THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 LOS ANGELES 
 
 GIFT OF 
 
 Clark J. liilliron 

 
 OF 
 
 ^t-UKKAKYQ^ ^l-UBKAKYQ^ ^\\t UNlVfcRty 
 
 \\\EUNIYER
 
 CONFLICT wi 
 
 with 
 
 A HISTORY OF THE WAR 
 
 BASED UPON OFFICIAL REPORTS AND DESCRIPTIONS 
 OF EYE-WITNESSES. 
 
 ILLUSTRATED WITH ORIGINAL DRAWINGS FROM 
 
 PHOTOGRAPHS AND SKETCHES MADE 
 
 ON THE SCENE OF ACTION. 
 
 By HENRY F. KEENAN 
 
 (Dunois) 
 
 Author of "Trajan," "The Aliens," "The Iron Game, 
 Etc., Etc. 
 
 P. W. ZIEGLER & CO. 
 
 PHILADELPHIA AND CHICAGO.
 
 Copyright J898. 
 By Henry F. Keenan.
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 IN the ensuing pages the reader will find the record of one of the most 
 astonishing transformations in the history of peoples. The plain tale 
 as set forth rivals the enchantments of feudal conquest, when the world 
 made war a part of its daily life. For though in point of time, the con- 
 flict with Spain embraced but the duration of three months, the prodigies 
 performed by our fleets rival a century's activities in other times. In an 
 hour almost, one of our fleets conquered an Oriental empire dating back 
 coevally with the settlement of our own states; at our very doors, in the 
 sea which has witnessed colossal struggles of most of the powers -of 
 Christendom, our navy in three hours ended the domination of the once- 
 world power. And if our armies did not equal in these achievements, the 
 marvels of the fleets, they performed wherever called upon, all that a 
 heroic soldiery was ever asked to do. The tale as it unrolls itself from 
 the far-off shores of the Philippines and the coral reefs of the Caribbean, 
 takes on the texture of the most absorbingly thrilling romance, for it in- 
 volves the dauntless heroism of the knight pledged to deeds of emprise 
 and armies consecrated to peril in every form known in war. It reveals 
 a galaxy of heroes added to the long list whose names shine in the golden 
 legend of our creation and maintenance as a state. From this tale, the 
 citizen of the republic will rise with a new confidence in our system, a 
 new hope in our destiny. For from the opening guns at Manila to the 
 last volley at Santiago, there was not a man under the flag who did not. 
 and does not deserve well, of his country. As much as possible I have 
 striven to let the heroes who wrought so grandly tell the story of their 
 achievements in their own words. From the captivating confidences of 
 the Hero Hobson to the caustic comment of General Miles, the reader 
 will find side by side with the author's deductions and appreciations, the 
 testimony of every actor in the grandiose drama which constitutes the 
 miraculous conquest of three months. 
 
 There is no equal period that has a tale of such results to tell ; no epic 
 or imagining of what fleets and armies have done that exceeds the in- 
 trepidity of our fleets and soldiery. Nor can any other war, from the 
 excursions of the crusaders, to the campaign in Cuba, equal the unvary- 
 ing chivalry of the great men who wrought in the republic's honor. For 
 what was never before known in war, both the chiefs of the soldiery cap- 
 
 00
 
 vi 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 tured by our fleets and armies, returned to their homes, testifying in pub- 
 lic documents to the chivalrous magnanimity of their treatment, by the 
 men who had conquered them. It is a stirring tale which tells itself and 
 has little need of the artifices of rhetoric for it recounts valor in every 
 conceivable stress, the qualities in short, which make up a race worth)* of 
 its destiny. It is peculiarly mete that freemen battling for the republic, 
 should be the heroes of the scene, for while no commanding figures were 
 discerned for public acclamation, the private soldier, the men behind the 
 guns became the country's admiration, the world's wonder. Instead of 
 one Napoleon, or a score of renowned marshals, every man that held a 
 bayonet illustrated the valor of knighthood, the quality of the freemen 
 in armor. An army raised in a day, achieved the work, hardly hoped for 
 from the veterans of a score of campaigns. Wonder books and fiction 
 cannot exceed in the marvelous, the plain unvarnished tale of a conflict, 
 ended almost as soon as begun so swiftl}' accomplished indeed, that the 
 spectators do not yet realize its momentous significance, its unparalleled 
 completeness.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 BOOK ONE. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PAKT I. RELATES how War Reveals Peoples to Themselves The Early "Victories of the 
 Republic Presents the Influence of the Civil War upon Youth Gives Types 
 of Americanism and our Race Name Shows War as a Passion Tells of the 
 Veterans of the Civil War Congress and the Press The President's Opposition 
 to War The Destruction of the Maine Describes the De Lome Incident The 
 Diplomatic Correspondence De Lome's Successor The " Jingoes "- 
 "Yellow " Journalism States that Dispassionate Deliberation was Impossible 
 That the Majority of the People were Opposed to War Takes up Cuban 
 Sentiment Commercial Interests Cuban Bonds Filibustering.. 17 
 
 PAST II. TREATS of the Purpose of the War The British Press British Estimate of 
 the Yankees Rumors of European Intervention The Proffer of British Alli- 
 anceEuropean Sympathy for Spain European Distrust of the United States- 
 Attitude of the British Liberals Enmity of the "Saturday Review "What 
 British Alliance Really Meant The Conversion of Depew Arguments of the 
 Tempters Carlyle's Estimate of his Countrymen An Outspoken British 
 Statesman and Editor 36 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 PAET I. SHOWS how Spain received the Ultimatum of the United States The 
 Monarchy in no condition to Wage War The Spectre of ''Carlism " Deca- 
 dence of the Monarchy Spain's Great Captains Her Audacious Enterprises 
 Her Activities Dependent- on Foreigners British Alliance Spain's Fleets- 
 Tells how Europe sees the United States through British Eyes Pictures 
 Spain Seeking Help .". 49 
 
 PART II. CONTAINS AN ACCOUNT of Spain under Charles V Her Wars Subsidies 
 from Britain Early British Intrigue Spain's Naval System Her Conscript 
 System Shows how she Treats her Sailors Gives her Naval Nomenclature . . .60 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 WHEREIN our Former Relations with Spain are Recounted Other Topics 
 Treated are : The Conquistadores Comparison of Forces Spain's Naval 
 Strength Warships of the Republic An Auxiliary Navy The Hornets of 
 VII
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 the Sea Encounter of the " St. Paul " and the " Terror" Early Navies of 
 the Republic Naval Warfare in 1812 Britain Mistress of the Seas Naval 
 Duels Comparison of Armaments Juggling Tonnage Figures The Man 
 Behind the Gun Naval Heroes of the Civil War Life on a Modern Battle- 
 shipThe Agonizing Expectancy The Fierce Joy of Battle Heroism of the 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 IN WHICH the Influence of the "Yellow" Press is Depicted Also Relates 
 the President's call for Troops and the Marvelous Response Likewise the 
 Capture of Prizes The Making of Soldiers from Recruits The Lessons of the 
 Civil War Treats of Politics in War How the West Point Graduates were 
 Ignored The Man With a " Pull "Moving the Legions The Devotion and 
 Constancy of the Soldiers" The Rough Riders "Presents Roosevelt, an In- 
 teresting Figure. .............................................................................. 85 
 
 BOOK TWO. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PAKT I. INTRODUCES Commodore George Dewey and the Asiatic Squadron Dewey 
 Fitting Out His Ships Dewey Waiting for Orders Gives the Fateful Message 
 Dewey's Comment and Vessels Comprising his Fleet Describes the City 
 of Manila Cavite Arsenal Corregidor Dewey's Captains The Spanish 
 Strength States what Battle Reveals Dewey's Precautions fchows Admiral 
 Montojo opening the Combat The "Olympia " Replying Dewey's Tactics 
 The Coolness of the Commanders The Duel Between the Flagships What an 
 "Eight-Incher" Did and the Spanish Admiral's Story of the Battle Tells 
 How Gridley's Guns were Worked How the Spauish Admiral Transferred 
 His Flag How the "Baltimore" Led the Second Attack Describes the 
 " Austria " Wrecked The Defiance of the " Ulloa "The Joy of the Crews 
 What the Men in the Turrets do The Audacious " Petrel "The Victors on 
 Errands of Mercy 99 
 
 PART II. DETAILS the Plight of the Queen Regent Spanish Self-RestraintShows 
 Spain Ready for Peace Carlist Plotters Life in Gay Madrid Tells of the 
 Sickness of the King Describes a Legacy of Hatred -The Spanish Court The 
 Spanish Cortes Shows Spain as only a Shadow of Former Greatness Tells of 
 Canovas del Castillo The Short-lived Democracy and Shows the Obverse of 
 the Picture 133 
 
 PART III CONTAINS a Description of the Philippines Their Area Population Dis- 
 covery and Conquest Diverse Tribes Amazing Fertility of the Soil The 
 Negritos The Malays The Peculiar Treatment of Criminals Relates how 
 Schooled by Priests they Become Assassins A Scientist's Story Introduces 
 the Jesuits Mohammedans Pirates Colonizing The Malay Proa Sulu 
 Homes Dress Amusements and Passions Food Products The " Queen of 
 Fruits." 147
 
 CONTENTS. IX 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 REFEES TO Our Vulnerable Sea-Coast The Ability of Our Fleets A Source 
 of Anxiety The Battleship Oregon Fears for the Noble Ship Creating an Aux- 
 iliary Navy The Puzzle of the " Cape Verde Fleet Solves the Mystery 
 Shows the Spanish Admiral Bottled Up Introduces a Strangely Daring Youth 
 Richmond P. Hobson Describes his Audacious Plan Details of the Scheme 
 The Collier Merrimac The Enterprise An Ensign's Heroism The Call for 
 Volunteers The Devoted Seven Watching the Expedition The Painful 
 Suspense The Flag of Truce The Heroes Safe As Prisoners of "War As 
 Exchanged Hero Worship Hobson's Modest Behaviour Relates his Praise 
 for the Jackies, and his Story of the Merrimao's Suicide 161 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 PART I AFTEE ALLUDING TO the Santiago " Nightmare," Describes the Destruction of 
 Cervera's Fleet The Warning Cry The Admiral's Ship The " Iowa " fight- 
 ing the "Teresa" Now the " Oquendo" The Apparition of the "Colon" 
 Titanic Fury of the Combat The Hadean Atmosphere The Dreaded De- 
 stroyersHow the "Gloucester" Marked its Prey The Stately " Vizcaya" 
 A Duel to the Death Spain's Proud Cruisers on the Rocks The Inhumanity 
 ot the Cubans The Soul-Stirring Devotion of the Yankee Crews The Prof- 
 fer of Captain Eulate's Sword Gives the Noble Sailor's Reply Recounts the 
 Difficulties of a Historian The Story of a Wide-Awake Young Lad Other 
 Details of the Fight 191 
 
 PART II UNFOLDS THE ROMANCE that Envelops Santiago Exploits the "Texas" 
 Givts Captain Philip's Epilogue Also Admiral Schley's Digest of the Battle 
 Also the Epic of the " Oregon "Contains Ensign Powell's Story Relates 
 the Intrepidity of the " Gloucester "Other Incidents of the Thrilling Drama 
 And what Captain Evans Regarded as his First Duty Besides Telling how 
 Turret Guns are Worked 209 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 PART I DESCRIBES the Difficulty of Accounting Rationally for the Effect and Causes of 
 Certain Battles Trials of the Santiago Expedition The Strength of the City 
 The First Landing Camp McCalla The Marine Corps The First Sanguinaiy 
 Encounter What a Correspondent Saw And Heard The Irksomeness of 
 Blockading What the "Winslow" Did A Withering Blast of Shells- 
 Ensign Bagley's Death Baiquiri Debarking an Army A Foodless Army 
 How the Rough Riders Set Out An Ambush in the Chapparal The Equa- 
 nimity of the Troops Coolness of the Leaders The Cry of Mutilation The 
 "Devil's. Claw "Poisonous Cacti Uncanny Things The Cuban Contingent 
 The Ingenious Yankee Soldier *. 243 
 
 PAST II AFFORDS A VIEW of Florida's Sand Wastes and Tawny Coasts The Troops 
 Eager for War Life on a Transport Leaving the Squalors of Tampa An Im- 
 posing Armada Fair Cuba at Last Describes the Delight of the Seaworn 
 Soldiers An Untried Undertaking Skirmishes The Natural Defenses of 
 Santiago The Invading Column Blockhouses and Wire Barricades Squad 
 Fights The Work of the Regulars Quotes Active Observers of the Operations 
 Mentions the Diversity of Comment Tells of General Linares in a Trap
 
 x CONTENTS. 
 
 The Filth Day The Cry of Hunger Our Thin Line A Whimsical Purpose 
 General Shafter's Objective St. James of Cuba Environed in Beauty. 269. 
 
 PABT III. DETAILS the Advance of General Young's Troops from Baiquiri Their 
 Progress The Implacable Eesistance of Earth and Wood The Exuberance of 
 the " Rough Riders "The Story of Sevilla Compares the Arms of the Oppos- 
 ing Forces States the Objective Point of the Army Carries the Reader to El 
 Caney Relates the Onset of the " Regulars "Tells the Story of Capron's 
 Merciless Guns-Of Haskell's Dash Into the Pitiless Hail Describes 
 Phenomena of the Battlefield The Anxiety to be on the Line of Fire 291 
 
 PART IV ILLUSTRATES Engineering Difficulties Before Santiago Shows a Panorama 
 of the City Itself Describes El Morro Other Defences of Santiago Some 
 Railroads Spanish Neglect of Sanitation Introduces Absorbing Episodes- 
 Personal Recollections of the Thirty-six Hours Fighting The Singing of 
 Bullets The Wire Barricades The Planting of the Colors The Silencing of 
 Batteries The Fury of the Fighting Excerpts from Reports of Commanders 
 Comment Describes the "Regulars'' Tells the Deserter's Story Defines 
 Bravery Likewise Cowardice 302 
 
 PABT V. TOUCHES UPON the Humorous Side of Grave Ordeals Relates the Story of 
 El Pozo Fittingly Eulogizes a Brilliant Staff Officer Tells how a Block- 
 house was Taken Paints the "Tramp" Aspect of the Troops Describes a 
 Cactus Jungle Touches Up the Cubanos Enlarges Upon the Loathly Land 
 Crab Gives British Impressions at El Caney 335 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 PART L EXPLOITS the "Red Cross" Society Its Work Miss Clara Barton Gives 
 the Origin of the Society Its Founder Its Emblem The "Seneca" and 
 " Concha " Horrors Presents Criticisms on the Medical Bureau The Evasive 
 Letter of the Secretary of War A Scathing Reply The Soldier's Story 
 Tells of Peculations, Large and Small Of Selling Supplies Of the Camp at 
 Tampa 353 
 
 PABT II. INTRODUCES the Red Cross Steamer " State of Texas " and its Samaritan 
 Crew and describes the Advancement of Medical Science What the Soldier was 
 Told-Field Hospitals Stretcher Squads First Dressings New Methods.. .573 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 PART I. SETS FORTH the Royalist Tendencies of Cuba's Capital City Slavery in 
 Cuba, How Born In War it Lived in Conquest The Impress of One Man Upon 
 Havana Tacon Havanese Architecture The Student Confused Population 
 of Cuba Distinctions of Birth Cuba Librists Cuba, the Fairest of Tropic 
 Climes Early Government Climate Influence Races Defines the Cubano 
 The Autonomist Group Shafter's Cuban Allies The Dream of the Hierarchy 
 Shows Havana Under the Blockade 379 
 
 PABT II. CONTAINS DISQUISITIONS on the Political Repose of Cuba An Anarchic 
 Interlude Cespedes The Virginius Affair Cuba for Sale The Rebellion of 
 1895 Cause of the Revolts-Agricultural Decay Spain's Unwisdom- 
 Campos Weyler's Regime Gomez's Methods The Inutile " Trochas" The 
 " Reconcentrado " System What a "Yellow" Journal Did Presents the 
 " Maine " Calamity as Fortuitous The Cuban Vendetta Maceo His Instinct 
 for Leadership His Fate The Cuban as an Ally 393
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 BOOK THREE. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PART I. DEPICTS DEWEY, the Man for the Hour Gives his Novitiate under Farragut 
 Career During the Civil War Subsequent Career Promotions Reluctant 
 Acceptance of the Asiatic Billet Personality Forecastle Criticism The Jack 
 Tar's Story Presents Dewey's Incomparable Equipoise as both Warrior and 
 Statesman Relates the Story of the White Flag at Cavite Augusti's Ridiculous 
 Proclamation Rivera's Treaty with Aguinaldo Sets Forth the Bumptious 
 Meddlings of the German Admiral And How Dewey Resented his Insolence 
 Also the Disingenuousness of the British Admiral 411 
 
 PAST II. SHOWS the Subtle Ease with which the War for " Humanity" Became a 
 War for Conquest Details the Vociferous Demands for "Expansion" And 
 Gives an Insight into the Character of Aguinaldo, the Bragadocio Insurgent 
 Leader It Portrays the Ineradicable Savagery of the Man His Ambitious 
 Pretensions His Grotesque Pranks And Presents a Faithful Picture of his 
 Tatterdemalion Followers It Recounts the Gathering and Despatching of 
 Troops to Reinforce the Fleet at Manila The Jocose Pillaging of the Treasury 
 in Fitting Out the Expedition The Rain-Driven Ingenuity of the Soldiers in 
 Front of Manila The Attack on aud Surrender of Manila 435 
 
 PART III. CONTAINS an Account of the Capture of the Ladrones, Beside which Fiction 
 is Pale and Nerveless The Author also Philosophizes on this Incident in the 
 Manila Escapade Describes the Discovery of the Group- -States Why the 
 Epithet ' ' Thieves " was Applied to the Islands And Supplies other Informa- 
 tion of Value Regarding them and the Islanders 460 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 ILLUSTRATES the Island of Porto Rico as a Land of Philosophic Repose- 
 States How an Almost Orphic Voice Demanded its Conquest Compares the 
 Island to Naboth's Vineyard Proclaimes the "Jingoes' " Greed Recites the 
 Adventures of a Young Officer whose Devoir was to Spy out the Land The 
 Refrains of the Press The Bouffe Conquest The Comments of a Porto 
 Rican 469 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 EXPLAINS the Responsibilities of the Administration after Santiago Gives 
 the President's Tranquilizing Proclamation Mentions the Fantastic Cam- 
 paign of Threats Shows how Spain Swallowed her Pride Invoked the Aid of 
 France Obtained the President's Ear Signed the Memorable Protocol The 
 Chapter Contains also the Full Text of the Fateful Paper, and Disquisitions on 
 Various Allied Matters 479 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 EULOGIZES the Admirable Group whose Prescience Perplexed and Discom- 
 fited the Enemy Unfoldp the Scope of the "War Board "The Comprehen- 
 sive Range of its Functions Quotes a High Authority on Awards and Promo- 
 tionsDefines "Prize Money" aud " Bounty Money "States the Methods
 
 XH CONTENTS. 
 
 of their Distribution Approximate Amounts Due Various Commanders and 
 Ships. 487 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 PART I. MAKKS the Volume Encyclopaedic, Containing as it does the Official Reports 
 of American and Spanish Naval Commanders It Embraces Admiral Dewey's 
 Story of Manila Admiral Montojo's Report to the Spanish Minister of Marine 
 The Report of tho Diario de Man ila Admiral Sampson's Report Com- 
 modore Schley's Report Captain Evan's Report Captain Cook's Report 
 Captain Philip's Report Captain Clark's Report Captain Taylor's Report 
 Captain Chad wick's Report Lieut. -Commander Wainwright's Report Lieut.- 
 Commander Sharp's Report Captain Cotton's Report Lieut. Usher's Report 
 Admiral Cervera's Statement Also Reports and Minutes of Conversations 
 between the Commanding Officers of the Naval and Lane: Forces before 
 Santiago 502 
 
 PABT II. CONTINUES the Official History of the War by Giving the Reports made to 
 the War Department by various Military Commanders ;t Contains General 
 Shatter's Report General Wheeler's Report General Kent's Report In- 
 spector-General Breckenridge's Report It also Contains General Lh,a;es' Re- 
 port to the Spanish Minister of War Various Statements and Documents Per- 
 taining to the Santiago Campaign from General Miles, Secretary Alger, Gen- 
 eral Shatter, and General Toral Address of the Spaniards to the American 
 Army General Merritt's Report General Anderson's Report 547 
 
 PART III. SUPPLEMENTS the Official Reports by Controversial Documents, such as 
 a Letter from Secretary Long to Admiral Sicard A General Officer's State- 
 ment Secretary Alger's Letter to Hon. Chauncey M. Depew General 
 Wheeler's Statement General Sternberg's Statement. ...582
 
 List of Illustrations. 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 Aguinaldo, The Insurgent Leader 446 
 
 Alger, Secretary, in his Office 38 
 
 Almirante Oquendo, Bow of 64 
 
 Almirante Oquendo, Wreck of 206 
 
 American School, Flag-day at an 23 
 
 Army Wagon Tail-piece 46 
 
 Atachio, General 445 
 
 August!, Captain-General 419 
 
 Aunon, Minister of Marine 435 
 
 Bagley, Eusign Worth 169 
 
 Baiquiri, TbeLandingat 259 
 
 Barton, Miss Clara 364 
 
 Bates, Major-General John C 236 
 
 Battleship Oregon 162 
 
 Blanco, Captain-General Eamon 388 
 
 Blockading Fleet leaving Key West 68 
 
 Blockading Fleet off Havana 77 
 
 Blockhouse, Lime-kiln converted into.. 279 
 
 Blue, Lieutenant Victor.. 169 
 
 Blue Monday Tail-piece 459 
 
 Breckenridge, Major-General Joseph C. 381 
 Bringing up Ammunition Tail-piece.. 581 
 
 Brooke, Major-General John R 482 
 
 Bugle Call Tailpiece 12 
 
 Butler, Major-General Matt. C 482 
 
 Buttons will Come Off 501 
 
 Cabinet, Sagasta announcing a new 49 
 
 Cadiz, Coast Defense Gun at 59 
 
 Cambon, M.Jules 484 
 
 Camp Alger, Company Drill at 87 
 
 Camp, A Convalescent 372 
 
 Campos, General Martinez 400 
 
 Castellar, Senor 145 
 
 Cavite Arsenal, Capture of 103 
 
 Cavite, Spanish Earthworks at 426 
 
 Cavite, A Street in 151 
 
 Cervera, Admiral Pascual y Topete 220 
 
 Cervera'a Fleet leaving Curacoa. 160 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 Cervera's Fleet, Destruction of 195 
 
 Cbadwick, Captain F. E 229 
 
 Chaffee, Major-General A. R 253 
 
 Clark, Captain Charles E 214 
 
 Color Guard, The 467 
 
 Commissary Tent, Regimental 288 
 
 Concas, Captain D. Victor M 218 
 
 Cook, Captain F. A 229 
 
 Corbin, Brig.-General Henry C 381 
 
 Cord uroy Road, Building a 225 
 
 Cristobal Colon, Wreck of. 197 
 
 Cuba, Off for 16 
 
 Cuban Patriot, A 399 
 
 Cutting Cables near Cienfuegoa 491 
 
 De Lome, Dupuy 31 
 
 Dewey, Rear- Admiral George 410 
 
 Don Carlos 51 
 
 Duffield, Brig.-General H. M 498 
 
 Dynamite Gun, Inspecting a 96 
 
 El Caney, Bringing up Artillery at 298 
 
 ElCaney, The Capture of 300 
 
 Embarking Troops at Tampa. 84 
 
 Eulate, Captain D. Antonio 217 
 
 Evans, Captain Robley D 214 
 
 Expedition, Loading Supplies for 273 
 
 Field Gun Loaded on Mule .". 267 
 
 Flag of Truce, The First from Santiago 346 
 
 Flagler, Brig.-General Daniel W 381 
 
 Garcia, General Calixto 406 
 
 Gomez, General Maximo 401 
 
 Grant, Brig.-General F. D 458 
 
 Greeley, Brig.-General A. V 415 
 
 Greene, Major-General F. V 458 
 
 Gridley, Captain Charles V 98 
 
 Gnantanamo, With the Marines at 247 
 
 Gun on the Texas, Loading a 83 
 
 Gun Squad at Practice 392 
 
 Gnus, Working the Olympiad 8-inch. .. 118
 
 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 Hawkins, Major-General H. S 253 
 
 Higginsou, Captain F J 2> 9 
 
 Hobson and his Crew 174 
 
 Hobson, Lieut. Richmond P 169 
 
 Hobson's Reception afier his Exchange 178 
 
 Hospital Ship, On a 378 
 
 Infantry, 25th U. S , Packing up 270 
 
 Keifer, Majo -General J. Warren 482 
 
 Kent, Major-General H. T 498 
 
 King, Brig.-General Charles 453 
 
 King of Spain, The, and Queen Regent 48 
 
 Ladrones, A Native of the 464 
 
 Ladrones, Native Hut in the 466 
 
 Lamberton, Commander B. F 422 
 
 La Quasina, Rough Riders at the Bat- 
 tle of 264 
 
 Lawton, Major-General H. W 236 
 
 Lazaga, Captain D. Juan B 217 
 
 Lee, Major-General Fitzhugh 290 
 
 Letter from Home, The 306 
 
 Lieber, Brig.-General Guido N 415 
 
 Linares, General... 291 
 
 Long, Secretary, in his Office 38 
 
 Ludlow, Maj. -General Wm 253 
 
 Maceo, General Antonio 404 
 
 Manila, Battle of The American Fleet 129 
 Manila, Battle of The Spanish Fleet.. 128 
 
 Manila Bay 420 
 
 Manila, General View of 102 
 
 Manila, Hermitage St. Nicholas 153 
 
 Manila, Insurgents Decoying Spaniards 429 
 
 Manila, Native Village near 149 
 
 Manila, Port of 146 
 
 Manila, Spanish Artillery Head- 
 quarters 104 
 
 Manila, Spanish Vessels Blockaded at 112 
 
 Maine, Survivors of the 30 
 
 Maria Teresa, Wreck of 198 
 
 Matanzas, The Puritan at 86 
 
 Matanzas, View of 80 
 
 McCalla, Commander B H 98 
 
 McKinley, President, and Cabinet 27 
 
 McKinley, William 21 
 
 Merriam, Major-General H. C 482 
 
 Merritt, Major-General Wesley 439 
 
 Military Barracks, Annapolis 234 
 
 Military Mast, In theOlympia's 132 
 
 Miles, Major-General Nelson A 475 
 
 Mining Village near Santiago 322 
 
 PAOK. 
 
 Monday Troubles Tail-piece 15 
 
 Mo ro Castle, Havana 383 
 
 Montojo, Admiral Patrick) y Parason... 116 
 Montojo, Admiral, leaving his Flag- 
 ship 119 
 
 Moreu, Captain D. Emilio D 218 
 
 New York, Volunteering in 85 
 
 Off Duty 434 
 
 Off for Manila Tail-piece 158 
 
 Packing Mules for the March 276 
 
 Philip, Captain, Giving Thanks 233 
 
 Philip, Commodore John W 214 
 
 Pillsbury, Lieut. -Commander John E. 98 
 
 Porto Rico, A Native of 477 
 
 Powell, Ensign Joseph W 169 
 
 Prizes, Spanish, in Key West Harbor.. 89 
 
 Railroad Bridge at Aguadores 311 
 
 Rapid-fire Gun on Shipboard 82 
 
 Rapid-fire Gun, Working a Five-inch... 109 
 Rapid-fire Gun, Working a Six-pounder 202 
 
 Red Cross in the Field, The 366 
 
 Regimental Post-Office Tail-piece 546 
 
 Roosevelt, Colonel Theodore 253 
 
 San Juan Hill, Assault of Frontispiece 
 
 San Juan, Charge of the Regulars 327 
 
 San Juan, Porto Rico, View of 468 
 
 Sampson, Rear- Admiral William T 188 
 
 Santiago, Bombardment of 249 
 
 Santiago, Boat Club House 322 
 
 Santiago, A Corner in Morro Castle 
 
 Tailpiece 241 
 
 Santiago, Fleet Positionsat 204 
 
 Santiago, Loading a Tiansport for 244 
 
 Santiago, Lying in Wait before 166 
 
 Santiago, Map of 307 
 
 Santiago, Morro Castle 179 
 
 Santiago, Officers Killed at 318 
 
 Santiago, Palace of the Governor-Gen- 
 eral 357 
 
 Santiago, View of 242 
 
 Santiago, Yellow Fever Hospital Near.. 311 
 
 Schofield, Lieut. -General John M 397 
 
 Schley, Rear-Admiral Wiufield Scott... 188 
 
 Sevilla, Block-house at 293 
 
 Shatter, Major-General William R 271 
 
 Shafter, Sampson and Garcia, Confer- 
 ence between 277 
 
 Shells used in the United States Navy 211 
 Sicard, Rear- Admiral Montgomery 397
 
 LIST OP ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 Signaling the Fleet 216 
 
 Sigsbee, Captain Charles D 397 
 
 Spanish Officers, Captured, on the 
 
 Nashville. 91 
 
 Spanish Reserve Fleet, The 57 
 
 Soldiers, Spanish, iu Arnbush 251 
 
 Stanton, Brig -General Thaddeus H.... 415 
 
 Sternberg, Bng. -General George M 381 
 
 Strategy Board, The 165 
 
 Staff our Navy is Made of, The 188 
 
 Sunday in Camp Tail-piece 6 
 
 Tampa, Infantry Receiving Visitors at.. 263 
 
 Tampa, Preparing to Leave 273 
 
 Taylor, Captain Henry C 114 
 
 Terror, St. Paul Disabling the 72 
 
 Toral, General Jose y Velasquez 332 
 
 Toral, General, Surrender of 353 
 
 Torpedo Boat in a Gale 66 
 
 Torpedo, Launching a. 257 
 
 PAOB. 
 
 Torpedo, Loading a 256 
 
 Uniforms, Light and Heavy 92 
 
 Vesuvius, The, Throwing Projectiles... 208 
 
 Virginius, Execution of the Crew 396 
 
 Vizcaya, Wreekof 205 
 
 Wade, Major-General J. F 498 
 
 Wain wright, Commander Richard 229 
 
 Walker, Commander Asa 98 
 
 Watson, Comm,)dore John C 397 
 
 Weyler, General Valeriano 403 
 
 Wheeler, Major-GeneralJoseph 290 
 
 Whitney, Lieut. Henry W 472 
 
 Wilson, Brig. -General John M 416 
 
 Wilson, Major-General James H 498 
 
 Wood, Brig. -General Leonard 236 
 
 Woodford, General Stewart L 24 
 
 Working the Big Turret Guns 80 
 
 Worth, Brig.-General W. S 458 
 
 Young, Major-General 8. B. M 236
 
 THE CONFLICT WITH SPAIN. 
 
 BOOK ONE. 
 I. 
 
 IT is noted in the history of all peoples, that war serves as a flash light 
 to reveal them to themselves and incidentally to their neighbors. 
 Until the civil war, we were in the dark as to our capabilities for organ- 
 izing armies, fleets, and the conduct of campaigns. Indeed our joco>e 
 habit of bragging, had long impressed the world with the conviction that 
 we were an incurably ungovernable race, unamenable to the severe 
 discipline rigorously essential in war. 
 
 Our earlier conflicts had shown that we had constancy, endurance, 
 and when adequately commanded, most of the qualities that go to make 
 trustworthy soldiers. Even in our infancy we had routed the veterans 
 of European fields ; had captured army corps under the most illustrious 
 British captains, had, after years of cruel vicissitudes, finally worn out 
 the British resources. But signal as our victory, in conquering inde- 
 pendence, it was held alike by the worsted enemy and the European 
 critics, that Britain's needs in Europe, more than the valor of the pa- 
 triots, was accountable for the successful issue of the War of Inde- 
 pendence. 
 
 In the struggle of 1812, Britain was still further hampered by the 
 prodigious efforts of Napoleon, who though rapidly sinking under coa- 
 lized Europe, made it necessary for the British to keep fleets and armies 
 in Europe, which, free to cross the water, would have made the war 
 life or death to us. But wherever a Yankee fleet, or man-of-war, en- 
 gaged an enemy, there remained no doubt of the status of our seaman. 
 Under the southern cross, in the purple reaches of the Mediterranean, 
 in the fogs of the German sea, or off the bleak coasts of New Eng- 
 land, our mariners left a glowing track of victory, or of valor, that 
 compelled the admiration of the world. Vessel for vessel, our fleets 
 were never successfully resisted, with equal numbers, yard arm to yard 
 arm, no enemy ever escaped capture or sinking. 
 
 While Europe suffered the ignominious pillage of its merchant fleets 
 
 (I'O
 
 18 TALES OF WAR. 
 
 by the fierce buccaneers of the Barbary coasts, our sailors boldly en- 
 tered the pirate harbors, burned the corsair treasure places, cut out 
 vessels and extorted treaties of peace, on the decks of our victorious 
 war craft. 
 
 The civil war, however, proved that in action, the people of this re- 
 public arose far above the energies, resources and audacities of Rome, 
 when she made war a religion, or France, when her legislature decreed 
 victories and won them. Since, as Gibbon acridly annotates, mankind 
 gives more glory to its destroyers than to its benefactors, the tale of 
 war is always the most absorbing, save possibly to the philosopher or 
 the poet. The self revelation of war, is comparable, to that premoni- 
 tory moment, in which it is said, that on the point of death, a man sees 
 his whole career in an instantaneous glimpse. Until the civil war the 
 lad at school or college, was taught eloquence in patriotism from the 
 texts of foreign speakers ; all his ideas of valor were drawn from the 
 spectacular glories of Napoleon, or the classics. The speeches of Burke, 
 Mirabeau, O'Connell ; the polished and rythmic prose of Motley or Ban- 
 croft, were the main resources for schools and academies. 
 
 But the civil war gave a new cast to even collegiate thinking and 
 admiration. The masterly simplicity of Lincoln, his addresses to all 
 manner and conditions of men, became models for the young. The thrill- 
 ing episodes of the armies that marched and fought from July, 1861, un- 
 til April, 1865, replaced the conquests of Italy, Egypt Europe. The 
 boy began by learning that this republic had been born in war; had 
 worsted its hereditary enemy, the British, twice ; had conquered Mex- 
 ico; had fought from '61 to '65 a war, compared to which all other wars, 
 up to that time were mere emutes ; had intimidated banded Europe, 
 from the plot to divide us and forced the British to observe the word, if 
 not the act of neutrality ; that we had curtly commanded the strongest 
 military power of that day to withdraw from an usurped sovereignty in 
 Mexico ; that in four years, an unmilitary, if not an unwarlike people, 
 had perfected a warlike machine which could have resisted combined 
 Europe. 
 
 It was the inculcation of these things in the minds of the present 
 generation that impelled Congress to disregard the prescribed course of 
 negotiation and imperiously command war ! A complex and confusing 
 vocabulary of new terms arose in the newspapers. The vain-glorious 
 who spoke lightly of wars as the end and aim of national greatness, were 
 spoken of as " types of Americanism." Careless arid ignorant news- 
 papers differentiated public men by this grotesque misnomer, but it be-
 
 A RACE NAME. 19 
 
 came firmly established as a synonym for " citizen " of the republic, more 
 fervent in his patriotism, than his neighbor ! 
 
 To be stigmatized as " un-American " became the haunting terror of 
 public life ; to be termed a "genuine American " was as mysteriously po- 
 tent as the insignia of the cross in the age of the crusades. Yet the 
 Canadian, the Mexican, the Brazilian, the Cuban, the Haytian, the Ar- 
 gentines and Peruvians, are genuine Americans ! Unlike the Dutch, 
 when the United States of Holland played its great part in the world, 
 we have no race name to designate our disparate social compact. " Yan- 
 kee " is the nearest we have to a national designation covering all ; yet 
 until the war of the rebellion, to call a southerner a Yankee, would 
 have been as deep an offence, as to confuse a high caste Hindoo with a 
 Pariah ! Now General Lee, kin of^the greatest of the Confederate com- 
 manders, glories in the name ! Perhaps no secondary incident in the rec- 
 onciliation of the North and South, is more significant of the effect of the 
 war than the complacent acceptance of a term once used in reviling, as a 
 glory and grace ! Phenomena like these must be noted to enable us to 
 comprehend the spirit in which our men took up the cross of war and 
 won the crown of conquest. 
 
 For it is a fact of curious import that no great war ever broke out 
 from causes that involved the real interests of a people, in modern times 
 at least, save our own struggle for independence and the French revolu 
 tioii. Even our own revolutionary war did not originate in what would 
 be counted a great cause. The begin ning__wasj3nji question, of taxa- 
 tion it was only after the passions of the two peoples had become 
 embittered that the struggle involved the vital issue of independence. 
 But the reader will search history in vain for a war that was worth the 
 fighting, all things considered ; that is a war deliberately declared and 
 systematically prepared. Wars have been justly fought, when a people 
 had been attacked wantonly, for revenge or conquest or dynastic ambi- 
 tions. For nothing is ever permanently settled by war that could not 
 have been secured by peaceful means! 
 
 By this is meant, aggressive war. When a nation is attacked, of course 
 resistance is the first requisite of patriotism. But peoples like individuals, 
 are rarely attacked, if they mind their own business, save when their 
 territories excite the covetousness of neighbors, or prosperity stands in 
 the way of the imperialistic tendencies of rivals. From 1789 until 1815, 
 the conquering flight of France, indoctrinating the world with the gospel 
 of democracy, was regarded as ample cause for the British to wage war. 
 And until this day, so deceptive is the animus of history, the world accepts
 
 20 WAR A PASSION. 
 
 the twenty years carnage, inspired by British greed, as a struggle between 
 freedom and tyranny. It was a struggle between these conditions, but 
 the tyranny was embodied, by the British and their allies, and freedom by 
 the spirit of the French Revolution. 
 
 War, however, is a passion like another. All our subsidiary activities, 
 since the close of the rebellion, have tended to indoctrinate us insidiously 
 with the passion for warlike things. During the term that has elapsed 
 since Lee delivered his sword to Grant, the presidency has been occu- 
 pied successively by men who achieved renown in the army! There 
 has been but one civilian chief magistrate of the republic since John- 
 son. That is inaugurated for no one now contests the validity of 
 Tilden's election in 1876. In the Senate and House, the leaders of both 
 armies have constantly held place. In the executive offices of the states 
 and all places of high trust, the military have held the preference ! Even 
 in the supreme court, men with military antecedents are conspicuous ! 
 
 On the ceremonial days when the veterans of the civil war appear, 
 they are acclaimed as impulsively as when in the days of their youth 
 they marched to the field. " Flag Day " has long been a function in 
 our public schools. Officers from our great military institute are de- 
 tailed at youth's academies all over the union to teach the manual and 
 the discipline of war! In every conceivable way, war is glorified, until a 
 majority of the youth of the land, count all other uses for life tame and 
 distasteful. 
 
 The militia of the several states, are made up of the finest flower of 
 the young manhood of the land. Co-existent with this imposing caval- 
 cade, is the never-ceasing clamor of the military for increased battalions ; 
 augmented armaments, a larger navy, fleets that shall equal those of na- 
 tions, whose existence depends upon colossal armadas. 
 
 Old as the world is, and many as the wars have been, there is no tale so 
 captivating to a people as the story of war. If there ever were a people 
 secure from the adventures of armies, we were until within the year, 
 emphatically believed to be that people. Our enemies said we were too 
 engrossed in the sordid to take time to prepare for strife, our admirers 
 pointed ua out as too happy, too well safeguarded from the snares and 
 menaces of neighbors, too confirmed in the philosophic detestation of 
 butchery to dream of war, save in defence of the national soil. Up, 
 therefore till the very hour, that the amazed Spanish ministry rejected our 
 imperious order to quit Cuba, within three days, war was as little foreseen 
 by the vast majority of the people of the republic, as the blizzard that 
 comes down in an instant upon the Western plains.
 
 WTT.T.TAM MCKINI.EY. 
 
 Commander -in-chief of the Army and Navy of the United Stataa.
 
 DEMAND FOR WAR. 23 
 
 There had been angry talk of war, with Britain, with Spain, with 
 Chili, in fitful gusts, for years. But the impulse was only momentary. 
 The country paused, berated the power or policy offending us, then 
 plunged into the ways of peace. So recurrent had these almost humorous 
 outbursts become, that our foreign critics cynically took up the tale to 
 point the moral of a hopelessly practical people, so bent on money making 
 that they couldn't carry a great impulse to its legitimate conclusion. 
 Other nations, saying the same things in the press and parliament, about 
 their neighbors, were ready for hostilities before uttering them. But the 
 
 FLAG DAY AT AN AMERICAN SCHOOL. 
 
 Yankee, it was agreed, whose immortal soul is immersed in "booms" 
 and deals and trusts, pays no heed to his parliament, except when it is 
 considering tariffs or the excise. 
 
 From long habit in warlike speech, most of us, had, while not assenting 
 to the acerbities of this criticism, come to regard Congress as a safety valve, 
 rather than a deciding force in peace or war. Nine out of ten, if asked 
 the question, any time before the 21st of April, would have declared that 
 war could not be brought nbout, except by the will of the people,
 
 24 
 
 THREE DAYS OF GRACE. 
 
 vaguely supposing that in some occult way, a mandate could be obtained 
 from the millions, who make Congress and executives. 
 
 Hence when Congress gave Spain three days to withdraw from Cuba, 
 there were very few of the citizens of this republic who realized that we 
 had thrown down the gauntlet; that war inevitably followed the deci 
 sive action of our lawmakers. The words were but too well understood 
 in Spain. To escape the humiliation of the ultimatum from the despised 
 nation of " merchants, " the Spanish cabinet resorted to a not unjusti- 
 fiable subterfuge ; the despatch from our Secretary of State to Minister 
 Woodford, informing him of the determination of Congress, was taken 
 
 GENERAL STEWART L. WOODFORD. 
 
 from the wire and conveyed to the Sagasta ministry before its deliv- 
 ery to the Legation. In the precedents of international dealing, Spain 
 had but one thing to do. Our minister was handed his passports. 
 This was a virtual declaration of war, for when the tension between 
 powers becomes so strained that a cabinet refuses to hold intercourse 
 with an envoy, he is given his passports to leave the country. 
 
 This was early on the morning of the 21st of April. Before night- 
 fall Spain had cause to realize that war was begun. From the Carib- 
 bean sea came reports of the enterprise of our cruisers. Swiftly, by
 
 ULTIMATUM TO SPAIN. 25 
 
 every despatch thereafter the tale of capture was retold. Then arose a 
 furious outcry. It was charged in the Spanish press, and reechoed in 
 London, that with true Yankee greed, we had anticipated the pre- 
 scribed forms of war and for the mere " money in it " had begun the 
 spoliation of innocent merchant vessels, sailing the seas unconscious of 
 the state of war. 
 
 On the 25th of April, in order to formalize the situation, Congress 
 put on record the declaration that the United States were at war with 
 the monarchy of the Spains. But even then, when the daily despatches 
 brought the country captivating narratives of the prowess of our auda- 
 cious mariners, the people did not wholly realize that the long-drawn 
 agony that had troubled the counsels of administrations for the last fifty 
 years, was irrevocably submitted to the arbitrament that leaves no appeal. 
 
 When the President called for 125,000 troops, a premonitory thrill 
 of the spirit that moved the land in '61, for a moment broke the 
 chill. Then began to be seen the results of multitudes of influences 
 that had been almost imperceptibly at work during the last thirty 
 years. Then the youth, who had been nourished on the deeds of their 
 fathers in the war of the rebellion, uprose as their fathers rose in the 
 memorable days of revolt. Then a condition was shown that never had 
 a parallel in a civilized state. Had the President's call been for a mil- 
 lion men, the number would have been enrolled before the machinery 
 could be prepared. Though we are ranked among the cold-blooded 
 and unimpassionate races, the imagination of the multitude, at once caught 
 the import of the struggle. We were going to war for an idea ! The 
 profligate despotism that had for a century stifled the energies of an 
 earthly paradise, was to be brought to book for crimes against human 
 freedom. 
 
 War had been talked loosely in our semi-jocose way of treating 
 grave subjects, any time during the last thirty years. So far indeed, as 
 cautious observation connoted public sentiment, we were much nearer 
 war with France in 1865, when the legions of the republic were freed 
 from the conquests of the rebellion ; again when the British seemed to 
 demur against paying the damages incurred by their aid and assistance 
 to the southern insurgents. War for a moment seemed inevitable when 
 Cleveland brought the British tergiversations to a pause in the Vene- 
 zuelan scheme. 
 
 In all the wars we have ever undertaken overt acts have preceded 
 the formal declaration; that is, the people have taken the matter into 
 their own hands. If the South Carolinians had not fired on Sumpter.
 
 26 CONDITIONS IN CUBA. 
 
 there might have been years of controversy, ending in compromise, "but 
 the tragedies of .human passion cannot be resisted, when war is in the 
 air. Therefore it may be said that war with Spain came as a grievous 
 surprise to a vast majority of the people. 
 
 It was in Congress and the public press, that the enormities of Span- 
 ish despotism had been most passionately dwelt upon ; the vast majority 
 of the people had but a vague notion of what was going on in Cuba, or 
 what had been going on since we first cautiously intervened in the 
 diplomatic way that nations observe in dealing with questions likely to 
 bring on serious crises. The story of the misgovernment of the island, 
 Spain's first conquest on this continent, had been told and retold so 
 often, that only the political devotee, so to speak, kept track of the 
 dolorous tragedy, as it was unrolled from day to day in the press, and 
 from year to year in volumes of thrilling power. 
 
 Rarely, since 1875 had there been a year when the cry of the Cuban 
 " patriot " was not raised ; revolt, more or less serious had employed the 
 resources of Spain. Time and again the assistance of sympathizers in the 
 States seemed about to wrench the island from the domination of the 
 parent power. Filibustering expeditions left our shores, and for a time 
 gave the Spanish captains serious alarm. These incursions, sometimes 
 rising to the gravity of international disputes, kept the two cabinets of 
 Washington and Madrid incessantly active. 
 
 Whenever this government made remonstrance with Spain at the in- 
 tolerable condition of the Cuban people, Spain retorted that all the un- 
 rest was the work of " Yankee adventurers. " In 1875, we barely es 
 caped war over the capture and execution of a band of impulsive volun- 
 teers, who set out to rescue the battling revolutionists. But by timely 
 concessions to our demands, successive Spanish cabinets succeeded in 
 staving off decisive measures. 
 
 But, during the last ten years a group of daring men arose in the 
 island, who, admonished by the failures of their predecessors, directed 
 their efforts to a campaign of attrition. While depending almost exclu- 
 sively upon sympathizers in this republic for material, and even men, they 
 maintained an incessant activity about the exposed legions of the Span- 
 ish army, that in time wore out the courage of the soldiery and disheart- 
 ened the efforts of the captains sent to put down the rebellion. But their 
 greatest triumph was in forcing the accents of their wrongs and miseries 
 upon the attention of the whole world, as they had never been heard be- 
 fore. The journals of this country rang daily with protests and these 
 were heard in the old world. Even the atrocities of the Turk, which
 
 OPPOSED TO THE IDEA OF WAR. 29 
 
 moved the heart of Christendom, could not drown the cry of anguish 
 that finally reached the ears of mankind. In Congress the leaders of the 
 great parties took up the tale. The pulpits echoed it. A distinct senti- 
 ment for the rescue of Cuba from intolerable oppression became irre- 
 sistible. 
 
 President Cleveland, in the last years of his administration warned 
 the Spanish ministry that the patience of the people of the United States 
 had been dangerously tried ; that it behooved wise men to make such a 
 change in the conduct of affairs in the island, as would insure content- 
 ment to the majority. 
 
 When assassination had carried off the chief advocate of repression, 
 Canovas del Castillo, the liberal ministry that succeeded, gave the Wash- 
 ington cabinet assurances that the Cubans should have Home Rule, in 
 the form Britain administers the Dominion of Canada. Then followed 
 the Autonomist experiment, but it was too late. The battling minority 
 were unconquerably averse to Spanish domination and the insurrection 
 raged as fiercely as ever. 
 
 President McKiuley was from the first opposed to the idea of war. 
 He selected a statesman of high character, a jurist of distinction, to go to 
 Madrid as our minister and impressed upon him the necessity of enlight- 
 ening Spanish statesmen of the dangers they were exposing the 
 monarchy to, by keeping Cuba a perpetual ulcer on the Spanish national 
 body. But, though Minister Woodford extorted the admiration of even 
 the Spaniards themselves, he was unable to make the ministry see that 
 all that was left to the Metropolitan was to withdraw from the island and 
 leave the inhabitants to their destiny. 
 
 The heritage of woe left the islanders by Captain General Weyler, 
 was too much for diplomacy to reconcile with the methods of a civilized 
 state. The horrors of his system of crowding the rural population into 
 masses under the range of fhe soldiers' guns, brought about a ferment of 
 feeling that no influence in Congress, not even the executive, could re- 
 sist. * 
 
 While the country was shuddering in horror over the atrocities of the 
 ' reconcentrados," the nation was roused to anguish by the sinking of 
 one of our most powerful war vessels in the harbor of Havana, where she 
 was anchored on a mission of peace. Slight events sometimes undo 
 the strongest forces of human calculation. The destruction of the Maine 
 made negotiation extremely difficult for the Washington cabinet. The 
 country believed that the noble ship had been sunk by a Spanish hand ; 
 it was never alleged that the hand had been inspired by anybody in
 
 30 
 
 THE MAINE" TRAGEDY. 
 
 authority, but the atrocity came as a conclusive proof, of all the ma- 
 lignant cruelties so long charged upon the Spanish administration. 
 
 Though it did not fire the heart of the republic, as the attack upon 
 the Massachusetts regiment marching at Lincoln's call, in 1861, it 
 made anything like procrastination on the part of the negotiators im- 
 possible. When the secret is found out, it will probably be seen that 
 
 SURVIVORS OP THE MAINE DISASTER. 
 (Drawn from life, in the Brooklyn hospital.) 
 
 the hand that struck down the great b*attle ship was dealing the 
 hardest blow to Spain that had ever been struck, since the spirit of re- 
 volt arose on the island. For had it not been for this, the president 
 would have had a strong following in his purpose of extricating Cuba 
 from her woes, Without the direful expedient of war. 
 
 Added to this was another incident, which though trivial enough in 
 itself, swayed public sentiment far beyond its gravity. The Cuban 
 Junta, tireless in its efforts to bring peaceful negotiations to a fruitless 
 issue, managed to get hold of a letter from the Spanish Minister. Du- 
 puy DeLome, in which the President was spoken of in a rather dis- 
 paraging way and the project of autonomy, referred to skeptically.
 
 THE DE LOME INCIDENT. 
 
 81 
 
 The Spaniard wrote, as he supposed, in the inviolable confidence of in- 
 timate personal friendship, and unburdened his mind of opinions and in- 
 ferences that he was forced to keep to himself, in the hostile atmosphere 
 of Washington. Letters of the same character are passing all the time 
 from diplomats to their familiars, or even unofficially, to their hierarchical 
 chiefs. Any volume of personal memoirs of statesmen will show correspond- 
 ence of the same tenor. But of course the contents are not made known 
 until the incidents, or persons criticized, have passed out of the sphere of 
 actualities. Mischievous as the letter was, the President would have 
 ignored it, had it not been published to the world, simultaneously with 
 
 DDPUr DE LOME. 
 
 its reception by the Secretary of State. It accomplished its purpose, to 
 the extent its purveyors desired. It made the further presence of the 
 luckless diplomat impossible, and to that extent, lessened the chances of 
 a peaceful solution of the negotiations with Spain. De Lome's successor 
 was at pathetic disadvantage in assuming the momentous mission from 
 which so much was expected.
 
 32 THE CISNEROS INCIDENT. 
 
 But perhaps the most conclusive indication of the wholly false attitude 
 the country was made to seem to hold, was in an incident which sur- 
 passed in insolent disregard of national comities anything ever done by 
 one people to another since the A ustro-British allies murdered the French 
 envoys at Rastadt. A young woman named Cisneros, had been put in 
 an Havana prison for undue activity in aiding and abetting the schemes 
 of the Junta. Volumes of lachrymose twaddle were published in the 
 sensational journals, recounting her heroism, her sufferings at the hands 
 of the Spanish authorities. It was however, never intimated that she was 
 conspiring against the lawful authorities of Cuba: that she was taken 
 with every evidence of her handiwork in evidence. She was put in 
 prison, and as Havana was virtually under military law, she fared as other 
 culprits of the kind ever fare in war. One of the most adventurous of 
 the yellow journals conceived that the invasion of the prison and the 
 rescue of this person would make a sensation. The prisoner was spirited 
 out of the lax keeping of her gaolers and carried to New York in triumph. 
 There was no attempt made to conceal the operation in fact the desperado 
 who managed the law breaking, made a copious narrative of the exploit. 
 The "rescued" young woman was petted and exhibited in New York ; she 
 was paraded to Washington and made the protc'ge' of eminent dames. The 
 wife of the Vice President went so far as to give her a sort of adoption. 
 High personages in the administration felicitated her and her rescuer. 
 
 Now, had Spain been Great Britain, would anybody in this country 
 have ventured to do this criminal act, or having done it, would the au- 
 thorities of the United States admit even tacit sympathy? Suppose, 
 during the Civil War, the British had countenanced the enterprise of a 
 London journalist in entering the " Old Capitol " prison to rescue Belle 
 Boyd, or Miss Surratt, or Miss Greenough? The demand of this govern- 
 ment for the restoration of the prisoner and the punishment of the des- 
 perado would have followed the first trace of the crime and the criminal. 
 Yet, Spain never ventured to present a word of protest against this mon- 
 strous invasion of her sovereignty. So far had we departed from the 
 right view of proper conduct, that scarcely a word of protest was ever 
 raised in press or public. It was plain that a nation compelled to endure 
 such an affront as that, would suffer anything rather than go to war. 
 Perhaps the jingoes and demagogues who continued provocation after 
 this, did not apprehend war, certainly no legislative chambers ever heard 
 snch utterances about a neighboring state as were uttered in both 
 branches of Congress, during the two months preceding the command to 
 Spain to vacate her sovereignty in Cuba.
 
 NOT READY FOR WAR. 83 
 
 Two distinct currents were marked in the discussion of the course to 
 be pursued by the President. One was voiced by what was called the 
 " Jingoes," the other by moderate men who repelled the very suggestion 
 I of war as barbarous. But by far the most decisive factor in the denoue- 
 \ ment, was a new school of newspapers called fantastically " Yellow 
 Journalism." This extraordinary evolution of the press had arisen sud- 
 I denly ; had dazzled the country by exploits that puzzled the grave and 
 delighted the lax. By every conceivable art. they magnified the inci- 
 dents attending the rebellion on the island of Cuba, and from the pettiest 
 detail upreared a fabric of atrocity that threw certain elements of the 
 people into a delirium of wrath. The excesses of the Spanish soldiery 
 were exaggerated, the inhumanity of the chiefs surcharged with refine- 
 ments of cruelty that convinced the reader of the incurable ferocity of 
 the Spanish administration. The truth and the fact were lamentable 
 enough, but these systematic inventions, reacted on the law-makers. It 
 was impossible to deliberate with the dispassionate sincerity such an emer- 
 gency called for. From all parts of the country, constituents made 
 known to congressmen that war alone could avenge outraged humanity. 
 For months both chambers of Congress echoed the indictments of the 
 press. The foremost advocates in the House and Senate were men who 
 had achieved distinction in the combats of the Civil War. 
 
 Against such a torrent the President struggled resolutely. He knew 
 that we were not ready for war. He knew that though Spain had been 
 drained of her lifeblood by maladministration, and almost incessant war- 
 fare at home and abroad, she was not an enemy to be attacked with 
 levity. In this attitude the President was supported by the great major- 
 ity of his countrymen. He was upheld by his Cabinet fervently. Indeed 
 when Congress made further negotiation impossible, two of the members 
 of this body resigned, feeling it to be impossible to give apparent assent 
 to the new departure. John Sherman, the veteran of the Republican 
 party, under plea of ill-health quit the great place of Secretary of State, 
 and the Postmaster General, Gary, retired to private life. Now every 
 one who gave thought to the Cuban cause, sincerely desired the enfran- 
 chisement of the island ; but not one in a thousand would have consented 
 to the extreme step of war, if the end could be brought about in any 
 other way. Nor were the men who advocated war in the House, or the 
 Senate, the leaders that the people trusted implicitly in counsel. The 
 veterans of our politics were almost unanimously opposed to war. In- 
 deed the advocacy of a universal system of arbitration, to which all that 
 is most sober in public life had given adhesion, made the very suggestion
 
 84 FIRING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. 
 
 of war seem an untimely derision. Nowhere from an authoritative 
 source came a voice for war. On the other hand, the clamor swelled and 
 was apparently unheard or misunderstood by the conservative. So in- 
 credible did such an issue seem, that the oldest journal in the metropolis, 
 stated gravely the very day before Congress acted, that such a thing as 
 war was impossible, in this advanced stage of public morals. 
 /"""An unimpeachable witness among others the editor and owner of 
 a powerful journal in Chicago, submitted proof that agents of the 
 Cuban Junta had offered him $1,000,000 in bonds to "Fire the American 
 people over Cuba's wrongs." Nor was there any doubt that the Cuban 
 outcry was almost purely mercenary, where it was not a delusion. If the 
 fomenters could but gain a five minutes' recognition of the so-called 
 Cuban republic, these millions of bonds, distributed where they would do 
 the most good, would be equal to so much money. That was the purpose 
 of the propaganda. How many of the public men who took up the cry 
 and carried on the crusade, were influenced by these bonds, will probably 
 never be known. But of two conclusions the one must be adopted. 
 Either the advocates of aggressive interference in Cuba were venal, and 
 disseminating what they knew to be lies, or they were ignorant and there- 
 fore had no authority to speak. The war had not gone on a month be- 
 fore this was made clear. There was no Cuban republic; there were no 
 Cuban patriots; there were no thousands on the island clamoring, suffer- 
 ing, dying, for Free Cuba! There was no executive government; there 
 was no army. There was no considerable number of what would be 
 regarded as reputable citizens desirous of a change. 
 
 But the very agencies that should have safeguarded us against com- 
 mitting the error of going to war, were most of them enlisted in forcing 
 uslnto war. If a statesman in Congress undertook to demand proof of 
 the matters alleged, or pointed out discrepancies, he was jeered in the 
 jingo presses as " The Senator from Spain ! " Only the most resolute public 
 men ventured to hold out ;^these, it is humiliating to say were few. Most 
 of the public men, while privately confessing the action wrong, voted to 
 force Spain to fight, when the time came. Unhappily for the republic, 
 the administration was confronted, by no opposition worthy of even the 
 semblance of tactical deference. In the House the party of Jefferson had 
 relapsed into the keeping of immature nondescripts, who were too dull or 
 too indifferent to look up the party traditions. The mere word war de- 
 prived them of the semblance of rational speech. They clamored for 
 war, yet denounced the majority for preparing for it. They professed 
 undying sympathy for the "patriots" pf Cuba, but took no action to
 
 BOOMING FREE CUBA. 35 
 
 prove that there were patriots there. Rarely indeed has the popular 
 system the government of the people, by the people, made so igno- 
 minious a failure, as the Congress of 1897-8. Neither group wanted war; 
 the sane men in both knew that there was no occasion for war but the 
 Democrats believed that they could gain a party advantage by daring the 
 majority to go to war, and then deriding them on the hustings for not 
 daring. It was this double duplicity that finally frustrated the wise 
 measures of the executive and the men capable of thinking calmly. 
 
 It is to be remembered too, that most of the party platforms made 
 mention of Cuba in recent political contests. Both the great parties in 
 the last presidential campaign demanded peace and liberty for Cuba, but 
 jione of them went so far as to declare for war. The people of this country 
 have come to regard platforms with a good deal of indifference ; for 
 parties in power rarely find it expedient to carry out what seems desir- 
 able when in opposition. It is too near the event perhaps, to trace mi- 
 nutely the interpenetrating influences which so suddenly transferred the 
 field of action from diplomacy to the field of war. 
 
 While sympathy, based on every trait that adorns and ennobles human 
 nature, was the basis of the sentiment the country felt toward the unfortu- 
 nate Cubans, there were unquestionably other and ignoble motives at 
 work to bring on a conflict. Vast commercial interests were involved in 
 the expulsion of the Spanish and the substitution of "Free Cuba." 
 Juntas for the " booming " of the cause of the " patriots," were main- 
 tained in many of the great seaports. Bonds to an enormous amount 
 were issued, and so placed as, to influence moulders of public opinion. An 
 immense traffic in arms, stores and supplies, sprung up along our sea- 
 coasts. Filibustering became almost as profitable to merchants in New 
 York, Boston and the southern seaports, as blockade running to the mer- 
 chants of London and Liverpool during our Civil War. Though the 
 Spanish press, and even Spanish statesmen, made this traffic a constant 
 subject of reproach to our administration, there is every evidence that 
 our officials strove in good faith to suppress this evasion of the law of 
 neutrality. This very necessity was among the causes that inflamed the 
 advocates of war. The activity of the revenue cutters was denounced 
 as a base partnership in the crimes Spain was committing daily on the 
 Cubans. To every remonstrance of our diplomacy against the enormi- 
 ties practiced by the Spanish soldiery, the Spanish diplomats made re- 
 sponse that the war would not last a week if it were not supported by 
 Yankee adventurers.
 
 PART II. 
 
 BARELY had we embarked in war when its scope and potentialities 
 began to expand. We set out by declaring our purpose to redress 
 an intolerable grievance. To break the ghastly clutch of the dying hand of 
 Spain from the corpse of Cuba. Before the war was ten days old, the same 
 influences and agencies which precipitated the conflict, were engaged in a 
 propaganda of conquest. The preconcert of the cry, the level uniformity 
 of the argument, the shameless appeal to all that is sordid, thoughtless, 
 unscrupulous in humanity, left no room to doubt that some ulterior 
 agency was at work, educating the people of the republic in the way of 
 danger of dishonor. 
 
 Coincident with this cry of conquest, an amazing phenomenon was wit- 
 nessed in the British press. Where we had always been reviled and dis- 
 paraged, we were now fulsomely plastered with praise. We were invited 
 to share the grotesque designation of " Anglo-Saxon " a term evolved 
 from the empyrical formularies of British Chauvins, restive under the his- 
 toric traditions of the Norman Conquest. We were asked to believe that 
 our seventy millions were really of British fibre and brawn ; that British 
 blood comes pure and undefiled from a handful of piratic nomads, who 
 fled from the penury of the Baltic marches, to pillage themselves into 
 prosperity on the island of the Angles. The clashing cymbals of triumph 
 were sounded over a race alliance which should join our seventy millions 
 with the " interests " of Britain ; fusion with the Yankees was acclaimed 
 in the Tory presses. A notorious politician identified with recreancy 
 to liberalism, infidelity to his convictions, moral turpitude in the Trans- 
 vaal outrage, denounced in Parliament as only second to Judas in recre- 
 ancy, took the stump to convince the British people that all they had to 
 do, was to dissemble their ingrained hate of us long enough, and British 
 power, paralyzed by the union of France and Russia, would again cow 
 the world. The argument was virtually this: 
 
 The Yankees are of the same covetous, grasping breed we are ; all that 
 is necessary to win them into aids and accomplices, is to flatter their love 
 of glory, dazzle them from the heights of the mountain of predetermined 
 victory, by plausible promises of booty in lands, the loot of all that Spain 
 possesses perhaps a share in the despoliation of the colonies Fiance has 
 gathered under her flag, during the last half century. Manila, it was 
 artfully held out, would be a noble acquisition for the republic. The 
 
 (36)
 
 SECRETARY OF WAR, RUSSELL A. ALGEK, IN HIS OFFICE. 
 
 SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, JOHN D. LONG, IN HIS OFFICE.
 
 BRITISH ALLIANCE OFFERED. 39 
 
 teeming interests of the United States would find that realm of magnif- 
 icent opportunities an ideal field for Yankee activities. Britain would 
 louk on with benevolent acquiescence while we declared the Monroe doc- 
 trine a sham. Coincidently with this, the agents of the British govern- 
 ment sedulously propagated the rumor as semi-official fact, that the great 
 powers, the European concert, were conspiring to limit our operations 
 beyond the waters of the Caribbean sea! Simultaneously with the ad- 
 vance of our fleets, the cablegrams from London were daily filled with 
 guarded disclosures of the heroic efforts of British diplomacy to check the 
 union of the powers. Tales of the enmity of France, Germany, Austria, 
 Italy all the European powers in short, were poured into our news chan- 
 nels with such assiduity, that for a term the horrified people expected 
 that any hour might bring a declaration of European intervention : the 
 appearance of an allied squadron in our waters, and the enforcement of a 
 peace upon such terms as the European concert might see fit to dictate. 
 
 Strangely enough, the jingo press the very yellow journals, culpable 
 in precipitating the war, were the noisiest in propagating this insensate 
 intrigue. There was a moment when if put to a vote, the Cabinet would 
 have been compelled to accept the yoke of an alliance with the Briton. 
 In every city in the Union, the presses were ablaze with letters to the 
 editor, glorifying the noble role Britain had played in the world. That 
 segment of social activity, the clergy, were as history often shows, first to 
 put the seal of approval upon this plausible campaign of hypocrisy and 
 craft. They melted into rhapsodic eulogiums of the " Christian graces " 
 of British civilization, of the endearing ties of kinship that linked the 
 two peoples; of the lingering love in the heart of the people of this re- 
 public for the " mother-country." Meanwhile, the continental powers 
 and social forces, ignorant of the astute campaign directed from and by 
 British agencies, went on treating the war very much as we treat the 
 conflicts that involve our friends and enemies abroad. 
 
 Sentimentally, the aristocrats sympathized with a monarchy staggering 
 under the crushing blows of the colossal democracy ; even those who ap- 
 proved our intervention to rid Cuba of its curse, were by a readily com- 
 prehensible tendency of human nature, moved to sympathize with the 
 " under dog." But when the agencies of the continental powers in this 
 country, made known to their home governments the malevolent craft, 
 the systematic perfidy of the British propagandists in distorting the ut- 
 terances and belying the attitude of the powers, it was too late. The 
 belief had been infiltrated into the mind of the people of the republic 
 that in our first venture in a war undertaken from high motives, the con-
 
 40 THE SHAMELESS ARTIFICE. 
 
 tinental nations distrusted our aims, and were only withheld from inter- 
 ference by the sturdy veto of Britain. It was useless for the ministers of 
 France, Russia and Austria to show documents in proof of an inviolate 
 neutrality ; of an attitude of absolute impartiality. The British cables 
 were at hand daily to represent the heroic magnanimity of Albion who 
 stood guardian over the snarling powers. Had it not been for the chiv- 
 alrous good sense of the British Liberals, within a month of the opening 
 of the war, we should have found our future mortgaged by a bond as in- 
 iquitous as it would be futile, with the nation that never kept a pledge, 
 and never succored an ally, the" moment her interests made treason prof- 
 itable. 
 
 The party of Gladstone denounced the shameless artifice; they 
 warned the republic that the Tory pleadings were simply to enable the 
 discredited diplomacy of the Tory Cabinet, to take up the battle against 
 a Europe coalized against Britain instead of, as heretofore, coalized with 
 her. A long series of affronts were to be avenged : Russia had elimi- 
 nated British influence in the East; Turkey hud escaped the thraldom of 
 the Crimean war; France is in threatening propinquity in Africa, and 
 resolute for enforcing the fulfilment of the compact for Egypt's libera- 
 tion. With the forces of the republic to do the fighting, as the conti- 
 nent did, in the campaigns against Napoleon ; as the French did in the 
 Crimea, Britain might hope to withstand combined Europe with her 
 fleets, and wear out the resources of the less affluent states. When the 
 time for peace came, she would turn on her " kinsmen " as she has turned on 
 every nation that ever entered into alliance with her, and despoil them of 
 every acquisition held out as a bribe. It was not, however, the transpar- 
 ency of the British machination that checked the impulse to become its 
 victim. It was the extraordinary readiness of our press and public men 
 to fall into the pitfall. With some there can be no manner of doubt the 
 conversion was venal. We have become so habituated to the charge of 
 " British gold," that the term is now derisive. But that British gold made 
 the path easy, and the way shining for the monstrous proposal of union 
 with our hereditary haters and contemners, no one acquainted with Brit- 
 ish methods doubts. 
 
 While a vigilant, satanic, unceasing corps was employed in watching 
 the ill-natured utterances of the continental press, the gist of whatever 
 was acrimonious was carefully collated and telegraphed to London, and 
 there made into paragraphs of studious malignity for our home consump- 
 tion ; the savage denunciation, the brutal innuendoes of the high caste 
 British periodicals were rigorously ignored or explained away.
 
 THE SATURDAY REVIEW. 41 
 
 If there is a journal in the British isles that faithfully voices the in- 
 alienable rancor, the inborn hatefulness of the whole British race, it is 
 the Saturday Review. A half century ago, Matthew Arnold took up 
 arms to educate that journal in the graces of suavity, or sweetness and 
 light : to turn its tone into the " sweet reasonableness " of the master, in 
 order that mankind might be brought to think less harshly of the British. 
 But he never succeeded. The Saturday Review has never treated the 
 people of this republic other than as a vast congeries of ignorant, dis- 
 honest, ungovernable and ungoverned social buccaneers. It was our in- 
 veterate and calumniating enemy during the Civil War. It never admit- 
 ted that we exhibited bravery, however constant, in the long war, or a 
 single virtue of a great people during the five years of ordeal, when 
 our institutions were tried as by fire. It vituperated Lincoln, from the 
 day he assumed his burden, until the day he laid it down. It befouled 
 our eminent men ; it pilloried our processes as venal, malodorous, anarchic. 
 It lashed the Gladstone government to shreds for assenting to the Ala- 
 bama award, and has never ceased to stigmatize the treaty as blackmail. 
 In the scale of peoples, it has consistently treated us as a mingling of 
 Mexican and Figiians. When the declaration of Congress, expelling 
 Spain from Cuba reached London, this journal denounced us as thieves 
 and bullies. The war was a speculation of the most abhorrent forces of 
 the most abhorrent people in Christendom. Now this is the real senti- 
 ment of seven in ten of the authoritative Britons. Any citizen of this 
 republic who has sojourned in a British city, knows that a hate of hates, 
 a scorn of scorns, animates the Briton in his estimate of the people of 
 this republic. It was but a few years ago that the great shops in Lon- 
 don made known that " American trade " was not desired in their estab- 
 lishments by "American," meaning the citizens of the United States of 
 America. 
 
 But a more eloquent testimony of the inexpugnable rancor borne for 
 us, is shown by the methods adopted by the journals and journalists en- 
 gaged in the plot to captivate our alliance. Such a compact would mean 
 a new career of arrogant, unbridled British domination for no sooner 
 were we compromised by the bonds of British intrigue, than we should be 
 compelled to transform our democratic civic system into an armed readi- 
 ness to meet the enemies Britain would on the instant raise for us. We 
 should be dragged into long and exhaustive wars in Britain's interest, in 
 Asia, even in Africa where the British thirst to exterminate the only free 
 people left the Boers of the Transvaal. 
 
 But more machiavelian than this, we should by joining in this nefari-
 
 12 AS THE BRITISH ARE. 
 
 ous union with a nation whose diplomacy is a synonym for fraud and 
 perfidy, give bonds against a future union with Canada. That immense 
 empire bounding us on the north, and to some extent shackling our ex 
 paiision, must in the very nature of things unite its fortunes with this re- 
 public. Indeed, the jingoes who exulted in the Venezuelan complication, 
 demanded with a perfervid insistence, a campaign for the annexation of 
 the Dominion. The press of the country, if polled a year ago, would 
 have proclaimed by an almost unanimous voice, the vital need of absorb- 
 ing the last relic of British dominion on the continent, if not in the 
 waters of the continent. The leprous union proposed by the British 
 would have ended that tendency. As yet, we have not been indoctri- 
 nated in the practice of despoiling allies, as Britain did Holland, Denmark 
 and Spain. Hence, Canada would be safe under the adage of honor 
 among thieves. For once identified with the British, we should be as the 
 British are, and there is not a literature in Christendom, or paganism 
 either, where the British do not figure as thieves. If the republic could 
 be lured into a treaty of "imperialism," seduced into seizing the Philip- 
 pines and thus forced to seek British countenance, the future would be 
 easy for the traditional British policy. We should be compelled to seek 
 British counsel and British aid. We should be vulnerable to the attacks 
 of coalized Europe. Above all, we should forever explode the logic of 
 the Monroe doctrine. All of South America would be open to the enter- 
 prise of the powers, surfeited but not slaked by the pillage of Africa. 
 
 The aim was set forth with characteristic cynicism to Channcey Depew. 
 This effusive personage deprecated the war for the Cubans, holding it our 
 duty to gain our ends by diplomacy. But in his annual tour to Europe 
 he was taken in hand by the Tory propaganda and to the stupefaction of 
 his admirers came back after a six-weeks' junket in British castles, a con- 
 vert to war, to imperialism and to the British alliance. He explained 
 without reserve the cajoleries employed. "You Yankees," said the 
 tempters, " have grown too big for your slice of the continent. You 
 must seize the Philippines; you can claim it as we always do when we 
 want desirable territory, on the plea of civilization. That's what we pre- 
 tend in Egypt, and the game always 'goes.'" It is easy to imagine the 
 leer of the descendants and acolytes of the Pitts, the Walpoles, the Cas- 
 tlereaghs and Palmerstons, as these phrases were Bounded in the ear of 
 the Yankee. Depew came home convinced, and set to work at once to 
 propagate the thirst for dominion, the fever o'f grab, the religion of 
 hypocrisy, that has carried the British on a tide of sordid glory and tar- 
 nished grandeur, from the days of Elizabeth to the days of Victoria.
 
 CARLYLE'S ESTIMATE. 43 
 
 Never did the fowler set the snare with such contemptuous disregard of 
 the victim's common sense. The presses which had reeked with disdain- 
 ful disparagement of everything we did or attempted to do ; the presses 
 which had glorified Jeff Davis and the slave holders, the presses which 
 had rated the people of the union as a mingling of the ticket-of-leave 
 man and the Irish bogtrotters, in a day, as it were, found that we were 
 bone of British bone, flesh of British flesh. That no wiser saying had 
 ever been uttered than the machiavelian gibe of the time-serving dys- 
 peptic Carlyle, that " King Shakspeare held the dwellers of the United 
 States in as profound allegiance as the cult of royalty itself." The same 
 Carlyle made his estimate of his countrymen as " Thirty millions, mostly 
 fools." Hence, the populace of this country were accorded the privilege 
 of being at one with the thirty millions, mostly fools. But the new 
 ecstasy went farther. The chief of the Tartuffe organs of British guile, 
 found that "Americans shared the hatred of the continent with the Brit' 
 ish." Now for sixty years the Briton has been loathed in continental 
 Europe. For almost the same length of time the British casuists, recog- 
 nizing this, have expended volumes in wonder over the fact. Various 
 reasons have been accepted or assigned sometimes even the true causes 
 have been complacently admitted. 
 
 Time and again, you might read in British monthlies that the Briton 
 was, and is, hated because he is hateful. The various states of Europe 
 hate the British because they have at various times made alliance with 
 British cabinets, and in every instance they have been cheated. Den- 
 mark hates the Briton, because in a time of peace a British navy entered 
 the harbor of Copenhagen and destroyed half her fleet, and carried away 
 the rest; Holland hates the British, because under the gi'ise of alliance, 
 the British flag was flung out over Dutch colonies, and still remains 
 there ; Portugal and Spain hate the British because as allies they robbed 
 and pillaged them ; Germany and Austria hate the British, because in 
 general wars, she made these states do the fighting, and when peace came 
 seized all the spoils. France loathes the British, because she subsidized 
 the world to check her liberalizing march ; because she sent hordes of as- 
 sassins to murder French patriots and French rulers; because she never 
 kept faith. Because she has made history a lie and turpitude a religion. 
 Because from 1789 to 1815 the flower and chivalry of France, that fell 
 into British hands were subjected to the atrocities we mean when we 
 speak of the prison ships in which our fathers rotted in our harbors; 
 the massacres of Wyoming and a thousand other martyrdoms, put upon 
 the patriots of the revolution ; because during the sweat and agony of
 
 44 WHY BRITAIN IS HATED. 
 
 the Civil War, British ships, British guns, British aid were poured out 
 like water to destroy the Union; that a rebel victory at Bull Run or 
 Fredericksburg, was hailed by the presses that now degrade us by their 
 sycophantic cajoleries, which were then most ebullient in pronouncing us 
 corrupt and imbecile. 
 
 One Briton, a public man, member of Parliament and editor of a widely 
 read weekly journal Henry Labouchere, has never minimized the crimes 
 of his country. He had opposed the greed for territory and the oppres- 
 sion of weaker powers, both in Parliament and in his journal. His speech 
 is the delight of the British plain people, for he sets his face against the 
 enormous expenditures the jingo policy costs the British tax payers. He 
 saw the object of " British sympathy " for the United States, and taking 
 the conversion of Depew as a text, he gave us warning. Depew went 
 abroad deprecating any aim in the war, other than the end Congress de- 
 clared. He returned converted to " imperial " jingoism. Labouchere gives 
 a glimpse of the seduction. Depew was beset by aristocratic wheedlers, 
 who know the weight of coronets and caste insignia, upon certain types 
 of the Democracy. "Keep the Philippines," they implored, "and share 
 China with us." They rallied him humorously on Yankee protestations 
 of fine sentiment, confiding to him, the working of the British system. 
 "That's the way we go about annexation, we protest Christian and civi- 
 lizing motives and promise to leave as soon as these begin, and then we 
 stay. Christianity and civilization demand it, you know, and we give 
 the beggars liberty, law, justice, and order, which they never had before. 
 It is in your blood, you have come to it honestly, you have aroused this 
 appetite of earth hunger, and you cannot stop." 
 
 Labouchere, who has been in public life longer than most of his con- 
 temporaries, adds some reflections that touch the British and their 
 methods, with a firm sure stroke : " I do not know who the statesmen 
 were that thus confided in Mr. Depew. Over the dinner table, with the 
 genial American, they laughed at the pleas for grab which they profess in 
 public to their countrymen. They glory in their predatory instincts. 
 They come honestly by these instincts, they boast because it is in their 
 blood, and they advise Americans to show their kinship to us by follow- 
 ing our example. There is, however, a fact which both they and Mr. 
 Depew would do well to remember : * thieves fall out.' * Share with us 
 China' sounds well, but if the booty were jointly secured, it is probable 
 that the confederates would proceed to fight for the lion's share of it. If 
 the Americans are wise, they will maintain the policy in regard to their 
 relations with foreign nations that has made them the most prosperous
 
 THIEVES FALL OUT. 45 
 
 nation on the globe. They would not annex any country, where they 
 would have to rule over subject races. They will claim a voice in any 
 alterations in the tenure of territory on the continent on which their lot 
 is placed, but they will steadily act elsewhere on those sound principles 
 of non-intervention that they have already so conclusively proved are the 
 road to fortune. They are entirely mistaken in supposing that the mass 
 of Englishmen are the cynical robbers that their statesmen have repre- 
 sented them to be to Mr. Depew. They have been temporarily led astray. 
 But there are already signs that they will soon return to the path of hon- 
 esty and of common sense." 
 
 Arguments so crudely base, so cynically rascally were addressed to the 
 groveling and sordid in us that it is clear we are rated of the intelligence of 
 the Pacific islanders, who exchange the sovereignty of the coral strands and 
 palm groves for casks of rum, glass beads, or opium. By some inexplicable 
 process, the correspondents of our chief journals stationed in Britain, be- 
 came ardent propagandists of the " deal." For it was frankly put upon 
 this basis. You need the markets of China, the Briton urged. If you 
 don't join hands with us, Russia, Germany and France will dismember 
 the ancient empire, and then where will your trade be? Nor in the vol- 
 umes on volumes of confraternal seduction poured out, was there any 
 argument more valid than this. Nor did the sense of the country seem 
 to detect the shallowness of this prattle. For why should China be any 
 less open to our markets with Russia and France, Germany and Austria 
 ruling the celestial territories, than when ruled by the Chinese them- 
 selves? 
 
 If we have wares that the millions of the Chinese empire need, they 
 will buy them from us, no matter what power or council of European 
 powers dominate Pekin. We sell our wares in Russia, in Germany, in 
 France why should we find it any more difficult to sell in markets 
 under the domination of these powers? Or, why should we need the 
 Philippines to insure the peaceful entry into Oriental ports? Our inter- 
 ests in Asia remain precisely where they always have been ; we have 
 reached a vast trade there, because the people must have what we pro- 
 duce. Could any power or combination of powers impede us even were 
 they disposed to ? But that the British should venture to insult our in- 
 telligence by this species of argument, discloses the ineradicable misun- 
 derstanding the Briton has always manifested in judging us. He be- 
 lieves that the majority of the people of this republic are knaves, in- 
 fluenced by the temptation that arms the cracksman and the freebooter, 
 and he addresses us arguments, that in old times would be resented as
 
 46 OUR FOREIGN MARKETS. 
 
 a cause for war. With honest wares to offer the world, it is a matter of 
 indifference to this republic what powers seize and hold other people's 
 territories. But the Briton urges : " We have discovered the immense 
 potentialities of the United States for reshaping international destinies, 
 and with the discovery has come the realization of the fact that only by 
 the aid of American influence can grave disasters to the prestige and 
 prosperity of the British empire be averted. Moreover, England is will- 
 ing to pay what she considers to be a fair price for the necessary coopera- 
 tion. That is the basis of the whole matter. Sentiment has nothing to 
 do with it, and the quicker it is dismissed from consideration in connec- 
 tion with the question of an Anglo-American understanding, the better 
 it will be for America." In other words, Britain will accord us what she 
 cannot possibly keep from us, if we will aid her to brow-beat the rest of 
 Europe : maintain her supremacy as arbiter of international destinies. 
 If we are the hard-headed, far sighted race, we get credit for being, the 
 impudent baseness of the proposition ought to be enough to forever end 
 anything but the most formal relations with a power cynical enough to 
 make the proffer, and insulting enough to believe us capable of consider- 
 ing it.
 
 THK KING OF SPAIN AND QCKKN KKGENT.
 
 II. 
 
 DNTIL the moment the action of Congress reached the Spanish people, 
 no one in the peninsula dreamed of the possibility of war with this 
 
 SAGASTA ANNOUNCING A NEW CABINET. 
 
 republic. The last to apprehend it, was the Queen Regent and the Cab 
 inet. Sagasta, a venerable statesman who had served all parties and was 
 
 (49,
 
 50 SPAIN'S DECADENCE. 
 
 known to deprecate extremes, had counselled concessions to the utter- 
 most demands of the Cubans as voiced by our minister. Day by day all 
 that had been denounced in Spanish administration on the isle, was 
 changing. Home rule, as applied to Canada by the British, had been 
 formulated above all, the odious Weyler had been promptly recalled on 
 the urgent suggestion of the Washington Cabinet. Our proffers to care 
 for and feed the wretched country people, crowded into the Spanish lines 
 called " reconcentrados " had been accepted. So far as the Spanish Cab- 
 inet knew, there were no further serious demands to be made. When 
 therefore the command of Congress reached Madrid, giving Spain three 
 days to quit the island of Cuba there was from one end of the peninsula 
 to the other but one cry, one resolution to die first. Nor was this con- 
 sidered a figure of speech, by the most patriotic of the people. Spain, 
 as all her children knew, was far from a condition to wage war, even with 
 a less formidable power than the republic. For years her treasury had 
 been drained by colonial wars, by the creation of a navy adequate to her 
 colonial needs, altogether out of proportion with her revenues : by revo- 
 lution at home, and insurrection abroad; by the maladministration of the 
 finances, by political jobbery, by the dynastic necessities of a semi-alien 
 sovereign to secure by bribery, what other rulers hold by loyalty and 
 patriotism. 
 
 Carlism the century curse of this kingdom, kept the Court and Cabi- 
 net in apprehension. At best the Spanish race have mistaken their tra- 
 dition for actualities, since the reign of Philip II. Under his hide bound 
 bigotry, the Spain of Charles V., the Spain of heroic achievements came 
 to an end. She had eminent men in her service for many a day after, 
 but the morale of the nation suffered an eclipse, as visible as it has here- 
 tofore been incomprehensible. Strangely enough the decadence began 
 from above ; a long series of semi-imbecile and wholly profligate kings 
 germinated the seeds of decadence, which spreading from court to camp, 
 from camp to cloister, gradually impregnated the race. Neither art nor 
 science in any of the varied fields that began to thrive exotically else- 
 where, remained in Spain. Decay was as manifest in the humbler arts of 
 industry as in the sublimer reaches of the plastic arts. Since the six- 
 teenth century, Spain has produced no great pictures, no statuary, no 
 eminent embodiment of any of the masterpieces that multiply among 
 perennially thriving peoples. In war, the Spanish armies sank to derision, 
 her fleets, never victorious save under exceptional circumstances, became 
 a nullity with the opening of the eighteenth century. 
 
 Yet, curiously enough this people mistaking its past achievements for
 
 SPAIN'S EARLY CONQUESTS. 
 
 51 
 
 present actualities, brought the career of the world master Napoleon to 
 an end. It was the stupefying surrender of a French corps d elite, 
 at Baylen, that aroused Europe to the fact that the master of victories 
 
 DON CARLOS. 
 
 was vulnerable, that he could be beaten in arms, if a whole people re* 
 solved it. It was the Spanish people who wore the French out, by the 
 endurance of four years of disaster on every field they fought. Three
 
 THE COXQUISTADORES. 
 
 hundred thousand of the soldiers who had conquered every army in 
 Europe, were decimated. The Spaniards won what is called in sublime 
 irony, "the war of independence," by very much the same tactics in 
 which the Cubans wasted the armies of Spain's greatest warriors during 
 the last ten years. Wherever they stood up in battle before the veterans 
 of Napoleon, they were routed like herded cattle, but in the deeps of the 
 forest, from the secret paths of mountain and defile, in the narrow 
 streets of the tortuous mountain towns, the deadly stroke of the guerilla 
 picked off the unconscious soldiery. Though nominally master of every 
 city aiid strong place in the peninsula, or the strategic points, the invad- 
 ing army was never secure, except in its camps. 
 
 Nor was the war of independence the only memory that stood as an 
 actuality in the mind of the Spaniard. Cortez, Pizarro, Alva, Ganzaga 
 the great captains, were in the minds of the million, living personages to- 
 day. Though he may be unable to read or write, the meanest peasant 
 from Andalusia to the Basques, knows the story of the great conquista- 
 dor Cortez, the ungovernable boy, who, fleeing from the trammels of the 
 law sought glory and gold in the Eldorado Columbus had just given to 
 Spain. How he had impressed his courage and ability on the viceroy of 
 Cuba, who was in need of a submissive lieutenant to blaze the way for 
 a secure conquest of the fabled Mexico. How with 500 men, Cortez 
 landed on the Mexican shores, astutely availed himself of the supersti- 
 tious awe of the people, who believed the strange white beings gods, 
 pushed on throught he swarming millions to the capital of the Montezu- 
 m;is ; dominated these wild and credulous children of the sun. How 
 when the truth dawned upon them that the whites were mere mortals, 
 and they arose in vengeance, Cortez with his 500 held them at bay and 
 though half his force was slaughtered in the "sad night" of destruction, 
 snatched victory and conquest from the very jaws of ruin. 
 
 Nor was this prodigious story the only one that the Spaniards counted 
 among the evidence of Spain's superiority. The annals of no people 
 ceem with more audacious enterprises, more constancy in every conceiv- 
 able danger and hardship. Scores of historical masterpieces in every 
 tongue are devoted to the stirring tale. The humblest Spaniard in com- 
 mon with the proudest, could not conceive the inheritors of such ances- 
 tors, such traditions, vulnerable to a race of yesterday, as it were. What 
 though there were seventy millions of people in the arrogant, parvenu 
 republic; could such a race pretend to give law to the inheritors of the 
 men who had conquered the masters of the old world and made the new? 
 Add to this, that reading as we know it, does not exist in the peninsula.
 
 BRITISH INTRIGUES. 63 
 
 That learning, education are prerogatives of the rich, the well born. 
 That newspapers are rare and costly. That the mind of the Spain of to- 
 day, is the mind of the Spain three centuries ago. 
 
 When a people are dependent for arms, for every article of commerce, 
 when their ships are built in foreign dock yards, their railways con- 
 structed, operated by foreign artisans and foreign capital, their mechanic 
 arts carried on by strangers, even their hostleries and pleasure houses 
 managed by foreign syndicates, their mineral wealth exploited by outside 
 companies, even their vineyards in the hands of aliens ; it is not hard to 
 prophesy the helplessness of such a people in the operations of war, now- 
 reduced to an exact science. 
 
 Since the day Spain accepted the alliance of the Briton, her decadence 
 has been steady, insidious, decisive. For the "war of independence" 
 carried on by British treasure and manipulated in British interests, was 
 but the transfer of the destinies of Spain from the constitutional liberal- 
 ism of Napoleon's well-meant usurpation, to the maleficient despotism of 
 Bourbonism, under the tutelage of British greed and duplicity. The 
 British alliance in Spain, as everywhere else that this unholy bond has 
 been formed, has brought rot, decay and extinction to all nationality. It 
 was a British alliance that wrought the destruction of Holland ; it was 
 British alliance that dragged France to the abysm of anarchy from 1815 
 to 1852. It was British alliance that blotted Prussia from the map of 
 Europe in 1805 and Austria from 1797 to 1815. It was by alliances with 
 her destined victims that the British succeeded in seizing a third of the 
 colonies of the globe. But of all the victims of British alliance, Spain is 
 the most warning example, for every step in the decadence of the people 
 is clearly traceable to British instrumentalities in specious forms. 
 
 To the student, there was the pathos of the inscrutable in the causes 
 and passion that thrust this republic to the front as the instrument of 
 Spain's last devastation. For even the most ardent friends of Spain felt 
 from the first, that the perishing people of the peninsula sixteen or 
 seventeen millions were no match for the seventy million robust antag- 
 onists, the war made us. There were exhaustive arguments and studies 
 in foreign periodicals demonstrating the inevitable outcome of the im- 
 pending conflict. The republic of course, must carry her point in the 
 end. But the earlier stages of the war would witness destructive over- 
 throws of the republic's fleets ; of her armies by disease in the swamps of 
 Cuba. For a year at least, it was circumstantially prefigured, the repub- 
 lic would have to learn war at the hands of her weaker foe ; on sea and 
 land she would be overwhelmed by the superior fleets and the better dis-
 
 64 SPAIN'S FLEETS ON PAPER. 
 
 ciplined soldiery of the Castilian elite. The array of the Spanish fleets 
 oil paper, overtopped all the republic could muster in majesty and 
 science. The trained ranks of a regular army, that had lived on war, 
 would rout the raw levies howsoever brave hastily called from the 
 pursuits of peace. Our great seaboard cities, it was mathematically 
 demonstrated, would be either leveled or ransomed within ten days of 
 the opening of hostilities! The points of vantage on our coast were 
 pointed out, where the invincible fleets of Spain, in the early days of the 
 conflict, would entrench bases for supply and even recruiting stations for 
 the army and navy. 
 
 For among the extraordinary delusions holding the fixity of an axiom 
 in the foreign mind, was the conviction that the population of this repub- 
 lic was not of the homogeneous texture that makes the multitude patriots, 
 that inspires men to quit home, wealtk getting all the ease and ends of 
 life, in short, to defend the flag, to illustrate it, if need be. The ablest 
 polemists, the most admired philosophers, made this mixture of races, this 
 disparity of citizenship, one of the fatal drawbacks to vigorous and sus- 
 tained effort on the part of this country. Indeed the universality of this 
 belief that the peoples of this republic who have not even a generic 
 name; who have no country in the sense that, the Frenchman, Italian 
 and Spaniard have their " patrie," the Germans, their " fatherland," could 
 not be brought to face the self-sacrifices of war, the immolation of soldier- 
 ing or sailoring, colored the judgments of our critics. The generality 
 of this belief and its serious utterance, are another testimony to the 
 superficiality of general knowledge. 
 
 The most cursory glance at the history of the republic, from the infant 
 efforts of the colonists, to the prodigious enterprises of the Civil War, 
 would have admonished theorists of this text, that no struggles in the 
 evolution of peoples, demonstrated more devotion to all the symbols of 
 citizenship, country, than the unanimity shown by the men who make up 
 this nation ; whether the volunteer be native born, alien, or the descend- 
 ant of an alien no state since the foundation of Rome, has ever evoked 
 the devotion of its citizens so impulsively as this. 
 
 Nor once since the formation of the republic, have we a record of a 
 treason among the trusted men of the republic. What race, nation, or 
 cause, since recorded events have been trustworthily reported, can show 
 a similar testimony? No one ever heard of state, military or adminis- 
 trative secrets, sold to foreign powers, from any official source in this 
 country. History could have refuted this argument of Europe, that we 
 were bound to pass through defeat to ultimate triumph, but our history
 
 YANKEE COUSINS. 55 
 
 does not seem to have interested the foreigner. Sor Is this surprising, for 
 we are separated from the continental peoples by the barrier of language 
 all that is known of us on the continent, is caught up from British 
 renderings. Now, though we use the same tongue as the British, we ara 
 as little known to the majority of the islanders, as we are to the Germans, 
 the French or the Russians. Such history as the continent reads con- 
 cerning the United States, is translated from British texts. Any one 
 familiar with the appreciations of this republic, and its manners, insti- 
 tutes, habits, tendencies, government and administration, as set forth 
 in British works, is not surprised at the grotesque misjudgments passed 
 upon us by continental jcritics. Until within a few years coincident in 
 fact with the President's message on British rapacity in Venezuela, Brit' 
 ish discourse on the republic and its people, was a mingling of derisive 
 misinformation, ironic tolerance or insufferable condescension. It is no 
 orime in the Briton to know little or nothing of the republic or its peo- 
 ple, but it is in keeping with his world-wide status in perfidy, that he re- 
 produces us to the rest of the world, without warning the reader that 
 his assertions are conjectures, his deductions half truths, his estimates 
 partial. 
 
 It is easy to comprehend why the British should estimate us in fantas- 
 tic disproportion. We are a new people ; our history is humdrum : there 
 Are none of the scenic situations in our development that a European 
 people presents. Our political intrigues involve no possibility of war. 
 What is, or is not done, in our Congress is a matter of indifference to 
 statesmen, guiding other peoples. The success or defeat of one or the 
 other party in our elections, bears no ulterior relation to other powers. 
 For an instant, our assertion of the Monroe doctrine aroused the super- 
 cilious interest of Europe. Journalists were despatched from over the 
 water to report just the sort of folk we seemed to be. Gushing evangels 
 of " kinship " were delegated from London to melt the sensibilities of 
 " the better classes " of the States, by the proclamation of the love the 
 British people felt for their " Yankee cousins." But, ap the yellow 
 journals of " the mother country ", as the Anglophiles are fond of styling 
 Britain, protested British love, the "nobility and gentry" made manifest 
 the contemptuous scorn in which we are now and always have been held 
 by the ruling caste. 
 
 It was largely by depending on British estimates of the people of the 
 United States, that the Spanish people and Spanish ministers played the
 
 56 SPAIN TEMPORIZES. 
 
 fatal game of temporization. They had learned from British diplomnts 
 and British presses that we were ineradicably corrupt; that our politicians 
 were braggart irvespousibles ; that the multitude were so intent on heap- 
 ing up millions, they would not stop for war, even if the Congress and 
 the President should have the courage to declare it. Down to the last 
 penny in our treasury, the last bolt in our war ships, the Spaniard got 
 his information from British presses, British publicists, and British 
 agents. It was an unquestioned acceptance of this voice, that led 
 them into the fools' paradise of confidence, which made the Spanish 
 masses turn in execration upon the British, so soon as the war was de- 
 clared. Then the Briton revealed himself; the presses scolded the Span- 
 iard for dreaming of war with such a treasury as the republic had at its 
 disposal. They pointed out the impossibility of meeting such an adver- 
 sary on equal terms. They reminded Spain that the Yankees were of 
 British kin, and that the race was always victorious at sea. The wretched 
 Spaniards began to catch a glimpse of the abyss they had dug for them 
 selves. 
 
 But there were other powers that had sometimes shown generosity. 
 France had gone to war for ideas; had fought to give Italy unity and 
 freedom ; had shed blood in rivers to free Poland, had never, in fact, re- 
 fused to aid the overmatched. Then too, the French were kin ; they were 
 of the same ancient stock that is to say, the two peoples could be traced 
 to a single source, called in the confusing jargon of the learned, 
 " Latins." France too, or her financiers, held millions on millions of 
 Spanish bonds; French skill, taste and enterprise were in exploitation of 
 nearly every branch of domestic handicraft in the peninsula. France 
 surely would the Spaniard believed fling the tri-color out beside the 
 livid oriflamme of Castile. But, while the ranks of pleasure, the bankers 
 and journalists, fell into fervid exclamations of sympathetic admiration for 
 the harassed cousins across the Pyrenees, the sober peasantry, the hard- 
 headed bourgeoise, the rank and file of the Democracy, turned away in 
 silence. It was hard to be unneighborly they said in dumb show but 
 France as a republic could not give more than platonic sympathy even 
 to a cousin. Then a Minister of the Queen arose in the Cortes with a 
 Jeremiah lament, that impressed the nations. Europe, he declared, had 
 lost its soul. There is no longer a sentiment of chivalry ; the adoration 
 of might has obliterated the very idea of the profit of right. Europe 
 wants cent per cent., for whatever she does. We must go with our 
 hands full and pay a big price if we expect help. 
 
 Just what Spain took in her hands when she appeared in Berlin this 
 generation will probably not know but Berlin seems to have found the 
 handful nearly enough for thereafter the master of Germany did every-
 
 SYMPATHY FOR SPAIN. 
 
 69 
 
 thing but send men and fleets to support the lavish hand. Not that the 
 Powers were not in sympathy with Spain ; when the time comes to disclose 
 the official documents it will be seen that every Cabinet in Europe, from 
 the Thames to the Neva, was of one mind, so far as partiality for Spain 
 went. But the spoil to be gathered afterward divided the harmonious 
 concert. By concessions in China the Russian bear and British lion 
 would have roared together behind the Spanish plume. By breaking the 
 compact with Russia and joining hands with Britain, France might have 
 shared the Philippine conquest with the preacher of "Anglo-Saxon'' 
 solidarity. But Spain could not prevail on France to break with Russia 
 for the doubtful boon of sharing British gains. France had experienced 
 the lack of equity in British alliances, and refused to join the plot. But 
 from the very blackness and deeps of defeat and affront, British diplo- 
 macy plucked the imposing semblance of a masterstroke. As if by magic, 
 the whole world awoke one morning and found this Republic enamored 
 of Great Britian. The tale is as humorous as Shakespeare's analogous 
 miracle Titania's infatuation for the ass I 
 
 COAST DEFENCE GUN AT CADIZ.
 
 PART II. 
 
 IN the grandiose pageantry of history, there is no host legendary or ideal 
 that stands out more impressively than the groups who wrought 
 Spain's earlier destinies, and impressed her supremacy on two worlds* 
 From the almost fabulous conquests of Ferdinand and Isabella, to the 
 subjugation of the two Americas, the Spaniard illustrated every trait as- 
 sociated with heroism. Under the sceptre of Charles V., more than half 
 of Europe paid tribute to the genius of Spain. Like Rome she estab- 
 lished her religion, her language, her laws, over unknown lands and peo- 
 ples a million fold more numerous than her own children. From his- 
 sombre cell in the Escurial, Philip II. sent mandates to his lieutenants 
 who ruled the then unknown continents of North and South America 
 even the Philippines now at the disposal of this republic. 
 
 The dynastic wars of the eighteenth century began the demolition 
 of this colonial world empire. The seating of a French Prince, the 
 grandson of the Bourbon King Louis the XIV., stimulated the jealous 
 rage of Britain, Austria and the Stadt-Halter of Holland, the crafty Prince 
 of Orange who by arts and conduct little in keeping with his professions, 
 gained possession of the British throne. The Continental Powers were 
 intent on crippling the European extension of French domination, while 
 the British were bent on appropriating the American possessions of the 
 decaying Spain. When the war ended, the French Prince was left undis- 
 turbed on the throne of the great Emperador Charles but all coveted 
 parts of the vast possessions of the crown had fallen into British hands. 
 
 When the Napoleonic wars began, Spanish power and Spanish admin- 
 istration were the scorn of Europe. The Bourbon monarchy, pendulating 
 between the caprice of women and the ineptitude of monks, ennobled the 
 worst Moslem regime by contrast. A Bourbon King invoked the army of 
 Napoleon to curb the plotting of the heir to the throne. In contempt of 
 law, policy, and even personal honor, Napoleon set the dynasty aside and 
 installed his brother in the palace of the Hapsburg Caesars. His methods 
 of doing this were of a piece with the substitution of the Houses of 
 Orange and Hanover, for the Stuarts in Britain but he neglected to 
 cover his designs with the panoply of religion and liberty, which the 
 Britain flings over similar predations. The Spanish, who loathed their 
 imbecile kings, were inflamed to expel the invader even though that in- 
 
 (60)
 
 SPAIN IN BONDAGE. 61 
 
 vader had begun the work of political, social and religious reconstruction 
 that would have made Spain a well-governed, enlightened and liberal 
 regime. But it was to the vital " interests " of Britain her oligarchy 
 and her traffic, that Spain should be kept in political and social bondage. 
 British subsidies were poured in Klondike streams into the treasuries of 
 the provincial juntas, which claimed to embody the patriotism of the 
 Spanish people. To the subsidies were added armies such as Britain 
 had never before organized, even for the crushing of our forefathers. By 
 attrition, by fomenting the passions of the people, by coalizing Europe, 
 Napoleon was diverted from completing the military conquest of the 
 peninsula, and finally when swirled into the campaign in Russia, the 
 British, with all Spain swarming in arms about Wellington's army, were 
 emboldened to face the depleted ranks of France, and drove them over the 
 border. 
 
 From that day to this, British intrigue has held Spain as firmly in the 
 grasp of British interest as Australia or Canada. During the campaign 
 from 1808 until 1813, the British laid claim to supporting and upholding 
 the Spanish people in their efforts for independence ; they formed the 
 wild enthusiasts that flocked to the Spanish standard in their own simil- 
 itude. They breathed the breath of national life into them. They denied 
 the armies, they organized every able-bodied man on the peninsula in- 
 cluding Portugal the first attribute of soldiery ; they protested that no 
 Spanish army, whatever its number or howsoever well equipped, could be 
 brought to stand a volley from the French, no matter how inferior in 
 numbers or lacking in supplies. British reports were laden with the 
 fanatic savagery of the Spaniards, gentle and simple. Yet Napier, the 
 standard historian of the Wellington campaign, puts on record that the 
 British soldiery whenever it was victorious in town or camp, outvied 
 savages in the excesses committed on women and property. 
 
 Every great power in Christendom maintains officers at the capitals of 
 other states, to keep track of the status of military and naval invention, 
 increase in fleets, armaments, and the whole field covering efficiency in 
 war. Now when war was declared, our administrative bodies were not 
 certain of the proportion of the fleets, nor the effectiveness of the arma- 
 ments that could be put to immediate use by Spain. 
 
 It was after 1868, when the Spanish naval system went to pieces from 
 the dry rot of maladministration, that the government took in hand the 
 re creation of a navy capable of safeguarding the monarchy both at home 
 and abroad. The dockyards of Spain and the mechanical ingenuity of 
 *be people were unequal to carrying out the decrees of the Cortes. The
 
 62 TORPEDO VESSELS. 
 
 building of the vessels was therefore turned over to the dockyards of 
 Britian, Italy and Germany. In the course of ten years, more than a 
 hundred fighting craft from armored cruisers and battle ships to tor- 
 pedo-boats, were turned over to the Spanish marine. They represented 
 at the epochs when completed, the very farthest advance in the perfection 
 of fighting machines. In the rating of navies, the maritime forces of 
 Spain have been given rank after Germany and Italy. The battle ships 
 and cruisers were accounted as effective as any similar vessels in the 
 British fleets, which are conceded precedence above all the powers both in 
 number and destructiveness. While the perfection of the Spanish ships 
 was universally admitted, there was, even before Dewey's and Schley's 
 demonstration, some doubt as to the efficiency of the officers and crews 
 to handle mechanism requiring qualities and aptitudes so unlike the pro- 
 verbial gifts of the Spaniard. 
 
 But while this was admitted, it was universally held that the possession 
 of a crushing preponderance of torpedo vessels would make it perilous 
 for the fleets of the republic to stand up before the enemy's war ships 
 even in equal numbers. It was pointed out by military writers, that the 
 efficiency of the naval army had been greatly impaired by the drastic 
 abolition of privileges, brought about after the revolution of 1868. Since 
 that time the nobility, the wealthy in the coast provinces have not con- 
 tributed their due proportion to the marine service. Hence, a large pro- 
 portion of the seamen and many of the officers, go on board the ships 
 from the interior, with no sea habitudes. Every Spaniard is bound to 
 serve with the colors after the age of nineteen, and it is made optional up 
 to a certain number whether the conscript shall join the land or sea forces. 
 Hence, while implicit confidence was generally expressed, by European 
 critics, in the intelligence, skill and patriotism of the naval hierarchy, there 
 was an admitted uncertainty as to the plain tar. 
 
 This doubt was more than justified in the combat which involved the 
 destruction of Cervera's fleet at Santiago. Our sailors found guns loaded 
 and ready to fire, and other evidences of slack discipline and half-hearted 
 endeavor. But Cervera and his staff supply the most explicit evidence. 
 They declare that the officers were compelled to humor the gun crews 
 with draughts of brandy, and stand over them with drawn cutlasses to 
 keep them working the batteries. There are other and more signifi- 
 cant circumstances to account for the astounding collapse of the Spanish 
 sailor while fighting his ship. 
 
 The official caste of a Spanish vessel preserves all the odious abuses that 
 have been abolished from the navies of other and freer countries. The tales
 
 THE SPANISH SAILOR. 08 
 
 of inhumanity related of the tar's life on the conquered fleets, revive the 
 excesses of old time British barbarism. Every ancient punishment identi- 
 fied with the brutalities of the navy, still holds a place in the discipline of 
 the Spanish fleets. From the moment the sailor sets his foot on the ves- 
 sel, often entrapped by the petty officers, he is made to feel that no 
 daring, no devotion to duty, can bring him into anything like equality 
 with the officer. He is regarded as of another class of the human ; he 
 is made to do the duty of a menial from the caring for his superior's 
 shoes, to washing his soiled linen. For the slightest infringement of the 
 capricious and onerous regulations of the ship, he may be strung up by 
 the thumbs, lashed on the naked back, or confined in an airless chamber, 
 and fed by a refinement of cruelty, on salt fish, until, mad with the 
 delirium of thirst, he is haled out to take his chances of recovery, 
 through burning fever. 
 
 So ill is the fame of the treatment of the common sailor, that of late 
 years the Spanish Admiralty have been compelled to wink at a very 
 general practice of what is called " shanghaeing," that is the systematic 
 search for stalwart youth, the leading them to places of depravity and 
 hustling them on board ship, while in drunken stupor. This would 
 hardly be considered a ^lomising novitiate for a sailor, but two-thirds 
 of the crews that manned the ships of Great Britain down to within a 
 half century, were obtained in this odious way ; with men thus impressed, 
 Nelson won the combats that Britain reckons her chief glory. Yet with 
 all this in mind, the critics of Europe professed the conviction that our 
 improvised sailors would prove no match for these Spanish serfs. Nor is 
 it unlikely that the knowledge of the status of the Spanish common 
 sailor, gave Dewey and Schley and our commanders everywhere, the con- 
 fidence that seemed recklessness. They knew that crews hating their 
 officers could not be made to fight, as the humanely treated sailors of 
 our navy fight. But to the Spaniard, the navy, in some occult sense 
 typifies his religion, his ancestry the enshrined heroic phalanxes 
 from the dim beginning of the race until its apogee under Charles II. 
 
 The naming of the ships attests at once the idealism and the credulity 
 of the Spanish mind. Of old, the names of the Armadas embraced the rubric 
 of the saints. A British Admiral attacking a Spanish fleet in the last cen- 
 tury felt as if he were invading heaven for the names of most of the saints 
 could be found on the Spanish hulls. The present fleets however, embalm 
 the secular worthies of the race, from that wondrous hero Pelayo, to Don 
 Antonio D'Ulloa whose namesake went down in the harbor of Manila. 
 Don Antonio was a scientist, who in moments of leisure, commanded his 
 4
 
 64 SPAIN'S ADMIRALS. 
 
 country's fleets and administered her colonies as viceroy. He was 
 
 BOW OF THE " ALMIRANTE OQUKNDO. 
 
 governor of Louisiana during Spain's occupancy of that colony, but his
 
 NAVAL NOMENCLATURE. 65 
 
 memory is cherished as the man who founded the observatory at Cadiz 
 and the conception of the only important engineering works of a remark- 
 able character on the peninsula. 
 
 The Spaniard acquainted with the history of his country, must have re- 
 flected on the irony of the naval nomenclature, when he read of the fate 
 of the Almirante Oquendo in the surf of Santiago. Oquendo is a name 
 that holds about the same place in Spanish naval glory, that Farragut 
 does in ours. Three generations of Oquendos distinguished themselves 
 in the Spanish naval service, between the middle of the sixteenth and the 
 middle of the seventeenth century. The Oquendo family belonged to 
 the province of Vizcaya, and the second vessel of the fleet, strangely 
 enough, bore the name, and went down with the Oquendo. The great 
 Admiral, the father, held a place in the "Invincible Armada " correspond- 
 ing to that of a commodore. He commanded the Guipuzcoa squadron. 
 His son Antonio was ten years old at that time; at the age of twenty-six, 
 in 1604, he commanded a squadron which destroyed a fleet of British cor- 
 sairs. Three years later, Almirante Oquendo wrought havoc among the 
 Dutch ships of war that were convoying the East India merchant fleet 
 past the Spanish coast. In 1631 he gained a great victory over the 
 Dutch Admiral, Adrian Hanspater, off the Argentine coast, and accord- 
 ing to Spanish authorities, a Dutch fleet which Oquendo successfully 
 withstood in the French Channel some years later, outnumbered the 
 Spanish, by five vessels to one. Antonio de Oquendo, as well as Miguel 
 his son, were and are regarded as the type of the Spaniard that gave 
 Spain the world. 
 
 But the vessel that Spaniards of all ranks and conditions regard with 
 reverence is the Pelayo, the monarch of the Spanish navy commemorat- 
 ing a character, half historical, half mythical the founder of the 
 Spanish nation. Beyond the Cid beyond all the great captains, mon- 
 archs and conquistadores, Don Pelayo holds the reverential devotion of 
 all Spaniards. He appeared in the seventh century, when Spain was the 
 prey of the Moors. He is variously set forth as of the Roman race that 
 peopled Spain, and the Goths that poured in from the Pyrenees frontier. 
 Pelayo made a pilgrimage to Jerusalem and on his return found that 
 the Moors in their conquering northward march, had subjugated his 
 birthplace, the Asturias. He breathed the vigor of resistance into his 
 clansmen. He raised an army and defeated the pagans. His victory 
 was entered in the records of this time as " Miraculous," because the 
 Moors were more than a thousand to Pelayo's one ! He was elected king 
 by the Gothio nobles, and from that kingdom comes the dynasty of to-
 
 66 
 
 NAVAL NOMENCLATURE. 
 
 day. It is further of record, that Pelayo was the first Spaniard voted 
 the right to use the title Don hitherto employed only to designate saints. 
 Spanish kings are always to this day called Don as Don Alfonso XII. 
 The Carlists pretenders adhere rigidly to the Don, and the title is in- 
 separable from their name, whether ruling or conspiring. 
 
 TORPEDO BOAT IN A GALK.
 
 III. 
 
 WAR once begun, invoked as the majority believed, recklessly, the 
 country began to consider with poignant questioning the char- 
 acter and resources of the antagonist we had challenged. Thirty years 
 of controversy in the press, heated declamation in Congress and on the 
 stump, had not disturbed the ancient admiration of the cultivated for the 
 splendid qualities that had made Spain mighty and admirable in other 
 days. Indeed, outside the ebullition of demagogues and the repulsive 
 jargon of jingo presses, there was never a rancorous feeling against the 
 Spanish people. Our literature from the first gropings of our earliest 
 writers is filled with appreciation and even reverence for the master 
 rninds, and masterpieces of Spanish art. Next to Shakespeare, the 
 genius of Cervantes finds its warmest and most generous admirers in this 
 country. 
 
 The historical studies of Prescott, of Washington Irving, Ticknor, to 
 omit scores, have made the Spaniard of the past two centuries much more 
 kin to us than the races on the British Isles, who sometimes acknowledge 
 kinship when the condescension may serve a purpose. Nor can it ever be 
 forgotten that in our struggle for life, Spain was only second to France 
 in the material aid given our forefathers. Indeed, had the Spanish court 
 refused to add the weight of Spain's alliance, France might never have 
 ventured to send her armies and fleets so far from the kingdom. Nor 
 was it forgotten that in the court of Spain our modest envoys, both 
 before and after the war, received distinguished consideration, only 
 second to that lavished on Franklin in the court of France. That the 
 Spanish monarch and Castilian grandees suspended the most cherished 
 forms of etiquette to make easier for our homely diplomats, the onerous 
 burdens they encountered in Europe. That personal amity existed be- 
 tween Washington, the Republican leaders, and the successor of the 
 Hapsburg Caesar. The curious too, recalled that it was to the inter- 
 vention of this good-natured monarch, we owe the domestication of that 
 grotesque but invaluable beast of burden the mule, for it was from his 
 royal stables, in Andalusia, that the first of that hybrid race came to this 
 country, a present to General Washington, sent on the suggestion of 
 Lafayette. Nor was it forgotten that after our independence had been 
 wrung from the hateful shackles of the arrogant Briton, our ministers 
 
 C69J
 
 fO SPAIN'S AVAILABLE FORCES. 
 
 forced to endure endless affronts from the British courts, were upheld and 
 vindicated by Spanish confraternity. But it was in the pages of Spain's 
 history, that the mind of the people became imbued with what may be 
 called identity of sentiment. The illustrious men who ventured into the 
 new world, now dominated by this republic, seemed in some incom- 
 municable way, our own ancestors. 
 
 The conquistadores from Columbus to Cortez, from Cortez to De Soto, 
 are enshrined among our national worthies under the majestic dome of 
 the nation's capital. The deeds of these great men are part of our heritage. 
 Cortez is as much the wonder and delight of the children of this republic, 
 as Daniel Boone or the stalwart yeomen who illustrated the settlement 
 of the great West. A boy of this republic would hold it shame not to 
 know the thrilling story of Cortez, the Arabian tale of Pizarro. The first 
 sentiment, when Spain stood before us as a foe, was the consciousness of 
 the task of confronting a race capable of the deeds recorded of the con- 
 quistadores. Even though diminished in numbers, despoiled of her world 
 realms, the victim of political bravos and childish bigotries, to the 
 imagination we were going forth to battle with a race that had conquered 
 every people in the world in other days. 
 
 The presses, the reviews teemed with studies of the available fleets and 
 armies of Spain. This was taken up all over the world. It was the em- 
 phatically expressed opinion of experts and amateurs that the first action 
 at sea, if not on land, would go ill with the improvised army and navy of 
 the republic. The comparison of the available war forces did seem 
 appalling, when set forth by men trained in analyzing the effectiveness of 
 armaments. It was agreed from the first that the conflict would be 
 mostly on the sea. There was never an idea expressed, either in Spain or 
 Europe, that the monarchy would attempt the invasion of the republic. 
 Cuba was by common agreement recognized as the battlefield, but even 
 in that field it was maintained there would be little beyond a blockade, 
 the island being in the nature of a fortress, assailable only by overwhelm- 
 ing fleets, whose business it would be to starve the garrison into 
 surrender. 
 
 The conviction was nowhere disputed in Europe, that the republic 
 would make no effort to carry hostilities to the Spanish mainland ; it was 
 even held improbable that the naval operations would extend beyond 
 Atlantic waters. In this preconception of the field of operations, certain 
 obvious advantages were universally conceded to the enemy. 
 
 Spain's fleets were more numerous, her great battleships, some of which 
 had been viewed with awe in our own harbors, where the workmanship of the
 
 THE REPUBLIC'S NAVY. 71 
 
 foremost yards of Europe in handicraft and invention. Her marines had 
 long been trained in the handling of these mighty forces. Her officers 
 were reckoned among the most accomplished in Christendom. Almost 
 constant warfare, during the last ten years, had given their rank and file, 
 the experience which alone can make the operations of fleets certain or 
 effective. In Havana, and its ideal harbor, Spain possessed a base, perfect 
 for defence or attack. Her ships, gathered under the impregnable walls 
 of Morro Castle and the ominous miles of forts commanding the water, 
 could from the outset compel the naval movements to take such form as 
 the Spanish Cabinet might seek. This republic could be put on the 
 defensive ; never certain whether the squadrons of the enemy were to 
 strike at our forts, or, by maneuvering with the advantages of greater 
 celerity, draw our fleets into ambush and destroy them in detail. For, 
 added to other advantages, all the more formidable ships of the enemy 
 were reputed greater in speed, by several miles an hour, than the swiftest 
 of our defenders. 
 
 The navy, at the immediate disposal of the administration, was more 
 formidable on paper than in arms. All the world could see what we had, 
 for the status of both army and fleet is presented yearly, to the uttermost 
 detail, to Congress. The list comprised four armored battle ships of the 
 first-class, launched and ready five under way. Two armored cruisers 
 of the second-class. Two armored cruisers of no class ; one armored ram. 
 Thirteen protected cruisers that is partly covered with steel ; seventeen 
 gunboats ; five torpedo boats. Beside these there were six monitors, 
 designed more for coast defence than actual action at sea. But beyond 
 these the sea administration had the potentialities of an almost indefinite 
 auxiliary navy. For no sooner was the war a fact, than private in- 
 dividuals crowded forward to put strong and fleet vessels of the most 
 modern type, at the service of the authorities. Equal to this significant 
 augmentation, great liners, that had attained world-wide fame for the 
 speed of their journeys across the ocean, were quickly transformed into 
 formidable cruisers, as was shown on the Cuban coast ; they answered 
 admirably to supplement the regular battle fleets. Indeed, one of the 
 incidents that gave the country immense gratification was the disabling of 
 the Spanish torpedo boat the Terror, by the guns of the transformed 
 American liner St. Paul, under command of the captain of the Maine 
 Sigsbee. Every naval expert in the world had looked forward to the 
 havoc bound to be wrought in the unwieldly vessels of the new type, by 
 the torpedo craft, swift sailing, slight in structure, but armed with appli- 
 ances that once launched at an ironclad, no armor could resist. The
 
 72 
 
 THE "ST. PAUL" AND "TERROR/ 
 
 incredible conquests achieved by our fleets, hardly won more attention in 
 Europe, than this slight encounter of the St. Paul and the Terror. For 
 it was accepted as evidence, that in the hands of a resolute commander, 
 the iron masses that make up the modern war ship, are not necessarily at 
 the mercy of the torpedo boat. This however was a rash assumption, for 
 
 ST. PAUL" DISABLING THE "TERROR." 
 
 our Gushing demonstrated that in the hands of a resolute man the torpedo 
 is fatal. Of late years there had been immense interest shown in the 
 new navy. The " White Fleet " had been pictured in every journal in the 
 country. Every schoolboy could possess photographs of favorite vessels. 
 The manning of the ships too, had aroused state and civic sentiment. 
 Most of the vessels named after states and cities, had received services of 
 plate to enable the officers to fitly entertain at the ship's tables. These 
 gifts were made up from contributions representing all grades of the life 
 of the republic. The creation too, of a naval reserve, at which the wise 
 in the old world, jeered unceasingly, made the extemporization of a 
 marine as facile as the creation of an army. 
 
 There were both high inspiration and vague apprehension in the horizon
 
 CONTINENTAL FLEETS. 73 
 
 of hopes the commanders of our fleets carried into the oper&tifttii >ith 
 Spain. They were inspired by the unbroken record of valor in our navies 
 from 1775 during five wars or sea campaigns. In all of these our 
 mariners had maintained an incontrovertible superiority ovei every adver- 
 sary encountered. The Continental fleets, though contemptible in size, 
 and few in number, wrought a havoc in the ranks of the British in almost 
 grotesque disproportion to their bulk in build. For the sailors were un- 
 trained, the vessels improvised, the armaments haphazard. Yet the fig- 
 ures collated at the end of the war, revealed the surprising fact that the 
 volunteer fleets, comprising privateers mostly, captured eight hundred of 
 the enemy's vessels. By the computation, agreed upon as a fair average, 
 fifteen men to a ship, the total number of prisoners could not have been 
 under 12,000. This was wrought by a force that never exceeded 5,000 
 men. Among these 12,000 taken by our na>y, there were at the low- 
 est estimate, one thousand regular soldiers, the flower of the British army, 
 whose capture by the land forces would have ranked as a decisive victory. 
 But the record of actual battles at sea, when our navy was an inchoate 
 experiment, compares with the marvels of the campaigns with Spain. 
 John Paul Jones, no matter what the disparity of forces, the inferiority 
 of his ships, never hesitated to attack a British ship, wherever encoun- 
 tered. The history of no navy records a, triumph so striking as the victory 
 of the Bon Homme Richard over the British ship Serapis. In all that 
 makes seamanship admirable, the infant attempts of the republic rank 
 with the finest achievements known in sea literature. 
 
 It was in 1812 however, that the fleets of the republic eclipsed all 
 rivalry taking the proportions into consideration. Though inferior to 
 the British in number and armaments of vessels, our successes at sea 
 were only second to the record made in the late war, and strangely 
 enough, our most striking victories were won at a cost always in amazing 
 disproportion to the casualities suffered. During the two years and five 
 months the war lasted, the Yankee fleets, cruisers, and privateers cap- 
 tured fifteen hundred vessels from the British flag, with more than 20,000 
 prisoners. Conditions consideied, this is even more striking' than the 
 destruction of Spain's fleets, by Dewey and Schley for Spain never pre- 
 sumed to the rank of the British on the seas, even in the days of her 
 might. 
 
 In 1812, Britain was the undisputed mistress of every navigable sea in 
 the known world. She had by the foulest of foul play, destroyed the 
 navies of the lesser powers, and by the genius and sometimes perfidy of 
 her admirals, crushed the fleets and suspended the marine growth of her
 
 74 "THE WHELP OF THE LION." 
 
 only rival France. She was as indisputably master of the sea as Napo- 
 leon was of the land. British journals, seamen and military men, hailed 
 the war with the " Yankee vipers " as the signal to " redeem the error " 
 committed in 1781 when a weak ministry conceded the " rabble " of the 
 colonies independence. The republic was to be crushed in a campaign, 
 its derisory navy swept from the seas by blank cartridges. During the 
 thirty months this war lasted, there were eighteen enga'gements fought : 
 the despised Yankees conquered in fifteen. But even more ominous than 
 the defeats the British sustained at the hands of our mariners, the dispar- 
 ity of the losses numbed the British. Though not quite so marked in the 
 disparity of the killed and wounded, as in Dewey's and Schley's combats, 
 the British losses were frightful as compared with ours. The results of 
 every encounter of our men-of-war and the British, were marked by 
 slaughter on the enemy's ships and but trifling loss on our own. But 
 the British were unwilling to draw the same deduction that they pro- 
 nounce to-day namely that the " whelp of the lion shows the origin of 
 his superiority " as one of the London Reviews summed up the battle of 
 Santiago. 
 
 In the famous action between the crack British frigate Macedonian, 
 thirty-eight guns and the United States, forty guns, out of three hundred 
 men, the enemy's loss was thirty-six killed and sixty-eight wounded 
 while our loss was seven wounded and five killed. The difference of two 
 guns in our favor, was more than compensated by the more effective am- 
 munition of the Macedonian. Indeed, the larger number of guns on the 
 United States war ships of those days, was generally condemned as an 
 error for it made the ship unwieldly and more difficult to manipulate at 
 a time when sails were the single locomotive power. The validity of this 
 criticism was soon shown by the diminution of the number of guns. But 
 every encounter told the same tale. When the Frolic was taken by the 
 Wasp, the British had fifteen killed and forty-seven wounded out of 487 
 our "Wasp" had five killed and five wounded. When our Hornet 
 vanquished the British Peacock in eleven minutes, the list was, five killed 
 and thirty-three wounded out of 130 men, while we had but three men 
 slightly injured. The tale might be carried to every encounter with 
 nearly the same result. All Britain made an outcry when these astound- 
 ing discrepancies leaked out in the press. "London" The Times of that 
 period solemnly announced," was covered by a degree of gloom, painful to 
 observe." Disasters on land, the British had long been accustomed to 
 bear, but to be beaten at sea, by a despised and derided republic, the 
 44 scum of Europe," as British publicists were in the habit of designating
 
 FALSE MEASUREMENTS. 75 
 
 the colonies, rankled for many a year in the mind of the privileged 
 classes. 
 
 But the remedy was soon found. I question whether one in a thou- 
 sand of the people of this republic, however proud of the record of our 
 ancestors knows that the victories won by our forefathers, were if not on 
 equal terms, in most cases at a disadvantage to our marines. The British 
 writers and naval pundits at once took the matter in hand. The naval 
 histories embalming the operations of the fleets, explain the humiliating 
 show made with the king's navy, by alleging superior tonnage against the 
 unfortunates, in every instance. Hence it is so written and so accepted. 
 That is, every conquest made by the United States ships, was due to the 
 heavier build of the winning vessel. Then it is set forth circumstantially 
 that in every instance where the Yankees came out best, the British 
 ships were old, rotten, inadequately manned or shackled by untrained 
 crews. In a comprehensive history of the United States navy, Maclay 
 has taken pains to go to the fountain head of evidence in the matter. 
 He accuinlates proof on proof to show that the British record is a tissue 
 of falsehoods ; that in every case the United States vessel was older in 
 build and less complete in equipment. In the tonnage pretext which 
 the general reader accepts, because the explanation is rather technical, 
 the British claim is squarely in the teeth of the facts. To palliate their 
 defeats and the enormous slaughter wrought among the crews, the ac- 
 cepted historians assert that the Yankee frigates were from forty to fifty 
 per cent, larger than their conquered antagonists. This was plausibly 
 shown by the method of measurement in those days. Half the vessel's 
 breadth at the broadest part was taken as the depth. Three-fifths of the 
 breadth was deducted from the length of the hull, the remainder was 
 multiplied by the breadth and this result divided by ninety-five. By 
 this method the United States ship was in every instance shown to be of 
 greater proportions, and for this reason. 
 
 From the very beginning of our naval construction, New England and 
 Baltimore shipbuilders discovered a genius for the improvement of vessels. 
 The form indeed of " The Baltimore Clipper," as well as the New Eng- 
 land " Sea Bird," was known wherever the sea carried the navies of com- 
 merce. It was on these docks the long graceful curving lines of our ships 
 first took form. By cutting off all the structure between the water line 
 and the keel the Yankee craft gave the appearance of solid lines down to 
 the bottom, whereas, in fact, they slanted off even with the water line. 
 The British vessels, on the other hand, were built on the old and ugly 
 lines, which are illustrated by a canal boat. It requires no technical
 
 76 A HISTORIC LIE. 
 
 training to perceive the differences in weight. A Yankee craft, to all in- 
 tents and appearances as heavy as a ship of the same size built squarely 
 down to the keel, was, in fact, not much more than half the weight, for she 
 had two of her angles cut off. But the falsehood did its work. Even the 
 warmest champions of our 1812 heroes, have conceded that the ships were 
 heavier because the historical lie stands sealed by the official imprimatur. 
 This fantastic method of measurement was adopted by experts, to rob the 
 United States of the credit, won in the encounters with British ships, 
 and as it is difficult to comprehend, and ostensibly perfectly above board, 
 the British contention has gone into history ; even writers on this side of 
 the water, adopting the plea. But the rule of measurement thus applied 
 to war vessels, was devised for custom-house purposes, to guage the col- 
 lection of revenues. For this use it was perhaps fair enough, but it was 
 grossly misleading in measuring the proportions of United States vessels, 
 even merchantmen. The plan of the British frigate showed that the ex- 
 treme length of the deck was maintained nearly the whole distance be- 
 tween the bow and the stern. The rake of the stem and the stern posts 
 of the Yankee frigate was uniformly greater than in the case of the 
 British. From measurements taken at the custom-house in Baltimore in 
 1812, it was made plain that a merchant vessel built on the plan of the 
 British Macedonian, registered 300 tons and was able to carry 400 hogs- 
 heads of tobacco, while a ship of the same tonnage, but built on the lines 
 of the United States frigate, could carry only 100 hogsheads. It is true 
 that the United States forty-four gun frigate in the war of 1812 was 
 from ten to fifteen feet longer than the British thirty-eight gun frigate, 
 but owing to the rake of the stem and stern posts in our vessels not an 
 extra gun could be put into the broadside, there being just fifteen ports 
 in the side in both ours and the British ship. 
 
 Another matter upon which some stress has been laid by the British, is 
 the heaviness of the metal carried on our frigates. It is a fact that the 
 United States vessels were armed with twenty-four pounders on the main 
 deck, while the British ships carried only eighteen pounders. At the time 
 of the war of 1812, however, the use of twenty-four pounders, as the main 
 armament of frigates, was largely experimental, with the weight of ex- 
 perience and authority against them. British commanders insisted that 
 twenty-four pounders were too heavy and could not be worked as effec- 
 tually as eighteen pounders. It was clearh r demonstrated that our three 
 frigates of the forty-four gun class, were overweighted, and the experience 
 of the first battles in which they were engaged, disclosed the truth to their 
 commanders. In the first actions of the war, the Constitution carried
 
 YANKEE CREWS. 79 
 
 fifty five guns in all, with a total weight in shot of 1,401 pounds: before 
 the close of the war, her armament was reduced to fifty-one guns, having 
 a total shot weight of 1,287 pounds. The " United States" in her action 
 with the Macedonian carried fifty-four guns to the enemy's forty-nine, but 
 on returning to port six of the United States guns were discarded, as it 
 was found that their great weight had caused the frigate to become 
 " hogged," or broken backed. The third of these frigates, the President, 
 also reduced the number of her guns to fifty-two, but even this was not 
 sufficient to prevent her from becoming "hogged." Overweight was the 
 cause of her being overtaken and brought to grief by a British squadron 
 in 1815. 
 
 The Yankee ships and Yankee crews of 1812 overcame the British 
 enemy for just the same reasons that they would to-day. Because the 
 ships were better built, but above all, because every shot fired from a 
 Yankee deck, represented a man who had a right to himself ; every man 
 was fighting for his own and his children's heritage, while the Briton was 
 fighting for pay, for a sovereign he had never seen, or might ever hope to 
 see; for a constitution which took no more note of the man or the mass, 
 than the ukase of the Czar or the irade of the Padishah. Not a man, how- 
 ever humbly employed in the republic's marine, forgets for an instant, that 
 it depends on himself whether he remains in the galley or mounts to the 
 bridge ; a rail splitter was president of the republic ; there is no insuper- 
 able obstacle to a stoker taking the place occupied by James A. Gaifield, 
 driver of a canal team. The outworn phrase that began to fill the British 
 press "the man behind the gun," has a vastly different meaning from 
 that inferred. When the man feels that he has a right in himself the gun 
 is part of him, but the man behind the British gun, has never felt that, 
 and he never can. 
 
 Uplifting as the retrospect of the early wars, there were still more gran- 
 diose pictures evoked in recalling the stupendous burdens borne by the 
 na\'3 r in the Civil War. The deeds of Ellet, of Dupont, of Foote, in the 
 early days of the war, when the navy was almost held in derision, until 
 Grant's forces were rescued at Belmont, Shiloh, and aided to victory at 
 Donelson and Fort Henry. These inland prodigies could not be imi- 
 tated or emulated in Cuban waters. With this double sentiment ani- 
 mating officers and crew, there was still another, and this weighed with 
 poignant pressure on the thought of the whole country. The stupendous 
 fighting machines we had fabricated during the last fifteen years were ob- 
 jects of unknown force. The mere manning of these involved the tech- 
 nical familiarity with abstrusities hitherto associated with expert crafts-
 
 80 
 
 MODERN FIGHTING MACHINES. 
 
 men, trained in engineering and the mechanic arts. What certainty that 
 the various corps of skilled artisans would be able to keep presence of 
 mind, during the pandemonium of actual warfare ? Even the least im- 
 aginative could invoke the actualities of the crash and carnage of battle; 
 in the meeting of two iron and steel masses, vomiting tons of metal, whose 
 mere impact crushes the stoutest shield. Masses that would plough 
 through yards of masonry; masses hurled three, four and five miles over 
 the surface of the water as surely as in other days the puny missiles of the 
 six pounder, were sped. 
 
 Nor were the horrors involved in the new life at sea for a moment for- 
 gotten, or ignored. Masses of 300 to 700 men sealed under iron rafters, 
 
 WORKING THE BIG TURRET GUNS ON THE IOWA. 
 
 iron partitions, iron gangways, and even in the calm watches of the night 
 immured in the foetid atmosphere of an iron vault. With such constraint, 
 with such vicissitudes, would the old-time constancy and valor avail to 
 keep the body of men equal to the unspeakable ordeal of combat? When 
 the fatal hour arrived, when the demoniac hail pattered on the decks, 
 could human nature find physical reserves to support the superadded
 
 THE INSTINCT OF THE SHIP. fcl 
 
 strain ? Millions put themselves in the sailor's place ; they saw the dis- 
 tant outline of the enemy's squadrons barring the blue horizon; they 
 heard the venomous screeching of the trial shells, searching for the range. 
 They felt the agonizing expectancy, when, everything breakable, inflam- 
 mable, cleared from the adamantine decks, the sea soldiery, swarmed to their 
 allotted places; here a group at the guns, there a reserve aligned in 
 ranks to fill the places of the dead and disabled. The very ship seems 
 instinct with the coming death. The thrill and throb of the engines enter 
 into a frightful rhythmic sympathy with the awful crisis. From the faces 
 of the men, great beads of sweat roll down in streams, while with lips 
 compressed, each fated figure waits his prescribed function. The captain 
 of the ship stands in the place of terror, the tribune of the deck; about 
 him the lesser officers wait immobile. The guns, as if endowed with con- 
 sciousness, lunge far outward, spying the point where they can carry 
 most fatal destruction. Everything is glowering formidable the en- 
 ginery of Pandemonium waiting the signal. In this prelude of tension, 
 that no words can make real, sea and sky seem blurred, by the apparition 
 of the potential ministers of slaughter. It would be a relief to the wait- 
 ing man, to feel the shells strike the iron ramparts, to get a touch of the 
 reality ; all thus far is of the supernatural. 
 
 The conviction that suddenly flashes into every man reared in peace, 
 indoctrinated in the amenities of the creed of Christ, is that the ocean is 
 a dream, that he cannot in reality, be sailing the summer seas, in search 
 of other men nurtured in the same doctrine, to slay; to be slain ; to inflict 
 all that earthquakes, storms and natural agencies visit upon the helpless. 
 This fleeting, whimsical ratiocination, is the supreme agony of man in 
 battle after that the ferocious instinct of slaughter holds him as in a 
 fever. For with the bidding to let loose the thunder of the guns, a con- 
 tracting condition comes in instantaneous swiftness. The exhilaration of 
 being a vengeance, an instrument of a people's wrath, exalts the feeblest, 
 stimulates the ardent, to another sphere of fairly preternatural effort. 
 The shock of the speeding mass of metal, as it quits the brazen maw of 
 the gun, induces of itself, an electric current, as the ship staggers under 
 her own vitalities. A fierce joy displaces this sombre tension of the long 
 expectancy. The words of command, no longer the perfunctory mono- 
 tones of death, but shrilling with a meaning, that portends, death or life, 
 subdue the apprehensions and swiften the movements of the thunderbolt 
 launchers. 
 
 To this phantasm of the imagination the millions added the down- 
 pour of lead; the din, infernal, and malignant, of the shells bursting
 
 82 FEEDING THE FIRES. 
 
 where the massed men are plying the guns. Appalling as these spectral 
 anticipations there were even more grewsome deeps in the minds of the 
 families who had brothers, sons, or kin on the terrible structures, that 
 preserve and destroy. In the sirocco breath of the engine caves, nude 
 figures are seen feeding the roaring furnaces. They are far below the 
 
 RAPID FIRE GUN ON SHIPBOARD. 
 
 water's level; hundreds of tons of metal are above and about them. 
 Every thrill through the fuliginous mass, may mean death in the most 
 atrocious form to these grimy gnomes. What after all is the heroism of 
 a Hobson, the valor of a Dewey or a Schley, to the inconceivable con- 
 stancy of these perpetual immolators of self? Is there not then something 
 incomparably rare in the patient devotion of that amazing body of men, 
 who alone make it possible to put the exquisite inventions of science to 
 the deadly uses involved in war? Heroism can take no more awe-inspir- 
 ing form than this abnegation of the brave in the deeps of the iron hulks, 
 denied the sustaining sunlight, the companionship of the common aven- 
 gers and defenders. He cannot even know whether death is coming by 
 shell or torpedo. He must wait until the waters gulf him in the briny
 
 APPALLING ANTICIPATIONS. 
 
 83 
 
 maelstrom. Not many bethought themselves of these momentous factors 
 in the prevoyant anguish that hovered over our fleets, as they gathered 
 in Cuban waters. And while the actual destruction was spared our 
 kindred, the horrors herein adumbrated, were actualities on the magnifi- 
 cent ships of the wretched Spaniards ; indeed these imaginings ten fold 
 inluridated would but feebly reproduce the inferno of each of the ships 
 that our guns battered into tortured masses of shapeless ruin. 
 
 LOADING A GUN ON THE TEXAS.
 
 IV. 
 
 BARELY had the word of war been spoken when the malevolent in- 
 fluence of the ** yellow " press began to make itself felt in the con- 
 duct of affairs. There were millions who remembered the disasters 
 forced upon Lincoln's administration by the clamor, "On to Bull Run I" 
 In the history of the Crimean War, Kinglake devotes a section of un- 
 equalled brilliancy to the influence of the press upon a nation at war. 
 He describes with absorbing and sustained force the gradual shifting of 
 the initiative from the grasp of the departments of State, to the editorial 
 
 VOLUNTEERING IN NEW YORK. 
 
 sanctum of the Times newspaper. Commanders in the field, councils, 
 every responsible source of action, worked in paralysis compared with 
 the potentiality of the Orphic utterances of the press. Before a squadron 
 could be reasonably expected to be ready, the yellow press began a vocif- 
 
 (85)
 
 36 THE RAW RECRUITS. 
 
 erous demand for action, for results, for the doing of things that would 
 enable "enterprise" to publish "extras." Insensibly the disposition of 
 the people was influenced by the incessant iteration. 
 
 The troops called out by the President were so-to-speak as naked as the 
 newborn babe. Everything had to be done to give them a semblance of 
 cohesive force. It was necessary to assign camps accessible to the va- 
 rious groups of quotas. Chickamauga, identified with one of the momen- 
 tous battles of the Civil War, was selected as the rendezvous for the 
 middle division of the Union. The daily papers were filled with the 
 admirable disposition of the youth of the land to take up the burden of 
 battle ; thousands in every state offered themselves to the recruiting offi- 
 
 THE "PURITAN" IN ACTION AT MATANZAS. 
 
 eers. The people, thrown into alarm by the vehemence of the press, 
 vaguely felt that the recruit was a soldier the moment he signed his name 
 to the muster-roll. The yellow press daily proclaimed that the navy was 
 ready and able to * end the war in a week " ; that the 200,000 men had 
 nothing to do but march to the sea and sail over to Cuba. It was even 
 argued in the noisiest and most potential of the metropolitan presses, that
 
 OUR NAVY AT MATANZAS. 
 
 89 
 
 there was no use for the calling out of the soldiery ; that the navy was 
 equal to the conquest of Cuba and the Spanish holdings in the Caribbean 
 Sea. 
 
 When, on April 24th the fleet made a slight test of its guns at Matan- 
 zas, there was a furious denunciation of the administration for withhold- 
 ing the tars from "real war." The President was represented as bent 
 upon a *' kind hearted war" in which there should be merely tentative 
 bombardments of fleets and strong places. Much was made of the fre- 
 
 SPANISH PRIZES IN KEY WEST HARBOR. 
 
 quency and facility of the captures on the high seas. The whole country 
 was thrown into merriment by the audacities of the hastily-improvised 
 cruisers and blockaders, attacking the most formidable of Spanish craft 
 and dragging them into port as prizes. Indeed, for a fortnight the 
 southern ports were incapable of harboring the immense fleets of mer-
 
 SPANISH PRIZES. , 91 
 
 chant vessels, that fell a prey to our energetic craft. The incidents gave 
 rise to embittered controversy abroad, where it was sneeringly deduced 
 that the mercantile spirit of the Yankee was, as usual, the preeminent 
 
 CAPTURED SPANISH OFFICERS ON THE " NASHVILLE. 
 
 phase of the conflict. By international law, an enemj^'s ships, when war 
 is declared, are entitled to thirty days' warning. We, on the contrary, 
 had barely broken relations with Spain, when our ships swarmed in every
 
 92 
 
 THE ADMINISTRATIVE BUREAUX. 
 
 avenue of commerce, to surprise vessels whose commanders had no sus- 
 picion of hostilities. Sordid calculation of the " money in it " for our 
 sailors and our treasury filled the presses. For a time, it would have been 
 natural to suppose that the war had been declared to enable our fleets to 
 accumulate prize-money ! 
 
 Meanwhile the harassed administrative bureaux were straining the 
 new and creaking machinery to make soldiers out of the admi- 
 rable material proffered. But soldiers cannot be made by mere de- 
 
 LIGHT AND HEAVY UNIFORMS. 
 
 crees. The regimenting and brigading, the mobilization of 200,000 
 men can only be rightly done in prescribed ways. In other countries, 
 these ways have been prepared for years where people live as in an 
 armed camp. With our small, but ample army of 25,000 men, we have 
 no machinery for putting four times that number in military harness. 
 Everything was to be done. Uniforms were to be made, the innumer-
 
 LESSONS OF THE CIVIL WAR. i'3 
 
 able requirements of men huddled in masses and obliged to supply them- 
 selves with food, covering all the needs of life, in short. Even the trans- 
 portation of these hastily formed bodies of troops presented difficulties. 
 The railways could not supply trains promptly ; groups of men were 
 shifted and sent astray, when the camps of organization were located. It 
 was found that there were no provisions for shelter, uniforming, even 
 drilling. The regulars were hurried to the deadly sand-dunes of the 
 Florida coast, ready for actual service ; but alone, it was held they were 
 unequal to attacking the least of the Spanish strong places. 
 
 In this interval disputations arose in most of the states over the terras 
 upon which the militia might be made use of to serve under the Presi- 
 dent's call. The rank and file of the state troops in every case waived 
 all rights to immunity from foreign service, and eagerly demanded the 
 privilege of upholding the republic wherever her interests were at stake. 
 In the war bureaux at Washington it was seen that an early movement 
 would be perilous ; that aside from the always present danger of the 
 Cuban climate, it would be murder to dispatch untrained ranks to encoun- 
 ter the veterans defending Cuba's strong places. Coincident with diffi- 
 culties and embarrassments inseparable from the extemporizing of so 
 large an army, one of the most vicious defects of our system came to add 
 to the confusion, inefficiency and benumbing fatalities of the situation. 
 The place-hunter, denied the usual spoils of office in the civil service, in- 
 sisted on having the officering of the new levies. 
 
 We had costly lessons in this very evil during the Civil War. We had 
 seen presuming politicians in command of regiments, brigades, army 
 corps, departments, in a million posts requiring the training and exper- 
 ience of men educated in our military schools; it was supposed that the 
 administration thus admonished would stand between the soldiery and 
 these soulless cormorants. There are volumes attesting the thousands 
 slaughtered on every field of the Civil War by the intrusion of political 
 adventurers ; the lessons had been so deeply impressed that the country 
 heard with a shock of indignant disbelief, that senators and representa- 
 tives were making it impossible to carry on the war, unless commissions 
 were given to "workers," relatives, and influential nobodies. The coun- 
 try was swarming with the graduated men, who had devoted years to the 
 study and practice of the art of war. There were enough accomplished 
 graduates of West Point to officer a million men safely and competently. 
 Not one in a thousand of these men, eager to return something to the 
 republic in zealous, enlightened devotion for the education given, could 
 even get a hearing. The rich sons of affluent politicians, the profligate
 
 94 THE "ROUGH RIDERS." 
 
 kinsraeii of war-time personalities, were given staff appointments, places 
 the most difficult to fill, and upon whose proper filling depends the safety 
 of the masses sent under fire. 
 
 The lamentable effects became apparent in every attempt to move the 
 inchoate legions. Indeed, the picture given of the hopeless tangle at the 
 various camps, became so disheartening, that the executive departments 
 were constrained to promise that no more of this murderous nepotism 
 should be carried on. But the country remarked that in every batch of 
 appointments sent to the Senate, the "political pull " still made itself felt, 
 and made itself felt to the end. Naturally, there was delay, confusion, 
 hardships in the mobilization of the army, for the indispensable machinery 
 was defective from its inception. The pictures that reached the country 
 from Key West, Tampa and other points of rendezvous, gave promise of 
 the disasters that signalized the years 1861, and '62. Even when exper- 
 ienced men were put in place, the selections seemed based on other than 
 consideration of fitness for the peculiar campaigns involved. 
 
 The administrative officers were in many instances long past the age of 
 vigor. Veterans from both the Confederate and Union armies were 
 promptly named, but they were frequently men who had not been identi- 
 fied with happy campaigns or individual initiative ; on the other hand 
 the most eminent of the groups who had conducted armies with precision 
 and success were passed by. Under these conditions, the armies assem- 
 bled in Florida and at the rendezvous in the interior, did not impress the 
 solicitous as likely to meet the crisis. But with these short-comings and 
 vices, there were imposing evidences of the devotion and constancy of the 
 soldier, that to a great extent made up for the lack of leadership. 
 
 Perhaps the most significant demonstration of this spirit of the country 
 was the organization of a regiment which became the joy of the para- 
 graphers and the pundits of the press. Theodore Roosevelt, a rich young 
 New Yorker, who had figured frequently as a reformer in the insurrections 
 of New York City politics during the last decade, resigned the responsi- 
 ble place of assistant secretary of the navy, to become a subaltern in a 
 regiment designed to do and dare. Under the characteristic designation 
 of the " Rough Riders," Roosevelt almost in a day, gathered the most dis- 
 parate groups of the republic's adventurers. The recruits came from the 
 scholastic seclusion of Harvard, from the wild life of the plains, from the 
 gilded clubs of the metropolis, the Capauan splendors of millionaire 
 palaces. The cowboy and the dude, the pioneer and the dilletante jostled 
 each other in the ranks that were formed almost in a day. The gathering 
 of this unique organization, the roster of its bizarre personalities, was read
 
 THEODORE ROOSEVELT. 95 
 
 from day to day, with delight and laughter. The drilling and disciplin- 
 ing of the mass, the Crcesan gifts of the privates to the regiment, the 
 readiness of the aristocratic contingent to fall into the squalid details of 
 camp life, made a page of piquant interest for the whole country. 
 
 Roosevelt, himself, was the most interesting figure ; a man of letters, 
 
 A GROUP OF ROUGH RIDERS. 
 
 eager, impulsive, absorbed in everything he undertook, he was indulgently 
 admired by even those who distrusted his sagacity or opposed his ideals. 
 He was the chief of the jingo voices in all international ardors. He had 
 been the candidate of his party for mayor of New York. He had been 
 put at the head of the metropolitan police commission on the overthrow 
 of Tammany in 1895 and made the life of his compatriots gay by his 
 original administration of this apparently uncongenial post. He had 
 written voluminous pamphlets in a semi-historical vein, on the settling of
 
 96 
 
 A MOTLEY LEGION. 
 
 the West, and had made himself the idol of the groups that demanded a 
 big navy, a big army everything big iu fact that the tax payer distrusts. 
 In his new endeavor, Roosevelt brought the same irrestrainable energy 
 to the task that had given him eminence in other enterprises. He mas- 
 tered the rubric of the tactics and set to work to drill his motley legion 
 with the assiduous delight of a Prussian martinet. In the long journey 
 from the regiment's rendezvous, at San Antonio, Texas, to Tampa, the 
 rough riders were a magnet to the inhabitants from far and near. The 
 farmers and villagers who had read for years of the " 400 " of New York, 
 flocked to the railway, to catch a glimpse of the scions of these mysterious 
 potencies, transformed into private soldiers of the republic. The famous 
 athletes, the notorious cowboys, the equivocal of mining camps and Buf- 
 falo Bill shows, were no less embodiments of wonder to the country 
 through which the squadrons passed. In every city they were feted, 
 caressed, glorified. But for that matter, no body of men bearing the in- 
 signia of the republic were neglected, as the trains bearing them, dragged 
 an uncertain course to the decisive point of embarkation. We shall see 
 them in the strain and storm of cruel trial, and find that the touch of one 
 hand, impressed some of the rare qualities, that make steadfast troops 
 but even in the almost bouffe heroism, we shall likewise see that soldiers 
 are not made, officers are not created by mere proclamations. 
 
 n 
 
 INSPECTING A DYNAMITE GUN.
 
 CAPTAIN CHARLES V. GRIDLEY. 
 
 COMMANDKK ASA WAI.KEK. 
 
 LlEIJT.-CoMMANDEB JOHN E. PlLLSlH:KY, 
 
 C'OMMANDKK KOWMAX H. McCALLA.
 
 BOOK TWO. 
 I. 
 
 ON the Sunday morning of the first of May, the war being nine days 
 old, a thrilling rumor stopped the groups wending their way to 
 church. Across vague leagues of sea and land, from the uttermost width 
 of the globe came a tale of conquest. The flag of the republic had been 
 victorious in a combat upon the fortunes of which depended a vast colony. 
 The distance, the mystery of the ships engaged, the sum of death and de- 
 struction, were for twenty-four hours a poignant anguish to the electrified 
 people. Gradually, the country learned that the almost unknown squad- 
 ron of Commodore Dewey, stationed in Chinese waters, had in obedience 
 to a curt order from the navy department, sailed from Hong Kong, sought 
 the enemy at his strong place and fought him until not a vessel was left 
 to fly the enemy's flag. There had been light talk and fanciful conjecture 
 in the public prints, on the possibilities of our Asiatic squadron doing 
 something to make the Spaniards uneasy for their last and most splendid 
 possession in the East, but the most sanguine never ventured to hope 
 that the first blow of the war would result in a conquest, such as great 
 powers consider ample gain for a long campaign. 
 
 Many causes had combined to bring about an increase in our Asiatic 
 squadron, even before the authorities had any clear apprehension of war. 
 The late astounding aggression of Germany on the territory of China, in a 
 time of peace, had suggested the need of ample sea power to safeguard 
 our immense commercial interests in Oriental waters. The threatening 
 complications between Britain and Russia, gave promise of a partition of 
 the unwieldly domains of the Celestial empire, such as the world has been 
 witnessing in Africa. It is inferable too, that the sagacious statesman at 
 the head of the navy department, had a prevoyant instinct in the matter, 
 when he selected the men and the craft for the station. Whether fortui- 
 tous or designed, the republic was miraculously served. One of the de- 
 cisive victories rarely achieved in war, was fought and won, almost before 
 the republic had adjusted its armor for the fray. To the country, the 
 news came with all the fascinating unexpectedness, that made the new 
 world conquests tales of marvel to the Europeans of three centuries ago ; 
 when successive caravels, brought to the monarch of the Spains, the title 
 deeds of lands far surpassing his inherited realms in extent. 
 
 It is on record that Dewey himself, accepted the Asiatic billet with re- 
 
 (99)
 
 100 COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY. 
 
 luctnnce, counting the Atlantic as the only chance for the fleets, in the 
 by no means probable event of hostilities. It was set down to his credit, 
 that having the right to an Atlantic assignment, he magnanimously 
 yielded to the request of a brother officer, whose term was nearing an 
 end, and hoped that if there were need for action he might have a chance 
 to wind up his career gloriously. 
 
 Hong Kong is a world harbor ; seized by the British in the first epoch 
 of European predation upon China, the port is open to the commerce arid 
 navies of the world. In this harbor, Commodore Dewey waited with a 
 sailor's impatience, the fateful word that was to launch the wondrous 
 " white squadron " against the unknown. The crews of the great ships, 
 the hierarchy of the officers, every man on the vessels longed for the 
 word war. For the idleness of an international harbor becomes irksome 
 to the tar. He loves the sea even in the inhuman tenements assigned 
 him in modern war structures. Hong Kong is a tropic port, and the lassi- 
 tude of the climate begins to tell after a short sojourn. It was noted by 
 the curious, that Dewey had become deeply immersed in the charts of 
 the China Seas ; that like Napoleon, before the Italian campaign, he 
 studied them by day, and meditated them by night. It was not however, 
 until the brush of the painter was called in to transform the beautiful 
 white surfaces of the fleet into a repellent nameless drab, that even the 
 almond eyed navvy, knew that there was ominous work ahead, when this 
 portentous transfiguration eclipsed the glory of the fleet. When Dewey 
 on his own responsibility anticipating the future, with the wise prevoy- 
 ance of a prudent executive, bought out of hand, a British steamer from 
 Cardiff, freighted with 3,000 tons of coal and a vessel of a Hong Kong 
 house, laden with provisions ; the very powder boys knew that war was to 
 be the wear very soon. Dewey's fitness for the post he had taken with 
 reluctance, was never more consummately shown than in this commercial 
 diplomacy. He assured breathing space for his enterprize and really 
 augmented his force by two powerful auxiliaries for the entire crews of 
 these vessels to a man took service under the flag of the republic. Then 
 came a breath of the far-off land home. The McCulloch, a revenue cutter, 
 employed by the Treasury Department on missions far removed from 
 war, suddenly appeared among the fleet, shrilling salutes to the en- 
 raptured tars. In war, the President may make use of these pacific craft 
 to supplement the fleets, and when this vessel appeared, every bluejacket 
 on board felt that he was sure of the deadly chance he had been eager 
 for. It was this swift craft, that on the 26th of April dashed up to the 
 flagship, to deliver this fr teful message :
 
 THE PRESIDENT'S ORDER. 101 
 
 " WASHINGTON, April 26th. 
 
 "DEWEY; Asiatic Squadron: Commence operations at once, particu- 
 larly against Spanish fleet, you must capture or destroy them. 
 
 " McKlNLEY." 
 
 It is not often that the President of the republic thus puts his signature 
 to a command. Only once during the Civil War did Abraham Lincoln 
 perform this function of his constitutional prerogative when on February 
 1862 he ordered all the armies of the United States to move. But no 
 order ever given was so completely executed. The Spanish fleet was both 
 destroyed and captured. Dewey's comment as reported by a witness at 
 hand, portended what was to follow : " Thank the Lord," he ejaculated, 
 "at last, I've got the chance, and I'll wipe them off the Pacific Ocean." 
 The squadron was lying in Chinese waters when this curt mandate 
 reached its commander. For under the laws of nations, neither belligerent 
 is permitted to make a stay of more than twenty-four hours in a neutral 
 port. Dewey had taken refuge in the nearest haven to Hong Kong, Mirs 
 Bay, and that Celestial harbor was thrown into a panic by the stertorous 
 outburst from the ships, when at two o'clock on the afternoon of April 
 26th the commodore's war pennant fluttered out from the mast head. 
 This was the seaman's signal that the ships were no longer panoplied by 
 the safeguards of law, that at any moment, they must be ready to de- 
 fend themselves, three miles from neutral shores. It meant war ; and 
 among the masses imprisoned in the iron hulks, there was the exultant 
 delight of the human on being liberated. Every mile the ship sailed 
 now, meant the growing peril of bomb, torpedo, and ram, but the sailors 
 hailed these dangers, as others hail redemption. On the instant, as if 
 impatient to taste to the full the liberty to slay and be slain, the fleet, 
 nine vessels in all, made straight eastward, where the enemy was known 
 to be. The commodore's flagship the Olympia, led the way, followed in 
 order by the Baltimore, the Boston, the Raleigh, the Concord, the 
 McCulloch, the Petrel, and the two improvised transports Zafiro and 
 Nanshan. 
 
 This fleet was familiarly known in every sea port of the republic. It 
 had been reproduced in illustrations for every reader of newspapers, to the 
 uttermost hamlet from the Canadian frontier to the Rio Grande. Every 
 man of eminence on each ship had been photographed and pictured, until 
 they were as well known as family friends in every household in the 
 union. The journey, made in the tension and hopes of conflict, was not 
 precipitate for though on fighting bent, Dewey was full of the wise pre- 
 caution of the strategist. The squadron was subdivided into scouts and
 
 102 
 
 THE LAST DAY OF APRIL. 
 
 guards. These vessels entered and scrutinized the sizes nnd purport of 
 the harbors, likely to be tenanted by the enein}-. Subig bay, a sheet of 
 water, only second in importance to Manila itself was entered with 
 every precaution suggested by naval craft. It was half hoped that Ad- 
 miral Moutojo would be found there, as the harbor offered many ad- 
 vantages for a battle. But Subig was empty of war vessels. Dewey 
 indeed, drew augury there of the inconceivable unpreparedness of the 
 enemy, for it was not known to the few ships encountered, that war was 
 on. Under a yellow moon that seemed to the watching mariners a 
 fantastically erratic balloon, the fleet quit Subig harbor the last day of 
 April and skirted down the Philippine coast, in thrilling expectation. 
 Every officer in control of each ship, knew to a dot on the chart, just 
 what must be met; the only conjectural point was, the number and place- 
 
 GENEEAL VIEW OP MANILA. 
 
 ment of the infernal machinery, prepared for the ships batteries. Would 
 they begin abreast the harbor of Manila Spain's most affluent spot in the 
 splendid colony of the Orient ? The harbor in peace, is reckoned one of 
 the most inviting in that strange eastern archipelago. Shaped like a 
 vast balloon swelling to twenty or thirty miles in width at the upper, 
 or northern part, the navigable waters decrease toward the neck or 
 entrance where the island of Corregidor blocks the mouth, ideally placed 
 by nature, to supplement the defensive works of art. The land,
 
 OLD MANILA. 
 
 103 
 
 coterminous with the narrow neck, rises on each side into gigantic pali- 
 sades, commanding the approaches from the open sea. From these 
 sentry-like acclivities, the ground rises inland in mountainous ranges 
 far into the interior of the island of Luzon. The ancient city of 
 Manila, the emporium of the vast Philippine group, is built upon a flat 
 plain, between the upland ranges and the curving bays, twenty-six miles 
 upward and northeastward, from the narrow passes on each side of the 
 island of Corregidor. The city was originally built upon inlets from the 
 bay, the largest called the Pasig river; which accommodates good sized 
 craft. In effect the arms of the bay make the city almost as detached 
 in quarters as Venice. The original settlement was made on an oblong 
 island south of the Pasig called " Old Manila or Binondo." This mass 
 of tenement is a perfect reproduction of the mediaeval Spanish walled 
 
 CAPTURE OF CAVITE ARSENAL. 
 
 city. It is compactly circumvallated from its neighboring suburbs, but 
 modern artillery has made these walls mere monuments of the past, as 
 they are no defences. Ten miles south by west, of Manila, the real 
 defences of the place are located at a military and naval settlement 
 Cavite. The place is admirably chosen for its purpose. An arm of land 
 6
 
 104 
 
 MANILA'S DEFENCES. 
 
 stretches outward and upward, like the claw of a lobster, completely 
 sheltering a small sheet of water, capacious enough for twenty fleets. 
 Since the attempt of the Germans to seize the Caroline group, Spain has 
 made unstinted efforts to erect Cavite into an inexhaustible defence, both 
 in provisions and appliances for any emergency. For four years, no 
 stranger could get within observing distance of its carefully guarded walls 
 or its imposing arsenal. It was the tale throughout all the eastern seas, 
 that Manila could never be successfully attacked, so ample were the pre- 
 cautions of the home government. And had the Spanish authorities 
 supplemented nature Cavite could only have been taken as Mobile or 
 New Orleans were, by patient approach and deadly grapple if even 
 
 SPANISH ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS, MANILA. 
 
 these could have won over such enginery as modern science puts in such 
 profusion at the disposal of the defensive. But the ominous points of 
 contact for such an enterprise as Dewey's were the islands, Corregidor 
 and Rulacabilla square in the mouth of the narrow entrance to the 
 harbor. Corregidor rises from the water six hundred and fifty feet sky- 
 ward the second island is less lofty by perhaps a hundred or more feet. 
 These islands, provided as any of our coasts were armed, could have 
 stopped a fleet a hundred fold more powerful than Dewey's. Indeed the
 
 DEWEY'S CAPTAINS. 105 
 
 completeness of the prodigious armaments on these heights was told all 
 over the Orient, when the first signs of war arose. 
 
 Add to this the interminable chains of mines, torpedoes and other infer- 
 nal agencies, and Dewey's hardihood can be comprehended. That mo- 
 mentous Saturday night, as the squadron steamed toward the unknown, 
 Dewey called the illustrious company commanding the several ships, to 
 counsel. The group comprised, Captain Charles V. Gridley, of the flag- 
 ship ; of the Raleigh, Captain Joseph B. Coghlan ; Boston, Commander 
 G. F. F. Wilde; Baltimore, Commander Nehemiah M. Dyer; Concord, 
 Commander Asa Walker; Petrel, Captain E. P. Wood; McCulloch, Captain 
 D. B. Hodgson. Dewey made known his plan of operations succinctly 
 and confidentially. He proposed, he declared, to carry out the President's 
 order. He directed the captains to slip into the bay past the islands under 
 cover of the night, and then make at the Spanish squadron, wherever 
 found. They were cautioned to extinguish all lights, and pay no heed to 
 shots fired at them in passing. It was after midnight when the captains 
 were rowed back to their vessels. The large moon suddenly slumped out 
 of sight, and the sea was a wilderness of misty darkness. The audacious 
 armada was soon at the crucial juncture of fort, fleet and mines. The 
 commander took the place of peril, as his old tutor Farragut used to do. 
 The Olympia steamed in spectral majesty under the sweep of the Cor- 
 regidor guns, and the rest of the line followed. The lights on the island 
 were plainly visible, when the men were called up to wash and get a stay- 
 ing draught of coffee. The silence of* the hour neither night nor morn- 
 ing made the ship's noises so distinct, that they grew into volcanic up- 
 roars in the excited minds of the crews. It seemed as if the mighty 
 throbbings of the engines must be audible even in Manila, thirty miles 
 away. 
 
 For hours, which seemed ages, the ships crept along until they came 
 into the channel, moving in single file, and without a sound on board, ex- 
 cept quiet orders and the throb of the engines and thwacks of the screws. 
 In that still air, it seemed impossible to escape the vigilance of the forts, yet 
 the Olympia, Baltimore, Raleigh, Petrel, Concord and Boston passed with- 
 out even the challenge of a hail. The batteries of Corregidor and Caballo 
 were mute, although the flagship passed well in range, with the Baltimore, 
 following still closer inshore. It was incredible to Dewey and his com- 
 manders, that the garrisons were at their posts and awake, for it seemed 
 that a fleet stealing into an enemy's bay never made so much noise. The 
 flotilla would all have been inside squadron, supply ships, and convoy 
 without the Spanish guards receiving the faintest intimation of its ap-
 
 106 PASSIXG CORREGIDOR. 
 
 proach, if it had not been for a fireman on board the McCulloch. Possi- 
 bly her commander had some idea that he was running behind and told 
 the engineer to put on a little more steam. It was supposed that the men 
 at the boilers got the idea that this was needed, and, throwing open the 
 furnace doors, a few shovelfuls of soft coal were dumped in. Up from 
 the smokestack of the cutter went a great shower of sparks. " If some 
 one doesn't see that, the whole island must be asleep," an officer on the 
 Olympia exclaimed. Some one evidently did see it, but even then the 
 answer did not come instantly, for some minutes elapsed before,out from 
 the west there came a bugle call, then a flash, and then the rolling boom 
 of a great gun. Between the flash and the report there should have been 
 the drop somewhere of the shot that went with them, but nobody in the 
 fleet ever saw or heard anything to prove that Spain's first gun in the 
 battle of Manila Bay, fired anything more than a blank cartridge. Twice 
 more the battery fired, and somewhere astern of the McCulloch, there was 
 a great splashing of water, but there was no ball felt anywhere near the 
 line. Up to the third shot with its answering splash, no reply was made 
 by the invading fleet, but with the third shot, and sounding almost like 
 its echo, there was a roar from the Concord. In what particular part of 
 the fort that shot hit, no one knew. Then further back, the Boston took 
 up the signal and sent in an eight-inch shell. Still further to the rear, the 
 McCulloch having started the melee, continued as if for diversion. The 
 batteries kept on flashing and booming a few minutes longer, and then 
 became silent. There remained the torpedoes and mines with which the 
 entrance was strewn, and Admiral Montojo's fleet rushing out to ram the 
 groping vessels. But it is recorded by a participant, that the unanimous 
 feeling was, that if mines were there, they were there, and that was all 
 there was about it. Still in the deep darkness just before the dawn, the 
 adventurous ships sailed implacably onward. Commodore Dewey was 
 talking in an undertone to the rebel Philippine, who was acting as pilot. 
 The figures of the men could be seen standing silently at their posts, up 
 and down the ship. An officer analyzing the sensations of that crisis of 
 the advance, declared "This invisible fleet ahead was a test out of which 
 no man came without a sigh of relief. It is a hard thing to whisper an 
 order, I know, so perhaps it is not to be wondered at that there should 
 have been a break, or vibration in the men's voices, as they passed the * 
 necessary word from mouth to mouth. We were all keyed up, but it was 
 not long before the fighting string in every man's heart was twanging and 
 singing like that of a taut bow." 
 
 Never in the history of desperate enterprises, was the flower safety
 
 THE SPANISH FLEET. 107 
 
 more daringly plucked from the nettle danger. It was known that the 
 Spanish fleet, in numbers, largely outnumbered the craft at Dewey's com- 
 mand. A victorious captain-general had just subdued a prolonged out- 
 break on the main islands, and it was generally supposed that the arsenals 
 of the harbors were amply guarded, and the stores abundant. It had 
 gone forth too, that a deadly system of mining had made the harbor of 
 Manila impossible to navigate, even were there no fleet to impede the 
 entrance. It was true, as a matter of fact, that Admiral Montojo's vessels 
 were more in number than the squadron of attack, but there the com- 
 parison ends, for one of our battle ships far surpassed any two of the 
 Spanish. In guns, in all the appliances that make fighting machines ef- 
 fective, our less numerous squadron was immeasurably superior. In an- 
 other respect the disparity was more vitally apparent. The conduct of 
 the Yankee crews, the inventive fertility of the rank and file, the quality, 
 which is often spoken of as " moral stamina," made our fleet incompa- 
 rably more than a match for an equal number-, even on superior fighting 
 machines. This, however, could only be a hope, not a reliance in Dewey's 
 calculations when he set sail from Hong Kong. 
 
 The last great colonial empire of the world possessions of Spain, were 
 within three days' steaming of the cosmopolitan haven of Hong Kong, 
 long held by the British. Pendulating between revolution and anarchy, 
 the tribes of this vast insular empire had been draining the life-blood of 
 the monarchy for years. Pro-consuls had been sent out, as to Cuba, had 
 waged ruthless war for a season, and returned to the metropolitan, pro- 
 claiming peace. But barely had the word reached Madrid, when revolt 
 was reported ; new bands were in motion and the Spanish masters in a 
 panic. The distance from the seat of government, the immensity of the 
 area of the islands, made it difficult to frame effective action from Mad- 
 rid. Had the affairs of the colony been in the hands of strong govern- 
 ments, capable administrators, the problem was great enough to tax the 
 sagacity of the most enlightened and accomplished statesmen. 
 
 But, as in Spain where a succession of adventurers succeeded in cabinet 
 after cabinet, so in the Philippines, adventurer after adventurer took up 
 the heavy burden of administration, and failed. The causes of these fail- 
 ures are precisely those that brought ruin upon Spain herself. Indolence, 
 ignorance, rapacity, the cynical venality deplored by every thoughtful 
 Spaniard. Captain-general after captain -general followed each other 
 at stated intervals, each returning to Spain enriched by his pro-consulate! 
 But even the fatuous misrule of the Spaniards would not have brought 
 about rebellion, if outside nationalities had not set the discontented into
 
 108 BATTLE DISCOVERS FACULTIES. 
 
 active revolt. There are no natives capable of aspiring to independence, 
 none that have the remotest conception of self-rule, or rule of any kind, 
 save the bludgeon or the bow string. But the Japanese, the Chinese and 
 even some of the more restless of the Western states of Christendom, 
 kept the natives in activity, with the purpose of wearing Spain out and 
 seizing the coveted territories. 
 
 Bismarck began the policy some years ago, by a claim on that group of 
 the Philippines known as the Caroline islands. He naively professed 
 that he had no idea they formed part of the possessions of Spain ; that 
 they were lying unclaimed by any competent authority, and that Germany 
 needed them ! Spain flew into a passion. Europe became interested. 
 Britain saw that her predominance in the Orient would be put in jeopard. 
 Spain was therefore encouraged to arm, to resist, and Britain would stand 
 by. Bismarck had no motion of going as far as a general war. He saw 
 that if he persisted in seizing the islands, that he would have to fight the 
 British. He was given a chance to withdraw without letting it be seen 
 that he was driven out ; the matter was submitted to the arbitration of 
 the Pope, and as prearranged, the pontiff reaffirmed Spain's title. 
 
 Dewey knew that his ships were perfect, in so far as they represented 
 what has come to be known as a " class " of fighting machines. They 
 had never been tried in action ; it was problematical whether the most 
 accomplished of the trained craftsmen could really guide and manipulate 
 the million niceties of invention that make the handling of a battle ship, 
 the work of a scientific adept. 
 
 As war reveals a people to itself, battle discovers to men, faculties they 
 are hardly conscious of. To manoeuver a stately battle ship, under the 
 rubric of the rules laid down in the school of the mariner, is far from do- 
 ing the same work in the stress of conflict. For not the least of the de- 
 mand upon the sailor or soldier, is the denial of curiosity ! He may not 
 stop to watch the thrilling phantasmagoria of strife ; he may not even 
 follow the meteoric parabola of the ball he speeds to do deathly work. 
 The shouts and cries of command or pain, the hoarse cheers in the pan- 
 demonium about him, the echoing voice of stertorous defiance in the 
 murky deeps beyond these he may not linger to take count of. He 
 must push hand, limb, body, sight, every faculty that differentiates the 
 man from the machine, how much soever of a prodigy it may be in com- 
 plicated workmanship. He is lost in the savage exultation of death ; but 
 he has none of the gluttonous delight of his ancestor, the redman, whose 
 blow preceded the triumph of the scalp the ecstasy of his enemy's dy- 
 ing groan or servile surrender.
 
 DEWEY'S COOLNESS. 
 
 109 
 
 Dewey's fleet had just enough ammunition to fight one battle, if the 
 resistance were not prolonged. This however, was not known to the sail- 
 ors, though the veterans must have divined it. Hence the daring of the 
 attack reaches the stage of heroism known as the forlorn hope for had 
 the Spanish fleet, resisted long enough, had Admiral Montojo been able 
 
 WORKING A FIVE-INCH RAPID FIRE GUN. 
 
 to shelter his vessels as he could have done, or as Dewey would have 
 done, had the emergency required it; our fleet would have found itself in 
 the enemy's harbor, four thousand miles from coal and ammunition 1 
 
 Dewey had taken all the precautions his daring implied. He had in- 
 formed himself of the enemy's resources ; he knew to a gun the armament 
 that would resist him. He had such charts and outlines as it was possi- 
 ble for agents of our government to procure. But he couldn't foreknow 
 the absolute poverty of the arsenal; the treasonable lack of precautions in 
 the vital defences of the harbor of Manila. It is a testimony to his 
 heroism that he went to his work anticipating all the dangers that skill, 
 prudence, scientific knowledge and ample warning foreboded. He ex- 
 pected to pass as did Farragut, his ancient commander at Mobile, miles of
 
 110 THE OPENING GUN. 
 
 water strewn with torpedoes, nets to impede his vessels, guns banked on 
 the island of Corregidor, commanding the entrance to the bay, us ef- 
 fectually as Staten Island guards the approaches of New York. For 
 Manila, as the chief city and naval entrepot of Spain's Oriental Empire, 
 was naturally supposed to be ready at all times for just such an onset as 
 Dewey meditated. 
 
 The recent war between China and Japan had illustrated the defects 
 of great ships alone, as protections to harbors. Admonished by China's 
 collapse, it was only natural to suppose that Manila would present an ag- 
 gressive defence redoubtable to the strongest squadron that Britain her- 
 self could bring to bear. All this Dewey counted upon, when after the 
 fateful sail across the Yellow Sea, his squadron came in sight of the 
 island of Corregidor. He had timed his approach to the crucial point, at 
 an hour when he would have the cover of darkness. But in the hands of 
 competent men, darkness would have been no shield. Invention has 
 placed it in the power of defenders of strong places, on the coast, to throw 
 wide beams of light across the pathway of approaching ships, to surprise 
 the most cautious night advance. Dewey 's fleet had almost wholly passed 
 the island, when a bed of soft coal in one of the furnaces of the fleet sent 
 up a lurid flame. A shot from one of the forts followed, but as the ships 
 had been moving as they neared land, with all lights out and every pre- 
 caution against the faintest twinkle of a lantern, the startled enemy had 
 nothing in sight to fire at. 
 
 With characteristic confidence, which under other circumstances might 
 have seemed reckless bravado, the fleet returned a salvo. Now this 
 passage at arms accentuates the incredible lack of preparation that the 
 whole combat discovered. This opening gun was fired seventeen miles 
 from Manila, but there was no telegraphic line communicating with the 
 admiral in command ! The destinies of the campaign might have been de- 
 cided by a timely telegram to the commander. At the rate the fleet 
 sailed four miles an hour to reach Manila, after this first warning shot, 
 the Spanish fleet could have been made ready. But no word was carried 
 to the unconscious Admiral Montojo. Scores of Krnpp guns of the 
 heaviest calibre lined the embattled cliffs on each side of Corregidor ; in 
 the hands of determined men, these guns could have riddled the stoutest 
 armor and made the fleet an easy conquest; for even the inferior ships of 
 the Spaniards, with mines properly placed along the channel, would have 
 made the entrance to the bay, a holocaust. Believing that these were 
 in his path, believing that the Krupp guns would do their office, Dewey, 
 without an instant's hesitation, pushed on to their encounter I
 
 THE MIDNIGHT ORDEAL. Ill 
 
 This ordeal began at midnight. As the dawn broke with a flash, in the 
 way day breaks in these tropic lands, the fleet was revealed in the 
 lovely harbor of Manila, each vessel stripped for action, and the long files 
 of stalwart men asleep beside their guns, expecting an onset every 
 minute, from midnight on, neither officers nor men ventured to quit the 
 decks. The sunlight revealed an entrancing spectacle to the eager mar- 
 iners. In curving circles of dewy green, the vernal parterres of the main- 
 land arose like blooming amphitheatres ; in the dazzling foliage nestled 
 the gay pavilions of Manila's suburbs; in the centre of the city itself, 
 uprose in tranquil majesty, spires and domes a vision of repose. In the 
 clear air, the soft jangle of the early church bells came soothingly across 
 the radiant waters. But beyond the curving line of peace, the grim por~ 
 tents of war engrossed the eager gaze of the men. Far other than the 
 music of the bells came from that quarter. The Spanish ships, some 
 visible, others concealed behind the tortuosities of Cavite, were making 
 ready to challenge the Yankee right of way. 
 
 In keeping with the shiftless state of the enemy's fleets, defences and 
 what not, our sailors could see the hurry and confusion that paralyzed the 
 Spanish crews. Manila had been apprized that war was declared : the com- 
 mander of the fleet was in cable communication with Hong Kong, and 
 must have known the exact status of his adversary. He had Spanish 
 compatriots in Hong Kong who could have served him as our consul in 
 Manila had served Dewey. But these elementary preparations and pre- 
 cautions never seem to have entered into Captain-general Augusti's or 
 Admiral Montojo's plan of campaign. The approach of the Yankees was 
 a bewildering surprise. The wrecked admiral in accounting for his an- 
 nihilation, naively confessed that he did not look for the hostile fleet 
 under a week at the earliest, yet it was not by swift sailing our fleet was 
 so promptly on the scene; for the Federal commander systematically 
 held the squadron at half speed. From the moment the island of Cor- 
 regidor was sighted, the rate was diminished to four miles an hour, to 
 guard against torpedo and mining enterprises. Significantly too, the 
 sailors were impressed superstitiously, by the fate of the Maine, for the 
 name of that vessel was heard in every corner where tars were gathered 
 in the solemn conclaves that precede battle. None feared open fight 
 shot or shell but to be ignobly smothered like rats in a tub has the hor- 
 ror for sailors, that the prison bars of Andersonville came to have for the 
 soldiers during the Civil War. But when the glorious tropic dawn irradi- 
 ated the surface of the sea, and the tars caught a glimpse of the Spanish 
 squadron, their trained eyes detected that while the men aboard might be
 
 112 STRIPPED FOR ACTION. 
 
 models of valor, the care of the ships was derisive. For it was noted that 
 there was no steam issuing from the pipes, no smoke to indicate fires. 
 The fleet indeed lay supine in the grasp of the determined captain, who 
 braving all, was to win all. Not so on the Yankee ships. The tropic 
 heat had warned the tars that garments would be a peril. When the 
 guns were ready, the men stood at them stripped to the belt, and remained 
 in this unconventional costume until the ships were " tidied " up for in- 
 
 SPANISH VESSELS BLOCKADED AT MANILA. 
 
 epection after the combat was ended. It is eminently worth recording, 
 that the time of a number of the plain sailors had expired just as Dewey 
 received the word from Washington to seek, engage, and destroy the 
 Spanish fleet. In every instance, the men asked to join in the battle and 
 though no longer amenable to the rules of war, fought the fight and did 
 duty like their brethren. 
 
 Such exhibitions are worth volumes as indicating the spirit of the rank 
 and file, the affectionate consideration in which the trained hierarchies of 
 the fleet are held. For there was never a time when a British seaman 
 was known to remain an hour in service, after the terra of his legal release 
 struck. The picture is fitly finished by the appearance of one of these 
 modest heroes at the White House, on the return from the field of his 
 glory, to narrate to the chief magistrate the incidents of the battle as a 
 gunner's eye saw it. It would not be a complete history of the epoch,
 
 THE SPANISH LINE. 113 
 
 that omitted this characteristic detail. Scores of incidents like these en- 
 dear Lincoln to the plain people he counted on so confidently to carry 
 the country through the ordeal of war. 
 
 From the compact mass of the Spanish line, came the opening volley, 
 our fleet moving in prescribed regularity, as if in evolution. Dewey in his 
 place of peril, on the bridge of the flagship Olympia, stood gravely calcu- 
 lating the gunmanship of his enemy. To the strained attention of the 
 men, immobile at the guns, it seemed as if the commander had forgotten 
 the mission of his fleet. Nearer the vessels ranged in due order to the 
 enemy's foreline, now sending missiles over the Yankee decks, hurtling 
 through every projection of the ships. The Spanish flagship, the Reina 
 Christina (Queen Christina) was 4,000 yards away, when she sent her 
 first salute to the impassible commander. In an instant the flagship be- 
 came the target of the Spanish line ; the air was a pandemonium of crack- 
 ing shells and whizzing shot. Still Dewey stood silent; finally, having 
 gauged the accuracy of the enemy's fire, he turned to the waiting subor- 
 dinate with the word': 
 
 " When you are ready you may fire, Gridley ! " 
 
 The massive bulk of the Olympia turned her side to the line of fire and 
 the roar from her enormous guns sounded almost simultaneously with the 
 commodore's tranquilly uttered signal. Each ship in its turn took up the 
 refrain. Then was seen the incommunicable something meant by dis- 
 cipline, the effects of enlightened training, the spirit of confidence that 
 enables a guiding mind to achieve the utmost results hoped for, planned 
 for, in the fallow years of peace. The men in every division of the innu- 
 merable parts seamen play, laid hold of their work as though its execution 
 under shot and shell were the oldest of old stories. The Spanish mis- 
 siles came in hurtling clouds about each ship ; and it must be borne in 
 mind that not the least of the benumbing terrors of battle on sea or land, 
 is the indescribable clamor of the bursting bombs ; the whizzing shot, 
 whether its speed be checked by a human body or the inert mass of the 
 ship's metal. Mingled with the tornado of shot and shell directed from 
 the Spanish ships, four well mounted earthworks added a continuous 
 deluge upon Dewey 's squadron. 
 
 Though the din and carnage seemed the blind fury of uncontrollable 
 forces, that is, events following each other by chance or coincidence, 
 studied design marked every volley, every movement of each ship had a 
 double consigne to act with such relation to natural obstacles as to gain the 
 greatest efficiency for her broadside and least expose vulnerable parts: to 
 keep in movement and in such guise as to give the enemy the least chance
 
 114 COOL HEAD AXD STRONG ARM. 
 
 to get sight on vulnerable parts. To gradually diminish the distance as 
 the work of destruction visibly shattered the effective force of the enemy. 
 This plan of operations kept our fleet in constant movement, easing the 
 strain on each battery in turn, and enabling every part of the ship's of- 
 fensive equipment to come into play by graduated instalments, so to 
 speak. Above all, it gave the masses of men, who could not see what was 
 going on, the unspeakable solace of feeling that all was going well, for 
 they were carrying out precisely the orders received in squadron drill ; 
 that was reassurance that no destructive missiles had crippled the vessel ; 
 nothing out of the normal had come to pass. And as after all the effect- 
 iveness of the vessel depends utterly upon the cool head and the strong 
 arm imprisoned among the mechanical appliances, this of itself reveals 
 the scope of Dewey's masterful system. Simple as the manceuvering 
 seems, in fact inevitable, it was clearly not counted on by the Spanish 
 Admiral Montojo, an accomplished mariner, as the tribute of Dewey at- 
 tests. Montojo had so aligned his ships, as to compel a standing fight, 
 ship to ship, and under such conditions he would have added immeasura- 
 bly to his chances for the guns of Cavite would have been as deadly as 
 the volleys from his broadsides. To have planted his line abreast the 
 Spanish line, would have lessened the offensive force of Dewey's squadron 
 by nearly half, for it would have taken time to turn each ship to bring 
 each broadside into play. A realistic observer, whose official functions 
 held him near the commodore during the evolutions, contributes the 
 charming detail, that as the fleet having safely anchored the supply ships 
 out of range, circled majestically back eastward toward the wharves of 
 Manila, Dewey, weighted with a responsibility that we who read and 
 wonder, lose sight of in the result, commented on the lovely lines of 
 landscape, likening the peaceful picture of earth, sea and sky with one of 
 his own Vermont home scenes. It was remarked of another commander, 
 Wilde of the Boston, that in the deadliest grapple of the combat, when 
 iron fell like hail, and no one knew the instant the torpedoes would sound 
 the ships' doom, he held a broad palm leaf fan and worked it with vigor. 
 Naturally the commander of fleet or vessel, were objects of interest to 
 their juniors and the testimony on each ship shows that the country can 
 count on as many Deweys as it has educated sailors. Once, for a mo- 
 ment, the breath of all who had time to glance overboard ceased, the 
 flesh crawled as the Baltimore rushed thunderingly toward the jaws of 
 flame, the water uprose in a pyramid of glittering jets the surface of 
 the water seemed to start upward a sensation as of the first disturbance 
 of an earthquake was imagined, not felt. Every man on ship seeing this
 
 THE DIN OF BROADSIDES. 115 
 
 recognized that the unknown had come. The torpedoes were taking a 
 hand. But there was no outward sign of the inward horror. They were 
 there to die, but before dying they were there to destroy the destroyers. 
 The ships sailed on implacably as the fate that had summoned them. 
 That, however, was the last evidence of the mining that was to undo the 
 invader, supposing him to pass the outer barricades. 
 
 Unlike most battles at sea there were witnesses at hand to mark every 
 stage, every gun shot, so-to-speak, that each side fired. Dewey himself 
 seemed intent on solving the scientific results; the aggressive and passive 
 potentialities of his own and the enemy's armaments. There was none of 
 the clamorous frenzy of shouting men and maniac officers, we read of in 
 the old days of wooden ships, where officers with cutlasses stood over the 
 gunners shrieking forth alternate commands and objurgations. Indeed 
 the fighting man moved with the same orderly determination, exacted at 
 drill. To get the full effect of the guns and the best results from the 
 men, each ship turned an alternate side in firing. Thus the groups at the 
 guns had an interval of ten minutes or more to rest, while their mates on 
 the other side were firing. In spite of the " smokeless " powder, dense 
 clouds of black smoke rose rapidly, cutting off the clear outlines of the 
 embattled enemy. 
 
 The din of broadsides had gone on perhaps fifteen minutes, when a 
 movement of significance was discerned among the Spanish ships. Into 
 the shot torn sea, directly in the line of the Olympia, came the Spanish 
 flagship, the majestic leader of the enemy's fleet. Admiral Montojo, 
 recognizing the Olympia as the rival flag bearer, made intrepidly toward 
 her. Dewey saw the manoeuvre and leaning over the rail of the bridge, 
 directed an officer to bid the gunners turn every muzzle upon the oncom- 
 ing assailant. The Spanish admiral could be seen on the bridge, direct- 
 ing the battle, with his two sons as aids beside him. At each turn in the 
 circuit made by the fleet, the Reina Christina made head toward the 
 Olympia ; every man in the fleet became conscious of the duel of the flag- 
 ships ; every gun was pointed with more deliberate aim toward the 
 Spanish leader, which advanced and retired with the coming and going 
 of the flag ship. Dewey had noted the tactics and when the Christina 
 turned to take temporary breathing space behind the Cavite spur, an 
 eight inch shell was sent square into the retreating ship's stern. 
 
 The immense missile struck squarely under the protecting deck plates, 
 tore through the length of the vessel, and when nearly at the other end 
 of the hulk, exploded the powder magazine. The havoc was beyond 
 words, destructive. One hundred and thirty men were killed or wounded ;
 
 116 
 
 THE DUEL OF THE FLAGSHIPS. 
 
 the noble ship was almost annihilated as a fighting machine. The cap- 
 tain was instantly killed and seventy-five per cent, of the crew disabled, 
 by this single shot ! 
 
 Of this episode an eye witness gives this remarkable picture: "The 
 commodore passed the word to concentrate all possible fire on the Reina 
 
 ADMIRAL PATRICK) MONTOJO Y PARASON. 
 
 Christina, and she actually shivered under the battering of our storm of 
 shot and shell. Rents appeared near her water line where the eight-inch 
 shells had torn their way. One shot struck the port bridge on which 
 Admiral Montojo stood, upon which like the brave man he was, the ad-
 
 TONS OF STEEL. 1 1 7 
 
 miral coolly stepped to the other end. But no bravery could stand the 
 driving, crushing, rending of the tons of steel which we poured into the 
 Christina, and there was quite a little cheer from our forward men as the 
 Spanish flagship turned and made for the shore. But appreciation of 
 courage on the part of the enemy, did not prevent our gunners from also 
 appreciating the excellent opportunity which the retreating flagship gave 
 us for a raking shot. As she got into her swing with the stern dead to- 
 ward us, one of Captain Gridley's guns thundered, and an eight-inch 
 shell struck the enemy as squarely in the centre as though she had been 
 painted off in target squares. It was a bull's eye so marvelous in its ex- 
 actness and so terrible in its effects that I cannot help speaking of it a 
 little more at length. We saw from where we stood that it shattered the 
 Christina's steering gear, and, unless our eyes very much deceived us, we 
 saw, too, that the Spaniard was actually driven forward with a shivering 
 motion like one prize fighter sent in catapult fashion staggering into the 
 ropes from the fist blow of another prize fighter. From what we learned 
 then, and from what we learned afterward, I am convinced that no man 
 in the squadron had up to that time an idea of the awfully destructive 
 possibilities of the eight incher. The projectile weighed two hundred 
 and fifty pounds, and one hundred and fifty pounds of powder were used 
 to expel it. The gun itself was about twenty-eight feet long. When it 
 left Gridley's gun the shell traveled at the rate of two thousand feet a. 
 second. The distance between the Olympia and the Reina Christina was 
 about two thousand five hundred yards, and the time between the shot's 
 leaving the muzzle of our gun, and its impact on the stern of the Spanish 
 ship was the scarcely appreciable one of five seconds. When it left our 
 gun it had what is technically known as an energy of eight thousand and 
 eleven hundred foot-tons ; that is, it would have gone through twenty-one 
 and a half inches of Harveyized steel. But the Reina Christina was an 
 unarmored vessel and all that enormous penetrative energy was expended 
 on the Spanish cruiser's protected sides, and such internal resistance as 
 partitions, bulkheads, engines, etc. It was through all these obstructions- 
 that the great shell tore its way until it reached the aft boiler. There it 
 exploded, and as it did so, ripped up the deck of the cruiser and scattered 
 its hail of steel in all directions. We could see the smoke pouring out 
 of the vessel, the gush of escaping steam and the shower of splinters and 
 mangled bodies." Dewey, of course, did not know the completeness 
 of the work done by this one fateful ball. Admiral Montojo contributes 
 the sequel : " Although we recognized the hopelessness of fighting the 
 American ships, we were busy returning their fire. The Reina Christina
 
 118 
 
 EIGHT-INCH GUXS. 
 
 \ 
 
 WORKING THE "OLYMPIAD" EIGHT-INCH GUNS. 
 
 raa hit repeatedly. Shortly after 6:30 o'clock I observed fire forward.
 
 EFFECT OF ONE SHOT. 
 
 119 
 
 Our steering gear was damaged, rendering the vessel unmanageable, and 
 we were being subjected to a terrible hail of shell and shot. The engines 
 were struck ; we estimated that we had seventy hits about our hull and 
 superstructure. The boilers were not hit, but the pipe to the condenser 
 
 ADMIRAL MONTOJO LEAVING HIS FLAGSHIP. 
 
 was destroyed. A few moments later I observed the after part on fire. 
 A shell from the Americans had penetrated and burst with deadly effect, 
 killing many of our men. The flag lieutenant said to me: 4 The ship is 
 in flames. It is impossible to stay on the Christina any longer.' He signalled 
 to the gunboat Isle de Cuba, and I and my staff were transferred, and my 
 7
 
 120 BREAKFAST TIME. 
 
 flag hoisted on her. Before leaving the Christina, my flag was hauled 
 down. My flagship was now one mass of flames. I ordered away all the 
 boats I could to save the crew." 
 
 Dewey at this point, not aware of the extremity of the enemy, made 
 signal to cease firing. A blinding, impenetrable smoke hid everything 
 above and about the vessels. It was impossible to distinguish visual 
 signals. The group near Dewey 's eyrie heard this dialogue. 
 
 " What time is it, Reese?" in the commodore's ordinary Yankee drawl. 
 " Seven forty-five, sir," Reese spoke imperturbably as if the ships were in 
 Boston harbor. 
 
 " Breakfast time," the commodore rejoined, smiling " run up the sig- 
 nal to cease firing, and follow me." It impresses the irony of events, 
 that the Spaniards at sight of the withdrawing fleets, sent up delirious 
 cheers. It was at this juncture that the unfortunate Montojo's superior, 
 like the Austrian at Marengo, sent the dispatch which intoxicated Madrid, 
 that the Yankee fleet had drawn off disabled. To accentuate their joy, 
 which they believed a triumph, the lands forts deluged the retiring squad- 
 ron with Krupp missiles. " No reply, I suppose, sir," asked the Olympiad 
 executive officer. "Oh, no," Dewey answered. "Let them amuse them- 
 selves. We shall have plenty of chance to burn powder after breakfast. 
 We haven't really begun fighting yet." 
 
 The combat had been waged since a few minutes after five. But the men 
 had been in a tension equal to a battle of twenty hours. Indeed the 
 tension had begun so soon as the dim surfaces of the Philippines could 
 be distinguished, the night before. To stop in the heat and fury of a 
 combat to eat, was a new thing in sea warfare, and the fancy of the ma- 
 rines all over the world was immensely amused at the evidence of Yankee 
 imperturbability. Dewey, however, had more weighty reasons than feed- 
 ing his outworn crews, vital as that need was. It behooved him to hus- 
 band his ammunition. He had tested the enemy's capacit} r for aggression 
 and if the conflict were to be prolonged, he must take note of the resour- 
 ces at Montojo's command. While the men were breakfasting, the Span- 
 iards had an opportunity to take an initiative. If they were capable of 
 an onset, the Yankee fleet was ready, but the silence in the deeps behind 
 Cavite and the conduct of the flagship, convinced Dewey that he had so 
 crippled the armada and forts that it would be running no risk to freely 
 use his ammunition in destroying the fleet, or forcing a surrender. 
 
 When the action ceased and the various fleet captains were signalled 
 to report their losses and damage, on Dewey's flagship, the body that 
 surrounded the commander regarded each other with stupefaction?
 
 THE LAST SIGNAL. 121 
 
 They had been firing and receiving fire for nearly three hours, and had 
 the miraculous tale to tell, that not a man had been injured, not a splinter 
 had been knocked from an iron frame I Dewey could scarcely believe 
 his ears. When the officers at the end of thirty minutes returned with 
 the astounding story to the ships, there was an outburst of cheers that 
 puzzled the Spaniards, for they were in the despair of men who recognize 
 that no valor can bring victory. 
 
 Admiral Montojo gives the picture in eloquent brevity : " Only a few 
 men were drowned, the majority being picked up by the boats. Before 
 jumping overboard, Captain Cadarso's son, a lieutenant on board the 
 Christina, saw his father alive on deck, but others state that as the cap- 
 tain was about to leave, a shell burst overhead and killed him. We esti- 
 mated that fifty-two men were killed on board the Christina, and about 
 150 wounded. In the Castilla about fifteen men were killed, but there 
 were many wounded both on the Castilla and the Don Juan, on which 
 thirteen men were killed. Altogether 400 men were killed and wounded 
 in our ships. As soon as I translated myself from the Reina Christina to 
 the Isle de Cuba, all the shots were directed upon the Cuba, following my 
 flag. We sought shelter behind the pier at Cavite, and recognizing the 
 futility of fighting more, I prepared to disembark, and gave orders for 
 the evacuation of the remainder of our ships. The Castilla had been on 
 fire from end to end for some time, and was of course already abandoned- 
 The Ulloa was also burning. 
 
 " My last signal to the captains of all vessels was : * Scuttle and aban 
 don your .ships.' This was about 7:30. The Reina Christina, Castilla 
 Don Juan d' Austria, Velasco and Ulloa, were all destroyed in this en 
 gagement. To prevent the guns being of use to the Americans, the cap 
 tains on abandoning them brought away portions of their mechanism 
 and also succeeding in saving all the ships' papers and treasure." 
 
 Unconscious of the havoc his ships had wrought, that is, the finality ot 
 the work done, Dewey ordered the renewal of the action at 10:45. The 
 fleet as fresh and staunch as when the opening gun boomed over tha 
 waters, headed serenely for the slaughter pen. As the concourse steamed 
 over the waters, the music of the church bells could be heard distinctly 
 from Manila, as though war were unknown in the port! The forts, 
 almost alone maintained the second combat. They were well armed, and 
 had the guns been well served, we should have paid a costly price for the 
 final conquest. But the same miraculous fortune attended to the end. 
 With his ships riddled into useless hulks, their crews decimated, the forts 
 silenced, Admiral Montojo was forced at the end of two hours to end <i
 
 122 EVERYTHING READY? 
 
 resistance whose heroism redeemed the end. For it adds to the splendor 
 of Dewey's triumph, that he overcame a resistance as desperate as sea 
 annals record. Had Spain done by her sailors one-half that her sailors 
 did for her, the contest at Manila would have left a different tale to tell. 
 History narrates down to the least syllable, the words of great seamen 
 in combats that bear feeble comparision with Dewey's work at Man- 
 ila. But there is no where in naval annals points more piquant, than 
 one observant officer's report from Dewey's flagship. The resumption 
 of the fight after the leisurely breakfast would have been called epic, had 
 it been recorded of Nelson. "Everything ready, Lieutenant?" Dewey 
 asked in his measured way. " I believe so, sir," Lamberton made answer. 
 " Very well, call to quarters and get under way." To his old friend 
 and comrade, Captain Dyer of the Baltimore, Dewey conceded the dan- 
 gers and glories of leading in the second assault. The programme had 
 been settled minutely. The Spanish fleet was to be finished, and then 
 the forts silenced. Plainly, Dewey now knew what he could do with his 
 ships, and knew the men he could count on, as well as what he might 
 look for from the Spaniards. The triumph of Montojo's seamen had been 
 shortlived. Even with the Yankees gone as they supposed to bind up 
 their wounds, the Spanish fleet was unable to right a gun or adjust a 
 splinter. The Baltimore's captain, emulous of the conduct of the flag- 
 ship, went to his task intrepidly, and yet with a certain circumspection. 
 As the ship ran within range she caught all the enemy's fire that was 
 left. It seemed that in their desperation the Spaniards fired better at 
 this time than they had in the earlier combat, for one of their shells ex- 
 ploded on the Baltimore's deck, wounding five men by scattering splin- 
 ters. No reply went from the Baltimore. A few minutes passed and 
 another shell burst on the ship's deck ; three more men were hit. Still 
 the Yankee did not reply. Shells plunged about the ship until she seemed 
 plowing through a bed of dynamite. When she reached about three-thou- 
 sand-yard range, she swung about and poured a broadside into the Keina 
 Christina. Every shot must have told, for the former flagship seemed 
 literally to crumble at the discharge. The smoke clouds hid everything 
 for a minute or two, but when they lifted, the Christina could be seen 
 bursting into fragments, the waters about her in a tempest of splinters. 
 Under that ferocious discharge of the Baltimore's guns, Captain Cadarso 
 and many of his men were killed. When the rain of her fragments had 
 ceased, the Christina settled and sank, the remainder of her crew jumping 
 overboard and swimming for the nearest consort. The Baltimore then 
 turned her attention to the San Juan d' Austria, the Olympia and
 
 WRECK OF THE AUSTRIA. 123 
 
 Raleigh steaming up to aid in the destruction. The three cruisers poured 
 a continuous stream into the Spaniard, which rocked under the concus- 
 sion. A shell from the Raleigh struck the Spaniard's magazine and ex- 
 ploded it. The doomed ship's decks went up like the crust of a volcano ; 
 so violent was the shock that the vessel next her, El Correo, careened in 
 almost complete wreck. The Austria was a wreck, and the El Correo 
 was so damaged, that the Petrel ran up close to the Spanish gun boat and 
 finished her by a few volleys. The cruisers Velasco and Castilla still re- 
 mained apparently able to fight. The Boston devoted herself to ending 
 the Velasco's activities. A broadside was landed from the cruiser with 
 such startling precision that the Spanish ship actually swung over side- 
 wise, revealing jagged rents in her starboard side that told the story. 
 She went down smoking, with barely time enough for her crew to throw 
 over their boats and make for the shore. The Castilla had been set on 
 fire in the first onslaught, and when the Concord and Baltimore poured 
 the tremendous weight of shells into her, she was scuttled in order to 
 prevent the magazine from exploding. "Every ship in the Spanish fleet," 
 says an eye witness, " with one exception fought valiantly, but to the Don 
 Antonio d' Ulloa and her commander Robion, should be given the palm 
 for that form of desperate courage and spirit which leads a man to die 
 fighting. The flagship and the Boston were the executioners. Under their 
 shells the Ulloa was soon burning in half a dozen places ; but her fighting 
 crew gave no signs of surrender. Shot after shot struck the Spaniard's 
 hull until it was riddled like a sieve. Shell after shell struck her upper 
 decks, until under the awful fire all of her upper guns were useless ; but 
 there were no signs of surrender. The main deck crew escaped, but the 
 captain and his officers clung to the wreck. On the lower deck her gun 
 crews stuck to their posts like the heroes they were. As shot after shot 
 struck the shivering hulk, still her lower guns answered back as best 
 they might; it seemed as though it was impossible to kill her. At last 
 we noticed her in the throes, that sickening unmistakable lurch of a sink- 
 ing ship. Her commander noticed it too, still there was no surrender. 
 Instead, he nailed the Spanish ensign to what was left of the mast and 
 the Don Antonio d' Ulloa went down, not only with her colors flying, 
 but also with her lower guns still roaring defiance. Just as the picture 
 of the Ulloa's end is luridly bright, so that of another ship is gloomily dark. 
 For the sake of her gallant mates, this ship shall be nameless. She had 
 hauled down her colors about the same time that the Ulloa had refused 
 to do so, and had gone down with them all aflutter. A boat's crew from 
 the McCulloch was signaled to go and take possession of this ship, when
 
 124 WE SURRENDER. 
 
 to our amazement she opened fire on the approaching gig. The ensign 
 stood up in the stern in open-mouthed wonder at such a piece of treachery, 
 but kept his boat along her course. The incident had not passed unob- 
 served by the squadron, however, and the Spaniard's fate was a swift one. 
 There was no need for the commodore to fly a signal, for it was as with 
 a common impulse that every one of our vessels stopped firing at the 
 enemy in general, and directed every available shot at that Spaniard in 
 particular. The bay leaped up and foamed around the traitorous vessel 
 as though it had been struck by the whip end of a Texas tornado, and 
 when the waters were at rest again the Spaniard had vanished as com- 
 pletely as though that tornado had carried her bodily into a neighboring 
 state." At 12:30, from the highest fortified point of Cavite, the Olym- 
 pia's flag officer read the message, " We surrender." 
 
 Then the work of destruction was turned to the rescue and re- 
 cuperation of the vanquished. On Dewey's fleet the sailors moved as if 
 in a dream ! It was at first difficult to make the grimy gunners believe 
 that the battle was ended ; that five hours' fighting had conquered the 
 last imperial possession of the Spanish monarchy. But the commanders 
 had no leisure to reflect on the magnitude of the work wrought in so 
 brief a space. Problems of poignant embarrassment, came with the re- 
 sponsibilities of victory. Though the right arm of Spanish power had 
 been crushed, a vigorous left arm remained to parry the final thrust. 
 The army of Spain remained intact in the fortifications of Manila, a few 
 miles away! Naturally the possession of Manila was desirable; until 
 the flag of the republic floated over its citadel, the conquest could not be 
 called complete ; yet without an army to occupy the strong places, there 
 was peril in taking possession. Dewey couldn't man his ships and garri- 
 son the town. The Spanish military commander couldn't resist a bom- 
 bardment, but he could and did refuse to withdraw, unless driven out by 
 the guns of the fleet. It was not however the mission of Dewey to 
 slaughter the innocent, to wantonly destroy private property. Beside 
 this, Manila is inhabited by colonies of many nationalities. These had to 
 be considered in the emergency of an attack. Dewey wisely deferred a 
 decision until he could hear from Washington. 
 
 Absorbing as the narrative of the battle to the reader, the telling of it 
 to each other on board ship, gives the officers and men a renewal of its 
 glories for many a day, and indeed will continue to thrill every one under 
 the flag, so long as war stories are related by men. It is the evidence of 
 the officers, that among the men the general impression had prevailed 
 that they were going to have a battle in the dark, with all its dangers of
 
 JOY OF THE CRKWS. 125 
 
 firing at friend or foe. When the real spectacular programme broke on 
 them, the relief of the men was eloquent of what followed. Few of the 
 crews had ever been under fire, but when once the battle did begin, they, 
 despite the fever of fight acted with the precision of veterans. Once in 
 it, they did not want to stop. When the breakfast order was known 
 below the decks or in untoward places, voices could be heard remonstrat- 
 ingly. " Oh, let's finish it up," but when the news spread that the com- 
 modore was only taking wind between the rounds, it was no longer pos- 
 sible to restrain them, nor for a moment or two was there any attempt to 
 exact the strict enforcement of discipline. All over the decks the tars 
 could be seen slapping each other on the back, shaking hands, and doing 
 a few steps of horn pipe, and this, not because there was not a man missing 
 from any mess, but because they were going to fight again. There was 
 need, however, for the interlude. The smoke of battle had grown so 
 thick that signals could not be seen. Dewey had started out to destroy 
 the Spanish fleet and he had his own way of doing it. It was turning 
 out to be an easier task than he had anticipated. He concluded that 
 there was no occasion to hurry, that as the men had been fighting on a 
 single cup of coffee all round, and a hot morning, it was just as well to 
 haul off for a little while for second breath. 
 
 Says a participant : " It had been bad enough for us ; breathing the 
 powder smoke; clinging to the railings as the ship shivered and shook 
 after each discharge ; exposed, of course, to the enemy's fire and scamp- 
 ering back and forward as the occasion required, but we were in the open 
 and could in a degree see what was going on. So, too, could the men 
 behind the shield guns, because, notwithstanding precautionary orders, 
 as the fight proceeded, the jackies persisted in running out to watch the 
 effect of their shots and to see generally how things were getting along. 
 But what must it have been for the men in the turrets ! Take for in- 
 stance the forward turret of the Olympia on that broiling hot Sunday 
 morning in the tropics. In the turret were the two eight inch guns and 
 twelve Yankee gunners, guns and men occupying about every available 
 inch of space. Above them and between the guns rose the platform of 
 the conning tower where Captain Gridley and his assistant perched. The 
 roar of the guns with their ear splitting concussions, and the occasional 
 crash of a Spanish shell on the turret, the hard, desperate work of man- 
 ning the guns in that confined and vibrating air, makes up a combination 
 of trials of which the man who has not experienced it can form no pos- 
 sible idea. Would you like to know what it is a man behind a turret 
 gun has to do? The turret crew is mustered, six for each gun, captain,
 
 126 IN THE TURRETS. 
 
 plugger, loader, sponger, liftman and shellman. Each man knows 
 exactly what his duties are, and has been drilled and drilled into them 
 until he has become an automaton animated by a soul. The crew is 
 kept on deck up to the very last instant, before entering the turret and 
 when once there, not a word except that of the division officer is heard. 
 The twelve half-naked men stand like statues beside the relentless ma- 
 chines of death. The order, " Cast loose and provide," is heard, and the 
 twelve machines flash into action. The breach is opened, elevating gear 
 inspected, lashings cast off, loading trays inspected, firing locks prepared, 
 slides placed, priming wires disposed, and all of the delicate parapher- 
 nalia that makes up a modern gun, inspected. Again the men become 
 machines, and the order " load " is given. Up from the magazine is 
 hauled the projectile and placed on the loading tray. The immense shell 
 is pushed home and by the time this is done the powder load has been 
 placed behind it. Gas checks and screw locks are adjusted, the breech is 
 locked home, the primer inserted, the lanyard hooked and the lock 
 cocked. Then comes the sighting, the man for this duty being one of 
 selection. Sometimes there is a man on ship who can point one of these 
 monster guns with the accuracy of a Texas ranger, and can do nothing 
 else well. Sometimes it is an officer who has a good eye, but in every 
 case the man at the sight judges for himself, and is the pivot man of the 
 engagement. The order to " fire " rings out, the lanyard is pulled and 
 the thunderbolt is on its way. Six shots a minute blazed out of the 
 Olympia's turret; the powder smoke poured through the portholes in a 
 choking smeach ; with each discharge the turret shook and rocked as 
 though in an earthquake; the air was shaken with a continuous crash 
 and thunder, but through it all the orders "sponge," "load," "point," 
 "fire," went on, and the twelve reeking, choking, quivering men went on, 
 with their labors, which chipped off a year of each man's life every in- 
 stant. No wonder that when the first round was over the turret-men 
 crept out into the open like so many victims of a colliery explosion 
 blackened, gasping, air-beating things. All honor, then, to "the men be- 
 hind the guns." 
 
 In his approach to the battle, the commander of the United States 
 fleet had taken the precaution to cut the cable connecting the whole 
 system of islands with the western world. This was a prudential measure 
 dictated by his own isolation and the necessity of cutting off every facility 
 the Spaniards possessed to summon aid, or enlighten the home authorities. 
 As the event turned out, the precaution was to our own disadvantage, for 
 it lengthened the delay in communicating between Washington and
 
 WHAT THE "PETREL" DID. 131 
 
 Manila. It was therefore ten days before the nation knew certainly what 
 had befallen Dewey's fleet. The garbled report that reached Madrid 
 from Manila, revealed by suppression, that Dewey's work had been 
 thorough, but there was tormenting anguish in many a home, dread in 
 the minds of millions, that the cost of our victory might be equal to its 
 magnitude. In Europe the tale was received with stupefied incredulity. 
 It could not be credited that the undisciplined "Mongrel" tars of the 
 Yankee fleets had fought a battle with the precision and method of the 
 most martinet navy in the world. But the story took on the proportions 
 of the grotesque humor our countrymen are noted for abroad, when it 
 was made known that Dewey had not lost a life, nor suffered a fracture 
 in his ships ! The German emperor, who had expressed himself with 
 considerable freedom on the incapacity of such an unruly race as the 
 Americans of this republic to make effective soldiery or seamen, was the 
 first to express his amazement, the first indeed to comprehend the mean- 
 ing of the work of Dewey and his crews. 
 
 Only a few years ago the world was called on to acknowledge the appa- 
 rition of a new fighting race, the Japanese. But brilliant as their con- 
 quest of the Chinese fleets, they had achieved nothing so decisive as 
 Dewey's five hours conquest at Manila. Among the piquancies which 
 afforded interest of a lighter vein to the tars of the squadron, was the 
 ceaseless activity of a little vessel, the Petrel, commanded by an officer 
 universally known to the men schooled at the naval academy as "Tough- 
 foot" Wood. This equivocal cognomen came from an odd walk. His 
 conduct of the Petrel kept up the fume of this eccentric designation. 
 The craft was not expected to undertake enterprises of a serious sort; 
 her functions were mainly to scout and do messenger duty. But in the 
 hands of the resolute Wood, she rivalled the more serious activities of 
 her majestic consorts. When the second part of the battle began, the 
 Petrel was half in joke given the mission to silence one of the forts, 
 somewhat out of range of the action, but troublesome in case of certain 
 eventualities. Her light draught and vigorous engines enabled her to 
 penetrate close to the shore where the shallowness of the water had been 
 counted one of the main defences by the Spaniards. Even then, it was a 
 most daring venture for a craft entirely unprotected by armor, or in any 
 serious sense, calculated to confront heavy guns. But had she been of 
 the impervious mould of the original Monitor, she could not have dared 
 more or done more. Though a target for innumerable guns and at close 
 quarters, her battery was worked with such rapidity and precision that the 
 fort was silenced. A squadron of the Spanish fleet, too small to take
 
 132 
 
 THE MISSION OF MERCY. 
 
 part in the open, was concealed in the inlets behind and abounding 
 about Cavite. The Petrel boldly pushed in among these and to the 
 speechless amazement of the ships' crews, emerged with a tail of captives 
 behind her, a mile or more in length. She encountered the fleet of tor- 
 pedo boats, calculated to give the finishing stroke to Dewey's ships, when 
 the action began, and either captured them, or rendered them useless. 
 
 When the work of death was done, Dewey began the mission of mercy. 
 His whole fleet was put at the service of the hospital corps on land, 
 where the wounded were lying uncared for. 'Without soldiers to hold 
 the forts, he was of course compelled to guard against future eventuali- 
 ties by destroying everything that could be made use of by a land enemy, 
 against the fleet. 
 
 IN THE OLYMPIA'S MILITARY MAST.
 
 PART II. 
 
 THE war, from the moment of its opening until its close, had this of 
 the novel in it. Both peoples stood as if before a mirror, and each 
 could look at all times at the other, seem to hear the accents of the utter- 
 ance of each, as by some wizard agency like the telephone. Madrid heard, 
 or saw the effect of all that was said in Washington ; every hamlet within 
 reach of the telegram from end to end of the republic to the other, knew 
 all that Spain did and said, so soon as uttered. Strangely enough, this 
 added a new and poignant malignity to the war; for hitherto moving in 
 mystery, waiting in painful anguish reports of battles and indications of 
 policy, the bold and brutal inconsequence of the sword had not stood so 
 nakedly revealed in all its inutile hideousness. It certainly did not nerve 
 the army of the heroic men who wasted the treasures of Spain, when 
 Cervera's fleet was sunk at Santiago, to see the tale recorded day by day, 
 that the admirable woman distractedly guiding the destinies of her alien 
 country, passed half of her time in tears, that the little lad born to the 
 woeful destinies of king, could not comprehend why his mother veiled 
 her eyes and denied him the usual childish pleasures. 
 
 Indeed, to the magnanimous, it robbed us of half the glory of our 
 facile conquests, when day by day the infantile confidence, or supine in- 
 difference of the Madrilene mob, came through the press despatches, re- 
 vealing a people piteously incapable of comprehending the remorseless 
 destruction of everything that they had prized in their days of glory. 
 Such evidences as came, indicated only the complottingof sinister groups 
 to bring about a change of kings, to put upon the perishing throne that 
 hateful relic of a hateful line, the indescribably dissolute Don Carlos. 
 And hand in hand with this numbness, so-to-speak, of the national heart, 
 went the inexplicable ineptitude of a ministry, which seemed incapable 
 of realizing that the nation was at war. Even that hearty hostility to- 
 ward an enemy, which ultimately makes a war a sort of second nature, 
 was lacking in the methods of the ministry. In spite of occasional testi- 
 monies to the contrary, there was no hatred of the people of the United 
 States. The attempts of the satirist press and the thick and thin organs 
 of Spanish jingoism, failed ludicrously in sustaining the campaign of 
 abuse that preceded the action of Congress. 
 
 Nor were our compatriots dela} r ed on the Peninsula after the outbreak 
 
 (133)
 
 134 SPANISH SELF-RESTRAINT. 
 
 of hostilities, subject in any case to such severities as other nations at 
 war visit upon the helpless non-combatant caught in the country. There 
 was no end of testimony to show that the citizens of this republic, moved 
 about in their wonted ways in Madrid, on business or whatever kept them 
 there, and their Spanish neighbors proffered no sign of hostility or in the 
 slightest degree molested their freedom of action. This extraordinary 
 self-restraint went so far that the enterprising journalists in search of 
 sensational despatches, were permitted to send volumes by cable, and if 
 confined to mere personal appreciations or conjectures they were never 
 estopped. More extraordinary still, the Spanish statesmen became for a 
 moment as garrulous and confidential as our own politicians in the stress 
 of a disastrous campaign. The highest personage in the state the 
 Regent herself, was almost daily quoted in interviews in which the cause 
 of Spain was sadly admitted to be without hope; that attacked by a 
 major force on a violently fraudulent pretext, Spain could only combat 
 with such arms as her half century of reverses had left her, the giant 
 power which was using that power wholly as a giant, and not as a mag- 
 nanimous people. 
 
 Almost daily the mountebank prime minister, Sagasta, was forced to 
 deny on the authority of the cabinet, wide-reaching comments purporting 
 to come from members of the government. The concurring testimony of 
 events and utterances leave no doubt, that even after the sailing of the 
 vaunted Cape de Verde fleet, the Regent and Cabinet could not credit 
 the doleful fact that the helpless monarchy was really embarked in war; 
 and the evidences, although not official, were of the sort that is called in- 
 controvertible, that almost from the moment Minister Woodward left 
 Madrid, the Cabinet and Queen Regent were seeking means to stay car- 
 nage, and resume peace on any terms dictated by the Washington author- 
 ities. What would be thought of such an utterance as this of our cabi- 
 net ministers pending a decisive campaign ; yet Senor Moret a Cabinet 
 minister made no contradiction when he was quoted as saying: 
 
 " We did not want the war. There was no reason for the war, even 
 from the point of view professedly taken by the Americans. We had 
 no desire to retain Cuba, if the majority of her people had willed other- 
 wise. Autonomy might have been followed after a time by complete in- 
 dependence, if the Cuban people had so desired, by the employment of 
 peaceful and legal methods. We made all this very plain too plain, ns 
 it turned out, since our concessions were mistakenly construed into proof* 
 of conscious weakness. Hut the impatience of the United States to enter 
 on their new policy of conquest and territorial aggrandizement, would not
 
 WAR HAS MANY SURPRISES. 135 
 
 allow of the peaceful evolution of the destinies of Cuba. The ground 
 for a pretext for armed intervention was fast slipping from their grasp 
 with the daily declining strength of the insurrection under the new 
 regime, and events had to be forced to precipitate a conflict. Events 
 were forced. War was upon us, while we were still believing in peace, 
 and all we have to do now is to confront the situation and act the part 
 assigned us with the serenity and the firmness that becomes brave and 
 honest men fighting against injustice." 
 
 Asked further what Spain would be willing to do to end the war there 
 and then this was just after Manila Senor Moret said : 
 
 "Events must determine. War has many surprises, and there are pos- 
 sibilities in the future that may overturn calculations seemingly the most 
 solidly founded. One thing is certain, however, the United States will 
 lose more by the war, whatever its outcome, than we can lose. She will 
 lose her prestige as a champion of right and the apostle of peace. She 
 has now entered into the category of conquering nations, and as such 
 she will be obliged to change completely her manner of being. She will 
 have to keep a standing army to protect her territory at home, ;;nd a 
 powerful navy to protect her outlying possessions. The power which 
 she has won by her conquests in the realm of science, she will have to 
 exchange for the power won by the sword, which as it is won in a day, 
 may be lost in a day. She has set the example of aggression on the 
 rights of other nations, and this example will be followed by those na- 
 tions which feel conscious of their strength to follow it. The laurels 
 which she has won in the moral realm she will have to exchange for the 
 laurels of war, which must be watered with blood to keep them fresh, for 
 they wither in peace. The military ideal will thus replace the moral 
 ideal with her people, and her respect for force will take the place of re- 
 spect for justice. In a word, she has turned backward on the path of 
 civilization, and placed upon herself fettecs fetters forged in injustice 
 and wrong which the older nations have been striving to cast off." 
 
 Another member of the cabinet declared that Spain had been waiting 
 only for an intimation from the United States, that her petition would be 
 favorably received, to sue for peace on any terms. He distrusted the 
 continuance of the war, lest Spain should gain a victory, which while in 
 no sense bearing on the ultimate terms of peace, would so embitter the 
 public mind in the United States, that the Washington Cabinet would find 
 itself compelled to ask more than it had intended. The Queen-Regent 
 herself, set all the machinery of diplomacy in motion from the instant she 
 realized that war was a finality ; and the Pope made known at various
 
 136 A CLEAN-HANDED STATESMAN. 
 
 legations, that if the Washington Cabinet would give ear, its utmost de- 
 mands would be complied with. Sagasta himself blew hot and cold. 
 One day he was on his knees to every diplomat who approached him, 
 praying for peace ; the next he had the blood of all Spain in his eyes r 
 roaring out maledictions on the wretched Cervera and Montojo, while 
 holding the Yankees up before high heaven as ravening monsters gloat- 
 ing in bloodshed, and as insatiate as their British kin, for their neighbors' 
 territory. And in spite of the concurrent judgment of all who ventured 
 to speak, that he was the most incapable of ministers, an ignoramus and 
 traitor to his party, recreant to his principles, he still held the shivered 
 helm. The force of faction ran so high, that in sheer desperation the 
 miserable monarch was obliged to maintain him in power. 
 
 No man of distinction would take the trying place, though for a mo- 
 ment the admired Polavieja, blind but virile, the only spotless administra- 
 tor that Spain has recently found in a place of trust, gave a half consent 
 to assume the dolorous mission of signing the last vestiges of Spain's ter- 
 ritorial grandeur away. He had but a year or two ago returned from 
 Manila, where he had left a record of clean-handed administration ; had 
 so far as was humanely possible, reconciled the unspeakable insurgents to 
 the metropolitan power. It was only his blindness that in the end seems 
 to have compelled him to relinquish the uncongenial task. While the 
 Queen trusted him, the Spanish public, as far as a Spanish public ever 
 takes part in forming the resolutions of a cabinet or dynasty, approved 
 the selection of the General, and indeed there was no doubt that had he 
 so chosen, Polavieja might have walked from his private apartment to the 
 palace of the Regent, and proclaimed himself dictator, or protector of the 
 realm. 
 
 He was the only Governor-General that ever returned from a billet t 
 poor as when he left. He was further endeared to the Spaniards by his 
 high-minded refusal to continue in his regal post in the Philippines, be- 
 cause the ministry falsified a promise that he had made to the rebels. It 
 was in the discharge of his duties to the state that he lost, temporarily at 
 least, the sight of his eyes. Perhaps his strongest claim upon the saga- 
 cious Christina, was that he was conspicuously unidentified with any of 
 the factions warring for the destruction of the country, as well as the ex^ 
 pulsion of the young Alfonso. It was remarked with the biting humor 
 that the Spaniards above all people throw into their expressions, that the 
 instant Polavieja came within the Queen's circle, Weyler and Robledo, 
 the arms and eyes of the Carlist plotters, quit the capital, as if in dread 
 of the intuitive perceptions of an honest man. A heart of stone might
 
 A MISERABLE MOTHER. 137 
 
 have been touched when Polavieja was borne to the palace, to meet a woman 
 who spoke to him between sobs, and virtually handed over all her preroga- 
 tives with the single admonition to save the people from blood and the 
 miseries of civil war. 
 
 In fact, this stranger woman, in a strange land, hated by the great and 
 haughty, mistrusted by the lowly, deserted by the army and only half- 
 heartedly sustained by the men and minions who owed her honors and 
 places, seems to have been the only person in the Spanish capital whose 
 heart was touched by the misery of the nation. For Madrid went on in 
 the usual course of febrile gayety. Bull fights, dinners, receptions, the- 
 atre parties, bicycle meets, automobile reviews, the open air frolics and 
 frivolities that signalize the French boulevardiers, when the idle seek dis- 
 traction, marked the life of the capital, unchecked by the astounding re- 
 verses on sea and land. Indeed the stranger in Madrid would never have 
 suspected, were it not for the sinister whisperings and over-earnest dem- 
 onstrations of the habitues of cafe's, and public places that the monarchy 
 was gasping in the agonies of death. With other horrors hanging above 
 her, the unfortunate Austrian feared for the life of her son ; his childish 
 pleasures were restrained from day to day, she dared not trust him in the 
 streets, nor allow him any of the usual recreations of the palace garden, 
 or such public ceremonials as are deemed essential to keep up the tradi- 
 tions of royalty. 
 
 Still gloomier precautions were adopted. The miserable mother was 
 obliged, or felt herself obliged to taste all the food prepared for her boy, 
 admonished from many sources that the malignants at work, were ready 
 to call in assassination to further their schemes. Even when the child 
 was sick, her heart bursting for the disasters of her country, she was 
 forced to appear in official places, with a tearful smile and the affectation 
 of as much unconcern, as was compatible with the head of a crumbling 
 state. The boy was ill, ill to the verge of death. And Spain was in- 
 formed by the official bulletins, that he was merely suffering from a child- 
 ish disorder. Madrid grew hot with the stifling heat, known only to that 
 arid plain, upon which the will of a monarch " With malice aforethought " 
 as a cynical historian remarked, had set the capital, in order to be geo- 
 graphically in the centre of the Peninsula. 
 
 No one who can afford to take a train, possessing the most modest 
 wherewithal, ever remains in Madrid in the torrid days of July and 
 August. Indeed, there are very few constitutions equal to the peculiarly 
 trying dry heat and furnace air that rushes down from what seem the 
 molten masses of metal called the Sierra guadarrama. Christina's Aus-
 
 1&8 A LEGACY OF HATRED. 
 
 trian physicians warned her incessantly that neither her own life nor her 
 boy's was safe for an instant in the capital, enduring as she was a strain 
 more trying than severe illness, and the boy scarcely recovered from a 
 typhoid attack. But to add to the malignancy of the climate, the palace 
 in Madrid is a pest house of bad drainage and outworn contrivances. 
 
 The stranger Queen, instructively enough, is one of the rare sovereigns 
 who from the first adopted the constitutional dogma propounded by 
 Thiers and practiced by the British, that the king reigns but does not 
 govern. And so loyally lias she carried this out, that while she secretly 
 hated and disapproved of the absolutist practices of her greatest minister, 
 Canovas del Castillo, she gave him loyal support in accordance with her 
 oath of office as head of the state. Canovas left her a legacy of undying 
 hatred, for his partisans were almost as envenomed against the "Aus- 
 trian " as the socialists or republicans. Not the least therefore of the 
 Regent's perils, just as the war began, was an astute effort on the part of 
 the conservatives to set her authority aside by law. 
 
 The propriety of this was just plausible enough to mislead the more 
 generous of the Queen's partisans. It was claimed that article seventy- 
 eight of the Spanish constitution provides that in the event of the mi- 
 nority of the sovereign, the Regency must be held by the nearest member of 
 the reigning family of Spanish nationality. If this were really the intent 
 of the constitution, Christina was obviously debarred from the Regency. 
 The dispute, therefore, turned on the meaning of the term "nationality" 
 and the acceptance of the universal practice, that marriage enfranchises 
 the stranger, that Christina when she gave her hand to Alfonso XII., 
 thereby became a Spanish citizen. It was, therefore, seriously debated 
 whether the princess, Isabella, the young king's aunt, should not be sub- 
 stituted, and in favor of this it was shown that half of Don Carlos' ad- 
 herents would fall off, for their strongest claim to the adhesion of the 
 provinces was the obtrusion of an Austrian arch-duchess upon the throne 
 of Castile and Arragon. Sagasta, infinite in craft and a monument of 
 guile, brought this most formidable complot to an end, and indeed the 
 old renegade has shown a certain consistence in his devotion to the lonely 
 woman struggling to preserve a throne for her son and a country to rule 
 over. The boy king has since his babyhood looked upon the venerable 
 statesman as a familiar, almost a kinsman, for in other days it was not an 
 unfrequent sight at the palace, to surprise the little boy clambering up 
 the knees of the patriarch, and fondling him as if he were in reality the 
 "grandpapa" which the boy endearingly termed him. 
 
 Christina's detestation of Weyler and her unconcealed disgust for hia
 
 THE COURT OF MADRID. 139 
 
 operations iu Cuba, made her administration still more difficult when 
 dealing with the army, for in spite of his antipathetic character, Weyler 
 lias preserved from the first a stout following among his militant country- 
 men. 
 
 The graces of womanhood and the virtues of the sex, would hardly be 
 looked for in an Austrian princess, yet it is one of the griefs against 
 Christina that she has transformed the court of Madrid, which rivalled in 
 profligacy the most tainted in Europe, until it is now as decorous as is 
 Queen Victoria's. She has discouraged dissoluteness on the part of the 
 grandees, unobtrusively inculcated modest demeanor and restraint in con- 
 viviality, outraging the women by a simplicity in dress considered by the 
 extravagant almost ignoble in the royal court. From all that the world 
 is permitted to see of the life and conduct of Christina, she embodies 
 much of what Macaulay meant, when he said that Madame de Maintenon 
 surpassed in tact all the men of her time, as much as the Grecians sur- 
 passed the Asiatics in refinement of language and literature: and this is 
 an extraordinary tribute. For the Austrian, especially the house of 
 Hapsburg, is not celebrated for the amenities of manner or speech, which 
 win the adulation of courts or peoples. Indeed for her son's sake the 
 Regent has led a life cf persistent political management. Even in her 
 dress she studies in order to placate the people and win adherents for her 
 boy. When in June, the heavens were hung in black for the disasters on 
 sea and land, the unfortunate woman undertook a ceremonial of great 
 moment to the Spaniards the administration of confirmation to the 
 young king. She arrayed herself for the function in dazzling splendor, 
 took her place among the radiant groups of courtiers, sat in the royal 
 chapel during the ceremonial, in every breath and motion the ideal of a 
 queenly woman in royal state. 
 
 Canovas' legacy of hatred was hardly a more formidable obstacle than 
 the debasing condition into which he had corrupted the Cortes. This 
 congress of Spain has become a mere echo of the political faction which 
 happens for the moment to hold the nation's purse-strings. Even the 
 dimensions of the two Houses, answering to our Senate and Congress, give 
 an intimation of the slight part these legislatures are permitted in the 
 government of the monarchy. The congress of deputies, and the senate 
 together constitute the Cortes, each body being equal in power. The 
 senators, however, as in France, are only in part elected ; the monarch 
 appoints a certain number, while a certain other fraction take their seats 
 by right of birth. The constitution endeavored to hold a check on the 
 hereditary and appointed senators, by giving a slight majority to those 
 8
 
 140 BRITISH ESTIMATE OF SPAIN. 
 
 elected. The deputies are chosen for a term of five years, one represent- 
 ative for every 50,000 inhabitants. Nominally, the body legislates with 
 as much freedom as our own Congress, but in reality, no law is ever 
 passed that is not devised by the junta in power, or, rather, the several 
 juntas, for party is a mere name in Spain, each group supporting its 
 enemy whenever the exigencies of politics seem to require a change. 
 The elections are a mere form. Any minister who holds the purse can 
 fill the Congress with whomsoever he pleases. 
 
 From 1808 until 1814, Spain was virtually a British protectorate. 
 The armies of Britain ostensibly sent to deliver the masses from the 
 " liberal " experiment of Napoleon, held the country about as we now 
 hold Cuba. In the British isles the sentiment in favor of the liberation 
 of Spain had been wrought up by very much the same processes that 
 fired our republican sympathies for the Cuban "patriots." No sooner, 
 however, had Wellington's army begun operations than the spirit which 
 had revolted against the clement and on the whole enlightened system 
 introduced by Napoleon, broke out angrily against the imperious exac- 
 tions, the supercilious contempt and characteristic British disregard for 
 everything that was not to be found on the British Isles. The private 
 despatches, the official reports, all the material essential for the making 
 up of history, sent by British agents diplomatic and otherwise, are filled 
 with the immeasurable contempt of the liberators for the liberees. 
 
 So just minded a man as General Napier, in his history of the penin- 
 sular war, can scarcely bring himself to speak with ealmness of the oper- 
 ations entrusted to the various Spanish generals called upon to lead their 
 embattled countrymen. Nor will there be found in any British authority 
 any evidence anywhere that the Spaniards demeaned themselves as trust- 
 worthy warriors, or administrators to be depended upon. Wellington 
 himself, wherever he was called upon to battle with his handful of Brit- 
 ons, almost invariably either ignored the hundreds of thousands of Span- 
 iards under his command, or with a disdainful reticence implied that in- 
 stead of a help, they were a hurt to him. Yet from the testimony of the 
 French, which could hardly be regarded as prejudiced, from the national 
 histories by liberal and even democratic Spaniards, it is impossible to be- 
 lieve that when Spain for eight years, was virtually an armed camp, the 
 embattled peasantry were not a main factor in destroying the armies 
 which had conquered all Europe. 
 
 Nor is it necessary to go beyond the memorable defence cf Saragossa, 
 or the astounding rout and capture of an entire French army at Baylen, to 
 comprehend that although unfortunately led, badly disciplined, the Span-
 
 A ONCE POTENT NATION. 141 
 
 iards never fearing death, were able at decisive times and places to wrest 
 victory from armies and generals who had never known defeat in any 
 other country of Europe. From the military tutelage between 1808 and 
 1814, the Spaniards fell under a commercial protectorate on the part of 
 the British, which with some diminution holds to this day. Hence, what 
 the world calls Spanish degeneration, may be traced to the insidious pre- 
 dominance of British arts and British interests. The Spaniards were 
 forced into war as the consummate result of British handiwork. It is 
 easy, therefore, to understand the almost stupefied disillusion of the 
 wretched peninsulars when Congress having sent its haughty message, 
 the British jingo presses instantly, and as if by preconcert, denounced the 
 miserable race as incapable of administering a home government, and 
 consequently ludicrously unfitted for the charge of great colonies. 
 
 Causes, far too deep for consideration in a history whose purpose is 
 merely to follow the actual events of the war, have for more than a hun- 
 dred years borne down the Spanish people, and outworn, so to speak, the 
 original sources of the race. Spain, as compared to all other nations, is 
 the shadow of the shade of a greatness once immeasurably more great 
 than anything we recognize in national existence to-day. And strangely 
 enough, hard-hearted as we are supposed to be, chief of the people who 
 as Matthew Arnold says " See straight and write clearly," we are more 
 impulsively moved by our historic allusions than any other existing con- 
 geries of races. For it is beyond dispute that when we threw down the 
 cartel to this emaciated shadow of a once potent nation, we made our- 
 selves believe that we were confronting a peril, and that in the " Interest 
 of humanity " we were invoking the " God of battles " to decide between 
 two disputants, not markedly unequal in faculties and the ways and 
 means that determine great struggles. 
 
 It was forgotten that we were a people of nearly seventy millions ; ac- 
 tive, energetic, irresistible in force when our mind ?s made up: that 
 thirty-five years ago we had organized the mightiest force ever known 
 among civilized men, that we had carried on a war prodigious as a hun- 
 dred years of campaigning in the old world, that we had revolutionized 
 naval warfare, that we had by inventions and inspirations out-dated and 
 antiquated the most approved war implements of all other countries ; that 
 in that chief essential of war money there was absolutely no imagi- 
 nable end to what we might raise ; that the combined world could not ex* 
 haust us, if embarked in a war essential to our existence ; and that these 
 stupendous agencies were in cold blood and on the bad faith of an un
 
 142 SUPPRESSING THE NEWS. 
 
 known segment of the Cuban people, lent to the crushing of the oldest 
 civilization in the world, upheld by the merest spectres of a people. 
 
 In fact, so far had Spain gone out of the list of nations, that there was 
 no personality in the monarchy, unless the foreign Queen-Regent Chris- 
 tina be excepted, that we could look to as giving any expression to the 
 feeling of the nation we were about to throttle. Statesmen, Spain had 
 none. Her legislators were a body of derisory rhetoricians, her diplo- 
 mats, chattering imbeciles mumbling the phrases of three centuries ago. 
 Her treasury bankrupt, her armies mere striplings, crowded into the 
 ranks while children of their age are at school, in more fortunate lands. 
 There was a vague belief, however, that the navy built in foreign dock- 
 yards, modeled on British masterpieces, and to a great extent indebted 
 to British hints and helps for their essentials, would be strong enough to 
 at least dispute the seas with us, and, perhaps, even for one intoxicating 
 week or month, force New York and other great seaports to seal them- 
 selves in. 
 
 But worse than all this, the war forced upon Spain by Congress was 
 not believed in by any considerable number of the Spanish themselves. 
 And it is almost an acknowledged statement of the case to say, that the 
 war was half over before the ignorant peasantry of Andalusia, Biscay, 
 Valencia, or even Castile, knew that the last remnants of what Spain 
 once was, had passed under the flag of the youngest of nations. For in 
 keeping with other species of misrule and decrepitude, the presses of the 
 large cities were permitted only to print such matter as came to them 
 from a hide-bound censor, at the elbow of a valetudinarian minister, whose 
 political convictions, not a man among the varied groups that have alter- 
 nately battened on and borne down the forces of the monarchy, knew. 
 The nominal head of the government Sagasta beginning his career as 
 a revolutionist, had figured in alternate cabinets as a republican, a mon- 
 archist, an absolutist, and so to speak, quietist. Probably not three peo- 
 ple in ten of the influential masses of Spain knew that the monarchy had 
 accepted the republic's challenge, ten days after the war began. Nor was 
 it until the crushing of Cervera's fleet that even the well informed sur- 
 mised that all was not going well with the armies and navies of the 
 monarchy. 
 
 The debacle at Manila was so refined by equivocal misrepresentations 
 in fact bald lying, that even official personages were uncertain of what 
 really had happened on that fateful Sunday morning of the first of May. 
 For ten days after the destruction of Cervera's fleet, the cafes of Madrid 
 'and the local rostra of each of the provincial capitals, were swelling in
 
 THE RULE OF CANOVAS. 143 
 
 pride over the undaunted heroism of the old admiral in breaking from his 
 Santiago lair and dispersing the Yankee fleet; and it may be doubted 
 whether half the Spanish people know to-day that its proudest squadron 
 was conquered and sunk within three hours of its appearance outside the 
 guns of the Morro. 
 
 The Spaniard, while-a brave man in one sense, has never shown himself 
 a patriot. Nothing could more subtly illustrate this than the pitiable re- 
 straints of the Sagasta cabinet from the opening of the war, down. For 
 even while our navies were sweeping Spain's armaments away, the 
 brooding and never ending fear of the capital, was not our fleets or 
 armies, but the odious spectre of the Carlist revolution. In other words, 
 Spain could never be brought to arouse itself en masse, at the cry of the 
 country in danger, as the French did in 1793, when they held monarchical 
 revolt in check, and crushed the combined mercenaries of Europe at their 
 very frontiers. The Cortes was a more dreadful field of doubt to the 
 Regent and her Cabinet than the beleaguering fleets at Santiago and 
 Havana. For the chiefs of the factions might at any moment say too 
 much, might divulge to a listening people exactly what the status was, 
 might bring about that indefinable psychologic moment which Bismarck 
 characterized as the stroke of fate for anybody who had resolution 
 enough to risk all. Nor could the loyalty of Spain's soldiers, who had 
 been trained in the command of Spain's armies, be entirely trusted. 
 Weyler, associated with much of the monarchy's misfortunes, yet rep- 
 resenting the most successful of the hateful repressive campaigns con- 
 ducted in Cuba, found a very formidable following among the nobles; 
 among the army personalities who retained a secular influence over their 
 subordinates. In fact, Spain accepted the war as a man might accept an 
 athlete's challenge, hands and feet corded and a blinder over one eye. 
 
 The monarchy, exhausted in a thousand other ways, had been absolutely 
 squeezed dry by the "strong" tenure of Canovas del Castillo's rule. In 
 many ways Canovas was the type of the " strong man " that weak people 
 love, and self-reliant people endure if they do not admire. He had 
 restored the monarchy in as far as the activities, genius and prevision of 
 any one man could bring about such a miracle. He had a large share of 
 the political astuteness that the world admired in Bismarck. He could 
 see through and prepare for all the machinations a diplomatic or factional 
 enemy could invent. On a larger arena, and with such forces as Bis- 
 marck, Cavour or Napoleon III. had at hand, there could be no doubt 
 that Canovas would have proved equal if not superior to all three. For 
 he had what none of these epochal figures possessed an immeasurable
 
 144 CASTELLAR'S ELOQUENCE. 
 
 fund of patience and an unparalleled faculty of reticence. Nothing seems 
 to have for an instant deflected the deeply-studied out combinations by 
 which he made Spain seem a great power, and in fact forced the acknowl- 
 edgment of this status from the reluctant concert of Europe. 
 
 From the short and fitful fever of the most ardent democracy, it was 
 the sinister task of Canovas to insensibly transform Spanish hierarchies 
 into the most perverse cult of despotism. That is, the dangerous prac- 
 tice of all the forms of feudal times without ostensibly declaring the 
 principles ; so that the system of Canovas really typified the worst 
 excesses of oligarchic abuse since the Italian republics of the middle 
 ages. The man, the multitude anything less than a noble born, came 
 to have neither weight, voice nor interest in the conduct of public 
 affairs. This too with all the forms of democratic constitutionalism in 
 existence. The election for the Cortes were as little the expression of 
 public sentiment, as the votes of an Imperial corps legislatif in the hey- 
 day of Napoleon's personal sway. 
 
 Like Sagasta, Canovas had begun life as an enlightened liberal. He 
 had even written a history of Spain which is ranked by impartial minds 
 as one of the most instructive and carefully collated annals of the period 
 treated. It must have been his familiarity with the ingrained perversity 
 of his countrymen that inspired him to a conduct in office, which finds no 
 parallel except in Macchiavelli's science of duplicity "The Conduct of a 
 Prince." Added to his contempt for the understanding and insincerity 
 of the nobility, he came to have a still profounder disgust of the peasantry, 
 or as we should call them, the plain people, during the turbulent era of 
 the republic. To the world at large, Spain seemed to have bloomed 
 anew. Never were her public men listened to by the world with more 
 attention than when the oratorical group, called into eminence by the 
 republic, spoke from the tribune and declared the Spanish people a new- 
 born race. The world was witched with a Castellar's eloquence. And 
 certainly speech more noble, adorned by everything that we understand 
 by eloquence, never broke from an official platform. Castellar for a brief 
 time held the attention of mankind as the oracle, not only of Spain, but 
 of all liberal Europe. 
 
 But under the arts and malign activities of Canovas tliis brilliant group 
 of democratic liberators were dispersed and muzzled as ignominiously as 
 the terror dispersed the brilliant and brave young paladins of the Gironde 
 in 1793. 
 
 Rarely in the history of nations has such a spectacle been presented as 
 that of the republic of 1872, for almost between the setting of the sun
 
 A SHORT-LIVED REPUBLIC. 
 
 145 
 
 and the rising, a perfectly organized administration perished, and the 
 President reappeared as a supporter of the monarchy abolished in derision 
 but five years before. Never was Johnson's acrid definition of a patriot 
 more decisively vindicated than in the extraordinary turn-coating of the 
 Spanish liberals. Canovas displayed his comprehension of his time and 
 people by disdainfully making use of every one of the leading men who 
 had come to power during the short reign of the populace. Corruption 
 in its most flagrant form, a corruption that would have turned Horace 
 Walpole green with envy, set in, until it is doubtful whether any man of 
 any eminence, social force or character, could be found in the whole 
 peninsula who had not sold his influence, his conscience, or his trust. 
 
 Strangely enough, the only obverse to this hideous picture is the Queen- 
 Regent Christina, the Austrian, as her enemies called her since the loss of 
 Canovas, in imitation of the disparagement of Marie Antoinette. The 
 Queen by the testimony even of her enemies, set out to make honor, 
 honesty, even frugality admirable in the public eye, and from the 
 moment that this was understood she became the abhorrence of the 
 ruling forces of every capital city in Spain. 
 
 SEN OB CASTELLAB.
 
 PART III. 
 
 UNTIL Dewey's conquest, the only point in the Philippine empire 
 known to the people of this republic, was the chief city of the main 
 island of this group, Manila. This was known only through articles of 
 commerce, twine and bagging ! The islands lie very much in the posture 
 of the British Isles Luzon, the larger, is the only one peopled to any 
 extent by Europeans. There are thirteen bodies of land in this group, of 
 an area of from 30 to 2,000 square miles. The entire area of the larger 
 islands of this group is set down at 114,326, with a population of from 
 7,000,000 to 20,000,000. Manila, the capital and seat of the Spanish Vice- 
 roy, has 350,000 inhabitants, though the Spanish occupants at times run 
 as high as 10,000; only a small percentage of the mass is white. 
 
 In so far as verified knowledge goes, the Philippine lands are fairly as 
 fabulous to us to-day as they were when the Spanish seized them under 
 Philip II. Their conquest was not marked by the marches and battles 
 that make the Mexican and Peruvian discoveries tales of such fascinating 
 interest. The islands peopled by the fiercest of the Polyponesian races 
 have never been thoroughly explored even by adventurous explorers. 
 Almost the only facts we have concerning the interior of the empire are 
 the reports of missionaries, who have wrought steadily with the ferocious 
 natives since Spain set her flag over the ports of vantage. It was in 
 1521 that the illustrious navigator, Hernando Magellan, came into the 
 noble harbor of Manila. He was in search of the Malluca islands, then 
 claimed by the Portugese. Though unable to explore the vast surface 
 of the islands, 1,000 miles in length and 400 in breadth, Magellan re- 
 ported them as the * pearls of the Eastern Ocean ! " But as there were 
 no cities built of gold, no legends of gems and precious metals, the earlier 
 hordes of Spanish adventurers made no attempt to penetrate inland. 
 The islands were invaded slowly, but even to-day, hardly a. thousandth 
 part has been touched by outside civilization. 
 
 The Spaniards have never attempted to utilize the inconceivably fertile 
 valleys, nor export the rare woods that are known to abound in limitless 
 plenty. For reasons not easily deduced, Spain never fully conquered 
 the islands, but contented herself with establishing garrisons in the more 
 inviting seaports, where traffic has been carried on in the products of the 
 tribes that utilize the rich produce of the teeming lands. To colonize 
 
 (147)
 
 (48 THE PIIILIPPIXOS. 
 
 uoh a diverse population no two tribes speaking the same tongue, 
 would tax the resources of all Europe ; Spain never undertook colonizing 
 in the sense of assimilating the native races that come under her sway. 
 Beyond the conversion to Christianity, the Spanish never intended to 
 lead the savage into the ways of western life. Public works, the gradual 
 introduction of western customs, these Spain never attempted, nor, con- 
 sidering the disposition of the fierce, slothful races occupying the islands, 
 \vould this have been possible. There are indeed scores of races in the 
 Philippines irreclaimable in the first generation, though the experience of 
 the French and British in the Polynesian ocean, shows that the following 
 generations after conquest, gradually succumb to a dominating race, in 
 the externals of civilized habits. 
 
 A French scientific mission sent to the Philippines, revealed all that is 
 known either of the tribes inhabiting the unoccupied islands, or the ca- 
 pacities of the soil for the cultivation of tropic products. Races, styled 
 Indians, Negritos, Malays, Manthans, and a score more, as unintelligibly 
 differentiated, teem on lands so rich that they produce year after year, 
 without a stroke of husbandry, the staples that form the food of unknown 
 millions. What has been the bane and the blessing of the Spanish ad- 
 ministration, has been a steady influx of Japanese and Chinese. The 
 bane, because they serve as instigators of insurrection to the naturally 
 docile native races ; blessings, because they supply steady labor, not to be 
 bought or brow-beaten from the indolent natives. 
 
 The Negritos, (little blacks) are so called because they are absurdly 
 small in stature, resembling the African race only in the intense blackness 
 of their skin. Tradition, no one has pointed out how founded, ascribes 
 to these dwarfish blacks, the original settlement of the islands. The 
 dominant race throughout, however, seems to be the Malay-Sulus a con- 
 glomerate of Indians, African and Caucasian. These are Mohamme- 
 dan in faith, ungovernably cruel, and capable of incredible perseverance 
 and constancy to their religion. They are really governed occultly, by 
 their own Sultan, who gives but nominal allegiance to the Spanish con- 
 queror. It is the concurrent testimony of all who have studied these 
 fierce nomads, that they embody all the ferocity associated with the North 
 American Indian. Had the race been as numerous as the early aborig- 
 ines on this continent, it would have depopulated Asia long ago. 
 
 The man who makes himself amenable to the few laws governing the 
 loose social fabric of the Malay, is not imprisoned, not executed. 
 Strangely enough, the inhuman monsters who hold the lives of the non- 
 believers so lightly, shrink from inflicting death by mere agreement, as
 
 150 THE DOMINANT RACE. 
 
 civilized society has always done. But for certain misdeeds the culprit is 
 separated from his wife and family, who become the property or spoil 
 either of the tribe, or the person against whom the crime has been com- 
 mitted. The convict's life then belongs to the tribe. He is set aside as 
 an instrument of sacred vengeance. He takes an oath, under awful and 
 mysterious forms, to rid the world of unbelievers in any way that his 
 master the priest of Mahomet may dictate. But the oath is not enough 
 to qualify the malefactor for this sanguinary apostolate. He waits pas- 
 sively the hour and place to redeem the lost paradise. The Panditos 
 priests, watch over him every hour, they guide his mind in every waking 
 moment, insidiously shaping the enthusiastic longings to deeds of 
 murder. 
 
 In time, under the awful schooling of mingled mysticism and unbridled 
 lust, the brain maddened to ungovernable impulse, sees nothing in the 
 natural sense. With mental prostitution, goes on an unceasing training 
 of the body, until every muscle is wrought into the endurance of steel. 
 The limbs like the members of a tiger or panther, the bones elastic, the 
 skin like parchment in resistance. When the body has been wrought 
 into as nearly a perfect machine as the most enthusiastic athlete ever 
 dreamed, then the mind is operated on with all that is likely to seduce 
 the senses of a sacerdotal libertinism. There are mystic seasons of 
 song, when the minstrel acolytes of the priesthood, sing roniaunts of the 
 ecstasies that await the faithful who enter the prophet's presence through 
 the heroism of slaughter. The dazzled victim is shown visions of the 
 voluptuous delights that he is prevented from enjoying, simply by the re- 
 tention of his mortal frame. When exultation and desire are at the full, 
 the fanatic's mission is confided to him. He is launched on the way to 
 kill and die, and he seeks both as the lover seeks his mistress. Death to 
 him in this state of mind is a rapture that he longs to enjoy. 
 
 Hence no valor, no weapons, no foresight can wholly check the mur- 
 ders relentlessly regular as the massacres of the Hermit assassin of the 
 early ages whence the name arose. Neither the sanctuary of the altar, the 
 seclusion of the palace, nor the bristling guns of fort or barrack, stop the 
 Malay when he is launched on his deadly work. He will creep into a 
 guarded city under the bellies of cattle; he will assume amazing dis- 
 guises ; he will suffer the pangs of hunger for days and endure hardships 
 that involve death, to reach the person of the chosen victim. 
 
 A French scientific observer who traveled in the country and made a 
 study of the Malay, condenses the results in this hideous episode : " A com- 
 pany of eleven Malays divided into three or four bands, managed to get
 
 152 A GHASTLY STORY. 
 
 through the gates of the town, bending under loads of fodder for cattle* 
 which they pretended to have for sale, and in which they had hidden their 
 creeses. Quick as lightning they stabbed the guards. Then in their 
 frenzied course they struck all whom they met. Hearing the cry of 
 ' Los juramentados ! ' the soldiers seized their arms. The juramentados 
 rushed on them fearlessly, their creeses clutched in their hands. The 
 bullets fell like hail among them. They bent, crept, glided and struck. 
 One of them, whose breast was pierced through and through by a 
 bullet, rose and flung himself on the troops. He was again transfixed 
 by a bayonet ; he remained erect, vainly striving to reach his enemy, 
 who held him impaled on the weapon. Another soldier had to run 
 up and blow the man's brains out before he let go his prey. When 
 the last of the juramentados had fallen and the corpses were picked up 
 from the streets, which consternation had rendered empty, it was found 
 that these eleven men had with their creeses hacked fifteen soldiers 
 to pieces, not to reckon the wounded. 
 
 "And what wounds ! the head of one corpse was cut off as clean as if it 
 had been done with the sharpest razor ; another soldier was almost cut in 
 two ! The first of the wounded to come under my hand was a soldier of 
 the third regiment who was mounting guard at the gate through which 
 some of the assassins entered ; his left arm was fractured in three places ; 
 his shoulder and breast were literally cut up like mincemeat; amputation 
 appeared to be the only chance for him, but in that lacerated flesh there 
 was no longer a spot from which could be cut a thread." 
 
 Immured in a land to the eye sensuous, to the mind deadening, the 
 mingled religion and profligacy combine to make the people hateful to 
 each other. Denied the distracting problems that check these latent pro- 
 pensities in civilized mankind, the Philippine wars upon his fellows. He 
 lives in the exaltation of demoniac cruelties, he wreaks a vulpine venge- 
 ance on the weak satiating passion, while winning the proclaimed pari- 
 dise of his prophets. Up to this time neither the curious traveler, nor 
 the still more adventurous seeker for markets and treasure incident to 
 untraveled lands, has ventured to penetrate the recesses of these san- 
 guinary races. 
 
 The religious missionary, whose life is gladly given up in the course 
 of his propaganda, is the only confidant, the sole stranger, not treated as 
 an intruder. Strangely enough, the Jesuit teachings have an irresistible 
 attraction for the most ferocious of these hideous malefactors. Tens of 
 thousands, if the testimony of recent French investigators is to be credited, 
 have been won over to the gentle precepts of Christ. Universal conver-
 
 THE MISSION FATHERS. 
 
 sion, it is believed, could liave been achieved had not the missionaries in- 
 sisted on secular changes hateful to the nomad nature of the insulars. 
 For reasons easily conjecturable, the mission fathers make it a point to 
 separate the convert from the idolater. Hence, they are gathered in great 
 companies of thousands, marched in a body to districts remote from their 
 old associates, and set on the path of transformation in civilized com- 
 
 HERMITAGE ST. NICHOLAS, MANILA. 
 
 munes or villages. In this way there have been formed countless oases, 
 so to speak, in the world of the savage people, where the primitive lights 
 of a civilization that takes us back centuries, is shed upon the motley fed- 
 erations, held together by the unknown God and his irresistible teachers. 
 Father Saturnin of the Jesuit Society of Madrid, converted and domiciled 
 5,000 of the most ferocious of the far-distant tribes in a single year. 
 
 The Island of Sulu, lying between the main Philippine lands and 
 Borneo, has been for centuries regarded, by the Malay Mahommedans, 
 precisely as Mecca is held by the western Moslems the sacred precincts 
 of Mahomet. The religious carnivals and traffic, so far as understood by 
 the tribes, were centred in this mysterious sanctuary. It was in this isle 
 that the first trace of the predominant Malay was found. Hence the race 
 spread over the vast wilds of this island continent. Indeed, in such fitful 
 glimpses as we catch of them from 1480 down to their frequent uprisings
 
 154 MALAY PIRATES. 
 
 against the Spanish, they suggest the unqualifiable hordes that overran 
 the island of Brittauia as we first know it. From the sparse peoples of 
 Polynesia to the straits of Malacca, the name became a synonym of pro- 
 digal ferocity. They were like the half-human nomads that overwhelmed 
 Brittania, expert sailors. They swarmed in their light and graceful proas 
 over the measureless archipelagos that fringe the eastern reaches of China 
 almost to the coast of what is now known as Australia. 
 
 Even after Spain had awed the coasts into subjection, the Malay hordes 
 kept up piratry, and the desolation of all accessible peoples. What the 
 Indians under the British were to the pioneer of the Continental patriots, 
 the Malay long remained to the scattered colonies of the Spaniards, as 
 well as the peaceably disposed natives. Abhorred as bloodthirsty mis- 
 creants, whose fanaticism counted any form of atrocity, a sacred obliga- 
 tion they made their sway even though permanent, a synonym of dev- 
 astation, death, ruin, in every conceivable form. From the first they 
 hated the Spaniards, as the Saracens hated the Franks. They refused 
 quarter to any one of that race, unhappy enough to fall into their hands. 
 As the naval forces of Spain overcame them on the seas and bays, they 
 betook themselves to innumerable inlets along the endless coasts, secreted 
 their values in forest lairs, and with fleets of light proas, dashed out, to 
 overwhelm a luckless craft. They seized annually an average of 5,000 
 captives, whom they put to death, with inconceivable torture. Peace 
 between these revoltees and Spain has really never existed. When sub- 
 dued in one campaign they have migrated elsewhere, won back the con- 
 vert or the indolent, and set out again on new hegiras of piracy and deso- 
 lation. It was not until 1876 that Spain saw the end of organized piracy 
 though rebellion has broken out sporadically nearly every year. But 
 in 1876 the captain-general was able to bring an army and navy into the 
 sphere where the bulk of the Malays were gathered ; there was the pirate 
 capital of the Confederacy, Tienggi. The foul nest was obliterated, and 
 with imposing ceremonies the Spanish army erected a new city. For a 
 breathing space the hateful spirit of the cruel race seemed extinct. 
 
 But the Japanese have long coveted the territories of the Philippines 
 for their own crowded millions ; have infiltrated crude ideas of a more 
 liberal regime among the profligate chiefs, and filled the slaves with de- 
 sire for freedom. Other causes have been at work to make the island a 
 burden to the distracted Spanish fendatory. The hordes who have main- 
 tained insurrection against Spain, have no more notion of self-rule, or any 
 rule save that of anarchy, than the negroes of Central Africa. The arms
 
 ISLAND TRADITIONS. . 155 
 
 they battled with were supplied by Japan, and their movements guided 
 by these greedy Britons of the Orient. 
 
 Spain is often cited as incapable of colonizing, yet the vast countries 
 speaking the Spanish tongue all of the South American continent in 
 fact, as well as Mexico, Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines are testi- 
 mony that Spain has impressed her civilization speech, religion and 
 manners on more territory than any other power ! Spain has not in the 
 modern times colonized by extermination ! Our race has colonized the 
 northern continent or the larger part of it, but we have done it by out 
 rooting the aborigines, and taking possession. The British, who claim 
 to be the preeminent colonizers, confuse conquest with colonizing. Where 
 they go, British ascendancy is first wrung from the native by arms or craft, 
 and then British armies of the needy follow. The colonizing is complete 
 when the natives are made the helots of the land, and the officialism of the 
 metropolitan rules the country. Yet the native of India, of Australia or 
 South Africa, who can give voice to his discontent, is as bitter in his 
 hatred of the superior civilized Britain, as the Philippines or Cubans are 
 against Spain. 
 
 Though traversed by the enormous fleets of the worlds commerce, the 
 various subdivisions of the Philippine empire are but superficially known. 
 The lands that dot the vast archipelago are buried in tradition, more or 
 less fanciful ; that portion of the Spanish possessions lying between the 
 main island of the Philippine group and Borneo, is generally spoken of as 
 the Sulu Archipelago. The inhabitants of these lands, are believed to be 
 the earliest type of the Malay. There, piracy and general predations are 
 still carried on when chance offers. They are mainly a race of seamen, 
 and pass much of their time in the proas known for centuries as pirate 
 craft, preying upon the shipwrecked or lighter ships of Oriental commerce. 
 The proa is a light, well constructed vessel, never weighing more than 
 thirty tons. But so built that it can go either backward or forward, the 
 skilful Malay propels it with incredible swiftness on the smaller waters 
 of these landlocked seas. 
 
 Until the Japanese took the desperadoes in hand, the whole i population 
 of the Sulu Archipelago lived by piracy. The Sultan and civic Council 
 claimed and received twenty five per cent, of the pirate gains, for which 
 they supplied the leader's guns and proas. Not the least remunerative of 
 the prizes brought in, were the crews of captured vessels, who were sent 
 into the interior as slaves to the Sultan or the tribal chiefs. Since first 
 known to Europeans, each island has had a ruler of its own, though the 
 the various groups acknowledge sovereignty in one Sultan, It was 
 9
 
 156 . THE MALAY SULUS. 
 
 through this potentate, that Spain made her treaties and did what was 
 possible to introduce civilized ways. In certain externals, there is a 
 primitive civilization. 
 
 The tribes now live in houses modeled somewhat on the Chinese and 
 Japanese edifices. They are built of bamboo and erected far above the 
 ground on posts. The roofs are thatched with palm leaves and for the 
 climate, no better form of shelter could be devised. Household treasures 
 are placed in chests in the centre of the single room. These serve for 
 beds at night curtained by light fabrics woven in the country. Chairs 
 and tables have only been a recent acquisition to the interior natives, 
 though the privileged or richer ranks are profuse in all the showiness of 
 civilized needs. 
 
 Strangely enough, these irreclaimable lawbreakers enjoy a certain formal 
 despotism. The tribal chiefs form a great council where the Sultan 
 has two votes. The land is all owned by the chiefs, and the multitude 
 bears the same relation to the lord of the land that existed in Europe before 
 the abolition of feudalism. The chief is the lawgiver and judge. He 
 can do substantially what he pleases with the tribal property, and the 
 bodies of his tenantry. Arms are carried at all times, by gentle and 
 simple. The aristocrat carries a lance and a weapon called the kris, a 
 curious sword in form. The arm of the multitude is the blow pipe 
 a hollow tube of the palm through which sharp darts are sent a surprising 
 distance, by the breath. The main use 'of this extraordinary weapon is 
 killing game, though it is used in war likewise; when thus used the dart 
 is poisoned. 
 
 The nobles when arrayed for affairs of social or political state, wear 
 gorgeous mandarin robes of silk embroidered with gold, and satin trousers 
 decorated with golden dragons. The kris is carried by all ranks. For a 
 head dress, a red handkerchief is wound about the head like a turban. 
 The men let their hair grow long, pluck out their beards, dye their teeth 
 black, and shave their eyebrows partly, so as to leave a marked crescent 
 arch. The women wear pygamas of white cotton or flowered silk to the 
 knees, and over these a petticoat, with a short jacket of colored cotton 
 cloth that fits closely to set off their figures. A scarf hangs over the 
 shoulders. The hair is tied up at the crown of the head. 
 
 The chief recreation of the race is dancing. The proudest chief delights 
 in efficiency in playing some instrument, generally the flute, guitar and 
 sometimes the violin. Spanish dances are stepped with as much grace 
 and animation as in the salons of Madrid. Gaming is a passion among 
 all ranks and conditions, while as in all Moslem countries there is no end
 
 THE QUEEN OF FRUITS. 157 
 
 to the number of wives a man may have. Conditions seem however to 
 restrain all but the very rich to one. It is no unusual thing to see men 
 maintaining a hundred concubines. 
 
 The products of the Philippines embracing the entire system, cover all 
 the fruits and edibles known in the tropics from edible birds' nests to the 
 doerian a fruit whose qualities are in strong contrast with its odor. It 
 is described as so repulsive in smell that those whose nostrils are new to 
 the smell, nearly faint, but once tasted, the daintiest dish of the gourmet 
 bears no comparison. A traveler from the archipelago sets forth the 
 eating and the effect : 
 
 " No fruit can rival its rich flavor as of strawberries and raspberries 
 mixed with violets and delicate rose leaves. Of all the products of 
 nature it is the most delicious. The first mouthful is all that is needed ; 
 the nauseating odor is past and done forever ; years may elapse between 
 the eating of the two doerian, but the disgusting stench will never again 
 be perceived." The plant though now abundant in the Philippines, is 
 believed to be indigenous to Sumatra. There at least, they endow it with 
 magic power to call the wanderer home, for the islanders often repeat the 
 proverb. " Who has eaten doerian will eat doerians." Naturalists rank 
 this extraordinary dainty as the queen of fruits, the orange being con- 
 sidered the king. Birds' nests, the edible delight of Oriental gournets 
 are another staple of the island. 
 
 The permanent drawback to the countries in the archipelago for 
 colonizing, is the frequency of earthquakes and an enormous number of 
 volcanic mountains rising all over the surface. 
 
 It is characteristic of the indolent ineptitude of the Spaniards that all 
 that is known of the Philippines even historically, comes from stranger 
 sources. The French for many years have exhibited a persistent curios- 
 ity about the people of the islands and the natural history of the races 
 which finds expression in reports to the scientific societies. It is from 
 this source that the world knows to-day what the Philippines represent. 
 The picture they give of the race, where it has come into contact with 
 the invaders, is full of a certain charm. For the half-natives' or mixed 
 groups are a mingling of the Creole and the educated Cubanos. They 
 imitate the excesses of civilization with great readiness ; they take on the 
 externals of religion and observe the pageantry with childlike delight. 
 The social side of the well-to-do Philippinos is full of the surprises noted 
 by the observer in the Spanish possessions in the two Americas. But 
 they do not receive schooling. Life is a perpetual festival, where there 
 is no need for labor. But labor in any of these lands would be consid-
 
 158 PHILIPPINOS' PATRIOTISM. 
 
 ered play in our more active societies. In one part of these immense pos- 
 sessions only, has Spain ever attempted to allure the natives to civiliza- 
 tion by showing them what civilization does for the well-being of peoples. 
 Manila, the capital, is in many respects a European city. But the effect 
 of the object lesson has been rather to demoralize the natives than edu- 
 cate them to a sense of better things. 
 
 Naturally, so soon as Dewey's squadron had ousted the Spaniards from 
 the metropolitan city, all the conspiring factions on the various islands 
 which had been used for years by the intriguing Japanese or Germans, 
 saw that a time had come when the western commodity known as " pa- 
 triotism " could be made marketable. From island recesses, that even 
 the educated never heard of, came the clamor for "independence " or a 
 protectorate under some of the great powers. Yet there is neither edu- 
 cation nor the habit of self-rule by tribes, as among some aboriginal 
 races, make up the semblance of a primitive regime. The Spaniards have 
 since time immemorial indulged the dangerous practice of buying off the 
 disaffected. The islanders regard the coming of the richer peoples of the 
 North American continent, as a larger market for their wares. It would 
 require years and processes like those that have solved the Indian ques- 
 tion in this country, to make the Philippines habitable to a civilized race. 
 Even then there are climatic excesses that make a residence for septen- 
 trional peoples doubtful. There are, however, residents from this coun- 
 try who declare that after a trying probation, the city of Manila becomes 
 a fascinating abode. It is not improbable that the pretty well authenti- 
 cated stories of fabulous gold deposits may make the less torrid of the 
 islands a sort of an Australia to the millions who love adventure and the 
 semi-nomad life of the treasure seeker.

 
 n. 
 
 IT'UROPEAN vaticinations on Spain's prowess had insensibly sunk 
 Jj into the mind of the people of the United States. Feverish as was 
 the desire for something to be done, there was at the same time the pre- 
 sentiment that we must taste some of the calamities we had invoked. 
 We had many thousand miles of vulnerable seacoast ; we had commercial 
 emporiums, within easy, even tempting striking distance of a resolute 
 commander, sailing one of the majestic fleets of modern construction. An 
 audacious stroke at New York or Boston, New Orleans, or Philadelphia, 
 would enable Spain to pay her war debt and redeem ulterior disasters. 
 No one knew exactly what our war fleets were capable of doing in action. 
 They had never been tried; the sneering estimates of foreign quid nuncs, 
 who pointed out the heterogeneous nature of the crews, the obtrusive 
 picture of ineptitude discovered in launching the army, in spite of the 
 decisive work done by Dewey, gave the serious minded hours of anguish. 
 Could our harbors be made impregnable to the fleets whose movements 
 were reported daily by cable? Were the guns we had fashioned in the 
 Cabinet, as it were, equal to the prodigious strain iron and steel fleets 
 would put them to ? Could the formidable armada of Admiral Cervera, 
 hovering at the Cape Verde islands, sail straight for the Narrows, dis- 
 perse the ships stationed there, pass the half improvised forts on the head- 
 lands and put the metropolis of the republic under contribution? 
 
 Naval administrators do not seem gifted with the exuberant speech of 
 their military brethren of the land forces. 
 
 The most persistent "interviewers" for the press extracted but meagre 
 confidences from that admirable corps of incomparable men charged with 
 the security of our seacoast. Noiselessly, as if done in the dark, every 
 accessible inlet of the immense shores of the republic were transformed 
 into traps of such stupendous destructiveness, that a pinnace could not 
 have entered a sheet of water included in the defence. The force and 
 aptitude of the thousand cruisers, even Dewey 's or Schley's victorious 
 ironsides, were almost in a day concentrated prevoyantly in the waters or 
 about the circumjacent headlands, that educated strategists knew were 
 decisive. To the public, all this seemed empyrical. The tortuous and 
 intricate system of mines, the unearthly appliances of sea and shore had 
 never been practically tested, because they had not been used in modern 
 
 (161).
 
 162 
 
 A TORMENTING PROBLEM. 
 
 warfare. It was then a tormenting problem, where we should get enough 
 ships. 
 
 Suspense, one of the numbing horrors of previous wars, found no place 
 among the ordeals of the people. The best or the worst was known in 
 the remotest corners of the republic within a few hours of the event. 
 Indeed, in the Manila combat, the Western world, owing to the processes 
 of the planet and the arrangement of time, knew of the destruction of the 
 Spanish fleet hours before its occurrence according to our laggard planet ! 
 There was in the old sense of suspense, but one incident that gave the 
 waiting country anxiety. 
 
 The splendid battleship Oregon had set sail from San Francisco nearly 
 
 UNITED STATES BATTLE SHIP OREGON. 
 
 simultaneously with the leap into war. Her voyage was the longest at- 
 tempted by a modern warship. Beside the dangers incidental to the navi- 
 gation of her untried and novel type of structure, the outbreak of hos- 
 tilities added the certainty of an encounter with a lurking fleet of the 
 enemy. Nothing indeed betrayed so explicitly Spain's unenterprising 
 methods, her languid unreadiness, than this momentous voyage of a soli- 
 tary craft from the republic's farthest western harbor to the very mael- 
 strom of the battle centre. At a thousand points from Cape Horn to the 
 Bermudas, a brace of Spanish battleships might have waylaid the cherished 
 ship. Cervera's fleet, for that matter, might have given Spain one brief 
 taste of glory by dragging the great vessel to the harbor of Cadiz. 
 
 Our own seamen, knowing well what they would have done, were such 
 a chance offered to their enterprise, made little doubt that the Oregon, if
 
 THE CAPE VERDE FLEET. 163 
 
 she ever reached her consorts, would have to run a thrilling gauntlet, but 
 much more likely she would be sent to the bottom for the men of our 
 navy knew the traditions too well, to fear that her captain would give the 
 Spaniards the satisfaction of capture, unless the major forces of disaster 
 joined in commanding surrender. Day after day, week after week passed, 
 and even among the thrilling actualities reported, the conjectural possi- 
 bilities of this lonely voyager ploughing the sombre seas, took chief hold 
 on the imagination of men. When she was reported at the extreme end 
 of South America, the public heart thrilled as over the preliminary details 
 of substantial victory. When she was reported at Bahia scene of the 
 immemorial exploits of the navy in 1812-14, it was reckoned as joyful an 
 event as the conquest of a Cuban town. But as the vessel finally cast 
 off from the friendly safeguards of neutral ports and waters, the public 
 excitement rose. It is hardly a figure of speech to say that from the 
 Cabinet of the President to the cabin of the logger, hearts beat more 
 swiftly. The Cape Verde fleet was just where the ,hip ought to pass in 
 ending her immense voyage. Would she be waylaid, turning into some 
 haven and find herself beset by overwhelming odds and thus give Admiral 
 Cervera plausible grounds for his incomprehensible cruising. The heart 
 of the country swelled with an emotion easy to understand, when the 
 welcome telegram announced the pilgrim in safety, lying tranquilly in the 
 waters of the Florida coast. The incident at once revealed the impotence 
 of the Spanish war administration : for no unusual danger was involved 
 in attempting the capture or destruction of this, our most powerful naval 
 engine. Indeed, the event at Santiago proves that had the Oregon been 
 out of the way, Spain's most powerful ship, the Colon, would have stood 
 more chances of escaping. 
 
 During the six weeks preceding Congressional action, our agents had 
 been busy abroad ; we had bought or engaged all the available vessels that 
 could be negotiated. With ample means we had gone into the shipyards 
 of the world, side by side with the agents of Spain, and whatever we 
 wanted, we had got. We were conscious that the foreign owners were 
 driving sharp and hard bargains. We were known to be rich beyond any 
 organized society in the world probably, and we were made to pay 
 fabulous prices. In six weeks we had added 500 crafts of one sort or 
 another to our military marine. We had impressed the magnificent 
 "flyers" of the so-called "American line," a fleet of rapid steamers 
 navigating between New York and Southampton. At home, we had 
 bought or chartered every craft that could navigate under steam. To 
 
 jse augmentations were added scores of very strong, swift-sailing pleasure
 
 164 SEARCHING FOR THE FLEET. 
 
 yachts, such as the modern Crcesi provide themselves with, for touring in 
 distant seas. But of course all these couldn't be seen by the millions, in- 
 deed, it is of record that the necessity put upon the administrative agents 
 to make use of them incited a species of alarm. 
 
 For the citizen who never pays heed to the details of administration 
 until a crisis comes, fell into a panic at the apparent paucity of our sea 
 forces, proven by this indiscriminate purchase of the private marine. 
 Where, it was asked, are the fleets we have seen extolled, that we see 
 millions lavished for year after year, if when the pinch comes we are 
 forced to go into the market and take any sort of craft proffered, at prices 
 ten fold greater than private purchasers pay? Nor was it wholly 
 reassuring when it was pointed out, that even Great Britain, who makes 
 her shores as much of a naval arsenal as the continental nations make 
 their territories camps, would, in case of war, impress the bulk of the 
 merchant marine for transports, auxiliaries and what not. For a month, 
 in spite of the diversions of the press, demanding that Cuba be occupied 
 within twenty-four hours, there were millions who felt secret presenti- 
 ments of disaster at our very doors. Thousands of families in seaport 
 cities gave up meditated summer tours, not daring to trust to the chance 
 of bombardment! For the Cape Verde fleet, that mysterious, much 
 vaunted armada, soon became the poignant puzzle of the amateur 
 tacticians. The hard-headed coasters of the Maine beaches, the ad- 
 venturous mariners from the British border to the sands of Long Island, 
 felt that with the night might come the cyclone of Spanish vengeance. 
 Boston with proclamations of indifference, too orotund to be real, b;ide 
 the Spaniard come ; New York confessed that the Spaniard at her gates 
 could hardly be more tormenting than the rigors put upon navigation in 
 the harbor by our naval guardians. 
 
 The search for a fleet at sea under modern conditions is one of the 
 problems that daunts the stoutest admiral. Before the outbreak of the 
 war, Admiral Cervera, one of the most accomplished of the ruling caste 
 among the Spanish hidalgos, had set out with a half dozen of the most 
 formidable of all the vessels of the Spanish fleet. The Spanish press had 
 given in glowing detail the prodigious weight of shot and shell the 
 batteries were capable of throwing ; the fleetness of the vessels themselves, 
 but above all, the awful power of the torpedo destroyers, flanking the 
 cruisers. In every press of Europe the significance and destructiveness 
 of the armada was suggestively pointed out to the Washington Cabinet, 
 as ample justification for deliberation in extreme measures. For days 
 this menacing mystery held, or seemed to hold, our fleets in suspense.
 
 166 
 
 SCHLEYtj 1JUXN SENTRIES. 
 
 We had encircled the ports of Cuba with a cordon of blockaders, within 
 twelve hours after Congress ordered Spain to draw the sword. The 
 Cape Verde fleet could make irreparable slaughter among these isolated 
 monitors ! Nor was it certain that Admiral Sampson could get his ex- 
 tended lines together smartly enough to give him the mastery of his 
 whole force. Commodore Schley, with a fleet of the cruisers admired in 
 every port of the old world, wherever seen, was held in leash at Fortress 
 Monroe, on the qui vive to fly to the rescue of Philadelphia, New York 
 or Boston I 
 
 The mystery of the Cape Verde fleet deepened, when the cable made 
 
 LYING IN WAIT BEFORE SANTIAGO. 
 
 known its disappearance from the Portuguese isles! Twenty -four hours 
 of apprehension filled the great seaports ; the unknown began to take 
 shape and form ! Then as if deriding the world's expectations, the fleet 
 suddenly appeared at Martinique. This extraordinary diversion verified, 
 Schley made like an eagle for the southern and eastern waters of Cuba ! 
 It was plain to the astute mariner that Cervera meditated reinforcing his 
 blockaded brethren at Havana. With Schley 's iron sentries guarding the 
 Caribbean, Admiral Cervera dared not involve himself in a combat with 
 the blockaders. He came to an extraordinary resolution. He took 
 refuge in the harbor of Santiago, where under ordinary conditions a 
 capable fleet like his own, could defy the world's navies combined. 
 Commodore Schley, a seaman of accomplished parts, in fact a prototype
 
 THE SANTIAGO BATTLE. 167 
 
 of our greatest admirals, couldn't credit his eyes, or rather his unerring 
 means of information ! So far as of use to Spain, the ominous squadron 
 might just as well be sealed in the Narrows at New York, under the guns 
 of Fort Hamilton. The great sailor made a characteristic comment, 
 * I've got Cervera bottled up and when he comes out, he can't escape 
 me." It is very rare indeed that science and heroism are so amply justi- 
 fied in their confidence. 
 
 But to the country, the dynamic quality of the incident didn't appear I 
 Was Cervera in the landlocked harbor of Santiago still the potentiality 
 for destruction that European observers had been threatening us with ? 
 Couldn't he choose his own time, say with the atrocious season of sirocco 
 and blizzard, select the vessels of the republic at leisure and run them 
 down one by one ! It is not unlikely that Schley or Dewey, or Evans or 
 any of three-score of our naval paladins would have counted on this or 
 even more intrepid enterprise, but though brave to temerity, Admiral 
 Cervera was not of the fibre that conceives original undertakings. 
 
 But Schley did not know this in the way that justifies a commander to 
 ignore chances. For one drawback of the complete mastery of the art of 
 war on sea or land, is the unvarying rule to credit your adversary with 
 that plan and enterprise which shall be most damaging to you. What, 
 therefore, might Cervera be expected to do! He could remain in the 
 Santiago "bottle," and by merely lying still, compel the most effective of 
 our squadrons to linger on a dangerous coast en vedette, thus depriving 
 our fleets of a decisive part of the effective force. Or, he could bide his 
 time, watch for the torrential season, dart out in force, and by surprise 
 overcome each of our ships in detail. Or, it might be that ulterior plans 
 had been made providing for the coming of Camara's fleet, vaguely sup- 
 posed to be made up of some of the most invulnerable of the latest built 
 ironclads. In any event, the prospect before Schley, was fatal to the re- 
 sults expected both by the Washington council and the over-stimulated 
 anticipations of the impatient. The country had that most dangerous of 
 all diseases, a febrile craving for dramatic, climacteric episodes. Victori- 
 ous, if humanly possible but in any event, the unexpected, the ordeal of 
 the human. For at best, that is the spirit of war; the diseased appetite 
 for that feast of the flesh that we do not call cannibalism, where it is the 
 maw of the cannon, we gorge fed with bodies of our sons and brothers 
 our firstborn and our best loved. 
 
 A widely read European Review struck the ruling note of the spirit 
 that actuates the modern when war is going on ; the " the opera-box view." 
 This is precisely what went on during the fateful interval between the
 
 168 CERVERA'S PLANS. 
 
 ultimatum of Congress and the prayer of Spain to be permitted to bind 
 up her gashes in peace. Dewey gave the world one spectacle, dazzling 
 radiant with the colors the military historian loves to embalm. He dis- 
 concerted calculations; he secured a mise en sctne of incomparable splen- 
 dor in the tropic glories of an almost unknown theatre ; he wrought with 
 such decision, struck with such sureness of calculation that even the 
 friendly critic was deprived of the qualification that assuages the envy 
 of the mediocre. A youth, fresh from the lamp, gave the world its next 
 spectacle. 
 
 A youth fresh from the lamp? I might have said a youth with the 
 lamp of Aladdin, so strangely daring, so sublimely devoted was the deed 
 he set out to do. It is proverbial with the sentimental philosophers that 
 all the world loves a lover. What is really meant is a hero ! The country, 
 the world, became enamored of a modest young sailor before the defences 
 of Santiago. Admiral Cervera's " bottling," as Commodore Schley humor- 
 ously put it, borrowing General Grant's caustic characterization of Gen- 
 eral Butler's luckless adventure at Bermuda Hundreds in 1864, was vari- 
 ously regarded by the critical. In Europe the bottling was saluted with 
 derision. Next to destroying Schley 's squadron, it was contended that 
 the Spanish Admiral had neutralized him. He was forced to hover about 
 the mouth of the harbor, never venturing too near, lest the missiles of 
 Morro should deplete his ships. It was Cervera's mission to defend 
 Cuban soil. This he was doing, even were he unable to meet and beat 
 the Federal fleets on equal terms. Whereas, Schley was held in the un- 
 comfortable open sea, his powerful ships useless in the general plan of 
 campaign. He dared not attempt the storming of the fleets and the bat- 
 teries, supplemented by mines. Something of this conviction began to 
 dampen the ardor of our home strategists, when the land was thrilled by 
 a deed of daring, which though perfectly in keeping with the traditions 
 of our navy, nevertheless struck public attention as an almost super- 
 natural order of adventure. 
 
 Among the subordinate officers of the fleet, there was a young North Caro- 
 linian, who had been remarkable for studious application in the academy 
 at Annapolis. This youth, Richmond P. Hobson, had gone through the 
 prescribed billets assigned the bright and capable in our great naval and 
 war schools. He had supplemented his Annapolis training by a course 
 in France, and like nearly all the marked men of these two nurseries of 
 greatness, he had continued his investigations during his active career. 
 This young man, knowing the value of the fleet for other operations, per- 
 fectly familiar with the narrow channel that gave security to the enemy's
 
 LIEUTENANT RICHMOND P. HOBSON. ENSIGN JOSEPH W. POWELL. 
 
 LIEUTENANT VICTOR Bon
 
 HOBSON'S CALCULATIONS. 171 
 
 squadron, devised a means of locking Cervera in his asylum and freeing 
 Schley's ships for other enterprises. He proposed to run a large vessel 
 into the narrow mouth of the harbor, under the guns of Morro Castle, 
 and there sink her. As a rule, in forlorn hopes and deeds of desperation, 
 it is the dare-devil spirit of chance that rules. But Hobson made a mathe- 
 matical calculation of the problems involved. 
 
 Poe's fantastic divining in his embryonic, scientific formula of ro- 
 mance, invents nothing so thrillingly minute as the plan of operations 
 prefigured by the young man on the eve of the undertaking. 
 
 " I shall go right into the harbor until about 400 yards past the Estrella 
 battery, which is behind Morro Castle. I do not think they can sink me 
 before I reach somewhere near that point. The Merrimac has 7,000 tons 
 buoyancy, and I shall keep her full speed ahead. She can make about 
 ten knots. When the narrowest part of the channel is reached I shall 
 put her helm hard aport, stop the engines, drop the anchors, open the sea 
 connections, touch off the torpedoes, and leave the Merrimac a wreck, 
 lying athwart the channel, which is not as broad as the Merrimac is long. 
 
 " There are eight ten -inch improvised torpedoes below the water line 
 on the Merrimac's port side. They are placed on her side against the 
 bulkheads and vital spots, connected with each other by a wire under the 
 ship's keel. Each torpedo contains eighty-two pounds of gunpowder. 
 Each torpedo is also connected with the bridge, and they should do their 
 work in a minute, and it will be quick work even if done in a minute and 
 a quarter. 
 
 " On deck there will be four men and myself. In the engine-room 
 there will be two other men. This is the total crew, and all of us will be 
 in our underclothing, with revolvers and ammunition in water-tight pack- 
 ing strapped around our waists. Forward, there will be a man on deck, 
 and around his waist will be a line, the other end of the line being made 
 fast to the bridge, where I shall stand. By that man's side will be an axe. 
 When I stop the engines I shall jerk this cord, and he will thus get the 
 signal to cut the lashing / which will be holding the forward anchor. He 
 will then jump overboard and swim to the four-oared dinghy, which we 
 shall tow astern. The dinghy is full of life buoys and is unsinkable. In 
 it are rifles. It is to be held by two ropes, one made fast at her bow and 
 one at her stern. The first man to reach her will haul in the tow line 
 and pull the dinghy out to starboard. The next to leave the ship are the 
 rest of the crew. The quartermaster at the wheel will not leave until 
 after having put it hard aport and lashed it so. He will then jump over- 
 board.
 
 172 A FEASIBLE PLAN. 
 
 " Down below, the man at the reversing gear will stop the engines, 
 scramble up on deck, and get over the side as quickly as possible. The 
 man in the engine-room will break open the sea connections with a sledge 
 hammer, and will follow his leader into the water. This last step insures 
 the sinking of the Merrimac, whether the torpedoes work or not. By 
 this time I calculate the six men will be in the dinghy and the Merrimac 
 will have swung athwart the channel, to the full length of her 300 yards 
 of cable, which will have been paid out before the anchors were cut loose. 
 Then all that is left for me is to touch the button. I shall stand on the 
 starboard side of the bridge. The explosion will throw the Merrimac on 
 her starboard side. Nothing on this side of New York City will be able 
 to raise her after that." 
 
 "And you expect to come out of this alive?" 
 
 "Ah I that is another thing. I suppose the Estrella battery will fire 
 down on us a bit, but the ships will throw their searchlights in the gun- 
 ners' faces and they won't see much of us. Then, if we are torpedoed 
 we should even then be able to make the desired position in the channel. 
 It won't be so easy to hit us, and I think the men should be able to swi r 
 to the dinghy. I may jump before I am blown up, but I don't see th 
 it makes much difference what I do. I have a fair chance of life eithe. 
 way. If our dinghy gets shot to pieces, we shall then try to swim for 
 the beach right under Morro Castle. We shall keep together at all haz 
 ards. Then we may be able to make our way alongside and perhaps gel 
 back to the ship. We shall fight the sentries or a squad until the last, 
 and we shall only surrender to overwhelming numbers, and our surrender 
 will only take place as a last and almost uncontemplated emergency." 
 
 His plan then was feasible at a glance, but it involved absolutely cer- 
 tain death either by drowning, dynamite, or both from the doomed vessel 
 and the rain of metal from the shore. All this Hobson had counted on, 
 but he argued simply, the end to be attained makes the consequences of 
 no moment. He was taken at his word and given official sanction to go 
 to his death. He selected a large steamer, such as we see faring to and 
 from other countries, or along the coast, the Merrimac bought by the 
 navy department to carry coal. 
 
 Details of men were at work denuding the fated Merrimac. The sun 
 set, and a moon of pallid intensity illuminated the misty mountain plateaus, 
 circumvallating the harbor and the distant city of Santiago. A scene of 
 lurid magnificence arrested the admiration of the masses on the fleet: 
 nature seemed in thrilling rivalry, for the thunder broke in volleyed peals, 
 not unlike the broadsides from fort and fleet. But the sacrificial ship was
 
 POWELL'S DARIXG MISSION. 173 
 
 not ready until long after the hour set ; it was breaking into sunrise, thus 
 imperiling even the slender chance that was hoped from darkness. 
 Hobson hurried portward, however, and was on the verge of the line of 
 lire, when Sampson, distrusting success in daylight, ordered the operation 
 to wait. Hobson sent an urgent plea to be permitted to go on, but the 
 Admiral wisely forbade. 
 
 The next morning, at the chosen hour half-after two, the enterprise 
 was undertaken again and carried out to the letter of the inventor. The 
 Merrimac was conducted to the entrance by a crew of forty men, who, at 
 Hobson's signal, when the ship slowed, disembarked in small boats, and 
 returned to the fleet, where they found the bluejackets all awake and 
 straining their eyes toward the fated craft. Beside the main adventure, 
 there was a secondary, involving hardly less peril. Midshipman Powell, 
 on a small launch, with a volunteer crew, accompanied the Merrimac for 
 the purpose of scouring the waters under the Spanish works to pick up 
 any of the wounded who might escape the wreckage of the doomed vessel 
 when the torpedoes had done their work. This mission was itself daring 
 to recklessness, for one shot, one fragment from the thousand projectiles 
 directed at the Merrimac, would have torn the frail craft to atoms and 
 left the men in the shark-infested waters, prey to death by drowning, by 
 shell, or by the ravening jaws of the man-eaters. The launch, faithful to 
 its consign, hovered in the waters of the bay until all chance of the escape 
 of Hobson or his comrades was plainly hopeless. 
 
 The channel narrows to 200 feet just within the circle of fire, of which 
 Morro Castle is the central and dominating work. To make the vessel 
 an obstruction, it would be necessary to pass the withering hail of the 
 Morro, and from other fortresses quite as deadly and then turn the ship 
 crosswise, or with her head toward the Morro or vice versa. The Merri- 
 mac was emptied of all her lading, perforated for the insertion of a net 
 work of dynamite bombs, capable of blowing her bottom to fragments 
 making the hulk itself a peril for its navigators even in calm seas and 
 peaceful surroundings. 
 
 When the contemplated audacity was made known to the fleet and 
 volunteers called for, it seemed as if every man stood ready to engage in 
 what every one knew meant certain death. The heart of the country ex- 
 ulted, quite as rapturously over the scene on the fleet, where the embar- 
 rassed admiral was compelled to choose seven men out of the eager mass, 
 as over the heroic action. Deeds of high emprise mark the records of all 
 nations and peoples, but there is no record in history which shows the 
 r&nlr. and file of a .squadron eager to take the billet of certain death. Of
 
 174 
 
 THE DEVOTED SEVEN. 
 
 course, in a sense, all men under the colors take the same risk, when they 
 take the oath of service, but there is even in the demoniac fury and car- 
 nage of the set battle an element of chance. A man always feels that he 
 may escape : Hobson and his seven knew that there were one thousand 
 chances to one against escape. 
 
 CLAUSEN 
 
 HOBSON AND HIS CREW. 
 
 From the moment official sanction consecrated the seven, the picture is 
 pathetically stirring. There was none of the hectic gayety we some- 
 times see in daring enterprises, where the stimulant of the battle supple-
 
 THE MERRIMAC'S SUICIDE. 176 
 
 meats the trembling nerves. Hobson and his seven addressed them- 
 selves to the commonplace concerns of navigating, placing the destroyer 
 and lessening the scope of accident, with the sustained purpose and sober 
 bearing of men engaged in daily monotony. 
 
 The night had worn dawnward, in brooding repose : the southern cross 
 sparkled in luminous glory over the tranquil waters, and threw the vague 
 mountain buttresses in forms of gigantic sentries ; the vague outlines of 
 Morro rose on the brow of the headland like a vast lantern, lighting the 
 headland and the shadowed waters. The pilot assigned the task of find- 
 ing the fissure that serves as the entrance of the bay, lost the channel, the 
 Merrimac, when every moment was of priceless value, lost a half hour in 
 groping for the way ! The Merrimac was soon detected by the forts, a 
 rain of projectiles fell upon her deck, for every inch of the way had 
 been, of course, measured by the artillerists of the forts. Incredible 
 to say, none of the hurtling masses of projectiles did vital destruction. 
 The seven navigators stretched prone on deck were miraculously pre- 
 served from even a splinter. When, at the point selected, Hobson 
 strove to anchor, he found that the iron hail had destroyed one of the 
 decisive resources. The anchor chains were shot away and he was 
 forced to sink the vessel lengthwise in the channel instead of crosswise. 
 All was not lost, however; the heroic endeavor was not wholly vain, the 
 hulk, even end for end, in the narrow way, would make the egress of 
 Cervera's enormous ships difficult. The electric lines were set going and 
 the Merrimac sunk by the prearranged machinery, quite as if Hobson and 
 his aids were carrying out a job in any of the peaceful preserves of the 
 navy. 
 
 The undertaking was begun in that hour in the twenty-four when the vital 
 energies are at the ebb, the opening dawn, neither night nor day. The 
 time when the aged die and the afflicted cease to rally, the time made 
 famous by Napoleon's saying that few men have "two o'clock in the 
 morning courage." Hobson's comrades record it, that even with the ship 
 on her course, the enterprise might have come to disaster, that is failed 
 of its moral effect, had Hobson lost for a moment that indescribable 
 domination of external difficulties which speaks the master mind. The 
 torrent of missiles came so thick that the men dared not rise on the deck. 
 Hobson in pursuit of his end arose to carry out a detail. The men im- 
 plored him to remain quiescent, urging that if anything happened to him, 
 they would be headless, helpless. To their plea he yielded and remained 
 under such cover as the deck afforded. 
 
 Every eye on the fleet followed the spectral vessel as she was driven 
 10
 
 176 WATCHING THE UNDERTAKING. 
 
 into the vortex of danger ; not a man slept on the fleet the rest of that 
 night, so absorbing was the interest of the desperate undertaking. Al- 
 most to the cliff, the outlines of the Merrimac could be dimly discerned 
 by the watchers ; the tensity of feeling became fairly maddening, when 
 there was no longer a trace for now the devoted crew were face to face, 
 hand to hand, with the momentous purpose. It was almost a relief, when 
 from the blackness and void of the dim mass of coast, the lightning flash 
 of a cannon was seen and then the thundering report was heard. The 
 shot was seen to splash seaward from the Merrimac, passing over her. 
 The firing became general, quickening into fierceness and rapidity from 
 the batteries inside on the left of the harbor, from which it was argued 
 that Hobson had attained the point he set out to reach. The flashes and 
 reports were of rapid fire guns. For fifteen minutes this fusillade was 
 kept up. Then the fire slackened, and by 3:30 had almost ceased. A 
 close watch was kept by the fleet on the mouth of the harbor, in order to 
 pick up the steam launch. The sleepless eyes that had watched during 
 the crisis, saw Ensign Powell's little craft crossing and recrossing the 
 mouth of the channel, scrutinizing the waves for a sign of the Hobson 
 crew. The guns of the forts were turned upon the forlorn watcher but 
 until the young ensign made up his mind that there was no hope of res- 
 cue, he maintained his dangerous quest with unimpaired tranquillity. 
 When the young officer reported to the commander of the Texas, that 
 none of the men had come from the harbor, the word went through the 
 fleet like an electric message and the seven were given up for dead. 
 Powell had performed a deed requiring nearly all the courage of the 
 Merrimac crew. He had followed his comrade in danger and glory, 
 Hobson to the very jaws of death ; waited under the guns of the battery 
 subject all the time to instant destruction. It was Powell indeed, who 
 rescued the Merrimac from her false direction, and led her to the channel. 
 From the launch's point of observation the movements of the Merrimac 
 could be seen until she came to a halt and tried to turn in the channel, 
 preparatory to sinking. From two in the morning until late in the after- 
 noon of that day, the crews of Sampson's fleet felt that they had wit- 
 nessed one of the sublime deeds of devotion that live in the minds of 
 men, Hobson and his mates were martyrs, but there was not a man on 
 the ships who would not have volunteered to do the same deed, then and 
 there. Toward three o'clock in the afternoon a flag of truce was distin- 
 guishable emerging from the harbor. Were the Spaniards bringing the 
 bodies of the dead, or were they taking advantage of the accident to get 
 a sight of the fleet? The flag was borne by a swift tug which made for
 
 ADMIRAL CERVERA'S COMPLIMENTS. 177 
 
 the admiral's ship. The officer in charge, Captain Ovidedo, presented 
 himself to Sampson in the glittering uniform of his nation. He was re- 
 ceived with the honors due his rank and the patiently awaited message 
 was delivered. Admiral Cervera presented his compliments to Admiral 
 Sampson, for the purpose of informing him that the heroes who had en- 
 tered the harbor of Santiago were safe, and not one of them severely in- 
 jured. Signals apprised the fleet almost as soon as the momentous 
 words were spoken. The sailors were thunderstruck. From that mo- 
 ment it became a conviction in the mind of every man serving under the 
 flag, that Spanish guns could not harm the men protected by its folds. 
 To describe the tumults of exultant joy would exhaust the epithets of 
 rapture. Discipline alone kept the fleet decorously to the routine of the 
 hour. 
 
 The first hint of this quaintly daring exploit, methodic in its madness 
 as Hobson's humorously matter of fact narrative shows, it filled the 
 country with a rapture, that in a sense, equalled, if it did not eclipse the 
 grateful exhilaration Dewey's grandiose victory aroused. For the desper- 
 ation of the undertaking confirmed the assurance that our sons and broth- 
 ers were of the same simple, self confident fibre of the fathers, the de- 
 voted young heroes, who like Bainbridge, Somers, Decatur, Gushing, held 
 life of value, only as it was of use to the country's cause. Our apparent 
 dedication to sordid ends, our incomprehensible abdication to demagogues 
 in politics and empyrics in most that makes to the solidity of societies 
 had not reached the moral marrow; our youths were still indoctrinated 
 with the stirring old simplicities of manliness, zeal, courage ; that pecul- 
 iar virtue, which is all virtue, really, loyalty to self respect and self- 
 control, coming from the idealization of the fathers. It was an im- 
 mensely proud, and justly proud, seventy millions that followed with fra- 
 ternal heart throbs the denoument of Hobson's miraculous venture. 
 Madrid for a moment tasted the cup that seems to hold the draught of 
 victory. "A large Yankee craft, attempting to enter Santiago harbor, 
 was sunk under the walls of Morro." For hours this was all we knew; 
 "Admiral Sampson had run a collier into the channel and sunk it there." 
 No episode was ever read with more delight, no event was ever waited 
 with more poignant impatience, than the fate of the devoted leader and 
 crew. Dewey's laconic word that he had won the combat at Manila, 
 hardly waked more exultation than the assurance that Hobson and his 
 seven had been rescued from the water by the Spanish Admiral himself 
 Cervera, and treated with the chivalrous consideration that the brave 
 feel for the brave. Indeed, when the story was told that the Spanish
 
 178 
 
 HOBSON'S LIBERATION. 
 
 Admiral, comprehending the state of the public mind, had sent out a flag 
 to the fleet to reassure Hobson's commander, the public mind underwent 
 a revulsion the effects of which Spain had cause to welcome every day 
 thereafter. If Admiral Cervera were so chivalrously responsive to the 
 amenities of civilized warfare, how could the Spanish people be the blood 
 thirsty, inveterate, cruel demons, the Cuban " patriots " had been painting 
 them for years? When Hobson's narrative of his faring in Spanish hands 
 was told, Admiral Cervera was only second in public reverence to the 
 
 HOBSON'S RECEPTION AFTER HIS EXCHANGE. 
 
 young hero, himself. Naturally, he was treated as a prisoner of war, but 
 the rigors of confinement were ameliorated as far as it was in the power 
 of the Spanish to do. On the proposal of Sampson to make an immediate 
 exchange, the Spanish Admiral at once assented, but the military com-
 
 THE ESSENCE OF HEROISM. 181 
 
 m;xiider, very properly, objected, as Hobson's keen eye had detected the 
 condition of Santiago, and had he returned at once to our fleet, we should 
 have been saved the glorious sacrifices of the Shafter expedition. For a 
 month's delay would have compelled the starved Spaniards to surrender 
 unable to fire a shot. This, when represented to the Madrid govern- 
 ment, delayed Hobson's liberation until the fate of the city was decided. 
 His return to our lines, on the surrender of Santiago, was the signal for 
 renewed acclamations in the army, the fleet, in the country this too, in 
 spite of the proof that his hardihood had been practically wasted, for 
 when Cervera was ready to quit the harbor, the hulk of the Merrimac 
 was no impediment. The country had seen with a clear eye, and distin- 
 guished the essence of heroism in the conduct, the purpose and the be- 
 havior of the men, who so greatly dared, for an uncertain gain, while 
 death itself seemed inevitably certain. When Admiral Cervera himself 
 a prisoner, was visited by his whilom captive, the country looked on with 
 a sympathy, not far from the tenderness of tears. 
 
 Science has been so persistively displacing poesy romance the seed 
 and appetent root of chivalry, that it had begun to be supposed that the 
 old-time deeds of mingled abnegation and daring were no longer part of 
 war. And indeed, the bleak hulk of the collier, the uncanny appliances 
 of the demolition, the repulsive practicalities, preparation, all seemed to 
 embody an episode far from the desperado deeds of knights and warriors 
 of the old time plumed and cuirassed richly, in doublets of steel, corslets 
 and what not, that the fancy conjures when heroism is in question I Yet, 
 the Merrimac adventure elated the country beyond any comparison, with 
 more of sentimental delight than any deed of daring recorded in our 
 history. 
 
 History is not fulfilling its function when it does not give the atmos- 
 phere of events, as well as their outline and effect. No battle gained or 
 lost could have created a more demonstrative outbreak than the first des- 
 patches giving the bald fact that Hobson and his seven had dared, had 
 succeeded, but had died in the doing! It was not until the chivalrous 
 instinct of the brave, recognizing the splendor of the deed Cervera's 
 assurances to his antagonist, that the man and his crew were safe, that 
 the country breathed freely. 
 
 Many a fiction will in future embalm this glowing picture of manli- 
 ness, but even the pen of Dumas cannot add to the heroic outline the 
 thrillingly romantic evolution from inception to climax and extraordi- 
 narily enough, from climax to the unexpected ending. Hobson was taken 
 to the hearts of the whole people. Inquiry, on the publication of his per-
 
 182 A METROPOLITAN AUDIENCE. 
 
 sonality, revealed the possibility that his homestead in Alabama was 
 likely to pass from the ownership of his aged parents. At once the hands 
 of millions were held out, ready to pay the incumbrance ! When on the 
 fall of Santiago, the young mariner in the ordinary routine of duty found 
 himself in New York, he was blockaded in the streets, beleaguered in 
 public places found himself, in fact, the tenderly adored hero of women, 
 the delight of men. His conduct under this trying ordeal confirmed all 
 that was said of him ; all that was believed of him for he accepted these 
 testimonials, with a surprise not unmingled with disapproval, demonstrat- 
 ing solidity and worth. At a public entertainment, organized by the 
 Red Cross Society to raise funds for the care of the wounded, Hobson 
 was prevailed upon to narrate something of his version of the sinking of 
 the Merrimac. No audience ever assembled in the metropolis in such 
 numbers, or marked its pleasure so impulsively, as when the abashed 
 young sailor stood up to speak. His portrayal of the scene was confined 
 exclusively to a glorification of the immeasurable devotion of the plain 
 sailor the real winner of the naval victories. Such words cannot be 
 repeated too often ; they deserve every form that permanence can give 
 them. Speaking of the plan of operations Hobson confides to his 
 audience: 
 
 " The order was that no man should pay attention to the fire of the 
 enemy. He was not even to look back over his shoulder to see where the 
 fire was coming from. It was also understood that if any man was 
 wounded, he should pay no attention to his wound nor call the attention 
 of anybody else to it, but should place himself in a sitting, kneeling or 
 any other posture that he could, so that when the signal came he could 
 perform the simple duty assigned him. And they carried out their in- 
 structions to the letter. They remained there on that ship, each man at 
 his post, until their duty was performed. They laid there until five of 
 the seven torpedoes had been shot away by the enemy's fire. The steer- 
 ing gear also had been shot away. The projectiles from the enemy's 
 guns were coming so fast, that it seemed as though they came more in a 
 stream than singly, yet those Jackies laid there to do their duty as in- 
 structed, and never flinched. Again, when the work was done and the 
 crew assembled at the appointed place and the Merrimac began to sink 
 under them, slowly, because only two of the seven torpedoes that were 
 to sink us had been fired ; when for ten minutes that crew of Jackies lay 
 there on their faces at the rendezvous and the projectiles were exploding 
 just in front of them, the simple word was given that no man should 
 move until further orders. If there ever was a time and condition when
 
 ON THE DECK OF THE MERKIMAC. 183 
 
 the principle of every man taking care of himself was justifiable, when 
 men would have been excused for going overboard going anywhere, so 
 long as they got away from where they were it was on board the Merri- 
 mac those ten minutes. But not a man stirred. They waited for the 
 order, feeling all the time the ship sinking beneath them and seeing the 
 shells exploding all around them. A few minutes later, when the same 
 group of Jackies was in the water, clinging with their heads just above 
 water to the rounded corners of the catamaran, and the enemy's picket 
 boats came scouring about with their lanterns, to find something living 
 then again the impulse was just as strong and as natural to get away 
 from those picket boats and to strike out for the shore. But the simple 
 word was given that no man should move until further orders. There, 
 clinging to that catamaran, for nearly an hour, those men remained, every 
 one of them without a murmur. When that afternoon the same after- 
 noon as the sinking by command of the gallant commander-in chief of 
 the Spanish fleet, Admiral Cervera, the personal effects of that crew of 
 Jackies were brought off from the ship to the prison, in the boat that was 
 sent to Admiral Sampson to tell of our safety, one of the men was al- 
 lowed to come over to me, while the distribution of our effects was being 
 made. This man, who was the spokesman for all the rest said, after re- 
 ferring to what they had just been through : * We would do it over again 
 to-night, sir.' 
 
 " The next day, when, for all those sailors vaguely felt that the remnants 
 of the inquisition might be applied to get information from the prisoners, 
 those Jackies had another test. A Spanish major, backed by several 
 soldiers, began to question them. As he did so the Spanish soldiers 
 made significant signs like this, (Hobson drew his hand across his throat). 
 The Jackies simply laughed at them. When the Spanish major urged 
 the question as to the object of bringing the Merrimac in the way we did, 
 George Charette, acting as spokesman replied : * In the United States 
 Navy, sir, it is not the custom for the seamen to know or to inquire the 
 object of his superior officer.' 
 
 " I want to go to Annapolis before I leave the country and pay my 
 respects to Admiral Cervera. For him I want to say that the American 
 public may never know just how much they owe to him for the way he 
 treated and protected the prisoners at Santiago. He is a grand old man, 
 I tell you, and I will never forget him for his kindness to me. When I 
 came here I sent him a telegram, telling him that when I had the chance 
 I would thank him in person. I want to take that chance now."
 
 184 HOLDING ON FOR LIFE. 
 
 No grace of phrase or eloquence of metaphor could be comparable to 
 the tale of the adventure as told by Hobson himself: 
 
 ** It was dark when we started in toward the strait, and it was darker 
 when we got the ship into position. We knew that we were taking des- 
 perate chances, and in order to be unencumbered when we got into the 
 water, we stripped down to our underclothing. The ship gave a heave, 
 when the charges exploded, and as she sank with a lurch at the bow, we 
 got over her sides. That we got into the water is nearly all we know of 
 what happened in that rather brief period. Some sprang over the ship's 
 side, but more than one of us was thrown over the rail, by the shock and 
 the lurching of the ship. It was our plan to escape on a catamaran float 
 which lay on the roof of the midship house. One of the greatest dan- 
 gers of the thing was that of being caught in the suction made by the 
 ship as she went down, so we tied the float to the taffrail, giving it slack 
 enough, as we thought, to let it float loose after the ship had settled in 
 her resting place. I swam away from the ship as soon as I struck the 
 water, but I could feel the eddies drawing rne backward in spite of all I 
 could do. That did not last very long, however, and, as soon as I felt the 
 tugging ease, I turned and struck out for the float, which I could see 
 dimly bobbing up and down over the sunken hull. The Merrimac's masts 
 were plainly visible, and I could see the heads of my seven men as they 
 followed my example and made for the float also. We had expected, 
 of course, that the Spaniards would investigate the wreck, but we had no 
 idea that they would be at it so quickly as they were. Before we could 
 get to the float, several row boats and launches came around the bluff 
 from inside the harbor. They had officers on board and armed marines as 
 well, and they searched that passage rowing backward and forward until 
 the next morning. It was only by good luck that we got to the float at 
 all, for they were upon us so quickly that we had barely concealed our- 
 selves when a boat with quite a large party on board was right beside us. 
 Unfortunately we thought then, but it turned out afterward that nothing 
 more fortunate than that could have happened for us, the rope with 
 which we had secured the float to the ship was too short to allow it to 
 swing free, and when we reached it we found that one of the pontoons 
 was entirely out of the water, and the other one submerged. Had the 
 raft lain flat on the water we could not have got under it, and would have 
 had to climb up on it, to be an excellent target for the first party of 
 marines that arrived. As it was, we could get upon the raft and by put- 
 ting our hands through the crevices between the slats which formed its 
 deck, we could hold our heads out of water, and still be unseen. That is
 
 WATCHING THE SPANISH BOATS. ISo 
 
 what we did, and all night long we stayed there, with our noses and 
 mouths barely out of water. None of us expected to get out of the 
 affair alive, but luckily the Spaniards did not think of the apparently 
 dumaged, half sunken raft floating about beside the wreck. They came 
 within a cable's length at intervals of only a few minutes all night. We 
 could hear their words distinctly, and even in the darkness could distin- 
 guish an occasional glint of light on the rifle barrels of the marines and 
 on the lace of the officer's uniforms. We were afraid to speak above a 
 whisper, and for a good while, in fact, whenever they were near us, we 
 breathed as easily as we could. I ordered my men not to speak unless to 
 address me and with one exception they obeyed. After we had been 
 there an hour or two the water which we found rather warm at first, be- 
 gan to get cold, and my fingers ached where the wood was pressing into 
 them. The clouds which were running before a pretty stiff breeze when 
 we went in, blew over, and then by the starlight we could see the boats 
 when they came out of the shadows of the cliffs on either side, and even 
 when we could not see them we knew that they were still near, because 
 we could hear very plainly the splash of the oars and the grinding of the 
 oar locks. Our teeth began to chatter before very long, and I was in 
 constant fear that the Spaniards would hear us when they came close. 
 It was so still then that the chattering sound seemed to us as loud as a 
 hammer, but the Spaniard's ears were not sharp enough to hear it. We 
 could hear sounds from the shore almost as distinctly as if we had been 
 there, we were so close to the surface of the water, which is an excellent 
 conductor, and the voices of the men in the boats sounded as clear as a 
 bell. 
 
 " My men tried to keep their teeth still but it was hard work, and not 
 attended with any great success at the best. We all knew that we would 
 be shot if discovered by an ordinary seaman or a marine, and I ordered 
 my men not to stir as the boats having officers on board kept well in the 
 distance. One of my men disobeyed my orders and started to swim 
 ashore, and I had to call him back. He obeyed at once, but my voice 
 seemed to create some commotion among the boats, and several of them 
 appeared close beside us before the disturbance in the water made by the 
 man swimming had disappeared. We thought it was all up with us then, 
 but the boats went away into the shadows again. There was much spec- 
 ulation among the Spaniards as to what the ship was and what we in- 
 tended to do next. I could understand many of the words, and gathered 
 from what I heard, that the officers had taken in the situation at once 
 but were astounded at the audacity of the thing. The boats, I also
 
 186 YOU ARE WELCOME. 
 
 learned were from the fleet, and I felt better because I had more faith in 
 a Spanish sailor than I had in a Spanish soldier. When daylight came a 
 steam launch full of officers and marines came out from behind tlie cliff 
 that hid the fleet and harbor and advanced toward us. All the men on 
 board were looking curiously in our direction. They did not see us. 
 Knowing that some one of rank must be on board, I waited until the 
 launch was quite close and hailed her. My voice produced the utmost 
 consternation on board. Every one sprang up, the marines crowded to 
 the bow and the launch's engines were reversed. She not only stopped 
 but she backed off until nearly a quarter of a mile away, where she 
 stayed. The marines stood ready to fire at the word of command, when 
 we clambered out from under the float. There were ten of the marines 
 and they would have fired in a moment had they not been restrained. I 
 swam toward the launch and then she started toward me. I called out 
 in Spanish: 'Is there an officer on board?' An officer answered in the 
 affirmative, and then I shouted in Spanish again : * I have seven men to 
 surrender.' I continued swimming, and when I reached the side of the 
 launch, I was seized and pulled out of the water. As I looked up, when 
 they were dragging me into the launch I saw that it was Admiral Cervera 
 himself, who had hold of me. He looked at me rather dubiously at first, 
 because I had been down in the engine room of the Merrimac, where I 
 got covered with oil, and that with the soot and coal dust, made my ap- 
 pearance most disreputable. I had put on my officer's belt before sink- 
 ing the Merrimac, as a means of identification, no matter what happened 
 to me, and when I pointed to it in the launch the admiral understood and 
 seemed satisfied. The first words he said to me when he learned who I 
 was, were, ' blen venido sea usted,' which means you are welcome. My 
 treatment by the naval officers, and that of ray men also, was courteous 
 all the time that I was a prisoner. They heard my story, as much of it 
 as I could tell, but sought to learn nothing more. My men were rescued 
 from the float and taken to the shore and we were all placed in a cell in 
 Morro Castle. I asked permission to send a note to Admiral Sampson 
 and wrote it, but when Admiral Cervera learned of it, he said that Gen- 
 eral Linares would not permit me to send it. The admiral seemed greatly 
 worried, but it was not until a day or two later that I learned what was 
 on his mind. That same day he said he would send a boat to the fleet 
 to get clothes for us, and that the men who went in the boat could tell 
 Admiral Sampson that we were safe. I learned later that General 
 Linares was inclined to be ugly, and that Admiral Cervera wished to get 
 word to our fleet, as soon as possible, that we were safe, knowing then
 
 WATCHING THE BOMBARDMENT. 187 
 
 tnat General Linares would know that the fleet knew it, and he would 
 not dare to harm us. 
 
 " When we were first placed in Morro, the solid doors to our cells were 
 kept closed for an hour or two, but when we objected to that, the admiral 
 ordered that they be thrown open. Then we had a view of Santiago 
 harbor, the city and the Spanish fleet. All the officers of the army and 
 fleet called on us that day, and their treatment of us was most consid- 
 erate and courteous. General Linares did not call, but sent word that as 
 all the others had called, he thought that a visit from him was not in- 
 cluded in his duties. I do not know what he meant by that, but am sure 
 we did not owe our safety to him. We were still in Morro Castle when 
 Admiral Sampson's fleet bombarded Santiago. The windows in the side 
 of our cell opened west across the harbor entrance, and we could hear 
 and see the shells as they struck. We knew that we would not be fired 
 upon as word had gone out as to where we were, so we sat at the windows 
 and watched the shells. Each one sung a different tune as it went by. 
 The smaller shells moaned or screeched as they passed, but the thirteen- 
 inch shells left a sound behind them like that of a sudden and continued 
 smashing of a huge pane of glass. The crackling was sharp and metal- 
 lic, something like sharp thunder without the roar, and the sound con- 
 tinued but decreased after the shell had gone. In many cases the shells 
 struck projecting points of rock, and ricochetting, spun end over end 
 across the hills. The sound they made as they struck again and again 
 was like the short sharp puff of a locomotive starting with a heavy train. 
 We were in Morro Castle four days and only once did I feel alarmed. 
 The day before we were taken into the city of Santiago, I saw a small 
 boat start from the harbor with a flag of truce up. When I asked one of 
 the sentries what it meant I was told that the boat had gone out to tell 
 our fleet that my men and I had already been taken into the city. Then 
 I feared that Morro would be bombarded at once, and believed it a scheme 
 got up by General Linares to end us. We were taken to the city the 
 next day, and were safe anyway, then. In the city we were treated with 
 the same consideration by the naval officers, with the exception of Gen- 
 eral Linares, which we got on the day of our capture. I believe we owe 
 to Admiral Cervera our exchange, and a great deal more in the way of 
 good treatment that we would not otherwise have received. General 
 Linarea had no good blood for us, nor did the soldiers and the marines, 
 who would have shot us on sight the night that we went into the harbor. 
 Sharks? No, we did not have time to think of them that night," said 
 Lieutenant Hobson, in reply to one of his listeners. " We saw a great
 
 188 
 
 IN THE WATER. 
 
 many things though, and went through a great many experiences. When 
 we started out from the fleet I tied to my belt a flask of medicated water, 
 supplied to me by the ship's surgeon. All the way the flask went from 
 hand to hand. Once I felt my pulse to see if I was frightened, but to my 
 surprise I found it normal. Later, we forgot all about it, and when we 
 got into the water, there was no need for the flask. 
 
 THE STUFF OUR NAVY IS MADE OF. 
 (Ensign Gillie capturing a floating torpedo.)
 
 ni. 
 
 WITH the mercurial inconsequence of our race, made up of a not 
 wholly coordinated mingling of all races, the eve of our national 
 anniversary closed with the heaven of hope hung in black. Santiago 
 had become a nightmare. The army so rashly planted before its walls 
 could neither advance nor retreat. It was in the awkward fix so aptly 
 described by President Lincoln, when Hooker proposed a movement on 
 Fredericksburg " like a bull caught in a fence which could neither kick 
 nor gore, use neither horns nor heels." General Shafter's cry of despair 
 was regarded as of deeper interest than the disheartened commander 
 really meant to co'ivey. He had given way to the same boyish impulse 
 which had carried the Rough Riders beyond prudent precaution and he 
 was now conscious of his peril, superadded to the impossibility of extri- 
 cating himself. But at the darkest hour of the Cuban enterprise, fortune, 
 as if cynically bent on confounding the wisdom of the wise, raised the 
 curtain on an achievement, which sets all conventional description, all 
 preconceived axioms of warfare, at defiance. 
 
 While Sampson's fleet on the memorable Sunday of the 3d of July 
 was going through the wearisome routine of the blockade, the trained eye 
 of an officer on the bridge of the redoubtable battleship Iowa, detected 
 the smoke of a cruiser emerging from the giant fissure that gives access 
 to the landlocked waters of Santiago harbor. The warning cry that rang 
 out transformed the dawdling masses in every crevice of the ship, into 
 spasmodic curiosity. It was exactly thirty-three minutes after nine. 
 The sombre cliffs that make the sea wall of all the visible line of coast, 
 were in the deep translucent shadows of the semi-tropic clime. To the 
 gaze of the Iowa's men, there seemed for the first moment of intense 
 scrutiny, only the image of a lowering mass of swiftly looming outlines. 
 But the nautical eye, quick at distinguishing the phenomena of the sea, 
 knew in a flash that the hoped-for hour had struck. The spectre was every 
 instant growing distinct in shape, and when Captain " Bob " Evans reached 
 the deck, he had no difficulty in distinguishing the flagship of Admiral 
 Cervera, the Infanta Maria Teresa. 
 
 The commander-in-chief of the squadron had sailed eastward to confer 
 with the army staff, and the direction of the combat fell to the officer 
 next in rank, Commodore Schley. So far, however, as the tactics of the 
 
 (191)
 
 192 FOLLOW AND FIGHT. 
 
 action that followed were carried out, chance was the potential factors. 
 That is to say, the captains of the ships followed the instinct of the 
 trained sailor and struck where the blows were certain to prove most ef- 
 fective. Schley gave but one order-- lollow and fight. But had the order 
 never been hung at his signal mast the work would have gone on pre- 
 cisely the same. Naturally, being nearest the on-coming Spaniard, Cap 
 tain Evans charged his ship with the business of despatching this antag- 
 onist. But there was no monoply for the Iowa. In stately procession, 
 aligned as if on parade, the Spanish squadron emerged in spectral 
 regularity from the granite doorway. They broke upon the somewhat 
 scattered fleet of Schley, swift, confidant, as if in no sort of doubt of 
 their predestined triumph. Even in the exultant ecstasy of hope ful- 
 filled, the captains and crews of our fleet, could hardly forbear the 
 homage of a cheer, for an enemy so proudly confidant, so superbly ship- 
 shape in trim and evolution. 
 
 Almost simultaneously, as if the four score guns of the several ships 
 were touched by one hand, a thundering volley broke from Schley's com- 
 bined broadsides. The Iowa, addressing herself exclusively to the 
 Infanta Maria Teresa, pursued one aim from the outset, to keep the 
 enemy toward the shore, batter her with the heaviest available projectiles, 
 and if it could be done, ram her into helplessness. But the splendid 
 speed of the Spanish ship soon made contact beyond the dream of the 
 battleship's commander. The Spanish line, well out of the intricate de- 
 bouch of the harbor, had turned westward, presenting their full length, 
 or in nautical phrase, their broadside, to the pursuing fleet. Then gun 
 answered gun in lightning swiftness. Unable to keep up with Cervera's 
 ship, the Iowa headed to cross behind her, in order to make more decisive 
 work by raking shot, that is, to sweep the deck from stern to bow. There 
 was another purpose ; the Oquendo, flying in the wake of the Teresa, 
 could be intercepted and raked from bow to stern. The tactics thus in- 
 volved placed the Iowa between the two racers, but Evans doesn't seem 
 to have counted the odds in his anxiety to get a point of vantage for 
 firing. Yet, any one familiar with the ancient tactics of naval encounters, 
 will recall, with tingling nerves, that the placing of a ship thus between 
 two adversaries, was considered the triumph of the mariner's skill ; it was 
 this manceuver that won Nelson his most vaunted triumph, yet our valiant 
 commander deliberately sought this place of peril. 
 
 Nor was this the utmost risk of the daring interposition, for at almost 
 the same moment the fleetest of the Spaniards, the Cristobal Colon, 
 cleaving the water like an ocean flyer, came abreast of the group and
 
 THE FURY OF THE COMBAT. 193 
 
 sent a withering flight of shells about and above the Iowa. It is no fig- 
 ure of speech to say that the enormous projectiles of the three fighting 
 ships, fell like hail on and in the deck and works of the Iowa. The ships 
 were darting through the water at the highest speed the engines were 
 capable of forcing. But the movement in no wise interfered with the 
 deadly precision of our range finders, while it did impair the accuracy of 
 the Spanish gunners, as the incredibly discrepant results attest. 
 
 It is not easy to make the landsman comprehend the Titanic fury of the 
 combat without using the technical jargon of the seaman, and yet that 
 jargon, while precising the alternate shifts of the adversaries, cannot por- 
 tray intelligibly to any save seafaring folk, the actuality of the episodes. 
 Indeed the imagination must be invoked. Let us put ourselves in the place 
 of one of the officers and note the effect ! To begin with, the vessel on 
 which you stand seems a volcano. The discharge of the broadside is pre- 
 cisely like the impact of train against train on the railroad, only men in- 
 durated by training can keep their feet when the guns thunder. If the 
 effect is so benumbing, when the projectile takes its flight, what must the 
 sensation be where it strikes? Nor is it possible to fully realize, let alone 
 picture the pandemonium of sound, unless there be the familiarity of sight. 
 There must be knowledge of the complicated structure, the turrets domi- 
 nating the sulphurous pit of flames and smoke, the Hadean atmosphere, 
 the grimy gnomes conjuring with the forces of destruction. 
 
 The Iowa vomiting broad swathes of flame, heads on, always on, as if 
 the point of death, the pit of the hell of bombs, were the coveted place. 
 In this extraordinary race, with overmastering destructive forces fronting 
 her, the ship, though incessantly struck, sped onward invincible a throb- 
 bing Behemoth of prodigious pulse and will. The monstrous volleys 
 told, and almost at once the Maria Teresa began to vibrate to something 
 else than the throbbing paroxysms of her engines. From the Iowa's 
 deck and bridge, from her places of vantage, the withering destruction 
 wrought from the steady downfall of our hail could be plainly verified. 
 Finally side by side, like sportive colossi in battle, the Iowa vomited 
 the contents of her entire battery, including the rapid firing guns, into 
 the Oquendo, at a distance of 1,100 yards. The Spaniards' deck on the 
 instant resembled a crater of hurtling metal ; smoke broke upward 
 through the gashes cut in the deck ; flames shot in licking lines from the 
 port holes ; the air on the ship was torture. Still the devoted Spaniards 
 gave no sign of comprehending that to fight further was insanity, not 
 heroism ; the stanch ship fairly reeled an instant, as if bewildered, then
 
 194 THE FLYER OF THE FLEET. 
 
 with leviathan energy shot ahead with bewildering velocity, leaving the 
 assailing Iowa booming sulphurously behind her. 
 
 Almost at the same instant, a huge apparition of spouting flame 
 lurid with innumerable wreaths of fire fringing every available foot 
 loomed up right in touch with the Iowa. It was recognized as the flyer 
 of the fleet, the Cristobal Colon. Her first salutation was the planting of 
 two six-inch shells, squarely in the side of the Federal vessel. Each of 
 these missiles did the work intended, and had the fabric of Evans' ship 
 been of anything but the best, the vessel would have gone to the bottom. 
 One shell entered the dispensary, strewing the appurtenances of that de- 
 partment in ruins ; another penetrated what the seamen call the coffer- 
 dam, where it was found lodged after the action was over. 
 
 At almost the same juncture a cry came from the lookout that two 
 torpedo-boat destroyers were within four hundred yards of the Iowa. 
 Captain Evans had the sailor's dread of the unknown, and remitting the 
 assault on the fleeing Colon, he concentrated his fire on the dreaded de- 
 stroyers. A twelve-inch shell from the ship's rear battery struck the 
 nearest of the terrors, and to the unspeakable delight of the watching 
 crew, cut the afterpart of the nearest of the destroyers square in twain ! 
 As this coup de grace was administered, a shot from the victim whirled 
 over the Iowa, within two feet of the captain's head. The Iowa, for a 
 maddening moment, followed the extraordinary denouement of the attack. 
 The Gloucester, which had been improvised for war, from a pleasure yacht, 
 commanded by Commander Wainright, one of the officers of the Maine, 
 with incredible audacity made square for the two destroyers. Her light 
 though formidable armament had been in constant play since the Spanish 
 fleets reached the opening. With untiring fury she opened on the de- 
 stroyer's craft, it will be remembered, designed to terrorize the stouter 
 battle ships. The outcome would not be credited, were it not attested by 
 scores of witnesses. She penetrated the vulnerable parts of the two de- 
 stroyers and in a few minutes they were thrown, dismantled, on the surf 
 beaten rocks! No episode in this memorable combat, so much interested 
 the world none produced so vital a change in the relative strength of 
 the fleets for most of the European sea powers have counted upon these 
 mysterious engines to offset rival superiority in large craft. 
 
 But Evans and his vulcans had little time to more than exult over this 
 astounding reversal of accepted conditions. Out of the pandemoniac 
 mSleX the imposing Vizcaya, suddenly uprose in ominous nearness. Then 
 the two ships, as if humanly or inhumanly animate with the instinct of 
 malignity, plied every gun, each at the other. Nothing that ear ever
 
 THE IOWA AND VIZCAYA. 
 
 197 
 
 heard, eye ever saw in any other phenomena of nature, can be made use 
 of to vivify the picture, the scene, the devilish ferocity of the salvos 
 sending havoc and death at every stertorous belch. The impact of the 
 volleys was felt like the uplifting of an ordinary locomotive by some 
 monster hand and striking the ship's side or surface. In an atmosphere 
 of pungent fumes, stifling to the sense, with the ships careening on a 
 boiling sea, the Iowa and Vizcaya maintained this Atlean duel, full fif- 
 teen minutes. With every outpour from the the flaming maws of the 
 Iowa, seams could be seen in the Vizcaya's enormous sides ; cracks in her 
 
 THE CRISTOBAL COLON. 
 
 vital places, destruction in all the exposed vantage points from bridge to 
 tiller. A pause, as if to take breath suspended the Spanish aggression 
 for an instant, and when she struck again the leviathan Oregon was 
 square upon her. 
 
 Then the combined Federal fleet, that is, the Oregon, Iowa and Texas 
 in a group plied their crushing broadsides into the staggering squadron 
 now in extremis. Most of them were enwreathed in flames ; with steer- 
 ing gear and offensive appliances beyond any remedy at hand. The 
 Iowa's captain and crew could see that the work was done and well done; 
 11
 
 198 FATE OF THE SURVIVORS. 
 
 there was but one of the splendid ships of the Cape Verde fleet intact, 
 the swift Colon flying to the westward pursued by an ample force. 
 
 The fire-beleagured crews of the three dismantled ships were now the 
 solicitude of the officers and crew of the Iowa. It was a woeful sight 
 even to the exultant victors. The three noble ships, unable to fire or fly, 
 had run upon the rocks to get a last chance for life a very poor one, for 
 even had the vessels been beyond the reach of the pursuer's guns the fires 
 raging below deck made explosion certain. The horrors of the bombard- 
 ment were almost humanitarian amenities compared with the spectacle 
 
 THE MARIA TERESA. 
 
 that met the startled vision of the rescuers. The scanty crews of the 
 Spanish ships were struggling in the water and in the very eyes, almost in 
 the grasp of the rescuers, were drawn under water by the swarming sharks, 
 other unfortunates were throwing themselves overboard in the wildness of 
 despair to quench the flames devouring them. 
 
 But more hideous than this, Captain Evans discovered the inhuman 
 Cubans, hidden among the rocks, dispatching the helpless and naked men 
 prisoners of the United States, as the white flag was at the mast of 
 each ship. The unqualifiable miscreants were deliberately picking off the 
 struggling victims, as they dragged their mutilated bodies from the fangs.
 
 AN ACT OF COURTESY. 199 
 
 of the sharks or suffering from the wounds of the fleet. The Iowa's 
 crew put an end to this feast of ferocity, and there were queer comments 
 among the valiant men who had fought Spaniards to their doom in the 
 interest of these semi-cannibals. Nor did the soul-stirring heroism and 
 manly magnanimity of our admirable compatriots end in the mere rescue 
 from the waves. In countless instances, volunteers from the boats 
 climbed the burning sides of the Spanish wrecks to rescue the wounded 
 left to their doom in the flaming craters the hulks presented. Captain 
 Evans, witness of the Bayard like devotion of one man, who climbed up 
 the scorching sides of the Vizcaya, named the hero for promotion on the 
 spot. The Iowa's part in the bewildering drama ends fitly in an act of 
 chivalrous courtesy, fitting for record beside the scenic amenities of the 
 troubadour days. The captain of the Vizcaya was brought up the Iowa's 
 gang plank among other prisoners. When the distressed Spaniard came 
 in sight of Captain Evans, he drew his sword from its scabbard, kissed the 
 hilt, and with an emotion easily understood, proffered this priceless in- 
 signia of the brave to the captor: " No," replied the noble sailor, "you 
 fought too well to give up your sword, keep it." The incident sank deep 
 into the minds of the Iowa's crew, for there was not a man on the ship, 
 who had not heard of a foolish boast made by Captain Eulate of the 
 Vizcaya, that he would drag the Iowa in tow to Spain a prize. 
 
 A combat so decisive, involving tests so numerous and radical in theii 
 effect, will receive the world's attention and excite volumes of description, 
 as no single eye could conceive the simultaneous effort of the United 
 States vessels, and no single narrative can comprehend all the details no 
 matter how elaborate or exhaustive, in one single picture. History 
 must accept the evidence of many, and choose the decision of the 
 competent. The world who reads for the sake of knowing the human 
 side of these awful slaughters we call "glorious victories," will proba- 
 bly acquire a clearer insight into the action now under consideration, 
 by the artless narrative of a young lad an uncommonly wide-awake 
 young lad, who gives this terse rendering of the Iowa episode and with- 
 out the technical jargon which confuses ordinary recitals from seamen. 
 The writer, Joseph T. Garbin, a lad of twenty, formed one of the watch 
 corps of the Iowa. His artless expression is the triumph of realism ; he 
 is writing from the Iowa on the night of the decisive action. 
 
 "At eight o'clock this morning I went on deck as usual for signal 
 watch. I made up my mind to keep a good lookout on the mouth of the 
 harbor, as it was only on Saturday night that I had reported to the officer 
 of the deck that there were three distinct lines of smoke to the left of the
 
 200 THE EMERGENCY SIGNAL. 
 
 entrance to the harbor, and I did not sleep very well during the night 
 thinking of it. I thought they had steam up, and were going to make a 
 break in the night. So, naturally, that only increased my anxiety to be 
 the first one to see them, as the navigator said he would give $10 to the 
 signal boy who gave the alarm, and I am proud to say that he stuck to 
 his word, and I am $10 richer to day than I was yesterday. At 9 A. M. 
 this morning I reported that the smoke I saw had moved toward the en- 
 trance. At 9:15 I reported it moving more so. Then, of my own accord, 
 I bent on the signal 2-5-0, which means ' The enemy's ships escaping,' 
 and laid it on the bridge ready to hoist. At 9:30, just as the navigator 
 was taking the deck, I reported a large black ship, with two stacks and 
 two military masts, in the entrance. The navigator, without looking, 
 says ' Bend on the emergency signal.' With that I ran it up to the yard- 
 arm. He said, ' Sound the alarm, bugler ; sound general quarters.' I 
 was patiently waiting to sound the alarm, and in two minutes after, or at 
 9:32 o'clock, the ship was reported ready for action. At 9:35 the Vizcaya 
 opened fire, and was promptly answered by our ship with a twelve-inch gun, 
 which went dangerously close for the first. Then there came a stream of 
 fire from the forts and ships, and they were all. directed at the Iowa, but 
 she seemed to be charmed, for not a shell struck her. Captain Evans 
 sang out ahead, ' Full speed, both engines,' and soon we were closing up 
 on the leader of the Dagoes. Talk about a ship pumping steel ! We 
 were at the Vizcaya when the flagship Maria Teresa got on our starboard 
 side, and Captain Evans smiled and said, ' Now, men, take accurate 
 aim, and make every shot tell.' So we were putting broadside after 
 broadside into both ships, when suddenly the Maria Teresa turned 
 around and headed for the beach. Our captain manoeuvred the ship a 
 little, and got between them again, but this time with the Vizcaya on our 
 starboard and the flagship on our port side. More shells hit the flagship, 
 and shi ran on the beach, with her crew dropping from all parts of her. 
 Soon the smoke oozed from her and a terrible explosion rent the air, and 
 then the crack cruiser of the Dagoes' fleet struck her colors and ran up a 
 pair of white pants as a flag of truce. 
 
 " We then mancBuvred around the Vizcaya so as to get the Almirante 
 Oquendo on our left, and succeeded. In ten minutes the Oquendo was 
 in the same position as the Maria Teresa, laid high and dry on the beach, 
 fire pouring from all sides and parts of her. Still the Vizcaya kept up 
 the fight and we saw that she was doomed. But then things changed. 
 She let drive her two eleven-inch guns and struck us plump on the water 
 line, causing a fire to start on the berth deck. But discipline showed it-
 
 A SHOWER OF SHELLS. 201 
 
 self here, for the fire was hardly started before it was put out, but we 
 were leaking badly. This in time was also stopped. 
 
 " Suddenly, as if it were a part of a programme, Captain Bob sang out 
 from the conning tower, ' Come, boj's ; five minutes more of this work, 
 and she'll be done for.' Then you should have seen the fire come from 
 those guns. It seemed as if all the guns in the ship were discharged at 
 once. When the smoke cleared away a little the captain sang out: 'Man 
 the secondary battery ; bugler sound the torpedo attack.' There, sure 
 enough, were Spain's two dreaded torpedo boat destroyers. The secondary 
 battery made the shells fairly rain on them. They did not last five 
 minutes." 
 
 This eager eyed boy on the spot, unquestionably all eyes for the thrill- 
 ing spectacle, it will be observed, counts the shots of the Iowa as de- 
 cisive on the torpedo destroyers. He also specifies severe hurt done the 
 Iowa not pointed out in the official report. These apparent discrepancies 
 illustrate the perplexity of presenting the ensemble of the momentarily 
 varying action for the officers' reports contain the same contradictions and 
 averments. It is instructive to compare what an officer's eyes saw and 
 an officer's pen set down, viewing precisely the same phenomena. Cadet 
 Graeme, fresh in the impressions of what he has just taken part in, wrote 
 from the same ship, the Iowa: 
 
 " A splendid, big, dark colored cruiser, flying a very large Spanish flag, 
 was coming out past Morro at full speed. I jumped to my turret and 
 saw everything ready in a hurry. The Iowa was headed in toward Morro 
 at about six thousand yards' distance. 
 
 " The Spanish vessels all headed to the westward and before we had 
 turned to follow them I got in three shots at the Vizcaya. One of the 
 cadets said he saw one of my shots land right on the Vizcaya's forecastle 
 and burst. This was the only shooting I did in the action, as our star- 
 board side was toward the enemy all the rest of the time. Our heavy 
 guns began firing within two minutes after the first alarm. The enemy's 
 shells came over us in showers. I saw the Texas on our port hand and 
 beyond her the Brooklyn. The Oregon was to the eastward of us, but 
 she passed the stern of us and headed in toward the enemy. 
 
 "When the first ship came out she fired an eleven -inch shell at us 
 which passed just over the bridges from the bow to the starboard quarter 
 and struck the water near the quarterdeck. If it had struck us the effect 
 would have been terrific, as it was a raking shot. The enemy fired a 
 great deal of shrapnel at us, and the whistling of the rifle balls as the 
 shells burst could be heard plainly.
 
 202 
 
 EFFECT OF THE LIGHT GUNS. 
 
 " All this time a running fire was kept up with the cruisers. Our 
 twelve and eight inch shells hulled them, and the lighter guns made their 
 sides look like pepper boxes. The Maria Teresa and the Oquendo were 
 seen to be on fire in about twenty minutes from the beginning of the action. 
 They headed for the shore and were on the beach in thirty-four minutes 
 from the first gun, complete wrecks, burning fiercely, the Spaniards 
 swimming ashore on gratings, ladders and other wreckage. The Oregon 
 was with us, but she and the Texas and Brooklyn devoted themselves 
 principally to the Colon and Vizcaya. We at once set out at full speed 
 after these two ships. 
 
 A SIX-POUNDER RAPID FIRE GUN IN ACTION. 
 
 " The Oregon and Brooklyn kept up a hot fire at the two fleeing Span- 
 iards and the Texas fired an occasional long range shot. We were too 
 far astern to fire at them, but we began to gain slowly on the Vizcaya. 
 Our first action lasted fifty-four minutes. The Vizcaya put her helm 
 a-port and headed in for the beach in a sinking condition. She was also 
 on fire. Two heavy shells had hit us on the starboard bow forward of 
 the armor The watertight doors had all been closed at the beginning of
 
 "OUT ALL BOATS." 203 
 
 the action, so the leak was not serious. We let the ships chase the Colon 
 and we turned in toward the Vizcaya. We left our guns and the word 
 k Out all boats ' was passed. . . . The Vizcaya was burning fiercely 
 inside the superstructure, and the after ports were red with flames. 
 While we were near, the mainmast fell with a crash, the large military 
 top falling across the after eleven-inch barbette. The guns were popping 
 as the fire reached them, the shells whistling over our heads, and by the 
 sharp crack or sullen boom I judged we had a sample shot from every 
 piece of ordnance in the ship. 
 
 " Every minute or so the fire would reach a box of rapid fire ammuni- 
 tion, and an explosion very much like a 'flower pot' would occur, thin, 
 feathery trails of smoke shooting far heavenward in a dozen different 
 directions. While we were some distance off, even from the Iowa one 
 could see the men going down the side on ropes, and swimming ashore in 
 little groups. Our first boats took men right from the ship's side, while 
 some hung on to ropes and refused to let go, fearing they would drown. 
 
 " Several had to be pulled away by main force. We had three boats 
 at work when I got there, and the United States yacht Hist had two 
 small skiffs employed in the rescue. I headed for the bow, but could 
 see no one on board. Any way it was at this time too hot for a human 
 being to live aboard of her. The ship was a crackling mass of flame. I 
 saw a great gaping shot hole in the forward barbette, and a good many 
 shreds of clothing about the bridge and forecastle." 
 
 While the Iowa, which was in the direct path of the escaping enemy, lost 
 herself in her own smoke, and that of the enemy, the other vessels of the 
 fleet aligned as may be seen in the comprehensive diagram illustrating 
 these pages, made directly for the course of the flying Spaniards, not quite 
 certain whether the manoauvre was intended to cover some ulterior pur- 
 pose or whether Admiral Cervera meant to stake all upon a fight of ship 
 to ship. The speed of the enemy and to a certain extent the unprepared - 
 ness of Commodore Schley's vessels decided this ; for, as if by instinct 
 each of the blockading vessels pushed to intercept the nearest enemy. In 
 the mele it was not always possible to tell which vessel did the deadly 
 execution soon visible in the flying squadron. We have seen the Iowa 
 placing herself squarely in the path of the Vizcaya and at the same time 
 challenging the utmost efforts of the Oquendo. The Texas, which sur- 
 prised her own crew and the enemy as well, and animated by the con- 
 sciousness of the result dependent upon her speed, turned the prophecies 
 of her detractors and even the hopes of her friends into idle sayings,
 
 CERVERA FEARED THE BROOKLYN. 
 
 205 
 
 for she developed a speed that it seems counted for a great deal in the 
 precipitate yielding of Cervera's vessels. 
 
 They had not counted on any approach to such sailing qualities ; in 
 fact Admiral Cervera himself owned, that when the order to emerge from 
 Santiago reached him, though he apprehended a desperate conflict, he 
 counted the Brooklyn as the only antagonist likely to be able to maintain 
 the combat if he could turn it into a stern chase. The Texas itself be- 
 came the centre of a fire almost as ferocious as though it had been con- 
 centric. But the vessel was so stoutly put together that not a splinter 
 was displaced nor a man injured, though Captain Philip was obliged, 
 
 WRECK OF THE "VIZCAYA 
 
 so dense was the fall of missiles, to transfer his operating station from the 
 conning tower, as it is called, to the bridge. And just as he did so a 
 shell from the enemy riddled the pilot house, leaving it useless during the 
 rest of the action. Another shell tore a hole through an ash funnel and 
 exploded in the smokestack, but injured no one. The Texas, meanwhile, 
 was like a hive of gigantic ants, each man working with deadly intensity 
 and each invisible to his neighbor, for the smoke grew every instant dense, 
 sulphurous, blinding ! And it is a curious comment on the enginery,
 
 206 
 
 EVERY BROADSIDE A TORTURE. 
 
 shown to be so fatefully effective, that the master strokes of destruction 
 were wielded in an almost impenetrable darkness. 
 
 In old times a vessel undergoing a bombardment had a free sea, clear 
 air, and only a slight jar from the detonation of the guns. Every time 
 the Texas leviathans vomited forth their monstrous missiles, the men on 
 their feet were flung violently upon the decks by the concussion, which to 
 an outsider implied the beginning of the wracking to pieces of the ship 
 itself. It can be readily, understood therefore what the captains and com- 
 
 WRECK OF THE " OQUENDO." 
 
 manders of the new school vessels mean, when they frankly declare that 
 the victory is due and due alone to the men at the guns. For every 
 broadside is a torture, in fact is accompanied by pains and penalties, al- 
 most as fatal to the physical system as a charge of cavalry or a fusillade 
 on land, to infantry. 
 
 Fitfully the great vessel passed out of the pandemoniac atmosphere 
 long enough to catch a glimpse of the lurid nebulae surrounding the 
 enemy ; then redoubled vigor, if this were possible, was added to the ef- 
 forts of the gunners. The fight had been going on an hour or more, when 
 the vulcan forces of the Texas were made aware that their projectiles had 
 riddled the two enemies nearest the indefinable sweep of the ship's pro-
 
 "DON'T CHEER, BOYS." 207 
 
 digious missiles. Then aligning, as if by accident, the Brooklyn, the 
 Oregon and the Texas found themselves cleaving the waters neck and 
 neck after the Cristobal Colon and the Almirante Oquendo. But the 
 speed, the incessant crash, the abysmal confusion, did not seem for an in- 
 stant to deter the activity of the gunners, or in the slightest effect the 
 preternatural accuracy of their aim. A vast apparition of flame, gaunt 
 and ghastly, arms obtruding in the darkness of the smoke flashed and fell 
 into quiescence. Then lines were revealed ; the Oquendo had turned 
 sharp, panting and sinking in an attempt to reach the land. Still the 
 Texas guns roared and the deadly missiles from all her batteries flew in 
 clusters against the now helpless wreck. Through the murky atmosphere, 
 the man at the post on the Texas signaled that the vessel had struck 
 and simultaneously with this an explosion rent the air that fairly made 
 the waters about the Texas uprear and quiver as though a million mines 
 had exploded beneath her keel. 
 
 It was at this memorable point that Captain Philip uttered the excla- 
 mation which has evoked the admiring comments of mankind. The 
 titans of the Texas, conscious of their handiwork and spectators of the 
 result, began a fierce vindictive cry of exultation : " Don't cheer, boys, 
 the poor devils are dying," Captain Philip called out, and the Texas, 
 with the men subdued and thoughtful, catching fitful glimpses of the 
 Oquendo's tragic helplessness, tore on to secure the Cristobal Colon. 
 In this episode of the engagement, another vessel, the Oregon, made the 
 record that sailors love. For, unwearied by her voyage half round the 
 world, this splendid ship tore through the water like an express train, out- 
 sailing swifter rivals. The Colon had performed a miracle up to this mo- 
 merit:shehad reached a forty mile bourn from the mouth of the Santiago 
 prison, and under all the laws of naval experience, she ought to have been 
 safe. The Brooklyn, counted on for swiftness and not for strength, had 
 kept in relentless chase. But divining the purpose of the commander of 
 the Colon, Admiral Schley directed his course far enough out to intercept 
 the flying Spaniard at a headland many miles distant. This to some ex- 
 tent lessened the effectiveness of the Brooklyn's fire. Hence, when the 
 Oregon joined the chase and discovered a speed equal to either of the 
 others, Admiral Schley knew the victory not only won but consummated. 
 
 The Brooklyn, Texas and Oregon were within deadly range, their 
 guns plying incessant destruction, when the Colon was seen to turn and 
 then give up the fight. As was fitting, Admiral Schley hastened aboard 
 the Spaniard, receiving the surrender of the last of the fleet. Returning 
 to his own vessel Commodore Schley, who has a very warm corner in the
 
 208 
 
 "A NICE FIGHT, JACK. 
 
 hearts of his sailors, came near enough to the Texas to call to his friends : 
 u It was a nice fight, Jack, wasn't it." Then the Fourth of July feelings 
 of the sailorsjfrom the chief in command,to the coal shoveler, broke out. 
 And Captain Philip, though the time appropriate to call all hands to the 
 quarter deck, to bare his head and deliver this impressive epilogue : " I 
 want to make public acknowledgment here that I believe in God the 
 Father Almighty. I want all you officers and men to lift your hats and 
 from your hearts to offer silent thanks to the Almighty." 
 
 THE VESUVIUS THROWING PROJECTILES.
 
 PART II. 
 
 HOWEVER gifted the historian, whatever powers he may possess in 
 making real to the eye the thing of the thought, the world is agreed 
 and I think rightly, that the word, reflecting the impressions of the man who 
 has been part of a fateful enterprise, is of more worth, if not more weight, 
 than the most carefully wrought coordinations of the purely philosophic 
 annalist. Recall the avidity of mankind in reading and treasuring Caesar's 
 ideas and impressions of his cyclonic campaign in Gaul; Napoleon's ut- 
 terances after the indescribable discomfiture in Russia ; these remain in 
 the world's mind, while the studiously wrought chapters of the conscien- 
 tious historian are known only to the erudite or the enthusiast. Hence 
 the sayings of Schley, of Evans, of Clark, of any of the knightly paragons, 
 who conducted our vessels to victory, are of more value than all the 
 philosophic study the French Academy could combine. I do not mean 
 by this, that a Schley, an Evans, a Dewey, can record history, more ac- 
 curately or more worthily, only, that what they say has the attraction of 
 actuality. The reader is seeing the soul of one of the guiding factors in 
 victory or defeat. The plodding historian intimidated by countless con- 
 tradiction, can only present the photographic negatives while the Schleys, 
 the Evans, the Deweys, the Clarks the man at the gun gives the crayon 
 lines caught, just as they were drawn by the vast camera of nature. 
 
 On his return to Washington, Schley was saluted as the hero and 
 architect of the Santiago edifice. Not that he claimed or reclaimed ; he 
 was of too fine a mould for that. He did what was allotted to the com- 
 mander of our fleet to do, and he was hero-like, disdainfully indifferent 
 as to the attribution of the glory. It was in short, glory enough for him 
 that on his beloved Brooklyn on all the ships, he loves as men love their 
 children, no life was lost, and the end won. We have his official version 
 of the grandiose action, which really ended the war, but an official report 
 is necessarily a guarded statement of facts no matter how momentous 
 the subject; just as history is constrained to a certain austere air of all- 
 knowingness, which impairs the free play of the imagination. Taken un- 
 awares, as it were, in the humorous inquisition of the interviewer, Schley 
 made these extremely interesting addenda to a report which the world 
 will read with interest so long as the language lasts : 
 
 (209)
 
 210 CERVERA FORCED TO FIGHT. 
 
 " My mind in regard to the battle," he said, " is like a camera full of in- 
 stantaneous photographs, the negatives of which have not been fully 
 developed. It has been so far, impossible for me to form a correct im- 
 pression of the entire engagement, but in thinking it over from time to 
 time, I remember new circumstances and impressions that were made on 
 my mind at the moment, but which had not before been remembered. 
 In the course of time I will have the negatives well developed and be 
 able to give the correct history of the engagement as I saw it. As far as 
 our being in the least unprepared for the battle, that is all nonsense. 
 We could not have been more prepared for them if they had notified us 
 that they were coming out. Our men watched the harbor night and day 
 so closely that a rat could not have slipped out without being seen. The 
 enemy was unable to put a shovel of fresh coal on their fires without the 
 fact being reported. Beyond the hills, at the entrance of the harbor we 
 could see the smoke arising from the enemy's vessels. While it was thin 
 we were at rest, but if a particularly black cloud arose we were alert. 
 On the morning the enemy left the harbor my Quartermaster reported 
 to me that the columns of smoke were shifting about the harbor, and 
 were denser than usual It looked as though they were preparing for a 
 dash. I was positive that they would come out within twenty four 
 hours. Public opinion everywhere is the same, and public opinion was 
 sure to force Cervera to fight. So sure were we that they were coming 
 out of the harbor, that we were at quarters when they appeared, and 
 three minutes later we had begun firing. It was the same on the other 
 vessels and the signal that the enemy was coming out appeared on all 
 the ships almost at the same instant." 
 
 The reader who has followed the narrative of the conflict, will compre- 
 hend the difficulty and embarrassments of the judicious historian on 
 meeting this authoritative averment, for it is in testimony from every 
 ship, that the men were in Sunday regalia ; that while the debouch of 
 the Spanish fleet was universally regarded as an eventuality, it was no- 
 where looked upon as a certainty. 
 
 Evidently, Admiral Sampson was not so impressed ; that is, not as 
 Schley avers he was, or he would not have steamed away, to leave the 
 conduct of the fight to his second in command. Admiral Schley does 
 not mistake, he simply confuses the denouement, with the prelude. Once 
 the enemy in the open, Schley was the warrior to the tips of his fingers. 
 He ordered his superb Brooklyn, where her fleetness and firing were de- 
 cisive. He left the Vizcaya, as Captain Evans shows, and turned the 
 prodigious energies of his Brooklyn to the Cristobal Colon. For this
 
 THE CUBANS. 
 
 211 
 
 reason he could not positively 
 deny the claim of the Cubans 
 that Admiral Cervera surren- 
 dered to them, and that they 
 turned the vanquished Spaniard 
 over to the United States fleet ; 
 but he could say that this was 
 the first time that he had heard 
 of such a claim I He had little 
 opportunity of observing the 
 conduct of the Cubans and 
 could not speak from experi- 
 ence. He quoted a Spanish 
 colonel, who said to him that he 
 hoped the Yankees would not 
 have the same experience with 
 the Cubans as allies, that the 
 Spaniards had with them as 
 enemies. " They are an excel- 
 lent advance guard of a re- 
 treat," said the colonel, "and 
 an admirable rear guard for an 
 advance." 
 
 In speaking of the disputed 
 merits of the eight-inch and the 
 thirteen -inch guns as shown 
 in the engagement, Admiral 
 Schley records: "I think the 
 relative merits of the two guns 
 are about the same. The only 
 difference is that when you are 
 too far away, with the eight-inch 
 guns for them to pierce the 
 armor of the enemy, you must 
 get nearer. If they are near 
 enough they will shoot through 
 anything put before them. It 
 is like the case of Admiral Far- 
 ragut, when he sent a com- 
 mander to bombard a fort.
 
 212 THE MAN BEHIND THE GUN. 
 
 When the commander had reached the station assigned, he signaled. * I 
 cannot reach the enemy.' ' Go nearer,' signaled back Farragut." Con- 
 quests like his own and Dewey's can be best understood by Schley's ap- 
 preciation of the plain sailor, the citizen of the republic, diverted from 
 peace, to carry on the hateful work of war : 
 
 "To the man behind the gun, I cannot give enough praise. I consider 
 it the highest honor to command such a splendid body of men. No better 
 sailors and fighters can be found in the world, and I doubt if they can 
 be equaled. During moments when a rain of iron hail was pouring all 
 around us, the men laughed, and when a shot struck near them they gave 
 a cheer. 
 
 " They were absolutely fearless, even in the face of death. How we 
 escaped with such a slight loss will always be a marvel to me. From the 
 instant the nose of the first ship appeared beyond the harbor entrance, 
 the Spaniards poured into us and about us, a terrible and continuous fire 
 from all their guns. They were prepared to fire as rapidly as possible, 
 and did so in their desperate hope of escape. I do not think the result 
 was due to any confusion on their ships, but to a lack of practice. They 
 simply could not hit us, while our men were so well trained that they 
 almost could hit a mosquito. For seven or eight years they had been 
 practicing for such an opportunity, and they pumped shot after shot into 
 the enemy, and after they secured the range every shot told. 
 
 " The Spaniards underrated the republic's sailors and the republic from 
 the beginning. As a matter of fact they were never in our class at all. 
 The ships that sailed out of the harbor, were the finest that could be put 
 together, yet they never had a chance of escaping. If I had been in com- 
 mand of the enemy's fleet, I would never have adopted the tactics em- 
 ployed by Admiral Cervera. If they had scattered as soon as they had 
 come out, one or two might have escaped, which would have been a vic- 
 tory for him, even if the others had been sacrificed. If he had taken a 
 dark night, he would have had a better chance. If I had been in his 
 place, I should not have let a dark night pass without trying to escape. 
 As it was, he could not have suited our convenience better. When he 
 came out we were prepared to fight, and if necessary to chase him. I 
 had coal and provisions enough to follow him to Cadiz." 
 
 Admiral Schley declared that the surrender of Santiago was due to the 
 bombardment of the navy. If it had not surrendered when it did, the 
 town would have been wiped from the map. Out of 108 eight and six- 
 inch shots fired over the hills at the city, he said 101 fell in the streets of 
 the town. If Santiago had not been surrendered the next day, we would

 
 CAPTAIN KOBLEY D. EVANS. 
 
 COMMODORE JOHN W. PHILIP. 
 
 CAPTAIN CHARLES v CLARK. 
 
 CAPTAIN HKNRY C. TAYIA>R.
 
 SCHLEY'S MANEUVERING. 215 
 
 have brought up the other vessels and dropped the ten and thirteen-inch 
 shells into the city. They had no alternative but to surrender. The dis- 
 tance was four and a half miles and the intervening hills were about two 
 hundred and fifty feet in height. 
 
 When the Spanish fleet came out, the flagship of the United States 
 squadron, the Brooklyn, was from two and a half to three miles from the 
 first of the enemy's fliers. Admiral Schley had been forewarned that if 
 an action ever came, several of the Spanish commanders were eager to try 
 the metal of his ship, hence, the instant he caught sight of the armada, 
 he felt that the Brooklyn would be the target ; that one or two at least of 
 the enemy would try the effectiveness of the ram on her armor. He 
 waited therefore, or rather directed his craft more for the purpose of head- 
 ing off the enemy than attacking them. His guns were operated from 
 the instant sight could be obtained, from what is called in naval parlance 
 the " starboard side," and as the vessel took on headway with increase of 
 fuel, the flagship's fire was probably the most constant, that is the least 
 intermittent of any of the ships. In fact, it is in testimony from the crew, 
 that the guns became so hot from time to time, that some of them had to 
 be abandoned, momentarily. But, two of her boilers were not fired, when 
 the first of the enemy's fleet appeared, and this accounts for the lack of 
 speed shown in the earlier part of the action. But second by second the 
 fires told. Before the decisive moment, she had six furnaces flaming like 
 volcanoes and with this vantage easily distanced her consorts, when the 
 final chase for the Colon set in. 
 
 Admiral Sohley's responsibility was not ended with the conduct of his 
 own ship, for with Sampson far away, like Sheridan at Winchester, the 
 directing of the battle depended upon him as second in command, and as the 
 event proved, Schley grappled an entirely unforeseen contingency and 
 wrested a victory which might have been less decisive. In fact Schley's 
 manoeuvering of the fleet made it impossible for Cervera to elect any 
 other action than the one he followed. For, when the Spanish admiral, in 
 obedience to orders, issued from the channel under the guns of Morro, he 
 had three feasible possibilities before him. He might have rushed square 
 ahead, beating down the ships nearest to him, and even by the sacrifice of 
 one, make good the escape of the others. This would have been a sub- 
 stantial victory : or, he might have divided his fleet, sending half eastward 
 and half westward, thus securing seven chances in ten of the escape of 
 half; or he might have stood squarely out en masse, held the blockaders 
 at bay, fought a defensive fight until night, and might then with what 
 were left, have successfully evaded his adversaries. Schley's action, how- 
 12
 
 216 CERVERA'S ALTERNATIVES. 
 
 ever, in closing in under the fire of Morro, left the Spanish admiral but 
 two alternatives, flight to the east or flight to the west. Luck gave him 
 an advantage, for had he gone eastward he would have met Sampson with 
 the New York and a half dozen formidable craft of secondary capacity. 
 From his flagship, Schley saw that his lieutenants were carrying out, as if 
 by hypnotic inspiration, exactly what he had in mind, for within three 
 quarters of an hour of the issue under the guns of Morro, the Iowa had 
 riddled the Vizcaya, which fluttered on the water like a vast series of 
 pyrotechnics, spitting flame and belching smoke. 
 
 SIGNALING THIS FLEKT. 
 
 After words have done their best to reproduce this awful moment that 
 no language seems adequate to lucidly portray, there is still lacking a 
 vague something. How account for the momentous issue decided in three 
 hours? The results of all the centuries of scientific application came 
 together, embodied in the six Spanish vessels and our own fleet. Untold
 
 THE THREE HOURS' COMBAT. 
 
 217 
 
 millions of money, inestimably more than is represented by the mere cost 
 of the ship as she sits in the water, are represented in the integers of a 
 ileet. Hence, the three hours' combat is really the final stroke, the finite 
 last word, so to speak, in the contest of intelligence, science, patience and 
 devotion. And yet the result so far as it impresses the world, can be 
 baldly told in a few lines. Fleet met fleet and one was sunk. Yet it 
 would be a very unsatisfactory history that dismissed the event in this 
 laconic fashion, and for many a day the curious will inquire, and many and 
 many a volume will be written, to tell the tale second by second, minute 
 by minute, during the three hours. But a great deal more vital thing 
 was won than the sinking of six iron hulks by six other iron hulks. 
 
 There is no student of history who would not be glad to know the mind 
 
 D. ANTONIO EULATB, 
 Captain of the "Vizcaya." 
 
 D. JUAN B. LAZAGA. 
 Captain of the "Oquendo." 
 
 of the man who held the heavy oar in the triremes of Antony, when his 
 imperial hopes went down on the sea near Actium. We are probably no 
 more curious than those ancient mariners, nor more faithful to the facts 
 than the Plinys and Plutarchs, yet the writer who seeks to embody with 
 fairness, clearness and impartiality the handiwork and significance of each 
 instrument in the conduct of such a combat as the Santiago viotory, finds 
 himself embarrassed by the richness of the testimonies, fresh and live and 
 lucid from the very heat, smoke and fur}' of the battle itself. Nor, sur- 
 prisingly enough is the story of one vessel the story of another, or the 
 adumbration of the whole. For each ship wrought somewhat in the 
 semblance of its commander, and these typified the varied range of intel- 
 lectual valor in the extraordinary phalanx of illustrious sailors who have 
 glorified the annals of our navy.
 
 218 
 
 THE DEAFENING PRELUDE. 
 
 When the apparition of the Spanish fleet surprised the Oregon, two 
 long blasts of her whistle admonished her neighbors, and the attention of 
 the official charged with that duty became fixed on the phenomenon. The 
 men at the guns, wearied with weeks of tedious blockading, broke into 
 shouts, as though the vessel had just reached port from a long voyage. 
 The cheers and the volleys from the guns mingled, and the Spaniard, as 
 he rode out gallantly, gave a taste of his metal with an eleven-inch shell 
 at each ship in succession, deafeningly preluding with crashes that seemed 
 the result of mechanical devices, so regular and so rapid were they. The 
 Oregon to the surprise of her crew, reached her best speed almost sim- 
 ultaneously with the onrush westward, of the third Spanish vessel. From 
 the Oregon's decks the onrush of the Towa and Texas seemed part of a 
 
 D. EMILIO D. MOREU. 
 Captain of the ' Cristobal Colon. 
 
 D. VICTOR M. CONGAS. 
 Captain of the " Maria Teresa.' 
 
 studied plan ; for a time there seemed danger that the three United States 
 vessels would do each other mischief, but the sailor knows his sea, and 
 though apparently crossing each other's path, every gun aimed went 
 straight to its mark in the body of the enemy. 
 
 Naturally, the excitement of battle does not leave the mind of the fighter 
 /lear for the exact sequence of things as they pass, but the people on the 
 Oregon marked the rush of the torpedo-boats and calculated the effect of 
 a stream of six-pound shells, flung at the two terrors, as they seemed to 
 hesitate, which vessel to choose, as the victim of their deadly powers. 
 A shot from the six-inch starboard gun of the Oregon, is credited with 
 having blown up one of the monsters, and it is even testified that the 
 destroyer went down, though it is confusingly added that the Gloucester 
 ran toward the sinking vessel and finished her.
 
 ADMIRAL PASCUAL CKRVKBA Y TOPKTE.
 
 THE OREGON AND THE TERRORS. 221 
 
 The same witness testifies that the Maria Teresa burst into flames 
 almost simultaneously and ran for the beach, and that all the ships sent 
 broadsides into her. It is significant of the spirit of the combat, that the 
 Oregon, in the language of the crew, seeing the enormous vessel hors de 
 combat, disdained to stop for the laurels of victory, but continued on- 
 ward, after everything in sight, that still presented belligerent activity. It 
 is likewise set down that a shot from the Oregon's thirteen-inch forward gun 
 settled the fate of the Almirante Oquendo, that she too burst into flames 
 and like the Infanta Maria Teresa, struck for the shore. " Her colors not 
 having been hauled down we raked her as we passed to make sure that 
 she would not fire any more ; and at the sight of two enemies knocked 
 out, all on board who could see, set up throat-splitting cheers and worked 
 away like Trojans to get at the next enemy in line." And to give each 
 his share, word was sent down to the gnomes immured in the deeps of thb 
 vessel, where neither air, sea nor sky were known or seen, the victorious 
 results thus far achieved ; so that as the mighty vessel panted on, cheers 
 from above met cheers from the decks, and these again were reechoed by 
 husky murmurings, as if humorous Calibans were grunting their appro- 
 bation in the tartarean regions below. 
 
 There was consternation on the Oregon's decks, however, when the 
 reckoning showed that one of the Spaniards was still at large, and then it 
 was discovered that the Cristobal Colon was looming up in the distance 
 four miles ahead. Grown insatiate by their astounding successes, the 
 vikings of the Oregon counted all that had been won as nothing, if this 
 melancholy vestige escaped. It seemed impossible to call for further ex- 
 ertion from the grimy giants who had been working in steam and flame 
 without relief. It was twelve o'clock and the outworn mariners were 
 bidden to what they called facetiously a " Dewey breakfast" baked beans 
 and strong coffee. But meanwhile, inch by inch, the great vessel was 
 crawling upon its victim until the captain, confident of the efficacy of the 
 murderous thirteen-inch shells, determined to try that resource. They 
 fell about the Colon, but did not strike her, until toward one o'clock the 
 Spaniard slowed down as if searching shelter landward. The Brooklyn's 
 fleetness gave her the finishing stroke, and when Admiral Sampson reached 
 the scene after the enemy had surrendered, the prize was turned over to 
 the Oregon, whose exhausted men were called upon for another day's 
 work, in rescuing the victims on board the wrecked ships. In all these 
 evolutions incomprehensible to laymen it is remarkable that the deluge 
 of iron poured out from the Spaniards, made so little impression in fact 
 none. At the same time the firing of the enemy was by no means amateur
 
 222 ONE GUN FOR THE FIREMEN. 
 
 or indecisive. An eleven-inch shell, passing over the bridge of the 
 Oregon, rendered many of the men almost lifeless for a few moments, 
 blew off their hats and sent everything of a movable nature scurrying by 
 the mere perturbation of the air ; the sensation caused was like that of a 
 heavy atmospheric pressure and the roar of an express train in a tunnel. 
 And yet the three hours' firing and maneuvering of Schley's implacable 
 monsters, wrought death to four hundred of the Spaniards and but one 
 man was slain on the decks of the victors ! 
 
 Car after car of ammunition rolled upward to the panting guns and the 
 "hoists " worked as if by electricity. The men in the fire-room redoubled 
 their energies, plunged the coal into the seething apertures as if it were 
 missiles directed at the flying fleets of the enemy. After a half hour's 
 practice the eyes that sighted the guns on the Oregon had become so keen, 
 that at this stage of the combat not a single shot deflected an appre- 
 ciable space from the point aimed at. And when it is borne in mind that 
 a volley exceeded in weight a heavily laden train, the wonder to the lay 
 mind is, that the Spanish ships were not crushed bodily and sunk into 
 fragments in the boiling waters. The Oregon's path, as seen from her 
 own decks by observant eyes, was the broadway of peril, of endeavor and 
 of final decisive victory. For her guns, aided by her astounding speed, 
 enabled each of the cruisers to finish at discretion all opposed to them. 
 Below, human nature was at its last ebb ; the captain of the vessel peering 
 eagerly into the pathway of flame and smoke, when the engineer came up 
 with trouble in his face and accent : " Can't you fire just one gun ? " he 
 asked with a tone of imploring. " One gun, what for ? " Captain Clark 
 responded. " The firemen are lying down just worn out, but if they could 
 hear a gun and thought that we were anywhere near the enemy and in 
 action, they will get up on their feet in an instant." And it so happened 
 that the captain thought that he could send one of his "railway trains " 
 within effective distance of the flying Colon. The legend runs that the 
 solace thus afforded the worn-out firemen, sustained them for another half 
 hour, until at the end of 1,776 shots the great vessel found her reward. 
 It was no less enrapturing to the crew when the final shot was fired, to 
 learn that the captain of the Colon regarded fate as maliciously against 
 him, when a vessel like the Oregon not only chased him but chased him 
 successfully until a thirteen-inch gun commanded every foot of his deck. 
 For, curiously enough, the last gun fired in this amazing conflict was from 
 the deck of the Oregon, a gun which when the war began, was at least 
 10,000 miles from the scene of Spain's overthrow ! 
 
 Ensign Powell, of the flagship New York, who followed Hobson on his 
 Mi'iTi-rno mission, recounts the battle as seen from the far rear, in the
 
 IN FIGHTING CLOTHES. 223 
 
 impatient presence of the admiral commanding. He notes that when the 
 word reached the vessel that Cervera had broken out and the flagship 
 " twenty miles away," the men were filled with gloom, but reassured that 
 they would be in at the death, they broke into irrestrainable jubilation, 
 they were " crazy to get at the dagoes." Nor is the sailor's picture of a 
 crew in such a conjuncture without its value : 
 
 "All hands took off their clean Sunday clothes and put on their dirt- 
 iest habiliments. After seeing that everything was all right at my gun, I 
 went below, took off my own finery, put on my fighting suit, and was 
 ready for business. I must admit that for once I caught the spirit of the 
 occasion, and was as crazy for a scrap, as any of them, though I am free 
 to admit that I don't ordinarily like shells whistling around my ears. All 
 this time the battle ships were pouring in shot after shot, while the four 
 Spanish crusiers, who turned away from us to the westward and were 
 straining along the coast, were quite enveloped in their smoke. We 
 could see shells splashing the water in all directions a sight it was worth 
 going to war to see. The two parallel lines of vessels moved up the 
 coast, but we moved faster astern of them and gained somewhat. The 
 Spanish vessels soon turned a point and we lost sight of them. Then 
 there was more smoke at the mouth of the harbor and we knew that 
 more vessels were coming out ; and in a minute we saw, first one, then a 
 second torpedo-boat destroyer appear and head up, after the ships. They 
 had nearly a clear chance to run, as all the vessels had passed to the 
 westward except one, the little Gloucester, commanded by Lieutenant 
 Commander Wainwright, a boat not as big as either of the destroyers, a 
 converted yacht, with only six six-pounders on a side not as much of a 
 battery as that of either of the destroyers. 
 
 ** But that didn't feaze Dick Wainwright. He sailed in and gave those 
 boats fits, first one and then the other, and when we were about off Mono, 
 and three miles to the eastward of the three vessels, a shot struck some- 
 thing explosive on one of the destroyers, there was a puff of black smoke 
 followed by a cloud of white, and the vessel turned and made for the 
 .shore. The Gloucester then turned her attention to the other destroyer, 
 which turned and started back for Mono, but we were there, and my for- 
 ward four-inch gun was ordered to open fire on it. Seeger, the gun cap- 
 tain, hit that fellow the first shot, nailed a boiler, and the boat never 
 moved again." 
 
 Passing the helpless Spanish craft, Ensign Powell confirms the in- 
 humanity of the Cubans. He says : 
 
 " We saw one nice little example of Cuban bravery there. Those
 
 224 PRISONERS OF WAR. 
 
 sweet, kind, considerate, gentle, abused Cuban soldiers, whom we are 
 fighting for, were on the beach, shooting every Spaniard who came within 
 range, so that swimmers and boats had to turn back to the ship. And 
 that ship blew up early. We saw a dozen small explosions, and finally 
 one big one that tore the after part of the ship to bits. The Iowa sent a, 
 boat, and a torpedo boat also went in, and I'll bet those Cubans stopped 
 their butchery in short order, under the persuasion of their guns. And, 
 by the way, that mutilation story of our marines is untrue. One was 
 killed with a machete and naturally had a couple of bad-looking cuts. 
 The other was shot thirty or forty times, but neither was mutilated as 
 was given out." 
 
 As bearing on the part the flagship took in the fight, the Ensign's naive 
 contribution has a certain value: 
 
 " About two o'clock we saw the Colon give up and head for the shore. 
 We then went to quarters again, but she never fired another shot ; merely 
 hauled down her flag and ran the boat on the beach. We were there al- 
 most as soon as the Oregon and Brooklyn. All our boats went for 
 prisoners, and then the Resolute, an ammunition supply boat, came up 
 from behind, and all the prisoners were sent to her except the Captain of 
 the Colon and Second Admiral of the Spanish fleet, who came to us. It 
 was a big job getting them off, and I wish we had done something to 
 them. They broke valves in their ship that let in the water, so that she 
 gradually filled and now she is sunk on the bottom. They also disabled 
 all their guns by throwing their truck mechanisms overboard. This is 
 distinctly against the rules of war, and the captain could be hanged for 
 allowing it. 
 
 " It was awful to see that beautiful big ship settle hour after hour. 
 When our men got on board, the engine-rooms were so badly flooded that 
 they could not find the valves that had been opened, though probably it 
 would have done no good, as they had been broken so that they couldn't 
 have been closed. After the Spanish Captain and Second Admiral came 
 on board the New York, I went over in a boat to get their belongings. I 
 found a gang from the Oregon loading the prisoners to send them to the 
 Resolute. I went all through the ship and got a couple of bayonets for 
 souvenirs. When I had a load of the Captain's clothes, I came back 
 here, and it was dinner time. I then had hopes that they would stop the 
 leaks and float the Colon off. Mr. Potter promised I should go on her prize 
 crew, which would have meant a trip to New York or Norfolk. But that 
 was not to be. A little later we could see she was sinking. Then about
 
 THE EPIC OF THE GLOUCESTER. 225 
 
 dark she slid off the rocks into deep water, and the signal came over that 
 she was afloat but sinking rapidly." 
 
 To the nautical mind, quite the most thrilling of this epic combat was 
 the encounter of the transformed pleasure yacht Gloucester commanded 
 by Richard Wainwright, who had been one of the officers of the Maine. 
 Following in the wake of the Spanish fleet, came the two terrors of the 
 modern marine, the Pluton and the Furor. Now this species of vessel 
 was counted upon, or has been counted upon, to neutralize the velocity 
 and armament, as well as the shield on the modern battle ship. Able to 
 attain great speed and armed with torpedoes calculated to penetrate the 
 stoutest armor as Cushing's destruction of the Albemarle proved and the 
 loss of the Maine corroborates, these little craft had been the unknown 
 quantity, exercising the conjectures of the experts. The larger craft, the 
 Iowa, the Indiana and Texas, having dismissed these troublesome tormen- 
 tors with a few shots that seemed to paralyze their action, passed on leav- 
 ing them as was supposed either useless, stripped of their terrors, or 
 vulnerable. They attempted to make back for the protection of Morro 
 when Commander Wainwright flung the puny Gloucester in their way 
 and to the astonishment of the various seamen, who saw the short con- 
 test, the ex-pleasure-yacht riddled the formidable destroyers and sunk 
 them. This was due of course to the work already begun by the cruisers 
 and battle ships, but at the same time the torpedoers might have reached 
 Santiago and might have remained a menace, had Wainwright hesitated 
 in attacking them. Commander Wainwright is credited with forcing the 
 probable action of the torpedo-destroyers. He foresaw that they would 
 linger behind the rest of the fleet in the hope of escaping unnoticed and 
 thus to find their chance to sneak up on the battle ships and blow them 
 out of the water. This is exactly what happened. The cruisers were at 
 least two miles beyond the entrance when the two terrors emerged. The 
 Gloucester was at the same time squarely in front of the fort steaming at 
 a prodigious rate. The intrepidity of the action consisted, not only in 
 the fact that the Gloucester ventured to stand before the two terrors, but 
 .from the first made squarely at them, firing her guns with as much con- 
 fidence as if they were the " railway " missiles of her colossal seamates, 
 the Oregon, or the Texas. One of the officers directing the guns on the 
 Gloucester, embodies the spirit, the movement, the actuality of the con- 
 test so succinctly, that it would be a deprivation to omit his picture of 
 the scene : 
 
 "I must have been pulling the trigger twelve times a minute. How
 
 226 PLUCKY INDIVIDUALITY. 
 
 many of the shells reached the mark I do not know ; some, certainly. To 
 catch the effect of a shot while other guns are belching forth smoke and 
 shell all around, is beyond the power of the human eye. The marvel is 
 how under such trying circumstances we managed to hit anything besides 
 sky and water. Like the roar of a distant storm, came the boom of the 
 heavy guns of the fleet firing at the four cruisers. I am not certain that 
 I even heard them ; every faculty was concentrated on the Furor and 
 the Pluton. The Indiana had been at our side at the start and had fired 
 her secondary battery at long range at the destroyers, but she, like the 
 rest, had slipped away in search of larger prey, leaving us to fight it out 
 with the two redoubted torpedo-boats, the terrors of the naval world. By 
 an unprejudiced outsider we would hardly have been considered a match 
 for one of the little black vessels. We, however, were more conceited, 
 and thought ourselves a match for both together." 
 
 Luck, the phantastic, almost humorous luck that attended all our essays, 
 presided over this Gargantuan combat. A shell not a millionfold as fierce 
 or destructive as thousands that had passed into, above and about our 
 happy go-lucky fleet, fell in the right place on the Spanish destroyer, and 
 the end had come. She could be seen rising in a dismantled mass on the 
 boiling waters, and then there was the spray of a gigantic fountain, and 
 the Gloucester, much to her own surprise, had conquered a craft that 
 under proper conditions ought to have destroyed her as soon as seen. 
 This was the Pluton. Then the Furor made for the inexpugnable Yankee, 
 or seemed to, for as it was afterward learned, the wretched vessels were 
 unable to control themselves, and another lucky shot ended her agonizing 
 efforts to bring her deadly weapons into use. In one sense, the enterprise 
 of Wainwright was as desperately daring as Hobson's, for a pleasure craft 
 turned into the semblance of a fighting ship, is but a poor resource at 
 best. In this instance, it was the Paul Jones like ardor of Wainwright 
 and the impetuous pluck of the men behind the guns, that decided the 
 result. A contest which evoked far more comment and applause on the 
 other side of the water, where war-making and slaughter curiously enough 
 rival the finest fruits of civilization in peaceful forms. In the navy of 
 this and other countries, Wainwright is secretly regarded as the "pluck- 
 iest" individuality discovered among the noble adventurers of our sea 
 campaign. 
 
 Her vengeful work done, the Gloucester became the harbor of the vic- 
 tims of the entire Spanish fleet; running all along the wreck-strewn shore, 
 the indomitable commander gathered up the debris of Cervera's ships. 
 The wounded were carefully fished up and tenderly cared for on the decks
 
 THE MOMENTOUS DRAMA. 227 
 
 which but a few moments before had been spitting death upon the Span- 
 iards. 
 
 It is of course understood that no one pair of eyes could see all the mo- 
 mentously thrilling drama that went on in the pellucid sunshine of the 
 Santiago coast, during the immortal three hours the ships of the republic 
 wrought destruction upon the most vaunted of Spain's armadas. For, 
 while we have been following the victorious efforts of the Iowa, the 
 Brooklyn, the Texas, the Oregon and the Indiana were plying the same 
 deadly prowess; manifesting the same implacable purpose and executing 
 these arbitrarily imposed parts with equal address. For nearly a half 
 century, volumes on volumes are in evidence attempting to reproduce the 
 successive phases of various naval battles Aboukir, Trafalgar, Copen- 
 hagen. The student of war history almost shrinks before the bibliography 
 of the naval combats of the Civil War. Yet none of these concentrated 
 so much of the mastery of condition, so much of the spirit of valor, 
 grounded in science, as the superhuman three hours' work at Santiago 
 in which as Commodore Schley finely said "there was glory enough for 
 all " without any of the aftermath of disputatious elucidation that fol- 
 lows the common efforts of great men and daring spirits. 
 
 To illustrate what impresses itself, on readers of any absorbing action, 
 is the contradiction of even visual testimony. An old sailor who had 
 been in the navy half a century whose time expired a month before the 
 combat with Cervera's fleet, who in pure love of battle, insisted on re- 
 maining with Commodore Schley, asserts, that he saw with his own eyes, 
 the shot from the Oregon which ended the torpedo boat the Pluton. 
 Now official reports and outside corroboration, assign the vital work of 
 destruction to the Gloucester! The ancient mariner, however, avers that 
 a thirteen inch shell from the Oregon "hit the middle" of the Spanish 
 craft and that she " doubled up like a jack knife." The same picturesque 
 Plutarch describes the Oregon as a "wonder." His garrulity has value 
 among the human documents essential to the study of the men and the 
 action. He declares that "every drop of oil on the Oregon was poured 
 into the furnaces and the flames roared from her smokestacks " during the 
 chase. He was within two feet of Yeoman Ellis when this single victim 
 of the fight was killed. He heard Schley say : " Ellis, find the range of 
 that ship." Ellis stepped out of a group of sailors to obey, just as a shell 
 came aboard, which " took his head off his shoulders so quickly that his 
 body did not fall for a second." Several sailors had time to step forward 
 and catch the body before it started to fall ! This mariner, Burns, insists 
 that the public may not know who whipped Cervera, but the officers and
 
 228 SCHLEY AND HIS MEN. 
 
 men of the fleet know ! " You have got to sail with a man to know him. 
 When Schley was congratulated he said : 4 Don't congratulate me, con- 
 gratulate my crews.' If Schley were to sail through hell his men would 
 follow him to a man. He doesn't devote himself to chasing unarmed ves- 
 sels for prize money." 
 
 Bearing on the destruction of the torpedo craft, another eyewitness 
 adds to the riddle which promises volumes of controversy. Lieutenant 
 Dawson, of the Indiana, wrote home, before he could have heard of any 
 dispute in the matter : " We began firing about 9:40 and headed for the 
 leading Spaniard ; he had more speed than we had on, however, and 
 steamed along the coast to the westward, firing at us pretty hard, but 
 hitting nothing but water. Then came the second, and third, and so on, 
 all firing rapidly but wildly. A number of their shells whistled close to 
 our ears, and it was pretty hot for some time; but we were hit only once 
 in the whole battle ; that was by a small shell, or fragment of a big one, 
 on the after thirteen-inch turret. Our shooting was good and we could 
 see some of our larger shells strike the Spaniards. When the destroyers 
 came out we concentrated most of our fire on them, as we were behind 
 the others ; then the Gloucester came up at full speed, and also engaged 
 the two destroyers from the rear, or rather their port side. They would 
 have demolished the little Gloucester, but for us, for they had fourteen- 
 pounder guns against her six-pounders, and they also had speed. They 
 were particularly dangerous on account of the latter quality, and because 
 of their torpedoes, so we used all our guns for awhile, big and little against 
 them. Presently one showed a big cloud of smoke pouring from her ; 
 she was struck and a magazine was exploded. Then another and an- 
 other, showed her boiler blowing up. She was gone now, and they steered 
 her into the nearest point, and abandoned her. The other suffered the 
 same fate, and sank alongside the beach, in a little cove near by. Both the 
 4 destroyers ' were destroyed, and all hands were relieved." 
 
 Supplementing these by evidences that fell under the eyes of "gunner" 
 Murphy of the Gloucester, it will be seen that history finds it difficult to 
 discriminate, to dogmatically assert anything beyond specific results. 
 The gunner declares: "The two great destroyers were left for us on 
 board of the Gloucester. We started for them at full speed, amid a 
 shower of shot and shell from the forts and ships and torpedo-boats, but 
 we returned the shot and shell with right good will. I was firing at the 
 rate of twenty shells a minute from my gun, arid I know I must have 
 killed a good many men, but God will forgive me, for it was my duty. 
 We kept firing at each other as fast as we could, for about thirty minutes.
 
 COMMANDER RICHARD WAIXWRIGHT. 
 
 CAPTAIN F. J. HIGGTNSON. 
 
 CAPTAIN F. A. COOK. 
 
 CAPTAIN F E. CHADWICK
 
 THE MAGAZINES. 231 
 
 By this time all the other ships were off in the distance, keeping up their 
 own fight, and left us to fight the two of them alone. 
 
 " One of the torpedo-boats headed right for us to torpedo us, and the cap- 
 tain gave orders for very rapid fire, and instead of trying to get out of their 
 way we ran right up toward them and rained shells on their decks in such 
 a fashion that they could not send a torpedo. I was told by one of the 
 prisoners afterward, that they tried eleven crews at the torpedo gun, but 
 they were swept from the deck by our shells as fast as they got up there. 
 He said our shells came pouring in through the engines and all about the 
 ship, and finally one exploded in and blew up the magazine. Then she 
 began to sink and hoisted the white flag. Talk about a crew going wild, 
 you ought to have seen us, we jumped up in the air and we gunners shook 
 hands with each other and yelled ourselves hoarse and threw our hats in 
 the air. Oh, it was a great moment, but suddenly the other destroyer 
 came heading toward us. We sighted our guns with that exulting feel- 
 ing of victory, and rained such a hail of shells on her decks and through 
 her everywhere, that we forced her to run right up on the beach and hoist 
 the white flag. We lowered our boats to rescue all we could, and out of 
 the two crews of a hundred and forty men there were only sixteen men 
 left alive to save. Their decks were a terrible sight to behold. The dead 
 were strewn all about and burning up with the ships. It seemed each of 
 the boats had about one hundred holes. When we returned to the ship 
 one of them went down to come up no more. We captured both their 
 
 An episode in the closing moments of this stupendous combat aroused 
 a good deal of comment throughout the press of the country. Captain 
 Philip of the Texas, as has been narrated, when the firing ceased, called 
 his crew about him to make acknowledgment that he believed in God ! 
 His action was viewed variously by the world. The general conclusion 
 was that as Captain Philip had deemed it expedient to make the acknowledg- 
 ment, the other commanders on the victorious ships were without his belief I 
 The world had mocked the old king of Prussia when from the battlefields 
 of France he had reported the continuing intervention of God in the daily 
 slaughter of men. Cromwell and the Puritan commanders were wont to 
 identify God with the sanguinary triumphs of brothers over brothers. 
 Military commanders have not unfrequently interpolated an expression 
 of recognition of divine favor in the slaughter of enemies. During the 
 Civil War, President Lincoln proclaimed days of prayer and devotion to 
 acknowledge the interposition of God both in victory and defeat. But 
 Captain Philip's words were new in warfare. . . . They charmed
 
 232 "THOU SHALT NOT KILL." 
 
 certain militant churchmen and journalists, who looked upon the scene as 
 impressively illustrative of the devout spirit in which the war was waged. 
 
 Naturally, from praise of Philip there grew a com minatory tone toward 
 the captains of the fleet who had neglected to inform the sweltering crews 
 that they believed in God. The men thus inculpated were placed in a 
 very embarrassing plight. Usually it is not considered part of a man's 
 duty, either in peace or war, to make proclamation of his beliefs. Indeed, 
 to the man really indoctrinated with the teachings of Christ, there is 
 something inexpressibly repulsive in associating divinity with the bar- 
 barity of war. The pirates in old times in the Caribbean Sea, were wont 
 to drop on their knees in prayer before sallying out to murder the victims 
 thrown in their way by the winds and waves. The Sultan of Turkey 
 offered prayer in the mosque of St. Sophia in Constantinople, whenever a 
 more than usually destructive slaughter was reported from Armenia. 
 The thinking and humane, regard war as criminal at best ; they eschew 
 therefore the identification of deity in the purely selfish and baser pas- 
 sions of the races, engendered by war. Certainly, if General Sherman's 
 aphorism " war is hell," be the condensation of the world's judgment, the 
 moment of victory, amid the shrieks of the dying and mangled seems 
 a hideously unfit time to invoke the embodiment of peace on earth 
 and good will to men. If " thou shalt not kill " be a commandment, how 
 can we invoke the utterer of the injunction to witness our disregard of 
 the mandate? Indeed, to the humane, if there were ever a time when 
 the closet seems a fitting place for communion with the Most High, it 
 is on the scene of battle after man has wreaked his worst on man. 
 
 One of the most brilliant, most capable, most chivalrous of the fleet 
 captains was specially singled out by the Tartuffe Pharisees, who seized 
 Captain Philip's eccentric display as a text. This officer, Captain Robley 
 Evans, is endowed with every quality that makes man lovable to his 
 kind. He is brave as the ideal of valor, modest, consistent, exemplary in 
 every relation in life and as a warrior counted a Bayard. He felt called 
 upon to defend his position and the utterance is worth preserving. The 
 editor of the criticising journal having sent a marked copy to Captain 
 Evans, he wrote: 
 
 "I am somewhat at a loss to know whether you sent it for the purpose 
 of calling my attention to the cuss words attributed to me in the news- 
 papers, or to Captain Philip's official show of Christian spirit in announc- 
 ing to his men on the quarter deck of the Texas after the battle of San- 
 tiago, that he believed in Almighty God. As, however, you have seen fit 
 to drag my name into your newspaper I hope that you will publish this
 
 234 
 
 CAPTAIN EVANS' STATEMENT. 
 
 reply that those who have read your issue of July 15 may also read what 
 I have to say about it. 
 
 " I have never considered it necessary, and I am sure that a great ma- 
 jority of officers in the navy do not consider it necessary, to announce to 
 their crews that * they believe in Almighty God.' I think that goes with- 
 out saying. We, each of us, have the right to show by our acts how 
 much we are imbued with this belief. Captain Philip had a perfect right 
 to show this to his men as he did ; it was simply a matter of taste. 
 
 " Now, for myself, shortly after the Spanish cruiser Vizcaya had struck 
 her colors, and my crew had secured the guns, the chaplain of the ship, an 
 
 NAVAL BARRACKS AT ANNAPOLIS. 
 Admiral Cervera'a residence while a prisoner of war. 
 
 excellent man, came to me and said, ' Captain, shall I say a few words of 
 thanks'to Almighty God for our victory?' I said: ' By all means do so; 
 I will have the men sent aft for that purpose,' and was on the point of 
 doing so when it was reported to me that a Spanish battle ship was stand- 
 ing toward us from the eastward. My first duty to God and my country 
 was to sink this Spanish battle ship, and I immediately made preparations 
 to do so. When it was discovered that this ship was an Austrian, I found 
 my ship surrounded by boats carrying dying and wounded prisoners, and
 
 BRIG.-GENERAL LEONARD WOOD. 
 
 MAJOH-GBNBBAL R B. M. YOUNO. 
 
 MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. LA WTO v. 
 
 MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN C. BATES.
 
 LET US LAVISH HONORS. 237 
 
 others of the crew of the Vizcaya to the number of two hundred and fifty. 
 To leave these men suffer for want of food and clothing while I called my 
 men aft to offer prayers was not my idea of either Christianity or reli- 
 gion. I preferred to clothe the naked, feed the hungry, and succor the 
 sick, and I am strongly of the opinion that Almighty God has not put a 
 black mark against me on account of it. I do not know whether I shall 
 stand with Captain Philip among the first chosen in the hereafter, but I 
 have this to say in conclusion that every drop of blood in my body on the 
 afternoon of the 3d of July was singing thanks and praises to Almighty 
 God for the victory we had won." 
 
 Congress awards medals, and in every conceivable form distinguishes 
 the titular chiefs of our navies and armies, but it is a heart-breaking 
 reflection to count the oblivion of the real architects of victory. A 
 Wellington or a Marlborough, wasting their time in a riotous debauchery, 
 up to even during the opening horrors of a decisive battle, are made 
 princes, awarded pensions, that descend to imbecile and profligate 
 progeny, but the plain citizen who marches by day and night, who bears 
 as he can, who encounters all that is hideous in life, in a campaign 
 receives no token. He is "the army," the " army fought well." But the 
 horses, the guns and the ordnance are likewise " the army." And yet, 
 who stops to count the infinite horrors of the normal life of the sailor 
 the soldier ? For my part I cannot be made to comprehend, how men 
 can be induced to enlist on the ship of to day. The slave crews of the 
 Roman triremes, endured a life that makes the heart throb, but their 
 miseries were joys compared to the routine of the tar on our iron wonders. 
 And what wage can pay a man for this? Let us then lavish honors; let 
 us reverently bow and give him of our best ; let us make him know that 
 the empty conventions of rank cannot eclipse our heartfelt admiration of 
 his heroism which is not evoked or illustrated during the hour of battle 
 only, but every instant he is in durance on the engines civilized man has 
 invented for the torture, crucifixion and destruction of civilized men. 
 
 One of the endearing traits in Admiral Schley, is his constant, almost 
 religious reference to the fleet's glories, to the nameless thousand, buried 
 in the torments of the modern ship. One of his standing orders is con- 
 stantly repeated by the loquacious tar " Keep your men below constantly 
 informed of what the ship is doing " Schley admonished his captains. 
 So, instant by instant, during the battle the devoted martyrs pouring 
 sweat sometimes blood were electrified by the inspiring word, " the 
 Oquendo is giving up ; the Vizcaya is knocked out " ; and thus on to the 
 end of the glorious chapter. Yet if this grimy brawn and muscle had 
 13
 
 238 THE RANK AND FILE. 
 
 faltered; if the mere human had given away to the infirmities of 
 flesh and bone, the Spanish fleet would not have been crushed. The 
 science of the captains, the accomplishments of the staff would have 
 availed nothing. 
 
 To the intelligence that had been given the opportunity to examine and 
 contrast, there was no spectacle so sublime as the interior the deeps of 
 any one of the fleet. It will be many a long year, please God, before the 
 world will see this republic recurring to the barbarism of war, and to put 
 that hateful time off it is well to know minutely what the cost of victory 
 is. It is well to know the Hadean torments that the men who win 
 victory undergo on those beautiful monsters, that we admire so com 
 placently in our harbors. The air, the life-giving unction of the sea the 
 sun itself is denied to the men who make victory possible. The big 
 eight-inch turret guns could not have done their deadly shooting, even 
 with the trained eyes guiding them, had not the men below sent up the 
 ammunition ; and the vessel could not have kept side by side with the 
 enemy had it not been for the engineer and fireroom force, working 
 below the deck like demons. The men in the turrets of five inches of 
 steel see as little as the men below deck, save, that once in a while they 
 get a glimpse of the object fired at. 
 
 When the ships of Cervera were sighted coming out on that memorable 
 July morning, the eight-inch and five-inch guns on Admiral Schley's ship 
 were all loaded, and in each turret within two minutes after the summons, 
 eleven men stood half naked awaiting the word to fire. The chief of the 
 turret, a lieutenant, in the hood, his eye to the telescope, gets the line of 
 his gun on the harbor, and awaits the signals. " Five thousand yards 
 cries an orderly in a turret opening and the gun goes up to the proper 
 elevation, as the lieutenant in the hood orders the elevating gear turned. 
 The No. 1 man at the guns connects the electric wire to the primer, with 
 the hood's handfiring apparatus, and all is waiting. " Commence firing" 
 comes the order, and the shot is sped. The turret lieutenant's hand 
 closes on the electric apparatus and the gun jumps back a foot or more as 
 a hundred and ten pounds of exploding powder drives a two hundred and 
 fifty pound shell from the muzzle of the piece at a rate of 2,080 feet per 
 second. Then before the roar has ceased the hand of the man in the 
 turret touches the electric lever and the 700 tons of steel move with 
 velocity and almost noiselessly around until the other gun of the twin is 
 in the same position as the first one has been. 
 
 Slowly the muzzle comes up to the directed elevation ; once more the 
 fingers close ori the electric handle, and another two hundred and fifty
 
 
 "COXEY'S ARMY." 239 
 
 pounds of steel shoot away on its death errand. Hardly had gun No. 1 
 belched forth its defiance to the Spanish ships, when the five men behind 
 it, until now as impassive as marble figures, spring into life. No. 2 opens 
 the breech, washes off the mushroom and gas-check with a sponge, oils 
 the breech plug, extracts the exploded primer, and sees the vent cleC- 
 No. 4 seizes the long bristled sponge wet with water and assisted by No 
 3 sponges the gun, lays aside the sponge and seizes the rammer ready to 
 drive home the new charge. While they are working there appears at 
 the top of the ammunition hoist new shells and new ammunition, and the 
 officer in command of the turret cries, " load." No 5 raises the ammu- 
 nition corner of the hoist, and with the assistance of No. 5 of the other 
 gun, grasps the handles upon the carriage and swings it to the rear of the 
 gun. The projectile is first on the lift, and No. 3 adjusts the primer 
 while No. 4 assisted by No. 6 rams home the two hundred and fifty pound 
 projectile. Then in quick succession, No. 4, No. 5, and 6 ram in the two 
 charges of powder in packages of fifty-five pounds, each done up in serge 
 or muslin, and in grains weighing an ounce and a quarter each. No. 2 
 closes the breech, No. 1 again connects the wire, and the gun is ready to 
 fire. All this takes just four minutes, and with two guns, the turret is 
 shooting once every two minutes. 
 
 Down below the water line of the ship, beneath the protective deck, 
 that in so many battles has proved the lid to the coffin of hundreds, is a 
 naked perspiring crowd, of titans, their eyes closed to the scene of battle, 
 but there senses alive to the fact that torpedo or shell below, or through 
 the armor means instant death. The third of July they sent up to the 
 various turrets and guns over 70,000 pounds of ammunition. The men de- 
 tailed in the handling rooms are from the fifth, or powder division, com- 
 posed of those not detailed as gun crews, such as carpenters, and 
 gunner's mates, servants, idlers of all kinds, and the relief watch of the 
 engineer's division. This medley of men is of many nationalities, and is 
 known on board the Brooklyn for example as " Coxey's Army." It is 
 commanded by the senior deck officer, Dr. Griffin, with four or five other 
 officers as assistants, each assistant having charge of a section of about 
 forty or fifty men, the whole division taking charge of all the magazine 
 holds and all spaces between decks during action. At the clang of the 
 alarm for "general quarters," the men rush for their stations, struggling 
 through a small steel hatch in the protective deck, and down a narrow 
 :ind almost vertical ladder to the magazines and shell rooms below. The 
 officer in charge, Dr. Griffin, hurries to the cabin for the magazine keys, 
 grabs a small leather bag containing them, from the hand of the marine
 
 240 "QUICK, LADS, LIVELY NOW." 
 
 orderly on duty at the door of the Captain's cabin, and rushes after his 
 men, distributing the keys as rapidly as he can to those already standing 
 at the box-like tops of the magazines, the bolts of which had already 
 been loosened. The ammunition bearers are quickly let out, the men 
 standing with their hands on a small lever ready to turn on the current 
 of the electric hoists, as soon as the hatches are off. When everything is 
 seen to be clear, the endless chains of the hoist start with the whir of a 
 motor, and roll their loads of rapid fire ammunition to the decks above, 
 where men are stationed to receive it. 
 
 Down the chute of the ten-inch gun turret, as an accompaniment to 
 the deep rumble of the turret itself, as it slowly swings from amidships 
 to the port or starboard comes the command, " Full charge, common 
 shot?" from the officer in command of the turret. The answer quickly 
 goes back, " Aye, aye, sir," and as a response to a lower tone of voice, 
 " Quick, lads, lively now," up come the long powder tanks and heavy 250 
 pound shell to the base of the turret. There the shell is seized in tongs 
 by two nimble apprentices, raised and rammed home in the car ; the tops 
 of the long copper powder tanks taken off and the powder in two sections 
 placed in the other compartments of the car, the signal given, and both 
 cars quickly rise to the breech of the turret guns and are sent back al- 
 most as swiftly, emptied. All this preparation of getting ready, occupies 
 a space of four minutes after all the men and the hatches are lowered 
 and secured. The heat varies in this steel cage from 120 to 146 degrees 
 Fahrenheit and soon causes the men to strip to the waist and settle down 
 to their work in an air tight box obeying orders with alacrity, not know- 
 ing the cause of the outbreak, whether target practice, bombardment, 
 the Spanish fleet, or a false alarm. On this crucifixion of body and nerves 
 comes the report of the first gun, followed in quick succession by another, 
 telling of the deadly purpose. Down the hoists and chutes rush the 
 powder and smoke to add to the already high temperature of the hand- 
 ling room, followed by the hot saltpetre water, from the sponging of the 
 guns, making the decks slippery and burning blisters on the bare backs 
 of the men underneath, who, groping and choking, feeling their way 
 through the dense smoke, go silently and obediently about their work, 
 with but one thought and aim in view, to keep those continually empty 
 hoists and cars filled with powder and projectiles, not knowing how the bat- 
 tle is going, until a cheer is finally heard from deck, their spirit brightens 
 and an old hand at the work, exclaims, *' I guess they must have hit 'em 
 that time." 
 
 But all this and a thousand pages more as explicit and circumstantial,
 
 "WAR IS HELL.' 
 
 241 
 
 do not tell the tale of the mute inglorious heroes who bring about the 
 supreme national joy we call victory. For in the fabrication of the 
 beautiful ships we take such pride in, man is degraded to his lowest state 
 the machine. Go into the ship yards, the armor furnaces, any or all of 
 the primary conditions of a modern war vessel and it will be easy to com- 
 prehend that War is hell." Money could not pay, glory could not lure, 
 the man, to such a service as the war of to-day implies ; yet, the republic 
 can at any hour summon, and innumerable millions are ready. It is this 
 aspect, that arrests the attention of the philosophic. Had President Mc- 
 Kinley called for six million volunteers instead of 200,000 they would 
 have been forthcoming, and in the stress and storm of incompetency, 
 greed and diabolism, the placid folk would have borne and foreborne, 
 fought and died because every man of our seventy millions has a right 
 in himself, and when he fights fights as he believes for his hearthstone. 
 
 A CORNER IN MORRO CASTLE.
 
 IV. 
 
 npHERE are few problems more perplexing to the annalist, than solving 
 J[ the causes of the effect of phenomena similar in circumstances but 
 disproportionate in the forces involved. The most difficult of all is to 
 account rationally for the effect and results of certain battles. The com' 
 paratively few shots fired at Concord, Lexington, and Bunker Hill, are 
 known to everybody who has any familiarity with the origin of the repub- 
 lic, while the greater and more decisive battles of Saratoga and Trenton 
 are known only to the student. Similarly in the Civil War, everybody 
 knows of the firing on Sumpter and Bull Run, while very few know even 
 vaguely of the frightful combats of Antietam, Malvern Hill, or Fred- 
 ericksburg. 
 
 It is probably ascribable to the condition of the public mind the 
 " psychologic moment " as Bismarck once described it that the first en- 
 gagements in Cuba resulting from the somewhat heedless landing of a 
 battalion of marines, stimulated as much agitation all over the land, as a 
 pitched battle, with the losses reaching into tens of thousands. The ex- 
 pedition was undertaken to appease journalistic clamor primarily 
 though ostensibly to prepare the way for the seizure of the city and 
 harbor of Santiago, where Cervera's fleet had found shelter. The narra- 
 tive of the landing of the marines, their strangely inhuman exposure to 
 the ambuscaded guerillas, on a densely wooded plateau, was received by 
 the country with something of the incredulous anger, that followed the 
 massacre of Ball's Bluff, while the rebellion was in its first stages. With 
 great armies in campaigns, the incident would have passed unobserved, 
 but the daily buUetins following the inexplicable manceuver, gave the 
 country painful apj.' r >nension. It seemed an augury of fatally feeble 
 council at headquarters, and the press which clamored most vociferously 
 for action, was most vehement in scarifying those responsible for the 
 butchery. The incident was of no consequence save in so far that it 
 compelled the impugned strategist in Washington, to a diversion. It was 
 apparently felt that the army must do something, or the country would 
 revolt from the agencies in control. In a military sense, the possession 
 of Guantanamo and its waters, would add nothing to the effectiveness of 
 a campaign against Havana. 
 
 (243;
 
 244 
 
 HOME STRATEGISTS. 
 
 But there were reasons of a military character, that forbade the attack 
 upon the capital of the island, before the fever season had come to an 
 
 LOADING A TRANSPORT FOR SANTIAGO. 
 
 end. Santiago was less liable to the ravages of the plague, and it was 
 suddenly determined to despatch the only force available for active opera-
 
 HOME STRATEGISTS. 245 
 
 tions to that point and attempt the reduction of the city. For weeks the 
 tension was grotesquely out of proportion to the forces involved. Euro- 
 pean opinion flashed back to our millions daily by the cable, made much 
 of the adventure which as the concurrent expression ran, verified the 
 prophesies of our inimical critics. We were admitted to have men of ap- 
 proved bravery, but they were sacrificed by blind misuse. Then, after in- 
 explicable miscalculations, the flower of our army the legions of the re- 
 gulars destined once more to illustrate their unrivaled efficiency, sailed 
 to invest Santiago. 
 
 Naturally, with press boats swarming in the vicinity of every semblance 
 of an expedition, rumors in ten thousand bewildering notes of exaltation, 
 apprehension, vainglory, and twaddle, preceded every stir. Volumes of 
 description, fixing the forces to the minutest detail, were sent broadcast. 
 Pictures of stupendous armadas, stretching for thirty miles over the 
 Caribbean waters with towering battle craft, flanking the line, were read 
 from Maine to Oregon, hours before it was known where this wandering 
 mass meant to strike. Not less stirring pictures filled the press, when the 
 ships came to a halt under the guns of Admiral Sampson's fleet fronting 
 Santiago. Then the home strategist knew what was coming. Shafter's 
 army was to conquer the enemy by merely landing; it was to present a 
 mass of marching men to the beleaguered Spaniards, and conquest would 
 follow. But men alone do not make an army courage alone cannot 
 conquer Mauser rifles. A full week of alternating hope and despair 
 followed. 
 
 Santiago, properly garrisoned and intelligently defended, is as strong as 
 Havana. When General Shafter's army scrambled over the deadly hills, 
 through the vengeful cactus, it was a more imposing citadel than the 
 Saragossa that held Napoleon's best corps at bay for nearly a year; it was 
 tenfold stronger than the cities carried only by seige operations in any 
 European war of the last hundred years. And though the science of in- 
 vention has increased the destructiveness of arms, General Shafter's 
 superiority in resources were more than offset by the Spanish possession 
 of the Mauser rifle, one of first form of that mysterious arm, that won 
 Prussia her primacy in Europe. The audacious decisiveness of the fleets 
 had demoralized popular judgment. It was held intolerable that Shafter 
 should let a day two clays pass, without unfurling the Federal flag over 
 the Spanish strong place ! The soldiery themselves seem to have caught 
 this spirit; without any of the precautions that precede advance in an 
 enemy's country, the darlings of the public, the Rough Riders, or rather 
 the squadrons accompanying the expedition, were vaguely despatched to
 
 246 PUBLIC CLAMOR FOR HASTE. 
 
 " do something." The weather was a mingling of the fumes of a furnace 
 and the humidity of a steam bath. 
 
 Goaded by the clamors of the press, the cabinet and its war council 
 finally yielded to the outcry. The country or rather the strategists at 
 large, so to speak, reckoned on an attack upon Havana. That was the 
 chief city of the island. It was likewise the citadel of the Spanish 
 strength, the symbol of its authority in the West. It held the chief of 
 the Spanish armies, and its capture would mean the end of the war. But 
 it was believed that Captain-general Blanco had at his disposal from 
 100,000 to 150,000 well-armed and effective soldiers. The fortifications 
 had been strengthened by all the available modern appliances. The city 
 was reckoned invulnerable to the fleet through its deadly array of land 
 batteries, even admitting that Sampson had as heroic a contempt for 
 mines and submarine defences as Farragut used to show. 
 
 But even the most vehement advocates of instant action did not go so 
 far as to urge the entrance of the navy into a channel made memorable 
 by the destruction of the Maine. A landing might be secured within 
 striking distance, where by the aid of the fleet the new army might preen 
 its wings for victorious flight to the capital ! It was set forth too, that 
 the insurgents would prove a tower of strength to the invading columns; 
 that familiar with every wood road and mountain path, they would be 
 able to lead our forces to the decisive points, saving them the wearing 
 reconnoissances which inure men for the shock of battle. From the 
 opening of hostilities there had been an incomprehensible cessation of the 
 glorification of the "patriots," which had been the daily dole of the jingo 
 presses. Though the Spaniards were naturally compelled to lessen their 
 forces at important strategic points, there were no more lurid pictures of 
 " patriot victories " in fact the instant war was declared, the lover of 
 Cuban liberty forgot the Cubans as completely as the mummer forgets 
 his mask when the play is done. 
 
 There was something like stupefaction when the news flashed home- 
 ward that the first serious landing on Cuban soil had been made at an 
 obscure hamlet on the coast near Santiago. For a week or ten days the 
 name Camp McCalla at the head of the despatches, warned the reader that 
 large drafts were making on his credulity. The despatches narrating the 
 landing of 600 marines, with two days and nights of out-post incivilities 
 on the part of the enemy, surpassed in volume and comminatory invective, 
 all that was ever said or sung of the army in Flanders. Just why the six 
 hundred were landed at the point chosen, what service they could perform 
 other than displaying the flag of the republic and distressing the amour
 
 248 CAMP McCALLA. 
 
 propre of the scantily clad Spaniard by their lavish raiment, neither official 
 report nor press prescience ever revealed. But the incident, though triv- 
 ial, made a significantly distinct impression on the public mind, clearly 
 shown in the temper of the speech of the multitude as reflected in the 
 press, and the public places where talk is wont to be free in times of 
 public excitement. 
 
 Bombardments by the fleet at divers points, were made much of, by 
 the newspapers. The corps of skilled writers who had been impressed 
 into the service of journalism, losing the sense of perspective in the ex- 
 egencies of news, magnified what was little more than target practice into 
 momentous, long-studied parts of a general whole. Perhaps the most in- 
 comprehensible of the many diversions of this nature, was the strange at- 
 tempt at Guantanamo. The harbor is capacious, but unless the point 
 were designed for a base, there seemed no possible use in sacrificing a life 
 to hold the shores, or any point of them. Yet for ten days the country 
 was kept in sickening tension over bewildering reports of desperate valor 
 on the part of a band of 600 marines, set ashore no one knew exactly 
 for what purpose, nor does any one know to this day. It was given out, 
 with apparent authority, that the movement was an idea of Admiral 
 Sampson's, who for prudential reasons was making sure of a refuge for his 
 fleet, in case his ships were separated by the sea blizzards that sweep the 
 Cuban littoral in those waters. The harbor of Guantanamo, though not 
 spacious, would afford the fleet ample security in the event of disaster 
 before Santiago. The marines have of late }'ears become an interesting 
 body to the whole people. The naval reserve, indeed shares with the 
 veteran tars, the liking and admiration of the whole people. Their trim 
 ranks, their jaunty ways, their engaging and artless ardor for war, have 
 been the mingled raillery and delight of the multitude since the Civil 
 War proved that they are as intrepid as they are ingenuous. That a 
 body of these should be sent on shore to confront the lures and artifices 
 of a solidiery practiced in years of the guile, ambuscade and skirmish, 
 struck the least censorious as an inhuman heedlessness on the part of the 
 responsible strategists. Tens of thousand of men, infinitely more useful, 
 even though not trained soldiers, were eating their hearts out with im- 
 patience, in the scores of rendezvous, who would have delighted in the 
 danger of camp McCalla; men who would have prevented the useless 
 slaughter of the first nights and days succeeding the landing. Skirmish- 
 ing in the tangled woods, and safe guarding exposed camps, are a part of 
 war that a body of marines is grotesquely unfitted for. Standing up in 
 open fight and firing with regularity and precision, no infantry or cavalry
 
 250 MUTILATION BY MAUSER BULLETS. 
 
 could hold their own better in a tight place, but flung upon a covert,such 
 as the ground at camp McCalla proved, the marines were at a criminal 
 disadvantage. The effect on the country therefore, of the first sanguinary 
 encounter, was not unlike the heartbreaking revolt that followed the 
 slaughter at Big Bethel, or the disaster at Balls Bluff in 1861-1862. 
 The harrowing tale of perfectly useless slaughter, filled the telegrams for 
 nearly a week ; day and night the young marines were held in a prepos- 
 terous cul de sac of exterminating fire. They could not secure an hour 
 for sleep during the night, nor rest during the day. Invisible enemies 
 were on every side of them save the sea. Indeed, the nearness of the 
 gunboats alone saved the squandered battalions from capture or decima- 
 tion. It was more the sentiment of the nation, watching this prelude, 
 that gave the daily bulletin of misadventure space and importance, than 
 the actual losses suffered. But for that matter, the engagement was pro- 
 longed, wrenching the heart-strings of the million. To intensify the ex- 
 aggerated forebodings filling the public mind, historians of the dailies and 
 weekly presses added, to give a more livid caste to the agony, that the re- 
 covered bodies of the dead showed that they had been mutilated! Then 
 the " patriotic " presses rose to their shrieking best or worst. Spain should 
 weep in blood the miscreant inhumanity of her atrocious soldiery. All the 
 stage horrors of the inquisition were made to reverberate ; the adminis- 
 tration was commanded to do, and do at once, the most desperate and des- 
 picable things. We had captured no end of astonished sea-faring folk 
 sailing the seas, unconscious that war had been declared. Why not, it 
 was hotly demanded put these in noisome and dreadful cells feed them 
 on the most wretched of fare, iron them with manacles! Indeed it was 
 urbanely suggested that it would be a just retaliation to hang a few score 
 of the compatriots of the wretches who had namelessly desecrated our 
 dead marines. When the cold eye of science examined the alleged mutila- 
 tions, and left no doubt that the hideous wounds, resembling mutilations 
 were the normal effects of the Mauser, no intimation of this ever appeared 
 in the "patriotic" press. To this day, very likely, seven in ten who read 
 the first ghastly reports, and the inflammatory comments of the press, 
 believe that the Spanish soldiery glutted their unspeakable vengeance on 
 the dead. It was set forth in almost plaintive indignation that the Span- 
 iards had "sneaked" upon the invaders and fired upon them, without a 
 word of warning. When the confiding marines left their weapons stacked, 
 and disposed themselves to breakfast, the faithless enemy beset them with 
 volleys, from the neighboring coverts of chapparal, and held them at a dis' 
 advantage. Indeed, it might have been supposed from the comments on
 
 A CORRESPONDENT'S STORY. 
 
 251 
 
 the early episodes of the war, that the mere apparition of "Old Glory" 
 should have been the signal for the dispersion of the Spanish troops. It 
 was set down to the malignity of the malevolent Spaniards that the cacti 
 grew in ingovernable luxury; that it was deadly to touch and impossible 
 to penetrate, save by the initiated. That the point of vantage chosen in 
 the ardor of the first conquest, was ideally adapted to surprise and onset 
 
 SPANISH SOLDIERS IN AMBUSH. 
 
 from all sides save the bay, where the guardian gunboats offered retreat, 
 if not protection. Yet this untenable camp and the gratification of keep- 
 ing the flag flying over the rebellious soil, had in three days lost the navy 
 more men than Dewey's conquest at Manila. In the rare intervals given 
 by the enemy, the six hundred discussed the origin of the blunder, for 
 from the first comprehension of the trap, the quick-witted marines knew 
 that some one had blundered. Vague assurances came that the point was 
 vital to the success of the invasion; that ten thousand regulars were 
 speeding over the waters to release them, to extend the hard -won con- 
 quest. A correspondent of a Boston journal, who shared in the sangui- 
 nary travesty, gives such humor as is to be extracted from the incident: 
 "It is easier here than in the North, to sympathize with those who demand 
 quick action of the army. It becomes a. personal matter with correspond- 
 ents. For weeks they have been tossed from one Caribbean port to an-
 
 252 BURYING THE DEAD. 
 
 other, over the most distressing of seas, in a steamer built for still waters 
 supplied as they are vividly aware, with a hydrographic forecast which 
 says that six hurricanes are due this month in these latitudes. They go 
 ashore. Field pieces are being taken up the steep hill to the camp on top, 
 and they grasp hold of the lines and pull with the rest. It is hot work: 
 at the top, the major greets them, or the colonel ; his brown uniform is 
 saturated with perspiration, bullets are flying, and the tents are being 
 struck and hurried to the lea of the ridge ; and as one worn guard line is 
 relieved by another not yet rested, men drop utterly played out, face 
 upward on the bare hill, and immediately as if stricken, fall deeply 
 asleep. Some ask for cigarettes ; some eagerly tell of mutilations prac- 
 ticed upon American dead by the ambushed guerrillas the Cuban niggers 
 who side with Spain. 'Publish that,' they say, 'and let the world 
 know the sort of men we are fighting.' It is too horrible for print. 
 Sympathies are excited, however, before the word of the colonel and of 
 the surgeon testifies that there were no mutilations. There is a funeral 
 presently. Four bodies are sewn in canvas and placed in a trench on a 
 hillside, and over the open grave, the first of our men in Cuban soil, the 
 chaplain reads the brief commitment, and a full company fires two volleys 
 in final leave taking. Then that afternoon the place all around is clamor- 
 ous with volleys not religious, but discharged with blasphemous signs of 
 anger. * Where is the enemy ? * the officers ask. * Twenty-seven thou* 
 sand regulars will be here to-night or to-morrow,' is the answer, and it ia 
 repeated to the wan-eyed, hungry men for their encouragement. They 
 are incredulous and will not cheer. But ' to-night' arrives, and still no 
 transports on the horizon, no reinforcements from insurgents, although 
 they too are hourly expected. Darkness settles down upon the hills and 
 ambushed hollows. From three sides and seven places come shots from 
 the invisible, indistinguishable enemy, and the Colt quick firers, which have 
 no stop-mechanism, but pour in their hose stream of nickelled bullets, 
 until their chambers are empty, they play upon every spot lighted by a 
 Mauser flush. Little help is afforded by the searchlight of the Marble - 
 head, twice we have to wigwag to her that she is revealing the American 
 position, and, however lovely the stars and stripes on camp McCalla ap- 
 pear, everybody knows that the pleasure is not equal to its possible cost. 
 Suddenly, near the central earthworks, a man tumbles forward. My 
 God ! '* is all he says, and when his features are made out by the powder 
 flashes, he is recognized as Goode, the sergeant-major, blood flowing from 
 a mortal hurt in the abdomen. Some men get wounded the enemy is 
 farther away and the Mauser bullets do not tear so much as the night be-
 
 COLONEL THEODORE KOOSEVELT. MAJOR-GENERAL H. S. HAWKINS. 
 
 MAJOR-GENERAL WM. LUDLOW. MAJOR-GENKRAL ADNA K. CHAFFKE.
 
 THE WINSLOW AT CARDENAS. 255 
 
 fore. Skies turn pale ; on the face of the men crouched in a rim round 
 the hill crest, rifles covering every approach, there is a smoky, grimy, 
 done-up look. Another guard is changed ; the young officers' chorus, 
 *Oh promise me' and inquire, 'did you say we had an army? Show 
 it ? " In comes Neville with his scouts one missing, three wounded. 
 Of the missing one it is said that he is only slightly hurt, but that still 
 believing Spain's guerrillas had visited strange cruelties upon men dis- 
 abled, he had jumped over the cliff into the sea, crying 'The hellions 
 shan't get me!' They did not get him but his 'own people' did at 
 last, and there was again an open grave and prayers and two blank 
 volleys, and flags in the bay sunk to half mast." 
 
 More, it seemed, to keep the public diverted, than to compass any 
 material part in the contemplated campaign, spasmodic naval attacks were 
 made at various obscure points of the Cuban coast. These were invaria- 
 bly attended by the same phenomenal ardor on the part of the assailants, 
 that signalized the more important engagements. But the price paid was 
 in dolorous disproportion to the end gained. The work of blockading, 
 is perhaps the most wearingly irksome of all the duties assigned seamen. 
 It involves the alert readiness of actual battle, without the excitement of 
 combat. The ship is obliged to be kept on the qui vive ; the men can 
 secure but fitful rest. The tension in the end enervates to such an 
 extent that prudent commanders are prompted to take precarious risks. 
 Among the blockading divisions, we had a restless little squadron off 
 Cardenas, an insignificant harbor of consequence only through its rela- 
 tions with Matanzas and Havana. In the recesses of its bay, a fleet of 
 Spanish gunboats found secure shelter. The commander of the block- 
 aders yearned to try his guns on the evasive craft, and to this end, sent 
 the Winslow, an active but fragile vessel, to lure the enemy within reach 
 of the fleet's batteries. 
 
 Two small crafts accompanied the Winslow which, catching sight of 
 a Spanish gunboat near the dock made sure that it could be assaulted and 
 cut out. The attacking trio rushed onward in ominous quietude until at 
 a point in the middle of the harbor, the Winslow ran Into a covey of 
 buoys. The purpo.se of these for an instant absorbed the attention of the 
 rash commander Lieutenant Bernadou. But there was not much time for 
 speculation. A withering blast of shells began to fall on the deck of the 
 vessel. The buoys were a cunning device to fix the range for the enemy's 
 batteries on shore. The massacre was prompt and relentless : the wretched 
 craft was completely in the Spaniards' power and in any other hands than 
 those working her she would have surrendered at once. One missile fall- 
 14
 
 256 
 
 ENSIGN BAGLEY KILLED. 
 
 ing square on the deck killed Ensign Bagley, wounded the commander, 
 and so disabled the machinery that the little craft was helpless. But the 
 devotion of the companion crews was equal to the emergency, the crip- 
 pled ship was aided out of the harbor. The Spaniards were delirious 
 with rapture. They had compelled the withdrawal of an invading fleet. 
 Madrid beflagged itself on the report, and for an instant drank all the in- 
 toxicating joy of a conquest. 
 
 It was not reassuring to the country to learn when the extent of the dis- 
 aster became known, that the Navy Department had strongly disapproved 
 of these sanguinary escapades. That the commanders, left largely to their 
 
 LOADING A TORPEDO. 
 
 own discretion were responsible for them ; that they had no part or pur- 
 pose in the general scheme of invasion. The effect was painful to the 
 country, for it revealed the almost naive ignorance of the generality in 
 the calamitous gravity of war. Clearly it had been the universal belief 
 that we were to assail the armies and fleets of Spain with no hurt to our 
 men or ships ! The incident gave the first well-grounded apprehension 
 that matured plans were not controlling the operation of the fleets and to 
 that extent prepared the public mind for graver disasters. But with the
 
 YOUNG BAGLEY CELEBRATED. 
 
 257 
 
 evidence of hierarchical uncertainty, the conviction became equally firm 
 that the men might be trusted to make up for the ineptitude of the com- 
 manders, for the fortitude and constancy of the Winslow's crew,were in 
 stimulating keeping with the Avonder work in Manila bay. These first 
 teutatives of war were saluted with the reverent sympathy and ennobling 
 testimonies that seem to come instinctively to a great people, in heart- 
 touching episodes. Young Bagley was celebrated in the press, in Congress, 
 everywhere that the quality of chivalry appeals to the sensibilities of men. 
 
 LAUNCHING A TORPEDO. 
 
 The Winslow was, perhaps, not one of the consummate efforts of the tor- 
 pedo-boat species and her swift disablement went to confirm the growing 
 conviction of experts, that this class of destroyers have enjoyed a delusive 
 renown. For in the Manila combat, and the subsequent trial at Santiago, 
 the most ordinary prudence with even inferior craft, were found equal to 
 the certain destruction of these hitherto dreaded inventions. The ques- 
 tion is by no means disposed of however, by the experience of this war 
 for our deadliest craft were not called upon where their resources could 
 be fully tested. The Winslow was on a gridiron so to speak, doomed the 
 instant she reached the point prearranged for the concentration of the 
 Spanish fire.
 
 258 DEBARKATION OF SHAFTER'S ARMY. 
 
 The .army was debarked with every evidence of improvised material. 
 By the favoring chance of clear weather at the very time sturms were 
 the rule, the soldiers were carried through the surf to the shore in front 
 of a hamlet variously called Daiquiri and Daiquiri. No intimation had 
 been given of the point selected for the landing of the army, and there 
 was a fever of wild conjecture until Cervera's presence in Santiago bay 
 suggested the value of that town for a military enterprise. The point 
 selected, offered many advantages for the base of an army of invasion bent 
 on a prize so tempting as the fleet of Cervera and the army of occupation. 
 Furthermore, the town had the very appreciable advantage of cable com- 
 munication with the continent, for the French line had its terminus there. 
 But there the invitation ended indeed nothing could well be more un- 
 inviting for the display of grand tactics or Napoleonic strategy, than the 
 hideous sixteen miles of nature at its wildest, between Siboney and San- 
 tiago. The land rises sheer from the sea, and buttresses two colossal 
 ridges of the mountain plateaux, extending all along the coast, save 
 where broken by spectral streams or yawning chasms. To make the 
 roads passible for artillery, the whole army would be forced to turn into 
 pioneer corps. Sherman's corduroying campaign in the Carolinas seemed 
 an ordinary task compared to that confronting the men who were anxious 
 only to fight, according to the daily asseveration of the newspaper Zenoph- 
 ons! 
 
 It would exhaust chapter on chapter of even this generous volume, to 
 set forth the multifarious needs of 15,000 men moved by ships, and from 
 ships to a shore to all needs barren, for though the Spaniards nowhere 
 and at no time discovered the genius of preparation, they were made fore- 
 seeing in spite of themselves, by the chronic denudation of the country. 
 The arrival at a decisive point of encounter inflamed the devouring greed 
 of the press for action I The wretched commander found the cable a 
 curse he was now within recriminative touch of the aulic council in 
 Washington but this he could have placated. The press could not be 
 lulled ; it was clamorous for action. So, foodless, without guns of the de* 
 cisive character implied by aggressive warfare, the heads of the columns 
 were hurried forward toward the enemy. Veterans of the civil war heard 
 the flamboyant acclamations of the press, the subdued approval of the hier- 
 archies in Washington, with foreboding. We had seen futilities ot the 
 same sort during the Civil War. Virginia was a thrice told tale of the 
 adventures of Milroy, Hunter, Pope, Siegel, passing prodigies in war 
 making, who mistook a few thousand willing men for perfected armies. 
 
 While the mass was gathering itself together gaily and confidently, the
 
 i 
 
 
 vl 
 
 11 
 
 A 
 
 I
 
 260 THE ROUGH RIDERS SET OUT. 
 
 two squadrons of the Rougli Riders that accompanied the expedition set 
 out adventurously in the direction of the enemy and Santiago. There 
 seems to have been no thought of the rudimentary operations of invasion 
 a careful reconnoissance of the country the army must pass over. 
 There were bands of Cubans at the service of the general staff men 
 who presumably knew the routes or the surfaces capable of being made 
 available for forward movements. But until a heavy cost had been ex- 
 acted, their knowledge was not utilized. When the sagacious Sherman 
 made his memorable excursion to the sea, his army was spread out like 
 a vast fan, the tips separated at times by a distance of a hundred miles ; 
 before these, rode concourses of cavalry so far in advance that if an enemy 
 blocked the way at any point, the fan could fold up and be in superior 
 force wherever the obstruction presented itself. This elementary prin- 
 ciple seems to have been ignored or forgotten. The Rough Riders, brave 
 to temerity, took no precaution to scour the thickets either immediately 
 in front, in the path they were following, or the lateral spaces on either 
 hand. Even a less enterprising foe than the Spaniard would have been 
 inspired to sanguinary surprises by such unqualifiable laxity. 
 
 Pushing gaily through the dense growth of chapparal a hedge fash- 
 ioned by nature more obstructive than the chevaux de frise of the mili- 
 tary engineer, the thin column was beset when out of reach of support, 
 by bands of invisible ambuscaders. The volleys crackling from dense 
 curtains of green, where no smoke gave a clue to the point of danger, 
 forced the only tactics in such a case a futile charge. The Rough Riders 
 proved that they were of the stuff fine soldiers are made of. They did 
 not break in a panic, as better disciplined soldiers have done when caught 
 at the same disadvantage. The scion of a family of distinction was one 
 of the first victims. When the news reached New York, tenfold impor- 
 tance was given the skirmish indeed there was an outburst of larmoyant 
 sympathy, such as salutes mishaps to royalty in older societies. That 
 the elect of all the troops, the Rough Riders, should have been victims of 
 inconsiderate haste in moving, seemed doubly derelict to the million who 
 were regarding the war as an opera box spectacle. 
 
 But it must be said for the men of the regiment engaged, they never 
 took themselves so seriously. They in fact did not quite realize what the 
 meaning of soldier was. They had the vague, inborn, unquestioned 
 patriotism implied in George Eliot's noble line : " That hour (to the sol- 
 dier) is regal when first he goes on guard ! " The athletes and hunters, 
 the cow boys and social amphytrions enlisted, just as they would have 
 joined a polo club or a " Wild West " hunt, or any opportunity for manly
 
 THE ROUGH RIDERS' FIGHT. 261 
 
 adventure. They accepted readily the direful monotony and half menial 
 camp duties, incident to soldiering, with good-natured tolerance, but 
 they seemed to think that when battle was in prospect, they were free to 
 seek it wherever it was to be found. Hence they met the bloody reprisal 
 with buoyant equanimity. Colonels Wood and Roosevelt discovered the 
 qualities, admiring friends had preconceded them. They faced the bul- 
 lets from the vernal palisades, as if that particular form of self-sacrifice 
 had been their daily habit. But the country, while deliriously proud of 
 the men, was not disposed to look kindly upon the conditions that brought 
 about the ordeal of the favorites, particularly as nothing tangible seemed 
 gained. Again the shriek of "mutilation " was raised and the fine flower 
 of society demanded reprisal. A strict examination revealed that science 
 and nature, were the malefactors. It was the inhuman Mauser bullet 
 that made the dead unrecognizable, or made the gashes seem the furious 
 slashes of insensate hate. But there was a still ghastlier agency in dis- 
 figuring the dead even the wounded an agency that no care could pre- 
 vent or waylay, no prescience turn aside. 
 
 Under the glistening chapparal, among the razor edged wall of the 
 cactus, in the dark lush foliage, lurks and preys a malevolent little mon- 
 ster called the "land crab." The odor of human blood electrifies the scaly 
 members of this obscene marauder. No sooner had the Mauser completed 
 its maiming work, than the land crab, " devils claw " the natives call it, 
 claws its way, with incredible velocity to the prostrate body. In a flash 
 its wiry tentacles are pinching out particles of flesh from the exposed 
 places. These in every case were the mutilators of the dead Spanish as 
 well as Yankee. Nor was the branding summer sun a less merciless 
 agent of torture. It fell in festering heat upon the unacclimated skin of 
 the invader; it parched his flesh, it blurred his aching eyes and blinded 
 him, as he groped feverishly in the assassin thickets ; for assassin they were. 
 The mere touch of the flesh upon certain cacti, the inhaling of certain 
 blooms, stung the flesh, poisoned the blood and disturbed the action of 
 the cerebral system. In the foetid gloom of the thicket, squirmed and 
 hissed a vipery brood of uncanny and monstrous things, their eyes glowing 
 in spots, like a firmament of tiny stars, and even where these repulsive and 
 loathly things were not present, the hint of them insidiously spread by the 
 Cubans, filled the mind of the exploring soldiery, with that terror of the 
 unseen to which the ordeal of battle is mere football or polo. 
 
 In the end, when the column had endured such agonies the mind 
 shrinks from further relating when a score or more had been slain, the 
 point was made secure by a strong earthwork circumvallating the pla
 
 262 INGENUITY OF THE SOLDIERS. 
 
 teau. Spasmodic attacks and venomous defence alternated until the 
 whole force Shufter had at his disposal reached the topmost height, form- 
 ing a vast natural bulwark about the lower plateau upon which the city 
 of Santiago spreads in a confused net work of alleys to the waters edge. 
 The Spaniards always under cover, had little to fear from the most frenzied 
 rushes of our soldiers, and frenzied is really the only term to qualify the 
 strange onset that followed the fitful arrival of the divisions concentrated 
 about the beleagured city. 
 
 In all warfare where an army attacks, the first work is the planting of 
 guns to concentrate a destructive fire on the point chosen for assault by 
 the line- As has been seen, the work from the base of operations at Sib- 
 oney was impracticable, military men said, for the infantry. The hauling 
 of artillery, capable of breaking the Spanish defences, implied days at least 
 of very hard road making by every available man in the army. In this 
 dilemma the Federal commander thought that the Cubans, who were not 
 exactly distinguished as soldiers, could be made available as pioneers 
 sappers and miners, as the road makers are called. But the lofty pride of 
 the "patriots" refused all such service. They were willing to march 
 and fire, when the troops of the republic were in sufficient force to assure 
 them from a charge by the enemy ; they were ready likewise to hover 
 where death mowed down the Spaniards, ply the machete on the wounded , 
 disfigure the dead and despoil all but they could not be brought to the 
 work of clearing the roads or aiding the success of the expedition. 
 
 As in the Civil War, so in this brief promenade in Cuba. The Yankee 
 soldier proved himself as full of ingenuity in overcoming natural ob- 
 stacles as he has always shown himself equal to the deadliest dangers. 
 The roads were made passable, the bulk of the army was within striking 
 distance within a week of the debarkation. Then the vivacity of the sol- 
 diers either anticipated orders or exaggerated them, a series of desper- 
 ately bloody combats went on at every point of impact with the enemy. 
 These were signalized by an almost romantic disregard of death, on the 
 part of the soldiers, and an almost equal absence of intelligent directions 
 on the part of the directing commander. The men charged up artfully 
 defended acclivities, swarmed over barbed wire obstructions, through 
 stone walls, through dykes and over earthworks bent only on pushing 
 forward no matter how invincibly defended. 
 
 While "storied urn nor animated bust" cannot bring back the fleeting 
 breath, the eyesight-ecstasies of the plain soldier may be accepted as in 
 ft senct; a mirror of the momentous crises, when bravery wrought its con- 
 quest. Sergeant Oursley of the Third Regulars, unconscious that he was
 
 BATTLE OF LA QUASIXA. 2G3 
 
 to the resources of scientific narrative, charged his mind with this 
 moving picture of the advance: 
 
 " At Daiquiri we had a little skirmish with a small body of the enemy, 
 but it did not amount to much. From there we moved on to Damayo, where 
 the remainder of our troops landed. It was as fine an army as one could 
 wish to see ; all of us were of the Regular Army, except the Seventy-first 
 New York, the Second Massachusetts, and the Rough Riders. It was 
 rather tough on the volunteers, fresh from their offices and workshops, 
 and some of them were overcome by the heat. It was no uncommon 
 sight to see a man discarding his clothing, even his trousers ; blankets 
 were strewn by the thousands all along the line of march. There is a 
 thick growth of underbrush and cacti and no roads, nothing except small 
 narrow and winding paths, so that marching in line was impossible, and 
 we moved forward much of the way in single file. All of the cavalry 
 dismounted, and it is probably the only country where a cavalry charge 
 could not be effectively made. Notwithstanding all the disadvantages, 
 however, our boys brought up in line very well. There is a range of hills 
 along the coast, and another just above Santiago, which runs at right 
 angles to these ; it is upon these hills that the Spaniards have thrown up 
 their breastworks and where they lay intrenched, largely hidden by the 
 bushes, shrubs and small palms* 
 
 " On the morning of June 24th the Rough Riders set out to take up a 
 position in advance of the others, and in fact, ventured far out beyond the 
 skirmish line. As a matter of fact, those fellows, brave and fearless as 
 they are, and deserving of great praise and credit, actually conceived the 
 idea they could take Santiago, themselves, and then return and tell the rest 
 of the army how it was done! They were overdaring and advanced 
 farther ahead than they were ordered to go. It was about seven o'clock 
 in the morning when the two forward troops were moving slowly ahead, 
 that they were suddenly fired at from one of the outer trenches, hidden 
 from view by the underbrush, where the enemy were concealed. They 
 were taken by surprise, but stood their ground uncommonly well, 
 although their relief was fully a quarter of a mile in the rear and their 
 support still further behind. Colonel Wood and Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Roosevelt went at once to the front and were in the thickest of the fight. 
 It is little less than a miracle that either escaped with his life. Roosevelt, 
 when the first volley was fired, quickly dropped his sword and side arms, 
 and picking up a rifle stood by the boys and fired shot after shot with 
 them as long as the skirmish lasted. He is idolized by his men, and his 
 daring on that day still further endeared him to them. The two Ameri-
 
 THE FIRST TO FALL. 2C< 
 
 can troops of cavalry had been allowed to advance to withir? lwfc,ty five 
 yards of the entrenchments before the Spaniards fired their first volley, 
 and the wonder is that at so short a range, they were not all killed. The 
 only explanation is, that the Spaniards all shoot high, and the fact that 
 they are all big cowards. [But if they were cowards, then there was no 
 glory in conquering them!] They fire a volley and then turn and mn 
 back to their next intrenchment. When they had fired their first volley 
 at the two troops of Rough Riders the Spaniards moved to the right, be- 
 hind another line of breastworks, and began a cross-fire upon our men. 
 
 " It was in this first fire in their new position that Captain Capron was 
 mortally wounded ; he was the first army officer to fall in the Spanish 
 war. Sergeant Hamilton Fish died first, for he lived but ten minutes 
 after he was shot. While mortally wounded Captain Capron supported 
 himself by placing his left arm, which was shot in two places, about a small 
 palm tree, and drawing his big pistol used it with effect, killing or wound- 
 ing a Spaniard each time he fired, so close was the range ! [How could 
 this be verified ? ] Just before the enemy fled they turned and fired a 
 volley at the officer and he fell dead, with seven bullet wounds in his 
 body. The first to come to the relief of the Rough Riders were companies 
 from the First and Ninth cavalry. In all there were not more than nine 
 hundred men, but for one hour and fifty minutes they withstood the fire 
 of the Spaniards, and finally succeeded in driving them, fully 4,000 
 strong, back into the second line of intrenchments ! Our company 
 reached the scene just before the firing ceased, and none of our men were 
 injured, although we poured several volleys into the line of the retreating 
 enemy. We bore our dead and wounded back to the rear, and all of 
 those killed, except Captain Capron, were buried within a hundred yards 
 of where they fell fighting. In the intrenchments we found forty dead 
 Spaniards, and half as many more scattered a short distance away. Some 
 of them died after the firing had ceased, and were so far beyond help that 
 we made no attempt to do anything for them. These we buried where 
 they fell, nearly sixty of them in all. Had the Spaniards been good 
 marksmen, they might have annihilated the whole division, so close was 
 the range." 
 
 Volumes have already been written on this episode and volumes will 
 still be written, but Sergeant Oursley embalms the actualities of the 
 scene from one point of view. The squadrons of Rough Riders, buoy- 
 antly heedless of the first precautions of war, ventured far beyond their 
 place and were made to pay a grievous penalty. They knew no fear, 
 and they met the consequences like veterans. That is all that can be
 
 266 SOMEBODY BLUNDERED. 
 
 said. It was a plunder. In war a blunder is a crime. But in this case 
 the crime was condoned, the blunderers were enshrined as heroes. It is 
 due however to the directing folk of the Rough Riders and the com- 
 mander in charge, the sagacious, cool headed and experimented to use 
 the French word, eloquent of what I mean, General Wheeler, to say, that 
 the Rough Riders had been given minute orders in the foray. They 
 were, according to the consign given them, neither surprised nor discom- 
 fited by the sudden downpour of Spanish bullets. They knew that the 
 path was to be contested ; that the Spaniards would have given up t 
 Santiago itself, had they not made known their presence just where they 
 did. All this may be conceded, it is no doubt true, that the five hundred 
 Rough Riders were sent just as they went and fought just as they were 
 expected to, but, the millions who fought in similar enterprises during 
 the Civil War, recall that wherever the enemy was expected to do all 
 that an enemy should, clouds of skirmishers were spread out like the 
 tentacles of a colossal devil fish, a mile in front of the main body so 
 that when the shock came only sparse groups could be hurt by the first 
 volleys. This, on testimony of the most vehemently impulsive of the 
 admirers of the Rough Riders, was not done. That a mere handful of 
 these joyous troopers was made to pay the reckless gallantry of their of- 
 ficers, is due quite as much to the impenetrable veil of foliage, as the 
 ineptitude of the Spaniards who of course never dreamed that a sane 
 commander was entrusting a mission so formidable to so few men. And 
 this incident illustrates, what I have recurrently pointed out; that a 
 stupendous blunder in battle, is often as effective as the most dazzling 
 Napoleonic conception. Linares took it for granted that, at least a divi- 
 sion of the invading army was advancing on him ; he took it for granted, 
 as he was bound to do, that the front attack was but a feint, and that his 
 flanks were in due time to be struck by the superior forces, his reconnoi- 
 tering groups had seen pouring out tumultuously from Sibone)>. 
 
 Hence, instead of cowards, the Spanish column that halted to force 
 or as the tacticians say demask, the enemy's intentions, were just the 
 sort of men, a profoundly wise commander depends on. It would be a 
 poor testimony to the sacrifice and devotion of the men who endured 
 more than the horrors of the Moscow deroute, to charge the wretched 
 Spaniards with cowardice. Indeed, one lively sentimentalist, who was 
 present and recounts the fateful struggle, that won Santiago, makes 
 lament, that he could not have been a Spaniard, for to him the sublime 
 immolation of the enfeebled ranks that stood and died, in hunger, in 
 despair, in the lack of all the incentives that make men heroic was the
 
 SPANISH HEROISM. 
 
 267 
 
 most captivating role, known in war. For while every man in the in- 
 vading army knew that our end would be gained, if it took a million 
 lives, the Spaniards knew that no matter how many assaults he repulsed, 
 in the end the flag of Spain must go down. He knew that, no matter 
 how masterfully commanded, no matter how scientifically administered, 
 the commissariat and supply, the time must come when neither bread nor 
 bullets would be obtainable. It was heroism, then, for the Spaniards to 
 stand the volleys from the determined, hilarious-jocose conquerors, who 
 were really playing war as they would have played polo or baseball 
 hardly realizing the gravity of the situation either in a moral or mili- 
 tary sense. 
 
 FIELD GUN CARRIED BY MULE.
 
 PART II. 
 
 IT was not the fault of the newspapers, that every man and woman, 
 every boy and girl in the republic, were not crowded on the sand 
 wastes of Florida, on that memorable 14th of June, when the expedition 
 for the conquest, that as it turned out, meant Cuba, meant peace. 
 For months, or to be determinate, from the instant the volunteers gathered 
 on the sand dunes of the Florida peninsula, the country fastened its eyes 
 on the corps, very much in the "opera box" attitude as it seemed to the 
 European presses. To this grand and trying tryst came the light and 
 heavy artillery of the press to narrate the daily and hourly doings of the 
 restive argonauts. Imposing hotels designed for the pleasuring of winter 
 tourists had been transformed into casernes for the keeping of the impos- 
 ing army of officers, military attaches, historians and what not, invariably 
 found at the decisive point, where mobilizing armies take their point of de- 
 parture. The tawny coasts, the dreary stretches of sand, the exotic foli- 
 age of southern Florida, were in a few weeks as well known to the eager 
 kinsmen of the assembled soldiers, as the White House in Washington or 
 Grant's Tomb at Riverside Park. Columns of the writing called "pic- 
 turesque " that would fill the expansive volumes of the completest ency- 
 clopaedia ever written, were telegraphed and mailed northward from day 
 to day, by the brigade of novelists, critics and general litterateurs im- 
 pressed into the service of the new journalism. In spite of a censorship, 
 smacking disagreeably of old world " methods," even arrogance, the people 
 to the uttermost ends of the republic knew from day to day the numbers, 
 condition, the status of the armada, concentrated at the most convenient 
 striking distance to Cuba. The niinutest details of the joys and sorrows, 
 the plaints and pleasures of the waiting heroes, were a household tale in 
 the million families where a son, a brother, a husband or father, made one 
 of the cherished crusaders, dedicated to the cause of humanity, as de- 
 clared by the Congress of the republic. Even in the rhapsodic roinaunts 
 of the "fine writers" there were premonitory notes of jarring, ominously 
 adumbrating the dolorous miscalculations so soon to be verified. There 
 was a shiver of apprehension when some of the more observing litterateurs 
 gave out the note of warning, that the machinery of moving the supplies 
 of the mass was in hands not able to handle the diverse instrumentalities 
 
 (269;
 
 270 
 
 THE SOLDIERS EAGER FOR ACTION. 
 
 of the movement. The dazzling corps of political, social and official 
 favorites, entrusted with feeding, speeding and safeguarding the needs of 
 the fighters, were even in the peaceful purlieus of war, proving inade- 
 quate to that uttermost of all needs the commissariat. Depressing hints 
 of an ineffective medical train, inkled northward and lent new vigor to 
 the Red Cross activities, already supernaturally zealous in its ministry. 
 But the note that struck loudest and bore most encouragingly upon the 
 
 25TH U. S. INFANTRY, (COLORED) PACKING UP IN A HUERY. 
 
 country was the feeling of the ranks for action. They panted for war, 
 now that they had outgrown the novelty of its forms and pageantry. They 
 demanded the shock of battle, the march, the tumult and glory of war. And 
 yet, when the order was reluctantly given to Shafter to set out on the 14th of 
 June, the sixteen thousand men were not ready in the sense that the 
 o: panizers of armies, the architects of victory mean by ready. The troops
 
 MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM R. SHAFTFR.
 
 ON THE TRANSPORTS. 
 
 273 
 
 had been sweltering and repining on the transports seven days, when the 
 start was definitely made. Every man of the cramped mass knew the 
 fleet by sight : every man invented a pastime to lull the hours and cheat 
 disease of its prey. But within a day of embarkation, an army with ban- 
 ners, could not have been more terrible to the imprisoned host than the 
 decks and deeps of the vessels. Life at sea is trying at best; language 
 fails to describe its torments, when men are packed together, leaving 
 barely space to stretch out in compact lines on every superficial foot of 
 deck and cabin. But it was of excellent augury for the metal of the cru- 
 
 TJ. S. INFANTRY EMBARKING FOR CUBA. 
 
 saders, that Yankee-like, they made these discomforts subjects for joke, 
 the deprivations, hilarious sarcasms. Yet historically this continent had 
 never witnessed a spectacle so imposing as the sweep of this armada from 
 the Florida sand dunes. It would have well repaid a jo'urney to witness, 
 for even the facile pens of the literary corps, could not, like the Egyptian 
 wizard, reproduce from a well of ink, the majestic panorama of the sea 
 pageant, the mile on mile of ships brilliant in color, animated by eager 
 forms moving in rhythmic unison over the opaline waters, through the 
 endless expanse of tranquil sea. The head of the fleet faded in the pur- 
 ple mists of the horizon, while the rear was emerging from the squalors of 
 Tampa. As a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, a fleet of trans- 
 ports is only as swift as its slowest craft; hence the journey Cubaward 
 15
 
 274 
 
 AN IMPOSING SPECTACLE. 
 
 never exceeded seven miles an hour. Hearts beat high as the majestic 
 line moved in the solemnity of the sea, straight southward. Every soldier 
 in the armada had studied his map of Cuba, and every man knew that the 
 direction of the fleet must bring the adventurers to the port of Havana. 
 That exhilarating anticipation made the hours pass with inebriating 
 swiftness, for to the most ardent that terminus meant battle in its fiercest 
 form. .Night fell and the pageant was eclipsed. Lights were forbidden. 
 Under the luminous radiance of the tropic stars, the wondrous beauty of 
 the sea was still visible; the eager thousands hung over the rails to note 
 what came to pass. The borealis play of lightning that illuminates the 
 southern skies added to the enchanting mystery of the scene. The least 
 sentimental felt the glow of rapture the poets profess, over beauty so 
 perfect, so whimsically in contrast with the mission of the spectres speed- 
 ing over the soft summer sea. 
 
 n 
 
 LOADING SUPPLIES FOR THB EXPEDITION. 
 
 It required twenty-four hours to get the tail end of the fleet on the 
 high seas, that is far beyond the Florida Keys, while the head was skirt- 
 ing Cuban waters. Never had this generation beheld a spectacle so im- 
 posing; even the armaments, though vast during the civil war, Butler's, 
 Banks' and Burnsides' did not number so many vessels nor so many 
 troops, in a single expedition, for besides the forty or more vessels of
 
 LANDING THE ARMY. 275 
 
 transports, there was a squadron of war ships to guard against the possi- 
 bility of attack by the enemy. The battleship Indiana,steamed far in 
 advance, the eye of the armada. It was the twentieth the sixth day 
 from the setting out at Tampa, that the ship-worn thousands saw with 
 wonder and relief, the purple horizon above the waters of Santiago. 
 Every man knew then the secret, so resolutely maintained during the 
 month of waiting and the week of sailing. To the Spaniards, neither the 
 sailing of the fleet, its direction nor number, even its probable destination, 
 were a mystery. For as the straggling line hugged the coast, signal 
 after signal went up from the headlands, and knowing the capacities of 
 the transports, the coming force could be estimated to a man. Even the 
 probable objective must have been divined, when the head of the column 
 passed the eastern capes and swung westward toward Guantanamo and 
 Sampson's sentries before Santiago. The thousands were worn with con- 
 finement; land never uprose more hospitably inviting than the serrated 
 terraces that spread under the eager eyes of impatient throngs. Death 
 or glory, or both, lurked in the mysterious deeps beyond, but at least the 
 limbs would be free ; the hateful duress of the ship, the torturing sounds 
 of the machinery, the deathly smells would be gone. Baiquiri. the spot 
 chosen for disembarkation, is a picture of nature in its most striking con- 
 formation of mountain, sky and water. The hamlet lurks furtively at 
 the base of a mountain spur, that seems to rise sheer twelve hundred feet 
 in the air. This immense mountain wall is indented irregularly, making 
 room for little bights, accessible to small craft. Streams, when there is 
 no rain, glide in crystal purity through the wondrous herbage kept 
 green by incessant rains. Plateau and plain intermingle in quick succes- 
 sion, as the land is penetrated inward and upward. To the seaworu sol- 
 diers the whole range of valleys and precipice, cliff and plateau, took on 
 the reality of Robinson Crusoe's isle; for among the glistening palms and 
 giant foliage, could be seen cocoannts, mangoes and other delights of the 
 parched stomach. For twelve hours Shafter's legions were boys on a pic- 
 nic, lost in the wonder and delight of the embodied reality of lifelong 
 dreams. But the haven of delight was not easily attained ; the sea leap- 
 ing and gamboling on the rocky ledges, sent up veils and volleys of 
 spray, that drenched the lighters, the wading ranks, the over eager thou- 
 sands. Nor was the picture devoid of wonder, even to eyes accustomed 
 to military pageantry. Horses were lowered from the lofty decks to the 
 water and forced to swim landward, many of them succumbing to wave 
 and fright in the short journey. On Wednesday, June 21st, the leading 
 division of the fleets had disembarked their quotas; as the darkness fell,
 
 276 
 
 JOY OF THE TROOPS. 
 
 the vales and glades that had been Arcady were nglow with campfires, the 
 soldiery eager to "see more " were impatient to plunge into the interior. 
 Millions followed with an interest tinged with anguish, the exasperat- 
 ingly inconsequent reports of the lari'ding of the troops: the jpyance 
 and even jocundities of the men, as they met the needs of an entirely un- 
 tried undertaking. It was indeed a time of cheers and laughter,as the 
 sixteen thousand scrambled from the prisons the ships had become, 
 and made for the jocund shore in the shallops provided for the work. 
 
 LOADING PACK MULES FOR THE MARCH. 
 
 That there was any serious ordeal before them never seemed to strike the 
 men. With the curious docility of the soldiery of a republic, they in- 
 vested the commanders with prescience and capacity to meet all that 
 might be humanly prepared against them. Even the lack of the commis- 
 sariat, irksomely evident so soon as the masses were landed, did not sug- 
 gest grumbling. In the exhilaration of the novel it was rather jocose 
 raillery than the ill-nature that precedes gloom and demoralization. The 
 circumscribed beach and limited space of Daiquiri, were soon overcrowded 
 and then the legions began to spread out taking the form of an advance
 
 THE SPANISH ARMY. 
 
 277 
 
 unpremeditated in the plan of battle. Hence it came to pass that 
 skirmishes, more or less sanguinary, were fought entirely outside the cal- 
 culation of the commander. 
 
 But for that matter, there was no need for elaborate strategy. The 
 Spaniards had simplified the campaign by relinquishing the landing, by 
 retreat from the imposing bulwark nature provided the sixteen miles of 
 impenetrable jungle and toilsome bridle paths, leading from the sea ham- 
 lets to the city of Santiago. 
 
 CONFERENCE BETWEEN SHAFTEH, SAMPSON AND GARCIA. 
 
 Captain-General Blanco had forewarned the republic that the spirit- of 
 the Cuban people was high and proud; that if through inexhaustible 
 wealth and unlimited resources, the invading armies reached their aim, 
 the cost would be so appalling that even the republic would stand aghast! 
 He said and said with truth, that he had one of the finest armies the con- 
 tinent had ever held; not less than two hundred thousand men in arms
 
 278 IN AN UNKNOWN COUNTY. 
 
 stood ready to die for Spain and the integrity of the patrie's conquest. 
 Certainly no place could have been better chosen than the declivitous 
 stretch of natural fastnesses between the base of Shafter's army and the 
 intrenchraents of Santiago. An enterprising commander with a dash of 
 originality, might have made Satiago's cost in blood as much as the tak- 
 ing of Havana. Indeed, the taking of the city with Cervera's fleet in 
 the harbor was looked upon as a more hazardous enterprise than the 
 assault of the capital itself. Nor could our cabinet counsellors and men 
 versed in war, be made to believe that Blanco was blind to the possibili- 
 ties of the campaign. He knew that Shafter had with him the flower of 
 our army; and in consonance with the hasty opinions of the educated 
 soldier, the volunteer forces called into action by proclamation, were 
 hardly to be taken into consideration. Hence a reinforcement of from 
 10,000 to 20,000 promptly sent to Santiago, as soon as it was certain 
 Havana was not the point aimed at, would have transferred the war to 
 the eastern end of the island ; it would have compelled a tedious halt in 
 the campaign ; would have given the climate time to work havoc with 
 our army and so changed the situation, that for a delusive moment Spain 
 might seem capable of coping with her enemy. But even without a di- 
 version from Havana there were columns dispersed with a stupefying 
 Disregard of sound military judgement that might have made every 
 nile fromi Santiago to the sea a sanguinary battleground. Even Gen- 
 eral Linares' force was adequate to a step by step contest from the sea 
 over the discomfiting ridges, the deadly chapparal, the natural fortresses, 
 the whole country presented for such a campaign, for illustration as Jo- 
 seph E. Johnson fought in 1864 in defending Atlanta. 
 
 It was therefore not surprising that the Rough Riders assumed that 
 where natural obstacles had been so heedlessly disregarded, no Spanish 
 soldiery need be looked for. In this belief swinging gaily over the 
 mountain wall, buried in forests of almost malignant obstacles, they were 
 surprised. But again, the woeful ineptitude of Spain saved us. A capa- 
 ble chief anywhere between the first mountain ridge and Sevilla, would 
 have made the entire advance of the somewhat heedless army,a slaughter 
 perhaps a disaster changing the course of the campaign. A jaunty 
 disregard for the primary prudence of war, as well as ignorance of first 
 principles, marked our conduct of the campaign, as well as the action of 
 the advance. 
 
 The various detachments marched toward Santiago apparently indif- 
 ferent to any of the safeguards, always redoubled as the resistance of the 
 enemy becomes weaker for then there is good reason to suspect. It was
 
 SQUAD FIGHTS. 
 
 279 
 
 due to Spanish negligence, rather than to the prevoyance of the com- 
 manders of the invading column, that every hillside was not littered with 
 our dead. 
 
 And the army soon had proof of this: not only in the murderous sur- 
 prise of the handful of Rough Riders, but in the deadly efficacy of the 
 primitive blockhouses buttressing rude intrenehments and barbed wire 
 
 LIME KILN CONVERTED INTO A BLOCKHOUSE. 
 
 barricades, holding the charging columns suspended in the onrush, while 
 perishing under the withering flight of Mauser bullets. From the mo- 
 ment the columns set out from the sea, such fighting as went on was 
 whimsically like the result of individual enterprise, or as the corre- 
 spondents ironically expressed it "squad fights." That is, bodies of men, 
 pushing out adventurously and meeting opposition, instead of making
 
 280 THE REGULARS. 
 
 back for the main body,as all well organized campaigning exacts, stood 
 their ground and held it until other squads in curiosity or a spirit of ad- 
 venture joined them ! This was brave, even brilliant, but it was in no 
 sense war. A foeman of the least address or resolution would have cut 
 off every vestige of these sporadic forces. Indeed, the contrast between 
 the determined resolution of the Spaniards, when in line, and their in- 
 comprehensible laggardness when every chance coveted by an inferior 
 force was heedlessly abandoned to them, would argue that the defence on 
 General Linares' part was purely perfunctory. During the Civil War 
 to go no farther, we saw innumerable instances of forces vastly inferior 
 to Linares', contesting a federal advance inch by inch and finally repulsing 
 it in disaster. In the Red River expedition in 1864, General Banks under- 
 took to conquer Shreveport and Central Texas, by a movement not un- 
 like Shafter's. His advance was marked by nearly the same grotesque 
 disdain of military axioms. He was made to pay the penalty by a defeat, 
 that under other circumstances would have imperilled the whole cam- 
 paign. But the Spaniards having relinquished the striking advantage, 
 the Morro would have given them in a defence of the coast line, merely 
 " annoyed " the advance over the hills. It was their unsystematic plan 
 and desultory execution which betrayed Shafter into the final series of 
 what for a time looked like bloody repulse, at San Juan and El Caney. 
 Indeed it is no exaggeration, no undue pride in our incomparable Regu- 
 lars, that impels the assertion, that had it not been for the inexpugnable 
 resolution of the compact mass of Regular soldiery, entrusted with the 
 mission, Shafter's movement would have ended as Banks' ended. From 
 the memorable exploits of Napoleon's invincible phalanxes in the first 
 Italian campaign to the most stirring of their prodigies at Ulm and Eck- 
 muhl, soldiery in action never surpassed the heroic resolution, evinced by 
 General Lawton's, Chaffee's and Kent's battalions. They stood in line of 
 battle, when standing meant incessant exposure swift, sure hurt; they 
 maintained the perilous line, taken when each Spaniard in front by virtue 
 of arms and shelter equalled ten of the invaders. They could not be 
 moved by the maelstrom of death each discharge of the murderous Mausers 
 inflicted ; they were as impassive in the red glare of the perfectly directed 
 volleys, as in the breathing space afforded by the trenches; they stood 
 calm, majestic, agonizing ; they died and made no outcry ; they charged 
 and never wavered in the alignments, they lay prone in the hideous 
 trenches and never for an instant could it be detected that they were not 
 as terribly effective thus spread out, as in the rush of the charge or the 
 sinister line of battle. Indeed, the Regular was to the land combat, what
 
 THE INDOMITABLE MASS. 281 
 
 the imposing Texas, Iowa, or Indiana, were to the fleets a mechanism 
 so perfect that nothing but complete destruction could impair that pro- 
 digious force. Against this indomitable mass, the Spanish impetuously 
 spent themselves in the three days of determined fight which brought the 
 campaign to an end. Now the effect the Regulars wrought upon the 
 enemy was not less potent upon the volunteers. Brave, too brave, these 
 fine soldiers, were; for there is a certain valor bred of lack of knowledge 
 of the danger one is confronting. When the volunteer masses looked 
 into the seething cauldron of fire and saw the impassive lines of the Regu- 
 lars, it was impossible to realize that death was the penalty of the slightest 
 movement. The bullets sang and hissed and did their deadly work, but 
 it seemed normal, so long as these imperturbable figures, made head 
 against them, in all the tranquil unconcern of the parade ground. The 
 bullets struck them and they fell quietly. I was about to say decorously, 
 but the term hardly befits that final sacrifice, the brave make for their 
 country. Had the defenders of Santiago possessed a genius like Napoleon 
 to lead, or an army like Massena's to resist, the qualities shown by our 
 Regulars, in the storm and stress of El Caney and San Juan, would have 
 defeated both. This is claiming a great deal ; but when the action is 
 studied, when the corroborating facts and details are compared, no mind 
 imbued with the real business of soldiery will question the assertion. If 
 fine soldiery is a fine thing, this republic has perhaps as redoubtable a 
 phalanx as can be found organized in war. But during the three or four 
 crucial days of the advance, when the Santiago shrubberies were sinister 
 with slaughter, when the pens that command vivid phrases were pictur- 
 ing the deeds of the day to the poignantly attentive millions, it would 
 never have been suspected that the strong rock of our reliance, the sure, 
 the indomitable instrument of victory, was the thin but invincible bul- 
 wark of disciplined valor, making so little of the worst that befalls the 
 soldier, that the untrained historians, seeing no signs of fear, overlooked 
 the fact that terror was the garment that covered all. 
 
 Once the small army was distributed for its work, the plan of cam- 
 paign, simple enough from the disposition of the Spanish leader's limita- 
 tions, went on with definite finality. Each version of the advance differs 
 according to the relations and partialities of the recording scribe. The 
 Rough Riders and certain New York regiments might be supposed to 
 have decided the fortunes of the event, by heroic dash and omnipresent 
 utility. Never was a small army so abundantly provided with historians. 
 The affluent journals of most of the large cities were deluged with points 
 of view from every regimental headquarters. Each of these active ob-
 
 282 DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY. 
 
 servers saw with an eye trained to effect. The campaign in front of Se- 
 vastopol evoked no more diversity of unbridled eulogy or acrimonious 
 commentary. 
 
 In some of the narratives, the republic was made to gloat over the al- 
 most jocose dare-deviltry of various favorite divisions ; others were painted 
 as restrained from something like disaffection, only by pride of organiza- 
 tion or state jealousy. 
 
 General Shafter was bodied forth alternately as cowering in his tent far 
 in the rear, ignoring all that was going on ; bewildering the war junta in 
 Washington by clamor for reinforcements, or stolidly forcing forward his 
 inadequate forces to gain the cheap renown of a Fourth of July conquest. 
 This diversity of tone extended to the uttermost detail of organization. 
 It was clamorously set forth that the provision for the nourishment of the 
 harassed ranks was derisory; that within au hour of the fleets and transports, 
 within twenty-four hours' sail of New York, the sweltering, the maimed 
 and the halt were on half rations. And in the dire hour of death, when 
 the Mauser was mowing down the onrushing and misled ranks, there were 
 no provisions for the wounded; no surgeons, no tents, no medicine, in 
 anything like reasonable proportions. One surgeon to a regiment was 
 the rule during the carnage at San Juan and El Caney. Ten minutes to 
 an operation, the amputation of a limb, or even the more serious attempts 
 that surgeons now undertake, in the very crisis of battle, was the allotted 
 space. Surgeons wrought among the mangled, and fell fainting in the 
 pestilential air; the wounded ranged in helpless prostration, like cattle 
 in a slaughter pen, waiting their turns, from early morning until the mer- 
 ciful darkness fell with the dewy coolness of the tropic clime. 
 
 These painful disclosures were made all over the battlefield, and so circum- 
 stantially corroborated, that the charge cannot be disputed. Even in the 
 comparatively facile affair of removing the wounded who reached the sea, 
 the lugubrious tale of mingled inefficiency and peculation found more 
 sinister material ; the transports allotted the wounded were unfit for them. 
 The able bodied and influential were awarded the comfortable quarters, 
 while the mutilated and helpless fared as they could. 
 
 Held by the arms of the sea as in a trap, General Linares, the Spanish 
 commander of the Santiago district, from the first, was under no illusion 
 as to his fate. He had no food, little ammunition, and few or none of the 
 military appliances essential to the defence of the vital points which, if 
 adequately armed in time, might have made the capture of Santiago quite 
 as formidable an undertaking as Havana was generally admitted to be. 
 Above all, the unfortunate Spanish commander had an army, which, if not
 
 CONDITION OF THE SPANISH ARMY. 283 
 
 exactly mutinous, was destitute of that buoyant spirit which nerves men 
 to dare, no matter how weighted the chances against them. And in truth, 
 as the Spanish army found itself, or rather as General Shafter found it, 
 its destruction ought to have followed the first impact with our soldiery. 
 But what we now know of the Spanish commander's miserable predica- 
 ment General Shafter did not know, when his buoyant battalions spread 
 themselves onward out of his reach and set about the capture of the city 
 by a coup-de-main. This indeed is the story of the ten days' maneuver- 
 ing and combat which finally ended in the breakdown of the Spanish de- 
 fenses. It is, however, a misuse of the term, as ordinarily understood in 
 military parlance, to speak of the sporadic combats and the bewildered 
 movements as an advance or a siege. The presence of a group of guer- 
 rillas in the thick undergrowth, the ominous whirring and whizzing of the 
 repeating Mauser, seemed to the excited imagination of the volunteers, 
 the fire and fury of war at its gravest. Even such reports as came from 
 the regimental brigade and division commanders, evidenced a sort of nave 
 surprise that real war permitted of such disorderly disturbances of regi- 
 mental formation, as the successive but half-hearted ambuscades presented. 
 It is within bounds to say that there was more soul-stirring narrative 
 of the sort called "thrilling," for the casual encounter of Colonel Roose- 
 velt's rough riders, than was written for the battles of Antietam, Fit-d- 
 ericksburg or Gettysburg. Successful ambuscades, at points where pru- 
 dent military judgment would have foreseen just such encounters, gave 
 the semblance of war to the movement of investment which, it must lie 
 owned, delighted a large majority of the volunteers, for it gave them just 
 the sensation that youthful ardor covets. But among the more wary, the 
 fifth day of the advance, when Shafter's army stretched in a long and 
 precarious line from, what may be called the extreme left of the Spaniards 
 at El Caney, to their extreme right at El Morro or Aguadores, a distance 
 of eight miles, was filled with the gloom of an apprehension, which in the 
 cold light of subsequent facts seems grotesque. Sinister prophecies of an 
 Adowah trap, wherein General Shafter was to meet the fate that the Abvs- 
 sinians visited upon the Italians, were whispered under the breath, even ly 
 the most daring. For it was covertly declared that the ma'rch from Agna- 
 <lores and Baiquiri to Sevilla, was an almost wanton invitation to the en- 
 terprise of some obscure Spanish Moseby, Stonewall Jackson or Jeb. Stew- 
 art. Indeed, there was not an hour from the landing of Shafter's sixteen 
 thousand, until the moment the wretched Toral handed over his cartel, 
 that a sanely led diversion to our flank or rear, would not have withered 
 the army as a strong sunshine on new snow.
 
 284 UNPLEASANT PREDICTIONS. 
 
 Not that the march was too fast, nor the seizure of the various points 
 misjudged, but that isolated regiments were thrown forward beyond 
 available touch with their supports; above all because this extraordinary 
 army adventured itself far beyond the guns of the fleet, without a single 
 piece of artillery to defend itself, in the event of a strong attack on any 
 given point. In war at least, if not in rnorals,the end justifies the means. 
 It may be that General Shafter knowing from secret sources the ex- 
 hausted, supine and unfit condition of his enemy, felt that the ordinary 
 precautions of war were a waste of time. Nothing else can explain the 
 thrusting of his grotesquely inadequate forces beyond the range of instant 
 reinforcements. But what seemed more inexplicable than all this happy- 
 go-lucky improvidence, was the persistent disregard of that most vital of 
 all elements to a fighting column, victualling and shelter. Napoleon in 
 his most daring ventures, when in his first Italian campaign as he jocosely 
 declared: "The army moved on its boots and its belly," never ventured 
 to let the cry of hunger be heard, no matter what the peril to his compli- 
 cated combinations. 
 
 Yet the intrepid bands who found themselves in possession of the ad- 
 vanced line, and for days none of them knew how, fell in the sticky 
 morasses and mountain mud, bent under dripping branches, or packed 
 themselves together for vital warmth, with not even the sustenance of a 
 hardtack. 
 
 We have drunk so deeply of the glory, inebriated ourselves so inex- 
 haustibly in the panegyrics of what our army did, that it is wise, even es- 
 sential that we should know that even the daring of the republic's sol- 
 diers cannot be placed in comparison beside their constancy, and that 
 nameless something, which makes a man trebly a soldier when he pos- 
 sesses it. This, when the last word is spoken on the Santiago campaign 
 will be the peculiar trait the military critic must signalize as the differ- 
 entiating distinction of our volunteers, as compared with the perfunctor- 
 ily drilled mechanisms that make up the old world battalions. Nor is it 
 without signification, to keep in mind that none of the prerequisite engi- 
 neering details obligatory upon the armies marching in an enemy's coun- 
 try, seem to have been thought of. The men who were launched out 
 under the shower of Mauser bullets were likewise the builders of bridge 
 and road, of abbatis breastwork and trench. 
 
 Apparently the guiding mind of the United States army was appre- 
 hensive that the Spanish commander would, on the mere apparition of the 
 Tampa army, sacrifice the city and carry his garrison to swell the forces 
 of the Captain-General northwestward. Hence, having secured the iso-
 
 HOW THE CAMPAIGN WAS FOUGHT. 286 
 
 lated advanced post of Siboney, he spread a thin line to the northwest- 
 ward in order to shut the beleaguered garrison in, or to at least make it 
 impossible for any considerable number to march out before the besiegers 
 could make themselves felt in sufficient force to check the exodus. 
 
 It was these columns which brought on the fitful and momentarily 
 fierce combats of San Juan hill and El Caney. Our thin line on attain- 
 ing within five miles of Santiago, on the northwest and a proportionate 
 distance from the arm of the sea, which forms the bay southward to 
 Aguadores, could see no Spanish line, could discern no troops, but for an 
 instant felt the sting of the Mausers and at certain points, the deadly ex- 
 plosions of artillery. It was the very intelligence of our soldiery that 
 made the situation difficult. For every man could see, even though de- 
 void of military training, that with anything like equal force, the de- 
 fenders, on such terrain, could hold ten times, yes, a hundred times their 
 own numbers at bay. 
 
 With characteristic nonchalance too, the majority of the regiments de- 
 cided their own plan of operations ; fixed the date of assault and sur- 
 render for the republic's, birthday, the fourth of July ! No official man- 
 date had gone out to that effect, but it is perfectly obvious from tlm 
 strenuous onrush of isolated regiments and brigades, that each com' 
 mander secretly determined to signalize his force by a triumph on Inde 
 pendence Day. It is not unlikely that General Shafter had this whimsf 
 cally laudable purpose in his own mind. It is the only admissible con 
 jecture of what would otherwise have been a criminal adventure. 
 
 But ill as the Spaniards were prepared and desultory as their onsets, it 
 was seen that the shrewdly planted lines of blockhouses and the murder 
 ous entanglements of barbed wire masking ditches and other not badly 
 conceived impediments, forced a recourse to the orderly appliances oi 
 siege operations. The heavy guns capable of knocking down blockhouses 
 and demolishing the defences, could alone be depended upon to make the 
 advance of soldiery possible without slaughter, criminally out of propor- 
 tion with the end to be achieved. It was fully four days after the heads 
 of columns, which may be called squadrons of discovery, reached the de- 
 cisive points of defence, that a few straggling guns were fyeard near the 
 strong point of El Caney and the hill of San Juan. The flower of the 
 army, its strong rock of defence, in fact, seven regiments of regulars, 
 reached the crucial point on the extreme right, the Malakoff as one might 
 call it, in a small way, of the situation, after an all-night march, foodless 
 but unimpairably ready. It tells most eloquently the difficulties of the 
 woodland march, the mountain impasses, the roaring streams, the impene-
 
 286 THE FLOWER OF THE ARMY. 
 
 trable paths, that a large percentage of these men, who had battled the 
 Indians in the West, had dropped exhausted in their tracks and were 
 reported for twenty-four hours at least, as stragglers. Nor is it without 
 its significance that the line when rushed into order for battle, was found 
 so mixed up, that stragglers from one regiment were found in bewildered 
 groups searching for some place to fight, unable to find their own com- 
 mands. 
 
 As the outcome proved, General Shafter's objective fulfilled the first 
 maxim of sound military tactics ; to meet and beat the enemy wherever 
 his loss would be greatest, and the consequences most decisive to the as- 
 sailant. Santiago was a double prize. It was the eastern centre of the 
 defences of Cuba; it was only second to Havana as a defensive point, and 
 with Cervera's fleet locked in its harbor, it was of even more value to our 
 forces than the Cuban capital itself. 
 
 It is one of the universal reflections suggested by the war, that there 
 was hardly a man in the ranks who did not appreciate the strategic value 
 of the place, so soon as the vast armada of transports came to a pause 
 within sight of the threatening walls of the Morro. But more than this, 
 there was not a man in the 16,000, who was not in a primary sense an 
 educated man. From the General down, the history and associations of 
 the beleaguered city,added to the zest of a young soldiery's first attempt 
 at war. 
 
 Santiago had been the scene of Columbus' ministry, it had been the 
 home of that great group of conquistadores who had made Spain famous. 
 It had something of the effect on the imaginations of the men, that Jaffa 
 and the oriental strong places, produced upon the young warriors of 
 Napoleon, when he invaded Egypt. Santiago was to all Spaniards, as 
 well as all Cubans in a sense, the Sacred City St. James of Cuba. 
 
 Huddled in the contracted fashion which the Spaniards adopted from 
 the Moors, the city itself would not meet the expectations of those accus- 
 tomed to our wide streets, our vernal alleys, our abounding parks and 
 vast suburban residence quarters. Nature, however, framed it in an 
 environment of ineffaceable beauty. Lapped by the waters of the bay on 
 its front, its outskirts mingled with the sensuous foliage of the tropic 
 plateaus. The mystery and enchantment of four hundred years of the 
 unknown, or vaguely known, aided the fancies of the invaders, and to 
 some extent relieved them of the oppression of the intolerable surround- 
 ings met the instant they disembarked. Every detail of the disembarka- 
 tion was known from Buenos Ayres to St. Petersburg almost an hour 
 after its happening. Never probably in war was a contest of what was at
 
 THE CITY OF SANTIAGO. 287 
 
 best but of secondary magnitude, watched with an interest so thrillingly 
 absorbing as that which centered itself upon Shafter's slender column, 
 whose work virtually ended the war. 
 
 It was dimly felt throughout the country, so soon as the first despatches 
 were read announcing the difficulties of the country between the landing 
 and the city, that the hosts cantoned at Chickamauga and a score more of 
 rendezvous in the republic would have been more wisely employed in 
 making the invading column irresistible. For almost from the instant of 
 landing, until the ominous reports of Shafter's uneasiness reached the 
 country, it was clear that the forces were not adequate to the conquest of 
 the city, if the Spaniards showed anything of the resolution and heroism 
 of their ancestors at Saragossa. 
 
 The Havana and Madrid presses had confidently assured the world 
 that the Yankees should meet before the walls of the Sacred City of St. 
 James, the fate that befell Napoleon's legions at the hands of Palafox and 
 the Joan qf Arc, who made the name of Saragossa renowned as an 
 example of what a people can do, when determined to defend their hearth- 
 stones. Now, in spite of their jaunty confidence and inexpugnable thirst 
 for adventure, something of these admonitions fell upon our adventurous 
 legions, as the indescribable difficulties of the march began. For to the 
 torments of a roadless mountain side broken by gulleys and defended 
 more cunningly by nature than the art of man could devise, there uprose 
 dense and fairly impenetrable chevaux-de frise of thorny plants, so stiff 
 and obstinate that an ordinary scythe, or any of the appliances of the hus- 
 bandman, made but faint impression upon them. Add to this a sun 
 scorching in the intensity of its rays and never clouded from its rising till 
 its going down, superadd to this, almost regularly of an afternoon, a 
 downpour of rain which transformed the clayey soil into a stickiness that 
 made lifting the feet the labor of a Hercules. 
 
 Before the armies quit their camps in the Union, an elaborate series of 
 instructions had been given each soldier providing for his welfare in the 
 new conditions he was about to face. First of these was, that no water 
 was to be used without boiling. And in keeping with other short-com- 
 ings, brought to light by the very first manoeuver, it was found that the 
 soldier's kit was unprovided with the means of heating, even had the con- 
 ditions been favorable. Luck, however, was the god ruling the planet of 
 our armies, as well as our navies. For almost every road of the mountain 
 side was broken by rivulets of clear pellucid water, refreshing as nectar 
 to the sweltering legions as they toiled painfully upward and onward. 
 
 It was recommended to the legions too, that they should never sleep
 
 288 
 
 THE CAMPS. 
 
 upon the ground and this admonition soon became the derisive byword 
 of the maltreated ranks, stretched for miles on the soaking grass or in the 
 muddy tracks of the column itself, as it advanced. It is very doubtful 
 whether a single man in expedition was wholly dry at any time from the 
 moment the march began, until the gates of Santiago opened in surrender. 
 The Cuban contingent, while unprovided with clothing and destitute 
 of arms, never failed to have its hammock, and while the men who did 
 the fighting burrowed in the mud and under the dripping foliage, the 
 
 REGIMENTAL COMMISSARY TENT. 
 
 Cubans were at ease, swinging from the trees in aerial beds. Some of the 
 complaints sounded with shrillness by the correspondents, were indicative 
 of the naive ignorance of the men that made them, and the soldiery who 
 endured them. It was held a great hardship that there should be nothing 
 to eat but "hard tack" and salt meat. Yet during the Civil War, the 
 two million and more of men who fought between 1861 and 1865, never 
 dreamed of anything better, save when in camp and far from the battle- 
 field. The strategists of the campaign, however, had overlooked the ne- 
 cessity of having this simple food in abundance, and within reach, for, as 
 there were no roads, no vehicles were at hand to accumulate stores at 
 such points as the heads of columns were directed to.
 
 MA
 
 PART III. 
 
 r< ENERAL YOUNG was despatched from the base at Baiquiri first. 
 \J[ He was to have had a strong corps, but the precipitancy of his 
 march and the impassibility of the roads forced him to do the brunt of 
 the fighting with the brigade of Regulars, the Rough Riders and the 
 Second Massachusetts. This march to the north and east of Santiago was 
 
 determined upon, in order to separate 
 General Linares' army from an auxiliary 
 force of 7,000 at Guantanamo to the east- 
 ward. It also provided for an ultimate 
 enfolding of the north and west de- 
 bouches from the beleaguered city, as 
 well as the prevention of reinforcements 
 threatened from places to the north and 
 west. The cavalry had no horses, nor 
 could they use them if they had; the 
 officers of all ranks were likewise dis- 
 Mt mounted during the earlier stages of the 
 march. But it is a misuse of words to 
 call the advancing movement a march. 
 The troops were really more in the pre- 
 dicament of Alpine climbers, or bushmen 
 compelled to slash their way through the impenetrable wall of obstinate 
 growth spreading out of gulch sides and rock-ribbed juttings, where nature 
 had played her wildest volcanic pranks at some unknown seismic epoch. 
 
 "Altares," is the name given by the Cubans to the corrugated fretwork 
 of ridges that break up the country into territory adapted more for the 
 passage of birds of the air, than man or beast. While not precisely like 
 the famous lava bed lands on which General Canby fought thirty years 
 ago, in Oregon, the veterans among the Regulars, who made the journey 
 from Siboney to the gates of Santiago, saw a painful resemblance. Now 
 when the land itself uprose in forbidding obstinacy, the Spaniards began 
 the defence which they declined at the seashore. That the invaders made 
 headway, is the extraordinary part of this extraordinary campaign ; for in 
 answering the well-studied volleys from unseen sources, our toiling masses 
 were forced to take aim at an angle of almost fo^tvflve degrees, almost 
 16 (291) 
 
 
 GENERAL LINARES.
 
 292 THE BATTLE OF SEVILLA. 
 
 vertically in the air. But quite as trying as this, in fact immeasurably 
 more arduous to limb and brain, was the labor of dragging the body up 
 what was in effect sheer declivity, in many parts of the advance. More 
 depressing even than the implacable resistance of earth and wood, there 
 was no sign either by traveled wood paths or cursory openings, that the 
 immense mountainous circumvallation ended anywhere. It shut in the 
 horizon completely ; the most vivid fancy could conceive no city in the 
 abysmal deeps of this rugged nature. But the maps, liberally supplied 
 the ranks, showed El Caney, San Juan and other inhabited hamlets, at 
 points of vantage for the assault upon Santiago, as well as excellent bul- 
 warks for a capable line of defence. 
 
 The Rough Riders debouched through the density of the wood upon 
 what was called the " hog back " and on reaching that fateful plateau, 
 seared with fissures and bristling with chapparal, found themselves en- 
 filaded by an unseen enemy. The hilarious Riders, on foot, were caracol- 
 ing through the thorny way, enlivening the solemn stillness of the woods 
 by the jocosities that seem part of the exuberance of our diversely mixed 
 blood, during hours of danger. The narratives of French troops in 
 action from the revolutionary epopee until Waterloo, dwell on the 
 " gaiete Francaise." This was the wear of the soldiery, all through the 
 Santiago campaign. Whether things were going well or ill, whether the 
 rations were scant or abundant, you might hear from end to end of the 
 line, mingled with more sinister exclamations, the grotesque humors and 
 fanciful slang, that expresses the joviality of good nature, good humor 
 and that semi serious levity, which it is so difficult for other peoples to 
 comprehend. For a breathless half hour, death was the chorus to the 
 Rough Riders' jokes. A score of the light-hearted merry-makers was 
 stretched quivering or silent on the palpitating sward, for the heat was 
 so intense that the very earth seemed to rise and fall as it exhaled the 
 hot, pungent odors of the dank, decaying vegetation. It was here, and at 
 this time, that young Hamilton Fish fell ; that the journalist Marshall 
 intrepidly venturing to "get all the news," reeled to the earth fairly 
 riddled with Mauser balls. But though the first reports represented this 
 episode as something of an unauthorized escapade on the part of the 
 Riders, it was really part of General Young's scheme to seize the outlying 
 points, commanding the Santiago entrenchments. 
 
 By a road somewhat easier than that which fell to the Roosevelt com- 
 panies, General Young reached a point parallel, and forced the enemy to 
 rush backward to the blockhouses of Sevilla. These were perched far 
 above the "hog back"; to attain them the Regulars, patient as pack
 
 A SERIOUS DILEMMA. 293 
 
 horses, were forced to use hands, and in some cases men vve^re seen holding 
 overhanging branches in their teeth, to steady themselves for an upward 
 lunge. The observant army officers set it down that the climb was 
 never at less than an angle of thirty degrees, and often forty. But when 
 death had taken its tale; when the herculean climb had ended, a 
 paradisaic vision rewarded the astonished column. Spreading far away 
 on every hand, far as the enraptured eyes could follow, on the vast 
 
 BLOCKHOUSE AT SEVILLA. 
 
 plateau, the villas, haciendas, homesteads, of the Santiago's well-to-do, 
 glimmered and glistened like friendly monitors. But the promises to 
 the hope were broken to the heart, for the gay walls and enchanting 
 gardens were broken and in ruins ; wild plants, of inconceivably luxuriant 
 growth, covered paths, once symmetrical and solacing ; walls once gay 
 with the hues the natives love to employ in decoration, were mere 
 mosques of paved elegance. For years the marauders of the " patriot " 
 army have made these homes of ease and leisure, tenantless. The lizard
 
 294 ON TO EL CANEY. 
 
 and the wild fowl perch where music and laughter once resounded. The 
 cost of this vision, the conquest of the plateau was heavy, the action is 
 known as the battle of Sevilla, June 24th. 
 
 Meanwhile, the army was still crawling, clambering and fighting onward 
 from the seashore, in paths still further to the northwest, aiming at the 
 furthermost bastion of Santiago, El Caney and San Juan. Sevilla was in 
 a direct line not more than three miles, but these three miles took the ex- 
 hausted soldiery from eight hundred to a thousand feet above the starting 
 point. El Caney is six miles from Sevilla, and the army had no sooner 
 clutched the vantage, than it was obvious to the group in command that 
 the advance must be instant or the army would be endangered. But the 
 very completeness of the clutch on Sevilla, added to the mountain of 
 difficulties that discovered themselves, curiously enough, only as the 
 troops advanced. For food and supplies vitally essential to the army and 
 the guns, could not be hoped for in time to put the men in shape for an 
 advance, or what was still more probable, a massed attack from the Span- 
 iards, whose lines grew ominously closer and more compact, as they were 
 driven backward. To add to the torments of the time, a series of rain- 
 storms poured down, and the soil where exposed to the sun became like 
 partly dissolved bricks. Every depression in the ground became a 
 rivulet, and every ridge a waterfall. Roads, or what had been semblances 
 of roads, became yellow streams, rapid and even dangerous to the in- 
 fantry. There were veterans present who were reminded of the famous 
 " mud march " of the army of the Potomac, brought to a pause by the 
 impossibility of moving over such footway. The dilemma was for a mo- 
 ment so serious, that suggestions were made to General Shafter to suspend 
 the northwest movement, and by capturing a small town in the bay 
 farther southward, secure a base nearer the investing line. But the troops 
 were already en-route, and the northwest movement continued and, whim- 
 sically enough, the nearness of the Fourth of July stimulated the officers 
 to undertake the impossible. This was on the 29th of June when the 
 council of war was held. Officers who had been part of the army in the 
 Civil War, looked with some distrust upon the ability of our over-willing 
 ranks to withstand the deadly volley of the Mauser, under the fatal dis- 
 advantages of a powder that betrayed our lines to the Spaniard at every 
 shot. At the least calculation, one Spaniard was in offensive qualities 
 equal to five of the invaders. 
 
 For most of our men were armed with the old-fashioned Springfield 
 rifle, which is as out of date now as the ungainly Queen Bess when the 
 Enfield came in. The Spaniards could count on killing anything bearing
 
 THROUGH THE DEATH PIT. 295 
 
 the semblance of life at a distance of nearly two miles, and this had hap- 
 pened frequently under the horrified eyes of the officers. No tactics, no 
 manceuvering, could compensate the invading lines for this almost super- 
 natural advantage. Even that last resource of a perplexed general, move- 
 ments by the flank, were unavailable from the density of the thickets and 
 the lack of roads. 
 
 Now standing far out from Santiago and covering the approach in every 
 direction which we were obliged to pursue, stood what was called the fort 
 of San Juan. But, to reach that the crenelated village of El Caney must 
 first be in our hands. From the counsels came the determination to as- 
 sault El Caney at dawn on the first of July, Generals Young and Chaffee 
 were given the post of danger while General Lawton was directed to 
 swing around northwestward, to be in a posture to give the decisive blow. 
 Reconnaissances were, however, essential, and General Lawton made these 
 with three brigades. The gist of this resolution, so momentous for 
 thousands of bedraggled soldiery, food less and shelterless, became known 
 in the mysterious way that army secrets have of conveying themselves to 
 those on the alert for them. The men dared light no fires for the Spanish 
 grape, as well as the Mausers commanded every inch of the plateau care- 
 fully studied in advance by its defenders. General Chaffee, through the 
 night edged his men through the death-pits to within striking distance of 
 El Caney, where, by unheard of toil, they entrenched themselves. Pits 
 guarded by a thick ridge of earth, covered the entire force by daylight. 
 In these rifle-pits, as they were called, the men found a reward for their 
 toil when the fury of the battle began next day. The general and staff 
 knew that the Spaniards had defended themselves by all the appliances 
 at their command. But it was not suspected, until the battle began, how 
 intelligently, even astutely, they had taken advantage of every favoring 
 undulation, preparing surprises where least expected, and masking ambus- 
 cades almost in front of the rifle pits. But the invading force could 
 neither advance nor retreat without the capture of this fort or series of 
 forts. . . . 
 
 The sun rises and the day breaks on the Cuban earth almost at the 
 same instant. There is no slow dawn as in our northern climes, and as 
 if in mirage the invading hosts saw the sun and the flash of the enemy's 
 guns simultaneously. The advance was ordered. Then the fateful cer- 
 tainty of the Regulars' onset displayed itself. Wherever the fight fell 
 upon the Regulars, there the work that the trained soldier is expected 
 to do was done calmly, intrepidly, with no fanfare of theatric show. At 
 a crisis in the combat, when the stoutly defended hill of San Juan was
 
 296 THE ONSET OF THE REGULARS. 
 
 working slaughter with its Mausers, Lieutenant Parker of the Thirteenth 
 Regulars made his way to an opening between that regiment and its neigh- 
 bor on the line. There was a slight gap in the inverting ranks, where the 
 ground rose to a knoll. Upon this the lieutenant set a battery of four 
 Gatling guns of the newest and most murderous pattern. These four 
 pitiless instruments ground out death as a coffee mill grinds out its 
 aromatic grain. The effect was instant, visible, heartrending even 
 though it was the enemy who suffered. The bullets sent in a hail, unceas- 
 ing, carefully aimed, withered all semblance of life, all attempt at cohesive 
 resistance out of the blockhouse or its defenders. This significant episode 
 had no journalistic witnesses. It was part of the prescribed work of the 
 Regulars. It had the effect of half a brigade, but in all the dithyrambic 
 details of the battle there is nowhere a word of mention of it. Possibly 
 because it is the conviction of the volunteers, the scribe and the on-looker, 
 that the Regular is in some subtle sense a creature of war ; that danger 
 is his delight, his element ; that overcoming the impossible is part of his 
 training ; that to deal death and make no display, receive death and make 
 no sign, are part of the Regular routine. Be this as it may the Regulars 
 redeemed all the precipitancy of the untrained, safeguarded the imperilled 
 lines, even when the danger was as menacing to fly as to stay. These four 
 well-placed Gatlings opened the way for a rush forward that nettle danger 
 which, when plucked, gave the rashly adventured mass safety. The 
 plateau was an immense sieve of surprisingly concealed rifle pits. In each 
 rifle-pit a group of tenacious Spaniards, clustered, showering the stretch of 
 ground between them and the advancing host with clouds of bullets that 
 fairly seemed to make the air black. But there was no halt, not the scintilla 
 of a waver in the heavy column steady, devoted, lurching forward over the 
 irregularities, gathering in line after line of the furious crevasses. But even 
 when these were overcome, behind them uprose massive stockades fairly 
 aflame with the density of the firing. These too the Regulars rushed upon, 
 seized, conquered. Meanwhile the ranks gathered about San Juan were 
 waiting and dying as they waited for Chaffee's blows at El Caney were 
 no longer a mere menace. In the very heat and fury of this triumphant 
 furious advance this leonine fighter received wailing messages from his 
 comrades in command, imploring him either to advance to the seizure of 
 the blockading fort or retreat, as it was death to the other brigades to re- 
 main where they were. The message spread along the ranks and the 
 men who had been out daring dare deviltry itself, took on a new impetus. 
 Inebriated by the opening volleys of Capron's guns, which by an inspira- 
 tion of the commander, so ranged themselves that they poured a concen-
 
 "TAKE THE VILLAGE." 297 
 
 trated fire into the blockhouse buttery, the piteously thinned ranks seemed 
 to increase in prowess, as they diminished in numbers. Capron's guns 
 sent their missiles through the line of blockhouses knocking whole panels 
 from the flaming sides. The effect was to benumb the defenders of the 
 still untaken rifle-pits and to dislodge the gunners, who had been scatter- 
 ing death from these stone bulwarks. But though shaken, dying and 
 dislocated, the Spaniards still had new coverts ; no sooner had our lines 
 routed one rank of defenders, than they swarmed as if reinforcements 
 had arrived, in another. 
 
 At this juncture the commander, Chaffee, received again the start- 
 ling tidings that the real battle of the day was going on at San Juan 
 and that unless reinforced the decimated ranks would be compelled to 
 retire. It was not an absolute command to suspend the more than half- 
 won victory, but it was one of those crises in action which tries the judg- 
 ment and reveals the soldier. It was the adjutant-general who came to 
 bring this disheartening word. He was taken along the line, shown what 
 had been accomplished and what remained to do ; the fate of the battle 
 and the siege depended upon the outcome. The decision was left to 
 Breckenridge the Inspector-General, who was not in authority : " You 
 must take the village," that official replied without hesitation. And 
 thirty minutes later the wall of death was in the hands of its assailants. 
 
 In the wild hurtling on-rush, Colonel Haskell of the Seventeenth In- 
 fantry had orders to support the Seventh Infantry, but his predicament 
 put his men in the very maw of the engulfing fire. There is a sublime 
 egotism in the bravery evoked in the crisis of battle, the naive belief that 
 the point to be gained depends upon the individual's effort; it is the 
 cumulative egotism of company, brigade, and divisions, that compels 
 victory, when decisive results hang on the conduct of one man, whose 
 example is a contagion. It was in this spirit that this admirable com- 
 mander pushed to the front of the line. The volleys from the Mausers 
 withered everything above the uneven surface ; it seemed to the panting 
 men, worn with the upward rush through the woody entanglements, that 
 the barbed wire fences had been flung enmasse sped with satanic veloc- 
 ity, to scrape the surface. Barely had Haskell stepped a pace forward to 
 lead his battalion, when he reeled to the earth. Lieutenant Dickinson oi 
 the same regiment, turning impulsively to aid his chief, was struck in the 
 arm but maintained his ministry. The men were taking such meager 
 advantage as the irregularity of the ground afforded, to preserve their 
 numbers for the death grapple, and did not see the fall of their chief. 
 But Lieutenants Hardway and Roberts among them saw the disaster and
 
 A TOOTH AND NAIL CONFLICT. 299 
 
 called for volunteers to lift and carry the commander to a place of safety. 
 The call was barely uttered when a dozen voices responded. Five went 
 out into the pitiless hail and three of these were riddled. Colonel Haskell 
 was dragged out of the vengeful maelstrom ; he was pierced with three 
 severe wounds. His Lieutenant, Dickinson, paid for his devotion by an- 
 other wound which killed him. 
 
 The assault led by Colonel Haskell was what might be called a tooth 
 and nail conflict, for actually the men seemed to use their fists and feet 
 as well as their guns. Haskell was a patriarch in appearance, with a long, 
 white beard that floated backward, as he fled onward into the fire, the men 
 of his command actually seeming to crowd upon each other to stop the 
 flight of bullets that came toward the veteran chief. The Spaniards stood 
 to their arms with a valorous constancy that revealed what they would be 
 capable of in a better cause. Indeed, to the educated on-lookers who 
 could not take part in the battle, they seemed indifferent to death, deter- 
 mined only to wrest revenge from the foemen despoiling them of their 
 stronghold. Fifty historians would be required to narrate in detail the 
 heroic episodes of the half mile of conflict, that resulted in the rout of 
 the masters of this fortified Golgotha, for the entire plateau was a place 
 of death deliberately planned and valiantly defended. 
 
 The first guns heard from our ranks at El Caney the battery of Cap- 
 tain Hamilton, were equal to a reinforcement of a division of men for it 
 is one of the phenomena of the battlefield, that the soldier feels security, 
 invincibility in fact, as the roar of his own guns breaks out behind him. 
 For reasons never very clearly set forth, a movement of considerable con- 
 centration was ordered within range of the enemy's guns. That is, the 
 line of battle which is usually formed outside of the enemy's fire, was 
 carried on at El Caney and to the south and eastward in the agony and 
 stress of the fight. The resultant slaughter was in the very nature of 
 such heedlessness lamentable. One regiment, the Thirteenth Infantry 
 lost thirty per cent, of its number, the officers suffering out of proportion 
 to the ranks. Nearly every man bearing the insignia of rank was either 
 killed or wounded. It would be impossible to render more eulogistic tes- 
 timony to men pursuing war, than the plain tale of what the right of the 
 army withstood. Had the Spaniards known the havoc they had wrought, 
 by a very slight reinforcement they might have compelled a retrogade all 
 along that part of the line. Indeed had the Spaniards been of the fiber 
 of the attacking forces, the right wing of the army must have been dis- 
 persed. Nor was this an advance, a conquest of territory to assuage the 
 ravages wrought on the maltreated remnant. The dead lay where they
 
 NO SIGN OF WAVERING. 301 
 
 tAi ; the wounded encumbered the open spaces, or if by chance they were 
 able to drag their mangled bodies under shelter, the prying eyes of the 
 guerrillas searched them out and riddled the torn bodies with volleys of 
 Mauser missiles. But in this most trying of war's vicissitudes, no one 
 saw a sign of wavering, a movement in retreat, by the able bodied. The 
 work of concentration under fire went on, in the crucial points of the 
 battle, from July 1st to July 3d, nor after the continuous slaughter of 
 hours, was it found achieved on the noon of that day. In almost humor- 
 ous keeping with the imprevoyance of the march, the provision of mate- 
 rials, food and what not, a balloon with un wieldly impedimenta was 
 riddled by shrapnel and left to block the main artery of passage to the 
 men under fire. The Regulars who marched in such order as the nar- 
 row way admitted, moved into line under fire and died in groups, were 
 entirely unprovided with surgeons. The surgeon of the Seventeenth 
 Regiment, Major Ebert, was so exhausted by the continuous calls upon 
 him that he fainted in the middle of an operation and was revived by a 
 Boston journalist, who by chance had enough cold water to bathe the 
 fevered victim. It was the authenticated testimony of those at hand, 
 studying the episodes and phenomena of the manoauvres, that twenty- 
 five per cent, of the wounded who died were lost by the lack of the most 
 ordinary medical aid provided for the battle line. Men badly wounded, 
 too much hurt to move without aid, gasped and groaned two days, where 
 they fell, before hospital assistance reached them. No commander can 
 see a whole battlefield, but any commander can foresee and so order in 
 advance that every man and appliance needed in every conceivable 
 emergency shall be within reach, or as nearly within reach as human pre- 
 vision can bring about. Most of the errors and shortcomings, however, 
 were ascribable to causes far from culpable. It was to be on the line of 
 fire, under the storm of shell, that the officers overlooked preliminaries. 
 To illustrate, General Ludlow, the head of the engineers, so soon as the 
 firing began, flew to the front to take active command, instead of remain- 
 ing to supervise the mechanical details of his corps.
 
 PART IV. 
 
 "T\RELIMINARY to the decisive operations of El Caney and San Juan, 
 something of the work incumbent on a prudent army officer can be 
 understood by a glimpse at some of the dangerous routine, involved in a 
 rational advance over ground whose possibilities for defence are unknown 
 to the invader. In fact, to fully comprehend the endless and inherent 
 obstacles meant by a war of invasion, it is essential to glance for a mo- 
 ment at audacities as thrilling in their way, though less inluridated by re- 
 port, than the charge or bayonet grapple. General Lawton's division with 
 headquarters at a dreamy little oasis in the wilderness of chapparal and 
 cacti, El Pozo, five miles from Santiago, was from the 29th of June until 
 the 3d of July a place of peril. No one knew what was immediately be- 
 yond, no one knew whether a path would take cavalry, artillery or in- 
 fantry in a single step into the range of the enemy's missiles, no one knew 
 whether the enemy was swarming in masked battalions, or lurked in the 
 convenient forks of the trees to slaughter the unsuspecting skirmishers. 
 Here again, the deplorable inefficiency, shortcomings or unwillingness, or 
 as our soldiery expressed it "dog cussedness " of the Cuban " patriots " 
 manifested itself to a degree that made it difficult to keep the volunteers, 
 at least, from falling upon the worthless ingrates, for whom the republic 
 had declared war. They refused to do or dare a single step beyond the 
 protecting bayonets of the Federal soldiers, though they had beguiled the 
 commanding general into a belief that they knew every step of the way, 
 and were holding back from attacking the " cowardly Spaniards," by the 
 desire of showing their "generous allies" the difficulties which the patriot 
 army had been compelled to face in the struggle for " Cuba Libre." 
 Hence, to move forward over the ground prepared by the Spaniards for the 
 destruction of whatever approached, after reaching certain distances, 
 skirmishing squadrons of topographical engineers were sent out, and these 
 modest, not to say obscure missions, performed vitally important functions 
 so far as they were called into operation. Unhappily, they were not em- 
 ployed to the extent prescribed by military ordinances, hence the diffi- 
 culties which afterward beset what is called the "turning movement," to 
 the north and east of Santiago. 
 
 At six" o'clock in the morning of June 29th, Lieutenant Guy Smith of 
 
 (302)
 
 ENGINEERING DIFFICULTIES. 303 
 
 the topographical engineers was directed to push out from El Pozo to- 
 ward Santiago, and map every rood of the way, that the commanders 
 might comprehend to an inch almost, the diversities of the terrain over 
 which the charging troop was obliged to pass. He was given a company 
 of the Seventh Regulars, under command of Lieutenant Durfee, and these 
 fifty men and sixty Cubans set out on what would be called a forlorn 
 hope, under ordinary circumstances. A rivulet large under the rains, but 
 dry when the sun shone, the Rio Seco, formed the starting point or rather 
 the boundary, where the United States troops patrolled. The educated 
 topographers set their instruments at work, every instant expecting vol- 
 leys from the trees above, from the dense clusters of chapparal or from 
 the thousand and one natural hiding-places that an enemy, master of the 
 country, would be apt to know, and the stranger could only find out by 
 murderous experience. Hour after hour this breathless band crawled at 
 much less than a snail's pace, for each man was forced to remain on the 
 alert, his gun at his shoulder ready to avenge the death of the surveyors, 
 immolated as it were on the altar of monotonous and inglorious duty. 
 
 For, fantastically enough, to die in the scientific service of war seems to 
 bring none of the acclaim, we so readily yield to the victim who falls in 
 the charge, or in line of battle. A characteristic suggestion of Spanish in- 
 consequence was found at a country residence, magnificent but deserted, 
 the estate of an affluent merchant, sacked and gutted by the energetic 
 Maceo. The place had been turned into a blockhouse ideally adapted to 
 an ambuscade, had the Spaniards meant a "last ditch" war. But it was 
 now a ruin. On the walls, incredible to say was found a crayon sketch 
 of the entire chain of blockhouses and earthworks barring the road to 
 Santiago. From this extraordinary carelessness the topographers were 
 enabled to lay before the invading commander a fairly lucid plan of the 
 circumvallating defences; though of course the natural obstacles of 
 bush and brake, ridge and deep, were not shown. 
 
 The little group of topographers had marched upon a plateau hardly 
 more than three miles from the coveted city of Santiago. It was the first 
 glimpse that any considerable body of the invaders had caught of the walls, 
 and a cry of delight broke impulsively from the men, for even the streets, 
 the houses, the time-worn tiles, the grey minarets, the romantic sugges- 
 tion of an older world, dropped into the fanciful verdure of the new, 
 ravished eyes acquainted only with our monotonous blocks, or our meager 
 northern foliage. The ravages from the civil strife of Cubanos against 
 Spaniards, were discernible in the broken crenelations of the walls, dis- 
 mantled churches, a general decay wrought by the wrath of man, and not
 
 304 A CUBAN JUNGLE. 
 
 the elements. The city, indeed, spread out like a vast, un wieldly chess- 
 board, slanting downward from the Sierra Maestra, to the pellucid waters 
 of the lovely bay. Brown ploughed fields, once affluent in coffee crops; 
 vestiges of sugar patches and the thrift of a servile race of planters 
 could be seen afar off, checkering the sloping plateau, in dreamlike quiet r 
 as if war had never been heard of. Between the surveyors and the 
 omnious outlines of blockhouses, rifle pits and defensive embankments, 
 spread a vast gulf of what seemed stagnant water, but what was in 
 reality the lush density of green, growing in murky swamps. This revealed 
 one of the difficulties that the advancing legions would have to meet, 
 when the final charge came. The Cubans called the place a jungle, and 
 jungle it certainly was, for in the attempt to penetrate it, crawling and 
 slimy and fearful things were startled in repulsive masses ; vultures fled 
 shrieking upward; all of the uncanny forms of nature seemed to have as- 
 sembled in this sinister bulwark, a thousandfold more ominous than all 
 the preparations of the Spaniards to torment the marching men. 
 
 In obedience to his consign, to make himself master of every possibility 
 of advance, Lieutenant Smith pushed from end to end of the sweltering 
 wastes and morasses, to mark the most available points of entrance. After 
 hours of experimenting and exhaustive labor, dim woody ways, dark al- 
 most as caverns, were found here and there, where by agility and indif- 
 ference to muck to the knees, it were possible to push on. It was not 
 until after the Santiago blockhouses had been won by columns coining in 
 from other than this direction, that the adventurous group found how 
 far they had really advanced, further than any skirmishers that had come 
 out on what i called the "Cainino Real " the state road, not two miles 
 from the heart of Santiago itself. Here the Spanish soldiers could be 
 seen loitering, drilling, occupied in fact in all the routine of barracks. 
 Groups came wandering from the town, and some of them walked squarely 
 into the Yankee ambuscade, never dreaming that any of Shafter's men 
 would be so adventurous as to come within half rifle shot often thousand 
 guns, ready to sweep the ground as clean as a lawn mower would. 
 
 Mangoes were growing in many of the openings, and our adventurous 
 group had barely settled itself for observation, when little bands of 
 women and children wandered suddenly from behind the walls or points 
 of concealment, and began to fill their baskets with these, about the only 
 food left to the poorer inhabitants. The Cuban contingent watched them 
 with ferocious intentness, until these unwary seekers were within reach 
 and then pounced on them, stifling their screams to prevent the alarm to 
 the soldiery, but a few yards away. Among the food-seekers two or
 
 THE CITADEL OF EL MORRO. 305 
 
 three lusty youths were seized and taken back to headquarters, for such 
 information as they might be able to give the staff. One point of infor- 
 mation gained from these unwilling witnesses, though they professed 
 ardent sympathy for "Cuba Libre " was, that General Vara del Key who 
 had inflicted condign severities on the Cuban ranks in various encounters, 
 had been compelled, even when marching at the head of his Spanish 
 column, to disguise himself in woman's apparel, in order to escape the 
 sworn vengeance of the rebel guerrillas. For a price had been placed upon 
 his head, and the poor man was hardly sure that his own ranks might not 
 take advantage of the ten thousand dollars, to sacrifice him to guerrilla 
 vengeance. The topographers counted on passing the night in this place 
 of peril, but the heavens ordered it otherwise, for a downpour of rain 
 began at the very moment an audacious advance was planned to sketch 
 the altitude of the fortifications. This rain was so continuous that further 
 attempts were impossible, and in the darkness of night the march back 
 may be imagined ; the condition of the men subjected to the sticky soil 
 and the hardships of the forest. 
 
 Not a man in the sixteen thousand in Shafter's force was ignorant of 
 the obstacles to be encountered. Whimsically enough, El Morro was the 
 dreaded enemy. For three hundred years, that mass of masonry has been 
 the shield of Spanish domain. Nature had made it invulnerable, man 
 had made it a horizon of death. Gibraltar itself is not more formidable 
 to attack than El Morro. No sea gun can ever reach it ; no armed mass 
 can approach or surprise it. Wrought from the primeval rock, El Morro 
 is part of a bold granite headland. The ocean washes its base. Its 
 upper sea' battery, bristling with Krupp guns, is nearly one hundred feet 
 above sea level. It has an all-around fire, commanding the sea front for 
 many miles, due east and west along the coast, as well as over all the 
 land within sight. The lower battery is constructed to command the 
 narrow entrance to the harbor. The in way there measures 580 feet 
 across. 
 
 Opposite El Morro is another bold headland, surmounted by La 
 Socapa, an old time fort dating to the time of Columbus. The guns of 
 the lower battery of El Morro face the entrance. Short of blowing that 
 headland of rock into the sea, El Morro may be deemed impregnable. 
 The gnus are ancient, but many rapid fire Hontoria and Ordonez rifles 
 were added so soon as Cervera took refuge there. La Socapa, is of the 
 old fortress type. Its elevation being less, it has neither the natural 
 strength nor the range of El Morro, but it has a usefulness all its own, as 
 formidable as its ally directly opposite; with the guns of Estrella Point
 
 306 LA SOCAPA AND ESTRELLA. 
 
 battery it can rake any ship that may pass the entrance. While El 
 Morro and La Socapa are designed to keep ships out, the Estrella Point 
 battery is constructed to deal with such as may have forced an entrance. 
 It is built of solid masonry, the counterpart of Fort Augusta, built by 
 Spain in the island Jamaica, over three centuries ago. Cayo Smith, 
 or Smith's island, nearly opposite Estrella Point was abundantly fortified. 
 Beyond Estrella battery, on a small elevation there was an old time earth- 
 work meant to finish anything that might have escaped the forts and bat- 
 tery. Between the latter and the city, there are no fortifications. In 
 time of peace the topmost wall of El Morro is used as a semaphore 
 station. This, with a series of hill branches extend to the city, the dis- 
 tance between the two being five miles. Owing to the narrow channel, 
 one vessel only is allowed to enter or leave at a time. Hence the signal 
 stations. 
 
 It was piquantly suggestive of our restless activities as a commercial or 
 business force, that the point selected for debarkation had been for years 
 the scene of our irrepressible commercial enterprise. The activities of 
 *' Iron Kings " or " Coal Barons " had made this unknown, or vaguely 
 outlined, segment of Cuba, a treasure-house of the iron industry of Penn- 
 sylvania. The money of our operators, the sagacity of our wealth breed- 
 ers, had developed that part of eastern Cuba, by opening up many miles 
 of mineral lands, by a substantially constructed coast railway, with two 
 elaborate piers, one on the coast and one in Santiago harbor itself. Rail- 
 ways had been built to carry out the mineral treasures, and when the 
 hour struck, these lines were of strategic value. The railway pier at the 
 western terminus in Santiago bay is on a headland projecting well into 
 the harbor. Just below the pier and headland, the shore of the bay runs 
 inland almost a quarter of a mile. The very substantial and costly iron 
 pier is lofty, and runs well out into the channel. Ocean going steamers 
 load at its gangways. The hillside from which it runs, occupies a com- 
 manding position of strategic importance. It lies just midway between 
 the city and El Morro. The main military road connecting the city with 
 the fortifications at El Morro and the battery at Estrella Point, passes 
 just inside the shore end of the pier. The position once taken by our 
 men, the two fortifications were irretrievably isolated from that city. 
 Any force holding such a point, commanded the channel opposite it. 
 
 El Caney lies about sixteen miles northwest of Baiquiri. It is one of 
 the termini of the El Cristo railway, a broad guage roa4 connecting a 
 number of inland points with Santiago. The march through the hills and 
 mountains ending in the capture of El Caney, gave us another railway to
 
 /; '>;*/ 
 
 ' --
 
 308 YELLOW FEVER. 
 
 be used in investing the city proper. The station of this railroad is on 
 the northern end of the main street, facing the harbor at the foot of Con- 
 gha avenue. Holding the two railways meant absolute control of the 
 whole district due east of Santiago. The engines and cars were of 
 United States manufacture. The flat and ore cars when armor clad, 
 ivould have been found very valuable and could have been used for rapid 
 fire and Nordenfeldt guns. From Siboney to Santiago, a distance of six- 
 teen miles to westward, two routes were open. One by the royal coast 
 road, which passes over high mountains, and the other by the Juragua 
 Company's railway, which skirts the coast to within one mile of Santiago. 
 Neither of them is easy traveling, at most points the two routes are 
 utterly inaccessible to each other. 
 
 From the moment war was proclaimed, the Spaniards, who really cared 
 for the end, put all their trust in the agency of yellow fever. There 
 were very few who did not realize that the Yankees must inevitably win. 
 But yellow fever is such an atrocious war-maker, deals out death so un- 
 sparingly, that the jingo inconsequents made themselves believe that we 
 would shrink from immolating our young and ardent youth in the 
 shambles, where there was neither glory nor gain. For an army with 
 banners is not so dreadful to those who know its harrowing decimation, 
 as the loathsome fever. Yellow fever lias been endemic in Cuba ever 
 Bince the Spaniards conquered the island. The public records show it 
 yearly, for over one hundred consecutive years. In all that time, Spain 
 has taken no adequate measures to stamp out so dire a foe to her own 
 children. The vast public presidio, or prison, at Santiago, has no outlet 
 for drainage. At night, after the people are in bed, its accumulated filth 
 is allowed to run down a public street to the sea. The military hospital 
 situated on an elevation in the upper and rear part of the city, near 
 Concha avenue, is a comprehensive establishment. Within its enormous 
 enclosure there is a vast cesspool with no outlet. This poisons the air 
 and infects the soil. While Spain has lost tens of thousands of soldiers 
 and sailors in Cuba from preventable disease, the desolation has taught 
 her no lesson. The wicked loss of life, and its cost to her as a nation, 
 have not been examined or reformed. In times of peace her soldiers have 
 died in thousands. The ten years' war from 1868 to 1878 cost her 
 200,000 men, the flower of the Spanish army, of whom 191,000 died in 
 hospital largely of climatic diseases, while less than ten thousand fell in 
 battle or died of wounds received in action, and even these might have 
 been saved by foresight. 
 
 Spain's neglect of sanitation in Santiago de Cuba is duplicated in San
 
 NEGLECT OF SANITATION. 309 
 
 Juan de Porto Rico. Her methods are fairly incomprehensible. The 
 main military and naval hospital in Havana has 1,500 beds. It is a sub- 
 stantially built place, near the end of the foul and pestilent harbor of 
 Havana. All patients were sent to it from the army and ships, yellow 
 fever patients were not isolated. For many years the building was a cen- 
 tre for distributing the poison of yellow fever, not only in the Antilles, 
 but all over the world. 
 
 The hospital was the medical storehouse for the island system of hos- 
 pitals. All supplies including bedding were sent from it. Yellow fever 
 was found at some port or town all the year round. In 1878, the Cuban 
 pestilence reached New Orleans, costing thousands of lives and a money 
 loss estimated at over $200,000,000. The ideal Holt maritime quarantine 
 system enabled New Orleans to shut it out. Britain had her experience 
 with Jamaica after Spain was forced to abandon it. Britain's sailors and 
 troopers died there in thousands. It was a pest hole. Pure water was 
 introduced, the soldiers and sailors were instructed and watched, un- 
 healthy sea level camps were abandoned, the death rate fell from 121 per 
 1,000 to 11.13, or less than half the death rate of New York, and this was 
 due wholly to sanitary measures, camps in the mountains and the intro- 
 duction of black regiments (West Indian negroes) officered by white men. 
 Had Spain kept abreast with Britain, Cuba to-day would be healthful, 
 and fairly safe for people of any clime. 
 
 As there are few things done by man that seem to interest men so pro- 
 foundly as the meeting of ranks in battle, so there are very few things 
 under the contact of life against life so difficult to reproduce exactly as 
 the phenomena of actual conflict. This ought to be readily understood by 
 every reader of war history ; no one eye can see more than the swift hap- 
 penings directly under a circumscribed line of vision ; no man is quick 
 enough to impress instantly the meaning of the movements that end in 
 the victory of one mass of the deroute of the other; hence, the thirty six 
 hours of really titanic wrestling which Shafter's army underwent, forms 
 almost as many absorbing episodes as there were minutes in that agoniz- 
 ing interval, for agonizing it certainly was, to every man within the 
 sphere of the Spanish guns ; not only within the sphere but far outside of 
 it, for as has been said, death lurked in the most unexpected places. The 
 Red Cross Samaritan took the wounded, no matter how far from the line 
 of fire, never sure that the tree above him or the thicket beside him did 
 not conceal an enemy secure in the density .of the tropical undergrowth. 
 The brief siege and the turbulent assault or series of assaults will prob- 
 ably take up as many volumes of critical controversy as the endlessly dis
 
 310 PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 puted assault upon the British lines at Monte St. Jean when Waterloo 
 was lost and won. In the melee of the two engagements at El Caney 
 and San Juan official reports vary. There were however many semi-offi- 
 cials, non-combatants, vividly observant of every phase of the occasion, 
 whose testimonies serve to fix the critical moments and identify most of 
 the men who wrought the victory. Breckenridge, the Inspector-Gen- 
 eral of the army, has already put his comrades under deep obligations by 
 a narrative of what he saw, which equals in interest the famous narrative 
 of Quartermaster-General Meiggs, of Hooker's "Battle above the 
 clouds." 
 
 In nearly every one of the thousands of newspapers published through- 
 out the United States, the participants and victims of the Santiago cam- 
 paign contributed personal observation of the battle ; the combined testi- 
 monies, if ever collated, would give definite account of every instant of 
 time from the moment the armada left Tampa, until the flag of the re- 
 public was flung out over the civic palace of Santiago. The abundance 
 of testimony, while a reassurance to the historian, is at the same time an 
 embarrassment, for many of the individual testimonies cover identical 
 hours, minutes even, and hence, make a choice difficult. But it is to be 
 said for the first time in war, that the men who fought it have been its 
 most striking historians ; every regiment possessed its Xenophon, and it 
 will be difficult to perpetuate such errors for example, as defaced the 
 allied battles in Spain as for sixty years disfigured even the disaster of 
 Waterloo. Let the reader, curious to make himself an image of the man 
 in action, compare the vigorous sketch of Captain John Bigelow of the 
 Tenth Cavalry, with the reports of Generals Kent, Lawtori and Brecken- 
 ridge, covering in general the same episode: 
 
 44 Our Tenth Cavalry was encamped over to the left of El Caney and 
 we had pickets thrown out toward Santiago. We could see the fighting 
 over toward El Caney, through our glasses. We could hear the noise of 
 the battle and could see our men emerging from the brush and advancing 
 to attack the Spanish position. We watched the fight for some time, and 
 then came the order to lay aside everything except arms and ammunition. 
 Of course we knew what that meant. We piled our knapsacks and other 
 accoutrements together, and I detailed a couple of men to guard them. 
 We had to guard our things, not from the Spaniards, but from the Cubans. 
 
 " Soon after this bullets began to come our way. It was the most mys- 
 terious thing imaginable. We could see them strike around us and hear 
 them singing through the air, but we couldn't tell where they came from. 
 We knew the general direction, but no amount of looking in that direc-
 
 YELLOW FEVER HOSPITAL NEAR SANTIAGO. 
 
 RAILROAD BRIDGE AT AGUADORES : DESTROYED BY THE SPANIARDS.
 
 THE TENTH CAVALRY AT EL CANEY. 313 
 
 tion disclosed any of the enemy. It is a good deal of a nervous strain to 
 be ordered to stay still while the bullets are skipping around you. Occa- 
 sionally a leaf cut off by a bullet would come floating gracefully down 
 to us, in an easy, pleasant way that made us shiver. We got tired of lying 
 still and doing nothing while under fire, and as there was no superior 
 officer around I concluded every command would have to shift for itself; 
 I started my troop forward (we were dismounted) to see if we could get 
 up to the battle line and take some active part in the affair. We pushed 
 on until we got near the edge of the bushes, and we found our battle 
 line retreating. The retreat of the battle line seemed to enrage and 
 arouse our men, for suddenly all started forward simultaneously over a 
 line a half mile long. I heard no order, and there could have been no 
 order given along that line. It was one of those inspirations which some-* 
 times moves a large body of men. Out they swept from the bushes into 
 the open space, our men with the rest. I saw no general officers. It was 
 every man for himself, and all for the enemy. There was no regular line 
 nor formation. It was a straggling mass fifty yards deep running across 
 the open and firing over each others' heads at the hill. We could see the 
 dust fly where the bullets struck on the Spanish defences. 
 
 We were about half way up the hill, and I was just looking over the mass 
 of men advancing up the steep, when I suddenly felt as if my left leg had 
 been struck by a cannon ball, and as though my little finger were in a ma- 
 chine that was grinding it to pulp. It didn't take me long to find that I 
 was wounded. It seemed to me that I must be horribly wounded. I was 
 afraid to look at that leg for fear it was entirely shot off. I called one of 
 my men who cut my trousers open and found that the wound whicli had 
 seemed so serious to me, was only a flesh wound through the calf of the 
 leg. One bullet passed through my left little finger. A bullet ploughed 
 a groove in my left shoulder. The one which went through my left thigh 
 I did not feel at all, and did not know it had struck me until some time 
 afterward. The Spanish sharpshooters were in the trees with smokeless 
 powder, arid they stayed up in the dense foliage of the treetops, while our 
 men marched right under them. Under these conditions, we did not know 
 of their presence, and could not distinguish their firing fronuthat of our 
 - own men. They had unchecked opportunity to pick off the officers, and 
 they improved it well. About twice as many officers were killed, as are 
 usually killed in proportion to the relative number of officers and men." 
 
 Philosophic Europe broke into a chorus of wonder when Thomas 
 Carlyle, at the apogee of his fame, produced the military annals of the 
 Seven years' War in which Frederic of Prussia was the commander. It
 
 314 THE HUMAN SIDE OF BATTLE. 
 
 was not exactly supposed to be a waste of time on Carlyle's part, to in- 
 corporate the testimonies of the humblest in the ranks, but it was some- 
 thing so entirely new, that even Froude, Green and the long line of able 
 writers who succeeded, rarely ventured to give the story of a people's do- 
 ings, from the point of view of the humbler segments in the social scale. 
 The history of this war however, would be a bare chronicle of cold 
 official facts, without color, were the contributions made by the rank and 
 file omitted. The human side of the battle was of course seen by the 
 plain, private soldier, who, while nominally irresponsible, as a matter of 
 fact has the crucial responsibility. For it is idle to say that the four or 
 six officials, performing perfunctory duties, can move or in any sense 
 change the volition of a hundred men. As a matter of fact, all battles 
 are fought by the men in the ranks. But it so happens that the testi- 
 mony of this handiwork was never so clear and striking, as in the aston- 
 ishing conflicts at Santiago. Tennyson says in In Memoriam : " They 
 speak their feeling as it is, and tell the fulness of their pain." 
 
 What for example could be more elucidative of the mingled confusion 
 and intrepid purpose of a body of men, than the adventure of Color- 
 Sergeant Andrews of troop B in the Third Cavalry. He was tearing up 
 the hill at San Juan with the impetuosity of a boy, although he has 
 been in the service eighteen years, and in the climb from the ditch while 
 holding the colors tenaciously, he was knocked over repeatedly. He clung 
 to his precious charge. For a moment in the melee, covered by the 
 wounded, and helplessly entangled in the ditch, he called out to his lieu- 
 tenant to take the flag, but the roar of the battle drowned his voice and, 
 unable to rise, he thrust the standard upward. " When I could get my 
 head out I sat up, and I could see the line of battle for a mile. There 
 are no words in any language, that I know, to tell what the fellows were 
 doing. The bullets came like the swash of water against the side of the 
 ship, as I heard it many a night sailing from Tampa. The nippers would 
 not cut the wires, and then you should see the men brace themselves with 
 their guns and jump upon them and push them over. Sergeant Mulhearn 
 grabbed the colors and planted them on the highest spot on the top of 
 the hill. Fully 200 shots were fired at the banner and it was riddled al- 
 most to a rag. My clothes were cut into ribbons, and I got to within 300 
 yards of the main body of Spaniards, just as our fellows were capturing 
 a regimental flag with the letter K on it. About that time, Colonel 
 Roosevelt and Major Westervelt of the Rough Riders came up and I 
 shouted to them to lie down or they would be shot. But they wouldn't. 
 Major Westervelt was shot in the neck, and the fellows that went to take him
 
 "WE'VE BEEN HERE ALWAYS." 315 
 
 out when they came back said, that as soon as he was bandaged he began to 
 puff his pipe. Then when he found out he was not seriously hurt, he in- 
 sisted on returning to the line, but the surgeon objected. He felt him- 
 self all over and remarked : ^Well, I guess I'm boss, and I'm going.' 
 He had barely got to the line of fire, when he was shot again and this 
 time knocked out." 
 
 What volumes we should be spared on the battle of Waterloo for ex- 
 ample, if some color-sergeant in the maddening charge with Ney, had been 
 able to tell us precisely what did happen in those fateful hours of the 
 swift-coming twilight, when as the British accounts have it, Wellington 
 felt that the storm had broken, and that he might release his sheltered 
 regiments from the cover that had saved them all day, and launch them 
 against the worn-out fragments of Ney's hideously misused cavalry. 
 
 Valiant men, who never dreamed of throwing the sheaves of their mod- 
 est glory in the wallet of time for remembrance, wrote private letters, 
 which proud kinsfolk published for the comfort of others for the emula- 
 tion of future heroes. In the subjoined, the attentive reader will observe 
 how the writer verifies other narratives, and yet wrote only to transcribe 
 his feelings and the scene, to those he loved. His kinsfolk had no idea 
 that the official reports would identify the officer but there were no con- 
 fusing number of shoulder-straps in the first entrance to San Juan. 
 
 " We have been in Cuba now for twenty days. The other day, as we 
 were changing position from the left to the right of the line, some soldier 
 in the trenches called out: * Have you fellows just got in?' A man in 
 my company called back : * H 1, no ; we've been here always.' And in- 
 deed, it seems as if we had been here for years, so many, many hot miles 
 have we marched ; so many wet nights have we slept on the bosom of 
 Mother Earth. We were landed without transportation, and everything 
 we have is what we carry. I have not even had a blanket. We sleep in 
 our clothing and wallow in the mud. We live on hardtack, bacon and 
 coffee. For nearly two weeks we have been daily and nightly under fire, 
 except when a flag of truce is up. The great event, so far as I am con- 
 cerned, was the fight of July 1. We were aroused at three in the morn- 
 ing and put in march at the first peep of dawn, over a road, which we had 
 built the day before. We waded through a river, and then were halted, 
 while on our left a battery of artillery opened fire on the enemy, who 
 was shelling our balloon. We were under the balloon, and you may 
 easily appreciate the interest we took in the proceedings. Shell and 
 shrapnel shrieked about us, the angry buzz and vicious bursting of the 
 shells seeming to be on every side. A piece of shell tore through a man's
 
 316 
 
 UNDER A PITILESS FIRE. 
 
 thigh. The noise was terrifying, the effect of shrapnel being dreadful 
 when it hits. Fortunately, it does not hit often. 
 
 "Our battery silenced the fire of the enemy, and we pushed on for- 
 
 A LETTER FROM HOME. 
 
 ward. Another river was waded, but it was only a little more than knee 
 deep. On its further bank whistled the enemy's bullets. The men 
 crouched down and rushed from cover to cover. We turned to the left ; 
 thicker and faster flew the bullets, which tore seams in the hot summer 
 air, all about us, above us, on our right and left, and at our feet. A part
 
 "COLONEL, WHAT ORDERS?" 817 
 
 of the company ahead of mine balked upon an open space. I drove them 
 on, and my own company followed me. The regiment was soon huddled 
 together in a bend of a river, surrounded by brush and trees. A few mo- 
 ments and the order came for Captain Turner's company to move for- 
 ward ; another moment and Captain Kennon followed him. Out into an 
 open, grassy field, where the hum of insects was replaced by the veno- 
 mous 'zipp' of the deadly bullet. 'Not to cross the river.' Such was 
 the order. Zipp, zipp, zipp came the bullets. The air was full of them. 
 What to do ? Nothing but stay there and be hit. Two more companies 
 came up, and all fell back but mine. But I was ordered to join on the 
 left of these, so I ordered my company back. ' I'm struck,' called out a 
 man. I hastened to him. His arm was bored through, and the rich ar- 
 terial blood was spouting his life away. I called a man to help me, and 
 Avhile the bullets fell like rain about us we put a tourniquet on his arm. 
 The bullet had entered his side. Poor fellow ! The blood was stanched 
 there, and we helped him carried him, rather to a place where he would 
 be sheltered from sun and bullets. 
 
 " But our line had gone back. We took him with us, the bullets 
 around us seeming almost like a solid wall of lead and brass, for the 
 brutes were using brass-covered bullets. There is the colonel. ' Colonel, 
 what orders?' 'Move forward,' and forward again we went, the colonel 
 going with us. He crossed the river, I after him, my company following. 
 Here we breathed, for we were under the shelter of the bank. I placed 
 my men in a hollow. The colonel sent my second lieutenant back with 
 orders for the other companies to join us. The poor boy was shot through 
 the heart after giving the order to two companies. I caught my breath 
 and plunged again into the storm to see where we were, where the enemy 
 was, what we were to do. On either hand were Spanish works, the one 
 to the left being Fort San Juan. It sat on a high, steep hill, with a wide, 
 flat, grassy plain in front, and a barbed-wire fence for us to climb. Oh, 
 that fence ! Many and many a fine fellow failed to cross it. There, dear 
 Sandy Wetherill, the last of the ' Old Sixth ' left to us, was killed, a bul- 
 let going through his forehead. 
 
 "A line was forming in the field. I went back and brought out the 
 company, forming on the right of the line. There was the rattle of war 
 the loudest. The crack of our rifles and those of the enemy, the whizz 
 of the bullet, the shouting of officers, the groans of the wounded, the 
 sound of the light artillery, the bursting of shells. 
 
 " We began to go forward. I got in front of the company and called, 
 * Come on, boys,' and the brave fellows went forward on a run, across the
 
 OFFICERS KILLED BEFORE SANTIAGO. 
 
 Lift/fr OftNPNWN 
 
 318
 
 MINISTERING TO THE WOUNDED. 319 
 
 iield and up the spur of the hill on which was the fort. Here we found 
 ourselves ahead of the rest. A Gatling gun opened on the enemy with 
 a noisy rattle, and with deadly effect. The Spaniards were firing from 
 trenches, we from the open, but the storm of bullets from the machine 
 gun seemed to shake them. I saw several run. I sent a man down to 
 the regiments who were forming at the foot of the hill to tell them that 
 if they moved forward at once the place was ours and begged them to 
 advance. Then with my company I pushed on, and was the first officer 
 to reach the summit. A few Spaniards were still there, the rest were re- 
 treating. I directed the arms to be taken from the wounded and dead 
 Spaniards, and fire to be opened on the retreating enemy. They started 
 to make a stand, but the others now coming up the hill, and lining up on 
 either side, poured volley after volley into them and they sought safety 
 in precipitate flight. An attempt was made later to retake it but was 
 repulsed. In the evening we were ordered to the left, and intrenched our 
 position. 
 
 " Eleven officers out of thirty-one, 120 men out of about 450, killed 
 and wounded, that is the record of the Sixth on the 1st of July. Every 
 day my company has been under fire, both of artillery and infantry. It 
 was worth a man's life to stand erect. A bullet came within less than six 
 inches of my head as I was taking my breakfast. It lodged in a tree two 
 feet away." 
 
 In this Hadean crucible of war the fabric of painfully repressed lies, 
 perished. The atmosphere was clarified; the Spanish soldiery were 
 stupefied to find that surrendering themselves to the " Yankee butchers " 
 did not mean instant scalping, as their presses had forewarned them. For 
 even though the hospital and medical provisions were painfully, criminally 
 stinted, the wounded Spaniard, like the wounded soldiery of the repub- 
 lic, were tenderly cared for; shared the meager comforts of the invading 
 ranks, both in the Red Cross refuges and the military hospitals. This 
 humanity which was so natural, that it was unnoticed by our soldiers, 
 -evoked a praise from the foreigners that is hardly flattering to the Euro- 
 pean conduct of war. Captain Webster of the Norwegian military staff, 
 bore this testimony : * 
 
 " One thing which specially pleased me was the magnanimity with 
 which the United States hospital corps ministered to the wounded Span- 
 iards found on the battlefield. They were picked up and placed in the 
 ambulance wagons and carried to the rear, where they received the very 
 best medical attention. American surgeons on the battlefield would 
 bandage the wound of a Spanish soldier to stop the flow of blood till the
 
 320 A BRITON'S STORY. 
 
 ambulance wagon arrived. The hospital service of the American army 
 is worthy of the highest commendation. 
 
 " I was told by American officers that the Cubans killed wounded 
 Spaniards with their machetes, but this barbarous practice was stopped 
 by the officers and men of the United States army. 
 
 " The Cubans could not be seen when an engagement opened. They 
 knew nothing about scientific warfare. The men are not trained ; they 
 fight as an organized mob. The Cubans rendered very little service to 
 the invading army, except as guides." 
 
 A startled Briton, reporting the campaign for the war office in London, 
 witnessed this characteristic trait: "In the whirlwind crisis of the San 
 Juan attack, an officer leading Regulars was struck, at short range, in the 
 cheek. The Mauser bullet made a small, clean hole, and came out through 
 the side of its victim's nose. He did not know he was hurt until another 
 officer, seeing his face bleeding, jokingly said : ' Why man, you're 
 wounded, mortally wounded look at the blood. I don't know but you're 
 killed already look at the hole in your nose. You've got four nostrils* 
 man, if you don't get plugged up, you'll be going about breathing like a 
 porpoise.' With that he led his comrade off to the hospital, to convince 
 him that he was disabled by holding a mirror to his face." 
 
 But fitful glimpses of the enormities going on in the small space 
 beleaguered by an army, reached the multitudes in the rear as far as 
 Siboney. For the track of an invading army is precisely like a city that 
 has been pillaged and dismantled. The roadways improvised for the 
 swift rush of the fighting cohorts, relapse into worse than the quagmires 
 and tangle hastily converted by corduroying, cutting and filling to give the 
 artillery space. From the sound and fury of the fight, to the ghastlier 
 environs of the field hospitals, the non-combatants, the stragglers, the 
 thousand diverse personalities of an army in movement, huddle or crawl 
 or ply an obscene trade in the pillage of the helpless, the robbery of the 
 wounded. Added to these repellent groups, in this campaign were the 
 surly mobs of Cubans, muscular whether to ply machete and stolen fire- 
 arms, or ravage the miserable remnants of the soldiery at their mercy. 
 ****** 
 
 An encounter of soldiery in a country like Cuba, or our own for that 
 matter, is fertile in surprises. It is the preconcerted thing that never 
 happens. To stand up on an open plain and deliver volleys into the faces 
 of men distinctly seen by each side, is the quintessence of soldierly per- 
 fection in European armies. But it has been very rare since the Thirty 
 Years' War, that a European army has been called upon to encounter
 
 BOAT CLUB HOUSE, SANTIAGO. 
 
 M IN I NO ViLLAGK NEAR
 
 EACH REGIMENT A CORPS. 323 
 
 natural obstacles of the really insurmountable sort that tried the muscles, 
 as well as the nerves of the soldiery in our Civil War, and in this brief 
 but gigantic operation at Santiago. Nor will the reader fully comprehend 
 the tortures of mind and body involved in what seems to the outsider a 
 brief interval, but to the men engaged, a year of phantasmal futility with 
 no reward at the end. In other words, at half the force exerted and in- 
 finitely less cost of life, battles that have given their commanders renown 
 have been won in every war. It is therefore impossible to understand 
 the magnitude of the dangers encountered, conquered, without follow- 
 ing step by step every regiment, almost every platoon. For, as a mat- 
 ter of fact, so soon as launched in the labyrinth of the battle plateau, 
 each regiment was a corps in itself, undertaking the manoeuvres of a grand 
 strategic operation, while unconscious of the influence that each of these 
 integral parts were exerting on the whole. 
 
 But with the third of the officers slain and twelve per cent, of each 
 regiment incapable of moving, wounded or dead, a conviction suddenly 
 settled upon the minds of the masses, after thirty-six hours of titanic 
 wrestling, that there was neither victory in further effort nor security in 
 retreat ; exactly the frame of mind that precedes the dissolution of organ- 
 ized armies. In this juncture, many of the commanders on the night of 
 July the first, urged General Wheeler to withdraw. They saw nothing 
 but disaster in remaining where they were, and extinction if they at- 
 tempted to advance. But Wheeler had been in dilemmas of a more try- 
 ing sort in the Civil War. He had been surrounded by the bayonets of 
 the Federals, and many a time had cut his way through massed ranks 
 which were quite as formidable as the barbed wire bulwarks, stone walls 
 and clay defences of the Spaniards. 
 
 The crafty old Confederate knowing the effect of a combined remon- 
 strance to a distant commander (Shafter was at the time ill on a transport) 
 wrote to his chief saying : " I presume the same influences are being 
 brought to bear on you that are working with me. But it will not do. 
 American prestige would suffer irretrievably if we give up an inch ; we 
 must stand firm." And yet at this very moment, when hope was extinct, 
 when brawn and muscle were at their last exertion, when the most ardent 
 were chilled by the empty belly and the parched throat, cumulative causes 
 were at work to end the extraordinary situation. Cervera's fleet was quit- 
 ting the harbor of Santiago. 
 
 General Breckenridge, touching the conditions on the night of July 2d, 
 in his report to the Secretary of War, departs thus widely from the tone 
 of official literature :
 
 324 THE BLACK FLIGHT OF BULLETS. 
 
 " Doubtless, through telegrams and otherwise, there have been sufficient 
 indications of the intense strain in the whole military situation on the 
 field of operations which led to the consultation at the El Pozo house the 
 night of July 2, and some of the general officers favored a retrograde 
 movement during the day or two prior to our intrenchments taking shape 
 and the armistice being agreed upon. . . . Probably it is now evi- 
 dent to all that it was far better to stand steadfast, and perhaps quite pos- 
 sible to advance rather than retreat so near the Fourth of July, and cer- 
 tainly we have demonstrated our ability to hold our own." 
 
 While the enemy's flag remains in sight, while the embrasures spit fire, 
 and death comes in torrents, no matter how much has been won, victory 
 has not been gained. And though we had crushed the volcanic outpour- 
 ing of El Caney, the thunders at San Juan and the mangled lines strug- 
 gling and crawling through the gullies, lingering by the streams, made it 
 plain to the rushing ranks of reinforcements, that the decisive point had 
 not been won. San Juan embodied vaguely to the minds of the hurrying 
 ranks the formidable personality of the Malakoff. One of the extraordi- 
 nary incidents of the battle as it arranged itself now, was the transposi- 
 tion of columns in the dense thickness of the undergrowth. The divisions 
 of Kent and Sumner crossed each other unseen, and when they emerged 
 into the line of fire, they were found to be in exactly reversed positions. 
 This itself will give a reader uninformed in military technicalities, a vivid 
 idea of the maddening noise and confusion going on, within the eight 
 miles of fire the battlefield comprised. For if two friendly bodies of men 
 could pass each other, oblivious each of the presence of the other, how 
 easy would it have been for an enterprising foe to place a force in a posi- 
 tion to destroy legions moving at such disadvantage. It was late in the 
 afternoon when the tide of battle became congested in front of what may 
 be called the headquarters of the invading army at El Pozo. A battery 
 of artillery which had painfully worked itself to this point of vantage r 
 while by no means disconcerting the enemy, brought down upon the gath- 
 ering masses of Kent, Sumner, Lawton and Hawkins, the deadly fire of 
 every Mauser in the enemy's blockhouses. Hawkins himself seemed to 
 breathe the intoxication of joy under the ordeal. He rode at the head of 
 his infantry brigade, across the plain and up the steep hillside commanded 
 on three sides by fire, and pushed determinedly forward, absolutely un- 
 conscious that he was the best target of the thousands on the field. The 
 infantry moved like a train of cars, with dismounted cavalry clustering 
 by their side. It seemed as though they disdained to use the old-fash- 
 ioned muskets, for they moved implacably forward, the brilliant colors of
 
 BUILDING A CORDUROY ROAD.
 
 326 THE MAELSTROM OF THE MAUSER. 
 
 the flag accentuating the precision of the line. Slight as the incident 
 was, Hawkins' unostentatious tranquillity, as he took off his hat, with a 
 slight gesture of courteous command, stiffened the sinews of the inarching 
 men. And it would be almost within the line to say that they met with 
 derision the black flight of bullets and the shrieking canister, as they bore 
 onward with gaping ranks, to the citadel of the enemy's resistance. 
 
 Ordinarily, in fact universally, by the concomitant testimony of the 
 European critics and monitors, this movement was a criminal impossi- 
 bility. No soldier had ever been called upon to walk up to unbroken 
 walls, to face, tear away, break down or in any way whatsoever, overcome 
 thick networks of barbed wire, one strand of which suffices to stay the 
 momentum of ten thousand herded cattle on the plains. Yet, under the 
 fire of the Spanish embrasures, in the maelstrom of the Mausers, those 
 who had the calmness to watch, could see bayonets twisting the wire, 
 hatchets chipping them, or some stalwart fellow, with his gun bracing 
 him, trampling the wire and holding it down for the others to pass over. 
 " It is not war," exclaimed the German attache*, " but it is magnificent. 
 Men who can make such soldiers as that could never be conquered by all 
 the armies of Europe." And over the entire eight miles, heroic insanity 
 of this sort was seen during these two abysmal days. More incomprehen- 
 sible still to the foreigner, accustomed to the methodic warfare of the 
 books, whether by an oversight or the instinct of the men themselves, the 
 bayonets were not fixed on the guns. Which either meant that our sol- 
 diery, as by an interpenetrating, common consent, had determined to give 
 the Spaniards no time to fight body to body, or that the enterprise seemed 
 so hopeless that none expected to reach that last stage of desperation, 
 when men meet, bayonet to bayonet, a thing very rarely seen in war. 
 
 But the battle was fought by the colonels, majors and the captains: 
 the division commanders, the brigade commanders, had followed their 
 orders in aligning their troops, the troops themselves saw the work that 
 must be done and resolutely went at it. The darkness on that space of 
 carnage fell as suddenly as the daylight came in the morning ; and while 
 this heroic struggle had won the outward and almost invincible defences 
 of Santiago, the last range of a despairing but undismayed army was still 
 between the war-worn ranks and the city. As I said before, other causes 
 were at work to make it unnecessary to further prove the valor of our 
 soldiery or the abnegation of the line and staff. It is not surprising that 
 with the relaxation of the night, with the tension gone, dismay and doubt 
 reigned at headquarters, and that simultaneously with Sampson's despatch 
 electrifying the country, the Cabinet was stupefied by an ominous hint
 
 EVERY MAN HIS OWN ENGINEER. 329 
 
 from Shafter that his energies were worn out, that without a redouble- 
 ment of his army, he could neither hold what he had won, nor safely 
 retreat. 
 
 The torrid hours of the July night were passed by the regimental rem- 
 nants under the fire line, in burrowing. Every man became his own 
 engineer. To remain on the surface, quiescent, was inevitable death. 
 The ground was transformed into monster mounds where the turf and 
 the bushy sedge had softened the arid hillsides or occasional level, the 
 morning found strange protuberances of reddish earth, bncked by a 
 cavity large enough to afford a grave-like covert for the outstretched 
 warrior. Sprawled at full length with his head to the ridge the fighter 
 was safe from the incessant search of the Mauser. He was able also to 
 rest his gun on the level earthwork and by quickly sighting, give the 
 enemy a taste of the unrest he had been inflicting the day before. It 
 would be hard to make any one realize who had not been under fire, the 
 swiftness with which men untrained in emergencies, seize and adapt them- 
 selves to the chances of warfare. To look at these recumbent, sprawling, 
 dirt-bedraggled ranks on the 3d of July, it would have been assumed 
 that they had passed a novitiate in burrowing, in improvising defences 
 against foes armed with such advantages as smokeless powder and repeat- 
 ing arms. Confident, or rather, reassured of existence until the time of 
 charge came, a poignant anguish of another sort arose. There was no 
 food at hand. The paths the army had passed over, even if found, were 
 turned into quagmires by the diluvian rains, they were littered with de- 
 bris, the cast-off garments of the men, the innumerable impedimenta that 
 oozes from an army as the rage of battle transforms the human into a 
 mere fighting machine. The weight of an ounce becomes a ton, as men 
 are shifted under fire, and only the most indurated veteran foresees far 
 enough to cling to his haversack, bulging with a stated supply of rations. 
 These weights had been lost or cast aside, in the ten thousand shif tings 
 of the thirty hours' battlings: hence at the very moment food was much 
 the most imperative need, it was almost totally lacking. Neither the 
 grewsome hardtack nor the equivocal salt meat were to be had. Coffee, 
 that support and mainstay of the fighter under every privation, *vas rare even 
 among the staff or the line. An empty stomach is a delusive counsellor. 
 It is the ruin of strategy, the destruction of armies. Yet the extraordi- 
 nary ranks which had been defying immemorial precedent in attack, 
 added another proof to the adage that no rule holds in war. For in spite 
 of hunger, in spite of the ominous aftermath of rumors that flew along 
 the line, the ironside tenacity of the ranks never for an instant relaxed. 
 18
 
 330 THE REVIEW OF STRATEGY. 
 
 The jovial quip, the biting sarcasm arose from the clustered figures 
 wherever the din of the rifle fell long enough for the accents of the voices 
 to be heard. Not a man of the burrowed ten thousand dreamed of what 
 was in store and not a man gave the slightest evidence that he cared. 
 But at the headquarters the peril had effaced the wonder of what was 
 done, and even in the throes of this peril, before the plight of Cervera was 
 known, the fateful resolution was reached to demand the surrender of the 
 foe, whose advance would have been our destruction, whose defiant delay 
 would have checked the campaign until another army could have been 
 brought to the coast, to protect the one we had wasted. 
 
 *####-x-#* 
 During the awful hours of hunger, expectancy of no hopeful sort, when 
 the forces of nature were lowest, when the blood crept and the nerves 
 pricked when " time was a maniac scattering fear, and life a fury slinging 
 flame," as Tennyson sings, the observant philosopher noted that the 
 Regular bore the strain with preternatural composure. Wherever pro- 
 fanity and the obscene gibe were heard, it was known there were no 
 Regulars ! Brave and fine as the volunteers were, they were not the ad- 
 mirable phalanx the Regulars were found in every emergency. The vol- 
 unteer is a coquette in campaign. He demands the incessant regard of 
 the country. He must have his every movement chronicled, his disci- 
 pline lauded, his bravery adulated. Taking war as a " vast picnic," a 
 " good time " when all the rigors of social propriety are relaxed, he insists 
 that his doings are precedents ; his obedience wonder-working, his naive 
 curiosity to test the utmost that bullets, bombs and the infernalities of 
 war can do, the cap and crown of heroism. " When I hear a soldier 
 swear," testifies an observant historian of all the momentous movements 
 at El Caney and San Juan, " I know without looking that he is a volun- 
 teer." As was noted in all the despatches recounting the scramble of the 
 Rough Riders, the colonel was compelled to admonish the men to swear 
 less and to fight more. But the Regular neither swears nor demonstrates. 
 He chews tobacco in the stress of hunger, occupies his hands in brighten- 
 ing his toggery, in verifying the efficiency of his Krag-Jorgenson. But in 
 the matter of profanity it is worth the study of the philosophic to trace 
 the process, which evokes from the victim of a bullet, the almost invari- 
 able exclamation "My God, I'm hit." The volunteer if he has breath 
 enough, however, is more profuse in his profanity and empties his exple- 
 tives in proportion to the painlessness of his wound. Yet at the same 
 time it was the concurrent testimony of chaplains and surgeons that a 
 general religious sentiment ran in a strong current among the majority of
 
 A REMNANT OF PURITAN BLOOD. 381 
 
 the Regulars and volunteers, as gauged by the evidences afforded in the 
 hospitals. In the pockets or among the private appurtenances of a large 
 majority of the wounded, Bibles and Testaments and other tokens of 
 church! y attachment were found in a large majority of cases. But more 
 impressive than this the foreign observer remarked with surprise on the 
 first Sunday morning when the army stood at bay before the bulwarks of 
 the besieged city, when the bells of Santiago rang for church service the 
 men in the invading army were seen with a Bible in one hand and a 
 musket in the other. It was the conviction of the old world observer that 
 a remnant of the Puritan blood still ran in the veins of descendants gen- 
 erally believed to be anything but Puritan. The men under him were a 
 study and delight to the transformed rebel, " Joe Wheeler" who in other 
 days made campaigning very serious work for the armies of the Union. 
 The boyish gaiety of his Confederate tatterdemalions found no equivalent 
 among the decorous Regulars, moving at his will like so many machines. 
 But he was reminded of the Confederate stress and storm, by the scant 
 larder and the fluctuating phases of victory or the counsel of retreat. 
 The general, seated in his meagerly furnished quarters, one day, had a 
 Spanish deserter brought before him. The Spaniard was a comely, even 
 jovial youth, obviously relieved to find himself beyond the uncertainties 
 in store for his beleagured brethren. The interpreter gives this piquant 
 narrative of the colloquy : 
 
 He admitted he had come into our lines to save his neck; he had 
 been sent out to forage and had slipped over. The Spanish soldiers, he 
 said, were not by any means discouraged ; they were indignant at not 
 being properly fed and at not receiving any money. The officers, he said, 
 took care to have their wants attended to. and had all kinds of luxury at 
 their mess, including wine, ice, and meat. Since General Toral had suc- 
 ceeded General Linares, things had somewhat bettered. They had been 
 paid three dollars, the first money they had received in six months, but 
 the officers had been paid with something like regularity. There was no 
 bread for the men, but the wealthy people could get it. The ice factory 
 at the head of the harbor was still running. The hospital was full of 
 wounded. The Spanish Sisters of Mercy remained, tending the sick, but 
 the Cuban sisters had left, and also the Sisters of Charity. All the stores 
 were closed, but General Toral had seized all provisions in them and 
 taken possession of the wine shops. When the deserter left, the Spanish 
 had not looted any houses, but had seized horses and mules left by the 
 pacificados, and were slaughtering them for the army. The Spaniards, 
 he said, had from 17,000 to 20,000 troops in the city. Cervera, had
 
 WHAT THE DESERTER TOLD. 
 
 supplied the army with ammunition and guns. When asked if the 
 Spanish liked the Cubans, he promptly replied: "No, no. They are 
 
 
 GENERAL JOSE TORAL Y VELASQUEZ. 
 
 cowardly and treacherous, and the Americans will soon find that out. 
 While the Spaniards would always fight, they were tired of the war ;
 
 THE FEAR OF DEATH. 333 
 
 they did not think Cuba was worth fighting for. If the Americans cap- 
 tured Cuba, many Spanish soldiers would desert and settle there, because 
 the} 7 knew they could earn an easy living by farming, but they would 
 never stay under the treacherous rule of the Cubans. He was told to 
 return to his lines, as he was not wanted. He replied that he did not 
 want to go, and upon the general threatening to shoot him, having sus- 
 picions that he was a spy, he replied: "If I go back, I will be shot, so I 
 would as soon be shot here." 
 
 It is the strongest instinct of life in all ranks of animated things to 
 fear and abhor death. Our organs seem to inherit this shrinking ; the 
 dread of death by pain, is the phenomena we call cowardice. The ex- 
 planation of the interest mankind takes in battle, in war, arises from 
 the consciousness of this. For no man differs from his fellow in the 
 shrinking from the ghastly mangling, the carnage of the bullet and bomb. 
 The heroism, therefore, that evokes wonder and adoration, consists in the 
 degree in which men suppress that natural terror and perform the work 
 assigned them like sentient machines, governed by impulses quite beyond 
 the normal developments of resolution. The single difference between 
 valor and recreancy, is, that the heroic fiber feels, thrills, but bears; the 
 coward collapses under the shock and seeks escape. But indeed, in this 
 state, the victim is as often paralyzed by a mental disease as the subject of 
 apoplexy. Cowardice is simply the inability of the mind to <sontrol the 
 body's mechanism in the perfect hold the mind possesses over the body. 
 No\v the battlefield has an atmosphere of its own. The mind, by some 
 quite indefinable process, acts with a million eyes and sees the cumulative 
 chances against life. No man ever fell into the line of march toward 
 battle without a conviction that death awaits him. Hence a panic, the 
 instant eclipse of the reasoning faculties, is as apt to arise from those who 
 would be heroes, as from those who seem cowards. It is largely a matter 
 of accident ; some of the most valiant warriors that ever dared death, 
 have fallen into panic. It is only men of unconquerable pride, who can 
 resist this moral cataclysm. There is no training, no safeguard that can as- 
 sure a commander against this temporary aberration. This is to be borne 
 'in mind by the millions who exult in the hardihood and constancy dis- 
 played in the Santiago campaign, for in this enterprise above all others re- 
 corded in war, the causes and conditions were ideally calculated to create 
 the atmosphere in which panic is inevitable; the wild and weird country, 
 with its aggressive shrubberies, its uncanny animal life, its mysterious 
 deeps of impenetrable gloom, its corrugated walls of soil that imprisoned
 
 334 IN THE VERY VORTEX. 
 
 the limbs and clogged the steps, the volleying deaths from above, where 
 instead of birds, the Spaniards lurked among the branches : the havoc 
 wrought from massed bodies, arising out of the very ground. Death fly- 
 ing from every direction, sped by a mechanism that made no sound and 
 emitted no smoke. All this was calculated to disturb the constancy of 
 the most perfectly trained soldiery. That Shafter's legions endured them 
 and wrought effectively, is as impressive as the valiance that won Auster- 
 litz or Marengo. 
 
 Official reports and eyewitnesses record but one instance of panic in 
 the pandemonium of death, that met the converging columns of Kent's 
 division. The seventy-first volunteers, a New York regiment of admir- 
 able materials, was given the order to allign on the left of Hawkins' 
 brigade. This movement brought them into the very vortex of the 
 Spanish fire. The leading battalion plunged forward, the hissing and 
 hurtling lead seemed to clamor for life ; the men quivered in bewilder- 
 ment, paused, the instinct of preservation, the inexpressible something 
 that makes the soldier oblivious, that, in battle at least, it is not all of 
 death to die, overwhelmed the file leaders ; there was a quiver of hesitancy, 
 and in that moment the soldier's shield and defender, pride, was lost. 
 The mass turned, in panic, and for an instant the doom of the whole 
 division was sealed. For there is nothing so swiftly contagious as 
 terror, unless it be daring. An instant's hesitation or hesitancy on the 
 part of the officers, and Shafter's army would have been a body of fly- 
 ing shreds and patches. But the hurricane roar of the guns the ghastly, 
 venomous hissing of the Mausers, drowned the dastard cry, of " sauve qui 
 peut," a cordon of the uncontaminated uprose in a flash, and the ordeal 
 was ended. But had General Kent not been on the spot, even the drawn 
 sword and pointed guns might not have stayed the unmanned groups. 
 The general ordered the battalions of the regiment still intact, to lie down. 
 This brought the chaos of fear to a pause. It gave the wretched culprits 
 time to recover, and when they were again called upon, they were all that 
 men needed to be. 
 
 Such momentary aberration has been known in all armies in all times. 
 One of the most valorous bodies in the corps that performed Napoleon's 
 most resounding prodigies in Italy, was for a moment overcome in the 
 same way on the plateau of Rivoli. The general promptly deprived them 
 of their colors. In the succeeding engagement the regiment thus tar- 
 nished, eclipsed the audacity of the most intrepid bodies, that won the 
 miraculous battle of Arcola and the flag restored to them was thereafter 
 identified with the most glorious regiment that marched from Naples to 
 Moscow.
 
 PART V. 
 
 IT is characteristic of our many strained race that it is the jocular form 
 that seems to come to the lips, no matter how grave the ordeal. It 
 was instantly known from end to end of the harassed line, that "old Shaf- 
 ter " was playing the Spaniards a " bluff." For by that inscrutable clair- 
 voyance with which the very minds of persons in authority seem to be 
 apprehended by the multitude, every man in the outworn ranks knew 
 that desperation alone held them to the ground they had won. It is easy 
 to conceive the immense sigh of relief that went up through the dim re- 
 cesses of chapparal and palm, over the beaver-like mounds that engirdled 
 Santiago, when white flags were seen waving wherever a point of vantage 
 could be gained. Nor was it less humorous that as the morning wore on 
 our imperiled commanders made plaint against the Spaniards that they 
 were taking advantage of the truce to strengthen their works and run 
 out embankments, where, in the event of a resumption of hostilities a 
 broadside or enfilading fire could be brought to bear from end to end of 
 our improvised fortifications. Again we were indebted to the Cubans 
 for a gratuitous augmentation of our perils, for the Spanish doggedly 
 made answer that the rebels had not recognized the flag and were carry- 
 ing on their accustomed warfare of sneaking assassination and predation. 
 But the flag brought a rebound to the old gaiety, the old confidence. 
 The men could rise to full height and from favorable points look far down 
 into the city, watch the people passing, watch the normal activities of 
 life going on very much as though the thin line of blood and iron had 
 coalesced, and the pandemonium of attack had passed. But the sights 
 were not pleasant to witness, for the roads were filled with the dying or the 
 wounded, and the stench of the decaying horses covered by the clouds of 
 vultures, came up almost as sickeningly as the feast of blood the day 
 before. 
 
 Swarms of refugees laden with their treasures could be plainly marked 
 passing out of the entrenchments westward and northward. The cannon 
 which had wrought such destruction on the charging regulars could now 
 be marked clearly, and the soldiers of the republic looked back wistfully 
 to count the brazen tongues that had tardily reached the field on our 
 side. But it is to be noted, and the fact is no discredit to the valor of our 
 men, that by common consent the very ranks that had been yearning for 
 
 (335)
 
 336 A TALE OF TWO CAPTAINS. 
 
 action glory or the grave admitted that it would be murder to con- 
 tinue the battle of the two previous days, if the Spaniards held out and 
 defended the formidable lines now clearly visible to every eye. Again, 
 the depressing disadvantage of our black smoke powder, revealing the 
 vuet position of the men and the almost preternatural work of the 
 smokeless powder, revealing nothing, had its effect on the imaginations of 
 those who had already felt the immense disparity of the two mediums. 
 Up to this point the soldiers felt that they had themselves taken the reins 
 in their own hands, that they had done the fighting and whatever faults 
 or mischances had resulted was largely of their own doing. It was their 
 own eagerness to seize the embattled lines in front, that deprived them of 
 incalculable advantages of the Gatling guns painfully clambering toward 
 them from the rear. A battery of these destructive machines at El Caney 
 or San Juan would have saved half of the 1,500 lives lost in the adven- 
 ture. In fact, by common consent, the capture of San Juan hill was as- 
 cribed to the extraordinary inspirations of two captains of the Sixth 
 United States Infantry, and in days to come when the daring of the 
 march and siege are discussed, the tale will take its place among the 
 thrilling legends of military history. The Sixth -lost 131 men killed and 
 wounded, out of a total of 450 who came through the via dolorosa of El 
 Pozo under the command of its colonel, Egbert. These 450 men launched 
 in the dark, vaguely directed to cross the San Juan river and hold the 
 foot of the hill, found themselves as it were, isolated, that is to say, out of 
 the reach of the staff guides and division commander. 
 
 The hill uprose bristling with cactus and impregnable with the thickly 
 set wires and traps prearranged for death. Up in the air, far above the 
 Sixth, rose the ancient crenelated ruin turned into a fortress or block- 
 house. The ascent from any side accessible to the regiment was by 
 actual measurement forty five degrees. The segment of the hill to be 
 taken and held, about a third of a mile crescent. The river oozes furtively 
 through an immense brake of jungle, wire, grass and all manner of cling- 
 ing and obstructive growths. The water at no point fell below the 
 middle of the men as they struggled through. Into this pit of gloom the 
 Spaniards had prearranged a fire which was so well nourished, as the 
 French would say, that hardly a leaf was spared on the taller growths, 
 and it seems like an invention to say that ;i man of the 450 escaped from 
 the clow ipoiir of Mausers. It is no discredit to the battalion that they 
 broke in every direction, not to seek cover but to avoid death in order 
 that they might achieve the task set them. In this dispersion, the various 
 companies were so dislocated that the men could not find their surround-
 
 THROUGH A PIT OF DEATH. 337 
 
 ings nor the officers their commands. In this blizzard of mingled death 
 and confusion, Captain L. W. V. Kennan of Company E, and Captain 
 Charles Byrne of Company F, asked the colonel, in despair, what they 
 should do. The previous consign had been not to push beyond the river 
 until the proper supports came up on either flank, but to remain in the 
 pit of death was to sacrifice the regiment uselessly, whereas by advancing, 
 the range of the Spaniards might be disconcerted. The two captains just 
 mentioned gathered together fragments of many companies as they came 
 to hand. With this dauntless band, Byrne made at the wire palisades, 
 where the men were already mowed down in heaps. He seized a machete 
 from the hand of a Cuban, slashed an opening in the wire and, amazing to 
 say, almost in single file the band poured through and as anticipated 
 were for a momentous pause sheltered from the plunging fire above. But 
 a harder task still fronted them, for the uprise was so steep that the men 
 were obliged to pull themselves up by the bushes. And it often happened 
 that the shoulder of one man was the stepping-stone to another to retain 
 his footway. But there was a surcease from the Mausers, for the bullets 
 went far beyond the squirming companies as they painfully toiled up- 
 ward. At the top of the hill Byrne and Kennan gravely shook hands in 
 commemoration of the feat done, and the work to do. On this gloriously 
 won point of vantage they found the brilliant and brave Lieutenant Ord, 
 who had paid for his temerity in seeking the spot, by his life. With 
 straggling fragments of the Sixteenth and Twenty-fourth he had, al- 
 though a staff officer, taken it upon him to silence the fort that was deal- 
 ing such destruction, and in the charge he was riddled by the bullets of a 
 revolver in the hands of a wounded Spaniard. 
 
 This one of the painful tragedies of the line of battle, in the deadly 
 climax of onset, illustrates the "hell " aspect of war. One of the aids of 
 General Hawkins Lieutenant Ord had distinguished himself by a bear- 
 ing and energy worthy of his lineage, for the young man was a son of 
 that splendid soldier General O. E. C. Ord, whose service during the Civil 
 War gave him rank and influence with the most admired of the group just 
 below Grant, Sherman and McClellan. Young Ord had proved the fine 
 fabric of his lineage, by entering the army as a private soldier. . He had 
 won the rank of lieutenant through the test of fitness. He had under- 
 gone the trials and dangers of the combats at Santiago, with such firm- 
 ness, with such an insight into the devoir of an officer, that his name 
 was telegraphed to Washington as one among the signally deserving. He 
 was everywhere on the deadly line guiding the broken ranks, informing 
 the officers of their positions and the work incumbent upon them. He
 
 338 A HIDEOUS REVENGE. 
 
 was hailed as the " gunner " by the ranks, for wherever his handsome 
 young figure appeared, there was danger, but there was intelligent 
 purpose. 
 
 He was carrying out his task at the head of the charging columns at 
 San Juan ; he had reached the summit of the hill, and saw the Spaniards 
 breaking just beyond. At the instant, observing a wounded enemy with 
 a gun in his hand, the lieutenant called out: "Take care of that man." 
 The Spaniard, as is supposed, mistook the intent of the officer's injunc- 
 tion supposed that he was directing his troops to kill instead of care for 
 the helpless, and fired point blank at the victim. Ord fell dead. The 
 soldiers of his regiment, the Sixth Infantry inflamed by the sight of the 
 young man's slaughter, rushed on the assassin in a fury, riddled him with 
 bullets, even tore the body into -fragments and thrust those into the 
 sticky soil. The vengeance no doubt seemed natural at such a time ; 
 Ord was passionately admired by his company, his death seemed an as- 
 sassination, but it was not. The soldier with gun in hand is chartered 
 by the laws of war to kill all who come within range. The wounded 
 Spaniard, misled by the fabrications of the Cuban presses, took it for 
 granted that death awaited him and he only imitated the most devoted 
 figures in all wars, by selling his life dearly and lessening the enemies of 
 his country. 
 
 But even the most vigorous application of duty could not justify a 
 company in avenging the lieutenant's death. The Spaniard was helpless 
 he was almost in the company's keeping, a prisoner. Now had this 
 episode happened to a Spanish officer, and had the United States soldier 
 who killed him, fared as the Spaniard fared, what would the world have 
 heard? It would have been another evidence of the inborn depraved 
 ferocity of the Spanish character. It would have justified any and all 
 reprisals. The incident is of moment, only as admonishing the impulsive 
 that in war, wrongdoing is the rule, rightdoing the mere chance of for- 
 tunate circumstances. 
 
 Byrne and Kennan, without a pause, concentrated the fragments of the 
 companies that had clambered up the hill, and by what seemed a miracle 
 of pure impudence charged upon the blockhouse, routed its defenders 
 and ran up the flag. 
 
 But the deeds of the day were scattered over so many points unwit- 
 nessed by staff officers and the agencies usually accounted on to make 
 reports, that these extraordinary exhibitions of individual courage and 
 sagacity found no mention in the official reports. Yet this passage was to 
 the general battle, what Hobson's feat was to the destruction of Cervera.
 
 ONLY TWENTY LEFT. 389 
 
 A witness of the adventure relates that the two captains moved entirely 
 on their own responsibility, and that during the upward climb they be. 
 came separated and as if by a mutual instinct on reaching the cres^ 
 ordered the same maneuvers. Captain Kennan made his men lie down 
 and ordered them not to shoot at anything but men, and not to fire with- 
 out orders. The men watched him eagerly, anticipating the word to ad 
 vance. Very soon he ordered them forward. "The men's faces," Cap- 
 tain Kennan testifies, "were like the faces of schoolboys when they heard 
 that they are to have an unexpected holiday." They rushed on eagerly, 
 and found a road which fortunately saved them from a good deal of 
 slaughter which other companies met in crossing a barbed wire fence 
 that borders the meadows here. They lined up at one point with some 
 of the men of the Sixteenth Infantry, but left them again ; they passed 
 on up the hill not directly at the blockhouse, but in a flanking direc- 
 tion, which gave them an easier ascent and then turned at right angles to 
 face the blockhouse. All the way up Captain Kennan led and encour- 
 aged his men ; but not one of them anywhere showed any disposition to 
 waver. When the turn was made, Captain Kennan found himself and 
 his company alone on the hill ; he had supposed that the whole regiment 
 was coming up. He hesitated a moment, wondering if lie must retrace 
 his steps. For one company, reduced more than one half by the scatter- 
 ing in the woods and the falling of men before the Spanish fire, to take 
 the fortification alone, would be impossible. The captain sent his junior 
 officer down the hill with this message : " The hill is ours if you'll come 
 up ; for God's sake come." Meanwhile, he saw other men ascending, and 
 pressed on. At the same time, the Gatling battery, under Captain Par- 
 ker of the Thirteenth Infantry, poured a galling fire from below straight 
 across the edge of the Spanish trenches into the defenders' faces. Ken- 
 nan saw the Spanish leaving their blockhouse and getting into the 
 trenches, which was a sign of panic. On he went with his men ; and 
 now he saw the Spanish, who by this time were menaced with the ad- 
 vance of other companies up the hill, abandoning the trenches and flying 
 down the back side of the hill toward Santiago. In another moment he 
 and his men, now reduced to about twenty, were leaping over the 
 trenches, which they found full of dead and wounded. 
 
 Battle itself would have been almost preferable to the hardships of the 
 miserably inadequate ground where the army lay sprawled, it cannot be 
 called encamped, during the trying hours of General Toral's pourparlers 
 with Madrid. The hill was too steep and cut up, to admit of even pitch- 
 ing of shelter tents, and beyond this, not even an officer was provided.
 
 340 MUD-STAINED INDESCRIBABLES. 
 
 But the grave-like ditches were enlarged, and by dint of branches and 
 all sorts of inventions which come readily to the Yankee under stress, made 
 huts of more or less capacity. These spread all over the sanguinary 
 plateau, which to some extent sheltered the bodies or part of the bodies 
 from the inconceivably thick downpour of water which seemed to come 
 regularly every afternoon in these leafy uplands. But the walking, since 
 walking was now possible, with the white flag flying, became a burden 
 for the mud was sticky as glue and left a murky spot wherever it touched 
 the flesh or the garments. All ranks and conditions were "painted red" 
 as the men humorously described it, for all were obliged alike to crawl 
 into the mud holes for shelter. Not a man in the entire mass had a 
 whole garment on his back or body. Few had shoes that were not out- 
 worn and in most cases tied on by cords. From the highest officer down, 
 there was scarcely a man in the grim ranks holding Santiago in leash 
 that did not resemble the worst form of " tramp " that wanders about the 
 northern cities. All the baggage was left at Baiquiriand carried back to 
 Tampa in the empty transports. Had any of the millions admiring the 
 bravery reported from day to day seen with the eye of the flesh the men 
 who achieved it, it would have been difficult to make them believe that 
 these mud-stained indescribables were the architects of an unparalleled 
 victory. 
 
 It is impossible to exaggerate the density of the uncanny growths that 
 fairly pinioned the writhing masses attempting to push through, even in 
 single file, man behind man. In the tangled wildernesses in which our 
 armies were engaged during the Civil War, the lusty growth of briars 
 was thought a torment almost beyond endurance, but in the Santiago 
 impenetralia, the rank arms of a dozen different thorn bushes, from cac- 
 tus to briars, clustered in vast reaches, thickly set as the most carefully 
 trained hedge. The lances, prickles, were in most cases over an inch 
 long, piercing as needles and tough as steel ; the leaves of the cacti were 
 sharp as knives and of a consistency that defied blade and bayonet to 
 break or wrest them from the stem. Never were such instruments of 
 torture invented, for the edge of the leaf was practically a saw like ob- 
 stacle, with millions of spurs and vicious teeth. The tortured ranks 
 could neither cut them down, burn them nor crawl under them ; they were 
 forced to wedge through them, tearing their clothing to shreds and 
 lacerating every inch of the body exposed to the venomous points. 
 
 The Cubans indeed had established themselves along the route, as if 
 life had finally reached the stage that realized their highest expectations. 
 Picnic pavilions, not uningeniously constructed of palms, jutted out from
 
 OUR CUBAN ALLIES. 341 
 
 the edge of the roadside, making miles of what under less acute sensa- 
 tions might have easily been transformed into vernal villages of Arcady. 
 But though apparent ease to these nomads, the existence could not be 
 called pence, with all the signs and tokens of war straggling past in the 
 shape of the maimed, the wounded and the implements of war. To those 
 who had time to observe the destitution of the natives, the task at hand 
 for the new masters of Cuba when the campaign had ceased, came vividly 
 to mind. As night fell, the male portion of these refugees assembled in 
 surly counsel to bemoan the fate they had brought on themselves. For 
 there was no concealment made of the fact that they had begun to con- 
 ceive a more violent hatred of the masterful invaders than they had ever 
 borne toward the easy-going, if cruel Spaniards. Words fail to describe 
 their emotions when the more adventurous from the front, retailed the 
 hideous heartlessness of " los Americanos" in denying the "patriot" 
 bands their inherent privilege of entering the towns taken in fight, loot- 
 ing the stores and perpetrating the death ceremony on such recalcitrant 
 Spaniards, as persisted in living after the sword and gun had done their 
 work. At first when the army landed, these dark-browed conspirators 
 had received the most humble soldier in the ranks, with a servility that 
 soon became nauseating. They could not lift their ragged hats too high, 
 nor bend their supple bodies too low when welcoming their rescuers. 
 The tide had now turned. Their rescuers were beasts come to burden 
 their beloved Cuba .with a new tyranny. For it seemed from the plaints 
 that could be gathered by those comprehending the jargon of the "patri- 
 ots " that law and order were the most odious signals of tyranny to men 
 who had for years lived by rapine and slaughter. 
 
 The observant newspaper correspondents found no end of amusement 
 in studying the promiscuous herding of these disenchanted natives with 
 the hardly less ferocious "land crabs," and these animals under other cir- 
 cumstances would deserve a chapter to themselves. A lurid red in color 
 with black trimmings so to speak, the crab swarms and rattles through 
 the palm villas of the herding Cubans, as ants might in a more civilized 
 community. This crab ranges in size from a soup plate to a "plug" hat 
 and what is more grewsomely grotesque about it, a casual glance reveals a 
 hideous resemblance to the human countenance, as sketched by careless 
 artists in making charcoal studies for pictures. No matter how crowded the 
 roadway, no matter how thick the battalions pressing onward to the fight, 
 or the litters carrying off the wounded, these loathly crawling things skirm- 
 ished and scattered under the very horses' hoofs, seeking the offal of the 
 camp when helplessness no longer gave the human bodies to the maws of
 
 342 THE GROTESQUE CRAB. 
 
 these hideous things, for forage. Their locomotion was a constant sur- 
 prise to the astonished invaders. They could go forward, backward, up- 
 side down, or down side up, any and every conceivable way, where a 
 natural object offered itself for their tentacular clutch. The small Cuban 
 children could be seen at times playing with them as with cart-wheels, the 
 crab revolving, very much as the old-fashioned fourth-of-July fire piece 
 called " spin-wheel." No interior, no matter how well constructed by the 
 soldiery, resisted them. They were in tents, under the straw or leaves, 
 in the hospital wards, in the wagons in short, wherever the sight or smell 
 of flesh or food attracted them. It was no unusual thing for the worn 
 soldier to be startled in his sleep by a clammy vulpine clusp on his face, 
 and on waking find these pestiferous marauders crawling over and about 
 him. They inflict on the flesh a very painful bite, which if not attended 
 to, degenerates into a poisonous wound. 
 
 Some of the adventurous and half-famished soldiery attempted to re- 
 taliate upon the " varmints " by potting them. But whether through lack 
 of skill in cooking or lack of the proper ingredients, these vicious monsters 
 fattened upon the flesh of the dead, were found unavailable, to the no 
 small satisfaction of the hospital people, who regarded the attempt to 
 cook them as almost canibalistic. 
 
 For two or three days after the army's advance began stalwart Cubans 
 almost naked as to garments, without arms or any evidences of soldier- 
 ship, flocked to the ranks demanding accoutrements and the wherewithal 
 to fight. 
 
 But it was very soon found that their fighting meant pillage, and that 
 they had no sort of notion of the discipline exacted in the conduct of 
 large bodies of men. They were incredibly . <jver however, in penetrat- 
 ing the jungles of cactus and thorn, and sug!> vod to the staff some ideas 
 as to the proper way of traversing Cuba, snould our conquest of the 
 island involve a campaign against the very people we set out to rescue. 
 For instead of using the ground as our thousands were compelled, to 
 sleep on, no matter how wretched, the Cuban had a hammock and a few 
 simple appurtenances, whereby at the coming of night he was comfort- 
 ably couched far from the crabs and out of danger of the malarial effluvia 
 that oozes from the soil or exhales from the foliage. 
 
 They became humorously expert too in picking up the refuse of the out- 
 worn soldiery. For, as universally testified, the painful labor of road build- 
 ing and the unforeseen hardships involved in the jungle march, compelled 
 the strongest to disembarrass themselves of very nearly everything but 
 gun and ammunition. All these disjecta membra, fell spoil to the far-
 
 THE STORY OF THE ANTS. 3i3 
 
 seeing Cubans. Now and then a staff officer striking out through an 
 opening came upon recesses where the accumulated accoutrements, 
 blankets and what not, of the army made the leafy glades resemble a 
 government storehouse. In many cases too when regiments were sent 
 off suddenly upon a reconnoissauce, piled their impedimenta, and at first 
 neglected to place guards over them, the entire store was seized and se- 
 creted by the Cubans. It not unfrequently happened too that small 
 squads of men, worn out by the march, halted by the wayside, were at- 
 tacked and pillaged by Cuban marauders. 
 
 A British correspondent who had seen war in all the recent outbreaks 
 in Europe, witnessed nothing so fierce for the time taken, or the sacrifices 
 of life involved, than the advance on Santiago. He gives a few glimpses 
 that the readers of military history will prize : 
 
 " When afternoon came I lost exact count of time there was still a 
 jumble of volleying over by Caney. But in front, our men were away 
 out of sight behind a ridge far ahead. Beyond, there arose a long, steep- 
 ish ascent crowned by the blockhouse upon which the artillery had 
 opened fire in the morning. 
 
 "Suddenly, as we looked through our glasses, we saw a little black ant 
 go scrambling quickly up this hill, and an inch or two behind him a 
 ragged line of other little ants, and then another line of ants at another 
 part of the hill, and then another, until it seemed as if somebody had 
 dug a stick into a great ants' nest down in the valley, and all the 
 ants were scrambling away up hill. Then the volley firing began ten 
 times more furiously than before ; from the right beyond the top of the 
 ridge burst upon the ants a terrific fire of shells; from the blockhouse in 
 front of them machine guns sounded their continuous rattle. But the 
 ants swept up the hill. They seemed to us to thin out as they went 
 forward ; but they still went forward. It was incredible, but it was grand. 
 The boys were storming the hill. The military authorities were most 
 surprised. They were not surprised at these splendid athletic daredevils 
 of ours doing it. But that a military commander should have allowed a 
 fortified and intrenched position to be assailed by an infantry charge up 
 the side of a long, exposed hill, swept by a terrible artillery fire, frightened 
 them not so much by its audacity as by its terrible cost in human life. 
 
 " As they neared the top the different lines came nearer together. One 
 moment they went a little more slowly; then they nearly stopped; then 
 they went on again faster than ever, and then all of us sitting there on 
 the top of the battery cried with excitement. For the ants were scram- 
 bling all round the blockhouse on the ridge, and in a moment or two we
 
 344 
 
 SWARMING UP THE RIDGES. 
 
 saw them inside it. But then our hearts swelled up into our throats, for 
 A fearful fire came from somewhere beyond the blockhouse and from 
 somewhere to the right of it and somewhere to the left of it. Then \ve 
 saw the ants come scrambling down the hill again. They had taken a 
 position which they had not the force to hold. But a moment or two 
 and up they scrambled again, more of them, and more quickly than before, 
 and up the other face of the hill to the left went other lines, and the 
 ridge was taken, and the blockhouse was ours, and the trenches were 
 full of dead Spaniards. 
 
 "It was a grand achievement for the soldiers who shared it this 
 storming of the hill leading up from the St. Juan River to the ridge before 
 the main fort. We could tell so much at 2,560 yards. But we also knew 
 that it had cost them dear. 
 
 "Later on, we knew only too well how heavy the cost was. As I was 
 trying to make myself comfortable for the night in some meadow grass as 
 wet with dew as if there had been a thunderstorm, I saw a man I knew 
 in the Sixteenth, who had come back from the front on some errand. 
 
 " ' How's the Sixteenth ? ' I asked him. 
 
 "'Good, what's left of it,' he said; 'there's fifteen men left out of my 
 company fifteen out of a hundred.' 
 
 " We have fought a great battle, but we have not taken Santiago yet." 
 
 Indeed, without the guaranty of actual eyesight, the future student 
 of war might suppose in the plain tale of Santiago he was reading an 
 exaggeration of the memoirs of Napoleon's rough riders, Marbot or Nan- 
 souty. 
 
 " It was the day after the big fight, and the road was busy both ways. 
 From the front, the heavy, jolting, six-mule ammunition wagons were 
 returning empty after dropping their boxes of cartridges at the firing 
 line. 
 
 " But not quite empty, for as they came nearer you saw that awnings 
 of big palm leaves were lightly spread from side to side. And then, 
 when, with a ' Whee hooyah! ' and a crack of the long whip and a ' Git in 
 thar, dura yer,' from the Texan teamster, the mules swung round from 
 the road up the steep bank into the hospital field, you saw as the wagon 
 tilted that under the palm leaves pale, bandaged men were lying. They 
 groaned in agony as the heavy springless wagons rorked and jolted. 
 
 "'For God's sake kill me out of this,' screamed a man as he clutched 
 in agony at the palm leaves between him and the sun. It seemed awful 
 that wounded men should be carried back in such fashion, but then, as 
 some one explained, ' Guess there's a considerable shortage of ambulance
 
 
 THB FIKST FLAG OP TBDCK FROM SANTIAGO.
 
 HUMAN AMMUNITION. 347 
 
 traction.' And then there was a certain grim appropriateness to the 
 proceedings of yesterday. 
 
 "The men had boen fired as ammunition against intrenchments and 
 positions that should have been taken by artillery. It was quite in keep- 
 ing that the porr, battered, spent bullets should be carted back in the 
 ammunition wagons. But besides the wagons there came along from the 
 front, men borne on hand litters, some lying face downward, writhing at 
 intervals in a'^ful convulsions, others lying motionless on the flat of their 
 backs with their hats placed over their faces for shade. And there also 
 came men, dozens of them afoot, painfully limping with one arm thrown 
 over the rhoulder of a comrade and the other arm helplessly dangling. 
 
 "'How much further to the hospital?' they would despairingly ask. 
 
 " ' Only a quarter of a mile or so,' I would answer, and, with a smile of 
 hope ftt the thought that after all they would be able to achieve the jour- 
 ney, *hey would hobble along. 
 
 " But the ammunition wagons and the few ambulance wagons did not 
 carry them all. For hobbling down the steep bank from the hospital, 
 cf--me bandaged men on foot. They sat down for awhile on the bank as 
 far as they could from the jumble of mules and wagons in the lane, and then 
 setting their faces toward Siboney they commenced to walk it. They 
 were the men whose injuries were too slight for wagon room to be given 
 them. There was not enough wagon accommodation for the men whose 
 wounds rendered them helplessly prostrate. So let the men who had 
 mere arm and shoulder wounds, simple flesh wounds, or only one injured 
 leg or foot, walk it. Siboney was only eight miles away. 
 
 " True, it was a fearfully bad road, but then the plain fact was that 
 there was not enough wagons for all, and it was better for these men to be 
 at the base hospital, and better that they should make room at the 
 division hospital, even if they had to make the journey on foot. There 
 was one man on the road whose left foot was heavily bandaged and 
 drawn up from the ground. He had provided himself with a sort of 
 rough crutch made of the forked limb of a tree, which he had padded 
 with a bundle of clothes. With the assistance of this and a short stick 
 he was padding briskly along when I overtook him. 
 
 " ' Where did they get you ? ' I asked him. 
 
 "'Oh, durn their skins,' he said in the cheerfulest way, turning to me 
 with a smile, ' they got me twice a splinter of a shell in the foot, and a 
 bullet through the calf of the same leg, when I was being carried back 
 from the firing line.' 
 
 144 A sharpshooter?*
 
 348 HEROISM OF THE WOUNDED. 
 
 " ' The fellow was up in a tree.' 
 
 " * And you're walking back to Siboney. Wasn't there room for you 
 to ride?' I expected an angry outburst of indignation in reply to this 
 question. But I was mistaken. In a plain, matter-of-fact way he said : 
 
 " * Guess not. They wanted all the riding room for worse cases 'n 
 mine. Thank God, my two wounds are both in the same leg, so I can 
 walk quite good and spry. They told me I'd be better off down at the 
 landing yonder, so I got these crutches and made a break.' 
 
 " ' And how are you getting along ? ' I asked. 
 
 " ' Good and well,' he said as cheerfully as might be, 'just good and easy.' 
 And with his one sound leg and his two sticks he went cheerfully pad- 
 ding along. 
 
 " It was just the same with other walking, wounded men. They were 
 all beautifully cheerful. And not merely cheerful. They were all abso- 
 lutely unconscious that they were undergoing any unnecessary hardships 
 or sufferings. They knew now that war was no picnic, and they were not 
 complaining at the absence of picnic fare. Some of them had lain out all 
 the night, with the dew falling on them where the bullets had dropped 
 them, before their turn came with the overworked field surgeons. 
 
 "'There was only sixty doctors with the outfit,' they explained, 'and, 
 naturally, they couldn't tend everybody at once.' 
 
 " That seemed to them a quite sufficient explanation. It did not occur 
 to them that there ought to have been more doctors, more ambulances. 
 Some of them seemed to have a faint glimmering of a notion that there 
 might perhaps have been fewer wounded ; but then that was so obvious 
 to everybody. The conditions subsequent to the battle they accepted as 
 the conditions proper and natural to the circumstances. The cheerful fel- 
 low with the improvised crutches was so filled with thankfulness at the 
 possession of his tree-branch that it never occurred to him that he had 
 reason to complain of the absence of proper crutches. I happened by 
 chance to know that packed away in the hold of one of the transports 
 lying out in Siboney Bay there were cases full of crutches, and I was on 
 the point of blurting out an indignant statement of the fact when I re- 
 membered that the knowledge would not make his walk easier. So I said 
 nothing about it. 
 
 " I had to make the journey to Siboney myself. There was nothing 
 more than a desultory firing going on at the front, and I had telegrams to 
 try and get away. So I passed a good many of the walking wounded, 
 and heard a good many groans from palm awninged wagons. The men 
 were, all the same, bravely and uncomplainingly plodding along through
 
 THE PRESIDENT'S ANXIETY. 349 
 
 the mud. As they themselves put it, they were ' up against it,' and that 
 was all about it. 
 
 "And down at Siboney? Well, thank God, the hospital tents had 
 been unloaded. They were short of cots, short of blankets, short of 
 surgeons, short of supplies, short of nurses, short of everything. But, 
 thank goodness, by squeezing and crowding and economizing space there 
 was shelter for the men as they came in. And thank goodness, too, for 
 the Red Cross Society." 
 
 During the Civil War, when battle was raging along the long front of 
 thousands of miles, President Lincoln haunted the homely quarters where 
 the Secretary of War was housed in those days, like an uneasy spectre. 
 Any hour of the day or night when it was known that the armies were 
 engaged, the President could be seen in pathetic expectancy, waiting the 
 word from the battling hosts. Many a soldier who had borne unshaken 
 the deadliest charges, where carnage had claimed its thousands, was 
 moved to tears by the sight of the awful solicitude of the chief magistrate 
 in the crises of the campaign. President McKinley knew from personal 
 experience what Abraham Lincoln underwent during those memorable 
 days. McKinley passed some hours of the same sort during the heat and 
 fury of the Santiago campaign. Meagre reports of the varying phases of 
 the combats at El Caney, San Juan and Aguadores reached the White 
 House during the trying hours of July 3d and 4th. But there were more 
 elaborate preparations and appliances for keeping instantaneously au 
 courant with the developments of the battlefield in Washington during 
 this war, than there were during the troubled incumbency of Lincoln. 
 The " war room " of the executive mansion served as an assembly for all 
 the counsellors of the executive. The walls were lined with charts and 
 the insignia of the game of war. Maps,revealing down to the minutest 
 detail the points of attack and strategic positions were spread out to en- 
 able the civic Commander-in-Chief to comprehend the marches and move- 
 ments of the armies and fleets. From hour to hour the vague echoes of 
 what was going on along the lines at Santiago came with exasperating 
 incoherence. 
 
 The President grew grave and graver as the tale went oh. For with 
 the unparalleled records of valor, at the crucial points of the battle line 
 came straggling accounts of the cost of the glory won on the Santiago 
 hills. Before anything definite as to the result achieved had come to 
 hand, it was known that more than a thousand lives had been lost. It 
 was not known that these had been the price of El Caney, San Juan, all 
 the most serious outworks of the Spanish defence. The worn look on Me-
 
 350 THE TERRIBLE HEAT. 
 
 Kinley's face grew deeper and deeper. If it had cost so much to merely 
 storm the advance works, what would be the penalty of the main line of 
 battlements? If there were 10,000 men in line and 1,000 had been 
 wounded or killed, how could Shafter be expected to continue ? The 
 very fear that began to haunt the mind of the President soon flashed 
 across the wires like an ill-boding echo. Shafter in the despondency of 
 his losses, confronted by an aggravation of the difficulties of transporta- 
 tion, broke down. He saw nothing but retreat before him. His utmost 
 effort had been put forth and the enemy gave no sign of yielding. He 
 had no reserves within reach, indeed, it would have done little good if lie 
 had, as the roads encumbered with the long train of wounded would have 
 been impracticable for an advance. The flowers of the army had been 
 withered in the hot fire of the two days' combat. The glorious Regulars 
 who knew how to die were no longer in force to teach the volunteers the 
 conduct of the soldier. He didn't exactly know the forces of the Span- 
 iards but he was certain that now he was besieging an army equal at least 
 in numbers to his own. It was an hour of such bitterness to the Presi- 
 dent and his dumbfounded strategists, as the despatches from Manila 
 must have caused in the cabinet of the Spanish Queen Regent. The Presi- 
 dent realized in an instant the fierce cry of wrath and scorn that would 
 salute the event, if things were going to turn out as Shafter, in his dis- 
 couragement, hinted. He would be held responsible to the world for the 
 hurrying forward of incompetent forces ; for the crass ignorance of a 
 movement that showed imprevoyance in every detail. Neither Bull Run 
 nor Fredericksburg wrought more misery on Lincoln, than the few hours 
 of doubt as to the outcome of Santiago revealed in the worn face of Mc- 
 Kinley. 
 
 The first days of July had been intolerably hot in Washington, the 
 thermometer had gone as high as 106 in the shade. What then must the 
 normal temperature have been on the sunburned hills of Santiago, in the 
 stifling fumes of battle smoke, in the rush and hurry of charge and 
 action? No wonder Shafter's heart fainted when he saw the sanguinary 
 lines of wounded dragging themselves past his quarters. It looked as if 
 the entire force were victims of the Mauser. But even more cruel than 
 the wan cavalcade cf mangled, the hecatombs that covered the sun-blis- 
 tered hillsides made it seem that the whole army was disabled. No won- 
 der that Shafter, himself ailing, despaired of pushing forward, where to 
 merely breathe seemed a hardship. For the 1,000 killed and the 1,000 
 wounded were not the only visible results of the week's marches and com- 
 bats. Many were inanimate or seemed so, from heat, the water and the
 
 AN ARMISTICE* 351 
 
 food. Shafter knew that if he could summon 5,000 able-bodied men out 
 of the 16,000 thousand on the rolls he would be doing extremely well. 
 In the war room in Washington, as in Shafter's tent at Santiago, this was 
 all vividly realized so soon as the commander's hint of retreat came. The 
 councillors of the executive probably realized it even more poignantly, for 
 they had already heard something of the hideous lack of system and pre- 
 vision governing the administrative details of the campaign. Fear like a 
 robe of penitence fell upon every one in authority for there was a dim 
 introspective vision of the coming storm, when millions began to learn 
 the story. 
 
 But the hardest of the strain was the secret fear of all that Shafter had 
 not ventured to tell the worst ; that more agonizing was to follow ! It 
 was even whispered under the breath, that he was already flying in dis- 
 order along the choked roads, stripped of every semblance of an organized 
 force. To lend to the worst apprehensions, there were inexplicable 
 breaks in the despatches; intervals of what seemed unnecessary delay 
 when the President lost all hope. He was steeling himself for the 
 catyclasm, when an almost grotesque word trickled over the wire. The 
 armies had agreed on an armistice ! That meant time for reinforcements ; 
 it meant that the wretched Spaniard had already half surrendered, for a 
 man in his place would never consent to stop fighting an instant with 
 such conditions confronting him, unless he was making ready to give up. 
 This too the merest amateur in the besieging ranks realized, and from the 
 moment the white flag fluttered out over the bloody spaces, the armies 
 knew that whatever further fighting went on, would be perfunctory. The 
 truce was all in favor of the invader and in no wise in favor of the be- 
 sieged. But as the wretched Spaniard was compelled to take counsel 
 with Madrid, and as the Sagasta cabinet had been warned that the forces 
 could not resist a siege, the truce was meant from the first as a pre- 
 liminary to the end. This, however, General Shafter didn't know. He 
 was now to some extent relieved of the burden by the arrival of the Gen- 
 eral-in-Chief, Miles, who set to work to push reinforcements to the sorely 
 worn ranks. The pourparlers went on from the temporary truce until 
 the 15th. General Toral the Spanish commander who had succeeded 
 General Linares, was in feverish correspondence with the authorities in 
 Madrid, who for some reason not explained, delayed a definitive answer 
 to the soldiers' prayer to be permitted to give up the useless contest. Even 
 when General Shafter felt himself strong enough to take the city by a 
 coup de main, the wiser method of persuasion went on. 
 
 It is worth setting down that the irrepressible soldiery, so far as their
 
 352 THE HOUR OF TRIUMPH. 
 
 wishes were expressed, desired carnage. They wanted to go into the 
 city in the tumult of battle. These too were the men who had gone 
 through the Walpurgis torments of those early July days, when the air 
 burned the lungs that inhaled it. But at noon on the 15th of July the 
 tedious preliminaries were brought to an end. The chiefs of the Federal 
 army, in the presence of the two lines, Spanish and Yankee,met a short 
 distance from the intrenchments, and the last solemnity was observed. 
 Followed by a regiment of the Regulars, Shafter and his staff were con- 
 ducted to the civic palace where the flag of the United States replaced the 
 banner of Spain. There was little attempt at the spectacular, but the 
 masses who witnessed the scene were impressed with the indifference of 
 the Spaniards. For both the citizens and soldiers seemed relieved. The 
 capitulation revealed to General Shafter the amazing luck that had at- 
 tended our whole campaign, for the forces surrendered were almost 
 double the number brought to the island from Tampa. Those who had 
 wrought incessantly for weeks were rewarded with a spectacle such as we 
 had not seen since the armies of Washington and Ilochambeau were 
 drawn up at Yorktown the filing past of an army corps, under the laws 
 of war. Our soldiery, in this intoxicating hour of triumph, confirmed all 
 the traditions of chivalry we have been accustomed to associate with them ; 
 they gave the Spaniards no cause to regret the giving up. Shafter him- 
 self like the stout soldier he had proven himself, refused to take the 
 sword of the Spanish commander. In an hour after the flag of the re- 
 public swung out over the turrets of the municipal palace the troops of 
 the two armies were mobilized in the kindliest confraternity. The good 
 augury was still later fulfilled by a document which forms a point of de- 
 parture in warfare. On leaving the country for Spain,the armies captured 
 at Santiago issued this remarkable testimony to the cordiality of the re- 
 lations established in the stress of war. 
 
 "To Major-General Shafter, Commanding the American Army in 
 Cuba: 
 
 "Sir: The Spanish soldiers who capitulated in this place on the 16th 
 of July last, recognizing your high and just position, pray that through 
 you all the courageous and noble soldiers under your command may 
 receive our good wishes and farewell, which we send them an embarking 
 for our beloved Spain. For this favor, which we have no doubt you will 
 grant, you will gain the everlasting gratitude and consideration of 11,000 
 Spanish soldiers, who are your most humble servants. 
 
 "PEDRO LOPEZ DE CASTILLO, 
 
 " Private of Infantry."
 
 354 ALL HAPPINESS AND HEALTH. 
 
 " Also the following letter, addressed to the soldiers of the American 
 Army : 
 
 " Soldiers of the American Army : We would not be fulfilling our duty 
 as well-born men, in whose breasts there live gratitude and courtesy, 
 should we embark for our beloved Spain without sending to you our most 
 cordial and sincere good wishes and farewell. We fought you with ardor, 
 with all our strength, endeavoring to gain the victory, but without the 
 slightest rancor or hate toward the American nation. We have been 
 vanquished by you (so our Generals- and chiefs judged in signing the 
 capitulation), but our surrender and the bloody battles preceding it have 
 left in our souls no place for resentment against the men who fought us 
 nobly and valiantly. You fought and acted in compliance with the same 
 call of duty as we, for we all but represent the power of our respective states. 
 
 " You fought us as men, face to face, with great courage, as before 
 stated, a quality which we had not met with during the three years we 
 have carried on this war against a people without religion, without morals, 
 without conscience, and of doubtful origin, who could not confront the 
 enemy, but, hidden, shot their noble victims from ambush and then im- 
 mediately fled. This was the kind of warfare we had to sustain in this 
 unfortunate land. You have complied exactly with all the laws and 
 usages of war, as recognized by the armies of the most civilized nations of 
 the world ; have given honorable burial to the dead of the vanquished ; 
 have cured their wounded with great humanity ; have respected and cared 
 for your prisoners and their comfort, and lastly, to us, whose condition 
 was terrible, you have given freely of food, of your stock of medicines, 
 and you have honored us with distinction and courtesy, for after the 
 fighting the two armies mingled with the utmost harmony. 
 
 " With this high sentiment of appreciation from us all, there remains 
 but to express our farewell, and with the greatest sincerity we wish you 
 all happiness and health in this land, which will no longer belong to our 
 dear Spain, but will be yours who have conquered it by force and watered 
 it with your blood, as your conscience called for, under the demand of 
 civilization and humanity, but the descendants of the Congo and of 
 Guinea, mingled with the blood of unscrupulous Spaniards and of traitors 
 and adventurers these people are not able so exercise or enjoy their 
 liberty, for they will find it a burden to comply with the laws which 
 govern civilized communities. From 11,000 Spanish soldiers. 
 
 "PEDRO LOPEZ DE CASTILLO, 
 
 "Soldier of Infantry." 
 
 "Santiago de Cuba 21st of August, 1898. 
 " SHAFTER, Major-General."
 
 THE ROMANCE OF SANTIAGO. 355 
 
 It was Cervera's fleet not Santiago that decided the siege of that city. 
 With the ungovernable curiosity of our compatriots for information, all 
 the accessible data bearing on this most ancient and picturesque of Cuban 
 capitals was brought into requisition. History, however, has curiously 
 neglected to set forth the innumerable layers of romance that bury San- 
 tiago in a vaguely unreal oblivion. Alternately the city of Spanish 
 power, the headquarters of its viceroys and the seat of rebellion, Santiago 
 has for a new world city as much interest to the archeaologist as Cadiz or 
 Seville. All the conquistadores from Columbus to Hernando de Soto 
 paused in their conquering flight in this sacred city named after the 
 patron saint of Spain, Saint lago. Here Ponce de Leon loitered, dreaming 
 his dreams of that mysterious spring that, once tasted, was to restore 
 youth to the jaded and beauty to the outworn. The city itself is an 
 irregular square rising steeply from the edge of the pellucid water of one 
 of the most enchanting bays of the world, and sprawling distractedly 
 upward to those heights which will for many a day be memorable in the 
 annals of this republic. 
 
 To the traveler who has seen Spain, the city is a fair reproduction of 
 any separate segment of Toledo. The houses like all tropic edifices, are 
 built for the double purpose of shading the streets and lessening the 
 danger in the event of earthquakes. The walls of the ancient edifices are 
 fortress-like in strength and not without the picturesque suggestion that 
 still makes a Spanish city an object of interest, even delight to eyes that 
 have grown weary of our monotonous brown stone grandeurs, or the de- 
 pressing " flat " structures that have come to make our cities models of 
 hideousness. It is not, however, so much the city as the people which 
 makes Santiago a study to neighbors even so near as ourselves. For, 
 though within a few hours' sail of the most capacious ports of the United 
 States, Santiago is far less known than Bordeaux or Hamburg. The San- 
 tiiigoans live very much as their forefathers three hundred years ago must 
 have lived, under the hard mediaeval conditions, when the populace had 
 little voice, few representatives and no consideration. The monteros for 
 example, working people, are housed in huts that would incite a riot 
 among the most downtrodden of the Africans of the South* The floors 
 are without plank and the walls rough finished mortar just as it is laid 
 on. The roof is generally broad palmetto leaves and sloped down to 
 within a foot or two of the ground. In this scanty " castle " huddles 
 usually a very large family, for the Cubano is a prolific begetter. Cloth- 
 ing is hardly an expense in the calculation of these monteros families, for 
 the children run about quite as they were born naked. In the upper
 
 356 INDOLENCE AND IGNORANCE, 
 
 strata of this civic system, while dwellings are marked by taste and even 
 elegance of refinement, the male Cuban has of late years at least, fallen 
 into the British habit of club life. The Don Carlos club of Santiago is 
 the rendezvous of all who are admitted to any degree of social distinction 
 in the city. The single thing to note in this aristocratic cenacle, is the 
 utter absence of any literature of any kind in the clubrooms. But it has 
 long been a singular distinction of the Cubans that they are the most 
 illiterate of any well-to-do race in Christendom. For, like the ancient 
 aristocrats of the feudal days, education still bears the stamp of low birth 
 or equivocal status. Ignorance, however, is rather the result of indolence 
 than a pronounced prejudice against learning. And in a system in which 
 personal initiative found little encouragement, no attempts have ever 
 been made in any of the Cuban cities to put schools to the front as even 
 the most obstinate absolutisms in Europe have found it necessary to do. 
 The chief distinction of the city of Santiago is, that the seat of the Catho- 
 lic Church is situated there. The archbishop's palace rivals the splendor 
 of the ancient castle of the viceroys. The union of church and state in 
 in its militant form, is significantly illustrated in the great cathedral, where 
 an armed warrior stands in effigy beside the high altar, accoutred as 
 though on the field of battle, a memorial of the warlike San lago. In 
 everything that pertains to life as our busy people understand it, Santiago 
 carries us back three hundred years, and we see the people as the eyes of 
 Cortez or Columbus must have seen them, when they quit the banks of 
 the Guadalquiver to gather the argosies which were to bring Spain the 
 treasure, that were to ultimately work her ruin. 
 
 Santiago did not have the good fortune to be burned down under a 
 vigorous administrator like Tacon, who rebuilt Havana. Hence its nar- 
 row, filthy streets, its ancient but not venerable walls, suggest the senti- 
 ment of Watts reversed in its aspect : where nothing pleases and man is 
 vile. For certainly it seems impossible for anything with refinement, or 
 our idea of order, to subsist in streets that are merely sewers, perpetually 
 confronted by sights repellent and disgusting. And yet, accustomed to 
 the place, every one who has resided in its filthy shambles, confesses to a 
 certain fascination. For, with all their alleged cruelty there is a certain 
 childlike and confiding side to the Spanish Cuban, almost irresistible to 
 our cold-blooded and rather calculating race. Possibly the lavish splen- 
 dor of the foliage of the palms, whose leaves are large as umbrellas, and 
 the indescribable blossoms that break out in the interstices of old walls, 
 wherever a particle of soil may have lodged, serve to hide the ugliness of 
 outline and even to cover the decay which resembles filth. Under the
 
 THE SANTIAGOANS. 
 
 357 
 
 benignant moonlight the life of the town has all the fascination of Seville 
 or Cadiz. The streets are animated with languorous cavaliers and seno- 
 ritas, just as we have seen them in pictures and heard them sung since 
 Don Quixote jibed chivalry away. There is but one public square and 
 this is the centre of the pleasure system, for here all ranks and conditions 
 of the Santiagoans meet of an evening, as do the Venetians in the Piazza St. 
 Marco. Fronting this plaza, rises the ungainly fagade of the cathedral, a 
 mingling of Moorish and Gallo-Roman architecture, imposing only by its 
 dimensions. For its 38,000 people, Santiago has fifty churches and six 
 casinos. The latter are renowned for their elaborate fittings and for the 
 constant gaiety going on within their walls. 
 
 PALACE OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL, SANTIAGO.
 
 V. 
 
 IF this narrative proves anything, it places beyond dispute the valor of 
 our soldiery, by sea and land. The mere recital of the prodigies 
 wrought by navy and army attest the unexampled loftiness of soul, the 
 devouring ardor of rank and file to do all that falls to man to do in 
 danger. Barely however, had the truce sounded and peace begun, when 
 a dolorous transformation set a new scene. The death and maiming 
 which were spared us in battle set in with astounding swiftness, the 
 moment the deliberate operations of withdrawal began. An outbreak of 
 indignant protest soon filled the land, obscuring for the time the momen- 
 tous issues to be decided by the peace commissions ; letters from thousands 
 of soldiers in camp revealed a state of destitution, of neglect, so incredible 
 that it required verified testimony on the part of those believed most 
 trustworthy, to convince the country. Such examinations as followed, 
 revealed a repulsive reign of unfitness and incapacity not found at the 
 front alone, in the fever smitten chapparal camps of Cuba. The rendez- 
 vous from Chickamauga to Washington were found to be all that camps 
 should not be. It was found that our sons and brothers, our husbands and 
 fathers, eager, high-minded, noble, were made the spoil of low-minded in- 
 triguers, coralled like cattle under untrained chiefs, shipped to the scene 
 of action by dunces and adventurers, who knew no more of war than the 
 cowboy or the fillibuster. 
 
 From the moment war was proclaimed until the hour peace came, it 
 was the nefarious influence of the politician, the hateful greed of syndi- 
 cates, that seemed to rule the war office. The lust of gain, the privilege 
 of place, the odious mechanism of what is vulgarly known as the "pull " 
 of the accidental holders of place, ruled the precincts of valor, of author- 
 ity. Shylock expounded the law and demanded the flesh and blood of 
 our heroes, our defenders. The administrative agencies seem to have 
 been dominated by a hierarchy of pitiless speculators demanding, not the 
 pound of flesh the poet makes typical, but the lifeblood of the soldiery, 
 the savings of the millions. The signal was given by the unqualifiable Con- 
 gress that forced the war. That body passed a revenue law, which ex- 
 acted the last penny from toil, and left substantially untouched the 
 affluent and influential. From the household salt to the miner's kit, the 
 
 (358)
 
 THE WAR DEPARTMENT ARRAIGNED. 859 
 
 tax fell, heavily inescapable, while the lordly yachtsman, the baron of the 
 mines, or the bond manipulator escaped untouched. The small army 
 called for to fight the spectre of a power that never meant to resent our 
 conduct beyond the form of protest, was launched with a machinery, on 
 paper, as costly as the vast force that put down the rebellion. Every 
 time server who knew the methods of the departments, every knave who 
 knew the complaisance of Congressmen, every self-seeker who aspired to 
 sudden wealth, rallied at the war department, at the various executive 
 counters of commerce, and exacted tribute from the administrative 
 agents. From a shoe string to a cavalry bridle, from a can of beans to a 
 vial of quinine, the war department accepted bids, higher by wholesale 
 than any reputable merchant ever dreamed of asking at retail. The 
 peculation in the naval purchases were open to all eyes, the people were 
 made to pay for useless hulks, tenfold, a hundredfold the valuation 
 set by competent appraisers. 
 
 But miscreant as this assassin traffic was, it would have passed un- 
 heeded, had the soldiers been spared the dolorous consequences. When 
 the agonizing cries of the wounded, the maledictions of parents and 
 friends uprose over the scoundrelly transports furnished, then the public, 
 always languid over abuses, indifferent over the criminal malfeasances of 
 legislators, broke into protest. The inhuman greed of the favored Shy- 
 locks cost the republic more lives than the Spanish fleets and bullets. 
 The scenes on the transports dispatched from Santiago eclipse in bar- 
 barous inhumanity the torments of the Turk in Armenia, the British 
 prisons of the revolution of 1812. While we were pouring out treasure 
 with unstinted measure, the sick, the wounded, the dying, were without 
 the essentials to existence. At this moment when the horrors of war, 
 through science, were reduced to the lowest terms, we, in a " War for hu- 
 manity " murdered our wounded, starved our convalescents, and conveyed 
 the heroes of glorious fields in ships that a humane cattle herder would 
 refuse to embark his herds on. We have seen the criminal neglect of the 
 commissary the medical department, all the secondary forces of cam- 
 paigning, during the awful advance and siege of Santiago : we have seen 
 an army pushed against scientifically prepared bulwarks, unprovided with 
 a single requisite for the campaign involved. We have seen a handful of 
 surgeons, fainting in the attempt to do the work apportioned for hun- 
 dreds ; we have seen men fighting three days without cover, without 
 food, without intelligible control. All this, however, may be explicable 
 through causes involving no criminality. But the lack of medical aid, 
 the utter absence of the hospital resources, paid for, and well paid for,
 
 360 THE MEN WITH A "PULL." 
 
 by the people, mean that knavery, rather than imbecility was the cause. 
 Whether rightly or wrongly, the head of the war department was uni. 
 versally held responsible for the misconduct of the entire administrative 
 forces. Put in place, by repulsive and abhorrent forces, Alger was 
 looked upon by many as the last expression of the type of official, the 
 weak, the wicked, the hatefully incompetent faction of party foisted upon 
 the tax payers. He had been for years an absurdly pushing candidate 
 for the presidency. 
 
 For the supply of the soldiers, the chartering of trains, the use of rail- 
 ways, the thousand and one contracts, depending on, if not originated by 
 the head of the war department, were from common report what the 
 plain people call theft. That is to say a sagacious executive, an educated 
 administrator would have made it a matter of personal pride, to say 
 nothing of patriotism, to secure to the people the lowest rates and the 
 most efficient services. There was not a regiment moved from any point 
 to any other point in the country, that an outcry of indignant contempt 
 was not heard. Even Theodore Roosevelt, bound by official amenities, to 
 speak moderately, characterized the transportation of his Rough Riders, 
 as a libel on civilized mobilization. Nor is it possible without some expe- 
 rience in the actual business of war, to wholly comprehend the nefarious, 
 inhuman treatment of the men entrusted to the despicable agencies signal- 
 ized in Cuba. To enrich contractors, they were improperly clad ; to en- 
 rich contractors, they were improperly fed, or as at Santiago, not fed at all. 
 At every rendezvous, the tale was told of inferior food, flimsy and half 
 made garments, winter coats under a torrid sun in fact plundering of 
 the treasury without restraint. The sons of senators, the progeny of the 
 group that command a " pull," were assigned to the scientific functions 
 that require education, training, experience. Their names were flaunted 
 daily in the press despatches, where glory was to be gained. 
 
 But the schooled legions that had been graduated from West Point, 
 during the last thirty-five years, eager, able, competent, were passed by 
 unnoticed. A thousand Cromwells were overlooked to gratify the sena- 
 torial demands. A corps that would have given Napoleon an army of 
 marshals, was ignored to conciliate the selfish greed of the politicians. A 
 thousand Neys were repelled by the war department, to make way for 
 the scions of the millionaire, the kinsmen of the secretary or his collabo- 
 rators. Not one in a thousand of the accomplished soldiers, graduated 
 from our great military school, found an opportunity to make use of his 
 attainments, to exhibit his gratitude to the patrie. Never in the most 
 absolutist heydey of the monarchies of the old world was such open nepo-
 
 THE SANITARY COMMISSION. 361 
 
 tism, such subservience to class and rank indulged. Politics, not war, 
 was the animating sentiment that ruled the formation of the army. This 
 we saw in its most hateful form in 1861 and onward, but it was to a cer 
 tain extent forced upon the inexperienced chief magistrate, who faced 
 the rebellion. It took four years of pillage and slaughter to stiffen Lin 
 coin against the perfidy of the contractor, the Shylock and the privileged ; 
 it was supposed that the lesson had been taught for all time. But the 
 first month of the war revealed that it was not. The contractor, callous, 
 grasping, insatiate, was given carte blanche in the war department, and 
 knavery held the army by the throat from the moment it reached the 
 rendezvous, until the moment the discharge papers were signed. Where 
 the private buyer would have been asked to pay a dollar, the government 
 was forced to pay from ten to one hundred, and then did not get what 
 the specifications called for. 
 
 During the Civil War, vast as were the preparations made by the au- 
 thorities, our battlefields would have proved Golgothas, had it not been 
 for an enlightened body of women and men, known as the Sanitary Com- 
 mission. This organization embraced the aid of the kindly disposed in 
 every community in the Union. During the five years of its operations 
 in the field, it received and expended twenty-five millions of dollars. It 
 saved 200,000 lives, that would have been otherwise sacrificed by lack of 
 prompt care and intelligent nursing. For no matter how perfectly organ- 
 ized a medical department may be, it is physically impossible to transport 
 and keep on the verge of the battlefield, surgeons and nurses in numbers 
 sufficient to attend the mangled. In one volley from musketry, a thou- 
 sand wounded may fall. How would it be possible to have a surgeon at 
 hand for each sufferer? The Sanitary Commission to a great extent 
 solved this dreadful problem by equipping its own ambulances, which 
 moved with and under protection of the armies. 
 
 When the war with Spain arose, the spirit of the founders of the Sani- 
 tary Commission came back, and the humane all over the land took in 
 hand the work of preparation. Money was contributed in sums lavish 
 enough to conduct a campaign. An army of nurses, large as the con- 
 tingent of soldiery summoned by the President, came eagerly-forward to 
 enlist in hospital work. With enlightened patriotism, all local societies 
 and Samaritans put themselves in unison, or merged their efforts in the 
 Red Cross. This splendid society needs a \\ord of retrospect to make its 
 magnificent utilities comprehensible. As the battle is not always to the 
 strong, nor the race to the swift, all the heroism of the brief campaign in 
 Cuba was not illustrated by the panoplied warrior. No history that fails
 
 362 THE RED CROSS. 
 
 to take into account the enduring effects, the consummate faculty dis- 
 played by the Red Cross legion, would be in any sense a comprehensive 
 picture of a momentous epoch. Side by side with the marches, battles, ^ 
 sieges, surprises all the vicissitudes, indeed that the armies and navies 
 met and vanquished, stands the noble ministry of the Red Cross. Indeed 
 the name of Dewey, himself, was hardly better known than that of Clara 
 Barton, the sagacious Captain-General in the Samaritan campaign. 
 
 Wherever the weak, the wounded, the ailing, the neglected the in- 
 numerable host, that in the best managed wars, must suffer some depriva- 
 tion and need succor, were, the assiduous, patient, benignant ministers of 
 this new adjunct to war, were seen and felt. There was not a home or 
 hamlet in the land, with a son or a citizen under fire, who had not cause 
 to know the efficiency of Miss Barton's modest ministers. The Red Cross 
 indeed, is one of the evidences that civilization has diminished some of 
 the calamities men and peoples bring upon themselves, when they give 
 way to the hereditary instinct and invoke war where peaceful means are 
 looked upon as too slow. 
 
 Forty years ago, a kindly Swiss, Henri Dunant was caught upon the 
 scene of carnage, the battlefield of Solferino presented after the French 
 and Austrians had fought all day. The wounded were lying in ghastly 
 heaps, deserted. The medical train was unequal to attending a thou- 
 sandth part of the victims. Dunant, reflecting on the hideous spectacle, 
 imagined a society, whose business it should be to accompany armies and 
 minister impartially to each victim on the field, irrespective of his nation- 
 ality. On his return to his Swiss home, he set his idea forth in an elo- 
 quent plea, suggesting the formation of a corps of Samaritans, devoted 
 exclusively to the wounded. The heart of the European world was 
 touched by the recital. A convention was called by the kindly, the phil- 
 anthropic. This remarkable assembly of the humane, met in Geneva in 
 the year 1864, at the very time our battlefields were covered almost con- 
 tinuously with hecatombs of the maimed. Representatives from every 
 people in Christendom attended the organization. A compact was signed 
 pledging the signatory nations to an inviolable neutrality toward the 
 members of the society during all succeeding wars while at work on the 
 field of battle and covered by the insignia, adopted in compliment to the 
 Swiss republic the flag of the confederation. The flag of Switzerland 
 is heraldically described as " on a field gules, a cross argent." This is the 
 flag of the society all over the world, the colors being reversed. The 
 insignia is jealously guarded, and the brassards and armlets, that are 
 sewed on the sleeves when issued in time of war, are marked with private
 
 I 
 
 
 Miss CLARA BARTON. 
 
 President American Red Cross Society.
 
 MISS CLARA BARTON. 365 
 
 devices, so that both armies may be protected from spies, and none but 
 those engaged in the work of helping the wounded shall be "immune." 
 
 Sixty-two nations are now members of the Red Cross. In 1882, Miss 
 Clara Barton was accredited to the Red Cross convention as the delegate 
 from this republic. Since then, her efforts have been incessant to bring 
 the organization up to the same efficiency that marks any department of 
 an army in campaign. Through Miss Barton's suggestions and active 
 advocacy, the scope of the society has been constantly enlarging. Some- 
 thing like training-schools for nurses, have been organized to aid the 
 afflicted, not only in war, but when calamities occur at any time. Though 
 comprehending but vaguely the vital succor this organization brings to 
 the battlefield, the war had no sooner begun than the society was borne 
 down with proffers of aid, both by volunteer nurses, medicines even 
 vessels, to carry the afflicted from port to port. Alongside the fleets in 
 Florida and side by side with the blockader in Cuban waters, the Red 
 Cross banner became as familiar as the flag of the republic. 
 
 In the awful days of deprivation that marked the advance to Santiago, 
 the Red Cross may be said to have been the only organized aid to the ail- 
 ing, the wounded, the helpless. These devoted companies hovered where 
 danger was deadliest ; they ministered to the wounded, under shot and 
 shell ; they braved the deadly fever of the plague smitten camps and to 
 their zeal and devotion, many a home owes the safe return of husband or 
 father, son or brother. No sooner were the ranks under fire than the Red 
 Cross was called. The stretchers were inadequate to carry out the 
 maimed, the nurses sought their charges, almost on the line of fire. In 
 the extraordinary march to Santiago, the army not only lacked proper 
 raiment and food, it lacked the presence of a medical corps. This the 
 Red Cross, to a surprising extent remedied. But everything was lacking, 
 it seems, from the testimony that even the cooperation of the constituted 
 medical hierarchy was refused, or if rendered was in a spirit so churlish that 
 disaster followed. There were no correspondents to proclaim the heroism 
 of this devoted band. But thousands of private letters, informed the 
 country of the work done, water borne from the very cannon's mouth to 
 the choking soldiers, tents improvised by a sheet thrown oVer the limb 
 of a tree, such dainties cooked in portable stoves, as a compact larder 
 afforded. Above all, the tender handiwork of women. 
 
 Incredible to say, the head of the medical department of the United 
 
 States army, opposed himself from the first, to the utilization of the Red 
 
 Cross agencies in succoring the wounded. He opposed and impeded the 
 
 going to Cuba of the women nurses, yet when the hour of need came, 
 
 20
 
 866 
 
 SUFFERING IN THE CAMPS. 
 
 the constituted instruments of his department were not on hand. The 
 food, medicine the paraphernalia of the most elementary hospital, was 
 nowhere near the fields where 1,700 dying men were in extremity. The 
 tale of the lamentable exhibition of mismanagement had begun to be 
 told, long before the soldiers left the various camps of concentration. 
 Acrimonious controversies filled the public press. In these it was shown 
 
 THE BED CROSS IN THE FIELD. 
 
 that by design or incapacity, thousands of men were hurried to isolated 
 spots, far from the aid of civilized communities and held in semi-impris- 
 onment, with none of the supplies at hand essential for health, let alone 
 comfort. The outcry from Tampa, Chickamauga and elsewhere, coming 
 in the stress and strain of preparation, did not attract general attention ; 
 but when the appalling pictures of an almost studious neglect of the 
 wounded, accompanied the thrilling portrayal of the battles fought, then 
 the public mind was deeply impressed. 
 
 It required, however, the exposure of the inhuman transport of the
 
 THE SENECA AND CONCHO. 367 
 
 convalescents on two steamers, the Seneca and Concho to arouse public 
 indignation to a white heat. The pictures of almost depraved inattention 
 embodied in the experience of the victims of these two ships, was an in- 
 dictment of the humanity as well as the capacity of all in any way re- 
 sponsible. The defects were indeed so harrowing that many journals 
 shrank from reproducing the ghastly pictures. A Brooklyn critic was 
 not thought to exceed the proper limits of reproval in asserting : " The 
 state of things on the Seneca, the other day, and on the Concho, this 
 week, was a disgrace to the United States. It made the army bureau of 
 medicine and surgery a worse enemy to the sick, wounded and suffering 
 by the war, than the Spanish Mausers, Cuban filth, yellow fever or trop- 
 ical typhoons combined. No culprits or imbeciles responsible for the 
 wrongs, must have to do with the investigation in any other role than 
 that of accused defendants. 
 
 44 And such of the incompetents as seek to put the blame on the Red 
 Cross, should be especially suspected. The Red Cross has stood out as 
 preeminently the far-sighted, deft-handed, alert, systematic, sane and sym- 
 pathetic force of amelioration in this war. Its women and men expected 
 bad results as possibilities and were prepared to meet them. Wherever 
 they have had way, and sway, things have gone right. Wherever red 
 tape and bureaucracy have stood in their way, Seneca facts and Concho 
 facts have indelibly disgraced our government and torn the hearts of our 
 people with agony and horror. 
 
 " The medical bureau has been even worse than that of the quarter- 
 master general's. More could hardly be said. Troops have been sent 
 where there was no food. Food has been sent, unfit to eat. Camps have 
 been located in pestiferous places. Men not even at the front have died 
 like sheep in American camps. And verified complaints, and unanswer- 
 able evidence have been met by a sturdy mendacity, an invincible igno- 
 rance or a fiendish indifference. And what is the transportation bureau 
 whatever be the official name of it doing? Is it smitten too with in- 
 competency? Why are not the regiments of immunes now at Santiago, 
 that the well of the fifth corps could be carried to the Cuban hills and the 
 ill brought to Montauk Point ? Were a thousand transports at anchor 
 at Santiago, they could not be loaded up without sufferers until the im- 
 munes were there for garrison duty. We dare not reproduce the details 
 of the sufferings. They are criminal, because largely preventable suffer 
 ings. We dare not lift the veil. The facts are awful. They ought to be 
 incredible, for they ought to be impossible. The war, fortunately is over. 
 But the accounting with the people of Spain should not prevent the ac
 
 368 SCATHING CRITICISM. 
 
 counting of the press, the people, and Congress, with those whose incom- 
 petency makes them worse than Spain. For Spain was licensed to hurt 
 our boys, and these imbeciles were licensed, paid, commissioned and 
 sworn to help them. And yet because of them, the mortality since the 
 enemy surrendered, far exceeds the mortality of battle. Shame on the 
 fact ! Justice in the form of punishment for those to blame for the fact ! " 
 
 Goaded by outcries from all sides in this tone, Secretary Alger wrote a 
 note of almost flippant lightness, dismissing the abuses as incident 
 to war ! 
 
 An ex-minister of the United States, Robert B. Roosevelt, voiced the 
 sentiment of the country in a swift response. In a letter to the press, he 
 wrote : " I have read with surprise and equal indignation the letter of 
 Secretary Alger to General Dodge. Its callous and heartless indifference 
 to the sufferings of our soldiers, is most unworthy of a patriotic public 
 officer, and almost incomprehensible in a father with a son at the front, 
 exposed to the unnecessary hardships the men have been forced to 
 endure. It even seems to me to furnish the ke}*note to the situation, for 
 if the head of the department is cynically indifferent and careless, the 
 underlings will be more so, and feel justified and sustained. When every 
 father and mother in this land who has a son in the war, is bitterly out- 
 raged at the want of proper precautions, or ordinary forethought, not to 
 say downright peculation for as yet, no one seems to know where the 
 blame should be placed the Secretary of War the man whose reputa- 
 tion is most involved, the man who has the greatest responsibility coolly 
 writes to General Dodge : * You and I know what this means. It has 
 always occurred and always will occur. That is war, and war would not 
 be war without it.' Is that anything but a carte blanche to any one in 
 any way connected with the war department to ill treat, under feed and 
 even rob the soldiers, as much as he pleases? 
 
 " I am not a military man, Secretary Alger, but I take issue with 
 every one of your brutal and self-sufficient assertions. It has not always 
 occurred, except when incompetent men were in places of responsibility. 
 It will not continue to occur, even if we have to get another Secretary of 
 War. It is not war. It exhibits on the other hand, utter incapacity for 
 the simplest duties of war. No war could be carried on successfully, if 
 such things were to be allowed to exist, as your letter would seem to 
 imply that you are perfectly willing they should. The country found 
 itself unexpectedly brought face to face with the dread realities of con- 
 flict. A call was made for volunteers and they poured out to the number 
 of nearly half a million, counting all who offered their services. They
 
 ALWAYS HUNGRY. 369 
 
 knew they had to brave the bullets of the enemy, the fever and the pesti- 
 lence and the loss of comforts and often employment, but they did not 
 think that they were to be half starved, and then told that to complain 
 was unpatriotic ; that even to write home to their families was spreading 
 disaffection. 
 
 " I do not intend that this attempt to assist them shall be made per- 
 sonal. No one's name shall be brought in ; no one shall be accused of 
 grumbling as the Secretary endeavors to do. If the men who defend the 
 system desire to make it personal with me they can, but they shall not 
 cast imputation on those, who having given up everything for their 
 country, taken their lives in their hands and left home and family, are 
 half starved even before they left our shores, are huddled in transports in 
 a way to renew the horrors of old time slave trade, and are sent home 
 when sick and wounded, crowded to excess, uncared for, without water 
 or suitable nourishment, and with surgeons unsupplied with instruments. 
 If Secretary Alger had the heart of a man, he would, instead of indulging 
 in ill-timed sarcasms, have been the first and most persistent in finding out 
 where lay the blame for all this wrong and suffering, and, instead oi 
 announcing that they were to continue, would have been the most urgent 
 in bringing them to a sudden and decided termination, instead of at< 
 tempting to silence complaints by insinuations against the patriotism of 
 those who would remove the cause from them. 
 
 " I do not know who is Commissary-General and have had no personal 
 quarrel with him or anybody else, but I do know that the army ration is 
 abundant and far better for the men than the ' stuff,' as one of them 
 called it, we are trying to get to them often vainly I fear, in place of the 
 good and appropriate food which the government ought to supply to 
 them. But when one of them writes 'mother I am always hungry,' is it 
 surprising that that mother endeavors to get to him the best she can and 
 whatever she can ? Think of it Mr. Alger and see if it does not awaken 
 something better than sarcasm in your mind. The boy, always hungry, 
 always wet, always facing the Mauser rifles of the Spaniards, in the 
 trenches day and night, ready at any moment to charge into ' the valley 
 of death ' as they did up the heights at Santiago, and yet through the 
 fault of some one, contractor, official or whoever it may be forced to go 
 4 always hungry.' Would it not be more worthy, more patriotic, more 
 politic even, especially in the head of the department which is responsible, 
 to endeavor to find out who is to blame and bring about a reform, in- 
 stead of saying contemptuously, 'Oh, such things always occur and will 
 continue ' ? If you don't think so, wait until you hear from the fathers
 
 370 ON THE "MASSACHUSETTS.*' 
 
 and mothers of the suffering and uselessly endangered heroes for whom 
 you seem to have so little sympathy." 
 
 Nearly every family that had a son or kinsman in the army received a 
 picture of the situation, couched in terms that left no doubt of the truth- 
 fulness of the extraordinary culpability revealed ; a soldier on board ship, 
 for illustration wrote : 
 
 " Figure to yourself a ship of not more than 3,500 tons, transporting 
 1,005 troops, exclusive of crew, and some 1,500 horses and mules. Such 
 is the state of affairs on board the Massachusetts, which is undoubtedly a 
 fair sample of the average transport. Two-thirds of the promenade deck, 
 which, is usually small, is allotted to officers ; one-half of the remainder is 
 improvised into a hospital, and the remaining half is all that the troops 
 are allowed to use. The main and lower decks are entirely filled by the 
 horses and mules. The troops are packed away in a quarter of the hold, 
 still lower. The space is entirely filled by hammocks, two deep, hung 
 lengthwise, and but eighteen inches apart, with an average of fifty to the 
 width of the vessel. There are five troops of cavalry on board, all of 
 whom were obliged to carry below to their sleeping (?) quarters all of 
 their saddles and other paraphernalia, weighing upward of eighty five 
 pounds, and leaving no space whatever to walk about in. Everything is 
 piled about the floor in extricable confusion. In fact, it is next to im- 
 possible for a man to claim his own. 
 
 " The filth and stench in the quarters are impossible to describe. For 
 more than a day no drinking water was provided for the men. The suffering 
 from thirst was intense. Everywhere could be seen men with their cups in 
 their hands simply begging for a drink of water. When water was at last 
 provided, it was the same that was fed to the mules, run into a large 
 basin and allowed to stand between the cattle and the water closets. The 
 water could not fail under these circumstances to become more or less 
 contaminated, and it will be an agreeable surprise to those on board if a 
 good many cases of typhoid do not break out soon after landing, as a 
 result. As to the lavatory accommodations, the English language fails to 
 provide words to describe such obnoxious and foul arrangements as were 
 improvised at the last moment, apparently by the ship's carpenter for our 
 use. 
 
 " Our meals, if one were fortunate (or unfortunate) enough to obtain 
 them, all consisted of hardtack and salted pork, varied occasionally by 
 canned corn beef and beans. I say if one were fortunate enough to ob- 
 tain them, for the culinary department bore more resemblance to a large 
 grab bag than anything else. If one's kit happened to have gone astray,
 
 PECULATIONS, LARGE AND SMALL. 871 
 
 rather the rule than the exception, one had to go a begging. Sleeping 
 on board is next to impossible. Below, the stench and suffocating atmos- 
 phere are intolerable. The only alternative is to lie down on the deck 
 Moor, if one is so fortunate as to find a place for himself. Every available 
 inch of space is taken up in this way, the men lying together like sardines 
 in a box, thankful at least for a breath of fresh air and relief from obnox- 
 ious odors of the quarters below in the hold of the vessel, now popularly 
 known as ' hell.' " 
 
 Peculation on a small and large scale was practiced in the furnishing 
 and supply departments. The fiduciary agents entrusted with buying 
 for the government, were often found in league with the contractor, 
 awarding bids through the influence of political agents, rather than fit- 
 ness to produce the article needed. From many posts of the country 
 horrified fathers and mothers read revelations like this, taken from one 
 of the most serious journals in the West : " Quartermaster-Sergeant 
 James Young, of a Kansas regiment, is under arrest charged with selling 
 supplies. His defence is that every other officer in similar position has 
 done the same. Sergeant Young seems to be a proper person for an ex- 
 ample. After he has been rigorously dealt with, the offenders should suf- 
 fer till the quartermaster's department is ruled by patriotism instead of 
 cupidity. Some men trade on noble sentiment, and find in war the 
 rascal's opportunity for gaining riches. It is as infamous as anything of 
 which we have accused the Spaniards. When splendid young men offer 
 themselves by thousands in the ranks, go cheerfully into danger, go pa- 
 tiently to hospital or serenely across the dark river, how hateful the con- 
 duct of pilferers." 
 
 A studious observer who had been for years among European armies 
 and knows something of the conditions of the Civil War, summed up the 
 situation at Tampa, just as the Shafter expedition was on the eve of de- 
 parture for Santiago : " The camp at Tampa is a disgraceful evidence 
 either of political jobbery or of equally gross incompetence. If this were 
 in Spain we would say that a Secretary of War, willing to accept the re- 
 sponsibility for locating troops at Tampa, must be either corrupt or other- 
 wise unfit for office. Mr. Alger accepts responsibility for Tampa. Can 
 .any one ask more evidence of political jobbery than that, with the whole 
 of Florida to choose from, our Secretary of War should have insisted on 
 locating our main army of invasion at a point where only one line of rail- 
 way owned a virtual monopoly of all transportation, and where the gov- 
 ernment pays two cents a gallon for water consumed? Close to Tiimpa 
 are camping grounds, where the men would have had abundant water
 
 372 
 
 THE CAMP AT TAMPA. 
 
 supply and where two competing roads would have greatly facilitated the 
 commissary question. Wh} r did not the War Department choose such a 
 place? Why did the Secretary of War treat as impertinence any ref- 
 erence to the state of things at Tampa ? Why are all Regular army offi- 
 cers outspoken on this subject, when they are talking to a friend, and 
 why are they afraid to be quoted? The reason is that they all feel that 
 some one at the head has a political or pecuniary interest in perpetuating 
 things as they are, and that officers are not thanked for telling the truth. 
 
 A CONVALESCENT CAMP,
 
 PART II. 
 
 WHILE the immense flotilla was waiting the signal to sail at Tampa, 
 the army on shore saw among the fleet an enormous steamer with 
 a flag whereon a Red Cross was a constant signal to the ill or ailing. On 
 the large smoke stacks the same sign invited, while from the broad sides 
 likewise gleamed this world known signal of humane dedication. This 
 vessel, The State of Texas, though officially ignored, was laden with the 
 most precious freight that sailed in the thirty ships of General Shafter's 
 armada. Aside from the Samaritan ranks that crowded the splendid 
 ship, the cargo represented the heart givings of the whole land twelve 
 hundred tons of needed comfort to the ailing. This mass of stores was 
 originally contributed for the Cuban reconcentrados, but the interven- 
 tion of another and worse foe than the lawlessness of the isle, made the 
 offering unavailable. None but Red Cross workers were on the ship. 
 There were men and women experienced in many scenes of war, disease, 
 disaster wherever in short, the human needs the help of the human. 
 All were veterans of varied experience where disaster made the work of 
 mercy no less terrible than the horrors of the battlefield. Ten of them 
 had worked among the reconcentrados. No phase of human suffering, 
 perhaps, could be more appalling, no condition of human wretchedness 
 more repulsive than they had faced in that ordeal of relief in Cuba. 
 
 As the admiral to the fleet, the general to his army, the managing 
 veteran at the head of the Red Cross, Clara Barton, is to this Samaritan 
 order. The seventy years of her life have neither impaired her faculties 
 nor diminished her emulous eagerness to do and dare. No soldier in the 
 barrack held himself so disciplinedly at the call of authority, as this ven- 
 erable incarnation of benignity holds herself at the beck of duty of 
 goodness. Her work in Cuba, before the brazen gates of war closed her 
 out, was equal to the hardest undergone by a commander of a corps at 
 Santiago. It is testimony of the universal recognition of this extraordi- 
 nary woman's genius in well-doing, that the blunt soldier, Blanco, saw 
 her quitting the Cuban capital with misgivings. " Your departure, Miss 
 Barton," he said, " means more to me than the departure of your Consul- 
 General. It means the possibility of war." 
 
 The sight of this great woman fairly awed the official hierarchy at 
 
 (3733
 
 374 MISS BARTON'S WORK. 
 
 Tampa, who thought themselves in slavish bondage, if they devoted six 
 hours a day to routine. The observer near Miss Barton saw her day be 
 gin with a mail that would dishearten a statesman aided by a corps t.i' 
 stenographers. No woman could arouse such sentiment as is felt in this 
 heroine's ordinary atmosphere, who is not possessed of the qualities that 
 make the exceptionally great. The character, conduct, distinction of 
 the mass who obey her behests, is at once a tribute to her genius and a 
 testimony to the results that genius achieves. Their inspiration is the 
 belief in her honesty and singleness of purpose. Understanding of the 
 work comes afterward, and later enthusiasm. It is this inspiration that 
 holds men and women in the service of the Red Cross without pay. 
 
 One of the assurances that reconciled the pacific millions to war, if 
 there could be such a state of mind as reconciliation to what all of gentle 
 mould abhor, was the circumstantial exposition, published in every jour- 
 nal of the day, that medical science had gone hand in hand with the 
 lethal weapons in betterment and invention : that to be wounded was no 
 longer certain death, hardly even a temporary pain. Medical amateurs 
 impregnated the ranks with such confidence in the manifold appliances 
 for mitigating bullet wounds, that thousands of the credulous, yearned 
 for this heroic distinction a scar in defence of the flag. Theoretically 
 our national medical service was perfection. If prescription and precept 
 could make it so, it certainly would be. But between the rubrics, as 
 set down, and the practice as witnessed, there was a most melancholy 
 gulf. For a body of men known as a division, which may comprise from 
 5,000 to 7,000 men, a hospital, tent, or building, if such be accessible, is 
 prescribed. Three per cent, of the enlisted men are assigned to aiding 
 the wounded to this haven in the time of battle. The able-bodied men 
 thus taken from the ranks are subjected to severe discipline. They are 
 thoroughly drilled and have absolute and entire charge of the wounded 
 from the moment they fall, until they pass into the hands of the surgeons 
 in the field hospital. These men are provided with stretchers and are 
 expected to keep close to the deadly line of the advancing soldiery to 
 pick up the wounded. Naturally, to avert calamity the hospital is be- 
 yond the range of fire that is the old range before the new gun came 
 into use. This necessitates carrying of wounded from one to three 
 miles. The surgeons are rigorously prohibited from performing any am- 
 putating function under fire. The fate of the wounded rests in the hands 
 of the one who applies the " first dressing." In other days amputation 
 was regarded as vital, the moment the wounded reached the doctor. 
 
 In the Civil War it was the practice to set up a kind of hospital, with-
 
 FIRST DRESSING. 375 
 
 out even a tent, in many cases, just out of range of the enemy's musketry 
 fire, where temporary dressings were hurriedly ajpplied, and amputations 
 performed, chiefly for the purpose of checking hemorrhage. The probe 
 was active, the removal of the foreign substance being regarded as a mat- 
 ter of moment. The "first dressings " would do, it was considered, until 
 the wounded could be carried to a more permanent hospital. All this is 
 changed. The first dressing calls for the utmost care and nothing short 
 of perfection is aimed at by the regulations. To any one who knows 
 the severe requirements of septic or antiseptic surger} T , it must be ob- 
 vious that the battlefield is no place for the first dressing. The medical 
 experts hold that it is far better that a wounded man should wait three or 
 four hours, if necessary, protected from the danger of hemorrhage by the 
 windlass or circular bandage, which every litter bearer carries, and knows 
 how to apply, than to risk his life in the first dressing, that leaves any- 
 thing to be desired. As a rule, the soldier who is not killed outright, 
 will save life and limbs, if the first dressing is perfect. It is another dis- 
 covery of the fraternity that except when it kills instantly, it is not the 
 bullet that kills. The thousands of men, an eminent surgeon declares, 
 who have died of their wounds in the past, really died of conditions that 
 were due to the wounds, but could have been prevented if the surgeons 
 had only known how. 
 
 A plodding French student, whose name is unknown out of his own 
 country, revolutionized the art of the surgeon, in the discovery of anti- 
 septic treatment. This was Guilbert Declat. He confided the result of 
 his labors to the French medical academy and Pasteur declared it the be- 
 ginning of a new scientific treatment. It was. A Scotch surgeon, Doc- 
 tor Lister, possessed himself of the preparation, pushed it on a little 
 farther and it is now known as the " Lister method." The discovery has 
 revolutionized medical treatment in a majority of cases long considered 
 difficult if not irremediable. Dr. Schwam found that the decay of meat 
 was always accompanied by the multiplication of microscopic creatures. 
 Then he examined the ordinary atmospheric air, and he found that it was 
 filled with microscopic life. He thought that if he could exclude the 
 air from meat it might not putrefy. And it did not. He thought gan- 
 grene might be regarded as a sort of putrefaction, due, like the decay of 
 meat, to microscopic creatures in the air. He covered wounds with some- 
 thing that could exclude these minute organisms or else destroy them, 
 and the result was no more gangrene and no more erysipelas. If these 
 creatures, these bacteria, caused putrefaction, might they not be the cause 
 of infection, also, since there seemed to be something common to putre-
 
 376 ANTISEPTIC SURGERY. 
 
 faction and the morbid processes, to diptheria, erysipelas, splenic fever, 
 septic poisoning and the like? To understand the part atmospheric 
 germs bring about in causing death, following wounds, is to enable the 
 practitioner to comprehend the importance of a perfect " first dressing." 
 The whole purpose is to exclude or destroy the germs that kill. Only 
 the experienced surgeon can appreciate the care this requires, and he 
 argues that it is impracticable on the field of battle. 
 
 It was chiefly because of the necessity of making the first aid to the 
 wounded, so complete as to elude the common causes of death, that " emer- 
 gency hospitals " were established in cities. The injured were liable to 
 fall into incompetent hands, which was not formerly looked upon as so 
 grave a matter. Now it is known, that the first surgeon to touch a case 
 must have all the appliances and conveniences, and all the knowledge and 
 skill, and also the sense of the importance of his art, to enable him to de 
 feat the minute enemies of life. It is known that any attempt to disin- 
 fect a wound thoroughly, in the street or at a corner store is practically 
 futile. For the same reasons it is held, it cannot be done on the battle- 
 field. Probing for bullets in the confusion and lack of paraphernalia is in- 
 terdicted. All the instruction given by authorities in military surgery, 
 direct that the arrest of hemorrhage, which is the single immediate dan- 
 ger, shall be effected by the use of elastic bandages. It is safe, it is held, 
 to trust to this entirely for four or five hours, but not longer. As it com- 
 pletely checks the flow of blood to the injured part, serious consequences, 
 including gangrene, might follow, if too long continued. 
 
 It is one of the many functions of modern surgery, to treat wounds of 
 the extremities as though saving them was a matter of course. Amputa- 
 tion is not attempted except in cases in which the soft parts, involving 
 also the vessels and nerves, are so lacerated as to make the nutrition of 
 the injured member impossible. In the Civil War, it was the exception 
 to spare an injured limb ; the first suggestion, save in the case of slight 
 flesh wounds, being amputation, because a stump was less dangerous than 
 a wound. Dr. Senn, the chief operating surgeon with Shafter's army, de- 
 clared that operative interference is indicated in all penetrating gun-shot 
 wounds of the skull, while gun-shot wounds of the chest are to be treated 
 by hermetically sealing the apertures under the strictest asceptic condi- 
 tions. Penetrating gun-shot wounds of the abdomen, which were for- 
 merly regarded as equivalent to death, can be subjected to operation with 
 many chances of success. If a patient is in a condition that he is likely 
 to survive the comparatively slight shock of the operation, laparotomy is 
 performed, if life is threatened by hemorrhage. It is possible to save the
 
 ADVANCE IN MEDICAL SCIENCE. 377 
 
 lives of persons whose intestines have been perforated many times by a 
 bullet. Such wounds were formerly inevitably mortal. A study of the 
 practice of modern military surgery shows that in a vast majority of 
 wounds, it is the dressing and not the operation that is chiefly depended 
 on. Chest wounds are the most dangerous, but frequently the hemor- 
 rhage, which is the only cause for fear when the possibility for poisoning 
 has been excluded, stops automatically. 
 
 All this knowledge which would have seemed profound scholarship to 
 the medical staff of Napoleon's armies, was, if not familiarly known, at all 
 events, laboriously inculcated in the staff quarters of the regiments. In- 
 deed, treatises embodying most of the foregoing were dealt out to the 
 private soldiers, who were expected to arm themselves with antiseptic 
 appliances, for self-aid in the emergencies of the battlefield. To the 
 ordinary pack the soldier earries, a compact little pharmacopceia was 
 added so that if deprived of a surgeon, he might himself stanch a bad 
 wound, and even make a maimed member serviceable for a time. But, 
 the road from Siboney to Santiago dealt disasterously with these sage 
 precautions. Everything portable oozed away, so to speak, in the swel- 
 tering heat, the tangled thickets, the path of pain, which made even 
 clothing an abrading torment. 
 
 It may be doubted whether the familiarizing of the soldier with the 
 occult part of surgery makes to his value as a fighting machine or his 
 constancy in the dismal purlieus of science, the hospital. It is no stimu- 
 lation to the spirit to know that the modern wound, occasioned with a 
 bullet that can be sped with certainty two miles and with some effect, 
 more than that, is less fatal to the tissues, because it cuts everything op- 
 posing it, like a blade ; that science to meet this has invented remedies 
 that stay poison, help nature and discard the need of cutting and slashing 
 which of old was the remedial panacea of surgery. The battlefield 
 ought, after sixty centuries of description, to be a well-known horror to the 
 most morbid but the hospital on the field evades the most intrepid un- 
 dertaker in embalming horror. For on the cot or on the pallet, lies the 
 relic of what an hour or two before, was the embodiment of that mysteri- 
 ous entity, the soldier ; the agent of a people's final mandate, the execu- 
 tioner of everything like civic, religious or even moral precept. He may 
 murder, he may burn, to a certain extent he may pillage ; he may, must 
 in short, put behind him every admonition taught at the fireside, the 
 school, the church, the social forum. A bit of lead has for the moment 
 made him as useless to himself 01 his country, as when he came naked 
 into the world.
 
 378 
 
 A VIVID CONTRAST. 
 
 This is the vivid contrast which makes the scene of the Red Cross 
 ministry, or the regimental, or division hospital, a spectacle as thrillingly 
 suggestive, as its forerunner, the battlefield. Painters of old the 
 greatest among the masters, essayed as a piece of realistic horror the 
 Dance of Death, but the most agonizing of these falls far short of the 
 spiritual atrocity the field hospital realizes, when death has set his signets 
 from cot to cot. The mind of the sufferer would be the most thrilling of 
 introspections as the consciousness shapes itself into the smitten body. 
 For one of the abiding phenomena is the uncertainty of the dim con- 
 ciousness, whether the body is awaking beyond the bourne, or that 
 reality is before the inert eyes. 
 
 ON A HOSPITAL SHIP,
 
 VI. 
 
 TO a people like ours who see a marsh on the prairies transformed into 
 a city ranking fourth or fifth in dimensions among the municipali- 
 ties of the world, it excites but languid interest to follow the vicissitudes 
 of a capital like Havana founded in 1508! Yet this enchanting entrepot 
 of one of the loveliest lands known to man, ought to typify the people for 
 whom the republic has sacrificed blood and treasure. Havana, though 
 the Cuban metropolis, never gave a scintilla of indication that any num- 
 ber of her citizens had the shibboleth of " Cuba Libre " at heart. In the 
 history of revolts it is usually the capital that speaks the decisive word ; 
 but from the first glimmerings of the restive incompatibility, which has 
 finally ended in the subtraction of Cuba from the dominion of Spain 
 Havana has been more royalist than royalty itself. Every great capital 
 in the world save possibly St. Petersburg, has either incited revolution 
 or by accepting it, made revolution triumphant. Yet of all cities Havana 
 would warrant prophecy in its insurgent instincts. Its population is of 
 the electric, mercurial congruity that revolution thrives on. For though 
 the seat of the Cubanos, Havana is peopled by races not even nominally 
 amalgamated. This, when we contrast the conditions of any large city 
 in the new world, may serve to explain how Spanish power, so uniformly 
 unwise in administration has, down to the unfurling of our flag, succeeded 
 in holding the disparate citizenship in a subserviency unmatched by the 
 sinister acquiescence of Warsaw or Dublin. One obvious reason for 
 Havana's steadfast loyalty arose in the sway of its aristocracy. The 
 Quixote tenaciousness of the Castilian in his rank and hereditaments, 
 never went farther in puerility than the pretensions of the race that made 
 the city the capital of Spain's most priceless conquest. Perhaps even 
 more interpenetrating than the occult influence, and immeasurably more 
 pervasive, was the long tenure of slavery. When that institution was 
 swept away, the slave holders had not been tried in the furnace of war, 
 as our aristocratic compatriots of the South were. When slavery ended in 
 the South, it left the body of the people as the devils exorcised of old: the 
 need of a new life came with the crash of those employed in the old : from 
 the pragmatic patriarchy of hereditary mastership of human chattels, the 
 Southerner confronted the instant need of bread-winning, and the new 
 man. was in the majority of cases fashioned by the new conditions. But 
 
 (879)
 
 380 THE CASTE OF CUBA. 
 
 in Cuba and its luxurious capital, the transformation brought about by 
 the abolition of slavery was merely in the legal aspect. The rich were 
 still rich and more lordly, not so easily rich as when the teeming sugar 
 galleons brought the gold of the world's wave ; and tobacco plantations 
 were wrought by labor involving little or no outlay, but still means of 
 inexhaustible affluence. The spirit however aroused by the new con- 
 ditions of social forces, made for the unrest that presently took the form 
 of revolt. Where caste is based upon accidence of form rather than 
 established usage, the discriminated range of mankind is certain to find 
 cause to hate, even the most benignant social tyrant, and everything 
 seems tyrannical that is based on the imprescriptive practices of men to 
 men. The families that make up the caste of Cuba and its capital, have 
 not only all the glories of Spain to boast of as their heritage, they have 
 300 years of ardent patriotism emblazoned among the proudest tablets of 
 their Castiliari or Andalusian Patria pedigrees. For Cuba was born in 
 war and lived by conquest that is the repulse of nation after nation 
 taking advantage of Spain's growing decrepitude, to possess this radiant 
 land. The navies of every European state have at one time or another 
 come to disaster under the guns of the Morro. Only once were the 
 walls of Havana penetrated by a stranger, when the British surprised a 
 landing and reduced the defences by siege. 
 
 The personality, so to speak, of Havana is by far the most distinctive 
 of any city on this continent. One man of energy was enough to impress 
 upon the city a certain individuality, that once seen or felt can never be 
 quite obliterated, no matter how many cities the same eyes may see or the 
 same senses comprehend. In the year 1802 the Havana of the conquista- 
 dores, was burned to the ground. It was rebuilt by the man still 
 revered, as much as so mercurial a race can revere, the Viceroy Tacon. 
 From a jocund penetralia of light timber, the city arose in stone, brick 
 and marble. But the climate was a drawback to the adoption of edifices 
 Northern taste regards alone as imposing. The residential streets are 
 almost uniformly of one story; this expression it is to be borne in mind, 
 gives a misleading inference. This single story would match most of the 
 two- and three-floored houses of the well to-do buildings in northern 
 cities ; the space cut from the height is added to the length and breadth. 
 Each house has a court or garden much as you see them in Spain. 
 Travelers are often struck by a suggested resemblance between Havana 
 and what one can see of Pompeii. There is a fanciful likeness in the 
 contour and the lineaments so-to-speak. This is suggested by the gay 
 coloring of the walls, the almost naive decoration and ornamentation
 
 BRIG -GEN'L GEORGE M. STEEXBERG. 
 
 Surgeon-General, U. S. A. 
 
 MAJOR-GEN'L JOSEPH C. BRECKENRIDGE. 
 
 Inspector-General, U. S. A. 
 
 BRIG.-GEN'L DAXIEI. \V. FLAGLKR. 
 
 Chief of Ordnance, U. S A. 
 
 MAJOK-GK.N'L HENKY C. CORBIN 
 
 Adjutant-General, U. S. A.
 
 LIKE A CROWN JEWEL. 
 
 383 
 
 interior and exterior. This rococo taste is, however, not seen only in 
 Havana. It is flagrant in Italy, in Southern Spain. But the effect in 
 such a sunshine as bathes Havana, is far unlike that created in Seville or 
 Florence. Here the air is of that rarefied borealis transparency, whicb 
 suggests perpetual mirage. The shapes you see seem airy forms and no 
 color can be too vivid. We never cease to wonder at the evidence the 
 French give of knowing nothing of the insular race across the Channel 
 that separates England from France ; yet in our very doorstep Havana 
 lies like a crown jewel of exquisite rarity in the circlet of Caribbean 
 beauties, and we know no more of the city, or of the people than the 
 
 MOERO CASTLE, HAVANA. 
 
 French do of London, or the Madrilinese of New York. We visit Madrid 
 or Berlin or St. Petersburg and let our impressions take the tincture of 
 awe over the venerable, yet Havana is earlier in the rank of great cities 
 than any of these. It is Spanish arid yet it is not; for there is no sug- 
 gestion of the imposing deliberation of centuries in building Madrid, the 
 impressively sinister of Toledo, Granada or Valladolid. It is not even 
 comparable to Cadiz, though both cities are creations of the second flight 
 of Spanish greatness. The penetralia of narrow streets, do not at first 
 suggest the ease, even affluence of dwelling quarters in a cit}- of the 
 republic. Yet these uninviting lanes and alleys swarm with the real 
 21
 
 384 BEAUTY AND DELIGHT. 
 
 life of the capital the bourgeois ranks. Even the aristocratic quarters 
 do not suggest the unrestrained affluence we associate with the affluent 
 in this country. Beauty and delight meet the eye but nature is as much 
 in the cause as art or architecture. The lordliest aristocrat is housed in 
 a mansion, half of whose magnificence comes from the indescribable 
 verdure that makes the island of Cuba the realization of the most gor- 
 geous romance. Even in the city limits, corresponding with our exclusive 
 residence quarters, the mansion of the noble and affluent is embowered 
 in blossom, that seems part of the radiant architecture. The only com- 
 parison that will give the reader the reality in full, is a landscape of 
 Turner all glistening marbles, amethyst skies and verdurous plateaux. 
 But for that matter the whole visible fabric of the city is aglow with 
 color. Nature has to deepen her tints, increase her glowing hues, to hold 
 her own with blue, and yellow, scarlet and purple columns, walls, pillars 
 and vestibules. It is naturally the expression of an exotic race ; a weight 
 of nerves at low tension save in anger or love. Indeed, the student 
 sojourning in the Cuban capital, insensibly confuses the people with the 
 extraneous signs and tokens of their temperament and taste. The houses 
 are not calculated for the "castle " of the Briton, the home of the dwellers 
 in the United States. Of all Americans the Cuban is the least intelligible 
 however, from his outer show. The windows of the one storied house 
 are open to the street, so that the passers-by can study the domestic 
 regime, as dawdlers crowd before shop windows to see industrial occu- 
 pations in our large cities. It has its own suggestion too, that the win- 
 dows are invariably barred by thick irons precisely as the basement- 
 stories in old Italian cities are. There is no concealment from the curious. 
 Every domestic office from breakfast to bedding, is confidingly exposed 
 to the passer-by. 
 
 The dwellers on the island are vaguely estimated at something over 
 1,500,000 probably an accurate census will reveal 2,000,000. Though 
 nominally of one race Spanish, the islanders are sharply differentiated 
 into Cubanos, sons or descendants of the earliest settlers, late comers, 
 and negroes. Among these is found a mingling of what is vaguely 
 called Creoles the issue of mixed Spanish and Cubanos. There is 
 immeasurable pride of ancestry among the Cubanos and with it the 
 rivalry of caste. The distinctions, though fleeting and insensible are as 
 clearly marked as the lines that separate the Brahmin caste from the 
 Pariah races in the Indies. The son or scion of the Spaniard, born in 
 Cuba is reckoned a Cubano. Indeed, the subtle distinction accepted by 
 custom is very much like the terms of our own law ; the progeny of a
 
 PUZZLING DISTINCTIONS. 666 
 
 citizen in this republic born, wheresoever he may be born, under whatso- 
 ever flag, in whatsoever dominion, is legally a citizen of the Union. But 
 the progeny of a Spaniard born in the island of Cuba, is never admitted 
 to be a Cuban. On the other hand, the son of a Spaniard born on the 
 island is never ranked as a Spaniard. All these puzzling and impre- 
 scriptible distinctions add to the complexities of the social fabric; the 
 pride of place, the pride of ancestry, the inscrutable pride of former slave 
 holding, these make up a series of conditions that the administrator of the 
 laws must count with in holding the scales of justice. When underneath 
 all these come the ranks of the children of poverty, the progeny of the 
 servile, it will be seen that a firmer hand and a clearer conscience than 
 the Spanish hierarchy brought to the work might well despair in recon- 
 ciling such clashing pretensions. Naturally in this absorbing pride of 
 place, adoration of ancestry, there was no place for that incommunicable 
 essence \ve know as patriotism. The most devoted of the men who 
 sacrificed all they had for " Cuba Libre " were not inspired by the noble 
 ideal of a homogeneous liberty; never dreamed of equal rights. Cuba 
 Libre meant a regency of the despised, the downtrodden, the helot and 
 the servile. To obtain a condition of things that should bring down the 
 sway and humble the pride of the privileged castes, that was the ideal of 
 the Cuba Librists ! It was the reclamation of their vengeance that first 
 admonished General Shafter that our chief difficulties had just begun 
 when the valor of the fleets and the efforts of the army had given him 
 possession of Santiago. Indeed, it would seem that the countries endowed 
 by nature with charms that enchant the eye and distract the sense, are 
 recompensated spiritually by a perpetual struggle between the passions of 
 disparate ranks. There is no land fairer to the eye than Cuba. Its 
 valleys are lovelier than any tropic clime known to man, for the seasons 
 of rain keep the foliage, the grasses, all growing things, in the perpetual 
 green which makes the British Isles so softly beautiful to the traveler 
 from the New World. Summer is rarely half over before the vernal 
 charms of our fields and hills, our mountains and valleys fade ; the grasses 
 are burned and withered, the foliage is parched and shriveled. But in 
 Cuba, an almost daily downpour keeps the root of everything appetent. 
 The soldier bent on the emprize of death is not keenly susceptible to the 
 beauties of nature, but it is attested that the seasick ranks of Shafter's 
 expedition, broke into cries of wonder and delight as the bewildering 
 radiance of Santiago's surroundings unfolded themselves in the rare 
 pure air. 
 
 With slight racial differences, the aristocratic Cuban may be likened to
 
 386 NEW CONDITIONS. 
 
 the planters of the South before the war. The same mingling of urbane 
 hospitality, tender solicitude for kin and Choctaw inhumanity toward 
 the servile races. Enriched and ruined alike by slavery, the Cuban 
 emerged into the new condition, irreverent, profligate, insincere, but courtly 
 in manner, fascinating in social conduct. An emptier form than ag- 
 nosticism rules their religious moments which are rare. They believe, 
 or pretend to believe and follow the outward form, where the inward 
 grace and sentiment are lacking. To such a people there could be 
 no interest in the form of government, provided the social conditions 
 they inheiit remain undisturbed. The gradual draining of the island's 
 treasures by Spain that is the singular prosperity coming from the soil 
 and its illimitable products, alienated the old patrie worship, while it did 
 not for an instant warp them to the idea of autonomy or independent ex- 
 istence as a state. Had the Spanish officials sent out to administer the 
 island made it less apparent that they were bent chiefly upon enriching 
 themselves, the Cubanos would have been as loyal to the crown as the 
 Canadians are to Britain. 
 
 In the early days the island was intelligently administered and Cuba 
 was in reality the pearl of the Spanish monarchy. But the decadence of 
 trade, the suspended development of the people, was not wholly due to 
 the maleficieut system maintained by Spain. 
 
 For years, any one born outside the walls of the Sacred City of Santiago, 
 has been called a Cuban. The patrician groups, that is the Cubans of 
 pure title, are a distinctly agreeable race physically. They are well-built, 
 slender, sprightly of movement and comely in visage often the historic 
 Spanish type. They are of the same perplexing mental structure as the 
 Italians or French, when expatriated though they have never attained 
 the colonial solidarity of the French Canadians. Indeed, the climatic in- 
 fluence on races could find no more conclusive demonstration than the 
 contrast between the French in Canada and the same race the Latin 
 in tropic countries. 
 
 The climate of Cuba is alternatively seductive and leonine ; the coasts 
 are swept by simoon-like storms, the mountains and valleys inundated by 
 rains of inconceivable violence. The foliage is dazzling in color, exuber- 
 ant to incomparable brilliance, yet not always wholesome. The nature 
 of the sons of the soil, partakes of these climatic phenomena even to the 
 flora of the thickets. 
 
 In milder moods there are no people more seductive than the Cubanos ; 
 in intrigue, feud, jealousy, authority, the annals of the Italian republics 
 present no more harrowing instance of the refined cruelty of plot and
 
 CAPTAIN-GENERAL, RAMON BLANCO Y ARENAS. MARQUIS DE PENA PLATA.
 
 A SON OF THE SOIL. 389 
 
 passion. Yet, Spanish in lineament ; Spanish in mould, manners and 
 entity, the Cubano is distinctly the son of the soil. He feels but languid 
 interest in the motherland. If he be educated and few of the Cubanos, 
 save the aristocratic rich are educated, he is filled with sentimental 
 reverence for the glories of the fatherland, the masters in literature, the 
 splendid pedestal once held in the arts. To the elder Cubanos the island 
 is or was part of Spain. He never looked upon himself as a temporary 
 exile from the patria. Indeed, the descendants of the colonists bore the 
 same relation to Spain that the Canadians of the Upper Provinces bear to 
 Great Britain. It is very rarely that the Canadian of Ontario or Mani- 
 toba or the Western Dominion, speak of themselves as Canadians. It is 
 oddly enough as "Englishmen" they invariably refer to themselves. It 
 is this constructive solidarity of the Cubanos with the mother-country, 
 that bred such confusion in the minds of our compatriots in the bewilder- 
 ing narratives of the insurrection. Whereas, the majority among us be- 
 lieved that all Cubans were revolters, the fact is that not ten per cent, of 
 the well-to-do the segment that rule in other countries, had the remotest 
 sympathy with the insurgents. This has been demonstrated so clearly 
 since our armies undertook the invasion of the island, that the very 
 presses which brought about the war are loudest in their vituperation of 
 the cabals and juntas, figuring so long as the representatives of an 
 overwhelming majority. There were men of high honor and incorruptible 
 integrity eager to secure home rule for the island but they were very 
 few ; they would have been the first to revolt from the hideous anarchy of 
 class government the hordes of adventurers aimed at. 
 
 But though the vast majority of the Cubanos were inveterately opposed 
 to the island's seizure by the "Cuba Libre " group, they were not by any 
 means partisans of the Spanish. They had longing aspirations for a 
 republican regime. They have learned by excoriating experience that 
 the spirit or aptitude for self-rule, is born, and if made, is made very 
 slowly. Cuba was a republic for a few tumultuous months, after the ex- 
 pulsion of the Bourbons from Spain in 1868, but gladly returned to the 
 monarchical system when Alphonso XII. secured the throne. The insur- 
 gent ranks in Cuba represent about what the anarchist elements embrace 
 in this country and in Europe. It would have been as fair for a Euro- 
 pean state, for example, to judge this republic by the Chicago, Pittsburg 
 and other outbreaks during the last fifteen years, as for us to assume that 
 the insurgents represented the people of Cuba. When war was sprung 
 upon Spain for the liberation of the island, it was the conviction of those 
 who favored it in good faith, that at the word the people of the island
 
 390 UNCIVILIZED CONDUCT. 
 
 would rise enmasse to meet our expeditions and fight the battle with the 
 Spaniards. 
 
 It was firmly believed by the majority that an army of from 40,000 to 
 100,000 men would spring from the Cuban jungles, asking of us nothing 
 but arms; that even in Havana and the large cities, the Spanish garrisons 
 would find themselves occupied in overawing the sympathizers with lib- 
 erty and home rule. Expeditions of arms and munitions were sent to 
 many parts of the island ; descents were made at points designated by 
 the juntas in New York, Philadelphia and Washington. In no instance 
 were our stupefied commanders met by forces bearing the remotest re- 
 semblance to an organized army. In the eastern part of the island 
 dominated by Santiago but impenetrable to the legions of Spain, from 
 three to five thousand tatterdemalions were brought together when 
 Sliafter's army disembarked. But they were useless as soldiers and re- 
 fused to aid in the auxiliary operations of road-making. Perhaps half of 
 these men aided in the military operations, but the ingrained ferocity 
 of the race became a menace to the civilized conduct of the war. They 
 could hardly be restrained from mutilating the dead ; they could not be 
 checked in the odious pillage of the battlefield. It required volleys from 
 the small boats of the fleet to stop them from assassinating the ghastly 
 remnants of Cervera's fleet. Never were benevolent legions, warring for 
 humanity so grotesquely disillusionized. The French were a good deal 
 surprised by the indifference of the Neapolitans and even the Poles, 
 when the republic made its war for humanity in 1795-6, but some noble 
 natures and real patriots were found. Our army found few or none in 
 Cuba. 
 
 The hierarchal representatives of the insurgent movement alternated 
 between threats against the soldiery of the United States and proffers of 
 aid, if the Cuban republic could be declared if only for a day. The 
 significance of this lies in the fact, that were the Cubans recognized if 
 only for an hour, the magnificent millions in bonds, that paid for the larmoy- 
 ant propaganda in the United States, would have a legal value, and the 
 inside managers of the juntas would be rich beyond the rivalry of bonanza 
 princes. 
 
 This country was reluctant to accept the first testimonies of the reality. 
 But the private letters of the soldiery, written from the field, the reluc- 
 tant admissions of the staff, the indignant protests of the naval command- 
 ers obliged to interrupt the work of rescue of the victims from the dis- 
 mantled hulks of Cervera's fleet to stop murder put doubt out of the 
 question. It is true that allies occupying the relations imposed in free-
 
 THE INTRIGUE REVEALED. 391 
 
 ing struggling peoples, do not often cooperate in amity. The British 
 armies sent to Spain, in 1808, nominally to free the people, found the na- 
 tives all and more than our troops found the insurgents. But the Span- 
 iards at least volunteered enmasse : there was never a battlefield where 
 they did not immensely outnumber the British troops and on many a 
 desperate field they bore themselves with fortitude, even heroism. In 
 our own struggle in 1779 the aristocrats who came in command of the 
 French legions, were disposed to make little of our ill-clad levies ; but 
 once on the battlefield, the legions of the lilies paid soldierly homage to 
 the devoted soldiery of Washington ; on every field where the allies 
 wrought in common, the continental battalions made up in valor, what 
 they lacked in pomp or the paraphernalia of war. There were ample op- 
 portunities for the insurgents to prove both fortitude and sincerity in the 
 campaign in Cuba, but beyond voluable protestations, they were hardly 
 heard or seen. Professedly familiar with the points selected for invasion, 
 they might have saved the unacclimatized ranks of Shafter from the 
 bloody reprisals of Guantanamo, El Caney, Sevilla and San Juan. The 
 final disclosure of their temper and pretension was made in the refusal to 
 cooperate with Shafter and their murderous attack upon a column of our 
 prisoners. The exact status of the Cuba Libre intrigue was at once re- 
 vealed beyond the hope of its deluded or subsidized advocates to deny 
 or to explain. 
 
 With the blockading of the port, Havana became a city so unlike 
 its usual gay self that the reports received from time to time gave evi- 
 dence that the first serious dissatisfaction to the home power had become 
 manifest. An evidence of this was shown in the precautions taken by 
 the Captain-General, Blanco, for his proclamations indicated that lie 
 felt distrustful of the loyalty of the masses of the citizens. It was for- 
 bidden to express any opinion unfavorable to Spain or the conduct of the 
 war, the transgressor to be shot without trial. The police force became 
 dissatisfied and were replaced by the military. Supplies reached the city 
 only irregularly and from the first, famine added to the perplexities of the 
 wretched commander. Even more formidable than the gathering armies 
 of the republic, to the 120,000 soldiers under Blanco's command, the 
 spectre of famine uprose. 
 
 The courage of the loyal, and the hopes of the indifferent were main- 
 tained by the preposterous reports of daily victories of the Spanish forces 
 among the Philippines and along the Spanish coasts. From the day of 
 the declaration of war, relaj's of the army were at work feverishly 
 strengthening the fortifications already considered impregnable to the
 
 392 
 
 UNDER THE BLOCKADE. 
 
 ordinary appliances of war. Within a week after the guns began to roar 
 over the Spanish possessions, the ill-to-do were wanderers from their 
 Havana homes, only the rich were enabled to pay the exorbitant rates of 
 living enforced by the blockade. 
 
 Yet, while the beleaguering guns were expected to open daily upon the 
 harbor, there was no evidence of apprehension that the city could be cap- 
 tured. There was, however, vague and almost ludicrous fear of the pro- 
 digious missiles fired from the Yankee battleships, the fame of which 
 went to such exaggeration, that even the soldiery became timid, though 
 never distrustful of their own ability to meet and defeat our legions. 
 
 GUN SQUAD AT PRACTICE.
 
 PART II. 
 
 IN one sense it may be said that all of Cuba's woes came from her re- 
 laxation in slavery. While the influence of the French Revolution 
 roused the neighboring colonies both in the Caribbean Sea and the vast 
 continent of South America, the seductive ease and the unlaboriously 
 won wealth of slave-holding, lulled the Cubans to what may be called an 
 immoral political repose. Hence, while all the other colonies of Spain 
 felt the leavening touch of revolution, and in many cases entered actively 
 into the business of expelling alien rulers, Cuba remained tranquil, not 
 Mily tranquil but chivalrously loyal to the Castilian crown. There were, 
 iiowever, groups here and there suffering under the heel of the slave-hold- 
 ing aristocracy, instigated to attempt some amelioration in the oligarchic 
 irm of Cuban rule. These attempts, however, were for many years 
 poradic as they were fierce. For in every case it was the servile segment 
 of the Cuban people, mainly negroes, and in some instances Creoles, who 
 whispered rather than proclaimed the word "freedom." In 1837. a more 
 general movement was made to induce the Spanish government to revise 
 the extortionate tax system, and to admit deputies from the Cuban peo- 
 ple into the national Cortes. In response, Spain redoubled its exactions, 
 nd a cry very much like that of Lombardy, which Victor Emmanuel de- 
 ;lared the world could not afford to pass unheeded, arose all over the 
 island. This seems to have been the first of the systematic attempts to 
 expel Spanish rule. 
 
 From an anarchic interlude, which in many of its excesses reached the 
 horror of the San Domingo outbreak, a lesser form of exaction was ap- 
 plied, more, however, because the hitherto colossal commerce of the isle 
 had fallen off and the home treasury began to feel the pinch, than to 
 comply with public clamors. In 1868 the excesses brought about by 
 Isabella's long term of misgovernment roused the Spanish people ; she 
 was driven from the throne and, with a temporary republic in the mother- 
 country, Cuba found itself free. 
 
 Carlos Manuel Cespedes, a Cuban aristocrat of immense wealth and an 
 energy quite unlike that of his race, was selected as the head of the state 
 and the independence of the island proclaimed. There seems to have 
 been the real passion of freedom in this attempt. Cespedes' forces seized 
 the city of Bayamo and when brought to bay by enormously superior 
 
 (393)
 
 394 A DOLOROUS EPISODE. 
 
 forces, the undaunted mass burned their town and scattered as best they 
 could, rather than surrender. For months Cuba was to every intent and 
 purpose in the same condition that Gladstone described Bulgaria with the 
 single exception that both rebel and royalist vied in ferocity and the in- 
 human excesses that marked brute strength. 
 
 Spanish confidence in a peaceful issue to the Cuban complication, came 
 from the memory of our forbearance in a still more poignant tragedy than 
 the Maine. Few even of those who contended most hotly for an end of 
 negotiations, recalled in sucli terms as the atrocity deserved, the dolorous 
 episode of the Virginius. Yet, it is certain that deep in the popular mind 
 the memory of that ferocious vengeance lingered; that the name Spaniard 
 recalled the sanguinary fate of the Virginias. 
 
 It was in the year 1873. We were still healing the gashes made by the 
 civil war. The Cuban struggle had begun and was carried on fitfully, by 
 some of the men identified with the last revolt. Recruits were not diffi- 
 cult to raise from the disbanded soldiery of the armies of the North and 
 South. Our ports were filled with suspicious crafts, keeping the adminis- 
 tration in hot water. General Grant, who was president, was loath to 
 make conditions harder for the Spanish Republic, then fitfully struggling 
 for existence with the universally admired Emilio Castellar as its presi- 
 dent. 
 
 In the early part of October the Virginius, a side wheeler paddle 
 steamer, originally built for the Confederates, in Great Britain, and cap- 
 tured by our blockaders, came into the possession of the Cuban Junta in 
 New York. The object of the voyage was to convey leaders of the Cuban 
 forces to the island. Her commander was Captain Fry of Louisiana, who 
 had won high repute for bravery in the Confederate service. On reaching 
 Jamaica, a British port, the vessel took on munitions of war and one hun- 
 dred and sixty Cuban passengers. She was searched at Kingston and 
 also at Port au Prince, Hayti, where she halted en route for Santiago 
 the port destined to witness the intrepidity of our soldiers and mariners. 
 No sooner had the Virginius left Kingston than the Spanish consul tele- 
 graphed her departure to General Burriel, commandant at Santiago. He 
 at once despatched the gunboat. Tornado to intercept the filibuster. She 
 was sighted on the last day of October and a vigorous chase began. The 
 gunboat was soon discovered to be the faster craft and the Virginius 
 made haste to throw over her compromising cargo. 
 
 Two thousand Remington rifles, two hundred horses for the insurgent 
 staff, millions worth of the munitions the Cubans cruelly needed, were 
 flung overboard. Still the gunboat gained. All night the crew and pas-
 
 CAPTURE OF THE VIRGINIUS. 395 
 
 sengers fed the fires with furniture, even the meats from the larder. 
 The night gave hope ; in the morning they would be in neutral waters. 
 They were in fact, within three miles of Jamaica and therefore inviolable, 
 when at daybreak the vessel was found leaking. There was no escape. 
 Varona, one of the Cuban generals, begged Captain Fry to blow up the 
 ship rather than fall into the merciless hands of the Spaniards. But Fry, 
 who was without fear, decided to haul down the stars and stripes and 
 trust to the law of nations. 
 
 Whatever mission the vessel might have been performing, there was no 
 evidence to incriminate passengers or commander. She was put in charge 
 of a prize crew and hurried to Santiago. Two courts were organized, one 
 naval, the other military. Before these two bodies appeared one 
 hundred and fifty-five persons, found on board the Virginius when run 
 down. Of these, thirty-seven were condemned to be shot by the naval 
 judges, seventeen by the military. The trial was so summary, the execu- 
 tion so swift, that the Washington government could not interfere in time 
 to stay the massacre ; even the Spanish cabinet was kept in the dark 
 until fifty-three victims had been slaughtered. Unheard-of cruelty marked 
 the last agonies of the victims. They were forced to kneel to receive the 
 assassin fire ; it was proclaimed with hideous unction by the Spanish 
 prelate of Santiago, that twenty of the doomed crew had asked the offices 
 of the church and died in the communion of their murderers ! W T hat lent 
 the ghastliest horror to the tragedy was the inability of the condemned 
 to speak or comprehend the language of the accusers in the court. 
 Ten minutes was the maximum time allowed to each prisoner on trial. 
 The monstrous Tribunal of the Terror in 1793, were more observant of 
 legal forms ! 
 
 Naturally, the consul of this republic protested against the seizure of 
 a ship flying the union flag; against the malignant haste of the trial ; 
 against the travesty of legal forms, against the competency, in short, of 
 every g tep taken by the Spaniards. The bloodthirsty business, would have 
 gone on until the last man of the unfortunates had been done to death, 
 had not the urgings of our consul received the portentous backing of a 
 man-of-war. The captain of the ship, informed of the emergency, promptly 
 sent word that he would blow the city to fragments, if another man of the 
 Virginius were injured. The halt gave time for intervention. The 
 Washington cabinet spoke out decisively. The Spanish cabinet, or rather 
 Castellar, took instant steps to make such amends as were possible. In- 
 demnities were promptly paid for the murdered, and an apology in due 
 form made to the republic.
 
 396 CUBA FOR SALE. 
 
 But the feeling aroused took little note of these perfunctory testimonies. 
 War was demanded in many parts of the republic. Indignation meetings 
 were held, and the press voiced the general sentiment in demanding an 
 instant attack on Cuba and the expulsion of a power so inhuman in its 
 vengeances. In the angriest paroxysms of wrath, it was acknowledged 
 that Castellar and the Spanish republicans were sincerely shamed and 
 penitent, as right-minded men should be, while the monarchists and aristo- 
 crats, tacitly approved the butchery and made the liberal contrition and 
 
 EXECUTION OF THE VIRGTNIUS' CREW. 
 
 amends, the grounds of an active campaign against the tottering republic. 
 But in spite of all this, it required a man of Grant's towering prestige in 
 the presidency to stay Congress from the very declaration made in April, 
 1898. 
 
 It was at this epoch, that the Virginius episode came to destroy one of 
 those rare chances which come in the life of peoples and make a mock of 
 diplomacy. For the republican government in Spain, finding it rather 
 inconsistent to refuse the Cubans what they demanded themselves, entered 
 into negotiations with General Grant's Secretary of State to sell the island
 
 LIEUT -GENERAL JOHN M. SCHOFIELD. R.:AK-ADMIRAL MONTGOMERY SICARD. 
 
 COMMOPORK JOHN C. WATSON. CAPTAIN CHARLES D. SIGSBEE.
 
 AGAIN IN REBELLION. 
 
 399 
 
 for " One hundred million piastres." General Sickles was even on his 
 way to Madrid, empowered to accept the proffer, when the news of the 
 Virginias tragedy brought the negotiations to an end. For the people of 
 the republic were in no humor to pay out money to the " butcher power " 
 responsible for the slaughter of its citizens, even though those citizens 
 were constructively amenable to the laws governing neutral intercourse. 
 
 From this time until 1878 the dissatisfaction of the Cubans seemed to 
 have died out, or, was repressed by the agencies peculiar to the ministries 
 which held power down to 1895, when the rebellion broke out again 
 though, curiously enough, mainly in the newspapers. Detailed reports 
 of battles and conquests by scores of 
 "patriot" chiefs, were reported from 
 week to week in the presses of this 
 republic, though it is very doubtful 
 whether any very considerable portion 
 of the readers paid any heed to the 
 monotonous iteration. In formulating 
 their griefs the leaders of the insur- 
 rectionary movement, dwelt mainly 
 upon the commercial distresses and 
 the poverty-stricken condition of the 
 island : attributing these to the mis-' 
 government of the mother-country. 
 Yet, at the same time, the neighbor- 
 ing colonies of Great Britain, which 
 every one supposes to be adminis- 
 tered on the high plane Britain pro- 
 fesses to adopt with colonies, were in 
 exactly the same condition. Indeed, the episode of the Eyre outbreak in 
 Jamaica, was a precise parallel to the enormities charged upon Spain by 
 the publicists of this and other countries. For the Jamaicans too, like 
 Cuba, were suffering from the manumission of the laboring population, 
 the necessity for a recuperative movement and the readjustment of con- 
 ditions to an entirely new system of labor. Above all, Cuba was suffer- 
 ing from the rivalry of Asia, Egypt, Europe and the United States, in the 
 products which had hitherto made her a monopolist in sugar and tobacco. 
 For nearly thirty years the island had been trying to readjust her re- 
 sources to these new conditions, and under such an unenterprising people 
 as the Spaniards, this was of course slow work. Unlike other peoples, 
 the rich were growing poorer while the poor were perishing. 
 
 A CUBAN PATRIOT.
 
 400 
 
 DISSATISFIED AND HOMELESS. 
 
 Immediately on being freed the negroes refused to work; the importa- 
 tion of Chinese labor proved a costly failure. The Spaniard accustomed 
 to the lash in coercing the slave found it difficult to manage the equiva- 
 lent of what we call "poor whites" in the South. Hence, great planta- 
 tions fell into decay; the farming regions became weed-grown wastes; 
 the negroes lent themselves to the demagogues and of course the Spanish 
 system was not elastic enough to stretch from the tyranny of the past to 
 
 the liberalism of the new 
 conditions. In the in- 
 terior parts of the island, 
 hordes of the dissatis- 
 fied and homeless, wan- 
 dered through the bnr- 
 ren lands, and these in 
 turn have been made 
 the "patriot " battalions 
 the world heard so much 
 of during the recent 
 troubles. With such 
 conditions to go upon, 
 naturally the tales told 
 have been thrilling, the 
 activity of men seeking 
 their own ends has 
 found unlimited oppor- 
 tunity ; the form and 
 semblance of a repub- 
 lican state was pro- 
 claimed early in the 
 struggle, but the most 
 adventurous and most industrious seeker never found a Cuban capital or 
 seat of government or any of the indications of a united popular desire 
 to replace Spanish rule by native. 
 
 It was easy to foretell the unwisdom of Spain's action from the moment 
 the parent state undertook to suppress a revolution, which was fictitious 
 from the first. We dealt with the same conditions in this country be- 
 tween 1865 and 1872, though so far as representing general sentiment can 
 be judged, the odious Klu-Klux of the South far more nearly represented 
 a majority of the southern people, than the motley hordes of the Garcias 
 and Gomez in Cuba. It is easy to show now how humane laws and a re- 
 
 GENERAL MARTINEZ CAMPOS.
 
 GOMEZ' WAITING GAME. 
 
 401 
 
 taxation of repression would have made the existence of insurrection im- 
 possible: would have estopped the campaign for sympathy carried on in 
 the presses of this republic, silenced the demagogues in Congress and 
 given the Cubans an opportunity to reclaim a system, not unlike that 
 which satisfies millions of freedom-loving citizens in Canada or Aus- 
 tralia. But Spain wasted her legions; it is reckoned that as high sis 
 200,000 men have been employed in the series of half hearted and mis 
 directed military campaigns that have desolated the most populous prov- 
 inces of the island. 
 
 It was not, however, until the astute and really capable administrator, 
 Martinez Campos, was removed, that the evils of Spanish maladministra- 
 tion took a form that 
 aroused universal con- 
 demnation. The tales of 
 misery, dissatisfaction, 
 cruelty and the failure of 
 all legitimate repressive 
 measures, began to form 
 the staple news of the 
 presses of the world. Yet 
 upon examination, there 
 was never in Cuba, even, 
 under Weyler's adminis- 
 tration, m >re of the misery 
 of want or the dissatisfac- 
 tion that comes from an 
 arrogant indifference to 
 the protests and desires of 
 the people, than the official 
 rep >rts to the British Par- 
 liament presented on the 
 recent famine in Ireland, 
 or India. It is alleged 
 but it is difficult to find 
 proof in the matter, that a 
 large percentage of the possessions of the Cubanos have pnssed into the 
 hands of Spaniards; that this alien invasion has brought about a spirit 
 not unlike that which existed between the Irish of the Bogs and the 
 English of the Pale. If this were really the case it would explain the 
 
 GENERAL MAXIMO GOMEZ.
 
 402 THE RECONCENTRADO SYSTEM. 
 
 Cuban movement, but the Cubans themselves deny the fact and in proof 
 remained to the last loyal to the home government. 
 
 The followers of the rebel leader Gomez explain his methods of cam-^ 
 paign as a waiting game. He proposed to exhaust the Spanish purse and * 
 deplete the ranks of the invading army not by arms or combat, but by 
 fever and the natural obstacles of the country. Some of these our own 
 soldiers have witnessed. For it was the jungles of Santiago, the fevers 
 and the uncanny denseness of the chapparal that made the seizure of 
 Santiago most difficult. 
 
 To combat the method invented by Gomez, Weyler despising the mobs 
 hidden in the jungle, invented what has become known as the " trocha " 
 system. This was a series of immense ditches running from sea to sea, 
 from north to south across the island at regulated distances. Behind 
 these, the rebels were supposed to be cooped up ready for seizure or 
 slaughter whichever seemed preferable to the Spanish commander. But 
 a soldiery capable of fighting in the open was found unequal to the tor- 
 menting ordeal this extraordinary system involved ; for a twenty-mi! 
 ditch, howsoever well secured by barbed wire and blockhouses at regula 
 distances, must be watched day and night by a man at every yard of dis- 
 tance, to hold an enterprising army of scouts, such as the Cuban insur- 
 gents fought with, under control. The trochas were a failure. The 
 hungry legions of Gomez crawled through thfim at a thousand points : 
 stole to unguarded plantations, pillaged and slaughtered and fled back 
 again to the jungles with impunity. 
 
 Then the exasperated Weyler imagined the "reconcentrado" system, 
 which was to gather up all the isolated agricultural population in city 
 camps, and by absolutely denuding the country starve Gomez' army into 
 submission. It was war if General Sherman's definition of war be 
 applicable that is, hell but the result secured for the insurgents, what 
 neither their own leadership nor their own intrigues could have ever brought 
 about the reports of the miseries of the expatriated population roused 
 indignant remonstrances, even from the absolutist presses of Berlin and 
 St. Petersburg. It was this device of Weyler's that made the action of 
 Congress possible ; that gave the warlike presses text and illustration for 
 the lurid denunciations and incessant demands for intervention. 
 
 It was said that 200,000 of this depopulated people died of starvation. 
 In the very presses in which these figures were reported, it was vouched 
 that 300,000 men were without occupation in the city of New York, and 
 there was scarcely a large community in the United States in which an 
 equal percentage of the slaves of want were not set forth as objects of
 
 A CONGRESSIONAL PILGRIMAGE. 
 
 403 
 
 public charity. From Bombay and the great cities of India, came reports 
 day after day of from a thousand to three thousand dying in the agonies of 
 starvation. In fact during the very years in which Cuban melodrama 
 unrolled itself in the presses of the republic, the massacres in Armenia, 
 the atrocious overthrow of the Greeks, came side by side with the 
 Weyler "atrocities" in the Cuban island. 
 
 Congressional missions 
 on the invitation of a yel- 
 low journal, made a pil- 
 grimage to the scene, and 
 it was probably the report 
 of the grave and reverend 
 Senator Proctor of Ver- 
 mont, that finally kindled 
 the spark that spread into 
 war. For he saw as he 
 might have seen in the 
 Five Points in New York, 
 in the slums of London 
 or the nether depths of 
 Chicago, assemblies of the 
 miserable, the starved and 
 the homeless ; and all this 
 charged against the Span- 
 ish system, stiffened the 
 nation's arm for the im- 
 pending blow. 
 
 But hand in hand 
 with our pressure upon 
 Spain, came by every mail 
 
 concession after concession, until in the Act of Autonomy the island of 
 Cuba stood about in the same relation to Spain that any State of this 
 Union stands to the whole republic. But it was too late. Yet it is very 
 doubtful if the Maine calamity had not come fortuitously for the hopes of 
 the warlike, if this republic could have been cajoled into action. A de- 
 lay of a year would have given the United States the island at a hun- 
 dredth part of the price in money we have paid for the privilege of the 
 slaughter among her possessions. But then we should not have been the 
 victors over Cervera, nor Montojo ! We should not have known, as the 
 British reviews with veiled sarcasm inform us that we are indisputably 
 22 
 
 GENERAL VALERIANO WEYLER.
 
 404 
 
 THE DIABOLISM OF CASTE. 
 
 the lion's whelps ; that on the seas we can do nearly as well as the 
 mistress of them, and that on land by some practice we may be made 
 a military nation. 
 
 Atrocity in every conceivable form marked the sporadic uprisings in the 
 provinces of Cuba. Human life counts but feebly, when the passions of 
 war are let loose, but the conflicts between the Spaniards and the insur- 
 gents took on almost from the first, the unspeakable ferocities of the ven- 
 detta. To this, it must be borne in mind, was superadded the sanguinary 
 spirit servile insurrection the malign diabolism of caste. History has- 
 recorded with a shudder the enormities that wasted Santo Domingo in the 
 beginning of the century. With but slight modification the same ex- 
 cesses, the same barbarous reprisals, mark the outbreaks on the Cuban 
 theatre. 
 
 Though the antagon- 
 ists are loosely charac- 
 terized as Spaniards and 
 Cubans, all who took 
 up arms were in charac- 
 ter and traits essentially 
 Spanish. Whatsoever, 
 therefore, we picture the 
 
 ^"VBHF ~MmHj Spanish to be for good 
 
 or ill, that also the in- 
 surgents were. With 
 this qualification: 
 There were a large fol- 
 lowing of blacks, a slight 
 mingling of Cuban born, 
 who had passed more or 
 less time in the states 
 of this republic: there 
 were, too, restless 
 nomads from the neigh- 
 boring South American 
 states peopled by 
 
 Spaniards in race, if not in birth men to whom insurrection was a habit, 
 a pastime. In the qualities that go to make up inspiring leadership, 
 the long and bloody record is searched in vain for a single noble 
 figure. The nearest approach to the patriot, as we conceive him was 
 the mulatto Maceo whose death the Spaniards rightly welcomed 
 
 GENERAL ANTONIO MACEO.
 
 FIGHTING FOR HIS RACE. 405 
 
 as the most vital blow struck at the insurrection. Yet Maceo would 
 never have been accepted as a leader among such a people as ours. 
 
 Hardly a fortnight after the opening of hostilities, the Home Rule par- 
 liament came in session, in form if not in fact Cuba was as free to fix her 
 own destinies as any State of this Republic. Yet there was none of the 
 popular demonstration Paris witnessed, when its National Assembly came 
 together under circumstances nearly as trying as those which beset the 
 new venture. Indeed, the members of the chambers seemed conscious 
 that they were legislating for a lost cause. The session continued 
 spasmodically during the siege, but the laws enacted gave no indication of 
 what the islanders might expect had the concession come in time. The 
 body was made up of the aristocrats among the Cubanos, but the process 
 of electing them hardly fulfilled the idea of a constitutional regime. 
 
 In most insurrectionary movements some figure stands out distinctly 
 marked either by achievement or special fitness. In the long tale of ig- 
 noble slaughter which the Cuban insurrection has presented, there is but 
 one man who seems to have given his whole soul into the resolution of 
 what we used to understand by patriotism. This was Antonio Maceo, 
 who was fearless in fight and prudent in counsel. He was the last of an 
 ephemeral line of mulattoes, and he fought for his race rather than for 
 liberty. He seems to have been the only man born with an instinct for 
 leadership on the field of battle. He conducted his desultory enterprises 
 with a skill and sagacity which reminds the reader of the prowess and 
 sagacity of our own Marion in the swamps of South Carolina, when con- 
 tending against British superiority during the war of Independence. It 
 was Antonio Maceo who counselled uprisings in every part of the island, 
 where two or three dissatisfied could be brought together in the name of 
 Cuba Libre. He had heard vaguely of the atrocious war of Toussaint 
 L'Ouverture in San Domingo, and he plead by day and preached by night 
 to spare neither age nor sex nor any condition of man that opposed the 
 yearnings of the colored people. 
 
 It was Antonio Maceo who undertook to prove the stupidity of Wey- 
 ler's trochas. It was he who taught the nomad hordes to shelter them- 
 selves under the bushes and even to make use of the shrubbery to de- 
 ceive the Spaniards. Decorating a squad of his followers with a veil of 
 thick branches, he moved with the patience of an animal of prey on the 
 verge of the woods, reaching spots favorable for his work, and then 
 slaughtered all who came within reach of the machete, the pistol or the fire- 
 arm of any description his followers might happen to possess. 
 
 In his final plan of campaign he concerted the conjunction of Maximo
 
 406 
 
 REPELLANT FREEBOOTERS. 
 
 Gomez, Calixto Garcia and his brother Jose, to make one determined 
 onset upon the Spanish troops at Artemisia. The plan failed and, An- 
 tonio Maceo conceived that suspicion of his fellow conspirers, which is 
 the beginning of the end of revolutionary enterprises. It is indicative of 
 the animating purpose of the insurgent ranks that, when Antonio Maceo 
 
 met his fate, he was at the 
 head of four thousand 
 followers, and that he was 
 defeated by a column of 
 four hundred men. The 
 blow was so stunning that 
 the adherents of his cause 
 undertook to prove that 
 Maceo had been assassi- 
 nated by hired minions of 
 Spain in his own ranks, 
 but the evidences were in- 
 contestable that the four 
 hundred disciplined Span- 
 ji iards had routed the four 
 I thousand overconfident 
 and unruly Cubans. 
 
 That our soldiery were 
 not hasty in stigmatizing 
 the Cuban insurgents as 
 irreclaimable malefactors, 
 perfectly impartial foreign 
 observers attest. There 
 were with the armies that went to Cuba, correspondents and official 
 note-takers from nearly every country in Europe. The letters published 
 in the European presses picture the unqualifiable hordes that flocked to 
 our flag, as the most repellent freebooters, with no more idea of the 
 amenities of civilized warfare than the black nomads of Dahomey or Ash- 
 ante. Of freedom in any other sense than the license to pillage and as- 
 sassinate, they had no more conception than the Philippine Malays, 
 sworn to take a certain number of lives, to win the Moslem paradise. 
 Not one in a thousand could read not one in ten thousand knew the ob- 
 ligations of citizenship. But let us look at them as set down by careful 
 observers as hostile to Spain, as the most intemperate Jingo amongst us. 
 44 The Cubans," says the correspondent of the London Telegraph, "are 
 
 GENERAL GALIXTO GARCIA.
 
 UNDISCIPLINED THIEVES. 407 
 
 incapable of realizing what true liberty means. Here and there a man 
 like Gomez or Muceo has some power of realizing it, but the overwhelm- 
 ing majority desire not liberty, but domination. They desire to possess 
 themselves of the offices and power now held by their Spanish rulers, and 
 if they are permitted by the United States government to become unre- 
 strainedly possessed of them, they will repeat, on an exaggerated scale, 
 all the cruelties and oppressions of which the Spaniards have been guilty. 
 The plain truth of the matter is, that sooner or later the United States 
 will be obliged to lick the Cubans into something resembling a civilized 
 community, and the sooner the work is undertaken the better. During 
 the last few weeks of the war I saw a good deal of the Cuban soldiers, 
 and if they are to be taken as a fair sample of the race to whom they be- 
 long, they are as unfit for freedom or constitutional government, as the 
 savages we routed out of Coomassie jungles a couple of years ago. These 
 armed insurgents are a little better than a horde of undisciplined thieves 
 and murderers. Like most mongrel races, they possess all the evil quali- 
 ties of both the races from which they have sprung, with little or none of 
 their good qualities. They have all the cruelty of the Spaniard, without 
 his chivalry and bravery, and like him, only in a more inordinate degree, 
 they are filled with an insane vanity, which they mistake for pride. With 
 their negro blood, they have inherited an unbounded capacity for lying, 
 and they are expert thieves, while they possess none of the negro's jollity 
 and good nature." 
 
 He then describes a number of acts of cruelty he witnessed. One of 
 them happened on the memorable day when Cervera's fleet was destroyed. 
 " A young Spanish officer on the Maria Teresa, who had been wounded 
 by a shell, was lying on the burning deck, with his clothes in flames. A 
 comrade hastily tore the clothes off the wounded youth and, lashing him 
 to a spar, threw him overboard in hope of saving his life. The Cubans 
 saw this and came to the conclusion that the wounded man must be an 
 officer of some importance. Instantly, a score or more of them began 
 shooting at the poor burned and wounded figure as it drifted about 
 among the breakers. This horrible brutality was too much for the chiv- 
 al -(MIS American officers and sailors engaged in the work of rescue, and 
 th" gnus of the Gloucester and Iowa opened fire on the murderous wretches 
 HM<1 ilrove them off the beach into the woods. I have since heard that 
 bitter complaints were made by the insurgents that the work of slaughter 
 was -it permitted to continue. 
 
 -. About 4.000 of them were present at Santiago under Garcia and 
 Castili >. but for effective fighting purposes they were not worth forty
 
 408 ROBBING THE DEAD. 
 
 American soldiers. They are all right for a treacherous ambuscade or 
 fighting behind cover, but they seem incapable with their present train- 
 ing at any rate, of standing in a regular line of battle. There was a fine 
 lot of things lying around loose, and the brave Cubans made an excellent 
 use of their time. While American soldiers were fighting the Spanish 
 soldiers on the hill of San Juan or among the fields and hedges of El 
 Caney, their Cuban allies were sneaking about in the rear, picking up 
 the overcoats and valises that the soldiers had lain down, so that they 
 might be less hampered in the charge up the steep slopes, for Cuban lib- 
 erty. During the battle I saw Cubans coming back in fifteens and 
 twenties with full cartridge belts not a shot expended and full sacks 
 of soldiers belongings on their backs, which they were hurrying with to 
 their own encampment. These ruffians were so busy looting, that they 
 refused point blank even to help the wounded, and I know from the evi- 
 dence of my own eyes, that they did not hesitate to rob the bodies of 
 American dead. A colored United States cavalryman came upon one of 
 them robbing the body of a dead American officer, and to the everlasting 
 honor of the negro, he brained the Cuban scoundrel with the butt of his 
 rifle and killed him on the spot. Neither would the Cubans work. After 
 the battle when the United States troops were laboring night and day, 
 repairing the roads, digging trenches and building earthworks, General 
 Shafter asked that some Cubans should be sent to assist in the work, in 
 order that Santiago might be more speedily reduced, and that food and 
 ammunition might be more easily and rapidly conveyed to the front. Senor 
 Garcia sent back a reply stating he would be glad if the American com- 
 mander would remember that the Cubans were soldiers, not laborers. I 
 forbear giving the comments of General Shafter. Such are some of the 
 characteristics of the people for whom the United States has sacrificed 
 the lives of hundreds of her sons and expended millions of treasure. A 
 more worthless race or one less fitted for freedom, does not exist, and it 
 will be an* evil day for Cuba and her civilization, if the insurgents ever 
 obtain unrestricted domination in that unhappy land."
 
 RKAR-ADMIRAL GKORGK DKWKY,
 
 BOOK THREE. 
 I. 
 
 AS war releases the ignoblest in the nature of man, it none the less 
 accentuates the noblest. In a people primevally young, autoch- 
 thonic so to speak, war is a crucible for the refining of the superior 
 natures, while exaggerating the turpitudes of the baser. The war was 
 hardly ten days old when one of the figures that people in all times 
 reckon as epoch makers, emerged at the hour and the place needed. 
 Dewey would have been the same man had the republic never given him 
 the momentous charge which he fulfilled so consummately, but in peace 
 he would have lived his allotted years, served his prescribed time in the 
 monotonous responsibilities of the naval hierarchy, and would have 
 passed on like many another man of the same mould, whose name is 
 known only in the illustrious roster of our sea soldiery. When the 
 passion of praise his conquest of the Spanish fleet aroused, broke out, 
 there was just enough of the romantic in his past, to enchant the hero 
 worshipper. He had fought with the most illustrious of all sea captains, 
 the incomparable Farragut. He had been part of that immortal fleet 
 which refused to recognize the invulnerability of iron rams; he treated 
 them as he would any other craft, ran them down or riddled them with 
 "wooden ships," quite as equal to equal. He had seen with his ardent 
 youngster eyes, the glorious Viking, lashed to the mast of the stout Hart- 
 ford, in the habor of Mobile, when sinister rams and the mysterious tor- 
 pedo were in the full first prime of the awe they inspired. He had 
 indeed served a hero novitiate, and came by right of achievement to the 
 glory that crowns his age. His was found a fitting title to stand in the 
 scroll of immortality upon which the republic has embalmed the names of 
 John Paul Jones, Decatur, Hull, Bainbridge, Perry, McDonough, and 
 scores more. 
 
 To the country, a result like Manila comes as a surprise ; to the men 
 that make up the navy, rank and file, the work done in Manila waters 
 was a matter of course. That is to say, there is not an officer graduate 
 from Annapolis, who would for an instant distrust his capacity to fight 
 the ships placed under his command, to the utmost extent of their capaci- 
 ties. This does not mean, of course, that all would meet the happy issue 
 
 (411)
 
 412 DEWEY, THE YANKEE. 
 
 Dewey 's onset secured. Dewey, in other words, is not the "heaven 
 sent " hero the emotional love to adore. He is a man far past the 
 meridian, and had there been no war, he would have passed into the 
 limbo of the retired, his name unknown, his fame undreamed. He is to 
 the core the quintessence of the Yankee. Born in Vermont in 1837, he 
 met the by no means stimulating vicissitudes of the hardy Green moun- 
 tains, very much as his ancestors before him. It is significant of the part 
 chance plays in the fates of even the elect, that until far beyond the age 
 when the bent of the boy is decided, Dewey knew nothing of the sea. 
 He was a farmer lad when he was appointed a cadet at Annapolis in 
 1854, in his seventeenth year. Four years later he was graduated from 
 the academy in a class of which nearly every man achieved distinction in 
 the Civil War. In that war too, Dewey met the various responsibilities 
 put upon him, with precisely the same certainty of touch and accuracy of 
 calculation the world admires in the Manila spectacle. He went through 
 the admirable routine of our young sea lions a cruise in the Mediter- 
 ranean ; and then in 1862 promptly with the opening of the naval cam- 
 paign, took up the burden he has ever since borne, beginning as a lieuten- 
 ant on the steamship Mississippi. Then he was attached to the West 
 Gulf blockading squadron, and Dewey from the first found himself in the 
 field fate was preparing for the glories of our fleets. He was thus 
 brought under the command of the most heroic figure, the most success- 
 ful admiral that ever fought a ship or commanded a squadron the in- 
 comparable Farragut. 
 
 It was in these stupendous combats, that the young lieutenant learned 
 the vital lesson of daring wisely, as illustrated in the passing of the 
 Spanish outworks, and adventuring on the unknown perils of mines, tor- 
 pedoes and shore batteries, at Manila. For never in the history of naval 
 warfare, were deeds of such daring undertaken and carried out, as Far- 
 ragut made part of the mission of his fleets. A young lieutenant grown 
 to a veteran, who had passed in the wooden fleets of Farragut through 
 the deadly pitfalls and iron hail of the Confederate defences before New 
 Orleans and Mobile, must have counted with confident certainty on what 
 such steps as he had at his disposal, could do before the Spanish defences 
 at Cavite. In a memorable attempt of Farragut to destroy or capture 
 the massive batteries on the bluffs of Port Hudson, the Mississippi paid 
 the penalty of too close an approach to the shore. She was riddled and 
 undone. The crew were compelled to take flight to save themselves, and 
 Dewey among them, fled to the swamps on the other side of the great 
 river- Thereafter, during the long years of the Civil War, Dewey alter-
 
 AFLOAT AND ASHORE. 41 S 
 
 nated between the squadrons, emerging from the contest in 1865 a lieu- 
 tenant-commander. His first service after the war, was on the imperish- 
 ably glorious Kearsarge, in European waters. He pursued the uneventful 
 regime of his profession with the relief of a year at Annapolis, and then 
 took to the sea again in command of the Narragansett. His next billet 
 was the survey of the Pacific, which lasted three years. In 1876, he was 
 appointed Light House Inspector, and later, Secretary of the Board. In 
 1882 he commanded the Juniata, from this he was awarded the rank of 
 Captain and entrusted with the Dolphin, the first of the "White Fleet." 
 He was in command of the European squadron until 1888, when he was 
 assigned to the Bureau of Recruiting and Equipment at Washington. In 
 February, 1896, he was named Commodore, and President of the Board of 
 Inspection and Survey. These varying tenures embrace twenty-three 
 years of land service and sixteen at sea. It was in Jan., 1898, that 
 Dewey raised his flag on the Olympia, in the Asiatic squadron. Had he 
 been given his way, he would never have been in the decisive fleet that 
 was to influence the result of the war; to paralyze both the hope and the 
 stroke of Spain ; for slight as the chances of the over-matched monarchy, 
 had the Manila fleet not succumbed with such startling completeness, the 
 squadrons of Cervera and Camara would have wrought with more heart ; 
 and that is a large part of combat even with modern instruments of 
 warfare. 
 
 When assigned to Asiatic waters, Dewey proffered the executive posts 
 of the fleet to young and promising officers, who were more than reluc- 
 tant to accept. The hope that the political cast given the Cuban compli- 
 cation, must end in war, had for a year or more held high in the hearts of 
 the junior ranks of the navy ; for being educated for battle, these casuists 
 hold that war is essential to their rounded careers. Hence the Asiatic 
 squadron gave little promise of the chances that would befall in the 
 event of war with Spain. It was never dreamed that operations would 
 extend to the Philippines, even were war brought about by the tumultuous 
 incitements of the congressional and journalistic fomentors. There was 
 therefore in the assignment to the far east, the heart-burning of the sort 
 gallant men feel when the looming vision of opportunity is obscured by 
 the dull needs of prescriptive routine. Dewey accepted his fleet as 
 honorable banishment, and his successful competitor, Howell, assumed com- 
 mand of the European squadron, with roseate visions of what was to be. 
 
 Naturally, after the event at Manila every one who had been brought 
 into relation with the Yankee viking, had, or invented, some touch of 
 portraiture to satisfy the eager curiosity of his countrymen. But beyond
 
 414 FORECASTLE STORIES. 
 
 the fact that as a man he is of the approved type, as an officer, of the 
 most distinguished qualities and qualifications, Dewey 's personality does 
 not lend itself to the vagaries of the poet or eulogist. He is the quint- 
 essence of the race best known perhaps in the James Russell Lowells, 
 Emersons, John A. Andrews astutely reticent by natural predilection, 
 yet garrulously confiding in an esoteric way. Dewey is the best ideal 
 of the Yankee cultivated, generous, self-reverencing, self-judging, re- 
 ceptive to every alternation that embodies experience. His best and 
 most interesting eulogists are found in the men before the mast, perhaps 
 the most penetrating critics of capacity that a man in authority in a fleet 
 is subjected to. He is known to be wisely lenient to petty offences, and it 
 is emphasized in every anecdote bearing on his career, that he was 
 intolerant only to liars. He affected deafness and blindness to the 
 temporary straying of the crew, that is to say, the aberrations that signalize 
 Jack, when his rare vacations on shore leave him helpless before the 
 seductions of the cup. A tar in Washington who sailed with the con- 
 queror of Spain's Manila fleet, confides this fascinating picture of the 
 Dewey known in the "forecastle": 
 
 " He's what I'd call a little fellow as to height, but he surely looked 
 bigger'n a Dutch frigate when he stood on his side of the mast and you 
 were up in front of him. But he was a tender-hearted man on the cruise 
 when he and I were shipmates. He'd try not to see or hear things that 
 he didn't want to see or hear. None of us knew him up forward I 
 mean as a commander. Some of us had been shipmates with him when 
 he was a deck officer, and had never got the worst of it at his hands. 
 But we weren't sure how he'd * stack up' as a skipper. We weren't long 
 in finding out. We had to sailorize all right, but there wasn't much 
 'brigging' with Dewey. He didn't like to see a man in double irons on 
 his tours of inspection. We hadn't been to sea with him very long before 
 we ' got next ' to how he despised a liar. One of the petty officers went 
 ashore at Gibraltar, got mixed up with the soldiers in the canteens up on 
 the hill and came off to ship * paralyzed.' He went before Dewey 
 at the mast next morning. He gave Dewey the two-beers-and-sun- 
 stroke ' yarn. ' You're lying, my man,' said Dewey. ' You were very 
 drunk. I myself heard you aft in my cabin. I will not have 
 my men lie to me. I don't expect to find total abstinence in a man-o'- 
 war's crew, but I do expect them to tell me the truth, and I am going to 
 have them tell me the truth. Had you told me candidly that you took 
 the drop too much on your liberty, you'd have been forward by this time, 
 for you, at least, returned to the ship. For lying you get ten days in
 
 BRIG. -GENERAL, THADDEUS H. STANTON. BRIG -GENERAL GUIDO N. LIEBKI 
 
 Paymaster-General, U. S. A. Judge-Advocate-General, TJ. S. A. 
 
 BRIG.-GENERAL JOHN M. WILSON. 
 
 Chief of Engineers, U. S. A 
 
 BRIG-GENERAL A. W. GREELEY. 
 
 Chief Signal Officer, U. S. A.
 
 ONE CHRISTMAS DAY. 417 
 
 irons. Let me have the truth hereafter. I am told you are a good sea- 
 man. A good seaman has no business lying.' 
 
 "After that there were few men on board who didn't throw themselves 
 on the mercy of the court when they waltzed up to the stick before 
 Dewey, and none of us ever lost anything by it. He'd have to punish us 
 in accordance with regulations, but he had a great way of ordering the 
 release of men he had to sentence to the brig, before their sentences were 
 half worked out. 
 
 " Dewey was the best liberty -granting skipper I was ever shipmates 
 with. He hated to keep quarantined men aboard, when the good-conduct 
 men were flocking off to the beach. One fine Christmas Day in Genoa 
 harbor, all the men entitled to shore liberty lined up at ten o'clock in the 
 morning to answer muster before taking the running boats for the shore. 
 There were about forty of us myself among the number, who were 
 quarantined aboard for having raised Cain ashore in Nice a few weeks 
 before. Our quarantine was for three months, and it wasn't half run out 
 on this Christmas Day. Dewey stood at the break of the poop, with his 
 hands on his hips, watching the liberty party line up. Us fellows that 
 couldn't go were standing around the gangway, smoking our pipes, and 
 looking pretty down in the mouth, I guess. The big liberty party there 
 were a couple of hundred men in the batch finally got away, and the 
 ship was practically deserted, except for us quarantined fellows. Dewey 
 watched us for a while out of the tail of his eye. We were leaning over 
 the side, watching the receding boats with the big liberty party. Dewey 
 went up on the poop and walked up and down, chewing his moustache, 
 and every once in a while shooting a look at us men up forward. Finally, 
 he walked down the poop ladder and straight forward to where we were 
 grouped. 
 
 " * You boys hop into your mustering clothes and go on off to the 
 beach. I'll let you have a couple of the running boats when they return. 
 Come back with the other fellows when you get ready. Don't raise any 
 more trouble ashore than you can help.' 
 
 " There wasn't a man in the gang of us that didn't want to hug little 
 Dewey for that, and you can gamble that we gave him a * cheer ship ' that 
 rang around the harbor of Genoa. We all got marked in the log as 
 'clean and sober,' too, when we got back to the ship, for we weren't going 
 to do any cutting up on Dewey, after the way he'd treated us." 
 
 Volumes of the closest study couldn't present a more graphic picture of 
 the great seaman, for the eye of the sailor is like the eye of the child, 
 single in its purpose of seeing things as they are. Naturally, the origin
 
 418 OF " LATIN " BLOOD. 
 
 of the family becomes a subject of discussion. Like Farragut, the ancient 
 stem of the race grew in what is vaguely called " Latin " soil. The first 
 Deweys were Douais probably named from the city in northern France. 
 Emigration and residence in England bred the corruption of the name, 
 we see in all those transplanted from the Gauloise surroundings. It 
 therefore appears that two of the most illustrious of our naval heroes 
 were growths of " Latin " blood a point worth signalizing while the 
 idiotic clamor of "Anglo-Saxon" antecedents are counted as indicative of 
 some rare superiority in men or peoples. A British journal contributes an 
 anecdote of Dewey that reveals one of the ineffaceable traits of his 
 Gauloise origin, " While on his European post, in 1883, Dewey was forced 
 to put himself under an eminent British specialist. He was suffering 
 from abcess of the liver in a very complex form, and was not expected to 
 survive an operation to which he had to submit. When about to undergo 
 it, the last words he murmured before he became quiet under the in- 
 fluence of the anaesthetic were, * I've made up my mind, and I won't die/ 
 and he didn't, to the general astonishment. After he became con- 
 valescent, I used sometimes to push him about the hospital gardens in a 
 bath chair, and on one occasion I remember his saying to me (apropos of 
 the operation) ' You know, I've got a wife and children depending on me 
 at home, and I couldn't afford to die just then.' I know that the doctors 
 said that nothing but his extraordinary determination pulled him through, 
 and that they never had a pluckier patient." 
 
 Startling almost theatric as were the climaxes of the three months' 
 war, none of the episodes many of them equally grandiose, diverted pub- 
 lic interest from the vicissitudes besetting Dewey. From the first memo- 
 rable intimation of his well-won immortality, the heart of the republic 
 thrilled in grateful adoration over his name, his winning personality. It 
 was impossible to tell enough about him. Every mail from the Orient 
 was awaited with an interest as keen as we can imagine concentered on 
 the Spanish galleons four centuries ago, when each bore to the descendant of 
 the Ctesars, the announcement of new realms, more imposing in area than the 
 greatest empire of Europe. Of Dewey himself, the anecdotage was meagre. 
 His life had been what Shakespeare describes Duncan So clear in its 
 high ministry, that there was nothing left to disentangle or equivocate 
 over. For months he was claimed by every sect in the church, by both 
 the great political parties and even the dilletante delighted in an unveri- 
 fied legend, which represented the great captain as so careful in attire, 
 that his comrades nicknamed him "Gentleman George." Never in the 
 history of war in modern times did conquest bring such instant fruition
 
 WARRIOR AND STATESMAN. 
 
 419 
 
 to the man. Congress vied- with the Navy Department the press with 
 both, to give the great sailor lofty testimonial of the republic's grateful 
 recognition. Any grade within the President's gift was urged, and in- 
 stantly. Indeed the unanimous voice of the country ordered a revival of 
 the grade illustrated by the greatest of all sea kings Farragut the 
 towering rank of " Admiral." For as in the army while a man may be 
 u "rear" admiral the complete and rounded office of Admiral was 
 abolished when Admiral Porter, the successor of Farragut died. 
 
 But, Dewey in his far away station, apparently gave little heed to his 
 own personal fortunes. He had at one master-stroke put himself in the 
 category of the most 
 -admired sea captains of 
 any age ; but the very 
 completeness of his con- 
 quest, for a time put 
 upon him a role of the 
 utmost difficulty. It 
 was in the second func- 
 tion that of warrior 
 and statesman, that the 
 vigor of his mind, his 
 incomparable equipoise, 
 added to the immeasur- 
 able esteem, admira- 
 tion of his countrymen. 
 We saw him in the con- 
 fusion of the conquest 
 on that memorable May 
 day, giving as much 
 solicitous care to the 
 safeguarding of the 
 wretched Spanish ma- 
 riners, as before the 
 event he had given to 
 the million details essential to the victory. Knowing the harrowing 
 anxiety that his countrymen must suffer with but an inkling of the battle, 
 or perhaps an untruthful version from the Spaniards, Admiral Dewey 
 made an effort to overawe the Spanish Captain General Augusti, and 
 by securing the surrender of the city which was at his mercy, obtained 
 access to the cable. The British consul had hurried to the fleet, so soon 
 
 CAPTAIN GENERAL AUGUSTI.
 
 AUGUSTI'S FAMOUS MESSAGE. 421 
 
 as the destruction of Montojo was an accomplished fact, and represented 
 the futility of the Spaniards attempting to resist our further onset. 
 
 Admiral Devvey knew perfectly the powerlessness of his enemy, but he 
 was diplomat enough to know that the Spaniard was not his own master. 
 That the surrender of the city would never be forgiven in Madrid, until 
 the walls were battered down and the " honor " of Spain vindicated. He 
 therefore made use of the British official to send Captain-General Augusti 
 word, that the city of Manila was in a state of blockade ; that the United 
 States forces would occupy Cavite ; that if a single shot were fired at the 
 fleet, he would destroy everything within range and that if he were not 
 permitted to use the cable, he would cut it. The telegraph company ex- 
 pressed their desire to have the cable then neutralized, but the Captain- 
 General peremptorily refused the transaction. Hence, as he could not 
 use the line himself, Admiral Dewey cut it, and thenceforth could com- 
 municate with Washington only by way of Hong Kong, 600 miles away. 
 Just as his messengers cut the wire, it was carrying to Madrid Augusti's 
 famous message that the Yankee fleet had retired "disabled." 
 
 Without soldiers to hold the city, its seizure after bombardment would 
 have been a task beyond the forces of Dewey's command. But it was 
 imperative that Cavite, the strong place of the city, should be held. 
 There the fleet had a base ; all sorts of supplies were stored in its ample 
 magazines, its wharves could accommodate the shipping bringing stores 
 and troops. When the fleet of Montojo was in extremis, a white flag had 
 been hoisted over the arsenal, but it was net until Monday that the Ad- 
 miral sent Commander Lamberton to take possession. 
 
 As this officer approached the landing, on the Petrel, he saw with dis- 
 may, that the white flag was no longer flying. The open places could be 
 seen crowded with troops and many evidences of belligerency in the atti- 
 tude of the men. Apprehensive of treachery, Commander Laraberton 
 got into a launch with Commander Wood, leaving orders that if they were 
 not back in an hour, to open fire on the arsenal. On landing, the two of- 
 ficers asked to be conducted to the commander. This proved to be a 
 Captain Sostoa, who informed Lamberton, that his Admiral had retired to 
 Manila and that he, Sostoa, was in charge. " May I ask, Captain," said 
 Lamberton, "why your men are under arms after yesterday's surrender?" 
 
 "There was no surrender," replied Sostoa. 
 
 "But," said Lamberton, "the white flag was hoisted," 
 
 " Yes," retorted Sostoa, " but not as a surrender, only as a toKen of 
 truce during which we might remove our women and children to a place 
 of safety."
 
 422 
 
 YOU FIRED THL FIRST SHOT.' 
 
 "But, Captain," said Lamberton, "an arsenal is not exactly the place 
 for women and children in times of war. They should have been removed 
 before the bombardment began." 
 
 "Ah, well, you see," said Captain Sostoa with a shrug. "You Ameri- 
 cans came in to visit us at such an extremely early hour that we had no 
 time to remove our women and children. If you had begun to fight at a 
 less unreasonable hour " 
 
 " Excuse, me Cap- 
 tain," said Lamberton. 
 "You fired the first shot. 
 But there is no use 
 talking of past events, 
 nor is it my place to do 
 so. I am sent here as 
 a representative of Com- 
 modore Dewey of the 
 United States Asiatic 
 squadron, to take pos- 
 session of this arsenal, 
 and my further instruc- 
 tions are that all Span- 
 iards, whom I find here, 
 must surrender their 
 arms and persons as 
 prisoners of war. If 
 this is not done and 
 done quickly, the en- 
 gagement will be re- 
 newed." 
 
 To this Sostoa replied 
 that he could do noth- 
 ing without consulting his superior. 
 
 " But we will regard you as sufficiently representative," Lamberton re- 
 joined. Then the Spaniard requested that the terms of the surrender 
 might be put down in writing. Lamberton glanced at his watch. Forty 
 of the sixty minutes had elapsed, and in twenty more the Petrel's guns 
 would be banging away, and while Lamberton and Wood knew very well 
 what the issue of the new fight would be, so far as the fleet and the 
 arsenal were concerned, their own predicament would be rather anomal- 
 ous. Lamberton wrote down these terms: 
 
 COMMANDER B. F. LAMBERTON.
 
 ONLY FIVE MINUTES LEFT. 428 
 
 "Without further delay all Spanish officers and men must be with- 
 drawn, and no buildings or stores must be injured. As Commodore 
 Dewey does not wish further hostility with the Spanish naval forces, the 
 Spanish officers will be paroled, and the forces at the arsenal will deliver 
 all their small arms." 
 
 The conversation had been in Spanish, but as the conditions were writ- 
 ten in English, Sostoa wanted them translated and clearly explained. 
 
 Again Lamberton looked at his watch. Five minutes of the hour only, 
 remained. 
 
 " Excuse me Captain," he said, " but there is an absolute reason why I 
 should return at once to the vessel. I will give you until noon, and if 
 on that hour the white flag is not again hoisted over this arsenal, we shall 
 again open fire." 
 
 They reached the landing and the launch just in time, for as they put 
 off from the steps they could see the men moving into position around 
 the Petrel's guns, preparatory to opening fire. 
 
 Captain Sostoa did not wait for noon, but hoisted the white flag at a 
 quarter of eleven ; and when Lamberton returned to take possession, he 
 found that the captain had marched off to Manila with every man, and 
 that every man had taken his rifle. 
 
 On the withdrawal of the Spaniards, hordes of natives who had been 
 lurking in the neighboring thickets swarmed into the deserted town. 
 They sacked everything accessible and portable. It was for some time a 
 matter of doubt whether the mass would heed the small band of marines 
 landed to hold the place. No sooner however, were the marines seen 
 marching through the streets, than an extraordinary spectacle unrolled 
 itself. While the natives were pillaging the arsenal and even the hospi- 
 tals, the Spaniards formed in a woeful procession headed by priests and 
 nurses. They came in the humble posture of condemned martyrs, mak- 
 ing a last prayer to their inhuman tormentors ! The officers could not 
 comprehend the meaning of the tearful embassies, until a copy of Cap- 
 tain-General Augustus proclamation was produced. It would be impos- 
 sible to characterize the mingled credulity and ignorance of a people in 
 compacter form : the viceroy of the Queen of Spain was not ashamed 
 to put his official signature to rhodomontade which rivals the naivete of 
 Don Quixote : 
 
 "Spaniards: Between Spain and the United States of North America 
 
 hostilities have broken out. The moment has arrived to prove to the 
 
 world that we possess the spirit to conquer those who, pretending to be 
 
 loyal friends, take advantage of our misfortunes and abuse our hospital- 
 
 23
 
 424 RIDICULOUS BOASTING. 
 
 ity, using means which civilized nations count unworthy and disrepu- 
 table. The North American people, constituted of all the social excres- 
 cences, have exhausted our patience and provoked war with their perfid- 
 ious machinations, with their acts of treachery, with their outrages 
 against the law of nations and international conventions. 
 
 " The struggle will be short and decisive. The God of victories will 
 give us one as brilliant as the justice of our cause demands. Spain, which 
 counts upon the sympathies of all nations, will emerge triumphantly from 
 this new test, humiliating and blasting the adventurers from those states 
 that, without cohesion, and without a history, offer to humanity only in- 
 famous traditions, and the ungrateful spectacle of chambers in which ap- 
 pear united insolence and defamation, cowardice and cynicism. 
 
 " A squadron manned by foreigners possessing neither instruction nor 
 discipline, is preparing to come to this archipelago with the ruffianly in- 
 tention of robbing us of all that means life, honor, and liberty. Pretend- 
 ing to be inspired by a courage, of which they are incapable, the North 
 Americans undertake as an enterprise capable of realization, the substitu- 
 tion of Protestantism for the Catholic religion you profess, to treat you as 
 tribes refractory to civilization ; to take possession of your riches as if 
 they were unacquainted with the rights of property, and to kidnap those 
 persons whom they consider useful to man their ships, or to be exploited 
 in agricultural or industrial labor. 
 
 " Vain designs ! Ridiculous boastings ! 
 
 " Your indomitable bravery will suffice to frustrate the attempt to carry 
 them into realization. You will not allow the faith you profess to be 
 made a mock of ; impious hands to be placed in the temple of the true 
 God; the images you adore to be thrown down by unbelief. The aggres- 
 sors shall not profane the tombs of your fathers, they shall not gratify 
 their lustful passions at the cost of your wives' and daughters' honor, or 
 appropriate the property that your industry has accumulated as a provi- 
 sion for your old age. No : they shall not perpetrate any of the crimes 
 inspired by their wickedness and covetousness, because your valor and 
 patriotism will suffice to punish and abase the people that, claiming to 
 be civilized and cultivated, have exterminated the natives of North Amer- 
 ica, instead of bringing to them the life of civilization and of progress. 
 
 " Philippines, prepare for the struggle, and united under the glorious 
 Spanish flag, which is ever covered with laurels, let us fight with the con- 
 viction that victory will crown our efforts, and to the calls of our enemies 
 let us oppose with the decision of the Christian and the patriot, the cry 
 of * Viva Espana ! ' Your general, 
 
 "BASILIO AUGUSTIN DAVILA.
 
 A FALLEN PROPHET. 425 
 
 " Manila, 23d April, 1898." 
 
 The reaction among the gullible masses, offered enough of the lighter 
 vein to recompense the fleet for the trials of the brief campaign. All the 
 wounded were tenderly cared for, and those able to bear transportation 
 were put under the charge of the Red Cross to be conveyed to Manila. 
 When the long train of hurt and maimed reached that hapless town, the 
 stupefaction of the Spaniards was complete. They could not be made to 
 believe that the ferocious Yankees had relinquished their prey. The 
 Captain-General became a fallen prophet, he issued no more proclama- 
 tions, his first having been so swiftly discredited. Dewey's immense task 
 began only when the civic problems to be dealt with presented them- 
 selves. He had the capital of the Philippines under his guns, but with 
 no soldiery to man the conquered posts, he was every hour at the mercy 
 of the enemy. The creed and contention of " Sea power " as the last and 
 final evidence of dominion received an interpretation that will tend to . 
 check the assumptions of the school that hold navies alone, as the final 
 and exclusive instruments of national defence and conquest. For though 
 Dewey had secured from his fleet the most complete victory ever won, 
 he was as helpless for offence, as though his guns had been ploughshares. 
 It would be at least six weeks before he could count on a platoon of the 
 fifteen thousand troops, promptly designated to sail to his succor. Mean- 
 while, the Spaniards though fleetless, were in sufficient numbers to defend 
 every mile of accessible territories. Indeed, in the hands of an enterpris- 
 ing chief, the armies of Spain might have forced the fleet to remain far 
 from shore, compelling the invader to get his supplies entirely from his 
 base in San Francisco. 
 
 Nor was this the least of Dewey's perplexities. Though the work of 
 defending Spain's empire had been done by incompetent or dishonest 
 agents, was nowhere what it should be, the nature of the ground, to a 
 large extent remedied, if it did not supplement science. Before his de- 
 parture Captain-General Blanco had worked with diligence to make the 
 approaches to Manila difficult. Immense guns from Europe were 
 mounted in modern earthworks, and strong garrisons of Spanish troops 
 were brought from Spain to man them. Cavite fortress was counted 
 upon as the principal stronghold. 
 
 The town of Cavite lies on the southeastern part of the great bay, 
 twenty miles from the quarantine station at the harbor entrance, and ten 
 miles from Manila. The ancient fortress, which defended the harbor 
 when Draper raised the British flag over Manila, was reckoned impreg- 
 nable to infantry attack. The insurgents with their bows and arrows
 
 426 
 
 MANILA'S DEFENSES. 
 
 and old muskets, have assailed it, many a time, in vain. The Fortress 
 stands upon a rise of ground and looks precisely like the Morro Castle at 
 the entrance of Havana harbor. On the Cavite peninsula, between the 
 castle and the shore, modern earthworks were thrown up. The} 7 were 
 not more than ten feet high, but thick enough to stop the heaviest pro- 
 jectiles of modern guns. Behind the earthworks were mounted eight 
 eight-inch cannon, built by the Krupps. They were mounted en bar- 
 bette, non-disappearing carriages and comparatively close together. The 
 Captain-General, had, when the fleet was destroyed, 25,000 regular troops 
 and 100,000 natives, officered by Spaniards. Under ordinary circum- 
 stances, these natives bloodthirsty, profligate, licentious, fight valor- 
 
 SPANISH EARTHWORKS AT CAVITE. 
 
 ously when not too indolent to march. But it was found nearly im- 
 possible to discipline them to fit them for any other than guerrilla war- 
 fare. As against the enemy Spain had now provoked, however, it was 
 hopeless to count on the fidelity of the Philippines. Though the former 
 Captain-General, Primo de Rivera had subdued the latest uprising, the 
 apparition of the United States forces had again aroused the fiercely un- 
 restful, insurgent spirit. The conquest of the rebellion and the negotia- 
 tions leading to it, illustrate the moral and military decadence of Spain in 
 colonial administration. 
 
 Don Emilio Aguinaldo had been conceded the post of leader of the 
 natives. He had given the Spaniards two years of incessant campaign- 
 ing, of the wearing and inglorious sort known as guerilla warfare. 
 Primo de Rivera, worn out with the task, finally proffered the insur- 
 gents, substantially then these terms first securing the assent of the 
 chiefs by a bribe of $800,000. The treaty of peace is eloquent at the 
 conduct of Spain's agents, and the venality illustrates the worthlessness 
 of the so-called patriots. The terms signed embrace these provisions:
 
 THE PLAINT 0* iHE PHILIPPINOS. 427 
 
 First. The expulsion or secularization of the religious orders, and tho 
 abolition of all the official vetoes of these orders, in civil affairs. 
 
 Second. A general amnesty for all rebels; guarantees for their per- 
 sonal security, and from the vengeance of the friars and parish priests, 
 after returning to their homes. 
 
 Third. Radical reforms to curtail the glaring abuses in the administra- 
 tion. 
 
 Fourth. Freedom of the press to denounce official corruption and 
 blackmailing. 
 
 Fifth. Representation in the Spanish parliament. 
 
 Sixth. Abolition of the iniquitous system of secret deportation of 
 political suspects. 
 
 This compact the Governor General had no intention of observing. No 
 sooner were the chiefs, including Aguinaldo, expatriated with their bribes 
 than the agreement was ignored. Then the Philippines of influence 
 carried their plaint to Madrid, and recited among other grievances, that 
 the Philippine treasury was forced to pay a heavy contribution to the 
 general expenses of the government at Madrid ; pay pensions to the Duke 
 de Veragua and to the Marquis of Bedmar, besides those of the sultans 
 and native chiefs of the islands of Sulu and Mindanao. It also provided 
 for the entire cost of the Spanish consulates at Pekin, Tokio, Hong 
 Kong, Singapore, Saigon, Yokohoma, and Melbourne, for the staff and 
 material for the minister of the colonies, including the purely ornamental 
 council of the Philippines ; the expenses of supporting the colony of 
 Fernando Po, in Africa, and all the pensions and retiring allowances of 
 the civil and military employees who have served in the Philippines, 
 amounting in the sum to $1,160,000 a year. More than $17,000,000 is 
 the amount consigned in the Philippine budget for the year 1894, but not 
 a penny is allowed for public works, highways, bridges, or public build- 
 ings, and only $6,000 for scientific studies, while the amount set apart for 
 religious purposes and clergy amounts to nearly $1,400,00.0. This sum 
 does not include the amounts paid to the clergy for baptisms, marriages, 
 sale of indulgencies, papal bulls and scapularies, which exceed the gov- 
 ernment allowances. The sum of $40,000 is set apart as a subvention to 
 railway companies and new projects of railways, but the college for Fran- 
 ciscan monks in Spain and the transportation of priests comes in for $55,- 
 000. The complaints had torn the henrt of General Polajieva, who re- 
 turned from his Captain-Generalcy of the islands, resolved on reform. 
 
 Aguinaldo, on reaching neutral territory refused to share the $800,000 
 bribe with his fellows, and having a quick wit, he realized from the talk
 
 428 WAR MAKES STRAXGE BEDFELLOWS. 
 
 of the consulates, that Spain was likely to have her hands full in dealing 
 with the gigantic republic of the west. He at once took his measures to 
 renew the revolt, and made use of the Spanish bribe to get his forces to- 
 gether. He made himself known to the consul of the United States at 
 Hong Kong, and impressed Dewey with his capacity to make a formidable 
 diversion in our favor, in case we had the good fortune to crush the Span- 
 ish fleet and overawe Manila. There was even a semi-official agreement, 
 made in the office of the United States consul, Spencer Pratt, and several 
 of the insurgent chieftains. In this conciliabule Aguinaldo described the 
 causes and incidents of the last rebellion. In case of war, he explained 
 the nature of the cooperation he could give, while he promised to main- 
 tain order and to conduct the war on civilized principles. He covenanted 
 that he would be willing to accept for Luzon, the same terms that the 
 United States intended giving to Cuba. War like poverty, makes strange 
 bedfellows. Dewey with the instinctive reserves of the born statesman 
 accepted tacitly the volunteer aid of the nondescript insurgent who 
 might, or might not, add to the embarrassments of the situation both 
 for himself and the Spanish enemy. To Aguinaldo's demand for instant 
 recognition as the President of the Philippines, Dewey opposed a polite 
 admonition to wait until Washington could be heard from. He supplied 
 the impetuous chief with ample stores for his impatient patriots, but gave 
 him no official status. A less sagacious administrator than Dewey would 
 have hesitated before the spectre of a republic with from 9,000,000 to 
 17,000,000 savages. 
 
 The Spanish commanders had added to their own peril in an unwise 
 attempt to transform the natives into auxiliary soldiery. The effect was, 
 as might have been foreseen, the contagion of unrest, insurgency. The 
 word liberty, which has an indigenous interpretation the world over, meant 
 to the Philippines, license, a state of things in which there should be no 
 toil no taxes. The Spaniards represented to them both toil and tax, and 
 the rumor that a free people never toiled, who sailed the seas for riches 
 and lived as they pleased in primeval forests, were on the way to drive 
 the Spaniards out very soon made the native troops a terror to the 
 wretched Spanish viceroy. Under the policy of conciliation, Mauser 
 rifles had been apportioned lavishly to the able-bodied nomads, and now 
 with the Yankee guns covering the city, the Captain-General faced revolt 
 among his auxiliaries and the bullets from the Mausers directed at the 
 Spanish soldiery. No sooner was Aguinaldo back among his compatriots, 
 than the Spaniards began to comprehend the extent of Dewey's blow. 
 The treacherous natives, with pledges of loyalty warm on their lips, up-
 
 THE BELEAGURED CITY. 
 
 429 
 
 rose in all the rural districts where there was loot to be gained or venge- 
 ance slaked. Within a radius of twenty miles of Manila, bands of con- 
 verts, with prayers and protests of devotion, uprose on the priests, on the 
 sparse military garrisons butchered and pillaged, without compunction. 
 Every hour brought news of outbreak and devastation outbreaks the 
 
 REBELS DECOYING SPANIARDS WITHIN RANGE. 
 
 more serious that the ferocious outlaws were armed with the best guns 
 and in many cases had been drilled by Spanish officers. Day after day, 
 the wan watchers in the streets and outworks, had to open the gates of 
 the beleaguered city to the routed garrisons of the towns outlying Manila. 
 It was a part of a wise warrior to aid and abet all these troubles of the 
 Manila garrison. Dewey contributed 5,000 Mauser rifles and an adequate
 
 430 THE WORN-OUT GARRISON. 
 
 amount of ammunition. Aguinaldo gave out that he had used the 
 greater part of the $ 800,000 bribe, to arm his compatriots. But a Brit- 
 ish banker in Hong Kong was known to have the sum or had it, nearly 
 intact, long after the fall of Manila. 
 
 But the Spaniards upheld their flag manfully. They were encouraged 
 to withstand the rebels, knowing that it would require six weeks for the 
 first of our troops to reeuforce Dewey. During those weeks Spain would 
 find allies or Madrid would send a succoring fleet. The German ships 
 too, coming so promptly on the scene it was argued by the beleaguered 
 garrison, was the preliminary of a joint action by European powers. But 
 to escape the horrors of capture by the indescribable natives, there was 
 not a man in the garrison who would not have preferred instant surrender 
 to Admiral Dewey. But to hold the city, work day and night, was in- 
 cumbent on the worn-out garrison. The slaughter among the officers of 
 the native regiments threatened to destroy the whole army. The most 
 grievous blow to Spanish pride was the uprising of one of the most 
 trusted of the native regiments charged with the defence of a vital ap- 
 proach. They fell upon the unsuspecting corps of Spaniards at night and 
 massacred them to a man. After that, the disheartened Captain-Gen- 
 eral, had he not been restrained by advice conveyed through the Ger- 
 mans, would have thrown himself upon Dewey 's mercy. But to keep 
 the garrison in heart, the work of strengthening the ancient, inner walls 
 went on feverishly. The clergy raised the sum of $1,000,000 to aid the 
 public treasury. The old moat, dug three hundred years ago, and grown 
 over, was deepened and widened. Every gun in the interior of the 
 islands that could be secured, was brought to Manila and placed to guard 
 against the land attack. There was never a sign of defence against the 
 sea. 
 
 It was not, however, the Spanish commander or his foredoomed forces 
 that gave Dewey uneasiness. Indeed, so far as they were concerned, he 
 had no perplexity. Two discordant intrigues were making his attitude 
 almost unbearable. The plots of the German and British both on their 
 fleets and in the consulates in Manila tended to embarrass Dewey's ac- 
 tion. The British from the first assumed the attitude of patronizing 
 good fellowship, which with them always precedes some diabolical treach- 
 ery ; the Germans intent on a grab, could scarcely be restrained from forc- 
 ing a combat with our victorious fleet. 
 
 The German emperor with that restless greed of the parvenu, which 
 seeks recognition at all hazards, began a studiously offensive plan of 
 campaign, designed to embarrass the invader and incidentally strengthen
 
 A MEDDLING ADMIRAL. 431 
 
 the hopes of the Spaniards. A German fleet, fresh from the rape of a 
 Chiniese port, seized in a time of peace, sailed into Manila harbor, assumed 
 the air of arbiter and for a time made it very probable that the fleet that 
 had destroyed Montojo would be called on to teach the bumptious med- 
 dler a lesson. Admiral Diedrich, the Kaiser's commander, indeed as- 
 sumed to set Dewey's prescription and regulation at defiance. By night 
 and by day our ships were held in leash, as if in the neighborhood of a 
 declared enemy. When these offences became too glaring, Dewey per- 
 emptorily reminded the meddling German that he was going too far and 
 that another outbreak would be met by a broadside of the republic's 
 fleets. 
 
 The world watched the strange spectacle with an interest swayed by 
 conflicting emotions. Half of Europe hoped that the Germans would 
 give loose to the arrogant disregard of the comities the empire has dis- 
 played since it achieved unity. The French and Russians were eager to 
 see the Kaiser involved in war with a power strong enough to bankrupt 
 the new dictator; Great Britain hoped for a collision which would give 
 her a chance to pose as the friend of her " Kin beyond the sea " and in- 
 cidentally break the power of the only commercial rival that was giving 
 her concern. But Dewey from the hour the Spanish flag was struck 
 from the fleet, to the end, met each dilemma with the ready resources of 
 a trained diplomat and administrator. While maintaining vigorous 
 blockade, he gave permission to a delegation of British and German mer- 
 chants to remove their families to Cavite. He ordered that port to be 
 made inhabitable and placed Consul Williams in Charge. The conse- 
 quence was that wealthy Manila families placed all their houses at Cavite 
 at Dewey's disposal. He made himself wisely popular among the British 
 ship masters. Instead of conducting himself with the absolutism of a 
 conqueror, he aided and facilitated their business so far as it did not in- 
 terfere with his duties. His praise was heard in every port in the far 
 east ; when he was in need of coal, these ship masters sold him 3,000 
 tons, as much from good will as a desire to do a good stroke of business. 
 Manila papers, all of which were under government control, tried to 
 keep up the Spanish courage by all sorts of fanciful and sensational re- 
 ports. They maintained that the Baltimore was so damaged in the bat- 
 tle that the Admiral had decided to scuttle her. One issue contained a 
 proclamation from the Archbishop, stating that four Spanish battleships 
 were on their way out, and that God had informed him that in the next 
 engagement, the armies of the most Christian Spain would be victorious! 
 
 Every incoming vessel brought rumors of unrest to the sorely tried
 
 432 DELIBERATE INFRINGEMENT. 
 
 Admiral, as the days of waiting dragged heavily onward. Spain was 
 gathering her greatest fleet to despatch through the Suez Canal to exter- 
 minate the audacious invader. As the rumors of Spanish recrudescence 
 became more tangible, the insolent and menacing provocation of the Ger- 
 man marplot passed from the tentative to the actual. As lord by con- 
 quest of Manila 'waters, Admiral Dewey established regulations safe- 
 guarding his fleet. Among other prescriptions, it was directed that no 
 craft should move about the bay after dark, without permission of the 
 proper authority. This rule is of universal application under such cir- 
 cumstances. All the navies and fleets in Manila harbor complied scru- 
 pulously with the requirement, save the Germans. They insisted in sail- 
 ing their launches, and pleasure boats and what not, through the sentinel 
 ships of Dewey's fleet, without a word of precaution. When this was 
 seen to be a deliberate infringement of his order, Admiral Dewey took 
 action. One night, a German launch was discovered prowling about the 
 bay. A searchlight was turned upon it, and for over an hour the boat 
 was kept under the convicting glare, while its actions were closely scru- 
 tinized. Finally Admiral Dewey sent a boat to the launch, and asked, in 
 a manner that admitted of no misunderstanding, that there be no move- 
 ment of boats or vessels in the bay at night, without his knowledge. 
 
 Hard by Manila, the Spaniards for some unknown purpose, early in 
 July, began to uprear fortifications on a point of strategic value, known as 
 Isla Grande. The point commands a sheet of water known as Subig 
 Bay, which the German " War lord," was understood to covet. The in- 
 surgent leader asked Admiral Dewe} r for permission to capture the point. 
 This was readily accorded. But when the storming party reached the 
 island, they found the German warship Irene in the bay, and they 
 reported at once to the Admiral that she refused to permit them to attack 
 the Spaniards. Admiral Dewey despatched the gunboat Concord and the 
 cruiser Raleigh to investigate the situation. They were instructed to 
 take the island in face of the Irene, if necessary, and turn it over to the 
 insurgents. When they entered Subig Bay, they saw the Irene there, 
 but as soon as she saw them she got under way and put back to Cavite. 
 The Spanish garrison on the island surrendered to our warships, without 
 making a fight. This incident made a grave and lasting impression on 
 the people of the republic. No sooner had the report reached Germany 
 than the Cabinet recognized the gravity of the situation. Semi-official 
 apologies were published in the German presses, and personages of author- 
 ity made haste to explain that it was a mere accident. But there was 
 not a man in this country who did not comprehend and resent the in-
 
 RUSSIA IN CLOSE AMITY. 483 
 
 science of the German Admiral. The merest trifle would have brought 
 the two peoples to a rupture. Meanwhile, the diplomatic agencies were 
 aglow with rumors of underhand treaties between Spain and the Kaiser, 
 for the transfer of Philippine sovereignty to the restless Hohenzollern. 
 That monarch, itching for the wonderment of the world, was known to 
 aspire to the sea-dominion of Great Britian. He had in profound peace, 
 without a word of warning, sent a fleet to the harbor of Kion Chon and 
 piratically demanded its cession. He had begun pourparlers for the 
 seizure of Delagoa Bay, the Portuguese haven, nearest the Transvaal re- 
 public, and was only stayed by the armament of an imposing British 
 squadron. In the Pacific, it was known that he was restive under the 
 arrangement forced upon him for the nominal autonomy of the Samoan 
 islands; he coveted the exclusive sovereignty. In fact, there is nothing 
 territorial that the new-fangled German empire does not covet, since the 
 momentary syncope of France permitted the abstraction of the old 
 Roman provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, as well as the Rhine frontiers; 
 yet the plot was in conception and detail the machination of British emissa- 
 ries, who made it known in every chancellery in Europe, that Britain saw 
 with distrust, the republic expelling the sovereignty of Spain, from her 
 American possessions. 
 
 To the Russian chancellor, the British made no secret that the republic 
 had grown presumptuous for no sooner were Spain driven out, than the 
 interloping democracy would demand the withdrawal of France and 
 Britain herself. But the Russians were no longer interested in trans- 
 atlantic colonies. They had sold their only possession to the republic 
 Alaska, and historically they were bound in the closest amity with the 
 United States. France was lured by proffers, to complete the Panama 
 canal, and thus free Europe of the menace of a water way under the sole 
 control of the Washington Cabinet. France was perfectly willing to join 
 in a remonstrance against pushing Spain to the wall ; untold millions of 
 French money are invested in Spanish securities further than that the 
 sagacious French statesmen would not go a step. But their willingness to 
 go thus far, was at once seized by British intriguers, to make it appear 
 that our oldest and only real friend on the continent, was willing to join 
 Europe in balking our action. Taking his cue from the home plotters, 
 the British Admiral at Manila made himself the shadow of the Yankee 
 Admiral, while preserving the closest intimacy with the German, Diedrich. 
 Coincidentally with this, the British Admiral found means to have the 
 word cabled to London for Yankee consumption, that the German com- 
 mander, having asked him, what he would do, if the two fleets, Dewey's
 
 484 
 
 A LIE WELL TOLD. 
 
 and the Kaiser's should come to blows he, the Briton had replied, " Oh, 
 that Admiral Dewej and I keep to ourselves " Of course the inference 
 to be drawn is. that Dewey had invoked the Briton's protection and that 
 the Queen's fleet would have been found aligned with the Yankees, if 
 the German's bumptiousness had forced Dewey to depart from his studi- 
 ous self-constraint. 
 
 The incident is another illustration of the inexpugnable perfidy of the 
 Briton in office. Admiral Dewey never dreamed of taking a Briton into 
 his confidence; never dreamed of calling upon the inborn, hereditary 
 enemy of the republic to aid him. For, side by side with the armada that 
 had conquered Spain, was the modest squadron of the French republic, 
 and there was not a man on the ships that would not have died and 
 gladly died for the chance to fire one volley at the hated black and 
 yellow flag of the parvenu power that despoiled France in 1870-1. Yet 
 a lie well told is as effective as the truth. The millions in this country 
 received the British fable and they believe it to this day, and will prob- 
 ably believe it until the day comes, when British fleets are thundering 
 in the harbors of New York and Boston. 
 
 OFF DUTY.
 
 PART II. 
 
 DEWEY'S dazzling work at Manila found the administration totally 
 unprepared to cooperate with him. This was, and is, no reflection 
 upon our sorely-tried administrative system. It was a hope, rather than 
 a trust, that Dewey might capture or destroy the military forces of Spain 
 in the vast Oriental empire known as the Philippines. The most that 
 was expected was, that his fleet might hold a considerable number of the 
 Spanish vessels in the far eastern seas, thereby lessening the task involved 
 in the submission of Cuba 
 and the enemy's posses- 
 sions in the Antilles. The 
 President had cabled 
 Dewey to destroy the Ma- 
 nila squadron, but neither 
 the executive nor his ac- 
 complished naval secre- 
 tary, Governor Long, 
 hoped for more than a 
 valorous combat and the 
 blockade of the Spanish 
 fleet in the roadstead of 
 Manila. When, therefore, 
 Dewey's laconic report 
 came to Washington, say- 
 ing simply, " I have obeyed 
 my orders," there was 
 something like a panic of 
 delight in high places. 
 With the Spanish fleet 
 destroyed, a prize more 
 glittering than fortune had 
 ever thrown in the grasp of conquering ambition, offered itself to the 
 administration. In an instant, "The war of humanity" was subtly 
 changed into a struggle with conscience, the teaching of religion, the 
 comities of national honor. For, the instant the Manila result was real- 
 ized by the Cabinet at Madrid, the word was sent out that Spain sue- 
 
 (435) 
 
 CAPTAIN AUNON. 
 Spanish Minister of Marine.
 
 436 REGULARS FOR DEPENDENCE. 
 
 cumbed, that she was ready to conform to the insolent and unprecedented 
 mandate of the United States Congress. 
 
 But, as a lie breeds a lie, a false pretense breeds a brood of pretenses 
 Howsoever much the President might desire peace, he dared not for an 
 instant, accept it. The famine of "glory" had not been glutted, the 
 armed quarter million had not heard the Mauser; the fleets of the At- 
 lantic had not demonstrated that they were the inheritors of Paul Jones, 
 Decatur, Bainbridge, and Farragut; the regiments so impulsively formed 
 in every state, had not shown that they were of the stuff that made the 
 myriads of the Civil War's glories. No president, no cabinet, no human 
 agency, dared accept the piteous hints of the wretched Spaniard. There 
 must be more destruction, more death, there nist be a siege and battle 
 in Cuba to justify the war, so recklessly, so needlessly to my mind, so 
 wickedly forced upon the helpless. The governing councils of Wash- 
 ington had counted only on a campaign in Cuba. To that end the lim- 
 ited number of troops called out seemed ample ; was ample. For the 
 more blatherskite fomentors of this war, knew that, when the worst 
 came to the worst, our dependence must be placed upon the Regulars. 
 I have been a volunteer in the armies of the republic and I can do im- 
 partial justice to the generous and noble millions who enlist, but, they are 
 no more to be compared with Regular soldiery in an immediate crisis, 
 than an ox is to be compared with a racer. Yet, it is a mere question of 
 time when the volunteer is able to do all that the Regular is expected to 
 do. It took two years and more, during the Civil War, to make our vol- 
 unteers as trustworthy as the Regulars, but after the two years, the vol- 
 unteers were Regulars. They stood and died in the seven days' battles; 
 they marched and died in the hideous Pope debacle ; in the end they 
 were the army. But it cost years and it cost millions to make 100,000 
 volunteers equal to 10,000 Regulars. 
 
 Of all that is venerable in the republic it is the Regular army that takes 
 precedence. A golden chord of the true glory that sanctifies fame, at- 
 taches their ranks with the sacred symbols of Washington's victories, 
 links them with every deed of emprise that redounds to the credit of the 
 republic, and makes them, though comparatively few in numbers, the 
 body best beloved and therefore the most implicitly reverenced tradition 
 in the republic. Officered by a corps of men who would be scholastic 
 exemplars in any other system, they have above all bodies serving the 
 state, dedicated to war, illustrated the meaning of the milites of the early 
 Roman civilization, when the soldier was the perfect paragon of the citi 
 zen. From the plains of Saratoga to the shambles of Yorktown, the Reg-
 
 OMITTED FROM POPULAR PLAUDITS. 437 
 
 ulars have embodied the peculiar characteristics that differentiate our 
 standing army from all others. They are first, and above all, instruments 
 of the law. In obedience, bravery, unmurmuring compliance with the 
 edicts of authority, they are all that Brutus dreamed, that Washington 
 meditated. Where the Regular army operates, there the work is done 
 systematically ; officered by men, every one of whom is capable of admin- 
 istering the government of a free people, this extraordinary body has been 
 the shield and defender of a republic which has grown from 1,500,000 to 
 70,000,000. It is because they perform their allotted task so modestly, 
 because they are so fastidiously observant of law and precedent, that their 
 virtues, their glory, even, is, if not unknown, but vaguely appreciated. 
 In the Civil War they were but a handful, yet their virtues impregnated 
 the 2,000,000 who fought the colossal fight; on any battlefield, when it 
 was known that the Regulars were present, the volunteers were tenfold 
 the force they would have been by themselves. Were an army in straits, 
 were a charge to be met, were a forlorn hope to be undertaken, the pres- 
 ence, the voice of a Regular troop was equal to a reinforcement of un- 
 numbered battalions. Yet, like the sunlight, like the beneficent forces of 
 nature, the Regulars were omitted from the popular plaudits, because it 
 seemed of course they should be equal to the utmost demanded like light. 
 or fire, or air. They have been, and they are, 25,000; that is enough 
 More would make us their slaves, that number makes us their adorers. 
 We never shall have need for more. Were they more they would be- 
 come the janissaries of the republic. They would lose their modesty, they 
 would lose their character; they would become the instruments of the 
 base, the designing, they would serve the miscreants who fatten on the 
 name of "patriot" to despoil the community. They would become what 
 is so easy for the military to become, the instrument of ambition, greed 
 war. We have no need of war. We covet nothing beyond our own 
 borders, that is, the sane majority do not. Within our own boundaries 
 we have all that a millionfold more in numbers than we are, need. If at 
 a future time the republic needs more, that is a matter for the future to 
 decide, and in that future, it is reasonable to hope that there will be no 
 such abhorrent barbarism as war, to veil greed or ambition. 
 
 The President and his military advisers hesitated before the painful 
 dilemma. It would be such a superb spectacle to reduce a far away, an 
 enchanting empire of romance. To throttle Spain at our own doors and 
 at the same time despoil her of the last vestiges of her greatness, in 
 the fabled isles of the East. Coincidently, the jingo press broke into 
 vociferous demands for "expansion." Shallow politicians divining all
 
 438 DEMAND FOR "EXPANSION." 
 
 that is mean and covetous in human nature, hurried to put themselves on 
 "record." Providence, the Almighty, all the deities, that the depraved 
 call upon when an especially evil end is advocated, were pointed out as 
 favoring our seizure of an empire, that had no more to do with our de- 
 clared purpose than Bohemia in Austria, or Poland, the lacerated victim 
 of the " humanitarian " process of Russia, Prussia or Austria. It was 
 finally decided that a very considerable portion of the army raised to 
 implant " civilization " in Cuba, should be diverted to reclaiming the 
 empire of the Philippines from the nerveless grasp of Spain. The vision 
 of a prodigious conquest ; the fascination of colonies greater in extent 
 than Britain had seized, dazzled a certain potential segment of the people, 
 and the President yielding to the clamor of the press and the insidious 
 beseechings of the truculent ordered half the available forces to Manila. 
 First 15,000 men were named as ample, but as European complications 
 fomented by the Briton began to be bruited, this number was doubled. 
 Finally, the commander of the forces impressed with the vociferations of 
 the jingo press, declared that he could not do the work expected under 
 50,000 men ! 
 
 General Wesley Merritt, a soldier of approved capacity was designated 
 for the post of Captain -General of the coveted empire. He sailed with 
 the conviction that he was expected to add the 2,000 islands of the 
 Philippine groups to the territory of the republic. He had barely touched 
 the soil of Luzon when he again demanded 50,000 soldiers to hold 
 Dewey's conquest and fulfil the expectations of the jingo journals. The 
 flower of the army, both regulars and volunteers accompanied General 
 Merritt. It required weary weeks to gather them together, and it 
 required still wearier weeks to traverse the immense waste of waters 
 between San Francisco and Manila. The army with this novel com- 
 mission, set out from San Francisco in straggling detachments. 
 
 But there were not enough Regulars to fight the spectacular battles 
 decreed in Cuba, and at the same time supplement Dewey's victorious 
 squadrons. General Miles, *he Commander-in-Chief, had from the first 
 advised an autumn campa'^n in Cuba. It was too late when Congress 
 ordered war, to expedite forces to the island in time to escape the fever 
 season, the torrential summer rains. But the agencies ordering the war 
 had taken no account of difficulties. The Morgans, Forakers, and 
 Thurstons, had translated the artifices of the innumerable juntas into 
 intolerable wrongs, that needed instant righting. The President knew 
 that a postponement until autumn would imperil the administration 
 even the war itself. Yet Lincoln encountered that; the war that Seward
 
 
 MAJOR-GENERAL WESLEY MERRITT.
 
 TO SUCCOR DEWEY. 441 
 
 announced would end in ninety days, went on in ever increasing volume 
 for five years. Hence there was doubt and misgiving over the resolution 
 to be taken. The Regulars could not be spared from Cuba or the bulk 
 of them ; they were too precious to commit to the long voyage between 
 San Francisco and Manila for the month required to carry them thither, 
 might be vital, in Cuba. Nor would an instant levy of 500,000 volunteers 
 resolve the problem. Then too, the imperial spirit had not yet become the 
 cry of any considerable number of journals. Clergymen had not approved 
 it, though a number of them did in time, after the jingo journals had pre- 
 pared the way. But the case was urgent. If not succored, Dewey might 
 find himself confronted by the last great fleet of Spain and an army equal 
 to our entire force. 
 
 On the last day of June, the anxious squadron and its sorely tried 
 commander, saw the national flag flying over an imposing flotilla. The 
 long expected succor had come. But, though the national administration 
 had strained all the available appliances of the departments to their 
 utmost, this first quota seemed almost ludicrously inadequate to the 
 work contemplated. Slight however as the force was, about 3,000 men, 
 they relieved the pressure on the fleet. While they were not equal to 
 forcing an action likely to result in the capture of Manila, they served 
 amply to garrison Cavite and even to hold the over-demonstrative natives 
 in check. For in the antipodes, as in Cuba, the native from the first 
 became the crucial complexity. Little had been known of the " Philip- 
 pines " or their fitness for self-rule. With neither schools, journals nor 
 literature, it was impossible to regard seriously the outbreaks of the 
 shifty leaders, as in any sense a reflex of a wide-spread unrest with the 
 civic institutions of Spain. Nor was the conduct of Aguinaldo the brag- 
 gadocio leader, calculated to reassure a clear-headed, scrupulously honor- 
 able executive like Dewey. Agninaldo, as has been seen, had compacted 
 with the Spanish Captain-General, to swallow his aspirations for reformed 
 administration or liberty, and had taken himself out of the islands. But 
 with the definite prospect of the immense pillage the city of Manila 
 offered, by the aid of the United States forces, the cohorts of insurgents 
 again became cohesive ; Dewey was barely master of the Manila waters, 
 when immense numbers of the nomads swarmed about the environs of 
 the city ready to enter, so soon as the Spanish forces were worn out. 
 
 To the armies and navies warring, as Congress declared, for "hu- 
 manity " nothing could be more repulsive than a coparceny with such a 
 leader and such hordes. For Aguinaldo was, and is of the most repellent 
 type of the manumitted, servile races. Born in the utmost obscurity, of 
 24
 
 442 EVIL AND CORRUPTION. 
 
 part Spanish and half-breed parents, fortune placed him as a child, with 
 a kindly priest who gave him humane treatment, opportunity to educate 
 himself and contact with whatever of refinement, the primitive society of 
 the islands afforded. He was quick of wit, diligent in a spasmodic way, 
 incorrigibly deceitful and ignobly enviously aspiring. He saw the 
 wrongs and oppressions put upon his people, but he saw them as wrongs 
 and oppressions, because he was not permitted to be of the governing 
 caste. Aguimildo studied medicine, mixed with the educated ranks of 
 the society about him, but all time kept up close confraternal relations 
 with the Philippine masses. He saw something of the world outside the 
 island empire where he was born. He is said to have passed years in 
 wandering through China and Japan. He became indoctrinated with 
 his value to himself, in Hong Kong, where British emissaries aroused him 
 to the opportunities for leadership in the Philippines. 
 
 The islands administered by viceroys, who regarded the billet very much 
 as a Klondiker his exile in the portals of eternal frost and snow, has been 
 consistently an evil and corrupt government. Every Captain-General 
 counted on returning to Spain rich, and he generally did so. The mur- 
 murs of the oppressed with difficulty reached the metropolitan, and when 
 they did, the needs of party, if not. the indifference of the government 
 stifled all outcry, all redress. Aguinaldo saw all this; he saw the restive- 
 ness of even the unofficial Spaniard, and he went to work to prepare a 
 dictatorship for himself. That is, he proposed to make himself a power 
 to be counted with. He had no conception of government, beyond the 
 simplest form of savage absolutism. He meant to get the millions be- 
 hind him, and then demand a share in the plunder. He is in his twenty- 
 eighth year now, and since his compatriots adopted him as their exponent 
 and idol, he has given every sign of the selfish, cruel, ineradicable savagery 
 born in him. Rivals or marplots, he treats as the Sultans of Turkey 
 treated possible aspirants to the throne. He has a face, hard as Nero's, 
 and morals that would shame a Fijian. He has the extraordinary 
 audacity of his race a race as I have before shown, taught that death is 
 the price of paradise, if given up in the cause of Mahomet. 
 
 Aguinaldo like all Philippinos associated with the Spaniards, is a 
 Catholic, but his revolt is primarily against the oppressive pervasive 
 influence of the religious orders. His most eminent rival, Atachio, said 
 to be a man of lofty views and self-denying integrity, incurred Agninaldo's 
 suspicion, because he began to share the adulation the people had first 
 paid the ex-valet. There was a quarrel between the two over the $800, 
 000 bribe, and Atachio mysteriously disappeared. It was really the
 
 A BOUFFE DECLARATION. 443 
 
 generalship of Atachio that wore out the corruptly led Spaniards in the 
 last revolution : it was the popular recognition of this that made the 
 unfortunate man one too many in the band of clever adventurers 
 Aguinaldo has brought about him. No sooner, however, is one of his 
 adlati distinguished in the favor of the Philippines, than he is sent far 
 away on a pretended mission, and once gone, his friends count him as 
 dead. When this extraordinary young man was the body servant of his 
 priestly patron, he was known simply as Emilio. Now he is obsequiously 
 addressed as " Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Faury." The man and the 
 system, or rather the bouffe regime he would conduct, may be best 
 judged from one of the first documents issued on the declaration of 
 independence of the Philippines : 
 
 DON EMILIO AGUINALDO Y FAURY, 
 
 " President of the Revolutionary Government of the Philippines and General- 
 in-Chief of its Army : 
 
 " In conformity with the precepts in the decree of this Government, dated 
 June 23, ult., and the instructions which accompanied it, I proclaim as 
 follows : 
 
 " Article 1. Senor Don Baldomero Aguinaldo is appointed Secretary of War 
 and Public Works; Senor Don Leandro Ibarra, Secretary of the Interior and 
 branches comprehended therein ; Senor Don Mariani Trias, Secretary of the 
 Treasury and the annexed branches. 
 
 " The conduct of the Bureau of Foreign Relations, Marine and Commerce 
 will be in charge provisionally, for the present, of the Presidency, until there is 
 appointed a Secretary who is considered more apt. 
 
 " Article 2. The gentlemen named will assume charge of their respective 
 offices, previously having solemnly taken, on the day designated for that pur- 
 pose by the President, the following oath : ' I swear by God and my honor to 
 carry out the laws and decisions and to fulfil faithfully the duty I voluntarily 
 accept, under the penalties established for the same. So may it be.' 
 
 " This oath will be taken before the President and the dignitaries who are 
 invited for this solemn act, the interested person placing his right hand on the 
 New Testament. 
 
 " Article 3. The directors and chiefs of provinces and villages, on receiving 
 their respective titles, will take a similar oath before the President and the 
 Secretaries of the Government. 
 
 " The prominent counsellors, as well as the delegates and subchiefs, will take 
 the oath before the chief of the province and the chiefs of villages previously 
 invited to the solemn act. 
 
 " Article 4. In the reports and similar documents presented to the author- 
 ities and in official correspondence there will be employed before the name of
 
 444 WHIMSICAL PRANKS. 
 
 the official the title ' Senor '' or ' Maguinor ' (Tagalo), according to the character 
 and importance of the same. When the official is not so addressed the per- 
 sonal title ' listed ' will be used when directed to an inferior or an equal, but 
 when addressed to a superior the title ' Xorot ros ' will be employed. 
 
 " Article 5. The Secretaries are empowered to sign ' by order of the Presi- 
 dent ' such resolutions or decisions as are of small importance and those which 
 expediency requires should be put into effect, but final decrees and resolutions 
 will be confirmed by the President and the Secretary. 
 
 " Article 6. The chiefs of provinces are permitted to use as distinctive of 
 their office a cane with gold head and silver tassels. On the upper part of the 
 cane there will be engraved a sun and three stars. 
 
 " The chiefs of villages may carry a similar cane, but with black tassels. The 
 subchiefs also may carry a cane with silver head and red tassels. 
 
 " The provincial counsellors are authorized to wear a triangular badge of 
 gold, pendent from a collar and a chain of the same metal ; on the badge there 
 shall appear an engraved sun and three stars. The delegates will wear a 
 similar badge, but of silver ; also the chain. 
 
 "Article 7. The President will wear as a distinctive mark a collar of gold 
 from which depends a badge similar to those heretofore described, and also a 
 whistle of gold. The Secretaries will wear a similar collar with the badge, and 
 the directors, also, but of silver. 
 
 u The President will carry also a cane with head and tassels of gold. 
 
 " Dated at Bakor, July 5, 1898. 
 
 " EMILIO AGUINALDO, 
 
 " The President of the Revolutionary Government." 
 
 No sooner was he recognized as an auxiliary, by Admiral Dewey, than 
 he began pranks in authority and arrogance, as whimsically droll, if it 
 were not for the dangers involved, as the grotesqueries of the German 
 war lord. In fact, the two characters are amazingly alike, making allow- 
 ance for the more civilizing restraints that the German Kaiser sometimes 
 acknowledges. From the moment he had gathered his nondescript rabble 
 about Manila, he began to treat as equal to equal, with the United States 
 commander. When the troops reached Cavite he exacted more ceremony 
 in the simplest administrative details than is usual in the haughty court 
 of Austria. General Anderson, having business of an urgent nature, 
 sent an aide-de-camp to request certain accommodations for the newly 
 arrived troops. Aguinaldo ; enthroned in one of the palaces of the suburb 
 where his motley hordes awaited the looting of the great city, kept the 
 officer in attendance an unseemly time and then sent word that he could 
 not be disturbed he was asleep! Innumerable perversities of this sort 
 finally brought about the total ignoring of his presence and refusal to
 
 HUNGERING FOR MANILA. 
 
 445 
 
 permit his cooperation iri the meditated attack. Then Aguinaldo set 
 about reducing Manila with his own forces. The Spanish, without sup- 
 plies in all the surrounding country, with roads in possession of in- 
 numerable bands of natives, were day after day forced to narrow their 
 defensive lines until nothing was left them to defend save the venerable 
 walls. Aguinaldo prepared to storm these, but the Spaniards gave no 
 sign of distrusting their ability to hold the city until the army of the 
 republic should be in force enough, to make a surrender to them. From the 
 first, as a matter of history that was really all the Spanish commander de- 
 layed for that is to say, so soon as he realized that Spain was impotent 
 to send a succoring fleet and an army. 
 
 To circumvent, this Aguinaldo displayed an energy that at times seemed 
 superhuman. He gathered from the 
 captured places, overrun by the sheer 
 numbers of his followers, all the ar- 
 tillery that was capable of firing. He 
 infused into his tatterdemalion ranks, 
 the enthusiasm of the crusaders, and 
 in scores of contests actually defeated 
 the better-armed and disciplined hosts 
 of Spain. He hungered to get hold 
 of Manila, if only long enough to lay /// 
 his hands on the city's riches, and 
 in a vague way to make terms with 
 the United States, when the fate 
 the Philippines came up for settle-* 
 me nt. There were vigorous protests 
 made to the Cabinet, when the lati- 
 tude given Aguinaldo was made 
 known for the character of this re- 
 pulsive miscreant, has been under- 
 stood by many men of standing in 
 
 this country who have had dealings with the Philippines. Nor has the ad- 
 ministration made any mistake in the marplot, events thrust upon Dewey. 
 That officer did as all commanders do in war. He made use of Aguinaldo, 
 as he would made use of a fire ship, or dynamite knowing that there 
 were chances that both might injure his own fleet. This must always be 
 done in war. No doubt sensitive Britons hated to hold converse with 
 Benedict Arnold, but as he could benefit British interests, he was made 
 much of. In the case of Aguinaldo, however, other influences were at work. 
 
 GENERAL ATACHIO.
 
 THE INSURGENT LEADER. 
 
 DON EMILTO AGUINALDO Y FAURY. 
 Leader of the Philippine Insurgents and President of the Revolutionary Government.
 
 A BRITISH GO-BETWEEN. 447 
 
 The ignoble system or lack of system, of our consular service, had 
 placed in the consulate at Hong Kong a grotesque diplomats from the 
 western plains, who conceived a violent admiration for the unqualifiable 
 Aguinaldo. This personage Wildman by name, schemed by day and 
 meditated by night, ways and means to make Aguinaldo a persona grata 
 to Dewey. But while recognizing Aguinaldo's availability as a factor in 
 holding Manila until troops were at hand, Admiral Dewey never gave the 
 Philippine adventurer the slightest official recognition. He permitted 
 him to help himself to the army stores in the captured arsenal in Cavite, 
 but that in no sense bound the United States government. Underneath 
 the Aguinaldo pretensions, however, was discernible the hand of British 
 intrigue. That power, knowing that it would be impossible for a re- 
 public to undertake the compulsory k * civilization " of such tribes as make 
 up the Philippines, determined from the first that we should be gulled 
 into assuming a protectorate. Spain once expelled, the British would in- 
 herit the empire so soon as the calmer judgment of the people of the 
 United States brought jingoism and spoliation to a halt. Aguinaldo has 
 been coached in every step by a British diplomat, one Bray, who brought 
 about meetings of Aguinaldo and his ineffable company, in the United 
 States consulate at Hong Kong. It was this British go-between, who 
 vouched for Auginaldo conducting the war on " Christian principles," if 
 Dewey would entrust him with arms and an auxiliary role in the con- 
 quest of Manila. Admiral Dewey seems to have required but a few days 
 experience with the insurgent chief to penetrate his motives, for it is plain 
 from every act since the destruction of the Manila fleet, that he merely 
 tolerated the agent of British greed. Dewey and his staff kept up a 
 diligent inquiry, pending the arrival of the army to ascertain exactly 
 what manner of folk Aguinaldo and his unqualifiable confidants rep- 
 resented. 
 
 The sober citizen of the republic, deafened by the clamor of the jingo 
 shriekers, would be surprised to see with the eyes of flesh, the indescribable 
 hordes we are asked to make part of our democratic system. A Parish 
 priest not far from Cavite, bears testimony that, after forty years' ministry 
 among the islanders, they are to him an absolutely incomprehensible race, 
 to whom no known rules of civilization or savagery had the smallest ap- 
 plication. "They are perversely unreliable; they will serve yon faith- 
 fully for twenty years and then commit some such horrible crime as 
 delivering over your house and family to brigands. They are patient, 
 sober, and even honest servants usually, but at any moment they may 
 break out and, joining a band of robbers, pillage your house. If you tax
 
 448 NEVER FORGET AN INJURY. 
 
 them with the crime they are not abashed, but disclaim all responsibility, 
 answering, * Senor, my head was hot,' which they consider sufficient ex- 
 case. They will never confess to a misdeed voluntarily. They will 
 submit to a beating without a murmur, if they think it is deserved, and 
 bear no malice ; but if they consider the punishment unjust, they will 
 seek the first opportunity for revenging themselves. They never forgive 
 and never forget an injury, but they cherish no memory of kindness. 
 Generosity they regard as a weakness. If you give them anything un- 
 sought they consider you a fool and treat you accordingly. They are 
 always asking favors, though never directly. Borrowing they think no 
 shame, but they never repudiate their debts. On the other hand they 
 never pay back voluntarily, and if taxed with their dishonesty, look sur- 
 prised and say, ' Senor, you never asked for it.' If you pay a man 
 twenty cents for a service he will be contented ; if you pay him thirty 
 cents he will grumble. They have no word for thank you, in their lan- 
 guage, nor a conception of what the phrase implies. They have no 
 notion of charity, never helping one another excepting in the case of rel- 
 atives ; but they acknowledge even the remotest tie of relationship. If 
 treated badly, they make good servants and never grumble ; if treated 
 kindly they are lost, and go to the bad. They never stick to an occupa- 
 tion but are ready to turn their hands to anything. They are jacks-of-all- 
 trades and good at none. They are brave against equals, if led by supe- 
 riors, but a real or fancied superiority in the foe causes them to abandon 
 all hope. They do riot know the meaning of hospitality. They will do 
 what you tell them if you tell them often enough, but they will never do 
 anything of their own accord. They will answer questions but never 
 volunteer information. They will let your horse die for want of feed and 
 never tell you that the supply has given out. They are confirmed liars, 
 and show only surprise when found out. They are good husbands though 
 intensely jealous; but they do not worry about the conduct of their 
 daughters or even their wives, previous to marriage. They have no am- 
 bition and no ideas of order or economy, but in the matter of cleanliness 
 they are superior to all the inhabitants of the far East save the 
 
 The first detachment arrived on June 30th, a month, to a day, after the 
 naval combat. The second instalment of troops reached the rendezvous 
 on the 16th of June making the army of invasion 6,000 men. General 
 Anderson, the first commander to reach the goal, was very desirous of at- 
 tacking at once and capturing Manila before the advent of General Mer- 
 ritt. But Admiral Dewey who had bided his time for six weeks, vetoed
 
 ATHIRST FOR GLORY. 449 
 
 this vivacity. General Merritt bore the government's instruction. It 
 was he, alone, who could assume the responsibility of taking the city. As to 
 that, Dewey could have taken it, any time, with a three hours' bombardment. 
 His only embarrassment was to keep the hideous hordes of Aguinaldo 
 from complicating matters by unfurling the pirate flag over the palace of 
 the viceroys. General Anderson, athirst for glory, with a soldier's con- 
 tempt for diplomacy, insisted on pushing forward. A council, described 
 as " acrimonious " ensued between the sagacious Dewey and the impetu- 
 ous general. Dewey impressed upon the eager soldier that it was un- 
 necessary for him to worry about taking the city, as the fleet could do it 
 in three hours whenever desired; but that he, Dewey, proposed to wait 
 for Merritt, unless some unexpected circumstance should force him to 
 action, such as the partial capture of the city by Aguinaldo. This was 
 something he did not concern himself much about, as no military man 
 believed it possible for Aguinaldo to achieve that feat. Even the soldiers 
 of the United States could not do it, without the aid of the fleet, for the 
 city proper was enclosed by a high stone wall, well mounted with cannon, 
 and surrounded by a broad moat, with an open space of half a mile for 
 troops to advance to the attack, exposed to fire of cannon and magazine 
 guns. It would be a great slaughter, and the best troops in the world 
 might well hesitate to make the assault. With Dewey taking this atti- 
 tude, General Anderson was forced to wait. 
 
 The fateful resolution taken, all the troops summoned from the ex- 
 treme Western states were ordered to rendezvous at San Francisco. 
 General Merritt elaborated his plans with the Cabinet folk in Washing- 
 ton, and the country rested in almost childlike expectation. It was all so 
 unreal, so utterly outside of everything contemplated in our social com- 
 pact, that for the moment for many a week and month, the voice of the 
 potential majority remained as if stifled. Then we began to see the sharp 
 differences that distinguish wars of impulse and wars of aggression. 
 Steamers could not be procured. The companies possessed of the craft 
 fitted for the needs of the government, thought the opportunity too good 
 to miss. The public treasury became the prey of the soulless, the greedy. 
 The departments in need, were made the sport of "gangs" and "pulls" 
 and what not, arising from our jocosely irresponsible political system. For 
 vessels that the owners would consider themselves well paid at $150 per 
 diem the government was engaged to pay $1,500. And so on to the least 
 of the requirements. The sordid and the repulsive stand out in pain- 
 ful contrast in all wars, but there seemed some magnetic something 
 somewhere in Washington, that stimulated the Shylock spirit wher-
 
 450 MISTAKES OF MANAGEMENT. 
 
 ever the needs of the government pressed. Naturally the home youth 
 of the west were enchanted with the promise of adventure. The 
 entire bone and sinew of the vast Pacific Coast could have been enlisted 
 for the romantic perils of the cruise to Manila. But when the dull de- 
 tails of camp and ship came on, there was a revulsion. I can do no 
 better service to the reader than copy a letter in extenso written by a 
 practiced observer who accompanied one of the expeditions, and from 
 careful examination this picture stands as a mirror of all : 
 
 " Was ever an officer's mess more badly supplied than this one on 
 board the China? Generosity and patriotism are not the leading char- 
 acteristics of the Pacific Mail Company. The food we had would dis- 
 grace the worst sailor's boarding house. The meat served was so bad 
 that at our universal complaint 6,000 pounds were dumped overboard to 
 poison the fishes, and the steward was forced to buy from the United 
 States commissary department. 
 
 "The cooking was bad, the service wretched, the quantity limited, and 
 this on board the China, noted on ordinary trips as having the best table 
 on the Pacific. After charging one thousand five hundred dollars a day 
 for the use of the ship, it was impudent to ask the officers $150 a day for 
 food unfit for convicts. Fifty officers on board signed a complaint, refus- 
 ing to pay more than one dollar a day the price charged on the Ze- 
 landia, where the food was excellent and ice was furnished throughout 
 the journey. The enervating effect of the climate is making itself felt 
 on the most energetic, and the motto of the ship is fast becoming, ' Never 
 do to-day what you can just as well put off until to morrow.' 
 
 " In spite of all the difficulties in the way of this expedition, it has so 
 far been remarkably successful. For instance, although among the volun- 
 teers it has been almost impossible to keep quarters clean, on account of 
 lack of discipline and the general inexperience of the officers, still the 
 health of the men has been excellent, and only four deaths have occurred 
 in all one on the Zelandia, two on the Colon, and one on the China. 
 The private who died on the China was really a victim of one of the in- 
 numerable mistakes of management by our government in the details of 
 this war. He was refused on medical examination, but was passed over 
 the heads of the doctors by authorized enlistment from Washington ! 
 
 "Examples of mismanagement might be indefinitely multiplied. For 
 instance, the Gatling guns sent on board are of the type of 1865. The 
 first one tried in practice the other day, discharged with barrels in every 
 position but the right one, and the bullets struck against portions of the 
 carriage and went flying about the deck. Several men were wounded
 
 POLITICAL APPOINTMENTS. 451 
 
 slightly. Another instance is the presence on the ship of a sutler, with 
 all his goods. Sutlers have been abolished by law, and yet this man, 
 brother of a representative in Congress, succeeded in shoving himself on 
 board and getting transportation for himself, his clerk, and his goods free 
 of charge, while the United States commissary was obliged to leave part 
 of its supplies on the dock at San Francisco, for lack of room ! It is 
 needless to say that the sutler arranged a store on the lower deck, where 
 he is gradually getting from the soldiers such money as the latter have 
 not given to the Chinese crew for Chinese whiskey, a grewsome mixture. 
 The commissary is confined to the hold. The authorities on board are 
 either indifferent, or ignorant, or helpless to remedy these abuses. The 
 commissary was established to take the place of sutlers, and give the men 
 articles at cost prices. The height of the ridiculous is reached, however, 
 when the clerk of the bureau of information claims to be a correspondent 
 for one of the New York dailies. 
 
 " We have arranged matters so as not to place temptation in the way of 
 government employees. It is a duty to point out the now practical re- 
 sult of political appointments to important offices in the staff corps. In 
 no part of the service is experience so essential to the welfare of the army 
 and its success, as in the quartermaster's and subsistence departments. 
 Every movement an army makes depends upon the quartermaster, for 
 he furnishes the clothing, bedding and tents. The duties of the com- 
 missary office are not so complex ; still they are equally essential to a suc- 
 cessful campaign. A soldier fights as he is fed a full belly gives stomach 
 for war. Hunger breeds discontent and insubordination, and is the best 
 ally of the enemy. What can justify the assignment of a totally inex- 
 perienced officer as chief commissionary of subsistence? 'Have you had 
 any experience in the subsistence department?' he was asked. 'None at 
 all,' he frankly answered. 
 
 " ' I suppose you have an experienced clerk then ? ' * No,' he replied, ' I 
 was unable to find a clerk with any experience in the department.' Now 
 what can be expected from such an appointment, but failure ? It is folly 
 to state that subsistence duties are so simple that they can be learned in 
 a day, or a week, or a year. It takes many years to make an efficient 
 officer of the subsistence department, and still longer to make a good 
 quartermaster. The President, in making political appointments to such 
 positions, is simply juggling with the health, comfort and lives of patriotic 
 citizens." 
 
 And the routine of the astonished western volunteer as he took up the 
 grandiose mission of imperialism would have inspired the humorous Mark
 
 452 RAIN-DRIVEN INGENUITY. 
 
 Twain, to the historical narrative he loves. Could anything better reveal 
 our jocose youth, than this picture of the soldier in camp between the dis- 
 heartened Spaniards in the trenches of Manila and the hungry eyed na- 
 tives awaiting Aguinaldo's signal to pocket the "loot" - of the great city? 
 
 "It beats all creation how it can rain out here. Rain is all right in its 
 way. Some of it is a good thing. It keeps things reasonably clean and 
 furnishes drinking water. But one steady, undisturbed, imperturbable, 
 unceasing flood becomes tiresome after a while, and all the time it is wet. 
 You don't mind an occasional soaking. It gives excuse for taking a drink. 
 But one has something to do down here besides change his clothes and 
 drink whisky. And wet feet bring fever. Windows and shutters 
 clamped as close together as Spanish rain-driven ingenuity can force 
 them, keep out some of the water, and all of the sodden air that courtesy 
 calls fresh, because it moves. The mercury charges to the top of its 
 glass case in the thermometer, and disappears from view in the barometer. 
 The wise men wag their beards and make remarks about typhoons. 
 With body and soul burning up with fever, and a Chinchona band 
 playing the 'Dead March from Saul ' in your ears, somehow you sort of 
 lose focus. Things get out of perspective and there is a lack of consist- 
 ent continuity. You wabble about, and the rum you have drunk to help 
 the quinine you have eaten, is singularly ineffective for the desired pur- 
 pose, but powerfully active in the wrong way." The tone, tense and im- 
 plication of this ribaldly matter-of-fact presentation of the soldier con- 
 fronting Manila, suggests no end of reflection in the processes of " civi- 
 lizing" involved in the seizure of Naboth's vineyard. It is a soldier who 
 is speaking. Let us hear him out : 
 
 "Over in camp they are enjoying themselves if one has no regard for 
 truth. Uncle Sam's nephew in the ranks is like the ' Bloomin' cosmopol- 
 ouse,' for his work 'begins at Gawd known when, and his work is never 
 through.' And the rain has not anything to do with it. He turns out 
 at 4:45 in the morning and drills a few hours (more or less) in the rain. 
 Then he gets his breakfast, seasoned with rainwater. After that, he 
 cleans up his rifle and coats it liberally with oil, against the soaking it 
 will get in the morning drill. Guard mount interrupts other things, and 
 if he happens not to be on the detail, or the police gang, he gets a few 
 moments in his soggy shelter tent, to consider the state of the weather 
 and to speculate on the subject of patriotism considered as a business. 
 After morning drill, he gets a chance to go out into the scrub and gather 
 aome thorned, spiked bamboo. This bamboo, tough, wiry, and covered 
 with briers as it is, is the only genuine all around infallible friend he has.
 
 HOUSEBUILDING IN CAVITE. 453 
 
 As long as his axe and his wit hold out, the bamboo will do the rest. 
 He cuts down a long pole perhaps four inches in diameter, and trims off 
 all the little branches and big thorns. Then he cuts it into four foot 
 lengths. One end he sharpens, and in the other he cuts a good sized 
 notch. He drives four of these stakes a foot or more into the ground, 
 one at each corner of his tent. The notches in the upper end serve as 
 cradles for the long bamboo he lays across them as stringers for the house 
 he means to build. These stringers are just as long as his tent. The 
 sticks that go with the shelter tent are not long enough now, so he cuts 
 a couple of bamboos to serve as tent poles, one at each end. At the 
 back of the tent, he swings a bamboo girder between the two stringers, 
 resting the ends in notches in the stringers, and lashing them fast with 
 fine strips of the surface of green bamboo, tougher, stouter and more 
 pliable than wire. 
 
 " His tent spreads at the bottom about seven feet, and he has one chum 
 to help him occupy it. Two feet and a half inside the corner stake, he 
 drives another one on each side. These are notched on top also, and 
 across them he lays two other stringers, resting the rear end in notches 
 at the girder in the back. This gives him the framework of two beds, each 
 two and a half feet wide and as long as his tent. Now he splits some 
 bamboo poles into thin strips, some just the length of his bed and others 
 just the width of it. The strips are perhaps an inch wide and are trimmed 
 down to about an eighth .of an inch in thickness. His sharp little 
 axe is his only tool. He weaves the short strips into long ones, criss- 
 cross, until he has a mat just the size of his bedstead. 'At two feet inter- 
 vals along the frame, he slips little bamboo slats in the bed springers. 
 Over these he lays his improvised springs, and he has a bed that is cool 
 comparatively, not even an ice machine is really cool down here and 
 comfortable. Between the two beds there is a space about two feet wide 
 where he can stand upright. At the rear end of the tent he swings an- 
 other little woven mat, about two feet wide between the beds, and there 
 he has a little table on which he can put the trinkets which he wants to 
 keep out of the wet. Above it, on the rear tent pole, he straps a small 
 piece of board, secured somewhere and sawed into the shape of an arm 
 rack. There the two guns rest in the intervals between drills and guard 
 duty. Some pegs in the tent poles serve as hooks, and the house is fairly 
 complete. There is space enough between the beds for the men to walk 
 into the tent and for their /set when they want to sit on their beds and 
 read or work. A frame- ->r the rear pole, beside the arm rack, holds a 
 candle.
 
 454 MERRITT REDUCES THE CHAOS. 
 
 " But the ingenious soldier is not through yet with his devices for com- 
 fort. His tent is only one thickness of canvas, and although it will stand 
 rain it will not stand against the customary Philippine deluge. He bnilds 
 a light frame of bamboo over it and covers the frame with a thatch of 
 banana leaves. Or, perhaps, he uses the ever-faithful bamboo. In front 
 of the tent he makes a similar awning. If the sun should shine by any 
 chance, it would serve as a shade, but its chief work is in turning 
 rain. .Altogether the soldier has built himself a serviceable house. It 
 keeps him fairly dry when he can stay in it and his bed is off the ground. 
 The tent makes the roof, and the thatch protects that. ^It is almost as 
 good as a native hut. Housebuilding such as this is not done, of course, 
 in one morning's respite from routine duty, or in an afternoon either. It 
 fills up the interval between army duty for a couple of days, and until it 
 is finished the soldier lies on the ground, and stands it as best he can. In 
 barracks in Cavite most are ill of sickness, principally due to the fact 
 that the men were so near the native village. They ate all sorts of fruit, 
 with as much avidity as if they never expected to see fruit of any kind 
 again. And they drank whatever they could find in the way of liquor, 
 experimentally. The results were often disastrous. At first there was a 
 good deal of sickness that was very much like dysentery. General 
 Anderson says that there was no dysentery. The medical men shake 
 their heads and say they do not think there was any dysentery." 
 
 Perhaps the person most heartily glad of General Merritt's arrival at 
 Manila was the sorely perplexed commander of the Spanish forces. For 
 with the instinct of the soldier, Merritt soon reduced the chaos of conflict- 
 ing ambitions to the cold calculation of the military problem involved. 
 He put Agninaldo in his place. He ordered and enforced strict military 
 conditions. He took no note of the native chief's pretensions to civil or 
 military sway. The Philippines and all of them within the reach of the 
 agents of the United States forces were the instrumentalities of our opera- 
 tions. Any one or anybody interfering or molesting, was an enemy of 
 the United States. The result was instantaneous and effective General 
 Merritt procured the animals and necessaries of his projected movements, 
 swiftly, smoothly. Aguinaldo recognized a master. He had taken ad- 
 vantage of his numerical superiority of able-bodied adventurers, to make 
 the lives of his Spanish prisoners a mingling of the Inquisition and the 
 Black Hole of Calcutta. General Merritt stopped that decisively. He 
 released the unfortunate sons of Spain entreated them, as we entreat 
 prisoners of war, and the tale spreading to Manila, the garrison, knowing
 
 THE IRONY OF FATE. 455 
 
 the hopelessness of resistance, demanded to be put under the clement 
 control of the hitherto distrusted Yankees. 
 
 But it is difficult to treat the action about Manila seriously when dis- 
 associated with the majesterial operations of Dewey. For as a mutter of 
 history there was never a moment the Spanish authorities were not eager 
 to end the anguish of uncertainty, and surrender to the Admiral. But 
 diplomatic considerations held them back from handing themselves over 
 to the fleet. When Mevritt came they were more than ready, but, the 
 orders from Madrid enjoined delay, countless ulterior considerations 
 entered into this childish procrastination. First of all, the British, with 
 insidious perversions, delayed decisive action, hoping to embroil the re- 
 public with Germany, and making the pretended approachment with the 
 Washington Cabinet a lever to intimidate Russia in the Chinese dispute. 
 In the end, by that inscrutable irony of fate, which baffles the prevoy- 
 ance of the wisest, the attack welcomed even arranged by the Spaniards, 
 was carried out on the 12th of August, when the preliminaries of peace 
 had already been officially signed in Washington. What need to describe 
 the subsequent wicked travesty of battle? The Spanish commander had 
 arranged with General Merritt that the surrender would follow a pom- 
 pous display of land force, sufficient to satisfy Spanish honor ; nor was it a 
 well-kept secret that the Captain -General practically suggested the man- 
 ner in which the troops should advance, to prevent loss of life on both 
 sides. 
 
 At first it was not intended to attack the trenches, but quietly to ad- 
 vance after the bombardment had ceased. At the last moment, however, 
 the programme was changed. Orders were issued for the land batteries 
 to open fire simultaneously with the fleet, and for the advance to be made 
 as soon as it was considered practical to assault the Spanish trenches. 
 After the bombardment by the fleet had lasted half an hour, General 
 Greene decided that it was possible to advance, although signals to cease 
 firing were disregarded by the fleet, invisible on account of the rain. Six 
 companies of the Colorado regiment leaped over their breastworks, dashed 
 into the swamp, and opened volley firing from the partial shelter of the 
 low hedges within 300 yards of the Spanish line. A few moments later, 
 the remaining six companies moved along the seashore, somewhat covered 
 by a sand ridge, forded an inlet under the outworks of the fort, and at 
 eleven o'clock occupied this formidable stronghold without loss. Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel McCoy hauled down the Spanish flag and raised the Stars 
 #nd Stripes, amid wild cheers along the line. 
 
 Meanwhile, the fleet, observing the movements of the troops along the
 
 456 AN AWKWARD SITUATION. 
 
 beach, withheld its fire. The bombardment had lasted exactly an hour. 
 Half an hour later, General Greene and staff proceeded along the beach, 
 still under a hot infantry fire, from where the Eighteenth Regulars and 
 Second Regular Artillery were engaging the enemy, and directed the 
 movements of the advance into Malate. In a few moments the outskirts 
 of the suburb were occupied and the Spanish sharp shooters were driven 
 away. As the Californians (Colonel Smith) came up- the beach, the band 
 played a national air, accompanied by the whistling of Mauser bullets ; 
 during the sharp shooting the band continued to encourage the men with 
 music. Each regiment carried its colors into action. There was con- 
 siderable street fighting in the suburbs of Malate and Ermita, but a bat- 
 talion of the Californians pushed into the Luneta, a popular promenade 
 within 200 yards of the moat of the citadel. Then the white flag was 
 hoisted at the southwest corner of the walled town. At this moment, the 
 Spanish forces retreating from Santa Anna came into view, visibly 2,000 
 strong, followed by the insurgents who had eluded General MacArthur's 
 troops, and opened fire. The situation was awkward if not critical, both 
 sides being justifiably suspicious of treachery. The Spanish troops lining 
 the citadel ramparts, observing the insurgents' apparition, opened fire on 
 the Californians, killing one and wounding three. The confusion, how- 
 ever, soon ceased by the shifting of the retreating Spaniards to the 
 esplanade, when General Greene ordered them to enter the citadel. 
 Presently, a letter was brought from the Captain-General, requesting the 
 commander of the United States troops to meet him for a consultation. 
 General Greene at once presented himself at the Spanish headquarters 
 and General Merritt followed. The terms of the surrender were then 
 ratified and were substantially to this effect: 
 
 An agreement for the capitulation of Manila ; a provision for the dis- 
 arming of the men who remain organized under the command of their offi- 
 cers, no parole being exacted, necessary supplies to be furnished from the 
 captured treasury funds, any possible deficiency being made good by the 
 United States authorities ; the safety of life and property of Spanish sol- 
 diers and citizens to be guaranteed as far as possible ; the question of the 
 transporting of the troops to Spain to be deferred to the decision of Wash- 
 ington, and that of the returning of their arms to the soldiers, to be left 
 to the discretion of General Merritt; banks and similar institutions to 
 continue operations under the existing regulations, unless these are 
 changed by the United States authorities. 
 
 It was not war and it was not glory, but at the same time, General 
 Merritt planned and executed with consummate wisdom. He did not

 
 MAJOR-GENERAL F. V. GREENE. I'.IUG. -GENERAL CHARLKS KING. 
 
 BRIG.-GENERAL F. D. GRANT. 
 
 BRIG. -GENERAL W. S. WORTH.
 
 LETTING THEM DOWN EASY. 
 
 459 
 
 know that the prayer of the v Madrid government had been finally 
 granted ; that peace had been virtually proclaimed ; that every life lost 
 was a sacrifice to form and pride. General Merritt, in short, proved that 
 the trained soldier is always to be trusted in military diplomacy. Spain 
 and her colonies'lay prone at the behest of the Washington Cabinet. 
 
 Notwithstanding the presence of the army under Merritt, the fleet was 
 the main factor in the reduction of the Philippine capital. It must have 
 irked Dewey, a man of sincerity, to go through the rather trivial per- 
 formance exacted as his part in letting the wretched Spaniards down 
 easily. The great ships volleyed and thundered ; they did it however, 
 with very little heart. Indeed, the whole episode is better forgotten for 
 it was not war though a sad number were killed and wounded. The fleet 
 fired two hours but there is no precise record that the massive guns 
 which destroyed Montojo in two hours, wrought any appreciable havoc 
 in the walls of Manila. There were columns of lurid cablegrams to de- 
 scribe the wanton waste of life, but the judicious should prefer to draw a 
 veil over the scene. Manila was handed over to General Merritt and 
 then it was made known that peace had been proclaimed three days befo*. 
 
 BLUE MONDAY. 
 
 25
 
 PART III. 
 
 BY far the most fascinating episode of the wondrous Oriental escapade 
 was the cruise of the Yankee commanders over the summer seas. 
 Fiction itself seems pale and nerveless in confronting the immense voy- 
 age of the inconscient homespun crusaders of our wild west, embattled 
 in the cause of " humanity." Could the mind of man conceive a more 
 grotesque epopee than the sailing of armadas of Pacific slope youth, to 
 rear the flag of progress over islands, subdued three hundred years ago 
 by the knights and paladins of the most lettered and accomplished people 
 in Europe? The men as they sailed, the decorous hierarchy of the Yan- 
 kee Captain-General Merritt, seemed to realize this. The spirit of the 
 reports sent by the literary squad detailed by the "great " journals, im- 
 presses this. It is from these acute and humorous observers that history 
 must take the record. The subjoined seems to me a faithful picture of 
 the mingled mirth, travesty and significance of one grotesque conquest. 
 
 Nearly midway between Honolulu and the Philippines, Spain has pos- 
 sessed since the first conquest of European navigators, an island system 
 known as the Ladrones, whose history is a sparkling volume of the ro- 
 mance and adventure attaching to the early exploits of Spanish and Por- 
 tuguese navigators. Now though we believe ourselves the least impres- 
 sionable, least sentimental least romance-loving of races, the truth is, 
 we are all these to our finger tips. We love adventure ; we love the hu- 
 morous, the soft answer that turns away wrath, is never more emollient 
 than the gibe or the fist with us. We are celts to the core of our being. 
 We love to dare and we love to laugh at all we dare. The keynote of 
 the entrancing history which has made the perpetuity of the Napoleonic 
 legend possible among the politest race in Europe, " The Consulate and 
 Empire" of Thiers, is his perpetual reminder of the "Gaiete francaise " 
 which upheld the legions of the republic in thirty years conquests. We 
 have not the Gaiete francaise, but we have the nai've humor of the race 
 to which we are indebted for most of our national traits the celt. 
 Hence the sail over the summer seas, to the morgen land of the Teuton 
 was a diversion tinged with such dreams as buoyed the myriads that 
 marched to Palestine in the dim twilight of civilization. I dare say, not 
 one man in a thousand of the impulsive warriors dedicated to the war of 
 u humanity," had ever heard of the Ladrone group or knew the curious 
 
 (460}
 
 THE ROBBER ISLANDS. 461 
 
 origin of the name " Robber islands." But as war demands that you 
 shall injure and despoil the adversary wherever the chance offers, the 
 commander of the first expedition maneuvered his armada into the harbor 
 of Spain's unsuspicious dependency. " Guam " is the geographical name 
 of the chief entrepot of the Ladrones. Thither, the first division of 
 General Merritt's Manila expedition directed its course. The conquest 
 is so thoroughly characteristic of the whole war, that it deserves perma- 
 nent embalming, and I take the record from one of the scribes on the 
 fleet as being too naively picturesque for condensation or improvement. 
 
 " Early in the morning, the fleet rounded the northern extremity of 
 Guam island and headed southward toward the harbor, the Charleston 
 well in the lead. The chief town, Agana, containing the residence of the 
 Governor and the garrison, lies on the north side of a coral peninsula, 
 jutting far out into the ocean. The Charleston worked slowly in toward 
 the town, as far as she dared to go because of coral shoals, and when 
 satisfied that the two Spanish gunboats, which were supposed to be some- 
 where among these outlying islands, and which were one of the chief ob- 
 jects of her quest, were not there, she turned her prow seaward again 
 and rounded the ejid of the coral spit; passing through a narrow chan- 
 nel between the reef and a high bluff of volcanic basalt, slowly pushed 
 her way into the harbor of San Luis, which is the chief harbor of the 
 island, whose landing place, Unapa, is about four miles across the penin- 
 sula from Agana. The three transports lay to off the entrance, beyond 
 the reach of cannon-shot, their upper decks and rigging black with the 
 crowds of soldiers eager to see the expected battle. 
 
 " Well within the harbor was seen a vessel, which, under the glass, 
 proved to be a small whaling brig flying the Japanese flag. It was 
 painted white, and when first seen created considerable excitement, being 
 mistaken for one of the Spanish gunboats. Near the shore, on the oppo- 
 site side of the bay, which is here about two miles wide, was seen a low 
 fort, apparently built of stone and faced with earth, with trees growing 
 from the embankment around it. 
 
 " When she was within two miles of the fort, the Charleston opened fire 
 upon it, with her three-pounders, firing thirteen shots in rapid succession, 
 four of which were seen to strike the fort. 
 
 " The bloodless conquest was hailed with derisive cheers, for the fort was 
 an ancient structure, built ninety years ago of coral, and never had a 
 cannon mounted. It had not been occupied for half a century, having 
 been originally constructed as a defence against the natives, and not for the 
 protection of the harbor against warships. Don Quixote's famous charge
 
 462 THE LAWS OF SPAIN FORBID. 
 
 on the windmills had been eclipsed by the Yankee navy. Some time 
 before the Charleston entered the harbor, the fleet had been observed 
 from the landing at Unapa, and the port officer had ordered out his gig 
 for the purpose of going aboard in his capacity as quarantine official. In 
 addition to this, an old brass cannon had been loaded for the purpose of 
 returning the expected salute. The port officer was about half-way out 
 to the ship when the firing began, and did not notice that solid shot were 
 being fired. This intelligence however was speedily conveyed to the men 
 in charge of the shore cannon, by a horseman, who had been riding some- 
 what in the rear of the fort, and was consequently made painfully aware 
 that cannon balls were sailing in his direction. He rode posthaste to the 
 landing and asked them what they were going to do with the cannon, 
 and was told that they were about to answer the salute. This put a new 
 phase on the matter to the Spanish officials, and immediately the Govern- 
 or's adjutant embarked in a boat, and hastened after the health officer for 
 the purpose of going aboard the Charleston to inquire the meaning of 
 such unfriendly conduct. The health officer was the first to arrive on 
 board. When he climbed over the side he was escorted to Captain 
 Glass's stateroom, and learned for the first time the vessel he had thought 
 of quarantining, was a warship of the United States navy, intent upon 
 capturing the island. A few minutes later the indignant adjutant 
 climbed over the side and received the same information. lie was fur- 
 ther told to return immediately to the shore and bring the Governor on 
 board. Meanwhile, the transports were signaled to follow the Charles- 
 ton into the harbor, which they quickly did, the vessels being anchored 
 within a few hundred yards of each other. 
 
 "At three o'clock the adjutant returned on board with a message from 
 the Governor, saying ' That the laws of Spain forbid him to go on board 
 a foreign warship, and that negotiations must be conducted on shore.' 
 Captain Glass then sent Lieutenant Braunersreuter, with a very courteous 
 note stating in effect that war existed between the United States and 
 Spain, that a war vessel of the republic, with three transports loaded with 
 troops, was in the harbor, with orders to take possession of the island of 
 Guam ; that it was folly for his small force to make resistance, demanding 
 that he surrender himself, his garrison, and all arms and munitions of war, 
 and giving him until morning to reply. When morning came and no reply 
 having been received, Captain Glass sent the Governor word that he 
 would wait only half an hour longer, and at once embarked a landing 
 party in boats for the purpose of taking forcible possession. This party 
 consisted of about fifty marines from the Charleston, and Companies A
 
 WAVING A WHITE FLAG. 4&3 
 
 and D of the Second Oregon, from the Australia. A strong wind was 
 blowing, and there was a heavy swell in the harbor, making the embark- 
 ation a slow and difficult task. The pitching and tossing of the boats 
 along side the vessel was so great that a number of the men, notwith- 
 standing that they had been a month on board ship, became seasick. As 
 the long string of thirteen boats started for shore, two miles distant, 
 towed by the Charleston's launch, a tremendous downpour of rain, such 
 as is only seen in the tropics, accompanied by a driving wind, obscured 
 the entire landscape and wet the men to the skin, giving them a baptism 
 of water in advance of ORC of fire, they expected soon to receive. How- 
 ever, before the boats reached the shore, the Governor's gig was seen to 
 put out from the landing, waving a white flag in token of surrender, and 
 the landing party was immediately taken back to the vessels, greatly dis- 
 appointed. 
 
 "The Governor's Adjutant went on board the Charleston and delivered 
 to Captain Glass a letter from his chief, saying, in view of the fact that 
 he had been utterly unaware that hostilities had broken out between the 
 two nations, and had therefore made no preparations for defence, and was 
 utterly helpless before the overwhelming force that had been sent against 
 him, and for reasons of humanity, and a desire to avoid needless blood- 
 shed, he would surrender upon condition that the usual treatment of 
 prisoners of war be accorded him and his officers, and that his men be 
 given as good quarters and fare on board ship as the republic's soldiers 
 received. These terms were accepted, and a company of marines was 
 sent on shore, accompanied by Lieutenant Braunersreuter, to receive the 
 surrender. The garrison consisted of fifty-four Spanish veterans and a 
 hundred and fifty native soldiers with six officers, including the Governor. 
 The garrison was drawn up in line awaiting the arrival of the marines, 
 who were promptly disembarked and drawn up in line opposite the 
 Spaniards. The Governor and his subordinates presented their swords to 
 the American officer, and took their places in the boats ; ihe soldiers 
 stacked arms, and, as the marines filed in front of them with boxes, each 
 man took off his cartridge belt and threw it into the box. The Spanish 
 soldiers were then placed in the boats and the native soldiers were dis- 
 banded. As soon as thus formally absolved from their allegiance to 
 Spain, the native soldiers cut off their buttons and all insignia of rank 
 they had and threw them away, to show their contempt for the 
 government which they had been unwillingly serving. The captured 
 soldiers were then conveyed to the steamer City of Sydney, and placed 
 under guard, while the Charleston's launch steamed out to the ancient
 
 464 
 
 A TEMPORARY GOVERNOR. 
 
 coral fort and raised above it the Stars and Stripes, the guns of the 
 Charleston pealing forth a salute to the flag, thus ending the ceremony of 
 taking formal possession in the name of the United States^ 
 
 " The arms surrendered consisted of fifty-four Mauser rifles, fifty-three 
 Remington rifles, and 3.700 rounds of ammunition. As it was thought it 
 was absolutely necessary that the entire force present be conveyed to 
 Manila for the support of Admiral Dewey, it was decided not to leave 
 any garrison on the island. This was considered safe, as the natives are 
 a very peaceable class, well-dis- 
 posed toward the Americans, and 
 there is no Spanish population left 
 since the removal of the garrison, 
 except the families of the Governor 
 and one or two of his officers and 
 a priest. There is but one United 
 States citizen on the island of 
 Guam, and he was selected for 
 temporary Governor. This is 
 Thomas Wilson, a keeper of a 
 trading post, born on the island, 
 of California!! parents. So earnest 
 a Yankee is he that he has made 
 the practice of filing an oath of 
 allegiance to the Washington gov- 
 ernment, in San Francisco, every 
 two years. The soldiery were 
 given time to go on shore and im- 
 press on their minds the physical 
 aspect of this merry conquest. 
 They found the natives docile 
 
 and delighted. What was more extraordinary, they found that gold was 
 at a discount, no article on the market was rated above a few pennies, and 
 when a five dollar gold piece was presented for a supply of food for one 
 of the ships, the bewildered natives implored copper or coins that could 
 be exchanged. With this lesson in the purely perfunctory values of 
 the metals, the soldiers quitted the new possession wondering greatly 
 why the islands should bear the disreputable name of the Ladrones, or 
 Robbers. 
 
 The Ladrones were first discovered \>y the accomplished mariner, 
 Magellan, whose name is still known by the strait south of Terra del 
 
 NATIVE OF THE LADRONES.
 
 AS THOUGH BY MAGIC. 465 
 
 Fuego. He landed among the astonished people of the group, after a 
 wonderous voyage, in 1520. The wretched explorer was in the worst 
 state of the adventurous sailor. His ships were foodless and his men 
 mutinying. He was received with rapture by the islanders, and his crew 
 were so enchanted with the land, the people, and the natural nourishment, 
 that they clamored to remain forever. But in a short time an extraor- 
 dinary phenomenon was remarked. Everything portable disappeared 
 from the ships. How Indians almost naked could contrive to handle and 
 carry off articles of the size of those which disappeared was a mystery. 
 But they managed it somehow, for axes, heavy crowbars, and even guns, 
 vanished as though by magic. Magellan one day noticed one of the 
 Indians swimming ashore from the ship. A heavy wave was encountered 
 by the swimmer. He dived under it, and as he came out of the other 
 side, a sharp steel point glittered for a moment in the sun. As a boat 
 \vas then alongside, Magellan had the man pursued, and when he was 
 overtaken, to the astonishment of every one, it was found that he was 
 carrying off one of the longest lances on the ship, a weapon with an 
 eighteen foot shaft. Holding it beneath the water he would have escaped 
 with his booty undiscovered, had it not been for the unusual height of the 
 wave which disclosed the head of the weapon. Thenceforward a guard 
 was placed over the ships, but to little purpose, and finally, after provid- 
 ing himself with food and water, Magellan sailed away and in disgust 
 gave the islands the epithet of " Ladrones," or Thieves' island. Not long 
 afterward Magellan perished in a fight which he and his men provoked 
 with the Philippine islanders. Of his five ships, only one, with eighteen 
 men, returned to Spain. Many years elapsed before any attempts were 
 made to occupy the islands which he had discovered. Toward the end of 
 the seventeenth century a military expedition from Mexico took possession 
 of the islands and renamed them the Mariana group, in honor of the then 
 reigning Spanish queen. The natives at that time numbered at least 
 -1 0,000, some estimates placing the population as high as 60,000, but, follow- 
 i ig their usual custom elsewhere, the Spaniards soon exterminated almost 
 the entire population. 
 
 The present islanders are mostly descendants of settlers from Mexico 
 or from the Philippine Islands. The most considerable town on any of 
 the group is Saypan, on the island of the same name, the houses of which 
 like most of those in the South Sea Islands, are elevated on piles from 
 two to four feet above the ground. There are few Spanish settlers on the 
 islands, and the hold of Spain upon the group has been for the most part 
 nominal. It is a singular fact, discovered by the navigator, Anson, that
 
 466 
 
 THE BREAD FRUIT PLANT. 
 
 ihere are evidences on several of the islands of a former civilization. 
 Cyclopean ruins exist, found in the islands of the Greek archipelago. 
 These lonely islands must therefore at one time have been a seat of 
 civilization. Aside from the bouffe capture, the point of most interest 
 regarding the group of islands is the historical location of the "bread 
 fruit " plant. It is set down in Dampier, the accepted authority, and is 
 
 NATIVE HUT IN THE LADRONES. 
 
 worth reproducing now that, the flag of the republic is flying over the 
 unknown lauds. "A certain fruit called the bread fruit growing on a 
 tree as big as our large apple trees with dark leaves. The fruit is round 
 and grows on the boughs, like apples, of the bigness of a good penny loaf. 
 When ripe it turns yellow, soft and sweet, but the native takes it green 
 and bakes it in an oven until the rind is black. This they scrape off and 
 eat the inside, which is soft and white, like the inside of a new baked 
 bread, having neither seed nor stone ; but if it is kept above twenty-four 
 hours it is harsh. As this fruit is in season eight months in the year, the
 
 THE "STARRY BANNER.' 
 
 467 
 
 natives feed upon no other sort of bread during that time. They told us 
 that all the Ladrone Isles had plenty of it. I never heard of it in any 
 other place." It is an old maxim, old as greed, that to derive profit from 
 travel, the tourist must be laden with knowledge. The conquerors of 
 the Ladrones knew nothing of bread fruit, and went away, rejoicing only 
 in the visible evidence that Uncle Sam had been able to give still another 
 conquest to the " starry banner." 
 
 THE COLOR GUARD.
 
 ir. 
 
 QEFORE a tithe of the legions were mustered for the " liberation " of 
 j_) the oppressed Cuban, the reader of the official literature of the war 
 was perplexed by the tone taken in outlining the conquest of Porto Rico. 
 Not one in 10,000 of the citizens of the republic had ever given a thought 
 to this island. Any one who did give it a passing moment of consider- 
 ation, found it to be an ideally happy community of almost primitive 
 simplicity. Closer study revealed it to be a land where life went on in 
 almost philosophic repose. The wealth getter got his wealth undisturbed 
 by the vicissitudes of party. The demagogue clamoring for the ideal 
 which generally means chaos, had never raised his Bashan voice in the 
 delectable vales where man seemed to live at his rational best. The 
 Spaniard was in the ascendant, but there was no "patriot" to inflame 
 the citizen over his cruelties. Babies were born, marriages were cele- 
 brated, the banal in life held its course serenely, and no one ever thought 
 of raising the cry of " Porto Rico Libre." The island, too far off to 
 attract the attention of the philanthropists of the stock markets, the 
 Samaritan of the syndicates, dwelt in a peace and prosperity so profound, 
 that even the tourist had no tales to tell of the people. But the moment 
 the enterprise for "humanity" was begun by our Congress, 500,000 
 il Mute inglorious Miltons" found voice to sing the praises of Porto Rico, 
 to inveigh against the unholy chance that made it a colony of the blood- 
 thirsty, the monstrous Spaniard. Insensibly orphically, the voice up- 
 rose, that Porto Rico was predestined ly a vineyard of this republic. That 
 even more religiously sacred than the mission of establishing " Cuba 
 Libre," was the obligation to give the pensive Porto Ricans the blessings 
 of our Federal sj r stem. 
 
 Indeed, the war had not been a week old, when the official expression 
 was common, current, indisputable, that the end of the war must see 
 Porto Rico part of the territory of this Union ! Yet in the declaration 
 of war. uttered by Congress, it was expressly stipulated, that unlike 
 greedy and egotistic European powers, we were embarking on war, for 
 the high motive of human rescue ; that no ulterior craving for gain in- 
 cited us to that last, barbarous resource, the killing of our fellow man, 
 in order that others might enjoy the liberties that we prize so highly. 
 And oddly enough, this word of conquest went forth in every press in the 
 
 (469)
 
 470 NABOTH'S VINEYARD OVER AGAIN. 
 
 country without rebuke. Indeed, I question whether the vast majority 
 of the men who read the story of Naboth's vineyard with fervid abhor- 
 rence of greed, with Christian anger against the covetousness of the 
 strong, did not complacently accept this apparently national impulse as 
 proper perhaps even righteous. At all events, even more eagerly and 
 more ardently than the mobilization for Cuba, the preparations to make 
 an irruption in Porto Rico were begun and carried on. The military folk 
 feigned to believe that Spain would stake all, on the retention of this 
 earthly paradise, where for nearly four hundred years the laws of Castile 
 had been the religion of the natives. Where felicity was so complete, 
 that the idle and the evil were unable to recruit even the semblance of 
 a revolt. And indeed, had the wretched Spaniards possessed the slender- 
 est resources for war, they would have been quick to concentrate them in 
 this blissful land, where insurrection had never been seriously known ; 
 where the revenues exacted were paid promptly, where gentle and simple 
 asked only to be let alone. 
 
 But Spain had neither armies nor navies to defend the shattered rem- 
 nants of her ancient world dominion. The retention of Cuba had 
 drained the home treasury ; the plots of pretenders, alone, had prevented 
 her relinquishing the island to whomsoever wanted it ; but Porto Rico, 
 she did prize prized as the miserable mother who, helpless and penniless, 
 sees her brood going into the world to do as best they may. In our 
 presses, the Porto Rico campaign eclipsed Cuba. There were no conceal- 
 ments j no phrases ; we were going to march into this idyllic land and 
 when we had ensanguined its rich fields with blood, we were going to 
 hoist "Old Glory "as the symbol of a new felicity. But our studious 
 plans for a symmetrical campaign were disjointed, first by the inability of 
 Spain to present any equal force anywhere except at Havana and the 
 woeful necessity of her miserable fleet to take refuge in Santiago. Now 
 what our jingoes counted on was a Sevastopol siege of Havana, lasting a 
 year or more and giving patriots the chance to aid the government with 
 food and munitions at a thousand per cent, above the market cost. It was 
 counted as certain, that the war could be very reasonably prolonged from 
 a year to eighteen months. Had it depended on the manipulation of the 
 War Department, this expectation would not have been disappointed. 
 Two almost simultaneous discoveries fell upon the fomentors of war ; 
 Manila proved that Spain's fleets could not fight, and the operations in 
 Cuba, proved that there were no " patriots " on the isle. In all the 
 threatened possessions of the Castilian dynasty the Spaniard virtually 
 bade our armies come and take possession ; that they had neither the
 
 THE VALUE OF FORESIGHT. 471 
 
 strength nor disposition to make war. In Porto Rico, above all, the 
 Spanish,. arraies_ werefew in number. Militia or volunteers were set in 
 the field to defend the island, but the Captain-General had no hope that 
 they would fight. 
 
 Study of the map of Porto Rico, by the War Board, revealed admira- 
 ble lines of defence. Indeed, with a stout navy and a capable army Porto 
 Rico would have been as costly a conquest as Vicksburg or Richmond. 
 When the first bewildering results of Prussian prevoyance began to 
 prove the value of foresight, in the campaign against France, there was 
 no detail too incredible, that went to accentuate the tireless industry of 
 the Prussian staff. It was for example, greedily believed that Von Moltke 
 appealed to late at night, when war had been forced by Bismarck's for- 
 gery, roused himself only an instant, to set the campaign in motion, by 
 directing the staff officer to open drawer three, bureau ten! Of course, 
 this was the silliest of silly inventions, for Bismarck has left the imper- 
 ishable record of his own malevolent dishonesty and Moltke's feverish 
 unrest during the hours when the forged dispatch was doing its deadly 
 work. 
 
 But in the beginning of the colossal enterprise which meant the oust- 
 ing of Spain from the Antilles, our War Department was forced to make 
 use of all the arts and intrigues which form the staple of certain schools 
 of fiction. To illustrate this, the adventures of Lieutenant Henry W. 
 Whitney deserve reciting. The War Board, the Naval strategists re- 
 quired accurate, absolute knowledge of the status of the Spanish military 
 power, in the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico. Young Whitney of the 
 Fourth United States Artillery, a hero of the kind that crucial moments 
 develop, offered himself to the eye and ear of authority. Death was 
 the very least of the dangers he risked for death is the devoir of the 
 soldier. But for him there was the ignoble shrift of the spy, the uncon- 
 secrated burial of the dishonored. Young Whitney, aglow with the confi- 
 dence of the Commander-in-Chief, Miles, burning to make the invasion 
 effective, set out for the enemy's country, light of heart, constant in pur- 
 pose, confronting death at every turn and never for an instant, doubtful 
 or unequal to the emergencies his mission contemplated. Romance itself, 
 seems the only vehicle to recount the daring of this officer, for from the 
 moment he touched Cuban soil, until the hour that he felt his mission 
 done, that his mandate was executed, he confronted execution. He passed 
 through the jaws of death in forms often grotesque, for he was compelled 
 to take the office of journalist, what not, ttf placate the hostile curiosity 
 of his captors. In one crisis he was a British sailor, lost from his ship ;
 
 472 
 
 YOUNG WHITNEY'S MISSION. 
 
 in another, a correspondent of a British journal, seeking facts. Again, 
 he was a happy-go-lucky adventurer, earning his daily dole as best he 
 might. 
 
 Whitney represents faithfully the spirit of the army the republic has 
 trained. He left Washington in the early part of April with important 
 documents for General Gomez, the Commander-in-Chief of the insurgent 
 army in Cuba. These were from General Miles, and conveyed instruc- 
 tions for the Cuban army to meet the United States army. The Lieuten- 
 ant was landed on Cu- 
 ban soil by a torpedo 
 boat, and on April 28th, 
 with his escort of in- 
 surgents, reached Gen- 
 eral Gomez's camp and 
 delivered his messages. 
 With another escort, 
 Lieutenant Whitney 
 was conducted through 
 the enemy's country, 
 and finally reached a 
 point on the shore where 
 he was to secure passage 
 and continue his trip to 
 Porto Rico. But to get 
 to Porto Rico and find 
 out, what it was essen- 
 tial that General Miles 
 and the Washington 
 authorities should 
 know, Whitney had to LIEUTENANT HENRY w. WHITNEY. 
 
 play the part of stoker. 
 This he did without an 
 
 instant's hesitation he was set to shoveling coal into the furnaces of a 
 British ship. When the steamship arrived at Ponce, Whitne} 7 was a 
 trusted member of the crew, and even went about buying stores for the 
 vessel. Then came the opportunity the young Lieutenant was waiting 
 for; with a little knowledge of the Spanish language he succeeded in 
 making the acquaintance of the Spaniards, who at times asked suspi- 
 ciously " Are you an American ? " " No I'm not one of those damn 
 Yankees, I'm an Englishman." As the Spaniards believed that the
 
 EYES AND EARS OPEN. 473 
 
 British were secretly opposed to the Yankees, his reply allayed all 
 doubt. 
 
 Meanwhile, the Lieutenant kept his eyes and ears open, and was men- 
 tally storing away such information as could be picked up. He deter- 
 mined to scour the island as thoroughly as possible, and for this purpose 
 he obtained a horse and started off over valleys and plains, where strategic 
 points existed. He found that on the island there were about two thou- 
 sand Spanish regulars, and almost as many volunteers. The latter 
 were discontented, and ready to flock to the support of the United 
 States troops when landed. Throughout the island the feeling was un- 
 equivocally anti-Spanish. Workmen on plantations were general!)' con- 
 sidered as part of the volunteer troops, and they had as their captains 
 their employer's plantation manager. Both men and employers while 
 they feigned allegiance to Spain, were really opposed to that nation's 
 rule. There was very little opportunity for the insurgents to carry on 
 their style of warfare, as there is little growth of underbrush, the wood- 
 land having been pretty well cleared, and nothing left standing but the 
 royal palms of Pal in a Real. 
 
 It reads like fiction again when this volunteer of the republic perform- 
 ing seaman service, saw the formidable agents of Spain taking possession 
 of the vessel he was serving on, in quest of a "Yankee officer." Whit- 
 ney was standing on the deck at the time checking the cargo as it was 
 lowered into the hold. He greeted the Spanish officers equably and 
 learning their mission said: "The captain is not on board at present, 
 but I know he would be pleased to have you satisfy yourselves that the 
 report is false. If you wish I'll accompany you." There was no neces- 
 sity for an escort, the officers replied, as they searched every part of the 
 steamship ; they finally reappeared arid expressed themselves as satisfied 
 that they had been misinformed. Heroism like this was so lavish during 
 the decisive months that ended in Santiago's surrender, that the histor- 
 ian had no space to tell of it but in all the battles, in all Jhe self-sacri- 
 fices that have won campaigns, there are few episodes more worthy of a 
 nation's admiration than this modest intrepidity and there were an 
 hundred score, quite as thrilling which in the days to come the novelist 
 will make much of, 
 
 In feverish haste, while the starving Spaniards were beseeching our 
 clemency at Santiago, the formidable armaments gathered at Tampa were 
 huriied on board transports for the conquest of Porto Rico. To add 
 dignity to the enterprise the general-in-chief of the armies, who had been 
 denied the glory of compelling the surrender of Santiago, was put at the
 
 474 INVADING PORTO RICO. 
 
 head of the column "invading" Porto Rico. He took with him for this 
 momentous operation twofold the force allotted to the conquest of the 
 Cuban stronghold. Dithyrambic refrains in the press stimulated national 
 expectation. But it must be recorded, that in spite of all the tom-toms, 
 the Porto Rico expedition excited but languid interest. It excited still less 
 when the reports came that Miles had landed at Ponce. That the aston- 
 ished Spaniards had run away ; that the equally astonished citizens had 
 welcomed the invaders with primitive hospitality. Then General Miles 
 issued an "address" and every citizen of the republic that took thought 
 of its duplicity hung his head in shame. For the address was a tissue 
 of let us say misconceptions. The general informed the stupefied 
 Porto Ricans that the great republic, whose heart was being torn with 
 grief over the wrongs of the islanders, had sent its armies to end the peo- 
 ple's woes ; that in future the downtrodden should be the wards of the 
 republic ; that life should be a grand, sweet dream. 
 
 Twenty thousand troops appeared in the island to make good General 
 Miles' pronounciamento. From the debarkation at Ponce, to the occupa- 
 tion of the insular capital, there was nothing that could be called war. 
 The islanders submitted with equanimity to the invasion to the substi- 
 tution of the control of the United States over the incapable government 
 of Spain. The majority of the people, perfectly indifferent to the owner- 
 ship of the island, simply desired to be let alone. The conquest was 
 complete with the mere appearance of the United States forces. We 
 wanted the island ; Spain was powerless to hold it, and it was ours. 
 Then too, the preliminaries of peace were under discussion, delay might 
 make the seizure more awkward. Perhaps the most conclusive comment 
 on this Porto Rico enterprise can be embodied in the utterances of a Porto 
 Rican, who has passed years in longing for the state we call "freedom." 
 
 For a Porto Rico, owning itself, a native of the isle one " Hos 
 tos," makes the situation clear in his melancholy plaint: 
 
 "What I had desired for Porto Rico was that, since her own ariw was 
 too weak to achieve her independence, it might be won for her by a noble 
 and powerful neighbor no longer able to endure the spectacle of old-world 
 tyranny at her very door ; that this liberator should tarry long enough to 
 see the infant republic born and assured of the vigorous beginning of 
 life; that the emancipator should then withdraw with the love and grati- 
 tude of a new nation, rightfully bearing a gladly yielded paramount in- 
 fluence with that nation in all continental and international matters. 
 This conclusion, I am sure, would have been better in the end for Porto 
 Rico as well as the United States. For America it would have meant so
 
 MAJOR-GENERAL NELSON A. MILES.
 
 SERIOUS MISAPPREHENSION. 
 
 477 
 
 much the less of the fatal imperial policy, and so much the more of ad- 
 herence to the wholesome traditions of the past. For the island it would 
 have meant development according to the genius of the people not de- 
 /elopment which must encounter at every step the difficulties raised by 
 difference of race, to temperament of language, and of education. 
 
 " The population of Porto Rico are totally ignorant of the federal system 
 of government ; even those who fancy that they understand it are, for the 
 
 most part, mistaken. It will be diffi- 
 cult for them to comprehend it; it 
 will be still more difficult for them to 
 adapt themselves to it and enter in to 
 it. An obstacle, and to my mind a 
 serious one, will arise in an introduc- 
 tion of a language foreign to the peo- 
 ple as the official language of the 
 island. It will tend in a measure 
 to the creation of caste ; to the rise 
 of an official class sharply set off 
 from the rest of the inhabitants. 
 The passing of the Spanish language 
 will in itself be viewed with regret, 
 for Spanish, as it is, it is dear to all 
 who speak it. Impediments in the 
 transactions of affairs, business as 
 well as governmental, will also neces- 
 sarily be produced by this difference in language, and their tendency will 
 be more or less toward irritation and friction. How many of my country- 
 men will agree with me in the views I hold, I cannot state with positive- 
 ness, but there are not a few I am confident, and it seems to me that it 
 should be easy for all to comprehend where their best interests lie. The 
 press of the United States has rightly made a great deal of the open 
 arms with which the Porto Ricans have received the army of General 
 Miles. All those manifestations of delight the resounding addresses 
 of welcome, the flowers, the tears of joy, the embraces of the unre- 
 strained enthusiasm were questionlessly honest and sincere. Yet and 
 I assert this with absolute conviction they were founded upon a serious 
 misapprehension. 
 
 " The Porto Ricans have taken for granted that the purpose of the United 
 States was, first, to strike a military blow at Spain, and second, to seize 
 the opportunity to put an end forever to Spanish misgovernment in the 
 26 
 
 NATIVE OF PORTO RICO.
 
 478 THE GOOD INVOLVED. 
 
 Antilles, by erecting on the island a free and independent government. 
 The policy of annexation, the imposition of sovereignty upon a people 
 without its solicitation and even without inquiry as to its desires, they 
 never suspected for one moment, opposed as it was to the fundamental 
 principles which had hitherto guided the republic. What revulsion of 
 feeling may follow a recognition of the true intention of the United 
 States, no one can tell. But what avails it now to talk in this strain? 
 The die is cast. The policy of the United States has been declared to 
 the world and it is doubtless inalterable. This being so, it behooves 
 Porto Ricaus to consider the future in the fixed light of annexation. 
 Whatever disappointment may be felt, however acute it may be at first, 
 I expect that it will give way to a general and hearty acceptance of the 
 status. The infinitude of good involved in the change from Spanish to 
 republican allegiance, forbids any other conclusion. But since our loi is 
 cast with the United States, we shall now desire, with intense eagerness 
 to be admitted to full participation in all the prerogatives of a sovereign 
 unit of the republic. We aspire to reach as speedily as possible our sta- 
 tion among the states to be that element in the affairs of the union 
 which such a status implies. The continuance of a military government 
 will be particularly unpleasing to Porto Ricans, reminiscent as it will be 
 of the odious shape of Spanish rule. A territorial government will be 
 viewed as a necessary stage, it may be, but with impatience for its termi- 
 nation. Since we must be Yankees we cannot be blamed if we are anx- 
 ious to become at once as citizens of the republic, the most Yankee of 
 the Yankees. At present we are not the best of material for such a 
 transformation, but immediate conversion will perhaps be for us the best 
 educative process." 
 
 And so in the year 1898 an administration elected to preserve the 
 sanctity of gold over silver, embarked on a crusade to acquire territory. 
 Congress decreed a war for humanity and the minute the legions were 
 formed we made it a war for conquest. We turned from suffering and 
 bleeding Cuba, and directed our chief armament to Porto Rico. We 
 frankly declared that we were going there because we coveted the island. 
 We met no opposition and the island is ours. But there are other islands 
 near by that it would be good to have. Jamaica, Martinique, the Ba- 
 hamas strangely enough we never made a move toward them.
 
 m. 
 
 BARELY had General Shafter raised the flag of the republic over 
 Santiago, when an ominous forecaste of our new responsibilities 
 was made plain. The Cuban leaders demanded as a right, entrance into 
 the captured stronghold, and the instant substitution of a Cuban regime 
 for the Spanish system. General Shafter, by instructions from Washington, 
 refused peremptorily to admit the insurgent armies as participants in the 
 pageant of occupation or the replacing of local authorities by the 
 Cubans. Thereupon one of the eminent insurgent leaders seceded from 
 union with the " liberators," and marched away with his army to continue 
 the war elsewhere. Disquieting reports of continued warfare went on in 
 the territory surrendered by General Toral, the Spanish commander, and 
 for ten days it seemed that the insurrection against Spain was to be re- 
 vived against the Yankees. The " Juntas " made assiduous attempts to 
 incite their old allies, the Jingo presses, to revive the " Cuba Libre " cry, 
 and fire the country in favor of the " patriots " denied the recognition of 
 their valor. The masses, however, who had come under the sphere of 
 our influence, that is the army, petitioned the General in command, and 
 even the Cabinet in Washington, to spare them from the horrors of the 
 Cuban domination. These masses included very nearly every citizen 
 owning property every native of serious repute. The army folk were 
 naturally surprised. We had gone to war, as we supposed, to give these 
 very people, free government, home rule, self-control, and here they were 
 to a man demanding a military regime, rather than the Cuban constitu- 
 tion and republican machinery so long waiting to crown the efforts of the 
 patriots ! In the embarrassment of the situation the President issued a 
 proclamation which at once gave Cuba tranquillity. Among other as- 
 surances, the executive held out these significant promises:' 
 
 " Under this changed condition of things, the inhabitants so long as 
 they perform their duties, are entitled to security in their persons and 
 property, and all their private right and relations. It is my desire that 
 the inhabitants of Cuba should be acquainted with the purpose of 
 the United States to discharge to the fullest extent its obligations in this 
 regard. It will therefore be the duty of the commander of the army of 
 occupation, to announce and proclaim in the most public manner, that we 
 come, not to make war upon the inhabitants of Cuba nor upon any party 
 
 (479)
 
 480 UNDER CHANGED CONDITIONS. 
 
 or faction among them, but to protect them in their homes, in their em- 
 ployments and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who 
 by active aid or honest submission cooperate with the United States, in 
 its efforts to give effect to this beneficent purpose, will receive the reward 
 of its support and protection." 
 
 Existing laws were to continue in force, and as far as possible the 
 capable incumbents of office were to be retained in place. In fact 
 Cuba was to be left to its own destiny in a sense far different from that 
 intended by the Junta who had posed as representing the Cuban people 
 in the cities of the republic. The effect of this assurance would have 
 made a prolongation of the war impossible to Spain for the clemency 
 and good sense of the President's prescription, at once diverted the 
 masses, who were indifferent to Spain, from any desire to prolong the 
 struggle. But for that matter, the conduct of our soldiers, the magnanim- 
 ity of the commanders on sea and shore, had made an ineffaceable im- 
 pression on Spaniards, not only in Cuba, but in Spain. Indeed, before 
 Santiago, the question was asked; what then are we fighting for ? We 
 may hold the Yankees off awhile, but we shall starve presently, why not 
 end it? Spain's loud hints and covert pourparlers for peace, had really 
 begun as soon as the impossibility of sending Camara's fleet to Manila 
 had been made clear. The utter break down of Cervera, and the result- 
 ant fall of Santiago, while virtually ending the Spanish defence in this 
 hemisphere, redoubled our resources. We had, the instant Cervera 's 
 fleet was put out of action a vast sea force ready to despatch to any 
 point deemed desirable. 
 
 Then began a fantastic campaign of threats. If Camara persisted in 
 sailing for Manila to avenge Montojo's destruction, the fleets that had 
 sunk Cervera's ships would be despatched to the coast of Spain. All 
 Europe pricked up its ears at this threat. The cables were hot with the 
 revelations of the colloguing of the continental powers. The Briti.-h 
 presses, with mock gravity let on to know the secret designs of the 
 Washington Cabinet. Europe was informed through these media, that 
 the voracious Yankees were bent on possessing a Mediterranean station. 
 That Commodore Watson would attack Ceuta, the counterpoise of the 
 Spanish fortress held by Great Britian. That he would seize the Canary 
 Islands possibly the most desirable of the Minorca group. That in 
 short, the Yankees having tasted the inebriating cup of facile conquest, 
 were bent on constituting a chain of possessions about the world, engird- 
 ling Europe itself. The Britons professed to regard this evidence that 
 the " Americans " were a chip of the old block, with complacency.
 
 MAJOR-GENERAL MATT. C. BUTLER. MAJOR-GENERAL J. WARREN KEIFER. 
 
 MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN R. BROOKE. 
 
 MAJOR-GENERAL H. C. MKKRTAM.
 
 THE COMEDY THAT FAILED. 483 
 
 Ceuta in Yankee hands, they reasoned, would be preferable to its trans- 
 fer to France. Reasons of the most elaborate and plausible contexture 
 were adduced to prove that this was the manifest destiny of the conquer- 
 ing republic. Day by day, the preparations of our " Flying squadron " 
 were set forth in the British presses and telegraphed by Renter's and 
 other European news agencies, all over the continent. Our own Jingoes 
 took up the tale and their exultant shrieks of covetousness were scattered 
 broadcast over the continent. 
 
 But the comedy failed. The continental powers had already learned 
 the use the British were making of the academic schemes pratted over in 
 the various chancelleries. France, Russia and Italy were smarting over 
 the perfidy which had made them seem inimical to the United States, 
 when the official documents cited by the Italian diplomatic journal, the 
 Arena proved that the only intimation of a purpose to, in any way, in- 
 terfere with the war between this country and Spain, was in the form of 
 a hint from Great Britain. The outcome however was far from the end 
 the intriguers calculated on. The reiterated declarations of the British 
 were taken seriously by the Spanish Cabinet. From the first, the states- 
 men of Spain had fallen into the trap set by the British. They believed 
 that the republic was in a sense, the mere protege of the British, that our 
 Cabinet was secretly governed by the Tory Cabal. The speeches of 
 "Joe " Chamberlain and other demagogues, in the Cabinet and out, were 
 proof to the rather punctilious statesmen of the Peninsula, that the open 
 patronage of British officials and the flamboyant testimonies in the London 
 press, meant that the odious alliance suddenly proclaimed by a Cabinet 
 minister, was a fact; that the republic had joined hands in the career of 
 spoliation which has given Britain domination. 
 
 The result was, that Camara's fleet was recalled in a panic from its de- 
 risive cruise toward Manila. Frantic prayers were sent to Paris to invent 
 some way of gaining the ears of the Washington Cabinet, to consider 
 peace, on its own terms. This was far from what the British wanted. 
 Another half year of war was necessary to enable them to wind us up 
 hopelessly in the "imperial" coil they had begun to enmesh us in. But 
 more important of all, they had been counting on acting the part of peace- 
 maker, after the republic had seized the Canaries, Ceuta and possibly one 
 of the Minorca isles. Then, as peace maker, Britain would have soothed 
 the anger of the Yankees and saved some of the captured islands. In 
 return, Spain could not refuse the cession of Ceuta, or aid in the British 
 seizure of Morocco. But the fright and desperation of the Regent and 
 the Cabinet, impelled Spain to swallow her pride and to appeal to France
 
 484 
 
 SPAIN APPEALS TO FRANCE. 
 
 to intermediate. At the same time the British Ambassador at Madrid 
 Sir Drummond Wolff began a system of nagging and hints. He de- 
 manded to be made the intermediary, under threat, that if he were not 
 selected, Britain would see to it that the Yankees consented to no peace, 
 not first approved by the British Cabinet. Desperate as Sagasta was, this 
 gave him a flash of the old Spanish spirit. He let the British envoy un- 
 derstand that Spain had never suffered more in war than she had when 
 governed by a British peace. 
 
 These pourparlers were going on simultaneously with the rendition of 
 Santiago but the 
 Washington Cabinet 
 was not apprised of the 
 part the British were 
 playing, until hints of it 
 began to appear in the 
 foreign press. The San- 
 tiago surrender came op- 
 portunely for the long 
 deferred acceptance of 
 the semi-official pro- 
 posals for peace. So 
 soon as it was known 
 that the President 
 would listen to the plea, 
 the French ambassador 
 \vas authorized to pre- 
 sent Spain's submis- 
 sion ; the willingness of 
 the Madrid Cabinet to 
 comply with any just 
 terms the victor might 
 prescribe. But even 
 then, the peace came inopportunely as Porto Rico had not yet been con- 
 quered. Hand in hand, with the prolonged preliminaries, the legions of 
 Miles were swarming over the undefended leagues of the island. The 
 mere word peace brought about a portentous public sentiment. The in- 
 stant the millions knew that peace was contingent on our authorities 
 from one end of the land to the other, the cry went up, " Make peace. We 
 have won what we set out to gain the liberation of Cuba, we did not go 
 to war for conquest and an hour's delay will be criminal." For a moment, 
 
 M. JULES CAMBON.
 
 THE PROTOCOL. 486 
 
 even the Jingo press was abashed into a semblance of decorous modera- 
 tion. Peace would be a sensation hardly less inspiring than war. For a 
 time, it would never have been imagined, that every energy of the repub- 
 lic had been devoted to slaughter and the mechanism of destruction. The 
 French minister, Cambon knowing the extremities of Spain, made no 
 demur over the basis or protocol as it was called. This memorable paper 
 embalms the most momentous change ever wrought in the destinies of 
 millions of people, who may be said to have had 110 voice in the events 
 that led to its adoption : 
 
 His Excellency M. Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister 
 Plenipotentiary of the French Republic at Washington, and Mr. William 
 R. Day, Secretary of State of the United States, having received lespec- 
 tively to that effect plenary powers from the Spanish Government and 
 the Government of the United States, have established and sigaed the 
 following articles, which define the terms on which the two Govei nments 
 have agreed with regard to the questions enumerated below, and cf which 
 the object is the establishment of peace between the two cc untries, 
 namely : 
 
 Article 1. Spain will renounce all claim to all sovereignty <i ver and 
 all her rights over the island of Cuba. 
 
 Article 2. Spain will cede to the United States the island cf Porto 
 Rico and the other islands which are at present under the sovereignty of 
 Spain in the Antilles, as well as an island in the Ladrona Archipjlago, to 
 be chosen by the United States. 
 
 Article 3. The United States will occupy and retain the city and bay 
 of Manila and the port of Manila pending the conclusion of a jreaty of 
 peace which shall determine the control and form of government of the 
 Philippines. 
 
 Article 4. Spain will immediately evacuate Cuba, Porto Rico, and the 
 other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the Antilles. To this 
 effect each of the two Governments will appoint Commissioners within 
 ten days after the signing of this protocol, and those Commissioners shall 
 meet at Havana within thirty days after the signing of this protocol, with 
 the object of coming to an agreement regarding the carrying out of the 
 details of the aforesaid evacuation of Cuba and other adjacent Spanish 
 islands; each of the two Governments shall likewise appoint within 
 ten days after the signature of this protocol other Commissioners, who 
 shall meet at San Juan <le Porto Rico within thirty days after the 
 signature of the protocol to ;i<rr MI> ;\ the details of the evacuation of 
 Porto Rico and other islands now u.id.-r Sp.inish sovereignty in the Antilles.
 
 486 THE PARIS COMMISSION. 
 
 Article 5. Spain and the United States shall appoint to treat for peace 
 five Commissioners at the most for either country. The Commissioners 
 shall meet in Paris on October 1, at the latest, to proceed to negotiations 
 and to the conclusion of a treaty of peace. This treaty shall be ratified 
 in conformity with the Constitutional laws of each of the two countries. 
 
 Article 6. Once this protocol is concluded and signed hostilities shall 
 be suspended, and to that effect in the two countries orders shall be given 
 by either Government to the commanders of its land and sea forces as 
 speedily as possible. 
 
 Done in duplicate at Washington, read in French and in English by 
 the undersigned, who affix at the foot of the document their signatures 
 and seals, August 12, 1898. 
 
 Peace came with the signature of this document but two days after- 
 ward the restored cable from Manila brought word that the mock battle 
 had been fought between General Merritt and the Spanish garrison. 
 Thereupon, controversy arose over the clause regarding Manila whether 
 having obtained it by conquest, it could be subjected to the decisions of 
 the commission charged to make the definite treaty in Paris. The event 
 let loose the Jingoes again in full cry. " Wherever the flag has been 
 raised," they argued, "it would be treason to haul it down." Now the 
 flag has been raised in Japan, in China, in the Barbary states, it has been 
 raised on many an island in the Pacific, and it lias been hauled down. It 
 floated over many a mile of Canadian territory, it has floated over miles 
 of our northern border and gone down before the exactions of British 
 treaty makers. Had Commodore Watson taken his fleets to Cadiz it might 
 have floated over the seaports of Andalusia. The President himself, who 
 has never indicated any sympathy with the expansionists or Jingoes, 
 save in the deplorable rape of the Hawaiian islands, set to work to secure 
 commissioners equal to the vast interests entrusted them. The selection 
 of Judge Day, the Secretary of State for the Paris commission, was re- 
 garded as an indication of wise conservatism for during his tenure of (he 
 great place forced upon him, he exhibited all the reserve, dignity and wise 
 conduct of the practiced diplomat. His associates were men not regarded 
 as skilled in the intricacies of diplomacy but in any event, the final de- 
 cision of the treaty that must effect the character of this country until 
 the end of time, lay in the hands of Congress. The commissioners ap- 
 pointed to Cuba and Porto Rico had merely perfunctory duties to perform. 
 They verified the property transferred and took possession of the islands 
 as Representatives of the Republic.
 
 Senator Cushman K.Dav 
 
 THE AMERICAN PEACE COMMISSIONERS.
 
 THE 8PAMSII PEACE COMMISSIONERS.
 
 rv. 
 
 WAR has become a science so complicated, that its conduct in peace 
 even, involves all the mechanism of a vast university. Indeed it 
 is doubtful whether Harvard or Oxford are called upon to maintain so 
 many subdivisions as the War Department or Navy Department of a 
 modern nation. Nominally, the President is commander in-chief of the 
 armies and navies. But the actual duties are performed by the senior 
 officer of each service, naval and military. 
 
 When the war with Spain began President McKinley, who saw some 
 service as a subaltern during the Civil War, and knew the need of skilled 
 direction in all parts of the vast machine, wisely divested himself of all 
 part in the details or plans. To General Miles and the Secretary of 
 War, the conduct of the campaign on land was entrusted. For the navy, 
 something like the " Aulic " council of Austria was adopted. There was 
 a "War Board" consisting of three eminent marines Rear Admiral 
 Sicard, Captains Mahan and Crowriinshield. The function of this board 
 was of the most comprehensive range and diversity. The character of 
 the men selected inspired confidence in the navy. Perhaps the most dis- 
 tinguished personage in the body was Captain T. A. Mahan, whose re- 
 searches and studies in "Sea power" have given him the rank of expert, 
 among the educated of his profession all over the world or perhaps it 
 would be more correct to say, in Great Britain and this country. Ad- 
 miral Sicard was of the highest type of the admirable group of great 
 sailors produced by the Civil War. 
 
 To these men, the problem was given of finding out what effective 
 forces the enemy possessed, and so disposing of our own fleets and even 
 armies as to impede, blockade or destroy them. The map of the world, 
 therefore was their study by day and night. It was exultingly pro- 
 claimed by Admiral Dewey's delighted comrades, that he had wisely cut 
 the Manila cable, in order that he might escape the hampering of the 
 War Board. But the Admiral did not thus escape. He went to his post 
 instructed in almost every detail by the recommendation of the board 
 put in the shape of orders by Secretary Long. Of course this does not 
 mean that a commander is held down to small details. It is the scope 
 and interest of the campaign he is expected to follow. Dewey, for exam- 
 ple, was charged with finding the Spanish fleet in Oriental waters. 
 
 (487)
 
 488 THE SCOPE OF THE WAR BOARD. 
 
 When found, he was to attack if the chances were anywhere nearly equal. 
 The War Board was responsible for providing the ships ; the admiral in 
 charge was responsible for fighting them. The War Board is therefore 
 the eyes and ears of a great power at war ; no one man could retain the 
 immensity of modern fleets in mind. Napoleon could keep the armies of 
 Europe in his head, but he was the only captain that ever could. The 
 War Board must keep each responsible commander apprised of the num- 
 ber and whereabouts of the adversary. But even prescience cannot 
 always do this, for there are endless strategems, that enable a crafty op- 
 ponent to misguide. By painting harmless craft to look like war ships ; 
 by dispersing into unexpected places; by taking a thousand advantages 
 of natural phenomena, a wary opponent may perplex and discomfort a 
 superior force and an abler commander. 
 
 For a time, the unwise act of Cervera served as a brilliant piece of 
 naval strategy, for the sagacious War Board could not conceive Spain's 
 most important fleet, deliberately withdrawing from the conflict, to waste 
 its vitalities in a land-locked harbor. It was the penetrating intelligence 
 of Admiral Schley that detected the trick and announced the end of the 
 fleet almost the instant it found shelter. For weeks before the war be- 
 gan, our consular agents were instructed to make reports on the where- 
 abouts of the Spanish men-of-war, in every port in the world. After 
 hostilities broke out, our agents were equally indefatigable in reporting 
 the presence and movements of Spanish shipping. Not a pound of coal, 
 for example, was bought or sold in any part of the world, that the War 
 Board was not informed on the instant. Not a vessel could change 
 hands that our strategists were not apprised. Every squadron that quit 
 a Spanish port, was known, down to the minutest detail. Naturally, thus 
 safeguarded, our blockading fleets which were saved the peril of other 
 days, when an enemy in force might appear at any point and destroy the 
 squadron in detail. Hence, even though the Spanish fleets had outnum- 
 bered ours, as the impression ran when the war began, the War Board 
 could have assembled a superior force at any endangered point. 
 
 For example, although the fleets of Great Britain outnumber ours 
 ten to one, that power would be no more successful in attacking us than 
 the Spaniards, because she could never make her Dreponderance avail- 
 able. We could always meet her squadrons in equal numbers since her 
 base is thousands of miles away. The sea has its strategy as the land 
 has. No one ever illustrated this so perfectly as Admiral Farragut. 
 And curiously enough, the French at sea have always outgeneraled their 
 British rivals, though rarely successful in actual conflict owing to about
 
 AT ITS IRON GAME. 489 
 
 the same causes that kept the northern armies second best to the south- 
 ern, during the early years of the struggle. The War Board then, must 
 know to a ship, all that the enemy can put into the water; it must 
 know the exact capacity of each ship, it must even know, or ought to, the 
 characteristics of the commanders and the hierarchies of each vessel. It 
 was by knowing the characteristics of the commanders opposing him, that 
 Napoleon won unhoped for victories. Our War Board knew the sort of 
 men we had to depend upon, and from the outset they never doubted 
 what the result would be, unless strain, stress or accident should inter- 
 vene. Strategy therefore takes in beside the manifold operations of sea 
 and land, the forces involved. 
 
 It fell to the War Board to provide for all possible contingencies in the 
 harbors that we should find it necessary to attack. To hamper the 
 enemy, all cables were cut in Cuban ports in order that the land forces 
 might be isolated that the various commanders should receive no aid, 
 when it became necessary to make an attack by fleet or army. Outside 
 of a battlefield, there was no place more suggestive of the work in hand 
 than the immense apartment in the navy building where this fateful 
 War Board sat da}' by day at its iron game for it can be likened to 
 nothing more suggestive than a vast game of chess with all the seas of 
 the world outspread on the walls and tables, and the various devices to 
 denominate forces, marking vital points. 
 
 It would require volumes as ample as a cyclopedia to merely enumer- 
 ate the masses of detail this extraordinary body was called upon to pass 
 upon and digest clearly. Each conjunction compelled a revision of pre- 
 vious determinations or modifications of adopted resolutions. For it was 
 in this form the work of the board went to the Secretary and from him 
 was submitted to the President. Of course this was in the main per- 
 functory, as neither President nor Secretary possesses the technical 
 knowledge necessary to pass intelligently upon abstruse questions of this 
 character. Naturally, men in such a post are garmented in a certain 
 fear. In case of disaster, they may be made the victims as the Aulic 
 council was during the century they brought woe upon the Hapsburgs. 
 But with such captains as manned our ships, the War Board never had 
 cause for apprehension ; there was not a man in authority on Dewey's or 
 Schley's fleets, that could not have taken his place on the War Board, 
 had there been reason for it. Naturally the Board possesses an occult in- 
 fluence, quite beyond its official status. The Secretary of the Navy 
 instinctively or insensibly, comes to see everything done and to be done 
 through the eyes of the Board. Hence the slight cloud of favoritism and
 
 490 SOME HEART-BURNINGS. 
 
 heart-burning over the awards and promotions following the Santiago 
 victories. To the lay mind, Admiral Schley was indisputably the hero of 
 the fleet. He had " bottled " Cervera and when the great day came, Prov- 
 idence so ordered that he was in command of the victorious squadron 
 that destroyed the Armada. But as Sampson was nominally the com- 
 mander, though not present, he received the official proclamation, award, 
 and promotion. As the controversy promises to last as long as the renown 
 of the victory, Captain Mahan's reasoning in Sampson's favor has high 
 historic value. In a letter to the public press, while the controversy was 
 raging, he set the official view forth in this fashion : 
 
 i% At Santiago, all the dispositions prior to action, and for over a month 
 before, were made by the Commander in-Chief. A number of orders, 
 issued from time to time by him, for the enforcement of the close watch 
 of the harbor's mouth, were published in the Washington Post of July 
 27, and I presume by other journals as well. There is very strong 
 ground for believing that Cervera's attempt to escape by day instead of 
 by night the incident of his conduct which has been most widely cen- 
 sured and is most inexplicable was due to the fact that the United States 
 ships kept so close to the harbor mouth at night that a dash like his, 
 desperate at best, had a better chance when the ships were at day dis- 
 tance. This was so stated, substantially, to Admiral Sampson by the 
 Captain of the Colon. If so, the merit of this, forcing the enemy to 
 action under disadvantageous conditions and it is one of the highest 
 achievements of military art belongs to the Commander in Chief. It 
 was the great decisive feature of the campaign, from start to finish. Few 
 naval authorities, I imagine, will dispute this statement. 
 
 " It will be noted also, by comparing the report of Admiral Sampson, 
 stating the disposition of the ships, with the report of Captain Cook, com- 
 manding the Brooklyn, Commodore Schley's flagship, that the United 
 States ships chased and fought in the order, from left to right, established 
 by Sampson. There is in this no particular merit for the latter, beyond 
 that, in placing the two fastest ships, Brooklyn and New York, on the 
 two flanks, he had made the best provision for heading off the enemy, 
 which the Brooklyn so handsomely effected. But the fact that the ships 
 chased as they stood shows that it was unnecessary for Schley to make a 
 signal ; and in truth, from first to last, the second in command needed to 
 make no signal of a tactical character, and made none, so far as is shown 
 by his own report, or that of the Captain of the ship. That is, the 
 second in command exercised no special directive functions of a flag or 
 general officer while the fighting lasted. In this there was no fault, for there
 
 /
 
 NO NEED FOR SIGNALS. 493 
 
 was no need for signals ; but the fact utterly does away with any claim to 
 particular merit as second in command, without in the least impairing the 
 Commodore's credit for conduct in all possible respects gallant and 
 ufficerlike. So far as plan is concerned, the battle was fought on Samp- 
 son's lines; and, to quote Collingwood be fore 'Trafalgar, '1 wish Nelson 
 would stop signalling, for we all know what we have to do.' The second 
 in command and the Captains before Santiago all knew what they had to 
 do, and right nobly they all did it. 
 
 " But the distinctive merit of the series of events which issued in the 
 naval battle of Santiago is that, so far as appears, Cervera was forced to 
 fight as he did on account of the unrelenting watch, through more than a 
 whole moon, including its dark nights, maintained by Admiral Sampson. 
 The writer has been told by a naval officer whose name he has not 
 authority to mention, but who would be recognized as one of the most 
 efficient of his mature years, and who had been off Santiago during part 
 of that eventful month, that he regarded Sampson's watch of the harbor 
 as the decisive feature in the great result. This neither ignores the 
 merits of the Captains nor of the " man behind the gun." But Captains 
 and the men behind the guns may be of the best, the Colonels of the 
 regiments and the privates of land warfare the same, but vain are their 
 valor and their skill if the Commander-in-Chief be wanting in either. 
 
 " With the wise and stringent methods laid down and enforced by the 
 Admiral, it would not in the least have mattered, as things happened, 
 with such ships and such Captains, had the Commander-in-Chief and the 
 second in command, either or both, been seventy miles away. It is ex- 
 actly with the fleet as with the single ships. The merit of each Captain 
 was not only, nor chiefly, that he handled and fought his ship admirably 
 on the day of battle. His greatest merit was that, when he took his ship 
 into action, she was so organized and trained that, had he himself been 
 absent or struck dead by the first shot, the ship would none the less 
 have played her full part efficiently in the fight, under her second in com- 
 mand. 
 
 "Few things in the observation of the writer have been more painful 
 than the attempt of a portion of the press and of the public to rob 
 Sampson of his just and painfully won dues. During the night hours of 
 July 2, 3, when there is strong reason to believe that Cervera, despite the 
 full moon, wished to come out, the Commander-in-Chief with the whole of 
 his force lay close to the harbor's mouth, and the Spanish attempt was 
 deferred till day, when it might be supposed from their usual practice that 
 the besieging vessels would be more distant, and perhaps off their guard.
 
 494 ALL THE WORK WAS WELL DONE. 
 
 At four A. M., when day began to break, the Massachusetts, commanded by 
 one of the most spirited officers in the service, silently withdrew, to coal 
 at Guantanamo, forty miles away. Half an hour before the enemy was 
 discovered coming out, the flagship New York also proceeded west. ID 
 doing this the Commander-in Chief, Admiral Sampson, was obeying a 
 specific and direct order of the Navy Department, to confer personally 
 with the Conimander-in-Chief of the army. To this was owing that, to 
 use the words of Sampson's despatch, the flagship ' was not at any time 
 within range of the heavy Spanish ships.' Upon this circumstance, 
 mortifying as a mere disappointment, that the ship, though pushed to her 
 utmost speed, could not retrieve her original disadvantage of position 
 incurred in obedience to the orders of the Navy Department has been 
 raised the shameful outcry, designed to deprive an eminent officer of the 
 just reward of his toils. 
 
 44 The injustice is with many doubtless unintentional and unwitting. 
 The same excuse can scarcely be made for the charge that the Admiral 
 has grudged praise to his subordinates. Some Washington papers have 
 in this matter been particularly vicious, and the Post of that city, in an 
 editorial of July 31 to that effect, is guilty, in quoting from one paragraph 
 of Sampson's despatch, of suppressing these following words in the suc- 
 ceeding paragraph: 'The commanding officers merit the greatest praise 
 for the perfect manner in which they entered into this plan [of blockade] 
 and put it into execution. The Massachusetts, which, according to 
 routine, was sent that morning to coal at Guantanamo, like the others had 
 spent weary nights upon this work, and deserved a better fate than to be 
 absent that morning.' Again, as regards the action: 'When all the 
 work was done so well, it is difficult to discriminate. The object of the 
 blockade of Cervera's squadron was fully accomplished, and each in- 
 dividual bore well his part in it the Commodore in command of the 
 Second Division, the Captains of ships, their officers and men. The fire 
 of the battleships was powerful and destructive and the resistance of the 
 Spanish squadron was, in great part, broken almost before they had got 
 beyond the range of their own forts.' If higher praise is expected, the 
 only reply that can be made is that it is, historically, rarely given. When 
 individual men are named, unless some conspicuous and unusual deed 
 compels it, those passed over feel slighted ; while, if each who has done 
 his duty is individually named, all distinctive effect is lost. Those who 
 doubt may examine the despatches of men like Nelson and Farragut." 
 
 In a rather heated polemic that arose over the various degrees of credit 
 due the commanders of fleets and ships, the curious anomaly of "Prize
 
 "THE MONEY IN IT." 49b 
 
 money" and bounties were for the first time made realistic to the whole 
 people. It struck the open-minded as an extraordinary retention of the 
 outworn, that our sailors should be left in the mercenary category of old 
 and evil times when the fleets of the world were manned by naval con- 
 dottieri who took pay and served under any flag that offered the most 
 chance for prize money. Indeed, the war had barely begun when the 
 newspapers vivaciously set forth the " Money in it " for the sailormen and 
 Captains of the fleets. For weeks the tales swelled and the visions of 
 the Klondike adventurers suddenly dimmed before the spoil waiting the 
 blockading fleet. Yet, when the allotments were counted it was shown 
 that Admiral Sampson, who had not been under fire during the war, was 
 entitled to $100,000 as his percentage simply because he commanded 
 the seas in which the bulk of the captures had been made. Schley, who 
 really destroyed the Spanish fleet had $5,000, or at the utmost $10,000 for 
 his share. Dewey, who destroyed Spam's efficiency as a power was 
 awarded $5,000!, The odiousness of the system brought about a discus- 
 sion that will probably force a change and put the navy on the same con- 
 ditions as the army. 
 
 Bounty money differs only from prize money in its origin. Prize 
 money is awarded for ships and cargoes captured ; bounty money for 
 those destroyed. The method of distribution is substantially the same in 
 both cases. Under our laws, a prize captured on the high seas is taken 
 to the nearest port in which there is a United States court. The vessel 
 is " libelled " as a prize, and if the owners wish to contest by proving 
 that she is not an enemy, they are permitted to do so. The court decides 
 the question, releasing the vessel, if the claim of the contestants is estab- 
 lished. If the vessel is declared a lawful prize, the court decides what 
 ships are entitled to share in the award. This includes not only those 
 which actually made the capture, but all which were within signalling 
 distance with flags by day, or lights by night. Ships near at hand be- 
 longing to the same squadron, which might have contributed to the result, 
 though not actually engaged in the battle, come in for their portion, the 
 will being taken for the deed. It is assumed that if their crews had a 
 chance they would have displayed as much valor as any others. In the 
 case of the destruction of an enemy's warships in battle, the evidence of 
 what has taken place is more easy to get, and there are practically no 
 court formalities. 
 
 But prize money has been the magnet of many a navy. The British 
 could never have manned their vaunted navies the instruments of loath- 
 some oppression, since fleets were first known, if these legalized bucca-
 
 496 THE LAW IS EXPLICIT. 
 
 neers had not been lured by the spoil of the weak, the cost of the cap- 
 tured prizes. The odious system still exists and the rank and file of our 
 victorious fleets in the late war will share a spoil, greater than the wages 
 won during the war of the revolution by John Paul Jones, or the war of 
 1812 by the glorious captains who humbled British arrogance. Move 
 than $1,000,000 are due the fleets for the conquest of the Spanish navies. 
 This, according to the law, which provides payment of $100 a head for 
 every man on the ships of an enemy when these ships are destroyed. 
 There is an old adage in the navy about the distribution of money won 
 in battle. According to the tars, the money is poured over a ladder and 
 all that falls through goes to the officers, and what remains on the rungs 
 goes to the sailors ! Nevertheless, every man in the fleets will receive a 
 purse small or great, for his part in the campaign. The law governing 
 the distribution of this money is explicit. There are exact provisions for 
 carrying it into effect, and every man according to his rank, will be paid 
 in due season. This statute provides: 
 
 A bounty shall be paid by the United States for each person on board 
 any ship or vessel of war belonging to an enemy at the commencement of 
 an engagement, which is sunk or otherwise destroyed in such engage- 
 ment, by any ship or vessel belonging to the United States, or which it 
 "may be necessary to destroy in consequence of injury received in action, 
 of $100 if the enemy's vessel was of inferior force, and $200 if of equal 
 or superior force, to be divided in the same manner as prize money ; and 
 when the actual number of men on board any such vessel cannot be satis- 
 factorily ascertained, it shall be estimated according to the complement 
 allowed the vessels of its class in the navy of the United States ; and 
 there shall be paid as bounty to the captors of any vessel of war, captured 
 from an enemy, which they may be instructed to destroy or which is im- 
 mediately destroyed for the public interest, but not in consequence of 
 injuries received in action, $50 for every person who shall be on board at 
 the time of such capture. According to this law the officers arid men of 
 Sampson's fleet will be entitled to $100 for every officer and man on 
 board the six Spanish vessels that were destroyed off Santiago. This 
 will give prize money in about this proportion : 
 
 Vizcaya 500 
 
 Maria Teresa 500 
 
 Almirante Oquendo 500 
 
 Cristobal Colon 450 
 
 Furor 67 
 
 Pluton 70
 
 MAJOR-GENERAL J. F. WADE. 
 
 MAJOR-GENERAL JAMKS H. WILSON. 
 
 BRIG.-GENERAL H. M. DUFFIELP, MAJOR-GENERAL H. T. KENT.
 
 SHARING THE BOUNTY. 499 
 
 On this reckoning, the treasury will pay to the officers and men of 
 Sampson's fleet, $208,700. Admiral Sampson will receive a lion's share 
 of the "Head money." The law explicitly provides that the command- 
 ing officer shall have one-twentieth part of all prize money awarded to 
 the ships under his immediate compiand. This will give Admiral Samp- 
 son over $10,000 as his share for the work of the three hours. But it 
 should be remembered that this is only a part of the extra money that 
 Admiral Sampson receives because of the decision of the Navy Depart- 
 ment to place him in command over the fleet, thus temporarily jumping 
 him over Commodore Schley, who ranked him by several points. Ad- 
 miral Sampson receives 'a share in all prizes captured in the Caribbean 
 from the time the war began. The Pedro, one of the captured vessels 
 was sold to the government for $200,000 one half of which goes to the 
 captors. Out of that prize alone, Admiral Sampson received about $5,- 
 000, and it is only one of many valuable prizes that were taken in West 
 Indian waters. While the Admiral in command of the fleet must alwaj's 
 be given his share of prize money, the ships of his fleet 'can be al- 
 lowed to share only when they are within signal distance of the fray, and 
 therefore in a position to give effective aid if needed. The New York 
 therefore shares in the " Head money." Commodore Schley receives only 
 about $4,000 of the " Head money." The law prescribes that the com- 
 manding officer of a division shall receive a one-fiftieth share. The 
 United States fleets are organized on a somewhat different plan now, 
 than when this law was enacted, so that the Commander of a squadron 
 really corresponds to the Commander of a division mentioned in the 
 statute. As a commander of a second squadron of the fleet, Commodore 
 Schley receives his one-fiftieth part of the "Head money" but Commo- 
 dore Howell who was in command of a squadron also receives nothing, 
 because he was away at Key West, and his ships were in no position to 
 render immediate aid. After these two shares have been taken out, the 
 money is apportioned among the vessels of the fleet that took part in the 
 engagement. 
 
 The law provides that every commanderof a single vessel shall receive 
 one-tenth part of the prize money awarded to the vessel in his command. 
 There were seven big warships in the Santiago battle entitled to share in 
 this distribution the battleships Oregon, Iowa, Indiana, Massachusetts, 
 and Texas, and the crusiers New York and Brooklyn. Some smaller 
 ships including the Gloucester and the Vixen are entitled to a share, as 
 they were warships in the meaning of the law. As there should be about 
 $200,000 left after Admiral Sampson and Schley have been helped, there 
 27
 
 600 BOUNTY FOR SINGLE VESSELS. 
 
 will be something like $25,000 to be distributed on each of these seven 
 ships, even after the smaller ships, which were con verted yachts have been 
 provided for. If this reckoning is approximately correct, Captains Tay- 
 lor, Evans, Philip, Chad wick, Higginson, Clark and Cook will leceive 
 about $2,500 each as his share. This is on the supposition that each of 
 these war vessels is given an equal distribution of the "Head money " 
 which seems probable from the fact that they carry about the same com- 
 plement of officers and men. 
 
 Number of Number of 
 
 officers.- men. 
 
 Iowa, 36 
 
 Indiana, 32 
 
 Oregon, 32 
 
 Massachusetts, 32 
 
 Texas, 30 
 
 New York, 40 
 
 Brooklyn, 46 
 
 Totals, .... 248 3,137 
 
 After the captain of each ship has been given his share, there will be 
 something over thirty officers and about 450 men to share every allot- 
 ment of -$22,500. For the distribution of these sums, the law provides that 
 they shall be divided among the others doing duty on board, borne upon 
 the books of the ship in proportion to their respective rates of pay in the 
 service. Speaking roughly, about one-half of this remainder will prob- 
 ably be required to pay the officers of the ship, excepting the commander, 
 and the other half will go to the sailors, who may receive something like 
 $20 each. But there is still more coming to the officers and men of 
 Sampson's fleet beside the money they receive for destroying Cervera's 
 fleet. The Reina Mercedes which was also destroyed off Santiago carried 
 875 officers and men, which means $37,500 for distribution. The squad- 
 ron doing duty off Havana will receive $30,000 for the destruction of the 
 Alphonso XII. as she carried a crew of 300 officers and men. Moreover 
 there may be some salvage from the destruction of Cervera's fleet, which 
 will go to swell the profit of the crews in West Indian waters. It is 
 probable that Congress will have to appropriate money to pay all this in- 
 debtedness. It takes considerable time to determine the allotments, and to 
 place the amounts due each officer and man, to his credit on the books of 
 the navy. The principle is a vicious one ; relic of barbarous age, for it is
 
 A VICIOUS PRINCIPLE. 
 
 501 
 
 an incitement to mercenary war; the sort of war made infamous in the 
 Italian republic, when armies hired themselves to the highest bidder. 
 An army is never given prize money now for a Gettysburg or a Sedan ; 
 why should a navy for a Santiago or a Mobile? The system degrades 
 our sailors and certainly never makes patriots. 
 
 BUTTONS WILL COME OFF.
 
 PRTY years of recrimination followed the British participation of the 
 invasion of the Crimea where the wretched French did most of the 
 fighting, and the sons of Albion caught up and carried off most of the 
 glory and all the advantages. Our own brief essay in foreign conquest 
 promises an interminable aftermath of disputation. To enable the reader 
 to judge impartially, the official utterances of both battle, siege and camp 
 are herewith presented in full. Debating societies and political enthu- 
 siasts may turn to these appendices and find the utterances of the chief 
 actors, when they find the text hostile to their contentions. This is mak- 
 ing a history, virtually an encyclopaedia, and in view of present tend- 
 encies, perhaps this is the ultimate expression of historic chroniclings 
 for when all the world thinks, no man is willing to accept the interpre- 
 tations of any one man, no matter how wise or self-restrained. 
 
 PART I. NAVAL REPORTS. 
 ADMIRAL DEWEY'S STORY OF MANILA. 
 
 " UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP OLYMPIA, CAVITE, May 4, 1898. 
 
 " The squadron left Mirs Bay on April 27, arrived off Bolinao on the morn- 
 ing of April 30, and, finding no vessels there, proceeded down the coast and 
 arrived off the entrance to Manila Bay on the same afternoon. The Boston and 
 the Concord were sent to reconnoitre Port Snbic. A thorough search was made 
 of the port by the Boston and the Concord, but the Spanish fleet was not found. 
 Entered the south channel at 11:30 p. M., steaming in column at eight knots. 
 After half the squadron had passed, a battery on the south side of the channel 
 opened fire, none of the shots taking effect. The Boston and McCnlloch re- 
 turned the fire. The squadron proceeded across the bay at slow speed and 
 arrived off Manila at daybreak, and was fired upon at 5:15 A. M. by three 
 batteries at Manila and two near Cavite, and by the Spanish fleet anchored in 
 an approximately east and west line across the mouth of Bakor Bay, with their 
 left in shoal water in Canacao Bay. 
 
 " The squadron then proceeded to the attack, the flagship Olympia, under 
 my personal direction, leading, followed at a distance by the Baltimore, 
 Raleigh, Petrel, Concord, and Boston in the order named, which formation was 
 maintained throughout the action. The squadron opened fire at 5:41 A. M. 
 
 (502)
 
 DEWEY'S STORY OF MANILA. 503 
 
 While advancing to the attack two mines were exploded ahead of the flagship, 
 too far to be effective. The squadron maintained a continuous and precise fire 
 at ranges vailing from 5,000 to 2,000 yards, countermarching in a line approx- 
 imately parallel to that of the Spanish fleet. The enemy's fire was vigorous, 
 but generally ineffective. Early in the engagement two launches put out 
 toward the Olympia with the apparent intention of using torpedoes. One was 
 sunk and the other disabled by our fire and beached before they were able to 
 fire their torpedoes. 
 
 " At seven A. M. the Spanish flagship Reina Cristina made a desperate at- 
 tempt to leave the line and come out to engage at short range, but was received 
 with such a galling fire, the entire battery of the Olympia being concentrated 
 upon her, that she was barely able to return to the shelter of the point. The fires 
 started in her by our shell at the time were not extinguished until she sank. 
 The three batteries at Manila had kept up a continuous fire from the beginning 
 of the engagement, which fire was not returned by my squadron. The first of 
 these batteries was situated on the south mole head at the entrance of the 
 Pasig River, the second on the south position of the walled city of Manila, and 
 the third at Molate, about one-half mile further south. At this point I sent a 
 message to the Governor-General to the effect that if the batteries did not cease 
 firing the city would be shelled. This had the effect of silencing them. 
 
 " At 7:35 A. M. I ceased firing and withdrew the squadron for breakfast. At 
 11:16 I returned to the attack. By this time the Spanish flagship and almost 
 all the Spanish fleet were in flames. At 12:30 the squadron ceased firing, the 
 batteries being silenced and the ships sunk, burned, and deserted. 
 
 " At 12:40 the squadron returned and anchored off Manila, the Petrel being 
 left behind to complete the destruction of the smaller gunboats, which were 
 behind the point of Cavite. This duty was performed by Commander E. P. 
 Wood in the most expeditious and complete manner possible. The Spanish 
 lost the following vessels : Sunk, Reina Cristina, Castilla, Don Antonio de 
 Ulloa; burned, Don Juan de Austria, Isla de Luzon, Isla de Cuba, General 
 Lezo, Marquis del Duero, El Correo, Velasco, and Isla de Mindanao (transport) ; 
 captured, Rapido and Hercules (tugs), and several small launches. 
 
 " I am unable to obtain complete accounts of the enemy's killed and wounded, 
 but believe their losses to be very heavj\ The Reina Cristina alone had 150 
 killed, including the Captain, and ninety wounded. I am happy to report that 
 the damage done to the squadron under my command was inconsiderable. 
 There were none killed and only seven men in the squadron were slightly 
 wounded. Several of the vessels were struck and even penetrated, but the 
 damage was of the slightest, and the squadron is in as good condition now as 
 before the battle. 
 
 " I beg to state to the department that I doubt if any Commander-in-Chief 
 was ever served by more loyal, efficient, and gallant Captains than those of the 
 squadron now under my command. Captain Frank Wildes, commanding the
 
 504 ADMIRAL MONTOJO'S REPORT. 
 
 Boston, volunteered to remain in command of his vessel, although his relief 
 arrived before leaving Hong Kong. Assistant Surgeon Kindelberger of the 
 Olympia and Gunner J. C. Evans, of the Boston, also volunteered to remain 
 after orders detaching them had arrived. The conduct of my personal staff 
 was excellent. Commander B. P. Lamberton, chief of staff', was a volunteer 
 for that position, and gave me most efficient aid. Lieutenant Brumby, Flag 
 Lieutenant, and Ensign E. P. Scott, aide, performed their duties as signal 
 officers in a highly creditable manner, Caldwell, Flag Secretary, volunteered 
 for and was assigned to a sub-division of the five-inch battery. Mr. J. L. Stick- 
 ney, formerly an officer in the United States Navy, and now correspondent for 
 the New York Herald, volunteered for duty as my aide, and rendered valuable 
 service. I desire especially to mention the coolness of Lieutenant C. G. Calk- 
 ins, the navigator of the Olympia, who came under my personal observation, 
 being on the bridge with me throughout the entire action, and giving the 
 ranges to the guns with an accuracy that was proven by the excellence of the 
 firing. 
 
 " On May 2, the day following the engagement, the squadron again went to 
 Cavite, where it remains. On the 3d the military forces evacuated the Cavite 
 arsenal, which was taken possession of by a landing party. On the same day 
 the Raleigh and the Baltimore secured the surrender of the batteries on 
 Corregidor Island, paroling the garrison and destroying the guns. On the 
 morning of May 4, the transport Manila, which had been aground in Bakor Bay, 
 was towed off and made a prize." 
 
 ADMIRAL MONTOJO'S REPORT. 
 
 " MANILA, May 7th. 
 
 " I have to report the destruction of the fleet under my command by a su- 
 perior number of American battleships. 
 
 " The force of these vessels, excepting transports that were non-combatant, 
 amounted to 21,410 tons, 49,290 horse power, 163 guns (many of which were 
 rapid fire), 1,750 men in their crews, and of an average speed of about seven- 
 teen miles. The power of our only five effective ships for battle was repre- 
 sented by 10,111 tons, 11,200 horse power, seventy-six guns (very short of 
 rapid fire), 1,875 crew, and a maximum speed of twelve miles. 
 
 " The Americans fired most rapidly. There came upon us numberless pro- 
 jectiles, as the three cruisers at the head of the line devoted themselves almost 
 entirely to fight the Cristina, my flagship. A short time after the action com- 
 menced one shell exploded in the forecastle and put out of action till those who 
 served the four rapid fire cannon, making splinters of the forward mast, which 
 wounded the helmsman on the bridge, when Lieutenant Jose Nunez took the 
 wheel with a coolness worthy of the greatest commendation, steering until the 
 end of the fight.
 
 ADMIRAL MONTOJO'S REPORT. 505 
 
 " In the meanwhile another shell exploded in the orlop, setting fire to the 
 crew's bags, which they were, fortunately, able to controL 
 
 " The enemy shortened the distance between us, and, rectifying his aim, cov- 
 ered us with a rain of rapid fire projectiles. 
 
 " At half-past seven one shell destroyed completely the steering geer. I 
 ordered to steer by hand while the rudder was out of action. In the mean- 
 while another shell exploded on the poop and put out of action nine men. 
 Another destroyed the mizzenmast head, bringing down the flag and my en- 
 sign, which were replaced immediately. 
 
 " A fresh shell exploded in the officers' cabin, covering the hospital with 
 blood, destroying the wounded who were being treated there. Another ex- 
 ploded in the ammunition room astern, filling the quarters with smoke and pre- 
 venting the working of the hand steering gear. As it was impossible to con- 
 trol the fire, I had to flood the magazine when the cartridges were beginning to 
 explode. 
 
 " Amidships, several shells of smaller calibre went through the smokestack, 
 and one of the large ones penetrated the fireroom, putting out of action one 
 master gunner and twelve men serving the guns. 
 
 " Another rendered useless the starboard bow gun. While the fire astern in- 
 creased, fire was started forward by another shell, which went through the hull 
 and exploded on the deck. 
 
 " The broadside guns, being undamaged, continued firing until there we. 
 only one gunner and one seaman remaining unhurt for firing them, as the guns 
 crews had been frequently called upon to substitute those charged with steer- 
 ing, all of whom were out of action. 
 
 " The ship being out of control, the hull, smokepipe and masts riddled with 
 shot, half of her crew out of action, among whom were seven officers, I gave 
 the order to sink and abandon the ship before the magazines should explode, 
 making signal at the same time to the Cuba and Luzon to assist in saving the 
 rest of the crew, which they did, aided by others from the Duro and the arse- 
 nal. 
 
 " I abandoned the Cristina, directing beforehand to secure her flag, and, ac- 
 companied by my staff, and with great sorrow, I hoisted my flag on the cruiser 
 Isla de Cuba. 
 
 1 " After having saved many men from the unfortunate vessel, one shell de- 
 stroyed her heroic commander, Don Luis Cadaraso, who was directing the 
 rescue. 
 
 " The Ulloa, which also defended herself firmly, using the only two guns 
 which were available, was sunk by a shell, which entered at the water line, put- 
 ting out of action her commander and half of her remaining crew, those who 
 were only remaining for the service of the two guns stated. 
 
 " The Castilla, which fought heroically, with her artillery useless, except one 
 stern gun, with which they fought spiritedly, was riddled with shot and set on
 
 506 THE DIARIO DE MANILA. 
 
 fire by the enemy's shells, then sunk, and was abandoned by her crew, in good 
 order, which was directed by her commander, Don Alonzo Algaro. The casual- 
 ties on this ship were twenty-three killed and eighty wounded. 
 
 " The Austria, very much damaged and on fire, went to the aid of the Castilla. 
 The Luzon had three guns dismounted and was slightly damaged in the hull. 
 The Duro remained, with one of her engines useless, the bow gun and one of 
 the redoubts. 
 
 " At eight o'clock in the morning, the enemy's squadron having suspended 
 its fire, I ordered the ships that remained to us to take positions in the bottom 
 of the roads', at Bacoor, and there to resist to the last moment, and that they 
 should be sunk before they surrendered. 
 
 " At half-past ten the enemy returned forming a circle to destroy the arsenal, 
 and the ships which remained to me, opening upon them a horrible fire, which 
 we answered as far as we could with the few cannon which we still had 
 mounted. 
 
 "There remained the last recourse to sink our vessels and we accom- 
 plished this operation, taking care to save the flag, the distinguishing, pennant, 
 the money in the safe, the portable arms, the breech plugs of the guns, and the 
 signal codes, after which I went, with my staff, to the convent of Santo Domingo 
 de Cavite to be cured of a wound received in the left leg, and to telegraph a 
 brief report of the action, with preliminaries and results. 
 
 " The inefficiency of the vessels which composed my little squadron, the lack 
 of all classes of the personnel, especially master gunners and seaman gunners, 
 the inaptitude of some of the provisional machinists, the scarcity of rapid fire 
 cannon, the strong crews of the enemy, and the unprotected character of the 
 greater part of our vessels, all contributed to make more decided the sacrifice 
 which we made for our country. 
 
 " Our casualties, including those of the arsenal, amounted to 381 men killed 
 and wounded." 
 
 REPORT OF THE DIARIO DE MANILA. 
 
 " As the sun rose above the clouds and mist that overhung our shores on the 
 morning of May 1, the inhabitants of Manila saw with surprise and dismay 
 the enemy's squadron in well-ordered line of battle on the waters of the bay. 
 Who could have imagined that they would have had the rashness to stealthily 
 approach our shores, provoking our defenders to an unavailing display of skill 
 and valor, in which, alas, balls could not be propelled by heart-throbs, else the 
 result would have been different? The sound of the shots from our batteries 
 and those from the enemy's ships, which awakened the citizens of Manila at 
 five o'clock on that May morning, transformed the character of our peaceful 
 and happy surroundings. Frightened at the prospect of dangers that seemed 
 greater than they were, women and children in carriages, or by whatever 
 means they could, sought refuge in the outskirts of the city, while all the men,
 
 THE DIARIO DE MANILA. 507 
 
 from the highest to the lowest, the merchant and the mechanic, the soldier and 
 the peasant, the dwellers of the mainland and those of the coast, repaired to 
 their posts and took up arms, confident that never, except by passing over their 
 dead bodies, should the soil of Manila be defiled by the enemy, notwithstanding 
 that from the first it was apparent that the armored ships and powerful guns 
 were invulnerable to any effort at our command. Before entering our port the 
 enemy had well assured himself of his superiority over our defences. 
 
 " The walls of the public square, the towers of the churches, the upper stories 
 of houses, and every place that commanded a view of the bay were thronged 
 by eager spectators. 
 
 " The shots from the batteries and plaza produced no impression upon the 
 cruisers. The spectators on the shore, with and without glasses, continued to 
 scan the advancing enemy, who, although he may have been brave, had no oc- 
 casion to show it, since the range of his guns and the deficiencies of our artil- 
 lery enabled him to do all the harm he wished with impunity. ... A sol- 
 dier of the First Battalion of Sharpshooters, who saw the squadron so far out 
 of range of our batteries, said, glancing up to Heaven, ' If the Holy Mary 
 would only transform that water into land, then the Yankees would see how we 
 could fight 1 ' And a Malay, squatting near by, exclaimed, ' Let them land, and 
 we will crush them under heel ! ' Meanwhile the enemy proceeded with speed 
 and safety, in perfect formation, toward Cavite, with the decision born of se- 
 curity. 
 
 "... From Manila we could see, by the aid of glasses, the two squadrons 
 almost confounded and enveloped in clouds of smoke. Owing to the infe- 
 riority of our batteries, it was evident that the enemy was triumphant and se- 
 cure in his armored strength ; he was a mere machine, requiring only motive 
 power to keep in action his destructive agencies. . . . Who can describe 
 the heroic acts, the prowess, the deeds of valor performed by the sailors of our 
 squadron as rage animated them ? All who were beneath the folds of the ban- 
 ner of Spain did their duty as becomes the chosen sons of the fatherland. 
 
 " A thick column of smoke burst out of the forward storeroom hatch of the 
 Cristina, indicating that an incendiary projectile, of the kind prohibited by 
 Divine and human laws, had taken effect in the cruiser. Without ceasing her 
 fire, she retired toward the shore and was scuttled to avoid falling into the 
 Yankees' hands. The indignation of the sailors of the Cristina was raised to 
 the highest pitch at seeing the Castilla on fire from the same incendiary causes. 
 The Spanish vessels that had not succumbed to the flames or the shots of the 
 enemy were run aground, as they could not be disposed of in any other way. 
 This was the last stroke ; we could do no more, the combat of Cavite was 
 ended, and our last vessel went down flying her colors. A list of the Spanish 
 killed and wounded is given, and high praise is awarded to the defenders of the 
 batteries at Manila and Cavite."
 
 508 ADMIRAL SAMPSON'S REPORT. 
 
 THE FLEET AT SANTIAGO. 
 REPORT OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, NORTH ATLANTIC STATION. 
 
 " UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP NEW YORK, FIRST HATE, 
 
 " OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 15, 1898. 
 To THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
 
 " SIR : 1. I have the honor to make the following report upon the battle with 
 and the destruction of the Spanish squadron, commanded by Admiral Cervera, 
 off Santiago de Cuba, on Sunday, July 3, 1898. 
 
 " 2. The enemy's vessels came out of the harbor between 9:35 and ten A. M., 
 the head of the column appearing around Cay Smith at 9:31, and emerging 
 from the channel five or six minutes later. 
 
 " 3. The positions of the vessels of my command off Santiago at that mo- 
 ment were as follows : The flagship New York was four miles east of her 
 blockading station and about seven miles from the harbor entrance. She had 
 started for Siboney, where I intended to land, accompanied b}' several of my 
 staff, and go to the front to consult with General Shatter. A discussion of the 
 situation and a more definite understanding between us of the operations pro 
 posed had been rendered necessary by the unexpectedly strong resistance of tin 
 Spanish garrison of Santiago. I had sent my chief of staff on shore the day be- 
 fore to arrange an interview with General Shafter, who had been suffering from 
 heat prostration. I made arrangements to go to his headquarters, and my 
 flagship was in the position mentioned above when the Spanish squadron ap- 
 peared in the channel. The remaining vessels were in or near their usual 
 blockading positions, distributed in a semicircle about the harbor entrance, 
 counting from the eastward to the westward, in the following order: The In- 
 diana, about a mile and a half from shore ; the Oregon the New York's place 
 between these two the Iowa, Texas, and Brooklyn, the latter two miles from 
 the shore west of Santiago. The distance of the vessels from the harbor 
 entrance was from two and one : half to four miles, the latter being the limit of 
 day blockading distance. The length of the arc formed by the ships was about 
 eight miles. The Massachusetts had left at four A. M. for Guantanamo for coal. 
 Her station was between the Iowa and Texas. The auxiliaries Gloucester and 
 Vixen lay close to the land and nearer the harbor entrance than the large ves- 
 sels, the Gloucester to the eastward and the Vixen to the westward. The tor- 
 pedo boat Ericsson was in company with the flagship, and remained with her 
 during the chase until ordered to discontinue, when she rendered very efficient 
 service in rescuing prisoners from the burning Vizcaya. I inclose a diagram 
 showing approximately the positions of the vessels as described above. 
 
 " 4. The Spanish vessels came rapidly out of the harbor, at a speed esti- 
 mated at from eight to ten knots, and in the following order : Infanta Maria 
 Teresa (flagship), Vizcaya, Cristobal Colon, and the Almirante Oquendo. The
 
 ADMIRAL SAMPSON'S REPORT. 509 
 
 distance between these ships was about 800 yards, which means that, from the 
 time the first one became visible in the upper reach of the channel until the last 
 one was out of the harbor, an interval of only about twelve minutes elapsed. 
 Following the Oquendo, at a distance of about 1,200 yards, came the torpedo 
 boat destroyer Pluton, and after her the Furor. The armored cruisers, as 
 rapidly as they could bring their guns to bear, opened a vigorous fire upon the 
 blockading vessels, and emerged from the channel shrouded in the smoke from 
 their guns. 
 
 " 5. The men of our ships in front of the port were at Sunday ' quarters for 
 inspection.' The signal was made simultaneously from several vessels, 
 ' Enemy's ships escaping,' and general quarters was sounded. The men 
 cheered as they sprang to their guns, and fire was opened probably within eight 
 minutes by the vessels whose guns commanded the entrance. The New York 
 turned about and steamed for the escaping fleet, flying the signal ' Close in to- 
 ward harbor entrance and attack vessels,' and gradually increasing speed, until 
 toward the end of the chase she was making sixteen and one-half knots, and 
 was rapidly closing on the Cristobal Colon. She was not at any time within 
 range of the heavy Spanish ships, and her only part in the firing was to receive 
 the undivided fire from the forts in passing the harbor entrance and to fire a 
 few shots at one of the destroyers, thought at the moment to be attempting to 
 escape from the Gloucester. 
 
 u 6. The Spanish vessels, upon clearing the harbor, turned to the westward 
 in column, increasing their speed to the full power of their engines. The 
 heavy blockading vessels, which had closed in toward the Morro at the instant 
 of the enemy's appearance, and at their best speed, delivered a rapid fire, well 
 sustained and destructive, which speedily overwhelmed and silenced the 
 Spanish fire. The initial speed of the Spaniards carried them rapidly past the 
 blockading vessels, and the battle developed into chase, in which the 
 Brooklyn and the Texas had at the start the advantage of position. The 
 Brooklyn maintained this lead. The Oregon, steamir;g with amazing speed 
 from the commencement of the action, took first place. The Iowa and Indiana, 
 having done good work, and not having the speed of the other ships, were di- 
 rected by me in succession, at about the time the Vfzcaya was beached, to 
 drop out of the chase and resume blockading stations. These vessels rescued 
 -many prisoners. The Yixen, finding that the rush of the Spanish ships would 
 put her between two fires, ran outside of our column and remained there during 
 the battle and chase. 
 
 " 7. The skilful handling and gallant fighting of the Gloucester excited the 
 admiration of every one who witnessed it, and merits the commendation of the 
 Navy Department. She is a fast and entirely unprotected auxiliary vessel 
 the yacht Corsair and has a good battery of light rapid-fire guns. She was 
 lying about two miles from the harbor entrance, to the southward and east- 
 ward, and immediately steamed in, opening fire upon the large ships. An-
 
 510 ADMIRAL SAMPSON'S REPORT. 
 
 ticipating the appearance of the Pluton aiid Furor, the Gloucester was slowed, 
 thereby gaining more rapidly a high pressure of steam, and when the destroy- 
 ers came out she steamed for them at full speed, and was able to close at short 
 range, when her fire was most deadly and of great volume. During this fight 
 the Gloucester was under the fire of the Socapa batter}'. Within twenty 
 minutes from the time they emerged from Santiago Harbor the careers of the 
 Furor and the Pluton were ended and two-thirds of their people killed. The 
 Furor was beached and sunk in the surf; the Pluton sank in deep water a few 
 minutes later. The destroyers probably suffered much injury from the fire of 
 the secondary batteries of the battleships Iowa, Indiana, and the Texas, yet I 
 think a very considerable factor in their speedy destruction was the fire at 
 close range of the Gloucester's battery. After rescuing the survivors of the 
 destroyers, the Gloucester did excellent service in landing and securing the 
 crew of the Infanta Maria Teresa. 
 
 " 8. The method of escape attempted by the Spaniards, all steering in the 
 same direction, and in formation, removed all tactical doubt or difficulties, and 
 made plain the duty of every United States vessel to close in, immediately en- 
 gage, and pursue. This was promptly and effectively done. As already 
 stated, the first rush of the Spanish squadron carried it past a number of the 
 blockading ships, which could not immediately work up to their best speed ; 
 but they suffered -heavily in passing, and the Infanta Maria Teresa and the 
 Oquendo were probably set on fire by shells fired during the first fifteen 
 minutes of the engagement. It was afterward learned that the Infanta Maria 
 Teresa's fire main had been cut by one of our first shots and that she was un- 
 able to extinguish fire. With large volumes of smoke rising from their lower 
 decks aft, these vessels gave up both fight and flight, and ran in on the beach, 
 the Infanta Maria Teresa at about 10:15 A. M., at Nima, six and one-half miles 
 from Santiago Harbor entrance, and the Almirante Oquendo at about 10:30 A. 
 M., at Juan Gonzales, seven miles from the port. 
 
 " 9. The Vizcaya was still under the fire of the leading vessels ; the Cristo- 
 bal Colon had drawn ahead, leading the chase, and soon passed beyond the 
 range of the guns of the leading American ships; the Vizcaya was soon set on 
 fire, and at 11:15 she turned inshore and was beached at Aserradero, fifteen 
 miles from Santiago, burning fiercely, and with her reserves of ammunition on 
 deck already beginning to explode. When about ten miles west of Santiago 
 the Indiana had been signalled to go back to the harbor entrance, and at 
 Aserradero the Iowa was signalled to ' Resume blockading station.' The Iowa, 
 assisted by the Ericsson and the Hist, took off the crew of the Vizcaya, while the 
 Harvard and the Gloucester rescued those of the Infanta Maria Teresa and the 
 Almirante Oquendo. This rescue of prisoners, including the wounded, from 
 the burning Spanish vessels, was the occasion of some of the most daring and 
 gallant conduct of the day. The ships were burning fore and aft, their guns 
 and reserve ammunition were exploding, and it was not known at what moment
 
 ADMIRAL SAMPSON'S REPORT. 511 
 
 the fire would reach the main magazines. In addition to this, a heavy surf 
 was running just inside of the Spanish ships. But no risk deterred our officere 
 and men until their work of humanity was complete. 
 
 " 10. There remained now of the Spanish ships only the Cristobal Colon 
 but she was their best and fastest vessel. Forced by the situation to hug the 
 Cuban coast, her only chance of escape was by superior and sustained speed. 
 When the Vizcaya went ashore, the Colon was about six miles ahead of the 
 Brooklyn and the Oregon ; but her spurt was finished, and the American ships 
 were now gaining upon her. Behind the Brooklyn and the Oregon came 
 the Texas, Vixen, and New York. It was evident from the bridge of the 
 New York that all the American ships were gradually overhauling the chase 
 and "that she had no chance of escape. At 12:50 the Brooklyn and the Orgeon 
 opened fire and got her range, the Oregon's heavy shell striking beyond her, 
 and at 1:20 she gave up without firing another shot, hauled down her colors, 
 and ran ashore at Rio Tarquino, fortj'-eight miles from Santiago. Captain 
 Cook, of the Brooklyn, went on board to receive the surrender. While his 
 boat was alongside I came up in the New York, received his report, and placed 
 the Oregon in charge of the wreck to save her if possible, and directed the 
 prisoners to be transferred to the Resolute, which had followed in the chase. 
 Commodore Scliley, whose chief of staff had gone on board to receive the sur- 
 render, had directed that all their personal effects should be retained by the 
 officers. This order I did not modify. The Cristobal Colon was not injured 
 by our firing, and probably is not much injured by beaching, though she ran 
 ashore at high speed. The beach was so steep that she came off by the work- 
 ing of the sea. But her sea valves were opened and broken treacherously, I 
 am sure, after her surrender, and despite all efforts, she sank. When it became 
 evident that she could not be kept afloat, she was pushed by the New York 
 bodily upon the beach, the New York's stem being placed against her for this 
 purpose, the ship being handled by Captain Chadwick with admirable judg- 
 ment, and sank in shoal water, and may be saved. Had this not been done, 
 she would have gone down in deep water and would have been to a certainty a 
 total loss. 
 
 " 11. I regard this complete and important victory over the Spanish forces 
 as the successful finish of several weeks of arduous and close blockade, so 
 stringent and effective during the night that the enemy was deterred from 
 making the attempt to escape at night, and deliberately elected to make the at- 
 tempt in daylight. That this was the case I was informed by the commanding 
 officer of the Cristobal Colon. 
 
 " 12. It seems proper to briefly describe here the manner in which this was 
 accomplished. The harbor of Santiago is naturally easy to blockade, there be 
 ing but one entrance, and that a narrow one ; and the deep water extendinj 
 close to the shore line presenting no difficulties of navigation outside of tin 
 entrance. At the time of my arrival before the port June 1, the moor
 
 512 ADMIRAL SAMPSON'S REPORT. 
 
 was at its full, and there was sufficient light during the night to enable any 
 movement outside of the entrance to be detected ; but with the waning of the 
 moon and the coining of dark nights, there was opportunity for the enemy to 
 escape, or for his torpedo boats to make an attack upon the blockading vessels. 
 It was ascertained with fair conclusiveness that the Merrimac, so gallantly 
 taken into the channel on June 3, did not obstruct it. I therefore maintained 
 the blockade as follows : To the battleships was assigned the duty, in turn, of 
 lighting the channel. Moving up to the port at a distance of from one to two 
 miles from the Morro, dependent upon the condition of the atmosphere, they 
 threw a searchlight beam directly up the channel, and held it steadily there. 
 This lighted up the entire breadth of the channel for half a mile inside of the 
 entrance so brilliantly that the movement of small boats could be detected. 
 Why the batteries never opened fire upon the searchlight ship was always a 
 matter of surprise to me ; but they never did. Stationed close to the entrance 
 of the port were three picket vessels, usually converted yachts, and, when they 
 were available, one or two of our torpedo boats. With this arrangement there 
 was at least a certainty that nothing could get out of the harbor undetected. 
 After the arrival of the army, when the situation forced upon the Spanish 
 admiral a decision, our vigilance increased. The night blockading distance 
 was reduced to two miles for all vessels, and a battleship was placed alongside 
 the searchlight ship, with her broadside trained upon the channel, in readiness 
 to fire the instant a Spanish ship should appear. The commanding officers 
 merit the greatest praise for the perfect manner in which they entered into this 
 plan and put it into execution. The Massachusetts, which, according to 
 routine, was sent that morning to coal at Guantanamo, like the others, had 
 spent weary nights upon this work, and deserved a better fate than to be absent 
 that morning. I inclose, for the information of the department, copies of 
 orders and memoranda issued from time to time, relating to the manner of 
 maintaining the blockade. 
 
 " 13. When all the work was done so well, it is difficult to discriminate in 
 praise. The object of the blockade of Cervera's squadron was fully accom- 
 plished, and each individual bore well his part in it the commodore in com- 
 mand of the second division, the captains of ships, their officers and men. 
 The fire of the battleships was powerful and destructive, and the 
 resistance of the Spanish squadron was, in great part, broken almost before 
 they had got beyond the range of their own forts. The fine speed of the 
 Oregon enabled her to take a front position in the chase, and the Cristobal 
 Colon did not give up until the Oregon had thrown a thirteen-inch shell be- 
 yond her. This performance adds to the already brilliant record of this fine 
 battleship and speaks highly of the skill and care with which her admirable 
 efficiency has been maintained during a service unprecedented in the history of 
 vessels of her class. The Brooklyn's westerly blockading position gave her an 
 advantage in the chase, which she maintained to the end, and she employed her
 
 ADMIRAL SAMPSON'S REPORT. 613 
 
 fine battery with telling effect. The Texas and the New York were gaining 
 on the chase during the last hour, and had any accident befallen the Brooklyn 
 or the Oregon, would have speedily overhauled the Cristobal Colon. From the 
 moment the Spanish vessel exhausted her first burst of speed the result was 
 never in doubt. She fell, in fact, far below what might reasonably have been 
 expected of her. Careful measurements of time and distance give her an 
 average speed, from the time she cleared the harbor mouth until the time she 
 was run ashore at Rio Tarquino, of 13.7 knots. Neither the New York nor 
 the Brooklyn stopped to couple up their forward engines, but ran out the chase 
 with one pair, getting steam, of course, as rapidly as possible on all boilers. 
 To stop to couple up the forward engines would have meant a delay of fifteen 
 minutes, or four miles in the chase. 
 
 " 14. Several of the ships were struck, the Brooklyn more often than the 
 others, but very slight material injury was done, the greatest being abroad the 
 Iowa. Our loss was one man killed and one wounded, both on the Brooklyn. 
 It is difficult to explain this immunity from loss of life or injury to ships in a 
 combat with modern vessels of the best type ; but Spanish gunnery is poor at 
 best, and the superior weight and accuracy of our fire speedily drove the men 
 from their guns and silenced their fire. This is borne out by the statements of 
 prisoners and by observation. The Spanish vessels, as they dashed out of the 
 harbor, were covered with the smoke from their own guns, but this speedily 
 diminished in volume, and soon almost disappeared. The fire from the rapid- 
 lire batteries of the battleships appears to have been remarkably destructive. 
 An examination of the stranded vessels shows that the Almirante Oqueudo 
 especially had suffered terribly from this fire. Her sides are everywhere 
 pierced, and her decks were strewn with the charred remains of those who had 
 fallen. 
 
 " 15. The reports of Commodore W. S. Schley and of the commanding of- 
 ficers are enclosed. 
 
 " 16. A board, appointed by me several days ago, has made a critical ex- 
 amination of the stranded vessels, both with a view of reporting upon the 
 result of our fire and the military features involved, and of reporting upon the 
 chance of saving any of them and of wrecking the remainder. The report of 
 board will be speedily forwarded. Very respectfully, 
 
 " W. T. SAMPSON, 
 
 " Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Force, North 
 Atlantic Station."
 
 514 ADMIRAL SAMPSON'S REPORT. 
 
 INCLOSURES IN THE REPORT. 
 The Admiral made these inclosures in his report : x 
 
 ORDER OF BATTLE. 
 
 " UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP NEW YORK, FIRST RATE, 
 u OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 2, 1898. 
 
 " The fleet off Santiago de Cuba will be organized during the operations 
 against that port and the Spanish squadron as follows : 
 
 " FIRST SQUADRON Under the personal command of the Commander-in- 
 Chief : New York, Iowa, Oregon, New Orleans, Mayflower, Porter. 
 
 " SECOND SQUADRON Commodore Schley : Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas, 
 Marblehead, Vixen. 
 
 " Vessels joining subsequently will be assigned by the Commander-in-Chief. 
 The vessels will blockade Santiago de Cuba closely, keeping about six miles 
 from the Morro in the daytime and closing in at night, the lighter vessels well 
 in shore. The first squadron will blockade on the east side of the port and the 
 second squadron on the west side. If the enemj' tries to escape the ships must 
 close and engage as soon as possible and endeavor to sink his vessels or force 
 them to run ashore in the channel. It is not considered that the shore bat- 
 teries are of sufficient power to do any material injury to battleships. 
 
 " In smooth weather the vessels will coal on station. If withdrawn to coal 
 elsewhere, or for other duty, the blockading vessels on either side will cover 
 the angle thus left vacant. Very respectfully, 
 
 " W. T. SAMPSON, 
 " Rear Admiral U. S. Navy, Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, North 
 
 Atlantic Station." 
 
 MEMORANDUM NO. 13. 
 
 " UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP NEW YORK, FIRST RATE, 
 
 " OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 7, 1898. 
 
 " After careful consideration of the various schemes of maintaining an effec- 
 tive blockade of Santiago de Cuba at night, which have been advanced, I have 
 decided upon the following, which will be maintained until further orders : 
 
 " The weather permitting, three (3) picket launches, detailed from the ships 
 of the squadron each evening, will occupy positions one mile from the Morro, 
 one to the eastward, one to the westward and one south of the harbor entrance. 
 On a circle drawn with a radius of two miles from the Morro will be stationed 
 three vessels, the Vixen to the westward, from one-half mile to one mile from 
 the shore ; the Suwanee south of Morro and the Dolphin to the eastward, be- 
 tween one-half mile and one mile from the shore. The remaining vessels will 
 retain the positions already occupied, but they will take especial care to keep 
 within a four-mile circle.
 
 ADMIRAL SAMPSON'S REPORT. 515 
 
 " All vessels may turn their engines whenever desirable to keep them in 
 readiness for immediate use, and while doing so may turn in a small circle, but 
 without losing proper bearing or distance. 
 
 " The signal for an enemy will be two (2) red Very lights fired in rapid 
 succession. If the enemy is a torpedo boat, these two red lights will be fol- 
 lowed by a green light. 
 
 " I again call attention to the absolute necessity of a close blockade of this 
 port, especially at night and in bad weather. In the daytime, if clear, the dis- 
 tance shall not be greater than six miles. At night or in thick weather not 
 more than four miles. The end to be attained justifies the risk of torpedo at- 
 tack, and that risk must be taken. The escape of the Spanish vessels at this 
 juncture would be a serious blow to our prestige, and to a speedy end of the 
 war. 
 
 " Attention is called to the provisional signals established by General Order 
 No. 9. Very respectfully, 
 
 " W. T. SAMPSON, 
 Rear Admiral IT. S. Navy, Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, North 
 
 Atlantic Station." 
 
 MEMORANDUM NO. 14. 
 
 " UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP NEW YORK, FIRST RATE, 
 " OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 8, 1898. 
 
 " During the dark hours of the night searchlights will be used as follows : 
 
 " The Iowa, Oregon and the Massachusetts will take turns of two hours 
 aeh, i. e., from dark to eight P. M., and from eight P. M. to ten p. M., &c., in 
 keeping one searchlight directly on the harbor entrance, maintaining carefully 
 during that time their blockading positions. Should a vessel's lights fail the 
 next in order will at once take up the duty. 
 
 " The picket launch and vidette, stationed south of the Morro, will move to 
 one side or the other sufficiently to get clear of the beam of light. 
 
 u The vessel on each flank, the Brooklyn and the Texas on the western side, 
 the New York and New Orleans on the eastern side, will take two hour turns 
 in using one searchlight from time to time on the coast line, swinging it to- 
 ward the Morro, but avoiding the illumination of the flanking videttes on the 
 inside line. The light should never be turned off more than five minutes at a 
 time. From time to time the horizon outside will be swept. 
 
 " Attention is called to bad and careless handling of searchlights. Last 
 night some of the lights were kept high in the air and were again swept 
 rapidly from side to side. Under such circumstances a searchlight is worse 
 than useless. 
 
 " The beams must be directed to the horizon, and must be moved very 
 steadily and slowly. Not less than three minutes should be employed in 
 sweeping through an arc of ninety degrees. 
 28
 
 516 ADMIRAL SAMPSON'S REPORT. 
 
 " The best way to discover a torpedo boat is by its smoke, and even this will 
 not be seen unless the light is very well handled. Very respectfully, 
 
 " W. T. SAMPSON, 
 
 44 Rear Admiral U. S. Navy, Commander-in- Chief U. S. Naval Force, North- 
 Atlantic Station." 
 
 MEMORANDUM NO. 17. 
 " UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP NEW YORK, FIRST RATE, 
 
 " OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 11, 1398. 
 
 " SIE : When on the blockade vessels will, unless for some special tempor- 
 ary reason for the contrary, habitually head toward the land instead of away 
 from it. Very respectfully, 
 
 " W. T. SAMPSON, 
 
 " Rear Admiral U. S. Navy, Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, North 
 Atlantic Station. 
 " The Commanding Officer, U. S. S. ." 
 
 MEMORANDUM NO. 18. 
 " UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP NEW YORK, FIRST RATE, 
 
 " OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 12, 1898. 
 
 " SIR: 1. While blockading the Spanish fleet in Santiago de Cuba vessels- 
 will hereafter maintain a blockading distance of four miles during the daytime. 
 44 2. This distance will not be exceeded except by permission or under special 
 circumstances. Very respectfully, 
 
 " W. T. SAMPSON, 
 
 " Rear Admiral U. S. Navy, Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, North 
 Atlantic Station. 
 44 The Commanding Officer, U. S. S. ." 
 
 MEMORANDUM NO. 20. 
 
 " UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP NEW YORK, FIRST RATE, 
 44 OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 15, 1898. 
 
 44 SIR : 1. The Commander-in-Chief desires again to call the attention of 
 commanding officers to the positions occupied by the blockading fleet, especially 
 during the daytime, and it is now directed that all ships keep within a dis- 
 tance of the entrance to Santiago of four miles, and this distance must not be 
 exceeded. 
 
 44 2. If the vessel is coaling or is otherwise restricted in her movements she 
 must nevertheless keep within this distance. 
 
 44 3. If at any time the flagship makes signal which is not visible to any 
 vessel, such vessel must at once approach the flagship or repeating vessel to a 
 point where she can read the signal. 
 
 44 4. Disregard of the directions which have already been given on this head
 
 COMMODORE SCHLEY'S REPORT. 517 
 
 has led to endless confusion. Many times during the day the fleet is so scat- 
 tered that it would be perfectly possible for the enemy to come out of the har- 
 bor and meet with very little opposition. 
 
 " 5. The Commander-in-Chief hopes that strict attention will be given this 
 order. Very respectfully, 
 
 " W. T. SAMPSON, 
 " Rear Admiral TJ. S. Navy, Commander-in-Chief TJ. S. Naval Force, North 
 
 Atlantic Station. 
 
 " The Commanding Officer, U. S. S. ." 
 
 COMMODORE SCHLEY'S REPORT. 
 
 " NORTH ATLANTIC FLEET, SECOND SQUADRON, 
 
 " UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP BROOKLYN, 
 " GUANTANAMO BAY, Cuba, July 6, 1898. 
 
 " SIR : 1. I have the honor to make the following report of that part of the 
 squadron under your command which came under my observation during the 
 engagement with the Spanish fleet on July 3, 1898. 
 
 " 2. At 9:35 A. M. Admiral Cervera, with the Infanta Maria Teresa, Vizcaya, 
 Oquendo, Cristobal Colon, and two torpedo-boat destroyers, came out of the 
 harbor of Santiago de Cuba in column at distance and attempted to escape to 
 the westward. Signal was made from the Iowa that the enemy was coming 
 out, but this movement had been discovered from this ship at the same moment. 
 This vessel was the farthest west, except the Vixen, in the blockading line. 
 Signal was made to the western division as prescribed in your general orders, 
 and there was immediate and rapid movement inward by your squadron and a 
 general engagement at ranges beginning at eleven hundred yards and varying 
 to three thousand, until the Vizcaya was destroyed, about 10:50 A. M. The 
 concentration of the fire of the squadron upon the ships coming out was most 
 furious and terrific and great damage was done them. 
 
 "3. About twenty or twenty-five minutes after the engagement began, two 
 vessels, thought to be the Teresa and Oquendo, and since verified as such, took 
 fire from the effective shell fire of the squadron and were forced ,to rim on the 
 beach some six or seven miles west of the harbor entrance, where they burned 
 and blew up later. The torpedo-boat destn^'ers were destroyed early in the 
 action, but the smoke was so dense in their direction that I cannot say to which 
 vessel or vessels the credit belongs. This, doubtless, was better seen from your 
 flagship. 
 
 u 4. The Vizcaya and Colon, perceiving the disaster to their consorts, 
 continued at full speed to the westward to escape, and were followed and 
 engaged in a running fight with the Brooklyn, Texas, Iowa, and Oregon until 
 10:50, when the Vizcaya took fire from our shells. She put her helm to port,
 
 518 COMMODORE SCHLEY'S REPORT. 
 
 and, with a heavj' list to port, stood in shore and ran aground at Aserradero, 
 about twenty -one miles west of Santiago, on fire fore and aft, and where she 
 blew up during the night. Observing that she had struck her colors and that 
 several vessels were nearing her to capture and save the crew, signal was made 
 to cease firing. The Oregon, having proved vastly faster than the other bat- 
 tleships, she and the Brooklyn, together with the Texas and another vessel, 
 which proved to be your flagship, continued westward, in pursuit of the Colon, 
 which had run close in shore, evidently seeking some good spot to beach, if she 
 should fail to elude her pursuers. 
 
 " 5. This pursuit continued with increasing speed in the Brooklyn, Oregon 
 and other ships, and soon the Brooklyn and the Oregon were within long range 
 of the Colon, when the Oregon opened fire with her thirteen-inch guns, landing 
 a shell close to the Colon. A moment afterward the Brooklyn opened fire with 
 her eight-inch guns, landing a shell just ahead of her. Several other shells 
 were fired at the Colon, now in range of the Brooklyn's and Oregon's guns. 
 Her commander seeing all chances of escape cut off and destruction awaiting 
 his ship, fired a lee gun and struck her flag at 1:15 p. M., and ran ashore at a 
 point some fifty miles west of Santiago harbor. Your flagship was coming up 
 rapidly at the time, as was also the Texas and Yixen. A little later, after your 
 arrival, the Cristobal Colon, which had struck to the Brooktyn and the Oregon, 
 was turned over to you as one of the trophies of this great victory of the 
 squadron under your command. 
 
 " 6. During my official visit a little later Commander Eaton, of the Reso- 
 lute, appeared and reported to you the presence of a Spanish battleship near 
 Altares. Your orders to me were to take the Oregon and go eastward to meet 
 her, and this was done by the Brooklyn, with the result that the vessel reported 
 as an enemy was discovered to be the Austrian cruiser Kaiserin seeking the 
 Commander-in-Chief. 
 
 " 7. I would mention for your consideration that the Brooklyn occupied the 
 most westward blockading position with the Yixen, and being more directly in 
 the route taken by the Spanish squadron, was exposed for some minutes, pos- 
 sibly ten, to the gun fire of three of the Spanish ships and the west battery at 
 a range of 1,500 yards from the ships and about 3,000 yards from the batteries, 
 but the vessels of the entire squadron, closing in rapidly, soon diverted this fire 
 and did magnificent work at close range. I have never before witnessed such 
 deadly and fatally accurate shooting as was done by the ships of your com- 
 mand as they closed in on the Spanish squadron, and I deem it a high privilege 
 to commend to you for such action as you may deem proper, the gallantry and 
 dashing courage, the prompt decision and the skilful handling of their respec- 
 tive vessels, of Captain Philip, Captain Evans, Captain Clark, and especially 
 of my chief of staff, Captain Cook, who was directly under my personal obser- 
 vation and whose coolness, promptness, and courage were of the highest order. 
 The dense smoke of the combat shut out from my view the Indiana and the
 
 COMMODORE SCHLEY'S REPORT. 519 
 
 Gloucester, but as these vessels were closer to your flagship, no doubt their part 
 in the conflict was under your immediate observation. 
 
 " 8. Lieutenant Sharp, commanding the Vixen, acted with conspicuous 
 courage; although unable to engage the heavier ships of the enemy with his 
 light guns, nevertheless was close into the battle line under heavy fire, and 
 many of the enemy's shot passed beyond his vessel. 
 
 " 9. I beg to invite special attention to the conduct of my flag lieutenant, 
 James H. Sears, and Ensign Edward McCauley, Jr., aide, who were constantly 
 at rny side during the engagement, and who exposed themselves fearlessly in 
 discharging their duties; and also to the splendid behavior of my secretary, 
 Lieutenant B. W. Wells, Jr., who commanded and directed the fighting of the 
 fourth division with splendid effect. 
 
 "10. I would commend the highly meritorious conduct and courage in the 
 engagement of Lieutenant-Commander N. E. Mason, the executive officer, 
 whose presence ever3 r where over the ship during its continuance did much to 
 secure the good result of this ship's part in the victory. 
 
 " 11. The navigator, Lieutenant A. C. Hodgson, and the division officers, 
 Lieutenant T. D. Griffin, Lieutenant W. R. Rush, Lieutenant Edward Simp- 
 son, Lieutenant J. G. Doyle, Ensign Charles Webster, and the junior divisional 
 officers were most steady and conspicuous in every detail of duty, contributing 
 to the accurate firing of this ship in her part of the great victory of your 
 forces. 
 
 " 12. The officers of the medical, pay, and engineer and marine corps re- 
 sponded to every demand of the occasion and were fearless in exposing them- 
 selves. The warrant officers, Boatswain William L. Hill, Carpenter G. H. 
 Warford and Gunner F. T. Applegate, were everywhere exposed in watching 
 for damage, reports of which were promptly conveyed to me. 
 
 "13. I have never in my life served with a braver, better or worthier crew 
 than that of the Brooklyn. During the combat, lasting from 9:35 until 1:15 
 p. M., much of the time under fire, they never flagged for a moment and were 
 apparently undisturbed by the storm of projectiles passing ahead, astern and 
 over the ship. 
 
 " 14. The result of the engagement was the destruction of the Spanish 
 squadron and the capture of the Admiral and some thirteen to fifteen hundred 
 prisoners with the loss of several hundred killed, estimated by Admiral Cer- 
 vera at 600 men. 
 
 " 15. The casualties on board this ship were : G. H. Ellis, chief yeoman, 
 killed; J. Burns, fireman, first-class, severely wounded. The marks and scars 
 show that the ship was struck about twenty-five times and she bears in all 
 forty-one scars as the result of her participation in the great victory of your 
 I'u-ce on July 3, 1898. The speed-cone halliards were shot away and nearly all 
 the signal halliards. The ensign at the main was so shattered that in hauling 
 it down at the close of the action it fell in pieces.
 
 520 CAPTAIN EVANS' REPORT. 
 
 "16. I congratulate you most sincerely upon this great victory to the 
 squadron under your command, and I am glad that I had an opportunity to 
 contribute in the least to a victory that seems big enough for all of us. 
 
 "17. I have the honor to transmit herewith the report of the commanding 
 officer and a drawing in profile of the ship showing the location of hits and 
 scars; also a memorandum of the ammunition expended and the amount to 
 fill her allowance. 
 
 " 18. Since reaching this place and holding conversation with several of the 
 Captains, viz, Captain Eulate of the Yizcaya and the second in command of the 
 Colon, Commander Contreras, 1 have learned that the Spanish Admiral's scheme 
 was to concentrate all fire for a while on the Brooklyn, and for the Vizcaya to 
 ram her, in hopes that if they could destroy her the chance of escape would be 
 increased, as it was supposed she was the swiftest ship of your squadron. This 
 explains the heavy fire mentioned and the Yizcaya's action in the earlier mo- 
 ments of the engagement. The execution of this purpose was promptly de- 
 feated by the fact that all the ships of the squadron advanced into close range 
 and opened an irresistibly furious and terrific fire upon the enemj r 's squadron 
 as it was coming out of the harbor. 
 
 " 19. I am glad to say that the injury supposed to be below the water line 
 was due to a water valve being opened from some unknown cause and flooding 
 the compartment. The injury to the belt is found to be only slight and the 
 leak small. 
 
 " 20. I beg to inclose a list of the officers and crew who participated in the 
 combat of July 3, 1898. 
 
 " 21. I cannot close this report without mentioning in high terras of praise 
 the splendid conduct and support of Captain C. E. Clark of the Oregon. Her 
 speed was wonderful and her accurate fire splendidly destructive. 
 
 " Very respectfully, 
 
 " W. S. SCHLEY, 
 
 " Commodore U. S. Navy, commanding second squadron, North Atlantic fleet. 
 "The Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic station." 
 
 CAPTAIN EVANS' REPORT. 
 
 " UNITED STATES STEAMSHIP IOWA, FIRST RATE, 
 
 " OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 4, 1898. 
 
 " SIR : I have the honor to make the following report of the engagement 
 with the Spanish squadron off Santiago de Cuba on the 3d of July : 
 
 " 1. On the morning of the 3d, while the crew was at quarters for Sunday 
 inspection, the leading vessel of the Spanish squadron was sighted at 9:31 
 o'clock coming out of the harbor of Santiago de Cuba. Signal ' Enemy's 
 ships coming out ' was immediately hoisted, and a gun fired to attract attention.
 
 CAPTAIN EVANS' iiEPORT. 521 
 
 The call to general quarters was sounded immediately, the battery made ready 
 for firing, and the engines rung full speed ahead. 
 
 " 2. The position of this vessel at the time of sighting the squadron was the 
 usual blockading station off the entrance of the harbor ; Morro Castle bearing 
 about north, and distant about three to four miles. The steam at this time in 
 the boilers was sufficient for a speed of five knots. 
 
 " 3. After sighting the leading vessel, the Infanta Maria Teresa (Admiral 
 Cervera's flagship), it was observed that she was followed in succession by the 
 remaining three vessels of the Spanish squadron, the Vizcaya, Cristobal Colon 
 and Almirante Oquendo. The Spanish ships moved at a speed of about eight 
 to ten knots, which was steadily increased as they cleared the harbor entrance 
 and stood to the westward. They maintained a distance of about 800 yards be- 
 tween vessels. The squadron moved with precision and stations were well 
 kept. 
 
 " 4. Immediately upon sighting the leading vessel fires were spread, and the 
 Iowa headed toward the leading Spanish ship. About 9:40 the first shot was 
 fired from this ship, at a distance of about 6,000 yards. 
 
 " The course of this vessel was so laid that the range speedily diminished. 
 A number of shots were fired at ranges varying between 6,000 and 4,000 yards. 
 The range was rapidly reduced to 2,500 yards, and subsequently to 2,000 and 
 to 1,200 yards. 
 
 " 5. When it was certain that the Maria Teresa would pass ahead of us, the 
 helm was put to starboard and the starboard broadside delivered at a range of 
 2,500 yards. The helm was then put to port and the ship headed across the 
 bow of the second ship, and as she drew ahead the helm was again put to star- 
 board, and she received in turn the full weight of our starboard broadside at a 
 range of about 1,800 yards. The Iowa was again headed off with port helm for 
 the third ship, and as she approached the helm was put to starboard until our 
 course was approximately that of the Spanish ship. In this position, at a 
 range of 1,400 3>ards, the fire of the entire battery, including rapid-fire guns, 
 was poured into the enemy's ship. 
 
 " 6. About ten o'clock the enemy's torpedo-boat destroyers Furor and Pluton 
 were observed to have left the harbor and to be following the Spanish squadron. 
 At the time that they were observed, and, in fact, most of the time that they 
 were under fire, they^ were at a distance varying from 4,500 to 4,000 yards. As 
 soon as they were discovered the secondary battery of this ship was turned 
 upon them, while the main batterj' continued to engage the Yizcaya, Oquendo 
 and Maria Teresa. 
 
 " The fire of the main battery of this ship when the range was below 2,500 
 yards was most effective and destructive, and after a continuance of this fire 
 for perhaps twenty minutes it was noticed that the Maria Teresa and Oquendo 
 were in flames and were being headed for the beach. Their colors were struck 
 about 10:20, and they were beached about eight miles west of Santiago.
 
 522 CAPTAIN EVANS' REPORT. 
 
 " 7. About the same time (about 10:25) the fire of this vessel, together with 
 that of the Gloucester and another smaller vessel, proved so destructive that 
 one of the torpedo-boat destroyers (Pluton) was sunk, and the Furor was so 
 much damaged that she was run upon the rocks. 
 
 44 8. After having passed, at 10:35, the Oquendo and Maria Teresa on fire 
 and ashore, this vessel continued to chase and fire upon the Vizcaya until 
 10:36, when the signal to cease firing was sounded on board, it having been dis- 
 covered that the Vizcaya had struck her colors. 
 
 44 9. At eleven the Iowa arrived in the vicinity of the Vizcaya, which had 
 been run ashore, and as it was evident that she could not catch the Cristobal 
 Colon, and that the Oregon, Brooklyn and New York would, two steam cutters 
 and three cutters were immediately hoisted out and sent to the Vizcaya to 
 rescue her crew. Our boats succeeded in bringing off a large number of offi- 
 cers and men of that ship's company and placing many of them on board the 
 torpedo boat Ericsson and the auxiliary despatch vessel Hist. 
 
 44 10. About 11:30 the New York passed in chase of the Cristobal Colon, 
 which was endeavoring to escape from the Oregon, Brooklyn, and Texas. 
 
 44 11. We received on board this vessel from the Vizcaya Captain Eulate, 
 the commanding officer, and twenty-three officers, together with about 248 
 petty officers and men, of whom thirty -two were wounded. There were also 
 received on board five dead bodies, which were immediately buried with the 
 honors due to their grade. 
 
 44 12. The battery behaved well in all respects, the dashpot of the forward 
 twelve-inch gun, damaged in the engagement of the 2d, having been replaced 
 the same day by one of the old dashpots, which gave no trouble during this 
 engagement. 
 
 44 13. The following is an approximate statement of the ammunition ex- 
 pended during the engagement. A more exact statement cannot be given at 
 this time : 
 
 31 twelve-inch semi-A. P. shell, with full charges. 
 
 35 eight-inch common shell, with full charges. 
 
 251 four-inch cartridges, common shell. 
 
 1,056 six-pounder cartridges, common shell. 
 
 100 one-pounder cartridges, common shell. 
 
 44 14. This ship was struck in the hull, on the starboard side, during the 
 early part of the engagement by two projectiles of about six-inch calibre, one 
 striking the hull two to three feet above the actual water line and almost 
 directly on the line of the berth deck, piercing the ship's side between frames 
 nine and ten, and the other piercing the side and the coffer dam between frames 
 eighteen and nineteen. 
 
 "The first projectile did not pass beyond the inner bulkhead of the coffer- 
 dam A 41-43. The hole made by it was large and ragged, being about six- 
 teen inches in a longitudinal direction and about seven inches in a vertical
 
 CAPTAIN EVANS' REPORT. 523 
 
 direction. It struck with a slight inclination aft, and perforated the coffer- 
 dam partition bulkhead (A 41-43, 45-47). It did not explode, and remained in 
 the cofferdam. 
 
 " The second projectile pierced the side of the ship and the cofferdam A 105, 
 the upper edge of the hole being immediately below the top of the cofferdam, on 
 the berth deck, in compartment A 104. The projectile broke off the hatch 
 plate and coaming of the water-tank compartment, exploded and perforated the 
 walls of the chain locker. The explosion created a small fire, which was 
 promptly extinguished. The hole in the side made by this projectile was about 
 five feet above the water line, and about two to three feet above the berth deck. 
 One fragment of this shell struck a link of the sheet-chain, wound around the 
 six-pounder ammunition hoist, cutting the link in two. Another perforated 
 the cofferdam on the portside and slightly dished the outside plating. 
 
 " These two wounds, fortunately, were not of serious importance. Two or 
 three other projectiles of small calibre struck about the upper bridge and smoke- 
 stacks, inflicting trifling damage, and four other small projectiles struck the 
 hammock nettings and the side aft. 
 
 " 15. There are no casualties among the ship's company to report. No 
 officer nor man was injured during the engagement. 
 
 " 16. After having received on board the rescued crew of the Vizcaya, this 
 vessel proceeded to the eastward and resumed the blockading station in obedi- 
 ence to the signal made by the Commander-in-Chief about 11:30. 
 
 " IT. Upon arriving on the blockading station the Gloucester transferred to 
 this vessel Rear-Admiral Cervera, his Flag Lieutenant, and the commanding 
 officers of the torpedo-boat destroyers Furor and Pluton, and also one man of 
 the Oquendo's crew rescued by the Gloucester. 
 
 " 18. Naval Cadets Frank Taylor Evans and John E. Lewis and five men 
 belonging to the Massachusetts were on board the Iowa when the enemy's 
 ships came out. They were stationed at different points and rendered efficient 
 service. 
 
 " 19. The officers and men of this ship behaved admirably. No set of men 
 could have done more gallant service. I take pleasure in stating to you, sir, 
 that the coolness and judgment of the executive officer, Lieutenant-Commander 
 Raymond P. Rodgers, deserves, and will, I hope, receive a proper reward at 
 the hands of the government. The test of the executive officer's work is the 
 conduct of ship and crew in battle ; in this case it was simply superb. 
 
 " The coolness of the navigator, Lieutenant W. H. Schuetze, and of Lieuten- 
 ant F. K. Hill, in charge of the rapid-fire guns on the upper deck, are worthy 
 of the greatest commendation. Other officers of the ship did not come under 
 my personal observation, but the result of the action shows how well they did 
 their duty. 
 
 " I cannot express my admiration for my magnificent crew. So long as the
 
 524 CAPTAIN COOK'S REPORT. 
 
 enemy showed his flag they fought like American seamen ; but when the flag 
 came down they were as gentle and tender as American women. 
 
 " 20. In conclusion, sir, allow me to congratulate you on the complete vic- 
 tory achieved by your fleet. Very respectfully, 
 
 " R. D. EVANS, 
 
 " Captain United States Navy, commanding. 
 
 " To the Commander-in-Chief United States Naval Force, North Atlantic 
 Station." 
 
 REPORT OF THE BROOKLYN'S COMMANDER. 
 
 " UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP BROOKLYN, FIRST RATE, 
 " AT ANCHOR, GUANTANAMO BAY, July 7, 1898. 
 
 "Sm: 1. At nine A. M., July 3,1 gave orders and arrangements were 
 made for general muster at 9:30 A. M. At 9:30 A. M. the enemy were tele- 
 graphed by the Iowa as coming out. At the same time they were discovered 
 by the Quartermaster on watch, N. Anderson, of this ship, and reported to the 
 officer of the deck. The executive officer, Lieutenant-Commander Mason, 
 who was on deck about to execute the order for general muster, immediately 
 gave the order : ' Clear ship for action and general quarters.' Signal was made 
 at the same time: ' Enemy coming out, action.' I went immediately forward, 
 stood for the enemy, and gave orders to get steam on all boilers. We started 
 with steam on three boilers at about twelve knots speed. 
 
 "2. The head of the Spanish squadron, in column, was just outside the 
 entrance of the harbor of Santiago, heading about southwest. The Spanish 
 squadron consisted of the Maria Teresa (flag), Vizcaya, Oquendo and Colon, 
 and two torpedo destroyers. We opened fire on the leading ship in five 
 minutes from the discovery. 
 
 " 3. The port battery was first engaged as we stood with port helm to head 
 off the leading ship, and giving them a raking fire at about 1,500 yards range. 
 The enemy turned to the westward to close in to the land. We then wore 
 around to starboard, bringing the starboard battery into action. The enemy 
 hugged the shore to the westward. 
 
 " 4. The Brooklyn, leading, was followed by the Texas, Iowa, Oregon, In- 
 diana and Gloucester. The Vixen, which had been to westward to us on the 
 blockade, ran to the southward and eastward of us and kept for some time off 
 our port side distant about 1,000 yards, evidently intending to guard against 
 torpedo attack upon this ship ; the shell passing over her. At this time the 
 firing was very fast and the whistling of shell incessant, and our escape with so 
 little injury was miraculous, and can only be attributed to bad marksmanship 
 on the part of the enemy. The Maria Teresa, which had dropped astern while 
 we were wearing, under the heavy fire of our fleet ran ashore. 
 
 " 5. The Vizcaj T a, Oqueudo and Colon, continuing on and gaining in dis-
 
 CAPTAIN COOK'S REPORT. 525 
 
 tance, the Brooklyn was engaged with the three leading ships of the enemy, 
 which were forging ahead, the Texas, Iowa, and Indiana keeping up a heavy 
 fire, but steadily dropping astern. The Oregon was keeping up a steady fire 
 and was coming up in the most glorious and gallant style, outstripping all 
 others. It was an inspiring sight to see this battleship, with a large white 
 wave before her, and her smokestacks belching forth continued pufl's from her 
 forced draught. We were making fourteen knots at the time, and the 
 Oregon came up off our starboard quarter at about six hundred yards 
 and maintained her position, though we soon after increased our speed 
 to fifteen knots, and just before the Colon surrendered were making nearly 
 sixteen. 
 
 " 6. The Oquendo, soon after the falling out of the Teress, dropped astern 
 and on fire ran ashore. The Vizcaya and Colon continued on, under fire from 
 the Brooklyn and Oregon. The other vessels of our fleet were well astern and 
 out of range. The Texas was evidently coming up fast. At about 10:53 A. M. 
 the Vizcaya was seen to be on fire, and the Colon passed inside of her with in- 
 creased speed, took the lead, and gradually forged ahead. The Vizcaya soon 
 after ran on the beach, ablaze with fire. We signaled the Oregon to cease 
 firing on the Vizcaya, as her flag was down. Firing immediately ceased and 
 we both continued the chase of the Colon, now about 12,000 yards away. The 
 ranges ran from 1,500 to 3,000 yards with the Vizcaj-a as she kept in and out 
 from the coast. We steered straight for a distant point near Cape Cruz, while 
 the Colon kept close to the land, running into ail the bights. She could not 
 have come out without crossing our bows, and we were steadily gaining on her. 
 We were getting more steam all the time and now had four and one-half boilers 
 on and the remaining one and one-half nearly ready. 
 
 " 7. After running for about fifty miles west from the entrance, the Colon 
 ran into a bight of land, beached, fired a gun to leeward and hauled down her 
 flag. The Oregon and Brooklyn had just previous!}' begun to fire upon the 
 Colon and were landing shell close to her. I was sent on board by Commodore 
 Schley to receive the surrender. The Captain spoke English and received me 
 pleasantly, though naturally much depressed. He surrendered uncondition- 
 ally. He was polite, shook hands and said his case was hopeless and that he 
 saw that we were too much for him. I was on board about fifteen minutes. 
 As we came from the Colon the flagship New York came in wilh the Texas. I 
 reported on board the flagship to Rear-Admiral Sampson. I stated to him 
 that I believed the Colon could be gotten off the beach. 
 
 " 8. During the entire action I was in constant communication with you, 
 so that I was enabled to promptly execute your orders and instructions. The 
 officers and crew behaved with great and unexceptionable coolness and bravery, 
 so that it is difficult to discriminate. They were encouraged in their best 
 efforts by your enthusiasm and your cheery words : ' Fire steady, boys, and 
 give it to them.'
 
 526 CAPTAIN COOK'S REPORT. 
 
 " 9. The executive officer, N. E. Mason, with his usual zeal, was continu- 
 ally at the battery directing the firing and keeping me well informed of the 
 exact condition of the ship, and in encouraging both officers and men by his 
 example of coolness and courage. 
 
 " 10. Lieutenant Hodgson was on the bridge coolly and deliberately taking 
 bearings and measuring and giving ranges. He was assisted in getting ranges 
 and noting time by Chief Yeoman George Ellis, with a stadimeter, until Ellis 
 was killed by a passing shell. 
 
 " 11. The officers of the divisions, Lieutenants T. D. Griffin, W. R. Rush, E. 
 Simpson, J. G. Doyle, B. W. Wells and Ensign Webster, all performed their 
 full duties deliberately and efficiently. . The naval cadets in divisions were cool 
 and efficient, Naval Cadets Halligan, Marble, Abele and Cronan having espe- 
 cially been noticed for good service. Lieutenant B. W. Wells, your secretary, 
 volunteered for command of a division, and was given the fourth division, thus 
 enabling me to station a commissioned officer in a turret. 
 
 " 12. Too much praise cannot be given the engineer's department for the 
 hard work done by all in the steadily raising the steam until the speed rose from 
 twelve to sixteen knots. 
 
 " 13. The marines did splendid service at the guns and at their stations. 
 The orderlies carried messages quickly and effectively. Captain Murphy and 
 Lieutenant Borden were constant in their visits to the different stations, to be 
 assured of efficiency. 
 
 " 14. Medical Inspector Paul Fitzsimons and P. A. Surgeon De Valin were 
 in constant attendance at the divisions and on deck to be ready for any emer- 
 gency. Flag Lieutenant James H. Sears was particularly active, standing in 
 the open directing signals, reporting fall of shot and position of the enemy. 
 He was cool and firm in his duty. 
 
 " 15. Ensign McCauley attended personally to signals while constantly 
 under fire, at one time mounting the forward turret and making the wigwag 
 himself. His coolness was conspicuous. 
 
 " 16. The boatswain, Mr. Hill, was continually about the forecastle, ready 
 for any duty, and materially assisted in watching the fall of shots and thus 
 checked the ranges. 
 
 " 17. The gunner, F. T. Applegate, rendered very valuable and conspicuous 
 service at the battery, making repairs wherever practicable during the action. 
 
 " 18. The carpenter, G. H. Warford, was on the alert, watching for effects 
 of shell and in examining compartments, pipes, and valves. 
 
 " 19. The signalmen under Chief Quartermaster O'Connell all stood in the 
 open and performed their duties courageously. 
 
 " 20. I would call to your special attention the valuable and conspicuous 
 services rendered during the action by B. Gay nor (G. M., first-class), as noted 
 in the reports of the executive officer, the divisional officers, and the gunner. 
 Gaynor is a natural mechanic, and a very intelligent man, and he went from
 
 CAPTAIN PHILIP'S REPORT. 527 
 
 gun to gun repairing breaks, and was constant in his work, keeping them in 
 condition for use. 
 
 "21. Chief Gunner's Mate D. F. Diggins was in all parts of the ship at- 
 tending faithfully and coolly to the electric apparatus. 
 
 " 22. N. Anderson (Q. M., first-class) is a particularly bright seaman. He 
 was at the wheel and kept the ship steadily on her course. He has been par- 
 ticularly known in this ship as a valuable man. He would prove very efficient 
 as a mate, and I recommend him for such appointment. 
 
 " 23. N. Morrissey (Lds.) twice got out on the muzzle of a forward six- 
 pounder and backed out a jammed shot. Private Macneal, U. S. M. C., 
 also went out on the muzzle of forecastle six-pounder and cleared a jammed 
 shot. 
 
 " 24. We had but two personal casualties, George H. Ellis (chief yeoman), 
 killed, and J. Burns (F., first-class), wounded. The ship was struck twenty 
 times by whole shot, and many times by pieces of buisting shell and from 
 small shot of machine guns. No serious injury was done to the ship, and all 
 repairs can be temporarily done by the ship's force, excepting to the five-inch 
 elevating gear. The smokestacks were hit in several places, the signal hal- 
 liards, rigging, and flags were cut in many places. The flag at the main 
 was destroyed, being much cut by shot and flying pieces of shell. The eight- 
 inch guns worked satisfactorily ; some trouble and delay was caused by jam- 
 ming of locks. The turrets worked well. The five-inch battery gave great 
 trouble with the elevating gear. At the end several were rendered useless for 
 battle. Two are bulged at the muzzle. This ship should have new elevating 
 gear for five inch as soon as practicable. We fired 100 rounds of eight-inch, 
 47,.' of five-inch, 1,200 of six-pounder, and 200 of one-pounder ammunition. 
 " Very respectfully, 
 
 " F. A. COOK, 
 
 " Captain U. S. Navy, commanding. 
 M To the Commander-in-Chief, Second Squadron, TJ. S. Naval Force, North 
 
 Atlantic Station." 
 
 REPORT OF CAPTAIN PHILIP OF THE TEXAS. 
 
 " UNITED STATES STEAMSHIP TEXAS, 
 
 " OFF SANTIAGO, July 4, 1898. 
 
 " Sm : In accordance with the requirements of article 437, Navy Regula- 
 tions, I respectfully submit the following statement in regard to the part the 
 Texas took in the engagement with the enemy yesterday : 
 
 " At daylight on the morning of the 3d the Texas stood out from entrance 
 to harbor, taking day blockading position about three miles from the Morro 
 (the Morro bearing N. N. E.).
 
 528 CAPTAIN PHILIP'S REPORT. 
 
 " At 9:35, the Morro bearing north by east half east, distant 5,100 yards, the 
 enemy's ships were sighted standing out of the harbor. Immediately general 
 signal 250 was made. This signal was followed by the Iowa's almost at the 
 same time. 
 
 " The ship, as per order, was heading in toward the entrance ; went ahead 
 full speed, putting helm hard a starboard and ordering forced draft on all boilers r 
 the officer of the deck, Lieutenant M. L. Bristol, having given the general 
 alarm and beat to quarters for action at the same time. 
 
 " As the leader, bearing the Admiral's flag, appeared in the entrance she 
 opened fire, whica was, at 9:40, returned by the Texas at range of 4,200 
 yards, while closing in. The ship leading was of the Vizcaya class and the 
 flagship. 
 
 " Four ships came out, evidently the Vizcaya, the Oquendo, Maria Teresa, 
 and Colon, followed by two torpedo boat destroyers. Upon seeing these two 
 we immediately opened fire upon them with our secondary battery, the main 
 battery at the time being engaged with the second and third ships in line. 
 Owing to our secondary battery, together with the Iowa and Gloucester, these 
 two destroyers were forced to beach and sink. 
 
 " While warmly engaged with the third in line, which was abreast and engag- 
 ing the Texas, our fire was blanketed for a short time by the Oregon forging 
 ahead and engaging the second ship. This third ship, after a spirited fire, 
 sheered inshore and at 10:35 ran up a white flag. We then ceased fire on the 
 third and opened fiie with our forward guns at long range (6,600 yards) on the 
 second ship which was then engaged with the Oregon, until 11:05, when she 
 (enemy's second ship) sheered into the beach on fire. At 11:10 she struck her 
 colors. We ceased fire and gave chase with Brooklyn and Oregon for the lead- 
 ing ship until 1:20, when the Colon sheered into beach and hauled down her 
 colors, leaving them on deck at foot of her flagstaff. We shut off forced draft 
 and proceeded at moderate speed to close up. 
 
 " I would state t,hat during this chase the Texas was holding her own with 
 the Colon, she leading us about four miles at the start. 
 
 " The reports of the executive officer and the surgeon are transmitted. 
 
 " I have the pleasure of stating that the entire battery of the Texas is in a 
 most excellent condition and ready for any service required by the Commander- 
 in-Chief, especially calling attention to the efficiency of the two turret guns, due 
 to the alterations recently made by Lieutenant F. J. Haeseler, of this ship. 
 
 " The bearing and performance of duty of all officers met with my entire ap- 
 proval. Very respectfully submitted, 
 
 " J. W. PHILIP, 
 
 " Captain U. S. Navy, Commanding. 
 " To Commander-in-Chief, North Atlantic Station."
 
 CAPTAIN CLARK'S REPORT. 620 
 
 " UNITED STATES STEAMSHIP OREGON, FIRST RATE, 
 " OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 4, 1898. 
 
 "Sm: 1. I have the honor to report that at 9:30 A. M. yesterday the 
 Spanish fleet was discovered standing out of the harbor of Santiago de Cuba. 
 They turned to the westward and opened fire, to which our ships replied vigor- 
 ously. For a short time there was an almost continuous flight of projectiles 
 over this ship, but when our line was fairly engaged, and the Iowa had made a 
 swift advance as if to ram or close, the enemy's fire became defective in train 
 as well as range. The ship was only struck three times, and at least two of 
 them were by fragments of shells. We had no casualties. 
 
 " 2. As soon as it was evident that the enemy's ships were trying to break 
 through and escape to the westward we went ahead at full speed with the de- 
 termination of carrying out to the utmost your order : If the enemy tries to 
 escape, the ships must close and engage as soon as possible and endeavor to sink 
 his vessels or force them to run ashore. We soon passed all of our ships except 
 the Brooklyn, bearing the broad pennant of Commodore Schley. At first we 
 only used our main battery, but when it was discovered that the enemy's tor- 
 pedo boats were following their ships we used our rapid-fire guns as well as the 
 six-inch upon them with telling effect. 
 
 " As we ranged up near the sternmost of their ships she headed for the beach, 
 evidently on fire. We raked her as we passed, pushing on for the next ahead, 
 using our starboard guns as they were brought to bear, and before we had her 
 fairly abeam she, too, was making for the beach. The two remaining vessels 
 were now some distance ahead, but our speed had increased to sixteen knots, 
 and our fire, added to that of the Brooklyn, soon sent another, the Vizcaya, to 
 the shore in flames. Only the Cristobal Colon was left, and for a time it 
 seemed as if she might escape, but when we opened with our forward turret 
 guns and the Brooklyn followed she began to edge in toward the coast and her 
 capture or destruction was assured. As she struck the beach her flag came 
 down and the Brooklyn signaled, ' Cease firing,' following with, ' Congratula- 
 tions for the grand victory ! Thanks for your splendid assistance.' 
 
 " 3. The Brooklyn sent a boat to her, and when the Admiral came up with 
 the New York, Texas, and Yixen she was taken possession of. A prize crew 
 was put on board from this ship under Lieutenant-Commander Cogswell, the 
 executive officer, but before eleven p. M. the ship, which had been filling in 
 spite of all efforts to stop leaks, was abandoned, and just as the crew left she 
 went over on her side. 
 
 " 4. I cannot speak in too high terms of the bearing and conduct of all on 
 board this ship. When they found the Oregon had pushed to the front and was 
 hurrying to a succession of conflicts with the enemy's vessels if they could be 
 overtaken and would engage, their enthusiasm was intense. 
 
 " 5. As these vessels were so much more heavily armored than the Brooklyn, 
 they might have concentrated upon and overpowered her, and consequently I
 
 530 CAPTAIN TAYLOR'S REPORT. 
 
 am persuaded that, but for the way the officers and men of the Oregon steamed 
 and steered the ship and fought and supplied her batteries, the Colon, and per- 
 haps the Vizcaya, would have escaped. Therefore I feel that they rendered 
 meritorious service to the countiy, and while I cannot mention the name of 
 each officer and man individually, I am going to append a list of the officers, 
 with their stations that they occupied, hoping that they may be of service to 
 them should the claims of others for advancement above them ever be 
 considered. Very respectfully, 
 
 " C. E. CLARK, 
 
 " Captain U. S. Navy, Commanding. 
 " To the Commander-in-Chief, TJ. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station." 
 
 CAPTAIN TAYLOR'S REPORT. 
 
 " UNITED STATES STEAMSHIP INDIANA, FIRST RATE, 
 " OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 4, 1898. 
 
 " SIR : I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of 
 the Indiana in the action of July 3 with the Spanish squadron off Santiago de 
 Cuba: 
 
 " 1. At 9:37 A. M., while the crew were at quarters, preliminary to general 
 muster, noted two guns fired from the Iowa and general signal ' Enemy's ships 
 scaping ' flying. At once cleared ship for action and the crew were at the 
 guns in a remarkably short time, all officers and men showing an alacrity that 
 indicated clearly their pleasure at the opportunity offered them. 
 
 " 2. The Spanish squadron was seen emerging from the harbor, and in a few 
 moments a general action ensued. The leading ship, which proved to be the 
 Infanta Maria Teresa, flying the flag of Yice Admiral Cervera, was followed 
 by the other vessels of the squadron as follows : Vizcaya, Cristobal Colon, 
 Oquendo, and the torpedo-boat destroyers, Furor and Pluton. The enemy's 
 vessels headed to the westward, and our ships headed in the same direction, 
 keeping as nearly abreast of them as possible. 
 
 " 3. This ship fired on all of them as they came out one by one, and con- 
 tinued the action later by firing principally on the Maria Teresa, Oquendo, 
 Furor and Pluton. Several of our shells were seen to take effect on these ves- 
 sels. Our secondary battery guns were directed principally on the destroyers 
 as also were the six-inch guns. The destroyers were sunk through the agency 
 of our guns and those of the Gloucester, which vessel had come up and engaged 
 them close abreast. 
 
 " 4. The initial fire of the last two ships was directed at this vessel, and al- 
 though falling very close, only struck the ship twice without any injury to 
 ship or crew. 
 
 " 5. Our ranges were obtained by stadimeter angles on Morro as the ships
 
 CAPTAIN TAYLOR'S REPORT. 531 
 
 emerged, and then by angles on the tops of the rear ships. The ranges were 
 from 4,500 to 3,000 yards, observed from the top. From the bridge I could see 
 that our shooting was excellent and showed its effects. One of our thirteen, 
 inch shells was seen to enter the Maria Teresa under the quarter deck and ex* 
 plode, and that ship was observed on fire very shortly afterward. 
 
 " 6. About 10:15 A. M. observed the Maria Teresa and Oquendo on fire and 
 heading for the beach, the fire from their guns having ceased. We then de- 
 voted our special attention to prevent the escape of the destroyers, which ap- 
 peared more than a match for the Gloucester, she being the only small vessel 
 near to engage them. They were soon seen to blow up, apparently struck by 
 our six-inch and six-pounders. We now fired our large guns at the Vizcaya, 
 which was at long range ; she made for the shore soon after, on fire and battery 
 silenced. These ships hauled down their colors as they made for the beach. 
 The Spanish flagship hoisted the white flag as she grounded. 
 
 " 7. We now ceased firing. The Colon was observed well over the western 
 horizon, closely pursued by the Brooklyn, Oregon, and Texas off shore of her. 
 The flagship New York, steaming full speed to the westward, as soon as the 
 Vizcaya surrendered, signaled us ' Go back and guard entrance of harbor.' 
 Several explosions were observed on board the burning ships. At noon turned 
 and stood to the eastward for our station in obedience to the above signal. Ob- 
 served the Harvard and several transports standing to the westward. 
 
 " 8. About 12:30 the Resolute came within hail and informed us by mega- 
 phone that a Spanish battleship was sighted to the eastward, standing toward 
 us. Later the Harvard passed, confirming the information, and adding that 
 the ship was painted white. We made out the vessel ahead and stood for her 
 with our guns bearing. She proved to be the Austrian armored cruiser Kais- 
 erin Maria Teresa. She sent an officer on board and requested permission to 
 enter the harbor. I referred him to the Commander-in-Chief. She then stood 
 on to the westward and we resumed our station. 
 
 " 9. During this action we used no armor-piercing shell, except the smoke- 
 less-powder six-pounders, and the good effect of the common shell is shown by 
 the fires on the enemy's ships and the short time taken to disable them with- 
 out piercing their armor, and with almost no injury to our ships. 
 
 " 10. The guns and mounts worked well, only two failures of electric prim- 
 ers noted. 
 
 " 11. During the afternoon sent boats with surgeon on shore to the burning 
 vessels to assist in caring for the wounded. The boats returned bringing one 
 wounded officer and seventeen men as prisoners. 
 
 " 12. Received also during the afternoon and night prisoners from the 
 Gloucester and Hist, in all seven officers and 217 men, who were to-day trans- 
 ferred to the St. Louis. 
 
 " 13. The conduct of the officers and crew was in every way commendable ; 
 coolness and good discipline prevailed, coupled with a marked enthusiasm. 
 29
 
 532 CAPTAIN CHADWICK'S REPORT. 
 
 This desirable condition of affairs is largely due to the efforts of the officers, 
 and I desire to commend to the Commander-in-Chief the executive officer, Lieu- 
 tenant Commander John A. Rodgers and all the officers of the ship for the part 
 taken by the Indiana in bringing about this great victory, and the complete 
 destruction of the enemy's squadron. Very respectfully, 
 
 u H. C. TAYLOR, 
 u Captain Commanding. 
 " To the Commander-in-Chief, IT. S. Naval Forces on North Atlantic Station." 
 
 CAPTAIN CHADWICK'S REPORT. 
 
 " UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP NEW YORK, 
 " PLAYA DEL ESTE, July 4, 1898. 
 
 " SIR : I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by 
 this ship in the action of yesterday during and following the sortie of Admiral 
 Cervera's squadron. 
 
 " 1. The ship had started at 8:50 for the army landing at Siboney, the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief having an appointment with the General commanding the 
 army. A few minutes after the crew had been called to quarters for Sunday 
 inspection firing was heard and a ship was seen leaving the harbor entrance. 
 The helm was at once put over, the crew called to general quarters, signal 
 ( Close in toward the harbor entrance and attack vessels ' made, orders given to 
 spread all fires, and the ship headed back for the enemy, whose ships were seen 
 successfully coming out at a high speed. The Flagship Infanta Maria Teresa 
 was first, then another armored cruiser of the same class (which turned out to 
 be the Vizcaya), followed by the Cristobal Colon, an armored cruiser 
 (Oquendo) and the torpedo-boat destroyers Furor and Phi ton. 
 
 " 2. The nearer ships had immediately engaged and by the time we were 
 off the entrance, one, the flagship, was alreadj' afire and was soon ashore ; the 
 Indiana and Gloucester were actively engaged with the torpedo boats ; this 
 ship fired some four-inch shells at the one nearer the port toward which she 
 was already headed and seemed attempting to return, but she was already 
 practically out of the fight. The boiler of the more advanced one had blown 
 up, showing a vast column of condensed steam. During the time the batteries, 
 whose line of fire we had crossed close to, repeatedly fired upon us, but with- 
 out effect. No return was made to this fire. A shell from the west battery 
 fell within 200 yards of the ship when we were over four miles to the west- 
 ward and we had thought ourselves entirely out of range. This ship stood on, 
 leaving the Gloucester, which had shown herself so capable, to look after the 
 survivors in the torpedo boats. By this time a second cruiser was ashore and 
 burning (the Almirante Oquendo), while the third, the Vizcaya, and the 
 Cristobal Colon were still steaming rapidly westward. The Indiana was now 
 signaled (11:26 A. M.) to return to her blockading position, to look after any-
 
 CAPTAIN CHADWICK'S REPORT. 533 
 
 thing which might be there. Very shortly the Vizcaya turned shoreward, smoke 
 began to issue from her after port, and by the time that she was ashore on the 
 reef at Aserradero (fifteen miles west of Santiago) she was ablaze. The Iowa 
 had signaled a little before that she had surrendered, and stopped off this 
 place, where she gave much assistance in the rescue of the Vizcaya's people. 
 
 " 3. This ship stood on in chase of the Cristobal Colon, with ahead of us 
 the Brooklyn, Oregon, Texas, and Vixen, the Oregon being much nearer in 
 shore of the two headmost ships, but not in gunshot. We were rapidly in- 
 creasing our speed. 
 
 " 4. It was evident, however, that the Colon would give us a lengthy chase, 
 and at noon the crew left quarters and went to dinner. 
 
 "5. About 12:50 the Oregon opened fire, and some of her shell were ob- 
 served to strike beyond the Colon ; this made her capture a foregone conclusion, 
 and shortly after one o'clock she turned in toward shore, and soon struck her 
 colors. She had been beached at a small inlet known as Rio Tarquino. By 
 the time we arrived, a boat was alongside her from the Brooklyn, and Captain 
 Cook, the boarding officer came alongside this ship and reported. This ship 
 then sent a boat to take possession, the commanding officer going in the boat. 
 I was received by the Commodore of the squadron, the Captain, Captain de 
 Navio Don Emilio Moreu, and Captain de Navio of the first-class Don Jose 
 de Paredes y Chacon (which latter had been civil Governor of Santiago, and 
 had only just been attached to the squadron). I arranged for the transfer of 
 the crew and officers, a division to each ship present, and the engineer force to 
 be left aboard. While aboard, however, the Resolute arrived, and it was ar- 
 ranged to transfer the whole number to her. 
 
 " 6. I had taken with me the fleet surgeon, an engineer, and the carpenter f 
 to examine and make secure everything necessary. The engineer reported to 
 me that she was making water aft. I had previously had soundings taken and 
 found eight feet at the bow and seventy at the stern, so that but a small portion 
 of the. ship was ashore. I returned as quickly as possible to the flagship to re- 
 port the situation. The Oregon was signaled to take charge, and the men 
 were hastened on board, a number sent also from the ship. Our work of 
 closing watertight doors, &c., was, however, of no avail; a large number of 
 sea valves had been treacherously opened, and the valves so broken as to make 
 it impossible to close them; the ship thus slowly settled. At 7:30 she came 
 afloat, and came out into deeper water. The officer in charge, Lieutenant-Com- 
 mander Cogswell, had let go an anchor, but it was clear that if she went down 
 in water of the depth in which she was, she could never be recovered. This 
 ship's stem was placed against her quarter, and later a line being taken from 
 our own bow to hers, the Colon was forced inshore. It was by this time dark, 
 but using a searchlight, we were enabled to force the ship on the beach, the 
 chain being played out at the same time. She thus sank in a very moderate 
 depth of water, and it is very probable she may be saved.
 
 534 LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER WAINWRIGHT'S REPORT. 
 
 " 7. At eleven p. M. the flagship returned to Santiago, leaving the Texas and 
 Oregon in charge of the prize. 
 
 " 8. Though the ship was not able to come to action with any of the larger 
 ships on account of her distance to the eastward, every nerve was strained to 
 do so, and all was done that could be done. Our speed had rapidly increased, 
 so that we were going sixteen knots at the end. We were immediately astern, 
 while all others were considerably to seaward. We were thus in a position to 
 prevent a possible doubling to the rear and escape to the southeast. 
 
 " 9. The officers and crew, as they always have done, acted in the most en- 
 thusiastic and commendable manner. They have worked into so complete a 
 system that the ship is practically instantaneously ready for action, and while 
 (all) are deserving of commendation and credit, I think it no derogation from 
 the deserts of others to particularly name Lieutenant-Commander Potter, to 
 whom, as executive officer, so much- of the ship's efficienc}' is due, and Chief 
 Engineer McConnell, who has kept the machinery in the admirable order which 
 has enabled us at all times to develop the ship's full speed. 
 
 " Very respectfully, 
 
 " F. E. CHADWIOK, 
 " Captain U. S. Navy, Commanding. 
 " To the Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station." 
 
 LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER WAINWEIGHT'S REPORT. 
 
 " UNITED STATES STEAMSHIP GLOUCESTER, 
 " OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 6, 1898. 
 
 " SIR : I have the honor to report that at the battle of Santiago on July 3 
 the officers and crew of the Gloucester were uninjured and the vessel was not 
 injured in hull or machinery, the battery only requiring some slight overhaul- 
 ing. It is now in excellent condition. 
 
 " I enclose herewith a copy of the report of the executive officer, made in 
 .compliance with paragraph 525, page 110, Naval Regulations, which report I 
 believe to be correct in all particulars. I also enclose copies of the reports of 
 the several officers which may prove valuable for future reference. 
 
 " It was the plain duty of the Gloucester to look after the destroyers, and 
 she was held back, gaining steam, until they appeared at the entrance. The 
 Indiana poured in a hot fire from all her secondary battery upon the destroy- 
 ers ; but Captain Taylor's signal, ' Gunboats close in,' gave security that we 
 would not be fired upon by our own ships. Until the leading destroyer was 
 injured, our course was converging, necessarily; but as soon as she slackened 
 her speed we headed directly for both vessels, firing both port and starboard 
 batteries as the occasion offered. 
 
 " All the officers and nearly all the men deserve my highest praise during
 
 LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER WAINWRIGHT'S REPORT. 535 
 
 the action. The escape of the Gloucester was due mainly to the accuracy and 
 rapidity of the fire. The efficiency of this fire, as well as that of the ship gen- 
 erally, was largely due to the intelligence and unremitting efforts of the exec- 
 utive officer, Lieutenant Harry P. Huse. The result is more to his credit when 
 it is remembered that a large portion of the officers and men were untrained 
 when the Gloucester was commissioned. Throughout the action he was on the 
 bridge, and carried out my orders with great coolness. 
 
 " That we were able to close in with the destroyers and until we did so they 
 were not seriously injured was largely due to the skill and constant attention 
 of Passed-Assistant Engineer George W. McElroy. The blowers were put out, 
 and the speed increased to seventeen knots without causing a tube to leak or a 
 brass to heat. Lieutenant Thomas C. Wood, Lieutenant George H. Norman, 
 Jr., and Ensign John T. Edson not only controlled the fire of the guns in their 
 division and prevented waste of ammunition, but they also did some excellent 
 shooting themselves. Acting Assistant Surgeon J. F. Bransford took charge 
 of one of the guns, and fired it himself occasionally. Acting Assistant Pay- 
 master Brown had charge of the two Colt guns, firing one himself, and they 
 did excellent work. Assistant Engineer A.M. Proctor carried my orders from 
 the bridge, and occasionally fired a gun when I found it was not being served 
 quite satisfactorily. All were cool and active at a time when they could have 
 had but little hope of escaping uninjured. 
 
 " Lieutenants Wood and Norman, Ensign Edson and Assistant Engineer 
 Proctor were in charge of the boats engaged in saving life. They all risked 
 their lives repeatedly in boarding and remaining near the two destroyers and 
 the two armored cruisers when their guns were being discharged by the heat 
 and their magazines and boilers were exploding. They also showed great skill 
 in landing and taking off the prisoners through the surf. 
 
 " Of the men mentioned in the several reports, I would call special attention 
 to John Bond, chief boatswain's mate. He would have been recommended to 
 the department for promotion, prior to his gallant conduct during the action of 
 July 3. I would also recommend to your attention Robert P. Jennings, chief 
 machinist, mentioned in the report of Mr. McElroy. I believe it would have a 
 good effect to recognize the skill of the men and the danger incurred by the 
 engineers' force. I would also recommend that the acting appointments of 
 those men mentioned by the officers in their reports be made permanent. 
 
 " The wounded men and exhausted prisoners were well and skilfully tended 
 by Assistant Surgeon Bransford, assisted by Ensign Edson, who is also a sur- 
 geon. The Admiral, his officers, and men were treated with all consideration 
 and care possible. They were fed and clothed as far as our limited means 
 would permit. Very respectfully, 
 
 " RICHARD WATNWRIGHT, 
 
 " Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy, commanding. 
 " To the Coininander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Forces, North Atlantic Station."
 
 536 LlEUTENANT-COMMANDEK SHARP'S REPORT. 
 
 " UNITED STATES STEAMSHIP VIXEN, 
 " GUANTANAMO, Cuba, July 7, 1898. 
 
 " SIR : I have the honor to make the following report as to the part taken by 
 the United States Steamship Vixen in the engagement with the Spanish fleet 
 under the command of Admiral Cervera during the morning and afternoon of 
 Sunday, July 3, 1898: 
 
 " Between 9:35 and 9:45 A. M., the Vixen was at a point about four miles to 
 the westward of Morro and at a distance of about one and one-half miles south 
 of the shore line. At about 9:40 o'clock it was reported to me that an explo- 
 sion had taken place in the entrance of Santiago harbor. I went on deck and 
 almost immediately sighted the leading vessel of the Spanish fleet, standing out 
 of the entrance. Some of the vessels of our fleet were closing in toward Morro 
 and firing. 
 
 " The Vixen was heading toward the Morro. The engines were ordered 
 ahead at full speed and the helm put hard-a-port, the object being to cross 
 ahead of the leading Spanish vessel and thus not obstruct the gun fire of our 
 own fleet, the shells from which soon began to fall about the position we had 
 just left. The leading Spanish vessel opened fire on this vessel with her star- 
 board bow guns, the projectiles from which passed over us, all being aimed too 
 high. I estimate the number of shots fired at us at this time to have been be- 
 tween five and ten. 
 
 " As the Vixen gathered headway her head came to about south by east, 
 opening the Krooklyn up about two points on our port bow. Steadied her and 
 steamed on about this course until we had reached a position about a mile to 
 the southward and westward of the Brooklyn, which was now turning with 
 port helm and firing her guns as they bore on the enemy's vessels. At 9:50 
 o'clock hoisted signal No. 252. The course was then ordered changed to west- 
 southwest, the intention being to steer a parallel course to that of the Spanish 
 fleet. By some mistake the Quartermaster steadied the helm on southwest by 
 south, which was soon discovered, but not until the Vixen had increased her 
 distance off shore by perhaps another half mile. The course west-southwest 
 was again ordered, and when steadied on it we were at an estimated distance of 
 about five miles from the shore. From about 10:15 the courses and times of 
 changing were as follows: At 10:15, changed course to west half south; at 
 10:56, to northwest by north ; at 11:00, west-northwest ; at 11:05, west by north ; 
 at 11:10, northwest by west; at 11:15, west by north ; at 11:30, west by south; 
 at 1:50, west by north. All these courses were by the steering compass, and 
 the speed was estimated from twelve to thirteen and one-half knots per hour. 
 Times noted are by the deck clock, which was five minutes fast of watch time, 
 used in the notes inclosed. Seeing that the Spanish vessels were out of range 
 of our guns, while we were well within range of theirs, we reserved our fire. 
 
 "About 11:06, having approached within range of the Vizcaya, we opened 
 fire with our starboard battery at an elevation of 5,000 yards for the six-pounder
 
 CAPTAIN COTTON'S REPORT. 537 
 
 guns and extreme elevation for the one-pounders. Continued the fire for six 
 minutes, when, seeing that the ensign of the Vizcay^a was not flying, at 11:12 
 ordered cease firing. Expended twenty-seven six-pounders A. P. shells and 
 i-ighteen one-pounder common shells. After passing Aserradero the course was 
 held at from west by north to west by south, heading for the point on the 
 western horizon. Average speed about twelve to thirteen and one-half knots ; 
 average number of revolutions, 105 per minute; average steam pressure, 122^ 
 pounds. 
 
 " The Brooklyn and Oregon bore on the port and starboard bows respectively, 
 and were gradually dropping the Vixen astern, as was the Cristobal Colon, 
 which was running closer inshore. About 12:25 the Oregon opened fire on the 
 Colon, as did also the Brooklyn, feeling their way up to the range, which was 
 apparently obtained after the fourth or fifth shot. About 1:20 the Oregon and 
 Brooklyn headed in shore, about four points. About 1:28 the Texas hoisted 
 signal, ' Enemy has surrendered.' This signal was repeated to the New York 
 by the Vixen. At 2:30 the Vixen stopped off Rio Tarquino, in the vicinity of 
 the Oregon and Brooklyn. The Cristobal Colon was close in shore, bows on 
 the beach, her colors down, lying on the deck at the foot of her staff. 
 
 " I have the honor to inclose a copy of notes, taken during the chase by my 
 orders, upon the suggestion of Lieutenant Harlow. These notes were written 
 by Assistant Paymaster Doherty, the incidents and times were given by Lieu- 
 tenant Harlow, whose watch was five minutes slow of deck-clock time. The 
 times taken after 10:30 are accurate ; those taken before that time were esti- 
 mated, and may be in error a few minutes. 
 
 " Inclosed is a sketch showing positions of vessels at various times. It is 
 taken from a chart taken from the Cristobal Colon after the surrender, and is 
 enlarged four times. All courses are true. 
 
 " In conclusion, I wish to call your attention to the coolness and strict atten- 
 tion to duty of both officers and men. Very respectfully, 
 
 " ALEX. SHARP, Jr., 
 " Lieutenant, Commanding. 
 " To the Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Forces, North Atlantic Station." 
 
 CAPTAIN COTTON'S REPORT. 
 
 " UNITED STATES STEAMSHIP HARVARD, 
 " AT SEA, OFF ALTARES, Cuba, July 4, 1898. 
 
 " SIR: 1. On Sunday, the 3d inst., the Harvard, under my command, was 
 at Altares, Cuba, discharging the military stores brought in the ship with the 
 troops from Newport News, Va. Nearly all of the boats and the majority of 
 the officers of the ship were employed in this work. Some of the boats were 
 away from the ship discharging their loads and others were alongside loading.
 
 538 CAPTAIN COTTON'S REPORT. 
 
 " 2. At 10:45 A. M. the United States Steamship Resolute passed Altares at a 
 considerable distance, standing to the eastward, sounding her whistle vigorously 
 and flying a signal which announced that the Spanish fleet had ' fled.' With the 
 utmost despatch I recalled the boats and officers to the ship, hoisted the former, 
 sent the steam launch on shore, got under way and stood to the westward to 
 join you. The ship was cleared for action. 
 
 u 3. I had previously observed that the fleet was firing, but supposed that 
 it was a bombardment of the Morro and the neighboring batteries. The ships 
 of the fleet had meantime disappeared to the westward, none being in sight 
 when I came out from behind the land where I could command an uninter- 
 rupted view of the coast west of Morro. 
 
 " 4. I soon came up with the wrecks on shore of two of the smaller vessels 
 and two of the cruisers of the Spanish fleet, and shortly afterward with the 
 wreck of a third cruiser, all of the cruisers burning fiercely. 
 
 " 5. I had meantime passed the Indiana and one of our torpedo boats stand- 
 ing to the eastward in search of the missing Spanish cruiser and informed 
 them that a large Spanish battleship or cruiser was in sight to the eastward off 
 Baiquiri. They immediately stood on in chase, but the supposed enemy was 
 ascertained later to be the Austrian cruiser Maria Teresa. 
 
 " 6. At the most westerly of the three wrecks of the Spanish cruisers, the 
 Vizcaya, I found the battleship Iowa and communicated with her. Learning 
 from Captain Evans that you in the New York were in chase of the Cristobal 
 Colon, and were probably many miles to the westward, I decided not to go 
 further in that direction. 
 
 " 7. Shortly afterward the Iowa and the Harvard stood to the eastward, and 
 upon reaching the wrecks of the Oquendo and Maria Teresa, Captain Evans 
 informed me that the officers and crews of both vessels were on shore in great 
 distress and suffering for want of food, and asked me if I would rescue them 
 a request with which I, of course, instantly complied, and which would have 
 been unnecessary had I previously known the circumstances concerning them. 
 
 " 8. I took the Harvard in as near the wrecks as I deemed to be prudent, 
 and at 4:40 p. M. lowered nine of our boats and sent them in to the shore to 
 rescue the survivors. This work continued until 9:45 P. M.,when the last boat- 
 load of Spanish prisoners came alongside. During the greater part of the 
 time the steam cutter of the Indiana rendered valuable assistance in towing 
 our boats to and from the shore. We had the good fortune to rescue thirt}-- 
 five officers and 637 men, without accident to them or to our boats, notwith- 
 standing the fact that the landing was through the surf and dangerous, as well 
 from the incessant explosion of ammunition, both small and large, as from the 
 surf. The boats were handled with skill and judgment by the officers in com- 
 mand of them, who were Lieutenants Beale, Roberts, Davis, and Bradshaw, 
 Ensigns Turner and Cuming, and Cadets Noa and Bruff, whose conduct and 
 that of the boats' crews was commendable.
 
 LIEUTENANT USHER'S REPORT. 539 
 
 " 9. Among the rescued were thirty-eight sick and wounded. At ten 
 o'clock I steamed on to rejoin the ships off Santiago, reaching them at 10:55 
 p. M. with the junior medical officer of the Indiana and a Lieutenant and a 
 boat's crew of the United States Steamship, Gloucester. 
 
 " 10. The Spanish officers and men received every attention that it was pos- 
 sible to bestow upon them for their comfort and welfare. Some of them came 
 on board wholly nude, and many with only a shirt or trousers. As soon as 
 possible after their arrival on board they were provided with food and neces- 
 sary clothing. About 300 working suits and many shoes and canvas hats were 
 issued to them. The sick and wounded were attended by our own medical 
 staff, assisted by two Spanish surgeons. 
 
 " 11. I transmit herewith a copy of the detailed report of Lieutenant 
 Joseph Beale, United States Navy, of the Harvard, who was the senior officer 
 in charge of the transportation of the Spaniards to this ship, and I beg leave 
 to invite your attention to the terms in which he speaks of the highly com- 
 mendable conduct of the officers and men associated with him in the successful 
 accomplishment of an important and humane duty, and one not without ex- 
 posure to danger. 
 
 " 12. This forenoon sixteen of the most severely wounded men were trans- 
 ferred to the United States hospital ship Solace. None of the Spanish officers 
 on board this ship was so seriously wounded as to require transfer to that 
 vessel. 
 
 " 13. In conclusion I beg to be permitted the privilege, in my own behalf as 
 well as that of the officers and men of the Harvard, to extend to you and to 
 the people of the United States our most hearty and sincere congratulations 
 upon the brilliant victory achieved by you yesterday, which adds another page 
 to the imperishable glory and renown of the history of our navy. 
 " Very respectfully, 
 
 " C. S. COTTON, 
 
 " Captain U. S. Navy, Commanding. 
 " To the Commander-in-Chief IT, S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station." 
 
 LIEUTENANT USHEE'S REPORT. 
 
 "UNITED STATES TORPEDO BOAT ERICSSON, 
 " HARBOR OP GUANTANAMO, Cuba, July 5, 1898. 
 
 " SIR: In obedience to Art. 437, p. 98, "United States Navy Register, 1896, 
 I respectfully report that on the morning of July 3, 1898, the United States 
 Torpedo Boat Ericsson was proceeding under half speed on the starboard 
 quarter of the United States Flagship New York toward Siboney, when the 
 enemy was sighted coming out of Santiago entrance, we being then five or six 
 miles to the eastward of the Morro. The vessels of our fleet were firing on
 
 540 LIEUTENANT USHER'S REPORT. 
 
 the enemy. The helm was put hard aport at once and full power put on as 
 speedily as possible, and the course directed toward the enemy's ships, the crew 
 at quarters and the vessel in all respects ready to deliver torpedo attack. By 
 the time we had turned to westward two of the enemy's vessels were out in 
 plain sight ; they were followed at short intervals by the other two cruisers, 
 and then after a longer interval by the two torpedo-boat destroyers. The fire 
 of the shore batteries supported the enemy's fleet, and the fire of both fleets 
 was rapid and continuous. The flagship New York had hoisted signal 260 : 
 ' Close in toward harbor entrance and attack vessels.' The Ericsson proceeded 
 as fast as possible, the steam pressure and speed gradually increasing. The 
 shore batteries at entrance to Santiago were directing their fire on the Glouces- 
 ter at this time, which was hotly engaged with the two torpedo-boat destroy- 
 ers. At full speed we drew near the entrance, and as we passed and afterward 
 the fire of the shore batteries was directed on us. Several shells struck near 
 us, short or beyond, and two burst overhead and over. The Ericsson was not 
 struck. The Brooklyn, Texas, Oregon, Iowa and Indiana were closely en- 
 gaged with the Colon, Vizcaya, Oquendo and Maria Teresa; the firing was 
 furious. As we drew near, the two torpedo-boat destroyers were seen to strike 
 to the Gloucester, and the Maria Teresa and Oquendo to run ashore, strike 
 their colors, and display white flags. They were both on fire and clouds of 
 steam arising from their hatches and ports. The Indiana remained near them, 
 the Iowa directed her fire on the Vizca3 T a, and the Oregon joined in the chase 
 of the Colon. The course of the Ericsson was directed toward the Vizcaya, 
 prepared to deliver torpedo attack, but before we could arrive within striking 
 distance the Vizcaya was seen to strike to the Iowa, run ashore and burst into 
 flames, her engines being left running and clouds of steam issuing from all her 
 openings on deck and in her sides. The course of the Ericsson was then set 
 for the Colon, which was running very fast to the westward, pursued by the 
 Brookljn, Texas, and Oregon. As the Ericsson was hauling away from the 
 New York in the chase, signal was made, interrogatory 2,872 : ' Request per- 
 mission to continue the chase.' The flagship hoisted negative, and by wigwag 
 signal directed the Ericsson to pick up men in the water astern. Turned with 
 port helm and found and picked up one man afloat on a piece of wreckage and 
 then returned to the chase, the New York in the meantime chasing fast after 
 the Colon. As we came up with the Iowa, lying about two miles seaward of 
 Vizcaya, the Ericsson was hailed and directed to go inshore and rescue the crew 
 of the Vizcaya from the burning vessel. Ran close alongside the Vizcaya and 
 sent small boat to her, boats from Iowa pulling in also at same time. Explo- 
 sions from the ammunition on board the Vizcaya began about this time, and 
 her guns, which had been left loaded, were fired one after the other by the 
 flames. The Vizcaya was on fire fore and aft, but the mass of the fire was aft, 
 and the position of the Ericsson was perilous in the extreme and only the 
 urgency of the occasion caused her to remain. Rescued eleven officers and
 
 ADMIRAL CERVERA'S STATEMENT. 541 
 
 about nine sailors and marines from the vessel, many of them sorely wounded. 
 The Spanish were 110 sooner taken on board than thej r urged immediate with- 
 drawal of the Ericsson, but this vessel remained until all alive had been taken 
 from the Vizcaya by the Ericsson's small boat and the boats from the Iowa. One 
 of the Yizcaya's large cutters was also used. The Ericsson's deck was then 
 crowded with prisoners, most of them naked and many of them wounded, and 
 she returned to the Iowa towing the Vizcaya's cutter, also filled with prisoners. 
 These were all put on board the Iowa. 
 
 " [The enemy afterward towed boats to and from the burning wrecks of the 
 Maria Teresa and Oquendo until no more persons remained to be rescued from 
 the vessels, the remaining prisoners being all ashore on the beach. There were 
 no casualties on board this vessel.] 
 
 " I respectfully commend the good conduct of Edward Ryan, G. M., second 
 class, who manned the small boat and brought off the officers and men from the 
 stern of the Vizcaya, a duty of great danger from the incessant explosions of 
 ammunition on board her. Very respectfully, 
 
 " N. R. USHER, 
 
 " Lieutenant U. S. Navy. Commanding. 
 " To the Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.'' 
 
 This naval history is compiled from a semi-official statement issued by 
 Admiral Cervera on leaving this country. This document declares, that 
 
 " The full truth concerning what led to the destruction of the magnificent 
 Cape Verde ileet, has never yet been told, and the time has come when certain 
 facts which have been heretofore withheld should be made public. It is true 
 that Admiral Cervera and his officers may be court-martialed upon reaching 
 Spain, and upon conviction it is also true that they could be shot if the authori- 
 ties, those composing the court-martial or the Government, saw fit to impose 
 such a penalty. However, such a catastrophe is not looked for ; it will not 
 occur; and when all the facts are plainly set forth and the blame placed where 
 it belongs, it will be clearly shown that Admiral Cervera acted like the wise 
 and sagacious Admiral that he is and both he and his officers and crew will be 
 completely exonerated. 
 
 " Notwithstanding this, their situation at present or upon their approaching 
 Spain is critical, and it may be safely said that the high standing of Admiral 
 Cervera's family all being of royal blood will not save him from court-mar- 
 tial. Public opinion has been inflamed against him in Spain through gross 
 misrepresentation, through falsehood and conspiracy of those who seek to shift 
 the blame for the loss of the Spanish ships from their own shoulders to the 
 shoulders of Admiral Cervera. Their erring deeds, unfaithfulness and treach- 
 ery were entirely responsible for the disaster they would place upon those who 
 are innocent, and who, if allowed to exercise their own wisdom and discretion, 
 would have saved for Spain the pride of her navy.
 
 542 ADMIRAL CERVERA'S STATEMENT. 
 
 " It is untrue that Admiral Cervera, after leaving the Cape Verde Islands 
 and reaching western waters, was seeking to avoid the American fleet and flying 
 here and there to avoid a fight. Naturally, his plans were different from those 
 laid out for him to follow by the American Board of Strategy, for he was 
 endeavoring to separate the American fleets and engage them separately ; he 
 wanted to meet and fight them singly, but his misfortune would not permit him 
 to do that. When he was nearly without coal and being in need of some slight 
 repairs to his ships he naturally put into Santiago, expecting there to find sup- 
 plies, to make what few repairs were needed, get provisions and proceed further, 
 but there he was greatly disappointed. 
 
 " Through the interference of General Blanco he was prevented from carry- 
 ing out his plans, and the whole world knows the result. General Blanco im- 
 mediately communicated to Spain and asked the Minister of Marine to place 
 Admiral Cervera and his fleet under his (Blanco's) orders, making various rep- 
 resentations and explaining the necessity of such action from his standpoint, 
 and his request was finally granted. 
 
 " It was simply a deep diabolical trick on the part of General Blanco. He 
 foresaw disaster somewhere, and in case it should come he wanted to have some 
 one high in authority upon whom he could shove a portion if not all of the 
 blame for any loss which might accrue to Spain and for which he was held 
 responsible. General Blanco then ordered Cervera to remain in Santiago and 
 assist in the defence of the shore batteries. Admiral Cervera protested strongly 
 against this and appealed to Spain, but it is doubtful if his appeal ever reached 
 the Government. He asked to be allowed to coal up and then leave Santiago, 
 where he might be free to meet the American fleet, rather than to be bottled 
 up in a blockaded harbor. He contended that he could not possibly be useful 
 to Spain by remaining in Santiago harbor with the certainty of American ships 
 coming to keep him there, whereas, outside and free, his strong fleet could be 
 of great value to the Spanish cause. 
 
 " The answer of General Blanco was that Admiral Cervera was now subject 
 to his orders, and that he, and not Admiral Cervera, was in command of affairs 
 in Cuba, and that the Admiral must obey his command. Cervera could then 
 do nothing. 
 
 " After the Merrimac affair, which made the name of Lieutenant Hobson im- 
 mortal and made Admiral Cervera, by his kindly treatment of the prisoner, 
 well regarded by Americans when he came to be a prisoner himself, Cervera 
 was fully aware that he could still get out of Santiago harbor if he had per- 
 mission to do so. His immediate investigation showed that the channel was 
 not entirely closed and that his ships could pass out. Finally, when fully 
 aware that the strong American fleet were waiting for him outside of the 
 harbor, as he was completely informed of the movements of the Americans 
 at all times, he concluded that he would do his best to defend the city, as 
 it would at that time be certain destruction to attempt to run out of the
 
 ADMIRAL CERVERA'S STATEMENT. 543 
 
 harbor. The time to escape had already passed, and he became resigned to do 
 his best. 
 
 " Then one night an order came to him from General Blanco to be ready to 
 sail out of the harbor within twenty-four hours and fixing one o'clock in the 
 morning for the time of departure, when, it was argued by General Blanco, the 
 Americans would be taken by surprise and probably off their guard and the 
 escape could be made. Admiral Cervera protested strongly against this, main- 
 taining that the American commanders were too shrewd not to double and 
 treble their guard at night, and pointed out to General Blanco that one o'clock 
 in the morning would be a very bad time to start, if indeed he should insist 
 upon the order to get out of the harbor. 
 
 " Admiral Cervera did not know at that time of the villainy of Blanco in 
 telegraphing to Madrid asking that Cervera be removed from command of the 
 fleet and Commodore Villamil be placed in command. Then later, when the 
 fleet was destroyed, Blanco sent another telegram stating that it was the fault 
 of the Minister of Marine in not heeding his advice and granting his request 
 to remove Cervera. 
 
 " Blanco was fully aware that to leave Santiago meant the destruction of the 
 fleet, and he waited to again shift the blame, and so made the request for the 
 change of commanders, which he knew would not and could not be made, but 
 he nevertheless had an excuse and some one to blame for not accepting his 
 counsel. General Blanco knew that the action which he ordered must mean 
 the destruction of the fleet, and he actually hoped and believed that it would 
 mean the death of Admiral Cervera, so that he could not make answer to the 
 charges which Blanco proposed to make against him. 
 
 " The same vile treachery of General Blanco is also shown in his conduct 
 toward General Toral, who he first ordered to surrender the city when it be- 
 came actually necessary to do so and the siege could no longer be endured, and 
 then publicly accused of cowardice when he and his command had laid down 
 their arms in honorable surrender. 
 
 " Every one of Admiral Cervera's crew, of course, knew that in attempting 
 to escape from Santiago harbor at the time they did meant not only the loss of 
 their vessels, but probably death to them. They knew that the course they 
 were entering upon by order of General Blanco was one of suicidfe, and all ex- 
 pected to find graves at the bottom of the sea. But the fleet would not have 
 attempted the escape had it not been for the command of Blanco, and the only 
 concession which Admiral Cervera could obtain from the Captain-General was 
 a change in the time of departure. 
 
 " It is true that Admiral Cervera and some of his officers and crew attempted 
 to escape by swimming to the shore, but there they found another obstacle and 
 were fired upon by a force of men whom it was afterward learned were Cubans 
 under command of Colonel Candelaris Cebrecos. The Spaniards have no cause 
 for complaint at the treatment received at their hands, for when the rank of
 
 544 ARMY AND NAVY BEFORE SANTIAGO. 
 
 their prisoners was ascertained they were taken to the Cuban camp and after- 
 ward surrendered to the American commanders and distributed among the 
 American ships. 
 
 " The remainder is all history, but the world at large has never known the 
 real inside facts or the cause which led to the destruction of the pride of the 
 Spanish navy, and the blame has never been properly attached. History 
 knows that the Spanish Cape Verde fleet was destroyed by superior American 
 forces, but it does not know of the wilful treachery, incompetency, and das- 
 tardly villainy of those who were responsible for it, and Admiral Cervera will 
 in the end be vindicated." 
 
 ARMY AND NAVY BEFORE SANTIAGO. 
 REPORT OF ADMIRAL SAMPSON TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
 
 " On July 1, a demonstration was made by a Michigan volunteer regiment 
 at Aguadores, under command of General Duffield. The New York, Glouces- 
 ter, and Suwanee moved up at the request of the army to assist in an attack 
 which was to begin at daylight, but the troops who came by rail did not arrive 
 until 9:20. 
 
 " The small river San Juan cuts through a deep defile and is spanned by an 
 iron railroad bridge. There is an ancient fort near the water, and on the hills 
 two small rifle-pits. Some sixteen or twenty of the enemy had been encoun- 
 tered while waiting for the troops, but disappeared when the ships began firing. 
 The troops advanced so far as the bridge, a corner of the fort was knocked off 
 by the shells of the navy, and the flagstaff was shot away. Desultory firing 
 was kept up between our troops and the Spanish, the troops returning to Sib- 
 oney about half-past ten. 
 
 " On the evening of July 1 the Admiral was advised by General Shafter that 
 the army would assault at daylight on the 2d, and the navy was requested to 
 keep up a fire at the batteries on the bluff. The squadron consequently closed 
 in early on the morning of the 2d, and kept up a vigorous fire for two hours, 
 but the attack proposed by General Shafter did not take place on that day. 
 
 " On the night of July 1 the Reina Mercedes was sunk by the Spaniards so 
 as to obstruct the ships. Extensive shore batteries existed, and if smaller 
 vessels had been sent in and sunk by the mines or batteries, the harbor would 
 have been effectually closed against us. 
 
 " It was essential to the new scheme of attack of the combined forces that 
 the position occupied by the eastern and western batteries should be carried, 
 and this was the scheme of action first proposed by General Shafter on the day 
 of his first arrival. It was at that time explained to him that it was of pri- 
 mary importance that these points should first be carried, as their possession
 
 ARMY AND NAVY BEFORE SANTIAGO. 545 
 
 insured the destruction of the mines, the entrance of heavy ships into the har- 
 bor, and the assault on Cervera's fleet. 
 
 " This was heartily consented to by General Shafter, who stated that the en- 
 trance to the harbor was the key to the situation. This was repeated in his 
 interview with General Garcia at Aserraderos. 
 
 " It had been the Admiral's desire to do everj'thing possible to cooperate with 
 General Shafter. Such an attack as that proposed by the General was in com- 
 plete accord with the views held by the Admiral and discussed with his staff. 
 It was proposed to bring up the marines from Guantanamo and add them to 
 the marines of the squadron, thus making a force of nearly a thousand men, 
 which might be landed either at the foot of the Morro in Estrella Cove, to as- 
 sault the Morro, or to the westward, for the purpose of assaulting the west 
 battery ; at the same time detaching a force of two or three thousand men from 
 the army and proceeding by Aguadores, to occupy the ground between the 
 Morro and that just to the northward of it. A visit to General Shafter was 
 arranged, but the Admiral being ill, his chief of staff went instead. The fol- 
 lowing arrangement was made : 
 
 " Camp near San Juan River, Cuba, July 6, 1898. Minutes of a conversa- 
 tion between Captain Chadwick of the navy, representing Admiral Sampson 
 and General Shafter. 
 
 " That a long-continuing bombardment be made of Santiago from the sea, 
 with the heavier guns of the fleet, the fleet firing slowly and continually dur- 
 ing, say, twenty-four hours, at the rate of one shell every five minutes, except- 
 ing one hour, at the rate of one every two minutes. This refers to the eight- 
 inch and thirteen-inch shells. 
 
 " If this be not sufficient to bring the enemy to terms, that an assault be ar- 
 ranged on the Socapa battery, using marines and the Cuban forces under Gen- 
 eral Cebrecos, and an effort made to enter the harbor, with some of the smaller 
 ships of the squadron. This attack to be made upon knowing the result of a 
 second demand made upon the commanding officer of the Spanish forces for 
 the surrender of the place, stating to him the conditions that surround him ; 
 destruction of the Spanish fleet, etc., etc., and the number of forces opposed to 
 him. To give him time to consider the matter, the date of the bombardment 
 is fixed at noon of the 9th unless he positive!}' refuses to consider it at all, 
 when it will be begun at such time as is convenient to ourselves. General 
 Shafter will furnish Admiral Sampson with correct map, showing where his 
 lines will be surrounding the city, and also open telegraphic communication by 
 the way of Siboney down to near Aguadores, to give information as to the fall- 
 ing of shots. 
 
 " This was followed by the following correspondence : 
 
 " The General-in-Chief commanding the Spanish forces, Santiago de Cuba: 
 
 " SIR : 1, Jn view of the events of the 3d inst., I have the honor to lay before
 
 546 ARMY AND NAVY BEFORE SANTIAGO. 
 
 your Excellency certain propositions, to which I trust your Excellency will 
 give the consideration which in my opinion they deserve. 
 
 " 2. I enclose a bulletin of the engagement of Sunday morning, which re- 
 sulted in the complete destruction of Admiral Cervera's fleet, the loss of 600 
 of his officers and men, and the capture of the remainder. The Admiral, Gen- 
 eral, Paredes, and all others who escaped alive are now prisoners on board the 
 Harvard and St. Louis, and the later ship, in which are the Admiral, General 
 Paredes, and the surviving captains (all except the Captain of the Almirante 
 Oquendo, who was slain), has already sailed for the United States. If desired 
 by j'ou, this may be confirmed by your Excellency sending an officer under a 
 flag of truce to Admiral Sampson, and he can arrange a visit to the Harvard, 
 which will not sail until to-morrow, and obtain the details from Spanish officers 
 and men aboard that ship. 
 
 " 3. Our fleet is now perfectly free to act, and I have the honor to state that 
 unless a surrender be arranged by noon of the 9th instant, a bombardment of 
 the city will be begun and continued with the heavy guns of our ships. The 
 city is within easy range of these guns, the eight-inch being capable of firing 
 9,500 yards, the thirteen-inch, of course, much further. The ships c:m so lie 
 that with a range of 8,000 yards they can reach the centre of the city. 
 
 " 4. I make this suggestion of a surrender purely in a humanitarian spirit. 
 I do not wish to cause the slaughter of any more men either of j*our Excel- 
 lency's forces or my own ; the final result under circumstances so disadvan- 
 tageous to your Excellency being a foregone conclusion. 
 
 " 5. As your Excellencj' may wish to make reference of so momentous a 
 question to your Excellency's home government, it is for this purpose that I 
 have placed the time of the resumption of hostilities sufficiently far in the fu- 
 ture to allow a reply being received. 
 
 " 6. I beg an early answer from your Excellency. 
 
 " I have the honor to be your Excellency's obedient servant, 
 
 " WILLIAM R. SHAFTER, Major-General, IT. S. V. 
 " Commanding Fifth Army Corps."
 
 PART II. MILITARY REPORTS. 
 
 GENERAL SHATTER'S REPORT. 
 
 " CAMP BEFORE SANTIAGO, Cuba, July 18, 1898. 
 
 " I take the liberty of sending to you this morning a copy of the agreement 
 between the Commissioners on my part and the Commissioners on the part of 
 the Government of Spain for the surrender of eastern Cuba. The schedule just 
 submitted shows there to be a little over 22,000 men and officers, about 6,000 
 more men than I have had myself; and I am glad to say that we have got all 
 these men with very little loss of life, compared to what it would have been had 
 we had to have fought them. The city of Santiago is simply a network of 
 fortifications at every street corner. I had no proper conception of its strength 
 until I went into it, although I knew these old stone towns were naturally very 
 strong. Everything is going admirably, so far as the transfer is concerned, 
 and the Spanish troops are behaving well, as they are perfectly delighted at 
 the thought of getting home. 
 
 " I send to you personally a telegram of General Linares to his Government, 
 which one of the Consuls gave me. It shows the straits to which they were 
 put and the feelings that animated them. He stated the case exactly. I did 
 have him so surrounded that it was impossible for him to get away, and I could 
 wait and he could not. 
 
 " I send out to-morrow morning to receive something over 2,000 men up in 
 the interior a short distance, about thirty miles, and in two or three daj's will 
 send to Guantanamo to receive the 7,000 that have surrendered there. They 
 should be shipped from Guantanamo Bay direct to Spain. There ai'e also 
 about 800 men each from Baracoa and Saguabe Tamamo on the north coast, 
 who will come into the port there for shipment. I will send an officer around 
 with a Spanish officer to take their arms and military supplies. We have got- 
 ten a great deal more than I had any idea of getting in the way of munitions of 
 war. In everything but food they were well supplied. Have got a few beau- 
 tiful, modern, high-power guns about a dozen. 
 
 "My only fear is that we will have some sickness ; and it is for that reason 
 
 that I have wired you so earnestly about getting these prisoners away, so that 
 
 we can go up in the mountains with my command, fifteen or twenty miles, at 
 
 the end of the railroad, at San Luis, which is said to be very healthy. It is, at 
 
 80 (547)
 
 548 GENERAL SHAFTER'S REPORT. 
 
 any rate, about 1,500 feet above the sea, and has communication by rail with 
 Santiago. So far there is no fever in Santiago. I* suppose there is no one 
 there except immunes. Three cases only so far this year, and the English 
 Consul tells me there was very little last year. 
 
 " Of those here who served throughout the Civil War all declare they never 
 had anything that could compare with it for hardship. With only one set of 
 clothes, officers have been until now rained on nearly every day, carrying three 
 days' rations like the men on their person, and suffering every privation that 
 any man can added to all these privations; in addition, all the horrors of dis- 
 ease in an unknown land, and very limited accommodations should they be 
 wounded. The spirit shown by them and by the whole army was simply 
 grand. I can recall no instance where a greater surrender has been made than 
 this. The final surrender of General Toral and his generals to myself and my 
 generals was highly dramatic, as well as the hoisting of the flag over the city 
 of Santiago, one of the oldest cities in this continent. 
 
 " I want to thank you and the President for the words of cheer that have 
 come to us, and to say that none of us has ever doubted that every effort possi- 
 ble to make our lives as secure and our situation as comfortable as is possible 
 would be done. 
 
 " W. R. SHAFTER, 
 " Major-General Commanding." 
 
 In a more extended report, condensed by the War Department, Gen- 
 eral Shafter says: 
 
 The expedition under his command, sailed from Tampa with 815 officers and 
 16,072 enlisted men. The orders were given by telegraph on May 30. 
 
 ' Admiral Schley reports that two cruisers and two torpedo boats have been 
 seen in the harbor of Santiago. Go with your force to capture garrison at 
 Santiago and assist in capturing harbor and fleet. 
 
 " On the morning of June 20 we arrived off Guantanamo Bay, and about 
 noon reached the vicinity of Santiago, where Admiral Sampson came on board 
 my headquarters transport. It was arranged between us to visit in the after- 
 noon the Cuban General (Garcia) at Aserradero, about eighteen miles to the 
 west of the Morro. During the interview General Garcia offered the services 
 of his troops, comprising about 4,000 men in the vicinity of Aserradero and 
 about 500, under General Castillo, at the little town of Cujababo, a few miles 
 east of Baiquiri. I accepted his offer, impressing it upon him that I could 
 exercise no military control over him except such as he would concede, 
 and as long as he served under me I would furnish him rations and ammuni- 
 tion. 
 
 " Ever since the receipt of my orders I had made a study of the terrain sur-
 
 GENERAL SHAFTER'S REPORT. 649 
 
 rounding Santiago, gathering information mainly from former residents of the 
 city, several of whom were on the transports with me. At this interview all 
 the possible points of attack were for the last time carefully weighed, and then, 
 for the information and guidance of Admiral Sampson and General Garcia, I 
 outlined the plan of campaign, which was as follows : 
 
 " With the assistance of the small boats of the navy, the disembarkation was 
 to commence on the morning of the twenty-second at Baiquiri. On the twenty- 
 first 500 insurgent troops were to be transferred from Aserradero to Cujababo, 
 increasing the force already there to 1,000 men. This force, under General 
 Castillo, was to attack the Spanish force at Baiquiri in the rear at the time of 
 disembarkation. This movement was successfully made. To mislead the 
 enemy as to the real point of our intended landing, I requested General Garcia 
 to send a small force (about 500 men), under General Rabi, to attack the little 
 town of Cabanis, situated on the coast a few miles to the west of the entrance 
 to Santiago harbor, and where it was reported the enemy had several hundred 
 men intrenched, and from which a trail leads around the west side of the bay 
 to Santiago. 
 
 " I also requested Admiral Sampson to send several of his warships, with 
 a number of my transports, opposite this town, for the purpose of making a 
 show of disembarking there. In addition, I asked the Admiral to cause a 
 bombardment to be made at Cabanis, and also at the ports around the 
 Morro, and at the towns of Aguadores, Siboney and Baiquiri. The troops 
 under General Garcia remaining at Aserradero were to be transferred to 
 Baiquiri or Siboney on the twenty-fourth. This was successfully accomplished 
 at Siboney. 
 
 " These movements committed me to approaching Santiago from the (;ast 
 over a narrow road, at first in some places not better than a trail, running from 
 Baiquiri through Siboney and Sevilla, and making attack from that quarter. 
 This, in my judgment, was the only feasible plan, and subsequent information 
 and results confirmed my judgment. 
 
 " On the 23d General Lawton's advance reached Siboney and the disembark- 
 ation of Kent's division on that date enabled Shafter to establish a base eight 
 miles nearer Santiago and to proceed with disembarkation at both points. 
 General Shafter continues with details of movements up to the battle of El 
 Caney, July 1, concerning which he says : 
 
 " These preparations were far from what I desired them to be, but we were 
 in a sickly climate ; our supplies had to be brought forward by a narrow wagon 
 road, which the rains might at any time render impassable ; fear was enter- 
 tained that a storm might drive the vessels containing our stores to sea, thus 
 separating us from our base of supplies, and, lastly, it was reported that Gen- 
 eral Pando, with 8,000 reinforcements for the enemy, was enroute from 
 Manzanillo, and might be expected in a few days. Under these conditions I 
 determined to give battle without delay.
 
 550 GENERAL SHAFTER'S REPORT. 
 
 " The disposition of the several bodies of troops is given, their formation under 
 fire (in which Colonel Wikoff was killed), and the results of their movements 
 are set forth in detail, and General Shafter adds : 
 
 u After completing their formation under a destructive fire, and advancing a 
 short distance, both divisions (Kent's and Hawkins's) found in their front a 
 wide bottom in which there had been placed a barbed-wire entanglement, and 
 beyond which there was a high hill, along the crest of which the enemy was 
 strongly posted. Nothing daunted, these gallant men pushed on to drive 
 the enemy from his chosen position, both divisions losing heavily. In this 
 assault Colonel Hamilton and Lieutenants Smith and Shipp were killed, and 
 Colonel Carroll and Lieutenants Thayer and Myer, all in the cavalry, were 
 wounded. 
 
 " Great credit is due to Brigadier-General H. S. Hawkins, who, placing him- 
 self between his regiments, urged them on by voice and bugle call to the attack 
 so brilliantly executed. In this fierce encounter words fail to do justice to the 
 gallant regimental commanders and their heroic men, for, while the General 
 indicated the formations and the points of attack, it was, after all, the intrepid 
 bravery of the subordinate officers and men that planted our colors on the crest 
 of San Juan Hill and drove the enemy from his trenches and blockhouses, thus 
 gaining a position which sealed the fall of Santiago. In this action on this 
 part of the field most efficient service was rendered by Lieutenant John 
 H. Parker, Thirteenth Infantry, and the Gatling gun detachment under 
 his command. The fighting continued at intervals until nightfall, but our 
 men held resolutely to the position gained at the cost of so much blood and 
 toil. 
 
 " I am greatly indebted to General Wheeler, who, as previously stated, re- 
 turned from the sick list to duty during the afternoon. His cheerfulness and 
 aggressiveness made itself felt on this part of the battlefield, and the information 
 furnished to me at various stages of the battle proved to be most useful. M.y 
 own health was impaired by overexertion in the sun and the intense heat of the 
 day before, which prevented me from participating as actively in the battle as 
 I desired, but from a high hill near my headquarters I had a general view of 
 the battlefield extending from El Caney on the right to the left of our lines on 
 San Juan Hill. My staff officers were stationed at various points on the field, 
 rendering frequent reports, and through them, by the means of orderlies and 
 the telephone, I was enabled to transmit my orders. 
 
 " During the afternoon I visited the position of Grimes's battery on the 
 heights of El Pozo. and saw Sumner and Kent in firm possession of San Juan 
 Hill, which I directed should be intrenched during the night. My regular 
 officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Derby, collected and sent forward the necessary 
 tools, and during the night trenches of very considerable strength were con- 
 structed. 
 
 " The cessation of firing at noon on July 3 practically ended the battle of
 
 GENERAL SHAFTER'S REPORT. 551 
 
 Santiago. General Shafter says it is doubtful if he had more than 12,000 men 
 on the firing line on July 1, when the battle was fiercest and when the impor- 
 tant and strong positions of El Caney and San Juan were captured. 
 
 " A few Cubans assisted in the attack at El Caney and fought valiantly, but 
 their numbers were too small to materially change the strength, as indicated 
 above. The enemy confronted us with numbers about equal to our own ; they 
 fought obstinately in strong and intrenched positions and the results obtained 
 clearly indicate the intrepid gallantry of the company officers and men and the 
 benefits derived from the careful training and instruction given in the company 
 in recent years in rifle practice and other battle exercises. Our losses in these 
 battles were twenty-two officers and 208 men killed and eighty-one officers and 
 1,203 men wounded ; missing, seventy-nine. The missing, with few exceptions, 
 reported later. 
 
 " In the battle of Santiago the Spanish Navy endeavored to shell our troops 
 on the extreme right, but the latter were concealed by the inequalities of the 
 ground, and the shells did little, if an}', harm. Their naval forces also assisted 
 in the trenches, having 1,000 on shore, and I am informed they sustained con- 
 siderable loss; among others Admiral Cervera's chief of staff was killed. Being 
 convinced the city would fall, Admiral Cervera determined to put to sea, in- 
 forming the French Consul it was better to die fighting than to sink his ships. 
 The news of the great naval victory which followed was enthusiastically re- 
 ceived by the army. 
 
 " The information of our naval victor} 7 was transmitted under flag of truce to 
 the Spanish commander in Santiago on July 4, and the suggestion again made 
 that he surrender to save needless effusion of blood. On the same date I in- 
 formed Admiral Sampson that if he would force his way into the harbor the 
 city would surrender without any further sacrifice of life. Commodore Watson 
 replied that Admiral Sampson was temporarily absent, but that in his (Wat- 
 son's) opinion the navy should not enter the harbor. 
 
 " July 12, I informed the Spanish commander that Major-General Miles, 
 Commander-in-Chief of the Army, had just arrived in my camp, and requested 
 him to grant us a personal interview on the following day. He replied that he 
 would be pleased to meet us. The interview took place on the 13th, and I in- 
 formed him that his surrender only could be considered, and that as he was 
 without hope of escape he had no right to continue the fight. 
 
 " At two P. M. on July 11 the surrender of the city was again demanded. 
 The firing ceased and was not again renewed. 
 
 " By this date the sickness in the army was increasing very rapidly, as a 
 result of exposure in the trenches to the intense heat of the sun and the heavy 
 rains. Moreover, the dews in Cuba are almost equal to rains. The weakness 
 of the troops was becoming so apparent I was anxious to bring the siege to an 
 end, but in common with most of the officers of the army I did not think an
 
 552 GENERAL SHAFTER'S REPORT. 
 
 assault would be justifiable, especially as the enem} T seemed to be acting in 
 good faith in their preliminary propositions to surrender. 
 
 u I wish to dwell upon the natural obstacles I had to encounter and which no 
 foresight could have overcome or obviated. The rocky and precipitous coast 
 offered no sheltered landing places, the roads were mere bridle paths, the effect 
 of the tropical sun and rains upon unacclimated troops was deadly and a dread 
 of strange and unknown diseases had its effect on the army. At Baiquiri the 
 landing of the troops and stores was made at a small wooden wharf which the 
 Spaniards tried to burn, but unsuccessfully, and the animals were pushed into 
 the water and guided to a sandy beach about 200 yards in extent. At Siboney 
 the landing was made on the beach and at a small wharf occupied by the engi- 
 neers. I had neither the time nor the men to spare to construct permanent 
 wharves. In spite of the fact that I had nearly 1,000 men continuously at 
 work on the roads, they were at times impassable for wagons. 
 
 " The San Juan and Aguadores rivers would often suddenly rise so as to 
 prevent the passage of wagons, and then the eight pack trains with the com- 
 mand had to be depended upon for the victualing of my armj 7 , as well as the 
 20,000 refugees, who could not in the interests of humanity, be left to starve 
 while we had rations. Often for days nothing could be moved except on pack 
 trains. 
 
 " After the great physical strain and exposure of July 1 and 2 the malarial 
 and other fevers began to rapidly advance throughout the command, and on 
 July 4 the yellow fever appeared at Siboney. Though efforts were made to 
 keep this fact from the army it soon became known. 
 
 " The supply of quartermaster and commissary stores during the campaign 
 was abundant, and, notwithstanding the difficulties in landing and transporting 
 the ration, the troops on the firing lines were at all times supplied with its 
 coarser components, namely of bread, meat, sugar and coffee. 
 
 " There was no lack of transportation, for at no time up to the surrender 
 could all the wagons I had be used. 
 
 " In reference to the sick and wounded, I have to say that they received 
 every attention that it was possible to give them. The medical officers without 
 exception worked night and day to alleviate the suffering, which was no greater 
 than invariably accompanies a campaign. It would have been better if we had 
 had more ambulances, but as many were taken as was thought necessary, 
 judging from previous campaigns. The discipline of the command was superb, 
 and I wish to invite attention to the fact that no officer was brought to trial by 
 court-martial and, as far as I know, no enlisted men. This speaks volumes for 
 an army of this size and in a campaign of such duration."
 
 GENERAL WHEELER'S REPORT. 553 
 
 GENERAL JOSEPH WHEELER'S OPERATIONS. 
 
 " BEFORE SANTIAGO, Cuba, July T, 1898. 
 " To Adjutant-General, Fifth Army Corps : 
 
 "SiR: After the engagements of June 24 I pushed forward my command 
 through the valley, Lawton's and Kent's commands occupying the hills in the 
 vicinity of that place. After two days' rest Lawton was ordered forward, and 
 on the night of the 30th instructions were given by Major-General Shafter to 
 this officer to attack Caney, while the cavalry division and Kent's division 
 were ordered to move forward on the regular Santiago roads. The movement 
 commenced on the morning of July 1. The cavalry division advanced and 
 formed its line with its left near the Santiago road, while Kent's division 
 formed its line with the right joining the left of the cavalry division. 
 
 " Colonel McClernand of General Shafter's staff directed me to give instruc 
 tions to General Kent, which I complied with in person, at the same time per. 
 sonally directing General Simmer to move forward. The men were all com. 
 pelled to wade the San Juan River to get into line. This was done under very 
 heavy fire of both infantry and artillery. Our balloon, having been sent up 
 right by the main road, was made a mark of by the enemy. It was evident 
 that we were as much under fire in forming the line as we would be by an 
 advance, and I therefore pressed the command forward from the covering under 
 which it was formed. It merged into open space in full view of the enemy, 
 who occupied breastworks and batteries on the crest of the hill which over- 
 looks Santiago, officers and men falling at every step. 
 
 "The troops advanced gallantly, soon reached the foot of the hill a:i.1 as- 
 cended, driving the enemy from their works and occupying them on the crest 
 of the hill. To accomplish this required courage and determiiihtion on the 
 part of the officers and men of a high order and the losses were very srvere. 
 Too much credit cannot be given to General Sumner and General Kent, and 
 their gallant brigade commanders, Colonel Wood and Colonel Carroll of the 
 cavalry; General Hamilton S. Hawkins, commanding First .Brigade; Kent's 
 division, and Colonel Pearson, commanding Second Brigade. Colonel Carroll 
 and Major Wessels were both wounded during the charge, but Major Wessells 
 was enabled to return and resume command. Colonel Wikoff, commanding 
 Kent's Third Brigade, was killed at 12:10; Lieutenant-Colonel Worth took 
 command, and was wounded at 12:15; Lieutenant-Colonel Liscum then took 
 command and was wounded at 12:20, and the command then devolved upon 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Ewers, Ninth Infantry. 
 
 " Upon reaching the crest I ordered breastworks to be constructed, and sent 
 to the rear for shovels, picks, spades, and axes. The enemy's retreat from the 
 ridge was precipitate, but our men were so thoroughly exhausted that it was 
 impossible for thorn to follow. Their shoes were soaked with water by wading 
 the San Juan River, they had become drenched with rain, and when they
 
 554 GENERAL WHEELER'S REPORT. 
 
 reached the crest they were absolutely unable to proceed further. Notwith- 
 standing this condition, these exhausted men labored during the night to erect 
 breastworks, furnish details to bury the dead, and carry the wounded back in 
 improvised litters. I sent word along the line that reinforcements would soon 
 reach us, and that Lawton would join our right and that General Bates would 
 come up and strengthen our left. 
 
 " After reaching the crest of the ridge, General Kent sent the Thirteenth 
 Regulars to assist in strengthening our right. At midnight General Bates re- 
 ported, and I placed him in a strong position on the left of our line. General 
 Lawton had attempted to join us from Caney, but when very near our lines he 
 was fired upon by the Spaniards, and turned back, but joined us next day at 
 noon by a circuitous route. During all the day on July 2, the cavalry divi- 
 sion, Kent's division, and Bates's brigade were engaged with the enemy, being 
 subjected to a fierce fire and incurring many casualties, and later in the day 
 Lawton's division also became engaged. 
 
 "During the entire engagement my staff performed their duties with cour- 
 age, judgment, and ability. Special credit is due to Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. 
 Dorst, Major William D. Beach, Captain Joseph G. Dickman, and Lieutenant 
 M. F. Steele. I desire also to say that Lieutenants James H. Reeves and 
 Joseph Wheeler, Jr., Captain William 'Astor Chanler, Major B. A. Garlington, 
 Mr. Aurelius Mestre, and Corporal John Lundmark also deserve high com- 
 mendation for courage and good conduct. Major West, my Quartermaster, 
 deserves special commendation for his energy and good conduct during the 
 campaign, and Major Valery Havard and Mr. Leonard Wilson have also done 
 their full duty. Captain Hardie and First Lieutenant F. J. Koester, with 
 Troop G, Third Cavalry, were detailed with headquarters and conducted them- 
 selves handsomely under fire. The superb courage displayed by the officers 
 and men will be especially mentioned in the reports of subordinate com- 
 manders. 
 
 " JOSEPH WHEELER, 
 "Major-General, Volunteers. 
 
 " Accompanying the report is a copy of the despatches which were sent to 
 General Shafter by General Wheeler, beginning June 25 and ending July 2. 
 On July 1, at 8;20 p. M., General Wheeler, writing from San Juan, has the fol- 
 lowing to say about withdrawing from the position we had won : 
 
 " I examined the line in front of Wood's brigade, and gave the men shovels 
 and picks, and insisted on their going right to work. I also sent word to Gen- 
 eral Kent to come and get entrenching tools, and saw General Hawkins in per- 
 son, and told him the same thing. They all promise to do their best, but say 
 the earth is very difficult, as a great part of it is rocky. The positions our 
 men carried were very strong and the entrenchments were very strong. 
 
 " A number of officers have appealed to me to have the line withdrawn, and 
 take up a strong position farther back, and I expect they will appeal to you. I
 
 GENERAL KENT'S REPORT. 555 
 
 have positively discountenanced this, as it would cost us much prestige. The 
 lines are very thin, as so many men have gone to the rear wounded and so 
 many are exhausted, but I hope these men can be got up to-night, and, with 
 our line intrenched and Lawton on our right, we ought to hold to-morrow, but 
 I fear it will be a severe day. 
 
 " If we can get through to-morrow all right, we can make our breastworks 
 very strong the next night. You can hardly realize the exhausted condition 
 of the troops. The Third and Sixth Cavalry and other troops were up march- 
 ing, and halted on the road all last night, and have fought for twelve hours 
 to-day, and those that are not on the line will be digging trenches to-night. 
 
 " I was on the extreme front line. The men were lying down, and reported 
 the Spaniards not more than 300 yards in their front." 
 
 OPERATIONS ABOUND SANTIAGO. 
 
 " HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, FIFTH ARMY CORPS IN THE FIELD, 
 
 " FORT SAN JUAN, NEAR SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 7, 1898. 
 " The Assistant Adjutant-General, Fifth Army Corps; 
 
 " SIR : I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of 
 my command in the battle of July 1. 
 
 " On the afternoon of June 30, pursuant to orders given me verbally by the 
 corps commander at his headquarters, I moved 1113- Second and Third Brigades 
 (Pearson and Wikoff) forward about two miles to a point on the Santiago road 
 near corps headquarters. Here the troops bivouaced, the First Brigade (Haw- 
 kins) remaining in its camp of the two preceding days, slightly in the rear of 
 corps headquarters. 
 
 " On the following morning (July 1), at seven o'clock, I rode forward to the 
 hill where Captain Grimes's battery was in position. I here met Lieutenant- 
 Colonel McClernand, Assistant Adjutant-General, Fifth Corps, who pointed out 
 to me a green hill in the distance, which was to be my objective on my left, and 
 either he or Lieutenant Miley of Major-General Shafter's staff gave me di- 
 rections to keep my right on the main road leading to the city of Santiago. I 
 had previously given the necessary orders for Hawkins's brigade to. move early, 
 to be followed in turn by Wikoff and Pearson. Shortly after Grimes's battery 
 opened fire I rode down to the stream and there found General Hawkins at the 
 head of his brigade, at a point about 250 yards from the El Pozo sugar house. 
 Here I gave him his orders. 
 
 " The enemy's artillery was now replying to Grimes's battery. I rode for- 
 ward with Hawkins about 150 yards, closely followed by the Sixth Infantry, 
 which was leading the First Brigade. At this point I received instructions to 
 allow the cavalry the right of way, but for some unknown reason they moved 
 up very slowly, thus causing a delay in my advance of fully forty minutes.
 
 556 GENERAL KENT'S REPORT. 
 
 Lieutenant Miley of General Shafter's staff was at this point and understood 
 how the division was delayed, and repeated several times that he understood I 
 was making all the progress possible. General Hawkins went forward, and 
 word came back in a few minutes that it would be possible to observe the 
 enemy's position from the front. I immediately rode forward with my staff. 
 The fire of the enemy's sharpshooters was being distinctly felt at this time. I 
 crossed the main ford of the San Juan River, joined General Hawkins, and, 
 with him, observed the enemy's position from a point some distance in advance 
 of the ford. General Hawkins deemed it possible to turn the enemy's right at 
 Fort San Juan, but later, under the heavy fire, this was found impracticable 
 for the First Brigade, but was accomplished by the Third Brigade coming up 
 later on General Hawkins's left. Having completed the observation with my 
 staff, I proceeded to join the head of my division, just coming under heavy fire. 
 Approaching the First Brigade, I directed them to move alongside the cavalry, 
 which was halted. We were already suffering losses caused by the balloon near 
 by attracting fire and disclosing our position. 
 
 " The enemy's infantry fire, steadily increasing in intensity, now came from 
 all directions, not only from the front and the dense tropical thickets on our 
 flanks, but from sharpshooters thickly posted in trees in our rear, and from 
 shrapnel apparently aimed at the balloon. Lieutenant-Colonel Derby of General 
 Shafter's staff met me about this time and informed me that a trail or narrow 
 way had been discovered from the balloon a short distance back leading to the left 
 to a ford lower down the stream. I hastened to the forks made by this road, and 
 soon after the Seventy-first New York Regiment of Hawkins's Brigade came 
 up. I turned them into the bypath indicated by Lieutenant-Colonel Derby 
 leading to the lower ford, sending word to General Hawkins of this movement. 
 This would have speedily delivered them in their proper place on the left of 
 their brigade, but under the galling fire of the enemy the leading battalion of 
 this regiment was thrown into confusion and recoiled in disorder on the troops 
 in the rear. At this critical moment the officers of my staff practically formed 
 a cordon behind the panic-stricken men, and urged them to again go forward. 
 I finally ordered them to lie down in the thicket and clear the way for others 
 of their own regiment who were coming up behind. This many of them did, 
 and the Second and Third battalions came forward in better order and moved 
 along the road toward the ford. 
 
 " One of my staff officers ran back, waving his hat to hurry forward the 
 Third Brigade, who, upon approaching the forks, found the way blocked by 
 men of the Seventy-first New York. There were other men of this regiment 
 crouching in the bushes, many of whom were encouraged by the advance of the 
 approaching column to rise and go forward. As already stated, I had received 
 orders some time before to keep in rear of the cavalry division. Their ad- 
 vance was much delayed, resulting in frequent halts, presumably to drop their 
 blanket rolls, and due to the natural delay in fording a stream. These delays,
 
 GENERAL KENT'S REPORT. 567 
 
 under such a hot fire, grew exceedingly irksome and I therefore pushed the 
 bead of my division as quickly as I could toward the river in column of files 
 or twos, paralleled in the narrow way by the cavalr}'. This quickened the for- 
 ward movement and enabled me to get into position as speedily as possible for 
 the attack. Owing to the congested condition of the road the progress of the 
 narrow columns was, however, painfully slow. I again sent a staff officer at a 
 gallop to urge forward the troops in rear. The head of Wikoff's brigade 
 reached the forks at 12:20 p. M. and hurried on the left, stepping over prostrate 
 forms of men of the Seventy-first. This heroic brigade (consisting of the 
 Thirteenth, Ninth, and Twenty-fourth United States Infantry) speedily crossed 
 the stream and were quickly deployed to the left of the lower ford. While per- 
 sonally superintending this movement Colonel Wikoff was killed, the command 
 of the brigade then devolving upon Lieutenant-Colonel Worth, Thirteenth In- 
 fantry, who immediately fell, severely wounded, and then upon Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Liscum, Twenty-fourth Infantiy, who, five minutes later, also fell un- 
 der the withering fire of the enemj'. The command of the brigade then de- 
 volved upon Lieutenant-Colonel E. P. Ewers, Ninth Infantry. 
 
 " Meanwhile, I had again sent a staff officer to hurry forward the Second 
 Brigade, which was bringing up the rear. The Tenth and Second Infantry, 
 soon arriving at the forks, were deflected to the left to follow the Third Brigade, 
 while the Twenty-first was directed along the main road to support Hawkins. 
 
 " Crossing the lower ford a few minutes later, the Tenth and Second moved 
 forward in column in good order toward the green knoll already referred to as 
 my objective on the left. Approaching the knoll the regiments deph^'ed, 
 passed over the knoll, and ascended the high ridge beyond, driving back the 
 enemy in the direction of his trenches. I observed this movement from the 
 Fort San Juan Hill. Colonel E. P. Pearson, Tenth Infantry, commanding the 
 Second Brigade, and the officers and troops under his command deserve great 
 credit for the soldierly manner in which this movement was executed. I 
 earnestly recommend Colonel Pearson for promotion. 
 
 " Prior to this advance of the Second Brigade the Third, connecting with 
 Hawkins's gallant troops on the right, had moved toward Fort San Juan, 
 sweeping through a zone of most destructive fire, scaling a steep and difficult 
 hill, and assisting in capturing the enemy's strong position, Fort San Juan, at 
 1:30 P. M. This crest was about 125 feet above the general level, and was 
 defended by deep trenches and a loopholed brick fort surrounded by barbed wire 
 entanglements. General Hawkins, some time after I reached the crest, reported 
 that the Sixth and Sixteenth Infantry had captured the hill, which I now con- 
 sider incorrect, and credit is almost equally due to the Sixth, Ninth, Thirteenth, 
 Sixteenth, and Twenty-fourth regiments of Infantry. Owing to General 
 Hawkins's representations I forwarded the report sent to corps headquarters 
 about three P. M. that the Sixth and Sixteenth Infantry regiments had cap- 
 tured the hill. The Thirteenth Infantry captured the enemy's colon waving
 
 658 GENERAL KENT'S REPORT. 
 
 over the fort, but unfortunately destroyed them, distributing the fragments 
 among the men, because, as was asserted, ' it was a bad omen,' two or thru- 
 men having been shot while assisting Private Arthur Agnew, Company II, 
 Thirteenth Infantry, the captor. All fragments which could be recovered are 
 submitted with this report. The greatest credit is due to the officers of my 
 command, whether company, battalion, regimental or brigade commanders, who 
 so admirably directed the formation of their troops, unavoidably intermixed in 
 the dense thicket, and made the desperate rush for the distant and strongly de- 
 fended crest. 
 
 " I have already mentioned the circumstances of my Third Brigade's advance 
 across the ford, where in the brief space of ten minutes it lost its brave com- 
 mander (killed) and the next two ranking officers by disabling wounds. Yet, 
 in spite of these confusing conditions, the formations were effected without 
 hesitation, although under a stinging fire, companies acting singly in some in- 
 stances and by battalion and regiment in others, rushing through the jungle, 
 across the stream waist deep, and over the wide bottom thickly set with barbed 
 wire entanglements. In this connection I desire to particularly mention First 
 Lieutenant Wendell L. Simpson, Adjutant Ninth Infantry, Acting Assistant 
 Adjutant-General Third Brigade, who was noticeably active and efficient in 
 carrying out orders which I had given him to transmit to his brigade com- 
 mander, who no longer existed. 
 
 " The enemy having retired to a second line of rifle pits, I directed my line 
 to hold their positions and intrench. At ten minutes past three P. M. I received 
 almost simultaneously two requests one from Colonel Wood, commanding a 
 cavalry brigade, and one from General Sumner, asking for assistance for the 
 cavalry on my right, 'as they were hard pressed.' I immediately sent to their 
 aid the Thirteenth Infantry, who promptly went on this further mission, de- 
 spite the heavy losses they had already sustained. 
 
 " Great credit is due to the gallant officer and gentleman, Brigadier-General 
 H. S. Hawkins, who, placing himself between the two regiments leading his 
 brigade, the Sixth and the Sixteenth Infantry, urged and led them by voice 
 and bugle calls to the attack so successfully accomplished. My earnest thanks 
 are due to my staff officers present at my side and under my personal observa- 
 tion on the field, especially to Major A. C. Sharpe, Assistant Adjutant-Gen- 
 eral ; Major Philip Reade, Inspector-General ; Captain U. G. McAlexander, 
 Chief Quartermaster, and my aides, First Lieutenant George S. Cartwright, 
 Twenty-fourth Infantry, and First Lieutenant William R. Jackson, Second In- 
 fantry ; also to Mr. Adolfo Carlos Munoz, the latter a volunteer aide, subse- 
 quently wounded in the fight of the 2d inst., who richly merits a commission 
 for his able assistance given without pa}'. 
 
 " The officers enumerated should at least be brevetted for gallantry under 
 fire. I also personally noticed the conduct of First Lieutenant T. J. Kirk- 
 patrick, Assistant Surgeon, United States Army, on duty with the Twenty-
 
 GENERAL KENT'S REPORT. 
 
 559 
 
 fourth Infanty, giving most efficient aid to the wounded under fire. I observed 
 several times First Lieutenant J. D. Miley, Fifth Artillery, aide to General 
 Shafter, who was conspicuous throughout the day for his coolness under fire, 
 delivering instructions with apparent unconcern. The bloody fighting of my 
 brave command cannot be adequately described in words. The following list 
 of killed, wounded and missing tells the story of their'valor : 
 
 REPORT OF KILLED, WOUNDED AND MISSING, FIRST 
 DIVISION, FIFTH ARMY CORPS, JULY 1, 1898. 
 
 Organization. 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 1 
 
 | 
 
 r 
 
 ^ 
 
 : 
 
 First Brigade. 
 Sixteenth Infanty 
 
 1 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 13 
 13 
 12 
 
 38 
 
 5 
 
 7 
 1 
 
 13 
 
 82 
 95 
 47 
 
 224 
 
 6 
 43 
 49 
 
 
 Seventy-first N. Y. Vol. Inf... 
 Totals 
 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 Tenth Infantry 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 4 
 5 
 1 
 
 10 
 
 5 
 
 1 
 4 
 
 10 
 
 21 
 25 
 16 
 
 62 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 Totals 
 
 
 Third Brigade. 
 Brigade Commander 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 2 
 2 
 
 6 
 
 3 
 
 16 
 10 
 
 29 
 
 5 
 4 
 
 9 
 
 23 
 81 
 73 
 
 177 
 
 i 
 
 7 
 9 
 68 
 
 
 Thirteenth Infantry 
 
 Twenty-fourth Infantry 
 Totals 
 
 
 Grand totals 
 
 12 
 
 77 
 
 32 
 
 463 
 
 " At daylight on the morning of July 2, the enemy resumed the battle, and 
 firing continued throughout the day, part of the time in a drenching rain. At 
 nightfall the firing ceased, but at nine P. M. a vigorous assault was made nil 
 along our lines. This was completely repulsed, the enemy again retiring to 
 his trenches. The following morning firing was resumed and continued until 
 near noon, when a white flag was displayed by the enemy and firing was 
 ordered to cease.
 
 560 GENERAL KENT'S REPORT. 
 
 " The casualties of these two days (July 2 and 3) are as follows: 
 JULY 2, 1898. 
 
 Organization. 
 
 Kill 
 
 J 
 
 ed. 
 
 Won 
 
 nded. 
 
 7 
 
 ! 
 
 
 
 
 1* 
 
 
 
 
 First Brigade. 
 
 
 i 
 i 
 
 2 
 
 21 
 2 
 
 30 
 
 i 
 
 
 Sixth Infantry 
 
 
 
 Seventy-first N. Y. Vol. Inf... 
 Totals 
 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 Tenth Infantry 
 
 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 14 
 7 
 31 
 
 52 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 Twenty-first Infantry 
 
 Totals 
 
 
 
 
 
 Third Brigade. 
 Ninth Infantry 
 
 " 
 
 i 
 
 2 
 
 4 
 3 
 1 
 
 8 
 
 4 
 
 Thirteenth Infantry 
 
 Twenty-fourth Infantry 
 Totals 
 
 
 Grand totals 
 
 .. 
 
 9 
 
 4 
 
 90 
 
 " General Kent's table of the casualties in the third day's fighting shows that 
 only one man, a private in the Second Infantry, was killed. One man was 
 wounded in the Sixteenth Infantry, two in the Sixth Infantry, four in the 
 Seventy-first New York and one in the Thirteenth Infantry. No missing. 
 
 'Grand total for July 1,2 and 3 Twelve officers and eighty-seven men 
 killed, thirty-six officers and 561 men wounded, sixty-two missing. 
 
 " One hospital corps man attached to the Tenth Infantry, killed, is not in- 
 cluded in the above report. 
 
 " The report concludes : ' I desire in conclusion to express my gratitude to 
 Major-General Joseph Wheeler for his courteous conduct to me and through 
 me to my division under the trying circumstances enumerated. Though ill 
 and suffering, General Wheeler was so perfectly at home under fire that he in- 
 spired all of us with assurance.' 
 
 " Attention is invited in this connection to the report of the brigade and 
 
 *Mr. A. C. Mufioz, volunteer aide to Division Commander.
 
 GENERAL BRECKENRIDGE'S REPORT. 561 
 
 subordinate commanders and of my Inspector-General herewith submitted. I 
 cordially indorse their commendations. 
 
 " Very respectfully, 
 
 " J. FORD KENT, 
 " Brigadier-General United States Volunteers, Commanding." 
 
 REPORT OF INSPECTOR- GENERAL BRECKENRIPGE. 
 
 " IT was seldom, indeed, that the supplies were brought up to the fighting 
 lines in any great excess of the immediate needs, and the entire absence of the 
 usual comforts and conveniences of even the simplest army life during the whole 
 of the expedition, and sometimes of medical essentials, even in the hour of ut- 
 most need, was one of its most marked features after landing. Even the shelter 
 tents and flies were abandoned, and all bivouacked without the wall of the 
 common tent. The energy with which every element was driven from first to 
 last will be sufficiently understood when such men as General Shafter and Col- 
 onels Humphrey and Watson had the task in hand. The means of expediting 
 the landing of stores seemed inadequate, even to the last, and it is understood 
 that lighter after lighter ordered to the Cuban coast was sunk at sea, and the 
 lack of quick communication between the vessels or of any launches was ap- 
 parently irremediable. The extent to which the transports suffered in their 
 ground tackle, capstans, small boats, and other paraphernalia, and the dread 
 their masters had of even a greater loss on such a surf-beaten, rock-bound 
 shore was constantly shown, and the navy appeared to leave the army at last 
 much to its own devices. 
 
 " Nothing like the usual proportion of artillery," continues the report, " was 
 present on the field to aid the other arms as accessories before the fact, and the 
 comments on and results of this question came best from line officers of other 
 arms. The remarkable marksmanship of our trained soldiers was hardly more 
 exploited than the gross ignorance of our recruits. The books say that it 
 ought not to be possible to successfully assault the enemy in front unshaken, 
 still more with his fortified infantry under modern conditions. But in this 
 instance dismounted cavalry, as well as its confrere of the infantry arm, did, 
 without bayonets, successfully assault infantry posted on commanding ground 
 and well entrenched, valiant and unshaken, and the difficulty of the task indi- 
 cated by the list of casualties, as compared with the actual numbers the imme- 
 diately opposing trenches will hold. And when the fight was over, though 
 successful everywhere, we had no reserves, Bates' Independent Brigade having 
 been in the assault, first at Caney and then by a night march reinforcing the 
 last at San Juan under most urgent calls. It was afterward supposed that the 
 gap between our road and the bay was closed by Garcia's forces, and the de- 
 mand for the surrender of the Spaniards was made prior to any knowledge of
 
 562 GENERAL BRECKENRIDGE'S REPORT. 
 
 the intention of Cervera to escape with his fleet or of the arrival of the enemy's 
 reinforcements. 
 
 " Such a conjunction of evidence may indicate the rapidity of the changes, 
 in the situation. Indeed, the fighting of this army came up to the highest 
 expectation, and accomplished results beyond what is usually expected of a 
 force so constituted. 
 
 " At early dawn on July 1, the troops of Lawton's division started in to the 
 position previously designated to them to occupy. The one battery of artillery 
 assigned to this division for the day occupied a position overlooking the village 
 of El Caney, 2,400 yards distant. General Chaffee's brigade took up a position 
 east of the village, ready to carry the town as soon as it should have been 
 bombarded by the artillery. General Ludlow's brigade took up a position to 
 the west of the village, in order to cut off the retreat of the Spaniards when 
 they should be driven out and attempt to retreat to the city of Santiago. But 
 with soldierly instinct and admirable effect he closed in upon the defences of the 
 village, and his white sailor hat became a target for the enemy during the 
 hours he hugged the blockhouses on his flank of the well defended village. 
 Colonel Miles' brigade was held in reserve south of the village. 
 
 " The artillery opened fire about seven A. M. The battery was entirely be- 
 yond the reach of small arms' fire, and the enemy had no artillery. The 
 battery opened with shrapnel at what appeared to be a column of cavalry 
 moving along the road from El Caney toward Santiago ; then fired a few shots 
 at the blockhouses, then a few at hedges where the enemy's infantry seemed to 
 be located, and then fired a few shots into the village. At about eleven o'clock 
 the battery stopped fire. During all this time a continuous fire of musketry, 
 partly firing at will and partly by volley, was kept up in all parts of the lines. 
 Our lines were drawing closer toward the enemy's works, and the brigade in 
 reserve was brought up on the line. General Bates' independent brigade 
 reached the position in the afternoon and also went into line, all closing in to- 
 ward the village. 
 
 " Between one and two o'clock the division commander directed the battery 
 of artillery to concentrate its fire upon the stone fort or blockhouse situated 
 upon the highest point in the village on the northern side, as it was the key 
 point to the village. The practice of the artillery against this was very 
 effective, knocking great holes in the fort and rendering it untenable. The 
 infantry of Chaffee's, Bates' and Miles' brigades then made an assault upon the 
 work and carried it. There were a number of small blockhouses on the other 
 side of the village from which a strong fire was kept up for some time after the 
 stone fort had fallen. Word was sent to the commander of the artillery to 
 bring his battery down so as to take these blockhouses, but by the time the 
 battery had arrived the fire ceased. But there was one blockhouse still occu- 
 pied by the Spaniards, and at this the battery fired four shots, resulting in the 
 loss of a number of Spaniards. Orders having reached the division commander
 
 GENERAL BRECKEN RIDGE'S REPORT, 563 
 
 in the meantime to withdraw his forces as soon as possible and to come into 
 touch with the division at his left, our troops were not moved into the village, 
 but were ordered to bivouac near the main road leading to the city of Santiago. 
 
 " The dawn of July 1 found the troops of Wheeler's division bivouacked on 
 the eminence of El Pozo. Kent's division bivouacked near the road back of El 
 Pozo. Grimes's battery went into position about 250 yards west of the ruined 
 buildings of El Pozo soon after sunrise and prepared gun pits. Grimes's bat- 
 tery opened fire against San Juan a little before eight A. M. The troops of the 
 cavalry division were scattered about on El Pozo Hill in the rear and around 
 the battery, apparently without order and With no view to their protection 
 from the enemy's fire. This condition rectified itself when the enemy, after 
 five or six shots by our battery, replied with shrapnel fire at correct range and 
 with accurately adjusted fuses, killing two men at the first shot. After some 
 firing soon after nine A. M., Wheeler's division was put in march toward San- 
 tiago. Crossing Aguadores stream, it turned to the right, under General 
 Sumner, who was in command at that time owing to General Wheeler's illness. 
 Scattering shots were fired by the enemy before the arrival of the first troops 
 at the crossing, but his volley firing did not commence until the dismounted 
 cavalry went into position, crossing open ground. Kent's division followed 
 Wheeler's moving across the stream, and advanced along the road in close order 
 under a severe enfilading fire. After advancing some distance, it turned off to 
 the left. Lieutenant Orr (killed in battle) made a reconnaissance from a large 
 tree on the banks of the stream. 
 
 " At about one o'clock, after a delay of nearly two hours waiting for the 
 troops to reach their positions, the whole force advanced, charged, and carried 
 the enemy's first line of intrencbments. They were afterward formed on the 
 crest and there threw up intrenchments facing the enemy's second line at a dis- 
 tance of from 500 to 1,000 yards. In the charge the Second Brigade of Kent's 
 division advanced upon the First, some of the regiment getting into the first line 
 and reaching the crossing at about the same time as the regiment of the lead- 
 ing brigade. At about one o'clock General Wheeler arrived at the crossing, and, 
 after a brief stay, proceeded on the road toward San Juan with his staff, obtain- 
 ing a good view of the troops as they were ascending San Juan Hill in the 
 final stage of the battle, and soon thereafter reached the command. 
 
 "During the 2d of July there were a great many casualties, resulting not 
 entirely from aimed fire, but from bullets clearing the crest of our intrench- 
 ments and going far be3'ond, striking the men as they were coming up together 
 into position or as they were going back and forth bringing water, caring for 
 the wounded, etc. Many casualties resulted from the fire of sharpshooters 
 stationed in trees, with such thick foliage that the sharpshooters could not be 
 seen. It seemed incredible that men should be so reckless as to i-emain within 
 our lines and continue firing, and it is believed by many that what was reported 
 to be firing from sharpshooters was simply spent bullets. But I and the mem- 
 81
 
 564 GENERAL LINARES' REPORT. 
 
 bers of my staff can testify to the fact that in many places along the road lead- 
 ing up to the centre of our lines the sharp crack of the Mauser rifle could be 
 heard very close to the road, and there were all the usual indications of the 
 near and selected aim against individuals. Scouting parties were sent out 
 from time to time to get hold of these fellows, and a number of them were cap- 
 tured or shot, but it was not until a day or two afterward, however, that they 
 were all cleared out." 
 
 REPORT OF THE SPANISH COMMANDER OF SANTIAGO. 
 
 " OFFICIAL CABLEGRAM, July 12, 1898. 
 
 " To the Minister of War from the General-in-Chief of the Division of San- 
 tiago de Cuba.: 
 
 " Although confined to my bed by great weakness and in much pain, the 
 situation of the long-suffering troops here occupies my mind to such an extent 
 that I deem it my duty to address your Excellency, that the state of affairs 
 may be explained. The enemy's lines are verj* near the town on account of the 
 nature of the ground : our lines are in full view from them. Troops weak ; sick 
 in considerable proportion not sent to hospitals, owing to the necessity for keep- 
 ing them in the intrenchments. Horses and mules without the usual allowance 
 of forage; in the midst of the wet season, with twenty hours' daily fall of rain 
 in the trenches, which are simpty ditches dug in the ground without any per- 
 manent shelter for the men, who have nothing but rice to eat and no means of 
 changing or drying their clothing. Considerable losses ; field officers and com- 
 pany officers killed, wounded, and sick deprive the troops of necessary orders 
 in critical moments. 
 
 " Under these circumstances it is impossible to fight our way out, because in 
 attempting to do so our force would be lacking one-third of the men, who could 
 not leave, and we should be weakened besides by casualties caused by the enemy, 
 resulting finally in a veritable disaster, without saving our diminished battal- 
 ions. In order to get out, protected by the Holguin division, it will be neces- 
 sary for me to come and break the enemy's lines, in order that my forces may 
 break through in some other place, both acting in conjunction. For this opera- 
 tion the Holguin division will require eight days, and will have to bring a 
 large amount of rations, which it is impossible to transport. 
 
 " The solution of the question is ominously imposed upon us. Surrender is 
 inevitable, and we can only succeed in prolonging the agony. The sacrifice is 
 useless, and the enemy understand this. They see our lines, theirs being well 
 established, up. They tire out our men without exposing themselves, as they 
 did yesterday when they cannonaded us on land, with such an elevation that 
 we were unable to see their batteries ; and, from the sea, by the squadron, which 
 had perfect range, and bombarded the town in sections with mathematical 
 precision.
 
 HIERARCHICAL JEALOUSIES. 565 
 
 " Santiago de Cuba is not a walled town, a part of a country defended inch 
 by inch by its own sons without distinction, by the old, the women, and the 
 children, who are all inspired, and help, and even expose their lives, all being 
 actuated by the holy thought of independence, with the hope of succor that 
 they shall receive. The complete exodus of the inhabitants, insular as well as 
 peninsular, includes the occupants of the public offices with few exceptions. 
 There only remain the clergy, and they to-day started to leave the town, with 
 the Archbishop at their head. 
 
 " The defenders here cannot now begin a campaign full of enthusiasm and 
 energy. They came here three years ago struggling against the climate, pri- 
 vations, and fatigue, and now they are placed in these sad circumstances, where 
 they have no food, no physical force, and no means of recuperating. The ideal 
 for them is lacking, because they are defending the city property of those that 
 have abandoned it and of those that now are being fed by the American forces. 
 The honor of arms has its limits, and I appeal to the opinion of the whole na- 
 tion as to whether these long-suffering troops have not kept it safely many 
 times since May 18, when they were subject to the first cannonade. If it is 
 necessary that the sacrifice be endured, for reasons of which I am ignorant, or 
 that some one shall assume the responsibility of the unfortunate termination 
 which I have anticipated and mentioned in a number of telegrams, I faithfully 
 offer myself on the altar of my country for the one, and for the other I will re- 
 tain the command for the purpose of signing the surrender, for my modest 
 reputation is of little value as compared with the country's interests. 
 
 " LINARES." 
 
 Hierarchical jealousies seem an inevitable part of the campaigns. There 
 was heart burning and recrimination even in Napoleon's perfectly com- 
 bined general staff. In war these always result in disaster. For had the 
 marshals fought the enemy and not among each other Spain would 
 never have proven the pit of doom Napoleon found there. In our Civil 
 War the schisms among eminent generals for years rendered the army of 
 the Potomac impotent. Nor is it easy to so adjust military mechanisms 
 as to wholly avoid this personal strife. It is true that the presence of 
 a civilian in the war office, inevitably tends to create jealousy even 
 mutiny unless the civilian be of a most unusual type. It was not until 
 the closing days of the war, that it was known outside the exclusive con- 
 claves of the war office, that General Miles distrusted the direction of 
 Secretary. Alger. The President did everything to assuage the indigna- 
 tion of the commander of the armies and keep the quarrel from becoming 
 a public scandal. But while in Porto Rico General Miles, as if con- 
 scious of the slightly absurd anti-climax his campaign made, revealed all 
 his griefs to the correspondent of a Western journal. The assertion will
 
 566 GENERAL MILES' STATEMENT. 
 
 be seen gravely to compromise the good faith, not only of the Secretary 
 of War, but all the official hierarchy directing the conduct of the cam- 
 paign. The subjoined statement which will form part of the official his- 
 tory of the war, was issued by the General-in-Chief, partly in his own 
 words and partly in the third person : 
 
 " After I arrived in Santiago with reinforcements for General Shafter and 
 while I was conducting the surrender negotiations Adjutant-General Corbin 
 sent a secret dispatch to General Shafter assuring him that my coming made 
 no difference in his command; that I did not go to supersede him. 
 
 " This dispatch I did not see then. General Shafter did not mention it to 
 me, but it was given out for publication in Washington. It might have caused 
 great trouble and confusion except that it was based on an impossibility. 
 
 " I no more superseded General Shafter than a Colonel supersedes a Captain. 
 If a Captain were sent ahead with a com pan}* of soldiers and was later on 
 joined by his Colonel with the rest of the regiment the Colonel would not 
 supersede the Captain ; he would simply take command of the entire force, as 
 I did at Santiago. That this fact was recognized by the War Department is 
 shown by all the subsequent proceedings, for the dispatches from there in re- 
 gard to the surrender all came to me, and General Shafter was not mentioned 
 in them. I have been commanding General of the Army of the United States 
 ever since Mr. Cleveland appointed me such three years ago, and I have heard 
 nothing to lead me to believe I have been relieved of the responsibility. 
 
 " The dispatches from and to Santiago all show this, but they were very 
 much mutilated and garbled in Washington when given to the public. Words 
 and sentences were left out, which changed the meaning and significance of the 
 messages, and several very important ones, which would have thrown a clearer 
 light upon the situation, were entirely suppressed." 
 
 Newspapers which reach here from the United States show that considerable 
 discussion is now going on as to the credit for moving the Santiago army from 
 Cuba back to the States. Secretary Alger claims, it appears, that he origi- 
 nated the idea and had already made the necessary arrangements before the 
 appeal sent from the commanding officers at Santiago reached Washington. 
 
 <l When called upon to submit a plan of campaign, he did so and put it in 
 writing. In substance lie took the stand, first, that every effort should be made 
 to equip the Cubans and thereby enable them to harass the Spanish forces. 
 The cry of 'on to Havana' should be encouraged, but when the transports, 
 loaded with troops, were out of sight of land they should sail as straight as 
 steam power could bear them to the gate of the Antilles and the key to the 
 whole position, Porto Rico; then, having seized and occupied that island, a 
 movement to Cuba was to follow by means of a strong cavalry force, which was 
 to be organized and equipped by August or September. He contemplated that 
 20,000 cavalry thrown to the centre of Cuba, cutting the Spanish forces in two
 
 GENERAL MILES' STATEMENT. 567 
 
 and moving west to Havana, by the time the rainy season was over and it 
 would be possible to manoeuver an army, we could move against that city a 
 well organized, well equipped, and well disciplined army, and complete the cap- 
 ture of the Spanish forces. 
 
 " The inclosure of Cervera's fleet in the harbor of Santiago changed condi- 
 tions and made it necessary to move a military force to that point. General 
 Miles, while at Tampa, organized the expedition, felt the importance of the 
 enterprise so greatly that he requested permission to accompany that expedi- 
 tion, or to immediately organize another to join it. This permission was not 
 granted so far as accompanying that expedition was concerned, but authority 
 was granted to equip a second 4 for movement and operation against the enemy 
 in Cuba and Porto Rico.' However, before this expedition was equipped calls 
 were made for additional forces to go to Santiago, and they were immediately 
 forwarded. 
 
 " The day he sailed with reinforcements (July 7) he sent the following de- 
 spatch from Washington : 
 " ' GENERAL SHAFTER, SANTIAGO : 
 
 "'Take every precaution against surprise, and be on the lookout that the 
 enemy does not turn your right flank and come in on the line of your commu- 
 nications. Reinforcements are being sent forward as rapidly as possible, but 
 you will have to be the judge of the position you are to hold until reenforce- 
 ments can reach you. 
 
 " * MILES, 
 " l Major-General, Commanding.' 
 
 " General Miles sailed for Cuba. On July 11 at noon he reported his safe 
 arrival to the War Department and at once assumed charge, reporting to the 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 ' All of the subsequent business of the surrender was entirely in his hands, 
 as shown by the fact that the War Department communicated with him direct, 
 not even mentioning General Shafter's name in the numerous despatches. 
 
 " WASHINGTON, D. C., July 13, 1898. 
 
 " MAJOR-GENERAL MILES : You may accept surrender by granting parole to 
 officers and men, the officers retaining their side arms. The officers and men 
 after parole will be permitted to return to Spain, the United States assisting. 
 If not accepted, then assault, unless in your judgment an assault would fail. 
 Consult with Sampson and pursue such course as to the assault as you jointly 
 agree upon. Matters should be settled promptly. 
 
 " R. A. ALGER, 
 " Secretary of War." 
 
 "In the face of this situation, Secretary Alger, through General Corbin, 
 sent a despatch to General Shafter, assuring him that General Miles did not 
 come to Cuba to supersede Shafter in any way.
 
 568 GENERAL MILES' STATEMENT. 
 
 " This despatch General Miles refers to as ' secret,' for he says he did not 
 know it had been sent, not being notified from Washington and General Shaf- 
 ter saying nothing about it. 
 
 " On July 15 Shafter wired General Miles that the surrender was not as 
 complete as he thought, and said, * Please do not go away with the reinforce- 
 ments, as I may yet need them.' 
 
 " Miles promptly replied by wire from Baiquiri that the surrender ' is com- 
 plete ' and the Spaniards ' must surrender.' 
 
 " On July 16 Shafter wired Miles that the surrender was finally complete, and 
 General Miles replied through Adjutant-General Gilmore as follows : 
 
 "' The Commanding-General is very much gratified to hear that the surren- 
 der is complete. He directs that you telegraph anything of importance and 
 the condition of your command daily.' 
 
 " General Miles then reported the condition of affairs to the Secretary of 
 War, with whom he had been in conference. In one of his telegrams to Miles 
 Secretary Alger says : 
 
 " ' As soon as Santiago falls the troops must all be put in camp as comforta- 
 ble as they can be made and remain, I suppose, until the fever has had its run.' 
 
 " Miles did not agree with Secretary Alger, for on July 21, in a letter, the 
 General urged the return of the army to the United States as soon as possible. 
 July 17, after the surrender was complete, General Shafter wired as follows to 
 General Miles : ' Letters and orders in reference to movement of camp re- 
 ceived and will be carried out. None is more anxious to get away from here 
 than myself.' 
 
 " It seems from your orders given me that you regarded my forces as part 
 of your command. Nothing will give me greater pleasure than serving you, 
 General, and I shall comply with all your requests and directions, but I was 
 told by the Secretary that you were not to supersede in command here. I will 
 furnish the information called for as to condition of command to Gilmore, 
 Adjutant-General, A. H. Q. 
 
 u SHAFTER, 
 " Major-General." 
 
 " General Miles promptly replied as follows : 
 
 "'PLATA DEL ESTE, July 18, 1898. 
 
 " ' GENERAL SHAFTER : Telegram received. Have no desire and have care- 
 fully avoided any appearance of superseding you. Your command is a part of 
 the United States army which I have the honor to command, having been duly 
 assigned thereto and directed by the President to go wherever I thought my 
 presence required and give such general directions as I thought best concern- 
 ing military matters, and especially directed to go to Santiago for a specific 
 purpose. 
 
 " * You will also notice that the orders of the Secretary of War of July 18
 
 GENERAL MILES' STATEMENT. 569 
 
 left the matter to my discretion. I should regret that any event should cause 
 either yourself or any part of your command to cease to be a part of mine. 
 " ' Very truly yours, 
 
 " ' NELSON A. MILES, 
 " Major-General, Commanding United States Army.' " 
 
 " Miles' arrival at Santiago, July 11, was not as a private individual nor as 
 a visitor. Any pretense that he went there disrobed of his authority or official 
 capacity is too childish to be considered by sensible men. From the moment 
 he arrived at Santiago he was responsible for what might occur. He arrived 
 there with the Yale, Columbia, and Rita, loaded with infantry, and three ships 
 loaded with artillery, besides those already disembarked. He designed to dis- 
 embark the troops and artillery named on the west side of Santiago, as was 
 understood before leaving Washington, and before he went ashore he made the 
 necessary arrangements according!}*. 
 
 " He then proceeded to the front, and after consulting with General Shafter 
 a note was sent to the Spanish commander by General Shafter, saying, that the 
 commanding General of the United States Army had arrived in his camp with 
 strong reinforcements and would meet him between the lines at any hour agree- 
 able to him. The reply of the Spanish commander was that he would meet 
 him at twelve o'clock next morning. The meeting was held, and after spme 
 conversation between General Shafter and General Toral, General Miles frankly 
 informed the Spanish General that he had left Washington six days before and 
 that it was then the determination of the government that this portion of the 
 Spanish army must be captured or destroj'ed. He also informed the Spanish 
 General that his reinforcements had arrived with him; that some of these 
 forces had already disembarked and the remainder would be disembarked on 
 the west side of the harbor, and that it was useless for him to contend against 
 the inevitable. These transports could also be plainly seen by the Spanish 
 from Morro Castle and other points. 
 
 " General Toral replied that so long as he had rations and ammunition he 
 had to fight in order to maintain the honor of the Spanish Army. In response 
 to that he was informed that he had already maintained the honor of the Span- 
 ish Arm}', and that further efforts would be useless, and would result in the 
 wanton sacrifice of human life. He then said that he was waiting to hear 
 from his government, and was informed by General Miles that he had already 
 taken much time for that purpose, and would be given until daylight of the 
 following morning, it being then three o'clock, to submit his final answer. He 
 begged for longer time, and earnestly requested until twelve o'clock next day. 
 This was finally granted by General Miles, the meeting dissolved, and the offi- 
 cers separated. 
 
 " On returning from this conference, a dispatch was received by General 
 Miles from Washington as follows :
 
 570 GENERAL MILES' STATEMENT. 
 
 " WASHINGTON, D. C., July 13, 1898. 
 " MAJOR-GENERAL MILES : 
 
 " You may accept surrender by granting parole to officers and men, the offi- 
 cers retaining their side arms, the officers and men after parole to be permitted 
 to return to Spain, the United States assisting. If not accepted then assault, 
 unless, in your judgment, an assault would fail. Consult with Sampson and 
 pursue such course as to the assault as you jointly agree upon. Matter should 
 be settled promptly. 
 
 "R. A. ALGER, 
 " Secretary of War. 
 
 " This," the statement says, "does not look as if General Miles was there as 
 a visitor. He was charged with responsibility of ordering an assault upon the 
 entrenchments and fortifications of an army, which, if successful, would have 
 cost at least 5,000 lives, or of withholding the assault, if, in his judgment, such 
 assault would fail. No greater discretion was ever given to any General com- 
 manding an army, and, what is more, as will be observed, he was authorized to 
 accept the surrender, which, in the interests of his subordinates, he generously 
 declined to do, and went away, leaving all the honor to his next in rank, Gen- 
 eral Shafter." 
 
 LETTER FROM GENERAL TORAL. 
 
 " On the morning succeeding the first interview, a letter was received from 
 General Toral, of which the following is a literal translation : 
 
 " SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 14, 1898. 
 " General-in-Chief of the American Forces : 
 
 " HONORED SIR : His excellency, the General-in-Chief of the army of the 
 Island of Cuba telegraphs from Havana yesterday at seven p. M., the following: 
 
 " ' Believing the business of such importance as the capitulation of that place 
 to be known and decided upon by the government of his majesty, I give you 
 notice that I have sent the conditions of 3 r our telegram asking an immediate 
 answer and enabling you also to show this to the General of the American 
 Army to see if he will agree to await the answer of the government which 
 cannot be as soon as the time which he has decided, as communication by \vnj 
 of Bermuda is more slow than by Key West. In the meanwhile your honoi 
 and the General of the American Army may agree upon capitulation on the 
 basis of repatriation (returning to Spain).' 
 
 " I have the honor to transmit this to you that in case you may consider the 
 foregoing satisfactory that he may designate persons in representation of him- 
 self who with those in my name may agree to clauses of the capitulation upon 
 the basis of returning to Spain, accepted already in the beginning by the Gen- 
 eral-in-Chief of this army. Awaiting a reply, I am very respectfully your 
 servant. 
 
 " JOSE TORAL, etc."
 
 GENERAL MERRITT'S REPORT. 571 
 
 " At the meeting on the following day General Toral stated that he was pre- 
 pared to surrender, with the approval of the Captain-General of Cuba, but it 
 would require a little time to have his acts confirmed by the home govern 
 ment ; that, in the meantime, he was prepared to appoint commissioners to ar- 
 range the clauses of capitulation. Not only this, he offered to surrender the 
 balance of his command, which had not been under fire during the campaign. 
 This remarkable offer was on his motion, and was in the nature of a surprise to 
 the American generals present. However, at the conference of the day pre- 
 vious, General Miles had reminded him that he had been tendered the most 
 liberal terms ever offered to an enemy, that his fleet was destroyed, and that 
 they were 3,000 miles from home. 
 
 " Toral's offer could be accounted for in one of two ways either that the 
 troops were wanted at home to meet a threatened revolution, or that they 
 wanted to get home, and regarded this as the only means of doing so at the 
 expense of the United States. Whether Blanco and the rest of the Spanish 
 forces in Cuba would have surrendered on the same terms is not now, and per- 
 haps may never be known." 
 
 OCCUPATION OF MANILA. 
 REPORT OP GENERAL WESLEY MERRITT. 
 
 Under date of August 20th, General Merritt said : " In obedience to 
 instruction from the President, I embarked at San Francisco June 29th, 
 and reached Cavite, Manila Bay, July 25th. 
 
 " The American fleet of warships, commanded by Rear Admiral George 
 Dewey, was anchored in line off Cavite and just outside of the transports and 
 supply vessels engaged in the military service. The distinguished Admiral 
 above mentioned was in full control of the navigation of the bay, and his ves- 
 sels passed and re passed within range of the water batteries of the town of 
 Manila without drawing the fire of the enemy. 
 
 " Brigadier-General Thomas M. Anderson, United States Volunteers, was in 
 command of the military forces prior to my arrival, and from his report I 
 learned that his headquarters were in Cavite, and that the troops were disposed 
 as follows : 
 
 41 The Second Oregon, detachments of California Heavy Artillery, Twenty- 
 third Infantry and Fourteenth Infantry occupied the town of Cavite; while 
 Brigadier-General F. V. Greene, United States Volunteers, was encamped with 
 his brigade, consisting of the Eighteenth Infantry, Third United States Artil- 
 lery, Company A, Engineer Battalion, First Colorado, First California, First 
 Nebraska, Tenth Pennsylvania and Batteries A and B,'of the Utah Artillery,
 
 572 GENERAL MERRITT'S REPORT. 
 
 along the line of the bay shore near the village of Paranaque, about five miles 
 by water and twenty-five miles by the roads from Cavite. 
 
 " Immediately after my arrival I visited General Greene's camp, and made 
 a reconnoissance of the position held by the Spanish, and also the opposing 
 lines of the insurgent forces, hereafter to be described. I found General 
 Greene's command encamped on a strip of sandy land running parallel to the 
 shore of the bay, and not far distant from the beach, but owing to the great 
 difficulties of landing supplies, the greater portion of the force had shelter 
 tents only, and were suffering many discomforts, the camp being situated in a 
 low, flat place, without shelter from the heat of the tropical sun or adequate 
 protection during the terrific downpours of rain so frequent at this season. I 
 was at once struck by the exemplary spirit of patient, even cheerful, endur- 
 ance shown by the officers and men under such circumstances, and this feeling 
 of admiration for the manner in which the American soldiers, volunteer and 
 regular alike, accept the necessary hardships of the work they have undertaken 
 to do has grown and increased with every phase of the difficult and trying 
 campaign which the troops of the Philippine expedition have brought to such 
 a brilliant and successful conclusion. 
 
 " I discovered during my visit to General Greene that the left or north flank 
 of his brigade camp extended to a point on the ' Calle Real ' about 3,200 yards 
 from the outer line of Spanish defences of the city of Manila. The Spanish 
 line began at the powder magazine, or old Fort San Antonio, within a hundred 
 yards of the beach, and just south of the Malate suburb of Manila, and 
 stretched awaj r to the Spanish left in more or less detached works, eastward, 
 through swamps and rice fields, covering all the avenues of approach to the 
 town and encircling the city completely. 
 
 " The Filipinos, or insurgent forces at war with Spain had, prior to the ar- 
 rival of the American land forces, been waging a desultory warfare with the 
 Spaniards for several months, and were at the time of my arrival in consider- 
 able force, variously estimated and never accurately ascertained, but probably 
 not far from 12,000 men. These troops, well supplied with small arms, with 
 plenty of ammunition and several field guns, had obtained positions of invest- 
 ment opposite to the Spanish line of detached works throughout their entire 
 extent ; and on the particular road called the ' Calle Real,' passing along the 
 front of General Greene's brigade camp and running through Malate to Manila, 
 the insurgents had established an earthwork or trench within 800 3'ards of the 
 powder magazine fort. They also occupied as well the road to the right, lead- 
 ing from the village of Pasay, and the approach by the beach was also in their 
 possession. This anomalous state of affairs, namely, having a line of quasi- 
 hostile native troops between our -forces and the Spanish position, was, of 
 course, very objectionable, but it was difficult to deal with, owing to the pecul- 
 iar condition of our .relations with the insurgents, which may be briefly stated 
 as follows :
 
 GENERAL MERRITT'b REPORT. 573 
 
 " Shortly after the naval battle of Manila Bay, the principal leader of the 
 insurgents, General Emilio Aguinaldo, came to Cavite from Hong Kong, and, 
 with the consent of our naval authorities, began active work in raising troops 
 and pushing the Spaniards in the direction of the city of Manila. Having met 
 with some success, and the natives flocking to his assistance, he proclaimed an 
 independent government of republican form, with himself as President, and at 
 the time of my arrival in the islands the entire edifice of executive and legisla- 
 tive departments and sub-division of territory for administrative purposes had 
 been accomplished at least on paper, and the Filipinos held military possession 
 of many points in the islands other than those in the vicinit}^ of Manila. 
 
 " As General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival nor offer his services 
 as a subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the President 
 fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by the American land forces, 
 and stated that ' the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme 
 and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants,' I did 
 not consider it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent 
 leader until I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I 
 would not until then be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce my 
 authority, in the event that his pretensions should clash with my designs. 
 
 " For these reasons the preparations for the attack on the city were pressed 
 and military operations conducted without reference to the situation of the in- 
 surgent forces. The wisdom of this course was subsequently fully established 
 by the fact that when the troops of my command carried the Spanish intrench- 
 ments, extending from the sea to the Pasay road on the extreme Spanish right, 
 we were under no obligations, by prearranged plans of mutual attack, to turn 
 to the right and clear the front still held against the insurgents, but were able 
 to move forward at once and occupy the city and suburbs. 
 
 " To return to the situation of General Greene's brigade as I found it on my 
 arrival, it will be seen that the difficulty in gaining an avenue of approach to 
 the Spanish line lay in the fact of my disinclination to ask General Aguinaldo 
 to withdraw from the beach and the ' Calle Real,' so that Greene could move 
 forward. This was overcome by instructions to General Greene to arrange, if 
 possible, with the insurgent brigade commander in his immediate vicinity to 
 move to the right and allow the American forces unobstructed control of the 
 roads in their immediate front. No objection was made, and according^ Gen- 
 eral Greene's brigade threw forward a heavy outpost line on the ' Calle Real ' 
 and the beach and constructed a trench, in which a portion of the guns of the 
 Utah batteries was placed. 
 
 " The Spanish, observing this activity on our part, made a very sharp at- 
 tack with infantry and artillery on the night of July 31. The behavior of our 
 troops during this night attack was all that could be desired, and I have, in 
 cablegrams to the War Department, taken occasion to commend by name those 
 who deserve special mention for good conduct in the affair. (For particulars
 
 574 GENERAL MERRITT'S REPORT. 
 
 of the action see the appended reports of the brigade commander.) Our posi- 
 tion was extended and strengthened after this and resisted successfully re- 
 peated night attacks, our forces suffering, however, considerable loss in 
 wounded and killed, while the losses of the enemy, owing to the darkness, 
 could not be ascertained. 
 
 " The strain of the night fighting and the heavy details for outpost duty 
 made it imperative to reenforce General Greene's troops with General Mac- 
 Arthur's brigade, which had arrived in transports on the 31st of July. The 
 difficulties of this operation can hardly be overestimated. The transports were 
 at anchor off Cavite, five miles from a point on the beach where it was desired 
 to disembark the men. Several squalls, accompanied by floods of rain, raged 
 day after day, and the only way to get to the troops and supplies ashore was 
 to load them from the ship's side into native lighters (called ' cascos ') or small 
 steamboats, move them to a point opposite the camp, and then disembark them 
 through the surf in small boats, or by running the lighters head-on to the 
 beach. The landing was finally accomplished, after days of hard work and 
 hardship, and I desire here to express again my admiration for the fortitude 
 and cheerful willingness of the men of all commands engaged in this operation. 
 
 " Upon the assembly of MacArthur's brigade in support of Greene's, I had 
 about 8,500 men in position to attack, and I deemed the time had come for final 
 action. During the time of the night attacks I had communicated my desire 
 to Admiral Dewey that he would allow his ships to open fire on the right of 
 the Spanish line of intrenchments, believing that such action would stop the 
 night firing and loss of life, but the Admiral had declined to order it unless we 
 were in danger of losing our position by the assaults of the Spanish, for the 
 reason that, in his opinion, it would precipitate a general engagement, for 
 which he was not ready. Now, however, the brigade of General MacArthur 
 was in position and the Monterey had arrived, and under date of August 6, 
 Admiral Dewey agreed to my suggestion that we should send a joint letter to 
 the Captain-General notifying him that he should remove from the city all 
 non-combatants within forty-eight hours, and that operations against the de- 
 fences of Manila might begin at any time after the expiration of that period. 
 
 " This letter was sent August 7, and a reply was received the same date, to 
 the effect that the Spanish were without places of refuge for the increased num- 
 bers of wounded, sick, women and children now lodged within the walls. On 
 the 9th, a formal joint demand for the surrender of the city was sent in. This 
 demand was based upon the hopelessness of the straggle on the part of the 
 Spaniards, and that every consideration of humanity' demanded that the city 
 should not be subjected to bombardment under such circumstances. The Cap- 
 tain-General's reply, of the same date, stated that the council of defence had de- 
 clared that the demand could not be granted ; but the Captain-General offered 
 to consult his government if we would allow him the time strictly necessary 
 for the communications by way of Hong Kong.
 
 GENERAL MERRITT'S REPORT. 575 
 
 " This was declined on our part for the reason that it could, in the opinion 
 of the Admiral and myself, lead only to a continuance of the situation, with no 
 immediate result favorable to us, and the necessity was apparent and very 
 urgent that decisive action should be taken at once to compel the enemy 
 to give up the town, in order to relieve our troops from the trenches 
 and from the great exposure to unhealthy conditions which were unavoid- 
 able in bivouac during the rainy season. The seacoast batteries in de- 
 fence of Manila are so situated that it is impossible for ships to engage them 
 without firing into the town, and as the bombardment of a city filled with 
 women and children, sick and wounded, and containing a large amount of 
 neutral property, could only be justified as a last resort, it was agreed between 
 Admiral Dewey and myself that an attempt should be made to carry the ex- 
 treme right of the Spanish line of intrenchments in front of the positions at 
 that time occupied by our troops, which, with its flank on the seashore, was 
 entirely open to the fire of the navy. 
 
 " It was not my intention to press the assault at this point, in case the 
 enemy should hold it in strong force, until after the navy had made practicable 
 breaches in the works and shaken the troops holding them, which could not be 
 done by the army alone, owing to the absence of siege guns. This is indicated 
 fully in the orders and memorandum of attack hereto appended. It was be- 
 lieved, however, as most desirable and in accordance with the principles of 
 civilized warfare that the attempt should be made to drive the enemy out of his 
 intrenchments before resorting to the bombardment of the city. 
 
 " By orders issued some time previously MacArthur's and Greene's brigades 
 were organized as the Second Division of the Eighth Army Corps, Brigade 
 General Thomas M. Anderson commanding, and in anticipation of the attack 
 General Anderson moved his headquarters from Cavite to the brigade camps 
 and assumed direct command in the field. Copies of the written and verbal 
 instructions, referred to above and appended hereto, were given to the division 
 and brigade commanders on the 12th, and all the troops were in position on 
 the 13th at an early hour in the morning. 
 
 " About nine A. M. on that day our fleet steamed forward from Cavite and be- 
 fore ten A. M. opened a hot and accurate fire of heavy shells and rapid-fire pro- 
 jectiles on the sea flank of the Spanish intrenchments at the powder magazine 
 fort, and at the same time the Utah batteries, in position in our trenches near 
 the ' Calle Real,' began firing with great accuracy. At 10:25, on a prearranged 
 aignal from our trenches that it was believed that our troops could advance, 
 the navy ceased firing, and immediately a light line of skirmishers from the 
 Colorado regiment of Greene's brigade passed over our trenches and deployed 
 rapidly forward, another line from the same regiment from the left flank of our 
 earthworks advancing swiftly up the beach in open order. Both these lines 
 found the powder magazine fort and the trenches flanking it deserted, but as 
 they passed over the Spanish works they were met by a sharp fire from a
 
 576 GENERAL MERRITT'S REPORT. 
 
 second line situated in the streets of Malate, by which a number of men were 
 killed and wounded, among others the soldier who pulled down the Spanish 
 colors still flying on the fort and raised our own. 
 
 " The works of the second line soon gave way to the determined advance of 
 Greene's troops, and that officer pushed his brigade rapidly through Malate 
 and over the bridges to occupy Binondo and San Miguel, as contemplated in 
 his instructions. In the meantime the brigade of General MacArthur, ad- 
 vancing simultaneously on the Pasay road, encountered a very sharp fire, com- 
 ing from the blockhouses, trenches, and woods in his front, positions which it 
 was very difficult to carry, owing to the swampy condition of the ground on 
 both sides of the roads and the heavy undergrowth concealing the enemy. 
 With much gallantry and excellent judgment on the part of the brigade com- 
 mander and the troops engaged, these difficulties were overcome with a mini- 
 mum loss, and MacArthur advanced and held the bridges and the town of 
 Malate, as was contemplated in his instructions. 
 
 "The city of Manila was now in our possession, excepting the walled town, 
 but shortly after the entry of our troops into Malate a white flag was displayed 
 on the walls, whereupon Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Whittier, United States Vol- 
 unteers, of my staff, and Lieutenant Brumby, United States Navy, represent- 
 ing Admiral Dewey, were sent ashore to communicate with the Captain-Gen- 
 eral. I soon personally followed these officers into the town, going at once to 
 the palace of the Governor-General, and there, after a conversation with the 
 Spanish authorities, a preliminary agreement of the terms of capitulation was 
 signed by the Captain-General and myself. This agreement was subsequent^ 
 incorporated into the formal terms of capitulation, as arranged by the officers 
 representing the two forces, a copy of which is hereto appended and marked. 
 
 " Immediately after the surrender, the Spanish colors on the seafront were 
 hauled down and the American flag displayed and saluted by the guns of the 
 navy. The Second Oregon Regiment, which had proceeded by sea from 
 Cavite, was disembarked and entered the walled town as a provost guard, and 
 the Colonel was directed to receive the Spanish arms and deposit them in places 
 of security. The town was filled with the troops of the enemy, driven in from 
 the intrenchments, regiments formed and standing in line in the streets, but 
 the work of disarming proceeded quietly and nothing unpleasant occurred. 
 
 " In leaving the subject of the operations of the 13th, I desire here to record 
 my appreciation of the admirable manner in which the orders for attack and 
 the plan for occupation of the city were carried out by the troops exactly as 
 contemplated. I submit that for troops to enter under fire a town covering n 
 wide area, to rapidly deploy and guard all principal points in the extensive 
 suburbs, to keep out the insurgent forces pressing for admission, to quietly dis- 
 arm an army of Spaniards, more than equal in numbers to the American troops, 
 and finally by all this to prevent entirely all rapine, pillage, and disorder, and 
 gain entire and complete possession of a city of 300,000 people filled with na-
 
 GENERAL MERRITT'S REPORT. 577 
 
 tives hostile to the European interests, and stirred up by the knowledge that 
 their own people were fighting in the outside trenches, was an act which only 
 the law-abiding, temperate, resolute American soldier, well and skillfully han- 
 dled by his regimental and brigade commanders, could accomplish. 
 
 "Prior to the action on the 13th, general order No. 3, hereto appended, 
 was issued, and a copy was sent to Aguinaldo's representative as an indication 
 of the conduct that would be expected of them in the event that any bands of 
 the insurgents should effect an entrance to the city. After the action, general 
 order No. 6 was published to the troops as a sincere expression of my appre- 
 ciation of their conduct. 
 
 " The amount of public funds and the numbers of the prisoners of war and 
 small arms taken have been reported in detail by cable. It will be observed 
 that the trophies of Manila were nearly $900,000, 13,000 prisoners, and 22,000 
 arms. 
 
 " Immediately after the surrender my headquarters were established in the 
 ayuntamiento or city office of the Governor-General, where steps were at once 
 inaugurated to set up the government of military occupancy. A proclamation 
 was issued and published in all the newspapers of the city in English, Spanish 
 and native dialect, and one of my two very efficient brigade commanders, Gen- 
 eral Mac Arthur, was appointed Provost Marshal General and Civil Governor 
 of the town, while the other, General Greene, was selected for the duties of In- 
 tendente General de Hacienda or director of financial affairs, the collectors of 
 customs and internal revenue reporting to him. Lieutenant-Colonel Whittier, 
 United States Volunteers, of my staff, an efficient business man of long expe- 
 rience, was appointed collector of customs, and a bonded officer, Major Whipple, 
 of the Pay Department, was announced as custodian of the public funds, to 
 whom all Spanish money derived from any source was to be transmitted for 
 safe keeping and disbursement under orders. 
 
 " On the 16th, a cablegram containing the text of the President's proclama- 
 tion directing a cessation of hostilities was received by me, and at the same 
 time an order to make the fact known to the Spanish authorities, which was 
 done at once. This resulted in a formal protest from the Governor-General in 
 regard to the transfer of public funds then taking place, on the ground that 
 the proclamation was dated prior to the surrender. To this I replied that the 
 status quo in which we were left with the cessation of hostilities was that ex- 
 isting at the time of the receipt by me of the official notice, and that I must 
 insist upon the delivery of the funds. The delivery was made under protest. 
 
 " After the issue of my proclamation and the establishment of my office as 
 Military Governor, I had direct written communication with General Aguinaldo 
 on several occasions. He recognized my authority as Military Governor of the 
 town of Manila and suburbs, and made professions of his willingness to with- 
 draw his troops to a line which I might indicate, but at the same time asking 
 pertain favors for himself. The matters in this connection had not been settled
 
 578 GENERAL ANDERSON'S REPORT. 
 
 at the date of my departure. Doubtless much dissatisfaction is felt by the 
 rank and file of the insurgents that they have not been permitted to enjoy the 
 occupancy of Manila, and there is some ground for trouble with them owing to 
 that fact, but notwithstanding many rumors to the contrary, I am of the opin- 
 ion that the leaders will be able to prevent serious disturbances, as they are 
 sufficiently intelligent and educated to know that to antagonize the United 
 States would be to destroy their only chance of future political improvement. 
 
 " On the 28th instant I received a cablegram directing me to transfer my 
 command to Major General Otis, United States Volunteers, and to proceed to 
 Paris, France, for conference with the Peace Commissioners. I embarked on 
 the steamer China on the 30th in obedience to these instructions. 
 
 " In view of my short occupancy of the office of Military Governor (sixteen 
 days) I shall leave to my successor to report in detail and at length on the 
 many important matters of administration and questions affecting trade and 
 commerce, which it was not difficult to see would soon arise. 
 
 " I may add, however, that great changes for the better have taken place in 
 Manila since the occupancy of the city by the American troops. The streets 
 have been cleaned under the management of General MacArthur, and the 
 police, under Colonel Reeve, Thirteenth Minnesota, were most proficient in 
 preserving order. A stranger to the city might easily imagine that the Ameri- 
 can forces had been in control for months rather than days. 
 
 " In concluding this report, I wish formally to declare my indebtedness for 
 the success of the expedition to the brigade commanders, the division com- 
 mander, the members of my staff, and my personal aids. While we were still 
 in San Francisco these latter were sent to me to report to the commanders of 
 the different organizations in camp, and were busy assisting in instructing the 
 newly arrived troops. That they did good service in this direction I have the 
 assurance of all concerned." 
 
 THE ATTACK ON MANILA. 
 
 GENERAL ANDERSON'S REPORT. 
 
 The report of General Thomas M. Anderson, commanding the Second 
 Division of the Eighth Army Corps was made public October 1. The 
 subjoined is from that document: 
 
 " On the 1st day of July I had an interview with the insurgent chief, Agu- 
 inaldo, and learned from him that the Spanish forces had withdrawn, driven 
 buck by his army, as he claimed, to a line of defence immediately around the 
 city and its suburbs. He estimated the Spanish forces at about 14,000 men, 
 and his own about the same number. He did not seem pleased at the incoming
 
 GENERAL ANDERSON'S REPORT. 579 
 
 of our land forces, hoping, as I believe, that he could take the city with his own 
 arrny, with the cooperation of the American fleet. 
 
 " Believing that, however successful the insurgents may have been in guer- 
 rilla warfare against the Spaniards, they could not carry their lines by assault 
 or reduce the city by siege, and suspecting, further, that a hearty and effective 
 cooperation could not be expected, I had at once a series of reconnaissances 
 made to exactly locate the enemy's lines of defence, and to ascertain their 
 strength." 
 
 General Anderson then described the attack on Manila, which was under his 
 immediate command, subject to orders from General Merritt, whose headquar- 
 ters were on a dispatch boat : 
 
 " The fleet opened fire at 9:30 A. M. The first shots fell short ; but the range 
 was soon found, and then the fire became evidently effective. I at once tele- 
 graphed General MacArthur to open on Blockhouse No. 14 and begin his at- 
 tack. At the same time seven of the guns of the Utah batteries opened fire 
 on the enemy's works in front of the Second Brigade and two guns on the 
 right of this brigade opened an oblique fire toward Blockhouse No. 14. 
 Riding down to the beach, I saw two of our lighter draft vessels approach and 
 open on the Polvorin, with rapid-fire guns, and observed at the same time some 
 men of the Second Brigade start up the beach. I ordered the First California, 
 which was the leading regiment of the reserve, to go forward and report to 
 General Greene. Going to the reserve telegraph I received a message from 
 MacArthur that his fire on the blockhouse was effective, but that he was en- 
 filaded from the right. I knew from this that he wished to push the insurgents 
 aside and put in the Astor Battery. I then authorized him to attack, which 
 he did, and, soon after, the Twenty-Third Infantry and the Thirteenth Minne- 
 sota carried the advance line of the enemy in the most gajlant manner, the one 
 gun of the "Utah Battery and the Astor Battery lending most effective assist- 
 ance. 
 
 " In the meantime, the Colorado regiment had charged and carried the right 
 of the enemy's line, and the Eighteenth Regular Infantry and the Third Heavy 
 (regular) Artillery, acting as infantry, had advanced and passed over the 
 enemy's works in their front without opposition. The reserve was ordered for- 
 ward to follow the Second Brigade, and a battery of Hotchkiss guns was di- 
 rected to follow the Eighteenth Infantry. Going to the telegraph station, on 
 the left of our line on the beach, I found the operator starting forward in the 
 rear of the First California, and I moved forward until the instrument was es- 
 tablished in the first house in Malate. The first ticking of the sounder in- 
 formed me that General MacArthur was heavily engaged at a second line of 
 defence near Singalong. 
 
 " It was evident that the best way to assist him was to press our success on 
 the left. I therefore, directed General Greene to connect, if possible, with 
 General MacArthur by sending a regiment to the right. But the enemy 
 32
 
 580 GENERAL ANDERSON'S REPORT. 
 
 seemed determined, for a time, to give us a street fight, and the Colorado and 
 California regiments were the only ones available. At this juncture the 
 Eighteenth Infantry and the Hotchkiss Battery appeared to be stopped by a 
 broken piece of a bridge, but the Engineer Corps brought forward a portable 
 bridge, and in a few minutes these organizations pressed through for the 
 Malate-Ermita redoubts. Soon the men from Nebraska and Wyoming came 
 on, shouting, for the white flag could now be seen on the sea front, yet the 
 firing did not cease, and the Spanish soldiers at the front did not seem to be 
 notified of the surrender. In the meantime, the reserve had been ordered for- 
 ward, except one regiment, which was ordered to remain in the Second Brigade 
 trenches. The seven Utah guns were also ordered to the front, one infantry 
 battalion being directed to assist the batteries in hauling the guns by hand. 
 
 " The field telegraph wires, extending in a wide circuit to the extreme right, 
 for a time gave discouraging reports. The front was contracted, the enemy 
 intrenched and the timber thick on both sides of the road. Only two regi- 
 ments could be put on the firing line. The Fourteenth Infantry was brought 
 forward, but could not fire a shot. Under these circumstances, I telegraphed 
 MacArthur to countermarch and come to Malate by way of Greene's intrench- 
 ments and the beach. This was at 1:25 p. M., but soon after I learned that 
 MacArthur was too far committed to retire. The guns of the Astor battery 
 had been dragged to the front only after the utmost exertions, and were about 
 being put into battery. At the same time I received a telegram stating that 
 the insurgents were threatening to cross the bamboo bridge on our right ; and 
 to prevent this, and guard our ammunition at Pasay, I ordered an Idaho bat- 
 talion to that point. It was evidently injudicious under these circumstances 
 to withdraw the First Brigade, so the order was countermanded, and a dispatch 
 sent announcing our success on the left. 
 
 " In answer, the report came that Singalong had been carried and that the 
 brigade was advancing on Paco. At this point it was subsequently met by one 
 of my aids and marched down to the Guartel de Malate, by the Calzada de 
 Paco. I had gone in the meantime to the south bridge of the walled city, and 
 learning that the Second Oregon was within the walls, and that Colonel Whit- 
 tier was in conference with the Spanish commandant, I directed General 
 Greene to proceed at once with his brigade to the north side of the Pasig, 
 retaining only the Wyoming battalion to remain with me to keep up the con- 
 nection between the two brigades. 
 
 " A remarkable incident of the day was the experience of Captain Stephen 
 O'Connor, of the Twenty-Third Infantry. With a detachment of fifteen skir- 
 mishers, he separated from his regiment and brigade at Blockhouse No. 14, 
 and, striking a road, probably in rear of the enemy, marched into the city 
 without opposition, until he came to the Calle Real, in Malate. Along this 
 street he had some unimportant street fighting, until he came to the Paseo de 
 la Calzada, where, learning that negotiations were going on for a surrender, he
 
 GENERAL ANDERSON'S REPORT. 
 
 581 
 
 took post at the bridge of the north sally port, and the whole outlying Spanish 
 force south of Pasig passed by this small detachment, hurrying in, intramuros. 
 Captain O'Connor deserves recognition for the coolness and bravery displayed 
 in this remarkable adventure. 
 
 " Our loss in the First Brigade was three officers wounded, four enlisted men 
 killed and thirty-five wounded. The loss in the Second Brigade was one en- 
 listed man killed and five wounded, making a total of five killed and forty- 
 three wounded. The antecedent loss in the trenches was fourteen killed and 
 sixty wounded, making a total of 122 casualties in the taking of Manila. This 
 is only part of the price we have paid and are paying for this success, for men 
 are dying daily in our hospitals from disease contracted from exposure in camp 
 and trenches. All hardships and privations have been borne by our soldiers 
 with remarkable patience and cheerfulness. 
 
 " The opposition we met in battle was not sufficient to test the bravery of 
 our soldiers, but all showed bravery and dash. The losses show that the leading 
 regiments of the First Brigade Thirteenth Minnesota, Twenty-Third Infantry 
 and the Astor battery met the most serious opposition and deserve credit for 
 their success. The Colorado, California and Oregon regiments, the regulars, 
 and all the batteries of the Second Brigade, showed such zeal that it seems a 
 pity that they did not meet foemen worthy of their steel. 
 
 " My staff officers were active, zealous and intelligent in the performance of 
 their duties, and the men and officers of the entire division showed the best 
 qualities of American soldiers."
 
 PART III. THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR. 
 
 To these foregoing official accounts of the campaigns, in order to make 
 the narrative as exhaustively complete as human authentication by docu- 
 ments can do, controversial statements issued by the various leading 
 actors are herewith added by way of supplemental evidence. 
 
 SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, JOHN D. LONG TO THE PRESIDENT or THE WAR BOARD. 
 
 " HINGHAM, MASS., August 21, 1898. 
 
 " MY DEAR ADMIRAL : In view of the practical ending of the war with Spain, 
 and the well-earned relief from further duty to which the Naval War Board is 
 now entitled, I cannot, though absent from the department, forbear to express 
 to you, and through you to your associates on the board Commodore Crownin- 
 shield and Captain Mahan (retired) the very high appreciation which the 
 department has of the services it has rendered since the war began. That its 
 members have been faithful and diligent in the highest measure goes without 
 saying, for they are animated by the high professional spirit which distinguishes 
 the navy and which they themselves have done much to stimulate and main- 
 tain. But from my personal knowledge and observation I desire to add to this 
 that equally marked have been the intelligence, the wise judgment, the compre- 
 hensive forethought, and the unfailing competency to meet every exigency 
 which have distinguished their deliberations and action. May it not be said 
 that not one error has been made? Proper control by the department has 
 been exercised over all movements in the field, and yet at the same time, com- 
 manding officers have been duly left to exercise discretion, and have never been 
 hampered in their work. I do not know how your work, as member of that 
 important board, could have been better done, or where in the arena of the war 
 you could have rendered better service or deserved more honor. 
 
 " Very truly yours, 
 
 " JOHN D. LONG, 
 " Secretary of the Navy. 
 " To Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard, United States Navy." 
 
 A GENERAL OFFICER'S STATEMENT. 
 
 A wounded general officer who withheld his name, issued almost im- 
 mediately after the battle of Santiago the first distinct criticism of the 
 
 (582)
 
 AN OFFICER'S STATEMENT. 5b3 
 
 conduct of the campaign. This was published universally and brought 
 out responses from most of the persons in place made responsible for the 
 shortcomings charged : 
 
 " My position as a subordinate of those who equipped General Shafter's 
 army and sent it to Cuba, and of those who planned and conducted the cam- 
 paign against Santiago, renders me reluctant to give to the public anything 
 tending to be critical of my official military superiors. So intense, however, is 
 my conviction that ' somebody blundered ' ' somebody ' meaning more than 
 one person and blundered monumentally ; so strong also is my persuasion 
 that all the ventilation and light possible should be let into such blundering 
 that I feel I shall be doing nothing more than a public service in stating some 
 general undeniable facts which ought to be, and I believe are, patent to every 
 soldier who participated in the campaign except possibly those whose peculiar 
 interest requires that they shall be blind. 
 
 " There have been two colossal and criminal mistakes. The first and main 
 one was the frightful lack of transportation facilities. To this deficiency alone 
 can be traced nearly all the blood shed by our troops, and nearly all the disease 
 which is now decimating our ranks more rapidly than did Spanish rifles and 
 cannon. It was known by those who planned the invasion and attack, that 
 the country was mountainous, practically roadless, and saturated with rain- 
 floods ; that to move in such a country heavy ordnance, subsistence, stores, 
 quartermaster's stores, hospital supplies, and all the other necessary equip- 
 ment of a large army engaged in the investment of a hostile city miles away 
 from the base of operations, required abundant means of transportation 
 vehicles and animals, but especially pack mules. Such knowledge, however, 
 seems to have been of small utility to the responsible authorities ; for what 
 happened? When the army landed and the advance began, it was found that 
 transportation facilities were cryingly, even ridiculously, inadequate to meet 
 the demands of the situation. I know that for the use of one whole division 
 there were less than sixty pack mules. 
 
 "What was the result? None of the essential things which should have 
 accompanied the troops in their forward movement could keep pace with them. 
 The men, indeed, could be marched on ; but the food necessary to sustain their 
 strength, health, and spirits, and fortify them against disease, the medical and 
 hospital supplies to save their lives when wounded or fallen sick, the artillery 
 essential to do artillery work and render it needless for infantry to go to 
 slaughter against positions rendered almost as impregnable as nature and man 
 together could do these could not follow ; for there were no sufficient means to 
 convey them. Some of all these things were got to the front, of course, but in 
 miserably insufficient amount. Piled up at Siboney were the things we were 
 perishing for and could not get. 
 
 " Let us trace the consequences of this lack of transportation. One was at
 
 584 AN OFFICER'S STATEMENT. 
 
 the army, undergoing such hardships from the weather, and fighting under 
 disadvantages such as an army has seldom been called upon to encounter, was 
 half-fed. To be half-fed in such circumstances meant, even in the comparatively 
 short period of the siege, the undermining of the constitution of the hardiest 
 men in the army and rendering them an easy prey to all the diseases with which 
 the water, the air, and everything they touched were freighted. To be 
 stricken in such condition has meant the slowest recovery ; to suffer a relapse 
 which may be said to have waited beside the cot of each convalescent has 
 signified death. I have roughly estimated that already we have lost more men 
 by disease than by battle. With the sustenance we ought to have had the 
 merest fraction of these men would have succumbed to disease ; and, with ample 
 transportation facilities, and an intelligent use of them, that sustenance would 
 have been ours. 
 
 " Another consequence of this omission to provide the needed transportation 
 was that the artillery could not be promptly brought up. And this leads me 
 to the second of the criminal blunders committed giving battle without the 
 artillery, which the circumstances imperatively demanded. I shall not under- 
 take to pronounce whether an adequate equipment of guns was sent with the 
 expedition, because I do not know the exact number. I regard it as very 
 doubtful whether there was anything like the quantity needed. But what I 
 do know is that the battle of July 1 and 2 was properly an artillery fight ; that 
 we fought it almost without artillery, and that infantry was required to do 
 what every military man every man of common sense knows ought to have 
 been done with numerous and powerful batteries. We might not have had 
 enough guns, from the standpoint of military judgment, if we had had in po- 
 sition all the guns which the transports brought ; but if we had had all that 
 were lying on the beach at Baiquiri or remaining in the holds of the vessels, 
 we should have been able, in time at least, to have shelled the Spanish from 
 the San Juan hill and El Caney. And if we could have done that, our lighting 
 before Santiago would have cost us something like 250 in killed and wounded, 
 instead of 1,700. 
 
 " It is useless for any one to pretend that the state of the roads prevented 
 the guns from being got to the front. Ever}' man of experience knows that a 
 corduroy road can be built through a swamp. With the force of men at the 
 command of the General of the army, a corduroy road to the front could have 
 been constructed in a comparatively short time, and then, even with our 
 wretched lack of animals, we could in time have hauled the artillery forward. 
 But no McClellan waited until he was ready, Grant struck whether ready or 
 not; and ours was a General who proposed to profit by their examples he 
 would ' take Santiago in forty-eight hours.' After many more than forty-eight 
 hours, he found himself brought to a dead standstill, and forced to telegraph to 
 Washington for reinforcements. If he had continued the assault, God only 
 knows what our losses would have been.
 
 SECRETARY ALGER'S LETTER. 585 
 
 " Other features of mismanagement were evidently the loading at Tampa, 
 where the stores, as I am credibly informed, got mixed up, leading to confusion 
 and mistakes when they were unloaded to be sent to the front. One of the 
 greatest oversights was shown in the failure to provide enough hospital ships. 
 There was only the old Olivette, most miserably fitted up at the last moment. 
 The Relief did not arrive until five days after the battle of San Juan. There 
 should have been four or five such ships at hand before the fighting began. It 
 may throw some light on the responsibility for the disgraceful state in which 
 a number of transports reached the North to say that I have personal knowl- 
 edge that those vessels were loaded and despatched by members of the surgical 
 staff themselves. 
 
 " To my mind, General Shafter and Surgeon-General Steruberg should have 
 a heavy reckoning to make with public opinion." 
 
 SECRETARY ALGER'S STATEMENT. 
 In a letter to Hon. Chauncey M. Depew, Secretary Alger said: 
 
 " WAR DEPARTMENT, 
 " WASHINGTON, Aug. 18, 1898. 
 
 " MY DEAR MR. DEPEW : The great pressure of business has up to now pre- 
 vented me from sending to you the statement you were kind enough to ask for 
 as to what had been accomplished in the way of outfitting the army for the 
 field, the conduct of campaign, &c. Also, the chiefs of divisions have been too 
 much driven with work to compile the data required. One not in the midst 
 of the work can hardly realize what an undertaking it is to call 125,000 men 
 into the field at one time, coming from all the states, and to have them mus- 
 tered and gathered in camps on so short notice, and this, too, when we had 
 scarce any camp outfit for their accommodation, all having to be provided for 
 by the War Department. As you know, when war was declared there was no 
 equipment whatever for the volunteers in store. That this was successfully 
 accomplished, with very few accidents, is a matter of record. Subsequent 
 calls, including the regular army (which numbered about 27,000 men when 
 war was declared), made a total of 268.500 men. To accomplish all in so short 
 a time has been a great work. Of course, gathering this vast number of men to- 
 gether, in a large measure under untrained regimental and company command- 
 ers I mean in actual field duty the lack of knowledge as to sanitary condi- 
 tions to be observed, the carelessness in not observing instructions which were 
 furnished as to proper care of the men, has added greatly to the work of the 
 Medical Department. Thus from the homes of 216,000 volunteers has been 
 Constant and great anxiety as to whnt might happen to tueir soldiers, and 
 hundreds of inquiries made by letters and telegrams have been received every 
 day concerning individual soldiers.
 
 586 SECRETARY ALGER'S LETTER. 
 
 " The feeling on the part of those individuals that the War Department is re- 
 sponsible for the care of their men individually has naturally aroused sympathy 
 in case of sickness and death, and has created much sorrow. There is nothing 
 young men in robust health are so prodigal of as their health, until it is gone. 
 Men go into camp feeling that they can stand anything and everything, and 
 cannot be made to believe to the contrary until stricken with disease. Every 
 effort has been made from the beginning to furnish every camp with all appli- 
 ances asked for, but of course the commanding officers in the field are the ones 
 who have the direct charge of these men. For instance, one army corps com- 
 mander has given orders and enforces them, respecting sanitary affairs, and he 
 has to-day but a fraction over two per cent, on the sick list. Others have been 
 less successful, and the consequence is typhoid and other fevers have been bred 
 and spread to a considerable extent. One regiment in the Chickamauga camp 
 has a Colonel who enforces sanitary rules in his regiment, obliging the men to 
 boil all the water they drink, keeping the camp cleanly, and the result, less 
 than twenty-five sick, and his camp, too, is as unfavorable a place as any in 
 the command. Others more favorably situated have ten times that number on 
 the sick list. One of the regiments of the last call, not yet removed from its 
 state, sends bitter complaints of typhoid fever. 
 
 " Concerning the Santiago campaign, when the ships left Tampa they had on 
 board three months' provisions and an abundance of hospital supplies. They 
 had lighters to unload with at point of debarkation. These lighters were lost 
 in a severe storm on the way. As soon as we were notified of the fact two 
 tows of lighters were sent from Mobile and New Orleans, which were also 
 overtaken by storm and lost. The navy supplied us with lighters, and one of 
 these was wrecked. The army disembarked, getting off a portion of its sup- 
 plies and medical stores, and immediately marched to the front to fight the 
 Spaniards. The great difficulty of landing supplies subsequently was that 
 wind sprang up every morning at ten and made a high surf, rendering almost 
 impossible the use of small boats with one lighter, which was all they had left 
 for this purpose. Of the packers who were employed, sixty per cent, soon fell 
 sick, and heavy rains falling every day, the roads (if they could be called such) 
 became impassable for vehicles. Pack animals had to be employed to carry 
 food to the army, which, being extended to the right around Santiago, in- 
 creased the distance from the coast every day and made the task more difficult. 
 However, the result and the subsequent sickness that has broken out in the 
 army showed the great wisdom of General Shatter in moving forward to make 
 the attack while his men were in vigor. It was a movement bordering on au- 
 dacity, but it succeeded, and the persistence of the attack, I have no doubt, 
 greatly disheartened the Spaniards. The result was one of the greatest vic- 
 tories for the men engaged of modern warfare. The number of prisoners taken 
 exceeded the attacking force by nearly two to one. 
 
 " When yellow fever broke out and the fever list increased into the thousand
 
 GENERAL WHEELER'S STATEMENT. 587 
 
 it was for a time supposed that it was principally yellow fever. The bringing 
 troops north at once after the surrender under such conditions would have been 
 certain death to a vast number, but upon inquiry it was ascertained that very 
 few of these cases comparatively were yellow fever, when it was at once de- 
 cided to bring the army home as speedily as possible. Eveiything that human 
 ingenuity could devise has been done to succor that army not the ingenuity 
 of the Secretary of War, but the result of the combined counsel of those who 
 have had a lifelong experience in the field. That some men have been neg- 
 lected on transports coming home there is no doubt all against positive 
 orders, due perhaps to carelessness and negligence, but largely on account of 
 not having the medical force to spare (many of whom were sick) from the 
 camp at Santiago. Many medical officers sent with transports were taken ill 
 on the way home." 
 
 Secretary Alger then detailed the work done by the departments of the 
 Adjutant-General, the Chief of Engineers, the Surgeon-General, the Com- 
 missary General, the Quartermaster-General, the Paymaster- General and 
 the Chief Signal Officer; and concluded: 
 
 " If you had a day or two to spare I would like to sandwich in a little work 
 for you. I would like to send you these statements in detail, which I think 
 would bewilder you, if anything can. 
 
 " Hoping you are having an enjoyable summer, I am, sincerely yours, 
 
 " R. A. ALQER. 
 
 " Hon. Chauncey M. Depew, New York, N. Y." 
 
 Major-General Joseph Wheeler issued a statement to controvert the 
 clamors against the War Department : 
 
 GENERAL WHEELER'S STATEMENT. 
 
 " HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES, 
 
 " CAMP WIKOFF, L. I., Sept. 2. 
 
 " The following is a sample of the letters we are constantly receiving regard- 
 ing the soldiers in the camp : 
 
 "' In regard to my stepson, we feel very uneasy about him on account of the 
 newspaper reports of the privation and suffering inflicted on the private sol- 
 diers. Although he has never uttered a complaint since he has been in the 
 army, we hear from other sources of the cruel and horrible treatment inflicted 
 on our soldiers, under the pretense of humanity for our neighbors, and the 
 whole country is in a state of terrible excitement. I should not be surprised if
 
 588 GENERAL WHEELER'S STATEMENT. 
 
 the feeling should lead to a revolution of some kind, for I assure you I hear on 
 all sides the most violent and bitter denunciations of the War Department 
 and the administration. It is, indeed, a great pity that the glory of our 
 triumphs should be dimmed by such a shameful thing as the ill-treatment and 
 starvation of our own brave soldiers, while the Spanish prisoners have the best 
 treatment that the country can afford.' 
 
 " It will be seen that this letter says that not a word of complaint has been 
 received from this soldier, and so far as my investigation goes, no complaint 
 has been made by any of the brave soldiers that have added glory to our arms 
 in the Cuban campaign. A great many anxious fathers, mothers, brothers, or 
 sisters arrive here from all parts of the United States to look after their rela- 
 tives, whom, they say, the papers tell them are suffering, and many of them 
 have heard that their relatives are in a condition of starvation. Most of these 
 people are little able to expend the money for such a journey, and they are sur- 
 prised when they come here to find their relatives surrounded with everything 
 to eat which can be procured by money ; and if sick in the hospital, they are 
 gratified and surprised to find they are given every possible care. 
 
 " In reply to a direct request that I will give the exact facts as I see them, 
 I will state that every officer and soldier who went to Cuba regarded that he 
 was given a great and special privilege in being permitted to engage in that 
 campaign. They knew they were to encounter yellow fever and other diseases, 
 as well as the torrid heat of the country, and they were proud and glad to do 
 so. They knew that it was impossible for them to have the advantage of 
 wagon transportation which usually accompanies armies, and yet officers and 
 men were glad to go, to carry their blankets and their rations on their backs, 
 and to be subjected, without any shelter, to the sun and rains by day and the 
 heavy dews by night. They certainly knew that the Spaniards had spent 
 years in erecting defences, and it was their pleasure to assault and their duty 
 to capture the Spanish works. They were more than glad to incur the hard- 
 ships and these dangers. They went there and did their duty, each man seem- 
 ing to feel that American honor and prestige was to be measured by his con- 
 duct. 
 
 " The brave men who won the victories did not complain of the neglect of the 
 government, but, on the contrary, they seemed grateful to the President and 
 Secretary of War for giving them the opportunity to incur these dangers and 
 hardships. They realized that in the hurried organization of an expedition by 
 a government which had no one with any experience in such matters, it was 
 impossible to have everything arranged to perfection, and they will testify that 
 under the circumstances the conditions were much more perfect than any one 
 would have reason to expect, and that the President and Secretary of War 
 and others, who planned and despatched these expeditions, deserve high com- 
 mendation. 
 
 " One reason why our army was lacking in some respects in equipage was
 
 GENERAL WHEELER'S STATEMENT. 589 
 
 that a telegram was received from Admiral Sampson stating that if the army 
 reached there immediately they could take the city at once, but if there should 
 be delay, the fortifications of the Spaniards would be so perfected that there 
 might be great difficulty in taking it. On receiving this dtepatch from 
 Admiral Sampson the War Department directed the army to move at once, 
 and as all connected with the army will recall, the orders were received after 
 dark, and the army was in motion, had traveled nine miles, and was on the 
 ships at daylight. 
 
 " When the expedition sailed for Cuba it went there escorted by a large fleet 
 of warships. At that time it was regarded as impossible for a merchant ship 
 to sail on the ocean safely from any American port for Santiago, but as soon as 
 the Spanish fleet was destroyed so that it was possible for unarmed ships to 
 sail safely to Santiago, the generous people of the United States subscribed 
 money without limit and despatched ship after ship loaded with luxuries and 
 delicacies for the Santiago army, and everything that could be accomplished 
 for their comfort was done by the President and Secretary of War. 
 
 " After the surrender had been completed and arrangements perfected for 
 transporting the Spanish Army to Spain, the President and Secretary of Wai- 
 sent shipping to Santiago and transported our army to one of the most health- 
 ful localities in the United States. The point selected by the Secretary of 
 War was so situated that thorough protection was given the people of the 
 United States from the danger of yellow fever contagion. The soldiers upon 
 their arrival at this place received every care and bounty which could be pro- 
 cured by money. The President and Secretary of War directed that their 
 health and comfort should be cared for, without reference to expense, and in ad- 
 dition the people within a circle of 100 miles vied with each other in shipping 
 to them carloads and steamboat loads of luxuries of all kinds. 
 
 " I have just finished my daily inspection of the hospitals. With rare excep- 
 tions the sick are cheerful and improving. I have nurses and doctors to care 
 for them, and in all my many tours I have not found a single patient who 
 made the slightest complaint. It is true there has been suffering, and great 
 suffering. The climate of Cuba was very severe upon all our soldiers, but in- 
 stead of complaining, the hearts of those brave men are filled with gratitude to 
 the people for the bounteous generosity which has been extended to them. 
 
 " There is no doubt that there has been individual cases of suffering and pos- 
 sibly neglect among the soldiers, not only in Cuba, but since their arrival at 
 this place. Nearly 20.000 men were brought from a yellow fever district to 
 the United States. It would have been criminal to have landed them and al- 
 lowed them to go promiscuously among the people. It has been stated by 
 physicians that if it had been done, j^ellow fever would have spread through 
 many of our states. 
 
 " To avoid such a catastrophe, a point which is more thoroughly isolated 
 from the people than any other locality which could be found, was selected.
 
 590 GENERAL STERNBERG'S STATEMENT. 
 
 By these wise means the country has been saved from a scourge of this fearful 
 disease. Every one will realize that to land 18,000 men and put them on bait- 
 fields without any buildings whatever could not be done without some hard- 
 ships. Ove* 5,000 very sick men have been received in the general hospital, 
 and as many more sick have been cared for in the camps, and yet only about 
 sixty deaths have occurred in these hospitals. 
 
 " Tents had to be erected and hospitals constructed and preparations to sup- 
 ply those 18,000 men with wholesome water, food, medicines, physicians, nurses, 
 cooks, hospital furniture, wagons, ambulances, and other needs essential to 
 caring for 18,000 men, fully half of whom are very sick or in a feeble physical 
 condition. In addition to this, most of the bedding and much of the clothing 
 was left in Santiago to prevent yellow fever infection. All of these deficiencies 
 have had to be supplied. We had but one line of railroad to bring these sup- 
 plies, and sometimes there have been delays." 
 
 SUEGEON-GENEBAL STERNBERG'S STATEMENT. 
 
 The Surgeon-General in defence of his department, made public this 
 document, which contains the whole case : 
 
 " When the regular troops were ordered into the field, commanding officers 
 of regiments were directed to take with them a complete field outfit and 
 medical supplies for three months. I enclose herewith a memorandum showing 
 the medical supplies which have been sent to the Fifth Army Corps at Tampa 
 and at Santiago. The only requisition for medical supplies received from the 
 Chief Surgeon of the Fifth Army Corps at Santiago is one dated July 23, 
 1898, by cable, as follows : 
 
 " SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 23, 1898. 
 " Surgeon-General United States Army, Washington : 
 
 "July 23. Wanted urgently: Quinine tablets, 1,000 bottles; strychnine 
 tablets, 100 bottles; calomel and soda tablets, 100 bottles; calomel, 200 
 grammes; nitric acid in two-ounce vials, 100 ; test tubes, 1,000; Fowler's solu- 
 tion, 1,000. 
 
 " V. HAVARD, 
 
 " Major- Surgeon, United States Army, 
 " Acting Chief Surgeon. 
 
 " The supplies asked for were sent by the Olivette, in addition to a large 
 quantity of medical supplies of various kinds, which I had ordered to be put 
 on board that ship and delivered at Santiago. 
 
 " I beg to remark that recent advices indicate that a majority of the cases of 
 fever now occurring among the troops at Santiago are malarial in character.
 
 GENERAL STERNBERG'S STATEMENT. 591 
 
 and that there has been an ample supply of quinine, which is the principal 
 remedy required in this form of fever. I have made every effort to anticipate 
 the wants of our sick and wounded soldiers in Cuba without waiting for requisi- 
 tions ; but, as we have had communication by cable, the fault does not rest 
 with me if, owing to the failure on the part of the Chief Surgeon of General 
 Shafter's army to ask for necessary supplies, there has been a failure to meet 
 the requirements of the sick. 
 
 ' The hospital ship Relief, which arrived at Siboney on July 8, had on board 
 medicines for twenty regiments for six months, calculated upon the basis of the 
 field supply table, and large supplies in addition of the more important medi- 
 cines, hospital stores, dressings, &c. If these supplies were inadequate there 
 was ample time to inform me of the fact before the sailing of the Olivette on 
 July 26. 
 
 " I inclose a copy of a letter just received from Captain Edward L. Munson, 
 Assistant Surgeon United States Army, which fully accounts for any deficiency 
 of medical supplies at Santiago." 
 
 The report of Dr. Munson is as follows : 
 
 " TAMPA HEIGHTS, Fla., July 29, 1898. 
 " To the Surgeon-General United States Army, Washington : 
 
 " SIR : In view of the recent charges affecting efficiency of the army Medical 
 Department at Santiago, and especially with reference to the conditions pre- 
 vailing on the hospital transports sent north with wounded, I have the honor 
 to submit the following facts, believing that my position as Adjutant to the 
 Chief Surgeon, Fifth Corps, and as the officer in charge of the outfitting of the 
 hospital transports Iroquois, Cherokee and Breakwater, may possibly give value 
 to such report. 
 
 " Drugs, medicines, dressings, instruments, hospital tentage and supplies were 
 loaded on the transports at Tampa in quantities sufficient to meet the needs of 
 the Santiago expedition. These supplies were divided up on the various ves- 
 sels,*each organization having its own equipment. While the bulk of the sup- 
 plies was with the organized hospital, the regimental equipment was largely in 
 excess of its needs, and was intended to be called in to supplement, if neces- 
 sary, the equipment of these hospitals. 
 
 " The landing on Cuban soil was made as rapidly as possible, each organiza- 
 tion accompanied by the medical attendance assigned to it, and troops were 
 pushed forward with no other equipment and supplies than could be carried by 
 the soldiers. Having no means of transportation for even their field chests, 
 the regimental medical officers had absolutely no resources at their command 
 except such as were provided by the orderly and ship corps pouches and the 
 first-aid packets carried by the soldiers. 
 
 " Having only left their ships, the latter were promptly ordered out of the 
 small bays at Siboney and Baiquiri to permit the unloading of other ships.
 
 592 GENERAL STERNBERG'S STATEMENT. 
 
 These partially unloaded ships, in obedience to their orders, then proceeded to 
 sea from five to fifteen miles, where they remained, hove to indefinitely. Such 
 orders were given the transports carrying the reserve and the first divisional 
 hospitals. The one carrying the reserve hospital, in obedience to its orders, 
 proceeded to join the naval blockading squadron off Morro Castle, where it re- 
 mained five days and nights, the other transports disappearing, if I was cor- 
 rectly informed, for an entire week. 
 
 " During this time the fight at Quasina had occurred, and large numbers of 
 sick and wounded were requiring treatment. In the meantime a report of the 
 conditions prevailing on shore was made to the chief surgeon, who promptly 
 laid the case before the commanding General, requesting that a launch be placed 
 under the control of the Medical Department for the collection of medical sup- 
 plies from the various transports. It was also requested that a pack train be 
 organized, in the proportion of one pack mule to each regiment, to transport 
 supplies, especially the field chests, to the front for proper distribution, and it 
 was suggested by the chief surgeon as available for the performance of these 
 duties. 
 
 " The exigency of the situation did not apparently appeal to the command- 
 ing General, and for two days the Medical Department was unable to get trans- 
 portation of any kind to the other ships or to the shore, although there were 
 a large number of naval launches and other boats employed on various other 
 duties. 
 
 " On the third day, by order of the Adjutant-General, one boat was turned 
 over to the Medical Department for the purposes above named, and at the same 
 time an order was issued for land transportation to carry medical supplies to 
 the front ' not to exceed one six-mule team.' 
 
 <l On getting into this boat with supplies from the headquarters' transport I 
 was directed by sundry staff officers to take them on various errands. On my 
 refusal to recognize their authority the commanding General, who had appeared 
 on the scene, personally revoked the previous order and directed, after the land- 
 ing of the supplies already in the boat, that it should return without delay.* 
 
 " Presenting the order for land transportation to the Quartermaster on shore, 
 I was informed that only pack mules had as 3 r et been landed, that neither 
 wagons nor harness had been brought ashore, and, finally, that the road was 
 impassable for wagons. 
 
 " After this boat had been taken away the chief surgeon was without any 
 means of communication with the medical officers on shore or transports, of 
 finding out their wants or of remedying the many already known to him. 
 This condition of things remained until after the fight at La Quasina, at which 
 time there were absolutely no dressings, hospital tentage, or supplies of any 
 kind on shore within reach of the surgeons already landed. The news of the 
 Quasina fight being reported to the chief surgeon, he was finally able to go on 
 board the Olivette and send her to Siboney, where she received the wounded.
 
 GENERAL STEINBERG'S STATEMENT. 593 
 
 " Within the following day or so the transports carrying the reserve and first 
 divisional hospitals were found and unloaded of their hospital contents, the lat- 
 ter hospital finally obtaining limited transportation to the front. After a cou- 
 ple of days' duty on board the Olivette I was directed to put the Iroquois 
 in condition to receive patients and to take the full capacity of the ship on 
 board. While doing this I was able to set ashore considerable hospital tentage 
 and supplies found aboard of her, and, having control of her boats, I was able 
 to visit other transports in the harbor and land medical supplies from them. 
 While subsequently outfitting the Cherokee and Breakwater this work was con- 
 tinued as well as opportunity and limited facilities permitted, getting supplies 
 from perhaps a third of the transports composing the fleet. Outside of this, it 
 is believed that no other regimental medical property was ever unloaded up to 
 the time of my departure with wounded on July 10. 
 
 " Appealing on several occasions for the use of a lighter or small steamer to 
 collect and land medical supplies, I was informed by the Quartermaster's De- 
 partment that they could render no assistance in that way, and the Medical De- 
 partment was compelled to rely entirely upon its own energies and improvise 
 its own transportation. 
 
 " I feel justified in saying that at the time of my departure large quantities of 
 medical supplies urgently needed on shore still remained on transports, a num- 
 ber of which were under orders to return to the United States. Had the Med- 
 ical Department carried along double the amount of supplies, it is difficult to 
 see how, with the totally inadequate land and water transportation provided by 
 the Quartermaster's Department, the lamentable conditions on shore could have 
 been in any way improved. 
 
 " The outfitting of transports for the reception of sick and wounded is a duty 
 demanding thought and experience, and should never be intrusted to any one 
 but a regular medical officer. It includes the proper policing of the portions 
 of the ship to be used by the wounded, the removal of bunks and partitions to 
 give space and air, the utilization of the ship's blankets, doormats, rugs and 
 carpets to render the bunks more comfortable, the securing of extra supplies, 
 such as canned soups and fruits, lime juice and oatmeal, the establishment of a 
 mess and laundry, and the assignment of convalescents to specific light duties 
 which materially relieve the overworked hospital corps. 
 
 " Usually it is necessary to overcome passive resistance and opposition on the 
 part of the crews and a tendency on the part of the Captains to disregard or 
 modify orders. In several instances in my own experience this action of the 
 crew amounted almost to mutiny, and was only to be dealt with by threats, a 
 show of force, and in one instance by the use of the irons. 
 
 " While executive officer at the general hospital of Fort Monroe, I learned 
 officially that the Captain of the steamship Seneca positively refused to obey 
 the orders emanating from your office, given him by the contract surgeon in 
 charge, to proceed to New York he remaining nearly an additional day at
 
 594 GENERAL STERNBERG'S STATEMENT. 
 
 Hampton Roads with sick and wounded, and asserting that he would obe}' no 
 orders given by the Medical Department. A similar experience of my own a u ^ 
 Baiquiri, which had to be settled by force, emphasizes the fact that no onr 
 should be placed in charge of such a ship who is not accustomed to command 
 men and enforce obedience. 
 
 " With regard to the Red Cross Society, it would seem as if the lofty pur- 
 poses of this organization were on the Santiago expedition subverted to indi- 
 vidual interests. While at Tampa the Red Cross ship State of Texas was 
 formally placed under the control of the Chief Surgeon, Fifth Corps, by Doctor 
 Eugan, the representative of the society, he acting under telegraphic instruct 
 tions to that effect. Colonel Pope accepted this offer and directed that the 
 State of Texas accompany the expedition of General Shafter to its destina- 
 tion. 
 
 "Although this order was fully understood by Doctor Eagan, the State of 
 Texas did not accompany the expedition, nor did it arrive at Siboney until the 
 forces had been landed, a battle fought, and our hospitals established and in 
 working order. The first offers of aid made by this society dealt largely in 
 generalities and manifested reluctance to subordinate the organization to the 
 Medical Department. Too much praise cannot be given to the individual efforts 
 of Doctor Lesser and the Red Cross nurses. Their work was untiring and un- 
 selfish, and the assistance rendered by them was of great value. 
 
 " In conclusion it is desired to emphasize the fact that the lamentable condi- 
 tions prevailing in the army before Santiago were due to the military necessity 
 which threw troops on shore and away from the possibility of supply without 
 medicines, instruments, dressings, or hospital stores of any kind. 
 
 " Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 " EDWARD L. MUNSON, 
 u Captain and Assistant Surgeon, commanding Res. Amb. Co."
 
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