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 AMEKICAN DIS-UNION.
 
 AMERICAN DIS-UNION : 
 
 CONSTITUTIONAL OE, UNCONSTITUTIONAL ? 
 A REPLY TO MR. JAMES SPENCE 
 
 VVOJf THE QUESTION 
 
 "IS SECESSION A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT?" 
 
 DISCUSSED Iir HIS BECENT WOBK, 
 
 "THE AMERICAN UNION." 
 
 BY ':, 
 CHARLES ED. RAWLINS, Jun. 
 
 "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made 
 in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
 the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land ; 
 and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the con- 
 stitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithslandiug." — Constitution 
 Of THB United States, Art. 6, Sec. 2. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 ROBERT HARDWICKE, 192, PICCADILLY 
 
 1862.
 
 PEEFACE. 
 
 A SHORT correspondence with Mr. Spence on 
 the question discussed in the sixth chapter 
 of his work, " The American Union," " Is 
 Secession a Constitutional Right ? '^ led me into 
 a closer inquiry than I had originally intended. 
 The result is seen in the following pages. If 
 they have any merit, it is that I have studiously 
 avoided originality of opinion. The question 
 is essentially one for appeal to authority. 
 What did the framers of the Constitution 
 themselves mean, and how Mas that document 
 understood by their contemporaries ? Hence 
 the profuseness of quotation from the letters, 
 speeches, and works of the leading men of the 
 Revolution. 
 
 I have referred to the Essays in the
 
 VI PREFACE . 
 
 Federalist as unquestionable authority. They 
 vera written by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, 
 for the express purpose of expounding and re- 
 commending the Constitution, just then fresh 
 from the Convention, to their fellow-citizens. 
 Distinguished by remarkable clearness, vigour, 
 and earnestness, they must have had no small 
 effect in the attainment of their object. They 
 express the thoughts, not of partisans, but of 
 j)atriots and statesmen, — of men who distinctly 
 saw the critical position of their country, and 
 who deeply felt their responsibility in urging 
 the only means of rescue. The main idea per- 
 vading the Federalist is Nationality. No word 
 more frequently appears on its pages than this. 
 With no less power than fidelity, its authors 
 proved to their countrymen, how all efforts to 
 attain to a genuine Nationality had hitherto 
 been abortive ; that a union of States can never 
 make one People ; that a Nation consists of 
 individuals, and not of corporate bodies; and, 
 that if they would enjoy the blessings of peace 
 and i)rosperity at home, and respect and con-
 
 PREFACE. Yll 
 
 fidenco abroad, (jvcry State must give up its 
 claim to independent sovereignty in order to 
 secure the consolidation of the Union. 
 
 I have freely availed myself of the opinions 
 of Judge Story, in his lucid " Commentaries on 
 the Constitution of the United States," which 
 are indeed founded u])on the Federalist. 
 
 I have quoted also from Mr. Curtis's admi- 
 rable " History of the Constitution," which 
 contains an interesting account of the failure 
 of the Confederation, and the labours of the 
 Convention. A study of these questions would 
 hardly be complete without a perusal of this 
 work. 
 
 It was only while revising my proof sheets 
 that the work of my fellow-townsman, 
 Mr. Thomas Ellison, " Slavery and Secession," 
 fell into my hands. Had 1 received it sooner 
 I should have been spared some labour in the 
 search for information which that book con- 
 tains, and probably should not have written at 
 all. I take the liberty, however, of now re- 
 commending it as an able and impartial resume
 
 Vlll PREFACE. 
 
 of the history of tlie Secession movement, 
 more especially in connection Avith the head 
 and front of offence in the Union, — Slavery. 
 
 I have waited patiently for some one better 
 qualified than myself to come forward with a 
 refutation of the great error of Mr. Spence's 
 work, until that work has reached a fourth 
 edition ; but I have waited in vain. And now, 
 if only to satisfy my own conscience, the word 
 of truth must be spoken. 
 
 If any furtlier apology be needed for 
 requesting public attention to the question 
 I have discussed, it may be found in the great 
 importance of our not only entertaining the 
 most friendly feelings towards a Nation with 
 whom we carry on an extensive commercial 
 intercourse, the limit of which, when Morill 
 Tariffs are swept away among the follies of 
 the past, it is difficult to conceive; but also 
 of forming just opinions of the great political 
 experiment of the government of a people 
 entirely through their representatives, now 
 being assayed on tlie American continent.
 
 PREFACE. IX 
 
 Collective humanity is interested in tlie result. 
 In the meantime let us be "equitable, nay, for- 
 bearant if need be," to their errors, as becomes 
 a nation resting upon a more established basis. 
 Evils are inseparable from every form of 
 Government. Some are peculiar to absolute 
 Monarchy ; some to Constitutional Monarchy ; 
 some to Democracies. In all are to be found 
 some compensating advantages. The best form 
 is that which permits the gradual adoption of the 
 best principles of each. And that system must 
 contain the most truth which promotes the 
 largest amount of Intelligence and Virtue. 
 
 Prince's Park, 
 
 Liverpool, 
 
 April, 1862.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Parje 
 PREFACE V 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 INTRODUCTOET 1 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 THE COLONIAL GOVERNMENTS 28 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 THE CONVENTION 42 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 THE CONSTITUTION— ITS FOUNDATION 58 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 THE CONSTITUTION — LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE 72 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 THB SUPREME JUDICIARY 85
 
 XU CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Page 
 
 P0WEE8 OP CONGRESS — TAXATION AND COMMERCE 96 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 NATIONAL DEFENCE 114 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 SUPEEMACT 128 
 
 CHAPTER X, 
 NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION 146 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 A. — THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDEEATION 181 
 
 B. — THE CONSTITUTION 193 
 
 c. — Washington's faeewell addkess 214 
 
 D. — LETTER FEOM MR. CARET TO M. CHEVALIEE ...222 
 E. — THE WASHINGTON TREATY 224
 
 AMErUCAN DIS-UNION. 
 
 I. 
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 Of all forms of government, that of a demo- 
 cratic Republic demands the largest amount of 
 public virtue, both in the governors and the 
 governed. Initiated by the people, — possessed 
 of no innate tendency, like mixed forms of 
 government, to create diversity of interests — 
 regarding as its sole aim the greatest hap- 
 piness of the greatest possible number — it not 
 only recognizes the people at large as the 
 sovereign power, but it individualizes that 
 power for every adult subject complying with 
 certain needful conditions, when at frequent 
 or stated intervals it appeals for a renewal in 
 its administration. It thus throws all respon- 
 sibility of success or failure ultimately upon 
 the people themselves. If they suiFe-r them- 
 selves to be corrupted by gold, — intimidated by 
 
 B
 
 ^Z DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA. 
 
 threat, — silenced by private expectations, — 
 swayed by sectional interests not in conformity 
 with those of the community ; if they become 
 listless, inert, or altogether abstinent in the 
 exercise of their public rights : just in pro- 
 portion as the people thus violate or neglect 
 their duty, will the head-springs of legislation 
 become impure, and its waters flow on with 
 baneful instead of beneficial influence in their 
 course. 
 
 On the other hand, if those whom the 
 people elect as their representatives enter the 
 senate-chamber with personal ends to satisfy 
 and sectional prejudices to serve — if they 
 forget that, though elected by a district, they 
 have to legislate for a country — the best in- 
 tentions of the people may be frustrated. 
 This danger is, however, comparatively small 
 where the power granted is of short duration ; 
 and as legislation is controlled in its birth by 
 the force of public opinion, upon which it 
 must depend for successful operation, a 
 representative government is generally true to 
 a nation in proportion as a nation is true to 
 itself.
 
 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA. 3 
 
 To say tiiat, the American People have not 
 readied their own Ideal, is but to proclaim the 
 loftiness of its requirements, and to acknow- 
 ledge the imperfection of all human endea- 
 vour. But their best friends must go even 
 beyond this, and confess that even fair and 
 moderate expectations of fidelity to the great 
 trust placed in their hands have not been 
 fulfilled. Have, not votes been sold to am- 
 bitious candidates, with whom private gain, 
 and not the public good, has been the ruling 
 motive ? Have not good men too often 
 retired from the arena of politics absorbed 
 in pursuits of commerce, literature, or 
 science, alike forgetting that the price of 
 freedom in a Republic is, of necessity, personal 
 fidelity and watchfulness, and that superior 
 abilities or larger knowledge are not given for 
 selfish gratification, but " for the glory of their 
 Creator, and the relief of man's estate " ? 
 When in Europe Political Economy is asserting 
 the great truth, that individual freedom, in the 
 exercise of skill and the employment of 
 capital, brings the largest gain to the State, 
 it is sad enough to find Young America 
 B 2
 
 4 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA. 
 
 putting on the cast-ofF clothes of the Old 
 World, and endeavouring to reconstruct 
 theories of protection now so entirely ex- 
 ploded. Starting upon her course with all 
 European experience to warn or guide her, 
 she has too persistently used it " like the stern- 
 lights of a ship, which serve only to illumine 
 the track it has passed." She has not only 
 by a false system of taxation prohibited or 
 restricted commerce by high duties, or diverted 
 it by bounties, but her compromises with 
 slavery — that evil so abhorrent to the framers 
 of the- constitution, that they believed it could 
 not co-exist with freedom — have spread over 
 North and South a moral leprosy ; and ex- 
 posed the free States to the suspicion that 
 they abolished slavery, not because it vvas 
 wrong, but because it was no longer remune- 
 rative. It has been said, that the transference 
 of the fortunes of our race from Europe to 
 America has been a gain to humanity of at 
 least a thousand years. With no vested 
 rights to obstruct the redress of social wrongs 
 — with no landed aristocracy, Norman or 
 otherwise, to monopolize the soil — no national
 
 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA. 5 
 
 debt to burden honest industry — "no en- 
 tangling- alliances^' to entail the necessity of 
 large standing armies and heavy taxation — lias 
 the progress of America in civilization, in all 
 that constitutes the true life and dignity of a 
 Nation, been commensurate with her advan- 
 tages, and fulfilled the hopes of humanity ? 
 
 Whatever may be the answer to these 
 questions, the evils we have referred to are in 
 no degree attributable to the American form 
 of government. This form is exposed to 
 dangers and inconveniences peculiar to itself; 
 but those evils are common to all forms alike. 
 In our own country, William III. ])ractised 
 parliamentary corruption as a system. To 
 Burnet's remonstrance he replied, " Nobody 
 hates bribery more than I ; but I have to do 
 with a set of men who must be managed in 
 this vile way or not at all. I must strain a 
 point, or the country is lost." 
 
 The Irish Union was notoriously bought with 
 English gold. And Lord Macaulay only dates 
 the extinction of the system as " within the 
 memory of the present generation." ^ Bribery 
 
 » "History of England," iii. 542.
 
 6 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA. 
 
 of voters is rampant enough in our own day, as 
 the recent revelations of Gloucester, Wakefield, 
 and Berwick, testify. Even in our House of 
 Lords, which, constitutionally, may not inter- 
 fere with elections to the Lower House, it is 
 not uncommon to hear "that the influence of 
 property over its tenants-at-will is perfectly 
 legitimate." The poverty of our free labourers 
 is often unfavourably contrasted with the 
 comfort of slaves, or the full diet of convicted 
 felons. An extended suffrage is denied to our 
 working classes, not because they have no 
 right to its possession, but because they are, 
 it is said, too uneducated for its exercise ; and 
 our philanthropists produce maps of the 
 country, darkly shaded by ignorance, pauper- 
 ism, and crime. 
 
 No new country ever has adopted, or most 
 probably ever will adopt, a monarchical form 
 of govenniient, for the feeling of loyalty upon 
 M'hich this form must always depend cannot 
 be transplanted at will. It is, moreover, a 
 tree of slow growth, and for the value of its 
 fruit must always be indebted to age and 
 culture.
 
 DE TOCQUEVILLE. 7 
 
 In America we have therefore to deal with 
 the only possible form of government, viz. : 
 a democratic Republic. It is useless to attempt 
 judging this by our own standard. 
 
 " I find," says De Tocqueville, ^ " that a great 
 number of my contemporaries undertake to 
 make a certain selection from among the 
 institutions, the opinions, and the ideas which 
 originated in the aristocratic constitution of 
 society as it was ; a portion of these elements 
 they would willingly relinquish, but they would 
 keep the remainder and transplant them into 
 their new world. I apprehend that such men 
 are wasting their time and their strength in 
 unprofitable efforts. * * * We have not 
 to seek to make ourselves like our progenitors, 
 but to strive to work out that species of great- 
 ness and happiness which is our own." 
 
 But this is precisely the spirit which English 
 writers too often fail to recognize in American 
 institutions. They bring everything found 
 there to an English standard of taste and 
 opinion, and pronounce accordingly. 
 
 Now, whatever is good or bad in the American 
 
 ' " Democracy in America," ii. 354 (American edition).
 
 8 EFFECTS OF DEMOCRACY. 
 
 character, and not common to all other nations, 
 is the result of a new order of society. Though 
 sprung from the Anglo-Saxon race, and con- 
 tinually receiving from it fresh accessions, new 
 principles of political action, especially demo- 
 cratic equality, a different climate and a 
 widely-extended territory have so engrafted 
 new habits and modes of thought upon the 
 original stock, that in the new fruit it is diffi- 
 cult to find a trace of the old. 
 
 It signifies little that their practical and 
 material philosophy finds expression in the 
 same lano^uasre as our own — that Bacon, and 
 Milton, and Shakspeare, are no less venerated 
 by them than ourselves. These act upon a 
 distinct order of mind. We are now essen- 
 tially two nations, and the same rules of 
 criticism will not apply to both. But there 
 may be still friendship and alliance between 
 us; and these may be all the closer because 
 the monotony of race has been effectually 
 subdued. 
 
 Of all the books which the present civil war 
 in America has produced, we must pronounce 
 the work of Mr. James Spence, on " The
 
 MR. SPENCE. 9 
 
 American Union," as at once the most brilliant 
 and the most mischievous. It has already 
 reached its fourth edition. A writer in the 
 Quarterly Review " can hardly speak too highly 
 of it, and recommends it to all who wish to 
 make themselves acquainted with the facts of 
 the great American controversy, which are so 
 often obscured by passion and distorted by 
 interest." The editor of All the Year Round 
 has most admirably epitomized the book for 
 those too busy to read it for themselves. He 
 says, " Mr. Spence has assembled facts and 
 authorities in masterly support of his reasoning", 
 and has grouped them with a temperate and 
 logical clearness that cannot fail to convince. 
 He writes with the discretion of a judge who 
 has all the evidence before him, strong and 
 honest in his own conviction." Indeed, every 
 review that we have seen has more or less 
 adopted Mr. Spence's facts and authorities as if 
 beyond dispute, and apparently without inquiry. 
 The Americans have certainly not been for- 
 tunate in their judge. Mr. Spence's Mork is 
 a comprehensive condetnnation of all that 
 constitutes their National life and character.
 
 10 MR. SPEXCE. 
 
 Their Constitution is a mistake — their politics 
 lax — their jiublic morality degraded — their 
 justice corrupted — their history perverted, and 
 their patriotic pride a gross exaggeration. 
 
 " The trail of the serpent is over it all." 
 
 Talent, Literature, and Respectability retire 
 despairing from the scene, disgusted with the 
 present, and hopeless for the future. 
 
 Mr. Spence has based his condemnation 
 broadly enough. His philosophy seems to be 
 that history invariably repeats itself. Hence, 
 it is but to trace the experience of the past, 
 and estimate the tendencies of the present, in 
 order to cast the horoscope of the future. 
 Thus, he sweeps the records of history from 
 the fabulous ages down to the present time 
 for an indictment against the American Con- 
 stitution. The Amphictyonic Council, the 
 Achean league, the Dutch republic, South- 
 American federations, have all failed and 
 disappeared. How, then, can the Federal 
 Union of the United States endure? This 
 would be harmless enough if it were not made 
 preliminary to something far more objection-
 
 MR. SPENCE. 11 
 
 able. Haying first insinuated the idea that 
 the American Union is inherently defective in 
 the elements of stability, he endeavours to 
 prove that there are grievances (some real and 
 others imaginary) on the part of the seceding 
 States to justify the disruption, and that any 
 attempt to maintain the Union against their 
 will is not only hopeless, but unconstitutional. 
 And he winds up with an attempt to deprive 
 the Northern States of English sympathy, by 
 raking up diplomatic disputes long since for^ 
 gotten, and reopening treaties which, however 
 disadvantageous to us, are now irrevocable.* 
 This effort to stir up the bitter waters of inter- 
 national hatred between England and the free 
 States of the North, on behalf of a confederacy 
 whose end and object is declared to be the 
 organization of Labour on the basis of slavery, 
 deserves the strongest reprobation.^ 
 
 • Appendix E. 
 
 * " Bnt, not to be tedious in tions, — African slavery as it ex- 
 enumerating the numerous ists amongst us, — the proper 
 changes for the better, allow me status of the negro in our form 
 to allude to one other, though of civilization. Tliis was the 
 last not least : the new con- immediate cause of the late 
 stitution has put at rest for rupture and present revolution, 
 ever all the agitating questions Jefferson, in his forecast, had 
 relating to our peculiar institu- auticipated this ' as the rock
 
 12 
 
 THE AMERICAN PRESS. 
 
 However nincli the tone of a large portion 
 of the American press towards this country is 
 to be condemned, that of our own towards 
 America — with far less excuse — has been 
 equally unfriendly. Since this unhappy civil 
 
 upon which the old Union would 
 split.' He was right. What 
 was conjecture with him is now 
 a realized fact. But whether 
 he fully comprehended the great 
 truth upon which that rock 
 stood and stands may be 
 doubted. The prevailing ideas 
 entertained by him, and most of 
 the leading statesmen at the 
 time of the formation of the old 
 constitution, were, that the en- 
 slavement of the African was in 
 violation of the laws of nature ; 
 that it was wrong in principle, 
 socially, morally, and politically. 
 It was an evil they did not 
 know well how to deal with ; 
 but the general opinion of the 
 men of that day was, that some- 
 how or other, in the order 
 of Providence, the institution 
 would be evanescent and pass 
 away. This idea, though not 
 incorporated in the constitution, 
 was the prevailing idea at the 
 time. The constitution, it is 
 true, secured every essential 
 guarantee to the institution 
 
 while it should last, and hence 
 no argument can be justly used 
 against the constitutional gua- 
 rantees thus secured, because of 
 the common sentiment of the 
 day. Those ideas, however, 
 were fundamentally wrong. 
 They rested upon the assump- 
 tion of the equality of races. 
 This was an error. It was a 
 sandy foundation, and the idea 
 of a government built upon it — 
 When the storm came and the 
 wind blew, it fell. Ouj' new 
 Government is founded upon 
 exactly the opposite ideas ; 
 its foundations are laid ; its 
 cornei'-stone rests upon the great 
 truth that the negro is not equal 
 to the white man ; that slavery, 
 suhordination to the superior race, 
 is his natural and moral con- 
 dition. This, our neio Govern- 
 ment, is the first in the history of 
 the world based upon this great 
 'physical, philosophical, and moral 
 truth." — Speech of Vice-Presi- 
 dent A. H. Stephens, at Sa- 
 vannah.
 
 THE ENGLISH PRESS. 13 
 
 war it has too often spoken of the 
 United States in language which it would 
 not have used when they were an unbroken 
 power. For this result Mr. Spence's 
 work is in no small degree answerable. 
 Readable in its type ; clear, flowing, and 
 forcible in its diction ; eloquent in its expres- 
 sion ; strewed with quotations so apt that they 
 only leave us to regret the absence of all 
 reference to their sources ; artistic in all its 
 arrangements, it has caught the popular eye, 
 and has given the public a logical result with- 
 out the necessity of thought. 
 
 But it is with the question discussed in the 
 sixth chapter of his book, " Is secession a con- 
 stitutional right?" that the following pages have 
 more especially to do. Mr. Spence evinces a 
 peculiar objection to America being considered 
 as in any respect a Nation. It was once said of 
 Goldsmith that he would have returned from 
 foreign travel, bringing home a wheelbarrow, 
 and called that an improvement. Mr. Spence 
 has made a discovery equally important. A 
 citizen of the United States now calls himself 
 an American ! Has he forgotten the words of
 
 14 AMERICAN NATIONALITY. 
 
 Washington's farewell address?' — "Citizens, 
 by birth or choice, of a common country, that 
 country has a right to concentrate your affec- 
 tions. The name of American, which belongs 
 to you in your National capacity, must alv/ays 
 exalt a just pride of patriotism more than 
 appellations derived from local discriminations." 
 But Mr. Spence repudiates the term " National 
 Government" as quite inapplicable to Congress, 
 and with singular inaccuracy declares it was 
 repudiated by the Federal Convention. He 
 states that those words actually appeared on 
 the face of the first draft of the Constitution, 
 and were struck out by that body on the 
 ground of their being inapplicable to the facts, 
 and op])osed to the intentions of its framers. 
 
 Mr. Spence is wrong in saying that they 
 appeared in the first draft of the Constitution. 
 They did appear, however, in the first of a 
 series of resolutions adopted by the Convention 
 soon after it had commenced its sittings.^ These 
 resolutions were subsequently revised, and, in 
 the revision, the term " National Government " 
 
 ' Appendix C. 
 
 * " History of the Constitu- Sampson Low & Co., London, 
 tion of the United States." 1858, ii. 86.
 
 AMERICAN NATIONALITi'. 15 
 
 disappeared from the first resolution simply 
 because it was surplusage. The resolution then 
 read, " That the Government of the United 
 States ought to consist of a supreme Legislative 
 Judiciary and Executive."^ Thew^ord "National'* 
 attached to these separate departments occurs 
 no less than twelve times in the subsequent 
 resolutions, and in two instances the term 
 "National Government" is used. The intentions 
 of the Convention are more clearly seen by 
 comparing the preamble of the first draft of 
 the Constitution as reported by the committee 
 of detail with that finally adopted." The former 
 says, " We, the people of the States of 
 New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, 
 and the Providence Plantations, Connecticut, 
 New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Dela- 
 ware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, 
 South Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare, 
 and establish the following constitution for the 
 government of ourselves and our posterity." 
 Now, as it was obvious that this preamble 
 presumed upon the ratification of the people 
 of all the States ; that one of the States 
 
 ' Idem, ii. 190. * Idem, ii. 60S.
 
 IG RIGHT OF REVOLUTION. 
 
 enumerated, viz., Rhode Island,had sent no repre- 
 sentatives to tlie Convention ; and that, more- 
 over, all mention of the objects of the Constitution 
 were omitted; on these accounts it was rejected 
 and the following adopted in its place, " We, 
 the people of the United States, in order to 
 form a more ])erfect Union, establish justice, 
 insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the 
 common defence, promote the general welfare, 
 and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves 
 and our posterity, do ordain and establish this 
 constitution for the United States of America." 
 Had Mr. Spence simply asserted the revo- 
 lutionary right which permanently exists with 
 every People, we should certainly not have 
 dissented. Our own system of government 
 rests upon the same foundation as that claimed 
 by the People of the United States — "the 
 consent of the governed." To give up this 
 right, inherent as it is in every nation and 
 overriding all constitutions whatever, parch- 
 ment or otherwise, is to pass over at once to the 
 doctrine of "divine right." Tyranny is notgovern- 
 ment, and allegiance is due only to protection. 
 Where a government does not fulfil its only
 
 RIGHT OF REVOLUTION. 17 
 
 true purpose in the protection of the lives, 
 liberties, and legitimate occupations of the 
 people, it becomes only a nuisance, and the 
 time has arrived for its overthrow. 
 
 But the responsibility of revolution under a 
 settled form of government is indeed fearful. 
 Before undertaking it, the evils of endurance, 
 however great, should be long and carefully 
 weighed against those of change and uncertainty. 
 The fabric of civil society ought not lightly to 
 be overthrown. It is easier to destroy than 
 reconstruct ; hence revolution is " the extreme 
 medicine of the state." Men are as much 
 bound by the moral law to abstain from its use 
 without good and sufficient reason, as they are 
 by the j)olitical law to resort to it when 
 occasion absolutely requires ; and wben this 
 becomes inevitable, they owe it to a candid 
 world to ex])lain their reasons with the most 
 scrupulous exactness. 
 
 Have the Southern States thus justified 
 their rebellion ? " Think, if you can," said Mr. 
 Lincoln, in his inaugural address, "of a single 
 instance in which a plainly-worded proviso of 
 the Constitution has been denied." Through
 
 18 RIGHT OF REVOLUTION. 
 
 all their ordinances of secession the search is in 
 vain for a record of that "single instance." Many of 
 these give no reason vhatever. Alabama sets 
 forth the election of Mr. Lincoln, " following 
 on the heels of many and dangerous infractions," 
 as justifying her withdrawal.^ South Carolina, 
 the first State to secede, only complains that 
 the free States have not restored her fugitive 
 slaves. The speeches of Southern orators have 
 pleaded protective tariffs and navigation laws 
 excluding foreign vessels from the coasting 
 trade; and, finally, Mr. Jefferson Davis has 
 wound up this impalpable list of grievances 
 with the belief of the Southern States that to 
 remain longer in the Union would be to 
 " subject them to a continuance of a disparaging 
 discrimination, submission to which would be 
 
 ' " Our present purpose does immediate encroachment upon 
 
 not require us to discuss the our rights as Slave States. * * * 
 
 propriety of the acts of these The States which have seceded 
 
 States, yet it may be proper for have abandoned the best Govern- 
 
 us to say that they find no war- ment in the world without any 
 
 rant in any known principle of good or sufficient cause." — Ad- 
 
 our Government, and no justifi- dress of the Convention of the 
 
 cation in the facts existing when Border (Slave) States, June, 1861 ; 
 
 they seceded. * * * W^e ask no Putnam's Rebellion Record, New 
 
 concession of new or additional York 1861. 
 rights. We do not fear any
 
 ITS EXERCISE NOT JUSTIFIED. 19 
 
 inconsistent with their welfare, and intolerable 
 to a proud people." Such are the alleged 
 causes set forth to justify revolution. Let us 
 briefly examine them. 
 
 We have here two pleas — insecurity to slave 
 institutions, and a protective policy. 
 
 With regard to slavery, the whole history of 
 the Union shows that the National concessions 
 have from the very first been only too favourable 
 to the South. They began in the Federal Con- 
 vention, by conceding an addition to the claims 
 of the white population of the Slave States for 
 proportionate representation of three-fifths 
 their number of slaves. 
 
 The revolt of Texas from Mexico was fol- 
 lowed by her admission into the Union, against 
 the strong protest of all the free States, after 
 the re-establishment of slavery where it had 
 been already abolished, and this too when 
 Mexico and the United States were at peace. 
 A costly and sanguinary war with Mexico was 
 the consequence, only closed by the purchase 
 of additional territory and the assumption of 
 American claims; these alone amounting to 
 nearly four millions sterling, 
 c 2
 
 20 SLAVERY COMPROMISES 
 
 The Missouri compromise of 1820, pro- 
 hibiting slavery from the territory ceded by 
 France north of 36° 30,° after thirty-four 
 years' acquiescence in its provisions by both 
 North and South, has been recalled. 
 
 A new and more stringent law was 
 passed in 1850 to facilitate the recovery of 
 fugitive Slaves, and most, if not all, of the free 
 States have repealed their personal-liberty bills, 
 which to some extent obstructed its operation. 
 
 The ordinance of 1787, forbidding the 
 introduction of involuntary servitude into 
 the North-Western domain, and for which it 
 is upon record, that at the formation of the 
 Constitution that clause giving the right to 
 demand back "the person held to service or 
 labour in one State under the laws thereof 
 escaping into another," was given as an equi- 
 valent, has been abrogated by the " Dred- 
 Scott " decision of the Supreme Court — a de- 
 cision opening the whole territory of the 
 United States to the polluting influence of 
 that accursed system, preventing its abolition 
 in the district of Columbia, and clearly opposed 
 to the whole spirit, if not the letter, of the
 
 FUGITIVE SLAVES. 21 
 
 Constitution ; and yet we are gravely told, that 
 " power ill the liands of the South threatens 
 nothing in the North, seeks nothing from it, 
 desires to disturb nothing in it.'"^ 
 
 Moreover, it has been shown by Mr. Ken- 
 nedy, of the Census Bureau, that not more 
 than 1,000 slaves })er annum make their 
 escape from thraldrom. In 1860, out of 
 4,000,000 of slaves only 803 escaped — equal 
 to one-fiftieth of one per cent. Many of these 
 escape southwards and westwards ; some to 
 Florida; some to the dismal swamps, until 
 hunted out by bloodhounds ; a small proportion 
 only to Canada ; and many are recovered by 
 due process of law. That this is not a justi- 
 fication for rebellion, is evident from the fact, 
 that if separation could be effected, the alleged 
 evil would only be aggravated, because no law 
 of extradition would then exist, and the slave, 
 once succeeding in pressing his foot on free 
 soil, would himself be free. 
 
 " Up to the present period," says Mr. Spence 
 most correctly, " the Southern interest has 
 
 ' "The American Union," by London, ISGl, 1st editioa. 
 Jaues Spence, 115. Bentley,
 
 22 AWAKENING OF THE NORTH. 
 
 been paramount." Nearly all the presidents 
 have been Southern men ; Statesmen fanatically 
 attached to slavery, — which, whether re^rarded 
 economically or morally, is only an accumu- 
 lative curse, — have presided at her councils and 
 directed her policy. The North, absorbed in 
 commerce, and hitherto exhausting their love 
 for the Union in vapid words, have been the 
 passive instruments of Southern slaveholders. 
 But when the celebrated Ostend manifesto 
 foreshadowing the seizure of Cuba, the filli- 
 busterings of Walker in Central America, so 
 openly espoused by the South, the attempt to 
 seize upon Kansas, and, finally, the " Dred- 
 Scott " decision, had at last fairly awakened 
 Northern Freemen from their culpable indif- 
 ference, it was seen that the greed of slavery 
 was insatiable, and, if the Constitution was to 
 retain any vestige of the free spirit which 
 animated its framers, the hour for action had 
 struck. Hence the election of Mr. Lincoln as 
 the representative of a party not desiring to 
 interfere with slavery in the States, but to pre- 
 vent its further extension. And herein lies the 
 immediate cause of secession. In 1812 Mr.
 
 PLEA FOR SECESSION. 23 
 
 Calhoun bad declared, that whenever the 
 South ceased to control the nation, they 
 would resort to a dissolution of the Union. 
 That time had now arrived. 
 
 The second plea for secession, viz., the pro- 
 tective policy, will be more appropriately 
 discussed hereafter. Suffice it here to remark, 
 that pernicious as it always has been to the 
 true interests of both North and South, it has 
 never been objected to on principle by any 
 section whatever. Protection w'as inauiru- 
 rated at the very birth of the Union. The 
 preamble of the first revenue law ever passed 
 by Congress thus ran : " Whereas, it is neces- 
 sary for the support of Government, for the 
 discharge of the debts of the United States, 
 a7id the encouragcnieiit and protectio7i of manu- 
 factures, that duties be laid on goods, wares, 
 and merchandise imported." The great apostle 
 of protection was Mr. Clay of Kentucky ; and 
 Southern Legislatures have always advocated 
 a moderate adoption of this policy. The only 
 pleas, then, recorded as justifying revolution 
 are not causes, but pretexts, and serve only to 
 betray a foregone conclusion.
 
 24 IS SECESSION CONSTITUTIONAL? 
 
 But Mr. Spence goes far beyond this. He 
 claims for seceding States a right of revolution, 
 as founded upon the Constitution, and by an 
 appeal to authorities which, ^vhen faithfully 
 examined, appear to us totally opposed to 
 him, he would persuade his readers, that 
 " secession is a just and clear constitutional 
 right of the States, and no Yiolation of any 
 enactment of the Federal compact." 
 
 Dissenting entirely from Mr. Spence on tbis 
 subject, we propose briefly to analyze the Con- 
 stitution, in order to ascertain bow far he is 
 justified in his conclusions. We cannot agree 
 with those who say that the time for this Con- 
 troversy has gone by ; that the right of secession 
 has been practically assumed by the Southern 
 States ; that the only problems to be solved 
 now are, which is the stronger party, and what 
 will be the consequences of the struggle to 
 ourselves? On the contrary, we think that 
 both private judgment and national action 
 should depend upon the right solution of 
 the question, " Is secession a constitutional 
 right ? " 
 
 If the Southern States are only resuming
 
 SECESSION — REBELLION. 25 
 
 powers which they never entirely abandoned, 
 but only leased for an indefinite period to the 
 Federal Government, it is clear that, whether 
 their reasons for resumption be good or bad, 
 they are at any rate Constitutional; and the war 
 now waged against them is purely aggressive, and 
 deserving the reprobation of every honest man, 
 and every constitutional government, as one of 
 the most fearful outrages upon human rights 
 recorded in the history of civilization. 
 
 But if, on the contrary, secession is nothing 
 more nor less than rebellion not justified by 
 previous oppression of any kind whatever, or by 
 the slightest violation of any clause in the 
 Constitution, then we say that a President, a 
 Senate, and Representatives, who have solemnly 
 sworn "faithfully to preserve, protect, and 
 defend " that Constitution, would be utterly 
 unworthy the name of a government if they 
 did not do their utmost to uphold it. 
 
 The advantages that would result from a dis- 
 tribution of the States into two or more confede- 
 racies have been much discussed in this country. 
 In no case should we despair of the results 
 of their free government or their republican
 
 26 AMERICAN DIS-UNION. 
 
 institutions ^vithout the institution of slavery. 
 Nations, we know, soon settle clown after the 
 most violent commotions, and make the best 
 of their new circumstances. But this is a 
 question for the Americans themselves to decide, 
 and one in which we are not likely to inter- 
 meddle with any advantage either to them or 
 to ourselves. It is clear that its settlement 
 involves considerations of no ordinary magni- 
 tude, such as the navigation of the western 
 rivers, the possession of the territories, the 
 partition of the national debt, and the surrender 
 of National property in the several States. 
 Beyond all these, too, loom greater difficulties 
 to be overcome, and more serious risks to be 
 incurred. "First," says Lord Bacon, "let 
 nations that pretend to greatness have this, 
 that they be sensible of wrongs, either upon 
 borderers, merchants, or politic ministers ; and 
 that they sit not too long upon a provoca- 
 tion. Secondly, let them be prest and ready 
 to give aid and succour to their confederates, 
 as it ever was with the Romans." In Europe, 
 density of population, and the humanizing 
 influences of art and commerce, are fast con-
 
 EVILS OF DIS-UNION. 27 
 
 verting Bacon's advice from a rule of states- 
 manship to a curiosity of history. But in 
 America, under a dissolution of the Union, its 
 authority would for the first time be asserted. 
 The new frontier would be but one long- line 
 of military border. Trade and Commerce 
 would languish under the operation of hostile 
 tariffs and the constant dread of civil war. 
 Territorial disputes at home and entangling 
 alliances abroad would create the necessity for 
 standing armies, and impart an entirely new 
 character to the policy hitherto pursued by the 
 Republic both in its internal and external 
 relations. Well may the statesmen of America 
 hesitate before an alternative fraught with 
 dangers such as these.
 
 28 
 
 11. 
 
 THE COLONIAL GOVERNMENTS. 
 
 American freedom is not indebted for its 
 earliest manifestations to any union of the 
 States. Its germs were thrown broadcast over 
 all the various colonies established by the 
 mother country. No matter what was the 
 form of government — Royal, Proprietary, or 
 Charter — in every colony the principle of 
 representative government was early adopted, 
 more or less complete in its arrangement, but 
 always modifying or controlling the encroach- 
 ments of arbitrary power. 
 
 The royal governments comprised the colonies 
 of New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey, 
 Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia. Their 
 constitutions closely resembled that of the 
 mother country. Governors and councils were 
 appointed by the crown ; representatives by 
 the people. The council acted as an upper 
 house, and the representatives as a lower house,
 
 THE COLONIAL GOVERNMENTS. 29 
 
 while the governor had a negative on all their 
 proceedings. 
 
 The proprietary governments, comprising 
 Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, only dif- 
 fered from the royal in this, that in the appoint- 
 ment of governors the proprietaries stood in 
 the place of the crown and exercised, by federal 
 right, all its powers and privileges. 
 
 The charter governments were the most 
 democratic of all. They comprised the colonies 
 of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode 
 Island. In the first the Governor was appointed 
 by the Crown, the Representatives chosen by the 
 people, and the general Council, after the first 
 board, by all three. These constituted one 
 general assembly. In Connecticut and Rhode 
 Island, governor, representatives, and council 
 were all elected by the people. In all these 
 Colonies, however, the power of veto upon every 
 laM' was reserved with certain conditions to the 
 English Crown. 
 
 Thus, the enthusiastic Puritans of New 
 England, the gay Cavaliers of Virginia, the 
 quiet Quakers of Pennsylvania, all proceed- 
 ing from one common stock, alike exhibited,
 
 30 THE COLONIAL GOVERNMENTS. 
 
 amid diversities of government, the old ances- 
 tral repugnance to irresponsible authority. 
 Before the reign of King Charles II. all 
 the colonies in America possessed legisla- 
 tures in vv^hich the people had a distinct 
 voice in the enactment of their own laws 
 and the imposition of their own taxes. 
 
 No formal or extensive political connection 
 had as yet been established between them. 
 From this, indeed, they were prohibited by 
 the very terms of their relation to the mother 
 country. But, notwithstanding this, every 
 circumstance seemed to conspire for their 
 union. " All the people of this country," says 
 Mr. Jay, " were the subjects of the King of 
 Great Britain, and owed allegiance to him; 
 and all the civil authority then existing or 
 exercised here flowed from the head of the 
 British Empire. They were, in a strict sense, 
 fellow-subjects, and in a variety of respects 
 one people." 
 
 Each colony was independent of every 
 other, and none could confer rights and pri- 
 vileges to be exercised elsewhere ; but no 
 
 ' Stobt's " Com. Abridgment," ch. xvii. p. 75. Boston, 1833
 
 TENDENCY TO UNION. 31 
 
 alien law had ever excited popular antagonism, 
 — no war between them had left behind it the 
 desire for future revenge. On the contrary, 
 uninterrupted peace, and a free commercial 
 intercourse, secured by the legislation of one 
 parent State, had engendered feelings of 
 mutual goodwill. 
 
 Thus drawn together by the cord of one 
 common origin, — protected by one "common 
 law," and acknowledging one common sove- 
 reignty, — we are not surprised to note very early 
 attempts at " Union " in spite of prohibitions. 
 
 In 1643 the New England Colonies formed 
 a *' perpetual " league, offensive and defensive. 
 This league existed for forty years : its in- 
 terests were superintended by a delegated 
 Congress. Again, in 1754, a Congress of Com- 
 missioners, representing the New England and 
 several of the central colonies, resolved that a 
 Union was absolutely necessary for their pre- 
 servation ; and in 1765, after the passing of 
 the Stamp Act, nine of the Colonies sent 
 delegates to a Congress at New York, and 
 declared their inherent right of self-taxation 
 and trial by jury.
 
 32 THE COLONIAL GOVERNMENTS. 
 
 In 1774 a still more formal attempt at 
 union was made by Massachusetts. At her 
 instance a Congress of Delegates from all 
 the colonies assembled at Philadelphia. Re- 
 ferring their appointment " to the good 
 people of these colonies," they regularly 
 organized themselves by the adoption of 
 fundamental rules and a declaration of rights. 
 They claimed to be entitled to the "common 
 law " of England, and the benefit of such 
 English statutes as they had respectively 
 found applicable to their circumstances ; and 
 they adopted a petition of grievances to the 
 Crown, and demanded redress. 
 
 But such redress came not. In vain was 
 the heated oratory of Chatham and the phi- 
 losophic eloquence of Burke exerted on their 
 behalf in the English Parliament. Both these 
 great men urged u])on Lord North to recall 
 the troops and undo all legislation respecting 
 the colonies since the year 1765. Petitions 
 and remonstrances were stifled, or their prayers 
 disregarded. 
 
 The crisis of colonial empire had come and 
 passed. The hill -sides and river -banks of
 
 WAR OF INDEPENDENX'E. o.} 
 
 New Eiighiiicl were already ring-ing with sliarj) 
 peals of musketry. The King's troops and the 
 determined colonists had met, and the first 
 blood had been shed. On the 26th May, 
 1775, Parliament separated, declaring that 
 " if the Americans should persist in rebellion, 
 and the sword iimst be drawn, the faithful 
 Commons would do everything- in their power 
 to support his Majesty and maintain the 
 supremacy of the Legislature." Almost on 
 the same day, the second Congress of Colonial 
 Delegates met in Philadelphia. On this occa- 
 sion they organized a general system of physi- 
 cal resistance, and adopted a preamble which 
 stated " that the exercise of every kind of 
 authority, under the crown of England, should 
 be suppressed." They established a general 
 post ; they emitted a large amount of paj)er 
 money, pledging the united colonies for its 
 redemption, and they ajipointed General 
 Washinoton commander-in-chief of the forces. 
 It is more needful, however, to our present 
 purpose to point out that both these important 
 Congresses of 1774 and 1775 had consisted 
 of delegates chosen partly by the representa- 
 
 D
 
 34 THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT. 
 
 tive branches of the colonial legislatures, but 
 principally by conventions of the people, and 
 in some instances the choice of the former 
 was confirmed by the latter. 
 
 " Thus was organized," says Mr. Story ,^ 
 " under the auspices and with the consent 
 of the people, acting directly in their primary 
 sovereign capacity, and without the inter- 
 vention of the functionaries, to whom ordinary 
 powers of government were delegated in the 
 colonies, the first general or National Govern- 
 ment, which has been very aptly called ' the 
 Revolutionary Government,' since in its origin 
 and powers it was wholly conducted upon 
 revolutionary principles. The Congress thus 
 assembled exercised, de facto and de jure, a 
 sovereign authority, not as the delegated 
 agents of the governments de facto of the 
 colonies, but in virtue of original powers 
 derived from the People." 
 
 On the 4th July, 1776, the long -antici- 
 pated result arrived, and Congress passed the 
 celebrated " Declaration of Independence." 
 The foreshadowing idea of unity is embodied 
 
 ' Stoky's Commentaries, Abridgment, ch. i. 85.
 
 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. 35 
 
 in its very first sentence and through the 
 whole document. 
 
 "When, in the course of human events, 
 it becomes necessary for one rsorLE to 
 dissolve the political bands which have con- 
 nected them with another, and to assume 
 among the powers of the earth the separate 
 and equal station to which the laws of nature 
 and of nature's God entitle them, a decent 
 respect to the opinions of mankind requires 
 that they should declare the causes which 
 impel them to the separation." * * * * 
 
 " We, therefore, the representatives of the 
 United States of America, * * solemnly 
 publish and declare, that these united colonies 
 are, and of right ought to be. Free and Inde- 
 pendent States ; * * * * and that all 
 political connection between them and the 
 State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, 
 totally dissolved ; and that, as free and inde- 
 pendent States, tliey have full powers to levy 
 war, conclude peace, contract alliances, esta- 
 blish commerce, and to do all other acts and 
 things which independent States may of right 
 do. And for the support of this declaration, 
 D 2
 
 36 THE CONFEDERATION. 
 
 * * we mutually pledge to each otliei\ our 
 lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honour." 
 
 Almost simultaneously with the appoint- 
 ment of a committee to prepare this declara- 
 tion, a second committee was formed for the 
 purpose of preparing and digesting the form of 
 a Confederation. Congress agreed upon the 
 celebrated "Articles of Confederation" in 
 1777, but they were not adopted by all the 
 States until 1781. 
 
 It is important, however, to observe, that 
 prior to these articles, and in the same docu- 
 ment that severed their individual connection 
 with the mother country, the Colonies declared 
 that already they were " the United States of 
 America," and to that union had pledged each 
 other.^ 
 
 '" The separate independence and that without it we could 
 and individual sovereignty of neither be free nor independent, 
 the several states were never Let us then consider all attempts 
 thought of by the enlightened to weaken this union, by main- 
 band of patriots who framed the taining that each State is sepa- 
 Declaration of Independence, rately and individually indepen- 
 The several States are not even dent, as a species of political 
 mentioned by name in any part heresy which can never benefit 
 of it, as if it was intended to us, and may bring on ua 
 impress this maxim on America, the most serious distresses." — 
 that our freedom and inde- Charles Cotesworth Pi>'k- 
 pendence arose from our union, net, quoted ly Mr, Everett.
 
 THE CONFEDERATION. 37 
 
 Accordingly, tlie first article declares that 
 " the style of tliis Confederacy shall be the 
 United States of America." 
 
 But it was no part of their intention to 
 create a central government for the internal 
 regulation of each State ; hence the second 
 article asserts " that each State retains its 
 sovereignty, freedom, and inde[)endence, and 
 every power, jurisdiction, and right which is 
 not by this Confederation expressly delegated 
 to the United States in Congress assembled." 
 
 No two or more States could enter into any 
 treaty, alliance, or confederation whatever, 
 between themselves, make war, or send or 
 receive embassies. All powers granted to the 
 General Congress were limited and checked 
 in various ways. Thus, the assent of nine 
 States was essential to the exercise of most of 
 them, although every State was bound by the 
 decision of Congress ; the *' Articles " were to 
 be inviolably observed ; no alteration was to be 
 made therein but by unanimous consent, and 
 the Union was to be perpetual. These 
 Articles, in 1781, had been ratified by the 
 delegates from all the States, upon the in-
 
 38 DEFECTS OF CONFEDERATION. 
 
 sti'uctions of the separate Legislatures. Look- 
 ing at them as a Constitution intended to 
 bind together communities for general welfare, 
 each of them claiming to be sovereign and 
 independent, we are at no loss to perceive 
 •why they should have failed in their object 
 of perpetuity. The powers they conferred 
 were neutralized by the restrictions they 
 imposed. Congress, organized for national 
 objects, was thus made a subordinate body 
 — subordinate, not to any individual State, 
 but to the united approval of at least nine 
 States; and when such approval was given, 
 the means of carrying out the object were 
 left to the States themselves. In case of war 
 (then the immediate duty of the Congress), 
 each separate Legislature was to raise, officer, 
 clothe, and equip its own quota towards the 
 general army. Its quota was fixed by Con- 
 gress, but the taxes for paying that proportion 
 were to be levied by the sole authority and 
 direction of the State ; nor did there exist 
 any national Court where obedience, if re- 
 fused, could be exacted. Looking back over 
 the history of the struggle for independence.
 
 DECLINE OF THE CONFEDERATION. 39 
 
 we only wonder how, under such arrange- 
 ments, it was ever crowned with success. 
 
 The Confederation had, in fact, but "a delu- 
 sive and empty sovereignty." Its main defect 
 was that it had never obtained the consent of 
 the people. In the language of one of the 
 ])apers in the Federalist attributed to Mr. 
 Hamilton, " It has not a little contributed to 
 the infirmities of the existing Federal system, 
 that it never had a ratification by the teople. 
 Resting on no better foundation than the 
 consent of the several lec-islatures, it has 
 been exposed to frequent and intricate ques- 
 tions concerning the validity of its powers ; 
 and has in some instances given birth to the 
 enormous doctrine of the rigid of legidative 
 repeal. Owing its ratification to the law of a 
 State, it has been contended that the same 
 authority might repeal the law by which it was 
 ratified. However gross a heresy it may be to 
 maintain that a party to a compact has a right 
 to revoke that compact, the doctrine itself has 
 had respectable advocates. The possibility of 
 a question of this nature proves the necessity 
 of laying the foundations of our national Go-
 
 40 DECLINE OF THE CONFEDERATION. 
 
 vernment deeper tlian in the mere sanction of 
 delegated authority. The fabric of American 
 empire ought to rest on the solid basis of the 
 
 CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE." ^ 
 
 It is but fair to add that the Committee of 
 Congress, which had drawn up the Articles of 
 Confederation, were not blind to the difficulties 
 of their task. " To form a permanent Union," 
 says their report, " accommodated to the 
 opinions and wishes of the delegates of so 
 many States, differing in habits, produce, com- 
 merce, and internal police, was found to be a 
 work which nothino' but time and reflection, 
 conspiring with a disposition to conciliate, could 
 mature and accomplish." ^ 
 
 The revolutionary war being closed in 1783, 
 by the acknowledgment of the independence 
 of the colonies by the Crown of England, the 
 revolutionary Government began visibly to de- 
 cline. The Confederation became a "shadow 
 without a substance." The sense of a common 
 danger had in some degree suppressed the 
 
 • Federalist, 22. M'Lean, United States, vol. iii., 491, 
 
 New York, 1778. Capitals and Appendix. Sampson Low & Co., 
 
 italics sic. London, 1854. 
 
 ^ Cdrtis's Constitution of the
 
 DECLINE OF THE CONFEDERATION. 41 
 
 antagonisms of the States ; but, that passed 
 away, thej revived in all their force; and then 
 it was found that a union of thirteen sove- 
 reignties was an impossibility. There existed, 
 however, then as now, two great political 
 parties : the one clung with tenacious fond- 
 ness to tlicir State independence, and watched 
 with the keenest jealousy any contraction of 
 its sovereignty ; tlie other, without disre- 
 srardino' the claims of the State to its internal 
 government, desired the establishment of a 
 powerful and a National republic. 
 
 Between these two parties the Confederation 
 rapidly fell into anarchy and confusion.
 
 42 
 
 III. 
 THE CONVENTION. 
 
 In the previous chapter we have traced the 
 progress of democratic freedom, from its birth 
 in the separate colonies, through successive but 
 partial unions. It is very noteworthy how in- 
 stinctively at the approach of danger the 
 colonies turned for safety to the idea of union. 
 And this was something more than a union of 
 States: it was a union of people. When in 
 1774 its necessity had become pressing, and 
 delegates from twelve States were authorized 
 to consult together for "the common welfare ;" 
 and again in 1775, when the revolutionary Con- 
 gress represented all the States ; on both these 
 occasions, the delegates referred their authority, 
 not to the State Legislatures, but to the People 
 in their sovereign capacity. They had been 
 appointed principally by the citizens in Con- 
 vention ; and when not so, by the popular 
 branch of the Legislature only. A fatal de-
 
 ITS APPROVAL BY CONGRESS. 43 
 
 ])arture from tliis mode wus adopted in the 
 case of the Confederation, and tlie delegates 
 were chosen by the State Legislatures. 
 
 After the War of Independence had termi- 
 nated in 1788, that Confederation dragged on 
 through four years of a useless and dishonoured 
 existence. Still, " that Congress should forego 
 the right of originating changes in the system 
 of government ; that it should advise the States 
 to confer that power upon another assembly ; 
 and that it should sanction a general revision 
 of the Federal Constitution, with the express 
 declaration of its present inadequacy, were all 
 preliminary essentials to a successful reform. 
 Feeble as it had become from the overgrown 
 vitality of State poicer, and from the lack of 
 numbers and talent upon its roll, it was still 
 the Government of the Union ; the Congress 
 of America ; the lineal successor of that re- 
 nowned assembly which had defied the power 
 of Eno'land, and broufjht into existence the 
 thirteen United States. If it stood but the 
 poor shadow of a great name, it was still a 
 name with whicli to do more than conjure ; 
 for it bore a constitutional relation to the
 
 44 POLICY OF HAMILTON. 
 
 States, still reverenced by the wise and thouglit- 
 ful, and still necessary to be regarded by all who 
 desired the security of Constitutional Liberty."^ 
 
 It was Hamilton — than whom a purer or 
 wiser patriot never lived — who first saw, that 
 while Congress was practically unable to revise 
 its own " Articles," and was utterly powerless 
 under them as they stood, it was nevertheless 
 desirable to obtain its sanction for a new con- 
 stitution. He, whose "mature and energetic 
 youth, trained in the school of Washington, 
 had been devoted to the formation and esta- 
 blishment of the Union, knew too well that 
 if its golden cord were once broken, no human 
 agency could again restore it to life. He knew 
 the value of habit, the respect for an established, 
 however enfeebled, authority ; and while he 
 felt and insisted on the necessity for a new 
 Constitution, and did all in his power to make 
 the country perceive the defects of the old one, 
 he M'isely and honestly admitted that the assent 
 of Congress must be gained to any movement 
 which proposed to remedy the evil."^ 
 
 It was therefore resolved, that Congress 
 
 ' CoKTis, i. 362. " Curtis, i. 365.
 
 AUTHORITY OF THE CONVENTION. 45 
 
 should be called ii|)Oii for its sanction to a 
 revision, but not for the revision itself. 
 
 On 21st February, 1787, a resolution was 
 adopted by Congress, recommenduKj a Conven- 
 tion for the following May. 
 
 'And here let us observe that Mr. Spence 
 has made an error of no small importance in 
 our discussion. He states that the Convention 
 was " summoned by an act of Congress, which 
 strictly defined its object and powers in these 
 words — ' for the purpose of revising the Act 
 of Confederation, and for reporting to the 
 several legislatures such alterations and j)ro- 
 visions therein as should, when agreed to in 
 Congress and confirmed by the States, render 
 the federal compact adequate to the exigencies 
 of government and the ])reservation of the 
 Union.' " " There is clearly," Mr. Spence adds, 
 " no authority here to frame a new system, or 
 effect organic change, but simply to make 
 ' alterations and provisions, to effect a vigorous 
 reform ;' nor could the Convention desire to 
 exceed their authority, seeing that the next 
 step was to refer the instrument to Congress 
 for its approval, to the very source of their
 
 46 AUTHORITY OF THE CONVENTION. 
 
 authority, whose sanction was essential to the 
 success of their lahours." ^ 
 
 But Cong-ress w.is not " the source of their 
 authority," nor did they assemble with the 
 limited j)owcrs which Mr. Sponce describes. 
 It was only the sanction of Congress that 
 Hamilton had desired, and its " recommenda- 
 tion " for a Convention w^as all that was given. 
 It was not within the power of Congress to do 
 more than this. One of its acknowledged de- 
 fects was, that it could only " devise and 
 recommend." Any alterations in its constitu- 
 tion must have been agreed to there, but could 
 only be confirmed by the legislature of every 
 State. Nor did the originating of such altera- 
 tions necessarily devolve upon that body. It, 
 therefore, simply " recomnjended " the separate 
 State legislatures to appoint delegates to the 
 Convention for the purposes described in the 
 resolution. And thus Hamilton's politic idea 
 was realized in perfect accordance with the 
 Articles of Confederation. 
 
 It is, indeed, quite true, and so much we 
 concede to Mr. Spence, that so wide a scheme 
 
 ' The Americau Union, by James Spence, p. 222.
 
 CONVENTION HAD FULL POWER. 
 
 47 
 
 as an ultimate appeal to the jieople, for the 
 establishment of a Constitution which was 
 henceforth to act, not upon States, but upon 
 individuals, was not at that time generally 
 entertained. It was rather confined to the 
 master-minds of the country. But every speech 
 and letter on record from those eminent men 
 show that if the Convention had not been in- 
 vested with authority equal to its objects of 
 preserving the Union and giving to the Govern- 
 ment adequate powers, they would never have 
 entered it.^ 
 
 ' In 1786, a meeting of com- 
 missioners from all the States in 
 the Union was summoned by 
 Virginia at Annapolis. Twelve 
 only attended, representing New 
 York, New Jersey, Pennsyl- 
 vania, Delaware, .-ind Virginia ; 
 Tidadison, Kandolph, and Hamil- 
 ton, were of the number. Their 
 report declared — "That there 
 are important defects in the 
 system of tiie Federal Govern- 
 ment, is acknowledged by the 
 acts of all those States which 
 have concurred in the present 
 meeting ; that the defects may 
 be found greater and more 
 numerous than even these acts 
 imply, is at least so far probable. 
 
 from the embarrassments which 
 characterize the present state of 
 our national affairs, foreign and 
 domestic, as may reasonably be 
 supposed to merit a deliberate 
 and candid discussion in some 
 mode which will unite the senti- 
 ments and councils of all the 
 Stiites. * * * They are, however, 
 of a nature so serious as in the 
 view of your commissioners to 
 render the situation of the 
 United States delicate and 
 critical, calling for an exertion 
 of the united virtue and wisdom 
 of all the members of the 
 Confederacy. "-T/te Constitution, 
 by HiCKEY, 103. Philadelphia, 
 1848.
 
 48 INSTRUCTIONS TO DELEGATES. 
 
 It was almost in precisely the same words 
 as the resolution of Congress that the instruc- 
 tions to their delegates were framed by each of 
 the twelve States adopting this " recommenda- 
 tion." Some of them went even beyond this. 
 Thus, Virginia, Delaware, Georgia, and Massa- 
 chusetts instructed their delegates to " devise 
 and discuss all such alterations and further 
 provisions as may be necessary to render the 
 Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies 
 of the Union." Pennsylvania used thesame form, 
 but strengthening them by the w^ords ''fully 
 adequate^ The instructions of North Carolina 
 and New Hampshire were " to discuss and 
 decide upon the most effectual means to re- 
 move the defects of our Federal Union, and to 
 procure the enlarged purposes it was intended 
 to effect ; " and those of South Carolina, " the 
 devising and discussing all such alterations, 
 clauses, articles, and provisions, as may be 
 thought necessary to render the Federal Con- 
 stitution entirely adequate to the actual situa- 
 tion and future good government of the Con- 
 federated States." 
 
 Thus unfettered in action, the Convention
 
 PROCEEDINGS OF CONVENTION. 49 
 
 met. George Washington was its president, 
 and some of the ablest men tlien living in 
 America (" There were giants in those days") 
 were among its members. After four months' 
 protracted debate, on the 17th September, 
 1787, the States represented unanimously 
 adopted the present Constitution, and resolved 
 that it should be " laid before the United 
 States in Congress assembled." They also 
 declared their opinion that it should afterwards 
 *' be submitted to a convention of delegates 
 chosen in each State by the people thereof, 
 under a recommendation of its legislature, for 
 their assent and ratification," the result to be 
 reported to Congress, and, in these terms Con- 
 gress transmitted the Constitution to the 
 States.^ 
 
 Before reviewing the internal evidence 
 afforded by the Constitution, let us see what 
 were the intentions of its framers, as repre- 
 sented by such men as Washington, Hamilton, 
 and Madison ; and how far its opponents in the 
 Convention understood those intentions. We 
 perfectly agree with Mr. S])ence, that we are 
 
 ' Elliott's Debates, 248 ; quoted by Mansfield, 169. 
 £
 
 50 Washington's views. 
 
 more likely thus to find out what the Consti- 
 tution really is, than through '* the eloquence, 
 hoM'ever graceful, of partial advocates of the 
 present period." 
 
 So early as 1783, General Washington, when 
 giving up his command of the army on the 
 conclusion of the war, addressed a circular 
 letter to the Governors of all the States, 
 wherein we read these words : — 
 
 " There are four things which I humbly 
 conceive are essential to the well-being, I 
 may even venture to say, to the existence, 
 of the United States as an independent 
 ])ower : — 
 
 " First, — An indissoluble union of the States 
 under one Federal head. 
 
 " Second, — A sacred regard to public justice. 
 
 " Third, — The adoption of a proper peace 
 establishment ; and 
 
 " Fourth, — The prevalence of that pacific 
 and friendly disposition among the peoj)le of 
 the United States which will induce them to 
 forget their local prejudices and policies ; to 
 make those mutual concessions which are 
 requisite to a general prosperity ; and, in some
 
 Washington's views. 51 
 
 instances, to sacrifice their individual advan- 
 tages to the interests of the community." 
 
 " These are the pillars on M'hicli the glorious 
 fabric of our independency and National cha- 
 racter must be supported : Liberty is the 
 basis ; and whoever would dare to saj) the 
 foundation, or overturn the structure, under 
 whatever specious pretext he may attempt it, 
 will merit the bitterest execration and the 
 severest punishment which can be inflicted 
 by his injured country." 
 
 Enlarging uj^on the first of these necessities, 
 he says, that there should be lodged somewhere 
 a supreme " power to regulate and govern 
 the general concerns of the Confederated 
 Republic, without which the Union cannot be 
 of long duration;" and he adds, "whatever 
 measures have a tendency to dissolve the 
 Union, or contribute to violate or lessen the 
 sovereign authority, ought to be considered 
 as hostile to the liberty and independency of 
 America, and the authors of them treated 
 accordingly/ 
 
 ' SPAEKa' Life of Washington, viii. 445. Hilliard, Boston, 
 1835. 
 
 E 2
 
 52 Madison's views. 
 
 We have seen liow the Confederation, in 
 spite of the warnings of this great man, had 
 constantly declined ; but in his retreat at Mount 
 Vernon, a watchful eye and a thoughtful mind at 
 once marked its decline and considered its re- 
 novation. His correspondence with the leading 
 ])atriots of the day was incessant. He had 
 asked their opinions upon a new Constitution, 
 and among others, from Madison, who thus 
 replied: "Conceiving that an individual inde- 
 ])endence of the States is totally irreconcilable 
 with their aggregate sovereignty, and that a 
 consolidation of the whole into one simple 
 Republic would be as inexpedient as it is 
 unattainable, I have sought for some middle 
 ground which may at once support a due 
 supremacy of the National authority, and not 
 exclude the local authorities wherein they can 
 be subordinately useful."^ And Mr. Jay thus 
 addressed Washington on the same subject : — 
 '" What powers should be granted to tiie 
 Government so constituted is a question which 
 deserves much thought — I think, the more the 
 better, the States retaining only so much as 
 
 ' Sparks' Life of Washington, ix. 516.
 
 jay's and knox's views. 53 
 
 may be necessary for domestic purposes, and 
 all their jirincijjal officers, civil and military, 
 being commissioned removable by the National 
 Government * * * No alterations in the 
 Government should, I think, be made, nor if 
 attempted will easily take place, unless dedu- 
 cible from the only source of just authority, 
 the People." ' 
 
 General Knox's opinion is equally strong, — 
 " In my former letters I mentioned that men 
 of reflection and principle were tired of the 
 imbecilities of the jiresent Government, but 
 I did not ])oint out any substitute. It would 
 be prudent to form the jdan of a new house, 
 before we pull down the old one. * * * * 
 It is out of all question that the foundation 
 must be of republican principles, but so modi- 
 fied and wrought together, that whatever shall 
 be erected thereon shall be durable and 
 efficient. I speak entirely of the Federal 
 Government, or, which would be better, one 
 Govemmeiit, instead of an association of 
 Governments," ^ 
 
 These opinions were given, be it observed, 
 
 ' Idem, ix. 572. * Idem, ix. 515.
 
 54 LETTER TO CONGRESS. 
 
 before the Convention had met. On the eou- 
 ckision of its labours, a letter to Congress was 
 adopted, to accompany the Constitution, and 
 officially signed by Washington, as President. 
 From it we make the following extract: — 
 
 " It is obviously impracticable, in the 
 Federal Government of these States, to secure 
 all rights of independent sovereignty to each, 
 and yet provide for the interest and safety of 
 all. Individuals entering into society must 
 give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest. 
 The magnitude of the sacrifice must depend as 
 well on situation and circumstance as on the 
 object to be obtained. It is at all times diffi- 
 cult to draw with precision the line between 
 those rights which inust he surrendered and 
 those which may be reserved ; and on the 
 present occasion this difficulty was increased 
 by a difference among the several States as to 
 their situation, extent, habits, and particular 
 interests. 
 
 "In all our deliberations on this subject, we 
 kept steadily in our view that which appears 
 to us the greatest interest of every true 
 American : the consolidation of the Union — in
 
 LETTER TO CONGRESS. 55 
 
 wliicli is involved our prosperity, felicity, 
 safety; perhaps, our national existence. This 
 important consideration, seriously and deeply 
 impressed upon our minds, led each State in 
 the Convention to be less rigid on points of 
 inferior masfnitude than mio^lit have been 
 Otherwise expected — a spirit of amity and of 
 that mutual deference and concession which 
 the peculiarity of our political situation ren- 
 dered indispensable." ^ 
 
 Mr, Hamilton's opinions were no less deci- 
 sive than those quoted. They are thus given 
 in summary by Mr. Curtis — " All Federal 
 Governments are weak and distracted.^ lu 
 
 ' Elliott's Debates, 249, 
 ' The render ig here warned people for adoption, its advO' 
 against supposing that Hamilton cates were popularly called 
 would thus have spoken of the " Federalists," and its oppo- 
 present Federal constitution of nents "Anti-federalists," accord- 
 the United States. The fact is, ing as they favoured or opposed 
 that the term " Federal" en- the enlargement of the Federal 
 tirely changed its meaning after powers. Thus Hamilton was 
 the Constitution had left the no Federalist in 1787, when the 
 Convention. Up to that time it opinions in the text were ex- 
 had described a Federal, as dis- pressed ; but he was a Federalist 
 tinguished from a National sys- in 1788, and wrote a large num- 
 temof Government, such as that ber of the celebrated essays 
 established by the Articles of published under that name.— 
 Confederation. But, when the Vide Hist, of the Constitution, 
 constitutioa was before the Curtis ii., 497.
 
 56 Hamilton's views. 
 
 order to avoid the evils incident to that forrn, 
 the Government of the American Union must 
 be a National representative system. But no 
 such system can be successful in the actual 
 situation of this country, unless it is endowed 
 with all the jirinciples and means of influence 
 and power which are the proper supports of 
 Government. 
 
 " It must, thereforCy he made completely 
 sovereign, and State power, as a separate 
 legislative authority, must he annihilated ; 
 otherwise the States will be not only able, 
 but will be constantly tempted, to exert their 
 own authority against the authority of the 
 nation." And, speaking in the New York 
 ratifvino- convention, he said, " We contend 
 that the radical vice in the old Confederation 
 is, that the laws of the Union apply to States in 
 their corporate capacity. Has not every man 
 who has been in our Legislature experienced 
 the truth of this position ? It is inseparable 
 from the disposition of bodies, who have a 
 constitutional power of resistance to examine 
 the merits of a law.^ 
 
 ■ Eloquence of United States, i. 24.
 
 A PERMANENT UXION. 57 
 
 Wg have thus provcrl, we trust, by the 
 history of former colonial unions, and by the 
 recorded o])inions of some of the most influ- 
 ential fathers or framers of the Constitution, 
 that it was intended to establish an indisso- 
 luble union of the States, and the complete 
 unity, within prescribed limits, of the National 
 Government ; and that these were the great 
 ends to which all otiier objects were })ro- 
 nounced by the Constitutional Convention 
 of inferior magnitude. What, then, says the 
 Constitution itself ?
 
 58 
 
 IV. 
 
 THE CONSTITUTION.— ITS FOUNDATION. 
 
 We propose now to examine the Constitu- 
 tion of the United States, with special refer- 
 ence to the question discussed in the sixth 
 chapter of Mr. Spence's work — "Is secession 
 a constitutional ri^fht ? " availinjr ourselves of 
 such external evidence as may be found in 
 the writings or speeches of its framers. 
 
 This remarkable document is of no great 
 length. It is not written in technical phrase, 
 but in the language of ordinary life. It con- 
 sists of seven articles, and is subdivided into 
 sections and clauses. These relate to the 
 Legislature, the Executive, the Judicial powers, 
 the rights of citizenship, the admission of new 
 States; the amendment of the Constitution, its 
 binding force, its ratification, and a supplement 
 of amendments afterwards adopted. We shall 
 examine such parts as come within the scope 
 of our present inquiry.
 
 SOURCE OF AUTHORITY. 59 
 
 The preamble states : — " We, the People of 
 the United States, in order to form a more 
 perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic 
 tranquillity, provide for the common defence, 
 promote the general welfare, and secure the 
 blessings of liberty to ourselves and our pos- 
 terity, do ordain and establish this Constitution 
 for the United States of America." 
 
 In this preamble we have, first, the authority 
 on which the Constitution is founded — " We, 
 the People." Second, the objects for which it 
 is ordained and established. These are to form 
 a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure 
 domestic tranquillity, &c. Third, the subject 
 of it — the United States of America. 
 
 The authority, we observe, is the People of 
 the United States ; not those of the separate 
 States; still loss the States themselves in their 
 corporate capacity, as they were united under 
 the Confederation. The Constitution was 
 proposed by a convention recommended by 
 Confjress, the delofjates of which were com- 
 missioned by the State legislatures. It was 
 ratified by conventions of the people within 
 each State. It is therefore a Constitution
 
 60 *' ^YK, THE PEOPLE. " 
 
 proposed by the individual States, but receiving 
 its sanction and validity from the whole })eople. 
 Mr. Spence has endeavoured to fritter away 
 the meaning of this phrase, " We, the People," 
 by some very strange arguments, a few of 
 which we must notice. 
 
 " It has also been endeavoured," he says, " to 
 impart a peculiar force to this epithet by the 
 deduction that it ])roved the popular action, 
 and so gave the sanction of its being a direct 
 manifestation of the people's will. The defect 
 of this argument is, that of being directly 
 opposed to historical record. It is the fact, 
 that after the Constitution was framed by 
 delegates of the States, approved by the Con- 
 gress appointed by the States, and referred to 
 the legislatures of the States, it was finally 
 ratified by a convention called in each State 
 for the purpose." ^ 
 
 The words " referred to the legislatures of the 
 States" do not, as we have just shown, give the 
 exact truth. The Convention and the Congress 
 had alike declared that the Constitution should 
 go direct to the people ; and if Mr. Spence 
 
 ' The American Union, 224.
 
 " WE, THE PEOPLE." 61 
 
 means to say that it rested in any way with the 
 State legislatures to determine whether it might 
 or might not be so submitted, we reply it is he 
 who is " opposed to historical record." ^ 
 
 He objects to the mode in which the people 
 ratified the Constitution, viz., by conventions 
 of representatives. 
 
 He says, " the decision, whether to ratify 
 or not, was left absolutely to these conventions : 
 they acted independently on their own judg- 
 ment. Their decision, therefore, was an act 
 of the people, simply as a vote of the House of 
 Commons may be called an act of the people, 
 and in no other sense," ^ Certainly ! We ask 
 no other admission. Plow the sovereign power 
 chooses to act does not impugn the act itself. 
 The people, politically speaking, means simply 
 
 ' "Whereas the Conventiou tion and letter accompanying the 
 assembled in I'hiladelphia pur- the same, be transmitted to the 
 suant to the resolution of Con- several legislatures, in order to 
 gress, 21stFeb., 1787, did, on the be submitted to a conventiou of 
 17th September in the same delegates, chosen in each State 
 year, report to the United States by the people thereof, ia con- 
 in Congress assembled a consti- fonnity to the resolves of the 
 tution for the iKople of the United Convention made and provided 
 States, whereupon Congress** in that case.'" — Proceedings in 
 did resolve unanimously, 'That Congress, 13th Sept, 1788. 
 the said report, with the resolu- Mickey's "Constitution," 190. 
 '■^ The American Union, 224.
 
 62 OBJECTIONS OF PATRICK HENRY. 
 
 its organized portion. No legislature can ever 
 obtain the assent of all the people. Discon- 
 tented minorities there must always be ; and 
 were the objection good, no civil government 
 whatever could be said to have been founded 
 on the consent of the governed. 
 
 It is, however, more important to notice Mr. 
 Spence's next objection, since he commits, as 
 we will show, a flagrant error in respect 
 to the intention of the framers of the Consti- 
 tution. 
 
 Speaking of Madison, he says, "It so happens 
 that we have on record his interpretation of 
 this very phrase. In the ratifying convention 
 of the State of Virginia, Patrick Henry objected 
 strongly to the words " We, the People," on the 
 ground that the very construction might be 
 given to them which is attempted at the 
 present day. But Madison at once showed 
 such construction to be erroneous. lie replied 
 in these words, ' The parties to it were to be 
 the people, but not the people as composing 
 one great society, but the people as composing 
 thirteen sovereignties.' Not contented with 
 giving the true meaning of the phrase, he
 
 REPLY OF MADISON. 63 
 
 adduced an argument to prove it, by adding, 
 'If it were a purely consolidated Government, 
 the assent of a majority of the people would be 
 sufficient to establish it. But it was to he 
 binding on the people of a State only by their 
 own separate consent. This argument seems to 
 be conclusive, and as an interpreter of the 
 meaning of the terms, none will attem])t to 
 compare the authority of Mr. Motley, or of 
 Webster, with that of Madison." ^ 
 
 But what if Madison, Motley, and Webster 
 be, after all, agreed ? Let us see how stand 
 the facts. In the first place, Mr. Henry 
 worded his objection in reference to the final 
 result of ratification, and not to the act itself; 
 Madison's reply refers to both, and, when given 
 in full, shows Mr. Henry's idea to be per- 
 fectly correct. 
 
 Mr. Henry thus put it, "My jiolitical 
 curiosity * * * leads me to ask who 
 authorized them to speak the language of 
 ' We, the People,' instead of ' We, the States ' 
 * * * 7/" the States be not the agents of this 
 compact, it must be one great consolidated 
 
 ' The American Union, 225. Our Italics.
 
 64 OBJECTIONS OF PATRICK HENRY. 
 
 National Government of the 2icople of all the' 
 States^ ^ 
 
 On another occasion he exclaimed, " The 
 fate of America may depend on this question, 
 have they said ' We, the States ? ' Have they 
 made a proj)osal of compact between States? 
 If they had, this woukl be a Confederation ; 
 it is, otherwise, most clearly a consolidated 
 Government. The whole question turns, sir, 
 on that poor little thing the expression. We, 
 the Pcojjle, instead of the States of America." ^ 
 
 It was upon the first of these occasions that 
 
 ' Wirt's Life of Put. Henry, 281. Italics sic. 
 
 ' Idem, 286. Italics sic. 
 
 "It is also historically known the various conventions, suffici- 
 
 that one of the objections taken ently evincive of the extreme 
 
 by the opponents of the Con- caution and jealousy of those 
 
 stitution was * that it is not a bodies and of the people at large, 
 
 Confederation of the States, but it is remarkable that there is no- 
 
 a Government of individuals. It where to be found the slightest 
 
 was, nevertheless, in the solemn allusion to the instrument as a 
 
 instruments of ratification by Confederation or compact of 
 
 the people of the several States in their sovereign capa- 
 
 States assented to as a Con- city, and no reservation of any 
 
 stitution ; and although many i ight on the part of any State to 
 
 declarations of rights, many dissolve its connection or to ab- 
 
 proposilions of amendments, rogate its assent, or to suspend 
 
 and many protestations of re- the operations of the Constitu- 
 
 served powers, are to be found tion as to itself."- — Story's 
 
 accompanying the ratification of Abridgement, 120.
 
 REPLY OF MADISON. GIj 
 
 Madison replied in the words quoted by Mr. 
 Spence. But this gentleman does not com- 
 mence his quotation soon enough, and ends 
 it too soon. We will give it nearly in full. 
 " Even if we attend to the manner in which 
 the Constitution is investigated, ratified, and 
 made the act of the people of America, I can 
 say, notwithstanding what the honourable 
 gentleman has alleged, that this Government 
 is not completely consolidated, nor is it 
 entirely federal. Who are the parties to it ? 
 The people ; not the people as composing 
 one great body, but the people as composing 
 thirteen sovereignties. Were it, as the gen- 
 tleman asserts, a consolidated Government, the 
 assent of a majority of the people would be 
 sufficient for its establishment, * * * no 
 State is bound bv it as it is without its own 
 consent. Should all the States adopt it, it 
 will be then a Government established by the 
 thirteen States of America, not throu()h the 
 intervention of the Legislatures, but by the people 
 at large.'' ^ These last words form a most 
 
 ' Eloquence of United States : Madison in the Virginian Conven- 
 tion, i. 137.
 
 G6 WHO ARE THE " PEOPLE ? " 
 
 important modification of those only quoted 
 by Mr. Spence. It is his failure to distin- 
 guish between the mode of ratification and 
 its results that has blinded Mr. Spence to the 
 fjict that, by the Constitution, all sections 
 of the Union are united as one People. And 
 hence lie has been led into a justification of 
 the present rebellion, by appealing to the 
 Declaration of Independence, which declares, 
 that governments derive their just powers 
 from the consent of the governed, and to the 
 constitutions of the several States, all of 
 which embody the same declaration. But 
 this is a principle which requires the very 
 strictest interpretation, or it may be made the 
 apology for anarchy. Who are the governed 
 under the Constitution of the United States? 
 The people at large. AVhenever they desire 
 to alter that Constitution, it provides for their 
 doing so ; and, those means failing, and a 
 decided majority still withholding their "con- 
 sent," the recognized revolutionary right of 
 overturning the entire structure remains.^ 
 
 ' The question has often been ratification marks in any way 
 discussed, wliethei- this mode of the character of the Government
 
 WHO ARE " THE PEOPLE ? 
 
 G7 
 
 Two writers in the Edinhurfjh Review, 
 October, 18G1, and in the Quarterly Review, 
 January, 1862, have both fallen into Mr. 
 Spence's error. The former — in order to 
 prove his position that the Union has never 
 had the power of a National Government 
 supreme over the People, and after denying 
 that its Constitution was ordained and esta- 
 blished by a power superior to the States 
 in their corporate capacity — quotes some 
 words of Madison from the SOtli number 
 
 established by the constitution. 
 At present it is only necessary 
 to observe, that the design of 
 the committee was to substitute 
 the authority of the people of 
 the States in the place of that of 
 the State Legislatures, for a 
 threefold purpose. First, it was 
 deemed desirable to resort to the 
 supreme authority of the people, 
 in order to give the new system 
 a higher sanction than could be 
 given to it by the State Govern- 
 ments. Secondly, it was thought 
 expedient to get rid of the doc- 
 trine often asserted under the 
 Confederation, that the L^nion 
 ■was a mere compact or treaty 
 between independent States, and 
 that therefore a breach of its 
 
 articles by any one State ab- 
 solved the rest from its obliga- 
 tions. In the third place, it 
 was intended by this mode of 
 ratification to enable the people 
 of a less number of States than 
 the whole" to form a new union, 
 if all should not be willing to 
 adopt the new system. The 
 votes of the States in committee, 
 upon this new mode of ratifica- 
 tion, show that on one side were 
 ranged the States that were 
 aiming to change the principle 
 of the Government, and on the 
 other the States that sought to 
 preserve the principle of the 
 Confederation." — History of the 
 Conn Lit ul ion, Cuktis, ii., S5. 
 
 2
 
 68 CONSOLIDATION OF THE UNION. 
 
 of the Federalist explaining the mode of 
 ratification, and supposes they applied to the 
 final result. The ratification was undoubtedly 
 Federal ; the combined result was National. 
 But, in the former, the appeal was not made 
 to the legislatures of the States, but to the 
 people in the States, who were sovereign alike 
 over their separate constitutions, and over that 
 one which, when ratified by all, would be 
 supreme over all within its prescribed limits. 
 This explanation should never be lost 
 sight of in our study of the American Con- 
 stitution. 
 
 Our author has, indeed, committed several 
 errors in this part of his inquiry. His great 
 difficulty seems to be how a consolidated State 
 can be a Union. " Union without plurality is 
 a contradiction of ideas." But are we not our- 
 selves citizens of a Union, — a union of States 
 once sovereign and independent, still governed 
 bv their own laws, but which now form a 
 united kingdom and a consolidated State ? 
 The phrase we are now discussing can have no 
 bearing, he thinks, on the question, unless it 
 indicate a single community, — a " consolidated
 
 CONSOLIDATION OF THE UNION. G9 
 
 State." ^ But no one has ever contended that 
 the Federal Rejjublic is a " consolidated 
 State," but only a consolidated Union ; and 
 this designation was given to it by the General 
 Convention itself," and rejieated by all the 
 franiers of the Constitution. 
 
 Again, Mr. Spence supposes that the 
 inequality of the suffrage existing in the 
 several States is one of the proofs that the 
 Republic is not a single People or State. 
 "Were it founded in fact," says he, "the 
 first result, under a republican form of 
 government, Avould be uniformity of suf- 
 frage. The Constitution leaves it to each 
 State to ordain what suffrage it may please. 
 One State may have the most aristocratic, 
 and another the most democratic, of electoral 
 constituencies, without the slightest power in 
 the Federal Government to interfere with 
 either."^ 
 
 We have already said no one has ever 
 spoken of the Republic as a single State. 
 
 ' The American Union, 223. 
 
 * Vide Letter of Federal Convention to Congress, ante, 54. 
 
 ^ The American Union, 224.
 
 70 CONSOLIDATION OF THE UNION. 
 
 But Avill Mr. Spence say that the inequality 
 of suffrage in our own country — much greater 
 before the Reform Bill than now — is destruc- 
 tive of our political unity? And why must 
 a Federal Union, with a republican form of 
 government, necessarily have a uniformity of 
 suffrage any more than a monarchy ? Surely, 
 a Constitution formed by the people can pre- 
 scribe its own terms. Besides, it is not true 
 that " the Constitution leaves it to each State 
 to ordain M-hat suffrage it may please." The 
 words are, " The House of Representatives 
 shall be composed of members chosen every 
 second year by the people of the several 
 States; and the electors in each State shall 
 have the qualifications requisite for electors 
 of the most numerous branch of the State 
 Legislature.^' ^ 
 
 The American Republic is not a simple 
 Republic : it is a Republic of United States. 
 The people of each State are (within the 
 limits of a republican form of government) 
 sovereign, as regards their own constitution ; 
 and whatever suffrage they consider most 
 
 ' Coustitution, Art. i. sec. ii. 1. Appendix.
 
 CONSOLIDATION OF THE UNION. 71 
 
 desirable for their own most iiiimeroiis branch 
 of legislature, that, tlie Constitution ordains 
 for the corresponding branch of tlie National 
 Legislature ; while the Senate — also an elec- 
 tive body — must be chosen by the Senate and 
 representatives of the State combined. How 
 these arrangements prevent tlic inhabitants of 
 all the States forming, for special purposes, and 
 in all their relations to foreign Powers, one 
 single Peo])le, we arc at a loss to conceive.
 
 72 
 
 V. 
 
 THE CONSTITUTION, LEGISLATIVE AND 
 EXECUTIVE. 
 
 ARTICLE I. 
 
 Section I. All Legislative powers herein granted shall be vested 
 in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a 
 Senate and House of Representatives. 
 
 Section II. — 1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of 
 members chosen every second year by the people of the several 
 States ; and the electors in each State shall have the qualifica- 
 tions requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the 
 State Legislature. 
 
 Section III. — 1. The Senate of the United^States shall.be composed 
 of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature 
 thereof, for six years ; and each Senator shall have one vote. 
 
 4. The Vice-President of the United States shall be Pre- 
 sident of the Senate, but shall have no vote unless they be 
 equally divided. 
 
 These clauses of the Constitution strongly 
 indicate its real character. 
 
 When, in the Virginian Convention, Patrick 
 Henry laboured to show that the proposed 
 Constitution implied a consolidated Govern- 
 ment, Madison thus replied : " I myself con- 
 ceive, that it is of a mixed nature ; it is, iu a
 
 CHARACTER OF THE CONSTITUTION. /3 
 
 manner, unprecedented. We cannot find one 
 express ])rototype in the experience of the 
 world : it stands by itself. In some respects 
 it is a Government of a Federal nature ; in 
 others it is of a consolidated nature." ^ And 
 De Tocqueville thus describes it : " In this 
 case the central Power acts directly upon those 
 wiiom it governs, whom it rules, and whom it 
 judges, in the same manner as, but in a more 
 limited circle than, a National Government. 
 Here the term Federal Government is clearly 
 no longer applicable to a state of tilings which 
 must be styled an incomplete National Govern- 
 ment ; a form of government has been found 
 out which is neither exactly National nor 
 Federal ; but no further progress has been 
 made, and the new word which will one day 
 designate this novel invention does not yet 
 exist. "^ 
 
 Both these descriptions are perfectly accu- 
 rate. In the Senate, the Constitution is Fede- 
 ral ; for the representation is by States, and 
 directly springs from the State Legislatures — 
 
 ' Eloquence of United States, i. 137. 
 
 ' Democracy ia America, i. 138. American edition, 1838.
 
 74 CHARACTER OF THE CONSTITUTION. 
 
 each State sending two senators, irresj3eetive of 
 its size or population. And yet in action it is 
 not wholly Federal ; for, every senator having 
 one vote, one may be absent upon a division, 
 and the two are frequently found recording 
 their votes on opposite sides of the same ques- 
 tion. In the House of Representatives it is 
 completely National, for there the power is 
 derived directly from the People, and the 
 members count in proportion to population. 
 In the Executive department, it is chiefly 
 National, but in some degree Federal : the 
 latter, because to the Legislature of each State 
 is left the " manner " of appointing the electors, 
 with the proviso, however, that they shall equal 
 in number its senators and representatives to- 
 gether in Congress. Now, as these representa- 
 tives are in proportion to population, the choice 
 of the Executive becomes mainly National, 
 because it is decided by a majority of the 
 electors so appointed. It may, however, be in 
 a further degree Federal, under a contingency 
 which we shall hereafter have occasion to 
 explain. 
 
 The appointment of Vice-President lies also
 
 POWERS OF CONGRESS. 75 
 
 with the Pcoj)le, and, in case of need, follows 
 a similar course ; with tliis exception, that the 
 ultimate choice is \vith the Senate, who vote 
 by senators anrl not by States. The Vice-Presi- 
 dent is, ed'-officio, President of the Senate, and 
 in case of equal division, has a casting vote. 
 Thus a man who is the choice of the People 
 at large presides over the House, which is 
 elected by the States in their corporate 
 ca])acity. 
 
 ARTICLE I. 
 
 Section V. — 1. Each House shall Le the judge of the elections, 
 returns, and qualifications of its own members ; and a majority 
 of each shall constitute a quorum to do business ; but a smaller 
 number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized 
 to compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner, 
 and under such penalties, as each House may provide. 
 
 2. Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings ; 
 punish its members for disorderly behaviour ; and, with the 
 concurrence of tvyo-thirds, expel a member. 
 
 These clauses are entirely National in their 
 character, and are in accordance with the prac- 
 tice of our own House of Commons. They 
 both form a negative on State sovereignty. 
 The first is, of course, in constant operation. 
 The second can point to a precedent so early
 
 76 COMPENSATION TO CONGRESS. 
 
 as 1707, when the Senator from Tennessee was 
 expelled for " a high misdemeanour entirely 
 inconsistent with his public trust and duty as a 
 Senator ; " his offence being an attempt to 
 seduce an Indian agent from his duty, and to 
 alienate the affections of the Indians from the 
 authorities of the United States. He was after- 
 wards impeached.^ 
 
 ARTICLE I. 
 
 Section VI. — 1. The Senators and Representativea shall receive a 
 compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and 
 paid out of the Treasury of the United States. 
 
 Compensation to members of Congress for 
 their services is here provided for. It is " ascer- 
 tained by law." They are not paid by the 
 session, but by the day; and, in addition, a 
 mileage allowance for distance between home 
 and the seat of government is enacted. They 
 are not paid by the separate States, but from 
 the "Treasury of the United States." The 
 receipt of it is not optional : the words are — 
 *' They shall receive." Before doing so they 
 take a solemn oath " to su])port the Constitu- 
 
 ' Story's Comni., 299.
 
 COMPENSATION TO CONGRESS. 77 
 
 tion ; " and thus the compensation becomes, as 
 it was doubtless intended to be, an acknow- 
 ledgment of its National character. By the 
 first draft of the Constitution, each State must 
 have paid its own members, in accordance with 
 the old rule of the " Confederation ; " but, for 
 the reason we have now given, a large majority 
 of the States ultimately decided upon payment 
 from the National treasury. 
 
 " The compensation," says Story, *' is fixed 
 w^ith a liberal view to the National duties, and 
 is paid from the National purse. If the com- 
 pensation had been left to be fixed by the 
 State Legislatures, the General Government 
 would have become dependent upon the Go- 
 vernments of the States ; and the latter could 
 almost at their own pleasure have dissolved it. 
 Serious evils were felt from this source under 
 the Confederation, by which each State was to 
 maintain its own delegates in Congress ; for 
 it was found that the States too often were 
 operated upon by local considerations, as con- 
 trad istinoujshcd from fi:eneral and National 
 interests."' 
 
 ' Story's Comm. Abridgment, 306.
 
 78 THE EXECUTIVE. 
 
 ARTICLE I. 
 
 Section VII. — 1. All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the 
 House of Representatives ; but the Senate may propose or 
 concur with amendments, as on other bills. 
 
 Under the Confederation, the revenue was 
 raised by requisitions upon each State. But 
 the Constitution acts upon individuals, and not 
 States. Its power, as De Tocqueville says, "is 
 not borrowed, but self-derived." The right of 
 orffinatino- taxation rests therefore, as in our 
 own House of Commons, exchisively with the 
 representatives of the people.^ 
 
 THE EXECUTIVE. 
 
 ARTICLE II. 
 
 Section I. — 1. The executive power shall be vested in aPresident of 
 the United States of America. He shall hold his office during 
 the term of four years, and, together with the Vice-President, 
 chosen for the same term, be elected as follows : — 
 
 2. Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the 
 Legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to 
 the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which 
 the State may be entitled in the Congress. But no Senator or 
 Representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit 
 under the United States, shall be appointed an elector. 
 
 An amendment of the Constitution, very 
 exactly worded, provides that there must be a 
 
 ' Democracy in America, American edition, i. 137.
 
 ELECTION OF EXECUTIVE. 79 
 
 clear majority of the whole body of electors 
 to constitute an election ; and if this fail, the 
 choice from among' the three highest can- 
 didates is to fall upon the House of Represen- 
 tatives, where the votes are to be taken by 
 States — one vote from each State ; so that in 
 this case the election would be more Federal 
 than National — Rhode Island having the same 
 power as the Empire State. 
 
 We see, then, that in the United States the 
 choice of President is left, in the first instance, 
 to the people in every State, voting in propor- 
 tion to the population, by means of a double 
 election. Our own Crown is at once elective 
 and hereditary, for it is subject, by the Act of 
 Settlement, to the consent of Parliament. 
 The office of President differs from it prin- 
 cipally in this, that it is vacated every four 
 years, and that its occupant is chosen by the 
 People, and its ])ower controlled by their 
 representatives. In all other respects the 
 power of the President is not less than that 
 of the English Crown ; in one respect it is 
 practically greater, because the legislative 
 veto, being subject to reversal by the votes of
 
 80 
 
 VETO OF EXECUTIVE. 
 
 two-thirds of each House, has not fallen into 
 desuetude, and its use becomes a sort of appeal 
 to public opinion : thus, the very limit to its 
 authority is an excuse for its exercise. 
 
 Under the old Confederation there was no 
 President ; and no part of the present Constitu- 
 tion more clearly marks the intentions of its 
 framers to unite the American People as one 
 Nation, than this appointment.^ 
 
 There is no doubt that many of these arrange- 
 ments were the result of compromise between 
 
 ' " They (the Convention) 
 have not made the appointment 
 of the President to depend on 
 any pre-existing bodies of men 
 who might be tampered with 
 beforehand to prostitute their 
 votes ; but they have referred it 
 in the first instance to an imme- 
 diate act of the people of America, 
 to be exerted in the choice of 
 persons for the temporary and 
 sole purpose of making the 
 appointment. * * Another and 
 no less important desideratum 
 was, that the Executive should 
 be independent for his conti- 
 nuance in office on all but the 
 people themselves. He might 
 otherwise be tempted to sacri- 
 fice his duty to his complaisance 
 for those whose favour was ne- 
 
 cessary to the duration of his 
 official consequence. iThis ad- 
 vantage will also be secured by 
 making his re-election to depend 
 on a special body of represen- 
 tatives, deputed by the society 
 for the single purpose of making 
 the important choice. All these 
 advantages will be happily com- 
 bined in the plan devised by the 
 Convention, which is, that the 
 people of each State shall choose 
 a number of persons as electors 
 equal to the number of senators 
 and representatives of such 
 State in the National Govern- 
 ment, who shall assemble within 
 the State and vote for some fit 
 person as President." — Federal- 
 ist, No. 68.
 
 ELECTION OF THE SENATE. 81 
 
 the smaller and larger States, and yet they 
 miirht have been the sug-g-estion of the highest 
 political wisdom. Complicated as they appear, 
 they have been most efficient in their results. 
 Take, for example, the mode of senatorial 
 election. It forms the true conservative 
 element in the Constitution. We quite agree 
 with Mr. Spence in his approval of Mr. 
 Seward's declaration, " That the Republic 
 has been successful only by reason of the 
 stability, strength, and greatness of the indivi- 
 dual States." ^ We could say much the 
 same for our own monarchy, inasmuch as our 
 freedom, as a Nation, undoubtedly rests upon 
 the broad basis of our municipal institutions. 
 The constitution of the Senate satisfied the 
 smaller States of the North, and the larger 
 but less populous States of the South ; and all 
 have felt that in one branch of the Legislature, 
 at least, they were upon an equality. The 
 necessity of vesting the legislative power in 
 two Houses was rendered ])ainfully evident 
 by the experience of the Confederation. A 
 resort to the same sources for both would 
 
 ' The American Union, 230. 
 G
 
 82 ELECTION OF THE SENATE. 
 
 have been to give up one of the greatest 
 advantages of a second Chamber. On the 
 other hand, to have denied all control in its 
 formation to the sovereign People, would have 
 been to nullify the great principle of the 
 Declaration of Independence, that " govern- 
 ments derive their just po vipers from the con- 
 sent of the governed." The State Legislatures 
 had already been elected by the People. To 
 confide to their hands, therefore, the election 
 to the Senate, and in equal proportions, was at 
 once to satisfy the State and the People, and 
 yet in no degree to depart from the principle 
 of a National government. 
 
 It has been asserted, that the organization 
 of the Senate is a standing acknowledgment of 
 the complete sovereignty and independence of 
 the several States.^ Were this the case, so far 
 from its possessing a conservative and bene- 
 ficial influence, it would become the fertile 
 source of anarchy and confusion. Such sove- 
 reignty and independence were the great evils 
 of the Confederation ; and all contemporary 
 history shows that their limitation was one of 
 
 ' The American Union, 228.
 
 THE STATES NOT SOVEREIGN. 83 
 
 the principal objects of the Constitution. That 
 assertion, however, is not true. Each State 
 had confessedly the full power to accept or 
 refuse the Constitution. The concession of 
 equal representation in one of the Houses was 
 offered to induce unanimous adoption, and 
 succeeded with only two temporary exceptions, 
 viz., North Carolina and Rhode Island. But 
 the States having accepted it, sovereignty, in 
 the complete sense of the term, was at the 
 same time surrendered.^ Their separate and 
 independent existence thenceforth continued 
 for internal and municipal purposes. For 
 these, and these only, " the State," to use 
 Mr. Spence's own words, " is as supreme as 
 the Federal law. No question exists of relative 
 rank, of any superiority ; each is supreme in 
 its own department ; both are equally power- 
 less beyond it.^'^ The States are no more 
 separate for all National purposes than are 
 English counties, and far less so than Ireland 
 from England before the Union ; and they are 
 
 ' See Letter of the Federal Convention to Congress, accompany- 
 ing the Constitution, ante, 54. 
 
 ' The American Union, 213. 
 
 G 2
 
 84 THE CONSTITUTION SUPREME. 
 
 no more independent than our own munici- 
 palities, the sole difference being, that in their 
 case autonomy is secured by the supremacy of 
 a Constitution liable to amendment, and in 
 ours by the supremacy of a law liable to 
 change.
 
 85 
 
 VI. 
 
 THE SUPREME JUDICIARY. 
 
 One of the objects of the Constitution, as 
 stated in the preamble, is " to establish 
 justice." The want of a court of final appeal, 
 especially between the States and Congress, 
 bad been severely felt under the Confederation. 
 Congress could command ; but what if the 
 States would not obey ? No means of coercion 
 were provided. Requisitions had been laid 
 upon them for the expenses of the war ; but 
 even the struggle for independence failed to 
 arouse them to a sense of their duty. These 
 articles provided that every State should be 
 bound by the decision of Congress, and the 
 right, not only to make these requisitions, and 
 even to compel their payment, was never 
 doubted ; but the defect was in the means of 
 enforcement ; for the Federal army itself was 
 divided into sectional divisions; it was, in fact, 
 a collection of small armies from the separate
 
 86 THE OLD CONFEDERATION. 
 
 States, and had it been employed for such a 
 purpose, it would have looked more like one 
 State forcing another State, than an act of the 
 General Government, and civil war must have 
 been the result. In short, Congress was en- 
 tirely Federal in its character, and deficient 
 in the true elements of sovereignty. The 
 Union was nothing but a confederation, and 
 its articles a loose compact. The touch of an 
 armed hand upon any one of its links Avould 
 have broken the ill-connected chain. Hamil- 
 ton saw this, when he said in the New York 
 Convention, " Sir, if we have National objects 
 to pursue, we must have National revenue. If 
 you make requisitions, and they are not com- 
 plied with, what is to be done ? It lias been 
 well observed, that to coerce the States is one 
 of the maddest projects that was ever devised. 
 But can we believe that one State will ever 
 suffer itself to be used as an instrument of 
 coercion ? The thing is a dream. It is impos- 
 sible. Then we are brought to this dilemma : 
 either a Federal standing army is to enforce the 
 requisition, or a Federal treasury is left without 
 supplies, and the Government without support.
 
 NECESSITY OF THE JUDICIARY. 87 
 
 What, sir, is the cure for this great evil? 
 Nothinc), but to enable the National Government 
 to operate on individuals in the same manner as 
 those of the States do.'' ^ 
 
 Now, it is clear that in every country in 
 which order is to reig'n tliere must be some 
 tribunal, than which tliere is no higher, or the 
 will of every man will be a law unto himself. If 
 the Constitution was to be the " supreme law 
 of the land," who was authoritatively to inter- 
 pret its provisions and decide their applica- 
 tion ? To this important question, therefore, 
 the Constitutional Convention directed its 
 earnest attention, and to its consideration 
 Madison brought the results of very mature 
 study. We find in a letter to Washington, 
 some months before, an opinion thus ex- 
 pressed : — " The National supremacy ought 
 also to be extended, as I conceive, to the 
 judiciary departments. If those who are to 
 expound and apply the laws are connected by 
 their interests and their oaths with the par- 
 
 • Eloquence of the United States, i. 26. Mr. Spence has used 
 the former part of this quotation as if it had referred to the state 
 of affairs as they exist under the Constitution,
 
 88 DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 
 
 ticular States wholly, and not with the Union, 
 the participation of the Union in the making 
 of the laws may be possibly rendered unavail- 
 ing. It seems, at least, necessary, that the 
 oaths of the judges should include a fidelity to 
 the general as well as local constitution, and 
 that an appeal should lie to some National tri- 
 bunals in all cases to which foreigners or 
 inhabitants of other States may be parties."^ 
 
 One of the first resolutions which the Con- 
 vention adopted, in conformity with the re- 
 commendation of Congress, Avas, — " That a 
 National Government ought to be established, 
 consisting of a supreme Legislature, Executive, 
 and Judiciary." ^ But it was only after long and 
 earnest discussion that the Judiciary was in- 
 vested with the power to interpret the Consti- 
 tution. At one time they had decided it 
 should be placed with the National Legislature, 
 with whom they declared ought to vest a 
 ])0wer to " negative all laws passed by the 
 several States contravening, in the opinion of 
 the National Legislature, the Articles of Union, 
 or any treaties made under the authority of 
 
 ' Life of Washington, ix. 518. ^ Hist, of the Const., Curtis, ii. 22.
 
 DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 89 
 
 the Union." ^ To this principle Madison ;it 
 first assented. In tlie letter last quoted he 
 had " proposed that the Federal Government 
 should be armed with complete authority for 
 for all cases requiring uniformity of taxation 
 and the regulations of trade;" and he went 
 still further: — "Over and above this positive 
 ] lower, a negative m all cases whatsoever on 
 leo'islative acts of the States, as heretofore 
 exercised by the kingly prerogative, appears to 
 me absolutely necessary." Without this, he 
 feared there would be invasion of the National 
 jurisdiction, and discord among the States;" 
 and he afterwards, in Convention, suggested 
 that such a power might be vested in the 
 Senate.'^ But he seems to have given up this 
 idea for one equally effective, and likely to be 
 more acceptable to the States. Curtis tells 
 us that it was " at his suggestion a clause in 
 Governor Randolph's plan, authorizing the use 
 of force against a delinquent member of the 
 Confederacy, was laid aside, in order that a 
 
 ' Idem, ii. 51. Elliott, v. 139. 
 
 ' Life of Washington-, ix. 517. Italics sic. 
 
 3 Hist, of the Constitution, Curtis, ii. 54.
 
 90 THE FINAL INTERPRETER. 
 
 system might be framed which would render it 
 unnecessary."^ This was the National Judiciary 
 department." 
 
 It is the third power in the Constitution, 
 and exercises the same authority, within the 
 limits of the Constitution, over the people of 
 the United States, as the State Judiciary does 
 over State subjects. It was thus intended to 
 be the last appeal. All cases arising under 
 the Constitution, in law or equity, may be 
 referred to it. It cannot, indeed, exercise a 
 veto upon a State law, even when in violation 
 of the Constitution ; but it can produce the 
 
 ' Hist, of the Constitution, CuKTia, ii. 62. 
 
 * " It is a remarkable circum- substitute was to change a legis- 
 
 stance, that this provision was lative into a judicial power, by 
 
 originally proposed by a very transferring from the National 
 
 earnest advocate of the rights of Legislature to the Judiciary the 
 
 the States, — Luther Martin. right of determining whether a 
 
 His design, however, was to State law, supposed to be in 
 
 supply a substitute for a power conflict with the constitution, 
 
 over State legislation, which had laws, or treaties of the Union, 
 
 been embraced in the Virginia should be imperative or valid, 
 
 plan, and which was to be exer- By extending the obligation to 
 
 cised through a negative by the regard the requirements of the 
 
 National Legislature upon all national constitution and laws 
 
 laws of the States contravening, to the judges of the State tribu- 
 
 in their opinion, the Articles of nals, their supremacy in all the 
 
 Union, or the treaties subsist- judicatures of the country was 
 
 ing under the authority of the secured." — Hist, of the Consti- 
 
 Union. The purpose of the tution, Curtis, ii. 374.
 
 THE FINAL INTERPRETER. 91 
 
 same effect indirectly, inasmuch as a case 
 arising under that law may be decided by it. 
 The dignity of a State is therefore preserved, 
 while its subordinate character is recognized. 
 
 Nor was this negation of sovereignty any 
 innovation on pre-existing arrangements. 
 Under the Confederation, the separate States 
 had entirely and for ever divested themselves 
 of the right of deciding ui)on vexed questions 
 arising out of its articles ; and so complete 
 was this surrender, that it was made irre- 
 vocable without the consent of the Legis- 
 lature of every State.^ In like manner, it 
 was provided that all disputes arising between 
 two or more States, from any cause whatever, 
 must, as a last resort, be submitted to Con- 
 gress, who were to appoint a special court for 
 the purpose, whose " sentence or judgment 
 was to be final and decisive." The more 
 closely we compare the old Articles and the 
 new Constitution, we shall find that in this, as 
 in most other respects, the difference arises, 
 not so nmch in any new powers granted to 
 Congress, as in making the old powers effectual, 
 
 ' Vide Articles of Confederation 9 and 13, Appendix A.
 
 92 POWERS OF THE JUDICIARY. 
 
 by making them act upon individuals instead 
 of corporations. This alone was required to 
 change Congress from a lifeless anatomy of 
 States into the livins: and active orijanization 
 of one People — to convert what had hitherto 
 been a delusive and empty supremacy into a 
 substantial sovereignty, acknovi'ledged by all, 
 and, therefore, endued with all the vigour of 
 National life and the capabilities of permanent 
 greatness.^ 
 
 The Constitution ordains — 
 
 ARTICLE III. 
 
 Section I. The judicial power of the United States shall be vested 
 in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Con- 
 gress may, from time to time, ordain and establish. The 
 Judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their 
 
 • " It seems scarcely to admit a party ; 4. To all those which 
 
 of controversy that the judiciary involve the peace of the Confede- 
 
 authority of the Union ought to I'aaj, whether they relate to the 
 
 extend to these several descrip- intercourse between the United 
 
 tious of causes : — 1. To all those States and foreign Nations, or to 
 
 which arise out of the laws of that between the States them- 
 
 the United States, passed in selves ; 5. To all those which 
 
 pursuance of their just and con- originate on the high seas, and 
 
 stitutional powers of legislation ; are of admiralty or maritime ju- 
 
 2. To all those which concern risdiction ; and lastly, to all 
 
 the execution of the provisions those in which the State tribu- 
 
 expressly contained in the Ar- nals cannot be supposed to be 
 
 tides of Union ; 3. To all those impartial and unbiased." — 
 
 in which the United States are Federalist, No. 80.
 
 POWERS OF THE JUDICIARY. 93 
 
 offices during good behaviour ; and shall, at stated times, 
 receive ft)r their services a compensation, which shall not be 
 diminished during their continuance in office. 
 Section II. — 1. The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in 
 law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of 
 the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, 
 under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other 
 public ministers, and consuls ; to all cases of admiralty and 
 maritime jurisdiction ; to controversies to which the United 
 States shall be a party ; to controversies between two or more 
 States, between a State and citizens of another State; between 
 citizens of different States, between citizens of the same 
 State claiming lands under grants of different States, and 
 between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, 
 citizens or subjects. 
 
 2. In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers 
 and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, the 
 supreme court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the 
 other cases before mentioned, the supreme court shall have 
 appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with such ex- 
 ceptions, and under such regulation, as the Congress shall 
 make. 
 
 By the grant of these powers to the National 
 Judiciary, the State sovereignty is very greatly 
 curtailed. There is an exception to the autho- 
 rity of a State even between its own subjects, 
 and this can be exercised in those cases only 
 which arise within its own boundaries. By 
 various other clauses in the Constitution, the 
 States are prohibited from doing a variety of 
 things ; and powers not prohibited or delegated 
 to the National Government still belonn^ to
 
 94 
 
 THE STATES SUBORDINATE. 
 
 them or the People ; but it is by the supreme 
 Judiciary, and not the States themselves, that 
 all cases of doubtful prohibition, delegation, 
 or reservation must be decided/ The subor- 
 dinate character of a State is further shown by 
 the fact, that while the separate States can 
 in no case cite the National Government into 
 a State Court, the latter has the power to 
 
 » Writing in 1833, Mr. Jus- 
 tice Story says, " The Constitu- 
 tion has now been in full opera- 
 tion more than forty years ; and 
 during this period the Supreme 
 Court has constantly exer- 
 cised this power of final inter- 
 pretation in relation, not only 
 to the Constitution and laws of 
 the Union, but in relation to 
 State acts and State constitu- 
 tions and laws, so far as they 
 have affected the Constitution, 
 laws, and treaties of the United 
 States. Their decisions upon 
 these grave questions have never 
 been repudiated or impaired by 
 Congress. No State has ever 
 deliberately or forcibly resisted 
 the execution of the judgments 
 founded upon them ; and the 
 highest State tribunals have, 
 with scarcely a single exception, 
 acquiesced in, and in most in- 
 stances assisted in executing, 
 
 them. During the same period 
 eleven States have been ad- 
 mitted into the Union, under a 
 full persuasion that the same 
 power would be exercised over 
 them. Many of the States have 
 at different times within the 
 same period been called upon 
 to consider and examine the 
 grounds on which the doctrine 
 has been maintained, at the so- 
 licitation of other States, which 
 felt that it operated injuriously 
 upon their interests. A great 
 majority of the States, which 
 have been called upon in their 
 legislative capacities to express 
 opinions, have maintained the 
 correctness of the doctrine, and 
 the beneficial effects of the 
 power as a bond of union, in 
 terms of the most unequivocal 
 nature." — Story's Commen- 
 taries, Abridgment, 132.
 
 THE STATES SUBORDINATE. 95 
 
 cite the State before the Judiciary, The 
 decree, being final, implies too a power of 
 coercion. Suppose this coercion to be resisted 
 by force, that force becomes treason, which 
 is thus defined by the Constitution : — 
 
 " Treason against the United States shall 
 consist in levying war against them, or in 
 adhering to their enemies, giving them aid 
 and comfort." 
 
 We conclude therefore that the Constitu- 
 tion, by the powers given to its Judiciary, has 
 reduced the sovereio^n States into somethinsr 
 less than sovereign municipalities — merging 
 them all into one great Rei)ublic.
 
 06 
 
 VII. 
 
 POWERS OF CONGRESS.— TAXATION AND 
 COMMERCE. 
 
 The Congress shall have power — 
 
 ARTICLE I. 
 
 Section VIII. — 1. To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and 
 excises ; to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence 
 and general welfare of the United States. But all duties, 
 imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United 
 States : 
 
 2. To borrow money on the credit of the United States : 
 
 3. To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among 
 the several States, and with the Indian tribes : 
 
 4. To establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and 
 uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the 
 United States : 
 
 5. To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign 
 coin ; and fix the standard of weights and measures : 
 
 6. To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the secu- 
 rities and current coin of the United States : 
 
 7. To establish post-offices and post-roads : 
 
 8. To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by 
 securing, for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclu- 
 sive right to their respective writings and discoveries : 
 
 Section IX. — 1. The migration or importation of such persona as 
 any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, 
 shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one
 
 TAXATION AND COMMERCE. 97 
 
 thousand eight hundred and eight ; but a tax or duty may 
 be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for 
 each person. 
 
 4. No capitation, or other direct tax, shnll be laid, unless 
 in proportion to the census or enumeration hereinbefore 
 directed to be taken. 
 
 5. No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from 
 any State. 
 
 6. No preference shall be given by any regulation of Com- 
 merce or revenue to the Ports of one State over those of 
 another ; nor shall vessels bound to, or from, one State, be 
 obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another. 
 
 Section X. — 1. No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or 
 confederation ; grant letters of marque and reprisal ; coin money ; 
 emit bills of credit ; make anything but gold and silver coin 
 a tender in payment of debts ; pass any bill of attainder, e.r 
 post faclo law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts ; or 
 grant any title of nobility. 
 
 2. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any 
 imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be 
 absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws ; and the 
 net produce of all duties and imposts laid by any State on 
 im|)orts or exports shall be for the use of the treasury of the 
 United States, and all such laws shall be subject to the revision 
 and control of the Congress. 
 
 We have here selected from the Constitu- 
 tion those clauses by which the people have 
 coiifitled to Congress powers to levy taxation 
 and regulate commerce. Some of these are 
 held concurrently with similar powers retained 
 by the several States. Thus, for example, a 
 State can levy taxes, but only locally and for 
 
 H
 
 98 REGULATION OF COMMERCE. 
 
 local purposes ; can borrow money, but only 
 on its own credit; can regulate its internal 
 trade ; can establish a bankrupt law for its 
 own subjects. But with Congress exclusively 
 rests the regulations of commerce with foreign 
 nations, between the several States, and with 
 the Indian tribes, tliough dwelling within a 
 State ; uniform laws of naturalization ; the 
 postal service ; and patent rights. 
 
 The surrender of State sovereignty is very 
 completely shown by the exclusive powers 
 given to the National Government to regulate 
 commerce. Under the Confederation these 
 ])owers were retained by the States. At the 
 close of the war Congress applied to each of 
 them for authority to make foreign commercial 
 treaties.^ Some refused ; while others conceded 
 it with conditions so impracticable that no 
 action could be taken. The evil became so 
 intolerable, that Virginia placed it as one of 
 the leading purposes of the constitutional con- 
 vention, and so it was considered in its delibe- 
 rations.^ The duties of that Convention were 
 twofold, viz., to consider " the great objects for 
 
 ' Hiat. of the Constitution, Curtis, ii. 298. ' Idem, ii. 12.
 
 PROTECTIVE TARIFFS. 99 
 
 which the Federal Government was instituted," 
 and " the exigencies of tlio Union." Taxes 
 for the national defence and the general wel- 
 fare must be classed among the former ; the 
 complete power to regulate commerce, among 
 the latter. 
 
 The attempt has been made by Mr. Spence 
 and others to justify the present rebellion of 
 the Southern States, on the plea that American 
 tariffs have been unconstitutional. It has been 
 urged that Congress had no power to impose 
 duties for the protection of domestic manufac- 
 tures ; and South Carolina has been pointed 
 out as a State nullifying upon this ground, and 
 to the extent of actual resistance, the tariff act 
 of 1828. It becomes, therefore, important to 
 see what the framers of the Constitution really 
 intended by the words " to regulate com- 
 merce," and what the Constitution itself says. 
 
 The Constitution forbids, — 
 
 First, — Direct taxes not in proportion to 
 population. 
 
 Second, — Taxes on exports. 
 
 Third, — Any preference of one port over 
 II 2
 
 100 PROTECTIVE TARIFFS. 
 
 another, or one part of the Union over 
 another. 
 
 The Constitution permits — Taxes, duties or 
 imposts on imi)orts, and grants a special power 
 of prohibiting the importation of slaves after 
 the year 1808. 
 
 But it expressly forbids any State from 
 levying duties either on exports or imports, 
 with one slight exception, and that subject to 
 the control of Congress. 
 
 It is clear, then, that with the three 
 exceptions named, the right of Congress is 
 both " plenary and indefinite," ^ to " collect 
 taxes," in order to '* provide for the com- 
 mon defence," and " to lay duties and im- 
 posts " for the " general welfare of the United 
 States." 
 
 It is said, however, that duties imposed with 
 the double object of revenue and protection do 
 not meet these requirements : that revenue is 
 not raised, and, protection being only sectional, 
 the general welfare is sacrificed. But is not 
 this deciding the question by our own modern 
 notions of free trade, and not by the intentions 
 
 ' Hamilton's Report aa Secretary of the Treasury, ia 1791.
 
 Washington's views. 101 
 
 of those who framed the Constitution, or the 
 decisions of that Supreme Court ordained to 
 be its interpreter? 
 
 Mr. Spence has argued as if American tariffs 
 have protected every Northern citizen at tlie 
 expense of every Southern. " Is it not a viola- 
 tion," he asks, " of the Constitution so to im- 
 pose taxation, that it shall benefit one portion 
 of the Union at the expense of the other ? " ^ 
 Were it so, we should unhesitatingly answer 
 •' Yes," But this could only be done by a 
 partial tax on the South, or a tax on such 
 commodities as the South only consume. 
 Neither has ever been attempted. 
 
 Free trade and protective tariffs are still 
 the subjects for discussion in our own country, 
 althouij^h John Bright and Richard Cobden 
 long ago settled the (juestion. But in the 
 early days of the Republic, the former was 
 a new doctrine. 
 
 Washington said, " The promotion of 
 domestic manufactures will, in my concep- 
 tion, be among the first consequences which 
 may naturally be expected to flow from 
 
 ' The American Union, 192.
 
 102 Madison's views. 
 
 an energetic government."^ And he was 
 ])rou(l to address La Fayette thus : — " I have 
 been writing to our friend, General Knox, 
 to procure homespun broadcloth, of the Hart- 
 ford fabric, to make a suit of clothes for 
 7nyself. T hope it will not be a great while 
 before it will be unfashionable for a gentleman 
 to appear in any other dress. Indeed, we have 
 already been too long subject to British pre- 
 judices. I use no porter or cheese in my family 
 but such as is made in America." ^ 
 
 Madison, although considered a free trader, 
 thus spoke in his message of December, 1815 : 
 — " However wise the theory may be, which 
 leaves to the sagacity and interest of indivi- 
 duals the application of their industry and 
 resources, there are in this, as in other cases, 
 exceptions to the general rule. * * * In 
 selecting the branches more especially entitled 
 to the public patronage, a preference is 
 obviously claimed by such as will relieve the 
 United States from a dependence on foreign 
 supplies, ever subject to casual failure, for 
 
 ' Life of Washington, xii. 141. April, 1789. 
 * Idem, ix. 465. 1789.
 
 story's opinion. 103 
 
 articles necessary for the public defence, or 
 connected with the primary wants of indi- 
 viduals." 
 
 And, finally, Justice Story has said, "The 
 very first Conirress that ever sat under the 
 Constitution, composed in a considerable de- 
 gree of those who had framed or assisted in 
 the discussion of its provisions in the State 
 Conventions, deliberately adopted this view of 
 the power. And what is most remarkable, 
 upon a subject of deep interest and excite- 
 ment, which at the time occasioned long and 
 vehement debates, not a single syllable of 
 doubt was breathed from any quarter against 
 the constitutionality of protecting agriculture 
 and manufactures by laying duties, although 
 the intention to protect and encourage them 
 was constantly avowed. Nay, it was contended 
 to be a paramount duty upon the faithful 
 fulfilment of which the Constitution had been 
 adopted, and the omission of which would 
 be a political fraud, without a whisper of 
 dissent from any side. It was demanded by 
 the people from various parts of the Union, 
 and was resisted by none. Yet, State jealousy
 
 104i REGULATION OF COMMERCE. 
 
 was never more alive than at this period, and 
 State interests never were more actively 
 niinoled in the debates of Con^^ress." ^ 
 
 It may be said, that at any rate, prohibitory 
 duties are unconstitutional — that the ])ower 
 given is a power to regulate commerce, but not 
 to destroy it ; and the objection seems, at first 
 sight, plausible. It was the argument used by 
 the New England States, in their opposition 
 to the Embargo Act of 1807; but a decree of 
 the Supreme Court, settling the question 
 against them, was acquiesced in. That Court 
 has repeatedly decided that the word commerce 
 embraces the "buying, selling, and interchange 
 of all commodities, as well as navigation and 
 intercourse."^ The regulation of commerce, 
 therefore, extends to its facilities, such as the 
 construction of buoys and beacons, and to the 
 removal of obstructions in rivers and bays. 
 Under this wide range, too, embargoes and 
 prohibitions in navigation have been re])eatedly 
 enacted, either for purposes of retaliation, or 
 
 ' Story's Commentaries on the Constitution, Abridgment, 377. 
 Boston, 1833. 
 
 * 9 Wheaton's "Rep., 189. 2 Story's Com., 506.
 
 EXAMPLE OF ENGLAND. 105 
 
 to obtain reciprocity of advantages. It is clear, 
 tlierefore. that, regarding the Constitution 
 itself, the intentions of its framers, or the 
 practice of successive Governments — nearly all 
 of Southern election — the limit thus proposed 
 to be put upon Congress, in regard to taxation, 
 is not justified by the Constitution. 
 
 And when the adoption of even excessive 
 ])rotection is brought forward, in order to 
 justify rebellion, it is well to turn back a few 
 of the pages of our history to note how recent 
 is our own conversion from a similar policy. 
 It is England, whose proud boast has been, 
 that her mission is " to teach the nations how 
 to live," which has set the example of poisoning 
 the sources of national prosperity by commer- 
 cial restrictions. More especially is she respon- 
 sible, for this fatal lesson, to the United States. 
 xVs colonies, both their export and import trade 
 was confined by law entirely to the mother 
 country. So strictly did we enforce this, that, 
 to use the words of Mr. Huskisson, " every 
 petty adventure in which the colonies embarked 
 was viewed, by the merchants of this country 
 and the Board of Trade, as an encroachment
 
 106 EXAMPLE OF ENGLAND. 
 
 upon the commercial monopoly of Great 
 Britain." The Eng-lish idea of a colony used 
 to be an extension of the Mother Country, but 
 without rei)resentation in Parliament, and an 
 exclusive market for English productions. 
 " The colonists of North America," exclaimed 
 Lord Chatham, " have no right to manufacture 
 even a nail for a horse-shoe." " The only use 
 of American colonies, or West India Islands," 
 said Lord Sheffield, "is the monopoly of their 
 consumption, and the carriage of their produce." 
 This was the principle universally acknow- 
 ledged, both by commercial men and the 
 statesmen of the day, and tlms, up to 1822, 
 our colonial ports were rigidly barred against 
 the admission of foreign ships, or foreign 
 manufactures. After the recognition of Ameri- 
 can Independence, the United States for 
 several years endeavoured to obtain from us a 
 treaty of navigation, with reciprocal advantages. 
 But England, intent on supporting the mono- 
 poly of her ship-owners in the carrying of British 
 produce, absolutely refused, and at length the 
 young Republic retaliated with restrictions 
 similar to our own. For nearly thirty years
 
 EXAMPLE OF ENGLAND. 107 
 
 the absurdity was exhibited of American ships 
 coming 3,000 miles, with cargoes of cotton, 
 rice, and tobacco, accompanied by English 
 ships in ballast; and English ships returning 
 upon the same route with English produce in 
 payment, accompanied by American ships in 
 ballast. This ruinous system was not terminated 
 until 1815, when the first inroad was made 
 upon those celebrated navigation laws, which 
 l)ad so long been vaunted as a monument of 
 human wisdom, and the source of our com- 
 mercial and maritime greatness, by a reciprocity 
 treaty with the United States. In the mean- 
 time, however, the natural results of mutual 
 restrictions, and the adoi)tion of our own 
 protective policy, had very greatly encouraged 
 American manufactures. Our own tariff, too, 
 had undergone no revision. The importation 
 of American corn w\as prohibited, until the 
 utmost distress, or even impending famine, 
 compelled its admission. American rice, 
 tobacco, and cotton, were all heavily taxed. 
 Colonial discriminations affected every article 
 of im])ort. Manufacturing and agricultural 
 industry were alike "protected" by enormous
 
 108 AMERICAN RETALIATION. 
 
 duties. Not a single article of consumption 
 ever came into fair competition with the same 
 article from abroad. Linen, for example, was 
 protected by duties varying from 40 to 180 per 
 cent., with heavy bounties on its export, and 
 woollen and silk manufactures in like manner; 
 while their raw materials were subject to heavy 
 duties, in some cases to the extent of j)ro- 
 hibition. 
 
 In 1820, the United States still further 
 raised their tariff, not less avowedly in retalia- 
 tion for our restrictions, than for still further 
 protection. Mr. Addington, our Minister at 
 Washington, thus wrote to Mr. Canning in 
 1821 : — " I have only to add, tliat had no 
 restrictions on the import of foreign commerce 
 existed in Great Britain, the tariff would never 
 have passed either House of Congress, since 
 the agricultural States, and especially Pennsyl- 
 vania^ would have opposed its enactment." 
 
 It was not until 1825 that the first innova- 
 tion was made by us on this wretched system, 
 upon the principle as laid down by Mr. Huskis- 
 son, that if 30 per cent. (!) would not sufficiently 
 protect an industry, there was no wisdom in
 
 EEFORM IN ENGLAND. 109 
 
 bolstering it up bj a higher duty. And still 
 the producers of sugar, coffee, timber, and corn 
 were exempted from even this " wholesome 
 competition." 
 
 A further advance towards a free-trade 
 policy was made by Sir Robert Peel, in 1842, 
 followed, as we all recollect, by the most 
 dismal vaticinations of wretchedness and ruin. 
 Nor, finally, must it be forgotten, that in spite 
 of the advantages wdiich, it was universally 
 acknowledged, had falsified those prophecies, 
 we were, in 1852, threatened with a reversal 
 of that policy during the short return of the 
 Conservative party to power. Our own his- 
 tory, therefore, gives us no right to sneer at 
 the United States for their adoption of protec- 
 tive tariffs, still less to admit them as justify- 
 ing rebellion. 
 
 We have no defence, however, to offer for 
 American tariffs. They have all been enor- 
 mous blunders. If ever a country was marked 
 out by nature for unrestricted intercourse, that 
 country is the United States. With a domi- 
 nion stretching from the Atlantic to the 
 Pacific, comprehending every variety of soil
 
 110 AMERICAN FOLLY 
 
 and climate, and watered by numerous rivers, 
 some of them navigable for thousands of miles 
 from their source ; bounded on the north by 
 lakes wliich are indeed inland seas ; with inex- 
 haustible mines of coal, iron, lead, copper, and 
 zinc stored up within its limits ; with an 
 endless supply of forest timber, and immense 
 tracts of unbroken land, it would seem that 
 here at least might industry be suffered to 
 take a free course without let or hindrance 
 from meddling legislation. And yet, strange 
 to say, it is here, amidst this profusion of 
 natural advantages, that the false policy of 
 protection has made its home, and even appro- 
 priated to itself the doubtful honour of being 
 called " the American System." 
 
 The Morrill tariff, the latest and worst 
 specimen of this system, was however passed 
 after secession had commenced, and cannot 
 therefore be regarded as one of its causes. 
 Mr. Spence has descanted with extreme 
 fervour upon its complications and absurdities. 
 The task is unfortunately but too easy, 
 although Mr. Gary, the well-known American 
 economist, has shown that, in this respect,
 
 TAXES TKE CONSUMER. Ill 
 
 it is exceeded by tlie late French treaty.^ 
 But far too much has been made of the 
 Southern grievance of manufacturing protec- 
 tion. All taxes on commodities fall upon the 
 consumer ; and, as consumption has always 
 been heavier among the vast thriving popula- 
 tion of the North, than among the slave- 
 owners and mean whites of the South (the 
 consumption of slaves hardly entering into the 
 calculation), it is the former who have been 
 the principal sufferers. It is also a recognized 
 truth in political economy, that protective 
 duties, though they are paid sometimes twice 
 over by the consumer, but seldom go into 
 the pockets of the producer. When actually 
 necessary to ensure production, they are lost 
 in its extra cost ; and when not so, the con- 
 stant tendency to equalization of all profits 
 soon sweeps away the temporary advantage. 
 We see this clearly enough now, and it is 
 equally amusing for those who have borne the 
 burden and heat of the controversy, to note 
 how oracular some men have become upon 
 a subject which, only a few years ago, 
 
 ' Appendix D.
 
 112 REGULATION OF COMMERCE. 
 
 divided even the statesmen of our own 
 country. 
 
 Tlie power to regulate foreign commerce is 
 an attribute of sovereignty, and no state can 
 properly be called sovereign which does not 
 possess it. Under the Confederation it had, 
 as we have seen, been retained by the separate 
 States, only to be used for mutual injury and 
 restraint. High countervailing duties in one 
 State had co-existed with low duties on the 
 same articles in another, the smuggler receiv- 
 ing a large proportion of the difference, and 
 each State had consulted its own supposed 
 interest without the slightest regard to the 
 welfare of the others. But in the ratification 
 of the Constitution, this vicious power was 
 surrendered to the National Government : 
 the immediate effect was, and the convention 
 so intended it to be, to unite the American 
 people as one nation, instead of a Confedera- 
 tion of States, and as such they are known to 
 the nations and governments of Europe. 
 Where would be the security for their public 
 loans, and for the observance of their com- 
 mercial treaties, if every State had the right
 
 A SOVEREIGN POWER. 113 
 
 upon her own judgment of nullifying an -Act 
 of Congress, and of seceding from her respon- 
 sibility, if that act were not repealed ? And 
 yet this is the conservative view of the sacred- 
 ness of a Constitution solemnly ordained and 
 established ! How could such right co-exist 
 with that clause which prescribes uniformity 
 as essential for every tax, since one single 
 State objecting would thereby destroy that 
 uniformity, and by thus compelling a repeal 
 miofht override the decision of all the other 
 States ? 
 
 American tariffs have been passed by Legis- 
 latures fairly elected by the People, on the 
 widest possible suffrage in the North, and by a 
 suffrage in the South which gives to every 
 slave State an additional power equal to three- 
 fifths the number of its slaves. No pretence 
 can, therefore, be set up that they inflict 
 taxation without representation. Erroneous 
 as they are, they have fulfilled the conditions 
 of their enactment, that the duties they have 
 levied should be *' uniform throughout the 
 United States."
 
 114 
 
 VIII. 
 NATIONAL DEFENCE. 
 
 AETICLE I. 
 
 Section VIII. — 10. Congress shall have power to define and punish 
 piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences 
 against the law of nations : 
 
 11. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and 
 make rules concerning captures on land and water : 
 
 12. To raise and support armies; but no appropriation of 
 money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years : 
 
 13. To provide and maintain a navy : 
 
 14. To make rules for the government and regulation of 
 the land and naval forces : 
 
 15. To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the 
 laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions : 
 
 16. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the 
 Militia, and for governing such part of them as may be em- 
 ployed in the service of the United States, reserving to the 
 States respectively the appointment of the Officers and the 
 authority of training the Militia according to the discipline 
 prescribed by Congress : 
 
 17. To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever 
 over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by 
 cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, 
 become the seat of the Government of the United States ; and 
 to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the 
 consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall 
 be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, 
 and other needful buildings : — And,
 
 NATIONAL DEFENCE. 115 
 
 18. To make all laws which shall he necessary and proper 
 for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other 
 powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the 
 United States, or in any department or officer thereof. 
 
 Section IX. — 2. The privilege of the writ of HaVjeas Corpus shall 
 not be suspended, unless when iu cases of rabellion or invasion 
 the public safety may require it. 
 
 Section X. — 1. No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or 
 confederation ; grant letters of marque and reprisal ; coin 
 money ; emit bills of credit, &c. 
 
 3. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any 
 duty of tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, 
 enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or 
 with a foreign Power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, 
 or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay. 
 
 We have liere powers given to Congress bj 
 the Constitution to raise armies and a navy, 
 and to call out the militia, in order to execute 
 the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection, 
 repel invasions, and to put down rebellion. 
 
 These powers are sovereign and absolute. 
 With them no State intermeddles. So far as 
 they concern National defence from foreign 
 invasion they Mill not be disputed. We shall, 
 therefore, briefly consider them in relation to 
 the right of coercion upon a State as opposed 
 to the right of secession by a State. 
 
 The Constitution was intended by its framers, 
 I 2
 
 116 TREASON OF A STATE 
 
 and ordained by the sovereign People, to be 
 " the supreme law of the land/' To tliat 
 standard all subsequent legislation was to 
 conform. In all cases of dispute as to con- 
 formity, or as to the general interpretation of 
 the document itself, the Judiciary was appointed, 
 as we have seen, to decide ; and this it is to do 
 without regard to the Constitution or laws of 
 any State. To its judgment, Congress, State, 
 and individual must alike submit voluntarily 
 or by force. 
 
 According to Mr. Spence, the Southern 
 States have not rebelled — but seceded by a 
 reserved right ; and one of his arguments is, 
 that there is in the Constitution no provision 
 against a State committing treason. " There 
 is," says he, " a provision against the treason of 
 individuals ; and if a State can also commit 
 treason, it would be a strange law that pro- 
 vided against crime on a small scale, omitting 
 to deal with it when on a large one. The 
 Tiien who framed the Constitution were 
 eminently practical men. It cannot be sup- 
 posed they would slight so formidable a 
 danger — why, then, the omission ? For the
 
 PROVIDED FOR. 117 
 
 soundest and wisest reasons, which we have on 
 record from their own lips."^ 
 
 Mr. Spence has, however, failed to give us 
 "the reasons" that justify his assertion: we 
 must, therefore, resort directly to the Consti- 
 tution ; there we find that " treason against 
 the United States shall consist only in levijimj 
 war against them, or in adhering to their 
 enemies, giving them aid and comfort." 
 Among the powers prohibited to a State, we 
 find it thus written : " No State shall enter 
 into any treaty, alliance, or confederation, keep 
 troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter 
 into any agreement or compact with any other 
 State or with a foreign power, or engage in 
 war, unless actually invaded or in immediate 
 danger." Have not all these prohibited powers 
 been exercised by the seceding States ? Is 
 not the raising of armed forces for the express 
 purpose of obstructing the laws of the Union, 
 and investing and taking forcible possession of 
 national arsenals and fortresses, " levying war 
 against the United States," and therefore 
 treason ? Where, then, we ask, is to be found 
 
 ' The American Union, 217.
 
 118 COERCION OF A STATE. 
 
 this boasted immunity of a State from its 
 possibility? 
 
 Again, it is stated by Mr. Spence, that the 
 framers of the Constitution contemplated the 
 right of secession, when they provided no force 
 to prevent it. " Other questions," says he, 
 " might be referred to the Supreme Court, but 
 a retiring State withdrew from its jurisdiction ; 
 other forms of delinquency could be visited on 
 individuals, but here was the action of a whole 
 community * * * * * j^q force was 
 to be created adequate to an undertaking 
 of this nature ; " and then he cites Madison 
 and Hamilton to prove its deliberate 
 omission.^ 
 
 Omission and authority are both in his own 
 imagination. Mr. Madison's opinion is thus 
 cited by Mr. Spence : " In the constitutional 
 Convention, Mr. Madison declared, that the use 
 of force against a State would be more like a 
 declaration of war than an infliction of punish- 
 ment, and would probably be considered by 
 the party attacked as a dissolution of all 
 previous compacts : a union of States contain- 
 
 ' The AmericaQ Union, 218.
 
 Madison's opinion, 119 
 
 ing such ail ingredient seemed to provide 
 for its own destruction." ^ 
 
 On turninof to Mr. Curtis's account of the 
 speech here referred to, we are at no loss to 
 explain its meaning in quite an opposite way 
 to that of Mr. Spence. Mr. Madison was not 
 opposed to force against a delinquent State; 
 but he desired to effect the same object in a 
 less objectionable way. This could be done 
 by making the Constitution act upon indivi- 
 duals through its Judiciary.^ But he did not 
 abandon the right of coercion, though he 
 endeavoured to obviate its use. He approved 
 the Constitution which distinctly gives power 
 to Congress to provide and maintain and regu- 
 late armies, a navy, and militia, for, among 
 other objects, the suppression of rebellion. 
 And he was no less clear in the ratifying Con- 
 vention of Virginia upon the right of forcing 
 a ^tate, if need be, to conform to the Constitu- 
 tion. " Congress," said he, " ought to have 
 the ])ower of establishing a uniform system of 
 discipline throughout the States, and to pro- 
 vide for the execution of the laws, suppress 
 
 ' The American Union, 218, ' Hist, of Const., Cuetis, ii. 62.
 
 120 Madison's opinion. 
 
 insurrection, and repel invasion ; * * with- 
 out a general controlling power to call forth 
 the strength of the Union for the purpose of 
 repelling invasions, the country might be over- 
 run and conquered by foreign enemies. 
 Without such a power to suppress insurrection, 
 our liberties might be destroyed by intestine 
 faction, and domestic tyranny be established."^ 
 It has indeed been said, that the insurrections 
 here spoken of are those within and not of a 
 State. What then is the meaning of the phrase 
 " in cases of rebellion " ? Besides, we have 
 evidence of Madison's opinion, as to what the 
 Constitution ought to provide for in such a 
 case, before that document was framed. In 
 the letter to Washington, before referred to, he 
 says, " An article should be inserted expressly 
 guaranteeing the tranquillity of the States 
 against internal as well as external dangers. 
 In like manner the right of coercion should be 
 ex:pressly declared. With the resources of 
 commerce in hand, the national administration 
 might always find means of exerting it by sea 
 or land. But the difficulty and awkward- 
 
 ' Eloquence of the TJ. States. Madison in Vir. Convention, i. 132.
 
 GENERAL KNOX's OPINION. 121 
 
 ness of operating- by force on the collective 
 will of a State, render it particularly desirable 
 that the necessity of it might be precluded. 
 Perhaps the negative on the laws might create 
 such a mutuality of dependence between the 
 general and particular authorities, as to answer 
 this purpose ; or perhaps some defined objects 
 of taxation might be submitted, along with 
 commerce, to the general authority." 
 
 " To give a new system its proper validity 
 and energy, a ratification must be obtained 
 from the People, and not merely from the 
 ordinary authority of the legislatures. This 
 will be the more essential, as inroads on the 
 existing constitution of the States will be 
 unavoidable." ^ 
 
 General Knox also wrote to Washington thus: 
 " I speak entirely of the Federal Government, 
 or, wliich would be better, one Government, in- 
 stead of an association of Governments. Thelavvs 
 passed by the general Government to be obeyed 
 by the local Governments, and, if necessary, to 
 be enforced hy a body of armed men to be kept 
 for the purposes which should be designated. 
 
 ' Life of Washington, ix. 518.
 
 122 Hamilton's opinion. 
 
 All National objects to be designed and 
 executed by the general Government, without 
 any reference to the local Governments. This 
 mere sketch is considered as the Government 
 of the least possible powers to preserve the 
 confederated Governments. To attempt to 
 establish less will be to hazard the existence 
 of Republicanism, and to subject us either to 
 a division by the European powers, or to a 
 despotism arising from high-handed com- 
 motion." ^ 
 
 Mr. Spence has cited Hamilton, also, as 
 opposed to the use of force upon a refractory 
 State. He gives us an extract from the 
 Federalist (No. 15), wherein that statesman 
 says, " The first war of this kind would proba- 
 bly terminate in a dissolution of the Union." 
 In the same number, we find these words, 
 " The great and radical vice in the construction 
 of the existing Confederation is in the principle 
 of legislation for States and Governments, 
 in their corjiorate and collective capacities, and 
 as contradistinguished from the individuals of 
 whom they exist," But (he argues) as Govern- 
 
 ' Idem, ix. 515.
 
 THE FEDERALISTS. 123 
 
 incnt imj)lies the power of making' laws, it must 
 also have power to punish those who destroy 
 them. This can only be done in two ways, 
 by the coercion of tlie magistracy, or by that 
 of arms. The former applies to men, the latter 
 to States. If, therefore, the execution of the 
 laws do not require the intervention of the 
 State Legislatures, but are to pass into opera- 
 tion immediately upon the citizens, "their 
 particular Governments could not interrupt 
 their progress witlioid an open and violent 
 exertion of nnconstitational powers ^ 
 
 ' " That there may happen Government) has no place but 
 
 cases in which the National Go- in the reveries of those political 
 
 vernraent may be necessitated doctors whose sagacity disdains 
 
 to resort to force, cannot be de- the admonitions of experimental 
 
 uied. Our own experience has instruction. Should such emer- 
 
 corroborated the lessons taught gencies at any time happen 
 
 by the examples of other na- under the National Government, 
 
 tions ; that emergencies of this there could be no remedy hut 
 
 sort will sometimes exist in all force. The means to be em- 
 
 aocieties however constituted ; ployed must be proportioned to 
 
 that seditions and insurrections the extent of the mischief. If 
 
 are unhappily maladies as inse- it should be a slight commotion 
 
 parable from the body politic as in a small part of a State, the 
 
 tumours and eruptions from the militia of the residue would be 
 
 natural body ; that the idea of adequate to its suppression ; and 
 
 governing at all times by the the natural presumption is that 
 
 simple force of law (which we they would be ready to do their 
 
 have been told is the only admis- duty.* * * If, on the contrary, the 
 
 sible principle of Republican insurrection should pervade a
 
 124 Jefferson's opinion. 
 
 For such a contingency as tliis no Constitu- 
 tion can possibly provide. The views of 
 Hamilton and Madison upon the question of 
 coercing a State, were in perfect accordance. 
 Indeed, all the leading minds of the day saw 
 its necessity, while they dreaded its danger. 
 Jefferson, in a letter to John Adams, 11th July, 
 1786, after balancing the arguments between 
 obtaining peace with the Barbary States, through 
 purchase or war, says, he should prefer the latter; 
 and, among other reasons, because " It will arm 
 the Federal head with the safest of all the instru- 
 ments of coercion over its delinquent members,"^ 
 And again, in August following, writing to 
 Colonel Monroe, " It will be said there is no 
 
 whole State, or a principal part ments as there are States, there 
 
 of it, the employment of a dif- might sometimes be a necessity 
 
 ferent kind of force might be- to make use of a force consti- 
 
 come unavoidable. ***** tuted differently from the militia 
 
 All candid and intelligent men to preserve the peace of the 
 
 must upon due consideration ac- community, and to maintain the 
 
 knowledge * * *that whether we just authority of the laws against 
 
 have one Government for all the those violent invasions of them 
 
 States, or different Governments which amount to insurrections 
 
 for different parcels of them, or and rebellions." — Federalist, 
 
 as many unconnected Govern- N"o. 28. 
 
 ' Randolph's Memoirs of Jefferson. Colburn, London, 1829; 
 ii. 37.
 
 Jefferson's opinion. 125 
 
 money in the treasury. There never Mill be 
 any money in the treasury till the Confederacy 
 shows its teeth. The States must see the rod ; 
 ])erha])S it must be felt by some of them. * * 
 Every rational citizen must wish to see an 
 effective instrument of coercion, and should 
 fear to see it on any other element than the 
 water. 
 
 This was under the Confederation ; but 
 when it had long been foreseen that that com- 
 pact must be broken up and give place to 
 " a more j)erfect Union," and when this 
 idea seemed to be realized by the ha])py 
 expedient of making the Constitution act 
 upon individuals as well as States, and the 
 a]ipointment of a Judiciary supreme over all, 
 Jefferson at once recognized it. 
 
 In a letter from Paris, to Madison, dated 
 December, 1787, he says : — " I like much the 
 idea of framing a government which should 
 go on of itself peaceably, without needing con- 
 tinual recurrence to the State Legislatures. 
 I like the organization of the Government 
 into Legislative, Judiciary, and Executive. I 
 
 ' Jdtm, ii. 43.
 
 126 EXECUTIVE POWER 
 
 like tlie power given the Legislature to levy 
 taxes, and for that reason, solely, I approve of 
 the greater House being chosen by the people 
 directly."^ 
 
 Congress then having the power to provide 
 the force, the question arises with whom rests 
 that of deciding the occasion, and calling it 
 into action. The answer is, " with the Presi- 
 dent of the United States, the executive of 
 their laws, and the representative of their 
 nationality." An act was passed in 1792, and 
 slightly modified in 1798, which says : — 
 
 " Whenever the laws of the United States 
 shall be opposed, or the execution thereof 
 obstructed, in any State, by combinations too 
 powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary 
 course of judicial proceedings, it shall be law- 
 ful for the President of the United States 
 to call for the militia of such State, or of any 
 other State or States, as may be necessary 
 to suppress such combinations, and to cause 
 the laws to be duly executed." ^ 
 
 In the American war of 1812, Connecticut, 
 
 ' Randolph's Memoirs of Jefferson, ii. 274. 
 
 ■•^ Hildketh's History of the United States, i. 312.
 
 FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE. 127 
 
 Massachusetts, and Rhode IsUind claimed this 
 power for the State Governors, and at the same 
 time refused its exercise. But Madison, then 
 President, at once denied it. In his message 
 to Congress, in December, 1812, he says : — 
 
 " The refusal was founded on a novel and 
 unfortunate exposition of the provisions of the 
 Constitution relating to the militia. The cor- 
 respondences, which will be before you, con- 
 tain the requisite information on the subject. 
 It is obvious, that if the authority of the 
 United States to call into service and com- 
 mand the militia for the public defence can 
 be thus frustrated, even in a state of declared 
 war, and of course under apprehensions of 
 invasion preceding war, they are not one 
 Nation for the purpose most of all requiring 
 it ; and that the public safety may have ho 
 other resource than in those large and per- 
 manent military establishments, whix;h are 
 forbidden by the principles of our free 
 Government, and against the necessity of 
 which tlie militia were meant to be a Con- 
 stitutional bulwark."
 
 128 
 
 IX. 
 
 SUPREMACY. 
 
 AETICLE IV. 
 
 Section IV. — The United Slates shall guarantee to every State in 
 this Union a Republican form of Government ; and shall 
 protect each of them against invasion ; and, on application of 
 the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature 
 cannot be convened), against domestic violence. 
 
 Akticle V. — The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses 
 shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Con- 
 stitution ; or on the application of the Legislatures of two-thirds 
 of the several States, shall call a convention for proposing 
 amendments ; which in either case shall be valid to all intents 
 and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by 
 the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or by 
 conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other 
 mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress. Pro- 
 vided that no amendment wliich may be made prior to the year 
 one thousand eight hundred and eight, shall in any manner 
 aflTect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the 
 first article ; and that no State, without its consent, shall be 
 deprived of its equal sufi'rage in the Senate. 
 
 Article VI. — 1. All debts contracted and engagements entered 
 into before the adoption of this Constitutiou shall be as valid 
 against the United States, under this Constitution, as under 
 the Confederation. 
 
 2. This Constitution, and the laws of the United States 
 which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and aU treaties 
 made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the
 
 SUPREMACY. 129 
 
 United States, shall be the supi'eme law of the land, and the 
 judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the 
 Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwith- 
 Btauding. 
 
 3. The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and 
 the members of the several State Legislatures, and all execu- 
 tive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the 
 several States, shall be bound, by oath or affirmation, to sup- 
 port this Constitution ; but no religious test shall ever be 
 required as a qualification to any office or public trust under 
 the United States. 
 
 We ask any candid reader to examine these 
 articles carefully, and then say if they leave 
 him the slightest justification for asserting the 
 reservation by the States of a Constitutional 
 riofht of secession from the Union. Let us 
 observe how completely the State is subordi- 
 nated by them to the Nation. While every 
 State functionary, legislative, executive, or 
 judicial, must take an oath of fealty to the 
 Constitution of the United States, there is no 
 recognition of a State Constitution whatever, 
 except to see that it assumes no other than a 
 republican form of government. Nor is the rela- 
 tion of the Nation to the State a doubtful one. 
 There are no indistiuct reservations on the part 
 of the latter, no shadowy claims by the former. 
 The Constitution of the United States shall 
 
 E
 
 130 THE STATES SUBORDINATE. 
 
 be tlie supreme law of the land, and tliis 
 supremacy does not refer alone to the con- 
 ditions it actually embodies, but pushes its 
 claims into an unlimited future. All laws 
 and treaties which shall be made in pursuance 
 of it shall be supreme. The judges in every 
 State are to regulate their decisions by it. 
 And, finally, as if to make assurance doubly 
 sure, it is added, " Anything in the Constitu- 
 tion or laws of any State to the contrary 
 notwithstanding." 
 
 Observe, too, how complete is the surrender 
 of the sovereignty in the articles providing for 
 amendments. Tlie right of demanding a con- 
 vention of the people to originate them is not 
 claimed by a single State, nor even by a majority 
 of States, but by two-thirds the whole iiumber. 
 And the ratification is not to depend upon 
 unanimous concurrence, as under the Con- 
 federation, but upon that of three-fourths the 
 State Legislatures or Conventions, as the one 
 or the other mode of ratification may be 
 selected, not by the States, but by Congress. 
 To their decision the whole must submit. 
 
 The expediency of leaving the whole
 
 THE NATION SUPREME. 131 
 
 question open until each State bad had an 
 opportunity of proposing amendments to the 
 proposed Constitution ^vas much discussed at 
 the time. But it was shown by its advocates, 
 and especially by Hamilton and Madison in 
 the ''Federalist," that it was confessedly a com- 
 promise between the dissimilar interests and 
 claims of thirteen States ; that it had been 
 already ap])roved by a representative from 
 each of them save one, Viz., Rhode Island, 
 M'hich had taken no part whatever; that no 
 hope could reasonably exist for equal unani- 
 mity in another Convention ; that no claim to 
 I>erfection was made on its behalf; that, on 
 the contrary, it provided expressly for its own 
 amendment, at any time, by a mode that was 
 itself a giuirantee for the utmost deliberation ; 
 and, finally, that the dangers arising from the 
 anarchy and confusion of the country loudly 
 demanded an immediate decision. " A nation 
 without a National Government," said 
 Hamilton, on closing the last number of the 
 " Federalist," " is to me an awful spectacle. 
 The establishment of a Constitution, in time 
 of profound peace, by the voluntary consent 
 K 2
 
 132 RATIFICATION. 
 
 of a whole People, is a prodigy, to the comple- 
 tion of which I look Ibrward with trembling 
 anxiety. I can reconcile it to no rules of 
 prudence to let go the hold we now have, 
 in so arduous an enterprise, upon seven out 
 of the thirteen States; and, after having 
 passed over so considerable a part of the 
 ground, to recommence the course. I dread 
 the more the consequences of new attempts, 
 because I know that powerful individuals, in 
 this and other States, are enemies to a 
 general national Government in every possible 
 shape." ^ 
 
 Conventions of the people in all the States 
 wieonditionalli/ Sido\)ted the Constitution, though 
 two delayed doing so for a few months, and 
 seven accompanied their ratification by proposed 
 amendments, many of which were subsequently 
 adopted according to the forms prescribed in 
 the Constitution. To two of these Conventions 
 we now turn for some light upon our present 
 question. 
 
 A writer in the " Quarterly Review" ^ asserts 
 
 ' Federalist, No. 85. Capitals, sic. ' January, 1862.
 
 VIRGINIAN DECLARATION. 133 
 
 that " Virginia was admitted into the Union 
 with the full knowledge that she had expressly 
 reserved to herself the rio-ht of v.^ithdrawins", 
 if the powers granted by her then were per- 
 verted to her injury." And he attempts to 
 j)rove this by quoting the following Act of the 
 Virginian Convention, 26th June, 1788, "We, 
 the delegates of the people of Virginia, duly 
 elected in pursuance of a recommendation of 
 the General Assembly, and now met in con- 
 vention, having fully and freely investigated and 
 discussed the proceedings of the Federal Con- 
 vention, and being prepared as well as the most 
 mature deliberation hath enabled us to decide 
 thereon, c?o, in their name and in behalf of the 
 people of Virginia, declare and make known, 
 that the powers under the Constitution, being 
 derived from the people of the United States, 
 may he resumed by them whenever the same 
 shall be perverted to their injury or oppression, 
 and that every power not granted thereby 
 remains with them, and at their will. That, 
 therefore, no right of any denomination can be 
 cancelled, abridged, restrained, or modified by 
 the Congress, by the Senate, or by the House
 
 131 VIRGINIAN DECLAHATION. 
 
 of Representatives, acting in any capacity, by 
 the President, or any department, or officer of 
 the United States, except in those instances in 
 which power is given by the Constitution for 
 this purpose, and that, among other essential 
 rights, tlie libertv of conscience and of tlie 
 press cannot be cancelled, abridged, restrained, 
 or modified, by any authority of the United 
 States." 
 
 The italics are so given by the reviewer, and 
 yet disprove his own assertion. The Convention 
 declared the right of resumption to be reserved, 
 not for herself, but, " for the people of the 
 United States." This declaration of rights, 
 together with certain amendments, was prepared 
 to be presented to Congress, for its considera- 
 tion ; thereby distinctly indicating its national 
 character, and it does not contain a single line 
 which is not in strict conformity to the 
 Constitution. 
 
 The reviewer was evidently in ignorance of 
 the proceedings of the Virginian Convention, 
 and has blindly followed Mr. Spence in his 
 too partial quotations. For example, he has 
 endorsed this author's account of the discussion
 
 HESEllYATION OF niGnTS. 135 
 
 between Mtidison and Henry, as to the true 
 meaning- of tlie phrase, "We the people," Mhich 
 account we have elsewhere shown to be erro- 
 neous. As a proof that the right of a State 
 to withdraw from the Union at will has never 
 been surrendered, he gives us the tenth amend- 
 ment to the Constitution, which provides, "that 
 the powers not delegated to the United States 
 by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
 States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
 or to the people.'" Now, we ask, what " people" 
 can be meant here, but the people of the 
 United States, as distinguished from those of 
 each State ? The previous clause is a proof of 
 this. "The enumeration in the Constitution of 
 certain rights shall not be construed to deny or 
 disparage others retained by the pcopley All 
 political authority is derived from the people. 
 Some powers they have reserved for local 
 purposes. Others they have delegated to 
 Congress for the common benefit. Those 
 by which the Constitution, now binding 
 together thirty-four States, may be annulled or 
 amended, rest with the People at large, as 
 a part of their residuary sovereignty, inasmuch
 
 136 VIRGINIAN RESOLUTIONS. 
 
 as tliey have been conferred neither upon the 
 separate Legislatures nor upon the Federal 
 GovernTnent. 
 
 But who was the author and mover in the 
 Virginian Convention of this declaration of 
 rights and the proposed amendments ? No 
 other than Patrick Henry, the stern opponent of 
 the Constitution up to the very moment of its 
 adoption. His evidence, as to what they really 
 meant, will not therefore be doubted. He had 
 ])roposed that they should be adopted before 
 the ratification ; but this proposition had been 
 rejected upon the express ground that it would 
 render the ratification conditional. The Con- 
 vention, therefore, ratified first, and then 
 adopted Mr. Henry's proposition.* 
 
 Now, Mr. Spence has referred to some 
 resolutions adopted by the Virginian Legisla- 
 ture in 1798, which appear to assert the right 
 of a State to a temporary and very qualified 
 nullification of an act of Congress, when " a 
 deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise 
 of other powers not granted by the said 
 compact was resorted to." 
 
 ' History of the Constitution, Curtis, ii. 580.
 
 PATRICK henry's OPINIONS. 137 
 
 Washington strongly condemned those reso- 
 lutions, .111(1 at his request Patrick Henry 
 came forward, in 1799, as a candidate for tlie 
 State Legislature, with the express ])urpose of 
 counteractinsf their effect. He thus addressed 
 the electors : — 
 
 "He told them, that the late proceedings of 
 the Virginian Assembly had filled him with 
 apprehensions and alarm ; that they had 
 planted thorns upon his pillow ; that they had 
 drawn him from that happy retirement which 
 it had ])leased a bountiful Providence to 
 bestow, and in which lie had hoped to pass in 
 quiet the remainder of his days ; that the State 
 had quitted the sphere in which she had been 
 •placed by the Constitution ; and in daring to 
 pronounce upon the validity of federal laws, 
 had gone out of her jurisdiction in a manner 
 not warranted by any authority, and in the 
 highest degree alarming to every considerate 
 man ; that such oi)position on the part of 
 Virginia to the acts of the General Govern- 
 ment must beget their enforcement by military 
 power ; that this would probably produce civil 
 war — civil war, foreign alliances ; and that
 
 138 Washington's opinion. 
 
 foreign alliances must end in subjugation to 
 the powers called in." * * * 
 
 " Having denied the rio^ht of a State to 
 decide u))on the constitutionality of federal 
 laws, he added, that perhaps it might be neces- 
 sary to say something of the merits of the laws 
 in question. His private opinion was, that 
 they were good and proper ; but whatever 
 might be their merits, it belonged to the 
 people, who held the reins over the head of 
 Congress, and to them alone, to say whether 
 they were acceptable or otherwise to Vir- 
 ginians, and that this must be done by way of 
 petition. That Congress were as much our 
 representatives as the Assembly (of Virginia), 
 and had as good a right to our confidence. 
 He had seen with regret the unlimited power 
 over the purse and sword consigned to the 
 general Government ; but he had been over- 
 ruled, and it was now necessary to submit to 
 the constitutional exercise of that power." ^ 
 
 Washington himself spoke of these Vir- 
 ginian resolutions, and similar ones passed by 
 the Kentucky Legislature, in 1799, "as 
 
 ' Wirt's Life of Pat. Henry, 408.
 
 RATIFICATION OF NEW TOrav. 139 
 
 measures systematically and pertinaciously 
 pursued, which must eventually dissolve the 
 Union or produce coercion."'^ We have before 
 shown that both Madison and Hamilton con- 
 templated the possibility of force upon a de- 
 linquent State, and we have here two other 
 framers of the Constitution reiifrettino- its 
 possible necessity. To Mr. Spence and his 
 Quarterly Reviewer we leave the difficult 
 task of reconciling the rights of sovereignty 
 and secession on the one hand, with those 
 of supremacy and coercion on the other. 
 
 Let us now turn to the State of New York, 
 the eleventh ratifying State. Here public 
 opinion was greatly divided. All her dele- 
 gates, with the exception of Hamilton, had 
 withdrawn from the Constitution, on the 
 o^round that thev had received no instructions 
 to go beyond a revision of the Articles of 
 Confederation. After the Constitution had 
 been referred by Congress to the peojjle in 
 several States, a thorough discussion of its 
 merits had been kept up by the publication of 
 a remarkable series of Essays, published in the 
 
 ' Life of Washington, xi. 388.
 
 IdO NEW YORK HESITATES. 
 
 Gazette of the city of Now York, under the 
 title of the " Federalist," and of which Madi- 
 son, Hamilton, and Jay were the authors. 
 When the ratifying Convention of New York 
 met, the two last were its commanding spirits. 
 United with them in opinion and action was 
 Chancellor Robert Livingston, one of the 
 committee of five who had drawn up the 
 Declaration of Independence. Able men were 
 never more needed. The situation was indeed 
 most critical. Ei^jht States had already rati- 
 fied, one more would complete the requisite 
 number, and the Confederation, distracted by 
 its jealousies and dying of inanition, would 
 virtually cease to exist. The Convention was 
 being held in a small village on the Hudson, 
 some distance from New York, and Hamilton 
 bad established a system of horse posts between 
 that place and New Hampshire on the east, 
 and Virginia on the south, the two States 
 whose ratifications were next expected, in 
 order that he might receive the earliest possi- 
 ble information. On the 24th June, 1788, he 
 received intelligence of the ratification by 
 New Hampshire, and the following day Liv-
 
 -so COMPROMISE. 141 
 
 ino-ston communicated it to the Convention. 
 Still the ojiposition was not subdued. The 
 table was covered with amendments, and the 
 adoption of any of these, as a condition of 
 ratification, would have been fatal to its vali- 
 dity. Dismayed for the moment at the danger 
 of so important a State as New York leaving 
 the Confederacy, Hamilton considered if it 
 might not be necessary to accede to a plan 
 whereby she should reserve the right to secede 
 from the Union in case her amendments were 
 not adopted within some limited period. He 
 saw the objection to this course, but not wish- 
 ing to assume the sole responsibility of risking 
 its apparent alternative, he wrote to Madison 
 as the possibility of receiving a State into the 
 Union in this form : — 
 
 "You will understand, that the only quali- 
 fication will be the reservation of a right to 
 secede in case our amendments have not been 
 decided upon, in one of the modes pointed out 
 in the Constitution, within a certain number 
 of years, perhaps five or seven. If this can, in 
 the first instance, be admitted as a ratification, 
 I do not fear any further consequences."
 
 142 Madison's opinion. 
 
 The full significance of Madison's reply will 
 be apparent, when we consider the danger 
 that must have resulted to the Union by the 
 secession of a State occupying its geographical 
 centre. 
 
 "■ My opinion is, that a reservation of a right 
 to withdraw, if amendments be not decided 
 on under the form of the Constitution within 
 a certain time, is a conditional ratification ; 
 that it does not make New York a member of 
 the new Union, and consequently that she 
 should not be received on that plan * * A 
 Constitution requires an adoption in toto and 
 for ever. It has been so adopted by the other 
 States. An adoption for a limited time would 
 be as defective as an adoption of some of the 
 articles only. In short, any condition Mdiat- 
 ever must vitiate the ratification. * * * 
 The idea of reserving the rioht to withdraw 
 was started at Richmond, and considered as 
 conditional ratification, which was itself 
 abandoned as worse than rejection.'" ^ 
 
 The Quarterly Reviewer follows Mr. Spence 
 in the admirable Jesuitism, that the Constitu- 
 
 ' Hist, of Constitution, Curtis, ii. 588. Hamilton's Works, i. 464.
 
 RATIFICATION BINDING. 113 
 
 tion is only binding so long as a State chooses 
 to continue a member ; and that the way not to 
 commit treason, and so invite coercion, is, first, 
 to \vitlidravv from the Union and then defy its 
 authority. As reasonably might the thief 
 claim to Mithdraw from the authority of a law 
 which he was determined to violate.^ 
 
 A periodical, professing to be the organ of 
 the Conservative party, is here found advoca- 
 ting ultra-revolutionary doctrines. " It is good, 
 also," says Lord Bacon, " not to try experiments 
 in States, except the necessity be urgent, or 
 utility evident; and well to beware that it be 
 the reformation that draweth on the change, 
 and not the desire for change that pretendeth 
 the reformation. And lastly, that the novelty, 
 though it be not rejected, yet be held for a 
 
 ' " I congratulate you on the in the hotbed where it sprang 
 
 event which restores you to the up." 
 
 public councils, where your ser- "I know not whence the idea 
 
 vices will be valuable, particu- could proceed that I concurred 
 
 larly in defending the Consti- in the doctrine, that although a 
 
 tution and Union against the State could not nullify a law of 
 
 falsedoctriues which assail them. the Union, it had a right to 
 
 That of nullification seems to be secede from the Union. Both 
 
 generally abandoned in Virginia spring from the same poisonous 
 
 by those who had most leaning root." — Mr. Madison to Jos. C. 
 
 towards it. But it still flourisheB Cabell, Sept. IC, 1831.
 
 114 THE CONSTITUTION SUPREME. 
 
 suspect, and, as the Scripture saitb, ' That we 
 make a stand upon the ancient way, and then 
 look nhuut us, and discover what is the straight 
 and rigid way, and so to walk in it' " ^ 
 
 Thus carefully did our great philosopher 
 guard even needful changes in the laws of a 
 country. But in the pages of a Conservative 
 journal we find the reverence due to the 
 solemn ordinance and establishment of a Con- 
 stitution by a whole People, and the sacredness 
 of political oaths on the part of its administra- 
 tors and all public functionaries throughout the 
 land to uphold its supremacy, put aside as 
 of trivial obligation, and made subservient to 
 popular fickleness and the fleeting interests of 
 a section of the community. The right of 
 Revolution by a majority we understand : it 
 is the lea^ non scripta of humanity ; but its 
 erection into a system of Government — its 
 recognition by an established Constitution — 
 would be a privilege worthy only of the 
 " Paradise of fools." To such miserable aro^u- 
 ments are the advocates for secession driven. 
 Whence, then, is a constitutional right to secede 
 
 * Essay on Innovations.'
 
 NO IIIGHT OF SECESSION. 145 
 
 derived ? Not certainly from tlie old Confe- 
 deration ; because there the Union ^vas to be 
 perpetual. The defect of that compact lay in 
 its conditions, making union impossible; but 
 certainly not in permitting secession as a right; 
 and not from the Constitution, because in 
 adopting it the Republic entered into that 
 " more perfect Union " which that Constitution 
 was expressly intended to secure.
 
 146 
 
 X. 
 
 NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION. 
 
 We have so far traced the idea of National 
 union pervading the Republic from the early 
 colonial times, through the abortive Articles of 
 *' Confederation," and into the complete organi- 
 zation of an established " Constitution." We 
 have discovered no trace of a reserved sove- 
 reignty on the part of the separate States, 
 except for local purposes, or in their power to 
 grant or withhold their consent to the new 
 terms of the Union proposed in 1787. And 
 when such persistent claims to sovereignty are 
 made, it is somewhat important to remark, 
 that, as a historical fact, it was never exercised 
 by any of the original thirteen States of the 
 Union, with two temporary exceptions, and by 
 none of those since admitted, save Texas. 
 Until the Declaration of Independence, the 
 former were all subject as colonies to the
 
 THE CONSTITUTION. 147 
 
 English crown. That document declared them 
 cotijointly absolved from their allegiance, and 
 thenceforth free and independent States ; but 
 the same document at once destroyed their 
 independence, for they mutually pledged them- 
 selves to act in union. While so united, 
 the Articles of Confederation, binding them 
 together in perpetuity, -were proposed and 
 accepted. The Constitution made their Union 
 not less indissoluble and far more perfect, 
 deriving its authority not from the State Legis- 
 latures, but direct from the People. In one 
 respect, indeed, this may be considered as a 
 peaceful revolution ; for, whereas the Articles 
 had provided that no alteration should be 
 made therein without the iinanimotis consent 
 of all the legislatures ; the Constitutional Con- 
 vention, on the contrary, recommended, and 
 Congress confirmed their recommendation, 
 that the new Constitution should be complete 
 by the ratification of the people of nine States 
 only out of the thirteen. And here we see 
 the wisdom of Hamilton's suggestion, that the 
 sanction of Congress should be secured for a 
 change so complete. So long as unanimity 
 L 2
 
 118 UNION NEVER DIED. 
 
 ^vas required, the simplest revision of the 
 articles would have been difficult, if not impos- 
 sible ; but when an entire reconstruction of 
 the whole system was to be proposed, super- 
 seding the Confederation, and resting upon a 
 totally different basis, that unanimity was 
 utterly hopeless. Every State, however, was 
 represented in Congress, and thus the assent 
 of all the States was indirectly obtained to a 
 mode of ratification which, while it enabled 
 each State to act for itself, involved a new 
 principle of Union for the future. 
 
 By the time the new Constitution was 
 organized, all the States had ratified it uncon- 
 ditionally, save Rhode Island and North 
 Carolina. These for a few months exercised 
 complete sovereignty ; but with these excep- 
 tions the Union formed in 1774 never died ; 
 and we must recollect it was that Union which 
 originallv o:ave the name of "State" to each 
 of the colonies. Texas stands upon an entirely 
 different basis. She was an independent power 
 recognized in both hemispheres before admis- 
 sion, at her own request, into the Union ; but 
 she is no less bound than the other States by 
 
 1
 
 UNITED STATES TERRITORY. 149 
 
 its terms. No pretence is, of course, set up 
 for orio^iiical sovereignty by the new States; and 
 as these are expressly invested ^vitll equal 
 powers to all the rest, some light may be 
 thrown ui)on our question by tracing them to 
 their origin. 
 
 The United States' territories have been 
 acquired from two sources, — firstly, by cession 
 from certain of the original States of lands 
 Ivinjr within their chartered limits and claimed 
 by them as successors to the English crown ; 
 secondly, by actual purchase with funds from 
 the National Treasury. All these cessions 
 and purchases are alike held for the common 
 benefit, and to Congress is left the exclusive 
 power of deciding when any portion shall be 
 called into existence as a State, and admitted 
 into the Union. 
 
 The North-western territory was acquired in 
 1781, by cession of Virginia. Congress imme- 
 diately provided for its future division into 
 States, and its direct government in the mean- 
 time ; and these provisions were, in 1787, en- 
 larged into an ordinance of law, stating funda- 
 mental articles of compact between the people
 
 150 NORTH-WESTERN TERRITORY. 
 
 settling in the territories and the original 
 States, — articles which were declared to be 
 unalterable, except by common consent.^ The 
 fourth clause in this ordinance is to the effect, 
 that the territory and the States to be formed 
 therein shall for ever remain a part of the Con- 
 federation, subject to the constitutional authority 
 of Congress. The fifth provided, that when a 
 particular district should contain sixty thousand 
 free inhabitants, they should be at liberty to 
 frame a permanent constitution, and a State 
 Government of republican form, in conformity 
 with the United States Constitution.^ Five 
 States — viz., Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan 
 and Wisconsin — have all been admitted into 
 the Union under these conditions, which are 
 distinctly recognized by their several consti- 
 tutions. We take one as an example, that of 
 Ohio: — "We, the people of the Eastern 
 division of the territory of the United States 
 north-west of the river Ohio, having the right 
 of admission into the general Goverment as a 
 member of the Union consistent with the Consti- 
 
 ' "History of the Constitution," Curtis, i.296. 
 * Idem, i. 805.
 
 onio. 151 
 
 tution of the United States, the ordinance of 
 Congress of 1787, and the law of Congress, 
 entitled ' An Act to enable the ])eople of the 
 Eastern division of the United States north- 
 west of the river Ohio to form a Constitution 
 and State Government, and for the admission 
 of such State into the Union on an equal 
 footing with the original States, and for other 
 purposes,' in order to establish justice, promote 
 the welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty 
 to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and 
 establish the following Constitution or form 
 of government, and do mutually agree with 
 each to form ourselves into a free and 
 independent State, by the name of the State 
 of Ohio." 
 
 We have here a distinct recognition not 
 only of the supremacy of the Constitution, but 
 of ordinances and laws passed previous, and 
 subsequent to, its adoption. Indeed, this is 
 expressly provided for by the first clause 
 of the sixth article, " that all debts con- 
 tracted, and engagements entered into, before 
 the adoption of this Constitution, shall 
 be as valid against the United States under
 
 152 TEimiTORY OF LOUISIANA. 
 
 this Constitution as under the Confede- 
 ration." 
 
 The purchase of the territory of Louisiana 
 from France in 1803, now divided into six 
 States, exceeding in extent the whole limits of 
 the original Republic, is a still more decisive 
 case. No power had been given to Congress for 
 such a purchase, and at the time it was stoutly 
 resisted. It was contended, that already the 
 Union was too large for one general govern- 
 ment, and to add to it was only increasing 
 the encumbrance. The New England States 
 opposed it, because it would ultimately throw 
 the balance of State interests into the west, 
 and, in the meantime, interfere with the 
 trade of the Atlantic States. The vast advan- 
 tages, however, to be gained by the com- 
 mand of the Mississippi, from its source to its 
 mouth, decided the question. But the only 
 ground on which it could be defended was 
 that of the common welfare. 
 
 Is it to be supposed for one moment that 
 Congress would have paid fifteen millions of 
 dollars for a free outlet to western productions 
 if they had believed that it was only to trans-
 
 THE MISSISSIPPI FREE. 153 
 
 fer the right of closing- it from one sovereign 
 power to another ? ^ 
 
 " For the entire region west of the Alle- 
 ghanies, and east of the Rocky Mountains," 
 says Mr. Everett, " the Missouri and the 
 Mississippi form the natural outlet to the sea. 
 Without counting the population of the seced- 
 ing States, there are ten millions of the free 
 citizens of the country between Pittsburg and 
 Fort Union wdio claim the course and the 
 mouths of the Mississippi as belonging to the 
 United States. * * * Louisiana, a frag- 
 ment of this colonial empire, detached from its 
 main portion, and first organized as a State, 
 undertakes to secede from the Union, and 
 thinks that by so doing she will be allowed by 
 the Government and people of the United 
 States to revoke this imperial transfer, to dis- 
 regard this possession and occupation of sixty 
 
 ' "We, the people of Louisi- all friendly states and powers; 
 ana, recognize the right of free and hereby declare our willing- 
 navigation of the Mississippi nesa to enter into stipulations 
 river and tributaries by all to guarantee the exercise of 
 friendly states hordenng thereon. those rights." — Louisiana Ordi- 
 We also recognize the right of nance of Secession, Putnam's 
 the ingress and egress of the Record, No, 27. 
 mouths of the Mississippi by
 
 154 TEimiTORY OF LOUISIANA. 
 
 years * * * * and she fondly believes 
 that ten millions of the free people of the 
 Union will allow her and her seceding brethren 
 to open and shut the portals of this mighty 
 region at their pleasure." 
 
 The territory of Louisiana has given six 
 new States to the Union, viz., Louisiana, 
 Arkansas, Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota, and 
 Kansas, and all their several Constitutions 
 have distinctly recognized the supremacy of 
 that of the United States ; that of Arkansas, 
 for example, claimed in its preamble, "the 
 right of admission into the Union, as one of 
 the United States of America, consistent with 
 the Federal Constitution." Their existence 
 is owing to an act of sovereignty under 
 powers not given to Congress by the Consti- 
 tution, and which therefore could only be 
 justified by the intrinsic character of supreme 
 authority. 
 
 Now, as it is beyoud a doubt that every 
 new State enters the Union with the same 
 rights as those already in it, and as Congress 
 has not the power to alienate or dispose of 
 the territories except for the common benefit.
 
 THE CONSTITUTION BINDING. 155 
 
 the conclusion seems inevitable, that neither 
 the new States formed out of those territories, 
 nor the old States to which they originally 
 belonged, can have any reserved right of 
 withdrawing from the Union. 
 
 It has been argued that, as no prohibition 
 of secession appears on the face of the Con- 
 stitution, the right continues in full force ; and 
 that one effect of the omission is to compel 
 those who deny it to proceed upon a system of 
 inferences. 
 
 To these arguments we emphatically object. 
 The "inferences" are all on the side of our 
 opponents, the direct proofs with ourselves. 
 Mr. Spence, for example, contends that the 
 Constitution is only the Articles revised, — that 
 " there occurred a radical reform of govern- 
 ment, but no organic change ; " and, therefore, 
 instead of following the rule he had himself 
 laid down of appealing to the framers of the 
 new Constitution for its interpretation, or to 
 the Constitution itself, he goes back to the old 
 articles to find what is the present relation 
 of the States to each other. But we contend 
 that those articles can only prove their rcla-
 
 156 MR. spence's opinion. 
 
 live position at that time. " We mu?.t 
 observe," says Curtis, "the position of ;' 3 
 States when thus assembled in convention. 
 Their meeting was purely voluntary ; they 
 met as equals, and they were sovereign poli- 
 tical communities, whom no power could 
 rightfully coerce into a change of their con- 
 ditio}i.'' That condition was, that each State 
 was a distinct unit in a perpetual federation of 
 States. Their separate right to adopt or reject 
 a Constitution which changed that condition has 
 never been doubted, but, having once adopted 
 it, a State no more retained the right of 
 withdrawal than the remaining States of 
 expulsion.^ 
 
 To this argument Mr. Spence has objected, 
 that to compel a State either to remain within 
 the Union, or withdraw from it, are alike 
 
 ' " If one State can, at will, dreaded an application of it to 
 
 withdraw from the others, the herself. The same may be said 
 
 others can, at will, with- of the doctrine of nullification 
 
 draw from her, and turn her, which she now preaches, as the 
 
 oiolentem volentem, out of the only faith by which the Union 
 
 Union. Until of late there is can be saved." — Mr. Madison 
 
 not a State that would have to Mr. Trist, Dec. 1832 ; Ben- 
 
 abhorred such a doctrine more ton's Thirty Years' War, i. 357. 
 than South Carolina, or more
 
 THE CONSTITUTION NATIONAL. 157 
 
 restraints upon its sovereignty. " Both," he 
 contends, " really involve the same principle ; 
 ejection and imj)risonment are equally acts of 
 compulsion." We admit the premises, but 
 deny the right, either to secede or to exjiel. For, 
 whether a State chose to go out or remain, 
 against the declared will of the others, its 
 sovereignty, so far, would dominate over theirs, 
 and the compulsion objected to for the one 
 State would be inflicted upon all the rest. 
 
 Nor can we admit that the M'ork of the 
 Federal Convention was a mere revision of 
 its articles on the old basis.^ Had that 
 Body believed that such would have met 
 the exigencies and fulfilled the purposes of the 
 Union, they would have adopted a sclieme of a 
 purely Federal character, such as that proposed 
 
 '" Every step by which they from which the event has re- 
 have advanced to the character suited, cannot be compared with 
 of an independent nation seems the means by which most go- 
 to have been distinguished by vernments have been established, 
 some token of a providential without some return of pioua 
 agency. And in the important gratitude, along with a humble 
 revolution just accomplished in anticipation of the future bless- 
 the system of their united go- ings which the past seem to pre- 
 vernment, the tranquil delibe- sage." — Washington's Inauyii.' 
 rations and voluntary consent ral Address. 
 of so many distinct communities,
 
 158 SECESSION UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
 
 under the name of " The New Jersey Plan," 
 which was actually discussed and rejected.^ 
 But, for the sake of argument, let us test this 
 alleged right of secession by an appeal to the 
 Articles of " Confederation." Their second 
 clause distinctly asserted the sovereignty, 
 freedom, and independence of each State, with 
 certain limitations, one of which was, that it 
 was bound by a perpetual union with the 
 others ; but all mention of even this limited 
 sovereignty is omitted from the " Constitution," 
 and this condition only is inserted : — "that the 
 powers not delegated to the United States by 
 the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
 States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
 or to the People." And this, too, in the form 
 of an amendment, after the Constitution had 
 been acknowledged by all the States to be the 
 supreme law. It follows, then, that as no 
 power of secession^existed under the Confede- 
 ration, it cannot even by inference exist under 
 the Constitution. 
 
 Under the Confederation the States had 
 indeed retained too much independence, as 
 
 ' " History of the Constitution," Curtis, ii, 109.
 
 PATRICK HENET. 169 
 
 was acknowledged by all parties. The ex- 
 tent of curtailment was the point of con- 
 tention. Thus Patrick Henry exclaimed in 
 the Virginian Convention, "To all the common 
 purposes of legislation, it (the Constitution) 
 is a great consolidation of Government. 
 * * What shall the States have to do ? 
 Take care of the poor ; repair and make high- 
 ways ; erect bridges, and so on, and so on ! 
 Abolish the State Legislatures at once. What 
 purposes should they be continued for ? " They 
 were continued for purely State Legislation. 
 Their sovereignty was thenceforth to be still 
 further shared with others. Political sovereignty 
 is capable of partition, but not its exercise. 
 The partition indeed may be for a limited 
 period, at the expiration of which the whole 
 power will revert to its original owner; but 
 in the meantime it is the powers which make 
 up that complete sovereignty that must be 
 divided. 
 
 In the case now before us the terms of 
 the partition are embodied in a Constitution, 
 *' ordained and established," and therefore 
 subject to no limit of time. The powers
 
 160 CONSTITUTION SACUED. 
 
 are so divided, that those of one class are 
 National, and those of another Municipal — 
 both acting- independently in their appro- 
 priate spheres. 
 
 It might have seemed superfluous to argue 
 against the doctrine, that a solemn compact 
 does not bind the parties to it, except a 
 positive prohibition against withdravral be 
 inserted ; but as the Southern Rebellion has 
 been so justified, we must endeavour to refute 
 the doctrine. Is this a consequence of other 
 compacts, commercial, social, or international ? 
 Take one example. Marriage is a civil contract. 
 It is perfectly voluntary in its character. No 
 IsiW exists for forcing either party into it ; but 
 when completed, are not the parties iudissolubly 
 bound, so far as their individual will is con- 
 cerned ? True, means of separation are 
 provided when the conditions of union are 
 not fulfilled, but those means lie not with the 
 parties themselves, but with the judges inter- 
 preting the law. The Union of the States was 
 not a mere partnership, where, no term being 
 fixed, each partner might break it up at will ; 
 or where, a period being fixed, separation would
 
 A NATION NEVER DIES. 161 
 
 then naturally ensue.' It was ratlier a political 
 marriage, and, as a nation never dies, no limit 
 could possibly be fixed for its duration. Its 
 object was expressly to secure tlie blessings of 
 liberty to the people of the United States and 
 their posterity. One escape is, however, pro- 
 vided, should circumstances interfere to prevent 
 the attainment of that object. The terms of 
 Union may be amended, or entirely abrogated, 
 upon a proper appeal to the Peoi)le, or to the 
 States ; and thus the Union itself may be 
 dissolved by concurrence of three-fourths of 
 the State Legislatures, or State Conventions. 
 What more than this could the wildest revolu- 
 tionist desire ? 
 
 There are two alleged State rights which 
 Mr. Spence apj)ears to us to have utterly con- 
 founded : the right of secession and that of 
 
 ' " We had thought that the obnoxious law by another State, 
 
 Federation was of the nature of or, it may be, a restrictive 
 
 a nationality ; wo find it is no- tariff, gives a State the right of 
 
 thing more tliaii a partnersliip. revolution, and permits it to 
 
 If any State may, on grounds withdraw itself from the com- 
 
 eatisfactory to a local conven- munity, then the position of the 
 
 tion, dissolve the union between American people with regard to 
 
 itself and its fellows ; if discon- Foreign Powers is C!>m[)letely 
 
 tent with the election of a Pre- altered." — London I'imcs, ^Jth 
 
 sident, or the passing of an Ja7i, 1861. 
 
 M
 
 1G2 SECESSION A NEW DOCTRINE. 
 
 nullification.^ We have seen that the former 
 i? a withdrawal by a State, at its own will and 
 upon its own terms ; but the latter is something 
 short of this. Secession, as a Constitutional 
 right, is an entirely new doctrine. It was 
 never broached on the floor of Congress, until 
 1811,^ and only at rare intervals up to 1837. 
 In that year, Miss Martineau, after a most 
 careful analysis of the whole policy of the 
 United States, wrote, " Nothing worse than 
 professed nullification has yet been heard of, 
 unless Colonel Burr's secret schemes were 
 indeed treasonable."^ Secession was indeed 
 
 ' " It is known to senators fication is the remedy which is 
 
 who have served hei-e, that I to be and ought to be applied 
 
 have for many years advocated, within tlie Union against an 
 
 as an essential attribute of State agent of the United States when 
 
 sovereignty, the right of a State the agent has violated consti- 
 
 to secede from the Union, * * * tutional obligations. * * * gg. 
 
 I hope none will confound this cession belongs to a different 
 
 expression of opinion with the class of rights, and is to be rati- 
 
 advocacy of the right of a State fied upon the basis that the 
 
 to remain in the Union, and Statesare sovereign." — Speechof 
 
 disregard its constitutional obli- Jefferson Davis on leaviivjthc 
 
 gations by nullification. NuUi- Senate, Jan. 1861. Putnam's 
 
 fication and secession are indeed Record, Document 23. 
 antagonistic principles. Nulli- 
 
 * History of the United States, by Hildreth, i. 220. 
 ^ Society in America, i. 91.
 
 Jefferson's letter. 163 
 
 sometimes spoken of in the early days of the 
 Constitution, and Mr. Spence has, ^ye think, 
 very erroneously dated its birth at that period. 
 He refers to a letter, addressed by Jefferson to 
 Washington, urging him to accept his re- 
 election to the Presidency, on account of the 
 otherwise extreme danger of " secession" ; ^ but 
 any one wlio candidly reads that letter will see 
 that the word was not used by him as exj)ress- 
 ing an alleged Constitutional right, but as a 
 " breaking of the Union into two or more 
 parts" from its own weakness, and which he 
 deprecated " as an incalculable evil." ^ Hamil- 
 ton and Randolph wrote to Washington with 
 the same object. The former says, " It is clear, 
 says every one with whom I have conversed, 
 that the affairs of the National Government 
 are not yet firmly established ; * * that 
 the period of the next House of Representatives 
 is likely to prove the crisis of its permanent 
 character." And Randolph says, " The Consti- 
 tution is in a state of probation." ] 
 
 ' The American Union, 207. 
 
 ^ Tucker's Life of Jefferson ; Cary and Lea, Philadelphia, i, 381. 
 ^ Spark's Life of Washington, x. 510, 513. 
 M 2
 
 164i PROGRESS OF THE HERESY. 
 
 These letters express the true state of public 
 feeling at the time. There existed a very 
 general belief, that from inherent defects the 
 Union could not be permanent. The Con- 
 stitution had been carried by a very small 
 majority in several of the States, and was an 
 object of great dislike to a large minority in 
 all. Many years elapsed before the People 
 thoroughly understood or appreciated it. Until 
 it was firmly established, and became an object 
 of their patriotism, there were constant fore- 
 bodings of the breaking up of the Union into 
 independent States, a fresh geographical group- 
 ing into three or more Republics, or a return 
 to the old System of the Confederation, 
 somewhat modified. All this, however, is 
 entirely different from the modern doctrine of 
 secession. Jealousy of any interference with 
 their domestic institutions, on the part of the 
 South, and the fatal policy of Congress in their 
 protective tariffs, have combined to infuse this 
 pernicious pqison into the veins of the Republic. 
 These are the dragon's teeth, which, sown in 
 ignorance and fatuity, have sprung up armed 
 men all over the laud.
 
 DE TOCQUEVILLE. 165 
 
 But the doctrine of secession was preceded 
 by that of nullification, and to this day finds 
 separate advocates. De Tocqueville, in a few 
 passages pregnant with meaning, thus explains 
 nullification : — " I have shown in the proper 
 place that the object of the Federal Constitution 
 was not to form a league, but to create a 
 National Government. The Americans of the 
 United States form a sole and undivided 'peojtle 
 in all the cases which are specified hy that 
 Constitution, and upon these points the M'ill of 
 the Nation is expressed, as it is in all Constitu- 
 tional Nations, by the voice of the majority. 
 When the majority has pronounced its decision, 
 it is the duty of the minority to submit. Such 
 is the sound legal doctrine, and the onhj one 
 which agrees with the teM of the Constitution^ 
 and the Imoum intention of those who framed 
 
 itr 
 
 " The partisans of nullification in the South 
 maintain, on the contrary, that the intention of 
 the Americans in uniting- was not to reduce 
 themselves to the condition of one and the same 
 people ; that they meant to constitute a league 
 of independent States ; and that each State,
 
 1G6 DE TOCQTJEVILLE. 
 
 consequently, retains its entire sovereignty, if 
 not dc facto, at least de jure ; and has the right 
 of putting its own construction upon the laws 
 of Congress, and of suspending their execution 
 within the limits of its own territory, if they 
 are held to be unconstitutional or unjust." 
 
 " The entire doctrine of nullification is com- 
 prised in a sentence uttered by Vice-President 
 Calhoun, the bead of that party in the South, 
 before the Senate of the United States in the 
 year 1833 : ' The Constitution is a compact 
 to ^vhich the States were parties in their 
 sovereign capacity; now, whenever a contract 
 is entered into by parties which acknowledge 
 no tribunal above their authority to decide in 
 the last resort, each of them has a right to 
 judge for itself the nature, extent, and obliga- 
 tions of the instrument.' " 
 
 " It is evident that such a doctrine destroys 
 the very basis of the Federal Constitution, and 
 brings back all the evils of the old Confedera- 
 tion, from which the Americans were supposed 
 to have had a safe deliverance." ^ 
 
 The first notes of discord were unhappily 
 
 * Democracy in America, i. 390,
 
 RESOLrTioNS OF 1798-9. 167 
 
 struck by Kentucky in 1798, and in Virginia 
 in tlie following- year, by men of no less note 
 than Jefferson and Madison. Jefferson had 
 been the authorof the marriage vow pronounced 
 by the States in their Declaration of Indepen- 
 dence. Madison had ap])roved in the Federal 
 Convention of a veto on all State legis- 
 lation ; and now we find them apparently 
 ignoring the Judiciary which they had lauded 
 as the common tribunal of the States, and ad- 
 vocating the doctrine of State nullification. 
 Expediency enters too much into the motives 
 of human action. There is no doubt that Con- 
 gress about this time made more than one 
 attemj)t to overstep the limits of its authority. 
 Excited by the fear of a French invasion, it 
 liad passed the Alien and Sedition Acts, which 
 were generally considered as unconstitutional ; 
 and a still more dangerous attempt was made 
 in their claim for jurisdiction under" the com- 
 mon law," for the National courts — that law 
 which was not found in legislative acts, but 
 deduced from previous decisions of the courts 
 and from immemorial usage — a power clearly 
 not granted by the people to the National
 
 168 RESOLUTIONS OF 1798-9. 
 
 Government, and therefore "reserved to them 
 or to tlie States." ^ Jefferson and Madison had 
 both evidently become alarmed at these 
 assum])tions of power, and under this feeling, 
 and [)erhaps not entirely uninfluenced by party 
 considerations, they composed the celebrated 
 resolutions adopted by the Kentucky and Vir- 
 ginia lemslatures, with an accumulative force 
 most liable to misconstruction, and, as it now 
 a])pears to us, entirely unsuited to the occasion. 
 These resolutions expressed indeed the 
 warmest attachment to the Constitution and 
 the Union ; declared (what was perfectly true) 
 
 ' " Of all the doctrines which sweeping pretension to a system 
 
 have ever been broached by the of law for the United States, 
 
 Federal Government, the novel without the adoption of their 
 
 one of the common law being Legislature, and so infinitely 
 
 in force and cognizable as an beyond their power to adopt, 
 
 existing law in these courts, is If this assumption be yielded to, 
 
 to me the most formidable. All the State courts may be shut 
 
 their other assumptions of un- up, as there will then be nothing 
 
 given powers have been in the to hinder citizens of the same 
 
 detail. The bank law, the treaty State suing each other in the 
 
 doctrine, the sedition act, alien Federal courts in every case, as 
 
 act, the undertaliing to change on a bond, for instance, because 
 
 the State laws of evidence in the common law obliges pay- 
 
 the State courts by certain parts ment of it, and the common law, 
 
 of the stamp act, &c., &c., have they say, is their law." — Jefper- 
 
 been solitary, unconsequential, SON to Randolph, Aug. 1799. 
 
 timid things, in comparison with Memoir o/ Jefferson, iii. 433. 
 the audacious, barefaced, and
 
 EESOLUTIONS OF 1798-9. 169 
 
 that the powers of the Federal Government 
 resulted only from a compact to which the 
 States Avere parties ; — tliat in case of " a deli- 
 berate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of 
 other powers not granted by the said compact, 
 the States Avho are the parties thereto have the 
 right and are in duty bound to interpose for 
 correcting the progress of the evil and for 
 maintaining within their respective limits the 
 authorities, rights, and liberties, appertaining 
 to them ;"^ and that the Federal measures then 
 pronounced to be unconstitutional were " not 
 law, but void and of no force or effect." These 
 last words Avere, however, struck out by the 
 Virginian Legislature.^ 
 
 ' History of the United States, by Hildreth, ii. 276. 
 
 * " These words, though The vote in that case seems not 
 synonymous with. ' unconstitu- to have engaged the attention 
 tional,' were alleged by the due to it. It not merely de- 
 critic to mean nullification ; and prives South Carolina of the 
 being, of course, ascribed to me, authority of Virginia, on which 
 I was, of course, a nullifier. It she has relied aud exulted so 
 seems not to have occurred, much in support of her cause, 
 that if the insertion of the words but turns that authority point- 
 could convict me of being a nul- edly against her." — Madison 
 lifier, the erasure of them (una- to J. C. Cabell, April, 1833. 
 nimous, I believe) by the Legis- Benton's Tliirty Tears' View, 
 lature was the strongest of pro- i. 350. 
 tests against the doctrine. * * *
 
 170 Madison's repoet. 
 
 It does not ai)pear that these resolutions 
 were ever acted upon. They were certainly 
 never laid before Congress in any shaj)e what- 
 ever ; and they were formally disapi)roved by 
 all the States (save North and South Carolina), 
 " who expressly disclaimed the right of a State 
 Legislature to decide on the validity of Acts 
 of Congress." ^ 
 
 These disavowals were referred by the Vir- 
 ginian Assembly to a committee, who made a 
 report, prepared by Madison himself, justifying 
 the resolutions, but attaching a meaning to 
 them very different from the modern interpre-« 
 tation of the right of absolute nullification. 
 They were described as simple declarations, 
 that the late proceedings of the National Go- 
 vernment had been unconstitutional ; but it 
 distinctly acknowledged that it belonged to the 
 Judiciary of the United States, and not to the 
 State Legislatures, to decide the meaning of 
 the Federal Constitution ; that such declara- 
 tions could not " be deemed in any point of 
 view the assumption of the office of the judge; " 
 that they were but " expressions of opinions, 
 
 ' History of the United States, by Hiluketh, ii. 296.
 
 MxIdison's report. 171 
 
 uiiaccompanied by any other effect than -what 
 they might produce on opinion by exciting- 
 reflection. The expositions of the Judiciary, on 
 the otiier hand, were carried into immediate 
 effect by force." Under this interpretation we 
 have here, then, nothing but the assertion, that 
 in cases of palpable and dangerous exercises of 
 unconstitutional power by the Federal Govern- 
 ment, tJie States (not an individual State) have 
 the right to interpose so as to maintain State 
 rights.^ The means of interposition had not 
 been pointed out, but the report referred to 
 enumerated them, viz., " the co-operation of 
 other States in adopting similar resolutions, a 
 direct appeal to Congress, and an explanatory 
 amendment to the Constitution " — all of them 
 clearly constitutional. 
 
 ' "And what is the text in it, the obvious and proper in- 
 
 tlie proceedings of Virginia ference precludes such a right, 
 
 which tiiis spurious doctrine of In a word, the nullifying claims, 
 
 nullification claims for its pa- if reduced to practice, instead 
 
 tronage ? It is found in the of being the conservative prin- 
 
 third of the resolutions of 1/98. ciple of the Constitution, would 
 
 Now, is tliere anything here necessarily, and it may be said 
 
 from which a ' single ' State obviously, be a deadly poison." 
 
 can infer n. right to arrest or — On Nullification, hy Madison, 
 
 annul an act of the general Go- iHl836. Benton's Thirty Years' 
 
 vernment which it may deem View, i. 368. 
 
 unconstitutional 1 So far from -it^
 
 172 Madison's opinions. 
 
 No small portion of Madison's time, in his 
 latter years, must have been occupied in repu- 
 diating, for himself and Mr. Jefferson, the 
 doctrine of nullification, afterwards deduced 
 from these resolutions.^ But this repudiation 
 was most complete. In a long letter to Mr. 
 Everett he argued the whole question, and 
 showed the absurdity of leaving the interpre- 
 tation of constitutional problems to individual 
 States, and he thus remarks, " That, to have 
 left a final decision in such cases to each of 
 the States, could not fail to make the Constitu- 
 tion and laws of the United States different in 
 different States, was obvious, and not less 
 obvious that this diversity of independent 
 decisions must altogether distract the Govern- 
 ment of the Union itself," " And from a score 
 
 ' " The amount of this modi- .and whose own words declare 
 
 fied right of nullification is, that that ' acquiescence in the de- 
 
 a single State may arrest the cision of the majority is the 
 
 operation of a law of the United vital principle of it.' Well may 
 
 States, and institute a process the friends of ]\Ir. Jefferson dis- 
 
 which is to terminate in the dain any sanction to it, or to 
 
 ascendancy of a minority over any constitutional right of nul- 
 
 a large majority. And this lilicatiou from his opinions." — 
 
 new-fangled theory is attempted Madisun on Nullification. Ben- 
 
 to be fathered on Mr. Jefferson, ton's Tliirly Years' View, i. 359. 
 the apostle of Hepublicanism, 
 
 * North Anerican Review, xxxi. 1830.
 
 HARTFORD CONVENTION. 173 
 
 of letters now before us to different parties on 
 this subject, we take almost at random the 
 following, to Mr. Trist, December, 1831 : — 
 " For this preposterous and anarchical pre- 
 tension (nullification) there is not a shadow of 
 countenance in the Constitution ; and well that 
 there is not, for it is certain that, with such a 
 deadly poison in it, no Constitution would be 
 sure of lasting a year." Upon these fatal reso- 
 lutions all subsequent claims to nullification 
 have been based, although their authors have 
 thus utterly repudiated any such interj)re- 
 tation ; but they have never served as an 
 authority for secession. 
 
 When nullification was next asserted, it was 
 by the New England States, in 1812, when 
 they refused to call out the militia. But 
 ■when, in 1814; the report of a joint committee 
 of the Massachusetts Legislature recommended 
 that conference of New England States which 
 resulted in the " Hartford Convention,'' under 
 the conviction that the Constitution had failed 
 in securing for them equality of benefit with 
 other parts of tlie Union, one of the objects 
 was stated to be " to lay the foundation of a
 
 174 NULLIFICATION. 
 
 radical reform in the National compact, by 
 inviting- to a future Convention a deputation 
 from all the States in the Union." ^ The 
 instructions to their delegates, and a circular 
 letter to all the other New England governors, 
 and finally tlie report of the Hartford Conven- 
 tion itself, all repeated this idea, and professed 
 attachment to the Union. Indeed, the Con- 
 vention positively repudiated all claim to 
 nullifying acts of Congress, but at the same 
 time asserted the right to prevent acts con- 
 stitutionally void being carried into execution 
 — a distinction without a difference.^ 
 
 From this time nothing was heard of nullifi- 
 cation until 1827, when Georgia came into 
 collision with the general Government, and 
 threatened to repel force by force. But the 
 treason reached its height in the nullification 
 by South Carolina, in 1832, of the new tariff 
 act of that year, with the like threat. The 
 debate upon the bill in Congress, authorizing 
 the Pi'esident to enforce the laM^s for collecting 
 the revenue, opened out the whole question of 
 
 ' History of the United States, Hildreth, iii. 532. 
 '^ Idem, ii. 552.
 
 IIATNE — WEBSTER. 175 
 
 nullification. Mr. Webster's speech on this occa- 
 sion was a model of close reasoning and argu- 
 mentative eloquence. It shivered the alleged 
 rights both of secession and nullification to 
 atoms. Witii inexorable logic he hunted 
 these errors through all their tortuous wind- 
 ings into their only proper and natural limits 
 of revolution. At this, his opponent, Mr. 
 Hayne, of South Carolina, the great fellow- 
 apostle, with Mr. Calhoun, of the gospel of nul- 
 lification, started to his feet and said, " he did 
 not contend for the mere right of revolution, 
 but for the right of constitutional resistance. 
 What ho maintained was, that in case of plain, 
 palpable violation of the Constitution by the 
 general Government, a State may interpose, 
 and that the interposition is constitutional." 
 
 Mr. Webster, however, showed that this 
 was a mere evasion. Who was to decide when 
 such a case occurred ? Mr. Hayno had worded 
 his resolution almost in the words of Mr. 
 Madison's Virginian resolution before alluded 
 to ; but this only weakened his own position, 
 since the very case which South Carolina had 
 selected for her constitutional resistance, viz.,
 
 176 MU. WEBSTER. 
 
 a protective tariff, had been pronounced by 
 this statesman perfectly constitutional. The 
 Judiciary Court had been adopted by the People 
 of the United States as a resort for justice in 
 all their fvrievances referring to their State 
 Governments, or to the Nation at large ; and 
 to controvert its decision there were only two 
 methods : — Amendment or Revolution. " If 
 we look," said Mr. Webster, " to the general 
 nature of the case, could anything have been 
 more preposterous, than to make a government 
 for the whole Union, and yet leave its powers 
 subject, not to one interpretation, but to thir- 
 teen, or twenty-four interpretations ? Instead 
 of one tribunal, established by all, responsible 
 to all, with power to decide for all — shall 
 constitutional questions be left to four-and- 
 twenty popular bodies, each at liberty to decide 
 for itself, and none bound to respect the 
 decisions of others; and each at liberty, too, 
 to give a new construction on every new 
 election of its own members ? Would anything, 
 with such a principle in it, or rather with such 
 a destitution of all principle, be fit to be called 
 a Government ? No ; it should not be denomi-
 
 HATNE — WEBSTER. 177 
 
 nated a Constitution ; it should be called, 
 rather, a collection of topics, for everlasting 
 controversy ; heads of a debate for a disj)uta- 
 tious people. It would not be a Government." 
 Mr. Ilayne, in reply, took up the same line 
 of argument, which Mr. Sjienco has adopted. 
 He denied tliat the Constitution was framed 
 by the people at large instead of the States. 
 He contended tliat it was a c()m])act between 
 the States. " When," said he, " in the preamble 
 we find the words, ' We, the People of the 
 United States,' it is clear they can only relate 
 to the people, as citizens of the several States, 
 because tlie Federal Government was not then 
 in existence." Even in that case, argued Mr. 
 Webster, the States would be the only parties 
 to the compact, and the National Government 
 would be of their creation. For the terms of 
 that compact, and the method of their inter- 
 pretation, we must look to the Constitution 
 itself. No one State can have a right to fix 
 upon it her own jieculiar construction to the 
 exclusion of the rest, but all must agree. And 
 thus the Constitution would have been sur- 
 rounded by the same difliculties and dangers, 
 
 N
 
 178 HATNE. 
 
 as the articles of Confederation. Mr. Hayne's 
 reply shows that no claim was then set up for 
 the right of secession. Nullification itself was 
 only intended to be a temporary arrest of what 
 might be considered by a State, an unconstitu- 
 tional exercise of power. 
 
 " A state," said he, "is brought into collision 
 with the United States in relation to the 
 exercise of unconstitutional powers : who is to 
 decide between them? * * In all such 
 eases some mode must be devised by mutual 
 agreement for settling the difficulty ; and most 
 happily for us that mode is clearly indicated in 
 the Constitution itself, and results indeed from 
 the very form and structure of the Government. 
 The creating power is three-fourths of the States. 
 By their decision the parties to the compact have 
 agreed to be bound, even to the extent of chang- 
 ing the entire form of the Government itself; and 
 it follows of necessity, that in case of a deliber- 
 ate and settled difference of opinion between 
 the parties to the compact, as to the extent of 
 the powers of either, resort must be had to 
 their common superior (that power which may 
 give any character to the Constitution tl)ey
 
 CALHOUN. 179 
 
 may think proper), viz., three-fourths of the 
 States." ' 
 
 Mr. Calhoun, at that time, held similar 
 opinions. In a declaration drawn up by 
 him in 1828 for the people of South Caro- 
 lina, he says, that " by the adoption of the 
 Federal Constitution the State had modified 
 its original right of sovereignty whereby its 
 individual consent was necessary to any 
 change in its political condition, and by be- 
 coming a member of the Union had placed 
 that power in the hands of three-fourths of the 
 States in whom the highest power known to 
 the Constitution actually resides." ^ 
 
 It has been well observed, that no Constitu- 
 tion ever provides for its own destruction. It 
 is confessedly subject to the changes of time 
 and to the chances of r(>volution. The Con- 
 stitution of the United States provides against 
 the hitter and for the former in the powder of 
 amendment by appeal to the source of its 
 authority — the Sovereign People. It guaran- 
 tees the blessings of a free press, free speech, 
 
 ■ Bkadford's History of the Federal (Government, Appendix, 
 * Everett's Oration, 82. 
 
 N 2
 
 ISO SOUTHERN REBELLION. 
 
 free religion, free self-government in internal 
 affairs, and trial by jury. The Southern States 
 have rebelled against this Constitution in order 
 to secure, and, if possible, to extend the insti- 
 tution of slavery ; to create for the first time a 
 State founded upon the subordination of the 
 African race, as its unchangeable basis ; to 
 make slavery " that stone rejected by the first 
 builders — the chief stone of the corner," ^ and 
 the Conservatives of England have justified 
 their rebellion ! 
 
 ' So described by the Vice-President of the Confederacy.
 
 181 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 A. 
 
 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND 
 PERPETUAL UNION. 
 
 Between the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, 
 Rhod^i Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, 
 New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaicare, 
 Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
 and Geori/ia. 
 
 Art. 1. The style of this Confederacy shall be " The 
 United States of America." 
 
 Art. 2. Each State retains its soverei<^nty, freedom, and 
 independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right 
 which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to 
 the United States in Congress assembled. 
 
 Art. 3. The said States hereby severally enter into a 
 firm league of friendship with each other for their common 
 defence, the security of their liberties, and tlieir niutuai 
 and general welfare; bimlirig themselves to assist each 
 other against all force offered to or attacks made uj)on 
 tliem on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any 
 otlier pretence whatever. 
 
 Art. 4. The better to secure and perpetuate mutual
 
 182 APPENDIX. 
 
 friendship and intercourse among the people of the differ- 
 ent States in this union, tlie free inhabitants of each of 
 these States (paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice 
 excepted) shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities 
 of free citizens in the several States ; and the people of 
 each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from 
 any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges 
 of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impo- 
 sitions, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respec- 
 tively, provided that such restriction shall not extend so 
 far as to prevent the removal of property imported into 
 any State to any other State, of which the owner is an 
 inhabitant; provided also, that no imposition, duties, or 
 restriction shall be laid by any State on the property of 
 the United States, or either of them. 
 
 If any person guilty of or charged with treason, felony, 
 or other high misdemeanor in any State, shall flee from 
 justice, and be found in any of the United States, he shall, 
 upon demand of the Governor or executive power of the 
 State from which he fled, be delivered up and removed to 
 the State having jurisdiction of his offence. 
 
 Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these 
 States to the records, acts, and judicial proceedings of the 
 courts and magistrates of every other State. 
 
 Art. 5. For the more convenient management of the 
 general interests of the United States, delegates shall be 
 annually appointed, in such manner as the legislature of 
 each State shall direct, to meet in Congress on the first 
 Monday in November, in every year, with a power re- 
 served to each State to recall its delegates, or any of them, 
 at any time within the year, and to send others in their 
 stead, for the remainder of the year.
 
 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATIOX. 183 
 
 No State shall be represented in Congress by less than 
 two, nor by more than seven members ; and no person 
 shall be capable of being a delegate for more than three 
 years in any term of six years ; nor shall any person, 
 being a delegate, be capable of holding any office under 
 the United States, for which he, or any other for his 
 benefit, receives any salary, fees, or emolument of any 
 kind. 
 
 Each State thall maintain its own delegates in any 
 meeting of the States, and while they act as members of 
 the committee of the States. 
 
 In determining questions in the United States in Con- 
 gress assembled, each State shall have one vote. 
 
 Freedom of speech and debate in Congress shall not be 
 impeached or questioned in any court or place out of 
 Congress ; and the members of Congress shall be protected 
 in their persons from arrests and imprisonments, during 
 the time of their going to and from and attendance on 
 Congress, except for treason, felony, or breach of the 
 peace. 
 
 Art. G. No State, without the consent of the United 
 States in Congress assembled, shall send any embassy to, 
 or receive any embassy from, or enter into any conference, 
 agreement, alliance, or treaty with any king, prince, or 
 state; nor shall any person holding any office of profit or 
 trust under the United States, or any of them, accept of 
 any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind what- 
 ever from any king, prince, or foreign state; nor shall the 
 United States in Congress assembled, or any of them, 
 grant any title of nobility- 
 No two or more States shall enter into any treaty, con- 
 federation, or alliance whatever between them, without the
 
 184 APPENDIX. 
 
 consent of the United States in Congress assembled, speci- 
 fying accurately tlie purposes for which the same is to be 
 entered into, and how long it shall continue. 
 
 No State sliall lay any imposts or duties, which may 
 interfere with any stipulations in treaties entered into by 
 the United States in Congress assembled, with any king, 
 prince, or state, in pursuance of any treaties already 
 proposed by Congress to the courts of France and 
 Spain. 
 
 No vessels of war shall be kept up in time of peace by 
 any State, except such number only as shall be deemed 
 necessary by the United States in Congress assembled for 
 the defence of such State or its trade ; nor shall any body 
 of forces be kept up by any State, in time of peace, except 
 such number only as, in the judgment of the United States 
 in Congress assembled, shall be deemed requisite to gar- 
 rison the forts necessary for the defence of such State ; 
 but every State shall always keep up a well-regulated and 
 disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accoutred, and 
 shall provide and have constantly ready for use, in 
 jjublic stores, a due number of field-pieces and tents, 
 and a proper quantity of arms, ammunition, and camp 
 equipage. 
 
 No State shall engage iu any war without the consent 
 of the United States in Congress assembled, unless such 
 State be actually invaded by enemies or shall have certain 
 advice of a resolution being formed by some nation of 
 Indians to invade such State, and the danger is so immi- 
 nent as not to admit of a delay till the United States in 
 Congress assembled can be consulted ; nor shall any State 
 grant commission to any ships or vessels of war, nor letters 
 of marque or reprisal, except it be after a declaration of
 
 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION. 185 
 
 war by the United States in Congress assembled, and then 
 only against the kingdom or state and the subjects thereof, 
 against which war has been so declared, and under such 
 regulations as shall be established by the United States in 
 Congress assembled, unless such State be infested by 
 pirates, in which case vessels of war may be fitted out for 
 that occasion, and kept so long as the danger shall con- 
 tinue, or until the United States in Congress assembled 
 shall determine otherwise. 
 
 Art. 7. When land forces are raised by any State for 
 the common defence, all officers of or under the rank of 
 colonel shall be appointed by the legislatures of each State 
 respectively by whom such forces shall be raised, or in such 
 manner as sucli State shall direct ; and all vacancies shall 
 be filled up by the State which first made the appointment. 
 
 Art. 8. All charges of war and all other expenses that 
 shall be incurred for the common defence or general 
 welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress 
 assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury 
 which shall be supplied by the several States in proportion 
 to the value of all land within each State granted to or 
 surveyed for any person, as such laud and the buildings 
 and improvements thereon shall be estimated, according 
 to such mode as the United States in Congress assembled 
 shall from time to time direct and appoint. 
 
 The taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid and 
 levied by the authority and direction of the legislatures of 
 the several States, within the time agreed upon by the 
 United States in Congress assembled. 
 
 Art. 9. The United States in Congress assembled shall 
 have the sole and exclusive right and power of determining 
 on peace and war, exce])t in the cases mentioned in the
 
 186 APPENDIX. 
 
 sixth article ; of sending and receiving ambassadors ; en- 
 tering into treaties and alliances, provided that no treaty 
 of commerce shall be made, whereby the legislative power 
 of the respective States shall be restrained from imposing 
 such imposts and duties on foreigners as their own people 
 are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation 
 or importation of any species of goods or commodities 
 whatsoever; of establishing rules for deciding in all cases 
 what captures on land or water shall be legal, and in what 
 manner prizes taken by land or naval forces in the service 
 of the United States shall be divided or appropriated; of 
 granting letters of marque and reprisal in time of peace ; 
 appointing courts for the trial of piracies and felonies com- 
 mitted on the high seas, and establishing courts for re- 
 ceiving and determining finally appeals in all cases of 
 captures, provided that no member of Congress shall be 
 appointed judge of any of the said courts. 
 
 The United States in Congress assembled shall also be 
 the last resort on appeal in all disputes and differences 
 now subsisting or that hereafter may arise between two or 
 more States concerning boundary, jurisdiction, or any 
 other cause whatever, which authority shall always be 
 exercised in the manner following : whenever the legis- 
 lative or executive authority or lawful agent of any State 
 in controversy with another shall present a petition to 
 Congress, stating the matter in question and praying for 
 a hearing, notice thereof shall be given by order of Congress 
 to the legislative or executive authority of the other State 
 in controversy, and a day assigned for the appearance of 
 the parties by their lawful agents, who shall then be 
 directed to appoint by joint consent commissioners or 
 judges to constitute a court for hearing and determining
 
 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION. 187 
 
 the matter in question ; but if they cannot agree, Congress 
 shall name three persons out of each of the United States, 
 and from the list of such persons each party shall alter- 
 nately strike out one, the petitioners beginning, until the 
 number shall be reduced to thirteen ; and from that 
 number not less than seven, nor more than nine names, as 
 Congress shall direct, sliall, in the presence of Congress, 
 be drawn out by lot ; and the persons whose names shall 
 be so drawn, or any five of them, shall be commissioners or 
 judges to hear and finally determine the controversy, so 
 always as a major part of the judges who shall hear the 
 cause shall agree in the determination : and if either party 
 shall neglect to attend at the day appointed, without 
 showing reasons which Congress shall judge sufficient, or, 
 being present, shall refuse to strike, the Congress shall 
 proceed to nominate three persons out of each State, 
 and the Secretary of Congress shall strike in behalf of 
 such party absent or refusing ; and the judgment and 
 sentence of the court to be appointed, in the manner 
 before prescribed, shall be final and conclusive : and if 
 any of the parties shall refuse to submit to the authority 
 of such court, or to appear or defend their claim or cause, 
 the court shall nevertheless proceed to pronounce sentence 
 or judgment, which shall in like manner be final and 
 decisive, the judgment or sentence and other proceedings 
 being in either case transmitted to Congress, and lodged 
 among the acts of Congress, for the security of the parties 
 concerned : provided, that every commissioner, before he 
 sits in jutlgment, shall take an oath, to be administered 
 by one of the judges of the Supreme or Superior Court of 
 the State where the cause shall be tried, " well and truly 
 to hear and determine the matter in question, according
 
 188 APPENDIX. 
 
 to tlie best of his judgment, without favour, affection, or 
 hope of reward ;" provided, also, that no State sliall be 
 deprived of territory for the benefit of the United 
 States. 
 
 All controversies concerning the private right of soil, 
 claimed under different grants of two or more States, 
 whose jurisdictions as they may respect such lands and the 
 States which passed such grants are adjusted, the said 
 grants or either of them being at the same time claimed to 
 have originated antecedent to such settlement of jurisdic- 
 tion, shall, on the petition of either party to the Congress 
 of the United States, be finally determined, as near as 
 may be in the same manner as is before prescribed for 
 deciding disputes respecting territorial jurisdiction between 
 different States. 
 
 The United States In Congress assembled shall also 
 have the sole and exclusive right and power of regulating 
 the alloy and value of coin struck by their own authority, 
 or by that of the respective States ; fixing the standard of 
 weights and measures throughout the United States ; regu- 
 lating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians 
 not members of any of the States ; provided that the legis- 
 lative right of any State within its own limits be not 
 infringed or violated ; establishing and regulating post- 
 offices from one State to another throughout all the 
 United States, and exacting such postage on the papers 
 passing through the same as may be requisite to defray 
 the expenses of the said office ; appointing all officers of 
 the naval forces, and commissioning all officers whatever 
 in the service of the United States ; making rules for the 
 government and regulation of the said laud and naval 
 forces, and directing their operations.
 
 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION. 189 
 
 The United States in Congress assembled shall have 
 authority to appoint a committee to sit in tlie recess of 
 Congress, to be denominated "a Committee of the States," 
 and to consist of one delegate from each State, and to 
 appoint such other committees and civil officers as may be 
 necessary for managing the general affairs of the United 
 States, under their direction ; to appoint one of their 
 number to preside, provided that no person be allowed to 
 serve in the office of President more than one year in any 
 term of three years ; to ascertain the necessary sums of 
 money to be raised for the service of the United States, 
 and to appropriate and apply the same for defraying the 
 public expenses ; to borrow money or emit bills on the 
 credit of the United States, transmitting every half-year 
 to the respective States an account of the sums of money so 
 borrowed or emitted ; to build and equip a navy ; to agree 
 upon the number of laud forces, and to make requisitions 
 from each State for its quota, in proportion to the number 
 of white inhabitants in such State ; which requisition shall 
 be binding, and thereupon the legislature of each State 
 shall appoint the regimental officers, raise the men, and 
 clothe, arm, and equip them in a soldierlike manner, at 
 the expense of the United States ; and the officers and 
 men to be clothed, armed, and equipped, shall march to 
 the place appointed, and within the time agreed on, by the 
 United States in Congress assembled ; but if the United 
 States in Congress assembled sliall, on consideration of 
 circumstances, judge proper that any State should not 
 raise men or should raise a smaller number than its quota, 
 and that any other State should raise a greater number of 
 men than the quota thereof, such extra number shall be 
 raised, officered, clothed, armed, and equipped in the same
 
 190 APPENDIX. 
 
 manner as tlie quota of such State, unless tlie legislature 
 of such State shall judge that such extra number cannot 
 be safely spared out of the same, in which case they shall 
 raise, otKcer, clothe, arm, and equip as many of such extra 
 number as they judge can be safely spared. And the 
 officers and men so clothed, armed, and equipped shall 
 march to the place appointed, and within the time agreed 
 on, by the United States in Congress assembled. 
 
 The United States in Congress assembled shall never 
 engage in a war nor grant letters of marque and reprisal 
 in time of peace, nor enter into any treaties or alliances, 
 nor coin money nor regulate the value thereof, nor ascer- 
 tain the sums and expenses necessary for the defence and 
 welfare of the United States, or any of them ; nor emit 
 bills, nor borrow money on the credit of the United States, 
 nor appropriate money, nor agree upon the number of ves- 
 sels of war to be built or purchased, or the number of land 
 or sea forces to be raised, nor appoint a commander-in-chief 
 of the army or navy, unless nine States assent to the same ; 
 nor shall a question on any other point, except for 
 adjourning from day to day, be determined, unless by 
 the votes of a majority of the United States in Congress 
 assembled. 
 
 The Congress of the United States shall have power to 
 adjourn to any time within the year, and to any place 
 within the United States, so that no period of adjournment 
 be for a longer duration than the sjiace of six months, and 
 shall publish the journal of their proceedings monthly, 
 except such jjarts thereof relating to treaties, alliances, or 
 military operations, as in their judgment require secrecy; 
 and the yeas and nays of the delegates of each State on 
 any question shall be entered on the journal, when it is
 
 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION. 191 
 
 desired by any delegate ; and the delegates of a State, or 
 any of tlicni, at his or their request, shall be furnished 
 with a transcript of the said journal, except such parts as 
 are above excepted, to lay before the legislatures of the 
 several States. 
 
 Art. 10. The Committee of the States, or any nine of 
 them, shall be authorized to execute, in the recess of 
 Congress, such of the powers of Congress as the United 
 States in Congress assembled, by the consent of nine 
 States, shall, from time to time, think expedient to vest 
 them with ; provided that no power be delegated to the 
 said Committee, for the exercise of which, by the Articles 
 of Confederation, the voice of nine States in the Congress 
 of the United States assembled is requisite. 
 
 Art. 11. Canada, acceding to this Confederation, and 
 joining in the measures of the United States, shall be 
 admitted into, and entitled to all the advantages of this 
 Union ; but no other Colony shall be admitted into the 
 same unless such admission be agreed to by nine States. 
 
 Art. 12. All bills of credit emitted, moneys borrowed, 
 and debts contracted by or under the authority of Congress, 
 before the assembling of the United States, in pursuance 
 of the present Confederation, shall be deemed and con- 
 sidered as a charge against the United States, for payment 
 and satisfaction whereof the said United States and the 
 public faith are hereby solemnly pledged. 
 
 Art. 13. Every State shall abide by the determinations 
 of the United States in Congress assembled on all questions 
 which by this Confederation are submitted to them. And 
 the Articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably 
 observed by every State, and the Union shall be perpetual ; 
 nor shall any alteration at any time herea,fter be made in
 
 192 APPENDIX. 
 
 any of them ; unless such alteration be agreed to in a 
 Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed 
 by the legislatures of every State. 
 
 These Articles shall be proposed to the legislatures of all 
 the United States, to be considered, and, if approved of 
 by them, they are advised to authorize their delegates to 
 ratify the same in the Congress of the United States ; 
 which being done, the same shall become conclusive.
 
 193 
 
 B. 
 
 CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 We, tbe People of the United States, in order to form 
 a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic 
 tranij[iiillity, provide for the common defence, promote the 
 general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to our- 
 selves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Con- 
 stitution for the United States of America. 
 
 ARTICLE I. 
 
 Section I. — All Legislative powers herein granted 
 shall be vested in a Congress of tlie United States, which 
 shall consist of a Senate and House of Kcpresentatives. 
 
 Section II. — 1. The House of Representatives shall be 
 coniposed of members chosen every second year, by the 
 people of the several States; and the electors in each 
 State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of 
 the most numerous branch of the State Legislature. 
 
 2. No person shall be a Representative who t<hall not 
 have attained to the age of twenty-five years, and been 
 seven years a citizen of the United States, and who shall 
 not, when elected, be an inhabitant of tliat State in which 
 he shall be chosen. 
 
 3. Re[)resentativps and direct faxes shall be apportioned 
 among the several States which may be included within 
 
 O
 
 194 APPENDIX. 
 
 this Union, accordin<^ to their respective numbers, which 
 shall be determined by adding to the whole number of 
 free persons, including those bound to service for a term 
 of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three- fifths of 
 all otlier persons. The actual enumeration shall be made 
 within three years after the first meeting of the Congress 
 of the United States, and within every subsequent term 
 of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law direct. 
 The number of Representatives shall not exceed one for 
 every thirty tliousand, but each State shall have at least 
 one Representative ; and, until such enumeration shall be 
 made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to 
 choose three ; JMassachusetts, eight ; Rhode Island and 
 Providence Plantations, one ; Connecticut, five ; New 
 York, six ; New Jersey, four ; Pennsylvania, eight; Dela- 
 ware, one ; Marjdand, six ; Virginia, ten ; North Carolina, 
 five ; South Carolina, five ; and Georgia, three. 
 
 4. AN^hen vacancies happen in the representation from 
 any State, the executive authority thereof shall issue writs 
 of election to fill such vacancies. 
 
 5. The House of Representatives shall choose their 
 speaker and other officers; and shall have the sole power of 
 impeachment. 
 
 Section III. — 1. The Senate of the United States shall 
 be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by 
 the Legislature thereof, for six years ; and each Senator 
 shall have one vote. 
 
 2. Immediately after they shall be assembled, in conse- 
 quence of the first election, they shall be divided, as 
 equally as may be, into three classes. The seats of the 
 Senators of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration 
 of the second year: of the second class, at the expiration
 
 CONSTITUTION. 195 
 
 of the fourth year ; and of tlie third class, at the expira- 
 tion of the sixth year; so that one-tliird maybe chosen 
 every second year. And if vacancies happen, by resigna- 
 tion or otherwise, during tlie recess of the Legislature of 
 any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary 
 appointments until the next meeting of the Legislature, 
 which shall then fill such vacancies, 
 
 3. No person shall bo a Senator who shall not have 
 attained to the age of thirty years, and been nine years a 
 citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when 
 elected, be an inhabitant of that State for which he shall 
 be chosen. 
 
 4. The Vice-President of the United States shall be 
 President of the Senate, but shall have no vote unless they 
 be equally divided. 
 
 .'5. The Senate shall choose their other officers, and also 
 a President pro tempore in the absence of the Vice-Presi- 
 dent, or when he shall exercise the office of President of 
 the United States. 
 
 G. The Senate shall have the sole power to try all im- 
 peachments. AVlien sitting for that purpose, they shall 
 be on oath or affirmation. AVhen the President of the 
 United States is trie<l, the Chief Justice shall preside ;, 
 and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence 
 of two-thirds of the members present. 
 
 7. Judgment, in cases of impeachment, shall not extend 
 further than to removal from office, and disqualification to 
 hold and enjoy any ofiice of honour, trust, or profit under 
 the United States. ]iut the paity CDUvicted shall, never- 
 theless, be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, 
 and punishment, according to law. 
 
 Section IV. — L The times, places, and manner of hold- 
 
 2
 
 196 APPENDIX. 
 
 in;^ elections for Senators and Representatives sliall be 
 jirescribed in each State by the Legishiture thereof; but 
 tlie Congress may, at any time, by hiw, make or alter 
 such regulations, except as to the places of choosing 
 Senators. 
 
 2. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every 
 year ; and such meeting shall be on the first Monday in 
 December, nnless they shall, by law, a[>{)oint a diflereut 
 day. 
 
 Section V. — 1. Each House shall be the judge of the 
 elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members; 
 and a majority of eacli shall constitute a quorum to do 
 business ; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to 
 day, and may be authorized to compel the attendance of 
 absent members, in such manner and under such penalties 
 as each House niay provide. 
 
 2. Each House may determine the roles of its proceei. 
 ings ; punish its members for disorderly behaviour ; and, 
 with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member, 
 
 3. Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, 
 and from time to time publish the same, excepting such 
 parts as may in their judgment require secrecy ; and the 
 yeas and nays of the members of either House on any 
 question shall, at the desire of one-fifth of those present, 
 be entered on the journal. 
 
 4. Neither House, during the session of Congress, shall, 
 without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than 
 three days, nor to any other place than that in which the 
 two Houses shall be sitting. 
 
 Section YI. — 1. The Senators and Representatives 
 shall receive a compensation for their services, to be ascer- 
 tained by law, and paid out of the treasury of the United
 
 CONSTITUTION. 197 
 
 States. They sluill, in all cases except treason, felony, 
 and breac-li of tlie peace, be privileged from arre.st during 
 tlieir attendance at the session of their resj)ectivc Houses, 
 and in going to and returning from the same : for any 
 speech or debate in either House, they shall not be ques- 
 tioned in any other place. 
 
 2. No Senator or Representative shull, during the time 
 for which he was elected, be apjiointed to any civil office, 
 under the authority of the United States, which shall have 
 been created, or the emoluments whereof yliiill have been 
 increased, during such time ; ami no person holding any 
 office under the United States shall be a member of either 
 House during his continuance in office. 
 
 Section VII. — 1. All bills for raising revenue shall 
 originate in the House of Representatives ; but the Senate 
 may projjose or concur with amendments, as on other 
 bills. 
 
 2. Every bill which shall have passed the House of 
 Representatives and the Senate shall, before it become a 
 law, be presented to the President of the United States. 
 If he ai)prove it, he shall sign it ; but if not, he shall 
 return it, with his objections, to that House in which it 
 shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at 
 large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If, 
 after such reconsideration, two-thirds of that House shall 
 agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the 
 objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise 
 be reconsidered ; and, if approved by two-thirds of that 
 House, it shall become a law. But in all such cases tlie 
 votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and 
 nays; and the names of the persons voting for and against 
 the bill shall be entered on the journal of each Hquse
 
 1 98 APPENDIX. 
 
 respectively. If any bill sliall not be returned by tlie 
 President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall 
 have been presented to him, tlie same sliall be a law, in 
 like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress, 
 by their a<ljournnient, prevent its return ; in which case it 
 shall not be a law. 
 
 3. Every order, resolution, or vote to which the concur- 
 rence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be 
 necessary (except on a question of adjournment), shall be 
 presented to the President of the United States, and, 
 before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by 
 him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by 
 two-thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, 
 according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the 
 case of a bill. 
 
 Section YHI. — The Congress shall have power, 
 
 1. To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises 
 to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and 
 general welfare of the United States; but all duties, 
 imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the 
 United States : 
 
 2. To borrow money on the credit of the United States: 
 
 3. To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and 
 among the several States, and with the Indian tribes : 
 
 4. To establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and 
 uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout 
 the United States : 
 
 5. To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of 
 foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures: 
 
 6. To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the 
 securities and current coin of the United States : 
 
 7. To establish post-offices and post-roads :
 
 CONSTITUTION. 199 
 
 8. To promote tlie progress of science and useful arts, 
 by securing, for limited times, to authors and inventors 
 the exclusive right to their respective writings and dis- 
 coveries : 
 
 9. To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court : 
 
 10. To define and puni.sh piracies and felonies com- 
 mitted on the high seas, and oflences against the law of 
 nations : 
 
 11. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, 
 and make rules concerning captures on land and water : 
 
 12. To raise and support armies ; but no appropriation 
 of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two 
 years : 
 
 13. To provide and maintain a navy: 
 
 14. To make rules for the government and regulation 
 of the land and naval forces : 
 
 15. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute 
 the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and rei)el 
 invasions : 
 
 16. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining 
 the militia, and for governing such part of them as may 
 be employed in the service of the United States, reserving 
 to the States respectively the appointment of the officers, 
 and the authority of training the militia according to the 
 discipline prescribed by Congress : 
 
 17. To exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases what- 
 soever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) 
 as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance 
 of Congress, become the seat of the government of the 
 United States ; and to exercise like authority over all 
 places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the 
 State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts,
 
 200 APPENDIX. 
 
 magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and otlier needful build- 
 ings : and, 
 
 IS. To make all laws which shall be necessary and 
 proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, 
 and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the 
 Government of the United States, or in any department 
 or officer thereof. 
 
 Section IX. — 1. The migration or importation of such 
 persons as any of the States now existing shall think 
 proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress 
 prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight ; 
 but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not 
 exceeding ten dollars for each person. 
 
 2. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not 
 be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or inva- 
 sion, the public safety may require it. 
 
 3. No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be 
 passed. 
 
 4. No capitation or other direct tax shall be laid, unless 
 in proportion to the census or enumeration hereinbefore 
 directed to be taken. 
 
 5. No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from 
 any State. 
 
 6. No preference shall be given by any regulation of 
 commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those 
 of another ; nor shall vessels bound to or from one State 
 be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another. 
 
 7. No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in 
 consequence of appropriations made by law ; and a regular 
 statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of 
 all public money shall be published from time to time. 
 
 8. No title of nobility shall be granted by the United
 
 CONSTITUTION. 201 
 
 States ; and no person holding any office of profit or trust 
 under tliein shall, without the consent of the Congress, 
 accept of any present, eniolunicnt, office, or title of any 
 kind whatever from any king, i)rince, or foreign state. 
 
 Skction X. — 1. No State shall enter into any treaty, 
 alliance, or confederation ; grant letters of marque and 
 reprisal ; coin money ; emit bills of credit ; make anything 
 but gold and silver coin a tender in jjayment of debts ; 
 pass any bill of attainder, ex jmst facto law, or law impair- 
 ing the obligation^iiof contracts ; or grant any title of 
 nobility. 
 
 2. No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, 
 lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except 
 what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspec- 
 tion laws ; and the net produce of all duties and imposts 
 laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the 
 use of the treasury of the United States ; and all such 
 laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the 
 Congress. 
 
 3. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay 
 any duty of tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time 
 of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another 
 State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war, uidess 
 actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not 
 admit of delay. 
 
 AETICLE II. 
 Section I. — 1. The Executive power shall be vested in 
 a President of the United States of America. He shall 
 hold his office during the term of four years, and, together 
 with the Vice-President, chosen for the same term, be 
 elected as follows : —
 
 202 APPENDIX. 
 
 2. Each State shall appoint, in such manner as thv 
 Legislature thereof may direct, a number of Electors, equal 
 to the whole number of senators and representatives to 
 which the State may be entitled in the Congress ; but no 
 senator or representative, or person holding any office of 
 trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed 
 an elector. 
 
 3. The Electors shall meet in their respective States, 
 and vote by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least 
 shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves. 
 And they shall make a list of all the persons voted for, 
 and of the number of votes for each ; which list they shall 
 sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the 
 Government of the United States, directed to the Presi- 
 dent of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in 
 the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, 
 open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be 
 counted. The person having the greatest number of votes 
 shall be the President, if such number be a maj(jrity of 
 the whole number of Electors appointed ; and if there be 
 more than one who have such majority, and have an equal 
 number of votes, then the House of Representatives shall 
 immediately choose by ballot one of them for President ; 
 and if no person have a majority, then from the five 
 highest on the list the said House shall in like manner 
 choose the President. But in choosing the President, the 
 votes shall be taken by States, the representation from 
 each State having one vote; a quorum for this purpose 
 shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of 
 the States, and a majority of all the States shall be neces- 
 sary to a choice. In every case, after the choice of the 
 President, the person having the greatest number of votes
 
 CONSTITUTION. 20.S 
 
 of the Electors sli.all be the Vice-President. But if there 
 shouhl remain two or more who have equal votes, the 
 Senate shall choose from them by ballot the Vice-Pre- 
 sident. ^ 
 
 4. The Congress may determine the time of choosing 
 the Electors, and the day on which they shall give their 
 votes ; which day shall be the same throughout the 
 United States. 
 
 5. No person, except a natural-born citizen, or a citizen 
 of the United States at the time of the adoption of this 
 Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President; 
 neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall 
 not have attained to the age of thirty-five years, and been 
 fourteen years a resident within the United States. 
 
 6. In case of the removal of the President from office, 
 or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the 
 powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve 
 on the Vice-President ; and the Congress may by law 
 provide for the case of removal, death, resignation, or 
 inability, both of the President and Vice-President, de- 
 claring what officer thall then act as President, and such 
 officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be re- 
 moved, or a President shall be elected. 
 
 7. The President shall, at stated times, receive for his 
 services a compensation, which shall neither be increased 
 nor diminished during the period for which he shall have 
 been elected, and he shall not receive within that period 
 any other emolument from the United States, or any of 
 them. 
 
 8. Before he enter on the execution of his office, he 
 shall take the following oath or affirmation : — 
 
 ' Annulled. See Amendment, Art. XII.
 
 204 APPENDIX. 
 
 " I do soloniiily swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully 
 execute tlie office of President of the United States ; and 
 will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and 
 defend the Constitution of the United States." 
 
 Section II. — 1. The President sliall be Commander-in- 
 Chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of 
 the militia of tlie several States when called into the 
 actual service of the United States ; he may require the 
 opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the 
 Executive departments, upon any subject relating to the 
 duties of their respective offices, and he shall have power 
 to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the 
 United States, excppt in cases of impeachment. 
 
 2. He shall have power, by and with the advice and 
 consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provi<led two- 
 t'r.irds of the Senators present concur ; and he shall nomi- 
 nate, and by and with the advice and consent of the 
 Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers, 
 and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other 
 officers of the United States whose appointments are not 
 herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be esta- 
 blished bylaw; but the Congress may by law vest the 
 appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper 
 in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the 
 heads of departments. 
 
 3. The President shall have power to fill up all 
 vacancies that may happen during the recess of the 
 Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at 
 the end of their next session. 
 
 Section III. — He shall, from time to time, give to the 
 Congress information of the state of the Union, and re-
 
 CONSTITUTION. 205 
 
 commend to their consideration sncli measures as he shall 
 judge necessary and exj)edient ; he may, on extraordinary 
 occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and, in 
 case of disagreement between tlieni with respect to the 
 time of adjournment, lie may adjourn them to such time 
 as he shall think proper ; lie shall receive ambassadors 
 and otlier jtublic ministers ; he shall take care that the 
 laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the 
 officers of the United States. 
 
 Section IV. — The President, Vice-President, and all 
 civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from 
 office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, 
 bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. 
 
 ARTICLE III. 
 
 Section I. — The Judicial power of the United States 
 shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior 
 courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and 
 establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior 
 courts, shall Indd their offices during good behaviour, and 
 shall, at stated times, receive for their services a compen- 
 sation which shall not be diminished during their con- 
 tinuance in office. 
 
 Section II. — 1. The Judicial power shall extend to all 
 cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, 
 the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which 
 sIkiU be made, under their authority ; to all cases affijcting 
 ambassadors ; other j)ublic ministers and consuls ; to all 
 cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ; to contro- 
 versies to which the United States shall be a party ; to 
 controversies between two or more States; between a 
 State and citizens of another State; between citizens of
 
 206 APPENDIX. 
 
 different States; between citizens of the same State claim- 
 ing lands under grants of different States ; and between a 
 State, or the citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens, 
 or subjects. 
 
 2. In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public 
 ministers, and consuls, and those in which a State shall 
 be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original juris- 
 diction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the 
 Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as 
 to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such 
 regulations, as the Congress shall make. 
 
 3. The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeach- 
 ment, shall be by jury, and such trial shall be held in the 
 State where the said crimes shall have been committed ; 
 but when not committed within any State, the trial shall 
 be at such place or places as the Congress may by law 
 have directed. 
 
 Section III. — 1. Treason against the United States 
 shall consist only in levying war against them, or in ad- 
 hering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. 
 No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the 
 testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on 
 confession in open court. 
 
 2. The Congress shall have power to declare the 
 punishment of treason ; but no attainder of treason shall 
 work corruption of blood or forfeiture, except during the 
 life of the person attainted. 
 
 ARTICLE IV. 
 Section I. — Full faith and credit shall be given, in 
 each State, to the public acts, records, and judicial pro- 
 ceedings of every other State. And the Congress may,
 
 CONSTITUTION. 207 
 
 by general laws, prescribe the inaiincr in which such acts, 
 records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect 
 thereof. 
 
 Sectiox II. — 1. The citizens of each State shall be en- 
 titled to all ])rivileges and immunities of citizens in the 
 several States. 
 
 2. A person charged in any State witli treason, fehniy, 
 or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in 
 another State, shall, on demand of the Executive authority 
 of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be 
 removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime. 
 
 3. No person, held to service or labour in one State 
 under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in 
 consequence of any law or regulation therein, be dis- 
 charged from such service or labour ; but shall be de- 
 livered up on claim by the party to whom such service or 
 labour may be due. 
 
 Section III. — 1. New States may be admitted by the 
 Congress into this Union ; but no new State shall be 
 formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other 
 State ; nor any State be formed by the junction of two or 
 more States, or parts of States, without the consent of 
 the Legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of the 
 Congress. 
 
 2. The Congress shall have power to dispose of and 
 make all needful rules and regulations respecting the 
 territory or other property belonging to the United States; 
 and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as 
 to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any 
 particular State. 
 
 Section IV. — The United States sliall guarantee to
 
 208 APPENDIX. 
 
 every State in tliis Union a republican form of govern- 
 ment, and shall protect cacli of them against invasion ; 
 and on application of the Legislature, or of the Exe- 
 cutive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against 
 domestic violence. 
 
 ARTICLE V. 
 1. The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses 
 shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this 
 Constitution, or, on the application of the Legislatures of 
 two-thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention 
 for proposing amendments ; which, in either case, shall 
 be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Con- 
 stitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths 
 of the several States, or by conventions in three-fourtlis 
 thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may 
 be proposed by the Congress : Provided that no amend- 
 ment which may be made prior to the year one thousand 
 eight hundred and eight, shall in any manner aflect the 
 first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first 
 article; and that no State, without its consent, shall be 
 deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate. 
 
 ARTICLE VI. 
 
 1. All debts contracted, and engagements entered into, 
 before the adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid 
 against the United States under this Constitution as under 
 the Confederation. 
 
 2. This Constitution, and the laws of the United States 
 which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties 
 made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the 
 United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and
 
 CONSTITUTION. 209 
 
 the judires in every State sliall be bound tlicreby, anj/^tliing 
 in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary 
 notwithstanding. 
 
 3. The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, 
 and the members of the several State Legislatures, and all 
 Executive and Judicial officers, both of tlie United States 
 and of the several States, shall be bound, by oath or 
 affirmation, to support this Constitution ; but no religious 
 test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office 
 or public trust under the United States. 
 
 ARTICLE VII. 
 
 The ratification of the conventions of nine States shall 
 be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution 
 between the States so ratifying the same. 
 
 Done in Convention by the unanimous consent of the 
 States present, the seventeenth day of September, in 
 the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and 
 eighty-seven, and of the independence of the United 
 States of America the twelfth. In witness whereof, we 
 have hereunto subscribed our names. 
 
 George Washington, President, 
 
 and Deputy from Virginux. 
 
 New HampsJnre — John Langdon, Nicholas Oilman; 
 Massachusetts — Nathaniel GorliaDi, llufus King ; Con- 
 necticut — William Samuel Johnson, Roger Sherman ; New 
 York — Alexander Hamilton; New Jersey — William 
 Livingston, David Brearley, William Paterson, Jonathan 
 Dayton ; Pennsylcania — Benjamin Franklin, i'iionias
 
 210 APPENDIX. 
 
 Mifflin, Robert Morris, deorfje Clymer, Thomas Fitzsim- 
 mons, Jared Ingersol, James Wilson, Gouverueur Morris ; 
 Delaware — George Rea.l, Gunning Bedford, Jun., John 
 Dickinson, Richard Biissett, Jacob Broom ; Maryland— 
 James M'llenry, Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer, Daniel 
 Carroll ; Virginia — John Blair, James Madison, Jun. ; 
 NorthCarolma — William Blount, Richard Dobbs Spaight, 
 Hugh AVilliamson; South Carolina — John Rutledge, 
 Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Charles Pinckney, Pierce 
 Butler ; Georgia — William Few, Abraham Baldwin. 
 
 Attest William Jackson, Secretary. 
 
 AMENDMENTS. 
 
 The following Articles in addition to, and amendment o/, 
 the Constitution of the United States, having been 
 ratified by the Legislatures of nine States, are equally 
 obligatory with the Constitution itself. 
 
 I. Congress shall make no law respecting an establish- 
 ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, 
 or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press ; or the 
 right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
 the Government for a redress of grievances. 
 
 II. A well-regulated militia being necessary to the 
 security of a free State, the right of the jjeople to keep 
 and bear arms shall not be infringed. 
 
 III. No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in
 
 CONSTITUTION. 211 
 
 any lionse, without tlio consent of the owner ; nor in time 
 of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. 
 
 IV. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
 houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
 and seizures, shall not be violated ; and no warrants shall 
 issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
 affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
 searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
 
 V. No person shall be held to answer for a capital or 
 otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
 in<lictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the 
 land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual 
 service, in time of war, or public danger ; nor shall any 
 person be subject, for the same oflTence, to be twice ])ut in 
 jeopardy of life or limb ; nor shall be compelled, in any 
 criminal case, to be witness against himself; nor be 
 deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due j)rocess 
 of law ; nor shall private jjrojierty be taken for public use, 
 without just compensation. 
 
 VI. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
 the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
 jury, of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
 have been committed; which district shall have been pre- 
 viously ascertained by law ; and to be informed of the 
 nature and cause of the accusation ; to be confronted with 
 the witnesses against him ; to have comj)ulsory process for 
 obtaining witnesses in his favour; and to have the assist- 
 ance of counsel for his defence. 
 
 VII. In suits at common law, where the value in cnii- 
 troversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by 
 
 p 2
 
 212 APPENDIX. 
 
 jury shall be preserveJ ; and no fact tried by a jury shall 
 be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United 
 States than according to the rules of the common law. 
 
 VIII. Excessive bail shall not be required ; nor ex- 
 cessive fines imposed ; nor cruel and unusual punishments 
 inflicted. 
 
 IX. The enumeration in the Constitution of certain 
 rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others 
 retained by the people, 
 
 X. The powers not delegated to the United States by 
 the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
 reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. 
 
 XI. The .Judicial power of the United States shall not 
 be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity com- 
 menced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
 citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any 
 foreign State. 
 
 XII. § 1. The Electors shall meet in their respective 
 States, and vote by ballot for President and Vice-Presi- 
 dent, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of 
 the same state with themselves ; they shall name in their 
 ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct 
 ballots the person voted for as Vice-President ; and they 
 shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as Pre- 
 sident, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and 
 of the number of votes for each, which list they shall 
 sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Government 
 of the United States, directed to the President of the 
 Senate ; the President of the Senate shall, in the presence
 
 CONSTITUTION. 213 
 
 of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the 
 certificates, and tlie votes shall then he counted ; the 
 person havini,^ the greatest numher of votes for President 
 shall be the President, if sucli number be a majority of 
 tlie wliole number of Electors appointed ; and if no person 
 have such majority, then from the persons having the 
 highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those 
 voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall 
 choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But, in 
 choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by States. 
 the representation from each State having one vote ; a 
 quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or 
 members from two-thirds of the States, and a majority of 
 all the States shall be necessary to a choice. And if the 
 House of Representatives shall not choose a President 
 whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, 
 before the fourth day of March next following, then the 
 Vice-President shall act as President, as in tlie case of the 
 death or other constitutional disability of the President. 
 § 2. The person having the greatest number of votes as 
 Vice-President shall be Vice-President, if such number be 
 a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed ; 
 and if no person have a majority, then from the two 
 highest numbers on the list the Senate shall choose the 
 Vice-President ; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of 
 two-thirds of the whole number of Senators and a majority 
 of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. § 3. But 
 no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President 
 shall be eligible to that of A'^ice-President of the United 
 States.
 
 214 
 
 C. 
 
 EXTRACT FROM WASHINGTON'S FAREWELL 
 ADDRESS. 
 
 Here, perhaps, I ought to stop : but a solicitude for 
 your welfare, which cannot end but with my life, and the 
 apprehension of danger, natural to that solicitude, urge 
 me, on an occasion like the present, to oflfer to your 
 solemn contemplation, and to recommend to your frequent 
 review, some sentiments, which are the result of much 
 reflection, of no inconsiderable observation, and which 
 appear to me all-important to the permanency of your 
 felicity as a people. These will be afl'orded to you with 
 the more freedom, as you can only see in them the disin- 
 terested warnings of a parting friend, who can possibly 
 have no personal motive to bias his counsel : nor can I 
 forget, as an encouragement to it, your indulgent recep- 
 tion of my sentiments on a former and not dissimilar 
 occasion. 
 
 Interwoven as is the love of liberty with every ligament 
 of your hearts, no recommendation of mine is necessary to 
 fortify or confirm the attachment. 
 
 The Unity of Government, which constitutes you one 
 people, is also now dear to you. It is justly so ; for it is 
 a main pillar in the edifice of your real independence ; the 
 support of your tranquillity at home, your peace abroad ; 
 of your safety ; of yoiu* prosperity ; of that very liberty
 
 WASHINGTON S FAREWELL ADDRESS. 215 
 
 which you so liiii;lily prize. But as it is easy to foresee, 
 that from dilfcrent causes and from different quarters, 
 much pains will be taken, many artifices employed, to 
 weaken, in your minds, the conviction of this truth ; as 
 this is the point in your political fortress against which 
 the batteries of internal and external enemies will be most 
 constantly and actively (though often covertly and insi- 
 diously) directed, it is of infinite niomont that you should 
 properly estimate the immense value of your National 
 union to your collective and individual happiness ; that 
 you should cherish a cordial, habitual, and immovable 
 attachment to it ; accustoming yourselves to think and 
 speak of it as of the palladium of your political safety and 
 prosperity ; watching for its preservation with jealous 
 anxiety; discountenancing whatever may suggest even a 
 suspicion that it can in any event be abandoned; and 
 indignantly frowning upon the first dawning of every 
 attempt to alienate any portion of our country from the 
 rest, or to enfeeble the sacred ties which now link together 
 the various parts. 
 
 For this you have every inducement of sympathy and 
 interest. Citizens by birth or choice of a common country, 
 that country has a right to concentrate your affections. 
 The name of American, wliich belongs to you in your 
 National capacity, must always exalt the just pride of 
 patriotism, more than any appellation derived from local 
 discrimina.tions. With slight shades of difference, you 
 have the same religion, manners, habits, and political 
 principles. You have, in a common cause, fought and 
 triumj)hed together : the independence and liberty you 
 possess are the work of joint councils and joint efforts, of 
 common dangers, suflerings, and successes.
 
 216 APPENDIX. 
 
 But these considerations, however powerfully they 
 address themselves to your sensibility, are greatly out- 
 weighed by those which apply more immediately to your 
 interest : here every portion of our country finds the most 
 commanding motives for carefully guarding and preserving 
 the Union of the whole. 
 
 The North, in an unrestrained intercourse with the 
 South, protected by the equal laws of a common govern- 
 ment, finds, in the productions of the latter, great addi- 
 tional resources of maritime and commercial enterprise, 
 and precious materials of manufacturing industry. The 
 South, in the same intercourse, benefiting by the agency 
 of the North, sees its agriculture grow, and its commerce 
 expand. Turning partly into its own channels the sea- 
 men of the North, it finds its particular navigation invi- 
 gorated : and while it contributes, in different ways, to 
 nourish and increase the general mass of the National 
 navigation, it looks forward to the protection of a maritime 
 strength, to which itself is unequally adapted. The East, 
 in like intercourse with the West, already finds, and ia 
 the progressive improvement of interior communication 
 by land and water will more and more find, a valuable 
 vent for the commodities which it brings from abroad, 
 or manufactures at home. The AVest derives from the 
 East supplies requisite to its growth and comfort; and 
 what is perhaps of still greater consequence, it must of 
 necessity owe the secure enjoyment of indispensable out- 
 lets for its own productions to the weight, influence, and 
 the future maritime strength of the Atlantic side of the 
 Union, directed by an indissoluble community of interest 
 as one Nation. Any other tenure by which the West can 
 hold this essential advantao:e, whether derived from its
 
 WASHINGTON S FAREWELL ADDUESS. 217 
 
 own separate strength or from an apostate and unnatural 
 connection with any foreign power, must be intrinsically 
 precarious. 
 
 While, then, every ])art of our country thus fools an 
 inmiediate and particular interest in Union, all the parties 
 combined cannot fail to find, in the united mass of means 
 and efforts, greater strength, greater resource, propor- 
 tionably greater security from external danger, a less fre- 
 quent interruption of their peace by foreign nations ; and, 
 what is of inestimable value, they must derive from Union 
 an exem])tion from those broils and wars between them- 
 selves which so frequently afflict neighbouring countries 
 not tied together by the same government ; which their 
 own rivalships alone would be sufficient to produce, but 
 which opposite foreign alliances, attachments, and in- 
 trigues, would stimulate and embitter. Hence, likewise, 
 they will avoid the necessity of those overgrown military 
 establishments which, under any form of government, are 
 inauspicious to liberty, and which are to be regarded as 
 particularly hostile to republican liberty ; in this sense it 
 is, that your Union ought to be considered as a main prop 
 of your liberty, and that the love of the one ought to endear 
 to you the preservation of the other. 
 
 These considerations speak a persuasive language to 
 every reflecting and virtuous mind, and exhibit the con- 
 tinuance of the Union as a primary object of patriotic 
 desire. Is there a doubt, whether a common government 
 can embrace so large a sphere? — Let experience solve it. 
 To listen to mere speculation, in such a case, were crimi- 
 nal. We are authorized to hope, that a proper organiza- 
 tion of the whole, with the auxiliary agency of govern- 
 ments for the respective subdivisions, will aflord a happy
 
 218 APPENDIX. 
 
 issue to the experiment. It is well worth a fair and full 
 experiment. AVitli such powerful and obvious motives to 
 union aflecting all parts of our country, while experience 
 shall not have demonstrated its impracticability, there will 
 always be reason to distrust the patriotism of those who, 
 in any quarter, may endeavour to weaken its bands. 
 
 In contemplating the causes which may disturb our 
 Union, it occurs as a matter of serious concern that any 
 ground should have been furnished for characterizing 
 parties by geographical discriminations — Northern and 
 Southern — Atlantic and Western — whence designing 
 men may endeavour to excite a belief that there is a real 
 difference of local interests and views. One of the expe- 
 dients of party to acquire influence within particular dis- 
 tricts, is to misrepresent the opinions and aims of other 
 districts. You cannot shield yourselves too much against 
 the jealousies and heart-burnings which spring from these 
 misrepresentations : they tend to render alien to each 
 other those who ought to be bound together by fraternal 
 affection. The inhabitants of our Western country have 
 lately had a useful lesson on this bead : they have seen 
 in the negotiation by the Executive, and in the unanimous 
 ratification by the Senate, of the treaty with Spain, and 
 in the universal satisfaction at that event throughout 
 the United States, a decisive proof how unfounded were 
 the suspicions propagated among them, of a policy in the 
 General Government and in the Atlantic States unfriendly 
 to their general interests in regard to the Mississippi; they 
 have been witnesses to the formation of two treaties, that 
 with Great Britain and that with Spain, which secure to 
 them everything they could desire in respect to our 
 foreign relations towards confirming their prosperity. Will
 
 Washington's farewell address. 219 
 
 it not be tlieir wisdom to rely for the preservation of these 
 advantages on the Union hy wliich they were procured ? 
 Will they not henceforth ho deaf to those advisers, if such 
 there are, who would sever thcin from their brethren and 
 connect them with aliens ? 
 
 To the eiiicacy and permanency of your Union, a go- 
 vernment for the whole is inili.sj)ensable. No alliance, 
 however strict, between the parts can be an ailequate 
 substitute ; they must inevitably experience the Infractions 
 and interruptions which all alliances in all times have 
 experienced. Sensible of this momentous truth, you have 
 improved upon your first essay, by the adoption of a Con- 
 stitution of government better calculated than your for- 
 mer for an intimate Union and for the efficacious manage- 
 ment of your common concerns. This Government, the 
 offspring of our own choice, uninfluenced and unawed, 
 adopted upon full investigation and mature deliberation, 
 completely free in its principles, in the distribution of its 
 powers, uniting security with energy, and containing 
 within itself a provision for its own amendment, has a 
 just claim to your confidence and your support. Respect 
 for its authority, compliance with its laws, acquiescence 
 in its measures, are duties enjoined by the fundamental 
 maxims of true liberty. The basis of our jiolitical sys- 
 tems is the right of the People to make and to alter tlieir 
 constitutions of government ; hut the Constitution wh\ch 
 at any time exists, till changed hy an explicit and authen- 
 tic act of the whole People, is sacredly ohligatory upon all. 
 The very idea of the potcer and the Hght of the People to 
 establish (government presupposes the duty of every indi- 
 vidual to ohey the estahlished Government. 
 
 All obstructions to the execution of the laws, all com-
 
 220 APPENDIX. 
 
 binations and associations, under wliatever plausible cha- 
 racter, with the real design to direct, control, counteract, 
 or awe the regular deliberation and action of tlie consti- 
 tuted authorities, are destructive of this fundamental 
 principle, and of fatal tendency. They serve to organize 
 faction, to give it an artificial and extraordinary force, to 
 put in tlie place of the delegated will of the Nation the 
 will of a party, often a small but artful and enterprising 
 minority of the community ; and, according to the alter- 
 nate triumphs of different parties, to make the public 
 administration the mirror of the ill-concerted and incon- 
 gruous projects of faction, rather than the organ of con- 
 sistent and wholesome plans, digested by common councils, 
 and modified by mutual interests. 
 
 However combinations or associations of the above de- 
 scription may now and then answer popular ends, they 
 are likely, in the course of time and things, to become 
 potent engines by which cunning, ambitious, and unprin- 
 cipled men will be enabled to subvert the power of the 
 people, and to usurp, for themselves, the reins of govern- 
 ment ; destroying, afterwards, the very engines which 
 have lifted them to unjust dominion. 
 
 Towards the preservation of your Government, and the 
 permanency of your present happy state, it is requisite, 
 not only that you speedily discountenance irregular oppo- 
 sitions to its acknowledged, authority, but also that you 
 resist with care the spirit of innovation upon its princi- 
 ples, however specious the pretexts. One method of 
 assault may be to effect, in the forms of the Constitution, 
 alterations which will impair the energy of the system, and 
 thus to undermine what cannot be directly overthrown. 
 In all the changes to which you may be invited, remember
 
 Washington's farewell address. 221 
 
 that time and habit are at least as necessary to fix the 
 true character of governments as of other hunuin institu- 
 tions ; that experience is the surest standard by which to 
 test the real tendency of the existing Constitution of a 
 country ; that facility in changes, upon the credit of mere 
 hypothesis and opinion, exposes to perpetual change, from 
 the endless variety of hypothesis and opinion ; and remem- 
 ber, especially, that for the efficient management of your 
 common interests, in a country so extensive as ours, a 
 government of as much vigour as is consistent with the 
 perfect security of liberty is indispensable. Liberty 
 itself will find in such a government, with powers properly 
 distributed and adjusted, its surest guardian. It is, 
 indeed, little else than a name where the government is 
 too feeble to withstand the enterprises of faction, to 
 confine each member of the society within the limits 
 prescribed by the laws, and to maintain all in the secure 
 and tranquil enjoyment of the rights of person and 
 property.
 
 09 9 
 
 D. 
 
 THE FRENCH AND AMERICAN TARIFFS 
 COMPARED. 
 
 " Coming, now, to the second point to which I have 
 desired to invite your attention — that of the nicety of 
 classification required for giving to each and every branch 
 of manufacture the precise protection that it needs — we 
 find the only case of the kind in the Morrill tariff to be that 
 of cottons, and that even there the discriminations are abso- 
 lutely as nothing when compared to those of the one to 
 which you point as likely to produce a revolution in the 
 commercial system of the world. Linens are by us disposed 
 of in two short lines, and both of these are ad valorem. 
 Woollen yarns have three lines where you have no less 
 than thirty-six ; and the only counting of threads that is 
 required by us is that of four qualities of cotton, with a 
 variety of duties as easy of calculation as is the counting 
 of your fingers. Our whole tariff is, indeed, simplicity 
 itself when compared with the classification of your own, in 
 which there are no less than one hundred and forty kinds 
 of cotton yarn, each with its separate rate of duty ! Flax 
 and hemp yarns, single unbleached, single bleached or 
 dyed, and twisted unbleached, twisted bleached or dyed, are 
 put into twenty-four classes, and under as many different 
 rates of duty. Linens have twenty-four descriptions deter-
 
 FEENCn AND AMERICAN TARIFFS. 223 
 
 mined by the number of threads, ranging from eight to 
 twenty-four threads to five square jnillimctre.s — these varie- 
 ties being run tlirough the several conditions of unbleached, 
 bleached, printed, and figured, with the duties varied in 
 every case ; the lowest at 30 francs and the highest at 
 535 francs per 100 kilogrammes (220 pounds avoirdu- 
 pois). Jute yarns and tissues stand in the tables in 
 equally numerous descriptions and varied duties ; and in 
 cottons the classification is carried to the extent of pro- 
 viding different rates for fifteen qualities of single un- 
 bleached yarns, fifteen of bleached, fifteen of dyed, forty- 
 five kinds or qualities of twisted in two strands, two kinds 
 of yarn of three threads, and forty-five kinds of warped 
 yarns, with the duties varied, according to fineness, as has 
 been already said, no less than 140 times — beginning with 
 ten centimes and rising to no less than three francs per 
 kilograninie, or about one-quarter of a dollar per pound. 
 Of the cotton tissues I have given in the table only the 
 coarsest, the medium, and the finest qualities. In the 
 schedule there are eight qualities, the description of one of 
 which will serve as a specimen of the whole. It reads 
 thus: 'Cotton tissues weighing 11 kilogrammes, or more 
 than 100 square metres of thirty-five threads or less to the 
 five square millimetres, 50 centimes per kilogramme.' 
 Had any such discrimination been attempted here, we 
 should have been assured that the object of the framers 
 of our tariff had been the utter annihilation of inter- 
 national intercourse, and there would have been a howl 
 among our British free-traders such as could have found no 
 parallel in the history of the world since the establish- 
 ment of the first custom-house." — Letter to Chevalier^ by 
 H. G. Carey, Philadelphia, 28th Oct., I860.
 
 224 
 
 E. 
 
 THE WASHINGTON TREATY AND THE SET- 
 TLEMENT OF THE NORTH-EAST BOUN- 
 DARY. 
 
 There is one charge brought by Mr. Spence against the 
 United States, which, though not exactly falling within 
 the range of our discussion, we may incidentally be allowed 
 to notice. It refers to the settlement of the north-east 
 boundary, under the treaty of Washington, in 1841, con- 
 cluded by Lord Ashburton. 
 
 Soon after England had recognized American independ- 
 ence, in 1781, she executed a treaty with the United 
 States, wherein that boundary was described as taking the 
 line of highlands dividing the waters flowing into the 
 St. Lawrence from those flowing into the Atlantic. Upon 
 this basis, many ineffectual eflforts were made to determine 
 the highlands referred to, England claiming one line, the 
 United States another. The dispute was then referred to 
 the king of Holland, who decided against both claims, 
 declaring a strict compliance with the requirements 
 of the treaty impossible, as no such highlands could be 
 found, and recommending a compromise. To this England 
 consented, but the United States objected. By the year 
 1841, the growing occupation of the lands on the frontier 
 rendered an immediate settlement imperative ; and Sir 
 
 V
 
 THE WASHINGTON TKEATY. 225 
 
 Kobert Peel despatched Lord Asliburton on a special em- 
 bassy to Washington for the purpose. Mutual concessions 
 between Mr. Webster and himself soon led to a settle- 
 ment very much to the advantage of the two countries, 
 but very unsatisfactory to the politicians on both sides. 
 Each of the ministers was accused by his countrymen 
 of sacrificing National claims. 
 
 NowiNIr. Spence says that, "When the treaty on this sub- 
 ject was made by Lord Asliburton, the Government of the 
 United States was in possession of the map sent by Franklin," 
 who had negotiated the treaty of 1783, ""to the French 
 ministry, and deposited in their archives — a map authenti- 
 cated by a note in his own handwriting. On that map 
 appeared a strong red line drawn by Franklin's own hand 
 and referred to in his note." Mr. Spence goes on to state 
 that the map in question had been discovered by Mr. Jared 
 Sparks (the American historian) in the archives of Paris, 
 and had been forwarded by him to his Government, who 
 had also in their possession another map, from Jefferson's 
 collection, with a similar line — both confirming the British 
 claim ; but that all this evidence was suppressed and the 
 compromise accepted.^ 
 
 Mr. Spence has admitted two errors into his state- 
 ment. — 
 
 First, Mr. Sparks made his discovery after^ and not 
 before, the treaty had been concluded. 
 
 Secondly, that map is not authenticated by Franklin, 
 nor is there any proof that the red line was drawn V)y 
 him, but the reverse. 
 
 In the House of Commons Sir Robert Peel said : — 
 
 ' The American Union, 297.
 
 226 APPENDIX. 
 
 " On subsequent enquiry, at Paris, we found a map, 
 which must be tlie map referred to by Mr. Jared Sparks. 
 There is placed upon that map a broad red line, and 
 that line marks out the boundary as claimed by the 
 British. 
 
 "It is probably a map by M. d'Anville, of 174G, and 
 there can be no doubt but that it is the map referred to by 
 Mr. Jared Sj)arks; but we can trace no indication of 
 connection between it and the despatch of Dr. Franklin. 
 To say that they were connected is a tnere unfounded 
 inference."^ 
 
 And, again, Mr. Disraeli said, — " They had all beard of 
 a map with a broad red line, which map, making out the 
 boundary according to the original claim of the English 
 Government, was discovered apparently in the Archives 
 of the Foreign-Office in Paris, subsequent to the settle- 
 ment of the question, and bad been talked of and 
 written of by many who had never seen it. He, however, 
 jierhaps, was in a position to speak, of it with more 
 authority than some members of the House, for he had 
 seen it. It was a map eighteen inches square, and was 
 drawn by D'Anville. He believed that it was one of the 
 smallest maps that D'Anville had ever drawn. It was 
 not, by the bye, a map of the disputed territory, nor a 
 map of Canada, but a map of the whole of North 
 America, and, consequently, this strong red line would 
 itself occupy no slight part of the disputed territory. In 
 fact, it blotted out no inconsiderable portion of the 
 state of INIaine, which could occupy but a very small 
 space in a map of North America, eighteen inches 
 square."^ 
 
 ' Hansard, Ixvii. 1248. ' Idem, Ixvii. 1304.
 
 THE WASHINGTON TREATY. 227 
 
 . But this is not all. Mr. Disraeli was able to cite tlie 
 evidence of Franklin himself on the point, in the form 
 of a letter addressed to Mr. Livingstone : — 
 
 " I am perfectly clear in the remembrance that the map 
 we used in tracing the boundary was brought to the treaty 
 by the Commissioners from England, and that it was 
 the same that was published by Mitchell twenty years 
 ago." 
 
 " I remember, too, that in that part of the boundary 
 (Passainaquoddy Bay, in j\[aiue), we relied much on the 
 opinion of Mr. Adams, who had been concerned in some 
 former disputes concerning those territories, and that the 
 map we used was IMitchell's map. Congress was ac- 
 quainted with it at the time by a letter to their Secretary 
 for Foreign Affairs." 
 
 And again, in a note on the preliminary articles of the 
 treaty of 1783, Frauklin says, — "The map used in the 
 course of our negotiation was Mitchell's." 
 
 Now, a map of Mitchell's, dated 1753, upon a large 
 scale, marked by a broad red Vino folloici)if/ the American 
 claim, was found in the lioyal Library in this country. 
 Over that line, in four different places, was written — 
 " Boundary, as described by our negotiator, ]\Ir. Oswald." 
 This map was in possession of Lord Ashburton, but Sir 
 R. Peel says, " he did not communicate its contents to 
 Mr. Webster." 
 
 Another map was found in Paris, inscribed " A map of 
 the boundary of the United States, as agreed to by the 
 treaty of 17S3, by Mr. Faden, geographer to the King" 
 (of England) ; and, finally, a map was issued by a poli- 
 tical journal {Beice's Journal) of the day to illustrate its 
 report of the debates in Parliament upon the treaty. And
 
 228 APPENDIX. 
 
 both tLese last-named maps also confirmed the American 
 claim. 
 
 There is, indeed, no positive evidence as to the identical 
 map used hy the negotiators ; but it is clear that if any 
 charge of the suppressio veri can lie at all it is against 
 ourselves. The whole inquiry shows, however, that any 
 attempt to impugn the good faith of either Government, 
 or darken the fame of the statesmen engaged upon the 
 treaty of Washington, upon such evidence as we have 
 adduced, would be equally vain and unjustifiable. 
 
 ROBERT HARDWICKE, PRINTER, 192, PICCADILLY.
 
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