SIMSADUS : LONDON THE AMERICAN NAVY IN EUROPE BY JOHN LANGDON LEIGHTON Formerly Ensign U. S. N. R. F. NEW YORK HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY 1920 COPYRIGHT, 1920 BY HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY TO MY MOTHER AS A MARK, NOT A MEASURE, OF THE LOVE OF A DEVOTED SON. 41S322 FOREWORD HOW unfit and how unworthy a choice have I made of myself to undertake a work of this mixture, mine own reason though exceeding weak, hath sufficiently resolved me." Thus wrote Sir Wal- ter Raleigh in the preface to his History of the World. By profession I am not an author nor a Naval Officer, and yet I have undertaken to write a brief narrative of the American Navy in Europe dur- ing the Great War. Would that the talents of Sir Walter were at my command but I shall mention him no further lest by drawing him into the matter I flatter myself. I can but thank him for the apt way in which he has expressed my sentiments. In these days of limitless rumors, twice-told tales of glory, startling revelations, hitherto undisclosed facts, and much misinformation, I hope this work will find a place. It is not official, and as sanction has not been sought, it is published without it. One morning in March, 1918, I found myself a member of the Intelligence Section of Admiral Sims' Staff in London. The work in which I then joined and continued during the remainder of the War, and for several months thereafter, was so totally ab- vi FOREWORD sorbing in its interests that, upon my return to this country, I put what I had witnessed into writing. Were my powers of expression not so limited, I know the reader would be as easily absorbed in learning why and how great things were done as I was in watching their development from day to day. If you are in quest of the Romance of the War, I recommend to you the voluminous literature that has been written thereon. In my own experience, the romance of the War began on April 16, 1917, the day on which I left Harvard University, and donned the uniform of a sea-man; it ceased the following morning when I was aroused from pleasant slumbers at 5 A. M. to wash the deck. Those of us who joined the ranks of the Navy in this War found ourselves playing a new role in the comedy or drama of life. We left a universe of free- dom and entered a world in which hours for smoking, shore leave, uniforms to be worn, and the adjustment of our lives were prescribed by autocratic law and regulations. We chafed under our restrictions and blamed those who enforced them in their tyranni- cal attitude. We did not realize that in an Officer's orders, or the manner in which we were addressed, there was nothing of the personal; these men were but enforcing that splendid institution, the code of discipline. But as I now look back and see before FOREWORD vii me the characters of those Officers with whom I came in contact, I doubt whether any finer or more manly group of men exists. They were educated and trained to know the true meaning of duty, responsi- bility, and devotion; they were brisk in their manner, quick to act, severe in their judgments, and, at heart, human. A word in explanation of my title is pertinent. "Simsadus: London" was the cable address of the American Navy in Europe, or, in other words Ad- miral Sims' Headquarters in London. The word " Simsadus " dissected, means " Sims Admiral U. S." JOHN LANGDON LEIGHTON. Monadnock Farms, Monadnock, New Hampshire. September, 1919 CONTENTS PAGE I. THE SITUATION IN APRIL, 1917 3 II. ADMIRAL SIMS IN LONDON 9 III. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES 23 Queenstown 24 Brest 36 Gibraltar 43 IV. PROGRESS 48 V. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS THE GRAND FLEET. ... 59 Bantry Bay 64 VI. THE NORTHERN MINE BARRAGE 66 VII. OTHER ACTIVITIES CHASERS AT CORFU 76 Chasers at Plymouth 82 Submarines at Bantry Bay Army Coal Trade, Azores Naval Aviation Murmansk, Russia The Naval Gun Batteries 84 VIII. SUBMARINES OFF THE AMERICAN COAST 94 IX. A DISCUSSION OF SUBMARINES AND THEIR METHODS 98 X. THE DISTRACTION OF SUBMARINES 124 XI. WHY AMERICAN TROOPSHIPS WERE NOT SUNK 134 XII. THE END OF THE SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN 141 XIII. THE MAN ON THE BRIDGE (IN HOMAGE) 150 APPENDIX 159 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS FACING PAGE Frontispiece Convoy Approaching Its Haven of Safety .... 20 The U.S.S. Duncan and the H.M.S. Wizard . . . 30 Crew of the 17 .58 Surrendering to the U.S.S. Fanning and Nicholson 31 A Convoy Entering Brest 38 The H.M.S. Mauretania and U.S.S. Leviathan ... 39 American Destroyer Escorting a Convoy .... 40 German Submarine Interned at Santandu, Spain ... 41 The U.S.S. Shaw in Rough Weather and After Collision . 50 Troop Convoy Entering Brest 51 The " Tonnage Curve "... 60 The 6th Battle Squadron 61 A Floating Aerodrome 66 The American Mine Laying Squadron ..... 67 A " Fleet " of Mines 70 A Few of the Mines, Northern Mine Barrage . . . 76 U.S. Submarine Chasers in Their Cove 77 The Harbor at Ponta del Gada 84 U.S. Naval Railway 1 4-inch Gun at Sommesous . . 92 The " Tracks " of Three Submarines off the American Coast 93 Chart, showing Position of Enemy Submarines . . .104 Movements of Submarines (Double Page Map) The Highest Development of Submarine Construction . 105 German Submarine Base at Bruges no Two Methods of Sinking Merchant Tonnage . .in A Submarine as Seen from an Aeroplane . . . .118 ILLUSTRATIONS FACING PAGE Depth-Charge Launching Device 128 The U.S.S. Covington, Torpedoed July 4, 1918 . . . 136 Map Showing Areas of American Operation . . .144 Chart Illustrating " Unity of Command " . . . .145 Allied Vessels Sunk by Submarines 146 Group on the U.S.S. New York; Surrender of the German Fleet 147 Admiral William Snowden Sims 152 Loading the " V " Gun 153 \ SIMSADUS : LONDON I THE GENERAL SUBMARINE SITUATION IN APRIL, 1917. PERHAPS some of us will recall that in the first week in May, 1917, we were informed by an official statement of the British Admiralty, that dur- ing the previous month of April 875,000 tons of Allied and neutral shipping had been sent to the bot- tom of the sea by German submarines. This in- formation was not given to the British people, for it would have been a more staggering blow to them than any other "war truth" yet disclosed. It might have stunned us likewise, had we not at that time been the possessors of optimistic hopes and rallying hearts in an adventure which seemed necessarily successful by our mere participation in it. To a cer- tain extent our point of view turned out to be correct, but at that time it was far from justified. The submarine situation in April, 1917, was briefly this. Germany had constructed 213 submarines; she had lost 55, leaving her a total of 158 underwater craft, with which in April she sank 875,000 tons of shipping. She was building an average of six or seven per month, while her losses averaged but three or four. The total tonnage of the world before the War was about 32,000,000 tons, of which by the end of April over 7,500,000 tons had already been sunk. Losses 3 4*v::: :/./': SIMSADUS at the rate of 1,000,000 tons per month, which Ger- many had promised she would sink, and which she virtually did in April, meant that in the course of a few months, the Allies would be in a state of star- vation. It was a simple problem of arithmetic to calculate the conclusion of the War in Germany's favor. England, the greatest shipbuilding nation of the world, was not meeting the losses by new construc- tion. Her shipyards were burdened with repair work on vessels injured by submarine attacks, and very much overcrowded in the construction of new Naval craft; and the continuous demand for men in the Army caused a chronic shortage of labor. It was a bad position in which Great Britain, against whom the brunt of the submarine campaign was directed, found herself, and a disheartening one when one considers that the construction of a ship takes many months and its destruction by a sub- marine but a few moments. The United States was launching a tremendous shipbuilding programme which looked promising on paper, but many realized that a non-shipbuilding nation, however great in wealth, man-power, and resources, could not be con- verted into a great shipbuilding nation in less than two or three years. And the critical period of the War was to come in four or five months! In view of all this, the leaders of Great Britain in May, 1917, looked upon the failure of the Allies through the success of German submarines as a possible reality. What then was to save the cause of the Allies ? The THE SUBMARINE SITUATION IN APRIL, 1917 5 checking of the submarine successes, one may an- swer; but how was this to be done, and how was the submarine menace being met at that time? At a rough estimate the British Navy was han- dling about 80% of the War against the submarine in all areas of submarine operations, such as the North Sea, the English Channel, all waters west of Eng- land and Ireland, and the West Coast of France; also in the Mediterranean, where the submarine campaign was pressed with the same virulence as marked its operations in Atlantic waters. England had at this time about 200 destroyers in commission, of which 100 were on duty with the Grand Fleet in the North Sea. As long as the German Fleet kept up its threat of fight, the British Grand Fleet had to remain intact. Another fifty destroyers were in service in the Eng- lish Channel, across which every British Tommy, his " Bully Beef," and his ammunition had to pass to get to France. A few more were employed in the Mediterranean. This left but a meagre two dozen to patrol all waters West of the United Kingdom, the Irish Sea, and to the South and North of Ireland, etc. The duties of all British destroyers were greater than they could really shoulder, and many of them, after three years of War, were in urgent need of ex- tensive repairs. These two dozen which were sta- tioned at Milford Haven, Plymouth, and Holyhead were responsible for the efficacious patrol of all the waters West of the British Isles. Their patrol sys- tem was briefly this. The waters were theoretically marked off into large squares or areas, and to each 6 SIMSADUS area a destroyer was assigned; with so few destroyers the squares were of course very large; and yet they were supposed to patrol their square incessantly to keep the Submarines down, and, if possible, to attack them. This put the destroyer in a position of little value, for as the submarine could see the destroyer long before the destroyer could see the submarine, and as submarines were looking for merchant ships, not for destroyers, the submarine could very easily avoid the anti-submarine vessels. The system worked out disastrously and therefore was discarded and a new plan adopted. All incoming ships were now directed to come into the Western British Ports, along any one of four or five different and designated lanes, which the destroyers were to keep as free from sub- marines as possible. An incoming or outgoing ship, while passing along one of these lanes, would be picked up by a destroyer and escorted for some dis- tance, and then left alone until she was picked up again. This system was an attempt at a Convoy system, but was successful only in that while one escorted ship arrived safely at its port, probably another two or three were unescorted, and therefore open to attack. It worked out better than its prede- cessor, but there still was very much to be desired. The Naval Authorities knew that a Convoy system would be better, for it had been used in the English Channel since 1914, and not a British Tommy had lost his life in crossing.* The Convoy system was a *The Convoy system was a procedure in which several merchant ships would be assembled together, and then proceed under the protec- THE SUBMARINE SITUATION IN APRIL, 1917 7 logical remedy to the Submarine menace, IF there were a sufficient number of destroyers to serve as escorts. It is true that the Admiralty had pressed and was pressing into service every available self-propelled vessel. These vessels, which were trawlers, fishing boats, and ferry boats, did noble work, and as Kip- ling has put it: In Lowestoft a boat was laid, Mark well what I do say! And she was built for the herring trade, But she has gone a-rovin', a-rovin', a-rovin', The Lord knows where! They gave her Government coal to burn, And a Q. F. gun at bow and stern, And sent her out a-rovin', a-rovin', a-rovin', The Lord knows where! Her skipper was mate of a bucko ship Which always killed one man per trip, So he is used to rovin', a-rovin', a-rovin', The Lord knows where! Her mate was skipper of a chapel in Wales, And so he fights in topper and tails Religi-ous tho' rovin', a-rovin', a-rovin', The Lord knows where! Her engineer is fifty-eight, So he's prepared to meet his fate, Which ain't unlikely rovin', a-rovin', a-rovin', The Lord knows where! tion of destroyers towards their destination. The principle of the Convoy dates back to the age of Merchant Caravans in the Far East. 8 SIMSADUS Her leading-stoker's seventeen, So he don't know what the Judgments mean, Unless he cops 'em rovin', a-rovin', a-rovin', The Lord knows where! Her cook was -chef in the Lost Dogs' Home, Mark well what I do say! And I'm sorry for Fritz when they all come A-rovin', a-rovin', a-roarin' and a-rovin', Round the North Sea rovin', The Lord knows where! But as the Submarine war continued and the fair weather and long summer nights were approaching, the submarines moved further out into deep waters where trawlers and paddle steamers could not ven- ture. Just how seriously the demand for anti-sub- marine vessels was, at this time, has never been ap- preciated, for the arrival of the American Destroy- ers in European waters added the desired number and changed the whole aspect of the situation. With the coming of these vessels in April, and more in May and June, new hopes came to those who knew that the sword of Damocles, disguised as a Submar- ine, had been hanging over the heads of France, Italy, Great Britain, and America. II ADMIRAL SIMS IN LONDON. DURING the latter part of March, 1917, Rear Admiral Sims was ordered from the U. S. Naval War College in Newport, R. L, of which he was President, to Washington. After conferences and instructions from Secretary Daniels, he and his Aid, Commander J. V. B. Babcock, prior to America's Declaration of War, proceeded to London in civilian clothes aboard the steamship "New York." They arrived in Liverpool on April loth, and were met by a special train and Rear Admiral Hope, R. N., the Envoy of the British Admiralty. Admiral Sims had been sent to Europe to confer with the British Naval Authorities as to the best manner in which the American Navy might throw its weight into the anti-submarine struggle and to command such American vessels as might be sent to Europe. As an American Naval Officer of high rank, he was well received in London, but there were also other reasons for the extremely warm reception extended to him. Admiral Sims was no mere acquaintance to the British Navy, for he had served in many stations in Europe, and as Attache in some of the great capitals, during which appointments he had made many friends in the Royal Navy. The higher Officers of the British Navy looked upon him as io SIMSADUS America's greatest Naval Officer, and they all were familiar with the story of his statement to a gather- ing of British Naval Officers in 1910, in which he said that if the British Navy ever needed the sup- port of the American Navy, that support would be extended. For this remark he had been censured by President Taft; but the censure had been for- gotten, and the remark had lived. Here was the same American Officer, who years before had ex- pressed an appreciation of Great Britain, and made a prophecy that the U. S. Navy would support the British Navy in time of trouble. The prophecy had come true and its author was to be the leader of the American forces, at the time when the fate of Eng- land and the world were in the balance. A few words here about Admiral Sims are pertinent. His career as a Naval Officer had been brilliant and he became a marked man on three different occa- sions. In 1905 he had set his heart so firmly upon the necessity of an improvement in the gunnery of the American Navy that, when his plans were refused by the Navy Department, he took the matter up with President Roosevelt himself, who immediately saw the value of Lieutenant-Commander Sims' schemes, and had the whole gunnery system of the U. S. Navy altered. . He became a marked man again in 1909, when, with the rank of Commander, he was ordered to serve as the Commanding Officer of the U. S. S. "Minnesota." This was the first time in the his- tory of the American Navy that an Officer below the rank of Captain had commanded a first class ADMIRAL SIMS IN LONDON 11 battleship. And then in 1910 he made his famous speech to the British Naval Officers. For these reasons, Admiral Sims was the American Naval Officer most widely known to the British Navy. He was the most welcome. His mission was to discuss with the British Naval Authorities the plans by which the efforts of the American Navy would be of the greatest value against the submarines or U-boats. Upon his ar- rival in London, he had long and pertinent confer- ences with the leaders of the Government, with the Prime Minister and other Cabinet Ministers, and the Lords of the Admiralty. In these conferences he requested that no information be withheld from him, regardless of how secret or pessimistic that in- formation might be. The results were interesting. Having made himself thoroughly familiar with existing conditions, he wrote home to the Secretary of the Navy, emphasizing two points. First, he pointed out that the Allies were in a fair way to suc- cumb to Germany's sea policy unless the United States could furnish merchant "bottoms" in the near future, and Military and Naval aid immediately. The second point of interest was the policy which he then and there laid down, and from which he never deviated, for the American Navy in Europe; namely, that in order to be of the greatest use, the American Warships which were to come to European waters, should operate as a part of the British Forces, and their employment and disposition supplement the weaker spots of the British Naval Organization. In 12 SIMSADUS this way he sacrificed fame for himself; for how splendid it would have been to be the gallant "Sea Admiral" of the American Navy, such as Beatty was in the British Navy. Instead he saw that to have the U. S. Navy in Europe as a distinct and separate organization would only lead to de- lays and complications; he saw that the policy al- ready mentioned, in which the two Navies could become merged into one, would be better. Thus he took his place as the first great Allied Chief to ap- preciate the value of unity of command. He immediately established himself in London that his headquarters might eventually function as an in- tegral part of the British Admiralty. The scope of the Naval War was wide, demanding that eiforts be concentrated and not scattered. Naturally, London offered facilities of easy contact with all theatres of operation, particularly as regards communica- tion. He realized that his communication system would be a vital factor in the efficient management of the U. S. Naval Forces, because of the great dis- tance which would separate him from his bases and from Washington. In May he requested the services of a young Lieutenant-Commander of the regular Navy named Blakeslee, who came over from Washington in August, and this officer with a vision of the potential activities of the Forces to come under the Admiral's command, established probably the finest communication system of any Allied belliger- ent organization in the War.* By means of this *The news of Lt. Commander Blakeslee's death in March, 1919 in ADMIRAL SIMS IN LONDON 13 system, members of Admiral Sims' staff could com- municate in code with any of the bases, later estab- lished, whether at Murmansk, in Russia, or at the Island of Corfu in the Mediterranean, with only a few hours intervening between cables sent and an- swers received. However, before Admiral Sims became worried over the efficient management of his forces, he de- voted all his energy and experience and resources towards the development of their future opera- tions, i. e., what were they to do? where were they to do it? and how should they do it? In adopting the policy that the United States Navy should supple- ment the weaker spots of the Royal Navy, he had made one reservation, that American vessels should primarily be engaged in anti-submarine warfare and that any portions of the British Navy not employed in fighting submarines, even though employed in the Naval situation as a whole, would have to wait to be strengthened by American vessels, until the critical stage had passed. He took this stand be- cause he believed that the anti-submarine forces needed help more critically than other units. He believed that the American people would prefer to have their forces in Europe primarily fighting sub- marines because the submarine war had been the cause of America's entry into the struggle. This stand was readily understood, appreciated, and ac- Paris was keenly felt by all who knew him, and realized what a great service he had rendered. In December, 1918, he was ordered to Paris and there established the Communication system used by the Ameri- can delegates at the Peace Conference. 14 SIMSADUS cepted by the Admiralty. In order properly to understand the future developments and ultimate activities of our forces, a closer view of the exist- ing conditions and suggested remedies is interesting. The tactics in fighting the submarine at the time of America's entry into the War have already been discussed, and I have shown that the presence of de- stroyers on patrol duty, here and there, was really of little value. They could hardly expect to find submarines resting quietly on the surface, and cer- tainly could not locate them when submerged. If a destroyer happened to pick up a ship and es- cort her some distance, some good was being done, but while one was being escorted safely, probably another two were being sunk a few miles away. Thus the time and effort spent in escorting one ship were all out of proportion to the value of one ship, as long as others were being destroyed in great numbers. What was wanted was a system in which time, effort, and energy could be used to the best advan- tage; in other words, concentration of the material and resources at hand. Many suggestions for the improvement of conditions were made, and the suggestions were all of value. In the discussion which follows, however, it must be borne in mind that, with the lack of sufficient numbers of anti- submarine vessels, and destroyers in particular, the sinkings could not feasably be lessened. The first of the many methods suggested was the arming of merchant ships. This was looked upon far more favorably in this country than in England, ADMIRAL SIMS IN LONDON 15 where experience had shown that the presence of a gun on a Merchant Ship in no way protected it from being sunk. What it did do was to force the sub- marine to use a torpedo in sinking a ship. This meant that a submarine could destroy no greater number of ships than the number of torpedoes it could carry, and of course, such a doctrine carried with it a cer- tain amount of virtue, but as a means of protecting ships from being sunk it was not successful. Another method suggested was the use of mines and nets. This was not a new idea; it involved rather the development of a principle already in use, for mines and nets have been used in all recent wars* to hamper the movements of enemy ships. As subma- rines operated on the high seas, and miles of open water could not be promiscuously sown with floating mines, their use had been restricted to such areas as the Dover Straits, the Eastern end of the North Sea, along the entrances to harbors, and such like. These fields proved effective to a certain extent, but many obstacles presented themselves. In the first place, wind and storm, ebb and flow, eventually would dis- rupt the mine field so much that it would often be- come just as much of a danger to Allied ships as to the enemy. Also a majority of U-boats were equipped with a mine and net -cutting device, which consisted of a sharp saw tooth instrument along the bows, aft of which, and along the whole length of the vessel, a strong steel wire above the periscope was * In 1777 a chain was laid across the Hudson River south of West Point, to prevent the British vessels from going up the River. 16 SIMSADUS stretched. A submarine running into a net would, by means of the saw tooth, cut one strand of the net open, and by means of the steel wire overhead, force its way through the gap. A submarine Commander knowing of nets or a mine field, could bring his ves- sel to the surface or submerge to a great depth, and pass over or under safely. According to theory, the use of mines or nets would seem such an easy and suc- cessful method of checking submarine operations, but according to results, this was far from the case. The U. S. Navy Department had since the begin- ning of the War, fostered a great plan for closing up the North Sea, and upon America's entry, the Depart- ment suggested the scheme to the Admiralty through Admiral Sims. This mine field was to reach from Scotland to Norway, and was to prevent the egress of submarines into the high seas by way of the North of Scotland. The plan was good, very good and pos- sible, and was eventually adopted, but in May, 1917, there were several excellent reasons for objecting to its construction at that time. When a mine field is laid, the mine-laying ships have to be protected from enemy assault, and after the field is laid, a constant watch has to be kept to prevent the enemy from raid- ing it and tearing it to bits with drags and towed nets. Now a mine barrage, laid across the North Sea would have called for a long and constant patrol, which, unless the ships were capital ships I mean battleships, cruisers, or battle cruisers would have been no match for a heavy squadron of enemy ves- sels. He could have concentrated an attack on any ADMIRAL SIMS IN LONDON 17 one spot along a comparatively long and weak line of resistance, and have done the damage before the patrol vessels, whose assistance against a heavy squadron would have been of little use anyway, could appear upon the scene. A mine field, when once de- stroyed, if only in a small spot, is of no value until re- paired. On the other hand, if the British were to employ capital ships as a protection to the mine field, these ships would have been open to torpedo attack. It will be seen, then, that the laying of a mine field across the North Sea at that time, would have only made further demands upon the British naval ves- sels, of which there was already an acute shortage. But the chief objection raised, and Admiral Sims was right when he raised it, was based on the fact that the Allies did not have the mines with which to do it, and their construction would have taken months, at a time when the critical period of the submarine war was at hand! To have pinned great faith on this scheme at that time would have been folly. The riddance of the submarine menace by mine fields was temporarily discarded, for after all is said and done, and in this peculiar and critical situation, mine fields were remedies of only a palliative sort and of secondary importance. Admiral Sims and the Admiralty authorities agreed on this point abso- lutely, and took their stand firmly that the subma- rine to be defeated had to be fought immediately where its strength lay. The most promising suggestion offered was that of the Convoy System. It was by no means a new sug- 1 8 SIMSADUS gestion, for as said, the British Navy had used it dur- ing the two preceding years in escorting troop and supply ships to and from France. The Admiralty had considered putting a similar system into opera- tion in the waters West of England, but realized that this could not be done with the lack of destroyers. The Convoy would only be an improvement, IF there were a sufficient number of destroyers available for escort duty. If there were not, it would be far worse, for the available destroyers could handle but a small percentage of the total merchant traffic, thereby laying a very large proportion open to at- tack. If the submarines had gained the information that the few available destroyers were escorting convoys, and no longer on patrol, a very free and open policy of still greater danger to the Allied ships would have followed. The mere fact that an occa- sional destroyer was out on patrol, tended to make the submarine exert a little caution at least; if these occasional patrols had been withdrawn, nothing would have remained to hamper their ravages. With the arrival of the American destroyers in April, and more to come in May and June, a portion of the desired number of destroyers were added to the anti- submarine forces, and more detailed plans were drawn up for the formation of a Convoy System. In drawing up these plans the Officers of the Mer- chant Marine Service had to be consulted, and many of these old time sea-going men were summoned to London to confer with the Admiralty authorities. Practically all of them declared themselves opposed ADMIRAL SIMS IN LONDON 19 to such a scheme. It must not be thought that in so doing their intentions were anything but of the best, for the desire for preservation of his ship is second nature to the Merchant Marine Officer; and all of them heartily wished to contribute to the cause by the prevention of tonnage losses. Their objections were based on sincere argument, but in these they underestimated their own genius. They were all of the opinion that in convoys, where great ships would be huddled together in close formation, the losses through accidents would be too great. They de- plored their own abilities, and that of their ships, to keep in formation and not be a nuisance to each other. None of them had ever had the training of station keeping, as had the Naval Officer, and so they believed that efficient station keeping would be be- yond their powers; they would far rather have run the risks of submarines themselves, protecting their ships by various antics or zigzags, and other manoeu- vres of their own invention. Admiral Sims and a few British Officers stepped into the breach of opinion thus formed, and declared that the Merchant Cap- tain had underrated his abilities, and said that from what they had seen of the Merchant Marine, the average Captain was very nearly as efficient in han- dling his ship as the average Naval Officer. In this way a compromise was reached, and it was agreed to give the Convoy System a tryout. This was done, and British destroyers at a later date proceeded out to sea some 150 miles, where they met some incom- ing ships from Gibraltar and escorted these back to 20 SIMSADUS Milford Haven. At the conclusion of this experi- ment the Naval Officers, whose destroyers had es- corted the Merchant ships, claimed that the station- keeping qualities of the Merchantmen was good, and with a little more practice, might be rendered ex- cellent. That settled the question, and definite plans for the establishment of the Convoy System were be- gun. The values of the scheme were many. In the first place, the submarines had been attacking and sinking Merchant ships without incurring any dan- ger to themselves. If the ship thus attacked was not armed, the submarine could attack it by gun fire, or stop it, and then by sending members of its crew aboard the captive vessel, scuttle it or blow a hole in its bottom. In convoys, where large numbers of ships could be herded together and protected by a few destroyers, this procedure would not be possible; the submarine would have a fight for every ship sunk. Furthermore, up to this time, submarines had roamed the open seas attacking Merchant vessels, and avoiding destroyers and other anti-submarine craft; but in the Convoy System, in which the mer- chant ships and destroyers would proceed together, the submarines could not attack the ships without encountering protectors. The best locality in which to shoot a fox is near a hen yard; just so, the Mer- chant ship was the submarine's prey, and in order to get the opportunity of attacking submarines, a few destroyers merely had to hang around, and the sub- marine would reveal itself sooner or later. This form ADMIRAL SIMS IN LONDON 21 of combating the submarine was really an offensive campaign against it, and that is what we wanted. One of the cardinal principles of military strategy has always been that of concentration against the enemy. The Convoy System would supply this con- centration perfectly. Before its adoption the anti- submarine effort had been scattered; a destroyer here and a destroyer there, and ships open to at- tack all over the place. The enemy, that is, the German submarines, had the concentration on his side in this state of Affairs, while the Allied anti-sub- marine efforts were at sixes and sevens. The Con- voy System turned the tables; for with its adop- tion large numbers of ships protected by destroyers on all sides, would proceed together. In other words, the efforts of the destroyers were concen- trated in their defence of shipping, while the efforts of the submarines, with fewer ships alone on the high seas, would have to be more varied and scat- tered. The introduction of this scheme then, was nothing more than a recognition and application of an old-time military principle. There was one more point of great strength in this new system. It has already been pointed out how much Admiral Sims appreciated the necessity at this time of doing something, and of doing it quickly if the U-boat campaign was to be defeated; and how for that reason mining or net operations had been shelved, to be considered at a later date. In fact all sorts of inventions and plans for unsink- able ships, and for the destruction of submarines were 22 SIMSADUS being received by the Admiralty and by the Navy Department, and some of these were excellent in principle. But it was not wise to take these too seriously for the present, because of the time neces- sary for their institution. The situation called for a remedy, the necessary component parts of which were already in the hands of the authorities and available for immediate use; that is, what the ad- vent of the American destroyers afforded the nec- essary number of destroyers for convoy and with their arrival the system could be immediately established. Ill THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES. IT has already been said that from June to Sep- tember, 1917, would be the critical period of the Submarine War; there was also a critical area, and this was in the waters between the Southwestern coast of Ireland and Cape Finisterre, or Brest, France. All ships from the United States, Canada, South America, the Mediterranean, and Africa, had to pass through this area to get into the Southern and Western ports of England, such as Southhamp- ton, Plymouth, Cardiff, Holyhead, or Liverpool. A considerable portion of shipping from the United States and Canada, was directed to pass to the North of Ireland, to Glasgow and Liverpool, thereby avoiding the necessity of steaming into this "neck of a bottle" formed by the Coast lines of England and France. But this did not seriously relieve the con- gestion of traffic; in fact, the congestion could not be relieved. In order to escort safely the hundreds of vessels which passed through this critical area South of Ireland, escorts to the convoys had to be provided. This meant that any location suitable for a base on the South coast of Ireland, would be very desirable, and Queenstown was the first local- ity chosen as an American Naval base. It formed a halfway point between the Western ports of Eng- 23 24 SIMSADUS land, and the rendezvous* at sea between which the convoys would be escorted. The next base to be decided upon was Brest, the location of which afforded many of the same advantages as those of Queenstown; both were located at the approach to the chief European ports. QUEENSTOWN The first flotilla of American destroyers ordered to Europe was sent directly to Queenstown. This de- tachment, consisting of six vessels under Commander Taussig, U. S. N., steamed into Queenstown harbor at noon on April 26, 1917. The British Naval person- nel at Queenstown knew that these vessels were coming, and were expecting them some time during the day, but hardly expected that they would arrive at noon, the hour which Taussig had designated by wireless, because of the delays and uncertainties in- volved in a trip across the Atlantic. But surely enough they did, and at a few minutes before noon, smoke was seen on the Western horizon, and then one, two, three, four, five, six little specks came up out of the ocean. Two mine sweepers were imme- diately sent out a few miles to sweep a channel clear for them, for who knew but that a German subma- rine might have laid mines at the entrance to the har- bor during the previous night. Great were the * The rendezvous at sea was the position at which destroyers would meet a group of merchant vessels from North and South America: this position was generally some 200 or 300 miles west of the British Isles and France. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES 25 cheers from all at the base, for these vessels were coming to help in the War against the submarine at a time when the need for destroyers was very great. As they steamed up the harbor, few, perhaps, real- ized what the advent of these American vessels really meant. It meant that America and England, sister nations, had at last joined hands against their common enemy. In memory of this day, it will be for the welfare of America to forget what her children are taught in school books about English tyranny; and it will be for the welfare of Great Britain to remember that, though separated by three thousand miles of water, she has a friend who helped her in a great struggle. These thoughts, shared as they are to-day by many Anglo-Saxons, were beautifully expressed to Admiral Sims before his departure from England in a picture given to him. The picture is entitled, "The Return of the May- flower"; in the foreground is the "Mayflower," as that vessel probably appeared behind it a full- fledged squadron of American destroyers as they appeared that morning entering Queenstown harbor. Previous to the arrival of the American destroy- ers, Admiral Sims had decided to commence his policy of supplementing the weaker portions of the British Navy by handing the operating command of these vessels over to Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, R. N., the Commander in Chief of the South- west coast of Ireland. In this way, Admiral Sims showed himself not only the first great Allied Chief to propose unity of command, but also the first to 26 SIMSADUS put such doctrines into effect. He was still to have administrative command over these vessels, but as far as operations were concerned, they were to serve with the British forces under Admiral Bayly. In order to insure harmony between these forces of two different nations, Vice-Admiral Bayly appointed Captain J. R. P. Pringle, U. S. N., who was Admiral Sims' Chief of Staff at Queenstown, as his first assistant. Vice-Admiral Bayly sent these vessels as they steamed up the harbor, the heart- iest welcome and congratulations upon their arrival in European waters; in concluding this message, he informed Commander Taussig that all facilities at his base were at the disposal of the American vessels, and asked what repair work was necessary and how long before the American flotilla would be ready for duty. Commander Taussig's reply was prompt, and read, "As soon as we refuel, Sir." Such an answer, after a hard trip across the Atlantic, from a destroyer's officer, whose vessels were never intended to cross the ocean except in emergencies, gave the American vessels a wonderful place a very extraordinary place in fact in the esteem of the authorities of the Royal Navy. The tale of Commander Taussig's reply soon spread broad- cast, and as late as February, 1919, it was still being told at the English dinner table as a remarkable accomplishment. That is what it was, and it im- mediately convinced the Officers of the English Navy that the types of vessels and men aboard the American vessels were of the very highest THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES 27 order. Whatever the accomplishments of the Amer- ican Navy had been in the past, all these were temporarily eclipsed by this incident. The Ameri- can crews were allowed four days' rest before com- mencing their new tasks as a belligerent Allied Navy. The American destroyers, in that another twenty- five or thirty would soon join them at Queenstown, were confronted with the problem of enlarging the scope of the facilities and requirements necessary at a Naval base. Queenstown had been used as a base by the British, but the present and future influx of twenty or thirty more vessels, made vast expansion necessary. Admiral Sims had already laid down the law that all vessels at U. S. Naval bases in Euro- pean waters should be self-maintaining, which meant in the case of Queenstown, that many store-houses, barracks, hospitals, recreation rooms, and repair facil- ities had to be provided. Work was commenced al- most immediately on the construction of such build- ings, and the growth of the base was rapid. In undertakings of this sort, as was the case wherever the British Naval Authorities were encountered, the members of the Royal Navy left no stone upturned in offering every assistance possible, a courtesy which will always be remembered by those who served at Queenstown. The most important facility necessary at Queens- town was an organization capable of executing rapid and extensive repairs. Destroyers always have needed, and always will need, a great deal of watch- ing and repairing. The English dock yards were al- 28 SIMSADUS ready so overcrowded that any repair work which could be done at the base would save time and trouble, for, besides not being a burden to the dock yards, the efficient up-keep of a vessel would be of value in keeping that vessel in the running. To serve this purpose two Mother ships, the U. S. S. "Dixie" and the U. S. S. "Melville," * to be used as store and repair ships, were sent to Queenstown. The record which these two ships established in keeping the de- stroyers in good repair, probably contributed more to the efficient up-keep of the destroyers than any one thing. Whenever a destroyer returned to port after several days at sea with Convoys, she would send a message to the "Melville" stating what repairs would be necessary, and by the time that the de- stroyer had made fast to her buoy, a working party from the "Melville" would be ready to commence work at once. The greater portion of repair work was done by the crew of the "Melville" rather than by those of the destroyers, for the duty at sea was so arduous that all time in port was needed for rest. There was no task short of a lost propeller or a severely injured turbine that the men from the "Melville " could not handle. In the general scheme" of operations it was planned that each de- stroyer should have four days' duty at sea and two days in port, which meant that each vessel would be on duty 67% of the time; statistics of operations show that the average time at sea for all destroyers was about 66%. This splendid record was largely * Admiral Sims' Flagship in Europe. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES 29 the result of the efficient and excellent work per- formed by the repair ships and their crews. But before the Americans felt themselv.es fully es- tablished, they joined in the work of the British. Vice-Admiral Bayly, R. N., who was a veritable horse for work, and Captain J. R. P. Pringle, U. S. N., Admiral Sims' Chief of Staff at Queens town, rightly believed that, as long as there was a War in prog- ress, the idleness of any vessel was a military crime. When any occasion arose in which a destroyer was ready for duty but was awaiting the approach of a convoy or a similar assignment of duty, that vessel was not allowed to stay idle, but was immediately sent out on patrol duty of some sort. The actual escort of a convoy was an arduous task. Four or five or more destroyers would leave Queenstown and proceed Westward to pick up a convoy about 200 miles West of Ireland. They would then es- cort this convoy to Liverpool or some other port, and then turn around and escort an outward-bound convoy to a point some 200 miles West of Ireland. Here they would pick up another incoming convoy and take it to a Western English port, or, if they were lucky, be relieved by another detachment of destroyers as they passed near Queenstown. A slow convoy would necessitate many inconceivable forms of antics and exercises in the execution of proper vigilance. A fast convoy would call for the same vigilance, but would be a great deal more severe on the destroyers and their personnel than a slow one. A few hours with a 2oknot convoy, 30 SIMSADUS which meant that the destroyers must maintain a speed of 23 knots at least, or the experience of two or three days of heavy storms, imposed as severe a strain upon the human body^ and nerve power as has been experienced in this War. The strain upon the ships themselves was often far greater than their designers expected them to weather. If the reader desires to learn of the Romance of convoy duty, I can only refer him to some of the ex- cellent books of Lieutenant Freeman, R. N. on that subject, or, better still, let the reader himself in- quire into the thoughts of the seaman who was or- dered aloft at two A. M. to the lookout nest on the forward mast of a destroyer, which was rolling forty- five degrees on a dark and stormy night, and making twenty knots; or ask the young regular or reserve of- ficer what thoughts went through his mind, when he was aroused from lifeless slumbers to go on watch for four hours as officer of the deck of his destroyer, awakened by a touch from the quartermaster and these cheering words: "11.45, Sir, and Mr. Smith says it is cold and wet, Sir;" and whatever there was of a romantic or human side in this War, will be found. A brief statistical resume shows that during the ten and a half months of 1918 the Queenstown de- stroyers * escorted 39% of all the traffic passing in and * In May, 1918, there were 33 American destroyers at Queenstown. Twelve of these the following month were transferred to Brest. As new destroyers came over they were sent to Queenstown, and a cor- responding number already at Queenstown were ordered to Brest. In Sept., 1918, 36 chasers arrived at Queenstown: they carried out Under-wood & The U. S. S. Duncan and the H. M. S. Wizard. Notice the difference in construction. A dispute once arose between Admiral Sims and some British officers as to the relative merits of English and American destroy- ers. An English officer said, that the British destroy- ers were better because they were more manly and sturdy, and that though American vessels were the more graceful, they looked effeminate. Admiral Sims replied : "The female is the more deadly of the species." THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES 31 out by way of the South coast of Ireland. In July and August alone they escorted a total of 2,340,000 tons without a single casualty to any convoy; in other words, they escorted about one-sixth of the shipping afloat on the high seas of the world, with- out a single loss. The experiences of the American destroyers at Queenstown calling for the greatest interest are those of the sinking of a submarine by the U. S. S. "Fan- ning" and "Nicholson" on November 17, 1917, and the loss of the U. S. S. "Jacob Jones" on November 5th of the same year. The "Fanning" and "Nichol- son" were escorting a convoy, when a submarine was sighted. They ran towards it at full speed and dropped depth charges over the spot beneath which it had submerged, and then circled around the vicin- ity while the submarine rose to the surface only to submerge again in a moment. Once more they dropped depth charges, one of which injured the elevation apparatus, corresponding to a rudder of the submarine. The submarine sank to a great depth, after which a Commanding officer blew his tanks, bringing the vessel to the surface. The "Fanning" immediately opened fire, and a moment later the crew came up on deck through the con- ning tower and surrendered. This was the first "prize" of the American Navy in Europe, and, as will be remembered, the news was heralded with enthusi- asm in this country. The submarine was the U-s8. some excellent operations, but their activities were cut short by the Armistice. 32 SIMSADUS On November 5, 1917, the U. S. S. "Jacob Jones," one of our newest and best destroyers, was steaming alone not far from the Scilly Islands. Late in the afternoon she was struck by a torpedo from an enemy submarine and sank in a few minutes, a little over half of her crew being saved. The wireless of the "Jacob Jones" was put out of commission by the explosion, but later the Commander-in-Chief on the South coast of Ireland, Admiral Bayly, received a wireless announcing that the "Jacob Jones" had sunk at a certain time, in a given latitude, and that the survivors were in the boats and on rafts; help was requested. This was a curious situation, and there is no doubt in the minds of the officers stationed at Queenstown but that wireless was sent by the German submarine. Among the requisites of a Naval Base are rec- reation centres. There are no greater believers in the value of suitable rest and recreation for crews than Admiral Sims and his associates, who were de- termined that the Queenstown Forces should enjoy their moments ashore, and saw to it that they did. A "Men's Club," in which almost nightly little amateur theatricals, dances, or "movies" were given by the crews of the vessels in port, was the centre of these attractions. The necessity for this sort of thing was more clearly realized after a few unfor- tunate disturbances between the sailors and the Irish at Cork. The Southern Irishman did not seem an easy person with whom to get along, and no doubt the apparent prosperity of the American THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES 33 sailors rubbed him a bit the wrong way. This, coupled with the attitude of many of the Irish to- wards the War, probably established the grounds for bad feeling. In other words these affairs re- sulted from a misunderstanding between the sailors and the Irishmen, the latter of whom are suffer- ing because the force which comtrols them and this force is not the British government does not offer them the benefits of education, at least in our American sense. Their reoccurrence was pre- vented when all shore leave to Cork was denied the American sailors, and from then on, the "Men's Club" and other recreation centres were of great value. The leaders of the various Armies and Navies in this War were concerned over the matter of coopera- tion, the success or failure of which rested on their shoulders. However, the attainment of understand- ing between the rank and file of the different forces was also to be considered, and this was a delicate problem to handle. In looking over the unwritten history of Queenstown and in talks with American Officers and men who served there, the impression is gathered immediately that the best of feeling existed between the personnel of the American and British Navies. This unity of sentiment and effort began with Admiral Bayly and Admiral Sims and was disseminated right down through the Officers of lesser rank and the enlisted men. A good example of it is seen in the fact that when British and Ameri- can destroyers were at sea together, either a British 34 SIMSADUS or an American would be the senior officer present; sometimes an American Officer would command the unit and at other times a British Officer. But in spite of the efforts of the Officers, arguments, re- lieved by brawls, arose between the enlisted men. This was really only natural, for an Englishman is a "Limy" * and an American is a "Yank" and there is enough of a difference to keep time from hanging too heavy. From my own experience as a "gob" in England, I know that these occasional disturbances were not the result of any deep feeling. The Eng- lishman is a very conservative person, who too often gives the impression that he is holding aloof; the American, on the other hand, is very frank and talkative and apparently wishes to shake hands with the world when he is out of his own country. When this indifference of the Englishman, which was often taken for conceit, came into contact with the enthusiasm of his cousin from over the water, who often was vivacious in relating "how we do things in America," action followed. Thus one hears the statement that the Americans fought with the British more than with the Frenchman, an ex- planation of which is simple. The American is differ- ent from both the Britisher and the Frenchman; he cannot argue with the Frenchman but he can argue with the Englishmen; and an argument was usually the training camp for a good old fashioned fight. * For some unknown reason, the British during this War, and in the past, have been called " Limies," which is short for " Lime- juicers." I do not know what the origin of the term is, but it might well be reversed now. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES 35 In order to show how little gaps of sentiment aris- ing from these disturbances were bridged over, I mention here a periodical of satire and humor which would occasionally appear for sale at the Base. This little paper went a long way towards keeping down the differences which arose as a result of the conflict- ing nationalities and from allowing the men to take such matters too seriously. As an illustration of its contents, I am giving a resume of one of the articles; it may not be correct in detail, but the ideas ex- pressed in it are to the point. The article recorded the preliminary proceedings of an imaginary board of investigation held to in- quire into the complaints of a British destroyer Officer, that the Commanding Officer of an American destroyer had "messed" fifteen minutes earlier on his vessel than the British Officer on his. The chairman of the board was purported as being Cap- tain Pringle, the American Chief of Staff. The in- vestigation opened with each officer explaining his case; in a few minutes the argument became heated; and the conflicting use of American and British slang was prominent. Captain Pringle arose and requested that the English Officers speak in the Eng- lish language; this remark immediately called an Englishman to his feet, who claimed that the Eng- lish language originated in England; this statement in turn produced another argument as to who knew the most about the English language, the Americans or the Englishmen. This continued for some min- utes, until a British Officer told an American to close 36 SIMSADUS his "blinking trap." Captain Pringle immediately jumped to his feet and said the meeting should pro- ceed no further until the meaning of the term "blinking trap" had been explained. Dictionaries, naval regulations, convoy orders, almanacks, and similar stores of information were all consulted, but no enlightenment was offered upon the term "blink- ing trap." After an hour of this important research work, Captain Pringle said he was going to have some lunch, whereupon a Britisher objected, saying that such discourtesy, as that exhibited by Captain Pringle, was unprecedented in the history of his the British Officer's family. The meeting ad- journed by Captain Pringle expressing himself strongly in doubt as to whether the British Officer ever had a family. But other than occasional brawls, the general feel- ing between the crews of the vessels of the two na- tions was excellent, and I have no hesitancy in say- ing that I know that those Americans and Britishers who took pains to learn the other fellow's point of view came out of this war and certainly home from Queenstown with admiration for the people, the ideals and accomplishments of the other fellow's nation. BREST During the early part of the nineteenth century and in the preceding century, Brest had been a sea- port and Naval centre of great importance; in the first three years of this war it had played but a small THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES 37 part. In June, 1917, a Fleet of American yachts, transformed into warships, left this country, and, stopping at the Bermudas and Azores, arrived at Brest at the end of the month. These ships were dispatched to Europe in answer to Admiral Sims' urgent call for anti-submarine craft, a fuller dis- cussion of which follows later. They were to a large extent manned by young Naval reserve volun- teers, most of whose sea experiences had been limited to the bathing beach; nevertheless they were the first American war vessels to reach the coast of France. Their crews were an eager and very en- thusiastic aggregation, many of them college men; one of the vessels, the U. S. S. "Harvard," was al- most completely manned by undergraduates of Har- vard the classes of 1918 and 1919. It seems cu- rious, that after the American Navy had been train- ing some 80,000 men for years and years, with the advent of War, the Navy Department should have sent the recruits of the Reserve Force among the first to Europe. Perhaps the Department realized how excellent their services would be in spite of their lack of training, and the least that can be said of them is that their services were excellent, for no crew of greater "land lubbers" ever set sail still less to go to War aboard any ship; and yet no crews ever acquitted themselves more creditably. The yachts commenced their duties shortly after their arrival. At Queenstown there already was a Naval base; at Brest there was a French Naval base, but as France was not a first-class Naval 38 SIMSADUS power, many of those facilities and necessities which go to make up an efficient base, were lacking. This was partly the result of the decadence of Brest as a Naval port of first importance, and partly due to the fact that in 1914, at the outbreak of the War, Great Britain had informed France that she her- self would try to handle whatever Naval situations might arise. This left France free to devote her entire energy to the development of her Army, and relieved her of the necessity of expanding her Navy, the greater part of which, because of the easy pro- tection of the French Coasts by the British Navy, had been transferred to the Mediterranean. Thus, when the American yachts arrived at Brest, they found their new home lacking the design of the Brooklyn Navy Yard. For three months the yachts, under Captain Fletcher, U. S. N., were the only Amer- ican Warships at Brest, during which time the work of preparing the base to serve as a port of debarka- tion for American troops and supplies and as a home for American warships in the future was carried on. The yachts were employed in convoy duty; the larger and faster ones, such as the "Noma," were used in deep-sea escorts, while the others were dispatched up and down the coast from Brest to Bordeaux and in- termediate ports. During this period of evolution, for that is what it was, the U. S. S. "Alcedo" was torpedoed and sunk; its loss was the first serious casualty to the American Navy in Europe. Admiral Sims always realized that the Western coast of France would eventually be the chief U. S. S. Leviathan The H. M. S. Mauretania and U. S. S. Leviathan, two transports which carried eight or nine thousand troops to France per trip. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES 39 area of activity of the American Navy; therefore as more destroyers came over, they were ordered to Brest. Later as the influx of American troops and supplies grew he designated Lorient, St. Nazaire, Rochefort, and Bordeaux as bases, and assigned ves- sels to them. In October 1917, he ordered Rear- Admiral Wilson, who had been in command of the U. S. Naval Forces at Gibraltar, to Brest and ap- pointed him Commander of our Naval Forces in France. Admiral Wilson was in command of his Forces from both an operative and administrative point of view: in both he was directly responsible to Admiral Sims in London. When Brest first began to function as a real base, the duty of the yachts, as has already been men- tioned, was that of escorting coastal convoys. As the influx of American troops grew, it became very evident that anti-submarine vessels with a greater cruising radius and higher speed were needed. The remark was once made that these yachts were fast enough on a downhill stretch, but not on the level. They could handle the coastal convoys up and down the coast but could not escort them 200 miles out in the Atlantic; until the Fall of 1917 the British destroyers at Plymouth and the American de- stroyers at Queenstown had shouldered this duty. As the volume of traffic increased it became too much for them; consequently the additional de- stroyers were stationed at Brest. After their arrival two sorts of convoy duty were adopted : the deep-sea convoy duty and the coastal convoys. In the for- 40 SIMSADUS mer, the destroyers would proceed to sea, pick up an incoming convoy, escort it to the coast, and there be met by the yachts and gun boats, which in turn would escort the various vessels to their port of destination. After January, 1918, the base and its duties grew rapidly, and we find that during the months of 1918 these Forces escorted 91% of all the convoys in and out of France, or about 1,700,000 tons per month. In November, 1918, 78 vessels and 12,000 men were stationed at Brest.* The Forces at Brest made their "first kill" on May 21, 1919. The "Christabel," a former yacht, was escorting the Merchant ship "Deanae," when a periscope was sighted between the yacht and the ship. The "Christabel" stood in towards the es- timated position of the submarine, dropped a depth charge; and a few minutes later another. After the second one had exploded, a third explosion, under water, followed. The second depth charge had injured the submarine, which was of the mine- laying type, and this had caused the third explo- sion. This boat was the UC-s6. The following morning it put into Santander, on the North coast of Spain, and because of injuries received, was forced to intern. On August 8, 1918, the U. S. S. "Tucker," one of our best destroyers, sighted a submarine while 150 miles Southwest of Brest. The submarine was first * These figures include the crews of those ships and the men stationed along the Western coast of France, at Lorient, St. Nazaire, Rochefort, and Bordeaux, and at the Naval Aviation bases. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES 41 seen when it suddenly came to the surface within 200 yards of the "Tucker." The "Tucker" immedi- ately opened fire with her forward gun, and at full speed, ran towards it to attack it with depth charges. The submarine immediately submerged. The de- stroyer then passed over to the spot where the sub- marine had submerged, dropped several depth charges, and described a circle in order to pass over the same spot again. While the "Tucker" was thus manoeuvering, the submarine came to the surface again and the "Tucker" opened fire, one of the shells apparently hitting it. Again, the submarine submerged and the "Tucker" passed over the spot dropping depth charges. A few moments later the bow of the submarine appeared above the waves, at an angle which indicated that all was not well on board, and then slowly sank. The Commanding Officer, in handing in his report of this encounter, felt convinced that a submarine had been destroyed. In consulting the charts of submarine movements, which I shall fully discuss later, it would appear that there was no sub- marine within 100 miles of the locality in which the attack took place. It remains unknown to this day whether this submarine was sunk or not, for no fur- ther evidences of her operations were noted, and no previous evidence of her presence had been observed.* * It is difficult to say there was no submarine present, for all hands claimed to have seen it. On the other hand, every submarine in ex- istence could be accounted for, and this one seen by the " Tucker " was not included in current intelligence. The matter is still unsolved, and probably will remain so, though official credit for its destruction was given to the " Tucker." 42 SIMSADUS Keen rivalry soon grew up between the Queens- town and the Brest destroyers, and it was expressed in many ways. The chief "bone" of contention was as to which base was doing the hardest work, that is, handling the greatest volume of traffic in propor- tion to the number of destroyers available. Statis- tics show that the Queenstown boats had a little the better of the argument. The Queenstown Officer used to tell, and will tell to-day, the tale that whenever his ship put into Brest, most of the Brest destroyers were in the harbor; on the other hand, the Brest offi- cers will tell that the Queenstown vessels were al- ways going to Liverpool so that the officers and crew could get a couple of days' leave to London. This rivalry, of course, was a splendid thing and it made for esprit de corps, a necessity to all great un- dertakings. And that is what these operations were. The figures I have quoted, showing the volume of traffic escorted, do not really convey the right im- pression as to the amount of work accomplished and the hardships endured. Life on a destroyer, at best, is not pleasant, and if we consider that all of these destroyers were out in all sorts of weather for four days out of every six, a better idea of the service they rendered will be gained. The manner in which Admiral Wilson cooperated with the French was most commendable. Capt. R. H. Jackson, U. S. N., was ordered to Paris where he was given a position in the French Ministry of Marine. Brest, with its historic background and picturesque surroundings, as the chief city of quaint THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES 43 old Brittany, was the subject of much interest, and later many literary efforts of our men. The geniality of the French aristocrat, or peasant, will undoubt- edly always be remembered by those who learned to know and appreciate the pleasures and comforts of the "old world" civilization. GIBRALTAR It has already been said that Queenstown and Brest were chosen as suitable locations for American Naval bases because they were situated at the gate- way to the British Isles and France; there was one other gateway to European waters, and that was Gibraltar. Here Admiral Sims established a third base. On August 18, 1918, theU. S. S. "Birmingham," a scout cruiser and the flag ship of the patrol force of the U. S. Atlantic fleet, steamed into Gibraltar. On August 20, Admiral Sims sent Admiral Wilson, * whose flag the "Birmingham" was flying, a cable in- structing him to cooperate in every way with the British Forces at Gibraltar. Admiral Wilson showed his comprehension of this policy by dispatching the U. S. S. "Sacramento" as escort to an English convoy on August 22. On the other hand, Rear- Admiral Grant, R. N., showed his willingness to help the United States Naval Forces by offering them the use of their supplies of all kinds : food, fuel, coal, and repair facilities. Thus began the activities of the United States Navy in the Mediterranean in August, 1917. * Ordered to command Forces at Brest in October, 1917. 44 SIMSADUS The duties of the American vessels varied greatly, mainly because of the variety of the types of vessels. These consisted of cruisers, destroyers, gunboats, coastguard cutters, and yachts converted into war- ships. The larger vessels, cruisers, destroyers and coastguard cutters, were continually on duty at sea with convoys between Gibraltar and England, or between many points in the Mediterranean. They also escorted large merchant convoys bound to and from the United States or South American ports. In this duty, it was not unusual for a vessel to be absent at sea for ten days or two weeks and then to return to port, only to be dispatched again in three or four days on similar duty. The smaller craft, that is, gunboats and yachts, came in for their share of hard work, by serving as escorts to many local Mediter- ranean convoys and to those bound for the Azores. Their task was perhaps more difficult than that of the larger vessels, in that they were less seaworthy, while the yachts were never designed to serve as war ves- sels. Patrol duty formed no small part of their cur- riculum, as a constant watch at the mouth of the Mediterranean was always kept. Their work was at all times satisfactory and they fulfilled the de- mands made upon them, a result rendered possible only by their efficient upkeep. The volume of work actually done by the Ameri- can vessels at Gibraltar is shown by a few figures. During July and August, 1918, for instance, the av- erage time at sea for all the vessels was 57%. This means roughly that each ship was at sea six days out THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES 45 of ten; of the four days in port, at least two, or per- haps three, were essential for repairs, refueling, taking on provisions, etc. During these two months they steamed 170,000 miles, or six times around the world, and were at sea about 17,000 hours. They furnished 25% of the escorts for local Mediterranean convoys, and over 75% of the escorts for the ocean and deep- sea convoys. In the offensive war against the submarine, they played their part and suffered their losses. The action of the U. S. S. "Lydonia," a yacht which had assumed a belligerent aspect, stands out con- spicuously. On May II, while she was proceeding as an escort, along with British warships, to a con- voy of merchant vessels in the Mediterranean, a submarine was sighted. It appeared that the sub- marine was manoeuvering to get into position to fire a torpedo, but by the skilful cooperation of H. M. S. "Basilisk" and the U. S. S. "Lydonia," a network of depth charges was laid around the submarine. The submarine was not seen again; three months later it was discovered she had been sunk. The loss of the U. S. S. "Tampa," a former coast- guard vessel, is one of the greatest tragedies and mysteries of the sea in the history of the War. On September 26, she was proceeding with an English convoy from Gibraltar to Milford Haven. When in sight of the English coast, she detached herself from the convoy and stood in towards the coast. She was sighted from some of the shore stations for a few mo- ments; a slight mist then descended and hid her 46 SIMSADUS from view. A loud explosion was heard, and the "Tampa" was never seen again. American de- stroyers searched the area for two days in the hope of finding some survivors, but the only traces found were the floating body of an American sailor and some wreckage marked "Tampa." The incident which perhaps stands out above all other experiences of the United States Navy in European Waters is that of the U. S. S. "Senaca," another coastguard ship based at Gibraltar. On September 16, 1918, she was proceeding from Eng- land to Gibraltar with a convoy when the British ship "Wellington" was struck by a torpedo. The "Senaca," under Lieutenant-Commander Wheeler, dropped enough depth charges in the direction whence the torpedo came to prevent the submarine from attempting more damage. . Shortly after the "Wellington" was torpedoed, her merchant crew deserted her and came alongside the "Senaca" in their boats. The master of the "Wellington" told Commander Wheeler that with the help of about thirty men, he thought the "Wellington" could be kept afloat until she reached port. Ten of the "Wellington's" crew volunteered to go back to try to save the ship; about 35 refused. Lieutenant Brown of the "Senaca" asked permission to go with * The cause of the destruction of the " Tampa " is unknown. There was no evidence to show that a submarine was the cause of the disaster, for no submarine was in the vicinity. It is possible that she struck a floating mine, but more probable, that an internal explosion took place. That something had gone wrong on board can be surmised by the man- ner in which she detached herself from the convoy without orders to do so. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES 47 the Master of the "Wellington" and picked 16 of the crew to help him. The " Senaca," in the meantime, was ordered to proceed with the remainder of the convoy and so left her seventeen volunteers to be of what service they could. It seemed that they would be able to keep the " Wellington" afloat, but a heavy wind and sea made their task impossible. An S. O. S. call was sent out and answered by the U. S. S. "Warrington," a destroyer based at Brest. The "Warrington" came to the rescue at full speed and arrived at the scene a few minutes before the "Well- ington" sank. In the heavy seas and the unusually dark night the task of rescuing the men was difficult. Eight of the "Senaca's" crew and Lt. Brown were rescued, but ten went down with the ship they had volunteered to save. The cooperation which existed between the Ameri- cans and British was not so noticeable among the French and Italians. Later it was established, but for several months Convoys were escorted by the vessels of two or three nations, and the misunder- standings which thereby arose were sometimes dis- astrous and occasionally humorous. I remember that the captain of one of our vessels who apparently had a grudge against somebody once sent in a report like this "A * destroyer then got excited and opened fire in various directions. The first shot missed my bows by a few feet, the second one carried away a stack of a * destroyer; the third sank a cargo ship loaded with rum. I think greater cooperation is necessary." * Nationality of the destroyer here omitted for obvious reasons. IV PROGRESS AFTER the American Naval Bases at Queens- town, Brest, and Gibraltar had been established, each one of which was located along a gateway to Allied European ports, it may be said that the American Navy was effectively participating in the War. It must be remembered that the establish- ment of Queenstown as a base and the full growth of Brest as a base were separated by six months' time; thus one must not become confused and think that the matter already dealt with has been discussed in mere chronological order. By August and September, 1917, the convoy had been introduced and put into operation. What an enormous piece of work this entailed and what mi- nute detail the execution of such a system required is too long a story to deal with here. Its effective organization was the result of the wholehearted co- operation between the different shipping organiza- tions and the British and American Navies, the American end of which was ^ 0,0 ca oj .S 5 ., rt "Jn ^^ THE NORTHERN MINE BARRAGE 67 bottling up the submarines in the North Sea; this to be accomplished by laying a barrage of mines across from Scotland to Norway. The history of mine laying in the War up to this time had been interesting. When the submarine campaign began, many a man in drawing-room or bar-room could tell the Naval Authorities that the way to remove the submarine from the ocean was by bottling them up with mines laid in front of their ports of exit. This was good sense, for the prover- bial school-boy has always laid tacks in front of the instructor's door when the prank-playing youths wished to hamper his exit. But perhaps many a master, on discovering the tacks, has taken a broom and swept them all aside. Now this was practically the same experience with the Allies in attempting to bottle up the German submarines in their own ports. An English mine-layer would sneak fairly close to a German submarine base and, under cover of dark- ness, lay mines along the route of exit. One German submarine might come to grief ori these mines, but thereafter all entrances to all submarines bases would be swept by mine-sweepers daily. The same is true about the German submarines laying mines off British ports. The submarines would lay mines during the night off some harbor and the following morning they would all be swept up by British sweepers. Mine fields, to be successful, must be laid in regions where the enemy is not free to sweep them up. Attempts to bottle up submarines in their own harbors proved useless. 68 SIMSADUS New locations for mines were then sought. As we look at the map of Great Britain, we immediately see that the Dover Straits afford excellent natural advantages for the laying of a mine-field. Mines had been laid early in the War to prevent an exodus of German raiders through this short route to the high seas; mines and nets, it was decided, would also be instrumental in keeping submarines out of the English Channel, across which every British Tommy had to travel to get to France. In this operation, nature favored the Germans, for it was soon discovered that no anchor or cable, however great, could withstand for any length of time the swift current through the Straits. Cables and an- chors might hold for a short time, but with the swift tides changing direction every six hours, one or the other, or both, eventually would let go. In the meantime submarines continued to use the Dover Straits almost at will. A submarine would get home through the Straits after a cruise, and her Command- ing Officer would immediately tell his fellow officers just how he did it, thereby allowing others to pass through in the same way. Finally under the com- mand of Vice-Admiral Sir Roger Keys, R. N., in the first half of 1918, a movable barrage was laid across the Straits. This barrage, or rather the locations of series of mine fields, could be occasionally changed, thereby eliminating the possibility of German sub- marine commanders discovering the leaky passages (which will occur in all mine fields). Some of these mines were laid in strings and connected by wires; THE NORTHERN MINE BARRAGE 69 when a submarine was known to be trying to pass through the field, the mines would be exploded from the shore by an electric current. By August, 1918, the Dover Straits were practically closed to German submarines, thereby forcing them to proceed to their respective theatres of operations via the North of Scotland. There were many British mine areas other than those of the Dover Straits. The entrances to prac- tically all the ports of England were very thickly sown with mines, to prevent submarines interfer- ing with departing and entering ships. The Chan- nel in particular was thickly sown. I had the unpleasant experience to be on board the U. S. S. "Piqua," a yacht based at Brest, when that vessel broke down along the edge of an enormous mine field a few miles East of Plymouth. The heavy wind blew us into the thick of it, and we were immediately informed by the shouts of the men on trawlers that we were in danger, a fact which we already knew too well. Incidentally, I remember trying to. determine .whereabouts on the ship I would be in least danger should we come to grief. I came to no conclusions, for before I had found such a place, we were safely out on the other side. Mine-fields of this kind accounted for many sub- marines during the course of the War. They were, of course, not removable by the Germans, as they were in waters controlled by the British, just as the German mine-fields in the Skagerrak, North of Denmark, were unremovable by the British. The 70 SIMSADUS enemy usually discovered the location of the Brit- ish fields, but this did not help him much, for a sub- marine commander, once cognizant of a mine-field in the vicinity, was sure to be very careful. Other mine-fields were sown in the North Sea in large quantities, but these, though they did prove effec- tive, did not prevent submarines from passing out into the high sea. And this is what the Naval Au- thorities finally decided the barrage from Scotland to Norway would accomplish. All the mines used up to this time had been of the "contact" type, which means that the mine ex- ploded when struck by a ship. On the outside of the mine there were four or five pins about eight inches long; when one of these was struck, as by the side of a ship, it was driven into the interior, the mine exploded. There were other types of "contact" mines, the detonating apparatus of which was of the same principle but differently carried out, in that in the place of pins, a bar on the top of the mine, would cause the explosion. Mines of this type would not be really satisfactory in the proposed scheme, for too many would have to be laid. There were also those types which could be exploded from the shore by electricity, but these also would not answer the purpose in such a broad area. What was wanted was a mine whose effective radius, or radius of dan- ger, would be comparatively large. When America declared War on Germany, many inventions to be used against the submarine began to pour into the Navy Department. Among these ~c r" "^ *i o u s :l^ s- s sl S a > THE NORTHERN MINE BARRAGE 71 was the handiwork of one Mr. Ralph C. Brown, of Winchester, Mass.; his invention was exactly the sort of mine which was wanted for this Northern Mine Barrage. The principle was this: Attached to the mine were four or five very fine wires about 50 yards long; these wires were light enough and had sufficient buoyancy to keep them from sinking and so remained extended beneath the water, stretch- ing with the current or in all directions at the same depth at which the mine was placed. Any large steel object, such as a ship, coming in contact with these wires, through the agency of an electric bat- tery in the mine, would set an electric current in motion, which would explode the mine. Too much credit can never be given Mr. Brown for this invention, for it made the Northern Mine Barrage possible. When the idea of laying a barrage of mines from Scotland to Norway was taken up seriously in Novem- ber, 1917, it was opposed in various circles, for some regarded it not unlike a Jules Verne yarn. It was also argued that it would entail terrific expense and that perhaps the "game would not be worth the candle," or that it would be almost impossible; Admiral Beatty, himself, opposed it on the grounds that it might hamper the operations of the Grand Fleet, But Admiral Sims and those who believed in it, by sticking to their point and showing the possibilities of the scheme and its potential results, won out, and plans for laying the largest field of mines of which man has ever dreamed were begun. In the develop- 72 SIMSADUS ment of the plans, a discussion arose over the ex- act location of the barrage. Practically all agreed that it should be laid between the most Northern- point of Scotland and the Norwegian Coast, but many were in favor of leaving an open passage of 30 miles near the Scottish Coast. Admiral Sims opposed this strongly, for he argued that there would be no object in spending millions of pounds or dollars in the construction of a mine-field 240 miles long, and then in that mine-field leaving an opening of thirty miles, when it had been found almost impos- sible to close an opening twenty-one miles long, such as the Dover Straits. He said that if patrol vessels with the help of mines could not shut the Dover Straits to enemy submarines, certainly patrol vessels with- out the help of mines, could not close this thirty mile gap. This point became a matter of great discussion, but Admiral Sims forcibly held to his ideas and won. The barrage was made complete, save for an opening a mile wide, near the Scotch coast. It may be recalled that in February, 1918, Rear- Admiral Earle, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance in the Navy Department, refused to state before a Congressional Committee the cause for millions of dollars worth of expenditures, on the grounds that such information was of too secret a nature. Ad- miral Earle was referring to the expenditures on the construction of the mines for the Northern Mine Barrage. The mines were constructed in this coun- try for the simple reason that, with the extreme shortage of labor in England, America could turn THE NORTHERN MINE BARRAGE 73 them out much faster. Over 100,000 were made and shipped to Scotland, where they were dumped along the rocky shores of Inverness and Invergordon, two little towns on the Western coast of Scotland, which were to become the United States Naval Mine Force Bases in the North Sea. Eleven old coastwise vessels in this country were converted into the latest types of mine-laying vessels, and sent to Europe; upon their arrival in the North Sea, they were placed under the command of Rear- Admiral Strauss, U. S. N. Great interest was manifested in all Naval circles concerning this barrage. Would it bottle up the submarine, and if it did, would it make the sub- marine warfare a thing of the past for the remainder of this war? This question was never answered, for the Armistice cut short the mine-laying operations before any definite conclusions could be reached but it was productive of good results, as is shown by the final count of submarines sunk and injured in their endeavors to pass its mesh. Six were destroyed in it, perhaps more, and another seventeen were turned back because injured. One phase of this great operation, which must not be forgotten, is the size of the task and the hero- ism of the men who laid the barrage and of those who swept it up. The American and British mine- laying vessels used to proceed to sea in these mine- laying excursions under cover of one or two squad- rons of the Grand Fleet as a protection against enemy assault. The various parts of the mines were 74 SIMSADUS assembled at the base and when placed on board the mine-laying vessels were ready for deposit in the sea. The actual laying of a string of 5000 mines only require a few hours. Operations were com- menced on June 8, 1918, and thereafter fourteen ex- cursions had taken place, the last occurring on Oc- tober 25. The total number of mines laid up to November ist, was a little over 70,000 of which 56,000 or 80% had been laid by our Forces, and the remainder by the British. As to the heroism of the men who laid this bar- rage, too much cannot be said. Commander Bab- cock, U. S. N., Admiral Sims' Aide, used to say, " Those fellows up there in Scotland are living on the edge of eternity," and the statement was true, for if anything had ever exploded one of these mines, and there were thousands of them scattered along the shore, probably the whole Northern end of Scotland would have been destroyed; the explosion at Halifax in the Winter of 1918 would not have been in the same category at all. Or if one mine : inside a ship had exploded, and each ship carried tseven or eight hundred of them, the vessel would probably have disappeared in fifteen seconds. How- ever, the human mind becomes accustomed to fear very rapidly and calloused to all thoughts of dan- ger. One officer said that when the task of laying this barrage commenced, an unnecessary cough from any of the Navy personnel was almost a court-martial offence, but that after a few months, the striking of a match on the side of one of these THE NORTHERN MINE BARRAGE 75 mines was an everyday occurrence. No loss of life occurred in this operation through premature explosions; one ship which was carrying mines from America to Scotland, the "Lakemoor," was detroyed. The degree of success* of this barrage will always be open to argument, for it cannot be said that the barrage entirely closed the North Sea as an exit for German submarines to the Atlantic, because in all mine fields, and particularly one of this size, holes and leaky passages will always occur; but it can be said that the moral and material results of the few months' trial gave every promise of success. It was a powerful weapon in the hands of the Allies, not as the chief means of defeating the submarine, but as an instrument to that end. * It proved sufficiently successful in the eyes of the authorities to warrant the construction of a similar barrage between Sicily and the coast of Africa, plans for which were being made at the time of the Armistice. VII OTHER ACTIVITIES LITTLE has been said so far about the submar- ine in the Mediterranean, where the U-boat campaign was carried on just as persistently as in the Atlantic and North Sea. The submarine bases in the Mediterranean were at Pola and Cattaro, on the Eastern shores of the Adriatic; both German and Austrian submarines were based here. The Ger- man boats were usually brought into the Mediter- ranean by way of the Atlantic and the Straits of Gibraltar, but in a few ca&es submarines had been dismantled at a German North Sea base, and trans- ported by rail through Germany and Austria. The submarines in their operations were favored by the physiography of the Mediterranean, which, because of its limited size presented many different areas in which traffic was congested. The ^Egean Sea, the waters between the South Coast of Spain and Africa, East of Gibraltar, and between Cap Bon the Southwestern point of Sicily and Tunis, are exam- ples of such areas. Trade routes were well es- tablished and difficult to alter without lengthening considerably the voyages of the convoys. But though these facts favored the enemy, the Allies had one great advantage on their side. Every submarine, to gain access to or from the Mediterranean, had to 76 e fc StJ c o pq C OTHER ACTIVITIES 93 twenty-eight miles. The last round was fired on No- vember n, at 10:59 A. M., one minute before the cessation of hostilities. After the Armistice, Admiral Plunkett, U. S. N., who had commanded the batteries, investigated some of the targets at which the guns had fired and it was discovered that the accuracy at- tained was equal to any attained during the War. VIII THE SUBMARINES OFF THE AMERICAN COAST ON May 2, 1918, Admiral Sims sent a cable to the Navy Department with the information that the U-I5I was en route to America and might be ex- pected to reach the Coast about May 24. It will be recalled, that in a previous discussion, as to the advisability of sending the majority of patrol boats on the American Coast to Europe in the Sum- mer of 1917, it was pointed out that there was no likelihood that submarines would attempt a trip to the American Coast for some time to come. This statement was based on the argument that it was much more profitable for submarines to operate around the British Isles where shipping was congested, than along an extensive coastline, such as that be- tween Newfoundland and Florida. In the latter part of April, Admiral von Capelle, Chief of the Ger- man Admiralty, apparently decided to send sub- marines to the American Coast. The significance of this new submarine policy will be discussed at the end of the chapter. On May 15 the U-I5I was in 34 oo' North, and 56 oo' West,* and ten days later the news was spread broadcast throughout the United States that a sub- *About 900 miles from Cape Cod. 94 SUBMARINES OFF THE AMERICAN COAST 95 marine was off the Eastern Coast, and so it was. From then on until September 1st, submarines were operating off our Coast. There were four of them in all; the UK-is6 arrived on July 1st, the U-I4O was the third, arriving on July 26, and the U-II7 arrived on August 8. The UK-I56 first revealed itself not far from Nan- tucket Light, and on the night of July 3d off Long Island, laid mines which sank the U. S. S. "San Diego" the following day. It then proceeded North by way of Chatham and Cape Cod to the shores of Nova Scotia; from here it turned South, and then turned North again towards Newfoundland and started for home July 31. The UK-I4O arrived on July 26, and spent exactly one month in American waters. It cruised up and down the Coast twice, from the Delaware Capes to Chatham, about 300 miles from shore, but was dis- tinctly unfortunate and unsuccessful in its "kills." The U-II7, a large mine-layer, arrived on August 8 off Chatham, laid mines off New York, proceeded South to Barnegat, where it laid more, and then con- tinued South to the mouth of Chesapeake Bay and there deposited the rest of its mines. The total complement of mines carried by the U-ny was 36, all of which were eventually swept up. On Septem- ber 2, it was 400 miles out to sea, homeward bound. During the period that these submarines were off our Coast, there was apparently considerable ex- citement over spies, involving the flashing of lights from the shore, mysterious boats seen at sea, and 96 SIMSADUS the danger of a raid from aeroplanes. There is no evidence that any of these submarines wished to have, or ever did have, any communication with the shore, and still less was there ever any chance that aeroplanes could have been launched from the submarines and have raided New York City. Just how the fear of such an event ever got started I do not know, for why should aeroplanes have been launched from submarines to raid the American Coast, when they had never been launched from submarines to raid the European Coast? It would have been absolutely impossible for these sub- marines to carry on board an aeroplane, for such an article would have required too much room inside the submarine; and even if a submarine had been made expressly for this purpose, in order to launch it, it would have been necessary to completely assemble it on the high seas. The success of the cruises of these submarines is undisputed. During July and August they sank off the American Coast about 20% of the total tonnage sunk in the two months. However, the mere fact that they ventured over here was an admission of failure on the part of the German Naval Authorities, for it meant that they knew that their U-boats could not keep the sinkings up to a high mark by operating in the Eastern Atlantic alone. In other words, it showed that the convoy system in Europe had been successful, for these submarines could have spent the amount of time lost in transit to and from America, five weeks each way, far more profitably in the waters SUBMARINES OFF THE AMERICAN COAST 97 about Great Britain, had not the convoy system protected the shipping so well. One reason, perhaps, for these submarines coming to America was to sat- isfy the German people, or more probably give the authorities the chance to inform the German people that German submarines, in their might and prow- ess, were still winning the War, as could be proved by their operations on the American Coast. Never- theless, whatever the German Authorities may have claimed, the sending of submarines to America was an admission of failure. IX SUBMARINE OPERATIONS THERE probably has been no more misunder- stood phase of the past conflict than that of submarine operations. A submarine campaign, such as Germany carried on, was a new departure in Naval Warfare, and the citizen had nothing but im- agination upon which to draw in his version of its execution. I do not by this mean to imply that the submarine war was less cruel than commonly sup- posed, for that would not be a fair statement. What I do mean, however, is that with no history upon which to base a comprehension of the U-boat war, one's only sources of information were the tales of those who came in contact with it. Stories of those crossing to France, relating how their ship was at- tacked by seven submarines and missed by four tor- pedoes, how four of the submarines were sunk and the remainder put to flight, were common. From such accounts one gathered that hundreds of submar- ines were at sea at one time, and their deportment not unlike that of porpoises. Now all such tales were grossly exaggerated, and I can say with assurance that very few of our soldiers ever saw a submarine. A short study of submarine operations is interesting, and should dispel all doubt or misconceptions as to the true facts. Let us take for example the situation on 98 SUBMARINE OPERATIONS 99 August i, 1918. This of course was more than a year after we had come into the War, but the fundamentals of operation and statistics were practically the same. On August I, 1918, Germany had constructed 335 submarines, of which 171 had been sunk; 164 were still operating.* There were four different types of submarines, and each was particularly adapted to certain services. Of the 164 f remaining for service, nine were of the large UK-type, fifty were of the U-type, sixty-five of the UB-type, and 20 of the UC- type; another twenty were used as school ships; twenty of these German boats and twenty-seven Austrian were based in the Adriatic. Deducting the twenty submarines which were in the Mediterranean, Ger- many had a total of 144 submarines J available for service in the Atlantic. The largest German submarines constructed were those of the UK-type, and these in size were sur- passed only by the British K-class, which were driven by steam. All German submarines were driven by Diesel engines on the surface, and by elec- tric batteries and motors when submerged. These UK-boats were 360 feet in length, 36 feet from keel to conning tower, and had a displacement of four thousand tons when submerged. A fairly good idea * Admiral Von Capelle recently said that Germany constructed 817 submarines during the War. His statement is not true. t Exclusive of the school ships. J The origin of the term U-boat is from the German "Unterseeboot." Thus the U-type was the first constructed. The later types were called UB and UC, and UK, the "B" and the "C" and " K " being merely the designation of type. ioo SIMSADUS of their size can be gained by comparing them with a cargo ship, the average displacement of which is about five thousand tons. The armament consisted of twenty torpedoes, thirty-six mines, eight torpedo tubes, and a six-inch gun fore and aft. On the surface they could make speed of fourteen knots and when submerged only seven or eight. Their complement of personnel was twelve officers and eighty-eight men. This type was designed and used for long cruises in the Atlantic (two of them visited the American coast) ; they could stay at sea, if a slow speed was maintained, for three or four months. The U-class was similar to but smaller than the UK- class; boats of this class varied in size according to date of construction. The early U-types were only of 800 tons displacement, the later were of 1200 tons. The speed of both was about eleven knots on the surface and six knots submerged. The smaller boats carried only eight torpedoes, the larger twelve, the armament of both was a three or four-inch gun fore and aft. The complement of these vessels was thirty-two or thirty-seven officers and men. Both types had a cruising radius of about six thousand miles, and were usually employed in the waters West of England and of France. The U-58, which was sunk by the U. S. S. "Fanning" and "Nicholson," was one of the smaller types of the U-class. The UB-boats were smaller than the U-boats, and had a displacement varying from 500 to 750 tons. They were armed with a thirty-two-pounder forward of the conning tower, and carried four to ten torpedoes. SUBMARINE OPERATIONS 161 Their cruising radius varied between four thousand and six thousand miles; they were usually employed in the waters about Great Britain, and were not de- signed or constructed for deep-sea duty. The third type, the UC-boats, were mine-layers, and of less displacement than the UB-type. They were armed with a twenty-two-pounder forward of the conning tower, and carried eighteen mines, which they would usually lay in the entrance of some harbor and then return to their base. The average number of submarines in the waters about Great Britain and France, per day during 1917 and 1918, was about twenty-one or twenty-two, though this average sometimes reached as high as twenty-eight and other times as low as sixteen. It would seem that twenty-two submarines, operating with a total of 144 in commission, was a very low per- centage but as a matter of fact it was not. The wear and strain on the submarine's machinery and person- nel was so great that it was usually necessary to keep a submarine in port for repairs, overhauling, and rest, two or three times as long as the average cruise.* It speaks well for the machinery and efficiency of the sub- marine flotilla that the operating number remained as high and as steady as it did. The average twenty-two boats thus operating would be located generally as fol- lows. There were usually three operating in the North Sea, preying upon the English and Scandinavian * In September, 1917, Germany made a great effort to send twice as many boats to sea as usual. The result was that half of them returned in a few days, because they were not really in good condition. 102 : ...:>^ SIMSADUS traffic; one of them would be a mine-layer en route to, or returning from, a mine-laying cruise to the mouth of the Thames or to the Firth of Forth or to a similar point; the other two would probably be UB-boats. Two more submarines, one probably bound for its base, the other for a cruise, would be in the North Sea; both of these would probably be U-boats. North of Scotland and Ireland another two, perhaps both U-boats or one a UK-boat, would be bound in or out. There was usually one of the UB-type in the Irish Sea and the Bristol Channel. South- west of the English Channel, where all lanes of ship- ping converge, there were always at least three U-boats and perhaps more. On July 8, 1918, there were as many as six in this area. Southwest of Brest and along the coast of France a U-boat and a UC-boat might be operating, the latter laying mines outside the harbors of the West coast of France. Off the coast of Spain, or further West, a UK was usu- ally outward or inward bound from the middle At- lantic or the waters about the Azores. The accom- panying chart gives a graphic location of the daily positions of submarines as might have been seen on a large map at Admiral Sims' headquarters in London. I know that the reader is now wondering how submarine positions were known, how their move- ments were followed from day to day, and how the different types of submarines were recognized as being in this or that area. The answer is, by the splendid work of the British Admiralty In- SUBMARINE OPERATIONS 103 telligence Service, under Rear-Admiral Sir Regi- nald Hall. This department of the Admiralty had three sources of information about submarines. First, by radio direction finders, the meaning of which will be explained in a moment; secondly, by an elaborate system of agents in Germany and neu- tral countries, and thirdly by the cross-examination of the survivors of submarines sunk. The presence and exact position of the majority of submarines at sea was learned every night by an elaborate system of radio stations along the coast. It was the custom of submarines to communi- cate with their headquarters in Germany almost nightly by wireless. The messages were always in a highly secret code, and might, or might not, be eventually deciphered by the Admiralty. The chief interest in them was the opportunity they afforded to locate the submarine which sent the mes- sage. Every time a submarine wirelessed to Ger- many, English radio stations would pick up the mes- sage. The wireless instruments at the stations were equipped with an apparatus known as a radio-direc- tion-finder by which the direction or bearing of the origin of the message could be determined to a frac- tion of a degree. Each station, upon receipt of such a message, would immediately telegraph to the Ad- miralty in London the exact bearing of its origin from that station. In order to illustrate how the submarine's position was then determined, let us take an imaginary example. Wireless stations at Land's End, Milford Haven, 104 SIMSADUS and Queenstown, have all sent telegrams to the Admiralty stating that a submarine at eleven o'clock at night communicated with Berlin, and that this submarine was in a position bearing due West from Land's End, Southwest from Milford Haven, and due South from Queenstown; these bearings naturally would be given in degrees rather than in terms of West and Southwest. When this informa- tion was received by the Admiralty, the officers there on duty would draw lines West from Land's End, Southwest from Milford Haven, and due South from Queenstown, and where those lines crossed, there would be the submarine. In this way, practically every submarine could be followed from day to day; I say practically every submarine, be- cause sometimes they did not communicate with Germany at night. Of course there were other re- ports of submarine movements, from the sightings of submarines at sea, but many of these were false. The striking or sinking of a ship by a torpedo was a positive proof of a submarine's presence in a certain position; a report of a ship being missed by a torpedo, or the sighting of a periscope, was not. Almost without fail, the positions of submarines, as es- tablished by the radio-direction-finder, were the same as the proofs of their positions established by the sinking of a ship. I remember one very interesting occasion to show the reliability of the direction finder; it occurred on the night of October 17, 1918. When I arrived at the office the following morning, I found a tele- A graphic illustration of the positions of enemy submarines as represented on the daily charts. A pin with a flag attached was used to represent the submarine's location, and each morning each pin was moved according to the submarine's movements of the night before. From this map, the reader will understand why Admiral Sims informed the Navy Department that the place to fight the submarine was in Europe, and that anti-submarine vessels in American waters were of no strategical value. The "tracks" or movements of submarines during the firs to date daily, and as each new position of each submarine Each position is shown by a small circle, the date, and hour time. The majority of the positions were established by me chart by the hour and date, but without vessel's name. Sc were rather famous : notably, those of the "Mt. Vernon," zance, the U. S. S. "Chester"' narrowly missed running into In the Irish Sea may 'be seen the location in which five Qt gow out of convoy. From this chart my statements that th more about submarine operations than was generally sum o weeks of September, 1918. This chart was kept up as definitely established, it was plotted on the chart. cording to the twenty-four hour method of reckoning of the radio direction finder; these are shown on the of the losses, represented by the vessels' names, ellington," "Kendel Castle,'" etc. Just south of Pen- e U-53 on the night of September 5th, in a thick fog. stpwn destroyers lost the "Mesaba" and City of Glas- kitish Admiralty and Admiral Sims' staff knew far d. are proved. SUBMARINE OPERATIONS 105 gram on my desk stating that the U. S. S. "Kim- berly," a destroyer at Queenstown, during the previous night had located a submarine off Bantry Bay, had hunted it down by means of listening devices, and finally attacked it with depth charges at eight minutes of twelve. In the telegram, the exact position of the attack was given. Later that morning I learned from the Admiralty that the submarine attacked by the " Kimberley " had commu- nicated with Germany by wireless at three minutes of twelve, or five minutes after the attack. The posi- tion of the attack which was of course the position of the submarine at eight minutes of twelve was exactly the same as the position of the submarine, as established by the radio direction finder at three min- utes of twelve. As soon as the position of each submarine had been worked out on the charts, such information was sent to the different bases or wirelessed to those ships to which the information might be of use. The Admiralty took the greatest care that this method of locating submarines should not be discovered by the enemy, for the authorities regarded it as the great- est secret in their possession; and there is no evidence to show that the Germans ever did discover it. The second manner in which the Admiralty kept itself informed was by a very efficient system of agents in Germany and neutral countries. The organiza- tion of this system commenced after the Declaration of War in 1914 (and the agents themselves were sent to Germany and neutral countries), for previous io6 SIMSADUS to 1914 the British Secret Service was of little im- portance. These agents, some of whom were English women, apparently found many sources of informa- tion, not the least of which were deserters from the German Army or Navy. As time went on Germany apparently discovered this and employed men to play the role of deserters, not only in order to catch the British agents, but also to give these agents all sorts of misinformation. Some of their reports were very heterogeneous and erratic and often the opposite to the true facts; on the other hand, a vast amount of them were good sound truths, which proved to be of inestimable value. The greater part of them dealt with data on the new construction of submarines, assignment of commands (a very important factor in calculating the submarines' prob- able movements) and much technical information concerning submarine machinery and the construc- tion of torpedoes. The aid which these agents ren- dered the Allied Cause can never be too highly rec- ognized; the submarine campaign was the vital issue in this war and these men and women, at the risk *of their lives as spies, rendered a great and patriotic service in helping to defeat it. The third method of gaining information about the submarine was by questioning and cross-examining the survivors of submarines destroyed. Previous to 1917, in this country, we all heard that the Eng- lish Navy refused to take German submarine officers and men prisoners when their boats were sunk. No more fabulous story was ever circulated. The SUBMARINE OPERATIONS 107 British made all survivors prisoners, and they spared no effort rescuing them; their services as inform- ants of the activities of the submarine flotillas were valuable; to have let them drown would have been a military error. When survivors of a sinking sub- marine had been rescued, they were immediately taken to a detention camp, and from there, after three or four days of good food and rest, arid enough whiskey to make them see the right side of life, brought up to London to be interrogated. Some of these men were very affable and in return for the kind treatment they had received, gave the interro- gators much valuable information; others, through patriotism or hate, would disguise their statements very cleverly, mistating facts just enough to make the sifting out of the truth very difficult. And then there were others who would relate the most dread- ful yarns imaginable; but such stories were always recognized as false. The information sought in these seances dealt with the value of various forms of offence and defence in the anti-submarine war, such as the value of depth charges, mines, and nets; and with conditions in Germany in general. As several survivors were taken prisoners each month, and information came in regularly from the agents in neutral countries and Germany itself, the task of learning the trend of events within the borders of the enemy was rendered possible. It will be seen from what has now been said that the Admiralty Intelligence Service was in a position to keep itself informed at all times. We heard a great io8 SIMSADUS deal in England and America as to the efficiency of the German spy system; there were undoubtedly a great many German agents at large in this coun- try, and in Europe. The German spy system was well organized, but it was inferior to the Brit- ish Admiralty Intelligence Service. Even though the German system was organized many years previous to the war and gained strength by probing into the secrets of, and plotting against, the un- suspecting and trusting nature of the world at peace. In comparing the information which the Germans had about the Allies, with the information the Ad- miralty had about Germany, it is easily seen that the calm and practical British mind was far better adapted to picking up true facts, than the bombastic German mind which too often allowed the wish to act as father to the thought. This was proven many times during the war, and the following is an ex- cellent example of the errors made. On July 19, 1918, the H. M. S. " Justicia " was torpedoed and sunk North of Ireland by a German submarine. The " Justicia " was a vessel of 33,000 tons and very similar to theU. S. S. "Leviathan," formerly the " Vaterland," in that both vessels were among the largest afloat, and each had three funnels. The German Admiralty sincerely believed that the "Leviathan" had been sunk. Now if the German Admiralty Intelligence had been on to its job, it would have known that the "Leviathan," since April, had been running only to Brest and accordingly could not have been SUBMARINE OPERATIONS 109 anywhere near the Northern coast of Ireland. It may be argued that to learn to what port the "Le- viathan " was sailing would be expecting a great deal of any Intelligence Service, but for such purposes an In- telligence Service exists. In this case the Germans had the wrong information, and wrong information is of less use to a military organization than no informa- tion at all. The British Admiralty Intelligence, on the other hand, to my recollection anyway, never had the wrong and always had the right information. There are many other cases in which the German Intelligence Service showed itself inferior to that of the British, a fact which gave the British Navy a tremendous advantage in the submarine war. It is only proper to mention here the courtesy and trust shown by the Admiralty in allowing Admiral Sims and his Staff the use of secret information. But to return to the discussion of the operations of submarines. I said that the average number operat- ing on any given day would be about twenty-two, not including those in the Mediterranean where the average would be about six or seven. The average length of a cruise, excluding the cruises of UK-boats, which would be about three months, was about three or four weeks. This means that one submarine left its base in Germany and one returned about every day. The bases of the submarines were at Kiel, Bremerhaven, Wilhelmshaven, Brundesbuttel, and in Flanders, at Zeebrugge, and Ostend. From these bases they would set out, pass through the Dover Straits, or more likely, particularly in 1918 after i io SIMSADUS the Dover Straits had practically been closed by mines, pass North by way of Scotland, and out into waters West of the British Isles. No submarine officer when he set out ever knew how long his cruise would be; he would have on board food and fuel enough for five or six weeks, but the chances were that he would not have to stay out that long. The factor which determined the length of the cruise, was the rapidity with which the tor- pedoes were used. The number of torpedoes carried, of course, was varied and limited, some of the smaller boats carrying only eight and the larger ones sixteen or twenty. Thus a submarine would stay at sea until all of its torpedoes had been spent in sinking or injuring vessels; this would usually take two or three weeks, and the remaining week or so of the average cruise would be consumed in passage to and from the various theatres of operations. The cruises of mine-layer submarines were usually shorter than those of the other types, for these boats would pro- ceed to the point where the mines were to be laid, lay them and return to the base immediately. Sub- marine commanders usually received but few instruc- tions from their flotilla commander at the base; the individual officer aboard the submarine was a better judge of his own abilities under various conditions than the Admiral at the base. The only orders usually given dealt with the areas of operations, and the vicinity in which the submarine was to op- erate; and this was only done to the extent of in- suring against the super-concentration in one area II OJ X dj in . -C.C 6 II O o bi North Sea Dover Area North Sea S. North Sea N. North Sea N. Dover Area North Sea N. North Sea N. North Sea N. prob. North Sea N. prob. North Sea prob. North Sea N. Medit. E. North Sea North Sea N. North Sea North Sea N. Medit. Medit. Medit. Medit. North Sea S. North Sea S. Medit. North Sea S. Medit. North Sea S. Medit. Medit. i66 APPENDIX Oct. Oct. (200) Nov. 9 *UC 53 Medit. *UC 54 Medit. U 34 Medit. W. Losses after signing of Armistice Nov. ii U 157 Interned, Norway Nov. 21 U 97 North Sea Nov. 21 UC 74 Interned, Barcelona * Destroyed by the Germans on evacuation of Flanders and the Adriatic. LIST OF GERMAN SUBMARINES SUNK Commander's Name Rank Name of Sub. Place Date of Sinking Albrecht, Kurt Dead K-i Albrecht, Werner " 0-L UC-53 Amberger, Gustav P.W. K-L UB- S 8 5o:58N oi:i4E Mar. 10, 1918 Amberger, Wilhelm Dead O-L UB-io8 Arnold, Alfred P.W. 0-L Bachmann, Gunther Dead 0-L UB- 3 8 5o:56N oi:25W Feb. 8, 1918 Barten, Wilhelm " 0-L Bauck, W. " K-L U-8 9 Feb. 1918 Bauer, Casar N K-L Bender, Waldemar Escaped, K-L U-69 North Sea (N) July 12, 1917 returned to Germany Berekhelm, Egewolf Freiherr von Dead K-L Berger, Gerardt * K-L U-so Near German Oct. 1917 Coast Bermis, Kurt Branchied, Albert N M K-L 0-L U-I04 UB-I7 Si:S9W o6:26W Channel April 26, Feb. 25, 1918 1918 Braun, Charles " 0-L Brever, Herbert P.W. O-L Buck, Gustav Dead K-L Degetau, Hans M 0-L U-68 Mar. 22, Dieckmann, Victor ft K-L U-62 Ditfurth, Benno von ft 0-L UB-32 North Sea Sept. 17, Edling, Karl " K-L U-48 Goodwins Nov. 24, 1917 Ehrentraut, Otto " 0-L UC-39 54:o3N 00:02 Feb. 8, 1918 Eltester, Max * K-L Feddersen, Adolf L- UC-I4 Fircks, Wilhelm Frieherr von Dead K-L Fischer, Karl-Hanno " L- Frohner, Eherhardt t( L- Furbringer, Gerhardt P.W. K-L Furbringer, Werner P.W. K-L UB-iio Galster, Hans Dead 0-L UC-si Dec. 1917 Gebeschus, Rudolf Gercke, Herman it K K-L K-L UB-6 3 U-IS4 56:17 O2:25W In Atlantic Tan. 28, May n, 1918 1918 Azores APPENDIX 167 Commander's Name Rank Name of Sub. Place Date of Sinking Gerlach, Helmut K-L U-93 49:59 o$:i2W Jan. 7, I9l8 Gerth, George P.W. K-L UC-6I Wissant Shoal July 26, 1917 near Gris Nez Glimpf, Herman Dead 0-L UB-20 North Hinder July 29, 1917 Graeff, Ernst P.W. K-L Gregor, Fritz Dead O-L UB-33 Channel April 14, I9l8 Gross, Karl it 0-L UC-2 Off Yarmouth July 2 I9IS Gunther, Paul ft 0-L UB-37 5o:o7N oi:47W Jan. 14,' 1917 Guntzel, Ludwig t K-L Gunzel, Erich 1 K-L U-7S Dec. I? Haag, George i L- Mar. I9l6 Hansen, Klaus ' K-L Hartman, Richard Hecht, Erich ! K-L 0-L U-49 UB-S4 46:i7N I4:42W Channel Sept. Mar. ii! 1917 I9l8 Heinke, Curt 0-L Heller, Bruno 0-L Hennig, Heinrich von P. W. K-L Heydebreck, Karsten V. Dead O-L UC-63 $i-23N 02-ooE Nov. i, 1917 Hirzel, Alfred 0-L Hoppe, Bruno " K-L Hufnagel, Hans Kesserlingk, Harold V. " K-L 0-L U-io6 UB- 3 6 North Sea North Sea Oct. June, 10, 1917 1917 Kiel, Wilhelm " O-L UC-i8 54t38N oo-ccN Mar. 12, 1917 Kiesewetter, Wilhelm Interned K-L UC- S 6 Santander May 26, I9l8 Klatt, Alfred Dead O-L UC-38 Medit. 38:32N Dec. 14, 1917 2o:uE Kolbe, Walther " 0-L UC-I03 40 miles South May II, I9l8 of Lizard Point Konig, Gerog " K-L Korsch, Hans Paul " 0-L UC-35 Sardinia May 16, I9l8 Kratzsch " K-L Krech, Gunther P.W. K-L UB-8 5 N. Channel April 3, I9l8 Kreysern, Gunther Dead 0-L UC-3 52:24N O2:24E April I9l6 Kroll, Karl N K-K U-no 55:49N o8:o6W Mar. 15, I9l8 Kustner, Heinrich M 0-L UB-39 5o:o5N oi:25W May i? 1917 Lafrenze, Claus P. P.W. K-L UC-65 So:28N oo:i7E Nov. 3, 1917 Launburg, Otto P.W. 0-L UB-52 Adriatic May 23, I9l8 Lammer, Johannes Dead K-L Lepsius, Rienhald M 0-L Lilienstern, Ruhler Lorenze, Hellmuth It Interned 0-L 0-L UC-ss UC- 4 8 6o:ooN oi:ooW 5o:22N oi:47W Sept. Mar. 29, 23, 1917 I9l8 Lorenze, Herman Dead K-L Lowe, Werner 0-L UB-58 co:58N oi:i4E Mar. 10, I9l8 Luhe, Vicco von der P.W. 0-L UB-i6 North Sea May 10, I9l8 Menzel, Bernhard Dead 0-L Metz, Artur M O-L Metzger, Heinrich Mey, Karl Interned Dead K-L 0-L U-39 Carthagena May 1 8, I9l8 Mildenstein, Christian " 0-L UC-i July, J9I7 Moecke, Fritz " O-L Mohrbutter, Urich P.W. 0-L Moraht Robert P.W. K-L U-6 4 Bizerta, Medit. June 21, I9l8 Muhlan, Helmut P.W. K-L Muhle, Gerhardt Dead K-L i68 APPENDIX Commander's Name Rank Name of Sub. Place Date of Sinking Muller, Hans Albrecht " Neumann, Friedrich P. W. Niemer, Hans Interned Niemeyer, Georg Dead Nitzsche, Alfred 0-L O-L 0-L 0-L 0-L UB-5 UB-23 July 26, 1917 Noodt, Erich P.W. O-L Petz, Willy Dead K-L U-85 49:52N 03-.20W Mar. 12, 1917 Platsch, Erich * 0-L Pohle, Richard " K-L Prinz, A thai win " K-L Pustkuchen, Herbert tt 0-L UC-66 49:56N o5:ioW June 12, 1917 Reichenback, Gottfried " 0-L UC-6 Sept. 28, 1917 Reimarus, Georg Remy, Johannes tt tt 0-L K-L UC-2I 5 i: 3 oN oi: 34 E Sept. 20, 1917 Roehr, Walter Rosenow, Ernest Rumpel, Walther " K-L K-L K-L U-8 4 UC-29 S5-S3N 5i:47N 05 :44W 1 1 :4oW Jan, June 7> 1918 1917 Rucker, Claus Saltzwedel, Rudolf " K-L 0-L U-IQ3 UB-8i 30J27N oi-38E 00:53 Jan. Dec. 26, 2, 1918 1917 Sebelin, Erwin " K-L Seuffer, Rudolf w K-L UC-50 5o:47N oozcpE Feb. 4, 1918 Schmettow, Graf von u K-L UC-26 5i:3N : E'4.oE May 9, 1917 Schmidt, Georg tt Schmidt, Siegfried tt O-L U-45 55-48N . 7:ioW Sept. 12, 1917 Schmidt, Walther G. Interned Schmitz, Max Dead 0-L 0-L UC- 5 6 UC-62 Santander May 5 1918 Schmitz, Walther P.W. 0-L UC-7S OfFTyne May 3 r > 1918 Schneider, Rudolf Schultz, Theodor Dead K-L 0-L U-87 UB-6i S 2: 5 6N 05:o7W Dec. Dec. 27, 1917 1917 Schurmann, Paul " 0-L UC-4 Oct. 15, 1917 Schwartz, Ferdinand tt 0-L UB-64 Schweinitz und Krain Graf von " K-L Schwieger " K-L U-88 49'42N !3:i8W Sept. 14, 1917 Sittenfield, Erich tt K-L U-4S 55 : 48N 7 : 3 oW Sept. 12, 1917 Smith, Wilhelm P.W. O-L Soergel, Hans Dead 0-L Sprenger P.W. K-L UC-34 Steckelberg, Oscar Interned O-L UB-6 Dutch Coast Mar. I3 1917 Stein Zu Lausnitz Freiherr von Dead 0-L UB-27 52:47N 02:2dE July 29, 1917 SteindofF, Ernest n O-L UB-74 5 miles S. Port- May 26, 1918 land Bill Stenzler, Heinrich Stosberg, Arthur P.W. O-L 0-L UB-78 UB-78 Off Cherbourg May 9, 1918 Stoss, Alfred P.W. K-L Stoter, Karl Stuhr, Fritz Dead it 0-L K-L UB-35 U-io 5i:6N oi:38E Jan. May 26, 1918 1916 Suchodoletz, Ferdi- nand V. " K-L Tebbenjohannes, Kurt Trager, Friedrich P.W. Dead K-L 0-L UC-44 TIB-?! 26 miles 6:59W SSW Aug. May 4 12, 1917 1918 Utke, Kurt P.W. O-L Portland Bill UC-II E. Harwich June 26, 1918 APPENDIX 169 Commander's Name Rank Name of Sub. Place Date of Sinking Valentiner, Hans Dead Voigt, Ernest Wachendorff, Seigfried 0-L 0-L 0-L U-I56 or U-I57 UC-72 5o:s8N oi:28E Dec. Stranded in Dover Sept. or Oct. 1917 1917 Wacker, Karl 0-L UB-22 Jan. 1918 Wagenfuhr, Paul Walther, Franz 0-L O-L U-44 UB-7 S 58-5 iN 4 -4oE Aug. 12, 1917 Weddigan, Otto Wegener, Bernhard K-L K-L Weisbach, Erwin K-L U-32 Mediterranean May i, 1918 Weisbach, Raimund P. W. Wendlandt, Hans H. P. W. K-L 0-L U-8i UC-38 SiN I3W Medit. 38:32N May i, Dec. 14, 1917 1917 Wenninger, Ralph P. W. K-L UB-ss Channel E. April 22, 1918 Wigankow, Gunther Dead 0-L Wilcke, Erich K-L Wilhelms, Ernest " K-L Willich, Kurt K-L UC-24 Off Cattaro May 24, 1917 Wutsdorff, Hans Osker " K-L Zerboni, di Sposetti Werner von K-L UC-I6 Oct. 1917 THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE STAMPED BELOW AN INITIAL FINE OF 25 CENTS WILL BE ASSESSED FOR FAILURE TO RETURN THIS BOOK ON THE DATE DUE. THE PENALTY WILL INCREASE TO SO CENTS ON THE FOURTH DAY AND TO $1.OO ON THE SEVENTH DAY OVERDUE. JAN R 3 2 2004 LD 21-50m-8,<32 YC 46952 418322 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY