PEINCIPLES OE PSYCHOLOGY.
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6 eK Tov acofiaroq.
EniXTOAH nPOX AIOTNHTON.
P^T^^:^IPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY
iiN THREE PARTS
BY GEORGE RAMSAY B.M.
It
AUTHOR OF " AN INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY,*
"analysis and theory of the EMOTIONS,"
" A CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES,"
ETC. ETC.
LONDON: WALTON AND MABEULY.
EUGBY : CROSSLEY AND BILLINGTUN.
MDCCCLVII.
^3
EDLO.
PSYCi-f. .
LIBRARY
PREFACE.
It is now just four years since I published "An
Introduction to Mental Philosophy," which may
be considered as a suitable preparation for the
present Work. It appeared to me that before
entering upon the thorny paths of metaphysical
ground, it was highly desirable to pave the way
by " A Philosophical Vocabulary," which should
endeavour to fix the meaning of the principal
terms used in Philosophy, not in ^Mental Philo-
sophy only, but in every inquiry worthy of that
name. Such are the terms. Substance, Qual-
ity, Quantity, Relation, Cause and Effect,
Law of Nature, Principle, Hypothesis
and Theory, Science, and Philosophy itself.
Accordingly, such a Philosophical Vocabulary
forms the First Part of the " Introduction,"
which, but for the Second Part, which treats
particularly of JSlental Philosophy, might have
been styled an Introduction to Philosophy in
general.
My principal reason for alluding now to the above
work is to mention that, with one exception, the
present and the former work are perfectly dis-
tinct. That exception consists in the Chapter
" Of Reasoning." Of course, in a work on
Psychology, it was impossible to avoid treating
of Reasoning, and as I had discussed the subject
I 92487
Yi. PREFACE.
at length in the former work, it was quite allow-
able, nay, unavoidable, to avail myself in the
present work of what I had previously written.
But the whole Chapter on Reasoning has been
carefully revised, some difference of arrangement
introduced, a good deal added, and something
omitted, which it seemed unnecessary to repeat.
Nay, in one particular an important change has
been made, a change of Principle. This is in
the sub-section which treats of Probable Reason-
ing. I had formerly thought that a general pro-
position or general principle, as it is often called,
understood indeed, not expressed, was necessary
to the validity of every case of Inductive reason-
ing: but, on this point, I have changed my
opinion, chiefly, I am willing to allow, from a
perusal of Mr. Bailey's excellent work on Reason-
ing, which fell into my hands after the publication
of my " Introduction." With the exception of
this Chapter on Reasoning, I repeat that the
present work is entirely distinct from the former.
This work has at least one claim to attention,
that it is one of the very few works in our language
which give a connected view of the whole of Pure
Mental Philosophy. Even the great work of
Locke barely touches upon that most interesting
class of phenomena, the Emotions. Dr. Brown's
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind
is the only work in English, which now occurs to
me, that treats of all the Mental Phenomena.
That a connected view of these phenomena is
PREFACE. vii/
desirable, will not be disputed. Of course,
Morals are not comprehended in the subject.
For these I must refer to my " Principles of
Human Happiness and Duty.''
I know not whether an apology will be thought
necessary for the use of the term Psychology.
The reader will observe that I have no partiality
for new and learned words, but there are cases
where they may be useful, if not necessary. And
this I consider to be a case in point. The words
Mental Philosophy are not sufficiently definite,
for mental philosophy embraces not only Psycho-
logy, but all the Sciences which relate directly
to Mind, as Logic, Morals, and even Politics.
Pure Mental Philosophy would be appropriate ;
but it is better to have a single word, if possible.
The term Metaphysics naturally suggests itself;
but, as this word has been employed in so many
senses ; and is, moreover, unhappily associated in
the public mind with much that is cloudy, mysti-
cal, if not unintelligible ; it seemed desirable to
have a word free from all ambiguity, as well as
from all unfavourable associations. Besides, the
term Psychology is no longer quite new, for it has
been used by some of our best writers ; in par-
ticular by Sir Benjamin Brodie in his " Psycho-
logical Inquiries." I have therefore resolved to
adopt it ; though the words Metaphysics and Meta-
physical occur occasionally in the following pages,
as synonymous with Psychology and Psycho-
logical.
viii. PREFACE.
It must be allowed that Psychology has been
hardly dealt with. It has been attacked not only
by foes, but by friends; not only by strangers, but
by its own Professors. Now this is too bad. It
tempts one to exclaim, Et tu Brute. To those,
then, if an}'- such there be, v.ho really think that
nothing has been, or can be done in Psychology,
the present work is with some degree of con-
fidence addressed. This shall be my only answer.
Though the work may have many faults, and no
doubt it has many, yet I venture to hope that
it will be found to contain a body of Philo-
sophical doctrine, neither obscure, frivolous,
captious, nor unsound ; neither Sophistical or
Rationalist on the one hand, nor Empirical on the
other.'' Of course I must have profited by the
labours of my predecessors, but I think that I
have added something to them, that there is here
nexv as well as old, and that I shall leave Psycho-
logy better than I found it.
I certainly have not attempted to construct an
edifice unassailable in all its parts, founded on
Self- evidence, and raised up by strict demonstra-
tion, like pure Mathematics : for any such attempt
would have shown a total misapprehension of the
nature of the subject. A misapprehension of
the nature of his subject, and of the evidence
whereof it admits, is the greatest fault which a
Philosopher can commit. It is fatal, and fore-
* See the Novum Orgauum Aph. LXII-III-IV, where these two
kinds of false philosophy are characterised.
PREFACE. ix.
dooms to failure all his subsequent labours. Nor
have I any wish to be numbered with those, who,
'* being unable to add any thing to Truth, seek
for eminence through the heresies of paradox."
It had not been my intention to engage in
controversy, but, as the Champion of the " New
Scottish Philosophy" has thrown down the gaunt-
let, I shall not decline taking it up, once for all.
That Philosophy is professedly demonstrative,
and so linked together, as the Author himself
allows, that, if one flaw can be detected in it, the
whole must fall to pieces. I shall therefore ex-
amine but one argument, on which the whole
Theory concerning the existence of Matter is
founded ; for, if that be unsound, no more refuta-
tion will be necessary. That argument is con-
tained in Professor Ferrier's last publication,
" Scottish Philosophy the Old and the New," and
is as follows : (page 2/).
" My argument is as follows. The only material world which
truly exists, is one which cither actually is, or may possibly be,
known. But the only material world which either actually is, or
may possibly be, known, is one, along with which intelligence is, and
must be, also known. Therefore, the only material world which
truly exists, is one, along with which, intelligence also exists.
Therefore, the mere material world has no real and absolute exist-
ence. But neither is it a nonentity (I am no idealist), for thei'e is
no nonentity, any more than there is entity out of relation to all
intelligence. It is simply an expression of nonsense. This is my
reasoning, and if any one can propose an amendment on the syllo-
gism, I shall very willingly receive it."
Now, I accept that challenge, and shall pro-
X. PREFACE.
pose two rectifications in the above argument,
necessary, as I conceive, to its validity.
First, I must observe that the conclusion above
stated is not the correct conclusion from the
premises ; but the correct conclusion is as follows :
Therefore, the only material world which truly
exists, is one, along with which intelligence is, and
must be known. The amended argument will
then stand thus :
The only material world which truly exists, is
one which either actually is, or may possibly be,
known ;
But the only material world which either ac-
tually is, or may possibly be, known, is one along
with which intelligence is, and must be, also
known ;
Therefore, the only material world which truly
exists, is one, along with which, intelligence is,
and must be, known.
This is the only legitimate conclusion from
those premises.
Secondly, there is an ambiguity in the above
argument, arising from a confusion between the
actual and the possible. What '\s> positively stated in
the first proposition is simply, that the only ma-
terial world which really exists, is one which may
possibly be known ; in other words, without in-
volving a contradiction. So, the second proposi-
tion cannot rightly imply that the material world
actually is known ; but merely that, if known,
intelligence must be known along with it. The
PREFACE. xi.
insertion of the words, if hioivn, will render
the meaning clear ; otherwise actual knowledge
might be unwarily supposed, as in the fallacious
argument it is supposed. Consequently, the argu-
ment fully corrected will stand thus :
The only material world which truly exists, is
one which either actually is, or may possibly be,
known ;
But the only material world which either ac-
tually is, or may possibly be, known, is one, along
with which, (if known) intelligence is, and must
be, also known.
Therefore, the only material world which truly
exists, is one, along with which, (if known) intel-
ligence is, and must be, also known.
Such is the only legitimate conclusion from
the premises ; but it is one of no force whatsoever
against the independent existence of matter. It
merely affirms that if the material world be
known, intelligence must be known along with it;
which advances us not one step beyond Professor
Ferrier's Propositions in his Theory of Knowing,
not one step toward Being. He has still to
prove that matter cannot exist unless it be
known, or, in his own words, that " the only
material world which truly exists, is one, along
with which, intelligence also exists ; " which is
quite another proposition.
The Author of the " New Philosophy" has
therefore failed in the above attempt to pass logic-
ally from Knowing to Being. Between the two
xii. PREFACE.
lies a deep mysterious abyss, which we must leap
across, for we never can bridge it over.
In his "Institutes of Metaphysic" the same
Author endeavours to cross the abyss by filling it
up ; in plain language, by identifying Being with
Knowing. " Thus Knowing and Being," says he,
(p. 515) " are shown to be built up out of the same
elements." But, if the elements be the same,
and if it be not maintained that they are in
different proportions, then the compounds, Know-
ing and Being, must also be the same. This is
one way of getting rid of the difficulty, but it is
cutting the Gordian knot, instead of untying it.
Again, " matter cannot be the cause of our
cognitions, inasmuch as it is a mere part of our
cognitions," (p. 540). AH this makes things much
worse ; for, in order to get rid of a difficulty, we
are called upon to efface the distinction between
Mind and Matter, which lies at the bottom of all
sane Metaphysics. Matter may exist, as all the
world supposes, or it may not, as Berkeley thought,
and still a Science of Mind be possible ; but a
system which confounds the two strikes at the
root of Mental Philosophy, and hence of all
genuine Philosophy whatsoever.
Rugby, November 21, 1856.
CONTENTS.
Part First.
PRELIMINARY.
Chapter Page
I. Introduction. Of the Mind in General . 1
II. Classification of the Mental Phenomena . 3
III. On the Mental Powers or Faculties . . 16
Part Second.
THE FEELINGS.
I. Op Sensation 18
II. Of Emotion.
Section First.
Of Emotion in General . . , . 29
Section Second.
Classification of the emotions. . . 31
Section Third.
On the Origin of Desire ... 45
Section Fourth.
Of the Will 56
Supplement First to Section Fourth.
Op the Will 87
Supplement Second.
Op the Will 90
xiv. CONTENTS.
Part Third.
THE THOUGHTS.
Chapter. Paga
I. Or Thought in General, and of the Proxi-
MATE Powers of the Human Mind . . 96
II. Of Consciousness 98
III. Of Perception.
Section First.
Op the Nature of Perception . . . 104
Section Second.
Origin of Perception . . . . 113
Section Third.
Evidence Afforded by Perception . .121
Supplement to Chapter III.
Of Perception 141
rV. Of Conception.
Section First..
Of Conception in General. . . .143
Section Second.
Division of Conceptions :
I. Op Particular Conceptions . . 148
II. Of General Conceptions :
1. Nature of General Conceptions . 158
2. Subdivision OF General Conceptions 169
3. General Names, Definition, and
Description . ♦ . . .171
CONTENTS.
XV.
Chapter paga
Section Third.
Origin op Conception . . . .190
V, Of Memory :
Section First.
What is Memory 197
Section Second.
Of Time 199
Section Third.
Of Personal Identity 209
Section Fourth.
Origin of Memory 212
Section Fifth.
Evidence Afforded by Memory. . .213
Section Sixth.
Connection of Memory with the other
Intellectual Faculties. Comparison
■with these. Causes of its Improvement
AND Decline 219
Yl. Of Eeason in General. Distinction Between
Keason AND Simple Intellect. . . 232
YII. Of Comprehension ..... 236
VIII. Of Belief 240
IX. Of Judgment 256
X. Of Eeasoning :
Section First.
Op Keasoking in General .... 278
•
xvi. CONTENTS.
Chapter Page
Section Second.
On Different Kinds of Eeasoning:
I. Or Demonstrative Eeasoning . 289
II. Or Probable Eeasoning . . . 357
Section Third.
On General Principles of Seasoning . 388
PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY,
PART I.
PRELIMINARY.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION. OF THE MIND IN GENERAL.
1. The difference between Mind and Matter
lies at the bottom of all Psychology ; and upon
it is founded the distinction between the Mental
and the Physical Sciences.
2. This difference is broad and definite, so that
Mind can never be mistaken for Matter, or Matter
for Mind.
3. In one respect alone do Mind and Matter
agree. They agree as Substances, that is, as
something permanent among innumerable modifica-
tions:^ but in everything else they differ.
4. Matter is extended, solid or impenetrable,
moveable, divisible without end ; but Mind has
' See the Author's " Introduction to Mental Philosophy."
Art. 1. Substance.
B
2 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY.
neither extension, solidity, mobility in space, nor
divisibility. It has no parts, it is strictly One.
5. Mind, on the other hand, is susceptible of
Sensations, Thoughts, and Emotions, which have
nothing in common with the known properties of
Matter. Therefore the separation between Mind
and Matter is broad, deep, and sudden.
6. If these distinctions be correct, the all-
important question as to the materiality or imma-
teriality of the Soul is already decided : for how
can that be material which has none of the proper-
ties of matter^
7. Again, it is allowed that Sensations, Thoughts,
and Emotions are not material; but these are
merely modifications of the Mind or Soul ; there-
fore the Mind itself is not material.
8. Consequently, from what it has not, as well
as from what it has, we draw the same conclusion,
that the Mind or Soul is immaterial.
9. Let us conclude this Chapter by observing
how important are accurate distinctions at the out-
set ! How many volumes of unprofitable discussion
may they prevent !
MENTAL PHENOMENA.
CHAPTER II.
CLASSIFICATION OF THE MENTAL PHENOMENA.
1. Though the mind is strictly One and
indivisible, yet it admits of innumerable modifica-
tions.
2. These modifications, considered as fleeting
or transitory, rapidly succeeding each other in
our waking or dreaming hours, are called simply
Phenomena or Appearances ; but when from such
appearances we infer the existence of some more
permanent modification, the source of these ap-
pearances, we name it a Mental Power or Faculty.
3. Mental Powers then, or Faculties, are
known only through Phenomena, and, conse-
quently, our first object must be to become well
acquainted with these.
4. Without a correct classification of the
Mental Phenomena there can be no accurate
Psychology ; but, with such Classification, the
most important questions can be solved without
much difficulty. A mistake here is fatal, for it
vitiates all subsequent conclusions ; while well-
4 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
grounded distinctions at the outset may render
truth ahnost self-evident.
5. Some Mental Phenomena comprise more
or less of Pleasure or Pain, Happiness or Misery,
while others are in themselves neutral. The
former we may call Feelings, the latter
Thoughts. This, then, is the first and funda-
mental distinction.
6. Feelings again are of two sorts, according
as they are, or are not, immediately dependant on
a change in the state of the Body. The former
we call Sensations, the latter Emotions; the
immediate antecedent of the one being a bodily
change, of the other a mental affection, whether
Thought, Sensation, or another Emotion.
7. Sensations then, are, in themselves, Mental
Phenomena as much as Emotions, though immedi-
ately dependant on the Body. A bodily pain is
one of which the cause lies in our material frame ;
the effect, the pain, being strictly mental.
8. That all Emotions comprise Pleasure or
Pain will not be disputed ; but do all Sensations
likewise '^
9. Many Sensations are undoubtedly pleasur-
able, many painful, even in an intense degree ;
but others are certainly dull, if felt at all as
pleasurable or painful.
10. I touch the table gently with my hand,
and I am quite sensible of the touch, but I could
hardly say that I feel pain or pleasure. I touch
MENTAL PHENOMENA. 5
it again more forcibly, and now I do feel pain.
Must we then separate these two Phenomena as
belonging to different classes ? I think not.
The pain diminishes gradually with the force of
the blow, till it becomes infinitesimally little, the
mere fluxion of a pain, and nowhere can we find
a limit. In other respects the Phenomena are
exactly similar, in themselves, and in their ante-
cedents, the difference being only in degree ; and
therefore, all may be called Feelings, the acute as
well as the dull.
1 1 . Sensations, then, as well as Emotions,
are rightly comprehended under the first grand
class of Mental Phenomena, the Feelings, and
the difference between them has been pointed out.
Let us turn now to the other grand class, the
Thoughts.
12. Though our Emotions, and hence most
of the happiness or misery which we feel, spring
from our Thoughts, yet, in themselves, these are
neutral. Closely united as Cause and Effect, and
often in reality inseparable, Thoughts and Emo-
tions may still be distinguished on reflection ; and
they are in fact distinguished by all people, and
in all languages.
13. If Thought and Emotion be so readily
and generally distinguished, though so closely
united, much more Thought and Sensation, which
depends upon the state of Body, and not at all
upon Thought.
6 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
14. Thus Thoughts are clearly distinguished
from our Feelings, that is from Sensations and
Emotions, which two make up all our pleasures
and pains, all our happiness and misery.
15. Now Thoughts are of two orders, Non-
relative and Relative, or Notions and Rela-
tions.
16. A Notion supposes but one thing, a Re-
lation two at least.
1/. I consider a man, a horse, a tree, a
mountain, each separately, and I have a Notion of
each. I compare one man with another, one
horse with another, one tree with another, one
mountain with another, and I am conscious of a
Relation between the two. So, I am aware of a
Relation between a mare and foal, a father and
son.
18. Notions again are of two sorts, Particular
and General, words which will be fully explained
hereafter.^
19. The second order of Thoughts consists
of Relative Thoughts or Relations.
20. The observation already made with re-
spect to Thoughts and Emotions, that, though
readily distinguished on reflection, they are often
in reality inseparable, applies to Notions and
Relations.
"^ For the further division of Notions, see the Chapter on
Conception.
MENTAL PHENOMENA. 7
21. Relations necessarily suppose Notions
between which a Relation exists, so that where
there are no notions we can be conscious of no
relation; but Notions imply not Relation of ne-
cessity, though they frequently do in fact.
22. Thus the Mental Phenomena differ from
Material elements, which, though at one time
combined with other elements, may at another be
actually separated by art and examined apart.
Common salt is a compound of a gas called
Chlorine and a metal Sodium, and these may be
obtained from Salt, and exhibited each by itself.
This facility we do not enjoy in Psychology, and
hence the difficulty of Psychological Analysis.
23. Relations are of three kinds. 1. Those
which always and of necessity suppose Time.
2. Those which do not ; and 3. Those which may
or may not suppose Time. The first are called
Relations of Succession, the second Relations of
Co-existence, and the third or mixed kind are
Relations of Resemblance.
24. Relations of Succession are of two
genera, relations of casual, and relations of in-
variahle antecedence and consequence, the latter
comprising the all-important relation of Power
or Cause and Effect.
25. Relations of Co-existence are numerous,
and when the things compared are Material, Co-
existence in Space is always supposed ; not so of
course when Mental. The heart and lungs bear
8 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY.
to each other an uniform relation of position, and
co-exist in Space ; so do the elements of a
chemical compound, as common salt ; not so the
elements of a mental compound, as love and
gratitude, which co-exist, but not in Space.
26. The whole object of Science is to dis-
cover the invariable Co-existence, and the invari-
able Succession of things.
27. Having now completed the classification
of the Mental Phenomena, so far as requisite for
our present purpose, for more detail would be
here out of place, we may be able to pass judg-
ment on some of the Psychological systems of our
predecessors.
28. If the above classification be correct, it
will, in the first instance, show the utter insuffi-
ciency of the system of Condillac and his
followers, whereby all the Phenomena of Mind
were reduced to Sensations, and what he called
transformed Sensations. We have seen that Sen-
sations are but one order of Mental Phenomena,
forming a subdivision of the Class of Feelings,
distinct from the other order the Emotions, and
differing still more from the second great class
the Thoughts. If Sensations might be confounded
with Emotions, or transformed into them, how
could they be assimilated to Notions, which
belong to a different class, and still more to
Relations, which are even further removed from
Sensations *? These all agree but in one respect,
MENTAL PHENOMENA. 9
that they are Mental Phenomena, in other respects
they radically differ. Could it even be shown
that all spring originally from Sensation, this
would prove nothing ; for on the same ground we
might prove that Sensation is not of Mind, since
it arises from a bodily change. The Cause and
the Effect may be widely different. Body acts
on Mind and Mind on Body, but the one bears
no resemblance to the other. We may there-
fore safely pronounce the system of Condillac the
most narrow, the farthest from nature, the most
degrading of any that ever obtained celebrity.
It reduces man to the rank of the lower animals,
nay below them ; for we have every reason to be-
lieve that these are not mere creatures of Sensa-
tion.
29. The above Classification will also show
the insufficiency of the well-known division of
Hume into Impressions and Ideas. The word
Impression, as used by Hume, seems to include
Sensations and Emotions, and so corresponds to
our Feelings ; and the term Idea means, accord-
ing to him, an Impression revived, — a faint copy of
the original. This is his own language. Ideas
differ from impressions only in the degree of force
and vivacity, and always spring from them ; so
that where there has been no Impression, there
can be no Idea. Ideas then, at most, are equiva-
lent to our Notions, and consequently, of Rela-
tions no account is taken in this Classification.
c
10 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCflOLOGY.
Accordingly, Hume endeavours to confound the
distinction between Notion and Relation, as fatal
to his theory ; for it is evident that Relation, if
distinct from Notion, has no prior Impression to
which it corresponds. Thus he attempts to prove
that " An opinion or behef is a lively Idea re-
lated to, or associated with, a present Impression,'"*
and even that " all probable reasoning is nothing
but a species of Sensation."" Such were the ab-
surd conclusions to which even Hume was led
by an imperfect Classification at the outset, and a
false theory founded thereon. Starting from the
same theory, he was brought to deny the inde-
pendent existence of many Notions or Ideas which
men commonly suppose that they have, such as
the Ideas of Space and Time, which he considered
as nothing distinct from the Sensations we ex-
perience on seeing objects at rest or in motion.''
This is, exactly the error of Condillac repeated.
Notions are here confounded with Sensations,
as before Relations with Notions. For the same
reason Hume denied that we have any idea of
Substance, or even of Self; for no impressions
" " Treatise of Human Nature." Vol. I., Part iii,, Sec. 7.
" Id. Sec. 8. I quote from the *' Treatise of Human
Nature," the earliest and the great Metaphysical work of Hume,
containing the full and consistent Statement of his opinions,
though it was afterwards given up by the Author, and, as he
thought, superseded by his " Essays."
^ Id. Part ii.
MENTAL PHENOMENA. H
corresponding to these could be shown.'' These
false conclusions may instruct us how important
is a correct Classification at first ; for on it Theory
will and must be built.
30. After refuting, in the First Book, the sup-
position of Innate Ideas, Locke commences the
Second Book of his great work by informing us
that all our Ideas spring from Sensation and Be-
J^ectioTi, and he divides them accordingly into
these two Classes. "^ Here, be it observed, the
Theory gives birth to the Classification, and not
the Classification to the Theory, as in the system
of Hume, which latter is assuredly the proper
method.
31. Considered as a Classification of the
Mental Phenomena, the division of Locke is mani-
festly incomplete ; for, in the first place, it ap-
pears not to include Sensations themselves, which
are not the same as Ideas of Sensation, i. e., de-
rived from Sensation. The Sensations of redness,
blueness, etc., are not the same as the Ideas or
Notions thereof, of which I am conscious when
* " Treatise of Human Nature." Part IV., Sec. 5, 6.
^ After this fundamental distinction, wliicli runs throughout the
whole of the Second Book, on the origin of onr Ideas, it is diffi-
cult to conceive how Locke could ever have been set down as a
pure Sensationalist. But so he has been, both at home and abroad,
even by writers of eminence, some of whom, however, had per-
haps never read a line of him. See on this point, Dugald
Stewart's "Dissertation on the Progress of Metaphysical Philo-
sophy," first published in the " Encyclopa?dia Britannica."
12 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
my eyes are shut. So the Sensation which I feel
when I touch the table is not the same as the
Notions of Extension, Solidity, Hardness, which
arise out of the Sensation, and are subsequent to
it. Consequently, the Classification of Locke
either does not comprehend Sensations at all, or
it confounds them with Ideas or Notions of Sen-
sation ; and on either supposition the Classifica-
tion errs, in one case by incompleteness, in the
other by confusion.
32. Secondly, we are told that Ideas of Re-
flecdon arise from reflecting on the operations of
our own minds. But what are these operations
themselves'? To what class do they belong'?
Locke ennumerates as such, jwrception, thinldng^
doubtitif/, believing, reasoning, Imoivirig^ ivilling^ and
afterwards adds : " The term operations here, I use
in a large sense, as comprehending not barely the
actions of the mind about its ideas^ but some sort
of passions arising sometimes from them, such as
the satisfaction and uneasiness arising from any
Thought."^
The operations of the mind, then, comprehend
the Emotions : and consequently. Ideas of Reflec-
tion embrace Ideas or Notions of the Emotions,
but not the Emotions themselves. The notion of
love or of gratitude is not the same as love or
gratitude felt.
^ " Essay concerning Human Understanding." Book II.,
Chap, i., Sec. 4.
MENTAL PHENOMENA. 13
33. Thus, as Locke's Ideas of Sensation com-
prise not Sensations proper, so his Ideas of He-
flection embrace not the Emotions proper; or
should it be said that he meant to include all
under the word Idea, then it must be allowed
that he has not clearly distinguished between
Idea proper or Notion and Sensation, in the one
case, between Idea or Notion and Emotion in the
other. Therefore, again, the Classification errs
either by deficiency or by confusion.'' The truth
of Locke's theory, as to the origin of our Ideas,
we shall consider afterwards.
34. The Classification which approaches most
nearly to the one here proposed is that brought
forward by the late Dr. Thomas Brown, in his
valuable Lectures on the Philosophy of the
Human Mind. Still they differ materially.
35. Dr. Brown begins by dividing all the
Mental Phenomena into two great Classes, the
Class of External, and that of Internal Phenomena,
meaning by the former, Sensations ; by the latter,
all other Phenomena preceded immediately, not
by a change of body, but by a change of mind.
These are subdivided into Iniellectual States of
^ The confusion between Idea proper or Notion and Passion
or Emotion is apparent in Book II., Chapter xx., " Of Modes of
Pleasure and Pain." This very meagre chapter is all relative to
the Emotions contained in Locke's great work. It may be said,
uideed, that he professed only to treat of the Human Under-
standing.
14 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
mind or ThonglitSy and Emotions. Thus, while I
class Emotions along with Sensations, under the
common term Feelings, though of different orders,
Dr. Brown classes Emotions along with Thoughts,
and afterwards separates these two orders. Now
the question is, which is the more natural arrange-
ment *? Should Emotions be classed with Sensa-
tions, or with Thoughts'?
36. It will go far to decide this question, if
we consider that in popular language we possess
a word which embraces both Sensations and Emo-
tions, and them only, — the word Feeling ; whereas
we have no word common to thoughts and Emo-
tions, and to them alone. This is a strong proof
that the arrangement here proposed is natural,
for all men are more or less metaphysicians. We
may or may not be mathematicians, or natural
philosophers, but we cannot help knowing some-
thing of our own minds. If, then, by common
consent, Sensation and Emotion have been classed
together under the one term Feeling, the proba-
bility is that the arrangement is good, particularly
if it be confirmed on reflection. So, in French,
the word Sensation comprises both Sensation pro-
per and Emotion.
37. The only point of agreement between
Emotion and Thought, mentioned by Brown, is
that both are preceded immediately by a Mental,
not by a Bodily change, and thus they are distin-
guished from Sensation. This, no doubt, is a
MENTAL PHENOMENA. 15
difference, and an important one, though it is a
difference rather in the antecedent than in the
phenomenon itself, — an excellent ground of dis-
tinction between the orders of Sensations and
Emotions, but hardly sufficient for a primary-
division. The grand difference between Mental
Phenomena is the presence or absence of pleasure
or pain, happiness or misery, and on this our
Classification is founded ; a Classification agree-
able to the consciousness of every man, and ac-
knowledged by the general sense of mankind, as
expressed in language. Dr. Brown afterwards
divides Intellectual states of mind or Thoughts
into Simple and Relative Suggestions, which cor-
respond exactly with my Notions and Relations ;
but he does not propose any subdivision of Simple
Suggestions.
16 P-RINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
CHAPTER III.
ON THE^ MENTAL POWERS OE EACULTIES.
1. We observed (Chapter ii. 2), that when the
modifications of mind are fleeting or transitory,
as they rapidly succeed each other in our waking
or dreaming hours, we call them Phenomena or
Appearances simply ; but when from such appear-
ances we infer the existence of some more per-
manent modification, the source of these appear-
ances, then we name it a Mental Power or Faculty.
2. From this it is evident that every class of
Phenomena has a corresponding Power or Faculty,
If we have Sensations, we must possess the Power
of Sensation ; if Emotions, the Power of Emo-
tion ; if Thoughts, the Power of Thinking. This
is self-evident. Consequently, the Classification
of Mental Powers must be the same as the Classi-
fication of Phenomena.
3. Therefore, the three Ultimate or Elemen-
tary powers of the mind are the Powers of
Sensation, Emotion, and Thought or Intelligence.
4. From these Ultimate elements all the
MENTAL POWERS Oil FACULTIES. 17
Proximate Powers are derived, and of them they
are compounded ; as, in Chemistry, the ultimate
elements of Animal and Vegetable Substances,
Ox)^gen, Hydrogen, Carbon, Nitrogen, &c., make
up the proximate and complex principles of
Albumen, Fibrin, Gelatin, Gluten, Tannin, Wax,
Resin, etc.
5. So, out of the elementary Powers of Sen-
sation, Emotion, and Thought, are formed and
compounded the proximate Powers of Perception,
Imagination, Memory, Will, Conscience or the
Moral Faculty, Judgment, Reasoning, etc.
6. To understand the nature of these powers,
and their corresponding phenomena, we must
analyse them and trace the elements of which
they are composed. The Analysis of the Mental
Phenomena is the first grand object of Meta-
physical inquiry : the second is the Theory of
their Origin and Succession. These two ought
to be kept distinct as far as we can ; though this
may not always be possible. A correct Analysis
and Classification is the only sure ground for
Theory. Locke starts with a theory, viz : that
all our Ideas are derived from Sensation and
Reflection ; and Hume, after his one division
into Impressions and Ideas, immediately builds
thereon a Theory which determines all his subse-
quent conclusions.
D
)
18 PHINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
PART II.
THE FEELINGS.
CHAPTER I.
OF SENSATION.
1. We have seen that Sensation and Emotion
agree, inasmuch as both are Feelings ; and
thus they are distinguished from Thought or
hitelligence.
2. This fundamental difference at once refutes
the opinion of a French philosopher, " Penser
c'est Sentir, et ce n'est rien que Sentir," " Thought
is Feeling, and nothing but Feeling."^
3. Feeling, as we have seen, supposes either
positive pleasure or pain, happiness or misery ;
or else such a tendency to them as to become
pleasure or pain by a slight increase of intensity,
and by imperceptible degrees, without any other
^ Destutt de Tracy. The word sentir may coinpreheiid
Emotion as well as Sensation, and I have given the author
cr 'dit for the larger sense ; though, as a disciple of Condillac,
he probably meant the latter only.
SENSATION. 19
difference in the nature of the phenomena. A
slight blow gives no pain, but one a little stronger
gives some ; a posture at first indifferent becomes
irksome by continuation ; some light or warmth
is agreeable, more is painful. Of the feelings,
Sensations alone may be indifferent, Emotions
are always pleasurable or painful.
4. This, however, is not the fundamental
distinction between Sensation and Emotion.
The grand difference is that the former is imme-
diately dependant on the body, the latter on
some previous state of mind. The immediate
indispensable antecedent of the one is a bodily
change, of the other a mental change, whether
Sensation, Thought, or some other Emotion.
5. Sensations being the only mental pheno-
mena immediately dependant on the body, it must
be through them that we become acquainted with
our o-wn bodies, and with the material world in
general.
6. Sensations, then, are at least the inlets of
the world without.
7. But Sensations alone give us no know-
ledge of the outward world. I feel a Sensation
of colour, as of redness and blueness, but the
Sensation tells me not that the source thereof
lies in an outward material object, totally different
from the mind itself, or from any modification of
mind. So, I touch the table, and feel a certain
Sensation, but this does not inform me that it
y
20 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
arises from contact with an extended solid sub-
stance, having no resemblance whatsoever to the
Sensation. And neither tastes^ nor sounds, nor
smells, as I feel them, can give me any informa-
tion about matter, — a thing utterly different from
themselves.
8. We may conclude that had we been
creatures of Sensation alone, we never should
have known the world witliout.
9. Sensations rest in themselves ; they point
not directly to anything else ; they are what we
feel them and no more ; they may be pleasurable,
painful, or nearly indifferent ; but they tell us of
nothing beyond.
10. That knowledge which Sensation gives
not, we obtain by Perception ; which must by
no means be confounded with the former^ as
hitherto has too frequently occurred. Of Percep-
tion we shall treat afterwards in its proper place.
11. Sensations constitute the line of demarca-
tion between Mental Philosophy and Physiology :
in themselves they belong to the former, but in
their antecedents to the latter. A bodily change
precedes every Sensation, and that of course is
the province of Physiology.^
^ " The examination of our Sensations," says Hume, " belongs
more to Anatomists and Natural Philosophers than to moral."
Strange misa])prehension of the subject of Metaphysics ! Sensa-
sations themselves belong to Mental ; their antecedents, to Physical
science. See " Treatise of Human Nature." Part I., Sec. 2.
SENSATION. 21
12. Since Sensations depend immediately
upon a bodily change, it follows that they do
not depend upon the Will. This inference is
moreover confirmed by experience, for we all
know that we cannot directly will the presence or
absence of any Sensation. When we open our eyes,
we cannot help receiving certain Sensations ; and,
•when we close them, we cannot retain the same.
It is only remotely that our will can influence
these, that is through the body, and, therefore,
"with respect to them, the mind is imssive.
13. Sensations are of various kinds ; but they
may all be comprehended under two Orders, the
Special and the General.
14. Special Sensations are those to which a
special organ is adapted; while General Sensa-
tions are such as may arise from any part of the
body.
15. The Special Sensations are Sight, Hear-
ing, Smell, Taste : all others are General. Touch,
which is commonly classed as one of the five
senses, is not confined to any one part, though
the hands be its most delicate organ; but this
may be owing to use. The hands are the most
convenient organs of touch, consequently the
most practised, and, therefore, it may be, the
most sensitive.
16. The organ of Sight is the eye, and more
especially the expansion of the Optic nerve, called
the Retina ; the organ of Hearing is the ear, par-
22 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
ticularly the internal chambers, and their curious
bones, the malleus, the incus, and the stapes, with
the corresponding nerve, the auditory ; the organ
of Smell is the delicate and voluminous membrane
lining the inner parts of the nose, over which the
Olfactory nerve is finely ramified ; and the organ
of Taste is the tongue and palate, also thickly
interspersed with nervous filaments.
17. In every case we know that a nerve is
indispensable to Sensation, for if it be cut or
injured, the Sense is gone. We infer that all the
complicated mechanism is useful only in fitting
the nerve to perform its proper functions. Thus,
the Pupil, the Humours of the eye, the Lens, serve
to admit and refract the rays of Light, so that
they may fall duly on the Retina.
18. We can point out the proper nerves of
the eye, the ear, the nose, one for each side, or
a pair; but we can show no nerves peculiar to
Touch, as it has no peculiar organ.
19. An uninterrupted communication be-
tween the further extremity of the nerve and
the brain, or the spinal marrow, is indispensable
to Sensation ; for if the communication be inter-
rupted by cutting, or even by pressure, the sense
is gone. This we may see, in a partial degree,
when a nerve is pressed upon, and the limb
becomes asleep.
20. This is almost all we know of the bodily
process in Sensation ; though in the want of real
SENSATION. 23
knowledge, theory has not been idle. Thus the
nerves have been compared to musical strings,
and a very pretty theory of vibrations has been
founded thereon, whereby to explain Sensation.
But the nerves are not strings, and their vibra-
tions are imaginary. Again, the nerves have been
said to contain animal spirits running up and
down to and from the Sensorium, bringing infor-
mation, like a general's aides-de-camp. But these
animal spirits are, like other spirits, to us invisible,
and their existence is now given up.
21. We know the uses of the various parts
of the eye, how they regulate the admission of
light ; but of the uses of the various parts of the
internal ear, we know nothing, no more than of
the convolutions of the brain or of the pineal
gland. And as to the action of the nerves, we
know only the result.
22. This, however, we do know, that in every
case of external Sensation there must be contact.
The rays of light must fall upon the retina, the
vibrations of air upon the extremities of the
auditory nerve, the impalpable effluvia of scents
upon the nerves of the nose, savoury bodies must
touch the tongue or palate, and tangible objects
some part of the frame, before any Sensation can
be felt. The eye, ear, and nose seem to be con-
versant with distant objects, but they are not so
in reality. The exciting causes of Sight, Hearing,
and Smell, are as much in contact with the bodily
24 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
organ as the exciting causes of Taste and Touch ;
and in no case does the mere Sensation give us
any knowledge of an outward object, whether
near or distant.
23. Having said thus much on the material
changes which precede iSensation, let us return to
the Mental Phenomena. And first, of the Special
Senses. These, as we have seen, are Sight,
Hearing, Smell, and Taste.
24. The Sensation proper to Sight is that of
Colour; to the Hearing, Sound; to the Smell,
Smell ; to the Taste, Taste. With respect to the
last three, there will be no dispute; but some
may suppose that the eye sees more than Colour,
namely, objects with their magnitudes and
distances.
25. But we have already shown that no Sen-
sation by itself can give us any knowledge of
outward objects ; and were there any doubt as to
the Sight, it would be dispelled by experience;
for persons born blind have had their vision per-
fectly restored by a surgical operation, and yet at
first have felt only a Sensation of Colour. And
surely there is nothing in mere sounds, smells, or
tastes, to tell us from what they come. When
these sounds, smells, or tastes are unusual, we
cannot even in mature years say whence they are
derived. Let a man shut his eyes, and let some-
thing tasty, but new, be put into his mouth, and
what will he know of it but the taste '?
SENSATION. 25
26. These four Special Sensations are com-
monly of suflicient interest to draw our attention,
unless absorbed by thought or emotion, and
great pleasure may be derived from them. The
charm of Colour, of Music, though much of this
is of a higher order, the gratifications of smell
and taste, form no contemptible part of our
enjoyments.
27. The same can hardly be said of our
otlier or General Sensations. These may be
divided into two genera, of which Touch is one,
while all our other general sensations, various
and anomalous as they are, may be comprehended
under the second genus. Such are the Sensations
of warmth and cold, comfort and discomfort, the
bodily pleasure of activity and pains of inactivity,
the agreeable feelings which accompany good
health, the general uneasiness and the innumer-
able pains of sickness and disease. Pleasurable
Sensations of this order are not intense, and,
therefore, they may attract little attention, though'
they are important from their permanence ; but
the pains are some of the worst that flesh is
heir to.
28. Sensations of mere Touch in particular
are seldom dwelt upon at all, and they are of
moment only as leading to Perceptions. There-
fore, it is here especially that Sensation and
Perception are confounded. The passage from
the one to the other is so quick, at all events after
E
26 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGI.
the period of infancy, and the former is in itself
so uninteresting, that we cannot wonder if it be
often overlooked altogether, or, at least, mixed up
with the latter. But, on reflection, we see well
that the mere feeling of Touch, and the notion of
an outward extended solid body as the cause
of that feeling, are mental phenomena widely
different, closely united in fact, but readily dis-
tinguishable by thought. Nor can we see any-
thing in the mere Sensation of Touch, which
should lead us to the knowledge of aught beyond
itself.
29. General Sensations, when not amounting
to positive pain, seem not to have been intended to
fix our attention, and when they do, it is a great
evil : for the capacity of the mind is occupied, and
distracted from important thoughts. Nothing is
more humiliating to man than his subjection to
sense. Pain may overcome any one, and pain, in
general, is only occasional, but there is such a
thing as a subjection to petty sensations, which
perpetually divides and weakens the mind. The
word Fidgetiness expresses this uneasy state.
30. On the other hand, never does the dignity
of man more appear than when he triumphs over
his Sensations ; as the early Christian martyrs
who could smile under their torments. So
Frederick the Great could read with attention and
profit, though in the agonies of gout."
" See Lord Dover's " Life of Frederick of Prussia."
SENSATION. 27
31. Sensations are often found combined with
other mental phenomena, especially with Emo-
tions ; and this combination is called an Appetite.
32. The Appetites of hunger and thirst com-
prehend I. An uneasy Sensation resulting from
the want of food and drink; 2. A desire of
relief from that uneasiness. Subsequently there
arises a desire of food and drink, as the known
remedy for the evil. The last desire is the result
of experience, and does not properly belong to
the Appetite, which includes only two instinctive
feelings, a Sensation and an Emotion, and sup-
poses no acquired knowledge. ■■
33. Sensations are also closely united with a
certain class of Thoughts which we call Percep-
tions, whereby we become acquainted with the
material world. So close indeed is the union, at
least in the mature mind, that the two are con-
stantly confounded, to the great injury of Mental
Philosophy. But of this more hereafter.
34. Sensations cannot be defined, because,
being simple feelings, we have nothing more
simple by which to explain them ; and they are
too diversified to admit of accurate description.
We talk of Sensations lively or faint, of pains
dull or acute ; but these epithets convey very
inadequate conceptions of what we really feel.
I cannot even be quite sure that my Sensations
at all correspond with those of other persons ;
and that what I call green is the same that is felt
28 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
by any one else. So long as the same objects
rouse the same Sensations in the same persons,
the same word will be applied; but this proves
not the sameness of Sensation in different persons.
It is quite possible, though, no doubt, highly im-
probable, that the sensation of colour which trees
rouse in me may be that which another calls
blue; but so long as our respective Sensations do
not vary, we shall agree that trees are green.
EMOTION. 29
CHAPTER II.
OF EMOTION.
SECTION FIRST.
OF EMOTION IN GENERAL.
1. The second order of the grand class of
Feehngs, is that of the Emotions ; and these
ought next to be treated of, because, as feehngs,
they are more alhed than the Thoughts are to
Sensations. Besides, in the order of mental
development, Emotion seems prior to Thought,
and immediately succeeds Sensation ; as in the
case of the Appetites, where an Emotion of
desire follows instantly on the pain of hunger or
thirst. This is probably the first Emotion of the
infant mind, and it precedes any exercise of
Intelhgence.
2. Emotion, as we have seen, agrees with
Sensation, inasmuch as both are Feelings; but
in this they differ, that the latter is always pre-
ceded immediately by a change in the state of
30 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
the body, the former by a mental change. There-
fore Emotion may be defined to be a Feeling
consequent on some mental condition^ on some Sensa-
tion, Thought, or other Emotion.
3. As Sensations and Emotions alone are
Feelings, in them, and in them only, all our
pleasm'es and pains, all our happiness and
misery consist ; but principally in the latter.
Moreover, these are not only remote incentives,
but the immediate cause of all voluntary bodily
action. The importance of a knowledge of the
Emotions cannot, therefore, be over-stated.
4. We have seen that the Sensations, pro-
perly so called, give us no knowledge of external
nature, no knowledge of anything but themselves:
what we feel them to be, that they are ; and hav-
ing once felt them, we know them ever after. So
it is with the Emotions. Some of these, such as
Cheerfulness and Melancholy, arise at times in an
unaccountable manner, without any evident cause,
and lead to no object. These, then, can tell us of
nothing but themselves. Others, again, such as
Beauty and Sublimity, are supposed to arise from
outward objects ; but certainly it is not the Emo-
tion that informs us that there are such objects.
These Emotions also rest in themselves, and lead
us to nothing beyond. And though other Emo-
tions, namely the Desires, do lead us to certain
objects, yet the knowledge of the object comes
not from the desire, but, on the contrary, the
EMOTION. 31
desire from the previous knowledge of the object.
Consequently, Emotions, like Sensations, acquaint
us with nothing but themselves ; and having once
felt them, we know them ever after.
Very different, as we shall find, are the
Thoughts, which acquaint us not only with them-
selves, but also with things quite distinct from
themselves, and of another nature. {Sensations
and Emotions are interesting and important for
their own sakes ; but Thoughts are interesting
from the objects which they contemplate, and the
effect of these on our Sensibility.
SECTION SECOND.
CLASSIFICATION OF THE EMOTIONS.*
1. All the Emotions of the human mind may
be divided into two great classes, the Passive,
and the Active Emotions.
2. Passive Emotions are those which do not
include Desire or Fear, and which, consequently,
' The Author having ah"eady published an " Analysis and
Theory of the Emotions," he has resolved to make this Sectiou
as concise as possible, and to refer for a fuller account to his
former work, from which the present Section is almost entirely
taken.
32 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY.
are not immediately connected with outward
action. No doubt they may lead to outward
action, indirectly, and so may every Thought ;
but they may not, and they never immediately
precede it. Such are Cheerfulness, Melancholy,
Ennui, Wonder, Beauty, Sublimity, the Ludicrous
Emotion, etc. #
3. Active Emotions, on the contrary, always
comprise Desire or Fear, always urge to action,
and when this takes place they are always the
immediate antecedents ; consequently, the Will
must come under the Active Emotions.
4. Passive Emotions are of two Orders ; for
some have no necessary connection with our
moral conduct, and our social relations ; while
others, on the contrary, have such a connection.
These last are intimately connected with Ethics,
and influence practice, leading on to the Active
Emotions.
5. Under the first Order may be enumerated
simple Joy and Grief, with their several species,
and varieties, namely. Cheerfulness, Mirth, Melan-
choly, Weariness of Mind, arising from sameness
or repetition, and Ennui from vacancy of mind. "
Also under this head come Wonder at what is
new ; the Emotions of Beauty, Sublimity, and
the Ludicrous. All these belong to the first
order of the Passive Emotions.
6. Though the above Emotions may have an
influence on the conduct, yet the influence is
EMOTION. 33
neither so near, nor so general, as in the case of
the Second Order, which, in the usual course of
things, leads on to the Active Emotions. These
may be called the PASSIVE Moral Emotions,
and they comprise two sub-orders, the Imme-
diate, and the Retrospective Emotions, ac-
cording as they look to the present, or to the
past.
7- The Immediate Emotions are — I. Sympathy
and Antipathy, the one being an Emotion of
pleasure, arising from the contemplation of some
pleasure in another, or of pain, on the contem-
plation of pain, — while Antipathy is exactly the
reverse. Antipathy, as an original Emotion, and
not confined to individuals, may be considered
as quite an exception, for Sympathy is the
general law of human nature. When Antipathy
results from previous hatred towards an indi-
vidual, then it is no longer original.
8. II. Fride and Humility. Pride is a
pleasing Emotion arising from the consciousness
of some real or supposed excellence in ourselves,
or connected with ourselves, as compared with
others. Humility is a painful Emotion arising
from the consciousness of some real or supposed
defect in ourselves, or connected with ourselves,
as compared with others.
9. The Retrospective Emotions are — I. Regret^
a painful Emotion, arising from reflecting on a
past action, or past omission, on our part, from
F
34 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
which loss or injury has resulted, but which we
do not morally condemn. We may regret our
want of foresight, or want of activity, but we do
not feel Remorse.
10. II. Remorse. This is a compound state
of mind, comprising — 1. A judgment of condem-
nation on our own past conduct. 2. A most
•painful Emotion consequent thereon. The grief
of Remorse is one sui (/eneris, accompanied with
Humility, but not so impregnated with it as the
next and kindred Emotion, Shame.
1 ] . III. Shame. " Shame and Remorse are
the two great bulwarks of morality, and though
allied, and often mixed one with another, yet
they are by no means identical. Remorse never
arises but from some action, which, on the retros-
pect appears to ourselves morally wrong, whereas
Shame is often roused by acts morally indifferent,
and sometimes, as in the case of false shame,
positively praise-worthy. Even when the conduct
which rouses Shame is of an immoral nature, the
shame is often out of all proportion to the
degree of guilt. A woman is more ashamed of a
slight act of immodesty than of a crime. Shame
originates in the consciousness, not, of necessity,
that we have done wrong, but that we have done
something that lays us open to ridicule and con-
tempt. Now, as ridicule and contempt, the
former especially, are often awarded where there
is no moral delinquency, so Shame is frequently
EMOTION. 35
felt where there is little to blame. Shame, then,
is variable, because it depends chiefly on the
sentiments of others, and in particular upon the
sentiments of Ridicule and Contempt, which
themselves are liable to change." * That the
feeling in Shame is peculiar, is proved by the
outward evidence of the Blush, which accom-
panies no other Emotion : but along with this
feeling there is a strong mixture of Humility.
12. The second great class is that of the
Active Emotions, which always comprise Desire
or Fear as one element at least, and these are
the immediate antecedents of all those actions
which are called voluntary. To them alone, and
only when intense or permanent, the term Passion
is properly applied.
13. Some of the Active Emotions look only
to self; some to others, either in whole or in
part ; and consequently, they may be divided into
the Solitary or Self-regarding, and the
Social Emotions.
14. Order First. The Solitary or Self-
regarding Emotions are the following : —
I. Ambition, or desire of power.
II. Desire of Wealthy with its varieties,
Covetousness and Avarice.
III. Desire of Reputation, of Fame or Glory.
IV. Curiosii)/, or Desire of Knowledge.
' Ramsay's "Analysis and Theory of the Emotions," page 7.
36 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
V. Desire of Life or Continued Existence,
here and hereafter."
15. Order Second. The Social Emotions
may be subdivided into the Benevolent and
the Malevolent.
16. The Benevolent Emotions may all be
included under two genera, Love and Pity.
17- Love, in whatever form, comprises at
least two elements: — 1. A certain pleasure de-
rived from contemplating the beloved object:
2. A desire of good to that object. These ele-
ments are essential; for they are sufficient to
constitute Love, and without them there can be
no such Emotion.'' Under this genus may be
enumerated as species —
L General Benevolence, or Love to mankind
in general, which is the simplest species of Love,
and distinguished from all other species by
being indiscriminate.
IL Friendship, and every private attachment,
whether transient or permanent, slight or serious,
contain a third element in addition to the two
above mentioned, namel3% the desire of being
loved in return. ^
*■ For a particular account of all these desires, see the Author's
" Inquiry into the Principles of Human Happiness and Duty,''
Book I, Part ii. Also his " Analysis and Theory of the
Emotions."
" Ramsay's "Analysis and Theory of the Emotions," page 17.
^ Ibid.
EMOTION. 37
III. Love, properly so called, Love between
the sexes, comprises a fourth element besides
these three, which, from its strength, is some-
times peculiarly called Desire.
18. These three species are quite distinct ; but
the following are only varieties or modifications
of the same. Thus, Patriotism, is general Benevo-
lence limited to our own countrymen ; and
Family Affection is a modification of Friendship
taken in its widest sense, for whatever partiality
we may entertain towards relatives, we certainly
desire that it should be reciprocal. Gratitude,
moreover, is love towards an individual on ac-
count of some benefit conferred intentionally^
and modified by that consideration.
19. Besides the above, there are other Com-
pound Emotions, of which Love forms a part.
Such are the Religious Emotions, which comprise
Gratitude to God, and if Gratitude, then Love,
and along with this the Desire of Continued
Existence. Such is Admiration, " which seems to
occupy the interval between pure Love and
Esteem, comprising some Affection, as well as
a favourable judgment concerning its object.
But it is essentially distinguished from both by
the presence of Wonder, which is a necessary
part of Admiration, and owing to this element in
particular, the compound state of mind is more
allied to Emotion than to cool intellectual de-
cision. In Esteem, on the other hand, the
38 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
Emotion of Love is reduced to the lowest degree
compatible with partiality, while the judgment as
to merit is serious and decided. Respect, again,
is a mixture of Love with Humility, and Humility
tempers Love with something approaching to
Fear. Moreover, Respect seems to comprise a
certain exercise of the judgment. In Veneration,
the Humility is deeper, and consequently the
Love is more tempered with Fear ; while in Awe
fear predominates." "
20. The second genus of the Benevolent
Affections is Pity.
21. Pity, or Compassion, embraces two ele-
ments ; first, a feeling of pain at the sufferings of
another, — -secondly, a desire to relieve those
sufferings. This desire may be further analysed,
for it seems compounded, 1. Of a desire of relief
to the sympathetic pain which we feel, closely
followed by 2. The desire of removing the occa-
sion of that pain, viz., the sufferings of another.
22. Thus, the primary element in Pity is
Painful Sympathy, which seems necessary to the
rise of the other, Desire of relieving ; while Love
begins with Pleasing Sympathy, from which
springs the Desire of giving pleasure. Sympathy,
then, — a feeling for the weal or woe of others, —
which is an ultimate fact in human nature, is the
source of both Love and Pity.
^ Ramsay's " Analysis and Theory of the Emotions," page 21.
EMOTION. 39
23. As the Benevolent Emotions comprise
Love and Pity, so do the Malevolent Hatred
and Malice .
24. Hatred, in ^vhatever form, contains at
least two elements ; first, a certain pain on con-
templating the object hated, secondly, a desire of
evil to that object. These elements are essential.
Under the genus Hate may be enumerated: —
I. Anger. All the species or varieties of
Hate agree in this, that they are limited to cer-
tain individuals or classes of individuals, and
that there is always some particular cause for the
Hate. There is no such thing as General Hate,
as there is General Love and Benevolence ; for if
Misanthropy exist, it is a rare exception, — a
disease, — not a regular and healthy phenomenon
of human nature. Thus, Anger is a sudden and
violent emotion of Hatred towards an individual
on account of some injury or affront, even though
unintentional, and it is gratified only by retalia-
tion; whereas, simple Hate is satisfied by evil that
may befall its object from any source.
n. Resentment is Anger permanent and con-
firmed by reflection on the conduct of the
offending party. If Anger seek retaliation, much
more Resentment, which is not confirmed until
we are convinced that the injury or affront was
intentional, or the result of undue neghgence.
HL In Revenge, the desire of retaUation be-
comes intense, and whatever calamities may
40 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
befall the offending party from other sources,
retaliation alone fully gratifies. When the oppor-
tunity of Revenge is delayed, this may become a
very permanent as well as a very violent passion,
and the attainment of its object would seem to
be attended with an intense pleasure, scarcely, if
at all, inferior to any of which our nature is sus-
ceptible. This passion is strongly pourtrayed in
the characters of Shylock, lago, and Zanga.
IV. Indignation. Resentment and Indignation
are both species of anger, and differ from one
another in this respect, that the former depends
entirely upon private injury or affront, and may
arise even when the offender is not morally to
blame ; whereas, the latter may be roused by an
injury to others as well as to ourselves, and
always supposes some moral fault in the pro-
voking party. As the injuries which are the
source of Resentment are felt by us directly, so
those which are the source of Indignation are, in
many cases, felt by Sympathy indirectly, and in
these cases Indignation rarely becomes excessive.
This, then, is a moral Emotion, and when united
with an intellectual decision or judgment, consti-
tutes the moral sentiment of Disapprobation.
Resentment, on the contrary, being roused by
personal injury, is sometimes unjust, more fre-
quently excessive, and, at least, never fails to
give additional energy to moral Indignation.
V. Jealousy, whatever be its object, comprises
UNIVlKoITY
CF
EMOTION. 41
two proximate elements, 1. A fear of being de-
prived by another of what we consider our right.
2. A feeling of hate towards the author of the
injury. The Emotion of Hate has already been
analysed. Thus, Fear and Hate are the essen-
tial elements of Jealousy, and the former precedes
and gives birth to the latter, or, in other words,
it is the Self-regarding passion which rouses the
Malevolent.
6. E7ivy. The passion of Envy compre-
hends also two elements, 1. Grief at the su-
periority of another. 2. A feeling of Hate
towards the possessor of such superiority. Thus
a Passive Emotion of pain, and an Active Emo-
tion of Hate, are the constituent elements of
Envy, and the former rouses the latter. We
may remark this difference between the Male-
volent desire ^vhich belongs to Anger and
Resentment, etc., and the one included under
Envy and Jealousy, that the former is a Primary
or Original Desire, the latter. Secondary, or
derived. When we receive an injury. Anger
immediately follows, and the passion vents itself
without any notion that the injury can thereby
be repaired. The Malevolent feeling, in this case,
therefore, is original, not dependent on calcu-
lation, nor subservient to any other design.
But, in Envy, the Grief felt cannot be looked upon
as an injury for which any one is to blame, other-
wise, Resentment, not Envy, would be roused ;
G
42 PEINTIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
and, consequently, Hatred is here not stirred up
immediately. A painful sense of Inferiority is
felt, followed by the desire of relieving this un-
easiness ; then the mind turns to the innocent
cause of the same, wishes to pull it down in
order to raise Self, and finally comes to hate it
as the obstacle to Self-complacency. In this
case, then, the Malevolent Emotion is the con-
sequence of a Self-regarding Desire. The same
holds true of Jealousy, as we have already seen
under that head. Agreeably to this distinction,
the Angry Passions, including Simple x\nger,
Resentment, Revenge, Indignation, might be
classed together as a sub-genus of Hate; and the
Jealous Passions, namely, Jealousy and Envy, as
another sub-genus.
7. Lastly : Contempt is a mixture of Pride
with Hatred or Dishke ; and is directly opposed
to Respect, which unites Humility with Love.
25. ^Ialice seems to bear the same relation
to Hatred which Pity does to Love. As Pity is
composed of two elements, a painful Sympathy
with the sufferings of another, who may be no
friend, and a desire to relieve those sufferings ; so
^Malice is compounded of a pleasurable feeling
arising from the pain of another, who is no
enemy, and of a desire to inflict such pain.
The one unites a painful Sympathy with desire
of relief, the other pleasurable Antipathy with
desire of its continuance. This desire also, as
EMOTION. 43
in the case of Pity, probably admits of a further
Analysis ; for it seems to be compounded of, I .
A desire of the continuance of that pleasure of
Antipathy which we experience, and, 2. A desire
of the continuance of the occasion of that plea-
sure, viz., the pain of another. And, as in Pity,
the primary element is a pain of Sympathy, so,
in Malice, the original element is a pleasure of
Antipathy, which seems necessary to produce
the desire which follows. Be it observed that
Malice is rather an exception to the general law
of human nature ; for where there is no parti-
cular reason to the contrary. Sympathy, not
Antipathy, Good-will, not Ill-will, is the rule.
But Malice supposes no cause of Hatred, — it is
not limited to any one, but applies indifferently
to all. Still, Malice is not Misanthropy ; for the
primary element in the one is Pleasure, in the
other, Pain. Besides, the latter, if it exist, is
a permanent feeling ; the former, but an occa-
sional emotion ; and whereas Malice supposes
no previous injustice, Misanthropy arises from
some injury, or series of injuries, inflicted on an
individual, who, by association, comes to hate
not only those who injured him, but even the
whole human race.
26. The Emotions are often united with
Intellectual states of mind. Thus, when Desire
is combined with Belief, we have Hope, Expec-
tation, Confidence, in all which the essential
44 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
elements arc the same, varying only in degree;
for, in all, Desire is united viith Belief, an emotion
with an intellectual state or Thought ; and, in
all, the probability of attainment modifies the
intensity of the Desire. Certainty, whether of
success or failure, in other words, Security or
Despair, both destroy desire, which depends upon
uncertainty ; and, therefore, towards either limit
the desire will decline ; while the degree of
probability most favourable to ardour will be
found between the two extremes, and at some
distance from both.
Corolla)')/. Were our knowledge of a future
state more extensive, our belief in it complete,
we should desire it less. So it is with Human
Love, which feeds upon Uncertainty, first of all
upon doubts of reciprocity, afterwards on un-
certainty arising from other obstacles.
27. Again, in Moral Sentiment, that complex
and most important mental phenomenon, Emotion
is combined with an Intellectual state. The
former is a species of Love or of Hate, mingled
with Wonder, the latter consists in a Judgment
as to the nature or tendency of actions and
characters ; and the whole constitutes a Moral
Sentihient of Approbation or of Disapprobation.^
28. In general, the term Sentiment properly
means a compound state of mind, wherein Emo-
" See the Author's " Piiuciples of Human Happiness and Duty."
Buuk II. Part i.
DESIRE. 45
tion is combined with a Judgment or Intellectual
decision. It is a valuable word, when so used,
and not employed, as it often is, to signify mere
opinion/ or mere feeling.
SECTION THIRD.
ON THE ORIGIN OF DESIRE.
1. The first and most important division of
the Desires is that into the Solitary or Self-
regarding, and the Social Desires ; of which the
former look only to the goofl of Self, the latter to
the good or evil of others. This distinction may
well be called important, inasmuch as it decides
in the negative the question as to the utter
Selfishness of man. We must therefore dwell a
little upon this point.
2. Sympathy with the weal or woe of others
is surely an indisputable fact in human nature,
and, as we conceive, an ultimate fact, not to be
accounted for by any other principle, in par-
ticular, not to be explained by a reference to
Self. For, we sympathize with total strangers,
with those far away, or long dead, who can have
'' Even Reid thus abuses the word when he talks of the Senli-
7nen/s of philosophers, of Locke, Hume, Berkeley, etc. See his
" Kssays on the Intellectual Powers." Essay II. Chaj). vii. viii.ix.
X. xi. xii.
46 PEINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY.
no influence whatsoever on our fortunes. Nay,
we sympathize even with fictitious personages.
Besides, this feeling is often instantaneous, as in
Pity, and therefore cannot arise, as Hobbes says,
" from the imagination that the like calamity may
befall himself." And even if it did, what then ^
On that supposition, no doubt, Sympathy would
be no longer an Ultimate fact, for it would be
accounted for by a selfish reflection ; but the fact
could not be explained away, — it could not be
denied that we do sympathize with others, in
numberless cases, where our own interests are
not immediateli/ concerned ; and therefore, even
on this supposition, the pleasures and pains of
Sympathy would be different from all others, and
we may add, more amiable, by reason of the
more remote reference to Self.
3. "Again, it cannot be denied that we often
desire the good of others, and sometimes their
evil, and that too in cases where the good or evil
of others seems productive of no benefit to our-
selves. No doubt, it may be maintained that, in
desiring the welfare of others, we really look to
our own gratification, and that the pleasure an-
ticipated from Sympathy creates the motive to
charitable deeds. But were this theory true, for
this also is a theory, it would not disprove the
reality of our Benevolent Desires, — it would only
account for their origin, supposing them to exist.
In every view of the case, then, the pleasures and
DESIRE. 47
pains of Sympathy, which reach us as it were by
a rebound, because pleasure or pain has been
first felt by another, must be distinguished from
the pleasures and pains whi^ch affect us directly ;
and the desires which look immediately to the
welfare of our fellow-creatures, which becomes
our own only by Sympathy, must be separated
from the Desires which urge us to our own
gratification without regard to that of others." ^
4. The reality of the Social Desires, as dis-
tinct from the Solitary or Self-regarding, being
established, we may now inquire how the former
originate. Do they really arise from the prospect
of some gratification to Self, however refined, or
do they not?
5. Take the case of Anger. When a choleric
man receives a blow, does he in general take time
to consider what benefit or what injury may result
to himself from returning it ? If he do, we may be
sure that Anger is not uppermost in his soul. He
may certainly restrain his Anger from Prudence,
from Fear, from Respect, for it is not pretended
that Anger is ungovernable ; but supposing it in-
dulged in, what does it imply *? When a blow is
received, the first impulse is to return it, and
if the impulse be not checked, the injury is re-
turned forthwith. To the feeling of injury, to the
perception of an individual as the cause of the
injury, there succeeds immediately a violent
*" Analysis and Theory of the Emotions." Part II.
48 PEINCIPLES or PSYCHOLOGY.
emotion of Hatred towards that individual, com-
prising pain at his presence, and desire of evil
towards him. Between the perception of the
being who has injured us, and the subsequent
emotion of Hatred, it does not seem possible to
detect any intervening feeling, or thought, much
less any calculation of consequences, or balancing
of opposite advantages. The emotion and its
effects are too sudden to admit of such an hypo-
thesis. Accordingly, the indulgence of Anger is
often quite at variance with our interests, it is
impolitic; and, therefore, the object of the pru-
dent and the crafty man is to keep it down. It
seems, then, vain to deny that the Malevolent
desire contained in Anger looks really to the evil
of another, not to the good of Self. The desire
is roused, as experience proves, not by the pros-
pect of some personal pleasure to come, but by
some pain actually felt. There is surely no reason,
prior to experience, why hurt to one who has in-
jured us may not be an ultimate object of Desire,
as well as pleasure to Self. The latter may be a
more general object, but must it be the only one ?
And where there is no convincing a priori argu-
mentj experience should decide.
6. What has been said of Anger, applies
equally to Love and Gratitude. Love, at first
sight, is no fiction of the poets, but a reality;
it may arise where no favours have been received,
and none expected; where there has been no
DESIRE. 49
time for calculations of interest, none even for
anticipating the pleasures of Sympathy. The de-
light felt at the sight of the object seems
to be followed instantaneously by Good-will
towards it. So in the case of Gratitude. In
many instances, Love towards our Benefactor
rises instantly, far too suddenly to admit of any
calculation as to the advantages likely to result to
ourselves from returning his kindness, and even
too rapidly to allow of the pleasures of Sympathy
being presented to the mind in prospect, as an
object of Desire. As far as our experience tells
us, and we can go no farther, the Love, the Good-
will, immediately follows the feeling of a benefit,
and the thought of a benefactor; nor are we
sensible of any intervening sequence of phe-
nomena. Thus, as, in the case of anger, ill-wiJl
follows instantly the pain of an injury ; so, in
gratitude, good-will immediately succeeds to the
pleasure of the benefit. And if we have already
allowed that the evil of another may be an
ultimate object of Desire, we shall admit the more
easily that the good of another may be so like-
wise. Thus, it appears that, in simple Love, as
well as in Gratitude, it is the pleasure which we
actually feel, not a vague pleasure in prospect,
that rouses the Emotion of Desire, the object of
which is, not the good of Self, of whatsoever
kind, but that of another.
7. So far as to the origin of the Social
H
50 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOCxY.
Desires, Benevolent, as well as Malevolent. Let
us now consider the Solitary or Self -regarding.
8. With respect to these, as well as to the
foregoing, there are two questions, the one re-
lating to the nature of the Self-regarding Desires,
the other to their origin. First, are all these re-
ducible to Desire of Pleasure, of some sort, or
Self-gratification,— in other words, are they all
varieties of one principle. Self-love ; or, on the
contrary, do they comprise Desires such as Am-
bition, Covetousness, Curiosity, which may be
distinguished from Self-love ^ ^
9. A distinction may, no doubt, be got up
between Self-love, and the Self-regarding Desires
or Passions ; but then it is by changing the usual
meaning of the word. This is exactly what
Bishop Butler has done, by limiting the signifi-
cation of Self-love to a calm calculating view of
our interests, that is, to Desire guided by reason.
But the Desire does not change its nature because
it is so guided, — it remains the same, only under
control. There appears, therefore, no good
ground for this distinction.
10. It may be that all the Self-regarding
Desires look not to mere pleasure, but what of
that"? If they look to Power, simply as such,
•^ The latter is the opinion of Bishop Butler, in his famous
Sermons at the Rolls, and it has been adopted by Dr. Thomas
Brown, in his Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind.
Vol. IIL, Lect. Ixv, Ixvi.
DESIRE. 51
without any ulterior object, or to Wealth, or to
Knowledge, or to Continued Existenee, it is still
our own Power, our own Wealth, our own Know-
ledge, our own Life, which we desire to increase
or prolong. Why then attempt a distinction
between them, as if one were more or less selfish
than another? Certainly, common sense makes
no such distinction, and in such matters, common
sense is of great weight.
1 1 . We cannot, therefore, adopt the distinc-
tion of Bishop Butler. At the same time, we
allow that a man may desire Power, Riches, or
Knowledge, for their own sakes, even without
thinking of the Pleasure which accompanies
them; but we believe that this is the result of
association, constant association with notions of
Pleasure. Riches, in particular, are sought at
first as the means of enjoyment, afterwards, by
the miser, for their own sake. So it is with the
rest.
12. It is allowed that Pleasure is one great
source of Desire, that the attainment of every
Desire is attended with Pleasure, and that this
Pleasure re-acts upon the Desire, and increases it.
There is surely, then, a probability that Pleasure
is ori(/inaUj/ the sole cause of Self-regarding
Desire.
13. This probability will be strengthened by
considering what we call a want. It is notorious
that men desire nothing ardently until they have
52 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
felt a want of it. Now a want comprehends two
elements, a passive feeling of pain, (bodily or
mental, according to common language) and a
Desire of relief to that pain. So it is with
Hunger, and Thirst, which are properly Ajjpetites,
because, here the pain is a Sensation, immediately
depending on a change in the state of the body.
Other innumerable wants we have where the
pain is not a Sensation.
14. Desire of relief from Pain is a Desire of
Negative Pleasure. This, then, must be our first.
Desire, if, as we have seen reason to believe.
Hunger and Thirst are the first of our feelings
which comprise Emotion.
15. Moreover, all experience seems to prove
that our other Desires begin with Wants. The
pain of Ignorance first rouses Curiosity, the pain
of Inferiority, Ambition, and Love of Glory;
the prospect of Indigence, Desire of Riches;
wearisome Repetition, a wish for Variety ; while
the pain of ennui creates activity of every sort.
Pain, in short, seems to be the primum mobile of
the human race.
16. Let a man be perfectly at ease in body,
and in mind, and what can he desire"? Corollary :
Perfect happiness in this life, or merely the ab-
sence of all pain, is inconsistent with Religion ;
for it would stifle the desire of a life to come.
17. Pain, then, actually felt, is the Origin or
Cause of Desire; and its first form is desire of
DESIRE. 53
relief from uneasiness. But desire of relief from
uneasiness is only a modification of desire of
Pleasure ; and, therefore, the conclusion is, that,
while Pain actually felt is the Source of Desire,
Pleasure is its primary object. It is allowed that,
subsequently/, other objects may be sought for their
own sakes, without direct reference to Pleasure ;
but had they not been intimately associated with
Pleasure, they never would have been desired.
18. To sum up all. When treating of the
Social Desires, we found that those desires are
real, and distinct from the Self-regarding; that
their direct object is the good or evil of others,
not the good of Self; and that they spring from
Passive Emotions of Pleasure, or of Pain, roused
by our fellows. Now we find that the Primary
Object of the Self-regarding Desires is Pleasure ;
while they originate in Pain. Therefore, Desire, in
general, springs from the actual feeling of Pleasure
or of Pain; the Benevolent affections taking their
origin from the former, the Malevolent, as well as
the Self-regarding, from the latter.
19. " If then you wish for the Love of others,
try to confer Pleasure ; and beware of giving
Pain, if you would not be an object of Hate." "
20. Does it not also follow that Pain, bodily
as well as mental, tends to render men Selfish or
INIalevolent ? It does ; yet so?ne private pain, so)?ie
" " Analysis aud Theoiy of the^Eiiioiioiis."'
54 PRINCIPLES or PSYCHOLOGY.
suffering, is essential to Sympathy, and to Pity.
Does Pleasure, then, make men Benevolent?
Only when it proceeds from another. Love
begets Love, — not merely to one, but to all.
21. There are two apparent exceptions to the
above Law, in the cases of Pity and Malice, for,
in these, Pain and Pleasure seem to create good
and ill-will respectively. We feel the sufferings of
our brother, and desire to relieve them ; we are
gratified at another's vexation, and wish to plague
him. How shall we account for this anomaly ?
22. When the sufferings of another give us
unmixed pain, they do not create Pity. The
proud man is humiliated at the calamities of his
relations, and in consequence feels Dislike to-
wards them, while towards others he entertains
only Contempt ; the over sensitive is shocked at
distress, and flies from it with Disgust or horror ;
while the righteous looks with Indignation, rather
than Pity, on merited misfortune. But when with
the Sympathetic pain is combined a pleasing Self-
complacency arising from contrast of position, as
well as from the consciousness of our suscep-
tibility to so amiable an emotion as Sympathy,
then arises Pity, the wish to relieve distress.
Thus pity springs from a mixture of pain and
pleasure, and the pain is even necessary to the
pleasure ; but where there is no pleasure there is
no Pity. This then is no real exception. There
are two Causes at work, Pain and Pleasure, and
JJESIRE. 55
the latter counteracts the former, producing its
usual effect, a feeling of Benevolence.
23. Remains the case of Malice. In simple
Malice, the pain of another gives pleasure, with-
out any previous hatred ; and desiring the continu-
ance of the pleasure, we must wish for the con-
tinuance of the pain. Here, pleasure derived
from another produces, not benevolence, but male-
volence, because the pain of another is indispens-
able to our own gratification, which depends upon
that pain, and upon nothing else. This, then, is
a real exception to the Law above stated, because,
happily, the tendency to feel pleasure, not pain,
at the ills of others, is itself an exception, an
anomaly in human nature.
24. That pain is the primum mobile of the
human race, first in the order of time, as well as
in importance, is a great truth pregnant with in-
ferences. It has often been remarked that men
of genius are liable to mental pains to which or-
dinary men are strangers ; but it has not been so
frequently noticed that those very pains develope
genius. Intolerance of life without activity, of
mere existence without distinction, a painful sense
of insignificance, an inward burning under Con-
tempt and obloquy, mental maladies in every
form, urge the man who has powers to exert
them to the utmost. The keen annoyance pro-
duced by an ill-natured Review first drew out
the talents of Lord Byron. The easy, good-
56 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
tempered, phlegmatic man, knows little of such
pains, and, therefore, he never rises to eminence.
Pain is the source of superiority, — the price that
is paid for it.
SECTION FOURTH.
OF THE WILL.
1. We now approach one of the most knotty
points in Metaphysics, involving the Liberty, or
the Necessity, of the Will.
2. To the solution of all intricate questions,
a right comprehension of the meaning of terms,
and an accurate statement of the Question, are
indispensable ; sometimes nothing more is re-
quired. Here, then, these must not be neglected.
3. First, then, what is meant by the Will ;
or, when are we said to Will anything %
4. It is perfectly clear that Will and Desire
are intimately related ; and yet they are not the
same. Volition^ which is an act of that Faculty
which we call WILL, always comprehends an emo-
tion of Desire ; but every Desire is not a Volition ;
consequently, Volition means Desire, and some-
thing more.
5. So far well ; but what is that more ? We
desire many things, some only for a moment,
others for a longer time, till the desire ceases, or
OF THE WILL. 57
is driven out by a contrary ; nay, we Desire things
which we know to be unattainable ; but we never
Will when we know that we cannot perform.
Will, then, certainly implies Belie/' that the ob-
ject of Desire is in our power.
6. Still, I may strongly desire to master a
difficult work, say the Princijda of Newton ; nay,
I may believe that I shall master it, but can I
affirm that I will*? So, though I may earnestly
wish to conquer a certain habit of thought, and
I may even believe that I shall, yet I cannot say
that I will succeed. Why not*? Because no one
can have a perfect belief, free from all doubt, that
his Thoughts will be obedient to his Desires.
We know that Thou2;hts are rebellious above all
things ; they are certainly greatly influenced by
Desire, but they obey it not implicitly, and can-
not be Willed.
7. And if Thought be not directly subject to
Desire, neither are Emotions, nor Sensations. No
one can pretend to call up an Emotion or a Sen-
sation directly, and at pleasure. Therefore, none
of these Mental States are subject to the Will.
Indirectly we can do much ; but we must first
Will something for the purpose, and, after all,
the end may fail.
8. Wliat then can we Will*? What can we
Desire without a doubt of succeeding"? Action,
bodily action, and nothing else. Here alone there
is Volition^ because here alone Desire is despotic.
I
58 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
9. Finally, to constitute an act of the Will,
or Volition, it is necessary that an outward ac-
tion be performed ; for, were a man's arm sud-
denly to become paralysed, he might make a
mental effort to move it, but he could not be said
to Will what was never done.
10. Therefore, to sura up all, Volition is Desire^
C07nbined with undonhting Belief that the object is
in our power ^ and terminating in an outward action,
1 1 . Having fixed the meaning of the term
Will, we have next to enquire in what sense
Liberty, or Necessity, can be applied to it.
12. In common language the term Liberty is
more frequently opposed to Slavery than to Ne-
cessity ; and it may be useful to our present pur-
pose, first to determine the former meaning of the
word.
13. When Liberty is opposed to Slavery, it
evidently implies the absence of Restraint or
Hindrance to action ; so that what we have to
determine is the nature of this Restraint or Hin-
drance.
14. Not every restraint, not every hindrance,
is opposed to Liberty ; for no one would say that
his Liberty was infringed, because he could not
walk ten miles an hour. He would say that he
was free, but he had not the Poiver. Neither
would he say that he was not at Liberty to mas-
ter the Principia of Newton, but he was unable.
Therefore the mere want of bodily or mental
.mM
OF THE WILL. 59
power in the individual is not opposed to Liberty.
15. Neither is every hindrance from without
at variance with Liberty ; for if a man came to a
mountain which he could not cross, or were he
kept from leaving his house by a flood of waters,
he would not really think himself less free ;
though, speaking metaphorically, he might call
himself a prisoner. His Power alone, as in the
former case, would be interfered with, not his
Liberty.
16. Now suppose that he be kept at home by
fear of a raging lion roaming round his dwelling,
is he then less free '? Certainly not, in the pro-
per use of language. He is restrained by his
fears ; but the fear of a beast is not Slavery.
17. What if he be restrained from any action,
from any sin, by the fear of God, or of some
superior Spirit ? Would this be an attack upon
Liberty r By no means. The man is still free to
do as he pleases. All men think themselves so.
18. But lastly, let a man be hindered from
doing anything he may wish, either by a physical
obstacle set up on purpose to restrain him by his
fellow-men, as bolts and bars, or by fear of some
harm from them ; then he is no longer free.
19. Thus it appears that Liberty, when op-
posed to Slavery, is curbed by the resisting Wills
of our fellow-men, and by nothing else. Man
alone can abridge the Liberty of man ; and this
abridgement consists either in a positive impedi-
60 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
ment, set up on purpose, as prison walls and
fetters, or in the dread of some penalty.
20. Liberty, in the above sense, as opposed
to Slavery, is applied only to action ; and a man
is a free agent in so far as he is unrestrained by
the Wills of his fellows. But, in every society,
civilized or savage, man experiences some op-
position from other men, even the most despotic
monarch, and, therefore, no where but in perfect
solitude can there be perfect Liberty. And the
most abject slave, even the negro of Carolina, has
freedom in some of his actions. Consequently,
the question of Liberty in this sense is one of
degree ; and we cannot say absolutely that man
is either free or enslaved ; though the difference
between an Englishman and a black slave be im-
mense.
21. When, however, Liberty is applied to the
Will, then it is opposed not to Slavery, but to
Necessity. What, then, is meant by Liberty in
this sense, — what by Necessity ? and where is the
analogy between the two meanings of the former
word ?
22. We have said that when Liberty is op-
posed to Slavery, liberty of action is always un-
derstood, and this consists in the absence of
restraint upon our actions from the wills of our
fellow-men.
23. But what is an action *? Action here
must mean voluntary action, or it means nothing;
OF THE WILL. Gl
for this alone can be enslaved ; and it consists of
two parts, the Will or Mental State, which is the
Cause, and the outward movement, the Effect.
Now, as an Effect can be either produced or pre-
vented only by operating on the Cause, therefore,
it is really the Will which is restrained, wherever
Liberty is abridged. Consequently, in the popu-
lar, as^ well as in the philosophical sense of the
word, Liberty refers to the Will, and as the ab-
sence of restraint, of one sort, is thereby supposed
in the former case, so, we may presume, restraint
of another sort is implied in the latter. For the
common use of language is a guide, wiiich may
indeed lead us astray, but still it is a guide. INIen
seldom call things by the same name whicb have
no points of resemblance. Liberty, then, when
opposed to Necessity, implies restraint upon the
Will, as well as when opposed to Slavery. Con-
sequently, the difference must lie in the kind of
restraint.
24. We believe that the Course of Nature, at
least of Material Nature, is dependant upon fixed
Causes, causes which under the same circum-
stance always produce the same Effects ; though,
of course, it would be the height of presumption
to deny that the Being who arranged the whole
may alter the same at His pleasure. Still it is
matter of experience that the course of material
nature is uniform, and we act with confidence
accordingly. We can thus predict with certainty.
62 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
long before, Physical Phenomena, such as the rise
of tides, the eclipses of Sun and Moon, and the
events always come to pass just as we foretold.
We, therefore, cannot believe that there exists in
the Physical universe any power of originating
change, of beginning motion ; in other words, the
course of Physical Nature is Necessary,
25. By Necessity, then, we mean a fixed un-
alterable (except by Omnipotence) concatenation
of Cause and Effect, wherein no change originates,
every change depending entirely on something
that went before. Now the question is, is the
Will, and consequently are the voluntary acts of
man, included in this necessary Course of Nature,
or are they not ^ On the latter supposition, the
Will is said to be free, free from the restraint of
an immutable Law, and consequently endowed
wuth a power of originating change. That is the
kind of restraint which necessity supposes.
26. Between Voluntary Motion, and every
other motion in the universe, the separation is
wide, deep', unfathomable, impassable, — for in
pure physical motion the cause, or Indispensable
Antecedent, is always some other motion, —
whereas, in Voluntary movement, the A.ntecedent
is mental, a Volition. Here, then, we have an
instance of the Origin of motion. Can we then
escape the inference that the First Cause of all
motion is spiritual^
27. This argument for a spiritual first cause
OF THE WILL. 63
is quite independent of that derived from the
manifold instances of desisrn in the universe.
Both come to the same conclusion, but from
different premises. Design unquestionably argues
a designer, and a designer must be intellectual,
and therefore spiritual. Again, we know but of
one case of the origin of motion, and in that
case the cause is spiritual ; hence the probability
that the first cause of all motion is spiritual.
These are the two grand arguments against
Materialism and Atheism ; two powers which
have often been crushed, and apparently annihi-
lated ; but ever and anon they rise again out of
the dirt, to scare and sadden the world. Some-
times they stalk abroad in great pomp, arrayed in
the garb of poetry by a Lucretius, sometimes they
lurk more modestly under the mask of gradual
developments^ or the cloak of positive Philosophy.
28. Man, being endowed with the power of
originating motion, partakes, in so far, of the
Attributes of Deity. He becomes, as it were, a
creator, a creator of motion, and thus, within his
comparatively limited sphere, he has great in-
fluence, either for good or for ill. Now, the God
whom we acknowledge, is not, like the Gods of
antiquity, subjected to a dark mysterious power
called Fate ; but he is a self-existent, self-
dependant, self-originating being, free to act or
not to act. If, then, man be so far like to God,
tliat he has a power of originating motion, is it
64 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
not probable that this power bears a re-
semblance to that of God who gave it'? that,
being once communicated, some Liberty was
given along with it to complete the delegated
authority ? Had the will of man been tied down
by inexorable laws, like material nature, would
not the gift have been illusory '? Instead of being
a copy, on an infinitely small scale, but still a
copy, of the Divine Will, would it not have been
quite different '? If God created man in his own
image, that resemblance must be supposed to
extend to his Will, without which the resemblance
could be of no importance. In short, once allow
that there is a God, a Spiritual and a free Being,
and that Fate is nonsense as applied to him ; then
we may presume that man, so far as spiritual, is
also free from fate.
29. This beginning of motion by the Will is
a grand and instructive fact, for it at once does
away with the argument derived from the neces-
sary chain of Cause and Effect, supposed to pre-
vail in the world of matter. A case wherein
motion begins can have no analogy to any other,
where motion is the effect of some previous
motion. There is, then, no improbability, prior
to actual experience, in the lines of the poet —
" And binding nature fast in fate,
Left free the human WilL"
OF THE WILL. 65
as there would have been but for the marked
difference between the origin and the continua-
tion of motion, and, I may add, the utter unlike-
ness in almost every respect between Mind and
Matter. Matter is subject to the law of vis
inerticc, i. e., it has a tendency to remain for ever
in the same state, whether of rest or motion ;
but Mind is perpetually changing, so that no one
can predict what his own state of mind may be
half-an-hour hence. It is clear, then, that all
analogies drawn from Matter to Mind are' falla-
cious. They may do for Poetry, but they are
inadmissable in Philosophy.
30. Having thus disposed of what may be
called the a priori argument in favour of Ne-
cessity, derived from Necessity in matter ; and
having shewn further, that the acknowledged
resemblance between God and Man in the power
of originating motion, renders it probable that
this resemblance comprehends the liberty of will-
ing, we may next consider what we learn on the
subject from direct experience.
31. That the human mind is in some degree
subject to causes, known and admitting of calcu-
lation, is a truth acknowledged by the universal
sense of mankind. All law, all morality, all
society, rest upon this supposition. There is no
law, political or moral, without a sanction, that
is, w ithout reward or punishment, — and, if reward
and punishment produce no effect, they are empty
K
66 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
names. But, that they do produce some Effect,
all men allow, though, as to the degree of Effect,
we may differ in opinion. And how can they act
but upon the Wills of men, and if they do so
act, then the Will is subject to causes known and
appreciable. The sanction of political law is
generally some punishment, in the shape of
restraint upon liberty, or bodily pain, or even loss
of life, or else some curtailment of our estate ;
while moral laws are guarded by more spiritual
arms, by praise and blame, moral approbation
and disapprobation. These, no less than the
terrors of political law, are universally supposed
to have an Effect, more or less, in the way of
encouraging some actions, and discouraging
others ; and be the Effect what it may, it can be
produced only through the Will.
32. bo far, then, we know that men are uni-
versally agreed. Wherever men exist there is some
moral law, wherever society is established there
is some political law, and every where they are
supposed to tend towards an useful effect, to have
a beneficient influence on the minds, and ulti-
mately on the Wills and Actions of mankind. This
universal belief we cannot suppose unfounded,
without violating a fundamental article of faith,
that whatever is universally believed has some
foundation in truth. Men in all ages, and in all
countries, cannot have believed a lie, at least
where the subject was one open to common ob-
OF THE WILL. 67
servation ; and what is more present to us than
the Wills and Actions of ourselves and our fellows?
33. On this sure foundation, Hume, Hobbes,
and others, have attempted to raise the fabric of
Necessity, but the basis was too-narrow for the
super-structure. For, if it be true that the Will
of man is to some extent subject to known Causes,
it is also a fact that the operation of these Causes
is very variable and uncertain, widely different
from the steady invariable march of physical
agencies. No Moral or Political Laws produce all
the effect intended. They certainly do check
crime and misdemeanour, but very imperfectly, as
all experience proves. With all our efforts, with
all our improvements in Morals and Politics, there
still remains a wide range of action which no Law
can reach. Our experience, then, of the operation
of human Laws does not disprove the doctrine of
Liberty, it shows only that Liberty has limits ;
that regulated Liberty, in short, not Licence or
mere Caprice, is the Law of Human Nature and
the Law of God.
34. If, on the one hand, the words and
actions of all men, in all ages, prove that they
consider the human Will to be in some degree
subject to the influence of known Causes ; on the
other, they are no less agreed as to the fact, that
these causes cannot be surely relied upon, and that
there exists in man a power which can set at naught
the deepest calculations. This power, the power
68 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
of willing, is then universally allowed, in a degree,
to originate within the individual, and not to be
traced to any outward source; and if we rely upon
the universal belief of mankind in one case, so
must we in another. At first sight, the two
opinions may seem contradictory ; but they are
not so ; for the opinion in neither case is ab-
solute. All men believe that the Will may be
influenced by known causes in some degree ; and
again, all believe that it can resist that influence
and act proj^rio inotu, and here there is no contra-
diction. The evidence of both these facts rests
partly upon the Consciousness of what passes
within ourselves, from which there is no appeal,
partly on our experience of the actions of others ;
and both go to establish the same conclusion —
the Liberty, but not the unlimited Liberty, of man.
35. In the following passage, the whole ques-
tion is taken for granted, and decided at once
against Liberty. " I conceive that nothing taketh
beginning from itself, but from the action of some
other immediate agent without itself. And that,
therefore, when first a man hath an appetite or
Will to something to which immediately before
he had no appetite nor will, the cause of his will
is not the will itself, but something else not in
his own disposing. So that, whereas, it is out
of controversy, that of voluntary actions the
Will is the necessary cause, and by this which
is said the Will is also caused by other things,
OF THE WIT.L. (39
whereof it disposeth not, it followeth that volun-
tary actions have all of them necessary causes,
and, therefore, are necessitated." °
36. Here it is evident that in starting with
the assumption that " nothing taketh beginning
from itself, but from the action of some other im-
mediate agent without itself," the whole question
is taken for granted. For such exactly is the
point in debate. To this assumption we may ob-
ject, and say, how do you know that ?
37. It is here assumed as an unquestionable
truth, that' whatever begins to exist must have
had a Cause of its existence, without itself. But
those who believe in a Deity must allow that one
Being at least exists without such a cause, from
all Eternity, and if we allow such a Being, how-
ever incomprehensible, as more reasonable than a
perpetual succession of Causes from all Eternity,
why may we not allow that something may bcffi?i
to exist without an outward Cause, provided such
a supposition be agreeable to the evidence of
Consciousness ? Is the fact of something be(jin-
ning to exist without an outward Cause more
incomprehensible than a Being existing without
an outward Cause from all Eternity ?
38. Our experience of the course of Physical
Nature certainly leads us to suppose that every
material change had a cause without itself ; and
* Hobbes' Tripos : of Libeily and Necessity.
70 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
a good deal of our experience of men leads us to
the same conclusion ; but our experience is ne-
cessarily limited, and, even within that experience,
there are, we maintain, great ojjparent exceptions,
to say the least.
39. But be our experience what it may, it
never can lead to an infallible conclusion, to a
conclusion universal and free from all possibility
of error. We can never rely upon it, as we can
upon the self-evident axioms and the demonstra-
tions of Geometry. That two straight lines can
never enclose a space, that the two angles at the
base of an isosceles triangle are equal, we cannot
doubt, when once we have considered the axiom,
or taken in the proof of the latter proposition.
Experience, Custom, Association, here go for no-
thing ; all is the work of pure Intellect. But our
Belief in an unbroken chain of Causes and Effects,
at first instinctive and unaccountable, is ajter-
wards only fortified by Experience, Custom, Asso-
ciation ; and neither first nor last can we see that
such a chain is necessary. We therefore cannot
dogmatically assert that the Law has no excep-
tion. And if the believers in Deity must allow
of one exception, for w^ith Him the chain begins,
they have no reason positively to disbelieve any
other ; provided a good case be made out. And
such a case we conceive to be afforded by the
Will of him who was made in the image of Deity.
40. From the above passage of Hobbes we
OF THE WILL. 71
see that the doctrine of Man's Necessity is de-
duced from that of a perpetual succession of
Causes and Effects distinct from each other, with-
out end, -without beginning, — a system \vhich
embraces no First Cause, no Deity. Thus Man's
Necessity follows from Atheism. The conclusion
is worthy of the premises ; and so we leave it."
41. A Philosopher of a very different stamp
from the one above quoted, a religious Philo-
sopher of the present day, has well said that " The
Idea of a Cause is not derived from Experience,
but has its origin in the mind itself ; "*" for the Idea
of a Cause arises in the infant mind after a single
instance of succession. The child who has burned
his finger in the candle will avoid it ever after.
The great error of the untutored mind is the see-
ing of Cause and Effect every where, an error
*" The doctrine of Atheism involves Man's Necessity ; but the
doctrine of Man's Necessity does not involve Atheism ; for many
necessitarians have been Theists. These admit One First Cause,
free and uncontrolled, but they deny any other. Do they not ])er-
ceive that the admission of One Free agent is an argument for the
existence of other similar agents'? The system which combines
Necessity with Atheism is at least more consistent than that which
unites Necessity with Theism. The one is an uniform web, the
other but a piece of patchwork.
' Whewell's '* Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences."
Book III. chap, ii.
72 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
which experience alone can correct. But when
the same philosopher goes on to maintain, that the
axiom " Every Event must have a Cause " is a
necessary one, that " the Relation of Cause and
Effect is of the same kind as the necessary rela-
tions of figure and number," he certainly runs
from one error into another. And both we con-
ceive to be dangerous. He who maintains with
Hume that our Idea of Cause and Effect is de-
rived from Experience or Custom, as he calls it,
and that prior to Experience anything may be the
Cause of anything, asserts a doctrine which, in its
application merely to physical changes, considered
as isolated phenomena, is no doubt free from dan-
ger. But when it is thence inferred that, for
aught we know, senseless matter may have ar-
ranged itself into the beautiful and beneficent
order manifest in the material world, or, still
more, that it may have produced an intelligent
soul, the mind instinctively revolts against such
an opinion, and loudly proclaims it false. Scared
from one extreme, we not unnaturally run into
another; but there again danger meets us. In
maintaining with Dr. Whewell that the axiom
" every Event must have a Cause " is a necessary
one, we support the doctrine of a perpetual cir-
cuit of Causes and Effects, without end, without
beginning, and thus we get rid of a Great First
Cause. That such was far, very far from the in-
tention of this distinguished author, we well
OF THE WILL. 73
know ; but nevertheless the conclusion is a legiti-
mate inference from the premises.**
42. The axiom, that "Every event must have
a Cause " is not necessary, for it is not self-evident,
and not universal, if we believe in God. Neither
is the axiom derived from Experience, for we be-
lieve it long before experience could have taught it.
It is, then, one of those fundamental Articles of
Belief, truly instinctive, for they arise in the mind
on the first occasion, but not self-evident, and,
therefore not necessary, and possibly not universal.
43. It may, indeed, be said that by the word
''event" is meant some change which had a be-
ginning, and that, as God had no beginning, he is
no exception to the Law. But if you allow that
a Being may exist without an outward cause
of his existence, can you dogmatically deny that
any thing can begin to exist without an outward
cause *? Can you show that one of these sup-
positions is possible, the other not*? and it is only
for possibility that we are at present contending.
You must either admit both, or neither ; that is,
you must either admit the possibility of God's ex-
istence and of Man's Liberty, or you must reject
both, and fall back upon Atheism and Necessity.
'' Thus we sfie that the axiom that prior to Experience any
thing may be the Cause of any thing, though true of material
changes, separately considered, leads to absurdity and Atheism
when applied to organized matter, and to the intellectual world.
See ou this subject Cudworih's " Intellectual System." Chap. iii.
L
74 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY.
44. The argument by which Hume attempts
to shake our belief in a Deity altogether, having
previously reduced His Power and importance as
much as possible, is derived entirely from the
axiom that, in matters of fact at least, the Intel-
lect is so dependant on Experience, that it cannot
advance one step beyond. " It is only when two
species of objects are found to be constantly con-
joined, that we can infer the one from the other ;
and were an Effect produced which was entirely
singular, and could not be comprehended under
any known species^ I do not see that we could form
any conjecture or inference at all concerning its
Cause. If experience, and observation, and an-
alogy be, indeed, the only guides which we can
reasonably follow in inferences of this nature;
both the Effect and Cause must bear a similarity
and resemblance to other Effects and Causes
which we know, and which we have found in
many instances to be conjoined with each other.
I leave to your own reflection to pursue the con-
sequences of this principle. I shall just observe
that, as the antagonists o{ Epicurus always suppose
the universe, an Effect quite singular and unpar-
alleled, to be the proof of a Deity, a Cause no less
singular and unparalleled, your reasonings, upon
that supposition, seem, at least, to merit our at-
tention." ^
' Essays, Vol. II. Sec. xi. *' Of a Particular Providence and
of a Future State."
OF THE WILL. 75
45. Now, the greater the difference between
the works of Creation and those of Man, the
stronger is the argument against the truth of the
axiom on which the above reasoning is founded.
For, I maintain, that no unprejudiced man, in the
full enjoyment of his Intellect, can examine nar-
rowly the works of Creation, for the first time,
before custom has rendered them familiar, with-
out being convinced of the existence of a Deity.
Let the marvellous structure of the human body
be unveiled to a young man, for the first time, by
anatomy ; let him study the formation of the eye,
and the beautiful provision for refracting the light
and throwing it on the Retina; or let him ex-
amine the hand, and observe how the tendons are
perforated exactly in the proper places to allow
other tendons to pass through to move the
further digits ; and he must be a dolt if the belief
in a God do not come upon him with a force to
defy all Scepticism.
46. This uncontrollable Belief is not only a
proof, the strongest possible, of the being of God,
but it also disproves the axiom that the Intellect
is chained down by Experience ; for we allow the
difference between the works of God and the
works of Man, and the greater the difference the
stronger the argument against the truth of the
axiom. No doubt there is an analogy between
the works of Creation and our own, whatever
Hume may say to the contrary, an analogy which
76 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
may help to open up the Intellect to see design
m nature ; but this consciousness of design must
be chiefly the work of the Intellect itself, because
we never witnessed the formation of an animal or
a plant, or anything much like to either.
It is not then because the works of nature are
similar to a house, a watch, or a steam-engine,
which I know to be effect of man's design, that I
infer that an animal or a plant is also the result
of design. I see the design at once, il saute aux
yeuoc, as the French say, it is almost, if not quite,
self-evident. No doubt a cultivated mind is re-
quired, and the instances of man's design which
we have witnessed must have taught us to detect
design in other and very different instances ; but,
we do not argue from the one to the other ; we
have no occasion so to argue ; for the mind, so
prepared, sees design in nature at once. Is any
argument required to prove that the tendons of
the hand above alluded to were perforated on
purpose to admit the other tendons ^ Can this
admit of a question *? Does not even the ir-
religious x\natomist and Physiologist tacitly and
unavoidably admit design though he openly deny
a designer^ For does he not constantly discourse
of the functions^ the uses, the imrposes of the vari-
ous organs '? and what do these words imply *? If
he discover a new organ in any animal, does he
for a moment doubt whether it be of any use ?
Nay, is not his whole object to find it ouf? And
OF THE WILL. 77
does he not thus as really admit a Creator and
Designer as if he acknowledged Him in set words'?
Thus, the Physiologist cannot discourse on his
own subject, without at every moment contradict-
ing Atheism.
Nay, more, as Reid has admirably observed,
were the doctrine of Hume correct, it would
be impossible to know that any work, even of
man, proceeded from an Intelligent Cause ; for,
according to Hume, the Cause and the Effect
must have been observed in conjunction ; and, in
this case, that can never be. We may see the
hands of a man at work, but can we see the In-
tellect and the Will that direct and move them ?
Impossible ; and, therefore, on this theory, did we
see a watch made, all we could know would be
that hands made it, but w^hat guided the hands
we could never tell. Surely this is a rediictio ad
ahsurdum. The case proves that design is never
perceived through the senses, that, in the works of
others, it is not, properly speaking, known by Ex-
perience, but inferred by Reason. The only Ex-
perience of the operation of design which we
can have, is in our own case, when our mind and
our hands work together ; and having thus learnt
the outward effect of a mental purpose, we can
afterwards detect that influence, even in cases
which bear but a faint resemblance to any work of
ours. On so narrow a basis of Experience can
the Intellect build a mighty super-structure, rising
from Earth to Heaven, from Self to Deity !
78 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
47. From the view above taken of the ques-
tion of Liberty and Necessity two very important
inferences remain to be stated ; first, that there
is such a thing as a Practical Science of Human
Nature ; secondly, that such a Science can never
become an exact one. If, on the one hand, the
Will of man be, in a degree at least, obedient to
known Causes, then, so far we can regulate that
Will, or it becomes the subject of Practical
Science ; and if, on the other, it be only partially
bound by Causes that can be calculated, then the
Science must always be imperfect. And, that
such is the fact at present, cannot be denied.
There are many Sciences of a practical nature,
the subject of which is the Will of man ; namely,
Ethics properly so called, which attempts to regu-
late the Wills of men as individuals, and Politics,
which, in its largest sense, comprehends several
subordinate Sciences, which profess to direct the
Wills of men in Society. There is, then, a body of
Practical Science, applicable to Human Nature.
And who will maintain that this Science is not
imperfect ? Nothing can show its imperfection
more forcibly than the fact, that it has been
debated whether there were such a Science or
not ; and that philosophers have thought them-
selves obliged to prove the Affirmative. Did any
one ever question the existence of Mathematical
or of Physical Science ? The innumerable dis-
putes in Moral and Political Philosophy also
prove how little it can pretend to be exact.
OF THE WILL. 79
48. These two conclusions being allowed to
be true at present, it may, nevertheless, be main-
tained, that the Science of Human Nature is still
in a provisional state, that it is improving, and
will improve till it become as exact as Natural
Philosophy. Our opinion upon this point must
depend upon the view we take of the question of
Liberty and Necessity. They who think that the
Human Will is subject to Causes which can be
calculated as well as those which regulate the
material world ; that, though hidden for a time,
they may be brought to light ; they, in short, who
maintain the doctrine of Necessity, may hope in
time to see a Social Edifice of fair and uniform
appearance, having Science for its Architect ;
but those who believe in Liberty will look upon
the fabric as a vision. Enthusiasts and even
Philosophers have not been wanting, who have
endeavoured to re-model and regenerate man and
Society by the application of a favourite Prin-
ciple, at one time by enlightened Self-interest, at
another by co-operation or Socialism, but the
signal failure of all such attempts has proved their
vanity.
49. That difficulties attend the theory of
Liberty, as here explained, is no valid objection,
if equal, much more if greater difficulties attend
the opposite theory. There is no self-evident
absurdity in the supposition of action originating
in Self; and we certainly can as easily embrace
80 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY.
this notion, as that of a perpetual circuit of Causes
and Effects, without beginning, without end.
Moreover, the undoubted fact of the origin of
motion from volition gives greater credibility to
the former hypothesis. But further, once believe
in God, allow the existence of a First Cause, and
the probability of self-originating action in man
becomes increased ; especially when confirmed by
direct experience, by our own Consciousness, by
Conscience or our feelings of responsibility, as well
as by the universal opinion of others that our
actions are in our own power.
50. The chief difficulty attending the doctrine
of Liberty is derived from our belief in the fore-
knowledge of God. Man may fore-know an event
as highly probable, a physical event almost as
certain, but this knowledge does not necessarily
imply any power of promoting or hindering the
result. I cannot doubt that the Sun will rise to-
morrow, but the event is utterly beyond my
controul. When, however, the Being who fore-
knows an Effect is also the Author of all nature,
and endued with all power, then it seems to
follow that, if an event has been fore-known, it
must also have been fore-willed, and if fore-willed,
what becomes of the Liberty of man ?
51. Such is the objection, and what is the
answer ? The answer is, that this objection to the
Liberty of the Will is derived from our notions as
to the nature of Deity, and his mode of operation
OF THE WILL. 81
with his creatures, subjects excessively obscure,
and ahnost out of the reach of the Human Intel-
lect ; whereas, our Belief in the Liberty of man is
founded upon our own Consciousness, and our
own Conscience, as well as upon the concurrent
opinion of all mankind ; that is, upon evidence
which comes home to every one. Shall we reject
evidence which we can appreciate, because we
cannot solve a difficulty which it is impossible
we should solve with our limited faculties ^ To
judge of the agency of God we must become Gods
or Angels, but to judge of ourselves we may re-
main men. Moreover, the objection goes to
prove too much. It has been well observed by
Dugald Stewart, that if the fore-knowledge of God
be inconsistent with the Liberty of Man, then is
it inconsistent with His own Liberty? Are The-
istical Necessitarians prepared to admit this
conclusion'?
52. That a creature who sees so little as man,
and that " through a glass darkly," should dog-
matically assert that with God to fore-know is to
ordain, that God has no means whereby to recon-
cile his Omniscience and Omnipotence with the
Liberty of man, is certainly presumptuous, as well
as unphilosophical. It is a moral offence, as well
as an intellectual mistake. But on the strength of
this assumption, to deny what we know and feel,
is an outrage to common sense, as well as to
common piety.
M
82 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
53. Suppose we adopt the opposite theory-
do we then get rid of difficulties ^ We certainly
do obtain a system of Divine agency, in one re-
spect more in accordance with our own limited
notions, a system, apparently, simple and har-
monious. God fore-knows and fore-ordains every-
thing, the actions of man as well as purely
physical changes ; and so far all is consistent.
But then Human Liberty is at an end ; and that
man is free, our Consciousness and our Conscience
assure us. You must then abandon the evidence
of Consciousness and of Conscience; you must re-
ject the uniform belief of all men in all ages, as
an old wife's fable, belief in that which comes
most near to them, because it seems inconsistent
with the agency of a Being, of whom we can
know but little. And this is to get rid of
difficulties !
54, The truth is, that not only the doctrine
of Liberty, but many other tenets which we firmly
believe, are liable to difficulties, to difficulties
even insuperable. We surely believe that man
consists of soul and body, the one immaterial,
and therefore not confined to place, the other
material, and existing in space ; but, at the same
time, we believe that the soul is united to the
body, and consequently bound to place. Do we,
then, alter our opinion, and reject the two-fold
nature of man because of this difficulty ? If not,
why should we abandon our belief in liberty.
i,
OF THE WILL. B3
which we entertain as firmly as the other, be-
cause we cannot see how it can be reconciled
with tlie fore-knowledge of God ? In the case of
the union of soul and body, the difficulty is
greater than in that of Liberty, for it relates to a
matter more near to us than the Divine Govern-
ment of the universe, and in which, therefore, we
might better expect a solution.
55. I believe that I am the same man now
that I was twenty years ago. But, during that
period what changes have I undergone ! Not to
mention my body, which has been entirely re-
newed, my mental disposition may have been
quite reformed. Then I may have been dissolute,
careless, worldly, irreligious; now I may be
temperate, prudent, spiritual, godly ; but for all
that, am I not still the same ? How am I to
reconcile this sameness with so much change ?
I know not ; but this I do know, that I cannot
doubt my identity.
56. You believe in the existence of the
material world. Assuredly. On what grounds?
Do I not see it, feel it, everywhere around and
about me? That you have sensations of sight
and feeling is true, but what have sensations to
do with matter ? The one, confessedly, is totally
different from the other, matter being supposed
to be extended and solid, occupying space, and
capable of motion, — Mind and its phenomena
having neither extension, solidity, place, nor
84 PllINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
mobility. How, then, can you get at the one
from the other, how, from a mental state of
which alone you are conscious, can you infer
something else, not only different, but opposed^
You are at a loss for a reply, — you know not, —
you can only say that you cannot help believing
in matter, — that this belief is a necessary part of
your constitution, arising without reasoning and
proof; nay, against all argument to the contrary,
though unanswerable.
57. You believe in the uniformity of nature,
that like Causes will continue to be followed by
like Effects, that what has been will be. Can you
give any reason for this belief^ Experience has
proved to me this uniformity. Yes, in time past ;
but what has that to do with the future ? How
do you know that all may not change by to-
morrow, that the sun may cease to shine, the fire
to warm, the graSs to grow ? I allow it to
be possible, but it is highly improbable. Why
improbable ? Because a long Experience has
confirmed my faith. I do not deny that long
experience confirms your faith, that it is a Cause
of belief, but I deny that it is any reason. This,
then, is a sufficient answer to the metaphysician,
but none to the logician. It accounts for the fact
of your belief, but does not justify it. Your faith
is still illogical, though I allow it to be firm and
universal, an original part of our mental consti-
tution.
OF THE WILL. 85
58. And so is my belief in the Liberty of the
Will. This belief is, I maintain, original, firm,
and universal, like the belief in our personal
identity, in the material universe, and in the
uniformity of nature ; and though, like them,
attended with difficulties, nay, with difficulties
which cannot rationally be solved, it defies all
scepticism, and remains unshaken.
59. Honour, then, and thanks be to God,
who has contrived to reconcile his own power
and fore-knowledge with the Liberty of man.
SUPPLEMENT FIRST TO SECTION FOURTH.
OF THE WILL.
60. According to Hobbes, " he is free to do a
thing, that may do it if he have the Will to do it,
and may forbear if he have the Will to forbear." ^
Now, it can easily be shown that, according to this
definition, every man is, nay, must be free ;
because the word Will really implies as much.
No laws, not even the arbitrary decrees of a
despot, interfere with Liberty, as thus understood ;
they only offer strong inducements to do, or to
refrain from certain actions ; but the man may, or
may not obey those inducements. He may still
^ Hobbes' Tripos : of Liberty and Necessity.
86 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
rob or murder, and run the chances of non-detec-
tion. He can still do as he Will. Nay, even a
man in prison is free in this sense. He can do
whatever he Wills; but then he is prevented from
willing by the want of power to perform. If he
know that he cannot perform, then he cannot
Will ; for undoubting Belief in the possibility of
an action is an essential part of Volition. Thus,
the sense given by Hobbes to Liberty is utterly
nugatory, for it tells nothing more than what is
contained in the meaning of the vi'ord Will. It is
opposed neither to Slavery nor to Necessity ; for
a man would be free in that sense, though he
were politically a Slave, or metaphysically fated.
6 1 . Further on, in the same Treatise, we have
the following account of Liberty : " Liberty is the
absence of all im])ediments to action, that are not
contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the
agent. As, for example, the water is said to de-
scend freely, or to have Liberty to descend, by the
channel of the river, because there is no impedi-
ment that way, but not across, because the banks
are impediments. And though the water cannot
ascend, yet men never say it wants the Liberty to
ascend, but the jaculty or 'power, because the im-
pediment is in the nature of the water or intrin-
sical. So also we say, he that is tied wants the
Liberty to go, because the impediment is not in
him, but in his bands ; whereas, we say not so of
him that is sick or lame, because the impediment
OF THE WILL. 87
is in himself." Now, not to dwell on the ab-
surdity of applying the word Liberty to itianiniate
objects, instead of restricting it to Voluntary
agents, which is its proper sense, the other being
merely metaphorical^ we may ask whether this be
meant for a definition of Political or of Meta-
physical Liberty ? If the first be intended, then it
is manifestly incorrect; for we have shown that
Political Liberty is restricted not by every out-
ward impediment, not by mere physical obstacles,
not even by the actions of brutes, nor by the
Law of God, but solely by the opposing Wills of
our fellow-men. But if metaphysical Liberty be
meant, then, to place it in the absence of external
impediments is quite beside the question ; for
we enquire not whether a man be hindered by
external impediment from doing what he wishes ;
but whether, first, his wishes, and last, his Will,
be regulated by Causes over which he has no Self-
controul. Thus, Hobbes, as well as some other
necessitarians, not daring openly to deny Liberty
to man, have been obliged so to alter the meaning
of the word, as to be able to assert that Liberty
may co-exist with Necessity.
62. It is surely a strong argument against
necessity, that it is repugnant to the moral senti-
ments, and inconsistent with the language of all
mankind. Thus, the opponent of Hobbes " dis-
puteth against the opinion of them that say, exter-
nal objects presented to men of such and such
88 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
temperaments do make their actions Necessary ;
and says, the power such objects have over us
proceeds from our own fault;" "but that," replies
Hobbes, "is nothing to the purpose, if such fault
of ours proceedeth from Causes not in our own
power, and, therefore, that opinion may hold true
for all that answer." ^ Now, to say that an action
proceeds from our own fault, and at the same
time that it proceedeth from Causes not in our
own power, is inconsistent and illogical ; for the
word fault implies that it was in our power to do
or not to do. 'I'herefore, the moral vocabulary,
as well as the moral sentiments of mankind, must
be altered to suit the doctrine of Necessity.
63. Since the word Spontaneous occurs so
frequently in discussions on Liberty and Neces-
sity, particularly in this Discourse of Hobbes, it
is necessary to fix its proper meaning ; more
especially as two meanings are attached to this
word by Hobbes himself, (generally an exact
writer) inconsistent with each other, and both of
them differing from the usual sense. First, he
says, that " all voluntaiy actions, where the thing
that induceth the Will is not fear, are called
Spontaneous, and said to be done by a man's own
accord. As when a man giveth money volun-
tarily to another for merchandise, or out of affec-
tion, he is said to do it of his own accord, which,
^ Hobbes' Tripos : of Liberty and Necessity.
OF THE WILL. 89
in Latin is sponte, and, therefore, the action is
spontaneous^ though to give one's money wilUngly
to a thief to avoid kilHng, or throw it into the sea
to avoid drowning, where the motive is fear, be
not called spontaneous.'' '* But, in the latter part
of the same Discourse, we are told that a sponta-
neous action signifies one without previous debate
or deliberation, " that by Spontaneity is meant in-
considerate action, or else nothing is meant by it."
Now these two senses of the word Spontaneous
are inconsistent ; for surely an action may result
from fear, and yet be inconsiderate, nay, such
actions most frequently are so ; and, therefore,
the action would be at once non-spontaneous, as
resulting from fear, — spontaneous, because incon-
siderate. And, not only are these two meanings
inconsistent with each other, a logical fault, but
neither of them is the usual sense of the word
Spontaneous, an offence against the propriety of
language. When we say that a plant grows
spontaneously 'in a certain spot, we mean that it
was not there planted by the hand of man. The
spontaneous productions of the earth are those on
which no human labour has been bestowed. So,
a spontaneous action is one which a man performs
of his own accord, projmo motu, that is, without
any direct suggestion and solicitation from another.
A spontaneous action is of course Voluntary, but
^ Hobbes' Tripos : of Liberty and Necessity.
N
90 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
every voluntary act is not spontaneous ; for out
of all the possible inducements to the Will we
except those arising from the direct suggestion
and solicitation of our fellow-men, and then call
the act spontaneous. What the motive may be
we pretend not to say ; only it was not directly
put into our head, and urged upon us by another.
Spontaneity, to use a word as old as Hobbes, does
not settle the question as to Liberty and Neces-
sity ; for though a man act without another's sug-
gestion and solicitation, yet, there may, or may
not, be other causes which render his action
necessary.
SUPPLEMENT SECOND TO SECTION
FOURTH.
OF THE WILL.
64. In the preceding inquiry we have sup-
posed that there are but two possible doctrines in
respect to the Will, the doctrine of Liberty, and
that of Necessity, and so it has generally been
thought ; but an attempt has been made in our
days to combine the two into one system. And
as this attempt has been made by one of our
most distinguished authors, it demands some
notice in this place.
OF THE WILL. 91
The system, as proposed by ISIr. Mill, appears
to me to be this. On the one hand, he allows
that we are able to modify our own character, if
we ivish, and so far we are free ; but, on the other,
the wish is formed not hi/ us but for us ; it is
as dependent upon outward Causes as physical
nature, and so we lie under Necessity. The
former opinion is thus stated.
" And indeed if w'e examine closely we shall
find that this feeling of our being able to modify
our own characters, if ive ivish, is itself the feel-
ing of moral freedom which we are conscious of.
A person feels morally free who feels that his
habits or his temptations are not his masters, but
he their's, who even in yielding to them knows
that he could resist ; that were he for any reason
desirous of altogether throwing them off, there
would not be required for that purpose, a stronger
desire than he knows himself to be capable of
feeling."^ So far well for the cause of Liberty.
65. But then, we are told that " Our cha-
racter is formed by us as well as for us, but the
wish which induces us to attempt to form it, is
formed for us ; and how ? not, in general, by our
organization, nor wholly by our education, but
by our own experience, experience of the painful
consequences of the character we previously had,
or by some strong feeling of admiration or as-
' System of Logic, liook VL cluij). ii.
92 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
piration accidentally aroused.'"" Here, on the
other hand, we have the doctrine of Necessity.
If it be allowed, as above, that we are able to
modify our own characters, if ive wish, and if it
be also true, as generally granted, that wishes
arise out of previous character, that out of the
heart proceed good or evil desires, then is there
a constant action and re-action between the more
permanent character, and the temporary desire
or wish. This we take to be the moral course of
the human mind, a course of much activity, in
which Desire performs a prominent part, acting
and acted upon. During this career a great
change may be effected, entirely by the mind
itself; and though the first wish may be traced
to some outward circumstance operating on the
mind, yet, the mind must have been prepared, or
the circumstance could produce no effect. We
do not deny the force of outward circumstances,
but we say that it is most unwarrantable to
assume them as the only causes of Desire and
Wish, forgetting that active and inward life,
which, starting from a feeling, possibly suggested
by something foreign, can so work upon it as to
make it chiefly of native growth. The culture,
at least, if not the planting, belongs to Self.
Unless Mr. Mill deny that our wishes depend, in
part, at least, upon the previous character, that
" System of Logit% Book VI. chap, ii.
OF THE WILL. 93
is, upon Self, the Necessitarian part of his scheme
cannot stand, for he himself allows that we can
modify our character by an antecedent wish.
66. " Correctly conceived, the doctrine called
Philosophical Necessity," says Mr. JMill, ''is simply
this, that given the motives which are present to
an individual mind, and given, likewise, the char-
acter and disposition of the individual, the man-
ner in which he will act may be unerringly in-
ferred ; that, if we knew the person thoroughly,
and knew all the inducements which are acting
upon him, we could foretell his conduct with as
much certainty as we can predict any physical
event." '
Nothing is more easy than to arrive at any
conclusion by means of a supposition. If I sup-
pose that the Sun will not rise to-morrow, I can
predict infallibly that it will be dark. Now, the
supposition above made is nearly as extravagant,
for to know all the motives present to any man's
mind, and to know thoroughly the character and
disposition of any individual, is simply impossible;
for no man knows himself so accurately. And
even suppose that a man's motives and disposition
be perfectly known at this moment, how can you
venture to predict, positively, what they will be
a month, a week, or even a day hence, whenever
an occasion for action arrives ? If you can, then
' System of Logic, Book VL, chap. ii.
%&
^*9
PBaD
3 Of
jnsiiB mjosti taike for sxaiated the v
to' llhe ]?^ecea8ijCTr
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. anQtiier
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• W
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im itiia»fttrtf agrees tn ke aJlo>ws that
ipe ace ahle to nnojd av/ w
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imtt likait Desires ©r Wishes ri^ i---^'"-
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-nzsV
96 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
PART III.
THE THOUGHTS
CHAPTER I.
OF THOUGHT IN GENERAL, AND OF THE PROXI-
MATE POWERS OF THE HUMAN MIND.
1 . Having treated of the First Great Class of
the Mental Phenomena, the Feelings, comprising
the Sensations and the Emotions, we must now
turn our attention to the Second Class, which
embraces all purely Intellectual States of mind,
or, in one word, the Thoughts.
2. Thoughts, as we have seen, are dis-
tinguished from Sensations, as well as from the
Emotions, by their neutral character, the absence
of Pleasure or Pain, Happiness or Misery ; for
though these frequently, nay, generally accom-
pany our Thoughts, yet they do not constitute
them even in part ; and though Feeling and
Thought were inseparable in reality, yet they
could be readily and clearly distinguished on
reflection. It belongs to the Metaphysician to
analyse what is compounded, and to present sepa-
rately to the mind what is generally found united.
THE THOUGHTS. 97
In like manner, though Sodium be never found
naturally separate from Oxygen, yet the Chemist
by artificial means can analyse Soda, and exhibit
the elements apart.
3. In Part First, Chapter Second, we gave a
general Classification of the Mental Phenomena,
particularly of the Thoughts, showing their various
kinds, and how one differs from another. These
are the elements from which the more complex
Phenomena of mind result. We must now take
these more complex Phenomena, and discover the
elements of which they are composed.
4. Again, in Part First, Chapter Third, we
stated that as each distinct kind of Phenomena
must have a distinct Power belonging to it, there-
fore, the number of mental Powers must be the
same as of mental Phenomena, and the classifica-
tion of the one the same as that of the other.
Consequently, that tlie three Ultimate or Ele-
mentary Powers of the Mind are the Powers of
Sensation, Emotion, and Thought, or Intelligence;
and, from these Ultimate Elements, variously
modified and compounded, all the Proximate
Powers are derived. It remains to enumerate
these Proximate Powers, and to analyse them if
possible.
98 PRINCIPLES OF P8yCH0L0GY
CHAPTER II.
OF CONSCIOUSNESS.
1. By some philosophers, as by Dr. Reid,
Consciousness has been considered as a dis-
tinct Power or Faculty, and, as such, classed
along with Perception, Conception, Imagi-
nation, Memory^ Abstraction, Judgement,
Reasoning, on the same line, but different from
all of these. This, however, can by no means be
admitted.
2. For, in the first place, Consciousness is
inseparably connected with each of the above
powers, and is even essential to their existence ;
so that, without Consciousness, there can be
neither Perception, nor Conception, nor Imagina-
tion, nor Memory, nor Abstraction, nor Judge-
ment, nor Reasoning. Now, what is essential to
the existence of anything cannot be separated
from it even by reflection, without destroying the
nature of the thing. Could we, then, suppose
Consciousness to be taken away from Perception
and the other powers, the result would be nil, or
we know not what.
CONSCIOUSNESS. 99
3. In the acts of Perceiving, Conceiving,
Imagining, Remembering, Judging, and Reason-
ing, there is not both an act of Perception, etc.,
and the Consciousness of that act, but these are
one and the same ; so that if we Perceive we are
Conscious ; and if we are Conscious of a Percep-
tion, we Perceive ; and vice versa, if we do not
Perceive, neither are we Conscious, and if we be
not Conscious, neither do we Perceive. In short.
Consciousness is indispensable to every mental
act which comes within the scope of Meta-
physics ; for it is not disputed that the Mind
may have an influence on the body of which we
are not Conscious, and which, therefore, belongs
to Physiology, or the science of animal life.
4. If, then. Consciousness be essential to
every mental power above enumerated, it is
utterly illogical to class it as distinct from all and
each ; for no class should over-lay another. As
it is essential to each, it must be above all, not
on the same line, and must stand alone. Thus,
Consciousness becomes a general term, compre-
hending all the mental powers, but not any one
more than another.
5. Should we be inclined to restrict, in any
degree, this wide and indiscriminate use of the
term Consciousness, we would propose one limita-
tion, as agreeable to the common notions of
mankind, and to the common use of language.
The term generally is, and perhaps ought to be,
100 PRINCirLES OF rSYCHOLOGY.
confined to the purely intellectual faculties, of
which we are now treating. Thus, we seldom say
that we are Conscious of a Sensation, or of an
Emotion, but we feel them ; whereas, we are
Conscious of any thought or train of thought.
Consciousness seems to imply knowledge, and
knowledge belongs to the intellectual faculties.
6. Again, while Consciousness belongs essen-
tially to each and every mental power, each of
these powers is not essential to the other. Thus,
I can Perceive an outward object without an act
of Memory, I can Remember without an act of
Perception, I can Imagine without Remembering,
or Reason without Willing. Therefore these
powers may be classed on the same line, but
apart, — while Consciousness cannot, because it is
common to them all.
7. " Consciousness," says Reid, " is an opera-
tion of the understanding of its own kind, and
cannot logically be defined. The objects of it
are our own present pains and pleasures, our
hopes, our fears, our desires, our doubts, our
thoughts of every kind, — -in a word, all the pas-
sions, and all the actions and operations of our
own minds, while they are present. We may Re-
member them when they are past, but we are
Conscious of them only while they are present." *
8. The inaccuracy of this statement is evi-
*" Reid's Intellectual Powers, Essay VI., cbap. v.
CONSCIOUSNESS. 101
dent from what we have already said. Moreover,
we would ask, where is the necessity for this
doubling of the Mental Phenomena, first a pain,
a desire, a thought, and then the Consciousness of
the same"? First a mental object, and then the
Consciousness of that object ? Surely this is
contrary to the simplicity of nature.
m
9. In the view here taken, Consciousness has
no distinct object ; it is simply the mental state
at the present moment. Whatever that may be,
of it we are conscious ; the act and the object
are one and indivisible.
10. Consciousness, then, is limited to the
present, and, under that restriction, the know-
ledge which it conveys is perfect and free from
all doubt ; for whatever the feeling or thought of
the moment may be, we must know it, since it is
what we are Conscious of, and nothing more ;
and we cannot doubt of its existence, for the
very doubt would be itself a phenomenon of
Consciousness, and therefore would contradict
the supposition that we could doubt the existence
of what is present to the mind. We may doubt
whether we ever had any Feeling or Thought
before, or whether we shall have any in future ;
but, of the Feeling or Thought of the present
moment, we, therefore, cannot doubt. This know-
ledge, at least, is proof against scepticism. We
may question the accuracy of Memory, we may
doubt the Uniformity of Nature in time to come.
102 PKINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
we may deny the existence of Matter, we may
even distrust our Reasoning powers, and dispute
about our own Identity ; but we must allow the
evidence of Consciousness. And all human
knowledge being founded on this, it is founded
on a Rock. The direct or immediate evidence
of Consciousness, is no doubt, very limited. Of
the world without us, of the Non-Self, it tells no-
thing, and, even of Self, nothing but the present
state. Still, as all our knowledge is based there-
upon, it is satisfactory to know that the founda-
tion is unassailable.
11. Does Consciousness necessarily imply
Belief? The affirmative is maintained by Dr.
Reid. "We have an immediate conception of
the operations of our own minds, joined with a
Belief of their existence, and this we call Con-
sciousness." — " There are many operations of
mind in which, when we analyse them as far as
we are able, we find Belief to be an essential in-
gredient. A man cannot be Conscious of his
own Thoughts without believing that he thinks.'""
12. This statement contains two assertions,
both of which appear to me questionable. In the
first place, actual Belief appears to me to suppose
the possibility of Unbelief ; and where Doubt is
impossible, so is Belief. Belief seems to be the
result of a mental operation where opposite views
^ Intellectual Puwers, Essay II., Chap. xx.
CONSCIOUSNESS: 1 03
are presented to the mind ; so that where no op-
posite views can be entertained, neither doubt nor
belief can arise. And such, we have seen, is the
case with Consciousness. Therefore, Belief forms
no element thereof.
13. We allow that Nature does nothing in
vain. But where is the use of Belief when w^e
cannot doubt? The evidence of Consciousness
is, then, above all other, being above both doubt
and belief. In Consciousness, we feel^ we M^wA',
we linow ; but we do not also believe that we feel,
think, or know.
14. But, secondly, even were it true that
Belief is an element of Consciousness, still it
would by no means follow that a man could not
be conscious of his own thoughts without believ-
ing that He thinks. Here a new idea is intro-
duced, that of Self or Mental Identity ; and this
does not arise at once, on a single act of Con-
sciousness, but it requires two acts at least, and
an act of Memory besides. It is by Memory, by
comparing a past Feeling or Thought with the
present, that we come to believe in our Identity ;
and, consequently, one act of Consciousness, one
Feeling or one Thought, may exist without any
notion of Self at all. We may believe, if you so
think, in the existence of the present mental state;
but you cannot maintain that Belief in our Iden-
tity is essential to Consciousness.
104 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
CHAPTER III.
OF PERCEPTION
SECTION FIRST.
OF THE NATURE OF PERCEPTION.
1. Before the days of Reid, the term Per-
ception was used in a very general sense, by
Des Cartes, Hume, and many others, so as to
embrace aU the phenomena of mind, whether
FeeUngs or Thoughts ;'' but, by the chief of the
Scottish school of philosophy, the word was
limited to express that Mental Faculty whereby
we become acquainted with the world without. This
was an important improvement in metaphysical
language ; and it has since been generally adopted,
as it is here,
2. As our Feelings come before our Thoughts
in the order of mental development, so do our Per-
ceptions precede our other Thoughts. We must
^ Thus, Hume says, that, " we may divide all the perceptions of
the mind into two classes or species, which are distinguished by
their different degress of force and vivacity." These are his
Impressions and Ideas, which, according to him, embrace all the
mental phenomena. Essays, Vol. II. Sec. ii.
rEllCEPTlOxX. 105
have/e/^j or experienced Sensation, before we can
Perceive an outward object; and we must have
perceived a present object before we can Conceive,
or Judge, or Reason, about an absent one. There-
fore, as Feelings have been treated prior to
Thoughts, so of these the first to be considered
are Perceptions.
3. The doctrine of Locke, that we have no
Innate Ideas, seems to amount simply to this,
that we have no Thoughts prior to Sensation.
Not that our Thoughts are only Sensations in
another form ; by no means ; but, that Sensation
is necessary to the development of Thought, a
Mental Phenomenon specifically different from
the other. The mind of man, previous to Sensa-
tion, may be compared to the embryo of plants,
which, though it contain the rudiments of the
tree, or shrub, or herb, yet requires heat and
moisture to favour its growth. So the mind
must have many dormant faculties, or Sensation
would stop there ; we should be sensitive animals
and nothing more. But, given the latent power,
the slumbering capability, and Sensation can
rouse it into life. How Sensations stir up
Thoughts, so different from themselves, so far
removed from sense, so wide in their range, so
deep, so sublime, is no doubt incomprehensible ;
but surely not more so than how jNIatter acts at
all upon Mind, or Mind upon Matter. Sensation,
after all, is a Mental Phenomenon, and therefore
p
106 PRINCIPLES or PSYCHOLOGY.
there is more resemblance between it and the
highest flights of Reason or of Fancy than be-
tween the world without and that within.
4. The connection between these last is a great
mystery, which, however, we are bound to accept,
and not to deny because it may seem strange that
substances so incongruous should directly effect
each other. Philosophers have been slow to
admit this direct and mutual agency, and have
invented many hypotheses to break the difficulty,
but without success, — for they have framed sys-
tems more complicated than nature, but not
more comprehensible.
5. In the endeavour to bridge over the gulph
which separates Mind and Matter, the Sensible
species of the Schools were first invented, passing
from the outward object to the Mind or subject,
but distinct from either, of a doubtful nature,
whether material, immaterial, or something be-
tween the two ; afterwards arose the Ideas of Des
Cartes and his followers, the immediate objects in
Perception, and decidedly immaterial in their
nature ; subsequently, these same Ideas sup-
posed to be seen in God, according to Male-
branche; then the pre-established harmony of
Leibnitz ; till at last the knot was cut by Berkeley
and Collier,*' who, admitting nothing but Imma-
'*' Arthur Collier, Rector of Langford Magna, near Sarum,
published in the year 1713 a work called " Clavis universalis," to
disprove the existence of the material world. His arguments
rEllCEPTION. 107
terial Ideas and Spirits, denied the existence of
Matter altogether.
6. All these ingenious but false systems owe
their origin to one unsound axiom, long uni-
versally admitted, namely, that the Cause and
the Effect must be like each other, an axiom
agreeable to the imagination which delights in
similitudes, but for which there is no proof.
Thus, in this case, as the object existing out-
wardly, and the subject or Mind knowing in-
wardly, were allowed to be very different, some
medium was sought by which they might com-
municate. Hence the invention of Sensible
Species, of Ideas, etc., by means of which out-
ward objects might affect the mind, and of animal
spirits, through which the Will might act upon
the body. But the above axiom being abandoned,
as directly contrary to experience, of course all
the systems derived from it must also be given up.
7. After these preliminary observations, w^e
may proceed to trace the phenomena of Percep-
tion. First, we must carefully distinguish the
outward material object said to be perceived,
from the percipient subject or Mind, — and then,
in the mental process, we must discriminate be-
tween the Sensation proper which precedes, and
are similar to Berkeley's, with whose work he appears to have-
been unacquainted, though Berkeley's " Principles of Human
Knowledge" had been published three years before. Collier's
book is extremely rare.
108 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
Perception proper which follows. The last alone
belongs to the class of Thoughts, — though the
two, the Sensation and the Perception, are often
confounded together and considered as one.
8. With respect to the outward object, one
important observation must be made, namely,
that some of our Senses are affected immediately,
others only mediately, by objects. Thus, I feel
the table immediately by touch, but I see it only
mediately by the intervention of the rays of light
passing from tht^ object to my eye. So, I taste
objects in contact, but I hear or smell them
at a distance, through the pulsations of air and
odorous effluvia. Still, in every case, there is
contact of something with the organ of sense,
whether of the object itself or the medium.
9. Is not then the medium the proper Object ?
All we can answer is, that it is never so considered,
never so called. I say, and all men say, I see and
perceive a rose, not the rays of light reflected
from a rose to mv retina : I hear a bell, not the
pulsation of air ; I smell a ciirnation, not the
effluvia thereof. Therefore the rose, the bell, the
carnation, are universally considered as the Ob-
jects. Consequently, these may be divided into
Immediate and Mediate, or near and remote ob-
jects. And we shall find that this distinction is
of great importance, when we come to trace the
origin of Perception.
iO. Next we must attend to the distinction
PERCEPTION. 109
between Sensation and Perception proper, a
distinction often disregarded, even by Locke and
other excellent authors ; but clearly pointed out
and dwelt upon by Reid. Sensation always pre-
cedes Perception proper, and is indispensable to it,
but the one being a Feeling^ the other a Thought^
they are essentially different. We have seen that
Sensation alone gives us no knowledge beyond
itself, no acquaintance with the world without.
What we feel in Sensation, of course we feel, and
nothing more. Had we been Sensitive beings
alone, we never should have known the exis-
tence of outward objects, nor, in fact, anything
except the passing Sensation.
11. We have seen, in treating of Sensation,
that the Sensations which accompany Perception
proper are of very different degrees of import-
ance, — that those which attend the Perception of
the Primary Qualities of matter. Extension,
Solidity or Impenetrability, Mobility, etc., are
in general little noticed ; while the Sensations
which go along with the Perception of the
Secondary Qualities, Colour, Sound, Taste, Smell,
are often very interesting and fill our minds.
In truth it may be laid down as a general law,
learnt by experience, that the more we are oc-
cupied with the Sensation, the less are we taken
up with the Perception proper; and vice versa.
Moreover, this would follow from another more
general Law of mind, namely, that the more we
110 rniNCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
lire (Mi/z;af^('(l vvitli owv. tliint:;, tlio less can we be
oecujjied with anotlier; vvliich a^aiii is derived
IVoiJi a still more i^encral fai't, thai tlie eai)aei(y
of l\\v, inind ib limited. Tiiis ()l)servatioii, again,
may he of use to uh wlu;n we come to trace the
origin of Perception.
12. Ill treating of the nature of Perception
])r()per, we must take it as it exists in tlu! mature
mind, not in the mind of an infant; and we sh:dl
attempt to analyse it ae(U)rdingly.
I.'l. I"'irst, then, it is evidtrnt that when we
jx'reeive an outward object, say a tree or a house,
w(^ have a notion or eoneei)tion of the tree or of
the house. This will not be disputed.
14. Hut we can shut our eyes, we can travel
a Inuidrtul miles away, and still have a notion of
the tree or of llic house; (H)nse(pjently a notion
or conception is not the whole of Percei)ti()n.
15. I perceive a ))()st or a \un)\ of water in
my path, and I turn out of the way to avoid it,
and that without an instjuit's iiesitation ; conse-
<pieutly 1 believe at once in the existence of the
])ost or of the water l)efore me and without me.
Therefore, JIELIJII' in the existence of an object
present before us and without us, capable of im-
peding our progress, and, consequently, having
the connnon proj)ertie8 of matter, forms an essen-
tial element of Perc«'ption proper. The notion
ot the object, and the IJclii'f in its present exis-
ivMvx'. are, as far us we can observe, simultaneous,
piacizTKaL
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112 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
we are aware of the diflPerence between the
dreamy and the waking Perception, though this
difference cannot be expressed in words. We are
conscious, however, of the difference, and there-
fore we call the one Perception real, the other
Imaginary, though the mental phenomena are so
alike as to defy metaphysical analysis.
19. When we say that we believe in the pre-
sent existence of the object before us, this means
that we believe in its existence at a greater or
less distance from us in Space, and at the present
Time. The former simple notion is certainly
comprehended in our Belief, for we cannot be-
lieve in the existence of a material object without
believing that it occupies Space ; but the latter
may not actually be developed in us unless the
object move. The notion of Space, then, seems
to be inseparable from Perception, but not that of
Time. Moreover, it is only by Perception, which
makes us acquainted with the material world,
that we can acquire the notion of Space ; whereas,
the succession of Thoughts in our own minds,
however arising, and of whatever kind, would
give us the notion of Time.
20. Thus we find that Perception, in its
largest sense, comprehends three different men-
tal phenomena — a Sensation, a Notion, and a
Belief, which also necessarily supposes the no-
tion of Space. The whole process, therefore,
comprises Mental Phenomena of three different
OllIGIN OF PERCEniON. 113
sorts, Sensation, Non-relative Thought or
Notion, and Belief.'' Such is that Perception
whereby we become acquainted with the world
without.
SECTION SECOND.
OF THE OEIGIN OF PERCEPTION.
1 . In the above Analysis, we have considered
Perception as it is found in the mature mind;
but the important questions remain, is Perception
at once perfect or is it acquired, and what is its
Origin ?
2. Let us first consider the senses of Smell
and Hearing, and endeavour to discover whether
our knowledge of the world without be derived
from these.
3. The Sensation of Smell is occasioned by
the contact of minute odoriferous particles with
the organ of Smell, the innumerable small
branches of the Olfactory nerve ramified within
the nose ; and the Sensation of Hearing is caused
by vibrations of air striking upon the drum of the
ear, and aff'ecting through it the complicated
" For the distinction between Feelings and Thoughts, and
between Non-relative Thoughts or Notions and Relative Tiioiights
or Relations, see Part I., chap. ii. of this work.
Q
114 PHINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
internal organ. In both these cases, the object
of Perception, the odoriferous, or the sounding
body, being at a distance, it seems improbable, a
priori, that any knowledge of them can be acquired
by means of the minute particles which flow from
the one, or the atmosphere set in motion by the
other.''
4. Of the minute particles themselves, directly
in contact with the nose, sense tells us nothing,
nor of the vibrations of air which touch the ear ;
these are subsequently learnt ; can we, therefore,
suppose that sense gives us more information
with respect to the distant objects ? Are we likely
to know more of the remote than of the near ?
Reasoning, it is clear, can teach us nothing, for
want of data; so that if we do perceive the
objects of Smell and Hearing, the knowledge
must be instinctive, not acquired.
^ In the cases of Smell and Hearing, as well as in that of Sight,
we have, as already observed, in accordance with common lan-
guage, which ought not to be changed unnecessarily, called the
distant body, the Object ; though some philosophers would give
that name to the medium in contact with the Organ. This, how-
ever, would lead to erroneous views, for, though it certainly is the
medium which directly causes Sensation, yet we cannot be said to
-perceive \\\e medium, and in reality we never do say so. We are
sensible of smell from odoriferous particles, but we perceive a rose
as the cause thereof or object ; we hear a sound from the movement
of air, but we refer that sound to a bell ; we feel colour from light,
but we perceive a red coat. Common language, and common
sense, must not be disregarded in Metaphysics; for all men are by
nature, more or less, metaphysicians, and cannot help being so.
ORIGIN OF PERCEPTION. ~ US
5. But can we, even now, in our mature state
of mind, perceive any object by means of these
senses when the object is not already known ?
Suppose we shut our eyes, and make no use of
our hands, can we describe an object placed under
our nose giving out a scent that is new to us ?
Could an Esquimau in such circumstances de-
scribe an orange r Could he tell any thing about
it, as to shape, size, consistency, or colour ? I
trow not. So, were I to hear a noise, such as I
never had heard before, could I say from what it
proceeded? Had I never seen or handled a bell,
could I describe it on hearing the sound thereof?
Could a savage fresh from the woods, however
exquisite his hearing, have the least notion of
such an object? Assuredly not. Therefore, it
is not only probable, a priori, but it can be proved
by actual experiment, that the Senses of Smell
and Hearing give us no knowledge of external
objects. Consequently, Perception does not or-
iginate with them, and whatever knowledge of
the world without they may afterwards give us,
that must first have been gained by means of
some other sense.
6. Let us next consider the Sense of Sight.
This agrees with the two former, inasmuch as the
object, usually so called, strikes the Sense only
through a medium, namely, the rays of light re-
flected from that object upon the expansion of
the Optic nerve, the Retina of the eye. Conse-
116 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
quently, whatever probability there be, a jmori,
against the original Perception of objects by
Smell and Hearing, the same must exist against
original perception by Sight. It is just as impro-
bable, a priori^ that we should be able to determine
the size, figure, and distance of objects, originally
by Sight, as by Smell or Hearing. Of Light itself,
though in contact with us, the Sight tells us no-
thing ; is it then likely that it should inform us
more about an object at a distance ^
7. Why should a Sensation of Colour give us
a knowledge of an extended, solid, coloured Sub-
stance '? Of course, no reason can be assigned,
but this is no proof that it is not so. There may
be original knowledge thus communicated rela-
tive to the world without ; but if we allow that
Smell and Hearing let in no such knowledge, as
has been proved, then is there a strong probability
against Sight also, for the circumstances attend-
ing the three are similar.
8. This is a case which admits not of so
easy an appeal to Experience as the two former,
because the sense of sight is undoubtedly much
more quick and accurate in detecting objects in
mature life than either smell or hearing. We
allow that it is better trained. Still we have
experience sufficient to decide the point. Per-
sons of mature mind, in the enjoyment of all the
intellectual faculties, but blind from infancy,
have, by an operation, been restored to the per-
ORIGIN OF PERCEPTION. 117
feet use of their eyes, without being able at first
to discriminate objects by sight, either as to size,
form, or distance. A new world, a world of
colour, was, for the first time, opened out before
them, but neither form, magnitude, nor place.
All was confused colour, and close to the eye.*
But that eye was physically perfect, and by de-
grees came to see like the eyes of others, without
any suhsequent ojjeratio?!. Thus was it proved that
our knowledge of the world without is not de-
rived originally from vision ; that in truth we
learn to see objects. We must look then to some
other sense for the origin of Perception.
9. The two remaining senses of Taste and
Touch agree among themselves, and differ from
the rest in this, that the objects, commonly so
called, of both, must be in contact with the organ
of sense, the object of Taste with the tongue or
palate, that of Touch with any part of the body.
Herein, therefore, there is a marked distinction
between these two and the other senses, which
" " He," (the patient) says Cheselden, " knew not the shape of
any thing, nor any one thing from another, however different in
shape or magnitude ; hut upon heing told what things were, whose
form he before knew from feeling, he would carefully observe, that
he might know them again ; but, having too many objects to learn
at once, he forgot many of them, and (as he said) at first he
learned to know, and again forgot a thousand times in a day."
To Bishop Berkeley belongs the merit of having anticipated the
results of this exj)eriment by reasoning a priori, in his " New
Theory of Vision."
118 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
are in contact not with the objects perceived, but
with a medium.
10. Consequently, the distance of the object
from the organ cannot be alleged against these
two senses, as against the others, as an argument
unfavourable to the supposition, that our know-
ledge of external nature is thence derived.
11. Moreover, it being already proved that
our knowledge of the world without is not derived
either from Smell, or from Hearing, or from
Sight, it must be derived from Taste or from
Touch, unless some sixth sense can be pointed
out. We have then to choose only between
these two.
12. In the first place, the sense of Taste is
limited to a few objects, and on that account it
seems unlikely that our far more general know-
ledge of outward nature can be derived from this
source. Comparatively few objects have any
taste, and very few are those which a child
actually does taste.
13. Besides, the Sensation of Taste is so
interesting in itself, that it is apt to engross our
attention to the exclusion of every thing else.
In this respect it resembles the Sensations of
Smell, Hearing, and Sight.
14. The sense of Touch, on the other hand,
extends to all solid and liquid substances, and is
exerted not merely occasionally, as Taste, but at
all times, and by all parts of the body. Here
ORIGIN OF PERCEPTION. HQ
there is a source sufficiently general to account
for our general knowledge of outward things.
15. JMoreover, the Sensation of Touch is
usually of little interest in itself. Some degree
of pleasure may be felt by passing one's hand
over a smooth surface, but it is insignificant. It
is chiefly by excess that the Sensation of Touch
affects us, and painfully.
16. But if the Sensation of Touch be not
given us for enjoyment, we must suppose that it
was granted for some farther and useful purpose,
if we believe that nothing has been made in vain.
And what purpose more probable, what more im-
portant, than the knowledge of the world without
us, on which our very being depends ?
1 7. It is therefore far more probable that our
acquaintance with the material w^orld is derived
through the Sensation of Touch than through
that of Taste ; and as Smell, Hearing, and Sight
have been proved to give originally no informa-
tion, therefore we may conclude that to Touch,
and to it alone, are we originally indebted for all
we know of the world around us.
18. We see from the foregoing, that Sensa-
tions have been given us for two different
purposes — for immediate enjoyment in them-
selves, and for knowledge through them, and that
these vary conversel}^ ; the more the enjoyment
the less the knowledge, the less the pleasure the
more the information. The Sensations of Smell,
120 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
Hearing, Sight, and Taste bring their own reward
along with them, and are dwelt upon accord-
ingly ; but Touch is of value chiefly as leading
to Perception, the mere Sensation being little at-
tended to.
19, The whole difficulty lies in tracing the
origin of Perception, and in accounting for it ;
for, these points being settled, the rest may all be
explained by the Principle of Association. To this
are we indebted for the information subsequently
obtained through our other Senses. Supposing
that through Touch we become acquainted with
the forms, magnitudes, and relative distances of
objects, it is easy to see that a certain object, al-
ready known by Touch, may be so associated with
a certain Smell, Sound, Sight, or Taste, that any
one of these Sensations shall instantly suggest
that object in its due form and proportion, with-
out the actual employment of Touch. And by
long custom, from our earliest years, so rapid may
be the suggestion, as not to be distinguished from
original knowledge.
20. The information subsequently afforded
through our other Senses being thus explained,
and the first information being traced to Touch,
we may still inquire, 1. Whether this Primary
Perception can in any way be accounted for, or
whether it be truly original and unaccountable ;
2. Whether we can rely upon the knowledge
thus obtained.
EVIDENCE AFFOHDED BY PERCErilON. 121
21. I can see no reason for doubting whether
Primary Perception be an original faculty, in
other words, ultimate and unaccountable. How
can we explain the fact that a certain Sensation
of Touch, and, as such, a Mental Phenomenon,
without extension, without solidity, without parts,
without mobility in space, is the medium through
which we become acquainted with an extended,
solid, divisible, and moveable substance, distinct
from the percipient mind? On what known prin-
ciple can we account for this wonderful fact?
There is here no room for association, for associa-
tion must have a beginning, and things must first
be somehow brought together, somehow related,
before the one can call up the other ; neither is
there scope for Reasoning, for there is no An-
alogy. What have ]Mind and Matter in common ?
and how from the existence of the one can we
infer the other'? There is here a deep gulf over
which Reasoning can throw no bridge. If there be
in human nature a fact original and unaccountable,
it is the Mental Perception of Material objects.
SECTION THIRD.
OF THE EVIDENCE AFFOEDED BY PERCEPTION.
1. Having analysed the process of Percep-
tion, having traced its origin to Touch, and deter-
mined that the faculty is original and unaccount-
R
122 PKINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
able, we have still to inquire what evidence we
have of the reality of the knowledge thence ob-
tained. What proof have we that the objects
which we perceive really do exist ^
2. This evidence must depend upon the theory
which we may adopt, with respect to the mode of
communication between Mind and Matter. All
the theories which have been formed, or which
can be formed on this subject, fall under two
general heads. Our knowledge of the Material
universe is either mediate or immediate^ in other
words, we are either non-conscious of the exist-
ence of Matter, or conscious ; our knowledge,
on the former supposition, being communicated
through a medium. The first is the opinion of
almost all philosophers, all thinkers, ancient and
modern, with one remarkable exception, that of
the first Metaphysician of the present day, and
perhaps of Dr. Reid, and may be one or two more,
who maintain the doctrine of Immediate Percep-
tion. Since this theory is one and indivisible, and
since, if true, it will save us the trouble of examin-
ing several others, we shall consider it first.
3. This theory is certainly supported by Sir
William Hamilton / but, whether it be held by
any one else, is, I think, doubtful. In his "Discus-
sions on Philosophy," Art. ii., Sir William stoutly
^ Discussions on Philosophy, Art. ii. Philosophy of Per-
ception.
EVIDENCE AEFORDED BY PERCEniON. 123
maintains, in opposition to Brown, that such is the
opinion of Reid, and he severely taxes Brown for
mis-conceiving the tenets of the latter. But in
the very valuable and acute notes to his edition
of Reid's works, Sir William often expresses him-
self doubtfully on the point, whether Reid did in
truth hold the doctrine of Immediate Perception.
This is sufficient to show that the language of
Reid is not free from ambiguity ; so that, if
Brown did mis-interpret him, he is not without
excuse. The notes below will prove that Sir
William himself admits the ambiguity.^
4. But dismissing authority, let us examine
this theory on its own merits. First, what are
we to understand by Immediate Perception *?
5. The theory supposes that we immediately
knoiv, in other words, are conscious of external
Objects ; so that the evidence of their existence
= ** Reid himself, like the philosophers in general, really holds
that we do not perceive external things immediately, if he does not
allow us a consciousness of the non-ego" — H. p. 263.
" Des Cartes and Reid coincide in docti'ine, if Reid holds that
we know the extended and external object only by a conception or
subjective modification of the percipient mind." — H. p. 274.
" This paragraph appears to be an explicit disavowal of the
doctrine of an intuitive or immediate perception." — H. p. 310.
" This statement of Reid again favours the opinion that his
doctrine of perception is not really immediate." — H. p. 327.
Other notes to the same effect might be quoted, but these suffice
to show that, even according to Sir William, the opinion of Reid
is doubtful.
124 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY,
is the highest possible, the evidence of Conscious-
ness. On this supposition, to doubt their exist-
ence is absurd ; for we have seen that to doubt
our Consciousness involves a contradiction. This,
assuredly, is to take up an high position in de-
fence of the material world, but can it be main-
tained ?
6. An absurd opinion, once fairly stated, is
all but refuted. We have seen that Mind and
Matter are separated from each other by a gulf,
broad, deep, impassable; that both indeed are Sub-
stances, or something permanent amid innumer-
able modifications, though their qualities are not
only different, but opposed, and incompatible.
We have also observed, that Consciousness is a
general term for all the Mental Phenomena, and
for them alofte, applicable alike to Sensations,
Emotions, and Thoughts ; but not to Matter nor
to any quality thereof. Thus we say that we are
conscious of Sensation, Emotion and Thought ;
but to affirm that we are conscious of Extension
or Solidity is a contradiction to the meaning
which we had attached to the term Consciousness,
and, therefore, absurd. Agreeably to that mean-
ing, if we be conscious of Extension, then Exten-
sion is a mental quality, which is surely absurd.
Or if Extension be allowed to be a mental quality,
then, as it is certainly a bodily quality, it must
be both, which is a palpable absurdity, unless
mind and body be alike, or at least not very
EVIDENCE AFFORDED BY PERCEPTION. 125
different. This, then, is the only supposition
consistent with the opinion that we immediately
know, or in other words, are conscious of matter,
a supposition which, by confounding matter and
mind, upsets the very foundation of Metaphysics,
undoes all the work begun in modern times by
Des Cartes, and continued by so many others.
In short, the theory of Immediate Perception
leadg either to absurdity or materialism ; so,
" choose your horn."
7. It remains for us to consider the other and
almost universal opinion that the knowledge of
external nature which we derive from Perception
is not immediate but mediate, or, as it is some-
times called, representative, in opposition to the
former, which is styled presentative ; the object, in
the one case, being supposed to be known through
something which represents it ; in the other, at
once, by itself; as England is ruled by a House
of Commons, an assembly of delegates, while
Athens was governed by the whole body of
Citizens. This opinion, however, admits of three
varieties.
8. The first variety is that the medium of
Communication between Mind and Matter is
something called Sensible Species, passing from
the outward object to the mind, but distinct from
both, of an anbiguous nature, but commonly sup-
posed not to be quite mental. This opinion, as
we have seen, was long prevalent in the schools,
]26 PllINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY.
and has been attributed to Aristotle, though, as
it seems, without sufficient grounds ;'' but, as it
is now universally exploded, we shall not trouble
our readers with a serious refutation thereof. It
was evidently a mere hypothesis without proof,
invented to explain, as was thought, the action
of matter upon mind, by bridging over the gulf
between them. The supposition of a third some-
thing, neither quite matter nor quite mind, was
purely imaginary, and injurious to Philosophy, as
tending to soften down the distinction between
Mind and Matter.
9. The second opinion is that the medium of
communication between Mind and Matter is
something called an Idea, itself a mental phe-
nomenon, and therefore a fit subject for con-
sciousness, and yet distinct from the Mind, and
capable of existing even independent of Con-
sciousness. Such was the opinion of Des Cartes
and his followers, of Malebranche and Berkeley ;
but whether it were entertained by Locke is at
least doubtful.' Reid certainly supposes that all
^ See on this subject .Sir William Hamilton's Notes to the
various Chapters on Perception, in his edition of Reid's Works.
' The language of Locke is so figurative and various that it
is very difficult to determine what was his real opinion on this
point. My own belief is that a person unacquainted with the
above theory of Ideas would not detect it in Locke ; but knowing,
as we do, that the theory was then the prevailing one, 'we may
EVIDENCE AFFORDED BY TERCEPTION. 127
modern philosophers previous to himself held the
opinion ; though in this he may be mistaken.
10. But, 1. Where is the proof of this hypo-
thesis ? That Ideas exist even independent of
consciousness is certainly incapable of proof, for
by consciousness alone we know them, and along
with it they seem to come and go. Even when a
similar idea recurs, we have no proof that it is the
same. It is not like an outward object to which
we can return and find it as before. The idea
vanishes, and, as far as appears, for ever. But
this supposes a constant creation of Ideas, or
rather of Thoughts. Why not"? Is not a recur-
rence of the same Idea quite as incomprehensible
as the creation of a new one '? If the Idea were
laid up, as in store, we might hope to find it again
when we wish ; but we know that often we
cannot.
11. And 2. What necessity is there for this
hypothesis ? What does it explain ? The con-
interpret the language of our gi'eat metaphysician in its favour ;
particularly as he never attempts to refute it. Of late years there
has rather been a tendency to depreciate Locke, but in spite of all
that has since been written, the Essay on the Human Understand-
ing is still the gi'eat English work on Mental Philosophy, as the
Wealth of Nations is on Political Economy. The prophecy of
Hume has hitherto certainly not been fulfilled, that "Addison
perhaps may be read when Locke shall be utterly forgotten." The
style and subject of Addison are popular, but he describes manners
which have changed already ; while the subject of Locke, the Mind
of Man, is still the same.
128 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
nection between Mind and Matter ? By no
means ; this is quite as inexplicable as before. Is
it more unaccountable that Matter should act
directly on Mind, than through an Idea? In fact
we have two difficulties instead of one. We have
first to suppose that Matter rouses a dormant
Idea, and then that the Mind becomes conscious
thereof. There remains the fundamental diffi-
culty, how the material can affect the immaterial ;
for surely it is as hard to suppose that Matter
should rouse a sleeping Idea as stir up the Mind
itself, the Idea and the Mind being both imma-
terial. The hypothesis then is without proof, as
well as quite gratuitous, it complicates the sim-
plicity of nature and yet explains nothing, re-
moves no difficulty.
12. The third and most simple variety of the
Representative Theory is the one which supposes
that the medium of communication between us
and the outward world is nothing more than a
fleeting modification of mind itself, having no
existence out of Consciousness. This fleeting
modification we call a Perception, which is dis-
tinguished from Perception only in this, that the
word, when used without the indefinite Article,
signifies a permanent Power or Faculty from
which innumerable particular and passing Per-
ceptions are supposed to flow. But, between a
Perception and a particular act of Perception
there is no difference. The act, or state of mind,
EVIDENCE AFFORDED BY PERCEPTION. 129
— call it what you will, — is one and indivisible ;
being simply a modification of mind, of which we
are conscious, and which dies with that con-
sciousness.
1 3. For the truth of this theory, if theory it
be, we can appeal confidently to experience, the
experience of Consciousness, the supreme arbiter
in all metaphysical questions. We maintain that
the above gives a correct statement of all we
know on the subject, all of which we are con-
scious, while other Theories are either contra-
dictory or fanciful. The simplicity of this account
ought also to plead for its adoption.
1 4. A correct analysis of the process of Per-
ception is sufficient to put this truth in a very
clear point of view. We have seen that Per-
ception consists of tv;o parts, Sensation and
Perception proper, the one preceding, the other
following with inconceivable rapidity, so as only
to be separated by reflection. Now, were we to
adopt the theory of Immediate Perception of
objects, a theory, however, which by me is incon-
ceivable, because contradictory ; still, our know-
ledge of nature being obtained through our Sen-
sations, that is through a medium, after all, it
would not be immediate. Here then is another
contradiction. And if abandoning immediate
Perception we cling to Sensible Species, or to
Ideas, then, as these are supposed to be the im-
mediate object of the mind, they must come be-
s
130 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
tween the Sensation and the act of Perception.
Thus, instead of Sensation and Perception pro-
per, we should have Sensation, Species, or else
Idea, and Perception proper ; on the one supposi-
tion, that of Species, a semi-material something
being interposed between two purely mental
states ; on the other, that of Idea, a permanent
immaterial something intervening between two
fleeting mental phenomena. Forced and un-
natural combinations !
15. But the important question still remains
undecided. If we reject the theory of Immediate
Perception, if we deny that we immediately know
or are conscious of external nature, on what evi-
dence do we believe in the existence of matter.
16. The evidence of consciousness being set
aside, can the existence of matter be said to be self-
evident, like the axioms of geometry, such as that
two lines cannot enclose a space ? Certainly not.
For aught we know, all appearances might be the
same, supposing matter not to exist ; we cannot
pronounce this absurd a priori. Who shall limit
the power of God, and say that he could not have
given us such and such notions, in any way he
pleased, without the creation of another world, a
world of matter? In short we see intuitively the
truth of mathematical axioms, we cannot doubt
these; but we do not see intuitively that the
notion and belief of matter necessarily imply its
EVIDENCE AFFORDED BY PERCEPTION. 131
existence. Why should an immaterial phenome-
non suppose of necessity a material one ?
17. Is, then, our belief in the external ^vorld
founded on Reasoning, or can it be supported
thereby ? That it is not founded on reasoning, in
the first instance, is clear from all that has here
been said on Perception. Our belief in the world
without arises from the Sensation of Touch, at
a very early age, long before our reasoning
powers have become developed. And wise indeed
is this provision, for such belief is necessary to
our preservation at every age ; and had it de-
pended on reasoning, we should have perished
prematurely.
18. Neither is our belief in the outward
world founded on Experience. We certainly ex-
perience certain Sensations, and we can recognise
others as similar when they recur, but experience
can never inform us that the cause or occasion of
these Sensations is an extended solid object with-
out the mind. Since then the existence of matter
is not known by Consciousness, nor self-evident,
nor learnt by Reasoning, or by Experience, it
must be considered as an original or fundamental
Article of Belief.^
19. Though not originating in reasoning,
may not our belief in matter be afterwards con-
' The subject of Fundamental Articles of Belief is discussed
in the Chapters " Of Memory," and " Of Belief."
132 PKINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
firmed and justified thereby? That is a distinct
question. Rational grounds for believing we
think that we have, and, if so, we have reasons,
probable indeed, not demonstrative, indirect
rather than direct, sufficient to obviate the objec-
tion that we believe without any proof, but not
enough to silence all scepticism.
20. On what ground, then, can we defend
our belief in matter ? Simply on this, Universal
Consent. That which all men, in all ages, at all
periods of life, from infancy upwards, have be-
lieved without doubt, without hesitation, must be
assumed to be true. That we take for a first
Principle ; and some first Principles must be
granted, or we can arrive at no knowledge, ex-
cept in the Science of Mathematics or Quantity,
where first principles are Self-evident. All other
branches of knowledge start from data not self-
evident, which, however, must be taken as true,
for otherwise, reasoning would have no Premises.
The attempt to prove every thing is therefore
absurd. Fundamental propositions admit of no
proof, they are either self-evident or not^ but
since they are first propositions, there can be no-
thing prior whereby tliey may be proved. We
assume then as a First or Fundamental Proposi-
tion, that " Whatever is and has been universally
believed is worthy of credit." But the existence
of the material world is and has been universally
believed ; therefore, it is worthy of credit.
EVIDENCE AFFORDED BY PERCEPTION. 133
21. Scepticism may be quite as great an
abuse of the Understanding as Credulity. To
doubt or disbelieve out of place is as much op-
posed to right reason as ill-founded belief. Now,
as to doubt or reject all fundamental propositions
not self-evident leads to universal scepticism or
universal ignorance, it must be an abuse of the
Understanding. Man was evidently made for
decision and action, his very being depends
upon them, and therefore he will and must be-
lieve something.
22. But here an objection presents itself. It
may be said, and has been said, you may plead
universal consent, provided it be consistent with
itself and with your own theory, but not so if it
be inconsistent with either. In the former case,
universal consent must be rejected as a solid
ground of belief, — in the other, your theory must
fall. " Thus," says Hume, " do you follow the
instinctive propensities of your nature in assent-
ing to the veracity of Sense. But these lead you
to believe, that the very perception or sensible
image is the external object. Do you disclaim
this principle in order to embrace a more rational
opinion, that the Perceptions are only repre-
sentations of something external ? You here de-
part from your natural propensities and more
obvious sentiments ; and yet are never able to
satisfy your reason, which can never find any
convincing argument from experience to prove
134 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY,
that the Perceptions are connected with any ex-
ternal Object."''
23. Such is the objection in full, and it places
us in this dilemma, either we hold fast by uni-
versal consent, and in so doing must adopt the
vulgar opinion, that the " very perception, or sen-
sible image is the external object;" or retaining
the theory of representation, we must allow univer-
sal opinion to be inconsistent therewith, and only
partially true. In a word, we have only to choose
between Absurdity and Scepticism ; for the com-
mon opinion, as so stated, is absurd ; and, if we
reject it and retain our theory, then, universal
consent, being allowed false in one case, cannot
be relied on in another. A pretty dilemma for-
sooth ! Which horn shall we choose ? '
24. But is it true that the " instincts and
propensities of our nature lead us to believe that
the very perception or sensible image is the ex-
ternal object." There lies all the question. This
is assumed, but can it be granted ? By no means :
we deny it altogether. No man ever believed
such a proposition. The vulgar are not professed
Metaphysicians, they never read Locke, Hume,
or Reid ; but they know enough not to confound
^ Hume's Essays: " Of the Academical oi- Sceptical Philosophy."
K' Pyrrhonism or Absurdity; choose your horn," says Sir
William Hamilton. "Discussions on Philosophy," Art. ii.
EVIDENCE AFFOHDED BY PERCEPTION. 135
mind with matter. In looking at any object, say
a tree, their attention is fixed upon the external
object, and on that alone ; and in general they
reflect not for a moment upon the operation going
on in their own minds. Of the perception, or
" sensible image," they make no account. They
pass over it to reach the object, seldom dwelling
enough upon the former to make it the subject of
a proposition. But, wherever the mental state
does occur to them, as sometimes it will, then
common language clearly separates the perception
from the external object. They say, all men say,
" I perceive a tree," or in other words, " I have a
perception of a tree," for the phrases are convert-
ible in common language ; and here the mental
phenomenon, the perception, or " sensible image,"
as Hume calls it, is expressly distinguished from
the material object, the tree. We also say, "let me
see such a thing," or, " let me have a sight of it,"
where again, the sight, which is mental, is clearly
distinguished from the material thing. It is,
therefore, altogether untrue, that "The instincts
and propensities of our nature lead us to believe
that the very perception or sensible image is the
external object," and, consequently, the objection
founded thereon falls to the ground. We are not
then reduced to the dilemma above stated ; we
need neither adopt this absurdity, nor, by allowing
that those instincts and propensities give us the
lie in one particular, deprive them of all credit in
136 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY.
another. The evidence of those instincts and pro-
pensities becomes agreeable to reason, and con-
sistent with itself; it justifies our belief in the
outward world, and confirms the representative
theory.
25. Universal consent being allowed true to
itself, as well as consistent with the only rational
theory of Perception, it may still be objected, that
universal consent is but a poor foundation for
knowledge, blind universal consent, at least, like
that in the existence of matter, which is not a
self-evident truth, nor established by reasoning,
or by experience. Where universal consent de-
pends upon the exercise of our Reason, as in the
case of Belief in a God or Gods, there it will be
allowed to be a good ground for conviction ; for
what appears rational to all men, at all times, and
in all countries, can hardly be supposed untrue,
without depreciating Reason altogether. But,
when Belief is a mere instinct, why should we
trust it? Practically, this belief may be useful,
nay, necessary to our preservation; but, for all
that, may it not be a deception, a salutary decep-
tion no doubt, a beneficent cheat, a trick of na-
ture, more solicitous for our safety than for the
accuracy of our speculative knowledge *?
26. To this we answer that belief, in general,
founded on " the instincts and propensities of our
nature," is justified, as far as it can be, by sub-
sequent Experience, and, therefore, the particular
EVIDENCE AFFORDED BY PERCEPTION. 137
belief now in question. We see no reason to sup-
pose that the present state of things is one vast
cheat. On the contrary, we find by experience
that we can rely upon the course of nature, that,
generally speaking, we can so far foresee events as
to direct our actions towards the attainment of
certain ends with a fair prospect of success ; that
one line of conduct may be predicted to terminate
in ruin, another in triumph ; in short, that we are
Nature's children, not her fools. We have then
no reason to suppose that any universal original
belief is fallacious, in particular, our belief in the
material world ; on the contrary, we have strong
reason to believe them true. Experience is de-
cidedly in favour of the truthfulness of Nature.
It strongly repels the supposition that the material
world is but a pageant, unsubstantial as the vision
of Prospero.
27. But to say that the Belief in question is
Universal, is to put the case too feebly, for this
Belief is not only Universal, but irresistible, an
essential part of our mental being, of which no
one, not even the greatest Sceptic, can divest
himself. It clings to us from infancy to age with
unfailing pertinacity, and those who dispute it,
dispute against their own conviction. To deny
in words what no one can doubt in reality, must
surely he intellectual perversity. It is in fact to
belie our nature. Nor is this the only instance
of Belief at once universal and irresistible. It is
T
138 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
one, but only one of the fundamental articles of
our creed, of which the criteria or tests will be
given under the head of Memory. Now w^e can-
not reject one of these A.rticles and retain the
rest. If we give up Matter, we must also abandon
our Belief of uniformity in the Constitution
and Course of Nature, our Trust in Memory,
nay, our Personal Identity, for all these rest on
the same foundation. Then we shall doubt of
every thing, except the present Sensation, Emotion,
or Thought ; the very doubting of which implies
contradiction ; and we shall approach the absolute
goal, the final discovery of Hegel and Oken, the
consummation of all Philosophy, Nothing :
" And Naught
Is ev'ry thing, and ev'ry thing is Naught ! "
28. With the following observations relative
to the Sensitive part of the process in Perception,
we conclude the present subject. Observe, first,
that Sir William Hamilton, in his doctrine of
Immediate Perception, entirely overlooks Sensa-
tion; for how can the perception of outward
objects be immediate, if a sensation intervene
between the external object and our knowledge
thereof? Observe, secondly, that pure Idealism,
as well as all Scepticism about the existence of
the material world, may be traced to the neglect
of Sensation, as antecedent to Perception proper.
The Sensation, being in itself unimportant, in the
EVIDENCE AFFORDED BY PERCKPTION. 139
case of the primary qualities of matter, is apt to
be over-looked. Hence pure Idealism. But,
allowing the Sensation, the question then arises
whence comes it? from the mind itself*? does the
mind then create Sensation of itself? if not, it
must come from something else ; i.e from the
non-mental and material."* Observe, thirdly, as
the neglect of Sensation has given rise to Idealism,
so too great attention to Sensation has produced
Sensationalism, and the doctrine of Condillac.
All mental phenomena depend, originally, on Sen-
sation ; but, for all that, all mental phenomena
are not Sensations. Sensation rouses the dormant
faculties of the mind, which without it might have
slumbered for ever, and it is therefore the occa-
sion of them all, that is, an aiding cause, essential,
though not principal, and yet the only original
cause which we can trace. There is, then, but
one assignable origin of our ideas, namely, Sensa-
tion, not two, as Locke supposes, for those opera-
" The only other possible supposition is, that Sensation in us,
in all men, nay, in all animals, is caused by an Omnipresent
Mind, that is by Deity. It was this view of the case, no doubt,
that led Berkeley to believe that in annihilating matter he levelled
Atheism. Sensation is a fact that must have a cause, material or
immaterial ; and, therefore, the former being removed, the latter
remains ; and as the cause, like the effect, must be every where
present, that Cause is God. Berkeley did not deny that the
universal and irresistible belief of mankind was worthy of credit ;
but he boldly asserted that the vulgar did not believe in matter,
— that it was an invention of philosophers !
140 PRINCIPLES OF PSTCHOLOGY,
tions of the mind which form the subject for Re-
flection, and, hence, Reflection itself, depend so
much upon Sensation that without it they would
never have been. But the ideas of Reflection of
Locke prove that he was no Sensationalist, that
he held that we have Ideas very different from
Sensations ; and that alone is important. This
being allowed, the question — whether or not Re-
flection should be considered a Second Source of
our Ideas, is of less consequence. It can scarcely
be an original and independent source, because,
those operations of the mind on which we are
supposed to reflect must be prior to Reflection,
and those very operations, which might more pro-
perly be considered as a source, are themselves
originally dependant on Sensation, though widely
diiferent from it, as an Eff^ect often differs alto-
gether from its Cause. The mind once roused
by Sensation, afterwards rises high above it, and
soars into regions, far, far removed from the low
and vulgar occasion of its first development.
29. With one observation more, we close the
present Chapter. Since all Perception supposes
that some object or objects are within the range
of our senses, and that some impression is actually
made upon the material organ by the object, either
immediately, or mediately, therefore, all Percep-
tions are of things particular and really existing.
There is no general, no abstract Perception. This,
again, shews us that, in the order of mental de-
PERCEPTION. 141
velopment, Perception is the earliest power of
Thought.
SUPPLEMENT TO CHAPTER THIRD.
OP PERCEPTION.
Since the above chapter was written, I have
made up my mind, chiefly from reading Locke's
Posthumous work — " An examination of P^re
Malebran die's opinion of seeing all things in
God," that our great Metaphysician did not en-
tertain the Ideal Theory, properly so called, the
theory which supposes Ideas to be something im-
material, yet distinct from the mind, and continu-
ing to exist, even out of our Consciousness. To
this theory, held by Des Cartes and others after
him, Malebranche and Berkeley added something
of their own, namely, that these Ideas, when not
present to our minds, exist in the Mind of the
Deity. This opinion was common to jMalebranche
and Berkele}^ though they differed in this, that
the former supposed that we saw the Ideas of out-
ward material objects in God, while the latter
maintained that there were no outward material
objects, and that Ideas were not seen in God, but
were suggested by God. From the opinion of
Malebranche, who denied that we could see ma-
terial objects directly, to that of Berkeley, who
denied that there were any such objects to see,
142 PEINCIPLKS OF PSYCHOLOGY.
there was but one, and an easy, step. Now, that
Locke held the Ideal Theory, under any of these
modifications, I utterly disbelieve ; and I think
that the above tract establishes the point. I am,
indeed, aware that a highly-gifted metaphysician,
of the present day, has deduced from one passage
of that work a conclusion diametrically opposed
to mine, but, as I humbly think, erroneously. In
Sir William Hamilton's ''Discussions on Philoso-
phy," Art. ii., a quotation is made from the " Ex-
amination," to show that Locke would not allow a
Sensation to be a modification of our Soul as Male-
branche called it ; " and if," argues Sir William,
" Locke ridicules even the opinion which merely
reduces the secondary qualities to mental states,
a fortiori^ and this on the jjrincijyles of his own 2)hil-
osojyhj/, must he be held to reject the doctrine
which would reduce, not only the non-resembling
sensations of the secondary, but even the re-
sembling, and consequently, extended ideas of the
primary qualities of matter, to modifications of
the immaterial unextended mind. " All I can
say is, that such is not Locke's own inference ;
and if my much esteemed and now deeply la-
mented friend had extended his quotation, only
to one sentence more, he would have seen that
the conclusion drawn by Locke is quite dif-
ferent. Locke is arguing, and no doubt errone-
ously, against Malebranche's distinction between
Sentiment (Sensation) and Idea in Perception, a
PERCEPTION. 143
distinction in accordance with our own between
Sensation and Conception ; and he attempts to
confound the two, and instead of saying that if
Sensation be not a Modification of the Soul much
less is an Idea on the contrary he argues, if a
Sensation be a Modification of our Soul, so like-
wise must be an Idea. Either both are modifica-
tions, or neither ; in this respect they are alike.
The concluding sentences of the section which
prove this are the following ; — " But let it finodi-
jication) signify what it will, when I recollect the
figure of one of the leaves of a violet, is not that
a new Modification of my Soul as when I think of
its purple colour^ Does my mind do or suffer
nothing a-new when I see that figure in God '? "
(Sec, 39). And the same strain of argument is
repeated in Sec. 48., the object of which is to
confound the distinction between Sensation and
Idea, and to show that if the formerbe a Modi-
fication of the Soul, so is the latter, and, conse-
quently, if we have not the Sensation of material
things in God, as Malebranche allows, neither do we
see Ideas in God. This, then, affords no evidence
of Locke's belief in the Ideal Theory, nay, rather a
proof of the contrary ; for, as no one ever main-
tained that Sensations had an existence out of Con-
sciousness, Locke, by assimilating Ideas and Sensa-
tions, showed that he did not hold the separate and
permanent existence of the former. Another and
more direct proof of the same is afforded by Sec. 1 7
144 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY.
of the same "Examination," where Locke prints in
italics, evidently as a startling proposition, the
opinion of Malebranche, who considered it as an
absurdity to think that Ideas are annihilated when
they are not present to the mind.
The following passage affords a strong proof that
Locke did not hold the Ideal Theory. " One who
thinks Ideas are nothing but perceptions of the
mind annexed to certain motions of the body by
the will of God, who ordered such perceptions
always to accompany such motions, though we
know not how they are produced, does in effect
conceive those Ideas or Perceptions to be only
Passions of the Mind when produced in it,
whether we will or no, by external objects. But
he conceives them to be a mixture of Action and
Passion when the mind attends to them or re-
vives them in the Memory." Sect. 15. Now, I
would ask, could one who held the Ideal Theory
use such language ^ Could he call Ideas Percep-
tions % Could he call them Passions of the Mind ■?
According to that theory an Idea is not a Per-
ception, but the immediate object of the mind in
the act of Perception ; still less, on the same
theory, could an Idea be called a Passion of the
Mind.
CONCIRP'I IO\. 145
CHAPTER IV.
OF CONCEPTION
SECTION FIRST.
OF CONCEPTION IN GENERAL.
1. In the preceding Chapter we unavoidably
touched upon Conception ; inasmuch as Concep-
tion is comprised in every act of Perception.
We shall not, therefore, recur to what has been
said on that point; but, observing tliat all Con-
ceptions are either Original or Derivative^ we
shall in this Chapter treat chiefly of the latter;
though whatever may be said of Conception in
general must be applicable to both. Original
Conceptions are those comprehended under Per-
ception, while all others are Derivative, because
they are derived from the former. No doubt
these words imply a Theory, for the truth of
which we must refer to the last Section of this
Chapter.
2. Conception, then, in the widest sense ad-
missible, means that Mental Power whereby we
obtain the thought of things separate, or apart, as
much as possible, from any relation with anything
u
146 PllINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
else. Thus, single words, or words equivalent to
one, correspond to Conceptions or Notions (for
these terms we use as perfectly synonymous) ;
such as man, tree, house, mountain, substance,
time, space. No doubt. Conceptions and Rela-
tions are generally mixed up together in those
compound states of mind of which we are con-
scious. But it is the business of the Metaphysi-
cian to analyse and examine separately what is
really united ; just as it becomes the Chemist to
analyse common salt into Chlorine and Sodium,
and treat of each apart, though neither is often
found by itself. Now Relative Thoughts cannot
exist without Conceptions, for if we see a Rela-
tion it must be between two things at least of
which we have Conceptions ; but Conceptions
may, without contradiction, be supposed to arise
without the Thought of Relation. Consequently,
non-relative Ihoughts or Conceptions ought to
be treated of before the Relative.
3. We must then be careful not to confound
Conception with Co7?iprehens{on, as Reid has done,^
to the darkening of this subject; for Compre-
hension implies Relation, But Comprehension is
not Judgment, for it may exist without any de-
cision as to Truth or Untruth, without either
Belief or Disbelief. Thus, when I read for the
first time the enunciations of the propositions
* See Reid's " Intellectual Powers," Essay IV., Cha])ter iii.
coxcErTiOxX. 147
of Euclid, for instance, that of the fifth of the
first book — that the angles at the base of an
isosceles triangle are equal, I perfectly compre-
hend the statement, though I can pass no judg-
ment upon it before I have gone through the
proof. Thus is Comprehension distinguished from
Judgment, as also from Conception, which is non-
relative. We may therefore say with propriety
that we comprehend the enunciation of any
relation, but not that we conceive it. We shall
afterwards find that this distinction is important
in fixing the criterion of truth.
4. All propositions aflirm or deny that some
Relation exists between two things ; propositions
must therefore be either true or false ; but Con-
ceptions affirm or deny nothing, and therefore
they cannot be pronounced false or true. Dis-
tinct or confused they may be, clear or obscure,
lively or dull, adequate or inadequate, real or
imaginative, but to predicate truth or falsehood
of them is contradictory, and therefore illogical.
5. Neither does Conception necessarily imply
that there is any object in nature corresponding
to it; for we can form Conceptions of monsters,
such as. Centaurs, mermaids, griffins, winged bulls
and lions, etc., which have no real existence.
One kind of Conceptions alone has always some
real material object, namely, those which we have
called Original, that form an element of Percep-
tion. Nothing is so free as Conception, it can
150 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
power by which sucli notions are framed is pro-
perly called the Imagination^ and it is a species or
variety of Conception. Where the objects have
no real existence in nature, they are said to be
Imaginary, and the notion of them must be
Imaginative ; but, are the notions of things which
really exist, though they have never been per-
ceived by the individual, also to be classed as
Imaginative *?
4. Here it seems desirable to enter more into
the nature of Imagination, to fix what is proper
to it, and to show how it differs from Fancy, with
which it is apt to be confounded. To judge from
the etymology of the word we may suppose that
originally Imagination was limited to the power
of conceiving visible objects, to the power of
Visual Conception, as we may call it, for none but
visible objects present to the mind anything like
an Imago or Image. But, in course of time, this
original signification received two modifications,
the one a limitation, the other an extension.
Visible objects, when actually present and per-
ceived, are now never said to be imagined^ but
see7i ; and some Conceptions other than visual are
said to be the work of Imagination. Nay more,
when visible objects, no longer present and per-
ceived, are conceived in their absence just as
they were formerly seen, no exercise of Imagina-
tion is supposed. But, when visible objects,
never before seen by the individual, are pre-
PARTICULAR CONCEPTIONS. 15 1
sented to his mind as if they had once actually
been seen, whether such objects really exist in
nature or not, then Imagination is said to be at
work. Thus, to me who have never seen the
Acropolis of Athens, or the Pyramids of Egypt,
it requires an effort of Imagination to picture
them in my mind, as well as to conceive fabulous
and unnatural animals, fairy scenes, and palaces
of enchantment ; a less effort, perhaps, in the
one case than in the other, but of the same sort ;
while to conceive Mont Blanc or the Bliimlis
Alp demands no such effort, for I have seen
them. The existence or non-existence of the
object is clearly immaterial, so far as the nature
of the mental effort is concerned, provided I have
not seen it or something very like it ; for what is
it to me whether the Shield of Achilles, the Palace
of the Sun, or the Gardens of Armida, ever really
existed or not '? On either supposition must I
not imagine them ?
Moreover, Imagination is not limited to Visual
Conceptions, for new combinations of Sound
in music are universally attributed to this
faculty ; and we can even imagine, though in a
far less degree, tastes and smells somewhat dif-
ferent from those which we have actually experi-
enced. In like manner, the Dramatist, the Poet,
and the Novelist, imagine Emotions similar, no
doubt, to such as they have felt, but considerably
modified, especially in intensity. Thus, upon the
152 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
whole, Imagination is that Faculty whereby we
form Conceptions of outward objects which we
have never perceived, or of Sensations and Emo-
tions which we have never felt. Fancy, on the
other hand, is the Faculty whereby we discover
new Relations, especially relations of resemblance,
between things. Imagination, then, is concerned
with new Conceptions, Fancy with new Rela-
tions. This seems to be the fundamental distinc-
tion. Remark only that Relations of Fancy must
be new, striking, unexpected, between things
which really differ widely. Thus, Fancy is the
very soul of both Poetry and Wit. In the one
case, the resemblances are sublime and beautiful ;
in the other ludicrous.
5. It is clear that all the Conceptions com-
prised in Perception are real ; but all real Con-
ceptions are not included in Perception ; for the
notions of things formerly perceived are also real.
Consequently real Notions are of two kinds ; the
Original and the Derivative.
6. Thus, starting from the division of Con-
ceptions into Particular and General, and sub-
dividing the Particular into Real and Imaginative,
we arrive at the Original and Derivative as a
further sub-division of the former ; while, in the
opening of this Chapter, w^e mentioned that all
Conceptions might be divided in the first instance
into Original and Derivative. These, then, are
two Classifications quite distinct, and we might
PAHTICIJL^VR CONCEPTIONS. 153
have carried out either ; but we prefer the one
on which we are now engaged, partly because it
does not imply any theory at the outset, partly
because it seems more natural ; for, on the other
system, many of our particular conceptions must
be arranged along with general conceptions, un-
der the head of Derivative, though they widely
differ, and separated from other particular con-
ceptions which they closely resemble. The no-
tion of a tree, as perceived, is surely very like to
the notion of the same tree no longer present to
the senses ; yet, on the other system, they must
be classed apart ; and though this latter con-
ception is very different from the abstract con-
ceptions of Substance, Time and Space, yet, as
Derivative, they must be arranged together. That
system, then, is less natural than the one we have
adopted. It is scarcely necessary to add that all
Imaginative Conceptions must be Derivative.
7. Another division of Particular Concep-
tions may be into Visual Conceptions or Con-
ceptions of Sight, whether Original or Derivative,
and the Non-visual.
We have seen that at first Conceptions of
Sight, and these alone, were attributed to the
Imagination,'' and though the sense of this word has
' " Imagination, when it is distinguished from Conception, seems
to me to signify one species of Conception, to wit the Conception of
Visible Objects." Reid's Intellectual Powers. Essay IV. Chap. i.
This was, I believe, the original meaning of Imagination.
X
154 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
since been modijQ.ed, yet it remains true that to the
Conceptions derived from Sight, and to them alone,
whether the Objects be actually seen or only recalled,
the word Image is at all applicable. Of course
the language is still metaphorical, derived from
the image of an object in a glass or in clear water,
but there is an analogy between this and the mental
representation of visible objects, an analogy of
which every one is conscious. And as this analogy
is shared by no other mental representation, it
serves to distinguish the Conception of Yisible
objects, or Visual Conceptions, from all others.
8. Visual Conceptions may be considered as the
grand source of amusement and cheerfulness. To
the great mass of mankind, who are little addicted to
scientific and abstruse pursuits, Visual Conceptions
are the chief intellectual delight ; and to all, with-
out exception, they are a grand resource against
vacancy on the one hand, and too concentrated
thought on the other. Is not light universally con-
sidered cheerful, and darkness gloomy ? and why *?
surely because the one gives us a perpetual succes-
sion of lively Conceptions, the other none. Hence
a principal delight of travelling, riding, driving,
walking, especially through a new country, which
affords us fresh and ever changing conceptions.
Hence the delight of the multitude in shows of all
kinds, even in funeral pomp, and the taste now
manifested universally for illustrated books and
newspapers. If children, as Rousseau says, are led
I'AllTICLLAH CON(:£ITlC)iN> loo
Ijy the mouth, children of a larger growth are led
by the eye. But to none are Visual Conceptions
more valuable than to men of deep research, who,
but for the recreation of the eye and of con-
ceptions borrowed from the eye, might lose theii
intellects from over-exertion. No books are more
generally relished than books of travels ; but these
owe most of their charm to the images which they
suggest. 1'hus, whether we consider the Original or
the Derivative Conceptions of Sight, we shall find
that much of our cheerfulness, nay, much of our
mental health, depends upon them. It has indeed
been remarked that the blind are more cheerful in
society than the deaf. This is natural enough ; for
blindness is not nearly so great an evil in society
as deafness. But, follow the blind man home,
especially to a solitary home, and think you that he
will not be found more dull than the deaf? Deaf-
ness is scarcely any evil in solitude, but blindness
is a perpetual blank. Still, if a man ever did see,
he can always delight his mind with colours and
forms no longer visible, or call up new forms and
new modifications of colour by means of Imagina-
tioD. Thus, the images of Sight, whether Original
or Derived, are particularly important among our
Conceptions, because they fill up so well the ca-
pacity of the mind. They supply vacancy, or
divert from other and engrossing thoughts. And
they are almost always in our power, for we have
only to open our eves and be filled ; or, even in
156 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
absence, or in the dark, we can wander mentally
through regions of beauty or sublimity. " The
Alps, the Appennines, the Pyrenean, and the river
Po," the isles of Greece, the heights of Olympus,
rise up like magic before us.
9. Visual Conceptions may be divided into
the Original and the Derivative, the former being
those Conceptions comprised in Visual Percep-
tion, the latter derived from the former, and
arising without the actual presence of any out-
ward object. Of course. Original Visual Concep-
tions are all real ; but Derivative Visual Con-
ceptions may either be real or imaginative; for
the images of visible objects may recur to us just
as they were at first, or else variously modified
by Imagination.
10. Particular Conceptions are in number
infinite, diversified without end. When in mo-
tion, our Visual Conceptions comprised in Per-
ception vary at every step we take ; and when
we rest with closed eyes, we can call up similar
Conceptions, and even diversify them by Imagi-
nation without limit. The mind is particularly
rich in visual notions, and can recal with pe-
culiar fidelity the images of things formerly seen,
Segnius irritant aiiimos demissa per aurem,
Qnam quae sunt oculis subjccta fidelibus.
1 1. Since Particular Conceptions are in-
numerable, their objects must also for the most
PARTICULAE CONCEPTIONS. I57
part be without names. Though every man has
ci name, yet to every one the vast mass of mankind
is as if nameless ; few animals have individual
names, and but few places. Countries, provinces,
parishes, towns, and villages have names ; but has
each house, each field, each hedge, each individual
tree and bush a name ? And what are they in
number as compared with the various and ever-
changing images arising from groups of these, as
present to the mind in Perception, or simply in
Conception *? Who could give names to all the
visual notions which arise even during a short
walk ?
12. Lastly, Particular Conceptions cannot be
defined, for a definition sets forth a common
nature, that is something common to many indi-
viduals whereby they are distinguished from others.
Thus, when I define a triangle to be a figure with
three sides and three angles, I distinguish it, in
the first instance, as a figure, from every thing
that is not figured ; and next, as having three
sides and three angles, I separate it from all
other figures having a different number of sides,
and angles. Consequently, figure, three sides,
and three angles, constitute a common nature, the
common nature of triangles, and to determine
this is the object of definition. But an Individual
has no common nature, the supposition thereof is
inconsistent wdth the notion of individual, and
therefore a definition in this case is absurd.
158 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
13, Though Individuals cannot be defined,
they may be pointed out so as to be known, either
directly, by name when they have one, or by show-
ing ; or indirectly, by various circumstances con-
nected with them. Thus, though I cannot define
a view, I can conduct my friend to the spot and
then point it out, or I can mention the spot, and tell
him to go there alone. In either of these ways I
can give my friend a perfect Conception of the
prospect, whereas every attempt at description must
have been lamentably incomplete.
14. Thus it appears that Particular Concep-
tions or Notions are innumerable, un-nameable for
die most part, and indefinable.
U.— OF GENERAL CONCEPTIONS.
L— NATURE OF GENERAL CONCEPTIONS.
15. One word before we proceed further on
the use of the term Conception. It has been
proposed by some, in particular by Sir William
Hamilton, to limit the sense of the w^ord to Gen-
eral Notions only ; and a great authority is ap-
pealed to, that of Leibnitz, who distinguishes
spnholical from intuitive knowledge, the former
being " limited to the thought of what cannot be
represented in the imagination, as the thought
suggested by a general term." This, we are told,
GENERAL CONCEPTIONS. 15c)
" is the sense in which Conceptio and Conceptus
have been usually and correctly employed. Mr.
Stewart, on the other hand, arbitrarily limits Con-
ception to the reproduction, in imagination, of an
object of sense as actually perceived;" '^ that is, to
one order of what we call Particular Conceptions.
Thus, while one author excludes Particular Con-
ceptions, and another excludes General Conceptions
from his use of the word, we comprehend both ;
not only because we think that common language
justifies this employment of the term, but also
because Particular and General Conceptions have
something in common, which requires a common
name, and if we reject Conception, we must adopt
another. We might take up Notion^ but as this is
usually employed as synonymous with Conception,
we should create confusion by attempting to dis-
tinguish them. Dr. Brown adopts the w^ord Sug-
gestion, or rather Simple Suggestion^ in opposition
to Relative Suggestion ; but, thus employed, Sug-
gestion is synonymous with Thought, and in no way
preferable. Upon the whole, I can see no good
reason why Conception should not be used as it is
here, distinguishing the different species thereof by
the words Particular and General. Conception, thus
understood, certainly constitutes a natural genus,
and 1 know of no better word to mark the same.
The two species seem to correspond with the Intui-
f See Sir William Hamilton's Reid, p. 360. notp.
160 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
tive and the Symholical thoughts of Leibnitz, the
(pdvTaa-fiaTa and the vorjfjbaTa of the Greeks, the
Anschaungen and the Begrife of the Germans.
16. A-fter these observations on iNJames, we
have next to inquire in what sense any Conceptions
can be called General. All the works of God, every
thing in nature is Particular, how, then, can we
have General Conceptions ^
17- From the above it is clear that, in them-
selves, General Conceptions are particular as much
as those especially so called ; as Mental Phenomena,
Phenomena of which we are conscious, they are
and must be particular. That the Conception
which I actually experience should be the very
same as that of which others are conscious is ab-
surd, for it supposes that my mind and their's is
identical, which is a contradiction.
18. When we talk then of a General Concep-
tion, do we mean that it is general inasmuch as
many individuals participate in similar Conceptions?
This cannot be the meaning, for, in this sense. Par-
ticular Conceptions, being shared by many, may also
be general. Any prospect, being under the eyes
of a crowd of people at one time, is general or
common to all.
19. Since then General cannot refer to the
Conceptions in themselves, it must relate to the
Object of Conception, to the thing conceived, what-
ever that may be. In Particular Conceptions, the
thing conceived is some particular object, as a
GENERAL CONCEPTIONS. \CA
house, a tree, a hill ; while in General Conceptions
the ohject is something general. But we have seen
that every thing in nature, every thing really exist-
ing is Particular, how then can there be General
objects }
20. The answer is, that General objects do not
really exist, any more than mathematical points,
lines and figures ; they are fictitious entities, which
can be conceived, though they exist not. Thus,
though the Conception itself be real, the object
thereof is not. The proper name for these fictitious
entities is Universals. In the old philosophy,
that of the Greeks, the term for these was Idea.
In modern philosophy, the word Idea has been used
in other senses : but originally it meant the same
as Universal.
21. With respect to the nature of Universals,
many, long, and bitter have been the disputes.
The opinions on this subject may be classed under
three heads, two extremes, and one the mean ; and
accordingly we have Realists, Nominalists, and
Conceptualists.
22. Plato and his followers, who were Realists,
par excellence, maintained that all the particular
objects around us are changeable and fluctuating
perpetually, and, consequently, that these could
afford no foundation for real Science; but they
held that above them are objects permanent and
immutable amid all the changes of sensible objects;
and, therefore, alone worthy of the attention of
Y
162 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
Philosophers. These are Ideas or Universals, which
existed in the mind of the Deity before any indi-
vidual was created, and were the models or patterns
according to which all particular things were made ;
which now exist entire, without separation or divi-
sion in every individual of a species ; and which,
though hidden from sense, may be contemplated by
the human intellect.
23. Such is the Realistic Theory in the ex-
treme, and though, when understood literally, it is
too absurd to deserve refutation, yet, figuratively
taken, it well represents the truth. It is quite true
that individuals change or perish, while general laws
are constant ; and it is also true that Science has to
do with generals not with particulars, which are
useful only as the means of arriving at general
results. It is also rational to suppose that the con-
ception of all things must have been present to the
mind of the Deity before he actually created them,
just as every man has a plan in his head before he
undertakes any work. This plan then is an object
of Intellect, not an object of Sense. And, whatever
is common to a Species must exist entire in every
individual of that species. Thus, the Realistic
Theory of Plato, interpreted figuratively, exactly
describes the truth. There was but one error, that
of supposing that Ideas or Universals had a real
existence. May we express a doubt whether Plato
actually understood his own theory in the literal
sense *? It would require a more intimate acquaint-
GENERAL CONCEPTIONS. 1G3
ance with the works of that sage than 1 can boast to
give a decisive answer to this question.
24. As an instance of the opposite extreme, we
may take the opinion of Hobbes, who maintains
that Universals are Names and nothing more.
Thus,- in his " Human Nature," he says, " It is
plain, therefore, that there is nothing Universal but
names."^ And again in the Leviathan, " There
being nothing in the world universal but names;
for the things named are every one of them indi-
vidual and singular. One universal name is im-
posed on many things, for their similitude in some
quality, or other accident ; and whereas a proper
Name bringeth to mind one thing only, Universals
recal any of those many.'""
25. The above may be taken as specimens of
the Realist and Nominalist opinions in the extreme ;
but between them lies another which is called Con-
ceptualism. The Conceptualist believes not that
there are in nature real entities corresponding to
General Conceptions; nor yet will he allow that
there is nothing general but Names. He main-
tains that Names without Conceptions attached to
them are a contradiction, that a Name must have
meaning of some kind, or it is a mere senseless
combination of letters, as paufory ; that there may
be disputes as to what is implied by a word, but
s " Human Nature," Chap. v. Sec. 6.
^ " Levialhan," Part I. Chap. iv.
164 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
no question whether it implies anything. General
Names, then, must have some general meaning
attached to them, and as names stand not for
propositions, that meaning must designate some
object "without expressing Relation with another
object, that is, it must be a Notion or Conception
of something. If, then, the name be rightly called
general because it brings to mind many things,
surely the Conception suggested by the Name, and
through which alone the things can be brought to
mind, ought also to be called general. General
Names, then, suppose General Conceptions.
26. But Conceptions suppose an object conceived,
real or unreal. Thus, Particular Conceptions have
always some particular object, either really exist-
ing, or supposed capable of really existing, by
itself, either some man, house, or tree, or an animal
with the head of a man, the body of a lion, and
the wings of an eagle, such as the sculptors of
ancient Nineveh delighted in. Such, however,
cannot be the objects of General Conceptions ; for
how can the Individual be the object of the
General"? This is a contradiction. No doubt a
General Conception may suggest an Individual
man, house, or tree, and from association it often
does : but this is not the object of the General
Conception. Association runs away with our
thoughts even against our will, so that while dis-
coursing of men in general, the image of John or
James may rise up before me, but I should not
GENERAL CONCEPTIONS. 1G5
therefore suppose that these Individuals were the
subject of my speech or writing. The image of
the individual is known to be a merely accidental
visitor, rather interrupting than furthering the pur-
pose 1 have in view. It is on what is common to
all men that my mind is or ought to be fixed,
if I discourse to any advantage ; that is, on the
Universal, which, though founded on natural
resemblances, and derived from an examination of
nature more or less accurate, has itself no real
independent existence. It is, then, a fictitious
entity, fictitious but not arbitrary, for here the
unreal is founded on the real.
27. A General Conception, then, is that which
has for its object an Universal ; and if a Name
may be called General because it suggests many
things, as all allow, a Conception is entitled to
the same epithet because it looks to many.
28. The Conceptualists, then, agree with the
Realists in maintaining that General Conceptions
have General Objects "called Universals, but they
differ from them as to the nature of these Uni-
versals ; the Realists maintaining that Universals
are real things, while the Conceptualists affirm
that they are fictitious, the creatures of man's
intellect, though derived not arbitrarily from
nature and reality. On the other hand, the Con-
ceptualists agree with the Nominalists in discard-
ing Universals as real natures ; but they disagree
with them in maintaining that Conceptions are
166 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
general, quite as much as Names, and in a like
sense ; and also, that Universals, though ficti-
tious entities, may be the objects of human
thought, nay, that they alone are the proper sub-
ject of Science.
29. Though the opinions of the Realists and
Nominalists be both absurd, yet it is not difficult
to account for them, to shew on what foundation
of truth they were built. The Realists were cer-
tainly right in supposing that our General Notions
are founded on reality, or derived from real
distinctions ; but they erroneously thought that
the points of resemblance between things can
have an independent existence. So the Nomi-
nalists were justified in rejecting such independent
existence ; but they were wrong in supposing,
that if there w^ere no General Thing really exist-
ing there could be no General Notion, that is, no
Notion of something common to many things,
cognizable by the intellect, though not really
separable from the things particular.
30. And this error of the Nominalists was
owing in a great degree to a mis -apprehension of
the term Notion or Conception, especially to the
want of a due appreciation of the difference
between Particular and General Conceptions.
They supposed that a General Conception must
have all the properties of one that is Particular,
nay, of a Visual Conception ; that the thing to
which it corresponds ought to be represented by
GENERAL CONCEPTIONS. 167
an image, like any individual object of sight ;
and because this is impossible, because we cannot
picture to ourselves a triangle *' neither oblique
nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor
scalenon, but all and none of these at once," '
therefore they maintained that there could be no
General Conceptions. And much wit was em-
ployed, especially in the Memoirs of Martinus
Scriblerus, to show the absurdity of this universal
triangle, a figure made up of inconsistent parts.
Being asked by his father if he could not frame
the idea of an Universal Lord Mayor, Martin
affirmed " that he had great difficulty to abstract
a lord mayor from his fur gown and gold chain ;
nay, that the horse he saw the lord mayor ride
upon not a little disturbed his Imagination. On
the other hand, Crambe, to show himself of a
more penetrating genius, swore that he could
frame a Conception of a lord mayor, not only
without his horse, gown, and gold chain, but
even without stature, feature, colour, hands,
head, feet, or body, which he supposed was the
abstract of a lord mayor." ^
31. This witty description is enough to show
what a General Conception was supposed to be,
namely, the mental image of something invisible ;
' Locke ; " Essay concerning Human Understanding , "
Book IV., Chap, vii.. Sect. 9.
r «
Memoirs of Mavtinus Scriblerus," Chap VII.
168 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
and as there can be no such Conception, as the
very supposition thereof is absurd, no wonder
that General Conceptions were exploded alto-
gether. Such is the real secret of Nominalism.
It sought in General Conceptions what cannot
be found in them, and therefore supposed that
there is nothing general but Names. But we
have already shown that Names without Concep-
tions are nothing, a mere bundle of letters, and
not words, — that hence Names must have mean-
ing, and if they have meaning, they must suggest
General Conceptions.
32. Many, I have no doubt, who have been
called Nominalists, had the term conception been
clearly explained, would have declared themselves
Conceptualists. But the system of Hume seems
utterly inconsistent with general notions ; and by him
accordingly they were exploded, though he could not
write a sentence without experiencing them. Ac-
cording to that philosopher, all Ideas are derived
from Impressions, of which those are merely Copies,
differing from the originals only in force and vivacity.
Now, as no Impressions can be shown to which
general Notions or Ideas correspond, the inference is
that these are a mere fiction. Thus all our abstract
notions vanish like a dream ; Space, Time, Sub-
stance, Mind, all disappear at once. But common
sense ought to have taught the Philosopher that we
have such notions, or the words would be empty
sounds, and therefore that the system inconsistent
GExMER.VL CONCEPTIOx\S. 1G9
with theii- existence must be false. All Ideas or
notions are not copies of impressions, though some
are, namely, particular notions; but general notions
and relative thoughts arise in the mind on contem-
plating objects without any previous impression, of
which, in any sense, they can be called the copies.
This indeed was allowed by Hume, and hence the
existence of such notions was denied, the last
resource of a faulty theory.
2.— SUBDIVISION OF GENERAL CONCEPTIONS.
33. General Conceptions, though all alike in
certain respects now explained, must differ in
others, and consequently they are of different sorts.
First, they are either Abstract or Concrete; in the
language of Locke, either Modes, or Notions oj
Substances.
34. General Abstract Notions, or Modes, are
notions of such things as cannot exist by them-
selves, even in the case of particulars, while
General Concrete Notions are notions of such
things as have an independent existence in particu-
lar instances, namely, substances.
35. Modes, again, are either Modes of Sub-
stances, in other words, notions of their qualities ;
or else Modes of Quantity, and so independent
of Substance, as the notions of time, space, and
number. And as the differences in qualities are
indefinite, or indeterminate, but in quantity definite
z
170 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
or determinate, therefore the Modes of Substances
may be called indefinite, those of Quantity definite
modes.
36. Lastly, Modes of Substances, or indefinite
modes, are notions either of mental or of bodily
qualities ; while Modes of Quantity or definite
modes, are, as we have seen, notions of time, space,
or number.''
37. Moreover, General Concrete Notions, or
notions of substances, comprehend the notions of
substance in general, of the two kinds, Mind and
Matter, and of all the species of material sub-
stances, in the mineral, vegetable, and animal king-
doms. All these exist in particular instances, of
themselves, without any necessary dependance on
anything else. They are thus essentially dis-
tinguished from the objects of general abstract
notions or modes, which have nothing in nature
corresponding to them, no real and independent
existence, even in particular instances. The quali-
ties of Mind and Matter necessarily depend on their
Substances and cannot exist alone ; while Time,
Space, and Number, if allowed to exist, have cer-
tainly no real existence.
38. Ihe notions of Substances are always
Complex, often comprehending a great number of
'' It will be observed that the word ^lode is rather ambiguous,
inasmuch as it might refer either to the mind conceiving, or to the
object conceived ; but it is here used in the former sense only, as a
short and convenient term for General Abstract Notion.
GENERAL NAMES, ETC. lyj
points, sometimes more, sometimes less, according
to the knowledge of the individual ; but general
abstract notions, or modes, may be either Simple or
Complex. First, Definite modes, or notions of
Quantity, may be either Simple or Complex, as
Space, a Hexagon ; Time, a year ; One, a thousand ;
and so may Indefinite modes or notions of Quali-
ties. Thus the qualities of Extension, Solidity or
Impenetrability, Mobility, Fluidity, Simple Colours,
Tastes, and Smells, are Simple ; and so are the no-
tions corresponding to them ; while the notions of
the virtues and vices, and of many emotions, such
as Love and Gratitude, as well as of all actions in
which Mind and Body concur, as Murder, Robbery,
Adultery ; likewise of innumerable mechanical,
chemical, and vital combinations, and changes, as
Digestion, Nutrition, Circulation, are Complex in a
greater or less degree. Thus, while notions of
Substances are always Complex, modes may be
either Complex or Simple.
3.— GENERAL NAMES, DEFINITION,
AND DESCRIPTION.
39. .Closely connected with the subject of no-
tions or conceptions is that of Names. The
doctrine of Names properly belongs to Logic, but
some notice of them seems indispensable even in a
pure Metaphysical treatise.
172 PEINCIPLES or PSYCHOLOGY.
40. Words are conventional signs of thought,
that is of Conceptions and Relations ; and thoughts
are the Representatives of things. Thus, words
suggest thoughts, and thoughts stand for things.
Words, then, are a sure index of the workings of
the human mind, but not a sure index of things ;
for the workings of the human mind may or may
not be in strict accordance v/ith the nature of
things. Indeed we well know that the thoughts of
man are often fanciful in the highest degree, utterly
at variance with existing things, as the thoughts of
Swift when he wrote "Gulliver's Travels," and those
of the author of the "Arabian Nights,"
41. Words being the signs of thought, it fol-
lows that the divisions of the one must correspond to
those of the other, the classes of words to those of
thoughts. Accordingly, as thoughts are divided
into the non-relative and the relative, or Concep-
tions and Relations', so are words into substantive
and non-substantive.
42. Names, or Nouns Substantive, in the no-
minative case, are words which express something
either actually existing, or supposed to exist, or
imagined as existing, or simply conceived as exist-
ing, independently of other things ; as Mount Etna,
the Mountains of the Moon, Aladdin's Wonderful
Lamp, whiteness, softness, hardness, colour, etc.
All these things can be talked of as existing, whether
they really exist or not, can be talked of as existing
of themselves, whether they do or not, without ab-
GENERAL NAMES. ETC. 1^3
surdity ; and these in Logic we call Names, ia
Grammar, Nouns Substantive, but strictly in the
nominative case only.
43. All other words, even the oblique cases of
Nouns, not only imply relation, but cannot be dis-
coursed of as existing alone. These, then, are
strictly relative words. Thus, as the objects of
Thought are either things, or the relations of
things, and Thoughts themselves either non-rela-
tive or relative, so words are either names, or words
expressive of the affections of names, such as adjec-
tives, verbs, participles. Of Names alone it is here
necessary to speak, because they correspond to
Conceptions.
Name must not be confounded with Tenn^
which is a purely logical word, and signifies any
word which alone can form the subject, or the pre-
dicate, of a proposition. Thus, in the proposition
" Man is mortal ;" mortal, though an adjective, is a
Term. These words are also called in logic Cate-
(/orcmatic, because they can form alone either the
Subject, or the Predicate, of a pure Categorical
Proposition.
44. Nanies, or Nouns Substantive in the nom-
inative case, form the Subject of every discourse,
and in the accusative case the Object, when there is
one, for many sentences have no object. It is clear
that nothing but what exists, or is conceived as ex-
isting, independently, can either create or suiTcr
change. The accusative case is generally marked
174 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY.
in Latin and Greek by a change in the form of the
word, but, in English, only in the case of Pronouns.
Thus, Brutus jugulavit Casarem, can only be ren-
dered into English by Brutus stabbed Cassar ;
though we say, I love him. He loved me. When
the word undergoes a change of form, it becomes
clear that it really is another word ; but, whether
the form change or not, a word in the accusative
case, expressing an Object somehow affected by
something else, is not a simple Name or Noun Sub-
stantive, but the same viewed relatively. The word
Caesarem by itself has no sense at all, and so with
all Accusatives, and other cases.
45. Since Names are the signs of Conceptions,
whatever classification we may adopt for the one,
the same must apply to the other. Thus, as Con-
ceptions are either Particular or General^ so Names
are either Singular or Common. The former are
usually called Proper Naines, and express an indi-
vidual. These, consequently, express things really
existing, or believed, or at least imagined, to exist,
as Ben Nevis, El Dorado, Utopia.
46. Common or General Names, on the other
hand, express universal things, having no real ex-
istence, but only conceived as existing ; and these
make up the mass of the names of every language.
They may be divided, like General Conceptions,
into Abstract and C oncrete ^ ames ; the former ex-
pressing Modes, the latter Substances. "; Names of
modes express either modes of substances, mental
GENERAL NAMES. ETC. 175
or matcrical, and so are Tiuleterminatc, as Whiteness,
Bluencss, Hardness, Softness, Generosity, Charity,
Avarice ; or they express modes of Quantity, and
so are Determinate, as mile, acre, square, circle.
Concrete names, on the other hand, express Sub-
stances, as j\Iind, Body, Animal, Vegetable, Mineral,
Man, Lion, Oak, Ash, Granite, Porphyry, Gold,
Silver, Air, or Water.
47. After these observations on Names in gen-
eral, we shall be better able to discuss the important
subject of Definition, Some Names, as we shall
find, can be defined^ while others cannot ; the objects
expressed by Names can sometimes be described^
sometimes not.
48. First, however, we must ascertain what a
definition properly is, and what a description. By
a definition, then, we understand such a statement
as shall accurately express, in words, our whole Con-
ception of the thing signified, and through the Con-
ception make us thoroughly acquainted with the
nature of the Thing. By a description, on the other
hand, I mean such a statement as shall, more or less
imperfectly, express our Conceptions, and give us
some, but iticompJete knowledge of the Thing.
49. And here I must remark, that an attempt
has been very generally made by Logicians to dis-
tinguish between the definition of a Name, and the
definition of a Thing ; but, as I conceive, without
success. I have never been able, with all my efforts,
to understand that distinction. I have never seen
17(i PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
it made out in intelligible language, and, therefore,
I must conclude that it is ill-founded. And in this
opinion, I am confirmed by the authority of Pascal.'
The definition of a Name, and the definition of a
Thing are one and the same, and cannot be other-
wise; for a Name without a Conception, and a
Conception without a thing conceived (real or un-
real) is a contradiction. Thus, the word Definition
may be applied either to a Name, a Conception, or a
Thing, or object conceived, with equal propriety. In
defining we fix the meaning of a Name, or declare
the Conception attached to it, and the Conception
represents the Thing. Thus are all three intimately
connected.
50. May not the explications of words in a dic-
tionary be called Definitions of Names, in opposition
to Definitions af Things *? By no means. Some-
times they are really Definitions, as Johnson's ex-
plication of a Triangle, " A figure of three angles ;"
sometimes they are Descriptions, as his account of
Animal, " A living creature corporeal ;" sometimes
they merely explain one word by one other word
better known, as Anomalism by " Irregularity,"
without any attempt at analysis, and without analysis
there can be no definition proper; sometimes, again,
they enumerate many different meanings of the same
word, and surely this in no sense can be called
definition. But, if we will apply the word Definition
"Pascal, Pensees, Vol. I., " De 1' Esprit G^om^triqiie,'' Mr.
Mill is of the same opinion, " System of Logic," Vol. I., Part i.
GENERAL NAMES, ETC. 177
to Names, and insist upon a distinction between the
definition of Names and that of Things, then the
former can be attributed only to explication by a
word strictly synonymous, as Anomalism by Ir-
regulariti/, a word of Greek origin by one of Latin ;
for if many words be given, the statement will be
either a Definition proper, or a Description more or
less imperfect.
51. It is worthy of remark, that while in com-
mon language we apply the word Definition to
Names, Conceptions, and Things, indifferently, we
are. said to describe only Thinj^s. We cannot with
propriety talk of describing a Name or a Conception.
The reason for this will appear presently. Common
language, after all, is no bad instructor.
. 52. We have next to consider what Names can
be defined, what not ; what Things can be only
described ; and what can neither be defined nor de-
scribed. This is an inquiry of very great im-
portance, were it only to prevent us from seeking
Definitions where they cannot be found. Much of
the time and energies of the Schoolmen was thus
wasted.
53. First, there are cases in which neither the
Names can be defined, nor the things corresponding
thereto described. So it is with the Names of all
Simple Conceptions. Simple Conceptions must
belong to General Abstract Notions, or Modes ; for
all Particular Notions, as we have seen, are Com-
plex, and, likewise, all General Concrete Notions, or
A A
178 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
Notions of Substances. Consequently, all Simple
Conceptions are Simple Modes ; and these, as before
observed, are of two sorts ; indeterminate modes, or
modes of Substances, and determinate modes, or
modes of Quantity. Instances of the former are
the physical Qualities of Extension, Impenetrability,
Solidity, Fluidity, Mobility, Divisibility, Whiteness,
Blueness, Redness, etc. ; of the latter, Space, Time,
Number in general. These Names admit of no
definition, nor can the things corresponding to them
be described ; because our conceptions of them are
simple and uncompounded. For what is simple
cannot be analysed, and what cannot be analysed
cannot be defined, because every definition is an
analysis, whereby a compound is reduced to its
elements. Thus, in the definition of a Triangle, a
figure with three sides and three angles, three ele-
ments are mentioned, figure, side, angle. And if
the above Names cannot be defined, neither can the
Things corresponding thereto be described, for the
same reason, that we have no more simple concep-
tions by which to explain them. Who can define
or explain Whiteness, Redness, Space, or Time*?
If any of the things corresponding to those Names
can be described, then are our conceptions thereof
not perfectly simple.
54. While Simple Modes can neither be de-
fined nor described, Complex Modes, on the
contrary, can be perfectly defined, and they alone.
For Modes or general abstract notions are pecu-
^
GENERAL NAMES, ETC. 179
liarly the creation of the mind of man, having
nothing in reality corresponding to them, even in
particular instances ; and what the mind can form
that it can define. All that is necessary is, that
the mind be consistent with itself, that the con-
ception of Virtue, for instance, be always the
same, and this is surely in our power. No one
pretends that there is outwardly any thing called
Virtue, really existing, as a horse or a cow exists,
and consequently our faculties, limited though
they be, can determine the whole nature of Vir-
tue ; while of the works of God we know but
little. These works neither are nor ever will be
thoroughly known to us ; but the notions which
we ourselves frame, or which, at least, are framed
in us, we surely may ascertain perfectly. There-
fore complex modes, whether modes of Sub-
stances, or modes of Quantity, may be strictly
defined.
55. Accordingly, Virtue, a Complex mode of
the Substance Mind, may be defined to be, " An
inflexible desire or will to pursue our own ulti-
mate good, and that of others, whatever self-denial
or self-sacrifice may be required,"" and Triangle,
a mode of Quantity, is usually defined to be, " A
figure with three sides and three angles." Now,
each of these is truly a definition, for it ex-
"See the Author's " Principles of Human Happiness and Duty,"
Part II., Chaji. iii.
180 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
presses our whole conception of the thing signi-
fied, not merely a part of that conception.
56. Lastly, the names of Substances cannot
be defined ; but the things may be described more
or less imperfectljj^ so as to distinguish one from
the other, well enough for practical purposes,
though the knowledge thus communicated is
always incomplete. For, as our knowledge of
Substances, of the works of God, is very super-
ficial, incomplete beyond measure, it is clearly
impossible to give a definition, that is a perfect
account of them. All the definitions hitherto
attempted of Substances have only been short
Descriptions.
57. Though several Substances are simple
Bodies, or at least have never yet been analysed, as
all the metals, and Sulphur, Phosphorus, Carbon,
Oxygen gas. Hydrogen, Chlorine, etc., yet our
Conception of them is far from simple. Take
for instance iron or copper ; of how many parti-
culars is our notion of these metals made up ;
particulars relative to colour, weight, use, value,
etc. ! V>' ho could pretend to enumerate all the
points in which iron differs from copper, lead
from tin, silver from gold? And though we
could have some notion of all their differences,
could we accurately distinguish them *? Besides,
different persons entertain different conceptions
of these Substances, according to the opportu-
nities vhich they may have had of becoming ac-
GENERAL NAMES, ETC. 181
(juiiinted with their quahties. Thus, a worker in
metals must have a much more extensive know-
ledge of the properties of iron, lead, tin, and cop-
per than others, and hence a more complex Con-
ception of them ; and a good chemist must have
a more complex conception of all Substances than
most people. So, supposing it were possible to de-
fine the Genus Metal, yet it would be out of our
power to determine all the Diff'erenticc by which
one Species oiMetol is distinguished from another;
for these dij^erentice are too numerous, too inde-
finite, and too fluctuating in the conceptions
of various individuals.
58i Here, however, fortunately, definitions
are not required. No man is in danger of mis-
taking silver for gold, lead for iron, copper for
zinc, for want of a definition ; he has only to
look at the substance attentively, to handle it, to
ring it, and he knows it ever after.
59. The same observations apply to Sub-
stances of all kinds, organized as well as un-
organized. Philosophers long puzzled themselves
in seeking for a definition of Man, and they
might search for ever without finding one. The
Animal implame hvpes, the Jeatherless biped animal,
of Plato, was worthy only of the ridicule of Dio-
genes, and the Rational Animal, though not
absurd, is no proper definition. In the first place,
we cannot affirm that man alone has reason, for
the tractable nature of many animals proves that
182 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
they do have some intellectual faculties which
can be improved ; but were the statement true, it
would still be miserably incomplete ; for man.
differs from other animals, not in Reason only,
but in innumerable particulars. At best it could
only be a characteristic description, that is, a
description which adopts the most striking and
important points of difference, and neglects the
rest. But who wants a definition of man ^ Are
we likely ever to confound man with any other
animal % To seek for what is unnecessary for
any purpose can be only philosophical trifling,
60. Books of Zoology and Botany are full of
such short statements, whereby the various
Genera and Species of Animals and Plants are
distinguished from each other. The Kegne Ani-
mal of Cuvier contains little else, and Smith's
Co7npendium Florce Britannicce is entirely made
up of them. These are properly characteristic
descriptions. No one can pretend that the points
stated are the only differences between the Species,
or the greater number of them, they are only the
most striking, and the most important, as supposed,
among those known. We have reason to think
that one species differs from another in innumer-
able particulars, the greater part of which will
probably never be discovered, as they lie too
deep for our limited faculties.
61. But some may say, is not this after all a
verbal question ? What yon call a characteristic
GENEEAL NAMES, ETC. 183
description others call a definition, that is all the
difference between you and them. By no means.
I have stated above (48) what a definition is, and
what a description, according to my notions, and
it seems logical to call different things by difTer-
ent names. But if some think that the difference
is not such as to warrant another name, in this
we disagree, and the disagreement is shown by
the use of two words, or of one only. Thus a
question apparently of words is at bottom one of
things.
62. Moreover, as above hinted, the common
use of language points out some well-grounded
distinction between definition and description,
and shows that sometimes the one is possible,
sometimes the other. Thus we can apply the
word definition alike to Names, Conceptions, and
Things, but we can describe things only. Why
so ^ Why cannot we be said to describe Names
and Conceptions'? Because these we are sup-
posed to know, or at least to be capable of know-
ing, tliorovghly. Names being given by man, and
Conceptions being entirely mental ; and we may
surely be well acquainted with our own inven-
tions, and our own thoughts. But, as for things,
since these we cannot pretend to know thoroughly
in all cases, — sometimes we are said to define,
sometimes only to describe them.
63. Now, what Things can be defined, what
only described, we have already seen. In the
184 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
first place, none bat Uuiversals can be defined,
and not all of them, only those not derived from
particular things having an independent exist-
ence ; for here the conception and the thing
conceived must exactly correspond, and there-
fore in defining the one we also define the
other. Such are the universals corresponding to
our abstract notions, or Modes, as we have called
them. But where the universals are derived from
particular things having an independent exist-
ence, as all material Substances, minerals, plants,
animals, there the universals cannot be defined,
because we know but imperfectly the particular
objects ; and though our knowledge may increase,
we never can be thoroughly acquainted with
them. Thus the Universal and our Conception of
it are perpetually varying. Lastly, particular
things, as we have shown, (12) cannot be defined;
but they may, like the Species of Substances, be
described, as they so frequently are in travels and
works of Imagination. Every day we are describ-
ing landscapes which we have seen, and the poet
both imagines and describes them, as Milton de-
scribes Paradise, and Spenser the Gardens of
Armida.
64. The difference between definition and
description may be illustrated from Botany. In"
this Science, as is well known, two classifications
have been adopted, the Artificial and the Natural ;
the one invented by Linnaeus, the other first pro-
GENER.a NAMES, ETC. 185
posed by Jussieu and De CandoUe, in France, and,
subsequently, improved by others. Now, as the
former is professedly artificial, and arranges plants
into classes and orders, not from all their resem-
blances, but from one or two only, chosen as
most convenient ; it follows that those classes and
orders can be strictly defined ; though the natural
cannot. Thus, having resolved to class together
all plants having one stamen, or two, or three, etc.,
whatever their points of difference may otherwise
be, it becomes easy to define the classes, Mon-
andria, Diandria, Triandria, etc., accordingly.
But, when we seek to class plants agreeably to all
their points of resemblance, the task becomes a
very difficult one. Still, some advance has been
made, and all plants have been divided into Ex-
ogens^ Endogens, and Cryptogamic plants, and sub-
divided into many orders, separated by character-
istic ditferences, some of which are known and can
be stated, while the greater part are still unknown,
and will probably always so remain. Even the
differences ascertained are not always constant.
Thus, the Arum, though an Endogen, has not the
proper leaves of its class. Therefore, the natural
classes and orders may be described with more or
less accuracy, but they cannot strictly be defined.
And, if the classes and orders cannot be defined,
still less can the Genera and Species, which in all
systems are natural, and present, of course, many
more points of resemblance and difference than
B B
186 rRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
the classes. We can have characteristic descrip-
tions which are quite sufficient in practice to dis-
tinguish one genus or species from another ; but
more we cannot have. So it is with the Classes,
Genera, and Species of Animals ; for, in Zoology,
Artificial Systems have no place.
65. Since the times of Aristotle and the
Schoolmen it has been generally said and allowed
that the only way of defining is by Genus and
DiJlferentia. This position, no doubt, has been
disputed by Locke, and therefore it demands
attentive consideration. If the statement imply
that every definition should consist of two parts,
and of two parts only, expressive of two points,
one marking the Genus, the other the Species \
then it may be boldly affirmed that this is only a
vain a priori attempt to tie down nature, and force
her into system. For many things cannot be
defined so simply ; though others may. Thus in
the definitions of the various kinds of triangle,
viz. an equilateral triangle, a triangle with three
equal sides ; an isosceles triangle, one with two
equal sides ; a scalene triangle, one with three
unequal sides ; a right-angled triangle, one which
has a right angle, etc. ; two points alone are
necessary. But when we come to define the
various sorts of four-sided figures, we say that
a square is a four-sided figure, with all its sides
equal, and all its angles right angles ; an oblong,
one with all its angles right angles, but not all
GENERAL NAMES, E'iC. 187
its sides equal ; a rhombus, one that has all
its sides equal, but its angles not right angles ;
and a rhomboid, one having its opposite sides
equal, but all its sides not equal, nor its angles
right angles. Thus, allowing four-sided figures
to constitute a Genus, we are obliged to enume-
rate two points at least, two dijfercntice, in order
to distinguish one Species of four-sided figures
from another. In the last instance, three
dijferentice must be stated; and were we to
define a Trapezium, we must say that it is a
four-sided figure, but neither a square, nor an
oblong, nor a rhombus, nor a rhomboid, thus
increasing the number of differentice. These
examples are sufficient to prove that definition
by Genus and one dijfercntia is not always
possible.
66. There is indeed one way in which
technical simplicity might be apparently pre-
served, and that is, by creating new Sub-Genera
to suit the occasion. Thus, instead of defining
a square to be a four-sided figure, having all its
sides equal, and all its angles right angles, we
might say that a square is a four-sided equilateral
figure, having all its angles right angles; thus
making a Genus of four-sided equilateral figures,
of which square and rhombus are Species. In
this way the credit of system would be saved,
though, it must be confessed, rather awkwardly
at times. For instance, in order to reduce the
188 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
definition of rhomboid to rule, we must say that
a rhomboid is a four-non-equal-equal-opposite-
sided figure, not having its angles right angles ;
thus making a Genus to comprehend rhomboid
and oblong which has right angles. Whether it
be worth while to resort to such expedients to
save the credit of the Scholastic System, we shall
not inquire.
67' Having shown that definition by Genus
and one Differentia is not always possible, we
may next inquire whether we can always define
by Genus and one or more Differeniice. Since,
as we have seen, a definition ought to express
accurately in words our ivhole conception of the
thing signified, it is clear that it ought to
enumerate all the simple conceptions which
make up the complex conception. But when
we define by the nearest Genus and Differentia,
we do not enumerate all the simple conceptions,
for, unless it be a Siimmum Genus, the Genus itself
is complex, and may be analysed. Consequently,
definition by the nearest Genus is only conveni-
ent, not necessary, — convenient for the sake of
abridgment, and nothing more. To give the
definition in full, we should mount up at once
to the Summum Genus, and enumerate all the
Dfferentice. Thus, in the definition of a tri-
angle, a figure with three sides and three angles,
it is taken for granted that we know what a figure
is ; but, were the whole stated, we should say
GENERAL NAMES, ETC. 189
that a triangle is something bounded by lines,
having three sides and three angles. In like
manner, in the so-called definition of Man (for
we do not allow it to be a definition proper),
a rational Animal, it is manifest that the Genus
Animal must be itself analysed and defined
before we can have a full account of man.
68. But we may go farther and raise a ques-
tion, whether definition by regular Genera and
Differetitice, one above another, though con-
venient, be always possible. It is not every
resemblance that induces us to class things into
Genera and Species ; but only certain resem-
blances, general, striking, important, or useful.
It therefore may happen that there is no Genus
to which we can refer the object, other than the
Summum Genus thing, or something nearly as
general. Thus, in the definition of parallel
straight lines, which are said to be " such as
are in the same plane, and which, being produced
ever so far both ways, do not meet," we can
discover no Genus whatsoever to which these
belong, except that of straight line in general,
for of lines in the same plane we have never
made a Genus. This, then, must be considered
as a Differentia, and the above definition will
consist of the high Genus, straight line, and the
two Dijferentice, lying in the same plane, and
never meeting though produced indefinitely.
69. Furthermore, there are some definitions
190 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY.
in Geometry in which we can make out no dis-
tinction between Genus and Differentia. For
instance, we are told that a plane angle " is the
inclination of two lines to each other in a plane,
which meet together, but are not in the same
straight line." It would not be easy to reduce
this definition to Logical rule.
SECTION THIRD.
OEIGIN OF CONCEPTION.
1. Having considered the nature of Concep-
tion in general, and the various kinds of Con-
ceptions, we have next to trace the origin of
this mental faculty.
2. We have already remarked that Conception
in general is not an original faculty, that it re-
produces a former state of mind, more or less
modified, no doubt, but still, as it were, a copy
of an original. Conception, then, cannot be one
of the earliest powers of the mind.
3. The above holds true of Conception as
commonly understood ; but we have seen that
Perception really comprehends a Conception
proper, which, in this case, and in this alone, may
be considered as original, because, though arising
from another state of mind, namely, a Sensation,
yet it differs widely from Sensation. When I
ORIGIN OF CONCEPTION. 191
stretch out my hand and touch a book on the
table, the conception of the book is totally dif-
ferent from the Sensation of touch which pre-
ceded it; and as it can be derived from no other
previous state of mind, this Conception, com-
prised in the Perception, is truly a new, an ori-
ginal phenomenon ; though, in the order of time,
subsequent to the Sensation which occasioned it.
This subsequence in time does not destroy the
originality or newness of the phenomenon, or the
wide difference between the conception and its
antecedents.
4. Barring this, all Conceptions are derived from
other and previous mental phenomena, which they
recal and reproduce in a modified form, and, there-
fore, they cannot be original. It remains, then, to
be seen what are the originals of these copies.
5. We have seen that, of all mental phenomena,
Sensations are certainly the earliest, Emotions, pro-
bably, the next ; and that both these classes, which
together constitute the Feelings, are, truly and pro-
perly, original. After them come Perceptions, and,
subsequently. Conceptions. Therefore, Concep-
tions, not being themselves original, must be copied
or derived, either from Sensations, Emotions, or
Perceptions, or from all of these.
6, First, as to Sensations. It is perfectly clear
that we can form no Conception of any Sensation
which we had not previously felt ; but having ielt
it once, we can ever afterwards concehe it. No
192 PRIXCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
power of words could give a man born blind any
Conception of Colours, or a man born deaf any
Conception of Sounds ; but having once experienced
those Sensations, we can easily recal them in Con-
ception, though no Sensation be then felt. There-
fore, Sensation is certainly one source of Conception.
7. The above remark must be taken with one
limitation, which is, that although no Sensation
utterly different from any other can be conceived
before felt, yet when Sensations vary but slightly,
or only in degree, then previous feeling does not
seem necessary to Conception. Thus, though a
knowledge of colours will give no Conception of
sounds, or vice versa, nor even a knowledge of one
colour, scarlet, suggest any notion of green ; yet
one shade of scarlet, or of green, may enable us to
conceive a darker or lighter shade of the same
colour, though these exact shades may never have
been seen. So, having heard one sort of sound, we
can conceive it more or less loud. Thus, within a
limited range, a slight degree of originality is left
to Conception.
8. Next as to Emotions. In this case, as in
the former, it is certain that we can conceive no
Emotion which we had not previously /<?/? ; as also,
that, having once experienced Emotion, we can con-
ceive it, though unfelt. How could we give a
Conception of Love, Ambition, or Covetousness, to
one who had never harboured these Passions ?
How teach Beauty to one who had never felt its
OKIGIN OF CONCErilON. 193
charm'? If the Emotions be origuial, they must
be inexplicable by any form of words, which, being
merely conventional signs, always suppose that our
original feelings are known by experience. We could
as easily teach colour to a blind man, as passion to
one without desires. As it is, one man is often a
riddle to another, because he cannot easily conceive
the desires which animate him ; but desires of some
kind all men have experienced, otherwise, they could
know nothing of human nature. And, having once
felt Emotion, we can afterwards easily conceive the
same ; for we perfectly understand Philosophical
Essays, Histories, Tales, and Plays, which treat of
the Passions, though at the time we may be quite
cool. It appears, then, that Emotion is a second
source of Conception.
9. Thirdly^ as to Perceptions. When we open
our eyes, we perceive a multitude of objects ; trees,
fields, houses, rivers, mountains, or it may be the
moon, the planets, and a countless host of stars.
We close our eyes, or we retire into a dark place,
and we perceive these objects no longer. Are they
then to us as if they had never been, or as if we had
never perceived them*? By no means. In total
darkness, in the dead of night, they rise up before
us, they re-appear, similar though not the same;
they fill our minds with Conceptions.
10. These Conceptions, then, are derived from
Perceptions, and they are, as we all know, like to
their originals, or copies of the same, as far as the
c c
194 PllINCIPLES or PSYCHOLOGY.
word is applicable to mental phenomena. They
need not, however, be servile copies, for the mind
has a power of varying its Conceptions, so as to
form combinations of objects different from any
which it had ever perceived, different even from
any which exist in nature ; such as the unicorn of
the ancients, and the colossal man-headed bulls
and lions of the palaces of Nineveh. This is the
power of Imagination. Still, the elements of such
objects must first have been perceived. I do not
believe that any one who knew not by perception
his own body, or that of some animal, could imagine
an animal of any kind, or that one who bad never
perceived plants, earth, stones, water, fire, could
conceive such objects.
11. It must, however, be allowed that much
more freedom is given to our Conceptions thus de-
rived, than to those which are copied from our Sen-
sations and Emotions. Literature is full of works
of fiction and imagination, of poetry, novels, and
romances, wherein new scenes, new animals, nay,
new worlds are depicted. Our great dramatist is
said to " have exhausted worlds and then invented
new." The objects around us, which strike our
senses, may be compared to the letters of the alpha-
bet, which, by combination, form innumerable words.
Such is nature to the man of poetical genius. It is
the elementary matter out of which he creates a
world of his own, newer at least, if not more fair,
than that which we behold. We acknowledge no
other Prometheus.
ORIGIN OF CONCEITION. I95
12. What a source of amusement to the mhid
is this Power of Conception ! Without this, so long
as our eyes were open, so long as it was light, we
should be filled and gratified with our Perceptions ;
but, when night came on, all would be blank.
Silent and solitary, and yet wakeful, our minds could
not be filled and amused with the lively images of
what we had seen during the day past, or in years
long gone by ; we could not wander again over the
hills of Alba, gaze upon the fall of Terni, or sit
beside the temples of Passtum. And without the
power of recalling sensible objects, without visual
conceptions especially, w hich bring back visible ob-
jects, without Imagination, which varies them,
Poetry of course could have no existence,
13. As particular conceptions, or more pro-
perly conceptions of things particular, are derived
from Sensations, Emotions, and Perceptions, so
general Conceptions, or more correctly concep-
tions of universals, are drawn from such as are
particular. We have seen that, when many ob-
jects agree in one or more points, the mind
seizes upon these resemblances, and constructs
out of them a fictitious entity called an Universal;
as when from an attentive consideration of John,
William, Thomas, and Alexander, it creates the
universal Man. Consequently, the general con-
ception, as it is called, must be subsequent to
those particular conceptions from which it sprang.
14. Though General Conceptions are, in the
196 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
order of time, subsequent to particular, and de-
pendent on them, yet they require a greater effort
of mind than these ; for, as we have seen, parti-
cular conceptions are little more than copies,
more or less faint, of their originals, with some
variation ; whereas general conceptions require
attentive observation and discrimination, and con-
sequently suppose a much greater development
and variety of mental power. Accurately to clas-
sify objects requires superior intellect, and all clas-
sification, which supposes some general notions,
demands more or less of the same. Consequently,
the power of forming general conceptions, em-
bracing, as it does. Abstraction and Generalization,
is a much more original as well as higher power
than that of Simple Conception.
OF MEMORY. 197
CIIAPTEll V.
or ]\I E ^I U Y ,
SECTION FIRST.
WHAT IS MEMORY?
1. Memory is that faculty by which any
mental state whereof we once were conscious
is recalled, and at the same time believed to have
been formerly experienced. Therefore a Re-
membrance, or particular act of Memory, consists
in any mental phenomenon whatsoever, combined
with the Belief that we were before conscious of
the same, or, more properly, of a similar phe-
nomenon ; for, of course, what is past and gone
and what is present and existing cannot be iden-
tical.
2. Memory then differs from Perception, inas-
much as the latter supposes a present, the former
a past object ; and whereas the object of Per-
ception is always something material, which in-
duces perception through the senses, the object of
memory is some prior state of our own conscious-
ness. Perception, then, gives us a knowledge of
the present, but only of material objects ; while
198 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCH0L0G7.
Memory acquaints us with the past, first with the
past states of our own mind, and through them
with every thing else.
3. Neither in the case of Perception nor of
Memory is this knowledge properly immediate^ for
we have seen that our acquaintance with the ma-
terial world is derived through the medium
of the senses ; and, moreover, that an immediate
or conscious knowledge of matter is absurd ; and
an immediate knowledge of the past is a contra-
diction, whatever Reid may say to the contrary.^
" For we can only know a thing immediately if
we know it in itself, or as existing ; but what is
past cannot be known in itself, for it is non-
existent.""
4. Memory differs also from mere Conception,
for we can conceive many things without being
conscious at the time that the present is but a re-
petition of the past ; and we even conceive things
which never before entered into our minds ; as
imaginary scenes of nature, and imaginary animals.
No doubt Conception is an essential part of
Memory, for we can remember nothing without
conceiving what we remember ; but Conception
may exist without Memory.
5. We have said that Memory embraces every
" " It is by memory that we have an immediate knowledge of
things past." " Reid's Intellectual Powers, " Essay III. chap. 1.
'' " Hamilton's note to the above."
OF TLME. 199
mental phenomenon \vliatsoever of which we
formerly were conscious. Accordingly, we re-
member Sensations, Emotions, Perceptions, Con-
ceptions, and Relations of all kinds, including
judgments and reasonings. What then is pecu-
liar to Memory'? First, there is the tendency,
the facility, to recall any past mental phenome-
non, and secondly, the irresistible belief in the
former existence of the said phenomenon. This
tendency and this belief are all that is peculiar to
Memory.
SECTION SECOND.
or TIME.
1. Sensations, Emotions, Perceptions, and
mere Conceptions, look only to the present mo-
ment, and therefore give us no notion of Time,
which implies succession. For this we are indebted
to Memory, which introduces us to the knowledge
of the past, as distinct from the present, and hence
of the future, for the present is future to the past.
2. It is clear that we cannot believe in the
foriner existence of any thing without some notion
of former and latter, that is of Time ; and con-
sequently this notion not only arises along with
Memory, but is an essential part of it. Indeed,
the one cannot exist without the other. Memory
200 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
can no more exist without the notion of Time, than
the notion of Time without Memory. Time and
Succession are the same, or, at least, they are in-
separable, and how can we know Succession but
by Memory ? Here, then, at the first, we see the
immense importance of this faculty. "Without
Memory, without a knowledge of Time, our know-
ledge would be confined to the present moment,
and therefore could never increase.
3. It is clear that our knowledge of Time can
be immediately derived only from the phenomena
of our own minds, not from any outward change ;
for outward change or motion is known to us only
through a succession of perceptions, and, therefore
these must be the immediate antecedents of our
notion of Time. Motion may be thus a remote
source of this notion, but we have no reason to
suppose that it is the only one, or that a succession
of mental phenomena, of whatever sort, or how-
ever derived, may not create Memory, and suggest
the notion of Time.
4. Though the notion of Time be thus got by
comparing a present state of mind with a past, we
are not thence to infer that the notion is not al-
together different from the phenomena which pre-
cede its appearance. Those phenomena might
recur without any conception of Time, as they
often do, and therefore Time is not involved in
them. On the contrary, it is evolved by them, or
struck out of the mind, like a flint out of a bed
OF TIiME. 201
of chalk, something quite different from the sur-
rounding mass. Effects are often widely different
from their causes, especially from their occasional
or auxiliary causes ; and so it is in this case. A
succession of mental phenomena is the occasional
and exciting cause of the notion of Time ; the
primary and predisponent lying deep in the
original structure of the mind itself. If there be
an original notion, it is that of Time.
5. What then is Time 1 what notion have we
of it*? An absurd question ! Either we know it
perfectly, or if not, no words can tell us. It was St.
Augustin, I think, who said "Ask me not, and
I know it well; question me, and I am quite' at a
loss." No doubt for how can-w^e illustrate and
explain that which by its originality and simplicity
bafUes both illustration and explanation"? The
notion of Time is so original, so new, so different
from any other, that there is nothing with which
to compare it, so as to help our apprehension ; and
it is so simple as to defy analysis, definition, or
description. The truth is that we know it so well,
that there is nothing which we know better, and
which might help to explain it. We know it as
intimately as we can any thing whatsoever ; and
it is exactly because it is so simple that we are
conscious of that incomprehensibility which at
bottom envelopes it and every thing. Could we
explain Time, our minds would be so far satisfied,
but the more simple notions by which we should
D D
202 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
explain it would be themselves as incomprehensible
as any. It is then the very perfection of our
knowledge of Time, so far as human knowledge
admits of perfection, that enables us to see the
limitation of our faculties, and makes us suppose
that we are here peculiarly ignorant. But the
very reverse is the case. Our knowledge of Time
is peculiarly clear, definite, and precise, as is that of
Space ; and upon them is built the only perfect
science, the Mathematics. The relations of Time
are relations of Quantity, and therefore they may
be perfectly ascertained.''
6. What is peculiarly incomprehensible about
Time is its beginning, or its past Eternity, for one
or the other must be true, and yet our faculties
can comprehend neither. We are forced however
to confess our belief in the Eternity of past Time,
though the more we consider it, the more myste-
rious it appears. We have no difficulty in com-
prehending a future Eternity ; indeed, we cannot
possibly comprehend or believe in the cessation
of Time. When Eternity is opposed to Time, the
infinite is opposed to a finite Quantity of the same
kind, not of a different kind ; and this, as Mathe-
maticians as well as divines assert, is an infinite
ratio, a ratio of one to Zero.
''■ On Time and Space as the foundaiions of Mathematics, see
the Author's "Introduction to Mental Philosophy." Part 1.
Art. Quantity.
OF TIME. 203
7. What has been said of Time applies also
to Space. Our knowledge of Space is perfect, as
far as human knowledge can be ; we can trace its
relations with the utmost accuracy ; and yet we
can comprehend neither how space can be limited,
nor how it can be unlimited. Thus it is the sim-
plest notions, those which we know best, which
show us most clearly the narrowness of our facul-
ties. Our knowledge is here perfect as far as it
goes, but beyond that there is no ground for con-
ception, judgment, or reasoning, all is void and
dark. We are brought up as if by a dead wall, or
a dense mist, we come at once to a stop.
8. If the notion of Time arise out of a suc-
cession of mental phenomena, it ought to follow
that the greater the number of different pheno-
mena in the same period, the longer the time
should appear, and vice versa : and so it is. When
we look back upon a period of great variety and
vicissitude, of travel and adventure, the time seems
very long ; whereas a life of monotony and routine
appears, on the retrospect, very short. Hours
past in thinking upon one knotty point seem like
minutes, while a year of varied impressions is a
life. " My life is but a long day," said to me one
whose occupation was full of sameness. On the
other hand, " Paris vecut un siecle dans ses huit
derniers jours d'attente et de confusion,'^ says
Lamartine, of the week immediately preceding
Napoleon's return to Paris from Elba, a week full
204 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY.
of surprise, indignation, bewilderment, hope and
fear.''
9. To this it has been objected that a period
of suffering or uneasiness generally appears long,
while time spent agreeably seems short; and as
there is no reason to suppose that our thoughts,
emotions, or sensations, are more varied in the
former case than in the latter, but the contrary,
the theory does not hold good.
10. If time pass slow with the unhappy, espe-
cially with the restless, it is because they are
always wishing it aw^ay ; and if it pass quick with
the happy and the amused, particularly with the
contented, it is for the contrary reason. Here then
a cause comes in to counteract the other ; but this
does not disprove the original tendency. Accord-
ingly, when the disturbing cause ceases to operate,
when the period of uneasiness or of contentment
is past, then, if the former have been one of bodily
pain, or of unvaried suffering of any kind, it will
appear short ; and if the latter have been a time
of amusement, properly so called, it will seem
long.
1 1 . Orlando. — " I pr'y thee who doth Time trot
withal?"^
^ " Paris lived an age during these last eight days of expectation
and bewilderment." — Histoire de la Reslauration. Livre xix.
Sec. in.
* " As you like it." Act iii. Scene 2.
OF TIME. 205
Rosalind. — " Marry he trots hard with a young;
maid, between the contract of her marriage and
the day it is solemnized ; if the interim be but a
se'nnight, time's pace is so hard that it seems the
length of seven years." Thus it is restlessness,
the wish to leap over time, not unhappiness simply,
that makes it seem long. So far from unhappiness,
the interim is one of joy.
Orlando. — " Who doth he gallop withal ?"
Rosalind. — " With a thief to the gallows : for
though he go as softly as foot can fall, he thinks
himself too soon there." Here it is not joy that
makes the interval pass quickly, for there is only
misery, but the wish to arrest the foot of time.
Ardent hope makes time to creep in the midst of
joy; and intense fear causes it to gallop during
misery.
But, Orlando. — " Who stays it withal ?"
Rosalind. — " With lawyers in the vacation : for
they sleep between term and term, and then they
perceive not how time moves." True, in deep
sleep, in sleep without dreaming, the moment of
awaking seems to touch that of going to sleep,
the interval is totally lost, a sure proof that with-
out a succession of mental phenomena we should
have no notion of Time.
12. Reid objects "I have heard a military
officer, a man of candour and observation, say,
that the time he was engaged in hot action always
appeared to him much shorter than it really was.
K
206 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY..
Yet, I think, it cannot be supposed that the succes-
sion of ideas was then slower than usual."^ If
the time in such circumstances seem short, it is
because the mind is too much engaged to think of
its lapse. It is the thinking about time, the
watching of it, which makes it appear long, forget-
fulness short. However rapid the succession of
ideas may be, this will not cause time to seem
long, unless it be reflected on. Now hurry and
danger drive awa}'^ all reflection ; but I have no
doubt that when the moment of reflection does
come, then a day spent in marching and counter-
marching, and in all the vicissitudes of hot action,
will appear very long.
13. "Mr. Locke," says Reid, "draws some
conclusions from his account of the idea of dura-
tion, which may serve as a touchstone to discover
how far it is genuine. One is, that, if it were possi-
ble for a waking man to keep only one idea in
his mind, without variation, or the succession of
others, he would have no perception of duration at
all; and the moment he began to have this idea
would seem to have no distance from the moment
he ceased to have it." This conclusion appears to
me just. Time, like motion, requires some mark,
in order to be known ; and without some change
of ideas, we should no more have been conscious
of Time, than we should have been aware of the
^ Intellectual Powers. Essay iii. Chap. V.
OF TIME. 207
motion of the earth without a change in the po-
sition of the heavenly bodies. " Now," continues
Reid, " That one idea should seem to have no du-
ration, and that a multiplication of that no dura-
ration should seem to have duration, appears to
me as impossible as that the multiplication of
nothini^ should produce something.* Here there
is a total misapprehension. It is not said that the
multiplication of one idea would seem to have du-
ration, but that, out of a succession of ideas, of
different ideas, would arise the notion of Time.
It is variety, not sameness, that strikes out the
new notion.
14. Again ; '^ If the idea of duration were got
merely by the succession of ideas in our minds ;
that succession must to ourselves appear equally
quick at all times, because, the only measure of
duration is the 7imnher of succeeding ideas ; but I
believe every man capable of reflection will be
sensible that at one time his thoughts come slowly
and heavily, and at another time have a much
quicker and livelier motion ? Now, what we
assert is, that the notion of Time originates by
reflecting on the succession of ideas in our
minds ; not that, when the notion is got, such
succession is the only measure of duration. After-
wards, we have many measures of time, and once
Ibid.
208 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY.
having the notion from a succession of ideas, we
can allow duration to a single idea, and may be
conscious that one remains longer in our minds
than another. In fact we soon come to know
that the succession of ideas in our own minds is
a very uncertain measure of time, though, without
such succession, we should never have had the
notion at all. And though we may have some
consciousness of the rapid and slow flow of our
ideas, I believe that it is more by considering
what we have done during a given time, as
measured by a clock, hour-glass, change of
position of the heavenly bodies, or any other
sure indication, that we become sensible of a
quick or tardy march of mind.
15. Though we can set no bounds to the di-
visibility of Time, any more than of Space, yet in
common life we consider Time in two lights,
either as a point practically indivisible, or as a
period capable of division and measurement.
Thus, when I say, I shall be with you to-morrow
afternoon at three o'clock, I fix a point of Time
like a mathematical point in Space ; but when I
add, I shall remain with you during twenty
minutes, I mention a period, divisible into
minutes, and so measured. This difference is
marked in English by the prepositions at and
during ; while in Latin it is expressed by a differ-
ence of case, a point of time being commonly put
in the Ablative, duration in the Accusative. The
OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 209
distinction is necessary in practice, though time
without duration be really an absurdity.
SECTION THIRD.
OF PERSONAL IDENTITY.
1. Besides the notion of Time we are in-
debted to Memory for a knowledge of Self, the
foundation of all other knowledge ; for without
the belief that we ourselves formerly thought or
felt, we could have no acquaintance with the past,
and consequently no grounds for expecting what
is to come. Our knowledge would be limited
to the present moment, and therefore could never
be enlarged.
2. As soon as we can remember any previous
state of Consciousness, whether of feeling or of
thought, an irresistible belief comes over us that
the Being who formerly felt or thought, and He
who now feels and thinks, is one and the same,
really, not metaphorically, the same, not similar,
strictly One and Indivisible. And however long
ago may be the fact which we remember, the be-
lief is still unshaken. But as our bodies, like all
material objects, are perpetually changing, so as
to remain strictly the same not for a single day,
therefore if there be Identity in man, it must be
E E
210 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
identity of something different from matter, that
is, something immaterial. Consequently, the
Identity of man and his Immateriality rest upon
the same foundation ; if we believe the one, we
are bound to admit the other. That we must be-
lieve the former, we shall see presently.
3. It thus appears that our belief in our own
identity originates in that form of Consciousness
which we call Memory ; so that without the
faculty of remembering, we never should have
known ourselves. This is a very different doc-
trine from that brought forward by Locke, who
maintains that Consciousness, which, in this case,
can mean nothing but Memory, actually consti-
tutes Self; so that so far as a man's memory
extends he is the same man, and no further. It
is unnecessary to dilate upon this doctrine, which
admits of so easy a refutation, and indeed has
been refuted repeatedly ; a doctrine which sub-
stitutes the means of knowledge for the thing
thereby known, which makes no difference be-
tween a fleeting phenomenon and a permanent
substance, and so destroys all that is constant in
mind, all whereon we build our hopes ; finally, a
doctrine which leads to downright absurdity ; for
from this it would follow that if a man were to
forget an event of his past life to-day, and recall
it to-morrow, he should have changed his identity
from one day to the other. In the words of John
Sergeant, an early critic of Locke, " a man must
OF PERSONAI. IDENTITY. 211
be the same, ere he can know or be conscious that
he is the same," an observation of itself sufficient
to refute the above opinion.''
4. Upon our personal identity, our perfect
sameness, oneness, permanence, and immateriality,
which all hold together, rest not only all personal
responsibility, all personal merit or demerit, all
liability to praise or blame here, but also our hopes
of continuance hereafter. If our identity be
nothing more than a fleeting phenomenon of con-
sciousness, how can it survive that consciousness ?
Must it not pass away like the foam on the river,
or like the morning hoar frost ? And if our boasted
identity be only such as matter admits of, that is,
mere similarity, then this similarity may disappear,
like everything material, by degrees, or all at once,
by slow decay, or by violent convulsion. But, if
there be something which remains truly one and
the same amid all the fleeting phenomena which
it presents, something permanent and indivisible,
and which therefore cannot be material, then it
may remain though the earthy body return to earth
inanimate. Nay, it is reasonable to infer that
what has continued the same so long, shall con-
tinue longer, seeing it is not subject like matter to
modifications which destroy identity, and can
perish therefore only by annihilation. But we have
•^ See Hamilton's Notes to Reid's Intellectual Powers. Essay
iii. Chap. VI.
212 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
no reason to believe that any particle of matter has
ever been annihilated, why then should the Soul'?
SECTION FOURTH.
ORIGIN OP MEMORY.
1 . With respect to the origin of Memory little
need now be said. We can conceive many things
which we formerly perceived or felt, without call-
ing to mind our former perceptions or feelings ;
but we cannot remember without conceiving what
we remember. Therefore the faculty of Memory
is subsequent to Conception, and dependent there-
on. And as Conception is subsequent to Sensa-
tion, Emotion, and Perception, much more must
Memory follow after all these.
2. This subsequence in the order of time, and
this dependence upon conception, do not however
impair the originality of Memory, its perfect new-
ness, the wide difference between it and those other
earlier faculties. Memory is neither Sensation,
Emotion, Perception, nor mere Conception, though
this last be necessary to it. We have seen that
what is peculiar to memory is First, the tendency,
the facility to recal any past state of conscious-
ness : and Secondly, the tendency to a firm belief
in the former existence of such a state. These
tendencies together constitute the faculty of Me-
mory, and they are tendencies quite original or
new, arising, it may be, out of former mental ten-
■j,i-£:
EVIDENCE AFFORDED BY MEMORY. 213
dencies, but essentially different from these. So,
a Remembrance, or particular act of INlemory,
consists of a conception of some past state of con-
sciousness, such as a Sensation, Emotion or Per-
ception, accompanied with the Belief that such a
Sensation, etc., was formerly experienced. Here,
though the conception be nothing new, the belief
is an original phenomenon -; for the belief which
attends Perception is a belief in the present, not
in the past, existence of the object. This gives
quite a new character to Belief, an original cha-
racter, though belief itself be not new, having
previously been known in Perception.
3. Since Memory extends to every previous
state of Consciousness, for we can remember
former judgments and reasonings, nay, whole
discourses, not merely separate Sensations, Emo-
tions, and Perceptions, therefore not only Con-
ceptions properly so called, but Relations also may
be combined with the phenomenon of Belief in
Remembrance. Relations of which we were
formerly conscious reappear, along with the firm
persuasion that they were before known, and we
can remember them as well as we do the moon of
yesterday.
SECTION FIFTH.
EVIDENCE AFFORDED BY ME]\IORY.
1. But what evidence have we that the be-
214 PRINCIPLES or PSYCHOLOGY.
lief implanted in us by Memory is to be depended
on *? How can we be sure that what we remember
to have happened actually did happen ? To this
the proper answer is, that we cannot help believ-
ing in the faithfulness of Memory, that all men
do believe in it instinctively, prior to experience,
and that all knowledge depends upon this belief.
Without trusting our memories we cannot ad-
vance one step beyond the present impression,
whatever that may be. Still, the faithfulness of
memory is by no means self-evident, nor can it be
proved by logical argument, for there is no con-
tradiction in supposing that memory may tell
what is false; and there are no premises from
which we can prove it to be true. Therefore,
belief in the faithfulness of memory must be set
down as one of the Fundamental Articles of our
Creed, Articles not self-evident, but which, from
the primary constitution of our nature, we can-
not help embracing, without question, without
hesitation.
2. That we may be sure that the belief in
question is really entitled to a place in the above
category, let us consider what are the marks by
which we may know any Article of Belief to be
really original and fundamental.
First, the belief must be universal.
Secondly, the belief must be irresistible, an es-
sential part of our Mental being, of which no one,
not even the greatest Sceptic, can divest himself.
EVIDENCE AFFORDED BY MEMORY. 215
Thirdly, it must be prior to experience.
Fourthly, it must be indispensable to all subse-
quent knowledge.
Fifthly, it must not be self-evident like the
Axioms of Mathematics.
Sixthly, it must admit of no proper logical
proof. Now, if we apply these Criteria to our
belief in the faithfulness of memory, we shall find
that they suit it exactly, and therefore we must
admit it to be an original and fundamental Article
of our Metaphysical Creed.
3. If we reject that Creed, we reject all know-
ledge, but against this human nature rebels.
Knowledge, like the machines of Archimedes,
must have a fixed point, a fulcrum, to rest upon ;
proof must depend upon premises, and where these
are not self-evident, they must be assumed, other-
wise we are stopped at once. Even the evidence
of Mathematical truth depends upon memory, for
we cannot go beyond the first principles without
reasoning, and reasoning supposes that w^e re-
member, and rely on, what we proved or admitted
before.
4. We might indeed pretend to establish our
trust in Memory on reasoning thus :
Whatever is universally believed is worthy of
credit; the facts attested by memory are uni-
versally believed ; therefore they are worthy of
credit.
The argument here is no doubt sound, it is
216 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
correctly drawn from the premises ; but the pre-
mises are assumed ; for it may be asked why is
universal belief an assurance of truth *? May not
all men believe a lie ? Does not the assumption
require proof as much as the conclusion drawn
from it ? So vain is the attempt to prove every-
thing ; so illusory the supposition that we can ever
do away with Primary Instinctive Universal Arti-
cles of Belief! All we can do is to lay down
Criteria or tests whereby we may distinguish
between genuine and spurious Fundamental Arti-
cles, and this we have endeavoured to accomplish.
5. Whatever has been said of the evidence
afforded by Memory applies with equal force to
the evidence of that great fact which we come to
know by means of Memory, namely, our Personal
Identity. When we remember any past pheno-
menon of consciousness, v^^e are convinced not
only that such a phenomenon formerly existed,
but also that the subject of that phenomenon, and
the subject who now thinks or feels, are strictly
one and the same, the same now, then, and during
all the intervening period, the Indivisible Self.
6. This is a fact which no one has ever really
doubted, or can doubt ; though it is not self-evi-
dent, nor can it be proved by reasoning. We do
not see how, amid all the changing phenomena
of consciousness, something still remains the same ;
nor, however difficult it may be to bring home any-
thing so foreign to our notions, is there any self-
EVIDENCE AFFORDED RY MEMORY. 217
evident contradiction in supposing that a pheno-
menon formerly known to another, or to no one,
should be made known to me now, together with
the belief, though a false one, that I myself was
once conscious of the same. However extravagant
such a supposition may be, it is not self-contra-
dictory. Consequently our Personal Identity is
not a self-evident fact.
7. From what premises then shall we start to
prove this great fact ^ It is clear that there are none
which do not themselves require proof as much as
the fact to be proved ; nay which do not actually
take for granted the very fact in question. Thus
were we to pretend to prove it from the proposition
formerly mentioned, •' Whatever is universally be-
lieved is worthy of credit," it would be evident not
only that this proposition itself required proof quite
as much as the fact of our Identity, but also that it
really supposes the latter to be true. Universally
believed by whom *? By men no doubt. Then there
are men capable of maintaining belief during days
and years ; men who think in short, not merely
thoughts without a permanent subject ; and if so,
men have identity.
8. If then our Personal Identity be neither a
self-evident fact, nor capable of proof by reasoning,
it must, if credible, be a Fundamental Article of
belief, instinctive and original. Let us apply our
Criteria or Tests to the present case.
F F
218 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
First, Belief in our own identity is certainly
Universal. ■
Secondly, it is irresistible.
Thirdly, it is prior to experience ; for every lesson
derived from Experience supposes that Self has ex-
perienced.
Fourthly, it must be indispensable to all subse-
quent knowledge, for in every step it is assumed
that we who now learn, and we who formerly learnt,
are the same. If not sure of ourselves, how can we
be sure of anything else ?
Fifthly, it is not self-evident, as has been
shown.
Sixthly, it admits of no proper logical proof, as
we have also seen. Therefore we may rest assured
that Belief in our own Identity, amid innumerable
changes of phenomena, Belief in our numerical one-
ness and indivisibility, is instinctive, original, and
fundamental, and therefore entitled to a place in
our Primary Metaphysical Creed.
9. The immediate deduction from this Funda-
mental Article is the Irfimateriality of that some-
thing which we call Self; for, whatever is numeri-
cally One and Indivisible cannot be material. The
inference is irresistible, and therefore the conclusion
is as much entitled to belief as the Fundamental
Article itself.
CONNECTION OF MEMORY. 219
SECTION SIXTH.
CONNECTION OF MEMORY WITH THE OTHER
INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES. COMPARISON WITH
THESE. CAUSES OF ITS IMPROVEMENT AND DE-
CLINE.
1. Since Memory depends for its development
upon previous Sensations, Emotions, Perceptions and
Conceptions, it follows that facility and accuracy
in remembering will vary with the quality of those
mental phenomena, that the more acute the Sensa-
tions, the more lively the Emotions, the more accurate
the Perceptions and Conceptions, the more retentive,
the more exact, will be the Memory. Much then
will certainly depend upon the original impression ;
and this we know from experience to be the case.
When Memory begins to fail in the aged, it is not
the events of their youth, although so remote, which
they forget, but the occurrences of yesterday, a re-
markable proof how much depends upon the liveli-
ness of the first impression. What we have deeply
felt we never forget, whether it be pain or pleasure.
2. Lively and delicate Sensibility to pleasure
and pain, whether bodily, usually so called, or men-
tal, whether Sensation or Emotion, is then one cause
of goodness of memory. "And as men's sensibilities
vary indefinitely, so do their memories. Some re-
member well the small events of past years, and
could write down a history of their lives with won-
220 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
derful minuteness ; while others can scarcely dis-
tinguish one year from another. Of course, the
nature of the life led, whether varied or monotonous,
and habits of abstraction or the contrary, will make
a great difference in the remembrance. Variety
stimulates, monotony deadens sensibility ; and
nothing can strike or be remembered unless it be
observed. Hence women, who are generally less
abstracted than men, less taken up with one pursuit,
should better remember the small events of life.
On the other hand, how can a man of science, who
lives in abstractions, or a man of business, whose
head is always full of calculations, be supposed to
remember passing occurrences ?
3. Whatever has been imperfectly perceived, or
indistinctly conceived, must of course be confusedly
remembered ; but here the fault is in the original
impression, not in memory, which does its duty
when it fairly represents the past. If clear Percep-
tion and Conception be better remembered than the
obscure or confused, the reason probably is, be-
cause they are more interesting, more full of feeling,
than the latter. As phenomena of pure intelligence,
Perception and Conception are themselves neutral,
but they constantly rouse feeling, and according to
the intensity of this, will be the faithfulness of the
recollection.
4. The differences between one man and ano-
ther, in regard to the faculty of Perception, are not
very striking, except in the case of illness. Ihe
CONNECTION OF MEMORY. 221
most ^Ykle-spread diversity is that of long and short
sight. In forming particular Conceptions of things
formerly perceived, the power of all men is also
pretty much on a par. With respect to general
conceptions no doubt, it is otherwise. Still, upon
the whole, the differences between one man and
another, whether in the faculty of Perception or of
Conception, are not sufficient to account for the very
great diversity of memories ; and therefore we must
conclude that this diversity depends not so much
upon the difference of those intellectual faculties as
on the difference in the strength of the feelings
which accompany them. Such is our first conclu-
sion on this subject. In one form of Conception,
indeed, men differ widely, namely, in the power of
Imagination. Now, as this intellectual power has
a peculiar influence on the emotions, so, agreeably to
the above conclusion, what men imagine vividly,
they should remember well ; because, if they imagine
vividly, they will feel warmly.
5. Neither does goodness of memory depend
much, if at all, on soundness of judgment and
strength of the reasoning powers ; though some de-
gree of Memory be essential to the exercise of these.
It is evident that without Memory, Judgment and
Reasoning could have nothing to go upon, no facts,
no former conclusions, no premises; but it does not
appear why judgment and reasoning should be ne-
cessary to Memory. And experience shows that
persons very deficient in the higher intellectual
222 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
faculties have sometimes excellent memories. I
have known boys, the least gifted in other respects,
the best at learning by heart. This surely proves
that memory depends little on judgment and reason-
ing power, even when all these are found together
in perfection. Such is our second conclusion, which
is corroborated by the fact that memory is generally
strongest in the young, in those whose higher facul-
ties have not come to maturity. The comparative
readiness with which men confess a deficiency of
memory may be admitted as a proof that, in popular
belief, Memory does not depend upon judgment, or
upon reasoning power, for assuredly they would not
so easily allow an inferiority in these faculties.
6. As Memory arrives at maturity before the
powers of judgment and reasoning, so it is apt to
decline before them. We often hear people of middle
age complain of weakness of Memory, and in after
years it not unfrequently fails very much, while the
higher faculties are still entire. The senses wax
dull, the emotions languid, Memory becomes weak,
before the Reason is affected. But the Senses, as
we know, depend much upon the state of the body —
of the eye, and ear, for instance, and no acuteness
of mind in other respects can remedy an imperfection
here. 1'he emotions also depend, a good deal, upon
the state of the body, on the slow or rapid flow of
blood especially ; and wdiatever retards or quickens
the pulse, has a corresponding effect upon the emo-
tions. Thus Digitalis or Foxglove, which lowers
CONNECTION OF MEMORY. 223
the pulse, produces depression of spirits ; while
strong drink stimulates the circulation, and at the
same time quickens the emotions, and is consequently
in great request. It is not so much for the pleasure
of Sense, that spirituous liquours, tobacco, and
opium, are in demand, as for the agreeable emotions
which they rouse. The state of the atmosphere
also, and other physical causes, such as good or bad
digestion, influence the emotions through the body.
Now, as Memory seems to follow the law of the
Senses and the Emotions, with respect to early
development and maturity, and early decline, more
than the higher intellectual faculties of judgment
and reasoning, does it not seem probable that it also
depends more upon the body than these ^ May we
not say, that, in the scale w^iich reaches from Matter
to Mind, from Sense to pure Intellect, Memory oc-
cupies a middle place *? that, though itself entirely
mental, it has more connection with the tenement of
day than pure reason ? Such is our third conclusion
upon this subject.
7. We have next to remark that the ^Yill seems
to have more power over the Memory than over any
other intellectual faculty, more than over any men-
tal faculty, except the emotive. Over the Senses,
the Will has no power at all, no immediate power,
none over the Perceptions, or the Conceptions, the
Judgment, or the Reasoning faculty ; and though it
may have a remote influence upon all these, yet its
power over the memory, though still indirect, seems
224 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
more considerable. Assuredly we cannot directly
will the presence of anything in the mind ; for, if it
be there already, there is no occasion for willing it,
and if not there, how can we will the presence of we
know not what '? Still there are innumerable helps
to memory which people soon learn, when they wish
to remember anything, numerous associations which
they can establish, so as to suggest at the proper
time the thought required. We have even systems
o[ memoria technica. Memory is subject to the laws
of Association, and by proper attention to these it
may, be not only assisted on particular occasions,
but even permanently improved. Such is the
fourth and last conclusion which we come to on
this subject, a conclusion, moreover, confirmed by
popular sentiment, which never blames a man for
imperfection in the Senses, in Perception, Concep-
tion, Judgment, or Reasoning, but often upbraids
him with forgetfulness. " I forget," is not always
admitted as a valid excuse ; the answer being
" Aye, but you ought to remember."
8. An important corollary is derived at once
from the foregoing. If Memory be more under the
controul of the Will than any other intellectual
faculty, nay, than any other mental faculty, except
the emotive, then, with this exception, the Memory
ought to be the most susceptible of improvement.
Therefore improvement of memory is an object not
only desirable but attainable. How then shall we
best secure this end •?
CONNECTION OF MEMORY. 22o
9. Since Memory depends so much on the
strength of the original impression, especially on the
degree of feeling which accompanies it, our principal
object ought to be to cherish that feeling. To this
of course Attention is indispensable. When the
mind is altogether absent, nothing can make im-
pression, and when it is distracted by many things,
each rouses but a feeble and transitory feeling.
Attention, then, is essential, and concentration upon
one subject for a length of time beneficial to memory ;
while absence of mind is fatal, and rapid transition
from one subject to another injurious. Except total
inattention, nothing is so bad for memory as vola-
tility, nothing so good as steadiness of mind. Hence
relaxation after study is better for memory than a
change of intellectual pursuit, and sleep, the great-
est relaxation, best of all. Accordingly, it may be
observed that what one has learnt at night, imme-
diately before going to bed, is often well remember-
ed in the morning, sometimes better remembered
than the night before. It used to surprise me,
when at school, how well I recollected lines on first
awaking which I knew but imperfectly before I
slept.
10. Since the capacity of the mind is limited,
and we cannot remember everything, no incon-
siderable part of the Art of Memory consists in
proper selection, in knowing what we ought to
remember, and what forget. When stupid people
begin to relate any event, they generally inter-
G G
226 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
lard their story with so many unimportant par-
ticulars, like Mrs. Quickly,' that the point of the
whole is blunted or destroyed ; and the mind,
being filled with such insignificant details, forgets
others of greater moment. Mere contiguity in
place and time may afford innumerable associa-
tions, but few of any importance ; and all that are
trivial ought to be forgotten, in order that we may
better retain the others. Relations of Causation
and of Resemblance afford the most useful asso-
ciations, and to them therefore our principal atten-
tion should be directed. Thus we see that the
Art of Remembering includes the Art of Forget-
ting.
11. If we could but stimulate the emotions
generally, we should certainly improve the Me-
mory. But how can this be brought about^ Though
nature has made a great diversity between one
man and another with respect to Sensibility, yet
education and circumstances may greatly modify
original temperament. Thus monotony impairs,
' " Thou did'st swear to me upon a parcel-gilt goblet, sitting in
my Dolphin chamber, at the round table, by a sea-coal fire, upon
Wednesday, in Witsun week, when the prince broke thy head for
liking his father to a singing-man of Windsor, thou did'st swear to
me then, as 1 was washing thy wound, to marry me, and make
me my lady, thy wife." King Henry IV. Part IL Act II. Scene
I. Here we have a precious specimen of unimportant associations
derived from mere contiguity in place and time, surrounding and
almost burying the main idea.
J
CONNECTION OF MEMORY. 227
variety quickens Sensibility. So Society, inter-
course with one's fellows, keeps the feelings alive,
while Solitude and Retirement deaden the flow of
emotion. In advanced age especially, nothing is
so injurious to the memory as Solitude. At that
period of life, the Emotions naturally flag, the
Senses fail, and with these the Memory goes,
unless it be refreshed by continual intercourse,
by cheerful faces, and animated talk, particularly
by contact with infancy and youth. Youth and
age form a great contrast, and like most contrasts,
benefit each other. Where, on the other hand,
none but old people meet together, as in hospitals
and workhouses, the effect is very depressing.
Anything, however, is better for Age than Soli-
tude. A life of Activity, which stimulates all the
faculties, is particularly favourable to Memory, by
maintaining a perpetual flow of emotion. Hopes
and fears, success and failure, triumph and disap-
pointment, are all full of feeling, whether pleasur-
able or painful, and pleasure and pain are alike
conducive to memory.
How much memory depends upon emotion,
will abundantly appear from the case of dreams.
What more unreal than dreams *? There the
Senses and Perception are dead, Conception is often
monstrous, Judgment and Reasoning power are
perverted ; yet Emotion lives, ay often flourishes
more than in our waking hours. Accordingly,
in spite of their absurdity, in spite of their rapi-
228 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
dity, in spite of their non-recurrence, there are
dreams which we never forget.
12. Every faculty, bodily as well as mental,
is improved by Exercise ; and Memory especially.
Now nothing is better adapted for this purpose
than the study of languages, and as Memory is
sooner developed than judgment and reasoning
power, therefore, this study is peculiarly fitted
for youth. It draws out and strengthens that
faculty at the natural time. For Philosophy and
the higher branches of Science, the youthful mind
is not yet prepared; and no science so much
improves the memory as languages. After lan-
guages comes History, which both requires and
strengthens the memory, without any strain upon
the higher intellectual powers. Chronology, of
course, is an essential part of history. Here
the influence of Association is very striking. When
dates are learnt by rote raerel}'', as by some system
of technical memory, the labour is irksome, the
profit small, the knowledge, such as it is, fleeting ;
but when associated with the facts, the fact will
recall the date, or the date the fact. Thus were
a person asked when Egbert lived, who united the
Heptarchy, he might not at once remember ; but
recollecting that he was brought up at the Court
of Charlemagne, he would require only to know
the age of the latter. So, the fact that Haroun-
el-Raschid sent a clock as a present to Charle-
magne, fixes the reign of the renowned Caliph of
CONNECTION OP MEMORY. 229
Ba2:dad. Thus does one date determine two
others. The constitution of the human mind,
and the order of the development of the faculties,
as we now see, justify the practice of training
youth by means of Languages and History, rather
than Science. Were we to change the system, as
some propose, and take up Science in preference,
we should strain the higher faculties too much
before they were duly prepared, and we should
neglect Memory at the very time when it is most
susceptible of improvement. It cannot be too
frequently repeated that the object of Education,
properly so called, is not so much Information as
Intellectual progress. There is more mental im-
provement in making out hard passages in a Greek
or Latin Author than in getting up all the known
facts of the planetary system. The study of lan-
guages has this advantage, that, beginning with
Memory, it afterwards requires the exercise of
higher powers. In the choice of languages, for
the purposes of Education, the dead languages,
Greek and Latin, or the Oriental languages, parti-
cularly Arabic and Sanscrit, offer great advantages
to us over those of modern Europe ; first, because
they differ more from our own ; secondly, because
they are more difficult; and thirdly, because, if
not acquired in youth, the dead languages at least,
they never will be learnt at all. We ought to
secure in early life what in after years we may
have no leisure to pursue. The rising importance
230 PRINCIPLES OE PSYCHOLOGY.
of our Indian possessions, and the system of public
competition for civil appointments in India now
happil}/- adopted, will tend to encourage the study
of the Oriental languages and literature ; and an
excellent study it will be, not only for a special
purpose, but also for general improvement.
13. Why is verse more easily learnt by heart
than prose ^ Because we know beforehand what
Rhythm is, and this knowledge helps us to re-
member the words which fall into metre. Instead
of two associations only, of sound and sense, we
have three, sound, sense, and measure. Rhyme,
of course, is an additional help, for, if we know the
end of one line, we partially know the end of the
next, we know the sound thereof. Partial fore-
knowledge is therefore a great help to memory.
14. Every one knows how difficult it is to
learn off by heart words which we do not under-
stand. In this case, the only association is that
of contiguous Sounds, and that alone is trifling.
Add to the Sound, Sense, and then we have two
associations, the latter very important. To these
add Measure, and we have three associations, the
last of a constant nature, and therefore well-known
before-hand. Again, add Rhyme, and we have
now four associations, that of Rhyme being derived
from similarity, not from mere contiguity, of
Sounds, and therefore far more serviceable. Thus,
the more associations we can form, the more easy
CONNECTION OF MEMORY. 231
it becomes to remember. The Art of Memory
might be called the Art of Association.
Since, as we have seen reason to believe. Me-
mory depends more upon the state of the body
than the higher intellectual faculties, it ought to
be sooner impaired by disease. And this seems
confirmed by Experience. Good health and good
spirits, useful to all the faculties, are particularly
beneficial to Memory.
232 FEmCIPLES OF PSTCHOLOGT.
CHA^TEfl YI.
OF KEASON IN GE^'ERAL- DISTINCTION BE-
TWEEN EIL^SON AND SIMPLE INTELLECT.
1. Hitherto we have treated of those Intel-
lectual faculties which properly belong to Simple
Intellect ; now we come to those which apper-
tain especially to the Reason. Under the for-
mer we include all those Intellectual faculties
which consider objects singly, without reference
to their relations ; while, under the latter, we class
those which look to the Relations of Things.
Thus, Perception, Conception, Memory, belong to
Simple Intellect ; Comprehension, Judgment, and
Reasoning power, to the Reason.
2. We are aware that this distinction has not
been always observed. Thomas Brown's division
of the Intellectual faculties, however, into Simple
and Relative Suggestion, is fundamentally the
same as the above ; and Dugald Stewart treats
of " Reason or the Understanding properly so
called," in the Second part of his " Elements."
Locke, on the other hand, under the name Under-
OF REASON IN CJENEUAL. 233
standing includes all the Intellectual faculties, and
this may be considered the usual meaning of the
word, as in the old division of the mental powers,
into the Understanding and the Will. The above
distinction, however, is real and important, what-
ever terras we may employ to mark it ; and as
the English language affords no single word under
which we may include all the Intellectual faculties,
other than Reason, I shall make use of the
terms Simple Intellect to signify the former. The
phrase appears to be appropriate, as expressing
that simple point of view under which the mind
contemplates Objects as opposed to the more
complex view embraced by Reason, which con-
siders objects not singly, but with their relations
to other objects.
3. It is self-evident that Reason cannot exist
without Simple Intellect ; for we cannot know the
relations of one thing to another without perceiv-
ing, conceiving, or remembering the separate
things so related. We cannot compare one tree
or one horse with another, without having some
notion of each separate tree, or horse. But sim-
ple Intellect can exist without Reason ; at least
it may be contemplated as so existing, though, in
reality, the one be rarely found altogether without
the other. We seldom consider any thing entirely
by itself, without relation to something else. By
the power of association, one thing constantly
suggests another, and thence arises comparison.
H H
234 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
If, however, Simple Intellect do not necessarily
suppose Reason, the distinction between them is
real, and ought not to be neglected in analysing
the Intellectual faculties. In nature, the metal
Potassium is always found united with Oxygen in
the alkali Potash; but chemical analysis can
separate the two elements.
4. It may be true that almost all objects in
nature bear some relation to each other ; but
that is nothing to the present purpose, unless the
relation itself be a subject of mental contempla-
tion. There is a certain relation between Matter
and Mind, whereby the one acts upon the other ;
but, in looking at a rose, the object alone in general
engrosses me, and I have no thought about the
relation subsisting between it and myself. That
thought may occur to the metaphysician, but
certainly not to the ordinary observer, the mere
lover of flowers. Therefore, we conclude that
there may be Perception, there may be Simple
Intellect, without Reason.
5. To this, however, it may be objected, that
as no material object is strictly one and indi-
visible, we cannot contemplate anything outwardly
without being conscious of some relation between
the parts. This consciousness, however, requires
some advancement of intellect. The child views ob-
jects in the gross, and cannot analyse and after-
wards compare. I knew a deaf and dumb boy of
six years old, whose education had been totally
OF REASON IN GENERAL. 235
neglected, who seemed to have great difficulty in
distinguishing the different parts of his own body.
To himself he appeared all one. And though we
should grant that some obvious relations of posi-
tion and magnitude might be known by simple
Intellect, yet this would prove not that the
distinction between Reason and Simple Intellect
was unfounded, but only, that things are not so well
defined in nature as in our classifications. It is a
great mistake, and the source of much error, to
attempt to overthrow distinctions, because their
limits cannot be stated with perfect accuracy.
6. This distinction between Simple Intellect
and Reason, though not strictly observed by
philosophers, seems to me warranted by the
common use of language. Vulgar notions in
metaphysics, as signified by ordinary speech, are
not likely to be without some good foundation,
for all men are, and cannot help being, to a certain
extent, metaphysicians. Our Sensations, Emo-
tions, and Thoughts, for ever present to us, must
be in some degree known. Now it appears to me
that Perception, Conception, and Memory, are
generally distinguished from Reason, though the
common name of Simple Intellect may not be
given to the three former. With this popular
consent, confirming the distinction, I shall rest
satisfied.
236 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
CHAPTER VII.
OP COMPREHENSION.
1. The first power that belongs to the Reason
is that of Comprehension. Here again we must
beg attention to a new or at least to a more
exact sense of the word. Indeed it would be
difficult to say what meaning has hitherto been
given to this term ; or to point out any author who
has always used it in the sense here proposed.
Comprehension, as here employed, is often con-
founded with Conception, but as I think improperly ;
for Conception should be limited to the notion of
single objects, and should not embrace Relation.
On the other hand, Comprehension differs from
Judgment; for I consider it certain that we can
comprehend a Relation without passing any judg-
ment as to its truth or falsehood. When I am told
in Euclid that the angles at the base of an isosceles
triangle are equal, I may or may not comprehend
the proposition, according as I know or do not know
the meaning of the words, angle, triangle, and isos-
celes ; and when I do comprehend it, I still cannot
he convinced of its truth until I have studied the
proof. Then, and then only, do I pass judgment
OF COMPREHENSION. 237
upon it. The same may be said of all the enunci-
atory propositions of Geometry. To comprehend
them is one thing, to determine their truth or fals-
hood another ; and so with respect to other proposi-
tions. I can comprehend the proposition that " the
Danube is a larger river than the Volga," though I
do not pretend to judge whether it be so or not.
Thus is Comprehension distinguished from Concep-
tion on the one hand, and from Judgment on the
other, inasmuch as it supposes the consciousness of
relation without the knowledge of truth. It is the
first and lowest of the powers of Reason ; first in
the order of mental developement, for we must com-
prehend what a relation or a proposition is before
we can judge of it ; lowest, because common to all,
and indispensable to all reasonable creatures.
2. The establishment of Comprehension as a
distinct mental faculty seems to me of consider-
able importance, necessary to a due appreciation
of the Intellectual powers. To the want of this
distinction may be attributed much obscurity and
even contradiction in the writings of mental phi-
losophers. Thus Reid allows in one part that
'* when simple apprehension is employed about a
proposition, every man knows that it is one thing
to apprehend (comprehend) a proposition, that is
to conceive what it means ; but it is quite another
thing to judge it to be true or false.^" Here the
words apprehend and conceive are used instead of
^ lylelleclual Powers. Essay VI. Chap. I.
238 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
comprehend, which I propose, but the sense is the
same, and the doctrine the same as that given
above. But not many sentences after we meet with
the following : " Relations of things make one
great class of our notions or ideas, and we cannot
have the idea of any relation without some exercise
of judgment '?'"' Now, as Reid would allow, and in-
deed every one allows, that a proposition supposes a
relation ; it follows that in the first sentence he grants,
and in the next denies that we can conceive or aj^pre-
hend, as he expresses it, a relation without an exer-
cise. of judgment. Here is a flat contradiction. Both
of these statements cannot be true ; and the former
I believe to be correct, as above shown. Had Reid
seen that there is a powder, which I call comprehen-
sion, distinct from Conception or apprehension proper,
as well as from Judgment, he could not have fallen
into this contradiction. In the third chapter of the
same Essay he again allows explicitly that " a propo-
sition may be simply conceived (comprehended)
without judging of it,'' and if a proposition, then
a relation ; for a proposition is simply a relation
expressed in words.^ And again, in the beginning
'' Intellectual Powers. Essay VI. Chap. I.
' There may be an exception to ibis metaphysical definition of
a proposition, in the case where Identity, or where simple Ex-
istence, is predicated; but in almost all propositions, if not in all,
some Relation is affirmed or denied. On this point see the
author's " Introduction to Mental Philosophy" Article, Propo-
sition. •
or COMPREHENSION. 239
of the fourth chapter we are told that some pro-
positions are of such a nature that a man of ripe
understanding may apprehend them distinctly, and
perfectly understand their meaning, without finding
himself under any necessity of believing them to be
true or false, probable or improbable." Substitute
the word coviprehend for apprehend and understand,
and this statement will agree with my own.
240 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY,
CHAPTER VIII.
OF BELIEF.
1. When we fully comprehend a Proposition,
the next step is to believe or to disbelieve it. Some
propositions we believe or disbelieve at once, with-
out any hesitation ; others we admit or reject slowly,
after some mental effort ; on others we make up
our mind with great difficulty ; while of a few we
may never be fully convinced, one way or another,
during the whole course of our lives. Let us first
determine what Belief is, and then see how it is
connected with the other Intellectual powers.
2. When I say that I believe in God, it is evi-
dent that the Belief is something different from the
mere conception of a Supreme Being, Maker of
heaven and earth, for an Atheist can conceive such
a Being, though he does not believe in him. It is
also clear that when I affirm my belief in the pro-
position " God exists," I do something more than
state that I comprehend it ; for an Atheist compre-
hends this proposition, or knows its meaning, as
well as myself, without any mixture of Belief. There-
fore Belief differs essentially from mere conception,
as well as from mere comprehension ; though with-
Tv)
OF BELIEF. 241
out conception and comprehension of course we
cannot believe. They are indispensable to Belief,
but may exist without it.
3. These observations are sufficient to refute
the statement of Hume delivered in his juvenile
work; "A Treatise of Human Nature," namely,
that " An opinion or belief is a lively Idea related
to, or associated with, a present Impression." ™
Here, Belief is confounded with Conception. It is
nothing but a lively Conception, or in Hume's lan-
guage, a lively Idea. This conclusion follows from
that one fundamental assumption with which the
work sets out, that all the phenomena of mind are
but of two sorts, Impressions and Ideas, the latter
being only copies, as it were, of the former, dimi-
nished in force and vivacity. But having already
criticised this assumption, I refer to it here again
only to show that it gave rise to an erroneous notion
of Belief. If all the mental phenomena be either
Impressions or Ideas, of course Belief must be one
or the other; and not being an Impression, it must
be an Idea. But we have shown that it is essentially
different from an Idea or Conception ; and conse-
quently, Hume's primary classification of the mental
phenomena is narrow and insufficient. Further on,
in the same Treatise, Hume seems to consider Belief
as an Impresssion, rather than an Idea ; for he says,
" Belief is more properly an act of the Sensitive
"Part III. Sect. 7.
I I
242 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
than of the Cogitative part of our nature."" Here
Belief is confounded with Sensation ; wretched Me-
taphysics ! The force of absurdity can no further
go.
4. So far we have seen what Belief is not ; but
as yet we know not what it is. Does it belong to
Simple Intellect or to Reason ? We have shown
that certain powers of Simple Intellect, such as
Perception and Memory, comprise Belief, belief in
the present existence of the outward object, belief
in the former existence of something now recalled :
and every one allows that there is Belief in Judg-
ment. It therefore seems that Belief belongs to
both Simple Intellect and Reason.
5. But, does the Belief which forms part of
Perception and Memory suppose an act of Judg-
ment *? If so, then Simple Intellect and Reason
are both united in these complex mental faculties,
and they cannot be attributed to the former alone.
In order to solve this question, we must first inquire
whether Belief be in any case possible without
Judgment.
6. Some writers are of opinion that we cannot
affirm or deny anything without an exercise of
Judgment. Thus, Dr. Watts says, " Judgment is
" Part IV. Sect. 1. — It must always be remembered, that
the " Treatise of Human Nature" was a youthful work, afterwards
given up by the Author ; but it was printed and published, and
therefore may be criticised, es])ecially if such criticism throw a
light upon mental philosophy.
OF JiELIEF. 243
that operation of the mind whereby we join two or
more ideas together by one affirmation or negation ;
that is, we either affirm or deny this to be that. So,
the tree is high ; that horse is not swift ; the mind
of man is a thinking being ; mere matter has no
thought belonging to it ; God is just ; good men are
often miserable in this world; a righteous governor
will make a dijference between the evil and the good;
which sentences are the effect of Judgment, and are
called Propositions,'^" And again, further on, " the
evidence of sense is when we frame a proposition ac-
cording to the dictates of any of our senses ; so we
judge that grass is green ; that a trumpet gives a
pleasant sound ; ih^ifire burns wood ; water is soft,
and iron is hard : for we have seen, heard, or felt
all these."p
7. Other writers seem to be of a different
opinion. The statements of Dr. Reid on this point
are not always consistent, but in the opening of his
Essay " Of Judgment," he finds fault with the defi-
nition given of judgment by the more ancient wri-
ters on logic, as an act of the mind whereby one thing
is a^rmed or denied of another : and that on two
grounds ; first, because it does not seem to embrace
mere mental affirmation and denial ; and secondly,
because " affirmation and denial is very often the
expression of testimony, which is a different act of
" Logic, Introduction.
P Id. Part II. Chap. II. Sect. 9.
244 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
the mind, and ought to be distinguished from judg-
ment. A judge asks of a witness what he knows of
such a matter to which he was an eye or ear witness.
He answers by affirming and denying something.
But his answer does not express his judgment ; it is
his testimony. Again, I ask a man his opinion in a
matter of science or criticism. His answer is not
testimony ; it is the expression of his judgment."
Here it is distinctly allowed that there may be
affirmation and denial, and consequently affirmative
and negative propositions, without an act of judg-
ment, and therefore Belief. Yet, in the very same
place we are told that " mental affirmation and
denial is only another name for judgment," which is
a flat contradiction to the above. 1 his latter asser-
tion, however, is not supported by any argument or
illustration, and seems to have been a mere over-
sight, contradicted by what immediately follows.
8. In order to decide this point let us take the
simplest case possible. I knock my hand against
the table, and what is the mental result*? First, I
feel a sensation, which may or may not amount to
pain ; then 1 have a conception of some material
object ; and lastly, I believe in the existence of such
an object there present. Now in all this what room
is there for judgment '? The sensation, the concep-
tion, and the belief, are all of which I am conscious.
But no one would maintain that the sensation or
the conception singly or together constitute judg-
ment ; nor will it, I think, be affirmed that Belief
OF BELIEF. 245
is only another name for Jiulgment. These words
are distinguished in all languages, and therefore the
states of mind which they express cannot be quite
the same. But it may be said that Conception and
Belief together constitute Judgment. This, however,
is only to repeat the assertion in another form, that
Belief and Judgment are identical, for neither Belief
nor Judgment can exist without Conception, and
therefore in this there is no difference between
them. If Conception and Belief together constitute
Judgment, and Conception be a part of Judgment,
then is Belief without Conception equivalent to
Judgment without Conception, and consequently
Belief with Conception is the same as Judgment
with Conception, and therefore Belief and Judgment
are identical. But this conclusion is at variance
with the universal sense of mankind, and therefore
cannot be true. Consequently, the Premises from
which we set out that Conception and Belief toge-
ther constitute Judgment, must be false.
9. Having thus exhausted all the combina-
tions of the three elements, Sensation, Conception,
and Belief, as occurring in the case just stated,
and having found nothing in them singly or in
union that would be called Judgment by any man
of common intelligence, we conclude that Belief
may exist without Judgment. And if in that case,
then in others innumerable. This is an important
conclusion.
10. The Belief which exists along with our
246 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
Perceptions is very frequently unaccompanied
with Judgment. It seems ridiculous to assert
that without an exercise of Judgment we cannot
know that " grass is green." Indeed, far from an
effort of Judgment being required to unite the
attribute of greenness to grass, we can scarcely
separate them even in Conception. And surely it
will not be maintained that the formal statement
of the fact in words as a proposition can require
Judgment, if the mental conviction required none.
11. But the Belief which attends upon Per-
ception sometimes does require an act of Judg-
ment. This is particularly the case with the
Perceptions of Sight. These, as we know, are
often acquired, not instinctive ; and much judg-
ment may be necessary, even in mature life, to
determine the exact distance, position, magnitude,
or figure of remote objects, as descried by the
eye. In these particulars people continually
differ, that is, they form different opinions, and
this diversity is the strongest proof that judgment
is necessary ; whereas in such statements as mar-
ble is hard, grass is green^ there is perfect unani-
mity, because there is no exercise of Judgment.
Instinct is the same in all ; but Judgment varies
indefinitely. Travellers in a new country often
differ as to the distance of the objects which pre-
sent themselves, but they never debate whether
the trees have leaves, or the rivers flow. Are you
a good judge of distances by the eye? is a com-
OF BELIEF. 247
mon question and expressive of a truth ; but no
one would ask another whether he were a good
judge of the colour of grass.
12. The knowledge derived from the sense of
Hearing also often requires an exercise of Judg-
ment. To be able to tell whence any noise pro-
ceeds, from what cause, and from how far, may
demand considerable experience and employment
of the rational faculties ; but no judgment is ne-
cessary in order to tell whether a sound be agree-
able or disagreeable. We do not judge, but feel
it to be one or the other, at the time ; and ever
afterwards we believe that a similar sound will
affect us in like manner. Having felt how the
sawing of stone grates upon the ear, we can surely
frame a proposition to express our belief in this
truth, without any act of Judgment.
13. What has been said of Perception also
applies to Memory. Common Sense makes a broad
distinction between Memory and Judgment ; and a
person may excel in the one and be very deficient
in the other. Judgment, indeed, cannot flourish
without some degree of Memory ; but Memory
may exist and even abound without Judgment. I
should like to know what Judgment is required
in order to learn off by heart a piece of prose or
poetry. And can I not affirm that " I yesterday
walked five miles into the country" without an
exercise of that faculty ? If I can, then the Belief,
which forms an essential part of Memory, is inde-
248 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
pendent of Judgment. Will any one maintain
that the same mental principle is required to frame
these two propositions — " last month I frequently
skated on the Serpentine," and, " Napoleon was a
more skilful general than Mack."
14. From the above it appears that Belief is
frequently unaccompanied with Judgment, espe-
cially in the case of Perception and of Memory.
Consequently, in these cases Belief belongs to
Simple Intellect, not to Reason. In other cases,
indeed, Belief is closely connected with Reason,
as in Judgment : but, if Belief can exist without
Judgment, without any act of Reason, then it is
properly a phenomenon of Simple Intellect.
It is a phenomenon sui generis, neither a Sen-
sation, nor an Emotion, nor a Perception,
though an element thereof, nor a Conception,
nor even a Relation ; for a relation may be com-
prehended without being believed. It is a pheno-
menon which cannot be defined, because it cannot
be analysed, nor for the same reason described.
In fact, we know it so well that neither definition
nor description are necessary. All that is required
is to find what place it occupies, and what combi-
nations it forms with other mental phenomena;
and this we have endeavoured in part to do. We
shall afterwards consider it in union with the
Judgment.
15. But if Belief be ever independent of the
Judgment on what does it depend^ To this we
OF BELIEF. 249
answer that Belief is of two kinds, Orifjinal or
Instinctive, and Derived or Acquired ; that the
former is an ultimate or unaccountable fact, an
original part of our mental constitution, which
cannot be traced any farther ; while the latter
depends upon causes that may be investigated.
1 6. We have already mentioned some of those
Articles of Belief which we consider as Original
and Jundamental, the ground of all subsequent
knowledge; but we shall again enumerate them
here. These then, are the following; —
1. Belief in our own Identity.
2. Belief in the evidence of Memory.
3. Belief in the existence of the material
world.
4. Belief in the uniformity of Nature, in uni-
formities of Co-existence as well as those of Succes-
sion ; for instance, that all cows, horses, sheep,
bears, lions, etc., are respectively formed alike,
not only outwardly and visibly, but inwardly
and out of sight; and that fire will always burn,
water always drown, etc., etc.
5. Belief in human Testimony.
All these, and possibly others, we consider as
Orijjinal and fundamental Articles of Belief.
17. Hume, no doubt, has attempted to prove
that our Belief in the uniformity of the course of
Nature, or in Causation, is derived from Custom.''
** Essays: Sceptical Doubts; and Sceptical solution of those
doubts.
K K
250 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
but this explanation is refuted by the fact that
such BeUef requires no Repetition. When a child
has once burned his finger in the candle, he will
avoid it ever afterwards ; and if he have seen a
man drowned in water, he will not require a re-
petion of the experiment to be sure that it will
drown himself. In truth, the tendency to associ-
ate phenomena as cause and effect is so strong,
that it leads to frequent error, to be corrected only
by subsequent experience. Repetition, then, is
necessary not to give the first Belief, but to con-
firm or dispel it. The same may be said of Belief
in human testimony. The child swallows impli-
citly all that is told him by those around him.
He never doubts the truth of what they say, until
experience have proved to him that they may
sometimes speak false. Here again Repetition
gives not the first Belief, but afterwards serves to
correct it. There is, however, this difference
between Belief in the uniformity of Nature, and
Belief in man's word, that the former is based
upon one instance at least of succession or of
co-existence, whereas the latter seems to be inde-
pendent of all experience as to the truth or false-
hood of what men say. The child believes what
he is told, long before he can prove anything,
prior to all experience, quite instinctively. Mr. Mill,
on the other hand, endeavours to prove that our
belief in the law of Causality does not depend
upon an instinct, but on an induction by simple
OF BELIEF, 251
enumeration/ But here the whole difficulty is
overlooked. In the first place, a number of in-
stances is not necessary to this belief, one only may
suffice ; but one instance, nay, ten millions of
instances of any event, show only a certain uni-
formity in time past or present ; they can prove no
such uniformity in time to come. No doubt, we
cannot help believing in the future uniformity ;
but there is no logical connection between the
premises and the conclusion. Why should the
future be like the past or the present ? Is this a
self-evident truth ? Certainly not ? Can any
reason be assigned for it ? We maintain not ;
and therefore we conclude that our belief in
Causation is not the result of reasoning, is not
acquired by induction, but is prior to all reason-
ing, to all induction, and truly instinctive.
Hume saw" the difficulty, and attempted to solve
it by Custom ; but I cannot see that Mr. Mill has
given atiy solution at all. He says indeed that
*^The justification of our Belief that the future
will resemble the past, is that the future does
resemble the past." But the word future in the
second place must mean the present as future to
the past ; and how past and present uniformity
can prove uniformity in time to come is still the
difficulty.
18. The above, and some other fundamental
articles of Belief, are called bv Dr. Reid " First
' " System of Logic." Book hi. Chap xxi.
252 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY.
Principles of Contingent Truth," and are treated
of by bim under the head of " Judgment." But
we have seen that they are independent of this
faculty. They arise very early in the infant mind,
long before judgment is developed ; and it is
necessary that they should, for the very existence
of the child depends upon them. Miserable in-
deed would be the lot of mankind, if Belief could
only follow upon Judgment! Judgment may in-
deed be required afterwards to generalise these
primary convictions, to state them in formal pro-
positions, and bring them forward as First Prin-
ciples ; but the Belief existed long before; it arose
on each particular occasion, as a particular phe-
nomenon, not formally stated, not expressed in
words, but entirely mental. On what occasions
the particular instances of Belief may arise, we
have already seen, and there is no uncertainty
here ; but the occasion is not the principal cause,
it is only an auxiliary. For the principal cause
we can look only to the original constitution of
the human mind, which, like the bud of a plant,
is susceptible of such wonderful development.
The sun, the rain, are but auxiliary causes of the
growth of the branch, the leaves, the flower, the
fruit ; the principal cause is in the bud itself.
Perhaps the most convincing instance of Belief,
independent of all Experience, of Judgment, of
Reason, is afforded by the child's easy confidence
in what is told him.
.j^.
OF BELIEF. 253
]{). The second sort of Belief is that which is
not original or instinctive, but derived or acquired ;
and of this therefore the causes may be assigned.
One cause of such Belief is unquestionably the
Judgment; but is it the only cause*? Is it from
an act of Judgment alone that the mass of man-
kind derive all those opinions which are -not origi-
nal or instinctive'? It is far otherwise.
20. Many opinions are adopted by children of
tender age before the Judgment is developed ;
many are believed implicitly from infancy to age
without question, without doubt; many seem to
be hereditary, descending from father to son, like
the paternal acres ; many are common to classes
of men, nay to whole nations. Such early, such
uniform belief, about things often questionable,
argues some cause acting sooner in life, and
acting with greater steadiness than the Judgment.
Wherever Judgment comes in, there we find di-
versity of belief at once. This is well known to
the Church of Rome ; and therefore the prohibi-
tion of private Judgment in religious matters is the
fundamental article of that church, distinguishing
it from every variety of Protestantism. All Pro-
testants, of whatsoever sect, appeal to private
Judgment; some more, some less, some deferring
much to authority, others very little; but the
Church of Rome rejects private judgment alto-
gether. The consequence is what we see; that
while the Church of Rome has held together for
254 PEINCIPLE3 OF PSYCHOLOGY.
good or for ill, Protestantism has been split into
innumerable sects. Even Protestant churches,
ostensibly one, are sometimes almost as much di-
vided among themselves as those which assume
diiferent denominations. Such is the consequence
of the acknowledged right of private judgment,
its use and its abuse.
21. Whence then are derived those early,
those uniform opinions to which we have alluded ?
We answer, without hesitation, from Custom.
We have seen that when Hume explained our
belief in Causation by Custom, he certainly was
mistaken ; because such primary belief requires
no repetition of phenomena, no custom ; but as a
cause of secondary Belief, custom is of immense
importance. It is a well-known fact, that persons
of mature age, even thoughtful men, insensibly
imbibe the opinions of those with whom they con-
stantly converse ; much more children, boys, and
unreflecting adults. We cannot blink the fact
that the immense majority of mankind, in all
countries, derive their religious opinions from
custom. Why are all Englishmen Christians, all
Turks Mahometans ^ In fact, the Christian reli-
gion is the only one which appeals to the Judg-
ment, the only one that has evidences ; and to
how few, comparatively, are those evidences
known! Though religious sentiment in general
be deeply founded in human nature, yet, in all
religions but the Christian, Belief in the prevail-
OF BELIEF. 255
ing creed is founded on nothing but custom; in
all very young Christians, and in most adults, it
depends upon the same principle ; in a few only
it rests upon sound judgment and reasoning.
22. And fortunate for us is this law of our
nature. Custom, indeed, may inculcate falsehood
as well as truth ; if it spread Christianity in
England, it keeps up Mahometanism in Turkey;
but perhaps any religion, certainly the Mahometan,
is better than none ; and any fixed belief, not de-
cidedly immoral, is preferable to a blank, or to a
tumult of conflicting opinions. Without the in-
fluence of custom there could be no family, except
in a material sense, and no nation ; for a nation
consists not merely in a geographical division of
country, and a number of people in that country,
but in a people among whom there exists a cer-
tain harmony of opinions, tastes, and character.
It is custom that binds the nation, like the family,
into one; whereas private judgment tends to
separate the members, and sometimes widely sepa-
rates them. In short, without custom the world
would be a Babel ; without the exercise of judg-
ment, an uniform, dead, unchangeable mass.
256 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
CHAPTER IX.
OF JUDGMENT.
1. The great antagonists to Belief founded on
mere custom are Judgment and Reasoning. These,
though so nearly related, and so commonly united,
are not inseparable by Metaphysical analysis, not
even in reality, for though there can be no Rea-
soning without Judgment, there may be Judgment
without Reasoning. But to determine what
Judgment properly is would seem to be no easy
task, considering the various and even contradic-
tory opinions of metaphysicians on this subject.
These discrepancies may be partly verbal, different
authors giving different meanings to the same
word ; but the result, if not absolute error, is
confusion. A writer cannot force all men to his
sense of any word, but he ought at least to ex-
plain clearly his own meaning, to adhere to it
consistently, and to depart as little as possible
from the common use of language.
2. Locke's account of this matter is summed
up by himself as follows : " Thus the mind has
two faculties conversant about Truth and False-
hood. First, Knowledge, whereby it certainly
OF JUDGMENT. 257
perceives and is undoubtedly satisfied of the
agreement or disagreement of any ideas Second-
ly, Judgment, which is the putting ideas together
or separating them from one another in the mind,
when the certain agreement or disagreement is
not perceived but presumed to be so ; which is,
as the word imports, taken to be so, before it cer-
tainly appears. And if it so unites, or separates
them as in reality things are, it is right Judg-
ment y^
3. What first strikes us in the above account is
the singular use of the word Knoivledge, beiDg em-
ployed to mean a mental faculty, and not as in com-
mon language a result obtained by means of our
faculties. Next we observe the distinction attempt-
ed between the faculty whereby we discern certainty
and that by which we descry probability only, the
latter alone being called Judgment. Such, in short,
is the doctrine of Locke. It is a doctrine, as we
see, that limits rather than extends the mean-
ing of the word Judgment, beyond what is usual.
4. Dr. Reid says, " That I may 'avoid disputes
about the meaning of words, I wish the reader to
understand that I give the name of Judgment to
every determination of the mind concerning what is
true and what is false. This, I think, is what logi-
cians, from the days of Aristotle, have called Judg-
<^ Essay conceming Human Understanding. Book IV.
Chap. 14.
L L
258 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
ment."* He also states that " in persons come to
years of understanding, judgment necessarily accom-
panies all sensation, perception by the senses, con-
sciousness, and memory, but not conception." In
short, according to Reid, wherever there is Belief,
there is Judgment ; and he even supposes Belief, as
in the case of sensation and simple consciousness,
where there is none. Here, Judgment is used in
the most extensive possible sense ; and as I have
endeavoured to show in the preceding chapter, quite
improperly . But, in the opening of the same chap-
ter, he finds fault with the usual definition, there ex-
pressed as an act of the mitid whereby one thing is
affirmed a?id denied of another^ although he adopts it,
observing that " affirmation and denial is very often
the expression of testimony, which is a different act
of the mind, and ought to be distinguished from
Judgment." But I cannot testify that " I yesterday
saw George Roberts in the town Coventry, at five
o'clock in the afternoon," without a conviction in my
mind that what I testify is true, or false, and there-
fore, according to Reid's own showing, without an
act of judgment. Nay, the very statement^ "I yes-
terday saw," etc., expresses my belief or conviction,
and therefore again, according to Reid, my judg-
ment. But this statement may be false, what then ?
why in that case I must disbelieve what I assert,
and disbelief surely argues judgment as much as
' Intellectual Powers. Essay VI. Chap. I.
OF JUDGMENT. 259
belief. The two statements of Reid are therefore
contradictory, and this contradiction may be traced
to the too extensive sense given to the term Judg-
ment, an extension not in accordance uith common
notions and common language. It is quite true, as
Reid says, that there is a real distinction, and one
generally allowed, between affirmation and denial
expressive of testimony, and affirmation and denial
expressive of opinion ; in other words, between
simple Belief and belief founded on Judgment.
5. As this is a matter of importance, I shall
bring forward two more passages to prove that
simple Belief and Belief founded on Judgment,
though distinguished by Reid at the outset, are
afterwards confounded by him. In the first Chap-
ter of his Essay on Judgment, after stating that
"in persons come to years of understanding,
judgment necessarily accompanies all sensation,
perception by the senses, consciousness, and me-
mory, but not conception," he adds, " I restrict
this to persons come to the years of understand-
ing, because it may be a question whether infants,
in the first period of life, have any judgment or
belief at all." Here judgment and belief are ex-
pressly used as synonimous. Again, in the Third
Chapter of the same Essay he says, " A proposition
may be simply conceived (comprehended) without
judging of it. But, when there is not only a con-
ception (comprehension) of the proposition, but a
mental affirmation or negation, an assent and
260 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
dissent of the understanding, whether weak or
strong, that is judgment." Here again, assent or
dissent of the understanding, in other words,
BeUef or Disbehef, and Judgment, are considered
as one and the same.
6. Since Locke and Reid differ so widely in
the notion attached by each to the term Judgment,
of course they must differ in all their conclusions
founded on such notions respectively. The objec-
tions brought forward by Reid against the doctrine
of Locke are consequently verbal ; they are objec-
tions not so much to a particular doctrine, as to
the particular use of a certain word. I shall
therefore not trouble the reader with them.
7. In common language, the term Judgment
is assuredly employed with considerable latitude
and vagueness ; but, as we have seen, it is not
generally confounded with simple Belief. Very
frequently it embraces Reasoning as well as Judg-
ment proper. When we talk of a man of sound
Judgment, we mean one who reasons well and
comes to sound conclusions on all affairs of ordi-
nary life. Having shown therefore, on the one
hand, that Judgment is not mere Belief, we ought
to prove, on the other, that there is a faculty
called with propriety Judgment, the foundation of
Reasoning, but distinguishable from Reasoning,
and capable of existing without it.
8. When I give my assent to the propositions,
twice two are equal to four, three times five are
OF JUDGArFXT. 2G1
equal to fifteen ; things which are equal to the
same are equal to one another ; two straight lines
cannot enclose a space ; etc., etc., what faculty
of the mind is called into exercise ? I certainly
believe these propositions; but is belief all? Is
my state of mind the same as when I say that I
beliei'e that the sun will rise to-morrow ? Cer-
tainly not. But perhaps there is a difference only
of degree, and I believe the one sort of proposition
more firmly than the other. Neither is this true ;
for I am as certain in my own mind that the sun
will rise to-morrow, as that twice two are equal
to four, and I would act as unhesitatingly on the
belief of the one, as on that of the other. There
is then here a difference greater than that of mere
degree ; something is added to the belief in the
one case which is not in the other. In the one
case I believe, and only believe, when I state the
proposition, for it does not appear to me at the
time on what that belief is founded. I may amuse
myself afterwards, if I please, by speculating upon
this point ; but at the moment the thought does
not arise, and it may never arise. It is therefore
beside the present question. The grounds of be-
lief do not immediately appear. But in the other
case, we believe because we see grounds of belief;
we believe not only that the proposition is true,
but w'e discern that it must be true; and this
faculty whereby we so discern is what is properly
called the Judgment. It comprehends belief, and
262 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
something more, and yet it does not embrace
reasoning ; for the truth of the proposition is
self-evident, not proved by inference from some-
thing else. Thus it appears that at least one
office of Judgment is to discern self-evident neces-
sary truth.
9. The primary propositions which we have
just considered are all Mathematical, having refer-
ence to Quantity alone, they are all abstract, and
all independent of actual matter of fact. It must
still be true that two straight lines (as we under-
stand them) cannot enclose a space, whether there
be any perfectly straight lines in nature or not.
But there are other primary propositions that
may be called Metaphysical, which differ from the
former, in this especially, that they do suppose
matter of fact, or real existence, distinct from the
conscious mind. These then are far more inter-
esting and far more important than the other.
The question which we have now to treat is,
whether these be discerned by the Judgment.
10. The first of these which 1 shall mention is,
that " whatever exists had a cause of existence dis-
tinct from itself." This is a proposition to which
every man of sound mind assents at once, in a gene-
ral way, without delay, without hesitation, but on
what grounds ^ from reasoning, certainly not ; for
there are no premises from which it can be proved.
Is it then self-evident and necessary ? If so, then
the contrary must be not only false, but impossible.
OF JUDGMENT. 2G3
This we cannot venture to say. A single case of
exception destroys impossibility ; and, if we believe
in God, we must admit that one exception. There-
fore the truth is neither self-evident nor necessary.
Is it then independent of Judgment? Assuredly
we do not discern, though we cannot help believing
it. Is it owing to custom *? Custom may confirm
the belief, but the rudiments thereof existed before
custom had power to act, even from the dawn of
Reason. Besides, Custom only associates pheno-
mena, and from the presence of one phenomenon
makes us look for another ; but in this there is no
notion of Causation. Therefore the truth in ques-
tion is an early generalization of an instinctive and
fundamental article of Belief, whereon Judgment and
Reasoning afterwards build. We do not consider
belief in this truth as instinctive, like Belief in our
own identity, in the material world, and in the uni-
formity of Nature, out of which it springs; for it
seems to arise later, and to require some Intellectual
development, some degree of Reason, for its com-
prehension ; but, as soon as comprehended, it is un-
hesitatingly embraced. Neither is it acquired by
Experience, for the very notion of a Cause is not
thus learnt, much less the necessity of a cause for
everything. It must, therefore, be chiefly the growth
of the mind itself, of the Intellect roused into activity
by what it contemplates of the course of nature
within and without.
11. If we vary the proposition and say that
264 PEINCIPLES or PSYCHOLOGY.
"^whatever had a hec/ inning of existence must have
had a cause thereof," then the proposition seems to
approach nearer to the nature of a necessary one ;
though, even in this case, considering our deep ig-
norance of Causation, it would be too much to pro-
nounce dogmatically that the contrary was impossi-
ble. No doubt, we must strain our minds to admit
the possibility ; but we can entertain the question ;
whereas we cannot for one moment allow the con-
trary of a mathematical axiom to be within the
limits of possibility. We do not admit the old
maxim ea^ nihilo nihihim Jit, but it is almost as great
a strain upon the intellect to believe in the creation
of matter out of nothing, as to believe in its first
existence without a cause ; and if we allow the
possibility/ of the one, we cannot dogmatically pro-
nounce the imioossihility of the other. This is all
we contend for ; in other words, that the propo-
sition in question is not, like mathematical axioms,
a self-evident necessary truth, but an instinct gene-
ralized, the eldest born of Reason, older even than
the Judgment.
12. The third proposition which I shall men-
tion under this head is, " that a certain order or
arrangement in the effect is a certain proof of an
intelligent and designing cause." Explain a steam-
engine to an ignorant man, point out to him the
uses of all the parts ; and however low his intellect
may be, if he be not an idiot, he will instantly con-
clude it to be the work of a thinking being. So,
OF JUDGMENT. 265
the instances of order and arrangement in the works
of nature, especially in the mind of man, point at
once to an intelligent cause. Who could be so
stupid as to think that mere matter, unthinking
matter, might make a thinking soul'? No propo-
sition is more revolting to the Reason of man than
this. If it be not absolutely impossible, it is des-
perately improbable, so that we reject it almost as
unhesitatingly as that twice two are not equal to
four. Still, speaking strictly, since with our limited
knowledge we cannot dogmatically assert the con-
trary to be absolutely impossible, we must class
this third proposition, like the two former, though
all but certain, as neither self-evident nor necessary.
13. These observations go to refute the atheis-
tical doctrine, that prior to experience anything may
be the cause of anything. With respect to mere
physical nature and isolated facts, this may be true ;
but not in reference to arranged and organized
matter, still less to the mind of man. That anything
could create order, that mere earth and water could
form a regular plant with all its vessels, branches,
leaves, flowers, and fruit ; that stone and clay and
moisture could give birth to a man, with his perfect
physical organization, and his god-like mental facul-
ties ; these are absurdities almost self-evident, des-
cried without the aid of experience, as soon as the
terms of the propositions are understood. That such
excessive improbabilities do not strictly amount to an
impossibility, we must indeed, with due philosophi-
M M
266 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
cal humility, admit; but, for all practical purposes, for
all sane belief, a probability so opposed is worth a
certainty.
Hume has ventured to start a doubt, whether
instances of design in the works of nature be not
too unlike those in the works of man to justify us in
arguing from them in favour of an Intelligent cause
of the Universe. But if the principles here stated
be correct, no argument drawn from an analogy
with man's works is necessary to prove a Diety.
Design in the works of nature is all but self-evident,
and a designing cause or Diety also evident to every
man with an open mind, and free from the prejudi-
ces of false philosophy."
14. This third proposition seems to me to differ
from the two former however, first in the later
development of the Belief which it implies ; and
secondly in this, that we truly discern that such a
cause is necessary to such an effect. I certainly
believe, nay I cannot help believing, that whatever
exists had a cause ; but I do not see the truth of this
as I do that an orderly effect proves an Intelligent
cause. This last belief then I attribute to the
Judgment, and consider the proposition which em-
braces it as one of those which are all but self-
evident.
15. We must not suppose that self-evident
propositions only are discerned by the Judgment.
" See move on this subject above : Part II. Chap. II. Sect.
Fourth. Of ihe Will,
OF JUDGMENT. 2G7
On the contrary, by far the greater number of pro-
positions so discerned are not strictly self-evident,
or of themselves certain, beyond a doubt. Indeed,
when the truth is very clear, many would doubt
whether there were any exercise of Judgment at
all. I see a small pony and a tall horse, side by
side, and I instantly discern that the one is taller
than the other. Is this, or is it not, an act of
Judgment^ Though I perceive the horse as
well as the pony, yet I do not perceive the dis-
similitude between them. The discernment of rela-
tion is beyond the power of Perception. But, though
I certainly believe the dissimilitude, and that with-
out a doubt, does this belief imply Judgment *?
16. Suppose the pony to grow so as at last to
reach within half-an-inch of the height of the horse.
In that case it might require a practised eye, as we
commonly say, in reality a practised judgment, to be
able to discern at once which was the taller. This
will be allowed ; and if considerable judgment be
required in such a case, on account of the smallness
of the difference, surely a less degree of the same
faculty will be necessary where the difference is
greater. The degree of Judgment may be measured
by the difficulty; but there maybe judgment where
no man of sound mind finds any difficulty, as in the
case of self-evident propositions.
17. None of the intellectual faculties appears
more susceptible of improvement than the Judg-
ment. I, a man unused to such matters, take notice
268 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
of two bullocks, so nearly alike in size that I cannot
say which is the heavier, while a practised grazier
will tell at a glance. Nay, he will state to a nicety,
and at the moment, the weight of each. Here we
see the difference between a practised and an un-
practised judgment, the original faculties being
possibly on a par. Therefore as Belief is either
instinctive or acquired, so is Judgment either
intuitive or cultivated.
18. Here I cannot help remarking how mis-
placed is that contempt with which some men look
down upon the intelligence of the rustic population.
In their own line, and no man can excel in every
line, they are far before those who despise them.
They certainly cannot write Greek verses, or
discuss philosophy, but they can judge well of the
qualities of horses, and all cattle, the varieties of
soil, and the processes of cultivation. 1 his is no
unimportant knowledge, and of it the mere book-
worm is quite ignorant. In these respects, the judg-
ment of the clown is cultivated, that of the literary
man uncultivated. Moreover, the education of the
field is far superior to that of the factory, where the
occupations are uniform and unvarying, tending as
little as possible to improve the intellectual faculties.
Consequently, some other intellectual exercise is
much more necessary to the manufacturing work-
man than to the agricultural labourer. The very
calling of the rustic educates him, not so that of the
operative. What ideas can a man gain by tending
OF JUDGMENT. 209
a spinning-jenny all day, and every day ? He in-
deed requires what we may venture to call a learned
education.
19. From all that has now been said, it will
not be difficult to form a pretty accurate notion of
the Judgment. We have seen that this faculty
comprises Belief, and something more, namely, a
discernment of the truth, a discernment of the agree-
ment or disagreement of two related objects, whe-
ther notions, or things corresponding to notions.
And this discernment is rapid, not comprehending a
process of reasoning of which we are conscious at
the time; though, in the case of cultivated judg-
ment, it may be the result of long previous observa-
tion, and even reasoning. Therefore, judgment may
be defined to be that faculty whereby we rapidly
discern, without reasoning, the agreement or disagree-
nient of two objects, whether notions or things, either
intuitively, or aided hy cultivation. This may be
otherwise expressed. Judgment is that faculty
whereby we rapidly discern, without reasoning, the
permanent relations of Notions or of Things; 'perman-
ent, as opposed to those casual or temporary con-
junctions in Time and Space, which, only by an ex-
tension of the term, can be called Relations at all.
20. But, it may be asked, what do we mean by
discerning P Of this we can give no explanation,
nor is any necessary. The word seeing is some-
times used for discerning, as when we say that we
see the truth of a proposition : but neither term
270 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
can be defined, for they defy analysis. But we
know intimately what it is to discern, and no defi-
nition could tell us more about it than we know
already.
21. When a particular act of Judgment is
expressed in words, it constitutes a Proposition, as
when I affirm that "Hannibal was a better general
than Flaminius." But since we have seen that
there may be Belief or Disbelief, and consequently
affirmation or denial, without an act of Judgment,
there must also be propositions expressive of
simple Belief, as when I say that, " I played at
cricket yesterday." Consequently, the metaphysi-
cal definition usually given of Proposition, namely,
A Judgment expressed in words, will not apply to
all cases. A Relation expressed in tvords is prefer-
able ; but even this is not applicable to proposi-
tions expressive of mere existence, as " God
exists," or to those where identity is affirmed, as
when I say, " this is the same man whom I met
yesterday.'^ It is not easy to make out any rela-
tion in these and similar propositions. Nay, it is
only by an extension of the term that the word
Relation can be at all employed in the case of
those casual conjunctions in Time and Space out
of which innumerable propositions can be framed,
such as, " yesterday I walked ten miles in the coun-
try ;" " this morning I played at bowls," etc., etc.
Therefore it seems to me better to define a Pro-
position as A verbal statement of Belief or Disbelief
OF JUDGMENT. 271
in any fact ; for every act of Judgment supposes
belief, though every case of beUef does not imply
Judgment.
22. The above is properly a metaphysical defi-
nition, looking especially to the mental phenome-
non Belief, in which the verbal expression origi-
nates ; whereas the logical definition regards first
the form of words, and through them ascends to
the meaning. Thus the logical definition of Pro-
position will be that given in the author's " Intro-
duction to Mental Philosophy," namely, A sentence^
or coynhination of words with meaning, lo hereby some-
thing is affirmed or denied of some other thing, either
simply, or with soine modification. The two defini-
tions agree, they are quite consistent ; they differ
only in the point of view from which they regard
their subject. While the Metaphysician analyzes
the phenomena of mind, in order to determine the
nature of Belief and Judgment, which terminate
in propositions, the Logician must analyse propo-
sitions themselves. But having treated of Propo-
sition fully in the above work, I need add no more
in this place.""
23. Before concluding this chapter, I must
make one or two remarks on the opinions of ray
predecessors. First, I may notice the opinion of
Brown, who thinks, because all the Intellectual
" See the Author's *' Introduction to Mental Philosophy."
Part II. Art. Proposition.
272 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
faculties can be reduced to two, which he calls
Simple and Relative Suggestion, that therefore
the common classification into Conception, Imagi-
nation, Memory, Judgment, the Reasoning faculty,
etc., is erroneous. It is quite ridiculous to sup-
pose that these very natural classifications can be
altogether wrong. They may not, as commonly
used, be very accurate divisions, but they are far
too obvious, and too general, to be without some
good foundation. It has been my object in the
preceding pages not to overthrow this classifica-
tion, but to define more accurately the limits of
these various powers. They are proximate powers
if you will, but not the less real on that account,
nor the less important. What should we think of
a chemist, who, having analyzed all vegetable and
animal substances, and found them to consist
ultimately of Carbon, Oxygen, Hydrogen, and
Nitrogen or Azote, should deny the existence of
the Proximate principles, Albumen, Gluten, Gum,
Resin, Fibrin, Gelatin, Mucous membrane, Serous
membrane, etc., formed by the combination of
those elements in different proportions'? Proxi-
mate, according to Bacon, are more fructifying
than ultimate principles. Brown makes no dis-
tinction between Comprehension, Belief, Judg-
ment, and Reason, which be confounds with
Reasoning. Though all these may belong to
Relative Suggestion, that tells us but little of what
we wish to know.
OF JUDGMENT. 273
24. The following passage of Reid seems to
demand notice. " The natural principles by which
our judgments and opinions are regulated before
we come to the use of reason, seem to be no less
necessary to such a being as man than those
natural instincts which the Author of nature has
given us to regulate our actions during that pe-
riod.'"'' Here it is supposed that there may be
judgments without reason. This, according to
my sense of the word Reason, is impossible ; for
Judgment, as I have stated, is one of the faculties
comprehended under the more general faculty of
Reason, intuitive, as well as cultivated Judgment.
There may be Judgment without Reasoning, but
not without Reason, and that may have been the
real opinion of Reid, though he has expressed it
inaccurately.
25 Lastly, in reference to the views of Locke
above stated, namely, that Judgment consists in
what he calls the presumption of the agreement
or disagreement of ideas, in opposition to the per-
ception or certainty of such agreement or dis-
agreement ; I may remark first, that the limita-
tion of Judgment to probability is contrary to all
usage and all authority ; and secondly, that
the word idea is at least ambiguous. When
I compare one affection of the mind with another,
as Love with Ambition, I may call these ideas if
'^ Intellectual Powers. Essay VI. Chap. V.
N N
274 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
you will, and judge of their agreement in some
respects, their disagreement in others ; but, were
I to compare Gold with Silver, it would certainly
sound very strange to call them ideas. Assuredly
I must have an Idea or notion of Gold and of
Silver before I can compare them, but the Notions
are only employed as means to get at the know-
ledge of the Things ; whereas, in the case of Love
and Ambition, the idea and the thing are one.
Now, did Locke mean to include external things
under the name of ideas ? Surely he would have
allowed that we can judge of things external, as
well as of mental phenomena, but of the former
only through the latter. This was probably his
meaning, though it must be allowed that he has
expressed it very ambiguously. And that it was
his meaning appears from the concluding sentence
of his Chapter " Of Judgment," which is as follows ;
" And if it Cthe mind) unites or separates them,
as in reality Things are, it is right Judgment;"
and a little before, " This faculty of the mind,
when it is exercised immediately about Things,
is called Judgment^''
26. In conclusion, we must remark that we
do not pretend to trace any very broad line of
'■ If the marginal references be by Locke, my view of his
doctrine will be confirmed ; for the reference here is as follows :
"Judgment is the presuming Things to be so, without perceiv-
" ing it." Essay Concerning Human Understandhig. Book IV.
Chap. XIV.
OF Ji;i)UMFi\T. 275
distinction between Judgment and Reasoning,
The two faculties are intimately allied. Every
conclusion drawn by reasoning requires an act of
Judgment, and though there may be Judgment
without Reasoning, yet the only difference is, that
in the one case the Judgment depends upon some
previous proposition, or at least mental decision,
in the other not. This does not seem to argue
any very great difference in the mental faculty.
In many cases, where the intellectual decision
appears to be immediate, a very rapid process of
reasoning probably goes on, too rapid perhaps to
be the subject of reflection, but not the less real.
In other cases, however, we have no grounds to
believe in any such process, and here therefore
there is Judgment without Reasoning. This is
enough to distinguish the two. The one might
be called Simple^ the other Compound Judgment,
considering them as species of one Genus, But
we are told by Dugald Stewart that there are
cases where the decision may be attributed to
either, according to the statement." Thus when
we say that " things which are equal to the same
are equal to one another," we enunciate an axiom,
the belief in which seems to depend upon simple
Judgment ; but when we state that " A B is
equal to B C, and A C to B C, therefore A B
* Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind. Part II,
Chap. II.
276 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
is equal to A C," we seem to arrive at the same
truth by means of Reasoning. In the one mode
of statement it appears as a primary truth, in the
other as a conclusion. Here, however, a distinc-
tion must be made. What we prove by the above
reasoning is not that things which are equal to
the same are equal to one another, but that A B
is equal to A C That is the exact conclusion
arrived at. Here are two quantities, represented
by A B and A C, related to each other, but how
we know not. As we cannot compare them
directly, we must try and find some common
medium or middle term with which they may be
compared respectively. This is B C, and since
both the original quantities are known to be equal
to B C, we conclude that they are equal to each
other. Here it is not the axiom which is proved,
but the axiom is involved in the proof of the con-
clusion that A B is equal to A C The axiom
is an essential element of the Reasoning, not a
major premiss, not a premiss at all, for the reason-
ing is perfect without any such premiss, but an
elementary Constituent or Principle of the Rea-
soning, making it what it is. That there
.ire several other Principles of Reasoning, we
shall see in the following chapter, meaning
by Principle an elementary constituent, for this
is one legitimate use of the word, just as Car-
bon, Oxygen, Hydrogen, Azote, are Principles
0¥ JUDGMENT. 277
or Elements of all animal matter.'' These must
not be confounded with what we call the Princi-
ples of any Science, meaning the fundamental
propositions from which many less general con-
clusions may be deduced ; for the elementary
Principles are, one or other of them, essential to
all Reasoning, a part of its very nature. To sup-
pose then that the Axiom above quoted is proved
by the Reasoning adduced, is quite a mistake,
and even absurd, for it is self-evident, and there-
fore incapable of proof; but the axiom is involved
in the reasoning necessary to prove that A B is
equal to A C.
To sum up all in one sentence ; Judgment
discerns the agreement or disagreement of notions
or of things : Reasoning discerns the agreement or
disagreement between one simple Belief, or one
Judgment, and another. But the further con-
sideration of Reasoning must be left to the follow-
ing Chapter.
** See the Author's " Tutrodiietion to JNIental Pbilosojihy."
Part I. Article Principle.
278 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
CHAPTER X.
OF SEASONING
SECTION FIRST.
OF REASONING IN GENERAL.
1. God, having given us a mind framed for
some original Articles of Belief, and for some In-
tuitive Judgments, has provided us afterwards
with two grand means for the discovery of truth,
and the advancement of knowledge, Observa-
tion, and Reasoning. Some truths are learnt
by observation alone, as particular facts submitted
to the senses ; others by reasoning alone, as the
truths of pure Mathematics ; others again, and by
far the greater number, by observation and rea-
soning together. All men know what is meant
by Observation. Suffice it then to remark, that
observation is of two kinds ; the one exercised
upon phenomena over which we have no control,
as observation on the weather, the other upon
changes which we ourselves have induced, as in
Chemistry, or in Mechanical Philosophy. The
former may be called natural, the latter artificial
observation, for it is exercised upon experiments.
The word Experience is nearly synonimous with
Observation, but in the latter more of intention
or REASONING IN GENERAL. 279
is implied. Observation supposes a wish to learn,
while in simple Experience we learn without a
wish, without any conscious effort. At first we
learn from simple Experience, subsequently from
Observation.
2. Though all men know what observation is,
but few, comparatively, know how to observe to the
best advantage. Observation, simply, is of limited
use, for it is confined to particulars; it may cer-
tainly prevent us from falling into a pit, or sinking
into a quagmire, before our eyes, but unless some
inference be drawn from it, no science, no general
truth of any kind, can be established. Conse-
quently, Observation is useful chiefly as a ground
for inference ; and in common discourse, as well
as in many popular works, the two are so blended
that it does not readily appear where the one
ends, and the other begins. Observed facts, and
inferences from these, are continually confounded
by inaccurate speakers and writers.
3. Nor will this surprise us, when we reflect
that there are cases where even thinking men
might not agree upon what was observed fact and
what was inference. When I observe the clouds
rising heavily in the south-west, and foretell rain
ere long, I evidently draw an inference. Again,
when Robinson Crusoe saw what exactly resem-
bled the print of a naked man's foot on the sand,
he readily inferred that a man had passed that
way, so readily, indeed, that the inference was
280 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
almost as an observed fact. But, when I put my
hand before the fire and say that the fire warms
it, is this an observed fact, or an inference ? An
observed fact most people would say, but strictly
speaking, not so ; for though the heat which I
feel is an observed fact, and the presence of the
fire* liliewise, yet the assertion that the one is the
cause of the other is an inference, irresistible no
doubt, and for all practical puposes as good as
observation, but metaphysically different. These
cases instruct us, 1, that observed facts and in-
ference are not always easily distinguished, and
2, that sometimes the inference is as firmly be-
lieved as the observed fact, and may be so without
any danger of error.
4. V/e might even refine upon this, and main-
tain that the very existence of the fire, and indeed
of all outward objects, commonly said to be ob-
served, is known to us only by inference, inference
from certain sensations, which irresistibly suggest
the notions of external objects, and the Belief in
their real existence independent of us. Thus
Observation, strictly so called, would be confined
to the phenomena of our own minds. Nor can
this be denied ; though for all practical purposes,
it would be necessary to distinguish between those
irresistible inferences drawn by all men, without
effort, without knowing what they are doing, and
such conclusions as they consciously deduce, and
distinguish from the premises. Whether the term
OF KEASONING IN GENERAL. 231
Reasoning should be limited to the latter process,
we shall see presently.
From the foregoing two Corollaries may be de-
duced: — First, we see how erroneous are the
opinions of those Materialists, such as M. Comte,
who treat Psychology with contempt, except as a
branch of Physiology, and who plume themsefves
on their positice philosophy. In any philosophical
sense that can be given to the term jyositive, the
phenomena of Psychology are so peculiarly ; for
they are beyond all doubt, and they alone are
known to us immediately. All material pheno-
mena are known only by inference. Secondly,
we learn how limited is the sphere of Experience
proper, embracing only mental phenomena uncon-
nected with the world without, for all connection,
all relation, between mind and matter, and between
matter itself, is not experienced, but inferred.
Causation, for instance, at least in the material
world, is known only by inference ; and this, no
doubt, is the reason why M. Comte denies that
Causes are a proper object of Philosophy, and
maintains that we can know nothing but sequences
of phenomena ; forgetting that the uniformity of
these sequences in time to come, nay, the very
existence of the material subjects of these sequen-
ces, is known to us only by inference. It is only
by giving a wide and loose sense to the term, so as
to embrace a great deal of inference, that Experi-
ence can be made of the importance sometimes
o o
282 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
assigned to it. Except in Psychology, experience
proper merely lays the foundation of our know-
ledge ; all above ground is Rational or at least
Intellectual development.
5. The nature of Reasoning, and its different
kinds, are not so generally understood as Obser-
vation. Though, as we shall afterwards find, there
are different sorts of reasoning, there must be
something common to all, or the name reasoning
would not have been given to the process in all
cases. Our first question then must be, what is
common to all reasoning ?
6. Wherever reasoning is expressed in words,
it is stated in propositions, in two at the very
least, and in propositions so connected that the
one establishes the other. And when we say two
propositions or more, we of course mean that there
really are two or more, different in some respects,
and not quite the same. The essence of an argu-
ment then is this, that it consists of two or more
differejH propositions, one or more of which serve
to establish the other. Now, in every argument
the proposition or propositions which serve to
establish the other are called the Premises, and
the Proposition established, or inferred as the
phrase is, is called the Conclusion.
Such is the logical account of Reasoning ex-
pressed in words, or an Argument. And to tran-
slate this into metaphysical language, we have
only to call to mind our definition of Proposition,
OF REASONING IN GENERAL. 283
viz. : A verbal statement of Belief or of Disbelief
in any fact. According; to this, wherever our
Belief in any fact or facts compels us to believe
another fact different from the former, as a cause
brings about an effect, there is Reasoning, whether
stated in words and propositions or not.
7. From the above we see that Reasoning
may be viewed in two points of view, the Logical
and the Metaphysical. Speaking logically, we
say that one proposition follows or flows from
another, or that it is a consequent of one or
more other propositions ; but speaking Metaphy-
sically, we must say that our Belief in a certain
fact is an effect of some prior Relief. It would
be absurd to state that one proposition is the
Effect of another, and incorrect to affirm that our
Belief is the Consequent of a former Belief. Con-
sequence, indeed, we might say, but Consequence
would then be synonymous with Effect. One pro-
position cannot be the cause of another, it is only
the cause of our knowing it ; but one Belief is
properly the cause of another Belief.
8. This distinction, obvious though it be, is of
the greatest importance. It at once points out the
respective provinces of Metaph/sics and Logic, in
respect to Reasoning. To analyze the mental pro-
cess of Reasoning belongs properly to Metaphysics,
and not, as Archbishop AYhately supposes, to Logic ;
while to Logic, it peculiarly appertains to give
correct types or models of arguments, and rules for
284 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
arguing soundly or conclusively. Metaphysics
take man as he is, and show how be commonly
reasons ; whereas Logic points out how he oii^ht to
avffiie, in order to arrive at sound conclusions. The
one is purely speculative, the other combines spe-
culation with practical application. In giving cor-
rect types or models of argument, Logic cannot
pretend that men always argue so, for in this
case there would be no use for Logic, but only
that they ought always so to argue, if they would
argue well. Metaphysics treat of arguments only
incidentally, the mental process being here the pro-
per subject; while Logic, on the contrary, touches
upon the reasoning process, only because arguments
necessarily suppose it. There may be reasoning
without argument, that is without words, but, of
course, there can be no argument without reasoning.
Logic, then, is a Science principally concerned about
types, models, or forms, whereby to test the validity
of all arguments, and, of course, of all reasoning that
can be reduced to arguments. We shall probably
find that much of that hopeless confusion, which
prevails in some works on Logic, arises from a want
of attention to the fundamental distinction here
laid down, the distinction between the respective
provinces of Metaphysics and Logic in regard to
Reasoning.
9. In illustration of the above general state-
ments, we may now bring forward some particular
examples of Reasoning. Suppose that there are
OF REASONING IN GENERAL. 285
two walls, and that 1 wish to know their relative
height. As I cannot place one wall beside the
other, I must look out for some common medium of
comparison, and for this purpose I choose a measur-
ing line ; by applying which to both 1 find that
each is just twenty feet high. 1 instantly conclude
that the one wall is equal in height to the other.
Stated in propositions, the reasoning will come out
thus:— Let A be one wall, B the other, and C the
measuring line of twenty feet.
Then A is equal to C,
And B is equal to C,
Therefore A is equal to B.
Here the conclusion follows irresistibly from the
Premises, or the reason is demonstrative. The
Premises, moreover, consist of two propositions,
both of which are necessary to establish the con-
clusion.
10. Taking a case formerly stated, when Robin-
son Crusoe saw the marks of a naked foot on the
sand, or more strictly, what looked like the print
of a foot, he instantly concluded that a man had
passed that way. Drawn out into propositions, his
reasoning would appear thus: —
Here is a mark on the sand.
It is a mark very like a foot-mark.
It is so like that it must be such a mark.
Therefore a man must have passed by here.
'i his conclusion leaves no rational ground for
doubt; but the reasoning is not strictly demonstra-
286 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
tive ; for it is just possible that something very like
a foot-in ark might have been otherwise made ; and
the third proposition, which is in fact a first infer-
ence, and not infallible, is necessary to establish the
conclusion finally arrived at.
11. Again, when I look to the South-west, and
see the clouds rising heavily, I conclude that we
shall have rain here long. Stated in propositions
my reasoning would be this : —
I see heavy clouds rising in the South-west ;
But 1 have formerly observed that similar clouds
rising in that quarter have been followed by rain.
Therefore, we shall soon have rain again.
In this case it is evident that the conclusion is by
no means certain, and that the reasoning is only pro-
bable.
12. \Yhile walking in my garden I hear a
sound. After a moment's observation and reflec-
tion, 1 conclude that it is the sound of a village
church bell about a mile and a half distant. How^
do I arrive at this conclusion *? The mental process
may be thus stated in words : —
I hear a sound.
The sound is very like that of a church bell for-
merly ascertained.
Therefore it is the sound of a church bell.
Moreover the sound is low^.
And a low sound from a church bell must come
from a distance.
Therefore this church bell is distant
OF REASONING IN GENERAL. 287
Again, I observe the clouds and see that they are
moving from the South-west.
But clouds are driven by the winds.
Therefore the wind is in the South-west.
Finally, wind brings sound.
And I know that there is a village church a mile
and a half off in a South-west direction.
Therefore the sound comes from that church.
All this, and perhaps more, passes through the
mind with the rapidity of thought, and the whole
embraces at least four arguments, one arising out of
the other. Here also it is evident that the conclu-
sion, though highly probable, is not quite certain.
13. Of the three cases of probable reasoning
now stated, by the first we arrive at the knowledge
of a past fact ; by the second, of a future event ;
and by the third, of a contemporaneous but distant
occurrence. Thus, the past, the future, and the
distant, all clearly beyond the sphere of observation,
become known to us by Reasoning.
14. When we consider the fouY examples of
reasoning given above, we find that what is ascer-
tained in the first case is a Relation of Equality, a
relation of equality betw^een the two walls repre-
sented by A and B ; while, in the other cases, a
Relation of Cause and Effect is inferred. Thus, in
the second example, we infer that a certain mark
on the sand was the effect of a human foot ; in the
third, that certain clouds in a certain direction will
soon cause rain ; in the fourth, that a certain sound
288 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
is the effect of the movement of a churcli bell.
Moreover, in the last example I also infer that the
church bell is so far distant from me, relation of
Quantity ; likewise that the church is to the South-
west, relation of Position. Thus in every one of
these inferences some Relation is established.
15. Relations, from which Reasoning proceeds,
or which it establishes, are various ; but they may
all be classed under three heads : — ■■
I. Relations of Co-existence ;
II. Relations of Succession ;
according as they do not, or do, involve the notion
of time ; and
III. Relations of Resemblance, which may or
may not involve the notion of time.
The Relations of Co-existence are numerous,
such as
1. Relations of Position.
2. Relations of Comprehension, or of a whole to
its parts.
3. Relations of Quantity, or more, equal, less,
which may be called ea^act Relations, in contradis-
tinction to
4. Relations of Quality or of indeterminate
Degree.
Relations of Succession, on the other hand, are
either of Invariable Succession or of Casual Suc-
cession.
These distinctions will be useful to us in deter-
or REASONING IN GENERAL. 289
mining the di(Terent kinds of Reasoning ; but, in
the mean time, they are sufficient to show how vast
is the field which it embraces.
Moreover, as we have seen, there are certain
propositions in which no relation is expressed,
namely, those which state Identity and simple Ex-
istence ; and since these propositions may be estab-
lished by argument, therefore, we cannot say uni-
versally that reasoning is employed in establishing
the relations of things. Accordingly, in Par. 6 and 7,
where reasoning is defined, no mention is made
of llelation. To establish relation may be the ge-
neral office of reasoning, but, strictly speaking, it is
not the only office.
SECTION SECOND.
ON DIFFERENT KINDS OF REASONING.
I. OF DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING.
1. Having seen what is common to all Reason-
ing or to Reasoning in general, we have next to
consider whether there be not Reasonings so differ-
ing from each other as to constitute distinct sorts or
kinds. That there are such, men are generally
agreed ; and the common use of language is a proof
of this agreement ; for Ihey would not talk of de-
moiistrative, probable, inductive, deductive, a priori
p P
290 PEINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY.
and aposteriori reasoning, unless they supposed that
the genus Reasoning admitted of specific differences.
2. The first grand division of Reasonings is
that into the Demonstrative and the Probable,
the inference in the former following irresistibly
from the Premises, in the latter, not. In demon-
strative reasoning, if we admit the Premises, we
must also admit the conclusion ; for otherwise we
do violence to our Intuitive Judgment ; whereas, in
probable reasoning, we may allow the Premises and
yet reject the coiiclusion; certainly not in all cases
without shocking common sense, but, at least,
without denying a self-evident Judgment. In pro-
bable reasoning we may disallow the conclusion,
and yet allow the Premises ; but, in demonstrative
reasoning, if we deny the conclusion we must also
deny the Premises, that is, we must contradict that
from which we set out as granted. And this neces-
sity of denying the Premises is a proof that the
inference therefrom was infallibly drawn. The dis-
tinction then between Demonstrative and Probable
reasoning is clear and definite.
3. But Demonstrative reasoning itself admits
of subdivision, according as the subject or matter of
which it treats is necessary or contingent. In the
former case the conclusion not only follows irresist-
ibly from the premises, but it is infallibly true ;
W'hereas, in the latter, though the inference be
irresistible, yet the conclusion may be false, for the
premises may be false. Ihus, strictly speaking, it
OF DEMONSTRATIVE EEASONING. 291
is not the reasoning that differs, but the certainty
of the fact inferred. Still, this difference is impor-
tant, and thereupon we found the distinction be-
tween Necessarj/ and Contingent Demonstrative
Reasoning.
4. Necessary Demonstrative reasoning is strictly
a priori, that is, independent of experience ; while
all other reasoning is strictly a jjosteriori, or depend-
ent upon experience, either immediately or remotely.
Kecessary reasoning is confined to Mathematics, or
the Science of Quantity ; and, contrary to what is
often thought, is not founded on general principles
or axioms, but on self-evident particular truths.
The evidence of the propositions of Euclid does not
rest upon the axioms placed at the beginning of the
work, but upon the particular instances of those
axioms which occur in any proposition. Thus,
when in the first proposition we show that, in the
triangle ABC, the side A B is equal to the side B C,
B c
and the side AC to B C, we conclude at once,
without the intervention of any general axiom, that
the side A B is equal to the side A C. The general
axiom, " things which are equal to the same are
equal to one another," cannot make the conclusion
one whit more evident than it was before. We see
292 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
at once from the particular data that such must be
the conclusion, or, if we do not, no general axiom
can convince us. The truth then of the propositions
of Euclid does not rest upon the axioms, nor were
they first demonstrated from these. The axioms
are placed there pro forma, and give a more scienti-
fic air to the whole, but they are not indispensable.
They are neat and convenient, as expressing in a
general form all that we are obliged to admit in
particular cases throughout the work that follows ;
and nothing more.
5. As particulars must be known before we can
generalize, so particular instances of the truth, that
" Things which are equal to the same are equal to
one another," must have been noticed, before we
could state it in the form of an universal axiom.
Not that the axiom is proved by an induction of
particulars, as some affirm, but only that particulars
were necessary to allow us to comprehend the gene-
ral proposition. As soon as comprehended, its
truth is self-evident. Still less, (if in such a matter
degree were possible) is the general proposition
required to prove the particular instances. In like
manner, having proved any proposition of Euclid in
a particular case, the mind instantly generalizes the
truth, for it sees that what has been proved in the
instance before it must hold good in all other in-
stances where the data are exactly similar.
6. I am well aware that a very high authority
in Logic maintains that we cannot draw the simplest
or DEMOXSTRATIYE EEASONIXG. 293
inference in Mathematics without the use of an
universal principle ; and that even the reasoning
A B is equal to B C, and A C to B C, therefore A B
is equal to A C is elliptical. . Stated in full we are
told that reasoning would be as follows: —
What are equal to the same are equal to each
other ;
A B and AC are equal to the same (B C) ;
Therefore A B and A C are equal to each other.
How is this question to he determined *? First, by
an appeal to Consciousness, the supreme tribunal in
Metaphysics. To consciousness, then, we do appeal,
and we maintain that the reasoning A B is equal to
B C, and A C to B C, therefore A B is equal to A C,
is not elliptical ; that nothing is wanting to the
evidence of the conclusion, that the mind discerns
that conclusion as resulting from the premises, at
once, and irresistibly. But, secondly, with all due
respect to the above authority, the statement given
as the full one appears to me to err both by redun-
dancy and deficiency. It errs by deficiency, for the
second proposition is a compound one, embracing
two simple propositions, being equivalent to
A B is equal to B C, and
A C is equal to B C ;
consequently, the statement in full will be as fol-
lows : —
What are equal to the same are equal to each
other ;
294 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY.
A B is equal to B C,
and A C is equal to the same B C ;
therefore A B and A C are equal to each other.
Here we have a syllogism of four propositions,
and therefore informal^ on the principles of the
School logicians themselves, for no proper syllo-
gism should have more than three propositions.
One therefore must be redundant, and it is easy to
see that the first is, for take it away, and the proof
is still perfect. Does any one deny the validity of
the reasoning without the universal proposition, and
ask for more proof? We have no more to offer, for
we cannot give a demonstration of a demonstration ;
and that it is a demonstration we confidently appeal
to the consciousness of any man of common under-
standing. As for what is called the full statement,
we deny that it is one whit more satisfactory than
the other, or that it is the natural mode of reasoning.
It is an artificial mode, invented to prop up a theory,
by reducing mathematical reasoning, apparently, to
the syllogistic form, and only appai:fntly, for after
all, the syllogism is redundant.
7. We must not confound Analysis with Gene-
ralization. The reasoning AB is equal toB C, and
A C to B C, therefore A B is equal to A C, seems to
admit of no further analysis, it is complete in all its
parts, all is expressed ; but when we come to
compare this with other examples of reasoning, we
find that there is a striking similarity between
them, which similarity, or point of agreement, may
OF DEMON STRA.TIVE REASONING. 295
be stated as a general principle, and formalized in
words, thus, " things which are equal to the same
are equal to one another." This general principle,
then, is said to pervade all such specimens of rea-
soning ; that is, each is a particular instance there-
of. But we must not therefore suppose that each is
proved from the general principle. On the contrary,
but for the particular instances, the general propo-
sition would never have been thought of. It comes
after the particular proofs, by a process of genera-
lization, forming an axiom convenient for the pur-
pose of communicating knowledge, and satisfac-
tory to the mind of the learner, as showing at a
glance all that he is called upon to take for grant-
ed in the ensuing demonstrations ; but it cannot
be necessary to a proof which is evident without
it, and which actually was established without it ;
for few will maintain that the geometrical discoverer
began by laying down axioms.
8. Taking the above as a specimen of demon-
strative necessary reasoning in general, and it
may be so taken without any danger of error, we
see that at least two previous propositions are
required to establish any mathematical conclusion.
First, we have A B equal to B C, then A C equal
to B C, and lastly, A B equal to A C. B C may be
called the middle term, or medium of comparison
between AB and AC. No doubt, we might so
state the argument as to give it the appearance
of two propositions only. Thus we might say
296 PEIXCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
that A B and A C are each equal to B C, therefore
A B and A C are equal to each other. But, in
this statement, it is clear that the first proposition
is a compound one, one only in form, two in sense,
being equivalent to A B is equal to B C, and A C
is equal to B C. Consequently, the two above
propositions are equivalent to three.
9. All the reasonings of pure Mathematics are
Demonstrative, and the conclusions arrived at are
certain and eternal, or, in other words, independent
of time ; for, first, they start from self-evident and
necessary truths, and the mind sees that they are
and always must be so ; secondly, the names em-
ployed are names of universals, which exist not as
real matter of fact ; thirdly, these universals be-
long to quantity alone, and so admit of an exact
definition, or, in other words, they can be accu-
rately distinguished one from another ; and lastly,
the deductions from these self-evident necessary
truths, and these definitions, are seen at each step
to be also irresistible, and unchangeable even by
OmniDotence. Since each step in the deduction
is self-evident and necessary, as well as the first
position, the conclusion must be true.
10. But, do the Relations of Quantity, or of
Equality and Inequality, alone admit of Demon-
stration ■? Certainly thev alone admit of a long
chain of demonstration ; though we shall see,
under the head of Contingent Reasoning, that a
single demonstrative argument or two mav be
OF DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING 297
formed about other relations. And why do the
relations of Quantity peculiarly admit of demon-
stration ? Because the modes or modifications of
Quantity alone can be accurately distinguished.
One is as distinct from two as from two thousand.
This is the case with no other modes. Other
modes admit of indefinite graduation, not so those
of Quantity. These do not shade off one into
another. It is on account of this indefinite gradu-
ation that other relations are very little susceptible
of demonstration. Take for example moral Rela-
tions. With the exception of Justice, which is
more definite, one Virtue passes by insensible de-
grees into its kindred Vice, and one Vice into its
kindred Virtue, as thrift into parsimony, parsi-
mony into thrift ; and all we can say is, that
Virtue lies somewhere between the two extremes,
prodigality and niggardliness. This of course is
very vague, very unlike demonstration. And had
Law been a demonstrative science, we should not
have had so many volumes written to determine
in particular cases what is Justice. We may
therefore safely conclude that the opinion of
Locke, that morality admits of demonstration, is
erroneous. Quantity is the proper subject of
demonstration, Quality of probable reasoning:
and morals treat of Quality.*'
11. The range of certainty is very limited,
' See the Author's " Introduction to Menial Philosophy." Part
I. Article, Quantity.
Q Q
298 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY.
comprising only the pure Mathematics ; for even
Mechanical Philosophy, which uses demonstrative
reasoning, is based upon experience, and therefore
it may err ; though, granting certain principles,
such as the Laws of Motion, the conclusions de-
duced from these are infallibly true. That is to
say, they are infallibly true, granting those prin-
ciples, and supposing that no others come into
play ; for it often happens that the conclusions of
the Mechanical Philosopher are wrong in reality,
because there are in nature other principles which
he has not taken into account. Even the pure
Mathematician sometimes arrives at absurd con-
conclusions, absurd in material nature, though
true in the world of Universals, for they follow
irresistibly from his data, i.e., from self-evident
necessary truths, and from his own definitions,
which correspond not exactly with anything really
existing. Such a conclusion is that of the Asymp-
tote, or a straight line which, though continually
approaching, can never meet a certain curve. The
same may be said of the infinite divisibility of
matter. It is proved mathematically, but it is
physically impossible.*^
^ If even perfect Ratiocination, such as the Mathematical, may
lead to conclusions absurd in material nature, surely the best pos-
sible Ratiocination on other subjects may also lead to absurdities.
Some German philosophers of the present day, men of much
thought, have reasoned themselves into Pantheism ! It is the
business of Experience to correct the errors of pure Reasoning.
OF DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 299
12. Dugald Stewart has shown very well that
Mathematical conclusions are not deduced from
the axioms; but he maintains that they are
founded on the definitions alone, which he calls
the First Principles of the Science. To give the
name of Principle to a Definition is certainly un-
usual, and can only be justified on the ground
that the definition is a Fundamental Proposition
on which the Science is built, and such is the
opinion of Stewart But this cannot be accepted
as a correct metaphysical view of the subject.
The definition is only the means of acquiring ac-
curate Conceptions, and did we possess such con-
ceptions without definition we should be as well
ofi^. The accurate conception is the thing we
want ; to this the definition is only subservient.
To make Mathematical truth dependent on defi-
nition is to make it dependent on a form of
words, not on clearness of conception, it is to take
the form for the substance. But Reasoning cannot
proceed from Conceptions alone, but from these
together with some intuitive Judgments concern-
ing them. The latter, as we have remarked,
are Judgments concerning self-evident parti-
cular truths, which the mind instantly gene-
ralizes, and applies to all cases exactly simi-
lar. Accurate Conceptions, then, and Intuitive
Bacon has admirably pointed out the dangers of Rationalism, as
well as of Empiricism. Novam Organum. Lib. I. Aph. LXII.
LXIII. LXIV.
300 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY.
Judgments about Self-evident truths, are the real
foundation of all mathematical reasoning. This
accuracy, again, and this self-evidence, depend
upon the nature of Quantity, which alone admits
of exact modifications and relations. Those self-
evident truths, when generalized and stated in
words, become Axioms.
13. Closely connected with the opinion that
the Mathematical theorems depend entirely on
the definitions, is the doctrine that Mathematical
Truth is only hypothetical; though the reasoning
be infallible, that the conclusions are Only logi-
cally correct, not really true. Suppose it granted
that no perfect lines, triangles, circles, etc.,
such as Mathematics contemplate, exist in
matter. What then ^ does Mathematics ever
assert this"? does it pretend to be a Physical
Science? By no means. It is the science of
Quantity, of Space, Time, and Number, and these
are independent of all matter. We must not seek
in one science what belongs to another ; we must
no more look for the properties of matter in pure
Mathematics than for the laws of matter in those
of Mind. But our conceptions of mathematical
lines, triangles, etc., are perfectly clear and dis-
tinct, genuine creations of abstraction, not arbi-
trary mental inventions, not the creatures of ima-
gination, as clearly apprehended as space and time
themselves. Is it not then an abuse of words to
say that truths founded on such notions are by-
OF DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 301
pothetical, and does not such language convey an
impression utterly erroneous^ If mathematical
lines, triangles, and circles, be hypothetical, so is
space itself; for those are only the modes thereof.
Moreover, though perfect mathematical figures
may no where exist in matter, yet we can approxi-
mate to perfection ; and thus the ideal truths of
Mathematics become with slight correction appli-
cable to the material universe. This again proves
how little the truths of Mathematics deserve the
appellation of hypothetical. But the opinion is
agreeable to those who would trace all real know-
ledge to Sensation and Experience, and who de-
preciate all a priori decisions of the intellect ;
though Dugald Stewart is certainly not of that
number.
14. We must not materialize the Science of
Quantity any more than that of Mind. The for-
mer alone, of all human knowledge, comes up to
the Platonic notion of Science, being conversant
about the unchangeable relations of unchangeable
Ideas. To make matter the measure of the ac-
curacy of these Ideas, is to degrade the Science
of Quantity entirely, to confound it with mutable
Physics, to bring it down to the Earth. But to
represent mathematical truths as hypothetical is
still worse ; for in that case the Science would be
frivolous, a mere play of reasoning, a mighty intel-
lectual exercise, with an impotent conclusion.
Let the vast discoveries in Natural Philosophy
302 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
and Astronomy, made by means of Mathematics,
tell whether her conclusions be hypothetical.
Other Sciences, while they show the strength of
the human intellect, also prove its weakness, for
disputes in them are endless ; but were we to look
to Mathematics alone, we should pronounce that
Intellect all-powerful. The column of Mathema-
tical truth is the noblest monument of human
intelligence, because it is at once vast and immov-
able. Metaphysical Science may be more inter-
esting, but it is like a ship tossed by the waves,
always in danger of shoals and rocks ; while
Mathematics stands as a martello tower, cold,
rigid, and imchangeable.
15. We have next to consider Demonstrative
Reasoning applied to Contingent matter. But
first it may be asked whether this be a possible
case. Does Contingent matter admit of demon-
stration ? That it does to a small extent at least,
a few examples will suffice to prove.
1. Taunton is further from London than Bris-
tol; and Exeter is further from London than
Taunton; much more then is Exeter furth er from
London than Bristol.
Here the reasoning is strictly demonstrative,
or the conclusion follows irresistibly from the
premises ; though the matter be contingent : for
the respective distances of Taunton and Bristol,
and of Exeter and Taunton, from London, on
which the inference is founded, are contingent
OF DEMONSTRATRE HEASONING. 303
facts. Therefore, though the inference be irre-
sistible, the conclusion may not be true. Here
the relation established is one of relative distance
or quantity. Thus, relations of Quantity become
themselves contingent, when brought down to
matter of fact. Observe also that the form of
this Reasoning exactly corresponds with the Ma-
thematical, consisting of three propositions, and
that these three propositions are indispensable;
for, from the first proposition, a person totally un-
acquainted with the position of Exeter could infer
nothing; and, from the second proposition, one
unacquainted with the position of Bristol could
infer nothing ; both, therefore, are indispensable
to the conclusion, which is not comprehended
under either.
2. Again, A is the cause of B ; but B is the
cause of C;
Therefore^ A is the remote cause of C.
Here also the reasoning is demonstrative ;
though the matter be contingent, for it is relative
to Causation.
3. Or, taking less general examples,
Application depends upon the will ; but intel-
lectual advancement depends much upon applica-
tion ;
Therefore intellectual advancement depends
much upon the will.
4. Cost of production regulates supply and
demand ; but supply and demand regulate price ;
304 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
Therefore cost of production is a remote cause
of price.
5. Romulus founded Rome; but Rome con-
quered great part of the world, and rose to an
unexampled pitch of power and grandeur ;
Therefore Romulus was an original cause of the
power and grandeur of Rome.
Here, also, the conclusion follows irresistibly
from the premises ; though it may be a question
whether Romulus ever founded Rome, or whether
he ever existed.
These examples seem sufficient to prove that
demonstrative reasoning may be applied to con-
tingent matter ; though we fully allow that, with
one important exception, it can go but a little way.
This exception exists in the case of relations of
Quantity in Contingent matter. The whole of
Natural Philosophy, embracing Mechanics, Hydro-
statics, Pneumatics, Optics, consists of demon-
strative reasoning tracing the relations of Quan-
tity in things contingent, in matter of fact, the
first laws of which are known by experience. The
same may be said of Physical Astronomy. Here,
then, Demonstrative reasoning applied to Contin-
gent matter has ample scope.
16. And why, with this exception, can demon-
strative reasoning go but a little way in contin-
gent matter ? The reason for this we have already
shown under the former head. The relations of
Contingent matter are of course various, and not
OF DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 305
confined to Quantity, and therefore, as we have
seen, they are for the most part indefinite relations ;
their differences are not accurately distinguished ;
and consequently they do not admit of demon-
stration. There is also another reason. All
matters of fact, every thing contingent is liable
to be influenced by many causes and circum-
stances (which are auxiliary causes) ; and to de-
termine the exact efficacy of each is often im-
possible. We may affirm with certainty that one
thing is a cause of another ; but we can rarely
pronounce it to be the only cause. Thus, to take
one of the examples above given, we may be
sure because Application depends upon the Will,
and Intellectual advancement depends upon Ap-
plication, that, therefore. Intellectual Advance-
ment depends in part upon the Will ; but it would
be an incorrect inference, as well as a false con-
clusion, to say that it depended entirely upon the
Will ; for it is not assumed that Intellectual ad-
vancement depends wholly upon Application ; and,
were it assumed, it would be false, and therefore
the conclusion drawn from it also false. In general,
if A be a cause of B, and B a cause of C, we may
safely conclude that A is a remote cause of C, but
not the only cause. Some cause generally re-
mains which we cannot calculate, and which
nullifies our boasted demonstration. It is apt to
be so even in relations of Quantity, where matter
of fact is concerned. Calculations unerring, so
R R
306 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
far as the data are concerned, are found de-
ceptive in practice, because other causes ha\'e
not been taken into account, causes more hidden,
more variable, such as friction, the resistance of
the atmosphere, its varying temperature, weight,
dryness, and moisture. Here hes the danger of
pure ratiocination. A chain of reasoning, in
which it would be difficult to detect a flaw, some-
times leads to absurd conclusions, because more
has unwarily been assumed than it was fair to
assume, or something has been omitted which
ought to have been taken into account. The only
remedy for these errors is Experience.
17. AH the examples hitherto given of de-
monstrative reasoning consist, as we have seen, of
three distinct propositions, the conclusion being
established by means of an intermediate proposi-
tion, and a middle term, whereby the Subject and
the Predicate of the conclusion are compared or
measured. Thus in the reasoning, A B is equal
to B C, and B C to A C, therefore A B is equal to
A C, B C is the middle term, which is compared
first with A B, and then with A C; and being
pronounced equal to each, we conclude that A B
and A C must be equal to each other. Here then
the inference is mediate. Moreover, though the
conclusion follows irresistibly from the premises,
yet it is really different from either premiss ; it is
really a new truth, and consequently the whole
agrees with our definition of reasoning in general,
OF DEMOMSTEATIVE KEASONIKG. 307
as given in the opening of this chapter. But
there are other demonstrative inferences, or at
least commonly so called, which are drawn at
once from a prior proposition without any propo-
sition intervening. These are immediate infer-
ences. Let us now examine them.
18. These immediate inferences are of two
sorts. They are either instances of mere con-
version of propositions, or they are not. Let us
first examine the latter. And as I shall attempt
to show that some, at least, if not all, of these ap-
parent cases of immediate inference are not real
cases, I prefer taking instances brought forward
by another, namely, Mr. Bailey, author of that ex-
cellent work, " The Theory of Reasoning."
1. The lines A and B are severally equal
to C.
Therefore A and B are equal to each other.
I have already shown that in this case the two
propositions are equivalent to three, the first pro-
position being a compound one, and readily ana-
lyzed into A is equal to C, and
B is equal to C,
from which w^e conclude that A and B are equal
to each other. Consequently, in this case, the in-
ference is not immediate but mediate,
2. The three angles of every triangle are to-
gether equal to two right angles :
Therefore the three angles of the triangle ABC
are equal to two right angles.
308 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
In this case the last proposition really compre-
hends two, which are,
This figure A B C is a triangle : .
Therefore its three angles are equal to two
right angles. In the compound proposition it is
clearly taken for granted that the figure A B C is
a triangle, and if taken for granted it may as well
be stated. Here therefore again, the inference is
not really immediate, but mediate.
3. The culprit at the bar was in Edinburgh
at one o'clock on the day named :
Therefore he could not be guilty of the offence
committed at that time in London.
In this case a knowledge of geography is sup-
posed, and without this knowledge no certain in-
ference can be drawn. We are supposed to know
that Edinburgh is about four hundred miles from
London, and not a suburb or part of London, like
Westminster and Southwark, as it might be.
Consequently, to supply what is tacitly assumed,
we must interpose the following proposition be-
tween the two above given :
But Edinburgh is about four hundred miles
from London ; when the inference becomes me-
diate.
4. The portrait resembles two different per-
sons ;
Therefore they must resemble each other.
Here again the first proposition is a compound
one, and easily analyzed. Calling the portrait A,
OF DEMOXSTRATIYE KEASONING. 309
and the two persons B and C, then we have the
argument in full thus,
A resembles B ;
but A resembles C ;
therefore B and C resemble each other.
5. The traveller had no money with him ;
Therefore he could not be robbed of a large
sum.
This inference, if it be so called, is no doubt im-
mediate, but at the same time insignificant, giving
us no additional information ; and therefore, ac-
cording to the definition laid down at the opening
of this chapter, not a legitimate case of Reasoning.
We might multiply instances of this sort without
end. Philip was the father of Alexander, therefore
Alexander w^as the son of Philip. John is brother
to Sarah, therefore Sarah is sister to John. "Who
would call this reasoning "? Reasoning may be de-
monstrative, or only probable ; it may be sound or
unsound, conclusive or inconclusive, good or bad ;
but it cannot be insignificant, a mere play upon
words. The proper epithet for this mental amuse-
ment is trifling. A mere change of form does
not of necessity give any new truth, and unless
there be some new truth, something not really the
same as any one premiss, there is no reasoning, in
our sense of the word. Hitherto, then, we have not
been able to find any legitimate instance of demon-
strative reasoning consisting of less than three pro-
positions, expressed or understood. Let us now
310 PRINCIPLES OE PSYCHOLOGY.
examine the other sort of immediate inferences, ob-
tained by the conversion of Propositions.
19. Logicians inform us that propositions may
be illatively converted in three ways; Simply; hy
limitation or per accidens ; and by negation or con-
tra-position. Let us give examples of each taken
from Archbishop Whately and others.
\. No virtuous man is a rebel,
therefore no rebel is a virtuous man.
Ko Christian is an astronomer,
therefore no astronomer is a Christian,
2. All birds are animals.
Therefore some animals are birds.
All men are mortals ;
Tlierefore some mortals are men.
3. Every poet is a man of genius ;
Therefore he who is not a man of genius is
not a poet.
All good rulers are just ;
Therefore no unjust rulers can be good, or every
unjust ruler is not good.
In the first case the Quantity and the Quality
of the proposition when converted remain the same
as before ; in the second, the Quantity^ in the third,
the Quality, is changed ; but in all the inference
is immediate and irresistible. The only question is,
are these specimens of reasoning % To this we
have only to ansvv^er, is any new truth contained in
the converted proposition, any truth really different
from that conveyed by the proposition previous to
OF DEMONSTRATIVE EEASONING. 311
conversion"? There is certainly a difTerence of
jorm^ but difTerence of form alone is, as before ob-
served, a mere play upon words, and unworthy of
the name of reasoning, which professes to teach us
something really new. I cannot therefore look
upon these as instances of reasoning properly so
called. Upon the whole, then, we have been un-
able to find any example of demonstrative reasoning
consisting of less than three propositions, any speci-
men of immediate demonstrative inference agreeing
with our definition of reasoning, and therefore enti-
tled to the name.*"
Should we adopt the thorough Quantification of
the Predicate proposed by Sir William Hamilton,
then the conversion by limitation or per accidens
would disappear ; for, instead of " All birds are ani-
mals," we should have " All birds are some ani-
mals," which is the true meaning ; and by simple
conversion, '' Some animals are all birds." So,
"All men are mortals" would become " All men
are some mortals ;" and again by simple conversion,
" Archbishop Whately and Mr. Mill are both of opinion that
conversion, though illative, is not reasoning. " The reader must
not suppose from the use of the word ' illative,' that this conversion
is a process oi reasoning ) it is in fact only stating the same Judg-
ment in another lorm.'' — Elements of Logic. Book II. Chap. II.
Sect. 4. Note. Mr. Mill also denies that illative conversion is
reasoning, because " there is in the conclusion no new truth, no-
thing but what was already in the premises, and obvious to whoever
apprehended them."— System of Logic. Rook II. Chap. I.
312 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
"Some mortals are all men." In this way the very
semblance of reasoning disappears.
20. Under the head of Demonstrative Reasoning
applied to Contingent matter, Ave are naturally
brought to consider, in the last place, that famous
sj)ecies, or that t^pe of reasoning, which has exer-
cised the wits of so many generations of logicians,
from the age of Aristotle downwards ; and which,
even in the present day, is upheld as of paramount
importance by some of the ablest of men. In the
whole history of Philosophy there is not a more re-
markable fact than this ; that thinking men are
not yet agreed as to the real value of the Syllo-
gism.
21. Since the days of Bacon, however, the em-
pire of Aristotle has gradually been going to decay,
and faith in the all-sufficiency of the Syllogism has
more and more been shaken. Bacon hmiself, in
his Novutn Organum^ frequently decries the Syllo-
gism ;^ Pascal depreciates it f Descartes shows
its uselessness for discovery ; and Locke, with
some succeeding philosophers, particularly Thomas
Brown, s.cofifs at it altogether.
' See Xoviim Organum in Distributione operis, and Aph. XI.
XII. XIII. XIV. and LXIII. where Aristotle is blamed for cor-
rupting Pli\ sics by his Dialectics. See also De Augmentis Scientia-
rmn. Lib. V. Cap. II.
s See Pascal " De I'esprit G^ometrique," and " De I'art de
persuader," contained in the best edition of the " Pens^es de Pas-
cal," by Prosper — Faug^re, Paris, 1844.
OF DEMONSTR.VTIVE REASONING. 313
22. But in our clays an attempt has been made
to restore the logic as well as the religion of the
middle ages, and the same University which nursed
a Newman has produced a Whately.** Ihe latter
has written a work chiefly to prove that the Logic
of Aristotle is the only Logic, and Syllogism the
only reasoning ; that in fact the syllogism is not a
particular kind of reasoning, but the /on« to which
all sound reasoning may be reduced, by whatever
name it be called. "A Syllogism," says he, " is no
distinct kind of argument, otherwise than in form,
but is, in fact, any argument whatever, stated regu-
larly and at full length."' Thus, according to that
celebrated Archbishop and Philosopher, there are
no different sorts of reasoning, but all reasonings
are alike, whether demonstrative or probable, a
priori or a jjosteriori, Inductive or Deductive, all
are exactly similar; and all, if stated regularly and
at full length, are syllogistical. This Dr. AYhately
assumes, without any attempt to prove that Mathe-
matical reasoning is syllogistical, or can be reduced
to syllogisms. He says that it can, but he gives
no proof. That Inductive reasoning is syllo-
•^ It is worthy of remark that Dr. Whately, in the Preface to
his *' Elements of Logic," acknowledges that the Rev. J , Newman
*' actually composed a considerable j)ortion of the work as it now
" stands, from manuscripts not designed for publication," and that
" he is the original author of several pages."
' " Elements of Logic." Book IV. Chap, II. Sect. I.
S S
314 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
gistical, he does indeed attempt, but in my opinion
utterly fails, to prove.
23. No doubt there must be something common
to all reasoning, or the same name reasoning would
not have been given to the process in all cases ; but
had there been no differences, neither would there
have been any specific names, such as demonstrative,
probable, inductive, deductive, etc. What is common
to all reasoning, what it is which makes reasoning a
genus, we have seen in the opening of this chapter ;
and that account we must bear in mind during the
following discussion. Wherein consist the differ-
ences which mark out several species of reasoning,
we have also seen in part, and we shall see in full
hereafter ; and if these differences be real, especially
the grand difference between demonstration and
probability, then it will follow, contrary to the opin-
ion of Dr. Whately, that all reasoning is not speci-
fically the same. Consequently, unless the word
Syllogism 7nean nothing more than a sound argu-
ment in general, stated in full, unless it be merely
a generic word, then all sound reasoning, stated
explicitly, cannot be syllogistical.
24. But in order to know what the word Syllo-
gism really does mean, we must refer to the defini-
tions which have been given of it, the examples
brought forward in illustration, and the general
principle said to pervade all syllogisms. When we
know what a syllogism really is, then, and not till
then, can we determine whether it include all rea-
soning, or any.
#
OF DEMONSTEATIVE REASONING. 315
25. Let us first take Aristotle's own definition
of the Syllogism, ■which is as follows ; '' A syllogism
is a speech, in which certain propositions being
stated and granted, some other proposition, different
from these, follows of necessity ; and this solely in
virtue of the propositions stated."" And this defini-
tion is thus explained by Alexander, one of Aristo-
tle's commentators. " But when Aristotle says,
follows of necessiti/, this does not mean that the con-
clusion, as a proposition in itself, should necessarily
be true, for this is the case only in syllogisms of
necessary matter ; but, that the conclusion^ he its
matter what it may, actual^ contingent^ or necessary,
must folloiv of necessity from the premises"^
26. Reid's definition of syllogism, as completed
by Sir William Hamilton, varies a little from the
foregoing, but is perfectly consistent with it. " A
syllogism," says he, " is an argument or reasoning
consisting (always explicitly or implicitly) of three
propositions, the last of which, called the Conclu-
sion, is (necessarily) inferred from the (very state-
ment of the) two preceding, which are called the
Premises." The only difference of importance be-
tween this definition and the other is, that here Syl-
logism is made a species of the genus argument or
reasoning ; while, according to Aristotle, it is a
'' Prior Analytics, Book I, Cbap. I.
* See " A brief account of Aristotle's Logic," in Sir William
Hamilton's edition of Reid's works : Chap IV. Sect. V. Note.
316 PHINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
species of the higher genus speech. Thus, by the
definition of Reid, the Syllogism is only a kind or
species of reasoning, while, by the definition of
Aristotle, it might be supposed equivalent to rea-
soning in general.
27. The first observation to be made on these
difinitious is, that they evidently apply to demon-
strative reasoning, and to it alone ; for in it assu-
redly, and in none other, does the conclusion follow
of necessity, or, in other words, is necessarily in-
ferred, from the premises. As definitions, then, of
Demonstrative reasoning, they are unexceptionable ;
but, for this very reason they cannot apply to all
reasoning; for we well know that by far the greater
part of our reasonings are probable only, not demon-
strative. This argument may itself be stated syllo-
gistically thus :
All syllogistical reasonings are demonstrative ;
But all reasonings are not demonstrative ;
Therefore, all reasonings are not syllogistic.
Take the following as a specimen :
Trade (in general) ought to be free ;
Therefore, the Corn-trade ought to be free.
Is this reasoning or is it not? Is it good rea-
soning? Most people, I believe, will allow that
the reasoning is fair, though not irresistible. From
the assumption that Trade ought to be free, we are
entitled to infer, probahly, indeed, not necessarily,
that the corn trade ought to be free ; probably only,
OF DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 317
because, though trade in general ought to be free,
there may be circumstances peculiar to the corn-
trade which take it out of the general rule. There-
fore, here we have a specimen of what all would
allow to be reasoning, where the conclusion does
not follow irresistibly or of necessity from the pre-
mises, and which therefore does not agree with the
definitions of the syllogism. Consequently, all
reasoning is not syllogistical in the sense above
given. But this is only a specimen of ten thousand
arguments of the same kind, and therefore we must
conclude in general that all reasoning is not syllogis-
tical, as above defined.
28. The next observation suggested by the
above definitions is, that little is therein said of any
certain form or type of words as essential to the
Syllogism, only, according to the second definition,
it must consist of three propositions. And that de-
monstrative reasoning consists of three propositions
we have already seen. Therefore the argument,
A B is equal to A C, and B C is equal to A C,
therefore A B is equal to B C, is a syllogism ; for it
consists of three propositions, and the conclusion
follows irresistibly from the premises. And such
are all the reasonings of pure Geometry. Conse-
quently, it is not necessary to turn all the proposi-
tions of Euclid into syllogisms, as has been attempt-
ed, for they consist of syllogisms already. But the
attempt is a proof that the word SijUogism has been
taken by logicians in a peculiar sense, not as syno-
318 PEINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY.
nymous with demonstrative reasoning in general,
not as determined by the above definitions. We
must then neglect the definitions, as the school logi-
cians have neglected them, and seek for the nature
of the syllogism in some other way.
29. With this view we must examine the Gene-
ral Principle said to pervade all Syllogisms, and the
particular examples brought forward in illustration.
Now dialecticians agree that the fundamental prin-
ciple of all syllogisms is correctly given in the famous
dictum of Aristotle, namely, that Whatever is af-
firmed or denied universally of a class of things may
he a-ffirmed or denied of anything comprehended in
that class. This, according to Archbishop Whately,
is not only the Universal Principle of the Syllogism,
but of all Reasoning ; for, as he thinks, all reason-
ing is syllogistical. What then are we to think of
this Principle % Is it exemplified in all reasoning, or
in any '?"'
30. In the first place, be it remarked, that
this celebrated dictum is, in reality, no principle or
axiom at all, for it affirms nothing which is not al-
ready meant by the word Class. It is, in fact, a
definition of a class, and so a merely verbal propo-
" Let it not be supposed that I assert that Aristotle thought
that he had discovered in this dictum the Universal Principle of
ReasoniHg. My remark applies only to one of the most distin-
guished of his modern disciples, and we all know that disciples
often go beyond their masters. Aristotle maintained only that the
above dictum was the Universal Principle of Syllogisms.
OF DEM0X3TR.VTIVE REASONING 319
sition ; for our notion of a class is that whatever is
affirmed or denied of it, may be affirmed or denied
of anything included under the same. And how a
mere definition can be the universal principle of
reasoning, passes all comprehension. This one ob-
jection appears to me fatal to the theory.
31. But waving this objection, which meets us
at the very threshold of the inquiry, and allowing,
for the sake of argument, the above to be entitled
to the name of a Principle, let us see whether it be
applicable to all, or to any kind of reasoning. ^Yhen
we refer to the various sorts of relation about which
reasoning is conversant, that are mentioned above,
we see but one kind, at most, to which the principle
of the Syllogism can be applicable, namely, rela-
tions of comprehension. This, no doubt, is a very
important class, but it is only one class ; and cer-
tainly not more important than relations of Cause
and Effect. If A be the cause of B, and B of C,
then A is the remote cause of C. This is surely
reasoning, nay, demonstrative reasoning ; but how
the conclusion is here comprehended under either of
the premises, I am quite at a loss to discern. And
taking a less general instance, formerly produced.
Application depends upon the will ;
But intellectual advancement depends much upon
application ;
Therefore, intellectual advancement depends
much upon the will.
Here it will be allowed that the conclusion
320 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
follows fairly, nay irresistibly, from the premises ;
but surely it is not comprehended under either of
them. According to the Syllogistic theory, " Ap-
plication" is here the middle term, and this is a
class, under which the subject of the conclusion,
namely, " Intellectual Advancement," must be
brought, in order that what had previously been
asserted of the former may be asserted of the
latter also. But, how " Intellectual Advance-
ment" is a particular instance, or a species, of
the genus " Application," I cannot see. By the
supposition, the one, " application" precedes as a
cause, and the other, " intellectual advancement,"
follows as an effect, and therefore cannot be an
instance of the former.
32. Again, taking relations of Quantity,
in the triangle A B C, if the side A B be equal to
the side B C, and A C to B C, then is the side A
B equal to A C. This, it will be allowed, is
demonstrative reasoning ; but here also the prin-
ciple of the Syllogism is quite inapplicable. That
conclusion follows irresistibly from the premises,
but it is not comprehended under either of the
previous propositions.
I am aware that an attempt has been made to
OF DEMOXSTR.VTIVE REASONING. 321
bring the reasonings of pure mathematics to the
Syllogistic form. We are informed by Sir
William Hamilton that there exists in the College
Library of Glasgow a rare work by Herlinius
and Dasypodius, namely " an edition of the first
six books of Euclid in which every demonstration
is developed in regular syllogisms."" One speci-
men of this we have seen above. A is equal to
B, and B to C, therefore A is equal to C, becomes
in due syllogistic form
What are equal to the same are equal to one
another ;
A and C are equal to the same (B) ;
Therefore A and C are equal to each other.
We have shown that it is only by compressing
two propositions into one that the form of the
syllogism has been obtained ; and that stated in
full the argument would stand thus,
What are equal to the same are equal to one
another ;
A is equal to B ;
And C is equal to the same B ;
Therefore A and C are equal to each other :
Where the utter uselessness, the impertinence of
the first proposition is evident ; for, take it away^
and the J) roof is still perfect. This may serve as a
specimen of the mode of developing mathematical
arguments in syllogisms. It can be done only by
" See Sir William Hamilton's Notes to Raid's " Brief Account
of Aristotle's Logic." Reid's Works, p. 702.
T T
322
PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY.
introducing a number of general propositions of
no use whatsoever to the proof, and consequently
forming no part of the proof; mere excrescences
or wens upon the smooth surface of mathematical
reasoning. The philoso{)her of Laputa, who
spent his time in attempting to extract sun-
beams from cucumbers, was quite as profitably
employed as Herlinius and Dasypodius in deve-
loping (as the phrase is) the propositions of Euclid
in Syllogisms.
Nevertheless we allow that there is one case in
which the syllogism is applicable to the demon-
strations of Euclid, and that is where an universal
proposition, formerly established, is referred to
as the ground of a new ])r()position. And in
order to exemplify this case, as well as the more
numerous cases where the syllogism is not api)li-
cable, we shall analyze a proposition of Euclid.
Any one almost might answer the purpose ; but
we shall take the fifteenth of the First Book as
short and simple.
If two straight lines cut one another, the ver-
tical or opposite angles shall be equal.
Because the straight line A E makes with C D, at
OF DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 323
the point E, the adjacent angles C E A, A E D,
Tliese angles are together equal to two right
angles (Prop. 13.)
Again, because the straight line D E makes
with A B, at the point E, the adjacent angles AED,
DE B,
These angles also are equal to two right angles ;
But the angles C K A, A E D have been shown
to be equal to two right angles ;
Wherefore the angles C E A, A E D are equal
to the angles A E D, D E B.
Take away from each the common angle A E D,
and the remaining angle C E A is equal to the
remaining angle DEB (ax. 3).
In the same manner it may be demonstrated
that the angle C E B is equal to the angle AED.
The Theorem begins by referring to a propo-
sition, formerly proved, the )3th, as the foundation
of the present argument, and consequently that
proposition may be stated in full.
1. The angles which one straight line makes
with another straight line, upon one side of it, are
either two right angles, or are together equal to
two right angles.
But the straight line A E makes with C D, at
the point E, the adjacent angles C E A, A E D ;
Therefore these angles are together equal to
two right angles.
Here it is clear that we have a formal syllogism,
and the axiom exenq)litied is that cle oiniii el nullo.
324 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
2. The same may be said of the second argu-
ment, which is exactly similar to the foregoing.
3. The angles C E A and A E D have been
proved equal to two right angles ;
And the angles A E D, DEB have also been
proved equal to two right angles ;
Therefore the angles C E A, A E D together
are equal to the angles A E D, DEB together.
Here there is no universal proposition, all is
particular ; neither of the premises is entitled to
be called the major in preference to the other ;
and consequently there is no syllogism technically
so called, no syllogism of the Schools ; but the
axiom exemplified is " Things which are equal to
the same are equal to one another."
4. The angles C E A, A E D are equal to the
angles A E D, DEB;
And the angle A E D is common to both ;
Therefore the angle C E A is equal to the angle
DEB.
Here again, as in the last case, all is particular,
and therefore there is no Syllogism proper : but
the axiom exemplified is, " if the same be taken
away from equals the remainders are equals."
The only observation to be made on the above
is, that the Syllogisms at the head of the Theorem
establish no new truth ; they only recall and for-
mally enunciate what we know from a previous
Theorem ; they make us sure of our old ground, but
they do not advance us one step. And this will
OF DEMONSTRATIVE EEASONING. 325
be found to be the utmost scope of the Syllogism.
33. It appears, then, from the acknowledged
general Principle of the Syllogism, and from the
particular instances of demonstrative reasoning
now given, adapted to both necessary and con-
tingent matter, that the Syllogism of the Schools
is not applicable to Demonstrative Reasoning in
general. And as the inference in Syllogism, if
inference it be, is irresistible, therefore it cannot
be applied to probable reasoning at all. Conse-
quently, so far is it from true that the Syllogisms
of the Schools is the perfect type or form of all
reasoning, that, at most, it can be only the type
or form of one kind or variety of Demonstrative
reasoning. The importance of the Syllogism,
then, to say the least, has been prodigiously over-
rated.
34. Before proceeding farther, it may be well
to state accurately what has already been proved.
1. That the Syllogism, being a form of De-
monstration, cannot be applicable to probable
reasoning, that is to the greater part by far of all
our reasonings.
2. That it is not applicable to all demonstra-
tive reasoning, neither to all demonstrative rea-
soning about necessary matter, nor to all demon-
strative reasoning about contingent matter ; in
other words, neither to all reasonings about Quan-
tity, or xMathematical reasoning, nor to all demon-
strative reasonings about matter of fact.
326 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
3. That it is applicable to one case of mathe-
matical reasoning, that where an universal pro-
position, formerly proved, becomes a premiss of a
subsequent conclusion ; a case, however, so clear
as scarcely to require reasoning at all, where no-
thing is proved, but only a formal statement
made of what has been proved, a formal statement,
moreover, which even Euclid does not think neces-
sary. It remains to be seen whether the Syllo-
gism can iii a}iij case be applied to Contingent
matter. That it cannot, seems probable a priori;
for where are we to look for universal propositions
in matters of fact ^ but if it be applicable, it will
in all likelihood be found to apply only to such a
case as that above, where we are merely reminded
of what we know already. Let us examine actual
instances of reasoning, however, in order to
settle this point.
35. Agreeably to the fundamental principle
of all syllogisms, as given above, it would appear,
that to relations of Comprehension, if to any, the
Syllogism must ap})ly ; for the principle is, that
what is true of a class, is true of all individuals
or all species comprehended under that class.
To class-reasoning then, as tracing relations of
comprehension, a species of demonstrative rea-
soning, the Syllogism may be applicable.
36. Observe that, in reference to reasoning,
there are two questions to be solved, the one
purely psychological and speculative, the other
OF DEMO^^STRATIYE REASONING. 327
logical and practical: the first, what is actually
the process which goes on in our minds in rea-
soning ( the second, can any form or type be in-
vented whereby we may test the validity of all
arguments, or of any one sort of argument ?
Each of these questions must be treated sepa-
rately.
,37. This distinction may be illustrated by
reference to Ethics, in which also there are two
grand questions ; the one, what are the Causes
present to the mind which actually regulate our
moral sentiments'? The other, what are the cir-
cumstance^ which justify us, on mature reflection,
in awarding approbation and disapprobation to
any action ? The former question, which is spe-
culative, relates to the origin of our moral senti-
ments ; the latter, which is practical, to the test
or criterion of morality. No little obscurity has
arisen from confounding these two questions.
38. The first question then is, whether the
Syllogism be a full statement, founded on a cor-
rect Analysis, of the mental process in any kind
of Reasoning, more especially in that which we
have called class-reasoning? Having already
mentioned the general principle of the Syllogism,
let us now bring forward some examples.
1. Whatever exhibits marks of design had an
intelligent Author.
The world exhibits marks of design :
Therefore the world had an intelligent
Author.
328 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
2. All tyrants deserve death.
Csesar was a tyrant :
Therefore Caesar deserved death.
3. Every dispensation of Providence is bene-
ficial.
Afflictions are dispensations of Providence :
Therefore they are beneficial.
4. Every creature possessed of reason and
liberty ought to practise justice.
Man is a creature possessed of reason and
liberty :
Therefore he ought to practise justice.
5. No vicious man is worthy of esteem and
reward.
John is a vicious man:
Therefore John is not worthy of esteem and
reward.
6. No tyrannical government is good.
The Turkish government is tyrannical :
Therefore it is not good.
These are instances of regular Syllogisms, in
the first Figure^ to which, as we are told by Aris-
totle and his followers, all legitimate syllogisms
may be reduced. Here the middle term is the
subject of the Major, and the predicate of the
Minor proposition." We shall also give a speci-
men of the second and of the third figure.
° The first three instances are taken from Whately's Logic.
The first, in particular, is his favourite specimen. Li the Prior
Analytics, Book I. Chap VIL, Aristotle proves that all syllogisms
OF DEMONSTRATIVE TIEASONING. 329
7. Whatever is bad is not the work of God.
All the natural passions and appetites of men
are the work of God ;
Therefore they are not bad.
In this case the middle term "The work of
God" is the predicate of both the Major and Minor
propositions, or the Syllogism is of the second Figure.
8. All Africans are black.
All Africans are men ;
Therefore some men are black.
Here the middle term is the subject of both the
Major and Minor, or the Syllogism is of the third
Figure.
39. These instances may suffice to show us the
nature of syllogisms. In all, the conclusion is
eVi^ewi, ]}rovided the premises he granted^ and in all,
the validity consists in the same thing, which, when
stated generally, constitutes the dictum above men-
tioned ; namely, that whatever is affirmed or denied
universally of any class of things, may be affirmed
or denied of anything comprehended in that class.
In framing the argument, then, the object is to refer
the subject of the conclusion to some class, (middle
term) of which class something can be affirmed or
denied universally. Thus in the first Syllogism,
the subject of the conclusion " the world" is referred
may be reduced not only to the first figure, but to the two universal
moods of the first figure, either directly by conversion, or /«-
directly by reductio ad absurdum.
U U
330 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY.
to a class of things " those which exhibit marks of
design," of which it can be universally affirmed that
" they had aa intelligent Author." And so with
the rest.
40. Now the question is, do men actually
reason thus*? That they do not openly or apparently
so reason, every one's experiiuice may convince him.
Taking each of the six syllo:^isms in the first figui e,
to which form the other figures may be reduced, we
shall see that in every case the natural or usual way
of reasoning would be confined to the second and
third propositions, omitting the first. In order to
prove that the workl had an intelligent Author, none
but a dialectician would think of beginning by
stating " Whatever exhibits marks of design had an
intelligent Author"; but an ordinary reasoner would
say.
The world exhibits marks of design.
Therefore it had an intelligent Author.
And so in the other cases.
But though not expressed, is not the first or
major proposition understood"? mentally embraced,
though not stated in words'? 'Ihere lies all the
question.
41. Were it granted that the Major pro-
position is necessary to the perfection of the proof,
still this would not establish the fact that men
actually reason thus ; for the present question is not
bow men oi g'lt to reason so as to arrive at demon-
stration, but how they do reason. And that men
OF DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING 331
commonly content themselves Avith arguments short
of demonstrations we all know. Moreover, that in
the ahove instances men would reason from the
minor alone, and in so reasoning would be thought
to reason fairly, thongh not irresistibly, cannot be
doubted. Where then is the proof that the major,
an liniversal proposition, is tacitly assumed by the
reasoner, and supposed by the listener. There is
no proof whatsoever, except that the logician thinks
that the said preposition is essential to a demonstra-
tion ; and, so thinking, he wishes to make men
reason better than they commonly do. Let us
examine the six instances and see whether the major
proposition be necessary to a legitimate argument,
an argument short of demonstration.
42. — 1. Whatever exhibits marks of design
had an intelligent Author.
The world exhibits marks of design.
Therefore the world had an intelligent Author.
Here we may safely assert that the Major is
altogether useless. \\ hen we say that the world
exhibits marks of design, we in fact assert that it
had an intelligent Author. We cannot say that
there is here any inference at all. To aflirra that
the world exhibits marks of design, or marks of a
designer, or marks of an intelligent Author, is all
one in meaning, with a variety only in expression.
We cannot even conceive design v\ithout a designer,
or w.thout an intelligent being. As we have already
shown, when we allow design, we already allow a
332 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY.
designer, we do not infer one. A Major, or universal
proposition, cannot therefore be required to establish
an inference, seeing that no inference is made. But
were we to grant that the conclusion " the world
had an intelligent Author'^ contains something
really different from the minor " the world exhibits
marks of design," still, the inference from the minor
would be self-evident and irresistible. No Major
could add to. its force. So close indeed is the con-
nection between them, so intimate the relation, that
we consider them as one proposition, or at least as
one assertion with a slight variety of form.
2. All tyrants deserve death.
Caesar was a tyrant.
Therefore Csesar deserved death.
Here the connection between the Minor, and the
conclusion is by no means self-evident ; and some
gefieral proposition does seem necessary to establish
the conclusion. But, in order to prove, we must
beware of assuming the very point in debate, and
this we should do were we to assert that all tyrants
(Csesar included), deserve death. The utmost that
we can assume is that tyrants in general deserve
death ; and from this we may argue, probably
indeed, not demonstratively, that Caesar deserved
death. This, indeed, is a question quite out of the
range of demonstration ; men's minds have been
much divided upon it; and therefore it can be only
by a trick that it puts on a demonstrative form. As
few men, if any, would maintain that all tyrants
OF DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 333
■without exception deserve death, they cannot be
supposed to reason from a proposition which they
do not hold.
3. Every dispensation of Providence is bene-
ficial.
Afflictions are dispensations of Providence ;
Therefore they are beneficial.
Here again we allow that some general proposi-
tion is necessary to establish the conclusion ; but, as
in the last instance, by assuming too much we pre-
judge the question ; we assert, we do not reason.
Religious men will freely allow that the dispensa-
tions of Providence are on the whole beneficial, and
that therefore even afflictions may have their use ;
but they do not make a sweeping assertion like the
one above, which would do away with all distinction
between good and evil, happiness and misery.
Logicians alone make such assumptions, in order to
give a demonstrative air to their arguments ; and
they care not how absurd the whole may be, pro-
vided it be a proper Syllogism.
4. Every creature possessed of reason and
liberty ought to practise justice.
Man is a creature possessed of reason and
liberty ;
Therefore he ought to practise justice.
Here, as before, the conclusion is evidently
assumed in the Major, and therefore the reasoning
is only apparent. That men from a due considera-
tion of reason and liberty might arrive at the con-
334 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
elusion here given is probable enough ; but they
certainly would not begin by assuming the final
result of their researches.
6. No vicious man is worthy of esteem and
reward.
John is a vicious man ;
Therefore John is not worthy of esteem and
reward.
In this instance, the uselessness of the Major is
evident; for, if John be a vicious man, it would be
a din^ct contradiction to our notion of Vice to sup-
pose that he could be worthy of esteem and reward.
6. No tyrannical government is good.
The Turkish government is tyrannical;
Therefore it is not good.
Here, the uselessness of the IMajor is quite as
evident, if possible more so, for a tyrannical govern-
ment means one that is not good. At least that is
a part of the meaning, and not an inference. If we
assert that the 'lurkish government is tyrannical,
we assert that it is not good ; no argument is
required to prove it ; and if no proof be wanted, of
what use can be the Major '?p
43. Having now examined each of these six
Syllogisms, given as specimens by writers on
Logic, we find that in no one case would men
P Lei not tlie reader suppose that I first made the ahove Svllo-
gisuis, and now criticise my own work. They are all the woik of
others. The first three, as hefore slated, are lukeu hum Wiiatcily's
Logic.
OF DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 335
naturally reason thus ; that in some cases there
is scarcely any thing that can be called an argu-
ment, certainly none requiring a major proposi-
tion ; while in others though a general proposition
may be assumed openly or tacitly, y^tOiW universal
proposition neither would nor could be taken for
granted. For we find that the major is always
an universal proposition ; and this, in fact, is one
of the laws of the first figure ; as it is of Syllo-
gisms in general that one of the premises must
be universal. Unless this be the case, no in-
falhble inference can be drawn. If the major
proposition be universal, it must embrace the con-
clusion, for this is only a particular instance of
the same. Consequently, by assuming the major,
we assume the conclusion, or, in other words, our
first proposition takes for granted the very thing
to be proved. And this, we are told, is the only
legitimate mode of reasoning! Certainly, of all
the delusions that ever passed current in the
learned world, this is the greatest, for it is a de-
lusion not peculiar to common minds, but shared,
even now, by some of the highest names in philo-
sophy, It is engendered between reverence for
antiquity in general, and respect for Aristotle and
Greek more particularly ; and in many instances
it has proved too strong, not only for common
sense, but for high imtellectual powers. On that
account it is the more important that the delu-
sion should be expelled.
336 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
44. Aristotle shows (Prior Analytics. Book I.
Chap. XXIV.) that unless one of the two proposi-
tions which compose the premises be universal,
there can be no Syllogism. "Thus," says he "if
we have to demonstrate that music is a dignified
pleasure, if we state only that pleasure is dignified
without saying a// pleasure, there is no Syllogism."
Strange that this acute philosopher should not
have put the question to himself, if all pleasure be
dignified, what occasion is there for reasoning to
prove that the pleasure of music is so ! That
question once fairly answered, he might have
spared himself the trouble of writing the Prior
Analytics, a mighty monument of useless ingenu-
ity. This instance also shows what unwarranted
assertions must be made in order to obtain a for-
mal syllogistic proof ; for who would really main-
tain that " all pleasure is dignified *?"
45. To these objections to the Syllogism, it
may, however, be replied : that the major propo-
sition embraces the conclusion is not denied, nay
unless it do, there can be no demonstration ; and
the very object of the reasoning is to show that
the conclusion is so comprehended. But what
we assert is, that no reasoning is required for this
purpose. The fact is self-evident. There is no-
thing new in the conclusion, nothing not already
affirmed in the premises, only the substitution of
the particular for the universal, and whosoever
allows the latter allows the former. Therefore
OF DEMONSTR.VTIVE REASONING. 337
the above specimens of Syllogism and othrrs such
as are usually found in books of Logic, in all the
varieties of figure and mood, do not answer to the
definition of reasoning in general, given at the
opening of this Section, nor even to that of
syllogism as delivered by Aristotle himself, which
we found to be applicable to demonstrative rea-
soning without reference to any particular form,
namely, that " it is a speech in which certain
propositions (the premises) being stated and
granted, some other proposition, (the conclusion)
different from these, follows of necessity), and this
solely in virtue of the propositions stated." Now,
we see that the Syllogism, constructed according
to the rules of figure and mood, and in agree-
ment with the dictum of Aristotle de omni et nullo,
as it is called, really bring out in the conclusion
nothing different from the premises. Therefore
they do not correspond with the above definition.
That is a definition of perfect or demonstrative
reasoning in general, and if we please to call it
syllogistic, well and good, but then we must re-
member that the definition does not apply to the
Syllogism properly so called, the Syllogism of
Aristotle and the Schoolmen, which alone we are
now considering. In this last, the connection
between the premises and the conclusion is no
doubt irresistible, because the latter is assumed
in the former ; but for that reason it can contain
nothing new, nothing different. Not so in real
X X
338 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
and perfect reasoning, such as that of Geometry,
where the conclusion not only follows irresistibly
from the premises, from both together, but where
it also contains something different from either.
46. " Wherein consists this admirable dis-
covery of the Syllogism" asks Barthelemy de
Saint Hilaire, in the Preface to his Translation of
Aristotle's Organum*? "In this," answers he "that
Aristotle first established that reasoning was
possible on the one condition alone of starting
from a Principle, to arrive by the aid of a middle
term at a conclusion resulting necessarily from
that principle." According to this statement,
there can be none but demonstrative reasoning ;
first mistake. Again, by this, the conclusion in
demonstrative reasoning follows necessarily from
the Principle, as Saint Hilaire calls it, or Major
proposition ; whereas, in mathematical reasoning
it follows not from one of the premises alone, but
from both together; second mistake. In the
simple reasoning A is equal to B, and B to C ;
therefore A is equal to C ; the conclusion follows
not necessarily from either of these premises, but
from both together, and the one is no more
entitled to be called a Principle than the other.
It is only in the fictitious reasoning of the Syllo-
gism that the conclusion follows necessarily from
the Major proposition, because in that proposition
the conclusion is taken for granted beforehand. It
may be remarked that Logicians of a certain class
OF DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 339
are often at war with Mathematicians. No wonder,
for no science so clearly refutes the absurd pre-
tensions of the School Logic as Mathematics.
47. Nothing is more remarkable than the
utter disregard of observation on the part of the
School Logicians. Having adopted from Aristotle
the Syllogistic theory of reasoning, they boldly
assert that it applies to all arguments ; but the
least observation upon real discourse is sufficient
to refute this opinion. Still, in spite of daily, of
hourly experience, they go on repeating the
assertion, which, to say the least, is a prodigious
exaggeration. The School Logic is one instance of
that system of philosophizing which prevailed gen-
erally among the ancients, as well as in the middle
ages, down even to the time of Bacon, a system
which, despising experience, pretended to deduce
everything from a few very general Principles.
Such was the system of Plato, and even of Aris-
totle in many of his works, though in his Politics
and his Natural History he has condescended to
examine facts.
48. The utmost that can be allowed in favour
of the Syllogism is, that there may be cases where
we should grant an universal Proposition more '
readily than a particular one comprehended under
it, and where therefore it might be well to remind
us of what we already admit. But, recalling what
we already know, and reasoning from the known
to the unknown, are surely different operations.
340 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
A Syllogism may strengthen, but it cannot origi-
nate Belief; and therefore it can lead to no dis-
covery. Our Belief in the existence of the
material world certainly requires no strengthen-
ing, it is instinctive and indelible ; yet, it may
be satisfactory to give it the sanction of an
universal principle, as in the following Syllogisraj
which seems a more favourable specimen than
what we generally meet with.
Whatever is universally believed is worthy of
credit.
The existence of the material world is univer-
sally believed :
Therefore it is worthy of credit.
If we choose to call this reasoning, be it so,
provided we be fully av\are what sort of reasoning
it is ; demonstrative in form, because we always
allow the conclusion when we assume the pre-
mises, but, for the same reason, utterly barren of
new truth, and, at most, confirming what we
already know. If reasoning be the process of
drawing a conclusion, which before was unknown,
or at least dark or doubtful, from some proposi-
tions known or more evident, then the above
syllogism does not answer to this definition, for
there the conclusion was surely as certain before-
hand as the premises. Nay, it is easier to doubt
whether universal consent be a sure ground of
belief, than to doubt the existence of the material
world. The only valid argument whereby we can
OF DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 341
justify this and other cases of Instinctive beUef
is, that we have here no reason to doubt ; that
we have no reason to believe that Nature per-
petually deceives us, that she is a great cheat.
But this argument cannot be put in the form of
a syllogism, because we cannot positively assert
that she never deceives us.
49. That such is the narrow province of the
syllogism is allowed even by its most strenuous
and indiscriminate supporters. " Since all reason-
ing (in the sense above defined), may be resolved
into syllogisms, and since even the objectors to
Logic make it a subject of complaint that in a
syllogism the premises do virtually assert the
conclusion, it follows at once that no new truths
(as above defined) can be elicited by any process
of reasoning. ''^ Thus, in order to maintain the
Syllogistic Theory in all its extension, we must
contract excessively the province of reasoning
in general, nay, we must allow that no new truths
can be elicited by reasoning ! If this be not a
reductio ad ahsurdum, what is ?
50. Ihe only use of reasoning, then, as we are
told, is " to expand and unfold the assertions wrapt
up, as it were, and implied in those with w hich we set
out, and to bring a person to perceive and acknow-
ledge the full force of that which he has admitted ;
to contemplate it in various points of view, to admit
" Whately's Logic, Book IV, Chap. 11.
342 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
in one shape what he has ah-eady admitted in
another, and to give up and disallow whatever is
inconsistent with it." "^ This mav be allowed to
be a correct account of the value of the Syllogism,
but, as a theory of reasoning in general, it is, pace
tanti viri, quite monstrous. According to this
theory, when Pythagoras established by reasoning,
that, in any right-angled triangle, the square of the
side subtending the right angle is equal to the
squares of the two other sides together, he made no
discovery, he only unfolded what was before wrapt
up in some mathematical axiom or axioms common
to him and other men. Must we then allow that
the above famous proposition is as much contained
within the axiom, " Things which are equal to the
same are equal to one another," or some other
similar, as that the proposition " James is mortal "
is contained within "All men are mortal"? No
one, not blinded by system, will maintain such a
doctrine for a moment. But the syllogistic theory
was to be supported, even at the expense of reason-
ing, which required to be depreciated in order to
suit an artificial and futile system.
51. We are told that no "New truths can be
elicited by any process of Reasoning." By what
then can discoveries be made ? By Observation no
doubt, for that is. the only other way. But no
discovery of general truth can be made by Obser-
' Whately's Logic, Book IV, Chap. II.
OF DEMONSTRATIVE TIEASONIXG. 343
vation alone. If I go into a new country, such as
the interior of Africa, I may certainly make disco-
veries in geography, that is, particular discoveries,
by simple Observation ; but Observation alone
cannot generalize, cannot discover any general truth.
Consequently, as general truth can be discovered
neither by Reasoning nor by Observation, it follows
that it cannot be discovered at all. Once more, is
this, or is it not, a reductio ad absurdum.
52. To say that discoveries cannot be made
by Reasoning alone, but by reasoning combined
with Observation, is incorrect, for the discoveries of
pure Geometry are altogether independent of Obser-
vation. Some Observation no doubt must precede
all reasoning about matter of fact ; but very limited
Observation may suggest an important discovery.
When Archimedes made his famous discovery of
the mode of determining the specific gravity of
solids, was it not by Reasoning chiefly that he made
it, by reasoning from one simple fact, the overflow-
ing of the water of a bath ^ The very same fact
might have been observed by thousands of others,
but he alone could draw an inference from it. Is
it not then correct to say that it was by Reasoning
chiefly that he made his discovery ?
The same may be said of Natural Philosophy
in general. The facts from which it proceeds are
but few in number, a few laws of motion in solids
and in fluids, and on these it builds a vast structure
by reasoning alone.
344 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
53. But as reasoning is depreciated in order to
suit the syllogistic theory, so are the truths of pure
Mathematics. We are told that all the propositions
of pure mathematics are what Locke calls " trifling,"
"wherein the predicate is merely a part of the com-
plex idea implied by the subject. Thus, when we as-
sert, taking the above example, that in a right-angled
triangle the square described on the side which
subtends the right-angle is equal to the two squares
described on the sides containing the right angle,
we state merely a trifling proposition, one included
in the meaning of the subject, square of side sub-
tending the right-angle of a right-angled triangle.
But did any man ever suppose that the Predicate,
namely, equality with the squares of the other two
sides, was included in the meaning of that Subject ?
If so, why was so much reasoning required to prove
it ; or why was it looked upon as a great discovery "?
The supposition is evidently preposterous.
54. Again, the truths of pure mathematics
are represented by the same Author as in con-
formity not with the nature of things, but only with
our own definitions, and therefore as comparatively
insignificant. But this objection to the importance of
Mathematics we have already answered in full.
Suffice it here to repeat that it is based on two
mistakes, on one or both, as it may happen. By
the first, pure Mathematics, the Science of Quantity,
is confounded with Physics, as when it is said that
the truths of Mathematics agree not with the
OF DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 345
nature of tliin2:s i.e. of material tliin2:s. No one
asserts that they do, any more than tl^at the
nature of mind agrees with that of matter. But
the truths of pure Mathematics are of a higher
order than those of Physics, for they are necessary
and eternal, instead of contingent and possibly
mutable in time ; and though Quantity depends
not upon matter, yet, as it does exist also in
matter, thus the truths of pure Quantity become
applicable to Quantity in matter, with some
corrections derived from Experience Hence the
whole fabric of Mechanical Philosophy and Phy-
sical Astronomy, which attest the practical appli-
cability of Mathematics. Accordingly, though
at Cambridge and in otVier universities Mathe-
matics may be studied chiefly as a mental exer-
cise, yet they also form an important part of the
education of practical men. In Commercial
Schools and Institutes for the working classes,
mathematics constitute a principal branch of
instruction.
The second mistake lies in supposing that the
definitions of Mathematicians are arbitrary inven-
tions, with nothing corresponding to the things
defined, baseless as the fabric of a vision. But,
in truth, there is nothing arbitrary but the Names,
line, triangle, circle, etc. The words whereby
these names are defined may also vary a little ;
but of the Things, the Universals, we have con-
ceptions the most fixed, clear and definite, and
Y Y
346 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
they are most important, for by means of these
abstract conceptions and their relations we can
not only measure the earth on which we tread,
but determine the distance and size of the sun
and planets. This second mistake seems to have
arisen out of the first ; for, it being allowed that
nothing exactly corresponding to the lines etc. of
pure Geometry exists in matter, it was thence
inferred that they must be visionary and the whole
Science hypothetical. But so it is, while Metaphy-
sicians dispute about the foundation of human
knowledge and some would cut away all solid
foundation, Mathematicians raise fearlessly a
pyramid of Science reaching from Earth to the
Heavens, which bids defiance to all assaults.
55. Before me, the Author of the Philosophy
of Rhetoric, as well as Dr. Thomas Brown, object-
ed to the Syllogism, as necessarily involving a
petitio principii. Dr. Whately does not attempt
to prove the contrary ; but he answers that the
same objection " lies against all arguments what-
soever." ' All arguments involve a petitio Prin-
cipii ! Am I wrong then in saying that all rea-
soning is depreciated in order to suit an artificial
and futile system ?
56. One question only now remains. Though
the Syllogism be not an accurate explicit state-
ment, derived from a correct analysis of the pro-
' The words in Italics are so printed in the original.
OF DEMON Sill ATI VE REASONING. 347
cess of reasoning in general, is it of any use as a
test or criterion of the validity of an argument ?
In other words, though false metaphysically, can
it serve any purpose logically ? If the Syllogism
be not a full and accurate statement of the men-
tal process in reasoning generally, there is surely
a strong probability a priori against its universal
logical utility. But let us examine particularly
the facts of this question.
57. That the Syllogism of the Schools can be
of any use as a test or criterion of mathematical
reasoning, is absurd ; for we have seen that the
Syllogism, so understood, is not applicable to it at
all, and moreover, mathematical reasoning requires
no criterion. Its accuracy or inaccurac}^ is self-
evident. The same may be affirmed of demon-
strative reasoning in general, whether applied to
necessary or to contingent matter. In either case,
it requires no test of validity. When we say
demonstrative, we in fact allow that the reasoning
demands no Criterion, that it speaks sufficiently
for itself.
58. To Probable reasoning, then, if to any,
the Syllogism may be applicable as a test. But,
the Syllogism being itself a form of demonstrative
reasoning, how can it apply to probable argu-
ments ? We answer that it may show the hoUow-
ness of many arguments which pretend to demon-
stration, arguments which appear demonstrative,
exactly because they are syllogistical. These
348 PHINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
argumePxts may pass current because we do not
see all that has been tacitly assumed ; but when
openly stated as a Syllogism, the imposture be-
comes evident. Instead of reasoning from a
general principle and deducing a probable infer-
ence, as he ought, the writer or speaker has
assumed an universal principle, and deduced from
it an infallible inference accordingly. Therefore,
though the inference be correct, the conclusion
may be false. The syllogism shows openly what
has been taken for granted, and that, unless such
a preliminary proposition be true, we cannot be
quite sure of the conclusion. This seems to me
the exact value of the syllogism, which is appli-
cable only to that species of probable reasoning
which most nearly resembles it, namely, reasoning
from a general principle ; for the precise differ-
ence between the two, betv^een the artificial and
spurious, and the natural and genuine argu-
ment is, that the one is based on an universal^
the other^on a general principle. Thus the Syllo-
gism serves as a specimen of an argument demon-
strative in form, but deceptive or futile in
reality ; and if any actual argument can be
brought into that form, we shall see clearly that
it is deceitful or trifling, that the pretended
demonstration is a sham, the conclusion possibly
a falsehood, if not a truism.
59. To illustrate the use to which the Syllo-
gism may be applied, as a test of probable and
OF DEMONSTR.VnVE REASONING 349
general, or deductive reasoninpj, I shall bring
forward Hume's famous argument against mira-
cles. This argument is contained in a single
sentence, and it maybe easily reduced to the form
of a Syllogism in the first figure ; and for that
very reason it is deceptive. "A miracle is a
violation of the laws of nature ; and as a firm
and unalterable experience has established those
laws, the proof against a miracle from the very
nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument
from experience can possibly be imagined." In
due syllogistic form the argument would stand
thus :
Whatever is opposed to a firm and unalter-
able experience is unworthy of credit.
But a miracle (being a violation of the laws
of nature) is so opposed :
Therefore a miracle is unworthy of credit.
The most obvious fallacy here lies in assuming,
in the minor premiss, that there is a firm and
unalterable experience against a miracle ; for there
exists a great deal of testimony in favour of mi-
racles, testimony even of eye-witnesses, as we have
reason to believe ; and until it be proved that all
this testimony is false or vain, it cannot be assum-
ed that there is an invariable experience against
them : for testimony is indirect experience, and
upon it by far the greater part of our knowledge
depends. Even the major premiss may be con-
tested. To experience really firm and unalterable
350 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
no one can pretend, for this supposes a knowledge
of every event bearing upon the subject, in every
age, and in every country, since the creation.
All, then, that can be meant, is the experience of
ourselves, our ancestors, all whom we have
known, heard, or read of; agreeably to which,
those born and bred in the torrid zone, who have
never wandered from thence, nor read of other
climates, ought not to believe in ice. In this case,
we should say that disbelief is the effect of ignor-
ance; why then not allow the possibility of a similar
influence in our own case ? Are we all-knowing,
all-wise ? Is not our experience after all very
limited ? Our experience of Effects, much more
our knowledge of Causes ?
There are more things in heaven and earth,
Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.
Though there may be a great deal of deception
in Mesmerism, yet enough remains to show that
we must admit some facts contrary to all our
former experience.
In truth, there is scarcely any universal pro-
position that may not be contested, and therefore
dialecticians have been obliged, in order not to
expose the hollowness of their art, to have re-
course to trifling examples, such as, " All men
are mortal" " James is a man" " therefore James
is mortal," " All men are sinners" " John is a
man" " therefore John is a sinner" ; where they
OF DE^rONSTTlATIVE REASONING. 351
knew that the major could not be disputed. Aris-
totle was more wary, for he stuck to letters, and
thus concealed the insignificance of examples.
60. Thus the major proposition of the Syllo-
gism is, in ejeneral, either a truism, or an un-
warranted assumption ; and therefore, though the
inference be irresistible, yet the conclusion must
be either trifling or uncertain. If the argument
of Hume had not laid claim to infallibility, it
could not have been reduced to the form of a
perfect Syllogism. It would have remained a
good, but an obvious argument, namely, that,
prior to the examination of the particular fact,
there is a probability, nay, a strong probability,
against any one miracle, on account of the gene-
ral uniformity of nature. But ^e?2^ra^ experience
could not answer the purpose of an infallible
conclusion ; and therefore unalterable or universal
experience was assumed ; and it is exactly by
reason of this assumption that the argument
becomes reducible to a Syllogism, and, as a demon-
stration, is deceitful. This may serve as a speci-
men of the only use which can be made of the
Syllogism. It may be useful, not as presenting a
perfect specimen of reasoning to be copied, but
as exhibiting a futile or deceptive sort of argu-
ment to be avoided, an argument possessing the
form without the power of demonstration.
61. The grand error which lies at the bottom
of the syllogistic theory is the belief that relations
352 PEINCIPLES 0"F PSYCHOLOGY.
other than those of Quantity admit of demon-
stration, not only occasionally, but as a general
rule. To justify this opinion, a form of reasoning
was invented, (for invented is the word) whereby
the appearance, and only the appearance of
infallibility was given to an argument, by assum-
ing universal instead of general propositions.
This is the precise difference between the ordinary
or natural mode of reasoning, that is, of probable
and general or deductive reasoning, and the artifi-
cial or syllogistic. We may reason from general
propositions, that is, we may attempt to show that
any particular case is comprehended under a
general truth ; but we cannot reason from univer-
sal propositions ; for these obviate the necessity
of reasoning. We reason in order to prove some-
thing not known before, to clear up something
dark or doubtful, but if the conclusion be already
known, be already clear, why reason ^ In every
case of legitimate syllogism, where the conclusion
is true, it was quite as well known beforehand, as
the premises ; as is proved by all the instances
brought forward in books of Logic. The very per-
fection of the proof in a regular syllogism shows
the futility of the argument : for we know that
the subjects to which the syllogism is usually ap-
plied admit very sparingly of demonstration ; and
consequently, the perfection may be presumed to
be only apparent, and therefore the result of a trick.
Now this trick, as we have seen, is assuming the
OF DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 353
conclusion in the premises. If indeed llie conclu-
sion be false or doubtful, it cannot have been knoicn
beforehand, and here therefore there will be some-
thing more like a new truth brought out by reason-
ing. But the inference being irresistible, if the
conclusion be false or doubtful, some unwarranted
assumption must have been made, an assumption
virtually embracing the conclusion, but, it may be,
not evidentlj/ emljracing it, as it does when the
major and the conclusion are both true, both trivial.
Here, therefore, there will be something more like
a real argument ; though a fallacious one. To
recur once more to Hume's argument against mi-
racles, stated as a Syllogism ; the conclusion is cer-
tainly startling and new, and it is not evidently
comprehended under the Major without the aid of
the Minor; and therefore it is no futile and trifling
argument; but it is deceptive, because unwarranted
assumptions have been made in both Major and
IMinor. Thus, though the Syllogism can never
serve to find out truth, it may be used to propagate
error. H cannot serve to find out truth, because
the conclusion, when true, is quite as well known
beforehand as the major premiss ; but it may be
used to propagate error, by assuming universal and
unwarranted propositions, and deducing false or
doubtful conclusions from them by demonstrative
inference. And these conclusions will be the more
dangerous, because they se€t}i to be proved demon-
stratively, like Hume's conclusion about miracles.
z z
354 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY.
62. That a system of Logic raised on such a
basis should so long have stood its ground, and
that, even at the present day, it should have eminent
supporters, is certainly one of the most extraordinary
facts in the history of the human mind. To the
name, the truly great name of Aristotle, must
chiefly be attributed this long delusion ; a man
distinguished in so many branches of science, in
Metaphysics, Ethics, Politics, Rhetoric, Criticism,
and Natural History ; the tutor of Alexander, the
founder of the Peripatetic Philosophy. Assuredly
the writings of Aristotle have shed a light upon
the V70rld , but the great power of the Philosopher
is chiefly shown in this, that he bewildered it so
long.
63. We may conclude this subject with one or
two examples to show the difference between the
Syllogism and that species of ordinary or natural
reasoning which it most resembles. Suppose that
either by induction or otherwise we have arrived
at the general proposition, that
Trade ought to be free,
we may thence infer directly, that
The Corn-trade ought to be free.
Here the conclusion follows from the premises, fol-
lows probably, but not infallibly; for the proposition
" Trade ought to be free" though general, is not
stated as universal ; and therefore there may be
circumstances peculiar to the Corn-trade which
make it an exception to the rule. Now this is the
OP DEMON STE/VTIVE REASONING. 355
natural mode of reasoning, But, if we wish to
convert this into a Syllogism, we must state the
argument thus :
All Trade ought to be free.
The Corn-trade is a trade ;
Therefore it ought to be free.
Here, by assuming too much, we make the argu-
ment insignificant, for we assume the conclusion in
the major premiss. It is a fair argument to infer,
because trade in general ought to be free, that the
Corn-trade ought to be free; it is an argument
drawn from a general proposition or a general
principle, as the common phrase is ; but it is no
argument to say that the Corn-trade ought to be
free, because all trade ought to be free. This is
simply a begging of the question ; it is to say that
there can be no dispute about the matter, that it
has been already decided. In the above syllogism,
it is evident that the minor proposition is a trijling
one, pure tautology, wherein the predicate is merely
a part of the complex idea implied by the subject.
This, then, is a proof that in order to maintain the
Syllogistic form, trifling propositions must some-
times be inserted.
64. Take another instance. Our general pro-
position may be,
A local legislature is advantageous to a coun-
try ; whence we may infer, that
A local legislature in Ireland would be advan-
tageous to that country.
356 . PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
This again is a fair argument ; but, as the pro-
position pretends not to universality, there may be
circumstances peculiar to Ireland which render the
general rule inapplicable ; or, on the contrary, there
may in this case be circumstances which render a
local legislature peculiarly desirable. When brought
to the form of a Syllogism, the argument becomes
as follows :
Every country isbenefited by a local legislature.
Ireland is- a country ;
Therefore, Ireland would be benefited by a
local legislature.
Here, as before, it is evident that, by assuming
too much, we do away with the argument altogether.
We prove nothing, we show the probability of
nothing, we suppose the question already settled.
Once more ; supposing ourselves convinced of the
truth of this general proposition, that the laws
ought to favour the equal partition of property
among all the children of a family, daughters as
well as sons, it may still be a question whether
there be any circumstances peculiar to land which
justify an exception; but, ifw^e begin by *an univer-
sal affirmation, that all property ought to be equally
divided, there is an end at once to reasoning.
65. So far concerning the Syllogism of the Schools,
the insuperable objection to which is, that it repre-
sents Reasoning as something demonstrative in
form, frivolous in reality ; that, under the semblance
of a perfect or infallible argument, it, in fact, dc^es
away with all argument.
OF rHOBABLE REASONING. 357
66. When I consider the reasons on which this
conclusion is built, they appear to me so clear and
cogent that here 1 could rest in full conviction.
But when I reflect on the fact, that, for many ages,
and throughout all civilized Europe, the Syllogism
was adopted, and that still some of the greatest'
thinkers defend it, I am almost tempted to fall back
into scepticism, and to discard metaphysics and
logic altogether, as destined perpetually to puzzle,
never to satisfy mankind. To avoid this scepticism,
this unmanly despair, 1 am forced to rebel against
authority, and maintain the liberty of thought.
II. OE PROBABLE REASONING.
67- AH reasonings other than those already
discussed lead to probable conclusions only ; partly
because they are all ultimately based upon facts
known by experience, which is always fallible, for
facts may be inaccurately observed, and even what
once was fact may cease to be so ; partly because
wrong conclusions may be drawn from those facts
where the reasoning is not demonstrative. In short,
errors may arise from inaccuracy either in Observa-
tion, or in Reasoning.
68. Although all probable reasonings (and many
demonstrative reasonings also, as we have seen)
are based ultimately upon facts, real or supposed,
yet they do not all arise immediately from the ex-
358 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY.
perience of particular things, which alone is pro-
perly Experience. Some reasonings, no doubt, do
so spring, but others start from general principles
or general facts, which had been inferred from many
particulars by a previous mental operation. Hence
a well-marked distinction between the Inductive
and the Deductive method. The one brings in
particular facts in order to establish a conclusion,
whether general or particular ; the other, from some
general proposition deduces or draws out a less
general proposition. Induction may proceed not
only from particulars to particulars, and from par-
ticulars to the general, but also from the general to
the more general ; while Deduction always proceeds
from a general proposition to one less general. The
latter is often called ajjriori reasoning, in opposi-
tion to the former styled a posteriori ; though, in
reality, the general proposition from which it starts
be known only by induction based upon experience.
For instance, when we speculate on the advantages or
the disadvantages of any form of civil government, we
may either consult the history of nations, in order to
determine the result of such a scheme in times past,
and then conclude that a similar result would follow
now ; and here we reason from immediate expe-
rience or inductively : or we may draw our infer-
ences from the acknowledged principles of human
nature ; and in this case we reason from remote
experience or deductively ; for the principles of
human nature are known to us only by experience.
or PROBABLE REASONING. 359
G9. It is evident that both these methods of
inquiry lead only to probable conclusions, strictly so
called. For, besides inaccurate observation and
false accounts of facts, the connection between the
Premises, namely, a number more or less of par-
ticular effects, and the conclusion that such a thing
is the Cause of these effects, and of innumerable
others similar, is not irresistible ; and even were it
irresistible in the cases observed, yet we never could
be sure that the cases actually tried, and those not
tried, were in all respects similar. And though
the principles established by induction may be true
generally^ yet, as they cannot be proved universality
as their limits are not defined with perfect accuracy,
and as there may be other and counteracting prin-
ciples at work, therefore reasoning from these gene-
ral principles cannot lead to conclusions absolutely
certain ; though, when the probability is very great,
it commonly passes for a certainty.
70. Instance of a general law of nature estab-
lished by Induction. From the fall, first of an
apple, afterwards of other bodies, to the earth,
Newton inferred, first, that all bodies tend to the
earth, and then that all bodies in nature tend to
each other, the earth, the moon, the planets, the
sun, and all that therein is, in a word, that gravi-
tation is universal.
Instance of a general practical maxim obtained
by Induction. " For this, Thou shalt not commit
adultery, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal,
360 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
Thou shalt not bear false witness, Thou shalt not
covet, and if there be any other commandment, it
is briefly comprehended in this saying, namely,
Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." *
The superiority of a standing army over a
militia, as to warlike efficiency, is proved induc-
tively from the history of many nations, particu-
larly of the ancient world, when standing armies
were not general, and when those who had them
conquered the rest ; and deductively from the
general principle of division of labour.
There is an antecedent improbability against
miracles, founded on our experience of the
general uniformity of the course of nature ; but
the truth of a particular miracle, as the raising of
Lazarus, may be proved by particular facts in
evidence. Here we have first a deduction, then an
i)iduction. The necessity, or, at least, the utility
of local government in general, is proved induc-
tively from the history of particular nations, some
being the seat of government, others ruled as
provinces ; and the same conclusion is arrived at
deductively from the known principles of human
nature ; such as, that persons on the spot better
understand and are more interested in their own
affairs than strangers. Again, the utility of local
government in general being proved, the expe-
diency of the same in a particular case, as that of
' Roinans xiii, 9.
OF PROBABLE REASONING. 361
Ireland, follows by deduction ; and a like conclu-
sion may be established inductivelj/, by referring to
the particular history of Ireland.
Take another specimen of deduction. A man
is accused of a certain crime, say of murdering
another. Starting from certain general principles
of human nature, or from the previous good
character of the individual in question, we argue
that it is very improbable that he committed the
murder. This is often called a imori reasoning,
because it draws a conclusion prior to an examina-
tion of the particular facts of the case ; though,
in reality, it is founded on experience, on expe-
rience of human nature in general, and of the
individual more especially. Afterwards, particu-
lar facts are brought forward to prove that he
actually committed the deed ; and from these facts
we draw our particular conclusion inductively.
Let us now take an illustration from compara-
tive anatomy. Suppose that a scientific zoologist
finds in the earth a fossil tooth of some unknown
animal, of a species probably extinct. He at once
decides from its form that it was the tooth of a
quadruped, and of a carnivorous quadruped.
This one fact combined with a general principle
will give him an insight into the whole structure
of the animal. The general principle is, that a
carnivorous animal must have such a conformation
as is necessary for the existence of life supported
on raw flesh. From this one principle an immense
AAA
362 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
number of consequences will flow. First, the
animal in question must have had a jaw fit for lay-
ing hold of objects with force, it must have had the
condyles or sockets of the jaw adapted for power-
ful motion up and down, not sideways as in grami-
nivorous animals ; it must have had large tem-
poral muscles, and a prominent zygomatic arch to
allow room for those muscles ; it must have had
strong muscles to raise the head and carry off its
prey ; it must have had claws to seize upon prey,
and much mobility in those claws; also a fore-
arm endowed with great facility of motion, and a
formation of bones corresponding; a strong shoul-
der-blade ; hinder limbs fitted for rapidity ; much
flexibility of vertebrae : peculiar organs of diges-
tion ; and very many other particulars too nume-
rous to mention. All these may be deduced from
the one general principle mentioned above. No
doubt, all these conditions of carnivorous life were
learnt beforehand from experience, but it was
reason that discerned them to be indispensable,
and not merely co-existent, and drew the general
inference accordingly ; so that subsequently the
principle might be applied to deduce, prior to
actual experience, what we should expect in the
new case. Now let our Zoologist stumble upon a
fossil cloven hoof, also of an unknown species of
animal, and he will instantly pronounce that the
animal had been ruminant ; but why ? Not as in
the former case because he can see any connec-
OF PROBABLE REASONING 363
tion between cloven hoofs and rumination, but
simply because all cloven-footed animals hitherto
known are ruminant. This is an argument, drawn
not from a general principle, but from particular
instances only ; and we cannot say positively, as
in the former case, that all cloven-footed animals
are, much less must be, ruminant, because we can
see no connection between the two, but only, all
hitherto observed are so. This, then, is an In-
ductive argument.
71. What is called Analogical Reasoning is
no distinct species, but only a variety of inductive
reasoning. It may be called Indirect Induction
No better specimen of this can be given than the
general strain of the Reasoning contained in
Butler's Analogy, of which I shall here give one
or two instances. It is supposed to be known by
experience that even here there is a moral govern-
ment, that the good, generally speaking, if not
more prosperous outwardly, are more happy
inwardly than the wicked. Hence the inference
that the same will hold good hereafter ; in other
words, that the future state will be one of rewards
and punishments according to desert. Again,
natural religion is attended with great difficulties ;
hence it is probable from analogy that a system of
revealed religion shall not be altogether free
from them.
Our own existence, particularly the union of
soul and body, is a great mystery, and seems even
364 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
to involve contradictions ; surely, then, it is pro-
bable that religion shall have mysteries. The soul,
from the nature of Spirit, can exist in no place ;
but we believe that it is united to our body, which
does exist in some place ; that where our body is,
there also is our soul, and nowhere else. Is the
mystery of the Trinity more incomprehensible
than this ?
72. Since Analogy signifies likeness or resem-
blance, (especially likeness of relation), and analo-
gical reasoning is reasoning from like things to
like ; wherein, it may be asked, lies the difference
between this and other varieties of Inductive
reasoning ? For all induction is from similar to
similar, whether from similar causes w^e infer
similar effects, and vice versa ; whether from
likeness in some part of the chain we infer like-
ness in the whole chain, without knowledge of
causes, as when, from certain appearances of the
sky we predict, perhaps long beforehand, the com-
ing weather; whether from certain parts we infer
the co-existence of other parts, as the experienced
anatomist, who, from a single bone, or even frag-
ment of a bone, can construct the whole animal.
Inductive reasoning is a species, of which Analogy
is a variety ; nor can we lay down any very defi-
nite distinction between it and other varieties.
Only, when along with the similarity there is also
a good deal of difference, then we call the reason-
ing anological; as when we reason from the
OF PEOB.VBLE REASONING. 365
order of things in this life to that in a future
state."
73. From the above examples and observations
the distinction between the Inductive and the De-
ductive method of inquiry seems to be clearly estab-
lished. But we have not yet noticed that the term
Induction comprehends two distinct mental opera-
tions ; first, the observing, the comparing, the
selecting of facts ; and secondly, drawing a conclu-
sion from them. Great Judgment may be required
in the first operation, but the second alone is pro-
perly Reasoning. The detail of facts, moreover,
may fill volumes, but the reasoning in Induction is
always very short : for, when from the particular
facts we have drawn our general conclusion directly,
inductive reasoning is ended. Then Deduction be-
gins, and the chain of reasoning may be prolonged
indefinitely. Thus there is much more of reasoning
in deduction than in induction, nay, the former is
all reasoning, the latter only in part.
74. As a specimen of a chain of deductive rea-
soning, take the following :
The capacity of the mind is limited ;
" For an admirable sijecimen of Analogical Induction, see
the opening chapters of Paley's Natural Theology. Never was
argument better put. Let us not forget that when we allow de-
sign, we allow a designer ; and who can help seeing design in all
around him ? The reasonings of Natural Theology lie in a nut-
shell ; the facts fill the universe.
366 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY,
Therefore the more it is occupied with one thing,
the less can it be occupied with another ;
Therefore the more it is taken up with intellec-
tual pursuits, the less can it be taken up with the
afifections, and nice versa.
Therefore, again, the more it is occupied with
general benevolence, the less can it be occupied with
private attachments, and vice versa.
In this chain of reasoning each proposition is
less general than the preceding, and each is an
inference from what went before. In induction
there is no such chain, the reasoning consists but
of one link.
75. Since it is the reasoning process alone
that is common to Induction and Deduction, in this
only can they admit of comparison. Let us then
examine that process in both cases, in order to de-
termine what similarity or what difference may exist
between them.
76. In Deductive Reasoning, having stated a
general proposition, our object is to show that the
particular case which we have in view is really
comprehended under the general rule; so that if
the one be true, so must the other. Thus, our
general proposition being that " the more the mind
is occupied with one thing, the less can it be occu-
pied with another," we then consider that intellec-
tual pursuits are an occupation; and again, that the
affections are another occupation ; whence it appears
that the less general proposition, " the more the
OF PROBABLE REASONING. 367
mind is occupied with intellectual pursuits the less
can it be occupied with the affections," is a case of
the general rule, or comprehended under it.
^^ . Now, how stands the case with Inductive
Reasoning ? Suppose a traveller in a new country
to meet with a troop of animals hitherto quite un-
known to him ; that he catches one, kills, and dis-
sects it with the skill of a practised anatomist.
One specimen contents him, for he confidently be-
lieves that all the rest, so like outwardly, are also
alike inwardly. But why does he believe so*? That
is the question. The mental process by which he
arrives at the conclusion seems to be simply as fol-
lows. Here is an animal of a certain make. There
are many other animals, to all outward appearance
exceedingly like to this, and to each other. There-
fore^ all these animals are alike within as well as
without.
78. The above is all of which the mind seems
to be conscious in inductive inference ; but as, on
reflection, there is no necessary connection between
the Premises and the Conclusion, for we certainly
cannot see that resemblance in certain particulars
infallibly proves resemblance in others; thereupon
logicians suppose that a general proposition must be
understood, in order to justify the inference. This
general proposition is, that nature is uniform in her
operations, and never deceives us hy uniting great
differences with striking resemblances, and from this
proposition, or one similar, the conclusion is sup-
368 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
posed to be drawn deductively. According to this
theory, then, the reasoning part of the process in
Induction is only a concealed Deduction.
79. The supposition that the foregoing general
proposition, or one similar, is actually present to the
mind in every case of inductive inference, and that
from it the conclusion is drawn, seems not to rest
on any sufficient evidence. It may be necessary to
reduce reasoning to an uniform system, it may be
necessary on subsequent reflection to satisfy the
rational mind, it may be required in Logic, but
not in Metaphysics. As a matter of fact, we be-
lieve that minds which have never risen to any
such very general proposition still draw conclu-
sions inductively with more or less accuracy, that,
when they have seen a cause followed by a certain
eff'ect to-day, they will expect a like cause to be
followed by a like effect to-morrow. This de-
pends upon a principle of human nature, that
when we see resemblance in one or more parti-
culars, then we expect resemblance in others.
Such is the real Cause of Inductive inferences, a
cause which influences those who have never
heard or dreamt of the Logical Reason. This is a
subsequent generalization of a very high order,
which justifies to our Reasoning faculty what at
first was independent thereof.
80. That there is a tendency in human nature
to expect like effects from like causes, and vice
versa, or, more generally, where we observe resem-
OF PROBABLE 11E.V30NL\G. 369
blance in certain particulars, there to look for
resemblance in others, cannot be doubted ; but it
may be questioned whether this tendency be
original or derived, instinctive or acquired ; and
if not original, from what it is derived. Hume
maintains that it is derived from Custom. When
two phenomena have often been observed in con-
junction, the mind passes readily between the two,
and when it observes the one cannot help ex-
pecting the other. " All inferences from expe-
rience, therefore, are effects of Custom not of
reasoning."'' This at first seems a plausible ex-
planation, but it is refuted by the fact that one
instance of Sequence or of Co-existence is often
enough to induce us to expect a similar Sequence
or Co-existence in future. The child who has
once been burnt by fire needs no repetition of the
experiment to avoid the flames ever after. In fact,
the tendency is to look for more uniformity in
nature than there really is, and to suppose that
what has happened once will happen again and
again. Subsequent experience, no doubt, corrects
our errors, but the natural tendency is to expect
the recurrence of events which had been only
casually united, and united but for once. Now
Custom supposes Repetition, and therefore the
explanation fails.
81. If these inferences from experience be
not the effect of custom, can they be traced to
* Essays Vol. II. Sceptical Solutions of these doubts.
B B B
370 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
anything else ? The other supposition, mentioned
by Hume and combated by him, is that they may
be the effect of Reasoning. This language, how-
ever, is very inaccurate. An inference may or
may not be entitled to the name of Reasoning ;
but to say that it is the effect of reasoning is
unintelligible. The only real question is, whether
these inferences from experience be properly rea-
soning, or not ? If they be instances of reasoning,
then we have nothing more to ask ; but if not,
we shall still have to inquire what they are, and
whether they can be otherwise accounted for,
since they cannot be owing to Custom.
82. When the child has once burnt his finger
in the candle, when he has once seen a man
drowned in the river, he will shun the flame and
deep water ever after. He must therefore believe
that, as in the past, so in the future, flame will burn
and water drown. But why does he so believe?
Is it by reasoning ? Not to mention that the rea-
soning powers are not developed at a very early
age, what connection do we discern between the
fact, this has happened once, and the inference, a
like effect will ever after ensue in similar circum-
stances ? Yet, in cases such as the above, the
inference is drawn at once, without hesitation, by
persons of all ages, and every degree of intelli-
gence, by infants, almost by idiots. Surely this is
not like reasoning. Reasoning power comes upon
us by degrees, is frequently at fault, exists not at
OF TROBABLE REASONING. 371
all in infancy, grows slowly, often decays pre-
maturely, and varies excessively in different in-
dividuals at all ages ; but simple inferences from
experience are early, certain, uniform, and univer-
sal. It may be said that all this depends upon
the simplicity of the reasoning. But point out to
me any reasoning, universally allowed to be so,
that is manifest to all ages and all degrees of
intelligence. Mathematical reasoning is very
simple, and admits, when comprehended, of no
doubt ; but many grown persons, not to say
children, have never been able to master a propo-
sition in Euclid. The early preservation of the
human race was of too great importance to be
left to the tardy development of the reasoning-
powers. A facility of drawing simple inferences
without reasoning was necessary to the very ex-
istence of the human race, as well as of other
animals. There can be no doubt that animals do
draw their inferences as well as man, that, after a
little experience, they avoid fire and water and
other things that may harm them ; but shall we
say that in so doing kittens and puppy-dogs rea-
son ? It may be that animals are capable of
reasoning to a certain extent, but we need not
therefore allow that they can infer nothing with-
out reasoning.
It has often been asked whether animals have
Reason. That many animals have, I cannot doubt,
for these simple inferences I attribute to Reason,
though not to reasoning power.
372 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
The tendency to draw such inferences is cer-
tainly an Instinct, but Reason seems necessary in
order to draw them correctly. The Idiot cannot
so draw them, and therefore he cannot take care
of himself, because he has no Reason ; but the
madman can, for his Reason is only partially
subverted. His danger arises not from ignorance
of common consequences, but from a wish to
destroy himself or others. Irrational inferences,
such as that Tenterden Church steeple was the
cause of the Goodwin Sands, show both the
Instinctive tendency, and the necessity of Reason
as a guide to that tendency.
It is only by a misconception of the nature of
Reason, and by confounding it with Reasoning,
that the question can have arisen whether animals
possess Reason. That they draw innumerable
inferences from experience, and that correctly,
there is no doubt : and if so, they have Reason
sufficient to guide the Instinct, the natural ten-
dency to draw inferences right or wrong. These
two must not be confounded; the tendency to
infer that things once conjoined will be conjoined
again and again ; and Reason, which informs us
when such conjunctions may be expected, when
not ; for every event is accompanied casually by
innumerable events, some immediately before,
some contemporaneous, some immediately after.
83. I must therefore conclude that there are
simple inferences from experience which are not
OF PROBABLE BEASONING. 373
instances of reasoning. What then are we to
think of these inferences^ Is the word inference
properly applied to them *? If so, then inference
does not always imply reasoning. This is clear ;
but let us examine their nature.
84. Our belief in the uniformity of nature
belongs to the same order of phenomena as our
belief in the existence of the material world. This
latter belief may also be called an inference, an
inference from certain sensations that are not
material, and bear no resemblance to matter, and
from which, therefore, no conclusion as to the
existence of matter could have been drawn by
reasoning. Where one phenomenon leads to be-
lief in something else, there, perhaps, the term
inference may be employed ; though I allow that
it is more properly used where the mind discerns
some connection between premises and conclusion,
where the Reason is convinced, not merely an
effect produced. But let that verbal question be
decided as it may, whether our belief in the ma-
terial world, and our belief in the uniformity of
nature, be called inferences or not, they are cer-
tainly not instances of reasoning. What then are
they ? They are Original articles of belief, which
arise in the mind on certain appointed occasions.
They are not derived from Custom or Repetition,
for no repetition of sensations can give of itself a
knowledge of matter, any more than a single in-
stance ; and we have seen that our belief in the
374 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
uniformity of nature often arises from a single
case : they are not acquired or learnt by Experi-
ence ; for, though experience makes us acquainted
with sensations, it can never inform us that they
depend upon an outward material cause ; and
though experience, in a wider sense, may teach
us what is now passing around, yet it cannot
instruct us that similar events will recur in future.
Between the knowledge, this has been once or
oftener, and the subsequent belief, this will always
be, there is a wide gulf, which we must leap across,
for we never can bridge it over. The inference, if
such we call it, is not logical, for we can see no
connection between premises and conclusion, but it
is often irresistible. This, then, like belief in the
existence of matter, is a primary article of our
creed, totally independent of reasoning ; neither
self-evident, nor learnt by experience ; for experi-
ence is only of the past. No doubt, experience is
the occasion on which the belief arises, and if the
occasion, then an auxiliary cause ; but the princi-
pal cause lies deep in the mind predisposed to
adopt the belief. This belief, at first dormant, is
roused and developed by the earliest exciting
cause.
85. But if these inferences from experience
be not reasoning, why do we talk of Inductive
reasoning at all ? All inductive conclusions are
founded on our belief in the uniformity of nature,
and if this belief be independent of reasoning.
OF PROBABLE REASONING. 375
must not all Induction be so likewise ?- This dif-
ficulty seems never to have been fairly met by
philosophers, and their language on the subject is
variable, and apparently contradictory ; for at one
time they assert that inferences of the kind in
question are not " effects of reasoning," or, are not
" grounded upon reasoning," while at another
they talk of experimental or inductive as a branch
of probable reasoning. Now, can these two state-
ments be reconciled *?
86. We have seen that the natural tendency
to associate phenomena is so strong that at first
we often suppose a constant, where there is only
a casual, conjunction. Afterwards, however, ex-
perience corrects this tendency, in some men
more, in others less, according to their opportu-
nities or their attention, by showing where there
is, and where there is not, uniformity. We gradu-
ally learn that perfect similarity in one respect is
essential to similarity in another, that causes
must really be like, in order that effects may also
be alike. Now, in determining the degree of si-
milarity between two cases, much judgment may
be required, where the resemblances are compli-
cated ; and thus a foundation is laid for reasoning.
Where the cases are very simple, as in the com-
mon effects of fire and water, there little judgment
is necessary, and the inference is immediate, but,
in difficult cases, the immediate belief is often
wrong, and judgment must come into play. In
376 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY.
short, we start with a natural tendency to belief,
but, after a time, it leaves us to the conduct of
Judgment. What judgment does, is to show us
the similarity or the dissimilarity of two cases, to
afford ground for reasoning, which is built there-
upon, and ends in a conclusion. The reasoning
is very short, consisting but of one argument,
which may be stated thus,
A has hitherto always been followed by B ;
Here is a case exactly similar to A ;
Therefore, A will again be followed by B ;
where the first proposition may be ascribed to
Observation, the second to Judgment, the third to
Reasoning.
87- Here then is the solution of the difficulty
above suggested. In simple cases of inference
from experience, the natural tendency requires
little guidance ; while, in the more complicated,
Judgment and Reasoning are necessary. Natural
tendency is content with one instance of co-ex-
istence or of succession, but Judgment, informed
by experience, may require many. In simple cases,
one instance is as good as a thousand, as in the
cases of drowning and burning ; but, in more com-
plex phenomena, many observations, many expe-
riments even, may be required to satisfy the judg-
ment as to the existence of similarity or of dissi-
milarity, and thereupon to draw a conclusion.
88. It must be allowed that this species of
reasoning differs considerably from those which
OF PROBABLE REASONING. 377
"vve have hitherto examined. In demonstrative rea-
soning we clearly discern the connection between
the premises and the conclusion, we see that if
the former be true, so must the latter ; and even in
probable deductive reasoning we are conscious that
if the premises be well-founded, the inference is j;ro-
bahlj/ correct; but what connection do we see
between tlie propo.-3ition. Alias hitherto always been
followed by B, and the inference A will again be
followed by B ? Yet the inference is always drawn,
nay, is often irresistible, as much relied on as the
conclusions of geometry. The only account that
can be given of these inferences, is, that they depend
upon a natural tendency, confirmed and corrected by
experience. They may be called IS on- Intuitive,
in opposition to Intuitive inferences. If we can-
not explain Intuition, neither can we account for
Natural tendency. It might indeed be a question
whether these non-intuitive inferences were or were
not reasoning ; but this we have already answered
by showing that some are, and others are not en-
titled to that name. All men are agreed in giving
the name of reasoning to certain inferences from
experience, and we cannot fight against the universal
sense of mankind on the subject of Metaphysics.
89. Mr. Bailey, in his very able work '■' The
Theory of Reasoning,"' has suggested Instinctive as
an epithet which might be properly applied to that
' The Theory of Reasoning, p. 25.
c c c
378 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
species of reasoning which we call Probable, and
which he terms Contingent. But this would be a
misapplication of the word Instinct. Nay, histinc-
tive reasoning appears to me very like a contradic-
tion. Instinct and Reason, at least, are constantly
opposed, and how can there be reasoning without
reason ? Instinctive inference might pass, if all
inference be not reasoning, and then it would be
ojDposed to Rational inference. But, strictly speak-
ing, Instinct acts prior to all experience, as in bees,
who, without any lesson, all build their cells in the
form of hexagons ; and as in some other animals,
who avoid poisonous plants without trying them.
Not so the child, who, before experience, does not
know that water will suffocate or fire give pain, for
children who have learnt no better will put their
fingers into the candle. The inference afterwards
drawn by them, even from a single experiment, is
hardly instinctive, though the tendency to draw
some inference is natural, universal, irresistible.
We have seen, indeed, above, that though the ten-
dency to draw inferences from past experience be
instinctive, yet, to draw them correctly some degree
of Reason is required, but not always Reasoning.
Therefore we may divide Inferences from Experience
into the Simple and the Complex, the former requir-
ing Reason only in its most simple form, as a guide ;
the other embracing Reasoning according to the
doctrine delivered in the previous pages.
90. Can any definite line be drawn whereby to
OF PROBABLE REASONING. 379
distinguish Simple from Complex inferences ^ The
forming of general laws is always a case of Complex
inference or Reasoning: but particular conclusions
may be either Simple or Complex. To predict from
certain signs the coming weather requires an effort
of Reasoning, but surely no reasoning is required to
foretell that the Sun will rise to-morrow. ]n these
and innumerable other cases, the distinction is
evident, but there may be others where it is doubt-
ful. Most of our classifications are liable to this
imperfection, and surely that most delicate piece of
"workmanship, the human mind, cannot be free from
those fine shades, those imperceptible differences,
which defy all discrimination. Perfectly to unravel
so intricate a network may w'ell baffle the subtlety
of the acutest metaphysician.
91. As Inductive appears to differ widely from
other reasoning, and as, moreover, the name of
reasoning cannot be denied to it without doing
violence to common notions and common lanfjuaere,
an attempt has been made to make it accord more
nearly with other species, by means of what I shall
call a logical fiction . The endeavour to reduce In-
ductive reasoning to the syllogistic form has miser-
ably failed, and could not but fail ; for in Induction
we do not start from an universal, or even from a
general principle, but, on the contrary, conclude by
one. The attempt to assimilate Inductive to proba-
ble Deductive reasoning has also failed, and for a
like reason. In this I confess my own error, for
380 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
the latter attempt was made by myself in my Intro-
duction to Mental Philosophy ; and here 1 shall
quote what is there written.
92.' " Suppose a traveller in a new country to
meet with a troop of animals hitherto quite unknown
to him ; that he catches one, kills, and dissects it
yviih the skill of a practised anatomist. One speci-
men contents him, for he confidently believes that
all the rest, so like outwardly, are also alike in-
wardly. Now what reason has he for this belief'?
The mental process necessary to justify this conclu-
sion seems to me as follows. Here is an animal of
a certain make. There are many other animals, to
all outward appearance exceedingly like to this, and
to each other. But, nature is umform in her opera-
tions^ and never deceives us by uniting great differ-
ences with such striking resemblances ; therefore, all
these animals are alike within as well as with-
out."^
93. Now, the proposition in Italics is what I
call a logical fiction. It has evidently been sup-
posed in order to assimilate this reasoning to the
deductive, which is based upon a general principle ;
in other words, for the sake of uniformity, that dar-
ling Idol of the human mind. But omit that pro-
position and we shall find no blank in the reasoning.
The inference is as cogent as before, the conclusion
as firmly established ; though it be not in accordance
* Introduction to Mental Philosophy, p. 192,
OF PROBABLE REASONING 381
with the rules of ratiocinatke logic. Mr. Mill has
"well divided Logic into the ratiociuative and the in-
ductive, thus allowing that there is a real difference
between them. It is allowed that the above general
proposition, or one equivalent, is never expressed,
always understood. But what right have we to
say that a proposition is understood if it be never
expressed"? In Logic as in Grammar, if in a cer-
tain case a proposition or a word be sometimes ex-
pressed, we may say, where a similar argument, or
a similar phrase occurs, only without that one pro-
position, or that one word, there the proposition or
the word is understood, reasoning from analogy ;
but when no instance can be shown of the full
statement, the supposed ellipse is a mere fiction.
Were we to assume that general propositions might
be understood in reasoning though never expressed,
we could affirm that even the syllogism was elliptical.
Thus, taking any common example, such as, All
men are mortal ; James is a man; therefore James
is mortal ; we could say that the General Principle
of the Syllogism, the dictum of Aristotle, is here
understood, and that the reasoning in full would
stand thus :
All men are mortal;
James is a man ;
But whatever is predicated of a class can be
predicated of everything comprehended under that
class ;
And it is predicated of the class men that they
are mortal;
382 PEINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY.
And James belongs to that class ;
Therefore, James (as a member of that class) is
mortal.
But, after this lengthened statement, is the con-
clusion one whit more certain than before ^ And if
not, must it not be considered as laborious trifling ?
But we have as much reason to affirm that the
above general proposition is understood in every
syllogism, as to assert that the general proposition
relative to the uniformity of nature is understood in
every inductive argument.
94. I grant that the general principle above
stated may be drawn out or educed, as Mr.
Bailey expresses it, from this and other similar cases
of reasoning ; that it is a generalization from parti-
cular instances ; but to say that the conclusion can
be drawn only by means of such a general proposi-
tion is a totally different assertion. In treating of
demonstrative reasoning we mentioned the difference
between generalization and analysis, a distinction
which again applies to the present case. The doc-
trine that the above general proposition is an indis-
pensable premiss of every Inductive argument, and
therefore necessary to its validity, can, I think, be
clearly disproved. For if a general proposition be
required for the validity of every Inductive argu-
ment, how, I may ask, was that general proposition
arrived at from which we are supposed to reason'?
It is allowed not to be self-evident; from simple
instinct it cannot be derived, for no general proposi-
OF TBOBABLE REASONING. 383
tiou is instinctive ; nor from simple observation, for
observation is only of particulars ; therefore it must
be arrived at by the aid of reasoning from particu-
lars. But, by the supposition, "we cannot reason
from particulars without a general proposition.
Here, then, is a flat contradiction, and consequently
the supposition is untenable. Were we to wait to
reason until we had framed general propositions
concerning the uniformity of nature, we should never
reason at all about matters of fact ; for those propo-
sitions cannot be arrived at without reasoning.
They are generalizations from experience by rea-
soning.
95. The object of general induction is to es-
tablish a general conclusion, by means of instances
so divested of peculiar circumstances as to ob-
viate the mistake of stating as general what is
only particular. One inference would be as good
as a thousand, if we could be sure that it was quite
in point, that is, free from any peculiar circumstan-
ces, and it is only because we are not sure of this,
that we must multiply instances. The grand object
then is to prove similarity, perfect or at least
sufficient similarity, between cases observed and
others not observed. The uncertainty of Induction
depends partly on the difficulty of determining the
degree of similarity between cases observed and
others which have not been observed in all points,
partly on the mistakes to which the original observa-
tion was liable. In a word, we may observe ill in
384 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
the first instance, or the new cases may not be in all
respects similar to the old.
96. Nothing more simple, nothing more brief
than the reasoning, properJy so called, in Induction ;
the grand difficulty lies in the collecting, comparing,
and scrutinising of instances. For this, great pa-
tience as well as great judgment may be required.
The tendency is to infer too hastily. To draw an
inference is easy enough ; but to know when we are
justified in drawing it, is the point. It is not as in
other reasoning where we see at once whether the
premises justify the conclusion ; for this reasoning
is based upon natural tendency to believe, not upon
Intuition, and natural tendency impels us to infer at
once, rather than to wait and infer rightly. Sub-
sequent experience, attention, and judgment, are
necessary to correct the errors of the natural ten-
dency. We may be also greatly assisted by a
system of rules applicable to the business of Induc-
tion, in other words^ by Inductive Logic, if the word
Logic may be used in a sense so extensive, and be
not confined to Logic proper, or pure Logic. Such a
system of rules we have in the Second Book of the
Novum Organum,the triumph of the genius of Bacon.
This subject, after a long interruption, has been taken
up again by Mr. Mill in his System of Logic.
97. Finally, the differences between Induction
and Deduction may be thus summed up.
Firsts the facts from which Induction springs are
never more general than the conclusion ;
OF PROB.VRLE REASONING. 395
Sccondhi, the conclusion always follows at once
from the facts, without the iuterveutiou of a gene-
ral principle.
Thirdly^ the inference is non-intuitive.
Fourthly, there is no such thing as a long chain
of inductive reasoning, as there may be of deduc-
tive, where one inference may follow^ upon another
till we get far away from the original premises ;
"whereas on the other hand,
Fifthly, in Induction, the detail of facts may fill
volumes. There is, in short, in Induction far less
reasoning than in Deduction, the reasoning process
consisting, in the former, of one step only.^
Lastlj/, since particulars occur first to the mind,
it follows that the Inductive must precede the De-
ductive process. The general propositions from
•which the latter sets out must have been estab-
lished by a previous process of inductive generaliza-
tion, well or ill performed. Thus, in the order of
time, induction comes before deduction.
98. By many, Bacon has been called the in-
ventor of the Inductive method, a method, how-
ever, as old as the creation, which that eminent
genius only brought more into notice, restored,
improved, illustrated, and reduced to system.
This system is contained in the Frarogativoe In-
* Take, as an instance of the one, Mai thus on Population, who
fills three volumes with facts in support of his principle ; of the
other, the writings of Ricardo and James Mill on Political Economy.
D D D
386 PRINCIPI.KS OF rSYClIOLOOy,
sfanft(irum,\\\i\v\\ fill the second Hook of the Novum
Origanum. The two methods, the Dcduetive and
the Induetive, are well described by him in the
followinii; Aphorism. " There are and can be but
two ways of seekin;^ and findini:; out truth. The
one from sense and jmrticulars flies to the most
general axioms, and from these ])rinei|)le8, firmly
established, finds out and judges of intermediate
axioms ; and this is the way now in use. The
other raises axioms from sense and particulars,
ascendinj^ continuously and gradually, so as at
last to arrive at the most general, which is the
true but untried way."''
99. Here we may remark a difference in form
between Demonstrative and Probable Keasoning.
We have seen, from an examination of instances,
that demonstrative reasoning consists of three
propositions at least ; but we did not formerly
observe that, from the nature of the case, it t/iust
have at least three propositions. For were a con-
clusion ii)ferre(l infallibly and directly from a
single proposition, then it must be necessarily
and evidently implied in that j)roj)Osition ; and if
so, the conclusion, so called, is not arrived at by
Reasoning. But Probable Reasoning may consist
of only two propositions, because if an inference
can be drawn from a single proposition and drawn
only probably, then it is not evidently compre-
'' Novum Orgaiium. Aph. 19. Translated.
OF PROBABLE BL 387
bended under or implied by it, and therefore thi«
is reasoning And, that an inference may be
dravrn from a ein^e proposition i« proved by the
follovring example :
Trade in general ou^ht to be free ;
Therefore the Corn Trade oui^ht to be free ;
which Ls a ca<>« of probable reason!
But all Trade ought to be free ;
Therefore the Cora Trade ought to be free,
is not reasoning; for the second proposition is
evidently comprehended under the first ; no rea-
ioniug Is required to draw it out. Perfect Rea-
Eoning, therefore, or Demonstrative, must consist
of three propositions at least. Imperfect or Pro-
bable Reasoning, of the Deductive kind, may
hare only two. A.s tor Induction, three Ls the
number of propositions which it contains, as we
hare already seen, and they may be expressed
generally thus :
A has hitherto always been followed or accom-
panied by B;
Here is a case to all appearance exactly simflar
to A ;
Therefore it will be followed or accompanied
brB.
The simplicity and uniformity of this species
of reasoning are here apparent
388 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
SECTION THIRD.
ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF REASONING.
1. We have seen (Section first of this Chap-
ter) what is common to all Reasoning, but we do
not attempt to establish one universal principle of
cogency in reasoning, because we do not believe
that any such principle exists. We have seen
that reasoning is of different kinds, first Demon-
strative and Probable, and then, that Probable
reasoning is either Inductive or Deductive. It is
unlikely that the same General Principle of co-
gency should run through these different species ;
and a particular examination of each will confirm
this supposition. Even in mathematical reason-
ing, which embraces but one kind of relation,
clearly distinguished from all other relations, and
having its own differences also clearly marked
out, there is more than one fundamental principle
or axiom. How then can there be but one prin-
ciple common to all reasoning. Probable as well
as Demonstrative ? The case of Mathematics
proves, at least, that all reasoning is not an exem-
plification of one and the same principle. " Things
which are equal to the same are equal to one
another," and "'if equals be added to equals the
GENERAL TUINCIPLES OF REASONLNG. 389
wholes are equal," are not one axiom but two ;'and
the axiom peculiar to Geometry, " two lines can-
not enclose a space," is surely different from
both.
2. But do we clearly understand what is
meant by a General Principle of Reasoning^ or
Principle of Cogency in Reasoning P It is a gene-
ral truth, of which each inference is a particular
instance, a truth either self-evident and necessary
as in mathematics ; or not self-evident, not neces-
sarily true, but undisputed, as in inquiries about
matters of fact. In a particular instance of such
a principle the validity of every inference consists,
and upon this instance conviction depends. Con-
sidered in respect to reasoning itself, the Principle,
by means of the particular instance, is an inva-
riable constituent or element ; in respect to the
influence on the mind of the inquirer, by the same
means, a Cause ; for, as we have shown else-
where,'' a Principle may be either Constituent or
elemental, or else Causal.
'6. We must not confound General Principles
of Reasoning with the General Principles of any
Science. The latter are the leading or most
important General Propositions from which the
many less general truths of each Science are
deduced ; as, in Political Economy, the Principle
of Division of Labour, the Principle of Popula-
"^See the Author's " Introduction to Mental Philosophy," Part
I. Article Puikciple.
390 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
tion, of Free Trade, etc. When any application
is to be made of these principles, they are always
stated, and conclusions drawn from them accord-
ingly. But the General Principles of Reasoning
are never stated, for they are the very elements of
which Reasoning itself consists ; and we cannot
both Reason on any subject and analyze the pro-
cess of Reasoning at the same time. It is only
when Reasoning itself becomes the subject of our
inquiry, that we analyze reasoning. The axioms
of mathematics are never stated in the course of
our reasonings in that Science, for the Science is
not deduced from them ; but every mathematical
argument is a particular instance of one or other
of the Axioms. Thus, the reasoning A is equal
to B, and B to C, therefore A is equal to C, is an
instance of the axiom " Things which are equal
to the same are equal to one another" ; and so
in every other case. These Axioms, then, are the
very elements or constituents of the reasoning,
not data from which reasoning proceeds. So it is
in probable reasoning. The principles of the
reasoning itself are never stated, whether in in-
duction or in deduction ; but each argument is
an exemplification of those principles of which the
reasoning consists ; such as, in the one case, that
Nature is uniform in her operations ; in the other,
that what is allowed to be true in general will be
true in particular instances.
4. There is then no one universal principle of
GENERAL TRIXCIPLES OF REASONING. 391
cogency in reasoning, but there are several gene-
ral principles, one or other of which pervades all
reasoning ; in other words, each instance of rea-
soning is a particular exemplification of some one
principle common to it, and to innumerable other
instances of the same kind ; but every argument
is not an example of the same principle. No
reasoning, then, can be said to be drawn from these
principles, but all reasoning embraces a particular
instance of one or other of them. They are not
the formal Premises of an argument, but the very
essence thereof.
5. Demonstrative reasoning seems to compre-
hend a greater number of these principles than
Probable reasoning ; though this may be only in
appearance, owing to the circumstance that
mathematicians have been at more pains to state
the axioms of their Science than writers on other
subjects. No less than twelve axioms are enume-
rated in Euclid's Elements of Geometry. Of
these, some are very much alike ; such as, " if
equals be added to equals, the wholes are equal,'*
and " if equals be taken from equals, the remain-
ders are equal ;" also " if equals be added to un-
equals, the wholes are unequal," and " if equals be
taken from unequals, the remainders are unequal."
" Things which are double of the same, are equal
to one another," likewise closely resembles
" Things which are halves of the same are equal
to one another ;" yet all these are considered as
392 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
distinct axioms. Moreover, " The whole is greater
than its part " is unworthy the name of axiom, for
it is an identical or trifling proposition, in which
nothing is affirmed not contained in the meaning
of the Subject. Whoever understands the signifi-
cation of the word " whole" must know that it is
greater than its part. Thus, the number of these
axioms has been enlarged as much as possible,
and, in one instance at least, improperly. All
these axioms relate to Quantity, and to Co-
existence alone ; and to them the following
may be added, as applicable to demonstrative
reasoning, applied not of necessity to Quan-
tity :
1. If the first always co-exist with the second, ^
and the second with the third, then will the third
always co-exist with the first.
2. And vice versa ; If the first never co-exist
with the second, and if the second always co-exist
with the third, then will the third never co-exist
with the first.
Lastly, among the axioms proper to demon-
strative reasoning, we may reckon the Dictum de
omni et nullo, the syllogistic axiom, which, so far
as applicable to any argument, can be only to a
demonstrative one, as to a certain case of Mathe-
matical reasoning already mentioned. Since, how-
ever, this dictum is not a proper axiom, as we
before observed, but only a verbal proposition, a
definition of a class, the reasoning which exem-
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF REASONING. 393
plifies it can be called such rather by courtesy
than by right.
6. We have seen that one general axiom per-
vades all probable Deductive Reasoning, namely,
" whatever is true in general must be true in par-
ticular cases, provided those cases be in point," a
palpable truism. The \vhole difficulty lies in es-
tablishing the fact that the case really is in point.
That granted, the inference is irresistible. The
relation here traced is evidently one of compre-
hension, and so included under Co-existence.
7. One general axiom also pervades all
Inductive Reasoning, viz., that there are unifor-
mities in nature, uniformities of Co-existence, as
well as of Succession, if we could but find them
out. The axiom, however, admits of modifications,
according to the nature of the subject investi-
gated. Sometimes it assumes this form : Two or
more things, which resemble each other in many
observed particulars, will be found to agree in
other non-observed particulars. From the appear-
ances of agreement we may infer, either that the
composition or internal arrangement of the things
in question is similar, or that the changes which
they undergo or produce are similar. The rela-
tions thus traced are either of co-existence or of
succession ; and they are reached by means of
Resemblance. Resemblance is the foundation, not
only of all classification, and hence of the descrip-
tive sciences or natural history, but also of rea-
E E E
394 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
soilings concerning cause and effect, and therefore
of Philosophy. Moreover, it is the pecuHar office of
the Fancy to trace relations of resemblance, not
so much for the sake of truth, as of effect or emo-
tion. Fortunate, then, is that mind which is
aUve to relations of resemblance, whether it
thread the mazes of Science, or follow the
flowery paths of eloquence and poetry; and valu-
able is that memory wherein things suggest others
from similarity, and not from mere contiguity in
place or in time.
8. Where human testimony is in question,
the above axiom takes a different form, and may
be expressed thus : Men will speak the truth
when they have no motive to utter falsehood.
This uniformity in human nature we believe at
first instinctively, even without the reservation ;
and experience confirms our belief, only with the
reservation. Whenever we assent to testimony,
we confess this belief in a particular instance, and
whenever w^e reason from testimony, we must
suppose it to be credible.
9. Besides these, which are properly called
Principles of Reasoning^ because one or other of
them runs through every argument, there are
Maxims applicable to inductive research, and of
great use in directing reasoning, which may be
therefore called Inductive maxims. Such are the
following :
1. Every effect has a chain of causes.
GENERAL TRINCIPLES OF REASONING. 395
Therefore one cause does not necessarily ex-
clude another, forming a different link in the same
chain.
2. One effect may have many concomitant
causes.
Therefore one cause does not necessarily ex-
clude another, acting even simultaneously.
3. An effect may be prevented, not merely by
the absence of the cause or causes proper to it,
but also by opposing causes. Therefore the ab-
sence of an effect proves not the absence of a ten-
dency/. Let these suffice as specimens of Inductive
maxims and their corollaries. They relate ex-
clusively to relations of Succession.
10. To conclude ; the object of Reasoning in
general may be said to be to prove that two or
more things co-exist, or do not co-exist ; or that
two or more things succeed, or do not succeed
each other, generally, if not invariably. The ob-
ject of Science, especially, is to determine the
permanent or incariah'e co-existence and succes-
sion of things, partly by direct observation, and
where that fails, by reasoning and inference.
Where one thing is known certainly to exist, there
to expect another along with it; or where one
thing is ascertaincMl, to look for another after it;
such are the anticipations of human science.
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