PEINCIPLES OE PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
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 EniXTOAH nPOX AIOTNHTON. 
 

 P^T^^:^IPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 iiN THREE PARTS 
 
 BY GEORGE RAMSAY B.M. 
 
 It 
 
 AUTHOR OF " AN INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY,* 
 
 "analysis and theory of the EMOTIONS," 
 
 " A CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES," 
 
 ETC. ETC. 
 
 LONDON: WALTON AND MABEULY. 
 EUGBY : CROSSLEY AND BILLINGTUN. 
 
 MDCCCLVII. 
 
^3 
 
 EDLO. 
 PSYCi-f. . 
 LIBRARY 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 It is now just four years since I published "An 
 Introduction to Mental Philosophy," which may 
 be considered as a suitable preparation for the 
 present Work. It appeared to me that before 
 entering upon the thorny paths of metaphysical 
 ground, it was highly desirable to pave the way 
 by " A Philosophical Vocabulary," which should 
 endeavour to fix the meaning of the principal 
 terms used in Philosophy, not in ^Mental Philo- 
 sophy only, but in every inquiry worthy of that 
 name. Such are the terms. Substance, Qual- 
 ity, Quantity, Relation, Cause and Effect, 
 Law of Nature, Principle, Hypothesis 
 and Theory, Science, and Philosophy itself. 
 Accordingly, such a Philosophical Vocabulary 
 forms the First Part of the " Introduction," 
 which, but for the Second Part, which treats 
 particularly of JSlental Philosophy, might have 
 been styled an Introduction to Philosophy in 
 general. 
 
 My principal reason for alluding now to the above 
 work is to mention that, with one exception, the 
 present and the former work are perfectly dis- 
 tinct. That exception consists in the Chapter 
 " Of Reasoning." Of course, in a work on 
 Psychology, it was impossible to avoid treating 
 of Reasoning, and as I had discussed the subject 
 
 I 92487 
 
Yi. PREFACE. 
 
 at length in the former work, it was quite allow- 
 able, nay, unavoidable, to avail myself in the 
 present work of what I had previously written. 
 But the whole Chapter on Reasoning has been 
 carefully revised, some difference of arrangement 
 introduced, a good deal added, and something 
 omitted, which it seemed unnecessary to repeat. 
 Nay, in one particular an important change has 
 been made, a change of Principle. This is in 
 the sub-section which treats of Probable Reason- 
 ing. I had formerly thought that a general pro- 
 position or general principle, as it is often called, 
 understood indeed, not expressed, was necessary 
 to the validity of every case of Inductive reason- 
 ing: but, on this point, I have changed my 
 opinion, chiefly, I am willing to allow, from a 
 perusal of Mr. Bailey's excellent work on Reason- 
 ing, which fell into my hands after the publication 
 of my " Introduction." With the exception of 
 this Chapter on Reasoning, I repeat that the 
 present work is entirely distinct from the former. 
 This work has at least one claim to attention, 
 that it is one of the very few works in our language 
 which give a connected view of the whole of Pure 
 Mental Philosophy. Even the great work of 
 Locke barely touches upon that most interesting 
 class of phenomena, the Emotions. Dr. Brown's 
 Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind 
 is the only work in English, which now occurs to 
 me, that treats of all the Mental Phenomena. 
 That a connected view of these phenomena is 
 
PREFACE. vii/ 
 
 desirable, will not be disputed. Of course, 
 Morals are not comprehended in the subject. 
 For these I must refer to my " Principles of 
 Human Happiness and Duty.'' 
 
 I know not whether an apology will be thought 
 necessary for the use of the term Psychology. 
 The reader will observe that I have no partiality 
 for new and learned words, but there are cases 
 where they may be useful, if not necessary. And 
 this I consider to be a case in point. The words 
 Mental Philosophy are not sufficiently definite, 
 for mental philosophy embraces not only Psycho- 
 logy, but all the Sciences which relate directly 
 to Mind, as Logic, Morals, and even Politics. 
 Pure Mental Philosophy would be appropriate ; 
 but it is better to have a single word, if possible. 
 The term Metaphysics naturally suggests itself; 
 but, as this word has been employed in so many 
 senses ; and is, moreover, unhappily associated in 
 the public mind with much that is cloudy, mysti- 
 cal, if not unintelligible ; it seemed desirable to 
 have a word free from all ambiguity, as well as 
 from all unfavourable associations. Besides, the 
 term Psychology is no longer quite new, for it has 
 been used by some of our best writers ; in par- 
 ticular by Sir Benjamin Brodie in his " Psycho- 
 logical Inquiries." I have therefore resolved to 
 adopt it ; though the words Metaphysics and Meta- 
 physical occur occasionally in the following pages, 
 as synonymous with Psychology and Psycho- 
 logical. 
 
viii. PREFACE. 
 
 It must be allowed that Psychology has been 
 hardly dealt with. It has been attacked not only 
 by foes, but by friends; not only by strangers, but 
 by its own Professors. Now this is too bad. It 
 tempts one to exclaim, Et tu Brute. To those, 
 then, if an}'- such there be, v.ho really think that 
 nothing has been, or can be done in Psychology, 
 the present work is with some degree of con- 
 fidence addressed. This shall be my only answer. 
 Though the work may have many faults, and no 
 doubt it has many, yet I venture to hope that 
 it will be found to contain a body of Philo- 
 sophical doctrine, neither obscure, frivolous, 
 captious, nor unsound ; neither Sophistical or 
 Rationalist on the one hand, nor Empirical on the 
 other.'' Of course I must have profited by the 
 labours of my predecessors, but I think that I 
 have added something to them, that there is here 
 nexv as well as old, and that I shall leave Psycho- 
 logy better than I found it. 
 
 I certainly have not attempted to construct an 
 edifice unassailable in all its parts, founded on 
 Self- evidence, and raised up by strict demonstra- 
 tion, like pure Mathematics : for any such attempt 
 would have shown a total misapprehension of the 
 nature of the subject. A misapprehension of 
 the nature of his subject, and of the evidence 
 whereof it admits, is the greatest fault which a 
 Philosopher can commit. It is fatal, and fore- 
 
 * See the Novum Orgauum Aph. LXII-III-IV, where these two 
 kinds of false philosophy are characterised. 
 
PREFACE. ix. 
 
 dooms to failure all his subsequent labours. Nor 
 have I any wish to be numbered with those, who, 
 '* being unable to add any thing to Truth, seek 
 for eminence through the heresies of paradox." 
 
 It had not been my intention to engage in 
 controversy, but, as the Champion of the " New 
 Scottish Philosophy" has thrown down the gaunt- 
 let, I shall not decline taking it up, once for all. 
 That Philosophy is professedly demonstrative, 
 and so linked together, as the Author himself 
 allows, that, if one flaw can be detected in it, the 
 whole must fall to pieces. I shall therefore ex- 
 amine but one argument, on which the whole 
 Theory concerning the existence of Matter is 
 founded ; for, if that be unsound, no more refuta- 
 tion will be necessary. That argument is con- 
 tained in Professor Ferrier's last publication, 
 " Scottish Philosophy the Old and the New," and 
 is as follows : (page 2/). 
 
 " My argument is as follows. The only material world which 
 truly exists, is one which cither actually is, or may possibly be, 
 known. But the only material world which either actually is, or 
 may possibly be, known, is one, along with which intelligence is, and 
 must be, also known. Therefore, the only material world which 
 truly exists, is one, along with which, intelligence also exists. 
 Therefore, the mere material world has no real and absolute exist- 
 ence. But neither is it a nonentity (I am no idealist), for thei'e is 
 no nonentity, any more than there is entity out of relation to all 
 intelligence. It is simply an expression of nonsense. This is my 
 reasoning, and if any one can propose an amendment on the syllo- 
 gism, I shall very willingly receive it." 
 
 Now, I accept that challenge, and shall pro- 
 
X. PREFACE. 
 
 pose two rectifications in the above argument, 
 necessary, as I conceive, to its validity. 
 
 First, I must observe that the conclusion above 
 stated is not the correct conclusion from the 
 premises ; but the correct conclusion is as follows : 
 
 Therefore, the only material world which truly 
 exists, is one, along with which intelligence is, and 
 must be known. The amended argument will 
 then stand thus : 
 
 The only material world which truly exists, is 
 one which either actually is, or may possibly be, 
 known ; 
 
 But the only material world which either ac- 
 tually is, or may possibly be, known, is one along 
 with which intelligence is, and must be, also 
 known ; 
 
 Therefore, the only material world which truly 
 exists, is one, along with which, intelligence is, 
 and must be, known. 
 
 This is the only legitimate conclusion from 
 those premises. 
 
 Secondly, there is an ambiguity in the above 
 argument, arising from a confusion between the 
 actual and the possible. What '\s> positively stated in 
 the first proposition is simply, that the only ma- 
 terial world which really exists, is one which may 
 possibly be known ; in other words, without in- 
 volving a contradiction. So, the second proposi- 
 tion cannot rightly imply that the material world 
 actually is known ; but merely that, if known, 
 intelligence must be known along with it. The 
 
PREFACE. xi. 
 
 insertion of the words, if hioivn, will render 
 the meaning clear ; otherwise actual knowledge 
 might be unwarily supposed, as in the fallacious 
 argument it is supposed. Consequently, the argu- 
 ment fully corrected will stand thus : 
 
 The only material world which truly exists, is 
 one which either actually is, or may possibly be, 
 known ; 
 
 But the only material world which either ac- 
 tually is, or may possibly be, known, is one, along 
 with which, (if known) intelligence is, and must 
 be, also known. 
 
 Therefore, the only material world which truly 
 exists, is one, along with which, (if known) intel- 
 ligence is, and must be, also known. 
 
 Such is the only legitimate conclusion from 
 the premises ; but it is one of no force whatsoever 
 against the independent existence of matter. It 
 merely affirms that if the material world be 
 known, intelligence must be known along with it; 
 which advances us not one step beyond Professor 
 Ferrier's Propositions in his Theory of Knowing, 
 not one step toward Being. He has still to 
 prove that matter cannot exist unless it be 
 known, or, in his own words, that " the only 
 material world which truly exists, is one, along 
 with which, intelligence also exists ; " which is 
 quite another proposition. 
 
 The Author of the " New Philosophy" has 
 therefore failed in the above attempt to pass logic- 
 ally from Knowing to Being. Between the two 
 
xii. PREFACE. 
 
 lies a deep mysterious abyss, which we must leap 
 across, for we never can bridge it over. 
 
 In his "Institutes of Metaphysic" the same 
 Author endeavours to cross the abyss by filling it 
 up ; in plain language, by identifying Being with 
 Knowing. " Thus Knowing and Being," says he, 
 (p. 515) " are shown to be built up out of the same 
 elements." But, if the elements be the same, 
 and if it be not maintained that they are in 
 different proportions, then the compounds, Know- 
 ing and Being, must also be the same. This is 
 one way of getting rid of the difficulty, but it is 
 cutting the Gordian knot, instead of untying it. 
 
 Again, " matter cannot be the cause of our 
 cognitions, inasmuch as it is a mere part of our 
 cognitions," (p. 540). AH this makes things much 
 worse ; for, in order to get rid of a difficulty, we 
 are called upon to efface the distinction between 
 Mind and Matter, which lies at the bottom of all 
 sane Metaphysics. Matter may exist, as all the 
 world supposes, or it may not, as Berkeley thought, 
 and still a Science of Mind be possible ; but a 
 system which confounds the two strikes at the 
 root of Mental Philosophy, and hence of all 
 genuine Philosophy whatsoever. 
 
 Rugby, November 21, 1856. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Part First. 
 PRELIMINARY. 
 
 Chapter Page 
 
 I. Introduction. Of the Mind in General . 1 
 
 II. Classification of the Mental Phenomena . 3 
 
 III. On the Mental Powers or Faculties . . 16 
 
 Part Second. 
 
 THE FEELINGS. 
 
 I. Op Sensation 18 
 
 II. Of Emotion. 
 
 Section First. 
 Of Emotion in General . . , . 29 
 
 Section Second. 
 Classification of the emotions. . . 31 
 
 Section Third. 
 On the Origin of Desire ... 45 
 Section Fourth. 
 
 Of the Will 56 
 
 Supplement First to Section Fourth. 
 
 Op the Will 87 
 
 Supplement Second. 
 Op the Will 90 
 
xiv. CONTENTS. 
 
 Part Third. 
 THE THOUGHTS. 
 
 Chapter. Paga 
 
 I. Or Thought in General, and of the Proxi- 
 
 MATE Powers of the Human Mind . . 96 
 
 II. Of Consciousness 98 
 
 III. Of Perception. 
 
 Section First. 
 Op the Nature of Perception . . . 104 
 
 Section Second. 
 Origin of Perception . . . . 113 
 
 Section Third. 
 Evidence Afforded by Perception . .121 
 Supplement to Chapter III. 
 
 Of Perception 141 
 
 rV. Of Conception. 
 
 Section First.. 
 Of Conception in General. . . .143 
 
 Section Second. 
 Division of Conceptions : 
 
 I. Op Particular Conceptions . . 148 
 II. Of General Conceptions : 
 
 1. Nature of General Conceptions . 158 
 
 2. Subdivision OF General Conceptions 169 
 
 3. General Names, Definition, and 
 
 Description . ♦ . . .171 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 XV. 
 
 Chapter paga 
 
 Section Third. 
 Origin op Conception . . . .190 
 V, Of Memory : 
 
 Section First. 
 
 What is Memory 197 
 
 Section Second. 
 
 Of Time 199 
 
 Section Third. 
 
 Of Personal Identity 209 
 
 Section Fourth. 
 
 Origin of Memory 212 
 
 Section Fifth. 
 Evidence Afforded by Memory. . .213 
 
 Section Sixth. 
 Connection of Memory with the other 
 Intellectual Faculties. Comparison 
 ■with these. Causes of its Improvement 
 
 AND Decline 219 
 
 Yl. Of Eeason in General. Distinction Between 
 
 Keason AND Simple Intellect. . . 232 
 YII. Of Comprehension ..... 236 
 
 VIII. Of Belief 240 
 
 IX. Of Judgment 256 
 
 X. Of Eeasoning : 
 
 Section First. 
 Op Keasoking in General .... 278 
 
 • 
 
xvi. CONTENTS. 
 
 Chapter Page 
 
 Section Second. 
 On Different Kinds of Eeasoning: 
 
 I. Or Demonstrative Eeasoning . 289 
 II. Or Probable Eeasoning . . . 357 
 Section Third. 
 On General Principles of Seasoning . 388 
 

 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY, 
 
 PART I. 
 
 PRELIMINARY. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 INTRODUCTION. OF THE MIND IN GENERAL. 
 
 1. The difference between Mind and Matter 
 lies at the bottom of all Psychology ; and upon 
 it is founded the distinction between the Mental 
 and the Physical Sciences. 
 
 2. This difference is broad and definite, so that 
 Mind can never be mistaken for Matter, or Matter 
 for Mind. 
 
 3. In one respect alone do Mind and Matter 
 agree. They agree as Substances, that is, as 
 something permanent among innumerable modifica- 
 tions:^ but in everything else they differ. 
 
 4. Matter is extended, solid or impenetrable, 
 moveable, divisible without end ; but Mind has 
 
 ' See the Author's " Introduction to Mental Philosophy." 
 Art. 1. Substance. 
 B 
 
2 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 neither extension, solidity, mobility in space, nor 
 divisibility. It has no parts, it is strictly One. 
 
 5. Mind, on the other hand, is susceptible of 
 Sensations, Thoughts, and Emotions, which have 
 nothing in common with the known properties of 
 Matter. Therefore the separation between Mind 
 and Matter is broad, deep, and sudden. 
 
 6. If these distinctions be correct, the all- 
 important question as to the materiality or imma- 
 teriality of the Soul is already decided : for how 
 can that be material which has none of the proper- 
 ties of matter^ 
 
 7. Again, it is allowed that Sensations, Thoughts, 
 and Emotions are not material; but these are 
 merely modifications of the Mind or Soul ; there- 
 fore the Mind itself is not material. 
 
 8. Consequently, from what it has not, as well 
 as from what it has, we draw the same conclusion, 
 that the Mind or Soul is immaterial. 
 
 9. Let us conclude this Chapter by observing 
 how important are accurate distinctions at the out- 
 set ! How many volumes of unprofitable discussion 
 may they prevent ! 
 
MENTAL PHENOMENA. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 CLASSIFICATION OF THE MENTAL PHENOMENA. 
 
 1. Though the mind is strictly One and 
 indivisible, yet it admits of innumerable modifica- 
 tions. 
 
 2. These modifications, considered as fleeting 
 or transitory, rapidly succeeding each other in 
 our waking or dreaming hours, are called simply 
 Phenomena or Appearances ; but when from such 
 appearances we infer the existence of some more 
 permanent modification, the source of these ap- 
 pearances, we name it a Mental Power or Faculty. 
 
 3. Mental Powers then, or Faculties, are 
 known only through Phenomena, and, conse- 
 quently, our first object must be to become well 
 acquainted with these. 
 
 4. Without a correct classification of the 
 Mental Phenomena there can be no accurate 
 Psychology ; but, with such Classification, the 
 most important questions can be solved without 
 much difficulty. A mistake here is fatal, for it 
 vitiates all subsequent conclusions ; while well- 
 
4 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 grounded distinctions at the outset may render 
 truth ahnost self-evident. 
 
 5. Some Mental Phenomena comprise more 
 or less of Pleasure or Pain, Happiness or Misery, 
 while others are in themselves neutral. The 
 former we may call Feelings, the latter 
 Thoughts. This, then, is the first and funda- 
 mental distinction. 
 
 6. Feelings again are of two sorts, according 
 as they are, or are not, immediately dependant on 
 a change in the state of the Body. The former 
 we call Sensations, the latter Emotions; the 
 immediate antecedent of the one being a bodily 
 change, of the other a mental affection, whether 
 Thought, Sensation, or another Emotion. 
 
 7. Sensations then, are, in themselves, Mental 
 Phenomena as much as Emotions, though immedi- 
 ately dependant on the Body. A bodily pain is 
 one of which the cause lies in our material frame ; 
 the effect, the pain, being strictly mental. 
 
 8. That all Emotions comprise Pleasure or 
 Pain will not be disputed ; but do all Sensations 
 likewise '^ 
 
 9. Many Sensations are undoubtedly pleasur- 
 able, many painful, even in an intense degree ; 
 but others are certainly dull, if felt at all as 
 pleasurable or painful. 
 
 10. I touch the table gently with my hand, 
 and I am quite sensible of the touch, but I could 
 hardly say that I feel pain or pleasure. I touch 
 
MENTAL PHENOMENA. 5 
 
 it again more forcibly, and now I do feel pain. 
 Must we then separate these two Phenomena as 
 belonging to different classes ? I think not. 
 The pain diminishes gradually with the force of 
 the blow, till it becomes infinitesimally little, the 
 mere fluxion of a pain, and nowhere can we find 
 a limit. In other respects the Phenomena are 
 exactly similar, in themselves, and in their ante- 
 cedents, the difference being only in degree ; and 
 therefore, all may be called Feelings, the acute as 
 well as the dull. 
 
 1 1 . Sensations, then, as well as Emotions, 
 are rightly comprehended under the first grand 
 class of Mental Phenomena, the Feelings, and 
 the difference between them has been pointed out. 
 Let us turn now to the other grand class, the 
 Thoughts. 
 
 12. Though our Emotions, and hence most 
 of the happiness or misery which we feel, spring 
 from our Thoughts, yet, in themselves, these are 
 neutral. Closely united as Cause and Effect, and 
 often in reality inseparable, Thoughts and Emo- 
 tions may still be distinguished on reflection ; and 
 they are in fact distinguished by all people, and 
 in all languages. 
 
 13. If Thought and Emotion be so readily 
 and generally distinguished, though so closely 
 united, much more Thought and Sensation, which 
 depends upon the state of Body, and not at all 
 upon Thought. 
 
6 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 14. Thus Thoughts are clearly distinguished 
 from our Feelings, that is from Sensations and 
 Emotions, which two make up all our pleasures 
 and pains, all our happiness and misery. 
 
 15. Now Thoughts are of two orders, Non- 
 relative and Relative, or Notions and Rela- 
 tions. 
 
 16. A Notion supposes but one thing, a Re- 
 lation two at least. 
 
 1/. I consider a man, a horse, a tree, a 
 mountain, each separately, and I have a Notion of 
 each. I compare one man with another, one 
 horse with another, one tree with another, one 
 mountain with another, and I am conscious of a 
 Relation between the two. So, I am aware of a 
 Relation between a mare and foal, a father and 
 son. 
 
 18. Notions again are of two sorts, Particular 
 and General, words which will be fully explained 
 hereafter.^ 
 
 19. The second order of Thoughts consists 
 of Relative Thoughts or Relations. 
 
 20. The observation already made with re- 
 spect to Thoughts and Emotions, that, though 
 readily distinguished on reflection, they are often 
 in reality inseparable, applies to Notions and 
 Relations. 
 
 "^ For the further division of Notions, see the Chapter on 
 Conception. 
 
MENTAL PHENOMENA. 7 
 
 21. Relations necessarily suppose Notions 
 between which a Relation exists, so that where 
 there are no notions we can be conscious of no 
 relation; but Notions imply not Relation of ne- 
 cessity, though they frequently do in fact. 
 
 22. Thus the Mental Phenomena differ from 
 Material elements, which, though at one time 
 combined with other elements, may at another be 
 actually separated by art and examined apart. 
 Common salt is a compound of a gas called 
 Chlorine and a metal Sodium, and these may be 
 obtained from Salt, and exhibited each by itself. 
 This facility we do not enjoy in Psychology, and 
 hence the difficulty of Psychological Analysis. 
 
 23. Relations are of three kinds. 1. Those 
 which always and of necessity suppose Time. 
 2. Those which do not ; and 3. Those which may 
 or may not suppose Time. The first are called 
 Relations of Succession, the second Relations of 
 Co-existence, and the third or mixed kind are 
 Relations of Resemblance. 
 
 24. Relations of Succession are of two 
 genera, relations of casual, and relations of in- 
 variahle antecedence and consequence, the latter 
 comprising the all-important relation of Power 
 or Cause and Effect. 
 
 25. Relations of Co-existence are numerous, 
 and when the things compared are Material, Co- 
 existence in Space is always supposed ; not so of 
 course when Mental. The heart and lungs bear 
 
8 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 to each other an uniform relation of position, and 
 co-exist in Space ; so do the elements of a 
 chemical compound, as common salt ; not so the 
 elements of a mental compound, as love and 
 gratitude, which co-exist, but not in Space. 
 
 26. The whole object of Science is to dis- 
 cover the invariable Co-existence, and the invari- 
 able Succession of things. 
 
 27. Having now completed the classification 
 of the Mental Phenomena, so far as requisite for 
 our present purpose, for more detail would be 
 here out of place, we may be able to pass judg- 
 ment on some of the Psychological systems of our 
 predecessors. 
 
 28. If the above classification be correct, it 
 will, in the first instance, show the utter insuffi- 
 ciency of the system of Condillac and his 
 followers, whereby all the Phenomena of Mind 
 were reduced to Sensations, and what he called 
 transformed Sensations. We have seen that Sen- 
 sations are but one order of Mental Phenomena, 
 forming a subdivision of the Class of Feelings, 
 distinct from the other order the Emotions, and 
 differing still more from the second great class 
 the Thoughts. If Sensations might be confounded 
 with Emotions, or transformed into them, how 
 could they be assimilated to Notions, which 
 belong to a different class, and still more to 
 Relations, which are even further removed from 
 Sensations *? These all agree but in one respect, 
 
MENTAL PHENOMENA. 9 
 
 that they are Mental Phenomena, in other respects 
 they radically differ. Could it even be shown 
 that all spring originally from Sensation, this 
 would prove nothing ; for on the same ground we 
 might prove that Sensation is not of Mind, since 
 it arises from a bodily change. The Cause and 
 the Effect may be widely different. Body acts 
 on Mind and Mind on Body, but the one bears 
 no resemblance to the other. We may there- 
 fore safely pronounce the system of Condillac the 
 most narrow, the farthest from nature, the most 
 degrading of any that ever obtained celebrity. 
 It reduces man to the rank of the lower animals, 
 nay below them ; for we have every reason to be- 
 lieve that these are not mere creatures of Sensa- 
 tion. 
 
 29. The above Classification will also show 
 the insufficiency of the well-known division of 
 Hume into Impressions and Ideas. The word 
 Impression, as used by Hume, seems to include 
 Sensations and Emotions, and so corresponds to 
 our Feelings ; and the term Idea means, accord- 
 ing to him, an Impression revived, — a faint copy of 
 the original. This is his own language. Ideas 
 differ from impressions only in the degree of force 
 and vivacity, and always spring from them ; so 
 that where there has been no Impression, there 
 can be no Idea. Ideas then, at most, are equiva- 
 lent to our Notions, and consequently, of Rela- 
 tions no account is taken in this Classification. 
 c 
 
10 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCflOLOGY. 
 
 Accordingly, Hume endeavours to confound the 
 distinction between Notion and Relation, as fatal 
 to his theory ; for it is evident that Relation, if 
 distinct from Notion, has no prior Impression to 
 which it corresponds. Thus he attempts to prove 
 that " An opinion or behef is a lively Idea re- 
 lated to, or associated with, a present Impression,'"* 
 and even that " all probable reasoning is nothing 
 but a species of Sensation."" Such were the ab- 
 surd conclusions to which even Hume was led 
 by an imperfect Classification at the outset, and a 
 false theory founded thereon. Starting from the 
 same theory, he was brought to deny the inde- 
 pendent existence of many Notions or Ideas which 
 men commonly suppose that they have, such as 
 the Ideas of Space and Time, which he considered 
 as nothing distinct from the Sensations we ex- 
 perience on seeing objects at rest or in motion.'' 
 This is, exactly the error of Condillac repeated. 
 Notions are here confounded with Sensations, 
 as before Relations with Notions. For the same 
 reason Hume denied that we have any idea of 
 Substance, or even of Self; for no impressions 
 
 " " Treatise of Human Nature." Vol. I., Part iii,, Sec. 7. 
 
 " Id. Sec. 8. I quote from the *' Treatise of Human 
 
 Nature," the earliest and the great Metaphysical work of Hume, 
 containing the full and consistent Statement of his opinions, 
 though it was afterwards given up by the Author, and, as he 
 thought, superseded by his " Essays." 
 
 ^ Id. Part ii. 
 
MENTAL PHENOMENA. H 
 
 corresponding to these could be shown.'' These 
 false conclusions may instruct us how important 
 is a correct Classification at first ; for on it Theory 
 will and must be built. 
 
 30. After refuting, in the First Book, the sup- 
 position of Innate Ideas, Locke commences the 
 Second Book of his great work by informing us 
 that all our Ideas spring from Sensation and Be- 
 J^ectioTi, and he divides them accordingly into 
 these two Classes. "^ Here, be it observed, the 
 Theory gives birth to the Classification, and not 
 the Classification to the Theory, as in the system 
 of Hume, which latter is assuredly the proper 
 method. 
 
 31. Considered as a Classification of the 
 Mental Phenomena, the division of Locke is mani- 
 festly incomplete ; for, in the first place, it ap- 
 pears not to include Sensations themselves, which 
 are not the same as Ideas of Sensation, i. e., de- 
 rived from Sensation. The Sensations of redness, 
 blueness, etc., are not the same as the Ideas or 
 Notions thereof, of which I am conscious when 
 
 * " Treatise of Human Nature." Part IV., Sec. 5, 6. 
 
 ^ After this fundamental distinction, wliicli runs throughout the 
 whole of the Second Book, on the origin of onr Ideas, it is diffi- 
 cult to conceive how Locke could ever have been set down as a 
 pure Sensationalist. But so he has been, both at home and abroad, 
 even by writers of eminence, some of whom, however, had per- 
 haps never read a line of him. See on this point, Dugald 
 Stewart's "Dissertation on the Progress of Metaphysical Philo- 
 sophy," first published in the " Encyclopa?dia Britannica." 
 
12 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 my eyes are shut. So the Sensation which I feel 
 when I touch the table is not the same as the 
 Notions of Extension, Solidity, Hardness, which 
 arise out of the Sensation, and are subsequent to 
 it. Consequently, the Classification of Locke 
 either does not comprehend Sensations at all, or 
 it confounds them with Ideas or Notions of Sen- 
 sation ; and on either supposition the Classifica- 
 tion errs, in one case by incompleteness, in the 
 other by confusion. 
 
 32. Secondly, we are told that Ideas of Re- 
 flecdon arise from reflecting on the operations of 
 our own minds. But what are these operations 
 themselves'? To what class do they belong'? 
 Locke ennumerates as such, jwrception, thinldng^ 
 doubtitif/, believing, reasoning, Imoivirig^ ivilling^ and 
 afterwards adds : " The term operations here, I use 
 in a large sense, as comprehending not barely the 
 actions of the mind about its ideas^ but some sort 
 of passions arising sometimes from them, such as 
 the satisfaction and uneasiness arising from any 
 Thought."^ 
 
 The operations of the mind, then, comprehend 
 the Emotions : and consequently. Ideas of Reflec- 
 tion embrace Ideas or Notions of the Emotions, 
 but not the Emotions themselves. The notion of 
 love or of gratitude is not the same as love or 
 gratitude felt. 
 
 ^ " Essay concerning Human Understanding." Book II., 
 Chap, i., Sec. 4. 
 
MENTAL PHENOMENA. 13 
 
 33. Thus, as Locke's Ideas of Sensation com- 
 prise not Sensations proper, so his Ideas of He- 
 flection embrace not the Emotions proper; or 
 should it be said that he meant to include all 
 under the word Idea, then it must be allowed 
 that he has not clearly distinguished between 
 Idea proper or Notion and Sensation, in the one 
 case, between Idea or Notion and Emotion in the 
 other. Therefore, again, the Classification errs 
 either by deficiency or by confusion.'' The truth 
 of Locke's theory, as to the origin of our Ideas, 
 we shall consider afterwards. 
 
 34. The Classification which approaches most 
 nearly to the one here proposed is that brought 
 forward by the late Dr. Thomas Brown, in his 
 valuable Lectures on the Philosophy of the 
 Human Mind. Still they differ materially. 
 
 35. Dr. Brown begins by dividing all the 
 Mental Phenomena into two great Classes, the 
 Class of External, and that of Internal Phenomena, 
 meaning by the former, Sensations ; by the latter, 
 all other Phenomena preceded immediately, not 
 by a change of body, but by a change of mind. 
 These are subdivided into Iniellectual States of 
 
 ^ The confusion between Idea proper or Notion and Passion 
 or Emotion is apparent in Book II., Chapter xx., " Of Modes of 
 Pleasure and Pain." This very meagre chapter is all relative to 
 the Emotions contained in Locke's great work. It may be said, 
 uideed, that he professed only to treat of the Human Under- 
 standing. 
 
14 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 mind or ThonglitSy and Emotions. Thus, while I 
 class Emotions along with Sensations, under the 
 common term Feelings, though of different orders, 
 Dr. Brown classes Emotions along with Thoughts, 
 and afterwards separates these two orders. Now 
 the question is, which is the more natural arrange- 
 ment *? Should Emotions be classed with Sensa- 
 tions, or with Thoughts'? 
 
 36. It will go far to decide this question, if 
 we consider that in popular language we possess 
 a word which embraces both Sensations and Emo- 
 tions, and them only, — the word Feeling ; whereas 
 we have no word common to thoughts and Emo- 
 tions, and to them alone. This is a strong proof 
 that the arrangement here proposed is natural, 
 for all men are more or less metaphysicians. We 
 may or may not be mathematicians, or natural 
 philosophers, but we cannot help knowing some- 
 thing of our own minds. If, then, by common 
 consent, Sensation and Emotion have been classed 
 together under the one term Feeling, the proba- 
 bility is that the arrangement is good, particularly 
 if it be confirmed on reflection. So, in French, 
 the word Sensation comprises both Sensation pro- 
 per and Emotion. 
 
 37. The only point of agreement between 
 Emotion and Thought, mentioned by Brown, is 
 that both are preceded immediately by a Mental, 
 not by a Bodily change, and thus they are distin- 
 guished from Sensation. This, no doubt, is a 
 
MENTAL PHENOMENA. 15 
 
 difference, and an important one, though it is a 
 difference rather in the antecedent than in the 
 phenomenon itself, — an excellent ground of dis- 
 tinction between the orders of Sensations and 
 Emotions, but hardly sufficient for a primary- 
 division. The grand difference between Mental 
 Phenomena is the presence or absence of pleasure 
 or pain, happiness or misery, and on this our 
 Classification is founded ; a Classification agree- 
 able to the consciousness of every man, and ac- 
 knowledged by the general sense of mankind, as 
 expressed in language. Dr. Brown afterwards 
 divides Intellectual states of mind or Thoughts 
 into Simple and Relative Suggestions, which cor- 
 respond exactly with my Notions and Relations ; 
 but he does not propose any subdivision of Simple 
 Suggestions. 
 
16 P-RINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 ON THE^ MENTAL POWERS OE EACULTIES. 
 
 1. We observed (Chapter ii. 2), that when the 
 modifications of mind are fleeting or transitory, 
 as they rapidly succeed each other in our waking 
 or dreaming hours, we call them Phenomena or 
 Appearances simply ; but when from such appear- 
 ances we infer the existence of some more per- 
 manent modification, the source of these appear- 
 ances, then we name it a Mental Power or Faculty. 
 2. From this it is evident that every class of 
 Phenomena has a corresponding Power or Faculty, 
 If we have Sensations, we must possess the Power 
 of Sensation ; if Emotions, the Power of Emo- 
 tion ; if Thoughts, the Power of Thinking. This 
 is self-evident. Consequently, the Classification 
 of Mental Powers must be the same as the Classi- 
 fication of Phenomena. 
 
 3. Therefore, the three Ultimate or Elemen- 
 tary powers of the mind are the Powers of 
 Sensation, Emotion, and Thought or Intelligence. 
 
 4. From these Ultimate elements all the 
 
MENTAL POWERS Oil FACULTIES. 17 
 
 Proximate Powers are derived, and of them they 
 are compounded ; as, in Chemistry, the ultimate 
 elements of Animal and Vegetable Substances, 
 Ox)^gen, Hydrogen, Carbon, Nitrogen, &c., make 
 up the proximate and complex principles of 
 Albumen, Fibrin, Gelatin, Gluten, Tannin, Wax, 
 Resin, etc. 
 
 5. So, out of the elementary Powers of Sen- 
 sation, Emotion, and Thought, are formed and 
 compounded the proximate Powers of Perception, 
 Imagination, Memory, Will, Conscience or the 
 Moral Faculty, Judgment, Reasoning, etc. 
 
 6. To understand the nature of these powers, 
 and their corresponding phenomena, we must 
 analyse them and trace the elements of which 
 they are composed. The Analysis of the Mental 
 Phenomena is the first grand object of Meta- 
 physical inquiry : the second is the Theory of 
 their Origin and Succession. These two ought 
 to be kept distinct as far as we can ; though this 
 may not always be possible. A correct Analysis 
 and Classification is the only sure ground for 
 Theory. Locke starts with a theory, viz : that 
 all our Ideas are derived from Sensation and 
 Reflection ; and Hume, after his one division 
 into Impressions and Ideas, immediately builds 
 thereon a Theory which determines all his subse- 
 quent conclusions. 
 
 D 
 
 ) 
 
18 PHINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 THE FEELINGS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 OF SENSATION. 
 
 1. We have seen that Sensation and Emotion 
 agree, inasmuch as both are Feelings ; and 
 thus they are distinguished from Thought or 
 hitelligence. 
 
 2. This fundamental difference at once refutes 
 the opinion of a French philosopher, " Penser 
 c'est Sentir, et ce n'est rien que Sentir," " Thought 
 is Feeling, and nothing but Feeling."^ 
 
 3. Feeling, as we have seen, supposes either 
 positive pleasure or pain, happiness or misery ; 
 or else such a tendency to them as to become 
 pleasure or pain by a slight increase of intensity, 
 and by imperceptible degrees, without any other 
 
 ^ Destutt de Tracy. The word sentir may coinpreheiid 
 Emotion as well as Sensation, and I have given the author 
 cr 'dit for the larger sense ; though, as a disciple of Condillac, 
 he probably meant the latter only. 
 
SENSATION. 19 
 
 difference in the nature of the phenomena. A 
 slight blow gives no pain, but one a little stronger 
 gives some ; a posture at first indifferent becomes 
 irksome by continuation ; some light or warmth 
 is agreeable, more is painful. Of the feelings, 
 Sensations alone may be indifferent, Emotions 
 are always pleasurable or painful. 
 
 4. This, however, is not the fundamental 
 distinction between Sensation and Emotion. 
 The grand difference is that the former is imme- 
 diately dependant on the body, the latter on 
 some previous state of mind. The immediate 
 indispensable antecedent of the one is a bodily 
 change, of the other a mental change, whether 
 Sensation, Thought, or some other Emotion. 
 
 5. Sensations being the only mental pheno- 
 mena immediately dependant on the body, it must 
 be through them that we become acquainted with 
 our o-wn bodies, and with the material world in 
 general. 
 
 6. Sensations, then, are at least the inlets of 
 the world without. 
 
 7. But Sensations alone give us no know- 
 ledge of the outward world. I feel a Sensation 
 of colour, as of redness and blueness, but the 
 Sensation tells me not that the source thereof 
 lies in an outward material object, totally different 
 from the mind itself, or from any modification of 
 mind. So, I touch the table, and feel a certain 
 Sensation, but this does not inform me that it 
 
y 
 20 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 arises from contact with an extended solid sub- 
 stance, having no resemblance whatsoever to the 
 Sensation. And neither tastes^ nor sounds, nor 
 smells, as I feel them, can give me any informa- 
 tion about matter, — a thing utterly different from 
 themselves. 
 
 8. We may conclude that had we been 
 creatures of Sensation alone, we never should 
 have known the world witliout. 
 
 9. Sensations rest in themselves ; they point 
 not directly to anything else ; they are what we 
 feel them and no more ; they may be pleasurable, 
 painful, or nearly indifferent ; but they tell us of 
 nothing beyond. 
 
 10. That knowledge which Sensation gives 
 not, we obtain by Perception ; which must by 
 no means be confounded with the former^ as 
 hitherto has too frequently occurred. Of Percep- 
 tion we shall treat afterwards in its proper place. 
 
 11. Sensations constitute the line of demarca- 
 tion between Mental Philosophy and Physiology : 
 in themselves they belong to the former, but in 
 their antecedents to the latter. A bodily change 
 precedes every Sensation, and that of course is 
 the province of Physiology.^ 
 
 ^ " The examination of our Sensations," says Hume, " belongs 
 more to Anatomists and Natural Philosophers than to moral." 
 Strange misa])prehension of the subject of Metaphysics ! Sensa- 
 sations themselves belong to Mental ; their antecedents, to Physical 
 science. See " Treatise of Human Nature." Part I., Sec. 2. 
 
SENSATION. 21 
 
 12. Since Sensations depend immediately 
 upon a bodily change, it follows that they do 
 not depend upon the Will. This inference is 
 moreover confirmed by experience, for we all 
 know that we cannot directly will the presence or 
 absence of any Sensation. When we open our eyes, 
 we cannot help receiving certain Sensations ; and, 
 •when we close them, we cannot retain the same. 
 It is only remotely that our will can influence 
 these, that is through the body, and, therefore, 
 "with respect to them, the mind is imssive. 
 
 13. Sensations are of various kinds ; but they 
 may all be comprehended under two Orders, the 
 Special and the General. 
 
 14. Special Sensations are those to which a 
 special organ is adapted; while General Sensa- 
 tions are such as may arise from any part of the 
 body. 
 
 15. The Special Sensations are Sight, Hear- 
 ing, Smell, Taste : all others are General. Touch, 
 which is commonly classed as one of the five 
 senses, is not confined to any one part, though 
 the hands be its most delicate organ; but this 
 may be owing to use. The hands are the most 
 convenient organs of touch, consequently the 
 most practised, and, therefore, it may be, the 
 most sensitive. 
 
 16. The organ of Sight is the eye, and more 
 especially the expansion of the Optic nerve, called 
 the Retina ; the organ of Hearing is the ear, par- 
 
22 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 ticularly the internal chambers, and their curious 
 bones, the malleus, the incus, and the stapes, with 
 the corresponding nerve, the auditory ; the organ 
 of Smell is the delicate and voluminous membrane 
 lining the inner parts of the nose, over which the 
 Olfactory nerve is finely ramified ; and the organ 
 of Taste is the tongue and palate, also thickly 
 interspersed with nervous filaments. 
 
 17. In every case we know that a nerve is 
 indispensable to Sensation, for if it be cut or 
 injured, the Sense is gone. We infer that all the 
 complicated mechanism is useful only in fitting 
 the nerve to perform its proper functions. Thus, 
 the Pupil, the Humours of the eye, the Lens, serve 
 to admit and refract the rays of Light, so that 
 they may fall duly on the Retina. 
 
 18. We can point out the proper nerves of 
 the eye, the ear, the nose, one for each side, or 
 a pair; but we can show no nerves peculiar to 
 Touch, as it has no peculiar organ. 
 
 19. An uninterrupted communication be- 
 tween the further extremity of the nerve and 
 the brain, or the spinal marrow, is indispensable 
 to Sensation ; for if the communication be inter- 
 rupted by cutting, or even by pressure, the sense 
 is gone. This we may see, in a partial degree, 
 when a nerve is pressed upon, and the limb 
 becomes asleep. 
 
 20. This is almost all we know of the bodily 
 process in Sensation ; though in the want of real 
 
SENSATION. 23 
 
 knowledge, theory has not been idle. Thus the 
 nerves have been compared to musical strings, 
 and a very pretty theory of vibrations has been 
 founded thereon, whereby to explain Sensation. 
 But the nerves are not strings, and their vibra- 
 tions are imaginary. Again, the nerves have been 
 said to contain animal spirits running up and 
 down to and from the Sensorium, bringing infor- 
 mation, like a general's aides-de-camp. But these 
 animal spirits are, like other spirits, to us invisible, 
 and their existence is now given up. 
 
 21. We know the uses of the various parts 
 of the eye, how they regulate the admission of 
 light ; but of the uses of the various parts of the 
 internal ear, we know nothing, no more than of 
 the convolutions of the brain or of the pineal 
 gland. And as to the action of the nerves, we 
 know only the result. 
 
 22. This, however, we do know, that in every 
 case of external Sensation there must be contact. 
 The rays of light must fall upon the retina, the 
 vibrations of air upon the extremities of the 
 auditory nerve, the impalpable effluvia of scents 
 upon the nerves of the nose, savoury bodies must 
 touch the tongue or palate, and tangible objects 
 some part of the frame, before any Sensation can 
 be felt. The eye, ear, and nose seem to be con- 
 versant with distant objects, but they are not so 
 in reality. The exciting causes of Sight, Hearing, 
 and Smell, are as much in contact with the bodily 
 
24 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 organ as the exciting causes of Taste and Touch ; 
 and in no case does the mere Sensation give us 
 any knowledge of an outward object, whether 
 near or distant. 
 
 23. Having said thus much on the material 
 changes which precede iSensation, let us return to 
 the Mental Phenomena. And first, of the Special 
 Senses. These, as we have seen, are Sight, 
 Hearing, Smell, and Taste. 
 
 24. The Sensation proper to Sight is that of 
 Colour; to the Hearing, Sound; to the Smell, 
 Smell ; to the Taste, Taste. With respect to the 
 last three, there will be no dispute; but some 
 may suppose that the eye sees more than Colour, 
 namely, objects with their magnitudes and 
 distances. 
 
 25. But we have already shown that no Sen- 
 sation by itself can give us any knowledge of 
 outward objects ; and were there any doubt as to 
 the Sight, it would be dispelled by experience; 
 for persons born blind have had their vision per- 
 fectly restored by a surgical operation, and yet at 
 first have felt only a Sensation of Colour. And 
 surely there is nothing in mere sounds, smells, or 
 tastes, to tell us from what they come. When 
 these sounds, smells, or tastes are unusual, we 
 cannot even in mature years say whence they are 
 derived. Let a man shut his eyes, and let some- 
 thing tasty, but new, be put into his mouth, and 
 what will he know of it but the taste '? 
 
SENSATION. 25 
 
 26. These four Special Sensations are com- 
 monly of suflicient interest to draw our attention, 
 unless absorbed by thought or emotion, and 
 great pleasure may be derived from them. The 
 charm of Colour, of Music, though much of this 
 is of a higher order, the gratifications of smell 
 and taste, form no contemptible part of our 
 enjoyments. 
 
 27. The same can hardly be said of our 
 otlier or General Sensations. These may be 
 divided into two genera, of which Touch is one, 
 while all our other general sensations, various 
 and anomalous as they are, may be comprehended 
 under the second genus. Such are the Sensations 
 of warmth and cold, comfort and discomfort, the 
 bodily pleasure of activity and pains of inactivity, 
 the agreeable feelings which accompany good 
 health, the general uneasiness and the innumer- 
 able pains of sickness and disease. Pleasurable 
 Sensations of this order are not intense, and, 
 therefore, they may attract little attention, though' 
 they are important from their permanence ; but 
 the pains are some of the worst that flesh is 
 heir to. 
 
 28. Sensations of mere Touch in particular 
 are seldom dwelt upon at all, and they are of 
 moment only as leading to Perceptions. There- 
 fore, it is here especially that Sensation and 
 Perception are confounded. The passage from 
 the one to the other is so quick, at all events after 
 
 E 
 
26 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGI. 
 
 the period of infancy, and the former is in itself 
 so uninteresting, that we cannot wonder if it be 
 often overlooked altogether, or, at least, mixed up 
 with the latter. But, on reflection, we see well 
 that the mere feeling of Touch, and the notion of 
 an outward extended solid body as the cause 
 of that feeling, are mental phenomena widely 
 different, closely united in fact, but readily dis- 
 tinguishable by thought. Nor can we see any- 
 thing in the mere Sensation of Touch, which 
 should lead us to the knowledge of aught beyond 
 itself. 
 
 29. General Sensations, when not amounting 
 to positive pain, seem not to have been intended to 
 fix our attention, and when they do, it is a great 
 evil : for the capacity of the mind is occupied, and 
 distracted from important thoughts. Nothing is 
 more humiliating to man than his subjection to 
 sense. Pain may overcome any one, and pain, in 
 general, is only occasional, but there is such a 
 thing as a subjection to petty sensations, which 
 perpetually divides and weakens the mind. The 
 word Fidgetiness expresses this uneasy state. 
 
 30. On the other hand, never does the dignity 
 of man more appear than when he triumphs over 
 his Sensations ; as the early Christian martyrs 
 who could smile under their torments. So 
 Frederick the Great could read with attention and 
 profit, though in the agonies of gout." 
 
 " See Lord Dover's " Life of Frederick of Prussia." 
 
SENSATION. 27 
 
 31. Sensations are often found combined with 
 other mental phenomena, especially with Emo- 
 tions ; and this combination is called an Appetite. 
 
 32. The Appetites of hunger and thirst com- 
 prehend I. An uneasy Sensation resulting from 
 the want of food and drink; 2. A desire of 
 relief from that uneasiness. Subsequently there 
 arises a desire of food and drink, as the known 
 remedy for the evil. The last desire is the result 
 of experience, and does not properly belong to 
 the Appetite, which includes only two instinctive 
 feelings, a Sensation and an Emotion, and sup- 
 poses no acquired knowledge. ■■ 
 
 33. Sensations are also closely united with a 
 certain class of Thoughts which we call Percep- 
 tions, whereby we become acquainted with the 
 material world. So close indeed is the union, at 
 least in the mature mind, that the two are con- 
 stantly confounded, to the great injury of Mental 
 Philosophy. But of this more hereafter. 
 
 34. Sensations cannot be defined, because, 
 being simple feelings, we have nothing more 
 simple by which to explain them ; and they are 
 too diversified to admit of accurate description. 
 We talk of Sensations lively or faint, of pains 
 dull or acute ; but these epithets convey very 
 inadequate conceptions of what we really feel. 
 I cannot even be quite sure that my Sensations 
 at all correspond with those of other persons ; 
 and that what I call green is the same that is felt 
 
28 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 by any one else. So long as the same objects 
 rouse the same Sensations in the same persons, 
 the same word will be applied; but this proves 
 not the sameness of Sensation in different persons. 
 It is quite possible, though, no doubt, highly im- 
 probable, that the sensation of colour which trees 
 rouse in me may be that which another calls 
 blue; but so long as our respective Sensations do 
 not vary, we shall agree that trees are green. 
 
EMOTION. 29 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 OF EMOTION. 
 
 SECTION FIRST. 
 
 OF EMOTION IN GENERAL. 
 
 1. The second order of the grand class of 
 Feehngs, is that of the Emotions ; and these 
 ought next to be treated of, because, as feehngs, 
 they are more alhed than the Thoughts are to 
 Sensations. Besides, in the order of mental 
 development, Emotion seems prior to Thought, 
 and immediately succeeds Sensation ; as in the 
 case of the Appetites, where an Emotion of 
 desire follows instantly on the pain of hunger or 
 thirst. This is probably the first Emotion of the 
 infant mind, and it precedes any exercise of 
 Intelhgence. 
 
 2. Emotion, as we have seen, agrees with 
 Sensation, inasmuch as both are Feelings; but 
 in this they differ, that the latter is always pre- 
 ceded immediately by a change in the state of 
 
30 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 the body, the former by a mental change. There- 
 fore Emotion may be defined to be a Feeling 
 consequent on some mental condition^ on some Sensa- 
 tion, Thought, or other Emotion. 
 
 3. As Sensations and Emotions alone are 
 Feelings, in them, and in them only, all our 
 pleasm'es and pains, all our happiness and 
 misery consist ; but principally in the latter. 
 Moreover, these are not only remote incentives, 
 but the immediate cause of all voluntary bodily 
 action. The importance of a knowledge of the 
 Emotions cannot, therefore, be over-stated. 
 
 4. We have seen that the Sensations, pro- 
 perly so called, give us no knowledge of external 
 nature, no knowledge of anything but themselves: 
 what we feel them to be, that they are ; and hav- 
 ing once felt them, we know them ever after. So 
 it is with the Emotions. Some of these, such as 
 Cheerfulness and Melancholy, arise at times in an 
 unaccountable manner, without any evident cause, 
 and lead to no object. These, then, can tell us of 
 nothing but themselves. Others, again, such as 
 Beauty and Sublimity, are supposed to arise from 
 outward objects ; but certainly it is not the Emo- 
 tion that informs us that there are such objects. 
 These Emotions also rest in themselves, and lead 
 us to nothing beyond. And though other Emo- 
 tions, namely the Desires, do lead us to certain 
 objects, yet the knowledge of the object comes 
 not from the desire, but, on the contrary, the 
 
EMOTION. 31 
 
 desire from the previous knowledge of the object. 
 Consequently, Emotions, like Sensations, acquaint 
 us with nothing but themselves ; and having once 
 felt them, we know them ever after. 
 
 Very different, as we shall find, are the 
 Thoughts, which acquaint us not only with them- 
 selves, but also with things quite distinct from 
 themselves, and of another nature. {Sensations 
 and Emotions are interesting and important for 
 their own sakes ; but Thoughts are interesting 
 from the objects which they contemplate, and the 
 effect of these on our Sensibility. 
 
 SECTION SECOND. 
 
 CLASSIFICATION OF THE EMOTIONS.* 
 
 1. All the Emotions of the human mind may 
 be divided into two great classes, the Passive, 
 and the Active Emotions. 
 
 2. Passive Emotions are those which do not 
 include Desire or Fear, and which, consequently, 
 
 ' The Author having ah"eady published an " Analysis and 
 Theory of the Emotions," he has resolved to make this Sectiou 
 as concise as possible, and to refer for a fuller account to his 
 former work, from which the present Section is almost entirely 
 taken. 
 
32 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 are not immediately connected with outward 
 action. No doubt they may lead to outward 
 action, indirectly, and so may every Thought ; 
 but they may not, and they never immediately 
 precede it. Such are Cheerfulness, Melancholy, 
 Ennui, Wonder, Beauty, Sublimity, the Ludicrous 
 Emotion, etc. # 
 
 3. Active Emotions, on the contrary, always 
 comprise Desire or Fear, always urge to action, 
 and when this takes place they are always the 
 immediate antecedents ; consequently, the Will 
 must come under the Active Emotions. 
 
 4. Passive Emotions are of two Orders ; for 
 some have no necessary connection with our 
 moral conduct, and our social relations ; while 
 others, on the contrary, have such a connection. 
 These last are intimately connected with Ethics, 
 and influence practice, leading on to the Active 
 Emotions. 
 
 5. Under the first Order may be enumerated 
 simple Joy and Grief, with their several species, 
 and varieties, namely. Cheerfulness, Mirth, Melan- 
 choly, Weariness of Mind, arising from sameness 
 or repetition, and Ennui from vacancy of mind. " 
 Also under this head come Wonder at what is 
 new ; the Emotions of Beauty, Sublimity, and 
 the Ludicrous. All these belong to the first 
 order of the Passive Emotions. 
 
 6. Though the above Emotions may have an 
 influence on the conduct, yet the influence is 
 
EMOTION. 33 
 
 neither so near, nor so general, as in the case of 
 the Second Order, which, in the usual course of 
 things, leads on to the Active Emotions. These 
 may be called the PASSIVE Moral Emotions, 
 and they comprise two sub-orders, the Imme- 
 diate, and the Retrospective Emotions, ac- 
 cording as they look to the present, or to the 
 past. 
 
 7- The Immediate Emotions are — I. Sympathy 
 and Antipathy, the one being an Emotion of 
 pleasure, arising from the contemplation of some 
 pleasure in another, or of pain, on the contem- 
 plation of pain, — while Antipathy is exactly the 
 reverse. Antipathy, as an original Emotion, and 
 not confined to individuals, may be considered 
 as quite an exception, for Sympathy is the 
 general law of human nature. When Antipathy 
 results from previous hatred towards an indi- 
 vidual, then it is no longer original. 
 
 8. II. Fride and Humility. Pride is a 
 pleasing Emotion arising from the consciousness 
 of some real or supposed excellence in ourselves, 
 or connected with ourselves, as compared with 
 others. Humility is a painful Emotion arising 
 from the consciousness of some real or supposed 
 defect in ourselves, or connected with ourselves, 
 as compared with others. 
 
 9. The Retrospective Emotions are — I. Regret^ 
 a painful Emotion, arising from reflecting on a 
 past action, or past omission, on our part, from 
 
 F 
 
34 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 which loss or injury has resulted, but which we 
 do not morally condemn. We may regret our 
 want of foresight, or want of activity, but we do 
 not feel Remorse. 
 
 10. II. Remorse. This is a compound state 
 of mind, comprising — 1. A judgment of condem- 
 nation on our own past conduct. 2. A most 
 •painful Emotion consequent thereon. The grief 
 of Remorse is one sui (/eneris, accompanied with 
 Humility, but not so impregnated with it as the 
 next and kindred Emotion, Shame. 
 
 1 ] . III. Shame. " Shame and Remorse are 
 the two great bulwarks of morality, and though 
 allied, and often mixed one with another, yet 
 they are by no means identical. Remorse never 
 arises but from some action, which, on the retros- 
 pect appears to ourselves morally wrong, whereas 
 Shame is often roused by acts morally indifferent, 
 and sometimes, as in the case of false shame, 
 positively praise-worthy. Even when the conduct 
 which rouses Shame is of an immoral nature, the 
 shame is often out of all proportion to the 
 degree of guilt. A woman is more ashamed of a 
 slight act of immodesty than of a crime. Shame 
 originates in the consciousness, not, of necessity, 
 that we have done wrong, but that we have done 
 something that lays us open to ridicule and con- 
 tempt. Now, as ridicule and contempt, the 
 former especially, are often awarded where there 
 is no moral delinquency, so Shame is frequently 
 
EMOTION. 35 
 
 felt where there is little to blame. Shame, then, 
 is variable, because it depends chiefly on the 
 sentiments of others, and in particular upon the 
 sentiments of Ridicule and Contempt, which 
 themselves are liable to change." * That the 
 feeling in Shame is peculiar, is proved by the 
 outward evidence of the Blush, which accom- 
 panies no other Emotion : but along with this 
 feeling there is a strong mixture of Humility. 
 
 12. The second great class is that of the 
 Active Emotions, which always comprise Desire 
 or Fear as one element at least, and these are 
 the immediate antecedents of all those actions 
 which are called voluntary. To them alone, and 
 only when intense or permanent, the term Passion 
 is properly applied. 
 
 13. Some of the Active Emotions look only 
 to self; some to others, either in whole or in 
 part ; and consequently, they may be divided into 
 the Solitary or Self-regarding, and the 
 Social Emotions. 
 
 14. Order First. The Solitary or Self- 
 regarding Emotions are the following : — 
 
 I. Ambition, or desire of power. 
 
 II. Desire of Wealthy with its varieties, 
 Covetousness and Avarice. 
 
 III. Desire of Reputation, of Fame or Glory. 
 
 IV. Curiosii)/, or Desire of Knowledge. 
 
 ' Ramsay's "Analysis and Theory of the Emotions," page 7. 
 
36 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 V. Desire of Life or Continued Existence, 
 here and hereafter." 
 
 15. Order Second. The Social Emotions 
 may be subdivided into the Benevolent and 
 the Malevolent. 
 
 16. The Benevolent Emotions may all be 
 included under two genera, Love and Pity. 
 
 17- Love, in whatever form, comprises at 
 least two elements: — 1. A certain pleasure de- 
 rived from contemplating the beloved object: 
 2. A desire of good to that object. These ele- 
 ments are essential; for they are sufficient to 
 constitute Love, and without them there can be 
 no such Emotion.'' Under this genus may be 
 enumerated as species — 
 
 L General Benevolence, or Love to mankind 
 in general, which is the simplest species of Love, 
 and distinguished from all other species by 
 being indiscriminate. 
 
 IL Friendship, and every private attachment, 
 whether transient or permanent, slight or serious, 
 contain a third element in addition to the two 
 above mentioned, namel3% the desire of being 
 loved in return. ^ 
 
 *■ For a particular account of all these desires, see the Author's 
 " Inquiry into the Principles of Human Happiness and Duty,'' 
 Book I, Part ii. Also his " Analysis and Theory of the 
 Emotions." 
 
 " Ramsay's "Analysis and Theory of the Emotions," page 17. 
 
 ^ Ibid. 
 
EMOTION. 37 
 
 III. Love, properly so called, Love between 
 the sexes, comprises a fourth element besides 
 these three, which, from its strength, is some- 
 times peculiarly called Desire. 
 
 18. These three species are quite distinct ; but 
 the following are only varieties or modifications 
 of the same. Thus, Patriotism, is general Benevo- 
 lence limited to our own countrymen ; and 
 Family Affection is a modification of Friendship 
 taken in its widest sense, for whatever partiality 
 we may entertain towards relatives, we certainly 
 desire that it should be reciprocal. Gratitude, 
 moreover, is love towards an individual on ac- 
 count of some benefit conferred intentionally^ 
 and modified by that consideration. 
 
 19. Besides the above, there are other Com- 
 pound Emotions, of which Love forms a part. 
 Such are the Religious Emotions, which comprise 
 Gratitude to God, and if Gratitude, then Love, 
 and along with this the Desire of Continued 
 Existence. Such is Admiration, " which seems to 
 occupy the interval between pure Love and 
 Esteem, comprising some Affection, as well as 
 a favourable judgment concerning its object. 
 But it is essentially distinguished from both by 
 the presence of Wonder, which is a necessary 
 part of Admiration, and owing to this element in 
 particular, the compound state of mind is more 
 allied to Emotion than to cool intellectual de- 
 cision. In Esteem, on the other hand, the 
 
38 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 Emotion of Love is reduced to the lowest degree 
 compatible with partiality, while the judgment as 
 to merit is serious and decided. Respect, again, 
 is a mixture of Love with Humility, and Humility 
 tempers Love with something approaching to 
 Fear. Moreover, Respect seems to comprise a 
 certain exercise of the judgment. In Veneration, 
 the Humility is deeper, and consequently the 
 Love is more tempered with Fear ; while in Awe 
 fear predominates." " 
 
 20. The second genus of the Benevolent 
 Affections is Pity. 
 
 21. Pity, or Compassion, embraces two ele- 
 ments ; first, a feeling of pain at the sufferings of 
 another, — -secondly, a desire to relieve those 
 sufferings. This desire may be further analysed, 
 for it seems compounded, 1. Of a desire of relief 
 to the sympathetic pain which we feel, closely 
 followed by 2. The desire of removing the occa- 
 sion of that pain, viz., the sufferings of another. 
 
 22. Thus, the primary element in Pity is 
 Painful Sympathy, which seems necessary to the 
 rise of the other, Desire of relieving ; while Love 
 begins with Pleasing Sympathy, from which 
 springs the Desire of giving pleasure. Sympathy, 
 then, — a feeling for the weal or woe of others, — 
 which is an ultimate fact in human nature, is the 
 source of both Love and Pity. 
 
 ^ Ramsay's " Analysis and Theory of the Emotions," page 21. 
 
EMOTION. 39 
 
 23. As the Benevolent Emotions comprise 
 Love and Pity, so do the Malevolent Hatred 
 and Malice . 
 
 24. Hatred, in ^vhatever form, contains at 
 least two elements ; first, a certain pain on con- 
 templating the object hated, secondly, a desire of 
 evil to that object. These elements are essential. 
 Under the genus Hate may be enumerated: — 
 
 I. Anger. All the species or varieties of 
 Hate agree in this, that they are limited to cer- 
 tain individuals or classes of individuals, and 
 that there is always some particular cause for the 
 Hate. There is no such thing as General Hate, 
 as there is General Love and Benevolence ; for if 
 Misanthropy exist, it is a rare exception, — a 
 disease, — not a regular and healthy phenomenon 
 of human nature. Thus, Anger is a sudden and 
 violent emotion of Hatred towards an individual 
 on account of some injury or affront, even though 
 unintentional, and it is gratified only by retalia- 
 tion; whereas, simple Hate is satisfied by evil that 
 may befall its object from any source. 
 
 n. Resentment is Anger permanent and con- 
 firmed by reflection on the conduct of the 
 offending party. If Anger seek retaliation, much 
 more Resentment, which is not confirmed until 
 we are convinced that the injury or affront was 
 intentional, or the result of undue neghgence. 
 
 HL In Revenge, the desire of retaUation be- 
 comes intense, and whatever calamities may 
 
40 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 befall the offending party from other sources, 
 retaliation alone fully gratifies. When the oppor- 
 tunity of Revenge is delayed, this may become a 
 very permanent as well as a very violent passion, 
 and the attainment of its object would seem to 
 be attended with an intense pleasure, scarcely, if 
 at all, inferior to any of which our nature is sus- 
 ceptible. This passion is strongly pourtrayed in 
 the characters of Shylock, lago, and Zanga. 
 
 IV. Indignation. Resentment and Indignation 
 are both species of anger, and differ from one 
 another in this respect, that the former depends 
 entirely upon private injury or affront, and may 
 arise even when the offender is not morally to 
 blame ; whereas, the latter may be roused by an 
 injury to others as well as to ourselves, and 
 always supposes some moral fault in the pro- 
 voking party. As the injuries which are the 
 source of Resentment are felt by us directly, so 
 those which are the source of Indignation are, in 
 many cases, felt by Sympathy indirectly, and in 
 these cases Indignation rarely becomes excessive. 
 This, then, is a moral Emotion, and when united 
 with an intellectual decision or judgment, consti- 
 tutes the moral sentiment of Disapprobation. 
 Resentment, on the contrary, being roused by 
 personal injury, is sometimes unjust, more fre- 
 quently excessive, and, at least, never fails to 
 give additional energy to moral Indignation. 
 
 V. Jealousy, whatever be its object, comprises 
 
UNIVlKoITY 
 
 CF 
 
 EMOTION. 41 
 
 two proximate elements, 1. A fear of being de- 
 prived by another of what we consider our right. 
 2. A feeling of hate towards the author of the 
 injury. The Emotion of Hate has already been 
 analysed. Thus, Fear and Hate are the essen- 
 tial elements of Jealousy, and the former precedes 
 and gives birth to the latter, or, in other words, 
 it is the Self-regarding passion which rouses the 
 Malevolent. 
 
 6. E7ivy. The passion of Envy compre- 
 hends also two elements, 1. Grief at the su- 
 periority of another. 2. A feeling of Hate 
 towards the possessor of such superiority. Thus 
 a Passive Emotion of pain, and an Active Emo- 
 tion of Hate, are the constituent elements of 
 Envy, and the former rouses the latter. We 
 may remark this difference between the Male- 
 volent desire ^vhich belongs to Anger and 
 Resentment, etc., and the one included under 
 Envy and Jealousy, that the former is a Primary 
 or Original Desire, the latter. Secondary, or 
 derived. When we receive an injury. Anger 
 immediately follows, and the passion vents itself 
 without any notion that the injury can thereby 
 be repaired. The Malevolent feeling, in this case, 
 therefore, is original, not dependent on calcu- 
 lation, nor subservient to any other design. 
 But, in Envy, the Grief felt cannot be looked upon 
 as an injury for which any one is to blame, other- 
 wise, Resentment, not Envy, would be roused ; 
 
 G 
 
42 PEINTIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 and, consequently, Hatred is here not stirred up 
 immediately. A painful sense of Inferiority is 
 felt, followed by the desire of relieving this un- 
 easiness ; then the mind turns to the innocent 
 cause of the same, wishes to pull it down in 
 order to raise Self, and finally comes to hate it 
 as the obstacle to Self-complacency. In this 
 case, then, the Malevolent Emotion is the con- 
 sequence of a Self-regarding Desire. The same 
 holds true of Jealousy, as we have already seen 
 under that head. Agreeably to this distinction, 
 the Angry Passions, including Simple x\nger, 
 Resentment, Revenge, Indignation, might be 
 classed together as a sub-genus of Hate; and the 
 Jealous Passions, namely, Jealousy and Envy, as 
 another sub-genus. 
 
 7. Lastly : Contempt is a mixture of Pride 
 with Hatred or Dishke ; and is directly opposed 
 to Respect, which unites Humility with Love. 
 
 25. ^Ialice seems to bear the same relation 
 to Hatred which Pity does to Love. As Pity is 
 composed of two elements, a painful Sympathy 
 with the sufferings of another, who may be no 
 friend, and a desire to relieve those sufferings ; so 
 ^Malice is compounded of a pleasurable feeling 
 arising from the pain of another, who is no 
 enemy, and of a desire to inflict such pain. 
 The one unites a painful Sympathy with desire 
 of relief, the other pleasurable Antipathy with 
 desire of its continuance. This desire also, as 
 
EMOTION. 43 
 
 in the case of Pity, probably admits of a further 
 Analysis ; for it seems to be compounded of, I . 
 A desire of the continuance of that pleasure of 
 Antipathy which we experience, and, 2. A desire 
 of the continuance of the occasion of that plea- 
 sure, viz., the pain of another. And, as in Pity, 
 the primary element is a pain of Sympathy, so, 
 in Malice, the original element is a pleasure of 
 Antipathy, which seems necessary to produce 
 the desire which follows. Be it observed that 
 Malice is rather an exception to the general law 
 of human nature ; for where there is no parti- 
 cular reason to the contrary. Sympathy, not 
 Antipathy, Good-will, not Ill-will, is the rule. 
 But Malice supposes no cause of Hatred, — it is 
 not limited to any one, but applies indifferently 
 to all. Still, Malice is not Misanthropy ; for the 
 primary element in the one is Pleasure, in the 
 other, Pain. Besides, the latter, if it exist, is 
 a permanent feeling ; the former, but an occa- 
 sional emotion ; and whereas Malice supposes 
 no previous injustice, Misanthropy arises from 
 some injury, or series of injuries, inflicted on an 
 individual, who, by association, comes to hate 
 not only those who injured him, but even the 
 whole human race. 
 
 26. The Emotions are often united with 
 Intellectual states of mind. Thus, when Desire 
 is combined with Belief, we have Hope, Expec- 
 tation, Confidence, in all which the essential 
 
44 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 elements arc the same, varying only in degree; 
 for, in all, Desire is united viith Belief, an emotion 
 with an intellectual state or Thought ; and, in 
 all, the probability of attainment modifies the 
 intensity of the Desire. Certainty, whether of 
 success or failure, in other words, Security or 
 Despair, both destroy desire, which depends upon 
 uncertainty ; and, therefore, towards either limit 
 the desire will decline ; while the degree of 
 probability most favourable to ardour will be 
 found between the two extremes, and at some 
 distance from both. 
 
 Corolla)')/. Were our knowledge of a future 
 state more extensive, our belief in it complete, 
 we should desire it less. So it is with Human 
 Love, which feeds upon Uncertainty, first of all 
 upon doubts of reciprocity, afterwards on un- 
 certainty arising from other obstacles. 
 
 27. Again, in Moral Sentiment, that complex 
 and most important mental phenomenon, Emotion 
 is combined with an Intellectual state. The 
 former is a species of Love or of Hate, mingled 
 with Wonder, the latter consists in a Judgment 
 as to the nature or tendency of actions and 
 characters ; and the whole constitutes a Moral 
 Sentihient of Approbation or of Disapprobation.^ 
 
 28. In general, the term Sentiment properly 
 means a compound state of mind, wherein Emo- 
 
 " See the Author's " Piiuciples of Human Happiness and Duty." 
 Buuk II. Part i. 
 
DESIRE. 45 
 
 tion is combined with a Judgment or Intellectual 
 decision. It is a valuable word, when so used, 
 and not employed, as it often is, to signify mere 
 opinion/ or mere feeling. 
 
 SECTION THIRD. 
 ON THE ORIGIN OF DESIRE. 
 
 1. The first and most important division of 
 the Desires is that into the Solitary or Self- 
 regarding, and the Social Desires ; of which the 
 former look only to the goofl of Self, the latter to 
 the good or evil of others. This distinction may 
 well be called important, inasmuch as it decides 
 in the negative the question as to the utter 
 Selfishness of man. We must therefore dwell a 
 little upon this point. 
 
 2. Sympathy with the weal or woe of others 
 is surely an indisputable fact in human nature, 
 and, as we conceive, an ultimate fact, not to be 
 accounted for by any other principle, in par- 
 ticular, not to be explained by a reference to 
 Self. For, we sympathize with total strangers, 
 with those far away, or long dead, who can have 
 
 '' Even Reid thus abuses the word when he talks of the Senli- 
 7nen/s of philosophers, of Locke, Hume, Berkeley, etc. See his 
 " Kssays on the Intellectual Powers." Essay II. Chaj). vii. viii.ix. 
 X. xi. xii. 
 
46 PEINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 no influence whatsoever on our fortunes. Nay, 
 we sympathize even with fictitious personages. 
 Besides, this feeling is often instantaneous, as in 
 Pity, and therefore cannot arise, as Hobbes says, 
 " from the imagination that the like calamity may 
 befall himself." And even if it did, what then ^ 
 On that supposition, no doubt, Sympathy would 
 be no longer an Ultimate fact, for it would be 
 accounted for by a selfish reflection ; but the fact 
 could not be explained away, — it could not be 
 denied that we do sympathize with others, in 
 numberless cases, where our own interests are 
 not immediateli/ concerned ; and therefore, even 
 on this supposition, the pleasures and pains of 
 Sympathy would be different from all others, and 
 we may add, more amiable, by reason of the 
 more remote reference to Self. 
 
 3. "Again, it cannot be denied that we often 
 desire the good of others, and sometimes their 
 evil, and that too in cases where the good or evil 
 of others seems productive of no benefit to our- 
 selves. No doubt, it may be maintained that, in 
 desiring the welfare of others, we really look to 
 our own gratification, and that the pleasure an- 
 ticipated from Sympathy creates the motive to 
 charitable deeds. But were this theory true, for 
 this also is a theory, it would not disprove the 
 reality of our Benevolent Desires, — it would only 
 account for their origin, supposing them to exist. 
 In every view of the case, then, the pleasures and 
 
DESIRE. 47 
 
 pains of Sympathy, which reach us as it were by 
 a rebound, because pleasure or pain has been 
 first felt by another, must be distinguished from 
 the pleasures and pains whi^ch affect us directly ; 
 and the desires which look immediately to the 
 welfare of our fellow-creatures, which becomes 
 our own only by Sympathy, must be separated 
 from the Desires which urge us to our own 
 gratification without regard to that of others." ^ 
 
 4. The reality of the Social Desires, as dis- 
 tinct from the Solitary or Self-regarding, being 
 established, we may now inquire how the former 
 originate. Do they really arise from the prospect 
 of some gratification to Self, however refined, or 
 do they not? 
 
 5. Take the case of Anger. When a choleric 
 man receives a blow, does he in general take time 
 to consider what benefit or what injury may result 
 to himself from returning it ? If he do, we may be 
 sure that Anger is not uppermost in his soul. He 
 may certainly restrain his Anger from Prudence, 
 from Fear, from Respect, for it is not pretended 
 that Anger is ungovernable ; but supposing it in- 
 dulged in, what does it imply *? When a blow is 
 received, the first impulse is to return it, and 
 if the impulse be not checked, the injury is re- 
 turned forthwith. To the feeling of injury, to the 
 perception of an individual as the cause of the 
 injury, there succeeds immediately a violent 
 
 *" Analysis and Theory of the Emotions." Part II. 
 
48 PEINCIPLES or PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 emotion of Hatred towards that individual, com- 
 prising pain at his presence, and desire of evil 
 towards him. Between the perception of the 
 being who has injured us, and the subsequent 
 emotion of Hatred, it does not seem possible to 
 detect any intervening feeling, or thought, much 
 less any calculation of consequences, or balancing 
 of opposite advantages. The emotion and its 
 effects are too sudden to admit of such an hypo- 
 thesis. Accordingly, the indulgence of Anger is 
 often quite at variance with our interests, it is 
 impolitic; and, therefore, the object of the pru- 
 dent and the crafty man is to keep it down. It 
 seems, then, vain to deny that the Malevolent 
 desire contained in Anger looks really to the evil 
 of another, not to the good of Self. The desire 
 is roused, as experience proves, not by the pros- 
 pect of some personal pleasure to come, but by 
 some pain actually felt. There is surely no reason, 
 prior to experience, why hurt to one who has in- 
 jured us may not be an ultimate object of Desire, 
 as well as pleasure to Self. The latter may be a 
 more general object, but must it be the only one ? 
 And where there is no convincing a priori argu- 
 mentj experience should decide. 
 
 6. What has been said of Anger, applies 
 equally to Love and Gratitude. Love, at first 
 sight, is no fiction of the poets, but a reality; 
 it may arise where no favours have been received, 
 and none expected; where there has been no 
 
DESIRE. 49 
 
 time for calculations of interest, none even for 
 anticipating the pleasures of Sympathy. The de- 
 light felt at the sight of the object seems 
 to be followed instantaneously by Good-will 
 towards it. So in the case of Gratitude. In 
 many instances, Love towards our Benefactor 
 rises instantly, far too suddenly to admit of any 
 calculation as to the advantages likely to result to 
 ourselves from returning his kindness, and even 
 too rapidly to allow of the pleasures of Sympathy 
 being presented to the mind in prospect, as an 
 object of Desire. As far as our experience tells 
 us, and we can go no farther, the Love, the Good- 
 will, immediately follows the feeling of a benefit, 
 and the thought of a benefactor; nor are we 
 sensible of any intervening sequence of phe- 
 nomena. Thus, as, in the case of anger, ill-wiJl 
 follows instantly the pain of an injury ; so, in 
 gratitude, good-will immediately succeeds to the 
 pleasure of the benefit. And if we have already 
 allowed that the evil of another may be an 
 ultimate object of Desire, we shall admit the more 
 easily that the good of another may be so like- 
 wise. Thus, it appears that, in simple Love, as 
 well as in Gratitude, it is the pleasure which we 
 actually feel, not a vague pleasure in prospect, 
 that rouses the Emotion of Desire, the object of 
 which is, not the good of Self, of whatsoever 
 kind, but that of another. 
 
 7. So far as to the origin of the Social 
 
 H 
 
50 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOCxY. 
 
 Desires, Benevolent, as well as Malevolent. Let 
 us now consider the Solitary or Self -regarding. 
 
 8. With respect to these, as well as to the 
 foregoing, there are two questions, the one re- 
 lating to the nature of the Self-regarding Desires, 
 the other to their origin. First, are all these re- 
 ducible to Desire of Pleasure, of some sort, or 
 Self-gratification,— in other words, are they all 
 varieties of one principle. Self-love ; or, on the 
 contrary, do they comprise Desires such as Am- 
 bition, Covetousness, Curiosity, which may be 
 distinguished from Self-love ^ ^ 
 
 9. A distinction may, no doubt, be got up 
 between Self-love, and the Self-regarding Desires 
 or Passions ; but then it is by changing the usual 
 meaning of the word. This is exactly what 
 Bishop Butler has done, by limiting the signifi- 
 cation of Self-love to a calm calculating view of 
 our interests, that is, to Desire guided by reason. 
 But the Desire does not change its nature because 
 it is so guided, — it remains the same, only under 
 control. There appears, therefore, no good 
 ground for this distinction. 
 
 10. It may be that all the Self-regarding 
 Desires look not to mere pleasure, but what of 
 that"? If they look to Power, simply as such, 
 
 •^ The latter is the opinion of Bishop Butler, in his famous 
 Sermons at the Rolls, and it has been adopted by Dr. Thomas 
 Brown, in his Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind. 
 Vol. IIL, Lect. Ixv, Ixvi. 
 
DESIRE. 51 
 
 without any ulterior object, or to Wealth, or to 
 Knowledge, or to Continued Existenee, it is still 
 our own Power, our own Wealth, our own Know- 
 ledge, our own Life, which we desire to increase 
 or prolong. Why then attempt a distinction 
 between them, as if one were more or less selfish 
 than another? Certainly, common sense makes 
 no such distinction, and in such matters, common 
 sense is of great weight. 
 
 1 1 . We cannot, therefore, adopt the distinc- 
 tion of Bishop Butler. At the same time, we 
 allow that a man may desire Power, Riches, or 
 Knowledge, for their own sakes, even without 
 thinking of the Pleasure which accompanies 
 them; but we believe that this is the result of 
 association, constant association with notions of 
 Pleasure. Riches, in particular, are sought at 
 first as the means of enjoyment, afterwards, by 
 the miser, for their own sake. So it is with the 
 rest. 
 
 12. It is allowed that Pleasure is one great 
 source of Desire, that the attainment of every 
 Desire is attended with Pleasure, and that this 
 Pleasure re-acts upon the Desire, and increases it. 
 There is surely, then, a probability that Pleasure 
 is ori(/inaUj/ the sole cause of Self-regarding 
 Desire. 
 
 13. This probability will be strengthened by 
 considering what we call a want. It is notorious 
 that men desire nothing ardently until they have 
 
52 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 felt a want of it. Now a want comprehends two 
 elements, a passive feeling of pain, (bodily or 
 mental, according to common language) and a 
 Desire of relief to that pain. So it is with 
 Hunger, and Thirst, which are properly Ajjpetites, 
 because, here the pain is a Sensation, immediately 
 depending on a change in the state of the body. 
 Other innumerable wants we have where the 
 pain is not a Sensation. 
 
 14. Desire of relief from Pain is a Desire of 
 Negative Pleasure. This, then, must be our first. 
 Desire, if, as we have seen reason to believe. 
 Hunger and Thirst are the first of our feelings 
 which comprise Emotion. 
 
 15. Moreover, all experience seems to prove 
 that our other Desires begin with Wants. The 
 pain of Ignorance first rouses Curiosity, the pain 
 of Inferiority, Ambition, and Love of Glory; 
 the prospect of Indigence, Desire of Riches; 
 wearisome Repetition, a wish for Variety ; while 
 the pain of ennui creates activity of every sort. 
 Pain, in short, seems to be the primum mobile of 
 the human race. 
 
 16. Let a man be perfectly at ease in body, 
 and in mind, and what can he desire"? Corollary : 
 Perfect happiness in this life, or merely the ab- 
 sence of all pain, is inconsistent with Religion ; 
 for it would stifle the desire of a life to come. 
 
 17. Pain, then, actually felt, is the Origin or 
 Cause of Desire; and its first form is desire of 
 
DESIRE. 53 
 
 relief from uneasiness. But desire of relief from 
 uneasiness is only a modification of desire of 
 Pleasure ; and, therefore, the conclusion is, that, 
 while Pain actually felt is the Source of Desire, 
 Pleasure is its primary object. It is allowed that, 
 subsequently/, other objects may be sought for their 
 own sakes, without direct reference to Pleasure ; 
 but had they not been intimately associated with 
 Pleasure, they never would have been desired. 
 
 18. To sum up all. When treating of the 
 Social Desires, we found that those desires are 
 real, and distinct from the Self-regarding; that 
 their direct object is the good or evil of others, 
 not the good of Self; and that they spring from 
 Passive Emotions of Pleasure, or of Pain, roused 
 by our fellows. Now we find that the Primary 
 Object of the Self-regarding Desires is Pleasure ; 
 while they originate in Pain. Therefore, Desire, in 
 general, springs from the actual feeling of Pleasure 
 or of Pain; the Benevolent affections taking their 
 origin from the former, the Malevolent, as well as 
 the Self-regarding, from the latter. 
 
 19. " If then you wish for the Love of others, 
 try to confer Pleasure ; and beware of giving 
 Pain, if you would not be an object of Hate." " 
 
 20. Does it not also follow that Pain, bodily 
 as well as mental, tends to render men Selfish or 
 INIalevolent ? It does ; yet so?ne private pain, so)?ie 
 
 " " Analysis aud Theoiy of the^Eiiioiioiis."' 
 
54 PRINCIPLES or PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 suffering, is essential to Sympathy, and to Pity. 
 Does Pleasure, then, make men Benevolent? 
 Only when it proceeds from another. Love 
 begets Love, — not merely to one, but to all. 
 
 21. There are two apparent exceptions to the 
 above Law, in the cases of Pity and Malice, for, 
 in these, Pain and Pleasure seem to create good 
 and ill-will respectively. We feel the sufferings of 
 our brother, and desire to relieve them ; we are 
 gratified at another's vexation, and wish to plague 
 him. How shall we account for this anomaly ? 
 
 22. When the sufferings of another give us 
 unmixed pain, they do not create Pity. The 
 proud man is humiliated at the calamities of his 
 relations, and in consequence feels Dislike to- 
 wards them, while towards others he entertains 
 only Contempt ; the over sensitive is shocked at 
 distress, and flies from it with Disgust or horror ; 
 while the righteous looks with Indignation, rather 
 than Pity, on merited misfortune. But when with 
 the Sympathetic pain is combined a pleasing Self- 
 complacency arising from contrast of position, as 
 well as from the consciousness of our suscep- 
 tibility to so amiable an emotion as Sympathy, 
 then arises Pity, the wish to relieve distress. 
 Thus pity springs from a mixture of pain and 
 pleasure, and the pain is even necessary to the 
 pleasure ; but where there is no pleasure there is 
 no Pity. This then is no real exception. There 
 are two Causes at work, Pain and Pleasure, and 
 
JJESIRE. 55 
 
 the latter counteracts the former, producing its 
 usual effect, a feeling of Benevolence. 
 
 23. Remains the case of Malice. In simple 
 Malice, the pain of another gives pleasure, with- 
 out any previous hatred ; and desiring the continu- 
 ance of the pleasure, we must wish for the con- 
 tinuance of the pain. Here, pleasure derived 
 from another produces, not benevolence, but male- 
 volence, because the pain of another is indispens- 
 able to our own gratification, which depends upon 
 that pain, and upon nothing else. This, then, is 
 a real exception to the Law above stated, because, 
 happily, the tendency to feel pleasure, not pain, 
 at the ills of others, is itself an exception, an 
 anomaly in human nature. 
 
 24. That pain is the primum mobile of the 
 human race, first in the order of time, as well as 
 in importance, is a great truth pregnant with in- 
 ferences. It has often been remarked that men 
 of genius are liable to mental pains to which or- 
 dinary men are strangers ; but it has not been so 
 frequently noticed that those very pains develope 
 genius. Intolerance of life without activity, of 
 mere existence without distinction, a painful sense 
 of insignificance, an inward burning under Con- 
 tempt and obloquy, mental maladies in every 
 form, urge the man who has powers to exert 
 them to the utmost. The keen annoyance pro- 
 duced by an ill-natured Review first drew out 
 the talents of Lord Byron. The easy, good- 
 
56 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 tempered, phlegmatic man, knows little of such 
 pains, and, therefore, he never rises to eminence. 
 Pain is the source of superiority, — the price that 
 is paid for it. 
 
 SECTION FOURTH. 
 
 OF THE WILL. 
 
 1. We now approach one of the most knotty 
 points in Metaphysics, involving the Liberty, or 
 the Necessity, of the Will. 
 
 2. To the solution of all intricate questions, 
 a right comprehension of the meaning of terms, 
 and an accurate statement of the Question, are 
 indispensable ; sometimes nothing more is re- 
 quired. Here, then, these must not be neglected. 
 
 3. First, then, what is meant by the Will ; 
 or, when are we said to Will anything % 
 
 4. It is perfectly clear that Will and Desire 
 are intimately related ; and yet they are not the 
 same. Volition^ which is an act of that Faculty 
 which we call WILL, always comprehends an emo- 
 tion of Desire ; but every Desire is not a Volition ; 
 consequently, Volition means Desire, and some- 
 thing more. 
 
 5. So far well ; but what is that more ? We 
 desire many things, some only for a moment, 
 others for a longer time, till the desire ceases, or 
 
OF THE WILL. 57 
 
 is driven out by a contrary ; nay, we Desire things 
 which we know to be unattainable ; but we never 
 Will when we know that we cannot perform. 
 Will, then, certainly implies Belie/' that the ob- 
 ject of Desire is in our power. 
 
 6. Still, I may strongly desire to master a 
 difficult work, say the Princijda of Newton ; nay, 
 I may believe that I shall master it, but can I 
 affirm that I will*? So, though I may earnestly 
 wish to conquer a certain habit of thought, and 
 I may even believe that I shall, yet I cannot say 
 that I will succeed. Why not*? Because no one 
 can have a perfect belief, free from all doubt, that 
 his Thoughts will be obedient to his Desires. 
 We know that Thou2;hts are rebellious above all 
 things ; they are certainly greatly influenced by 
 Desire, but they obey it not implicitly, and can- 
 not be Willed. 
 
 7. And if Thought be not directly subject to 
 Desire, neither are Emotions, nor Sensations. No 
 one can pretend to call up an Emotion or a Sen- 
 sation directly, and at pleasure. Therefore, none 
 of these Mental States are subject to the Will. 
 Indirectly we can do much ; but we must first 
 Will something for the purpose, and, after all, 
 the end may fail. 
 
 8. Wliat then can we Will*? What can we 
 Desire without a doubt of succeeding"? Action, 
 bodily action, and nothing else. Here alone there 
 is Volition^ because here alone Desire is despotic. 
 
 I 
 
58 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 9. Finally, to constitute an act of the Will, 
 or Volition, it is necessary that an outward ac- 
 tion be performed ; for, were a man's arm sud- 
 denly to become paralysed, he might make a 
 mental effort to move it, but he could not be said 
 to Will what was never done. 
 
 10. Therefore, to sura up all, Volition is Desire^ 
 C07nbined with undonhting Belief that the object is 
 in our power ^ and terminating in an outward action, 
 
 1 1 . Having fixed the meaning of the term 
 Will, we have next to enquire in what sense 
 Liberty, or Necessity, can be applied to it. 
 
 12. In common language the term Liberty is 
 more frequently opposed to Slavery than to Ne- 
 cessity ; and it may be useful to our present pur- 
 pose, first to determine the former meaning of the 
 word. 
 
 13. When Liberty is opposed to Slavery, it 
 evidently implies the absence of Restraint or 
 Hindrance to action ; so that what we have to 
 determine is the nature of this Restraint or Hin- 
 drance. 
 
 14. Not every restraint, not every hindrance, 
 is opposed to Liberty ; for no one would say that 
 his Liberty was infringed, because he could not 
 walk ten miles an hour. He would say that he 
 was free, but he had not the Poiver. Neither 
 would he say that he was not at Liberty to mas- 
 ter the Principia of Newton, but he was unable. 
 Therefore the mere want of bodily or mental 
 
 .mM 
 
OF THE WILL. 59 
 
 power in the individual is not opposed to Liberty. 
 
 15. Neither is every hindrance from without 
 at variance with Liberty ; for if a man came to a 
 mountain which he could not cross, or were he 
 kept from leaving his house by a flood of waters, 
 he would not really think himself less free ; 
 though, speaking metaphorically, he might call 
 himself a prisoner. His Power alone, as in the 
 former case, would be interfered with, not his 
 Liberty. 
 
 16. Now suppose that he be kept at home by 
 fear of a raging lion roaming round his dwelling, 
 is he then less free '? Certainly not, in the pro- 
 per use of language. He is restrained by his 
 fears ; but the fear of a beast is not Slavery. 
 
 17. What if he be restrained from any action, 
 from any sin, by the fear of God, or of some 
 superior Spirit ? Would this be an attack upon 
 Liberty r By no means. The man is still free to 
 do as he pleases. All men think themselves so. 
 
 18. But lastly, let a man be hindered from 
 doing anything he may wish, either by a physical 
 obstacle set up on purpose to restrain him by his 
 fellow-men, as bolts and bars, or by fear of some 
 harm from them ; then he is no longer free. 
 
 19. Thus it appears that Liberty, when op- 
 posed to Slavery, is curbed by the resisting Wills 
 of our fellow-men, and by nothing else. Man 
 alone can abridge the Liberty of man ; and this 
 abridgement consists either in a positive impedi- 
 
60 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 ment, set up on purpose, as prison walls and 
 fetters, or in the dread of some penalty. 
 
 20. Liberty, in the above sense, as opposed 
 to Slavery, is applied only to action ; and a man 
 is a free agent in so far as he is unrestrained by 
 the Wills of his fellows. But, in every society, 
 civilized or savage, man experiences some op- 
 position from other men, even the most despotic 
 monarch, and, therefore, no where but in perfect 
 solitude can there be perfect Liberty. And the 
 most abject slave, even the negro of Carolina, has 
 freedom in some of his actions. Consequently, 
 the question of Liberty in this sense is one of 
 degree ; and we cannot say absolutely that man 
 is either free or enslaved ; though the difference 
 between an Englishman and a black slave be im- 
 mense. 
 
 21. When, however, Liberty is applied to the 
 Will, then it is opposed not to Slavery, but to 
 Necessity. What, then, is meant by Liberty in 
 this sense, — what by Necessity ? and where is the 
 analogy between the two meanings of the former 
 word ? 
 
 22. We have said that when Liberty is op- 
 posed to Slavery, liberty of action is always un- 
 derstood, and this consists in the absence of 
 restraint upon our actions from the wills of our 
 fellow-men. 
 
 23. But what is an action *? Action here 
 must mean voluntary action, or it means nothing; 
 
OF THE WILL. Gl 
 
 for this alone can be enslaved ; and it consists of 
 two parts, the Will or Mental State, which is the 
 Cause, and the outward movement, the Effect. 
 Now, as an Effect can be either produced or pre- 
 vented only by operating on the Cause, therefore, 
 it is really the Will which is restrained, wherever 
 Liberty is abridged. Consequently, in the popu- 
 lar, as^ well as in the philosophical sense of the 
 word, Liberty refers to the Will, and as the ab- 
 sence of restraint, of one sort, is thereby supposed 
 in the former case, so, we may presume, restraint 
 of another sort is implied in the latter. For the 
 common use of language is a guide, wiiich may 
 indeed lead us astray, but still it is a guide. INIen 
 seldom call things by the same name whicb have 
 no points of resemblance. Liberty, then, when 
 opposed to Necessity, implies restraint upon the 
 Will, as well as when opposed to Slavery. Con- 
 sequently, the difference must lie in the kind of 
 restraint. 
 
 24. We believe that the Course of Nature, at 
 least of Material Nature, is dependant upon fixed 
 Causes, causes which under the same circum- 
 stance always produce the same Effects ; though, 
 of course, it would be the height of presumption 
 to deny that the Being who arranged the whole 
 may alter the same at His pleasure. Still it is 
 matter of experience that the course of material 
 nature is uniform, and we act with confidence 
 accordingly. We can thus predict with certainty. 
 
62 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 long before, Physical Phenomena, such as the rise 
 of tides, the eclipses of Sun and Moon, and the 
 events always come to pass just as we foretold. 
 We, therefore, cannot believe that there exists in 
 the Physical universe any power of originating 
 change, of beginning motion ; in other words, the 
 course of Physical Nature is Necessary, 
 
 25. By Necessity, then, we mean a fixed un- 
 alterable (except by Omnipotence) concatenation 
 of Cause and Effect, wherein no change originates, 
 every change depending entirely on something 
 that went before. Now the question is, is the 
 Will, and consequently are the voluntary acts of 
 man, included in this necessary Course of Nature, 
 or are they not ^ On the latter supposition, the 
 Will is said to be free, free from the restraint of 
 an immutable Law, and consequently endowed 
 wuth a power of originating change. That is the 
 kind of restraint which necessity supposes. 
 
 26. Between Voluntary Motion, and every 
 other motion in the universe, the separation is 
 wide, deep', unfathomable, impassable, — for in 
 pure physical motion the cause, or Indispensable 
 Antecedent, is always some other motion, — 
 whereas, in Voluntary movement, the A.ntecedent 
 is mental, a Volition. Here, then, we have an 
 instance of the Origin of motion. Can we then 
 escape the inference that the First Cause of all 
 motion is spiritual^ 
 
 27. This argument for a spiritual first cause 
 
OF THE WILL. 63 
 
 is quite independent of that derived from the 
 manifold instances of desisrn in the universe. 
 Both come to the same conclusion, but from 
 different premises. Design unquestionably argues 
 a designer, and a designer must be intellectual, 
 and therefore spiritual. Again, we know but of 
 one case of the origin of motion, and in that 
 case the cause is spiritual ; hence the probability 
 that the first cause of all motion is spiritual. 
 These are the two grand arguments against 
 Materialism and Atheism ; two powers which 
 have often been crushed, and apparently annihi- 
 lated ; but ever and anon they rise again out of 
 the dirt, to scare and sadden the world. Some- 
 times they stalk abroad in great pomp, arrayed in 
 the garb of poetry by a Lucretius, sometimes they 
 lurk more modestly under the mask of gradual 
 developments^ or the cloak of positive Philosophy. 
 
 28. Man, being endowed with the power of 
 originating motion, partakes, in so far, of the 
 Attributes of Deity. He becomes, as it were, a 
 creator, a creator of motion, and thus, within his 
 comparatively limited sphere, he has great in- 
 fluence, either for good or for ill. Now, the God 
 whom we acknowledge, is not, like the Gods of 
 antiquity, subjected to a dark mysterious power 
 called Fate ; but he is a self-existent, self- 
 dependant, self-originating being, free to act or 
 not to act. If, then, man be so far like to God, 
 tliat he has a power of originating motion, is it 
 
64 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 not probable that this power bears a re- 
 semblance to that of God who gave it'? that, 
 being once communicated, some Liberty was 
 given along with it to complete the delegated 
 authority ? Had the will of man been tied down 
 by inexorable laws, like material nature, would 
 not the gift have been illusory '? Instead of being 
 a copy, on an infinitely small scale, but still a 
 copy, of the Divine Will, would it not have been 
 quite different '? If God created man in his own 
 image, that resemblance must be supposed to 
 extend to his Will, without which the resemblance 
 could be of no importance. In short, once allow 
 that there is a God, a Spiritual and a free Being, 
 and that Fate is nonsense as applied to him ; then 
 we may presume that man, so far as spiritual, is 
 also free from fate. 
 
 29. This beginning of motion by the Will is 
 a grand and instructive fact, for it at once does 
 away with the argument derived from the neces- 
 sary chain of Cause and Effect, supposed to pre- 
 vail in the world of matter. A case wherein 
 motion begins can have no analogy to any other, 
 where motion is the effect of some previous 
 motion. There is, then, no improbability, prior 
 to actual experience, in the lines of the poet — 
 
 " And binding nature fast in fate, 
 Left free the human WilL" 
 
OF THE WILL. 65 
 
 as there would have been but for the marked 
 difference between the origin and the continua- 
 tion of motion, and, I may add, the utter unlike- 
 ness in almost every respect between Mind and 
 Matter. Matter is subject to the law of vis 
 inerticc, i. e., it has a tendency to remain for ever 
 in the same state, whether of rest or motion ; 
 but Mind is perpetually changing, so that no one 
 can predict what his own state of mind may be 
 half-an-hour hence. It is clear, then, that all 
 analogies drawn from Matter to Mind are' falla- 
 cious. They may do for Poetry, but they are 
 inadmissable in Philosophy. 
 
 30. Having thus disposed of what may be 
 called the a priori argument in favour of Ne- 
 cessity, derived from Necessity in matter ; and 
 having shewn further, that the acknowledged 
 resemblance between God and Man in the power 
 of originating motion, renders it probable that 
 this resemblance comprehends the liberty of will- 
 ing, we may next consider what we learn on the 
 subject from direct experience. 
 
 31. That the human mind is in some degree 
 subject to causes, known and admitting of calcu- 
 lation, is a truth acknowledged by the universal 
 sense of mankind. All law, all morality, all 
 society, rest upon this supposition. There is no 
 law, political or moral, without a sanction, that 
 is, w ithout reward or punishment, — and, if reward 
 and punishment produce no effect, they are empty 
 
 K 
 
66 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 names. But, that they do produce some Effect, 
 all men allow, though, as to the degree of Effect, 
 we may differ in opinion. And how can they act 
 but upon the Wills of men, and if they do so 
 act, then the Will is subject to causes known and 
 appreciable. The sanction of political law is 
 generally some punishment, in the shape of 
 restraint upon liberty, or bodily pain, or even loss 
 of life, or else some curtailment of our estate ; 
 while moral laws are guarded by more spiritual 
 arms, by praise and blame, moral approbation 
 and disapprobation. These, no less than the 
 terrors of political law, are universally supposed 
 to have an Effect, more or less, in the way of 
 encouraging some actions, and discouraging 
 others ; and be the Effect what it may, it can be 
 produced only through the Will. 
 
 32. bo far, then, we know that men are uni- 
 versally agreed. Wherever men exist there is some 
 moral law, wherever society is established there 
 is some political law, and every where they are 
 supposed to tend towards an useful effect, to have 
 a beneficient influence on the minds, and ulti- 
 mately on the Wills and Actions of mankind. This 
 universal belief we cannot suppose unfounded, 
 without violating a fundamental article of faith, 
 that whatever is universally believed has some 
 foundation in truth. Men in all ages, and in all 
 countries, cannot have believed a lie, at least 
 where the subject was one open to common ob- 
 
OF THE WILL. 67 
 
 servation ; and what is more present to us than 
 the Wills and Actions of ourselves and our fellows? 
 
 33. On this sure foundation, Hume, Hobbes, 
 and others, have attempted to raise the fabric of 
 Necessity, but the basis was too-narrow for the 
 super-structure. For, if it be true that the Will 
 of man is to some extent subject to known Causes, 
 it is also a fact that the operation of these Causes 
 is very variable and uncertain, widely different 
 from the steady invariable march of physical 
 agencies. No Moral or Political Laws produce all 
 the effect intended. They certainly do check 
 crime and misdemeanour, but very imperfectly, as 
 all experience proves. With all our efforts, with 
 all our improvements in Morals and Politics, there 
 still remains a wide range of action which no Law 
 can reach. Our experience, then, of the operation 
 of human Laws does not disprove the doctrine of 
 Liberty, it shows only that Liberty has limits ; 
 that regulated Liberty, in short, not Licence or 
 mere Caprice, is the Law of Human Nature and 
 the Law of God. 
 
 34. If, on the one hand, the words and 
 actions of all men, in all ages, prove that they 
 consider the human Will to be in some degree 
 subject to the influence of known Causes ; on the 
 other, they are no less agreed as to the fact, that 
 these causes cannot be surely relied upon, and that 
 there exists in man a power which can set at naught 
 the deepest calculations. This power, the power 
 
68 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 of willing, is then universally allowed, in a degree, 
 to originate within the individual, and not to be 
 traced to any outward source; and if we rely upon 
 the universal belief of mankind in one case, so 
 must we in another. At first sight, the two 
 opinions may seem contradictory ; but they are 
 not so ; for the opinion in neither case is ab- 
 solute. All men believe that the Will may be 
 influenced by known causes in some degree ; and 
 again, all believe that it can resist that influence 
 and act proj^rio inotu, and here there is no contra- 
 diction. The evidence of both these facts rests 
 partly upon the Consciousness of what passes 
 within ourselves, from which there is no appeal, 
 partly on our experience of the actions of others ; 
 and both go to establish the same conclusion — 
 the Liberty, but not the unlimited Liberty, of man. 
 35. In the following passage, the whole ques- 
 tion is taken for granted, and decided at once 
 against Liberty. " I conceive that nothing taketh 
 beginning from itself, but from the action of some 
 other immediate agent without itself. And that, 
 therefore, when first a man hath an appetite or 
 Will to something to which immediately before 
 he had no appetite nor will, the cause of his will 
 is not the will itself, but something else not in 
 his own disposing. So that, whereas, it is out 
 of controversy, that of voluntary actions the 
 Will is the necessary cause, and by this which 
 is said the Will is also caused by other things, 
 
OF THE WIT.L. (39 
 
 whereof it disposeth not, it followeth that volun- 
 tary actions have all of them necessary causes, 
 and, therefore, are necessitated." ° 
 
 36. Here it is evident that in starting with 
 the assumption that " nothing taketh beginning 
 from itself, but from the action of some other im- 
 mediate agent without itself," the whole question 
 is taken for granted. For such exactly is the 
 point in debate. To this assumption we may ob- 
 ject, and say, how do you know that ? 
 
 37. It is here assumed as an unquestionable 
 truth, that' whatever begins to exist must have 
 had a Cause of its existence, without itself. But 
 those who believe in a Deity must allow that one 
 Being at least exists without such a cause, from 
 all Eternity, and if we allow such a Being, how- 
 ever incomprehensible, as more reasonable than a 
 perpetual succession of Causes from all Eternity, 
 why may we not allow that something may bcffi?i 
 to exist without an outward Cause, provided such 
 a supposition be agreeable to the evidence of 
 Consciousness ? Is the fact of something be(jin- 
 ning to exist without an outward Cause more 
 incomprehensible than a Being existing without 
 an outward Cause from all Eternity ? 
 
 38. Our experience of the course of Physical 
 Nature certainly leads us to suppose that every 
 material change had a cause without itself ; and 
 
 * Hobbes' Tripos : of Libeily and Necessity. 
 
70 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 a good deal of our experience of men leads us to 
 the same conclusion ; but our experience is ne- 
 cessarily limited, and, even within that experience, 
 there are, we maintain, great ojjparent exceptions, 
 to say the least. 
 
 39. But be our experience what it may, it 
 never can lead to an infallible conclusion, to a 
 conclusion universal and free from all possibility 
 of error. We can never rely upon it, as we can 
 upon the self-evident axioms and the demonstra- 
 tions of Geometry. That two straight lines can 
 never enclose a space, that the two angles at the 
 base of an isosceles triangle are equal, we cannot 
 doubt, when once we have considered the axiom, 
 or taken in the proof of the latter proposition. 
 Experience, Custom, Association, here go for no- 
 thing ; all is the work of pure Intellect. But our 
 Belief in an unbroken chain of Causes and Effects, 
 at first instinctive and unaccountable, is ajter- 
 wards only fortified by Experience, Custom, Asso- 
 ciation ; and neither first nor last can we see that 
 such a chain is necessary. We therefore cannot 
 dogmatically assert that the Law has no excep- 
 tion. And if the believers in Deity must allow 
 of one exception, for w^ith Him the chain begins, 
 they have no reason positively to disbelieve any 
 other ; provided a good case be made out. And 
 such a case we conceive to be afforded by the 
 Will of him who was made in the image of Deity. 
 
 40. From the above passage of Hobbes we 
 
OF THE WILL. 71 
 
 see that the doctrine of Man's Necessity is de- 
 duced from that of a perpetual succession of 
 Causes and Effects distinct from each other, with- 
 out end, -without beginning, — a system \vhich 
 embraces no First Cause, no Deity. Thus Man's 
 Necessity follows from Atheism. The conclusion 
 is worthy of the premises ; and so we leave it." 
 
 41. A Philosopher of a very different stamp 
 from the one above quoted, a religious Philo- 
 sopher of the present day, has well said that " The 
 Idea of a Cause is not derived from Experience, 
 but has its origin in the mind itself ; "*" for the Idea 
 of a Cause arises in the infant mind after a single 
 instance of succession. The child who has burned 
 his finger in the candle will avoid it ever after. 
 The great error of the untutored mind is the see- 
 ing of Cause and Effect every where, an error 
 
 *" The doctrine of Atheism involves Man's Necessity ; but the 
 doctrine of Man's Necessity does not involve Atheism ; for many 
 necessitarians have been Theists. These admit One First Cause, 
 free and uncontrolled, but they deny any other. Do they not ])er- 
 ceive that the admission of One Free agent is an argument for the 
 existence of other similar agents'? The system which combines 
 Necessity with Atheism is at least more consistent than that which 
 unites Necessity with Theism. The one is an uniform web, the 
 other but a piece of patchwork. 
 
 ' Whewell's '* Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences." 
 Book III. chap, ii. 
 
72 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 which experience alone can correct. But when 
 the same philosopher goes on to maintain, that the 
 axiom " Every Event must have a Cause " is a 
 necessary one, that " the Relation of Cause and 
 Effect is of the same kind as the necessary rela- 
 tions of figure and number," he certainly runs 
 from one error into another. And both we con- 
 ceive to be dangerous. He who maintains with 
 Hume that our Idea of Cause and Effect is de- 
 rived from Experience or Custom, as he calls it, 
 and that prior to Experience anything may be the 
 Cause of anything, asserts a doctrine which, in its 
 application merely to physical changes, considered 
 as isolated phenomena, is no doubt free from dan- 
 ger. But when it is thence inferred that, for 
 aught we know, senseless matter may have ar- 
 ranged itself into the beautiful and beneficent 
 order manifest in the material world, or, still 
 more, that it may have produced an intelligent 
 soul, the mind instinctively revolts against such 
 an opinion, and loudly proclaims it false. Scared 
 from one extreme, we not unnaturally run into 
 another; but there again danger meets us. In 
 maintaining with Dr. Whewell that the axiom 
 " every Event must have a Cause " is a necessary 
 one, we support the doctrine of a perpetual cir- 
 cuit of Causes and Effects, without end, without 
 beginning, and thus we get rid of a Great First 
 Cause. That such was far, very far from the in- 
 tention of this distinguished author, we well 
 
OF THE WILL. 73 
 
 know ; but nevertheless the conclusion is a legiti- 
 mate inference from the premises.** 
 
 42. The axiom, that "Every event must have 
 a Cause " is not necessary, for it is not self-evident, 
 and not universal, if we believe in God. Neither 
 is the axiom derived from Experience, for we be- 
 lieve it long before experience could have taught it. 
 It is, then, one of those fundamental Articles of 
 Belief, truly instinctive, for they arise in the mind 
 on the first occasion, but not self-evident, and, 
 therefore not necessary, and possibly not universal. 
 
 43. It may, indeed, be said that by the word 
 ''event" is meant some change which had a be- 
 ginning, and that, as God had no beginning, he is 
 no exception to the Law. But if you allow that 
 a Being may exist without an outward cause 
 of his existence, can you dogmatically deny that 
 any thing can begin to exist without an outward 
 cause *? Can you show that one of these sup- 
 positions is possible, the other not*? and it is only 
 for possibility that we are at present contending. 
 You must either admit both, or neither ; that is, 
 you must either admit the possibility of God's ex- 
 istence and of Man's Liberty, or you must reject 
 both, and fall back upon Atheism and Necessity. 
 
 '' Thus we sfie that the axiom that prior to Experience any 
 thing may be the Cause of any thing, though true of material 
 changes, separately considered, leads to absurdity and Atheism 
 when applied to organized matter, and to the intellectual world. 
 See ou this subject Cudworih's " Intellectual System." Chap. iii. 
 L 
 
74 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 44. The argument by which Hume attempts 
 to shake our belief in a Deity altogether, having 
 previously reduced His Power and importance as 
 much as possible, is derived entirely from the 
 axiom that, in matters of fact at least, the Intel- 
 lect is so dependant on Experience, that it cannot 
 advance one step beyond. " It is only when two 
 species of objects are found to be constantly con- 
 joined, that we can infer the one from the other ; 
 and were an Effect produced which was entirely 
 singular, and could not be comprehended under 
 any known species^ I do not see that we could form 
 any conjecture or inference at all concerning its 
 Cause. If experience, and observation, and an- 
 alogy be, indeed, the only guides which we can 
 reasonably follow in inferences of this nature; 
 both the Effect and Cause must bear a similarity 
 and resemblance to other Effects and Causes 
 which we know, and which we have found in 
 many instances to be conjoined with each other. 
 I leave to your own reflection to pursue the con- 
 sequences of this principle. I shall just observe 
 that, as the antagonists o{ Epicurus always suppose 
 the universe, an Effect quite singular and unpar- 
 alleled, to be the proof of a Deity, a Cause no less 
 singular and unparalleled, your reasonings, upon 
 that supposition, seem, at least, to merit our at- 
 tention." ^ 
 
 ' Essays, Vol. II. Sec. xi. *' Of a Particular Providence and 
 of a Future State." 
 
OF THE WILL. 75 
 
 45. Now, the greater the difference between 
 the works of Creation and those of Man, the 
 stronger is the argument against the truth of the 
 axiom on which the above reasoning is founded. 
 For, I maintain, that no unprejudiced man, in the 
 full enjoyment of his Intellect, can examine nar- 
 rowly the works of Creation, for the first time, 
 before custom has rendered them familiar, with- 
 out being convinced of the existence of a Deity. 
 Let the marvellous structure of the human body 
 be unveiled to a young man, for the first time, by 
 anatomy ; let him study the formation of the eye, 
 and the beautiful provision for refracting the light 
 and throwing it on the Retina; or let him ex- 
 amine the hand, and observe how the tendons are 
 perforated exactly in the proper places to allow 
 other tendons to pass through to move the 
 further digits ; and he must be a dolt if the belief 
 in a God do not come upon him with a force to 
 defy all Scepticism. 
 
 46. This uncontrollable Belief is not only a 
 proof, the strongest possible, of the being of God, 
 but it also disproves the axiom that the Intellect 
 is chained down by Experience ; for we allow the 
 difference between the works of God and the 
 works of Man, and the greater the difference the 
 stronger the argument against the truth of the 
 axiom. No doubt there is an analogy between 
 the works of Creation and our own, whatever 
 Hume may say to the contrary, an analogy which 
 
76 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 may help to open up the Intellect to see design 
 m nature ; but this consciousness of design must 
 be chiefly the work of the Intellect itself, because 
 we never witnessed the formation of an animal or 
 a plant, or anything much like to either. 
 
 It is not then because the works of nature are 
 similar to a house, a watch, or a steam-engine, 
 which I know to be effect of man's design, that I 
 infer that an animal or a plant is also the result 
 of design. I see the design at once, il saute aux 
 yeuoc, as the French say, it is almost, if not quite, 
 self-evident. No doubt a cultivated mind is re- 
 quired, and the instances of man's design which 
 we have witnessed must have taught us to detect 
 design in other and very different instances ; but, 
 we do not argue from the one to the other ; we 
 have no occasion so to argue ; for the mind, so 
 prepared, sees design in nature at once. Is any 
 argument required to prove that the tendons of 
 the hand above alluded to were perforated on 
 purpose to admit the other tendons ^ Can this 
 admit of a question *? Does not even the ir- 
 religious x\natomist and Physiologist tacitly and 
 unavoidably admit design though he openly deny 
 a designer^ For does he not constantly discourse 
 of the functions^ the uses, the imrposes of the vari- 
 ous organs '? and what do these words imply *? If 
 he discover a new organ in any animal, does he 
 for a moment doubt whether it be of any use ? 
 Nay, is not his whole object to find it ouf? And 
 
OF THE WILL. 77 
 
 does he not thus as really admit a Creator and 
 Designer as if he acknowledged Him in set words'? 
 Thus, the Physiologist cannot discourse on his 
 own subject, without at every moment contradict- 
 ing Atheism. 
 
 Nay, more, as Reid has admirably observed, 
 were the doctrine of Hume correct, it would 
 be impossible to know that any work, even of 
 man, proceeded from an Intelligent Cause ; for, 
 according to Hume, the Cause and the Effect 
 must have been observed in conjunction ; and, in 
 this case, that can never be. We may see the 
 hands of a man at work, but can we see the In- 
 tellect and the Will that direct and move them ? 
 Impossible ; and, therefore, on this theory, did we 
 see a watch made, all we could know would be 
 that hands made it, but w^hat guided the hands 
 we could never tell. Surely this is a rediictio ad 
 ahsurdum. The case proves that design is never 
 perceived through the senses, that, in the works of 
 others, it is not, properly speaking, known by Ex- 
 perience, but inferred by Reason. The only Ex- 
 perience of the operation of design which we 
 can have, is in our own case, when our mind and 
 our hands work together ; and having thus learnt 
 the outward effect of a mental purpose, we can 
 afterwards detect that influence, even in cases 
 which bear but a faint resemblance to any work of 
 ours. On so narrow a basis of Experience can 
 the Intellect build a mighty super-structure, rising 
 from Earth to Heaven, from Self to Deity ! 
 
78 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 47. From the view above taken of the ques- 
 tion of Liberty and Necessity two very important 
 inferences remain to be stated ; first, that there 
 is such a thing as a Practical Science of Human 
 Nature ; secondly, that such a Science can never 
 become an exact one. If, on the one hand, the 
 Will of man be, in a degree at least, obedient to 
 known Causes, then, so far we can regulate that 
 Will, or it becomes the subject of Practical 
 Science ; and if, on the other, it be only partially 
 bound by Causes that can be calculated, then the 
 Science must always be imperfect. And, that 
 such is the fact at present, cannot be denied. 
 There are many Sciences of a practical nature, 
 the subject of which is the Will of man ; namely, 
 Ethics properly so called, which attempts to regu- 
 late the Wills of men as individuals, and Politics, 
 which, in its largest sense, comprehends several 
 subordinate Sciences, which profess to direct the 
 Wills of men in Society. There is, then, a body of 
 Practical Science, applicable to Human Nature. 
 And who will maintain that this Science is not 
 imperfect ? Nothing can show its imperfection 
 more forcibly than the fact, that it has been 
 debated whether there were such a Science or 
 not ; and that philosophers have thought them- 
 selves obliged to prove the Affirmative. Did any 
 one ever question the existence of Mathematical 
 or of Physical Science ? The innumerable dis- 
 putes in Moral and Political Philosophy also 
 prove how little it can pretend to be exact. 
 
OF THE WILL. 79 
 
 48. These two conclusions being allowed to 
 be true at present, it may, nevertheless, be main- 
 tained, that the Science of Human Nature is still 
 in a provisional state, that it is improving, and 
 will improve till it become as exact as Natural 
 Philosophy. Our opinion upon this point must 
 depend upon the view we take of the question of 
 Liberty and Necessity. They who think that the 
 Human Will is subject to Causes which can be 
 calculated as well as those which regulate the 
 material world ; that, though hidden for a time, 
 they may be brought to light ; they, in short, who 
 maintain the doctrine of Necessity, may hope in 
 time to see a Social Edifice of fair and uniform 
 appearance, having Science for its Architect ; 
 but those who believe in Liberty will look upon 
 the fabric as a vision. Enthusiasts and even 
 Philosophers have not been wanting, who have 
 endeavoured to re-model and regenerate man and 
 Society by the application of a favourite Prin- 
 ciple, at one time by enlightened Self-interest, at 
 another by co-operation or Socialism, but the 
 signal failure of all such attempts has proved their 
 vanity. 
 
 49. That difficulties attend the theory of 
 Liberty, as here explained, is no valid objection, 
 if equal, much more if greater difficulties attend 
 the opposite theory. There is no self-evident 
 absurdity in the supposition of action originating 
 in Self; and we certainly can as easily embrace 
 
80 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 this notion, as that of a perpetual circuit of Causes 
 and Effects, without beginning, without end. 
 Moreover, the undoubted fact of the origin of 
 motion from volition gives greater credibility to 
 the former hypothesis. But further, once believe 
 in God, allow the existence of a First Cause, and 
 the probability of self-originating action in man 
 becomes increased ; especially when confirmed by 
 direct experience, by our own Consciousness, by 
 Conscience or our feelings of responsibility, as well 
 as by the universal opinion of others that our 
 actions are in our own power. 
 
 50. The chief difficulty attending the doctrine 
 of Liberty is derived from our belief in the fore- 
 knowledge of God. Man may fore-know an event 
 as highly probable, a physical event almost as 
 certain, but this knowledge does not necessarily 
 imply any power of promoting or hindering the 
 result. I cannot doubt that the Sun will rise to- 
 morrow, but the event is utterly beyond my 
 controul. When, however, the Being who fore- 
 knows an Effect is also the Author of all nature, 
 and endued with all power, then it seems to 
 follow that, if an event has been fore-known, it 
 must also have been fore-willed, and if fore-willed, 
 what becomes of the Liberty of man ? 
 
 51. Such is the objection, and what is the 
 answer ? The answer is, that this objection to the 
 Liberty of the Will is derived from our notions as 
 to the nature of Deity, and his mode of operation 
 
OF THE WILL. 81 
 
 with his creatures, subjects excessively obscure, 
 and ahnost out of the reach of the Human Intel- 
 lect ; whereas, our Belief in the Liberty of man is 
 founded upon our own Consciousness, and our 
 own Conscience, as well as upon the concurrent 
 opinion of all mankind ; that is, upon evidence 
 which comes home to every one. Shall we reject 
 evidence which we can appreciate, because we 
 cannot solve a difficulty which it is impossible 
 we should solve with our limited faculties ^ To 
 judge of the agency of God we must become Gods 
 or Angels, but to judge of ourselves we may re- 
 main men. Moreover, the objection goes to 
 prove too much. It has been well observed by 
 Dugald Stewart, that if the fore-knowledge of God 
 be inconsistent with the Liberty of Man, then is 
 it inconsistent with His own Liberty? Are The- 
 istical Necessitarians prepared to admit this 
 conclusion'? 
 
 52. That a creature who sees so little as man, 
 and that " through a glass darkly," should dog- 
 matically assert that with God to fore-know is to 
 ordain, that God has no means whereby to recon- 
 cile his Omniscience and Omnipotence with the 
 Liberty of man, is certainly presumptuous, as well 
 as unphilosophical. It is a moral offence, as well 
 as an intellectual mistake. But on the strength of 
 this assumption, to deny what we know and feel, 
 is an outrage to common sense, as well as to 
 common piety. 
 
 M 
 
82 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 53. Suppose we adopt the opposite theory- 
 do we then get rid of difficulties ^ We certainly 
 do obtain a system of Divine agency, in one re- 
 spect more in accordance with our own limited 
 notions, a system, apparently, simple and har- 
 monious. God fore-knows and fore-ordains every- 
 thing, the actions of man as well as purely 
 physical changes ; and so far all is consistent. 
 But then Human Liberty is at an end ; and that 
 man is free, our Consciousness and our Conscience 
 assure us. You must then abandon the evidence 
 of Consciousness and of Conscience; you must re- 
 ject the uniform belief of all men in all ages, as 
 an old wife's fable, belief in that which comes 
 most near to them, because it seems inconsistent 
 with the agency of a Being, of whom we can 
 know but little. And this is to get rid of 
 difficulties ! 
 
 54, The truth is, that not only the doctrine 
 of Liberty, but many other tenets which we firmly 
 believe, are liable to difficulties, to difficulties 
 even insuperable. We surely believe that man 
 consists of soul and body, the one immaterial, 
 and therefore not confined to place, the other 
 material, and existing in space ; but, at the same 
 time, we believe that the soul is united to the 
 body, and consequently bound to place. Do we, 
 then, alter our opinion, and reject the two-fold 
 nature of man because of this difficulty ? If not, 
 why should we abandon our belief in liberty. 
 
 i, 
 
OF THE WILL. B3 
 
 which we entertain as firmly as the other, be- 
 cause we cannot see how it can be reconciled 
 with tlie fore-knowledge of God ? In the case of 
 the union of soul and body, the difficulty is 
 greater than in that of Liberty, for it relates to a 
 matter more near to us than the Divine Govern- 
 ment of the universe, and in which, therefore, we 
 might better expect a solution. 
 
 55. I believe that I am the same man now 
 that I was twenty years ago. But, during that 
 period what changes have I undergone ! Not to 
 mention my body, which has been entirely re- 
 newed, my mental disposition may have been 
 quite reformed. Then I may have been dissolute, 
 careless, worldly, irreligious; now I may be 
 temperate, prudent, spiritual, godly ; but for all 
 that, am I not still the same ? How am I to 
 reconcile this sameness with so much change ? 
 I know not ; but this I do know, that I cannot 
 doubt my identity. 
 
 56. You believe in the existence of the 
 material world. Assuredly. On what grounds? 
 Do I not see it, feel it, everywhere around and 
 about me? That you have sensations of sight 
 and feeling is true, but what have sensations to 
 do with matter ? The one, confessedly, is totally 
 different from the other, matter being supposed 
 to be extended and solid, occupying space, and 
 capable of motion, — Mind and its phenomena 
 having neither extension, solidity, place, nor 
 
84 PllINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 mobility. How, then, can you get at the one 
 from the other, how, from a mental state of 
 which alone you are conscious, can you infer 
 something else, not only different, but opposed^ 
 You are at a loss for a reply, — you know not, — 
 you can only say that you cannot help believing 
 in matter, — that this belief is a necessary part of 
 your constitution, arising without reasoning and 
 proof; nay, against all argument to the contrary, 
 though unanswerable. 
 
 57. You believe in the uniformity of nature, 
 that like Causes will continue to be followed by 
 like Effects, that what has been will be. Can you 
 give any reason for this belief^ Experience has 
 proved to me this uniformity. Yes, in time past ; 
 but what has that to do with the future ? How 
 do you know that all may not change by to- 
 morrow, that the sun may cease to shine, the fire 
 to warm, the graSs to grow ? I allow it to 
 be possible, but it is highly improbable. Why 
 improbable ? Because a long Experience has 
 confirmed my faith. I do not deny that long 
 experience confirms your faith, that it is a Cause 
 of belief, but I deny that it is any reason. This, 
 then, is a sufficient answer to the metaphysician, 
 but none to the logician. It accounts for the fact 
 of your belief, but does not justify it. Your faith 
 is still illogical, though I allow it to be firm and 
 universal, an original part of our mental consti- 
 tution. 
 
OF THE WILL. 85 
 
 58. And so is my belief in the Liberty of the 
 Will. This belief is, I maintain, original, firm, 
 and universal, like the belief in our personal 
 identity, in the material universe, and in the 
 uniformity of nature ; and though, like them, 
 attended with difficulties, nay, with difficulties 
 which cannot rationally be solved, it defies all 
 scepticism, and remains unshaken. 
 
 59. Honour, then, and thanks be to God, 
 who has contrived to reconcile his own power 
 and fore-knowledge with the Liberty of man. 
 
 SUPPLEMENT FIRST TO SECTION FOURTH. 
 
 OF THE WILL. 
 
 60. According to Hobbes, " he is free to do a 
 thing, that may do it if he have the Will to do it, 
 and may forbear if he have the Will to forbear." ^ 
 Now, it can easily be shown that, according to this 
 definition, every man is, nay, must be free ; 
 because the word Will really implies as much. 
 No laws, not even the arbitrary decrees of a 
 despot, interfere with Liberty, as thus understood ; 
 they only offer strong inducements to do, or to 
 refrain from certain actions ; but the man may, or 
 may not obey those inducements. He may still 
 
 ^ Hobbes' Tripos : of Liberty and Necessity. 
 
86 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 rob or murder, and run the chances of non-detec- 
 tion. He can still do as he Will. Nay, even a 
 man in prison is free in this sense. He can do 
 whatever he Wills; but then he is prevented from 
 willing by the want of power to perform. If he 
 know that he cannot perform, then he cannot 
 Will ; for undoubting Belief in the possibility of 
 an action is an essential part of Volition. Thus, 
 the sense given by Hobbes to Liberty is utterly 
 nugatory, for it tells nothing more than what is 
 contained in the meaning of the vi'ord Will. It is 
 opposed neither to Slavery nor to Necessity ; for 
 a man would be free in that sense, though he 
 were politically a Slave, or metaphysically fated. 
 
 6 1 . Further on, in the same Treatise, we have 
 the following account of Liberty : " Liberty is the 
 absence of all im])ediments to action, that are not 
 contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the 
 agent. As, for example, the water is said to de- 
 scend freely, or to have Liberty to descend, by the 
 channel of the river, because there is no impedi- 
 ment that way, but not across, because the banks 
 are impediments. And though the water cannot 
 ascend, yet men never say it wants the Liberty to 
 ascend, but the jaculty or 'power, because the im- 
 pediment is in the nature of the water or intrin- 
 sical. So also we say, he that is tied wants the 
 Liberty to go, because the impediment is not in 
 him, but in his bands ; whereas, we say not so of 
 him that is sick or lame, because the impediment 
 
 
OF THE WILL. 87 
 
 is in himself." Now, not to dwell on the ab- 
 surdity of applying the word Liberty to itianiniate 
 objects, instead of restricting it to Voluntary 
 agents, which is its proper sense, the other being 
 merely metaphorical^ we may ask whether this be 
 meant for a definition of Political or of Meta- 
 physical Liberty ? If the first be intended, then it 
 is manifestly incorrect; for we have shown that 
 Political Liberty is restricted not by every out- 
 ward impediment, not by mere physical obstacles, 
 not even by the actions of brutes, nor by the 
 Law of God, but solely by the opposing Wills of 
 our fellow-men. But if metaphysical Liberty be 
 meant, then, to place it in the absence of external 
 impediments is quite beside the question ; for 
 we enquire not whether a man be hindered by 
 external impediment from doing what he wishes ; 
 but whether, first, his wishes, and last, his Will, 
 be regulated by Causes over which he has no Self- 
 controul. Thus, Hobbes, as well as some other 
 necessitarians, not daring openly to deny Liberty 
 to man, have been obliged so to alter the meaning 
 of the word, as to be able to assert that Liberty 
 may co-exist with Necessity. 
 
 62. It is surely a strong argument against 
 necessity, that it is repugnant to the moral senti- 
 ments, and inconsistent with the language of all 
 mankind. Thus, the opponent of Hobbes " dis- 
 puteth against the opinion of them that say, exter- 
 nal objects presented to men of such and such 
 
88 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 temperaments do make their actions Necessary ; 
 and says, the power such objects have over us 
 proceeds from our own fault;" "but that," replies 
 Hobbes, "is nothing to the purpose, if such fault 
 of ours proceedeth from Causes not in our own 
 power, and, therefore, that opinion may hold true 
 for all that answer." ^ Now, to say that an action 
 proceeds from our own fault, and at the same 
 time that it proceedeth from Causes not in our 
 own power, is inconsistent and illogical ; for the 
 word fault implies that it was in our power to do 
 or not to do. 'I'herefore, the moral vocabulary, 
 as well as the moral sentiments of mankind, must 
 be altered to suit the doctrine of Necessity. 
 
 63. Since the word Spontaneous occurs so 
 frequently in discussions on Liberty and Neces- 
 sity, particularly in this Discourse of Hobbes, it 
 is necessary to fix its proper meaning ; more 
 especially as two meanings are attached to this 
 word by Hobbes himself, (generally an exact 
 writer) inconsistent with each other, and both of 
 them differing from the usual sense. First, he 
 says, that " all voluntaiy actions, where the thing 
 that induceth the Will is not fear, are called 
 Spontaneous, and said to be done by a man's own 
 accord. As when a man giveth money volun- 
 tarily to another for merchandise, or out of affec- 
 tion, he is said to do it of his own accord, which, 
 
 ^ Hobbes' Tripos : of Liberty and Necessity. 
 
OF THE WILL. 89 
 
 in Latin is sponte, and, therefore, the action is 
 spontaneous^ though to give one's money wilUngly 
 to a thief to avoid kilHng, or throw it into the sea 
 to avoid drowning, where the motive is fear, be 
 not called spontaneous.'' '* But, in the latter part 
 of the same Discourse, we are told that a sponta- 
 neous action signifies one without previous debate 
 or deliberation, " that by Spontaneity is meant in- 
 considerate action, or else nothing is meant by it." 
 Now these two senses of the word Spontaneous 
 are inconsistent ; for surely an action may result 
 from fear, and yet be inconsiderate, nay, such 
 actions most frequently are so ; and, therefore, 
 the action would be at once non-spontaneous, as 
 resulting from fear, — spontaneous, because incon- 
 siderate. And, not only are these two meanings 
 inconsistent with each other, a logical fault, but 
 neither of them is the usual sense of the word 
 Spontaneous, an offence against the propriety of 
 language. When we say that a plant grows 
 spontaneously 'in a certain spot, we mean that it 
 was not there planted by the hand of man. The 
 spontaneous productions of the earth are those on 
 which no human labour has been bestowed. So, 
 a spontaneous action is one which a man performs 
 of his own accord, projmo motu, that is, without 
 any direct suggestion and solicitation from another. 
 A spontaneous action is of course Voluntary, but 
 
 ^ Hobbes' Tripos : of Liberty and Necessity. 
 
 N 
 
90 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 every voluntary act is not spontaneous ; for out 
 of all the possible inducements to the Will we 
 except those arising from the direct suggestion 
 and solicitation of our fellow-men, and then call 
 the act spontaneous. What the motive may be 
 we pretend not to say ; only it was not directly 
 put into our head, and urged upon us by another. 
 Spontaneity, to use a word as old as Hobbes, does 
 not settle the question as to Liberty and Neces- 
 sity ; for though a man act without another's sug- 
 gestion and solicitation, yet, there may, or may 
 not, be other causes which render his action 
 necessary. 
 
 SUPPLEMENT SECOND TO SECTION 
 FOURTH. 
 
 OF THE WILL. 
 
 64. In the preceding inquiry we have sup- 
 posed that there are but two possible doctrines in 
 respect to the Will, the doctrine of Liberty, and 
 that of Necessity, and so it has generally been 
 thought ; but an attempt has been made in our 
 days to combine the two into one system. And 
 as this attempt has been made by one of our 
 most distinguished authors, it demands some 
 notice in this place. 
 
OF THE WILL. 91 
 
 The system, as proposed by ISIr. Mill, appears 
 to me to be this. On the one hand, he allows 
 that we are able to modify our own character, if 
 we ivish, and so far we are free ; but, on the other, 
 the wish is formed not hi/ us but for us ; it is 
 as dependent upon outward Causes as physical 
 nature, and so we lie under Necessity. The 
 former opinion is thus stated. 
 
 " And indeed if w'e examine closely we shall 
 find that this feeling of our being able to modify 
 our own characters, if ive ivish, is itself the feel- 
 ing of moral freedom which we are conscious of. 
 A person feels morally free who feels that his 
 habits or his temptations are not his masters, but 
 he their's, who even in yielding to them knows 
 that he could resist ; that were he for any reason 
 desirous of altogether throwing them off, there 
 would not be required for that purpose, a stronger 
 desire than he knows himself to be capable of 
 feeling."^ So far well for the cause of Liberty. 
 
 65. But then, we are told that " Our cha- 
 racter is formed by us as well as for us, but the 
 wish which induces us to attempt to form it, is 
 formed for us ; and how ? not, in general, by our 
 organization, nor wholly by our education, but 
 by our own experience, experience of the painful 
 consequences of the character we previously had, 
 or by some strong feeling of admiration or as- 
 
 ' System of Logic, liook VL cluij). ii. 
 
92 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 piration accidentally aroused.'"" Here, on the 
 other hand, we have the doctrine of Necessity. 
 
 If it be allowed, as above, that we are able to 
 modify our own characters, if ive wish, and if it 
 be also true, as generally granted, that wishes 
 arise out of previous character, that out of the 
 heart proceed good or evil desires, then is there 
 a constant action and re-action between the more 
 permanent character, and the temporary desire 
 or wish. This we take to be the moral course of 
 the human mind, a course of much activity, in 
 which Desire performs a prominent part, acting 
 and acted upon. During this career a great 
 change may be effected, entirely by the mind 
 itself; and though the first wish may be traced 
 to some outward circumstance operating on the 
 mind, yet, the mind must have been prepared, or 
 the circumstance could produce no effect. We 
 do not deny the force of outward circumstances, 
 but we say that it is most unwarrantable to 
 assume them as the only causes of Desire and 
 Wish, forgetting that active and inward life, 
 which, starting from a feeling, possibly suggested 
 by something foreign, can so work upon it as to 
 make it chiefly of native growth. The culture, 
 at least, if not the planting, belongs to Self. 
 Unless Mr. Mill deny that our wishes depend, in 
 part, at least, upon the previous character, that 
 
 " System of Logit% Book VI. chap, ii. 
 
OF THE WILL. 93 
 
 is, upon Self, the Necessitarian part of his scheme 
 cannot stand, for he himself allows that we can 
 modify our character by an antecedent wish. 
 
 66. " Correctly conceived, the doctrine called 
 Philosophical Necessity," says Mr. JMill, ''is simply 
 this, that given the motives which are present to 
 an individual mind, and given, likewise, the char- 
 acter and disposition of the individual, the man- 
 ner in which he will act may be unerringly in- 
 ferred ; that, if we knew the person thoroughly, 
 and knew all the inducements which are acting 
 upon him, we could foretell his conduct with as 
 much certainty as we can predict any physical 
 event." ' 
 
 Nothing is more easy than to arrive at any 
 conclusion by means of a supposition. If I sup- 
 pose that the Sun will not rise to-morrow, I can 
 predict infallibly that it will be dark. Now, the 
 supposition above made is nearly as extravagant, 
 for to know all the motives present to any man's 
 mind, and to know thoroughly the character and 
 disposition of any individual, is simply impossible; 
 for no man knows himself so accurately. And 
 even suppose that a man's motives and disposition 
 be perfectly known at this moment, how can you 
 venture to predict, positively, what they will be 
 a month, a week, or even a day hence, whenever 
 an occasion for action arrives ? If you can, then 
 
 ' System of Logic, Book VL, chap. ii. 
 
%& 
 
 ^*9 
 
 PBaD 
 
 3 Of 
 
 jnsiiB mjosti taike for sxaiated the v 
 to' llhe ]?^ecea8ijCTr 
 pcwwET of Self-_^s-_^ - 
 LSiierty maTrraftiaiitiTa. 2 
 
 jiL. as 
 
 .nff t±Lat 
 
 .caJies of 
 
 to foretell 
 
 . anQtiier 
 
 be HLore knuowim^ ? We do not demy tkait caases ' 
 (Dpesaite jsjptani nbe WML;, bait we mafflmfliaiTiiii that 
 
 • W 
 
 caJrubftied. Mr. 
 
 im itiia»fttrtf agrees tn ke aJlo>ws that 
 
 ipe ace ahle to nnojd av/ w 
 
 TTbia admmfflxoo. ia fa -t of Neces- 
 
 KJlw ; ttiaiLeas, iaadeed, the ' be utt*- • 
 Itieyffliibd ©or cocLtrtMiL B*tt a.11 '^r 
 
 imtt likait Desires ©r Wishes ri^ i---^'"- 
 
 ptTBTixaioB character aand di-"' '- rr-rv^-.n 
 
 Seiie..'" IhiOfi, IMr ''■^"■" - ui .v^:....- 
 
 m^^'"'" "^" **^" ■ -^ - ind frien ' 
 
 mami pcHiajcs nis a 
 aoi the 
 
 C7, One woirci uojore^ ioae who 
 
 asamllaffiifc ttheut ooar ': is e formed 
 
 y«Mf IK byr CKL i. They whffi> 
 
 1 dufili! a iiiau. 
 l)iii ihii mutai ciiurjcitir aiiti di 
 
 XUiai" DIVJCHI" 
 
 iU liiiucpi 
 
 vvliut m the lii^rt. 
 
 II, aud haw call luuv 
 
 ipa or Wuili t OuL ot lius 
 
 liou and Ai-'iiuii. 
 
ts*< 
 
 ' air»n'«frn!T 
 
 -nzsV 
 
96 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 PART III. 
 
 THE THOUGHTS 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 OF THOUGHT IN GENERAL, AND OF THE PROXI- 
 MATE POWERS OF THE HUMAN MIND. 
 
 1 . Having treated of the First Great Class of 
 the Mental Phenomena, the Feelings, comprising 
 the Sensations and the Emotions, we must now 
 turn our attention to the Second Class, which 
 embraces all purely Intellectual States of mind, 
 or, in one word, the Thoughts. 
 
 2. Thoughts, as we have seen, are dis- 
 tinguished from Sensations, as well as from the 
 Emotions, by their neutral character, the absence 
 of Pleasure or Pain, Happiness or Misery ; for 
 though these frequently, nay, generally accom- 
 pany our Thoughts, yet they do not constitute 
 them even in part ; and though Feeling and 
 Thought were inseparable in reality, yet they 
 could be readily and clearly distinguished on 
 reflection. It belongs to the Metaphysician to 
 analyse what is compounded, and to present sepa- 
 rately to the mind what is generally found united. 
 
THE THOUGHTS. 97 
 
 In like manner, though Sodium be never found 
 naturally separate from Oxygen, yet the Chemist 
 by artificial means can analyse Soda, and exhibit 
 the elements apart. 
 
 3. In Part First, Chapter Second, we gave a 
 general Classification of the Mental Phenomena, 
 particularly of the Thoughts, showing their various 
 kinds, and how one differs from another. These 
 are the elements from which the more complex 
 Phenomena of mind result. We must now take 
 these more complex Phenomena, and discover the 
 elements of which they are composed. 
 
 4. Again, in Part First, Chapter Third, we 
 stated that as each distinct kind of Phenomena 
 must have a distinct Power belonging to it, there- 
 fore, the number of mental Powers must be the 
 same as of mental Phenomena, and the classifica- 
 tion of the one the same as that of the other. 
 Consequently, that tlie three Ultimate or Ele- 
 mentary Powers of the Mind are the Powers of 
 Sensation, Emotion, and Thought, or Intelligence; 
 and, from these Ultimate Elements, variously 
 modified and compounded, all the Proximate 
 Powers are derived. It remains to enumerate 
 these Proximate Powers, and to analyse them if 
 possible. 
 
98 PRINCIPLES OF P8yCH0L0GY 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 1. By some philosophers, as by Dr. Reid, 
 Consciousness has been considered as a dis- 
 tinct Power or Faculty, and, as such, classed 
 along with Perception, Conception, Imagi- 
 nation, Memory^ Abstraction, Judgement, 
 Reasoning, on the same line, but different from 
 all of these. This, however, can by no means be 
 admitted. 
 
 2. For, in the first place, Consciousness is 
 inseparably connected with each of the above 
 powers, and is even essential to their existence ; 
 so that, without Consciousness, there can be 
 neither Perception, nor Conception, nor Imagina- 
 tion, nor Memory, nor Abstraction, nor Judge- 
 ment, nor Reasoning. Now, what is essential to 
 the existence of anything cannot be separated 
 from it even by reflection, without destroying the 
 nature of the thing. Could we, then, suppose 
 Consciousness to be taken away from Perception 
 and the other powers, the result would be nil, or 
 we know not what. 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS. 99 
 
 3. In the acts of Perceiving, Conceiving, 
 Imagining, Remembering, Judging, and Reason- 
 ing, there is not both an act of Perception, etc., 
 and the Consciousness of that act, but these are 
 one and the same ; so that if we Perceive we are 
 Conscious ; and if we are Conscious of a Percep- 
 tion, we Perceive ; and vice versa, if we do not 
 Perceive, neither are we Conscious, and if we be 
 not Conscious, neither do we Perceive. In short. 
 Consciousness is indispensable to every mental 
 act which comes within the scope of Meta- 
 physics ; for it is not disputed that the Mind 
 may have an influence on the body of which we 
 are not Conscious, and which, therefore, belongs 
 to Physiology, or the science of animal life. 
 
 4. If, then. Consciousness be essential to 
 every mental power above enumerated, it is 
 utterly illogical to class it as distinct from all and 
 each ; for no class should over-lay another. As 
 it is essential to each, it must be above all, not 
 on the same line, and must stand alone. Thus, 
 Consciousness becomes a general term, compre- 
 hending all the mental powers, but not any one 
 more than another. 
 
 5. Should we be inclined to restrict, in any 
 degree, this wide and indiscriminate use of the 
 term Consciousness, we would propose one limita- 
 tion, as agreeable to the common notions of 
 mankind, and to the common use of language. 
 The term generally is, and perhaps ought to be, 
 
100 PRINCirLES OF rSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 confined to the purely intellectual faculties, of 
 which we are now treating. Thus, we seldom say 
 that we are Conscious of a Sensation, or of an 
 Emotion, but we feel them ; whereas, we are 
 Conscious of any thought or train of thought. 
 Consciousness seems to imply knowledge, and 
 knowledge belongs to the intellectual faculties. 
 
 6. Again, while Consciousness belongs essen- 
 tially to each and every mental power, each of 
 these powers is not essential to the other. Thus, 
 I can Perceive an outward object without an act 
 of Memory, I can Remember without an act of 
 Perception, I can Imagine without Remembering, 
 or Reason without Willing. Therefore these 
 powers may be classed on the same line, but 
 apart, — while Consciousness cannot, because it is 
 common to them all. 
 
 7. " Consciousness," says Reid, " is an opera- 
 tion of the understanding of its own kind, and 
 cannot logically be defined. The objects of it 
 are our own present pains and pleasures, our 
 hopes, our fears, our desires, our doubts, our 
 thoughts of every kind, — -in a word, all the pas- 
 sions, and all the actions and operations of our 
 own minds, while they are present. We may Re- 
 member them when they are past, but we are 
 Conscious of them only while they are present." * 
 
 8. The inaccuracy of this statement is evi- 
 
 *" Reid's Intellectual Powers, Essay VI., cbap. v. 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS. 101 
 
 dent from what we have already said. Moreover, 
 we would ask, where is the necessity for this 
 doubling of the Mental Phenomena, first a pain, 
 a desire, a thought, and then the Consciousness of 
 the same"? First a mental object, and then the 
 Consciousness of that object ? Surely this is 
 contrary to the simplicity of nature. 
 
 m 
 
 9. In the view here taken, Consciousness has 
 no distinct object ; it is simply the mental state 
 at the present moment. Whatever that may be, 
 of it we are conscious ; the act and the object 
 are one and indivisible. 
 
 10. Consciousness, then, is limited to the 
 present, and, under that restriction, the know- 
 ledge which it conveys is perfect and free from 
 all doubt ; for whatever the feeling or thought of 
 the moment may be, we must know it, since it is 
 what we are Conscious of, and nothing more ; 
 and we cannot doubt of its existence, for the 
 very doubt would be itself a phenomenon of 
 Consciousness, and therefore would contradict 
 the supposition that we could doubt the existence 
 of what is present to the mind. We may doubt 
 whether we ever had any Feeling or Thought 
 before, or whether we shall have any in future ; 
 but, of the Feeling or Thought of the present 
 moment, we, therefore, cannot doubt. This know- 
 ledge, at least, is proof against scepticism. We 
 may question the accuracy of Memory, we may 
 doubt the Uniformity of Nature in time to come. 
 
102 PKINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 we may deny the existence of Matter, we may 
 even distrust our Reasoning powers, and dispute 
 about our own Identity ; but we must allow the 
 evidence of Consciousness. And all human 
 knowledge being founded on this, it is founded 
 on a Rock. The direct or immediate evidence 
 of Consciousness, is no doubt, very limited. Of 
 the world without us, of the Non-Self, it tells no- 
 thing, and, even of Self, nothing but the present 
 state. Still, as all our knowledge is based there- 
 upon, it is satisfactory to know that the founda- 
 tion is unassailable. 
 
 11. Does Consciousness necessarily imply 
 Belief? The affirmative is maintained by Dr. 
 Reid. "We have an immediate conception of 
 the operations of our own minds, joined with a 
 Belief of their existence, and this we call Con- 
 sciousness." — " There are many operations of 
 mind in which, when we analyse them as far as 
 we are able, we find Belief to be an essential in- 
 gredient. A man cannot be Conscious of his 
 own Thoughts without believing that he thinks.'"" 
 
 12. This statement contains two assertions, 
 both of which appear to me questionable. In the 
 first place, actual Belief appears to me to suppose 
 the possibility of Unbelief ; and where Doubt is 
 impossible, so is Belief. Belief seems to be the 
 result of a mental operation where opposite views 
 
 ^ Intellectual Puwers, Essay II., Chap. xx. 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS: 1 03 
 
 are presented to the mind ; so that where no op- 
 posite views can be entertained, neither doubt nor 
 belief can arise. And such, we have seen, is the 
 case with Consciousness. Therefore, Belief forms 
 no element thereof. 
 
 13. We allow that Nature does nothing in 
 vain. But where is the use of Belief when w^e 
 cannot doubt? The evidence of Consciousness 
 is, then, above all other, being above both doubt 
 and belief. In Consciousness, we feel^ we M^wA', 
 we linow ; but we do not also believe that we feel, 
 think, or know. 
 
 14. But, secondly, even were it true that 
 Belief is an element of Consciousness, still it 
 would by no means follow that a man could not 
 be conscious of his own thoughts without believ- 
 ing that He thinks. Here a new idea is intro- 
 duced, that of Self or Mental Identity ; and this 
 does not arise at once, on a single act of Con- 
 sciousness, but it requires two acts at least, and 
 an act of Memory besides. It is by Memory, by 
 comparing a past Feeling or Thought with the 
 present, that we come to believe in our Identity ; 
 and, consequently, one act of Consciousness, one 
 Feeling or one Thought, may exist without any 
 notion of Self at all. We may believe, if you so 
 think, in the existence of the present mental state; 
 but you cannot maintain that Belief in our Iden- 
 tity is essential to Consciousness. 
 
104 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 OF PERCEPTION 
 
 SECTION FIRST. 
 
 OF THE NATURE OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 1. Before the days of Reid, the term Per- 
 ception was used in a very general sense, by 
 Des Cartes, Hume, and many others, so as to 
 embrace aU the phenomena of mind, whether 
 FeeUngs or Thoughts ;'' but, by the chief of the 
 Scottish school of philosophy, the word was 
 limited to express that Mental Faculty whereby 
 we become acquainted with the world without. This 
 was an important improvement in metaphysical 
 language ; and it has since been generally adopted, 
 as it is here, 
 
 2. As our Feelings come before our Thoughts 
 in the order of mental development, so do our Per- 
 ceptions precede our other Thoughts. We must 
 
 ^ Thus, Hume says, that, " we may divide all the perceptions of 
 the mind into two classes or species, which are distinguished by 
 their different degress of force and vivacity." These are his 
 Impressions and Ideas, which, according to him, embrace all the 
 mental phenomena. Essays, Vol. II. Sec. ii. 
 
rEllCEPTlOxX. 105 
 
 have/e/^j or experienced Sensation, before we can 
 Perceive an outward object; and we must have 
 perceived a present object before we can Conceive, 
 or Judge, or Reason, about an absent one. There- 
 fore, as Feelings have been treated prior to 
 Thoughts, so of these the first to be considered 
 are Perceptions. 
 
 3. The doctrine of Locke, that we have no 
 Innate Ideas, seems to amount simply to this, 
 that we have no Thoughts prior to Sensation. 
 Not that our Thoughts are only Sensations in 
 another form ; by no means ; but, that Sensation 
 is necessary to the development of Thought, a 
 Mental Phenomenon specifically different from 
 the other. The mind of man, previous to Sensa- 
 tion, may be compared to the embryo of plants, 
 which, though it contain the rudiments of the 
 tree, or shrub, or herb, yet requires heat and 
 moisture to favour its growth. So the mind 
 must have many dormant faculties, or Sensation 
 would stop there ; we should be sensitive animals 
 and nothing more. But, given the latent power, 
 the slumbering capability, and Sensation can 
 rouse it into life. How Sensations stir up 
 Thoughts, so different from themselves, so far 
 removed from sense, so wide in their range, so 
 deep, so sublime, is no doubt incomprehensible ; 
 but surely not more so than how jNIatter acts at 
 all upon Mind, or Mind upon Matter. Sensation, 
 after all, is a Mental Phenomenon, and therefore 
 p 
 
106 PRINCIPLES or PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 there is more resemblance between it and the 
 highest flights of Reason or of Fancy than be- 
 tween the world without and that within. 
 
 4. The connection between these last is a great 
 mystery, which, however, we are bound to accept, 
 and not to deny because it may seem strange that 
 substances so incongruous should directly effect 
 each other. Philosophers have been slow to 
 admit this direct and mutual agency, and have 
 invented many hypotheses to break the difficulty, 
 but without success, — for they have framed sys- 
 tems more complicated than nature, but not 
 more comprehensible. 
 
 5. In the endeavour to bridge over the gulph 
 which separates Mind and Matter, the Sensible 
 species of the Schools were first invented, passing 
 from the outward object to the Mind or subject, 
 but distinct from either, of a doubtful nature, 
 whether material, immaterial, or something be- 
 tween the two ; afterwards arose the Ideas of Des 
 Cartes and his followers, the immediate objects in 
 Perception, and decidedly immaterial in their 
 nature ; subsequently, these same Ideas sup- 
 posed to be seen in God, according to Male- 
 branche; then the pre-established harmony of 
 Leibnitz ; till at last the knot was cut by Berkeley 
 and Collier,*' who, admitting nothing but Imma- 
 
 '*' Arthur Collier, Rector of Langford Magna, near Sarum, 
 published in the year 1713 a work called " Clavis universalis," to 
 disprove the existence of the material world. His arguments 
 
rEllCEPTION. 107 
 
 terial Ideas and Spirits, denied the existence of 
 Matter altogether. 
 
 6. All these ingenious but false systems owe 
 their origin to one unsound axiom, long uni- 
 versally admitted, namely, that the Cause and 
 the Effect must be like each other, an axiom 
 agreeable to the imagination which delights in 
 similitudes, but for which there is no proof. 
 Thus, in this case, as the object existing out- 
 wardly, and the subject or Mind knowing in- 
 wardly, were allowed to be very different, some 
 medium was sought by which they might com- 
 municate. Hence the invention of Sensible 
 Species, of Ideas, etc., by means of which out- 
 ward objects might affect the mind, and of animal 
 spirits, through which the Will might act upon 
 the body. But the above axiom being abandoned, 
 as directly contrary to experience, of course all 
 the systems derived from it must also be given up. 
 
 7. After these preliminary observations, w^e 
 may proceed to trace the phenomena of Percep- 
 tion. First, we must carefully distinguish the 
 outward material object said to be perceived, 
 from the percipient subject or Mind, — and then, 
 in the mental process, we must discriminate be- 
 tween the Sensation proper which precedes, and 
 
 are similar to Berkeley's, with whose work he appears to have- 
 been unacquainted, though Berkeley's " Principles of Human 
 Knowledge" had been published three years before. Collier's 
 book is extremely rare. 
 
108 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 Perception proper which follows. The last alone 
 belongs to the class of Thoughts, — though the 
 two, the Sensation and the Perception, are often 
 confounded together and considered as one. 
 
 8. With respect to the outward object, one 
 important observation must be made, namely, 
 that some of our Senses are affected immediately, 
 others only mediately, by objects. Thus, I feel 
 the table immediately by touch, but I see it only 
 mediately by the intervention of the rays of light 
 passing from tht^ object to my eye. So, I taste 
 objects in contact, but I hear or smell them 
 at a distance, through the pulsations of air and 
 odorous effluvia. Still, in every case, there is 
 contact of something with the organ of sense, 
 whether of the object itself or the medium. 
 
 9. Is not then the medium the proper Object ? 
 All we can answer is, that it is never so considered, 
 never so called. I say, and all men say, I see and 
 perceive a rose, not the rays of light reflected 
 from a rose to mv retina : I hear a bell, not the 
 pulsation of air ; I smell a ciirnation, not the 
 effluvia thereof. Therefore the rose, the bell, the 
 carnation, are universally considered as the Ob- 
 jects. Consequently, these may be divided into 
 Immediate and Mediate, or near and remote ob- 
 jects. And we shall find that this distinction is 
 of great importance, when we come to trace the 
 origin of Perception. 
 
 iO. Next we must attend to the distinction 
 
PERCEPTION. 109 
 
 between Sensation and Perception proper, a 
 distinction often disregarded, even by Locke and 
 other excellent authors ; but clearly pointed out 
 and dwelt upon by Reid. Sensation always pre- 
 cedes Perception proper, and is indispensable to it, 
 but the one being a Feeling^ the other a Thought^ 
 they are essentially different. We have seen that 
 Sensation alone gives us no knowledge beyond 
 itself, no acquaintance with the world without. 
 What we feel in Sensation, of course we feel, and 
 nothing more. Had we been Sensitive beings 
 alone, we never should have known the exis- 
 tence of outward objects, nor, in fact, anything 
 except the passing Sensation. 
 
 11. We have seen, in treating of Sensation, 
 that the Sensations which accompany Perception 
 proper are of very different degrees of import- 
 ance, — that those which attend the Perception of 
 the Primary Qualities of matter. Extension, 
 Solidity or Impenetrability, Mobility, etc., are 
 in general little noticed ; while the Sensations 
 which go along with the Perception of the 
 Secondary Qualities, Colour, Sound, Taste, Smell, 
 are often very interesting and fill our minds. 
 In truth it may be laid down as a general law, 
 learnt by experience, that the more we are oc- 
 cupied with the Sensation, the less are we taken 
 up with the Perception proper; and vice versa. 
 Moreover, this would follow from another more 
 general Law of mind, namely, that the more we 
 
110 rniNCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 lire (Mi/z;af^('(l vvitli owv. tliint:;, tlio less can we be 
 oecujjied with anotlier; vvliich a^aiii is derived 
 IVoiJi a still more i^encral fai't, thai tlie eai)aei(y 
 of l\\v, inind ib limited. Tiiis ()l)servatioii, again, 
 may he of use to uh wlu;n we come to trace the 
 origin of Perception. 
 
 12. Ill treating of the nature of Perception 
 ])r()per, we must take it as it exists in tlu! mature 
 mind, not in the mind of an infant; and we sh:dl 
 attempt to analyse it ae(U)rdingly. 
 
 I.'l. I"'irst, then, it is evidtrnt that when we 
 jx'reeive an outward object, say a tree or a house, 
 w(^ have a notion or eoneei)tion of the tree or of 
 the house. This will not be disputed. 
 
 14. Hut we can shut our eyes, we can travel 
 a Inuidrtul miles away, and still have a notion of 
 the tree or of llic house; (H)nse(pjently a notion 
 or conception is not the whole of Percei)ti()n. 
 
 15. I perceive a ))()st or a \un)\ of water in 
 my path, and I turn out of the way to avoid it, 
 and that without an instjuit's iiesitation ; conse- 
 <pieutly 1 believe at once in the existence of the 
 ])ost or of the water l)efore me and without me. 
 Therefore, JIELIJII' in the existence of an object 
 present before us and without us, capable of im- 
 peding our progress, and, consequently, having 
 the connnon proj)ertie8 of matter, forms an essen- 
 tial element of Perc«'ption proper. The notion 
 ot the object, and the IJclii'f in its present exis- 
 ivMvx'. are, as far us we can observe, simultaneous, 
 
piacizTKaL 
 
 111 
 
 Tlsier^ 
 
 taei 
 
 dcF^ 
 
 assid. tsz^rs. 
 
 :M 
 
 i,. ^^z 
 
 ]£» 
 
112 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 we are aware of the diflPerence between the 
 dreamy and the waking Perception, though this 
 difference cannot be expressed in words. We are 
 conscious, however, of the difference, and there- 
 fore we call the one Perception real, the other 
 Imaginary, though the mental phenomena are so 
 alike as to defy metaphysical analysis. 
 
 19. When we say that we believe in the pre- 
 sent existence of the object before us, this means 
 that we believe in its existence at a greater or 
 less distance from us in Space, and at the present 
 Time. The former simple notion is certainly 
 comprehended in our Belief, for we cannot be- 
 lieve in the existence of a material object without 
 believing that it occupies Space ; but the latter 
 may not actually be developed in us unless the 
 object move. The notion of Space, then, seems 
 to be inseparable from Perception, but not that of 
 Time. Moreover, it is only by Perception, which 
 makes us acquainted with the material world, 
 that we can acquire the notion of Space ; whereas, 
 the succession of Thoughts in our own minds, 
 however arising, and of whatever kind, would 
 give us the notion of Time. 
 
 20. Thus we find that Perception, in its 
 largest sense, comprehends three different men- 
 tal phenomena — a Sensation, a Notion, and a 
 Belief, which also necessarily supposes the no- 
 tion of Space. The whole process, therefore, 
 comprises Mental Phenomena of three different 
 
OllIGIN OF PERCEniON. 113 
 
 sorts, Sensation, Non-relative Thought or 
 Notion, and Belief.'' Such is that Perception 
 whereby we become acquainted with the world 
 without. 
 
 SECTION SECOND. 
 OF THE OEIGIN OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 1 . In the above Analysis, we have considered 
 Perception as it is found in the mature mind; 
 but the important questions remain, is Perception 
 at once perfect or is it acquired, and what is its 
 Origin ? 
 
 2. Let us first consider the senses of Smell 
 and Hearing, and endeavour to discover whether 
 our knowledge of the world without be derived 
 from these. 
 
 3. The Sensation of Smell is occasioned by 
 the contact of minute odoriferous particles with 
 the organ of Smell, the innumerable small 
 branches of the Olfactory nerve ramified within 
 the nose ; and the Sensation of Hearing is caused 
 by vibrations of air striking upon the drum of the 
 ear, and aff'ecting through it the complicated 
 
 " For the distinction between Feelings and Thoughts, and 
 between Non-relative Thoughts or Notions and Relative Tiioiights 
 or Relations, see Part I., chap. ii. of this work. 
 
 Q 
 
114 PHINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 internal organ. In both these cases, the object 
 of Perception, the odoriferous, or the sounding 
 body, being at a distance, it seems improbable, a 
 priori, that any knowledge of them can be acquired 
 by means of the minute particles which flow from 
 the one, or the atmosphere set in motion by the 
 other.'' 
 
 4. Of the minute particles themselves, directly 
 in contact with the nose, sense tells us nothing, 
 nor of the vibrations of air which touch the ear ; 
 these are subsequently learnt ; can we, therefore, 
 suppose that sense gives us more information 
 with respect to the distant objects ? Are we likely 
 to know more of the remote than of the near ? 
 Reasoning, it is clear, can teach us nothing, for 
 want of data; so that if we do perceive the 
 objects of Smell and Hearing, the knowledge 
 must be instinctive, not acquired. 
 
 ^ In the cases of Smell and Hearing, as well as in that of Sight, 
 we have, as already observed, in accordance with common lan- 
 guage, which ought not to be changed unnecessarily, called the 
 distant body, the Object ; though some philosophers would give 
 that name to the medium in contact with the Organ. This, how- 
 ever, would lead to erroneous views, for, though it certainly is the 
 medium which directly causes Sensation, yet we cannot be said to 
 -perceive \\\e medium, and in reality we never do say so. We are 
 sensible of smell from odoriferous particles, but we perceive a rose 
 as the cause thereof or object ; we hear a sound from the movement 
 of air, but we refer that sound to a bell ; we feel colour from light, 
 but we perceive a red coat. Common language, and common 
 sense, must not be disregarded in Metaphysics; for all men are by 
 nature, more or less, metaphysicians, and cannot help being so. 
 
ORIGIN OF PERCEPTION. ~ US 
 
 5. But can we, even now, in our mature state 
 of mind, perceive any object by means of these 
 senses when the object is not already known ? 
 Suppose we shut our eyes, and make no use of 
 our hands, can we describe an object placed under 
 our nose giving out a scent that is new to us ? 
 Could an Esquimau in such circumstances de- 
 scribe an orange r Could he tell any thing about 
 it, as to shape, size, consistency, or colour ? I 
 trow not. So, were I to hear a noise, such as I 
 never had heard before, could I say from what it 
 proceeded? Had I never seen or handled a bell, 
 could I describe it on hearing the sound thereof? 
 Could a savage fresh from the woods, however 
 exquisite his hearing, have the least notion of 
 such an object? Assuredly not. Therefore, it 
 is not only probable, a priori, but it can be proved 
 by actual experiment, that the Senses of Smell 
 and Hearing give us no knowledge of external 
 objects. Consequently, Perception does not or- 
 iginate with them, and whatever knowledge of 
 the world without they may afterwards give us, 
 that must first have been gained by means of 
 some other sense. 
 
 6. Let us next consider the Sense of Sight. 
 This agrees with the two former, inasmuch as the 
 object, usually so called, strikes the Sense only 
 through a medium, namely, the rays of light re- 
 flected from that object upon the expansion of 
 the Optic nerve, the Retina of the eye. Conse- 
 
116 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 quently, whatever probability there be, a jmori, 
 against the original Perception of objects by 
 Smell and Hearing, the same must exist against 
 original perception by Sight. It is just as impro- 
 bable, a priori^ that we should be able to determine 
 the size, figure, and distance of objects, originally 
 by Sight, as by Smell or Hearing. Of Light itself, 
 though in contact with us, the Sight tells us no- 
 thing ; is it then likely that it should inform us 
 more about an object at a distance ^ 
 
 7. Why should a Sensation of Colour give us 
 a knowledge of an extended, solid, coloured Sub- 
 stance '? Of course, no reason can be assigned, 
 but this is no proof that it is not so. There may 
 be original knowledge thus communicated rela- 
 tive to the world without ; but if we allow that 
 Smell and Hearing let in no such knowledge, as 
 has been proved, then is there a strong probability 
 against Sight also, for the circumstances attend- 
 ing the three are similar. 
 
 8. This is a case which admits not of so 
 easy an appeal to Experience as the two former, 
 because the sense of sight is undoubtedly much 
 more quick and accurate in detecting objects in 
 mature life than either smell or hearing. We 
 allow that it is better trained. Still we have 
 experience sufficient to decide the point. Per- 
 sons of mature mind, in the enjoyment of all the 
 intellectual faculties, but blind from infancy, 
 have, by an operation, been restored to the per- 
 
ORIGIN OF PERCEPTION. 117 
 
 feet use of their eyes, without being able at first 
 to discriminate objects by sight, either as to size, 
 form, or distance. A new world, a world of 
 colour, was, for the first time, opened out before 
 them, but neither form, magnitude, nor place. 
 All was confused colour, and close to the eye.* 
 But that eye was physically perfect, and by de- 
 grees came to see like the eyes of others, without 
 any suhsequent ojjeratio?!. Thus was it proved that 
 our knowledge of the world without is not de- 
 rived originally from vision ; that in truth we 
 learn to see objects. We must look then to some 
 other sense for the origin of Perception. 
 
 9. The two remaining senses of Taste and 
 Touch agree among themselves, and differ from 
 the rest in this, that the objects, commonly so 
 called, of both, must be in contact with the organ 
 of sense, the object of Taste with the tongue or 
 palate, that of Touch with any part of the body. 
 Herein, therefore, there is a marked distinction 
 between these two and the other senses, which 
 
 " " He," (the patient) says Cheselden, " knew not the shape of 
 any thing, nor any one thing from another, however different in 
 shape or magnitude ; hut upon heing told what things were, whose 
 form he before knew from feeling, he would carefully observe, that 
 he might know them again ; but, having too many objects to learn 
 at once, he forgot many of them, and (as he said) at first he 
 learned to know, and again forgot a thousand times in a day." 
 To Bishop Berkeley belongs the merit of having anticipated the 
 results of this exj)eriment by reasoning a priori, in his " New 
 Theory of Vision." 
 
 
118 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 are in contact not with the objects perceived, but 
 with a medium. 
 
 10. Consequently, the distance of the object 
 from the organ cannot be alleged against these 
 two senses, as against the others, as an argument 
 unfavourable to the supposition, that our know- 
 ledge of external nature is thence derived. 
 
 11. Moreover, it being already proved that 
 our knowledge of the world without is not derived 
 either from Smell, or from Hearing, or from 
 Sight, it must be derived from Taste or from 
 Touch, unless some sixth sense can be pointed 
 out. We have then to choose only between 
 these two. 
 
 12. In the first place, the sense of Taste is 
 limited to a few objects, and on that account it 
 seems unlikely that our far more general know- 
 ledge of outward nature can be derived from this 
 source. Comparatively few objects have any 
 taste, and very few are those which a child 
 actually does taste. 
 
 13. Besides, the Sensation of Taste is so 
 interesting in itself, that it is apt to engross our 
 attention to the exclusion of every thing else. 
 In this respect it resembles the Sensations of 
 Smell, Hearing, and Sight. 
 
 14. The sense of Touch, on the other hand, 
 extends to all solid and liquid substances, and is 
 exerted not merely occasionally, as Taste, but at 
 all times, and by all parts of the body. Here 
 
ORIGIN OF PERCEPTION. HQ 
 
 there is a source sufficiently general to account 
 for our general knowledge of outward things. 
 
 15. JMoreover, the Sensation of Touch is 
 usually of little interest in itself. Some degree 
 of pleasure may be felt by passing one's hand 
 over a smooth surface, but it is insignificant. It 
 is chiefly by excess that the Sensation of Touch 
 affects us, and painfully. 
 
 16. But if the Sensation of Touch be not 
 given us for enjoyment, we must suppose that it 
 was granted for some farther and useful purpose, 
 if we believe that nothing has been made in vain. 
 And what purpose more probable, what more im- 
 portant, than the knowledge of the world without 
 us, on which our very being depends ? 
 
 1 7. It is therefore far more probable that our 
 acquaintance with the material w^orld is derived 
 through the Sensation of Touch than through 
 that of Taste ; and as Smell, Hearing, and Sight 
 have been proved to give originally no informa- 
 tion, therefore we may conclude that to Touch, 
 and to it alone, are we originally indebted for all 
 we know of the world around us. 
 
 18. We see from the foregoing, that Sensa- 
 tions have been given us for two different 
 purposes — for immediate enjoyment in them- 
 selves, and for knowledge through them, and that 
 these vary conversel}^ ; the more the enjoyment 
 the less the knowledge, the less the pleasure the 
 more the information. The Sensations of Smell, 
 
120 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 Hearing, Sight, and Taste bring their own reward 
 along with them, and are dwelt upon accord- 
 ingly ; but Touch is of value chiefly as leading 
 to Perception, the mere Sensation being little at- 
 tended to. 
 
 19, The whole difficulty lies in tracing the 
 origin of Perception, and in accounting for it ; 
 for, these points being settled, the rest may all be 
 explained by the Principle of Association. To this 
 are we indebted for the information subsequently 
 obtained through our other Senses. Supposing 
 that through Touch we become acquainted with 
 the forms, magnitudes, and relative distances of 
 objects, it is easy to see that a certain object, al- 
 ready known by Touch, may be so associated with 
 a certain Smell, Sound, Sight, or Taste, that any 
 one of these Sensations shall instantly suggest 
 that object in its due form and proportion, with- 
 out the actual employment of Touch. And by 
 long custom, from our earliest years, so rapid may 
 be the suggestion, as not to be distinguished from 
 original knowledge. 
 
 20. The information subsequently afforded 
 through our other Senses being thus explained, 
 and the first information being traced to Touch, 
 we may still inquire, 1. Whether this Primary 
 Perception can in any way be accounted for, or 
 whether it be truly original and unaccountable ; 
 2. Whether we can rely upon the knowledge 
 thus obtained. 
 
EVIDENCE AFFOHDED BY PERCErilON. 121 
 
 21. I can see no reason for doubting whether 
 Primary Perception be an original faculty, in 
 other words, ultimate and unaccountable. How 
 can we explain the fact that a certain Sensation 
 of Touch, and, as such, a Mental Phenomenon, 
 without extension, without solidity, without parts, 
 without mobility in space, is the medium through 
 which we become acquainted with an extended, 
 solid, divisible, and moveable substance, distinct 
 from the percipient mind? On what known prin- 
 ciple can we account for this wonderful fact? 
 There is here no room for association, for associa- 
 tion must have a beginning, and things must first 
 be somehow brought together, somehow related, 
 before the one can call up the other ; neither is 
 there scope for Reasoning, for there is no An- 
 alogy. What have ]Mind and Matter in common ? 
 and how from the existence of the one can we 
 infer the other'? There is here a deep gulf over 
 which Reasoning can throw no bridge. If there be 
 in human nature a fact original and unaccountable, 
 it is the Mental Perception of Material objects. 
 
 SECTION THIRD. 
 
 OF THE EVIDENCE AFFOEDED BY PERCEPTION. 
 
 1. Having analysed the process of Percep- 
 tion, having traced its origin to Touch, and deter- 
 mined that the faculty is original and unaccount- 
 
 R 
 
122 PKINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 able, we have still to inquire what evidence we 
 have of the reality of the knowledge thence ob- 
 tained. What proof have we that the objects 
 which we perceive really do exist ^ 
 
 2. This evidence must depend upon the theory 
 which we may adopt, with respect to the mode of 
 communication between Mind and Matter. All 
 the theories which have been formed, or which 
 can be formed on this subject, fall under two 
 general heads. Our knowledge of the Material 
 universe is either mediate or immediate^ in other 
 words, we are either non-conscious of the exist- 
 ence of Matter, or conscious ; our knowledge, 
 on the former supposition, being communicated 
 through a medium. The first is the opinion of 
 almost all philosophers, all thinkers, ancient and 
 modern, with one remarkable exception, that of 
 the first Metaphysician of the present day, and 
 perhaps of Dr. Reid, and may be one or two more, 
 who maintain the doctrine of Immediate Percep- 
 tion. Since this theory is one and indivisible, and 
 since, if true, it will save us the trouble of examin- 
 ing several others, we shall consider it first. 
 
 3. This theory is certainly supported by Sir 
 William Hamilton / but, whether it be held by 
 any one else, is, I think, doubtful. In his "Discus- 
 sions on Philosophy," Art. ii., Sir William stoutly 
 
 ^ Discussions on Philosophy, Art. ii. Philosophy of Per- 
 ception. 
 
EVIDENCE AEFORDED BY PERCEniON. 123 
 
 maintains, in opposition to Brown, that such is the 
 opinion of Reid, and he severely taxes Brown for 
 mis-conceiving the tenets of the latter. But in 
 the very valuable and acute notes to his edition 
 of Reid's works, Sir William often expresses him- 
 self doubtfully on the point, whether Reid did in 
 truth hold the doctrine of Immediate Perception. 
 This is sufficient to show that the language of 
 Reid is not free from ambiguity ; so that, if 
 Brown did mis-interpret him, he is not without 
 excuse. The notes below will prove that Sir 
 William himself admits the ambiguity.^ 
 
 4. But dismissing authority, let us examine 
 this theory on its own merits. First, what are 
 we to understand by Immediate Perception *? 
 
 5. The theory supposes that we immediately 
 knoiv, in other words, are conscious of external 
 Objects ; so that the evidence of their existence 
 
 = ** Reid himself, like the philosophers in general, really holds 
 that we do not perceive external things immediately, if he does not 
 allow us a consciousness of the non-ego" — H. p. 263. 
 
 " Des Cartes and Reid coincide in docti'ine, if Reid holds that 
 we know the extended and external object only by a conception or 
 subjective modification of the percipient mind." — H. p. 274. 
 
 " This paragraph appears to be an explicit disavowal of the 
 doctrine of an intuitive or immediate perception." — H. p. 310. 
 
 " This statement of Reid again favours the opinion that his 
 doctrine of perception is not really immediate." — H. p. 327. 
 
 Other notes to the same effect might be quoted, but these suffice 
 to show that, even according to Sir William, the opinion of Reid 
 is doubtful. 
 
124 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY, 
 
 is the highest possible, the evidence of Conscious- 
 ness. On this supposition, to doubt their exist- 
 ence is absurd ; for we have seen that to doubt 
 our Consciousness involves a contradiction. This, 
 assuredly, is to take up an high position in de- 
 fence of the material world, but can it be main- 
 tained ? 
 
 6. An absurd opinion, once fairly stated, is 
 all but refuted. We have seen that Mind and 
 Matter are separated from each other by a gulf, 
 broad, deep, impassable; that both indeed are Sub- 
 stances, or something permanent amid innumer- 
 able modifications, though their qualities are not 
 only different, but opposed, and incompatible. 
 We have also observed, that Consciousness is a 
 general term for all the Mental Phenomena, and 
 for them alofte, applicable alike to Sensations, 
 Emotions, and Thoughts ; but not to Matter nor 
 to any quality thereof. Thus we say that we are 
 conscious of Sensation, Emotion and Thought ; 
 but to affirm that we are conscious of Extension 
 or Solidity is a contradiction to the meaning 
 which we had attached to the term Consciousness, 
 and, therefore, absurd. Agreeably to that mean- 
 ing, if we be conscious of Extension, then Exten- 
 sion is a mental quality, which is surely absurd. 
 Or if Extension be allowed to be a mental quality, 
 then, as it is certainly a bodily quality, it must 
 be both, which is a palpable absurdity, unless 
 mind and body be alike, or at least not very 
 
EVIDENCE AFFORDED BY PERCEPTION. 125 
 
 different. This, then, is the only supposition 
 consistent with the opinion that we immediately 
 know, or in other words, are conscious of matter, 
 a supposition which, by confounding matter and 
 mind, upsets the very foundation of Metaphysics, 
 undoes all the work begun in modern times by 
 Des Cartes, and continued by so many others. 
 In short, the theory of Immediate Perception 
 leadg either to absurdity or materialism ; so, 
 " choose your horn." 
 
 7. It remains for us to consider the other and 
 almost universal opinion that the knowledge of 
 external nature which we derive from Perception 
 is not immediate but mediate, or, as it is some- 
 times called, representative, in opposition to the 
 former, which is styled presentative ; the object, in 
 the one case, being supposed to be known through 
 something which represents it ; in the other, at 
 once, by itself; as England is ruled by a House 
 of Commons, an assembly of delegates, while 
 Athens was governed by the whole body of 
 Citizens. This opinion, however, admits of three 
 varieties. 
 
 8. The first variety is that the medium of 
 Communication between Mind and Matter is 
 something called Sensible Species, passing from 
 the outward object to the mind, but distinct from 
 both, of an anbiguous nature, but commonly sup- 
 posed not to be quite mental. This opinion, as 
 we have seen, was long prevalent in the schools, 
 
]26 PllINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 and has been attributed to Aristotle, though, as 
 it seems, without sufficient grounds ;'' but, as it 
 is now universally exploded, we shall not trouble 
 our readers with a serious refutation thereof. It 
 was evidently a mere hypothesis without proof, 
 invented to explain, as was thought, the action 
 of matter upon mind, by bridging over the gulf 
 between them. The supposition of a third some- 
 thing, neither quite matter nor quite mind, was 
 purely imaginary, and injurious to Philosophy, as 
 tending to soften down the distinction between 
 Mind and Matter. 
 
 9. The second opinion is that the medium of 
 communication between Mind and Matter is 
 something called an Idea, itself a mental phe- 
 nomenon, and therefore a fit subject for con- 
 sciousness, and yet distinct from the Mind, and 
 capable of existing even independent of Con- 
 sciousness. Such was the opinion of Des Cartes 
 and his followers, of Malebranche and Berkeley ; 
 but whether it were entertained by Locke is at 
 least doubtful.' Reid certainly supposes that all 
 
 ^ See on this subject .Sir William Hamilton's Notes to the 
 various Chapters on Perception, in his edition of Reid's Works. 
 
 ' The language of Locke is so figurative and various that it 
 is very difficult to determine what was his real opinion on this 
 point. My own belief is that a person unacquainted with the 
 above theory of Ideas would not detect it in Locke ; but knowing, 
 as we do, that the theory was then the prevailing one, 'we may 
 
EVIDENCE AFFORDED BY TERCEPTION. 127 
 
 modern philosophers previous to himself held the 
 opinion ; though in this he may be mistaken. 
 
 10. But, 1. Where is the proof of this hypo- 
 thesis ? That Ideas exist even independent of 
 consciousness is certainly incapable of proof, for 
 by consciousness alone we know them, and along 
 with it they seem to come and go. Even when a 
 similar idea recurs, we have no proof that it is the 
 same. It is not like an outward object to which 
 we can return and find it as before. The idea 
 vanishes, and, as far as appears, for ever. But 
 this supposes a constant creation of Ideas, or 
 rather of Thoughts. Why not"? Is not a recur- 
 rence of the same Idea quite as incomprehensible 
 as the creation of a new one '? If the Idea were 
 laid up, as in store, we might hope to find it again 
 when we wish ; but we know that often we 
 cannot. 
 
 11. And 2. What necessity is there for this 
 hypothesis ? What does it explain ? The con- 
 interpret the language of our gi'eat metaphysician in its favour ; 
 particularly as he never attempts to refute it. Of late years there 
 has rather been a tendency to depreciate Locke, but in spite of all 
 that has since been written, the Essay on the Human Understand- 
 ing is still the gi'eat English work on Mental Philosophy, as the 
 Wealth of Nations is on Political Economy. The prophecy of 
 Hume has hitherto certainly not been fulfilled, that "Addison 
 perhaps may be read when Locke shall be utterly forgotten." The 
 style and subject of Addison are popular, but he describes manners 
 which have changed already ; while the subject of Locke, the Mind 
 of Man, is still the same. 
 
128 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 nection between Mind and Matter ? By no 
 means ; this is quite as inexplicable as before. Is 
 it more unaccountable that Matter should act 
 directly on Mind, than through an Idea? In fact 
 we have two difficulties instead of one. We have 
 first to suppose that Matter rouses a dormant 
 Idea, and then that the Mind becomes conscious 
 thereof. There remains the fundamental diffi- 
 culty, how the material can affect the immaterial ; 
 for surely it is as hard to suppose that Matter 
 should rouse a sleeping Idea as stir up the Mind 
 itself, the Idea and the Mind being both imma- 
 terial. The hypothesis then is without proof, as 
 well as quite gratuitous, it complicates the sim- 
 plicity of nature and yet explains nothing, re- 
 moves no difficulty. 
 
 12. The third and most simple variety of the 
 Representative Theory is the one which supposes 
 that the medium of communication between us 
 and the outward world is nothing more than a 
 fleeting modification of mind itself, having no 
 existence out of Consciousness. This fleeting 
 modification we call a Perception, which is dis- 
 tinguished from Perception only in this, that the 
 word, when used without the indefinite Article, 
 signifies a permanent Power or Faculty from 
 which innumerable particular and passing Per- 
 ceptions are supposed to flow. But, between a 
 Perception and a particular act of Perception 
 there is no difference. The act, or state of mind, 
 
EVIDENCE AFFORDED BY PERCEPTION. 129 
 
 — call it what you will, — is one and indivisible ; 
 being simply a modification of mind, of which we 
 are conscious, and which dies with that con- 
 sciousness. 
 
 1 3. For the truth of this theory, if theory it 
 be, we can appeal confidently to experience, the 
 experience of Consciousness, the supreme arbiter 
 in all metaphysical questions. We maintain that 
 the above gives a correct statement of all we 
 know on the subject, all of which we are con- 
 scious, while other Theories are either contra- 
 dictory or fanciful. The simplicity of this account 
 ought also to plead for its adoption. 
 
 1 4. A correct analysis of the process of Per- 
 ception is sufficient to put this truth in a very 
 clear point of view. We have seen that Per- 
 ception consists of tv;o parts, Sensation and 
 Perception proper, the one preceding, the other 
 following with inconceivable rapidity, so as only 
 to be separated by reflection. Now, were we to 
 adopt the theory of Immediate Perception of 
 objects, a theory, however, which by me is incon- 
 ceivable, because contradictory ; still, our know- 
 ledge of nature being obtained through our Sen- 
 sations, that is through a medium, after all, it 
 would not be immediate. Here then is another 
 contradiction. And if abandoning immediate 
 Perception we cling to Sensible Species, or to 
 Ideas, then, as these are supposed to be the im- 
 mediate object of the mind, they must come be- 
 
 s 
 
130 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 tween the Sensation and the act of Perception. 
 Thus, instead of Sensation and Perception pro- 
 per, we should have Sensation, Species, or else 
 Idea, and Perception proper ; on the one supposi- 
 tion, that of Species, a semi-material something 
 being interposed between two purely mental 
 states ; on the other, that of Idea, a permanent 
 immaterial something intervening between two 
 fleeting mental phenomena. Forced and un- 
 natural combinations ! 
 
 15. But the important question still remains 
 undecided. If we reject the theory of Immediate 
 Perception, if we deny that we immediately know 
 or are conscious of external nature, on what evi- 
 dence do we believe in the existence of matter. 
 
 16. The evidence of consciousness being set 
 aside, can the existence of matter be said to be self- 
 evident, like the axioms of geometry, such as that 
 two lines cannot enclose a space ? Certainly not. 
 For aught we know, all appearances might be the 
 same, supposing matter not to exist ; we cannot 
 pronounce this absurd a priori. Who shall limit 
 the power of God, and say that he could not have 
 given us such and such notions, in any way he 
 pleased, without the creation of another world, a 
 world of matter? In short we see intuitively the 
 truth of mathematical axioms, we cannot doubt 
 these; but we do not see intuitively that the 
 notion and belief of matter necessarily imply its 
 
EVIDENCE AFFORDED BY PERCEPTION. 131 
 
 existence. Why should an immaterial phenome- 
 non suppose of necessity a material one ? 
 
 17. Is, then, our belief in the external ^vorld 
 founded on Reasoning, or can it be supported 
 thereby ? That it is not founded on reasoning, in 
 the first instance, is clear from all that has here 
 been said on Perception. Our belief in the world 
 without arises from the Sensation of Touch, at 
 a very early age, long before our reasoning 
 powers have become developed. And wise indeed 
 is this provision, for such belief is necessary to 
 our preservation at every age ; and had it de- 
 pended on reasoning, we should have perished 
 prematurely. 
 
 18. Neither is our belief in the outward 
 world founded on Experience. We certainly ex- 
 perience certain Sensations, and we can recognise 
 others as similar when they recur, but experience 
 can never inform us that the cause or occasion of 
 these Sensations is an extended solid object with- 
 out the mind. Since then the existence of matter 
 is not known by Consciousness, nor self-evident, 
 nor learnt by Reasoning, or by Experience, it 
 must be considered as an original or fundamental 
 Article of Belief.^ 
 
 19. Though not originating in reasoning, 
 may not our belief in matter be afterwards con- 
 
 ' The subject of Fundamental Articles of Belief is discussed 
 in the Chapters " Of Memory," and " Of Belief." 
 
132 PKINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 firmed and justified thereby? That is a distinct 
 question. Rational grounds for believing we 
 think that we have, and, if so, we have reasons, 
 probable indeed, not demonstrative, indirect 
 rather than direct, sufficient to obviate the objec- 
 tion that we believe without any proof, but not 
 enough to silence all scepticism. 
 
 20. On what ground, then, can we defend 
 our belief in matter ? Simply on this, Universal 
 Consent. That which all men, in all ages, at all 
 periods of life, from infancy upwards, have be- 
 lieved without doubt, without hesitation, must be 
 assumed to be true. That we take for a first 
 Principle ; and some first Principles must be 
 granted, or we can arrive at no knowledge, ex- 
 cept in the Science of Mathematics or Quantity, 
 where first principles are Self-evident. All other 
 branches of knowledge start from data not self- 
 evident, which, however, must be taken as true, 
 for otherwise, reasoning would have no Premises. 
 The attempt to prove every thing is therefore 
 absurd. Fundamental propositions admit of no 
 proof, they are either self-evident or not^ but 
 since they are first propositions, there can be no- 
 thing prior whereby tliey may be proved. We 
 assume then as a First or Fundamental Proposi- 
 tion, that " Whatever is and has been universally 
 believed is worthy of credit." But the existence 
 of the material world is and has been universally 
 believed ; therefore, it is worthy of credit. 
 
EVIDENCE AFFORDED BY PERCEPTION. 133 
 
 21. Scepticism may be quite as great an 
 abuse of the Understanding as Credulity. To 
 doubt or disbelieve out of place is as much op- 
 posed to right reason as ill-founded belief. Now, 
 as to doubt or reject all fundamental propositions 
 not self-evident leads to universal scepticism or 
 universal ignorance, it must be an abuse of the 
 Understanding. Man was evidently made for 
 decision and action, his very being depends 
 upon them, and therefore he will and must be- 
 lieve something. 
 
 22. But here an objection presents itself. It 
 may be said, and has been said, you may plead 
 universal consent, provided it be consistent with 
 itself and with your own theory, but not so if it 
 be inconsistent with either. In the former case, 
 universal consent must be rejected as a solid 
 ground of belief, — in the other, your theory must 
 fall. " Thus," says Hume, " do you follow the 
 instinctive propensities of your nature in assent- 
 ing to the veracity of Sense. But these lead you 
 to believe, that the very perception or sensible 
 image is the external object. Do you disclaim 
 this principle in order to embrace a more rational 
 opinion, that the Perceptions are only repre- 
 sentations of something external ? You here de- 
 part from your natural propensities and more 
 obvious sentiments ; and yet are never able to 
 satisfy your reason, which can never find any 
 convincing argument from experience to prove 
 
134 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY, 
 
 that the Perceptions are connected with any ex- 
 ternal Object."'' 
 
 23. Such is the objection in full, and it places 
 us in this dilemma, either we hold fast by uni- 
 versal consent, and in so doing must adopt the 
 vulgar opinion, that the " very perception, or sen- 
 sible image is the external object;" or retaining 
 the theory of representation, we must allow univer- 
 sal opinion to be inconsistent therewith, and only 
 partially true. In a word, we have only to choose 
 between Absurdity and Scepticism ; for the com- 
 mon opinion, as so stated, is absurd ; and, if we 
 reject it and retain our theory, then, universal 
 consent, being allowed false in one case, cannot 
 be relied on in another. A pretty dilemma for- 
 sooth ! Which horn shall we choose ? ' 
 
 24. But is it true that the " instincts and 
 propensities of our nature lead us to believe that 
 the very perception or sensible image is the ex- 
 ternal object." There lies all the question. This 
 is assumed, but can it be granted ? By no means : 
 we deny it altogether. No man ever believed 
 such a proposition. The vulgar are not professed 
 Metaphysicians, they never read Locke, Hume, 
 or Reid ; but they know enough not to confound 
 
 ^ Hume's Essays: " Of the Academical oi- Sceptical Philosophy." 
 
 K' Pyrrhonism or Absurdity; choose your horn," says Sir 
 William Hamilton. "Discussions on Philosophy," Art. ii. 
 
EVIDENCE AFFOHDED BY PERCEPTION. 135 
 
 mind with matter. In looking at any object, say 
 a tree, their attention is fixed upon the external 
 object, and on that alone ; and in general they 
 reflect not for a moment upon the operation going 
 on in their own minds. Of the perception, or 
 " sensible image," they make no account. They 
 pass over it to reach the object, seldom dwelling 
 enough upon the former to make it the subject of 
 a proposition. But, wherever the mental state 
 does occur to them, as sometimes it will, then 
 common language clearly separates the perception 
 from the external object. They say, all men say, 
 " I perceive a tree," or in other words, " I have a 
 perception of a tree," for the phrases are convert- 
 ible in common language ; and here the mental 
 phenomenon, the perception, or " sensible image," 
 as Hume calls it, is expressly distinguished from 
 the material object, the tree. We also say, "let me 
 see such a thing," or, " let me have a sight of it," 
 where again, the sight, which is mental, is clearly 
 distinguished from the material thing. It is, 
 therefore, altogether untrue, that "The instincts 
 and propensities of our nature lead us to believe 
 that the very perception or sensible image is the 
 external object," and, consequently, the objection 
 founded thereon falls to the ground. We are not 
 then reduced to the dilemma above stated ; we 
 need neither adopt this absurdity, nor, by allowing 
 that those instincts and propensities give us the 
 lie in one particular, deprive them of all credit in 
 
136 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 another. The evidence of those instincts and pro- 
 pensities becomes agreeable to reason, and con- 
 sistent with itself; it justifies our belief in the 
 outward world, and confirms the representative 
 theory. 
 
 25. Universal consent being allowed true to 
 itself, as well as consistent with the only rational 
 theory of Perception, it may still be objected, that 
 universal consent is but a poor foundation for 
 knowledge, blind universal consent, at least, like 
 that in the existence of matter, which is not a 
 self-evident truth, nor established by reasoning, 
 or by experience. Where universal consent de- 
 pends upon the exercise of our Reason, as in the 
 case of Belief in a God or Gods, there it will be 
 allowed to be a good ground for conviction ; for 
 what appears rational to all men, at all times, and 
 in all countries, can hardly be supposed untrue, 
 without depreciating Reason altogether. But, 
 when Belief is a mere instinct, why should we 
 trust it? Practically, this belief may be useful, 
 nay, necessary to our preservation; but, for all 
 that, may it not be a deception, a salutary decep- 
 tion no doubt, a beneficent cheat, a trick of na- 
 ture, more solicitous for our safety than for the 
 accuracy of our speculative knowledge *? 
 
 26. To this we answer that belief, in general, 
 founded on " the instincts and propensities of our 
 nature," is justified, as far as it can be, by sub- 
 sequent Experience, and, therefore, the particular 
 
EVIDENCE AFFORDED BY PERCEPTION. 137 
 
 belief now in question. We see no reason to sup- 
 pose that the present state of things is one vast 
 cheat. On the contrary, we find by experience 
 that we can rely upon the course of nature, that, 
 generally speaking, we can so far foresee events as 
 to direct our actions towards the attainment of 
 certain ends with a fair prospect of success ; that 
 one line of conduct may be predicted to terminate 
 in ruin, another in triumph ; in short, that we are 
 Nature's children, not her fools. We have then 
 no reason to suppose that any universal original 
 belief is fallacious, in particular, our belief in the 
 material world ; on the contrary, we have strong 
 reason to believe them true. Experience is de- 
 cidedly in favour of the truthfulness of Nature. 
 It strongly repels the supposition that the material 
 world is but a pageant, unsubstantial as the vision 
 of Prospero. 
 
 27. But to say that the Belief in question is 
 Universal, is to put the case too feebly, for this 
 Belief is not only Universal, but irresistible, an 
 essential part of our mental being, of which no 
 one, not even the greatest Sceptic, can divest 
 himself. It clings to us from infancy to age with 
 unfailing pertinacity, and those who dispute it, 
 dispute against their own conviction. To deny 
 in words what no one can doubt in reality, must 
 surely he intellectual perversity. It is in fact to 
 belie our nature. Nor is this the only instance 
 of Belief at once universal and irresistible. It is 
 
 T 
 
138 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 one, but only one of the fundamental articles of 
 our creed, of which the criteria or tests will be 
 given under the head of Memory. Now w^e can- 
 not reject one of these A.rticles and retain the 
 rest. If we give up Matter, we must also abandon 
 our Belief of uniformity in the Constitution 
 and Course of Nature, our Trust in Memory, 
 nay, our Personal Identity, for all these rest on 
 the same foundation. Then we shall doubt of 
 every thing, except the present Sensation, Emotion, 
 or Thought ; the very doubting of which implies 
 contradiction ; and we shall approach the absolute 
 goal, the final discovery of Hegel and Oken, the 
 consummation of all Philosophy, Nothing : 
 
 " And Naught 
 Is ev'ry thing, and ev'ry thing is Naught ! " 
 
 28. With the following observations relative 
 to the Sensitive part of the process in Perception, 
 we conclude the present subject. Observe, first, 
 that Sir William Hamilton, in his doctrine of 
 Immediate Perception, entirely overlooks Sensa- 
 tion; for how can the perception of outward 
 objects be immediate, if a sensation intervene 
 between the external object and our knowledge 
 thereof? Observe, secondly, that pure Idealism, 
 as well as all Scepticism about the existence of 
 the material world, may be traced to the neglect 
 of Sensation, as antecedent to Perception proper. 
 The Sensation, being in itself unimportant, in the 
 
EVIDENCE AFFORDED BY PERCKPTION. 139 
 
 case of the primary qualities of matter, is apt to 
 be over-looked. Hence pure Idealism. But, 
 allowing the Sensation, the question then arises 
 whence comes it? from the mind itself*? does the 
 mind then create Sensation of itself? if not, it 
 must come from something else ; i.e from the 
 non-mental and material."* Observe, thirdly, as 
 the neglect of Sensation has given rise to Idealism, 
 so too great attention to Sensation has produced 
 Sensationalism, and the doctrine of Condillac. 
 All mental phenomena depend, originally, on Sen- 
 sation ; but, for all that, all mental phenomena 
 are not Sensations. Sensation rouses the dormant 
 faculties of the mind, which without it might have 
 slumbered for ever, and it is therefore the occa- 
 sion of them all, that is, an aiding cause, essential, 
 though not principal, and yet the only original 
 cause which we can trace. There is, then, but 
 one assignable origin of our ideas, namely, Sensa- 
 tion, not two, as Locke supposes, for those opera- 
 
 " The only other possible supposition is, that Sensation in us, 
 in all men, nay, in all animals, is caused by an Omnipresent 
 Mind, that is by Deity. It was this view of the case, no doubt, 
 that led Berkeley to believe that in annihilating matter he levelled 
 Atheism. Sensation is a fact that must have a cause, material or 
 immaterial ; and, therefore, the former being removed, the latter 
 remains ; and as the cause, like the effect, must be every where 
 present, that Cause is God. Berkeley did not deny that the 
 universal and irresistible belief of mankind was worthy of credit ; 
 but he boldly asserted that the vulgar did not believe in matter, 
 — that it was an invention of philosophers ! 
 
140 PRINCIPLES OF PSTCHOLOGY, 
 
 tions of the mind which form the subject for Re- 
 flection, and, hence, Reflection itself, depend so 
 much upon Sensation that without it they would 
 never have been. But the ideas of Reflection of 
 Locke prove that he was no Sensationalist, that 
 he held that we have Ideas very different from 
 Sensations ; and that alone is important. This 
 being allowed, the question — whether or not Re- 
 flection should be considered a Second Source of 
 our Ideas, is of less consequence. It can scarcely 
 be an original and independent source, because, 
 those operations of the mind on which we are 
 supposed to reflect must be prior to Reflection, 
 and those very operations, which might more pro- 
 perly be considered as a source, are themselves 
 originally dependant on Sensation, though widely 
 diiferent from it, as an Eff^ect often differs alto- 
 gether from its Cause. The mind once roused 
 by Sensation, afterwards rises high above it, and 
 soars into regions, far, far removed from the low 
 and vulgar occasion of its first development. 
 
 29. With one observation more, we close the 
 present Chapter. Since all Perception supposes 
 that some object or objects are within the range 
 of our senses, and that some impression is actually 
 made upon the material organ by the object, either 
 immediately, or mediately, therefore, all Percep- 
 tions are of things particular and really existing. 
 There is no general, no abstract Perception. This, 
 again, shews us that, in the order of mental de- 
 
PERCEPTION. 141 
 
 velopment, Perception is the earliest power of 
 Thought. 
 
 SUPPLEMENT TO CHAPTER THIRD. 
 
 OP PERCEPTION. 
 
 Since the above chapter was written, I have 
 made up my mind, chiefly from reading Locke's 
 Posthumous work — " An examination of P^re 
 Malebran die's opinion of seeing all things in 
 God," that our great Metaphysician did not en- 
 tertain the Ideal Theory, properly so called, the 
 theory which supposes Ideas to be something im- 
 material, yet distinct from the mind, and continu- 
 ing to exist, even out of our Consciousness. To 
 this theory, held by Des Cartes and others after 
 him, Malebranche and Berkeley added something 
 of their own, namely, that these Ideas, when not 
 present to our minds, exist in the Mind of the 
 Deity. This opinion was common to jMalebranche 
 and Berkele}^ though they differed in this, that 
 the former supposed that we saw the Ideas of out- 
 ward material objects in God, while the latter 
 maintained that there were no outward material 
 objects, and that Ideas were not seen in God, but 
 were suggested by God. From the opinion of 
 Malebranche, who denied that we could see ma- 
 terial objects directly, to that of Berkeley, who 
 denied that there were any such objects to see, 
 
142 PEINCIPLKS OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 there was but one, and an easy, step. Now, that 
 Locke held the Ideal Theory, under any of these 
 modifications, I utterly disbelieve ; and I think 
 that the above tract establishes the point. I am, 
 indeed, aware that a highly-gifted metaphysician, 
 of the present day, has deduced from one passage 
 of that work a conclusion diametrically opposed 
 to mine, but, as I humbly think, erroneously. In 
 Sir William Hamilton's ''Discussions on Philoso- 
 phy," Art. ii., a quotation is made from the " Ex- 
 amination," to show that Locke would not allow a 
 Sensation to be a modification of our Soul as Male- 
 branche called it ; " and if," argues Sir William, 
 " Locke ridicules even the opinion which merely 
 reduces the secondary qualities to mental states, 
 a fortiori^ and this on the jjrincijyles of his own 2)hil- 
 osojyhj/, must he be held to reject the doctrine 
 which would reduce, not only the non-resembling 
 sensations of the secondary, but even the re- 
 sembling, and consequently, extended ideas of the 
 primary qualities of matter, to modifications of 
 the immaterial unextended mind. " All I can 
 say is, that such is not Locke's own inference ; 
 and if my much esteemed and now deeply la- 
 mented friend had extended his quotation, only 
 to one sentence more, he would have seen that 
 the conclusion drawn by Locke is quite dif- 
 ferent. Locke is arguing, and no doubt errone- 
 ously, against Malebranche's distinction between 
 Sentiment (Sensation) and Idea in Perception, a 
 
PERCEPTION. 143 
 
 distinction in accordance with our own between 
 Sensation and Conception ; and he attempts to 
 confound the two, and instead of saying that if 
 Sensation be not a Modification of the Soul much 
 less is an Idea on the contrary he argues, if a 
 Sensation be a Modification of our Soul, so like- 
 wise must be an Idea. Either both are modifica- 
 tions, or neither ; in this respect they are alike. 
 The concluding sentences of the section which 
 prove this are the following ; — " But let it finodi- 
 jication) signify what it will, when I recollect the 
 figure of one of the leaves of a violet, is not that 
 a new Modification of my Soul as when I think of 
 its purple colour^ Does my mind do or suffer 
 nothing a-new when I see that figure in God '? " 
 (Sec, 39). And the same strain of argument is 
 repeated in Sec. 48., the object of which is to 
 confound the distinction between Sensation and 
 Idea, and to show that if the formerbe a Modi- 
 fication of the Soul, so is the latter, and, conse- 
 quently, if we have not the Sensation of material 
 things in God, as Malebranche allows, neither do we 
 see Ideas in God. This, then, affords no evidence 
 of Locke's belief in the Ideal Theory, nay, rather a 
 proof of the contrary ; for, as no one ever main- 
 tained that Sensations had an existence out of Con- 
 sciousness, Locke, by assimilating Ideas and Sensa- 
 tions, showed that he did not hold the separate and 
 permanent existence of the former. Another and 
 more direct proof of the same is afforded by Sec. 1 7 
 
144 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 of the same "Examination," where Locke prints in 
 italics, evidently as a startling proposition, the 
 opinion of Malebranche, who considered it as an 
 absurdity to think that Ideas are annihilated when 
 they are not present to the mind. 
 
 The following passage affords a strong proof that 
 Locke did not hold the Ideal Theory. " One who 
 thinks Ideas are nothing but perceptions of the 
 mind annexed to certain motions of the body by 
 the will of God, who ordered such perceptions 
 always to accompany such motions, though we 
 know not how they are produced, does in effect 
 conceive those Ideas or Perceptions to be only 
 Passions of the Mind when produced in it, 
 whether we will or no, by external objects. But 
 he conceives them to be a mixture of Action and 
 Passion when the mind attends to them or re- 
 vives them in the Memory." Sect. 15. Now, I 
 would ask, could one who held the Ideal Theory 
 use such language ^ Could he call Ideas Percep- 
 tions % Could he call them Passions of the Mind ■? 
 According to that theory an Idea is not a Per- 
 ception, but the immediate object of the mind in 
 the act of Perception ; still less, on the same 
 theory, could an Idea be called a Passion of the 
 Mind. 
 
CONCIRP'I IO\. 145 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 OF CONCEPTION 
 
 SECTION FIRST. 
 
 OF CONCEPTION IN GENERAL. 
 
 1. In the preceding Chapter we unavoidably 
 touched upon Conception ; inasmuch as Concep- 
 tion is comprised in every act of Perception. 
 We shall not, therefore, recur to what has been 
 said on that point; but, observing tliat all Con- 
 ceptions are either Original or Derivative^ we 
 shall in this Chapter treat chiefly of the latter; 
 though whatever may be said of Conception in 
 general must be applicable to both. Original 
 Conceptions are those comprehended under Per- 
 ception, while all others are Derivative, because 
 they are derived from the former. No doubt 
 these words imply a Theory, for the truth of 
 which we must refer to the last Section of this 
 Chapter. 
 
 2. Conception, then, in the widest sense ad- 
 missible, means that Mental Power whereby we 
 obtain the thought of things separate, or apart, as 
 much as possible, from any relation with anything 
 u 
 
146 PllINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 else. Thus, single words, or words equivalent to 
 one, correspond to Conceptions or Notions (for 
 these terms we use as perfectly synonymous) ; 
 such as man, tree, house, mountain, substance, 
 time, space. No doubt. Conceptions and Rela- 
 tions are generally mixed up together in those 
 compound states of mind of which we are con- 
 scious. But it is the business of the Metaphysi- 
 cian to analyse and examine separately what is 
 really united ; just as it becomes the Chemist to 
 analyse common salt into Chlorine and Sodium, 
 and treat of each apart, though neither is often 
 found by itself. Now Relative Thoughts cannot 
 exist without Conceptions, for if we see a Rela- 
 tion it must be between two things at least of 
 which we have Conceptions ; but Conceptions 
 may, without contradiction, be supposed to arise 
 without the Thought of Relation. Consequently, 
 non-relative Ihoughts or Conceptions ought to 
 be treated of before the Relative. 
 
 3. We must then be careful not to confound 
 Conception with Co7?iprehens{on, as Reid has done,^ 
 to the darkening of this subject; for Compre- 
 hension implies Relation, But Comprehension is 
 not Judgment, for it may exist without any de- 
 cision as to Truth or Untruth, without either 
 Belief or Disbelief. Thus, when I read for the 
 first time the enunciations of the propositions 
 
 * See Reid's " Intellectual Powers," Essay IV., Cha])ter iii. 
 
coxcErTiOxX. 147 
 
 of Euclid, for instance, that of the fifth of the 
 first book — that the angles at the base of an 
 isosceles triangle are equal, I perfectly compre- 
 hend the statement, though I can pass no judg- 
 ment upon it before I have gone through the 
 proof. Thus is Comprehension distinguished from 
 Judgment, as also from Conception, which is non- 
 relative. We may therefore say with propriety 
 that we comprehend the enunciation of any 
 relation, but not that we conceive it. We shall 
 afterwards find that this distinction is important 
 in fixing the criterion of truth. 
 
 4. All propositions aflirm or deny that some 
 Relation exists between two things ; propositions 
 must therefore be either true or false ; but Con- 
 ceptions affirm or deny nothing, and therefore 
 they cannot be pronounced false or true. Dis- 
 tinct or confused they may be, clear or obscure, 
 lively or dull, adequate or inadequate, real or 
 imaginative, but to predicate truth or falsehood 
 of them is contradictory, and therefore illogical. 
 
 5. Neither does Conception necessarily imply 
 that there is any object in nature corresponding 
 to it; for we can form Conceptions of monsters, 
 such as. Centaurs, mermaids, griffins, winged bulls 
 and lions, etc., which have no real existence. 
 One kind of Conceptions alone has always some 
 real material object, namely, those which we have 
 called Original, that form an element of Percep- 
 tion. Nothing is so free as Conception, it can 
 
150 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 power by which sucli notions are framed is pro- 
 perly called the Imagination^ and it is a species or 
 variety of Conception. Where the objects have 
 no real existence in nature, they are said to be 
 Imaginary, and the notion of them must be 
 Imaginative ; but, are the notions of things which 
 really exist, though they have never been per- 
 ceived by the individual, also to be classed as 
 Imaginative *? 
 
 4. Here it seems desirable to enter more into 
 the nature of Imagination, to fix what is proper 
 to it, and to show how it differs from Fancy, with 
 which it is apt to be confounded. To judge from 
 the etymology of the word we may suppose that 
 originally Imagination was limited to the power 
 of conceiving visible objects, to the power of 
 Visual Conception, as we may call it, for none but 
 visible objects present to the mind anything like 
 an Imago or Image. But, in course of time, this 
 original signification received two modifications, 
 the one a limitation, the other an extension. 
 Visible objects, when actually present and per- 
 ceived, are now never said to be imagined^ but 
 see7i ; and some Conceptions other than visual are 
 said to be the work of Imagination. Nay more, 
 when visible objects, no longer present and per- 
 ceived, are conceived in their absence just as 
 they were formerly seen, no exercise of Imagina- 
 tion is supposed. But, when visible objects, 
 never before seen by the individual, are pre- 
 
PARTICULAR CONCEPTIONS. 15 1 
 
 sented to his mind as if they had once actually 
 been seen, whether such objects really exist in 
 nature or not, then Imagination is said to be at 
 work. Thus, to me who have never seen the 
 Acropolis of Athens, or the Pyramids of Egypt, 
 it requires an effort of Imagination to picture 
 them in my mind, as well as to conceive fabulous 
 and unnatural animals, fairy scenes, and palaces 
 of enchantment ; a less effort, perhaps, in the 
 one case than in the other, but of the same sort ; 
 while to conceive Mont Blanc or the Bliimlis 
 Alp demands no such effort, for I have seen 
 them. The existence or non-existence of the 
 object is clearly immaterial, so far as the nature 
 of the mental effort is concerned, provided I have 
 not seen it or something very like it ; for what is 
 it to me whether the Shield of Achilles, the Palace 
 of the Sun, or the Gardens of Armida, ever really 
 existed or not '? On either supposition must I 
 not imagine them ? 
 
 Moreover, Imagination is not limited to Visual 
 Conceptions, for new combinations of Sound 
 in music are universally attributed to this 
 faculty ; and we can even imagine, though in a 
 far less degree, tastes and smells somewhat dif- 
 ferent from those which we have actually experi- 
 enced. In like manner, the Dramatist, the Poet, 
 and the Novelist, imagine Emotions similar, no 
 doubt, to such as they have felt, but considerably 
 modified, especially in intensity. Thus, upon the 
 
152 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 whole, Imagination is that Faculty whereby we 
 form Conceptions of outward objects which we 
 have never perceived, or of Sensations and Emo- 
 tions which we have never felt. Fancy, on the 
 other hand, is the Faculty whereby we discover 
 new Relations, especially relations of resemblance, 
 between things. Imagination, then, is concerned 
 with new Conceptions, Fancy with new Rela- 
 tions. This seems to be the fundamental distinc- 
 tion. Remark only that Relations of Fancy must 
 be new, striking, unexpected, between things 
 which really differ widely. Thus, Fancy is the 
 very soul of both Poetry and Wit. In the one 
 case, the resemblances are sublime and beautiful ; 
 in the other ludicrous. 
 
 5. It is clear that all the Conceptions com- 
 prised in Perception are real ; but all real Con- 
 ceptions are not included in Perception ; for the 
 notions of things formerly perceived are also real. 
 Consequently real Notions are of two kinds ; the 
 Original and the Derivative. 
 
 6. Thus, starting from the division of Con- 
 ceptions into Particular and General, and sub- 
 dividing the Particular into Real and Imaginative, 
 we arrive at the Original and Derivative as a 
 further sub-division of the former ; while, in the 
 opening of this Chapter, w^e mentioned that all 
 Conceptions might be divided in the first instance 
 into Original and Derivative. These, then, are 
 two Classifications quite distinct, and we might 
 
PAHTICIJL^VR CONCEPTIONS. 153 
 
 have carried out either ; but we prefer the one 
 on which we are now engaged, partly because it 
 does not imply any theory at the outset, partly 
 because it seems more natural ; for, on the other 
 system, many of our particular conceptions must 
 be arranged along with general conceptions, un- 
 der the head of Derivative, though they widely 
 differ, and separated from other particular con- 
 ceptions which they closely resemble. The no- 
 tion of a tree, as perceived, is surely very like to 
 the notion of the same tree no longer present to 
 the senses ; yet, on the other system, they must 
 be classed apart ; and though this latter con- 
 ception is very different from the abstract con- 
 ceptions of Substance, Time and Space, yet, as 
 Derivative, they must be arranged together. That 
 system, then, is less natural than the one we have 
 adopted. It is scarcely necessary to add that all 
 Imaginative Conceptions must be Derivative. 
 
 7. Another division of Particular Concep- 
 tions may be into Visual Conceptions or Con- 
 ceptions of Sight, whether Original or Derivative, 
 and the Non-visual. 
 
 We have seen that at first Conceptions of 
 Sight, and these alone, were attributed to the 
 Imagination,'' and though the sense of this word has 
 
 ' " Imagination, when it is distinguished from Conception, seems 
 to me to signify one species of Conception, to wit the Conception of 
 Visible Objects." Reid's Intellectual Powers. Essay IV. Chap. i. 
 This was, I believe, the original meaning of Imagination. 
 X 
 
154 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 since been modijQ.ed, yet it remains true that to the 
 Conceptions derived from Sight, and to them alone, 
 whether the Objects be actually seen or only recalled, 
 the word Image is at all applicable. Of course 
 the language is still metaphorical, derived from 
 the image of an object in a glass or in clear water, 
 but there is an analogy between this and the mental 
 representation of visible objects, an analogy of 
 which every one is conscious. And as this analogy 
 is shared by no other mental representation, it 
 serves to distinguish the Conception of Yisible 
 objects, or Visual Conceptions, from all others. 
 
 8. Visual Conceptions may be considered as the 
 grand source of amusement and cheerfulness. To 
 the great mass of mankind, who are little addicted to 
 scientific and abstruse pursuits, Visual Conceptions 
 are the chief intellectual delight ; and to all, with- 
 out exception, they are a grand resource against 
 vacancy on the one hand, and too concentrated 
 thought on the other. Is not light universally con- 
 sidered cheerful, and darkness gloomy ? and why *? 
 surely because the one gives us a perpetual succes- 
 sion of lively Conceptions, the other none. Hence 
 a principal delight of travelling, riding, driving, 
 walking, especially through a new country, which 
 affords us fresh and ever changing conceptions. 
 Hence the delight of the multitude in shows of all 
 kinds, even in funeral pomp, and the taste now 
 manifested universally for illustrated books and 
 newspapers. If children, as Rousseau says, are led 
 
I'AllTICLLAH CON(:£ITlC)iN> loo 
 
 Ijy the mouth, children of a larger growth are led 
 by the eye. But to none are Visual Conceptions 
 more valuable than to men of deep research, who, 
 but for the recreation of the eye and of con- 
 ceptions borrowed from the eye, might lose theii 
 intellects from over-exertion. No books are more 
 generally relished than books of travels ; but these 
 owe most of their charm to the images which they 
 suggest. 1'hus, whether we consider the Original or 
 the Derivative Conceptions of Sight, we shall find 
 that much of our cheerfulness, nay, much of our 
 mental health, depends upon them. It has indeed 
 been remarked that the blind are more cheerful in 
 society than the deaf. This is natural enough ; for 
 blindness is not nearly so great an evil in society 
 as deafness. But, follow the blind man home, 
 especially to a solitary home, and think you that he 
 will not be found more dull than the deaf? Deaf- 
 ness is scarcely any evil in solitude, but blindness 
 is a perpetual blank. Still, if a man ever did see, 
 he can always delight his mind with colours and 
 forms no longer visible, or call up new forms and 
 new modifications of colour by means of Imagina- 
 tioD. Thus, the images of Sight, whether Original 
 or Derived, are particularly important among our 
 Conceptions, because they fill up so well the ca- 
 pacity of the mind. They supply vacancy, or 
 divert from other and engrossing thoughts. And 
 they are almost always in our power, for we have 
 only to open our eves and be filled ; or, even in 
 
156 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 absence, or in the dark, we can wander mentally 
 through regions of beauty or sublimity. " The 
 Alps, the Appennines, the Pyrenean, and the river 
 Po," the isles of Greece, the heights of Olympus, 
 rise up like magic before us. 
 
 9. Visual Conceptions may be divided into 
 the Original and the Derivative, the former being 
 those Conceptions comprised in Visual Percep- 
 tion, the latter derived from the former, and 
 arising without the actual presence of any out- 
 ward object. Of course. Original Visual Concep- 
 tions are all real ; but Derivative Visual Con- 
 ceptions may either be real or imaginative; for 
 the images of visible objects may recur to us just 
 as they were at first, or else variously modified 
 by Imagination. 
 
 10. Particular Conceptions are in number 
 infinite, diversified without end. When in mo- 
 tion, our Visual Conceptions comprised in Per- 
 ception vary at every step we take ; and when 
 we rest with closed eyes, we can call up similar 
 Conceptions, and even diversify them by Imagi- 
 nation without limit. The mind is particularly 
 rich in visual notions, and can recal with pe- 
 culiar fidelity the images of things formerly seen, 
 
 Segnius irritant aiiimos demissa per aurem, 
 Qnam quae sunt oculis subjccta fidelibus. 
 
 1 1. Since Particular Conceptions are in- 
 numerable, their objects must also for the most 
 
PARTICULAE CONCEPTIONS. I57 
 
 part be without names. Though every man has 
 ci name, yet to every one the vast mass of mankind 
 is as if nameless ; few animals have individual 
 names, and but few places. Countries, provinces, 
 parishes, towns, and villages have names ; but has 
 each house, each field, each hedge, each individual 
 tree and bush a name ? And what are they in 
 number as compared with the various and ever- 
 changing images arising from groups of these, as 
 present to the mind in Perception, or simply in 
 Conception *? Who could give names to all the 
 visual notions which arise even during a short 
 walk ? 
 
 12. Lastly, Particular Conceptions cannot be 
 defined, for a definition sets forth a common 
 nature, that is something common to many indi- 
 viduals whereby they are distinguished from others. 
 Thus, when I define a triangle to be a figure with 
 three sides and three angles, I distinguish it, in 
 the first instance, as a figure, from every thing 
 that is not figured ; and next, as having three 
 sides and three angles, I separate it from all 
 other figures having a different number of sides, 
 and angles. Consequently, figure, three sides, 
 and three angles, constitute a common nature, the 
 common nature of triangles, and to determine 
 this is the object of definition. But an Individual 
 has no common nature, the supposition thereof is 
 inconsistent wdth the notion of individual, and 
 therefore a definition in this case is absurd. 
 
158 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 13, Though Individuals cannot be defined, 
 they may be pointed out so as to be known, either 
 directly, by name when they have one, or by show- 
 ing ; or indirectly, by various circumstances con- 
 nected with them. Thus, though I cannot define 
 a view, I can conduct my friend to the spot and 
 then point it out, or I can mention the spot, and tell 
 him to go there alone. In either of these ways I 
 can give my friend a perfect Conception of the 
 prospect, whereas every attempt at description must 
 have been lamentably incomplete. 
 
 14. Thus it appears that Particular Concep- 
 tions or Notions are innumerable, un-nameable for 
 die most part, and indefinable. 
 
 U.— OF GENERAL CONCEPTIONS. 
 L— NATURE OF GENERAL CONCEPTIONS. 
 
 15. One word before we proceed further on 
 the use of the term Conception. It has been 
 proposed by some, in particular by Sir William 
 Hamilton, to limit the sense of the w^ord to Gen- 
 eral Notions only ; and a great authority is ap- 
 pealed to, that of Leibnitz, who distinguishes 
 spnholical from intuitive knowledge, the former 
 being " limited to the thought of what cannot be 
 represented in the imagination, as the thought 
 suggested by a general term." This, we are told, 
 
GENERAL CONCEPTIONS. 15c) 
 
 " is the sense in which Conceptio and Conceptus 
 have been usually and correctly employed. Mr. 
 Stewart, on the other hand, arbitrarily limits Con- 
 ception to the reproduction, in imagination, of an 
 object of sense as actually perceived;" '^ that is, to 
 one order of what we call Particular Conceptions. 
 Thus, while one author excludes Particular Con- 
 ceptions, and another excludes General Conceptions 
 from his use of the word, we comprehend both ; 
 not only because we think that common language 
 justifies this employment of the term, but also 
 because Particular and General Conceptions have 
 something in common, which requires a common 
 name, and if we reject Conception, we must adopt 
 another. We might take up Notion^ but as this is 
 usually employed as synonymous with Conception, 
 we should create confusion by attempting to dis- 
 tinguish them. Dr. Brown adopts the w^ord Sug- 
 gestion, or rather Simple Suggestion^ in opposition 
 to Relative Suggestion ; but, thus employed, Sug- 
 gestion is synonymous with Thought, and in no way 
 preferable. Upon the whole, I can see no good 
 reason why Conception should not be used as it is 
 here, distinguishing the different species thereof by 
 the words Particular and General. Conception, thus 
 understood, certainly constitutes a natural genus, 
 and 1 know of no better word to mark the same. 
 The two species seem to correspond with the Intui- 
 
 f See Sir William Hamilton's Reid, p. 360. notp. 
 
160 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 tive and the Symholical thoughts of Leibnitz, the 
 (pdvTaa-fiaTa and the vorjfjbaTa of the Greeks, the 
 Anschaungen and the Begrife of the Germans. 
 
 16. A-fter these observations on iNJames, we 
 have next to inquire in what sense any Conceptions 
 can be called General. All the works of God, every 
 thing in nature is Particular, how, then, can we 
 have General Conceptions ^ 
 
 17- From the above it is clear that, in them- 
 selves, General Conceptions are particular as much 
 as those especially so called ; as Mental Phenomena, 
 Phenomena of which we are conscious, they are 
 and must be particular. That the Conception 
 which I actually experience should be the very 
 same as that of which others are conscious is ab- 
 surd, for it supposes that my mind and their's is 
 identical, which is a contradiction. 
 
 18. When we talk then of a General Concep- 
 tion, do we mean that it is general inasmuch as 
 many individuals participate in similar Conceptions? 
 This cannot be the meaning, for, in this sense. Par- 
 ticular Conceptions, being shared by many, may also 
 be general. Any prospect, being under the eyes 
 of a crowd of people at one time, is general or 
 common to all. 
 
 19. Since then General cannot refer to the 
 Conceptions in themselves, it must relate to the 
 Object of Conception, to the thing conceived, what- 
 ever that may be. In Particular Conceptions, the 
 thing conceived is some particular object, as a 
 
GENERAL CONCEPTIONS. \CA 
 
 house, a tree, a hill ; while in General Conceptions 
 the ohject is something general. But we have seen 
 that every thing in nature, every thing really exist- 
 ing is Particular, how then can there be General 
 objects } 
 
 20. The answer is, that General objects do not 
 really exist, any more than mathematical points, 
 lines and figures ; they are fictitious entities, which 
 can be conceived, though they exist not. Thus, 
 though the Conception itself be real, the object 
 thereof is not. The proper name for these fictitious 
 entities is Universals. In the old philosophy, 
 that of the Greeks, the term for these was Idea. 
 In modern philosophy, the word Idea has been used 
 in other senses : but originally it meant the same 
 as Universal. 
 
 21. With respect to the nature of Universals, 
 many, long, and bitter have been the disputes. 
 The opinions on this subject may be classed under 
 three heads, two extremes, and one the mean ; and 
 accordingly we have Realists, Nominalists, and 
 Conceptualists. 
 
 22. Plato and his followers, who were Realists, 
 par excellence, maintained that all the particular 
 objects around us are changeable and fluctuating 
 perpetually, and, consequently, that these could 
 afford no foundation for real Science; but they 
 held that above them are objects permanent and 
 immutable amid all the changes of sensible objects; 
 and, therefore, alone worthy of the attention of 
 
 Y 
 
162 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 Philosophers. These are Ideas or Universals, which 
 existed in the mind of the Deity before any indi- 
 vidual was created, and were the models or patterns 
 according to which all particular things were made ; 
 which now exist entire, without separation or divi- 
 sion in every individual of a species ; and which, 
 though hidden from sense, may be contemplated by 
 the human intellect. 
 
 23. Such is the Realistic Theory in the ex- 
 treme, and though, when understood literally, it is 
 too absurd to deserve refutation, yet, figuratively 
 taken, it well represents the truth. It is quite true 
 that individuals change or perish, while general laws 
 are constant ; and it is also true that Science has to 
 do with generals not with particulars, which are 
 useful only as the means of arriving at general 
 results. It is also rational to suppose that the con- 
 ception of all things must have been present to the 
 mind of the Deity before he actually created them, 
 just as every man has a plan in his head before he 
 undertakes any work. This plan then is an object 
 of Intellect, not an object of Sense. And, whatever 
 is common to a Species must exist entire in every 
 individual of that species. Thus, the Realistic 
 Theory of Plato, interpreted figuratively, exactly 
 describes the truth. There was but one error, that 
 of supposing that Ideas or Universals had a real 
 existence. May we express a doubt whether Plato 
 actually understood his own theory in the literal 
 sense *? It would require a more intimate acquaint- 
 
GENERAL CONCEPTIONS. 1G3 
 
 ance with the works of that sage than 1 can boast to 
 give a decisive answer to this question. 
 
 24. As an instance of the opposite extreme, we 
 may take the opinion of Hobbes, who maintains 
 that Universals are Names and nothing more. 
 Thus,- in his " Human Nature," he says, " It is 
 plain, therefore, that there is nothing Universal but 
 names."^ And again in the Leviathan, " There 
 being nothing in the world universal but names; 
 for the things named are every one of them indi- 
 vidual and singular. One universal name is im- 
 posed on many things, for their similitude in some 
 quality, or other accident ; and whereas a proper 
 Name bringeth to mind one thing only, Universals 
 recal any of those many.'"" 
 
 25. The above may be taken as specimens of 
 the Realist and Nominalist opinions in the extreme ; 
 but between them lies another which is called Con- 
 ceptualism. The Conceptualist believes not that 
 there are in nature real entities corresponding to 
 General Conceptions; nor yet will he allow that 
 there is nothing general but Names. He main- 
 tains that Names without Conceptions attached to 
 them are a contradiction, that a Name must have 
 meaning of some kind, or it is a mere senseless 
 combination of letters, as paufory ; that there may 
 be disputes as to what is implied by a word, but 
 
 s " Human Nature," Chap. v. Sec. 6. 
 ^ " Levialhan," Part I. Chap. iv. 
 
164 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 no question whether it implies anything. General 
 Names, then, must have some general meaning 
 attached to them, and as names stand not for 
 propositions, that meaning must designate some 
 object "without expressing Relation with another 
 object, that is, it must be a Notion or Conception 
 of something. If, then, the name be rightly called 
 general because it brings to mind many things, 
 surely the Conception suggested by the Name, and 
 through which alone the things can be brought to 
 mind, ought also to be called general. General 
 Names, then, suppose General Conceptions. 
 
 26. But Conceptions suppose an object conceived, 
 real or unreal. Thus, Particular Conceptions have 
 always some particular object, either really exist- 
 ing, or supposed capable of really existing, by 
 itself, either some man, house, or tree, or an animal 
 with the head of a man, the body of a lion, and 
 the wings of an eagle, such as the sculptors of 
 ancient Nineveh delighted in. Such, however, 
 cannot be the objects of General Conceptions ; for 
 how can the Individual be the object of the 
 General"? This is a contradiction. No doubt a 
 General Conception may suggest an Individual 
 man, house, or tree, and from association it often 
 does : but this is not the object of the General 
 Conception. Association runs away with our 
 thoughts even against our will, so that while dis- 
 coursing of men in general, the image of John or 
 James may rise up before me, but I should not 
 
GENERAL CONCEPTIONS. 1G5 
 
 therefore suppose that these Individuals were the 
 subject of my speech or writing. The image of 
 the individual is known to be a merely accidental 
 visitor, rather interrupting than furthering the pur- 
 pose 1 have in view. It is on what is common to 
 all men that my mind is or ought to be fixed, 
 if I discourse to any advantage ; that is, on the 
 Universal, which, though founded on natural 
 resemblances, and derived from an examination of 
 nature more or less accurate, has itself no real 
 independent existence. It is, then, a fictitious 
 entity, fictitious but not arbitrary, for here the 
 unreal is founded on the real. 
 
 27. A General Conception, then, is that which 
 has for its object an Universal ; and if a Name 
 may be called General because it suggests many 
 things, as all allow, a Conception is entitled to 
 the same epithet because it looks to many. 
 
 28. The Conceptualists, then, agree with the 
 Realists in maintaining that General Conceptions 
 have General Objects "called Universals, but they 
 differ from them as to the nature of these Uni- 
 versals ; the Realists maintaining that Universals 
 are real things, while the Conceptualists affirm 
 that they are fictitious, the creatures of man's 
 intellect, though derived not arbitrarily from 
 nature and reality. On the other hand, the Con- 
 ceptualists agree with the Nominalists in discard- 
 ing Universals as real natures ; but they disagree 
 with them in maintaining that Conceptions are 
 
166 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 general, quite as much as Names, and in a like 
 sense ; and also, that Universals, though ficti- 
 tious entities, may be the objects of human 
 thought, nay, that they alone are the proper sub- 
 ject of Science. 
 
 29. Though the opinions of the Realists and 
 Nominalists be both absurd, yet it is not difficult 
 to account for them, to shew on what foundation 
 of truth they were built. The Realists were cer- 
 tainly right in supposing that our General Notions 
 are founded on reality, or derived from real 
 distinctions ; but they erroneously thought that 
 the points of resemblance between things can 
 have an independent existence. So the Nomi- 
 nalists were justified in rejecting such independent 
 existence ; but they were wrong in supposing, 
 that if there w^ere no General Thing really exist- 
 ing there could be no General Notion, that is, no 
 Notion of something common to many things, 
 cognizable by the intellect, though not really 
 separable from the things particular. 
 
 30. And this error of the Nominalists was 
 owing in a great degree to a mis -apprehension of 
 the term Notion or Conception, especially to the 
 want of a due appreciation of the difference 
 between Particular and General Conceptions. 
 They supposed that a General Conception must 
 have all the properties of one that is Particular, 
 nay, of a Visual Conception ; that the thing to 
 which it corresponds ought to be represented by 
 
GENERAL CONCEPTIONS. 167 
 
 an image, like any individual object of sight ; 
 and because this is impossible, because we cannot 
 picture to ourselves a triangle *' neither oblique 
 nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor 
 scalenon, but all and none of these at once," ' 
 therefore they maintained that there could be no 
 General Conceptions. And much wit was em- 
 ployed, especially in the Memoirs of Martinus 
 Scriblerus, to show the absurdity of this universal 
 triangle, a figure made up of inconsistent parts. 
 Being asked by his father if he could not frame 
 the idea of an Universal Lord Mayor, Martin 
 affirmed " that he had great difficulty to abstract 
 a lord mayor from his fur gown and gold chain ; 
 nay, that the horse he saw the lord mayor ride 
 upon not a little disturbed his Imagination. On 
 the other hand, Crambe, to show himself of a 
 more penetrating genius, swore that he could 
 frame a Conception of a lord mayor, not only 
 without his horse, gown, and gold chain, but 
 even without stature, feature, colour, hands, 
 head, feet, or body, which he supposed was the 
 abstract of a lord mayor." ^ 
 
 31. This witty description is enough to show 
 what a General Conception was supposed to be, 
 namely, the mental image of something invisible ; 
 
 ' Locke ; " Essay concerning Human Understanding , " 
 Book IV., Chap, vii.. Sect. 9. 
 
 r « 
 
 Memoirs of Mavtinus Scriblerus," Chap VII. 
 
168 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 and as there can be no such Conception, as the 
 very supposition thereof is absurd, no wonder 
 that General Conceptions were exploded alto- 
 gether. Such is the real secret of Nominalism. 
 It sought in General Conceptions what cannot 
 be found in them, and therefore supposed that 
 there is nothing general but Names. But we 
 have already shown that Names without Concep- 
 tions are nothing, a mere bundle of letters, and 
 not words, — that hence Names must have mean- 
 ing, and if they have meaning, they must suggest 
 General Conceptions. 
 
 32. Many, I have no doubt, who have been 
 called Nominalists, had the term conception been 
 clearly explained, would have declared themselves 
 Conceptualists. But the system of Hume seems 
 utterly inconsistent with general notions ; and by him 
 accordingly they were exploded, though he could not 
 write a sentence without experiencing them. Ac- 
 cording to that philosopher, all Ideas are derived 
 from Impressions, of which those are merely Copies, 
 differing from the originals only in force and vivacity. 
 Now, as no Impressions can be shown to which 
 general Notions or Ideas correspond, the inference is 
 that these are a mere fiction. Thus all our abstract 
 notions vanish like a dream ; Space, Time, Sub- 
 stance, Mind, all disappear at once. But common 
 sense ought to have taught the Philosopher that we 
 have such notions, or the words would be empty 
 sounds, and therefore that the system inconsistent 
 
GExMER.VL CONCEPTIOx\S. 1G9 
 
 with theii- existence must be false. All Ideas or 
 notions are not copies of impressions, though some 
 are, namely, particular notions; but general notions 
 and relative thoughts arise in the mind on contem- 
 plating objects without any previous impression, of 
 which, in any sense, they can be called the copies. 
 This indeed was allowed by Hume, and hence the 
 existence of such notions was denied, the last 
 resource of a faulty theory. 
 
 2.— SUBDIVISION OF GENERAL CONCEPTIONS. 
 
 33. General Conceptions, though all alike in 
 certain respects now explained, must differ in 
 others, and consequently they are of different sorts. 
 First, they are either Abstract or Concrete; in the 
 language of Locke, either Modes, or Notions oj 
 Substances. 
 
 34. General Abstract Notions, or Modes, are 
 notions of such things as cannot exist by them- 
 selves, even in the case of particulars, while 
 General Concrete Notions are notions of such 
 things as have an independent existence in particu- 
 lar instances, namely, substances. 
 
 35. Modes, again, are either Modes of Sub- 
 stances, in other words, notions of their qualities ; 
 or else Modes of Quantity, and so independent 
 of Substance, as the notions of time, space, and 
 number. And as the differences in qualities are 
 indefinite, or indeterminate, but in quantity definite 
 z 
 
170 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 or determinate, therefore the Modes of Substances 
 may be called indefinite, those of Quantity definite 
 modes. 
 
 36. Lastly, Modes of Substances, or indefinite 
 modes, are notions either of mental or of bodily 
 qualities ; while Modes of Quantity or definite 
 modes, are, as we have seen, notions of time, space, 
 or number.'' 
 
 37. Moreover, General Concrete Notions, or 
 notions of substances, comprehend the notions of 
 substance in general, of the two kinds, Mind and 
 Matter, and of all the species of material sub- 
 stances, in the mineral, vegetable, and animal king- 
 doms. All these exist in particular instances, of 
 themselves, without any necessary dependance on 
 anything else. They are thus essentially dis- 
 tinguished from the objects of general abstract 
 notions or modes, which have nothing in nature 
 corresponding to them, no real and independent 
 existence, even in particular instances. The quali- 
 ties of Mind and Matter necessarily depend on their 
 Substances and cannot exist alone ; while Time, 
 Space, and Number, if allowed to exist, have cer- 
 tainly no real existence. 
 
 38. Ihe notions of Substances are always 
 Complex, often comprehending a great number of 
 
 '' It will be observed that the word ^lode is rather ambiguous, 
 inasmuch as it might refer either to the mind conceiving, or to the 
 object conceived ; but it is here used in the former sense only, as a 
 short and convenient term for General Abstract Notion. 
 
GENERAL NAMES, ETC. lyj 
 
 points, sometimes more, sometimes less, according 
 to the knowledge of the individual ; but general 
 abstract notions, or modes, may be either Simple or 
 Complex. First, Definite modes, or notions of 
 Quantity, may be either Simple or Complex, as 
 Space, a Hexagon ; Time, a year ; One, a thousand ; 
 and so may Indefinite modes or notions of Quali- 
 ties. Thus the qualities of Extension, Solidity or 
 Impenetrability, Mobility, Fluidity, Simple Colours, 
 Tastes, and Smells, are Simple ; and so are the no- 
 tions corresponding to them ; while the notions of 
 the virtues and vices, and of many emotions, such 
 as Love and Gratitude, as well as of all actions in 
 which Mind and Body concur, as Murder, Robbery, 
 Adultery ; likewise of innumerable mechanical, 
 chemical, and vital combinations, and changes, as 
 Digestion, Nutrition, Circulation, are Complex in a 
 greater or less degree. Thus, while notions of 
 Substances are always Complex, modes may be 
 either Complex or Simple. 
 
 3.— GENERAL NAMES, DEFINITION, 
 AND DESCRIPTION. 
 
 39. .Closely connected with the subject of no- 
 tions or conceptions is that of Names. The 
 doctrine of Names properly belongs to Logic, but 
 some notice of them seems indispensable even in a 
 pure Metaphysical treatise. 
 
172 PEINCIPLES or PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 40. Words are conventional signs of thought, 
 that is of Conceptions and Relations ; and thoughts 
 are the Representatives of things. Thus, words 
 suggest thoughts, and thoughts stand for things. 
 Words, then, are a sure index of the workings of 
 the human mind, but not a sure index of things ; 
 for the workings of the human mind may or may 
 not be in strict accordance v/ith the nature of 
 things. Indeed we well know that the thoughts of 
 man are often fanciful in the highest degree, utterly 
 at variance with existing things, as the thoughts of 
 Swift when he wrote "Gulliver's Travels," and those 
 of the author of the "Arabian Nights," 
 
 41. Words being the signs of thought, it fol- 
 lows that the divisions of the one must correspond to 
 those of the other, the classes of words to those of 
 thoughts. Accordingly, as thoughts are divided 
 into the non-relative and the relative, or Concep- 
 tions and Relations', so are words into substantive 
 and non-substantive. 
 
 42. Names, or Nouns Substantive, in the no- 
 minative case, are words which express something 
 either actually existing, or supposed to exist, or 
 imagined as existing, or simply conceived as exist- 
 ing, independently of other things ; as Mount Etna, 
 the Mountains of the Moon, Aladdin's Wonderful 
 Lamp, whiteness, softness, hardness, colour, etc. 
 All these things can be talked of as existing, whether 
 they really exist or not, can be talked of as existing 
 of themselves, whether they do or not, without ab- 
 
GENERAL NAMES. ETC. 1^3 
 
 surdity ; and these in Logic we call Names, ia 
 Grammar, Nouns Substantive, but strictly in the 
 nominative case only. 
 
 43. All other words, even the oblique cases of 
 Nouns, not only imply relation, but cannot be dis- 
 coursed of as existing alone. These, then, are 
 strictly relative words. Thus, as the objects of 
 Thought are either things, or the relations of 
 things, and Thoughts themselves either non-rela- 
 tive or relative, so words are either names, or words 
 expressive of the affections of names, such as adjec- 
 tives, verbs, participles. Of Names alone it is here 
 necessary to speak, because they correspond to 
 Conceptions. 
 
 Name must not be confounded with Tenn^ 
 which is a purely logical word, and signifies any 
 word which alone can form the subject, or the pre- 
 dicate, of a proposition. Thus, in the proposition 
 " Man is mortal ;" mortal, though an adjective, is a 
 Term. These words are also called in logic Cate- 
 (/orcmatic, because they can form alone either the 
 Subject, or the Predicate, of a pure Categorical 
 Proposition. 
 
 44. Nanies, or Nouns Substantive in the nom- 
 inative case, form the Subject of every discourse, 
 and in the accusative case the Object, when there is 
 one, for many sentences have no object. It is clear 
 that nothing but what exists, or is conceived as ex- 
 isting, independently, can either create or suiTcr 
 change. The accusative case is generally marked 
 
174 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 in Latin and Greek by a change in the form of the 
 word, but, in English, only in the case of Pronouns. 
 Thus, Brutus jugulavit Casarem, can only be ren- 
 dered into English by Brutus stabbed Cassar ; 
 though we say, I love him. He loved me. When 
 the word undergoes a change of form, it becomes 
 clear that it really is another word ; but, whether 
 the form change or not, a word in the accusative 
 case, expressing an Object somehow affected by 
 something else, is not a simple Name or Noun Sub- 
 stantive, but the same viewed relatively. The word 
 Caesarem by itself has no sense at all, and so with 
 all Accusatives, and other cases. 
 
 45. Since Names are the signs of Conceptions, 
 whatever classification we may adopt for the one, 
 the same must apply to the other. Thus, as Con- 
 ceptions are either Particular or General^ so Names 
 are either Singular or Common. The former are 
 usually called Proper Naines, and express an indi- 
 vidual. These, consequently, express things really 
 existing, or believed, or at least imagined, to exist, 
 as Ben Nevis, El Dorado, Utopia. 
 
 46. Common or General Names, on the other 
 hand, express universal things, having no real ex- 
 istence, but only conceived as existing ; and these 
 make up the mass of the names of every language. 
 They may be divided, like General Conceptions, 
 into Abstract and C oncrete ^ ames ; the former ex- 
 pressing Modes, the latter Substances. "; Names of 
 modes express either modes of substances, mental 
 
GENERAL NAMES. ETC. 175 
 
 or matcrical, and so are Tiuleterminatc, as Whiteness, 
 Bluencss, Hardness, Softness, Generosity, Charity, 
 Avarice ; or they express modes of Quantity, and 
 so are Determinate, as mile, acre, square, circle. 
 Concrete names, on the other hand, express Sub- 
 stances, as j\Iind, Body, Animal, Vegetable, Mineral, 
 Man, Lion, Oak, Ash, Granite, Porphyry, Gold, 
 Silver, Air, or Water. 
 
 47. After these observations on Names in gen- 
 eral, we shall be better able to discuss the important 
 subject of Definition, Some Names, as we shall 
 find, can be defined^ while others cannot ; the objects 
 expressed by Names can sometimes be described^ 
 sometimes not. 
 
 48. First, however, we must ascertain what a 
 definition properly is, and what a description. By 
 a definition, then, we understand such a statement 
 as shall accurately express, in words, our whole Con- 
 ception of the thing signified, and through the Con- 
 ception make us thoroughly acquainted with the 
 nature of the Thing. By a description, on the other 
 hand, I mean such a statement as shall, more or less 
 imperfectly, express our Conceptions, and give us 
 some, but iticompJete knowledge of the Thing. 
 
 49. And here I must remark, that an attempt 
 has been very generally made by Logicians to dis- 
 tinguish between the definition of a Name, and the 
 definition of a Thing ; but, as I conceive, without 
 success. I have never been able, with all my efforts, 
 to understand that distinction. I have never seen 
 
17(i PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 it made out in intelligible language, and, therefore, 
 I must conclude that it is ill-founded. And in this 
 opinion, I am confirmed by the authority of Pascal.' 
 The definition of a Name, and the definition of a 
 Thing are one and the same, and cannot be other- 
 wise; for a Name without a Conception, and a 
 Conception without a thing conceived (real or un- 
 real) is a contradiction. Thus, the word Definition 
 may be applied either to a Name, a Conception, or a 
 Thing, or object conceived, with equal propriety. In 
 defining we fix the meaning of a Name, or declare 
 the Conception attached to it, and the Conception 
 represents the Thing. Thus are all three intimately 
 connected. 
 
 50. May not the explications of words in a dic- 
 tionary be called Definitions of Names, in opposition 
 to Definitions af Things *? By no means. Some- 
 times they are really Definitions, as Johnson's ex- 
 plication of a Triangle, " A figure of three angles ;" 
 sometimes they are Descriptions, as his account of 
 Animal, " A living creature corporeal ;" sometimes 
 they merely explain one word by one other word 
 better known, as Anomalism by " Irregularity," 
 without any attempt at analysis, and without analysis 
 there can be no definition proper; sometimes, again, 
 they enumerate many different meanings of the same 
 word, and surely this in no sense can be called 
 definition. But, if we will apply the word Definition 
 
 "Pascal, Pensees, Vol. I., " De 1' Esprit G^om^triqiie,'' Mr. 
 Mill is of the same opinion, " System of Logic," Vol. I., Part i. 
 
GENERAL NAMES, ETC. 177 
 
 to Names, and insist upon a distinction between the 
 definition of Names and that of Things, then the 
 former can be attributed only to explication by a 
 word strictly synonymous, as Anomalism by Ir- 
 regulariti/, a word of Greek origin by one of Latin ; 
 for if many words be given, the statement will be 
 either a Definition proper, or a Description more or 
 less imperfect. 
 
 51. It is worthy of remark, that while in com- 
 mon language we apply the word Definition to 
 Names, Conceptions, and Things, indifferently, we 
 are. said to describe only Thinj^s. We cannot with 
 propriety talk of describing a Name or a Conception. 
 The reason for this will appear presently. Common 
 language, after all, is no bad instructor. 
 
 . 52. We have next to consider what Names can 
 be defined, what not ; what Things can be only 
 described ; and what can neither be defined nor de- 
 scribed. This is an inquiry of very great im- 
 portance, were it only to prevent us from seeking 
 Definitions where they cannot be found. Much of 
 the time and energies of the Schoolmen was thus 
 wasted. 
 
 53. First, there are cases in which neither the 
 Names can be defined, nor the things corresponding 
 thereto described. So it is with the Names of all 
 Simple Conceptions. Simple Conceptions must 
 belong to General Abstract Notions, or Modes ; for 
 all Particular Notions, as we have seen, are Com- 
 plex, and, likewise, all General Concrete Notions, or 
 
 A A 
 
178 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 Notions of Substances. Consequently, all Simple 
 Conceptions are Simple Modes ; and these, as before 
 observed, are of two sorts ; indeterminate modes, or 
 modes of Substances, and determinate modes, or 
 modes of Quantity. Instances of the former are 
 the physical Qualities of Extension, Impenetrability, 
 Solidity, Fluidity, Mobility, Divisibility, Whiteness, 
 Blueness, Redness, etc. ; of the latter, Space, Time, 
 Number in general. These Names admit of no 
 definition, nor can the things corresponding to them 
 be described ; because our conceptions of them are 
 simple and uncompounded. For what is simple 
 cannot be analysed, and what cannot be analysed 
 cannot be defined, because every definition is an 
 analysis, whereby a compound is reduced to its 
 elements. Thus, in the definition of a Triangle, a 
 figure with three sides and three angles, three ele- 
 ments are mentioned, figure, side, angle. And if 
 the above Names cannot be defined, neither can the 
 Things corresponding thereto be described, for the 
 same reason, that we have no more simple concep- 
 tions by which to explain them. Who can define 
 or explain Whiteness, Redness, Space, or Time*? 
 If any of the things corresponding to those Names 
 can be described, then are our conceptions thereof 
 not perfectly simple. 
 
 54. While Simple Modes can neither be de- 
 fined nor described, Complex Modes, on the 
 contrary, can be perfectly defined, and they alone. 
 For Modes or general abstract notions are pecu- 
 
 ^ 
 
GENERAL NAMES, ETC. 179 
 
 liarly the creation of the mind of man, having 
 nothing in reality corresponding to them, even in 
 particular instances ; and what the mind can form 
 that it can define. All that is necessary is, that 
 the mind be consistent with itself, that the con- 
 ception of Virtue, for instance, be always the 
 same, and this is surely in our power. No one 
 pretends that there is outwardly any thing called 
 Virtue, really existing, as a horse or a cow exists, 
 and consequently our faculties, limited though 
 they be, can determine the whole nature of Vir- 
 tue ; while of the works of God we know but 
 little. These works neither are nor ever will be 
 thoroughly known to us ; but the notions which 
 we ourselves frame, or which, at least, are framed 
 in us, we surely may ascertain perfectly. There- 
 fore complex modes, whether modes of Sub- 
 stances, or modes of Quantity, may be strictly 
 defined. 
 
 55. Accordingly, Virtue, a Complex mode of 
 the Substance Mind, may be defined to be, " An 
 inflexible desire or will to pursue our own ulti- 
 mate good, and that of others, whatever self-denial 
 or self-sacrifice may be required,"" and Triangle, 
 a mode of Quantity, is usually defined to be, " A 
 figure with three sides and three angles." Now, 
 each of these is truly a definition, for it ex- 
 
 "See the Author's " Principles of Human Happiness and Duty," 
 
 Part II., Chaji. iii. 
 
180 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 presses our whole conception of the thing signi- 
 fied, not merely a part of that conception. 
 
 56. Lastly, the names of Substances cannot 
 be defined ; but the things may be described more 
 or less imperfectljj^ so as to distinguish one from 
 the other, well enough for practical purposes, 
 though the knowledge thus communicated is 
 always incomplete. For, as our knowledge of 
 Substances, of the works of God, is very super- 
 ficial, incomplete beyond measure, it is clearly 
 impossible to give a definition, that is a perfect 
 account of them. All the definitions hitherto 
 attempted of Substances have only been short 
 Descriptions. 
 
 57. Though several Substances are simple 
 Bodies, or at least have never yet been analysed, as 
 all the metals, and Sulphur, Phosphorus, Carbon, 
 Oxygen gas. Hydrogen, Chlorine, etc., yet our 
 Conception of them is far from simple. Take 
 for instance iron or copper ; of how many parti- 
 culars is our notion of these metals made up ; 
 particulars relative to colour, weight, use, value, 
 etc. ! V>' ho could pretend to enumerate all the 
 points in which iron differs from copper, lead 
 from tin, silver from gold? And though we 
 could have some notion of all their differences, 
 could we accurately distinguish them *? Besides, 
 different persons entertain different conceptions 
 of these Substances, according to the opportu- 
 nities vhich they may have had of becoming ac- 
 
GENERAL NAMES, ETC. 181 
 
 (juiiinted with their quahties. Thus, a worker in 
 metals must have a much more extensive know- 
 ledge of the properties of iron, lead, tin, and cop- 
 per than others, and hence a more complex Con- 
 ception of them ; and a good chemist must have 
 a more complex conception of all Substances than 
 most people. So, supposing it were possible to de- 
 fine the Genus Metal, yet it would be out of our 
 power to determine all the Diff'erenticc by which 
 one Species oiMetol is distinguished from another; 
 for these dij^erentice are too numerous, too inde- 
 finite, and too fluctuating in the conceptions 
 of various individuals. 
 
 58i Here, however, fortunately, definitions 
 are not required. No man is in danger of mis- 
 taking silver for gold, lead for iron, copper for 
 zinc, for want of a definition ; he has only to 
 look at the substance attentively, to handle it, to 
 ring it, and he knows it ever after. 
 
 59. The same observations apply to Sub- 
 stances of all kinds, organized as well as un- 
 organized. Philosophers long puzzled themselves 
 in seeking for a definition of Man, and they 
 might search for ever without finding one. The 
 Animal implame hvpes, the Jeatherless biped animal, 
 of Plato, was worthy only of the ridicule of Dio- 
 genes, and the Rational Animal, though not 
 absurd, is no proper definition. In the first place, 
 we cannot affirm that man alone has reason, for 
 the tractable nature of many animals proves that 
 
182 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 they do have some intellectual faculties which 
 can be improved ; but were the statement true, it 
 would still be miserably incomplete ; for man. 
 differs from other animals, not in Reason only, 
 but in innumerable particulars. At best it could 
 only be a characteristic description, that is, a 
 description which adopts the most striking and 
 important points of difference, and neglects the 
 rest. But who wants a definition of man ^ Are 
 we likely ever to confound man with any other 
 animal % To seek for what is unnecessary for 
 any purpose can be only philosophical trifling, 
 
 60. Books of Zoology and Botany are full of 
 such short statements, whereby the various 
 Genera and Species of Animals and Plants are 
 distinguished from each other. The Kegne Ani- 
 mal of Cuvier contains little else, and Smith's 
 Co7npendium Florce Britannicce is entirely made 
 up of them. These are properly characteristic 
 descriptions. No one can pretend that the points 
 stated are the only differences between the Species, 
 or the greater number of them, they are only the 
 most striking, and the most important, as supposed, 
 among those known. We have reason to think 
 that one species differs from another in innumer- 
 able particulars, the greater part of which will 
 probably never be discovered, as they lie too 
 deep for our limited faculties. 
 
 61. But some may say, is not this after all a 
 verbal question ? What yon call a characteristic 
 
GENEEAL NAMES, ETC. 183 
 
 description others call a definition, that is all the 
 difference between you and them. By no means. 
 I have stated above (48) what a definition is, and 
 what a description, according to my notions, and 
 it seems logical to call different things by difTer- 
 ent names. But if some think that the difference 
 is not such as to warrant another name, in this 
 we disagree, and the disagreement is shown by 
 the use of two words, or of one only. Thus a 
 question apparently of words is at bottom one of 
 things. 
 
 62. Moreover, as above hinted, the common 
 use of language points out some well-grounded 
 distinction between definition and description, 
 and shows that sometimes the one is possible, 
 sometimes the other. Thus we can apply the 
 word definition alike to Names, Conceptions, and 
 Things, but we can describe things only. Why 
 so ^ Why cannot we be said to describe Names 
 and Conceptions'? Because these we are sup- 
 posed to know, or at least to be capable of know- 
 ing, tliorovghly. Names being given by man, and 
 Conceptions being entirely mental ; and we may 
 surely be well acquainted with our own inven- 
 tions, and our own thoughts. But, as for things, 
 since these we cannot pretend to know thoroughly 
 in all cases, — sometimes we are said to define, 
 sometimes only to describe them. 
 
 63. Now, what Things can be defined, what 
 only described, we have already seen. In the 
 
184 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 first place, none bat Uuiversals can be defined, 
 and not all of them, only those not derived from 
 particular things having an independent exist- 
 ence ; for here the conception and the thing 
 conceived must exactly correspond, and there- 
 fore in defining the one we also define the 
 other. Such are the universals corresponding to 
 our abstract notions, or Modes, as we have called 
 them. But where the universals are derived from 
 particular things having an independent exist- 
 ence, as all material Substances, minerals, plants, 
 animals, there the universals cannot be defined, 
 because we know but imperfectly the particular 
 objects ; and though our knowledge may increase, 
 we never can be thoroughly acquainted with 
 them. Thus the Universal and our Conception of 
 it are perpetually varying. Lastly, particular 
 things, as we have shown, (12) cannot be defined; 
 but they may, like the Species of Substances, be 
 described, as they so frequently are in travels and 
 works of Imagination. Every day we are describ- 
 ing landscapes which we have seen, and the poet 
 both imagines and describes them, as Milton de- 
 scribes Paradise, and Spenser the Gardens of 
 Armida. 
 
 64. The difference between definition and 
 description may be illustrated from Botany. In" 
 this Science, as is well known, two classifications 
 have been adopted, the Artificial and the Natural ; 
 the one invented by Linnaeus, the other first pro- 
 
GENER.a NAMES, ETC. 185 
 
 posed by Jussieu and De CandoUe, in France, and, 
 subsequently, improved by others. Now, as the 
 former is professedly artificial, and arranges plants 
 into classes and orders, not from all their resem- 
 blances, but from one or two only, chosen as 
 most convenient ; it follows that those classes and 
 orders can be strictly defined ; though the natural 
 cannot. Thus, having resolved to class together 
 all plants having one stamen, or two, or three, etc., 
 whatever their points of difference may otherwise 
 be, it becomes easy to define the classes, Mon- 
 andria, Diandria, Triandria, etc., accordingly. 
 But, when we seek to class plants agreeably to all 
 their points of resemblance, the task becomes a 
 very difficult one. Still, some advance has been 
 made, and all plants have been divided into Ex- 
 ogens^ Endogens, and Cryptogamic plants, and sub- 
 divided into many orders, separated by character- 
 istic ditferences, some of which are known and can 
 be stated, while the greater part are still unknown, 
 and will probably always so remain. Even the 
 differences ascertained are not always constant. 
 Thus, the Arum, though an Endogen, has not the 
 proper leaves of its class. Therefore, the natural 
 classes and orders may be described with more or 
 less accuracy, but they cannot strictly be defined. 
 And, if the classes and orders cannot be defined, 
 still less can the Genera and Species, which in all 
 systems are natural, and present, of course, many 
 more points of resemblance and difference than 
 
 B B 
 
186 rRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 the classes. We can have characteristic descrip- 
 tions which are quite sufficient in practice to dis- 
 tinguish one genus or species from another ; but 
 more we cannot have. So it is with the Classes, 
 Genera, and Species of Animals ; for, in Zoology, 
 Artificial Systems have no place. 
 
 65. Since the times of Aristotle and the 
 Schoolmen it has been generally said and allowed 
 that the only way of defining is by Genus and 
 DiJlferentia. This position, no doubt, has been 
 disputed by Locke, and therefore it demands 
 attentive consideration. If the statement imply 
 that every definition should consist of two parts, 
 and of two parts only, expressive of two points, 
 one marking the Genus, the other the Species \ 
 then it may be boldly affirmed that this is only a 
 vain a priori attempt to tie down nature, and force 
 her into system. For many things cannot be 
 defined so simply ; though others may. Thus in 
 the definitions of the various kinds of triangle, 
 viz. an equilateral triangle, a triangle with three 
 equal sides ; an isosceles triangle, one with two 
 equal sides ; a scalene triangle, one with three 
 unequal sides ; a right-angled triangle, one which 
 has a right angle, etc. ; two points alone are 
 necessary. But when we come to define the 
 various sorts of four-sided figures, we say that 
 a square is a four-sided figure, with all its sides 
 equal, and all its angles right angles ; an oblong, 
 one with all its angles right angles, but not all 
 
GENERAL NAMES, E'iC. 187 
 
 its sides equal ; a rhombus, one that has all 
 its sides equal, but its angles not right angles ; 
 and a rhomboid, one having its opposite sides 
 equal, but all its sides not equal, nor its angles 
 right angles. Thus, allowing four-sided figures 
 to constitute a Genus, we are obliged to enume- 
 rate two points at least, two dijfercntice, in order 
 to distinguish one Species of four-sided figures 
 from another. In the last instance, three 
 dijferentice must be stated; and were we to 
 define a Trapezium, we must say that it is a 
 four-sided figure, but neither a square, nor an 
 oblong, nor a rhombus, nor a rhomboid, thus 
 increasing the number of differentice. These 
 examples are sufficient to prove that definition 
 by Genus and one dijfercntia is not always 
 possible. 
 
 66. There is indeed one way in which 
 technical simplicity might be apparently pre- 
 served, and that is, by creating new Sub-Genera 
 to suit the occasion. Thus, instead of defining 
 a square to be a four-sided figure, having all its 
 sides equal, and all its angles right angles, we 
 might say that a square is a four-sided equilateral 
 figure, having all its angles right angles; thus 
 making a Genus of four-sided equilateral figures, 
 of which square and rhombus are Species. In 
 this way the credit of system would be saved, 
 though, it must be confessed, rather awkwardly 
 at times. For instance, in order to reduce the 
 
188 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 definition of rhomboid to rule, we must say that 
 a rhomboid is a four-non-equal-equal-opposite- 
 sided figure, not having its angles right angles ; 
 thus making a Genus to comprehend rhomboid 
 and oblong which has right angles. Whether it 
 be worth while to resort to such expedients to 
 save the credit of the Scholastic System, we shall 
 not inquire. 
 
 67' Having shown that definition by Genus 
 and one Differentia is not always possible, we 
 may next inquire whether we can always define 
 by Genus and one or more Differeniice. Since, 
 as we have seen, a definition ought to express 
 accurately in words our ivhole conception of the 
 thing signified, it is clear that it ought to 
 enumerate all the simple conceptions which 
 make up the complex conception. But when 
 we define by the nearest Genus and Differentia, 
 we do not enumerate all the simple conceptions, 
 for, unless it be a Siimmum Genus, the Genus itself 
 is complex, and may be analysed. Consequently, 
 definition by the nearest Genus is only conveni- 
 ent, not necessary, — convenient for the sake of 
 abridgment, and nothing more. To give the 
 definition in full, we should mount up at once 
 to the Summum Genus, and enumerate all the 
 Dfferentice. Thus, in the definition of a tri- 
 angle, a figure with three sides and three angles, 
 it is taken for granted that we know what a figure 
 is ; but, were the whole stated, we should say 
 
GENERAL NAMES, ETC. 189 
 
 that a triangle is something bounded by lines, 
 having three sides and three angles. In like 
 manner, in the so-called definition of Man (for 
 we do not allow it to be a definition proper), 
 a rational Animal, it is manifest that the Genus 
 Animal must be itself analysed and defined 
 before we can have a full account of man. 
 
 68. But we may go farther and raise a ques- 
 tion, whether definition by regular Genera and 
 Differetitice, one above another, though con- 
 venient, be always possible. It is not every 
 resemblance that induces us to class things into 
 Genera and Species ; but only certain resem- 
 blances, general, striking, important, or useful. 
 It therefore may happen that there is no Genus 
 to which we can refer the object, other than the 
 Summum Genus thing, or something nearly as 
 general. Thus, in the definition of parallel 
 straight lines, which are said to be " such as 
 are in the same plane, and which, being produced 
 ever so far both ways, do not meet," we can 
 discover no Genus whatsoever to which these 
 belong, except that of straight line in general, 
 for of lines in the same plane we have never 
 made a Genus. This, then, must be considered 
 as a Differentia, and the above definition will 
 consist of the high Genus, straight line, and the 
 two Dijferentice, lying in the same plane, and 
 never meeting though produced indefinitely. 
 
 69. Furthermore, there are some definitions 
 
190 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 in Geometry in which we can make out no dis- 
 tinction between Genus and Differentia. For 
 instance, we are told that a plane angle " is the 
 inclination of two lines to each other in a plane, 
 which meet together, but are not in the same 
 straight line." It would not be easy to reduce 
 this definition to Logical rule. 
 
 SECTION THIRD. 
 
 OEIGIN OF CONCEPTION. 
 
 1. Having considered the nature of Concep- 
 tion in general, and the various kinds of Con- 
 ceptions, we have next to trace the origin of 
 this mental faculty. 
 
 2. We have already remarked that Conception 
 in general is not an original faculty, that it re- 
 produces a former state of mind, more or less 
 modified, no doubt, but still, as it were, a copy 
 of an original. Conception, then, cannot be one 
 of the earliest powers of the mind. 
 
 3. The above holds true of Conception as 
 commonly understood ; but we have seen that 
 Perception really comprehends a Conception 
 proper, which, in this case, and in this alone, may 
 be considered as original, because, though arising 
 from another state of mind, namely, a Sensation, 
 yet it differs widely from Sensation. When I 
 
ORIGIN OF CONCEPTION. 191 
 
 stretch out my hand and touch a book on the 
 table, the conception of the book is totally dif- 
 ferent from the Sensation of touch which pre- 
 ceded it; and as it can be derived from no other 
 previous state of mind, this Conception, com- 
 prised in the Perception, is truly a new, an ori- 
 ginal phenomenon ; though, in the order of time, 
 subsequent to the Sensation which occasioned it. 
 This subsequence in time does not destroy the 
 originality or newness of the phenomenon, or the 
 wide difference between the conception and its 
 antecedents. 
 
 4. Barring this, all Conceptions are derived from 
 other and previous mental phenomena, which they 
 recal and reproduce in a modified form, and, there- 
 fore, they cannot be original. It remains, then, to 
 be seen what are the originals of these copies. 
 
 5. We have seen that, of all mental phenomena, 
 Sensations are certainly the earliest, Emotions, pro- 
 bably, the next ; and that both these classes, which 
 together constitute the Feelings, are, truly and pro- 
 perly, original. After them come Perceptions, and, 
 subsequently. Conceptions. Therefore, Concep- 
 tions, not being themselves original, must be copied 
 or derived, either from Sensations, Emotions, or 
 Perceptions, or from all of these. 
 
 6, First, as to Sensations. It is perfectly clear 
 that we can form no Conception of any Sensation 
 which we had not previously felt ; but having ielt 
 it once, we can ever afterwards concehe it. No 
 
192 PRIXCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 power of words could give a man born blind any 
 Conception of Colours, or a man born deaf any 
 Conception of Sounds ; but having once experienced 
 those Sensations, we can easily recal them in Con- 
 ception, though no Sensation be then felt. There- 
 fore, Sensation is certainly one source of Conception. 
 7. The above remark must be taken with one 
 limitation, which is, that although no Sensation 
 utterly different from any other can be conceived 
 before felt, yet when Sensations vary but slightly, 
 or only in degree, then previous feeling does not 
 seem necessary to Conception. Thus, though a 
 knowledge of colours will give no Conception of 
 sounds, or vice versa, nor even a knowledge of one 
 colour, scarlet, suggest any notion of green ; yet 
 one shade of scarlet, or of green, may enable us to 
 conceive a darker or lighter shade of the same 
 colour, though these exact shades may never have 
 been seen. So, having heard one sort of sound, we 
 can conceive it more or less loud. Thus, within a 
 limited range, a slight degree of originality is left 
 to Conception. 
 
 8. Next as to Emotions. In this case, as in 
 the former, it is certain that we can conceive no 
 Emotion which we had not previously /<?/? ; as also, 
 that, having once experienced Emotion, we can con- 
 ceive it, though unfelt. How could we give a 
 Conception of Love, Ambition, or Covetousness, to 
 one who had never harboured these Passions ? 
 How teach Beauty to one who had never felt its 
 
OKIGIN OF CONCErilON. 193 
 
 charm'? If the Emotions be origuial, they must 
 be inexplicable by any form of words, which, being 
 merely conventional signs, always suppose that our 
 original feelings are known by experience. We could 
 as easily teach colour to a blind man, as passion to 
 one without desires. As it is, one man is often a 
 riddle to another, because he cannot easily conceive 
 the desires which animate him ; but desires of some 
 kind all men have experienced, otherwise, they could 
 know nothing of human nature. And, having once 
 felt Emotion, we can afterwards easily conceive the 
 same ; for we perfectly understand Philosophical 
 Essays, Histories, Tales, and Plays, which treat of 
 the Passions, though at the time we may be quite 
 cool. It appears, then, that Emotion is a second 
 source of Conception. 
 
 9. Thirdly^ as to Perceptions. When we open 
 our eyes, we perceive a multitude of objects ; trees, 
 fields, houses, rivers, mountains, or it may be the 
 moon, the planets, and a countless host of stars. 
 We close our eyes, or we retire into a dark place, 
 and we perceive these objects no longer. Are they 
 then to us as if they had never been, or as if we had 
 never perceived them*? By no means. In total 
 darkness, in the dead of night, they rise up before 
 us, they re-appear, similar though not the same; 
 they fill our minds with Conceptions. 
 
 10. These Conceptions, then, are derived from 
 Perceptions, and they are, as we all know, like to 
 their originals, or copies of the same, as far as the 
 
 c c 
 
194 PllINCIPLES or PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 word is applicable to mental phenomena. They 
 need not, however, be servile copies, for the mind 
 has a power of varying its Conceptions, so as to 
 form combinations of objects different from any 
 which it had ever perceived, different even from 
 any which exist in nature ; such as the unicorn of 
 the ancients, and the colossal man-headed bulls 
 and lions of the palaces of Nineveh. This is the 
 power of Imagination. Still, the elements of such 
 objects must first have been perceived. I do not 
 believe that any one who knew not by perception 
 his own body, or that of some animal, could imagine 
 an animal of any kind, or that one who bad never 
 perceived plants, earth, stones, water, fire, could 
 conceive such objects. 
 
 11. It must, however, be allowed that much 
 more freedom is given to our Conceptions thus de- 
 rived, than to those which are copied from our Sen- 
 sations and Emotions. Literature is full of works 
 of fiction and imagination, of poetry, novels, and 
 romances, wherein new scenes, new animals, nay, 
 new worlds are depicted. Our great dramatist is 
 said to " have exhausted worlds and then invented 
 new." The objects around us, which strike our 
 senses, may be compared to the letters of the alpha- 
 bet, which, by combination, form innumerable words. 
 Such is nature to the man of poetical genius. It is 
 the elementary matter out of which he creates a 
 world of his own, newer at least, if not more fair, 
 than that which we behold. We acknowledge no 
 other Prometheus. 
 
ORIGIN OF CONCEITION. I95 
 
 12. What a source of amusement to the mhid 
 is this Power of Conception ! Without this, so long 
 as our eyes were open, so long as it was light, we 
 should be filled and gratified with our Perceptions ; 
 but, when night came on, all would be blank. 
 Silent and solitary, and yet wakeful, our minds could 
 not be filled and amused with the lively images of 
 what we had seen during the day past, or in years 
 long gone by ; we could not wander again over the 
 hills of Alba, gaze upon the fall of Terni, or sit 
 beside the temples of Passtum. And without the 
 power of recalling sensible objects, without visual 
 conceptions especially, w hich bring back visible ob- 
 jects, without Imagination, which varies them, 
 Poetry of course could have no existence, 
 
 13. As particular conceptions, or more pro- 
 perly conceptions of things particular, are derived 
 from Sensations, Emotions, and Perceptions, so 
 general Conceptions, or more correctly concep- 
 tions of universals, are drawn from such as are 
 particular. We have seen that, when many ob- 
 jects agree in one or more points, the mind 
 seizes upon these resemblances, and constructs 
 out of them a fictitious entity called an Universal; 
 as when from an attentive consideration of John, 
 William, Thomas, and Alexander, it creates the 
 universal Man. Consequently, the general con- 
 ception, as it is called, must be subsequent to 
 those particular conceptions from which it sprang. 
 
 14. Though General Conceptions are, in the 
 
196 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 order of time, subsequent to particular, and de- 
 pendent on them, yet they require a greater effort 
 of mind than these ; for, as we have seen, parti- 
 cular conceptions are little more than copies, 
 more or less faint, of their originals, with some 
 variation ; whereas general conceptions require 
 attentive observation and discrimination, and con- 
 sequently suppose a much greater development 
 and variety of mental power. Accurately to clas- 
 sify objects requires superior intellect, and all clas- 
 sification, which supposes some general notions, 
 demands more or less of the same. Consequently, 
 the power of forming general conceptions, em- 
 bracing, as it does. Abstraction and Generalization, 
 is a much more original as well as higher power 
 than that of Simple Conception. 
 
OF MEMORY. 197 
 
 CIIAPTEll V. 
 or ]\I E ^I U Y , 
 
 SECTION FIRST. 
 
 WHAT IS MEMORY? 
 
 1. Memory is that faculty by which any 
 mental state whereof we once were conscious 
 is recalled, and at the same time believed to have 
 been formerly experienced. Therefore a Re- 
 membrance, or particular act of Memory, consists 
 in any mental phenomenon whatsoever, combined 
 with the Belief that we were before conscious of 
 the same, or, more properly, of a similar phe- 
 nomenon ; for, of course, what is past and gone 
 and what is present and existing cannot be iden- 
 tical. 
 
 2. Memory then differs from Perception, inas- 
 much as the latter supposes a present, the former 
 a past object ; and whereas the object of Per- 
 ception is always something material, which in- 
 duces perception through the senses, the object of 
 memory is some prior state of our own conscious- 
 ness. Perception, then, gives us a knowledge of 
 the present, but only of material objects ; while 
 
198 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCH0L0G7. 
 
 Memory acquaints us with the past, first with the 
 past states of our own mind, and through them 
 with every thing else. 
 
 3. Neither in the case of Perception nor of 
 Memory is this knowledge properly immediate^ for 
 we have seen that our acquaintance with the ma- 
 terial world is derived through the medium 
 of the senses ; and, moreover, that an immediate 
 or conscious knowledge of matter is absurd ; and 
 an immediate knowledge of the past is a contra- 
 diction, whatever Reid may say to the contrary.^ 
 
 " For we can only know a thing immediately if 
 we know it in itself, or as existing ; but what is 
 past cannot be known in itself, for it is non- 
 existent."" 
 
 4. Memory differs also from mere Conception, 
 for we can conceive many things without being 
 conscious at the time that the present is but a re- 
 petition of the past ; and we even conceive things 
 which never before entered into our minds ; as 
 imaginary scenes of nature, and imaginary animals. 
 No doubt Conception is an essential part of 
 Memory, for we can remember nothing without 
 conceiving what we remember ; but Conception 
 may exist without Memory. 
 
 5. We have said that Memory embraces every 
 
 " " It is by memory that we have an immediate knowledge of 
 things past." " Reid's Intellectual Powers, " Essay III. chap. 1. 
 
 '' " Hamilton's note to the above." 
 
OF TLME. 199 
 
 mental phenomenon \vliatsoever of which we 
 formerly were conscious. Accordingly, we re- 
 member Sensations, Emotions, Perceptions, Con- 
 ceptions, and Relations of all kinds, including 
 judgments and reasonings. What then is pecu- 
 liar to Memory'? First, there is the tendency, 
 the facility, to recall any past mental phenome- 
 non, and secondly, the irresistible belief in the 
 former existence of the said phenomenon. This 
 tendency and this belief are all that is peculiar to 
 Memory. 
 
 SECTION SECOND. 
 
 or TIME. 
 
 1. Sensations, Emotions, Perceptions, and 
 mere Conceptions, look only to the present mo- 
 ment, and therefore give us no notion of Time, 
 which implies succession. For this we are indebted 
 to Memory, which introduces us to the knowledge 
 of the past, as distinct from the present, and hence 
 of the future, for the present is future to the past. 
 
 2. It is clear that we cannot believe in the 
 foriner existence of any thing without some notion 
 of former and latter, that is of Time ; and con- 
 sequently this notion not only arises along with 
 Memory, but is an essential part of it. Indeed, 
 the one cannot exist without the other. Memory 
 
200 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 can no more exist without the notion of Time, than 
 the notion of Time without Memory. Time and 
 Succession are the same, or, at least, they are in- 
 separable, and how can we know Succession but 
 by Memory ? Here, then, at the first, we see the 
 immense importance of this faculty. "Without 
 Memory, without a knowledge of Time, our know- 
 ledge would be confined to the present moment, 
 and therefore could never increase. 
 
 3. It is clear that our knowledge of Time can 
 be immediately derived only from the phenomena 
 of our own minds, not from any outward change ; 
 for outward change or motion is known to us only 
 through a succession of perceptions, and, therefore 
 these must be the immediate antecedents of our 
 notion of Time. Motion may be thus a remote 
 source of this notion, but we have no reason to 
 suppose that it is the only one, or that a succession 
 of mental phenomena, of whatever sort, or how- 
 ever derived, may not create Memory, and suggest 
 the notion of Time. 
 
 4. Though the notion of Time be thus got by 
 comparing a present state of mind with a past, we 
 are not thence to infer that the notion is not al- 
 together different from the phenomena which pre- 
 cede its appearance. Those phenomena might 
 recur without any conception of Time, as they 
 often do, and therefore Time is not involved in 
 them. On the contrary, it is evolved by them, or 
 struck out of the mind, like a flint out of a bed 
 
OF TIiME. 201 
 
 of chalk, something quite different from the sur- 
 rounding mass. Effects are often widely different 
 from their causes, especially from their occasional 
 or auxiliary causes ; and so it is in this case. A 
 succession of mental phenomena is the occasional 
 and exciting cause of the notion of Time ; the 
 primary and predisponent lying deep in the 
 original structure of the mind itself. If there be 
 an original notion, it is that of Time. 
 
 5. What then is Time 1 what notion have we 
 of it*? An absurd question ! Either we know it 
 perfectly, or if not, no words can tell us. It was St. 
 Augustin, I think, who said "Ask me not, and 
 I know it well; question me, and I am quite' at a 
 loss." No doubt for how can-w^e illustrate and 
 explain that which by its originality and simplicity 
 bafUes both illustration and explanation"? The 
 notion of Time is so original, so new, so different 
 from any other, that there is nothing with which 
 to compare it, so as to help our apprehension ; and 
 it is so simple as to defy analysis, definition, or 
 description. The truth is that we know it so well, 
 that there is nothing which we know better, and 
 which might help to explain it. We know it as 
 intimately as we can any thing whatsoever ; and 
 it is exactly because it is so simple that we are 
 conscious of that incomprehensibility which at 
 bottom envelopes it and every thing. Could we 
 explain Time, our minds would be so far satisfied, 
 but the more simple notions by which we should 
 
 D D 
 
202 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 explain it would be themselves as incomprehensible 
 as any. It is then the very perfection of our 
 knowledge of Time, so far as human knowledge 
 admits of perfection, that enables us to see the 
 limitation of our faculties, and makes us suppose 
 that we are here peculiarly ignorant. But the 
 very reverse is the case. Our knowledge of Time 
 is peculiarly clear, definite, and precise, as is that of 
 Space ; and upon them is built the only perfect 
 science, the Mathematics. The relations of Time 
 are relations of Quantity, and therefore they may 
 be perfectly ascertained.'' 
 
 6. What is peculiarly incomprehensible about 
 Time is its beginning, or its past Eternity, for one 
 or the other must be true, and yet our faculties 
 can comprehend neither. We are forced however 
 to confess our belief in the Eternity of past Time, 
 though the more we consider it, the more myste- 
 rious it appears. We have no difficulty in com- 
 prehending a future Eternity ; indeed, we cannot 
 possibly comprehend or believe in the cessation 
 of Time. When Eternity is opposed to Time, the 
 infinite is opposed to a finite Quantity of the same 
 kind, not of a different kind ; and this, as Mathe- 
 maticians as well as divines assert, is an infinite 
 ratio, a ratio of one to Zero. 
 
 ''■ On Time and Space as the foundaiions of Mathematics, see 
 
 the Author's "Introduction to Mental Philosophy." Part 1. 
 Art. Quantity. 
 
OF TIME. 203 
 
 7. What has been said of Time applies also 
 to Space. Our knowledge of Space is perfect, as 
 far as human knowledge can be ; we can trace its 
 relations with the utmost accuracy ; and yet we 
 can comprehend neither how space can be limited, 
 nor how it can be unlimited. Thus it is the sim- 
 plest notions, those which we know best, which 
 show us most clearly the narrowness of our facul- 
 ties. Our knowledge is here perfect as far as it 
 goes, but beyond that there is no ground for con- 
 ception, judgment, or reasoning, all is void and 
 dark. We are brought up as if by a dead wall, or 
 a dense mist, we come at once to a stop. 
 
 8. If the notion of Time arise out of a suc- 
 cession of mental phenomena, it ought to follow 
 that the greater the number of different pheno- 
 mena in the same period, the longer the time 
 should appear, and vice versa : and so it is. When 
 we look back upon a period of great variety and 
 vicissitude, of travel and adventure, the time seems 
 very long ; whereas a life of monotony and routine 
 appears, on the retrospect, very short. Hours 
 past in thinking upon one knotty point seem like 
 minutes, while a year of varied impressions is a 
 life. " My life is but a long day," said to me one 
 whose occupation was full of sameness. On the 
 other hand, " Paris vecut un siecle dans ses huit 
 derniers jours d'attente et de confusion,'^ says 
 Lamartine, of the week immediately preceding 
 Napoleon's return to Paris from Elba, a week full 
 
204 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 of surprise, indignation, bewilderment, hope and 
 fear.'' 
 
 9. To this it has been objected that a period 
 of suffering or uneasiness generally appears long, 
 while time spent agreeably seems short; and as 
 there is no reason to suppose that our thoughts, 
 emotions, or sensations, are more varied in the 
 former case than in the latter, but the contrary, 
 the theory does not hold good. 
 
 10. If time pass slow with the unhappy, espe- 
 cially with the restless, it is because they are 
 always wishing it aw^ay ; and if it pass quick with 
 the happy and the amused, particularly with the 
 contented, it is for the contrary reason. Here then 
 a cause comes in to counteract the other ; but this 
 does not disprove the original tendency. Accord- 
 ingly, when the disturbing cause ceases to operate, 
 when the period of uneasiness or of contentment 
 is past, then, if the former have been one of bodily 
 pain, or of unvaried suffering of any kind, it will 
 appear short ; and if the latter have been a time 
 of amusement, properly so called, it will seem 
 long. 
 
 1 1 . Orlando. — " I pr'y thee who doth Time trot 
 withal?"^ 
 
 ^ " Paris lived an age during these last eight days of expectation 
 and bewilderment." — Histoire de la Reslauration. Livre xix. 
 Sec. in. 
 
 * " As you like it." Act iii. Scene 2. 
 
OF TIME. 205 
 
 Rosalind. — " Marry he trots hard with a young; 
 maid, between the contract of her marriage and 
 the day it is solemnized ; if the interim be but a 
 se'nnight, time's pace is so hard that it seems the 
 length of seven years." Thus it is restlessness, 
 the wish to leap over time, not unhappiness simply, 
 that makes it seem long. So far from unhappiness, 
 the interim is one of joy. 
 
 Orlando. — " Who doth he gallop withal ?" 
 Rosalind. — " With a thief to the gallows : for 
 though he go as softly as foot can fall, he thinks 
 himself too soon there." Here it is not joy that 
 makes the interval pass quickly, for there is only 
 misery, but the wish to arrest the foot of time. 
 Ardent hope makes time to creep in the midst of 
 joy; and intense fear causes it to gallop during 
 misery. 
 
 But, Orlando. — " Who stays it withal ?" 
 Rosalind. — " With lawyers in the vacation : for 
 they sleep between term and term, and then they 
 perceive not how time moves." True, in deep 
 sleep, in sleep without dreaming, the moment of 
 awaking seems to touch that of going to sleep, 
 the interval is totally lost, a sure proof that with- 
 out a succession of mental phenomena we should 
 have no notion of Time. 
 
 12. Reid objects "I have heard a military 
 officer, a man of candour and observation, say, 
 that the time he was engaged in hot action always 
 appeared to him much shorter than it really was. 
 
 K 
 
206 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.. 
 
 Yet, I think, it cannot be supposed that the succes- 
 sion of ideas was then slower than usual."^ If 
 the time in such circumstances seem short, it is 
 because the mind is too much engaged to think of 
 its lapse. It is the thinking about time, the 
 watching of it, which makes it appear long, forget- 
 fulness short. However rapid the succession of 
 ideas may be, this will not cause time to seem 
 long, unless it be reflected on. Now hurry and 
 danger drive awa}'^ all reflection ; but I have no 
 doubt that when the moment of reflection does 
 come, then a day spent in marching and counter- 
 marching, and in all the vicissitudes of hot action, 
 will appear very long. 
 
 13. "Mr. Locke," says Reid, "draws some 
 conclusions from his account of the idea of dura- 
 tion, which may serve as a touchstone to discover 
 how far it is genuine. One is, that, if it were possi- 
 ble for a waking man to keep only one idea in 
 his mind, without variation, or the succession of 
 others, he would have no perception of duration at 
 all; and the moment he began to have this idea 
 would seem to have no distance from the moment 
 he ceased to have it." This conclusion appears to 
 me just. Time, like motion, requires some mark, 
 in order to be known ; and without some change 
 of ideas, we should no more have been conscious 
 of Time, than we should have been aware of the 
 
 ^ Intellectual Powers. Essay iii. Chap. V. 
 
OF TIME. 207 
 
 motion of the earth without a change in the po- 
 sition of the heavenly bodies. " Now," continues 
 Reid, " That one idea should seem to have no du- 
 ration, and that a multiplication of that no dura- 
 ration should seem to have duration, appears to 
 me as impossible as that the multiplication of 
 nothini^ should produce something.* Here there 
 is a total misapprehension. It is not said that the 
 multiplication of one idea would seem to have du- 
 ration, but that, out of a succession of ideas, of 
 different ideas, would arise the notion of Time. 
 It is variety, not sameness, that strikes out the 
 new notion. 
 
 14. Again ; '^ If the idea of duration were got 
 merely by the succession of ideas in our minds ; 
 that succession must to ourselves appear equally 
 quick at all times, because, the only measure of 
 duration is the 7imnher of succeeding ideas ; but I 
 believe every man capable of reflection will be 
 sensible that at one time his thoughts come slowly 
 and heavily, and at another time have a much 
 quicker and livelier motion ? Now, what we 
 assert is, that the notion of Time originates by 
 reflecting on the succession of ideas in our 
 minds ; not that, when the notion is got, such 
 succession is the only measure of duration. After- 
 wards, we have many measures of time, and once 
 
 Ibid. 
 
208 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 having the notion from a succession of ideas, we 
 can allow duration to a single idea, and may be 
 conscious that one remains longer in our minds 
 than another. In fact we soon come to know 
 that the succession of ideas in our own minds is 
 a very uncertain measure of time, though, without 
 such succession, we should never have had the 
 notion at all. And though we may have some 
 consciousness of the rapid and slow flow of our 
 ideas, I believe that it is more by considering 
 what we have done during a given time, as 
 measured by a clock, hour-glass, change of 
 position of the heavenly bodies, or any other 
 sure indication, that we become sensible of a 
 quick or tardy march of mind. 
 
 15. Though we can set no bounds to the di- 
 visibility of Time, any more than of Space, yet in 
 common life we consider Time in two lights, 
 either as a point practically indivisible, or as a 
 period capable of division and measurement. 
 Thus, when I say, I shall be with you to-morrow 
 afternoon at three o'clock, I fix a point of Time 
 like a mathematical point in Space ; but when I 
 add, I shall remain with you during twenty 
 minutes, I mention a period, divisible into 
 minutes, and so measured. This difference is 
 marked in English by the prepositions at and 
 during ; while in Latin it is expressed by a differ- 
 ence of case, a point of time being commonly put 
 in the Ablative, duration in the Accusative. The 
 
OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 209 
 
 distinction is necessary in practice, though time 
 without duration be really an absurdity. 
 
 SECTION THIRD. 
 
 OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 
 
 1. Besides the notion of Time we are in- 
 debted to Memory for a knowledge of Self, the 
 foundation of all other knowledge ; for without 
 the belief that we ourselves formerly thought or 
 felt, we could have no acquaintance with the past, 
 and consequently no grounds for expecting what 
 is to come. Our knowledge would be limited 
 to the present moment, and therefore could never 
 be enlarged. 
 
 2. As soon as we can remember any previous 
 state of Consciousness, whether of feeling or of 
 thought, an irresistible belief comes over us that 
 the Being who formerly felt or thought, and He 
 who now feels and thinks, is one and the same, 
 really, not metaphorically, the same, not similar, 
 strictly One and Indivisible. And however long 
 ago may be the fact which we remember, the be- 
 lief is still unshaken. But as our bodies, like all 
 material objects, are perpetually changing, so as 
 to remain strictly the same not for a single day, 
 therefore if there be Identity in man, it must be 
 
 E E 
 
210 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 identity of something different from matter, that 
 is, something immaterial. Consequently, the 
 Identity of man and his Immateriality rest upon 
 the same foundation ; if we believe the one, we 
 are bound to admit the other. That we must be- 
 lieve the former, we shall see presently. 
 
 3. It thus appears that our belief in our own 
 identity originates in that form of Consciousness 
 which we call Memory ; so that without the 
 faculty of remembering, we never should have 
 known ourselves. This is a very different doc- 
 trine from that brought forward by Locke, who 
 maintains that Consciousness, which, in this case, 
 can mean nothing but Memory, actually consti- 
 tutes Self; so that so far as a man's memory 
 extends he is the same man, and no further. It 
 is unnecessary to dilate upon this doctrine, which 
 admits of so easy a refutation, and indeed has 
 been refuted repeatedly ; a doctrine which sub- 
 stitutes the means of knowledge for the thing 
 thereby known, which makes no difference be- 
 tween a fleeting phenomenon and a permanent 
 substance, and so destroys all that is constant in 
 mind, all whereon we build our hopes ; finally, a 
 doctrine which leads to downright absurdity ; for 
 from this it would follow that if a man were to 
 forget an event of his past life to-day, and recall 
 it to-morrow, he should have changed his identity 
 from one day to the other. In the words of John 
 Sergeant, an early critic of Locke, " a man must 
 
OF PERSONAI. IDENTITY. 211 
 
 be the same, ere he can know or be conscious that 
 he is the same," an observation of itself sufficient 
 to refute the above opinion.'' 
 
 4. Upon our personal identity, our perfect 
 sameness, oneness, permanence, and immateriality, 
 which all hold together, rest not only all personal 
 responsibility, all personal merit or demerit, all 
 liability to praise or blame here, but also our hopes 
 of continuance hereafter. If our identity be 
 nothing more than a fleeting phenomenon of con- 
 sciousness, how can it survive that consciousness ? 
 Must it not pass away like the foam on the river, 
 or like the morning hoar frost ? And if our boasted 
 identity be only such as matter admits of, that is, 
 mere similarity, then this similarity may disappear, 
 like everything material, by degrees, or all at once, 
 by slow decay, or by violent convulsion. But, if 
 there be something which remains truly one and 
 the same amid all the fleeting phenomena which 
 it presents, something permanent and indivisible, 
 and which therefore cannot be material, then it 
 may remain though the earthy body return to earth 
 inanimate. Nay, it is reasonable to infer that 
 what has continued the same so long, shall con- 
 tinue longer, seeing it is not subject like matter to 
 modifications which destroy identity, and can 
 perish therefore only by annihilation. But we have 
 
 •^ See Hamilton's Notes to Reid's Intellectual Powers. Essay 
 iii. Chap. VI. 
 
212 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 no reason to believe that any particle of matter has 
 ever been annihilated, why then should the Soul'? 
 
 SECTION FOURTH. 
 
 ORIGIN OP MEMORY. 
 
 1 . With respect to the origin of Memory little 
 need now be said. We can conceive many things 
 which we formerly perceived or felt, without call- 
 ing to mind our former perceptions or feelings ; 
 but we cannot remember without conceiving what 
 we remember. Therefore the faculty of Memory 
 is subsequent to Conception, and dependent there- 
 on. And as Conception is subsequent to Sensa- 
 tion, Emotion, and Perception, much more must 
 Memory follow after all these. 
 
 2. This subsequence in the order of time, and 
 this dependence upon conception, do not however 
 impair the originality of Memory, its perfect new- 
 ness, the wide difference between it and those other 
 earlier faculties. Memory is neither Sensation, 
 Emotion, Perception, nor mere Conception, though 
 this last be necessary to it. We have seen that 
 what is peculiar to memory is First, the tendency, 
 the facility to recal any past state of conscious- 
 ness : and Secondly, the tendency to a firm belief 
 in the former existence of such a state. These 
 tendencies together constitute the faculty of Me- 
 mory, and they are tendencies quite original or 
 new, arising, it may be, out of former mental ten- 
 
 ■j,i-£: 
 
EVIDENCE AFFORDED BY MEMORY. 213 
 
 dencies, but essentially different from these. So, 
 a Remembrance, or particular act of INlemory, 
 consists of a conception of some past state of con- 
 sciousness, such as a Sensation, Emotion or Per- 
 ception, accompanied with the Belief that such a 
 Sensation, etc., was formerly experienced. Here, 
 though the conception be nothing new, the belief 
 is an original phenomenon -; for the belief which 
 attends Perception is a belief in the present, not 
 in the past, existence of the object. This gives 
 quite a new character to Belief, an original cha- 
 racter, though belief itself be not new, having 
 previously been known in Perception. 
 
 3. Since Memory extends to every previous 
 state of Consciousness, for we can remember 
 former judgments and reasonings, nay, whole 
 discourses, not merely separate Sensations, Emo- 
 tions, and Perceptions, therefore not only Con- 
 ceptions properly so called, but Relations also may 
 be combined with the phenomenon of Belief in 
 Remembrance. Relations of which we were 
 formerly conscious reappear, along with the firm 
 persuasion that they were before known, and we 
 can remember them as well as we do the moon of 
 yesterday. 
 
 SECTION FIFTH. 
 
 EVIDENCE AFFORDED BY ME]\IORY. 
 
 1. But what evidence have we that the be- 
 
214 PRINCIPLES or PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 lief implanted in us by Memory is to be depended 
 on *? How can we be sure that what we remember 
 to have happened actually did happen ? To this 
 the proper answer is, that we cannot help believ- 
 ing in the faithfulness of Memory, that all men 
 do believe in it instinctively, prior to experience, 
 and that all knowledge depends upon this belief. 
 Without trusting our memories we cannot ad- 
 vance one step beyond the present impression, 
 whatever that may be. Still, the faithfulness of 
 memory is by no means self-evident, nor can it be 
 proved by logical argument, for there is no con- 
 tradiction in supposing that memory may tell 
 what is false; and there are no premises from 
 which we can prove it to be true. Therefore, 
 belief in the faithfulness of memory must be set 
 down as one of the Fundamental Articles of our 
 Creed, Articles not self-evident, but which, from 
 the primary constitution of our nature, we can- 
 not help embracing, without question, without 
 hesitation. 
 
 2. That we may be sure that the belief in 
 question is really entitled to a place in the above 
 category, let us consider what are the marks by 
 which we may know any Article of Belief to be 
 really original and fundamental. 
 
 First, the belief must be universal. 
 
 Secondly, the belief must be irresistible, an es- 
 sential part of our Mental being, of which no one, 
 not even the greatest Sceptic, can divest himself. 
 
EVIDENCE AFFORDED BY MEMORY. 215 
 
 Thirdly, it must be prior to experience. 
 
 Fourthly, it must be indispensable to all subse- 
 quent knowledge. 
 
 Fifthly, it must not be self-evident like the 
 Axioms of Mathematics. 
 
 Sixthly, it must admit of no proper logical 
 proof. Now, if we apply these Criteria to our 
 belief in the faithfulness of memory, we shall find 
 that they suit it exactly, and therefore we must 
 admit it to be an original and fundamental Article 
 of our Metaphysical Creed. 
 
 3. If we reject that Creed, we reject all know- 
 ledge, but against this human nature rebels. 
 Knowledge, like the machines of Archimedes, 
 must have a fixed point, a fulcrum, to rest upon ; 
 proof must depend upon premises, and where these 
 are not self-evident, they must be assumed, other- 
 wise we are stopped at once. Even the evidence 
 of Mathematical truth depends upon memory, for 
 we cannot go beyond the first principles without 
 reasoning, and reasoning supposes that w^e re- 
 member, and rely on, what we proved or admitted 
 before. 
 
 4. We might indeed pretend to establish our 
 trust in Memory on reasoning thus : 
 
 Whatever is universally believed is worthy of 
 credit; the facts attested by memory are uni- 
 versally believed ; therefore they are worthy of 
 credit. 
 
 The argument here is no doubt sound, it is 
 
216 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 correctly drawn from the premises ; but the pre- 
 mises are assumed ; for it may be asked why is 
 universal belief an assurance of truth *? May not 
 all men believe a lie ? Does not the assumption 
 require proof as much as the conclusion drawn 
 from it ? So vain is the attempt to prove every- 
 thing ; so illusory the supposition that we can ever 
 do away with Primary Instinctive Universal Arti- 
 cles of Belief! All we can do is to lay down 
 Criteria or tests whereby we may distinguish 
 between genuine and spurious Fundamental Arti- 
 cles, and this we have endeavoured to accomplish. 
 
 5. Whatever has been said of the evidence 
 afforded by Memory applies with equal force to 
 the evidence of that great fact which we come to 
 know by means of Memory, namely, our Personal 
 Identity. When we remember any past pheno- 
 menon of consciousness, v^^e are convinced not 
 only that such a phenomenon formerly existed, 
 but also that the subject of that phenomenon, and 
 the subject who now thinks or feels, are strictly 
 one and the same, the same now, then, and during 
 all the intervening period, the Indivisible Self. 
 
 6. This is a fact which no one has ever really 
 doubted, or can doubt ; though it is not self-evi- 
 dent, nor can it be proved by reasoning. We do 
 not see how, amid all the changing phenomena 
 of consciousness, something still remains the same ; 
 nor, however difficult it may be to bring home any- 
 thing so foreign to our notions, is there any self- 
 
EVIDENCE AFFORDED RY MEMORY. 217 
 
 evident contradiction in supposing that a pheno- 
 menon formerly known to another, or to no one, 
 should be made known to me now, together with 
 the belief, though a false one, that I myself was 
 once conscious of the same. However extravagant 
 such a supposition may be, it is not self-contra- 
 dictory. Consequently our Personal Identity is 
 not a self-evident fact. 
 
 7. From what premises then shall we start to 
 prove this great fact ^ It is clear that there are none 
 which do not themselves require proof as much as 
 the fact to be proved ; nay which do not actually 
 take for granted the very fact in question. Thus 
 were we to pretend to prove it from the proposition 
 formerly mentioned, •' Whatever is universally be- 
 lieved is worthy of credit," it would be evident not 
 only that this proposition itself required proof quite 
 as much as the fact of our Identity, but also that it 
 really supposes the latter to be true. Universally 
 believed by whom *? By men no doubt. Then there 
 are men capable of maintaining belief during days 
 and years ; men who think in short, not merely 
 thoughts without a permanent subject ; and if so, 
 men have identity. 
 
 8. If then our Personal Identity be neither a 
 self-evident fact, nor capable of proof by reasoning, 
 it must, if credible, be a Fundamental Article of 
 belief, instinctive and original. Let us apply our 
 Criteria or Tests to the present case. 
 
 F F 
 
218 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 First, Belief in our own identity is certainly 
 Universal. ■ 
 
 Secondly, it is irresistible. 
 
 Thirdly, it is prior to experience ; for every lesson 
 derived from Experience supposes that Self has ex- 
 perienced. 
 
 Fourthly, it must be indispensable to all subse- 
 quent knowledge, for in every step it is assumed 
 that we who now learn, and we who formerly learnt, 
 are the same. If not sure of ourselves, how can we 
 be sure of anything else ? 
 
 Fifthly, it is not self-evident, as has been 
 shown. 
 
 Sixthly, it admits of no proper logical proof, as 
 we have also seen. Therefore we may rest assured 
 that Belief in our own Identity, amid innumerable 
 changes of phenomena, Belief in our numerical one- 
 ness and indivisibility, is instinctive, original, and 
 fundamental, and therefore entitled to a place in 
 our Primary Metaphysical Creed. 
 
 9. The immediate deduction from this Funda- 
 mental Article is the Irfimateriality of that some- 
 thing which we call Self; for, whatever is numeri- 
 cally One and Indivisible cannot be material. The 
 inference is irresistible, and therefore the conclusion 
 is as much entitled to belief as the Fundamental 
 Article itself. 
 
CONNECTION OF MEMORY. 219 
 
 SECTION SIXTH. 
 
 CONNECTION OF MEMORY WITH THE OTHER 
 INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES. COMPARISON WITH 
 THESE. CAUSES OF ITS IMPROVEMENT AND DE- 
 CLINE. 
 
 1. Since Memory depends for its development 
 upon previous Sensations, Emotions, Perceptions and 
 Conceptions, it follows that facility and accuracy 
 in remembering will vary with the quality of those 
 mental phenomena, that the more acute the Sensa- 
 tions, the more lively the Emotions, the more accurate 
 the Perceptions and Conceptions, the more retentive, 
 the more exact, will be the Memory. Much then 
 will certainly depend upon the original impression ; 
 and this we know from experience to be the case. 
 When Memory begins to fail in the aged, it is not 
 the events of their youth, although so remote, which 
 they forget, but the occurrences of yesterday, a re- 
 markable proof how much depends upon the liveli- 
 ness of the first impression. What we have deeply 
 
 felt we never forget, whether it be pain or pleasure. 
 
 2. Lively and delicate Sensibility to pleasure 
 and pain, whether bodily, usually so called, or men- 
 tal, whether Sensation or Emotion, is then one cause 
 of goodness of memory. "And as men's sensibilities 
 vary indefinitely, so do their memories. Some re- 
 member well the small events of past years, and 
 could write down a history of their lives with won- 
 
220 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 derful minuteness ; while others can scarcely dis- 
 tinguish one year from another. Of course, the 
 nature of the life led, whether varied or monotonous, 
 and habits of abstraction or the contrary, will make 
 a great difference in the remembrance. Variety 
 stimulates, monotony deadens sensibility ; and 
 nothing can strike or be remembered unless it be 
 observed. Hence women, who are generally less 
 abstracted than men, less taken up with one pursuit, 
 should better remember the small events of life. 
 On the other hand, how can a man of science, who 
 lives in abstractions, or a man of business, whose 
 head is always full of calculations, be supposed to 
 remember passing occurrences ? 
 
 3. Whatever has been imperfectly perceived, or 
 indistinctly conceived, must of course be confusedly 
 remembered ; but here the fault is in the original 
 impression, not in memory, which does its duty 
 when it fairly represents the past. If clear Percep- 
 tion and Conception be better remembered than the 
 obscure or confused, the reason probably is, be- 
 cause they are more interesting, more full of feeling, 
 than the latter. As phenomena of pure intelligence, 
 Perception and Conception are themselves neutral, 
 but they constantly rouse feeling, and according to 
 the intensity of this, will be the faithfulness of the 
 recollection. 
 
 4. The differences between one man and ano- 
 ther, in regard to the faculty of Perception, are not 
 very striking, except in the case of illness. Ihe 
 
CONNECTION OF MEMORY. 221 
 
 most ^Ykle-spread diversity is that of long and short 
 sight. In forming particular Conceptions of things 
 formerly perceived, the power of all men is also 
 pretty much on a par. With respect to general 
 conceptions no doubt, it is otherwise. Still, upon 
 the whole, the differences between one man and 
 another, whether in the faculty of Perception or of 
 Conception, are not sufficient to account for the very 
 great diversity of memories ; and therefore we must 
 conclude that this diversity depends not so much 
 upon the difference of those intellectual faculties as 
 on the difference in the strength of the feelings 
 which accompany them. Such is our first conclu- 
 sion on this subject. In one form of Conception, 
 indeed, men differ widely, namely, in the power of 
 Imagination. Now, as this intellectual power has 
 a peculiar influence on the emotions, so, agreeably to 
 the above conclusion, what men imagine vividly, 
 they should remember well ; because, if they imagine 
 vividly, they will feel warmly. 
 
 5. Neither does goodness of memory depend 
 much, if at all, on soundness of judgment and 
 strength of the reasoning powers ; though some de- 
 gree of Memory be essential to the exercise of these. 
 It is evident that without Memory, Judgment and 
 Reasoning could have nothing to go upon, no facts, 
 no former conclusions, no premises; but it does not 
 appear why judgment and reasoning should be ne- 
 cessary to Memory. And experience shows that 
 persons very deficient in the higher intellectual 
 
222 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 faculties have sometimes excellent memories. I 
 have known boys, the least gifted in other respects, 
 the best at learning by heart. This surely proves 
 that memory depends little on judgment and reason- 
 ing power, even when all these are found together 
 in perfection. Such is our second conclusion, which 
 is corroborated by the fact that memory is generally 
 strongest in the young, in those whose higher facul- 
 ties have not come to maturity. The comparative 
 readiness with which men confess a deficiency of 
 memory may be admitted as a proof that, in popular 
 belief, Memory does not depend upon judgment, or 
 upon reasoning power, for assuredly they would not 
 so easily allow an inferiority in these faculties. 
 
 6. As Memory arrives at maturity before the 
 powers of judgment and reasoning, so it is apt to 
 decline before them. We often hear people of middle 
 age complain of weakness of Memory, and in after 
 years it not unfrequently fails very much, while the 
 higher faculties are still entire. The senses wax 
 dull, the emotions languid, Memory becomes weak, 
 before the Reason is affected. But the Senses, as 
 we know, depend much upon the state of the body — 
 of the eye, and ear, for instance, and no acuteness 
 of mind in other respects can remedy an imperfection 
 here. 1'he emotions also depend, a good deal, upon 
 the state of the body, on the slow or rapid flow of 
 blood especially ; and wdiatever retards or quickens 
 the pulse, has a corresponding effect upon the emo- 
 tions. Thus Digitalis or Foxglove, which lowers 
 
CONNECTION OF MEMORY. 223 
 
 the pulse, produces depression of spirits ; while 
 strong drink stimulates the circulation, and at the 
 same time quickens the emotions, and is consequently 
 in great request. It is not so much for the pleasure 
 of Sense, that spirituous liquours, tobacco, and 
 opium, are in demand, as for the agreeable emotions 
 which they rouse. The state of the atmosphere 
 also, and other physical causes, such as good or bad 
 digestion, influence the emotions through the body. 
 Now, as Memory seems to follow the law of the 
 Senses and the Emotions, with respect to early 
 development and maturity, and early decline, more 
 than the higher intellectual faculties of judgment 
 and reasoning, does it not seem probable that it also 
 depends more upon the body than these ^ May we 
 not say, that, in the scale w^iich reaches from Matter 
 to Mind, from Sense to pure Intellect, Memory oc- 
 cupies a middle place *? that, though itself entirely 
 mental, it has more connection with the tenement of 
 day than pure reason ? Such is our third conclusion 
 upon this subject. 
 
 7. We have next to remark that the ^Yill seems 
 to have more power over the Memory than over any 
 other intellectual faculty, more than over any men- 
 tal faculty, except the emotive. Over the Senses, 
 the Will has no power at all, no immediate power, 
 none over the Perceptions, or the Conceptions, the 
 Judgment, or the Reasoning faculty ; and though it 
 may have a remote influence upon all these, yet its 
 power over the memory, though still indirect, seems 
 
224 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 more considerable. Assuredly we cannot directly 
 will the presence of anything in the mind ; for, if it 
 be there already, there is no occasion for willing it, 
 and if not there, how can we will the presence of we 
 know not what '? Still there are innumerable helps 
 to memory which people soon learn, when they wish 
 to remember anything, numerous associations which 
 they can establish, so as to suggest at the proper 
 time the thought required. We have even systems 
 o[ memoria technica. Memory is subject to the laws 
 of Association, and by proper attention to these it 
 may, be not only assisted on particular occasions, 
 but even permanently improved. Such is the 
 fourth and last conclusion which we come to on 
 this subject, a conclusion, moreover, confirmed by 
 popular sentiment, which never blames a man for 
 imperfection in the Senses, in Perception, Concep- 
 tion, Judgment, or Reasoning, but often upbraids 
 him with forgetfulness. " I forget," is not always 
 admitted as a valid excuse ; the answer being 
 " Aye, but you ought to remember." 
 
 8. An important corollary is derived at once 
 from the foregoing. If Memory be more under the 
 controul of the Will than any other intellectual 
 faculty, nay, than any other mental faculty, except 
 the emotive, then, with this exception, the Memory 
 ought to be the most susceptible of improvement. 
 Therefore improvement of memory is an object not 
 only desirable but attainable. How then shall we 
 best secure this end •? 
 
CONNECTION OF MEMORY. 22o 
 
 9. Since Memory depends so much on the 
 strength of the original impression, especially on the 
 degree of feeling which accompanies it, our principal 
 object ought to be to cherish that feeling. To this 
 of course Attention is indispensable. When the 
 mind is altogether absent, nothing can make im- 
 pression, and when it is distracted by many things, 
 each rouses but a feeble and transitory feeling. 
 Attention, then, is essential, and concentration upon 
 one subject for a length of time beneficial to memory ; 
 while absence of mind is fatal, and rapid transition 
 from one subject to another injurious. Except total 
 inattention, nothing is so bad for memory as vola- 
 tility, nothing so good as steadiness of mind. Hence 
 relaxation after study is better for memory than a 
 change of intellectual pursuit, and sleep, the great- 
 est relaxation, best of all. Accordingly, it may be 
 observed that what one has learnt at night, imme- 
 diately before going to bed, is often well remember- 
 ed in the morning, sometimes better remembered 
 than the night before. It used to surprise me, 
 when at school, how well I recollected lines on first 
 awaking which I knew but imperfectly before I 
 slept. 
 
 10. Since the capacity of the mind is limited, 
 and we cannot remember everything, no incon- 
 siderable part of the Art of Memory consists in 
 proper selection, in knowing what we ought to 
 remember, and what forget. When stupid people 
 begin to relate any event, they generally inter- 
 
 G G 
 
226 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 lard their story with so many unimportant par- 
 ticulars, like Mrs. Quickly,' that the point of the 
 whole is blunted or destroyed ; and the mind, 
 being filled with such insignificant details, forgets 
 others of greater moment. Mere contiguity in 
 place and time may afford innumerable associa- 
 tions, but few of any importance ; and all that are 
 trivial ought to be forgotten, in order that we may 
 better retain the others. Relations of Causation 
 and of Resemblance afford the most useful asso- 
 ciations, and to them therefore our principal atten- 
 tion should be directed. Thus we see that the 
 Art of Remembering includes the Art of Forget- 
 ting. 
 
 11. If we could but stimulate the emotions 
 generally, we should certainly improve the Me- 
 mory. But how can this be brought about^ Though 
 nature has made a great diversity between one 
 man and another with respect to Sensibility, yet 
 education and circumstances may greatly modify 
 original temperament. Thus monotony impairs, 
 
 ' " Thou did'st swear to me upon a parcel-gilt goblet, sitting in 
 my Dolphin chamber, at the round table, by a sea-coal fire, upon 
 Wednesday, in Witsun week, when the prince broke thy head for 
 liking his father to a singing-man of Windsor, thou did'st swear to 
 me then, as 1 was washing thy wound, to marry me, and make 
 me my lady, thy wife." King Henry IV. Part IL Act II. Scene 
 I. Here we have a precious specimen of unimportant associations 
 derived from mere contiguity in place and time, surrounding and 
 almost burying the main idea. 
 
 J 
 
CONNECTION OF MEMORY. 227 
 
 variety quickens Sensibility. So Society, inter- 
 course with one's fellows, keeps the feelings alive, 
 while Solitude and Retirement deaden the flow of 
 emotion. In advanced age especially, nothing is 
 so injurious to the memory as Solitude. At that 
 period of life, the Emotions naturally flag, the 
 Senses fail, and with these the Memory goes, 
 unless it be refreshed by continual intercourse, 
 by cheerful faces, and animated talk, particularly 
 by contact with infancy and youth. Youth and 
 age form a great contrast, and like most contrasts, 
 benefit each other. Where, on the other hand, 
 none but old people meet together, as in hospitals 
 and workhouses, the effect is very depressing. 
 Anything, however, is better for Age than Soli- 
 tude. A life of Activity, which stimulates all the 
 faculties, is particularly favourable to Memory, by 
 maintaining a perpetual flow of emotion. Hopes 
 and fears, success and failure, triumph and disap- 
 pointment, are all full of feeling, whether pleasur- 
 able or painful, and pleasure and pain are alike 
 conducive to memory. 
 
 How much memory depends upon emotion, 
 will abundantly appear from the case of dreams. 
 What more unreal than dreams *? There the 
 Senses and Perception are dead, Conception is often 
 monstrous, Judgment and Reasoning power are 
 perverted ; yet Emotion lives, ay often flourishes 
 more than in our waking hours. Accordingly, 
 in spite of their absurdity, in spite of their rapi- 
 
228 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 dity, in spite of their non-recurrence, there are 
 dreams which we never forget. 
 
 12. Every faculty, bodily as well as mental, 
 is improved by Exercise ; and Memory especially. 
 Now nothing is better adapted for this purpose 
 than the study of languages, and as Memory is 
 sooner developed than judgment and reasoning 
 power, therefore, this study is peculiarly fitted 
 for youth. It draws out and strengthens that 
 faculty at the natural time. For Philosophy and 
 the higher branches of Science, the youthful mind 
 is not yet prepared; and no science so much 
 improves the memory as languages. After lan- 
 guages comes History, which both requires and 
 strengthens the memory, without any strain upon 
 the higher intellectual powers. Chronology, of 
 course, is an essential part of history. Here 
 the influence of Association is very striking. When 
 dates are learnt by rote raerel}'', as by some system 
 of technical memory, the labour is irksome, the 
 profit small, the knowledge, such as it is, fleeting ; 
 but when associated with the facts, the fact will 
 recall the date, or the date the fact. Thus were 
 a person asked when Egbert lived, who united the 
 Heptarchy, he might not at once remember ; but 
 recollecting that he was brought up at the Court 
 of Charlemagne, he would require only to know 
 the age of the latter. So, the fact that Haroun- 
 el-Raschid sent a clock as a present to Charle- 
 magne, fixes the reign of the renowned Caliph of 
 
CONNECTION OP MEMORY. 229 
 
 Ba2:dad. Thus does one date determine two 
 others. The constitution of the human mind, 
 and the order of the development of the faculties, 
 as we now see, justify the practice of training 
 youth by means of Languages and History, rather 
 than Science. Were we to change the system, as 
 some propose, and take up Science in preference, 
 we should strain the higher faculties too much 
 before they were duly prepared, and we should 
 neglect Memory at the very time when it is most 
 susceptible of improvement. It cannot be too 
 frequently repeated that the object of Education, 
 properly so called, is not so much Information as 
 Intellectual progress. There is more mental im- 
 provement in making out hard passages in a Greek 
 or Latin Author than in getting up all the known 
 facts of the planetary system. The study of lan- 
 guages has this advantage, that, beginning with 
 Memory, it afterwards requires the exercise of 
 higher powers. In the choice of languages, for 
 the purposes of Education, the dead languages, 
 Greek and Latin, or the Oriental languages, parti- 
 cularly Arabic and Sanscrit, offer great advantages 
 to us over those of modern Europe ; first, because 
 they differ more from our own ; secondly, because 
 they are more difficult; and thirdly, because, if 
 not acquired in youth, the dead languages at least, 
 they never will be learnt at all. We ought to 
 secure in early life what in after years we may 
 have no leisure to pursue. The rising importance 
 
230 PRINCIPLES OE PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 of our Indian possessions, and the system of public 
 competition for civil appointments in India now 
 happil}/- adopted, will tend to encourage the study 
 of the Oriental languages and literature ; and an 
 excellent study it will be, not only for a special 
 purpose, but also for general improvement. 
 
 13. Why is verse more easily learnt by heart 
 than prose ^ Because we know beforehand what 
 Rhythm is, and this knowledge helps us to re- 
 member the words which fall into metre. Instead 
 of two associations only, of sound and sense, we 
 have three, sound, sense, and measure. Rhyme, 
 of course, is an additional help, for, if we know the 
 end of one line, we partially know the end of the 
 next, we know the sound thereof. Partial fore- 
 knowledge is therefore a great help to memory. 
 
 14. Every one knows how difficult it is to 
 learn off by heart words which we do not under- 
 stand. In this case, the only association is that 
 of contiguous Sounds, and that alone is trifling. 
 Add to the Sound, Sense, and then we have two 
 associations, the latter very important. To these 
 add Measure, and we have three associations, the 
 last of a constant nature, and therefore well-known 
 before-hand. Again, add Rhyme, and we have 
 now four associations, that of Rhyme being derived 
 from similarity, not from mere contiguity, of 
 Sounds, and therefore far more serviceable. Thus, 
 the more associations we can form, the more easy 
 
CONNECTION OF MEMORY. 231 
 
 it becomes to remember. The Art of Memory 
 might be called the Art of Association. 
 
 Since, as we have seen reason to believe. Me- 
 mory depends more upon the state of the body 
 than the higher intellectual faculties, it ought to 
 be sooner impaired by disease. And this seems 
 confirmed by Experience. Good health and good 
 spirits, useful to all the faculties, are particularly 
 beneficial to Memory. 
 
232 FEmCIPLES OF PSTCHOLOGT. 
 
 CHA^TEfl YI. 
 
 OF KEASON IN GE^'ERAL- DISTINCTION BE- 
 
 TWEEN EIL^SON AND SIMPLE INTELLECT. 
 
 1. Hitherto we have treated of those Intel- 
 lectual faculties which properly belong to Simple 
 Intellect ; now we come to those which apper- 
 tain especially to the Reason. Under the for- 
 mer we include all those Intellectual faculties 
 which consider objects singly, without reference 
 to their relations ; while, under the latter, we class 
 those which look to the Relations of Things. 
 Thus, Perception, Conception, Memory, belong to 
 Simple Intellect ; Comprehension, Judgment, and 
 Reasoning power, to the Reason. 
 
 2. We are aware that this distinction has not 
 been always observed. Thomas Brown's division 
 of the Intellectual faculties, however, into Simple 
 and Relative Suggestion, is fundamentally the 
 same as the above ; and Dugald Stewart treats 
 of " Reason or the Understanding properly so 
 called," in the Second part of his " Elements." 
 Locke, on the other hand, under the name Under- 
 
OF REASON IN CJENEUAL. 233 
 
 standing includes all the Intellectual faculties, and 
 this may be considered the usual meaning of the 
 word, as in the old division of the mental powers, 
 into the Understanding and the Will. The above 
 distinction, however, is real and important, what- 
 ever terras we may employ to mark it ; and as 
 the English language affords no single word under 
 which we may include all the Intellectual faculties, 
 other than Reason, I shall make use of the 
 terms Simple Intellect to signify the former. The 
 phrase appears to be appropriate, as expressing 
 that simple point of view under which the mind 
 contemplates Objects as opposed to the more 
 complex view embraced by Reason, which con- 
 siders objects not singly, but with their relations 
 to other objects. 
 
 3. It is self-evident that Reason cannot exist 
 without Simple Intellect ; for we cannot know the 
 relations of one thing to another without perceiv- 
 ing, conceiving, or remembering the separate 
 things so related. We cannot compare one tree 
 or one horse with another, without having some 
 notion of each separate tree, or horse. But sim- 
 ple Intellect can exist without Reason ; at least 
 it may be contemplated as so existing, though, in 
 reality, the one be rarely found altogether without 
 the other. We seldom consider any thing entirely 
 by itself, without relation to something else. By 
 the power of association, one thing constantly 
 suggests another, and thence arises comparison. 
 
 H H 
 
234 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 If, however, Simple Intellect do not necessarily 
 suppose Reason, the distinction between them is 
 real, and ought not to be neglected in analysing 
 the Intellectual faculties. In nature, the metal 
 Potassium is always found united with Oxygen in 
 the alkali Potash; but chemical analysis can 
 separate the two elements. 
 
 4. It may be true that almost all objects in 
 nature bear some relation to each other ; but 
 that is nothing to the present purpose, unless the 
 relation itself be a subject of mental contempla- 
 tion. There is a certain relation between Matter 
 and Mind, whereby the one acts upon the other ; 
 but, in looking at a rose, the object alone in general 
 engrosses me, and I have no thought about the 
 relation subsisting between it and myself. That 
 thought may occur to the metaphysician, but 
 certainly not to the ordinary observer, the mere 
 lover of flowers. Therefore, we conclude that 
 there may be Perception, there may be Simple 
 Intellect, without Reason. 
 
 5. To this, however, it may be objected, that 
 as no material object is strictly one and indi- 
 visible, we cannot contemplate anything outwardly 
 without being conscious of some relation between 
 the parts. This consciousness, however, requires 
 some advancement of intellect. The child views ob- 
 jects in the gross, and cannot analyse and after- 
 wards compare. I knew a deaf and dumb boy of 
 six years old, whose education had been totally 
 
OF REASON IN GENERAL. 235 
 
 neglected, who seemed to have great difficulty in 
 distinguishing the different parts of his own body. 
 To himself he appeared all one. And though we 
 should grant that some obvious relations of posi- 
 tion and magnitude might be known by simple 
 Intellect, yet this would prove not that the 
 distinction between Reason and Simple Intellect 
 was unfounded, but only, that things are not so well 
 defined in nature as in our classifications. It is a 
 great mistake, and the source of much error, to 
 attempt to overthrow distinctions, because their 
 limits cannot be stated with perfect accuracy. 
 
 6. This distinction between Simple Intellect 
 and Reason, though not strictly observed by 
 philosophers, seems to me warranted by the 
 common use of language. Vulgar notions in 
 metaphysics, as signified by ordinary speech, are 
 not likely to be without some good foundation, 
 for all men are, and cannot help being, to a certain 
 extent, metaphysicians. Our Sensations, Emo- 
 tions, and Thoughts, for ever present to us, must 
 be in some degree known. Now it appears to me 
 that Perception, Conception, and Memory, are 
 generally distinguished from Reason, though the 
 common name of Simple Intellect may not be 
 given to the three former. With this popular 
 consent, confirming the distinction, I shall rest 
 satisfied. 
 
236 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 OP COMPREHENSION. 
 
 1. The first power that belongs to the Reason 
 is that of Comprehension. Here again we must 
 beg attention to a new or at least to a more 
 exact sense of the word. Indeed it would be 
 difficult to say what meaning has hitherto been 
 given to this term ; or to point out any author who 
 has always used it in the sense here proposed. 
 Comprehension, as here employed, is often con- 
 founded with Conception, but as I think improperly ; 
 for Conception should be limited to the notion of 
 single objects, and should not embrace Relation. 
 On the other hand, Comprehension differs from 
 Judgment; for I consider it certain that we can 
 comprehend a Relation without passing any judg- 
 ment as to its truth or falsehood. When I am told 
 in Euclid that the angles at the base of an isosceles 
 triangle are equal, I may or may not comprehend 
 the proposition, according as I know or do not know 
 the meaning of the words, angle, triangle, and isos- 
 celes ; and when I do comprehend it, I still cannot 
 he convinced of its truth until I have studied the 
 proof. Then, and then only, do I pass judgment 
 
OF COMPREHENSION. 237 
 
 upon it. The same may be said of all the enunci- 
 atory propositions of Geometry. To comprehend 
 them is one thing, to determine their truth or fals- 
 hood another ; and so with respect to other proposi- 
 tions. I can comprehend the proposition that " the 
 Danube is a larger river than the Volga," though I 
 do not pretend to judge whether it be so or not. 
 Thus is Comprehension distinguished from Concep- 
 tion on the one hand, and from Judgment on the 
 other, inasmuch as it supposes the consciousness of 
 relation without the knowledge of truth. It is the 
 first and lowest of the powers of Reason ; first in 
 the order of mental developement, for we must com- 
 prehend what a relation or a proposition is before 
 we can judge of it ; lowest, because common to all, 
 and indispensable to all reasonable creatures. 
 
 2. The establishment of Comprehension as a 
 distinct mental faculty seems to me of consider- 
 able importance, necessary to a due appreciation 
 of the Intellectual powers. To the want of this 
 distinction may be attributed much obscurity and 
 even contradiction in the writings of mental phi- 
 losophers. Thus Reid allows in one part that 
 '* when simple apprehension is employed about a 
 proposition, every man knows that it is one thing 
 to apprehend (comprehend) a proposition, that is 
 to conceive what it means ; but it is quite another 
 thing to judge it to be true or false.^" Here the 
 words apprehend and conceive are used instead of 
 
 ^ lylelleclual Powers. Essay VI. Chap. I. 
 
238 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 comprehend, which I propose, but the sense is the 
 same, and the doctrine the same as that given 
 above. But not many sentences after we meet with 
 the following : " Relations of things make one 
 great class of our notions or ideas, and we cannot 
 have the idea of any relation without some exercise 
 of judgment '?'"' Now, as Reid would allow, and in- 
 deed every one allows, that a proposition supposes a 
 relation ; it follows that in the first sentence he grants, 
 and in the next denies that we can conceive or aj^pre- 
 hend, as he expresses it, a relation without an exer- 
 cise. of judgment. Here is a flat contradiction. Both 
 of these statements cannot be true ; and the former 
 I believe to be correct, as above shown. Had Reid 
 seen that there is a powder, which I call comprehen- 
 sion, distinct from Conception or apprehension proper, 
 as well as from Judgment, he could not have fallen 
 into this contradiction. In the third chapter of the 
 same Essay he again allows explicitly that " a propo- 
 sition may be simply conceived (comprehended) 
 without judging of it,'' and if a proposition, then 
 a relation ; for a proposition is simply a relation 
 expressed in words.^ And again, in the beginning 
 
 '' Intellectual Powers. Essay VI. Chap. I. 
 ' There may be an exception to ibis metaphysical definition of 
 a proposition, in the case where Identity, or where simple Ex- 
 istence, is predicated; but in almost all propositions, if not in all, 
 some Relation is affirmed or denied. On this point see the 
 author's " Introduction to Mental Philosophy" Article, Propo- 
 sition. • 
 
or COMPREHENSION. 239 
 
 of the fourth chapter we are told that some pro- 
 positions are of such a nature that a man of ripe 
 understanding may apprehend them distinctly, and 
 perfectly understand their meaning, without finding 
 himself under any necessity of believing them to be 
 true or false, probable or improbable." Substitute 
 the word coviprehend for apprehend and understand, 
 and this statement will agree with my own. 
 
240 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY, 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 OF BELIEF. 
 
 1. When we fully comprehend a Proposition, 
 the next step is to believe or to disbelieve it. Some 
 propositions we believe or disbelieve at once, with- 
 out any hesitation ; others we admit or reject slowly, 
 after some mental effort ; on others we make up 
 our mind with great difficulty ; while of a few we 
 may never be fully convinced, one way or another, 
 during the whole course of our lives. Let us first 
 determine what Belief is, and then see how it is 
 connected with the other Intellectual powers. 
 
 2. When I say that I believe in God, it is evi- 
 dent that the Belief is something different from the 
 mere conception of a Supreme Being, Maker of 
 heaven and earth, for an Atheist can conceive such 
 a Being, though he does not believe in him. It is 
 also clear that when I affirm my belief in the pro- 
 position " God exists," I do something more than 
 state that I comprehend it ; for an Atheist compre- 
 hends this proposition, or knows its meaning, as 
 well as myself, without any mixture of Belief. There- 
 fore Belief differs essentially from mere conception, 
 as well as from mere comprehension ; though with- 
 
Tv) 
 
 OF BELIEF. 241 
 
 out conception and comprehension of course we 
 cannot believe. They are indispensable to Belief, 
 but may exist without it. 
 
 3. These observations are sufficient to refute 
 the statement of Hume delivered in his juvenile 
 work; "A Treatise of Human Nature," namely, 
 that " An opinion or belief is a lively Idea related 
 to, or associated with, a present Impression." ™ 
 Here, Belief is confounded with Conception. It is 
 nothing but a lively Conception, or in Hume's lan- 
 guage, a lively Idea. This conclusion follows from 
 that one fundamental assumption with which the 
 work sets out, that all the phenomena of mind are 
 but of two sorts, Impressions and Ideas, the latter 
 being only copies, as it were, of the former, dimi- 
 nished in force and vivacity. But having already 
 criticised this assumption, I refer to it here again 
 only to show that it gave rise to an erroneous notion 
 of Belief. If all the mental phenomena be either 
 Impressions or Ideas, of course Belief must be one 
 or the other; and not being an Impression, it must 
 be an Idea. But we have shown that it is essentially 
 different from an Idea or Conception ; and conse- 
 quently, Hume's primary classification of the mental 
 phenomena is narrow and insufficient. Further on, 
 in the same Treatise, Hume seems to consider Belief 
 as an Impresssion, rather than an Idea ; for he says, 
 " Belief is more properly an act of the Sensitive 
 
 "Part III. Sect. 7. 
 I I 
 
242 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 than of the Cogitative part of our nature."" Here 
 Belief is confounded with Sensation ; wretched Me- 
 taphysics ! The force of absurdity can no further 
 
 go. 
 
 4. So far we have seen what Belief is not ; but 
 
 as yet we know not what it is. Does it belong to 
 Simple Intellect or to Reason ? We have shown 
 that certain powers of Simple Intellect, such as 
 Perception and Memory, comprise Belief, belief in 
 the present existence of the outward object, belief 
 in the former existence of something now recalled : 
 and every one allows that there is Belief in Judg- 
 ment. It therefore seems that Belief belongs to 
 both Simple Intellect and Reason. 
 
 5. But, does the Belief which forms part of 
 Perception and Memory suppose an act of Judg- 
 ment *? If so, then Simple Intellect and Reason 
 are both united in these complex mental faculties, 
 and they cannot be attributed to the former alone. 
 In order to solve this question, we must first inquire 
 whether Belief be in any case possible without 
 Judgment. 
 
 6. Some writers are of opinion that we cannot 
 affirm or deny anything without an exercise of 
 Judgment. Thus, Dr. Watts says, " Judgment is 
 
 " Part IV. Sect. 1. — It must always be remembered, that 
 the " Treatise of Human Nature" was a youthful work, afterwards 
 given up by the Author ; but it was printed and published, and 
 therefore may be criticised, es])ecially if such criticism throw a 
 light upon mental philosophy. 
 
OF JiELIEF. 243 
 
 that operation of the mind whereby we join two or 
 more ideas together by one affirmation or negation ; 
 that is, we either affirm or deny this to be that. So, 
 the tree is high ; that horse is not swift ; the mind 
 of man is a thinking being ; mere matter has no 
 thought belonging to it ; God is just ; good men are 
 often miserable in this world; a righteous governor 
 will make a dijference between the evil and the good; 
 which sentences are the effect of Judgment, and are 
 called Propositions,'^" And again, further on, " the 
 evidence of sense is when we frame a proposition ac- 
 cording to the dictates of any of our senses ; so we 
 judge that grass is green ; that a trumpet gives a 
 pleasant sound ; ih^ifire burns wood ; water is soft, 
 and iron is hard : for we have seen, heard, or felt 
 all these."p 
 
 7. Other writers seem to be of a different 
 opinion. The statements of Dr. Reid on this point 
 are not always consistent, but in the opening of his 
 Essay " Of Judgment," he finds fault with the defi- 
 nition given of judgment by the more ancient wri- 
 ters on logic, as an act of the mind whereby one thing 
 is a^rmed or denied of another : and that on two 
 grounds ; first, because it does not seem to embrace 
 mere mental affirmation and denial ; and secondly, 
 because " affirmation and denial is very often the 
 expression of testimony, which is a different act of 
 
 " Logic, Introduction. 
 P Id. Part II. Chap. II. Sect. 9. 
 
244 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 the mind, and ought to be distinguished from judg- 
 ment. A judge asks of a witness what he knows of 
 such a matter to which he was an eye or ear witness. 
 He answers by affirming and denying something. 
 But his answer does not express his judgment ; it is 
 his testimony. Again, I ask a man his opinion in a 
 matter of science or criticism. His answer is not 
 testimony ; it is the expression of his judgment." 
 Here it is distinctly allowed that there may be 
 affirmation and denial, and consequently affirmative 
 and negative propositions, without an act of judg- 
 ment, and therefore Belief. Yet, in the very same 
 place we are told that " mental affirmation and 
 denial is only another name for judgment," which is 
 a flat contradiction to the above. 1 his latter asser- 
 tion, however, is not supported by any argument or 
 illustration, and seems to have been a mere over- 
 sight, contradicted by what immediately follows. 
 
 8. In order to decide this point let us take the 
 simplest case possible. I knock my hand against 
 the table, and what is the mental result*? First, I 
 feel a sensation, which may or may not amount to 
 pain ; then 1 have a conception of some material 
 object ; and lastly, I believe in the existence of such 
 an object there present. Now in all this what room 
 is there for judgment '? The sensation, the concep- 
 tion, and the belief, are all of which I am conscious. 
 But no one would maintain that the sensation or 
 the conception singly or together constitute judg- 
 ment ; nor will it, I think, be affirmed that Belief 
 
OF BELIEF. 245 
 
 is only another name for Jiulgment. These words 
 are distinguished in all languages, and therefore the 
 states of mind which they express cannot be quite 
 the same. But it may be said that Conception and 
 Belief together constitute Judgment. This, however, 
 is only to repeat the assertion in another form, that 
 Belief and Judgment are identical, for neither Belief 
 nor Judgment can exist without Conception, and 
 therefore in this there is no difference between 
 them. If Conception and Belief together constitute 
 Judgment, and Conception be a part of Judgment, 
 then is Belief without Conception equivalent to 
 Judgment without Conception, and consequently 
 Belief with Conception is the same as Judgment 
 with Conception, and therefore Belief and Judgment 
 are identical. But this conclusion is at variance 
 with the universal sense of mankind, and therefore 
 cannot be true. Consequently, the Premises from 
 which we set out that Conception and Belief toge- 
 ther constitute Judgment, must be false. 
 
 9. Having thus exhausted all the combina- 
 tions of the three elements, Sensation, Conception, 
 and Belief, as occurring in the case just stated, 
 and having found nothing in them singly or in 
 union that would be called Judgment by any man 
 of common intelligence, we conclude that Belief 
 may exist without Judgment. And if in that case, 
 then in others innumerable. This is an important 
 conclusion. 
 
 10. The Belief which exists along with our 
 
246 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 Perceptions is very frequently unaccompanied 
 with Judgment. It seems ridiculous to assert 
 that without an exercise of Judgment we cannot 
 know that " grass is green." Indeed, far from an 
 effort of Judgment being required to unite the 
 attribute of greenness to grass, we can scarcely 
 separate them even in Conception. And surely it 
 will not be maintained that the formal statement 
 of the fact in words as a proposition can require 
 Judgment, if the mental conviction required none. 
 11. But the Belief which attends upon Per- 
 ception sometimes does require an act of Judg- 
 ment. This is particularly the case with the 
 Perceptions of Sight. These, as we know, are 
 often acquired, not instinctive ; and much judg- 
 ment may be necessary, even in mature life, to 
 determine the exact distance, position, magnitude, 
 or figure of remote objects, as descried by the 
 eye. In these particulars people continually 
 differ, that is, they form different opinions, and 
 this diversity is the strongest proof that judgment 
 is necessary ; whereas in such statements as mar- 
 ble is hard, grass is green^ there is perfect unani- 
 mity, because there is no exercise of Judgment. 
 Instinct is the same in all ; but Judgment varies 
 indefinitely. Travellers in a new country often 
 differ as to the distance of the objects which pre- 
 sent themselves, but they never debate whether 
 the trees have leaves, or the rivers flow. Are you 
 a good judge of distances by the eye? is a com- 
 
OF BELIEF. 247 
 
 mon question and expressive of a truth ; but no 
 one would ask another whether he were a good 
 judge of the colour of grass. 
 
 12. The knowledge derived from the sense of 
 Hearing also often requires an exercise of Judg- 
 ment. To be able to tell whence any noise pro- 
 ceeds, from what cause, and from how far, may 
 demand considerable experience and employment 
 of the rational faculties ; but no judgment is ne- 
 cessary in order to tell whether a sound be agree- 
 able or disagreeable. We do not judge, but feel 
 it to be one or the other, at the time ; and ever 
 afterwards we believe that a similar sound will 
 affect us in like manner. Having felt how the 
 sawing of stone grates upon the ear, we can surely 
 frame a proposition to express our belief in this 
 truth, without any act of Judgment. 
 
 13. What has been said of Perception also 
 applies to Memory. Common Sense makes a broad 
 distinction between Memory and Judgment ; and a 
 person may excel in the one and be very deficient 
 in the other. Judgment, indeed, cannot flourish 
 without some degree of Memory ; but Memory 
 may exist and even abound without Judgment. I 
 should like to know what Judgment is required 
 in order to learn off by heart a piece of prose or 
 poetry. And can I not affirm that " I yesterday 
 walked five miles into the country" without an 
 exercise of that faculty ? If I can, then the Belief, 
 which forms an essential part of Memory, is inde- 
 
248 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 pendent of Judgment. Will any one maintain 
 that the same mental principle is required to frame 
 these two propositions — " last month I frequently 
 skated on the Serpentine," and, " Napoleon was a 
 more skilful general than Mack." 
 
 14. From the above it appears that Belief is 
 frequently unaccompanied with Judgment, espe- 
 cially in the case of Perception and of Memory. 
 Consequently, in these cases Belief belongs to 
 Simple Intellect, not to Reason. In other cases, 
 indeed, Belief is closely connected with Reason, 
 as in Judgment : but, if Belief can exist without 
 Judgment, without any act of Reason, then it is 
 properly a phenomenon of Simple Intellect. 
 It is a phenomenon sui generis, neither a Sen- 
 sation, nor an Emotion, nor a Perception, 
 though an element thereof, nor a Conception, 
 nor even a Relation ; for a relation may be com- 
 prehended without being believed. It is a pheno- 
 menon which cannot be defined, because it cannot 
 be analysed, nor for the same reason described. 
 In fact, we know it so well that neither definition 
 nor description are necessary. All that is required 
 is to find what place it occupies, and what combi- 
 nations it forms with other mental phenomena; 
 and this we have endeavoured in part to do. We 
 shall afterwards consider it in union with the 
 Judgment. 
 
 15. But if Belief be ever independent of the 
 Judgment on what does it depend^ To this we 
 
OF BELIEF. 249 
 
 answer that Belief is of two kinds, Orifjinal or 
 Instinctive, and Derived or Acquired ; that the 
 former is an ultimate or unaccountable fact, an 
 original part of our mental constitution, which 
 cannot be traced any farther ; while the latter 
 depends upon causes that may be investigated. 
 
 1 6. We have already mentioned some of those 
 Articles of Belief which we consider as Original 
 and Jundamental, the ground of all subsequent 
 knowledge; but we shall again enumerate them 
 here. These then, are the following; — 
 
 1. Belief in our own Identity. 
 
 2. Belief in the evidence of Memory. 
 
 3. Belief in the existence of the material 
 world. 
 
 4. Belief in the uniformity of Nature, in uni- 
 formities of Co-existence as well as those of Succes- 
 sion ; for instance, that all cows, horses, sheep, 
 bears, lions, etc., are respectively formed alike, 
 not only outwardly and visibly, but inwardly 
 and out of sight; and that fire will always burn, 
 water always drown, etc., etc. 
 
 5. Belief in human Testimony. 
 
 All these, and possibly others, we consider as 
 Orijjinal and fundamental Articles of Belief. 
 
 17. Hume, no doubt, has attempted to prove 
 that our Belief in the uniformity of the course of 
 Nature, or in Causation, is derived from Custom.'' 
 
 ** Essays: Sceptical Doubts; and Sceptical solution of those 
 doubts. 
 
 K K 
 
250 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 but this explanation is refuted by the fact that 
 such BeUef requires no Repetition. When a child 
 has once burned his finger in the candle, he will 
 avoid it ever afterwards ; and if he have seen a 
 man drowned in water, he will not require a re- 
 petion of the experiment to be sure that it will 
 drown himself. In truth, the tendency to associ- 
 ate phenomena as cause and effect is so strong, 
 that it leads to frequent error, to be corrected only 
 by subsequent experience. Repetition, then, is 
 necessary not to give the first Belief, but to con- 
 firm or dispel it. The same may be said of Belief 
 in human testimony. The child swallows impli- 
 citly all that is told him by those around him. 
 He never doubts the truth of what they say, until 
 experience have proved to him that they may 
 sometimes speak false. Here again Repetition 
 gives not the first Belief, but afterwards serves to 
 correct it. There is, however, this difference 
 between Belief in the uniformity of Nature, and 
 Belief in man's word, that the former is based 
 upon one instance at least of succession or of 
 co-existence, whereas the latter seems to be inde- 
 pendent of all experience as to the truth or false- 
 hood of what men say. The child believes what 
 he is told, long before he can prove anything, 
 prior to all experience, quite instinctively. Mr. Mill, 
 on the other hand, endeavours to prove that our 
 belief in the law of Causality does not depend 
 upon an instinct, but on an induction by simple 
 
OF BELIEF, 251 
 
 enumeration/ But here the whole difficulty is 
 overlooked. In the first place, a number of in- 
 stances is not necessary to this belief, one only may 
 suffice ; but one instance, nay, ten millions of 
 instances of any event, show only a certain uni- 
 formity in time past or present ; they can prove no 
 such uniformity in time to come. No doubt, we 
 cannot help believing in the future uniformity ; 
 but there is no logical connection between the 
 premises and the conclusion. Why should the 
 future be like the past or the present ? Is this a 
 self-evident truth ? Certainly not ? Can any 
 reason be assigned for it ? We maintain not ; 
 and therefore we conclude that our belief in 
 Causation is not the result of reasoning, is not 
 acquired by induction, but is prior to all reason- 
 ing, to all induction, and truly instinctive. 
 Hume saw" the difficulty, and attempted to solve 
 it by Custom ; but I cannot see that Mr. Mill has 
 given atiy solution at all. He says indeed that 
 *^The justification of our Belief that the future 
 will resemble the past, is that the future does 
 resemble the past." But the word future in the 
 second place must mean the present as future to 
 the past ; and how past and present uniformity 
 can prove uniformity in time to come is still the 
 difficulty. 
 
 18. The above, and some other fundamental 
 articles of Belief, are called bv Dr. Reid " First 
 ' " System of Logic." Book hi. Chap xxi. 
 
252 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 Principles of Contingent Truth," and are treated 
 of by bim under the head of " Judgment." But 
 we have seen that they are independent of this 
 faculty. They arise very early in the infant mind, 
 long before judgment is developed ; and it is 
 necessary that they should, for the very existence 
 of the child depends upon them. Miserable in- 
 deed would be the lot of mankind, if Belief could 
 only follow upon Judgment! Judgment may in- 
 deed be required afterwards to generalise these 
 primary convictions, to state them in formal pro- 
 positions, and bring them forward as First Prin- 
 ciples ; but the Belief existed long before; it arose 
 on each particular occasion, as a particular phe- 
 nomenon, not formally stated, not expressed in 
 words, but entirely mental. On what occasions 
 the particular instances of Belief may arise, we 
 have already seen, and there is no uncertainty 
 here ; but the occasion is not the principal cause, 
 it is only an auxiliary. For the principal cause 
 we can look only to the original constitution of 
 the human mind, which, like the bud of a plant, 
 is susceptible of such wonderful development. 
 The sun, the rain, are but auxiliary causes of the 
 growth of the branch, the leaves, the flower, the 
 fruit ; the principal cause is in the bud itself. 
 Perhaps the most convincing instance of Belief, 
 independent of all Experience, of Judgment, of 
 Reason, is afforded by the child's easy confidence 
 in what is told him. 
 
 .j^. 
 
OF BELIEF. 253 
 
 ]{). The second sort of Belief is that which is 
 not original or instinctive, but derived or acquired ; 
 and of this therefore the causes may be assigned. 
 One cause of such Belief is unquestionably the 
 Judgment; but is it the only cause*? Is it from 
 an act of Judgment alone that the mass of man- 
 kind derive all those opinions which are -not origi- 
 nal or instinctive'? It is far otherwise. 
 
 20. Many opinions are adopted by children of 
 tender age before the Judgment is developed ; 
 many are believed implicitly from infancy to age 
 without question, without doubt; many seem to 
 be hereditary, descending from father to son, like 
 the paternal acres ; many are common to classes 
 of men, nay to whole nations. Such early, such 
 uniform belief, about things often questionable, 
 argues some cause acting sooner in life, and 
 acting with greater steadiness than the Judgment. 
 Wherever Judgment comes in, there we find di- 
 versity of belief at once. This is well known to 
 the Church of Rome ; and therefore the prohibi- 
 tion of private Judgment in religious matters is the 
 fundamental article of that church, distinguishing 
 it from every variety of Protestantism. All Pro- 
 testants, of whatsoever sect, appeal to private 
 Judgment; some more, some less, some deferring 
 much to authority, others very little; but the 
 Church of Rome rejects private judgment alto- 
 gether. The consequence is what we see; that 
 while the Church of Rome has held together for 
 
254 PEINCIPLE3 OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 good or for ill, Protestantism has been split into 
 innumerable sects. Even Protestant churches, 
 ostensibly one, are sometimes almost as much di- 
 vided among themselves as those which assume 
 diiferent denominations. Such is the consequence 
 of the acknowledged right of private judgment, 
 its use and its abuse. 
 
 21. Whence then are derived those early, 
 those uniform opinions to which we have alluded ? 
 We answer, without hesitation, from Custom. 
 We have seen that when Hume explained our 
 belief in Causation by Custom, he certainly was 
 mistaken ; because such primary belief requires 
 no repetition of phenomena, no custom ; but as a 
 cause of secondary Belief, custom is of immense 
 importance. It is a well-known fact, that persons 
 of mature age, even thoughtful men, insensibly 
 imbibe the opinions of those with whom they con- 
 stantly converse ; much more children, boys, and 
 unreflecting adults. We cannot blink the fact 
 that the immense majority of mankind, in all 
 countries, derive their religious opinions from 
 custom. Why are all Englishmen Christians, all 
 Turks Mahometans ^ In fact, the Christian reli- 
 gion is the only one which appeals to the Judg- 
 ment, the only one that has evidences ; and to 
 how few, comparatively, are those evidences 
 known! Though religious sentiment in general 
 be deeply founded in human nature, yet, in all 
 religions but the Christian, Belief in the prevail- 
 
OF BELIEF. 255 
 
 ing creed is founded on nothing but custom; in 
 all very young Christians, and in most adults, it 
 depends upon the same principle ; in a few only 
 it rests upon sound judgment and reasoning. 
 
 22. And fortunate for us is this law of our 
 nature. Custom, indeed, may inculcate falsehood 
 as well as truth ; if it spread Christianity in 
 England, it keeps up Mahometanism in Turkey; 
 but perhaps any religion, certainly the Mahometan, 
 is better than none ; and any fixed belief, not de- 
 cidedly immoral, is preferable to a blank, or to a 
 tumult of conflicting opinions. Without the in- 
 fluence of custom there could be no family, except 
 in a material sense, and no nation ; for a nation 
 consists not merely in a geographical division of 
 country, and a number of people in that country, 
 but in a people among whom there exists a cer- 
 tain harmony of opinions, tastes, and character. 
 It is custom that binds the nation, like the family, 
 into one; whereas private judgment tends to 
 separate the members, and sometimes widely sepa- 
 rates them. In short, without custom the world 
 would be a Babel ; without the exercise of judg- 
 ment, an uniform, dead, unchangeable mass. 
 
256 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 OF JUDGMENT. 
 
 1. The great antagonists to Belief founded on 
 mere custom are Judgment and Reasoning. These, 
 though so nearly related, and so commonly united, 
 are not inseparable by Metaphysical analysis, not 
 even in reality, for though there can be no Rea- 
 soning without Judgment, there may be Judgment 
 without Reasoning. But to determine what 
 Judgment properly is would seem to be no easy 
 task, considering the various and even contradic- 
 tory opinions of metaphysicians on this subject. 
 These discrepancies may be partly verbal, different 
 authors giving different meanings to the same 
 word ; but the result, if not absolute error, is 
 confusion. A writer cannot force all men to his 
 sense of any word, but he ought at least to ex- 
 plain clearly his own meaning, to adhere to it 
 consistently, and to depart as little as possible 
 from the common use of language. 
 
 2. Locke's account of this matter is summed 
 up by himself as follows : " Thus the mind has 
 two faculties conversant about Truth and False- 
 hood. First, Knowledge, whereby it certainly 
 
OF JUDGMENT. 257 
 
 perceives and is undoubtedly satisfied of the 
 agreement or disagreement of any ideas Second- 
 ly, Judgment, which is the putting ideas together 
 or separating them from one another in the mind, 
 when the certain agreement or disagreement is 
 not perceived but presumed to be so ; which is, 
 as the word imports, taken to be so, before it cer- 
 tainly appears. And if it so unites, or separates 
 them as in reality things are, it is right Judg- 
 ment y^ 
 
 3. What first strikes us in the above account is 
 the singular use of the word Knoivledge, beiDg em- 
 ployed to mean a mental faculty, and not as in com- 
 mon language a result obtained by means of our 
 faculties. Next we observe the distinction attempt- 
 ed between the faculty whereby we discern certainty 
 and that by which we descry probability only, the 
 latter alone being called Judgment. Such, in short, 
 is the doctrine of Locke. It is a doctrine, as we 
 see, that limits rather than extends the mean- 
 ing of the word Judgment, beyond what is usual. 
 
 4. Dr. Reid says, " That I may 'avoid disputes 
 about the meaning of words, I wish the reader to 
 understand that I give the name of Judgment to 
 every determination of the mind concerning what is 
 true and what is false. This, I think, is what logi- 
 cians, from the days of Aristotle, have called Judg- 
 
 <^ Essay conceming Human Understanding. Book IV. 
 Chap. 14. 
 
 L L 
 
258 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 ment."* He also states that " in persons come to 
 years of understanding, judgment necessarily accom- 
 panies all sensation, perception by the senses, con- 
 sciousness, and memory, but not conception." In 
 short, according to Reid, wherever there is Belief, 
 there is Judgment ; and he even supposes Belief, as 
 in the case of sensation and simple consciousness, 
 where there is none. Here, Judgment is used in 
 the most extensive possible sense ; and as I have 
 endeavoured to show in the preceding chapter, quite 
 improperly . But, in the opening of the same chap- 
 ter, he finds fault with the usual definition, there ex- 
 pressed as an act of the mitid whereby one thing is 
 affirmed a?id denied of another^ although he adopts it, 
 observing that " affirmation and denial is very often 
 the expression of testimony, which is a different act 
 of the mind, and ought to be distinguished from 
 Judgment." But I cannot testify that " I yesterday 
 saw George Roberts in the town Coventry, at five 
 o'clock in the afternoon," without a conviction in my 
 mind that what I testify is true, or false, and there- 
 fore, according to Reid's own showing, without an 
 act of judgment. Nay, the very statement^ "I yes- 
 terday saw," etc., expresses my belief or conviction, 
 and therefore again, according to Reid, my judg- 
 ment. But this statement may be false, what then ? 
 why in that case I must disbelieve what I assert, 
 and disbelief surely argues judgment as much as 
 
 ' Intellectual Powers. Essay VI. Chap. I. 
 
OF JUDGMENT. 259 
 
 belief. The two statements of Reid are therefore 
 contradictory, and this contradiction may be traced 
 to the too extensive sense given to the term Judg- 
 ment, an extension not in accordance uith common 
 notions and common language. It is quite true, as 
 Reid says, that there is a real distinction, and one 
 generally allowed, between affirmation and denial 
 expressive of testimony, and affirmation and denial 
 expressive of opinion ; in other words, between 
 simple Belief and belief founded on Judgment. 
 
 5. As this is a matter of importance, I shall 
 bring forward two more passages to prove that 
 simple Belief and Belief founded on Judgment, 
 though distinguished by Reid at the outset, are 
 afterwards confounded by him. In the first Chap- 
 ter of his Essay on Judgment, after stating that 
 "in persons come to years of understanding, 
 judgment necessarily accompanies all sensation, 
 perception by the senses, consciousness, and me- 
 mory, but not conception," he adds, " I restrict 
 this to persons come to the years of understand- 
 ing, because it may be a question whether infants, 
 in the first period of life, have any judgment or 
 belief at all." Here judgment and belief are ex- 
 pressly used as synonimous. Again, in the Third 
 Chapter of the same Essay he says, " A proposition 
 may be simply conceived (comprehended) without 
 judging of it. But, when there is not only a con- 
 ception (comprehension) of the proposition, but a 
 mental affirmation or negation, an assent and 
 
260 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 dissent of the understanding, whether weak or 
 strong, that is judgment." Here again, assent or 
 dissent of the understanding, in other words, 
 BeUef or Disbehef, and Judgment, are considered 
 as one and the same. 
 
 6. Since Locke and Reid differ so widely in 
 the notion attached by each to the term Judgment, 
 of course they must differ in all their conclusions 
 founded on such notions respectively. The objec- 
 tions brought forward by Reid against the doctrine 
 of Locke are consequently verbal ; they are objec- 
 tions not so much to a particular doctrine, as to 
 the particular use of a certain word. I shall 
 therefore not trouble the reader with them. 
 
 7. In common language, the term Judgment 
 is assuredly employed with considerable latitude 
 and vagueness ; but, as we have seen, it is not 
 generally confounded with simple Belief. Very 
 frequently it embraces Reasoning as well as Judg- 
 ment proper. When we talk of a man of sound 
 Judgment, we mean one who reasons well and 
 comes to sound conclusions on all affairs of ordi- 
 nary life. Having shown therefore, on the one 
 hand, that Judgment is not mere Belief, we ought 
 to prove, on the other, that there is a faculty 
 called with propriety Judgment, the foundation of 
 Reasoning, but distinguishable from Reasoning, 
 and capable of existing without it. 
 
 8. When I give my assent to the propositions, 
 twice two are equal to four, three times five are 
 
 
OF JUDGArFXT. 2G1 
 
 equal to fifteen ; things which are equal to the 
 same are equal to one another ; two straight lines 
 cannot enclose a space ; etc., etc., what faculty 
 of the mind is called into exercise ? I certainly 
 believe these propositions; but is belief all? Is 
 my state of mind the same as when I say that I 
 beliei'e that the sun will rise to-morrow ? Cer- 
 tainly not. But perhaps there is a difference only 
 of degree, and I believe the one sort of proposition 
 more firmly than the other. Neither is this true ; 
 for I am as certain in my own mind that the sun 
 will rise to-morrow, as that twice two are equal 
 to four, and I would act as unhesitatingly on the 
 belief of the one, as on that of the other. There 
 is then here a difference greater than that of mere 
 degree ; something is added to the belief in the 
 one case which is not in the other. In the one 
 case I believe, and only believe, when I state the 
 proposition, for it does not appear to me at the 
 time on what that belief is founded. I may amuse 
 myself afterwards, if I please, by speculating upon 
 this point ; but at the moment the thought does 
 not arise, and it may never arise. It is therefore 
 beside the present question. The grounds of be- 
 lief do not immediately appear. But in the other 
 case, we believe because we see grounds of belief; 
 we believe not only that the proposition is true, 
 but w'e discern that it must be true; and this 
 faculty whereby we so discern is what is properly 
 called the Judgment. It comprehends belief, and 
 
262 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 something more, and yet it does not embrace 
 reasoning ; for the truth of the proposition is 
 self-evident, not proved by inference from some- 
 thing else. Thus it appears that at least one 
 office of Judgment is to discern self-evident neces- 
 sary truth. 
 
 9. The primary propositions which we have 
 just considered are all Mathematical, having refer- 
 ence to Quantity alone, they are all abstract, and 
 all independent of actual matter of fact. It must 
 still be true that two straight lines (as we under- 
 stand them) cannot enclose a space, whether there 
 be any perfectly straight lines in nature or not. 
 
 But there are other primary propositions that 
 may be called Metaphysical, which differ from the 
 former, in this especially, that they do suppose 
 matter of fact, or real existence, distinct from the 
 conscious mind. These then are far more inter- 
 esting and far more important than the other. 
 The question which we have now to treat is, 
 whether these be discerned by the Judgment. 
 
 10. The first of these which 1 shall mention is, 
 that " whatever exists had a cause of existence dis- 
 tinct from itself." This is a proposition to which 
 every man of sound mind assents at once, in a gene- 
 ral way, without delay, without hesitation, but on 
 what grounds ^ from reasoning, certainly not ; for 
 there are no premises from which it can be proved. 
 Is it then self-evident and necessary ? If so, then 
 the contrary must be not only false, but impossible. 
 
OF JUDGMENT. 2G3 
 
 This we cannot venture to say. A single case of 
 exception destroys impossibility ; and, if we believe 
 in God, we must admit that one exception. There- 
 fore the truth is neither self-evident nor necessary. 
 Is it then independent of Judgment? Assuredly 
 we do not discern, though we cannot help believing 
 it. Is it owing to custom *? Custom may confirm 
 the belief, but the rudiments thereof existed before 
 custom had power to act, even from the dawn of 
 Reason. Besides, Custom only associates pheno- 
 mena, and from the presence of one phenomenon 
 makes us look for another ; but in this there is no 
 notion of Causation. Therefore the truth in ques- 
 tion is an early generalization of an instinctive and 
 fundamental article of Belief, whereon Judgment and 
 Reasoning afterwards build. We do not consider 
 belief in this truth as instinctive, like Belief in our 
 own identity, in the material world, and in the uni- 
 formity of Nature, out of which it springs; for it 
 seems to arise later, and to require some Intellectual 
 development, some degree of Reason, for its com- 
 prehension ; but, as soon as comprehended, it is un- 
 hesitatingly embraced. Neither is it acquired by 
 Experience, for the very notion of a Cause is not 
 thus learnt, much less the necessity of a cause for 
 everything. It must, therefore, be chiefly the growth 
 of the mind itself, of the Intellect roused into activity 
 by what it contemplates of the course of nature 
 within and without. 
 
 11. If we vary the proposition and say that 
 
264 PEINCIPLES or PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 "^whatever had a hec/ inning of existence must have 
 had a cause thereof," then the proposition seems to 
 approach nearer to the nature of a necessary one ; 
 though, even in this case, considering our deep ig- 
 norance of Causation, it would be too much to pro- 
 nounce dogmatically that the contrary was impossi- 
 ble. No doubt, we must strain our minds to admit 
 the possibility ; but we can entertain the question ; 
 whereas we cannot for one moment allow the con- 
 trary of a mathematical axiom to be within the 
 limits of possibility. We do not admit the old 
 maxim ea^ nihilo nihihim Jit, but it is almost as great 
 a strain upon the intellect to believe in the creation 
 of matter out of nothing, as to believe in its first 
 existence without a cause ; and if we allow the 
 possibility/ of the one, we cannot dogmatically pro- 
 nounce the imioossihility of the other. This is all 
 we contend for ; in other words, that the propo- 
 sition in question is not, like mathematical axioms, 
 a self-evident necessary truth, but an instinct gene- 
 ralized, the eldest born of Reason, older even than 
 the Judgment. 
 
 12. The third proposition which I shall men- 
 tion under this head is, " that a certain order or 
 arrangement in the effect is a certain proof of an 
 intelligent and designing cause." Explain a steam- 
 engine to an ignorant man, point out to him the 
 uses of all the parts ; and however low his intellect 
 may be, if he be not an idiot, he will instantly con- 
 clude it to be the work of a thinking being. So, 
 
OF JUDGMENT. 265 
 
 the instances of order and arrangement in the works 
 of nature, especially in the mind of man, point at 
 once to an intelligent cause. Who could be so 
 stupid as to think that mere matter, unthinking 
 matter, might make a thinking soul'? No propo- 
 sition is more revolting to the Reason of man than 
 this. If it be not absolutely impossible, it is des- 
 perately improbable, so that we reject it almost as 
 unhesitatingly as that twice two are not equal to 
 four. Still, speaking strictly, since with our limited 
 knowledge we cannot dogmatically assert the con- 
 trary to be absolutely impossible, we must class 
 this third proposition, like the two former, though 
 all but certain, as neither self-evident nor necessary. 
 13. These observations go to refute the atheis- 
 tical doctrine, that prior to experience anything may 
 be the cause of anything. With respect to mere 
 physical nature and isolated facts, this may be true ; 
 but not in reference to arranged and organized 
 matter, still less to the mind of man. That anything 
 could create order, that mere earth and water could 
 form a regular plant with all its vessels, branches, 
 leaves, flowers, and fruit ; that stone and clay and 
 moisture could give birth to a man, with his perfect 
 physical organization, and his god-like mental facul- 
 ties ; these are absurdities almost self-evident, des- 
 cried without the aid of experience, as soon as the 
 terms of the propositions are understood. That such 
 excessive improbabilities do not strictly amount to an 
 impossibility, we must indeed, with due philosophi- 
 
 M M 
 
266 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 cal humility, admit; but, for all practical purposes, for 
 all sane belief, a probability so opposed is worth a 
 certainty. 
 
 Hume has ventured to start a doubt, whether 
 instances of design in the works of nature be not 
 too unlike those in the works of man to justify us in 
 arguing from them in favour of an Intelligent cause 
 of the Universe. But if the principles here stated 
 be correct, no argument drawn from an analogy 
 with man's works is necessary to prove a Diety. 
 Design in the works of nature is all but self-evident, 
 and a designing cause or Diety also evident to every 
 man with an open mind, and free from the prejudi- 
 ces of false philosophy." 
 
 14. This third proposition seems to me to differ 
 from the two former however, first in the later 
 development of the Belief which it implies ; and 
 secondly in this, that we truly discern that such a 
 cause is necessary to such an effect. I certainly 
 believe, nay I cannot help believing, that whatever 
 exists had a cause ; but I do not see the truth of this 
 as I do that an orderly effect proves an Intelligent 
 cause. This last belief then I attribute to the 
 Judgment, and consider the proposition which em- 
 braces it as one of those which are all but self- 
 evident. 
 
 15. We must not suppose that self-evident 
 propositions only are discerned by the Judgment. 
 
 " See move on this subject above : Part II. Chap. II. Sect. 
 Fourth. Of ihe Will, 
 
OF JUDGMENT. 2G7 
 
 On the contrary, by far the greater number of pro- 
 positions so discerned are not strictly self-evident, 
 or of themselves certain, beyond a doubt. Indeed, 
 when the truth is very clear, many would doubt 
 whether there were any exercise of Judgment at 
 all. I see a small pony and a tall horse, side by 
 side, and I instantly discern that the one is taller 
 than the other. Is this, or is it not, an act of 
 Judgment^ Though I perceive the horse as 
 well as the pony, yet I do not perceive the dis- 
 similitude between them. The discernment of rela- 
 tion is beyond the power of Perception. But, though 
 I certainly believe the dissimilitude, and that with- 
 out a doubt, does this belief imply Judgment *? 
 
 16. Suppose the pony to grow so as at last to 
 reach within half-an-inch of the height of the horse. 
 In that case it might require a practised eye, as we 
 commonly say, in reality a practised judgment, to be 
 able to discern at once which was the taller. This 
 will be allowed ; and if considerable judgment be 
 required in such a case, on account of the smallness 
 of the difference, surely a less degree of the same 
 faculty will be necessary where the difference is 
 greater. The degree of Judgment may be measured 
 by the difficulty; but there maybe judgment where 
 no man of sound mind finds any difficulty, as in the 
 case of self-evident propositions. 
 
 17. None of the intellectual faculties appears 
 more susceptible of improvement than the Judg- 
 ment. I, a man unused to such matters, take notice 
 
268 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 of two bullocks, so nearly alike in size that I cannot 
 say which is the heavier, while a practised grazier 
 will tell at a glance. Nay, he will state to a nicety, 
 and at the moment, the weight of each. Here we 
 see the difference between a practised and an un- 
 practised judgment, the original faculties being 
 possibly on a par. Therefore as Belief is either 
 instinctive or acquired, so is Judgment either 
 intuitive or cultivated. 
 
 18. Here I cannot help remarking how mis- 
 placed is that contempt with which some men look 
 down upon the intelligence of the rustic population. 
 In their own line, and no man can excel in every 
 line, they are far before those who despise them. 
 They certainly cannot write Greek verses, or 
 discuss philosophy, but they can judge well of the 
 qualities of horses, and all cattle, the varieties of 
 soil, and the processes of cultivation. 1 his is no 
 unimportant knowledge, and of it the mere book- 
 worm is quite ignorant. In these respects, the judg- 
 ment of the clown is cultivated, that of the literary 
 man uncultivated. Moreover, the education of the 
 field is far superior to that of the factory, where the 
 occupations are uniform and unvarying, tending as 
 little as possible to improve the intellectual faculties. 
 Consequently, some other intellectual exercise is 
 much more necessary to the manufacturing work- 
 man than to the agricultural labourer. The very 
 calling of the rustic educates him, not so that of the 
 operative. What ideas can a man gain by tending 
 
OF JUDGMENT. 209 
 
 a spinning-jenny all day, and every day ? He in- 
 deed requires what we may venture to call a learned 
 education. 
 
 19. From all that has now been said, it will 
 not be difficult to form a pretty accurate notion of 
 the Judgment. We have seen that this faculty 
 comprises Belief, and something more, namely, a 
 discernment of the truth, a discernment of the agree- 
 ment or disagreement of two related objects, whe- 
 ther notions, or things corresponding to notions. 
 And this discernment is rapid, not comprehending a 
 process of reasoning of which we are conscious at 
 the time; though, in the case of cultivated judg- 
 ment, it may be the result of long previous observa- 
 tion, and even reasoning. Therefore, judgment may 
 be defined to be that faculty whereby we rapidly 
 discern, without reasoning, the agreement or disagree- 
 nient of two objects, whether notions or things, either 
 intuitively, or aided hy cultivation. This may be 
 otherwise expressed. Judgment is that faculty 
 whereby we rapidly discern, without reasoning, the 
 permanent relations of Notions or of Things; 'perman- 
 ent, as opposed to those casual or temporary con- 
 junctions in Time and Space, which, only by an ex- 
 tension of the term, can be called Relations at all. 
 
 20. But, it may be asked, what do we mean by 
 discerning P Of this we can give no explanation, 
 nor is any necessary. The word seeing is some- 
 times used for discerning, as when we say that we 
 see the truth of a proposition : but neither term 
 
270 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 can be defined, for they defy analysis. But we 
 know intimately what it is to discern, and no defi- 
 nition could tell us more about it than we know 
 already. 
 
 21. When a particular act of Judgment is 
 expressed in words, it constitutes a Proposition, as 
 when I affirm that "Hannibal was a better general 
 than Flaminius." But since we have seen that 
 there may be Belief or Disbelief, and consequently 
 affirmation or denial, without an act of Judgment, 
 there must also be propositions expressive of 
 simple Belief, as when I say that, " I played at 
 cricket yesterday." Consequently, the metaphysi- 
 cal definition usually given of Proposition, namely, 
 A Judgment expressed in words, will not apply to 
 all cases. A Relation expressed in tvords is prefer- 
 able ; but even this is not applicable to proposi- 
 tions expressive of mere existence, as " God 
 exists," or to those where identity is affirmed, as 
 when I say, " this is the same man whom I met 
 yesterday.'^ It is not easy to make out any rela- 
 tion in these and similar propositions. Nay, it is 
 only by an extension of the term that the word 
 Relation can be at all employed in the case of 
 those casual conjunctions in Time and Space out 
 of which innumerable propositions can be framed, 
 such as, " yesterday I walked ten miles in the coun- 
 try ;" " this morning I played at bowls," etc., etc. 
 Therefore it seems to me better to define a Pro- 
 position as A verbal statement of Belief or Disbelief 
 
OF JUDGMENT. 271 
 
 in any fact ; for every act of Judgment supposes 
 belief, though every case of beUef does not imply 
 Judgment. 
 
 22. The above is properly a metaphysical defi- 
 nition, looking especially to the mental phenome- 
 non Belief, in which the verbal expression origi- 
 nates ; whereas the logical definition regards first 
 the form of words, and through them ascends to 
 the meaning. Thus the logical definition of Pro- 
 position will be that given in the author's " Intro- 
 duction to Mental Philosophy," namely, A sentence^ 
 or coynhination of words with meaning, lo hereby some- 
 thing is affirmed or denied of some other thing, either 
 simply, or with soine modification. The two defini- 
 tions agree, they are quite consistent ; they differ 
 only in the point of view from which they regard 
 their subject. While the Metaphysician analyzes 
 the phenomena of mind, in order to determine the 
 nature of Belief and Judgment, which terminate 
 in propositions, the Logician must analyse propo- 
 sitions themselves. But having treated of Propo- 
 sition fully in the above work, I need add no more 
 in this place."" 
 
 23. Before concluding this chapter, I must 
 make one or two remarks on the opinions of ray 
 predecessors. First, I may notice the opinion of 
 Brown, who thinks, because all the Intellectual 
 
 " See the Author's *' Introduction to Mental Philosophy." 
 Part II. Art. Proposition. 
 
272 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 faculties can be reduced to two, which he calls 
 Simple and Relative Suggestion, that therefore 
 the common classification into Conception, Imagi- 
 nation, Memory, Judgment, the Reasoning faculty, 
 etc., is erroneous. It is quite ridiculous to sup- 
 pose that these very natural classifications can be 
 altogether wrong. They may not, as commonly 
 used, be very accurate divisions, but they are far 
 too obvious, and too general, to be without some 
 good foundation. It has been my object in the 
 preceding pages not to overthrow this classifica- 
 tion, but to define more accurately the limits of 
 these various powers. They are proximate powers 
 if you will, but not the less real on that account, 
 nor the less important. What should we think of 
 a chemist, who, having analyzed all vegetable and 
 animal substances, and found them to consist 
 ultimately of Carbon, Oxygen, Hydrogen, and 
 Nitrogen or Azote, should deny the existence of 
 the Proximate principles, Albumen, Gluten, Gum, 
 Resin, Fibrin, Gelatin, Mucous membrane, Serous 
 membrane, etc., formed by the combination of 
 those elements in different proportions'? Proxi- 
 mate, according to Bacon, are more fructifying 
 than ultimate principles. Brown makes no dis- 
 tinction between Comprehension, Belief, Judg- 
 ment, and Reason, which be confounds with 
 Reasoning. Though all these may belong to 
 Relative Suggestion, that tells us but little of what 
 we wish to know. 
 
OF JUDGMENT. 273 
 
 24. The following passage of Reid seems to 
 demand notice. " The natural principles by which 
 our judgments and opinions are regulated before 
 we come to the use of reason, seem to be no less 
 necessary to such a being as man than those 
 natural instincts which the Author of nature has 
 given us to regulate our actions during that pe- 
 riod.'"'' Here it is supposed that there may be 
 judgments without reason. This, according to 
 my sense of the word Reason, is impossible ; for 
 Judgment, as I have stated, is one of the faculties 
 comprehended under the more general faculty of 
 Reason, intuitive, as well as cultivated Judgment. 
 There may be Judgment without Reasoning, but 
 not without Reason, and that may have been the 
 real opinion of Reid, though he has expressed it 
 inaccurately. 
 
 25 Lastly, in reference to the views of Locke 
 above stated, namely, that Judgment consists in 
 what he calls the presumption of the agreement 
 or disagreement of ideas, in opposition to the per- 
 ception or certainty of such agreement or dis- 
 agreement ; I may remark first, that the limita- 
 tion of Judgment to probability is contrary to all 
 usage and all authority ; and secondly, that 
 the word idea is at least ambiguous. When 
 I compare one affection of the mind with another, 
 as Love with Ambition, I may call these ideas if 
 
 '^ Intellectual Powers. Essay VI. Chap. V. 
 
 N N 
 
274 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 you will, and judge of their agreement in some 
 respects, their disagreement in others ; but, were 
 I to compare Gold with Silver, it would certainly 
 sound very strange to call them ideas. Assuredly 
 I must have an Idea or notion of Gold and of 
 Silver before I can compare them, but the Notions 
 are only employed as means to get at the know- 
 ledge of the Things ; whereas, in the case of Love 
 and Ambition, the idea and the thing are one. 
 Now, did Locke mean to include external things 
 under the name of ideas ? Surely he would have 
 allowed that we can judge of things external, as 
 well as of mental phenomena, but of the former 
 only through the latter. This was probably his 
 meaning, though it must be allowed that he has 
 expressed it very ambiguously. And that it was 
 his meaning appears from the concluding sentence 
 of his Chapter " Of Judgment," which is as follows ; 
 " And if it Cthe mind) unites or separates them, 
 as in reality Things are, it is right Judgment;" 
 and a little before, " This faculty of the mind, 
 when it is exercised immediately about Things, 
 is called Judgment^'' 
 
 26. In conclusion, we must remark that we 
 do not pretend to trace any very broad line of 
 
 '■ If the marginal references be by Locke, my view of his 
 doctrine will be confirmed ; for the reference here is as follows : 
 "Judgment is the presuming Things to be so, without perceiv- 
 " ing it." Essay Concerning Human Understandhig. Book IV. 
 Chap. XIV. 
 
OF Ji;i)UMFi\T. 275 
 
 distinction between Judgment and Reasoning, 
 The two faculties are intimately allied. Every 
 conclusion drawn by reasoning requires an act of 
 Judgment, and though there may be Judgment 
 without Reasoning, yet the only difference is, that 
 in the one case the Judgment depends upon some 
 previous proposition, or at least mental decision, 
 in the other not. This does not seem to argue 
 any very great difference in the mental faculty. 
 In many cases, where the intellectual decision 
 appears to be immediate, a very rapid process of 
 reasoning probably goes on, too rapid perhaps to 
 be the subject of reflection, but not the less real. 
 In other cases, however, we have no grounds to 
 believe in any such process, and here therefore 
 there is Judgment without Reasoning. This is 
 enough to distinguish the two. The one might 
 be called Simple^ the other Compound Judgment, 
 considering them as species of one Genus, But 
 we are told by Dugald Stewart that there are 
 cases where the decision may be attributed to 
 either, according to the statement." Thus when 
 we say that " things which are equal to the same 
 are equal to one another," we enunciate an axiom, 
 the belief in which seems to depend upon simple 
 Judgment ; but when we state that " A B is 
 equal to B C, and A C to B C, therefore A B 
 
 * Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind. Part II, 
 Chap. II. 
 
276 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 is equal to A C," we seem to arrive at the same 
 truth by means of Reasoning. In the one mode 
 of statement it appears as a primary truth, in the 
 other as a conclusion. Here, however, a distinc- 
 tion must be made. What we prove by the above 
 reasoning is not that things which are equal to 
 the same are equal to one another, but that A B 
 is equal to A C That is the exact conclusion 
 arrived at. Here are two quantities, represented 
 by A B and A C, related to each other, but how 
 we know not. As we cannot compare them 
 directly, we must try and find some common 
 medium or middle term with which they may be 
 compared respectively. This is B C, and since 
 both the original quantities are known to be equal 
 to B C, we conclude that they are equal to each 
 other. Here it is not the axiom which is proved, 
 but the axiom is involved in the proof of the con- 
 clusion that A B is equal to A C The axiom 
 is an essential element of the Reasoning, not a 
 major premiss, not a premiss at all, for the reason- 
 ing is perfect without any such premiss, but an 
 elementary Constituent or Principle of the Rea- 
 soning, making it what it is. That there 
 .ire several other Principles of Reasoning, we 
 shall see in the following chapter, meaning 
 by Principle an elementary constituent, for this 
 is one legitimate use of the word, just as Car- 
 bon, Oxygen, Hydrogen, Azote, are Principles 
 
0¥ JUDGMENT. 277 
 
 or Elements of all animal matter.'' These must 
 not be confounded with what we call the Princi- 
 ples of any Science, meaning the fundamental 
 propositions from which many less general con- 
 clusions may be deduced ; for the elementary 
 Principles are, one or other of them, essential to 
 all Reasoning, a part of its very nature. To sup- 
 pose then that the Axiom above quoted is proved 
 by the Reasoning adduced, is quite a mistake, 
 and even absurd, for it is self-evident, and there- 
 fore incapable of proof; but the axiom is involved 
 in the reasoning necessary to prove that A B is 
 equal to A C. 
 
 To sum up all in one sentence ; Judgment 
 discerns the agreement or disagreement of notions 
 or of things : Reasoning discerns the agreement or 
 disagreement between one simple Belief, or one 
 Judgment, and another. But the further con- 
 sideration of Reasoning must be left to the follow- 
 ing Chapter. 
 
 ** See the Author's " Tutrodiietion to JNIental Pbilosojihy." 
 Part I. Article Principle. 
 
278 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 OF SEASONING 
 
 SECTION FIRST. 
 
 OF REASONING IN GENERAL. 
 
 1. God, having given us a mind framed for 
 some original Articles of Belief, and for some In- 
 tuitive Judgments, has provided us afterwards 
 with two grand means for the discovery of truth, 
 and the advancement of knowledge, Observa- 
 tion, and Reasoning. Some truths are learnt 
 by observation alone, as particular facts submitted 
 to the senses ; others by reasoning alone, as the 
 truths of pure Mathematics ; others again, and by 
 far the greater number, by observation and rea- 
 soning together. All men know what is meant 
 by Observation. Suffice it then to remark, that 
 observation is of two kinds ; the one exercised 
 upon phenomena over which we have no control, 
 as observation on the weather, the other upon 
 changes which we ourselves have induced, as in 
 Chemistry, or in Mechanical Philosophy. The 
 former may be called natural, the latter artificial 
 observation, for it is exercised upon experiments. 
 The word Experience is nearly synonimous with 
 Observation, but in the latter more of intention 
 
or REASONING IN GENERAL. 279 
 
 is implied. Observation supposes a wish to learn, 
 while in simple Experience we learn without a 
 wish, without any conscious effort. At first we 
 learn from simple Experience, subsequently from 
 Observation. 
 
 2. Though all men know what observation is, 
 but few, comparatively, know how to observe to the 
 best advantage. Observation, simply, is of limited 
 use, for it is confined to particulars; it may cer- 
 tainly prevent us from falling into a pit, or sinking 
 into a quagmire, before our eyes, but unless some 
 inference be drawn from it, no science, no general 
 truth of any kind, can be established. Conse- 
 quently, Observation is useful chiefly as a ground 
 for inference ; and in common discourse, as well 
 as in many popular works, the two are so blended 
 that it does not readily appear where the one 
 ends, and the other begins. Observed facts, and 
 inferences from these, are continually confounded 
 by inaccurate speakers and writers. 
 
 3. Nor will this surprise us, when we reflect 
 that there are cases where even thinking men 
 might not agree upon what was observed fact and 
 what was inference. When I observe the clouds 
 rising heavily in the south-west, and foretell rain 
 ere long, I evidently draw an inference. Again, 
 when Robinson Crusoe saw what exactly resem- 
 bled the print of a naked man's foot on the sand, 
 he readily inferred that a man had passed that 
 way, so readily, indeed, that the inference was 
 
280 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 almost as an observed fact. But, when I put my 
 hand before the fire and say that the fire warms 
 it, is this an observed fact, or an inference ? An 
 observed fact most people would say, but strictly 
 speaking, not so ; for though the heat which I 
 feel is an observed fact, and the presence of the 
 fire* liliewise, yet the assertion that the one is the 
 cause of the other is an inference, irresistible no 
 doubt, and for all practical puposes as good as 
 observation, but metaphysically different. These 
 cases instruct us, 1, that observed facts and in- 
 ference are not always easily distinguished, and 
 2, that sometimes the inference is as firmly be- 
 lieved as the observed fact, and may be so without 
 any danger of error. 
 
 4. V/e might even refine upon this, and main- 
 tain that the very existence of the fire, and indeed 
 of all outward objects, commonly said to be ob- 
 served, is known to us only by inference, inference 
 from certain sensations, which irresistibly suggest 
 the notions of external objects, and the Belief in 
 their real existence independent of us. Thus 
 Observation, strictly so called, would be confined 
 to the phenomena of our own minds. Nor can 
 this be denied ; though for all practical purposes, 
 it would be necessary to distinguish between those 
 irresistible inferences drawn by all men, without 
 effort, without knowing what they are doing, and 
 such conclusions as they consciously deduce, and 
 distinguish from the premises. Whether the term 
 
OF KEASONING IN GENERAL. 231 
 
 Reasoning should be limited to the latter process, 
 we shall see presently. 
 
 From the foregoing two Corollaries may be de- 
 duced: — First, we see how erroneous are the 
 opinions of those Materialists, such as M. Comte, 
 who treat Psychology with contempt, except as a 
 branch of Physiology, and who plume themsefves 
 on their positice philosophy. In any philosophical 
 sense that can be given to the term jyositive, the 
 phenomena of Psychology are so peculiarly ; for 
 they are beyond all doubt, and they alone are 
 known to us immediately. All material pheno- 
 mena are known only by inference. Secondly, 
 we learn how limited is the sphere of Experience 
 proper, embracing only mental phenomena uncon- 
 nected with the world without, for all connection, 
 all relation, between mind and matter, and between 
 matter itself, is not experienced, but inferred. 
 Causation, for instance, at least in the material 
 world, is known only by inference ; and this, no 
 doubt, is the reason why M. Comte denies that 
 Causes are a proper object of Philosophy, and 
 maintains that we can know nothing but sequences 
 of phenomena ; forgetting that the uniformity of 
 these sequences in time to come, nay, the very 
 existence of the material subjects of these sequen- 
 ces, is known to us only by inference. It is only 
 by giving a wide and loose sense to the term, so as 
 to embrace a great deal of inference, that Experi- 
 ence can be made of the importance sometimes 
 o o 
 
282 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 assigned to it. Except in Psychology, experience 
 proper merely lays the foundation of our know- 
 ledge ; all above ground is Rational or at least 
 Intellectual development. 
 
 5. The nature of Reasoning, and its different 
 kinds, are not so generally understood as Obser- 
 vation. Though, as we shall afterwards find, there 
 are different sorts of reasoning, there must be 
 something common to all, or the name reasoning 
 would not have been given to the process in all 
 cases. Our first question then must be, what is 
 common to all reasoning ? 
 
 6. Wherever reasoning is expressed in words, 
 it is stated in propositions, in two at the very 
 least, and in propositions so connected that the 
 one establishes the other. And when we say two 
 propositions or more, we of course mean that there 
 really are two or more, different in some respects, 
 and not quite the same. The essence of an argu- 
 ment then is this, that it consists of two or more 
 differejH propositions, one or more of which serve 
 to establish the other. Now, in every argument 
 the proposition or propositions which serve to 
 establish the other are called the Premises, and 
 the Proposition established, or inferred as the 
 phrase is, is called the Conclusion. 
 
 Such is the logical account of Reasoning ex- 
 pressed in words, or an Argument. And to tran- 
 slate this into metaphysical language, we have 
 only to call to mind our definition of Proposition, 
 
OF REASONING IN GENERAL. 283 
 
 viz. : A verbal statement of Belief or of Disbelief 
 in any fact. According; to this, wherever our 
 Belief in any fact or facts compels us to believe 
 another fact different from the former, as a cause 
 brings about an effect, there is Reasoning, whether 
 stated in words and propositions or not. 
 
 7. From the above we see that Reasoning 
 may be viewed in two points of view, the Logical 
 and the Metaphysical. Speaking logically, we 
 say that one proposition follows or flows from 
 another, or that it is a consequent of one or 
 more other propositions ; but speaking Metaphy- 
 sically, we must say that our Belief in a certain 
 fact is an effect of some prior Relief. It would 
 be absurd to state that one proposition is the 
 Effect of another, and incorrect to affirm that our 
 Belief is the Consequent of a former Belief. Con- 
 sequence, indeed, we might say, but Consequence 
 would then be synonymous with Effect. One pro- 
 position cannot be the cause of another, it is only 
 the cause of our knowing it ; but one Belief is 
 properly the cause of another Belief. 
 
 8. This distinction, obvious though it be, is of 
 the greatest importance. It at once points out the 
 respective provinces of Metaph/sics and Logic, in 
 respect to Reasoning. To analyze the mental pro- 
 cess of Reasoning belongs properly to Metaphysics, 
 and not, as Archbishop AYhately supposes, to Logic ; 
 while to Logic, it peculiarly appertains to give 
 correct types or models of arguments, and rules for 
 
284 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 arguing soundly or conclusively. Metaphysics 
 take man as he is, and show how be commonly 
 reasons ; whereas Logic points out how he oii^ht to 
 avffiie, in order to arrive at sound conclusions. The 
 one is purely speculative, the other combines spe- 
 culation with practical application. In giving cor- 
 rect types or models of argument, Logic cannot 
 pretend that men always argue so, for in this 
 case there would be no use for Logic, but only 
 that they ought always so to argue, if they would 
 argue well. Metaphysics treat of arguments only 
 incidentally, the mental process being here the pro- 
 per subject; while Logic, on the contrary, touches 
 upon the reasoning process, only because arguments 
 necessarily suppose it. There may be reasoning 
 without argument, that is without words, but, of 
 course, there can be no argument without reasoning. 
 Logic, then, is a Science principally concerned about 
 types, models, or forms, whereby to test the validity 
 of all arguments, and, of course, of all reasoning that 
 can be reduced to arguments. We shall probably 
 find that much of that hopeless confusion, which 
 prevails in some works on Logic, arises from a want 
 of attention to the fundamental distinction here 
 laid down, the distinction between the respective 
 provinces of Metaphysics and Logic in regard to 
 Reasoning. 
 
 9. In illustration of the above general state- 
 ments, we may now bring forward some particular 
 examples of Reasoning. Suppose that there are 
 
OF REASONING IN GENERAL. 285 
 
 two walls, and that 1 wish to know their relative 
 height. As I cannot place one wall beside the 
 other, I must look out for some common medium of 
 comparison, and for this purpose I choose a measur- 
 ing line ; by applying which to both 1 find that 
 each is just twenty feet high. 1 instantly conclude 
 that the one wall is equal in height to the other. 
 Stated in propositions, the reasoning will come out 
 thus:— Let A be one wall, B the other, and C the 
 measuring line of twenty feet. 
 
 Then A is equal to C, 
 
 And B is equal to C, 
 
 Therefore A is equal to B. 
 Here the conclusion follows irresistibly from the 
 Premises, or the reason is demonstrative. The 
 Premises, moreover, consist of two propositions, 
 both of which are necessary to establish the con- 
 clusion. 
 
 10. Taking a case formerly stated, when Robin- 
 son Crusoe saw the marks of a naked foot on the 
 sand, or more strictly, what looked like the print 
 of a foot, he instantly concluded that a man had 
 passed that way. Drawn out into propositions, his 
 reasoning would appear thus: — 
 
 Here is a mark on the sand. 
 
 It is a mark very like a foot-mark. 
 
 It is so like that it must be such a mark. 
 
 Therefore a man must have passed by here. 
 
 'i his conclusion leaves no rational ground for 
 doubt; but the reasoning is not strictly demonstra- 
 
286 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 tive ; for it is just possible that something very like 
 a foot-in ark might have been otherwise made ; and 
 the third proposition, which is in fact a first infer- 
 ence, and not infallible, is necessary to establish the 
 conclusion finally arrived at. 
 
 11. Again, when I look to the South-west, and 
 see the clouds rising heavily, I conclude that we 
 shall have rain here long. Stated in propositions 
 my reasoning would be this : — 
 
 I see heavy clouds rising in the South-west ; 
 
 But 1 have formerly observed that similar clouds 
 rising in that quarter have been followed by rain. 
 
 Therefore, we shall soon have rain again. 
 
 In this case it is evident that the conclusion is by 
 no means certain, and that the reasoning is only pro- 
 bable. 
 
 12. \Yhile walking in my garden I hear a 
 sound. After a moment's observation and reflec- 
 tion, 1 conclude that it is the sound of a village 
 church bell about a mile and a half distant. How^ 
 do I arrive at this conclusion *? The mental process 
 may be thus stated in words : — 
 
 I hear a sound. 
 
 The sound is very like that of a church bell for- 
 merly ascertained. 
 
 Therefore it is the sound of a church bell. 
 
 Moreover the sound is low^. 
 
 And a low sound from a church bell must come 
 from a distance. 
 
 Therefore this church bell is distant 
 
OF REASONING IN GENERAL. 287 
 
 Again, I observe the clouds and see that they are 
 moving from the South-west. 
 
 But clouds are driven by the winds. 
 
 Therefore the wind is in the South-west. 
 
 Finally, wind brings sound. 
 
 And I know that there is a village church a mile 
 and a half off in a South-west direction. 
 
 Therefore the sound comes from that church. 
 
 All this, and perhaps more, passes through the 
 mind with the rapidity of thought, and the whole 
 embraces at least four arguments, one arising out of 
 the other. Here also it is evident that the conclu- 
 sion, though highly probable, is not quite certain. 
 
 13. Of the three cases of probable reasoning 
 now stated, by the first we arrive at the knowledge 
 of a past fact ; by the second, of a future event ; 
 and by the third, of a contemporaneous but distant 
 occurrence. Thus, the past, the future, and the 
 distant, all clearly beyond the sphere of observation, 
 become known to us by Reasoning. 
 
 14. When we consider the fouY examples of 
 reasoning given above, we find that what is ascer- 
 tained in the first case is a Relation of Equality, a 
 relation of equality betw^een the two walls repre- 
 sented by A and B ; while, in the other cases, a 
 Relation of Cause and Effect is inferred. Thus, in 
 the second example, we infer that a certain mark 
 on the sand was the effect of a human foot ; in the 
 third, that certain clouds in a certain direction will 
 soon cause rain ; in the fourth, that a certain sound 
 
288 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 is the effect of the movement of a churcli bell. 
 Moreover, in the last example I also infer that the 
 church bell is so far distant from me, relation of 
 Quantity ; likewise that the church is to the South- 
 west, relation of Position. Thus in every one of 
 these inferences some Relation is established. 
 
 15. Relations, from which Reasoning proceeds, 
 or which it establishes, are various ; but they may 
 all be classed under three heads : — ■■ 
 
 I. Relations of Co-existence ; 
 
 II. Relations of Succession ; 
 
 according as they do not, or do, involve the notion 
 of time ; and 
 
 III. Relations of Resemblance, which may or 
 may not involve the notion of time. 
 
 The Relations of Co-existence are numerous, 
 such as 
 
 1. Relations of Position. 
 
 2. Relations of Comprehension, or of a whole to 
 its parts. 
 
 3. Relations of Quantity, or more, equal, less, 
 which may be called ea^act Relations, in contradis- 
 tinction to 
 
 4. Relations of Quality or of indeterminate 
 Degree. 
 
 Relations of Succession, on the other hand, are 
 either of Invariable Succession or of Casual Suc- 
 cession. 
 
 These distinctions will be useful to us in deter- 
 
or REASONING IN GENERAL. 289 
 
 mining the di(Terent kinds of Reasoning ; but, in 
 the mean time, they are sufficient to show how vast 
 is the field which it embraces. 
 
 Moreover, as we have seen, there are certain 
 propositions in which no relation is expressed, 
 namely, those which state Identity and simple Ex- 
 istence ; and since these propositions may be estab- 
 lished by argument, therefore, we cannot say uni- 
 versally that reasoning is employed in establishing 
 the relations of things. Accordingly, in Par. 6 and 7, 
 where reasoning is defined, no mention is made 
 of llelation. To establish relation may be the ge- 
 neral office of reasoning, but, strictly speaking, it is 
 not the only office. 
 
 SECTION SECOND. 
 
 ON DIFFERENT KINDS OF REASONING. 
 
 I. OF DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 
 
 1. Having seen what is common to all Reason- 
 ing or to Reasoning in general, we have next to 
 consider whether there be not Reasonings so differ- 
 ing from each other as to constitute distinct sorts or 
 kinds. That there are such, men are generally 
 agreed ; and the common use of language is a proof 
 of this agreement ; for Ihey would not talk of de- 
 moiistrative, probable, inductive, deductive, a priori 
 p P 
 
290 PEINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 and aposteriori reasoning, unless they supposed that 
 the genus Reasoning admitted of specific differences. 
 
 2. The first grand division of Reasonings is 
 that into the Demonstrative and the Probable, 
 the inference in the former following irresistibly 
 from the Premises, in the latter, not. In demon- 
 strative reasoning, if we admit the Premises, we 
 must also admit the conclusion ; for otherwise we 
 do violence to our Intuitive Judgment ; whereas, in 
 probable reasoning, we may allow the Premises and 
 yet reject the coiiclusion; certainly not in all cases 
 without shocking common sense, but, at least, 
 without denying a self-evident Judgment. In pro- 
 bable reasoning we may disallow the conclusion, 
 and yet allow the Premises ; but, in demonstrative 
 reasoning, if we deny the conclusion we must also 
 deny the Premises, that is, we must contradict that 
 from which we set out as granted. And this neces- 
 sity of denying the Premises is a proof that the 
 inference therefrom was infallibly drawn. The dis- 
 tinction then between Demonstrative and Probable 
 reasoning is clear and definite. 
 
 3. But Demonstrative reasoning itself admits 
 of subdivision, according as the subject or matter of 
 which it treats is necessary or contingent. In the 
 former case the conclusion not only follows irresist- 
 ibly from the premises, but it is infallibly true ; 
 W'hereas, in the latter, though the inference be 
 irresistible, yet the conclusion may be false, for the 
 premises may be false. Ihus, strictly speaking, it 
 
 
OF DEMONSTRATIVE EEASONING. 291 
 
 is not the reasoning that differs, but the certainty 
 of the fact inferred. Still, this difference is impor- 
 tant, and thereupon we found the distinction be- 
 tween Necessarj/ and Contingent Demonstrative 
 Reasoning. 
 
 4. Necessary Demonstrative reasoning is strictly 
 a priori, that is, independent of experience ; while 
 all other reasoning is strictly a jjosteriori, or depend- 
 ent upon experience, either immediately or remotely. 
 Kecessary reasoning is confined to Mathematics, or 
 the Science of Quantity ; and, contrary to what is 
 often thought, is not founded on general principles 
 or axioms, but on self-evident particular truths. 
 The evidence of the propositions of Euclid does not 
 rest upon the axioms placed at the beginning of the 
 work, but upon the particular instances of those 
 axioms which occur in any proposition. Thus, 
 when in the first proposition we show that, in the 
 triangle ABC, the side A B is equal to the side B C, 
 
 B c 
 
 and the side AC to B C, we conclude at once, 
 without the intervention of any general axiom, that 
 the side A B is equal to the side A C. The general 
 axiom, " things which are equal to the same are 
 equal to one another," cannot make the conclusion 
 one whit more evident than it was before. We see 
 
292 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 at once from the particular data that such must be 
 the conclusion, or, if we do not, no general axiom 
 can convince us. The truth then of the propositions 
 of Euclid does not rest upon the axioms, nor were 
 they first demonstrated from these. The axioms 
 are placed there pro forma, and give a more scienti- 
 fic air to the whole, but they are not indispensable. 
 They are neat and convenient, as expressing in a 
 general form all that we are obliged to admit in 
 particular cases throughout the work that follows ; 
 and nothing more. 
 
 5. As particulars must be known before we can 
 generalize, so particular instances of the truth, that 
 " Things which are equal to the same are equal to 
 one another," must have been noticed, before we 
 could state it in the form of an universal axiom. 
 Not that the axiom is proved by an induction of 
 particulars, as some affirm, but only that particulars 
 were necessary to allow us to comprehend the gene- 
 ral proposition. As soon as comprehended, its 
 truth is self-evident. Still less, (if in such a matter 
 degree were possible) is the general proposition 
 required to prove the particular instances. In like 
 manner, having proved any proposition of Euclid in 
 a particular case, the mind instantly generalizes the 
 truth, for it sees that what has been proved in the 
 instance before it must hold good in all other in- 
 stances where the data are exactly similar. 
 
 6. I am well aware that a very high authority 
 in Logic maintains that we cannot draw the simplest 
 
or DEMOXSTRATIYE EEASONIXG. 293 
 
 inference in Mathematics without the use of an 
 universal principle ; and that even the reasoning 
 A B is equal to B C, and A C to B C, therefore A B 
 is equal to A C is elliptical. . Stated in full we are 
 told that reasoning would be as follows: — 
 
 What are equal to the same are equal to each 
 other ; 
 
 A B and AC are equal to the same (B C) ; 
 Therefore A B and A C are equal to each other. 
 
 How is this question to he determined *? First, by 
 an appeal to Consciousness, the supreme tribunal in 
 Metaphysics. To consciousness, then, we do appeal, 
 and we maintain that the reasoning A B is equal to 
 B C, and A C to B C, therefore A B is equal to A C, 
 is not elliptical ; that nothing is wanting to the 
 evidence of the conclusion, that the mind discerns 
 that conclusion as resulting from the premises, at 
 once, and irresistibly. But, secondly, with all due 
 respect to the above authority, the statement given 
 as the full one appears to me to err both by redun- 
 dancy and deficiency. It errs by deficiency, for the 
 second proposition is a compound one, embracing 
 two simple propositions, being equivalent to 
 A B is equal to B C, and 
 A C is equal to B C ; 
 consequently, the statement in full will be as fol- 
 lows : — 
 
 What are equal to the same are equal to each 
 other ; 
 
294 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 A B is equal to B C, 
 and A C is equal to the same B C ; 
 therefore A B and A C are equal to each other. 
 
 Here we have a syllogism of four propositions, 
 and therefore informal^ on the principles of the 
 School logicians themselves, for no proper syllo- 
 gism should have more than three propositions. 
 One therefore must be redundant, and it is easy to 
 see that the first is, for take it away, and the proof 
 is still perfect. Does any one deny the validity of 
 the reasoning without the universal proposition, and 
 ask for more proof? We have no more to offer, for 
 we cannot give a demonstration of a demonstration ; 
 and that it is a demonstration we confidently appeal 
 to the consciousness of any man of common under- 
 standing. As for what is called the full statement, 
 we deny that it is one whit more satisfactory than 
 the other, or that it is the natural mode of reasoning. 
 It is an artificial mode, invented to prop up a theory, 
 by reducing mathematical reasoning, apparently, to 
 the syllogistic form, and only appai:fntly, for after 
 all, the syllogism is redundant. 
 
 7. We must not confound Analysis with Gene- 
 ralization. The reasoning AB is equal toB C, and 
 A C to B C, therefore A B is equal to A C, seems to 
 admit of no further analysis, it is complete in all its 
 parts, all is expressed ; but when we come to 
 compare this with other examples of reasoning, we 
 find that there is a striking similarity between 
 them, which similarity, or point of agreement, may 
 
OF DEMON STRA.TIVE REASONING. 295 
 
 be stated as a general principle, and formalized in 
 words, thus, " things which are equal to the same 
 are equal to one another." This general principle, 
 then, is said to pervade all such specimens of rea- 
 soning ; that is, each is a particular instance there- 
 of. But we must not therefore suppose that each is 
 proved from the general principle. On the contrary, 
 but for the particular instances, the general propo- 
 sition would never have been thought of. It comes 
 after the particular proofs, by a process of genera- 
 lization, forming an axiom convenient for the pur- 
 pose of communicating knowledge, and satisfac- 
 tory to the mind of the learner, as showing at a 
 glance all that he is called upon to take for grant- 
 ed in the ensuing demonstrations ; but it cannot 
 be necessary to a proof which is evident without 
 it, and which actually was established without it ; 
 for few will maintain that the geometrical discoverer 
 began by laying down axioms. 
 
 8. Taking the above as a specimen of demon- 
 strative necessary reasoning in general, and it 
 may be so taken without any danger of error, we 
 see that at least two previous propositions are 
 required to establish any mathematical conclusion. 
 First, we have A B equal to B C, then A C equal 
 to B C, and lastly, A B equal to A C. B C may be 
 called the middle term, or medium of comparison 
 between AB and AC. No doubt, we might so 
 state the argument as to give it the appearance 
 of two propositions only. Thus we might say 
 
296 PEIXCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 that A B and A C are each equal to B C, therefore 
 A B and A C are equal to each other. But, in 
 this statement, it is clear that the first proposition 
 is a compound one, one only in form, two in sense, 
 being equivalent to A B is equal to B C, and A C 
 is equal to B C. Consequently, the two above 
 propositions are equivalent to three. 
 
 9. All the reasonings of pure Mathematics are 
 Demonstrative, and the conclusions arrived at are 
 certain and eternal, or, in other words, independent 
 of time ; for, first, they start from self-evident and 
 necessary truths, and the mind sees that they are 
 and always must be so ; secondly, the names em- 
 ployed are names of universals, which exist not as 
 real matter of fact ; thirdly, these universals be- 
 long to quantity alone, and so admit of an exact 
 definition, or, in other words, they can be accu- 
 rately distinguished one from another ; and lastly, 
 the deductions from these self-evident necessary 
 truths, and these definitions, are seen at each step 
 to be also irresistible, and unchangeable even by 
 OmniDotence. Since each step in the deduction 
 is self-evident and necessary, as well as the first 
 position, the conclusion must be true. 
 
 10. But, do the Relations of Quantity, or of 
 Equality and Inequality, alone admit of Demon- 
 stration ■? Certainly thev alone admit of a long 
 chain of demonstration ; though we shall see, 
 under the head of Contingent Reasoning, that a 
 single demonstrative argument or two mav be 
 
OF DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING 297 
 
 formed about other relations. And why do the 
 relations of Quantity peculiarly admit of demon- 
 stration ? Because the modes or modifications of 
 Quantity alone can be accurately distinguished. 
 One is as distinct from two as from two thousand. 
 This is the case with no other modes. Other 
 modes admit of indefinite graduation, not so those 
 of Quantity. These do not shade off one into 
 another. It is on account of this indefinite gradu- 
 ation that other relations are very little susceptible 
 of demonstration. Take for example moral Rela- 
 tions. With the exception of Justice, which is 
 more definite, one Virtue passes by insensible de- 
 grees into its kindred Vice, and one Vice into its 
 kindred Virtue, as thrift into parsimony, parsi- 
 mony into thrift ; and all we can say is, that 
 Virtue lies somewhere between the two extremes, 
 prodigality and niggardliness. This of course is 
 very vague, very unlike demonstration. And had 
 Law been a demonstrative science, we should not 
 have had so many volumes written to determine 
 in particular cases what is Justice. We may 
 therefore safely conclude that the opinion of 
 Locke, that morality admits of demonstration, is 
 erroneous. Quantity is the proper subject of 
 demonstration, Quality of probable reasoning: 
 and morals treat of Quality.*' 
 
 11. The range of certainty is very limited, 
 
 ' See the Author's " Introduction to Menial Philosophy." Part 
 I. Article, Quantity. 
 
 Q Q 
 
298 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 comprising only the pure Mathematics ; for even 
 Mechanical Philosophy, which uses demonstrative 
 reasoning, is based upon experience, and therefore 
 it may err ; though, granting certain principles, 
 such as the Laws of Motion, the conclusions de- 
 duced from these are infallibly true. That is to 
 say, they are infallibly true, granting those prin- 
 ciples, and supposing that no others come into 
 play ; for it often happens that the conclusions of 
 the Mechanical Philosopher are wrong in reality, 
 because there are in nature other principles which 
 he has not taken into account. Even the pure 
 Mathematician sometimes arrives at absurd con- 
 conclusions, absurd in material nature, though 
 true in the world of Universals, for they follow 
 irresistibly from his data, i.e., from self-evident 
 necessary truths, and from his own definitions, 
 which correspond not exactly with anything really 
 existing. Such a conclusion is that of the Asymp- 
 tote, or a straight line which, though continually 
 approaching, can never meet a certain curve. The 
 same may be said of the infinite divisibility of 
 matter. It is proved mathematically, but it is 
 physically impossible.*^ 
 
 ^ If even perfect Ratiocination, such as the Mathematical, may 
 lead to conclusions absurd in material nature, surely the best pos- 
 sible Ratiocination on other subjects may also lead to absurdities. 
 Some German philosophers of the present day, men of much 
 thought, have reasoned themselves into Pantheism ! It is the 
 business of Experience to correct the errors of pure Reasoning. 
 
OF DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 299 
 
 12. Dugald Stewart has shown very well that 
 Mathematical conclusions are not deduced from 
 the axioms; but he maintains that they are 
 founded on the definitions alone, which he calls 
 the First Principles of the Science. To give the 
 name of Principle to a Definition is certainly un- 
 usual, and can only be justified on the ground 
 that the definition is a Fundamental Proposition 
 on which the Science is built, and such is the 
 opinion of Stewart But this cannot be accepted 
 as a correct metaphysical view of the subject. 
 The definition is only the means of acquiring ac- 
 curate Conceptions, and did we possess such con- 
 ceptions without definition we should be as well 
 ofi^. The accurate conception is the thing we 
 want ; to this the definition is only subservient. 
 To make Mathematical truth dependent on defi- 
 nition is to make it dependent on a form of 
 words, not on clearness of conception, it is to take 
 the form for the substance. But Reasoning cannot 
 proceed from Conceptions alone, but from these 
 together with some intuitive Judgments concern- 
 ing them. The latter, as we have remarked, 
 are Judgments concerning self-evident parti- 
 cular truths, which the mind instantly gene- 
 ralizes, and applies to all cases exactly simi- 
 lar. Accurate Conceptions, then, and Intuitive 
 
 Bacon has admirably pointed out the dangers of Rationalism, as 
 well as of Empiricism. Novam Organum. Lib. I. Aph. LXII. 
 LXIII. LXIV. 
 
300 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 Judgments about Self-evident truths, are the real 
 foundation of all mathematical reasoning. This 
 accuracy, again, and this self-evidence, depend 
 upon the nature of Quantity, which alone admits 
 of exact modifications and relations. Those self- 
 evident truths, when generalized and stated in 
 words, become Axioms. 
 
 13. Closely connected with the opinion that 
 the Mathematical theorems depend entirely on 
 the definitions, is the doctrine that Mathematical 
 Truth is only hypothetical; though the reasoning 
 be infallible, that the conclusions are Only logi- 
 cally correct, not really true. Suppose it granted 
 that no perfect lines, triangles, circles, etc., 
 such as Mathematics contemplate, exist in 
 matter. What then ^ does Mathematics ever 
 assert this"? does it pretend to be a Physical 
 Science? By no means. It is the science of 
 Quantity, of Space, Time, and Number, and these 
 are independent of all matter. We must not seek 
 in one science what belongs to another ; we must 
 no more look for the properties of matter in pure 
 Mathematics than for the laws of matter in those 
 of Mind. But our conceptions of mathematical 
 lines, triangles, etc., are perfectly clear and dis- 
 tinct, genuine creations of abstraction, not arbi- 
 trary mental inventions, not the creatures of ima- 
 gination, as clearly apprehended as space and time 
 themselves. Is it not then an abuse of words to 
 say that truths founded on such notions are by- 
 
OF DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 301 
 
 pothetical, and does not such language convey an 
 impression utterly erroneous^ If mathematical 
 lines, triangles, and circles, be hypothetical, so is 
 space itself; for those are only the modes thereof. 
 Moreover, though perfect mathematical figures 
 may no where exist in matter, yet we can approxi- 
 mate to perfection ; and thus the ideal truths of 
 Mathematics become with slight correction appli- 
 cable to the material universe. This again proves 
 how little the truths of Mathematics deserve the 
 appellation of hypothetical. But the opinion is 
 agreeable to those who would trace all real know- 
 ledge to Sensation and Experience, and who de- 
 preciate all a priori decisions of the intellect ; 
 though Dugald Stewart is certainly not of that 
 number. 
 
 14. We must not materialize the Science of 
 Quantity any more than that of Mind. The for- 
 mer alone, of all human knowledge, comes up to 
 the Platonic notion of Science, being conversant 
 about the unchangeable relations of unchangeable 
 Ideas. To make matter the measure of the ac- 
 curacy of these Ideas, is to degrade the Science 
 of Quantity entirely, to confound it with mutable 
 Physics, to bring it down to the Earth. But to 
 represent mathematical truths as hypothetical is 
 still worse ; for in that case the Science would be 
 frivolous, a mere play of reasoning, a mighty intel- 
 lectual exercise, with an impotent conclusion. 
 Let the vast discoveries in Natural Philosophy 
 
302 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 and Astronomy, made by means of Mathematics, 
 tell whether her conclusions be hypothetical. 
 Other Sciences, while they show the strength of 
 the human intellect, also prove its weakness, for 
 disputes in them are endless ; but were we to look 
 to Mathematics alone, we should pronounce that 
 Intellect all-powerful. The column of Mathema- 
 tical truth is the noblest monument of human 
 intelligence, because it is at once vast and immov- 
 able. Metaphysical Science may be more inter- 
 esting, but it is like a ship tossed by the waves, 
 always in danger of shoals and rocks ; while 
 Mathematics stands as a martello tower, cold, 
 rigid, and imchangeable. 
 
 15. We have next to consider Demonstrative 
 Reasoning applied to Contingent matter. But 
 first it may be asked whether this be a possible 
 case. Does Contingent matter admit of demon- 
 stration ? That it does to a small extent at least, 
 a few examples will suffice to prove. 
 
 1. Taunton is further from London than Bris- 
 tol; and Exeter is further from London than 
 Taunton; much more then is Exeter furth er from 
 London than Bristol. 
 
 Here the reasoning is strictly demonstrative, 
 or the conclusion follows irresistibly from the 
 premises ; though the matter be contingent : for 
 the respective distances of Taunton and Bristol, 
 and of Exeter and Taunton, from London, on 
 which the inference is founded, are contingent 
 
OF DEMONSTRATRE HEASONING. 303 
 
 facts. Therefore, though the inference be irre- 
 sistible, the conclusion may not be true. Here 
 the relation established is one of relative distance 
 or quantity. Thus, relations of Quantity become 
 themselves contingent, when brought down to 
 matter of fact. Observe also that the form of 
 this Reasoning exactly corresponds with the Ma- 
 thematical, consisting of three propositions, and 
 that these three propositions are indispensable; 
 for, from the first proposition, a person totally un- 
 acquainted with the position of Exeter could infer 
 nothing; and, from the second proposition, one 
 unacquainted with the position of Bristol could 
 infer nothing ; both, therefore, are indispensable 
 to the conclusion, which is not comprehended 
 under either. 
 
 2. Again, A is the cause of B ; but B is the 
 cause of C; 
 
 Therefore^ A is the remote cause of C. 
 
 Here also the reasoning is demonstrative ; 
 though the matter be contingent, for it is relative 
 to Causation. 
 
 3. Or, taking less general examples, 
 Application depends upon the will ; but intel- 
 lectual advancement depends much upon applica- 
 tion ; 
 
 Therefore intellectual advancement depends 
 much upon the will. 
 
 4. Cost of production regulates supply and 
 demand ; but supply and demand regulate price ; 
 
304 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 Therefore cost of production is a remote cause 
 of price. 
 
 5. Romulus founded Rome; but Rome con- 
 quered great part of the world, and rose to an 
 unexampled pitch of power and grandeur ; 
 
 Therefore Romulus was an original cause of the 
 power and grandeur of Rome. 
 
 Here, also, the conclusion follows irresistibly 
 from the premises ; though it may be a question 
 whether Romulus ever founded Rome, or whether 
 he ever existed. 
 
 These examples seem sufficient to prove that 
 demonstrative reasoning may be applied to con- 
 tingent matter ; though we fully allow that, with 
 one important exception, it can go but a little way. 
 This exception exists in the case of relations of 
 Quantity in Contingent matter. The whole of 
 Natural Philosophy, embracing Mechanics, Hydro- 
 statics, Pneumatics, Optics, consists of demon- 
 strative reasoning tracing the relations of Quan- 
 tity in things contingent, in matter of fact, the 
 first laws of which are known by experience. The 
 same may be said of Physical Astronomy. Here, 
 then, Demonstrative reasoning applied to Contin- 
 gent matter has ample scope. 
 
 16. And why, with this exception, can demon- 
 strative reasoning go but a little way in contin- 
 gent matter ? The reason for this we have already 
 shown under the former head. The relations of 
 Contingent matter are of course various, and not 
 
OF DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 305 
 
 confined to Quantity, and therefore, as we have 
 seen, they are for the most part indefinite relations ; 
 their differences are not accurately distinguished ; 
 and consequently they do not admit of demon- 
 stration. There is also another reason. All 
 matters of fact, every thing contingent is liable 
 to be influenced by many causes and circum- 
 stances (which are auxiliary causes) ; and to de- 
 termine the exact efficacy of each is often im- 
 possible. We may affirm with certainty that one 
 thing is a cause of another ; but we can rarely 
 pronounce it to be the only cause. Thus, to take 
 one of the examples above given, we may be 
 sure because Application depends upon the Will, 
 and Intellectual advancement depends upon Ap- 
 plication, that, therefore. Intellectual Advance- 
 ment depends in part upon the Will ; but it would 
 be an incorrect inference, as well as a false con- 
 clusion, to say that it depended entirely upon the 
 Will ; for it is not assumed that Intellectual ad- 
 vancement depends wholly upon Application ; and, 
 were it assumed, it would be false, and therefore 
 the conclusion drawn from it also false. In general, 
 if A be a cause of B, and B a cause of C, we may 
 safely conclude that A is a remote cause of C, but 
 not the only cause. Some cause generally re- 
 mains which we cannot calculate, and which 
 nullifies our boasted demonstration. It is apt to 
 be so even in relations of Quantity, where matter 
 of fact is concerned. Calculations unerring, so 
 
 R R 
 
306 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 far as the data are concerned, are found de- 
 ceptive in practice, because other causes ha\'e 
 not been taken into account, causes more hidden, 
 more variable, such as friction, the resistance of 
 the atmosphere, its varying temperature, weight, 
 dryness, and moisture. Here hes the danger of 
 pure ratiocination. A chain of reasoning, in 
 which it would be difficult to detect a flaw, some- 
 times leads to absurd conclusions, because more 
 has unwarily been assumed than it was fair to 
 assume, or something has been omitted which 
 ought to have been taken into account. The only 
 remedy for these errors is Experience. 
 
 17. AH the examples hitherto given of de- 
 monstrative reasoning consist, as we have seen, of 
 three distinct propositions, the conclusion being 
 established by means of an intermediate proposi- 
 tion, and a middle term, whereby the Subject and 
 the Predicate of the conclusion are compared or 
 measured. Thus in the reasoning, A B is equal 
 to B C, and B C to A C, therefore A B is equal to 
 A C, B C is the middle term, which is compared 
 first with A B, and then with A C; and being 
 pronounced equal to each, we conclude that A B 
 and A C must be equal to each other. Here then 
 the inference is mediate. Moreover, though the 
 conclusion follows irresistibly from the premises, 
 yet it is really different from either premiss ; it is 
 really a new truth, and consequently the whole 
 agrees with our definition of reasoning in general, 
 
OF DEMOMSTEATIVE KEASONIKG. 307 
 
 as given in the opening of this chapter. But 
 there are other demonstrative inferences, or at 
 least commonly so called, which are drawn at 
 once from a prior proposition without any propo- 
 sition intervening. These are immediate infer- 
 ences. Let us now examine them. 
 
 18. These immediate inferences are of two 
 sorts. They are either instances of mere con- 
 version of propositions, or they are not. Let us 
 first examine the latter. And as I shall attempt 
 to show that some, at least, if not all, of these ap- 
 parent cases of immediate inference are not real 
 cases, I prefer taking instances brought forward 
 by another, namely, Mr. Bailey, author of that ex- 
 cellent work, " The Theory of Reasoning." 
 
 1. The lines A and B are severally equal 
 to C. 
 
 Therefore A and B are equal to each other. 
 
 I have already shown that in this case the two 
 propositions are equivalent to three, the first pro- 
 position being a compound one, and readily ana- 
 lyzed into A is equal to C, and 
 
 B is equal to C, 
 from which w^e conclude that A and B are equal 
 to each other. Consequently, in this case, the in- 
 ference is not immediate but mediate, 
 
 2. The three angles of every triangle are to- 
 gether equal to two right angles : 
 
 Therefore the three angles of the triangle ABC 
 are equal to two right angles. 
 
308 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 In this case the last proposition really compre- 
 hends two, which are, 
 
 This figure A B C is a triangle : . 
 
 Therefore its three angles are equal to two 
 right angles. In the compound proposition it is 
 clearly taken for granted that the figure A B C is 
 a triangle, and if taken for granted it may as well 
 be stated. Here therefore again, the inference is 
 not really immediate, but mediate. 
 
 3. The culprit at the bar was in Edinburgh 
 at one o'clock on the day named : 
 
 Therefore he could not be guilty of the offence 
 committed at that time in London. 
 
 In this case a knowledge of geography is sup- 
 posed, and without this knowledge no certain in- 
 ference can be drawn. We are supposed to know 
 that Edinburgh is about four hundred miles from 
 London, and not a suburb or part of London, like 
 Westminster and Southwark, as it might be. 
 Consequently, to supply what is tacitly assumed, 
 we must interpose the following proposition be- 
 tween the two above given : 
 
 But Edinburgh is about four hundred miles 
 from London ; when the inference becomes me- 
 diate. 
 
 4. The portrait resembles two different per- 
 sons ; 
 
 Therefore they must resemble each other. 
 Here again the first proposition is a compound 
 one, and easily analyzed. Calling the portrait A, 
 
OF DEMOXSTRATIYE KEASONING. 309 
 
 and the two persons B and C, then we have the 
 argument in full thus, 
 A resembles B ; 
 but A resembles C ; 
 therefore B and C resemble each other. 
 
 5. The traveller had no money with him ; 
 
 Therefore he could not be robbed of a large 
 sum. 
 
 This inference, if it be so called, is no doubt im- 
 mediate, but at the same time insignificant, giving 
 us no additional information ; and therefore, ac- 
 cording to the definition laid down at the opening 
 of this chapter, not a legitimate case of Reasoning. 
 We might multiply instances of this sort without 
 end. Philip was the father of Alexander, therefore 
 Alexander w^as the son of Philip. John is brother 
 to Sarah, therefore Sarah is sister to John. "Who 
 would call this reasoning "? Reasoning may be de- 
 monstrative, or only probable ; it may be sound or 
 unsound, conclusive or inconclusive, good or bad ; 
 but it cannot be insignificant, a mere play upon 
 words. The proper epithet for this mental amuse- 
 ment is trifling. A mere change of form does 
 not of necessity give any new truth, and unless 
 there be some new truth, something not really the 
 same as any one premiss, there is no reasoning, in 
 our sense of the word. Hitherto, then, we have not 
 been able to find any legitimate instance of demon- 
 strative reasoning consisting of less than three pro- 
 positions, expressed or understood. Let us now 
 
310 PRINCIPLES OE PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 examine the other sort of immediate inferences, ob- 
 tained by the conversion of Propositions. 
 
 19. Logicians inform us that propositions may 
 be illatively converted in three ways; Simply; hy 
 limitation or per accidens ; and by negation or con- 
 tra-position. Let us give examples of each taken 
 from Archbishop Whately and others. 
 \. No virtuous man is a rebel, 
 therefore no rebel is a virtuous man. 
 Ko Christian is an astronomer, 
 therefore no astronomer is a Christian, 
 
 2. All birds are animals. 
 Therefore some animals are birds. 
 All men are mortals ; 
 Tlierefore some mortals are men. 
 
 3. Every poet is a man of genius ; 
 Therefore he who is not a man of genius is 
 not a poet. 
 
 All good rulers are just ; 
 
 Therefore no unjust rulers can be good, or every 
 unjust ruler is not good. 
 
 In the first case the Quantity and the Quality 
 of the proposition when converted remain the same 
 as before ; in the second, the Quantity^ in the third, 
 the Quality, is changed ; but in all the inference 
 is immediate and irresistible. The only question is, 
 are these specimens of reasoning % To this we 
 have only to ansvv^er, is any new truth contained in 
 the converted proposition, any truth really different 
 from that conveyed by the proposition previous to 
 
OF DEMONSTRATIVE EEASONING. 311 
 
 conversion"? There is certainly a difTerence of 
 jorm^ but difTerence of form alone is, as before ob- 
 served, a mere play upon words, and unworthy of 
 the name of reasoning, which professes to teach us 
 something really new. I cannot therefore look 
 upon these as instances of reasoning properly so 
 called. Upon the whole, then, we have been un- 
 able to find any example of demonstrative reasoning 
 consisting of less than three propositions, any speci- 
 men of immediate demonstrative inference agreeing 
 with our definition of reasoning, and therefore enti- 
 tled to the name.*" 
 
 Should we adopt the thorough Quantification of 
 the Predicate proposed by Sir William Hamilton, 
 then the conversion by limitation or per accidens 
 would disappear ; for, instead of " All birds are ani- 
 mals," we should have " All birds are some ani- 
 mals," which is the true meaning ; and by simple 
 conversion, '' Some animals are all birds." So, 
 "All men are mortals" would become " All men 
 are some mortals ;" and again by simple conversion, 
 
 " Archbishop Whately and Mr. Mill are both of opinion that 
 conversion, though illative, is not reasoning. " The reader must 
 not suppose from the use of the word ' illative,' that this conversion 
 is a process oi reasoning ) it is in fact only stating the same Judg- 
 ment in another lorm.'' — Elements of Logic. Book II. Chap. II. 
 Sect. 4. Note. Mr. Mill also denies that illative conversion is 
 reasoning, because " there is in the conclusion no new truth, no- 
 thing but what was already in the premises, and obvious to whoever 
 apprehended them."— System of Logic. Rook II. Chap. I. 
 
312 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 "Some mortals are all men." In this way the very 
 semblance of reasoning disappears. 
 
 20. Under the head of Demonstrative Reasoning 
 applied to Contingent matter, Ave are naturally 
 brought to consider, in the last place, that famous 
 sj)ecies, or that t^pe of reasoning, which has exer- 
 cised the wits of so many generations of logicians, 
 from the age of Aristotle downwards ; and which, 
 even in the present day, is upheld as of paramount 
 importance by some of the ablest of men. In the 
 whole history of Philosophy there is not a more re- 
 markable fact than this ; that thinking men are 
 not yet agreed as to the real value of the Syllo- 
 gism. 
 
 21. Since the days of Bacon, however, the em- 
 pire of Aristotle has gradually been going to decay, 
 and faith in the all-sufficiency of the Syllogism has 
 more and more been shaken. Bacon hmiself, in 
 his Novutn Organum^ frequently decries the Syllo- 
 gism ;^ Pascal depreciates it f Descartes shows 
 its uselessness for discovery ; and Locke, with 
 some succeeding philosophers, particularly Thomas 
 Brown, s.cofifs at it altogether. 
 
 ' See Xoviim Organum in Distributione operis, and Aph. XI. 
 XII. XIII. XIV. and LXIII. where Aristotle is blamed for cor- 
 rupting Pli\ sics by his Dialectics. See also De Augmentis Scientia- 
 rmn. Lib. V. Cap. II. 
 
 s See Pascal " De I'esprit G^ometrique," and " De I'art de 
 persuader," contained in the best edition of the " Pens^es de Pas- 
 cal," by Prosper — Faug^re, Paris, 1844. 
 
OF DEMONSTR.VTIVE REASONING. 313 
 
 22. But in our clays an attempt has been made 
 to restore the logic as well as the religion of the 
 middle ages, and the same University which nursed 
 a Newman has produced a Whately.** Ihe latter 
 has written a work chiefly to prove that the Logic 
 of Aristotle is the only Logic, and Syllogism the 
 only reasoning ; that in fact the syllogism is not a 
 particular kind of reasoning, but the /on« to which 
 all sound reasoning may be reduced, by whatever 
 name it be called. "A Syllogism," says he, " is no 
 distinct kind of argument, otherwise than in form, 
 but is, in fact, any argument whatever, stated regu- 
 larly and at full length."' Thus, according to that 
 celebrated Archbishop and Philosopher, there are 
 no different sorts of reasoning, but all reasonings 
 are alike, whether demonstrative or probable, a 
 priori or a jjosteriori, Inductive or Deductive, all 
 are exactly similar; and all, if stated regularly and 
 at full length, are syllogistical. This Dr. AYhately 
 assumes, without any attempt to prove that Mathe- 
 matical reasoning is syllogistical, or can be reduced 
 to syllogisms. He says that it can, but he gives 
 no proof. That Inductive reasoning is syllo- 
 
 •^ It is worthy of remark that Dr. Whately, in the Preface to 
 his *' Elements of Logic," acknowledges that the Rev. J , Newman 
 *' actually composed a considerable j)ortion of the work as it now 
 " stands, from manuscripts not designed for publication," and that 
 " he is the original author of several pages." 
 
 ' " Elements of Logic." Book IV. Chap, II. Sect. I. 
 S S 
 
314 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 gistical, he does indeed attempt, but in my opinion 
 utterly fails, to prove. 
 
 23. No doubt there must be something common 
 to all reasoning, or the same name reasoning would 
 not have been given to the process in all cases ; but 
 had there been no differences, neither would there 
 have been any specific names, such as demonstrative, 
 probable, inductive, deductive, etc. What is common 
 to all reasoning, what it is which makes reasoning a 
 genus, we have seen in the opening of this chapter ; 
 and that account we must bear in mind during the 
 following discussion. Wherein consist the differ- 
 ences which mark out several species of reasoning, 
 we have also seen in part, and we shall see in full 
 hereafter ; and if these differences be real, especially 
 the grand difference between demonstration and 
 probability, then it will follow, contrary to the opin- 
 ion of Dr. Whately, that all reasoning is not speci- 
 fically the same. Consequently, unless the word 
 Syllogism 7nean nothing more than a sound argu- 
 ment in general, stated in full, unless it be merely 
 a generic word, then all sound reasoning, stated 
 explicitly, cannot be syllogistical. 
 
 24. But in order to know what the word Syllo- 
 gism really does mean, we must refer to the defini- 
 tions which have been given of it, the examples 
 brought forward in illustration, and the general 
 principle said to pervade all syllogisms. When we 
 know what a syllogism really is, then, and not till 
 then, can we determine whether it include all rea- 
 soning, or any. 
 
 # 
 
OF DEMONSTEATIVE REASONING. 315 
 
 25. Let us first take Aristotle's own definition 
 of the Syllogism, ■which is as follows ; '' A syllogism 
 is a speech, in which certain propositions being 
 stated and granted, some other proposition, different 
 from these, follows of necessity ; and this solely in 
 virtue of the propositions stated."" And this defini- 
 tion is thus explained by Alexander, one of Aristo- 
 tle's commentators. " But when Aristotle says, 
 follows of necessiti/, this does not mean that the con- 
 clusion, as a proposition in itself, should necessarily 
 be true, for this is the case only in syllogisms of 
 necessary matter ; but, that the conclusion^ he its 
 matter what it may, actual^ contingent^ or necessary, 
 must folloiv of necessity from the premises"^ 
 
 26. Reid's definition of syllogism, as completed 
 by Sir William Hamilton, varies a little from the 
 foregoing, but is perfectly consistent with it. " A 
 syllogism," says he, " is an argument or reasoning 
 consisting (always explicitly or implicitly) of three 
 propositions, the last of which, called the Conclu- 
 sion, is (necessarily) inferred from the (very state- 
 ment of the) two preceding, which are called the 
 Premises." The only difference of importance be- 
 tween this definition and the other is, that here Syl- 
 logism is made a species of the genus argument or 
 reasoning ; while, according to Aristotle, it is a 
 
 '' Prior Analytics, Book I, Cbap. I. 
 
 * See " A brief account of Aristotle's Logic," in Sir William 
 Hamilton's edition of Reid's works : Chap IV. Sect. V. Note. 
 
316 PHINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 species of the higher genus speech. Thus, by the 
 definition of Reid, the Syllogism is only a kind or 
 species of reasoning, while, by the definition of 
 Aristotle, it might be supposed equivalent to rea- 
 soning in general. 
 
 27. The first observation to be made on these 
 difinitious is, that they evidently apply to demon- 
 strative reasoning, and to it alone ; for in it assu- 
 redly, and in none other, does the conclusion follow 
 of necessity, or, in other words, is necessarily in- 
 ferred, from the premises. As definitions, then, of 
 Demonstrative reasoning, they are unexceptionable ; 
 but, for this very reason they cannot apply to all 
 reasoning; for we well know that by far the greater 
 part of our reasonings are probable only, not demon- 
 strative. This argument may itself be stated syllo- 
 gistically thus : 
 
 All syllogistical reasonings are demonstrative ; 
 
 But all reasonings are not demonstrative ; 
 
 Therefore, all reasonings are not syllogistic. 
 
 Take the following as a specimen : 
 
 Trade (in general) ought to be free ; 
 
 Therefore, the Corn-trade ought to be free. 
 
 Is this reasoning or is it not? Is it good rea- 
 soning? Most people, I believe, will allow that 
 the reasoning is fair, though not irresistible. From 
 the assumption that Trade ought to be free, we are 
 entitled to infer, probahly, indeed, not necessarily, 
 that the corn trade ought to be free ; probably only, 
 
OF DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 317 
 
 because, though trade in general ought to be free, 
 there may be circumstances peculiar to the corn- 
 trade which take it out of the general rule. There- 
 fore, here we have a specimen of what all would 
 allow to be reasoning, where the conclusion does 
 not follow irresistibly or of necessity from the pre- 
 mises, and which therefore does not agree with the 
 definitions of the syllogism. Consequently, all 
 reasoning is not syllogistical in the sense above 
 given. But this is only a specimen of ten thousand 
 arguments of the same kind, and therefore we must 
 conclude in general that all reasoning is not syllogis- 
 tical, as above defined. 
 
 28. The next observation suggested by the 
 above definitions is, that little is therein said of any 
 certain form or type of words as essential to the 
 Syllogism, only, according to the second definition, 
 it must consist of three propositions. And that de- 
 monstrative reasoning consists of three propositions 
 we have already seen. Therefore the argument, 
 A B is equal to A C, and B C is equal to A C, 
 therefore A B is equal to B C, is a syllogism ; for it 
 consists of three propositions, and the conclusion 
 follows irresistibly from the premises. And such 
 are all the reasonings of pure Geometry. Conse- 
 quently, it is not necessary to turn all the proposi- 
 tions of Euclid into syllogisms, as has been attempt- 
 ed, for they consist of syllogisms already. But the 
 attempt is a proof that the word SijUogism has been 
 taken by logicians in a peculiar sense, not as syno- 
 
318 PEINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 nymous with demonstrative reasoning in general, 
 not as determined by the above definitions. We 
 must then neglect the definitions, as the school logi- 
 cians have neglected them, and seek for the nature 
 of the syllogism in some other way. 
 
 29. With this view we must examine the Gene- 
 ral Principle said to pervade all Syllogisms, and the 
 particular examples brought forward in illustration. 
 Now dialecticians agree that the fundamental prin- 
 ciple of all syllogisms is correctly given in the famous 
 dictum of Aristotle, namely, that Whatever is af- 
 firmed or denied universally of a class of things may 
 he a-ffirmed or denied of anything comprehended in 
 that class. This, according to Archbishop Whately, 
 is not only the Universal Principle of the Syllogism, 
 but of all Reasoning ; for, as he thinks, all reason- 
 ing is syllogistical. What then are we to think of 
 this Principle % Is it exemplified in all reasoning, or 
 in any '?"' 
 
 30. In the first place, be it remarked, that 
 this celebrated dictum is, in reality, no principle or 
 axiom at all, for it affirms nothing which is not al- 
 ready meant by the word Class. It is, in fact, a 
 definition of a class, and so a merely verbal propo- 
 
 " Let it not be supposed that I assert that Aristotle thought 
 that he had discovered in this dictum the Universal Principle of 
 ReasoniHg. My remark applies only to one of the most distin- 
 guished of his modern disciples, and we all know that disciples 
 often go beyond their masters. Aristotle maintained only that the 
 above dictum was the Universal Principle of Syllogisms. 
 
OF DEM0X3TR.VTIVE REASONING 319 
 
 sition ; for our notion of a class is that whatever is 
 affirmed or denied of it, may be affirmed or denied 
 of anything included under the same. And how a 
 mere definition can be the universal principle of 
 reasoning, passes all comprehension. This one ob- 
 jection appears to me fatal to the theory. 
 
 31. But waving this objection, which meets us 
 at the very threshold of the inquiry, and allowing, 
 for the sake of argument, the above to be entitled 
 to the name of a Principle, let us see whether it be 
 applicable to all, or to any kind of reasoning. ^Yhen 
 we refer to the various sorts of relation about which 
 reasoning is conversant, that are mentioned above, 
 we see but one kind, at most, to which the principle 
 of the Syllogism can be applicable, namely, rela- 
 tions of comprehension. This, no doubt, is a very 
 important class, but it is only one class ; and cer- 
 tainly not more important than relations of Cause 
 and Effect. If A be the cause of B, and B of C, 
 then A is the remote cause of C. This is surely 
 reasoning, nay, demonstrative reasoning ; but how 
 the conclusion is here comprehended under either of 
 the premises, I am quite at a loss to discern. And 
 taking a less general instance, formerly produced. 
 
 Application depends upon the will ; 
 
 But intellectual advancement depends much upon 
 application ; 
 
 Therefore, intellectual advancement depends 
 much upon the will. 
 
 Here it will be allowed that the conclusion 
 
320 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 follows fairly, nay irresistibly, from the premises ; 
 but surely it is not comprehended under either of 
 them. According to the Syllogistic theory, " Ap- 
 plication" is here the middle term, and this is a 
 class, under which the subject of the conclusion, 
 namely, " Intellectual Advancement," must be 
 brought, in order that what had previously been 
 asserted of the former may be asserted of the 
 latter also. But, how " Intellectual Advance- 
 ment" is a particular instance, or a species, of 
 the genus " Application," I cannot see. By the 
 supposition, the one, " application" precedes as a 
 cause, and the other, " intellectual advancement," 
 follows as an effect, and therefore cannot be an 
 instance of the former. 
 
 32. Again, taking relations of Quantity, 
 
 in the triangle A B C, if the side A B be equal to 
 the side B C, and A C to B C, then is the side A 
 B equal to A C. This, it will be allowed, is 
 demonstrative reasoning ; but here also the prin- 
 ciple of the Syllogism is quite inapplicable. That 
 conclusion follows irresistibly from the premises, 
 but it is not comprehended under either of the 
 previous propositions. 
 
 I am aware that an attempt has been made to 
 
OF DEMOXSTR.VTIVE REASONING. 321 
 
 bring the reasonings of pure mathematics to the 
 Syllogistic form. We are informed by Sir 
 William Hamilton that there exists in the College 
 Library of Glasgow a rare work by Herlinius 
 and Dasypodius, namely " an edition of the first 
 six books of Euclid in which every demonstration 
 is developed in regular syllogisms."" One speci- 
 men of this we have seen above. A is equal to 
 B, and B to C, therefore A is equal to C, becomes 
 in due syllogistic form 
 
 What are equal to the same are equal to one 
 another ; 
 
 A and C are equal to the same (B) ; 
 
 Therefore A and C are equal to each other. 
 
 We have shown that it is only by compressing 
 two propositions into one that the form of the 
 syllogism has been obtained ; and that stated in 
 full the argument would stand thus, 
 
 What are equal to the same are equal to one 
 another ; 
 
 A is equal to B ; 
 
 And C is equal to the same B ; 
 
 Therefore A and C are equal to each other : 
 Where the utter uselessness, the impertinence of 
 the first proposition is evident ; for, take it away^ 
 and the J) roof is still perfect. This may serve as a 
 specimen of the mode of developing mathematical 
 arguments in syllogisms. It can be done only by 
 
 " See Sir William Hamilton's Notes to Raid's " Brief Account 
 of Aristotle's Logic." Reid's Works, p. 702. 
 
 T T 
 
322 
 
 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 introducing a number of general propositions of 
 no use whatsoever to the proof, and consequently 
 forming no part of the proof; mere excrescences 
 or wens upon the smooth surface of mathematical 
 reasoning. The philoso{)her of Laputa, who 
 spent his time in attempting to extract sun- 
 beams from cucumbers, was quite as profitably 
 employed as Herlinius and Dasypodius in deve- 
 loping (as the phrase is) the propositions of Euclid 
 in Syllogisms. 
 
 Nevertheless we allow that there is one case in 
 which the syllogism is applicable to the demon- 
 strations of Euclid, and that is where an universal 
 proposition, formerly established, is referred to 
 as the ground of a new ])r()position. And in 
 order to exemplify this case, as well as the more 
 numerous cases where the syllogism is not api)li- 
 cable, we shall analyze a proposition of Euclid. 
 Any one almost might answer the purpose ; but 
 we shall take the fifteenth of the First Book as 
 short and simple. 
 
 If two straight lines cut one another, the ver- 
 tical or opposite angles shall be equal. 
 
 Because the straight line A E makes with C D, at 
 
OF DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 323 
 
 the point E, the adjacent angles C E A, A E D, 
 
 Tliese angles are together equal to two right 
 angles (Prop. 13.) 
 
 Again, because the straight line D E makes 
 with A B, at the point E, the adjacent angles AED, 
 DE B, 
 
 These angles also are equal to two right angles ; 
 
 But the angles C K A, A E D have been shown 
 to be equal to two right angles ; 
 
 Wherefore the angles C E A, A E D are equal 
 to the angles A E D, D E B. 
 
 Take away from each the common angle A E D, 
 and the remaining angle C E A is equal to the 
 remaining angle DEB (ax. 3). 
 
 In the same manner it may be demonstrated 
 that the angle C E B is equal to the angle AED. 
 
 The Theorem begins by referring to a propo- 
 sition, formerly proved, the )3th, as the foundation 
 of the present argument, and consequently that 
 proposition may be stated in full. 
 
 1. The angles which one straight line makes 
 with another straight line, upon one side of it, are 
 either two right angles, or are together equal to 
 two right angles. 
 
 But the straight line A E makes with C D, at 
 the point E, the adjacent angles C E A, A E D ; 
 
 Therefore these angles are together equal to 
 two right angles. 
 
 Here it is clear that we have a formal syllogism, 
 and the axiom exenq)litied is that cle oiniii el nullo. 
 
324 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 2. The same may be said of the second argu- 
 ment, which is exactly similar to the foregoing. 
 
 3. The angles C E A and A E D have been 
 proved equal to two right angles ; 
 
 And the angles A E D, DEB have also been 
 proved equal to two right angles ; 
 
 Therefore the angles C E A, A E D together 
 are equal to the angles A E D, DEB together. 
 
 Here there is no universal proposition, all is 
 particular ; neither of the premises is entitled to 
 be called the major in preference to the other ; 
 and consequently there is no syllogism technically 
 so called, no syllogism of the Schools ; but the 
 axiom exemplified is " Things which are equal to 
 the same are equal to one another." 
 
 4. The angles C E A, A E D are equal to the 
 angles A E D, DEB; 
 
 And the angle A E D is common to both ; 
 
 Therefore the angle C E A is equal to the angle 
 DEB. 
 
 Here again, as in the last case, all is particular, 
 and therefore there is no Syllogism proper : but 
 the axiom exemplified is, " if the same be taken 
 away from equals the remainders are equals." 
 
 The only observation to be made on the above 
 is, that the Syllogisms at the head of the Theorem 
 establish no new truth ; they only recall and for- 
 mally enunciate what we know from a previous 
 Theorem ; they make us sure of our old ground, but 
 they do not advance us one step. And this will 
 
OF DEMONSTRATIVE EEASONING. 325 
 
 be found to be the utmost scope of the Syllogism. 
 
 33. It appears, then, from the acknowledged 
 general Principle of the Syllogism, and from the 
 particular instances of demonstrative reasoning 
 now given, adapted to both necessary and con- 
 tingent matter, that the Syllogism of the Schools 
 is not applicable to Demonstrative Reasoning in 
 general. And as the inference in Syllogism, if 
 inference it be, is irresistible, therefore it cannot 
 be applied to probable reasoning at all. Conse- 
 quently, so far is it from true that the Syllogisms 
 of the Schools is the perfect type or form of all 
 reasoning, that, at most, it can be only the type 
 or form of one kind or variety of Demonstrative 
 reasoning. The importance of the Syllogism, 
 then, to say the least, has been prodigiously over- 
 rated. 
 
 34. Before proceeding farther, it may be well 
 to state accurately what has already been proved. 
 
 1. That the Syllogism, being a form of De- 
 monstration, cannot be applicable to probable 
 reasoning, that is to the greater part by far of all 
 our reasonings. 
 
 2. That it is not applicable to all demonstra- 
 tive reasoning, neither to all demonstrative rea- 
 soning about necessary matter, nor to all demon- 
 strative reasoning about contingent matter ; in 
 other words, neither to all reasonings about Quan- 
 tity, or xMathematical reasoning, nor to all demon- 
 strative reasonings about matter of fact. 
 
326 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 3. That it is applicable to one case of mathe- 
 matical reasoning, that where an universal pro- 
 position, formerly proved, becomes a premiss of a 
 subsequent conclusion ; a case, however, so clear 
 as scarcely to require reasoning at all, where no- 
 thing is proved, but only a formal statement 
 made of what has been proved, a formal statement, 
 moreover, which even Euclid does not think neces- 
 sary. It remains to be seen whether the Syllo- 
 gism can iii a}iij case be applied to Contingent 
 matter. That it cannot, seems probable a priori; 
 for where are we to look for universal propositions 
 in matters of fact ^ but if it be applicable, it will 
 in all likelihood be found to apply only to such a 
 case as that above, where we are merely reminded 
 of what we know already. Let us examine actual 
 instances of reasoning, however, in order to 
 settle this point. 
 
 35. Agreeably to the fundamental principle 
 of all syllogisms, as given above, it would appear, 
 that to relations of Comprehension, if to any, the 
 Syllogism must ap})ly ; for the principle is, that 
 what is true of a class, is true of all individuals 
 or all species comprehended under that class. 
 To class-reasoning then, as tracing relations of 
 comprehension, a species of demonstrative rea- 
 soning, the Syllogism may be applicable. 
 
 36. Observe that, in reference to reasoning, 
 there are two questions to be solved, the one 
 purely psychological and speculative, the other 
 
OF DEMO^^STRATIYE REASONING. 327 
 
 logical and practical: the first, what is actually 
 the process which goes on in our minds in rea- 
 soning ( the second, can any form or type be in- 
 vented whereby we may test the validity of all 
 arguments, or of any one sort of argument ? 
 Each of these questions must be treated sepa- 
 rately. 
 
 ,37. This distinction may be illustrated by 
 reference to Ethics, in which also there are two 
 grand questions ; the one, what are the Causes 
 present to the mind which actually regulate our 
 moral sentiments'? The other, what are the cir- 
 cumstance^ which justify us, on mature reflection, 
 in awarding approbation and disapprobation to 
 any action ? The former question, which is spe- 
 culative, relates to the origin of our moral senti- 
 ments ; the latter, which is practical, to the test 
 or criterion of morality. No little obscurity has 
 arisen from confounding these two questions. 
 
 38. The first question then is, whether the 
 Syllogism be a full statement, founded on a cor- 
 rect Analysis, of the mental process in any kind 
 of Reasoning, more especially in that which we 
 have called class-reasoning? Having already 
 mentioned the general principle of the Syllogism, 
 let us now bring forward some examples. 
 
 1. Whatever exhibits marks of design had an 
 intelligent Author. 
 The world exhibits marks of design : 
 Therefore the world had an intelligent 
 Author. 
 
328 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 2. All tyrants deserve death. 
 Csesar was a tyrant : 
 Therefore Caesar deserved death. 
 
 3. Every dispensation of Providence is bene- 
 ficial. 
 
 Afflictions are dispensations of Providence : 
 Therefore they are beneficial. 
 
 4. Every creature possessed of reason and 
 liberty ought to practise justice. 
 
 Man is a creature possessed of reason and 
 
 liberty : 
 
 Therefore he ought to practise justice. 
 
 5. No vicious man is worthy of esteem and 
 reward. 
 
 John is a vicious man: 
 
 Therefore John is not worthy of esteem and 
 
 reward. 
 
 6. No tyrannical government is good. 
 The Turkish government is tyrannical : 
 Therefore it is not good. 
 
 These are instances of regular Syllogisms, in 
 the first Figure^ to which, as we are told by Aris- 
 totle and his followers, all legitimate syllogisms 
 may be reduced. Here the middle term is the 
 subject of the Major, and the predicate of the 
 Minor proposition." We shall also give a speci- 
 men of the second and of the third figure. 
 
 ° The first three instances are taken from Whately's Logic. 
 The first, in particular, is his favourite specimen. Li the Prior 
 Analytics, Book I. Chap VIL, Aristotle proves that all syllogisms 
 
OF DEMONSTRATIVE TIEASONING. 329 
 
 7. Whatever is bad is not the work of God. 
 All the natural passions and appetites of men 
 are the work of God ; 
 
 Therefore they are not bad. 
 In this case the middle term "The work of 
 God" is the predicate of both the Major and Minor 
 propositions, or the Syllogism is of the second Figure. 
 
 8. All Africans are black. 
 All Africans are men ; 
 Therefore some men are black. 
 
 Here the middle term is the subject of both the 
 Major and Minor, or the Syllogism is of the third 
 Figure. 
 
 39. These instances may suffice to show us the 
 nature of syllogisms. In all, the conclusion is 
 eVi^ewi, ]}rovided the premises he granted^ and in all, 
 the validity consists in the same thing, which, when 
 stated generally, constitutes the dictum above men- 
 tioned ; namely, that whatever is affirmed or denied 
 universally of any class of things, may be affirmed 
 or denied of anything comprehended in that class. 
 In framing the argument, then, the object is to refer 
 the subject of the conclusion to some class, (middle 
 term) of which class something can be affirmed or 
 denied universally. Thus in the first Syllogism, 
 the subject of the conclusion " the world" is referred 
 
 may be reduced not only to the first figure, but to the two universal 
 moods of the first figure, either directly by conversion, or /«- 
 directly by reductio ad absurdum. 
 
 U U 
 
330 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 to a class of things " those which exhibit marks of 
 design," of which it can be universally affirmed that 
 " they had aa intelligent Author." And so with 
 the rest. 
 
 40. Now the question is, do men actually 
 reason thus*? That they do not openly or apparently 
 so reason, every one's experiiuice may convince him. 
 Taking each of the six syllo:^isms in the first figui e, 
 to which form the other figures may be reduced, we 
 shall see that in every case the natural or usual way 
 of reasoning would be confined to the second and 
 third propositions, omitting the first. In order to 
 prove that the workl had an intelligent Author, none 
 but a dialectician would think of beginning by 
 stating " Whatever exhibits marks of design had an 
 intelligent Author"; but an ordinary reasoner would 
 say. 
 
 The world exhibits marks of design. 
 
 Therefore it had an intelligent Author. 
 
 And so in the other cases. 
 But though not expressed, is not the first or 
 major proposition understood"? mentally embraced, 
 though not stated in words'? 'Ihere lies all the 
 question. 
 
 41. Were it granted that the Major pro- 
 position is necessary to the perfection of the proof, 
 still this would not establish the fact that men 
 actually reason thus ; for the present question is not 
 bow men oi g'lt to reason so as to arrive at demon- 
 stration, but how they do reason. And that men 
 
OF DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING 331 
 
 commonly content themselves Avith arguments short 
 of demonstrations we all know. Moreover, that in 
 the ahove instances men would reason from the 
 minor alone, and in so reasoning would be thought 
 to reason fairly, thongh not irresistibly, cannot be 
 doubted. Where then is the proof that the major, 
 an liniversal proposition, is tacitly assumed by the 
 reasoner, and supposed by the listener. There is 
 no proof whatsoever, except that the logician thinks 
 that the said preposition is essential to a demonstra- 
 tion ; and, so thinking, he wishes to make men 
 reason better than they commonly do. Let us 
 examine the six instances and see whether the major 
 proposition be necessary to a legitimate argument, 
 an argument short of demonstration. 
 
 42. — 1. Whatever exhibits marks of design 
 had an intelligent Author. 
 
 The world exhibits marks of design. 
 Therefore the world had an intelligent Author. 
 
 Here we may safely assert that the Major is 
 altogether useless. \\ hen we say that the world 
 exhibits marks of design, we in fact assert that it 
 had an intelligent Author. We cannot say that 
 there is here any inference at all. To aflirra that 
 the world exhibits marks of design, or marks of a 
 designer, or marks of an intelligent Author, is all 
 one in meaning, with a variety only in expression. 
 We cannot even conceive design v\ithout a designer, 
 or w.thout an intelligent being. As we have already 
 shown, when we allow design, we already allow a 
 
332 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 designer, we do not infer one. A Major, or universal 
 proposition, cannot therefore be required to establish 
 an inference, seeing that no inference is made. But 
 were we to grant that the conclusion " the world 
 had an intelligent Author'^ contains something 
 really different from the minor " the world exhibits 
 marks of design," still, the inference from the minor 
 would be self-evident and irresistible. No Major 
 could add to. its force. So close indeed is the con- 
 nection between them, so intimate the relation, that 
 we consider them as one proposition, or at least as 
 one assertion with a slight variety of form. 
 
 2. All tyrants deserve death. 
 Caesar was a tyrant. 
 Therefore Csesar deserved death. 
 
 Here the connection between the Minor, and the 
 conclusion is by no means self-evident ; and some 
 gefieral proposition does seem necessary to establish 
 the conclusion. But, in order to prove, we must 
 beware of assuming the very point in debate, and 
 this we should do were we to assert that all tyrants 
 (Csesar included), deserve death. The utmost that 
 we can assume is that tyrants in general deserve 
 death ; and from this we may argue, probably 
 indeed, not demonstratively, that Caesar deserved 
 death. This, indeed, is a question quite out of the 
 range of demonstration ; men's minds have been 
 much divided upon it; and therefore it can be only 
 by a trick that it puts on a demonstrative form. As 
 few men, if any, would maintain that all tyrants 
 
OF DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 333 
 
 ■without exception deserve death, they cannot be 
 supposed to reason from a proposition which they 
 do not hold. 
 
 3. Every dispensation of Providence is bene- 
 ficial. 
 
 Afflictions are dispensations of Providence ; 
 Therefore they are beneficial. 
 Here again we allow that some general proposi- 
 tion is necessary to establish the conclusion ; but, as 
 in the last instance, by assuming too much we pre- 
 judge the question ; we assert, we do not reason. 
 Religious men will freely allow that the dispensa- 
 tions of Providence are on the whole beneficial, and 
 that therefore even afflictions may have their use ; 
 but they do not make a sweeping assertion like the 
 one above, which would do away with all distinction 
 between good and evil, happiness and misery. 
 Logicians alone make such assumptions, in order to 
 give a demonstrative air to their arguments ; and 
 they care not how absurd the whole may be, pro- 
 vided it be a proper Syllogism. 
 
 4. Every creature possessed of reason and 
 liberty ought to practise justice. 
 
 Man is a creature possessed of reason and 
 
 liberty ; 
 
 Therefore he ought to practise justice. 
 Here, as before, the conclusion is evidently 
 assumed in the Major, and therefore the reasoning 
 is only apparent. That men from a due considera- 
 tion of reason and liberty might arrive at the con- 
 
334 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 elusion here given is probable enough ; but they 
 certainly would not begin by assuming the final 
 result of their researches. 
 
 6. No vicious man is worthy of esteem and 
 reward. 
 
 John is a vicious man ; 
 
 Therefore John is not worthy of esteem and 
 
 reward. 
 
 In this instance, the uselessness of the Major is 
 evident; for, if John be a vicious man, it would be 
 a din^ct contradiction to our notion of Vice to sup- 
 pose that he could be worthy of esteem and reward. 
 
 6. No tyrannical government is good. 
 The Turkish government is tyrannical; 
 Therefore it is not good. 
 
 Here, the uselessness of the IMajor is quite as 
 evident, if possible more so, for a tyrannical govern- 
 ment means one that is not good. At least that is 
 a part of the meaning, and not an inference. If we 
 assert that the 'lurkish government is tyrannical, 
 we assert that it is not good ; no argument is 
 required to prove it ; and if no proof be wanted, of 
 what use can be the Major '?p 
 
 43. Having now examined each of these six 
 Syllogisms, given as specimens by writers on 
 Logic, we find that in no one case would men 
 
 P Lei not tlie reader suppose that I first made the ahove Svllo- 
 gisuis, and now criticise my own work. They are all the woik of 
 others. The first three, as hefore slated, are lukeu hum Wiiatcily's 
 Logic. 
 
OF DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 335 
 
 naturally reason thus ; that in some cases there 
 is scarcely any thing that can be called an argu- 
 ment, certainly none requiring a major proposi- 
 tion ; while in others though a general proposition 
 may be assumed openly or tacitly, y^tOiW universal 
 proposition neither would nor could be taken for 
 granted. For we find that the major is always 
 an universal proposition ; and this, in fact, is one 
 of the laws of the first figure ; as it is of Syllo- 
 gisms in general that one of the premises must 
 be universal. Unless this be the case, no in- 
 falhble inference can be drawn. If the major 
 proposition be universal, it must embrace the con- 
 clusion, for this is only a particular instance of 
 the same. Consequently, by assuming the major, 
 we assume the conclusion, or, in other words, our 
 first proposition takes for granted the very thing 
 to be proved. And this, we are told, is the only 
 legitimate mode of reasoning! Certainly, of all 
 the delusions that ever passed current in the 
 learned world, this is the greatest, for it is a de- 
 lusion not peculiar to common minds, but shared, 
 even now, by some of the highest names in philo- 
 sophy, It is engendered between reverence for 
 antiquity in general, and respect for Aristotle and 
 Greek more particularly ; and in many instances 
 it has proved too strong, not only for common 
 sense, but for high imtellectual powers. On that 
 account it is the more important that the delu- 
 sion should be expelled. 
 
336 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 44. Aristotle shows (Prior Analytics. Book I. 
 Chap. XXIV.) that unless one of the two proposi- 
 tions which compose the premises be universal, 
 there can be no Syllogism. "Thus," says he "if 
 we have to demonstrate that music is a dignified 
 pleasure, if we state only that pleasure is dignified 
 without saying a// pleasure, there is no Syllogism." 
 Strange that this acute philosopher should not 
 have put the question to himself, if all pleasure be 
 dignified, what occasion is there for reasoning to 
 prove that the pleasure of music is so ! That 
 question once fairly answered, he might have 
 spared himself the trouble of writing the Prior 
 Analytics, a mighty monument of useless ingenu- 
 ity. This instance also shows what unwarranted 
 assertions must be made in order to obtain a for- 
 mal syllogistic proof ; for who would really main- 
 tain that " all pleasure is dignified *?" 
 
 45. To these objections to the Syllogism, it 
 may, however, be replied : that the major propo- 
 sition embraces the conclusion is not denied, nay 
 unless it do, there can be no demonstration ; and 
 the very object of the reasoning is to show that 
 the conclusion is so comprehended. But what 
 we assert is, that no reasoning is required for this 
 purpose. The fact is self-evident. There is no- 
 thing new in the conclusion, nothing not already 
 affirmed in the premises, only the substitution of 
 the particular for the universal, and whosoever 
 allows the latter allows the former. Therefore 
 
OF DEMONSTR.VTIVE REASONING. 337 
 
 the above specimens of Syllogism and othrrs such 
 as are usually found in books of Logic, in all the 
 varieties of figure and mood, do not answer to the 
 definition of reasoning in general, given at the 
 opening of this Section, nor even to that of 
 syllogism as delivered by Aristotle himself, which 
 we found to be applicable to demonstrative rea- 
 soning without reference to any particular form, 
 namely, that " it is a speech in which certain 
 propositions (the premises) being stated and 
 granted, some other proposition, (the conclusion) 
 different from these, follows of necessity), and this 
 solely in virtue of the propositions stated." Now, 
 we see that the Syllogism, constructed according 
 to the rules of figure and mood, and in agree- 
 ment with the dictum of Aristotle de omni et nullo, 
 as it is called, really bring out in the conclusion 
 nothing different from the premises. Therefore 
 they do not correspond with the above definition. 
 That is a definition of perfect or demonstrative 
 reasoning in general, and if we please to call it 
 syllogistic, well and good, but then we must re- 
 member that the definition does not apply to the 
 Syllogism properly so called, the Syllogism of 
 Aristotle and the Schoolmen, which alone we are 
 now considering. In this last, the connection 
 between the premises and the conclusion is no 
 doubt irresistible, because the latter is assumed 
 in the former ; but for that reason it can contain 
 nothing new, nothing different. Not so in real 
 
 X X 
 
338 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 and perfect reasoning, such as that of Geometry, 
 where the conclusion not only follows irresistibly 
 from the premises, from both together, but where 
 it also contains something different from either. 
 
 46. " Wherein consists this admirable dis- 
 covery of the Syllogism" asks Barthelemy de 
 Saint Hilaire, in the Preface to his Translation of 
 Aristotle's Organum*? "In this," answers he "that 
 Aristotle first established that reasoning was 
 possible on the one condition alone of starting 
 from a Principle, to arrive by the aid of a middle 
 term at a conclusion resulting necessarily from 
 that principle." According to this statement, 
 there can be none but demonstrative reasoning ; 
 first mistake. Again, by this, the conclusion in 
 demonstrative reasoning follows necessarily from 
 the Principle, as Saint Hilaire calls it, or Major 
 proposition ; whereas, in mathematical reasoning 
 it follows not from one of the premises alone, but 
 from both together; second mistake. In the 
 simple reasoning A is equal to B, and B to C ; 
 therefore A is equal to C ; the conclusion follows 
 not necessarily from either of these premises, but 
 from both together, and the one is no more 
 entitled to be called a Principle than the other. 
 It is only in the fictitious reasoning of the Syllo- 
 gism that the conclusion follows necessarily from 
 the Major proposition, because in that proposition 
 the conclusion is taken for granted beforehand. It 
 may be remarked that Logicians of a certain class 
 
OF DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 339 
 
 are often at war with Mathematicians. No wonder, 
 for no science so clearly refutes the absurd pre- 
 tensions of the School Logic as Mathematics. 
 
 47. Nothing is more remarkable than the 
 utter disregard of observation on the part of the 
 School Logicians. Having adopted from Aristotle 
 the Syllogistic theory of reasoning, they boldly 
 assert that it applies to all arguments ; but the 
 least observation upon real discourse is sufficient 
 to refute this opinion. Still, in spite of daily, of 
 hourly experience, they go on repeating the 
 assertion, which, to say the least, is a prodigious 
 exaggeration. The School Logic is one instance of 
 that system of philosophizing which prevailed gen- 
 erally among the ancients, as well as in the middle 
 ages, down even to the time of Bacon, a system 
 which, despising experience, pretended to deduce 
 everything from a few very general Principles. 
 Such was the system of Plato, and even of Aris- 
 totle in many of his works, though in his Politics 
 and his Natural History he has condescended to 
 examine facts. 
 
 48. The utmost that can be allowed in favour 
 of the Syllogism is, that there may be cases where 
 we should grant an universal Proposition more ' 
 readily than a particular one comprehended under 
 it, and where therefore it might be well to remind 
 us of what we already admit. But, recalling what 
 we already know, and reasoning from the known 
 to the unknown, are surely different operations. 
 
340 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 A Syllogism may strengthen, but it cannot origi- 
 nate Belief; and therefore it can lead to no dis- 
 covery. Our Belief in the existence of the 
 material world certainly requires no strengthen- 
 ing, it is instinctive and indelible ; yet, it may 
 be satisfactory to give it the sanction of an 
 universal principle, as in the following Syllogisraj 
 which seems a more favourable specimen than 
 what we generally meet with. 
 
 Whatever is universally believed is worthy of 
 credit. 
 
 The existence of the material world is univer- 
 sally believed : 
 
 Therefore it is worthy of credit. 
 If we choose to call this reasoning, be it so, 
 provided we be fully av\are what sort of reasoning 
 it is ; demonstrative in form, because we always 
 allow the conclusion when we assume the pre- 
 mises, but, for the same reason, utterly barren of 
 new truth, and, at most, confirming what we 
 already know. If reasoning be the process of 
 drawing a conclusion, which before was unknown, 
 or at least dark or doubtful, from some proposi- 
 tions known or more evident, then the above 
 syllogism does not answer to this definition, for 
 there the conclusion was surely as certain before- 
 hand as the premises. Nay, it is easier to doubt 
 whether universal consent be a sure ground of 
 belief, than to doubt the existence of the material 
 world. The only valid argument whereby we can 
 
OF DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 341 
 
 justify this and other cases of Instinctive beUef 
 is, that we have here no reason to doubt ; that 
 we have no reason to believe that Nature per- 
 petually deceives us, that she is a great cheat. 
 But this argument cannot be put in the form of 
 a syllogism, because we cannot positively assert 
 that she never deceives us. 
 
 49. That such is the narrow province of the 
 syllogism is allowed even by its most strenuous 
 and indiscriminate supporters. " Since all reason- 
 ing (in the sense above defined), may be resolved 
 into syllogisms, and since even the objectors to 
 Logic make it a subject of complaint that in a 
 syllogism the premises do virtually assert the 
 conclusion, it follows at once that no new truths 
 (as above defined) can be elicited by any process 
 of reasoning. ''^ Thus, in order to maintain the 
 Syllogistic Theory in all its extension, we must 
 contract excessively the province of reasoning 
 in general, nay, we must allow that no new truths 
 can be elicited by reasoning ! If this be not a 
 reductio ad ahsurdum, what is ? 
 
 50. Ihe only use of reasoning, then, as we are 
 told, is " to expand and unfold the assertions wrapt 
 up, as it were, and implied in those with w hich we set 
 out, and to bring a person to perceive and acknow- 
 ledge the full force of that which he has admitted ; 
 to contemplate it in various points of view, to admit 
 
 " Whately's Logic, Book IV, Chap. 11. 
 
342 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 in one shape what he has ah-eady admitted in 
 another, and to give up and disallow whatever is 
 inconsistent with it." "^ This mav be allowed to 
 be a correct account of the value of the Syllogism, 
 but, as a theory of reasoning in general, it is, pace 
 tanti viri, quite monstrous. According to this 
 theory, when Pythagoras established by reasoning, 
 that, in any right-angled triangle, the square of the 
 side subtending the right angle is equal to the 
 squares of the two other sides together, he made no 
 discovery, he only unfolded what was before wrapt 
 up in some mathematical axiom or axioms common 
 to him and other men. Must we then allow that 
 the above famous proposition is as much contained 
 within the axiom, " Things which are equal to the 
 same are equal to one another," or some other 
 similar, as that the proposition " James is mortal " 
 is contained within "All men are mortal"? No 
 one, not blinded by system, will maintain such a 
 doctrine for a moment. But the syllogistic theory 
 was to be supported, even at the expense of reason- 
 ing, which required to be depreciated in order to 
 suit an artificial and futile system. 
 
 51. We are told that no "New truths can be 
 elicited by any process of Reasoning." By what 
 then can discoveries be made ? By Observation no 
 doubt, for that is. the only other way. But no 
 discovery of general truth can be made by Obser- 
 
 ' Whately's Logic, Book IV, Chap. II. 
 
OF DEMONSTRATIVE TIEASONIXG. 343 
 
 vation alone. If I go into a new country, such as 
 the interior of Africa, I may certainly make disco- 
 veries in geography, that is, particular discoveries, 
 by simple Observation ; but Observation alone 
 cannot generalize, cannot discover any general truth. 
 Consequently, as general truth can be discovered 
 neither by Reasoning nor by Observation, it follows 
 that it cannot be discovered at all. Once more, is 
 this, or is it not, a reductio ad absurdum. 
 
 52. To say that discoveries cannot be made 
 by Reasoning alone, but by reasoning combined 
 with Observation, is incorrect, for the discoveries of 
 pure Geometry are altogether independent of Obser- 
 vation. Some Observation no doubt must precede 
 all reasoning about matter of fact ; but very limited 
 Observation may suggest an important discovery. 
 When Archimedes made his famous discovery of 
 the mode of determining the specific gravity of 
 solids, was it not by Reasoning chiefly that he made 
 it, by reasoning from one simple fact, the overflow- 
 ing of the water of a bath ^ The very same fact 
 might have been observed by thousands of others, 
 but he alone could draw an inference from it. Is 
 it not then correct to say that it was by Reasoning 
 chiefly that he made his discovery ? 
 
 The same may be said of Natural Philosophy 
 in general. The facts from which it proceeds are 
 but few in number, a few laws of motion in solids 
 and in fluids, and on these it builds a vast structure 
 by reasoning alone. 
 
344 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 53. But as reasoning is depreciated in order to 
 suit the syllogistic theory, so are the truths of pure 
 Mathematics. We are told that all the propositions 
 of pure mathematics are what Locke calls " trifling," 
 "wherein the predicate is merely a part of the com- 
 plex idea implied by the subject. Thus, when we as- 
 sert, taking the above example, that in a right-angled 
 triangle the square described on the side which 
 subtends the right-angle is equal to the two squares 
 described on the sides containing the right angle, 
 we state merely a trifling proposition, one included 
 in the meaning of the subject, square of side sub- 
 tending the right-angle of a right-angled triangle. 
 But did any man ever suppose that the Predicate, 
 namely, equality with the squares of the other two 
 sides, was included in the meaning of that Subject ? 
 If so, why was so much reasoning required to prove 
 it ; or why was it looked upon as a great discovery "? 
 The supposition is evidently preposterous. 
 
 54. Again, the truths of pure mathematics 
 are represented by the same Author as in con- 
 formity not with the nature of things, but only with 
 our own definitions, and therefore as comparatively 
 insignificant. But this objection to the importance of 
 Mathematics we have already answered in full. 
 Suffice it here to repeat that it is based on two 
 mistakes, on one or both, as it may happen. By 
 the first, pure Mathematics, the Science of Quantity, 
 is confounded with Physics, as when it is said that 
 the truths of Mathematics agree not with the 
 
OF DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 345 
 
 nature of tliin2:s i.e. of material tliin2:s. No one 
 asserts that they do, any more than tl^at the 
 nature of mind agrees with that of matter. But 
 the truths of pure Mathematics are of a higher 
 order than those of Physics, for they are necessary 
 and eternal, instead of contingent and possibly 
 mutable in time ; and though Quantity depends 
 not upon matter, yet, as it does exist also in 
 matter, thus the truths of pure Quantity become 
 applicable to Quantity in matter, with some 
 corrections derived from Experience Hence the 
 whole fabric of Mechanical Philosophy and Phy- 
 sical Astronomy, which attest the practical appli- 
 cability of Mathematics. Accordingly, though 
 at Cambridge and in otVier universities Mathe- 
 matics may be studied chiefly as a mental exer- 
 cise, yet they also form an important part of the 
 education of practical men. In Commercial 
 Schools and Institutes for the working classes, 
 mathematics constitute a principal branch of 
 instruction. 
 
 The second mistake lies in supposing that the 
 definitions of Mathematicians are arbitrary inven- 
 tions, with nothing corresponding to the things 
 defined, baseless as the fabric of a vision. But, 
 in truth, there is nothing arbitrary but the Names, 
 line, triangle, circle, etc. The words whereby 
 these names are defined may also vary a little ; 
 but of the Things, the Universals, we have con- 
 ceptions the most fixed, clear and definite, and 
 
 Y Y 
 
346 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 they are most important, for by means of these 
 abstract conceptions and their relations we can 
 not only measure the earth on which we tread, 
 but determine the distance and size of the sun 
 and planets. This second mistake seems to have 
 arisen out of the first ; for, it being allowed that 
 nothing exactly corresponding to the lines etc. of 
 pure Geometry exists in matter, it was thence 
 inferred that they must be visionary and the whole 
 Science hypothetical. But so it is, while Metaphy- 
 sicians dispute about the foundation of human 
 knowledge and some would cut away all solid 
 foundation, Mathematicians raise fearlessly a 
 pyramid of Science reaching from Earth to the 
 Heavens, which bids defiance to all assaults. 
 
 55. Before me, the Author of the Philosophy 
 of Rhetoric, as well as Dr. Thomas Brown, object- 
 ed to the Syllogism, as necessarily involving a 
 petitio principii. Dr. Whately does not attempt 
 to prove the contrary ; but he answers that the 
 same objection " lies against all arguments what- 
 soever." ' All arguments involve a petitio Prin- 
 cipii ! Am I wrong then in saying that all rea- 
 soning is depreciated in order to suit an artificial 
 and futile system ? 
 
 56. One question only now remains. Though 
 the Syllogism be not an accurate explicit state- 
 ment, derived from a correct analysis of the pro- 
 
 ' The words in Italics are so printed in the original. 
 
OF DEMON Sill ATI VE REASONING. 347 
 
 cess of reasoning in general, is it of any use as a 
 test or criterion of the validity of an argument ? 
 In other words, though false metaphysically, can 
 it serve any purpose logically ? If the Syllogism 
 be not a full and accurate statement of the men- 
 tal process in reasoning generally, there is surely 
 a strong probability a priori against its universal 
 logical utility. But let us examine particularly 
 the facts of this question. 
 
 57. That the Syllogism of the Schools can be 
 of any use as a test or criterion of mathematical 
 reasoning, is absurd ; for we have seen that the 
 Syllogism, so understood, is not applicable to it at 
 all, and moreover, mathematical reasoning requires 
 no criterion. Its accuracy or inaccurac}^ is self- 
 evident. The same may be affirmed of demon- 
 strative reasoning in general, whether applied to 
 necessary or to contingent matter. In either case, 
 it requires no test of validity. When we say 
 demonstrative, we in fact allow that the reasoning 
 demands no Criterion, that it speaks sufficiently 
 for itself. 
 
 58. To Probable reasoning, then, if to any, 
 the Syllogism may be applicable as a test. But, 
 the Syllogism being itself a form of demonstrative 
 reasoning, how can it apply to probable argu- 
 ments ? We answer that it may show the hoUow- 
 ness of many arguments which pretend to demon- 
 stration, arguments which appear demonstrative, 
 exactly because they are syllogistical. These 
 
348 PHINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 argumePxts may pass current because we do not 
 see all that has been tacitly assumed ; but when 
 openly stated as a Syllogism, the imposture be- 
 comes evident. Instead of reasoning from a 
 general principle and deducing a probable infer- 
 ence, as he ought, the writer or speaker has 
 assumed an universal principle, and deduced from 
 it an infallible inference accordingly. Therefore, 
 though the inference be correct, the conclusion 
 may be false. The syllogism shows openly what 
 has been taken for granted, and that, unless such 
 a preliminary proposition be true, we cannot be 
 quite sure of the conclusion. This seems to me 
 the exact value of the syllogism, which is appli- 
 cable only to that species of probable reasoning 
 which most nearly resembles it, namely, reasoning 
 from a general principle ; for the precise differ- 
 ence between the two, betv^een the artificial and 
 spurious, and the natural and genuine argu- 
 ment is, that the one is based on an universal^ 
 the other^on a general principle. Thus the Syllo- 
 gism serves as a specimen of an argument demon- 
 strative in form, but deceptive or futile in 
 reality ; and if any actual argument can be 
 brought into that form, we shall see clearly that 
 it is deceitful or trifling, that the pretended 
 demonstration is a sham, the conclusion possibly 
 a falsehood, if not a truism. 
 
 59. To illustrate the use to which the Syllo- 
 gism may be applied, as a test of probable and 
 
OF DEMONSTR.VnVE REASONING 349 
 
 general, or deductive reasoninpj, I shall bring 
 forward Hume's famous argument against mira- 
 cles. This argument is contained in a single 
 sentence, and it maybe easily reduced to the form 
 of a Syllogism in the first figure ; and for that 
 very reason it is deceptive. "A miracle is a 
 violation of the laws of nature ; and as a firm 
 and unalterable experience has established those 
 laws, the proof against a miracle from the very 
 nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument 
 from experience can possibly be imagined." In 
 due syllogistic form the argument would stand 
 thus : 
 
 Whatever is opposed to a firm and unalter- 
 able experience is unworthy of credit. 
 But a miracle (being a violation of the laws 
 of nature) is so opposed : 
 Therefore a miracle is unworthy of credit. 
 The most obvious fallacy here lies in assuming, 
 in the minor premiss, that there is a firm and 
 unalterable experience against a miracle ; for there 
 exists a great deal of testimony in favour of mi- 
 racles, testimony even of eye-witnesses, as we have 
 reason to believe ; and until it be proved that all 
 this testimony is false or vain, it cannot be assum- 
 ed that there is an invariable experience against 
 them : for testimony is indirect experience, and 
 upon it by far the greater part of our knowledge 
 depends. Even the major premiss may be con- 
 tested. To experience really firm and unalterable 
 
350 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 no one can pretend, for this supposes a knowledge 
 of every event bearing upon the subject, in every 
 age, and in every country, since the creation. 
 All, then, that can be meant, is the experience of 
 ourselves, our ancestors, all whom we have 
 known, heard, or read of; agreeably to which, 
 those born and bred in the torrid zone, who have 
 never wandered from thence, nor read of other 
 climates, ought not to believe in ice. In this case, 
 we should say that disbelief is the effect of ignor- 
 ance; why then not allow the possibility of a similar 
 influence in our own case ? Are we all-knowing, 
 all-wise ? Is not our experience after all very 
 limited ? Our experience of Effects, much more 
 our knowledge of Causes ? 
 
 There are more things in heaven and earth, 
 Horatio, 
 
 Than are dreamt of in your philosophy. 
 Though there may be a great deal of deception 
 in Mesmerism, yet enough remains to show that 
 we must admit some facts contrary to all our 
 former experience. 
 
 In truth, there is scarcely any universal pro- 
 position that may not be contested, and therefore 
 dialecticians have been obliged, in order not to 
 expose the hollowness of their art, to have re- 
 course to trifling examples, such as, " All men 
 are mortal" " James is a man" " therefore James 
 is mortal," " All men are sinners" " John is a 
 man" " therefore John is a sinner" ; where they 
 
OF DE^rONSTTlATIVE REASONING. 351 
 
 knew that the major could not be disputed. Aris- 
 totle was more wary, for he stuck to letters, and 
 thus concealed the insignificance of examples. 
 
 60. Thus the major proposition of the Syllo- 
 gism is, in ejeneral, either a truism, or an un- 
 warranted assumption ; and therefore, though the 
 inference be irresistible, yet the conclusion must 
 be either trifling or uncertain. If the argument 
 of Hume had not laid claim to infallibility, it 
 could not have been reduced to the form of a 
 perfect Syllogism. It would have remained a 
 good, but an obvious argument, namely, that, 
 prior to the examination of the particular fact, 
 there is a probability, nay, a strong probability, 
 against any one miracle, on account of the gene- 
 ral uniformity of nature. But ^e?2^ra^ experience 
 could not answer the purpose of an infallible 
 conclusion ; and therefore unalterable or universal 
 experience was assumed ; and it is exactly by 
 reason of this assumption that the argument 
 becomes reducible to a Syllogism, and, as a demon- 
 stration, is deceitful. This may serve as a speci- 
 men of the only use which can be made of the 
 Syllogism. It may be useful, not as presenting a 
 perfect specimen of reasoning to be copied, but 
 as exhibiting a futile or deceptive sort of argu- 
 ment to be avoided, an argument possessing the 
 form without the power of demonstration. 
 
 61. The grand error which lies at the bottom 
 of the syllogistic theory is the belief that relations 
 
352 PEINCIPLES 0"F PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 other than those of Quantity admit of demon- 
 stration, not only occasionally, but as a general 
 rule. To justify this opinion, a form of reasoning 
 was invented, (for invented is the word) whereby 
 the appearance, and only the appearance of 
 infallibility was given to an argument, by assum- 
 ing universal instead of general propositions. 
 This is the precise difference between the ordinary 
 or natural mode of reasoning, that is, of probable 
 and general or deductive reasoning, and the artifi- 
 cial or syllogistic. We may reason from general 
 propositions, that is, we may attempt to show that 
 any particular case is comprehended under a 
 general truth ; but we cannot reason from univer- 
 sal propositions ; for these obviate the necessity 
 of reasoning. We reason in order to prove some- 
 thing not known before, to clear up something 
 dark or doubtful, but if the conclusion be already 
 known, be already clear, why reason ^ In every 
 case of legitimate syllogism, where the conclusion 
 is true, it was quite as well known beforehand, as 
 the premises ; as is proved by all the instances 
 brought forward in books of Logic. The very per- 
 fection of the proof in a regular syllogism shows 
 the futility of the argument : for we know that 
 the subjects to which the syllogism is usually ap- 
 plied admit very sparingly of demonstration ; and 
 consequently, the perfection may be presumed to 
 be only apparent, and therefore the result of a trick. 
 Now this trick, as we have seen, is assuming the 
 
OF DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 353 
 
 conclusion in the premises. If indeed llie conclu- 
 sion be false or doubtful, it cannot have been knoicn 
 beforehand, and here therefore there will be some- 
 thing more like a new truth brought out by reason- 
 ing. But the inference being irresistible, if the 
 conclusion be false or doubtful, some unwarranted 
 assumption must have been made, an assumption 
 virtually embracing the conclusion, but, it may be, 
 not evidentlj/ emljracing it, as it does when the 
 major and the conclusion are both true, both trivial. 
 Here, therefore, there will be something more like 
 a real argument ; though a fallacious one. To 
 recur once more to Hume's argument against mi- 
 racles, stated as a Syllogism ; the conclusion is cer- 
 tainly startling and new, and it is not evidently 
 comprehended under the Major without the aid of 
 the Minor; and therefore it is no futile and trifling 
 argument; but it is deceptive, because unwarranted 
 assumptions have been made in both Major and 
 IMinor. Thus, though the Syllogism can never 
 serve to find out truth, it may be used to propagate 
 error. H cannot serve to find out truth, because 
 the conclusion, when true, is quite as well known 
 beforehand as the major premiss ; but it may be 
 used to propagate error, by assuming universal and 
 unwarranted propositions, and deducing false or 
 doubtful conclusions from them by demonstrative 
 inference. And these conclusions will be the more 
 dangerous, because they se€t}i to be proved demon- 
 stratively, like Hume's conclusion about miracles. 
 z z 
 
354 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 62. That a system of Logic raised on such a 
 basis should so long have stood its ground, and 
 that, even at the present day, it should have eminent 
 supporters, is certainly one of the most extraordinary 
 facts in the history of the human mind. To the 
 name, the truly great name of Aristotle, must 
 chiefly be attributed this long delusion ; a man 
 distinguished in so many branches of science, in 
 Metaphysics, Ethics, Politics, Rhetoric, Criticism, 
 and Natural History ; the tutor of Alexander, the 
 founder of the Peripatetic Philosophy. Assuredly 
 the writings of Aristotle have shed a light upon 
 the V70rld , but the great power of the Philosopher 
 is chiefly shown in this, that he bewildered it so 
 long. 
 
 63. We may conclude this subject with one or 
 two examples to show the difference between the 
 Syllogism and that species of ordinary or natural 
 reasoning which it most resembles. Suppose that 
 either by induction or otherwise we have arrived 
 at the general proposition, that 
 
 Trade ought to be free, 
 we may thence infer directly, that 
 The Corn-trade ought to be free. 
 Here the conclusion follows from the premises, fol- 
 lows probably, but not infallibly; for the proposition 
 " Trade ought to be free" though general, is not 
 stated as universal ; and therefore there may be 
 circumstances peculiar to the Corn-trade which 
 make it an exception to the rule. Now this is the 
 
OP DEMON STE/VTIVE REASONING. 355 
 
 natural mode of reasoning, But, if we wish to 
 convert this into a Syllogism, we must state the 
 argument thus : 
 
 All Trade ought to be free. 
 The Corn-trade is a trade ; 
 Therefore it ought to be free. 
 Here, by assuming too much, we make the argu- 
 ment insignificant, for we assume the conclusion in 
 the major premiss. It is a fair argument to infer, 
 because trade in general ought to be free, that the 
 Corn-trade ought to be free; it is an argument 
 drawn from a general proposition or a general 
 principle, as the common phrase is ; but it is no 
 argument to say that the Corn-trade ought to be 
 free, because all trade ought to be free. This is 
 simply a begging of the question ; it is to say that 
 there can be no dispute about the matter, that it 
 has been already decided. In the above syllogism, 
 it is evident that the minor proposition is a trijling 
 one, pure tautology, wherein the predicate is merely 
 a part of the complex idea implied by the subject. 
 This, then, is a proof that in order to maintain the 
 Syllogistic form, trifling propositions must some- 
 times be inserted. 
 
 64. Take another instance. Our general pro- 
 position may be, 
 
 A local legislature is advantageous to a coun- 
 try ; whence we may infer, that 
 A local legislature in Ireland would be advan- 
 tageous to that country. 
 
356 . PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 This again is a fair argument ; but, as the pro- 
 position pretends not to universality, there may be 
 circumstances peculiar to Ireland which render the 
 general rule inapplicable ; or, on the contrary, there 
 may in this case be circumstances which render a 
 local legislature peculiarly desirable. When brought 
 to the form of a Syllogism, the argument becomes 
 as follows : 
 
 Every country isbenefited by a local legislature. 
 
 Ireland is- a country ; 
 
 Therefore, Ireland would be benefited by a 
 
 local legislature. 
 Here, as before, it is evident that, by assuming 
 too much, we do away with the argument altogether. 
 We prove nothing, we show the probability of 
 nothing, we suppose the question already settled. 
 
 Once more ; supposing ourselves convinced of the 
 truth of this general proposition, that the laws 
 ought to favour the equal partition of property 
 among all the children of a family, daughters as 
 well as sons, it may still be a question whether 
 there be any circumstances peculiar to land which 
 justify an exception; but, ifw^e begin by *an univer- 
 sal affirmation, that all property ought to be equally 
 divided, there is an end at once to reasoning. 
 
 65. So far concerning the Syllogism of the Schools, 
 the insuperable objection to which is, that it repre- 
 sents Reasoning as something demonstrative in 
 form, frivolous in reality ; that, under the semblance 
 of a perfect or infallible argument, it, in fact, dc^es 
 away with all argument. 
 
OF rHOBABLE REASONING. 357 
 
 66. When I consider the reasons on which this 
 conclusion is built, they appear to me so clear and 
 cogent that here 1 could rest in full conviction. 
 But when I reflect on the fact, that, for many ages, 
 and throughout all civilized Europe, the Syllogism 
 was adopted, and that still some of the greatest' 
 thinkers defend it, I am almost tempted to fall back 
 into scepticism, and to discard metaphysics and 
 logic altogether, as destined perpetually to puzzle, 
 never to satisfy mankind. To avoid this scepticism, 
 this unmanly despair, 1 am forced to rebel against 
 authority, and maintain the liberty of thought. 
 
 II. OE PROBABLE REASONING. 
 
 67- AH reasonings other than those already 
 discussed lead to probable conclusions only ; partly 
 because they are all ultimately based upon facts 
 known by experience, which is always fallible, for 
 facts may be inaccurately observed, and even what 
 once was fact may cease to be so ; partly because 
 wrong conclusions may be drawn from those facts 
 where the reasoning is not demonstrative. In short, 
 errors may arise from inaccuracy either in Observa- 
 tion, or in Reasoning. 
 
 68. Although all probable reasonings (and many 
 demonstrative reasonings also, as we have seen) 
 are based ultimately upon facts, real or supposed, 
 yet they do not all arise immediately from the ex- 
 
358 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 perience of particular things, which alone is pro- 
 perly Experience. Some reasonings, no doubt, do 
 so spring, but others start from general principles 
 or general facts, which had been inferred from many 
 particulars by a previous mental operation. Hence 
 a well-marked distinction between the Inductive 
 and the Deductive method. The one brings in 
 particular facts in order to establish a conclusion, 
 whether general or particular ; the other, from some 
 general proposition deduces or draws out a less 
 general proposition. Induction may proceed not 
 only from particulars to particulars, and from par- 
 ticulars to the general, but also from the general to 
 the more general ; while Deduction always proceeds 
 from a general proposition to one less general. The 
 latter is often called ajjriori reasoning, in opposi- 
 tion to the former styled a posteriori ; though, in 
 reality, the general proposition from which it starts 
 be known only by induction based upon experience. 
 For instance, when we speculate on the advantages or 
 the disadvantages of any form of civil government, we 
 may either consult the history of nations, in order to 
 determine the result of such a scheme in times past, 
 and then conclude that a similar result would follow 
 now ; and here we reason from immediate expe- 
 rience or inductively : or we may draw our infer- 
 ences from the acknowledged principles of human 
 nature ; and in this case we reason from remote 
 experience or deductively ; for the principles of 
 human nature are known to us only by experience. 
 
or PROBABLE REASONING. 359 
 
 G9. It is evident that both these methods of 
 inquiry lead only to probable conclusions, strictly so 
 called. For, besides inaccurate observation and 
 false accounts of facts, the connection between the 
 Premises, namely, a number more or less of par- 
 ticular effects, and the conclusion that such a thing 
 is the Cause of these effects, and of innumerable 
 others similar, is not irresistible ; and even were it 
 irresistible in the cases observed, yet we never could 
 be sure that the cases actually tried, and those not 
 tried, were in all respects similar. And though 
 the principles established by induction may be true 
 generally^ yet, as they cannot be proved universality 
 as their limits are not defined with perfect accuracy, 
 and as there may be other and counteracting prin- 
 ciples at work, therefore reasoning from these gene- 
 ral principles cannot lead to conclusions absolutely 
 certain ; though, when the probability is very great, 
 it commonly passes for a certainty. 
 
 70. Instance of a general law of nature estab- 
 lished by Induction. From the fall, first of an 
 apple, afterwards of other bodies, to the earth, 
 Newton inferred, first, that all bodies tend to the 
 earth, and then that all bodies in nature tend to 
 each other, the earth, the moon, the planets, the 
 sun, and all that therein is, in a word, that gravi- 
 tation is universal. 
 
 Instance of a general practical maxim obtained 
 by Induction. " For this, Thou shalt not commit 
 adultery, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal, 
 
360 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 Thou shalt not bear false witness, Thou shalt not 
 covet, and if there be any other commandment, it 
 is briefly comprehended in this saying, namely, 
 Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." * 
 
 The superiority of a standing army over a 
 militia, as to warlike efficiency, is proved induc- 
 tively from the history of many nations, particu- 
 larly of the ancient world, when standing armies 
 were not general, and when those who had them 
 conquered the rest ; and deductively from the 
 general principle of division of labour. 
 
 There is an antecedent improbability against 
 miracles, founded on our experience of the 
 general uniformity of the course of nature ; but 
 the truth of a particular miracle, as the raising of 
 Lazarus, may be proved by particular facts in 
 evidence. Here we have first a deduction, then an 
 i)iduction. The necessity, or, at least, the utility 
 of local government in general, is proved induc- 
 tively from the history of particular nations, some 
 being the seat of government, others ruled as 
 provinces ; and the same conclusion is arrived at 
 deductively from the known principles of human 
 nature ; such as, that persons on the spot better 
 understand and are more interested in their own 
 affairs than strangers. Again, the utility of local 
 government in general being proved, the expe- 
 diency of the same in a particular case, as that of 
 
 ' Roinans xiii, 9. 
 
OF PROBABLE REASONING. 361 
 
 Ireland, follows by deduction ; and a like conclu- 
 sion may be established inductivelj/, by referring to 
 the particular history of Ireland. 
 
 Take another specimen of deduction. A man 
 is accused of a certain crime, say of murdering 
 another. Starting from certain general principles 
 of human nature, or from the previous good 
 character of the individual in question, we argue 
 that it is very improbable that he committed the 
 murder. This is often called a imori reasoning, 
 because it draws a conclusion prior to an examina- 
 tion of the particular facts of the case ; though, 
 in reality, it is founded on experience, on expe- 
 rience of human nature in general, and of the 
 individual more especially. Afterwards, particu- 
 lar facts are brought forward to prove that he 
 actually committed the deed ; and from these facts 
 we draw our particular conclusion inductively. 
 
 Let us now take an illustration from compara- 
 tive anatomy. Suppose that a scientific zoologist 
 finds in the earth a fossil tooth of some unknown 
 animal, of a species probably extinct. He at once 
 decides from its form that it was the tooth of a 
 quadruped, and of a carnivorous quadruped. 
 This one fact combined with a general principle 
 will give him an insight into the whole structure 
 of the animal. The general principle is, that a 
 carnivorous animal must have such a conformation 
 as is necessary for the existence of life supported 
 on raw flesh. From this one principle an immense 
 
 AAA 
 
362 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 number of consequences will flow. First, the 
 animal in question must have had a jaw fit for lay- 
 ing hold of objects with force, it must have had the 
 condyles or sockets of the jaw adapted for power- 
 ful motion up and down, not sideways as in grami- 
 nivorous animals ; it must have had large tem- 
 poral muscles, and a prominent zygomatic arch to 
 allow room for those muscles ; it must have had 
 strong muscles to raise the head and carry off its 
 prey ; it must have had claws to seize upon prey, 
 and much mobility in those claws; also a fore- 
 arm endowed with great facility of motion, and a 
 formation of bones corresponding; a strong shoul- 
 der-blade ; hinder limbs fitted for rapidity ; much 
 flexibility of vertebrae : peculiar organs of diges- 
 tion ; and very many other particulars too nume- 
 rous to mention. All these may be deduced from 
 the one general principle mentioned above. No 
 doubt, all these conditions of carnivorous life were 
 learnt beforehand from experience, but it was 
 reason that discerned them to be indispensable, 
 and not merely co-existent, and drew the general 
 inference accordingly ; so that subsequently the 
 principle might be applied to deduce, prior to 
 actual experience, what we should expect in the 
 new case. Now let our Zoologist stumble upon a 
 fossil cloven hoof, also of an unknown species of 
 animal, and he will instantly pronounce that the 
 animal had been ruminant ; but why ? Not as in 
 the former case because he can see any connec- 
 
OF PROBABLE REASONING 363 
 
 tion between cloven hoofs and rumination, but 
 simply because all cloven-footed animals hitherto 
 known are ruminant. This is an argument, drawn 
 not from a general principle, but from particular 
 instances only ; and we cannot say positively, as 
 in the former case, that all cloven-footed animals 
 are, much less must be, ruminant, because we can 
 see no connection between the two, but only, all 
 hitherto observed are so. This, then, is an In- 
 ductive argument. 
 
 71. What is called Analogical Reasoning is 
 no distinct species, but only a variety of inductive 
 reasoning. It may be called Indirect Induction 
 No better specimen of this can be given than the 
 general strain of the Reasoning contained in 
 Butler's Analogy, of which I shall here give one 
 or two instances. It is supposed to be known by 
 experience that even here there is a moral govern- 
 ment, that the good, generally speaking, if not 
 more prosperous outwardly, are more happy 
 inwardly than the wicked. Hence the inference 
 that the same will hold good hereafter ; in other 
 words, that the future state will be one of rewards 
 and punishments according to desert. Again, 
 natural religion is attended with great difficulties ; 
 hence it is probable from analogy that a system of 
 revealed religion shall not be altogether free 
 from them. 
 
 Our own existence, particularly the union of 
 soul and body, is a great mystery, and seems even 
 
364 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 to involve contradictions ; surely, then, it is pro- 
 bable that religion shall have mysteries. The soul, 
 from the nature of Spirit, can exist in no place ; 
 but we believe that it is united to our body, which 
 does exist in some place ; that where our body is, 
 there also is our soul, and nowhere else. Is the 
 mystery of the Trinity more incomprehensible 
 than this ? 
 
 72. Since Analogy signifies likeness or resem- 
 blance, (especially likeness of relation), and analo- 
 gical reasoning is reasoning from like things to 
 like ; wherein, it may be asked, lies the difference 
 between this and other varieties of Inductive 
 reasoning ? For all induction is from similar to 
 similar, whether from similar causes w^e infer 
 similar effects, and vice versa ; whether from 
 likeness in some part of the chain we infer like- 
 ness in the whole chain, without knowledge of 
 causes, as when, from certain appearances of the 
 sky we predict, perhaps long beforehand, the com- 
 ing weather; whether from certain parts we infer 
 the co-existence of other parts, as the experienced 
 anatomist, who, from a single bone, or even frag- 
 ment of a bone, can construct the whole animal. 
 Inductive reasoning is a species, of which Analogy 
 is a variety ; nor can we lay down any very defi- 
 nite distinction between it and other varieties. 
 Only, when along with the similarity there is also 
 a good deal of difference, then we call the reason- 
 ing anological; as when we reason from the 
 
OF PEOB.VBLE REASONING. 365 
 
 order of things in this life to that in a future 
 state." 
 
 73. From the above examples and observations 
 the distinction between the Inductive and the De- 
 ductive method of inquiry seems to be clearly estab- 
 lished. But we have not yet noticed that the term 
 Induction comprehends two distinct mental opera- 
 tions ; first, the observing, the comparing, the 
 selecting of facts ; and secondly, drawing a conclu- 
 sion from them. Great Judgment may be required 
 in the first operation, but the second alone is pro- 
 perly Reasoning. The detail of facts, moreover, 
 may fill volumes, but the reasoning in Induction is 
 always very short : for, when from the particular 
 facts we have drawn our general conclusion directly, 
 inductive reasoning is ended. Then Deduction be- 
 gins, and the chain of reasoning may be prolonged 
 indefinitely. Thus there is much more of reasoning 
 in deduction than in induction, nay, the former is 
 all reasoning, the latter only in part. 
 
 74. As a specimen of a chain of deductive rea- 
 soning, take the following : 
 
 The capacity of the mind is limited ; 
 
 " For an admirable sijecimen of Analogical Induction, see 
 the opening chapters of Paley's Natural Theology. Never was 
 argument better put. Let us not forget that when we allow de- 
 sign, we allow a designer ; and who can help seeing design in all 
 around him ? The reasonings of Natural Theology lie in a nut- 
 shell ; the facts fill the universe. 
 
366 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY, 
 
 Therefore the more it is occupied with one thing, 
 the less can it be occupied with another ; 
 
 Therefore the more it is taken up with intellec- 
 tual pursuits, the less can it be taken up with the 
 afifections, and nice versa. 
 
 Therefore, again, the more it is occupied with 
 general benevolence, the less can it be occupied with 
 private attachments, and vice versa. 
 
 In this chain of reasoning each proposition is 
 less general than the preceding, and each is an 
 inference from what went before. In induction 
 there is no such chain, the reasoning consists but 
 of one link. 
 
 75. Since it is the reasoning process alone 
 that is common to Induction and Deduction, in this 
 only can they admit of comparison. Let us then 
 examine that process in both cases, in order to de- 
 termine what similarity or what difference may exist 
 between them. 
 
 76. In Deductive Reasoning, having stated a 
 general proposition, our object is to show that the 
 particular case which we have in view is really 
 comprehended under the general rule; so that if 
 the one be true, so must the other. Thus, our 
 general proposition being that " the more the mind 
 is occupied with one thing, the less can it be occu- 
 pied with another," we then consider that intellec- 
 tual pursuits are an occupation; and again, that the 
 affections are another occupation ; whence it appears 
 that the less general proposition, " the more the 
 
OF PROBABLE REASONING. 367 
 
 mind is occupied with intellectual pursuits the less 
 can it be occupied with the affections," is a case of 
 the general rule, or comprehended under it. 
 
 ^^ . Now, how stands the case with Inductive 
 Reasoning ? Suppose a traveller in a new country 
 to meet with a troop of animals hitherto quite un- 
 known to him ; that he catches one, kills, and dis- 
 sects it with the skill of a practised anatomist. 
 One specimen contents him, for he confidently be- 
 lieves that all the rest, so like outwardly, are also 
 alike inwardly. But why does he believe so*? That 
 is the question. The mental process by which he 
 arrives at the conclusion seems to be simply as fol- 
 lows. Here is an animal of a certain make. There 
 are many other animals, to all outward appearance 
 exceedingly like to this, and to each other. There- 
 fore^ all these animals are alike within as well as 
 without. 
 
 78. The above is all of which the mind seems 
 to be conscious in inductive inference ; but as, on 
 reflection, there is no necessary connection between 
 the Premises and the Conclusion, for we certainly 
 cannot see that resemblance in certain particulars 
 infallibly proves resemblance in others; thereupon 
 logicians suppose that a general proposition must be 
 understood, in order to justify the inference. This 
 general proposition is, that nature is uniform in her 
 operations, and never deceives us hy uniting great 
 differences with striking resemblances, and from this 
 proposition, or one similar, the conclusion is sup- 
 
368 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 posed to be drawn deductively. According to this 
 theory, then, the reasoning part of the process in 
 Induction is only a concealed Deduction. 
 
 79. The supposition that the foregoing general 
 proposition, or one similar, is actually present to the 
 mind in every case of inductive inference, and that 
 from it the conclusion is drawn, seems not to rest 
 on any sufficient evidence. It may be necessary to 
 reduce reasoning to an uniform system, it may be 
 necessary on subsequent reflection to satisfy the 
 rational mind, it may be required in Logic, but 
 not in Metaphysics. As a matter of fact, we be- 
 lieve that minds which have never risen to any 
 such very general proposition still draw conclu- 
 sions inductively with more or less accuracy, that, 
 when they have seen a cause followed by a certain 
 eff'ect to-day, they will expect a like cause to be 
 followed by a like effect to-morrow. This de- 
 pends upon a principle of human nature, that 
 when we see resemblance in one or more parti- 
 culars, then we expect resemblance in others. 
 Such is the real Cause of Inductive inferences, a 
 cause which influences those who have never 
 heard or dreamt of the Logical Reason. This is a 
 subsequent generalization of a very high order, 
 which justifies to our Reasoning faculty what at 
 first was independent thereof. 
 
 80. That there is a tendency in human nature 
 to expect like effects from like causes, and vice 
 versa, or, more generally, where we observe resem- 
 
OF PROBABLE 11E.V30NL\G. 369 
 
 blance in certain particulars, there to look for 
 resemblance in others, cannot be doubted ; but it 
 may be questioned whether this tendency be 
 original or derived, instinctive or acquired ; and 
 if not original, from what it is derived. Hume 
 maintains that it is derived from Custom. When 
 two phenomena have often been observed in con- 
 junction, the mind passes readily between the two, 
 and when it observes the one cannot help ex- 
 pecting the other. " All inferences from expe- 
 rience, therefore, are effects of Custom not of 
 reasoning."'' This at first seems a plausible ex- 
 planation, but it is refuted by the fact that one 
 instance of Sequence or of Co-existence is often 
 enough to induce us to expect a similar Sequence 
 or Co-existence in future. The child who has 
 once been burnt by fire needs no repetition of the 
 experiment to avoid the flames ever after. In fact, 
 the tendency is to look for more uniformity in 
 nature than there really is, and to suppose that 
 what has happened once will happen again and 
 again. Subsequent experience, no doubt, corrects 
 our errors, but the natural tendency is to expect 
 the recurrence of events which had been only 
 casually united, and united but for once. Now 
 Custom supposes Repetition, and therefore the 
 explanation fails. 
 
 81. If these inferences from experience be 
 not the effect of custom, can they be traced to 
 * Essays Vol. II. Sceptical Solutions of these doubts. 
 B B B 
 
370 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 anything else ? The other supposition, mentioned 
 by Hume and combated by him, is that they may 
 be the effect of Reasoning. This language, how- 
 ever, is very inaccurate. An inference may or 
 may not be entitled to the name of Reasoning ; 
 but to say that it is the effect of reasoning is 
 unintelligible. The only real question is, whether 
 these inferences from experience be properly rea- 
 soning, or not ? If they be instances of reasoning, 
 then we have nothing more to ask ; but if not, 
 we shall still have to inquire what they are, and 
 whether they can be otherwise accounted for, 
 since they cannot be owing to Custom. 
 
 82. When the child has once burnt his finger 
 in the candle, when he has once seen a man 
 drowned in the river, he will shun the flame and 
 deep water ever after. He must therefore believe 
 that, as in the past, so in the future, flame will burn 
 and water drown. But why does he so believe? 
 Is it by reasoning ? Not to mention that the rea- 
 soning powers are not developed at a very early 
 age, what connection do we discern between the 
 fact, this has happened once, and the inference, a 
 like effect will ever after ensue in similar circum- 
 stances ? Yet, in cases such as the above, the 
 inference is drawn at once, without hesitation, by 
 persons of all ages, and every degree of intelli- 
 gence, by infants, almost by idiots. Surely this is 
 not like reasoning. Reasoning power comes upon 
 us by degrees, is frequently at fault, exists not at 
 
OF TROBABLE REASONING. 371 
 
 all in infancy, grows slowly, often decays pre- 
 maturely, and varies excessively in different in- 
 dividuals at all ages ; but simple inferences from 
 experience are early, certain, uniform, and univer- 
 sal. It may be said that all this depends upon 
 the simplicity of the reasoning. But point out to 
 me any reasoning, universally allowed to be so, 
 that is manifest to all ages and all degrees of 
 intelligence. Mathematical reasoning is very 
 simple, and admits, when comprehended, of no 
 doubt ; but many grown persons, not to say 
 children, have never been able to master a propo- 
 sition in Euclid. The early preservation of the 
 human race was of too great importance to be 
 left to the tardy development of the reasoning- 
 powers. A facility of drawing simple inferences 
 without reasoning was necessary to the very ex- 
 istence of the human race, as well as of other 
 animals. There can be no doubt that animals do 
 draw their inferences as well as man, that, after a 
 little experience, they avoid fire and water and 
 other things that may harm them ; but shall we 
 say that in so doing kittens and puppy-dogs rea- 
 son ? It may be that animals are capable of 
 reasoning to a certain extent, but we need not 
 therefore allow that they can infer nothing with- 
 out reasoning. 
 
 It has often been asked whether animals have 
 Reason. That many animals have, I cannot doubt, 
 for these simple inferences I attribute to Reason, 
 though not to reasoning power. 
 
372 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 The tendency to draw such inferences is cer- 
 tainly an Instinct, but Reason seems necessary in 
 order to draw them correctly. The Idiot cannot 
 so draw them, and therefore he cannot take care 
 of himself, because he has no Reason ; but the 
 madman can, for his Reason is only partially 
 subverted. His danger arises not from ignorance 
 of common consequences, but from a wish to 
 destroy himself or others. Irrational inferences, 
 such as that Tenterden Church steeple was the 
 cause of the Goodwin Sands, show both the 
 Instinctive tendency, and the necessity of Reason 
 as a guide to that tendency. 
 
 It is only by a misconception of the nature of 
 Reason, and by confounding it with Reasoning, 
 that the question can have arisen whether animals 
 possess Reason. That they draw innumerable 
 inferences from experience, and that correctly, 
 there is no doubt : and if so, they have Reason 
 sufficient to guide the Instinct, the natural ten- 
 dency to draw inferences right or wrong. These 
 two must not be confounded; the tendency to 
 infer that things once conjoined will be conjoined 
 again and again ; and Reason, which informs us 
 when such conjunctions may be expected, when 
 not ; for every event is accompanied casually by 
 innumerable events, some immediately before, 
 some contemporaneous, some immediately after. 
 
 83. I must therefore conclude that there are 
 simple inferences from experience which are not 
 
OF PROBABLE BEASONING. 373 
 
 instances of reasoning. What then are we to 
 think of these inferences^ Is the word inference 
 properly applied to them *? If so, then inference 
 does not always imply reasoning. This is clear ; 
 but let us examine their nature. 
 
 84. Our belief in the uniformity of nature 
 belongs to the same order of phenomena as our 
 belief in the existence of the material world. This 
 latter belief may also be called an inference, an 
 inference from certain sensations that are not 
 material, and bear no resemblance to matter, and 
 from which, therefore, no conclusion as to the 
 existence of matter could have been drawn by 
 reasoning. Where one phenomenon leads to be- 
 lief in something else, there, perhaps, the term 
 inference may be employed ; though I allow that 
 it is more properly used where the mind discerns 
 some connection between premises and conclusion, 
 where the Reason is convinced, not merely an 
 effect produced. But let that verbal question be 
 decided as it may, whether our belief in the ma- 
 terial world, and our belief in the uniformity of 
 nature, be called inferences or not, they are cer- 
 tainly not instances of reasoning. What then are 
 they ? They are Original articles of belief, which 
 arise in the mind on certain appointed occasions. 
 They are not derived from Custom or Repetition, 
 for no repetition of sensations can give of itself a 
 knowledge of matter, any more than a single in- 
 stance ; and we have seen that our belief in the 
 
374 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 uniformity of nature often arises from a single 
 case : they are not acquired or learnt by Experi- 
 ence ; for, though experience makes us acquainted 
 with sensations, it can never inform us that they 
 depend upon an outward material cause ; and 
 though experience, in a wider sense, may teach 
 us what is now passing around, yet it cannot 
 instruct us that similar events will recur in future. 
 Between the knowledge, this has been once or 
 oftener, and the subsequent belief, this will always 
 be, there is a wide gulf, which we must leap across, 
 for we never can bridge it over. The inference, if 
 such we call it, is not logical, for we can see no 
 connection between premises and conclusion, but it 
 is often irresistible. This, then, like belief in the 
 existence of matter, is a primary article of our 
 creed, totally independent of reasoning ; neither 
 self-evident, nor learnt by experience ; for experi- 
 ence is only of the past. No doubt, experience is 
 the occasion on which the belief arises, and if the 
 occasion, then an auxiliary cause ; but the princi- 
 pal cause lies deep in the mind predisposed to 
 adopt the belief. This belief, at first dormant, is 
 roused and developed by the earliest exciting 
 cause. 
 
 85. But if these inferences from experience 
 be not reasoning, why do we talk of Inductive 
 reasoning at all ? All inductive conclusions are 
 founded on our belief in the uniformity of nature, 
 and if this belief be independent of reasoning. 
 
OF PROBABLE REASONING. 375 
 
 must not all Induction be so likewise ?- This dif- 
 ficulty seems never to have been fairly met by 
 philosophers, and their language on the subject is 
 variable, and apparently contradictory ; for at one 
 time they assert that inferences of the kind in 
 question are not " effects of reasoning," or, are not 
 " grounded upon reasoning," while at another 
 they talk of experimental or inductive as a branch 
 of probable reasoning. Now, can these two state- 
 ments be reconciled *? 
 
 86. We have seen that the natural tendency 
 to associate phenomena is so strong that at first 
 we often suppose a constant, where there is only 
 a casual, conjunction. Afterwards, however, ex- 
 perience corrects this tendency, in some men 
 more, in others less, according to their opportu- 
 nities or their attention, by showing where there 
 is, and where there is not, uniformity. We gradu- 
 ally learn that perfect similarity in one respect is 
 essential to similarity in another, that causes 
 must really be like, in order that effects may also 
 be alike. Now, in determining the degree of si- 
 milarity between two cases, much judgment may 
 be required, where the resemblances are compli- 
 cated ; and thus a foundation is laid for reasoning. 
 Where the cases are very simple, as in the com- 
 mon effects of fire and water, there little judgment 
 is necessary, and the inference is immediate, but, 
 in difficult cases, the immediate belief is often 
 wrong, and judgment must come into play. In 
 
376 PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 short, we start with a natural tendency to belief, 
 but, after a time, it leaves us to the conduct of 
 Judgment. What judgment does, is to show us 
 the similarity or the dissimilarity of two cases, to 
 afford ground for reasoning, which is built there- 
 upon, and ends in a conclusion. The reasoning 
 is very short, consisting but of one argument, 
 which may be stated thus, 
 
 A has hitherto always been followed by B ; 
 
 Here is a case exactly similar to A ; 
 
 Therefore, A will again be followed by B ; 
 where the first proposition may be ascribed to 
 Observation, the second to Judgment, the third to 
 Reasoning. 
 
 87- Here then is the solution of the difficulty 
 above suggested. In simple cases of inference 
 from experience, the natural tendency requires 
 little guidance ; while, in the more complicated, 
 Judgment and Reasoning are necessary. Natural 
 tendency is content with one instance of co-ex- 
 istence or of succession, but Judgment, informed 
 by experience, may require many. In simple cases, 
 one instance is as good as a thousand, as in the 
 cases of drowning and burning ; but, in more com- 
 plex phenomena, many observations, many expe- 
 riments even, may be required to satisfy the judg- 
 ment as to the existence of similarity or of dissi- 
 milarity, and thereupon to draw a conclusion. 
 
 88. It must be allowed that this species of 
 reasoning differs considerably from those which 
 
OF PROBABLE REASONING. 377 
 
 "vve have hitherto examined. In demonstrative rea- 
 soning we clearly discern the connection between 
 the premises and the conclusion, we see that if 
 the former be true, so must the latter ; and even in 
 probable deductive reasoning we are conscious that 
 if the premises be well-founded, the inference is j;ro- 
 bahlj/ correct; but what connection do we see 
 between tlie propo.-3ition. Alias hitherto always been 
 followed by B, and the inference A will again be 
 followed by B ? Yet the inference is always drawn, 
 nay, is often irresistible, as much relied on as the 
 conclusions of geometry. The only account that 
 can be given of these inferences, is, that they depend 
 upon a natural tendency, confirmed and corrected by 
 experience. They may be called IS on- Intuitive, 
 in opposition to Intuitive inferences. If we can- 
 not explain Intuition, neither can we account for 
 Natural tendency. It might indeed be a question 
 whether these non-intuitive inferences were or were 
 not reasoning ; but this we have already answered 
 by showing that some are, and others are not en- 
 titled to that name. All men are agreed in giving 
 the name of reasoning to certain inferences from 
 experience, and we cannot fight against the universal 
 sense of mankind on the subject of Metaphysics. 
 
 89. Mr. Bailey, in his very able work '■' The 
 Theory of Reasoning,"' has suggested Instinctive as 
 an epithet which might be properly applied to that 
 
 ' The Theory of Reasoning, p. 25. 
 
 c c c 
 
378 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 species of reasoning which we call Probable, and 
 which he terms Contingent. But this would be a 
 misapplication of the word Instinct. Nay, histinc- 
 tive reasoning appears to me very like a contradic- 
 tion. Instinct and Reason, at least, are constantly 
 opposed, and how can there be reasoning without 
 reason ? Instinctive inference might pass, if all 
 inference be not reasoning, and then it would be 
 ojDposed to Rational inference. But, strictly speak- 
 ing, Instinct acts prior to all experience, as in bees, 
 who, without any lesson, all build their cells in the 
 form of hexagons ; and as in some other animals, 
 who avoid poisonous plants without trying them. 
 Not so the child, who, before experience, does not 
 know that water will suffocate or fire give pain, for 
 children who have learnt no better will put their 
 fingers into the candle. The inference afterwards 
 drawn by them, even from a single experiment, is 
 hardly instinctive, though the tendency to draw 
 some inference is natural, universal, irresistible. 
 We have seen, indeed, above, that though the ten- 
 dency to draw inferences from past experience be 
 instinctive, yet, to draw them correctly some degree 
 of Reason is required, but not always Reasoning. 
 Therefore we may divide Inferences from Experience 
 into the Simple and the Complex, the former requir- 
 ing Reason only in its most simple form, as a guide ; 
 the other embracing Reasoning according to the 
 doctrine delivered in the previous pages. 
 
 90. Can any definite line be drawn whereby to 
 
OF PROBABLE REASONING. 379 
 
 distinguish Simple from Complex inferences ^ The 
 forming of general laws is always a case of Complex 
 inference or Reasoning: but particular conclusions 
 may be either Simple or Complex. To predict from 
 certain signs the coming weather requires an effort 
 of Reasoning, but surely no reasoning is required to 
 foretell that the Sun will rise to-morrow. ]n these 
 and innumerable other cases, the distinction is 
 evident, but there may be others where it is doubt- 
 ful. Most of our classifications are liable to this 
 imperfection, and surely that most delicate piece of 
 "workmanship, the human mind, cannot be free from 
 those fine shades, those imperceptible differences, 
 which defy all discrimination. Perfectly to unravel 
 so intricate a network may w'ell baffle the subtlety 
 of the acutest metaphysician. 
 
 91. As Inductive appears to differ widely from 
 other reasoning, and as, moreover, the name of 
 reasoning cannot be denied to it without doing 
 violence to common notions and common lanfjuaere, 
 an attempt has been made to make it accord more 
 nearly with other species, by means of what I shall 
 call a logical fiction . The endeavour to reduce In- 
 ductive reasoning to the syllogistic form has miser- 
 ably failed, and could not but fail ; for in Induction 
 we do not start from an universal, or even from a 
 general principle, but, on the contrary, conclude by 
 one. The attempt to assimilate Inductive to proba- 
 ble Deductive reasoning has also failed, and for a 
 like reason. In this I confess my own error, for 
 
380 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 the latter attempt was made by myself in my Intro- 
 duction to Mental Philosophy ; and here 1 shall 
 quote what is there written. 
 
 92.' " Suppose a traveller in a new country to 
 meet with a troop of animals hitherto quite unknown 
 to him ; that he catches one, kills, and dissects it 
 yviih the skill of a practised anatomist. One speci- 
 men contents him, for he confidently believes that 
 all the rest, so like outwardly, are also alike in- 
 wardly. Now what reason has he for this belief'? 
 The mental process necessary to justify this conclu- 
 sion seems to me as follows. Here is an animal of 
 a certain make. There are many other animals, to 
 all outward appearance exceedingly like to this, and 
 to each other. But, nature is umform in her opera- 
 tions^ and never deceives us by uniting great differ- 
 ences with such striking resemblances ; therefore, all 
 these animals are alike within as well as with- 
 out."^ 
 
 93. Now, the proposition in Italics is what I 
 call a logical fiction. It has evidently been sup- 
 posed in order to assimilate this reasoning to the 
 deductive, which is based upon a general principle ; 
 in other words, for the sake of uniformity, that dar- 
 ling Idol of the human mind. But omit that pro- 
 position and we shall find no blank in the reasoning. 
 The inference is as cogent as before, the conclusion 
 as firmly established ; though it be not in accordance 
 
 * Introduction to Mental Philosophy, p. 192, 
 
OF PROBABLE REASONING 381 
 
 with the rules of ratiocinatke logic. Mr. Mill has 
 "well divided Logic into the ratiociuative and the in- 
 ductive, thus allowing that there is a real difference 
 between them. It is allowed that the above general 
 proposition, or one equivalent, is never expressed, 
 always understood. But what right have we to 
 say that a proposition is understood if it be never 
 expressed"? In Logic as in Grammar, if in a cer- 
 tain case a proposition or a word be sometimes ex- 
 pressed, we may say, where a similar argument, or 
 a similar phrase occurs, only without that one pro- 
 position, or that one word, there the proposition or 
 the word is understood, reasoning from analogy ; 
 but when no instance can be shown of the full 
 statement, the supposed ellipse is a mere fiction. 
 Were we to assume that general propositions might 
 be understood in reasoning though never expressed, 
 we could affirm that even the syllogism was elliptical. 
 Thus, taking any common example, such as, All 
 men are mortal ; James is a man; therefore James 
 is mortal ; we could say that the General Principle 
 of the Syllogism, the dictum of Aristotle, is here 
 understood, and that the reasoning in full would 
 stand thus : 
 
 All men are mortal; 
 
 James is a man ; 
 
 But whatever is predicated of a class can be 
 predicated of everything comprehended under that 
 class ; 
 
 And it is predicated of the class men that they 
 are mortal; 
 
382 PEINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 And James belongs to that class ; 
 
 Therefore, James (as a member of that class) is 
 mortal. 
 
 But, after this lengthened statement, is the con- 
 clusion one whit more certain than before ^ And if 
 not, must it not be considered as laborious trifling ? 
 But we have as much reason to affirm that the 
 above general proposition is understood in every 
 syllogism, as to assert that the general proposition 
 relative to the uniformity of nature is understood in 
 every inductive argument. 
 
 94. I grant that the general principle above 
 stated may be drawn out or educed, as Mr. 
 Bailey expresses it, from this and other similar cases 
 of reasoning ; that it is a generalization from parti- 
 cular instances ; but to say that the conclusion can 
 be drawn only by means of such a general proposi- 
 tion is a totally different assertion. In treating of 
 demonstrative reasoning we mentioned the difference 
 between generalization and analysis, a distinction 
 which again applies to the present case. The doc- 
 trine that the above general proposition is an indis- 
 pensable premiss of every Inductive argument, and 
 therefore necessary to its validity, can, I think, be 
 clearly disproved. For if a general proposition be 
 required for the validity of every Inductive argu- 
 ment, how, I may ask, was that general proposition 
 arrived at from which we are supposed to reason'? 
 It is allowed not to be self-evident; from simple 
 instinct it cannot be derived, for no general proposi- 
 
OF TBOBABLE REASONING. 383 
 
 tiou is instinctive ; nor from simple observation, for 
 observation is only of particulars ; therefore it must 
 be arrived at by the aid of reasoning from particu- 
 lars. But, by the supposition, "we cannot reason 
 from particulars without a general proposition. 
 Here, then, is a flat contradiction, and consequently 
 the supposition is untenable. Were we to wait to 
 reason until we had framed general propositions 
 concerning the uniformity of nature, we should never 
 reason at all about matters of fact ; for those propo- 
 sitions cannot be arrived at without reasoning. 
 They are generalizations from experience by rea- 
 soning. 
 
 95. The object of general induction is to es- 
 tablish a general conclusion, by means of instances 
 so divested of peculiar circumstances as to ob- 
 viate the mistake of stating as general what is 
 only particular. One inference would be as good 
 as a thousand, if we could be sure that it was quite 
 in point, that is, free from any peculiar circumstan- 
 ces, and it is only because we are not sure of this, 
 that we must multiply instances. The grand object 
 then is to prove similarity, perfect or at least 
 sufficient similarity, between cases observed and 
 others not observed. The uncertainty of Induction 
 depends partly on the difficulty of determining the 
 degree of similarity between cases observed and 
 others which have not been observed in all points, 
 partly on the mistakes to which the original observa- 
 tion was liable. In a word, we may observe ill in 
 
384 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 the first instance, or the new cases may not be in all 
 respects similar to the old. 
 
 96. Nothing more simple, nothing more brief 
 than the reasoning, properJy so called, in Induction ; 
 the grand difficulty lies in the collecting, comparing, 
 and scrutinising of instances. For this, great pa- 
 tience as well as great judgment may be required. 
 The tendency is to infer too hastily. To draw an 
 inference is easy enough ; but to know when we are 
 justified in drawing it, is the point. It is not as in 
 other reasoning where we see at once whether the 
 premises justify the conclusion ; for this reasoning 
 is based upon natural tendency to believe, not upon 
 Intuition, and natural tendency impels us to infer at 
 once, rather than to wait and infer rightly. Sub- 
 sequent experience, attention, and judgment, are 
 necessary to correct the errors of the natural ten- 
 dency. We may be also greatly assisted by a 
 system of rules applicable to the business of Induc- 
 tion, in other words^ by Inductive Logic, if the word 
 Logic may be used in a sense so extensive, and be 
 not confined to Logic proper, or pure Logic. Such a 
 system of rules we have in the Second Book of the 
 Novum Organum,the triumph of the genius of Bacon. 
 This subject, after a long interruption, has been taken 
 up again by Mr. Mill in his System of Logic. 
 
 97. Finally, the differences between Induction 
 and Deduction may be thus summed up. 
 
 Firsts the facts from which Induction springs are 
 never more general than the conclusion ; 
 
OF PROB.VRLE REASONING. 395 
 
 Sccondhi, the conclusion always follows at once 
 from the facts, without the iuterveutiou of a gene- 
 ral principle. 
 
 Thirdly^ the inference is non-intuitive. 
 
 Fourthly, there is no such thing as a long chain 
 of inductive reasoning, as there may be of deduc- 
 tive, where one inference may follow^ upon another 
 till we get far away from the original premises ; 
 "whereas on the other hand, 
 
 Fifthly, in Induction, the detail of facts may fill 
 volumes. There is, in short, in Induction far less 
 reasoning than in Deduction, the reasoning process 
 consisting, in the former, of one step only.^ 
 
 Lastlj/, since particulars occur first to the mind, 
 it follows that the Inductive must precede the De- 
 ductive process. The general propositions from 
 •which the latter sets out must have been estab- 
 lished by a previous process of inductive generaliza- 
 tion, well or ill performed. Thus, in the order of 
 time, induction comes before deduction. 
 
 98. By many, Bacon has been called the in- 
 ventor of the Inductive method, a method, how- 
 ever, as old as the creation, which that eminent 
 genius only brought more into notice, restored, 
 improved, illustrated, and reduced to system. 
 This system is contained in the Frarogativoe In- 
 
 * Take, as an instance of the one, Mai thus on Population, who 
 fills three volumes with facts in support of his principle ; of the 
 other, the writings of Ricardo and James Mill on Political Economy. 
 D D D 
 
386 PRINCIPI.KS OF rSYClIOLOOy, 
 
 sfanft(irum,\\\i\v\\ fill the second Hook of the Novum 
 Origanum. The two methods, the Dcduetive and 
 the Induetive, are well described by him in the 
 followinii; Aphorism. " There are and can be but 
 two ways of seekin;^ and findini:; out truth. The 
 one from sense and jmrticulars flies to the most 
 general axioms, and from these ])rinei|)le8, firmly 
 established, finds out and judges of intermediate 
 axioms ; and this is the way now in use. The 
 other raises axioms from sense and particulars, 
 ascendinj^ continuously and gradually, so as at 
 last to arrive at the most general, which is the 
 true but untried way."'' 
 
 99. Here we may remark a difference in form 
 between Demonstrative and Probable Keasoning. 
 We have seen, from an examination of instances, 
 that demonstrative reasoning consists of three 
 propositions at least ; but we did not formerly 
 observe that, from the nature of the case, it t/iust 
 have at least three propositions. For were a con- 
 clusion ii)ferre(l infallibly and directly from a 
 single proposition, then it must be necessarily 
 and evidently implied in that j)roj)Osition ; and if 
 so, the conclusion, so called, is not arrived at by 
 Reasoning. But Probable Reasoning may consist 
 of only two propositions, because if an inference 
 can be drawn from a single proposition and drawn 
 only probably, then it is not evidently compre- 
 
 '' Novum Orgaiium. Aph. 19. Translated. 
 
OF PROBABLE BL 387 
 
 bended under or implied by it, and therefore thi« 
 is reasoning And, that an inference may be 
 dravrn from a ein^e proposition i« proved by the 
 follovring example : 
 
 Trade in general ou^ht to be free ; 
 
 Therefore the Corn Trade oui^ht to be free ; 
 which Ls a ca<>« of probable reason! 
 
 But all Trade ought to be free ; 
 
 Therefore the Cora Trade ought to be free, 
 is not reasoning; for the second proposition is 
 evidently comprehended under the first ; no rea- 
 ioniug Is required to draw it out. Perfect Rea- 
 Eoning, therefore, or Demonstrative, must consist 
 of three propositions at least. Imperfect or Pro- 
 bable Reasoning, of the Deductive kind, may 
 hare only two. A.s tor Induction, three Ls the 
 number of propositions which it contains, as we 
 hare already seen, and they may be expressed 
 generally thus : 
 
 A has hitherto always been followed or accom- 
 panied by B; 
 
 Here is a case to all appearance exactly simflar 
 to A ; 
 
 Therefore it will be followed or accompanied 
 brB. 
 
 The simplicity and uniformity of this species 
 of reasoning are here apparent 
 
388 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 SECTION THIRD. 
 
 ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF REASONING. 
 
 1. We have seen (Section first of this Chap- 
 ter) what is common to all Reasoning, but we do 
 not attempt to establish one universal principle of 
 cogency in reasoning, because we do not believe 
 that any such principle exists. We have seen 
 that reasoning is of different kinds, first Demon- 
 strative and Probable, and then, that Probable 
 reasoning is either Inductive or Deductive. It is 
 unlikely that the same General Principle of co- 
 gency should run through these different species ; 
 and a particular examination of each will confirm 
 this supposition. Even in mathematical reason- 
 ing, which embraces but one kind of relation, 
 clearly distinguished from all other relations, and 
 having its own differences also clearly marked 
 out, there is more than one fundamental principle 
 or axiom. How then can there be but one prin- 
 ciple common to all reasoning. Probable as well 
 as Demonstrative ? The case of Mathematics 
 proves, at least, that all reasoning is not an exem- 
 plification of one and the same principle. " Things 
 which are equal to the same are equal to one 
 another," and "'if equals be added to equals the 
 
GENERAL TUINCIPLES OF REASONLNG. 389 
 
 wholes are equal," are not one axiom but two ;'and 
 the axiom peculiar to Geometry, " two lines can- 
 not enclose a space," is surely different from 
 both. 
 
 2. But do we clearly understand what is 
 meant by a General Principle of Reasoning^ or 
 Principle of Cogency in Reasoning P It is a gene- 
 ral truth, of which each inference is a particular 
 instance, a truth either self-evident and necessary 
 as in mathematics ; or not self-evident, not neces- 
 sarily true, but undisputed, as in inquiries about 
 matters of fact. In a particular instance of such 
 a principle the validity of every inference consists, 
 and upon this instance conviction depends. Con- 
 sidered in respect to reasoning itself, the Principle, 
 by means of the particular instance, is an inva- 
 riable constituent or element ; in respect to the 
 influence on the mind of the inquirer, by the same 
 means, a Cause ; for, as we have shown else- 
 where,'' a Principle may be either Constituent or 
 elemental, or else Causal. 
 
 '6. We must not confound General Principles 
 of Reasoning with the General Principles of any 
 Science. The latter are the leading or most 
 important General Propositions from which the 
 many less general truths of each Science are 
 deduced ; as, in Political Economy, the Principle 
 of Division of Labour, the Principle of Popula- 
 
 "^See the Author's " Introduction to Mental Philosophy," Part 
 I. Article Puikciple. 
 
390 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 tion, of Free Trade, etc. When any application 
 is to be made of these principles, they are always 
 stated, and conclusions drawn from them accord- 
 ingly. But the General Principles of Reasoning 
 are never stated, for they are the very elements of 
 which Reasoning itself consists ; and we cannot 
 both Reason on any subject and analyze the pro- 
 cess of Reasoning at the same time. It is only 
 when Reasoning itself becomes the subject of our 
 inquiry, that we analyze reasoning. The axioms 
 of mathematics are never stated in the course of 
 our reasonings in that Science, for the Science is 
 not deduced from them ; but every mathematical 
 argument is a particular instance of one or other 
 of the Axioms. Thus, the reasoning A is equal 
 to B, and B to C, therefore A is equal to C, is an 
 instance of the axiom " Things which are equal 
 to the same are equal to one another" ; and so 
 in every other case. These Axioms, then, are the 
 very elements or constituents of the reasoning, 
 not data from which reasoning proceeds. So it is 
 in probable reasoning. The principles of the 
 reasoning itself are never stated, whether in in- 
 duction or in deduction ; but each argument is 
 an exemplification of those principles of which the 
 reasoning consists ; such as, in the one case, that 
 Nature is uniform in her operations ; in the other, 
 that what is allowed to be true in general will be 
 true in particular instances. 
 
 4. There is then no one universal principle of 
 
GENERAL TRIXCIPLES OF REASONING. 391 
 
 cogency in reasoning, but there are several gene- 
 ral principles, one or other of which pervades all 
 reasoning ; in other words, each instance of rea- 
 soning is a particular exemplification of some one 
 principle common to it, and to innumerable other 
 instances of the same kind ; but every argument 
 is not an example of the same principle. No 
 reasoning, then, can be said to be drawn from these 
 principles, but all reasoning embraces a particular 
 instance of one or other of them. They are not 
 the formal Premises of an argument, but the very 
 essence thereof. 
 
 5. Demonstrative reasoning seems to compre- 
 hend a greater number of these principles than 
 Probable reasoning ; though this may be only in 
 appearance, owing to the circumstance that 
 mathematicians have been at more pains to state 
 the axioms of their Science than writers on other 
 subjects. No less than twelve axioms are enume- 
 rated in Euclid's Elements of Geometry. Of 
 these, some are very much alike ; such as, " if 
 equals be added to equals, the wholes are equal,'* 
 and " if equals be taken from equals, the remain- 
 ders are equal ;" also " if equals be added to un- 
 equals, the wholes are unequal," and " if equals be 
 taken from unequals, the remainders are unequal." 
 " Things which are double of the same, are equal 
 to one another," likewise closely resembles 
 " Things which are halves of the same are equal 
 to one another ;" yet all these are considered as 
 
392 PEINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 distinct axioms. Moreover, " The whole is greater 
 than its part " is unworthy the name of axiom, for 
 it is an identical or trifling proposition, in which 
 nothing is affirmed not contained in the meaning 
 of the Subject. Whoever understands the signifi- 
 cation of the word " whole" must know that it is 
 greater than its part. Thus, the number of these 
 axioms has been enlarged as much as possible, 
 and, in one instance at least, improperly. All 
 these axioms relate to Quantity, and to Co- 
 existence alone ; and to them the following 
 may be added, as applicable to demonstrative 
 reasoning, applied not of necessity to Quan- 
 tity : 
 
 1. If the first always co-exist with the second, ^ 
 and the second with the third, then will the third 
 always co-exist with the first. 
 
 2. And vice versa ; If the first never co-exist 
 with the second, and if the second always co-exist 
 with the third, then will the third never co-exist 
 with the first. 
 
 Lastly, among the axioms proper to demon- 
 strative reasoning, we may reckon the Dictum de 
 omni et nullo, the syllogistic axiom, which, so far 
 as applicable to any argument, can be only to a 
 demonstrative one, as to a certain case of Mathe- 
 matical reasoning already mentioned. Since, how- 
 ever, this dictum is not a proper axiom, as we 
 before observed, but only a verbal proposition, a 
 definition of a class, the reasoning which exem- 
 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF REASONING. 393 
 
 plifies it can be called such rather by courtesy 
 than by right. 
 
 6. We have seen that one general axiom per- 
 vades all probable Deductive Reasoning, namely, 
 " whatever is true in general must be true in par- 
 ticular cases, provided those cases be in point," a 
 palpable truism. The \vhole difficulty lies in es- 
 tablishing the fact that the case really is in point. 
 That granted, the inference is irresistible. The 
 relation here traced is evidently one of compre- 
 hension, and so included under Co-existence. 
 
 7. One general axiom also pervades all 
 Inductive Reasoning, viz., that there are unifor- 
 mities in nature, uniformities of Co-existence, as 
 well as of Succession, if we could but find them 
 out. The axiom, however, admits of modifications, 
 according to the nature of the subject investi- 
 gated. Sometimes it assumes this form : Two or 
 more things, which resemble each other in many 
 observed particulars, will be found to agree in 
 other non-observed particulars. From the appear- 
 ances of agreement we may infer, either that the 
 composition or internal arrangement of the things 
 in question is similar, or that the changes which 
 they undergo or produce are similar. The rela- 
 tions thus traced are either of co-existence or of 
 succession ; and they are reached by means of 
 Resemblance. Resemblance is the foundation, not 
 only of all classification, and hence of the descrip- 
 tive sciences or natural history, but also of rea- 
 
 E E E 
 
394 PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 soilings concerning cause and effect, and therefore 
 of Philosophy. Moreover, it is the pecuHar office of 
 the Fancy to trace relations of resemblance, not 
 so much for the sake of truth, as of effect or emo- 
 tion. Fortunate, then, is that mind which is 
 aUve to relations of resemblance, whether it 
 thread the mazes of Science, or follow the 
 flowery paths of eloquence and poetry; and valu- 
 able is that memory wherein things suggest others 
 from similarity, and not from mere contiguity in 
 place or in time. 
 
 8. Where human testimony is in question, 
 the above axiom takes a different form, and may 
 be expressed thus : Men will speak the truth 
 when they have no motive to utter falsehood. 
 This uniformity in human nature we believe at 
 first instinctively, even without the reservation ; 
 and experience confirms our belief, only with the 
 reservation. Whenever we assent to testimony, 
 we confess this belief in a particular instance, and 
 whenever w^e reason from testimony, we must 
 suppose it to be credible. 
 
 9. Besides these, which are properly called 
 Principles of Reasoning^ because one or other of 
 them runs through every argument, there are 
 Maxims applicable to inductive research, and of 
 great use in directing reasoning, which may be 
 therefore called Inductive maxims. Such are the 
 following : 
 
 1. Every effect has a chain of causes. 
 
GENERAL TRINCIPLES OF REASONING. 395 
 
 Therefore one cause does not necessarily ex- 
 clude another, forming a different link in the same 
 chain. 
 
 2. One effect may have many concomitant 
 causes. 
 
 Therefore one cause does not necessarily ex- 
 clude another, acting even simultaneously. 
 
 3. An effect may be prevented, not merely by 
 the absence of the cause or causes proper to it, 
 but also by opposing causes. Therefore the ab- 
 sence of an effect proves not the absence of a ten- 
 dency/. Let these suffice as specimens of Inductive 
 maxims and their corollaries. They relate ex- 
 clusively to relations of Succession. 
 
 10. To conclude ; the object of Reasoning in 
 general may be said to be to prove that two or 
 more things co-exist, or do not co-exist ; or that 
 two or more things succeed, or do not succeed 
 each other, generally, if not invariably. The ob- 
 ject of Science, especially, is to determine the 
 permanent or incariah'e co-existence and succes- 
 sion of things, partly by direct observation, and 
 where that fails, by reasoning and inference. 
 Where one thing is known certainly to exist, there 
 to expect another along with it; or where one 
 thing is ascertaincMl, to look for another after it; 
 such are the anticipations of human science. 
 
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