LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
DAVIS
ABRAHAM I,INCOI<N, 1864.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN
AND
MEN OF WAR-TIMES
SOME PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS OF WAP
AND POLITICS DURING THE LIN
COLN ADMINISTRATION
WITH INTRODUCTION BY DR. A. C. LAMBDIN
A. K. McCLURE, LLD.
FOURTH EDITION.
PHILADELPHIA
THE TIMES PUBLISHING COMPANY
EIGHTH AND CHESTNUT
1892
LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNBt
Copyrighted, 1802. bv A. K. McCLURE.
PRESS OF
AVIL PRINTING Co-, ELECTROTYPBD mr
PHILADELPHIA. WttTCOTT & THOMSON.
PHILADELPHIA.
PREFACE.
THE chapters in
this volume make
n o pretensions t o
give either a biog
raphy of Abraham
Lincoln or a history
of his memorable
Administration.
They were written
amidst the constant
pressure of editorial
duties simply to cor
rect some popular er
rors as to Lincoln's
character and actions. So much has been written of
him by persons assuming to possess information obtained
in the inner circle of his confidence, and such conflicting
presentations of his personal attributes and private and
public acts have been given to the public, that I have
deemed it a duty to contribute what little I could from
personal knowledge, to correct some common errors in
estimating his character, ability, and efforts.
The closest men to Abraham Lincoln, both before and
after his election to the Presidency, were David Davis,
8 PREFACE.
Leonard Swett, Ward H. Lamon, and William H. Hern-
don. Davis and Swett were his close personal and
political counselors; Lamon was his Marshal for Wash
ington and Herndon had been his law-partner for twenty
years. These men, who knew Mr. Lincoln better than
all others, unite in testifying that his extreme caution
prevented him from making a personal confidant of any
one; and my own more limited intercourse with him
taught me, in the early period of our acquaintance, that
those who assumed that they enjoyed Lincoln's confi
dence had little knowledge of the man. It is the gen
erally honest but mistaken belief of confident ial relations
with Lincoln on the part of biographers and magazine
and newspaper writers that has presented him to the
public in such a confusion of attitudes and as possessing
such strangely contradictory individual qualities.
I saw Mr. Lincoln many times during his Presidential
term, and, like all of the many others who had intimate
relations with him, I enjoyed his confidence only within
the limitations of the necessities of the occasion. I do
not therefore write these chapters assuming to have been
the confidant of Mr. Lincoln; but in some things I did
see him as he was, and, from necessity, knew what he
did and why he did it. What thus happened to come
under my own observation and within my own hearing
often related to men or measures of moment then and
quite as momentous now, when the events of the war
are about to be finally crystallized into history.
My personal knowledge of occurrences in which Mr.
Lincoln and other great actors in the bloody drama of
PREFACE. g
our Civil War were directly involved enables me to pre
sent some of the chief characteristics of Mr. Lincoln,
and to support them by facts and circumstances which
are conclusive. I have, therefore, written only of Lin
coln and his relations with the prominent chieftains and
civilians with whom I had more or less intimate personal
acquaintance. The facts herein given relating to lead
ing generals and statesmen are presented to illustrate in
the clearest manner possible the dominating character
istics of Mr. Lincoln. They may or may not be ac
cepted by the public as important, but they have the
one merit of absolute truthfulness.
Abraham Lincoln achieved more in American states
manship than any other President, legislator, or diplomat
in the history of the Republic; and what he achieved
brought no borrowed plumes to his crown. Compelled
to meet and solve the most momentous problems of our
government, and beset by confused counsels and intensi
fied jealousies, he has written the most lustrous records
of American history; and his name and fame must be
immortal while liberty shall have worshipers in any
land. To aid to a better understanding of this ' ' noblest
Roman of them all" is the purpose of these chapters;
and if they shall, in the humblest degree, accomplish
that end, I shall be more than content.
The portraits in these chapters have been selected with
scrupulous care and executed in the best style. The
frontispiece portrait of Lincoln is the only perfect copy
of his face that I have ever seen in any picture. It was
10 PREFACE.
taken in March, 1864, on the occasion when he handed
Grant his commission as lieutenant-general. Two nega
tives were taken by the artist, and only one of them
"touched up" and copies printed therefrom at the time.
The other negative remained untouched until a few
months ago, when it was discovered and copies printed
from it without a single change in the lines or features
of Lincoln's face. It therefore presents Lincoln true to
life. The other portraits of Lincoln present him as he
appeared when he delivered his speech in Cooper Insti
tute, New York, in 1859, with the cleanly-shaven face
that was always maintained until after his election to the
Presidency, and as he appeared when studying with his
son ' ' Tad ' ' at his side. These portraits I have selected
because they give the most accurate presentations of the
man, and to them are added a correct picture of the
humble home of his early childhood; of his Springfield
home of 1860; of the tomb in which his dust reposes
near Springfield, 111. ; and a fac-simile of his letter of
acceptance in 1860.
I am greatly indebted to the Lives of Lincoln given by
Nicolay and Hay the most complete and accurate record
of dates and events, military and civil, relating to Lin
coln by Mr. Herndon, by Mr. Lamon, by Mr. Arnold,
and by Mr. Brooks, and to Mr. Elaine's " Twenty Years
in Congress," for valuable information on many points
referred to in these chapters.
A. K. McCLURK.
PHILADELPHIA, 1892.
INTRODUCTION.
THE modern spir
it, which is essen
tially the democratic
spirit, that has so
profoundly influ
enced every mani
festation of human
thought, has
wrought a great
change in the study
of history and in
the estimate of his
torical personages.
To the older writers
history was mainly a record of the acts of great men
monarchs, ministers, and generals who rose out of the
mist of the past as independent and irresponsible agents;
the champions of opposing ideas, it might be, but them
selves the centres of all interest, and to be considered
and classified as heroes or villains according as one liked
or disliked the general purpose of their lives. The mod
ern historian, on the other hand, finds the material for
a just estimate of times past not in the lives of the few
IT
1 2 INTR OD UCTION.
as much as in the lives of the many in the general
conditions of civilization, of which the men of distinc
tion are only the strongest exponents, dramatizing in
themselves the forces of their age.
Most of all is this recognized concerning periods of
storm and stress, of war and tumult. Leaders may
hasten or retard events, may direct or misdirect the
impulses of the people, but they do not create these
impulses. They are governed by them. Whether or
not we accept that magnificent generalization of Count
Tolstoi in his Physiology of War that makes Napoleon
and Alexander but cock-boats on the tide, and the
private soldier a more genuine power than either of
them, the time certainly is past when one could speak
of wars or revolutions as the capricious acts of indi
vidual men, or could profess to estimate the - character
and achievements of these men apart from the history
of the people that surrounded them.
This does not diminish the admiration due to the
heroes of history. If it takes from them that element
of the miraculous by which their proportions were dis
torted, it shows more clearly the means and methods of
their achievement, which no longer appears due to the
mere accident of birth, position, or opportunity, but
rather to the individual qualities by which one man is
enabled to assert himself as the representative of the
mass. Most of all is this the case in a republic, where
these accidents of birth or place, while they give oppor
tunities, confer no privileges; where incapacity may find
preferment, but where it must be soon discovered; and
INTRODUCTION. 13
where, in the long run, it is the man who best appre
ciates and can most highly direct the forces of his time
that earns his final place among the great.
It follows that while the history of the individual can
be studied only in relation with his surroundings, the
history of a nation may be exemplified in that of its
representative men. There is no sharp dividing-line
between history and biography. As the poet, the
painter, the composer must be considered in the light
of the poetry, the painting, the music of his period,
which he in turn illuminates, so the man of affairs can
only be understood if we can see him in his relations
with his contemporaries, as he appeared to them and
they to him, and as he and they were related to the great
popular movements that controlled them all. And these
movements, in their turn, may be best understood when
we can see them as they were apprehended by the men
who had directly to deal with them.
The history of our civil war is yet to be written. A
great popular movement and counter-movement, the
contest, now seen to have been inevitable, of ideas de
veloped through generations, bearing results more far-
reaching than the wisest could foresee and affecting the
whole current of the nation's life, requires the perspec
tive of a greater distance in time than we have reached
perhaps even yet, for the final view that shall give to
every part its just proportion. The soldier in battle sees
only that part of the field that is about him; the colonel
reports only the movements of his own regiment; the
general of his brigade, division, corps; yet from these
14 INTRODUCTION.
various reports the military historian forms his estimate
of the campaign. Thus far, our records of the war are
mainly in biography, personal narrative, and this for the
most part of a controversial character, designed to set
forth some one person's view, to vindicate his conduct,
to defend the policy of a party. Even the purely mili
tary movements from 1861 to 1865 have scarcely yet
crystallized in history, and the vastly more important
political and social history of that great era is still in
controversy.
With the exception of Mr. Elaine's delightful narra
tive of Twenty Years in Congress, the most comprehen
sive, compact, and philosophic summary that has been
made of any like experience, we have nothing relating
to this period that approaches to the dignity of history.
The Life of Lincoln by Nicolay and Hay is an admirable
compilation of the political records of the time, and its
narrative of public events is invaluable. But as an
actual biography of Lincoln it is unsatisfactory, and
as a comprehensive view of the great forces for which
Lincoln stood it is lacking in proportion as in insight.
For Lincoln is, above all things, the representative of
the people whose President he was, the embodiment and
exponent of their convictions, their courage, their per
sistence, their limitations as well as their strength, their
homely as well as their heroic attributes. The halo of
a martyr's death exalted him, in the eyes of those of us
who came after, to the plane of the ideal where we lost
sight of the actual man. To know Lincoln as he was
we must know him in his actual relations to the tre-
INTR OD UCTION. 1 5
mendous task that devolved upon him, and to all the
fluctuations of that public sentiment whose support alone
could make the execution of this task possible. To
think of him as a specially inspired genius, innocent
of the world and holding his triumphant way against
all experience by some sort of supernatural insight, is
to do needless violence alike to the philosophy of history
and to recorded fact.
The chapters upon Lincoln which make up this vol
ume have one supreme value that they present a con
vincingly truthful picture of the man as he appeared to
an experienced observer who was called at various times
into intimate relations with him, and who records only
what he personally and directly knew of Lincoln's acts
and motives at certain critical and illustrative periods,
and of his attitude toward other actors in the same great
drama.
A many-sided character like Lincoln's shows itself
under various aspects to various men, and Mr. McClure
makes it very plain to us that few if any of those who
thought they knew Lincoln intimately knew really more
than the one side he showed to each of them. Much of
Mr. McClure' s intercourse with Lincoln had to do, from
time to time, with what we now call practical politics,
and his extraordinary shrewdness as a politician is one
aspect of this many-sided character that has not before
been so intelligently set forth. Yet this seems one of
the great secrets of Lincoln's success his ready percep
tion of the popular current, his carefulness in guiding
it, and his ability to wait for it if he found himself in
1 6 INTR OD UCTION.
danger of going ahead .too fast. No man of his time
was more earnest and sincere in his convictions, but he
could not afford to risk them in impracticable experi
ments. He had to achieve results and patiently to await
opportunities. The ideal hero of the old-fashioned his
torian, who must be always heroic, would not have
waited. And he would not have achieved. If those
to whom these revelations of Lincoln's shrewdness and
ingenuity as a practical politician bring something of a
shock will only think of the failures that he witnessed,
and what failure in his case would have meant, they
will not fear that Lincoln's fame will suffer from the
truth.
It is perhaps best of all in Mr. Lincoln's relations with
his immediate associates and subordinates that we ob
serve those elements of shrewd judgment, of patience,
self-repression, persistence, and abiding faith that are
such essential parts of his character. His treatment of
Grant is a conspicuous illustration not only of his judg
ment of men, but of that cautious policy that so often
enabled him to carry his ends by deferring them. His
patient endurance with Stanton, often yielding to him
against his own convictions in order to avoid a rupture
that would have brought disaster, and indeed his rela
tions with all the leading members of his Cabinet, not
less than the curiously characteristic diplomacy that re
sulted in the nomination of Andrew Johnson, illustrate
this same thoughtful prudence that ever subordinated
the minor issue to the greater which is the art of the
statesman.
IN TROD UCTION. 1 7
This aspect of Mr. Lincoln's character is dwelt upon
here because it is one that has been generally obscured
in the popular estimate, but that is absolutely essential
to any right estimate of the man and his work. No acts
of his administration have been less understood than the
great achievement of emancipation and his attitude
toward the States in rebellion at the close of the war.
On both of these points Mr. McClure speaks with the
authority of exact knowledge, and he shows us with
how little of self-assertion, with how much of prudent,
self-repression, Mr. Lincoln approached these as all other
great crises of his career. He was not more in advance
of his time than others were in foreseeing the inevitable
destruction of slavery; but to him the one great purpose
of the restoration of the Union was ever paramount, and
the other must wait till the exigencies of the war should
solve the problem or bring the people, the masses as well
as the leaders, to recognize an act of emancipation as a
supreme necessity. His own plan of compensated eman
cipation he brought forward in his Cabinet, and when it
was disapproved he folded it up and put it by. And so
he watched and waited till the time came when the
country called for more heroic measures and he could
speak as the mouthpiece of the nation.
Again, at the close of the war he had his own plan,
deliberately formed, for the recall of the legislatures of
the Southern States to resume their functions under the
Constitution. There can be no dispute as to Lincoln's
intentions, as expressed in his own directions concern
ing Virginia, or his communication of these intentions to
2
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
FACING PASE
ABRAHAM LINCOLN Frontispiece.
LINCOLN'S LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE, 1860 26
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 1859 45
WINFIELD SCOTT 58
ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND "TAD" 73
ABRAHAM LINCOLN'S HOMES 86
ABRAHAM LINCOLN'S TOMB 99
HANNIBAL HAMLIN 116
SALMON P. CHASE 131
SIMON CAMERON 148
EDWIN M. STANTON 169
ULYSSES S. GRANT 190
GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN 209
WILLIAM T. SHERMAN 226
ANDREW G. CURTIN, 1860 247
LINCOLN'S LETTER TO CURTIN ,264
ANDREW G. CURTIN, 1892 271
THADDEUS STEVENS 276
STEVENS'S LETTER TO MCCLURE 291
JAMES BUCHANAN 296
HORACE GREELEY 3 T 3
GREELEY'S LETTER TO MCCLURE 33
JOHN BROWN 333
GEORGE G. MEADE 354
GEORGE H. THOMAS 354
FITZ JOHN PORTER 354
G. K. WARREN 354
D. C. BUELL 354
ROBERT E. LEE 39 1
J. E. B. STUART 400
LEE'S LETTER TO MCCLURE 4 11
SAMUEL W. CRAWFORD 424
20
CONTENTS.
LINCOLN IN 1860 Ills First Nomination for President at Chicago
How Seward was Overthrown Curtin and Lane Defeated him and
Nominated Lincoln The October States decided it Seward's Nomi-
natioh would have Defeated Curtin in Pennsylvania and Lane in Indi
ana at the October Elections The School Question made Seward Un
available The Bitterness of Seward's Friends after his Defeat .... 2?
A VISIT TO LINCOLN First Impressions of the New President-
Ungraceful in Dress and Manner His Homely Ways soon Forgotten
in Conversation Lincoln's Midnight Journey The Harrisburg Dinner
to Lincoln by Governor Curtin Discussion of a Change of Route
Decided against Lincoln's Protest Colonel Scott's Direction of Lin
coln's Departure A Night of Painful Anxiety The Cheering Message
of Lincoln's Arrival in Washington received 44
LINCOLN'S SORE TRIALS Without Hearty Support from any Party
Confused Republican Councils A Discordant Cabinet from the Start
How Union Generals Failed A Memorable Conference with General
Scott in the White House His Ideas of Protecting the Capital The
People Unprepared for War and Unprepared for its Sacrifices .... 59
LINCOLN'S CHARACTERISTICS The most Difficult of Characters
to Analyze None but Himself his Parallel He Confided in None
without Reservation How Davis, Swett, Lamon, and Herndon Esti
mated him The Most Reticent and Secretive of Men He Heard all
and Decided for Himself Among the Greatest in Statesmanship and the
Master Politician of his Day How his Sagacity Settled the Mollie
Maguire Rebellion in Pennsylvania 72
LINCOLN IN POLITICS His Masterly Knowledge of Political Strat
egy The Supreme Leader of his Party How he held Warring Fac
tions to his Support His First Blundering Venture in his Presidential
Contest He was Master of Leaders, and not of Details His Inter
vention in the Curtin Contest of 1863 How he made James Gordon
Bennett his Friend when the Political Horizon was Dark His Strategy
in making a Faithless Officer perform his Duty without Provoking Po
litical Complications 85
LINCOLN AND EMANCIPATION Willing to Save or Destroy Slav
ery to Save the Union Not a Sentimental Abolitionist His Earnest
Efforts for Compensated Emancipation Slavery could have been Saved
The Suicidal Action of the Border States The Preliminary Procla
mation offered Perpetuity to Slavery if the Rebellion ended January I,
1863 How the Republic gradually Gravitated to Emancipation Lin
coln eloquently Appeals to the Border-State Representatives The Vio
lent Destruction of Slavery the most Colossal Suicide of History Ap
peals to Lincoln to avoid Political Disasters by Rejecting Emancipation
He Builded Better than he Knew 98
LINCOLN AND HAMLIN Why Lincoln Nominated Johnson in 1864
A Southern War Democrat Needed The Gloomy Outlook of the
Political Battle Lincoln would have been Defeated at any Time in 1864
before the Victories of Sherman at Atlanta and Sheridan in the Valley
The Two Campaign Speeches which Decided the Contest made by
Sherman and Sheridan The Republican Leaders not in Sympathy with
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
FACING PA6E
ABRAHAM LINCOLN Frontispiece.
LINCOLN'S LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE, 1860 26
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 1859 45
WINFIELD SCOTT 58
ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND "TAD" 73
ABRAHAM LINCOLN'S HOMES 86
ABRAHAM LINCOLN'S TOMB 99
HANNIBAL HAMLIN 116
SALMON P. CHASE 131
SIMON CAMERON 148
EDWIN M. STANTON 169
ULYSSES S. GRANT 190
GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN 209
WILLIAM T. SHERMAN 226
ANDREW G. CURTIN, 1860 247
LINCOLN'S LETTER TO CURTIN ,264
ANDREW G. CURTIN, 1892 271
THADDEUS STEVENS 276
STEVENS' s LETTER TO MCCLURE 291
JAMES BUCHANAN 296
HORACE GREELEY 313
GREELEY'S LETTER TO MCCLURE 330
JOHN BROWN 333
GEORGE G. MEADE 354
GEORGE H. THOMAS 354
FITZ JOHN PORTER 354
G. K. WARREN 354
D. C. BUELL 354
ROBERT E. LEE 391
J. E. B. STUART 400
LEE'S LETTER TO MCCLURE 411
SAMUEL W. CRAWFORD 424
20
CONTENTS.
PAGE
LINCOLN IN 1860 His First Nomination for President at Chicago
How Seward was Overthrown Curtin and Lane Defeated him and
Nominated Lincoln The October States decided it Seward's Nomi
nation would have Defeated Curtin in Pennsylvania and Lane in Indi
ana at the October Elections The School Question made Seward Un
available The Bitterness of Seward's Friends after his Defeat .... 27
A VISIT TO LINCOLN First Impressions of the New President-
Ungraceful in Dress and Manner His Homely Ways soon Forgotten
in Conversation Lincoln's Midnight Journey The Harrisburg Dinner
to Lincoln by Governor Curtin Discussion of a Change of Route
Decided against Lincoln's Protest Colonel Scott's Direction of Lin
coln's Departure A Night of Painful Anxiety The Cheering Message
of Lincoln's Arrival in Washington received 44
LINCOLN'S SORE TRIALS Without Hearty Support from any Party
Confused Republican Councils A Discordant Cabinet from the Start
How Union Generals Failed A Memorable Conference with General
Scott in the White House His Ideas of Protecting the Capital The
People Unprepared for War and Unprepared for its Sacrifices .... 59
LINCOLN'S CHARACTERISTICS The most Difficult of Characters
to Analyze None but Himself his Parallel He Confided in None
without Reservation How Davis, Swett, Lamon, and Herndon Esti
mated him The Most Reticent and Secretive of Men He Heard all
and Decided for Himself Among the Greatest in Statesmanship and the
Master Politician of his Day How his Sagacity Settled the Mollie
Maguire Rebellion in Pennsylvania 72
LINCOLN IN POLITICS His Masterly Knowledge of Political Strat
egy The Supreme Leader of his Party How he held Warring Fac
tions to his Support His First Blundering Venture in his Presidential
Contest He was Master of Leaders, and not of Details His Inter
vention in the Curtin Contest of 1863 How he made James Gordon
Bennett his Friend when the Political Horizon was Dark His Strategy
in making a Faithless Officer perform his Duty without Provoking Po
litical Complications 85
LINCOLN AND EMANCIPATION Willing to Save or Destroy Slav
ery to Save the Union Not a Sentimental Abolitionist His Earnest
Efforts for Compensated Emancipation Slavery could have been Saved
The Suicidal Action of the Border States The Preliminary Procla
mation offered Perpetuity to Slavery if the Rebellion ended January I,
1863 How the Republic gradually Gravitated to Emancipation Lin
coln eloquently Appeals to the Border-State Representatives The Vio
lent Destruction of Slavery the most Colossal Suicide of History Ap
peals to Lincoln to avoid Political Disasters by Rejecting Emancipation
He Builded Better than he Knew 98
LINCOLN AND HAMLIN Why Lincoln Nominated Johnson in 1864
A Southern War Democrat Needed The Gloomy Outlook of the
Political Battle Lincoln would have been Defeated at any Time in 1864
before the Victories of Sherman at Atlanta and Sheridan in the Valley
The Two Campaign Speeches which Decided the Contest made by
Sherman and Sheridan The Republican Leaders not in Sympathy with
22 CONTENTS.
PAGfe
Lincoln The Question of Foreign Intervention in Favor of the Con
federacy shaped Lincoln's Political Action Hamlin's Letter admitting
that Lincoln Defeated him 115
LINCOLN AND CHASE Secretary Chase the Fly in the Lincoln
Ointment His Presidential Ambition He was an Annual Resigner of
his Portfolio His Efforts to Defeat Lincoln How Chase's Presidential
Movements grieved Lincoln Lincoln's Story about Declining Chase
Lincoln's Fears about his Renomination His Final Acceptance of
Chase's Resignation Chase's Resolve to Oppose Lincoln's Re-election
His Visits to Lincoln after Lincoln's Re-election was Assured He
Declared for Lincoln Two Weeks before the Election, and Telegraphed
Congratulations from Ohio His Appointment as Chief-Justice violently
Opposed 132
LINCOLN AND CAMERON Cameron's Exceptional Senatorial Hon
ors in Pennsylvania The First Man Four Times chosen His Can
didacy for President in 1860 His Battle for the Cabinet The Sander
son Compact with Davis at Chicago Lincoln Tendered Cameron a
Cabinet Portfolio, and Revoked it Three Days later The Convulsive
Contest in Pennsylvania Visit to Lincoln, and what he Said Cameron
and Slavery His Report as War Minister on Arming Slaves recalled
by Lincoln and Revised The True Story of Cameron's Retirement
from the Cabinet The Wonderful Political Power Cameron created in
Pennsylvania 147
LINCOLN AND STANTON Stanton's Strange Medley of Attributes
The Fiercest and Gentlest of Men Capable of the Grandest and
the Meanest Actions Jere McKibben Imprisoned Lincoln releases
McKibben from Old Capitol Prison -on Parole Stanton's Angry Re
sentment The Conflict over McClellan Lincoln Overrules Stanton's
Protests Stanton's Refusal to Execute Lincoln's Order Lincoln's An
swer: " Mr. Secretary, it will have to be Done" Lincoln's High Ap
preciation of Stanton's Public Services He believed Stanton to be the
best War Minister he could Obtain Stanton's Conflict with Johnson
His Death 1 70
LINCOLN AND GRANT Grant's Trouble in Getting a Command-
Given an Insubordinate Regiment Popular Demand for Grant's Dis
missal after Shiloh Lincoln alone saved Grant " I can't Spare this
Man : he Fights" Lincoln's Heroic and Sagacious Methods to restore
Grant to Public Confidence Relieved of Command without Reproach
Restored when Fighting was Wanted An Incident of the Battle for
Lincoln's Re-election Lincoln Distrusted Grant's Fidelity to him
"Phil Sheridan; he's all Right" Grant's Explanation Twelve Years
later Injustice done to Grant by Lincoln's Distrust Grant as a Con
versationalist A Genial Guest in the Social. Circle 189
LINCOLN AND McCLELL AN Their Relations yet Disputed by their
Friends How History will Judge them Lincoln a Successful Presi
dent: McClellan an Unsuccessful General Lincoln was McClellan's
Friend He Hoped that McClellan would again be Commander-in-
Chief McClellan's Misfortune in declining Command of the Pennsyl
vania Reserves He was Called to the Chief Command when neither
Generals nor the Country understood the Magnitude or the Necessities
of the War McClellan would have made the Best Confederate Gen
eral Why Lincoln Restored him to Command He was the Great Or
ganizer of the War Grant the Great Aggressive General : McClellan
the Great Defensive General McClellan's Devoted Loyalty and Pa
triotism 208
CONTENTS. 23
PAGE
LINCOLN AND SHERMAN Sherman at First sadly Disappointed in
Lincoln Lincoln's Early Distrust of Sherman Sherman declared a
Lunatic because he Understood the War How Time justified his
Judgment Sherman won Lincoln and Grant's Confidence at Shiloh
Lincoln's Strong Faith in Sherman in his Atlanta Campaign and March
to the Sea Sherman's Qualities as a Commander The Atlanta Cam
paign the most Brilliant of the War Sherman's Terms of Surrender
given to Johnston They were in Exact Accord with Lincoln's Instruc
tions given to Sherman at City Point Lincoln and the Virginia Legis
lature He did what he Instructed Sherman to do in North Carolina-
Lincoln's Views of Reconstruction looked solely to Peace and Cordial
Reunion 227
LINCOLN AND CURTIN Their First Meeting at Harrisburg, Febru
ary 22, 1861 They were Always in Accord Curtin and Sherman the
two Men who Wanted Great Armies The Pennsylvania Reserve Corps
Rejected by the Government, then frantically Called for The Loyal
Governors united to call for More Troops in June, 1862 The Altoona
Conference that made the Emancipation Policy Successful Curtin's
Conference with Lincoln that brought the Loyal Governors together
Lincoln's Fidelity to Curtin in 1863 Curtin and Stanton How Sol
diers' Orphans' Schools Originated Unexampled Expressions of Con
fidence in Curtin in 1867 and 1869 by the Unanimous Votes of the Leg
islature 248
LINCOLN AND STEVENS The Executive and Legislative Leaders
of the War Stevens the Great Commoner Two Characters so Like
and yet so Unlike Humanity Mastered Lincoln Stevens blended Hu
manity with Fierce Resentment Lincoln and Stevens's Personal Rela
tions always Kind, but seldom Cordial They Worked on the Same
Lines, but far Apart The Influence of their Opposing Qualities upon
each Other Stevens's vindictive Policy of Reconstruction How it
would have Saved the South from Desolation Stevens as a Lawyer
His Defense of Hanway Nominated for Congress when Dead His
Tomb and Epitaph 277
LINCOLN AND BUCHANAN The Injustice done to the Memory of
Buchanan He was Patriotic and Loyal Lincoln followed Buchanan's
Policy until Sumter was Fired on Buchanan's Cabinet Reorganized
in Loyalty Judge Black Reversed the Policy of the Administration
Buchanan's Debt to the South He was Elected because he was in
Sympathy with Slavery Progression His Federal Strict-Construction
Ideas His Prompt and Heroic Action when he saw the South plunge
into Rebellion He did not Reinforce the Southern Forts because he
had no Troops His Loyalty to Lincoln and to the Country during the
War His many Expressions of Lofty Patriotism His Conscientious
Discharge of every Public and Private Duty 297
LINCOLN AND GREELEY One of the most Fretting of Lincoln's
Thorns They First met in Congress Greeley Opposed Lincoln's
Election over Douglas How Greeley Aided Lincoln in 1860 He
Made the First Breach in the Seward Column Greeley's Embarrass
ment to Lincoln by advocating Peaceable Secession His Demand that
Force should not be employed to Hold any State in the Union Gree
ley's " On to Richmond !" Cry, and the Bull Run Disaster His Arro
gant Demand for Emancipation His Letter to Lincoln, and Lincoln's
Answer Greeley's Hostility to Lincoln's Renomination, and his Reluc
tant Support of Lincoln's Re-election The Jewett Peace Fiasco
Greeley's Quarrel with Grant His Candidacy for the Presidency in
1872 The Cincinnati Convention Greeley's Defeat and Sad Death. 312
24 CONTENTS.
PAGE
AN EPISODE OF JOHN BROWN'S RAID Brown's Visit to Cham-
bersburg Known as " Dr. Smith " No Resident of the Town had
Knowledge or Intimation of his Virginia Raid List of Brown's
Harper's Ferry Raiders Capture of John E. Cook Dan Logan cap
tured Cook in South Mountain Ill-fated in several Chances to Escape
His Trial and Execution ^A
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES George G. Meade, George H.
Thomas, Fitz John Porter, G. K. Warren, and D. C. Buell Meade
and Thomas denied Just Honors Porter, Warren, and Buell Dis
graced by the Passion of Power The Heroes of Gettysburg and Nash
ville The Reluctant Atonement done to the Humiliated Soldiers
Meade's Soldierly Qualities at Gettysburg His Heroic Character in
every Military Trial Thomas's Disfavor with the Ruling Military
Power His Soldierly Ability displayed at Nashville His Great Vic
tory won when he had been Relieved of his Command Porter's Cruel
and Brutal Conviction by a Packed Tribunal His Aggressive Loyalty
at Harrisburg His Courage and Skill as a Commander His Final
Complete Vindication and Restoration to Rank Warren's Unjust Dis
missal from Command in the Last Battle of the War How Military
Hatred smote him when he had done most to Win Victory His Sad
Death before his Vindication Buell's Wise and Heroic Campaign in
Kentucky and Tennessee He Saved Grant from Annihilation Re
lieved from Command by the Partisan Clamor of the Time The Rec
ords of his Military Commission suppressed for Ten Years Stanton's
Effort at Atonement 255
BORDER-LIFE IN WAR-TIMES The First Murmurs of the Civil
War The Strain upon the Border People Raids and Battles con
stantly Disturbing them How War Despoiled them Stuart's First
Great Raid of the War An Interesting Evening with Confederates
How Hospitality saved the Host from Capture Incidents of the Battle
of Antietam Lee's Gettysburg Campaign The Unknown Scout who
gave First Information of Lee's Advance on Gettysburg A Confed
erate Hospital Incident The Fierce Passions of Civil War The De
struction of Chambersburg by McCausland How a Soldier's Wife
Saved her Home The Surrender of Lee Rest for the Border . . . 390
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS Its Peculiar Relations
to the State as a Distinct Organization Its many Heroic Commanders :
McCall, Meade, Reynolds, Ord, and Crawford It Won the First Vic
tory for the Army of the Potomac at Dranesville Under McDowell
Bayard's Flying Brigade The Reserves Ten Thousand Strong when
the Peninsula Battles began Heroic Defense at Games' Mills and
Mechanicsville Always Fighting on the Retreat to the James River
McCall and Reynolds Captured and Fourteen Hundred Reserves Killed
or Wounded In the Second Bull Run Campaign under Reynolds
Complimented by Pope In the Antietam Campaign under Meade
First to Open the Battle Opened the Fight at Fredericksburg, but not
Supported Ordered to Washington Crawford called to Command
Crawford's Successful Appeal to get the Reserves in the Chancellors-
ville Campaign The Bloody Struggle for Round Top at Gettysburg
The Reserves Win it, and were Last in Action on the Field At Mine
Run In the Wilderness Campaign The Last Battles of the Gallant
Reserves Crawford's Farewell Address Most of them Re-enlist
Only Twelve Hundred Officers and Men return . . ' 423
APPENDIX The Nicolay-McClure Controversy 457
INDEX 483
FAC-SIMII.E OP UNCOI,N'S LETTER OP ACCEPTANCE.
[Copied from " Abraham Lincoln ; A History," by permission of its authors.]
LINCOLN IN 1860.
IT was the unexpected that happened in Chicago on
that fateful i8th of May, 1860, when Abraham
Lincoln was nominated for President of the United
States. It was wholly unexpected by the friends of
Seward; it was hoped for, but not confidently expected,
by the friends of Lincoln. The convention was the
ablest assembly of the kind ever called together in this
country. It was the first national deliberative body of
the Republican party that was to attain such illustrious
achievements in the history of free government. The
first national convention of that party, held in Phila
delphia in 1856, was composed of a loose aggregation
of political free-thinkers, embracing many usually de
nominated as ' ' cranks. ' ' The party was without organ
ization or cohesion; its delegates were self-appointed and
responsible to no regular constituency. It was the sud
den eruption of the intense resentment of the people
of the North against the encroachments of slavery in
Northern Territories, and neither in the character of
its leaders nor in the record of its proceedings did it
rank as a distinctively deliberative body. It nomi
nated a romantic adventurer for President a man un
tried in statesmanship and who had done little to
commend him to the considerate judgment of the
nation as its Chief Magistrate in a period of uncom-
27
28 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
mon peril. The campaign that followed was one of
unusual brilliancy, and resulted in anchoring nearly all
of the old Democratic States of the West in the Repub
lican column. In 1860 the principles of the Republican
party had been clearly denned; its organization had been
perfected in every Northern State, and each delegate
to that convention at Chicago was regularly chosen and
represented a great party inspired by a devotion to its
faith that has seldom been equaled and never surpassed
in all our political history. The halo of romance that
encircled General Fremont, * * the Pathfinder, ' ' four
years before had perished, and he was unthought of as
a candidate.
For nearly two years before the meeting of the Chicago
Convention in 1860 the Republican party had one pre
eminent leader who was recognized as the coming can
didate for President. The one man who had done most
to inspire and crystallize the Republican organization
was William H. Seward of New York. Certainly, two-
thirds of the delegates chosen to the convention pre
ferred him for President, and a decided majority went
to Chicago expecting to vote for his nomination. Had
the convention been held in any other place than
Chicago, it is quite probable that Seward would have
been successful ; but every circumstance seemed to con
verge to his defeat when the delegates came face to face
in Chicago to solve the problem of a Republican national
victory. Of the 231 men who voted for Lincoln on the
third and last ballot, not less than 100 of them voted
reluctantly against the candidate of their choice. It
was a Republican-Seward convention; it was not a Sew-
ard-Republican convention. With all its devotion to
Seward it yielded to a higher devotion to Republican
success, and that led to the nomination of Abraham
Lincoln.
LINCOLN IN i860. 29
I have read scores of magazine and newspaper articles
assuming to explain how and why Lincoln was nomi
nated at Chicago in 1860. Few of them approach ac
curacy, and no one of them that I can recall tells the
true story. Lincoln was not seriously thought of for
President until but a few weeks before the meeting of
the National Convention. Elaine has truly said that the
State Convention of Illinois, held but a short time before
the meeting of the National Convention, was surprised
at its own spontaneous and enthusiastic nomination of
Lincoln. He had been canvassed at home and in other
States as a more than possible candidate for Vice- Presi
dent. I well remember Lincoln mentioning the fact
that his own delegation from Illinois was not unitedly in
earnest for his nomination, but when the time came for
casting their votes the enthusiasm for Lincoln in Chicago,
both inside and outside the convention, was such that
they could do no less than give him the united vote of
the State. Leonard Swett, who was one of the most
potent of the Lincoln leaders in that struggle, in a letter
written to Mr. Drummond on the 27th of May, 1860, in
which he gives a detailed account of the battle made for
Lincoln, states that 8 of the 22 delegates from Illinois
' ' would gladly have gone for Seward. ' ' Thus, not only
in many of the other States did Lincoln receive reluc
tant votes in that convention, but even his own State
furnished a full share of votes which would have been
gladly given to Seward had he been deemed available.
The first breach made in the then apparently invin
cible columns of Seward was made by Horace Greeley.
His newspaper, the Tribune, was then vastly the most
influential public journal on the continent, and equaled
in the world only by the Times of London. His battle
against Seward was waged with tireless energy and con
summate skill. It was not then known that he had
30 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
separated from immediate political association with Sew-
ard and Weed. Had his relations with those gentlemen
been fully understood then, as they were soon after the
convention, when Greeley's memorable letter of political
dissolution was given to the public, it would have greatly
impaired his influence in opposing Seward. But I think
it just to Greeley to say that, independent of all real or
imaginary wrongs from Seward and Weed, he was hon
estly convinced that Seward was not an available candi
date in 1860. He espoused the cause of Edward Bates
of Missouri, who was a man of most distinguished cha
racter and ability, and whose record appealed very
strongly to the more conservative elements of the party.
Indeed, the nomination of Bates would have been within
the lines of possibility, instead of the nomination of
Lincoln, had the convention been surrounded by local
influences in his favor as potent as were the local influ
ences for the successful candidate. The Pennsylvania
delegation in determining its final choice gave Lincoln
barely four majority over Bates, and but for the fact that
Indiana had decided to give unanimous support to Lin
coln at an early stage of the contest, Bates would have
been a much more formidable candidate than he now
appears to have been by the records of the convention.
The defeat of Seward and the nomination of Lincoln
were brought about by two men Andrew G. Curtin of
Pennsylvania, and Henry S. Lane of Indiana, and neither
accident nor intrigue was a material factor in the strug
gle. * They not only defeated Seward in a Seward con-
* Mrs. Henry S. Lane to the Author, September 16, 1891 : " I
read with the greatest interest your excellent article in the St.
Louis Globe- Democrat, giving a history of the convention which
nominated Lincoln. I thank you for the kindly mention of Mr.
Lane's name in that memorable convention. So many different
versions of the same have been given the public (with many mis-
LINCOLN IN 1860. 3*
vention, but they decided the contest in favor of Lincoln
against Bates, his only real competitor after Seward.
Curtin had been nominated for Governor in Pennsyl
vania and Lane had been nominated for Governor in
Indiana. The States in which their battles were to be
fought were the pivotal States of the national contest.
It was an accepted necessity that both Pennsylvania and
Indiana should elect Republican Governors in October to
secure the election of the Republican candidate for Presi
dent in November. Curtin and Lane were naturally the
most interested of all the great host that attended the
Chicago Convention in 1860. Neither of their States
was Republican. In Pennsylvania the name of Repub
lican could not be adopted by the party that had chosen
Curtin for Governor. The call for the convention sum
moned the opposition to the Democratic party to attend
the People's State Convention, and all shades of antago
nism to the administration then in power were invited to
cordial and equal participation in the deliberations of
that body. The Republicans had made a distinct battle
takes) that I was glad to see a true one published to vindicate
the truth of history.
" I was with my husband in Chicago, and may tell you now,
as most of the actors have 'joined the silent majority,' what no
living person knows, that Thurlow Weed, in his anxiety for the
success of Seward, took Mr. Lane out one evening and pleaded
with him to lead the Indiana delegation over to Seward, saying
they would send enough money from New York to ensure his
election for Governor, and carry the State later for the New York
candidate.
" His proposal was indignantly rejected, as there was neither
money nor influence enough in their State to change my hus
band's opinion in regard to the fitness and availability of Mr.
Lincoln for the nomination, and with zeal and energy he worked
faithfully for his election, remained his firm friend through his
administration till the end came and death crystallized his fame.
With sincere thanks, respectfully."
32 LINCOLN- AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
for Governor three years before, with David Wilmot as
their candidate, against Isaac Hazelhurst, the American
candidate, and William F. Packer, the Democratic can
didate. The result was the election of Packer by a
majority over the combined votes of both the opposing
nominees. The American organization was maintained
in Philadelphia and in many of the counties of the State.
Fillmore had received a large majority of the votes cast
for the Fremont-Fillmore Fusion Electoral ticket in 1856
in various sections. These elements had been combined
in what was then called the People's party in Pennsyl
vania in the State elections of 1858 and 1859, an( ^ ^ ne
Democrats had been defeated by the combination, but
the American element remained very powerful and quite
intense in many localities. Without its aid the success
of Curtin was simply impossible. A like condition of
things existed in Indiana. The American element had
polled over 22,000 votes for Fillmore in 1856, and in
1858, when the same effort was made in Indiana to unite
all shades of opposition to the Democracy, the combina
tion was defeated by a small majority. While the anti-
slavery sentiment asserted itself by the election of a
majority of Republicans to Congress in 1858, the entire
Democratic State ticket was successful by majorities
varying from 1534 to 2896, It was evident, therefore,
that in both Pennsylvania and Indiana there would be a
desperate battle for the control of the October election,
and it was well known by all that if the Republicans
failed to elect either Curtin or L,ane the Presidential
battle would be irretrievably lost.
Both of the candidates presented in these two pivotal
States were men of peculiar fitness for the arduous task
they had assumed. Both were admittedly the strongest
men that could have been nominated by the opposition
to the Democracy, and both were experienced and con-
LINCOLN IN i860. 33
summate politicians. Their general knowledge of poli
tics and of the bearing of all political questions likely to
be felt in the contest made them not only wise counsel
ors, but all appreciated the fact that they were of all men
the most certain to advise solely with reference to suc
cess. Neither of them cared whether Seward, Lincoln,
Bates, or any of the other men named for President
should be nominated, if the man chosen was certain to
be the most available. They were looking solely to their
own success in October, and their success meant the suc
cess of the Republican party in the nation. With Lane
was John D. Defrees, chairman of his State committee,
who had been called to that position because he was re
garded as best fitted to lead in the desperate contest
before him. I was with Curtin and interested as he was
only in his individual success, as he had summoned me
to take charge of his October battle in Pennsylvania.
The one thing that Curtin, Lane, and their respective
lieutenants agreed upon was that the nomination of
Seward meant hopeless defeat in their respective States.
Lane and Defrees were positive in the assertion that the
nomination of Seward would lose the Governorship in
Indiana. Curtin and I were equally positive in declar
ing that the nomination of Seward would defeat Curtin
in Pennsylvania.
There was no personal hostility to Seward in the efforts
made by Curtin and Lane to defeat him. They had no
reason whatever to hinder his nomination, excepting the
settled conviction that the nomination of Seward meant
their own inevitable defeat. It is not true, as has been
assumed by many, that the objection to Seward was be
cause of his radical or advanced position in Republican
faith. It was not Seward' s "irrepressible conflict" or
his "higher-law" declarations which made Curtin and
Lane oppose him as the Republican candidate. On the
3
34 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
contrary, both of them were thoroughly anti-slavery
men, and they finally accepted Lincoln with the full
knowledge that he was even in advance of Seward in
forecasting the ' ' irrepressible conflict. ' ' Lincoln an
nounced in his memorable Springfield speech, delivered
on the iyth of June, 1858, U 'A house divided against
itself cannot stand ;' I believe this Government cannot
endure permanently half slave and half free," and
Se ward's "irrepressible-conflict" speech was not deliv
ered until the 25th of October.* Lincoln was not only
fully abreast with Seward, but in advance of him in
forecasting the great battle against slavery. The single
reason that compelled Curtin and Lane to make aggres
sive resistance to the nomination of Seward was his atti
tude on the school question, that was very offensive to
the many thousands of voters in their respective States,
who either adhered to the American organization or
cherished its strong prejudices against any division of
the school fund. It was Seward' s record on that single
question when Governor of New York that made him an
* It is an irrepressible conflict between opposing and enduring-
forces, and it means that the United States must and will, sooner
or later, become either entirely a slaveholding nation or entirely
a free-labor nation . Seward' s speech at Rochester, October 25, 1858.
But there is a higher law than the Constitution which regu
lates our authority over the domain and devotes it to the same
noble purposes. The territory is a part, no inconsiderable part,
of the common heritage of mankind bestowed upon them by the
Creator of the universe. We are His stewards, and must so dis
charge our trust as to secure, in the highest obtainable degree,
their happiness. Seward' s Senate speech, March n, 1850.
" A house divided against itself cannot stand." I believe this
Government cannot endure permanently one half slave and one
half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved ; I do not
expect the house to fall ; but I do expect it will cease to be di
vided. It will become all one thing or all the other. Lincoln's
Springfield speech, June 17, 1858.
LINCOLN IN i860. 35
impossible candidate for President in 1860, unless he was
to be nominated simply to be defeated. Had he been
nominated, the American element in Pennsylvania and
Indiana would not only have maintained its organi
zation, but it would have largely increased its strength
on the direct issue of hostility to Seward. It was -not
an unreasonable apprehension, therefore, that inspired
Curtin and Lane to protest with all earnestness against
the nomination of Seward. There could be no question
as to the sincerity of the Republican candidates for Gov
ernor in the two pivotal States when they declared that
a particular nomination would doom them to defeat,
and it was Andrew G. Curtin and Henry S. Lane whose
earnest admonitions to the delegates at Chicago com
pelled a Seward convention to halt in its purpose and set
him aside, with all his pre-eminent qualifications and
with all the enthusiastic devotion of his party to him.
It was Curtin and Lane also who decided that Lincoln
should be the candidate after Seward had been practi
cally overthrown. When it became known that Sew
ard' s nomination would defeat the party in Pennsylvania
and Indiana, the natural inquiry was, Who can best aid
these candidates for Governor in their State contests?
Indiana decided in favor of Lincoln at an early stage
of the struggle, and her action had much to do in de
ciding Pennsylvania's support of Lincoln. The Penn
sylvania delegation had much less knowledge of Lincoln
than the men from Indiana, and there were very few
original supporters of Lincoln among them. Wilmot
was for Lincoln from the start; Stevens was for Judge
McLean; Reeder was for General Cameron. The dele
gation was not a harmonious one, because of the hos
tility of a considerable number of the delegates to
Cameron for President, and it was not until the first
day that the convention met that Pennsylvania got into
36 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
anything like a potential attitude. At a meeting of the
delegation it was proposed that the first, second, and
third choice of the delegates for President should be
formally declared. It is needless to say that this propo
sition did not come from the earnest supporters of
Cameron, but it was coupled with the suggestion that
Cameron should be unanimously declared the first choice
of the State; which was done. Stevens was stubbornly
for McLean, and had a considerable following. He
asked that McLean be declared the second choice of the
State, and, as McLean was then known to be practically
out of the fight, he was given substantially a unanimous
vote as the second choice. The third choice to be ex
pressed by the delegation brought the State down to
practical business, as it was well known that both the
first and second choice were mere perfunctory declara
tions. The battle came then between Bates and Lin
coln, and but for the facts that Indiana had previously
declared for Lincoln, and that Curtin and Lane were
acting in concert, there is little reason to doubt that
Bates would have been preferred. Much feeling was
exhibited in deciding the third choice of the State, and
Lincoln finally won over Bates by four majority. When
it became known that Pennsylvania had indicated Lin
coln as her third choice, it gave a wonderful impetus to
the Lincoln cause. Cameron and McLean were not
seriously considered, and what was nominally the third
choice of the State was accepted as really the first choice
among possible candidates. The slogan of the Lincoln
workers was soon heard on every side, " Pennsylvania's
for Lincoln," and from the time that Pennsylvania
ranged herself along with Indiana in support of Lincoln
not only was Seward's defeat inevitable, but the nomi
nation of Lincoln was practically assured. Thus did
two men Curtin and Lane not only determine Sew-
LINCOLN IN i860. 37
ard's defeat, but they practically determined the nomi
nation of Lincoln.
Notwithstanding the substantial advantages gained by
the supporters of Lincoln in the preliminary struggles
at Chicago, the fight for Seward was maintained with
desperate resolve until the final ballot was taken. It
was indeed a battle of giants. Thurlow Weed was the
Seward leader, and he was simply incomparable as a
master in handling a convention. With him were such
able lieutenants as Governor Morgan, and Raymond of
the New York Times, with Bvarts as chairman of the
delegation, whose speech nominating Seward was the
most impressive utterance of his life. The Bates men
were led by Frank Blair, the only Republican Congress
man from a slave State, who was nothing if not heroic,
aided by his brother Montgomery, who was a politician
of uncommon cunning. With them was Horace Gree-
ley, who was chairman of the delegation from the then
almost inaccessible State of Oregon. It was Lincoln's
friends, however, who were the "hustlers" of that
battle. They had men for sober counsel like David
Davis ; men of supreme sagacity like Leonard Swett ;
men of tireless effort like Norman B. Judd ; and they
had what was more important than all a seething mul
titude wild with enthusiasm for Abraham Lincoln. For
once Thurlow Weed was outgeneraled just at a critical
stage of the battle. On the morning of the third day,
when the final struggle was to be made, the friends of
Seward got up an imposing demonstration on the streets
of Chicago. They had bands and banners, immense
numbers, and generous enthusiasm ; but while the Sew
ard men were thus making a public display of their
earnestness and strength, Swett and Judd filled the im
mense galleries of the wigwam, in which the convention
was held, with men who were ready to shout to the echo
^8 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
for Lincoln whenever opportunity offered. The result
was that when the Seward men filed into the convention
there were seats for the delegates, but few for any others,
and the convention was encircled by an immense throng
that made the wigwam tremble with its cheers for the
" rail-splitter."
Twelve names had been put in nomination for Presi
dent, but the first ballot developed to the comprehension
of all that the struggle was between Seward and Lincoln.
Seward had received 173^ votes and Lincoln 102. The
other votes scattered between ten candidates, the highest
of whom (Cameron) received 50^, all of which were from
Pennsylvania with the exception of 3. Cameron's name
was at once withdrawn, and on the second ballot Seward
rose to 184^, with Lincoln closely following at 181, but
both lacking the 233 votes necessary to a choice. The
third ballot was taken amid breathless excitement, with
Lincoln steadily gaining and Seward now and then
losing, and when the ballot ended Lincoln had 231)^
to 1 80 for Seward. Lincoln lacked but 2^/2 votes of a
majority. His nomination was now inevitable, and be
fore the result was announced there was a general
scramble to change from the candidates on the scatter
ing list to Lincoln. Cartter of Ohio was the first to
obtain recognition, and he changed four Ohio votes
from Chase to Lincoln, which settled the nomination.
Maine followed, changing ten votes from Seward to
Lincoln. Andrew of Massachusetts and Gratz Brown
of Missouri next came with changes to the Lincoln
column, and they continued until Lincoln's vote was
swelled to 354.*
* The following were the ballots for President :
First. Second. Third.
Lincoln ... .... 102 181 231^
Seward 173^ 184^ 180
LINCOLN IN i860. 39
As soon as Ohio gave the necessary number of votes
to Lincoln to nominate him a huge charcoal portrait
of the candidate was suddenly displayed from the gallery
of the wigwam, and the whole convention, with the
exception of the New York delegation, was whirled to
its feet by the enthusiasm that followed. It was many
minutes before the convention could be sufficiently
calmed to proceed with business. The New York dele
gates had kept their seats in sullen silence during all
this eruption of enthusiasm for Lincoln, and it was long
even after quiet had been restored that Bvarts' tall form
was recognized to move that the nomination be declared
unanimous. He was promptly seconded by Andrew of
Massachusetts, who was also an ardent supporter of
Seward, and the motion was adopted with a wild hurrah
that came spontaneously from every part of the conven
tion excepting the several lines of seats occupied by the
seventy delegates from New York. Mr. Evarts' motion
for a recess was unanimously carried, and the convention
and its vast audience of spectators hurried out to make
Cameron
First.
Second.
2
Third.
Bates ....
A.8
1C
22
Chase .
AQ
JO
A 2*4
McLean . . .
Vy
8
c
Dayton . . . ,
Id
10
I
Collamer . . ,
Wade ....
10*
1*
Read ....
. . I
Sunmer . .
I
Fremont . .
. . . I
Clav
2
I
Before the third ballot was announced changes were made to
Lincoln, giving him 354 votes, or 120 more than the number
necessary to nominate.
* Withdrawn.
4 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
the streets ring with shouts for the Illinois candidate
for President.
Until after the nomination of Ivincoln little attention
had been given to the contest for Vice-President. Had
Seward been nominated, Lincoln would have been unan
imously tendered the second place on the ticket, but
with lyincoln nominated for the first place the leading
friends of Lincoln at once suggested to the friends of
Seward that they should name the candidate for the
Vice- Presidency. Mr. Greeley was sent to Governor
Morgan to proffer the nomination to him if he would
accept it, or in case of his refusal to ask him to name
some' man who would be acceptable to the friends of
Seward. Governor Morgan not only declined to accept
it himself, but he declined to suggest any one of Sew
ard' s friends for the place. Not only Governor Morgan,
but Mr. Bvarts and Mr. Weed, all refused to be con
sulted on the subject of the Vice- Presidency, and they
did it in a temper that indicated contempt for the action
of the convention. Hamlin was nominated, not because
Seward desired it, for New York gave him a bare major
ity on the first ballot, but because he was then the most
prominent of the Democratic-Republicans in the Bast.
The contest was really between Hamlin and Cassius M.
Clay. Clay was supported chiefly because he was a resi
dent of a Southern State and to relieve the party from
the charge of presenting a sectional ticket ; but as there
were no Southern electoral votes to be fought for, Ham
lin was wisely preferred, and he was nominated on the
second ballot by a vote of 367 to 86 for Clay.* Not-
* The following were the ballots for Vice-President :
First. Second.
Hamlin < 194 367
Clay ioi> 86
Hickman 58 18
LINCOLN IN i860. 4 1
withstanding Governor Morgan's keen disappointment
at the defeat of Seward, he was easily prevailed upon to
remain at the head of the National Committee, thus
charging him with the management of the national
campaign.
I called on Thurlow Weed at his headquarters during
the evening after the nominations had been made, ex
pecting that, with all his disappointment, he would be
ready to co-operate for the success of the ticket. I found
him sullen, and offensive in both manner and expression.
He refused even to talk about the contest, and intimated
very broadly that Pennsylvania, having defeated Seward,
could now elect Curtin and Lincoln. Governor Curtin
also visited Mr. Weed before he left Chicago, but re
ceived no word of encouragement from the disappointed
Seward leader. * Weed had been defeated in his greatest
effort, and the one great dream of his life had perished.
He never forgave Governor Curtin until the day of his
death, nor did Seward maintain any more than severely
civil relations with Curtin during the whole time that he
was at the head of the State Department. I called on
First. Second.
Reeder 51* . .
Banks 38^* -
Davis (Henry Winter) . . . 8*
Dayton 3
Houston . 3
Read i
* Withdrawn.
* I called on Morgan the night after the nomination was
made. He treated me civilly, but with marked coolness, and I
then called on Weed, who was very rude indeed. He said to me,
"You have defeated the man who of all others was most revered
by the people and wanted as President. You and Lane want to
be elected, and to elect Lincoln you must elect yourselves."
That was all, and I left him. Governor Curtirfs Letter to the
Author, August 18, 1891.
4 2 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
Seward but once after the organization of the Lincoln
Cabinet, and not for the purpose of soliciting any favors
from him, but he was so frigid that I never ventured to
trespass upon him again. Three months after the Chi
cago convention, when the battle in Pennsylvania was
raging with desperation on both sides, I twice wrote to
Weed giving the condition of affairs in the State and
urging the co-operation of himself and Chairman Mor
gan to assure the success of the ticket in October. He
made no response to either letter, and it so happened
chat we never met thereafter during his life.
Tlie contest in Pennsylvania was really the decisive
battle of the national campaign. A party had to be
created out of inharmonious elements, and the commer
cial and financial interests of the State were almost sol
idly against us. I cannot recall five commercial houses
of prominence in the city of Philadelphia where I could
have gone to solicit a subscription to the Lincoln cam
paign with reasonable expectation that it would not be
resented, and of all our prominent financial men I recall
only Anthony J. Drexel who actively sympathized with
the Republican cause. Money would have been useless
for any but legitimate purposes, but the organization of
a great State to crystallize incongruous elements was an
immense task and involved great labor and expense. I
visited Chairman Morgan in New York, presented the
situation to him, but he was listless and indifferent, and
not one dollar of money was contributed from New York
State to aid the Curtin contest in Pennsylvania. The
entire contributions for the State committee for that great
battle aggregated only $12,000, of which $2000 were a
contribution for rent of headquarters and $3000 were
expended in printing. Three weeks before the election,
when I felt reasonably confident of the success of the
State ticket, I again visited Governor Morgan, and met
LINCOLN IN i860. 43
with him Moses Taylor and one or two others, and they
were finally so much impressed with the importance of
carrying a Republican Congress that they agreed to raise
$4300 and send it direct to some six or seven debatable
Congressional districts I indicated. Beyond this aid ren
dered to Pennsylvania from New York the friends of Mr.
Seward took no part whatever in the great October bat
tle that made Abraham Lincoln President. Curtin was
elected by a majority of 32,164, and Lane was elected in
Indiana by 9757. With Curtin the Republicans carried
19 of the 25 Congressmen, and with Lane the Republi
cans of Indiana carried 7 of the n Congressmen of that
State. Thus was the election of a Republican President
substantially accomplished in October by the success of
the two men who had defeated William H. Seward and
nominated Abraham Lincoln at Chicago.
A VISIT TO LINCOLN.
I NEVER met Abraham Lincoln until early in Janu
ary, 1 86 1, some two months after his election to the
Presidency. I had been brought into very close and con
fidential relations with him by correspondence during the
Pennsylvania campaign of 1860. His letters were fre
quent, and always eminently practical, on the then su
preme question of electing the Republican State ticket
in October. It was believed on all sides that unless
Pennsylvania could be carried in October, Lincoln's de
feat would be certain in November. Pennsylvania was
thus accepted as the key to Republican success, and Lin
coln naturally watched the struggle with intense interest.
In accordance with his repeated solicitations, he was ad
vised from the headquarters of the State Committee, of
which I was chairman, of all the varied phases of the
struggle. It soon became evident from his inquiries and
versatile suggestions that he took nothing for granted.
He had to win the preliminary battle in October, and he
left nothing undone within his power to ascertain the
exact situation and to understand every peril involved
in it.
The Republican party in Pennsylvania, although then
but freshly organized, had many different elements and
bitter factional feuds within its own household, and all
who actively participated in party efforts were more or
less involved in them. I did not entirely escape the bit-
44
(Photo by Brady, Washington.)
ABRAHAM UNCOI,N, 1850.
46 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
terness that was displayed in many quarters. Had I
been simply a private in the ranks, it would have been
of little consequence to Lincoln whether I was compe
tent to conduct so important a campaign or not ; but
when he was advised, not only from within the State,
but from friends outside the State as well, that the part}'
organization in Pennsylvania was not equal to the press
ing necessities of the occasion, he adopted his own cha
racteristic methods to satisfy himself on the subject.
I had met David Davis and Leonard Swett for the firct
time at the Chicago Convention, and of course we knew
little of each other personally. Some time toward mid
summer, when the campaign in Pennsylvania was well
under way, Davis and Swett entered my headquarters
together and handed me a letter from Lincoln, in which
he said that these gentlemen were greatly interested in
his election that they were on East looking into the
contest generally, and he would be pleased if I would
furnish them every facility to ascertain the condition of
affairs in the State. I was very glad to do so, and they
spent two days at my headquarters, where every informa
tion was given them and the methods and progress of the
organization opened to them without reserve. They saw
that for the first time in the history of Pennsylvania poli
tics the new party had been organized by the State Com
mittee in every election district of the State, and that
everything that could be done had been done to put the
party in condition for a successful battle.
After Davis and Swett had finished their work and
notified me of their purpose to leave during the night,
they invited me to a private dinner at which none were
present but ourselves. During the course of the dinner
Swett informed me that they were very happy now to be
able to tell me the real purpose of their mission that
had their information been less satisfactory they would
'A VISIT TO LINCOLN. 47
have returned without advising me of it. He said that
they had been instructed by Lincoln to come to Pennsyl
vania and make personal examination into the condition
of affairs, especially as to the efficiency of the party
organization of the State, and that his reason for doing
so was that he had been admonished that the direction
of the campaign by the State Committee was incompe
tent and likely to result in disaster. They added that,
inasmuch as their answer to Lincoln must be that the
organization was the best that they had ever known in
any State, they felt entirely at liberty to disclose to me
why they had come and what the result of their inquiry
was.
After their return to Illinois letters from Lincoln were
not less frequent, and they were entirely confident in
tone and exhibited the utmost faith in the direction of
the great Pennsylvania battle. I twice sent him during
the campaign once about the middle of August, and
again in the latter part of September a carefully-pre
pared estimate of the vote for Governor by counties that
had been made up by a methodical and reasonably accu
rate canvass of each election district of the State. The
first gave Governor Curtin a majority of 12,000, leaving
out of the estimate a considerable doubtful vote. The
last estimate gave Curtin a majority of 17,000, also omit
ting the doubtful contingent. The result not only justi
fied the estimates which had been sent to him in the
aggregate majority, but it justified the detailed estimates
of the vote of nearly or quite every county in the State.
Curtin' s majority was nearly double the last estimate
given him because of the drift of the doubtful vote to
our side, and, being successful in what was regarded as
the decisive battle of the campaign, Lincoln accorded me
more credit than I merited. From that time until the
day of his death I was one of those he called into coun-
48 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
sel in every important political emergency. Much as I
grieved over the loss of the many to me precious things
which I had gathered about my home in Chambersburg,
and serious as was the destruction of all my property
when the vandals of McCausland burned the town in
1864, I have always felt that the greatest loss I sustained
was in the destruction of my entire correspondence with
Abraham Lincoln.
About the ist of January, 1861, I received a telegram
from Lincoln requesting me to come to Springfield. It
is proper to say that this invitation was in answer to a
telegram from me advising him against the appointment
of General Cameron as Secretary of War. The factional
feuds and bitter antagonisms of that day have long since
perished, and I do not purpose in any way to revive
them. On the 3ist of December, Lincoln had delivered
to Cameron at Springfield a letter notifying him that he
would be nominated for a Cabinet position. This fact
became known immediately upon Cameron's return, and
inspired very vigorous opposition to his appointment, in
which Governor Curtin, Thaddeus Stevens, David Wil-
mot, and many others participated. Although the Sen
ate, of which I was a member, was just about to organize,
I hastened to Springfield and reached there at seven
o'clock in the evening. I had telegraphed Lincoln of
the hour that I should arrive and that I must return at
eleven the same night. I went directly from the depot
to Lincoln's house and rang the bell, which was answered
by Lincoln himself opening the door. I doubt whether
I wholly concealed my disappointment at meeting him.
Tall, gaunt, ungainly, ill clad, with a homeliness of
manner that was unique in itself, I confess that my heart
sank within me as I remembered that this was the man
chosen by a great nation to become its ruler in the grav
est period of its history. I remember his dress as if it
A VISIT TO LINCOLN. 49
were but yesterday snuff-colored and slouchy panta
loons ; open black vest, held by a few brass buttons ;
straight or evening dress-coat, with tightly-fitting sleeves
to exaggerate his long, bony arms, and all supplemented
by an awkwardness that was uncommon among men of
intelligence. Such was the picture I met in the person
of Abraham Lincoln. We sat down in his plainly fur
nished parlor, and were uninterrupted during the nearly
four hours that I remained with him, and little by little,
as his earnestness, sincerity, and candor were developed
in conversation, I forgot all the grotesque qualities which
so confounded me when I first greeted him. Before half
an hour had passed I learned not only to respect, but,
indeed, to reverence the man.
It is needless to give any account of the special mis
sion on which I was called to Springfield, beyond the
fact that the tender of a Cabinet position to Pennsylvania
was recalled by him on the following day, although re
newed and accepted two months later, when the Cabinet
was finally formed in Washington. It was after the
Pennsylvania Cabinet imbroglio was disposed of that
Lincoln exhibited his true self without reserve. For
more than two hours he discussed the gravity of the situ
ation and the appalling danger of civil war. Although
he had never been in public office outside the Illinois
Legislature, beyond a single session of Congress, and had
little intercourse with men of national prominence dur
ing the twelve years after his return from Washington,
he exhibited remarkable knowledge of all the leading
public men of the country, and none could mistake the
patriotic purpose that inspired him in approaching the
mighty responsibility that had been cast upon him by
the people. He discussed the slavery question in all its
aspects and all the various causes which were used as
pretexts for rebellion, and he not only was master of the
4
50 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
whole question, but thoroughly understood his duty and
was prepared to perform it. During this conversation I
had little to say beyond answering an occasional ques
tion or suggestion from him, and I finally left him fully
satisfied that he understood the political conditions in
Pennsylvania nearly as well as I did myself, and entirely
assured that of all the public men named for the Presi
dency at Chicago he was the most competent and the
safest to take the helm of the ship of State and guide
it through the impending storm. I saw many dark days
akin to despair during the four years which recorded the
crimsoned annals from Sumter to Appomattox, but I
never had reason to change or seriously question that
judgment.
I next met Abraham Lincoln at Harrisburg on the 22d
of February, 1861, when he passed through the most
trying ordeal of his life. He had been in Philadelphia
the night before, where he was advised by letters from
General Winfield Scott and his prospective Premier,
Senator Seward, that he could not pass through Balti
more on the 23d without grave peril to his life. His
route, as published to the world for some days, was
from Philadelphia to Harrisburg on the morning of
the 22d ; to remain in Harrisburg over night as the
guest of Governor Curtin; and to leave for Washington
the next morning by the Northern Central Railway, that
would take him through Baltimore about midday. A
number of detectives under the direction of President
Felton of the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore
Railroad, and Allan Pinkerton, chief of the well-known
detective agency, were convinced from the information
they obtained that Lincoln would be assassinated if he
attempted to pass through Baltimore according to the
published programme. A conference at the Continental
Hotel in Philadelphia on the night of the 2ist, at which
A VISIT TO LINCOLN. 51
Lincoln was advised of the admonitions of Scott and
Seward, had not resulted in any final determination as to
his route to Washington. He was from the first ex
tremely reluctant about any change, but it was finally
decided that he should proceed to Harrisburg on the
morning of the 22d and be guided by events.
The two speeches made by Lincoln on the 22d of Feb
ruary do not exhibit a single trace of mental disturbance
from the appalling news he had received. He hoisted
the stars and stripes to the pinnacle of Independence
Hall early in the morning and delivered a brief address
that was eminently characteristic of the man. He arrived
at Harrisburg about noon, was received in the House of
Representatives by the Governor and both branches of
the Legislature, and there spoke with the same calm de
liberation and incisiveness which marked all his speeches
during the journey from Springfield to Washington.
After the reception at the House another conference was
held on the subject of his route to Washington, and,
while every person present, with the exception of Lin
coln, was positive in the demand that the programme
should be changed, he still obstinately hesitated. He
did not believe that the danger of assassination was
serious.
The afternoon conference practically decided nothing,
but it was assumed by those active in directing Lincoln's
journey that there must be a change. Lincoln dined at
the Jones House about five o' clock with Governor Curtin
as host of the occasion. I recall as guests the names of
Colonel Thomas A. Scott, Colonel Sumner, Colonel La-
mon, Dr. Wallace, David Davis, Secretary Slifer, Attor
ney-General Purviance, Adjutant-General Russell, and
myself. There were others at the table, but I do not
recall them with certainty. Of that dinner circle, as I
remember them, only three are now living Governor
52 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
Curtin, Colonel Lamon, and the writer hereof. Mr. Judd
was not a guest, as he was giving personal attention to
Mrs. Lincoln, who was much disturbed by the suggestion
to separate the President from her, and she narrowly es
caped attracting attention to the movements which re
quired the utmost secrecy.
It was while at dinner that it was finally determined
that Lincoln should return to Philadelphia and go thence
to Washington that night, as had been arranged in Phila
delphia the night previous in the event of a decision to
change the programme previously announced. No one
who heard the discussion of the question could efface it
from his memory. The admonitions received from Gen
eral Scott and Senator Seward were made known to Gov
ernor Curtin at the table, and the question of a change
of route was discussed for some time by every one with
the single exception of Lincoln. He was the one silent
man of the party, and when he was finally compelled to
speak he unhesitatingly expressed his disapproval of the
movement. With impressive earnestness he thus an
swered the appeal of his friends: "What would the na
tion think of its President stealing into the Capital like
a thief in the night?" It was only when the other
guests were unanimous in the expression that it was
not a question for Lincoln to determine, but one for
his friends to determine for him, that he finally agreed
to submit to whatever was decided by those around him.
It was most fortunate that Colonel Scott was one of the
guests at that dinner. He was wise and keen in percep
tion and bold and swift in execution. The time was
short, and if a change was to be made in Lincoln's route
it was necessary for him to reach Philadelphia by eleven
o' clock that night or very soon thereafter. Scott at once
became master of ceremonies, and everything that was
done was in obedience to his directions. There was a
A VISIT TO LINCOLN. 53
crowd of thousands around the hotel, anxious to see the
new President and ready to cheer him to the uttermost.
It was believed to be best that only one man should ac
company Lincoln in his journey to Philadelphia and
Washington, and Lincoln decided that Lamon should be
his companion. Colonel Sumner, who felt that he had
been charged with the safety of the President-elect, and
whose silvered crown seemed to entitle him to prece
dence, earnestly protested against Lincoln leaving his
immediate care, but it was deemed unsafe to have more
than one accompany him, and the veteran soldier was
compelled to surrender his charge. That preliminary
question settled, Scott directed that Curtin, Lincoln, and
Lamon should at once proceed to the front steps of the
hotel, where there was a vast throng waiting to receive
them, and that Curtin should call distinctly, so that the
crowd could hear, for a carriage, and direct the coach
man to drive the party to the Executive Mansion. That
was the natural thing for Curtin to do to take the Presi
dent to the Governor's mansion as his guest, and it ex
cited no suspicion whatever.
Before leaving the dining-room Governor Curtin halted
Lincoln and Lamon at the door and inquired of Lamon
whether he was well armed. Lamon had been chosen
by Lincoln as his companion because of his exceptional
physical power and prowess, but Curtin wanted assurance
that he was properly equipped for defense. Lamon at
once uncovered a small arsenal of deadly weapons, show
ing that he was literally armed to the teeth. In addition
to a pair of heavy revolvers, he had a slung-shot and
brass knuckles and a huge knife nestled under his vest.
The three entered the carriage, and, as instructed by
Scott, drove toward the Executive Mansion, but when
near there the driver was ordered to take a circuitous
route and to reach the railroad depot within half an
54 LINCOLN AND M&N OF WAR-TIMES.
hour. When Curtin and his party had gotten fairly
away from the hotel I accompanied Scott to the railway
depot, where he at once cleared one of his lines from
Harrisburg to Philadelphia, so that there could be no
obstruction upon it, as had been agreed upon at Phila
delphia the evening before in case the change should be
made. In the mean time he had ordered a locomotive
and a single car to be brought to the eastern entrance of
the depot, and at the appointed time the carriage arrived.
Lincoln and Lamon emerged from the carriage and en
tered the car unnoticed by any except those interested in
the matter, and after a quiet but fervent ' ' Good-bye and
God protect you!" the engineer quietly moved his train
away on its momentous mission.
As soon as the train left I accompanied Scott in the
work of severing all the telegraph lines which entered
Harrisburg. He was not content with directing that it
should be done, but he personally saw that every wire
was cut. This was about seven o'clock in the evening.
It had been arranged that the eleven o'clock train from
Philadelphia to Washington should be held until Lin
coln arrived, on the pretext of delivering an important
package to the conductor. The train on which he was
to leave Philadelphia was due in Washington at six in
the morning, and Scott kept faithful vigil during the
entire night, not only to see that there should be no res
toration of the wires, but waiting with anxious solicitude
for the time when he might hope to hear the good news
that Lincoln had arrived in safety. To guard against
every possible chance of imposition a special cipher was
agreed upon that could not possibly be understood by
any but the parties to it. It was a long, weary night of
fretful anxiety to the dozen or more in Harrisburg who
had knowledge of the sudden departure of Lincoln. No
one attempted to sleep. All felt that the fate of the na-
A VISIT TO LINCOLN 55
tion hung on the safe progress of Lincoln to Washington
without detection on his journey. Scott, who was of
heroic mould, several times tried to temper the severe
strain of his anxiety by looking up railway matters, but
he would soon abandon the listless effort, and thrice we
strolled from the depot to the Jones House and back
again, in aimless struggle to hasten the slowly-passing
hours, only to find equally anxious watchers there and a
wife whose sobbing heart could not be consoled. At last
the eastern horizon was purpled with the promise of day.
Scott reunited the broken lines for the lightning messen
ger, and he was soon gladdened by an unsigned dispatch
from Washington, saying, u Plums delivered nuts safely."
He whirled his hat high in the little telegraph office as
he shouted, " Lincoln's in Washington," and we rushed
to the Jones House and hurried a messenger to the Ex
ecutive Mansion to spread the glad tidings that Lincoln
had safely made his midnight journey to the Capital.
I have several times heard Lincoln refer to this jour
ney, and always with regret Indeed, he seemed to
regard it as one of the grave mistakes in his public
career. He was fully convinced, as Colonel Lamon has
stated it, that " he had fled from a danger purely imag
inary, and he felt the shame and mortification natural to
a brave man under such circumstances. ' ' Mrs. Lincoln
and her suite passed through Baltimore on the 23d with
out any sign of turbulence. The fact that there was not
even a curious crowd brought together when she passed
through the city which then required considerable time,
as the cars were taken across Baltimore by horses con
firmed Lincoln in his belief. It is needless now to dis
cuss the question of real or imaginary danger in Lincoln
passing through Baltimore at noonday according to the
original programme. It is enough to know that there
were reasonable grounds for apprehension that an attempt
56 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TlJMl^S.
might be made upon his life, even if there was not the
organized band of assassins that the detectives believed
to exist. His presence in the city would have called out
an immense concourse of people, including thousands of
thoroughly disloyal roughs, who could easily have been
inspired to any measure of violence. He simply acted
the part of a prudent man in his reluctant obedience to
the unanimous decision of his friends in Harrisburg
when he was suddenly sent back to Philadelphia to take
the midnight train for Washington, and there was no
good reason why he. should have regretted it; but his
naturally sensitive disposition made him always feel
humiliated when it recurred to him.
The sensational stories published at the time of his
disguise for the journey were wholly untrue. He was
reported as having been dressed in a Scotch cap and
cloak and as entering the car at the Broad and Prime
station by some private alley-way, but there was no truth
whatever in any of these statements. I saw him leave
the dining-room at Harrisburg to enter the carriage with
Curtin and Lamon. I saw him enter the car at the Har
risburg depot, and the only change in his dress was the
substitution of a soft slouch hat for the high one he had
worn during the day. He wore the same overcoat that
he had worn when he arrived at Harrisburg, and the
only extra apparel he had about him was the shawl that
hung over his arm. When he reached West Philadelphia
he was met by Superintendent Kenney, who had a car
riage in waiting with a single detective in it. Lincoln
and Ivamon entered the carriage and Kenney mounted
the box with the driver. They were in advance of the
time for the starting of the Baltimore train, and they
were driven around on Broad street, as the driver was
informed, in search of some one wanted by Kenney and
the detective, until it was time to reach the station.
A VISIT TO LINCOLN. 57
When there they entered by the public doorway on
Broad street, arid passed directly along with other pas
sengers to the car, where their berths had been engaged.
The journey to Washington was entirely uneventful, and
at six in the morning the train entered the Washington
station on schedule time. Seward had been advised, by
the return of his son from Philadelphia, of the probable
execution of this programme, and he and Washburne
were in the station and met the President and his party,
and all drove together to Willard's Hotel. Thus ends
the story of Lincoln's midnight journey from Harrisburg
to the National Capital.
(Photo by Brady, Washington.)
LIEUT. -GENERAI, WINFIELD SCOTT, l86l.
LINCOLN'S SORE TRIALS.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN arrived in Washington on the
/v. 2 ^d of February, 1861, to accept the most appalling
responsibilities ever cast upon any civil ruler of modern
times. ' If he could have commanded the hearty confi
dence and co-operation of the leaders of his own party,
his task would have been greatly lessened, but it is due
to the truth of history to say that few, very few, of the
Republican leaders of national fame had faith in Lin
coln's ability for the trust assigned f o him. I could
name a dozen men, now idols of the nation, whose open
distrust of Lincoln not only seriously embarrassed, but
grievously pained and humiliated, him. They felt that
the wrong man had been elected to the Presidency, and
only their modesty prevented them, in each case, from
naming the man who should have been chosen in his
stead. Looking now over the names most illustrious in
the Republican councils, I can hardly recall one who en
couraged Lincoln by the confidence he so much needed.
Even Seward, who had been notified as early as the 8th
of December that he would be called as Premier of the
new administration, and who soon thereafter had signi
fied his acceptance of the office and continued in the
most confidential relations with Lincoln, suddenly, on
the 2d of March, formally notified Lincoln of his recon
sideration of his acceptance. The only reason given was
that circumstances had occurred since his acceptance
59
60 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
which seemed to render it his duty " to ask leave to
withdraw that consent. ' ' The circumstances referred to
were the hopeless discord and bitter jealousies among
party-leaders both in and out of the Cabinet.
Lincoln found a party without a policy ; the strangest
confusion and bitterest antagonisms pervading those who
should have been in accord, not only in purpose, but in
earnest sympathy, with him in the discharge of his great
duties, and he was practically like a ship tempest-tossed
without compass or rudder. Even the men called to his
Cabinet did not give Ivincoln their confidence and co
operation. No two of them seemed to have the same
views as to the policy the administration should adopt.
Seward ridiculed the idea of serious civil war, and then
and thereafter renewed his bond for peace in sixty days,
only to be protested from month to month and from year
to year. Chase believed in peaceable disunion as alto
gether preferable to fraternal conflict, and urged his
views with earnestness upon the President. Cameron,
always eminently practical, was not misled by any senti
mental ideas and regarded war as inevitable. Welles
was an amiable gentleman without any aggressive quali
ties whatever, and Smith and Bates were old and con
servative, while Blair was a politician with few of the
qualities of a statesman.
A reasonably correct idea of the estimate placed upon
Lincoln's abilities for his position may be obtained by
turning to the eulogy on Seward delivered by Charles
Francis Adams in 1873. Adams was a Republican mem
ber of Congress when Ivincoln was chosen President, and
he was Lincoln's Minister to England during the entire
period of the war. In eulogizing Seward as the master
spirit of the administration and as the power behind the
throne stronger than the throne itself, he said: "I must
affirm, without hesitation, that in the history of our gov-
LINCOLN 1 S SORE TRIALS. 61
ernment down to this hour no experiment so rash has
ever been made as that of electing to the head of affairs
a man with so little previous preparation for his task as
Mr. Lincoln." Indeed, Lincoln himself seems to have
been profoundly impressed with his want of fitness for
the position when he was first named as a candidate from
his State. In 1859, a fter he had attained national repu
tation by his joint discussion with Douglas in the contest
for Senator, Mr. Pickett, the editor of an Illinois Repub
lican journal, wrote to him, urging that he should permit
the use of his name for President. To this he answered:
" I must in candor say I do not think myself fit for the
Presidency. I certainly am flattered and gratified that
some partial friends think of me in that connection, but
I really think it best for our cause that no concerted
effort, such as you suggest, should be made." Seward
evidently agreed with his eulogist, Mr. Adams. That is
clearly shown by the fact that in less than one month
after the administration had been inaugurated he wrote
out and submitted to the President a proposition to
change the national issue from slavery to foreign war,
in which he advised that war be at once declared against
Spain and France unless satisfactory explanations were
promptly received, and that the enforcement of the new
policy should be individually assumed by the President
himself or devolved on some member of his Cabinet.
He added that while it was not in his special province,
"I neither seek to evade nor assume the responsibility."
In other words, Seward boldly proposed to change the
national issue by a declaration of war against some for
eign power, and to have himself assigned practically as
Dictator. He assumed that the President was incompe
tent to his task, that his policy, if accepted, would be
committed to himself for execution, and that he meant
to be Dictator is clearly proved by the fact that in his
62 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
formal proposition he provides that the policy "once
adopted, the debates on it must end and all agree and
abide."
Outside of the Cabinet the leaders were equally dis
cordant and quite as distrustful of the ability of Lincoln
to fill his great office. Sumner, Trumbull, Chandler,
Wade, Henry Winter Davis, and the men to whom the
nation then turned as the great representative men of the
new political power, did not conceal their distrust of Lin
coln, and he had little support from them at any time
during his administration. Indeed, but for the support
given him by the younger leaders of that day, among
whom Blaine and Sherman were conspicuous, he would
have been a President almost without a party. The one
man who rendered him the greatest service of all at the
beginning of the war was Stephen A. Douglas, his old
competitor of Illinois. When the Republican leaders
were hesitating and criticising their President, Douglas
came to the front with all his characteristic courage and
sagacity, and was probably the most trusted of all the
Senators at the White House. It is not surprising that
there was great confusion in the councils of the Repub
lican leaders when suddenly compelled to face civil war,
but it will surprise many intelligent readers at this day to
learn of the general distrust and demoralization that ex
isted among the men who should have been a solid pha
lanx of leadership in the crisis that confronted them. It
must be remembered that there were no precedents in
history to guide the new President. The relation of the
States to the National Government had never been de
fined. The dispute over the sovereignty of the States
had been continuous from the organization of the Re
public until that time, and men of equal intelligence and
patriotism widely differed as to the paramount authority
of State and Nation. Nor were there any precedents in
LINCOLN'S SORE TRIALS, 63
history of other civilizations that could throw any light
upon the dark path of Lincoln. There have been re
publics and civil wars, but none that furnish any rule
that could be applied to the peculiar condition of our
dissevered States. The President was therefore com
pelled to decide for himself in the multitude of conflict
ing counsels what policy the administration should adopt,
and even a less careful and conservative man than Lin
coln would have been compelled, from the supreme ne
cessities which surrounded him, to move with the utmost
caution.
Lincoln could formulate no policy beyond mere gen
eralities declaring his duty to preserve the integrity of
the Union. He saw forts captured and arsenals gutted
and States seceding with every preparation for war, and
yet he could take no step to prepare the nation for the
defense of its own life. The Border States were trem
bling in the balance, with a predominant Union senti
ment in most of them, but ready to be driven into open
rebellion the moment that he should declare in favor of
what was called " coercion " by force of arms. Coercion
and invasion of the sacred soil of the Southern States
were terms which made even the stoutest Southern
Union man tremble. As the administration had no
policy that it could declare, every leader had a policy
of his own, with every invitation to seek to magnify
himself by declaring it. The capital was crowded with
politicians of every grade. The place-seekers swarmed
in numbers almost equal to the locusts of Egypt, and the
President was pestered day and night by the leading
statesmen of the country, who clamored for offices for
their henchmen. I well remember the sad picture of
despair his face presented when I happened to meet him
alone for a few moments in the Executive Chamber as
he spoke of the heartless spoilsmen who seemed to be
64 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
utterly indifferent to the grave dangers which threatened
the government. He said: " I seem like one sitting in a
palace assigning apartments to importunate applicants
while the structure is on fire and likely soon to perish
in ashes."
Turn where Lincoln might, there was hardly a silver
lining to the dark cloud that overshadowed him. The
Senate that met in Executive session when he was in
augurated contained but 29 Republicans to 32 Democrats,
with i bitterly hostile American, and 4 vacancies from
Southern States that never were filled. It was only by
the midsummer madness of secession and the retirement
of the Southern Senators that he was given the majority
in both branches of Congress, and when he turned to the
military arm of the government he was appalled by the
treachery of the men to whom the nation should have
been able to look for its preservation. If any one would
study the most painful and impressive object-lesson on
this point, let him turn to Greeley's American Conflict
and learn from two pictures how the stars of chieftains
glittered and faded until unknown men filled their places
and led the Union armies to victory. In the first volume
of Greeley's history, which was written just at the begin
ning of the war and closed with the commencement of
hostilities, there is a page containing the portraits of
twelve men, entitled "Union Generals." The central
figure is the veteran Scott, and around him are Fremont,
Butler, McDowell, Wool, Halleck, McClellan, Burnside,
Hunter, Hooker, Buell, and Anderson. These were the
chieftains in whom the country then confided, and to
whom Lincoln turned as the men who could be en
trusted with the command of armies. In the second
volume of Greeley's history, published after the close
of the war, there is another picture entitled "Union
Generals," and there is not one face to be found in the
LINCOLN'S SORE TRIALS. 65
last that is in the first. Grant is the central figure of
the Heroes of the Union at the close of the war, with
the faces of Sherman, Sheridan, Thomas, Meade, Han
cock, Blair, Howard, Terry, Curtis, Banks, and Gilmore
around him. In short, the military chieftains who saved
the Union in the flame of battle had to be created by
the exigencies of war, while the men upon whom the
President was compelled to lean when the conflict
began one by one faded from the list of successful
generals.
The ability of the government to protect its own life
when wanton war was inaugurated by the Southern Con
federacy may be well illustrated by an interview between
the President, General Winfield Scott, Governor Curtin,
and myself immediately after the surrender of Sumter.
The President telegraphed to Governor Curtin and to me
as Chairman of the Military Committee of the Senate to
come to Washington as speedily as possible for consulta
tion as to the attitude Pennsylvania should assume in the
civil conflict that had been inaugurated. Pennsylvania
was the most exposed of all the border States, and, being
the second State of the Union in population, wealth, and
military power, it was of the utmost importance that she
should lead in defining the attitude of the loyal States.
Sumter was surrendered on Saturday evening, the i3th
of April, 1 86 1, and on Monday morning Governor Cur
tin and I were at the White House to meet the President
and the Commander-in-Chief of the armies at ten o'clock
in the morning. . I had never before met General Scott.
I had read of him with all the enthusiasm of a boy, as
he was a major-general before I was born, had noted
with pride his brilliant campaign in Mexico, and remem
bered that he was accepted by all Americans as the Great
Captain of the Age. I assumed, of course, that he was
infallible in all matters pertaining to war, and when I
5
66 LINCOLN AND MEN OP
met him it was with a degree of reverence that I had
seldom felt for any other mortal.
Curtin and I were a few minutes in advance of the ap
pointed time for the conference, and as the Cabinet was
in session we were seated in the reception-room. There
were but few there when we entered it, and a number of
chairs were vacant. We sat down by a window looking
out upon the Potomac, and in a few minutes the tall form
of General Scott entered. In the mean time a number
of visitors had arrived and every chair in the room was
occupied. Scott advanced and was cordially greeted by
Governor Curtin and introduced to me. He was then
quite feeble, unable to mount a horse by reason of a dis
tressing spinal affection; and I well remember the punc
tilious ideas of the old soldier, who refused to accept
either Curtin' s chair or mine because there were not
three vacant chairs in the room, although he could not
remain standing without suffering agony. We presented
the ludicrous spectacle of three men standing for nearly
half an hour, and one of them feeble in strength and
greatly the senior of the others in years, simply because
there were not enough chairs for the entire party. With
all his suffering he was too dignified even to lean against
the wall, although it was evident to both of us that he
was in great pain from his ceremonial ideas about ac
cepting the chair of another. When we were ushered
into the President's room the practical work of our mis
sion was soon determined. The question had been fully
considered by the President and the Secretary of War,
who was a Pennsylvanian. Governor Curtin speedily
perfected and heartily approved of the programme they
had marked out, and we had little to do beyond inform
ing them how speedily it could be executed. How
quickly Pennsylvania responded to the request of the
government will be understood when I state that in a
;*
LINCOLN'S SORE TRIALS. 67
single day a bill embracing all the features desired was
passed by both branches and approved by Governor
Curtin.
It was only after the work of Pennsylvania had been
defined and disposed of that I began to get some insight
into the utterly hopeless condition of the government. I
found General Scott disposed to talk rather freely about
the situation, and I ventured to question him as to the
condition of the capital and his ability to defend it in
case of an attack by General Beauregard. The answer
to the first question I ventured was very assuring, coming
from one whom I supposed to know all about war, and to
one who knew just nothing at all about it. I asked Gen
eral Scott whether the capital was in danger. His an
swer was, ' ' No, sir, the capital is not in danger, the cap
ital is not in danger. ' ' Knowing that General Scott
could not have a large force at his command, knowing
also that General Beauregard had a formidable force at
his command at Charleston, and that the transportation
of an army from Charleston to Washington would be the
work of only a few days, I for the first time began to
inquire in my own mind whether this great Chieftain
was, after all, equal to the exceptional necessities of the
occasion. I said to him that, if it was a proper question
for him to answer, I would like to know how many men
he had in Washington for its defense. His prompt an
swer was, " Fifteen hundred, sir; fifteen hundred men
and two batteries." I then inquired whether Washing
ton was a defensible city. This inquiry cast a shadow
over the old veteran's face as he answered, " No, sir;
Washington is not a defensible city. ' ' He then seemed
to consider it necessary to emphasize his assertions of
the safety of the capital, and he pointed to the Potomac,
that was visible from the President's window. Said he :
u You see that vessel? a sloop of war, sir, a sloop of
68 LINCOLN AND. MEN OF WAR-TIMES,
war. ' ' I looked out and saw the vessel, but I could not
help thinking, as I looked beyond to Arlington Heights,
that one or two batteries, even of the ineffective class of
those days, would knock the sloop of war to pieces in
half an hour.
As Johnson, Cooper, and a number of other able sol
diers had left the army but a short time before, I felt
some anxiety to know who were commanding the forces
under General Scott in Washington. He gave me their
names, and within three days thereafter I saw that two
of them had resigned and were already in Richmond
and enlisted in the Confederate service. My doubts mul
tiplied, and a great idol was shattered before I left the
White House that morning. I could not resist the con
viction that General Scott was past all usefulness ; that
he had no adequate conception of the contest before us ;
and that he rested in confidence in Washington when
there was not a soldier of average intelligence in that
city who did not know that Beauregard could capture it
at any time within a week. My anxiety deepened with
my doubts, and I continued my inquiries with the old
warrior by asking how many men General Beauregard
had at Charleston. The old chieftain's head dropped
almost upon his breast at this question, and a trace of
despair was visible as he answered in tremulous tones :
" General Beauregard commands more men at Charles
ton than I command on the continent east of the fron
tier." I asked him how long it would require Beaure
gard to transport his army to Washington. He answered
that it might be done in three or four days. I then re
peated the question, ' ' General, is not Washington in
great danger ?' ' The old warrior was at once aroused,
straightened himself up in his chair with a degree of
dignity that was crushing, and answered "No, sir, the
LINCOLN'S SORE TRIALS. 69
capital can' the taken; the capital can't be taken, sir."
President Lincoln listened to the conversation with evi
dent interest, bnt said nothing. He sat intently gazing
at General Scott, and whirling his spectacles around in
his fingers. When General Scott gave the final answer
that the capital could not be taken, Lincoln, in his
quaint way, said to General Scott, ' ' It does seem to me,
general, that if I were Beauregard I would take Wash
ington. ' ' This expression from the President electrified
the old war-lion again, and he answered with increased
emphasis, "Mr. President, the capital can't be taken,
sir; it can't be taken."
There was but one conclusion that could be accepted
as the result of this interview, and that was that the
great Chieftain of two wars and the worshiped Captain
of the Age was in his dotage and utterly unequal to the
great duty of meeting the impending conflict. Governor
Curtin and I left profoundly impressed with the convic
tion that the incompetency of General Scott was one of
the most serious of the multiplied perils which then con
fronted the Republic. I need not repeat how General
Scott failed in his early military movements ; how he
divided his army and permitted the enemy to unite and
defeat him at Bull Run ; how General McClellan, the
Young Napoleon of the time, was called from his vic
tories in Western Virginia to take command of the
army ; how that change reinspired the loyal people of
the nation in the confidence of speedy victories and the
overthrow of the rebellion; how he and his Chief soon
got to cross purposes; and how, after months of quarrel,
the old Chieftain was prevailed upon to resign his place.
The inside history of his retirement has never been writ
ten, and it is best that it should not. President Lincoln,
Secretary Cameron, and Thomas A. Scott were the only
men who could have written it from personal knowledge,
7 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
They are dead, and an interesting chapter of history has
perished with them.
Such was the condition of the government at the open
ing of our civil war. A great soldier was at the head of
our army, with all his faculties weakened by the infirm
ities of age, and we were compelled to grope in the dark
day after day, week after week, month after month, and
even year after year, until chieftains could be created to
lead our armies to final victories. It must be remem
bered also that public sentiment had at that time no
conception of the cruel sacrifices of war. The fall of a
single soldier, N Colonel Ellsworth, at Alexandria cast a
profound gloom over the entire country, and the loss of
comparatively few men at Big Bethel and Ball's Bluff
convulsed the people from Maine to California. No one
dreamed of the sacrifice of life that a desperate war must
involve. I remember meeting General Burnside, Gen
eral Heintzelman, and one or two other officers of the
Army of the Potomac at Willard's Hotel in December,
1 86 1. The weather had been unusually favorable, the
roads were in excellent condition, and there was general
impatience at McClellan's tardiness in moving against
Manassas and Richmond. I naturally shared the impa
tience that was next to universal, and I inquired of Gen
eral Burnside why it was that the army did not move.
He answered that it would not be a difficult task for
McClellan's army to capture Manassas, march upon
Richmond, and enter the Confederate capital; but he
added with emphasis that he regarded as conclusive that
"It would cost ten thousand men to do it." I was
appalled to silence when compelled to consider so great
a sacrifice for the possession of the insurgents' capital.
Ten times ten thousand men, and even more, fell in the
battles between the Potomac and Richmond before the
bars fell from fbe Richmond State House, but
LINCOLN'S SORE TRIALS. 7 1
in the fall of 1861 the proposition to sacrifice ten thou
sand lives to possess the Confederate capital would have
been regarded by all as too appalling to contemplate.
Indeed, we were not only utterly unprepared for war,
but we were utterly unprepared for its sacrifices and its
bereavements; and President Lincoln was compelled to
meet this great crisis and patiently await the fullness of
time to obtain chieftains and armies and to school the
people to the crimsoned story necessary to tell of the
safety of the Republic.
LINCOLN'S CHARACTERISTICS.
ABRAHAM UNCOIyN was eminently human. As
-TlL the old lady said about General Jackson when she
had finally reached his presence, " He's only a man, after
all. ' ' Although much as other men in the varied quali
ties which go to make up a single character, taking him
all in all, ' ' none but himself can be his parallel. ' ' Of
all the public men I have met, he was the most difficult
to analyze. His characteristics were more original, more
diversified, more intense in a sober way, and yet more
flexible under many circumstances, than I have ever
seen in any other. Many have attempted to portray
Lincoln's characteristics, and not a few have assumed
to do it with great confidence. Those who have spoken
most confidently of their knowledge of his personal
qualities are, as a rule, those who saw least of them
below the surface. He might have been seen every day
during his Presidential term without ever reaching the
distinctive qualities which animated and guided him,
and thus hundreds of writers have assumed that they
understood him when they had never seen the inner in
spirations of the man at all. He was a stranger to deceit,
incapable of dissembling; seemed to be the frankest and
freest of conversationalists, and yet few understood him
even reasonably well, and none but Lincoln ever thor
oughly understood Lincoln. If I had seen less of him
72
(Photo by Gutekunst, Philadelphia.)
ABRAHAM I,1NCOI,N AND HIS SON TAD.
74^ LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
I might have ventured with much greater confidence to
attempt a portrayal of his individuality, but I saw him
many times when Presidential honors were forgotten in
Presidential sorrows, and when his great heart throbbed
upon his sleeve. It was then that his uncommon quali
ties made themselves lustrous and often startled and con
fused his closest friends.
I regard Lincoln as very widely misunderstood in one
of the most important attributes of his character. It has
been common, during the last twenty-five years, to see
publications relating to Lincoln from men who assumed
that they enjoyed his full confidence. In most and per
haps all cases the writers believed what they stated, but
those who assumed to speak most confidently on the sub
ject were most mistaken. Mr. Lincoln gave his confi
dence to no living man without reservation. He trusted
many, but he trusted only within the carefully-studied
limitations of their usefulness, and when he trusted he
confided, as a rule, only to the extent necessary to make
that trust available. He had as much faith in mankind
as is common amongst men, and it was not because he
was of a distrustful nature or because of any specially
selfish attribute of his character that he thus limited his
confidence in all his intercourse with men. In this view
of Lincoln I am fully sustained by those who knew him
best. The one man who saw more of him in all the
varied vicissitudes of his life from early manhood to his
elevation to the Presidency was William H. Herndon,
who was his close friend and law-partner for a full score
of years. In analyzing the character of Lincoln he thus
refers to his care as to confidants: u Mr. Lincoln never
had y a confidant, and therefore never unbosomed himself
to others. He never spoke of his trials to me, or, so far
as I knew, to any of his friends." David Davis, in
whose sober judgment Lincoln had more confidence than
LttfCOLtf'S CHARACTERISTICS. 75
in that of his other friends, and who held as intimate
relations to him as was possible by any, says: "I knew
the man so well; he was the most reticent, secretive man
I ever saw or expect to see. ' '
Leonard Swett is well known to have been the one
whose counsels were among the most welcome to Lin
coln, and who doubtless did counsel him with more free
dom than any other man. In a letter given in Herndon's
Life of Lincoln he says: "From the commencement of
his life to its close I have sometimes doubted whether he
ever asked anybody's advice about anything. He would
listen to everybody; he would hear everybody; but he
rarely, if ever, asked for opinions." He adds in the
same letter: "As a politician and as President he arrived
at all his conclusions from his own reflections, and when
his conclusions were once formed he never doubted but
what they were right." Speaking of his generally as
sumed frankness of character, Swett says, ' ( One great
public mistake of his [Lincoln's] character as generally
received and acquiesced in is that he is considered by the
people of this country as a frank, guileless, and unso
phisticated man. There never was a greater mistake.
Beneath a smooth surface of candor and apparent decla
ration of all his thoughts and feelings he exercised the
most exalted tact and wisest discrimination. He handled
and moved men remotely as we do pieces upon a chess
board. He retained through life all the friends he ever
had, and he made the wrath of his enemies to praise
him. This was not by cunning or intrigue in the low
acceptation of the term, but by far-seeing reason and
discernment. He always told only enough of his plans
and purposes to induce the belief that he had communi
cated all; yet he reserved enough to have communicated
nothing. ' '
Mr. Herndon, in a lecture delivered on Lincoln to a
76 LINCOLN AND- MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
Springfield audience in 1866, said: "He [Lincoln] never
revealed himself entirely to any one man, and therefore
he will always to a certain extent remain enveloped in
doubt. I always believed I could read him as thor
oughly as any man, yet he was so different in many re
spects from any other one I ever met before or since
his time that I cannot say I comprehended him. ' ' Mr.
Lamon, who completes the circle of the men who were
closest to Lincoln, the man who was chosen by Lincoln
to accompany him on his midnight journey from Harris-
burg to Washington, and whom he appointed Marshal
of the District of Columbia to have him in the closest
touch with himself, thus describes Lincoln in his biog
raphy: " Mr. Lincoln was a man apart from the rest of
his kind unsocial, cold, impassive; neither a good hater
nor fond friend." And he adds that Lincoln u made
simplicity and candor a mask of deep feelings carefully
concealed, and subtle plans studiously veiled from all
eyes but one."
I have seen Lincoln many times when he seemed to
speak with the utmost candor, I have seen him many
times when he spoke with mingled candor and caution,
and I have seen him many times when he spoke but lit
tle and with extreme caution. It must not be inferred,
because of the testimony borne to Lincoln's reticence
generally and to his singular methods in speaking on
subjects of a confidential nature, that he was ever guilty
of deceit. He was certainly one of the most sincere men
I have ever met, and he was also one of the most saga
cious men that this or any other country has ever pro
duced. He was not a man of cunning, in the ordinary
acceptation of the word; not a man who would mislead
in any way, unless by silence; and when occasion de
manded he would speak with entire freedom as far as it
was possible for him to speak at all. I regard him as
LINCOLN'S CHARACTERISTICS. 77
one who believed that the truth was not always to be
spoken, but who firmly believed, also, that only the
truth should be spoken when it was necessary to speak
at all.
Lincoln's want of trust in those closest to him was
often a great source of regret, and at times of morti
fication. I have many times heard Mr. Swett and Mr.
Lamon, and occasionally Mr. Davis, speak of his per
sistent reticence on questions of the gravest public mo
ment which seemed to demand prompt action by the
President. They would confer with him, as I did my
self at times, earnestly advising and urging action on his
part, only to find him utterly impassible and incompre
hensible. Neither by word nor expression could any
one form the remotest idea of his purpose, and when he
did act in many cases he surprised both friends and foes.
When he nominated Mr. Stanton as Secretary of War
there was not a single member of his Cabinet who had
knowledge of his purpose to do so until it was done, and
when he appointed Mr. Chase Chief-Justice there was
not a man living, of the hundreds who had advised him
and pressed their friends upon him, who had any inti
mation as to even the leaning of his mind on the subject.
I remember on one occasion, when we were alone in the
Executive Chamber, he discussed the question of the
Chief-Justiceship for fully half an hour; named the men
who had been prominently mentioned in connection with
the appointment; spoke of all of them with apparent
freedom; sought and obtained my own views as to the
wisdom of appointing either of them, and when the
conversation ended I had no more idea as to the bent of
his mind than if I had been conversing with the Sphinx.
I suggested to him, in closing the conversation, that his
views on the subject were very much more important
than mine, and that I would be very glad to have them,
78 LINCOLN AND 'MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
to which he gave this characteristic answer: "Well,
McClure, the fact is I'm 'shut pan' on that question."
Lincoln's intellectual organization has been portrayed
by many writers, but so widely at variance as to greatly
confuse the general reader. Indeed, he was the most
difficult of all men to analyze. He did not rise above
the average man by escaping a common mingling of
greatness and infirmities. I believe he was very well
described in a single sentence by Mr. Herndon when he
said: "The truth about Mr. Lincoln is, that he read less
and thought more than any man in his sphere in Amer
ica." Tested by the standard of many other great men,
Lincoln was not great, but tested by the only true stand
ard of his owi achievements, he may justly appear in
history as one of the greatest of American statesmen.
Indeed, in some most essential attributes of greatness I
doubt whether any of our public men ever equaled him.
We have had men who could take a higher intellectual
grasp of any abstruse problem of statesmanship, but few
have ever equaled, and none excelled, Lincoln in the
practical, common-sense, and successful solution of the
gravest problems ever presented in American history.
He possessed a peculiarly receptive and analytical mind.
He sought information from every attainable source.
He sought it persistently, weighed it earnestly, and in
the end reached his own conclusions. When he had
once reached a conclusion as to a public duty, there was
no human power equal to the task of changing his pur
pose. He was self-reliant to an uncommon degree, and
yet as entirely free from arrogance of opinion as any
public man I have ever known.
Judged by the records of his administration, Lincoln
is now regarded as the most successful Exectitive the
Republic has ever had. When it is considered what
peculiarly embarrassing and momentous issues were pre-
LINCOLN'S CHARACTERISTICS. 79
sented to him for decision, and issues for which history
had no precedents, it is entirely safe to say that no man
has ever equaled him as a successful ruler of a free
people. This success was due chiefly to one single qual
ity of the man the will of the people was his guiding
star. He sprang from the people and from close to
Mother Earth. He grew up with the people, and in all
his efforts, convictions, and inspirations he was ever in
touch with the people. When President he looked solely
to the considerate judgment of the American people to
guide him in the solution of all the vexed questions
which were presented to him. In all the struggles of
mean ambition and all the bitter jealousies of greatness
which constantly surged around him, and in all the con
stant and distressing discord that prevailed in his Cabinet
during the dark days which shadowed him with grief,
Lincoln ever turned to study with ceaseless care the in
telligent expression of the popular will.
Unlike all Presidents who had preceded him, he came
into office without a fixed and accepted policy. Civil
war plunged the government into new and most per
plexing duties. The people were unschooled to the sad
necessities which had to be accepted to save the Re
public. Others would have rushed in to offend public
sentiment by the violent acceptance of what they knew
must be accepted in the end. These men greatly vexed
and embarrassed Lincoln in his sincere efforts to advance
the people and the government to the full measure of the
sacrifices which were inevitable ; but Lincoln waited
patiently waited until in the fullness of time the judg
ment of the people was ripened for action, and then, and
then only, did Lincoln act. Had he done otherwise, he
would have involved the country in fearful peril both at
home and abroad, and it was his constant study of, and
obedience to, the honest judgment of the people of the
80 LINCOLN AND -MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
nation that saved the Republic and that enshrined him
in history as the greatest of modern rulers.
If there are yet any intelligent Americans who believe
that Lincoln was an innocent, rural, unsophisticated cha
racter, it is time that they should be undeceived. I ven
ture the assertion, without fear of successful contradiction,
that Abraham Lincoln was the most sagacious of all the
public men of his day in either political party. He was
therefore the master-politician of his time. He was not
a politician as the term is now commonly applied and
understood; he knew nothing about the countless meth
ods which are employed in the details of political effort;
but no man knew better indeed, I think no man knew
so well as he did how to summon and dispose of polit
ical ability to attain great political results; and this work
he performed with unfailing wisdom and discretion in
every contest for himself and for the country.
A pointed illustration of his sagacity and of his cau
tious methods in preventing threatened evil or gaining
promised good is presented by his action in 1862 when
the first army draft was made in Pennsylvania. There
was then no national conscription law, and volunteering
had ceased to fill up our shattered armies. A draft under
the State law was necessary to fill a requisition made
upon Pennsylvania for troops. The need for immediate
reinforcements was very pressing, and in obedience to
the personal request of both Lincoln and Governor Cur-
tin I accepted the ungracious task of organizing and
executing the draft under the State laws. How promptly
the task was executed may be understood when I say that
within sixty days the entire State was enrolled, quotas
adjusted, the necessary exemptions made, the draft exe
cuted, and seventeen organized regiments sent to the
front, and without a dollar of cost to either the State or
National Governments for duties performed in my office
LINCOLN'S CHARACTERISTICS. 8 1
beyond the salaries of two clerks. While there were
mutterings of disloyalty in a very few sections of Penn
sylvania, and they only within a very limited circle,
there was one sore spot where open rebellion was threat
ened. That was Cass township, Schuylkill county. The
Mollie Magtiires were then just approaching the zenith
of their criminal power, and Cass township was the cen
tre of that lawless element. Thirteen murders had been
committed in that district within a few years, and not
one murderer had been brought to punishment. This
banded criminal organization was as disloyal to the gov
ernment as it was to law, and it was with the utmost dif
ficulty that even an imperfect enumeration had been
made and the quota adjusted to be supplied by draft.
The draft was made, however, and on the day fixed for
the conscripts to take the cars and report at Harrisburg
the criminal element of the district not only refused to
respond to the call, but its leaders came to the station
and drove other conscripts violently from the depot.
It was open, defiant rebellion. I at once reported the
facts to Secretary Stanton, who promptly answered, di
recting that the draft should be enforced at every hazard,
and placing one Philadelphia regiment and one regiment
at Harrisburg subject to the orders of the Governor, with
instructions to send them at once to the scene of revolt.
Fearing that the Secretary did not fully comprehend the
peril of a conflict between the military and the citizens,
Governor Curtin directed me to telegraph more fully to
Secretary Stanton, suggesting his further consideration
of the subject. His answer was promptly given, repeat
ing his order for the military to move at once to Cass
township and enforce the law at the point of the bayonet.
The regiments were given marching orders, and reached
Pottsville on the following day. I felt that a conflict
between the military and citizens in any part of the State
82 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
must be very disastrous to the loyal cause, and after full
consultation with Governor Curtin, in obedience to his
directions, I telegraphed to Lincoln in cipher asking him
to consider the subject well. This was in the early part
of the day, and I was surprised and distressed when even
ing came without any reply. When I entered the break
fast-room of the hotel the next morning I saw seated at
the table Assistant Adjutant-General Townsend of the
United States Army. I knew him well, and when he
saw me he beckoned me to his side and asked me to
breakfast with him. We were out of hearing of any
others at the table, and he at once stated to me the pur
pose of his visit. He had arrived at three o'clock in the
morning, and was waiting to see me as soon as I should
appear. He said : u I have no orders to give you, but I
came solely to deliver a personal message from President
Lincoln in these words: ' Say to McClure that I am very
desirous to have the laws fully executed, but it might be
well, in an extreme emergency, to be content with the
appearance of executing the laws; I think McClure will
understand.'" To this General Townsend added: "I
have now fulfilled my mission ; I do not know to what
it relates."
I of course made no explanation to General Townsend,
but hurried from the breakfast- table to summon Benja
min Bannan from Pottsville to Harrisburg as speedily as
possible. He was the commissioner of draft for that
county, a warm friend of the President, and a man of
unusual intelligence and discretion. He reached Harris-
burg the same day, and Lincoln's instructions were
frankly explained to him. No one had any knowledge
of them but ourselves and the Governor. Commissioner
Bannan appreciated the necessity of avoiding a collision
between the military and the citizens of Cass township,
but, said he, ' ' How can it be done ? How can the laws
LINCOLN'S CHARACTERISTICS. 83
even appear to have been executed ?' ' I told him that in
a number of cases evidence had been presented, after the
quotas had been adjusted and the draft ordered, to prove
that the quotas had been filled by volunteers who had
enlisted in some town or city outside of their townships.
In all such cases, where the evidence was clear, the order
for the draft was revoked because the complement of
men had been filled. I said only by such evidence from
Cass township could the order for the draft be revoked
and the arrest of the conscripted men for service be
avoided. He intuitively comprehended the gravity of
the situation, and took the first train home. By the next
evening he was back and laid before me a number of
affidavits in regular form, apparently executed by citi
zens of Cass township, which, if uncontradicted, proved
that their quota was entirely full. I asked no explana
tions, but at once indorsed upon the testimony that as
the quota of Cass township had been filled by volunteers,
the draft was inoperative in that district and its con
scripts would not be held to sendee.
I have never made inquiry into the method of obtain
ing those affidavits, and there is none now living who
could give any information about it, as Mr. Bannan has
long since joined the great majority beyond. The Gov
ernor had, in the mean time, halted the troops at Potts-
ville, and as the laws seemed to be executed in peace, the
regiments were ordered back by the Governor and the
conflict between the military and the Mollie Maguires
was averted. Stan ton never had knowledge of Lincoln's
action in this matter, nor did a single member of his ad
ministration know of his intervention. Had Stanton
been permitted to have his sway, he would have ruled in
the tempest, and Pennsylvania would have inaugurated
a rebellion of her own that might have reached fearful
proportions, and that certainly would have greatly para-
84 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
lyzed the power of the loyal people of the State. I am
quite sure that not until after the war was ended, and
probably not for years thereafter, did any but Lincoln,
Curtin, Bannan, and myself have any knowledge of this
important adjustment of the Cass township rebellion.
LINCOLN IN POLITICS.
IF Abraham Lincoln was not a master politician, I am
entirely ignorant of the qualities which make up such
a character. In a somewhat intimate acquaintance with
the public men of the country for a period of more than
a generation, I have never met one who made so few
mistakes in politics as Lincoln. The man who could
call Seward as Premier of his administration, with Weed
the power behind the Premier, often stronger than the
Premier himself, and yet hold Horace Greeley even
within the ragged edges of the party lines, and the man
who could call Simon Cameron to his Cabinet in Penn
sylvania without alienating Governor Curtin, and who
could remove Cameron from his Cabinet without alien
ating Cameron, would naturally be accepted as a man of
much more than ordinary political sagacity. Indeed, I
have never known one who approached Lincoln in the
peculiar faculty of holding antagonistic elements to his
own support, and maintaining close and often apparently
confidential relations with each without offense to the
other. This is the more remarkable from the fact that
Lincoln was entirely without training in political man
agement. I remember on one occasion, when there was
much concern felt about a political contest in Pennsyl
vania, he summoned half a dozen or more Pennsylvania
Republicans to a conference at the White House. When
85
LINCOLN'S HOME IN CHILDHOOD.
*^jzsS^^
LINCOLN'S HOME IN SPRINGFIELD.
LINCOLN IN POLITICS. $7
we had gathered there he opened the subject in his
quaint way by saying: "You know I never was a con
triver; I don't know much about how things are done
in politics, but I think you gentlemen understand the
situation in your State, and I want to learn what may
be done to ensure the success we all desire. ' ' He made
exhaustive inquiry of each of the persons present as to
the danger-signals of the contest, specially directing his
questions to every weak point in the party lines and
every strong point of the opposition. He was not con
tent with generalities; he had no respect for mere enthu
siasm. What he wanted was sober facts. He had abid
ing faith in the people, in their intelligence and theii
patriotism; and he estimated political results by ascer
taining, as far as possible, the popular bearing of every
vital question that was likely to arise, and he formed
his conclusions by his keen intuitive perception as to
how the people would be likely to deal with the
issues.
While Lincoln had little appreciation of himself as
candidate for President as late as 1859, the dream of
reaching the Presidency evidently took possession of
him in the early part of 1860, and his first efforts to
advance himself as a candidate were singularly awkward
and infelicitous. He had then no experience whatever
as a leader of leaders, and it was not until he had made
several discreditable blunders that he learned how much
he must depend upon others if he would make himself
President. Some Lincoln enthusiast in Kansas, with
much more pretensions than power, wrote him in March,
1860, proposing to furnish a Lincoln delegation from that
State to the Chicago Convention, and suggesting that
Lincoln should pay the legitimate expenses of organ
izing, electing, and taking to the convention the prom
ised Lincoln delegates. To this Lincoln replied that
LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
( ' in the main, the use of money is wrong, but for cer
tain objects in a political contest the use of some is both
right and indispensable. ' ' And he added, ' ' If you shall
be appointed a delegate to Chicago I will furnish $100 to
bear the expenses of the trip. ' ' He heard nothing further
from the Kansas man until he saw an announcement in
the newspapers that Kansas had elected delegates and
instructed them for Seward. This was Lincoln's first
disappointment in his effort to organize his friends to
attain the Presidential nomination, but his philosophy
was well maintained. Without waiting to hear from his
friend who had contracted to bring a Lincoln delegation
from Kansas he wrote him, saying, U I see by the dis
patches that since you wrote Kansas has appointed dele
gates instructed for Seward. Don't stir them up to
anger, but come along to the convention, and I will do
as I said about expenses." It is not likely that that
unfortunate experience cost Lincoln his $100, but it is
worthy of note that soon after his inauguration as Pres
ident he gave the man a Federal office with a comfort
able salary.
When he became seriously enlisted as a candidate for
the Presidential nomination, he soon learned that while
he could be of value as an adviser and organizer, the
great work had to be performed by others than himself.
He gathered around him a number of the ablest poli
ticians of the West, among whom were Norman P. Judd,
David Davis, Leonard Swett, O. M. Hatch, and Mr.
Medill of the Chicago Tribune. These men had, for the
first time, brought a National Convention to the West,
and they had the advantage of fighting for Lincoln on
their own ground with the enthusiasm his name inspired
as a potent factor in their work. They went there to
win, and they left nothing undone within the range of
political effort to give him the nomination. Two posi-
LINCOLN IN POLITICS. 89
tions in the Cabinet, one for Pennsylvania and one for
Indiana, were positively promised by David Davis at an
early period of the contest, when they feared that there
might be serious difficulty in uniting the delegations of
those States on Lincoln. It is proper to say that Lincoln
had no knowledge of these contracts, and had given no
such authority, and it is proper, also, to say that the con
tracts were made in both cases with comparatively irre
sponsible parties who had little power, if any, in guiding
the actions of their respective delegations. Certainly
Lane and Curtin, who were the most important factors
in bringing their States to the support of Lincoln, not
only were not parties to these contracts, but were entirely
ignorant of them until their fulfillment was demanded
after Lincoln's election. I have good reason to know
that in the case of Pennsylvania that contract, while it
did not of itself make General Cameron Secretary of
War, had much to do with resolving Lincoln's doubts in
favor of Cameron's appointment in the end.
There were no political movements of national import
ance during Lincoln's administration in which he did
not actively, although often hiddenly, participate. It
was Lincoln who finally, after the most convulsive efforts
to get Missouri into line with the administration, effected
a reconciliation of disputing parties which brought Brown
and Henderson into the Senate, and it was Lincoln who
in 1863 took a leading part in attaining the declination
of Curtin as a gubernatorial candidate that year. Grave
apprehensions were felt that Curtin could not be re-
elected because of the bitterness of the hostility of Cam
eron and his friends, and also because there were 70,000
Pennsylvania soldiers in the field who could not vote.
Lincoln was Curtin' s sincere friend, but when Curtin' s
supporters suggested that his broken health called for his
retirement, Lincoln promptly agreed to tender Curtin a
90 LINCOLN AND 'MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
first-class foreign mission if he decided to decline a re-
nomination. Curtin accepted the proffered mission, to
be assumed at the close of his term, and he published his
acceptance and his purpose to withdraw from the field for
Governor.
Curtin' s declination was responded to within a week
by a number of the leading counties of the State per
emptorily instructing their delegates to vote for his re-
nomination for Governor. It soon became evident that
the party would accept no other leader in the desperate
conflict, and that no other candidate could hope to be
elected. Curtin was compelled to submit, and he was
nominated on the first ballot by more than a two- thirds
vote, although bitterly opposed by a number of promi
nent Federal officers in the State. Lincoln was disap
pointed in the result not because he was averse to Cur
tin, but because he feared that party divisions would lose
the State. Both Lincoln and Stanton made exhaustive
efforts to support Curtin after he had been nominated,
and all the power of the government that could be
wielded with effect was employed to promote his elec
tion. The battle was a desperate one against the late
Chief-Justice Woodward, who was a giant in intellectual
strength, and who commanded the unbounded confidence
and enthusiastic support of. his party, but Curtin was
elected by over 15,000 majority.
One of the shrewdest of Lincoln's great political
schemes was the tender, by an autograph letter, of the
French mission to the elder James Gordon Bennett. No
one who can form any intelligent judgment of the polit
ical exigencies of that time can fail to understand why
the venerable independent journalist received this maik
of favor from the President. Lincoln had but one of
the leading journals of New York on which he could
for positive support, That w Mr,
LINCOLN IN POLITICS. 9 1
New York Times. Mr. Greeley's Tribune was the most
widely read Republican journal of the country, and it
was unquestionably the most potent in moulding Repub
lican sentiment. Its immense weekly edition, for that
day, reached the more intelligent masses of the people
in every State of the Union, and Greeley was not in
accord with Lincoln. Lincoln knew how important it
was to have the support of the Herald, and he carefully
studied how to bring its editor into close touch with
himself. The outlook for Lincoln's re-election was not
promising. Bennett had strongly advocated the nomi
nation of General McClellan by the Democrats, and that
was ominous of hostility to Lincoln; and when McClel
lan was nominated he was accepted on all sides as a most
formidable candidate. It was in this emergency that
Lincoln's political sagacity served him sufficiently to
win the Herald to his cause, and it was done by the
confidential tender of the French mission. Bennett did
not break over to Lincoln at once, but he went by grad
ual approaches. His first step was to declare in favor of
an entirely new candidate, which was an utter impossi
bility. He opened a leader on the subject thus: "Lin
coln has proved a failure; McClellan has proved a fail
ure; Fremont has proved a failure; let us have a new
candidate." Lincoln, McClellan, and Fremont were
then all in the field as nominated candidates, and the
Fremont defection was a serious threat to Lincoln.
Of course, neither Lincoln nor McClellan declined,
and the Herald, failing to get the new man it knew
to be an impossibility, squarely advocated Lincoln's
re-election.
Without consulting any one, and without any public
announcement whatever, Lincoln wrote to Bennett, ask
ing him to accept the mission to France. The offer was
declined, Bennett valued the offer vety much more than
92 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
the office, and from that day until the day of his death
he was one of Lincoln's most appreciative friends and
hearty supporters on his own independent line. The
tender of the French mission to Bennett has been dis
puted, but I am not mistaken about it. W. O. Bartlett,
a prominent member of the New York bar, and father
of the present Judge Bartlett of the Supreme Court of
that State, had personal knowledge of Lincoln's auto
graph letter that was delivered to Bennett, and Judge
Bartlett yet has the original letter, unless he has parted
with it within the last few years. Bennett was not only
one of the ablest and one of the most sagacious editors
of his day, but he was also one of the most independent,
and in controversy one of the most defiant. He was in
a position to render greater service to Lincoln and to the
country in its desperate civil war than any other one man
in American journalism. He did not pretend to be a
Republican; on the contrary, he was Democratic in all
his personal sympathies and convictions, but he gave a
faithful support to the war, although often freely criti
cising the policy of the administration. He had no de
sire for public office, but he did desire, after he had ac
quired wealth and newspaper power, just the recognition
that Lincoln gave him, and I doubt whether any one
thing during Bennett's life ever gave him more sincere
gratification than this voluntary offer of one of the first-
class missions of the country, made in Mr. Lincoln's own
handwriting, and his opportunity to decline the same.
Looking as Lincoln did to the great battle for his re-elec
tion, this was one of the countless sagacious acts by
which he strengthened himself from day to day, and it
did much, very much, to pave the way for his over
whelming majority of 1864.
That Lincoln understood practical politics after he had
been nominated for a second term is very clearly illus-
LINCOLN IN POLITICS. 93
trated in the letter he wrote to General Sherman on the
1 9th of September, 1864. The States of Indiana, Ohio,
and Pennsylvania then voted in October for State offices,
and Indiana was desperately contested. Ohio was re
garded as certain, and Pennsylvania had only Congress
men and local officers to elect. The soldiers of Indiana
could not vote in the field, and Lincoln's letter to Sher
man, who commanded the major portion of the Indiana
troops, appeals to him, in Lincoln's usual cautious man
ner, to furlough as many of his soldiers home for the
October election as he could safely spare. His exact
language is : " Anything you can safely do to let your
soldiers, or any part of them, go home to vote at the
State election will be greatly in point." To this he
adds: "This is in no sense an order; it is simply in
tended to impress you with the importance to the army
itself of your doing all you safely can, yourself being the
judge of what you can safely do." While this was "in
no sense an order, ' ' it was practically a command that
Sherman promptly and generously obeyed, and the result
was that Morton was elected Governor by some 22,000
majority. It was at Lincoln's special request that Gen
eral Logan left his command and missed the march to
the sea, to stump Indiana and Illinois in the contest of
1864. He was one of the ablest and most impressive of
all the campaigners of the West, and it was regarded by
Lincoln as more important that Logan should be on the
hustings than in command of his corps.
I recall a pointed illustration of Lincoln's rare sagacity
when confronted with embarrassing political complica
tions that occurred in 1862, when I was in charge of the
military department of Pennsylvania pertaining to the
draft for troops made under the State law. Harrisburg
was an important centre of military supplies, as well as
the political centre of the State. Immense army con-
94 LINCOLN AND' MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
tracts were there awarded and executed under officers
assigned to duty at that place. After the draft had been
made the conscripts began to pour into the capital by
thousands, and, as the demand for reinforcements in the
field was very pressing, I called upon the military officer
of the city and urged upon him the necessity of muster
ing the new men as promptly as possible. To my sur
prise, he mustered only two companies the first day out
of a thousand men. On the second day, notwithstand
ing my earnest appeal to him, he mustered no more than
two companies, and on the third day, when I had over
5000 men in camp, a mere mob without organization or
discipline, the same tedious process of mustering was
continued. I telegraphed Secretary Stanton that I had
many men in camp, and that they were arriving in large
numbers, but that I could not have them mustered that
I could forward a regiment of troops every day if the
government would furnish the officers to muster and or
ganize them. A prompt answer came that it would be
done. The following morning a new officer appeared,
of course subordinate to the commandant of the place
who had charge of the mustering., and he promptly mus
tered an entire regiment the first day. On the following
morning he was relieved from duty and ordered else
where, and the mustering again fell back to two com
panies a day.
In the mean time over 7000 men had been gathered
into the camp, and it was evident that the question of
supplying the camp and the interests of contractors had
become paramount to the reinforcement of the army. I
f elegraphed Lincoln that I would see him in Washing
ton that night, and hurried on to correct the evil by per
sonal conference with him. The case was a very simple
one, and he readily took in the situation. He knew that
I had labored day and night for two months, without
LINCOLN IN POLITICS. 95
compensation or the expectation of it, to hasten the
Pennsylvania troops to the aid of our soldiers in the
field, and I said to him that if he would send mustering
officers to organize them promptly, I would return and
finish the work ; if not, I would abandon it and go home.
Lincoln was greatly pained at the development, but he
understood that a change of military officers at Harris-
burg, such as this occasion seemed to demand, would
involve serious political complications. He was of all
things most desirous to strengthen our shattered armies,
and it was evident very soon that he meant to do so in
some way, but without offense to the political power that
controlled the military assignments at Harrisburg. With
out intimating his solution of the problem, he rang his
bell and instructed his messenger to bring Adjutant-Gen
eral Thomas to the Executive Chamber. Soon after the
Adjutant-General appeared, and Lincoln said: "General,
what is the military rank of the senior officer at Harris-
burg?" To which the Adjutant-General replied: " Cap
tain, sir," and naming the officer. Lincoln promptly
said in reply : * ' Bring me a commission immediately for
Alexander K. McClure as Assistant Adjutant-General of
the United States Volunteers, with the rank of major. ' '
The Adjutant-General bowed himself out, when I imme
diately said to Lincoln that I could not consent to be sub
ject to arbitrary military orders that I desired no com
pensation for the work I performed, and I must decline
the honor he proposed to confer upon me. In his quiet
way he replied: "Well, McClure, try my way; I think
that will get the troops on without delay and without
treading on anybody's toes. I think if you will take
your commission back to Harrisburg, call upon the cap
tain in command there to muster you into the service of
the United States, and show him your assignment to
duty there, you will have no trouble whatever in getting
9 6 LINCOLN AND 'MEN OF WAR-TIMES,
the troops organized and forwarded as rapidly as you
wish. Now try it, won't you?"
I saw the wisdom of the suggestion, and well under
stood why the President desired to avoid the offense that
would have been given by the removal of the military
officers, and I agreed to try his plan. When I returned
to Harrisburg the next day I sent for the senior officer to
come to my office. He came in with all the dignity and
arrogance of an offended Caesar and spoke to me with
bare civility. I quietly handed him my commission,
requested him to muster me into the military service,
and also exhibited the order assigning me for duty at
Harrisburg. When he saw my commission his hat was
immediately removed and he was as obsequious as he
had been insolent before. When he had finished mus
tering me into the service I said to him, ' ' I presume you
understand what this means. I don't propose to make
any display of military authority or to interfere with
anything except that which I have immediately in hand.
There must be a regiment of troops mustered and for
warded from this State every day until the troops in
camp are all sent to the field. Good-morning." He
immediately bowed himself out, saluting in military
stylo as he did so a grace that I had not yet mastered
sufficiently to return and from that day until the camp
was emptied of conscripts a regiment of troops was mus
tered daily and forwarded to Washington. That was the
only military authority I ever exercised, and few knew
of the military dignity I had so suddenly attained.
When the troops were forwarded to the field and the
accounts settled I resigned my commission as quietly as
I received it and sent my resignation to the President,
who, as he had voluntarily promised, ordered its imme
diate acceptance. The officer who was thus so unex
pectedly superseded, and who was so promptly made
LINCOLN IN POLITICS. 97
to render efficient service to the country by Lincoln's
admirable strategy, is no longer among the living,
and I omit his name. He learned how Lincoln
could discipline a soldier, and he profited by the
lesson.
LINCOLN AND EMANCIPATION.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN was not a sentimental Aboli-
-T\ tionist. Indeed, he was not a sentimentalist on
any subject. He was a man of earnest conviction and
of sublime devotion to his faith. In many of his public
letters and State papers he was as poetic as he was epi
grammatic, and he was singularly felicitous in the pathos
that was so often interwoven with his irresistible logic.
But he never contemplated the abolition of slavery until
the events of the war not only made it clearly possible,
but made it an imperious necessity. As the sworn Ex
ecutive of the nation it was his duty to obey the Consti
tution in all its provisions, and he accepted that duty
without reservation. He knew that slavery was the im
mediate cause of the political disturbance that culminated
in civil war, and I know that he believed from the begin
ning that if war should be persisted in, it could end only
in the severance of the Union or the destruction of slav
ery. His supreme desire was peace, alike before the war,
during the war, and in closing the war. He exhausted
every means within his power to teach the Southern peo
ple that slavery could not be disturbed by his administra
tion as long as they themselves obeyed the Constitution
and laws which protected slavery, and he never uttered
a word or did an act to justify, or even excuse, the South
LINCOLN'S TOMB AT SPRINGFIELD.
1 00 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
in assuming that he meant to make any warfare upon
the institution of slavery beyond protecting the free Ter
ritories from its desolating tread.
It was not until the war had been in progress for
nearly two years that Lincoln decided to proclaim the
policy of Emancipation, and then he was careful to as
sume the power as warranted .under the Constitution only
by the supreme necessities of war. There was no time
from the inauguration of Lincoln until the ist of Janu
ary, 1863, that the South could not have returned to the
Union with slavery intact in every State. His prelimi
nary proclamation, dated September 22, 1862, gave notice
that on the ist of January, 1863, he would by public
proclamation, "warranted by the Constitution upon
military necessity, ' ' declare that * * all persons held as
slaves within any State, or designated part of the State,
the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the
United States, shall be thenceforward and for ever free. ' '
Every insurgent State had thus more than three months'
formal notice that the war was not prosecuted for the
abolition of slavery, but solely for the restoration of the
Union, and that they could, by returning and accepting
the authority of the National Government at any time
before the ist of January, 1863, preserve slavery indef
initely. Lincoln's letter to Horace Greeley, written just
one month before his preliminary Emancipation Procla
mation, presents in the clearest and most concise manner
Lincoln's views on the subject of slavery and the Union.
After saying that if he could save the Union without
freeing any slaves he would do it; that if he could save
it by freeing all the slaves he would do it; and that if
he could save it by freeing some and leaving others
he would also do that, he adds: "What I do about
slavery and the colored race I do because I believe it
helps to save this Union, and what I forbear I forbear
LINCOLN AND EMANCIPATION. IO i
because I do not believe it would help to save the
Union."
As President of the Republic, Lincoln was governed
at every step by his paramount duty to prevent the dis
memberment of the nation and to restore the Union and
its people to fraternal relations. The best expression of
his own views and aims in the matter is given in a single
brief sentence, uttered by himself on the I3th of Sep
tember, 1862, only nine days before he issued the pre
liminary proclamation. It was in response to an appeal
from a large delegation of Chicago clergymen, represent
ing nearly or quite all the religious denominations of that
city, urging immediate Emancipation. He heard them
patiently, as he always did those who were entitled to be
heard at all, and his answer was given in these words:
1 ' I have not decided against the proclamation of liberty
to the slaves, but hold the matter under advisement, and
I can assure you the matter is on my mind by day and
by night more than any other. Whatever shall appear
to be God's will I will do." However Lincoln's relig
ious views may be disputed, he had a profound belief in
God and in God's immutable justice, and the sentence I
have just quoted tells the whole story of Lincoln's action
in the abolition of slavery. He did not expect miracles
indeed, he was one of the last men to believe in mira
cles at all but he did believe that God overruled all
human actions; that all individuals charged with grave
responsibility were but the means in the hands of the
Great Ruler to accomplish the fulfillment of justice.
Congressman Arnold, whom Lincoln once declared to
me to be the one member of the House in whose per
sonal and political friendship he had absolute faith,
speaking of the earnest appeals made to Lincoln for
Emancipation, says: "Mr. Lincoln listened not un
moved to such appeals, and, seeking prayerful guidance
102 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
of Almighty God, the Proclamation of Emancipation
was prepared. It had been, in fact, prepared in July,
1862."
Thus from July until September, during which time
there was the greatest possible pressure on Lincoln for
an Emancipation policy, his proclamation had been for
mulated, but his usual caution had prevented him from
intimating it to any outside of his Cabinet. It was the
gravest step ever taken by any civil ruler in this or any
other land, and military success was essential to main
tain and execute the policy of Emancipation after it had
been declared. Had McClellan been successful in his
Peninsula campaign, or had Lee been defeated in the
second conflict of Manassas, without bringing peace, the
proclamation would doubtless have been issued with the
prestige of such victory. Under the shivering hesitation
among even Republicans throughout the North, Lincoln
felt that it needed the prestige of a military victory to
assure its cordial acceptance by very many of the sup
porters of the government. The battle of Antietam,
fought by the only general of that time who had pub
licly declared against an Emancipation policy, was the
first victory the Army of the Potomac had achieved in
1862, and five days after the Antietam victory the pre
liminary proclamation was issued.
Only the careful student of the history of the war can
have any just conception of the gradual manner in which
Lincoln approached Emancipation. He long and earn
estly sought to avoid it, believing then that the Union
could be best preserved without the violent destruction
of slavery; and when he appreciated the fact that the
leaders of the rebellion were unwilling to entertain any
proposition for the restoration of the Union, he accepted
the destruction of slavery as an imperious necessity, but
he sought to attain it with the least possible disturbance.
LINCOLN AND EMANCIPATION. 103
The first direct assault made upon slavery was "by Sec
retary Cameron's overruled annual report in December,
1 86 1, in which he advised the arming of slaves. The
first Congress that sat during the war made steady
strides toward the destruction of slavery by the passage
of five important laws. The first abolished slavery in
the District of Columbia; the second prohibited slavery
in all the Territories of the United States; the third
gave freedom to the escaped slaves of all who were in
rebellion; the fourth gave lawful authority for the enlist
ment of colored men as soldiers; and the fifth made a
new article of war, prohibiting any one in the military
or naval service from aiding in the arrest or return of a
fugitive slave under pain of dismissal. Slavery was
abolished in the District of Columbia as early as April,
1862, the act having passed the Senate by 29 to 6, and
the House by 92 to 38. A bill prohibiting slavery in the
Territories was passed on the i9th of June, and a bill
giving freedom to slaves of rebellious masters who per
formed military service was passed on the i;th of July.
Thus was Congress steadily advancing toward Eman
cipation, and as early as March, 1862, Lincoln had pro
posed his plan of compensated Emancipation. On the
6th of March he sent a special message to Congress
recommending the adoption of the following joint reso
lution:
RESOLVED, That the United States ought to co-operate with,
any State which may adopt gradual abolishment of slavery, giv
ing to such State pecuniary aid, to be used by such State, in its
discretion, to compensate for the inconvenience, public and pri
vate, produced by such change of system.
His message very earnestly pressed upon Congress the
importance of adopting such a policy, and upon the
country the importance of accepting it, North and
South, His concluding sentence is; "In full view of
104 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
my great responsibility to my God and to my country, I
earnestly beg the attention of Congress and the people to
the subject" Again, when revoking General Hunter's
order of the 9th of May, 1862, declaring all slaves free
within his military district, Lincoln made a most im
pressive appeal to the people of the South on the sub
ject of compensated Emancipation. He said: u I do
not argue; I beseech you to make the argument for
yourselves. You cannot, if you would, be blind to the
signs of the times. . . . The change it contemplates
would come gently as the dews of heaven, not rending
or wrecking anything. Will you not embrace it? So
much good has not been done by any one effort in all
past time as, in the providence of God, it is now your
high privilege to do. May the vast future not have to
lament that you have neglected it" Soon after this
Lincoln had an interview with the Congressional dele
gations from the Border Slave States, at which he again
earnestly urged them to accept compensated Emanci
pation. Speaking of that interview, Lincoln said: "I
believed that the indispensable necessity for military
Emancipation and arming the blacks would come unless
averted by gradual and compensated Emancipation."
Again in July, 1862, only two months before he issued
the preliminary proclamation, Lincoln summoned the
delegates from the Border Slave States to a conference
with him, and again most persuasively appealed to them
to accept gradual and compensated Emancipation. He
said to them: " I do not speak of Emancipation at once,
but of a decision at once to emancipate gradually. ' ' He
also clearly foreshadowed to them that if they refused it,
more violent Emancipation must come. He said : ( ' The
pressure in this direction is still upon me and is increas
ing. By conceding what I now ask you can relieve me,
and much more can relieve the country, on this import-
LINCOLN AND EMANCIPATION. 105
ant point." He concluded with these eloquent words:
" Our common country is in great peril, demanding the
loftiest views and boldest action to bring a speedy relief.
Once relieved, its form of government is saved to the
world; its beloved history and cherished memories are
vindicated, and its happy future fully assured and ren
dered inconceivably grand. To you, more than to any
others, the privilege is given to assure that happiness
and swell that grandeur, and to link your names there
with for ever."
Strange as it may now seem, in view of the inevitable
tendency of events at that time, these appeals of Lincoln
were not only treated with contempt by those in rebel
lion, but the Border State Congressmen, who had every
thing at stake, and who in the end were compelled to
accept forcible Emancipation without compensation, al
though themselves not directly involved in rebellion,
made no substantial response to Lincoln's efforts to save
their States and people. Thus did the States in rebel
lion disregard repeated importunities from Lincoln to
accept Emancipation with payment for their slaves.
During long weary months he had made temperate
utterance on every possible occasion, and by every
official act that could direct the attention of the coun
try he sought to attain the least violent solution of the
slavery problem, only to learn the bitter lesson that
slavery would make no terms with the government, and
that it was the inspiration of rebellious armies seeking
the destruction of the Republic. Soon after his appeal
to the Congressmen of the Border States in July, 1862,
Lincoln prepared his Emancipation Proclamation, and
quietly and patiently waited the fullness of time for pro
claiming it, still hoping that peace might come without
resort to the extreme measure of military and uncompen-
sated Emancipation. Seeing that the last hope of any
io6 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TlMES.
other method of peace had failed, he issued the prelim
inary proclamation on the 22d of September, 1862, and
his final proclamation on the ist of January following;
and there never was a day from that time until Lin
coln's death that he ever entertained, even for a mo
ment, the question of receding from the freedom he had
proclaimed to the slaves. But while he was compelled
to accept the issue of revolutionary Emancipation, he
never abandoned the idea of compensated Emancipation
until the final overthrow of Lee's army in 1865. He
proposed it to his Cabinet in February of that year, only
to be unanimously rejected, and I personally know that
he would have suggested it to Stephens, Campbell, and
Hunter at the Hampton Roads Conference in February,
1865, had not Vice-President Stephens, as the immediate
representative of Jefferson Davis, frankly stated at the
outset that he was instructed not to entertain or discuss
any proposition that did not recognize the perpetuity of
the Confederacy. That statement from Stephens pre
cluded the possibility of Lincoln making any propo
sition, or even suggestion, whatever on the subject. In
a personal interview with Jefferson Davis when I was a
visitor in his house at Bevoir, Mississippi, fifteen years
after the close of the war, I asked him whether he had
ever received any intimation about Lincoln's desire to
close the war by the payment of $400,000,000 for eman
cipated slaves. He said that he had not heard of it
I asked him whether he would have given such in
structions to Stephens if he had possessed knowledge
of the fact. He answered that he could not have given
Stephens any other instructions than he did under the
circumstances, because as President of the Confederacy
he could not entertain any question involving its dis
solution, that being a subject entirely for the States
themselves.
LINCOLN AND EMANCIPATION. IO^
Lincoln treated the Emancipation question from the
beginning as a very grave matter-of-fact problem to be
solved for or against the destruction of slavery as the
safety of the Union might dictate. He refrained from
Emancipation for eighteen months after the war had
begun, simply because he believed during that time that
he might best save the Union by saving slavery, and had
the development of events proved that belief to be cor
rect he would have permitted slavery to live with the
Union. When he became fully convinced that the safety
of the government demanded the destruction of slavery,
he decided, after the most patient and exhaustive con
sideration of the subject, to proclaim his Emancipation
policy. It was not founded solely or even chiefly on the
sentiment of hostility to slavery. If it had been, the
proclamation would have declared slavery abolished in
every State of the Union; but he excluded the slave
States of Delaware, Maryland, and Tennessee, and cer
tain parishes in Louisiana, and certain counties in Vir
ginia, from the operation of the proclamation, declaring,
in the instrument that has now become immortal, that
"which excepted parts are for the present left precisely
as if this proclamation were not issued.' 5 Thus if only
military Emancipation had been achieved by the Presi
dent's proclamation, it would have presented the singular
spectacle of Tennessee in the heart of the South, Mary
land and Delaware north of the Potomac, and nearly one-
half of Louisiana and one-half of Virginia with slavery
protected, while freedom was accorded to the slaves of
all the other slaveholding States. Lincoln evidently
regarded the Emancipation policy as the most moment
ous in the history of American statesmanship, and as
justified only by the extreme necessity of weakening
the rebellion that then threatened the severance of the
Union.
108 LINCOLN AND- MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
From the very day of his inauguration until he issued
his Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln was constantly
importuned by the more radical element of his supporters
to declare his purpose to abolish slavery. Among them
were a number of the ablest leaders of his party in the
Senate and House, and some of them as impracticable in
their methods as they were imperious in their demands.
That he was glad of the opportunity to destroy slavery
none can doubt who knew him, but he patiently bore the
often irritating complaints of many of his friends until
he saw that slavery and the Union could not survive to
gether, and that the country was at least measurably pre
pared to accept and support the new policy. He was
many times threatened with open rebellion against his
administration by some of the most potent Republicans
because of his delay in declaring the Emancipation pol
icy, but he waited until the time had come in the fall of
1862, when he felt that it was not only a necessity of war,
but a political necessity as well. Another very grave
consideration that led him to accept Emancipation when
he did was the peril of England and France recognizing
the Confederacy and thereby involving us in war with
two of the greatest powers of Europe. The pretext on
which was based the opposition of England to the Union
cause in the early part of the war was the maintenance
of slavery by the government while prosecuting a war
against a slaveholders' rebellion, and it seemed to be an
absolute necessity that our government should accept the
Emancipation policy to impair the force of the public
sentiment in England that demanded the recognition of
the South as an independent government. These three
weighty considerations, each in itself sufficient to have
decided Lincoln's action, combined to dictate his Eman
cipation policy in the early fall of 1862. The proclama
tion did not in itself abolish slavery, but the positive
LINCOLN AND EMANCIPATION. 109
declaration in the proclamation ' ' that the Executive
government of the United States, including the military
and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and main
tain the freedom of said persons," gave notice to every
slaveholder and promise to every slave that every bond
man brought within the lines of the Union Army would
thereafter be for ever free.
While the Emancipation Proclamation inflicted a mor
tal wound upon slavery and assured its absolute extinc
tion, sooner or later, throughout the entire country, Lin
coln fully appreciated the fact that much was yet to be
done, even beyond victories in the field, to efface the blot
of slavery from the Republic. As early as the i4th of
January, 1863, Representative Wilson of Iowa, then
chairman of the Judiciary Committee, and now a United
States Senator, reported a proposed amendment to the
Constitution declaring slavery "for ever prohibited in
the United States." On the loth of February, 1864,
Senator Trumbull reported from the Judiciary Com
mittee of that body a proposed amendment that was
finally adopted in 1865, and is now part of the funda
mental law of the nation. It was passed in the Senate
on the 1 8th of April by a vote of 38 to 6. It was de
feated in the House by a vote of 93 in its favor and 65
against it, lacking the requisite two-thirds. Seeing that
the amendment was lost, Ashley of Ohio changed his
vote from the affirmative to the negative with a view of
entering a motion to reconsider, and the subject went
over until the next session. On the 6th of January,
1865, Ashley made his motion to reconsider and called
up the proposed amendment for another vote. One of
the most interesting and able debates of that time was
precipitated by Ashley's motion, and the notable speech
of the occasion was made by Mr. Rollins of Missouri,
who had been a large slaveholder, and who declared that
110 LINCOLN ANti MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
" the rebellion instigated and carried on by slaveholders
has been the death-knell of the institution." Stevens^
the great apostle of freedom from Pennsylvania and the
Great Commoner of the war, closed the debate, and
probably on no other occasion in the history of Congress
was such intense anxiety exhibited as when the roll was
called on the adoption or rejection of the amendment.
The Republicans did not have two-thirds of the House,
but several Democrats openly favored the amendment
and a number of others were known to be uncertain.
The first break in the Democratic line was when the
name of Coffroth of Pennsylvania was called, who
promptly answered ay, and was greeted with thunders
of applause in the House and galleries. He was fol
lowed by Ganson, Herrick, Nelson, Odell, Radford, and
Steele, Democrats from New York, by English from
Connecticut, and by McAlister from Pennsylvania, and
when the Speaker declared that the amendment had
been adopted by 119 yeas to 56 nays, being more than
the requisite constitutional majority, the great battle of
Emancipation was substantially won, and Lincoln hailed
it with a measure of joy second only to his delight at
the announcement of Lee's surrender. Before the mem
bers left their seats salvos of artillery announced to the
people of the capital that the Constitutional amendment
abolishing slavery had been adopted by Congress, and
the victorious leaders rushed to the White House to
congratulate Lincoln on the final achievement of
Emancipation.
The acceptance of the proposed amendment by the
requisite number of States was not a matter of doubt,
and the absolute overthrow of slavery throughout the
entire Republic dates from the adoption of the amend
ment to the Constitution in the House of Representatives
on the 6th of January, 1865. Illinois, the home of Lin-
LINCOLN AND EMANCIPATION. in
coin, fitly led off in ratifying the amendment. Massa
chusetts and Pennsylvania both ratified on the 8th of
February, and one of the most grateful recollections of
my life is that as a member of the popular branch of the
Pennsylvania Legislature I supported and voted for that
measure. Owing to the delay in the meeting of Legis
latures in a number of the States the official proclamation
of the ratification of the amendment was not made until
the 1 8th of December, 1865, on which day Secretary
Seward formally declared to the country and the world
that the amendment abolishing slavery had "become to
all intents and purposes valid as a part of the Constitu
tion of the United States. ' ' Lincoln had thus dealt the
deathblow to slavery by his proclamation, but it was not
until after he had sealed his devotion to free government
by giving his life to the assassin's hate that the great
work was consummated and the Republic was entirely
free from the stain of human bondage.
The most earnest discussions I ever had with Lincoln
were on the subject of his Emancipation Proclamation.
I knew the extraordinary pressure that came from the
more radical element of the Republican party, embracing
a number of its ablest leaders, such as Sumner, Chase,
Wade, Chandler, and others, but I did not know, and
few were permitted to know, the importance of an
Emancipation policy in restraining the recognition of
the Confederacy by France and England. I was earn
estly opposed to an Emancipation Proclamation by the
President. For some weeks before it was issued I saw
Lincoln frequently, and in several instances sat with him
for hours at a time after the routine business of the day
had been disposed of and the doors of the White House
were closed. I viewed the issue solely from a political
standpoint, and certainly had the best of reasons for the
views I pressed upon Lincoln, assuming that political
112 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
expediency should control his action. I reminded him
that the proclamation would not liberate a single slave
that the Southern armies must be overthrown, and that
the territory held by them must be conquered by military
success, before it could be made effective. To this Lin
coln answered: " It does seem like the Pope's bull against
the comet;" but that was the most he ever said in any
of his conversations to indicate that he might not issue
it. I appealed to him to issue a military order as Com
mander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, proclaiming
that every slave of a rebellious owner should be for ever
free when brought within our lines. Looking simply to
practical results, that would have accomplished every
thing that the Emancipation Proclamation achieved; but
it was evident during all these discussions that Lincoln
viewed the question from a very much higher standpoint
than I did, although, as usual, he said but little and
gave no clue to the bent of his mind on the subject.
I reminded Lincoln that political defeat would be in
evitable in the great States of the Union in the elections
soon to follow if he issued the Emancipation Proclama
tion that New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio,
Indiana, and Illinois would undoubtedly vote Democratic
and elect Democratic delegations to the next Congress.
He did not dispute my judgment as to the political effect
of the proclamation, but I never left him with any rea
sonable hope that I had seriously impressed him on the
subject. Every political prediction I made was fearfully
fulfilled in the succeeding October and November elec
tions. New York elected Seymour Governor by 10,700
majority, and chose 17 Democratic and 14 Republican
Congressmen. New Jersey elected a Democratic Gov
ernor by 14,500, and 4 Democrats and i Republican to
Congress. Pennsylvania elected the Democratic State
ticket by 3500 majority and 13 Democrats and n Re-
LINCOLN AND EMANCIPATION. 113
publicans to Congress, with a Democratic Legislature
that chose Buckalew to the United States Senate. Ohio
elected the Democratic State ticket by 5500 majority and
14 Democrats and 2 Republicans to Congress, Ashley and
Schenck being the only two who escaped in the political
Waterloo. Indiana elected the Democratic State ticket
by 9500 majority and 7 Democrats and 4 Republicans to
Congress, with 30 Democratic majority in the Legis
lature. Illinois elected the Democratic State ticket by
16,500 majority and 9 Democrats and 5 Republicans to
Congress, and 28 Democratic majority in the Legislature.
Confidently anticipating these disastrous political results,
I could not conceive it possible for Lincoln to success
fully administer the government and prosecute the war
with the six most important loyal Spates of the Union
declaring against him at the polls; but Lincoln knew
that the majority in Congress would be safe, as the rebel
lious States were excluded, and the far West and New
England were ready to sustain the Emancipation policy;
and he appreciated, as I did not, that the magnitude of
his act cast all mere considerations of expediency into
nothingness. He dared to do the right for the sake of
the right. I speak of this the more freely because, in
the light of events as they appear to-day, he rose to the
sublimest duty of his life, while I was pleading the mere
expedient of a day against a record for human freedom
that must be immortal while liberty has worshipers in
any land or clime.
Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation be
cause it was an imperious duty, and because the time
had come when any temporizing with the question
would have been more fatal than could possibly be any
temporary revolt against the manly declaration of right.
He felt strong enough to maintain the freedom he pro
claimed by the military and naval power of the govern-
8
114 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
ment. He believed it to be the most mortal wound that
could be inflicted upon the Confederacy. He believed
that it would disarm the strong anti-Union sentiment
that seemed to be fast pressing the English government
to the recognition of the South, and he believed that,
however public sentiment might falter for a time, like
the disturbed and quivering needle it would surely settle
to the pole. He did not issue it for the mere sentiment
of unshackling four millions of slaves, nor did he then
dream of universal citizenship and suffrage to freedmen.
In the last public address that he ever delivered, on the
nth of April, 1865, speaking of negro suffrage, he said:
4 ( I would myself prefer that suffrage were now conferred
upon the very intelligent and on those who served our
cause as soldiers. ' ' He believed it to be simply an act
of justice that every colored man who had fought for his
freedom and for the maintenance of the Union, and was
honorably discharged from the military service, should
be clothed with the right of franchise; and he believed
that "the very intelligent" should also be enfranchised
as exemplars of their race and an inspiration to them for
advancement. He was always stubbornly for justice,
stubbornly for the right, and it was his sublime devotion
to the right in the face of the most appalling opposition
that made the name of Abraham Lincoln immortal as
the author of the Emancipation Proclamation, on which
he justly invoked " the considerate judgment of mankind
and the gracious favor of Almighty God. ' '
LINCOLN AND HAMLIN.
THE fact that Abraham Lincoln conceived and exe
cuted the scheme to nominate Andrew Johnson for
Vice-President in 1864 has been feebly disputed, but is
now accepted as the truth of history. It was not an
arbitrary exercise of political power on the part of Lin
coln. He had no prejudice against Hannibal Hamlin to
inspire him to compass Hamlin' s defeat. He had no
special love for Andrew Johnson to lead him to over
throw his old associate of 1860 and make the Military
Governor of an insurgent State his fellow-candidate for
1864. Hamlin was not in closa sympathy with Lincoln;
on the contrary, he was known as one who passively
rather than actively strengthened a powerful cabal of
Republican leaders in their aggressive hostility to Lin
coln and his general policy; but Lincoln was incapable
of yielding to prejudice, however strong, in planning his
great campaign for re-election in 1864. Had Hamlin
been ten times more offensive than he was to Lincoln,
it would not have halted Lincoln for a moment in favor
ing Hamlin' s renomination if he believed it good politics
to do so. He rejected Hamlin not because he hated him ;
he accepted Johnson not because he loved him. He was
guided in what he did, or what he did not, in planning
the great campaign of his life, that he believed involved
the destiny of the country itself, by the single purpose
of making success as nearly certain as possible.
115
(Photo by Brady, Washington.)
HANNIBAI, HAMUlv, 1890.
LINCOLN AND HAMLIN. 117
Hamlin was nominated for the Vice- Presidency in 1860
simply because he was a representative Republican fresh
from the Democratic party. Another consideration that
favored his selection was the fact that his State had been
carried into the Republican party under his leadership,
and that its State election in September would be the
finger-board of success or defeat in the national contest.
His position as Representative, Senator, and Governor,
and his admitted ability and high character, fully justi
fied his nomination as the candidate for Vice- President;
but when elected there was the usual steadily widening
chasm between him and the Executive, and, like nearly
or quite all Vice- Presidents, he drifted into the embrace
of the opposition to his chief. It was this opposition,
led by men of such consummate ability as Wade of Ohio
and Henry Winter Davis of Maryland, that admonished
Lincoln of the necessity of putting himself in the strong
est possible attitude for the then admittedly doubtful bat
tle of 1864. While the defeat of Lee at Gettysburg and
the surrender of Vicksburg the year before had done
much to inspire faith in the success of the war, the Con
federacy was stubbornly maintaining its armies. The
opening of the new year of 1864 called for large drafts
of men to fill the thinned ranks of the Union forces, and
there was a powerful undertow of despondency among
the loyal people of the North. The war was costing
$3,000,000 a day, and after three years of bloody conflict
the end was not in view. The Republican leaders in the
early part of 1864 were divided in councils, distracted by
the conflicts of ambition, and very many of the ablest of
them regarded the defeat of the party as not only possi
ble, but more than probable. The one man who fully
understood the peril and who studied carefully how to
avert it was Abraham Lincoln.
Lincoln, as was his usual custom, consulted with all
LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
who came within his reach, and developed his views
from time to time with extreme caution. In the early
part of the year he reached the conclusion that it would
be eminently wise to nominate a conspicuous War Demo
crat for Vice- President along with himself for President.
A number of prominent men who acted with the Demo
cratic party in 1860 against Lincoln's election, but who
patriotically entered the military service and won dis
tinction by their heroism, represented a very large class
of Democratic voters upon whom Lincoln felt he must
rely for his re-election. Hamlin had been a Democrat,
but he did not come under the class of War Democrats,
while Butler, Dix, Dickinson, Johnson, Holt, and others
represented a distinctive and very formidable class of
citizens who, while yet professing to be Democrats, were
ready to support the war under Lincoln until it should
be successfully terminated by the restoration of the Union.
Lincoln's first selection for Vice- President was General
Butler. I believe he reached that conclusion without
specially consulting with any of his friends. As early
as March, 1864, he sent for General Cameron, to whom
he proposed the nomination of Butler, and that, I as
sume, was his first declaration of his purpose to any one
on the subject. He confided to Cameron the mission to
Fortress Monroe to confer confidentially with Butler.
On that journey Cameron was accompanied by Ex-Con
gressman William H. Armstrong of Pennsylvania, who
was first informed of the real object of Cameron's visit
when they were returning home, and after Butler had
declined to permit his name to be considered. Butler
was at that time a strong man in the loyal States. He
had not achieved great military success, but his adminis
tration in New Orleans had made him universally popu
lar throughout the North, in which the vindictive vitu
peration of the Southern people heaped upon him was
LINCOLN AND HAMLlN. 119
an important factor. Butler's declination was peremp
tory, and Cameron returned home without learning in
what direction Lincoln would be likely to look for a
candidate for Vice- President.
In a later conference with Cameron, in which the
names of Johnson, Dickinson, and Dix were seriously
discussed, Lincoln expressed his preference for Johnson,
to which Cameron, with unconcealed reluctance, finally
assented. While Lincoln at that time decided in favor
of Johnson, he did not himself regard it as final. His
extreme caution and exceptional sagacity made him
carefully consider all possible weak points in Johnson's
candidacy before he launched the movement for his
nomination. He summoned General Sickles to Wash
ington, and sent him to Tennessee on a confidential mis
sion to examine and make report to him of the success
of Johnson's administration as Military Governor. That
State was in a revolutionary condition ; Johnson was
charged with violent and despotic official acts, and Lin
coln meant to know fully whether Johnson might, by
reason of his administration, be vulnerable as a national
candidate. Sickles had no knowledge of the real pur
pose of his mission. The question of nominating John
son for the Vice- Presidency was never suggested or even
intimated to Sickles, and he fulfilled his trust and re
ported favorably on Johnson's administration, without
even a suspicion that he was to determine the destiny
of Andrew Johnson, make him Vice-President of the
United States, and thus President.
Lincoln's purpose in seeking Johnson as his associate
on the national ticket in 1864 was much more far reach
ing than any but himself at the time supposed. He
meant to guard against possible defeat by getting a
number of the insurgent States in some sort of line to
enable their Electoral votes to be counted if needed.
120 LINCOLN AND 'MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
His most promising experiment was in Tennessee under
the guidance of Johnson, but he obviously intended that
the States of Louisiana, Arkansas, and West Virginia
with Tennessee should be organized with the semblance
of full Statehood to make their Electoral votes available
should the national contest be close. Had he developed
this policy to his party or to Congress, it would have
been met with positive and aggressive opposition, but
he developed it in the quietest way possible. His first
movement in that line was to have delegations elected
to the National Convention from the Southern States
named, and when they appeared at the Baltimore Con
vention on the yth of June the battle for their admission
was led with consummate skill by the few who under
stood Lincoln's policy. Tennessee being in the strong
est attitude, the delegation from that State was selected
on which to make the fight. It was desperately con
tested, because it was then well understood to mean the
nomination of Johnson for Vice-President; but the Ten
nessee delegates were admitted by more than a two-
thirds vote. With Tennessee accepted as entitled to
representation, the contest was ended, and Louisiana
and Arkansas were given the right of representation
without a serious struggle.
When Congress met again after the election in No
vember, and when Lincoln's election by an overwhelm
ing popular as well as Electoral vote was assured, the
question of counting the Electoral votes of Louisiana,
Tennessee, and Arkansas was raised and elaborately dis
cussed in both branches. As Lincoln had 212 Electoral
votes to 21 for McClellan, exclusive of the votes of the
three insurgent States referred to, there was no political
necessity to induce Congress to strain a point for the ac
ceptance of these votes; and a joint resolution was finally
passed declaring " that no valid election for Electors of
LINCOLN AND HAMLIN. 12 r
President and Vice-President of the United States" had
been held in Louisiana, Tennessee, and Arkansas. Lin
coln approved the resolution, but took occasion by spe
cial message to disclaim approval of the recital of the
preamble. Had the votes of these three States been
needed to elect a Republican President, I hazard little in
saying that they would have been treated as regular and
lawful and counted with the approval of both the Senate
and House ; as they were not needed and as the develop
ment of these States was Lincoln's own conception, those
who were not specially friendly scored an empty victory
against him.
He moved with masterly sagacity at every step in his
efforts to nominate Johnson, and his selection of General
Cameron as early as March to be his first ambassador in
search of a War Democrat for Vice-President was not
one of the least of his many shrewd conceptions. The
relations between Lincoln and Cameron had been some
what strained by Cameron's retirement from the Cabinet
in 1862. At least Lincoln assumed that they might be
somewhat strained on the part of Cameron, and he took
early caution to enlist Cameron in his renomination. He
knew the power of Cameron in the manipulation of dis
cordant political elements, and he fully appreciated the
fact that Cameron's skill mfide him a dangerous oppo
nent. He bound Cameron to himself by making him
one of his trusted leadeis in the selection of a candidate
for Vice-President. The man who was probably closest
to Lincoln in this movement was Henry J. Raymond,
but in this as in all Lincoln's movements his confidence
was limited with each of his trusted agents. Raymond
was then editor of the only prominent New York journal
that heartily supported Lincoln ; and he, with the aid of
Seward and Weed, who early entered into the movement
for the nomination of Johnson, overthrew Dickinson in
122 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
his own State and was the confessed Lincoln leader in
the Baltimore Convention of 1864. With Dickinson
beaten in New York and with Hamlin's forces demoral
ized early in the contest, the nomination of Johnson was
easily accomplished, chiefly because it was what Lincoln
desired.
Neither Swett nor Lamon had any knowledge of Lin
coln's positive movement for the nomination of Johnson
until within a day or two of the meeting of the conven
tion. Colonel Lamon has recently given a description
of the scene between Lincoln, Swett, and himself a day
or two before they went to Baltimore to aid in Lincoln's
renomination. Swett earnestly and even passionately
protested against the overthrow of Hamlin, but after
hearing Lincoln fully on the subject he consented to go
to the convention, in which he was a delegate from Illi
nois, and support the nomination of Johnson; but he
wisely declared Holt to be his candidate, as a foil to pro
tect Lincoln. Swett naturally felt uncertain as to how
the suggestion of Johnson's name would be received at
Baltimore, as he had no knowledge of the extent to
which Lincoln had progressed in the Johnson move
ment. In answer to his inquiry whether he was at lib
erty to say that Lincoln desired Johnson's nomination,
Lincoln answered in the negative, and, as quoted by
Colonel Lamon in a recent public letter, said: "No, I
will address a letter to Lamon here embodying my views,
which you, McClure, and other friends may use if it be
found absolutely necessary; otherwise it may be better
that I shall not appear actively on the stage of this
theatre. ' ' The letter was written by Lincoln and deliv
ered to Lamon, who had it with him at Baltimore, but,
as there was no occasion for using it, it was never shown
to any one and was returned to Lincoln after the con
vention at his request
LINCOLN AND HAMLIN. 123
How shrewdly Lincoln moved, and with what extreme
caution he guarded his confidence, is well illustrated by
the fact that while he consulted Cameron confidentially
about the nomination of Johnson some months before the
convention, and consulted me on the same subject the
day before the convention met, neither of us supposed
that the other was acting in the special confidence of
Lincoln. On the contrary, I supposed that Cameron was
sincerely friendly to Hamlin and would battle for his re-
nomination, until he finally proposed to me the night
before the convention met that we give a solid compli
mentary vote to Hamlin, and follow it with a solid vote
for Johnson. Another evidence of his extreme caution
in politics is given by the fact that while he carefully
concealed from both Cameron and myself the fact that
the other was in his confidence in the same movement,
he surprised me a few weeks before the convention by
sending for me and requesting me to come to the con
vention as a delegate-at-large. I had already been unani
mously chosen as a delegate from my own Congressional
district, and was amazed, when I informed Lincoln of
that fact, to find that he still insisted upon me going
before the State Convention and having myself elected
as a delegate-at-large. To all my explanations that a
man in the delegation was good for just what he was
worth, whether he represented the district or the State,
Lincoln persisted in the request that I should come as a
delegate-at-large. When I finally pressed him for an
explanation of what seemed to me to be a needless re
quest involving great embarrassment to me, he finally
with evident reluctance answered : ' ( General Cameron
has assured me that he will be a delegate-at-large from
your State, and while I have no reason to question his
sincerity as my friend, if he is to be a delegate-at-large
from Pennsylvania I would much prefer that you be one
I2 4 LINCOLN AND MEN CF WAR TIMES.
with, him." Had he been willing to tell me the whole
truth, he would have informed me that Cameron was en
listed in the Johnson movement, and that he specially
desired at least two of the delegates-at-large, representing
opposing factions, to be active supporters of Johnson's
nomination. There could be no other reasonable expla
nation of his earnest request to me to accept the embar
rassing position of seeking an election from the State
Convention when I was already an elected delegate from
my district. A fortunate combination of circumstances
made it possible for me to be elected without a serious
contest, Cameron and I receiving nearly a unanimous
vote.
Lincoln realized the fact that the chances were greatly
against his re-election unless he should be saved by the
success of the Union army. There was no period from
January, 1864, until the 3d of September of the same
year when McClellan would not have defeated Lincoln
for President. The two speeches of that campaign which
turned the tide and gave Lincoln his overwhelming vic
tory were Sherman's dispatch from Atlanta on the 3d of
September, saying: " Atlanta is ours and fairly won;"
and Sheridan's dispatch of the i9th of September from
the Valley, saying: "We have just sent them (the enemy)
whirling through Winchester, and we are after them to
morrow. ' ' From the opening of the military campaign
in the spring of 1864 until ^Sherman announced the cap
ture of Atlanta, there was not a single important victory
of the Union army to inspire the loyal people of the
country with confidence in the success of the war.
Grant's campaign from the Rapidan to the James was
the bloodiest in the history of the struggle. He had lost
as many men in killed, wounded, and missing as Lee
ever had in front of him, and there was no substantial
victory in all the sacrifice made by the gallant Army of
LINCOLN AND HAMLIN. I2 5-
the Potomac. Sherman had been fighting continuously
for four months without a decisive success. The people
of the North had become heartsick at the fearful sacri
fices which brought no visible achievement. Democratic
sentiment had drifted to McClellan as the opposing can
didate, and so profoundly was Lincoln impressed by the
gloomy situation that confronted him that on the 23d of
August, seven days before the nomination of McClellan
and ten days before the capture of Atlanta, he wrote the
following memoranda, sealed it in an envelope, and had
it endorsed by several members of the Cabinet, including
Secretary Welles, with written instructions that it was
not to be opened until after the election:
EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, August 23, 1864.
This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly
probable that this administration will not be re-elected. Then
it will be my duty to co-operate with the President-elect so as to
save the Union between the election and the inauguration, as he
will have secured his election on such grounds that he cannot
possibly save it afterward. A. LINCOLN.
Nor was Lincoln alone in his apprehension of defeat.
Distrust and disintegration were common throughout the
entire Republican organization, and nearly all of the sin
cere supporters of Lincoln were in next to utter despair
of political success. I spent an hour with him in the
Executive Chamber some ten days before he wrote the
memoranda before given, and I never saw him more de
jected in my life. His face, always sad in repose, was
then saddened until it became a picture of despair, and
he spoke of the want of sincere and earnest support from
the Republican leaders with unusual freedom. I dis
tinctly remember his reference to the fact that of all
the Republican members of the House he could name
126 LINCOLN' AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
but one in whose personal and political friendship he
could absolutely confide. That one man was Isaac N.
Arnold of Illinois. Stevens, the Great Commoner of
the war, while sincerely desiring Lincoln's re-election
because he hated McClellan worse than he hated Lin
coln, and because he felt that the election of Lincoln
was necessary to the safety of the Union, was intensely
bitter against Lincoln personally, and rarely missed an
opportunity to thrust his keenest invectives upon him.
New York had a Democratic Governor of matchless abil
ity, and that great State was regarded as almost hope
lessly lost. Pennsylvania was trembling in the balance,
as was confirmed by the failure of the Republicans to
carry the State at the October election, and Indiana
would have been almost in rebellion but for the vic
tories of Sherman and Sheridan during the month of
September.
At this interview Lincoln seemed to have but one over
mastering desire, and that was to attain peace on the basis
of a restored Union. He took from a corner of his desk
a paper written out in his own handwriting, proposing to
pay to the South $400,000,000 as compensation for their
slaves, on condition that the States should return to their
allegiance to the government and accept Emancipation.
I shall never forget the emotion exhibited by Lincoln
when, after reading this paper to me, he said: "If I
could only get this proposition before the Southern peo
ple, I believe they would accept it, and I have faith that
the Northern people, however startled at first, would soon
appreciate the wisdom of such a settlement of the war.
One hundred days of war would cost us the $400,000,000
I would propose to give for Emancipation and a restored
Republic, not to speak of the priceless sacrifice of life
and the additional sacrifice of property; but were I to
make this offer now it would defeat me inevitably and
LINCOLN AND tiAMLltf. 12 7
probably defeat Emancipation. ' ' I had seen him many
times when army disasters shadowed the land and op
pressed him with sorrow, but I never saw him so pro
foundly moved by grief as he was on that day, when
there seemed to be not even a silvery lining to the polit
ical cloud that hung over him. Few now recall the
grave perils to Lincoln's re-election which thickened
almost at every turn in 1864 until the country was elec
trified by Sherman's inspiring dispatch from Atlanta,
followed by Sheridan's brilliant victories in the Valley
and Sherman's memorable march to the sea; and it was
these grave perils and these supreme necessities, long un
derstood by Lincoln, which made him, in his broad and
sagacious way, carefully view the field for the strongest
candidate for Vice- President, and finally led him to nomi
nate Andrew Johnson. To Lincoln, and to Lincoln
alone, Johnson owed his nomination.
I had no personal knowledge of Lincoln's purpose to
nominate Johnson for Vice-President until the day before
the Baltimore Convention met. He telegraphed me to
visit Washington before attending the convention, and I
did so. He opened the conversation by advising me to
give my vote and active support to Johnson as his asso
ciate on the ticket. It was evident that he confidently
relied on my willingness to accept his judgment in the
matter. I had expected to support the renomination of
Hamlin. I had little respect for Andrew Johnson, and
of all the men named for the position he was the last I
would have chosen if I had been left to the exercise of
my own judgment. It is more than probable that I
would have obeyed the wishes of Lincoln even if he had
not presented the very strong and, indeed, conclusive
reasons for his request; but after hearing the arguments
which had led him to the conclusion that Johnson should
be nominated as his associate, I was quite as ready to ac-
128 LINCOLN AND .MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
cept the wisdom of the proposition as to obey the wishes
of the President.
There was not a trace of bitterness, prejudice, or even
unfriendliness toward Hamlin in all that Lincoln said
about the Vice-Presidency, and he was careful to say
that he did not desire the nomination of Johnson to
gratify any personal preference of his own. He natu
rally preferred a new man, as Hamlin was not in sympa
thy with Lincoln personally or with the general policy
of his administration, but he preferred Johnson for two
reasons, which he presented with unanswerable clear
ness: First, he was the most conspicuous, most aggres
sive, and the most able of all the War Democrats of that
time, and was just in the position to command the largest
measure of sympathy and support from that very import
ant political element. Dix, Dickinson, Butler, and Holt
had made no such impressive exhibition of their loyalty
as had Johnson in Tennessee. He was then just in the
midst of his great work of rehabilitating his rebellious
State and restoring it to the Union, and his loyal achieve
ments were therefore fresh before the people and certain
to continue so during the campaign. There was really
no answer to Lincoln's argument on this point. Second,
the stronger and more imperative reason for Lincoln pre
ferring Johnson was one that I had not appreciated fully
until he had presented it. The great peril of the Union
at that day was the recognition of the Confederacy by
England and France, and every month's delay of the
overthrow of the rebellious armies increased the danger.
Extraordinary efforts had been made by Lincoln to stim
ulate the Union sentiment, especially in England, but
with only moderate success, and there was no safety
from one day to another against a war with England
and France that would have been fatal to the success of
the Union cause. The only possible way to hinder recog-
LINCOLN AND HAM LIN. 129
nition was to show successful results of the war in restor
ing the dissevered States to their old allegiance, and Lin
coln was firmly convinced that by no other method could
the Union sentiment abroad be so greatly inspired and
strengthened as by the nomination and election of a rep
resentative Southern man to the Vice- Presidency from
one of the rebellious States in the very heart of the Con
federacy. These reasons decided Lincoln to prefer John
son for Vice-President, and Lincoln possessed both the
power to make the nomination and the wisdom to dic
tate it without jarring the party organization.
The fact that Lincoln did not make known to Hamlin
and his friends his purpose to nominate another for Vice-
President in 1864 does not accuse him of deceit or insin
cerity; and the additional fact that when the Convention
was in session and he was asked for a categorical answer
as to his position on the Vice-Presidency, he declined to
express his wishes or to avow his interference with the
action of the party, cannot be justly construed into polit
ical double-dealing. It was quite as much a necessity
for Lincoln to conceal his movements for the nomination
of Johnson as it was, in his judgment, a necessity for him
to nominate a Southern man and a War Democrat, and
he simply acted with rare sagacity and discretion in his
movements and with fidelity to the country, the safety
of which was paramount with him. Hamlin was pro
foundly grieved over his defeat, as were his many friends,
and had they seen the hand of Lincoln in it they would
have resented it with bitterness; but Hamlin himself was
not fully convinced of Lincoln's opposition to his renomi-
nation until within two years of his death. I have in
my possession an autograph letter from Hamlin to Judge
Pettis of Pennsylvania, to whom Lincoln had expressed
his desire for Johnson's nomination on the morning of
the day the convention met, in which he says that he
9
130 LINCOLN AKD MEN- OF WAR-TIMES.
had seen and heard statements relating to Lincoln's
action in the matter, but he did not believe them until
the evidence had lately been made conclusive to his
mind. In this letter he says: U I was really sorry to be
disabused." And he adds: "Mr. L. [Lincoln] evidently
became some alarmed about his re-election, and changed
his position. That is all I care to say. ' ' I have thus the
conclusive evidence from Hamlin himself, that in Sep
tember, 1889, he had full knowledge of Lincoln's direct
intervention to nominate Johnson for Vice-President in
1864. Hamlin gave an earnest support to the ticket,
believing that the supreme sentiment of Republicanism
had set him aside in the interest of the public welfare.
He maintained his high position in the party for many
years thereafter, filling the office of Collector of Portland
and subsequently returning to the Senate, where he
served until he had passed the patriarchal age, and then
voluntarily retired to enjoy the calm evening of a well-
spent life.
(Photo by Gutekunst, Philadelphia.)
SALMON P. CHASE.
LINCOLN AND CHASE.
SALMON P. CHASE was the most irritating fly in
the Lincoln ointment from the inauguration of the
new administration in 1 86 1. until the 29th of June, 1864,
when his resignation as Secretary of the Treasury was
finally accepted. He was an annual resigner in the Cabi
net, having petulantly tendered his resignation in 1862,
again in 1863, and again in 1864, when he was probably
surprised by Mr. Lincoln's acceptance of it. It was
soon after Lincoln's unanimous renomination, and when
Chase's dream of succeeding Lincoln as President had
perished, at least for the time. He was one of the strong
est intellectual forces of the entire administration, but in
politics he was a theorist and a dreamer and was unbal
anced by overmastering ambition. He never forgave
Lincoln for the crime of having been preferred for Presi
dent over him, and while he was a pure . and conscien
tious man, his prejudices and disappointments were vastly
stronger than himself, and there never was a day during
his continuance in the Cabinet when he was able to ap
proach justice to Lincoln. Like Sumner, he entered
public life ten years "before the war by election to the
Senate through a combination of Democrats and Free-
Soilers, and it is worthy of note that these two most
brilliant and tireless of the great anti-slavery leaders cast
their last votes for Democratic candidates for President
132
LINCOLN AND CHASE. 133
From the day that Chase entered the Cabinet he seems
to have been consumed with the idea that he must be
Lincoln's successor in 1864, and to that end he system
atically directed his efforts, and often sought, by flagrant
abuse of the power of his department, to weaken his
chief. He will stand in history as the great financier of
the war; as the man who was able to maintain the na
tional credit in the midst of rebellion and disruption, and
who gave the country the best banking system the world
has ever known. In that one duty he was practical and
amenable to wholesome counsel, and his unblemished
personal and official integrity gave great weight to his
policy as Secretary of the Treasury. With all the vexa
tion he gave Lincoln, and with the many reasons he gave
his chief to regard him as perfidious, Lincoln never
ceased to appreciate his value as a Cabinet officer. In
1863, when Chase had become an open candidate for the
Presidency, and when many of his political movements
were personally offensive to the President, Lincoln said
of Chase: " I have determined to shut my eyes so far as
possible to everything of the sort. Mr. Chase makes a
good Secretary, and I shall keep him where he is. If he
becomes President, all "right. I hope we may never have
a worse man. I have observed with regret his plan of
strengthening himself." This expression from Lincoln
conveys a very mild idea of his real feelings on the sub
ject. In point of fact, Lincoln was not only profoundly
grieved at Chase's candidacy, but he was constantly irri
tated at the methods Chase employed to promote his
nomination.
I never saw Lincoln unbalanced except during the fall
of 1863, when Chase was making his most earnest efforts
to win the Republican nomination. The very widespread
distrust toward Lincoln cherished by Republican leaders
gave him good reason to apprehend the success of a com-
134 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
bination to defeat him. Scores of national leaders were
at that time disaffected, but when they were compelled
to face the issue of his renomination or Republican de
feat, they finally yielded with more or less ill grace, and
supported him. Lincoln saw that if the disaffected ele
ments of the party should be combined on one strong
candidate, his own success would be greatly endangered.
It was the only subject on which I ever knew L/incoln
to lose his head. I saw him many times during the sum
mer and fall of 1863, when the Chase boom was at its
height, and he seemed like one who had got into water
far beyond his depth. I happened at the White House
one night when he was most concerned about the Chase
movement, and he detained me until two o'clock in the
morning. Occasionally he would speak with great seri
ousness, and evidently felt very keenly the possibility of
his defeat, while at other times his face would suddenly
brighten up with his never-ending store of humor, and
he would illustrate Chase's attitude by some pertinent
story, at which he would laugh immoderately. After
reviewing the situation for an hour, during which I as
sured him that Chase could not be the Republican can
didate, whoever might be, and that I regarded his re-
nomination as reasonably certain, I rose at midnight,
shook hands with him, and started to go. He followed
me to the end of the Cabinet table nearest his desk,
swung one of his long legs over the corner of it, and
stopped me to present some new phase of the Chase bat
tle that had just occurred to him. After he had gotten
through with that I again bade him good-night and
started to the door. He followed to the other end of the
Cabinet table, again swung his leg over the corner of it,
and started in afresh to discuss the contest between Chase
and himself.
It was nearly one o'clock when I again bade Lincoln
LINCOLN AND CHASE. 135
good-night, and got as far as the door, but when just
about to open it he called me and with the merriest
twinkling of his eye, he said: " By the way, McClure,
how would it do if I were to decline Chase?" I was
surprised of course at the novel suggestion, and said to
him, "Why, Mr. Lincoln, how could that be done?"
He answered, "Well, I don't know exactly how it
might be done, but that reminds me of a story of two
Democratic candidates for Senator in Egypt, Illinois, in
its early political times. That section of Illinois was
almost solidly Democratic, as you know, and nobody but
Democrats were candidates for office. Two Democratic
candidates for Senator met each other in joint debate
from day to day, and gradually became more and more
exasperated at each other, until their discussions were
simply disgraceful wrangles, and they both became
ashamed of them. They finally agreed that either
should say anything he pleased about the other and it
should not be resented as an offense, and from that time
on the campaign progressed without any special display
of ill temper. On election night the two candidates,
who lived in the same town, were receiving their returns
together, and the contest was uncomfortably close. A
distant precinct, in which one of the candidates confi
dently expected a large majority, was finally reported
with a majority against him. The disappointed can
didate expressed great surprise, to which the other can
didate answered that he should not be surprised, as he
had taken the liberty of declining him in that district
the evening before the election. He reminded the de
feated candidate that he had agreed that either was free
to say anything about the other without offense, and
added that under that authority he had gone up into
that district and taken the liberty of saying that his
opponent had retired from the contest, and therefore the
136 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
vote of the district was changed, and the declined can
didate was thus defeated. I think," added Lincoln,
with one of his heartiest laughs, "I had better decline
Chase." It was evident that the question of inducing
Chase to decline was very seriously considered by Lin-
coin. He did not seem to know just how it could be
done, but it was obvious that he believed it might be
done in one way or another, and what he said in jest he
meant in sober earnest.
Lincoln's anxiety for a renomination was the one
thing ever uppermost in his mind during the third year
of his administration, and, like all men in the struggles
of ambition, he believed that his only motive in his de
sire for his own re-election was to save the country,
rather than to achieve success for himself. That he
was profoundly sincere and patriotic in his purpose and
efforts to save the Union, and that he would willingly
have given his life as a sacrifice had it been necessary to
accomplish that result, none can doubt who knew him ;
but he was only human, after all, and his ambition was
like the ambition of other good men, often stronger than
himself. In this as in all political or administrative
movements Lincoln played the waiting game. When
he did not know what to do, he was the safest man in
the world to trust to do nothing. He carefully veiled
his keen and sometimes bitter resentment against Chase,
and waited the fullness of time when he could by some
fortuitous circumstance remove Chase as a competitor,
or by some shrewd manipulation of politics make him a
hopeless one. His inexperience in the details of politics
made him naturally distrustful and apprehensive as to
his renomination. He could not, at that early day, get
together the political forces necessary to make him feel
safe in the battle, and it was not until about the close of
1863 or e arly in 1864 that he finally formulated in his
LINCOLN AND CHASE. 137
mind his political policy, and began the work of consoli
dating his forces for action. He did this with a degree
of sagacity and method that would have done credit to
the ripest politician of the age, but there was no time
until the Baltimore Convention met that Lincoln felt
secure. Even after an overwhelming majority of the
delegates had been instructed in his favor, and when to
all but himself it was evident that there could be no
effective opposition to him in the convention, he was
never entirely free from doubts as to the result. Within
a month of his nomination, and when his more violent
enemies had abandoned the effort to defeat him, as was
evidenced by the Fremont Convention called at Cleve
land, he was yet perplexed with anxiety over the possi
bility of his defeat. In discussing the question as late
as May, 1864, I was surprised to find the apprehensions
he cherished. I told him that his nomination was a
foregone conclusion, and that it was not possible for any
combination to be made that could endanger his success.
I presented the attitude of the various States, and re
ferred to their delegations to prove to him that his nomi
nation must be made on the first ballot by a two-thirds
vote, if not with absolute unity. To this he responded:
"Well, McClure, what you say seems to be unanswer
able, but I don't quite forget that I was nominated for
President in a convention that was two-thirds for the
other fellow."
It is needless to say that the official and personal rela
tions between Chase and Lincoln during the latter part
of the year 1863 and the early part of 1864 were severely
strained. Lincoln felt it deeply, but said little to any
one on the subject, and never permitted Chase to know
how keenly he grieved him. He knew that Chase sin
cerely desired to be honest in the performance of his
public duty, and he judged his infirmities with generous
138 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
charity. He fully appreciated the fact, so well stated
by Chase's biographer, Judge Warden, that Chase "was
indeed sought less by strong men and by good men than
by weak men and by bad men." Indeed, Chase, with
all his towering intellect and all his admitted devotion
to the country's cause, was the merest plaything of the
political charlatans who crossed his path, and he was
thus made to do many things which were unworthy of
him, and which, with any other than Lincoln to judge
him, would have brought him to absolute disgrace. He
wrote many letters to his friends in different parts of
the country habitually complaining of Lincoln's incom-
petency and of the hopeless condition of the war. In
none of the many letters which have reached the light
did he give Lincoln credit for capacity or fitness for his
responsible trust. In disposing of the patronage of his
department he was often fretful and generally ill-advised.
With all these infirmities of temper and of ambition,
Lincoln bore with Chase with marvelous patience until
after Lincoln's unanimous renomination in 1864, when
Chase sent his third resignation to the President. In
his letter of resignation he said: "My position here is
not altogether agreeable to you, and it is certainly too
full of embarrassment and difficulty and painful respon
sibility to allow in me the least desire to retain it."
For the first time Lincoln recognized the fact that he
and Chase could not get along together, and he promptly
answered Chase's letter of resignation in the following
terse but expressive note: " Your resignation of the office
of Secretary of the Treasury, sent me yesterday, is ac
cepted. Of all I have said in commendation of your
ability and fidelity I have nothing to unsay, and yet you
and I have reached a point of mutual embarrassment in
our official relation which it seems cannot be overcome
or long sustained consistently with the public service."
LINCOLN AND CHASE. 139
Like all irritable men who are the prey of infirmities,
Chase believed, and recorded in his diary, that the em
barrassments which arose between him and Lincoln
were not of his creation. He thus expresses it in his
own language : "I had found a good deal of embarrass
ment from him, but what he had found from me I can
not imagine, unless it has been caused by my unwilling
ness to have offices distributed as spoils or benefits."
Chase retired from the Cabinet believing that he had
severed all political relations with Lincoln for the re
mainder of his life, and the last thing that he then
could have dreamed of was that his name would ever be
considered by the President for the office of Chief Justice
of the United States.
When Chase retired from the Cabinet, in the latter
part of June, he did not expect to support Lincoln for
re-election. Within a week thereafter he recorded in his
diary the fact that Senator Pomeroy could not support
Lincoln, and he added: " I am much of the same senti
ment, though not willing now to decide what duty may
demand next fall. ' ' But he then hoped much from the
revolutionary attitude of the supporters of Fremont and
the bold assault made upon Lincoln by Senator Wade
and Representative Henry Winter Davis. Chase retired
to the White Mountains to await events, and it soon be
came evident that the revolt against Lincoln would not
materialize. On the contrary, every week brought way
ward stragglers into the Lincoln camp, until at last Fre
mont himself had to surrender the side-show nomination
he had accepted and fall into line in support of the ad
ministration, and the manifesto of Wade and Davis had
fallen upon listless ears. It soon became evident that the
sulking Republican leaders must choose between Lincoln
and McClellan between supporting the war and opposing
the war, for the McClellan platform distinctly declared
140 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
the war a failure and demanded the restoration of the
Union by some other method than an appeal to arms.
When Chase returned from his rest in the mountains in
the latter part of September, he visited Washington, and
of course paid his respects to the President. It is evi
dent from Chase's own report of his interview with Lin
coln that he was not greatly inspired by Lincoln's pro
fessions of devotion. He notes the fact that Lincoln was
' ' not at all demonstrative, either in speech or manner, ' '
and he adds, ' ' I feel that I do not know him. " It is
evident that Chase returned to Washington with the
view of getting into some sort of friendly relations with
the President. He twice visited Lincoln during his short
stay in Washington, and within a week thereafter he
publicly declared himself in favor of Lincoln's election
at his home in Ohio. He voted the Republican State
ticket in October, and sent a congratulatory telegram to
Lincoln on the result of the election.
It was known to all about Washington during the fall
of 1864 that Chief Justice Taney could not long survive,
and after the first of September he was likely to die any
day. It would be unjust to Chase to say that he was in
fluenced in his political action by the hope of succeeding
Chief Justice Taney, but the fact that his name was
pressed upon Lincoln simultaneously by his friends
throughout the country, even before the dead Chief
Justice had been consigned to the tomb, proves that
Chase had cherished the hope of reaching that exalted
judicial position. Taney died on the I2th of October,
1864, within two weeks after Chase declared himself in
favor of the election of Lincoln, and on the I3th of Oc
tober Chase's name was on the lips of all his friends as
the man for Chief Justice. The movement was digni
fied by the active and earnest efforts of Senator Sumner,
who was in a position to exert considerable influence
9
LINCOLN AND CHASE. 141
with the President, although, on many questions they
had seriously differed. He desired a Chief Justice who
could be trusted on the slavery question, and, believing
that Chase was the safest of all on that important issue,
he made an exhaustive struggle to win the position for
Chase. Secretary Stanton, who had been in general
harmony with Chase in the Cabinet, was also his earnest
friend in the struggle for the Chief Justiceship, but the
opposition aroused at the mention of his name came from
every part of the country, and from very many of the
ablest and most earnest of Lincoln's friends. It was
argued against Chase that while his ability was admit
ted, his practical knowledge of law was limited, and that
he was without legal training, because his life had been
devoted almost exclusively to politics. He was elected
to the Senate a dozen years before the war; he retired
from the Senate to become Governor of Ohio, in which
position he served two terms, and he was re-elected to
the Senate at the close of his gubernatorial service. He
gave up the Senatorship to enter the Cabinet in 1861, so
that for many years he had given no thought or efforts to
the law, and he was regarded by very many , as lacking
in the special training necessary to the first judicial office
of the national government.
Strong as was the hostility to Chase's appointment in
every section of the Union, the most intense opposition
came from his own State of Ohio. The suggestion that
he should become Chief Justice was resented by a large
majority of the leading Republicans of the State, and
they severely tested Lincoln's philosophy by the violence
of their opposition, and especially by the earnestness
with which they insisted that it was an insult to Lin
coln himself to ask him to appoint Chase. Pennsylva
nia's most prominent official connected with the admin
istration, and one of her most learned lawyers, Joseph J.
142 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
Lewis, then Commissioner of Internal Revenue, reflected
the general Republican sentiment of Pennsylvania by
his unusual proceeding of sending a formal protest to
Lincoln against Chase's appointment. He declared that
Chase ( ' was not a man of much legal or financial know
ledge; that his selfishness had gradually narrowed and
contracted his views of things in general; that he was
amazingly ignorant of men; that it was the opinion in
the department that he really desired, toward the end of
his term of office, to injure, and as far as possible to
destroy, the influence and popularity of the adminis
tration."
I have, in a previous chapter, related an interview I
had with Lincoln a short time before he appointed
Chase. It was very evident from Lincoln's manner,
rather than from what he said, that he was much per
plexed as to his duty in the selection of a Chief Justice.
In that conversation he discussed the merits of the half
dozen or more prominent men who were suggested for
the place. It is hardly proper to say that Lincoln dis
cussed the matter, for the conversation was little else on
his part than a succession of searching inquiries to ob
tain the fullest expression of my views as to the merits
and demerits of the men he seemed to have under con
sideration. As to his own views he was studiously reti
cent. I tried in various ways to obtain some idea of the
leaning of his mind on the subject, but did not succeed.
The many inquiries he made about Stanton, and the
earnestness he exhibited in discussing, or rather having
me discuss, Stanton as the possible Chief Justice, im
pressed me with the belief that he was entertaining the
idea of appointing his Secretary of War; but he gave no
expression that could have warranted me in assuming
that I could correctly judge the bent of his mind on the
subject. The fact that he delayed the appointment for
LINCOLN AND CHASE. 143
nearly two months after the death of Taney proves that
Lincoln gave the subject not only very serious but pro
tracted consideration, and I doubt whether he had fully
decided in his own mind whom he would appoint until
the 6th of December, the day that he sent the name of
Chase to the Senate for Chief Justice.
At no time during Lincoln's administration had he
ever submitted to an equal pressure in deciding any pub
lic appointment, and, excepting the Emancipation Proc
lamation, I doubt whether any question of policy was
ever so earnestly pressed and opposed by his friends as
was the appointment of Chase. Any other President
than Lincoln would not have appointed Chase. His
personal affronts to Lincoln had been continuous and
flagrant from the time he entered the Cabinet until he
resigned from it a little more than three years thereafter,
and I am quite sure that at no time during that period
did Lincoln ever appeal to Chase for advice as his friend.
He had many consultations with him, of course, on mat
ters relating to the government, but that Lincoln regarded
Chase as his bitter and even malignant enemy during all
that period cannot now be doubted. The only pretense
of atonement that Chase had ever made was his hesi
tating and ungracious support of Lincoln's re-election,
but only after the brilliant success of the Union armies
under Sherman and Sheridan had absolutely settled the
contest in Lincoln's favor. Grant overlooked a malig
nant assault made upon him by Admiral Porter when he
promoted him to succeed Farragut; but in that case Por
ter's record clearly entitled him to the distinction, and
Grant simply yielded personal resentment to a public
duty. It was not pretended that Chase had any claim
to the Chief Justiceship on the ground of eminent legal
attainments or of political fidelity, and Lincoln's appoint
ment of Chase was simply one of the many exhibitions
144 LINCOLN AND M&N OF WAR-TIMES.
of the matchless magnanimity that was one of the great
est attributes of his character. He appointed him not
because he desired Chase for Chief Justice so much as
because he feared that, in refusing to appoint him, he
might permit personal prejudice to do injustice to the
nation. *
Of course, Chase promptly and effusively thanked the
President when he learned that his name had been sent
to the Senate for Chief Justice. In his letter to Lincoln
he said : ' ' Before I sleep I must thank you for this mark
of your confidence, and especially for the manner in
which the nomination was made. ' ' But before he was
* You give a wrong impression as to Chase's legal training.
He was a thorough student of the law, and a careful, painstaking
lawyer till he entered the Senate at the age of forty -two. He even
was so fond of law as to take up superfluous drudgery, editing
with notes and citations the Ohio Statutes. He kept out of poli
tics till he was thirty-three. While in the Senate he argued cases
in the Supreme Court as one involving the title to lands in and
about Keokuk.
Now, it is the study and practice a lawyer has before forty
which determine his quality and equipment as a jurist, and these
are not much affected by diversions afterward. A man culmi
nates professionally by forty : witness B. R. Curtis, Choate, Fol-
lett, etc. Edmunds has been in the Senate twenty or twenty-five
years, but he has not lost his legal ability acquired before he
entered it.
My own impression is, from the conversations with Lincoln
which different persons have reported to me and from some
manuscript letters of Sumner, that Lincoln intended all along to
appoint Chase, though somewhat doubting whether Chase would
settle down quietly in his judicial office and let politics alone.
That was a sincere apprehension which others shared, but I do
not think that Lincoln's mind at all rested on any other person.
I began to write this note only to make the points that Chase
had ample legal training, and that his intellect was naturally
judicial. See his able argument in the Van Landt case, about
1846. Edward L. Pierce to the Author, December 7, 1891.
LINCOLN AND CHASE. 145
three months in the high office conferred upon him by
Lincoln he became one of Lincoln's most obtrusive and
petulant critics, and his last letter to Lincoln, written on
the very day of Lincoln's assassination, was a harsh criti
cism on the President's action in the Louisiana case.
Immediately after the death of Lincoln, writing to an
old political associate in Ohio, Chase said: "The schemes
of politicians will now adjust themselves to the new con
ditions; I want 110 part in them." Indeed, the only
specially kind words from Chase to Lincoln that I have
been able to discover in all the publications giving
Chase's views I find in the one expression of hearty
gratitude and friendship, written on the impulse of the
moment, when he was first notified of his nomination to
the Chief Justiceship. The new conditions of which he
spoke after the death of Lincoln, and in which he de
clared he could have no part, speedily controlled the new
Chief Justice in his political actions. The leader of the
radical Republicans when he became Chief Justice, he
gradually gravitated against his party until he was ready
to accept the Democratic nomination for President in
1868, and he never thereafter supported a Republican
candidate for President. He hoped to receive the Presi
dential nomination from the New York Convention of
1868. It had been agreed upon by some who believed
that they controlled the convention that Chase should be
nominated, and Governor Seymour retired from the chair
at the appointed time, as is generally believed, to make
the nomination to the convention; but Samuel J. Tilden
had no love for Chase, and it was he who inspired the
spontaneous movement that forced the nomination of
Seymour while he was out of the chair, and carried it
like a whirlwind. Tilden did not guide the convention
to the nomination of Seymour because he specially de
sired Seymour's nomination ; he did it because he desired
JO
146 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
to defeat the nomination of Chase. The result was the
keenest disappointment to the Chief Justice. He defined
his political position during the contest of 1868 as fol
lows: "The action of the two parties has obliged me to
resume, with my old faith, my old position that of
Democrat; by the grace of God free and independent."
After 1868, Chase was unknown as a factor in politics.
In June, 1870, he was attacked by paralysis, and from
that time until his death, on the 7th of May, 1873, he
was a hopeless invalid. His last political deliverance
was a feeble declaration in favor of Greeley's election in
1872, when he was shattered in mind and body. It may
truthfully be said of him that from 1861 until his death
his public life was one continued and consuming disap
pointment, and the constant training of his mind to poli
tics doubtless greatly hindered him in winning the dis
tinction as Chief Justice that he might have achieved
had he given up political ambition and devoted himself
to the high judicial duties he had accepted. While one
of the greatest intellects among all the Republican lead
ers, he was an absolute failure as a politician, and his
persistence in political effort made him fail to improve
other opportunities. His life may be summed up in the
single sentence: He was an eminently great, a strangely
unbalanced, and a sadly disappointed man.
LINCOLN AND CAMERON.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN had more varied and compli-
<L\ cated relations with Simon Cameron than with any
other Pennsylvanian during his Presidential term. In
deed, Cameron fills more pages in the annals of Penn
sylvania politics than any citizen of the State since the
organization of our government. He is the only man
who was four times elected to the United States Senate
by the Pennsylvania Legislature until his son attained
the same distinction as his successor, and he would have
won a fifth election without a serious contest had he not
voluntarily resigned to assure the succession to his son.
Without great popular following, he was the most con
spicuous of all our Pennsylvania politicians, measured
by the single standard of success in obtaining political
honors and power. He was first elected to the Senate in
1845 to succeed Buchanan, who had been transferred to
the Polk Cabinet. The tariff of 1842 was then a vital
issue in Pennsylvania, and Cameron was known as a
positive protectionist. The Legislature was Democratic,
and had nominated the late Chief Justice Woodward
with apparent unanimity to succeed Buchanan ; but
Cameron organized a bolt from the Democratic party,
commanded the solid Whig vote on the tariff issue, and
was thus elected. The Senate to which he was chosen
was Democratic, and he exhibited his peculiar power
over that body when he served in it by the rejection of
{Photo by Brady, Washington.)
SIMON CAMERON, 1865.
LINCOLN AND CAMERON. H9
Judge Woodward when nominated by President Polk as
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. He
made a memorable record during his early Senatorial
service by his earnest appeal to Vice-President Dallas in
favor of protection, when it was known that the repeal
of the tariff of 1842 would depend upon the casting vote
of the Vice-President. At the expiration of his term,
in 1849, Cameron was a candidate for re-election. The
balance of power in the Legislature was held by Native
American Representatives from Philadelphia, elected on
the Fusion ticket. He failed, however, to divert that
element from the Whigs, and abandoned the struggle,
giving the field to James Cooper, the regular Whig can
didate, who was successful.
In 1854 a strange political revolution occurred in
Pennsylvania, in which the new American or Know-
Nothing party elected the Whig candidate for Governor
and the Democratic candidate for Canal Commissioner,
and carried an overwhelming majority of the Legis
lature, embracing nominees of both parties. Cameron
supported the Democratic ticket, and made a speech in
its favor the night before election, but immediately after
the election he associated himself with the Americans
and became an aggressive candidate for United States
Senator. This was the beginning of the factional con
flict between Cameron and Curtin (then Secretary of the
Commonwealth) that continued as long as they were in
active political life. The new party was without leader
ship or discipline, and was speedily broken into frag
ments by a dozen aspirants for the Senatorship, of whom
Cameron and Curtin were the leading and apparently
only hopeful candidates. The struggle became excep
tionally bitter, the joint convention meeting and ad
journing from time to time without succeeding in a
choice, until finally it became a matter of necessity
15 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
to elect Cameron or adjourn without an election; and
after a protracted contest over that issue the joint con
vention adjourned sine die by one majority. The next
Legislature was Democratic, and Governor Bigler was
chosen. When the Legislature met in 1857 the Demo
crats had three majority on joint ballot, and confidently
expected to elect a Senator. The late Colonel Forney
was made the candidate by the direct intervention of
President-elect Buchanan, who was then just on the
threshold of the enormous power and patronage of the
Presidency. The nomination would naturally have gone
to Henry D. Foster, who was a member of the House,
but for the attitude assumed by Buchanan. Forney's
nomination somewhat weakened the Democratic lines
by the general and clamorous discontent of the several
candidates who had hoped to win in an open contest.
The Republicans were intensely embittered against For
ney because they believed that he, as chairman of the
Democratic State Committee, had controlled the October
election unfairly to defeat the Republican State ticket
by a small majority, and thus assured the election of a
Democratic President. Cameron had for the first time
taken open ground against the Democrats in 1856, when
he was one of the Republican candidates for elector at
large, and actively supported Fremont's election. But
he was not in personal favor with most of the Repub
licans, and when his name was proposed in the Repub
lican caucus as a candidate for Senator, it was not seri
ously entertained until Senator Penrose assured the
caucus that Cameron could command three Democratic
votes if given the solid support of the Republicans. A
confidential committee was appointed to ascertain the
truth of the statement by personal assurance from the
Democratic members, and after a confirmative report, in
which the names of the Democratic members were not
LINCOLN AND CAMERON. 1 5 l
given, the Republican caucus resolved to cast one vote
for Cameron. That resolution was carried out in joint
convention, and three Democratic Representatives (Lebo,
Maneer, and Wagonseller) voted for Cameron and elected
him.
In 1 86 1, Cameron resigned the Senatorship to accept
the War portfolio under Lincoln. Early in 1862 he was
transferred by Lincoln from the War Department to the
Russian Mission, and in 1863 he had resigned his mission
and again appeared as a candidate for United States Sen
ator to succeed Wilmot, who had been chosen to fill
Cameron's unexpired term. The Legislature contained
one Democratic majority on joint ballot. Wilmot would
have been unanimously renominated had it been possible
to elect him, but Cameron was nominated upon the posi
tive assurance from his friends that he could command
one or more Democratic votes and was the only Repub
lican who could be successful. His nomination and the
contest that followed led to an eruption that not only pre
vented any Democratic support, but deprived him of a
solid Republican support, and Buckalew was elected.
In 1867, Cameron and Curtin again locked horns on the
Senatorship, and Cameron was successful after a struggle
of unexampled desperation. Cameron served his full
term of six years, and was re-elected in 1873 to succeed
himself, without a contest. Most of the active oppo
nents within his party had broken to the support of
Greeley in 1872, and thereafter Cameron was practically
supreme in the direction of the Republican organization.
He resigned in 1877, when the Legislature was in ses
sion, and after it had been ascertained that his son, the
present Senator Cameron, could be elected as his suc
cessor. Had Cameron not resigned, he would have been
elected to his fifth term in 1879 ^Y tne united vote of his
party; but from his retirement in 1877 until his death,
*5 2 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
a dozen years later, he seemed to enjoy freedom from the
cares and perplexities of political life, and had the grati
fication of seeing his son thrice elected to the position he
had surrendered to him. He had survived all the many
intensified asperities of his long and active political life,
and died at the ripe age of fourscore and ten years, with
his faculties unabated until the long halt came. He and
his son have each attained the highest Senatorial honors
ever awarded by Pennsylvania to any of her citizens by
four elections to the Senate an entirely exceptional rec
ord of political success in the history of all the States of
the Union. It was often complained by his foes that
Cameron fought and won unfairly in his political con
tests, but the defeated generals of Europe made the same
complaint against Napoleon.
Cameron was a Senator when Lincoln served his single
term in Congress, but they did not become even acquaint
ances, and he first became involved in Lincoln's political
life in 1860, when both were candidates for the Repub
lican nomination for President. Cameron's candidacy
was not regarded as a serious effort to nominate him, but
the peculiar political situation in Pennsylvania greatly
favored him in making himself the candidate of the
State, and with his sagacity and energy in political
affairs he was not slow to avail himself of it. Curtin
was the prominent candidate for Governor, and Cameron
led Curtin' s opponents. Curtin commanded the nomina
tion for Governor, .and naturally enough desired a united
party to assure his election. Cameron secured a majority
of votes in the State Convention for President, and rea
sonably claimed that he was as much entitled to the
united support of the party for President as Curtin was
entitled to it for Governor. The conflict between the
two elements of the party led to a compromise, by which
a nearly united delegation was given to Cameron for a
LINCOLN AND CAMERON. *53
complimentary vote for President. Cameron himself be
lieved, in after years, that he could have been nominated
and elected if he had been heartily pressed by Pennsyl
vania. He many times eluded me for refusing to give
him an earnest support, saying that he could have been
made a successful candidate, and then, to use his own
expressive language, ' ' We could all have had everything
we wanted." While Cameron had a majority of the
delegation, a large minority was more or less bitterly
opposed to him, and his name was withdrawn in the
convention after the first ballot, because the delegation
would have broken. The men who immediately repre
sented Cameron on that occasion were John P. Sander
son, who was subsequently appointed to the regular army,
and Alexander Cummings, whose confused use of mili
tary authority conferred upon him in the early part of
the war led to a vote of censure upon Cameron by Con
gress. They knew before the convention met that the
contest was narrowed down to Seward and Lincoln, and
that Cameron, Chase, and Bates were not in the fight.
Sanderson and Cummings, with little or no control of
the delegation, were early in negotiation with David
Davis, who was specially in charge of Lincoln's interest
in Chicago, and obtained Davis' s positive assurance that
if the Pennsylvania delegation would support Lincoln
and Lincoln succeeded to the Presidency, Cameron would
be appointed Secretary of the Treasury. This agreement
was not made known at the time to any in the delega
tion, nor did it become known to Lincoln, at least as a
positive obligation, until after the election.
The success of Lincoln at the November election left
the political situation in Pennsylvania without change,
except that the war of factions was intensified. Curtin
did not give even a perfunctory support to Cameron for
the Presidency, and Cameron gave about the same sort
T 54 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES,
of support to Curtin for Governor; and when it was an
nounced, about the ist of January, that Cameron had
been to Springfield and had returned with the proffer of
a Cabinet portfolio, it immediately inspired the most ag
gressive opposition to his appointment. I was not in
sympathy with Cameron, and promptly telegraphed Lin
coln, protesting against his appointment, to which Lin
coln answered urging me to come immediately to Spring
field. When I met Lincoln he frankly informed me that
on the last day of December he had given Cameron a
letter tendering to him a position in the Cabinet, reserv
ing the right to decide whether it should be that of Sec
retary of the Treasury or Secretary of War. I explained
to the President, with all the ardor of an intense partisan
in the factional feud, that the appointment of Cameron
would be a misfortune to the party in Pennsylvania, and
a misfortune to the President that he must soon realize
after his inauguration. It is needless now to review the
causes which led to this active and embittered hostility
of the friends of Curtin to Cameron's political advance
ment. It is sufficient to say that there was persistent
war between these elements, and the usual political de
moralization that ever attends such conflicts was pain
fully visible from the factional battles of that time. I
saw that Lincoln was very much distressed at the situ
ation in which he had become involved, and he discussed
every phase of it with unusual frankness and obviously
with profound feeling. I did not then know that Lin
coln had been pledged, without his knowledge, by his
friends at Chicago to the appointment of Cameron, nor
did Lincoln intimate it to me during our conversation.
After an hour or more of discussion on the subject Lin
coln dismissed it by saying that he would advise me
further within a very few days.
I left Lincoln conscious that I had seriously impressed
LINCOLN AND CAMERON. 155
him with my views, but entirely unable to form any
judgment as to what might be his ultimate action. Al
though I left him as late as eleven o'clock in the even
ing, he wrote Cameron a private letter dated the same
night, beginning with this sentence: " Since seeing you,
things have developed which make it impossible for me
to take you into the Cabinet." He added: "You will
say this comes from an interview with McClure, and this
is partly but not wholly true ; the more potent matter is
wholly outside of Pennsylvania, yet I am not at liberty
to specify. Enough that it appears to me to be suf
ficient." He followed with the suggestion that Came
ron should write him declining the appointment, stating
that if the declination was forwarded he would ( ' not
object to its being known that it was tendered " to him.
He concluded by saying: "No person living knows, or
has an intimation, that I write this letter," and with a
postscript asking Cameron to telegraph the words "All
right. ' ' * lyincoln also wrote me a letter of a single sen-
* The following is the text of the Lincoln letters to Cameron
on the subject of the Cabinet appointment, as given in Nicolay
and Hay's life of Lincoln, published by the Century Company,
New York:
SPRINGFIELD, ILL., December 31, 1860.
Hox. SIMON CAMERON:
MY DEAR SIR: I think fit to notify you now, that by your per
mission I shall at the proper time nominate you to the U. S. Sen
ate for confirmation as Secretary of the Treasury, or as Secretary
of War which of the two I have not yet definitely decided.
Please answer at your earliest convenience.
Your obedient servant,
A. LINCOLN.
(Private.)
SPRINGFIELD, ILL., Jan. 3, 1861.
HON. SIMON CAMERON:
MY DEAR SIR: Since seeing you things have developed which
make it impossible for me to take you into the Cabinet. You
will say this comes of an interview with McClure; and this is
J 5 6 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
tence, dated the same night, asking that the accusations
against Cameron should be put in tangible shape for his
partly, but not wholly, true. The more potent matter is wholly
outside of Pennsylvania, and yet I am not at liberty to specify it.
Enough that it appears to me to be sufficient. And now I sug
gest that you write me declining the appointment, in which case
I do not object to its being known that it was tendered you.
Better do this at once, before things so change that you cannot
honorably decline, and I be compelled to openly recall the tender.
No person living knows or has an intimation that I write this
letter. Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.
P. S. Telegraph me instantly on receipt of this, saying, "All
right." A. L.
(Private and confidential^)
SPRINGFIELD, ILL., Jan. 13, 1861.
HON. SIMON CAMERON:
MY DEAR SIR: At the suggestion of Mr. Sanderson, and with
hearty good- will besides, I herewith send you a letter dated
Jan. 3, the same in date as the last you received from me. I
thought best to give it that date, as it is in some sort to take the
place of that letter. I learn, both by a letter of Mr. Sw r ett and
from Mr. Sanderson, that your feelings were wounded by the
terms of my letter really of the 3d. I wrote that letter under
great anxiety, and perhaps I was not so guarded in its' terms as I
should have been; but I beg you to be assured I intended no
offense. My great object was to have }*ou act quickly, if possible
before the matter should be complicated with the Penn. Senatorial
election. Destroy the offensive letter or return it to me.
I say to you now I have not doubted that you would perform
the duties of a Department ably and faithfully. Nor have I for
a moment intended to ostracize your friends. If I should make
a Cabinet appointment for Penn. before I reach Washington, I
will not do so without consulting you, and giving all the weight
to your views and wishes which I consistently can. This I have
always intended. Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.
(Inclosure.}
SPRINGFIELD, ILL., Jan. 3, 1861.
HON. SIMON CAMERON:
MY DEAR SIR; When you were here, about the last of Decem-
LINCOLN AND CAMERON. J 57
consideration. I am unable to quote literally any of the
correspondence with Lincoln on this subject, as all of
my many letters received from him, and the correspond
ence relating to the campaign and the organization of
the administration, that I had preserved, were destroyed
when Chambersburg was burned by McCausland in 1864.
I answered Lincoln's very indefinite note by declining to
appear as an individual prosecutor of Cameron, and his
request for the formulation of Cameron's alleged political
and personal delinquencies was not complied with.
Lincoln's letter to Cameron tendering him the Cabinet
appointment had been shown to some confidential friends
whose enthusiasm outstripped their discretion, and they
made public the fact that Cameron was an assured mem
ber of the new Cabinet. The second letter from Lincoln
to Cameron, recalling the tender of a Cabinet office, was
not made public, and doubtless was never seen beyond
a very small and trusted circle of Cameron's associates;
but it soon became known that Lincoln regarded the
question as unsettled, and that led to exhaustive efforts
on both sides to hinder and promote Cameron's appoint
ment. Sanderson, who had made the compact at Ch'i-
ber, I handed you letter saying I should at the proper time
nominate you to the Senate for a place in the Cabinet. It is due
to you and to truth for me to say you were here by my invitation,
and not upon any suggestion of your own. You have not as yet
signified to me whether you would accept the appointment, and
with much pain I now say to you that you will relieve me from
great embarrassment by allowing me to recall the offer. This
springs from an unexpected complication, and not from any
change of my view as to the ability or faithfulness with which
you would discharge the duties of the place.
I now think I will not definitely fix upon any appointment for
Pennsylvania until I reach Washington.
Your obedient servant,
A. LINCOLN.
*58 LINCOLN AND 'MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
cago with Davis for Cameron's appointment, was sent at
once to Springfield to enforce its fulfillment. He reason
ably complained that Lincoln's letter to Cameron revok
ing the appointment was offensively blunt and needed
explanation, as it gave no reason whatever for the sudden
change in his judgment. While Sanderson and other
prominent Pennsylvanians who visited Lincoln about
the same time failed to obtain from him any assurance
of his purpose to appoint Cameron, Lincoln was pre
vailed upon on the I3th of January, ten days after he
had written the letter revoking the appointment, to
write a confidential letter to Cameron apologizing for
the unguarded terms in vyhich he had expressed himself,
and giving the assurance that he " intended no offense."
He also enclosed to Omeron a new letter, antedated
January 3, which he suggested that Cameron should
accept as the original of that date, and destroy or re
turn the one that had given offense. In this letter he
said: u You have not as vet signified to me whether you
would accept the appointment, and with much pain I
now say to you that you will relieve me from great em
barrassment by allowing me to recall the offer." The
explanatory letter in which the antedated letter was en
closed gave Cameron only this assurance as to Lincoln's
purpose: " If I should make a Cabinet appointment for
Pennsylvania before I reach Washington, I will not do
so without consulting you and giving all the weight to
your views and wishes which I consistently can. ' ' None
of these letters were made public by Cameron, but it was
well understood that it was an open fight for and against
him, and Pennsylvania was convulsed by that struggle
from the ist of January until the Cabinet was announced
after the inauguration of the President.
When Lincoln arrived in Washington the five mem
bers of the Cabinet who had been positively chosen were
LINCOLN AND CAMERON. *50
Messrs. Seward, Bates, Chase, Welles, and Smith. The
ten days he spent at the Capital before becoming Presi
dent were given up almost wholly to a battle over the
two remaining Cabinet portfolios. The appointment of
Cameron and Blair was not finally determined until the
day before the inauguration, and then the Cameron issue
was decided by the powerful intervention of Seward and
Weed. They were greatly disappointed that Cameron
had failed to deliver the Pennsylvania delegation to Sew
ard, as they had been led to expect, but they were in
tensely embittered against Curtin because he and Lane
had both openly declared at Chicago that Seward' s nomi
nation would mean their inevitable defeat. Looking
back upon that contest with the clearer insight that the
lapse of thirty years must give, I do not see how Lincoln
could have done otherwise than appoint Cameron as a
member of his Cabinet, viewed from the standpoint he
had assumed. He desired to reconcile party differences
by calling his Presidential competitors around him, and
that opened the way for Cameron. He acted with entire
sincerity, and in addition to the powerful pressure for
Cameron's appointment made by many who were en
titled to respect, he felt that he was not free from the
obligation made in his name by Davis at Chicago to
make Cameron a member of his Cabinet. The appoint
ment was not made wholly for that reason, but that
pledge probably resolved Lincoln's doubts in Cameron's
favor, and he was accepted as Secretary of War. That
there was some degree of mutual distrust between Lin
coln and Cameron was a necessity from the circumstances
surrounding the selection; but as there was no very large
measure of mutual trust between Lincoln and any of his
Cabinet officers, Cameron's relations with the President
were little if any more strained than were the relations
of his brother constitutional advisers with their chief;
LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
and Cameron's practical views in the grave emergency
in which the administration was placed were probably
of more value to Lincoln at times than were the coun
sels of most of the Cabinet. Every member had his
own theory of meeting the appalling crisis, from peace
able dismemberment of the Republic to aggressive war,
while Lincoln had no policy but to await events, and he
counseled with all and trusted none. Cameron entered
the Cabinet, therefore, with about equal opportunity
among his associates to win and hold power with the
President, and his retirement within less than a year was
not due to any prejudices or apprehensions which may
have been created by the bitter struggle against his ap
pointment.
Had the most capable, experienced, and upright man
of the nation been called to the head of the War Depart
ment when Lincoln was inaugurated in 1861, it would
have been impossible for him to administer that office
without flagrant abuses. The government was entirely
unprepared for war. It was without armies, without
guns, without munitions of war; indeed, it had to im
provise everything needed to meet an already well-organ
ized Confederate army. Contracts had to be made with
such haste as to forbid the exercise of sound discretion
in obtaining what the country needed; and Cameron,
with his peculiar political surroundings, with a horde
of partisans clamoring for spoils, was compelled either
to reject the confident expectation of his friends or to
submit to imminent peril from the grossest abuse of his
delegated authority. He was soon brought under the
severest criticism of leading journals and statesmen of
his own party, and Representative Dawes, now Senator
from Massachusetts, led an investigation of the alleged
abuses of the War Department, which resulted in a
scathing report against Cameron's methods in adminis-
LINCOLN AND CAMERON. 161
tering the office, and a vote of censure upon Cameron by
the House. Lincoln promptly exhibited the generous
sense of justice that always characterized him by send
ing a special message to the House, exculpating Came
ron, because the acts for which he was criticised had not
been exclusively Cameron's, but were largely acts for
which the President and Cabinet were equally respon
sible. Some ten years later the House expunged the
resolution of censure. Notwithstanding the message
of Lincoln lessening the burden of reproach cast upon
Cameron by the House, popular distrust was very gen
eral as to the administration of the War Department,
and the demands for Cameron's removal grew in both
power and intensity. He was not accused of individual
corruption, but the severe strain put upon the national
credit led to the severest criticisms of all manner of pub
lic profligacy, and it culminated in a formal appeal to
the President from leading financial men of the country
for an immediate change in the Minister of War.
I have no reason to believe that Lincoln would have
appointed a new Secretary of War had not public con
siderations made it imperative. His personal relations
with Cameron were as pleasant as his relations with any
other of his Cabinet officers, and in many respects Came
ron was doubtless a valuable adviser because of his clear,
practical, common-sense views of public affairs. The
one vital issue that Cameron very early appreciated was
that of slavery. As early as May, 1861, he wrote to
General Butler, instructing him to refrain from surren
dering to their masters any slaves who came within his
lines, and to employ them * ' in the services to which
they may be best adapted." That was the first step
taken by the administration toward the overthrow of
slavery. In August of the same year General Fremont
issued a proclamation in Missouri declaring the slaves
ii
1 62 LINCOLN AND * MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
of all those in the Confederate service to be for ever free,
which was a substantial emancipation of all slaves in
Missouri. Lincoln at once revoked the Fremont order,
and sent Secretary Cameron and the Adjutant-General
to personally examine into the situation in Missouri and
report upon it. Cameron obviously sympathized with
Fremont's emancipation ideas, and, instead of delivering
to Fremont the order for his removal prepared before he
left Washington, he finally decided to bring it back with
him and to give Fremont an opportunity to retrieve him
self. Lincoln, always patient, yielded to Fremont's im
portunities, and permitted him to remain in command
until October, when he sent General Curtis in person to
deliver the order of removal, with the single condition
that if Fremont "shall then have, in personal command,
fought and won a battle, or shall then be actually in
battle, or shall then be in the immediate presence of the
enemy in expectation of a battle, it is not to be delivered,
but held for further orders. ' ' As Fremont was not near
a battle, he was relieved of his command.
Cameron pressed the slavery issue to the extent of a
flagrant outrage upon his chief by recommending the
arming of slaves in his first annual report without the
knowledge of the President, and sending it out in printed
form to the postmasters of the country for delivery to the
newspapers after having been presented to Congress.
The slavery question had then become an important
political theme, and politicians were shaping their lines
to get into harmony with it. In this report Cameron
declared in unqualified terms in favor of arming the
slaves for military service. Lincoln was not only shocked,
but greatly grieved when he learned the character of
Cameron's recommendation, and he at once ordered that
the copies be recalled by telegraph, the report revised,
and a new edition printed. Cameron submitted as grace-
LINCOLN AND CAMERON. 163
fully as possible, and revised his report, limiting his
recommendations about slaves to the suggestion that
they should not be returned to their masters.* While
this episode did not produce unfriendly personal relations
between Lincoln and Cameron, it certainly was a severe
strain upon Lincoln's trust in the fidelity of his War
* It is as clearly a right of the government to arm slaves when
it may become necessary, as it is to use gunpowder taken from
the enemy. What to do with that species of property is a ques
tion that time and circumstance will solve, and need not be
anticipated further than to repeat that they cannot be held by the
government as slaves. It would be useless to keep them as pris
oners of war; and self-preservation, the highest duty of a govern
ment or of individuals, demands that they should be disposed
of or employed in the most effective manner that will tend most
speedily to suppress the insurrection and restore the authority
of the government. If it shall be found that the men who have
been held by the rebels as slaves are capable of bearing arms and
performing efficient military service, it is the right, and may be
come the duty, of the government to arm and equip them, and
employ their services against the rebels under proper military
regulation, discipline, and command. Cameron's Original Re
port, recalled by the President for revision.
It is already a grave question what shall be done with those
slaves who were abandoned by their owners on the advance of
our troops into Southern territory, as at Beaufort district in
South Carolina. The number left within our control at that
point is very considerable, and similar cases will probably occur.
What shall be done with them ? Can we afford to send them for
ward to their masters, to be by them armed against us or used in
producing supplies to sustain the rebellion ? Their labor may be
useful to us; withheld from the enemy, it lessens his military re
sources, and withholding them has no tendency to induce the
horrors of insurrection, even in the rebel communities. They
constitute a military resource, and, being such, that they should
not be turned over to the enemy is too plain to discuss. Why
deprive him of supplies by a blockade, and voluntarily give him
men to produce them? Cameron's Report \ as revised by direction
of the President.
1 64 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
Minister; but Lincoln was too wise to put himself in
open antagonism to the antislavery sentiment of the
country by removing Cameron for his offensive and sur
reptitious antislavery report. The financial pressure for
Cameron's removal would probably have accomplished
it under any circumstances, and Lincoln waited more
than a month after the flurry over Cameron's report.
There have been many and conflicting accounts given
to the public of Cameron's retirement from the Lincoln
Cabinet, no one of which is wholly correct, and most of
them incorrect in vital particulars. Cameron had ver
bally assured the President when censured by Congress,
and again when the dispute arose over his annual report,
that his resignation was at Lincoln's disposal at any
time, but he had no knowledge of Lincoln's purpose to
make a change in the War Department until he received
Lincoln's letter in January, 1862, informing him of the
change. In Nicolay and Hays' life of Lincoln (volume
5, page 128) is given what purports to be the letter de
livered to Cameron notifying him of the change. Lin
coln certainly wrote that letter, as his biographers have
published it from his manuscript, but it is not the letter
that was delivered to Cameron. Lincoln sent his letter
to Cameron by Chase, who met Cameron late in the
evening after he had dined with Colonel Forney, and he
delivered the letter in entire ignorance of its contents.
I happened to be spending the evening with Colonel
Thomas A. Scott, then Cameron's Assistant Secretary
of War, when Cameron came in near the midnight hour
and exhibited an extraordinary degree of emotion. He
laid the letter down upon Scott's table, and invited us
both to read it, saying that it meant personal as well as
political destruction, and was an irretrievable wrong
committed upon him by the President. We were not
then, and indeed never had been, in political sympathy,
LINCOLN AND CAMERON. 165
but our friendly personal relations had never been inter
rupted. He appealed to me, saying: "This is not a po
litical affair; it means personal degradation; and while
we do not agree politically, you know I would gladly
aid you personally if it were in my power." Cameron
was affected even to tears, and wept bitterly over what
he regarded as a personal affront from Lincoln. I re
member not only the substance of Lincoln's letter, but
its language, almost, if not quite, literally, as follows:
( ' I have this day nominated Hon. Edwin M. Stanton to
be Secretary of War and you to be Minister Plenipo
tentiary to Russia. ' ' Although the message did not go
to the Senate that day, it had been prepared and was
sent in pursuance of that notice. Colonel Scott, who
was a man of great versatility of resources, at once sug
gested that Lincoln did not intend personal offense to
Cameron, and in that I fully agreed; and it was then
and there arranged that on the following day Lincoln
should be asked to withdraw the offensive letter; to per
mit Cameron to antedate a letter of resignation, and for
Lincoln to write a kind acceptance of the same. The
letter delivered by Chase was recalled; a new corre
spondence was prepared, and a month later given to the
public.
Cameron had no knowledge or even suspicion of Stan-
ton succeeding him. Chase and Seward, as well as Cam
eron, have claimed direct or indirect influence in the
selection of Stanton, but there was not a single member
of the Cabinet who knew of Stanton' s appointment until
Lincoln notified Cameron of the change. Stanton had
been in open, malignant opposition to the administration
only a few months before, but he was then the closest
friend and personal counselor of General McClellan; was
in hearty sympathy with the war; was resolutely and ag
gressively honest; and Lincoln chose him without con-
LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
suiting any, as far as I have ever been able to learn,
unless it was General McClellan. One of the many
good results he expected from Stanton as War Minister
was entire harmony between him and the general com
manding the armies.
Cameron well concealed his disappointment at the
manner of his retirement from the Cabinet ; wisely
maintained personal relations with Lincoln; and when
he returned from Russia, after less than a year of service
as minister, he resumed active political life, and was one
of the earliest of the political leaders to foresee that the
people would force the renomination of Lincoln, regard
less of the favor or disfavor of politicians. The early
movement in January, 1864, in which Curtin cordially
co-operated, by which the unanimous recommendation
of the Republican members of the Pennsylvania Legis
lature was given for Lincoln's renomination, was sug
gested by Cameron; and Lincoln, with a sagacity that
never failed him, took the earliest opportunity to attach
Cameron so firmly to his cause that separation would be
impossible. His first movement in that line was the
Cameron mission to Fortress Monroe to ask Butler to
accept the Vice-Presidency. This was in March, 1864,
and Cameron was one of the very few whom Lincoln
consulted about the Vice- Presidency until he finally set
tled upon the nomination of Johnson, in which Cameron
reluctantly concurred, and he went to the Baltimore
Convention as a delegate-at-large to execute Lincoln's
wishes. He became chairman of the Republican State
Committee in Pennsylvania, and doubtless would have
been in very close relations with the President during
his second term had Lincoln's life been spared.
I have written of Lincoln and Cameron with some
hesitation, because during the thirty years in which
Cameron and I were both more or less active in politics
LINCOLN AND CAMERON. 167
we never were in political sympathy. He had retired
from his first term of Senatorial service before I had be
come a voter, and was thirty years my senior. He was
then a Democrat and I a Whig, and the political hos
tility continued when in later years we were of the same
political faith. He never was a candidate with my sup
port, nor was I ever a candidate with his support, even
when I was the unanimous nominee of our party. We
differed radically in political methods, and often in bit
terness, but our personal relations were never strained,
and on occasions he confided in me and received friendly
personal service that he warmly appreciated. We many
times had a truce to attain some common end, but it was
never misunderstood as anything more than a truce for
the special occasion. When he entered the Lincoln
Cabinet he knew that I would gladly have aided him to
success, and we seldom met without an hour or more of
pleasant personal intercourse over a bottle of wine, the
only stimulant he ever indulged in. In 1873 ne was
elected to his fourth term to the Senate and I was a
State Senator. An effort was made by legislative mer
cenaries to call into the field some man of large fortune
as his competitor. He called on me, stated the case, and
appealed to me to oppose the movement, as it was ob
viously dishonest. It was expected that my opposition
to Cameron would make me willing to join any move
ment for his defeat; but I at once assured him that,
while I would not support his election, I would earn
estly oppose any effort to force him into the corrupt
conciliation of venal legislators. He thanked me, and
added: "I can rely upon you, and I will now dismiss
the thieves without ceremony. " The movement failed,
and he was elected by the united vote of his party, while
I voted for the late William D. Kelley. No man has so
strongly impressed his personality upon the politics of
l LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
Pennsylvania as has Simon Cameron, and the political
power he organized is as potent in the State to-day as at
any time during his life. He was one of the few men
who voluntarily, retired from the Senate when he could
have continued his service during life. He survived his
retirement a full dozen years; his intercourse mellowed
into the gentlest relations with old-time friends and foes,
and in the ripeness of more than fourscore and ten sum
mers and in peaceful resignation he slept the dreamless
sleep of the dead.
(Photo by Brady, Washington.)
EDWIN M. STANTON, 1865.
LINCOLN AND STANTON.
OF all the men intimately connected with Abraham
Lincoln during our civil war, Kdwin M. Stanton
presented the strangest medley of individual attributes.
He was a man of whom two histories might be written
as widely diverging as night and day, portraying him as
worthy of eminent praise and as worthy of scorching
censure, and yet both absolutely true % His dominant
quality was his heroic mould. He could be heroic to a
degree that seemed almost superhuman, and yet at times
submissive to the very verge of cowardice. Like Lin
coln, he fully trusted no man; but, unlike Lincoln, he
distrusted all, and I doubt whether any man prominently
connected with the government gave confidence to so
few as did Stanton. He in turn trusted and hated nearly
every general prominent in the early part of the war.
He was McClellan's closest personal friend and counselor
when he entered the Lincoln Cabinet, and later became
McClellan's most vindictive and vituperative foe. The
one general of the war who held his confidence without
interruption from the time he became Commander-in-
Chief of the armies until the close of the war was Gen
eral Grant, and he literally commanded it by distinctly
defining his independent attitude as General-in-Chief
when he accepted his commission as Lieutenant-General.
He often spoke of, and to, public men, military and civil,
with a withering sneer. I have heard him scores of
170
LINCOLN AND STANTON. 17 1
times thus speak of Lincoln, and several timt*> thus
speak to Lincoln. He was a man of extreme moods;
often petulant, irritating, and senselessly unjust, and at
times one of the most amiable, genial, and delightful
conversationalists I have ever met. He loved antago
nism, and there was hardly a period during his remark
able service as War Minister in which he was not, on
some more or less important point, in positive antago
nism with the President. In his antagonisms he was,
as a rule, offensively despotic, and often pressed them
upon Lincoln to the very utmost point of Lincoln's for
bearance; but he knew when to call a halt upon himself,
as he well knew that there never was a day or an hour
during his service in the Cabinet that Lincoln was not
his absolute master. He respected Lincoln's authority
because it was greater than his own, but he had little
respect for Lincoln's fitness for the responsible duties of
the Presidency. I have seen him at times as tender and
gentle as a woman, his heart seeming to agonize over
the sorrows of the humblest; and I have seen him many
more times turn away with the haughtiest contempt from
appeals which should at least have been treated with re
spect. He had few personal and fewer political friends,
and he seemed proud of the fact that he had more per
sonal and political enemies than any prominent officer
of the government. Senators, Representatives, and high
military commanders were often offended by his wanton
arrogance, and again thawed into cordial relations by his
effusive kindness. Taken all in all, Edwin M. Stanton
was capable of the grandest and the meanest actions of
any great man I have ever known, and he has reared
imperishable monuments to the opposing qualities he
possessed.
Stanton had rendered an incalculable service to the
nation by his patriotic efforts in the Cabinet of Bu-
172 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
chanan. Cass had resigned from the Premiership be
cause he was much more aggressive in his ideas of meet
ing rebellion than was the President. Attorney-General
Black was promoted to the head of the Cabinet, and
Stanton was called in as Black's successor. It was Judge
Black who saved Buchanan's administration from sud
den and irretrievable wreck at the outset of the issue,
and he doubtless dictated the appointment of Stanton,
who was his close personal friend. From the time that
Stanton entered the Buchanan Cabinet the attitude of
the administration was so pointedly changed that none
could mistake it. He was positively and aggressively
loyal to the government, and as positively and aggres
sively hated rebellion. While Stanton and Black gen
erally acted in concert during the few remaining months
of the Buchanan administration, they became seriously
estranged before the close of the Lincoln administration
so much so that Black, in an article published in the
Galaxy of June, 1870, said of Stanton: "Did he accept
the confidence of the President (Buchanan) and the Cabi
net with a predetermined intent to betray it?" After
Stanton' s retirement from the Buchanan Cabinet when
Lincoln was inaugurated, he maintained the closest con
fidential relations with Buchanan, and wrote him many
letters expressing the utmost contempt for Lincoln, the
Cabinet, the Republican Congress, and the general pol
icy of the administration. These letters, given to the
public in Curtis' s life of Buchanan, speak freely of the
"painful imbecility of Lincoln," of the "venality and
corruption ' ' which ran riot in the government, and ex
pressed the belief that no better condition of things was
possible ' ' until JefF Davis turns out the whole concern. ' '
He was firmly impressed for some weeks after the battle
of Bull Run that the government was utterly overthrown,
as he repeatedly refers to the coming of Davis into the
LINCOLN AND STANTON. 173
National Capital. In one letter he says that " in less
than thirty days Davis will be in possession of Washing
ton;" and it is an open secret that Stanton advised the
revolutionary overthrow of the Lincoln government, to
be replaced by General McClellan as military dictator.
These letters published by Curtis, bad as they are, are
not the worst letters written by Stanton to Buchanan.
Some of them were so violent in their expressions against
Lincoln and the administration that they have been
charitably withheld from the public, but they remain
in the possession of the surviving relatives of President
Buchanan. Of course, Lincoln had no knowledge of
the bitterness exhibited by Stanton to himself personally
and to his administration, but if he had known the worst
that Stanton ever said or wrote about him, I doubt not
that he would have called him to the Cabinet in Janu
ary, 1862. The disasters the army suffered made Lin
coln forgetful of everything but the single duty of sup
pressing the rebellion. From the day that McClellan
was called to the command of the Army of the Potomac
in place of McDowell, Stanton was in enthusiastic accord
with the military policy of the government. The con
stant irritation between the War Department and mili
tary commanders that had vexed Lincoln in the early
part of the war made him anxious to obtain a War Min
ister who was not only resolutely honest, but who was in
close touch with the commander of the armies. This
necessity, with the patriotic record that Stanton had
made during the closing months of the Buchanan ad
ministration, obviously dictated the appointment of Stan-
ton. It was Lincoln's own act. Stanton had been dis
cussed as a possible successor to Cameron along with
many others in outside circles, but no one had any reason
to anticipate Stanton' s appointment from any intimation
given by the President Lincoln and Stanton had no
174 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
personal intercourse whatever from the time of Lincoln's
inauguration until Stanton became his War Minister.
In a letter to Buchanan, written March i, 1862, Stanton
says : ' ' My accession to my present position was quite as
sudden and unexpected as the confidence you bestowed
upon me- in calling me to your Cabinet." In another
letter, written on the i8th of May, 1862, he said: "I
hold my present position at the request of the President,
who knew me personally, but to whom I had not spoken
from the 4th of March, 1861, until the day he handed
me my commission." The appointment was made be
cause Lincoln believed that Stan ton's loyal record in the
Buchanan Cabinet and his prominence as the foe of every
form of jobbery would inspire the highest degree of con
fidence in that department throughout the entire country.
In that he judged correctly. From the day that he en
tered the War Office until the surrender of the Confeder
ate armies, Stanton, with all his vagaries and infirmities,
gave constant inspiration to the loyal sentiment of the
country, and rendered a service that probably only Edwin
M. Stanton could have rendered at the time.
Lincoln was not long in discovering that in his new
Secretary of War he had an invaluable but most trouble
some Cabinet officer, but he saw only the great and good
offices that Stanton was performing for the imperiled Re
public. Confidence was restored in financial circles by
the appointment of Stanton, and his name as War Min
ister did more to strengthen the faith of the people in the
government credit than would have been probable from
the appointment of any other man of that day. He was
a terror to all the hordes of jobbers and speculators and
camp-followers whose appetites had been whetted by a
great war, and he enforced the strictest discipline through
out our armies. He was seldom capable of being civil to
any officer away from the army on leave of absence un-
LINCOLN AND STAN TON. 175
less he had been summoned by the government for con
ference or special duty, and he issued the strictest orders
from time to time to drive the throng of military idlers
from the capital and keep them at their posts. He was
stern to savagery in his enforcement of military law.
The wearied sentinel who slept at his post found no
mercy in the heart of Stanton, and many times did Lin
coln's humanity overrule his fiery minister. Any neglect
of military duty was sure of the swiftest punishment, and
seldom did he make even just allowance for inevitable
military disaster. He had profound, imfaltering faith in
the Union cause, and, above all, he had unfaltering faith
in himself. He believed that he was in all things except
in name Commander-in-Chief of the armies and the navy
of the nation, and it was with unconcealed reluctance
that he at times deferred to the authority of the Presi
dent. He was a great organizer in theory, and harsh to
the utmost in enforcing his theories upon military com
manders. He at times conceived impossible things, and
peremptorily ordered them executed, and woe to the man
who was unfortunate enough to demonstrate that Stan-
ton was wrong. If he escaped without disgrace he was
more than fortunate, and many, very many, would have
thus fallen unjustly had it not been for Lincoln's cautious
and generous interposition to save those who were wan
tonly censured. He would not throw the blame upon
Stanton, but he would save the victim of Stanton's in
justice, and he always did it so kindly that even Stanton
could not complain beyond a churlish growl.
Stanton understood the magnitude of the rebellion,
and he understood also that an army to be effective must
be completely organized in all its departments. He had
no favorites to promote at the expense of the public ser
vice, and his constant and honest aim was to secure the
best men for every important position. As I have said,
1 76 LINCOLN AND MN OF WAR-TIMES.
he assumed, in his own mind, that he was Commander-
in-Chief, and there was nothing in military movements,
or in the quartermaster, commissary, hospital, secret ser
vice, or any other department relating to the war, that
he did not claim to comprehend and seek to control in
his absolute way. * I doubt whether his partiality ever
unjustly promoted a military officer, and I wish that I
* Mr. Stanton's theory was that everything concerned his own
department. It was he who was carrying on the war. It was he
who would be held responsible for the secret machinations of the
enemy in the rear as well as the unwarranted success of the en
emy in front. Hence he established a system of military censor
ship which has never, for vastness of scope or completeness of
detail, been equaled in any war before or since or in any other
country under the sun. The whole telegraphic system of the
United States, with its infinite ramifications, centered in his
office. There, adjoining his own personal rooms, sat Gen. Eck-
ert, Hymer D. Bates, Albert B. Chandler, and Charles A. Tinker,
all of them young men of brilliant promise and now shining
lights in the electrical world. Every hour in the day and night,
under all circumstances, in all seasons, there sat at their instru
ments sundry members of this little group. The passage be
tween their room and the Secretary's was unobstructed. It was
an interior communication they did not have even to go through
the corridor to reach him and every dispatch relating to the war
or party politics that passed over the Western Union wires, North
or South, they read. Cipher telegrams were considered especially
suspicious, so every one of those was reported. The young men
I have mentioned were masters of cipher- translation. Every
message to or from the President or any member of his house
hold passed under the eye of the Secretary. If one Cabinet Min
ister communicated with another over the wire by a secret code,
Mr. Stanton had the message deciphered and read to him. If
Gen. McClellan telegraphed to his wife from the front, Mr. Stan-
ton knew the contents of every dispatch. Hence, as far as the
conduct of the war was concerned, Mr. Stanton knew a thousand
secrets where Mr. Lincoln knew one; for the Secretary's instruc
tions were that telegrams indiscriminately should not be shown
to the President. Albert E. H. Johnson, Stanton's confidential
clerk, in Washington Post, July 14, 1891,
LINCOLN AND STANTON. 177
could say that his prejudices had never hindered the pro
motion or driven from the service faithful and competent
military commanders. His hatreds were intense, im
placable, and yielded to the single authority of Lincoln,
and that authority he knew would be exercised only in
extreme emergencies. The effect of such a War Minis
ter was to enforce devotion to duty throughout the entire
army, and it is impossible to measure the beneficent re
sults of Stanton's policy in our vast military campaigns.
Great as he was in the practical administration of his
office that could be visible to the world, he added im
measurably to his greatness as War Minister by the im
press of his wonderful personality upon the whole mili
tary and civil service.
Stanton's intense and irrepressible hatreds were his
greatest infirmity and did much to deform his brilliant
record as War Minister. A pointed illustration of his
bitter and unreasonable prejudices was given in the case
of Jere McKibben, whom he arbitrarily confined in Old
Capitol Prison without even the semblance of a pretext
to excuse the act. The Constitution of Pennsylvania
had been so amended during the summer of 1864 as to
authorize soldiers to vote in the field. The Legislature
was called in extra session to provide for holding elec
tions in the army. It was in the heat of the Presi
dential contest and party bitterness was intensified to the
uttermost. Despite the earnest appeals of Governor
Curtin and all my personal importunities with promi
nent legislators of our own party, an election law was
passed that was obviously intended to give the minority
no rights whatever in holding army elections. The
Governor was empowered to appoint State Commis
sioners, who were authorized to attend the elections
without any direct authority in conducting them. As
the law was violent in its character and liable to the
12
1 78 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
grossest abuses, without any means to restrain election
frauds, the Democrats of the State and country justly
complained of it with great earnestness. The Governor
decided, as a matter of justice to the Democrats, to ap
point several Democratic Commissioners, but it was with
difficulty that any could be prevailed upon to accept.
He requested me to see several prominent Democrats
and obtain their consent to receive his commission and
act under it. As McKibben had three brothers in the
Army of the Potomac, I supposed it would be pleasant
for him to make a visit there in an official way, and I
suggested it to him. He promptly answered: "Why,
Stanton would put me in Old Capitol Prison before I
was there a day. He hates our family for no other
reason that I know of than that my father was one of
his best friends in Pittsburg when he needed a friend. ' '
I assured him that Stanton would not attempt any vio
lence against a man who held the commission of the
Governor of our State, and he finally consented to go,
having first solemnly pledged me to protect him in case
he got into any difficulty.
McKibben and the other Commissioners from Phila
delphia were furnished the election papers and started
down to the army, then quietly resting on the James
River. On the second day after he left I received a tele
gram from him dated Washington, saying: " Stanton has
me in Old Capitol Prison ; come at once. ' ' I hastened to
Washington, having telegraphed to Lincoln to allow me
to see him between eleven and twelve o'clock that night,
when I should arrive. I went direct to the White House
and told the President the exact truth. I explained the
character of the law of our State; that I had personally
prevailed upon McKibben to go as a Commissioner to
give a semblance of decency to its execution; that he
was not only guiltless of any offense, as he knew how
LINCOLN AND STANTON. 179
delicately he was situated, but that he was powerless to
do any wrong, and I insisted upon McKibben's imme
diate discharge from prison. Lincoln knew of Stanton's
hatred for the McKibbens, as he had been compelled to
protect four of McKibben's brothers to give them the
promotion they had earned by most heroic conduct in
battle, and he was much distressed at Stanton's act.
He sent immediately to the War Department to get the
charge against McKibben, and it did not require five
minutes of examination to satisfy him that it was utterly
groundless and a malicious wrong committed by Stanton.
He said it was a ' ' stupid blunder, ' ' and at once proposed
to discharge McKibben on his parole. I urged that he
should be discharged unconditionally, but Lincoln's cau
tion prevented that. He said : " It seems hardly fair to
discharge McKibben unconditionally without permitting
Stanton to give his explanation;" and he added, "You
know, McClure, McKibben is safe, parole or no parole,
so go and get him out of prison. ' ' I saw that it would
be useless to attempt to change Lincoln's purpose, but I
asked him to fix an hour the next morning when I could
meet Stanton in his presence to have McKibben dis
charged from his parole. He fixed ten o'clock the next
morning for the meeting, and then wrote, in his own
hand, the order for McKibben's discharge, which I
hurriedly bore to Old Capitol Prison and had him
released.
Promptly at ten o'clock the next morning I went to
the White House to obtain McKibben's discharge from
his parole. Lincoln was alone, but Stanton came in a
few minutes later. He was pale with anger and his first
expression was: "Well, McClure, what damned rebel are
you here to get out of trouble this morning ?' ' I had
frequently been to Washington before when arbitrary
and entirely unjustifiable arrests of civilians had been
I So LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR- TIMES.
made in Pennsylvania, to have the prisoners discharged
from military custody; and as I had never applied in
such a case without good reason, and never without suc
cess even when opposed by Stanton, he evidently meant
to square up some old accounts with me over McKibben.
I said to him and with some feeling: "Your arrest of
McKibben was a cowardly act; you knew McKibben
was guiltless of any offense, and you did it to gratify a
brutal hatred." I told him also that I had prevailed
upon McKibben, against his judgment, to act as a State
Commissioner to give a semblance of decency to what
would evidently be a farcical and fraudulent election in
the army, and that if he had examined the complaint
soberly for one minute, he would have seen that it was
utterly false. I told him that I had requested his ap
pearance there with the President to have McKibben
discharged from his parole, and that I now asked him to
assent to it. He turned from me, walked hurriedly back
and forth across the room several times before he an
swered, and then he came up to me and in a voice trem
ulous with passion said: "I decline to discharge McKib
ben from his parole. You can make formal application
for it if you choose, and I will consider and decide it."
His manner was as offensive as it was possible even for
Stanton to make it, and I resented it by saying: "I
don't know what McKibben will do, but if I were Jere
McKibben, as sure as there is a God I would crop your
ears before. I left Washington. ' * He made no reply, but
suddenly whirled around on his heel and walked out of
the President's room. Lincoln had said nothing. He
was used to such ebullitions from Stanton, and after the
Secretary had gone he remarked in a jocular way,
"Well, McClure, you didn't get on very far with Stan-
ton, did you? but he'll come all right; let the matter
rest," Before leaving the President's room I wrote out
LINCOLN AND STAN TON. I8l
a formal application to Stanton for the discharge of
McKibben from his parole. Several days after I re
ceived a huge official envelope enclosing a letter, all in
Stanton' s bold scrawl, saying that the request for the
discharge of Jere McKibben from his parole had been
duly considered, and ' ' the application could not be
granted consistently with the interests of the public
service. ' ' McKibben outlived Stanton, but died a pris
oner on parole.
After such a turbulent interview with Stanton it would
naturally be supposed that our intercourse thereafter would
be severely strained, if not wholly interrupted ; but I had
occasion to call at the War Department within a few
weeks, and never was greeted more cordially in my life
than I was by Stanton. The election was over, the mili
tary power of the Confederacy was obviously broken, and
the Secretary was in the very best of spirits. He promptly
granted what I wanted done, which was not a matter of
much importance, and it was so cheerfully and gener
ously assented to that I carefully thought of everything
that I wanted from his department, all of which was
done in a most gracious manner. I puzzled my brain to
make sure I should not forget anything, and it finally
occurred to me that a friend I much desired to serve had
lately appealed to me to aid in obtaining promotion for a
young officer in the quartermaster's department whom I
did not know personally. It seemed that this was the
chance for the young officer. I suggested to Stanton
that Quartermaster was reputed to be a very
faithful and efficient officer, and entitled to higher pro
motion than he had received. Stanton picked up his
pen, saying: "It will give me great pleasure, sir; what
is his name?" I had to answer that I could not recall
his name in full, but he took down the officer's rank and
last name and assured me that he would be promptly pro-
1 82 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES,
moted. I supposed that a change of mood would make
him forgetful of this promise; but the young quarter
master wore new shoulder-straps within ten days, and
won distinction as the chief of his department in large
independent army movements in Virginia. I never had
the pleasure of meeting the worthy officer who thus un
expectedly secured his promotion, and he is doubtless
ignorant to this day of the peculiar way in which it was
accomplished.
Stanton's hatred for McClellan became a consuming
passion before the close of the Peninsular campaign.
When McClellan was before Yorktown and complaining
of his inadequate forces to march upon Richmond, Stan-
ton summed him up in the following expression: " If he
(McClellan) had a million men, he would swear the en
emy had two millions, and then he would sit down in
the mud and yell for three." He was impatient and
often fearfully petulant in his impatience. He was dis
appointed in McClellan not marching directly upon
Richmond by Manassas, and he was greatly disappointed
again when McClellan laid siege to Yorktown, but he
was ever ready to congratulate, in his blunt way, when
anything was accomplished. When General ' ' Baldy ' '
Smith made a reconnoissance at Yorktown that produced
the first successful results of that campaign, Stanton an
swered McClellan' s announcement of the movement:
4 ' Good for the first lick ; hurrah for Smith and the one-
gun battery!" but from that time until the withdrawal
of the army from the Peninsula, Stanton never found
occasion to commend McClellan, and McClellan was a
constant bone of contention between Stanton and Lin
coln. Lincoln's patience and forbearance were marked
in contrast with Stanton's violence of temper and inten
sity of hatred. McClellan so far forgot himself as to
telegraph to Stanton after the retreat to the James River:
LINCOLN AND STAN TON. 183
" If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe
no thanks to you or to any other person in Washington.
You have done your best to sacrifice this army. ' ' Any
other President than Lincoln would have immediately
relieved McClellan of his command, and Stanton not
only would have relieved him, but would have dismissed
him from the service. Lincoln exhibited no resentment
whatever for the ill-advised and insubordinate telegram
from McClellan. On the contrary, he seemed inclined
to continue McClellan in command, and certainly ex
hibited every desire to sustain him to the utmost. In
a letter addressed to the Secretary of State on the same
day that McClellan' s telegram was received he expressed
his purpose to call for additional troops, and said: "I
expect to maintain this contest until successful, or till
I die, or I am conquered, or my term expires, or Con
gress or the country forsakes me."
This was one of the most perplexing situations in
which Lincoln was ever placed. The defeat of the army
would not, in itself, have been so serious had Lincoln
been able to turn to commanders in whom he could im
plicitly confide. He had abundant resources and could
supply all needed additional troops, but where could he
turn for safe advice? He had, to a very large extent,
lost faith in McClellan. When he counseled with Stan-
ton he encountered insuperable hatreds, and he finally,
as was his custom, decided upon his own course of action
and hurried off to West Point to confer with General
Scott. His visit to West Point startled the country and
quite as much startled the Cabinet, as not a single mem
ber of it had any intimation of his intended journey.
What passed at the interview between Lincoln and Scott
was never known to any, so far as I have been able to
learn, and I believe that no one has pretended to have
had knowledge of it. It is enough to know that Pope
184 LINCOLN AND MEN OA WAR-TlMLS.
was summoned to the command of a new army, called
the Army of Virginia, embracing the commands of Fre
mont, Banks, and McDowell, and that Halleck was made
General-in-Chief. The aggressive campaign of Lee, re
sulting in the second battle of Bull Run and the utter
defeat of Pope, brought the army back into the Washing
ton intrenchments in a most demoralized condition. It
was here that Lincoln and Stanton came into conflict
again on the question of the restoration of McClellan to
command. Without consulting either the General-in-
Chief or his War Minister, Lincoln assigned McClellan
to the command of the defenses of Washington, and as
the various commands of Pope's broken and demoralized
army came back into the intrenchments in utter confu
sion they thereby came again under the command of
McClellan.
When it was discovered that McClellan was thus prac
tically in command of the Army of the Potomac again,
Stanton was aroused to the fiercest hostility. He went
so far as to prepare a remonstrance to the President in
writing against McClellan' s continuance in the com
mand of that army or of any army of the Union. This
remonstrance was not only signed by Stanton, but by
Chase, Bates, and Smith, with the concurrence of Welles,
who thought it indelicate for him to sign it. After the
paper had been prepared under Stanton' s impetuous lead,
some of the more considerate members of the Cabinet
who had joined him took pause to reflect that Lincoln
was in the habit not only of having his own way, but of
having his own way of having his own way, and the
protest was never presented. Lincoln knew McClellan' s
great organizing powers, and he knew the army needed
first of all a commander who was capable of restoring it
to discipline. To use his own expressive language about
the emergency, he believed that ' ' there is no one in
LINCOLN AND STANTON. 185
the army who can command the fortifications and lick
those troops of ours into shape one-half as well as he
could." It was this conviction that made Lincoln
forget all of McClellan's failings and restore him to
command, and Stan ton was compelled to submit in
sullen silence.
Lincoln's restoration of McClellan to command in dis
regard of the most violent opposition of Stanton was only
one of the many instances in which he and his War Min
ister came into direct and positive conflict, and always
with the same result; but many times as Stanton was
vanquished in his conflicts with Lincoln, it was not in
his nature to be any the less Edwin M. Stanton. As late
as 1864 he had one of his most serious disputes with Lin
coln, in which he peremptorily refused to obey an order
from the President directing that certain prisoners of
war, who expressed a desire to take the oath of alle
giance and enter the Union army, should be mustered
into the service and credited to the quotas of certain
districts. An exact account of this dispute is preserved
by Provost- Marshal General Fry, who was charged with
the execution of the order, and who was present when
Lincoln and Stanton discussed it. Stanton positively
refused to obey the order, and said to Lincoln: u You
must see that your order cannot be executed. ' ' Lincoln
answered with an unusually peremptory tone for him:
u Mr. Secretary, I reckon you'll have to execute the
order." Stanton replied in his imperious way: u Mr.
President, I cannot do it; the order is an improper one,
and I cannot execute it. ' ' To this Lincoln replied in a
manner that forbade all further dispute: u Mr. Secretary,
it will have to be done. ' ' A few minutes thereafter, as
stated by Provost-Marshal General Fry in a communica
tion to the New York Tribune several years ago, Stanton
1 86 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
issued instructions to him for the execution of the Presi
dent's order.
Notwithstanding the many and often irritating con
flicts that LincTn had with Stanton, there never was an
hour during Stan ton's term as War Minister that Lincoln
thought of removing t iim. Indeed, I believe that at no
period during the war, after Stanton had entered the
Cabinet, did Lincoln feel that any other man could fill
Stanton' s place with equal usefulness to the country.
He had the most unbounded faith in Stanton' s loyalty
and in his public and private integrity. He was in
hearty sympathy with Stanton' s aggressive earnestness
for the prosecution of the war, and at times hesitated,
even to the extent of what he feared was individual in
justice, to restrain Stanton' s violent assaults upon others.
It will be regretted by the impartial historian of the
future that Stanton was capable of impressing his in
tense hatred so conspicuously upon the annals of the
country, and that Lincoln, in several memorable in
stances, failed to reverse his War Minister when he had
grave doubts as to the wisdom or justice of his methods.
It was Stanton' s fierce resentment that made just verdicts
impossible in some military trials which will ever be his
toric notably, the unjust verdict depriving Fitz John
Porter at once of his commission and citizenship, and
the now admittedly unjust verdict that sent Mrs. Surratt
to the gallows. Lincoln long hesitated before giving his
assent to the judgment against Porter, as is clearly shown
by the fact that, with Pope's accusations against Porter
fresh before him, he assented to McClellan's request and
assigned Porter to active command in the Antietam cam
paign, and personally thanked Porter on the Antietam
field, after the battle, for his services. Another enduring
monument of Stanton' s resentment is the Arlington Na
tional Cemetery. The home of Lee was taken under the
LINCOLN AND STANTON. 187
feeblest color of law that Stanton well knew could not be
maintained, and the buildings surrounded with graves
even to the very door of the venerable mansion, so that
it might never be reclaimed as the home of the Confed
erate chieftain. The government made lestitution to the
Lees in obedience to the decision of its highest court,
but the monument of hate is imperishable.
Soon after the surrender of Lee, Stanton, severely
broken in health by the exacting duties he had per
formed, tendered his resignation, believing that his great
work was finished. Lincoln earnestly desired him to re
main, and he did so. The assassination of Lincoln called
him to even graver duties than had before confronted
him. His bitter conflict with Johnson and his violent
issue with Sherman stand out as exceptionally interest
ing chapters of the history of the war. It was President
Johnson's attempted removal of Stanton in violation of
the Tenure-of-OfHce Act that led to the President's im
peachment, and Stanton persisted in holding his Cabinet
office until Johnson was acquitted by the Senate, when he
resigned and was succeeded by General Schofield on the 2d
of June, 1868. After his retirement Stanton never exhib
ited any great degree of either physical or mental vigor.
I last saw him in Philadelphia in the fall of 1868, where
he came in answer to a special invitation from the Union
League to deliver a political address in the Academy of
Music in favor of Grant's election to the Presidency. I
called on him at his hotel and found him very feeble,
suffering greatly from asthmatic* disorders, and in his
public address he was often strangely forgetful of facts
and names, and had to be prompted by gentlemen on
the stage. It may be said of Stanton that he sacrificed
the vigor of his life to the service of his country in the
sorest trial of its history, and when President Grant
nominated him as Justice of the Supreme Court, on the
1 88 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TJMES.
aoth of December, 1869, all knew that it was an empty
honor, as he was both physically and mentally unequal
to the new duties assigned to him. Four days thereafter
the inexorable messenger came and Edwin M. Stantou
joined the great majority across the dark river.
LINCOLN AND GRANT.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN and Ulysses S. Grant were
^~V entire strangers to each other personally until the
9th of March, 1864, when Lincoln handed Grant his
commission as Lieutenant-General, which made him
three days later Commander-in-Chief of. all the armies
of the Union. Although Grant entered the army as a
citizen of Lincoln's own State, he had resided there only
a little more than a year. When he retired from the
army by resignation on the 3ist of July, 1854, as a cap
tain, he selected Missouri as his home and settled on a
farm near St. Louis. He had won promotion at the
battles of Molino del Rey and Chapultepec in the Mex
ican War, and was brevetted for special gallantry. Dur
ing the nearly seven years between his retirement from
the army and re-entering the military service at the be
ginning of the civil war he had done little or nothing
to make himself known to fame. He had moved from
Missouri to Galena early in 1860 to improve his worldly
condition by accepting a salary of $600 from his two
brothers, who were then engaged in the leather business.
After remaining with them for a year his salary was ad
vanced to #800, and in a letter to a friend he exhibited
his gratification at his business success and expressed the
hope of reaching what then seemed to be his highest
ambition a partnership in the firm. His life in Galena
was quiet and unobtrusive as was Grant's habit under
189
(Photo by Gutekunst, Philadelphia.)
GENERAI, U. S. GRANT, 1864.
LINCOLN AND GRANT. 19*
all circumstances; and when the first call for troops was
issued and Grant brought a company from Galena to
Springfield without any friends to press his promotion,
it is not surprising that, while political colonels were
turned out with great rapidity, Grant remained without
'a command. He served on the staff of Governor Yates
for several weeks, giving him the benefit of his military
experience in organizing new troops, but it does not
seem to have occurred to Grant to suggest his own ap
pointment to a command or to Governor Yates to tender
him one. He returned to Galena, and on the 24th of
May, 1 86 1, sent a formal request to the Adjutant-General
of the army at Washington for an assignment to military
duty " until the close of the war in such capacity as may
be offered. ' ' To this no reply was ever received, and a
month later he made a personal visit to the headquarters
of General McClellan, then in command of the Ohio
volunteers at Cincinnati, hoping that McClellan would
tender him a position on his staff; but he failed to meet
McClellan, and returned home without suggesting to
any one a desire to enter the service under the Cin
cinnati commander.
It was a wayward and insubordinate regiment at
Springfield that called Grant back to the military ser
vice and started him on his matchless career. The
Twenty-first Illinois defied the efforts of Governor Yates
to reduce it to discipline, and in despair he telegraphed
to the modest Captain Grant at Galena, asking him to
come and accept the colonelcy. The prompt answer
came: U I accept the regiment and will start imme
diately." It is needless to say that the appearance of a
plain, ununiformed, and modest man like Grant made
little impression at first upon his insubordinate com
mand, but in a very short time he made it the best dis
ciplined regiment from the State, and the men as proud
I9 2 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
of their commander as he was of them. The story of
Grant's military achievements from Belmont to Shiloh
is familiar to every reader of American history. It was
Grant's capture of Fort Henry, soon followed by the
capture of Fort Donelson and Nashville, that opened
the second year of the war with such brilliant promise
of an early overthrow of the Confederate armies. It was
his sententious answer to General Buckner at Fort Don
elson that proclaimed to the nation his heroic qualities
as a military commander. He said: "No terms except
unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted;
I propose to move immediately upon your works. ' ' He
soon became popularly known as ' ' Unconditional Sur
render Grant, ' ' and while his superior officers, including
General-in-Chief McClellan and his immediate division
commander Halleck, seemed to agree only in hindering
Grant in his military movements, the country profoundly
appreciated his victories. Soon after the capture of
Nashville he was ordered by Halleck to make a new
military movement that was rendered impossible by im
mense floods which prevailed in the Western waters.
Halleck reported him to McClellan, complaining that he
had left his post without leave and had failed to make
reports, etc., to which McClellan replied: u Do not hesi
tate to arrest him at once if the good of the service re
quires it, and place C. F. Smith in command." Halleck
immediately relieved Grant and placed Smith in com
mand of the proposed expedition. Grant gave a tem
perate explanation of the injustice done to him, but as
the wrong was continued he asked to be relieved from
duty. In the mean time Halleck had discovered his
error, and atoned for it by answering to Grant: " Instead
of relieving you, I wish you, as soon as your new army
is in the field, to assume the immediate command and
lead it on to new victories."
LINCOLN AND GRANT. 193
It was not "until after the battle of Shiloh, fought on
the 6th and yth of April, 1862, that Lincoln was placed
in a position to exercise a controlling influence in shap
ing the destiny of Grant. The first day's battle at Shiloh
was a serious disaster to the Union army commanded by
Grant, who was driven from his position, which seems to
have been selected without any special reference to re
sisting an attack from the enemy, and, although his
army fought most gallantly in various separate encoun
ters, the day closed with the field in possession of the
enemy and Grant's. army driven back to the river. For
tunately, the advance of Buell's army formed a junction
with Grant late in the evening, and that night all of
Buell's army arrived, consisting of three divisions. The
two generals arranged their plans for an offensive move
ment early the next morning, and, after another stub
born battle, the lost field was regained and the enemy
compelled to retreat with the loss of their commander,
General Albert Sidney Johnston, who had fallen early in
the first day's action, and with a larger aggregate loss of
killed, wounded, and missing than Grant suffered. The
first reports from the Shiloh battle-field created profound
alarm throughout the entire country, and the wildest
exaggerations were spread in a floodtide of vituperation
against Grant. It was freely charged that he had ne
glected his command because of dissipation, that his
army had been surprised and defeated, and that it was
saved from annihilation only by the timely arrival of
Buell.
The few of to-day who can recall the inflamed condi
tion of public sentiment against Grant caused by the dis
astrous first day's battle at Shiloh will remember that he
was denounced as incompetent for his command by the
public journals of all parties in the North, and with
almost entire unanimity by Senators and Congressmen
13
*94 LINCOLN AND MZX OF WAR- TIMES.
without regard to political faith. Not only in Washing
ton, but throughout the loyal States, public sentiment
seemed to crystallize into an earnest demand for Grant's
dismissal from the army. His victories of Forts Henry
and Donelson, which had thrilled the country a short
time before, seemed to have been forgotten, and on every
side could be heard the emphatic denunciation of Grant
because of his alleged reckless exposure of the army,
while Buell was universally credited with having saved
it. It is needless to say that owing to the excited condi
tion of the public mind most extravagant reports gained
ready credence, and it was not uncommon to hear Grant
denounced on the streets and in all circles as unfitted by
both habit and temperament for an important military
command. The clamor for Grant's removal, and often
for his summary dismissal, from the army surged against
the President from every side, and he was harshly criti
cized for not promptly dismissing Grant, or at least re
lieving him from his command. I can recall but a single
Republican member of Congress who boldly defended
Grant at that time. Elihu B. Washburne, whose home
was in Galena, where Grant had lived before he went
into the army, stood nearly or quite alone among the
members of the House in wholly justifying Grant at
Shiloh, while a large majority of the Republicans of
Congress were outspoken and earnest in condemning
him.
I did not know Grant at that time; had neither par
tiality nor prejudice to influence my judgment, nor had I
any favorite general who might be benefited by Grant's
overthrow, but I shared the almost universal conviction
of the President's friends that he could not sustain him
self if he attempted to sustain Grant by continuing him
in command. Looking solely to the interests of Lincoln,
feeling that the tide of popular resentment was so over-
LINCOLN AND GRANT. 1 95
whelming against Grant that Lincoln must yield to it, I
had repeated conferences with some of his closest friends,
including Swett and Lamon, all of whom agreed that
Grant must be removed from his command, and com
plained of Lincoln for his manifest injustice to himself
by his failure to act promptly in Grant's removal. So
much was I impressed with the importance of prompt
action on the part of the President after spending a day
and evening in Washington that I called on Lincoln at
eleven o'clock at night and sat with him alone until after
one o'clock in the morning. He was, as usual, worn out
with the day's exacting duties, but he did not permit me
to depart until the Grant matter had been gone over and
many other things relating to the war that he wished to
discuss. I pressed upon him with all the earnestness I
could command the immediate removal of Grant as an
imperious necessity to sustain himself. As was his cus
tom, he said but little, only enough to make me continue
the discussion until it was exhausted. He sat before the
open fire in the old Cabinet room, most of the time with
his feet up on the high marble mantel, and exhibited un
usual distress at the complicated condition of military
affairs. Nearly every day brought some new and per
plexing military complication. He had gone through a
long winter of terrible strain with McClellan and the
Army of the Potomac; and from the day that Grant
started on his Southern expedition until the battle of
Shiloh he had had little else than jarring and confusion
among his generals in the West. He knew that I had
no ends to serve in urging Grant's removal, beyond the
single desire to make him be just to himself, and he lis
tened patiently.
I appealed to Lincoln for his own sake to remove
Grant at once, and in giving my reasons for it I simply
voiced the admittedly overwhelming protest from the
J 9 6 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
loyal people of the land against Grant's continuance in
command. I could form no judgment during the con
versation as to what effect my arguments had upon him
beyond the fact that he was greatly distressed at this new
complication. When I had .said everything that could
be said from my standpoint, we lapsed into silence.
Lincoln remained silent for what seemed a very long
time. He then gathered himself up in his chair and
said in a tone of earnestness that I shall never forget:
U 7 cart t spare this man; he fights " That was all he
said, but I knew that it was enough, and that Grant was
safe in Lincoln's hands against his countless hosts of
enemies. The only man in all the nation who had the
power to save Grant was Lincoln, and he had decided to
do it. He was not influenced by any personal partiality
for Grant, for they had never met, but he believed just
what he said "I can't spare this man; he fights." I
knew enough of Lincoln to know that his decision was
final, and I knew enough of him also to know that he
reasoned better on the subject than I did, and that it
would be unwise to attempt to unsettle his determina
tion. I did not forget that Lincoln was the one man
who never allowed himself to appear as wantonly defy
ing public sentiment. It seemed to me impossible for
him to save Grant without taking a crushing load of con
demnation upon himself; but Lincoln was wiser than all
those around him, and he not only saved Grant, but he
saved him by such well-concerted effort that he soon won
popular applause from those who were most violent in
demanding Grant's dismissal.
The method that Lincoln adopted to rescue Grant from
the odium into which he had, to a very large degree, un
justly fallen was one of the bravest and most sagacious
acts of his administration. Halleck was commander of
the military division consisting of Missouri, Kentucky,
LINCOLN AND GRANT. J 97
Tennessee, and possibly other States, but he remained at
his headquarters in St. Louis until after the battle of
Shiloh. Lincoln's first move was to bring Halleck to
the field, where he at once superseded Grant as com
mander of the army. This relieved public apprehen
sion and soon calmed the inflamed public sentiment that
was clamoring for Grant's dismissal. Lincoln knew that
it would require time for the violent prejudice against
Grant to perish, and he calmly waited until it was safe
for him to give some indication to the country of his
abiding faith in Grant as a military commander. Hal
leck reached the army at Pittsburg Landing on the nth
of April, four days after the battle had been fought, and
of course his presence on the field at once made him the
commanding officer. On the 3<Dth of April, when the
public mind was reasonably well prepared to do justice
to Grant, an order was issued assigning him ' ' as second
in command under the major-general commanding the
department. ' '
This was an entirely needless order so far as mere
military movements were involved, and it is one of the
very rare cases in the history of the war in which such
an order was issued. Orly under very special circum
stances could there be any occasion for an order assign
ing a particular general as second in command of an
army. While the army is within reach of orders from
the commanding general there can be no second in com
mand. In case of his death or inability to take active
command in battle, the military laws wisely regulate the
succession, and only in extraordinary cases is it departed
from. In this case the purpose of it was obvious. Lin
coln had quieted public apprehension by bringing Gen
eral Halleck to the field and thus relieving Grant of
command without the semblance of reproach; but he
desired to impress the country with his absolute faith
I9 8 LINCOLN AND 'MEN OF WAR- TIMES.
in Grant as a military leader, and it was for that reason
that the special order was issued assigning him as second
in command of Halleck's army. The effect of that order
was precisely what Lincoln anticipated. It made all
loyal men take pause and abate or yield their violent
hostility to Grant in obedience to the publicly expressed
confidence of Lincoln. The country knew that Lincoln
best understood Grant, and from the date of Grant's as
signment as second in command of the army the preju
dice against him rapidly perished. It was thus that
Lincoln saved Grant from one of the most violent surges
of popular prejudice that was ever created against any
of our leading generals, and on the nth of July, when
it was entirely safe to restore Grant to his command for
active operations, Halleck was ordered to Washington
by Lincoln and assigned as commander-in-chief. Thus
was Grant restored to the command of the army that he
had lost at the battle of Shiloh, and it was Lincoln, and
Lincoln alone, who saved him from disgrace and gave to
the country the most lustrous record of all the heroes of
the war.
I doubt whether Grant ever understood how Lincoln,
single and alone, protected him from dishonor in the
tempest of popular passion that came upon him after
the disaster at Shiloh. Grant never was in Washington
until he was summoned there early in 1864 to be com
missioned as Lieutenant-General, and he was entirely
without personal acquaintance with Lincoln. After he
became Commander-in-Chief he made his headquarters
in the field with the Army of the Potomac, and was very
rarely in Washington after he crossed the Rapidaii and
opened the campaign by the battles of the Wilderness.
That he frequently saw Lincoln between February and
May while perfecting his plans for army movements is
well known, but Grant was one of the most silent of
LINCOLN AND GRANT. 1 99
men and most of all reluctant to talk about himself,
while Lincoln was equally reserved in all things per
taining to himself personally. Especially where he had
rendered any service to another he would be quite un
likely to speak of it himself. Judging the two men from
their chief and very marked characteristics, it is entirely
reasonable to assume that what Lincoln did to save
Grant from disgrace was never discussed or referred to
by them in personal conversation. Grant never, in any
way known to the public, recognized any such obligation
to Lincoln, and no utterance ever came from him indi
cating anything more than the respect for Lincoln due
from a general to his chief.
I never heard Lincoln allude to the subject but once,
and that was under very painful circumstances and when
the subject was forced upon him by myself. Lincoln
knew that I had personal knowledge of his heroic effort
to rescue Grant from the odium that came upon him
after Shiloh, and an accidental occasion arose in the
latter part of October, 1864, when his relations to Grant
became a proper subject of consideration. The October
elections in 1864, when Lincoln was a candidate for re
election, resulted favorably for the Republicans in Ohio
and Indiana, but unfavorably for them in Pennsylvania.
There was no State ticket to be elected in Pennsylvania
that year, and the vote for Congress and local officers
gave a small Democratic majority on the home vote in
the State. McClellan, a native of Pennsylvania, was
the Democratic candidate for President, and State pride
naturally added to his strength. General Cameron was
chairman of the Republican State Committee. He was
well equipped for the position, but was so entirely con
fident of success that he neglected to perfect the organ
ization necessary to gain the victory, and the prestige of
sucqess fell to McClellan. New York was regarded as
200 LINCOLN AND' MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
extremely doubtful, and there was much concern felt
about the possibility of New York and Pennsylvania
both voting against Lincoln in November. It was not
doubted that the army vote would give Pennsylvania to
Lincoln, but it was of the utmost importance, to give
moral force and effect to the triumph, to give Lincoln a
majority on the home vote. Lincoln was much con
cerned about the situation, and telegraphed me to come
to Washington the day after the October election. I
went on at once, and after going over the political situ
ation carefully, Lincoln asked me whether I would be
willing to give my personal services to aid the State
Committee during the month intervening between the
October and November elections. I reminded him that
General Cameron and I were not in political sympathy,
and that he would regard it as obtrusive for me to volun
teer assistance to him in the management of the cam
paign. To this Lincoln replied: "Of course, I under
stand that, but if Cameron shall invite you can you give
your time fully to the contest?" I answered that I
would gladly do so. He did not suggest how he meant
to bring about co-operation between Cameron and my
self, but I knew him well enough to know that he would
be very likely to accomplish the desired result. Two
days thereafter I received a cordial letter from General
Cameron inviting me to join him at the headquarters
and assist in the November contest.
I at once went to Philadelphia, and found Wayne
MacVeagh already with General Cameron in obedience
to a like invitation that had been brought about by Lin
coln. MacVeagh had been chairman of the State Com
mittee the previous year, when Curtin was re-elected, as
I had been chairman in 1860 when Lincoln was first
elected, and both of us were at the time regarded as
somewhat conspicuous among the opponents of Came-
LINCOLN AND GRANT. 2OI
ron. The failure in Pennsylvania, contrasted with the
party successes in Ohio and Indiana, was very mortify
ing to Cameron, and he was ready to employ every avail
able resource to redeem the State in November. There
was the heartiest co-operation by MacVeagh and myself,
all being done under the name and immediate direction
of Cameron as chairman, and there was not a jar during
the month of desperate effort to win the State for Lin
coln. I took a private room at another hotel, and never
was at headquarters except for confidential conference
with Cameron himself; and, as requested by Lincoln, I
wrote him fully every night my impressions of the prog
ress we were making. The Democrats were highly
elated by their rather unexpected success in October,
and they made the most desperate and well-directed
battle to gain the State for McClellan. So anxious was
Lincoln about the campaign that after I had been a
week in co-operation with the State Committee, he sent
Postmaster-General Dennison over to Philadelphia spe
cially to talk over the situation more fully than it could
be presented in my letters, and to return the same night
and make report to him. It was evident that we had
gained nothing, and I so informed the Postmaster-Gen
eral, and expressed great doubts as to our ability to do
more than hold our own, considering the advantage the
Democrats had in the prestige of their October victory.
I told him, however, that in another week the question
could be determined whether we were safe on the home
vote in Pennsylvania, and that if there was reasonable
doubt about it I would notify Lincoln and visit Wash
ington.
A week later, as I had advised Lincoln from day to
day, I saw nothing to warrant the belief that we had
gained any material advantage in the desperate battle,
and I telegraphed Lincoln that I would see him at ten
2o2 LINCOLN AND MEN OF
o'clock that night. I found him waiting, and he exhib
ited great solicitude as to the battle in Pennsylvania.
He knew that his election was in no sense doubtful, but
he knew that if he lost New York and with it Pennsyl
vania on the home vote, the moral effect of his triumph
would be broken and his power to prosecute the war and
make peace would be greatly impaired. His usually sad
face was deeply shadowed with sorrow when I told him
that I saw no reasonable prospect of carrying Pennsylva
nia on the home vote, although we had about held our
own in the hand-to-hand conflict through which we were
passing. "Well, what is to be done?" was Lincoln's
inquiry after the whole situation had been presented to
him. I answered that the solution of the problem was a
very simple and easy one that Grant was idle in front
of Petersburg; that Sheridan had won all possible vic
tories in the Valley; and that if 5000 Pennsylvania sol
diers could be furloughed home from each army the elec
tion could be carried without doubt. Lincoln's face
brightened instantly at the suggestion, and I saw that
he was quite ready to execute it. I said to him : "Of
course, you can trust Grant to make the suggestion to
him to furlough 5000 Pennsylvania troops for two
weeks?" To my surprise, Lincoln made no answer,
and the bright face of a few moments before was in
stantly shadowed again. I was much disconcerted, as I
supposed that Grant was the one man to whom Lincoln
could turn with absolute confidence as his friend. I then
said with some earnestness: "Surely, Mr. President, you
can trust Grant with a confidential suggestion to furlough
Pennsylvania troops?" Lincoln remained silent and evi
dently distressed at the proposition I was pressing upon
him. After a few moments, and speaking with empha
sis, I said: "It can't be possible that Grant is not your
friend; he can't be such an ingrate?" Lincoln hesitated
LINCOLN AND GRANT. 203
for some time, and then answered in these words: " Well,
McClure, I have no reason to believe that Grant prefers
my election to that of McClellan."
I must confess that my response to this to me appalling
statement from Lincoln was somewhat violative of the
rules of courteous conversation. I reminded Lincoln
how, in that room, when I had appealed to him to re
spect the almost universal demand of the country for
Grant's dismissal, he had withstood the shock alone and
interposed his omnipotence to save Grant when he was
a personal stranger. Lincoln, as usual, answered intem
perance of speech by silence. I then said to him: " Gen
eral Meade is a soldier and a gentleman; he is the com
mander of the Army of the Potomac; send an order to
him from yourself to furlough 5000 Pennsylvania soldiers
home for two weeks, and send that order with some
trusted friend from the War Department, with the sug
gestion to Meade that your agent be permitted to bring
the order back with him. ' ' After a little reflection Lin
coln answered: "I reckon that can be done." I then
said, ' ' What about Sheridan ?' * At once his sad face
brightened up, like the noonday sun suddenly emerging
from a dark cloud, as he answered: " Oh, Phil Sheridan;
he's all right." Before I left his room that night he had
made his arrangements to send messengers to Meade and
Sheridan. The order was sent to Meade, and he per
mitted it to be returned to the President, but Sheridan
needed no order. The 10,000 Pennsylvania soldiers were
furloughed during the week, and Lincoln carried Penn
sylvania on the home vote by 5712 majority, to which
the army vote added 14,363 majority. It was thus that
Lincoln made his triumph in Pennsylvania a complete
victory without what was then commonly called the
' ' bayonet vote, ' ' and Lincoln carried New York by
6749, leaving McClellan the worst defeated candidate
204 LINCOLN' AND MEN OF WAR- TIMES
ever nominated by any of the great political patties of
the country.
I left Lincoln fully convinced that Grant was an in-
grate, and Lincoln certainly knew that he permitted that
conviction to be formed in my mind. He did not in any
way qualify his remark about Grant, although it was his
custom when he felt compelled to disparage any one to
present some charitable explanation of the conduct com
plained of. The fact that he refused to send his request
to Grant, while he was willing to send it to Meade,
proved that he was, for some reason, disappointed in
Grant's fidelity to him; and the enthusiasm with which
he spoke of Sheridan proved how highly he valued the
particular quality that he did not credit to Grant. I con
fess that the conviction formed that day made the name
of Grant leave a bad taste in my mouth for many years.
I heartily supported his nomination for the Presidency in
1868, and was chairman of the Pennsylvania delegation
in the Chicago Convention that nominated him, because
I believed that the chivalrous victor of Appomattox
would command the highest measure of confidence from
the Southern people and hasten the restoration of peace
and business prosperity; but Grant and his immediate
friends knew that while I earnestly supported his nomi
nation and election, I did not have the confidence in him
that he generally commanded. I now believe that Lin
coln was mistaken in his distrust of Grant. It was not
until after Grant's retirement from the Presidency that I
ever had an opportunity to hear his explanation. I re
membered that on election night, when Grant was ad
vised at his headquarters in front of Petersburg of Lin
coln's election, he sent Lincoln a dispatch heartily con
gratulating him upon his triumph. I never heard Lin
coln allude to the subject again, and I am therefore
ignorant as to whether his belief was ever changed.
LINCOLN AND GRANT. 205
I never visited the White House during Grant's Presi
dency, although twice specially invited to do so to con
sider what I regarded as an impracticable or impossible
political suggestion, but I accidentally met him in the
Continental Hotel, soon after his retirement, in company
with Mr. Childs. Grant came forward in the most cor
dial manner and thanked me for an editorial that had
appeared in The Times on the day that ended his Presi
dential term, in which I had spoken of him and his
achievements as history would record them, regardless
of the political passions and prejudices of the day. The
meeting ended with an invitation to lunch with him that
afternoon at Mr. Drexel's office, which I accepted.
There were present only Mr. Drexel, Mr. Childs, and
one or two others connected with the Drexel house.
After luncheon all dispersed but Grant, Childs, and my
self, and we had a most delightful conversation with
Grant for an hour or more. I was anxious to learn, if
possible, what Grant's feelings were in the Presidential
battle of 1864. Without intimating to him that Lincoln
had doubted his fidelity, I reminded him that he had
maintained such a silent attitude that some of Lincoln's
closest friends were at a loss to know his preference in
the contest. He answered very promptly that he sup
posed none could have doubted his earnest desire for the
re-election of Lincoln, although he studiously avoided
any expression, public or private, on the subje- He
said: " It would have been obviously unbecoming on my
part to have given a public expression against a general
whom I had succeeded as Commander-in-Chief of the
army. " I do not doubt that Grant declared the exact
truth in that statement. Naturally silent and averse to
any expressions whatever on politics, he felt that he
could not with propriety even appear to assail a man
who had failed and fallen in the position that he had
206 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
won and maintained. Thus for twelve years I cherished
a personal prejudice against Grant because of his sup
posed want of fidelity to Lincoln that I now believe to
have been wholly unjust. One revelation to me at the
meeting with Grant at the Drexel luncheon was his re
markable and attractive powers as a conversationalist.
He discussed politics during his term and the politics of
the future, public men and public events, with great free
dom and in a manner so genial as to amaze me. I had
shared the common impression that Grant was always
reticent, even in the circle of his closest friends, but the
three hours spent with him on that day proved that when
he chose he could be one of the most entertaining of men
in the social circle.
It is evident that from the day that Grant became
Commander-in-Chief, Lincoln had abiding faith in him.
He yielded implicitly to Grant's judgment in all matters
purely military; Grant, like all great soldiers, yielded as
implicitly to Lincoln in all matters relating to civil ad
ministration, and the annals of history will testify that
Grant fulfilled every expectation of the government and
of the loyal people of the nation as military chieftain.
Many have criticised some of his military movements,
such as his assaults at Vicksburg and Cold Harbor and
his battles in the Wilderness, but he met the great need
of the country and was as heroic in peace as in war.
When President Johnson attempted to punish Lee for
treason, Grant not only admonished the President, but
notified him that u the officers and men paroled at Appo-
mattox Court-House, and since upon the same terms
given to Lee, cannot be tried for treason so long as they
preserve the terms of their parole;" and he went so far
as to declare that he would resign his commission if the
government violated the faith he had given when Lee
surrendered to him. He fought more battles and won
LINCOLN AND GRANT. 207
more victories than any general of any country during
his generation, and when on the 23d of July, 1885,
Ulysses S. Grant met the inexorable messenger, the
Great Captain of the Age passed from time to eternity.
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN.
NOT until all the lingering personal, political, and
military passions of the war shall have perished
can the impartial historian tell the true story of Abra
ham Lincoln's relations to George B. McClellan, nor
will the just estimate of McClellan as a military chief
tain be recorded until the future historian comes to his
task entirely free from the prejudices of the present.
Although more than a quarter of a century has elapsed
since the close of the war, and countless contributions
have been given to the history of that conflict from
every shade of conviction that survived it, McClellan' s
ability as a military commander, and the correctness of
Lincoln's action in calling him to command and in dis
missing him from command, are as earnestly disputed
to-day as they were in the white heat of the personal
and political conflicts of the time. Notwithstanding
the bitter partisan assaults which have been made upon
McClellan in the violence of party struggles, at times
impugning his skill, his courage, and his patriotism, it
is safe to say that fair-minded men of every political
faith now testify to the absolute purity of his patriotism,
to his exceptional skill as a military organizer, and to
his courage as a commander. I knew McClellan well,
and I believe that no reasonably just man could have
known him without yielding to him the highest measure
of personal respect. He was one of the most excellent
208
(Photo by Gutekunst, Philadelphia.)
GENERAL, GEORGE B. M'CI<EI<I,AN, 1862.
210 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
and lovable characters I have ever met, and that he was
patriotic in everything that he did, however he may
have erred, and that he would have given his life as a
sacrifice to his army or his country had duty required
it, will not be doubted within the circle of his personal
associations. I saw him frequently after he came to
Washington heralded as the u Young Napoleon," to
perform the herculean task of organizing the best army
that ever was organized in any country within the same
period of time. I saw him when he started upon his
Peninsula campaign with the hope of victory beaming
from his bright young face, and I stood close by his side
most of the day when he fought his last battle at An-
tietam. Only a few months thereafter he was finally
relieved from his command, and his military career
ended on November 5, 1862, when, by order of the Pres
ident, he transferred his army to General Burnside and
went to Trenton, New Jersey, "for further orders."
The ( ' further orders ' ' never came until Presidential
election day, 1864, when McClellan resigned his com
mission as major-general in the army and Sheridan was
appointed to his place.
Both Lincoln and McClellan now live only in history,
and history will judge them by their achievements as it
has judged all mankind. Lincoln was a successful Pres
ident, and, like the great Roman Germanicus, ' ' fortunate
in the opportunity of his death." McClellan was an un
successful general and a defeated politician. Such will
be the imperishable records of history as to these two
men; but even the next generation will see continued
disputation as to McClellan' s capabilities as a com
mander, and Lincoln will be censured alike for having
maintained and supported McClellan as a military
leader, and for having failed to appreciate and support
him after having called him to responsible command.
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN. 211
None the less, however, will be the irrevocable judgment
of history that Lincoln succeeded and that McClellan
failed. But why did McClellan fail as a military com
mander? The answer of his devoted partisans is that
he was deliberately hindered and embarrassed in every
military movement, and that he would have achieved
great success had he been supported as the more success
ful generals later in the war were supported by the gov
ernment. To this comes the response from the friends
of Lincoln that he earnestly and heartily seconded
McClellan to the utmost of his resources; that he long
confided in him when the confidence of his friends had
been greatly shattered ; that he reappointed him to com
mand against his Cabinet and against the general senti
ment of his party leaders; and that whatever failures
were suffered by McClellan were the result of his own
incompetency or of the inability of the government to
meet his wants.
It is unjust to McClellan to judge him by the same
standard that is applied to the successful generals who
succeeded him. I believe that it was McClellan' s great
est misfortune that he was suddenly called to the daz
zling position of Commander-in-Chief when he was a
comparative novice in great war operations and without
the experience necessary to make a great commander.
I believe that the 23d of April, 1861, was the fateful day
that dated the beginning of McClellan's misfortunes.
He was then in Cincinnati, in charge of one of the
railroads connected with that city. Pennsylvania troops
were then being organized by Governor Curtin, and he
was in search of a Pennsylvanian of military education
and attainments to be placed in command. He first
offered the position to McClellan, who promptly arranged
his business to go to Harrisburg in person with the view
of accepting it, By special request he stopped at Colum-
212 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
bus on his way to Harrisburg to confer with Governor
Dennison on some military problems which were vexing
the Governor of Ohio. He expected to remain at Colum
bus only a few hours and then proceed to Pennsylvania.
While in conference with Governor Dennison he was
tendered the commission of major-general commanding
the volunteers of Ohio, although ineligible because of
his want of residence in that State. The difficulty was
obviated by both branches of the Legislature passing, in
a few hours, a bill making him eligible, and on the same
23d of April, 1861, he was commissioned as major-gen
eral and assigned to the command of the Ohio State
troops. This led to his skirmishes in West Virginia,
which in that day were magnified into great battles and
great victories, and, when it became necessary to select
a successor to Scott as Commander-in- Chief, McClellan
was the only general whose victories had attracted the
attention of the nation. He was thus called to the re
sponsible position of Commander-in-Chief when a little
over thirty years of age, with no experience in war be
yond a brief campaign in Mexico, and without the train
ing necessary to enable him to comprehend the most
colossal war of modern times. Had he accepted the
command of the Pennsylvania troops he would doubtless
have made them the best disciplined and most effective
division of the Army of the Potomac, would have fought
them wisely and gallantly in every conflict, and would
have won distinction as a commander with the experi
ence that would have enabled him to maintain it. In
stead of floundering along in untrodden paths and com
mitting errors for others to profit by, he would have seen
others charged with the gravest responsibility that could
be assigned to any military man, would have seen them
blunder and fall, and would have been ripened, by his
own experience and by the misfortunes of his superiors,
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAM. 213
for the command that he won so suddenly and twice lost
by order of a President who sincerely desired to be
McClellan's friend and to give him success.
McClellan's fundamental error, and the one that I be
lieve was the fountain of most, if not all, his misfortunes,
was -in his assumption not only that Lincoln and the
government generally were unfriendly to him when he
started out on his spring campaign of 1862, but that they
deliberately conspired to prevent him from achieving
military success.* This was a fatal error, and it was
certainly most unjust to Lincoln. If McClellan really
believed that the government had predetermined his
military failure or if he seriously doubted its fidelity,
it exhibited moral cowardice on his part to march an
army into hopeless battle. He might have believed the
President, the Secretary of War, and the administration
generally to have been unfriendly to him, and yet, rely
ing upon his ability to win their confidence by winning
victory, he could have retained his command with just
ice to himself and to the country; but his own statements
show that he believed then that he would not be permit
ted to win a victory or to capture Richmond; and, thus
believing, he owed it to himself, to the great army he
had organized as none other could have organized it, and
to the country to whose cause he was undoubtedly loyal,
to resign the command and put the responsibility upon
* Don't worry about the* wretches in Washington. They have
done nearly their worst, and can't do much more. I am sure that
I will win in the end, in spite of all their rascality. History will
present a sad record of these traitors, who are willing to sacrifice
the country and its army for personal spite and personal aims.
The people will soon understand the whole matter. Gen. McClel
lan's Letter to his Wife, dated Yorktown, April n, 1862, in McClel
lan's Own Story, page 310.
LINCOLN AND MEN of WAR-TIMES.
those he believed to be conspirators for the destruction
of himself and his army.
McClellan has not left this question open to dispute.
In McClelland Own Story, written by himself, on page
150, he says: "They (the President and others) deter
mined to ruin me in any event and by any me'ans.
First, by endeavoring to force me into premature move
ments, knowing that a failure would end my military
career; afterward by withholding the means necessary to
achieve success." On the same page he says: "They
determined that I should not succeed, and carried out
their determinations only too well, at a fearful sacrifice
of blood, time, and treasure. " On page 151 in the same
book McClellan says: "From the light that has since
been thrown on Stanton's character I am satisfied that
from an early day he was in this treasonable conspir
acy." * It will thus be seen that McClellan started on
* From the light that has since been thrown on Stanton's cha
racter I am satisfied that from an early date he was in this trea
sonable conspiracy, and that his course in ingratiating himself
with me, and pretending to be my friend before he was in office,
was only a part of his long system of treachery. . . .
I had never seen Mr. Stanton, and probably had not even heard
of him, before reaching Washington in 1861. Not many weeks
after arriving I was introduced to him as a safe adviser on legal
points. From that moment he did his best to ingratiate himself
with me, and professed the warmest friendship and devotion. I
had no reason to suspect his sincerity, and therefore believed him
to be what he professed. The most disagreeable thing about him
was the extreme virulence with which he abused the President*
the administration, and the Republican party. He carried this
to such an extent that I was often shocked by it.
He never spoke of the President in any other way than as the
"original gorilla," and often said that Du Chaillu was a fool to
wander all the way to Africa in search of what he could so easily
have found at Springfield, Illinois. Nothing could be more bitter
than his words and manner always were when speaking of the
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN. 215
his Peninsula campaign not merely believing that the
President and the administration generally were un
friendly to him, but really believing that they had
formed a treasonable conspiracy by which his military
movements should be made disastrous and the blood of
thousands of brave soldiers sacrificed to accomplish
McClellan' s overthrow. This is a monstrous accusation
against Lincoln, and but for the fact that McClellan pre
sents it so clearly in language from his own pen that
none can mistake, it would seem incredible that he could
have believed such a conspiracy to exist, and yet led a
great army to defeat that treachery on the part of the
government would make inevitable. In this I am sure
that McClellan does both himself and Lincoln the gravest
injustice. Lincoln was the one man of all who was ut
terly incapable of deliberately hindering military success
under any circumstances. There were those who be
lieved it best to protract the war in order to accomplish
the overthrow of slavery, but Lincoln was not of that
number. On the contrary, he offended many when he
distinctly declared in his letter to Greeley, August 22,
1862: " If there be those who would not save the Union
unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do
not agree with them. My paramount object in this
struggle is to save the Union, and it is not either to save
or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without
freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by
administration and the Republican party. He never gave them
credit for honesty or patriotism, and very seldom for any ability.
At some time during the autumn of 1861, Secretary Cameron
made quite an abolition speech to some newly-arrived regiment.
Next day Stanton urged me to arrest him for inciting to insub
ordination. He often advocated the propriety of my seizing the
government and taking affairs into my own hands. Gen. McClel
lan in McClellan's Own Story, pages 151, 152.
2l6 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
freeing all the slaves I would do it, and if I could save
it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also
do that. ' ' What Lincoln wanted was the speediest over
throw of the rebellion and the restoration of the Union,
with or without the destruction of slavery; and the as
sumption that he could have been capable of such a
treasonable conspiracy as to deliberately send a general
to the field with a great army solely to have that army
sacrificed and its commander dishonored is at war with
every attribute of Lincoln's character. There never was
the blood of a soldier shed in battle that did not bring
grief to the heart of Abraham Lincoln, and there never
was a disaster of the Union troops that did not shadow
his face with sorrow, no matter whether he loved or dis
trusted the commander. I am quite sure that the two
men of all the nation who most desired McClellan' s
success in the field were Lincoln and McClellan them
selves.
I have said that it is unjust to McClellan to compare
his achievements in the first great campaign of the war
with the achievements of Grant and Sherman in the
later campaigns which culminated in the overthrow of
the rebellion. All the generals of the early part of the
war were making object-lessons to guide themselves and
those who succeeded them in later conflicts. In this
work the many failed, and many of the most promising
among them. The few succeeded and made their names
immortal. One of the greatest wars of history produced
but one Grant and one Lee; but one Joe Johnston and
one Tecumseh Sherman; but one Phil Sheridan and one
Stonewall Jackson. Scores of generals on both sides
had opportunities of winning the laurels of these great
chieftains, but none was equal to the task. It is no re
proach to McClellan to say that Grant fought few bat
tles which McClellan would have fought under precisely
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN. 217
similar circumstances. McClellan was an organizer, a
disciplinarian, and the best defensive general in all trie
armies of the late war. He would have made a greater
Confederate leader than L,ee himself. He would never
have made the exhaustive and fruitless campaigns of
the second Bull Run and Antietam which cost Lee one-
fourth of his army when he had feeble means to replace
his losses. He never would have made an aggressive
campaign to Gettysburg when the resources of the Con
federacy were so nearly exhausted, and Pickett's charge
would never have been dreamed of by McClellan. He
was the greatest organizer and defensive officer of the
age, but the Union cause demanded swift and terrible
blows and countless sacrifices. It had to fight on fields
chosen by the enemy. It had often to give two men for
one in the death-lists of the struggles, but it had bound
less resources to fill the shattered ranks. The most ag
gressive warfare was certain to bring the speediest vic
tory and with the least sacrifice of life and treasure in
the end. Grant met this want. He was the great ag
gressive general of the war. He always fought when he
should have fought, and sometimes fought when it would
have been wiser to have refrained. Had he been a South
ern general, he would have been an utter failure, for the
Southern general had to study how to husband his re
sources; how to protect the life of every soldier; how to
fight only when a thousand men could withstand two
thousand; and to that system of warfare Grant was an
entire stranger. He was the embodiment of aggressive
warfare; McClellan was the embodiment of defensive
warfare, and McClellan was as great as' Grant in his line,
and with no greater limitations upon his military genius.
Grant fought one defensive battle at Shiloh and lost
it and lost his command. McClellan fought only one
pitched battle as the aggressor at Antietam, and then he
218 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
was strategically defensive, while tactically aggressive,
but his military genius shone resplendent in his de
fensive battles when retreating to the James River.*
Thus a condition confronted McClellan to which his
great military genius and attainments were not best
adapted, and Grant's star rose and brightened as
McClellan' s faded, because Grant possessed, in the full
est measure, the qualities needed to win peace and re
store the Republic.
No man ever commanded the Army of the Potomac
for whom the soldiers had so much affection as they had
for McClellan. They knew that he was a soldier and a
great soldier. They knew that he would never put
them into action unless good generalship dictated it.
They knew they were safe from wanton sacrifice while
under his command. They knew that he valued the
life of every man with the tenderness of a parent, and
they loved him because they revered and trusted him.
Lincoln fully appreciated and greatly valued the devo
tion of the army to McClellan. He believed that no
other general could have so quickly organized and dis
ciplined a great army out of entirely raw materials as
McClellan had done, and he never gave up faith in
McClellan until he felt that he could no longer trust the
destiny of the war to his direction. He was many times
* The movement from Washington into Maryland, which cul
minated in the battles of South Mountain and Antietam, was not
a part of an offensive campaign, with the object of the invasion
of the enemy's territory and an attack upon his capital, but was
defensive in its purposes, although offensive in its character, and
would be technically called a "defensive-offensive campaign."
It was undertaken at a time when our army had experienced
severe defeats, and its object was to preserve the national capital
and Baltimore, to protect Pennsylvania from invasion, and to
drive the enemy out of Maryland. Gen. McClellan in McClellan' s
Own Story, page 642.
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN. 219
justly fretted at McClellan's complaints about military
matters, at his obtrusive criticism about political mat
ters, and especially at his insulting declaration to the
Secretary of War, in a letter dated at army headquarters
on the Peninsula, June 28, 1862, just after his retreat to
the James River, in which he said: u If I save this army
now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to
any other person in Washington. You have done your
best to sacrifice this army." This letter, although ad
dressed to the Secretary of War, distinctly embraced the
President in the grave charge of conspiracy to defeat
McClellan's army and sacrifice thousands of the lives of
his soldiers. None but a man of Lincoln's exceptional
forbearance and patience would have tolerated McClel-
lan in command for a day after such a declaration, writ
ten from the headquarters of a defeated army, but Lin
coln neither dismissed nor reproached him, nor, as far as
I can learn, did he ever allude to it.
Ten days after the offensive and insubordinate letter
was written Lincoln visited McClellan at his headquar
ters on the James River. While Lincoln was there
McClellan personally handed him a letter dated July 7,
1862, that was a caustic criticism of the political and
military policy of the administration, and assumed to
define not only the military action of the government,
but the civil and political policy of the government on
all important questions relating to the war. McClellan
himself records the fact that Lincoln read the letter in
McClellan's presence without comment, and that he
never alluded to the subject again. McClellan vigor
ously protested against the withdrawal of the army from
the Peninsula, but the order was peremptory, and he
obeyed it with obvious reluctance. His personal feeling
toward Lincoln and the administration is clearly exhib
ited in a letter to his wife written on the 3ist of August
220 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
and published in McClellarf s Oivn Story, p. 532. Speak
ing of Washington, he says: u As a matter of self-respect
I cannot go there." On the ist of September, however,
he was called to Washington and given a verbal order
by General Halleck, then Commander-in-Chief, to take
charge of the defenses of Washington. On the follow
ing morning Lincoln and Halleck called on General
McClellan at his house and asked him to take command.
McClellan states that Lincoln asked him as a favor to the
President to "resume command and do the best that
could be done." The same day an order was issued
from the War Department by Halleck stating that " Ma
jor-General McClellan will have command of the fortifi
cations of Washington and all the troops for the defense
of the capital." The manner of the restoiation of
McClellan to command has given rise to latitudinous
dispute, but the short story is that most of the Army of
the Potomac had been put under command of General
Pope in his disastrous battles of the second Bull Run
campaign, and both the armies of McClellan and Pope
were compelled to retreat into the Washington defenses
in a very demoralized condition.
No man better understood McClellan' s value as an
organizer and as a defensive commander than Lincoln,
and he solved the problem himself by calling McClellan
to the new command because he believed the capital to
be in danger and McClellan the best man to protect it.
If he ever consulted any one on the subject, the fact has
never been given to the public in any authentic form.
Had he consulted his Cabinet, it would have been next
to unanimous against giving McClellan any command
whatever, and the administration leaders in both branches
of Congress would also have been nearly unanimous in
demanding McClellan' s dismissal from command. Lin
coln acted in this case, as was his custom in all severe
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN. 221
trials, on his own personal responsibility, and Lincoln,
and Lincoln alone, is responsible for calling McClellan
to command the defenses of Washington and for per
mitting McClellan, under that assignment, to take the
field for the Antietam campaign without any special
orders from the government. The assumption that Lin
coln simply consulted his fears in restoring McClellan to
command is an absurdity. There were twenty generals
in the Army of the Potomac and in Pope's army who
could have taken command of the complete defenses of
Washington, constructed under McClellan' s faultless en
gineering skill, and protected the capital against double
the number of men Lee had in his entire army. That
McClellan handled the demoralized army better than any
other could have done I do not doubt, but that he was a
necessity to save the capital is not to be considered for
a moment. It is obvious also that Lincoln believed
McClellan to be the best man to command the army in
the campaign in pursuit of Lee, but he was prudent
enough to avoid any specific order to McClellan assign
ing him to the command. He put McClellan in position
to take the command to move against Lee, and McClel
lan, always obedient to what he believed to be his duty,
availed himself of it and fought the battle of Antietam.
So far from Lincoln being unfriendly to McClellan
when he started on his spring campaign of 1862, there
is the strongest evidence in support of the belief that
Lincoln hoped for McClellan' s success and earnestly de
sired him to win his way back as Commander-in-Chief
of the armies. It was on March n, 1862, that Lincoln
relieved McClellan from his position of Commander-in-
Chief and limited him to the command of his own im
mediate army, but no Commander-in-Chief was ap
pointed until July n, 1862. Had Lincoln intended that
McClellan should never return to the command of all the
222 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
armies, lie certainly would have appointed Halleck Com-
mander-in-Chief before the nth of July. It is known
that General Scott, when he retired from the command,
desired the appointment of Halleck as his successor, and
McClellan himself was in doubt for some weeks whether
he or Halleck would be called to the supreme command.
After McClellan, Halleck was the one man to whom Lin
coln turned as the most competent for Commander-in-
Chief, but he delayed rilling the position not only until
after the disastrous close of the Peninsula campaign, but
for two weeks after McClellan' s insulting letter to Stan-
ton and four days after McClellan' s offensive political
letter handed to the President at Harrison's Landing. It
was not until McClellan had proclaimed himself a polit
ical as well as a military general on the yth of July,
1862, that Lincoln abandoned all hope of McClellan ever
regaining the position of Commander-in-Chief, and four
days thereafter he called Halleck to that task. I many
times heard Lincoln discuss McClellan. I do not mean
that he usually or even at any time expressed fully his
views as to McClellan, but I have reason to know that
with all the troubles he had with him about moving in
the early part of 1862 and about the Peninsula campaign,
he sincerely and earnestly hoped that McClellan would
capture Richmond and thus reinstate himself as Com
mander-in-Chief of the armies, with his laurels fairly
won and his ability to maintain them clearly demon
strated.
If Lincoln had been capable of resentment against
McClellan or against any of his military leaders, many
heads would have fallen that were saved by Lincoln's
patience and generosity. He knew that McClellan and
more than one other general had at times listened to the
whispers of a military dictatorship. McClellan states,
on page 152 of his own book, that Stan ton once urged
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN.
him to arrest Secretary Cameron for inciting to insubor
dination by making an Abolition speech to a newly-
arrived regiment, and he adds: " He (Stanton) often ad
vocated the propriety of my seizing the government and
taking affairs in my own hands. " In a letter to his wife,
dated August 9, 1861, also published in his own volume,
page 85, McClellan refers to the fact that he is earnestly
pressed by letter after letter and conversation after con
versation to save the nation by assuming the powers of
the President as dictator. Writing in the free confidence
of a devoted husband to a devoted wife, he said: " As I
hope one day to be united with you for ever in heaven I
have no such aspiration. I would cheerfully take the
dictatorship and agree to lay down my life when the
country is saved. ' ' Had Lincoln been jealous of McClel
lan' s power, he had ample opportunity to relieve him
from command long before he did, but he never feared
those who prattled about the dictatorship, although well
informed of the many, including some prominent gen
erals, who had advised it. His generosity to military
men who committed such follies is clearly exhibited in
his letter of January 26, 1863, to General Hooker, notify
ing him of his assignment to the command of the Army
of the Potomac. Hooker was one of those who had be
lieved in a military dictatorship, and Lincoln believed
that Hooker had not given cordial support to General
Burnside when he was in command of the army. To
use Lincoln's own plain language, he told Hooker that
he had done ' ' a great wrong to the country and to a
most meritorious and honorable brother-officer." He
then said to Hooker: "I have heard, in such a way as
to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army
and the government needed a dictator. Of course it was
not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the
command. Only those generals who gain success can be
224 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
dictators. What I now ask of you is military success,
and I will risk the dictatorship. ' ' Thus did Lincoln as
sign Hooker to the command of the Army of the Poto
mac when he knew that Hooker had been guilty of the
failure to support his commanding officer in important
military movements, and that he had advised a dictator
to usurp the prerogatives of the President. He believed
McClellan to be in political sympathy with the men who
were most implacably hostile to his administration, but
he was sagacious enough to know that military success
under any general of his appointment would give polit
ical success to the administration; and I am certain that
he would have preferred McClellan as the conqueror of
Richmond in 1862, and would gladly have restored him
to the command of all the armies, knowing that the vic
tory would have been as much the victory of Lincoln as
the victory of McClellan.
I saw Lincoln many times during the campaign of
1864, when McClellan was his competitor for the Presi
dency. I never heard him speak of McClellan in any
other than terms of the highest personal respect and
kindness. He never doubted McClellan' s loyalty to the
government or to the cause that called him to high mili
tary command. But he did believe, until after the cap
ture of Atlanta by Sherman and Sheridan's victories in
the Valley, which settled the political campaign in favor
of Lincoln, that McClellan was quite likely to be elected
over him, and that if elected, with all his patriotism and
loyalty to the Union, he would be powerless to prevent
the dissolution of the Republic. The convention that
nominated McClellan for President met only a few days
before Sherman captured Atlanta. There had been no
important victories for any of the Union armies until
that time during the year 1864, and there had been great
sacrifice of life in both Sherman's and Grant's campaigns.
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN. 225
The convention that nominated McClellan voiced the
sentiment that regarded the war as a failure, and it was
so declared in the platform in the clearest terms, with
the call for a suspension of hostilities because of the fail
ure to obtain peace by force of arms. Lincoln believed
that McClellan, if elected, would be coerced into a pol
icy of humiliating peace and the loss of all the great
issues for which so much blood and treasure had been
sacrified. But that he ever cherished the semblance of
resentment against McClellan, even when McClellan was
offensively insubordinate as a military man and equally
offensive in assuming to define the political policy of the
administration, I do not for a moment believe. Had
McClellan understood Lincoln half as well as Lincoln
understood McClellan, there never would have been
serious discord between them. It was the creation of
what I believe to be McClellan' s entirely unwarranted
distrust of Lincoln's personal and official fidelity to him
as a military commander, and that single error became a
seething cauldron of woe to both of them and a consum
ing misfortune to McClellan.
Lincoln's position in history is secure, but it is doubt
ful whether the impartial historian of the future will give
McClellan his full measure of justice. History records
results only achievements and failures. It will tell of
McClellan that he was an unsuccessful military chieftain,
and that on his own record in an appeal to the country
he was the most overwhelmingly defeated candidate for
President in the history of the present great parties of
the nation; but no truthful historian can fail to say of
him that he was one of the great military geniuses of his
day, one of the purest of patriots, and one of the most
loyal of men in the great battle for the preservation of
the Union.
15
(Photo by Sarony, New York )
GENERAL WILLIAM T. SHERMAN, 1890.
LINCOLN AND SHERMAN.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN and William T. Sherman had
\- never met until Sherman came to Washington to
visit his brother, the present Senator Sherman, ten days
after Lincoln's inauguration. Sherman's mission to the
capital was not to obtain a command. He had resigned
as president of a military institute in Louisiana, because,
as he frankly said to the State officials who controlled
the institution, he could not remain and owe allegiance
to a State that had withdrawn from the Union. In his
letter of resignation, dated January 18, 1861, he said:
' ' Should Louisiana withdraw from the Federal Union, I
prefer to maintain my allegiance to the Constitution as
long as a fragment of it survives, and my longer stay
here would be a wrong in every sense of the word."
He left New Orleans about the ist of March to make his
home in the North. Like Grant, he tendered his ser
vices to the government, but, again like Grant, his offer
was not answered. His first meeting with Lincoln was
in company with his Senator brother to pay a brief visit
of courtesy to the President. After the Senator had
transacted some political business with Lincoln, he
turned to his brother and said: u Mr. President, this is
my brother, Colonel Sherman, who is just up from Lou
isiana; he may give you some information you want."
To this Lincoln replied, as reported by Sherman him
self: "Ah! How are they getting along down there?"
227
228 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
Sherman answered: " They think they are getting along
swimmingly; they are prepared for war." To which
Lincoln responded: " Oh, well, I guess we'll manage to
keep house." Sherman records in his Memoirs that
he was ' ' sadly disappointed, ' ' and that he ( ' broke out
on John, damning the politicians generally," saying:
" You have got things in a hell of a fix; you may get
them out as best you can." Sherman then, as ever, was
ruggedly honest and patriotic, and often more impressive
than elegant in his manner of speech. Some old St.
L,ouis friends had obtained for him the presidency of a
street-railway of that city at a salary of #2500. Speak
ing of this position, he says: "This suited me exactly, and
I answered Turner that I would accept with thanks. ' '
Before Sherman was comfortably installed in his posi
tion as street-railway president, Postmaster-General Blair
telegraphed him, on the 6th of April, asking him to
accept a chief clerkship in the War Department, with
the assurance that he would be made Assistant Secretary
of War when Congress met. Sherman answered with
the laconic dispatch: U I cannot accept." In a letter
written at the same time to Blair he says that after his
visit to Washington, where he saw no chance of em
ployment, he had gone to St. Louis, accepted an official
position and established his home, and that he was not
at liberty to change. He added that he was thankful
for the compliment, and that he wished "the adminis
tration all success in its almost impossible task of gov
erning this distracted and anarchical people." A few
days thereafter General Frank Blair called on Sherman
and said that he was authorized to select a brigadier-gen
eral to command the Department of Missouri, and he ten
dered the position to Sherman, who declined it, and Gen
eral L,yon was then appointed. Feeling, however, as the
clouds of war darkened upon the country, that his ser-
LINCOLN AND SHERMAN. 2 29
vices might be needed, on the 8th of May Sherman ad
dressed a formal letter to the Secretary of War, again
tendering his services to the government, and on the
i4th of the same month he was appointed colonel of the
Thirteenth regiment of regulars. On the 2oth of June
he reported at Washington in obedience to orders from
General Scott, who assigned him to inspection duty; and
before the movement was made to Manassas, Sherman
was ordered to the command of a brigade of Hunter's
division, and in that position was in the first battle of
the war.
Sherman was one of the very few generals who seldom
grieved Lincoln. While he was one of the most volum
inous of writers on every phase of the war and every
question arising from it, he never assumed to be wiser
than the government, and he never committed a serious
blunder. He had the most profound contempt for poli
ticians in and out of the army, and for political methods
generally, and his bluntness of both manner and expres
sion emphasized his views and purposes so that none
could misunderstand them. Naturally impulsive, he
often felt keenly the many complications which sur
rounded all great generals, and he spoke and wrote with
unusual freedom, but always within the clearest lines of
military subordination. He was an earnest, ardent, out
spoken patriot, and had more controversy than any other
general with the single exception of McClellan; but I
doubt whether there is a single important utterance of
Sherman's during the four long years of war, when new
and grave problems had to be met and solved from time
to time, that he would have recalled in the later years
of his life. He had learned to cherish the most pro
found respect for I/incoln, although they never met after
his first introduction to the President during the early
period of the war, until the spring of 1865 at City Point,
230 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
after Sherman had made his march to the sea and his
great campaign had practically ended at Raleigh, North
Carolina.
There is no doubt that Lincoln's earliest impressions
of Sherman were quite as unfavorable to Sherman as
were Sherman's early impressions of Lincoln. It was
not until Sherman had been assigned to Kentucky, along
with General Anderson, that he attracted the attention
of the country. Along with a number of others he had
won his star at Bull Run, and on the 24th of August he
was sent with Anderson to Louisville. Anderson's feeble
health soon demanded that he should be relieved, and
Sherman was thus left in command. The position of
Kentucky was a most delicate and important one. Sher
man succeeded to the command on the 8th of October,
and within a few weeks thereafter it was whispered
throughout Washington that he was a lunatic. This
belief was accepted in most if not all military circles at
the capital, and was doubtless shared by Lincoln himself,
as in little more than two months after Sherman had as
sumed command in Kentucky he was ordered to report
at Benton Barracks, St. Louis, and General Buell was
assigned as his successor. The attitude of Kentucky at
tracted very general interest throughout the country, and
the repeated changes of commanders caused great solici
tude. I remember calling on Colonel Scott, Assistant
Secretary of War, on the day that the announcement
was made of Sherman's transfer to Missouri and Buell' s
appointment to Kentucky, and asking him what it
meant. Scott answered: "Sherman's gone in the
head;" and upon inquiry I found that Scott simply
voiced the general belief of those who should have been
best informed on the subject. Reports were published
in all the leading newspapers of the country speaking
of Sherman as mentally unbalanced, and it naturally
LINCOLN AND SHERMAN. 231
mortified the blunt, straightforward soldier to the last
degree. General Halleck, in a letter to McClellan ask
ing for more officers, said: U I am satisfied that General
Sherman's physical and mental system is so completely
broken by labor and care as to render him, for the pres
ent, unfit for duty. Perhaps a few weeks' rest may re
store him." But it is only just to Sherman to say that
the chief reason for the military authorities in Washing
ton assuming that he was a lunatic was his report soon
after assuming command in Kentucky, stating that it
would require an army of 60,000 men to hold Kentucky
and 200,000 men to open the Mississippi and conquer the
rebellion in the South-west. This was at that time re
garded as conclusive evidence of his insanity, and his
mental condition was a matter of almost daily discussion
in the public journals, with Halstead's Cincinnati Com
mercial, published in Sherman's own State, leading the
attack against his mental capacity.
When Secretary Cameron and Adjutant-General
Thomas were returning from their investigation of
General Fremont's department, soon after Sherman had
assumed command of Kentucky, Sherman took special
measures to prevail upon Cameron to stop over in Louis
ville and personally inquire into the condition of that
State. Cameron did so, and had a confidential confer
ence with Sherman at the Gait House, in which Sherman
said to Cameron that for the purpose of defense in Ken
tucky he should have 60,000 men, and for offensive
movements 200,000 would be necessary. Cameron's an
swer, as reported by Sherman himself, was: u Great God!
where are they to come from?" That demand of Sher
man's convinced Cameron that Sherman was mentally
unbalanced, and on his return to Washington he united
with all the military authorities of that day in ridiculing
Sherman's demand. Those who have distinct recollec-
232 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
tions of the war, as well as every intelligent reader of its
history, need not now be reminded that Sherman was the
only military man of that day who thoroughly and accu
rately appreciated the situation in the South-west, and
that his original estimate of the forces necessary to over
throw the rebellion in that section of the country is
proved to have been substantially correct. Buell, who
succeeded Sherman in command of Kentucky, had
nearly 60,000 men when he was ordered to Grant at
Shiloh, and fully 200,000 men were reapers in the har
vest of death before the rebellion was conquered in the
South-west and the Father of Waters again ' ' went un-
vexed to the sea."
Sherman was not permitted to take the field until after
the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson and the city
of Nashville. From December 23, 1861, to the I3th of
February, 1862, he was in charge of the St. Louis bar
racks as military instructor. He was first ordered from
St. Louis to take command of the post at Paducah, Ken
tucky, where he remained until the loth of March, when
he was placed in command of a division and ordered to
join Grant for the Shiloh campaign. It will be remem
bered that he exhibited great skill and courage as a gen
eral during the disastrous first day at Shiloh. That was
the first action in which Sherman had an opportunity to
prove his ability as a military commander, and it is safe
to say that from that day until the close of the war Grant
regarded him as the best lieutenant in his entire army.
He was with Grant at Vicksburg, shared Grant's victory
at Missionary Ridge, and when the Atlanta campaign
was determined upon in the spring of 1864 there was no
question in military circles as to the pre-eminent fitness
of Sherman to take the command. His campaign from
Chattanooga to Atlanta was one of the most brilliant of
all the campaigns of the war. It exhibited the most ac-
LINCOLN AND SHERMAN. 23$
complished military strategy coupled with trie wisest di
rection of an army that had to contend with an enemy
always intrenched and to fight every battle under the
greatest disadvantages. Many even of our successful
military campaigns have been severely criticised, but I
doubt whether any intelligent military man at home or
abroad has ever found fault with Sherman's generalship
in his Atlanta campaign. With all his natural impetu
osity of temper, he was always clear-headed and abun
dant in caution when charged with the command of an
army. In his march to Atlanta he was passing through
a country that was, to use his own language, ' ' one vast
fort, ' ' and with ' ' at least fifty miles of connected trenches
with abatis and finished batteries. ' ' With the single ex
ception of his assault upon Johnston's lines at Kenesaw
he did not meet with a serious reverse until he entered
Atlanta, and it was his dispatch to Lincoln, announcing
the capture of that city, that reversed the political tide
of the country and assured Lincoln's re-election.
Sherman's march to the sea, that furnished the most
romantic story of the civil war, was really a holiday pic
nic as compared with the march from Chattanooga to
Atlanta. On the i2th of November, 1864, Sherman
severed communications with the North, and started for
Savannah with a picked army full 60,000 strong, and on
the loth of December he was in front of the Confederate
defenses of Savannah. On the I3th, after the capture
of Fort McAllister, he had opened communications with
the Union squadron and was enabled to obtain the sup
plies his army so much needed. Thus for more than
one entire month the country had no word whatever
from General Sherman except in the vague and often
greatly exaggerated reports which came from the South
ern newspapers. I saw Lincoln several times during
Sherman's march, and while he did not conceal his
234 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
anxiety concerning him, he always frankly expressed his
unbounded confidence in Sherman's ability to execute
what he had undertaken. He had the strongest faith in
Sherman as a military commander. On one occasion
during Sherman's march, when he had been out for two
or three weeks, I called at the War Department and as
certained that no word had been received from him, and
that none need be expected for some days to come. I
went from the War Department to the White House, and
after a brief conference with Lincoln, in which Sherman
was not alluded to at all, I bade him good-day and started
to leave the room. Just as I reached the door he turned
round and with a merry twinkling of the eye he said:
" McClure, wouldn't you like to hear something from
Sherman?" The inquiry electrified me at the instant,
as it seemed to imply that Lincoln had some information
on the subject. I immediately answered: "Yes, most
of all I should like to hear from Sherman." To this
Lincoln answered with a hearty laugh: "Well, I'll be
hanged if I wouldn't myself." When Sherman reached
Savannah, Lincoln overflowed with gratitude to him and
his army. He then felt fully assured that the military
power of the rebellion was hopelessly broken.
The names of Lincoln and Sherman are indissolubly
linked together in the yet continued dispute over Lin
coln's original views on reconstruction, as Sherman
claimed to represent them in the terms of the first sur
render of Johnston to Sherman at Durham Station, North
Carolina. On the i8th of April, 1865, Sherman and
Johnston met at the house of Mr. Bennet to agree upon
the terms for the surrender of Johnston's army. On the
1 2th of April Sherman had announced to his army the
surrender of Lee. Two days later a flag of truce was
received from Johnston proposing ' ' to stop the further
effusion of blood and devastation of property," and sug-
LINCOLN AND SHERMAN.
gesting that the civil authorities of the States be per
mitted ' ' to enter into the needful arrangements to termi
nate the existing war." Sherman's answer of the same
date said : "I am fully empowered to arrange with you
any terms for the suspension of further hostilities be
tween the armies commanded by you and those com
manded by myself. ' ' An interview with Johnston hav
ing been arranged by a staff officer, Sherman started
from Raleigh on the iyth to fill the appointment with
Johnston. When he was about to enter the car he was
stopped by a telegraph-operator, who gave him the start
ling information of the assassination of Lincoln on the
1 4th. He gave orders that no publicity should be given
to the death of Lincoln, and he did not even inform the
staff officers accompanying him. As soon as he was
alone with Johnston he communicated to him the fact
of Lincoln's assassination, and he adds that "the per
spiration came out in large drops on his (Johnston's)
forehead, and he did not attempt to conceal his distress."
This conference with Johnston did not result in formu
lating the terms of surrender. Johnston did not assume
to possess authority to surrender all the various armies
yet in the field, but as Jefferson Davis, with Breckenridge,
his Secretary of War, and Reagan, his Postmaster-Gen
eral, was within reach of Johnston, he proposed to meet
Sherman on the following day, when he hoped to have
authority to surrender the entire Confederate armies re
maining in the service. When they met again Brecken
ridge was with Johnston without assuming to act in any
official capacity, and the terms of surrender were formu
lated and signed by Sherman and Johnston. So far as
the purely military terms were involved, they were prac
tically the same as those agreed to by Grant and Lee at
Appomattox. The third article of the basis of agree
ment provided for * ' the recognition by the Executive of
236 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
the United States of the several State governments on
their officers and legislatures taking the oath prescribed
by the Constitution of the United States." The fifth
article provided for substantial amnesty, so far as in the
power of the President, to all who accepted the terms of
surrender, who should be protected in "their political
rights and franchise as well as their rights of person and
property. ' ' It was provided also that the armies of Sher
man and Johnston should refrain from all warlike move
ments until the terms of surrender were finally accepted,
and in the event of failure forty-eight hours' notice
should be given by either side for the resumption of
hostilities. Sherman transmitted the agreement to the
government through Grant, and Stanton published the
disapproval by the administration with most offensive
reflections upon Sherman.
But for the dispute that arose over Sherman's original
terms of surrender with Johnston, Lincoln's views as to
reconstruction would never have been crystallized in his
tory. The fact that Sherman claimed to act under the
direct authority of Lincoln in the terms he gave to John
ston and to the civil governments of the insurgent States
brings up the question directly as to Lincoln's contem
plated method of closing the war; and it is notable that
many of Lincoln's biographers have injected partisan
prejudice into history and have studiously attempted to
conceal Lincoln's ideas as to the restoration of the Union.
Whether he was right or wrong, it is due to the truth of
history that his convictions be honestly presented. The
plain question to be considered is this: Did or did not
Lincoln expressly suggest to Sherman the terms he gave
to Johnston in his original agreement of surrender ? If
he did, it clearly portrays Lincoln's purposes as to recon
struction and fully vindicates Sherman. If he did not
thus suggest and instruct Sherman, then Sherman is a
LINCOLN AND SHERMAN. 237
deliberate falsifier; and who is prepared to doubt the in
tegrity of any positive statement made by William T.
Sherman ? There were four persons present at the con
ference held at City Point on the 28th of March, 1865.
They were Lincoln, Grant, Sherman, and Admiral Por
ter. It was before these men that Lincoln freely dis
cussed the question of ending the war, and in Sherman's
Memoirs he says: "Mr. Lincoln was full and frank in
his conversation, assuring me that in his mind he was all
ready for the civil reorganization of affairs at the South
as soon as the war was over." Had Lincoln stopped
with the general assurance of his purpose to restore the
South to civil government, it might be plausible to as
sume that Sherman misinterpreted his expressions, but
Sherman adds the following positive statement: u He
(Lincoln) distinctly authorized me to assure Governor
Vance and the people of North Carolina that as soon as
the rebel armies laid down their arms and resumed their
civil pursuits they would at once be guaranteed all their
rights as citizens of a common country ; and that to avoid
anarchy the State governments then in existence, with
their civil functionaries, would be recognized by him as
the governments de facto till Congress could provide
others* ' ' * There was no possibility . for Sherman to
* Your note of the 26th inst., enclosing proof sheet of your
article on Lincoln and Sherman, has been received and very care
fully read. I have no criticisms to make, for I think it is a just
and fair delineation, well stated, of the character of these two
conspicuous actors in the war of the Rebellion. I remember
very well the interview with Mr. Lincoln in March, 1861. A
good deal more was said than you have noted. Among other
things, I remember that Lincoln said to Sherman: "I guess we
will get along without you fellows," or some such remark, mean
ing that he thought there would be no war. This was the remark
that made the most impression upon Captain Sherman, as he was
then called, and led him to a want of confidence in I^ncolnj who
238 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIME^
mistake this expression of Lincoln. He was distinctly
instructed to assure the Governor of North Carolina, the
State in which Sherman's army was then operating, that
upon the surrender of the insurgent forces all would be
guaranteed their rights as citizens, and the civil govern
ments then in existence would be recognized by Lincoln.
There was no chance for misunderstanding on this point.
did not seem to appreciate the condition of the South and the
peril in which the whole country was then involved. During
General Sherman's march to the sea I went to Lincoln as you
did. I was somewhat troubled by the reports from rebel sources
that General Sherman had been flanked and that this wing or
that wing had been driven back, etc., and went to Lincoln for
encouragement, and asked him if he knew anything about the
correctness of these reports. Lincoln said, "Oh no. I know
what hole he went in at, but I can't tell what hole he will come
out of," but seemed to be entirely confident that he would come
out safely.
In respect to the conditional arrangement made between Gen
eral Sherman and General Johnston for the surrender of John
ston's army your statement agrees entirely with what I under
stood from General Sherman a few days after the surrender. I
went with General Sherman on his return from the interview
with Lincoln to Goldsborough, N. C., where the army was en
camped, and was fully advised by General Sherman of the con
ference between Lincoln, Grant, Porter, and himself at Hampton
Roads. I did not at .the time agree with the generous policy pro
posed by Mr. Lincoln, but at the meeting with Johnston General
Sherman acted upon it in exact accordance with what he under
stood were the instructions of Mr. Lincoln, and afterward com
plained bitterly at the injustice done him for obeying what he
regarded as the orders of the President. Immediately after Stan-
ton's cruel statement of his reasons for setting aside the agree
ment between Sherman and Johnston, I wrote a reply which was
published in Washington, stating my view of this agreement at
that time. I have not seen it since, but I have no doubt if you
have access to it you will find it supports the statements you
now make. You are at liberty to use the contents of this letter
or any part of it at your discretion. Senator John Sherman to
the Author, January 29, 1892.
LINCOLN AND SHERMAN. 239
Either Lincoln thus instructed Sherman or Sherman
states what is deliberately untrue.
These were the last instructions that Sherman received
from Lincoln or from the government until the surrender
of Johnston. In a little more than two weeks thereafter
Lincoln was assassinated, and the only event that could
have been regarded as an additional guide for Sherman
was the surrender of Lee, in which all the rights that
Sherman accorded to Johnston's army were given to
Lee's army by Grant. The testimony of Lincoln could
not be had after the issue was raised with Sherman, as
Lincoln was then dead; but Sherman knew that on the
6th of April, Lincoln had authorized the reconvening
of the Virginia Legislature, and thus felt sure that Lin
coln was doing in Virginia precisely what he had in
structed Sherman to do in North Carolina. Grant,
always reticent in matters of dispute except when tes
timony was a necessity, was not called upon to express
any opinion as to the correctness of Sherman's under
standing of Lincoln's instructions. General Badeau,
who was with Grant at the time he received Stan ton's
offensive revocation of the agreement between Sherman
and Johnston, says that Grant pronounced Stanton's ten
reasons for rejecting the terms of surrender to be "in
famous." An entirely new condition had been pro
duced by the murder of Lincoln and the succession of
Johnson, and had Sherman been advised of the frenzy
of public sentiment that followed the assassination of the
President, he probably would not have obeyed Lincoln's
instructions by giving the promise that the government
would recognize the Confederate civil authorities of the
States.
The tragic death of Lincoln aroused public sentiment
to the highest point of resentment. The new President
was ostentatious in his demand for vengeance upon the
240 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
Southern leaders. Stanton was most violent in his cry
for the swiftest retribution, and it was in this changed
condition of sentiment and of authority that Sherman's
terms, accorded to Johnston in obedience to the peaceful
purposes of Lincoln, were sent to the government for
approval or rejection. Stanton immediately proclaimed
the rejection of the terms of surrender in a dispatch given
to the public press, in which he denounced Sherman with
unmingled ferocity as having acted without authority and
surrendered almost every issue for which the war had been
fought. So violent was this assault upon Sherman from
Stanton that soon after, when Sherman's victorious army
was reviewed in Washington by the President and Sec
retary of War, Sherman refused the proffered hand of
Stanton before the multitude. President Johnson subse
quently assured Sherman that Stanton's public reflection
upon him had not been seen by the President nor any
of Stanton's associates of the Cabinet until it had been
published. Admiral Porter, who was the remaining wit
ness to the instructions received by Sherman, took down
notes immediately after the conference ended, and within
a year thereafter he furnished Sherman a statement of
what had occurred, in which he fully and broadly sus
tained Sherman as to Lincoln's instructions. I assume,
therefore, that it is true beyond all reasonable dispute
that Sherman in his original terms of Johnston's sur
render in North Carolina implicitly obeyed the direc
tions of Lincoln, and was therefore not only fully jus
tified in what he did, but would have been false to his
trust had he insisted upon any other terms than those he
accepted.
This issue made with General Sherman and feebly
sustained by a few partisan historians of the time has
led intelligent students to study carefully Lincoln's ideas
pf reconstruction, and they should be correctly uncler-
LINCOLN AND SHERMAN. 241
stood to correctly estimate Lincoln's character. I fre
quently saw Lincoln during trie summer and fall of 1864
and winter of 1865. Some time in August, 1864, I spent
several hours with him alone in the White House, when
he spoke most earnestly about the closing of the war.
He had but a single purpose, and that was the speedy
and cordial restoration of the dissevered States. He
cherished no resentment against the South, and every
theory of reconstruction that he ever conceived or pre
sented was eminently peaceful and looking solely to re-
attaching the estranged people to the government. I
was startled when he first suggested that it would be
wise to pay the South $400,000,000 as compensation for
the abolition of slavery, but he had reasoned well on the
subject, and none could answer the arguments he ad
vanced in favor of such a settlement of the war. He
knew that he could not then propose it to Congress or to
the country, but he clung to it until the very last. He
repeatedly renewed the subject in conversations when I
was present, and on the 5th of February, 1865, he went
so far as to formulate a message to Congress, proposing
the payment of $400,000,000 for emancipation, and sub
mitted it to his Cabinet, only to be unanimously rejected.
Lincoln sadly accepted the decision of his Cabinet, and
filed away the manuscript message with this indorsement
thereon, to which his signature was added : ' ' February 5,
1865. To-day these papers, which explain themselves,
were drawn up and submitted to the Cabinet and unani
mously disapproved by them." When the proposed
message was disapproved Lincoln soberly asked : ( ' How
long will the war last ?' ' To this none could make an
swer, and he added: " We are spending now in carrying
on the war $3,000,000 a day, which will amount to all
this money, besides all the lives."
At Lincoln's conference \yith Sherman and Grant at
242 LINCOLN AND MEN OP WAR-TIMES,
City Point on the 28th of March he exhibited profound
sorrow at the statement of these generals that another
great battle would probably have to be fought before
closing the war. Sherman says that "Lincoln ex
claimed more than once that there had been blood
enough shed, and asked us if another battle could not
be avoided. " His great desire was to attain peace with
out the sacrifice of a single life that could be saved, and
he certainly desired that there should be no policy of
retribution upon the Southern people. He intimated to
Sherman very broadly that he desired Jefferson Davis to
escape from the country. Sherman in his Memoirs re
peats a story told by Lincoln to him illustrative of his
wish that Davis should escape ' ' unbeknown to him ;' '
and in discussing the same subject in the White House
in the presence of Governor Curtin, Colonel Forney, sev
eral others, and myself, he told the same story to illus
trate the same point, obviously intending to convey very
clearly his wish that the Southern leaders should escape
from the land and save him the grave complications
which must follow their arrest. Secretary Welles, in an
article in the Galaxy, quotes Lincoln as saying on this
subject: u No one need expect he would take any part in
hanging or killing these men, even the worst of them.
Frighten them out of the country; open the gates; let
down the bars, scare them off. Enough lives have been
sacrificed ; we must extinguish our resentments if we ex
pect harmony and union. ' '
Lincoln's greatest apprehension during the last six
months of the war was that the South would not return
to the Union and recognize the authority of the govern
ment. He knew that the military power of the rebellion
was broken, but he knew that the bitterness that pre
vailed among the Southern people would "be an almost
insuperable barrier to anything like cordial reconstruc-
LINCOLN AND SHERMAN. 243
tion. He knew that they were impoverished, and he
feared almost universal anarchy in the South when the
shattered armies of the Confederacy should be broken
up, and, instead of a restoration of peace and industry
or anything approaching friendly relations between the
Southern people and the government, he anticipated
guerilla warfare, general disorder, and utter hopelessness
of tranquility throughout the rebellious States. It was
this grave apprehension that made Lincoln desire to close
the war upon such terms as would make the Southern
people and Southern soldiers think somewhat kindly of
the Union to which they were brought back by force of
arms. It was this apprehension that made him instruct
Sherman to recognize the civil governments of the South
until Congress should take action on the subject, and
that made him personally authorize General Weitzel to
permit the Virginia State government to reconvene, as
he himself stated it, to "take measures to withdraw the
Virginia troops and their support from resistance to the
general government." He meant to do precisely what
Sherman agreed to do in his terms with Johnston. On
Lincoln's return to Washington from Weitzel's head
quarters in Richmond he was surprised to find that his
consent to the reassembling of the Virginia State gov
ernment, like his proposed message offering $400,000,000
as compensation for slavery, was disapproved by the Cab
inet, and that it was likely to be disapproved by the
country. He was greatly distressed, and hesitated some
time before he attempted to extricate himself from the
complication. Secretary Welles, in the Galaxy of April,
1872, page 524, speaking of the question in the Cabinet,
says: "The subject had caused general surprise, and on
the part of some dissatisfaction and irritation. " Stanton
and Speed were especially disturbed about it, and Secre
tary Welles quotes Lincoln as finally saying that he " was
244 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
surprised that his object and the movement had been so
generally misconstrued, and under the circumstances per
haps it was best the proceeding should be abandoned."
In the mean time Lee's army had surrendered, and
Lincoln was given a reasonable opportunity to stop the
proposed meeting of the Virginia Legislature; and on
the 1 2th of April he wrote to General Weitzel that as
the proposed meeting had been misconstrued, and that
as Grant had since captured the Virginia troops, so that
they could not be withdrawn by the Virginia Legislature,
his letter to Judge Campbell should be recalled and the
legislature not allowed to assemble; but if any had come
in pursuance of the order to allow them a safe return to
their homes. In his interview with Judge Campbell and
others in relation to the proposed assembling of the Vir
ginia Legislature, Lincoln had distinctly agreed that if
Virginia could be peaceably restored to the Union, con
fiscation should be remitted to the people. The evidence
is multiplied on every side that Lincoln intended to give
the Virginians exemption from all the retributory laws
of war, including amnesty to all who obeyed the govern
ment, just as Sherman provided in his terms of surrender
with Johnston; but he was halted in his purpose, as he
was halted in his proposed compensated emancipation,
by the bitter resentments of the time, which prevailed
not only in his Cabinet, but throughout the country.
Had he been able to see Sherman after he had revoked
the authority for the Virginia Legislature to assemble,
he would doubtless have modified his instructions to him,
but Lincoln never again communicated with Sherman.
Two days after his revocation of the Weitzel order he
was assassinated, and four days after Lincoln's assassina
tion Sherman made his terms of surrender with John
ston. Had Lincoln been alive when Sherman's firs':
report of Johnston's surrender was received in
LINCOLN AND SHERMAN. 245
ton, his experience in assenting to the reassembling of
the Virginia State government would doubtless have
made him disapprove the terms given to Johnston in
obedience to Lincoln's instructions to Sherman; but he
would have cast no reproach upon the heroic victor of
Atlanta and Savannah, and would have manfully as
sumed his full share of responsibility for Sherman's
action.* What policy of reconstruction Lincoln would
* In a recent publication which I understand to be a fragment
of a forthcoming book from your pen you referred to the terms
of surrender which Gen. Sherman agreed to with Gen. Jo John
ston at the close of the civil war. You express the opinion that
had Mr. Lincoln been alive he would have rejected these terms,
but you censure Mr. Stanton very emphatically for publishing
the reasons for their disapproval. You seem to think that Mr.
Stanton in stating these reasons to Gen. John A. Dix, and per
mitting their publication, was guilty of a wanton and unneces
sary assault on Gen. Sherman. In reply to your criticism I beg
leave to submit to you the opposite view from yours expressed in
a letter written at the time by a statesman of calm temper and
good judgment. The letter is as follows:
WOODSTOCK, VT., June I4th, 1865.
DEAR SIR:
Gen. Sherman promulgated to his army and the world his ar
rangements with Johnston. Indeed, the armistice could be in no
other way accounted for, and the army were gratified with the ex
pectation of an immediate return home.
To reject that arrangement was clearly necessary, and to do it
without stating any reason for it would have been a very danger
ous experiment, both to the public and the army. Indeed, many
had serious apprehensions of its effect on the army even with the
conclusive reasons which w r ere given. Should not this view be
presented in any and every true manifesto of the case ?
Yours respectfully,
J. COIyIvAME)R.
HON. E. M. STANTON:
There is no ground for the belief that Mr. Stanton had any
other motive in the action he took than to guard against the
246 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
have adopted had he lived to complete his great work
cannot now be known; but it is entirely safe to assume
that, while he would have yielded to the mandatory sen
timent of the nation, he would in the end have taught
the country that ' ' with malice toward none, with char
ity for all, ' ' he could assure the world that ' ' government
of the people by the people and for the people shall not
perish from the earth."
danger of disturbances in the army and throughout the country,
which might have resulted had the inadmissible terms been re
jected without explanation. Hon. George C. Gorham to the Au
thor, February 16, 1892.
(From Sypher's Pennsylvania Reserves.)
ANDREW G. CURTIN, l86o.
LINCOLN AND CURTIN.
ANDREW G. CURTIN has written the most brilliant
-tV chapters in the annals of our great civil conflict by
his official record as Governor of Pennsylvania. I am
not unmindful, in paying this high tribute to the great
War Governor of the Union, that there are many Penn
sylvania names that have become memorable for their
heroism in the struggle for the preservation of our free
institutions. Nor am I unmindful that Pennsylvania
has within her borders the great battle-field of the war,
and that the names of such Pennsylvania heroes as
Meade, Reynolds, and Hancock are inseparably linked
with the decisive victory that gave assured safety and
unsullied freedom to the Union. While Pennsylvania
heroism was making itself immortal on every battle-field
of the war, the civil administration of the State was
more intimately involved with every issue growing out
of the war than that of any other State of the Republic.
Pennsylvania was second only to New York in popu
lation and physical power, and first of all in the import
ance of her position and in moulding the policy of the
States and their relations to the parent government.
Bordered by slave commonwealths from her eastern to
her western lines, and more exposed to the perils of war
than any of the other loyal States, her people were con
servative to the utmost limits of positive loyalty to the
Union. In January, 1861, when Curtin was inaugurated
248
LINCOLN AND CUR TIN. 249
as Governor, not a single Northern State had officially
denned its relations to the Union or its attitude as to the
threatened civil war, and any utterance from a State of
such pre-eminent physical and political power could not
but make its impression on every State of the Union,
North and South.
Few of the present day can have any just appreciation
of the exceptional delicacy and grave responsibility of
the position of the new Governor of Pennsylvania. An
ill-advised utterance from him might have wantonly in
flamed the war spirit of the South or chilled the loyal
devotion of the North. He was called upon to define,
in advance of all the other States, the position of the
North when confronted by armed treason, and there
were no precedents in our history to guide him. His
inaugural address was prepared entirely by himself be
fore he came to the capital to assume his most respon
sible trust. Before he delivered it he summoned to his
council a number of the most intelligent and considerate
men of both parties in the State, but after careful and
dispassionate reflection upon every sentence of the docu
ment it was not substantially changed in any particular,
and the highest tribute that history could pay to his
statesmanship is in the fact that the position of his great
State, and its relations with the general government as
defined in that address, were accepted by every loyal
State and vindicated alike by the loyal judgment of the
nation and by the arbitrament of the sword.
Curtin stood single among the public men of Pennsyl
vania in 1860 as a popular leader. His strength was
with the people rather than in political invention. He
had made himself conspicuously known by his services
as Secretary of the Commonwealth when that officer was
charged with the control of the school system. It was
he who first organized a distinct department to extend
250 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
and elevate our schools, and he succeeded in greatly
liberalizing our educational system and starting it on
the high way to its present matchless advancement. As
early as 1844 he had made himself known as one of the
most eloquent stump-speakers of the State, and from that
time until his nomination for Governor in 1860 he was in
the forefront of every political contest, and was greeted
with boundless enthusiasm by his political followers
wherever he appeared. When the great battle of 1860
was to be fought Pennsylvania was accepted by all as a
doubtful State, and as her vote in October would be the
unerring finger-board of national victory or defeat in
November, it became not only a State but a national
necessity for the Republicans to nominate their most
available candidate to lead in that pivotal contest. The
Republican people, almost as with one voice, demanded
the nomination of Curtin, and there would have been no
other name presented to the convention but for the pecu
liar political complications arising from General Came
ron being a candidate for President before the same con
vention, and bitterly hostile to Curtin. But despite the
peculiar power of Cameron as an organizer and manager
of political conventions, he was finally compelled to
assent to Curtin' s nomination without being able to
obtain an earnestly united delegation in his favor for
President. When Curtin was called before the conven
tion to accept the leadership conferred upon rjim, he
aroused the enthusiasm of that body and of his party
friends throughout the State by declaring that he ac
cepted the flag of the convention and would carry it in
the front of battle from Lake Brie to the Delaware; and
he grandly fulfilled his promise. He was one of the
most magnetic popular speakers Pennsylvania has ever
known, combining matchless wit, keen invective, and
persuasive argument with singular felicity, and his tow-
LINCOLN AND CURTIN. 251
ering and symmetrical form and his genial face and
manner made him the most effective of all our men on
the hustings. He was aggressive from the day he entered
the battle until it closed with his magnificent victory that
declared him Governor by a majority of over thirty-two
thousand.
Many circumstances combined to bring Lincoln and
Curtin into the closest official and personal relations
from Lincoln's nomination until his death. As I have
shown in a previous chapter, the nomination of Lincoln
was made possible by two men Henry S. Lane of Indi
ana and Curtin of Pennsylvania. Both would have been
defeated had Seward been nominated, and Curtin' s first
great struggle to give himself even a winning chance in
Pennsylvania was his effort to defeat the nomination of
Seward at Chicago. After that had been accomplished
he united with Lane to nominate Lincoln. He and Lin
coln never met until Curtin received the President-elect
on his way to Washington on the 22d of February, 1861,
and it was at the dinner given to Lincoln by Curtin on
the evening of that day that Lincoln's route was changed
and he suddenly started on his memorable midnight jour
ney to the national capital. The appointment of Came
ron to the Lincoln Cabinet was regarded by Curtin as
unfortunate, and would have made very strained rela
tions between Lincoln and Curtin had not both been
singularly generous in all their impulses and actions.
Notwithstanding the frequent irritating complications
which arose between the Secretary of War and the Gov
ernor in the organization of troops in the early part of
the war, there never was a shadow upon the relations
of these two men. Curtin was profoundly loyal and an
enthusiast in everything pertaining to the war. He was
proud of his great State, and especially of the hundreds
of thousands of heroes she sent to the field, and so tire-
252 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES,
less in his great work that he always commanded the
sincerest affection and confidence of the President. Al
though often disappointed in the political action of the
national administration, and at times keenly grieved per
sonally because of political honors unworthily conferred,
or withheld from those he deemed most worthy of them,
he never for a moment lost sight of his paramount duty
to give unfaltering support to the government in the
great struggle for the maintenance of the Union.
The two men of the country who are distinctly upon
record as having appreciated the magnitude of the war
when it first began are General Sherman and Governor
Curtin. Sherman was judged a lunatic and relieved of
his command in Kentucky because he told the govern
ment the exact truth as to the magnitude of the rebellion
in the South-west and the forces necessary to overthrow
it. In a little time the country began to appreciate Sher
man's military intelligence. He was finally permitted to
go to the front in command of a division, and in his first
battle he proved himself to be one of the most skillful
and courageous of our generals. Curtin proved his ap
preciation of the necessities of our imperiled government
by issuing his proclamation on the 25th of April, 1861,
calling for twenty-five additional regiments of infantry
and one of cavalry to serve for three years or during the
war, in addition to the quota furnished by Pennsylvania
under the President's call of April 15, 1861, summoning
75,000 three months' men to the field. This call of Cur
tin was made without the authority of the general gov
ernment, and entirely without the knowledge of the
President or Secretary of War. Pennsylvania and the
whole loyal North had been cut off from all communi
cation with the national capital for several days by trea
sonable rioters in Baltimore, who burned the railroad
bridges and prevented all railroad or even telegraphic
LINCOLN AND CURTIN. 253
communication with Washington. In this grave emer
gency, although Pennsylvania had furnished every man
called for by the government, and had offered many more
than the quota, after the most careful study of the situ
ation with General Robert Patterson and Colonel Fitz
John Porter, then serving as Assistant Adjutant-General,
and a number of civilians who were heartily sustaining
Curtin in his arduous labors, it was decided to assume
the responsibility of calling out twenty-six additional
regiments for service under the general government, be
cause it was believed by all that they would be needed as
speedily as they could be obtained. *
The requisition for troops made by Pennsylvania was
in pursuance of the unanimous judgment of the military
and civil authorities then at Harrisburg, and it was not
doubted that the government would gratefully accept
them. The response to Curtin' s proclamation for vol-
* HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF WASHINGTON,
PHILADELPHIA, April 25th, 1861.
SIR:
I feel it my duty to express to you my clear and decided opin
ion that the force at the disposal of this department should be
increased without delay.
I therefore have to request Your Excellency to direct that
twenty-five additional regiments of infantry and one regiment
of cavalry be called for forthwith, to be mustered into the service
of the United States.
Officers will be detailed to inspect and muster the men into
service as soon as I am informed of the points of rendezvous
which may be designated by Your Excellency.
I have the honor to be, with great respect,
Your obedient servant,
R. PATTERSON,
Major- General.
His Excellency ANDREW G. CURTIN,
Governor of Pennsylvania.
254 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
unteers was unexampled, and in the few days during
which Harrisburg was without communication with
Washington thousands of patriotic men were crowding
the trains for the capital from every part of the State
to enter the military service. To the utter surprise of
the Governor and the commander of the department,
the first communication received from Washington after
notice of this requisition for additional troops had been
forwarded was a blunt refusal to receive any of the regi
ments under the new call; and to emphasize the attitude
of the government and its appreciation of the magnitude
of the war, Secretary Cameron stated in a dispatch to the
Governor not only that the troops could not be received,
but "that it was more important to reduce than enlarge
the number. ' ' Earnest appeals were made to the Presi
dent and the War Department from the Governor and
General Patterson to have these troops, or at least part
of them, accepted, but every such appeal was met with
a positive refusal. John Sherman, then as now Senator
from Ohio, was a volunteer aide on General Patterson's
staff, and he fully agreed with the authorities at Harris-
burg that it was of the utmost importance to the govern
ment that the additional Pennsylvania troops be accepted.
In view of his important political position and presumed
influence with the President and Secretary of War, he
was hurried to Washington as soon as communications
were opened to make a personal appeal for the accept
ance of the troops. On the 3oth of May, five days after
the requisition had been made, he wrote General Patter
son from Washington, stating that he had entirely failed
to persuade the government to accept any part of these
new regiments. It was not within the power of the gov
ernment to depose Governor Curtin and order him to
some military barracks as a lunatic, but it could rebuke
him for proposing to furnish a large number of addi-
LINCOLN AND CURTIN. 255
tional troops, when, as subsequent events proved, the
government had the most pressing need for them. For
tunately for the government and for the complete vindi
cation of the broad sagacity and heroic fidelity of Curtin,
he resolved to perform his duty to his State and nation
regardless of the Washington authorities.
After a bitter contest, in which some prominent Re
publicans opposed the Governor's recommendations, a
bill had been passed by the Legislature some weeks be
fore appropriating half a million of dollars to provide for
the defense of the State, and he had issued his call for
an extraordinary session of the Legislature as early as
the 2oth of April to meet the great issue of civil war.
He revoked his proclamation for additional regiments
called for by General Patterson's requisition, but much
more than one-half the number called for had already
volunteered, and were practically in charge of the State
for organization. When the special session of the Leg
islature met on the 3oth of April he sent an earnest mes
sage calling for the organization of the volunteers then
in camp into fifteen regiments as a State corps, but to be
subject to the call of the United States in any emergency.
It was this brave action of Curtin that gave us the Penn
sylvania Reserve Corps, whose heroism crimsoned nearly
every battle-field of the Army of the Potomac. These
troops were organized not only without the aid of the
national government, but in defiance of its refusal to
accept them and of its positive declarations that they
could not and would not be needed. It was a most
heroic policy on the part of Curtin. It involved a loan
of $3,000,000 when the credit of the State was severely
strained, and every partisan or factional foe was inspired
to opposition by the known fact that the national govern
ment declared additional troops to be entirely unneces
sary. The Legislature and the people had faith in Cur-
256 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
tin, had faith in his integrity, his patriotism, and his
judgment, of the nation's peril, and the bill creating a
loan and organizing fifteen regiments of the Reserve
Corps was passed by an overwhelming majority in both
branches of the Legislature. He had around him a
number of leading men of both parties who cheerfully
gave their time and ceaseless labor to assist him. Among
those I recall who sat in his councils by day and night to
strengthen his hands by voluntary service on his staff
were such men as the late Thomas A. Scott, John A.
Wright, R. Biddle Roberts, Reuben C. Hale, and John
B. Parker, and Craig Biddle and Joseph E. Potts, who
yet survive. These men, as well as the military officers
on duty in Pennsylvania with General Patterson, all
heartily concurred in the policy of the Governor and
shared his vindication at an early day.
Even before the disastrous battle of Bull Run was
fought on the 2ist of July, two of the Reserve regiments
were called for by the government to march to Cumber
land to the relief of Colonel Wallace, and the regiments
commanded by Colonel Charles J. Biddle and Colonel
Simmons and a battery of artillery were on the march
the same day the order was received, and soon thereafter
the Tenth regiment followed. Notwithstanding the re
fusal to entertain the question of accepting these troops,
Curtin again tendered the Reserve Corps to the govern
ment on the 1 8th of July, just before the battle of Bull
Run, and the same day brought orders from the War
Department that four regiments should be sent to Ha-
gerstown and the remaining, exclusive of those in West
Virginia, should be sent to Baltimore. These regiments
were encamped at Pittsburg, Easton, West Chester, and
Harrisburg, and the Governor at once ordered them to
march as requested by the Washington authorities. His
answer to the request to forward the troops was in these
LINCOLN AND CUR TIN. 257
words: u All the regiments have been ordered to Harris-
burg in obedience to your dispatch just received, and on
arrival will be immediately forwarded to the seat of war,
as previously ordered. If there is not time to muster
them in at this place, mustering officers can follow them
into the field." Had these troops been on the battle
field of Bull Run, as they could have been had not the
government persistently refused to accept them, it would
have given an overwhelming preponderance of numbers
to the Union forces, and doubtless reversed the disaster
of that day. On the night of July 2ist, when the gov
ernment learned that the army had been routed at Bull
Run, most frantic appeals were made to Curtin from the
Washington authorities to hasten his troops to the front
to save the National Capital, and within twenty-four
hours after the retreat of McDowell's army into the
Washington fortifications the welcome tread of the Penn
sylvania Reserves was heard on Pennsylvania Avenue,
and the panic was allayed and confidence restored by
regiment after regiment of the once-rejected troops
hurrying to Washington. One dispatch from the War
Department thus appeals to Curtin: " Get your regiments
at Harrisburg, Easton, and other points ready for imme
diate shipment. Lose no time in preparing. Make
things move to the utmost." Another dispatch said:
"To-morrow won't do for your regiments; you must
have them to-night. Send them to-night. It is of the
utmost importance." Another appeal to him said: " Stop
the regiment at Green castle, and send it to Washington
to-night. Do not fail. ' ' Thus the war authorities that
had treated with contempt the appeals of Curtin to accept
the troops he had called for when cut off from the na
tional capital, in a few months thereafter sent the most
earnest appeals to him to save them from their own folly
17
258 LINCOLN AND MEN Of WAR-TIMES.
by forwarding the troops he had organized in defiance of
their protest.
I speak advisedly when I say that there was not a sin
gle new phase of the war at any time that did not sum
mon Curtin to the councils of Lincoln. He was the first
man called to Washington after the surrender of Sumter,
and I accompanied him in obedience to a like summons
to me as chairman of the Military Committee of the Sen
ate. Pennsylvania was to sound the keynote for all the
loyal States of the North in the utterance of her loyal
Governor, and her action was to be the example for
every other State of the Union. How grandly Curtin
performed that duty is proved by the fact that he organ
ized and furnished to the national government during
the war 367,482 soldiers, and organized, in addition to
that number, 87,000 for domestic defense during the
same period. New duties and grave responsibilities
were multiplied upon him every week, but he was al
ways equal to them, and was a tireless enthusiast in the
performance of his labors. Three times during the war
was his State invaded by the enemy, and at one time
90,000 of L,ee's army, with L,ee himself at their head,
were within the borders of our State on their way to
their Waterloo at Gettysburg. While responding with
the utmost promptness to every call of the national gov
ernment, whether for troops or for moral or political sup
port, he was most zealous in making provision for the
defense of his exposed people in the border counties.
He had an ample force within the State to protect the
border against raids by the enemy, and would have saved
Chambersburg from destruction by the vandal torch, had
not his own State troops been ordered away from him to
save General Hunter after his disgraceful and disastrous
raid into Virginia in 1864. Hunter's vandalism had
justly inflamed the South, and when he was driven
ZAV( OLN AND CURTIN. 259
across the Potomac the Pennsylvania regiments organ
ized for the special defense of the State, being subject
to orders from Washington because mustered into the
United States service, passed through Chambersburg,
within forty-eight hours of the period of its destruction,
to join Hunter in Maryland and save him from the retri
bution his folly had invited. Had these Pennsylvania
troops remained subject to the orders of the State author
ities, they could have been in Chambersburg before
McCausland reached there, and would have outnum
bered him nearly three to one. Chambersburg was thus
destroyed solely because of the grave emergency that
called the State troops to the support of Hunter, and
they were almost within sound of McCausland' s guns
when he opened on the defenseless people of Chambers
burg at daylight on the 3Oth of July, 1864, before he
entered the town to destroy it.
Curtin's relations with Stanton were never entirely
cordial and at times embarrassing; but Lincoln always
interposed when necessary, and almost invariably sus
tained Curtin when a vital issue was raised between
them. The fact that Lincoln supported Curtin against
Stanton many times greatly irritated the Secretary of
War, and doubtless intensified his bitterness against the
Pennsylvania War Governor. In one notable instance
only, in which Curtin and Stanton were in bitter con
flict, did Lincoln hesitate to sustain Curtin, but Lincoln
was overruled by his military commanders and bowed to
their exactions with profound reluctance. In the winter
or early spring of 1864, Curtin, always alive to the inter
ests of humanity, and feeling keenly the sorrows of the
Pennsylvania soldiers who were in Southern prison-pens
suffering from disease and starvation, went to Washing
ton on three different occasions and appealed to both
Stanton and Lincoln for the exchange of prisoners as
260 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
the Southern commissioners proposed. We then held
about 30,000 Southern prisoners, and the South held as
many or more of Union soldiers, and General Grant,
looking solely to military success, peremptorily refused
to permit the exchange of these men, because L,ee would
gain nearly 30,000 effective soldiers, while most of the
30,060 Union prisoners would be unfit for service because
of illness. On Curtin's third visit to Washington on that
subject he was accompanied by Attorney-General Wil
liam M. Meredith, and they both earnestly pressed upon
the government the prompt exchange of prisoners. Stan-
ton grew impatient and even insolent, retorting to the
Governor's appeal: " Do you come here in support of the
government and ask me to exchange 30,000 skeletons for
30,000 well-fed men?" To which Curtin replied with
all the earnestness of his humane impulses: "Do you
dare to depart from the laws of humane warfare in this
enlightened age of Christian civilization ?' ' Curtin and
Meredith carried their appeal to Lincoln, who shared all
of Curtin's sympathies for our suffering prisoners, and
who exerted himself to the utmost, only to effect a par
tial exchange. In 1863, when Curtin was a candidate
for re-election, Stanton gave most earnest support to his
cause, notwithstanding he rarely spoke of Curtin person
ally except with bitterness. Curtin keenly appreciated
what Stanton had done, and went to Washington soon
after his election with the purpose of paying his respects
to Stanton and thanking him for the hearty support he
had given him. A mutual acquaintance, who knew that
Curtin was in Washington to pay his respects to Stanton,
happened to meet Stanton during the evening and spoke
with much enthusiasm of Curtin's victory, and of his
presence there to visit and thank the Secretary of War.
Stanton replied in his cynical way : ' ( Yes, Pennsylvania
must be a damned loyal State to give such a victory to
LINCOLN AND CUR TIN. 261
Curtin." This was repeated to Curtin the same even
ing, and the result was that Curtin' s visit to the War
Office was indefinitely postponed, and Stanton died
without having received the thanks that Curtin had in
tended for him. Soon after the war was over, however,
Stanton seemed to have justly appreciated Curtin, as he
wrote him a voluntary and most affectionate letter, re
viewing the great work he had done as Governor of
Pennsylvania, thanking him for his patriotism and fidel
ity, and offering a full apology for anything that he
might have done to give him unpleasant recollections.
Lincoln played a most conspicuous part in Curtin' s
second nomination and re-election. So profoundly was
Curtin impressed with the necessity of uniting all par
ties in the support of the war for the suppression of the
rebellion that he was the first man to suggest his own
retirement from the office of Governor if the Democrats
would present the name of General William B. Frank
lin, a gallant Pennsylvania Democratic soldier. I was
present when Curtin first made this suggestion to a
number of his friends, and he made it with a degree of
earnestness that impressed every one. He said that it
was vastly more important to thus unite the whole
Democratic party with the Republicans on an honest
war platform than that any party or any individual
should win political success. So earnestly did he press
the matter that communication was opened w r ith a num
ber of leading Democrats of the State, many of whom
regarded the suggestion with favor and sought to accom
plish it. Unfortunately for the Democracy, the more
Bourbon element controlled its councils and a Supreme
Judge who had declared the national conscription act
unconstitutional, thereby depriving the government of
the power to fill its wasted armies, was nominated for
Governor when the thunders of Lee's guns were heard
262 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
in the Cumberland Valley and almost within hearing of
the capital where the convention sat. Had Franklin
been nominated by the Democrats, Curtin would have
publicly declared for him, and the Republican Conven
tion would have welcomed him as their candidate, re
gardless of his political faith. Failing in that move
ment, there seemed to be but one hopeful loyal candi
date for Governor Curtin himself. He was broken in
health and entirely unequal to the strain of a desperate
battle. In political contests he was expected to be
leader of leaders in Pennsylvania. In addition to his
shattered health, there were over 70,000 of his soldiers
in the field who had not then the constitutional right to
vote in their camps, while the bitter factional feud be
tween the Curtin and Cameron wings of the party seri
ously threatened his defeat. Curtin' s greatest desire,
next to the faithful fulfillment of the high responsi
bilities cast upon him, was to retire from public office
and recover his physical vigor. It was believed in his
own household that he could not survive another polit
ical campaign in which he was compelled to take the
lead. His devoted and estimable wife, who brightened
every public honor he attained, appealed to me with
tears in her eyes to take absolute measures to retire him
from the field, and the Governor heartily assented if he
could be permitted to retire in any way honorable to
himself.
Of Curtin' s renomination there was no doubt what
ever if he permitted his name to be used, and it became
merely a question how he could retire gracefully. En
trusted with this matter, acting entirely upon my own
judgment, I went to Washington, called upon Colonel
Forney and told him my mission. I said: "Senator
Cameron will desire the retirement of Curtin because he
is his enemy ; I desire it because I am his friend ; may we
LINCOLN AND CURTIN. 263
not co-operate in bringing it about ?" Cameron was sent
for; the matter was presented to him, and he at once said,
with some asperity, that ' ' Curtin should be got rid of. ' '
I suggested that if Lincoln would tender to Curtin a
foreign mission in view of his broken health, it would
solve the difficulty and enable Curtin to retire. To this
Cameron agreed, and within half an hour thereafter we
startled Lincoln by appearing before him together, ac
companied by Forney. It was the first time Cameron
and I had appeared before Lincoln to unite in asking
him to perform any public act. I stated the case briefly
but frankly, and he promptly responded that Curtin was
entitled to the honor suggested, and that it would be a
great pleasure to him to tender him the place. ' * But, ' '
said he, "I'm in the position of young Sheridan when
old Sheridan called him to task for his rakish conduct,
and said to him that he must take a wife; to which young
Sheridan replied: ' Very well, father, but whose wife shall
I take?' It's all very well," he added, "to say that I
will give Curtin a mission, but whose mission am I to
take ? I would not offer him anything but a first-class
one." To this Cameron replied that a second-class mis
sion would answer the purpose, but Forney and I resented
that, and said that if a second-class mission was to be dis
cussed we had nothing further to say. Lincoln closed
the conference by suggesting that as it seemed to be my
affair I should call to see him in the morning. I did so,
when Lincoln handed me the following autograph letter,
tendering Curtin a first-class mission, to be accepted at
the close of his gubernatorial term:
EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, April 13, 1863.
HONORABLE ANDREW G. CURTIN.
MY DEAR SIR : If, after the expiration of your present term as
Governor of Pennsylvania I shall continue in office here, and you
LINCOLN AND CUR TIN. 265
shall desire to go abroad, you can do so with one of the first-class
missions. Yours truly,
ABRAHAM LINCOI/N.
This letter I delivered to Curtin. The announcement
was at once made to the Associated Press that a foreign
mission had been tendered to Curtin, that he had signi
fied his acceptance of it, and that he would not be a can
didate for renomination for Governor. The popular de
mand for Curtin' s renomination came with such emphasis
from every section of the State that within a few weeks
after his declination he was compelled to accept the can
didacy, and he was nominated in Pittsburg by an over
whelming majority on the first ballot, and after one of
the most desperate contests ever known in the State was
re-elected by over 15,000 majority, even with his soldiers
disfranchised. Lincoln exhibited unusual interest in that
struggle, and his congratulations to Curtin upon his re
election were repeated for several days, and were often as
quaint as they were sincere.
The secret of Curtin' s re-election in 1863 was the de
votion of the Pennsylvania soldiers to him and his cause.
He was the earliest of all the Governors in the States to
devise and put into practical execution every measure
that could lessen the sorrows of war to his people. After
every battle in which Pennsylvania troops were engaged
Curtin was always among the first visitors to camp and
hospital, and his sympathetic hand was felt and his voice
heard by the sick and wounded. He had his official
commissioners to visit every part of the country in search
of Pennsylvania troops needing kind ministrations, and
early in the war he obtained legislative authority to
bring the body of every soldier who was killed or died
in the service home for burial at the cost of the State.
Every Pennsylvania soldier in the army felt that he had
266 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
one friend upon whom he could always rely in the War
Governor of his State, and many hundreds of letters
poured in upon Curtin at the Capitol every day appeal
ing to him for redress from real or imaginary grievances,
every one of which was promptly answered. If injustice
was done to any Pennsylvania officer or any hindrance
of gallant men in the ranks from just promotion, an early
appeal to Curtin invariably brought him to the front to
correct it. It is not surprising, therefore, that when he
became a candidate for re-election and was assailed on
every side with bitterness, nearly every soldier in the
army, whether Democrat or Republican, appealed to his
people at home to support and vote for Curtin. While
the soldiers were themselves unable to testify their ap
preciation of their patriotic Governor at the polls, every
soldier at home on leave, however unskilled in rhetoric,
was a most eloquent advocate of Curtin' s re-election, and
there was hardly a home in the State that had a soldier
in the field to which did not come earnest appeals by
letters to fathers and brothers to vote for the Soldier's
Friend. Thus was Curtin re-elected by a large majority,
and by the votes of Democrats who were influenced solely
by their sympathy with their sons and brothers in the
field whose gratitude to Curtin was reflected in almost
every family circle.
It was on Thanksgiving Day of 1863 that Curtin first
conceived the idea of State provision for the care and
education of the orphans of our fallen soldiers. While
on his way in Harrisburg to hear Dr. Robinson's Thanks
giving sermon, he was met by two shivering and starving
children, who piteously appealed to him to relieve them
of their distress, saying that their father had been killed
on the Peninsula and that their mother was broken in
health by her efforts to provide for them. He was so
deeply impressed and his sympathies so keenly aroused
LINCOLN AND CURTIN. 267
by the children that he heard little of the eloquent ser
mon. He remembered that all over Pennsylvania there
were such orphans without home or bread, and he re
solved from that day that some provision should be made
for the care of these helpless little ones. Soon after he
presided at a meeting at which Henry Ward Beecher was
the speaker. Beecher had just returned from England,
where he had been most eloquent in his defense of the
Union cause, and he was welcomed in Pennsylvania with
enthusiasm by the loyal people. In Curtin's introductory
speech he, for the first time, made public allusion to the
duty of the State to provide for the orphans of our sol
diers who had fallen in battle, and the suggestion was
greeted with round after round of applause. Some time
before that period the Pennsylvania Railroad had placed
at the disposal of the State $50,000 to equip troops. The
money was received by Curtin, but he had no need to
use it for the equipment of troops, and if he had covered
it into the treasury, it would have merged into the gen
eral fund. This money lay idle on special deposit for
some months, and Curtin conceived the plan of making
it the basis of a fund for the care of our soldiers' orphans.
To this President Thomson assented, and with $50,000
already assured, the Governor presented the subject to
the Legislature in his annual message, and earnestly
urged early action. There was much hesitation to sup
port such a bill, and no progress was made in it until
near the close of the session. The bill was finally de
feated, and when the next Legislature met Curtin ar
ranged with President Thomson for the transportation
of a large number of our soldiers' orphans to visit Har-
risburg. They were sent free of cost for transportation,
and were received into the homes of generous people, ten
of them being guests of Curtin in the Executive Man
sion. They came bearing the flag under which their
268 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
fathers had fallen, and the House received them at three
o'clock, when patriotic speeches were made, the little
orphans sang patriotic songs, and Curtin made a most
eloquent appeal to the Legislature to make these chil
dren the wards of the commonwealth. The Legislature
speedily retraced its steps, passed the bill, and the Gov
ernor had the gratification of signing it the next morn
ing. Such was the beginning of the Soldiers' Orphans'
Schools which have lasted now for nearly thirty years,
which have educated thousands and thousands of the
war orphans of the State, and are still performing that
humane mission to the few yet in our midst. In this
sublime beneficence to the helpless children of our heroes
Pennsylvania stands single and alone among the loyal
States, and there has not been a class of orphans in any
school in Pennsylvania that has not lisped the name of
Curtin with affectionate reverence.
Some of the most momentous official acts of Curtin' s
public career have almost passed from the recollection
of the men of the present who lived at that day, yet they
rendered the greatest service to the national government
when it was in the gravest peril. After the disastrous
Peninsula campaign it became a necessity to summon a
large additional force to the field, and it was regarded as
a dangerous experiment in view of the despairing condi
tion of public sentiment in the North. Volunteering
had entirely ceased; there was at that time no national
conscription act; the appeal had to be made directly to
the States to raise their respective quotas of troops. As
was common in every serious emergency, Curtin was
called into the councils of Lincoln, and the subject dis
cussed with a full appreciation of the solemn responsi
bilities that devolved upon both of them. It was Cur-
tin's suggestion that the Governors of the loyal States
should be conferred with and got to unite in a formal
LINCOLN AND CURTIN, 269
demand upon the President to call out a large additional
force. Eighteen loyal Governors responded, and on the
28th of June, 1862, they aroused every loyal heart in the
country by their bold demand for the promptest measures
to fill up our armies and for the most vigorous prosecu
tion of the war. The address concludes with this patri
otic sentence: " All believe that the decisive moment is
near at hand, and to that end the people of the United
States are desirous to aid promptly in furnishing all rein
forcements that you may deem necessary to sustain our
government." This address was delivered in person by
a number of the Governors themselves, and Lincoln re
plied: "Gentlemen: Fully concurring in the wisdom of
the views expressed to me in so patriotic a manner by
you in the communication of the 28th of June, I have
decided to call into the service an additional force of
300,000 men." The Altoona conference of the loyal
Governors was originally proposed by Curtin to Lincoln
and cordially approved by the President before the call
was issued. It was a supreme necessity to crystallize the
loyal sentiment of the country in support of the coming
and then clearly foreshadowed Emancipation policy.
Curtin telegraphed Governor Andrew of Massachusetts:
' ' In the present emergency would it not be well that the
loyal Governors should meet at some point in the Border
States to take measures for the more active support of
the government?" The Governors of Massachusetts,
Ohio, and West Virginia responded promptly, and the
call was issued on the 14! a of September, and the Al
toona conference met on the 24th, the day after the
Emancipation Proclamation had been published to the
world. There were seventeen Governors in attendance,
and after a full interchange of views, Curtin and Andrew
were charged with the duty of preparing an address to
the President and the country. That address, coming ar
2 yo LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
the united voice of the loyal States through their Gov
ernors, was regarded by Lincoln as of inestimable service
to the cause of the Union. It not only gave the keynote
for every loyal man to support the Emancipation policy,
but it suggested to the President to call out additional
troops to keep a reserve of 100,000 men for any emer
gency of the war.*
* In 1862, after the disaster on the Peninsula, and when I was
in New York under medical treatment and not able to receive my
personal friends, I sent for a newspaper and read of the defeat of
McClellan's army. Soon after a messenger came to see me from
Mr. Seward, who was at the Astor House, inviting me to meet
Mr. Seward, saying that he would come to see me if I could not
go to see him. With much risk and suffering I went at once to
the Astor House, where I found Mr. Seward with the Mayor of
New York and the Mayor of Philadelphia, who were then con
sidering the question of going to Boston. Mr. Seward gave me
all the telegrams from the front, which I read carefully, and found
that of McClellan's army there were not over 80,000 effectives left.
I suggested to Mr. Seward that it might be better to ask the Gov
ernors of the loyal States than the Mayors of our cities to unite
in an address to the President, asking for a more vigorous prose
cution of the war and an immediate call for additional troops.
He asked me to put it in writing. I did so, and he immediately
telegraphed it to the President, who prompt^ answered that it
was just what he wanted done. I at once prepared a telegram
to the other Governors, and Colonel Scott, who happened to be
there, hurried it off to all the Governors of the loyal States. Ap
proving answers were received from all but Governor Andrew,
who made the objection that a public policy should be declared,
which of course meant Emancipation. The names of the Gov
ernors were appended to the paper, and it was immediately re
turned to Lincoln. Governor Andrew afterward acquiesced, and
I then wrote him asking his views as to the propriety of calling
the loyal Governors to meet at Altoona for the purpose of declar
ing a policy and demanding a more vigorous prosecution of the
war. He agreed to it at once, and we commenced writing and
telegraphing to the Governors, and I had favorable answers to
all excepting Governor Morgan of New York, whose relations
with me were not friendly. Governor Andrew, Governor Todd,
(Photo by Brady, Washington.)
ANDREW G. CURTIN, 1892.
272 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
Thus, from the day that Curtin welcomed Lincoln in
the Hall of the House of Representatives at Harrisburg
when on his way* to be inaugurated, until their last meet
ing in the same hall when it was the chamber of death,
and sorrowing patriots passed silently through it to take
their last look upon the face of the martyred President,
he was side by side with Lincoln in every trial; and,
backed by his great State, he was enabled to render a
service to the President and to the country unapproached
by any other Governor of the Union. How gratefully
his public record was appreciated by the people of Penn
sylvania of that day is clearly shown by reference to the
journals of our Legislature of April 12, 1866, when a
resolution was passed, by unanimous vote in both
branches, thanking him, in the name of Pennsylvania,
u for the fidelity with which, during the four years of
war by which our country was ravaged and its free in
stitutions threatened, he stood by the national govern
ment and cast into the scales of loyalty and the Union
the honor, the wealth, and the strength of the State."
These resolutions were offered in the House by Repre-
and myself consulted Mr. Lincoln, and tie highly approved of
oiir purpose. In that interview he did not attempt to conceal
the fact that we were upon the eve of an Emancipation policy,
and he had from us the assurance that the Altoona conference
would cordially endorse such a policy. All that was done at the
Altoona conference had the positive approval of President Lin
coln in advance, and he well understood that the whole purpose
of the movement was to strengthen his hands and support the
bolder policy that all then knew was inevitable. The address
presented to Mr. Lincoln from the Altoona conference was pre
pared by Governor Andrew and myself. I did not then doubt
that it would lose us the coming election in Pennsylvania, and
so said to Mr. Lincoln, but I believed that the country then knew
what the war was about, and that it was time to bring slavery to
the front as the great issue. Ex-Governor Curtin' s Letter to the
Author, Feb. 16, 1892,
LINCOLN AND CUR TIN. 273
sentative Ruddimaii, the Republican leader of that body,
and were passed by a vote of 97 ayes and no nays, being
within 3 of the entire membership of the body.* On
the same day the resolutions were called up in the Sen
ate by Senator Wallace, the Democratic leader of that
body, and on the call of the ayes and nays received the
vote of every Senator. No Governor of any State ever
received such a tribute as this from all parties when
about to retire from his high office after six years of ser
vice during the most heated partisan and factional strife
* Whereas, The term of His Excellency Andrew G. Curtin as
Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania will expire
with the present year, and the Legislature of the State will not
stand toward him in the relation of official courtesy and personal
regard which they have heretofore sustained;
And whereas, This House cannot contemplate his course dur
ing the recent struggle of our country without admiration of the
patriotism which made him one of the earliest, foremost, and
most constant of the supporters of the government, and without
commendation of the spirit which has prompted him with un
tiring energy and at the sacrifice of personal repose and health
to give to the soldier in the field and in the hospital, and to the
cause for which the soldier fell and died, fullest sympathy and
aid; be it
Resolved, That in the name of the Commonwealth of Pennsyl
vania we tender to Governor Curtin our thanks for the fidelity
with which, during the four years of war by which our country
was ravaged and its free institutions threatened, he stood by the
national government and cast into the scale of loyalty and the
Union the honor, the wealth, and strength of the State.
Resolved, That by his devotion to his country, from the dark
hour in which he pledged to the late lamented President of the
United States the faith and steadfast support of our people, he
has gained for his name an historical place and character, and
while rendering himself deserving of the nation's gratitude he
has added lustre to the fame and glory to the name of the Com
monwealth over which he has presided during two terms of office
with so much ability, and in which he has tempered dignity with
kindness and won the high respect and confidence of the people.
18
274 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES,
ever known in our political history. Again on the 6th
of April, 1869, when he had been a private citizen for
several years, the Legislature passed joint resolutions of
thanks to President Grant for his appointment of Curtin
as Minister to Russia, and they received the vote of every
member present of both branches, and were approved by
Governor Geary on the following day.* In 1868 the
Republican State Convention proclaimed Curtin with
almost entire unanimity for the Vice- Presidency of the
United States on the ticket with Grant, who was then
the accepted candidate of the party for President, and I
went to Chicago as chairman of the Pennsylvania dele
gation to present his name and cast the vote of the State
for her honored War Governor.
Political necessities rather than individual merit con
trolled the National Convention, and Schuyler Colfax
* Joint Resolutions relative to the appointment of Andrew
Gregg Curtin Minister to Russia:
Whereas, His Excellency the President of the United States
has appointed Andrew Gregg Curtin, the former Chief Magis
trate of this Commonwealth, to a high and responsible position
in the representation at the Court of the ruler of the European
nation whose boast is that he has always been a friend of the
United States of America;
Be it resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in General Assembly met,
That the best wishes of the members of this Assembly be con
veyed to His Excellency Andrew G. Curtin, Minister Plenipo
tentiary and Envoy Extraordinary of the United States at St.
Petersburg, Russia, for his restoration to health, so much impaired
by his heroic and constant labors in behalf of this Commonwealth,
and that he has and always will receive the grateful assurance of
the high regard and esteem in which he is held by his fellow-citi
zens, without regard to partisan -views, on account of the noble
and self-sacrificing spirit displayed by him alike in the hours of
victory and defeat, and the fidelity with which he executed the
solemn and responsible trusts committed to his hands by his fel
low-citizens.
LI.\COLN' AFD CUR TIN. 275
was taken to turn the scale in doubtful Indiana; but
Curtin was, as ever, in the front of the battle, as Grant
gratefully acknowledged by nominating him as Minister
to Russia a few days after the inauguration. He had
been offered the same mission by President Johnson sev
eral years earlier, but his fidelity to the cause that had
enlisted the best efforts of his life forbade his even con
sidering it. In the Republican revolt against the des
potic political and sectional policy of Grant in 1872,
Curtin sincerely sympathized with the Liberals, and he
resigned his mission to obtain freedom in political action.
When on his way home he was met in both Paris and
London by authorized offers of either of those missions
if he would remain abroad, but he declined. On his
return home he was nominated by the Liberal Repub
licans for delegate-at-large to the Constitutional Conven
tion, and Ex-Governor Bigler voluntarily retired from
the Democratic ticket to enable that party to tender Cur
tin an unanimous nomination, resulting in his election.
His exceptional experience in State government made
him one of the most practical and useful members of
the body, and many of the most beneficent reforms of
the new fundamental law are of his creation. In 1880,
and again in 1882 and 1884, he was elected to Congress,
and during his six years of service in the House he was
the favorite of every social and political circle. Since
then he has enjoyed the mellow evening of his life in his
mountain-home, where every face brightens at his com
ing, and on every hillside and valley of the State there
are grizzled veterans and their children and their chil
dren's children whose hearts throb with grateful emotion
as they speak of the Soldier's Friend,
(Photo by Brady, Washington.)
THADDEUS STEVENS, 1 866.
LINCOLN AND STEVENS.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN and Thaddeus Stevens were
-\ strangely mated. Lincoln as President and Stevens
as Commoner of the nation during the entire period of our
sectional war assumed the highest civil responsibilities in
the administrative and legislative departments of the gov
ernment. While Lincoln was President of the whole peo
ple, Stevens, as Commoner, was their immediate represen
tative and oracle in the popular branch of Congress when
the most momentous legislative measures of our history
were conceived and enacted. No two men were so much
alike in all the sympathy of greatness for the friendless
and the lowly, and yet no two men could have been
more unlike in the methods by which they sought to
obtain the same great end. Lincoln's humanity was
one of the master attributes of his character, and it was
next to impossible for him to punish even those most de
serving of it. In Stevens humanity and justice were
singularly blended, and while his heart was ever ready
to respond to the appeal of sorrow, he was one of the
sternest of men in the administration of justice upon
those who had oppressed the helpless. No man pleaded
so eloquently in Congress for the deliverance of the bond
men of the South as did Stevens, and he made ceaseless
battle for every measure needed by ignorant freedmen for
the enjoyment of their rights obtained through the mad
ness of Southern rebellion ; and there was no man of all
277
78 LINCOLN AND MEti OF WAR-TIMES.
our statesmen whose voice was so eloquent for the swift
punishment of the authors of the war. He declared on
the floor of Congress that if he had the power he would
summon a military commission to try, convict, and exe
cute Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the rebellion
* ' for the murders at Andersonville, the murders at Salis
bury, and the shooting down of prisoners-of-war in cold
blood;" and when the whole world was shocked by the
relentless vengeance of Juarez in the summary execution
of Maximilian, he was the one man of Congress who rose
and boldly defended the Mexican President; and his
ground of defence was that Maximilian had sought to
usurp power from the weak. Lincoln's humanity was
always predominant in his nature and always reflected
itself in his public and private acts. He never signed a
death-warrant unless it was absolutely unavoidable, and
then always with a degree of sorrow that could not be con
cealed. He earnestly desired that Davis and all South
ern leaders who might be called to account after the war
for precipitating the nation into fraternal strife should
safely escape from the country; and Maximilian could
not have appealed in vain to Lincoln for his life had it
been within his power to save him. Such were the con
flicting attributes of the two great civil leaders of the
country during the war. Each filled his great trust with
masterly fidelity, and the opposing qualities of each were
potent upon the other.
The country has almost forgotten the exceptionally re
sponsible position of Stevens as the Great Commoner of
our civil war. It is the one high trust of a free govern
ment that must be won solely by ability and merit. The
Commoner of a republic is the organ of the people, and
he can hold his place only when all confess his pre-emi
nent qualities for the discharge of his duties. Presi
dents, Cabinets, Senators, and Representatives may be
LINCOLN AND STEVENS. 273
accidents. Fortuitous circumstances or sudden muta
tions in politics may create any of these civil function
aries in a popular government to serve their brief terms
and pass away into forgetfulness, but the Commoner of
the nation must be the confessed " leader of leaders."
Mere popular attributes are valueless in struggling for
such a place. Only he who can come to the front when
ever occasion calls, lead discordant elements to a common
end, and maintain his position in all the sudden changes
of a mercurial body can go into history as an American
Commoner; and Stevens grandly, undisputedly, met these
high requirements. There were those around him in
Congress much riper in experience in national legis
lation, for he had served but six years in the House
when the war began, and four of those were nearly a
decade before the rebellion ; but when the great conflict
came before which all but the bravest-hearted quailed,
Stevens' supreme ability and dauntless courage made
him speedily accepted by all as the leader of the popular
branch of Congress. In all the conflicts of opinion and
grave doubts among even the sincerest of men as to the
true policy of the government in meeting armed rebel
lion, Stevens was the one man who never faltered, who
never hesitated, who never temporized, but who was ready
to meet aggressive treason with the most aggressive as
saults. He and Lincoln worked substantially on the
same lines, earnestly striving to attain the same ends,
but Stevens was always in advance of public sentiment,
while Lincoln ever halted until assured that the con
siderate judgment of the nation would sustain him.
Stevens was the pioneer who was ever in advance of the
government in every movement for the suppression of
the rebellion, whether by military or civil measures. He
always wanted great armies, heroic chieftains, and relent
less blows, and he was ready to follow the overthrow of
280 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
rebellion with the sternest retributive policy. He had
faith that the people would sustain the war that they
would patriotically submit to any sacrifice of blood and
treasure necessary to preserve the Union and overthrow
slavery that was the cause of fraternal conflict, and he
was always in the lead in pressing every measure that
promised to weaken the slave power in any part of the
Union.
Lincoln was inspired by the same patriotic purpose
and sympathies with Stevens in everything but his pol
icy of vengeance. Lincoln possessed the sagacity to
await the fullness of time for all things, and thus he
failed in nothing. These two great civil leaders were
not in close personal relations. Stevens was ever im
patient of Lincoln's tardiness, and Lincoln was always
patient with Stevens' advanced and often impracticable
methods. Stevens was a born dictator in politics; Lin
coln a born follower of the people, but always wisely aid
ing them to the safest judgment that was to be his guide.
When Stevens proposed the abolition of slavery in the
District of Columbia, and followed it with the extension
of the elective franchise to the liberated slaves, very
many of his party followers in the House faltered and
threatened revolt, and only a man of Stevens' iron will
and relentless mastery could have commanded a solid
party vote for the measures which were regarded by
many as political suicide. I sat by him one morning
in the House before the session had opened when the
question of negro suffrage in the District of Columbia
was about to be considered, and I heard a leading Penn
sylvania Republican approach him to protest against
committing the party to that policy. Stevens' grim face
And cold gray eye gave answer to the man before his bit
ter words were uttered. He waved his hand to the trem
bling suppliant and bade him go to his seat and vote for
LINCOLN AND STEVENS. 281
the measure or confess himself a coward to the world.
The Commoner was obeyed, for had disobedience fol
lowed the offender would have been proclaimed to his
constituents, over the name of Stevens, as a coward, and
that would have doomed him to defeat.
The relations between Lincoln and Stevens were
always friendly, but seldom cordial. Stevens did not
favor the nomination of Lincoln in 1860, although he
voted for him as a second choice in preference to Seward.
He was the champion of John McLean for President,
and presented the anomaly of the most radical Repub
lican leader of the country, Giddings excepted, support
ing the most conservative candidate for the Presidency.
He was politician enough to understand that there was
a large conservative element, especially in Pennsylvania
and Indiana, that had to be conciliated to elect a Repub
lican President, and he loved McLean chiefly because
McLean had dared to disobey the commands of Jackson
when in his Cabinet. He was again a delegate when
Lincoln was renominated in 1864, and he voted for Lin
coln simply because it was not possible to nominate any
other man more in accord with his convictions; but in
neither of these conventions, in both of which he voted
for Lincoln, was he enthusiastic in Lincoln's cause. He
had faith in Lincoln's patriotism and integrity, but he
believed him weak because he kept far behind Stevens
in his war measures, and he was especially bitter against
the nomination of Johnson for Vice-President instead
of Hamlin, but he permitted his vote to be recorded for
Johnson in obedience to the 9bvious purpose of his own
delegation and of the convention to nominate him. I
sat close by him in the first informal meeting of the
Pennsylvania delegation in Baltimore in 1864, and, being
a delegate-at-large, I was one of the first four who voted
on the choice for Vice-President When I voted for
282 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
Johnson, Stevens was startled, and turning to me he
said in a tone of evident bitterness, "Can't you find a
candidate for Vice- President in the United States, with
out going down to one of those damned rebel provinces
to pick one up ?" I gave a kind answer and evaded dis
cussion of the subject. He had no personal love for
either of the candidates for whom his own vote had been
finally cast, but his hatred of McClellan called out his
fiercest invective and made him ready to do tireless battle
for his defeat. He harshly judged all men who pretended
to prosecute the war while protecting slavery, and he be
lieved that McClellan was a traitor to the cause for which
he was leading his armies, and, believing it, he declared
it.
Stevens never saw Lincoln during the war except when
necessity required it. It was not his custom to fawn
upon power or flatter authority, and his free and incisive
criticism of public men generally prevented him from
being in sympathetic touch with most of the officials
connected with the administration. He was one of the
earliest of the party leaders to demand the unconditional
and universal freedom of the slaves, and he often grieved
Lincoln sorely by his mandatory appeals for an Emanci
pation Proclamation, and by the keen satire that only he
could employ against those who differed from him. It
was known to but few that he suffered a serious disap
pointment from lyincoln when Cameron was appointed
to the Cabinet. Stevens took no part in the contest for
a Pennsylvania Cabinet officer until after it became
known that Lincoln had revoked his offer of a Cabinet
portfolio to Cameron about the ist of January. Stevens
then entered the field with great earnestness as a candi
date for the Cabinet himself, and the position he desired
was that of Secretary of the Treasury. In obedience to
his invitation I met him at Harrisburg, and found him
LINCOLN AND STEVENS. 283
more interested in reaching the Cabinet than I had ever
known him in any of his political aspirations. Later,
when Cameron became again prominent as a Cabinet
expectant, Stevens bitterly protested, and when Cam
eron's appointment was announced he felt personally
aggrieved, although few even of his most intimate ac
quaintances had any knowledge of it. It was his second
disappointment in his efforts to reach Cabinet honors.
In December, 1839, when the Whig National Convention
was about to meet at Harrisburg to decide whether Clay,
Harrison, or Scott should be honored with the candidacy,
Harrison sent to Stevens by Mr. Purdy an autograph
letter voluntarily proposing that if Harrison should be
nominated and elected President, Stevens would be made
a member of his Cabinet. Stevens was one of the most
potent of the political leaders in that convention, and he
finally controlled the nomination for Harrison. He never
saw or heard from Harrison from that time until he was
inaugurated as President, and he was astounded when
the Cabinet was nominated to the Senate to find his
name omitted. So reticent was he as to Harrison's pre
vious proffer of the position that Mr. Burroughs, who
was at the head of the Pennsylvanians in Washington
urging Stevens' appointment, was never advised of the
promise he held from Harrison for the place. Harrison
died too early to feel the retribution that would surely
have come from Stevens, but in his second disappoint
ment Stevens was face to face with Lincoln and side by
side with him until death divided them. Only once
during Lincoln's administration can I recall Stevens'
positive and enthusiastic commendation of Lincoln, and
that was when he issued his Emancipation Proclamation
in 1862. He then believed in Lincoln, and expected a
rapid advance in every line of aggression against slavery
and rebellion, but soon new causes of dissent arose be-
284 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
tween them, as Stevens called for the speedy confiscation
of property of those in rebellion and for the punishment
of all who were responsible for the civil war. Thus they
continued during the whole period of Lincoln's adminis
tration, both earnestly working to solve the same great
problems in the interest of free government, and yet sel
dom in actual harmony in their methods and policies.
I am quite sure that Stevens respected Lincoln much
more than he would have respected any other man in
the same position with Lincoln's convictions of duty.
He could not but appreciate Lincoln's generous forbear
ance even with all of Stevens' irritating conflicts, and
Lincoln profoundly appreciated Stevens as one of his
most valued and useful co-workers, and never cherished
resentment even when Stevens indulged in his bitterest
sallies of wit or sarcasm at Lincoln's tardiness. Strange
as it may seem, these two great characters, ever in con
flict and yet ever battling for the same great cause, ren
dered invaluable service to each other, and unitedly ren
dered incalculable service in saving the Republic. Had
Stevens not declared for the abolition of slavery as soon
as the war began, and pressed it in and out of season,
Lincoln could not have issued his Emancipation Procla
mation as early as September, 1862. Stevens was ever
clearing the underbrush and preparing the soil, while
Lincoln followed to sow the seeds that were to ripen in
a regenerated Union ; and while Stevens was ever hast
ening the opportunity for Lincoln to consummate great
achievements in the steady advance made for the over
throw of slavery, Lincoln wisely conserved the utter
ances and efforts of Stevens until the time became fully
ripe when the harvest could be gathered. I doubt not
that Stevens, had he been in Lincoln's position, would
have been greatly sobered by the responsibility that the
President must accept for himself alone, and I doubt not
LINCOLN AND STEVENS. 285
that if Lincoln had been a Senator or Representative in
Congress, he would have declared in favor of Emancipa
tion long before he did it as President. Stevens as Com
moner could afford to be defeated, to have his aggressive
measures postponed, and to take up the battle for them
afresh as often as he was repulsed; but the President
could proclaim no policy in the name of the Republic
without absolute assurance of its success. Each in his
great trust attained the highest possible measure of suc
cess, and the two men who more than all others blended
the varied currents of their efforts and crystallized them
in the unchangeable policy of the goverment were Abra
ham Lincoln and Thaddeus Stevens.
After the death of Lincoln, Stevens was one of tie
earliest of the Republican leaders to place himself in an
aggressively hostile attitude to Johnson, and he persisted
in it with tireless energy until he performed his last great
task in his plea before the Senate for the conviction of
the President under articles of impeachment preferred
by the House. He was then greatly enfeebled by broken
health, but his mental powers were unabated. I remem
ber meeting him one morning in acting Vice-President
Wade's room of the Capitol, before 'the meeting of the
Senate, when the impeachment trial was in progress.
Chase had just startled some of the Republican leaders
by rulings which foreshadowed the probable acquittal
of Johnson. Stevens came limping into Wade's room,
dropped into an easy-chair, and at once opened his in
vective upon Chase. He ended his criticism of the trial
with these words: "It is the meanest case, before the
meanest tribunal, and on the meanest subject of human
history. ' ' After the acquittal of Johnson he seemed al
most entirely hopeless of preserving the fruits of the vic
tory won by our armies in the overthrow of the rebellion.
I remember meeting him at his house some three weeks
286 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
before his death. He spoke of the perfidy of Johnson
with great bitterness, and seemed clouded with gloom as
to the achievements of his own life. He then hoped to
go to Bedford Springs to recover sufficient vigor to be
able to resume his seat at the next session, but he saw
little of the future that promised restoration of the Union
with justice to the liberated slaves. Although he was the
acknowledged Commoner of the war, and the acknow
ledged leader of the House as long as he was able to re
tain his seat after the war had closed, he said, ' ' My life
has been a failure. With all this great struggle of years
in Washington, and the fearful sacrifice of life and trea
sure, I see little hope for the Republic." After a mo
ment's pause his face suddenly brightened, and he said,
' ' After all, I may say that my life has not been entirely
vain. When I remember that I gave free schools to
Pennsylvania, my adopted State, I think my life may
have been worth the living. ' ' He had lately reprinted
his speech delivered in the Pennsylvania House in 1835
that changed the body from its purpose to repeal the
free-school law, and he handed me a copy of it, say
ing, "That was the proudest effort of my life. It gave
schools to the poor and helpless children of the State. ' '
Thus did the Great Commoner of the nation, crowned
with the greenest laurels of our statesmanship, turn back
more than a generation from his greatest achievements
because they were incomplete, although fully assured,
to find the silver lining to the many disappointments
of his life.
Stevens, like Lincoln, had few intimate acquaintances,
and no one in whom he implicitly confided. That he
had had some untold sorrow was accepted by all who
knew him well, but none could venture to invade the
sacred portals of his inner life. He seldom spoke of
himself, but his grim, cynical smile and his pungent
LINCOLN AND STEVENS. 2&7
invective against the social customs of the times pro
claimed his love of solitude, except when his lot could
be cast with the very few congenial spirits he found
around him. One name alone ever brightened his stern
face and kindled the gray eye that was so often lustre
less, and that name was "mother." He loved to speak
of her, and when he did so all the harsh lines of his
countenance disappeared to give place to the tenderness
of a child. That one devotion was like an oasis in the
desert of his affections, and, regardless of his individual
convictions, he reverenced everything taught him by his
mother. In his will he provided that the sexton of her
little churchyard in the bleak hills of Vermont should
ever keep her grave green, * ' and plant roses and other
cheerful flowers at each of the four corners of said grave
every spring." He also made a devise of $1000 to aid
in the building of a Baptist church in Lancaster, giving
in the will this reason for it: "I do this out of respect to
the memory of my mother, to whom I owe what little
prosperity I have had on earth, which, small as it is, I
desire emphatically to acknowledge."
I need hardly say that a man of Stevens' positive and
aggressive qualities left an enduring record of his great
ness in both the statutes and the fundamental law of the
nation. Unlike his distinguished fellow-townsman, Pres
ident Buchanan, who with all his long experience in both
branches of Congress never formulated a great measure
to stand as a monument of his statesmanship, Stevens
was the master-spirit of every aggressive movement in
Congress to overthrow the rebellion and slavery. His
views of the civil war and of reconstruction were point
edly presented in the Confiscation Act of July 17, 1862.
It was a radical measure, and clearly foreshadowed the
employment of freedmen in the military service of the
Union. It was practically the abolition of slavery by
288 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
Congress under the war powers of the government. Lin
coln saw that the passage of the bill was inevitable, and
he took occasion to make known the fact that it could
not meet with his approval, because it assumed that Con
gress had the power to abolish slavery within a State.
He went so far as to prepare a veto, but Stevens wisely
obviated the necessity of a veto by consenting to an ex
planatory joint resolution of Congress relieving the bill of
its acutely offensive features, and Lincoln signed the bill
and the explanatory resolutions together. Stevens was
the author of the Fourteenth Amendment to the national
Constitution, although it was not accepted as he would
have preferred it. This new article of the fundamental
law, next to the Thirteenth Article abolishing slavery, is
the most important of all the actions of Congress relating
to reconstruction. It conferred unchangeably upon the
liberated slaves the high right of American citizenship,
and made it impossible for any State to abridge the privi
leges of any race. It also limited representation to the
enfranchised voters of the States; it made the validity
of the public debt absolutely sacred; prohibited the as
sumption or payment of Confederate debt by any State;
and it disqualified most of the Southern leaders from ever
again enjoying citizenship unless their disability were
relieved by a two-thirds vote of Congress. Stevens was
bitterly opposed to the provision allowing restoration to
citizenship of any who had taken the oath of office, mili
tary or civil, to support the government and afterward
engaged in the rebellion, but, being unable to obtain the
absolute disqualification of those men, he accepted the
gravest obstacles that he could interpose against the res
toration of civil rights. His policy of reconstruction,
exclusive of his fierce confiscation and retributive pur
poses, would have been a priceless blessing to the South,
although at the time it would have been accepted as ex-
LINCOLN AND STEVENS. 289
tremely vindictive. He would have held the rebellious
States as provinces and governed them as Territories, to
await the period when they might with safety be restored
to the Union. Had that policy been adopted the desola
tion almost worse than war would have been averted in
the Southern States. Sadly as the people of the South
were impoverished by war, the greatest humiliation they
ever suffered was in the rule of the carpet-bagger and
the adventurer who despoiled them of safety and credit
and ran riot in every channel of State authority. Had
they been held as provinces there would have been peace,
their industries would have been speedily revived, mu
tual confidence between the North and South would have
rapidly strengthed, and in a very few years at the most
they would have resumed their position in the galaxy of
States ; and universal negro suffrage would not have been
in the cup of bitterness they had to drain. Stevens was
bitterly denounced by many for his vindictive recon
struction policy; but, stripped of its utterly impracti
cable and impossible confiscation and retributive fea
tures, it would have been the wisest policy for both
North and South that could have been adopted.
It is a common belief that on the question of recon
struction and on many other questions relating to the
war Stevens planted himself entirely above the Consti
tution and acted in utter contempt of the supreme law.
I have heard thoughtless and malicious people many
times quote him as having said ' ' Damn the Constitu
tion!" but Stevens never uttered or cherished such a
sentiment. He defined his views on the subject so
clearly that none could mistake them in his speech giv
ing his reasons for voting for the admission of West
Virginia as a State. He quoted the requirements of the
Constitution, and said that it was a mockery to assume
that the provisions of the Constitution had been com-
19
2go LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
plied with. He did not justify or excuse his vote in
favor of the creation of a new State because of his dis
regard of, or contempt for, the Constitution. On the
contrary, he presented the unanswerable argument that
Virginia was in rebellion against the government and
the Constitution, and had been conceded belligerent
rights by our government and by the governments of
Europe, thus making her subject to the rules of war
governing a public enemy, whereby she placed herself
beyond the pale of the Constitution and had no claim
upon its protecting attributes. He said, "We may ad
mit West Virginia as a new State, not by virtue of any
provision in the Constitution, but under the absolute
power which the laws of war give us under the circum
stances in which we are placed. I shall vote for this bill
upon that theory, and upon that alone, for I will not
stultify myself by supposing that we have any warrant
in the Constitution for this proceeding. ' ' The logic that
a belligerent power, recognized by ourselves and by the
world, was entirely beyond the protecting power of our
Constitution was indisputable, and in that case, as in all
cases, he always maintained the sanctity of the Consti
tution to all who had not become public enemies with
conceded belligerent rights.
Being outside the pale of the Constitution in war, he
held that the insurgent States occupied the legal status
of conquered enemies when the war closed, and upon
that theory was based his whole policy of reconstruction,
including the confiscation of property and the punish
ment of the leaders of the rebellion. That he was ab
stractly right in his interpretation of the laws of war
cannot be questioned, however widely others may differ
from him in the expediency or justice of the measures
he proposed. He was one of the first to appreciate the
truth that President Johnson had adopted a policy of re-
~^
FAC-SIMII.E; OF BETTER FROM STEVENS.
292 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
construction that the Republican party could not sustain.
In this I heartily agreed with him, and one of my most
valued mementos of the men of war-times is an auto
graph letter received from Mr. Stevens warmly com
mending an editorial on the subject published in the
Chambersburg Repository, which I then edited, in which
he expressed the hope, since proved gratefully prophetic,
that I should one day conduct a daily newspaper in Phila
delphia with a hundred thousand readers. * I had voted
for Johnson's nomination for Vice-President in disregard
of Stevens' bitter complaint, but when Johnson had dis
graced himself before the nation and the world by his
exhibition of inebriety at his inauguration, I had de
nounced him and demanded his resignation. He never
was permitted to return to the Senate as Vice-President,
but a little more than a month thereafter the assassination
of Lincoln made him President. Assuming that my free
criticism and demand for his resignation would preclude
cordial relations between us, I did not visit him in the
White House until he had twice requested me to do so
through Governor Curtin, and my first and only inter
view with him convinced me that his policy of recon
struction could not be sustained by the North.
My relations with Stevens for a dozen years before his
death were peculiarly pleasant, and as intimate perhaps
as was common between him and those in the narrow
circle of his close acquaintances. He spent his summers
* WASHINGTON, Dec. 16, 1865.
DEAR SIR : I thank you for the kindness to me personally in
your letter; but I more particularly thank you for the grand argu
ment in favor of the right policy.
You ought to speak from Philadelphia in a daily of 100,000
circulation. Why cannot you get up such a paper?
THADDEUS STEVENS.
Coi,. A. K. McCLURE.
LINCOLN AND STEVENS. 293
at his quiet mountain-furnace home in Franklin county,
where I resided, and during the few years that I was in
active practice at the bar in Chambersburg he attended
our courts and tried one side of nearly every important
cause. In all my acquaintance with the lawyers of
Pennsylvania I regard Stevens as having more nearly
completed the circle of a great lawyer than any other
member of the Pennsylvania bar. He was perfect in
practice, a master of the law, exceptionally skillful in
eliciting testimony from witnesses, a most sagacious, elo
quent, and persuasive advocate, and one of the strongest
men before a law court that I have ever heard. He was
thoroughly master of himself in his profession, and his
withering invective and crushing wit, so often employed
in conversation and in political speeches, were never dis
played in the trial of a cause unless it was eminently wise
to do so; and he was one of the most courteous of men
at the bar whether associate or opponent. He was espe
cially generous in his kindness to young members of the
bar unless they undertook to unduly flap their fledgling
wings, when they were certain to suffer speedy and
humiliating discomfiture. His trial of the Hanway trea
son case before Judge Greer in the United States Court
at Philadelphia exhibited his matchless skill in the best
use of his matchless powers. While he conceived and
directed every feature of the defence, he was the silent
man of the trial. He knew the political prejudices
which were attached to his then odious attitude on the
slavery question, and he put upon the late Chief Justice,
John M. Read, the laboring oars of the trial, as Read
was a Democrat of State and even national fame. It was
a trial that attracted the attention not only of the nation,
but of the civilized world, and was the first case adjudi
cated in Pennsylvania in our higher courts under the
Fugitive Slave lyaw of 1850. Mr. Gorsuch, a Virginia
294 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
minister, pursuing his slave into Chester county, was
killed in an altercation at Christiana by the friends of
the hunted bondman, and Hanway and others were in
dicted for treason in inciting to rebellion and murder.
Hanway was acquitted, and he owed his deliverance to
the legal acumen and skill of Thaddeus Stevens.
The highest tribute ever paid to an American states
man since the foundation of the Republic was paid to
Thaddeus Stevens by his bereaved constituents of L/an-
caster county when his dead body lay in state at his
home. He died on Thursday, the nth of August, 1868,
and his body was brought from Washington to his home
on the following day, and on Saturday it was viewed by
thousands of sorrowing friends. The Republican prim
ary elections had been called for that day, and, although
Stevens had died three days before and a nomination was
to be made for his successor, no one of the several candi
dates in the county dared to whisper his name as an as
pirant while Stevens' body was untombed. Acting under
a common inspiration, the people of the county who were
entitled to participate in the primary elections cast a
unanimous vote for Stevens' renomination as their can
didate for Congress when they knew that he had passed
away and his body was in state in his humble house in
Lancaster. There is nothing in Grecian or Roman story
of such a tribute to a dead leader. Monuments were
erected in those days to greatness which have crumbled
away under the gnawing tooth of time, but the dust of
Thaddeus Stevens reposes under an humble monument
suggested by himself, located in an humble u City of
the Silent," chosen by him because it recognized " equal
ity of man before his Creator," and admitted any of
every race and color to sleep the sleep that knows no
waking. The inscription on his monument, dictated by
himself, is in these words:
LINCOLN AND STEVENS. 295
THADDEUS STEVENS,
Born at Danville, Caledonia Co., Vermont,
April 4, 1792.
Died at Washington, D. C.,
August n, 1868.
I repose in this quiet and secluded spot,
Not from any natural preference for solitude,
But, finding other Cemeteries limited as to Race
By Charter Rules,
I have chosen this that I might illustrate
In my death
The Principles which I advocated
Through a long life:
EQUALITY OF MAN BEFORE HIS CREATOR.
Thus passed away the Great Commoner of the war; the
friend of the lowly, the oppressed, and the friendless; the
author of our free-school system of Pennsylvania that now
gives education to the humblest of every township ; and I
can fitly quote the eloquent tribute of Charles Sumner:
"I see him now as I have so often seen him during life;
his venerable form moves slowly with uncertain steps,
but the gathered strength of years in his countenance
and the light of victory on his path. Politician, calcu
lator, time-server, stand aside; a Hero Statesman passes
to his reward. ' '
(Photo by Say lor, Lancaster, Pa.)
JAMES BUCHANAN, 1865.
LINCOLN AND BUCHANAN.
IT is now more than thirty years since James Buchanan
retired from the office of President of the United
States, but I doubt whether there is any one of our great
national characters whose relations to our civil war are
so widely and so flagrantly misunderstood. It will sur
prise many at this day when I say that Abraham Lincoln
took up the reins of government just where James Bu
chanan left them, and continued precisely the same pol
icy toward the South that Buchanan had inaugurated,
until the Southern leaders committed the suicidal act of
firing upon Fort Sumter. From the time that Buchan
an's original Cabinet was disrupted on the sectional
issues that culminated in armed rebellion, the adminis
tration of Buchanan was not only thoroughly loyal to
the preservation of the Union, but it fixed the policy
that Lincoln accepted, and from which he took no
marked departure until actual war came upon him.
This is not the common appreciation of Buchanan
among the American people, but it is the truth of his
tory. He retired from his high office in the very flood-
tide of sectional and partisan passion. The loyal people
were frenzied to madness by what was regarded as the
perfidy of Buchanan's War Minister, Mr. Floyd, in ship
ping valuable arms and munitions to the South ; by
the insolent treason of his Secretary of the Treasury,
Mr. Cobb; by the boldly-asserted and generally-believed
297
29 LINCOLN AND' MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
treachery of his Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Toucey, in
scattering our navy throughout the world; and it is now
accepted by many, amongst even intelligent people of
this country, that Buchanan was faithless to his duty in
failing to reinforce Major Anderson at Sumter. In addi
tion to these deeply-seated unjust convictions in regard
to Buchanan, he is commonly believed to have been in
hostility to the Lincoln administration and to the war,
and his sympathies to have been with the South in the
bloody struggle for the preservation of the Union. It
is certainly time that these utterly erroneous and most
unjust impressions as to Buchanan should be dissipated;
and, fortunately for his own good name, he has left on
record the most positive evidence of his devotion to the
Union and his earnest support of the government in the
most vigorous prosecution of the war that had been, as
he always held, wantonly precipitated upon the nation
by the South. I never was in political sympathy with
Buchanan while he was in public life, excepting the few
closing months of his administration, when, as I then
knew, both he and his Cabinet were estranged from their
ultra-Democratic friends North and South, and were in
daily intercourse with the leading friends of Lincoln as
the incoming President. My personal acquaintance with
him was of the most casual character, and I have there
fore neither lingering personal nor political affection to
inspire me to any strained attempt to vindicate his
memory.
Buchanan as President should be judged by the cir
cumstances under which he reached that position, by his
long-cherished and conscientious convictions, and by his
peculiar political environment, that led him into the
most sympathetic relations with the South. It should
be remembered that he was elected President over Gen
eral Fremont, a distinctly sectional candidate who was
LINCOLN- AND BUCHANAN. 29$
not thought of with any degree of favor in any State
south of Mason and Dixon's line. It was an earnest
battle against what was assailed as the ultra-sectionalism
of the North, and it consolidated the South in support
of Buchanan. It naturally intensified the sober judg
ment of his life against political Abolitionism, and he
entered the Presidency owing his election to the solid
vote of the Slave States. To these facts, which could
not fail to profoundly impress Buchanan, it should be
added that he was naturally a most conservative and
strict-constructionist statesman. Born and reared in the
Federal school, acting with the Federal party until he
had become noted as a leader in Congress, and gravi
tating thence into the Democratic school when strict
constructionists had settled upon State rights as the
jewel of their faith, it is not surprising that Buchanan
sympathized with the South in all the preliminary dis
putes which finally ended in sanguinary war. That he
was radically wrong on the fundamental issues relating
to the war when he entered the Presidency cannot be
doubted. He foreshadowed the Dred Scott decision in
his inaugural address, and evidently believed that it was
to come as a final solution of the slavery dispute, as it
greatly enlarged the constitutional protection of slave
holders; and his support of the lawless and revolutionary
Lecompton policy, into which he and his party were
dragooned by the Southern leaders, engulfed him and
his administration in the maelstrom of secession. Thus
was he drifting, step by step, insensibly into the hands
of those who, however fair in declaration or promise,
were treasonable in purpose, and sought through him to
wield the power of the government to aid rather than
hinder the disruption of the Republic. It is only just to
Buchanan, however, to say that whenever he was brought
face to face with the true purposes of the Southern lead-
3oo LINCOLN AND MEN of
ers he reversed his own policy, revised his Cabinet, and
made his administration quite as aggressive as was wise
under the circumstances in asserting the paramount au
thority of the Union.
The crisis that changed Buchanan's whole policy on
the question of Secession was initiated on the i2th of
December, 1860, when General Cass resigned his posi
tion as Secretary of State because he could not har
monize with Buchanan's views in meeting the question.
Cass was greatly enfeebled by age, and Buchanan left a
private record on Cass' resignation in which he stated
that until that time the only difference between them
that he had knowledge of was on the ground that
Buchanan had failed to assert with sufficient clearness
that there was no power in Congress or the government
to make war upon a State to hinder it in separating from
the Union. The retirement of Cass was speedily followed
by the enforced resignations of Floyd from the War De
partment and Cobb from the Treasury. Philip Thomas
of Maryland succeeded Cobb; Joseph Holt of Kentucky
succeeded Floyd; Attorney-General Black was promoted
to Secretary of State; and Edwin M. Stanton made his
successor as Attorney-General. Thomas remained in
office only a month, when he was succeeded by General
Dix, an aggressive loyalist. Stanton, Dix, and Holt
were aggressively against every form of treasonable re
bellion, and they gave a visibly altered tone to every
thing about the administration in the preliminary dis
putes with the leading Secessionists. One of the first
acts of South Carolina after her formal withdrawal from
the Union was to appoint Commissioners to proceed to
Washington to treat with the government of the United
States for peaceable separation and the recognition of
the independence of the Palmetto State. These Com
missioners proceeded to Washington, and were cour-
LINCOLN AND BUCHANAN. 301
teously received by Buchanan as citizens of South Caro
lina, without any recognition of their official capacity,
and several misunderstandings arose between them as to
what was accepted or agreed upon in relation to the mili
tary status in Charleston.
It finally became necessary for Buchanan to give a
formal answer to the South Carolina Commissioners as
to the attitude of the government and his purposes as its
Executive. He prepared an answer without consulting
any of the members of his Cabinet, in which he said:
' ' I have declined for the present to reinforce these forts
(in Charleston harbor), relying upon the honor of South
Carolinians that they will not be assaulted while they
remain in their present condition, but that Commis
sioners will be sent by the convention to treat with Con
gress on the subject." In this paper Buchanan assumed
that he had no power to take any action as President
that the whole dispute was one to be submitted to Con
gress. He added, however, that "if South Carolina
should take any of these forts, she will then become the
assailant in a war against the United States. ' ' In the
many interesting conversations I had with the late Judge
Black on the subject of the difficulties in Buchanan's
Cabinet, I received from his own lips detailed accounts
of almost every incident of importance that occurred,
and what I state in regard to the answer of Buchanan to
the South Carolina Commissioners I give from distinct
recollection on his authority. On the 2Qth of December,
soon after Buchanan had written the original draft of his
answer to the Commissioners, he submitted it to his Cab
inet. It was little criticised at the Cabinet meeting by
any of the President's constitutional advisers, and Black
was ominously silent. He was profoundly grieved at the
attitude the President had assumed, and his strong per
sonal devotion to Buchanan made his position one of
302 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
extreme delicacy. He was the one man of the Cabinet
whom Buchanan regarded as his close personal and po
litical friend. He did not express his views to any of
his Cabinet associates until he had spent an entire night
in anxious reflection as to his duty. On the following
day he called upon Buchanan and told him frankly that
if he sent the answer to the South Carolina Commission
ers as originally prepared he (Black) must resign from
the Cabinet, because he could not assent to the govern
ment being placed in such an attitude. It was seldom
that Buchanan ever betrayed emotion, but when Black
informed him that they must separate Buchanan was
moved even to tears. Few words passed between them,
and Buchanan handed Black the original paper with the
request to modify it in accordance with his own views,
and return it as speedily as possible. Black then wrote
the paper that went into history as the answer of
Buchanan to the Commissioners. Before he presented it
to the President it was, carefully considered and revised
by Black, Holt, and Stanton, who then were, and there
after continued to be, with Dix, the aggressively loyal
members of the Buchanan Cabinet; and in their actions
they had the hearty sympathy and support of the Pres
ident.
One of the common accusations against Buchanan is
that he failed to reinforce the garrisons in the Southern
forts and protect them from capture by the Secessionists.
A careful study of the facts, however, shows that Bu
chanan was utterly without an army to protect these
forts. He and General Scott had a somewhat bitter dis
pute on this point after Buchanan's retirement from
office, but Scott's own statement proves that he had no
intelligent knowledge of the ability of the government
to reinforce the forts, or that he, as commander-in-chief
of the army, made an official suggestion to the President
LINCOLN AND BUCHANAN. 303
that was impossible of execution. On the 29th of Octo
ber, 1860, Scott addressed Buchanan on the subject of
these Southern forts, and he enumerated nine of them
that would be exposed to easy capture unless speedily
reinforced. On the day after thus addressing the Presi
dent, Scott pointedly illustrated the absurdity of his
recommendation by saying to the President, ' ' There is
one regular company at Boston, one here at the Narrows,
one at Portsmouth, one at Augusta, Georgia, and one at
Baton Rouge." According to Scott's own statement,
there were but five companies of the army then within
the reach of the government to garrison or reinforce the
threatened forts. These five companies did not aggre
gate four hundred men, and these four hundred men,
scattered from Boston to Baton Rouge, were presented
by Scott himself as the resources of the government for
the protection of nine forts in six Southern States.
Our little army of that day was all needed on our then
remote frontiers to protect settlers and emigrants from (
the savages who ruled in those regions, and it would
have required weeks, and in some cases months, to bring
them to the Bast for the protection of the endangered
forts. Even when war came and the frontiers had to be
stripped of their military protection wherever it was pos
sible, there were but few regular troops at the battle of
Bull Run. Scott and Buchanan both agreed that there
was danger of turbulence at the inauguration of Lin
coln, and they cordially co-operated with each other to
take the most effective measures to preserve peace on
that occasion. After gathering all the troops that could
be marshaled from every part of the country to serve at
the inauguration, they finally got together six hundred
and thirty, and they made their arrangements for the
inauguration with that small military display because
the commander- in-chief of the army could not summon
304 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
a larger force. It was simply impossible, therefore, for
President Buchanan to garrison or reinforce the South
ern forts, for the reason that he had not the men with
which to do it. There was but one way to save the
Southern forts, and that was to garrison them so strongly,
with ample provisions and munitions of war, that they
would be invulnerable to assault. To have sent inade
quate reinforcements to any of these forts in the then
inflamed condition of the public mind in the South
would have been to wantonly provoke attack upon forces
that could not protect themselves. Had Lincoln been
President he could not have done more without doing
wha' would have been accepted as an open declaration
of war against the South, and Lincoln would no more
have committed that folly than did Buchanan. It would
have been a wise thing to do if we had had an army of
thirty or forty thousand men. Then all the forts could
have been garrisoned and reinforced, and they could
have had the support necessary in case of threatened
assault; but our government was entirely unprepared for
defence, and when we were compelled to face the peril
of war the army could not be increased without making
the North either measurably or wholly responsible for
precipitating a civil conflict. The intelligent and dis
passionate American citizen, who carefully reads the
whole story of the action of Buchanan and his Cabinet
in co-operation with Scott, must reach the conclusion
that Buchanan was not in any degree at fault for the
failure to garrison or reinforce the forts in the South
ern States.
On the important question of Buchanan's support of
the government after war had been commenced by the
assault on Sumter, he has fortunately left the most posi
tive and multiplied evidence of his patriotic loyalty to
the Union, He was singularly reticent during the war,
LINCOLN AND BUCHANAN. 35
and his silence was misconstrued into a lack of sympa
thy with the government. After his retirement from
the Presidency he was most mercilessly vilified, brutally
misrepresented as deliberately disloyal, and he seems to
have abandoned the hope of correcting public sentiment
and doing himself justice until the flood- tide of passion
had run its course. He was, however, in constant com
munication with his leading friends throughout the
country, and to every one of them, from the beginning
of the war until its close, he expressed the most patriotic
convictions, and uniformly urged the earnest support of
the war and its most vigorous prosecution. In Septem
ber, 1 86 1, he was invited by an intimate friend to deliver
a public address on the condition of the country and the
attitude of the government. In his answer he said, wri
ting in the frankness of sacred friendship, ' ' Every per
son who has conference with me knows that I am in
favor of sustaining the government in the vigorous pros
ecution of the war for the restoration of the Union. But
occasion may offer when it may be proper for me author
itatively to express this opinion to the public. Until that
time shall arrive I desire to avoid any public exhibition. ' '
In a private letter to James Buchanan Henry, his nephew,
immediately after he had heard of the firing upon Sum-
ter, he said : * ( The Confederate States have deliberately
commenced a civil war, and God knows where it may
end. They were repeatedly warned by my adminis
tration that an assault on Fort Sumter would be civil
war and they would be responsible for the conse
quences."
On the i9th of April, 1861, soon after the bombard
ment of Sumter, he wrote to General Dix, who had then
been announced as the president of a great Union meet
ing soon to be held, at which he advised him to repeat
the admonitions the administration had given to South
20
306 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
Carolina against precipitating war. He referred to the
fact that as Dix had been a member of the Cabinet at
the time he could speak with great propriety of the utter
want of excuse on the part of South Carolina for firing
upon Sumter. In this letter he said : ' ' The present ad
ministration had no alternative but to accept the war
initiated by South Carolina or the Southern Confed
eracy. The North will sustain the administration to a
man, and it ought to be sustained at all hazards."
Again, on the 26th of April, writing to Mr. Baker, he
said : ' ' The attack on Fort Sumter was an outrageous
act. The authorities at Charleston were several times
warned by my administration that such an attack would
be civil war, and would be treated as such. If it had
been made in my time it should have been treated as
such." In a letter to Mr. Stanton, May 6, when Stan-
ton was writing to Buchanan fiercely criticising Lincoln
and every act of the administration, Buchanan said:
' ' The first gun fired by Beauregard aroused the indig
nant spirit of the North as nothing else could have done,
and made us an unanimous people. I repeatedly warned
them that this would be the result. " In a letter to Mr.
King, July 13, he said: "The assault upon Fort Sum
ter was the commencement of war by the Confederate
States, and no alternative was left but to prosecute it
with vigor on our part. Up until all social and political
relations ceased between the Secession leaders and my
self I had often warned them that the North would rise
to a man against them if such an assault was made. . . .
I am glad that General Scott does not underrate the
strength of his enemy, which would be a great fault in
a commander. With all my heart and soul I wish him
success." In a letter to Mr. Leiper, August 31, he said:
4 ' I agree with you that nothing but a vigorous prose
cution of the war can now determine the question be-
LINCOLN AND BUCHANAN. 37
tween the North and the South. It is vain to think of
peace at the present moment."
In a letter to Dr. Blake. September 12, he said: "We
must prosecute the war with the utmost vigor. May
God grant us a safe deliverance and a restoration of the
Union!" In a letter to Mr. King, September 18, he
said: " I think I can perceive in the public mind a more
fixed, resolute, and determined purpose than ever to pros
ecute the war to a successful termination with all the
men and means in our power. Enlistments are now pro
ceeding much more rapidly than a few weeks ago, and I
am truly glad of it. The time has passed for offering
compromises and terms of peace to the seceded States. . . .
There is a time for all things under the sun, but surely
this is not the moment for paralyzing the arm of the
national administration by a suicidal conflict among our
selves, but for bold, energetic, and united action. ' ' On
the 28th of September, Buchanan addressed a letter to
a committee of the citizens of Chester and Lancaster
counties who had invited him to address a Union meet
ing at Hagersville. He declined because "advancing
years in the present state of my health render it impos
sible." He said: "Were it possible for me to address
your meeting, waiving all other topics, I should confine
myself to a solemn and earnest appeal to my countrymen,
and especially those without families, to volunteer for the
war and join the many thousands of brave and patriotic
volunteers who are already in the field. This is the
moment for action for prompt, energetic, and united
action and not for discussion of peace propositions."
In closing the letter he said that until the South shall
voluntarily return to the Union "it will be our duty to
support the President with all the men and means at the
command of the country in a vigorous and successful
prosecution of the war."
3 8 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
In a letter to Mr. King, January 28, 1862, he said: u I
do most earnestly hope that our army may be able to do
something before the first of April. If not, there is
great danger not merely of British, but of European,
interference." In a letter to Mrs. Boyd, February 16,
he said: "The Confederate States commenced this un
happy war for the destruction of the Union, and until
they shall be willing to consent to its restoration there
can be no hopes of peace." On the 4th of March he
wrote Judge Black: "They (the South) chose to com
mence civil war, and Mr. Lincoln had no alternative but
to defend the country against dismemberment. I cer
tainly should have done the same thing had they begun
the war in my time, and this they well knew." In a
letter to Dr. Blake, July 12, he speaks of the deep anx
iety he felt about the safety of McClellan's army, with a
heavy pressure removed from his heart when he learned
that it was safe, and he then adds: "Without doubt his
change of position in the face of a superior army evinced
great skill in strategy; but why was the wrong position
originallv selected? I still feel great confidence in
McClellan, and with all my heart wish him success.
Still, there is a mystery in the whole affair which time
alone can unravel." On February 14, 1863, in a letter
to Mr. Roosevelt, he expressed his great disappointment
that a country so great as ours * ' has not yet produced
one great general." In a letter to Mr. L/eiper, March
19, he said: "I cannot entertain the idea of a division
of the Union; may God in His good providence restore
it!" In a letter to Mr. Schell, July 25, he expresses his
profound regret at Governor Seymour's hostility to the
national conscription law, and said: " The conscription
law, though unwise and unjust in many of its provisions,
is not in my opinion unconstitutional. ' ' So earnest was
Buchanan in his efforts to have the Democracy of Perm-
LINCOLN AND BUCHANAX. 309
Sylvania give the most cordial support to Lincoln and to
tiie war that he even trangressed the lines of delicacy in
a letter addressed to Judge Woodward, then a Supreme
Justice and candidate for Governor of Pennsylvania, ear
nestly appealing to him to sustain the national conscrip
tion law by a judicial decision. This he did as early as
July, 1863, when the question was first raised in our
courts. In a letter of September 5, also addressed to
Judge Woodward, he offered an apology for having ad
vised him as to his judicial duties, and his apology was,
as stated by himself, " I perceived that in New York the
party was fast making the unconstitutionality of the
conscription law the leading prominent point in the
canvass. ' '
On January 27, 1864, he wrote Mr. Capen, expressing
his regret that "the Democrats have made no issue on
which to fight the Presidential battle," and on the I4th
of March he wrote to the same friend, expressing the
belief that it would be best if the Democrats would fail
to succeed to power at the Presidential election of that
year. On the 25th of August he wrote to the same
friend, assuming that McClellan would be nominated, in
which he said: " A general proposition for peace and an
armistice without reference to the restoration of the
Union would be, in fact, a recognition of their inde
pendence. For this I confess I am far from being pre
pared." On the 22d of September, writing to his
nephew, Mr. Henry, he said: u Peace would be a very
great blessing, but it would be purchased at too high a
price at the expense of the Union." In a letter to Mr.
Capen of October 5 he declares his purpose to support
McClellan for President, and he denounces the Chicago
peace platform, and specially commends McClellan for
having patriotically dissented from it. In the same let
ter he expresses some hope of McClellan' s election, and
310 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
frankly says that * c the recent victories of Grant, Sher
man, and Farragut have helped the Republicans," but
he rejoiced at the victories of our armies and the pros
pect of the South submitting to a restoration of the
Union. In a letter to Mr. Capen, December 28, he says:
"I agree in opinion with General McClellan that it is
fortunate both for himself and the Democratic party that
he was not elected." In a letter to Mr. Flinn, April,
1865, he speaks most feelingly of the assassination of
Lincoln, and says: "I deeply mourn his loss from pri
vate feelings, and still more deeply for the sake of the
country. Heaven, I trust, will not suffer the perpetra
tors of the deed and their guilty accomplices to escape
just punishment, but we must not despair of the Repub
lic." In a letter to Mr. Capen, October 19, 1867, he
says: "Negro emancipation is a fixed fact, and so let
it remain for ever; but the high privilege of voting can
only be constitutionally granted by the legislatures of
the respective States." He heartily accepted emanci
pation, but he felt that the Democracy had an issue on
which it could stand in a patriotic attitude opposing
universal negro suffrage.
Thus from the day that civil war was precipitated
upon the country by the madness of secession until the
last insurgent gun was fired there was not an utterance
from James Buchanan that did not exhibit the most
patriotic devotion to the cause of the Union.
In the flood of light thrown upon the actions of
Buchanan and Lincoln as nearly a generation has come
and passed away, the intelligent and unbiased reader of
the truth of history will be amazed to learn how closely
the policy of Lincoln adhered to the policy inaugurated
by Buchanan after he had been compelled to face the
issue of actual secession and armed rebellion. From the
day that Judge Black revised the answer of Buchanan to
LINCOLN AND BUCHANAN. 311
the South Carolina Commissioners the aims and efforts
of Buchanan were uniformly and earnestly in the line
of the most patriotic devotion to his responsible duties;
and when he had such men as Black, Dix, Stanton, and
Holt by his side, the majority, and the absolutely domi
nant element, of his Cabinet were aggressively loyal to
the government, and made heroic effort to exercise every
power they possessed to maintain the integrity of the
Union. Whatever may have been Buchanan's political
errors during the greater part of his administration, and
however those errors may have strengthened the arms of
secession, it is only simple justice to one of the most con
scientious and patriotic of all our Presidents to say that
when Buchanan was brought face to face with the fruits
of his policy he severed all political and social intercourse
with the leaders who had controlled his election, and cast
his lot and all the power of the government on the side
of unqualified loyalty. Not only did the call of Lincoln
for troops to prosecute the war after the firing upon
Sumter command the uniform and earnest support of
Buchanan, but he heartily sustained the government in
every war measure, even to the extent of assenting to
emancipation. Such a record demands the commenda
tion rather than the censure of our only Pennsylvania
President; and I have performed the task of attempting
to present him justly to the American people all the more
gratefully because there are no lingering bonds of special
personal or political sympathy between us. He is entitled
to justice from every honest American citizen, and I have
sought to f i /e him justice nothing more, nothing less.
LINCOLN AND GREELEY.
HORACE GREELEY was one of the earliest and
most fretting of the many thorns in the political
pathway of Abraham Lincoln. They served together in
Congress in the winter of 1848-49, when Greeley was
chosen to a short term to fill a vacancy. Speaking of
Lincoln some years after his death, Greeley, referring to
his association with him in Congress, said that Lincoln
was ' ' personally a favorite on our side, ' ' and adds : * ' He
seemed a quiet, good-natured man; did not aspire to
leadership, and seldom claimed the floor." For ten
years after these two memorable characters separated as
members of Congress Lincoln was little known or heard
of outside of his State of Illinois, and when his great
contest with Douglas for the Senate attracted the atten
tion of the whole country in 1858, Greeley, with his
powerful Republican organ, vastly the most potent polit
ical journal in the country, took positive grounds in favor
of the return of Douglas to the Senate by the Republi
cans of Illinois, because of Douglas' open hostility to
the Ivecompton policy of the Buchanan administration.
This attitude of Greeley 's Tribune was one of the most
serious obstacles that confronted Lincoln in his great
campaign against Douglas, and it is possible that the
influence of the Tribune may have lost Lincoln the leg
islature. He carried the popular vote and elected the
Republican State ticket, but Douglas won the legislature
312
HORACE GREEDY, 1872.
314 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
and was re-elected to the Senate. Thus did Greeley
antagonize Lincoln in the first great battle he made for
national leadership in politics, and with the exception
of a single act of Greeley 's, in which he served Lincoln
to an extent that can hardly be measured, when in the
early part of 1860 he opened the broadsides of the
Tribune against Seward's nomination for President, he
was a perpetual thorn in Lincoln's side, seldom agreeing
with him on any important measure, and almost con
stantly criticising him boldly and often bitterly.
The first assault made on the Seward lines that at
tracted any attention from the country was the unex
pected and aggressive revolt of Greeley 's Tribune against
Seward some months before the meeting of the Chicago
Convention that nominated Lincoln. It attracted special
attention from considerate Republicans throughout the
country, because this assault came from the ablest Re
publican editor of the nation, from Seward's own State,
and from one who was presumed to be Seward's personal
and political friend. It was not then known to the pub
lic that on the nth of November, 1854, he had written
a pungent letter to Seward and formally severed all po
litical association with him, to take effect in the follow
ing February, when Seward was re-elected to the United
States Senate. The letter was written in strict confi
dence, but in 1860, when the friends of Seward keenly
felt Greeley 's criticisms on Seward's availability as a
Presidential candidate, and especially in the bitter dis
appointment of Seward's friends after his defeat at Chi
cago, such free allusions were made to the contents of
this letter and to Greeley 's personal animosity that at
Greeley 's request the letter was made public. Until
Greeley had thus thrown his great Tribune into the con
test against Seward's nomination Seward was the gen
erally-accepted Republican candidate for President in
LINCOLN AND G REE LEY. .315
1860, and, notwithstanding the ability and influence
exerted by Greeley and his newspaper, the Republicans
of the country elected a convention overwhelmingly in
favor of Seward. It was Greeley, however, who drove
the entering wedge that made it possible to break the
Seward column, and I shall never forget the smile that
played upon his countenance as he sat at the head of the
Oregon delegation in the Wigwam at Chicago and heard
the announcement that Abraham Lincoln had been nomi
nated as the candidate of the convention for President.
He had made no battle for Lincoln. His candidate was
Edward Bates of Missouri, whose cause he championed
with all his fervency and power; but it is evident that in
selecting Bates as his favorite he had been influenced
solely to choose the most available candidate to contest
the honor with Seward. After Bates, he was for any one
to beat Seward, and when Lincoln became the chief
competitor of Seward he was more than willing to ac
cept him. After the nomination of Lincoln, Greeley 's
Tribune was leader of leaders among the Republican
journals of the land in the great struggle that elected
Lincoln President. But his rejoicing over the success
of Lincoln was speedily chilled by the announcement
that Seward would be called as premier of the new ad
ministration. The appointment of Seward as Secretary
of State meant the mastery of Thurlow Weed in wield
ing the patronage and power of the administration in
New York, and it meant much more than that to Gree
ley. It meant that all the power that Seward and Weed
could exercise would be wielded relentlessly to punish
Greeley for his revolt against Seward. On the very day
that Lincoln entered the Presidency, therefore, Greeley
was hopelessly embittered against him, and while no
man in the whole land was more conscientious than
Greeley in the performance of every patriotic and per-
316 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
sonal duty, lie was also human, and with all his bound
less generosity and philanthropy he was one of the best
haters I have ever known.
Soon after Lincoln's election Greeley put himself in
an attitude that he must have known at the time was an
utterly impossible one for Lincoln to accept. That he
was influenced in any degree by a desire to embarrass
Lincoln I do not for a moment believe, but it is none
the less the truth of history that, after having done
much to make Lincoln's nomination possible, he did
more perhaps than any one man in the country to assure
his election, and then he publicly demanded that Lin
coln should be so far forgetful of his oath to maintain the
Constitution as to permit the Southern States to secede
in peace. Only three days after Lincoln's election Gree
ley published an editorial in the Tribune in which he
said: "If the Cotton States shall become satisfied that
they can do better out of the Union than in it, we insist
on letting them go in peace. . . . The right to secede
may be a revolutionary one, but it exists nevertheless.
We must ever resist the right of any State to remain in
the Union and nullify or defy the laws thereof. To
withdraw from the Union is quite another matter, and
whenever a considerable section of our Union shall de
liberately resolve to get out we shall resist all coercive
measures designed to keep it in. We hope never to live
in a republic whereof one section is pinned to another
by bayonets." Again, on the i7th of December, 1860,
just after the secession of South Carolina, a leading edi
torial in the Tribune, speaking of the Declaration of
Independence, said: "If it justified the secession from
the British empire of three million of colonists in 1776,
we do not see why it would not justify the secession of
five million of Southerners from the Federal Union in
1 86 1. . . . If seven or eight contiguous States shall pre-
LINCOLN AND GREELEY. 317
rent themselves at Washington saying, ' We hate the
Federal Union; we have withdrawn from it; we give
you the choice between acquiescing in our secession and
arranging amicably 'all incidental questions on the one
hand, and attempting to subdue us on the other,' we
would not stand up for coercion, for subjugation, for we
do not think it would be just. We hold to the right of
self-government even when invoked in behalf of those
who deny it to others.' 1 Less than two weeks before
the inauguration of Lincoln, on the 23d of February,
1 86 1, and the same day on which his paper announced
Lincoln's midnight journey from Harrisburg to Wash
ington, Greeley said in a leading editorial: u We have
repeatedly said, and we once more insist, that the great
principle embodied by Jefferson in the Declaration of
American Independence, that governments derive their
just powers from the consent of the governed, is sound
and just, and that if the Slave States, the Cotton States,
or the Gulf States only choose to form an independent
nation, they have a clear moral right to do so. When
ever it shall be clear that the great body of Southern
people have become conclusively alienated from the
Union and anxious to escape from it, we will do our best
to forward their views. ' '
Such were the pointed and earnest utterances of Gree
ley between the period of Lincoln's election and of his
inauguration, and it is needless to say that these utter
ances not only grieved but embarrassed Lincoln to an
extent that can hardly be appreciated at this time. Had
Greeley stood alone in these utterances, even then his
position and power would have made his attitude one of
peculiar trouble to Lincoln, but he did not stand alone.
Not only the entire Democratic party, with few excep
tions, but a very large proportion of the Republican
party, including some of its ablest and most trusted
3l8 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
leaders, believed that peaceable secession, that might
reasonably result in early reconstruction, was preferable
to civil war. The constitutional right of coercion by
the government upon a seceded State was gravely dis
puted by most Democratic statesmen and by many Re
publican statesmen; and it is worthy of note that Lin
coln, like Buchanan, studiously avoided any attempt at
coercion until the South wantonly precipitated war by
firing upon the starving garrison in Fort Sumter. The
first gun fired upon Sumter solved the problem of coer
cion. Coercion at once ceased to be an issue. The
South had coerced the government into war by cause
lessly firing upon the flag of the nation and upon a gar
rison that had committed no overt act of war; and from
that day until the surrender of the Southern armies to
Grant and Sherman the overwhelming sentiment of every
Northern State demanded the prosecution of the war to
conquer Secession. Had Buchanan or Lincoln fired a
single gun solely to coerce the Southern States to re
main in the Union, the North would have been hope
lessly divided, and the administration would surely have
been overthrown in any attempt to prosecute the war.
Greeley recognized the fact that the firing upon Sumter
ended the issue of coercion as understood and discussed
until that time, and from the day that Lincoln issued his
call for seventy-five thousand troops to engage in the w r ar
that had been so insanely precipitated against the gov
ernment he heartily sustained the President and his
policy ; but he added new grief and fresh embarrassments
to Lincoln by his fretful impatience and his repeated
and emphatic demands that the army should be hurled
against the Confederates as soon as it was organized.
u On to Richmond!" was his almost daily battle-rrv.
and Greeley was overwhelmed with sorrow and humil
iation when at last his impetuous orders were obeyed
LINCOLN AND G REE LEY. 319
and McDowell's army was defeated and hurled back into
the intrenchments of Washington.
When war was accepted as a necessity no man in the
country was more earnest in his support of a most vig
orous and comprehensive war policy than was Greeley.
After the lesson of the first Bull Run he appreciated the
fact that a great war was upon us, and every measure
looking to the increase of our armies and the mainte
nance of our severely strained credit was supported by
the Tribune with all of Greeley 's matchless ability and
vigor; but he was never without some disturbing issue
with Lincoln and the policy of the administration. Sin
cerely patriotic himself, he was as sincere in his convic
tions on all questions of public policy, and he seldom
took pause to consider the claims of expediency when
he saw what he believed to be the way dictated by the
right. He believed Lincoln equally patriotic with him
self, and equally sincere in every conviction and public
act, but no two men were more unlike in their mental
organization. Greeley was honest, aggressive, impul
sive, and often ill advised in attempting to do the right
thing in the wrong way. Lincoln was honest, patient,
considerate beyond any man of his day, and calmly
awaited the fullness of time for accomplishing the great
achievements he hoped for. Writing of Lincoln some
time after his death, Greeley said that after the war be
gan " Lincoln's tenacity of purpose paralleled his former
immobility; I believe he would have been nearly the
last, if not the very last, man in America to recognize
the Southern Confederacy had its armies been triumph
ant. He would have preferred death. ' ' That two such
men should differ, and widely differ, and that Greeley
should often differ in bitterness from Lincoln's apparent
tardiness, was most natural; and with a great war con
stantly creating new issues of the gravest magnitude
320 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR- TIMES.
Greeley was kept in constant conflict with Lincoln on
some great question while honestly and patriotically sup
porting the government in the prosecution of the war.
The question of destroying slavery enlisted Greeley 's
most earnest efforts when it became evident that a great
civil war must be fought for the preservation of the
Union, and on that issue he fretted Lincoln more than
any other one man in the United States, because he had
greater ability and greater power than any whose criti
cisms could reach either Ivincoln or the public. While
the Cabinet had as much discord as there was between
Lincoln and Greeley, and while even great Senators and
Representatives of the same political faith with the Pres
ident had serious dispute with him on the subject, Gree
ley was the most vexatious of all, for he was tireless in
effort and reached the very heart of the Republican party
in every State in the Union with his great newspaper.
Notwithstanding the loyal support given to Lincoln by
the Republicans throughout the country, Greeley was in
closer touch with the active loyal sentiment of the peo
ple than even the President himself, and his journal con
stantly inspired not only those who sincerely believed in
early Emancipation, but all who were inclined to factious
hostility to Lincoln, to most aggressive efforts to embar
rass the administration by untimely forcing the Emanci
pation policy. Finally, Greeley 's patience became ex
hausted over what he regarded as the inexcusable inac
tion of Lincoln on the subject of Emancipation, and on
the aoth of August, 1862, he published in his own news
paper an open letter to Lincoln denouncing him for his
failure to execute the Confiscation Act in ' ( mistaken
deference to rebel slavery," for bowing to the influence
of what he called ' ' certain fossil politicians hailing from
the Border States," and because our army officers
u evinced far more solicitude to uphold slavery than to
LINCOLN AND G REE LEY. 321
put down the rebellion.'' Thus plainly accused by one
whose patriotism Lincoln did not question and whose
honesty of purpose he could not doubt, Lincoln felt that
he could no longer be silent, and on the 22d of August
he addressed a letter to Greeley that did more to steady
the loyal sentiment of the country in a very grave emer
gency than anything that ever came from Lincoln's pen.
It is one of Lincoln's clearest and most incisive presenta
tions of any question. Greeley, with all his exceptional
tact and ability in controversy, was unable successfully to
answer it. It was in that letter that Lincoln said: "I
would save the Union; I would save it the shortest way
under the Constitution;" and he followed these terse ut
terances with the statement, several times referred to in
these articles, that he would save the Union either by the
destruction or the maintenance of slavery as might best
serve the great end he had in view. It should be remem
bered that at the time this letter was written by Lincoln
to Greeley his draft of the Emancipation Proclamation
had been prepared nearly one month, and precisely one
month after he wrote the letter he issued his preliminary
proclamation ; but the letter gives no indication whatever
as to his action on the issue beyond his concluding sen
tence, in which he says: "I intend no modification of
my often expressed personal wish that all men for ever
could be free."
This constant friction between Greeley and Lincoln
logically led Greeley into the ranks of the opposition to
Lincoln's renomination in 1864, and he labored most
diligently to accomplish Lincoln's overthrow. His ripe
experience in politics prevented him from falling in with
the few disappointed Republican leaders who nominated
Fremont at Cleveland before the Baltimore Convention
met. He would gladly have joined in that effort had he
not fully appreciated the fact that the occasion was too
21
322 LINCOLN AND- MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
momentous to organize a faction on personal or political
grievances; but, while he kept aloof from the Fremont
movement, he aggressively resisted the nomination of
Lincoln, and on the day the convention met he published
an earnest protest and indicated very clearly that Lin
coln's nomination meant Republican defeat. He had
long been in intercourse with the friends of Chase, and
he would gladly have accepted Chase or Grant, or, in
deed, almost any other Republican in the country whose
name had been mentioned for the Presidency, in prefer
ence to Lincoln. When Lincoln was renominated by
practically an unanimous vote, Greeley avoided direct
antagonism to the party, but earnestly co-operated with
Senator Wade and Representative Davis in their open
rebellion against Lincoln. Wade and Davis issued an
address to the people of the United States that appeared
in Greeley 's journal on the 5th of August, in which Lin
coln was severely arraigned for usurping the authority
of Congress and for withholding his approval to a bill
presented to him just on the eve of adjournment, for the
purpose, as they assumed, of holding * ' the Electoral
votes of the rebel States at the dictation of his personal
ambition." Such an appeal, coining from two of the
ablest of the Republican leaders, cast a dark gloom over
the prospects of the Republican party, and to the sup
port of this revolt Greeley added an ostentatious and ill-
advised effort to negotiate a peace through a plausible
adventurer commonly known as ' * Colorado ' ' Jewett.
The effusive and irrepressible George N. Sanders was
Involved in it, and through Greeley they communicated
to Lincoln a basis of peace that Greeley was led to be
lieve the South would accept.
The terms suggested were the restoration of the Union,
the abolition of slavery, universal amnesty, payment of
$400,000,000 for the slaves, full representation to be given
LINCOLN AND GREELEY. 323
to the Southern States in Congress, and a National Con
vention to be called at once to engraft the new policy on
the Constitution. Instead of maintaining the secresy
necessary to the success of an adjustment of the difficulty
between the sections then at war, the Greeley-Jewett ne
gotiations soon became public, and Lincoln was earnestly
importuned by Greeley to meet the emergency by open
ing the doors widely to the consideration of any proposi
tion of peace. Lincoln, in his abundant caution, al
though entirely without hope of accomplishing anything
by the Greeley negotiations, transmitted a paper to be
delivered to the Confederates who were assuming to act
for the South a statement over his signature saying
that any proposition for ' ' the restoration of peace, the
integrity of the whole Union, and the abandonment of
slavery, and which comes by and with an authority that
can control the armies now at war against the United
States, will be received and considered by the executive
government of the United States, and will be met by
liberal terms on other substantial and collateral points,
and the bearer or bearers thereof shall have safe-conduct
both ways." Greeley had become enthusiastic in his
efforts to accomplish peace. He was a lover of peace, an
earnest and inherent foe of the arbitrament of the sword
under all circumstances, and when he found that the
whole effort made to arrest fraternal war brought only
a contemptuous rejection of Lincoln's proposition from
those who assumed to represent the Confederate govern
ment, he was profoundly humiliated. It is fortunate for
both Greeley and the country that Messrs. Clay and Hoi-
combe, who assumed to speak for the Confederate gov
ernment, refused even to consider the question of peace
on the basis of a restored Union and the abandonment
of slavery. Had they entertained the proposition, or
even pretended to entertain it, they would have misled
324 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
Greeley into a violent crusade against the further prose
cution of the war and into as violent hostility to the
re-election of Lincoln.
The pronounced anti-war platform of the Democratic
Convention that nominated McClellan against Lincoln
was even less to Greeley 's liking than the attitude of the
Republicans, and finally, as the Wade and Davis mani
festo seemed to have fallen stillborn upon the country,
and Greeley 's negotiations for peace had ended disas
trously, without credit to any, Greeley had no choice but
to fall in with the Lincoln procession and advocate the
success of the Republican ticket. Sherman's capture
of Atlanta and Sheridan's victories in the Valley started
the tidal wave in favor of Lincoln, and Greeley was quite
prepared, through his sad experiences in his hostility to
the administration, to fall in with the tide and share the
victory his party was then certain to win. After Lin
coln's re-election there was little opportunity for Greeley
to take issue with Lincoln. During the winter of 1865
he earnestly favored every suggestion looking to the ter
mination of the war upon some basis that would bring
the South back into cordial relations with the Union.
The failure of the Hampton Roads conference between
Lincoln and the Confederate Commissioners was regretted
by Greeley, but he no longer criticised Lincoln with his
old-time severity; and when, after Lee's surrender and
the final triumph of the Union cause, Lincoln's life was
taken by the assassin's bullet, Greeley and Lincoln were
more nearly in harmonious relations than they had ever
been at any time from the day of Lincoln's inauguration.
When the war ended Greeley was the first prominent
man of the country to demand universal amnesty and
impartial suffrage. A leading editorial in the Tribune
demanding the forgiveness of the insurgents as the price
of universal suffrage to the freedmen startled the coun-
LINCOLN AND GREELEY. 325
try, and cost Greeley the Senatorial honors he much
coveted.
While Greeley was one of the founders of the Repub
lican party, and certainly did more to make it successful
than any other one man of the nation, he gathered few
of its honors and was seldom in harmony with Repub
lican authority in State or nation. His rebellion against
Seward in 1860 cost him an election to the United States
Senate in 1861. His universal amnesty and suffrage pol
icy, proclaimed immediately after the war, again defeated
him as a Senatorial candidate in 1865, an d while he ac
cepted Grant for President in 1868 and supported his
election with apparent cordiality, he very soon drifted
into a hostile attitude toward the administration. Grant
had none of Lincoln's patience and knew little of Lin
coln's conciliatory methods; and when Greeley rebelled
Grant allowed him to indulge his rebellious ideas to his
heart's content. Long before the close of Grant's first
administration Greeley was ripe for revolution, and was
one of the earliest of those who inaugurated the Liberal
Republican movement of 1872 that nominated Greeley
as its candidate for President. I cordially sympathized
with the revolt against Grant in 1872, and was chairman
of the delegation from Pennsylvania in the Cincinnati
Convention. My relations with Greeley had been of the
most friendly character from the time I first met him
when a boy-journalist at the Whig Convention in Phila
delphia in 1848, and I not only profoundly respected his
sincerity, his philanthropy, and his masterly ability, but
I cherished an affection for him that I felt but for few,
if any, of our public men. He was surprised when he
learned from me, after the delegation to the Liberal Con
vention had been selected in Pennsylvania, that I was
not urging his nomination for President. He believed
that all my personal inclinations would make me favor
326 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
him at any time that it might be in my power to do so,
and he made an appointment by telegraph to meet me at
the Colonnade Hotel in Philadelphia to discuss the ques
tion of the Presidency. We met at the appointed time,
and I greatly pained Greeley when I told him that I did
not believe his nomination would be a wise one, because
I saw no possible chance for his election. He believed
me when I assured him that I had no candidate whom I
preferred to him, and that I was influenced solely by my
desire to protect him from a great personal disaster and
the country from a failure in the then promising effort to
overthrow the despotic political rule that had obtained
under Grant. I told him that I did not believe it pos
sible for the Democrats to support him, and without
their support his election would be utterly hopeless.
After hearing me very fully, and evidently in great sor
row because of the attitude I assumed, he finally made
this significant remark: "Well, perhaps the Democrats
wouldn't take me head foremost, but they might take
me boots foremost." I well understood that Greeley
meant that while he might not be an available candidate
for President, he might be an acceptable candidate for
the second place on the ticket. I at once answered:
"Yes, Mr. Greeley, with a conservative Republican for
President you can easily be nominated for Vice- Pres
ident and add great strength to the ticket." I said:
"There are two names which seem to me to be the
strongest David Davis and Charles Francis Adams:
which would you prefer?" Greeley answered: "The
name of Adams leaves a bad taste in my mouth ; I would
prefer Davis;" and we finally agreed that I should go to
the Cincinnati Convention and support the nomination
of Davis for President and Greeley for Vice-President.
While I knew that Greeley most reluctantly gave up
the idea of being nominated for President, I did not
LINCOLN AND GREELEY. 327
doubt that his candidacy for that office was practically
ended by our conference. When I went to Cincinnati,
I there met Leonard Swett, John D. Defrees, Senator
Fenton, and others, and we started out to accomplish
the nomination of Davis and Greeley. Sorrie fifteen or
twenty of us met at ten o'clock in the evening and de
cided on a programme by which we confidently expected
to nominate Davis and Greeley on the first ballot. But
while we were thus conferring General Frank P. Blair
had gotten together a conference between some of the
more radical supporters of Greeley and the supporters of
B. Gratz Brown, and their conference ended by deciding
to nominate Greeley for President and Brown for Vice-
President. By this new combination we were deprived
of the support of the important State of New York, and
also lost a large support in the West. While many of
the New York delegates would have preferred the nomi
nation of Davis and Greeley, when Greeley was presented
as a hopeful candidate for President the delegation natu
rally united in his support, and Brown brought into the
combination a large number of Western delegates who
would have preferred Davis had they been free to exer
cise their own judgment in selecting a candidate. Davis
was thus practically out of the race, and after giving a
complimentary vote to Curtin a large majority of the
Pennsylvania delegation united with me in supporting
the nomination of Adams. I did not regard Adams as
possessing the qualities of availability presented in Davis,
but Adams seemed to be the only man who had a reason
able prospect of winning the nomination over Greeley.
I was placed in the most unpleasant attitude of support
ing a man for President to whom I was almost an entire
stranger, and for whom I had little personal sympathy,
against Greeley, for whom I cherished the profoundest
respect and affection,
328 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
On the first ballot Adams led Greeley by a vote of 203
to 147, with a large scattering vote between Trumbull,
Brown, Davis, Curtin, and Chase. On the second ballot
Adams rose to 243 and Greeley to 239, with Trumbull to
148, On the third ballot Adams had 264, Greeley 258,
and Trumbull 156. On the fourth ballot Adams in
creased to 279, and Greeley fell off to 251, with Trum
bull still holding 141. On the fifth ballot Adams had
309 and Greeley 258; and on the sixth and final ballot,
as first reported, Greeley led Adams 8 votes, having 332
to Adams 324. This was the first ballot on which Gree
ley led Adams, and it clearly indicated that the conven
tion was resistlessly drifting to Greeley as its candidate.
There was at once a rush from different delegations to
change votes from Adams to Greeley. I did not partici
pate in it, and only when a majority of votes had been
cast and recorded for him did I announce the change
of the Pennsylvania delegation to Greeley. The ballot
as finally announced was 482 for Greeley and 187 for
Adams. While the balloting was in progress Greeley
was sitting in his editorial room in the Tribune office
along with one of his editorial assistants, who informed
me that Greeley became intensely agitated as the sixth
ballot developed his growing strength; and when the
telegrams announced that he led Adams on that vote, he
excitedly exclaimed: "Why don't McClure change the
vote of Pennsylvania ?' ' The next bulletin he received
announced his nomination, and he promptly telegraphed
to Whitelaw Reid, then his chief editorial associate, who
was in attendance at the convention: u Tender my grate
ful acknowledgments to the members of the convention
for the generous confidence they have shown me, and
assure them that I shall endeavor to deserve it.'*
I was greatly disappointed at the result of the conven
tion, and was deeply grieved at what I regarded as a
LINCOLN AND G REE LEY. 329
cruel sacrifice of one of the men I most loved and the
surrender of a great opportunity to win a national vic
tory in the interest of better government and sectional
tranquil ity. The nomination of Greeley carried with it
the nomination of B. Gratz Brown for Vice- President,
and when the convention adjourned I returned to my
room at the hotel feeling that our work was farcical,
because I did not regard it as possible for the Democrats
to accept Greeley. Before midnight, however, a number
of leading Democrats from different parts of the country
who were in constant touch with the convention pulled
themselves together, and their utterances given to the
world the next morning foreshadowed the possibility
that the Democrats would accept Greeley and Brown;
but even when the Democratic National Convention
with substantial unanimity accepted both the candidates
and the platform of the Liberal Republicans, I saw little
hope for Greeley 's election, as I feared that the Demo
cratic rank and file could not be brought to his support.
For some time after both conventions had nominated
Greeley we had a Greeley tidal-wave that seemed likely
to sweep the country. In Pennsylvania, as chairman
of the Liberal State Committee, I had voluntary letters
from hundreds of leading Republicans in every section
of the State indicating their purpose to fall in with the
Greeley current, but the loss of North Carolina early in
August not only halted the Greeley tide, but made its
returning ebb swift and destructive. With this obvious
revulsion in the political current the great business in
terests of the country were speedily consolidated in oppo
sition to any change in the national administration, and
there never was a day after the North Carolina defeat
when Greeley 's election seemed to be within the range
of possibility.
The September elections proved that Greeley 's nomi-
^ ^-^ (&*'*& p o-
* ^^ 4^U-
^
^X/^-^^cp
-?
GRBEI,EY'S LAST
LINCOLN AND GREELEY. 331
nation made no impression upon the Republicans in New
England, including his native State of Vermont, where
it was hoped he would have thousands of Republican
followers, and the October elections came like an ava
lanche against the Liberal movement. Greeley delivered
campaign speeches in New England and in the Middle
States which were models of statesmanlike ability, but
he was fighting a hopeless battle; and when the October
elections cast their gloom upon his political hopes he was
called to nurse a dying wife, where for nearly a month
he passed sleepless nights, and closed her eyes in death
only a week before his overwhelming defeat in Novem
ber. Thus at once broken in heart and hope, the most
brilliant and forceful editor the country has ever pro
duced, and one of the sincerest and most tireless of
American philanthropists, pined away in the starless
midnight of an unsettled mind until the 29th of No
vember, 1872, when he passed to his final account. Im
mediately after the election I had written him a personal
letter expressing my sincere sympathy with him in his
multiplied misfortunes. One of the most valued of my
mementos of the men of the past is his reply, dated No
vember loth, the last day on which he ever wrote any
thing, as follows:
(Private.}
NEW YORK, November 10, 1872.
MY DEAR FRIEND :
I am a man of many sorrows, and doubtless have deserved
them, but I beg to say that I do not forget the gallant though
luckless struggle you made in my behalf. I am not well.
Yours truly,
HORACE GREEDY.
COL. A. K. McCLURE,
144 So. Sixth St., Philada.
Thus ended one of the most useful and one of the sad
dest lives of the last generation. He was of heroic
33 2 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR- TIMES.
mould in his matchless battles for the lowly and help
less, and was always invincible in political controversy,
because his integrity was ever as conspicuous as his abil
ity; but he was as impatient as he was philanthropic,
and he most longed for what was so pointedly denied
him the generous approval of his countrymen. He
was made heart-sore when he saw the colored voters,
whose cause he had championed when no political party
had the courage to espouse it, almost unitedly oppose his
election to the Presidency; and finally, smitten in his
home, in his ambition, and in his great newspaper, Hor
ace Greeley, broken in heart and hopelessly clouded in
intellect, gave up the battle of life, and slept with his
loved ones who had gone before.
(Photo by Gutekunst, Philadelphia.)
JOHN BROWN,
AN EPISODE OF JOHN BROWN'S RAID.
FAR down in the beautiful Cumberland Valley, the
old-time heartsome village of Chambersburg was
one of the chief attractions a generation ago. It was
founded by the sturdy Scotch-Irish pioneers, who carried
their severe religion and not less severe detestation of
despotism with them, and mingled their prayers with
their warfare against the savage and the soldiers of King
George. The memorable pioneer whose name the village
bears chose a lovely spot as his home and the heritage of
his children, where the soft murmurs of the crystal waters
of Falling Spring are lost in the Conococheague, and the
united waters course through the centre of the town on
their journey to the sea. Here more than a century had
been devoted to the genial civilization that made Cham
bersburg first in the affections of its people; and its homes,
palatial for that day; its grand elms and lindens which
arched the walks with their shades; its cultured people,
with just pride of ancestry and equal pride of present
character and usefulness, made it one of the most de
lightful of Pennsylvania towns for citizen or visitor. It
had none of the paralysis that comes when "wealth ac
cumulates and men decay;" large fortunes were unknown,
but plenty, thrift, and comfort stamped their impress
upon the community.
In the summer of 1859 a man f ratner ru( ^ e aspect,
but of grave and quiet demeanor, was noticed by the
334
AN EPISO DE OF JOHN BR WN ' S A' A ID. 3 } 5
village crowd that usually gathered in social converse
about the post-office while the evening mail was being
distributed. He attracted little attention, as he seldom
spoke save when spoken to, and then only in the briefest
way. He was known as ' ( Dr. Smith, ' ' and was reputed
to be engaged in the development of iron-mines on the
Potomac, some twenty-five miles distant. He lodged at
a private boarding-house off from the centre of the town,
and there was nothing in his sayings or doings to excite
any apprehension that his mission was anything else than
a peaceful one. This man was John Brown, then of
Kansas fame, and later immortalized in song and story
throughout every civilized land. The supposed mining-
implements which he was storing in Chambersburg were
the rude pikes with which the negroes of Virginia were
to be armed in their expected insurrection against their
masters. There was not a man, woman, or child in
Chambersburg who then dreamed that " Dr. Smith"
was John Brown not one who knew or suspected his
real purpose. None of the many who then saw him
casually from day to day could have dreamed that the
harmless-looking and acting " Dr. Smith" was engaged
in a drama the sequel of which would be enacted when
the vandals' torch left the beautiful old village in ashes
only five years later. The South ever believed that John
Brown made Chambersburg the base for his mad raid on
Harper's Ferry because he had many sympathizing con
fidants and abetters there; and that unjust prejudice re
solved all doubts as to dooming the town when McCaus-
land rioted in its destruction on the 3Oth of July, 1864.
In the early part of October, 1859, two men, unknown
to me, entered my office and asked to submit some legal
matters in private. We retired to the private office,
when the younger of the two, an intelligent and evi
dently positive man, gave his name as Francis Jackson
336 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR. TIMES.
Meriam of Boston, and his companion gave his name as
John Henry. Meriam said that he was going on a jour
ney South ; that he had some property at home ; that acci
dents often happened to travelers ; and that he desired me
to draw his will. I did so, and was not surprised that a
young Boston traveler, after making a few special be
quests, gave his property to the Abolition Society of his
native State. There was nothing in his appearance,
manner, or conversation to attract any special attention
to his proceeding, and his will was duly executed, wit
nessed, and, in obedience to his orders, mailed to the
executor in Boston. When I asked Meriam' s companion
to witness the will, he declined, saying that he was a
traveler also, and that both the witnesses had better be
in the same town. His real reasons for declining to wit
ness the will of his friend were first, that "John Henry "
was none other than John Henry Kagi, and, second, be
cause he presumed his life to be as much in peril as was
that of his friend. The sequel proved that he judged
well, for Kagi was killed in the attack on Harper's
Ferry, while Meriam escaped. When the two visitors
left they were no more thought of in the village lawyer's
office until the startling news came of Brown's attempt
to capture Harper's Ferry and to arm the slaves of Vir
ginia in general insurrection. Then, to my surprise, I
read the name of the testator in the will I had written a
short time before, and the name and description of an
other assured me that his fellow-visitor in my office was
the then fallen John Henry Kagi.
It may be remembered that of the twenty-one who
composed John Brown's army of invasion, Watson
Brown, Oliver Brown, John Henry Kagi, Adolphus
Thompson, and Stewart Taylor, whites, and Sherrard
Lewis Leary, Dangerfield Newby, and Jeremiah Ander
son, colored, were killed in the battle, and that William
AN EPISODE OF JOHN BROWN'S RAID. 337
H. Leeman and William Thompson were killed in at
tempting to retreat. Owen Brown, Barclay Coppoch,
Charles P. Tidd, and Francis Jackson Meriam, whites,
and Osborne P. Anderson, colored, escaped. They made
their way through the forests of the South Mountain to
Chambersburg, traveling only by night; were concealed
in a retired grove near Chambersburg for several days to
enable the wounded men of the party to recruit their
strength, and then went on by short night-marches
across the North Mountain to the Juniata Valley, near
Bell's Mills, where they were taken in charge by a
prominent citizen of Harrisburg, whose dust has long
mouldered with that of John Brown. Meriam left the
party at Chambersburg, took the cars, and went through
to Boston without detection. Only two residents of
Chambersburg knew of the presence of the fugitives,
and they are no longer numbered among the citizens of
the town whose history forms such an important chapter
in the annals of our terrible civil war. John K. Cook,
Edwin Coppoch, Aaron Dwight Stevens, and Albert
Hazlitt, whites, and John Copeland and Shields Green,
colored, were captured, and, with John Brown their
leader, convicted of murder at Charlestown, Virginia,
and executed in December, 1859. Hazlitt was the first
of the fugitives captured in Pennsylvania. He was
arrested while walking along the Cumberland Valley
Railroad near Shippensburg, and lodged in the jail at
Carlisle. His captors supposed him to be Captain Cook,
and that error cost Cook his life on the gibbet. A requi
sition was quietly obtained from Richmond for the ren
dition of Cook. When it arrived the identity of Hazlitt
had been established, but the requisition remained within
thirty miles of Chambersburg, to surprise Cook and return
him to Virginia just when he had perfected his plans for
escape. Cook was the last of the fugitives to be cap-
22
LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
tured, and the circumstances and manner of his arrest,
the strange miscarriage of his apparently certain oppor
tunities of escape, and his heroism in the lawless cause
that so blindly misguided him make a truthful story be
fore which the fascinating inventions of romance pale.
I was the counsel of John E. Cook in Chambersburg,
and the only person entirely familiar with the inner his
tory of his capture and the plans of escape. The com
munity of which Chambersburg was the centre of busi
ness and sentiment was nearly equally divided on the
political issues of that day; but the undertow of anti-
slavery conviction was stronger than the partisan dogmas
which made one-half the people declare slavery a lawful
and therefore a defensible institution. Fervent and elo
quent speeches would be made on the stump in every
campaign against interference with slavery and in favor
of the faithful observance of the mandates of the Con
stitution, and glittering resolves would emanate from
party conventions in favor of the Union, the Constitu
tion, and tiie laws; but the practical division of the com
munity on the issues of obedience to the Constitution and
the laws which commanded the rendition of fugitive slaves
left here and there a despised negro-catcher on the one side
and all the people on the other side. There was no Demo
crat in Franklin County to accept a commissionership under
the Fugitive Slave L,aw. I have seen two Democratic
president judges administer the laws with a singleness of
purpose to hold the scales of justice in even balance; and
I have known a prominent Democratic candidate for the
same position, once a member of Congress, who pub
licly demanded justice to the South by the rendition of
slaves; but all of them would feed the trembling sable
fugitive, hide him from his pursuers, and bid him God
speed on his journey toward the North Star. The Demo
cratic president judge who personally remanded Captain
AN EPISODE OF JOHN BROWN'S RAID. 339
Cook to the custody of the Virginia authorities for exe
cution would have assented to and aided his escape had
they met simply as man and man outside the sacred obli
gations of the law. There was no sentiment in Frank
lin County or elsewhere in the North to give any practical
enforcement to the Fugitive Slave Law; and in every
contest between slave and master and in every issue re
lating to slavery the people were profoundly anti-slavery,
however they resolved in convention or spoke in the
forum or voted at the polls. This statement of the pub
lic sentiment that prevailed a quarter of a century ago
in Southern Pennsylvania, hard by the slave border, and
which was but a reflex of the sentiment of the North
that gave practical effect to its teachings, will make the
story of Captain Cook's apparently certain but singular ly-
defeated opportunities of escape better understood.
It had been known for some days after the Brown raid
on Harper's Ferry that Captain Cook was at > large, and,
as a liberal reward for his capture had been offered by
Governor Wise of Virginia, and a minute description of
his person published throughout the country, the whole
skilled and amateur detective force of the land was
watching every promising point to effect his capture.
The Northern cities, East and West, were on the watch
to discover his hiding-place, but the forest-schooled and
nature-taught detective of the South Mountain knew
that some of its fastnesses must be his retreat. The
broken ranges of the mountain on the southern border
of Franklin embraced the line between Pennsylvania
and Maryland, between the free and the slave States.
It was the favorite retreat of the fugitive slave, and its
nearness to Harper's Ferry, and its sacred temples of
solitude where only the hunter or the chopper wandered,
made it the most inviting refuge for the fleeing insurrec
tionist. Cook was known as a man of desperate courage,
340 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
as a rare expert in the use of pistol and rifle, as a reckless
desperado in the anti-slavery crusade; and his capture
alive was not expected. He had braved assassination in
Kansas, and all believed that he would resist to the death
any attempt to capture him for Virginia vengeance on
the gallows. He had been concealed in the mountain-
recesses for some days with his companions, who subse
quently escaped through Chambersburg to the North,
when he decided to seek out some woodman's home and
obtain provisions. They were afraid to shoot game, lest
the reports of their guns might indicate their retreat and
lead to their capture. Cook was of a nervous, restless,
reckless disposition, and he started out alone, going he
knew not whither, to obtain food. He reasoned plausi
bly that he could not be captured by any one or two
men, as he was well armed and thoroughly skilled in the
use of his weapons. He took no thought of arrest, as,
had a score of armed men confronted him, he would
have sold his life as dearly as possible and died in the
battle for his liberty. He understood that he might die
any day or hour, but to be made a prisoner and be ren
dered up to Virginia justice to die on the gibbet was the
one doom that he meant to escape. He felt safe, there
fore, in his venture out in the pathless mountains to
claim the hospitality of some humble home in the wil
derness. And his judgment would have been justified
had he not walked into the hands of the only man in
Franklin County who combined with the courage and
the skill the purpose to capture him.
Among the sturdy population of the mountaineers
on the southern Pennsylvania border was a family of
Logans. There were two brothers, both shrewd, quiet,
resolute men, both strongly Southern in their sympathies,
both natural detectives, and both trained in the summary
rendition of fugitive slaves without process of law. It
AN EPISODE OF JOHN BROWN'S RAID. 341
was common for slaves to escape from Maryland and
Virginia into the South Mountain, whose broken spurs
and extended wings of dense forest gave them reasonably
safe retreat. Their escape would be followed by hand
bills describing the fugitives and offering rewards for
their capture and return. These offers of rewards always
found their way into the hands of Daniel and Hugh
Logan, and many fleeing sons of bondage were arrested
by them and quietly returned to their masters. Hugh
followed his natural bent and went South as soon as the
war began. He at once enlisted in the Confederate ser
vice, rose to the rank of captain, and was the guide in
General Stuart's raid to Chambersburg in October, 1862.
He then saved me from identification and capture, al
though my arrest was specially ordered, with that of a
dozen others, in retaliation of Pope's arrest of Virginia
citizens; and I was glad at a later period of the war to
save him from summary execution as a supposed bush
whacker by General Kelley. Whatever may be said or
thought of his convictions and actions, he sealed them
with his life, as he fell mortally wounded in one of the
last skirmishes of the war. His brother Daniel was less
impulsive, and he did not believe that either slavery or
freedom was worth dying for. He was then just in the
early vigor of manhood and a man of rare qualities.
He possessed the highest measure of courage, but never
sought and seldom shared in a quarrel. He was a com
plete picture of physical strength, compactly and sym
metrically formed, and with a face whose clear-cut fea
tures unmistakably indicated his positive qualities. He
was a born detective. Silent, cunning, tireless, and reso
lute, he ever exhausted strategy in his many campaigns
against fugitives, and he seldom failed. Had he been
city-born, with opportunities for culture in the pro
fession, Logan would have made one of the best chiefs
342 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
of a detective bureau to be found in the country. But,
mountain-born, unschooled save by himself, and trained
only in the rude contests with fugitive slaves and an
occasional criminal in the border wilderness, he finally
wearied of his trade, and his arrest of Captain Cook was
his last exploit in the detective line. He subsequently
removed to Lancaster, where a very quiet, well-to-do,
well behaved, and respected dealer in horses answers to
the name of Daniel Logan.
In a mountain-ravine near Mont Alto Furnace, Cleg-
gett Fitzhugh, manager of the works, and a man of
Southern birth and strong Southern sympathies, was
overseeing a number of men at work, and Daniel Logan
had happened to come that way and was engaged in
casual conversation with him. The ravine is so hidden
by the surrounding forest that one unacquainted with
the locality would not know of its existence until he
entered it. Captain Cook, in his wanderings in search
of food, was surprised to find himself suddenly emerge
from the mountain-thicket into an open space and within
less than fifty yards of a number of workmen. He was
clad and armed as a hunter, and he at once decided to
evade suspicion by boldly meeting the men he could not
hope to escape by flight. The moment he appeared the
keen eye of Logan scanned him, and, without betraying
his discovery in any way, he quietly said to Fitzlnigh,
"That's Captain Cook; we must arrest him; the reward
is one thousand dollars." Fitzhugh heartily sympathized
with Logan alike in hatred of the John Brown raiders
and in desire for the reward, and he knew enough about
Logan to say nothing and obey. Cook advanced in a
careless manner to Logan and Fitzhugh, and told them
that he was hunting on the mountains and wanted to re
plenish his stock of bread and bacon. Logan at once
disarmed suspicion on the part of Cook by his well-
AN EPISODE OF JOHN tiROWWS RAW. 343
affected hospitality, as he proposed to go at once with
Cook to Logan's store which had no existence, by the
way and supply the hunter's wants. Cook was so com
pletely thrown off guard by the kind professions of Lo
gan and Fitzhugh that he fell in between them without
noticing how he was being flanked. His gun rested
carelessly on his shoulder, and the hand that could grasp
his pistol and fire with unerring aim in the twinkling of
an eye was loosely swinging by his side. None but a
Daniel Logan could have thus deceived John K. Cook,
who had studied men of every grade in many perils; but
there was not the trace of excitement or the faintest be
trayal of his desperate purpose on the face of Logan.
Thus completely disarmed by strategy, the little blue-
eyed blonde, the most sympathetic and the fiercest of all
John Brown's lieutenants, was instantly made powerless,
as two rugged mountaineers, at a signal from Logan,
grasped his arms and held him as in a vice. Cook was
bewildered for a moment, and when the truth flashed
upon him he struggled desperately; but it was one small,
starved man against two strong mountaineers, and he
soon discovered that resistance was vain.
u Why do you arrest me?" was his inquiry, when he
perceived that violence was useless.
"Because you are Captain Cook," was the cool reply
of Logan.
Cook neither affirmed nor denied the impeachment,
and the speedy search of his person settled the question,
as his captain's commission in John Brown's army was
found in an inner pocket. Cook was taken to Fitz
hugh' s house and stripped of his weapons, consisting
of gun, revolver, and knife. He was allowed to eat a
hasty meal, and was then placed, unbound, in an open
buggy with Logan, to be taken to Chambersburg. He
was informed that if he attempted to escape he would be
344 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
shot; and it did not need an extended acquaintance with
his captor to assure him that what he threatened he
would certainly perform. He then gave up all hope of
escape by either fight or flight. As they were journey
ing along the eighteen miles Cook found that his captor
was less bloodthirsty than mercenary; and the following
conversation, subsequently repeated to me by both par
ties, passed substantially between them:
' ' You will get a reward of one thousand dollars for
me, you say?" queried Cook.
"Yes, a thousand dollars," answered the sententious
Logan.
"They will hang me in Virginia, won't they?" was
Cook's next inquiry.
' ' Yes, they will hang you, ' ' was the chilling answer.
"Do you want to have me hung?" was Cook's first
venture upon the humane side of his captor.
' ' No, ' ' was the prompt but unimpassioned answer of
Logan.
"Then you want only the reward?" was Cook's half-
hopeful appeal to Logan.
" Yes; that's all," was Logan's reply.
Cook's naturally bright face beamed at once with hope
as he enthusiastically entered into various plans for the
payment of the sum that would ransom his life. He told
Logan how a thousand dollars, or five times that sum,
would not be a matter of a moment's consideration to
his brother-in-law, Governor Willard of Indiana, or his
other brother-in-law, a man of large fortune residing in
Brooklyn ; but Logan distrusted this story of high digni
taries and large fortunes, and no practical way seemed
open to make Cook's credit good enough to assure his
discharge. Finally, he inquired of Logan whether there
was no one in Chambersburg who would be likely to take
an interest in him, and who could act as his counsel and
AN EPISODE OF JOHN BROWN'S RAID. 345
assure Logan of the payment of the reward. Logan
named me as a Republican Senator just elected, who
might agree to act as his counsel. He proposed to take
Cook to my office without revealing his identity to any
others, and if I assured him of the payment of the re
ward he would walk away and leave Cook with me.
With this truce between captor and captive they arrived
in Chambersburg a little before sunset, put up at a hotel,
and Logan sent for me. I had walked out to the south
ern suburbs of the town that evening after tea to look at
some lots, and on my way back had stopped with a circle
of men gathered about a small outskirt store. We had
just closed one of the most desperate local contests of
the State, and only those who know the sunny side of
village politics can appreciate how an evening hour or
more could thus be pleasantly spent. It was an out-of-
the-way place, and among the last that would be thought
of in deciding to look for me. Meantime, Logan had
me searched for in every place where I was accustomed
to stroll in the evening, until, as it grew late, his evident
concern attracted attention, and he feared the discovery
or suspicion of the identity of his prisoner. When dark
ness began to gather and all efforts to find me had been
unsuccessful, he sent for an officer and started with his
prisoner for the office of Justice Reisher, to deliver Cook
to the custody of the law. The office of the justice was
on the main street, about midway between the hotel and
the suburban store where I had tarried, and as I walked
leisurely homeward I noticed a crowd about the door of
the little temple of justice. As I came up to the door
Logan first noticed me from the inside, and hurried out
to meet me, exclaiming in a whisper, with a betrayal of
excitement that I had never before seen in him, "My
God, Colonel McClure! where have you been? I have
been hunting you for more than an hour. That's Cap-
346 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR. TIMES.
tain Cook, and I had agreed to bring him to you. Can't
you get him yet?"
I was greatly surprised, of course, and equally per
plexed at the grave results likely to follow. I quietly
pressed my way into the office until the justice noticed
me, and he at once addressed Cook, saying, "Here's
your counsel now."
Cook beckoned me to his side in the corner, and said,
in a tone of visible despair, ' ' I had expected to meet you
at your office and escape this misfortune. ' ' He added,
" I am Cook: there's no use in denying it. What's to be
done?"
I turned to the justice, and said, "There is no dispute
as to the identity of the prisoner: a hearing is needless.
Let him be committed to await the demand for his ren
dition."
The justice would have been quite content had Cook
been able to bounce through a window and escape, but
that was not possible, and Cook was committed to prison.
I/ogan repented of his work when he saw that he had sur
rendered a life for a price, and his last direction to me as
we passed out of the office was, " Get Cook away, reward
or no reward. ' '
Cook was conducted to the old jail, accompanied by
the officer and myself; and I shall never forget the trem
ulous voice in which the sheriff inquired of me what pre
cautions he should take to secure the prisoner. I was
in the doubly unpleasant position of being counsel for a
prisoner whose life depended upon his escape from prison,
and also counsel for the sheriff, who was more than ready
to obey any instructions I might give him to facilitate
Cook's escape without legal responsibility for the act.
The sheriff was one of a class of simple countrymen who
are as rugged in their political convictions and prejudices
as in their physical organization, He ill concealed his
AN EPISODE OF JOHN BROWN'S RA,D. 347
willingness to let Cook get away if it could be done with
out official responsibility for the escape; and this he was
more than willing to leave me to decide. I told him to
take Cook and myself to a cell, leave us together, and
admit no others. When the lawless little captive had
got comfortably seated in his cell, I had my first oppor
tunity to note his appearance and qualities. His long,
silken, blonde hair curled carelessly about his neck; his
deep-blue eyes were gentle in expression as a woman's;
and his slightly bronzed complexion did not conceal the
soft, effeminate skin that would have well befitted the
gentler sex. He was small in stature, barely five feet
five, and his active life on the Western theatre of war
had left him without superfluous flesh. He was nervous
and impatient; he spoke in quick, impulsive sentences,
but with little directness, save in repeating that he must
escape from prison. I reminded him that he could not
walk out of jail, and that his escape that night, under
any circumstances, would be specially dangerous to him
self and dangerous to the sheriff. My presence with him
in the jail until a late hour and my professional relations
as counsel of the sheriff forbade any needless haste. We
carefully considered every possible method of getting a
requisition for him from Richmond; and, assuming that
Cook's arrest was telegraphed to Richmond that evening,
a requisition by mail or special messenger could not pos
sibly reach Chambersburg the next day or night. It was
decided, therefore, that he should not attempt to escape
that night, but that the next night he should have the
necessary instructions and facilities to regain his liberty.
How or by whom he was to be aided need not be told.
The two men who took upon themselves the work of
ascertaining just where and by what means Cook could
best break out of the old jail were never known or sus-
348 LINCOLN AND MEN OF U'AR-TIMF.S.
pected as actively aiding the prisoner. One is now dead
and the other is largely interested in Southern enter
prises. They did their part well, and, had Cook re
mained in Chambersburg over the next day, he would
have been following the North Star before the midnight
hour.
I had spent half an hour with Cook when he first en
tered the prison, and then left him for an hour to confer
with my law-partner about the possibility of a legal con
test to delay or defeat the requisition in case it should be
necessary. I returned to the jail about ten o'clock, and
had my last interview with Cook. As he never dreamed
of a requisition reaching him before the second day, and
as he was entirely confident of his escape the following
night, he threw off the cloud of despair that shadowed
him in the early part of the evening, and startled me
with the eloquence and elegance of his conversation.
His familiar discussion of poetry, painting, and every
thing pertaining to the beautiful would have made any
one forget that he was in a chilly prison-cell, and im-
gine that he was in the library of some romantic lover
of literature and the fine arts. I became strangely in
terested in the culture that was blended with the mad
desperation of the Virginia insurgent. He was evidently
a man of much more than common intellectual qualities
and thoroughly poetic in taste and temperament, with a
jarring mixture of wild, romantic love of the heroic.
He told me of his hairbreadth escapes in Kansas, of the
price set upon his head; and his whole soul seemed to be
absorbed in avenging the Kansas slavery crusades by
revolutionary emancipation in the Slave States. When
I asked him whether he would not abandon his lawless
and hopeless scheme when he escaped, his large, soft eyes
flashed with the fire of defiance as he answered, with an
emphasis that unstrung every nerve in his body: " No!
AN EPISODE OF JOHN BROWN'S RAID. 349
the battle must be fought to the bitter end; and we must
triumph, or God is not just."
It was vain to argue with him the utter madness of
attempting such a revolution, and its absolute lawless
ness: he rejected all law and logic and believed in his
cause. And more: he fully, fanatically, believed in its
justice: he believed in it as a duty as the rule of patriot
ism that had the sanction of a higher law than that of
man. In short, John B. Cook was a wild fanatic on the
slavery question, and he regarded any and every means
to precipitate emancipation as justified by the end. He
did not want to kill or to desolate homes with worse than
death by the brutal fury of slave insurrection; but if such
appalling evils attended the struggle for the sudden and
absolute overthrow of slavery, he was ready to accept the
responsibility and believe that he was simply performing
his duty. I do not thus present Cook in apology for his
crime; I present him as he was a sincere fanatic, with
mingled humanity and atrocity strangely unbalancing
each other, and his mad purposes intensified by the bar
barities which crimsoned the early history of Kansas.
After half an hour thus spent almost wholly as a lis
tener to the always brilliant and often erratic conversa
tion of the prisoner, I rose to leave him. He bade me
good-night with hope beaming in every feature of his
attractive face. I engaged to call again the next after
noon, and left him to meet nevermore. He could have
made his escape in thirty minutes that night, but it
would have compromised both the sheriff and myself,
and the second opportunity for his flight was lost. I
reached my home before eleven o'clock, and was sur
prised to find Mrs. McClure and her devoted companion,
Miss Virginia Reilly, awaiting me in the library, dressed
to face the storm that had begun to rage without. They
stated that they were about to proceed to the jail, ask to
350 LINCOLN AND, MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
see Cook which they knew would not be refused them
by the sheriff dress him in the extra female apparel
they had in a bundle, and one of them walk out with
him while the other remained in the cell. It was en
tirely practicable, and it required more than mere prot
estation on my part to prevent it. Even when assured
that Cook would certainly escape the following night
without embarrassment to the sheriff or any one else, the
woman's intuition rejected the reason it could not answer,
and only when it was peremptorily forbidden as foolish
and needless did they reluctantly consent to abandon the
last chance Cook could then have to escape. They were
both strongly anti-slavery by conviction, and their lives
were lustrous in the offices of kindness. Miss Reilly,
better known in Philadelphia as the late Accomplished
wife of Rev. Thomas X. Orr, was the daughter of a
Democratic member of Congress, and wag positive in
her party faith in all save slavery; and both women were
of heroic mould. They many times reproached them
selves for not acting upon their woman's intuition with
out waiting to reason with man on the subject. Had
they done so, Cook would have been out of prison, fleetly
mounted, and the morning sun would have greeted him
in the northern mountains. Their mission \led because
forbidden when the escape of the prisoner by other means
seemed as certain as anything could be in th$ future, and
the ill-fated Cook lost his third chance for lij/.erty. Both
his fair would-be rescuers sleep the dream] ^ cc sleep of
the dead, and the winds of the same autun ng their
requiem and strewed their fresh graves w Nature's
withered emblems of death.
About noon on the following day the " riff rushed
into my office, wild with excitement a"U.l his eyes
dimmed by tears, and exclaimed, "Cook's t? .en away!"
A thunderbolt from a cloudless sky couj ( not have
AN EPISODE OF JOHN BROWN'S RAID. 351
startled me more, but the painful distress of the sheriff
left no doubt in my mind that he had stated the truth.
He soon calmed down sufficiently to tell me how a req
uisition for Cook had been lying in Carlisle, only thirty
miles distant by railroad, where it had been brought
some days before when Hazlitt had been arrested and
was believed to be Cook. The error had been corrected
when the identity of Hazlitt had been discovered, and
another requisition forwarded, on which he had been
returned to Virginia; but the Cook requisition remained
with the sheriff of Cumberland. When Cook's arrest
was announced the requisition was brought on to Cham-
bersburg in the morning train, and the officer, fearing
delay by the sheriff sending for his counsel, called on the
president udge, who happened to be in the town, and
demanded his approval of the regularity of his papers
and his cc umand for the prompt rendition of the pris
oner. T: e judge repaired to the prison with the officer,
and perfc med his plain duty under the law by declaring
the office entitled to the custody of Cook. The noon
train borj the strangely ill-fated prisoner on his way
to Virginia and to death. No man in like peril ever
seemed t have had so many entirely practicable oppor
tunities .. ,r escape; but all failed, even with the exercise
of what would be judged as the soundest discretion for
his safet; .
His n ,urn to the Charlestown jail, his memorable
trial, V ' inevitable conviction, his only cowardly act of
subn j to recapture when he had broken out of his
cell a hours before his execution, and his final exe
cution _h his captive comrades, are familiar to all.
His tri? attracted more attention than that of any of
the otht ., because of the prominent men enlisted in his
cause ai ' of the special interest felt in him by the com
munity i and about Harper's Ferry. He had taught
352 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
school there some years before, had married there, and
his return as one of John Brown's raiders to kindle tne
flame of slave insurrection intensified the bitterness of
the people against him. From the 28th day of October,
1859, when he was lodged in the Charlestown jail, until
the last act of the tragedy, when he was executed, Cook
attracted the larger share of public interest in Harper's
Ferry, much as Brown outstripped him in national or
worldwide fame. Governor Willard, the Democratic
executive of Indiana, appeared in person on the scene,
and made exhaustive efforts to save his wayward but be
loved brother-in-law. Daniel W. Voorhees, now United
States Senator from Indiana, was then United States Dis
trict Attorney of his State, and his devotion to his party
chief made him excel every previous or later effort of his
life in pleading the utterly hopeless cause of the brilliant
little Virginia insurgent It was a grand legal and for
ensic battle, but there was not an atom of law to aid the
defense, and public sentiment was vehement for the
atonement.
Viewed in the clearer light and calmer judgment of
the experience of more than thirty years, it would have
been wiser and better had Virginia treated John Brown
and his corporal's guard of madmen as hopeless lunatics
by imprisonment for life, as was strongly advised by con
fidential counsels from some prominent men of the land
whose judgment was entitled to respect; but Governor
Wise, always a lover of the theatrical, made a dress-
parade burlesque of justice, and on the i6th day of De
cember, 1859, amidst the pomp and show of the concen
trated power of the Mother of Presidents, John E. Cook
paid the penalty of his crime on the gallows. No demand
was ever made for the rendition of Cook's companions
who had escaped from Harper's Ferry into the South
Mountain with him. Some of them lived in Northern
AN EPISODE OF JOHN BROWN'S RAID. 353
Pennsylvania without concealment, but no one thought
of arresting them. A few months thereafter the long-
threatening clouds of fraternal war broke in fury upon
the country; the song of John Brown inspired great
armies as they swept through the terrible flame of battle
from the Father of Waters to the Southern Sea, and the
inspiration that made lawless madmen of Brown and
Cook at Harper's Ferry crowned the Republic with uni
versal freedom at Appomattox.
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES.
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES.
A<Lf great wars produce great victors, and they are
crowned with the greenest laurels of the people for
whose cause they have achieved success. These chief
tains live in history and their memory is gratefully cher
ished long after they have passed away ; but every great
war has also its unrewarded heroes, whose merits are
often equal to, sometimes even greater than, those who
attained the highest measure of distinction. In war
and politics nothing is successful but success, and the
unsuccessful military commander and the unsuccessful
politician are forgotten, whatever may be their personal
merits, while those who win victories win the applause
of the world. Accident, fortuitous circumstance, and
personal or political influence aid largely in winning
promotion in both peace and war, and a lost battle, how
ever bravely and skillfully fought, often deposes a com
mander, while a victory won, even in spite of the absence
of the elements of greatness, may make a name immor
tal. The rewarded heroes of our late civil war are well
known to the country and to the world, but that great
conflict left unrewarded heroes whose names and merits
should be crystallized in the history of the Republic.
Prominent among these are General George G. Meade,
General George H. Thomas, General Fitz John Porter,
General G. K. Warren, and General D. C. Buell.
The country has never done justice to General Meade
355
356 LINCOLN AND *MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
as a military commander, and our varied histories, as a
rule, have grudgingly conceded to him only what could
not be withheld from him. The man who fought and
won the battle of Gettysburg should have been the com-
mander-in-chief of the armies of the Union and held
that position during life. It was the great battle of the
war; it was the Waterloo of the Confederacy, and the
victory there achieved was won by the skill of the com
manding general and the heroism of his army. No man
ever accepted a command under circumstances as embar
rassing and in every way discouraging as those which
confronted General Meade when he succeeded Hooker as
commander of the Army of the Potomac. That superb
army had never up to that time won a decisive victory
in a great battle. It had been defeated in 1861 under
McDowell, in the spring of 1862 under McClellan on the
Peninsula, again under Pope on the second Bull Run
field, next under Burnside at Fredericksburg in the fall
of 1862, and in 1863 under Hooker at Chancellorsville;
and the only success it had achieved in pitched battle
was the victory of Antietam. That was a victory only
because Lee left the field unassailed after the battle had
been fought. Meade was called to the command within
three days of the battle of Gettysburg, and was compelled
to advance to meet the strongest and most defiant army
that ever marched under the Confederate flag, and one
that fully equaled his in numbers and that was flushed
with repeated triumphs. His army was fresh from the
humiliating discomfiture of Chancellorsville, distrustful
of its own ability because of distrust in its commanders,
and it had to be concentrated by forced marches to meet
the shock of battle on Cemetery Hill.
The Gettysburg campaign was in all material respects
defensive. The government had little hope of anything
more than repelling L,ee's advance upon the national
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 357
capital or upon Baltimore or Philadelphia. The destruc
tion of I/ee's army was not to be thought of, for it was
equal in numbers, equipment, and prowess to the ever-
gallant though often-defeated Army of the Potomac. It
was the single hope of the nation, for had it been de
feated in a great battle Washington and the wealth of our
Eastern cities would have been at the mercy of the in
surgents. It was an occasion for the most skillful and
prudent generalship, united with the great courage essen
tial to command successfully in such an emergency. All
these high requirements General Meade fully met, and
the most critical examination of the records he made in
the Gettysburg campaign develops nothing but what
heightens his qualities for the' peculiarly grave emer
gency that confronted him. He has been thoughtlessly
or maliciously criticised because he took the wise pre
caution to provide for his retreat from Gettysburg had
the chances of war made it necessary, and also because
he failed to pursue Lee more vigorously on the retreat,
and decided not to assault him at Williamsport.
When General Meade arrived at Gettysburg, which he
did at the earliest hour possible, he knew how desperate
the battle must be and how the advantage was with the
enemy, as I^ee had largely superior numbers on the first
day, and should have had largely superior numbers on
the second day. Not until the morning of the third day
was Meade' s army all upon the field, and then one corps
had made a forced march of nearly thirty miles. He
had expected to fight a defensive battle east of Gettys
burg, and his topographical examinations had been care
fully made and his lines fully formulated. He thus acted
as a wise and skillful general in making the earliest prepa
rations for the retirement of his army to another position
in case he should be assaulted or flanked from his lines
on Cemetery Hill. He was thus prepared to retire hi3
358 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
army at any moment in perfect order, with every corps
advised precisely where to form its new lines; but he
proved by the dauntless courage with which he held his
position at Gettysburg that he did not contemplate retreat
until retreat became an absolute necessity. So far from
being complained of for having looked beyond Gettys
burg for a position in which to fight the decisive battle
with Lee, he is entitled to the highest commendation as
a most skillful, brave, and considerate soldier.
When Lee was defeated and retired from the field, the
Army of the Potomac was worn by forced marches and
fighting for more than a week, and more than twenty
thousand of its gallant warriors were killed or wounded,
and when the two armies were brought face to face again
at Williamsport, they were yet equal in numbers, equal
in prowess, and presumably equal in equipment, and Lee
had the advantage of a chosen position for repelling as
saults, upon his lines. Meade might have won another
victory, but it would have been at such fearful sacrifice
that no wise soldier would have attempted it. After
Gettysburg, General Meade had but a single opportunity
of displaying his generalship in handling the Army of
the Potomac, and that was in the fruitless movement
upon Mine Run, where by disobedience of his orders,
owing to a mistake of one of his corps commanders, Lee
was enabled to unite his forces in an impregnable posi
tion before the Army of the Potomac was ready for as
sault. He might have done at Mine Run as Grant did
at Vicksburg and Cold Harbor, and as Burnside did at
Fredericksburg, and sacrificed ten thousand men with
only defeat as his reward; but General Meade was too
great a soldier to sacrifice an army to conceal failures in
generalship. General Grant, the victor of Vicksburg on
the same day that Meade was victor at Gettysburg, added
fresh laurels to his crown at Missionary Ridge, where he
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 359
had overwhelming numbers to assure success. That
achievement made him Lieutenant-General, as Meade
would have been made had he succeeded at Mine Run
and Grant failed at Missionary Ridge, and thenceforth
Grant was the only chieftain the nation could know until
his final victory at Appomattox.
I first saw General Meade on the day that he reported
for duty at Tenleytown, wearing his new brigadier's uni
form, to take command of a brigade of the Pennsylvania
Reserves. He impressed me then, as he ever impressed
those who came in close contact with him, as a thorough
gentleman and soldier, quiet, unobtrusive, intelligent, and
heroic, and in every battle in which he led his brigade
or his division or his corps he was ever first in the fight
and last to leave it. He would have won Fredericksburg
had he been half supported, as his movement in the early
part of the day was the only success achieved by any
effort of the army in that disastrous battle; and when he
was called to the command of the Army of the Potomac
he hesitated long before accepting it, and finally accepted
it only when it was pressed upon him as an imperious
duty that he could not evade.
I have reason to believe that Meade lost the Lieuten
ant-Generalship that was conferred upon Sheridan in
1869 because of the disappointment in Washington at
his failure to deliver battle to Lee at Williamsport I
saw Lincoln within a week after Lee's retreat from Penn
sylvania, and he inquired most anxiously and in great
detail as to all the roads and mountain-passes from Get
tysburg to the Potomac. I was entirely familiar with
them, and gave him minute information on the subject.
After a somewhat protracted inquiry into the topography
of the country, I asked Lincoln whether he was not sat
isfied with what Meade had accomplished. He answered
with the caution that always characterized Lincoln in
360 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
speaking of those who were struggling for the preserva
tion of the government. I remember his exact language
as well to-day as if it had been spoken but yesterday.
He said: " Now, don't misunderstand me about General
Meade. I am profoundly grateful down to the bottom of
my boots for what he did at Gettysburg, but I think that
if I had been General Meade I would have fought an
other battle. ' ' The atmosphere about Washington was
not friendly to Meade. He was all soldier, and would
have died unpromoted had he been compelled to seek
or conciliate political power to attain it. Stanton raved
against him because he did not do the impossible thing
of capturing Lee and his army, and political sentiment
in and around the administration and in Congress settled
down in the conviction that Meade had lost a great op
portunity. They would have deified Meade, when terror-
stricken as Lee was marching upon Gettysburg, had he
given them the assurance that he could drive Lee's army
back defeated and broken upon its desolated Virginia
homes; but when their fears were quieted by Meade' s
hard- fought battle and decisive victory, they forgot the
grandeur of his achievement and accused him of incom-
petency for failing to fight at Williamsport. Had he
fought there and been repulsed, as he had every reason
to believe was more than probable had he attacked, he
would have been denounced as rash and unfitted for com
mand ; but he was censured for his wisdom ; multiplied
censure fell upon him for his wisdom at Mine Run; and
thus the man who should have been the Great Captain
of the war was subordinated, but performed his duty with
matchless fidelity until the last insurgent flag was furled.
That Meade was sore at heart because he felt that his
best efforts as a soldier were not fully appreciated is
known to all his personal associates. One month before
General Grant was inaugurated as President, I met hiin
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 361
on a railway-train going to Washington. He and his
family were in a private car at the rear of the train.
When I learned that he was there, along with others I
called to pay my respects. After a very brief conversa
tion I was about to leave him when he asked me to
remain for a moment, as he wished to speak to me about
the proposed abolishment of the rank of General, which
he was soon to vacate when he became President, and to
which Sherman was fairly entitled by regular promotion.
He asked me to take some interest in the matter at Wash
ington and urge some of our prominent Pennsylvania
Representatives to defeat the passage of the bill. I fully
agreed with him, and in leaving him said, "The coun
try well understands who should succeed you as General
in the army, but there is dispute as to who should suc
ceed Sherman as Lieutenant-General. ' ' I did not expect
any intimation from Grant as to his choice for Lieuten
ant-General, but to my surprise he answered, ' ' Oh, that
is not a matter of doubt; Sheridan is fully entitled to it."
The remark was not made in confidence, although none
heard it but his family and myself. The names of Meade
and Thomas were both freely discussed at that time as
likely to reach the Lieutenant-Generalship, while few,
if any, expected Sheridan, a junior major-general, to
attain it. On my return from Washington I happened
to meet General Meade in Col. Scott's room of the Penn
sylvania Railroad office, and without intimating that I
had any information on the subject I inquired of him
whether the Lieutenant-Generalship, soon to be vacant,
would not, of right, go to the senior major-general of the
army. General Meade answered very promptly and with
great emphasis: " Of course, it can go only to the senior
major-general; I could not with self-respect remain in
the army for a day if any other should be appointed over
me. ' ' I need hardly say that I did not venture to inform
362 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
General Meade of the positive views expressed by Gen
eral Grant on the subject, as it would have wounded him
beyond expression. A few weeks thereafter Grant was
inaugurated and Sheridan promptly appointed to the Lieu
tenant-Generalship. I saw Meade many times thereafter,
but always wearing- the deep lines of sad disappointment
in his finely-chiseled face. The Lieutenant-Generalship
was obviously a forbidden topic with him, and he went
down to his grave one of the sorrowing and unrewarded
heroes of the war.
GEORGE H. THOMAS was another of the unrewarded
heroes of the war. He was the same type of soldier as
General Meade, cautious in movement and heroic in
action, and both were modest and gentle as a woman in
their private lives. No two men in the army more per
fectly completed the circle of soldier and gentleman, and
either was equal to the highest requirements of even the
exceptional duties imposed upon a great commander by
our civil war. Either would have taken Richmond with
Grant's army, and saved tens of thousands of gallant
men from untimely death. Both of these men fought
one great battle when in supreme command, Meade at
Gettysburg and Thomas at Nashville, and they stand
out single and alone in history as the two most decisive
battles of the w r ar. Meade dealt the deathblow to the
Confederacy from Cemetery Hill; Thomas annihilated
the army of Hood from the heights of Nashville, and
thenceforth Hood's army is unknown in the history of
the conflict. In all the many other achievements of
these men they fought as subordinate commanders, and
their records are unsurpassed by any of the many heroic
records made by our military commanders. Both were
considered as hopeful candidates for the Lieutenant-Gen-
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 363
eralship to which Grant appointed Sheridan. I remem
ber a conversation with Senator John Sherman soon
after the election of Grant to the Presidency in 1868, in
which he expressed the opinion that either Thomas or
Meade would certainly be promoted when Grant became
President; and at that time he certainly reflected the be
lief of his brother, then Lieutenant-General, who was
soon to be promoted to the highest rank of the army.
General Thomas's military record is one of the most
remarkable to be found in the history of our civil con
flict. He is one of the very few commanders who never
committed a serious military error, who never sacrificed
a command, and who never lost a battle. He was prob
ably more cautious than Meade, but I doubt whether
any man of all the generals of the war was better
equipped for the supreme command of all our armies
than George H. Thomas. He lacked Grant's persistent
aggression, but Grant never lost a battle that Thomas
would have fought, and never failed in an assault that
Thomas would have ordered. His battle at Mill Spring,
fought on the i9th of January, 1862, with an army of
entirely raw troops, was one of the first important vic
tories of the war, and it directed the attention of the
country to the great skill and energy of Thomas as a
military commander. Soon after he was called to the
command of one of the three wings of the army of
Rosecrans, and in the bloody battle of Stone River his
command played a most conspicuous part and contrib
uted more than any other to the victory that was finally
wrested from Bragg on that memorable field. Again his
name called out the homage of every loyal heart as he
and his brave warriors stood alone to resist the success
ful enemy on the sanguinary battle-field of Chickamauga.
He, and he alone, saved the army from utter rout in that
disastrous battle, and it led to his promotion to the com-
LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR- TIMES.
mand of the army as the successor of Rosecrans. In
Sherman's great campaign from Chattanooga to Atlanta,
Thomas was one of his most efficient lieutenants. So
highly was he appreciated by Sherman that he was
chosen from all of Sherman's subordinates to protect
Sherman's rear by confronting Hood in Tennessee when
Sherman started on his march to Savannah. When
Sherman cut loose from his base of supplies and started
on his romantic march through the heart of the rebel
lion, he left Thomas to give battle to Hood, knowing
that Thomas would be outnumbered by the enemy, but
entirely confident in Thomas's ability to maintain his
position.
The duty assigned to Thomas was one that required
exceptional discretion and courage, and he was doubt
less chosen because he possessed those qualities in a pre
eminent degree. Had he given battle to Hood before
he was entirely prepared to fight, even under the most
favorable circumstances, he could have been easily over
whelmed, but Sherman confidently trusted Thomas,
knowing that if any man could save an army Thomas
was the man. Because of the inadequacy of his force to
make an aggressive movement against Hood, Thomas
was compelled to fall back upon Nashville, where he
could best concentrate his army for the decisive conflict.
He reached Nashville on the 3d of October, 1864, where
he summoned scattered commands with all possible speed
until he had gathered 25,000 infantry and 8000 cavalry
to resist Hood's advance with 40,000 infantry and over
10,000 cavalry.
Sherman did not start upon his march to the sea until
a month or more after Thomas had begun the concentra
tion of his army at Nashville, and until Hood had moved
far enough against Thomas to make it impossible for him
to pursue Sherman. So rapidly did Hood march north-
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES, 365
ward that General Schofield was compelled to fight a
desperate battle at Franklin before he was able to join
Thomas at Nashville, where he arrived on the ist of
December. On the next day after Schofield' s arrival
the authorities at Washington became most importunate
to have Thomas deliver battle at once. Stanton tele
graphed Grant on the 2d of December, complaining of
the ' ' disposition of Thomas to lay in fortifications for an
indefinite period. . . . This looks like the McClellan and
Rosecrans strategy of do nothing and let the enemy raid
the country." On the same day Grant telegraphed
Thomas urging him to make an early attack upon Hood.
On the same day he telegraphed him again, complaining
that lie had not moved out from Nashville to Franklin
and taken the offensive against the enemy. To these
complaints General Thomas replied on the same day that
had he joined Schofield at Franklin he could have had
no more than 25,000 men to take the offensive against
nearly 50,000. Again, on the 5th of December, Grant
telegraphed Thomas complaining of his delay in attack
ing Hood, and again Thomas answered that he could not
take the aggressive for want of sufficient cavalry force
that he was rapidly increasing and equipping. On the
6th of December, Grant telegraphed Thomas a peremp
tory order in these words: "Attack Hood at once, and
wait no longer for a remount for your cavalry. ' ' This
dispatch was dated 4 p. M., and at 9 p. M. of the same
evening Thomas replied : "I will make the necessary
disposition and attack Hood at once, agreeably to your
orders, though I believe it will be hazardous with the
small force of cavalry now at my service." On the next
day Stanton telegraphed Grant: "Thomas seems unwill
ing to attack because it is hazardous, as if all war was
any but hazardous. If he waits for Wilson to get ready,
Gabriel will be blowing his last horn." On the 8th of
LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
December, Grant telegraphed Halleck: "If Thomas has
not struck yet, he ought to be ordered to hand over his
command to Schofield. There is no bet'ter man to repel
an attack than Thomas, but I fear he is too cautious to
take the initiative." Halleck replied: u If you wish
General Thomas relieved, give the order. No one here
will, I think, interfere. The responsibility, however,
will be yours, as no one here, so far as I am informed,
wishes General Thomas removed." On the same day
Grant telegraphed Thomas: " Why not attack at once?
By all means avoid the contingency of a foot-race to see
which, you or Hood, can beat to the Ohio." On the
same day, in answer to Halleck' s inquiry about removing
Thomas, Grant said: " I would not say relieve him until
I hear further from him." At 11.30 P. M. of the same
day Thomas telegraphed Grant: "I can only say, in
further extenuation why I have not attacked Hood, that
I could not concentrate my troops and get their trans
portation in order in shorter time than it has been done,
and am satisfied I have made every effort that was pos
sible to complete the task." On the 9th of December,
Halleck telegraphed Thomas: u lieutenant-General Grant
expresses much dissatisfaction at your delay in* attacking
the enemy;" and on the same day Grant telegraphed to
Halleck: ' ' Please telegraph orders relieving him (Thomas)
and placing Schofield in command." In obedience to
this request of Grant, the War Department issued a gen
eral order reciting Grant's request to have Thomas re
lieved by Schofield, and assigning Schofield to the com
mand of the Department and Army of the Cumberland.
On the afternoon of December 9th, Thomas telegraphed
Halleck, expressing his regret at Grant's dissatisfaction
at his delay in attacking the enemy, and saying that ' c a
terrible storm of freezing rain has come on since day
light, which will render an attack impossible till it
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 367
breaks." On the same day he telegraphs Grant that if
Grant should deem it necessary to relieve him, "I will
submit without a murmur. " At 5. 30 p. M. of the same
day Grant thought better of his purpose to relieve
Thomas, and telegraphed to Halleck: U I am very un
willing to do injustice to an officer who has done so
much good service as General Thomas has, however,
and will therefore suspend the order relieving him until
it is seen whether he will do anything." Two hours
later he telegraphed to General Thomas, earnestly press
ing him to give early battle. The severe freeze that had
covered the ground with ice, so that troops could not be
manoeuvred at all, contined for several days, and on the
1 1 th Grant again telegraphed Thomas: u Delay no longer
for weather or reinforcements. ' ' To this dispatch Thomas
answered : ' * The whole country is now covered with a
sheet of ice so hard and slippery it is utterly impossible
for troops to ascend the slopes, or even move on level
ground in anything like order. . . . Under these circum
stances I believe that an attack at this time would only
result in a useless sacrifice of life. ' ' On the following
day, December i3th, Grant issued special orders No. 149,
as follows: " Major-General John A. Logan, United States
Volunteers, will proceed immediately to Nashville, Ten
nessee, report by telegraph to the Lieutenant-General his
arrival at Louisville, Kentucky, and also his arrival at
Nashville, Tennessee. ' '
General Logan started immediately upon his mission
with an order in his pocket requiring General Thomas
to transfer to him the command of the army. When
he reached Louisville he learned that the battle was in
progress, and he wisely halted and returned without vis
iting Nashville. On the evening of the i4th, Thomas
telegraphed Halleck: " The ice having melted away to
day, the enemy will be attacked to-morrow morning."
368 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
In the mean time Grant had become alarmed at the pos
sible consequences of his own order in transferring the
command from Thomas to L,ogan, and on the I4th he
started for Nashville himself to take personal command.
When he reached Washington he received the first infor
mation of Thomas's attack, and later in the evening a
report of the great victory achieved, to which Grant re
sponded by the following dispatch to Thomas: "Your
dispatch of this evening just received. I congratulate
you and the army under your command for to-day's ope
rations, and feel a conviction that to-morrow will add
more fruits to your victory. ' ' Stanton also telegraphed
Thomas: u We shall give you a hundred guns in the
morning." Two days later, when Grant learned how
complete were Thomas's methods and his victory, he
telegraphed Thomas : ' ' The armies operating against
Richmond have fired two hundred guns in honor of
your great victory."
I give the substance of these dispatches because it is
necessary to convey to the public the peculiar attitude in
which Thomas was placed before he fought the battle at
Nashville. He was soldier enough to disobey the per
emptory order of the commander-in-chief when he knew
that his commander could not know or appreciate the
peril of an attempt to obey his orders, and he exhibited
the most sublime qualities of a great soldier when, even
in the face of his threatened removal from his command,
he peremptorily refused to fight a battle that he was con
vinced could result only in disaster and in the needless
sacrifice of life. The result so fully vindicated General
Thomas that none have since questioned the wisdom of
the position he assumed and maintained so heroically;
but the fact that the battle of Nashville proved that
Thomas was entirely right, and that Grant, Halleck,
and Stanton were entirely wrong, doomed Thomas to
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 369
disfavor with the government; and while he never could
be censured by those who so severely criticised him, I
fear that even Grant, with all his greatness, never fully
forgave Thomas for the wrong that Grant had done him
in regard to the battle of Nashville. It was the one
battle of the war that was planned on the most thorough
principles of military science and executed in its entirety
with masterly skill; and it is the only great battle of our
civil war that is studied in the military schools of the
world because of the completeness of the military strat
egy exhibited by Thomas. There were no more battles
to be fought in the South-west after the battle of Nash
ville, as Thomas had left no enemy to confront him.
I first met George H. Thomas in May, 1861, when he
dined at my home in Chambersburg along with Generals
Patterson, Cadwalader, Doubleday, and Keim, and Col
onels Fitz John Porter and John Sherman, who were
serving as staff officers. Thomas was then a colonel,
and commanded the regulars in Patterson's movement
into the Shenandoah Valley. The war was freely dis
cussed by this circle of military men, and I well remem
ber that all those present, with the exception of Double-
day and Thomas, freely predicted that it would not last
over three months, and that no more than one or two
battles would be fought. Doubleday aggressively dis
puted the theory generally advanced of an early peace,
and Thomas, with that modesty that always character
ized him, was silent. Doubleday had met the South
erners in battle at Sumter, and he knew how desperately
earnest they were ; and Thomas was a son of Virginia,
and knew that the Southern people were as heroic as
any in the North. I saw him several times during that
campaign, and much enjoyed visits to his camp; but
even in the privacy of personal conversation he was
most reluctant to discuss the situation, evidently because
24
370 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES,
he knew that the North did not understand, and could
not be made to understand, the determined purpose of
the Southern people to win independence. Our ac
quaintance that began at Chambersburg was maintained
until his death, and whenever opportunity presented I
always sought his companionship. He was one of the
most lovable characters I have ever known, but it re
quired exhaustive ingenuity to induce him to speak
about any military movements in which he was a prom
inent participant Any one might have been in daily
intercourse with him for years and never learned from
him that he had won great victories in the field.
After the war Thomas suffered in silence the disfavor
of those in authority. It was doubtless the more dis
tressing to one of his sensitive temperament from the
fact that there was no visible evidence of the injustice
that was studiedly done him. Politicians tempted him
to enter the field as a candidate for President, but he
wisely declined, and on no occasion did he so grandly
exhibit the higher qualities of the soldier and gentleman
as when President Johnson, having quarrelled with Grant,
decided to supersede Grant as commander-in-chief of the
army by nominating Thomas to the same brevet rank
held by Grant. The President went so far as to send his
name to the Senate for confirmation as General by brevet,
which would have enabled Johnson to assign Thomas to
the command of the army. The President acted without
conference with or the knowledge of Thomas, and as
soon PS Thomas learned of it he promptly telegrapher 1
to Senator Chandler and others peremptorily refusing to
accept the proffered promotion. After having served as
commander of the third military district in the South
and of his old Department of the Cumberland, he was
finally assigned to the Military Division of the Pacific,
and he arrived in San Francisco to assume his last com-
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 371
mand in June, 1869. My last meeting with him was some
time during the winter of 1870, when he made his last
visit to Washington. We spent the evening together at the
opera, and afterward sat until late in the night conversing
on topics of general interest. I doubt whether any one
ever heard him utter a single complaint, but it was ob
vious to those who knew him well that he felt humiliated
and heart-sore at the treatment he had received from the
military power of the government. Within a few weeks
thereafter the lightning flashed from the Western coast
the sad news that the great warrior's head had fallen
upon his breast while sitting in his office, and on the
evening of the same day one of the noblest but unre
warded heroes of the war passed away.
GENERAL FITZ JOHN PORTER was the most conspicu
ous victim of military injustice in the history of our civil
war. I doubt whether the military records of modern
times in any civilized country present such a flagrant
instance of the overthrow of one of the bravest and most
skillful of officers by a deliberate conspiracy of military
incompetents and maddened political partisans. He was
the only one of McClellan's lieutenants who had proved
his ability to exercise supreme command in fighting great
battles, and I doubt whether there was then in the entire
Army of the Potomac a more competent man for the su
preme command than Fitz John Porter; and certainly no
one was more patriotic in his devotion to the cause of the
Union. I first met him in the dark days of April, 1861,
when he was sent to Harrisburg to represent General
Scott in organizing and forwarding troops to the national
capital. When communication between Washington and
the North had been severed by the treasonable revolution
in Baltimore, it became a grave question what action
37" LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
should be taken in Pennsylvania in the absence of orders
from the national authorities. I shall never forget the
last council held in the Executive Chamber at Harris-
burg when General Patterson, Governor Curtin, and
their advisers were compelled to act upon their own re
sponsibility. Each in turn advised caution, as revolu
tion was in the air and it was impossible to devise a plan
of operations with any assurance of safety. After all
had spoken Fitz John Porter, the youngest of the party,
who had won his promotion on the battle-fields of Mex
ico, spoke with an earnestness that inspired every one
present. With his handsome face brightened by the
enthusiasm of his patriotism, and his keen eye flashing
the fire of his courage, he said to General Patterson and
Governor Curtin: "I would march the troops through
Baltimore or over its ashes to the defence of the capital
of the nation. ' ' He was a thorough soldier and an ear
nest patriot, and had his counsels prevailed it would not
have been left for General Butler to command obedience
to the laws in Baltimore by his shotted guns on Federal
Hill, nor would the government have been compelled to
confess its weakness by shipping troops surreptitiously by
Annapolis to Washington.
Colonel Porter had been among the first of our soldiers
called to active duty when the madness of Secession took
shape by the capture of forts in the Secession States,
lie was ordered by General Scott to Texas, where he
made earnest effort to save Albert Sydney Johnson from
being engulfed in the maelstrom of rebellion. By his
skill and energy the garrisons at Key West and Tortugas
were reinforced and saved from capture, and when at
Harrisburg, unable to reach his commander-in-chief or
the War Department because of the interruption of com
munications, he took the responsibility of telegraphing
to General Frank P. Blair of Missouri authority to mus-
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 373
ter in troops for the protection of that State, whereby, as
General Blair subsequently stated, Missouri was saved to
the Union. Before the close of the first year of the war
he had organized a division that attained the highest
reputation as a model of discipline, and early in 1862 he
went to the Peninsula with McClellan as a division com
mander. Immediately after the capture of Yorktown he
was assigned to the command of the Fifth Army Corps,
and with that corps he fought the battles of Mechanics-
ville and Games' Mill, and won the highest encomiums
from both General McClellan and the government for the
ability he exhibited. After the failure of the Peninsula
campaign, and when Pope was playing the braggart and
sacrificing his army to his incompetency in the second
Bull Run campaign, Porter was ordered to the relief of
Pope, and, learning that Lee was rapidly advancing upon
Pope's defeated army, Porter disobeyed orders to stop at
Williamsburg, and assumed the responsibility whereby
he was enabled to join Pope several days earlier. He
participated in the second Bull Run battle, and was
finally compelled with the rest of the army to retreat
into the defences of Washington.
Pope was smarting under the disgraceful failure he had
made as a military commander, and his cause was taken
up by the embittered partisans who then sought the over
throw of McClellan" and all who were supposed to be in
friendly relations with him. General Porter was singled
out for sacrifice, although so fully did General-in-chief
Halleck and Secretary-of-War Stan ton confide in Porter's
ability as a military commander that when the movement
was made against Lee in the Antietam campaign, Porter
was directed to select a division of 12,000 from among
several divisions and a commander among twenty gen
eral officers, and add them to his corps. With this com
mand he held the centre of the line of battle at Antie-
374 LINCOLN AND -MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
tarn, and was one of the first to pursue Lee in his retreat,
and with his single corps fought the battle of Shepherds-
town. Early in November, General McClellan was re
moved from the command of the Army of the Potomac,
and one week later General Porter was relieved of the
command of his corps. Pope preferred charges against
him, and on the 25th of November, Porter was placed
under arrest. The substance of the charges against him
was that he had failed to obey an order from General
Pope requiring him to start with his division to General
Pope in the field. The court was chosen by Secretary
Stanton, who had become so intensely inflamed against
McClellan and all w T ho were supposed to be in sympathy
with him that he had determined to eliminate them from
the army, and he could dispense with so skillful and he
roic a soldier as Porter, after Lee had been driven back
to Virginia, only by disgracing him. The court was
organized to convict. By the verdict of the court-mar
tial he was not only dismissed from the army ? but he was
made a stranger to the country for which he had so gal
lantly fought, by depriving him of his citizenship and
making him ineligible to any public position under the
government.
For fifteen years General Porter was compelled to bear
the fearful stigma that had been put upon him by a court
that simply obeyed the vindictive orders of its master.
Many applications had been made from time to time to
have his case reopened, and fully ten years before the
effort was successful men like Governor Curtin, Senator
Wilson of Massachusetts, and others had made earnest
efforts to have a review of Porter's case. During the
eight years in which Grant was President he had been
earnestly urged to open the door for justice to a fellow-
soldier, but he stubbornly refused; and it was not until
after he had retired from the Presidency, and had care-
UNREWARDED HEROES. 375
fully studied the whole question from the accurate his
tory of both sections, that he became fully convinced of
his error, and manfully declared, in an article published
in the North American Revieiv, that Porter had not only
not failed to perform his duty as a soldier, but that he
was entitled to the highest measure of credit for having
performed his duty to the uttermost. In 1878, President
Hayes authorized a military commission to review the
judgment in Porter's case, and three of the most expe
rienced and respected generals of the army, Schofield,
Terry, and Getty, were assigned to that duty. Two of
these generals entered upon that duty inclined to the be
lief that Porter deserved censure if not dismissal, and it
is not known that any one of the three was specially
friendly to his cause. They heard all the evidence in
the case, and they not only reversed the judgment of the
partisan court that had condemned Porter by relieving
him of all accusations of failing to perform his duty, but
they declared: " Porter's faithful, subordinate, and intel
ligent conduct that afternoon (August 29th) saved the
Union army from the defeat which would otherwise have
resulted that day in the enemy's more speedy concentra
tion. . . . Porter had understood and appreciated the mil
itary situation, and so far as he had acted upon his own
judgment his action had been wise and judicious. ' ' Such
was the unanimous judgment of three of the ablest and
confessedly among the most fair-minded generals of the
army, but it was not until 1885 that a bill was finally
passed authorizing General Porter's restoration to the
army roll, upon which he had shed such conspicuous
lustre in the early part of the war, and that bill was
vetoed by President Arthur. General Porter was re
stored to the army on the yth of August, 1886, by a
subsequent act of Congress, and was permitted to exer
cise his own discretion as to active service or retiring
37 6 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES
with his original rank. In obedience to his own request
he was placed upon the retired list.
A memorable incident, not generally known in history,
occurred about this time, arising from the retirement of
General Pope from the major-generalship to which he
had been so unjustly promoted. General Terry, who was
one of the members of the military commission that had
heard and decided the Porter case, was entitled by rank
to succeed Pope as major-general, but he was as chival
rous in peace as he was in war, and so keenly did he feel
the injustice under which General Porter had suffered
that he not only proposed, but insisted, that General Por
ter should be promoted to the major-generalship in prefer
ence to himself as the only possible atonement the gov
ernment could make for the unspeakable wrong it had
perpetrated. General Porter gratefully appreciated this
manly action of General Terry, and, in the face of Gen
eral Terry's appeal to him to accept the promotion, he
resolutely declined to be considered for the place, because
it would have hindered the promotion of the equally gal
lant soldier who had vindicated the majesty of justice.
General Grant, in a letter written December 30, 1881,
speaking of Porter's case, said: U I have done him an
injustice, and have so written to the President;" and
from that time until the verdict of the military commis
sion was rendered Grant left no opportunity unemployed
to aid in the restoration of Porter to the position and
respect to which he was justly entitled.
In 1869, General Porter was tendered by the Khedive
of Egypt the position of commander-in-chief of his
army, but he declined it, and recommended General
Stone, who accepted it. Since then he has made his
home in New York, where he has filled most important
public and private positions, having served as Commis
sioner of Public Works, Assistant Receiver of the Cen-
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 377
tral Railroad of New Jersey, as Police Commissioner,
and later as Fire Commissioner of that city. He retired
in 1889, since when he has been engaged in private busi
ness pursuits. Despite the fearful flood-tide of injustice
that was flung upon him, General Porter has survived
nearly all his assailants, and the few who survive with
him are now ashamed to whisper even an accusation
against his heroism or his honor as a soldier. He is yet
in the full vigor of life, and while his accusers have been
forgotten where the names of men are cherished with
respect, he lives beloved by all who know him and hon
ored by every soldier of the land. Many of the heroes
of the war failed to meet just reward for the devotion
they gave to the country, but Fitz John Porter stands out
single from all as the one man who suffered a judgment
of infamy, formally declared by a military court, for the
single offence of having been one of the wisest, noblest,
and bravest of our army's commanders.
THE record of GENERAL G. K. WARREN is the story
of a brilliant military career touched with every hue of
promise cut short by the unjust exercise of that power
that resides in military rank, used upon impulse and in
ignorance of actual existing conditions, without hesita
tion and without reference to inquiry or investigation.
It was the ist of April, 1865; the war was yet in progress,
and the two armies still faced each other at Petersburg.
Our lines had been extended to the left, which brought
them in immediate contact with the enemy. On the
3ist of March, Sheridan with his cavalry had struck the
enemy's combined force of infantry and cavalry at Din-
widdie Courthouse under Pickett, and had been roughly
handled. Warren with the Fifth Corps had come to his
support; upon the next day a battle was fought at Five
378 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
Forks, wholly decisive, far-reaching in its results, and
ending in the rout of the enemy's forces. The whole
nation was exulting, when suddenly the news was flashed
over the land that Major-General Warren, the commander
of the Fifth Corps, had been relieved of his command
by order of General Sheridan, on the field of battle.
It is with a recognition of what Warren, in long and
faithful service, in character and achievement, brought
to the discharge of his duties as a corps commander in
this battle that I am to deal with him. Just before the
Wilderness campaign, when Sykes had been relieved as
commander of the Fifth Corps, Warren was at once
named as its commandant. He brought to the command
of the Fifth Corps a reputation for ability and energy
and brilliant service that had won for him steady and
well-deserved promotion. With a courage that never
quailed he had fought his way from the command of a
regiment to that of an army corps. There was no mili
tary reputation more promising than his when at the
head of one of the army's best corps of veteran soldiers
he crossed the Rapidan and became at once involved in
the battles of the Wilderness. Initiating almost every
flank movement after the investment of Petersburg, his
corps participated prominently in all the battles of the
army, his restless spirit knowing no repose. He was be
loved by his men, who trusted him, and who testified to
their affection when, on the return march of the corps
through Petersburg, recognizing him as he stood among
the crowd, they rent the air with shouts of recognition.
On the ist of April, 1865, after some preliminary fight
ing in front of Dinwiddie Courthouse on the 3ist, in
which he had been unsuccessful, Sheridan applied to
Grant for infantry support. He wanted the Sixth Corps,
which had been with him in the Valley of the Shenan-
doah. He objected to Wcirren, and only took him aivJ.
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 379
his corps when Grant had authorized him to relieve War
ren upon any occasion justifying that action. Warren
moved his corps to Gravelly Run Church. Pickett had
fallen back to the White Oak road and intrenched.
Warren with his corps was to move upon the left in
trenched flank of Pickett' s works. A faulty reconnais
sance had been made, and when the Fifth Corps moved
at noon of the ist the intrenchments of the enemy were
found to be three-quarters of a mile to the left of the
position supposed by Sheridan. To meet this unexpected
fire upon his flank Ayres broke away from Crawford and
Griffin. Warren went at once to these flanking divisions,
where he remained in person, directing their movements,
changing their direction to meet the force on Ayres' s
flank as well as their own front, getting into the enemy's
rear with Crawford's division, capturing guns and thir
teen hundred prisoners, and compelling the retreat of the
enemy.
The battle as it was fought was a series of flank move
ments, and was, as such, wholly unanticipated by Sheri
dan. Warren had just reached a point directly in rear
of the enemy at the Forks, and was pursuing his success
when he sent his adjutant-general to Sheridan to report
that he was in the enemy's rear, had taken a large num
ber of prisoners, and was pursuing his advantages, when
the stroke fell, in the midst of the victory he had done
so much to secure. " Tell General Warren," said Sheri
dan, u that, by God! he was not at the front: this is all
I've got to say to him." He had already replaced him
without any attempt to communicate with him, and
this with the victory won, the enemy in retreat, and the
evacuation of Richmond and Petersburg made inevit
able. Conscious of his innocence and knowing what he
had accomplished, Warren went in person to Sheridan
and asked him to reconsider his action. "Hell!" said
380 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
Sheridan; " I don't reconsider my determinations." Nor
did he.
Warren at once sought an investigation, which was
then refused him, and fifteen years of incessant applica
tion and pleading were to pass before it was secured; but
at last the long-hoped-for investigation came, an inquiry
where the keenest legal acumen was instrumental in
bringing facts to light, wholly regardless of that pedantry
that belongs to military life a search for truth, unawed
by the glitter of the uniform or the prestige of rank, no
matter how high, and with a result so wholly different
from that which had been assumed and acted upon as to
seem almost romance. And what was gained by this
investigation, to which were summoned witnesses from
every quarter, and where the Confederate testimony es
tablished the facts of the battle beyond controversy?
This, that but for the movement of Crawford's division
under Warren's immediate orders the enemy's lines
would have been held, and were held until the move
ment of Crawford, and that the results of Ayres's attack
were rendered possible by that movement. What, then,
could excuse the action of General Sheridan in view of
the victory secured to him? Nothing but that he was
ignorant of what was done, as he himself testifies, and
that he knew nothing of the Confederate Mumford's en
gagement with Crawford's division, nor of the fighting
of that division, nor of the cavalry. He knew that in
relieving Warren he was pleasing General Grant, and he
ignored then and subsequently anything presented to
him that might in any way question his action. War
ren made every effort to carry out the order and execute
the plan of this battle ; and when asked by his own coun
sel if he had or had not done this, his reply was nobie.
Asking that the question be withdrawn, he said, " I do
it on the ground that I am willing to be judged by nry
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 381
deeds." Sheridan, with a magnetism second to none, a
fighter beyond all other qualities, was deficient in strong
mental or moral sense.
When the battle of Five Forks had been fought and
won he did not know what had been accomplished nor
by whom. His testimony distinctly shows this: he made
his official report without that knowledge, and, although
the commanding general upon the field, he saw but one
of the many movements which contributed to the vic
tory, and ignored the rest; nor would he give any ac
count of his own personal movements after Ayres's as
sault; and yet he committed an act of despotic power so
uncalled for, unjust, and cruel as to wellnigh constitute a
crime. The record of Warren's court of inquiry will
remain for ever an enduring stain upon an otherwise
great reputation. Warren, after long and patient wait
ing, at last began to despond and to doubt as to the final
result. His health was breaking. He lost the fiery spirit
that had animated him. Grant and Sheridan were om
nipotent, the heroes of the hour, and unassailable. And
so the end came at last before the decision of his court
was known, and they buried him in that sunny city by
the sea where he was known and loved and where he
worked in peace. His last request was that there should
be no military display, no emblems of his profession upon
his coffin, and no uniform upon his person. Devoted
friends followed him to his last resting-place, and as they
turned homeward the conviction came to each of them
that the earth with which they had filled his grave gave
rest to a generous and broken heart.
GENERAL DON CARLOS BUELL very clearly demon
strated in the early part of the war that he was one of
the most accomplished soldiers of our army. While he
382 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
was not dishonored, as were General Porter and General
Warren, he was displaced from command in obedience to
partisan clamor. He was a thorough soldier, brave, in
telligent, skillful, and equal to every emergency in which
he was placed; but he was not a politician. He believed
that war was war; he believed that armies were organized
to fight battles, and to fight them, according to the estab
lished rules of military science, to accomplish the speedi
est and most substantial results. During the period that
he was in command in Kentucky he accomplished more
in the same length of time than any other general in the
Western army. When he assumed command at Louis
ville on the 1 5th of November, 1861, his entire effective
Union force was less than 30,000 men, and they largely
without organization, arms, equipment, or transportation.
During the seven months he remained there he organized
one of the best disciplined armies that ever marched on
the continent. He defeated the enemy at Middle Creek
and Mills Springs in January, aided in the capture of
Fort Donelson, occupied Middle Tennessee and the north
ern part of Alabama, and moved with the main body of
his army by a forced march to the rescue of Grant at
Shiloh. All this was accomplished between the i5th of
November, 1861, and the loth of January, 1862. He
committed no military mistakes, met with no military
disasters, and he strengthened the Union cause unspeak
ably in Kentucky by the strict discipline he enforced in
his command.
The temptation was great to Union troops in Kentucky
to demoralize themselves by pillage and plunder, as one-
half the people of the State were earnestly disloyal and
very many of them in the Confederate service; but Buell
was placed in command in Kentucky to save it to the
Union, and he performed that duty most conscientiously
and patriotically. But the most effective means he em-
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 383
ployed to save Kentucky were seized upon by the poli
ticians of the times, and he was denounced from one end
of the country to the other as a semi-rebel because he
strictly restrained his troops from the plundering of pri
vate property of either friend or foe. He was not only a
soldier himself, but he made a soldier of every man in
his command as far as he could be obeyed. But for his
timely arrival at Pittsburgh Banding on the evening of
the first day's battle, when Grant's army had been liter
ally routed and driven to the river, the army of Grant
would have ceased to exist in history at the close of the
following day. It was Buell whose energy and skill as
a soldier brought relief to Grant, and it was his courage
and skill on the battle-field, co-operating with Grant on
the second day, that gave the victory to the Union armies
at Shiloh. Both were as generous as they were brave,
and Buell never claimed the victory as his, and Grant
proved his appreciation of Buell by asking his assign
ment to an important command when he was com-
mander-in-chief of the army. Stanton was implacable
in his hatred of Buell, as he was in his hatred against
all who incurred his displeasure, and Buell was left with
out a command, although his services were called for by
the one who certainly best understood his value as a
soldier.
On the loth of June, Buell was assigned to make a
campaign for the capture of Chattanooga. It was ordered
by General Halleck, who was then in personal command
at Corinth. This movement was regarded by the author
ities at Washington as the most important of all our
army operations, with the single exception of the cam
paign against Richmond. Stanton, in a dispatch to
Halleck, declared that the capture of Chattanooga
' ' would be equal to the capture of Richmond, ' ' but
soon after Buell was assigned to this task the disasters
384 LINCOLN AND* MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
on the Peninsula and the second Bull Run campaign
brought importunate calls from Washington for troops
from Halleck's army to strengthen the Army of the
Potomac. On the 4th of July, Lincoln telegraphed Hal-
leek: u You do not know how much you would oblige
us if, without abandoning any of your positions or plans,
you could promptly send us 10,000 infantry. Can you
not?" On receipt of this dispatch Halleck called a
council of war, and sent a dispatch saying that no troops
could be sent to the East without abandoning the Chat
tanooga expedition, and Halleck himself became alarmed
at his position at Corinth, as, after having detached Buell
to the Chattanooga campaign, he had sent reinforcements
to General Curtis in Arkansas. After having started
Buell on his Chattanooga campaign, in which he was
to confront Bragg with his 75,000 men and maintain a
long line of communication, Buell was notified by Hal
leck that Thomas's division must be withdrawn from
him, and perhaps other portions of his -command would
be called away. Thus, after starting Buell with an in
ferior force to fight his way to Chattanooga and maintain
hundreds of miles of communication in an enemy's coun
try, his force was depleted, his plan of campaign was
overruled, and because he failed to march with a rapidity
that Halleck had never approached he was censured from
day to day by both Halleck and the War Department for
his failure to accomplish the impossible. Halleck had
required two months to remove his army from Shiloh to
Corinth, a distance of twenty miles, and soon thereafter
he telegraphed Buell complaining of his slow movement,
when he had marched with four times the rapidity that
Halleck had himself.
When it is remembered that Buell was compelled to
fortify every bridge for more than three hundred miles
of road in his rear, the depletion of his forces and the
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 385
necessity for caution may be intelligently understood.
Especially did Halleck become mandatory about rapid
movements on the part of Buell after he became coni-
mander-in-cliief and had been transferred to Washing
ton. On the 1 3th of August he telegraphed Buell that
he had been notified to have him removed, but inti
mating that he interposed to save him. To this Buell
replied on the same day : "I beg that you will not inter
pose in my behalf. On the contrary, if the dissatis
faction cannot cease on grounds which I think may be
supposed if not apparent, I respectfully request that I
may be relieved. My position is far too important to be
occupied by any officer on sufferance. I have no desire
to stand in the way of what may be deemed for the pub
lic good." Buell was not then relieved from command,
but the clamor for his removal grew more imperious,
and all the partisan rancor of that time was thrown into
the scale against Buell as a military commander. His
command was composed largely of Illinois and Indiana
troops, and Governors Morton and Yates pursued him
with intense ferocity because he enforced discipline in
his army and would not permit his soldiers to plunder
private homes. It was political clamor and not military
necessity, nor even military expediency, that made the
War Department issue an order on the 27th of Septem
ber relieving Buell of his position and ordering him to
Louisville, limiting his authority to the command of the
troops in that city, and directing him to transfer the
army to the direction of General Thomas. Buell
promptly called General Thomas to this place, but
Thomas was one of the bravest and noblest of our sol
diers, and he at once telegraphed to Secretary Stan ton:
"General Buell' s preparations have been complete to
move against the enemy, and I therefore respectfully ask
that he may be retained in command." In obedience to
25
LINCOLN AND* MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
Thomas's request the order relieving Buell was revoked,
only to be met by a fiercer clamor from the political pas
sions of the day for his sacrifice. On the 8th of October
he fought and won the battle of Perrysville, after a san
guinary conflict in which he lost over four thousand
men. Even when Buell had won a decisive victory,
instead of being complimented by the authorities at
Washington, he was daily criticised for his failure to
pursue and destroy Bragg' s army that largely outnum
bered him. On the I9th of October he was notified by
Halleck that the capture of East Tennessee should be
the main object of his campaign, and saying, "Buell
and his army must enter East Tennessee this fall."
Four days later, on the 23d of October, Buell was re
moved from his command and General Rosecrans as
signed to it. General Buell in his modest but soldier
like farewell to his army, after referring to its heroic
achievements, broadly took upon himself all responsi
bility for any failures it might be charged with. He
said: "If anything has not been accomplished which
was practicable within the sphere of its duty, the gen
eral cheerfully holds himself responsible for the failure."
Strange as it may seem, while the Secretary of War
notified Halleck in the early part of the Tennessee cam
paign that the capture of Chattanooga was second only
in importance to that of Richmond, and while only ten
days before Buell was relieved of command General Hal
leck notified him that he "must enter East Tennessee
this fall," Rosecrans immediately abandoned the East
Tennessee movement and pushed his army as directly as
possible to Nashville. To show how promptly Buell had
moved in comparison with others, it may be stated that
General Rosecrans, although only thirty-two miles away
from Bragg, permitted two months to elapse before he
delivered battle at Stone River; and he did not march
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 387
his army a mile for six months thereafter. The same
army under Buell in about the same period of eight
months marched across the State of Kentucky, 185
miles; thence across Tennessee, 217 miles; thence across
the State of Alabama to East Tennessee, 217 miles;
thence across Tennessee and Kentucky to Louisville,
336 miles; thence through Central and Eastern Ken
tucky in pursuit of Bragg and back to Nashville, 485
miles making nearly fifteen hundred miles of march
and several hard-fought battles.
Thus ended the military career of one who could and
should have been one of the great military leaders of our
civil war. He was retired from command solely because
of the intense partisan hatred that had pursued him for
no other reason than being a true, faithful, and skillful
soldier. When Grant asked for his restoration to com
mand on the iQth of April, 1864, Halleck replied: U I
would like very much to see Buell restored to command,
and have several times pressed him at the War Depart
ment, but there has been such a pressure against him
from the West that I do not think the Secretary will give
him any at present." In obedience to Buell' s request for
an official investigation of the operations of the armies
under his command, a military commission was appoint
ed for the purpose on the 2oth of November, 1862, and
its labors continued until May 10, 1863. The record and
opinion of the commission were received at the War De
partment, but were never published, and after they had
been suppressed for nearly ten years the House of Repre
sentatives, by resolution passed March i, 1872, called for
a copy of the proceedings, which brought the astounding
answer from the Secretary of War that ' ' a careful and
exhaustive search among all the records and files of the
Department fails to discover what disposition was made
of the proceedings of the commission and the papers en-
388 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
closed. " It is obvious that the evidence and the finding
of the commission were not in accord with the violent
passions which had forced the removal of one of the most
gallant soldiers of our army, and the proceedings were
deliberately suppressed and justice withheld from General
Buell. The Governors of the Western States who had
so boldly assailed Buell were called upon to confront him
and testify before the commission, but all refused. His
accusers dared not meet him, and when a packed com
mission, chosen and manipulated by the filling of va
cancies to hinder justice, had failed to convict him, the
proceedings were deliberately suppressed for ten years,
and General Buell permitted to live under the false and
malicious charges made against him by reckless poli
ticians who did not even venture to testify against him.
That Stanton himself felt that his injustice to Buell
was so flagrant as to call for some atonement is evident
by the fact that in the spring of 1864 he invited Buell to
a personal interview, received him most cordially, and
asked him which one of several important commands he
would prefer to receive. Buell' s only answer was that it
was first a necessity to dispose of the proceedings of the
military commission that inquired into his case. Buell' s
self-respect as a soldier forbade his acceptance of a com
mand when his fidelity and ability as a commander had
been inquired into by a military commission ^ Those judg
ment was withheld not only from the accused, but from
the public. This was a degree of manliness that Stanton
was unprepared for, and they parted for the last time, as
Stanton never again conferred with Buell. Subsequently,
Stanton twice voluntarily offered Buell important com
mands, but he very properly declined both, as the verdict
of the commission was denied publicity, and in both cases
he would have been compelled to serve under officers
whom he outranked.
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 389
Thus the war closed with one of its ablest and most
patriotic chieftains not only refused the right to give the
gallant service he offered, but he was assailed by partisan
passion for having faithfully performed his duty as a sol
dier, and he was finally tried by a military commission
whose testimony and judgment were stolen from the
archives of the Department to give license to his ma
licious slanderers. His chief accusers have all passed
away, but General Buell yet lives, honored and respected
by the country as one of the noble but unrewarded
Heroes of the War.
BORDER-LIFE IN WAR-TIMES.
WHILE all sections of the country keenly felt the
sad bereavements and sacrifices of the civil var,
only those who lived on the border between the two con
tending sections involved in bloody fraternal strife, with
all the fierce passions it inspires, can have any just con
ception of the severe trials and constant strain which fell
upon the border people. My home was tlion m Cliam-
bersburg, in one of the most beautiful valleys of the
country, and among a people exceptionally comfortable
and forming one of the most delightful communities of
the State. The first distant murmurs of the coming war
were heard in Chambersburg in October, 1859, when
John Brown and his few insane followers attempted the
conquest of Virginia by assaulting Harper's Ferry. Al
though Brown had made Chniubersburg his base of ope
rations for some weeks before he moved upon Harper's
Ferry, freely mingling with the citizens of the town and
known only as u Dr. Smith," who was ostensibly en
gaged in mining pursuits in Maryland, there was not a
single resident of Chambersburg who had any concep
tion or suspicion of his purpose; but when the startling
news came that actual conflict had been precipitated at
Harper's Ferry by the stubborn fanatic fresh from the
Kansas battles, it appalled the community, as it seemed
to be the precursor of civil war. In little more than a
year thereafter the people of the town were again startled
390
(Photo by Brady, Washington.)
ROBERT E, I,EE, 1865.
392 LINCOLN AND 'MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
by Lieutenant Jones and straggling members of his com
mand reaching there, exhausted and footsore, to announce
that he had been compelled to abandon Harper's Ferry,
where he was in command, and had blown up the works
as far as he was able to accomplish it. This was one of
the first of the many thrilling events of the great war
that was soon to burst upon us. From that time, through
four long years of bloody battle until the end came at
Appomattox, there was not a day nor an hour of absolute
peace in the border counties.
Chambersburg was within a night's ride of the Con
federate lines during the whole war, and not only the
repeated raids made into that community by the Con
federate commanders, but the constant sense of insecurity
and the multiplied reports of incursions from the enemy,
made tranquility impossible. Not only did these people
suffer their full share of the exactions of war which fell
upon every community, but they were subject to constant
convulsions by actual or threatened raids of the enemy,
and often by destructive incursions of militia defenders;
and they suffered unspeakable loss of property from both
armies. Finally, upon Chambersburg fell the avenging
blow for Hunter's vandalism in Virginia, and the beau
tiful old town was left in its ashes and its people largely
impoverished. On the I2th of April, 1861, the brief tel
egraphic bulletins which were then obtainable in coun
try districts announced the bombardment of Sumter.
Business was practically suspended, public meetings were
held in support of the government at which the leading
men of every political faith were orators, the Stars and
Stripes were displayed from every house, and patriotic
badges and shields graced almost every person. Volun
teering was so rapid that companies could not even be
organized to keep pace with them. The first call for
troops was responded to more generously in that sectiprj
BORDER-LIFE IN WAR-TIMES. 393
than from any other in the State. Its very nearness to
the seat of war and the exceptional dangers which fell
upon it seemed to call out the highest measure of
patriotic purpose and action. Party differences were
obliterated in the common effort to maintain the cause
of the Union. It is only in times of great danger that
the greatest qualities of both men and women are devel
oped, and the border people, of whom Chambersburg was
the central altar, grandly illustrated the truth of the
adage.
On the 28th of May the advance of General Patterson's
army reached Chambersburg, and from that day until the
war closed Chambersburg was the military headquarters
for all movements on the border. Even with a great
army in our midst, it was impossible for the people to
appreciate what war really meant. I well remember that
when two officers of General Patterson's command had
crossed the Potomac as scouts, and had been captured by
the Confederates, it was spoken of by all in bated breath
as if some unspeakable calamity had befallen them.
Both the North and the South seemed to believe that
they were about to engage in war with a barbarous
enemy, and all expectations of humane and civilized
warfare appeared to have perished in the minds of the
people. For two months General Patterson's army kept
the border people in a state of restless suspense. He
crossed the Potomac to Falling Waters, then fell back
upon Maryland, and then renewed his march into the
enemy's country. The wildest excitement prevailed in
every circle: a great battle was expected every day, as
Patterson was threatening Johnson at Winchester and
McDowell marched against Beauregard at Manassas.
Finally, on Monday, July 22d, the news of a great tri
umph won by McDowell was posted on the bulletin-
boards, and all business was forgotten as the people re-
394 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAK-T/MF.S.
joiced over the victory, but before the sun had set on the
same day the reports from Manassas told the sad story
that McDowell was not only defeated, but that his army
was routed and retreating into the defences of Washing
ton, with little hope that the capital would be saved from
the enemy.
The call for additional troops was responded to by a
regiment of volunteers made up almost entirely of the
sturdy young men of Franklin and Fulton counties.
When the regiment started for Harrisburg the people
turned out almost en masse to inspire them in their patri
otic work. Speeches were made, flags were waved, tears
shed, sorrowing hearts were left behind as the brave men
went to their great task, and many to death. In May,
1862, the border people were thrown into convulsion by
the retreat of Banks from Strasburg to Winchester,
thence to Martinsburg, and finally to the north side of
the Potomac. This was assumed to mean the invasion
of Pennsylvania. Stock and valuables, including the
goods of merchants and money of banks, were all hur
ried away to places of safety. This was only the first
of many like disturbances that came during every year
of the war. General Kwell, who had driven Banks to
the north side of the Potomac, did not pursue his victory
upon Northern soil, but in August of the same year, when
Pope was defeated in the second Bull Run campaign and
Lee crossed the Potomac into Maryland, war was brought
to the very doors of the people of the border. As Lee's
army moved westward from Frederick, a portion of it
extended northward as far as Hagerstown, while Jackson
hastened to Williamsport, thence to Martinsburg and
Harper's Ferry, where he captured 10,000 men and 60
guns, and was back on the Antietam battle-ground in
time to fight McClellan.
An interesting story may here be told of the methods
BORDER-LIFE IN WAR TIMES. 395
by which information was obtained to guide the actions
of great armies. I was then Assistant Adjutant-General
of the United States, assigned to duty at Harrisburg to
make a draft under the State laws of Pennsylvania.
There was no military force on the border, and not even
an officer of the army who had exercised any command
of troops. I was compelled, therefore, to exercise what
little military authority could be enforced under the cir
cumstances, and Governor Curtin ordered a half-organ
ized company of cavalry, that Captain W. J. Palmer was
recruiting at Carlisle, to report to me at Chambersburg
for duty as scouts. I thus became commander of an
army of nearly one hundred men, or about one man to
each mile of border I had to guard, but Captain Palmer
proved to be a host within himself, as he entered the
Confederate lines every night for nearly a week under
various disguises, obtained all information possible as to
the movements of Lee's command, and with the aid of
William B. Wilson, an expert telegrapher, who was co
operating with him, attached his instrument to the first
telegraph-wire he struck and communicated to me all
movements of the enemy, present and prospective, as far
as he had been able to ascertain them. As rapidly as
these telegrams reached me they were sent to Governor
Curtin, who promptly forwarded them to the War De
partment, whence they were hastened to General McClel-
lan's headquarters, who was then moving through Mary
land against Lee; and all the important information that
McClellan received from the front of Lee's army until
their lines faced each other at Antietam came from Cap
tain Palmer's nightly visits within the enemy's lines and
his prompt reports to me in the morning. Ho well Cobb's
division finally reached as far north as Hagerstown, and
Captain Palmer spent most of the night within Cobb's
camp, and learned from leading subordinate officers that
396 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
the destination of Lee's army was Pennsylvania, and that
Cobb's command would lead the movement probably the
next day.
I need hardly say that I hastened the information to
Curtin, who hurried it through to Washington, whence
McClellan received it within a few hours. McClellan
was then ignorant of the exact movements of General
Reynolds, whom he had sent to Pennsylvania to organize
a force of u emergency-men " and bring them to the aid
of McClellan in Western Maryland. He did not know,
therefore, who was in command at Chambersburg or
what force was there, but doubtless supposed that either
Reynolds or some part of his command was already there
on its way to join him. General McClellan, on receipt
of the news that Lee was likely to advance into Pennsyl
vania, sent substantially this telegram to the commander
at Chambersburg, without naming him: " I am advised
that Lee's probable destination is Pennsylvania, and if
he shall advance in that direction, concentrate all your
forces and obstruct his march until I can overtake him
and give battle. The occasion calls for prompt action. ' '
As I was the commander and had less than one hundred
men, all told, and not twenty of them within fifteen
miles of me, the prospect of concentrating my forces
and marching out to meet one of Lee's army corps was
not specially enticing. I promptly advised Curtin of the
situation and of the orders I had received from McClel
lan. Thaddeus Stevens happened to be in the Executive
Chamber when the message was received, and McClel
lan' s order to me to confront one of Lee's army corps
with my force, which did not amount to a corporal's
guard within reach, caused considerable merriment.
Stevens, who at that time never lost an opportunity to
slur McClellan, said: "Well, McClure will do something.
If he can't do better, he'll instruct the tollgate keeper
BORDER-LIFE IN WAR-TIMES. 397
not to permit Lee's army to pass through; but as to
McClellan, God only knows what he'll do."
Thus one bold, heroic, and adventurous young captain,
aided by an equally heroic young telegrapher, furnished
McClellan all the reliable information he received about
Lee's movements from the time McClellan left Rockville
in the Antietam campaign until the shock of battle came
ten days later. I met Captain Palmer at Antietam when
the battle was in progress, and, after complimenting him
as he so well deserved for the great work he had done, I
earnestly cautioned him against attempting to repeat his
experiments if Lee should be driven into Virginia. He
was a young man of very few words, arid made no re
sponse to my admonition beyond thanking me for my
kind expressions of confidence. When Lee retreated
across the Potomac, Captain Palmer followed him the
next night, entered his lines again, and brought import
ant reports which, as I believe, led to the battle of Shep-
herdstown that was successfully fought by General Fitz
John Porter. He then passed beyond my jurisdiction,
and became known to some of the 'leading officers of
McClellan' s army as the scout or spy who had given
McClellan most reliable and important information. For
several nights he entered Lee's lines and reported in the
morning. Finally, he was missed at the usual time his
report was expected. When the second day passed with
out any word from him, great anxiety was felt for his
safety, and every effort was made that could be made
without exposing him to the discovery of his identity to
learn of his whereabouts, but without success. When he
had been missing a week it was evident that he had been
captured, and, upon being advised of it from the head
quarters of McClell an's army, I hastened to Philadelphia
to confer with President J. Edgar Thompson of the Penn-
398 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
sylvania Railroad Company, whose secretary Captain Pal
mer had been until he entered the service, and who was
greatly interested in him personally.
A conference with President Thompson and Vice-Pres-
ident Scott resulted in the purpose to endeavor to save
Palmer from being identified by his captors, and it was
finally decided that I should go to the offices of the North
American, the Press, and the Inquirer, the leading morn
ing journals of the city, and write up for publication the
next morning displayed dispatches announcing the arrival
in Washington of Captain W. J. Palmer, who had been
scouting in Virginia for some days, and who had brought
most important .information of the movements and pur
poses of the enemy. Some details of his reported facts
were given to make the story plausible, to which was
added the statement that he had brought momentous in
formation that could not be given to the public, but that
would doubtless lead to early military movements against
the enemy. The dispatches were all accepted by the pub
lishers, as all felt a special interest in Captain Palmer's
fate, and that publication doubtless saved him from being
gibbeted as a spy. He had been arrested by the enemy,
tried, and convicted as a spy, but he had managed to
maintain doubt as to his identity. His execution was
delayed from time to time to ascertain who he was. The
dispatches published in the Philadelphia papers, all of
which reached the enemy's lines within forty-eight hours,
if not sooner, entirely misled the Confederates as to Cap
tain Palmer, and the failure to identify him saved him,
until he finally effected his own exchange by quietly tak
ing the place of a dead prisoner in the ranks and re
sponding to his name when the roll was called for the
men who were to be sent to the North. He is better
known to the world of to-day as President Palmer of
New York, lately of the Denver and Rio Grande Rail-
BORDER-LIFE IN WAR-TIMES 399
way, and one of the fortunate and potential railroad
magnates of the land.
After the battle of Antietam and the retreat of Lee
beyond the Potomac the border people began to breathe
freely again, and felt that they were reasonably safe at
least for a season, but twenty days after the retreat of
Lee they were thrown into panic again, as General Stuart
made the first great raid of the war clear around McClel-
lan's army, crossing the Potomac near Hancock, swing
ing through Mercersburg and Chambersburg, and getting
safely back to Lee again. It was on Friday evening,
October 10, 1862, and I had gone home from Harrisburg
after weeks of almost ceaseless labor night and day, ex
pecting a quiet rest until Monday morning. When I
landed on the depot platform at Chambersburg, Mr. Gil-
more, the telegraph-operator, called me into his private
office and exhibited to me several dispatches he had just
received from Mercersburg, stating that a strong Confed
erate force of cavalry was just entering that town, and
other dispatches stating that they were moving from
Mercersburg toward St. Thomas, which was on the
direct line toward Chambersburg. I could not believe
it possible that Stuart would venture to Chambersburg,
when he must have known that part of McClellan's force
was at Hagerstown, within one hour of us by railway,
and that troops could be brought there to overwhelm him
by the exercise of any reasonable military skill. I at
once telegraphed to the commander at Hagerstown, who
turned out to be General Wood, telling him that Stuart
was approaching Chambersburg, to which I received an
impertinent reply ; saying in substance that Stuart was
no such fool, and not to bother myself about it. I re
mained at the telegraph -office for two hours without com
municating the information to any one, as I hoped that
Stuart would not get so far from his base as Chambers-
(Photo by Brady, Washington.)
GENERAL, J. E. B. STUART, 1862.
BORDER-LIFE IN WAR-TIMES. 401
burg, and that our people could be spared the panic that
must follow the announcement of his coming. I soon
learned that Stuart's force had reached the turnpike six
or eight miles west of Chambersburg, and was moving
toward us, and I urgently appealed to General Wood to
throw a force into Chambersburg to protect the town.
Even then he had ample time to do so, as the railway
facilities were at his command, but the only answer I
received was a repetition of the assumption that Stuart
would not dare to venture into Chambersburg, and
broadly intimating to me not to annoy him any further.
Finding that nothing could be done to protect Cham
bersburg, I quietly went to my home, took tea, and re
turned to my office to await events. A cold, drizzling
rain had been falling during the day, and between the
clouds and fog darkness came unusually early. Some
of the prominent citizens of the town had been advised
of the approach of Stuart, but all agreed that it could do
no good to make an alarm or to attempt defence. About
seven o'clock in the evening there was a knock at my
office-door, which I promptly opened, and in came three
Confederate soldiers with a dirty rag tied to a stick which
they called a flag of truce. Judge Kimmell and Colonel
Thomas B. Kennedy were present. The Confederate
officer said he had been sent in advance to demand the
surrender of Chambersburg. We told him that there
were no troops in the town and nobody to oppose the
entrance of the insurgents. I asked who was in com
mand of the Confederate forces, but they refused to an
swer. I then asked where the forces were, which they
also refused to answer. I then asked them whether they
would take us to the commanding general and give us
safe-conduct back. They assured us that they would do
so, and we three mounted horses and rode out on the west
ern turnpike for nearly a mile, and were there brought
26
402 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
up before a solid column of soldiers. General Wade
Hampton came to the front and announced his name.
He said he desired to take peaceful possession of the
town, and in answer to our inquiries assured us that pri
vate citizens and private property would be respected,
excepting such property as might be needed for the pur
poses of the army. Remembering that I was a commis
sioned officer, I said to General Hampton : * ' There are
several military officers in the town in charge of hos
pitals, recruiting service, etc. ; what will be done with
them ?" He promptly answered: u They will be paroled,
unless there are special reasons for not doing so, but you
must not give information to any of them, so that they
may escape." As we were not in a position to quibble
about the terms of surrender, and as General Hampton's
proposition seemed reasonably fair, we decided to give
him a town that he could take without opposition, and
rode back into Chambersburg, with Hampton's command
immediately following.
In a short time the large square in the centre of the
town was filled with soldiers in gray, the first our people
had ever seen in fighting force. In crossing the square
to my office through a crowd of the enemy, I was tapped
on the shoulder, and, turning round, I recognized Hugh
Logan, who was a Franklin county man, and to whom I
had rendered some professional service when he was a
resident of the county. His exclamation was: "Why,
colonel, what are you doing here ? Don't you know that
Stuart has orders to arrest a number of civilians, and you
among them, and that we have half a dozen with us now,
including Mr. Rice of Mercersburg ?' ' I answered that
I had not been informed of that interesting fact. He
advised me quietly to get out of the way, and I reminded
him that I was a commissioned officer, and that under
my agreement with General Hampton I assumed that I
BORDER-LIFE IN WAR-TIMES. 403
would be entitled to parole if arrested. His answer was
unpleasantly significant. He said: "If you are arrested
and can reach Hampton he will parole you, for he's a
gentleman ; but Jeb Stuart wants you, and I am not cer
tain that he would release you on parole. " As I lived a
mile out of the centre of the town, I decided that I would
return home and await events, rather than leave my fam
ily alone. When I reached there, I found that a detach
ment of Stuart's troops had been in advance of me and
relieved me of the possession of ten fine horses. My
house stood back from the highway some fifty yards and
was largely hidden by shade trees, and I closed up the
house, so as to leave no lights visible, and sat on the
porch awaiting visitors, whom I sincerely hoped would
not come. Shortly after midnight I heard the clatter
of hoofs and the jingle of sabres coming down the road
toward the town. Soon they arrived in front of my
house. They saw corn-shocks on one side of the road,
a large barn and water on the other side, and a paling
fence that promised a quick fire. They halted, appa
rently about one hundred and fifty in number, and im
mediately proceeded to tumble the corn-shocks over to
the horses and tear down the palings to start the fire.
Seeing that their acquaintance was inevitable, I walked
down to the gate and kindly said to them that if they
wanted to make a fire they would find wood just a few
feet from them, and showed them a short way to water.
The commander of the detachment stepped up to me and
very courteously inquired whether I resided there, with
out asking my name, and said he would be greatly
obliged if he and some of his officers could get a cup
of coffee. I told them that I had plenty of coffee, but
that my servants were colored and had hidden. He as
sured me that they were not after negroes, whether slave
or free, and that if I could find the servants and get them
404 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES,
some coffee I could promise them absolute safety. My
servants were hidden in the thicket but a little distance
from the house, and I soon found some twenty negroes,
who swarmed back and speedily had hot coffee and tea
for the officers of the command. It was evident they
had no idea at whose place they were stopping, but they
were thinly clad, without their overcoats and blankets,
in order to be in the lightest trim for rapid marching,
and they were suffering from the cold rain of the entire
day. They gladly accepted my invitation to come into
the house and warm themselves, and they were not five
minutes in the library, where the New York and Phila
delphia papers lay on my table with my name on them,
before they all intuitively comprehended the fact that
they had asked hospitality and were about to receive it
in the house of a man whom they were ordered to take
as a prisoner to the South. They were all Virginians
and gentlemen of unusual intelligence and culture, as
the young bloods of that State with fine horses filled up
the ranks of the cavalry in the early part of the war. I
watched with unusual interest to see what the effect
would be when they discovered in whose house they
were as guests, but they did not long leave me in doubt
as to their appreciation of the peculiar condition in which
they were placed. They at once took in the situation
without opportunity to confer on the subject. It was
soon evident that they had decided that, having asked
and accepted hospitality, they would not permit them
selves to know that they were in the house of a host
whom it was their duty to arrest as a prisoner. We sat
at tea and over our pipes and cigars until at daylight the
bugle called them to the march. Every phase of the
war was discussed with the utmost freedom, but no one
of them spoke the name of himself or any of his fellows,
and not one assumed to know my identity. It was to
BORDER-LIFE IN WAR-TIMES. 405
me one of the most interesting events of the war, and I
doubt whether the war itself was ever discussed with
equal candor on both sides without a single exhibition
of prejudice or passion. When the bugle sounded they
arose and bade me good-bye, thanking me for my hospi
tality and earnestly expressing the hope that we should
some time meet again under more pleasant auspices.
Soon after I followed them into the town, and stood in
the crowd close beside Jeb Stuart for some time before
he started on his homeward march. He did not doubt
that I was one of his prisoners, and it was not until he
had crossed the Potomac that he learned that I was not
among his captives, when, as I have since been told by
officers who were present, he made the atmosphere blue
with his profane lamentations.
I much regretted that I had no clue whatever to the
identity of any of the Virginia officers who had spent the
night with me, and after the war had closed, and Presi
dent Johnson was breathing the fiercest vengeance against
the South, I felt that I might be of some service to these
men if I could discover who they were. I wrote to a
newspaper in Winchester and also to the Richmond
Whig, stating the facts and asking for information as to
these officers, but there was then universal distrust in the
South, and, as my property had been burned with Cham-
bersburg but a year before, I infer that my suggestions
were regarded as insincere, and no answers were received
to either of my letters. It was not until ten years after
the war that I accidentally learned the names of some of
the officers who were with me. On a visit to Washing-
ton I was in conversation with the late Heister Clymer
on the floor of the House just before the meeting of the
body, when he remarked to me that a Virginia member
desired to renew his acquaintance with me, and asked
permission to bring him and introduce him. I of course
406 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
assented, and he brought up Colonel Whitehead, then a
Congressman from the Lynchburg district, who informed
me that he had spent a night with me at my house during
Stuart's raid, and that he desired to renew his acquaint
ance of that evening under the more pleasant circum
stances which then surrounded us, and to thank me for
the kindness they had all received. From him I learned
that Lieutenant- Colonel James W. Watts commanded the
detachment, and that Captain W. W. Tebbs, Captain
Thomas W. Whitehead (himself), Lieu tenant Kelso, and
two others, whose names he did not then recall, consti
tuted the unique tea-party at Norland on the night of
October 10, 1862. John Paxton of Adams County, who
was on the list with myself from that town, was taken
by Stuart's command, but released soon after he had
reached Richmond. Perry A. Rice of Mercersburg, a
prominent member of the bar, was held in Libbey Prison
for some months, and died there. It was thus that I es
caped being Jeb Stuart's captive in the first and one of
the most brilliant cavalry raids of the war. It is but just
to Captain Hugh Logan, however, to state that he ad
vised me, when telling me of my danger, that if cap
tured and refused parole I should quietly submit and join
the procession, and he would put me out of the ranks the
first night. That he would have done so, even at the
peril of his life, I do not doubt, and I am as grateful to
him as if he had had occasion to perform that act of
kindness to me.
The Stuart raid of October, 1862, was the first actual
experience of the border people of Pennsylvania with a
Confederate force in their midst, but beyond the general
panic and disturbance it produced, the loss of some twelve
hundred horses by our farmers and the destruction of rail
road property, we felt none of the serious results of war.
The Pennsylvania "emergency-men" followed to give
BORDER-LIFE IA WAR-TIMES. 47
protection when it was no longer needed, as they did
again in 1863, after Lee had retreated, and again in 1864,
after McCausland had burned Chambersburg. These
suddenly-organized and undisciplined commands were
inspired by patriotic purpose, but they really never ren
dered any service in protecting the people of the border,
and at times were very destructive because of their want
of discipline and properly-organized supplies.
After the militia had been quietly disposed of, there
was comparative peace along the border until after the
defeat of Hooker at Chancellorsville and Lee commenced
his movement northward. The first sullen murmurs of
invasion came, as usual, from the Shenandoah Valley, as
General Milroy was routed at Winchester and his stam
peded army scattered in fragments over the border region.
With them came fleeing loyal fugitives from Virginia
and swarms of negroes, creating panic in every direction,
and on the evening of the i5th of June positive informa
tion was received that General Jenkins, commanding the
cavalry advance of Lee's army, was approaching. They
took possession of Chambersburg the same night, and
General Jenkins exhibited the good taste of all com
manders of both armies by camping on my farm, and
he further honored me by taking possession of my house
as his headquarters.
A short time before this advance of Lee a prominent
citizen who lived just south of the Pennsylvania line in
Maryland, who was a client and friend of mine, and
whose release I had obtained after he had been con
demned by General Schenck and banished into the
Southern lines, rode nearly all night from his home to
Chambersburg to advise me that an invasion was inevit
able, and that I must not permit myself to be captured.
He had spent some weeks within the Confederate lines
after he had been banished by court-martial, and he feU
LINCOLN AND. MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
it to be his duty to inform me of the excessive estimate
the Southern leaders put upon me as a prisoner, as they
supposed that with me as captive they could make un
usually good terms with Governor Curtin and President
Lincoln. I heeded his advice, and thereafter did not
remain in Chambersburg to extend hospitality to the
sons of the South. General Jenkins was hospitably
treated by my family, and his sick soldiers, for whom
my barn had been improvised as hospital, were kindly
ministered to by Mrs. McClure. It was this same com
mand that one year later, under General McCausland,
burned Chambersburg and went a mile out of its way to
burn my house and barn. Of course all stock and valu
ables that could be shipped away had been sent to Har-
risburg or points beyond, and our people were living
under many discomforts. Jenkins remained only a few
days in Chambersburg, when he suddenly fell back toward
the Potomac between Greencastle and Hagerstown, and
from there sent out marauding parties to capture horses
and supplies. The whole southern portion of Franklin
county was mercilessly plundered while Jenkins was
waiting the arrival of Lee's infantry. General Rhodes'
division was the first to reach Pennsylvania, and with
that command Jenkins again advanced and took posses
sion of Chambersburg.
The history of the great Gettysburg campaign and
battle is so familiar to all that I need not dwell on de^
tails. Lee then commanded the largest and the most
defiant army the Confederates ever had during the war.
General Bwell's corps, over twenty thousand strong, en
camped on my farm, and thence Generals Rhodes and
Early made their movements against York and Harris-
burg. On the 26th of June, General Lee entered Cham
bersburg with his staff, and it is needless to say that his
movements were watched with intense interest by all in-
BORDER-LIFE IN WAR-TIMES. 49
telligent citizens. Early and Rhodes were already ope
rating on the lines of the Susquehanna, and Lee's army
was so disposed that it could be rapidly concentrated for
operations in the Cumberland Valley and against Phila
delphia or thrown south of the South Mountain to ope
rate against Washington. Lee held a brief council in
the centre square of Chambersburg with General A. P.
Hill and several other officers, and when he left them
intense anxiety was exhibited by every one who observed
them to ascertain whether his movements would indicate
the concentration of his army in the Cumberland Valley
or for operations against Washington. When he came
to the street where the Gettysburg turnpike enters the
square, he turned to the right, went out a mile along
that road, and fixed his headquarters in a little grove
close by the roadside then known as Shetters' Woods.
When Lee turned in that direction, Benjamin S. Huber,
a country lad, happened to be present, and, as he had
already exhibited some fitness for such work, he was
started immediately overland for Harrisburg to commu
nicate to Governor Curtin the fact that Lee's movement
indicated Gettysburg as his objective point. Lee was
fated to lose three days of invaluable time at his head
quarters in the quiet grove near Chambersburg, as his
cavalry had been cut off from him by encountering our
cavalry forces in Eastern Maryland, and he could get no
information whatever of the movements of the Union
army.
It was not until the 29th of June that he received in
formation from one of Longstreet's scouts of the position
of the Army of the Potomac, and he immediately de
cided to cross South Mountain and accept battle on the
line to Baltimore and Washington. On the night of
Monday, June 29th, General Ewell's wagon-trains passed
through Chambersburg and turned eastward on the Get-
4 10 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
tysburg turnpike. This movement was carefully watched,
and it soon became evident to intelligent observers that
Lee's army was moving rapidly to concentrate south of
the South Mountain. I was then at Harrisburg with
Governor Curtin, and the only news we received of Lee's
movement, and the only reliable news received at Meade's
headquarters for some days, came from the several ener
getic young men who performed scout-duty between
Chambersburg and Harrisburg by traversing the moun
tains north of the Cumberland Valley. It was known
to us that Lee was in the Cumberland Valley with the
largest Southern army ever organized, and the gravest
apprehensions were felt by all as to the ability of the
Army of the Potomac to meet it in battle. There was
no sleep for the weary men at Harrisburg who were com
pelled to watch and to await events.
The first intimation received of Lee's movement toward
Gettysburg came from John A. Seiders of Chambersburg,
who had entered the enemy's lines in Confederate uni
form and saw General Rhodes begin the movement from
Carlisle in the direction of Gettysburg; but as Rhodes
and Early were both moving from point to point, the
fact that Rhodes was apparently retiring from Carlisle
was no indication of Lee's movements in Chambers
burg.
I shall never forget the first dispatch received at the
Executive Mansion at Harrisburg giving the information
that Lee had moved toward Gettysburg. It was some
time between midnight and morning on the ist of July,
while a dozen or more were waiting with the intensest
interest for news, that an unsigned dispatch was received
by Governor Curtin from Port Royal in Juniata county,
stating that the writer had left Chambersburg the day
before at the request of Judge Kimmell to convey the
information to the Governor that Lee was marching
OF I,E;TTKR FROM GENERA^
412 LINCOLN AND* MEN OF WAR- TIMES.
toward Gettysburg. The fact that the dispatch was un
signed threw doubt upon the value of the information,
but as it described minutely the route the scout had trav
eled through Franklin and Juniata counties, with which
I was personally quite familiar, I was able to give reason
able assurance that the dispatch was genuine. The tele
graph-office at Port Royal had been opened to send the
dispatch, and was closed immediately after, so that no
details could be obtained. General Couch, then in com
mand of the Union force at Harrisburg, was present in
the Governor's room, and he immediately communicated
with General " Baldy " Smith, giving the information
received and asking him to see whether the enemy had
retired from his front. Before noon the next day the
correctness of the statement given by the unknown scout
was fully verified; and it is a most remarkable fact that
the identity of this man was never discovered by Gov
ernor Curtin until twenty years thereafter.
This scout was Stephen W. Pomeroy, whose father had
sat on the bench as associate with Judge Kimmell, and
Kimmell, knowing the trustworthiness of the young
man, wrote the dispatch for Governor Curtin, cut a hole
in the buckle-strap of Pomeroy 's pantaloons, and hid the
telegram therein. Information came from so many quar
ters during the next day that the message of the young
scout was almost forgotten, and the thrilling events that
followed and the many conspicuous feats performed by
the young men of the Cumberland Valley in scouting
service prevented minute inquiry into the source of the
important dispatch of the early morning. Twenty years
later the Presbyterian Synod of that section met in Belle-
fonte, and several ministers in attendance were guests of
Governor Curtin. In the course of his reminiscent con
versations about the war he happened to mention the
receipt of this important dispatch, and the fact that he
BORDER-LIFE IN WAR-TIMES. 413
had never been advised as to the author of it. To his
surprise, Rev. S. W. Pomeroy, then his own guest, told
him that he was the man, and at Curtin's request he
wrote a letter that was given to the public stating the
full particulars of his marvelous journey. * It was upon
* MOUNT UNION, PA., Nov. 13, 1883.
HON. A. G. CURTIN DEAR SIR : In compliance with your
request, I send you the account of how I came to send you the
telegram of the concentration of the Confederate army at Gettys
burg during the war. After being discharged from the nine
months' service of the Pennsylvania volunteers, I happened to
be home, at my father's Judge Pomeroy of Roxbury, Franklin
county when the enemy were marching down the Cumberland
Valley. There was, of course, great excitement, for the enemy
were at our doors and taking what they would. Farmers hid
their horses and other stock in the mountains as far as possible.
One day three hundred cavalry marched into Roxbury. When
we learned of their coming, ten of the men who had been out in
the nine months' service armed ourselves as best we could and
went out to intercept them ; but the odds were too great, so we
retired. Anxious to hear the news and render what service we
might to our country, a number of us walked to Chambersburg,
a distance of fourteen miles, reaching there in the afternoon.
That night the rebels were concentrated at Gettysburg. Next
morning Judge F. M. Kimmell, with whom my father sat as
associate judge, learned that a son of Thomas Pomeroy was in
town. He sent for me to come to him at once. I found the judge
on the street that leads to McConnellsburg, a short distance from
the Franklin Hotel, where the Central Presbyterian Church now
stands. As the town was full of rebels and a rebel had his beat
near us, the judge asked m$ in a low tone if I was a son of Judge
Pomeroy. I replied in the affirmative. With apparent unconcern
he asked me to follow him. I did so, and he led me into a little
dark back room and told me that the rebels were concentrating
at Gettysburg and Governor Curtin did not know it. He said it
was of the utmost importance that the Governor should know at
the earliest possible moment, and asked me if I would take a tel
egram to the nearest point on the Pennsylvania Railroad and
send it to him. He added: " It is of infinite importance to him
and to our country." I replied that I would try it, The telegram
414 LINCOLN AND' MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
this information that General Meade, then just placed in
the command of the Army of the Potomac, hastened to
was already written, so he cut a hole in the buckle-strap of my
pantaloons and deposited there the telegram to be sent, and
said: "Get this safely and in the shortest time possible to the
Governor." Assuming indifference, I came to the street and met
the rebel guard, who did not disturb me. Some of those who
came with me wishing to return to Roxbury, we set out together.
We met many at the edge of the town returning who could not
get through the guards, who were stationed around the town.
Coming to the forks of the Strasburg and Roxbury roads, we
found both cavalry and infantry. On the left there was a slight
hollow, also several wheat-fields, and beyond these there were
woods . This was the only way to hope for escape. At my pro
posal we crept along this hollow, at the end of which there were
some wheat-fields; we kept these between us and the guard till
we reached the woods. When getting over the fence into the
woods we were seen by the enemy. They called, rode after us,
and leveled their muskets at us, but we ran on, and, as they did
not fire or follow far, we escaped. Still fearing capture, we kept
to the fields. Before we reached Strasburg all had fallen behind
but one. We must have walked about seventeen miles before we
got to Roxbury. As the horses were hid in the mountains, I was
in dread lest I should not get a horse; but I met Mr. L. S. Sent-
man riding into town to get feed for his horses in the mountains.
Telling him of the message I was carrying, he gave me his horse.
Informing my father of my errand, I set out on my trip at once.
It was about noon. The mountain-road to Amberson Valley
was, I knew, blockaded with trees to prevent the marauders from
entering the valley to steal horses. The Barrens below Concord
were blockaded by citizens of Tuscarora Valley, many of whom
knew me. The report having reached them that I was killed
while trying to hinder the rebels from entering Roxbury, the ob
stacles and excitement of my friends at finding me alive hindered
me about ten minutes. Free from them, I hastened down the
Tuscarora Valley as fast as my horse could carry me. At Beal-
town, Mr. Beal (now the Rev. D. J. Beal) speedily got me a fresh
horse. When I reached Silas E. Smith's I did these two things:
got lunch and proved to the future Mrs. Pomeroy that I was not
dead, as she supposed, but good for many years to come. From
thence I rode to my uncle's, Joseph Pomeroy, at Academia, found
RORDER-LIt'E IN \VAR-TlMbS. 415
concentrate his army, and he ordered General Reynolds
to make a recognizance in force at Gettysburg to ascer
tain the position of the enemy. The young men who
performed the most important duty of maintaining com
munications between Harrisburg and Chambersburg by
circuitous journeys through the mountains were Stephen
W. Pomeroy, Thomas J. Grimison, Sellers Montgomery,
J. Porter Brown, Anthony Holler, Shearer Houser, Ben
jamin S. Huber, and probably others whose names I can
not recall.
When Lee had passed the South Mountain and the
battle at Gettysburg had begun it was impossible to ob
tain any news from Lee's rear as to important movements
between the two armies, and thenceforth until Lee's re
treat the only information received at Harrisburg and
Chambersburg came from General Meade through Wash
ington. On the evening of the first day's battle we
learned the sad news that Reynolds had fallen and that
them likewise mourning my supposed death, and he supplied an
other horse, the fastest he had. That carried me to within a mile
of my destination, when a soldier on guard called, "Halt!" I
told the sergeant on guard my mission, and requested one of the
guard to go with me, that I might get the telegram off to Harris
burg in the shortest time possible.
Getting on the horse behind me, we rode in a few minutes to
the office. Finding the operator, he cut the telegram out of the
strap of my pantaloons and sent it at once to you. The excite
ment and journey being over and the telegram being off to you,
I began to look at the time and found it about midnight. I had
walked that day about seventeen miles and ridden about forty-
one miles. Anxious as I was about the critical state of the coun
try, I was so tired I had to seek the house of my kinsman, Major
J. M. Pomeroy, in Perryville (now Port Royal), for rest.
The above is the history of that telegram that, I believe, first
gave you notice of the concentration of the rebel troops at Gettys
burg just before the famous battle in that place.
Respectfully yours,
STEPHEN W. POMEROY.
416 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
the Union troops had been badly defeated. On the sec
ond day no material news came, and for two days the
government at Harrisburg and the people in the Valley
were agonized by fearful suspense as to the issue of the
conflict. Late in the evening of July 3d, Wayne Mac-
Veagh, who had been with the Governor during the
whole period of trial, and whose anxiety kept him close
beside the telegraph-operator, rushed into the Executive
Chamber with Meade's report of the repulse of Pickett
on Cemetery Hill. It was the first silver lining of the
dark cloud flung upon us by the Gettysburg invasion,
and when the next morning it was known that Lee had
retreated, while every loyal heart of the land was glad
dened, the border people felt a relief that was unknown
in any other part of the country.
One of the incidents of Lee's retreat I do not recall
with pleasure, but it is due to the truth of history to tell
the story of the fierce passions which ran riot in our civil
war. Lee left thousands of his wounded scattered along
the line of his retreat, and a number of them were gath
ered into a hospital in Chambersburg. Little attention
was paid to the fact that there was a Confederate hospital
in our midst, as "uncommon things make common
things forgot." Some ten days after Lee's retreat, Dr.
A. H. Senseny, my own family physician, came to me
and informed me that he was attending the Confederate
wounded in the hospital, and that they were .in great
need of some things which were not supplied by army
regulations. He appealed to me to go in person and see
them and take the lead to have them properly supplied,
as he believed I could do it without suspicion of disloy
alty. I visited the hospital with him and found a num
ber of severely- wounded men who had great need of some
delicacies necessary to their recovery or comfort. Mrs.
McClure immediately took charge of the effort, and was
BORDER-LIFE I ft WAR-'TIMES. 417
heartily seconded by a number of estimable ladies. I
became specially interested in a young Confederate,
Colonel Carter, who resided in Texas, but who was a
native of Tennessee. It was evident that his wound was
mortal, and he fully understood it. When he was in
formed by the doctor that I had come to perform some
kind offices for the wounded in that hospital, he thanked
me effusively, and made a piteous appeal to me to assure
him decent Christian burial after his death. I gave him
the promise, little dreaming of the angry passions it
would arouse in a Christian community. He died a few
days thereafter, and I applied to the trustees of the Pres
byterian church I attended for permission to bury him in
the graveyard attached to it. To my surprise it was
refused. I made like application to the several other
churches in the town which had cemeteries, and was
refused in every instance. I then applied to a company
that had recently started a new cemetery near the town,
and proposed to purchase a lot for the burial of the dead
Confederate colonel, but that was refused, and indigna
tion was expressed on almost every side because of my
effort to give a Confederate soldier decent burial. I then
announced that I would set apart a small lot in the corner
of the field in front of my house to bury him there and
dedicate it as his resting-place. Finally Mr. Burnett, an
estimable Christian character, gave Colonel Carter's re
mains a resting-place in his own lot in the Methodist
burial-ground. Such were the fierce passions of civil
war in one of the most intelligent, generous, and Chris
tian communities of the North, and I recall it often as
one of the saddest memories of our fraternal conflict.
After the battle of Gettysburg the border people had
seen war in its most horrible aspect. The constant peril
from incursions of the enemy, and the possibility of other
great battles being fought upon the border or north of
27
41 & LINCOLN AND, MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
the Potomac, destroyed all hope of tranquility in that
region until the war closed. There was comparative
peace and quiet during the winter of 1863-64, but when
the spring of 1864 opened the border counties were almost
constantly threatened by cavalry raids or hostile armies.
Governor Curtin had taken the precaution to organize an
ample force to protect the border from raids, but as these
troops were mustered into the service of the national
government, and thereby subject to the call of the War
Department, they were ordered from the State to rein
force Hunter on the north side of the Potomac after his
disastrous advance into Virginia. While Hunter was
thus endeavoring to reorganize his demoralized forces
and the border was threatened in the direction of Hagers-
town, the startling news came to General Couch's head
quarters on the evening of July 29, 1864, that a Confed
erate force had entered Mercersburg and was marching
toward Chambersburg. General Couch, although com
manding a department with headquarters at Chambers-
burg, had but one hundred and fourteen men under his
command, and they were scattered over half as many
miles as scouts on the border. The troops that he could
have summoned to repel invasion under ordinary circum
stances had passed through Chambersburg within twenty-
four hours to join Hunter, in command of another de
partment, and were beyond his control.
I remained with Couch the night of the 29th until
three o'clock the next morning. He received frequent
reports from the heroic Lieutenant McLean, who had just
thirteen men with him, but who in the darkness of the
night confronted McCausland at every cross-roads in his
advance upon Chambersburg, and so hindered him that
he did not arrive in front of the town until daylight.
McCausland in his official report states that he was con
fronted by a regiment that fought him most gallantly and
BORDER-LIFE IN WAR-TIMES, 419
greatly delayed his advance, but I happened to know that
the entire force opposed to him was the lieutenant and his
thirteen men. It was evident at three o'clock in the
morning that the Confederate force would reach the town
before daylight, and, as General Couch had no means
whatever for defending the place, he ordered a special
train to be in readiness to take himself, staff, and official
records away when it became necessary. He urged me
to go with him, believing that it was unsafe for me to
remain at home, but I decided that I would not leave my
family, perilous though it seemed to be, and left him to
go to my own house. When I reached there and gave
the condition of affairs, Mrs. McClure most earnestly
urged me to go with General Couch, and while I was
hesitating he sent a staff-officer to my house, saying that
he felt it his duty to command me to accompany him out
of the town, and to come at once and leave with him on
the train. I still hesitated and sent his staff-officer away,
but soon after Mr. Taylor, an old friend, drove up in his
buggy and proposed to take me with him, and I accom
panied him to Shippensburg.
Telegraphic communication was of course cut off, but
the next morning I took the cars for Harrisburg, where
I was greeted with the information that McCausland had
burned the town and had sent a special detachment, com
manded by a son of Ex-Governor Smith of Virginia, to
burn my house and barn, after having burned my print
ing-office and law-office in the town. Rev. Samuel J.
Niccolls, now of St. L,ouis, was my immediate neighbor,
and he came to my house when he found that a detach
ment of the enemy had entered it. Mrs. McClure was
ill, confined to her room, but Captain Smith entered it
and notified her to leave immediately, as he was going to
burn the house in retaliation for the destruction of pri
vate property by Hunter in Virginia, and forbade her to
420 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
take anything with her. Mr. Niccolls attempted to take
some of my clothing on his arms, but it was grasped
from him and cast into the flames. The only thing
saved from the house was a portrait that Miss Virginia
Riley seized, and with it ran out of the house through a
back door, and the family Bible was taken charge of by
Mrs. Gray, the mother of my wife. When Captain Smith
was about to fire the room in which Mrs. McClure was
an invalid, she opened a drawer in her bureau and handed
him a letter she had received but a few days before and
requested him to read it. It was from one of the same
command who had been there under Jenkins the year
before, and who had been ill and received generous min
istrations from her. It was a letter of thanks from one of
Captain Smith's own associates for the kind offices she
had given to an enemy when in distress, but it did not
stop the vandal's work, and everything perished by the
vandal's torch.
I need not describe the brutality that is inevitable
when a military command is ordered to play the barba
rian. Many of the men became intoxicated, and there
were numerous records of barbarity which all would be
glad to forget. A large brick house on another part of
my farm was fortunately occupied by the family of Col
onel Boyd, one of our most gallant troopers and success
ful scouts. Learning that that property belonged to me,
Colonel Harry Gilmore led a detachment to burn it.
Colonel Boyd was absent on duty, but his wife was an
heroic woman, and, when Colonel Gilmore entered the
house and informed her of their purpose, she amazed
them by her coolness of manner and much more by her
defiance. She said: "Do you know whose home this
is ?' ' The answer was: ' ' Yes, we know that this belongs
to Colonel McClure, and we are ordered to burn it"
Her answer was: "This is the home of Colonel Boyd,
BORDER-LIFE IN WAR-TIMES. 421
of whom you have some knowledge. I am now ready
to walk out of it, and you can burn it if you choose, but
don't forget that it is the home of Colonel Boyd." They
knew of Colonel Boyd, and they knew also that if his
home was burned it would make a hundred Virginians
homeless before another month, as he would have given
fearful retribution. Colonel Gilmore bowed to Mrs. Boyd,
saying: "We will not burn the home of so gallant a sol
dier;" and thus the property was saved. He gives a dif
ferent account of the incident in his book, but all who
remember Mrs. Boyd well know that she was not the
whimpering dame he represents her.
I need not describe the burning of Chambersburg. It
was ordered by General Early upon the failure of the
people to pay a tribute of $500,000, which was an impos
sible demand, and the order was executed in unexampled
barbarity. It accomplished nothing in the war beyond
making hundreds of homeless families in the South, and
especially in Columbia, South Carolina, when Sherman
was marching north, where the people learned to asso
ciate the cry of Chambersburg with sweeping destruc
tion. Every drunken Union soldier in Southern cities
applied the torch as did the drunken soldiers of McCaus-
land in Chambersburg, always preceding it with the cry
of "Remember Chambersburg!" The fact remains that
one of the most beautiful towns of the State had been
ruthlessly destroyed by war; that the people of Cham
bersburg and of the border regions had suffered spoliation
to the extent of not less than $4,000,000; and that the
burning of Chambersburg was the direct result of the
general government calling away the troops organized
for State service that would have been ample to defend
the town. It was not the accident of a lost battle; it
was the result of the extreme necessities of the national
government that deprived Pennsylvania of her own right-
422 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
ful defenders, and it is a blistering stain upon the gov
ernment that it has not made reasonable restitution for
the loss which resulted from the action of the govern
ment itself. The people of Chambersburg heroically
struggled to rebuild their homes and revive their busi
ness, but soon after the war closed there was a general
paralysis and depression of values, and many were hope
lessly bankrupted, while others struggled on for years in
the vain effort to retrieve their fortunes.
This fearful strain upon the people of the border con
tinued for four long years. Finally, on the night of
April 9, 1865, when the long-suffering residents of Cham
bersburg were at rest in the homes they had improvised
in their ashes, they were suddenly startled by the ringing
of the courthouse bell, in which the chimes of several
church bells were soon mingled. There had been no
rumors of a raid, but the people hurried from their beds
to inquire what new peril confronted them or what great
victory had been achieved. In a very short time the
streets resounded with the shouts: " L,ee has surren
dered!" Soon the people of the town, young and old,
were upon the streets, many of them weeping with joy,
and all mingling in congratulations; and thus the fearful
strain upon them was ended. To them it meant more
than peace between the North and the South ; it meant
much more than a restored nation: it meant the ending
of the strife that entered their own homes and desolated
the places where their affections centered, and it meant
that at last, after the bloodiest war of modern history,
they had rest.
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS.
WHIL,E none will claim that the soldiers of the
Pennsylvania Reserve Corps were more heroic
than other scores of thousands of Pennsylvania soldiers
who volunteered for the defence of the Union, it is none
the less true that this organization, alike by reason of the
peculiar circumstances under which it was created and
because of its opportunities for the most heroic service
in nearly every battle of the Army of the Potomac, oc
cupies a distinctive place in the history of Pennsylva
nia heroism. How it was organized has already been
stated in these articles. How it was summoned by the
patriotism and sagacity of Governor Curtin when the
national government had not only not called for it, but
refused to accept it; how the legislature was appealed to
by the Governor, and a State organization effected alike
for the protection of the State and the general govern
ment; how it was frantically called for by the same au
thorities who had rejected it when disaster fell upon the
Union forces at Bull Run; how it promptly marched to
Washington and ended panic by assuring the safety of
the capital, are matters of history known to all; and
when it is remembered that it had such commanders as
McCall, Meade, Reynolds, Ord, and Crawford, and bri
gade commanders who have shed lustre upon the skill
and heroism of Pennsylvania soldiers, and that more
than one-half of its entire force fell wounded or dead
423
(Photo by Gutekunst, Philadelphia.)
MAJOR-GENERAL S. W, CRAWFORD, 1865,
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 4 2 5
in battle, it is not surprising that the Pennsylvania Re
serve Corps occupies a unique position in the annals
of Pennsylvania achievement and sacrifice in our civil
war.
The command of the Reserves was first offered to Gen
eral McClellan, and he had accepted, but on his way to
Harrisburg he was stopped at Columbus, Ohio, where he
was prevailed upon to accept the command of the Ohio
State troops. It was then offered to General Franklin,
but he declined, as he had been promoted to a colonelcy
in the regular army. It was then tendered to General
McCall of Chester county, Pennsylvania, a retired army
officer, who proved to be an excellent disciplinarian and
a most gallant soldier. General McCall earnestly devoted
himself, and at once, to the organization for service of
the division, to its drill and discipline, and gave to the
Bucktails, or First Rifles, his especial care a regiment
to become famous as skirmishers wholly unique, and
whose value in thick woods, tangled overgrowth, streams,
and mountain-passes was unequaled anywhere. Three
brigades were formed, under Reynolds, Meade, and Ord
names soon to become famous for ability and conspicu
ous service; and it cannot be questioned that the impres
sion left by these able soldiers of the highest class in
their discipline and instruction was long effective and
contributed greatly to the reputation of the division.
Before the advance of our lines in front of Washington
to a stronger position the Reserves were ordered to I^ang-
ley, at Camp Pierpoint, beyond the Chain Bridge, where
McCall's division constituted the right of the army,
which it held until after the seven days' retreat on the
Peninsula. Constantly in contact with the enemy, and
always with credit to itself, it was preparing for the
larger operations of war so soon to devolve upon it. A
reconnaissance in force showed the presence of the enemy
426 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
in uncertain numbers near Dranesville, and an attack
from the direction of Centreville was anticipated, in re
gard to which McCall's division was warned. Had the
reconnaissance to Dranesville resulted in holding that
place, the disaster to Baker and his command at Ball's
Bluff, and his subsequent rout, might have been avoided.
From intelligence received by a scout it was learned
that the enemy was in force at Dranesville, and that
his object was to forage in the unoccupied country in
his immediate front. He had advanced his pickets in
front of his line, and was molesting Union men about
him, when it was determined to drive his line back
and take possession of the supplies of grain and forage
available.
On the aoth, Ord's brigade, with Easton's battery
and a detachment of cavalry, and with the Bucktails
as skirmishers, was ordered to move up the Dranesville
road. Reynolds with his brigade, in support, was to
move in the same direction later, while Meade was held
in reserve in camp. Ord reached Dranesville, and soon
developed the enemy, who opened fire with his artillery.
The brigade soon became closely engaged, Easton's bat
tery coming rapidly into position and rendering most
effective service through the battle. Ord's dispositions
were admirable, and he directed in person the operations
of his regiments, with Easton's guns and the Bucktails.
In an attempt to turn the left of our position the enemy
was repulsed by Easton's guns and the Sixth regiment.
There was close firing along the line, when an advance
was ordered and the enemy rapidly retreated toward
Centreville. Meantime, Reynolds' brigade, followed
by that of Meade, had come up, but the battle was
over a most successful affair, hardly to be dignified
with the name of a battle, and, in view of the immense
issues of the future, insignificant, but in its moral as-
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS.
pects immense. Young men gathered from all parts
of Pennsylvania had assumed the panoply of war, and
had gone into action and moved and fought with the
confidence of veteran soldiers; and it was the first vic
tory of the Army of the Potomac. Pennsylvania was
thrilled at the achievement of her sons, and not only
through her Governor, but through the Secretary of
War, himself a Pennsylvanian, congratulations and com
mendations, official and private, upon the conduct of
the division came in profusion.
The division now returned to its camp (Pierpoint) and
made preparations to go into winter quarters. McClellan
had been appointed to the command of the army, which
for seven long months remained inactive confronting
the enemy's lines. The Reserves under their competent
officers were daily attaining efficiency in drill and in dis
cipline and in preparation for battle an efficiency that
was never to leave them during their service. The
whole heart of their State had gone out to them, and the
patriotic Governor, who ever considered them his own
special creation, never wearied in the exercise of his
paternal care.
McClellan now moved from Alexandria to Fortress
Monroe, and the advance of the Army of the Potomac
began. To reach Yorktown and the Peninsula the army
embarked by divisions. McDowell's corps, with the
Pennsylvania Reserves, was in the rear. But while all
was in motion, the President, learning that Washington
had not been protected by a sufficient force in accordance
with his orders, detached McDowell's corps and ordered
him to report to the Secretary of War. This conse
quently kept the Pennsylvania Reserves from the Penin
sula, and they accompanied their corps to Alexandria.
Soon after another advance was made into Virginia to
Falmouth and Fredericksburg. But when McDowell
LINCOLN AND 'MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
arrived and was about to take up the line of march, he
received an order, directly from the President, forbidding
him to cross the river. Here the Reserves remained for
over a month, going through all the phases and vicissi
tudes of military life, and becoming hardened and thor
oughly fitted for the future service in store for them.
They were directly on the road to Richmond. The gal
lant Bayard was made a brigadier-general on the 28th of
April, and the flying brigade was organized under his
command.
Again a forward movement toward Richmond was
ordered, and McDowell's corps had begun its movement
by the advance of Bayard's brigade, and everything
looked favorable to the speedy junction of McDowell and
his corps with the Army of the Potomac, when the Presi
dent and his Cabinet arrived at Fredericksburg to confer
with McDowell as to the movement. All was in readi
ness, the transportation secured, the men eager, and only
awaited the final order. It was Saturday, the 24th of
May. The next day being Sunday, the President ob
jected to beginning a campaign on that day, when Mon
day morning was fixed upon. Meantime a despatch was
received by McDowell revoking the order and changing
the whole plan of campaign. Jackson had again burst
into the Valley of the Shenandoah and was in full march
northward. The President personally interfered, Bayard
was quickly recalled, and the three divisions of Shields,
King, and Ord were hurried to the Shenandoah Valley
to meet him. McCall with the Pennsylvania Reserves
was to hold Fredericksburg temporarily, some troops of
the cavalry only accompanying the expedition on their
march. Bayard with his brigade encountered the enemy
in Jackson's rearguard, other troops, from Fremont's
command, joined him, and there was a brisk fight with
the enemy. Bayard's brigade remained with Fremont.
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 429
Meantime the Reserves remained at Fredericksburg under
McCall, when, on the 4th of June, McClellan called ear
nestly for reinforcements, and the Reserves were prom
ised him to go to the White House. McClellan had
assured the President that upon McCall' s arrival with
his division, if the state of the ground permitted, he
would advance. McDowell moved promptly with the
division of the Reserves alone. By the I4th of June
the division was united at Tunstall's Station. Stuart's
Confederate cavalry had threatened an attack upon the
depot and had opened fire upon a train at the station.
Upon the appearance of Reynolds with his brigade the
cavalry retreated.
The Reserves, now united, mustered nearly ten thou
sand strong, of effective material. Fully organized, well
drilled and equipped, under favorite and skilled com
manders, they marched on the iyth with enthusiasm to
take their place on the right of the army. It was the
place of honor; they occupied it upon the iQth, and
almost at once came under the fire of the enemy. It
was a position which should have never been chosen,
but which McCall with admirable sagacity and judg
ment at once made strong and formidable, taking ad
vantage of the natural features of the ground and dis
posing his force with reference to the efficiency of its
fire, putting two of his brigades in line and holding
Meade's brigade in reserve.
The enemy was in plain view. At three o'clock he
threw forward his skirmishers, which were at once
driven back. Advancing his main body under cover
of his artillery fire, he attacked the Reserves along their
whole front. The fighting was long continued, and
from the right centre to the left was hotly maintained.
Various attempts were made by the enemy to find weak
places in our line, but without success. The Reserves
430 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
maintained their position, inflicting great losses upon
the enemy, who finally retired at nine o'clock p. M.
McCall at once prepared for a renewal of the attack in
the morning, when he received McClellan's order to fall
back to Games' Mills. Jackson was marching from the
direction of Gordonsville upon the right flank and rear
of our army. This compelled an immediate change to
one definite side of the Chickahominy, the right bank.
The movement was executed with skill and success.
The Reserves moved speedily, and the spectacle of an
army with an impassable boggy stream flowing through
its centre was no longer seen.
The command fell back with regret, in perfect order,
behind the lines of Games' Mills at ten A. M. , June
27th a movement which the corps commander doubted
his ability to accomplish. Here it was held in reserve.
No veteran troops could have behaved with any greater
distinction than did the Pennsylvania Reserves in this
battle of Mechanicsville, and the glowing approbation
of their commander, McCall, was wholly deserved.
They had met most honorably every requirement of
their position with a devotion and courage worthy of
any troops in any army; and Mechanicsville will ever
remain one of their proudest achievements.
The withdrawal had been successfully accomplished,
and Porter's corps was in strong position at Games' Mill
by noon on the 27th of June, its flanks resting on the
creeks. The Pennsylvania Reserves, in justice to them
after their continued and gallant fighting, were held at
first in reserve and rear. But the enemy in strong
columns commenced his attack at four o'clock, and It
was so determined and persistent that the second line
had been moved up by the corps commander's order;
and the Second and Third brigades were ordered at once
to the support of the left centre, now severely engaged.
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 43 1
The conflict became desperate, and the men fought with
out regard to anything but the enemy in their front and
the officers who commanded them. Other troops were
moved up and much confusion prevailed. Again and
again the enemy was repulsed, only to re-form, and,
being reinforced, to again attack.
On our side the troops held their position bravely
until every cartridge had been fired. One regiment on
the left was repulsed and driven across the Chickahominy.
Regiments of different corps were gotten together, led
on a charge into the woods, and advanced against the
enemy, when their flanks were assailed and broken, and
in disorder they fell back to their old position. The
Bucktails, by their unerring fire, forced a Confederate
battery to change its position, and finally drove it from
the field. One regiment that had gone 'to the relief of
another then in line remained fighting until, its ammu
nition exhausted, with half its number captured, and
with the enemy all around it, it was forced to surrender.
Easton, after most heroic fighting, his support gone, his
gunners killed at their pieces, his retreat cut off, lost
four of his guns and two caissons.
The action had now become general, and for four hours
raged furiously. The left, unable to withstand the re
peated and desperate attacks upon it, had broken and
was falling back in confusion, when McCall by his per
sonal efforts partially restored order. It was now after
sunset. The enemy, after forcing our left, had cut off
the retreat of the Eleventh regiment and the Fourth New
Jersey, to whose relief Reynolds had gone. While at
tempting to regain our lines the next morning he was
captured with his adjutant-general. The enemy, believ
ing that reinforcements had reached us, made no further
attack. He had before displayed no such strength or de
termination. The Reserves fought against superior num-
43 2 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
bers and bravely, wholly ' ' supporting the character they
had previously gained," as was justly said by their com
mander. Reynolds had been everywhere, and in the ex
ercise of that personal magnetism so characteristic of him
was of the greatest influence in restoring order. We lost
twenty-two guns in the battle, and the Pennsylvania Re
serves alone had lost, including the affair at Beaver Dam
Creek, fourteen hundred men. The enemy had been
held in check, and this, the commanding general said,
was all that he proposed, to secure his changed base on
the James River.
But there was to be no rest yet for the division. On
the 2yth of June, after the affair at Gainesville, the Penn
sylvania Reserves crossed the Chickahominy. It was
late before their orders reached them to move to White
Oak Creek as an escort and protection to Hunt's reserve
artillery. It was an important and hazardous service,
and it seemed to fall to the lot of the Reserves, as other
details had done, without much reference to justice or
routine. The transfer of so important an element of his
fighting material might well occasion anxiety to the com
manding general, and he had especially entrusted its care
to McCall's division of Pennsylvanians. He had been
satisfied with its brilliant service, and his unjust criti
cisms upon its action at New Market road had not yet
been made.
The demoralization at Savage Station was great ; every
thing was in confusion; nearly three thousand sick and
wounded men were in tents and under any shelter that
could be found, and all sorts of rumors of the approach
of the enemy tended to demoralize the men. Upon their
arrival the Reserves at once sought out and ministered to
the wants of their comrades as far as they were able to do.
The wounded and sick were to be left behind, and when
this became known it occasioned a feeling that moved
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 433
the stoutest heart. McCall had crossed the swamp with
the artillery train, and had formed his division in line
of battle, when he was relieved from his escort duty and
ordered forward on the Quaker road toward the James
River. The division moved with its corps. When on
the march some confusion and delay took place in regard
to the exact location of the Quaker road. The whole
command was countermarched, except the Reserve divis
ion, to whom Porter, in command of the corps, sent no
instructions, leaving the division in front and in sight
of the enemy. His explanation was that he did not con
sider the division then under his command. The enemy
had now discovered McClellan' s intention to change his
base, and resolved to go in pursuit. The army was
formed in line of battle, and Sumner with the rearguard
held Savage Station, the point of honor, and nobly re
pulsed a determined attack of the enemy.
Porter with his corps, including the Reserves, was in
line of battle, with the remainder of the army across the
roads and facing Richmond. The position originally
taken by McCall was at the crossing of the Quaker road
and the New Market road. Ordered back from this posi
tion, McCall received orders from McClellan himself to
form his division on the New Market road, and to hold
that position until our trains had passed on toward the
James River. There was no continuous line of battle.
The divisions were disjointed and McCall held the centre.
He had formed his division with his usual ability. Meade
with the Second brigade was on his right; Seymour on
the left; Simmons with the First brigade in reserve, and
his batteries were strongly posted. The Confederates
had determined to seize the point where the Charles City
and New Market roads crossed each other, and thus place
themselves on our line of retreat. This movement, if
successful, would have divided McClellan' s army. Hill's
ft
434 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
Confederate division, that had been repulsed by the
Reserves at Mechanicsville, was again to attack, and
McCall's division of Pennsylvania Reserves was again
to meet it.
At half-past two o'clock the battle began by the driv
ing in of our skirmishers. The enemy threw forward
two regiments to feel McCall's line. Colonel Sickel with
the Third and Colonel Harvey with the Seventh drove
them back, when the enemy moved a large column upon
our left flank and made a determined assault with his
artillery and infantry. For two long hours the battle
raged fiercely. The brave Simmons fell and the enemy
was driven back. Our batteries, under Kern and Cooper,
were well served, and a reckless and desperate charge
made upon Randall's guns was bravely repulsed, the
enemy coming up to the muzzles of the guns. Our men
crossed bayonets with the Alabama troops, and a hand-
to-hand fight occurred, a rare thing at any time in war.
But there were no supports; every man had been put in;
our lines were broken and could not re-form, and fell
back in disorder. At once McCall began to re-form his
line, to get his scattered men together, and to present
again his front to the enemy. But all was changed: his
brigade commanders had gone; his staff had all been dis
abled or killed, and even his personal escort wounded or
dispersed, and he himself exhausted. While riding for
ward, unaccompanied by any of his staff, to look for one
of his officers, he was captured.
At no previous battle had there been so many instances
of hand-to-hand fighting, no such display of personal
courage. Well might the enemy regard this battle as
one of the most stubborn and long-contested that had
yet occurred, and say, as Longstreet did, that if McCall's
division had not fought as it did they would have cap
tured our army. The Reserves had met the divisions of
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 435
Longstreet and A. P. Hill, among the best of the Con
federate troops, and from eighteen to twenty thousand
strong. The conduct of the Reserve division, as its
commander said, was worthy of all praise. It had
added to its laurels by as devoted and valiant a service
as had ever been rendered by any troops. Meade had
been wounded, but remained for a while, when he finally
left the field. Seymour became separated from his com
mand, and retired. In his official report the division
commander thanks Colonels Roberts, Sickel, Hays, Jack
son, and others. Three stands of colors, with two hun
dred prisoners, were captured, while the loss of the di
vision in the three battles of the 26th, 2 7th, and 3oth of
June amounted to 3180; the killed and wounded amounted
to 650 out of the 7000 who went into battle at Mechanics-
ville on the 26th of June.
The Reserve commander and Reynolds being now pris
oners in the hands of the enemy, and Meade wounded,
the command of the division devolved upon Seymour
temporarily as the senior. Porter with the Fifth corps
reached Malvern Hill only on the 3<Dth of June, and took
position to cover the passage of our trains and reserve
artillery to the river behind Malvern Hill.
Lee, failing to break our centre on the New Market
road, now determined to turn our left flank at Malvern
Hill. A strong line was formed by our troops, and in
front of it the enemy appeared on the morning of the ist
of July. Porter's corps held the left of the line. The
Pennsylvania Reserve division was held in reserve be
hind Porter and Couch. In the attacks upon these com
mands the Reserves were not engaged. At the conclusion
of the fight McClellan withdrew his army to Harrison's
Landing, which had been previously determined upon,
but which was received with regret by both officers and
men,
43 6 LINCOLN AND' MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
The condition of the Reserves was not an encouraging
one. Reduced in numbers, many sick, their officers
gone, the severe service imposed upon them had affected
their well-being and touched their morale. They were
broken down, and their losses in men and officers had
affected them; many were sent to hospitals only to die;
many never again returned to their commands. But
there was no giving up. Early in August, McCall, Rey
nolds, and the prisoners captured in the previous fights
were exchanged and returned to the army. McCall' s re
turn was warmly welcomed by the division, but he too,
broken down in health, was obliged to seek relief at his
home. Failing to regain his strength, he resigned his
commission, when Reynolds assumed command of the
division, and was welcomed by the men with every ex
pression of gratification and joy.
The government had now determined upon a new plan
of operations. The Peninsula campaign had failed; a
junction of the corps of Banks, Fremont, and McDowell
had taken place, and Major-General Pope placed in com
mand. While Pope protected Washington and made
demonstrations toward Gordonsville, the Army of the
Potomac was to be withdrawn from Harrison's Landing
and to join him. The Confederates soon learned what
was contemplated, and by the i8th their united forces
were in Pope's front. An order to McClellan required
him to withdraw his army to the Potomac. There
was unaccountable delay. The Pennsylvania Reserves
took the advance on the nth of August, and by the
1 5th were en route to join Burnside. They were pushed
forward with the greatest promptness, and on the 25th
joined Pope's forces at Warrenton Junction, to resume
their old position as a division of McDowell's corps.
With Kearney's division they were the only organized
troops that joined Pope until the 26th of August,
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 437
Pope was now on the Rapidan, but the concentration
and force of the enemy on the south bank, the failure to
receive reinforcements again and again demanded, both
flanks exposed, and his communications with Fredericks-
burg threatened by which his relief was to arrive, com
pelled him to fall back to the Rappahannock. Lee fol
lowed with his army, and extended his line far beyond
Pope's right. There was now constant fighting and skir
mishing, and Pope's position again became untenable.
The enemy was crossing to his left, when the river rose
in floods and became an impassable barrier. Reynolds
had now joined Pope, who fell back to Warrenton Junc
tion and Manassas. Pope believed that he had thrown
his force between Jackson and Longstreet, and he deter
mined at once to force the fighting on the 28th and to
attack Jackson. Reynolds, without waiting for formal
orders from his chief, formed on Sigel's left, and on the
inarch to Manassas came under the enemy's fire, which
he repulsed with his artillery.
The Reserves, in connection with McDowell's other
divisions and with Sigel, had succeeded in getting be
tween Jackson and Thoroughfare Gap, and on the 2Qth
Reynolds with his division was at once engaged with the
enemy all day. On the morning of the 3oth, Reynolds
posted his division with all of his artillery on the left.
Pushing forward his skirmishers and their support, he
found a large force of the enemy ready for attack. He
was ordered to resist this attack, and other troops were
to support him. Porter's corps had been repulsed, and
the Reserves were to form a line behind which it could
rally. Heintzelman's corps was in retreat amid much
confusion, leaving but one brigade of the Reserves under
Anderson, with its batteries, to resist the attack. Here
the command suffered great loss. Kern lost four of his
guns; he himself was wounded and left on the field.
LINCOLN AND, MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
Colonel Hardin of the Twelfth was severely wounded.
The command now fell back by order to the right of the
Henry House, where Meade's and Seymour's brigades,
with Ransom's batteries, ''gallantly maintained their
position." It was in this battle, when our left was forced
back and the troops on the right of the Reserves had
given way, that the brave Reynolds, seizing the flagstaff
of the Second regiment, dashed along his line, cheering
on his men with magnetic effect. The bridge over Bull
Run was saved to the army.
Thus ended another battle most creditable to the
Reserves, wholly sustaining their reputation. Well
might the army commander say in his official report:
' ' The Pennsylvania Reserves under Reynolds . . .
rendered most gallant and efficient service." In this
campaign they lost 4 officers and 64 privates killed,
31 officers and 364 privates wounded, which makes an
aggregate loss of 463 men.
The army had hardly become reunited in the defences
of Washington when the Confederates crossed the Poto
mac in force and marched toward Maryland. The Army
of the Potomac at once took the field. The Pennsylvania
Reserves were now a division in the First army corps,
commanded by Hooker. Meantime the Governor of
Pennsylvania had called out 75,000 of the militia, and
Reynolds had been relieved of his command of the Re
serves and ordered to Harrisburg to assist the Governor.
General Meade now took command of the division, and
on the 1 3th of September they crossed the Monocacy.
The enemy, pushing northward, had taken position on
South Mountain. McClellan at once made his disposi
tions to attack him, and if possible to throw Franklin
with the Sixth corps and Couch's division between
the main body of the enemy and Jackson at Harper's
Ferry. Franklin forced the enemy to take position on
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 439
the top of South. Mountain, where he strongly posted
himself at Turner's Gap. Burnside reported the fact
to McClellan, when the whole army was ordered to
move to the attack.
At one o'clock the Reserves were in position on our
right, with orders to create a diversion in favor of Reno,
who was pressed on our left by the enemy. They were
to advance and turn the enemy's flank. Seymour's bri
gade, under Meade's order, took the crest of the first
ridge, and, forming line of battle with the other bri
gades, advanced upon the enemy, the Bucktails leading.
The enemy was engaged, and after determined fighting
was driven from the walls and rocks and thick under
growth. Reinforcements came up, but too late to open
fire, when the enemy, who was not in large force, retired
amid the loud shouts of our men.
The Reserves lost in this battle an aggregate of 392
officers and men. In his official report Meade states his
indebtedness to the Bucktails, which he says "have al
ways been in the advance," for ascertaining the exact
position of the enemy. The battle was not renewed in
the morning. During the night the enemy had fallen
back across the Antietam Creek to Sharpsburg. Push
ing through Boonesboro' and Keedysville, the enemy
was found in force on the Antietam in front of Sharps-
burg, and an attack in the morning was determined
upon. The enemy had meantime changed his position
to one of more strength, and had strongly posted his
artillery.
Hooker with his corps, including the Pennsylvania Re
serves, was to cross the Antietam and was to attack the
enemy's left; Meade with the Reserves led the advance
and opened the battle. The Bucktails soon found the
enemy, and Meade at once ordered in Seymour with his
brigade and posted his batteries. The engagement be-
440 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
came general, when the remaining brigades were ordered
up, and the fight continued until dark, with active artil
lery firing from Cooper's and Simpson's batteries. The
opposing forces were almost hand to hand.
At daylight on the ijth the battle was renewed. Fresh
troops had come up and the line was strengthened. The
Reserves were at once engaged on the left. Cooper and
Simpson, on the enemy's left flank, served their batteries
actively. Warner with the Tenth Reserves was ordered
to join Crawford's division of Mansfield's corps in his
attack upon the enemy in the morning. The now noted
cornfield was carried, then lost, again reoccupied with
cheers, when their ammunition became exhausted, and
the enemy, reinforced, pressed them again back and
came on in heavy force; again the enemy was driven
back, and not an inch of ground was lost.
The struggle was for the possession of the cornfield.
Hooker with part of Mansfield's corps determined to take
it. While in the act of initiating the movement he was
wounded in the foot, and Meade took command of the
corps, while Seymour assumed command of the Reserves.
The Reserves were relieved at noon, after having been
engaged for five hours and having exhausted their am
munition. Mansfield had now come up with all of his
corps.
In his official report Meade gives to Ransom's battery
the credit of repulsing the enemy in the cornfield at one
of the most critical periods. He highly commends Sey
mour for his admirable service. In this battle the Re
serves lost 573 men 9 officers and 96 men killed; 22
officers and 444 men wounded; and 2 missing.
Constant fighting and marching had now reduced the
strength of the division to little more than a third of
its effective strength. It was desired by Governor Curtin
that it should be sent back to the State to be reorgan-
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 44 l
ized and recruited. This was not acceded to, and the
work went on in the field;, other regiments were added
to the Second brigade. Colonel Biddle Roberts, who
had done excellent service in every capacity, now re
signed to assist Governor Curtin, and was placed on his
staff. Reynolds upon his return was given the First
army corps, while Meade went back to his division.
The army now rested at Sharpsburg and Harper's
Ferry. But the President and authorities became anx
ious, and after repeated orders to move, the President, on
the 6th of October, directed that McClellan should " cross
the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him
southward " a very positive military order, but in which
the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief concurred.
At last, on the 26th of October, the army moved. The
Reserves under Meade inarched with their corps to War-
renton, arriving on the 6th of November. Meantime,
McClellan was relieved from his command by Burnside
unwillingly, and later resigned his position in the army.
Seymour had been relieved and sent South. The army
was now formed into three grand divisions, and the Re
serves were attached to the left grand division, under
Franklin.
In accordance with a plan of campaign of the new
general, the army was to march to Fredericksburg by a
forced movement, having made a feint toward Gordons-
ville. This was ordered, and on the i6th of November
the movement commenced. By another blunder the
pontoon bridges were not forwarded, and valuable time
was lost while others were constructing, and the enemy
had strongly occupied Fredericksburg. Finally, the
river was crossed and the Reserves were placed on the
extreme left of the army, and Meade was designated to
lead the charge that was to break through the enemy's
line. No description of their heroic service can be better
44 2 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
than the testimony of General Meade himself: "The
attack was for a time perfectly successful. The enemy
was driven from the railroad, his rifle-pits, and breast
works for over half a mile. Over three hundred pris
oners were taken and several standards, when the ad
vancing line encountered the heavy reinforcements of
the enemy, who, recovering from the effects of our as
sault, and perceiving both our flanks unprotected, poured
in such a destructive fire from all three directions as to
compel the line to fall back, which was executed without
confusion;" and he subsequently says that "the best
troops would be justified in withdrawing without loss of
honor." The list of his losses, which he subsequently
corrected, was not less than 14 officers and 161 men
killed; 59 officers and 1182 men wounded; 12 officers
and 425 men captured or missing.
It was the old story again of hesitancy and slowness
of movement upon the part of the supporting forces at a
critical time. No support, all in confusion from their
attack, the enemy all around them, their work accom
plished, their ammunition gone, broken, destroyed al
most, they were driven from the hills to the low grounds,
where they re-formed, and had left 176 killed, 1197
wounded, and 400 missing. Jackson of the Third bri
gade was killed while in command of his men : a most
excellent and gallant officer was thus lost to the division.
No proper account of the battle can fail to mention the
service of Captain O'Rourke of the First regiment, who
had command of the ambulance corps, and a voluntary
testimonial to his coolness, energy, and efficiency was
tendered to him by the division and brigade surgeons.
On Monday the army recrossed the river, having lost ten
thousand men. Hooker relieved Burnside. The Reserves
were now encamped at Belle Plaine. Meade had mean
time been promoted to a major-gen eralcy, and was as-
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 443
signed to the command of the Fifth corps, while Colonel
Sickel, and subsequently General Doubleday, took tem
porary command of the division.
The effort to withdraw the Reserves from the army to
recruit them was again made, and was again unsuccessful.
Hooker reorganized the army and prepared for a forward
movement. But before this, on the 8th of February, the
Reserves under the command of Sickel were ordered to
Washington and assigned to stations in the defenses
under the command of Heintzelman, and were thus
absent from Chancellorsville. They were placed on duty
to guard the railroads, and the troops they relieved took
their place as the Third division of the First corps of the
Army of the Potomac. Finally, they were withdrawn
from the railroad and assigned to duty at Upton Hill,
Fairfax Courthouse, and Alexandria. Strong recom
mendations for their withdrawal to rest and recruit were
again made to the authorities. Meade, just before his
relief from their command, had made a strong represen
tation to Franklin, and Colonel Sickel had made a sim
ilar statement to Governor Curtin; but the Secretary of
War did not see his way to consent, as similar applica
tions had been made by other States, and all could not
be granted. Everything was now done to recall the ab
sentees, those who had recovered from wounds and sick
ness, and to recruit and refit the command. Brigadier-
General S. W. Crawford, an officer of the regular army
and a Pennsylvanian by birth, who had served at Fort
Sumter, who had commanded a brigade and division
after Cedar Mountain, and who had been severely
wounded at Antietam, although not yet wholly recov
ered from his wounds, was in Washington, and upon the
request of Governor Curtin, Senator Cameron, and my
self was placed in command of the division on the 3d of
June, and made his headquarters at Upton Hill, with the
444 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
First brigade under McCandless. Here the division
rested through the month of June, preparing for further
service.
Meantime, elated with his success at Chancellorsville,
the enemy under his ablest general had crossed the
Rapidan and was moving northward. As soon as the
movement was known Hooker promptly crossed the Po
tomac at Edwards' Ferry and the Point of Rocks on the
24th of June, and moved upon Frederick City, where he
got his army together. As soon as it was known among
the Reserves that the enemy was moving in the direction
of their State some of the regiments at once asked for
orders to accompany the Army of the Potomac into
Maryland. Crawford earnestly and repeatedly urged,
both by letter and in person, upon the government and
upon the Governor of the State the necessity that the
Reserves should be ordered to join the army. On the
2oth of June he went at night to Hooker's headquarters,
a considerable distance off, and in person induced him to
ask for the division. This was successful, and at once,
upon the receipt of the order, Crawford moved his com
mand on the 25th of June toward L,eesburg, crossing the
Potomac at Kdwards' Ferry to the Monocacy, leaving his
camp and garrison equipment and his trains to follow
him.
Karly on the 28th the division reached Fredericksburg.
Meantime, Hooker had been relieved and Meade assigned
to the command of the army. This caused the greatest
joy and satisfaction to the Reserves, who loved the gen
eral who had shared all of their dangers and successes
with them. At Fredericksburg, Crawford reported at
first to General Meade, who expressed his gratification
at the return of his old division, which again became the
Third division of the Fifth corps, under General Sykes.
The division joined the corps on Rock Creek in the rear
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 445
of our right, after a severe night-march to Hanover and
Bonnoughtowu, and prepared at once for the coming
struggle. As it crossed the boundary-line of Maryland
at Silver Springs its commander addressed it in a few
stirring words of congratulation and encouragement.
At three o'clock the corps moved to take its positions
on our left. The Reserves arrived upon the field so
promptly as to elicit the commendation of the corps
commander.
After some contradictory orders, made necessary by the
enemy's movements, the Reserves were drawn up in line
of battle on the slopes and near the crest of the Little
Round Top, on the edge of the woods and undergrowth.
Fisher's brigade had been sent to Big Round Top to sup
port Vincent, when Crawford retained the Eleventh regi
ment under Jackson, attached it to McCandless's brigade,
and took personal command. Seeing the advance of the
enemy over the wheatfield and his approach to the Round
Top, the retreat and confusion of our troops, and the fall
ing back of the Second division of Ayres's regulars,
Crawford, who had been left to act in accordance with
his own judgment, rode forward and ordered the com
mand to advance. The line moved at once, after open
ing fire; the Bucktails and the Sixth regiment, being in
the rear of each flank, were subsequently deployed, and
the line moved forward. Seizing the colors of the First
regiment, near which he was, Crawford took them upon
his horse and led on his men. The enemy was ad
vancing irregularly, and had crossed the stone wall on
the side of the wheatfield, when he was met by the
Reserves and driven back to the stone wall, for the pos
session of which there was a short and active struggle,
when he was driven across the wheatfield and made
no further attempt at any advance.
On the left, Colonel Taylor of the Bucktails was killed
44-6 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
while leading his regiment. The line of the stone wall
was firmly held by the Reserves until the afternoon of
the next day, after Pickett's charge, when Crawford, in
carrying out the direct orders of General Meade, who
with other general officers was present, directed an ad
vance. During the night the enemy had established
himself in the woods opposite the Round Tops. Ander
son's brigade of Hood's division lay in line, his left flank
resting on the wheatfield, while Benning's brigade was
in the rear in support. The presence of these troops was
unknown to Meade or to Sykes. Crawford in person di
rected McCandless's movements. The command moved
steadily, but in a wrong direction, when orders were sent
to McCandless to halt, change front, and move toward
the Round Top. When he entered the woods, striking
the flanks of Anderson's brigade, which was behind tem
porary breastworks, that brigade gave way, involving
Benning's brigade in its flight, and retiring to a dis
tance of a mile, where it strongly entrenched itself
along the general line of the army.
It was the last of the fighting upon the field of Gettys
burg, and done by Pennsylvania troops, as the battle had
been opened by the Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania regiment
on the right. Had the force of the enemy been known,
it were foolhardy to send such a force unsupported under
such circumstances. Meade himself declared that there
was no force in the woods but sharpshooters and stragglers
only. The result was the capture of over two hundred
prisoners, the battle-flag of the Fifteenth Georgia regi
ment, and the retaking of a great portion of the ground
lost the previous day by our troops, and the recovery of
one gun, two caissons, and over seven thousand stand of
arms. Our picket-line was largely advanced.
And thus ended the battle of Gettysburg, the Pennsyl
vania Reserves adding largely to their well-earned repu-
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 447
tation upon the soil of their own State. Their losses
were between two hundred and three hundred men. The
enemy maintained his front until Sunday night, when he
fell back to the Potomac and strongly entrenched at Fall
ing Waters in Virginia. The army followed, and on
the i4th a reconnaissance was made by three selected
divisions of the Second, Fifth, and Sixth corps, under
Caldwell, Crawford with his Reserves, and Wright. The
enemy had retreated. The Reserves alone followed to
the river with the cavalry. The army soon after re-
crossed the Potomac and advanced into Virginia, ma
noeuvring and skirmishing for position, while detach
ments were sent to various points of importance.
While on the Rappahannock, on the 28th of August,
advantage was taken of a moment of inaction to present
to General Meade, upon the part of the officers and men
of the division, a costly sword of the finest workmanship,
with sash and belt and a pair of golden spurs. A large
number of distinguished people had been assembled.
General Crawford in a few appropriate and stirring
words made the presentation. General Meade replied,
referring touchingly to his association with the division,
justifying its action at New Market road, and regard
ing its service generally said ' ' that no division in this
glorious army is entitled to claim more credit for its uni
form gallant conduct and for the amount of hard fighting
it has gone through than the division of the Pennsylva
nia Reserve Corps."
Finally, the enemy determined upon a forward move
ment, apparently to seize the line of the Rapidan. He
occupied Culpepper and its vicinity in great force. It
was the middle of October when Meade concluded that
the enemy's intention was to seize the heights of Centre-
ville. By a rapid movement Meade succeeded in seizing
the strong position at Bull Run, where on the I4th the
44-3 LINCOLN AND ' MEN OF WAR- TIMES.
Fifth corps under Warren came up with the Confederates
under Heth at Bristoe Station and engaged the enemy,
when the Pennsylvania Reserves fell upon the left flank
of the enemy and completely routed him, capturing
some pieces of artillery and a large number of prisoners.
Lee then fell back to the Rapidan, extending to Harr
iett's Mills on Mine Run. Meade then commenced his
movement to attack Lee's scattered forces. This Lee
anticipated, and concentrated on Mine Run, which he
strongly fortified. Meade determined to attack, and sent
Warren with a strong force to feel the enemy's line and
flanks. Warren had 24,000 men under his command.
All was in readiness, and on the 3Oth the batteries opened
upon the whole line. But Warren, finding the enemy
more strongly posted than he had anticipated, took the
responsibility of suspending his movements until further
orders. The attack was not made, and Meade again fell
back across the Rapidan.
In these operations the Reserves had been sent in sup
port of Gregg's cavalry, and were ordered to attack the
position which had proved too strong for our cavalry.
The Sixth regiment, under Knt, rapidly advanced, driv
ing in the skirmishers, when the enemy retired a work
that elicited the approval of Sykes, not at all partial to
the division. On the 3d they had moved to the right
into the woods with the large body of infantry under
Sedgwick, anticipating the storming of the enemy's
works. It was intensely cold, and many perished then
and from the subsequent effects. Finally, they fell back
with the army to Bristoe Station and Manassas, where
they guarded the Orange and Alexandria Railroad until
the end of April, 1864.
Grant, who had on the 2 ad of March been appointed
General-in-Chief of all the armies, made his headquar
ters with the Army of the Potomac. The army was
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 449
again to move, and the Reserves now entered upon their
last campaign. Sykes had been relieved and Warren
placed in permanent command of the Fifth corps. On
the 3d of May the army crossed the Rapidan, the Re
serves crossing at Germania Ford, and they moved out
to the old Wilderness Tavern on the 4th. On this day
the Ninth regiment was relieved, as it had completed its
term of service, and it was ordered home. Warren moved
out toward Parker's Store, with Hancock on his left and
Sedgwick on his right. The enemy moved promptly,
and lyongstreet was ordered to attack at the Wilderness
Tavern, and fell heavily on Warren's corps. Griffith
successfully resisted the attack, and was supported by
some of Crawford's division of the Reserves, and also by
the divisions of Wadsworth and Robinson.
The Reserve division had been ordered to Parker's
Store on the plank road. Upon advancing the enemy
was found in force. It was when the regiments under
McCandless were supporting Wadsworth that a gap had
been opened between the Reserves and the other divis
ions: the enemy pushed into this gap and nearly sur
rounded the Reserves, which were extricated with dif
ficulty, McCandless coming in with only two of his
regiments and losing many of his men. Colonel Bol-
linger with the Seventh regiment, pressing too far to the
front, was surrounded by the enemy; he was wounded
and captured with a large portion of his regiment. The
battle raged with varying success. Warren advanced his
division in the centre, with the Reserves on his right,
with some losses. The attack upon the right of the
Sixth corps had driven Shaler's and Seymour's brigades,
and, the enemy getting into the rear, Sedgwick was cut
off. At this juncture the Reserves were ordered to the
support of Sedgwick. The country was most difficult
of passage, but the men pushed on and found Sedgwick,
29
45 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR- TIMES.
who had meantime restored his line, when the Reserves
returned to their former position at Lacy Farm. The
army again was in motion to the left, the fight of Gregg
and Curtis at Todd's Tavern having opened the way
to Spottsylvania. Warren's corps, with the Reserves in
front, marched all night. The great effort now making
was to secure the heights of Spottsylvania, which were
gained by the enemy.
Meantime all of the divisions of the Fifth corps had
come up, and the enemy had concentrated his forces to
attack them. The Reserves and Coulter with Wads-
worth's division were ordered to attack, which resulted
in driving the enemy upon his second line of entrench
ments. McCandless, commanding the First brigade, was
wounded and left the field. After a short respite the
Reserves were again ordered to form in two lines under
Tally, and a determined assault on the enemy's lines was
again made three times, but without success. Again and
again the assault was renewed at different portions of the
line and with varied success day after day. The enemy
had been driven from the Wilderness, his right flank
turned, and Spottsylvania relinquished. Meade on the
1 3th issued a complimentary order to his army, and an
nounced the enemy's loss to be 18 guns, 22 stands of
colors, and 8000 prisoners.
Again a movement to the left was made, and again the
enemy was encountered, and assaults, again and again
repeated, were made, fighting along the whole line often
for days at a time. The enemy, losing a position, would
make desperate efforts to retake it ; and ' ' so terrific, ' ' says
a writer, "was the death-grapple that at different times
of the day the rebel colors were planted on one side of the
works and ours on the other." On the I4th the Fifth
corps changed its position, and the Reserves became
again the extreme right of the army. Again marched
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 45 r
to the left, they were constantly engaged, until the rains
and impassable roads gave the army a temporary respite.
On Thursday, May igth, an attempt was made to turn
our left. Tyler's heavy artillery regiments were the only
troops at the point threatened. They were new and had
just arrived from Washington, but they behaved gal
lantly and repulsed the enemy, when Crawford with his
Reserves was sent to their support and to take com
mand. They moved at once, but the enemy had rapidly
retreated. Spottsylvania was now to be abandoned, and
once more a flank movement to the left decided upon.
On the 22d the Fifth corps marched toward Bowling
Green, Crawford's division in advance. On Monday, the
23d, the Fifth corps removed to the North Anna. The
enemy had fortified his position on both flanks. Griffin's
division had crossed, and the Reserves were formed on
his left. The enemy assaulted the lines, but were re
pulsed. Warren had taken a strong position. On Tues
day the Reserves were ordered to advance to support
Hancock. Early on Tuesday, General Warren had or
dered Crawford to send a small detachment along the
river-bank to open communication with Hancock's
troops. This detachment was finally supported by an
other regiment under Colonel Stewart. It was a hazard
ous movement. Crawford had asked to move with his
division. The enemy was in force, and had wellnigh
cut off the regiment sent in advance, when Warren, see
ing that his orders had isolated the regiment, directed
Crawford to move to its position. Crittenden's division
of Hancock's corps had not crossed, and seemed to have
gone astray, when Crawford and his Reserves opened
communications, and Crittenden crossed, followed shortly
by the rest of his corps, to a firm position on the south
bank.
Finding the enemy's position too strong for attack,
45 2 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR- TIMES.
Grant on Thursday recrossed the North Anna. The
Reserves moved with their corps in advance, crossed the
Pamunkey at Hanover, advanced on the Mechanicsville
road, and entrenched. By night the whole army had
concentrated, when the enemy took up a new line to
oppose the advance. On the 3oth of May the Fifth
corps crossed the Tolopotamy. The Reserves moved
forward on the Mechanicsville road to connect with
Griffin, who, finding himself a mile north of the ene
my's outposts, determined to seize the road by a vigorous
movement, and advanced upon Mechanicsville. The
Bucktails in their advance drove back the enemy's cav
alry to Bethesda Church. Hardin's brigade was ad
vanced, but exposed his flank, when Crawford ordered
Kitchen's brigade of heavy artillery to support him.
Together these brigades drove back the enemy's right
wing and centre. Fisher with the Third brigade was
now ordered up to defend the right, and the whole divis
ion was posted on strong and irregular ground and light
defenses were thrown up hastily. Two pieces of Rich
ardson's batteries were placed in position on Hardin's
left and two .on his right.
Crawford had hardly made his dispositions when the
enemy opened with his artillery, and soon after his in
fantry advanced, and the whole line engaged. In this
attack on the Fifth corps Crawford with the Reserves
was on the left. On came the enemy with his assaulting
column, opening with artillery and infantry fire. Three
times the attack was renewed, and as often repulsed.
The men, now veterans, reserved their fire until the
enemy's lines were close to them, and thus secured the
result. The enemy was driven back with loss. The
Reserves then advanced, captured seventy prisoners, and
compelled the retreat of the enemy in confusion; a col
onel, five commissioned officers, and three hundred pri-
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 453
vates were left upon the field. The Richmond papers,
in commenting upon this affair, pronounced it "sad and
distressing. "
This brilliant success of the Pennsylvania Reserves
marked the close of their service. They had fought a
successful battle when within a few hours they were to
be free. All around them were souvenirs of their early
and devoted service, Beaver Dam Creek and Mechanics-
ville, and now the whole was crowned by a brilliant suc
cess due alone to them and to their officers. On the
3ist of May the Reserves were relieved from all further
service with the army. Taking farewell of Warren, they
crossed the Tolopotamy, and soon after, on June ist, de
parted with the remnant of that brave and devoted body
of men who had been the first to offer themselves to the
government. But even now they were not all to return.
Nearly two thousand men re-enlisted to follow the for
tunes of the army. About twelve hundred officers and
men were all that returned to the State. The two thou
sand that were veteranized were organized into two regi
ments, the One-Hundred-and-Ninetieth and One-Hun-
dred-and-Ninety-first, by General Crawford at Peebles
Farm, and remained in service till the end of the war.
Before their march their general issued the following
farewell to the faithful men who had so nobly borne
themselves under his command:
Soldiers of the Pennsylvania Reserves: To-day the connection
which has so long existed between us is to be severed for ever.
I have no power to express to you the feelings of gratitude and
affection that I bear to you, nor the deep regret with which I now
part from you.
As a division you have ever been faithful and devoted soldiers,
and you have nobly sustained me in the many trying scenes
through which we have passed with an unwavering fidelity.
The record of your service terminates gloriously, and "the Wil
derness," " Spottsylvania Courthouse," and " Bethesda Church"
454 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
have been added to the long list of battles and of triumphs that
have marked your career.
Go home to the great State that sent you forth three years ago
to battle for her honor and to strike for her in the great cause of
the country; take back your soiled and war-worn banners, your
thin and shattered ranks, and let them tell how you have per
formed your trust. Take back those banners, sacred from the
glorious associations that surround them, sacred with the mem
ories of our fallen comrades who gave their lives to defend them,
and give them again into the keeping of the State for ever.
The duties of the hour prevent me from accompanying you,
but my heart will follow you long after you return, and it shall
ever be my pride that I was once your commander, and that side
by side we fought and suffered through campaigns which will
stand unexampled in history. Farewell!
Upon their return to the capital of their State they
were received by the civil and military authorities and
the people with a welcome and a demonstration wholly
unprecedented. Nothing was omitted to show them the
loving appreciation in which they were held, how warmly
their services had been appreciated, and of the affection
in which they must ever be cherished, and the State
pride that was to continue to follow them ; and all this
was renewed at their homes. After a short rest many
of the officers and men returned to the army in various
regiments and batteries, and remained until the end of
the war.
The Second brigade had been divided at Alexandria,
and two of the regiments had been ordered to West Vir
ginia, where they served creditably in all the relations
they were called upon to fulfill under General Crook.
Their term of service having expired in June, they were
in turn transferred to their State to be mustered out of
service. An effort was made to preserve the organiza
tion, but failed, as the authorities at Washington could
only act for all regiments and organizations. Before
separating at Harrisburg the Reserves sent for their old
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 455
commander, McCall, and abundantly testified to him
their enduring confidence and affection.
And thus passed into history the record of one of the
most extraordinary bodies of men that had ever assem
bled for any single purpose. I have from time to time
alluded to the peculiar conditions, the peculiar associa
tions and characteristics, and their constant and heroic
source. It is not now intended to enlarge upon this. To
no other body of troops was'it given to secure so entirely
distinct a reputation that will go into history. Whatever
credit may arise to them as a simple division, they will
be known as the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, as under
that appellation they achieved their fame. To this title
they ever adhered with a tenacity that assured it. Give
them that, and you might add the name of any body to
the division, and, although in accordance with orders,
they were called by the name of the general command
ing them, they ever retained among themselves their
favorite title of Pennsylvania Reserves.
And what a peculiar soldiery they became! For all
purposes of drills and discipline and in preparation for
battle they ever gave the readiest acquiescence and obe
dience; but to all the special detail that went to make
up the technical soldier they never would and never did
yield until the last. They believed that they were ever
citizens in arms for the nation's life, and they never lost
sight of their coming return to their homes and the pur
suits of peace. As to their service, it makes but little
difference as to the necessity of their employment: the
fact remains that they were constantly called upon for
every variety of service, thrown into critical positions
without hesitancy, and their services but poorly acknow
ledged. There was no murmur or complaint; they ac
cepted every detail of the service required of them from
Dranesville to Bethesda Church, and how they performed
456 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
it let the official reports of their commanders and the sad
lists of their losses attest.
It is not pretended that in this imperfect sketch any
thing like justice has been done to the living or the dead.
Most is merely reference; honored names that will be re
membered in history have not been mentioned, and many
instances of personal valor unrecorded. If, however, the
memory of their deeds has been recalled at all, and has
again awakened a feeling of* appreciation and gratitude
upon the part of their fellows, 'with praise for those who
yet survive and an affectionate memory for the self-sacri
ficing dead, then my object will not have been wholly
lost in recalling the memory 7 of their conspicuous service
to the minds of a new generation.
APPENDIX.
THE NICOLAY-McCLURE CONTROVERSY.
LINCOLN AND HAMLIN.
[From The Philadelphia Times, July 6, 1891.]
THE death of Hannibal Hamlin, one of the few lingering pict
uresque characters of the political revolution that conquered
armed rebellion and effaced slavery, has inspired very free dis
cussion of the early conflicts of Republicanism and of the rela
tions which existed between Lincoln and Hamlin. Hamlin was
one of the central figures of the first national Republican battle
in 1856; he was the first elected Republican Vice-President; his
personal relations with President Lincoln were admittedly of the
most agreeable nature; his public record while Vice-President
had given no offense to any element of his party; and his then
unexpected and now apparently unexplainable defeat for renomi-
nation with Lincoln in 1864 has elicited much conflicting dis
cussion.
Looking back over the dark days of civil war, with their often
sudden and imperious necessities in field and forum, and in po
litical directions as well, it is often difficult to explain results in
accord with the sunnier light of the present; and as yet we have
seen no explanation of the rejection of Vice-President Hamlin
in 1864 that presents the truth. Most of our contemporaries
which have discussed the question have assumed that the defeat
of Hamlin was accomplished against the wishes of Lincoln. This
point is taken up in the elaborate Life of Lincoln by Nicolay and
Hay, and they assume to settle it by stating that Mr. Lincoln
was accused by members of the Baltimore Convention of prefer
ring a Southern or a new man for Vice-President, and Mr. Nicolay
communicated with Lincoln on the subject and reported a denial
of Lincoln's purpose to interfere in the contest.
457
45 8 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
The Evening Telegraph of this city, usually accurate in the
presentation of political history, states that "it was not the
President's (Lincoln's) doings that his trusted and cherished
coadjutor was deposed; it was a piece of politics, pure and sim
ple; a mistaken attempt to placate Southern feeling before the
time was ripe for it." In the same article it is assumed that " if
Mr. Hamlin had been renominated President Lincoln would
have lived through his second term," and the motive for Lin
coln's assassination is ascribed to " the fact that a Southern man
was to succeed as a result of his (Booth's) murderous deed." The
theory that Lincoln was murdered to bring a Southern man to
the Presidency is clearly refuted by the well-known historical
fact that of all men North or South no one was at that time more
execrated in the South than Andrew Johnson.
It is true that Hamlin, an entirely unobjectionable Vice-Presi-
dent and a leader with peculiar claims upon the Republican
party, was rejected as Vice-President by the Republican Conven
tion of 1864 to place a Southern man in that office, and it is
equally true that it would not and could not have been done had
President Lincoln opposed it. So far from opposing it, Lincoln
discreetly favored it; indeed, earnestly desired it. The writer
hereof was a delegate at large from Pennsylvania in the Balti
more Convention of 1864, and in response to an invitation from
the President to visit Washington on the eve of the meeting of
the body, a conference was had in which Lincoln gravely urged
the nomination of Johnson for Vice-President. It was solely in
deference to Lincoln's earnest convictions as to the national and
international necessities which demanded Johnson's nomination
for the Vice-Presidency that the writer's vote was cast against
Hamlin, and other Pennsylvania delegates were influenced to the
same action by the confidential assurance of Lincoln's wishes.
It should not be assumed that Lincoln was ambitious to play
the role of political master or that he was perfidious to any. His
position was not only one of the greatest delicacy in politics, but
he was loaded with responsibilities to which all former Presidents
had been strangers. His one supreme desire was the restoration
of the Union, and he would gladly have surrendered his ow r n
high honors, and even his life, could he thereby have restored
the dissevered States. The one great shadow that hung over
him and his power was the sectional character of the ruling
party and the government. It weakened his arm to make peace ;
it strengthened European hostility to the cause of the Union;
APPENDIX. 459
and it left the South without even a silver lining to the dark
cloud of subjugation. Lincoln firmly believed that the nomi
nation of Johnson, an old Democratic Southern Senator who had
been aggressively loyal to the Union, and who was then the Mili
tary Governor of his rebellious but restored State, would not only
desectionalize the party and the government, but that it would
chill and curb the anti-Union sentiment of Kngland and France,
and inspire the friends of the Union in those countries to see a
leading Southern statesman coming from a conquered insurgent
State to the second office of the Republic.
Such were Lincoln's sincere convictions, and such his earnest
arguments in favor of the nomination of Johnson in 1864, and
but for Lincoln's convictions on the subject Hamlin would have
been renominated and succeeded to the Presidency instead of
Johnson. It is easy, in the clear light of the present, to say that
the nomination of Johnson was a grave misfortune, and to specu
late on the countless evils which could have been averted; but
the one man who was most devoted to the endangered nation,
and who could best judge of the sober necessities of the time,
believed that it was not only wise, but an imperious need, to
take a Vice-President from the South, and that is why Hannibal
Hamlin was not renominated in 1864.
MR. NICOLAY'S DENIAL.
[Telegram given to Associated Press.]
WASHINGTON, July 7, 1891.
MRS. HANNIBAL HAMLIN, Bangor, Me. :
The editorial statement from The Philadelphia Times, printed
in this morning's news dispatches, to the effect that President
Lincoln opposed Mr. Hamlin's renomination as Vice-President,
is entirely erroneous. Mr. Lincoln's personal feelings, on the
contrary, were for Mr. Hamlin's renomination, as he confiden
tially expressed to me, but he persistently withheld any opinion
calculated to influence the convention for or against any candi
date, and I have his written words to that effect, as fully set forth
on pages 72 and 73, chapter 3, volume ix. of Abraham Lincoln:
A History, by Nicolay and Hay.
Permit me, in addition, to express my deepest sympathy in
yours and the nation's loss through Mr. Hamlin's death.
JOHN G. NICOLAY.
4^o LINCOLN- AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
THE EXTRACT NICOLAY REFERRED TO.
[From Nicolay and Hay's Life of Lincoln, vol. ix., pages 72, 73.]
The principal names mentioned for the Vice-Presidency were,
besides Hannibal Hamlin, the actual incumbent, Andrew John
son of Tennessee and Daniel S. Dickinson of New York. Be
sides these General L,. H. Rousseau had the vote of his own
State, Kentucky. The Radicals of Missouri favored General B.
F. Butler, who had a few scattered votes also from New England.
But among the three principal candidates the voters were equally
enough divided to make the contest exceedingly spirited and
interesting.
For several days before the convention the President had been
besieged by inquiries as to his personal wishes in regard to his
associate on the ticket. He had persistently refused to give the
slightest intimation of such wish. His private secretary, Mr.
Nicolay, was at Baltimore in attendance at the convention, and
although he was acquainted with this attitude of the President,
at last, overborne by the solicitations of the chairman of the Illi
nois delegation, who had been perplexed at the advocacy of
Joseph Holt by Leonard Swett, one of the President's most in
timate friends, Mr. Nicolay wrote a letter to Mr. Hay, who had
been left in charge of the executive office in his absence, contain
ing, among other matters, this passage: " Cook wants to know
confidentially whether Swett is all right; whether in urging Holt
for Vice-President he reflects the President's wishes; whether the
President has any preference, either personal or on the score of
policy; or whether he wishes not even to interfere by a confiden
tial intimation. . . . Please get this information for me if pos
sible." The letter was shown to the President, who indorsed
upon it this memorandum: "Swett is unquestionably all right.
Mr. Holt is a good man, but I had not heard or thought of him
for V.-P. Wish not to interfere about V.-P. Cannot interfere
about platform. Convention must judge for itself."
This positive and final instruction was sent at once to Mr.
Nicolay, and by him communicated to the President's most inti
mate friends in the convention. It was, therefore, with minds
absolutely untrammeled by even any knowledge of the Presi
dent's wishes that the convention went about its work of select
ing his associate on the ticket.
APPENDIX. 46l
McCLURE ANSWERS NICOLAY.
[From The Philadelphia Times, July 9, 1891.]
The ignorance exhibited by John G. Nicolay in his public tele
gram to the widow of ex-Vice-President Hamlin is equaled only
by his arrogance in assuming to speak for Abraham Lincoln in
matters about which Nicolay was never consulted, and of which
he had no more knowledge than any other routine clerk about
the White House. I do not regret that Mr. Nicolay has rushed
into a dispute that must lead to the clear establishment of the
exact truth as to the defeat of Hamlin in 1864. It will surely
greatly impair, if not destroy, Nicolay 's hitherto generally ac
cepted claim to accuracy as the biographer of Lincoln, but he
can complain of none but himself.
I saw Abraham Lincoln at all hours of the day and night
during his Presidential service, and he has himself abundantly
testified to the trust that existed between us. Having had the
direction of his battle in the pivotal State of the Union, he
doubtless accorded me more credit than I merited, as the only
success in politics and war is success; and the fact that I never
sought or desired honors or profits from his administration, and
never embarrassed him with exactions of any kind, made our
relations the most grateful memories of my life.
In all of the many grave political emergencies arising from the
new and often appalling duties imposed by internecine war, I
was one of those called to the inner councils of Abraham Lin
coln. He distrusted his own judgment in politics, and was ever
careful to gather the best counsels from all the varied shades of
opinion and interest to guide him in his conclusions; and there
were not only scores of confidential conferences in the White
House of which John G. Nicolay never heard, but no man ever
met or heard of John G. Nicolay in such councils. He was a
good mechanical, routine clerk; he was utterly inefficient as the
secretary of the President; his removal was earnestly pressed
upon Lincoln on more than one occasion because of his want of
tact and fitness for his trust, and only the proverbial kindness of
Lincoln saved him from dismissal. He saw and knew President
Lincoln; the man Abraham Lincoln he never saw and never
knew; and his assumption that he was the trusted repository of
Lincoln's confidential convictions and efforts would have been
regarded as grotesque a quarter of a century ago, when Lincoln
and his close surroundings were well understood, His biography
462 LINCOLN ANT) MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
of Lincoln is invaluable as an accurate history of the public acts
of the Lincoln administration, but there is not a chapter or page
on the inner personal attributes of the man that is not burdened
with unpardonable errors. Nicolay was a plodding, precise, me
chanical clerk, well fitted to preserve historical data and present
them intelligently and correctly; but there his fitness as a biog
rapher ended.
I now repeat that, in obedience to a telegraphic request from
President Lincoln, I visited him at the White House the day
before the meeting of the Baltimore Convention of 1864. At that
interview Mr. Lincoln earnestly explained why the nomination
of a well-known Southern man like Andrew Johnson who had
been Congressman, Governor, and Senator by the favor of his
State would not only nationalize the Republican party and the
government, but would greatly lessen the grave peril of the recog
nition of the Confederacy by England and France. He believed
that the election to the Vice-Presidency of a representative states
man from an insurgent State that had been restored to the Union
would disarm the enemies of the Republic abroad and remove the
load of sectionalism from the government that seemed to greatly
hinder peace. No intimation, no trace, of prejudice against Mr.
Hamlin was exhibited, and I well knew that no such consider
ation could have influenced Mr. Lincoln in such an emergency.
Had he believed Mr. Hamlin to be the man who could best pro
mote the great work whose direction fell solely upon himself, he
would have favored Hamlin's nomination regardless of his per
sonal wishes ; but he believed that a great public achievement
would be attained by the election of Johnson; and I returned to
Baltimore to work and vote for Johnson, although against all my
personal predilections in the matter.
Mr. Nicolay's public telegram to Mrs. Hamlin, saying that the
foregoing statement "is entirely erroneous," is as insolent as it
is false, and the correctness of my statement is not even inferen-
tially contradicted by Nicolay's quotation from Lincoln. On the
contrary, Nicolay's statement given in his history (vol. ix. pages
72, 73) proves simply that Nicolay was dress-parading at Balti
more and knew nothing of the President's purposes. True, he
seems to assume that he had responsible charge of the Executive
duties, as he says that " Mr. Nicolay wrote a letter to Mr. Hay,
who had been left in charge of the Executive office," asking
whether Leonard Swett, "one of the President's most intimate
friends," was "all right" in urging the nomination of Judge-
APPENDIX. 463
Advocate-General Holt for Vice President. Had Nicolay ever
learned anything in the White House, he would have known
that of all living men Leonard Swett was the one most trusted
by Abraham Lincoln, and he should have known that when
Swett was opposing Hamlin, Lincoln was not yearning for Ham-
lin's renomination. Then comes Lincoln's answer to Nicolay's
bombastic query, saying: "Swett is unquestionably all right;"
and because Lincoln did not proclaim himself a fool by giving
Nicolay an opportunity to herald Lincoln's sacredly private con
victions as to the Vice-Presidency, he assumes that he has Lin
coln's "written words" to justify his contradiction of a circum
stantial statement and an executed purpose of which he could
have had no knowledge. When Leonard Swett was against
Hamlin, none could escape the conclusion that opposition to
Hamlin was no offense to Lincoln. I saw and conferred with
Swett almost every hour of the period of the convention. We
both labored to nominate Johnson, and Swett made Holt, who
was an impossible candidate, a mere foil to divide and conquer
the supporters of Hamlin. Had Lincoln desired Hamlin's nomi
nation, Swett would have desired and labored for it, and Hamlin
would have been renominated on the first ballot. The conven
tion was a Lincoln body pure and simple, and no man could have
been put on the ticket with Lincoln who was not known to be
his choice. It was not publicly proclaimed, but it was in the
air, and pretty much everybody but John G. Nicolay perceived
and bowed to it.
Of the few men who enjoyed Lincoln's complete confidence,
Charles A. Dana was conspicuous, and his statement is as cred
ible testimony as could now be given on the subject. He was
trusted by Lincoln in most delicate matters political and mili
tary, and he logically tells of Johnson's " selection by Lincoln "
for the Vice-Presidency in 1864. With Dana's direct corrobo-
ration of my statement added to the strongly corroborative facts
herein given, I may safely dismiss John G. Nicolay and the dis
pute his mingled ignorance and arrogance have thrust upon me.
A. K. M.
NICOLAY TO McCLURE.
To the Editor of The Philadelphia Times :
I will not reply to your personal abuse; it proves nothing but
464 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
your rage and wounded vanity at being exposed in a gross his
torical miSvStatement.
You asserted that President Lincoln opposed the renomination
of Hannibal Hamlin for Vice-President. I refuted that assertion
by calling attention to the written record wherein Lincoln in his
own handwriting explicitly states to the contrary. You now re
assert your statement, or, to put it in other words, you accuse
President Lincoln of acting a low political deceit and with his
own hand writing a deliberate lie. The country will not believe
the monstrous implication.
Allow me to restate the facts. I was at the Baltimore Conven
tion as a spectator. The chairman of the Illinois delegation,
Hon. B. C. Cook, had a conversation w r ith me about the course
of certain disaffected leaders in Illinois. That conversation I
reported to the President in a letter to Major Hay, my assistant
private secretary, in part as follows:
" What transpired at home and what he has heard from several
sources have made Cook suspicious that Swett may be untrue to
Lincoln. One of the straws which lead him to this belief is that
Swett has telegraphed here urging the Illinois delegation to go
for Holt. . . . Cook wants to know confidentially whether Swett
is all right; whether in urging Holt for Vice-President he reflects
the President's wishes; whether the President has any preference,
either personally or on the score of policy; or whether he wishes
not even to interfere by a confidential indication.".
Upon this letter President Lincoln made the following indorse
ment in his own handwriting :
"Swett is unquestionably all right. Mr. Holt is a good man,
but I had not heard or thought of him for V.-P. Wish not to
interfere about V.-P. Cannot interfere about platform conven
tion must judge for itself."
This written evidence is quoted in our history, and no amount
of denial or assertion to contrary can overturn it.
In trying to evade its force you assert that Lincoln called you
to Washington and urged the nomination of Johnson, and that
you returned to Baltimore to work and vote in obedience to that
request, against your personal predilections. Let us examine
this claim. The official proceedings of the convention show that
you were one of the four delegates at large from Pennsylvania,
the others being Simon Cameron, W. W. Ketchum, M. B. Lowry,
while the list of district delegates contains the names of many
Other eminent Pennsylvanians. The proceedings also show that
APPENDIX. 4 6 5
you acted an entirely minor part. You were a member of the
Committee on Organization and presented its report recommend
ing the permanent officers which were elected. With that pres
entation your service and influence ended, so far as can be gath
ered from the proceedings.
Of other Pennsylvania delegates, William W. Ketchum was
one of the vice-presidents of the convention. E. McPherson was
on the Committee on Credentials, A. H. Reeder on the Committee
on Organization, M. B. Lowry on the Committee on Resolutions,
S. F. Wilson on the Committee on Rules and Order of Business,
S. A. Purviance on the National Committee, while General Simon
Cameron held the leading and important post of chairman of the
Pennsylvania delegation. So again, among those who made
motions and speeches were Cameron, Thaddeus Stevens, A. H.
Reeder, C. A, Walborn, Galusha A. Grow, and M. B. Lowry, but
beyond the presentation of the routine report I have mentioned
your name did not give forth the squeak of the smallest mouse.
Is it probable that Lincoln among all these men would have
called you alone to receive his secret instructions?
It is a matter of public history that Simon Cameron was more
prominent and efficient than any other Pennsylvanian in the
movement in that State to give Lincoln a second term, and that
on the i4th of January, 1864, he transmitted to the President the
written request of every Union member of the Pennsylvania Leg
islature to accept a renomination. This and his subsequent open
and unvarying support left no doubt of Cameron's attitude. How
was it with you ? I find among Lincoln's papers the following
letter from you:
FRANKLIN REPOSITORY OFFICE,
CHAMBERSBURG, PA., May 2, 1864.
SIR: I have been amazed to see it intimated in one or two jour
nals that I am not cordially in favor of your renomination. I
vshall notice the intimations no further than to assure you that
you will have no more cordial, earnest, or faithful supporter in
the Baltimore Convention than your obedient servant,
A. K. McCijJRK.
To the President.
That is, only a month before the Baltimore Convention you
felt called upon to personally protest against accusations of party
disloyalty. But this is not all. When the time came to make
the nominations for Vice-President, Simon Cameron, chairman
30
466 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
of the Pennsylvania delegation and one of the earliest and most
persistent friends of Lincoln, himself nominated Hannibal Ham-
lin for Vice-President, while the whole vote of Pennsylvania was
on the first ballot cast for Hamlin's nomination. So also the
Illinois delegation cast its entire vote for Hamliu on the first
ballot. Does it stand to reason that Lincoln called upon you to
defeat Hamlin and nominate Johnson, and gave no intimation of
this desire to the chairmen of the Pennsylvania delegation and
of the Illinois delegation ?
And once more, is it probable that if Lincoln had desired the
nomination of Johnson he would have allowed Swett, "one of the
President's most intimate friends," to urge the nomination of
Holt ? Dare you venture the assertion that Lincoln was deceiv
ing Cameron, deceiving Cook, carrying on a secret intrigue
against Hamlin and another secret intrigue against Holt, and
that on top of the whole he was writing a deliberate lie to us ?
That may be your conception of Abraham Lincoln, but it is not
mine. That may be your system of politics, but it was not his.
JOHN G. NICOLAY.
McCLURE TO NICOLAY.
[From The Philadelphia Times, July 12, 1891.]
To JOHN G. NICOLAY:
The public will be greatly surprised that such an undignified
and quibbling letter as yours addressed to me could come from
one who claims to be the chosen biographer of Abraham Lincoln.
It must so generally offend the dispassionate opinion of decent
men that answer to it is excusable only to expose several se
verely-strained new falsehoods you present, either directly or by
the suppression of the vital parts of the truth.
Had you known anything about the inside political movements
in the White House in 1864, you would have known that my let
ter to Lincoln, quoted in your defense, was written because of a
suddenly-developed effort in this State to divide the lines drawn
by the then bitter Cameron and Curtin factional war for and
against Lincoln. The Cameron followers claimed to be the
special supporters of Lincoln, and attempted to drive Curtin and
the State administration into hostility to the President. My
justly-assumed devotion to Curtin was the pretext for declaring
me as either restrained in my support of Lincoln or likely to be
APPENDIX, 467
in the opposition. The moment I saw the statement in print I
wrote the letter you quote to dismiss from Lincoln's mind all
apprehensions about either. open or passive opposition from Cur-
tin's friends. Had you stated these facts you would have been
truthful. As you probably did not know of them, you may be
excused for not stating them; but your ignorance can be no ex
cuse for the entirely false construction you put upon my letter.
Equally indeed even more flagrantly false is your statement
of only a minor part of the truth about the action of the Penn
sylvania delegation at Baltimore in 1864. You say that General
Cameron cast the solid vote of the State for Hamlin. Had you
told the whole truth, ignorant as you seem to be of the force of
important political facts, you would have known that your as
sumption that Johnson had no votes in the delegation was untrue.
Had you desired to be truthful, you would have added that Gen
eral Cameron cast the solid vote of the delegation for Johnson
before the close of the first ballot. Were you ignorant of this
fact ? or have you deliberately attempted to so suppress the truth
as to proclaim a palpable falsehood ?
The Pennsylvania delegation was personally harmonious, al
though divided on Vice-President. In the Pennsylvania caucus
an informal vote put Johnson in the lead, with Hamlin second
and Dickinson third. Cameron knew that Hamlin's nomination
was utterly hopeless, and he accepted the result without special
grief. He urged a solid vote as a just compliment to Hamlin,
and it was given with the knowledge that it could not help Ham
lin and that a solid vote for Johnson would follow. The solid
vote for Johnson was the only vital vote cast for Vice-President,
and that record, accessible to every schoolboy, you studiously
suppress to excuse a falsehood.
I was a doubly-elected delegate to the Baltimore Convention,
having been first unanimously chosen as a district delegate with
out the formality of a conference, and when a district delegate I
was one of two delegates elected at large on the first ballot by
the State Convention. What I did or did not, or how important
or unimportant I was as a member of the convention, is an issue
that I have not raised or invited. I stated the simple fact that
Lincoln had sent for me, had urged me to support Johnson, and
that I had done so. Had Lincoln chosen to confide his wishes to
another than myself, I would not have imitated his secretary and
charged him with deceit and falsehood because he did not tell me
all his purposes. He did not trust you with what you probably
468 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
could not have understood had he told you, but that is no reason
why you should accuse him of deceit, intrigue, and "writing a
deliberate lie. ' ' He wrote you the exact truth in the only paper
you have as the basis of your inexcusable misconception of his
language. In it he says that " Swett is unquestionably all
right;" and the only thing he could have been right about in the
matter was in his active opposition to Hamlin's renomination.
Your history is quite right in quoting Lincoln, but he cannot be
justly held responsible for the want of common understanding
of one of his biographers more than a quarter of a century after
his death.
For answer to your undignified and unmanly efforts to belittle
my relations with Lincoln, I refer you to your more discreet co-
biographer, Mr. Hay. He refused to sustain your interpretation
of Lincoln's note on the Vice-Presidency. He added that the
dispute is a question of veracity between you and me, and he
speaks of me as "evidently armed with his enviable record of
close intimacy with our illustrious Lincoln." One of you is
lying on this point : is it Mr. Hay or is it you ?
Had you sought the truth as an honest biographer, you could
have obtained it without offensive disputation, not only from me
so far as I knew it, but from such living witnesses as Charles A.
Dana and Murat Halstead, and from the recorded testimony of
General Cameron, Colonel Forney, and others who know much
of Lincoln and but little of you. Instead of seeking the truth,
you flung your ignorance and egotism with ostentatious inde
cency upon the bereaved household of the yet untombed Hamlin,
and when brought to bay by those better informed than yourself,
you resent it in the tone and terms of the ward-heeler in a wharf-
rat district battling for constabulary honors. I think it safe to
say that the public judgment will be that it would have been
well for both Lincoln's memory and for the country had such a
biographer been drowned when a pup. Dismissed.
A. K. M.
NICOLAY TO McCLURE.
WASHINGTON, July n, 1891.
To COL. A. K. McCLURE, Editor Philadelphia Times:
I will not allow you to retreat in a cloud of vituperation from
full conviction of having made a misstatement of history. I
need only to sum up the points of evidence,
APPENDIX. 469
You allege that Mr. Lincoln called and instructed you to op
pose Hamlin and nominate Johnson.
1. This is proven to be a misstatement by Lincoln's written
words: " Wish not to interfere about V.-P.; cannot interfere about
platform convention must judge for itself."
It is not a question between your assertion and my assertion,
but between your assertion and Lincoln's written word.
It is proven to be a misstatement by the testimony of Hon.
B. C. Cook, chairman of the Illinois delegation, who says : " Mr.
Nicolay's statement that Mr. Lincoln was in favor of Hannibal
Hamlin is correct. The dispatch which is published this morn
ing was sent to me in reply to an inquiry to Mr. Lincoln in re
gard to the matter. It read: ' Wish not to interfere about V.-P.
Cannot interfere about platform convention must judge for
itself.'
"I went to see Mr. Lincoln personally, however. There are
always men who say the Presidential candidates prefer this man
or that, and they do it without the slightest authority. It was
so in this campaign. It was reported that Andrew Johnson was
Mr. Lincoln's choice, and it was my business to find out whether
it was or not. We were beyond all measure for Mr. Lincoln first,
last, and for all time. Had he desired Mr. Johnson he would
have been our choice, but he did not.
" As the dispatch indicates, Mr. Lincoln was particularly anx
ious not to make known his preferences on the question of his
associate on the ticket. But that he had a preference I positively
know. After my interview with him I was as positive that Han
nibal Hamlin was his favorite as I am that I am alive to-day.
The fact is further proven by the action of the entire Illinois
delegation, which was a unit for Mr. Hamlin, and, as I stated
before, we were at his service in the matter."
2. It is proven to be a misstatement by Colonel Hay, who says:
" I have nothing to say about Mr. Nicolay's assertion nor about
this telegram, but I do corroborate the statement that Mr. Lin
coln withheld all opinion calculated to influence the Baltimore
Convention of 1864." And further: "I stand simply by the
proposition contained in our History. . . . For several days be
fore the convention the President had been besieged by inquiries
as to his personal wishes in regard to his associate on the ticket.
He had persistently refused to give the slightest intimation of
such wish. ... It was therefore with minds absolutely untram-
meled by any knowledge of the President's wishes that the con-
47 LINCOLN AND -MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
vention went about the work of selecting his associate on the
ticket."
3. It is proven to be a misstatement by the action of Simon
Cameron, chairman of the Pennsylvania delegation, in nomina
ting Hamlin as a candidate for Vice-President and casting for
him the whole fifty-two votes of the Pennsylvania delegation.
4. It is proven to be a misstatement by your own action in the
Baltimore Convention, when, at the first vote for Vice-President,
after the supposed instructions which you claim to have received
from Lincoln, and having, as you say, "returned to work and
vote for Johnson," you as a member of the Pennsylvania dele
gation voted for Hannibal Hamlin for Vice-President. If you
did this willingly, you betrayed Lincoln's confidence and instruc
tions which you alleged to have received. If you did it unwill
ingly, you proved yourself a political cipher a pretended agent
to manipulate a national convention who had not influence
enough in his own delegation to control his own vote. The first
roll-call was decisive in showing Johnson's strength against the
Pennsylvania vote (yourself included), and it shows that you
contributed nothing for, but everything against, the result you
say you were commissioned to bring about. Subsequent changes
still on the first ballot (for there was no second) were simply the
usual rush to make the choice unanimous, in which Pennsylvania
did not lead, but only joined after the rush became evident, just
as Maine and Illinois did.
JOHN G. NICOLAY.
TESTIMONY OF LEADING POLITICAL ACTORS.
LINCOLN ADVISES JUDGE PETTIS.
[From The Philadelphia Times, Aug. I, 1891.]
HON. S. NEWTON PETTIS, who was an active supporter of Lin
coln at the conventions of 1860 and 1864, and who has been Con
gressman, Judge, and Foreign Minister, was personally advised
by Lincoln in 1864 to support Johnson for Vice-President. The
following is his testimony on the point:
MEADVILLE, July 20, 1891.
HON. A. K. McCLURE:
DEAR SIR: Your favor of last week reached me at Washington,
asking for a copy of Mr. Hamlin's letter to me in 1889, and in-
APPENDIX. 471
stead of a copy I enclose the original, which you can return to
me at your convenience.
You will remember the circumstances connected with it, for we
spoke about it shortly after. On the morning of the meeting of
the Baltimore Convention in 1864 which nominated Mr. Lincoln,
and immediately before leaving for Baltimore, I called upon Mr.
Lincoln in his study and stated that I called especially to ask
him whom he desired put on the ticket with him as Vice-Presi-
dent. He leaned forward and in a low but distinct tone of voice
said, " Governor Johnson of Tennessee."
In March, 1889, I spent an hour with Mr. Hamlin in Washing
ton at the house of a friend with whom he was stopping while
attending the inauguration of President Harrison in March of
that year.
Among other matters I casually mentioned the expression of
Mr. Lincoln the morning of the meeting of the Baltimore Con
vention in 1864, not supposing for a moment that it was any
thing that would surprise him. You can imagine my annoyance
at the remark that it called out from Mr. Hamlin, which was:
"Judge Pettis, I am sorry you told me that." I regretted having
made the statement, but I could not recall it.
Later in the year I noticed a published interview had with you
in which you had made substantially the same statement from
Mr. Lincoln to you very shortly before the meeting of the con
vention, which I clipped and with satisfaction enclosed to Mr.
Hamlin in verification of mine to Mr. H., stating that your state
ment to the same effect as mine made to him in the March before
had relieved me from fear that he, Mr. Hamlin, might have some
times questioned the accuracy of my memory, and the letter I
now send you was Mr. Hamlin's reply.
Yours very truly,
S. NEWTON PETTIS.
HAMLIN'S LETTER TO PETTIS.
THE following is Mr. Hamlin's letter to Judge Pettis, the orig
inal of which is now in our possession :
BANGOR, September 13, 1889.
MY DEAR SIR: Have been from home for several days, and did
not get your letter and newspaper slip until last evening. Hence
the delay in my reply.
47 2 LINCOLN AND' MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
When I met and conferred with you in Washington, and yon
told me of your interview with Mr. L. (Lincoln), I had not the
slightest doubt of your correctness. The remark that I made
was caused wholly because you made certain statements of Mr.
L. which I had seen, but which I did not believe until made posi
tive by you. I was really sorry to be disabused. Hence I was
truly sorry at what you said and the information you gave me.
Mr. L. (Lincoln) evidently became some alarmed about his re
election and changed his position. That is all I care to say. If
we ever shall meet again, I may say something more to you. I
will write no more. Yours very truly,
H. HAMUN.
HON. S. N. PETTIS, Meadville, Pa.
LINCOLN, CAMERON, AND BUTLER.
THE following letter from General Butler, and the added ex
tract from his magazine article on the same subject, explain
themselves:
BOSTON, July 14, 1891.
MY DEAR SIR: A few years ago I was asked to write, as my
memory serves me, for the North American Review, while under
the editorial management of Mr. Allen Thorndike Rice, my
reminiscences of the facts in relation to the interview between
Mr. Cameron and myself which took place at Fort Monroe some
time in March, 1864, as I remember. It might have been a little
later, but it must have been before the 4th day of May, 1864, be
cause I went into the field on that date, and did not see Mr.
Cameron during the campaign. My recollection is that the arti
cle was entitled "Vice-Presidential Politics in 1864." I should
say that the article was written five or six years ago.
I cannot now add anything that I know of to what I said then.
I meant to tell it just as it lay in my memory, and certainly did
so, wholly without any relation to Mr. Hamlin, because I under
stood it had been determined on by Mr. Lincoln and his friends
that somebody else, if it were possible, should be nominated in
stead of Mr. Hamlin. Of the reasons of that determination I
made no inquiry, because the whole matter was one in which I
had no intention to take any part. Yours truly,
BENJ. F. BUTLER.
A. K. McCuJRE, Esq.
APPENDIX. 473
GENERAL BUTLER'S STATEMENT IN MAGAZINE.
[From the North American Review for October, 1885.]
"Within three weeks afterward a gentleman (Cameron) who
stood very high in Mr. Lincoln's confidence came to me at Fort
Monroe. This was after I had heard that Grant had allotted to
me a not unimportant part in the coming campaign around Rich
mond, of the results of which I had the highest hope, and for
which I had been laboring, and the story of which has not yet
been told, but may be hereafter.
" The gentleman informed me that he came from Mr. Lincoln;
this was said with directness, because the messenger and myself
had been for a considerable time in quite warm friendly relations,
and I owed much to him, which I can never repay save with
gratitude.
" He said: ' The President, as you know, intends to be a candi
date for re-election, and as his friends indicate that Mr. Hamlin
is no longer to be a candidate for Vice-President, and as he is
from New England, the President thinks that his place should be
filled by some one from that section; and aside from reasons of
personal friendship which would make it pleasant to have you
with him, he believes that being the first prominent Democrat
who volunteered for the war, your candidature would add strength
to the ticket, especially with the War Democrats, and he hopes
that you will allow your friends to co-operate with his to place
you in that position.'
"I answered: 'Please say to Mr. Lincoln that while I appre
ciate with the fullest sensibility this act of friendship and the
compliment he pays me, yet I must decline- Tell him,' I said
laughingly, 'with the prospects of the campaign, I would not
quit the field to be Vice-President, even with himself as Presi
dent, unless he will give me bond, with sureties, in the full sum
of his four years' salary, that he will die or resign within three
months after his inauguration.' "
CAMERON'S DECLARATIONS.
THE following is an extract from an interview with General
Cameron taken by James R. Young, now Executive Clerk of the
Senate, in 1873, revised by Cameron himself and published in the
New York Herald in the summer of that year:
474 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
" Lincoln and Stanton thought highly of Butler, and I will
now tell you of another fact that is not generally known, and
which will show you how near Butler came to being President
instead of Andrew Johnson. In the spring of 1864, when it was
determined to run Mr. Lincoln for a second term, it was the de
sire of Lincoln, and also that of Stanton, who was the one man
of the Cabinet upon whom Lincoln thoroughly depended, that
Butler should run on the ticket with him as the candidate for
Vice-President. I was called into consultation and heartily en
dorsed the scheme. Accordingly Lincoln sent me on a mission
to Fort Monroe to see General Butler, and to say to him that it
was his (Lincoln's) request that he (General Butler) should allow
himself to be run as second on the ticket.
" I, accompanied by William H. Armstrong, afterward a mem
ber of Congress from the Williamsport district, did visit General
Butler and made the tender according to instructions. To our
astonishment, Butler refused to agree to the proposition. He
said there was nothing in the Vice-Presidency, and he preferred
remaining in command of his army, where he thought he would
be of more service to his country. ' '
A LATER CAMERON INTERVIEW.
THE following interview with General Cameron, taken by
Colonel Burr a few years before his death, was carefully revised
by Cameron himself. It is not only a repetition of General But
ler's statement, but it tells how, after Butler declined the Vice-
Presidency, Lincoln carefully considered other prominent War
Democrats, and finally agreed with Cameron to nominate John
son:
"I had been summoned from Harrisburg by the President to
consult with him in relation to the approaching campaign," said
General Cameron. " He was holding a reception when I arrived,
but after it was over we had a long and earnest conversation. Mr.
Lincoln had been much distressed at the intrigues in and out of
his Cabinet to defeat his renomination ; but that was now assured,
and the question of a man for the second place on the ticket was
freely and earnestly discussed. Mr. Lincoln thought, and so did
I, that Mr. Hamlin's position during the four years of his admin
istration made it advisable to have a new name substituted. Sev
eral men were freely talked of, but without conclusion as to any
APPENDIX. 475
particular person. Not long after that I was requested to come
to the White House again. I went and the subject was again
brought up by the President ; and the result of our conversation
was that Mr. Lincoln asked me to go to Fortress Monroe and ask
General Butler if he would be willing to run, and, if not, to con
fer with him upon the subject.
"General Butler positively declined to consider the subject,
saying that he preferred to remain in the military service, and he
thought a man could not justify himself in leaving the army in
the time of war to run for a political office. The general and
myself then talked the matter over freely, and it is my opinion
at this distance from the event that he suggested that a Southern
man should be given the place. After completing the duty as
signed by the President, I returned to Washington and reported
the result to Mr. Lincoln. He seemed to regret General Butler's
decision, and afterward the name of Andrew Johnson was sug
gested and accepted. In my judgment, Mr. Hamlin never had a
serious chance to become the Vice-Presidential candidate after
Mr. Lincoln's renomination was assured."
JOHNSON'S SECRETARY SPEAKS.
MAJOR BENJAMIN C. TRUMAN, a well-known Eastern journalist,
and now manager of the California exhibit for the coming Chicago
Fair, testifies in the following conclusive manner on the subject:
CHICAGO, July 25.
MY DEAR MR. McCujRE:
We met in New Orleans the year of the fair, as you may re
member. I am the man recently quoted in the Tribune in rela
tion to the Lincoln-Hamlin controversy, but I did not wish to
volunteer conspicuously in the dispute. I was private secretary
of Andrew Johnson in Nashville in 1864. I saw and handled all
his correspondence during that time, and I know it to be a fact
that Mr. Lincoln desired the nomination of Johnson for Vice-
President, and that Brownlow and Maynard went to Baltimore at
request of Lincoln and Johnson to promote the nomination.
Forney wrote to Johnson saying that General Sickles would be
in Tennessee to canvass Johnson's availability, and that Lincoln,
on the whole, preferred Johnson first and Holt next. I do not
know that General Sickles conferred with Johnson on the sub
ject, and it is possible that General Sickles was not advised by
47 6 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
Lincoln at the time he sent him on the secret mission what he
had in view, for Lincoln may at that time have been undecided
in his own mind. It is certain, however, that after General
Sickles returned and reported to Lincoln, Lincoln decided to
favor the nomination of Johnson.
I went out to Tennessee with Johnson in March, 1862, and had
charge of his official and private correspondence for four years.
I wrote at his dictation many letters to Mr. Lincoln, and was
cognizant of all Mr. Lincoln's communications to him.
When he was made Military Governor and Brigadier-General,
I was appointed on his staff along with William A. Browning of
Baltimore, who died in '66. It was Colonel Forney who obtained
the position for me, and he was in close confidential relations
with Johnson during the entire period I speak of.
Very truly,
BEN C. TRUMAN.
JONES SPEAKS FOR RAYMOND.
HENRY J. RAYMOND was editor of the New York Times in
1864, of which George Jones was then, as now, the chief owner,
and their relations were of the most confidential character. Ray
mond was the Lincoln leader and the master-spirit of the Balti
more Convention of 1864. He framed and reported the platform;
he was made chairman of the National Committee; he wrote the
Life of Lincoln for the campaign; and it was his leadership that
carried a majority of the New York delegation for Johnson even
against Dickinson, from Raymond's own State, because he was
in the confidence of and acting in accord with the wishes of Lin
coln. Raymond has long since joined the great majority beyond,
but Jones thus incisively speaks for him:
SOUTH POLAND, ME., July 17, 1891.
MY DEAR COLONEL McCLURE: Your letter has been forwarded
to me here. I have read the contention about the Vice-Presi
dency, and do not hesitate to say that you are absolutely in the
right in your statement of the facts.
I had many talks with Raymond on the subject. Dickinson's
friends never forgave him, although he made Dickinson U. S.
District Attorney afterward to compensate him for the loss of the
Vice-Presidency. Seward and Weed were also with Raymond in
that fight. Faithfully yours,
GEORGE JONES.
APPENDIX. 477
MARSHAL LAMON'S LETTER.
CARLSBAD, BOHEMIA, August 16, 1891.
HON. A. K.
DEAR SIR: The question of preference of President Lincoln in
1864 as to who ought to be placed on the national ticket with
himself is one of doubt, I observe from reading the American
newspapers, and one which has, since the death of Ex-Vice-Presi-
dent Ham! in, given rise to nmch controversy. At this distance
of time from the exciting events of that period I had thought
that no fact was better established than Mr. Lincoln's politic
preference as a strategic skirmish from the beaten path to give
strength to the party and discouragement to the South . He was
decidedly in favor of a Southern man for Vice-President. And
of all men South, his preference, as he expressed himself to pru
dent friends, was for Andrew Johnson. This he could not con
sistently make public, for he occupied a delicate position before
the people, and was apprehensive of giving offense to Hamlin's
united New England constituency.
To discreet and trusted friends with whom he deemed it pru
dent to confer he urged that such a nomination would disarm our
enemies of the Union abroad, and be a check to the recognition
of the Confederacy by England and France to a greater extent
than anything in our power to do at that time, and if judiciously
and quietly effected would, in his opinion, in no wise jeopardize
the success of the party.
He believed that the election of one of the candidates on the
national ticket from an insurgent State, from the heart of the
Confederacy, that had been restored to the Union and had re
pented of the sin of rebellion, would not only be wise, but expe
dient; and Johnson being a lifelong representative Southern man,
who had been Governor, a member of Congress, a United States
Senator, and was then Military Governor of the State of Tennes
see, it was fitting, and would have more influence in proving the
success of the Union arms against the Confederate rebellion than
anything that had been accomplished.
I recall to mind the fact that Mr. Lincoln sent for you, Mr.
Editor, the day before the National Convention was to meet, for
consultation on this veritable subject. To the best of my recol
lection, you were not in sympathy with the scheme; that you
opposed it and declared yourself in favor of the old ticket of
1860; and I am confident that at first you were opposed to the
47$ LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
nomination of Johnson. But after some discussion and hearing
Mr. Lincoln's earnest reasoning in favor of his position, you
yielded your prejudices and seemed convinced that there was
philosophy and, perhaps, sound politics in the proposition. The
late lamented Leonard Swett of Illinois was also sent for and
consulted before the convention met; Mr. Lincoln always had
great faith and confidence in Mr. Swett's political wisdom. The
proposition took Swett by surprise. He had made up his mind
that the old ticket of Lincoln and Hamlin would be again renomi-
nated as a matter of course. Swett said to him: " Lincoln, if it
were known in New England that you are in favor of leaving
Hamlin off the ticket it would raise the devil among the Yankees
(Mr. Swett was born in Maine), and it would raise a bumble-bee's
nest about your ears that would appall the country." Swett con
tinued about in this strain: " However popular you are with the
masses over the country, you are not so with the New England
politicians, because of your tardiness in issuing your Emancipa
tion Proclamation and your liberal reconstruction policy. You
must know that you have not recovered from what these people
think two great blunders of your administration. In view of
these facts I think it a dangerous experiment."
Lincoln was serious, earnest, and resolute. He produced argu
ments so convincing to Swett that he shortly became a con
vert to the proposed new departure, and in deference to Mr.
Lincoln's wishes he went to the convention as a delegate from
Illinois, and joined Cameron, yourself, and others in supporting
Johnson.
I recollect that Swett asked Mr. Lincoln, as he was leaving the
White House, whether he was authorized to use his name in this
behalf before the convention. The reply was, " No; I will address
a letter to Lamon here embodying my views, which you, McClure,
and other friends may use if it be found absolutely necessary.
Otherwise, it may be better that I should not appear actively on
the stage of this theatre." The letter was written, and I took it
to the convention with me. It was not used, as there was no
occasion for its use, and it was afterward returned to Mr. Lin
coln, at his request.
Mr. Lincoln was beset before the convention by the friends of
the Hamlin interest for his opinion and preference for Vice-Presi-
dent. To such he invariably dodged the question, sometimes
saying: "It perhaps would not become me to interfere with the
will of the people," always evading a direct answer.
APPENDIX. 479
However this conduct may subject him to the charge by some
persons of the want of open candor, the success of the party and
the safety of the Union were the paramount objects that moved
him. He did not, by suppressing the truth to those whom he
thought had no right to cross-question him, purpose conveying
a false impression. If this is to be construed as duplicity, be it
so; he was still " Honest old Abe," and he thought the end justi
fied the means.
About this time, and for a short time before this convention
was held, Mr. Lincoln was exceedingly anxious to bring Ten
nessee under a regular State government, and he argued that by
emphasizing it by the election of Johnson to the Vice-Presidency
(not that he had any prejudice against Mr. Hamlin) in no way
could such rapid strides be made toward the restoration of the
Union.
If the nomination of Johnson was a mistake, a misdemeanor,
or a crime, the responsibility of it should rest where it belongs.
Mr. Lincoln was undoubtedly blamable for the blunder. It may
be that more calamitous mistakes happened in the lives of very
many eminent and good men during those troublous times of our
country's history.
With all my affection, admiration, love, and veneration for Mr.
Lincoln, I have never been one of those who believed him im
maculate and incapable of making mistakes. He was human
and in the nature of things was liable to err, yet he erred less
often than other men. He had amiable weaknesses, some of
which only the more ennobled him.
It is no compliment to his memory to smother from the closest
scrutiny any of the acts of his life and transfigure him by full-
some deification, so that his most intimate friends cannot recog
nize the Abraham Lincoln of other days. The truth of history
requires that he should be placed on the record, now that he is
dead, as he stood before the people while living. Whatever mis
takes he made were made through the purest of motives. All his
faults, all his amiable weaknesses, and all his virtues should be
written on the same pages, so that the world may know the true
man as his friends knew him. With all the truth told of him he
will appear a purer and better man than any other man living or
any man that ever did live.
With all that can truthfully be said of him, Abraham Lincoln
has reached that stage of moral elevation where his name alone
will be more beneficial to humanity at large than the personal
480 LINCOLN AND .MEN OF WAR-TIMES.
services of any other man to the people of any country as their
Chief Magistrate. Respectfully,
WARD H. LAMON.
A CABINET MINISTER TESTIFIES.
[Gideon Welles, in the Galaxy, Nov., 1877.]
MR. HAMUN, who was elected with Lincoln in 1860, had not
displayed the breadth of view and enlightened statesmanship
which was expected, and consequently lost confidence with the
country during his term. Yet there was no concentration or
unity on any one to fill his place. His friends and supporters,
while conscious that he brought no strength to the ticket,
claimed, but with no zeal or earnestness, that as Mr. Lincoln
was renominated, it would be invidious not to nominate Hamlin
also.
The question of substituting another for Vice-President had
been discussed in political circles prior to the meeting of the con
vention, without any marked personal preference, but with a
manifest desire that there should be a change. Mr. Lincoln felt
the delicacy of his position, and was therefore careful to avoid the
expression of any opinion ; but it was known to those who en
joyed his confidence that he appreciated the honesty, integrity,
and self-sacrificing patriotism of Andrew Johnson of Tennessee.
GENERAL SICKLES' STATEMENT.
[General Sickles' Interview in New York Times."}
"WHEN I went South to visit Governor Johnson this sentiment
was in the air," continued General Sickles. " I knew of it, but
I considered from my past position that it would be indelicate for
me to invite the President's confidence on purely political mat
ters. It was not my mission to undertake to bring about changes
in Mr. Johnson's methods of administration which should affect
his standing before the Baltimore Convention. The result of my
visit may have had some such effect: I do not say that it did not.
I reported to Mr. Lincoln and to Mr. Seward.
' ' Now, what was the situation at Baltimore ? Mr. Leonard
Swett was President Lincoln's shadow. Whatever Mr. Swett did
represented and reflected Mr. Lincoln's views. In the Baltimore
APPENDIX. 481
Convention Mr. Swett at once came out for Judge Holt, a Border-
State man. Mr. Nicolay sent word to M Hay, who had been
left to keep house, asking if the President approved of this.
Now note Mr. Lincoln's reply:
" ' Swett is unquestionably all right. Mr. Holt is a good man,
but I had not thought of him for Vice-President. Wish not to
interfere. '
"That tells the whole story. Mr. Lincoln knew that Mr. Swett,
in bringing out a Border-State man, was doing precisely right.
The indorsement on that note was for Mr. Nicolay 's eye. He was
not one of the President's close advisers. He was but a clerk.
He was not the man whom President Lincoln would send to Bal
timore to take a hand in shaping the convention. A tyro in poli
tics would see that if the President wanted a thing done, his own
secretary would have been the last messenger sent to do it. It
would have revealed the President's hand if Mr. Nicolay had
been given a mission in the convention.
" Colonel McClure, Governor Andrew G. Curtin, Simon Came
ron, and others of that stamp were the men whom Mr. Lincoln
relied on. So that while the indorsement on the note gives Mr.
Nicolay documentary evidence for his position, that very remark,
'Swett is all right,' gives Colonel McClure good ground for his
position if there were nothing else.
" Mr. Seward and Mr. Stanton were close advisers of Mr. Lin
coln. They spoke their sentiments in favor of a Border-State
man. That they advised the choice of Mr. Johnson I do not
know, or that the President had chosen Mr. Johnson I do not
know, but the one expression, ' Swett is all right,' is the key that
unlocks all the mystery there is in this present controversy."
INDEX.
Adams, Charles Francis Eulogy
of Seward, 60; as a candidate
for President, 1872, 326.
Altoona Conference Meeting of,
269, 270; Curtin's letter con
cerning, note, 270, 272.
Anderson, Robert Relieved from
command by Sherman, 230.
Andrew, John A. Changes vote
of Mass, to Lincoln, 39; sec
onds Evarts' motion, 39; joins
Altoona Conference, 269.
Armstrong, William H. Visits
Butler with Cameron, 118.
Army of the Potomac Vicissi
tudes of, 356.
Arnold, Isaac N. On Lincoln
and emancipation, 101; Lin
coln's confidence in, 126.
Ashley, James M. Saves consti
tutional amendment abolishing
slavery from defeat, 109.
Banks, Nathaniel P. Vote for
Vice-President in Chicago Con
vention, 41; retreat across the
Potomac, 1862, 394.
Bannan, Benjamin Draft Com
missioner in Schuylkill county,
82, 83.
Bartlett, W. O. Knowledge of
the Lincoln-Bennett letter, 92.
Bates, Edward Greeley's sup
port of, 30, 315; votes received
in Chicago Convention, 39; in
Lincoln's Cabinet, 60.
Bayard, George A. Given com
mand of brigade Pa. Reserves,
428.
Beauregard, P. G. T. Threatens
Washington, 67.
Bennett, James Gordon Offered
French mission, 90; supports
Lincoln's re-election, 91; tati-
tude toward Lincoln, 92.
Biddle, Col. Charles J. Goes to
relief of Col. Wallace, 256.
Biddle, Craig On Gov. Curtin's
staff, 256.
Black, Jeremiah S. Becomes Bu
chanan's Secretary of State, 172,
300; grieved by Buchanan's pol
icy toward S. C., 301, 302; writes
Buchanan's answer, 302.
Blaine, James G. Opinion of 111.
Republican Convention, 1860,
29; support of Lincoln, 62.
Blair, Frank P. Supports Bates
at Chicago, 1860, 37; offers Gen.
Sherman a Missouri brigadier-
ship, 228; secures Greeley's
nomination for President, 327.
Blair, Montgomery Supports
Bates at Chicago, 1860, 37; of
fers Gen. Sherman a War-De
partment clerkship, 228.
Boyd, William H. His home at
Chambersburg saved, 420, 421.
Brown, B. Gratz Nominated for
Vice-President, 327.
Brown, John In Chambersburg
in 1859, 334, 335, 390.
Buchanan, James Stanton and
Black in Cabinet of, 172; mis
conceptions regarding his ad
ministration, 297, 298; estimate
of, 298, 299; change of policy,
300; policy toward S. C., 301,
302; reinforcement of Southern
forts, 302, 303; impossibility of
reinforcement, 304; proofs of
loyalty of, 304; patriotic letters
of, 305-310; justice to, 310, 311.
Buckalew, Charles A. Elected
to the United States Senate,
152.
Buell, Don Carlos An unre
warded hero, 355; military ca
reer of, 381-383; campaign
against Chattanooga, 383, 384;
(483)
4 8 4
INDEX.
plan of campaign overruled,
but censured by the War De
partment, 384; his removal
asked, 385; relieved, 386; asks
for investigation, 387; myste
rious disappearance of the rec
ord, 387, 388.
Burnside, Ambrose E. What it
would cost to capture Manas-
sas, 70.
Butler, Benjamin F. Lincoln's
first selection for Vice-Presi
dent in 1864, 118; Cameron's
mission to, 118; nomination de
clined, 119; Cameron's instruc
tions to, regarding slaves, 161.
Cameron, Simon Candidate for
President, 1860, 35, 36; opposed
for Secretary of War, 48; re
garded war as inevitable, 60;
David Davis' Cabinet promise,
89; advised arming the slaves,
103, 161; mission to Gen. But
ler, 1864, 118; consents to John
son's nomination, 119; relations
to Lincoln in 1864,121, 123, 124;
estimate of, 147; beginning of
feud with Curtin, 149; defeats
Forney for the Senat-, 150, 151;
defeated by Buckalew, 151;
Presidential aspirations, 1860,
152; the War Secretaryship,
403; Lincoln's hesitation and
letters, 155-157; subsequent ne
gotiations and appointment,
157-160; administration of the
War Department, 160, 161; offi
cial recommendation regarding
slavery, 161 - 163; retirement
from Cabinet, 164; feels ag
grieved, 164, 165; subsequent
relations to Lincoln, 166; esti
mate of, 166-168; conducts
campaign in Pa. in 1864, 199-
201; conference with Sherman
at Louisville, 231; refuses to ac
cept Pa. Reserves, 254; unites
with McClure and Forney to
ask foreign mission for Curtin,
263.
Carter, Colonel Story of his
burial at Chambersburg, 416,
417-
Cass, Lewis Resignation from
Buchanan's Cabinet, 172, 300.
Chambersburg Why destroyed,
258, 259; description of, 334,
390; John Brown in, 335, 390;
anti-slavery sentiment in, 338;
Capt. Cook in, 343; the town
in war times, 392; Patterson's
command at, 393; alarm at,
1862, 394; Stuart's capture of,
1862, 399; flag of truce demand
ing surrender of, 401; surren
dered to Gen. Hampton, 402;
Gen. Jenkins in, 1864, 407; Gen.
Lee in, 408; Lee's council in
public square, 400; Christian
burial refused to a Confederate
officer in, 416, 417; Gen. Mc-
Causland's approach rumored,
418; captured and burned, 419;
" Remember Chambersburg! "
421; no reimbursement, 421,
422; after the burning, 422.
Chandler, Zach. Distrust of Lin
coln, 62.
Chase, Salmon P. Votes re
ceived in Chicago Convention,
39; believes in peaceable dis
union, 60; nomination as Chief
Justice, 77; attitude toward Lin
coln, 1861-64, 132,133; Lincoln
proposed to "decline," 135, 136;
strained relations with Lin
coln, 137; resigns from Cabinet,
138; in retirement, 139; visits
Lincoln in 1864, 140; appointed
Chief Justice, 141; Lincoln's
magnanimity toward, 143, 144;
legal attainments of, note, 144;
subsequent career of, 144-146;
bearer of Lincoln's letter re
moving Cameron from War
Department, 164; Stevens on
impeachment rulings of, 285.
| Childs, George W. At luncheon
with Grant, 205.
Clay, Cassius M. Vote for Pres
ident in Chicago Convention,
39; for Vice-President, 40.
! Cobb, Howell Leaves Buchan
an's Cabinet, 300; his division
at Hagerstown, 1862, 395.
j Coffroth, Alexander H. Gives
first Democratic vote in favor
INDEX.
485
of constitutional amendment
abolishing slavery, no.
Collamer, Jacob Votes received
in Chicago Convention, 39; let
ter on Sherman's terms to
Johnston, 244.
Columbia, S. C. The cry of re
taliation for Chambersburg,42i.
Congress Acts prohibiting sla
very, 103; constitutional amend
ment abolishing slavery in, 109,
no.
Convention, Democratic National,
1864 Declares the war a fail
ure, 225; anti-war platform, 324.
Convention, Republican National,
1856 Character of, 27.
Convention, Republican National,
1860 Character of, 27; Seward
demonstration, 37, 38; ballots
for President, 38, 39.
Convention, Republican National,
1864 Representation of insur
gent States in, 120.
Cook, John E. Hazlitt mistaken
fr, 337; romance of the cap
ture of, 338; reward for, 339;
characteristics of, 340, 347-3491
capture by Logan and Fitz-
hugh, 342, 343; taken to Cham-
bersburg, 343; negotiations
with Dan Logan, 344, 345; be
fore Justice Reisher, 345; sent
to jail, 346; plans for escape,
346-350; the romance of the
requisition, 351; surrender,
trial, and execution, 351, 352.
Couch, Darius N. In command
at Harrisburg, 1863, 412; has no
force to meet McCausland,
1864, 418; retires to Harrisburg,
419.
Crawford, Samuel W. Given
command of Pa. Reserves, 443;
asks that his division rejoin the
army, 444; at Gettysburg, 445;
with his division in Va., 447-
453; farewell to Pa. Reserves,
453, 454-
Cummings, Alexander Repre
sented Cameron at Chicago,
1860, 153.
Curtin, Andrew G. Supports
Lincoln at Chicago, 1860, 30, 31;
candidate for Governor of Pa.,
32, 33; reasons for opposing
Seward, 33-35; reasons for sup
porting Lincoln, 35, 36; calls on
Weed in Chicago, 41; cam
paign of 1860, 42; elected Gov
ernor, 43, 47; conference at the
White House, 65, 66; not a
party to Cabinet pledges, 89;
gubernatorial declination, 1863,
89, 90; re-election, 90; begin
ning of feud with Cameron, 149;
appeals to Stanton for Jere Mc-
Kibben, 177; offers McClellan
cor mand of Pa. troops, 211;
brilliant services of, 248; inau
gural address, 249; as a popular
leader, 249, 250; early relations
with Lincoln, 251; Pa. Reserves,
the Governor's call, 252, 25.3;
refused by the government,
254; order recalled, but the
corps authorized by the Legis
lature, 255; appeals to, by War
Department, 256, 257; in Lin
coln's councils, 258; responsi
bilities and achievements, 258,
259; relations to Stanton, 259;
asks for exchange of prisoners,
259, 260; Stanton's support of,
for re-election, 260, 261 ; sug
gests Gen. W. B. Franklin for
Governor, 261; willing to re
tire, 261-265; offered first-class
foreign mission, 263; renomina-
tion and re-election, 265; de
votion to the soldiers, 265;
266; care of soldiers' or
phans, conception of scheme,
266, 267; appeals to the
Legislature, 268; suggests con
ference of War Governors, 268,
269; letter concerning the Al-
toona Conference, note, 270,
272; resolution of thanks, 273;
President Grant thanked for
nomination of, as minister to
Russia, 274; minister to Russia
and subsequent services, 275;
complimentary vote in Cincin
nati Convention, 327; orders
Capt. Palmer's company to act
as scouts, 395; advised of Lee's
movement against Gettysburg,
486
INDEX.
409, 410; a mysterious dispatch
to, 410, 412; identity of the
sender, 412, 413 ; receives Meade's
report of Pickett's repulse, 416;
care for the Pa. Reserves, 427.
Davis, David Supports Lincoln
at Chicago, 1860, 37; visits Pa.
Republican headquarters, 46;
on Lincoln's reticence, 74, 75;
a Lincoln organizer, 88; Cabi
net places promised by, 89; ne
gotiations with Sanderson and
Cummings, 153; the Cameron
bargain, 159; as a candidate for
President, 1872, 326; not nomi
nated, 327.
Davis, Henry Winter Vote for
Vice-President in Chicago Con
vention, 41; distrusts Lincoln,
62; in opposition to Lincoln,
1864, 117, 139, 322, 323.
Davis, Jefferson Instructions for
Hampton Roads Conference,
106; Lincoln's wish for his es
cape, 242.
Dawes, Henry L. Investigates
the War Department under
Cameron, 160.
Dayton, William L. Votes re
ceived in Chicago Convention,
39-
Defrees, John S. With Lane at
Chicago, 1860, 33; at Cincin
nati Convention, 1872, 327.
Democratic Party Strength of,
in Pa., 1857-60, 32; anti-war
platform of, 324.
Dennison, William Political mis
sion to Pa., 1864, 201; offers
McClellan command of Ohio
volunteers, 212.
Dickinson, Daniel S. War Dem
ocrat, 118, 119, 121, 122.
District of Columbia Slavery
abolished in, 103, 280.
Dix, John A. War Democrat,
118, 119, 300.
Doubleday, Abner At the begin
ning of the war, 369, 370.
Douglas, Stephen A. Sustains
Lincoln's administration, 62.
Drexel, Anthony J. Sympathizes
with Republican cause, 1860, 42;
at luncheon with Grant, 205.
Early, Jubal A. Orders burning
of Chambersburg, 421.
Easton, Captain His battery at
the Chickahominy, 431.
Ellsworth, Col. E. E. Death of,
70.
Emancipation Proclamation
Preliminary proclamation, 100;
States and districts not in
cluded in, 107; as a war meas
ure, 108; talks with Lincoln on,
as a political measure, 111-113;
effects of, in State elections,
in; compensation for slaves,
241.
Emergency-Men Reynolds sent
to Pa. to organize, 396- never
serviceable, 407.
Evarts, William M. Nor ' -- t es
Seward at Chicago, 1860, 37;
moves to make Lincoln's nom
ination unanimous, 39; attitude
on nomination for Vice-Presi
dent, 40.
Ewell, Richard S. Drives Banks
across the Potomac, 394.
Fenton, Reuben E. At Cincin
nati Convention, 1872, 327.
Fitzhugh, Cleggett Assists in
the capture of Cook, 342.
Floyd, John B. In Buchanan's
Cabinet, 297, 300.
Forney; John W. Defeated for
United States Senator, 150, 151;
asked to promote Curtin's re
tirement, 262, 263.
Franklin, William B. Suggested
by Curtin for Governor of Pa.,
261.
Fremont, John C. Nominated
for President, 27, 28; vote for,
in Chicago Convention, 39;
candidature in 1863, 91; procla
mation regarding slaves, 161.
Gettysburg Lee's movement
against, 408; Benjamin S. Hu-
ber sent to inform Gov. Curtin,
409; information from John A.
Seiders, 410; story of an un-
INDEX.
487
signed message, 410, 412; Lee's
retreat from, 416; Pa. Reserves
at, 445, 446.
Gilmore, Harry Refrains from
burning Colonel Boyd's home,
420, 421.
Gorham, George C. Letter on
Sherman's terms of surrender,
245-
Grant, Ulysses S. Virginia cam
paign, 1864, 124; magnanimous
treatment of Admiral Porter,
143; Stanton's relations to, 170;
early life, 189, 191; colonel of
the Twenty-first 111. V Is., 191;
service in Kentucky and Ten
nessee, 192; antagonized by
Halleck and McClellan, 192; at
Shilph, 193; inflamed public
sentiment against, 193, 194;
saved by Lincoln, 196-198; first
acquaintance with Lincoln, 198,
199; Lincoln doubtful of his po
litical sympathies in 1864, 202;
fidelity to Lincoln, 204; frank
explanation, 205; as a conver
sationalist, 206; in war and
peace, 206, 207; contrasted with .
McClellan, 217; thanked by Pa. |
Legislature for nomination of j
Curtin as minister to Russia,
274; indifference toward Gree-
ley, 325 ; Meade contrasted with,
358; injustice to Meade, 361;
orders Thomas to attack Hood,
365; requests relief of Thomas,
366; congratulates Thomas on
victory at Nashville, 368; treat
ment of Fitz John Porter, 374,
376; apnreciation of Buell, 383;
asks for Buell's restoration, 387;
Greeley, Horace Opposed to,
Seward in 1860, 30-40; supports
Bates, 30; chairman Oregon
delegation, Chicago, 1860, 37;
offers Gov. Morgan nomination
for Vice-President, 40; not in
accord with Lincoln, 91; Lin
coln's letter to, on emancipa
tion, 100; early hostility to Lin
coln, 312; revolt against Sew
ard, 314; support of Lincoln,
315; subsequent estrangement,
315, 316; in favor of peaceable
secession, 316; "On to Rich
mond!" cry, 318; characteristics
of, 319; differences with Lin
coln, 319, 320; attitude toward
slavery and emancipation, 320,
321; opposes Lincoln's renomi-
nation, 321; supports Wade and
Davis' arraignment of Lincoln,
322; part in the Jewett-Sanders
negotiations, 322, 323; later re
lations to Lincoln, 324; in po
litical revolt, 325; Grant's indif
ference, 325; choice of candi
dates at Cincinnati in 1872, 326;
how nominated, 327, 328; the
Democratic endorsement of,
329; defeat and death, 331, 332.
Halleck, Henry W. Made gen-
eral-in-chief, 4; antagonizes
Grant, but reverses his judg
ment, 192; ordered to the field
by the President, 107 ; ordered
to Washington as commander-
dn-chief, 198; belief in Gen.
Sherman's imbecility, 231; as
sents to relief of Thomas at
Nashville, 366; injustice to
Buell, Chattanooga campaign,
384; explains why Buell could
not be restored, 359.
Hamlin, Hannibal Vote for
Vice-President in Chicago Con
vention, 40; Lincoln unfavora
ble to re-election of, 115; why
nominated in 1860, 117; forces
demoralized, 122; Lincoln's feel
ings toward, 128; no deceit to
ward, 129; knowledge of Lin
coln's wishes, letter to Judge
Pettis, 129, 130.
Hampton, Wade Receives sur
render of Chambersburg, 402.
Hatch, O. M. A Lincoln organ
izer, 88.
Hazlehurst, Isaac American can
didate for Governor of Pa., 32.
Hazlitt, Albert Arrested in the
Cumberland Valley, 337; the
romance of the requisition, 351.
Herndon, William H. On Lin
coln's confidences, 74, 76.
Hickman, John Vote for Vice-
488
INDEX.
President in Chicago Conven
tion, 40.
Holt, Joseph War Democrat,
118; receives Lincoln's ostensi
ble support for Vice-President,
1864, 122; in Buchanan's Cabi
net, 300.
Hooker, Joseph Urges a dicta
torship on McClellan, 223.
Huber, Benjamin S. Carries
news of Lee's movement against
Gettysburg to Governor Cur-
tin 409.
Hunter, David Vandalism of,
258, 259.
Indiana Doubtful in 1864, 126.
Jenkins Captures Chambers-
burg, 1863, 407, 408.
Jewett, William Cornell As a
peacemaker, 322.
Johnson, Albert E. H. Letter
on Stanton, note, 176.
Johnson, Andrew Lincoln fa
vors, for Vice-President, 1864,
115; Gen. Sickles' mission to,
119; nomination accomplished,
122; Lincoln's reasons for his
nomination, 128, 129; Stanton's
hostility to, 187; admonished by
Grant, 206; repudiates Stanton's
violent treatment of Gen. Sher
man, 240; Stevens' dislike of,
281, 282; hostility of Stevens,
285, 286; attempt to supersede
Grant, 370.
Johnston, Joseph E. Surrenders
to Sherman, 234, 235; terms ac
corded by Sherman, 236.
Jones, Lieutenant Reached
Chambersburg from Harper's
Ferry, 392.
Judd, Norman B. Supports Lin
coln at Chicago, 1860, 37; at
tends Mrs. Lincoln at Harris-
burg, 52; a Lincoln organizer,
Kagi,John Henry With Meriam
in Chambersburg, 335, 336;
killed at Harper's Ferry, 336.
Kimmell, Francis M. Method of
sending news of Lee's invasion,
410.
Lamon, Ward H. Dines with
Lincoln and Curtin at Harris-
burg, 51; accompanies Lincoln
to Washington, 53; on Lin
coln's character, 76; Lincoln's
letter to, at Baltimore Conven
tion, 122.
Lane, Henry S. Supports Lin
coln at Chicago, 1860, 30, 31;
candidate for Governor of Ind.,
32, 33; reasons for opposing
Seward, 33-35; reasons for sup
porting Lincoln, 35, 36; elected
Governor of Ind., 43; not a
party to Cabinet pledges, 89.
Lane, Mrs. Henry S. Letter
from, note, 30, 31.
Lee, Robert E. Criticism of his
campaigns, 217; Maryland cam
paign in 1862, 394, 395; invasion
of Pa. in 1863, 407, 408; council
in public square in Chambers
burg, 409; retreat from Gettys
burg, 416.
Lewis, Joseph J. Protests against
Chase for Chief Justice, 141, 142.
Lincoln, Abraham His nomina
tion unexpected, 27; character
of his support, 27-29; support
of Curtin and Lane, 30; attitude
toward slavery, 34; Pennsylva
nia's attitude toward, 36; en
thusiasm for, 36, 37; nominated,
38; McClure's first visit to, 44;
sends Davis and Swett to Pa.,
46; letters to McClure destroy
ed, 48; invites McClure to
Springfield, 48; the interview,
49; Curtin's guest on his way
to Washington, 50; fears of as
sassination, 50, 51; reception
and dinner, 51; arrangements
for the journey, 51-53; the jour
ney, 54, 55; his regrets, 55; sen
sational stories, 56; arrival in
Washington, 57; distrust of his
ability, 59; his fitness for the
Presidency, 60, 61; difficulty of
formulating a policy, 63; epi
gram on the spoilsmen, 64; con
ference with Curtin and Me-
INDEX.
489
Clure touching defence of Pa.,
65, 66; characteristics, 72; his
confidence, how far given, 74;
his reticence, 77; intellectual or
ganization, 78; a man of the
people, 80; his political sagac
ity, 81; averts a draft riot, 82,
83; in politics, 85; Presidential
aspirations, 87; no knowledge
of Cabinet promises, 89; offers
French mission to J. G. Ben
nett, 90; letter to General Sher
man, 93; solution of mustering- j
in difficulty in Pa., 94, 95; views
of slavery, 98; Emancipation
Proclamation, 100; nswer to
Chicago clerical delegation, 101; !
waiting for victory, 102; plan
of compensated emancipation, '
103, 104; Hunter's order re
voked, 104; compensated eman
cipation at Hampton Roads
Conference, 106; congratulated
on achievement of emancipa- !
tion, no; Johnson for Vice-
President, 1864, 115; leaders in
opposition to, 117; wants a War
Democrat on ticket, 118; elec
toral purposes of, 119, 120;
manipulation of Cameron, 121;
interview with Lamon and
Swett, 122; relations to Mc-
Clure and Cameron, 123, 124;
fears defeat, 125, 126; reasons
for Johnson's nomination, 128,
129; no deceit toward Hamlin,
129; Chase's attitude toward,
132-134; proposes to "decline"
Chase, anecdote, 135; desire for
renomination, 136; doubts, 137;
strained relations with Chase,
137-139; discusses Stanton as a
possible Chief Justice, 142; mag
nanimity toward Chase, 143,
144; relations toward Cameron, i
147; the War Secretaryship,
154; letters to Cameron, 155-
157; subsequent action, 157-160;
exculpation of Cameron, 161;
relieves Fremont, and recalls
Cameron's report touching sla
very, 161-163; letter removing
Cameron from War Depart
ment, 164, 165; letter recalled,
165; appointment of Stanton,
165, 166; Stanton's attitude to
ward, 171-173; attitude toward
Stanton, 173; treatment of the
McKibben case, 178-181; for
bearance shown McClellan, 182,
183; visit to Gen. Scott at West
Point, 183; gives McClellan
command of the defences of
Washington, 184; compels Stan-
ton's obedience, 185; never con
templated removing Stanton,
186; pressure on, for Grant's re
moval, 193-196; his method to
save Grant, 196-198; asks Mc-
Clure and MacVeagh to co-op
erate with Republican State
Committee in Pa. in 1864, 200;
solicitude in regard to result in
Nov., 201, 202; McClure's in
terview with, regarding the sol
dier vote, 202,203; Grant's fidel
ity to, 204, 205; relations to Mc
Clellan, 208, 210; McClellan's
accusations, 215, 216; trust in
McClellan, 218; McClellan's. po
litical and military protests to,
219, 220; magnanimity toward
Hooker, 223; fears success of
McClellan's Presidential candi
dature, 224; views of the conse
quences, 225; first meeting with
Gen. Sherman, 227; early esti
mate of Sherman, 230; later
confidence in Sherman, 234;
views of reconstruction, 236,
240, 241 ; instructions to Sher
man, 236, 237; message to Gov.
Vance, 237; compensation for
slavery, 241; wish for Jefferson
Davis' escape, 242; fears re
garding the South, 242, 243; in
structions to Gen. Weitzel, 243,
244; relations with Curtin, 251;
Curtin in councils of, 258; Cur-
tin appeals to, for exchange of
prisoners, 260; offers first-class
foreign mission to Curtin, 263;
approved Altoona Conference,
note, 272; contrasted with Ste
vens, 277; methods in contrast
with Stevens', 279, 280, 284, 285;
early policy identical with Bu
chanan's, 297, 304, 310; early
490
INDEX.
hostility of Greeley to, 312;
Greeley's support of, 315; sub
sequent estrangement of Gree
dy* 3!5> 3 J 6; embarrassed by
Greeley, 316, 317; Greeley op
poses renomination of, 321;
Wade and Davis' arraignment
of, 322; share in Greeley-Jewett
negotiations, 323; Greeley's
later relations to, 324; dissatis
fied with Meade after Gettys
burg, 359, 360.
Lincoln, Mrs. Disinclined to the
secret journey of the President
elect, 52; passes through Balti
more, 55.
Logan, Daniel Account of, 341;
capture of Cook, 342; to allow
Cook to escape, 344-346.
Logan, Hugh Account of, 341;
in Chambersburg with Stuart's
cavalry, 402; makes a bold
promise, 406.
Logan, John A. Political ser
vices in 1864, 93; sent to relieve
Thomas at Nashville, 367.
McCall, George A. Given com
mand of Pa. Reserves, 425; or
dered to hold Fredericksburg,
1862, 428; skillful conduct at
Games' Mills, 430; at Savage
Station, 433, 434; captured, 434;
exchanged and resigns, 436.
McCandless, William Wounded
at the Wilderness, 450.
McCausland, General Threatens
Chambersburg, 418; seizes and
burns the town, 419, 420.
McClellan, George B. Called to
the command, 69, 212; Burn-
side on his tardiness, 70; can
didature in 1864, 91; could have
defeated Lincoln, 124; Stanton's
relations to, as Secretary of
War, 165, 166; Stanton's rela
tions to, 170-182; petulant mes
sage to Stanton, 183; in com
mand of the defences of Wash
ington, 184, 185, 220; antago
nizes Grant, 192; as a military
commander, 208; explanations
of failure, 210, 211; offered com
mand of Pa. troops, 211, 425;
accepts command of Ohio vol
unteers, 212; believes himself
victim of a conspiracy, 213-215;
compared with Lee and Grant,
217; affection of his soldiers for,
218; Lincoln's trust in, 218, 219;
caustic political criticism, 219;
personal feeling toward Lin
coln, 219, 220; Lincoln's treat
ment of, 220, 221; contemplates
a dictatorship, 222-224; candi
date for President, 224, 225;
Lincoln's view of consequences
of election of, 225; Stevens' ha
tred of, 282; information of
Lee's movements before Antie-
tam, 395; orders McClure to
obstruct Lee's advance, 396;
after Antietam, 441; Fredericks-
burg report, 432.
McClure, Alexander K. With
Curtin at Chicago, 1860, 33;
calls on Weed in Chicago, 41;
discouragements in Pa. cam
paign in 1860, 41, 42; calls on
Seward, 42; first visit to Lin
coln, 44; meets Davis and
Swett. at Republican head
quarters, 46; visits Lincoln at
Springfield, 1861, 48; the inter
view, 49, 154, 155; meeting at
Harrisburg, 50; conference at
the White House, 65, 66; on
Lincoln's characteristics, 76,77;
organizes draft in Pa., 80; ef
forts to muster conscripts, 94;
interview with Lincoln, 94, 95;
Lincoln's solution, 95, 96; talks
with Lincoln on Emancipation
Proclamation, 111-113; instruc
tions for, in letter to Lamon,
122; delegate-at-large from Pa.,
123; interview with Lincoln
political prospects, 1864, 125,
126; Johnson's nomination, in
terview with Lincoln, 127, 128;
Chase's candidature, Lincoln
on, 134-136; Lincoln's letter re
moving Cameron from War
Department shown to, 164; es
timate of Cameron, 166-168;
appeals to Lincoln on behalf of
Jere McKibben, 178-181; inter
view with Stanton, 179-181;
INDEX.
491
finds Stanton gracious, 181,182;
belief in Grant's failure at Shi-
loh, 194, 195; asked by Lincoln
to co-operate with Republican
State Committee in Pa. in 1864,
200; interview with Lincoln re
garding the soldier vote in
1864, 202, 203; testifies to
Grant's fidelity to Lincoln, 204;
meeting with Grant in Phila.,
205; anecdote of Lincoln and
Sherman, 235; tribute to Cur-
tin, 248; seeks to promote Cur-
tin's retirement, 262, 263; rela
tions to Stevens, 292; in Cin
cinnati Convention, 1872, 325;
attitude in regard to Greeley's
nomination, 325, 326; supports
Charles Francis Adams, 326;
disappointed with Greeley's
nomination, 329; Greeley's
last letter to, 331; draws
Meriam's will, 335, 336; counsel
for Captain Cook, 3^8, 345;
meeting with Cook, 345, 346;
interviews in the jail, 346-349;
first meeting with Gen. Meade,
359; witli Gen. Thomas, 369; as
a military commander, 1862,
395, 396; ordered by McClellan
to obstruct Lee's advance, 396;
warns Capt. Palmer at An-
tietam, 397; plan to prevent
Palmer's identification, 398;
hears of Stuart's intended raid,
399; surrender of Chambers-
burg demanded of, 402; meets
Gen. Hampton, 402; meets
Hugh Logan, 402; arrest by
otu-irt ordered, 402, 403; experi
ence with a detachment of Stu
art's cavalry, 403-405; identity
of his Confederate guests, 405,
406; how advised of Lee's inva
sion, 1863, 407; arrest of, again
ordered, 408; fails to obtain
Christian burial for a Confed
erate officer, 416, 417; house at
Chambersburg burned by Mc-
Causland's cavalry, 419.
McDowell, Irwin Pa. Reserves
in corps of, 427, 428.
McKibben, Jere Stanton's treat
ment of, 177-181.
McLean, John Votes received in
Chicago Convention, 39; rea
sons for Stevens' support of,
281.
MacVeagh, Wayne Assists Re
publican State Committee in
Pa. in 1864, 200; bears Meade' s
report of Pickett's repulse to
Gov. Curtin, 416.
Meade, George G. Furloughs
Pa. soldiers in 1864, 203; an un
rewarded hero, 355; military
career of, 356; Gettysburg
campaign, 356-358; contrasted
with Grant, 358; characteristics
of, 3595 less of the Lieutenant-
Generalship, 359, 360; confi
dence and disappointment, 361,
362; contrasted with Thomas,
362; given command of bri
gade, Pa. Reserves, 425; at
Dranesville, 426; wounded
at Savage Station, 434; in com
mand of Pa. Reserves, 438;
with the Reserves at South
Mountain, 439; at Antietam,
439, 440; back to his division,
441; in command of Fifth corps,
442, 443; sword presented by
Pa. Reserves, 447.
Medill, Joseph A Lincoln or
ganizer, 88.
Meredith, William M. Presses
for exchange of prisoners, 260.
Meriam, Francis J. Makes his
will, 335, 336; escapes, 337.
Milroy, Gen. Stampede into Pa.,
407.
Morgan, Edwin D. Supports
Seward at Chicago, 1860, 37: of
fered nomination for Vice-
President, 40; remains at head
of National Committee, 41 ; de
clined to join Altoona Confer
ence, note, 272.
Morton, Oliver P. Elected Gov
ernor of Ind., 93; hostility to
Buell, 385-
New York Herald Supports
Lincoln's re-election, 91.
New York Tribune Influence of,
in 1860, 29; not in accord with
Lincoln, 91; in campaign of
492
INDEX.
1860, 314, 315; favors peace
able secession, 316.
Niccolls, Samuel J. At the
the burning of Mr. McClure's
house, 419, 420.
Ord, E. O. C. Given command
brigade Pa. Reserves, 425; at
Dranesville, 426; ordered to the
Shenandoah Valley, 428.
O'Rourke, Captain Testimonial
of Pa. Reserves to, 442.
Packer, William F. Elected Gov
ernor of Pa., 1857, 32.
Palmer, Capt. W. J. Serves as
a scout in Maryland in 1862,
395; continues to enter Lee's
lines in Va., 397; arrested, but
escapes identification, 397, 398.
Parker, John B. On Gov. Cur-
tin's staff, 256.
Patterson, Robert Asks for more
soldiers, note, 253; his army at
Chambersburg, 393.
Pennsylvania Campaign of 1860,
42-47; defence of, 65, 66; draft
in, 80; opposition in Schuylkill
county, 81, 82; Lincoln on poli
tics in, 85, 87; State draft of
1862, 93, 94; doubtful in, 1864,
126; law regulating elections in
the army, 177; Republican party
beaten in October elections,
1864, 199; Lincoln's solicitude
in regard to the result in, in
Nov., 201, 202; the soldier
vote, 202, 203.
Pennsylvania Reserves Gov.
Curtin's call, 252; Gen. Patter
son's letter, note, 253; their ac
ceptance refused, 254; the com
mand authorized, 255; begin
active service, 256, 257; organ
ization of, 423; command given
to Gen. McCall, 425; at Dranes
ville, 426; with McDowell's
corps, 426; on the right of Mc-
Clellan's army, 429; in the bat
tle of Games' Mills, 429-431;
at Savage Station, 432; in the
battle, 433-435; losses before
Richmond, 435; Reynolds suc
ceeds McCall, 436; join Pope at
Warrenton Junction, 436, 437;
at the second battle of Man-
assas, 437, 438; Meade in com
mand, 438; at the battle of
South Mountain, 439; at An-
tietam, 439, 440; at Fredericks-
burg, 441, 442; effort to with
draw for reorganization, 443;
Gen. Crawford in command of,
443, 444; march into Md. and
Pa., 444,445; at Gettysburg, 445 ;
446; again in Va., 447; brisk
action at Bristoe Station, 448;
at the battle of the Wilderness,
449, 450; continued fighting,
451-453; services ended, 453;
Gen. Crawford's farewell, 453,
454; their return home, 454;
tribute to, 455, 456.
Pinkerton, Allan Convinced of
Lincoln's danger, 50.
Pomeroy, Stephen W. Sender of
the mysterious Kimmell mes
sage, 412; letter telling the his
tory of, 413-415.
Pope, John Given command of
Army of Virginia, 184; military
incompetency of, 373; prefers
charges against Fitz John Por
ter, 374; falls back from the
Rapidan, 437.
Porter, David D. Grant's mag
nanimity toward, 143; testi
mony to Lincoln's instructions
to Sherman, 240.
Porter, Fitz John Lincoln and
Stanton on judgment against,
186; an unrewarded hero, 355;
military injustice to, 371, 372;
antebellum and early war rec
ord, 372, 373; alleged dis
obedience of Pope's orders, 373;
services at Antietam, 373, 374;
Pope's charges, 374; fruitless
efforts to obtain justice, 374,
375; censure removed, 375;
Gen. Terry's generous con
duct toward, 376; career since
the war, 376, 377.
Potts, Joseph E. On Gov. Cur-
tin's staff, 256.
Raymond, Henry J. In Lin
coln's confidence in 1864, 121
INDEX.
493
Read, John M. Vote received in I
Chicago Convention, 39.
Reeder, Andrew H. For Cam- \
eron for President, 1860, 35;
vote received for Vice-Presi
dent in Chicago Convention, 39.
Republican Party Formation of, !
27, 28; in Pa. in 1860, 31, 32;
in Ind., 1860, 32; campaign in |
Pa., 1860, 42; discord in, 60; i
leaders distracted in 1864, 117.
Reynolds, John F. Sent to or- j
ganize emergency men, 1862, '
396; at Gettysburg, 415; given '
command of brigade Pa. Re- !
serves, 425; at Dranesville, 426; !
captured, 431; exchanged and
in command of Pa. Reserves,
436; at the second battle of
Manassas, 437, 438; relieved
and ordered to Harrisburg,
438; with First army corps, 441.
Rice, Perry A. One of Stuart's
Pa. prisoners, 402; death in
Libby Prison, 406.
Roberts, R. Biddle On Gov.
Curtin's staff, 256, 441.
Rosecrans, William S. Succeeds
Buell in Tennessee, 386.
Sanders, George N. As a peace
maker, 322.
Sanderson, John P. Represented
Cameron at Chicago, 1860, 153;
confers with Lincoln at Spring
field, 157, 158.
Schofield, John M. Joins
Thomas at Nashville, 365;
order to relieve Thomas, 366;
reviews judgment against Fitz
John Porter, 375.
Scott, Thomas A. Dines with
Lincoln, 51; arranges for Lin
coln's journey to Washington,
52, 53; Lincoln's letter remov
ing Cameron from War De
partment shown to, 164; be
lieved Gen. Sherman a lunatic,
230; on Gov. Curtin's staff,
256.
Scott, Winfield Warns Lincoln,
50; estimate of, in 1861, 65, 66;
on the military situation, 67, 68;
in his dotage, 69; Lincoln's visit
to, at West Point, 183 ; urges
Buchanan to reinforce South
ern forts, 302, 303.
Seiders, John A. Reports
Rhodes' movement from Car
lisle toward Gettysburg, 410.
Seward, William H. Before Chi
cago, 1860, 28; why opposed by
Curtin and Lane, 33, 34;
earnestness of the contest, 37;
indifference of, in campaign of
1860, 41; warns Lincoln, 50;
meets the President-elect, 57;
accepts and then declines office
under Lincoln, 59, 60; disbelief
in civil war, 60; favors a foreign
war, 61; favors Johnson for
Vice-President, 1864, 121; favors
Cameron for War portfolio,
159; Greeley's revolt against,
314.
Seymour, Horatio Nominated
for President, 1868, 145.
Seymour, Truman At Savage
Station, 435; at South Moun
tain, 439; at Antietam, 440.
Sheridan, Philip H. Victories in
1864, 124; furloughs Pa. sol
diers in 1864, 203; appointment
as Lieutenant-General 359-361;
accusations against Warren at
Five Forks, 379; persistent in
justice to Warren, 380, 381.
Sherman, John Support of Lin
coln, 62; visits Lincoln with
Capt. Sherman, note, 237; on
Lincoln's views of the restora
tion of State governments in
the South, note, 238; urges ac
ceptance of Pa. Reserves, 254.
Sherman, William T. Furloughs
soldiers to vote, 1864, 93; cap
tures Atlanta, 124; first meeting
with Lincoln, 227; declines
clerkship in War Department
and a Missouri brigadiership,
228; appointed colonei Thir
teenth regiment U. S. A., 229;
character of, 229, 230; Lincoln's
early estimate of, 230; regarded
as a lunatic, 230, 231; reasons
for the assumption, 231, 252;
conference with Cameron, 231,
2-?2; military services of, 232-
494
INDEX.
234; Lincoln's later confidence
in, 234; Johnston's surrender
to, 234, 235; terms of, 236; Lin
coln's views and instructions,
236, 237; John Sherman's let
ter, note, 238; assassination of
Lincoln, 239; Stanton's violent
rejection of Sherman's terms,
240; Gorham's letter, note, 245.
Sickles, Daniel E. Mission to
Tennessee, 1864, 119.
Simmons, Col. Goes to relief of
Col. Wallace, 256.
Slavery Lincoln's early attitude
toward, 34; position toward, as
President, 98; Emancipation,
preliminary proclamation and
letter to Greeley, 100; destruc
tion by Congressional action,
103; in the Border States, 103;
104; constitutional emancipa
tion, 109; constitutional amend
ment abolishing, 109, no; Dem
ocratic votes for amendment,
no; amendment ratified, in;
compensation for emancipation,
126, 127; Lincoln's attitude on
Cameron's and Fremont's
actions, 161-163; compensated
emancipation, 241.
Smith, C. R Named by Mc-
Clellan to succeed Grant, 102.
Smith, Caleb B. In Lincoln's
Cabinet, 60.
Smith, Captain Burns Mr. Mc-
Clure's house at Chambers-
burg, 419.
South Carolina President Bu
chanan's policy, 301, 302.
Stanton, Edwin M. Nomination
as Secretary of War, 77; orders
the 'military to Schuylkill
county, 81; orders superseded,
83; supports Chase for chief-
justice, 141; considered by Lin
coln for chief-justice, 142; rea
sons for appointment to War
Department, 165, 166; character
of, 170, 171; attitude toward
Lincoln, 171-183, 214, 215; ser
vices in Buchanan's Cabinet,
171, 172; virulent letters to Bu
chanan, 172, 173; change of
tone, 174; as Secretary of War,
174-177; telegraphic facilities,
note, 176; hatreds, 177; treat
ment of Jere McKibben, 177-
181; hatred of McClellan, 182;
hostilitv to McClellan's rein
statement, 184, 185; disobe
dience to Lincoln, 185; more
resentments, 185, 186; conflict
with President Johnson, 187;
in retirement, 187, 188; Mc
Clellan's accusations, 214, 215;
on dictatorship, 223; violent re
jection of Sherman's terms to
Johnston, 240; Curtin's rela
tions to, 259; supports Gov.
Curtin for re-election, 260;
subsequent unfriendliness, 260,
261; influence in Buchanan's
Cabinet, 300; 'dissatisfaction
with Thomas, 365; hatred of
Buell, 383, 387, 388.
States' Rights Question of, 62.
Stephens, Alex. H. Demands
recognition of the Confederacy
at Hampton Roads Conference,
106.
Stev.ns, Thaddeus Supports
McLean for President, 1860, 35;
closes debate on. constitutional
amendment abolishing slavery,
no; attitude toward Lincoln,
1864, 126; contrasted with Lin
coln, 277; courageous for jus
tice, 278; as the Commoner of
the republic, 278, 279; methods
in contrast with Lincoln's, 279;
280; abolition of slavery in
District of Columbia, 280, 281;
reasons for sunporting Mc
Lean in 1860, 281; reluctant
vote for Johnston for Vice-
President at Baltimore, 281,
282; eagerness of, to enter Lin
coln's Cabinet, 282, 283; pro
tests against Cameron's ap
pointment, 283; previous Cab
inet disappointment, 283; con
flicts with Lincoln, 284; hostile
attitude toward Johnson, 285,
286; his disappointment over
his own career, 286; love for
his mother, 287; the measures
formulated by, 287, 288; recon
struction policy, 288-292; as a
INDEX. \ '
495
lawyer, 293; death, 294, 295; ;
estimate of two commanders, |
396, 397-
Stuart, J. E. B. Raid into the
Cumberland Valley, 3995 arrest
of civilians in Pa., 1862, 402.
Sumner, Charles Vote for in
Chicago Convention, 39; dis
trusts Lincoln, 62; supports
Chase for chief-justice, 140,
141; tribute to Stevens, 295.
Sumner, Col. Disappointment
over Lincoln's departure from
Harrisburg to Washington, 53.
Swett, Leonard Letter to Mr.
Drummond, 29; supports Lin
coln at Chicago, 1860, 37; visits
Pa. Republican headquarters,
46; on Lincoln's characteristics,
75; a Lincoln organizer, 88;
reluctant support of Johnson at
Baltimore, 1864, 122; at Cincin
nati Convention, 1872, 327.
Taney, Roger B. Death of, 140.
Taylor, Col. Killed at Gettys
burg, 445, 446.
Tennessee Represented in Re
publican National Convention,
1864, 1 20.
Terry, A. H. Reviews judgment
in case of Fitz John Porter,
375; generous conduct toward
Porter, 376.
Thomas, George H. An unre
warded hero, 355; contrasted
with Meade, 362; military rec
ord of, 363, 364; his position at
Nashville and impending re
moval, 337-367; Gen. Logan's
mission, 367; battle of Nash
ville, 367, 368; vindicated by the
result, 368, 369; characteristics
f> 369, 370; refuses nomination
as General by brevet, 372;
career after the war, 372, 373;
requests recall of order reliev
ing Buell, 385, 386.
Thomas, Philip Succeeds Cobb
in Buchanan's Cabinet, 300.
Thomson^ John Edgar Soldiers'
orphans' schools, 267.
Tilden, Samuel J. Controls Dem
ocratic National Convention,
1868, 145.
Townsend, Assistant Adjutant-
General Mission to Harris-
burg, 82.
Trumbull, Lyman -Distrust of
Lincoln, 62; reports constitu
tional amendment abolishing
slavery, 109.
Virginia Lincoln's instructions
to Weitzel, 243; order revoked,
244.
Voorhees, Daniel W. Defends
Captain Cook, 352.
Wade, Benjamin F. Votes re
ceived in Chicago Convention,
39; distrusts Lincoln, 62; in op
position to Lincoln, 1864, 117,
139, 322, 324-
War for the Union In 1864, 117;
military and political situation,
124; declared a failure by Dem
ocratic National Convention,
225; Greeley's war issues, 318,
.19-
arren, G. K. An unrewarded
hero, 355; military career of,
377-379; Sheridan's allegations
at Five Forks, 379; ineffectual
efforts t> secure justice, 380,
381; death, 381.
Washburne, Elihu B. Meets
Lincoln on his arrival in Wash
ington, 57; justifies Grant's
conduct at Shiloh, 194.
Washington Threatened, 67;
McClellan in command of de
fences of, 184, 185.
Weed, Thurlow Greeley's rela
tions toward 1860, 30; seeks to
control Lane, note, 31; Seward
leader at Chicago, 37; displeas
ure over Lincoln's nomination,
40-42; favors Johnson for Vice-
President, 1864, 121; favors
Cameron for War portfolio,
159; relations to Seward and
Greeley, 315.
Welles, Gideon In Lincoln's
Cabinet, 60; on Lincoln's pol
icy of reconstruction, 242-244.
Weitzel, Godfrey Lincoln's or
der regarding Virginia Legis-
W 3 a
496
INDEX.
lature, 243; order revoked, 244.
Whitehead, Thomas W. Mr.
McClure's two meetings with,
406.
Willard, Governor Captain
Cook's brother-in-law. 344; ef
forts in Cook's behalf, 352.
Wilmot, David Republican can
didate for Governor of Pa., 32;
supports Lincoln at Chicago,
1860, 35-
Wilson, James F. Offers amend
ment to the constitution abol
ishing slavery, 109.
Wilson, William W. Services as
a military telegrapher, 395.
Wise, Henry A. Offers reward
for Cook's arrest, 339; insists
on Cook's execution, 352.
Wood, General Incredulity re
garding Stuart's raid, 1862,
399, 401.
Woodward, George W. Opposes
Curtin for Governor of Pa.
1863, 90.
Wright, John A. On Gov. Cur-
tin's staff, 256.
Yates, Richard Appoints Grant
colon:! Twenty-first Illinois
Volunteers, 191; hc.tility to
Buell, 385.
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