LIBRARY ^ 
 
 UNIVERSITY Of I 
 CALIFORNIA I 
 
 SAN OICSO j
 
 2
 
 I^S^
 
 INTERNATIONAL SERIES, No. 3 
 
 KDITED HY 
 
 CAPTAIN ARTHUR L. WAGNER, 
 
 Sixth Infantry, U. S. Army; Instructor in the Art of War at the V. S. 
 Infantry and Cavalry School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 
 
 TACTICAL STUDII<:S 
 
 ON THE 
 
 Battles Around Plevna, 
 
 By THILO VON TROTHA, 
 
 Captain of the Grenadier Regiment P'rederick William IV. Attached). 
 
 WITH ONE MAP. 
 
 Translated by Carl Reichmann, 
 
 First Lieutenant gth Infantry, U. S. Army. 
 
 lyH-,. 
 
 HUDSON-KIMUKKI.Y rrBI.lSIllNC. COMTANY. 
 
 lOH lOlti WvANHorrF. Strekt. 
 
 KANSAS CITY. MO.
 
 Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1896, 
 
 By HUDSON-KIMBKRLY PUBLISHING CO., 
 
 In the OflSce of the Librarian of Congrsss, Washington, D. C.
 
 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 Among the many books on the Turko-Russian war of 
 1877 8, two works stand out prominently; namely, Greene's 
 "Russian Campaigns in Turkey," which is universally recog- 
 nized as a military classic, and Von Trotha's able work, 
 which, though long and favorably known in Germany, is 
 here presented in English for the first time. Of the latter 
 work it is perhaps sufficient to say that, in its full and care- 
 ful consideration of tactical matters, it forms a worthy sup- 
 plement to the former, and as such it will doubtless prove 
 welcome to American and English readers. 
 U. S. Infantry and Cavalry School, 
 
 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, May 1, 1896.
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Ammunition supply, 52. 
 
 Archangel Regiment, at Plevna on July 19th, 43; inaction on July 20th, 
 
 46; losses on July 29th, 49; criticised, .52; at first battle of Plevna, 57; 
 
 at second battle'of Plevna, 105; at the last sortie, 185. 
 Armament of the opposing infantry, 212. 
 Arnoldi, General, supersedes Kryloff on the left bank of the Vid, 155; 
 
 at Dolni Dubnik, 167. 
 Artillery, comments on, 221. 
 
 Astrachan Dragoons, ordered to the left bank of the Vid, 134. 
 Babakonak pass, 37. 
 
 Bashi-bozouks, mentioned, 22, 77; on the left bank of the Vid, 141. 
 Bazaine, Marshal, his action at Metz, discussed, 196. 
 Berdan rifles used at Plevna by Russians, 117, 211. 
 Biskupski, makes a reconnaissance on July 29th, 68. 
 Bug Lancers, ordered to the left bank of the Vid, 141. 
 Caucasian Cossacks, action on night of 1.5th-16th July, 43; at Plevna 
 
 on July 19th, 43; in action July 20th, 48; at capture of Lovtcha, 83; 
 
 at second battle of Plevna, 94; on left bank of the Vid, 142; at 
 
 Gorni Dubnik. 160; at Telis, 169. 
 Cavalry, comments, 215. 
 
 Charkof Lancers, on the left bank of the Vid, 145. 
 Charles of Roumania, 15; commands Roumanian Army, 27; orders 
 
 final dispositions at Plevna, 184. 
 Chasseur regiments, at Gorni Dubnik, 163; at Telis, 165. 
 Chefket Pasha, reenforces the army at Plevna, 153; attempts to succor 
 
 the "etappen" posts, 169. 
 Chifsi Pasha, commanding the fortified posts in rear of Plevna, 154; 
 
 surrenders, 164. 
 Coast Arm}', mentioned, 9. 
 Combat, character of, 2"3. 
 Czarowitz, mentioned, 13, 15 
 Daniloff, General, at the last sortie, 186. 
 Danube campaign, review of, 9. 
 
 Dismounted fighting, criticised in the Russian Army, 219. 
 Dobrovolski, General, at capture of Lovtcha, 84; at second battle of 
 
 Plevna, 100; killed, 126. 
 Dobrudja, mentioned, 12. 
 Don Cossacks, before Plevna on July 19th, 43; in action of July 20th, 
 
 45; criticised, 51; at second battle of Plevna, 94; ordered to the 
 
 left bank of the Vid, 134; numbers, 216. 
 DoTobanzes regiments, at sortie of August 31st, 76; at second battle of 
 
 Plevna, 105; on the left bank of the Vid, 139. 
 Dragoon regiments, at sortie of August 31st, 76; on the left bank of 
 
 the Vid, 138; at Telis, 165; at Dolni Dubnik, 168; at investment of 
 
 Plevna, 182. 
 Ellis, General, at Gorni Dubnik, 159. 
 Entrenching tools, 212. 
 Estland Regiment, at capture of Lovtcha, 87; at second battle of 
 
 Plevna, 98.
 
 Inaex. 5 
 
 Finland Regiment, at Gorni Dubnik, 162. 
 
 Fire of masses, 203. 
 
 Formak, General, commanding militia brigade, 157. 
 
 Fortresses and field entrenchments, 225. 
 
 Galitz Regiment, in action of July 20th, 47; at first battle of Plevna, 57; 
 
 at sortie of August 31st, 76; at second battle of Plevna, 94. 
 Ganetzki, General, commands a sector of the line of investment, 182; 
 
 at last sortie, 189; receives the surrender, 191. 
 Gorni Dubnik, use of artillery at, 224. 
 Gortaloff, Major, killed, 125. 
 Gourko, General, mentioned, 13, 15; in rear of Plevna, 155; captures 
 
 Gorni Dubnik, 162; seizes the passes over the Balkans, 183. 
 Grand Headquarters, mentioned, 13, 15. 
 "Green Hills" of Plevna, mentioned, 39; attacked, 98. 
 Grenadiers, arrive from Russia, 31; defeat the final sortie of the Turks, 
 
 33, 185; at Gorni Dubnik, 159; at Telis, 167; at investment of 
 
 Plevna, 182. 
 Grivitza redoubt, mentioned, 30, 97. 
 Guard corps, arrival from Russia, 31, 154; in actions in rear of Plevna, 
 
 174. 
 Haki Pasha, surrenders at Telis, 170. 
 Hussar regiments, at sortie of August 31st, 75; on the left bank of the 
 
 Vid, 143; at Telis, 165; at Dolni Dubnik, 168; at investment of 
 
 Plevna, 182. 
 Imeretinski, General, arrives from Lovtcha, 29; ordered to attack 
 
 Lovtcha, 83; at second battle of Plevna, 94. 
 Infantry, comments on, 209. 
 
 Ingermanland Regiment, at second battle of Plevna, 132. 
 Ismailof Regiment at Gorni Dubnik, 163. 
 Jablonitza pass, mentioned, 92. 
 Jaroslof Regiment, at first battle of Plevna, 62; losses, 65; at sortie of 
 
 August 31st, 76; at second battle of Plevna, 108. 
 Kalarashi regiments, on the left bank of the Vid, 138. 
 Kaluga Regiment, at capture of Lovtcha, 86; at second battle of 
 
 Plevna, 98. 
 Kataley, General, commands a sector of the investment, 182. 
 Kazan Dragoons, ordered to the left bank of the Vid, 134. 
 Kazan Regiment, position on August 31st, 76; at capture of Lovtcha, 
 
 83; at second battle of Plevna, 108. 
 Kerim Pasha, his secret plan, 10, 2D2. 
 Kieff Regiment, at the second battle of Plevna, 94. 
 Koloma Regiment, at first battle of Plevna, 59; losses, 65; assigned to 
 
 the left wing, 73; at sortie on August 31st, 76; at second battle of 
 
 Plevna, 108. 
 Kosloff Regiment, at first battle of Plevna, 56; at second battle of 
 
 Plevna, 108. 
 Kostroma Regiment, arrives before Plevna, July 19th, 43; in the action 
 
 of July 20th, 47; losses, 49; criticised, -52. 
 Kourloff, General, at the last sortie, 189. 
 Krenk rifles, used by Russians, 117, 211. 
 Krishin redoubt, attacked, 98. 
 Kriidener, General, mentioned, 14; orders the occupation of Plevna, 
 
 24; reinforced, 25; defeated, 26; at the first battle of Plevna, 56; 
 
 criticised, 67; at the second battle of Plevna, 93; commanding a 
 
 sector of the investment, 181.
 
 i5 Index. 
 
 Kryloff, General, commanding cavalry on the left bank of the Vid, 31; 
 commanding the Fourth Corps, 75; at the second battle of Plevna, 
 93; commanding the "combined cavalry corps," 142; driven back 
 by Turkish relief troops, 153. 
 
 Kuban Regiment, on the left bank of the Vid, 146; at Gorni Dubnik, 161. 
 
 Kuropatkin, Captain, at capture of Lo\i:cha, 89; at second battle of 
 Plevna, 113; wounded, 123. 
 
 Kursk Regiment, at battle of Plevna, 55; losses, 65. 
 
 Lancer regiments, at sortie of August 31st, 75; on the left bank of the 
 Vid, 135; at Dolni Dubnik, 168; at Telis, 170; at investment of 
 Plevna, 182. 
 
 Leontieff, General, at second battle of Plevna, 94. 
 
 Levis, Colonel, on the left bank of the Vid, 145; driven back by relief 
 troops, 154. 
 
 Libau Regiment, at capture of Lovtcha, 86; at second battle of 
 Plevna, 100. 
 
 Loshkareff, General, on the left bank of the Vid, 31, 134; at the first 
 battle of Plevna, 55; at the second battle of Plevna, 94; ordered to 
 Bogot, 142. 
 
 Lovtcha, mentioned, 83; advance on, 19, 83; arrangements for capture 
 of, 84; action on right bank of the Osma, 85; action on the left 
 bank, 87; losses, 88; attempts to relieve, 88; comments, 89. 
 
 Mariopul Hussars, on the left bank of the Vid, 145. 
 
 Mariopul Regiment, at the second battle of Plevna, 94. 
 
 Mehemed Ali Pasha, mentioned, 15,17; at Sophia, 32. 
 
 Midhat Pasha, governor of the Danube province, 35. 
 
 Moscow Regiment, at Gorni Dubnik, 159. 
 
 Moszewoi, Colonel, at second battle of Plevna, 115. 
 
 Muravieff, General, at investment of Kars, 192. 
 
 Mustahafiz, mentioned, 11. 
 
 National Guard, mentioned, 11. 
 
 Nicholas, Grand Duke, mentioned, 9. 
 
 Orloff, Colonel, at second battle of Plevna, 121. 
 
 Osman Pasha, mentioned, 10, 11, 14; starts from Widdin, 23; sortie of 
 August 31st, 28; surrenders, 34, 191; at second battle of Plevna, 
 119; supplies his army, 154; attempts to break the investment, 183. 
 
 Pawlof Regiment, at Gorni Dubnik, 162. 
 
 Peabody-Martini rifles, used by the Turks, 211. 
 
 Pelisha't, sortie of August 31st, 28, 75. 
 
 Penza Regiment, at first battle of Plevna, 57; at second battle of 
 Plevna, 108. 
 
 Plans of operations, 19-^. 
 
 Plevna, review of operations around, 22; geographical conditions, 35; 
 topographical conditions, 38; fortifications, 40; advance on July 
 19th, 43; attack on July 20th, 14, 45; losses on July 20th, 49, battle 
 of July 30th, 54; position of troops on July 29th, 54; dispositions for 
 July 30th, 55; events up to 2:30 p. m. July 30th, .56; Russian right 
 attack July 30th, 57; Russian left attack Ju y 30th, 60; Skobeleff's 
 attack July 30th, 62; losses on July 30th, 65;' panic at Sistova, 65; 
 comments on battle of July 30th, 67; artillery attack on Septem- 
 ber 7th-10th, 93; comments on artillery attack, 101; battles on 
 September 11th andl2th, 10:^; dispositions on September 11th, 103; 
 attack on the Grivitza works, 105; attack on the Radischevo works, 
 107; attack on the Krishin works, 109; losses in second battle of
 
 Index. 7 
 
 Plevna, 125; comments on second battle of Plevna, 127; cavalrv on 
 the left bank of the Vid, 134; cavalry under Loshkareff, 134; cavalry 
 under Kryloff, 142; comments, 148; investment from the west, 153, 
 communications to the rear, 153; Gourko's task and dispositions, 
 154; capture of Gorni Dubnik, 158; events at Telis on October 
 24th, 165; events at Dolni Dubnik on October 24th, 167; capture of 
 Telis on October 28th, 168; losses on the left bank of the Vid, 173; 
 comments on events in rear of Plevna, ^74; the fall of, 181; gen- 
 eral measures for the investment, 181; signs of the Turkish at- 
 tempt to break out, 183; Russian dispositions for December 10th, 
 183, events on the left bank of the Vid, 185; events on the right 
 bank of the Vid, 189; the surrender, 191; losses, 191; comments, 192. 
 
 Pokof Regiment, at capture of Lovtcha, 87. 
 
 Radischevo redoubt, attack of, 97; "Red Hill" at Lovtcha, 85. 
 
 Reaf Pasha, mentioned, 11. 
 
 Reval Regiment, at capture of Lovtcha, 86; at second battle of 
 Plevna. 109. 
 
 Richter, General, commanding bridge at Sistova, 66. 
 
 Rifle battalions, at capture of Lovtcha, 85; at second battle of Plevna, 
 100; in rear of Plevna, 15 ; at Gorni Dubnik, 161; at investment of 
 Plevna, 182. 
 
 Rifle-trenches, 203 
 
 Rodionof, General, at second battle of Plevna, 106; wounded, 126. 
 
 Rosalita pass, 37. 
 
 Roschiori, on the left bank of the Vid, 135. 
 
 Rosenbach, General, at Gorni Dubnik, 159. 
 
 Roumanian Army, mentioned, 10, 11, 16; joins the Russians, 27, 29; 
 at the investment of Plevna, 181. 
 
 Roumanian troops, at sortie of August 31st, 78; at second battle of 
 Plevna, 94; ordered to the left bank of the Vid, 134; at Dolni Dub- 
 nik, 168; at the last sortie, 185. 
 
 Rykatschef, Colonel, at second battle of Plevna, 107. 
 
 Rylsk Regiment, at first battle of Plevna, 60; losses, 65. 
 
 Schilder-Schuldner, General, mentioned, 2+; ordered to advance, 43; 
 criticised, 50; at first battle of Plevna, 57. 
 
 Schnitnikoff, General, at second battle of Plevna, 108; commands the 
 fifth sector of the investment, 184. 
 
 Serpuchoff Regiment, at first battle of Plevna, 59; losses, 65, in sup- 
 port of left wing, 73; at sortie of August 31st, 76; at second battle of 
 Plevna, 108. 
 
 Shakofskoi, General, at first battle of Plevna, 55. 
 
 Shernosuboff, General, on the left bank of the Vid, 141. 
 
 Shestakoff, at second battle of Plevna, 114. 
 
 Shipka pass, mentioned, 13, 17, 38. 
 
 Shuja Regiment, at first battle of Plevna, 61; losses, 65; at sortie of 
 August 31st, 75; at capture of Lovtcha, 83; at second battle of 
 Plevna, 108. 
 
 Skobeleff, General, attacks the "Green Hills," 30; at first battle of 
 Plevna, 55; his use of the three arms, 74; at capture of Lovtcha, 83; 
 at second battle of Plevna, 98; commands a sector of the invest- 
 ment, 182; at the last .sortie, 189; his handling of artillery, 223. 
 
 Snider rifles, used by the Turks, 211. 
 
 South Army, mentioned, 9. 
 
 btalkenberg, Colonel, mentioned, 143.
 
 8 Index. 
 
 Sulienian Pasha, mentioned, 11, 17. 
 
 Susdal Regiment, at sortie on August 31st, 75; at second battle of 
 
 Plevna, 101. 
 Tamboff Regiment, at first battle of Plevna, 57; at second battle of 
 
 Plevna, 108. 
 Tcherkass, Colonel, mentioned, 147. 
 Tcherkesses, mentioned, 11, 22; on the left bank of the Vid, 1.37; at 
 
 Gorni Dubnik, 161; at Telis, 169; numbers of, 215. 
 Tchermat, General, commander-in-chief of the Roumanian Army, 46; 
 
 commanding a sector of the line of investment, 181. 
 Tebjanik, General, at second battle of Plevna, 114; wounded, 123. 
 Telis, use of artiller\' at, 223. 
 Tetewen pass, mentioned, 92. 
 "Three Wells," mentioned, 95. 
 
 Todleben, General, "assistant" to the commander-in-chief, 154; pre- 
 pares the investment of Plevna, 181. 
 Trajan's wall, mentioned, 12. 
 Trojan pass, mentioned, 37. 
 
 Turkish Army, mentioned, 10; strength at the end of August, 10, 81. 
 Turkish cavalry on the left bank of the Vid, 136. 
 Tutolmin, Colonel, at first battle of Plevna, 63; on the left bank of 
 
 the Vid, 143. 
 Uglitz Regiment, at sortie on August 31st, 75; at second battle of 
 
 Plevna, 108. 
 Vladi Caucasian Regiment, on the left bank of the Vid, 145. 
 Vladimir Regiment, at sortie of August 31st, 76; at second battle of 
 
 Plevna, 109. 
 West Army, strength of Russian, 30; strength at end of August, 81. 
 Widdin, mentioned, 23. 
 
 Wilhelminoff, General, at first battle of Plevna, 55 
 Wologda Regiment, before Plevna on July 19th, 43; in action of July 
 
 20th, 46; losses on July 20th. 49; criticised, 52; at first battle of 
 
 Plevna, 57; supports attack, 71; at second battle of Plevna, 106; at 
 
 the last sortie, 185. 
 Woronesh Regiment, at first battle of Plevna, 60; at second battle of 
 
 Plevna, 108. 
 Zeddeler, General, at Gorni Dubnik, 159. 
 Zgalevitza, sortie on August 31st, 28, 75; position of troops before, 75; 
 
 Turkish attack on, 76; Turkish repulse at, 78; Russian pursuit, 79; 
 
 losses at, 80; comments, 80. 
 Zimmerman, General, mentioned, 12. 
 Zotoff, General, commmands the Russian West Army, 27; at sortie of 
 
 August 31 9t, 76; chief of staff, 100; at second battle of Plevna, 121; 
 
 commands a sector of the investment, 182.
 
 The Damihe Canijmif/v. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 IXTKODUCTORY REVIEW OF THE DANUBE 
 CAMPAIGN. 
 
 The army designated to operate against European Tur- 
 key, and called the Army of the South, was commanded by 
 the Grand Duke Nicholas and consisted of the YIIL, IX., XI., 
 and XII. Corps of t\v(> infantry and one cayalry diyision 
 each, of the 4th Rifle Brigade, a combined Cossack diyision, 
 and a. number of separate Cossack regiments attached to the 
 corps and diyisions. On April 24th the Army began to 
 cross Mie Roumanian frontier, and (•omi)leted its strategic 
 deployment along the Danube during the ensuing month, 
 mostly by marching and to a smaller extent l)y the use of 
 the railroad, which was largely occupied hj the transport of 
 the heayy artillery, the pontoon ])arks, and other stores of 
 munitions and proyisions. 
 
 ^^'hile the greater part of the cayalry held the line of 
 the Danube from the mouth of the Aluta downward, the 
 main body of the army stood toward the end of May in the 
 yicinity of Bucharest, the right wing at Slatina on the 
 Aluta, the left wing at Oltenitza on the Danube, On the 
 lower Danube was one diyision of the XI. Corps, strength- 
 ened by a. detachment of the ^'II. Corps, which latter, to- 
 gether with the X. Corps, constituted the Coast Army for 
 the pi'otection of the northern shores of the Black !r>ea.
 
 10 T<i<-tic<il Shidiix oil the lidfth s Around I'lcina. 
 
 Of three other corps also mobilized and assigned to the 
 fiekl army, the XIV. Corps was directed to- advance to the 
 lower Danube and relieve there the division of the XL Corps 
 wiiich was to rejoin the main army, while the IV. and XIIL 
 Corps were to join tlit^ main army directly. Political reasons 
 preventedtlieRonmanian Army fr;)m active i)articipati()n in 
 the campaiji'n. This force consisted of four divisions posted 
 in Lesser Wallachia, and in a certain sense constituted the 
 right fltuik guard of' the Russian deployment in Greater 
 Wallachia. 
 
 On account of the complete absence of any fixed organi- 
 zation of the Turkish army, and on account of the unsettled 
 state of the Turkish Empire, the strength, distribution, and 
 special formation of the Turkish troops can not be given with 
 comx>lete accuracy, although the following round figures 
 may be approximately correct. At the time of the Russiaji 
 passage of the Danube there w^ere: 
 
 1. In the (]u ad ri lateral Shumla — Varna — Silistria — 
 Rustehuk, the main (East) army under Kerim Pasha, 100,000 
 strcmg, of which about 00,000 men may be considered avail- 
 able for field operations; 
 
 2. In the Dobrudja, about 10,000 to 15,000 men ; 
 
 'A. In Nikopolis, Sistova, and Tirnova, about 10,000 
 men ; 
 
 4. At Widdin, the Western Army under Osman Pasha, 
 50,000 strong, of which about 40,000 men probably marched 
 toward Plevna at the end of June ; 
 
 5. At Sophia, about 20,000 men, a. sort of reserve army,
 
 The JJ(titiih( < '(niijKii(/ii. 11 
 
 for the most pai't a,lso niaitliin^' to Plevna to join Osnian 
 Pasha; 
 
 G. South of the Balkans, on the line Philii)i>opolis — 
 Adi'ia.n(>i)le, sonu^ 10,000 to 15,000 uwu iindtM- Ivcui' I'aslui, 
 will) (lid not assnnu' actual conunand until aftci- thr tirst 
 passages of the I^alkans by tlu^ Russians; 
 
 7. About 30,000 men under Suleiman I'asha, which had 
 been put in motion towai-<l Kounudia from the theater of war 
 in ^NIontenegTO ; 
 
 S. The reinforcements of regular troo]»s from Constan- 
 tinople, fr(un distant provinces, and from new organizations 
 which had been formed with considerable zeal and skill, are 
 estimated at not h^ss than 40,000 nn^n. Most nf tlu^se were 
 scmt to Suleiman Pa.sha.'s army. 
 
 The Tcherkesses,a.n irregular but excellent light cavalry, 
 numbering about 20,000 men, are included in the above data. 
 The Mustahaiiz or National Guard are not included, as their 
 militai'y value is doubtful and has not yet been tested in 
 actual conflict Avitli Russian troops. 
 
 On the side of the Russians the infantry divisions may be 
 put down at 10,000 men, the cavalry divisions at 2,'M) horses, 
 the Cotssack regiments at 500 horses; the entire tield army of 
 seren coiq^s is therefore to be estimated at about 150,000 in- 
 fantry, 25,000 cavalry, 20,000 special troops, and 800 field 
 guns; in. a<l<li1ion there was a. siege jtarlc of ."MO hea\y and 
 medium guns. 
 
 The R(Minianian Army, so far as lit for the held. ina>- be 
 estimated at 40,000 men.
 
 12 Tdclival l^ludie-'i on (he Batilvs AroumI Plrnia. 
 
 Active pperations suffered a further poslponemeut of 
 four weeks through the unusually high and long-continued 
 rise of tJie Danube; the delay in the arrival of the large 
 masses of bridging material required, due to defective or- 
 ganization of the Roumanian railways; and the necessity of 
 rendering the Turkish monitor flotilla on the Danube harm- 
 less by the use of batteries and torpedoes. 
 
 On the 21st of June General Zimmermann crossed the 
 Danube at Galatz with the head of his (XIV.) corps, and es- 
 tablished himself on the opposite bank after a brisk engage- 
 ment. The remainder of his corps followed during the next 
 few days, and was subsequently joined by a. part of the VII. 
 Corps ; the whole constituted the so-called ^'Column of the 
 Lower Danube," which advanced through the Dobrudja, 
 meeting insignificant resistance on the part of the enemy, 
 and reached Kustendje and Trajan's Wall about the middle 
 €f July. None but small reconnoitering parties crossed this 
 line. Unfavorable sanitary conditions, difficulties of sup- 
 ply and the duty of guarding the shore line, caused the 
 larger portion of the column of 30,000 men to remain inactive 
 in the Dobrudja and to exercise no influence whatever on the 
 operations in Bulgaria beyond. The opposing Turkish 
 troops appear to have been greatly inferior. 
 
 We now turn to the main army. On the 27th of June 
 the VIII. Corps crossed the Danube at Zimnitza under a 
 sharp engagement with a Turkish brigade posted at Sistova ; 
 by the 5th of July the IX. and Xni. Corps, the 4th Rifle Bri- 
 gade, the Bulgarian Legion, and the combined Cossa<:'k
 
 Tlic Ddinihc ('(nup(ii(/ii. 13 
 
 division had also completed their passage at this point. 
 Anticipatino- somewhat, we note here that by the middh' of 
 July the XL, XII., and IV. Corps were also brought to the 
 right bank. 
 
 The Yantra bridge at Biela having fallen into the hands 
 of the Russians on the 3d of July, General Gourko occupied 
 Tirnova on the 8th of July v^dth a mixed advance guard, 
 crossed the Balkans from here by the trail to the east of the 
 Shipka pass, reached the village of Hankioi at the southern 
 foot of the mountains on the 14th, and turned westward, took 
 Kazanlyk <m July ITlh, whn-c lir found liimsolf in tli<' rear 
 of the Shipka pass, which was unsuccessfully attacked on 
 the same day by a detachment of the VIII. Corps coming 
 from Gabrova. The appearance of Gourko in rear of their 
 position caused the weak Turkish garrison to evacuate the 
 pass on the 19th without resistance, and to i-ctreat by side 
 paths. One of the principal l.alkau passes was thus in 
 Russian hands. 
 
 Grand Headquai'ters was moved from Sistova to Biela 
 on the 8th of July, and thence to TirnoA'a on the 17th. 
 
 Tlie passage of the Balkans divided the Russian army of 
 operation in Bulgaria into three separate groups: the cen- 
 ter, consisting of th(^ N'lII. Coips ;ind Goui-ki)"s mixed ad- 
 vance guard, operated in the P.alkiUis and f«»r sonic linio also 
 to the south of them; the loft wing, ronsistiiig <»f the XII. 
 and XIII. Corps, charged with the investment and siege of 
 Rustchuk and placed under the orders of the Czarowitz, 
 extended along the Lorn from the Danube to Osman-Bazar,
 
 14 Tdcticdl Sftnlics on the lUtttki^ Around I'lcrna. 
 
 Willi headquarters at Kadikioi. The ri<iht winj?, consisting 
 of the IX, Corps, under (xeneral Ivrudeiier,\vas cliarged in 
 the first ])lace with takinjr Nikopolis, j^niarding the line 
 Nikopolis — Phmia. — Lo^'tcha, and establishinj; eomniunica- 
 tion from the latter place with the center in the Balkans, 
 The IV. and XI. Corps were at this time in the act of c.ross- 
 ing: the Danube. 
 
 Meanwhile General Kriidener with the IX. Cwps had 
 moved on Nikopolis. On the loth of July the commandinji' 
 and strong^ly fortified positions in front of the x>l^ce were 
 taken by assault, and ol the Kith the o^arrison capitulated. 
 
 (>sman Pasha, who marched from Widdin with his 
 oorx)S about the end of June, had in the meantime- reached 
 Plevna without being discovered by the Russians. A weak 
 detacliment of the IX, Corjis dispatched against this place 
 on the 20th of July was repulsed with considerable loss. 
 
 The un<'xpected api>earance of this strong Turkish army 
 in the space between the \\(l and the Osma caused a com- 
 plete change in tlie situation. 
 
 Kriidener, with the IX, Corps reinforced by a brigade of 
 the XI, and a division of the I^", Corps, attacked Plevna on 
 the 30th of July and sutfered a heavy defeat, 
 
 Osman Pasha ^'a.s pre■^'ented, probably by the deficient 
 character of his army, from acting on the offensive and reap- 
 ing the fruits of his victory, and the Russian communica- 
 tions by way of Sistova, senously menaced at first, remained 
 undisturbed, XeverthelesS( the Russian offensive had not 
 only been checked for the present, but the Russians were
 
 The Duniihe Ca»}piii(/ii. 15 
 
 obliged to make retrograde raovemeuts in the center and on 
 both, flanks. 
 
 On the left the Czaro\\itz. whose forces had been 
 angmented by a. part of the XI. Corps, raised th<' invest- 
 iinent of Knstchuk and took a defensive position along the 
 Black Lorn against the Tnrkish army assembling in his 
 front. After his snccessful passage of the Balkans, (Jonrko 
 extended his troops in the Tundja valley, called the Bul- 
 garians to arms, spread terror and confusion as far as IMiil- 
 ippopolis and Adrianople. He was defeated at Eski-Zagra on 
 the 31st of July and compelled to retreat to Kazaulyk. by 
 Suleiman I'asha., who had brought his corx)s, heretofore em- 
 ployed against ^Montenegro, by water from Antivari to Ded- 
 eag at the mouth of the Maritza, thence by rail to Adriano- 
 ple, and had advanced from the latter ]»la('e norllnvard by 
 forced marches. The ^'ITI. Corps, originally designated to 
 follow Gourko across the Balkans, could no longer be em- 
 ployed in the hitter's support, on account of the unfavorable 
 situation north of the Balkans. He therefore evacuated 
 Kazanlyk on the 6th of August and withdrew into the Bal- 
 kan pasises, w'here he entrenched himself. 
 
 Cri'and Headquarters was moved back from Tiriio\a to 
 l>iela.. The unfavoi'abh' situation liad dcinoiisiralcd to the 
 Russian leaders that the forces employed were une(iual to 
 the task, and the attempt was made to remedy this evil in 
 two ways: ftret., reinforcements of ten infantry divisions 
 (five Line, three Guard, two Grenadier) and two cavalry 
 di\isions (Gua.rd) were ordered from Kussia; second, a
 
 16 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 treaty (lieretofore refused by Russia) was concluded with 
 Roumauia, which made the Roumanian army available for 
 use in active operations. The West Army, consisting of the 
 I\\ and IX, Corps, was augmented by the entire Roumanian 
 army and the Guards and Grenadiers which arrived later, 
 and the command w^as conferred on Prince Charles of Rou- 
 mania. The remaining three Russian infantry divisions 
 were assignedtothe East Army under the Czarowitz, as also 
 those parts of the XI. Corpsnotheretoforesoassigned. Gen- 
 eral Radetzki, with part of the former advance guard and 
 the VIII. Corps, foi'med the center in the Balkans and con- 
 nected the two rtank aniiies, which were ijosted with their 
 backs toward each other. 
 
 For the present the West Army left one Roumanian 
 division, and the East Army left several Russian bodies, on 
 the north bank of the Danube opposite the Turkish fort- 
 resses. 
 
 The reinforcements ordered had not arrived when at 
 the beginning of August the three Turkish armies — the West 
 Army under Osman Pasha at Plevna, the South Army under 
 Suleiman Pashaat Kazanly k, the East Army under Mehemed 
 Ali Pasha on the line Razgrad — Osman-Bazar — were in 
 readiness to advance to a concentric attack. The Russian 
 Army, which was posted between the Osma, the Lom, and 
 the Balkansin the triangle Xikopolis — Gabrova^ — Rustchuk, 
 was shaken by its reverses, and in an undoubted critical po- 
 sition, having to rely for weeks, until the arrival of consider- 
 able reinforcements, on its own strength, which had been 
 recognized as insufficient.
 
 Thv Danuhe Canipaifju. 17 
 
 Even the splendid bravery manifested by the Russian 
 troops on ever}- occasion would hardly have saved the aiiuy 
 from heavy reverses, had not a certain unwieldiness of the 
 Turkish Army in offensive movements, as well as lack of har- 
 mony, and even open enmity, between the Turkish leaders, 
 acted in favor of the Russians. 
 
 Instead of utilizin<i- the open ])asses to the east of 
 Shipka and advancing- with the nuiin body of his army, 
 consisting- of battle-tried elite battalions, against the line 
 Osman-Bazar — Tirn<iva in cooiteiation with tlu^ P]ast Ai-uiy, 
 Suleiman Pasha wasted his strength for six days in heroic 
 but useless attacks against the position in the Shipka pass, 
 which was defended by an opponent equally heroic, though 
 much infeiior in strength. His heavy losses (more tlian 
 15,000 men, according to Turkish statements) rendered 
 SuleimaJi's amiy unfit for active operations, at least foi' the 
 presemt. It was not until September 17th, and after com- 
 plete reorganization of his troops and considerable acces- 
 sions of reinforcements, that he undertook another' unex- 
 I>ected attack on the Shipka pass, which, though successful 
 at first, was repulsed in the end. 
 
 During this time MelicuKMl Ali advanced from Razgrad 
 against the Russian position on the Kara Lom. 
 
 After several small engagements, a detachment of the 
 Russian center was defeated at Kara-Hassan kioi on the 
 right bank of the Kara. Lom on the -Slst of August, another 
 was beaten at Kazeljewo on the 5tli of September and ])nslied 
 over the Lom, whose right bank was completely in the hands
 
 18 Tactical t<tudics on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 of the Turks on Se])tembei" 7tli. To defend tlie line of the 
 Jjintrji. tJie Russian East Anny took j)osition on the right 
 banlc of tlie stream on the phiteau between tlie Jantra and 
 the Bajiizka Lorn (left brajich of the Kara. Loni). On the 
 13th of September Mehemed Ali crossed to the left bank of 
 the Kara Lorn, defeated a Russian detachment at Sinaiikioi 
 on the 14th, and on September 21st made an unsuccessful 
 attempt to force a pasisage oyer the Banizka Lom at Tschir- 
 kowna. Repulsed with considerable loss. Mehemed Ali re- 
 crossed the Kara Lom, whose pasisages from Kazeljewo 
 downward as far a-s Pyrgos were reoccupied by the Russians 
 by the middle of October. 
 
 Osman Pasha's inactivity throughout is surprising. By 
 his unexpected approach from Vk'iddin and his tactical skill 
 in the defensive actions during July he had made his appear- 
 ance on the field of war in splendid manner, and decisive 
 action might have been expected on his part. An insignifi- 
 cant advance from IMevna westward on the 14th of August 
 and another feeble unsuccessful attack from Lovtcha 
 against Selvi on the 21st and 22d of August are not to be 
 taken for seriously contemplated aggressive movements. 
 Still the coincidence in time of the latter attack with the be- 
 ginning of the great attack on the Shipka. pass by Suleinuui 
 Pasha, as well as with the advance of Mehemed Ali against 
 the upper Lom, is worth noting. More seriously contem- 
 plated and more vigorously carried out was Osman Pasha's 
 attack against the Russian positions at Zgalevitza and Pel- 
 ishat on the 31st of August; but this attack was likewise
 
 Tlw Ddiiuhe C(nni)<ii(/ii. 19 
 
 undertaken with but half of the avaihible forces, and is not 
 to be considered as a last struggle for final decision. Coin- 
 cident again with Osmaii's attack was Mehemed Ali's ad- 
 vance against the middle Loni, while Suleiman was still en- 
 gaged in reorganizing his army, which was shattered and un- 
 able to cooijerate with the aggressive movements of the two 
 flank armies. 
 
 ^Vhile tile Kussians were restricting themselves in the 
 Balkans and on the Lorn to the defense of their partly main- 
 tained and reoccupied positions, tlie West Army, reinforced 
 by two Russian infantry divisions and the Roumanians, jiro- 
 ceeded to the serious attack on IMevna, 
 
 After the capture of Lovtcha on the 3d of September, 
 the great artillery attack against Plevna opened on the 7th, 
 and continued for some time after the great assault on the 
 lltli of September, which, though in part successful, must 
 be accounted a failure. 
 
 The attempt to deprive the Army of Plevna of its com- 
 munications with Widdin and Sophia, l)y ]>osting a strong 
 cavalry corps on the left bank of the Vid was without result 
 for a tinia Reinforcements with considerable supplies of 
 provisions and munitions repeatedl}' broke through the 
 weak line of investment on the left bank, and succeeded in 
 getting int(> Plevna. The investnicnl of Plcxiia did not be- 
 come effective and make itself felt until after General 
 Gourko assumed command of the corps of imcslnicnt (tn 
 the left bank of the Vid with trooi>s of the (Juard, and had 
 established himself on the line of communication and retreat
 
 20 Tacticdl Sttidivx on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 of tlie Ai'iny of Plevna. After the capture b}^ assault of tlie 
 fortified station of Gorni Dubnik, provisions and ammunition 
 ran short in Plevna. 
 
 Russian detachments which were pushed into the 
 mountains along the Isker and Vid cut off Mehemed Ali's 
 reserve army assembling at Sophia and compelled it to be 
 more solicitous of its own defense than of the relief of 
 Plevna. • 
 
 Deprived of hope of assistance from without and 
 pressed by the daily increasing difficulties of his position, 
 Osman Pasha attempted to break through the Russian line 
 of investment westward on the 10th of December; the at- 
 tempt failed, and Osman Pasha and his entire army sur- 
 I'endered as prisoners of war. 
 
 It remains to cast a brief glance at the coincident events 
 on the Lom. where the Russian East Army, after reoccupy- 
 ing the line of the Kara Lom, remained strictly on the 
 defensive. 
 
 Suleiman Pasha, who had assumed command of the 
 Turkish East Army about the middle of October, in place of 
 Mehenled Ali Pasha, attempted to draw the attention of the 
 Russians to their own left flank by attacking the lower Lom 
 on the 19th and 26th of Xovember, and seriously and unex- 
 pectedly attacked the extreme right of the Russian position 
 in the mountains at Maren and Elena, on the 4th of Decem- 
 ber, with .30,000 men. The feeble Russian detachment was 
 driven ba;Ck with severe loss in men and guns, but in rear 
 of Elena the Turkish advance came to a stop, and on receipt
 
 The Danube Campaign. 21 
 
 of the news of the surrender of Plevna the Turkish corps 
 withdrew toward Achmedli on the 14th of December. On 
 December 12th the Turlcs suffered a bloody repulse at Met- 
 schka on the lower Loni. where they made a vigorous at- 
 tack. With the fall of Plevna, almost coincident Avith the 
 end of the year, the campaign on the Danube terminated ; all 
 subsequent events on the various portions of the theater of 
 war pertain to a new period, the campaign of Adrianople.
 
 22 Tactical Studies oii the Battles Around PUvna. 
 
 PART n. 
 
 REVIEW OF THE OPERATIONS AROUND PLEVNA. 
 
 The opevatious of the IX. Corps, wliich constituted the 
 nucleus of the su'bsequently formed West Army, began 
 July IStli with the assault on the heights commanding 
 Nikopolis and the surrender of the fortress on the 16th. 
 
 Dur-ing the struggle at Nikopolis the Caucasian Cos- 
 sack .Brigade was pushed into the space between the Osma 
 and Vid, to cover the IX. Coi*ps against anj^ hostile enter- 
 prises from Rah ova and Plevna; according to the statements 
 of prisoners, the garrison of Nikopolis did in fact expect 
 relief from tiie west. 
 
 During the night of the IStli-lGth the Cossack Brigade 
 had an action with a detacJmient of Turkish infantry which 
 seemed to belong to the garrison of Nikopolis and to have 
 escaped from the impending capitulation. No hostile 
 bodies made their appearance from the west in these days. 
 
 But on the 17th one of the recounoitering parties dis- 
 patched to tlie south encountered at Selvi a detachment 
 of about 1,000 men, consisting of Tcherkesses and Bashi- 
 bozouks "s\ith some infantin, which retired on Lovtcha. (^n 
 the evening of the same day reports ai'rived at Grand Head- 
 quarters, from the (Cossack pati'ols scouting along the '^^id, 
 of the approach of sti-ong hostile detachme<nt.s from the
 
 Operations Aronitd Phviui- 23 
 
 west, marching iii the direction of IMevmi. It seems that 
 the commander-in-chief phiced little imjjortance on these 
 reports, and certainly did not believt^ in the presence of 
 strong masses of the eni^nv in tluit direction; the only 
 measure taken in this respect was an order to the com- 
 mander of the IX. (''ori)s to occupy Plevna with a. detach- 
 ment and to clear the vicinity of such bodies of the eni^my as 
 might be there. 
 
 The fact that the Head(pia.rters rested in such fa.ls(^ 
 security as regards the danger threatening from West r>nl 
 garia does not throw favorable light on the organiza- 
 tion and direction of the service of information. An entire 
 army was assembled at Plevna by this tim(\ 
 
 The date when Osman I*asha started from \\'iddin with 
 the main body of tJie West Bulgai'ian Army can not be ac- 
 curately ascertained. Su]>posing the movement from Wid- 
 diu to have begiui when the passage of the l)anul>e b.\ the 
 Russians became known. Osman Pasha's army would have 
 consumed about twenty days in traversing the disTanci- of 
 about 125 miles from Widdin to Plevna. The heads of these 
 columns were the troo])s whose presence on the Vid was 
 reported on the 17tli of July by the Cossacks scouting there. 
 In addition, a part of the i-eserve army at Soj)hia was or- 
 dered to join Osnuui. aJid it is ])robablc that this c(»rps took 
 the great road through Orkhanie. and thence eitliei* the load 
 leading from Ttdis to rievua or from .labloni/.a ahmg the 
 northern foot of the Balkans to Plevna; in the foi-mer ca.s<^ 
 the troops with whom the Russians came in touch at Relvi
 
 24 Tdcticdl Studies on the Battles Around Pl( ritd. 
 
 (Ill the ITth may be considerd as the right flank guard, aud 
 iu the hitter case as the advance guard of the corps ap- 
 proaching from Sophia. 
 
 Nothing is Icnown with certainty of the phm on whicli 
 Osman's march was originally based; had he arrived on the 
 banks of the Vid a few^ days earlier, the capture of Nikopolis 
 by the Russian IX. Corps would hardly have been possible. 
 
 ^^'e now again turn to the operations of the Russian 
 Army. 
 
 Pursuant to instructions from the Headquarters, Gen- 
 eral Kriidener on the 18th of July ordered the commander 
 of the .5th Infantry Division, Lieutenant-General Schilder- 
 Schuldner, to move with the 1st Brigade of his division, 4 
 batteries, and the 9th Don Cossack Regiment from Mkopolis 
 to Plevna, and to occupy the place. The troops already be- 
 yond the Osma and along the highroad from Bulgareni to 
 Plevna — the Kostroma Regiment of the .5th Division with 
 a battery and the Caucasian Cossack Brigade — were ordered 
 to cooperate in the enterprise and placed under the orders of 
 Lieutenant-General Schilder-Schuldner. 
 
 The latter permitted the two detachments to advance 
 separately from north and east against Plevna, where mean- 
 w'hile a large part of Osman's armj^, probably not less than 
 20.000 to 25,000 men, had arrived, and he suffered a bloody 
 defeat on the 20th of July, the three infantry regiments 
 losing .3,000 men, one-third of their proper strength. 
 
 The vigorous sign of life given by the hitherto neglected 
 arnw of Osman made a very unpleasant impression at Head-
 
 Oixrailons Around Plevna- 25 
 
 quarters, occupied at tins moment bv Gourko's surprisingly 
 successful passage of tlie Balkans, and probably engaged in 
 plans of an immediate advance on Adrianople. The un- 
 favorable impression produced by the defeat at Plevna was 
 to be wiped out as quickly as possible by overpowering the 
 troublesome opponent. General Kriidener received consid- 
 erable reinforcements from the corps recently brought to 
 the right bank of the Danube, and was enjoined to attack 
 Plevna vigorously. 
 
 General Kriidener had meanwhile been concentrating 
 his IX. Corps at P.resljaniza; but one regiment Avas left at 
 Nikopolis, which place received a Roumanian garrison in 
 addition. 
 
 Up to July 2Gth Kriidener received the following rein- 
 forcements: the 1st Brigade of the 32d Infantry Division 
 and the 1st Brigade of the 11th Cavalry Division, both of the 
 XL Corps and under the personal command of Prince Sha- 
 kofskoi, the corps commander; also the 30th Infantry Di- 
 vision of the IV. Corps. 
 
 Lovtcha, temporarily occupied by a Russian detachment, 
 was recovered by the Turks on July 2Gth, whO' at this jioint 
 were distant 50 miles from the headquarters at Tirnova 
 and 37 from Gabrova at the northern issue of the Shipka 
 pass. 
 
 Kriidener's total strength, including the reinforce- 
 ments and deducting losses, amounted to about 30,000 men 
 with 170 gun's. He had some hesitation in attacking the 
 enemv a.t IMevna, belicvinir his own forces insufficient in
 
 26 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 view of the enemy's stroiio- positiou and large force, for b}' 
 the end of Jul^' Osmau Pasha must have had more than 
 40,000 men with about 80 guns at Plevna. Reiterated or- 
 ders from Headquarters prompted him finally to jjroceed 
 to the attack on the 30th of July. The battle was contested 
 on both sides with great bravery, but terminated in a heavy 
 defeat of the Russians, who lost 7,500 men in killed and 
 wounded, which was one-fourth of their effectives. 
 
 Strange to say, there was no pursuit on the i^art of the 
 Turks; thereby the Russian troops, which were much de- 
 moralized immediately after the unsuccessful termination 
 of the struggle, gained time to make front in good condition 
 on the line Trestenik — Poradim, bareh' 13 miles from the 
 battle-field. 
 
 A pause now- ensued in front of Plevna. Prevented by 
 some cause — probably by the defective character of his army 
 — from turning his victory to full account by a vigorous 
 attack on the Russian communications, Osman Pasha occu- 
 pied himself with strengthening his position by means of 
 fortifications and converted it into a spacious, extremely 
 strong, entrenched camp, to which it seems a number of 
 heavy guns of position w^ere en route from Widdin. The 
 only sign of life given by the Turkish army at Plevna was a 
 feeble reconnaissance westw^ard on the lltli of August, 
 which was driven back by the fire of Russian guns, and a 
 movement from Lovtcha on Selvi, which was undertaken on 
 the 21st and 22d of August with small forces, without en- 
 ergy, and therefore without result.
 
 Operations Around Plevna. 27 
 
 The Eussiaas passed tlie entire mouth of August iu a 
 waiting attitude; the arrival of the reinforcements ordered 
 Mas awaited with impatience, and it was a matter of grati- 
 fication that the Turks did not proceed from Plevna to the 
 attack of the line of the Jantra, The portion of the XI. 
 Corps which had been present before Plevna since the end of 
 Juh' was detached from the West Ami}- and employed 
 farther to the east; in its place the entire IV, Corps and the 
 4th Roumanian Division were assigned to' this army, now 
 commanded by General Zototf, the commander of the IV. 
 Corps and senior general present; the 4th Roumanian 
 Division, which rested on the Vid at Riben, formed the right 
 wing, the IX. Corps nor-th of the highroad to Bulgareni 
 formed the center, and the IV, Corps south of the highroad 
 formed the left wing of the position. 
 
 After the completion of the diplomatic formalities and 
 military agreements, the main body of tlie RoumaJiiau Anuy 
 (i. €., the 2d and 3d Divisions) crossed the Danube at Kora- 
 bia (22 miles above Xikopolis) during the last days of August. 
 The 1st Division remained opposite Widdin. The selection 
 of the point of crossing raises the presumption that the Rou- 
 manians were to operate on the left bank of the \Ui and to 
 invest Plevna from the west, but after a few days the two 
 Roumanian divisions were brought to the right bank of the 
 Vid. The Roumanian Army of three divisions now consti- 
 tuted the right wing of the ^^'est Army, over which Prince 
 Charles of Roumania assumed command, the previous com- 
 mander, Geaieral Zototf, becoming his chief of staff.
 
 28 Taciicfil ^^liidics: o)) the Jintths Aroiiiid Plcnid. 
 
 On the 31st of August, previous to the arrival of the 
 Roumanian Army on the right banlc of the Vid, Osman 
 Pasha made a vigorous attack, south of the Bulgareni road, 
 with some 25,000 men, against the left of the Russian posi- 
 tions at Zgalevitza and Telisliat. He was rejtulsed after a 
 long and doubtful struggle, with a loss of several thousand 
 killed and wounded; the Russians lost 1,000 men. 
 
 The period from the beginning of August to the begin- 
 ning of September, which, aside from the action of Pelishat, 
 was broken by no noteworthy event, was utilized by the 
 Russians for various preparations for the great attack con- 
 templated upon the arrival of reinforcements. 
 
 The first of these measures was a thorough reconnais- 
 sance of the ground, which was ver^- much broken and well 
 covered by the fire of the Turks. But an accurate survey 
 on the scale of three inches to the mile was nevertheless 
 made, and the resulting map was manifolded and distrib- 
 uted among the troops. 
 
 Fascines, gabions, and scaling ladders were also pre- 
 pared, and the troops practiced in escalade; approaches to 
 the enemy's position as well as lateral communications 
 M'ere built; many large and small bridges were repaired or 
 newly constructed; the existing wells were cleaned and a 
 number of ninv (uies sunk.particuiarlv at suchpointsas v.i're 
 designed tO' serve as future dressing stations; lastly, a 
 number of siege guns were brought uj), ]»artly iu. order lo 
 employ heavy calibers against the Turkish position, partly 
 to give a moral support to the troops, which had lost confi-
 
 Operntioiis Aroiin<] PIciiki. 29 
 
 dejioe ill the field artillery iii the uctioii against the Turkish 
 works. 
 
 At the begiiiiiing of September the long-expected rein- 
 forcements arrived. They consisted of the main body of 
 the Roumanian Army, which was posted on the right; part 
 of the cavalry of Gourko's former advance guard, two Dra- 
 goon regiments, oiie Hussar regiment, and twO' Don Cossack 
 regiments; the siege artillery of 20 tw^enty-four-pounders; 
 lastly, on the 5th of September General Prince Imeretinski, 
 with the 2d Infantry Division and the 3d Rifle Brigade, ar- 
 rived from Lovtcha, which he had taken by assault on Sep- 
 tember 3d, after an obstinate and bloody struggle, which 
 severed the communications of Plevna to the southeast; his 
 detachment for the present took position in rear of the left 
 of the IV. Corps. 
 
 The Rnssian army before IMevna now numbered five 
 infantry divisions and one ritle brigade, a total of sixty-four 
 battalions. But it may be safely assumed tliat the battal- 
 ions crossed the Danube witli not more than 800 elfectives, 
 and it is not probable that the ranks could have been filled 
 with recruits by the beginning of September. The losses 
 of the loth, 20th, and 30th of July and 31st of August and 
 at Lovtcha amounted to some 12,000 men, wLih; the loss 
 from sickness dnriug .July and Augusl must at a mod(n*ate 
 calciilalion l)e jiIactMl at several thousiuid men, so tliat the 
 number of elfectives of the Russian infantry before IMevna 
 could hardly have been more than 35,000 and certainly not 
 more than 40,000 men. If we add the artillery, cavalry, and
 
 30 Tacticul ^hidks on the Battles Around Plcrna. 
 
 engineer troops, the total of the Russian West Army was at 
 the most 50,000 ell'ectives, to which some 25,000 Roumanians 
 should be added. 
 
 The number of effectives of the Turkish, army assembled 
 at Plevna was probably about 50,000 men, after making 
 allowance for the losses suffered in July and August and 
 counting reinforcements. 
 
 During the night of the 6th-7th of September the Rus- 
 sian troops approached in deep silence mthin gun-shot of 
 the Turkish works and threw up entrenchments for their 
 artillery and covei' for part of the infantry. On the morn- 
 ing of the 7th fire was opened on the Turkish positions and 
 continued until noon of the 11th — almost without any effect 
 whateA-er, as will be seen later on. On the left General 
 Skobeleff began kis assault on the "Green Hills" on the 8th, 
 and made himself master of the southern portion of that 
 irapoi'tant point in a bloody struggle of three days. At 
 3 p. m. on the 11th of September a general assault was made; 
 on the right by the Roumanians and the IX. Corps against 
 the Grivitza works, in the center by the IV. Corps against 
 the Radischevo works, on the left by Skobeleff's combined 
 corps against the Krishin works. 
 
 The attack in the center was repulsed; on the' right the 
 most advanced Grivitza. redoubt, on the left the nortliern 
 portion o^f the "Green Hills" and two redoubts of the 
 Krishin works, fell into the hands of the Russians. 
 
 The Grivitza redoubt was the only one, however, that 
 remained in Russian liands; after a furious struggle and
 
 Operations Anmml Plevna. 31 
 
 under great losses ou both sides, the Turks made a counter- 
 stroke in force, regained the redoubts on the left, and also 
 drove the Russians from the "Green Hills." 
 
 As it soon became clear that the captured redoubt, 
 which had been considered the key point of the hostile posi- 
 tion, was completely overlooked by the works hing farther 
 to the rear, the assault, which cost the Russians about 
 12,500 and the Roumanians about 3,000 men, may be consid- 
 ered a total failure. 
 
 Ujjon the unsuccessful and costly issue of this assault 
 the Russians abandoned the idea of taking Plevna by 
 assault, and decided upon the conquest of Osman Pasha's 
 army by means of investment and starvation. The center 
 of gravity of the events was thus shifted from the right to 
 the left bank of the Vid. 
 
 On the 8th of September General Loshkaretf crossed to 
 the left ba.nk with eight regiments of lUissian and Rou- 
 manian cavalry and made sevea\al scouting expeditions. On 
 the 10th General Krylotf took command of all cavalry corps 
 on the left bank, but was unablei to effectually check the 
 march of Turkish trains and reinforcements from Sophia 
 on the road Orkha.nic^ — Telis — Gonii Dnbnik.and the whole 
 attempt to invest Plevna from the west is to be accounted 
 a. complete failure. 
 
 In this quarter the investment did n;)t become effective 
 until the arrival of the Guards and Grenadiers, which for 
 the greater part were assigned to the ojxM'ations on the west 
 side. On the 24th of October General Gonrko willi greatly
 
 32 Tdrficdl »S7//f//('.s' OH the Btifflcs Around Plcrim. 
 
 superior foiccs nssMulted and took Gorni Uubuik, a sti-ongiy 
 fortified point on the line of communications which, was 
 bravely defended by a few thousand men. Tells fell into 
 the hands of the Russians on October 2Sth, after a slight en- 
 gagement, and Dolui Dubnik on November 1st, without re- 
 sistance. The line of investment on the west of Plevna was 
 then completed by the building of a series of stron;4 en- 
 trenchments. 
 
 All communications of the army in Plevna were now 
 severed; moreover, to deprive it of any hope of relief by 
 Mehemed All's army, which was assembling at Sophia and 
 whose advance guard had reached Orkhanie, strong Eussian 
 detachments were pushed to the west and south. 
 
 Toward the west A'ratza was taken on the 9th of Novem- 
 ber, Rahova on the 22d, and Lom-Palanka on the 30th. On 
 December 1st, Hying detachments advanced toward the di- 
 rect line of ctmimnnication with the Servians. 
 
 Toward the south Teteven (on the upper Vid) was occu- 
 pied on the 2d and the Rosalita pass (on the upper Osma) on 
 the 17th of November; on the 23d strong detachments took 
 Prawez, between Orkhanie and Etropol, and on the 24:th the 
 latter place itself, whereupon the Turkish advance guard 
 at Orlvhanie fell back on the main body at Sophia. 
 
 Reverting now to the events on the east front of Plevna, 
 we have stated above that no decisive importance attaches 
 to tliem after the middle of September; the question here 
 for the Russians was partly one of holding their positions, 
 partly of gradually advancing the line of investment so as 
 to shorten it somewhat.
 
 Ojxrdtioiis AiokikI l^hrim. '6'A 
 
 On the 17tb of September a.u attempt ou the part ef the 
 Turks to retake the "first" Orivitza redoubt was repulsed; 
 on the following- day an attempt on the part of the Kouma- 
 nians to take the so-called ^'second'' Grivitza redoubt also 
 failed, whereupon trenches were resorted to for the approach 
 on the Turkish positions, the artillery meanwhile maintain- 
 ing a slow fire, which failed to elicit any reply from the Turks. 
 
 After pushing- their trenches to within thirty yards of 
 the enemy's redoubt, the Roumanians made a dash at it on 
 the 19th of October, but were flung back with great loss. 
 
 On the left General Skobeleff occupied the village of 
 Brestovetz on the night of November Ith-oth, seized the 
 "first knoir' of the "Green Hills'' on November !)tli. and 
 maintained himself in the rapidly entrenched position 
 against two hostile assiiults launched against it by the 
 Turks on the 12th and 15th of November. The complete 
 investment of Plevna meanwhile made itself felt ; munitions 
 and provisions began to fail, and disease made great rav- 
 ages auumg the troops, which were poorly fed, clothed, and 
 housed. The hope of relief from without diminished more 
 and more, and Osman Pasha was at last compelled to relin- 
 quish his stout and prdtracted resistance. 
 
 The attem]»t undertaken with great l)ravei*y on Decem- 
 ber 10th, of breaking through the Russian line (»f iuvt^st- 
 ment on the west where it was held by two Grenadier divis- 
 ions, seemed to be without hope of success and merely for 
 the sake of sji.ving tJie luMior of the Turkish arms. Ou the 
 I'a.ilure of the attack, and after the loss of the pai-tly aliaJi-
 
 34 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 doued and weakl}- held works on the east, Osman Pasha 
 surrendered uncouditionally with his entire army, whose 
 effectives may still have numbered some 40,000 men, not 
 counting some 20,000 sick and wounded. 
 
 For nearly five months Osman^ Pasha and his army 
 maintained themselves against a constantly increasing oj)- 
 ponent and under the apparently overwhelming fire of 
 a formidable artillery. The entire situation was altered 
 by this obstinate resistance, and the decision of the cam- 
 paign, which at one time seemed to become ripe dm'ing the 
 year of 1877, w^as staved off until 1878. The results gained 
 by Osman Pasha and his army may therefore be justly re- 
 garded as surpassing their own expectations. 
 
 On the other hand, it cannet be denied that the re- 
 peated reverses suffered at Plevna helped toward the Rus- 
 sian final success. Timely attention was called to the de- 
 fective character of the -whole Russian plan of operation, 
 and much greater forces than originally contemplated were 
 brought to the theater of war, which rendered a. subsequent 
 successful and decisive conduct of the war possible. 
 
 Had the Russian Army succeeded in reaching Adrian- 
 ople in August, 1877, without the interlude of Plevna, peace 
 might have been made under stipulations much more ac- 
 ceptable to Turkey than those now to be expected.
 
 Plevna. 35 
 
 PART in. 
 
 PLEVNA. 
 
 1. Geographical Conditions. 
 
 Plevna is situated in the center of a great agricultural 
 district on the great road from Sophia to Rustchuk, in the 
 valley of the Tutchenitza brook, a right branch of the Vid. 
 From here radiate important roads to Nikopolis in the north, 
 Widdin in the west, to Orkhanie and Sophia in the south- 
 west, to Lovtcha and Trojan in the south, to Selvi and Tir- 
 nova in the southeast, and lai^tly, as previously stated, to 
 Biela and Rustchuk in the east. 
 
 Appreciating the importance of Plevna as an industrial 
 and commercial center, Midhat Pasha, the former Governor- 
 General of the Danube Province (Tuna-Vilajet), decided to 
 connect the town with the Danube by railway. 
 
 Nikopolis was at first intended to be the terminus of the 
 I'oad; but closer examination showed this place unsuited 
 for a commercial depot and the requisite harbor construc- 
 tion, and Midhat decided to establish a new commercial 
 center, to be named 'Tort Sultanie," at the mouth of the 
 Osma, west of Nikopolis. From this latter place the road 
 was to ascend the valley of the Osma for some distance and 
 reach Plevna by way of Metchka, Kojulowza, and Griv- 
 itza. For the construction of the road-bed. which consisted
 
 30 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 for liie most part of fillings, Midhat Pasha collected some 
 20,000 Bulgarian laborers; the requisite timber was taken 
 from the forests at the foot of the Balkans. 
 
 4 
 
 Soon afterward Midhat was recalled from his position, 
 the enterprise was allowed to lapse, and few vestiges of the 
 work remain. 
 
 We will now examine the communications radiating 
 from I'levna: 
 
 (a) From Plevna to Nikopolls, 25 miles, by way of Caly- 
 sovat and Bresljaniza. 
 
 (6) From Plevna to Widdin. — The road from Plevna to 
 Rahova is 35 miles across the deep valleys of the Isker and 
 its branches. 
 
 Rahova is a Bulgarian commercial town, situated in 
 a narrow, level valley between receding mountains. The 
 Turks had constructed some redoubts on the surrounding 
 heights in order to make it serve as a poist on the communi- 
 cations betvN'een Plevna and Widdin. The distance from 
 Rahova to Lom-Palanka on the Danube is 35 miles, and from 
 there is Widdin is also 35 miles. 
 
 A good road leads southward from Rahova to Vratza 
 (40 miles); from Yratza there is a direct road to Plevna 
 (60 miles), which crosses to the left bank of the Isker and fol- 
 lows that stream in its further course. All the roads named, 
 except thehighroad Rahova — Vratza, are country roads which 
 cross the deep-cut valleys of the Ogost, Isker, and Skit at 
 various points. 
 
 (c) The Great Road from Plevna to Orhhanie and Sophia
 
 Plevna. 37 
 
 was built during Midbat Paslia's governorsliip. and sui- 
 passes most of the Turkish roads in being well paved and 
 wide enough to permit two four-horse wagons to pass each 
 otheratany point; a telegraph line follows the road through- 
 out its lengih. 
 
 From Plevna the road runs westward, crosses the Md 
 (3 miles), runs southwesterly across undulating ground to 
 Dolni (Lower) Dubnik (0 miles) and Telis (10 miles). sMitli- 
 ward to Lukovitza (9 miles) and Jablonitza (12 miles), west- 
 ward to Orkhanie (20 miles), then soutJnvard to the Balkan 
 pass of Babakonak (12 miles), and from here westward to 
 Sophia (30 miles). 
 
 {(!) From Plevna to Lovtcha and Trojan. — From Ple\na 
 to Lo^'tcha (elevation 000 feet) 20 miles, from here upstream 
 along the left bank of the Osma to Trojan (elevation 1,100 
 feetj also 20 miles. Trojan is situated at the junction of the 
 Balabanka with the Osma and numbers GOO houses with 
 3,500 inhabitants in a dislT^^'ict almost exclusively inhabited 
 by Bulgarians. South of Trojan is the wealthy liulgarian 
 monastery which was the center of the Bulgarian insurrec- 
 tion of 1807. From Ti-ojan the road leads to the pass of 
 Trojan, which has an eleA'ation of 5,000 feet. 
 
 (e) Fi-07n Plevna to Lovtcha and Tirnova. — A highroad 
 runs the entire distance: from IMcvna to Lovtcha. on the 
 Osma 20 miles, from there to Selvi on the Rusitza (left branch 
 ■ of the Jantra) 20 miles, thence to Tirnova on the Jantra 25 
 miles. From Selvi a road leads southward to the Rosalita 
 pass, whicli has aji elevation of L400 feet and is distant
 
 38 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 from Selvi 30 miles, and 6 miles north, of Kalifer. Tlie 
 Rosalita pass is 25 miles to the west of the Shipka pass. 
 
 (/) Frojn Plevna to Rustchnk. — From Plevna the great 
 road (prolongation of the Sophia road) leads to Bulgareni on 
 the Osma (25 miles), thence to Biela on the Jantra (30 miles), 
 and lastly to Rustchuk (25 miles). 
 
 2. TopograpMcal Conditions. 
 
 Plevna was a well-built town of 17,000 inhabitants, one- 
 half of whom were Mohammedans, with 3,100 houses, 18 
 mosques, and 2 Christian churches. It is situated on the 
 Tutchenitza brook, 3 miles above its junction with the river 
 Vid. Higher up on the brook lies the village of Tutchenitza, 
 from which the brook derives its name. 
 
 Just below Plevna the Tutchenitza brook is joined by 
 the Grivitza brook, which comes from the eaist and is so 
 called from the village of GriWtza on its upper course. 
 
 The entire country surrounding Plevna on the east 
 may be divided into three sections : the section north of the 
 Grivitza brook, the ijiiddle section between Grivitza and 
 Tutchenitza brooks, the section between Tutchenitza brook 
 and the Vid river. 
 
 The heights skirting the right bank of the Vid closely 
 approach the river at Bivolar and Opanetz in the nortliern 
 and at Oltschages in the southern section; above Plevna 
 the valley of the Tutchenitzia is a steep, narrow ravine, but 
 expands below the town and forms a broad plain enclosed 
 by mountains .on the north and south. 
 
 In the northern section the great road Plevna — Bui-
 
 Plevna. 39 
 
 gareni — Biela follows the northern bank of the Grivitza. 
 The heights which form the northern edge of the Grivitza 
 amd Tutchenitza brooks, and whose southern slopes are 
 very abrupt, ai-e divided by the ravine of Bukova into a 
 western and eastern portion, the former lying between the 
 ravine named and the Vid river, the latter between the 
 ravine of Bukova and another ravine extending northward 
 from Grivitza. 
 
 The plateau forming the section between the Grivitza 
 and Tutchenitza brooks is furrowed by three smaller ra- 
 vines: from Grivitza southward extends the ''southern 
 Grivitza ravine," from the Tutchenitza valley eastward the 
 "Radischevo ravine," and, between the two, from Plevna 
 Boutheastward, the "middle ravine." The eastern edge of 
 the southern Grivitza ravine and the northern edge of the 
 Radischevo ravine were covered with brush and gr()u])s of 
 trees; the slopes of the steep and deep Tutchenitza ravine 
 \v ere covered for the most part with vineyards. 
 
 The southern portion of the southern section has be- 
 come known as the "Green Hills," and was thickly covered 
 with trees, vines, and high corn-flelds; to the east it forms 
 three sharply separated knolls, which' are designated from 
 south to north as "first," "second," and "third" knoll; 
 the two depressions inten-ening between the knolls open 
 into the Tutchenitza ravine. The Lovtcha road follows the 
 western edge of the latter ravine and crosses the "Green 
 Hills." The noHhern part of this section between Plevna 
 and the Vid river, and separated from the "Green Hills" by
 
 -iu Tdclicdl Studies on the Battles Around I'lvrnd. 
 
 a depression running: east and west, seems to overtop the 
 entire country around Plevna. 
 
 From Plevna tlie great road to Sophia follows the left 
 bank of the Tutohenitza to the Vid and crosses that river on 
 a well-constructed wooden bridge, which is 140 paces in 
 length and rests on stone piers. 
 
 S. Fortifivdtions. 
 At the beginning of July Plevna was without any forti- 
 fication whatever; about the middle of July, at the time of 
 the first attack, probably but few points of the town itself 
 were prepared for defense, as the monastery at the east- 
 ern exit of the town. Toward the end of July the con- 
 struction of works on the surrounding heights was taken 
 in hand with great energy; at the time of the great attack 
 on July .30th most of the commanding points in the vicinity 
 were entrenched, and subsequently the whole position was 
 thoroughly fortified, partly by the erection of new works, 
 partly by completing and strengthening those already in 
 existence. To the west of the Bukova ravine was the 
 Bukova redoubt (a) ; east of the Bukova. ravine the so-called 
 second Grivitza redoubt (6); close in front of Grivitza 
 the first Grivitza redoubt, also called Abdul Kerim 
 Tabia (c); to the southwest of the last was the eastern Rad- 
 ischevo redoubt, also called Central redoubt or Haflz Bey 
 Tabia (d); further to the west on the edge of the Tutchenitza 
 ravine the western Radischevo redoubt or Tutchenitza 
 redoubt (e); lastly, north of the *'Green Hills" the Krishin 
 redoubt [f). All these works were very large, of very
 
 Plevna. 41 
 
 strong profile, and provided in the interior witli large hol- 
 low traverses prepared for artillery defense; in front and 
 on the sides of the redoubts were several lines of rifle- 
 trenches, which, partly by the use of the natural slopes and 
 partly by artificial construction, rendered a defense by tiers 
 of rifle fire possible on a large scale. 
 
 In second line were a number of smaller works to guard 
 communication between those works and with the town. 
 
 Between the Krishiu redoubt and the town two re- 
 doubts were subsequently built, which were taken and again 
 lost b}' Skobeleft" on the 11th and 12th of September; in 
 rear of the Krishin redoubt was the camp of the Turkish 
 reserves, protected by a number of works. 
 
 On the west bank of the Vid a sort of bridge-head was 
 constructed in front of the bridge; the space from there 
 northward to the mouth of the Netropolie brook was covered 
 by two additional works. 
 
 Lastly let us quote here a brief description of the exter- 
 nal aspect of the Turkish works as given by an eye-witness. 
 at the beginning of September: 
 
 "As viewed from the Russian batteries, the surround- 
 ings of Plevna appeared as a hilly plateau about 5 miles in 
 width, bounded on the right .and left by continuous ridges 
 (the Grivitza heights and tJie "Gr^en Hills"); in the back- 
 ground, hidden in a depression, was Plevna. On first sight 
 the entire plateau offered nothing unusual to the eye; on 
 closer observation, however, a series of entrenchments 
 might be seen which looked like yellowish bands on the gen-
 
 42 Tactical Stmlies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 eral green ground. Even with the aid of tlie field-glass, 
 details could not be distinguished; most conspicuous were 
 the three foremost redoubts — on Lhe right the Grivitza Re- 
 doubt, on the left the Radischevo woncs, and farther in rear 
 an entrenched camp."
 
 The Action <if I'ltriia. ^3 
 
 PART IV. 
 
 THE AC^TION AT PLEVNA ON JULY 20TR 
 
 1. Adranrc on Plcriia on Jiilj/ ]t)tJi. 
 
 On July IStli Lieutenant-General Schilder-Sclnilduer, 
 commander of the V. Infantry Division, received orders from 
 General Kriidener to advance with two regiments (Arch- 
 angel, No. 17, and Wologda, No. 18) of his division, four 
 batteries, and the 9th Don Cossacks, from Nikopolis on 
 Plevna and to take possession of that place. Additional 
 troops from beyond the Osma were also placed under his 
 orders; at Bulgareni, 25 miles from Nikopolis, ten sotnias* 
 of the Caucasian Cossack Brigade with a battery, also one 
 battalion of the Kostroma Regiment, number 10 ; at Poradim, 
 12 miles nearer Plevna, the remainder of the 19th Regiment, 
 a battery, and two sotnias of Cossacks. 
 
 Oeneral Schilder-Schuldner gave directions to the Kos- 
 troma Regiment to assemble at Poradim, and then to march 
 to Zgalevitza, arriving at 2 p. m. July 19th. The Cossack 
 iBrigade was ordered to nuirch to Tutchenitza. 
 
 During the night of -Inly 18tli-l!Mli Liciitcnant-General 
 Schilder-Schuldner bivouacked with tlic infantry brigade 
 and artillerv at the moulh of the Osnia, and arrived on the 
 
 "The sotnia is the squadron of the Cossacks. 'I'lit word means "a hiitidred," 
 but the sotnia varies from 100 to 200 men. — A. h. W.
 
 ■14 Tactical Sttidies on the Battles Around PIcrna. 
 
 afternoon of the 19th before Plevna (21 miles). Finding 
 the place occupied by the Turks, he opened fire from his 
 guns and continued the cannonade until dark, and then went 
 into bivouac in front of the town. 
 
 The 9th Don Cossacks had started toward Plevna sepa- 
 rately from the infantry, bivouacked at Riben on ihe night 
 of the 18th-19th, and seem to have remained there during 
 theforenoonof the 19th. While they were cooking, the sound 
 of guns was heard fr.om Plevna (10 miles) about 3 p.m. The 
 camp-kettles were emptied at once, and the regiment marched 
 to within '1^ miles of Plevna, where a small Turkish infantry 
 detachment was encountered. Half a sotnia dismounted 
 and began a fight, which lasted; until dark. Covered by a 
 chain of outposts consisting of two sotnias, the regiment 
 bivouacked in view of Plevna, 
 
 The Kostroma Eegiment with the battery and the two 
 attached sotnias reached Zgalevitza at the designated hour 
 and sent both sotnias forward to reconnoiter toward Plevna, 
 In. rear of the village of Grivitza a hostile camp was discov- 
 ered, from which about three hundred men, one infantry 
 battalion, and two guns started to meet the Cossacks, who 
 fell back on their infantry. 
 
 On tlie evening of the 19th the troops of Schilder-Schuld- 
 ner were posted in four separate groups as follows: 
 
 The 9th Don Cossacks — 6 sotnias — on the extreme right 
 north of Plevna. 
 
 The 1st Brigade of the 5th Division— 6 battalions, 32 
 guns — to the northeast of Plevna.
 
 The Acf ion at Pinna. 45 
 
 The Kostroma Regiment — 3 battalions, 2 sotnias, S guns 
 — southeast of rievna at Zgalevitza. 
 
 The Cossack Brigade — 10 sotnias, 6 gun» — south of 
 Plevna at Tutchenitza. 
 
 The whole detachment, which did not number more than 
 9,000 men, was in a crescent-shaped position 10 miles in ex- 
 tent, facing a concentrated enemy at least twice its strength. 
 Late in the evening Schilder-Schuldner issued orders for the 
 attack at 5 o'clock on the next morning; the Kostroma Regi- 
 ment received the order at 2 a. m. 
 
 2. The Attack on Plevna on July 20th. 
 At 4 a. m. Turkish troops advanced from Plevna against 
 the 9th COiSsacks and opened fire with artillery. The out- 
 posts of the Cossacks were assembled, dismounted, and 
 occupied the edge of a wood on the extreme right. As the 
 Turkish infantry, and artillery advanced against this posi- 
 tion, a report of the situation was dispatched to General 
 Schilder-Schuldner, who sent two infantry companies and a 
 battery to support the regiment. The shrapnel fire of this 
 battery soon caused the Turks to seek cover. Without 
 further engagement both sides remained facing each oth(^r 
 until noon, when the Cossack regiment was ordered to cover 
 the withdrawal of the infantry. The regiment, which had 
 for the most part dismounted to fight on foot, mounted and 
 moved to the left to interpose itself between the withdraw- 
 ing infantry and the enemy; a Turkish cavalry detachment 
 advancing in pursuit was driven back. At ]>. m. the regi- 
 ment was at IJrvslan.
 
 •i<'> Tdcticdl Sfudir.s on the Battles Aroiiitd Plevmi. 
 
 The maiu body, posted aloug the road from Nikopolis to 
 Plevua, bi'ou<'iit three batteries into action at 4:45 a. m. 
 against two Turkish batteries; soon afterward the brigade 
 deployed on the west of the road in the following order: to 
 the left of the batteries one battalion of the Archangel Regi- 
 ment, to the right tw^o battalions of the Archangel and two 
 battalions of the Wologda Regiment — all live battalions in 
 two lines of company columns. The rifle company (fifth com- 
 pany of each battalion) was deployed in front as skirmishers; 
 one Wologda battalion with a battery formed the reserve, 
 from which the batter}^ and two companies were soon after- 
 ward dispatched to the extreme right to support the 
 Cossacks. 
 
 In front of the Russian position was a ravine which 
 opened into the Vid valley at Riben; the further edge of the 
 ravine was covered with bushes and held by hostile rifle- 
 men; in rear of the ravine w^ere the heights on which the 
 so-called second Grivitza redoubt and the Bukova redoubts 
 were subsequently built. 
 
 At 5:30 a. m. the Russians advanced to the attack 
 all along the line; the Archangel Regiment on the left en- 
 countered obstinate resistance and did not make much head- 
 way; the Wologda Regiment on the right and the nearest 
 comiJanies of the Archangel Regiment drove the hostile 
 skirmishers back and reached the town itself, where furious 
 street-fighting began. The Turks brought forward rein- 
 forcement after reinforcement and the losses of the Rus- 
 sians increased at an alarming rate. The brigade commander
 
 The Action at Plevna. 47 
 
 was wounded, the commander of the Wologda Regiment 
 was killed, and the commander of the 5th Artillery Brigade, 
 as the senior officer present, assumed command; the posi- 
 tion was held for the present. 
 
 Up to 9:30 a. m. (jeneral Schiider-Schuldner was with- 
 out any information of the doings of the Kostroma Regi- 
 ment; at that time he received a report'tliat the commander 
 of the Kostroma Regiment had been killed, and that the 
 attack of the regiment was not making headway. Receiving 
 reports, from several sides, of the total exhaustion and great 
 losses of the troops, and having no reserves at hand, he or- 
 dered the infantry to retire at 11:30 a. ni., the 9th Cossack 
 Regiment to cover the withdrawal of the infantry. 
 
 Upon, the witlidrawal of the Archangel and ^\'o]()g(la 
 Regiments, seventeen ammunition carts fell into the hands 
 of the Turks, partly because they were shot to pieces, partly 
 because the teams were killed. The retreating brigade was 
 relieved by the Galitz Regiment (of same division), which 
 was coming up from Nikopolis, and in the evening botli 
 bivouacked at Brysla.n. 
 
 At 5 a. m., after a brief preparation by arHUery lire, the 
 Kostroma Regiment advanced to the attack, along ihe high- 
 road from Plevna to Bulgareni, against the height on which 
 subsequently the first Grivitza redoubt (Abdul Kerini Taliiai 
 was built. The regiment deployed the 2d and 3d battalions 
 in two lines of companj^ columns, the two rifle companies in 
 front as skiraiishers, the 1st battalion in reserve; the two 
 sotnias were on the i-iglit flank.
 
 48 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 Three lines of rifle-trenches were taken by the regiment 
 one after tlie other, and linally also tlic intreuchmeiits on the 
 height of the subsequent Abdul Kerim Tabia; the assail- 
 ants here captured a gun which had been dismounted by the 
 fire of the Russian artillery. 
 
 Throw^n back to the! town, the Turks offered furious 
 resistance from behind hedges and walls. The losses of the 
 Kostroma Regiment increased from minute to minute; the 
 regimental commander, three field officers, most of the other 
 officers, and a large part of the men were dead or wounded. 
 The ammunition of the infantry and the artillery, which 
 had followed the assaulting infantry to within effective 
 infantry fire, began to run short. For these reasons the regi- 
 ment fell back at 9 a. m., when the Turks were bringing for- 
 ward fresh reserves to the counter-attack. In order to ap- 
 proach the main body, the retreat was made in a different di- 
 rection from that of the attack, and the men's packs which 
 had been taken ofl" before the assault, fell into the enemy's 
 hands. 
 
 As the action began, the Caucasian Cossack Brigade 
 moved from Tutchenitza to Radischevo. 
 
 Since the ground impeded the movements of the cavalry 
 and as the mountain battery attached to the brigade could 
 produce no effect on the hostile position, owing to its small 
 caliber, the brigade moved more to the right to connect with 
 the Kostroma Regiment. At 10 a. m., when the brigade 
 reached Grivitza, the Kostroma Regiment was in retreat, in 
 which the Cossack Brigade joined.
 
 The Action at Plevna. 49 
 
 The Turkish pursuit did not extend beyond the original 
 foremost Turkish positions. 
 
 3. Losses. 
 
 The 1st Brigade of the 5th Division lost 1 general, 51 
 field and company officers, and 1,878 men; it is to be noted 
 here that in the assault on Xikopolis. a few days before, the 
 Archangel Eegiment lost 12 men, the Wologda Regiment 
 6 officers and 256 men ; the loss of the brigade, whose effect- 
 ive strength can hardly have been more than 5,000 men, 
 therefore amounts to almost 2,000 men for the two days of 
 the 15th and 20th of July. 
 
 On July 20th the Kostroma Regiment (which suffered 
 no losses at Nikopolis) lost at Plevna 7 officers and 359 men 
 killed, and 15 officers and 534 men wounded. 
 
 The losses of the Cossacks and of the artillery are not 
 stated, but they can not have amounted to much. 
 
 The Turks claim to have captured a Russian gun on 
 that day; nothing reliable is known about it; it may have 
 been a gun of the 5th Battery of the 31st Brigade, since this 
 battery accompanied the assaulting Kostroma Regiment to 
 within range of infantry fire. 
 
 Comments. 
 1. That the supreme command attached so little im- 
 portance to the reports which reached Tirnova on the 17th of 
 July about hostile columns approaching the Vid from the 
 west, and that it treated the occupation of Plevna as of in- 
 ferior importance, are matters which can be commented on
 
 50 Tactical Studies on the Battles AroKiid Plcrna. 
 
 only with a full knowledge of the idea entertained of the 
 whole situation at that time. Why was not a strong body 
 of cavalry, a division, or at least a. brigade, dispatched to 
 Plevna in the middle of July during the struggle around 
 Nikopolis? Being an important junction point of roads, 
 25 miles from Nikopolis and barely 43 from the point of pas- 
 sage at i^istova, Plevna was well worth that much attention, 
 
 2. The advance of General Schilder-Schuldner's weak 
 detachment in two widely separated columns against an 
 enemy of unknown strength was imprudent; although, in 
 view of the actual positions of the troops, a separation could 
 not be avoided, an attempt should have been made to unite 
 the two detachments before proceeding to the attack. 
 
 The march of the Nikopolis column under General 
 Schilder-Schuldner, when considered by itself, invites un- 
 favorable criticism. Instead of sending his Cossack Regi- 
 ment forward at once to cover his march, the general led his 
 infantry directly on Plevna, without caring for the where- 
 abouts of his cavalry and without having given it specific 
 instructional. On arri\'^l before the town on the afternoon 
 of the 19th he had no cavalry to reconnoiter the ground in 
 front or to establish communication with the other column; 
 he was unable, on the one hand, to learn anything of matters 
 in and around Plevna, and, on the other hand, he seems to 
 have been uncertain of the whereabouts of the other detach- 
 ments. The cannonade opened on Plevna appears to have 
 been a cover behind which he hid his painful perplexity, but 
 it had the good effect of informing the other detachments of 
 the whereabouts of the main column.
 
 The Action at Pier ua. 51 
 
 Some time after the beginning of the cannonade, the 9th 
 Cossack Kegiment made its appearance; not only had it not 
 preceded the infantry on the march to Plevna, but it had re- 
 mained far in rear. On tlie night of July 18th-19th the 
 bivouac of the Cossack Regiment at Riben was but 10 miles 
 from Plevna, while the bivouac of the infantry on the same 
 night was 22 miles from that place. By proper management 
 the Cossacks would have had plenty of time to thoroughly 
 reconnoiter the vicinity of Plevna before the arrival of the 
 infantry; but at the moment when the infantry arrived and 
 the artillery opened, the Cossacks were still quietly resting 
 at Riben and in the act of cooldng. This can be explained 
 in no other way except that the commander of the Cossack 
 Regiment was not properly informed of the contemplated 
 movement; and the fact that this infantry, marching at ran- 
 dom toward the enemy, did not suffer a heavy defeat on the 
 19th, is probably due to the incredible clumsiness of the 
 Turkish troops in offensive movements. 
 
 Turning to the march of the other column, we lind the 
 infantry provided with two sotnias of Cossacks, which were 
 properly employed in reconnaissance. However, the em- 
 ployment of the Cossack Brigade, which was also attached to 
 this column, can not be considered proper. 
 
 The brigade marched 25 miles, from P>ulgareni to Tut- 
 chenitza, while the infantry column, which marched from 
 Bulgareni to Zgalevitza, covered almost an equal distance. 
 It is true that small patrols were sent out from Tiitchenitza, 
 but complete infoi-mation Mt llie sit nation was not gained.
 
 52 Tactical Sttidks on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 According to recent ideas on the employment of advanced 
 bodies of cavalry in the Russian Army, one would expect the 
 Cossack Brigade to move rapidly on Plevna, reach there 
 about noon, make a feint against the town from the south 
 under cooperation of the horse artillery, and endeavor to 
 advance with several sotnias between the town and the river 
 against the bridge over the Vid. Whether Plevna was 
 occupied feebly or not at all, in any event sufficient informa- 
 tion would have been gathered without exposing the brigade 
 to great risk. 
 
 3. The attack of the two regiments of Archangel and 
 Wologda.on the morning of July 20th was made without 
 sufficient reconnaissance of the enemy's position and without 
 any preparation by the fire of skirmishers ; the preparation 
 of the attack by artillery did not last more than half an hour. 
 From the very beginning five of the six available battalions 
 were led to the attack against the wholly unknown position 
 of the enemy; the only battalion kept in reserve was very 
 soon called upon to detach two companies to the right to 
 sn])port the Cossacks, so that there was no real reserve at the 
 disposal of the leader for use in emergencies or after clearer 
 knowledge of the situation. 
 
 The same may be stated, of tlie attack of the Kostroma 
 Regiment; although one-third of the troops was nominally 
 set aside as reserve, it was almost as soon engaged in the con- 
 flict as the two other battalions. 
 
 4. The expenditure of ammunition in the six hours of 
 this action seems to have been verv great, since almost all
 
 The Action at Plevna. 53 
 
 the ammunition-carts were brought up and emptied. The 
 Russian infantry carried 60 rounds in the pouches, and in 
 addition each company was provided with a three-horse 
 ammunition-cart. More than one-half of the ammunition- 
 carts of the 1st Brigade fell into the hands of the Turks.
 
 54 TacticKiI ^^tiidics on the Battles Around Flenia. 
 
 PART V. 
 
 THE BATTLE OF PLEVNA ON JULY 30TH. 
 
 1. Positio7i of' the troo]))< on the Evening of July Wth. 
 
 At Bryslan, 9tli Lancers, 9th Don Cossacks, 2d Don* Cos- 
 sack Battery — 10 squadrons and 6 guns. 
 
 At Koioulovtsij, 81st lufantr}' Division (less the \Vov- 
 onesh (124) Regiment and 1 battery at Sistova) — 9 battal- 
 ions and 40 guns. 
 
 At Tristenik, 5tli Infantry Division (less Kostroma Regi- 
 ment, No. 19, and 1 battery at Nikopolis) — 9 battalions and 40 
 guns. 
 
 At JCaragatch, 2d Brigade of the 30th Infantry Division, 
 with 3 batteries — 6 battalions and 24 guns. 
 
 A.i Poradiin, 1st Brigade of the 30th Infantry Division, 
 1st Brigade of the 32d Lifantry Division, 6 foot batteries, 1st 
 Brigade of the 11th Cavalry Division, and 1 horse battery — 
 12 battalions, 8 squadrons, 54 guns. 
 
 At Bogot, the Caucasian Cossack Brigade with the Sth 
 Don Cofesacks and the mountain horse battery — 12 sotnias 
 • and 12 guns. 
 
 Total, 36 battalions, 30 squadrons, and 176 guns, among 
 which were 80 nine-pounders, 72 four-pounders, 18 horse, and 
 mountain guns. 
 
 The line Brvslan — Poradim — Bogot was about 25 miles
 
 The Batth of Plevixt. 55 
 
 long and formed an arc of a circle whose radius was about 
 12 miles and whose center w^as at Plevna. The left at Bogot 
 was 12 miles from Lovtcha, w'hich was held by the Turks; 
 the right at Brvslan was the same distance from Xii^opolis. 
 The distance from the center of the position at Poradim to 
 the Osma bridge in rear at Bulgareni was also 12 miles. 
 
 2. Dispositions for the Battle. 
 
 (a) Right flank cavalry detachment, under General Losh- 
 kareff, to start at a. m. from Brvslan, covered the right 
 flank and observed as far as the Vid. 
 
 (&) Right King, under Lieutenant-Genera 1 Wilhelminoff 
 (31st and oth Infantry Divisions), to attack the enemy's posi- 
 tion north of the highroad — the 5th Infantry Division in 
 reserve. 
 
 (c) Left u-ing. under Lieutenant-General Prince Shakof- 
 skoi (1st Brigade of the 30th Division and 1st Brigade of the 
 32d Division), to march at 5 a. m, from Poradim and attack 
 the position between Grivitza and Radischevo. 
 
 (d) Left flank cavalry detachment, under Major-General 
 Skobeleff, to march at 5 a. m. from Bogot, take position on 
 the Lovtcha road and watch the country, particularly in 
 the direction of Lovtcha. Tlie detachment was reinforced 
 from Prince Sha.kofskoi's command by the 3d Battalion of 
 the Kursk Regiment, No. 125, and 4 guns. 
 
 Both cavalry detachments had orders, in case of the ene- 
 my's retreat, to cross to the left bank of the Vid and bar the 
 enemy's road to Sophia if possible. 
 
 (f) General reserre. under personal command of Lienten-
 
 56 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Flevna. 
 
 ant-General Kriidener (2d Brio;ade of the 30th Infantry Di- 
 vision, 2 squadrons each of the 11th Dragoons, and 11th 
 Lancers, 1 horse battery ; total, 6 battalions, 4 squadrons, and 
 30 guns), was posted with the infantry at Poradim and the 
 cavalry at Pelishat. 
 
 S. Deployment for Battle and the Artillery Combat up to 
 2:30 p. m. 
 
 The right icing completed its deployment by 7 a, m. The 
 first line consisting of the 1st Brigade of the 31st Division 
 with 6 battalions and 24 guns, in second line the Kosloff 
 Regiment, No. 123, with 3 battalions and 16 guns. 
 
 About 10 o'clock the 5th Infantry Division, consisting of 
 9 battalions and 24 guns, was posted in third line. 
 
 At 8:15 a. m. the first gun was fired by the Turks; the 
 24 Russian guns in first line directed their fire on the flashes 
 of the enemy's guns, the fog being so dense that the enemy's 
 position could not be seen; all that could be observed in 
 front was a wide ravine densely covered with brush and hos- 
 tile skirmishers and 2 guns at its further edge. 
 
 By 9 a, m. the fog had settled so far that the large 
 Grivitza redoubt became visible, against which the Russian 
 guns, reinforced by the batteries in second line, now directed 
 their fire. The ground did not permit of placing more than 
 40 guns in battery. The artillery combat thus opened was 
 continued until 2:40 p. m. 
 
 The left wing occupied the village of Radischevo by 9 
 a. m. without firing a shot; the 1st Brigade (numbering 5 
 battalions and 28 guns after reinforcing Skobelefif) of the
 
 The Battle of Plevna. 57 
 
 32d Division deployed on the heights to the east and north of 
 the village; the 1st Brigade of the 30th Division was kept in 
 reserve and posted at first on the road from Pelishat to 
 Radischevo, subsequently nearer to Radisehevo. 
 
 At 10 a. m. the Turks opened the artillery combat, which 
 was taken up by the Russians and continued until 2:30 p. 
 m.; the infantry meanwhile not firing a shot. In the course 
 of the cannonade two Turkish batteries ceased firing, the 
 redoubt north of Radischevo (Hafiz Bey Tabia) had suffered 
 severe!}', three Russian guns were rendered unserviceable 
 and the battery had to be relieved from the reserve. 
 
 4- Attack of the Russian Right Wing. 
 
 At 2:40 p. m. Lieutena,nt-General Knidi^ner ordered 
 Lieutenant-General Wilhelminoff to proceed to the attack of 
 the Grivitza redoubt in two columns: one from the north 
 and one from the east. The north column consisted of the 
 Penza Regiment and 2d and 3d Battalions of the Kozloff 
 Regiment; on the east General Wilhelminoff himself with the 
 Tamboft" Regiment and 1st Battalion of the Kozloff Regi- 
 ment; the right column was followed by a reserve of G bat- 
 talions (Archangel and ^Yologda Regiments), the left by 3 
 battalions (Gfilitz Regiment). 
 
 The 1st Penza Battalion, which led the right column, 
 took the first line of trenches on the near side of the ravine, 
 but was brought to a halt by the murderous fire from a sec- 
 ond line just behind it. The 2d Penza Battalion advajiced 
 on the left of the first, carried the second liiu^ of ritlc- 
 trenches. crossed the ravine with the retreating Turks, and
 
 68 Tactical ^'<1ii(li('S on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 approached the redoubt. The third line of trenches in front 
 of the redoubt was also taken, the assailants ensconced 
 themselves in it, and a part of them rushed for the redoubt. 
 After the commander of tlie 2d Battalion, who had placed 
 himself at the head of the assailants, was killed on the para- 
 pet, the attack was repulsed; the efforts of the rest of the 
 regiment to take the redoubt were equally fruitless. After 
 losing 29 officers and 1,000 men by the murderous infantry 
 fire from the redoubt and flanking rifle-trenches, the Penza 
 Eegiment retreated in considerable disorder. 
 
 The two Kozlofi" Battalions of this column then ad- 
 vanced to the attack, penetrated to the redoubt, and a part 
 reached the ditch, where the regimental commander fell 
 pierced by three bullets. The assailants did not succeed 
 in taking the breastwork, but maintained themselves in the 
 ditch, both sides keeping up a murderous fire at short range. 
 
 At this time Lieutenant-General Schilder-Schuldner 
 brought up from the right the last reserves of the column 
 consisting of the Archangel and Wologda Regiments; he 
 crossed the ravine and took the trenches on the side from 
 whence up to this time the Kozloff Regiment had received 
 flanking fire; but the attack of these six fresh battalions 
 on the redoubt itself also failed. 
 
 The left column of four battalions under Lieutenant- 
 General Wilhelminoff, which moved from the east and more 
 in the direction of the highroad, came under such severe fire 
 that the attack was stopped without reaching the redoubt.
 
 The Bat lie of I'Irnia. £9 
 
 the men openiuo- what s<'emed to be a verv ineffective lapid 
 fire. 
 
 The Galitz Re^dment, which formed the reserve of this 
 column, havinoalso been bronjilit up, the attack was renewed 
 and again repulsed. 
 
 At 6 p. m., after the infantry attack had lasted over three 
 hours, the situation of the rig^ht wing was as follows: the 
 three battalions of the Penza Regiment, almost destroyed 
 by its losses, seem to have withdrawn from the fighting line 
 altogether; the remnants of fifteen battalions, shot to pieces 
 and badly intermixed, maintained themselves in the space 
 between the redoubt and ravine, partly to the east, partly to 
 the north of the former. 
 
 As early as 4 p. m. the whole Koloma Regiment had been 
 drawn from the general resen^e to support the left wing. 
 At p. m. one battalion of the Serpuchoff Regiment, with 
 some cavalry and artillery, was dispatclied to the extreme 
 right to check the retrograde movement beginning there, 
 leaving but two fresh battalions, two squadrons, and some 
 artillery as general reserve. 
 
 Toward sundown Cxeneral Kriidener ordered a renewed 
 attack, to support which he sent forward three companies 
 of the reserve, followed subscMpiently by three more com- 
 panies. Three successive assaults were repulsed; in* the 
 last the commander of the 2d Brigade of the :i()th Division 
 was wounded within 100 paces of the redoubt. 
 
 Darkness had meanwhile settled down, but in the vicin- 
 ity of the redoubt a wild and disorderly conflict was con-
 
 60 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Flevna. 
 
 tiiiued with uninterrupted firing and cheering. Under these 
 circumstances, Kriidener abandoned all hope of a favorable 
 turn of the struggle and gave the order to retreat. The last 
 Serpuchoff Battalion of the reserve, the Galitz Regiment of 
 the left column, which had suffered least, and the Woronesh 
 Regiment, which had just arrived on the field from Sistova, 
 were ordered to cover the retreat. These troops took up the 
 action, under cover of w^hich the wounded were collected 
 bj means of the available transportation. 
 
 The conflict raged around the redoubt during the whole 
 night; at daybreak the last detachments retreated and it 
 was not until 11 a, m. on July 31st that the troops of the 
 right wing were assembled at Tristenik and Karagatch, 
 
 No pursuit took place. 
 
 5. The Attack of the Russian Left Winf/. 
 
 At 2:30 p. m. Prince Shakofskoi sent forward the Kursk 
 and Rylsk Regiments (five battalions) on the two redoubts 
 between the highroads to Lovtcha and Bulgareni. In front 
 of the redoubts three and four lines of trenches had been 
 constructed: The trenches were taken after a furious strug- 
 gle and the Turks thix)wn back on the redoubts, whereupon 
 the Rylsk Regiment moved on the eastern, the Kursk Regi- 
 ment on the western redoubt. The eastern redoubt was car- 
 ried after a brief struggle; two guns fell into the hands of 
 the assailants, the Turks succeeding in removing ten other 
 guns from the fortification in good time. 
 
 The assault on the western redoubt presented greater 
 difficulties. On advancing against this redoubt the Kursk
 
 The Battle of Flenia. 01 
 
 Regiment was taken in left fianlv by tlie fire of a battery and 
 skirmishers in action on the edge of the Tutchenitza ravine, 
 while in front on both sides of the redoubt dense lines of 
 closed infantry appeared to receive the assailants with a 
 murflerous fire at a range of 200 to 300 paces. To support 
 the attack, some companies of the Rylsk Regiment advanced 
 at this critical moment from the captured eastern^redoubt 
 and the 1st Shuja Battalion from the reserve came up on 
 the left, while the artillery of the left wing, reinforced by 
 fresh batteries from the reserve, advanced at the same time. 
 The attack was successful and the western redoubt was also 
 taken, but the losses were very heavy. The commander of 
 the Rylsk Regiment, although wounded, retained command 
 of his regiment; the commander of the Shuja Regiment, 
 leading his first battalion in person, fell mortally wounded, 
 but ordered the soldiers, who wanted to carry him off, to 
 leave him, and encouraged his men to advance. Matters 
 had reached this stage at 5 p. m. 
 
 Prince Shakofskoi received from General Kriidener the 
 information that the Koloma Regiment and a battery from 
 the general reserve had been dispatched in support of the 
 left wing. In fact, however, the regiment did not reach its 
 destination, but became embroiled in the general conflict on 
 the extreme right of the left wing without producing a visi- 
 ble effect on the course of the action. 
 
 As the Turks were proceeding to the counter-attack with 
 fresh forces, Shakofskoi, in the hope of using the Koloma 
 Regiment as reserve, brought tlie 2d and 3d Shuja Battalions
 
 62 Tact leal ><tudies on the Battles AioiiikJ PIciiki. 
 
 from his own reserve to the support of liis right, which left 
 him but three fresh battalions of the Ja.roslof Regiment in 
 reserve; two batteries were brought forward from tlie riglit 
 of the artillery position and posted to the right of the east- 
 ern redoubt. Soon afterward the 1st Jaroslof Battalioit was 
 ordered forward to support the left. 
 
 Wi^i the beginning of darkness the Turks made a new 
 counter-attack, this time with considerable bodies of cavalry 
 on both flanks, endeavoring to turn the Russian position. To 
 su])poi't the hard-pressed left, another Jaroslof battalion 
 came forward from the reserve, while a battery advanced 
 boldly into action almost on the flank of the Turkish attack 
 and took it under efl'ective fire. 
 
 Shakofskoi decided to retreat, although the Turkish 
 attack was repulsed; ten of his eleven battalions were in 
 action and reduced by severe losses; all the troops were 
 completeh^ exhausted and no reinforcements were at hand 
 or in prospect to oppose the frequently renewed attacks of 
 the Turks. The retreat was begun in good order, the two 
 captured guns having to be left behind; the troops at first 
 took up the position on the heights close in front of Rad- 
 ischevo which they had in the morning, and passed the night 
 there. Next morning they withdrew to Poradim unmolested. 
 
 6. Attach of the Left Flank Detachment. 
 
 Meanwhile General Skobeleff was making his last at- 
 tack, presently to be described, thereby rendering the posi- 
 tion of Shakofskoi's left less difficult. 
 
 Under cover of the dense fog, Skobeleff had moved from
 
 The Battle of Phrna. (33 
 
 Bogot unmolested to Krishin, where he halted his main body 
 and advanced in person with two sotnias and four guns to 
 within 650 yards of the edge of the western suburb of Plevna. 
 From this point he observed some 20,000 infantry in close 
 reserve formation between the heights of the Grivitza re- 
 doubt and the town, while cavahy was seen in rear toward 
 the Vid. 
 
 At 10 a. m. ^^hakofskoi's guns were heard, and Skobeleff 
 ordered his four guns to open fire, which was at once replied 
 to by six Turkish guns. Shortly afterward quite a number 
 of Turkish guns took up the fire, and infantrj^ columns with 
 skirmishers in front and cavalry on the flanks moved to the 
 attack of Skobeleff. 
 
 Before this overwhelming attack Skobeleff withdrew to 
 his main position at Krishin and made the following dis- 
 positions: 
 
 1. Colonel Tutolmin with three sotnias and twelve 
 horse guns remained on the height of Krishin, fronting to- 
 ward Lo'V'tcha witli, strong Cossack posts i)ushed out beyond. 
 
 2. One sotnia was sent to the left toward the Vid in 
 observation, and twenty volunteers under an officer were 
 charged with discovering a. ford for use in case the dctacli- 
 ment should have to cross to the left bank to move on the en- 
 emy's communications. The detachment of volunteers ac- 
 complished its object to Skobelelf's complete satisfaction. 
 
 3. One sotnia was detached to the liglit, witli orders 
 to keep up conimunicalion with Sliakofskoi. from wliose 
 position Skobeleff was separated by ilic steep and nxky
 
 64 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 Tutchenitza ravine; throughout the day it reported all that 
 took place on Shakofskoi's side. 
 
 Skobeleff advanced with four remaining sotnias, the 3d 
 Kursk Battalion, and the four foot guns toward Plevna to 
 reoccupy the position he had held before and from which the 
 Turks might direct an effective fire against the flank of 
 Shakofskoi's troops. 
 
 Skobeleff at first moved to the attack with one and a 
 half companies, two sotnias, and the four guns, keeping the 
 rest of his detachment in reserve in case he should be at- 
 tacked from the direction of Lovtcha. This small detach- 
 ment occupied the commanding height close in front of 
 Plevna and maintained itself there from 10 a. m. to 4 p. m. 
 against eight Tuirkisih battalions supported by artillery, 
 which made repeated attacks against the Eussian position. 
 By 4 p. m, Skobeleff had become convinced that no danger 
 was impending from Lovtcha; and he was informed that 
 Shakofskoi was making a decisive attack. On receipt of 
 this information he left but half a company in reserve and 
 led three companies forward to support his hard-pressed 
 detachment. When within a few paces of the guns the 
 Turks were driven back as far as the edge of the town by 
 a sudden bayonet charge. 
 
 ■ Supported by the four guns, the Kursk Battalion with- 
 stood for two hours thei repeated attacks of the Turks. It 
 was only at dusk that Skobeleff ordered the retreat. To cover 
 the withdrawal of the infantry and guns and the removal of 
 the wounded, the Cossacks advanced repeatedly to the at-
 
 The Batik of Plevna. 65 
 
 tack, mounted and dismounted. Upon the arrival of the de- 
 tachment at Krishin at 10 p. m. SkobelefE received Shakof- 
 skoi's order to withdraw to Bogot and Pelishat. 
 
 7. Losses. 
 The Russian losses in killed, wounded, and missing are 
 given as 169 officers and 7,136 men. 
 
 Some details of the official tables of losses are inter- 
 esting. 
 
 The regiments of the 30th Divsion lost in killed and 
 wounded : 
 
 Jaroslof, No. 117 2.38 men. 
 
 Shuja, No. 118 114 men. 
 
 Koloma, No. 119 85 men. 
 
 Serpuchoff, No. 120 214 men. 
 
 Details of the losses of the regiments of the 5th and 
 31st Divisions (IX. Corps) cannot be ascertained, since the 
 losses at Nikopolis and in the two battles of Plevna are not 
 separately given. 
 
 The losses of the two regiments of the XL Corps on the 
 left of the first line, which captured the two redoubts north 
 of Radischevo, were quite severe. 
 
 Kursk Regiment, No. 125 (part of tlie regi- 
 ment was in action under Skobeleff). . . . 
 
 336 men killed. 
 
 Rylsk Regiment, No. 126. .725 men killed. 
 
 8. The Panic at Sistova. 
 The following events, although very slightly connected
 
 6(i Tactical Studies on the Battles A round Pleriin. 
 
 with the battle of Plevna, are here stated as forming an inter- 
 esting contribution to the history of confusion created by a 
 false alarm. 
 
 At noon on July 31st the first wounded from the battle- 
 field of Plevna reached Sistova from Bulgareni, saving that 
 the battle was lost and that it was rumored that a transport 
 of wounded while en route had been attacked by Turkish cav- 
 alry and cut down. The statement created consternation 
 among the inhabitants of Sistova and among the men of new 
 Bulgarian druschinas which were being formed there; a 
 large portion of these men started for the pontoon bridge 
 below the town with the cry, ''The Turks are coming!" Here 
 a large number of empty provision-wagons were halting on 
 the Bulgarian bank, their destination being Zimnitza, A 
 drunken Cossack on an unsaddled horse, preceding the swarm 
 of fugitives, galloped toward the bridge crying, "The Turks 
 are in Sistova!'' whereupon a. terrible confusion ensued in 
 the train, all the wagons trying to gain the bridge ; the swarm 
 of fugitives from Sistova also rushed upon the bridge. 
 
 The commander of the bridge (General Eichter, of the 
 Engineers), who happened to be on the north bank at the 
 time, ordered the small detachments at his disposal to close 
 the bridge by force of arms if necessary; through his ener- 
 getic intervention he succeeded in restoring order; mean- 
 while word came from the commander of Sistova that the 
 report was false and that no Turks were in sight at all. To 
 allay the uneasiness of the inhabitants the Kussian detach- 
 ments stationed in the town had meanwhile taken a defen- 
 sive position in front of the town.
 
 The Battk of Plevna. 07 
 
 The bridge being closed, swarms of fugitives crossed tlie 
 Danube by boat (in whicli operation several i)ersons were 
 drowned); they soon spread tlie false alarm in Zimnitza: 
 "The Turks have taken the bridge! The Turks are march- 
 ing on Zimnitza ! The Turks are crossing from the right to 
 the left bank on four steamers!" 
 
 The entire population and a large part of the wounded 
 in the hospitals began to fly; after much trouble, Cossack 
 patrols succeeded in bringing the fugitives back to town. 
 The confusion was increased by the fact that at the time of 
 the arrival of the first alarming news a detachment of Turks, 
 captured in fonner engagements, happened to be conducted 
 through Zimnitza.. 
 
 Comments. 
 1. Greueral Kriidener, although nominally commander- 
 in-chief, seems to have occupied himself chiefly with his own 
 (IX.) corps, which formed the right wing, and to have left 
 the conduct of the left wing without reservation to Prince 
 Stiakofskoi, commander of the XI, Corps. This fact became 
 evident in the dispositions made by Kriidener for tlu' ])()si- 
 tion and attack of the IX. Corps (although that corps had an 
 acting commander in th(» person of General AN'ilhelminof), 
 wiiile he left these details on the other w'ing to General 
 Shakofskoi. Moreover, Kriidener ordered the right wing 
 (with which he remained exclusively) to attack at 2:40 p. m., 
 after Shakofskoi had begun the attack of the left wing at 
 2:;>0 p. m. on lijs own responsibility. In uniform conduct
 
 6 8 Tactical Studies on th e Battles Around Plevna . 
 
 of the baj;tle by a common superior, General Krudener is 
 therefore out of the question. 
 
 2. A striking point in the disposition is the weakness 
 of the general reserve consisting of one-sixth of the avail- 
 able battalions. The disruption of the unity of the 30th In- 
 fantry Division is also surprising; one of its brigades was 
 combined with a brigade of another division to form the left 
 wing, while the other brigade of the former division was 
 held in reserve; the reason may have been a desire of plac- 
 ing under Prince Shakofskoi's orders the only infantry bri- 
 gade of his corps present (1st of the 32d Division). 
 
 The brigades and divisions being posted in lines in rear 
 of each other instead of abreast caused a complete disrup- 
 tion of the larger tactical units in the course of the battle. 
 This was particularly noticeable in the IX. Corps, where it 
 would have been far more appropriate to have fonned each 
 of the great wing columns of an entire division. 
 
 3. General Kriidener is said to have reconnoitered 
 the enemy's position in person on the day preceding the bat- 
 tle; the same was done by Colonel Biskupski, chief of staff 
 of the XI. Corps, in the portion south of the highroad Bul- 
 gareni — Plevna, which was assigned to the left wing as its 
 field of attack. Both reconnaissances seem to have been 
 conducted in a very general way. For several days the 
 Eussians had been in comparatively close proximity to the 
 enemy, yet a thorough reconnaissance of the enemy's position 
 does not seem to have taken place; sufficient information 
 had not been gained about the details of the terrain in front,
 
 The Battle of Plevna. 60 
 
 or about the fortifications of the Turks. Had this been done, 
 the dense fog which covered the field during the first hours of 
 the artillery combat, and which was not favorable to the eflB- 
 cacy of the Russian artillery fire, might have been turned to 
 good account by the Russians in maskingthe advance of strong 
 skirmish lines against the Turkish position. It would have 
 been possible, for instance, to capture the great ravine in 
 front of the Grivitza redoubt without much difficulty and 
 with comparatively small loss, thus securing from the be- 
 ginning an intermediate position favorable to subsequent 
 attack on the redoubt. 
 
 Skobeleff's bold and skillful mode of proceeding on the 
 extreme left demonstrates that the fog could be taken advant- 
 age of for reconnaissance and attack of the enemy's position. 
 
 4. Nowhere was the Russian attack ushered in hj the 
 fire of skirmishers. After the cannonade, whose effect seems 
 to have been small, the Russian infantry, which up to this 
 time had not fired a shot, moved in dense masses to the at- 
 tack, which was frontal throughout and unaccompanied by 
 any attempt to turn the enemy's flank. 
 
 The chief strength of the Turkish position did not lie in 
 the redoubts which have attracted the most attention, but in 
 the tiers of rifle-trenches in front and flank of the redoubts. 
 In order to capture a position entrenched in this manner it is 
 evidently not so important to penetrate into the redoubts as 
 to carry the trenches on the flanks, in which case the redoubt 
 would be isolated and unable to hold out for any length of 
 time.
 
 70 Tactical IStndks on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 But the method of the right wing- in its attaclc is not 
 based on sucli an idea. The nine battalions in the first line 
 were formed in two columns and moved from north and east 
 against the great redoubt in rear of the village of Grivitza; 
 the entire second line was attached to these two columns 
 from the beginning and moved off with them, so that, prop- 
 erly speaking, all of the eighteen battalions of the right 
 wing were out of hand of the leaders from the very begin- 
 ning of the .attack. 
 
 If we examine the details of the action, we find the two 
 columns advancing against the redoubt on a narrow front 
 and under effective flank fire from some rifie-trenches at the 
 side. 
 
 Of the right column, five battalions advanced succes- 
 sively on the redoubt; each battalion reached the enemy 
 when the preceding battalion had been used up; each bat- 
 talion lost a large part of its men under the fire from the 
 rifle-trenches which swept the approaches to the redoubt; 
 of each battalion only fragments got into the ditch of the 
 redoubt, where they maintained a hopeless and desperate 
 struggle, in which a large part of the officers and the brav- 
 est of the men found their death; further tactical availabil- 
 ity of these five battalions was out of the question. 
 
 The six battalions of the Archangel and Wologda Regi- 
 ments, brought up from the reserve to support the attack, 
 at last turned on the rifle-trenches, the gauntlet of whose mur- 
 derous fire the preceding assailants of tht* redoubt had run. 
 These rifle-trenches were taken after a furious struggle, but
 
 The Battle of Plevna. 71 
 
 now these six battalions were also expended, for it should be 
 borne in mind that these battalions, whose strength at the 
 beginning of July w^as probably less than 5,000 men, had lost 
 more than 2,000 men and the greater part of their officers in 
 the bloody actions of the loth and 20th of July. Attempts 
 made by fractions of the battalions to take the redoubt 
 failed and added to the losses, and henceforth these bat- 
 talions were likewise no longer to be regarded as tactical 
 bodies, but as a disorganized mass of more or less brave 
 men on which the higher leaders could no longer exert any 
 influence, since most of the officers were dead or wounded. 
 The conditions with the left (east) column were similar. 
 Here also the battalions of the second line became early in- 
 volved in the action; all frontal attacks against the redoubt 
 were repulsed with great loss, cliieflii hi/ the fire from the rifle- 
 trenehes, which, on this part of the field, were not captured 
 at all. 
 
 All available troops of the right wing (IS battalions) 
 were expended and out of hand before the Turkish reserves 
 moved to the counter-attack. 
 
 On the whole, the attack of the Russian left wing was 
 conducted more correctly, and therefore with more success. 
 The five battalions of the first line made their attack without 
 preparation by fire, but simultaneously on a broad front, 
 and supported by one battali<»n from the reserve and the Are 
 of several batteries also advancing upon the enemy's posi- 
 tion. The battalions of the first line succeeded in capturing 
 both redoubfs au<l Wvo rifle-treiiclics in fi-itnt and (in 1 lie Hank,
 
 7^ Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 wliilei five fresh battalions of the second line remained 
 available. 
 
 The Turkish counter-attack, effectively supported by 
 artillery and swarms of skirmishers in a flanking position 
 along the Tutchenitza ravine, was repulsed with the aid of 
 three battalions gradualh' brought forward from the sec- 
 ond line. 
 
 At dusk the Turks began the second counter-attack 
 with fresh forces; it was repulsed, it is true, with the as- 
 sistance of another battalion from the second line, but having 
 a single fresh battalion left to him, and having learned of the 
 complete failure of the attack on the right, Shakofskoi did 
 not wait for the third counter-attack of the Turks, and 
 began a well-ordered retreat, covered by his last fresh 
 battalion. 
 
 The course of the action was thus very different on the 
 two wings; on the right Knidener's eighteen battalions 
 failed to gain possession of the enemy's position, aud in this 
 wing the Turks were not obliged to use their reserves at all 
 (in consequence of which almost all of them were sent against 
 Shakofskoi), and in order to cover the retreat of the bat- 
 talions engaged, the last troops of the senselessly squan- 
 dered general reserve had to be brought forward. On the 
 left Shakofskoi's first line succeeded almost single-handed 
 in capturing the enemy's position, and the second line was 
 only usedto repulse two strong counter-attacks of theTurkish 
 reserves; and at the termination of this furious and costly 
 struggle the troops possessed a certain outward cohesion.
 
 The Battk of Plcvmt. 73 
 
 which rendered tactical action and leading; possible. It can 
 not be denied that the left wing accomplished much more 
 with far inferior means than the right. 
 
 In casting a parting glance at the employment of the 
 "general reserve," we find that shortly after the beginning 
 of the infantry attack it was diverted from its proper pur- 
 pose by direct orders of General Kriidener and distributed 
 among both wings as a kind of special reserve. At 4 p. m. 
 the Koloma Regiment was detached to the left wing (where 
 it became engaged in the general action without plan or 
 effec^t), and the Superchoff Regiment was retained in sui)port 
 of the right wing. From the moment of this division the all- 
 too-w^eak reserve was no longer able to exert a decisive influ- 
 ence on the general conflict; how the Superchoff Regiment 
 was subsequently squandered has been stated above. 
 
 Had the right wing gained the same results as the left, 
 compelling the Turks to expend part of their reserves against 
 it, then a general advance about dusk by tlu* reserve, held 
 in hand until the moment, either in the center along the great 
 highroad or on either flank, might, and probably would, 
 have produced a decisive result of this bloody day in favor 
 of the Russian arms. 
 
 5. It becomes evident from the above descrijttion that 
 we can hardly speak of a cooperation of the three arms in the 
 course of the battle. The preparation of the attack was left 
 exclusively to the artillery; the attack of the infantry re- 
 ceived little assistance from the ai-tillcrv on the left, and none
 
 74 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 at all on the right; the Kussian cavalry' took no active part 
 in the conflict of the main bodies. 
 
 The possihilitfj of cooperation of the three arms in un- 
 favorable terrain is demonstrated by the small left flank de- 
 tachment under General Skobeleff. 
 
 The conduct of the action by this general shows a rare 
 combinaton of prudence and rashness. His personal and 
 thorough reconnaissance of the ground; his careful arrange- 
 ments for guarding the rear of his detachment, and for main- 
 taining communication with the main army; the bold ad- 
 vance of his small detachment close to the enemj'^s position, 
 attracting disproportionately large forces of the enemy 
 and rendering the attack of the main army correspondingly 
 easier; his stout defensive action, in which infantry, artil- 
 lery, and cavalry (both mounted and dismounted) sup- 
 ported one another with great skill ; lastly, upon learning 
 of the beginning of the main attack on the part of Shakof- 
 skoi's troops, his energetic offensive, for which he em- 
 ployed his heretofore carefully husbanded small infantry 
 reserve, and the skillful and successful retreat under diffi- 
 cult circumstances — are certainly worthy of great consid- 
 eration and thorough study.
 
 Battle of Zgahritza <ind PcU.shat. 75 
 
 PART VI. 
 
 SORTIE BATTLE OF ZOA'LEVITZA AXL) PELISHAT 
 ON THE 31ST OF AUGUST. 
 
 1. Position of the West Artnij on the Morninf/ of the Slst 
 of August. 
 
 The right of the aruiy was formed by the 4th Roumanian 
 DiYision, which was posted between the Vid and the highroad 
 to Nitopolis ; the IX. Corps formed the center between the 
 Nikopolis and Bulgareui roads; the IV. Corps formed the 
 left between the Bulgai*eni and Lovtcha roads. 
 
 The IV. Corps was commanded by General Kryloff , in the 
 absence of General Zotoflf, who was acting as commander-in- 
 chief of the West Army. The following positions were occu- 
 pied on the morning of the 31st of August: 
 
 The outposts stood on the line Bogot — Tutchenitza — 
 Radischevo — GrivitzadO miles) and were furnished on the left 
 by 2 squadrons of the 4th Lancers, on the right by 2 si^uad- 
 rons of the 4th Hussars. 
 
 The corps was posted as follows: On the left at Vv\- 
 ishat, the regiments Susdal,No. 02,Uglitz,No. 63,2 squadrons 
 of the 4th I>ancei*s, and probably 4 batteries. Alxuit 2.0(io 
 yards in fr(mt of the jjosition there was a lunette, (»<•( iijticd 
 by 2 companies and 2 guns. 
 
 At Zgalevitza on the riffht tliere were entrenched 2
 
 70 Tacticdl Studies on Ihv Baltics A yoiiiid Plevna. 
 
 Shuja battalions, 2 squadrons of the 4th Hussars, 2 foot 
 batteries, 8th Horse Battery of the IV. Corps, the Galitz 
 Regiment, No. 20, with a battery of the IX, Corps; also a sap- 
 per company. 
 
 The regiments Jaroslof, No. 117, Koloma, No. 119, Ser- 
 puchoff. No. 120, and 2 batteries were in reserve. 
 
 The following troops of the IV. Corps were absent: 
 
 The 4th Dragoons observed the valley of the Osma at 
 Karahassan; 
 
 The A'ladimir Regiment, No. 61, was on the way from 
 Zimnitza to join its corps and had reached Karagatch (8 
 miles west of Bulgareni on the great road) ; 
 
 The Kazan Regiment, No. 64, '1 Shuja battalion, No. 
 118, and a battery were with the corps of Prince Imeretinski 
 operating against Lovtcha; 
 
 The position of the 4th Cossack Regiment and 3 bat- 
 teries at this time cannot be ascertained. 
 
 2. Turkish Attack, 6:30 a. m. until 1 p. m. 
 
 At 6:30 a. m. the Russian outposts reported that strong 
 Turkish bodies were marching out of the entrenchments 
 south of the highroad and advancing onPelishataud Zgalev- 
 itza with a thick line of cavalry in front. 
 
 General Zotoff was at first inclined to consider the re- 
 ported movement a feint to screen a serious attack against 
 either the IX. Corps or the Roumanians. No changes in the 
 position of the troops were made for the present. 
 
 The 2 squadrons of Lancers at Pelishat, the 2 Hussar 
 squadrons, and the horse battery at Zgalevitza advanced to
 
 Battle of Zfjalevitza and Pdlsluit. 77 
 
 the support of the haid-pressed outposts. In view of the 
 strength of the Turkish cavalry, which numbered 2,500 
 horses, the Lancers gradually fell back on Pelishat, and the 
 Hussar Regiment on Zgalevitza, 
 
 At 8 a. m. the Turkish cavalry withdrew to the flank, 
 disclosing a strong line of infantry, w'hich moved to the 
 attack on Pelishat, The lunette was taken after a brief but 
 fierce struggle; its garrison fell back on Pelishat, where it 
 was relieved by 5 companies of the Susdal Regiment. Af- 
 ter 3 batteries had cannonaded the Turks for some time, de- 
 tachments of the Susdal Regiment advanced to the attack 
 and recaptured the lunette. 
 
 Tow^ard 9 a. m. the Turks brought up considerable re- 
 inforcements; their right extended more and more and 
 turned the left of the Russian position; swarms of Bashi- 
 bozouks* penetrated into Pelishat and set fire to the village. 
 A new attack on the lunette was repulsed; opposite the 
 position of Zgalevitza batteries came into action and a can- 
 nonade began on both sides. 
 
 At 10 a, m., no reports of any hostile movements having 
 been received from the outposts of the IX. Corps and the 
 Roumanian Division, General Zotoff became convinced that 
 the main attack was against his left wing I'lV. Corpsi. and 
 issued the following orders: 
 
 (o) One brigade of the IX. Corps to advance at once on 
 the highroad and attack the enemy's left flank. 
 
 (&) The reserves of the IX. Corps — 3 regiments of the 
 30th Infantry Division — to take position north of I'oradim 
 
 .*Guerinas or irreg-iilar troops.— A. L. W.
 
 78 Tact'icaJ studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 and hold tlieiuselves at the disposal of the commauder-iu- 
 chief. 
 
 (c) The Vladimir Reji^imeiit, Xo. 01, which had reached 
 Karagatch, to leave train and knapsacks and to march as 
 quickly as possible to Poradim to join the general reserve. 
 
 (d) The 4th Roumanian Division to assemble at once at 
 ( 'alysovat. 
 
 Opposite the entire Russian position from Pelishat to 
 Zgalevitza the Turks deployed a long line of infantry about 
 noon; in front of the infantry some 40 or 50 guns fired on 
 the Russian position aud were replied to by the Russian 
 batteries. 
 
 3. Repulse of the Turkish Attack, 1 to 5 p. m. 
 
 Toward 1 p. m. the Turkish infantry advanced to a gen- 
 eral attack, which was made in three principal directions: 
 against the position of the lunette, against the left flank, and 
 against the center of the Zgalevitza position, 
 
 (a) The attack against Pelishat and the lunette in front 
 was repulsed in front by the fire of 4 batteries; the com- 
 mander of the IV. Corps, General Krylotf, advanced against 
 the extreme right of the assailing Turks with 4 squadrons 
 of Lancers, 2 squadrons of Hussars, and a horse battery. The 
 Turks retired slowly and threw their right well back when it 
 was threatened by the Russian cavalry. 
 
 (6) The attack on the left of the Zgalevitza position 
 struck 1 Galitz battalion, No. 20, and 4 guns. This portion of 
 the position was reinforced from the reserve at Poradim by
 
 Battle of Zf/alcvifza and PrJishttt. 79 
 
 2 battalions (Serpiu-lioff.Xo. 120) aud a battery. The attack 
 of the Turks was repulsed. 
 
 (c) The attack directed a gainst the center of theZgalev- 
 itza position was carried out witli <ireat energy and reached 
 the Russian rifle-trenches, but was repulsed by the counter- 
 attack of the Russian infantry posted there — 2 Galitz bat- 
 talions. No. 20, and 2 Shuja. battalions. No. 118; 24 guns cov- 
 ered the Turks with a murderous fire during their advance as 
 well as during their retreat. 
 
 During the great infantry attack the cavalry of the 
 Tui'kish left attempted to tuni the right of the Zgalevitza 
 position; the movement was discovered by the 2 Hussar 
 squadrons posted ther(% and frustrated without difficulty by 
 artillery fire. 
 
 Notwithstanding their previous failure and great loss, 
 the Turks undertook a second attack at ;i ]). m., well pre- 
 pared by artillery and infantry fire. The attack was not 
 made with the same energy- as the first, and failed also. 
 
 On this occasion the regiments Susdal and TTglitz of the 
 left, and 2 battalions each of the regiments Galitz and Shuja 
 of the right wing, made an attempt to take the offensive, 
 but were checked by a Turkish counter-attack undertaken 
 l»artly by fresh troops and su])ported by severe fire of heavy 
 artillery. whereu]»on the Russian battalions fell back to their 
 original positions. At 4:30 p. m. the Turks began their re- 
 treat to IMevna. under the cover of a heavy artillery fire. 
 
 Jj. Ineffectual l'iti:siiit. 
 freneral KrvlDft' ordered the ten battalions in first line
 
 80 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 and the available 8 squadrons of Lancers and Hussars to 
 pursue, which, however, yielded no result. 
 
 The 2 cavalry regiments had been on outpost without 
 interruption for two months; and they had not been able 
 either to feed or unsaddle throughout this day. The Dra- 
 goon regiment posted on the Osma did not reach the corps 
 until after the termination of the action. 
 
 The infantry pursued for three miles and returned with- 
 out having effected an;\i:hing particular. The result might 
 have been better if the brigade which was ordered forward 
 to Grivitza by the highroad had been able to take the Turks 
 in flank. Although directed to advance with the utmost 
 speed in the direction indicated, the brigade did not leave its 
 knapsacks behind, but started with them; this circumstance, 
 in connection with the great heat, so delayed the movement 
 that the brigade was too late to act against the enemy's 
 flank. 
 
 5. Losses. 
 The losses of the Russians were: 
 
 Killed 3 officers, 171 men; 
 
 Wounded 27 officers, 708 men; 
 
 Missing 66 men; 
 
 Total 30 officers, 915 men. 
 
 Comments. 
 1. The outer line of the Russian line of investment, or, 
 better, their line of observation east of Plevna, began on the 
 left at the road to Lovtoha and described from there an arc
 
 Battle of Zf/alcvitza and Pelishat. 81 
 
 of a circle, with Plevna as a center, to the Vid above Riben. 
 The line had an extent of about 20 miles with a radius of 
 'about G miles. The position of the Russian reserves at Pora- 
 dini was 12 miles to the east of Plevna and G miles in rear of 
 the center of the Russian front. 
 
 It may not be out of place here to cast a glance at the 
 strength of the armies opi)asing each other at IMevna. 
 
 At the beginning- of August the ''West Arm^^" in front 
 of Plevna consisted of the 4 infantry divisions of the IV. 
 and IX. Corps, Avhich, at the time of the passage of the Dan- 
 ube, may have numbered about 40,000 effectives. Deduct- 
 ing 10,000 men for the losses suffered by these divisions in 
 the' actions of July, there remain 30,000 infantry, without 
 counting loss from disease. To these may be added about 
 10,000 cavalry, artillery, and special troops, and as many 
 Roumanians (4th Division), giving a total of some 50,000 
 men. Deducting losses from disease during the months of 
 July and August, and taking also into account the absence 
 of several bodies included in the above calculation which 
 were attached to the cori)S operating against Lovtcha, the 
 maximum available strength did not probably exceed 45,000 
 men present before Plevna toward the end of August. 
 
 In calculating the strengtli of tlic Tuikisli Aiiiiy it is 
 perhaps best to figure backward from the number of men 
 com])ris<'d in the suncndci-. At 1liat lime IIkm-c were in 
 PleTua some 57,000 men, inclusive of 20,000 sick and 
 wounded; it oan be proved that reinforcements to the 
 amount of gome 12,000 men entered Plevna during the month
 
 82 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 of September, which leaves 45,000 men. Estimating the htss 
 from battle or disease from September to December at 
 5,000 men (probably much too low), we find that toward the 
 end of August the Turkish army at Plevna numbered at least 
 50,000 effectives, and was at least equal, and probably supe- 
 rior, to the investing army, which, moreover, was scattered 
 over a line 20 miles long. 
 
 2. The failure of the pursuit after the repulse of the 
 Turkish attack renders it proper to ask whether such an at- 
 tempt was right under the circumstances. 
 
 It would probably be so only in case it were the in- 
 tention to enter the entrenchments of the retreating ene- 
 my, or in case it seemed practicable to drive a portion of the 
 enemy from the line of retreat before reaching the shelter 
 of the entrenchments. If neither is the case, pursuit under 
 similar circumstances had better be omitted, as it will in- 
 variably result in the retreat of the pursuing troops from the 
 works, thus raising the moral of the previously defeated 
 enemy.
 
 Capture of Lovtcha. 83 
 
 PART VII. 
 
 CAPTURE OF LOVTCHA OX THE 3D OF SEPTEMBER. 
 
 ■ 1. Advance on Lovtcha. 
 
 Early in August General Skobeleff was posted at Kak- 
 rina, on the road from Selvi to Lovtcha, with the Caucasian 
 Cossack Brigade and a mixed detachment from the IV. 
 Corps (Kazan Regiment, No. 64, 1 Shuja battalion, and 1 bat- 
 tery). A portion of the new reinforcements had by this time 
 reached Selvi, consisting of the 2d Infantry Division, the 2d 
 ]5rigade of the 3d Infantry Division with its artillery, the 3d 
 Rifle Brigade, and a heavy battery made up of 4 guns cap- 
 tured at Nikopolis. 
 
 On the 31st of August Prince Imeretinski, commander- 
 in-chief of the forces at Selvi, received orders to .attack 
 Lovtcha. 
 
 On the 1st of September Skobeleff was accordingly 
 I)ushed forward from Kakrina to Fontana (about 3,000 j'ards 
 east of Lovtcha), with orders to occup}- the heights dominat- 
 ing the approaches to the position of Lovtcha, to recon- 
 noiter the terrain with a view to artillery positions, and to 
 construct rifle-trenches and gun-emplacements. 
 
 The Caucasian Cossack Brigade was to cross the Osma 
 at Iglaw (7 miles below Lovtcha) and to reconnoiter the road 
 to Plevna (by which reinforcements might reach Lovtcha
 
 84 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 or by which its garrison might withdraw) ; 2 sotnias of the 
 30th Don Cossacks were to observe the roads from Trojan 
 to Selvi. A single poor road was available for the march 
 of the main body from Selvi to Lovtcha (33 miles), so that it 
 was started in echelons^-the 2d Brigade of the 2d Division 
 on the afternoon of September 1st, the 2d Brigade of the 
 3d Division at 11 p. m., the 1st Brigade of the 2d Division at 
 2 o'clock next morning, and at 4 a. m. (September 2d) the 3d 
 Kifle Brigade. 
 
 Z. Preparatory Arrangements on the 1st and 2d of 
 Scptcinher. 
 
 General Skobeleff reached Fontana at 2 p. m. September 
 1st, recounoitered the country, and ordered the 1st Kazan 
 Battalion to occupy the height (a) on the left of the road and 
 the remaining troops of his detachment to take post in rear 
 of that height. 
 
 Throughout the night the men were at work construct- 
 ing rifle-trenches and emplacements for 21 guns, and 1 bat- 
 tery was dragged by the infantry to the steep, rocky height 
 (6) north of the road, where it opened fire at 5 a. m. September 
 2d, sweeping more particularly the ground iu front of the 
 height (a). 
 
 During the uight of the 2d-3d the infantry dragged 5 
 batteries to the height (h), so that on both sides of the road 
 48 guns were iu position. 
 
 Major-Greneral Dobrovolski, w^ho was to form the right 
 wing of the position with the 3d Rifle Brigade, arrived at 
 Prissiaka (3 miles northeast of Lovtcha) on the evening of
 
 Capture of Lovtcha. 85 
 
 September 2d, and entrenched himself on the height in front 
 during- the night and the following morning; a field battery 
 and the heavy battery heretofore mentioned were placed 
 in position at this point early on the morning of Septem- 
 ber 3d. 
 
 For the execution of the general attack contemplated 
 for the 3d, Prince Imeretinski directed tliat, after proper 
 preparation by artillery fire, the left wing under Skobeleff 
 attack the **Red Hill," situated close to Lovtcha and forming 
 the key to the enemy's position; that Dobrovolski, with the 
 right wing, attack the heights on the right bank of the Os- 
 ma. The 2d Infantry Division and the parts of the 3d Di- 
 vision present were to follow in reserve. 
 
 3. Action on the Right Bank of the Osma. 
 
 At 5:30 a, m. September 3d the artillery opened along 
 the whole Russian linc^^ — with IG four-pounders, 40 nine- 
 pounders, and the 4 heavy guns. On the left the fire was 
 continued without inteuruption until 2 p. m. According to 
 Russian accounts, the Turkish artillery, thenumber of whose 
 guns cannot be ascertained, but which certainly was much 
 inferior to the Russian, offered a most obstinate and suc- 
 cessful resistance. 
 
 At 6:15 a. m. the Turks opened a brisk infantry fire from 
 the trenches on the heights of the right bank of the Osma 
 against Dobrovolski's rifle battalions in front of Prissiaka, 
 The latter must have been in a faulty jtosition — no other ex- 
 planation-can be given of the loss of 8 officers and 150 men
 
 8 6 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 iu the 11th Rifle Battalion before the Russian infantry in 
 this wing had fired a shot. 
 
 According to the plan, Dobrovolski ^Yas not to advance 
 until Skobeleff's attack on the "Red Hill" had succeeded. 
 In view of the great losses which his troops had suffered, and 
 which seemed likely to increase with further delay, General 
 Dobrovolski at 8 a. m. moved against the opposite heights on 
 the right bank, which were defended by two lines of rifle- 
 trenches — one half way up, the other at the crest. The rifle 
 brigade (reinforced by a combined company of the head- 
 quarters guard of the commander-in-chief) captured the 
 heights after an action lasting from 8 to 11 a. m. ; the Turkish 
 left wing fell back behind the Osma. The Reval Regiment 
 was brought forward from the reserve to support General 
 Dobrovolski; it turned to the left, where meanwhile the at- 
 tack on the "Red Hill," the chief point of the hostile posi- 
 tion, had been preparing. 
 
 After the great Russian battery on both sides of the 
 road had continued its fire against the Turkish position un- 
 til 2 p. m., the Kazan Regiment advanced, with band playing, 
 to the attack on the "Red Hill," and captured it. Two bat- 
 teries from the reserve were at once dragged to the top of the 
 hill, whence they opened fire against the line of redoubts on 
 the left bank of the Osma, whose central stronghold was a 
 formidable redoubt. On the right of the Kazan Regiment, 
 north of the road, the regiments of Kaluga and Libau crossed 
 the marshy bottom intervening between the Russian aiid 
 Turkish positions, and captured the heights north of the
 
 Capture of Lovtcha. 87 
 
 "Red Hill," leaving the whole right bank iu j^he hands of the 
 Russians. 
 
 4. Action on the Left Bank of tlie Osma. 
 
 Upon the capture of the "Red Hill" the 1st Kazan Bat- 
 talion took post there, while the remaining 2 battalions of 
 the regiment crossed the river, penetrated into the town, and 
 captured its farther ed^e after a brief action. 
 
 In addition to the 2 batteries posted on the "Red Hill" 
 itself, 2 more were posted on the highroad farther to the 
 north, so that 32 guns brought their fire to bear on the en- 
 trenchments of the left bank. The regiments Pokof, No 11, 
 Estland, No. 8, Reval, No. 7, and the 1st Shuja Battalion 
 crossed the river, so that, inclusive of the 2 Kazan battalions 
 already there, 12 battalions stood in readiness for attack. 
 
 Eight battalions of these troops advanced at 5:30 p. m. 
 against the right of the enemy's position, while the Kaluga 
 Regiment, No. 5, together with detachments of the Libau 
 Regiment, No. (5, and the Rifles, crossed the river lower 
 down and attacked the left of the Turkish position. The 
 latter was taken after a furious hand-to-hand conflict; the 
 retreating Turks were pursued by the Caucasian Cossack 
 Brigade, which advanced from the right wing across the 
 Osma. Two Turkish battalions were cut off and destroyed 
 by the Cossacks after brave resistance; the fire of the Cos- 
 sack horse battery which had accompanied ihc Cossacks 
 made great havoc among tlie fleeing Turks.
 
 88 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 5. Losses. 
 
 The losses of the Kussians were:* 
 
 Killed G officers, 313 men. 
 
 Missing 52 men. 
 
 Wounded 33 officers, 1,112 men. 
 
 Total 39 officers, 1,477 men. 
 
 On the part of the Turks neither the number of troops 
 engaged nor the losses can be ascertained. According to 
 Russian accounts, 2,200 Turks were buried within the cap- 
 tured entrenchments, not counting those killed by the Cos- 
 sacks during the pursuit. It seems verv probable, under the 
 circumstances described, that the latter number was very 
 great. The statement of Prince Imeretinski at the conclusion 
 of his report, that 3,000 Turks (the number occurs more than 
 once, and is therefore not a misprint) were cut down in their 
 flight, bears too much the stamp of inordinate exaggeration 
 to be of any value whatever, the more when it is considered 
 that the pursuing Cossacks could barely have numbered 
 more than 1,000 horses. 
 
 6. Events on the J/th and 5th of September. 
 
 Late on the evening of September 3d reports were re- 
 ceived from the headquarters of the IV. Corps that strong 
 bodies of the enemy had marched froni Plevna in the direc- 
 tion of Lovtcha; soon afterward patrols reported the appear- 
 ance of strong hostile detachments. 
 
 On the morning of September 1th this column moved on 
 the position of Lovtcha, and tried to gain the Russian left
 
 Capture of Lovtcha. 89 
 
 flank by continued maneuvering to the right. The conflict, 
 however, was limited to a wholly ineffective artillery com- 
 bat, and toward noon the Turks withdrew in the direction 
 of Mikren (12 miles southwest of Lovtcha). 
 
 On the 5th of September Prince Imeretinski left the 2d 
 Brigade of the 3d Division at Lovtcha and marched to rejoin 
 the main body of the West Army, whose left wing he reached 
 in the evening at Bogot (about 12 miles). 
 
 Comments. 
 
 1. A surprising feature of the order of march of the 
 corps from Selvi to Lovtcha is, that the Rifle Brigade, al- 
 though intended to form the right of the attack, marched 
 at tJie rear of the column, and that the troops intended for 
 reserves marched in front. It is also surprising that the 
 unity of the 2d Division was broken up on the march by 
 sandwiching a brigade of the 3d Division between the two 
 brigades of the 2d. 
 
 2. As the corps had 70 guns, there must have been 
 present a number of field officers of artillery and certainly 
 one (probably two) brigade commanders; yet it was not an 
 artillery offlcer, but Captain Kiiiopatkin* of the general staff', 
 who was charged with ])osting the artillery on the heights 
 on both sides of the highroad. 
 
 The same Captain Kuropatkin traced the lines for the 
 rifle-trenches to be constructed on the left, and the execu- 
 
 "In view of the fact that Kuropatkin. though only a captain, was Skobeleff'.s 
 chief of staff", the author's conun<=nts seem somewhat severe. Kuropatkin after- 
 wards became a lieutenant-Kt*neral and Governor of the Trans-Caspian Provinces. 
 He is a soldier of distinsruished ability, and is regarded by many as SkobeleflTs nat- 
 ural successor. — A. L. W.
 
 90 Tacticnl FitudleH on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 tion of these pioneer works, including the construction of 
 , emplacements for 4S ^uns, was directed by an infantry lieu- 
 tenant of tlfe Kazan regiment. On the right of General 
 Dobrovolski's position the construction of rifle-trenches and 
 gun-emplacements was superintended by an ensign of the 
 sapper battalion of the Guard, who, with his small detach- 
 ment of sappers, belonged to the combined Guard company 
 w^hich formed the commander-in-chief's headquarter guard. 
 This corps, therefore, although consisting of 26 battalions, 
 seems to have been practically without special troops. 
 
 3. The attack on the Turkish position of Lovtcha was 
 purely frontal, and its preparation and inception was left to 
 the artillery, which, to be sure, was very much superior to 
 that of the enemy. Not a musket seems to have been dis- 
 charged on the Kussian left, before the infantry advanced to 
 the decisive attack on the ''Red Hill," in doing which it had 
 to traverse a distance of not less than 1,000 yards from its 
 sheltered position to that of the enemy. 
 
 4. It would appear from our description that the un- 
 suitable position of the rifle brigade on the right made it 
 almost helpless against the enemy's infantry entrenched on 
 the right bank of the Osma. Instead of opposing the trou- 
 blesome and destructive infantry fire of the Turks with 
 musketry, the Russian right wing was unable to help itself 
 except by an attack, which was contrary to the programme 
 and insufiSoiently prepared, but which succeeded through 
 the bravery of the troops and their superior numbers. 
 
 5. The vigorous advanctv of the Cossack Brisrade
 
 Capture of Loutcha. 'Jl 
 
 against the defeated enemy's line of retreat resulted in con- 
 siderable loss for the latter. The question seems not inap- 
 propriate here, whether, in view of the great and undoubted 
 numerical superiority o'f the Russians in this action, a turn- 
 ing movement below the position by a strong infantry de- 
 tachment, say a brigade, might not have been decisive and 
 entailed less loss? It appears from the description tliat the 
 Osma could be crossed with little trouble and witliont using 
 the bridge. 
 
 6. The headquarters of the IV. Corjjs, which formed 
 the left of the Russian army before Plevna, discovered in the 
 course of the afternoon that a strong Turkish column was 
 marching from Plevna against Lovtcha, where it was known 
 that Prince Imeretinski was engaged in battle. A report 
 was accordingly sent to him. It does not appear, however, 
 that the IV. Corps made any movement of troops in indirect 
 support of the corps engaged at Lovtcha. An advance of 
 the cavalry and horse artillery posted on the Russian left 
 against the flank of the hostile column would ceitainly have 
 seriously delayed or stoj^ped that movement. 
 
 7. The constant maneuvering to the right by the Turk- 
 ish column which appeared before Lovtcha on the morning 
 of September itii is explained by the Russians as an attempt, 
 threatened but not c<arried out, of turning their loft. The 
 movement is, however, susceptible of a difl'erent oxpliniation. 
 The Turkish coIuhui from Plevna iwliosc approximate 
 strength is not known) reached the vicinity of Lovtcha at a 
 time when the garrison of that place was in full flight, proba-
 
 92 Tactical Sfxdic.^ on the Jiattles Around Plevna. 
 
 bly toward Mikren, in the oj posite direciion, on account of 
 the turning movement of The Cossacks in the north. Under 
 the circumstances, it is not improbable that the Turkish col- 
 umn had good reason to consider the direct road to Plevna, 
 leading as it would i»ast the left of the Russian main posi- 
 tion, too dangerous for its retreat, and therefore executed a 
 sort of liank march past the Kussian position under the cover 
 of a rather harmless cannonade, with a view of gaining the 
 road to the upper Vid by way of Mikren. Nor should it be 
 overlooked that the movement was best calculated to cover 
 the road to the Tetewen and Jablonitza passes, which were 
 now endangered by the capture of Lovtcha by the Russians
 
 Artillery Attack on Plevna. 93 
 
 PART VIII. 
 
 ARTILLERY ATTACK ON PLEVNA FROM SEPTEM- 
 BER 7TH TO IITH. 
 
 1. Dispositions for the Night of September 6th-lth. 
 At p. in. (ju the <»tli the troops left their eucanipineuts 
 and took up the followin*^- position aj;ainst the south front of 
 the Turkish entrenchments: 
 
 (a) General Kriidener with the IX. Corps between the 
 Bulgareni and the I'elishat roads, where emplacements were 
 constructed for the artillerj- and trenches for the infantry. 
 Three infantry regiments and the 6 batteries were placed in 
 first line; 8 infantry regiments with 4 batteries formed the 
 corps reserve; 1 regiment and 1 battery formed part of the 
 main reserve; 1 regiment with 1 battery was at Nikopolis. 
 
 In addition 20 siege guns in 2 batteries were established 
 in the front line of the corps. 
 
 (b) General Kryloff with the I\'. Corps was on the left 
 of the IX. on the so-called "heights of Radischevo," and here 
 also emplacements and trenches were constructed. The 
 corps had 3 regiments of the 16th Division and 5 batteries in 
 first line; the 1st Brigade of the 3()th Division with 1 bat- 
 teries formed the corps reserve; the 2d Brigade of the oOth 
 Division with 2 batteries w'ere assigned to the main reserve; 
 1 regiment (Kazan) and 1 battery were as yet with Prince 
 Imeretinski.
 
 V»4 Tnctlval titudies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 {(■) GeiuMiil IMiiicp TiiicicJiiiski with his detachment of 
 the 2d Infaiili'v Division and its aitilleiy, the :>d Rifle Bri- 
 gade, a batteries of the 8d Artillery Brigade, and 4 siege 
 guns was posted at Tutchenitza, in rear of the left of the IV. 
 Corps. The detachments from the IV. Corps rejoined their 
 own corps. 
 
 (fZ) The 4th Koumanian Division was posted north of 
 the highroad, abreast of the IX. Corps. Three regiments of 
 irregular Roumanian cavalry guarded the space between the 
 right of the division and the Vid. 
 
 (c) General Loshkareff with the 8th and 9th Dragoons, 
 the 9th Lancers, and the 9tk Cossacks with 2 horse batteries 
 was posted on the highroad in rear of the Roumanians and 
 the IX. Corps. 
 
 (f) General Leontieff with the 1st Brigade of the 4th 
 Cavalr}' Division and a horse battery covered the left of the 
 IV. Corps and maintained communication with the 2 Cossack 
 brigades of the Don and Caucasus which were observing the 
 Lovtcha road. 
 
 {g) The general reserve consisted of the 2d Brigade of 
 the 30th Division, the Galitz Regiment, No. 20, of the 5th Di- 
 vision, 8 batteries, the Hussar regiments Mariopul, Xo. 4, 
 and Kieff, Xo. 9, and a horse battery. It w'as posted west of 
 Pelishat at the junction of the Grivitza — Tutchenitza and 
 Pelishat — Plevna roads. 
 
 (/«) Three sotnias of the 84th Don Cossacks formed the 
 headquarters guard of the commander of the West Army, 
 who took jiost with the main reserve.
 
 Artillenj Attack mi Plevna. 95 
 
 {%) Packs were left bebiud in the camps; each man car- 
 ried two pounds of coolced meat and four pounds of hard 
 bread. Each regiment formed a detachment of convales- 
 cents to guard the packs and train. 
 
 (/.) The light baggage followed the troops. The flying 
 park of the IX. Corps at Zgalevitza, of the IV. Corps between 
 Tutchenitza and Bogot. Reserve park of the IX. Corps at 
 Bulgareni, of the IV. Coi^is at Leshan. Baggage of the IX. 
 Corps in rear of Karagatch, of the IV. Corps in rear of 
 Poradim. 
 
 (Z) The dressing station of the IX. Cor])s at the "Three 
 Wells," 2 miles in rear of the IV. Corps on the Tutchen 
 itza brook. As many country carts as possible were col- 
 lected at the dressing stations. 
 2. Erection of Batteries duriiKi the Night of Septemher 6th-7th. 
 
 Notwithstanding the darkness of the night, the whole 
 movement was carried out with rapidity, order, and silence, 
 the leaders having previously familiarized themselves with 
 the positions to be taken and roads to be followed. The 
 troops carried gabions, fascines, and entrenching tools, and 
 constructed emplacements for field and siege guns 2,000 to 
 2,500 yards from the enemy's works. 
 
 One company of the .''>d Sapper Battalion was assigned 
 to each corps, a,nd a detachment of 40 sapi»ers to the Rou- 
 manian Division; 2 sapper comi)anies were charged with the 
 establishment of the siege artillery — one for 12, the other for 
 S twenty-four-p(»und(M-s. Four infantry l)atlali<»ns furnished 
 the working parties and 4 other infantry battalions brought 
 up gabions, fascines, and other material.
 
 96 Tactical Studies on the Battles A round Plevna. 
 
 The entrenching tools had been issued to the troops 
 from the field engineer park. 
 
 The earthworks were completed b}' G a. m. and armed with 
 the nine-pounder field batteries and the 20 siege guns. In 
 each of the 2 great batteries an observatory 95 feet high 
 was constructed of ladders. 
 
 3. The 7th of September. 
 
 At G a. m. the battery of 12 siege guns fired a salvo as 
 a signal, whereupon all the batteries — numbering altogether 
 20 twenty-four-pounders and 88 nine-pounders — opened fire, 
 which W'as briskly answered by the Turks. 
 
 The Russian infantry lines, posted under cover, were in 
 complete readiness for battle. Wherever water was near, 
 the infantry cooked a meal at noon. 
 
 The cannonade was continued throughout the day. 
 
 4. Dispositions for September 8th. 
 
 In the course of the night the artillery was moved closer 
 to the enemy's works and brought into action some four- 
 poimder batteries, which heretofore had not taken part on 
 account of the long range. 
 
 The 3d Roumanian Division crossed the Vid at Riben at 
 daybreak, closed up on the right of the 4th Division, and 
 brought its artillery into action. 
 
 The Roumanian Reserve Division moved to Yerbitza 
 and formed the special reserve of the Roumanians. 
 
 General Loshkareff with his 4 Russian cavalry regi- 
 ments, reinforced by 4 Roumanian cavalry regiments.
 
 Artillcri/ AtfacJ: on Ph iitu. 97 
 
 crossed to the left bank of the Vid at Ribeii aud moved to 
 Lower Dubnik on the Sophia road; his task was to cut the 
 enemy's communications and to fall upon him in case of his 
 retreat from Plevna. 
 
 General Prince Imeretinski moved during the night 
 from Tutchenitza to the Lovtcha road to gain the wooded 
 ridge south of Plevna. 
 5. The Artillenj Combat on the 8th, 9th, and 10th of Septemher. 
 
 The dispositions for the 8th of September were carried 
 out with precision; the batteries were advanced during the 
 night to within 1,G00 yards of the enemy's works; in addi- 
 tion to those previously engaged, 5 Russian and 5 Rou- 
 manian batteries took part; the fire was chiefly directed 
 against the Grivitza redoubt and the Radischevo redoubt. 
 At first the Turks answered briskly, but toward 2 p. m. their 
 fire diminished, and ceased toward evening altogether. 
 
 In order to disturb the Turks in repairing their works, 
 the Russian artillery maintained a slow fire throughout the 
 night. 
 
 Eight of the siege guns which on the 8th had confined 
 their fire to the Grivitza redoubt, were shifted, during the 
 night to the position of the IV. Corps to bring their fire to 
 bear on the middle group of redoubts. 
 
 The cannonade was maintained along the whole front 
 on the 9th. The artillery conflict of the past few days had 
 cost the Russians about HOO men. 
 
 On the 10th of September the bombardment of the Turk- 
 ish position was at first continued as heretofore, but it soon
 
 1)8 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 became evident that it could not continue niucli longer for 
 lack of ammunition. Prompt replenishment could not be 
 hoped for, as the fine weather suddenly changed on the even- 
 ing of the 10th, and the ensuing rain quickly rendered all 
 roads impracticable. 
 
 The uninterrujited fire of several days had also damaged 
 several carriages of the siege guns and quite a number of 
 those of the field guns. 
 
 Under these circumstances it seemed unwise to continue 
 the artillery combat, and the assault, which was to be pre- 
 pared by the cannonade, had to be abandoned or made at 
 once. The latter alternative was decided upon. 
 
 6. Preparatori/ Actions of the Left Wing on the 8th, 9th, and 
 10th of September. 
 
 During the artillery combat on the 8th of September, 
 Prince Imeretinski moved his corps from Tutchenitza to the 
 Lovtcha road and took position on both sides of the road. 
 General Skobeleff commanded the advance guard — consist- 
 ing of the regiments Kaluga, No. 5, and Estland, No. 8, 2 
 rifle battalions, 8 sotnia,s of Cossacks, 4 batteries, and the 4 
 heavy guns. He occupied Brestovetz with the 3d Estland 
 Battalion, placed 2 nine-pounder batteries and the 4 heavy 
 guns in action on the height in rear of the town, and opened 
 fire on the Krishin redoubt. 
 
 After the artillery fire had been continued until 8 p. m., 
 the Kaluga Regiment was ordered to take the so-called "sec- 
 ond laioll" of the ''Green Hills." The regiment advanced to
 
 ArtiUery Attack on Plevna. 99 
 
 the attack with 2 battalions in first line, the 3d Battalion 
 following as reserve with a distance of 500 yards; 9 com- 
 panies of the Estland Regiment were told off as the general 
 reserve of this attack, and 6 companies occupied Brestovetz. 
 The Kaluga Regiment captured the "second knoll" ; carried 
 on by its ardor, it continued the attack, took the ''third 
 knoll," and penetrated to the rifle-trenches between that 
 knoll and the Krishin redoubt; here the regiment was as- 
 sailed by Turkish reserves and driven back to the "second 
 knoll,'' where it was supported by the previously mentioned 
 9 Estland companies. The pursuing enemy was then him- 
 self driven back. The 3 sotnias attached to the advanced 
 guard had taken an active and skillful part in the infantry 
 action, and proved very useful in seeking out and removing 
 the wounded. 
 
 The Russian losses in the action amounted to 900 men, 
 700 of which fell on the Kaluga Regiment. 
 
 For the present the "second knoll" was held by the 
 Russians; but when informed during the night that the gen- 
 eral assault which he expected for the following day would 
 not take place until some later day, General Skobeleff consid- 
 ered hisadvanced position astoo risky and withdrew his right 
 from the captured "second knoll" to the "first knoll," which 
 was streng-thened feyadouble lineof rifle-trenches. Anattack 
 on the "first knoll," attempted by several Turkish battalions 
 at 5 a, m., was repulsed chiefly by the fire of the artillery. At 
 8 a. m, the attack was renewed with increased numbers; this 
 time the Turks penetrated to within 60 paces of the rifle- 
 trenches, but were again repulsed.
 
 lUO Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 Anticipating a renewal of the attack, — which, however, 
 did not talve place, — Skobeleff remained in his position with 
 the Estland and Libau Regiments (the latter from the re- 
 serve having relieved the Kaluga Regiment) and ?> rifle bat- 
 talions. His right was on the "first knoll," his center was 
 formed by the village of Brestovetz and the height in rear 
 with 28 guns, his left by a series of rifle-trenches to the w^est 
 of the village of Brestovetz. In rear of the position stood 
 Prince Imeretinski with the Kaluga and Reval Regiments, 
 a rifle battalion, and 3 four-pounder and 1 nine-pounder bat- 
 teries as general reserve. 
 
 In the course of the night of the 9th-10th, Prince Imere- 
 tinski received orders from General Zotofl:", chief of statf of 
 the West Army, to gain possession of the ''third knoll" of the 
 "Green Hills" next morning. He was reinforced for that 
 purpose by the 1st Brigade of the 16th Division (of the IV. 
 Corps), which crossed the Tutchenitza ravine at daybreak 
 and took post on the right of the corps. 
 
 Prince Imeretinski entrusted General SkobelefE with the 
 direction of the attack and placed at his disposal the 2d Bri- 
 gade of the 2d Division, the 9th and 10th Rifle Battalions, 
 and 4 nine-pounder batteries. As additional support the 
 1st Brigade of the 16th Division was placed in readiness; 
 the remaining troops of the coi'ps — 1st Brigade of the 2d Di- 
 vision, 11th and 12th Rifle Battalions, 3 four-pounder bat- 
 teries — were posted in rear of Brestovetz as general reserve 
 under General Dobrovolski. At daybreak (September 10th) 
 the Estland Regiment captured the ''second knoll" almost
 
 ArtiUcrt/ Attack on Flevna. 1«>1 
 
 without resistance, and Sl^obeleff had it fortified at once; 
 in the construction of the rifle-trenches the lack of entrench- 
 ing tools was sensibly felt and part of the men used the lids 
 of their cooking-pots and their bare hands. To ensure the 
 best possible field of fire to the front, the vines in the vine- 
 yards were pulled up. 
 
 Skobeleff had the 1st Brigade of the 16th Division 
 brought up at once, and took post with the troops under his 
 command on the "second knoll" between the road and the 
 Tutchenitza. ravine; 16 nine-pounders were placed in battery 
 in the center ; the Susdal Regiment was posted in rear on the 
 "first knoll" as reserve. 
 
 Not deeming it advisable to attempt the capture of the 
 "third knoll," Skobeleff postponed it till the general attack 
 ordered for the morrow. 
 
 To support the contemplated attack 2 companies of the 
 Susdal Regiment escorted 12 nine-pounders and the 4 siege 
 guns to the east side of the Tutchenitza ravine, where they 
 were so posted as to sweep the slopes of the "third knoll" as 
 well as the "third knoll" itself with their fire. 
 
 Comments. 
 
 1. The fact that the carriages of all the Russian guns 
 were damaged by the fire of several days" duraticm was also 
 met with in the siege of Kars. There it was attributed to the 
 excessive elevation given to the guns on account of the great 
 range. 
 
 2. The number of technical troops employed before
 
 102 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 Plevna was altogether insufficient; there was but 1 sapper 
 battalion with 5 infantry divisions, not counting the Rou- 
 manians. But 35 sappers were at the disposal of Prince 
 Imeretinski's corps, consisting of 2 infantry divisions; more- 
 over, no entrenching tools were issued to that corps, while 
 the lY. and IX. Corps, as well as the Roumanians, received 
 at least a few hundred tools each from the field engineer 
 park.
 
 The Assault on Fkniu. 103 
 
 PART IX. 
 
 THE ASSAULT ON PLEVXA ON THE IITH AND 12TH 
 OF SEPTEMBER. 
 
 1. Dispositions for the Assault. 
 
 The hour for the assault was selected at 3 p. m. of Sep- 
 tember 11th, instead of at daybreak, for two reasons: first, 
 to spare the troops a half-day of battle; second, to allow the 
 artillery to use the forenoon in i)reparino; the assault by its 
 fire. In order to keep the Turks as much as possible in the 
 dark as to the time of the assault, to exhaust their attention, 
 and to keep up their suspense, it was ordered that the artil- 
 lery should open the heaviest possible fire at daybreak, pause 
 all along the line at 9 a. m., to resume its fire at 11, and again 
 suspend suddenly and simultaneously at 1 o'clock. The 
 fire was to be resumed at 2:30 p. m. and continued until 
 further orders; those batteries alone whose fire should be 
 masked by Russian troops, suspending their fire for the time. 
 
 The attack was to be directed on three points: the 
 Grivitza works, the Radischevo works, and against the Kris- 
 hin works. 
 
 The Grivitza redoubt was to be attacked from the north- 
 east by the Roumanians, and on the s<uith by the 1st Brigade 
 of the 5th Division with 2 four-pounder batteries. 
 
 Against the Central redoubt tlie 1st Brigade of the
 
 104 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 30th Division and the 2d Brigade of the lOtli Division were 
 tola off. 
 
 The Krishin redoubt was to be attacked by the 1st Bri- 
 gade of the IGtli Division, the 3d Rifle Brigade, the entire 2d 
 Division, and 9 batteries. 
 
 The 1st Brigade of the 31st Division was charged with 
 the protection of the entire line of the artillery from Grivitza 
 to Radischevo; the 2d Brigade of the same division and 2 
 batteries formed the special reserve for the 1st Brigade, and 
 was posted on the right edge of the Radischevo ravine. 
 
 The main reserve was posted in rear of the center, and 
 consisted of the 2d Brigade of the 30th Division and 1 regi- 
 ment of the 2d Brigade of the 5th Division, 3 batteries, and 
 the 4th Hussars with a horse battery. 
 
 The 1st Brigade of the 4th Cavalry Division, with the 
 2 Cossack brigades and 2 horse batteries, all under com- 
 mand of General Leontieff, had orders to cross the Vid if 
 possible and gain the Sophia road, as well as to establish 
 communication with Loshkareff's cavalry. 
 
 The 9th Hussars were posted on tlie Bulgareni road be- 
 tween the IX. Corps and the Roumanians. 
 
 A brigade of Roumanian cavalry covered the right of the 
 Roumanians as far as the Vid. 
 
 General Loshkarefif, who already had 4 Russian and 4 
 Roumanian cavalry regiments on the left bank of the Vid 
 in the vicinity of Lower Dubnik, sought to establish com- 
 munication with Leontieff's cavalry. 
 
 The rain, which began to fall on the evening of the 10th, 
 continued without interruption until Sei^tember 12th.
 
 The Assault on Plciiia. 105 
 
 On the early moruiDg of tlie 11th of September a dense 
 fog covered the entire field; the ground was thoroughly 
 soaked, and everywhere men and horses moved with diflS- 
 cult}'. Still any further postponement of the assault was 
 not advisable, 
 
 2, Attack of the R'ujht ^Vin(| on the Grivitza Works. 
 
 The double attack on the Grivitza redoubt — from the 
 north by the Roumanians, from the south by the Russians — 
 was carried out without any tactical combination what- 
 ever; the final meeting of the Russians and Roumanians in 
 the captured redoubt appears in the descriptions of both 
 parties more like an accidental meeting than the result of a 
 bloody struggle carried out according to a common plan. 
 
 According to Roumanian accounts, parts of the 3d and 
 4th Divisions advanced to the attack from the north at 3 p. 
 m. as ordered, and were three times repulsed. At p. m. 
 there was a lull in the fight, and at 7:30 p. m. the 2d Rifle 
 Battalion and the 16th Dorobanzes (militia) Regiment re- 
 newed the attack and captured the redoubt, assisted by the 
 Russian Archangel Regiment. The losses of the Rouma- 
 nians — 56 officers and 2,.500 men dead and wounded — give 
 clear proof of the bravery and contempt of death with which 
 that young army had here undergone its baptism of fire; 
 the tactical decision of the attack, ho\v«ner, was probably 
 brought about by the advance of the Russian brigade from 
 the south.
 
 1 OG Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 The 1st Brigade of the 5tli Division under Major-Gen- 
 eral Kodionof, the Archangel Regiment, the Wologda Regi- 
 ment, and 2 batteries crossed the Grivitza brook, passed 
 through the village, and formed for attack to the west of the 
 latter. Both batteries were in the center, on the right the 
 Archangel Regiment, on the left the ^Yologda Regiment. 
 Each regiment deployed a rifle company as skirmishers in 
 front and formed the three battalions in rear in three lines, 
 the first two in company columns, the rear one in battalion 
 column. 
 
 Immediately upon crossing the brook the brigade re- 
 ceived severe artillery fire from the w^orks on the left bank 
 of the Grivitza brook, slightly to the left of the direction of 
 attack; a caisson of the 6th Battery was blown up. 
 
 The brigade now advanced to the attack: the Archangel 
 Regiment straight on the redoubt; the Wologda Regiment, 
 advancing slightly its left shoulder, past the redoubt and 
 against an entrenched camp 500 yards farther in rear and 
 connected with the redoubt by trenches. 
 
 Twice during the advance General Rodionof halted the 
 troops in sheltered depressions to restore order in the bat- 
 talions. On approaching the redoubt the interval between 
 the regiments, through which the two batteries had kept 
 firing, was closed. The Archangel Regiment threw itself 
 on the redoubt from the front, passed the deep, steep ditch, 
 and climbed the breastwork, which was 10 feet high and 
 slippery from the rain. At the same time a portion of the 
 Wologda Regiment, which had overlapped the redoubt on the
 
 The Assault on Plevna. 107 
 
 left, entered the work from the gorge; the rest of the regi- 
 ment advanced past the redoubt against the camp, engaged 
 the troops posted there, and prevented them from coming to 
 the support of the garrison of tlie redoubt, which was cut 
 down after a furious resistance. From the north, Roumanian 
 troops — particularly the 2d Rifle Battalion — also penetrated 
 into the redoubt. Five guns were captured. The Colonel 
 of the Archangel Regiment and the commander of the Rou*- 
 manian brigade were killed near the works. 
 
 At 7:30 the Russian brigade was assembled at the re- 
 doubt. Colonel Rykatschef relinquished his attack on the 
 west camp, assumed command in place of General Rodionof, 
 who had been wounded, re-formed the disordered battalions, 
 and posted them partly in the redoubt, partly in the adjoin- 
 ing trenches. During the night the Turks make three at- 
 tacks to recover the redoubt, but were repulsed by fire and 
 bayonet. 
 
 The loss of the brigade was 22 officers and 1,300 men 
 killed and wounded. 
 
 A sapper company, an improvised sapper company 
 formed of men of both regiments, and on the extreme right, 
 as outer flank guard, the Gth Sotnia of the 34th Don Cossacks 
 had a part in the action. 
 
 3. The Attack of the Center on the Radischevo Works. 
 
 The troops in the center, between the Bulgareni and 
 Lovtcha roads, may be divided into four groups according 
 to their tasks:
 
 108 Tactical l^iiidics on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 ((/) To attack the Kadischevo works: the regiments 
 Uglitz, No. 63, Kazan, No, 64, Jaroslaf, No. 117, Shuja, No. 
 118, all under the command of Major-General Schnitnikolt', 
 commander of the 30tli Division; 
 
 (&) To protect the batteries : the regiments Penza, No. 
 121, and Tamboflf, No. 122; 
 
 (c) Special reserve of the center: the regiments Kos- 
 loff. No. 12.3, and Woronesh, No. 124; 
 
 (d) Main reserve: the regiments Galitz, No. 20, Koloma, 
 No. 119, Serpuchoff, No. 120. An unfortunate accident dis- 
 arranged the combination from the beginning. The dense 
 fog, brisk infantry fire on the extreme left (Skobeleff), and 
 an insignificant movement in the Turkish trenches caused 
 one battalion of the Uglitz Kegiment to attack prematurely 
 at 11 a. m., drawing after it the rest of the regiment and also 
 the Jaroslaf Regiment. After a severe action, the two regi- 
 ments captured the rifie-trenches of the enemy in front of the 
 redoubt, but were compelled to retire on the arrival of Turk- 
 ish reinforcements, after losing half of their men and nearly 
 all their officers. 
 
 Though deprived by this accident of half of his troops, 
 General Schnitnikoff deemed it advisable to adhere to the 
 original disposition and advanced at the appointed time 
 with the Kazan and Shuja Regiments. On the march he 
 met the retreating Uglitz and Jaroslaf Battalions, which 
 carried disorder into his ranks. It was in vain that the Kos- 
 loff and Woronesh Regiments and the Galitz Regiment of the 
 main reserve were brought forward in support of the attack.
 
 The Assault on Pleimi. 109 
 
 The attack was finally repulsed with enormous loss: the 7 
 regiments engaged lost altogether 110 officers and 5,200 
 men killed and wounded; the greater part of the losses fall- 
 ing- on the Uglitz and Jaroslaf Regiments. 
 
 Jj. Attack hi/ the Left Winf/ on the Krisltin Tro/-A-.S', 
 
 The task set General Hkobeletf was to capture the so- 
 called "third knoll" of the ''Green Hills" and the line of re- 
 doubts in rear of Krishin, which formed the direct protec- 
 tion of the camp of the Turkish reserves. 
 
 To enable him to accomplish his task, the following 
 troops were placed at his disposal: the regiments Vladimir. 
 Xo. 61, Susdal, No. 02, Reval, No. 7, the 3d Rifle Brigade, 3 
 nine-pounder batteries, 1 four-j)ounder battery, and 1 siege 
 guns, 
 
 Skobeleff resolved on the immediate capture of the 
 "third knoll" and to attack the redoubts in rear simultane- 
 ously with the general attack at 3 p. m. 
 
 After the 10 guns, jjosted previously at the east of the 
 Tutchenitza ravine, had taken the northern slopes of the 
 "Green Hills" for some time under fire, Skobeleff. at 10 a. m., 
 advanced and occupied the "third knoll" with the following 
 troops: in the center 2 Vladimir battalions in two lines of 
 company columns, on their right the 10th Rifle Battalion, on 
 the left 3 Estland companies, in rear as special reserve the 
 3d Vladimir Battalion and 3 batteries. The "thiid knoll" 
 svns deserted by the enemy, but he was annoyed by fiie from 
 Turkish infantry in the trenches between this knoll and the 
 redoubts.
 
 110 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plerna. 
 
 The 3d Vladimir Battalion having been bi'()u«;ht to the 
 front to reinforce the fighting line, its place as special reserve 
 was taken by the Susdal Regiment, formed in battalion col- 
 umns in rear of the fighting line under the best cover ob- 
 tainable. About 2 p. m. strong lines of Turkish skirmishers 
 advanced up the slopes of the "Green Hills" against the 
 troops on the top; the fire of the Turkish infantry increased 
 more and more in strength and inflicted sensible losses not 
 only on the troops in the firing line, but also on the first 
 echelon of the reserves posted 1,000 yards in rear. 
 
 In view of these circumstances and of the fact that the 
 general attack was soon to begin. General Skobelefl: ordered 
 the Susdal Regiment to drive back the Turkish skirmish 
 lines. This was done; the Turks did not withstand the 
 attack and fell back on their redoubts; from there and from 
 the adjoining rifle-trenches they maintained a brisk and 
 galling fire against the Russian troops. 
 
 About 2:30 p. m. Skobelefl"s troops had approximately 
 the following position: on the "third knoll" in the firing line 
 next the enemy the Vladimir and Susdal Regiments and the 
 9th and 10th Rifle Battalions; in the depression between 
 the "third" and "second knoll" the Reval Regiment; in the 
 entrenched position on the "second knoll" 2 Kaluga and 2 
 Estland battalions with 3 batteries; in the depression be- 
 tween the "first" and "second knoll" the Libau Regiment and 
 the 11th and 12th Rifle Battalions; 1 Kaluga battalion held 
 the village of Brestovetz.
 
 The Assault on PJeviia. ill 
 
 At 2:30 p. m. the batteries on the "second kuoll" upened 
 over the heads of the troops on the "third knoll." 
 
 At 3 p. m, Skobeleff gave the order to attack: the troops 
 in first line descended from the "third knoll." crossed the 
 deep depression between the knoll and the height beyond, 
 and began to ascend the steep height on whose crest lay the 
 three strong redoubts, the western one of which was known 
 as the '^redoubt of Krishin." The redoubts were connected 
 by trenches and on the slopes in front were a series of rifle- 
 trenches. 
 
 The attack, which was directed at first against the east- 
 ern and middle redoubt, was received by a murderous mus- 
 ketry fire from the rifle-trenches and redoubts, and also In- 
 artillery fire from the redoubts. The attack of the IV. Corps 
 on the entrenchments north of Kadischevo having mean- 
 while failed, the artillery of the western portion of these 
 fortifications then directed its tire across The Tutchenitza 
 ravine against ihe troops of C>kobelefl', which wore attacking 
 the Turkish right 
 
 The efficacy of this severe fire and the ensuing losses 
 brought the attack to a stop; part of the attacking troops 
 halted in the depression, and those which had begun to ascend 
 the further slope tried to find cover, and ojiened a ratlier in- 
 effective fire against the we-ll -covered adversary. 
 
 Skobeleff now ordered the Reval Regiment 1 > advance 
 to the support of the troops engaged, and the Libau Regi- 
 ment and 11th and 12th Rifle Battalions, posted as reserves 
 between the ''first" and ''second knoll," to take the place of
 
 1 1 2 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 the Reval Regiment in the depression between the "second" 
 and "third knoll." 
 
 The Reval Regiment advanced with firm order, crossed 
 the brook, ascended the bare slope beyond, and carried for- 
 w^ard with it parts of the troops engaged there, but the at- 
 tack of this regiment was also stopped half way up, and the 
 remnants of the Madimir and Susdal Regiments and 9th and 
 10th Ritle Battalions began to fall back — singly at first, then 
 in crowds. 
 
 Skobeleff now had to decide whether to throw in his last 
 reserves for a decisive attack, or, in view of the failure of 
 the attack of the IV. Corps, to order the retreat of the troops 
 engaged, under cover of part of his reserves. 
 
 He decided for the former: the Libau Regiment (leaving 
 3 companies in rear) and the 11th and 12th Rifle Battalions 
 were ordered forward, and were joined by those remnants 
 of the Vladimir, vSusdal, and Reval Regiments and the 9th 
 and 10th Rifle Battalions which were still in the firing line; 
 the whole line advanced with a cheer in the direction of the 
 middle redoubt and captured the rifle-trenches in front, the 
 Turks withdrawing within the line of redoubts. 
 
 Encouraged by their first success, the Russian battalions 
 continued the attack with great determination, though in 
 disordered crowds; the nearer they approached the enemy's 
 position, the less effective became the enemy's fire; the Turk- 
 ish line wavered and the foremost Russian detachments 
 penetrated into the trenches between the eastern and middle 
 redoubts. At 4 :25 p. m. the middle redoubt was in the hands
 
 The Assault on Flerna. 113 
 
 of the assailants, who seized almost the entire line of tiench 
 up to the eastern redoubt. One gun was abandoned in the 
 redoubt. 
 
 Several thousand men of various organizations soonfilied 
 the interior of the captured redoubt and trenches; those ar- 
 riving later found no shelter from the fire from the other 
 positions of the Turks; the captured middle redoubt was, 
 moreover, open to the rear and its interior exposed to the 
 fire from the western (Krishin) redoubt, which was making 
 great havoc among the Russians crowded together in the 
 interior. At the same time strong Turkish reserves ad- 
 vanced to the counter-attack from the entrenched camp in 
 rear of the line of redoubts, partly against the left, partly 
 against the front of the Russians. 
 
 Captain Kuropatkin of the general staff gathered some 
 300 men from those inside the redoubt, and, moving 1*00 
 paces to the left, led them against the enemy; this nucleus 
 was joined by other crowds of assailants arriving at tliis 
 time, and about 5:15 p. m. the counter-attack against the 
 Russian left was repulsed, though not without great loss. 
 
 At 5:o0 p. m., when the Turkish fire slackened somewhat, 
 the Russians began to entrench the captured position on the 
 side toward the enemy; the almost total absence of entrench- 
 ing tools was painfull}^ felt. 
 
 The rapid retreat of the Turks who had advanced from 
 the Krishin redoubt against the Russian left had been influ- 
 enced to a certain extent by the appearance of General 
 Leontieff's cavalry in the vicinity; a horse battery opened
 
 1 ] 4 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 fire on the redoubt and a detachment of dismounted Cossacks 
 occupied the village of Krishin, thereby making the Turks 
 uneasy for their own right flank and preventing an energetic 
 execution of the counter-attack against the Russian left. 
 
 Meanwhile a brisk fire was maintained from the east- 
 ern against the captured middle redoubt, and part of the 
 connecting trench was still in the hands of the Turks. An 
 officer collected a detachment of about 100 volunteersto drive 
 them out, seized the trench, and, carried away by success, 
 advanced against the east redoubt, where most of the men 
 fell under the murderous fire of the Turks, 
 
 Meanwhile Colonel Shestakoff of the general stafl", act- 
 ing under orders from Prince Imeretinski, was busy in rear 
 of the front collecting the scattered men and forming them 
 into detachments. Thanks to his efforts, the following de- 
 tachments formed of scattered men arrived in line of battle 
 at 5 p. m., in addition of the 3 Libau companies which had 
 been held back at first: 2 Susdal companies, ^ Eeval com- 
 pany, 2^ Vladimir companies, and 1 company of the 12th 
 Rifle Battalion. The detachments belonging to the Vladi- 
 mir and Reval Regiments and 12th Rifle Battalion rein- 
 forced the defenders of the middle redoubt, over which 
 Major-General Dobrovolski, co^imander of the rifle brigade, 
 and, after he was mortally wounded, Major-General Teb- 
 jauik, commander of the 1st Brigade of the 10th Infantry 
 Division, assumed command. 
 
 The 5 liibau and Susdal companies were led forward 
 against the east redoubt, supported by mixed detachments
 
 The Assault on Plevna. 115 
 
 from the middle redoubt; at 5:30 p. m. tke east redoubt fell 
 into the hands of the Russians; Lieutenant-Colonel Mosze- 
 woi, of the Susdal Regiment, assumed command there. 
 
 With the approach of darkness the Turkish fire slack- 
 ened somewhat, but never died out completely throughout 
 the night. 
 
 5. The Night of Septemher llth-12th. 
 
 As darkness settled down, the troops of the Russian left 
 wing occupied about the following positions: 
 
 Fractions of the Vladimir, Susdal, Reval, and Libau 
 Regiments and of the 4 rifle battalions held the two (^ap 
 tured redoubts and the trenches between them; opposite 
 their front was the entrenched camp of the Turks between 
 the town and river; on their left the Krishin redoubt was 
 still in the hands of the Turks; on their right, beyond the 
 Tutchenitza ravine, were the western works of the Rad- 
 ischevo entrenchments. 
 
 In the rear of the line of battle the ''third knoll" was not 
 occupied; on the ''second knoll" 2 Estland battalions and 2 
 very weak Kaluga battalions covered the great artillery 
 position of 24 guns; 1 Kaluga battalion held the village of 
 Brestovetz. 
 
 To guard the intermediate space of almost 2,000 yards 
 between the captured redoubts and the artillery position on 
 the "second knoll," General Skobeleff personally took posi- 
 tion at dark with 2 weak battalions in the middle of this 
 space at the northern foot of the '"third knoll" and deployed
 
 J 1 6 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 2 companies to cover his right and left, one fronting east, 
 the other west; the remaining 3 companies halted with 
 Skobeleff and faced north. 
 
 Scattered men, singly and in groups, moved about every- 
 where — some of them returning from the redoubts, where 
 they could no longer find cover, and some coming from the 
 rear and endeavoring to find their organizations in the line 
 of battle. Skobeleff had as many or them as possible col- 
 lected by members of his staff and formed into a battalion, 
 without regard to the organizations to which they belonged. 
 After some hours, the battalion had reached a strength of 
 more than 1,000 men, when a new subdivision was made, the 
 men of the several regiments and of the rifle brigade being 
 each formed into a separate company. 
 
 The 2 companies mentioned had hardly deployed on the 
 flanks when Turkish detachments advanced on the left from 
 the direction of Krishiu, but were repulsed by the company 
 deployed on that flank. 
 
 Soon afterward volleys were fired against the Russian 
 position from the right and the bullets fell near the reserves. 
 The darkness prevented the firing troops from being recog- 
 nized, but patrols reported them to be Russians. Deeming 
 it possible that detachments of the IV. Corps may have 
 crossed the Tutchenitza ravine to make a night attack, Sko- 
 beleff forbade his men to fire. Patrols were again sent out 
 and made a positive report that the firing troops were Turks 
 some hundred paces in front of the Russian skirmish line.
 
 Tlie Assault on Flcuna. 1 1 7 
 
 Fire was opened on both sides, but, on account of the darli- 
 ness, nothing but the Hash of the guns could be seen. 
 
 To get his main body out of the line of the Turkish flank- 
 ing fire, Skobeleff led it about 1,000 paces to the rear in the 
 utmost silence, and prolonged his skirmish lines, which had 
 remained in jjlace, by adding a deployed company to each. 
 The fatigue of his men had become such that they would 
 fall asleep as soon as halted; to be prepared for an emer- 
 gency, Skobelelf had them waked up from time to time and 
 formed. 
 
 By accident a sotnia of Caucasian and half a sotuia of 
 Don Cossacks arrived at t^kobeleff's position at midnight, 
 whereupon he immediately sent patrols to the right and 
 left beyond the skirmish lines; 60 of the Cossacks he re 
 tained, resolved to oppose them to any sudden attack by the 
 enemy. 
 
 Upon report that the firing line was getting short of 
 ammunition, Skobeleff had ordered up ammunition-carts; 
 two of them reached his position and he sent the ammuni- 
 tion to the firing line by special detachments. The differ- 
 ence in the armament caused some difficulty: the infantry 
 was armed with the Krenka, the Rifles with the Berdan rifle, 
 and the latter were therefore unable to use the infantry 
 ammunition, which alone was contained in the two carts. 
 A Cossack non-commisioned officer, who with 20 Cossacks 
 was sent after Berdan cartridges, finally brought a small 
 supply in the nosebags of his detachment ; thus relieving the 
 want to some extent.
 
 118 Tactical ^Studies on the Battles Around Plcrna. 
 
 While the events just described were taking place in 
 rear of the line of battle proper, the utmost activity was 
 maintained in the latter throughout the night. 
 
 The open gorges of the two captured redoubts had to be 
 closed, the enemy's rifle-trenches had to be arranged for 
 cover from the opposite side, and some new trenches had to 
 be made to cover the left against the Krishin redoubt, the 
 lines having been marked out during daylight by Captain 
 Kuropatkin of the general staff. The execution of the work 
 was extremely difficult, owing to the almost total absence 
 of entrenching tools; the Russian soldiers well understood 
 the importance of the task in view of the murderous charac- 
 ter of the enemy's fire, and worked for dear life with bayo- 
 nets, side arms, camp-kettle lids, and bare hands. 
 
 With the beginning of darkness the Turkish fire had 
 considerably slackened; but toward 10 p. m. strong Turkish 
 bodies rushed on the Russian position with much yelling and 
 a severe fire, but in this, as well as in several subsequent 
 attempts, they were repulsed by the fire of the Russians. In 
 one of these attempts the retreating assailants were mis- 
 taken for Russians by fresh Turkish reserves which were 
 coming up, and subjected to a severe musketry fire. 
 
 6. TJie 12th of Septemher. 
 
 Toward 6 a. m. the Turks opened a severe artillery fire 
 
 from the Krishin redoubt, the entrenched camp, and the 
 
 works beyond the Tutchenitza ravine, and caused at once 
 
 considerable losses to the Russians. To engage the Krishin
 
 The Assault on Plevna. 119 
 
 redoubt Skobeleff ordered 4 nine-poimders to be brought 
 inside the middle redoubt and to open fire, which served to 
 ^encourage the troops in the redoubt. 
 
 Soon afterward large bodies of Turks, preceded by dense 
 swarms of skirmishers, advanced against the Russian left 
 and penetrated to within 300 yards of the Russian position 
 despite the severe fire with which they were greeted. There 
 the attack was checked and soon converted into a retreat; 
 at 900 yards from the Russian position the Turks halted and 
 opened a severe fire. 
 
 At 8 a. m. a second Turkish attack began, which was 
 chiefly directed against the left flank of the Russian first 
 line; Skobeleff, who was on the ''third knoll," dispatched 
 from there a skirmish line, which opened fire at 900 yards 
 against the^ right flank of the attacking Turks; a battery was 
 brought up to the "third knoll" to fire also against their 
 right. Notwithstanding the effective cross-fire of the 12 
 guns (8 on the "third knoll" and 4 in the middle redoubt), the 
 Turks approached the Russian rifle-trenches to within 500 
 yards, came to a halt, maintained a brisk fire for some time, 
 and then fell back with great loss. 
 
 Meanwhile the defenders of the east redoubt had been 
 engaged since early morning with the enemy's detachments 
 posted on the outskirts of Plevna and attempting to turn the 
 Russian right. 
 
 Convinced of the importance of the advantages gained 
 by General Skobelefl", Osman Pasha utilized the inactivity of 
 the Russians opposite his loft and center to send all troops
 
 1 20 Tactical /Studies on the Battles Around Plana. 
 
 that could possibly be spared to reinforce his threatened 
 right. 
 
 Leaving a thiclc skirmish line, which maintained a severe 
 tire, in a well-covered position opposite the two redoubts in 
 the hands of the Russians, the Turks assembled their main 
 force near the Krishin redoubt, to advance from there 
 against the Russian left. The reinforcements, withdrawn 
 from the east, moved partly through Plevna against the 
 right of the line of captured redoubts, partly in the Tutch- 
 enitza ravine against the position of the Russians on the 
 "third knoll." 
 
 At 10:30 a. m. the third attack began, at first from front 
 and left against the middle redoubt. After two Turkish 
 batteries had caused great havoc among the defenders 
 crowded together inside, these men, after an uninterrupted 
 exposure to"severe fire for thirty hours, began to waver and 
 to leave the redoubt — singly at first, afterward In crowds. 
 The defenders of the east redoubt followed the infectious 
 example, but when Skobeleff came galloping up from the 
 ''third knoll" and spoke words of admonition and cheer, all 
 turned about and reoccupied the redoubts before the Turks 
 were able to take possession of them. Isolated Turkish de- 
 tachments which succeeded in penetrating into the redoubts 
 were cut down. 
 
 On returning to his position on the "third knoll" Sko- 
 belefif sent forward some companies, formed of dispersed 
 men, to support the troops engaged at the redoubts. 
 
 Meanwhile Turkish troops were forming partly in the
 
 The Assault oit FIcciki. 121 
 
 Tutchenitza ravine itself, partly on its eastern edge (north 
 of the Radischevo ravine), for the purpose of attacking the 
 "third knoll," A company formed of dispersed riflemen was 
 deploj'ed for the defense of the western edge, while two guns 
 attempted to enfilade the ravine; the Turks nevertheless 
 su(.'ceeded in ascending the w'estern edge of the ravine and 
 driving back the Russian riflemen, and it was only when 
 assisted by two Libau companies (which had been detached 
 yesterday and had very insignificant losses) and a Caucasian 
 Cossack sotnia that the Turks were driven back into the 
 ravine. The Turkish reserves in the ravine at the southern 
 exit of Plevna fell back into the town. 
 
 Skobeleff had become convinced on the 11th Tliat tlie 
 capture of the entrenched height between town and river 
 would decide the victory, and, on the other hand, that he was 
 too weak to gain that result. Having asked for reinforce- 
 ments on the 11th, General Skobeleff expressed to Colonel 
 Orloff, who arrived from Grand Headquarters to inform him- 
 self of the state of affairs, his opinion that without reinforce- 
 ments he would be unable to maintain his position.. 
 
 Early on the morning of the 12th Skobeleff received a 
 copy of the following order addressed to General Prince 
 Imeretinski : 
 
 "By direction of the Connnander-iu-Chief, I order you 
 and General Skobelett' to entren(.-h and maintain yourselves 
 In the positions captured to-day. We cannot send rein- 
 forcements, because we have none. 
 
 (Signed) "Zo/o/f, LinifciKnif-GcncrdJ."
 
 122 Tactical aS7//<//V.s- oh the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 jS'otwitlistajiding this discouraging order, SkobelefE 
 hoped for a favorable turn, since the entire IV, Corps stood 
 east of the Tutchenitza ravine, apparently in readiness for 
 battle, but inactive. 
 
 At 10:30 a. m., as the third Turkish attack began. Colo- 
 nel OrlofE delivered to General Skobeleff the following 
 order : 
 
 "By order of the Commander-in-Chief, if you cannot 
 hold the captured positions, you are to fall back — if possible, 
 not before evening — in the direction of Tutchenitza, covered 
 by the cavalry of General Leontieff. Communicate this or- 
 der, which is to be kept secret otherwise, to General Prince 
 Imeretihski. The Grivitza redoubt is in our hands, but the 
 attack is not to be continued, and we are to fall back slowly. 
 
 8:30 a.m. 
 
 (Signed) '"Zotoff, Lkiitcnant-Gciivral."' 
 
 Even after the receipt of this order Skobeleff did not 
 give up hope of a general turn for the better; he hoped at 
 any moment to see the IV. Corps advance to the attack to the 
 east of the Tutchenitza ravine. 
 
 The situation of the defenders in the redoubts was be- 
 coming more and more critical, receiving fire not only from 
 the Krishin redoubt in front, but from the Radischevo works 
 in rear, ^ At 1 p, m, 2 of the 4 guns in the middle redoubt 
 had become useless and the other 2 were almost without men 
 and teams, Skobeleff ordered these guns to be relieved by 
 3 guns of the 5th battery of the 3d Brigade posted in rear of 
 the ''third knoll." The movement having attracted the at- 
 tention of the Turks, thev increased their fire, causing con-
 
 The Assault on Pleimi. 123 
 
 siderable loss to the newly arrived guus iu the redoubt, bu1 
 the latter now opened on the Krishin redoubt; the one 
 ammunition-wagon brought along was i^osted between the 
 breastwork and traverse, the only comparatively safe place 
 in the redoubt. It was nevertheless blown uj) by a hostile 
 shell, killing and wounding many men in the narrow space 
 of the redoubt; among the wounded was Major-General 
 Tebjanik (who had assumed command in the redoubt after 
 the wounding of General Dobrovolski) and Captain Kuro- 
 patkin of the general staff. 
 
 At 2 p. m, the last available troops, sent by General 
 Prince Imeretinski, arrived. Two exceedingly small Kaluga 
 battalions (heretofore retained as protection for the artillery 
 position) and a detachment made up of 200 dispersed rifle- 
 men were disposed as follows: 4 Kaluga companies pro- 
 ceeded to the redoubts, ?> companies covered the right on the 
 ''third knoll" against the Tutehenitza ravine, ;5 companies 
 took post in rear of the left. The combined rifle detachment 
 was at first posted in rear of the "second knoll" as a last 
 general reserve, but was soon ordered forward to the left, 
 where Skobeleff also ordered 4 guns to proceed and to take 
 up a covered position. 
 
 Soon afterward the fourth attack began from the 
 Krishin redoubt. This time Skobeleff allowed the Turks 
 to approach to within 500 j'ards and then greeted them with 
 rapid musketry fire from his infantry, and canister from 
 his 4 concealed guns. The Turks halted and replied to the 
 fire, but their fresh rc'serves were not able to carry the attack
 
 124 Tactical IStiidics on the Battles Around Plana. 
 
 forward; after three-quarters of an hour of very costly fire 
 action, the Turks fell back. 
 
 At 2:30 p. m., when Skobeleff arrived at the redoubts to 
 examine personally how matters stood in his hrst line, the 
 fortifications presented a ghastly spectacle. The interior 
 of both redoubts and the trench connecting them were filled 
 with corpses; the gorge of the east redoubt, open toward 
 Plevna, was closed by a breastwork made of corpses; the 3 
 guns of the 3d Brigade in the middle redoubt were dis- 
 mounted, the cannoneers killed or wounded. The 2 dis- 
 mounted guns of the 2d Brigade were removed, and the aban- 
 doned Turkish gun was rendered unserviceable by the re- 
 moval of the breech-block. 
 
 The movements of the Turkish troops were plainly vis- 
 ible as they assembled from all directions at Plevna against 
 Skobeletf's right. Those Turkish troops which had hereto- 
 fore made several attacks from the Krishin redoubt against 
 the Russian left departed for the same point. 
 
 Upon his return from the redoubts to the "Green Hills,'" 
 Skobeleff was informed that the Shuja Regiment, numbering 
 1,300 men, had come from the center to support him. He 
 retained the regiment in reserve and sent several hundred 
 dispersed men to reinforce the defenders of the redoubts. 
 
 At 4:30 p. m. the Turks advanced in several lines to make 
 the fifth attack simultaneously on both redoubts. The 
 severe fire which greeted them did not check them; though 
 the leading columns resolved themselves into disordeied 
 swarms, &till they continued to advance with determination, 
 and were followed in rear by fresh troops.
 
 The Assault on Flecua. 125 
 
 Before this overwlielming attack the defenders of the 
 middle redoubt began to give way and abandoned the re- 
 doubt in swarms; the small body of brave men which faced 
 the attack fell after a furious hand-to-hand struggle, among 
 them Major Gortaloff, who had greatly distinguished him- 
 self on this bloody day. 
 
 Despite the loss of the middle redoubt, Lieutenant-Colo- 
 nel Moszewoi held out in the east redoubt against the attack 
 which was now directed against him from the front and both 
 flanks. To prevent the useless sacrifice of the brave garri- 
 son of this redoubt, Skobelefl:" ordered Moszewoi to fall back, 
 and in order to make the withdrawal possible he advanced 
 in person with the Shuja Kegiment and a. battery, covering 
 the retreat of all troops engaged in front. An attempt at 
 pursuit on the part of the Turks was frustrated by a splendid 
 charge of 2 sotnias of Cossacks. 
 
 A battery of 2-1 guns on the ''second knoll,'' guarded by 
 some detachments formed of dispersed men of the Vladimir, 
 Susdal, and Reval Regiments, covered the further retreat, 
 the troops carrying their wounded along as best they could. 
 On the 13th of September Skobeleft" remained almost the 
 entire day on the "first knoll," ^ind at 7 p. ni. fell back by or- 
 der to 15ogot. 
 
 7. Losses. 
 
 The total loss sustained h\ the Russians in the attacks 
 on Plevna from the 7th to the 12th of September is stated in 
 round numbers at 300 officers and 12.500 men. including 60 
 officers and 3,000 men killed.
 
 126 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 According to the special lists of losses, the 2 regiments 
 of the right wing which captured the Grivitza redoubt lost 
 22 officers and 1,305 men; the 7 regiments which vainly 
 attacked the Radischevo works in the center lost 110 officers 
 and 5,249 men. • Adding about 300 for losses sustained dur- 
 ingthe artillery attack on the first days of the attack, wehave 
 for the troops of the left wing under Skobeleff — 6 regiments 
 and 4 rifle battalions — a loss of 160 officers and 5,600 men. 
 
 Individual losses cannot be accurately ascertained from 
 the available data; still some figures may be given as 
 accurate. 
 
 The Uglitz and Jaroslaf Regiments, which attacked pre- 
 maturely in the center, lost respectively 370 and 300 killed. 
 Of Skobeleff's troops, the Vladimir Regiment lost 200, the 
 Susdal Regiment 150 killed; the former regiment lost 36 offi- 
 cers killed and wounded, the latter 15 officers. 
 
 The 3d Rifle Brigade, consisting of 4 battalions, which 
 had entered upon the theater of war barely 3,000 strong and 
 had lost at Lovtcha 1 officer and 132 men killed and 17 offi- 
 cers and 400 men wounded, lost here its commander, Major- 
 General Dobrovolski, 3 officers and 177 men killed, and 20 
 officers and 666 men wounded. 
 
 Of the superior leaders, Major-General Dobrovolski, of 
 the rifle brigade, was among the killed, as already stated: 
 Major-General Rodionof, commanding the 1st Brigade of the 
 5th Division, and Major-General Tebjauik, commander of the 
 1st Brigade of the 16th Division, were wounded. The loss
 
 The As.suKJt on Plevna. 127 
 
 of the Roumaniaus — 50 officers and 2,500 men — has been 
 previously stated. 
 
 The losses of the Turks are not accurately known; op- 
 posite General Skobeleff they must have been very heavy. 
 
 Comments. 
 1. The above description of the attack on the (irivitza 
 redoubt is based on the official Russian report; other ac- 
 counts state that two attacks were repulsed and that the 
 third succeeded. The difference may be explained by the 
 two halts made by the assailing troops, which practically 
 did interrupt the advance, though it does not imply that 
 the attack was repulsed. 
 
 There was no preparation by infantry fire; the tactical 
 form of the attack was about the same as that of the uu- 
 successful assault on the same works on July 30th. but in 
 this instance the real result was gained by the advance of 
 portions of the Wologda Regiment past the flank of the re- 
 doubt, for it seems that the entrance of portions of the regi- 
 ment through the gorge of the redoubt, and the engagement 
 of the Turkish reserves in rear by other detachments, brought 
 the attack to a successful issue. 
 
 It is not quite clear whether in forming for the attack 
 the first and second line of each regiment consisted of one 
 battalion each, or whether two battalions were formed 
 abreast, each in two lines of company columns; in view of 
 the formation used on other occasions where they are clearly 
 described, the latter seems more probable.
 
 128 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 Since the two tii'st lines are expressly stated to have 
 been formed in company columns, it may be assumed that 
 in the third line the battalions were formed in mass. It 
 would seem, however, that all three lines started at the same 
 time with comparatively short distances; the two halts 
 seem to have diminished the distances between the lines, the 
 whole in the further course of the attack formed a single 
 mass of unequal depth; special tactical employment of the 
 lines and reserve was out of the question. All reached the 
 enemy about the same time. 
 
 Although the faulty cooperation of the two columns who 
 were attacking the same work may be attributed to several 
 causes, it nevertheless remains reprehensible from the pro- 
 fessional point of view; proper combination and coopera- 
 tion of the double attack would no doubt have accomplished 
 its object more quickly and with less loss, 
 
 2, The details of the failure of the attack of the center 
 are still enshrouded in obscurity; no tactical details are 
 known and the whole thing seems to have been a wild chaos 
 from the beginning. 
 
 The fact that an unfortunate accident caused the prema- 
 ture advance of the Uglitz and Jaroslaf Regiments does not 
 provoke criticism; but it may well be asked whether the 
 procedure after that event might not have been better con- 
 trived. Obeying the letter of his orders, General Schnit- 
 nikof held back the two regiments still in hand until 3 p, m,; 
 for three hours he allowed the regiments v.ho had advanced 
 prematurely to fight single hauded. It might have been
 
 The Assault on Plevna. 129 
 
 assumed as certain that these two regiments alone would not 
 be able to take the enemy's works; on the other hand, it could 
 not be presumed that these; regiments would be really eifect- 
 ive after lighting single-handed for three hours against great 
 odds. Hence, after the advance of the Uglitz and Jaroslaf 
 Regiments, General Schuitnikof sliould either have pushed 
 the Kazan and Shuja Regiments also forward at once, or the 
 Koslof and Woronesh Regiments should have been brought 
 up in order to undertake the attack with sufficient strength 
 from the very beginning; for, as above stated, the Uglitz 
 and Jaroslaf Regiments could, under the circumstances, not 
 be counted upon at 3 o'clock. 
 
 Under the circumstances, there was no good reason for 
 postponing the attack until 3 o'clock pursuant to the disposi- 
 tion, for not only had the advance of those two regiments 
 compelled a large part of the Russian artillery to cease fir- 
 ing, but the Turks had long been alarmed and prepared for 
 the assault; hence the contemplated surprise could under 
 no circumstances be realized. 
 
 Did the commander-in-chief, posted in rear of the cen- 
 ter, receive any information whatever of the premature at- 
 tack? If yes, when? Did he express no opinion whatever 
 to General Schnitnikof as to what he should do? In what 
 formation was the attack made? When and in what direc- 
 tion did the regiments from the reserve advance? These are 
 questions which can not as yet be answered, but which are 
 indispensable for any real criticism of the bloody events in 
 the center.
 
 130 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 3. In turning now to the events on the Russian left, 
 the peculiar mode of command obtaining here attracts our 
 attention. Prince Imeretinski was the senior general, but 
 he played an entirely subordinate role by the side of the 
 younger Skobeleff, and was pushed altogether into the back- 
 ground by the latter. 
 
 During the initiatory actions on the 8th, 9th, and 10th 
 of September Imeretinski officially had the command of all 
 troops of the left wing. Skobeleff was subordinated to him, 
 but acted independently as commander of an advance guard, 
 which was increased to a strength equal to two-thirds of the 
 whole corps. Since a very small part of the troops under 
 Imeretinski's command was not engaged on the 10th, his to- 
 tal subsidence is less striking. But on the 11th of Septem- 
 ber matters were different: on this day Skobeleff was 
 charged direct from the headquarters of the West Army witli 
 the conduct of the attack on the south front of the enemy's 
 position, and was reinforced by part of Imeretinski's troops; 
 the latter was left in command of the remaining troops, and 
 ordered to support Skobeleff' if necessary. In the course of 
 the action Prince Imeretinski gradually sent all his troops 
 to General Skobeleff's assistance, so that in the end he had 
 not a company under his command and was a mere spectator 
 on the battle-field, and was even favorably mentioned in the 
 junior's direct report to the commander-in-chief for making 
 himself useful in collecting the dispersed men and looking 
 after the sanitary service. These are conditions for which 
 our conception lacks understanding and expression!
 
 The Assault on Plevna. 131 
 
 i. Skobelefif's method of couclucting the action exhib- 
 its the traits discussed in connection with the events of July 
 30th, on a larger scale; careful reconnaissance of the enemy's 
 position; general prepai-ation of the attack by concentrated 
 artillery fire, careful formation of the infantry in the fighting 
 line, special reserves in rear of the flanks, and a general re- 
 serve in two lines ; special preparation of the attack by brisk 
 fire of strong, well-covered skirmish lines, increased where- 
 ever possible by that of some batteries or at least some guns 
 brought into the front line; advance of the infantry by 
 stages, occupation of the new line reached, and renewed prep- 
 aration by infantry and artillery fire from that point; great 
 care for the safety of the flanks ; wise husbanding of the re- 
 serves; wherever practicable, new reserves were foiuied 
 from troops heretofore engaged; notwithstanding the un- 
 favorable condition of the ground for cavalry, the latter was 
 at the right place at the decisive moment, was properly em- 
 pJoyed, and took a decisive part in the action; lastly, the in- 
 defatigable efforts in collecting scattered men, which alone 
 made it possible again and again to lead formed and half- 
 fresh detachments into the action. To be sure, mistakes 
 may have been made in the details of tactical employment of 
 the individual bodies of troops, but the conduct of the battle 
 as a whole presents a brilliant picture, interesting and fas- 
 cinating in its smallest details. 
 
 5. It was only by their utmost efforts that the Turks 
 succeeded on the 12th of September in recapturing the re- 
 doubts lost on tlie preceding day, when the complete inac-
 
 132 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 tivity of the Russians opposite the Turldsh left and center 
 left the latter free to use most of their available troops for 
 support of their right. Had the Turks failed to drive Skobe- 
 lefif from the position he had captured — and there can be lit- 
 tle doubt that this would have been the case, had the Rus- 
 sian right and center shown auv activity whatever — had the 
 Russians permanently ensconced themselves on the heights 
 south of Plevna and posted their numerous artillery there, 
 the remaining portions of the Turkish position would, it is 
 presumed, have become untenable. 
 
 That the supreme command failed to appreciate the im- 
 portance of the advantages gained by Skobeleff, or to do 
 anything for their completion, preservation or retention, is 
 probably due to the fact that the supreme command, posted 
 in rear of the center near Radischevo, was so struck and in- 
 fluenced by the defeat inflicted under its own eyes as to be 
 unable to divert its mind to any other thought. 
 
 The complete inaction of the Russian center on the 12th 
 at a time when but a short distance away the furious action 
 on the "Green Hills" w^as fought out, does not admit of ex- 
 planation by the theory of exhaustion and losses on the pre- 
 vious day; there can be no doubt that the defeat witnessed 
 on the preceding day had deprived the supreme command 
 of confidence in a happy result, and that the only thought 
 was to find some honorable way out of the battle. 
 
 At the time when Skobeleff's request for reinforcements 
 was denied, 4 entirely fresh regiments were available in the 
 center, not to mention the Ingermanland Regiment (of the
 
 The Assault on Flecna. 133 
 
 3d Division), which was not mentioned in the disposition and 
 seems to have been the special escort of headquarters. 
 
 The Shuja Regiment, which came to Skobeleff's assist- 
 ance at noon on the 12th and covered the retreat of the other 
 troops by an offensive movement, was one of the 7 regiments 
 which on the preceding day had suffered defeat in the center; 
 it may therefore be presumed that the other regiments (ex- 
 cepting perhaps the Uglitz and Jaroslaf Regiments) were 
 again fit for action; at any rate, they would have been capa- 
 ble to undertake the protection of the artillery positions, 
 thus setting those 4 fresh regiments free. 
 
 It should be stated, however, that the Shnja Regiment 
 was sent to Skobeleff's assistance not by the supreme com- 
 mand, which was opposed to any continuation of the battle, 
 but by the commander of the IV. Corps, from courtesy, as it 
 were.
 
 1 34 Tactical Siudies on the Battles Around Plerna. 
 
 PART X. 
 
 WORK OF THE CAVALRY ON THE LEFT BANK OF 
 
 THE VID. 
 
 1. General Loshkareff from the 1th to the 19th of Septemhcr. 
 
 On September 7th General Loshkarett", commander of 
 the 9th Cavalry Division, was posted on the highroad east of 
 Grivitza, between the IX. Corps and the Roumanians, with 
 the Astrachan Dragoons. No. 8, Kazan Dragoons, No. 9, Bug 
 Lancer Regiment, No. 9, Don Cossacks, No. 9. and the 16th 
 Horse and 2d Don Cossack Battery. He was ordered to 
 move to Riben, pass the night there, to draw to himself both 
 regular Roumanian cavalry regiments, the 5th and 6th irreg- 
 ular cavalry regiments, and 1 Roumanian horse battery, to 
 cross the Vid on the next day with the united cavalry corps, to 
 make an energetic advance toward Dubnik, and to threaten 
 the communications of Osman Pasha's army by taking suit- 
 able position on the left bank. 
 
 Pursuant to this order, the 8 regiments of cavalry and 3 
 batteries were assembled by 9 p. m., September 7th, at 
 Riben, on the right bank of the brook which there emptied 
 into the Vid. 
 
 At 6 a. m. September 8th the Vid was crossed, and at 
 n :30 a. m. Smaret-Trestenik was reached, 8 miles west of
 
 Work of the Cavalry. 135 
 
 Riben and about the same distance to the northwest of the 
 bridge over the Vid at Plevna. 
 
 Wheeling to the left, the cavalry corps took front to- 
 ward the southeast against Plevna. Thence the Roschiori 
 (Regular) Brigade with the battery moved to Dolni (Lower) 
 Netropolie with instructions to observe Plevna and the road 
 leading thence to Rahova. The main body of the corps 
 marched through Grorni (Upper) Netropolie to Dolni Dub- 
 nik, where it went into bivouac at 1:45 p. m. On the march 
 the Cossacks of the advance guard captured a small herd of 
 cattle, whose armed escort fled to Plevna; nothing further 
 was seen of the enemy. 
 
 The line of outposts of the Roumanians at Lower Netrop- 
 olie extended from the Vid opposite Bivolar to the Sophia 
 road, facing the west front of the Plevna position. At the 
 Sophia road began the Russian outpost line, formed of 2 
 Lancer squadrons and a sotnia of Cossacks, which extended 
 at first southward along the heights between the Vid and 
 highroad, turned oft" to the west half way between Lower 
 and Upper Dubnik, crossed the road, and fronted toward 
 Upper Dubnik; the length of the entire line was about 
 lo miles. A separate detachment was posted in rear of the 
 whole position in observation of the road from Lower Dub- 
 nik to Rahova. The distance between Lower Dubnik and 
 Lower Xetropolie is about 6 miles; the former place is 4 miles 
 from the bridge over the Vid at Plevna, the latter about 2i 
 miles. 
 
 At 4 p. m. reports were received from the outposts that
 
 136 Tactical ^^tudies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 from 1,000 to 1,500 cavalry, followed by 3 battalions of in- 
 fantry, were approaching Lower Dubnik from Plevna; at 
 the same time the Eoumanians reported that about 4 bat- 
 talions of infantry with some cavalry were approaching 
 Lower Netropolie, and that the works of the west front of 
 the Plevna position had opened an artillery fire. 
 
 The Roumanians were ordered to maintain themselves 
 at Lower Xetropolie as best they could ; the balance of the 
 9th Lancers (1st and 2d squadrons), a sotnia of Cossacks, and 
 4 Cossack guns were dispatched to support the Russian out- 
 posts; the main body was posted in readiness at Lower 
 Dubnik. 
 
 The Turkish infantry halted within the range of protec- 
 tion afforded by the works; the 1.000 to 1,500 cavalry ad- 
 vanced against the Russian line of outposts, which fell slowly 
 back on its supports. Of the latter, one-half of the 1st squad- 
 ron, supported by the formed detachments of the outpost 
 squadrons (3d and 4th), advanced against the Turks from the 
 front; the other half X)f the 1st squadron took them on the 
 left flank, a platoon of the 2d squadron on the right flank; 
 after a brief hand-to-hand conflict, the Turks fell back on 
 their infantry, and the pursuing Lancers were received 
 with infantry fire and retired. The Turkish cavalry left 70 
 dead on the ground. The Turkish detachments, which had 
 been advancing against the Roumanians, retired to the works 
 after a brief artillery fire, without having made a real at- 
 tack. After the outposts had taken their former positions and 
 the 4 Cossack guns had been posted under cover to one side
 
 IVor/i- of the Cavalry. 137 
 
 of the highroad, the Turks again advanced to the attack at 
 6 p. m. with infantiy. At 1,500 yards the Turks were greeted 
 with shrapnel fire from the heretofore concealed guns, and 
 retired at once. 
 
 The total Russian losses on this day were 3 men and 9 
 horses killed, 9 men and 22 horses wounded. The Rou- 
 manians suffered no loss. 
 
 Early on the 9th of September patrols weie sent out 
 westward toward the Isker, southeastward along the high- 
 road, and southward up the Vid. TTpon report of the ajj- 
 pearance of Tcherkesses west of Upper Dubnik, 2 sotnias 
 of the 9th Cossacks were dispatched in that direction at 2 
 J), m. 
 
 At 3:30 p. m. the outposts reported the approach of 
 strong hostile bodies against the position of the Roschiori 
 at Lower Netropolie, and that bodies of hostile troops were 
 assembling at the bridge over the Vid, opposite the Russian 
 position. Upon receipt of this report the whole corps was 
 placed in readiness. 
 
 At 4:30 p. m, bodies of hostile troops api)eared on the 
 heights on tlie left bank of the Vid, and farther to the south 
 dense skirmish lines, cavalry on the flanks, closed infantry 
 and artillery in rear, amounting to about (> batlalions, 1 
 cavalry regiment, and 4 guns. The attack was supported 
 by artillery fire from the works of Opanetz, and was made 
 with great determination. The Regular Brigade retired 
 from Lower Netropolie. With a view of utilizing the favor- 
 able situation for a successful attack. General Loshkareff
 
 1 3 8 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 ordered tbe Koumaniaus to fall back to the heights of Upper 
 Netropolie, in order to entice the Turks as far as possible 
 from their works; as soon as the main body took the enemy 
 in flank, the Roumanians were to attack in front. 
 
 The 8th Dragoon Regiment, on outpost south of Lower 
 Netropolie, was to push 2 dismounted squadrons under cover 
 of the high corn and a depression of the ground against the 
 left flank of the Turks advancing on the Roumanians; the 
 attack was to be supported on the left by 2 mounted squad- 
 rons of the 9th Dragoons with 2 guns of the 16th Horse Bat- 
 tery; 2 Lancer squadrons and the remaining 4 guns of the 
 horse battery were posted on the right as protection against 
 any Turks who might advance from the bridge over the 
 Vid, Two sotnias of Cossacks having been dispatched to 
 Upper Dubnik, and 2 squadrons of the 8th Dragoons (and 
 probably also a sotnia of Cossacks) having been deployed 
 on the extensive outpost line, there remained in general re- 
 serve 4 squadrons of Dragoons and Lancers, 3 sotnias of Cos- 
 sacks, the Cossack battery, and probably the 2 Kalarashi 
 (Irregular) Regiments, of whose special employment nothing 
 is known. The attack directed simultaneously against their 
 front and flank caused the Turks to fall back to their works 
 about 6 p. m., whereupon the troops at the bridge also with- 
 drew. 
 
 While this engagement was in progress, the detachment 
 of Cossacks dispatched to Upper Dubnik reported that it 
 had encountered Tcherkesses, and that an infantry camp of 
 some 10,000 men had been observed in rear of the wood west 
 of Upper Dubnik.
 
 Work of thv Vara! 11/. 139 
 
 Loshkareff now ordered his outposts into their original 
 positions and moved with his main body to Lower Netropolie; 
 the 9th Cossacks remained at Lower Dubnik with instruc- 
 tions to light a large number of camp-fires, with a view of 
 deceiving the enemy at Upper Dubnik as to the strength of 
 the troops at Lower Dubnik, and at the same time to lead 
 the Turks in Plevna to believe that reinforcements from 
 Riben had arrived at Lower Netropolie in the evening. 
 
 The aggregate loss of the Russians and Roumanians on 
 the 9th of September was: 1 man and 11 horses killed, 1 man 
 missing, and 25 men and 31 horses wounded. 
 
 Early on September 10th the corps took up the following 
 position: the Regular Brigade between Upper and Lower 
 Netropolie, facing Plevna; all 1 Russian regiments with 
 both batteries and the 5th Militia Regiment at Lower Dub- 
 nik, their right resting on the highroad, their front fac- 
 ing the south, covered by the Dubnik brook, a branch of the 
 Vid; the Gth Militia Regiment, south of Upper Netropolie, 
 connecting the two bodies. 
 
 The Turks could be plainly observed increasing and 
 strengthening the works of their west front; a number of 
 guns were placed in battery. The Turks were evidently ex- 
 pecting the beginning of a serious attack from this direction. 
 
 Besides several small patrols which reconnoitered the 
 ground on both sides of the highroad between the Vid and 
 Isker, as well as the ground beyond the Isker, two strong 
 patrols were dispatched with instructions to seek communi- 
 cation with the cavalry of the left wing of the West Army
 
 140 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 and to cross to the right bank of the Vid above Plevna if 
 necessary for the accomplishment of their object. The 4th 
 squadron of the 9th Lancers crossed to the right bank of the 
 Vid at Medivan (O miles above the bridge) and scouted in 
 an easterly direction as far as Kebel (2 miles southeast of 
 Medivan), without meeting either Turks or Eussians. A 
 sotnia of Cossacks which attempted to cross at Dessewitza 
 (3 miles above the bridge) found the village held by Turkish 
 infantry and cavalry, and fell back. The reports of all the 
 patrols agreed that small bodies of Tcherkesses were roam- 
 ing between the Vid and Isker, and that beyond the Iskcr 
 they were in orreater force. 
 
 On September 11th a squadron of regular Roumanian 
 cavalry was ordered to cross the Isker at Magaleta (west of 
 Lower Dubnik) and to send patrols as fai* as possible in the 
 direction of Rahova — Widdin. For the purpose of establish- 
 ing communication with the left flank of the West Army, a 
 second squadron of the 9th Lancers was sent out with or- 
 ders to find the Russian troops under all circumstances, and, 
 if possible, to communicate directly with the commander- 
 in-chief. The squadron accomplished its object and re- 
 turned next day by the same route, capturing a Turkish 
 officer on the road. Moreover, a squadron of the 4th Dra- 
 goons dispatched by General Leontief, commanding the cav- 
 alry of the left wing of the West Army, arrived during 
 the day. 
 
 During the night of the llth-12th skirmishing took 
 place along the entire line of outposts with small bodies of
 
 Work of the Valid nj. Ul 
 
 Tcherkesses and Bashi-bozouks, who endeavored to steal 
 througli to the west and south and lost some killed and pris- 
 oners in the attempt. At the same time many Bulgarians 
 with empty wagons were leaving Plevna. 
 
 On the 12th of t^eptember the Turks began llu* <t)nst ruc- 
 tion of a new battery along the highroad to sweep the ap- 
 proaches of the bridge ; at Opanetz also a 4-gun battery was 
 built against the Roumanian battery at Lower Netropolie. 
 
 On September 13th the Roumanian squadron dis- 
 patched to Magaleta reported that the patrols on the pre- 
 vious day found the ntugliboring villages full of Tcher- 
 kesses and Bashi-bozouks. The total loss of the Roumanians 
 in this reconnaissance consisted of 1 man wounded. 
 
 A detachment of 2 squadrons of Lancers, which ad- 
 vanced on the highroad toward Telis and dispatched small 
 patrols to the right toward the Isker and on the left to 
 Rakita and Radomirtza,. found in all the villages plundering 
 Tcherkesses and Bashi-bozouks, who retired on the appear- 
 ance of the Lancers. 
 
 Patrols sent ont on the 14th and 15th of September 
 rendered similar reports. On the latter day 7 sotnias of the 
 Don Cossack Brigade of (Jt^noral Shernosuboff, with the 
 15th Don Cossack Battery, arrived at Lower Dubnik, and 
 brought an order for the 0th Cossacks to move to Bogot 
 (south of Plevna on the road to Lovtcha). 
 
 The patrols sent out on the lOth everywhere had skir- 
 mishes with Tcherkesses and armed inhabitants; the Rou- 
 manians at Magaleta lost 1 man and 1 horse killed.
 
 142 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 During the night an attaclc was made from Plevna 
 against the 5th Irregular Regiment, which was on outpost 
 along the Vid. The attack was repulsed without loss to the 
 Roumanians. 
 
 The patrols sent out southward on the 17th and 18th of 
 September no longer met with hostile detachments; in the 
 evening an attack on the outposts north of the highroad was 
 repulsed with a loss of 1 man wounded; the Turks had 2 
 men killed. 
 
 The 1st Brigade of the 4th Cavalry Division having ar- 
 rived on the evening of the 18th of September, General Losh- 
 kareff started for Bogot at 10 o'clock next morning with the 
 rest of his division, the 9th Lancers, the Dragoons, and the 
 9th Cossacks preceding him there; the 9th Hussars had 
 throughout this period been at the east of Plevna. 
 
 General Loshkareflf then with his (9th) Cavalry Division 
 guarded the left of the West Army. 
 
 2. General Kri/loff from September 19th to October 1th. 
 General Kryloff, the newly appointed commander of the 
 "Combined Cavalry Corps" on the left bank of the Vid, ar- 
 rived at Lower Dubnik on the 19th of September. Rein- 
 forcements, consisting of a Don Cossack brigade, a Caucas- 
 ian Cossack brigade, and part of the 4th Cavalry Division, 
 which had heretofore been posted on the left of the West 
 Army near Bogot and toward Lovtcha. arrived at Lower 
 Dubnik partly before, partly at the same time with Kryloflf. 
 The task of the corps was to cut off all supplies from
 
 Work- of the Caialnj. 143 
 
 the Turkish army at Plevna, to save the troops as much as 
 possible, to prevent entireh- any cooperation of the troops in 
 Plevna with operations on the left bank of the Vid, or to 
 entice the troops from Plevna to such a distance as to tem- 
 porarily weaken the garrison. 
 
 About the time of the arrival of Kryloff and the main 
 body of his corps at Lower Dubnik reports came in of the ap- 
 proach of hostile columns from Magaleta; these reports 
 proved erroneous, but still Kryloff bestowed special atten- 
 tion to the country of Magaleta and west of the Isker. 
 
 On September 20th Colonel Stakelberg, with 2 squad- 
 rons of Hussars, 2squadronsof Irregulars, and 2guns, scouted 
 toward Telis in order to reconnoiter the country between 
 the Isker and the highroad as far as Rakita. Near Telis he 
 encountered strong hostile detachments, and fell back after 
 a brief engagement. 
 
 In order to more accurately ascertain the strength and 
 position of the enemy, Colonel Tutolmin, with the Caucasian 
 Cossack Brigade, 2 squadrons of regular cavalry, and the 8th 
 Don Battery, was again dispatched toward Telis. His vig- 
 orous attack developed about 10 Turkish battalions en- 
 sconced in rifle-trenches, and about 2 regiments of cavalry; 
 3 guns were covered by entrenchments and several others 
 were in the open. While the action was taking place, a gen- 
 eral staff officer made a sketch of the enemy's position. The 
 enemy's strength was estimated at 10,000 or 12,000 men. 
 
 On the 22d of September the outposts reported that con- 
 siderable hostile forces were approaching Lower Dubnik
 
 1 44: Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 from Upper Dubuik, and tliat the strong Russian patrols 
 were falling back fighting to Lower Dubnik. 
 
 General Kryloff at first decided to make a stand at Lower 
 Dubnik; but, on receipt of information from Loshkareff on 
 the right bank that he was marching on Telis, Kryloff de 
 cided to attack the enemy in front, while Loshkareff, as he 
 supposed, was attacking in rear. 
 
 After Kryloff had opened the action by a brisk artillery 
 fire, the sound of the guns of Loshkareff's detachment was 
 heard at 3 o'clock — not, however, in the enemy's rear, but in 
 prolongation of the Russian left; at the same time reports 
 came in from the outposts at Lower Dubnik that strong 
 bodies of hostile infantry were, advancing from the bridge- 
 head against the Russian position. In view of these circum- 
 stances, Krylott' led his corps to Smaret-Trestenik, leaving 
 a strong advance guard (the Don Cossack Brigade and the 
 Irregular Brigade) at Netropolie. The infantry advanc- 
 ing from the bridge-head retired within the works toward 
 evening. 
 
 On the morning of the 2.3d of September the advance 
 guard at Netropolie reported that the hostile forces at Up- 
 per Dubnik had marched into Plevna during the night under 
 the fire of the 15th battery attached to the Don Cossack 
 Brigade. 
 
 On the 24th Kryloff was ordered to cover the right of 
 the army by taking position abreast of Brestovetz (midway 
 between the lower Yid and lower Isker), and to fall back in 
 case of necessity to Riben. At the same time reports arrived
 
 Work of the Cavalnj. 1^:5 
 
 from the west of the presence of bodies of Tcherkesses col- . 
 lecting provisions for the Turkish Army. 
 
 On the 25th of September Krjloff marched to Rahova 
 with the Caucasian Cossack Brigade, the Roumanian Regular 
 Brigade, the 1st Brigade of the 4th Cavalry Division, the 8th 
 Dragoons, and 3 batteries. A flank detachment marched to 
 Bieloslatina. Bodies of Tcherkesses were driven from sev- 
 eral of the villages of that vicinity; the telegraph line be- 
 tween Widdin and Plevna was cut. 
 
 On the 26th of September the 3 redoubts covering Ra- 
 hova were bombarded and 1 Turkish gun dismounted. 
 Kryloff made no attempt to capture Rahova, since he would 
 not have been able to hold it ; nor did he desire to set it on fire 
 by shells, as the village was chiefly inhabited by Bulgarians. 
 
 On the 28th Kryloff retired to Riben to replenish his 
 provisions and ammunition, and on the 30th the corps again 
 stood at Smaret-Trestenik. 
 
 During the absence of the main body the detachment at 
 Ketropolie captured 2 wagon-trains, of 20 and 100 wagons 
 loaded with flour and barley respectively, and on another 
 occasion relieved a Turkish foraging party of i)art of the hay 
 collected. 
 
 On the 30th of September Colonel Levis advanced with 
 4 sotnias of the Vladi Caucasian Regiment, 2 squadrons of 
 Charkof Lancers, 2 squadrons of Mariopul Hussars, and the 
 8th Horse Battery on Telis and Radomirtza. He reported 
 on October 1st, that he had encountered Bashi-bozouks and 
 pursued them to Lukovitza, that his detachment had cap-
 
 146 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 tured 1,000 head of beef cattle, 80 horses, and a wagon-train 
 loaded with salt and quinine, and that the bridge at Rado- 
 mirtza and the telegraph line had again been destroyed as 
 far as Lukovitza. 
 
 On the 1st of October General Tchermat, commander- 
 in-chief of the Roumanian Army, appeared and informed 
 General Kryloff that he had arranged for a reconnaissance 
 in force on the next day by a body of Roumanian troops 
 against the position of Opanetz, and requested support. 
 
 In compliance with the request. General Krsioff ordered 
 the detachment at Netropolie to advance on October 2d 
 against Opanetz. Learning of the advance of a strong Turk- 
 ish corps of all arms from the bridge-head against Lower 
 Netropolie, he sent forward all the troops at Smaret- 
 Trestenik. 
 
 On reaching the detachment. General Kryloff found the 
 15th Don Battery engaged with Turkish infantry and artil- 
 lery, which had advanced to Lower Netropolie; the Rouma- 
 nian and Sth Don Batteries came at once into action on the 
 right of the engaged battery, and took part in the conflict. 
 One of the enemy's guns was dismounted, an ammunition- 
 cart blown up, and Netropolie was set on fire by shells. The 
 15th Don Battery being seriously molested by the fire of 
 Turkish skirmishers ensconced in the outskirts of the vil- 
 lage, 2 squadrons of the 4th Dragoons dismounted and drove 
 them away. The retreat of the Turkish infantry was covered 
 by an attack of a body of Tcherkesses, and to cover the dis- 
 mounted Dragoons 2 sotnias of the Kuban Regiment ad- 
 vanced and threw the Tcherkesses back on their infantrv.
 
 Work of the Cavalry. l^T 
 
 At 1 :30 p. m. the Roumanian Colonel Tcherkass reported 
 that the reconnaissance against Opanetz could not take 
 place, and as it would have been to no purpose under these 
 circumstances to continue the action, General Kryloft" with- 
 drew to his right about 3 p. m. An attempt of the Turks to 
 take the Russian detachment in left flank was frustrated 
 by a counter-attack of the Kuban Regiment 
 
 Meanwhile the detachment of Colonel Levis had ad- 
 vanced southward, and its patrols had established commu- 
 nication with General Loshkareff's cavalry scouting on the 
 right bank of the Vid. 
 
 Having burned the bridge at Shervenibreg on October 
 2d while en route from Radomirtza to Sumakova, Colonel 
 Levis moved from Sumakova on October 3d, and assembled 
 at Lukovitza in the evening, having skirmished with Tcher- 
 kesses on the way. The bridge at Lukovitza was demol- 
 ished; some mail was captured and sent to Kryloff, and by 
 him to the commander of the West Army. 
 
 On the 4th and 5th of October Levis remained at Rado- 
 mirtza with the main body, and sent patrols in all directions; 
 on the 6th of October he was attacked by some 4.000 or 5,000 
 infantry and Tcherkesses from Lukovitza. Up to 2 p. m. he 
 repulsed the attacks on his front, but at this hour an equally 
 strong body, which left Plevna in the morning, appeared in 
 his rear. Covered by the fire of his artillery and Dragoons. 
 Levis withdrew, crossed the Isker, and moved to Sumakova. 
 
 On the 7th of October Levis moved to Magaleta, from 
 which point a detachment sent against Telis reported tapper 
 and Lower Dubnik occupied by the Turks.
 
 148 Tactical Stitdies on the Battles Around Plecna. 
 
 By entrenching Lukovitza, Telis, and Upper and Lower 
 Diibnik the Turks protected their line of communication from 
 Orkhanie to Plevna so etfectively that the Kussian cavalry 
 was compelled to abandon for the present all attempts to 
 cut the line. The investment at the West of Plevna, which 
 for a time seemed successfully established, was completely 
 broken. 
 
 Comments. 
 
 The task of the Russo-Koumanian cavalry was to pre- 
 vent reinforcements and supplies from reaching Plevna. 
 The task might be accomplished by defensive or offensive 
 means — i. e.f the cavalry might bar the road to an approach- 
 ing relief corps in some favorable position, or it might go 
 to meet the relieving troops and try to overthrow them by a 
 vigorous and unexpected attack. The latter method is more 
 in keeping with the tactical ideas of cavalry than a pure 
 defensive in which the inherent strength of the arm, modern 
 armament and training notwithstanding, cannot be fully 
 developed. 
 
 In the period described above the Eussian cavalry made 
 no attempt whatever to solve the problem by offensive 
 action, and the very weak defensive aittempt failed 
 completely. 
 
 The work of the Russo-Roumanian cavalry may be di- 
 vided into two portions: the period of the attempted in- 
 vestment up to the successful movement of the Turkish 
 relief corps September 23d, and the period of simple observa 
 tion subsequent to that day; within the latter period fall
 
 Work of the Cavalry. 149 
 
 the movement on Rahova from September 25tli to 28th, and 
 the expedition of Colonel Levis to Lukovitza from September 
 30th to October 7th. 
 
 On the 8th of September, the day when Loshkareff was 
 dispatched to the left bank of the Vid, the artillery prelude 
 to the great attack on Plevna was beginning; at this mo- 
 ment it was not so much Loshkareff's task to cut Plevna from 
 relief without as to facilitate the attack on the east by de- 
 monstrations on the west, and, in case of the capture of 
 Plevna, to cut off the retreat of the fleeing Turks on the left 
 bank. It is evident that the appearance of the strong body 
 of cavalry opposite the west side of their position attracted 
 the attention of the Turks in no small degree, but we fail to 
 note any sensible effect on the events of the east front. 
 
 On the receipt by Loshkareff on September 9th of infor- 
 mation that a hostile corps of some 10,000 men was in the 
 vicinity of Upper Dubnik, it was to be expected that a strong 
 advance would be made at once in that direction to verify 
 the correctness of this important information. Loshkareff, 
 however, contented himself with taking up a defensive 
 position so close to Plevna as to expose himself to the dan- 
 ger of being attacked simultaneously by the relief corps and 
 by the garrison of Plevna itself. 
 
 Upon the abandonment of the idea of a capture of 
 Plevna by assault after the failure of the attack on Sep- 
 tember 11th, the investment, particularly on the west, be- 
 came the important feature. Loshkareff with part of the 
 cavalry was withdrawn from the left to the right bank, where
 
 150 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 he covered the left of the army. In his phice Kryloff made 
 his appearance with considerable reinforcements, so that the 
 total strength of the cavalry corps operating on the left 
 bank must be put down at not less than G,000 or 7,000 
 effectives. 
 
 Kr^'loli" had very pertinent instructions from the com- 
 mander-in-chief to meet any relief corps at as great a distance 
 as possible from Plevna, yet when the approach of a strong 
 hostile corps from Telis became known, Kryloff remained 
 close to Plevna, and, upon the appearance of the enemy, fell 
 back without offering any serious resistance, so that the 
 Turks had no difficulty in getting their large train of pro- 
 visions and ammunition into the town. 
 
 The task demanded of General Kryloff' and his cavalry 
 was a cavalry task of the most common sort. He failed 
 completely, and made no attempt to solve the problem by 
 force of arms. The passage in Kryloft's orders "to save his 
 troops as much as possible in the solution of his task" may 
 perhaps be admitted as an explanation — though by no means 
 as an extenuation — of his feeble action. That phrase was 
 not well chosen and served no clear purpose. That a gen- 
 eral should save his troops "as much as possible" is so ele- 
 mentary a rule that it would be trivial and unnecessary 
 to call attention to it; if it is used, it is apt to lead a careful 
 and prudent man into such exaggerated caution as to render 
 any success impossible, because real success against an 
 active enemy will rarely be gained without bloody sacrifices. 
 
 If Kryloff had been compelled to leave the road open to
 
 Work of the Cavalry. 151 
 
 the Turks after losing a few hundred of his horsemen in a 
 fruitless defensive action or in a vigorous though hopeless 
 charge, the Eussians might have consoled themselves with 
 the idea that the fortune of war is variable; but it is hardly 
 to be assumed that the Russian commander-in-chief was 
 satisfied when the Turks were able to accomplish their ob- 
 ject almost without any shedding of blood, in the face of 
 G,(JUU to 7,000 eager horsemen. 
 
 It is interesting to note how Kryloflf in his report seeks 
 to vindicate, not to say excuse, his action. In the first place, 
 he claimed credit for delaying the arrival of the relief corps 
 in Plevn:a by forty-eight hours; since no decisive events 
 were taking place in Plevna at the time, it was a matter of 
 indifference whether the Turkish corps arrived forty-eight 
 hours sooner or later. 
 
 He justified his retreat from Lower Dubnik to Smaret- 
 Trestenik on September 22d by stating, "that that point was 
 but little farther from the highroad than Lower Dubnik, and 
 much closer to the line of retreat of the corps (Riben); and 
 that the posting of the detachment at Netropolie furnished 
 the means for observing everything that passed in and out 
 of Plevna." To watch the Turks from a distance carrying 
 provisions into Plevna did not, we should say, require the 
 presence of a body of 7,000 cavalry. 
 
 If the entire affair could be repeated with the difference 
 of -having Skobeleff or Gourko at the head of the cavalry 
 corps, a comparison between their action and that of Kryloff 
 would be as interesting as it would be instructive.
 
 152 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna, 
 
 The very iuterestiug events during the first weelv of 
 October could, unfortunately, not be described in full, owing 
 to the lack of reliable information. 
 
 The expedition of (.'olonel Levis was the first attempt, 
 though undertaken with insufficient force, to accomx)lish the 
 investment of Plevna by offensive movements, and the idea 
 of opposing an attempt at relief at Lukovitza rather than at 
 Dubnik was certainly correct; but there is a certain ob- 
 scurity in the accounts before us as to what the main bod}' 
 of some 40 squadrons was doing while Levis advanced south- 
 ward with 12 squadrons and 8 guns, and how a compara- 
 tively small Turkish force should find it possible under his 
 very e3es to advance against Levis's rear. 
 
 The numerous tactical details which it was possible to 
 interweave in the description are of interest in judging the 
 tactics of the Kussian cavalry. It is much to be regretted 
 that information as to tactical details and losses in the two 
 most important actions — at Netropolie on the 2d and at 
 Lukovitza on the 6th of October — are scant in the case of the 
 former and lacking altogether in the case of the latter.
 
 Invcstmciit of Plevna. 153 
 
 PART XI. 
 
 INVESTMENT OF i'LEVNA FKOM THE WEST. 
 
 1. The Comnuinieations of Plevna to the Reav. 
 
 As early as the beginning of hostilities an army of 
 newly formed reserves was assembled at Sophia. About 
 the time of the Russian passage of the Danube par-t of it was 
 I'Ut in motion and effected its junction at Plevna, with Osman 
 Pasha's array frora Widdin. 
 
 When, after their repeated failure to capture Plevna by 
 force, the Russians threatened to cut the communications of 
 the army posted there, it became the duty of the force at 
 Sophia to keep the communications with Plevna open, and 
 to look to the safety of the trains of provisions and ammu- 
 nition destined for that place. 
 
 Crossing the Balkans with part of the army assembled 
 at Sophia, Chefket Pasha moved to Orkhanie, and thence 
 with about 10,000 men to Telis, and, after some slight en- 
 gagements with reconnoitering Russian cavalry, succeeded, 
 on September 22d, in driving back General Kryloft" and 
 getting his large convoy of provisions and ammunition into 
 Plevna, where the greater part of his troops renuiined; he 
 himself, however, returning to Orkhanie. 
 
 At the beginning of October Chefket again started out 
 with a large convoy and 5.000 men, a corps of equal strength
 
 154 Tactical Studies on the Battles A round Plevna. 
 
 marching from Plevna to meet him. Colonel Levis, wlio 
 blocked the road at Radomirtza, was driven back on the 6th 
 of October, and the convoy of 2,000 wagons succeeded in 
 reaching the left bank of the Vid opposite Plevna on Octo- 
 ber 8th, the lighter vehicles crossing at once by a ford above 
 the bridge, while the heavy wagons waited for the damaged 
 bridge to be repaired. 
 
 In order to protect tlie march of further convoys against 
 Russian scouting parties, the Turks fortified three stations 
 on the northernmost part of the road between Plevna and 
 Orkhanie, Dolni Dubnik, Gorni Uubnik, and Telis. These 
 stations were garrisoned by a division consisting of 20 bat- 
 talions and 15 guns (according to other accounts, 18 bat- 
 talions and 24 guns) and a number of Tcherkesses under 
 Chifsi Pasha, whoi established his headquarters at Gorni 
 Dubnik, Other bodies of troops stood echeloned on the sec- 
 tion from Lukovitza to Orkhanie. 
 
 Very considerable supplies were collected at Sophia 
 and Orkhanie for Osman Pasha, between whom and Chefket 
 Pasha there was an agreement that every two weeks a con- 
 voy with provisions for a month should be dispatched. 
 
 2. General Gourko's Task and Disposition for the 2.'ith of 
 
 October. 
 The arrival of the Guard having considerably increased 
 the number of available troops, it was decided to adopt the 
 plans of General Todleben, now appointed "assistant'' to the 
 commander-in-chief, and to undertake the investment of 
 Plevna from the west in a manner that would ensure success.
 
 Inca^tinriit of Flrviia. 155 
 
 General (iourko, heretofore commauding the 2d Cav- 
 alry Division of the Guard, was entrusted with the task 
 and given the greater part of the Guard in addition to the 
 masses of cavalry on the left bank of the Vid. 
 
 At this time — about the middle of October — the follow- 
 ing troops under General Arnoldi (Kryloff having been re- 
 lieved) were on the left bank of the Vid, northwest of Plevna, 
 in the vicinity of Trestenik and Riben : the 4th Cavalry Di- 
 vision, numbering 18 squadrons and sotnias with 12 guns; 
 a Don Cossack brigade of 12 sotnias* and 6 guns; lastly, 4 
 Roumanian cavalry regiments (the two regular and the 5th 
 and 6th militia regiments) of IG squadrons and G guns; total, 
 G2 squadrons and sotnias with 30 guns. 
 
 At the south of Plevna, on the right bank of the Vid, 
 was Loshkareff with the 9th Cavalry Division (18 squadrons 
 and 12 guns), scouting southward on both banks. 
 
 In addition to these bodies of cavalry, the following 
 troops of the Guard were placed at the disposal of General 
 Gourko to enable him to accomplish his purpose: the 1st 
 and 2d Infantry Divisions with 32 battalions, the Rifle Bri- 
 gade with 4 battalions, the battalion of sappers, the 2d Cav- 
 alry Division with 24 squadrons, the personal escort of the 
 Emperor with 4 squadrons, 12 foot batteries willi JM'» guns, 
 and 3 horse batteries with 18 guns; all these trooi)s were 
 south of Plevna, between the Vid and the highroad to 
 Lovtcha. In addition, General Arnoldi's cavalry was rein- 
 forced by 7 battalions of Roumanian infantry and a Rou- 
 
 •This is the organic strength; on their arrival on the left bank of the Vid the 
 account mentions but 7 sotnias.
 
 156 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 mauian foot battery, while the •Ith Don Cossacks, thoutfh be- 
 longing to the 4th Cavalry Division, were attached to the 
 Guard Corps to serve as guides, on account of their knowl- 
 ■ edge of the terrain gained from their protracted presence in 
 the locality. 
 
 On the 22d of October each of the 6 cavalry regiments 
 of the Guard sent a platoon to the left bank of the Vid to 
 reconnoiter; at the same time General Gourko was recon- 
 noitering in the direction of Telis, accompanied by the supe- 
 rior officers of cavalry of the Guard and escorted by 2 
 squadrons of the Emperor's escort and 1 sotnia of the -tth 
 Cossacks. From that point he rode forward on the high- 
 road toward Gorni Dubnik, accompanied by a few officers, 
 and reconnoitered the enemy's position under a brislv fire. 
 
 As a first step in the accomplishment of his task, Gourko 
 decided upon the seizure of the fortified position of Gorni 
 Dubnik. While the main attack was to be directed against 
 that point, the enemy's forces at Telis and Dolni Dubnik 
 were to be kept busy, and a sortie from Plevna as well as 
 the approach of reinforcements from Orkhauie had also to 
 be provided against. 
 
 The disposition drawn up to this effect by General 
 Gourko for the 24:th of October divided his forces into five 
 groups: 
 
 (a) The following troops were to make the direct at- 
 tack on Gorni Dubnik: the 2d Infantry Division of the 
 Guard with 15 battalions, the rifle brigade of the Guard 
 with 1 battalions, the sapper battalion of the Guard, 2
 
 1 nvestment of Plevna. 1 57 
 
 squadrons of the imperial escort, 4 sotuias of the ith Don 
 Cossaclvs, and (3 foot batteries of the Guard with 48 guns. 
 In addition, the Caucasian Cossack Brigade (12 sotnias with 
 6 guns) was to advance from Abaskoi and take post west of 
 Gorni Dubnik to prevent any retreat westward. 
 
 One battalion of the 2d Infantry Division of the Guard 
 and a foot batter}- of the Guard were to remain at the ford 
 of Medivan to cover the passage there. 
 
 (6) The following troops were detailed to make a dem- 
 onstration against Telis and repulse any troops of the ene- 
 my that might be advancing from Orkhanie: the Chasseur 
 Regiment of the 1st Infantry Division of the Guard with 4 
 battalions, the 1st and 2d Brigade of the 2d Cavalry Divis- 
 ion of the Guard with 16 squadrons, 1 sotnia of the 4th Cos- 
 sacks, and 1 foot and 2 horse batteries of the Guard with 20 
 guns. In addition, Formak's militia brigade — 8 squadrons — 
 was to move from Magaleta, i)artly on the riglit bank of the 
 Isker to Shervenibreg, partly on the left bank to Sumakova, 
 forming as it were the western flank guard of the detach- 
 ment operating against Telis. 
 
 (c) The following troops under General Arnoldi were 
 told oft" for the demonstration against Dolni Dubnik: the 
 4t.h Cavalry Division (without the 4th ('ossacks and another 
 squadron detached with 2 guns) with 11 squadrons and 
 10 guns and the militia brigade with 8 squadrons, (J guns, 
 and 2 battalions of Roumanian infantry. 
 
 In addition, a detachment was to be dispatched by the 
 9th Cavalry Division from Medivan against Dolni Dubnik 
 to establish communication with General Ainoldi.
 
 L58 Taeilcul Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 (d) To meet any sortie from Plevna, General Shernosubof 
 was to occupy the position of Netropolie with 7 sotnias of 
 his brigade, 5 battalions of Koumanian infantry and 6 Rus- 
 sian horse and G Roumanian foot guns. 
 
 (e) The general reserve was posted between Upper and 
 Lower Dubnik, and consisted of: the 1st Infantry Division 
 of the Guard with 12 battalions, the 3d Brigade of the 2d 
 (^avalry Division of the Guard with S squadrons, 2 squad- 
 rons of the imperial escort, 1 sotnia of the 4th Cossacks, 
 and 4 foot and 2 horse batteries of the Guai'd with 44 guns. 
 
 3. Capture of Gorni Duhnik on October 24th. 
 
 Gorni Dubnik is situated on the Dubnik brook, about 
 i.OOO yards west of the highroad. At the highest point west 
 of the road and south of the village a spacious redoubt was 
 built with a cavalier in the interior; a smaller redoubt lay 
 east of the great redoubt; both redoubts were surrounded 
 by rifle-trenches. 
 
 On the north the level and open ground sloped almost 
 insensibly toward Dolni Dubnik; toward the east the slopes 
 were gentle and covered with a young and very dense growth 
 of timber; the distance of the smaller redoubt from the 
 edge of this wood was about 400 yards. To the south and 
 west the ground sloped steeply into a depression about 200 
 yards wide. About 1,800 yards south of the small redoubt 
 there was a clearing in the wood which the Turks had begun 
 to fortify. 
 
 The troops detailed for the direct attack on Gorni Dub-
 
 Investment of Plevna. 159 
 
 nik crossed the Vid duiiug the uight iieur Shiiakuva by three 
 fords with kuee-deep water, and were divided into three col- 
 umns as follows: 
 
 Right column under Major-General Ellis — 4 rifle bat- 
 talions, 2 batteries, 2 squadrons, and 1 sotuia — on the road 
 from Shirakova to Krushevitza, 2,000 yards from the former 
 place. 
 
 Middle column under Major-General Baron Zeddeler — 
 1st Brigade of the 2d Infantry Division of the Guard with 7 
 battalions, the sapper battalion of the Guard, 2 batteries, 
 and 1 sotnia. — on the road from Shirakova to Sumakovitza, 
 500 yards from the former place. 
 
 Left column under Major-General Rosenbach — 2d Bri- 
 gade of the 2d Infantry Division of the Guard with 8 bat- 
 talions and 2 batteries — was the last to cross the Md, and 
 took position 3,500 yards west of the river in the ravine of 
 Swinar. 
 
 Two sotnias of Cossacks can not be accounted for. 
 
 The two flank columns, which were to advance from the 
 north and south against the enemy's position w'ere to start 
 aL G:15 a. m.; the middle column, which was to attack from 
 the east and had the shortest route, was to start at ():45 a. m. 
 The latter column entered the action at 8:30, the two flank 
 columns at !) a. m., their movements having been somewhat 
 delayed. 
 
 The artillery of the middle column was posted about 
 the center of the position of that column; on the left of the 
 artillerv was the Bodv Guard Grenadier regiment with its
 
 1 60 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 4th battalion in first line, the 2d and 3d battalions in second 
 line; to the right of the batteries was the Body Guard Moscow 
 Kegiment in the same formation; the 1st battalion of the 
 Grenadiers and the sapper battalion formed the reserve. 
 
 At 8:30 a. m. both batteries came into action in the clear- 
 ing above referred to and opened fire at a range of 1,600 
 yards. The Grenadier regiment, advancing through dense 
 undergrowth, lost direction, went too far to the left, and 
 touched the left column, whereupon General Zeddeler moved 
 the regiment some distance to the rear and then to the right- 
 oblique to approach the batteries. The gap caused by the 
 oblique movement had meanwhile been filled from the re- 
 serve by the 1st battalion of the regiment. 
 
 On renewing the advance the Grenadier regiment 
 reached the western edge of the wood and was about abreast 
 of the Moscow Regiment on the right of the artillery. 
 
 At this time (9 o'clock) the two tiank columns appeared 
 before the enemy's position and opened fire from their artil- 
 lery. At 9:30 o'clock the Caucasian Cossack Brigade ap- 
 peared west of Gorni Dubnik and also opened fire from its 
 battery, so that the Turkish position, where there were but 1 
 guns, was receiving a concentric fire from 51 guns. 
 
 Shortly after 10 o'clock the Grenadier regiment at- 
 tacked the east redoubt, which was captured in spite of the 
 murderous fire from this as well as from the main redoubt. 
 The garrison of the east redoubt fell back on the main re- 
 doubt; an attempt of the Grenadiers to enter the main re- 
 doubt at the same time with the retreating enemv was frus-
 
 Inccstineitt of Plevna. 1 61 
 
 trated by a severe tire, whereupon the Grenadiers ensconced 
 themselves in the captured redoubt. 
 
 ^V'hile the attack of the Grenadiers was in progress, 
 Major-Genera 1 Zeddeler ordered the batteries and the Mos- 
 cow Regiment to go forward. The 1st Battery approached 
 under a severe infantry fire to within 800 yards of the main 
 redoubt, but, being unable to maintain itself, fell back to its 
 original position after firing a few rounds. The Moscow 
 Regiment advanced until abreast of the Grenadiers and en- 
 sconced itself in the rifle-trenches to the right (north) of the 
 captured redoubt. 
 
 Meanwhile the right column had gained the highroad 
 leading from Dolni to Gorni Dubnik, and advanced against 
 the Turkish position from the north; the two Kuban squad- 
 rons of the imperial escort marching at the head drove bands 
 of Tcherkesses before them and cut the telegraph line which 
 ran by the side of the road. 
 
 Leaving 1 battalion opposite Dolni Dubnik, General 
 Ellis formed his remaining 3 battalions for the attack: 1 
 battalion on each side of the road, the 2 batteries in the 
 center, 1 battalion in reserve. 
 
 At 1,700 yards from the main redoubt the artillery 
 opened fire, the rifle battalions continuing the advance. In 
 consequence of the loss of the east redoubt, the Turks also 
 abandoned the northern line of advanced trenches; the 
 Rifles of The Guard took cover in them and opened fire at a 
 range of from 600 to 700 yards. As the Rifles were directly 
 in front of their artillerv and masking their fire, both bat-
 
 162 Tactical Httnlics on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 teries, notwithstanding the severe fire of the enemy, came 
 up almost to the position of the Rifles and again opened fire 
 at SCO yards. The 1st Division of the Guard having mean- 
 while arrived between Gorni and Dolni Dubnik and having 
 deployed with front toward the latter place, the rifle bat- 
 talion heretofore opposite Dolni Dubnik was ordered to join 
 its brigade. 
 
 Gourko had ridden to the foremost line of the Rifles of 
 the Guard to reconnoiter the great redoubt, and there about 
 noon received report of the failure of the attack of the left 
 column. 
 
 The left column started about 6:15 o'clock from the 
 ravine of Swinar, and was considerably delayed in crossing 
 a narrow but deep water-course. It advanced on the road 
 leading from Telis to Gorni Dubnik, and did not arrive be- 
 fore the enemy's position until 9 o'clock. Two batteries 
 placed in the center opened fire at a range of 1,800 yards, 
 but soon closed to 1,500 yards, and were reinforced by the 5th 
 Horse Battery of the Guard. 
 
 The Finland Regiment advanced on the left (west) of the 
 road against Gorni Dubnik through dense underwood; the 
 Pawlof Regiment to the right (east) of the road, on open 
 ground. After crossing the ravine in front, both regiments 
 moved to the attack on the main redoubt, but were re- 
 pulsed by a severe fire and rallied in several places where the 
 terrain afforded cover in rear. 
 
 The rifle battalions meanwhile, utilizing the depression 
 opening into the valley of the Dubnik brook, were obliquing
 
 Investment of Plevna. 1 63 
 
 more and more to the rig-lit so sis almost to face the west 
 front of the Turkish position. Gourko ordered forward 2 
 battalions of the Ismailof Regniment to fill the gap between 
 the Rifles and the artillery on the road, which belonged to 
 the right column; at the same time he reinforced the middle 
 and left column each by 1 battalion of the same regiment. 
 Having made these arrangements, Gourko repairf^d in per- 
 son to the batteries of the middle column, at about 2 \). m. 
 
 Having learned that the Chasseur regiment of the Guard 
 had been repulsed at Telis and was retreating, Gourko feared 
 the arrival of Turkish reinforcements' from that direction, 
 and decided to bring the aifair before Gorni Dubnik to a con- 
 clusion by a simultaneous assault from all sides; the mid- 
 dle column received verbal instructions to that effect; a 
 written order was dispatched to the right flank column. 
 
 The following arrangement was made to ensure a 
 simultaneous attack: as soon as the left column had com- 
 pleted its arrangements and stood ready to attack, its artil- 
 lery was to fire three salvoes; the same was to be done by 
 the middle column when everything was in readiness there, 
 and lastly by the right column. As soon as the artillery of 
 the right column fired the last salvo, the assault was to begin 
 from all directions. The space to be crossed by the assault- 
 ing ti'oops differed at the various points from 100 to 400 
 paces. 
 
 Having himself seen to the arrangements of the middle 
 column, Gourko went to the left column to personally see to 
 what was needful; but before this was accompliv*ihed, the
 
 1 64 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 salvoes of the right column resounded and its troops ad- 
 vanced to the assault, which misunderstanding rendered a 
 simultaneous attack impossible. 
 
 In order to support the assaulting troops of the right 
 column as much as possible, Gourko dispatched orderlies in 
 all directions with orders for every detachment to advance 
 to the attack without waiting for the signal — with the nat- 
 ural result of provoking a series of individual attacks which 
 were anything but simultaneous. Received by a murderous 
 infantry fire, none of the detachments was able to reach the 
 redoubt, and the assailants ensconced themselves at various 
 distances from the redoubt where they found shelter; the 
 Finland Regiment, finding no shelter at all, fell back to its 
 original position on the rear slope of the hill. 
 
 The attack came to a standstill about 4 o'clock. Gourko 
 decided to leave his troops in their positions for the time 
 being, and to renew the attack at dusk. 
 
 The artillery was compelled to suspend its fire every- 
 where in order not to fire on its own troops. 
 
 As darkness set in, 2 battalions of the Ismailof Regi- 
 ment advanced creeping to within about 50 paces of the re- 
 doubt and threw themselves on it simultaneously from all 
 sides. After a brief struggle, the redoubt was taken; the 
 Turkish commander, Ahmed Chifsi Pasha, surrendered with 
 his whole garrison, which still numbered 53 officers and 
 2,235 unwounded men; 4 (Krupp) guns and large quantities 
 of cartridges were also captured. 
 
 The main body of the general reserve did not become 
 engaged.
 
 Investment of Plevn a. 165 
 
 4, Events at Telis on October 2'ith. 
 
 To tlie troops detailed to operate against Telis, and 
 which crossed the Vid at Shirakova toward morning, the 
 tasks were assigned as follows: the 1st Cavalry Brigade of 
 the Guard to block the communication between Telis and 
 Gorni Dubnik ; the 2d Brigade, the Chasseur regiment of the 
 Guard, and a battery to move to the direct attack of Telis. 
 
 The latter detachment started at 0:15 a. m. from the 
 ravine near Swinar, where it had remained for some time 
 after crossing the Vid; at its head the Dragoon regiment 
 with 2 horse guns moved to the height of Rakita to cover the 
 left and rear of the troops on their march to Telis ; the Hus- 
 sar regiment with 4 horse guns moved to the left in order to 
 advance against Telis from the south, and the Chasseurs 
 with the foot battery advanced from the east. 
 
 The works of Telis consisted of a large redoubt built 
 across the highroad, a smaller redoubt more to the west, and 
 a series of rifle-trenches in front. 
 
 The detachment arrived before Telis at 9:30 a. m., and 
 the 8 foot and 4 horse guns opened fire at a range of 1,000 
 yards; the Chasseur regiment having been drawn up in two 
 lines of 2 battalions, the first line advanced across tlie i»er- 
 fectly level and open ground to attack the foremost rifie- 
 trenches. The latter were captured with the bayonet about 
 10 a. m„ but, unfortunately, they offered no shelter w hat- 
 ever from the fire from the enemy's main position in rear, so 
 that the Chasseurs sutlcM-ed great losses in tlu* captured 
 position.
 
 166 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 h\ Older uot to expose themselves idly and uselessly to 
 this miii-derous fire, the 2 battalions of the first line tried to 
 attack the main redoubt, and were followed, without or- 
 ders, by the 2 battalions of the second line not heretofore 
 engaged, but the attack did not approach the redoubt closer 
 than within 100 paces, where the assailants sought such 
 cover as they could find. 
 
 A sortie of the Turks was repulsed by a brisk fire, but as 
 the capture of the redoubt proved impracticable, and as re- 
 port was received from the Dragoons at Rakita that bodies 
 of hostile infantry and artillery were approaching Telis from 
 the south, the order to retreat was given. 
 
 During the unsuccessful attack of the Chasseurs, the 
 Hussars advanced on Telis from the south; some of their 
 detachments galloped into the foremost rifle-trenches and 
 drove out the Turks. An attack made by a strong body of 
 infantry from the Turkish main position was repulsed by the 
 fire of the horse artillery and the dismounted fire of some of 
 the Hussars. The retreat of the Chasseurs was covered by 
 1 lie Hussars. 
 
 The Dragoon regiment dispatched to Rakita was skir- 
 mishing with swarms of Tcherkesses; bodies of infantry 
 Avith artillery appeared near Radomirtza, but did uot ad- 
 vance further. 
 
 Subsequently the regiment joined the retreat of the 
 troops that had been engaged at Telis; part of the regiment, 
 in conjunction with a squadron of Hussars, assisted in the re- 
 moval of the wounded.
 
 1 urcstiiKnt of Plmia. 167 
 
 At dusk the 2d Cavalry Brigade of the (Inaid halted iu 
 touch with the enemy. 
 
 The 1st Cavalry Brigade of the Guard started from the 
 Vid about 7 o'clock and readied the highroad between Telis 
 and Gorni Dubnik at 10 o'clock; communication was estab- 
 lished with the column moving on Telis and with the Cau- 
 casian Cossack Brigade, which had arrived west of Gorni 
 Dubnik. The 2d Horse Battery of the Guard, which be- 
 hmged to the brigade, was dispatched in support of the left 
 column moving on Gorni Dubnik, and took part in the fire 
 against the Turkish position. 
 
 On learning about noon of the failure of the attack on 
 Telis, the regiment of Mounted Grenadiers was dispatched 
 to meet and sui)port the retreating troops, but no assistance 
 was required, as the enemy failed to pursue. 
 
 During the night the brigade remained in its position 
 between Telis and Gorni Dubnik. 
 
 J. E rents at Dohti Duhnik on Octohcr 2-'ith. 
 
 Leaving Trestanik early on October 24th with his de- 
 tachment, consisting of 19 squadrons, 2 battalions, and 1<» 
 horse guns. General Arnoldi arrived 8,000 yards nortli of 
 Dolni Dubnik about 7 a. m. Being greeted with artillery 
 fire from two redoubts in front of the place, Arnoldi moved 
 to the southwest, turning Dolni Dubnik, and continued the 
 march under cover of the 4th Dragoons, whom he left oppo- 
 site the town. 
 
 When the detachment liad almost reached the high-
 
 168 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 road, a third redoubt was encountered. Covered by the 4th 
 Hussars and the 2 militia regiments, tlie Roumanian and 1 
 Kussian battery came into action against this redoubt and 
 opened fire. Meanwhile the 4th Lancers with 4-horse guns 
 advanced at a trot on the highroad toward Gorni Dubuik, 
 where the rifle brigade of the right column arrived about 
 the same time. 
 
 A hill which commanded the redoubt was captured by 
 some dismounted Dragoons and occupied at once by the Rus- 
 sian artillery. A daring charge of the Russian cavalry 
 against Dolni Dubnik was repulsed by infantry fire. 
 
 The 2 Roumanian battalions arrived and threw up en- 
 trenchments on the left of the artillery position. The can- 
 iiouade was kept up by both sides until late in the evening, 
 without visible result. 
 
 The Turks in Dolni Dubnik numbered 6 battalions and 4 
 guns. 
 
 While the action of General Arnoldi's detachment 
 against Dolni Dubnik was in progress. General Loshkaref 
 ordered 6 of his squadrons and a horse battery from Medivan 
 to cross to the left bank. Dashing against Gomi Dubnik 
 without result, the action of the detachment was thereafter 
 limited to maintaining communication between the troops of 
 General Arnoldi, the general reserve, and the troops on the 
 right bank of the Vid. 
 
 6. Capture of Tells on October 28t1i. 
 
 After the capture of Gorni Dubnik, the 1st Division 
 fronted toward Dolni Dubnik, covering the 2d Division and
 
 Investment of Plevna. 169 
 
 the sapiJei- battalion wiiile tlu^y entrenched the captured 
 position of Gorni Dnbnik on the side toward Plevna. 
 
 Meanwhile Arnoldi's cavalry was watching Dolni Dub- 
 nik and the bridge-head of Plevna. The Cavalry Division of 
 the Guard was south of Gorni Dubnik toward Telis. 
 
 Dolni Dubnik and Telis were each occupied by G or 7 
 battalions of infantry', a few hundred Tcherkesses, and 4 
 guns. The guard-house on the highroad 3 miles south of 
 Telis was also entrenched, surrounded by rifle-trenches, and 
 occupied by infantry. At Radomirtza there were strong 
 bodies of infantry and cavalry, under Chefket Pasha, w'ho 
 was approaching from Orkhanie with 20 battalions, 10 guns, 
 and several thousand horsemen to succor the ''etappen" 
 posts, and who had halted and faced about on learning of the 
 capture of Gorni Dubnik. 
 
 From the 25th to the 28th of October the 2d Cavalry Bri- 
 gade of the Guard was stationed at Rakita Avith outposts 
 toward Radomirtza, the guard-house, and the south side of 
 Telis; the outpost service w'as very exacting, and skirmishes 
 with the enemy were incessant ; the horses of the 2d Brigade 
 remained saddled for almost three times twenty-four hours. 
 The 1st Cavalry Brigade of the Guard was in the ravine of 
 Swinar with outposts toward the east side of Telis, the 3d 
 Cavalry Brigade of the Guard at Gorni Dubnik with outposts 
 toward the north side of Telis; the Caucasian Cossack Bri- 
 gade was farther to the west on the Isker. and observed 
 Telis from the west. 
 
 On October 2Sth! Gourko advanced to the attack on 
 "11—
 
 17(> Tactical ^tmlies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 Telis. While the 1st aud 2d Cavalry Brigade were observing 
 toward the south, Telis was surrounded on all sides by 16 bat- 
 talions of infantry and the 3d Cavalry Brigade, and subjected 
 to a concentric fire from foot and 2 horse batteries between 
 11 a. m. and 2 p. m. Gourko then sent some Turks, captured 
 at Cxorni Dubnik, into Telis, with a demand for immediate 
 surrender and the threat that he would destroy everything 
 with his artillery if the surrender did not take place within 
 half an hour. Ismail Haki Pasha now surrendered with his 
 garrison of 7 battalions, still numbering 100 officers and 
 3,000 men. Four guns and very large quantities of cart- 
 ridges fell into the hands of the Russians, whose entire loss 
 consisted of 1 man killed and a few wounded; while, on the 
 other hand, many dead Turks lay about in the badly damaged 
 works. 
 
 We now turn to the events of the 1st and 2d Cavalry 
 Brigades of the Guard, which during this time were posted 
 at Rakita to check the approach of reinforcements from that 
 direction and to cut off the retreat of the garrison of Telis to 
 the south. 
 
 The Dragoon regiment was at Rakita, fronting south; 
 on its right the 5th Horse Battery, escorted by a squadron of 
 mounted Grenadiers, came into action against the guard- 
 house; the 2d Horse Battery, escorted by 2 squadrons of 
 Lancers, was firing against the south front of Telis. The 
 rest of the 2 brigades — i. e., 3 squadrons of Grenadiers, 2 of 
 Lancers, and 4 of Hussars — were posted in reserve in rear of 
 the Dragoons,
 
 In vest men t of Plevna . Ill 
 
 The 5th Horse Battery opened fire about 10 a. m., and 
 soon compelled the Turks to leave the rifle-trenches in front 
 of the guard-house. At the same time the Caucasian Cos- 
 sack Brigade advanced from the west against Radomirtza 
 under a brisk engagement with Turkish infantry and cavalry, 
 and was joined by 2 squadrons of Lancers sent toward them 
 from the reserve; the brigade was, however, ultimately 
 forced to fall back, followed by the Lancers, who thus be- 
 came separated from the main body of the cavalry of the 
 Guard, , 
 
 Having repulsed the attack on their left, the Turks ad- 
 vanced against the enemy opposite their right. Turkish 
 infantry began to advance from the guard-house through 
 the brush against the 5th Horse Battery, and dense swarms 
 of mounted Tcherkesses threatened the 2d Horse Battery, 
 which was firing on Telis. The 2 squadrons of Lancers 
 which formed the escort of this battery and were posted with 
 front toward Telis changed front against the Tcherkesses, 
 and the 7 squadrons posted in reserve at Rakita also ad- 
 vanced against them in the space between the batteries. 
 
 The Lancers charged before the arrival of these rein- 
 forcements. The 3d squadron followed in second line at a 
 trot; the 4th squadron charged at full speed against the 
 Tcherkesses, who received the charge with a brisk fire from 
 their magazine rifles, and, suddenly wheeling to the right 
 and left, unmasked a line of infantry which had been posted 
 under cover and now greeted the Lancers with a severe fire. 
 The Lancers galloped around the flanks of the infantry, 
 charged from the flank, and cut down the greater part.
 
 172 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 On proceeding further in the direction of the guard- 
 house, the Lancers received fire from the infantry posted in 
 the dense brush, and, turning about, regained their original 
 position at a short trot. 
 
 Meanwhile the main body of the cavalry reached the 
 highroad between Telis and the guard-house, when the news 
 of the capture of Telis arrived. Small detachments of the 
 garrison, attempting to escape to the south, were overtaken 
 and cut down by the cavalry. 
 
 The 2d Horse Batter}- now also directed its fire on the 
 guard-house, which was soon after abandoned by the Turks ; 
 all Turkish troops that had come under observation so far 
 were withdrawing southward. The 3d Cavalry Brigade of 
 the Guard, arriving from Telis, relieved the outposts toward 
 Eadomirtza and Lukowitza ; the 1st and 2d Brigades were 
 assembled at Rakita. 
 
 The Turkish brigade at Dolni Dubuik evacuated the 
 place on October 31st and withdrew without further action 
 into Plevna. Dolni Dubnik was occupied on November 1st 
 by the Russians, who advanced their lines 2,000 yards beyond 
 the village toward Plevna, and at once entrenched their 
 position. 
 
 Plevna was now completely invested on the west side, 
 and deprived of all communication with the army posted at 
 Orkhanie and Sophia.
 
 Investmcitt of Plccna. 173 
 
 7. Losses. 
 The accounts of the losses of the Guards iu the actions 
 on the left bank of the Vid toward the end of October are very 
 complete, 
 
 (a) Capture of Gorni Dubnik, October 24th: 
 Killed: 18 officers, 811 men. 
 Wounded: 3 generals, 05 officers, 2,384 men. 
 Total loss: 116 officers and 3,195 men. 
 (?>) Action of Telis on October 24th : 
 
 Chasseur Regiment of the Guard: 2() officers and 
 
 907 men killed and wounded. 
 2d Cavalry Brigade of the Guard: 1 officer, 1 man, 
 and 2 horses killed; 1 officer, 15 men. and 18 
 horses wounded. 
 (c) Action of Telis on October 28th: 
 
 Infantry: 1 man killed and 15 men wounded. 
 Lancers of the Guard: 5 men and 14 liorses killed; 
 4 officers, 11 men, and 31 horses wounded. 
 No special data are given for the losses of the 4th Cav- 
 alry Division, the Cossacks, and Roumanians, during this 
 period, particularly in the action of Dolni Dubnik on Octo- 
 ber 24th; the losses, however, were very slight. 
 
 Nothing accurate is known of the losses of the Turks in 
 killed and wounded in these actions. The garrisons of Gorni 
 Dubnik and Telis contained 13 battalions of infantry and 
 about 2 regiments of cavalry, or 8,000 men at the most. 
 Since not less than 5,500 unwounded prisoners fell into the 
 hands of the Russians and a finv hundred men seem to have
 
 174 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 escaped from Telis, the losses of the Turks in. killed and 
 wounded in the two actions of the 24th and 28th of October 
 were probably not much in excess of 2,000 men. 
 
 The losses of the Turks engaged at Kadomirtza on the 
 28tb can not have been heavy. 
 
 Comments. 
 
 The actions described above are in more than one re- 
 spect worthy of attention. 
 
 1. In the first place, they were the result of a correct 
 strategic idea after repeated previous mistakes; then, as 
 regards tactics, they were planned with great prudence and 
 skill and executed with much awkwardness; lastly, the Rus- 
 sian Guards appeared for the first time, which apparently 
 very indifferent fact is of importance for an understanding 
 of many features. 
 
 The strategic importance of the operations described we 
 will not discuss here, as considerations of this character will 
 find a place later. We turn to the conception of the opera- 
 tions directed by Gourko up to the investment of Plevna on 
 the left bank of the Vid. 
 
 The enemy's troops encountered here numbered 12,000 
 men at the most, about equally distributed among the three 
 fortified "etappen" stations, Dolni Dubnik, Gorni Dubulk, 
 and Telis. Under certain circumstances, they might liope 
 for assistance from Plevna or Orkhanie. The insuflicient 
 supply of artillery with these troops deserves special men- 
 tion; there seem to have been but 4 guns in each of the for- 
 tified places.
 
 liirr.sfiKCHt of Plevna. 175 
 
 To overcome these three points General Gonrko was 
 given considerable forces: 36 battalions of the Kussian 
 Guard, 7 battalions of Roumanian infantry, about 80 squad- 
 rons and sotnias of Russian and Roumanian cavalry, and 
 150 guns— a total of not less than 32,000 infantry and 8,000 
 cavalry. Leaving out a few small detachments, we find 
 about one-half of the cavalry, the 7 Roumanian battalions, 
 and 30 guns employed to observe Dolni Dubnik and Plevna; 
 one-quarter of the cavalry, 20 battalions, and 00 guns were 
 detailed to attack Gorni Dubnik; one-quarter of the cavalry, 
 4 battalions, and 20 guns observed Telis; lastly, 12 bat- 
 talions and 32 guns stood as general reserve between Upper 
 and Lower Dubnik. 
 
 The force detailed against Gorni Dubnik was so large in 
 comparison with the garrison of that place that the defeat 
 of the latter, as long as it had to depend on itself, could n<jt 
 be doubtful. The general reserve may therefore from the 
 beginning be considered as intended for use against Dolni 
 Dubnik and Plevna; any attack from Plevna in the direction 
 of Dolni Dubnik would therefore encounter not less than 
 4,000 cavalry, 19 battalions, and 62 guns. The enterprise 
 against Gorni Dubnik may therefore be considered as well 
 covered on the side of Plevna. 
 
 To be sure, considerably smaller forces were posted 
 toward Telis; but, in the first place, the appearance at this 
 point of superior forces of the enemy was much less proba- 
 ble; in the second place, the approach of such a force would 
 have been discovered at quite .a distance, so that the proper
 
 17G Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 counter-measiir€^s might have been taken; the enterprise 
 against Gorni Dubnik may therefore be considered as suffi- 
 ciently covered toward the south also. 
 
 When we consider that, according to the disposition, 
 Dolui Dubnik and Telis were to be merely observed, and not 
 attacked, it is safe to say that the plan was bound to suc- 
 ceed, and that there was no reason to fear a check. The 
 Large number of troops available for these operations might 
 have been a source of temptation to make a decisive attack 
 against all three points at the same time, and the relative 
 strength of the opponents would justify the Russians in ex- 
 pecting certain success in that case also. Gourko restricted 
 himself to the attack on one point in order to make it with an 
 overwhelming force, and this extreme prudence, which ap- 
 proaches timidity, may be explained in several ways; in the 
 first place, the confidence of the Russians in their own 
 strength w^as undoubtedly weakened after the many failures 
 suffered before Plevna; and, in the second place, it was his 
 intention to prevent any failure of the Russian Guards in 
 their first action, and to preserve their unshaken self- 
 confidence. 
 
 2, Gourko's plan bore within it all the conditions for 
 certain, quick, and easy success ; and it is solely due to the 
 awkward tactical execution that the success, though ulti- 
 mately attained, was gained only after a protracted, varia- 
 ble, and bloody- action. 
 
 A field entrenchment held by 4,000 men and 4 guns was 
 surrounded by 20,000 men, subjected for half a day to a con-
 
 In vesfmen t of PI em a. 177 
 
 centric fire from OU guus, and, after repeated failures, ulti 
 mately captured, with a loss to the assailant almost equal- 
 ing the total strength of the defenders. This cannot be ex- 
 plained by the single assumption of extreme bravery and skill 
 on the part of the defender, and any one is warranted in say- 
 ing that great tactical mistakes were undoubtedly made by 
 the assailant. 
 
 In turning to the details of the attack on Gorni Dubnik, 
 we miss uniformity of instructions as to the method of exe- 
 cution of the attack by three infantry columns advancing 
 separately against the Turkish position. Each of the three 
 detachments moved to the attack without regard to the 
 other two. Moreover, the attack was fairly executed only 
 on the part of the right column; the conformation of the 
 ground was here utilized and the advance made by rushes, 
 and an attempt was made — though without much success — 
 to prepare the attack by infantry fire. 
 
 The attack of the middle and left column makes the im- 
 pression of having developed itself not in accordance with 
 some well-defined plan, but under the influence of a precip- 
 itate advance from the beginning, and of an irrepressible ar- 
 dor on the part of the troops. 
 
 At any rate, all the troops were almost simultaneously 
 engaged, and there was practically no preparation of the at- 
 tack by infantry fire. The attack itself was made without a 
 formation of several lines and without utilizing the terrain; 
 the dense masses threw themselves, with a bravery which 
 despised death, from a great distance (1,000 paces), against
 
 178 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 the murderous frontal fire, and, of course, suffered terrible 
 losses. 
 
 It is surprising that the middle column failed to utilize 
 the small eastern redoubt, which was captured at the begin- 
 ning, as an intermediate position from which to prepare the 
 further attack by artillery and infantry fire;' It is stated 
 (in extenuation, as it were) that the captured position af- 
 forded no shelter from the fire from the main position in 
 rear. To be sure, this is a notable proof of the skill of the 
 Turks in planning and locating the fortifications (which also 
 becomes manifest at Telis), but would not the entire sapper 
 battalion, which accompanied this column and was un- 
 doubtedly equipped with entrenching tools, have supplied 
 the means for converting the captured position into- good 
 cover? The employment of the sajjper battalion, which 
 seems to have been held as a closed reserve to the last like 
 ordinary infantry, must certainly be set down as unusual. 
 
 In view of the noise and excitement of battle, it is not 
 surprising that Gourko's attempt to secure combination in 
 the renewed attack, by a seemingly very well devised though 
 complicated signal, failed in execution; it might have been 
 better to fix a certain hour, not too near the time of the order. 
 
 In the attack of the Chasseurs of the Guard on Telis we 
 miss plan and direction even more than in the attack on 
 Gorni Dubnik. Not only was the attack of the first line 
 made without due reflection and contrary to the general dis- 
 position, but the second line — the last available body of in- 
 fantry — ran away from the superior leader and threw it-
 
 Investment of Flemia. 179 
 
 self into the action without orders. The detachment was 
 sufficiently strong, but the attack was contrary to pro- 
 gramme and premature, and its severe loss diminished the 
 defensive strength of the detachment to such an extent that 
 a vigorous counter-attack of the Turks from Telis might have 
 exercised a bad effect on the entire enterprise against Gorni 
 Dubnik. 
 
 Nearly all the defects in the Kussian attack may be 
 somewhat extenuated by the fact that the troops were on 
 that day under fire for the first time, and that they felt that, 
 being a specially privileged corps, they were expected to do 
 something quite extraordinary. The Russian Guards may 
 certainly point with pride to the fact that they failed in no 
 enterprise, and that upon their appearance the war took a 
 brilliant turn; nevertheless a little more steadiness and 
 coolness on the day of their baptism of fire would certainly 
 not have diminished the success, while, on the other hand, it 
 would have greatly reduced the losses. 
 
 3. The behavior of the Turkish garrisons in Gorni Dub- 
 nik on the 24th, and in Telis on the 28th, shows a striking 
 contrast. On the 24th Gorni Dubnik was cannonaded for 
 half a day by (JO guns, yet the garrison repulsed several 
 furious assaults of a greatly superior enemy and did not 
 succumb until after a protracted struggle. On the 2Sth the 
 garrison of Telis surrendered, though its tactical situation 
 was exactly the same as that of their brethren at Gorni Dub- 
 nik, after being cannonaded for two hours, and without 
 waiting for an assault.
 
 180 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 On the part of the Kussians the reason is assi^^ed that 
 the garrison of Telis was so disheartened bv the fall of 
 Gorni Dubnik as to lose all heart for resistance; but that 
 fact alone is not sufficient to explain the striking contrast. 
 
 If on the 24th Gourko had demanded the surrender of 
 the garrison of Gorni Dubnik after a cannonade of five or 
 six hours, without moving his infantry to the attack, I be 
 lieve that very probably the garrison would have surren 
 dered. On the other hand, if on the 28tli Gourko had sent 
 his infantry to the attack instead of opening negotiations, J 
 believe it very probable that the gai-rison of Telis would have 
 offered an obstinate resistance.
 
 The Fall of Plevna. 181 
 
 PART XII. 
 
 THE FALL OF PLEVNA. 
 
 1. General Measures for the Investment. 
 
 It having been determined by the Russians to avoid any 
 attack entailing useless loss, and to overcome Osman Pasha's 
 army by a close investment, all requisite steps were taken 
 with great care under the direction of General Todleben. 
 
 The line of investment was strengthened by a series of 
 rifle-trenches and artillery emplacements; the most import- 
 ant points were secured by lunettes or redoubts; between 
 the positions of the investing troops commodious communi- 
 cations were constructed and their use facilitated by sign- 
 posts; lastly, the line was connected throughout by a line 
 of telegraph. 
 
 The line of investment, which measured 44 miles, was 
 divided into six separate and to a certain degree indejjend- 
 ent sectors. 
 
 The first sector extended from Bi volar on the Vid to the 
 Grivitza redoubt; commander, General Tschermat; troops, 
 the main body of the Roumanian Army, exclusive of the 4th 
 Division. 
 
 The second sector extended from the Grivitza redoubt to 
 the Galitz redoubt near Radischevo; commander, General 
 Kriidener; troops, 31st Infantry Division witli 31st Artillery
 
 182 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 Brigade and 2d Brigade of the 5tli Infantry Division with 4 
 batteries of the 5th Artillery Brigade; total, 18 battalions 
 and 10 batteries. 
 
 The third sector extended from the Galitz redoubt to the 
 ravine of Tutehenitza; commander, General ZotofE; troops, 
 2d Infantry Division, 12th Rifle Battalion, and 30th Artillery 
 Brigade; total, 13 battalions, 6 batteries. 
 
 The fourth sector extended from the ravine of Tutehen- 
 itza to that of Kartuschaven ; commander, General Skobe- 
 leff ; troops. 16th and 30th Infantry Division, 9th, 10th, and 
 11th Rifle Battalions, and 16th and 2d Artillery Brigades; 
 total, 27 battalions, 12 batteries, and a Cossack regiment. 
 
 The fifth sector extended from the Kartuschaven ravine 
 to the right bank of the Vid at Tyrnen; commander, Gen- 
 eral Kataley; troops, 3d Infantry Division of the Guard, 2 
 squadrons of Cossacks of the Guard, 3d Foot Artillery Bri- 
 gade of the Guard, and 10th Don Horse Battery; total. 16 
 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 7 batteries. 
 
 The sixth sector extended from the left bank opposite 
 Tyrnen to opposite Bivolar; commander. General Ganetzki; 
 troops, 2d and 3d Grenadier Divisions with the 2d and 3d 
 Grenadier Artillerly Brigade, 1st Brigade of the 5th In- 
 fantry Division with 2 batteries of the 5th Artillery Bri- 
 gade, Ith Roumanian Division with its artillery, 9th Dra- 
 goons, 9th Lancers, 9th Hussars, and 4th Cossacks, 7th 
 Horse Battery, 2d Don Horse Battery, and a regiment of 
 Irregulars; total, 30 battalions, 18 squadrons, 16 batteries, 
 besides the Roumanians.
 
 The Fall of Plevna. 183 
 
 The commanders of sectors had exact instriictious in the 
 various possible cases of an attempt on the part of the Turks 
 to break through; some days before the sortie of the Turks 
 took place the marches prescribed were carried out under 
 Todleben's direction in the fifth and sixth sectors, in order to 
 ascertain the amount of time requisite to carry out these 
 concentrations. 
 
 The remainder of the troops heretofore belonging to the 
 West Army — 1st and 2d Infantry Division of the Guard, the 
 Rifle Brigade of the Guard, Cavalry of the Guard, part of the 
 4th Cavalry Division, several Cossack regiments, and some 
 Eoumanian detachments — were united under Gourko's or- 
 ders, pushed to the south and west, and engaged in seizing 
 several passes over the Balkans and opening communication 
 toviard Servia. 
 
 2. Signs of the Impendkuj Attempt to Break Throu(jh : 
 Russian Dispositions for December 10th. 
 From the reports received on December 9th from all 
 parts of the line of investment, and from the statements of 
 numerous deserters, it appeared that Osman Pasha was pre- 
 paring for a decisive attempt to break through. The fire 
 from the Turkish works had been quite weak on the 8th, and 
 almost completely silent on the 9th. Deserters stated that 
 shoes and a supply of hard bread, as well as 150 rounds of 
 ammunition i)er man, had been issued, and that the rifles had 
 been inspected, ^fuch movement was discernible on and 
 along the highroad between town and livcr; large bodies 
 bivouacked there and large trains were parked.
 
 184 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 Since all these statements and signs pointed to an at- 
 tack against the sixth sector, General Todleben, in concert 
 with the Prince of Koumania, made the following disposi- 
 tions on the evening of December 9th: 
 
 1. At daybreak on the 10th of December General 
 Skobeleflf to cross the Vid with 1 brigade of the IGth Divi- 
 sion and 3 of its batteries, and 1 brigade of the 3d Division 
 of the Guard; the Brigade of the 16th Division with the ar- 
 tillery to move to Dolni Diibnik and remain in readiness to 
 support Ganetzki's troops; until the situation should be 
 cleared up, the brigade of the Guard to remain close to the 
 river on the left bank, so as to be available for reinforcing 
 either in the fifth or sixth sector. 
 
 2. The fifth sector to remain occupied by a brigade of 
 the 3d Division of the Guard, the fourth by a brigade of the 
 IGth Division and the whole of the 30th Division. General 
 Schnitnikof to assume command in Skobeleflf 's place. 
 
 3. No changes in the troops holding the third sector. 
 1. The three rifle battalions belonging to the garrison 
 
 of the fourth sector to move to the village of Grivitza to rein- 
 force the second sector. 
 
 5, The main body of the Roumanian Army to occupy 
 the first sector; early in the morning 1 battalions and 3 bat- 
 teries to cross to the left bank and move to Demirkioi to sup- 
 port the troops of the sixth sector; 1 battalions and 2 bat- 
 teries to remain in readiness to follow.
 
 The Fall of Pin- un. 185 
 
 S. The Events on the Left Bank of the \"kL 
 
 Oil the morning of December lOtli the following was the 
 situation on the left bank of the Vid: 
 
 The line of Russian entrenchments began near Tyrneu 
 and extended east of Dolni Dubnik and Gorni Netropolie to 
 the ground opposite Bivolar. In addition to a number of 
 connected rifle-trenches, it seems there were two redoubts 
 east of Dolni Dubnik, three east of Gorni Neftrojtolie, and a 
 sixth redoubt north of Gorni Netropolie. 
 
 The entrenchments of the right wing of this position, in- 
 cluding the first and second redoubts, were held on the morn- 
 ing of December 10th, bv the Grenadier Regiment Kieff and 
 theSnine-pounder batteriesof the2dGrenadier Artillery Bri- 
 gade; in their rear was the Grenadier Regiment Tauris as 
 first reserve; the second reserve posted at Dolni Dubnik 
 consisted of the 2d Brigade of the 2d Grenadier Division — 
 the Samogitia and Moscow Regiments — and the 3 four- 
 ])ounder batteries of the 2d Grenadier Artillery Brigade. 
 
 The entrenchments of the center, including the redoubts, 
 were held by the Grenadier Regiment Siberia and 3 nine- 
 pounder batteries; in reai^ stood the Russia Minor Regiment 
 as reserve. The Fanagoria and Astrachan Regiments and 
 the 3 four-pounder batteries were posted at Gorni Netroiio- 
 lie as second reserve. 
 
 The left wing of the entrenchments north of (lorni 
 Netropolie was held by the Archangel Regiment and two 
 Roumanian divisions; in their rear were the Wologda Regi- 
 ment and two Russian batteries as first reserve; farther to 
 
 -12-
 
 186 Tactical studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 the rear, near Demirkioi, the 4th Koumanian Division was 
 posted as second reserve. 
 
 One brigade of the 16th and another of the 3d Guard 
 Division were expected to arrive in rear of the right of the 
 entire position; the reserves in rear of the left were to be 
 reinforced by four Koumanian battalions from the right 
 bank. 
 
 During the night cavalry patrols reported the concen- 
 tration of Turkish forces on the banks of the Vid; under 
 cover of a dense fog the Turkish masses crossed to the left 
 bank at daybreak over the main bridge, a newly constructed 
 bridge near Opanetz, and several fords. The Turkish troops 
 deployed in a large fold of the terrain, the artillery took posi 
 tion on the high ground and opened fire, and at 7:30 a. m. the 
 attack began in the direction of Gorni Netropolie. 
 
 A dense skirmish line was closely followed by small 
 closed bodies, the main body following at a greater distance; 
 the artillery, keeping up its tire, advanced abreast of the in- 
 fantry, the guns halting to fire one round and then galloping 
 forward again. 
 
 On the part of the Russians a nine-pounder battery 
 posted in redoubt No. 3 opened fire; General Daniloff, com- 
 mander of the 3d Grenadier Division, ordered the Russia 
 Minor Regiment closer up to the line of entrenchments and 
 also directed the brigades at Gorni Xetropolie to advance. 
 
 Meanwhile the Turkish masses, projecting a terrible hail 
 of bullets to their front, reached the Russian position about 
 8:15 a. m. The losses of the 6 companies of the Siberia
 
 Thv Fall of ricnia. 187 
 
 Regiment, which held redoubt No. l\ and the litle-tienches 
 in the A'icinity, were very great; the trenches on either side 
 of the redoubt were lost first ; the battery in the redoubt had 
 lost nearly all its men and horses; and when the redoubt 
 had to be abandoned, but 2 guns could be removed, the re- 
 maining () falling into the hands of the Turks. 
 
 At this time — about 8 :3U a. m. — the Turkish attack was 
 directed against redoubt No. 4, which was held by the rest 
 of the Siberia Regiment ; the nine-pounder battery posted in 
 the redoubt continued to tire for some time; but when the 
 Turks, after the capture of redoubt N(>. :i, turned the right 
 of the position and at the same time attacked in front, the 
 remnants of the Siberia Regiment fell back, and redoubt No. 
 4 with the adjoining rifle-trenches was lost with 2 guns, 
 which could not be removed because the teams had been 
 killed. 
 
 At this hour the Russia Minor Regiment reached the 
 battle-field; formed in two lines of company columns, it ad- 
 vanced in the interval between the redoubts Xos. :> and 4 and 
 checked the attack of the Turks, but not without very great 
 losses; within a few minutes all three battalion commanders 
 and more than half of the company commandei-s were killed 
 or wounded. 
 
 The situation (►f Ihe two (Irenadier regiments, which, 
 though almost annihilated, were alone opposed to the vigor- 
 ous attack of the hostile masses, was very critical. About 
 
 10:30 a. m. the 2d Pwigade of the 3d GrenadiiM- Division ar- 
 rived from Gorni Netropolie in supi>ort of its 1st llrigade.
 
 188 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 and the 2d Brigade of the 2d Grenadier Division posted in 
 reserve at Dolni Dubnik approached the battle-lield. The 
 1st Brigade of the 2d Grenadier Division still held the en- 
 trenchments on the right, east of Dolni Duhnik. 
 
 The debris of the Siberia, and Rnssia Minor Regiments 
 joined in the advance of the Fanagoria and Astrachan Regi- 
 ments; the attack of the division was successful, and the 
 two redoubts and adjoining rifle-trenches were recaptured, 
 as well as the lost guns; the Astrachan Regiment, moreover, 
 captured 7 Turkish guns and a stand of colors. 
 
 During this successful attack 2 Wologda battalions ar- 
 rived from the left and attacked the Turkish right; at the 
 same time the Samogitia Regiment of the 2d Grenadier Di- 
 vision appeared from the right and took part in the recap- 
 ture of the lost entrenchments, taking 3 Turkish guns. 
 
 Having recovered all the lost positions, the Russian bat- 
 talions halted and re-formed. 
 
 It was about noon when the Turks finally gave up the 
 attack and fell back toward the bank of the Vid. 
 
 All the batteries of the 3d Grenadier Artillery- Brigade 
 were now placed in the front line with the infantry and cov- 
 ered the retreating Turks with a brisk fire; the lost and re- 
 captured guns were being served by men from the infantry. 
 
 General Danilolf now advanced to the attack with the 
 entire 3d Grenadier Division, followed on the left by the 1st 
 Brigade of the otli Division and on the right by the 2d Bri- 
 gade of the 2d Grenadier Division, The 1st Brigade of the 
 latter division, heretofore holding the entrenchments of the
 
 The Fall of PIev)ia. 189 
 
 right, was also brought forward and took tlie Turks iu left 
 flank; one battalion each of the Taurida and Kieff Regi- 
 ments of this brigade forded the Vid, the water reaching to 
 their waist-belts, and seized the height of Blasivatz; the 
 garrison of the Turkish redoubts at this point surrendered 
 without firing a shot. 
 
 Upon request of General Ganetzki, the 6 battalions of 
 the 3d Infantry Division of the Guard under General Kour- 
 loff, having crossed to the left bank by a pontoon bridge, 
 started at 10 a. m. for Dolni Dubnik; arriving there, the bri- 
 gade received orders to advance against the left of the 
 Turks. General Skobeleff, however, who arrived at this 
 moment, ordered the brigade to delay its advance until the 
 arrival of the brigade of the 16th Division; having given 
 the order, General Skobeleft" repaired elsewhere. Neither 
 the brigade of the 16th Division nor further orders having 
 arrived by 2 p. m., Kourloflt' on his own responsibility ad- 
 vanced along the highroad; when the brigade reached the 
 bridge over the Vid, the battle was already at an end. 
 
 '4. The Events on the Bight Bank of the \'i(I. 
 
 In the course of the night of the 9th-10th of December 
 General Skobeleff was informed by outposts that the Kris- 
 hin works had been abandoned by the Turks. A party of 
 volunteers was dispatched at once to investigate, and found 
 the redoubts and trenches in rear of Krishin empty; they 
 were at once occupied by troops of the 30th Infantry Division. 
 
 Simultaneously with the report of the occupation of the
 
 1 90 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 Krisliin works, information was received at lieadquarters at 
 9 a. m. that the so-called ''second (irivitza redoubt" had been 
 abandoned by the Turks and occupied by the Roumanians. 
 General Todleben immediately ordered all the troops on the 
 east front of Plevna to move to the attack on the Turkish 
 works; the brigade of the 16th Division, which was still on 
 the right bank in the fourth sector, as well as the 3 rifle bat- 
 talions which had been ordered to the village of Grivitza, 
 but had not yet reached their destination, were directed to 
 cross to the left bank as quickly as possible and to place 
 themselves under Skobeletf's orders, who, we know, had 
 been sent with 2 brigades to support Ganetzki. 
 
 Advancing on Plevna from all directions, the troops 
 found a large portion of the works evacuated by the Turks; 
 others were held weakly to deceive the enemy, and were 
 easily taken. 
 
 The Roumanians approaching from the north found the 
 works of Opanetz still occupied; after a brief engagement, 
 the Turkish garrison of 2.000 men surrendered; 3 guns were 
 captured in these works. 
 
 On perceiving the withdrawal of the Turks toward the 
 river, General Kataley, commander of the fifth sector, led 
 those battalions of his division of the Guard which were still 
 on the right bank against the Turkish entrenchments to the 
 west of Krisliin; by 1 p. m. all the works of the entrenched 
 camp between Plevna and the river were in his hands: 1 
 pasha, 120 officers, 3,600 men, and 1 guns were captured here 
 by the Russians, whose losses did not exceed 3 killed and 15 
 wounded.
 
 The Fall of Phvmi. 191 
 
 J. The Surrender. 
 
 Crowded together from all sides against the banks of the 
 Vid, and helplessly exposed to the tire of the Russian guns, 
 the Turks had to give up not only the idea of renewing the 
 attack, but of prolonging the resistance. Osman Pasha dis- 
 patched officers in all directions to seek the Russian com- 
 mander-in-chief and to inform him of the cessation of resist- 
 ance on the part of the Turks. 
 
 General Gaiietzki, riding toward the bridge over the 
 Vid, met Osmau's chief-of-statT and demanded the uncondi- 
 tional surrender of the whole army. Osman, who was 
 wounded, having acceded to the demand, the Turkish troops 
 everj'where laid down their arms. 
 
 Exclusive of 20,000 sick and wounded, the army surren- 
 dering here to Russian captivity still numbered 40,000 etfect- 
 ives, among them 10 pashas, 12S lield officers, and 2,000 of- 
 ficers of lower grade; 77 gnus, 70,000 rifles, and a great 
 quantity of cartridges fell into the hands of the Russians. 
 A number (about 30) of heavy guns, which were buried by 
 the Turks before the beginning of their attempt to break 
 through, were not discovered until later. 
 
 6. Losses. 
 The losses of the two Russian Gi-enadier Divisions were 
 as follows: killed 2 field officers, 7 compjiny officers, 409 
 men; wounded, 1 general, 3 field officers, 47 company officers, 
 and 1,2G3 men. By far the greater part of thes(^ losses fell 
 on the Siberia and Russia ]Minor Regiments. The next
 
 192 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 greater loss was suffered by the Astraclian Regiment: 1 of- 
 ficer and 72 men killed, 12 oflficers and 346 men wounded. 
 
 The 1st Brigade of the 5th Division last 1 officer and 47 
 men wounded; the 3d Division of the Guard lost 3 men killed 
 and 15 wounded. 
 
 The losses of the two batteries posted in the redoubts 
 which were for some time in the hands of the Turks must 
 have been heavy, but can not be ascertained. 
 
 The loss of the Roumanians was trifling. The Turks 
 lost about 6,000 men, killed and wounded. 
 
 Comments. 
 
 1, The troops available for the investment of Plevna 
 during the last six weeks numbered 8 Russian Infantry Di- 
 visions (3d Division of the Guard, 2d and 3d of the Grena- 
 dier Corps, 2d, 5th, 16th, 30th, and 31st Infantry Divisions) 
 and 1st rifle brigade, some cavalry and Cossack regiments, 
 and 48 foot and 3 horse batteries; total, about 75,000 men 
 with 400 field guns, to which should be added 25,000 Rouma- 
 nians, The total strength of the investing army was there- 
 fore 100,000 men with about 500 guns, while the effectives of 
 the Turkish Army during the last few weeks may be put 
 down at 50,000 men with a little more than 100 field and 
 position guns. The Russian line of investment measured 
 45 miles, the Turkish line of defense about 25 miles. 
 
 A brief comparison of the investment of Plevna with 
 the successful investment of Kars by the Russians under 
 Muravieff in 1855 is not without interest. The Russian
 
 The Fall of Plevna. 193 
 
 Army of investment numbered 30,000 men, the invested 
 Turkish Army 20,000 to 25,000 men; the length of the Turk- 
 ish line of defense was about 13 miles, that of the Russian 
 line of investment 50 miles. 
 
 The methods of investment pursued in these two sieges 
 differ materially. General Muravieff posted his entire in- 
 fantry with some cavalry south of Kars on the line of com- 
 munication with Erzeroum, and the investment proper was 
 maintained by five strong detachments of cavalry (consist- 
 ing each, of one or two cavalry regiments with some artil- 
 lery), W'hich were posted in a circle around Kars and kept 
 up communication with each other. After an investment of 
 several weeks, the Turkish Army surrendered on account of 
 lack of provisions, without making an attempt to cut its way 
 out. 
 
 The investment of Plevna wa.s of nearly equal strength 
 at all points; the greatest importance attaches to the fourth 
 and sixth sectors, which were traversed by the great roads 
 which might be used by Osman on his retreat. 
 
 In comparing the extent of the line of investment of 
 Plevna with the two great investments of the Franco-Prus- 
 sian War, we find that the German line of investment of 
 Metz had an extent of 25 miles, that of Paris of 53 miles. 
 The circumference of the enceinte of Paris measured 10 miles, 
 the line connecting the forts about 35 miles. 
 
 2. The sixth sector of the line of investment of Plevna, 
 embracing the left bank of the Vid. was geographically the 
 most important portion of the line, and had. from Tyrnen to
 
 194 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 Dolni Dubuik and fiom (iorui Netropolie to opposite Bivolar, 
 a length of 12 miles. This portion of the line was held by 2 
 Grenadier Divisions which had not yet been engaged, 1 bri- 
 gade of the 5th Division which had suffered considerably, 
 and several thousand Roumanians; total, 25,000 to 30,000 
 infantry, giving about 5 men for every 3 yards of front. 
 
 As a matter of comparison, we state here the following: 
 
 About the middle of November, 1870, when the great 
 sortie from I'aris was expected, the investment was so ar- 
 ranged that the III. Army guarded the left bank of the Seine, 
 extending 15 miles, with 100,000 infantry, and the Meuse 
 Army guarded the right bank, which measured 37 miles, 
 with 80,000 infantry, giving to the III. Army about 13 men 
 for 3 yards of front, to the Meuse Army about 4 men for the 
 same front. 
 
 3. The two points of Dolni Dubnik and Gorni Netropo- 
 lie, where the main reserves of the sector were posted, were 
 distant 6 and 4 miles respectively from the bridge over the 
 Vid; the line of investment consisting of redoubts and rifle- 
 trenches seems to have been 2,000 or 3,000 yards farther to 
 the front. 
 
 The beginning of the Turkish attack was discovered by 
 the Russians about 7:30 a. m., whereupon, it seems. General 
 Daniloff at once issued orders for the two rear echelons of 
 his division to move up to the line of defense held by the 
 Siberia Regiment. As the Russia Minor Regiment did not 
 reach the fighting line before 9 a. m., and the 2d Brigade 
 coming from Gorni Netropolie not before 10:30 a. m., there
 
 TheFiiU of Plrnia. 195 
 
 must have beeu delays whose nature eanuot be aseei'tained 
 with the lights before us; the distance was not such as to 
 prevent these troops from arriving much earlier. 
 
 Peculiar ill luck also seems to have attached to the 
 movements of the troops dispatched under Skobeleff to the 
 left bank in support of Ganetzki. Since both brigades were 
 on the fui-ther bank of the Vid by 7 a. m., there is no reason 
 why they should not have arrived in good time at the assailed 
 front either in direct supjjort or, still better, have advanced 
 against the left Hank of the Turkish attack; but it seems 
 that, owing to some misunderstanding, the brigade of the 
 Kith Division never reached Dolni Dubnik, and that Kour- 
 loflf's brigade of the Guard was held at Dolni Dubnik by con- 
 tradictory orders during the decisive hours, 
 
 Skobeleff's order to Kourlotf to wait for the arrival of the 
 16th Division is due to a justifiable desire to undertake the 
 decisive attack of the day, not with an isolated brigade, but 
 with all his available troops. On the other hand, Ganetzki's 
 order to that brigade to advance along the highroad was 
 perfectly proper, for he was in position to know that the at- 
 tack of even a comparatively small detachment in the direc- 
 tion indicated would no longer encounter serious resistance. 
 
 4. The number of effectives of the Turkish Army on 
 the morning of December 10th must be set down at 45,000 
 men, and the strength of the corps led to the attack on the 
 left bank of the Vid at 80,000 to 85,000 men with GO guns. 
 
 The passage of the Vid was effected before dawn with 
 surprising rapidity, by means of two biidges and a few
 
 11^ (J TacHcal Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 fords; the deployment oa the further bank was also effected 
 with great rapiditj-, so that the attack, made in dense, 
 closed formation, oould be begun at 7:30 a. m. 
 
 The passage as well as the deployment for the attack 
 challenge an interesting comparison with similar events dur- 
 ing the investment of Metz. 
 
 During the night of the 25th-26th of August Marshal 
 Bazaine issued the necessary orders for a sortie to be under- 
 taken next day on the right bank of the Moselle against St. 
 Barbe, with a view of marching thence along the river to 
 Thionville. The troops encamped on the left bank of the 
 Moselle were put in motion at 5 a. m., in broad daylight. 
 Although four bridges were available for the passage of 
 the INloselle, the crossing was not completed until 3 p. m. 
 At that hour, when everybody was waiting for the begin- 
 ning of the attack, Marshal Bazaine assembled his gener- 
 als in council, and it was decided, after protracted consul- 
 tation, to defer the attack, whereupon the troops returned to 
 their camping-grounds. 
 
 The events of the 31st of August preceding the battle 
 of Noisseville were of similar nature. Early on the morn- 
 ing of the 31st Bazaine ordered the army to deploy in front 
 of the Forts Queuleu and St. Julien, the arrangements dif- 
 fering but little from those of the 26th; but although an ad- 
 ditional bridge was thrown on that day near Fort Queuleu, 
 it was 2 p. m. before the deployment on the left bank was 
 completed. Again Bazaine assembled his lieutenants, this
 
 The Fall of Plevna. 197 
 
 time to communicate to them his orders for the attack; 
 and it was 4 p. m. when the attack began. 
 
 Even making allowance for the fact that the number of 
 French troops crossing the Moselle was three times that of 
 the Turks crossing the Vid, still a comparison between 
 the two leaders and the two armies, with reference to the 
 point under discussion, is decidedly in favor of the Turks. 
 
 5. The Turks attacked the Kussian i)osition with a 
 bravery that despised death, and at first with surprising 
 success, considering that the Russians must have been more 
 or less prepared for the attack; as soon, however, as the first 
 check was suflered and the attack brought to a halt, the 
 heretofore convulsive tension gave way to a total relaxation. 
 The Turks ceased all resistance before the ea])itnla1i()n was 
 officially concluded. 
 
 The feeble action of the garrisons on the right bank of 
 the Vid is hard to understand, and must in part be called 
 shameful. Though not strong enough to permanently hold 
 their works, they might undoubtedly have checl^tMl The Rus- 
 sians for hours and inflicted on them very sensible losses. 
 If those 30 guns, instead of being buried, had remained in 
 1he works on the right bank, they would certaiuly have paid 
 for their ultimate loss many times over. 
 
 (). Lastly, a negative answer must be giveu to the (|ue;s- 
 lion. Did the Tui'kish sortie have any jtrosjiect of success? 
 
 The garrison of a suiall place of a few thousiiud uieu, 
 if led with determination and ])rudence. may cut its way 
 through an investing enemy by ]>iercing" the line of invest-
 
 198 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 ment by sudden attack and escaping through the gap (Me- 
 nin, 1795; Almedia, 1811). This method of escape, however, 
 without assistance from without, is out of the question for 
 an invested army, A merely temporary piercing of the line 
 of investment will jnobably in most cases be followed by a 
 defeat in the open field; escape is possible only if the invest- 
 ing army is beaten. On that eventuality the Turks could 
 under no circumstances count; for, even if it had been pos- 
 sible to overthrow the Kussian troops on the left bank, the 
 Turks would beyond a doubt have been surrounded and 
 crushed within twenty-four or, at the most, forty-eight 
 hours. In this particular there is considerable similarity 
 between the conditions at Metz and Plevna. 
 
 As long as a so-called relief army stood at Orkhanie, Os- 
 man's retreat, if difficult, was possible; but the fate of the 
 army of Plevna was sealed as soon as Gourko's bold ojjera- 
 tions in the passes of the Balkans compelled the Turkish 
 Army at Orkhanie to fall back to Sophia.
 
 Comments. 919 
 
 PART XIII. 
 COMMENTt^. 
 
 1. The Operations. 
 
 By what plan of operations the Russian commander- 
 in-chief was originall}' guided will probably never be known 
 with exactness — at any rate, not until after a long time. 
 It may be assumed that the programme of the campaign 
 was carried out up to the passage of the Danube. 
 
 The forcing of the passage of the Danube with compara- 
 tively small difficulty, and still more, Gourko's unexpected 
 passage of the Balkans undertaken with a bold appreciation 
 of the situation, impressed upon the heretofore prudent and 
 methodical leadership a new and somewhat liazardous char- 
 acter. It appears as if political considerations liad previ- 
 ously exercised a greater influence upon the conduct of the 
 war than purely military considerations. 
 
 The low estimation placed upon the opponent led to a 
 precipitate advance and exacted a severe penalty. Suc- 
 cesses easily gained, and existing more in appearance than 
 in reality, produced a complete intoxication which made the 
 most difficult objectives seem t<> be within easy reach. 
 
 It is interesting to draw a. rough outline of llic develop- 
 ment things might have taken, with a high degree of proba- 
 bility, if the incident of Plevna had not ]iai)pened.
 
 200 Tactical Sttidies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 Tlie first possibility was that the sudden appearance 
 of the Russians south of the Balkans would have created 
 such consternation in Constantinople as to cause further 
 resistance to be abandoned and the road of negotiations, 
 attended by inevitable sacrifices on the part of the Turks, 
 to be entered upon. 
 
 Should Turkey have made far-reaching concessions and 
 placed the execution of the promised reforms in the hands 
 of a European commission, Russia would tol a certain de- 
 gree have been disarmed. The object for which Russia had 
 drawn the sword would, in appearance at least, have been 
 accomplished, and rivers of Russian blood would not have 
 washed out the peaceful protestations of unselfish and hu- 
 mane sentiments. Perhaps it might still have been possi- 
 ble to allay the justifiable impulsesi of Russian self-confi- 
 dence with formal concessions. In one word, the solution 
 of the Oriental question, that bugbear of the peace of Eu- 
 rope, might again have been postponed for a shorter or a 
 longer period. But the events connected with the name of 
 Plevna removed that possibility and rendered the long- 
 impending Oriental catastrophe unavoidable. Therein lies 
 the great political importance of the conflict which for five 
 months raged around Plevna, 
 
 A second possibility is that of the war continuing after 
 the Russians had passed the Balkans, when they might have 
 been so carried away by the intoxication of easily gained 
 successes at Ihe beginning as to transfer the center of their
 
 Comments. 201 
 
 operations beyond tJie Balkans with their totally inadequate 
 forces. 
 
 In that case the reverse might have come at Sophia or 
 Adrianople, instead of Plevna, and would have been quite 
 unavoidable. in view of the wholly inadequate Russian forces 
 and the Turkish power of resistance, which surpassed all 
 expectations. This result would have come independently 
 of the numerous mistakes in the conduct of the war on tke 
 part of the Russians, which were counterbalanced by equal- 
 ly heavy errors on the part of the Turks. The new prepara- 
 tions to surmount this crisis, which entailed on the Rus- 
 sians such unusual difficulties and enormous sacrifices of 
 treasure and blood before Plevna, would of course have been 
 more difficult on account of the greater length of the com- 
 munications and the obstacle presented b}' the Balkans, and 
 it seems quite possible that the campaign of 1877 might have 
 ended with a failure for the Russian arms. 
 
 The great strategic importance of the conflicts around 
 Plevna lies in the fact that they opened the eyes of the 
 Russians to the impending danger, caused them in good time 
 to make a suitable change in their entire plan, and forced 
 them, against their will, to employ the amount of force indis- 
 pensable for decisive success. 
 
 The question then would be. Whether the Turks made a 
 mistake in fighting at Plevna? since tliat campaign, not- 
 withstanding its primary disadvantages, did certainly con- 
 fer very considerable advantages u]m)ii I he Russian cause. 
 This point is worthy of reflection. 
 
 -13-
 
 202 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 Upon the appearance of Osman Pasha on the right flank 
 of the Russians the strategic situation of the latter was de- 
 cidedly unfavorable, and it became highly dangerous by 
 Kriidener's defeat at Plevna on July 30th, 
 
 Had Osman Pasha been able to follow up his victory 
 with an immediate and vigorous pursuit, and to drive Kriid- 
 ener's morally and materially weakened troops across the 
 Osma, all conditions would have been favorable, in case of 
 fairly proper and combined action on the part of the East 
 and West Armies, to involve the Russian Army in a defeat 
 which was bound to be decisive for the campaign of that 
 year. 
 
 In that case the detention of the West Army at Wid- 
 din and its subsequent skillful advance on the decisive point 
 at the right moment would justly stand as a brilliant and 
 successful example of strategic calculation, and old Abdul 
 Kerim Pasha's "secret plan," often derided and maligned 
 to the extent of having its existence denied, would have 
 been vindicated. 
 
 Yet these claims to consider the advance of the West 
 Bulgarian Army from Widdin on Plevna as the efflux of a 
 brilliant strategic reflection are seriously weakened, not by 
 the ultimate failure, but by another factor. 
 
 The above described decisive role could not be played 
 by Osman's army except by way of the most vigorous offens- 
 ive. Osman's inactivity after his second victory at Plevna 
 on July 30th proves that his army, however stout on the de- 
 fensive, must have lacked every trace of offensive force. A
 
 Comments. 203 
 
 general as able as Osman Pasha would not have allowed the 
 favorable situation, as it existed at the beginning of August, 
 to slip by without turning it to account. 
 
 If Osman Pasha considered his army capable of carry- 
 ing the offensive to the point of seeking a decisive battle, 
 his advance from Widdin to Plevna was a well-planned op- 
 eration. If he did not credit his army with this offensive ca- 
 pacity, his advance must be accounted an error. In spite of 
 all defensive successes attributable in part to the lack of 
 skill of the Kussian leading, the mere stay of his army at 
 Plevna was not only useless, but an advantage voluntarily 
 conceded to the Russians; that they failed to turn the ad- 
 vantage to account until very late and after many mistakes 
 and sacrifices, and that the tenacity with which the Turks 
 held out at Plevna came near giving the whole campaign a 
 turn unfavorable to the Russians, was due to circumstances 
 which were beyond Osman Pasha's control. 
 
 2. Combat; Fire of Masses and Rifle-Trenches. 
 The great wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centu- 
 ries bear to a certain degree a peculiai' character in which the 
 personality of one or several leaders is strongly impressed. 
 To be sure, a long series of improvements has been made 
 in the course of time, pai-tly in armament and equipment, 
 partly in tactical arrangement and employment of troops; 
 still, grand innovations which influence the character of the 
 whole method of fighting do not appear, and the technique
 
 204 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 of fighting has remained essentially unchanged for a long 
 time. 
 
 The period of the Napoleonic wars forms the tramsition 
 from the period just mentioned to that of modem wars. It 
 is true the introduction of the dispersed order of battle 
 brought about a complete modification of the entire fighting 
 technique, but the armament and equipment of Napoleon's 
 infantry, cavalry, and artillery differed in nothing from the 
 armament and equipment of his opponents; and, leaving out 
 some trifling matters, it was not different from the armament 
 of the times of Frederick, Eugene, and Turenne. 
 
 An entirely different picture is presented by the great 
 wars of the quarter of a centur}' just passed. Compared with 
 former times, the individuality of the leaders, though still de- 
 cisive of the final result of the war, is placed in the back- 
 ground. On the other hand, each of the great wars of recent 
 times is characterized by improvements which mark an epoch 
 in the character of weapons, and a resulting transfonnation 
 of the methods of fighting. 
 
 The Oriental War i)roduced the rifled musket, the Ital- 
 ian War the rifled gun, the American War the armored ship 
 and monitor, the Austro-Prussian War the breechloader 
 with moderate rapidity and range, the Franco-Prussian War 
 the chassepot, a far superior rival of the old breechloader; 
 lastly, the Turko-Kussian War produced the new systems of 
 rifles of surpassing rapidity of fire and range, up to the re-
 
 Conuncnts. 205 
 
 peater, and, as a result, field entrencliments on a ^rand 
 scale,* which are now not the exception, but the lule. 
 
 The waste of ammunition predicted by the oi)ponents of 
 the breechloader on its first introduction was happily pre- 
 vented by the firo discipline of the Prussian troops. The 
 surprisingly small consumption of ammunition - millions) 
 in the campaign of 1866 proved conclusively that the capac- 
 ity of the new arm as regards rapidity of fire needed to be 
 fully utilized only in exceptional cases, and then for very 
 brief periods; as a rule, the fire delivered was aimed tire at 
 short range and of moderate rapidity. 
 
 Quite ditferent was the use made in 1870 by the French 
 Army, after a brief |)ea.ce training, of the rapid-firing, long- 
 range arm. Fire was opened at enormous ranges, in part be- 
 fore the opponent came in full view; the latter sometimes 
 suffered considerable losses at very long ranges, but a real 
 success was never gained by this kind of fire. It is not our 
 intention to discuss here the much-mooted question of the 
 l:)ng-range fire of masses, but we feel safe in stating that 
 theprocedure of the French in this particiihir was ill-adapted, 
 and not based on clear refiection and calculaiioii. but chief- 
 
 *It is surprising that a military writer ot Von Trotha's attainments should 
 speak of "field entrenchments on a grand scale" as an outgrowth of the Turko- 
 Russian War. Had he given even the most superficial study to the War of Seces- 
 sion, he would have known that the great armies engaged in that contest made a 
 more extended use of field entrenchments than was made by the Turks more than 
 twelve years later. The battles at Kenesaw Mountain, and. indted, the entire cam- 
 paign from Chattanooga to Atlanta: the battles of The Wilderness and Spoltsyl- 
 vania, and the long struggle at Petersburg, might be studied with profit by Von 
 Trotha, Clery. and other European critics who labor under the delusion that 
 "field entrenchments on a grand scale" were practically unknown until the Turks 
 brought them to the attention of the military world. Moreover, the American War 
 produced a breechloader which was superior in range, accuracy, and rapidity of 
 fire to the Prussian "needle-gun" of 18(>ti, and whi^h was largely used by the Union 
 troops, especially the cavalrj-, in the last year of the war. — A. L. W.
 
 206 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 ly on lack of fire discipline and obscure conceptions of the 
 real value of the new arm. 
 
 After the Franco-Prussian War, the long-range fire of 
 masses became the frequent topic of theoretical disquisitions 
 and ipractical experiments in the gireat armies of Europe; 
 but while the contending parties were still deeply engaged in 
 their controversies and no final settlement of the necessary 
 transformation of fire tactics had been reached, the question 
 had been very simply settled in Turkey, without much previ- 
 ous inquiry, and the most extreme conclusions had been 
 drawn from the armament with long-range, rapid-firing 
 arms. 
 
 At the beginning of the war the Turkish Army developed 
 a sj'stem of fire tactics complete in its simplicity: as soon 
 as the enemy was known to be within reach of the rifle, the 
 space supposed to be occupied or about to be traversed by 
 him was covered, without regard to distance and probability 
 of hitting or consumption of ammunition, with a fire whose 
 severity and duration were without example. 
 
 Intimately connected with this system of fire tactics is 
 the use of field entrenchments, which were probably never 
 heretofore employed to this extent or in this manner. 
 
 The Turkish method of fighting in this war rests, there- 
 fore, on two, to a certain extent new, factors, and although 
 many objections may be raised or improvements suggested 
 as to the application of the system in detail, still the sound- 
 ness of these new factors and their influence on any change 
 of fighting tactics cannot be denied.
 
 Comments. 207 
 
 In tuming now to the active factor of the Turkish tac- 
 tics we find that experience has silenced those objections 
 which were formerly frequently raised against the prac- 
 ticability of such rapid fire. 
 
 The new and complicated systems of small-arms have 
 l»roven efficient in the hands of untrained men, nor was there 
 any difficulty encountered in the handling of the magazine 
 rifles formerly condemned as a weapon in wai". The supply 
 of ammunition, which was consumed in incredible quanti- 
 ties, was effected on the part of the Turks without difficulty^ 
 To be sure, as regards the latter point, the Turks were 
 greatly favored by the fact of being almost everywhere on 
 the tactical defensive, but even in the rare cases where the 
 Turkish infantry made great attacks, the thorough organiza- 
 tion of the ammunition supply can be traced up to the very 
 firing line. 
 
 In nearh- all the Turkish positions which the Russians 
 captured enormous supplies of cartridges were found, fre- 
 quentl}^ spread out in shallow boxes for convenient use be- 
 tween the prostrate skirmishers. It was not at all rare to 
 find 200 to 300 empty cartridge shells by the side of a dead 
 Turk. Instances occurred when individual Turks ex- 
 pended as many as 500 rounds in a single action. P'vcn in 
 tiiose cases where the Turks moved to the attack (ui ilio 
 Russian positions, it has been proved that some Turkish 
 skiruiisliers. covering llieniselves in front of llic Russian 
 line, fired nway 120 to 150 rounds in a comparatively short 
 time. \\e may supplement this by the assertion of the
 
 208 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 Russians that in the course of the war they toolv altogether 
 in the captured positions and in the several surrenders 500 
 millions of cartridges. It may be interesting to state here 
 that the total supply of a German army corps, inclusive of 
 the aiinniiMition columns, amounts in round figures to 4^ 
 millions of cartridges. 
 
 Nor should the fact be overlooked that the distances in 
 I'lont of the Turkish positions were frequently measured by 
 pacing, and marked. 
 
 We now turn to the passive factor of the Turkish tac- 
 tics: the employment of field entrenchments. 
 
 Here we have to do with two things, which, though inti- 
 mately connected, must be separately considered: the con- 
 struction of entrenchments proper and the shelter afforded 
 by rapidly constructed rifle-trenches. 
 
 Wherever the Turkish infantry took up a tactical posi- 
 tion, it sought cover for deployed lines, utilizing to the full- 
 est extent any advantages offered by the ground. Where it 
 became necessary, a shallow rifle-trench was constructed. 
 Wherever tlie ground permitted, tiers of fire were arranged 
 for several lines of infantry covering themselves at short 
 distances, one above the other, on more or less steep slopes. 
 
 A 
 
 The Turkish infantry seems to have possessed great skill in 
 the construction of these trenches ; the first hasty construc- 
 tion was accomplished with great rapidity, and technical 
 troops were not employed in this work. Where there was 
 ample time, the shallow trench was deepened and the breast- 
 work strengthened. If the position was to be occupied for
 
 Comments. 209 
 
 several days, traverses against enfilading fire were added 
 and shelter for part of the men constructed by digging ob- 
 liquely down under the counterscarp, thus obtaining better 
 shelter, whenever the garrison of the trench was not en- 
 gaged. As a very good arrangement we commend the plac- 
 ing of numerous vessels filled with water in the trenches, 
 the latter in some cases being also fully supplied with pro- 
 visions, so that neither hunger nor thirst would compel the 
 men to leave the trenches even temporarily. The latter 
 case happened several times on the Russian side, causing in 
 some instances tactical disadvantages, and in every case use- 
 less losses. 
 
 When preparing to hold a position, for some time, the 
 lines just described were strengthened by redoubts con- 
 structed at the highest points of the position and armed 
 with guns; they served particularly to sweep the front of the 
 trenches. 
 
 In preparing the line of entrenchments great care was 
 taken that the advanced line, when earned by the enemy, 
 gave him no protection from the lines still held in rear. 
 
 Having endeavored to give a brief outline of the two new 
 factors of modern fighting — fire of masses and field en- 
 trenchments — We will snl)j(M-t the tactical (Miiployiiicnt of 
 the several ai-ms to a brief consideration. 
 
 3. The I II I'd lit 11/. 
 The Russian infantry on the Einoi)ean theater of war 
 is organized into regiments of ;{ battalions of 5 companies
 
 2 1 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 each; the fifth company of eacli battalion is styled "rifle 
 company" and intended for skirmishing, although differing 
 neither in armament nor equipment from the remaining 
 companies. The regiments of the Guard liave 4 battalions 
 of 4 companies each; the rifle battalion has 4 companies. 
 When preparing for battle, the battalion usually forms 4 com- 
 pany columns in two lines with short distances, the fifth 
 ("rifle") company being deployed in front. A regiment 
 formed for battle usually has two battalions abreast in the 
 formation just described, and the third battalion is held 
 closed in mass as reserve in rear. 
 
 From the description of the several actions it is plain 
 that there was no preparation of the attack by the fire of skir- 
 mishers, and that all preparation w^as left to the a.rtiller3\ 
 
 The attack was mostly undertaken from a great dis- 
 tance — 1,000 paces and over — and carried out in such a man- 
 ner that the skirmish line, the two lines of company columns,, 
 and frequently the reserve started almost at the same time 
 and with very small distances, and became intermixed in the 
 advance, so that the attack, in a favorable case, approached 
 the eneni,y in the shape of a more or less disordered swarm. 
 
 If the first advance failed to bring the troops to the ene- 
 my's position, they found shelter on the ground and opened 
 a lively, but for the most part ineffective, fire; the tactical 
 arrangement was greatly loosened, and the tactical leading 
 rendered difficult, frequently impossible; fresh reserves 
 were required to get the halted lines again in motion. 
 
 The attacks on the enemy's positions were almost invari-
 
 Comments. 211 
 
 ably frontal and attempts to turn one or both of the enemy's 
 Hanks rare. 
 
 When on the defensive, the Russian infantry frequently 
 advanced to the counter-attack too soon, without having 
 fully utilized the destructive effect of rapid fire at short 
 range. The pursuit of the defeated enemy also was some- 
 times made with the bayonet, though pursuit by fire would 
 have been far more effective. 
 
 The tactics of the Turkish infantry on the defensive has 
 been noticed in connection with the discussion of the Turkish 
 fire tactics. In addition we note on the defensive a persist- 
 ent holding back and usually a skillful employment of the 
 reserves. On the offensive a dense skirmish line was fol- 
 lowed by small closed detachments, which in turn were fol- 
 lowed by larger bodies at greater distances. They opened 
 a terrible fire and endeavored to utilize the terrain in deliver- 
 ing the decisive blow against the enemy. In most cases the 
 flanks of the advancing infantry were (overed by more or 
 less cavalry. 
 
 A few words more on the armament of the opi»()siii!4 
 infantry. 
 
 The Russian Guards and Rifles were armed with the 
 Berdan rifle, the remaining infantry on the European theater 
 with the Krenk rifle; and the Turks with the Teabody- 
 Martini and partly with the Snider, 
 
 The following table gives a comparison of the diflerent 
 arms: .
 
 212 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Flecna. 
 
 
 Berdan. 
 
 Krenk. 
 
 Peabo dy- 
 Ma rtini. 
 
 Snider. 
 
 Weight of rifle and 
 
 10.27 pounds. 
 
 10.84 pounds. 
 
 14.30 pounds. 
 
 11 pounds. 
 
 
 
 Weight of rifle with- 
 out bayonet 
 
 9.37 pounds. 
 
 9.9; pounds. 
 
 9.5 pounds. 
 
 9.9 pounds. 
 
 Caliber 
 
 .42 inch. 
 
 .60 inch. 
 
 ■ .44 inch. 
 
 
 
 
 Weight of cartridge. . 
 
 6C8 grains. 
 
 841 grains. 
 
 636 grains. 
 
 70S grains. 
 
 Initial velocitj- 
 
 1450 feet per 
 second 
 
 1082 feet per 
 second. 
 
 l.'?49 feet per 
 second. 
 
 1163 feet per 
 second. 
 
 Dangerous spaces for 
 
 infantry. 
 At WlO paces 
 
 170 paces. 
 46 paces. 
 25 paces. 
 
 75 paces. 
 
 28 paces. 
 
 Disappears. 
 
 135 paces. 
 45 paces. 
 20 paces. 
 
 100 paces. 
 
 36 paces. 
 
 Disappears. 
 
 At 1200 paces 
 
 At 1600 pacts 
 
 In coiiiiection with fit-Id entrenchriients which wo have 
 discussed above and which' have gained greatly in import- 
 ajice, and more particularly in connection with entrench- 
 ments thrown up in the course of the action, the entrenching 
 tool comes to the fore as a point in the infantry equipment. 
 
 In the actions here described one becomes painfully 
 aware of the frequent lack of entrenching tools on the part 
 of the Russians; it is partially explained by the fact that in 
 many cases the Russian foot soldier threw away his entrench- 
 ing tool as a troublesome burden,* — ^but, leaving this out of 
 consideration, the equipment of the Russian Army with en- 
 trenching tools seems to have been too small to satisfy the 
 requirements of modern combat. 
 
 -'After the bitter lessons of Plevna, the throwing away of entrenching tools 
 by the Russian soldiers seems to have ceased. Referring to the march of Skobe- 
 leff's division from Plevna to Constantinople, Greene says: "Every man carried 
 an implement of some kind, about 85 per cent being spades or shovels, 10 per cent 
 picks, and the rest axes, etc. His division marched with these on their backs from 
 Plevna to Constantinople: they were slung over the back, the handle projecting 
 above the left shoulder and the spade below the right hip, and were attached to the 
 shoulder with a piece of string, a strap, a piece of old tent, or anything else that 
 was available; they were heavy (weigiiing over 5 pounds), they were uncomforta- 
 ble, they were in every way inconvenient, l)ut each man had learned by hard expe- 
 rience to feel that his individual life depended upon his musket and'his spade — 
 and he took good care to lose neither the one nor the other." — A. L. W.
 
 Comments. 213 
 
 Several means are available fur baviiij; the requisite 
 entrenebing tools on hand at the decisive moment: by an 
 addition of special troops; by atrrying the tools on wagons 
 and issuing them to the troops as required; and lastly, by 
 maldng the entrenching tool a permanent part of the in- 
 fantry equipment. 
 
 The detail of special troops for thi' const ruelion of sueh 
 works would seem to be inadequate on account of the great 
 extent to which hasty entrenchments have been and will be 
 employed in modern war, and on account of the intimate 
 connection of tliese works with the tactical action of in- 
 fantry, ir^ome one in the Russian Army has proposed to 
 equip a company of each regiment with entrenching tools 
 and to compensate the company for the extra weight by re- 
 duction in another direction — in other words, to give each 
 regiment a. pioneer company and to enornionsly increase the 
 special troops. Aside from many disadvantages entailed, 
 this plan would still fall short of its aim. 
 
 It is wholly impracticable to carry the tools on wagons, 
 issue them to the infantry before the action, and to have 
 them turned in afterwtyd — so that nothing remains but 1o 
 permanent!}' equip the infantry with such a supply of en- 
 trenching tools as to enable it to meet any demands of bat- 
 tle; a supply of entrenching tools would of course have to 
 be carried on wagons as a reserve and for the construction of 
 extensive works. The infantry should be wholly independ- 
 ent of the assistance of special troo]»s in the execution of all 
 purely tactical trench work; and the Tmkisli infantry, in
 
 2 1 4 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 spite of its defective training, has shown that this is 
 feasible. 
 
 Some voices in the Kussian Army oppose the permanent 
 equipment of infantry with entrenching tools, on the ground 
 that they are too heavy and are sure to be thrown away. 
 Yet, a tool, suitably contrived and carried, aided by proper 
 instruction of the men in the great value of the tool, supple- 
 mented by historical examples, would for the most part de- 
 prive these objections of their force. 
 
 It is a fact that the Russians were deficient in entrench- 
 ing tools before Plevna. 
 
 Unfortunately, the author has no means for ascertain- 
 ing what the supply of entrenching tools in the hands of the 
 troops was, but the number must have been very small. 
 
 At the beginning of the great artillery attack in the early 
 days of September, when emplacements for more than 100 
 guns had to be constructed, as well as advanced rifle-trenches 
 and other trenches in rear as cover for 6 divisions, there 
 were issued to the troops from the field engineer park 1,600 
 small spades, and several hundred large spades and picks. 
 But the tools issued from the field engineer park formed the 
 bulk of the tools on hand, for Skobeleflf's three brigades, 
 which received none of these tools, were almost completely 
 destitute of entrenching tools. 
 
 As a matter of comparison, we will state here that in ad- 
 dition to the tools carried by the cavalry, ai'tillery, and 
 trains, the Gennan arm}' corps of 25 battalions has imme- 
 diately on hand for entrenching purposes 5,000 small spades, 
 3,000 large spades, 1,000 picks and pickaxes, and 2,500
 
 Oomments. 2 1 5 
 
 hatchets and axes; the 5,000 small spades and part of the 
 liatchets are permanently carried by the infantry. 
 
 Jf. The Cavalry. 
 
 Some adverse criticisms, commenting with some justifi- 
 cation on the defective work of the cavalry in the first part 
 of the campaign, remark that the work of the cavalry was all 
 the more unintelligible, since the Russian cavalrj' was not 
 only proportionately strong, but also superior to the weak 
 Turkish cavali*y. Both of these assumptions are wrong. 
 
 At the beginning of the war the proportion of cavalry to 
 infantry in the army of operation was 1 to 6, which is about 
 the normal proportion in the Grerman Army and may be 
 deemed sufficient, and not unusually large. The reinforce- 
 ments brought to the theater of war in the course of the cam- 
 paign amounted to 10 infantry divisions, numbering at least 
 100,000 men. The chivalry of the Guard and Cossacks — 
 numbering not more than 8,000 men — changed the above 
 I)roportion very much in favor of the infantry. 
 
 It is wrong to speak of a great numerical superiority 
 of the Russian over the Turkish cavalry. The so-called regu- 
 lar Turkish cavalry, to be sure, was not more tluui 8,000 
 strong, but 20,000 Tcherkesses formed not only the most 
 numerous, but also decidedly the best portion of the Turkisli 
 cavalry. The relative strength of the Russian and Turkish 
 cavalry is therefore approximately the same, and at first 
 slightly in favor of the Turks, subsequently slightly in favor 
 of the Russians. 
 
 Aside from the cavalrv of tlie Guard, which had a special
 
 2 1 6 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 formation, the entire Russian ciivalrv of tlie line and the 20 
 Don Cossack regiments in service were, under the most re- 
 cent organization, formed in 15 permanent divisions: 14 
 divisions were composed each of one Dragoon, one Lancer^ 
 one Hussar, and one Cossack regiment. Two Cossack regi- 
 ments did not form part of the divisions. In view of the ex- 
 perieuces of the German Army in 1866 and 1870, it was 
 deemed advisable not to organize larger bodies. The divis- 
 ions were to be used independently and closed in one body, 
 and their tactical training corresponded thereto. The ser- 
 vice with the infantry divisions was to be performed by Don 
 Cossack regiments, which did not belong to any cavalry 
 division. 
 
 These principles were, however, soon deviated from. 
 At the beginning of hostilities the 15 cavalry divisions were 
 distributed among the fifteen corps, so that each cavalry 
 division became an integral par-t of an army corps to the ex- 
 clusion of all independence and the strategic usefulness 
 of the cavalry divisions. 
 
 At the beginning of hostilities the army of operation 
 numbered seven army corps and as many cavalry divisions, 
 besides a Caucasian Cossack brigade and 10 Don Cossack 
 regiments, which latter, not belonging to any higher unit, 
 were intended to perform the service of divisional cavalry. 
 
 Immediately upon the passage of the Danube the divis- 
 ional organization was wantonly destroyed for the purpose 
 of forming a new and* larger unit for General Gourko's ad- 
 vance across the Balkans. 
 
 The Caucasian Brigade and 3 combined brigades formed
 
 Oomments. 217 
 
 this corps: the Dragoon Brigade, composed of the 2 Dragoon 
 regiments of the 8th and 9th Divisions; the so-called com- 
 bined brigade, consisting of the Hussar regiment of the 9th 
 Division and a Don regiment ; lastly, the Don Brigade, con- 
 sisting of 2 regiments. 
 
 Three of the 10 Don regiments were thus taken up; and 
 but 7 Cossack regiments remained for the 14 infantry divis- 
 ions. This number of course proved inadequate at once; a 
 large number of regiments belonging to cavalry di\lsions 
 were thereupon taken from their divisions and attached to 
 individual infantrj^ divisions and brigades. 
 
 The cavalry divisions soon disappeared in name also and 
 their commanders were assigned according to rank to the 
 command of mixed bodies of troops. 
 
 On the other hand, a large cavalry corps imder Krylotf 
 was formed at the beginning of September for the pnr]»(»se of 
 investing Plevna from the west. 
 
 The strategic task of this corps was manifold: it was to 
 observe the army of Plevna, reconnoiter the country to the 
 west and south, and oppose any relief coming from these 
 directions as far away from Plevna as possible. 
 
 The task necessitated a repeated division of I lie corps 
 and proved that this clumsy mass-forniation would have 
 entailed difficulties of leading, even had tlic hmcr bct'u 
 more vigorous and appropriate than it was. 
 
 Two or three independent cavalry divisiiuis willi special 
 instructions directly from the comuuuider-in-chief of the 
 West Army might perhaps have been bctici- able n> accoiii- 
 plish the object contemplated by the supreme ciinniaiul.
 
 i^l8 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 The idea of repulsing by cavalry alone any relief coming 
 from the south or west implies an overestimation of the 
 fighting capacity of the cavalry unsupported by infantry, 
 and although in our above discussion we were bound to find 
 fault with Kryloflf's retreat with so little fighting, it is doubt- 
 ful whether the cavalry could have succeeded in keeping an 
 infantry corps of 10,000 men permanently from Plevna. 
 None of the faces or statements point to any plan of giving 
 Krylofi"s cavalry timely support by infantry. The tasks 
 imposed on the German cavalry in 1870-71 never implied 
 the carrying through of a decisive action against large 
 bodies of the enemy's infantry. 
 
 At this point the following reflection is, perhaps, not 
 out of place: 
 
 The attitude of Osman Pasha at Plevna in July and 
 August may have convinced the Russian leaders that Os- 
 man's army was incapable of a sustained vigorous offensive; 
 it was therefore desirable for the Russians to entice the 
 Turks in some way to leave the entrenchments of Plevna and 
 fight the Russians in the open field 
 
 Supposing the Russian West Army took post in Septem- 
 ber, not to the east, but to the west of Plevna, with two strong 
 bridge-heads on the right bank above and below Plevna, 
 perhaps at Medivan and Riben, while 1,000 or 5,000 cavalry 
 were watching the east side, the fi)llowing would have been 
 the situation : 
 
 No relief army, coming either from the west (Widdin) 
 or from the south (Orkhanie), could join hands with the army
 
 Comments. 219 
 
 ill Plevna without first defeating the Russian Army ; but the 
 latter, wholly aside from proper entrenchments and a far 
 superior artillery, was strong enough to repulse a simultane- 
 ous attack by the relief army and the army inside Plevna- 
 Should Osman turn this position of the Russian West Army 
 to account in order to march suddenly eastward and threaten 
 the line of the Jantra, there was the greatest probability that 
 he would be overtaken by the main body of the Russian West 
 Army before reaching the Osma and forced to give battle in 
 the open field under very unfavorable conditions. 
 
 Returning to the actual conditions before IMevna, we 
 find that the investment on the west side did not become 
 effective until General Gourko took command and consid- 
 erable forces of infantry had reinforced the cavalry. 
 
 Lastly, in casting a glance over the tactical employment 
 of cavalry, we notice the exaggerated us^ of dismounted 
 fighting. Its modern role will certainly place cavalry often 
 in positions where it must fight dismounted, and on that 
 account it should be trained correspondingly; still dis- 
 mounted fighting will and must be an unwelcome expedient 
 and more or less opposed to the nature of the arm. 
 
 Not so in the Russian cavalry: dismouulcd tighiiiig 
 there has become a perfect mania; it is used on almost every 
 occasion and even without cogent reasons. This is no doubt 
 due to the peace training of the Russian cavalry, in whicli an 
 exaggerated value seems to be i)laced on dismounted tjgli ting; 
 for exaggerated it must be called considering tliat in liie
 
 220 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 grand maneuvers of 1876 more than once entire cavalry regi 
 ments dismounted for village fighting, and that cavalry 
 assaulted considerable towns held by strong infantry 
 garrisons. 
 
 The Dragoons are still looked ujjon in Russia as real 
 "double fighters" as in the days of Emperor ^'icholas, who 
 sought to realize the "centaur combination" of infantry and 
 cavalry in the creation of his "Dragoon Corps." Although 
 this creation of the Dragoon Corps failed completely at the 
 first test — in the Oriental War — still the underlying idea 
 has, within narrower limits, been preserved in the Russian 
 Army up to this day. 
 
 The Dragoon regiment of each normal Russian cavalry 
 division is to represent in a certain sense the infantry ele- 
 ment of that division. 
 
 Dismounted fighting of the Russian cavalry is an essen- 
 tial factor of its action; the dismounted fighting of the Ger- 
 man cavalry is never more than an expedient. The Russian 
 cavalry division — viewed from the ideal standpoint — is in- 
 tended to be a combination of all three arms, capable of any 
 
 > 
 
 kind of action and equipped for the greatest possible celer- 
 ity of movement; the German cavalry is meant to accomplish 
 all that is possible for cavalrj- proper, while as a single arm 
 it must renounce complete independence in battle. 
 
 These latter requirements are decidedly more in keep- 
 ing witli tlie law of the equal division of labor, which is be- 
 coming more and more predominant in every sphere, and 
 which results in an increased efficiency of the whole. Many
 
 Comments. 221 
 
 features of war which according to our ideas are surprising 
 and bewildering may be exphiined by the difference in prin- 
 ciple just stated, between the Russian and German cavalry. 
 
 5. The Artillenj. 
 
 The Russian field artillery was armed with breech-load- 
 ing guns of two calibers: the so-called four-pounder had a 
 caliber of 3.4 inches and fired a projectile of 11 pounds, the 
 barrel weighed G14 pounds, the limber contained 18 rounds, 
 and there were 2 ammunition-wagons for every gun; the so- 
 called nine-pounder bad a caliber of 4 2 inches, the projectile 
 weighed 22 pounds, the barrel weighed 1,260 pounds, the 
 limber contained 12 rounds, and there were 3 ammunition- 
 wagons for ever^' gun. Both these Russian guns surpassed 
 the corresponding calibers of the German field artillery as re- 
 gards weight of projectile and barrel; as regards weight of 
 projectile, the nine-pounder was but little inferior to the Ger- 
 man 4.7-inch gun. The entire field artillery was provided 
 with wrought-iron carriages. 
 
 A gun was drawn by 6 horses ; the batteries of 
 the foot artillery consisted of 8 giins, half of them four-, the 
 other half nine-pounders; the horse artillery had four- 
 pounders only and 6 guns to the battery. 
 
 A brigade of 6 batteries with 48 guns was permanently 
 attached to each infantry division; there were 4 guns for 
 each infantry battalion, slightly more than provided in the 
 normal strength of the German army corps. Each cavalry 
 division had 2 horse batteries with 12 guns.
 
 222 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 In view of the great numerical superiority of the Rus- 
 sian over the Turkish artilleiy, it was to be expected that 
 its influence in action, would be dominant and that its effect 
 would vigorously prepare and support the attack of the in- 
 fantry, but we find little of the sort; most actions give the 
 impression that the cooperation of the artillery' had no in- 
 fluence on their course worth mentioning. 
 
 There are two reasons for this: first, the method of its 
 tactical employment; second, the tasks devolving upon it in 
 this wai' as compared with its inadequate effect. 
 
 In glancing back over the tactical employment of the 
 artillery in the actions described, we find the following: 
 
 1. The available batteries were mostly, from the very 
 beginning, evenly distributed over the line of battle; part 
 of the artillery was not held back for the purpose of using it 
 en masse at a certain point of the line of battle in the sense 
 of a corps artillery. 
 
 2. Fire was opened on the enemy's position at very 
 long ranges and was almost invai'iably frontal; seldom do 
 we find an endeavor to flank a position. An exception is the 
 position of the artillery taken by Skobeleff.'s orders on the 
 east side of the Tutchenitza ravine for the purpose of enfilad- 
 ing the Turkish position on the "third knoll." 
 
 3. In most cases the numerically inferior Turkish artil- 
 lery soon gave up the fight against the Russian artillery 
 and withdrew to cover, only to reappear in efficient condi- 
 tion the moment the Russian infantry moved to the attack.
 
 Comments. ' 223 
 
 4. The frontal position of the artillei'}' compelled it to 
 cease firing as soon as the infantry attack began. 
 
 5. Those cases are exceptions where batteries followed 
 the attacking infantry and endeavored to support it from 
 positions in front; the artillery remained for the most part 
 in its original position and played an inferior role in the sec- 
 ond phase of the action, while, on the other hand, the in- 
 ferior Turkish artillery was very much in evidence in that 
 second phase. A vigorous advance of the artillery to sup- 
 port the infantry attack is seldom found except under Sko- 
 beleff's direction; the battery attached to the Kostroma 
 Regiment on July 20th furnishes an example of that kind, and 
 so do some batteries of the Russian left under Shakofskoi on 
 July 30th. 
 
 The batteries which advanced with the infantry under 
 the enemy's infantry fire suffered such losses in men and 
 horses as to be put, entirely or in part, out of action in a 
 short space of time. 
 
 If we investigate the material effect of the Russian ar- 
 tillery, we fail to find any thorough and successful effect in 
 any of the actions excepting that of Telis on October 28th. 
 
 The Russian artillery seldom found an opportunity to 
 fire on troops not under cover; the fire was mostly directed 
 against lines of infantry under natural cover, against rifle- 
 trenches or more or less regular entrenchments, and the fir« 
 had hardly any effect. Despite its preparation, continued 
 for hours, by the fire of a formidable mass of artillery, the in 
 fantry attack invariably encountered an unshaken opponent.
 
 224 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. 
 
 It is a fact that the small effect of the Russian field artil- 
 lery in the actions of July and August, against the sheltered 
 and entrenched Turkish position, shook the confidence of the 
 troops in their field artillery so severely that 20 twenty-four- 
 pounders from the siege park were used in the preparation 
 of the great attack on Plevna in September ; but the latter 
 were likewise unable to produce a result in any way satis- 
 factory. 
 
 The first fire was opened at an average range of 2,500 
 yards, at which distance the four-pounders were deemed in- 
 efficient and nine-pounders alone were used by the side of the 
 heavy guns. Upon approaching to within 1,600 yards of the 
 enemy's position some of the four-pounder batteries took 
 part in the firing. The result of the bombardment of the 
 Turkish position, which was carried on for several days with 
 great energy, was almost nd, unless the fact of the Kus- 
 sian gun carriages becoming unserviceable is considered a 
 negative and doubtful result. 
 
 The effect produced October 24th by the concentric fire 
 of 60 guns on the redoubt of Gorni Dubnik can not be con- 
 sidered satisfactory; one would have thought that such an 
 overwhelming fire — 60 guns against 4 — would speedily 
 break any resistance. Having withstood this seemingly 
 terrible fire for several hours, the garrison of the redoubt 
 was still able to repulse several assaults made by superior 
 numbers. 
 
 The surrender of the redoubt of Telis is the one success 
 that is to be credited to the artillery alone.
 
 Comments. 2 25 
 
 Presuming- that in the future extensive field entrench- 
 ments will pla}' the same role as in the Kusso-Turkish War, 
 the following demands may be made on the artillery: 
 
 First: An appreciable portion of the field artillery must 
 consist of considerably heavier calibers than are at present 
 numbered among the field artillery, in order to sufficiently 
 destroy the enemy's cover at greater ranges. 
 
 Second: The light calibers of the field artillery will be 
 employed not so much in rearward positions as in direct 
 connection with the attacking infantry. The task of the 
 light artillery is partly to accompany the assaulting infantry 
 in small bodies, partly by skillful and bold nianeuv(n-ing in 
 larger bodies to take important points of the enemy's position 
 under a massed fire during a brief space of time. 
 
 In fulfilling these tasks great losses in men and horses, 
 perhaps even of guns, become unavoidable, but the responsi- 
 ble leader, if aiming at decisive results, will not shrink from 
 such losses. 
 
 A battery which fires at the decisive point with destruc- 
 tive effect for five minutes — or even for one minute — and is 
 then lost, has done better service to the whole command 
 than ten batteries which from well-chosen rearward posi- 
 tions have maintained a well-aimed, but in the end rather 
 useless, fire. 
 
 6. Fortresses and Field Entrrnrhinnifs. 
 Ardalian, Nikopolis, and Kars, all ainuMl wiili nuiucroMs 
 guns of the heaviest caliber, succumbed te the open at- 
 tack; the field entrenchments of Plevna, built in the fac<' of
 
 226 Tactk'ul Stiuhcs un the Battles Around rienia. 
 
 the enemy and partly under his fire, armed witli compara- 
 tively few guns of small caliber, held out for five months and 
 ultimately succumbed to hunger alone. That contrast is 
 naturally the first thought engendered by this war relative 
 to fortifications. 
 
 To be sure, Ardahan, Nikopolis, and Kars did not fall so 
 quickly because they were real fortresses, but in spite of that 
 fact; Plevna did not offer such protracted resistance because 
 its works were field entrenchments, but notwithstanding 
 that fact; and lastly, these instances but serve to furnish 
 additional proof of the old established fact, that a fortifica- 
 tion receives its importance and value from its defenders 
 alone. It cannot be denied that, as compared with for- 
 tresses, field entrenchments played a more important role in 
 this war than formerly, and that the same condition will 
 probably obtain in the next few wars. The principle of for- 
 tresses and entrenchments is the same — that is, to form a 
 battle-ground strengthened by all available means; the dif- 
 ference lies in the means available in each case. 
 
 In the construction of fortresses the limits of these 
 means are fixed by considerations of finance; in the con- 
 struction of field entrenchments circumstances vary each 
 case, the amount of available time being a very important 
 item. 
 
 It is, of course, impracticable to convert into fortresses 
 all points of a country which under certain circumstances 
 may become decisive in the conduct of a war; that is ren- 
 dered impossible not only by financial considerations, but by
 
 Comments. 22 7 
 
 many other conditions, military and non-military. Such 
 places alone as possess a permanent strategic value under all 
 circumstances can be taken into account, and it is left to 
 field fortification to supplement this skeleton of defense 
 formed by the fortresses, by additional fortifications closely 
 conforming to the situation of the moment. 
 
 Greater demands than formerly are made on all fortifi- 
 cations in consequence of the great improvements in weapons 
 and means of transportation, rendering it possible to rap- 
 idly bring up comparatively heavy guns and enormous sup- 
 plies of ammunition. In the construction of fortresses, in 
 peace the element of time can easily be satisfied by utilizing 
 all imaginable technical means; but in the construction of 
 field entrenchments there will invariably be a dearth of 
 time and in most cases one of hands, and it will become a 
 question what preparations will best facilitate a suitable 
 and rapid construction of field entrenchments when the 
 moment for so doing arrives. These preparatory measures 
 may be divided into two classes: intellectual and material. 
 
 To the former belong the preparations of plans of forti- 
 fication for all such points as may easily become important 
 in certain situations, and the practicing of troops in the con- 
 struction of large fortifications; the material measures 
 consist in a sufficient equipment of the aimy with entrench- 
 ing tools and the preparation of all wood constructions re- 
 quired in such works, as block-houses, powder magazines, 
 gun platforms, revetting material, bridges, ramps, and can- 
 tonments, the component parts of which should be kept in 
 store in the great fortresses ready for shipment.
 
 J- J- JUST COMPLETED— A REVISED 
 EDITION (THE THIRX)), ENLARGED 
 AND WITH NEW ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 The Service of Security and Information 
 
 (THIRD EDITION) 
 
 By ARTHUR L. WAGNER, 
 
 Captain. Sixth Infantrj', U. S. Army ; Instructor in Art of War at the 
 U. S. Infantry and Cavalry School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 
 
 CONTENTS : 
 
 Chapter I.— Introduction. Chapter VII.— Spies 
 
 Chapter II. — Advance Guards. Chapter VIII. — Orientation and MapRead- 
 
 Chapter III.— Outposts. ing. 
 
 Chapter IV. — Reconnaissance. Chapter IX.— Indian Scouting. 
 
 Chapter V. — The Cavalry Screen. Appendix I. — .\dvance Guard Drill. 
 
 Chapter VI.— Rear Guards. Appendix II.— Questions for General Re- 
 
 view. 
 Illustrated with Fifteen Plates. 
 
 * * l» 
 
 This book has beeu officially adopted by the War Department as a stand- 
 ard in the examination of officers of the Regular Army for promotion. It 
 has also been officially adopted as a text-book in the U. S. Ailillery vSchool, 
 Fort Monroe; the U. S. Infantrv and Cavalry School, Fort Leavenworth; the 
 U. S. Cavalry and Light Artillery School, Fort Riley. 
 
 ^ ^ ^ 
 
 8vo, 265 pages. Sent postpaid on receipt of -P ' O 
 HUDSON-KIMBERLY PUBLrSHING CO., KANSAS CITY. 
 
 A Catechism of Outpost Duty 
 
 including 
 
 ADVANCE GUARD, REAR GU.\RD, AND 
 
 RECONNAISSANCE. 
 
 By ARTHUR L. WAGNER, 
 
 Captain. Sixth Infantry. U. S. .\rmy : Instructor in .\rt of War at the 
 U. S. Infantry and Cavalry School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 
 
 This book is a careful abridgment, in the form of questions and answers, 
 of Captain Wagner's "Service of Securitv and Information," which has 
 been officially sanctioned by the War Department as a standard in tlie exam- 
 ination of officers of the Regutar Army for proviotion. 
 
 The 'Catechism ok Outpost I)i-tv" will be found admirably 
 adapted to the needs of the National Guard, well suited to tlie instruc- 
 tion of non-commissioned officers, and of value to officers in review- 
 ing the larger book preparatory to examination. 
 
 One volume, 16mo, cloth, ten ilhistrative diagrams. Sent post- ^ _^ nf c 
 
 paid on receipt of ^ ^ L Lb. 
 
 HuDSON-KlMBERLV PUBLISHING Co. 
 
 > 1014-1016 Wvaudotte St. Kansas Citv, Mo.
 
 Military Letters and 
 Essays 
 
 International 
 
 Military Series 
 
 No. 1 
 
 By CAPTAIN F. N. MAUDE, RE., 
 
 Author of "Letters on Tactics and Organization,' 
 OF Modern Drill-Books," Ktc. 
 
 "The Evolution 
 
 II. 
 
 III. 
 
 IV. 
 
 V. 
 
 VI. 
 
 VII. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 IX. 
 
 X. 
 
 XI. 
 XII. 
 
 CONTENTS: 
 
 statistics of the Franco-German XIV. 
 
 War. XV. 
 
 Smokeless Powder. XVI. 
 Conditions of Modern Warfare. 
 
 Cost of Modern War. XVII. 
 German Cavalry Maneuvers. 
 
 Independent Patrols. XVIII. 
 
 A Modern Battle. XIX. 
 
 A Study of a Modern Battle. XX. 
 
 Attack or Defence. XXI. 
 
 The Origin of Extended-Order XXII. 
 
 Fighting. XXIII. 
 
 The Legend of St. Privat. XXIV. 
 Von Wedell's Brigade at Mars-la- 
 
 Tour. XXV. 
 
 Present Tactical Tendencies in the XXVI. 
 
 German Army. 
 
 The Physique of European Armies. 
 
 The Weapon or the Man. 
 
 The Minor Tactical Day at Alder- 
 shot. 
 
 The Volunteer Field Day at Alder- 
 Shot. 
 
 P'ield Day at Aldershot. 
 
 Notes on the French Maneuvers. 
 
 The German Army. 
 
 Marching Through Thuringia. 
 
 The Panics at Gravelotte. 
 
 Moltke's Work. 
 
 The Spirit of the New German 
 Infantry Regulations. 
 
 Notes in Germany, 1839. 
 
 Blank vs. Ball Cartridge Tactics. 
 
 *¥¥ 
 
 One volume, 8vo, handsomely bound in blue cloth. Sent post- (h -. _, ^ 
 
 paid on receipt of -P ^ • j ^ 
 
 HUDSON-KIMBERLY PUBLISHING CO., KANSAS CITY. 
 
 Cavalry Studies from 
 Two Great Wars 
 
 International 
 
 Military Series 
 
 No. 2 
 
 COMPRISING 
 
 THE FRENCH CAVALRY IN 1870, 
 
 By LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BONIE, 
 (French Array.) 
 
 THE GERMAN CAVALRY IN THE BATTLE OF VIONVILLE— MARS- 
 LA-TOUR, 
 
 By MAJOR KAEHLER, 
 (German General Staff.) 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF THE CAVALRY IN THE GETTYSBURG 
 
 CAMPAIGN, 
 
 By LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GEORGE B. DAVIS, 
 U. S. A. 
 
 ¥ ¥ ¥ 
 Illustrated ; full blue cloth. Sent postpaid on receipt of s^ ^ • 5 
 
 HuDSON-KlMBERLY PUBLISHING Co. 
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 MANUAL OF MILITARY FIELD ENGINEERING 
 
 FOR THE USE OF 
 
 Officers and Troops of the Line. 
 
 Prepared at the U. S. Infantry and Cavalry School 
 
 BY THE 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF ENGI^EERING. 
 
 Captain WM. D. BEACH, Third Cavalry, Instructor. 
 
 This book Iihs been in use at the U. S. Infantry and Cavalry School as 
 the official text-book on the subject since September, IMU. It is a profusely 
 illustrated volume of 2H4 pages, and treats in a most comprehensive and non- 
 teclinical manner of Hasty Intrenchments, Obstacles, Field Works, Working 
 Parties, Revetments, Field Casements and Magazines, Defense of Houses and 
 Villages, Use of Cordage and Spars, Spar Bridges, Floating Bridges, Roads, 
 Camping iixpedients. etc, etc. 
 
 The work has been ( fflcially recognized by the War Department as a 
 standard in tlie examination of l^ine Officers for promotion Price, ft ,75. 
 
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 MILITARY TOPOGRAPHY AND SKETCHING 
 
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