FROM ISOLATION 
 
 ADERSHIP
 
 ; FROM ISOLATION 
 TO LEADERSHIP 
 
 A Review of 
 American Foreign Policy 
 
 BY 
 JOHN HOLLADAY ; LATANE, PH.D., LL.D. 
 
 PROFESSOR OF AMERICAN HISTORY IN THE 
 JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY 
 
 GARDEN CITY NEW YORK 
 
 DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY 
 1918
 
 COPYRIGHT, 1918, BY 
 
 DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY 
 
 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, INCLUDING THAT OF 
 
 TRANSLATION INTO FOREIGN LANGUAGES, 
 
 INCLUDING THE SCANDINAVIAN
 
 TO MY STEP-SONS 
 
 LEWIS BERKELEY Cox 
 
 First Lieut,, 6th Infantry 
 
 WILLIAM JUNKIN Cox 
 
 Second Lieut., 6o$th Engineers 
 
 NOW WITH THE 
 
 AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES IN FRANCE 
 AND 
 
 RICHARD THRELKELD Cox 
 
 of the Student Army Training Corps, 
 at the Virginia Military Institute 
 
 WHO EXPECTS SHORTLY TO FOLLOW THEM 
 
 THIS VOLUME IS INSCRIBED 
 WITH PRIDE AND AFFECTION
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER PACE 
 
 I. ORIGIN OF THE POLICY OF ISOLATION . 3 
 
 II. FORMULATION OF THE MONROE DOC- 
 TRINE 19 
 
 III. THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE 
 
 EUROPEAN BALANCE OF POWER . 43 
 
 IV. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WITH- 
 
 OUT THE SANCTION OF FORCE . . 57 
 
 V. THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY .... 83 
 
 VI. ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS ... 99 
 
 VII. IMPERIALISTIC TENDENCIES OF THE 
 
 MONROE DOCTRINE 131 
 
 VIII. THE NEW PAN-AMERICANISM . . . 151 
 
 IX. THE END OF NEUTRALITY AND ISOLA- 
 TION 169 
 
 X. THE WAR AIMS OF THE UNITED STATES 191 
 
 INDEX 211
 
 I 
 
 
 
 ORIGIN OF THE POLICY OF ISOLATION
 
 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 ORIGIN OF THE POLICY OF ISOLATION 
 
 THE Monroe Doctrine and the policy of polit- 
 ical isolation are two phases of American diplo- 
 macy so closely related that very few writers 
 appear to draw any distinction between them. 
 The Monroe Doctrine was in its origin nothing^ 
 more than the assertion, with special applica- 
 tion to the American continents, of the right of 
 independent states to pursue their own careers 
 without fear or threat of intervention, domina- 
 tion, or subjugation by other states. President 
 Monroe announced to the world that this prin- 
 ciple would be upheld by the United States in 
 this hemisphere. The policy of isolation was 
 the outgrowth of Washington's warning against 
 permanent alliances and Jefferson's warning 
 against entangling alliances. Both Washington 
 and Jefferson had in mind apparently the form 
 of European alliance common in their day,
 
 4 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 which bound one nation to support another 
 both diplomatically and by force in any dispute 
 that might arise no matter whether it concerned 
 the interests of the first state or not. Such 
 alliances were usually of the nature of family 
 compacts between different dynasties, or be- 
 tween different branches of the same dynasty, 
 rather than treaties between nations. In fact, 
 dynastic aims and ambitions were frequently, 
 if not usually, at variance with the real interests 
 of the peoples affected. It will be shown later 
 tha't neither Washington nor Jefferson intended 
 that the United States should refrain perma- 
 nently from the exercise of its due influence in 
 matters which properly concern the peace and 
 welfare of the community of nations. Washing- 
 ton did not object to temporary alliances for 
 special emergencies nor did Jefferson object to 
 special alliances for the accomplishment of defi- 
 nite objects. Their advice has, however, been 
 generally interpreted as meaning that the United 
 States must hold aloof from world politics and 
 attend strictly to its own business. 
 
 The Monroe Doctrine was a perfectly sound 
 principle and it has been fully justified by nearly 
 a century of experience. It has saved South 
 America from the kind of exploitation to which 
 the continents of Africa and Asia have, during
 
 Origin of the Policy of Isolation 5 
 
 the past generation, fallen a prey. The policy 
 of isolation, on the other hand, still cherished 
 by so many Americans as a sacred tradition of 
 the fathers, is in principle quite distinct from 
 the Monroe Doctrine and is in fact utterly in- 
 consistent with the position and importance of 
 the United States as a world power. The dif- 
 ference in principle between the two policies can 
 perhaps best be illustrated by the following sup- 
 position. If the United States were to sign a 
 permanent treaty with England placing our 
 navy at her disposal in the event of attack 
 from Germany or some other power, on condi- 
 tion that England would unite with us in oppos- 
 ing the intervention of any European power in 
 Latin America, such a treaty would not be a 
 violation of the Monroe Doctrine, but a dis- 
 tinct recognition of that principle. Such a 
 treaty would, however, be a departure from 
 our traditional policy of isolation. Of the two 
 policies, that of avoiding political alliances is 
 the older. It was announced by Washington 
 under circumstances that will be considered in a 
 moment. 
 
 In the struggle for independence the colonies 
 deliberately sought foreign alliances. In fact, 
 the first treaty ever signed by the United States 
 was the treaty of alliance with France, negoti-
 
 6 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 ated and ratified in 1778. The aid which 
 France extended under this treaty to our revo- 
 lutionary ancestors in men, money, and ships 
 enabled them to establish the independence of 
 our country. A few years later came the 
 French Revolution, the establishment of the 
 French Republic followed by the execution of 
 Louis XVI, and in 1793 the war between Eng- 
 land and France. With the arrival in this 
 country of Genet, the minister of the newly 
 established French Republic, there began a 
 heated debate in the newspapers throughout 
 the country as to our obligations under the 
 treaty of alliance and the commercial treaty of 
 1778. President Washington requested the 
 opinions in writing of the members of his cabinet 
 as to whether Genet should be received and the 
 new government which had been set up in 
 France recognized, as to whether the treaties 
 were still binding, and as to whether a procla- 
 mation of neutrality should be issued. Hamilton 
 and Jefferson replied at great length, taking as 
 usual opposite sides, particularly on the ques- 
 tion as to the binding force of the treaties. 
 Hamilton took the view that as the government 
 of Louis XVI, with which the treaties had been 
 negotiated, had been overthrown, we were 
 under no obligations to fulfill their stipulations
 
 Origin of the Policy of Isolation 7 
 
 and had a perfect right to renounce them. 
 Jefferson took the correct view that the treaties 
 were with the French nation and that they 
 were binding under whatever government the 
 French people chose to set up. This principle, 
 which is now one of the fundamental doctrines 
 of international law, was so ably expounded by 
 Jefferson that his words are well worth quoting. 
 "I consider the people who constitute a so- 
 ciety or nation as the source of all authority 
 in that nation, as free to transact their common 
 concerns by any agents they think proper, to 
 change these agents individually, or the organ- 
 ization of them in form or function whenever 
 they please: that all the acts done by those 
 agents under the authority of the nation, are 
 the acts of the nation, are obligatory on them, 
 and enure to their use, and can in no wise be 
 annulled or affected by any change in the form 
 of the government, or of the persons adminis- 
 tering it. Consequently the Treaties between 
 the United States and France were not treaties 
 between the United States and Louis Capet, 
 but between the two nations of America and 
 France, and the nations remaining in existence, 
 tho' both of them have since changed their forms 
 of government, the treaties are not annulled by 
 these changes."
 
 8 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 The argument was so heated that Washington 
 was reluctant to press matters to a definite con- 
 clusion. From his subsequent action it appears 
 that he agreed with Jefferson that the treaties 
 were binding, but he held that the treaty of 
 alliance was purely defensive and that we were 
 under no obligation to aid France in an offensive 
 war such as she was then waging. He accord- 
 ingly issued his now famous proclamation of 
 neutrality, April, 1793. Of this proclamation 
 W. E. Hall, a leading English authority on inter- 
 national law, writing one hundred years later, 
 said: "The policy of the United States in 1793 
 constitutes an epoch in the development of 
 the usages of neutrality. There can be no 
 doubt that it was intended and believed to give 
 effect to the obligations then incumbent upon 
 neutrals. But it represented by far the most 
 advanced existing opinions as to what those 
 obligations were; and in some points it even went 
 farther than authoritative international custom 
 has up to the present time advanced. In the 
 main, however, it is identical with the standard 
 of conduct which is now adopted by the com- 
 munity of nations." Washington's proclama- 
 tion laid the real foundations of the American 
 policy of isolation. 
 
 The very novelty of the rigid neutrality pro-
 
 Origin of the Policy of Isolation 9 
 
 claimed by Washington made the policy a diffi- 
 cult one to pursue. In the Revolutionary and 
 Napoleonic wars, which lasted for nearly a 
 quarter of a century, the United States was the 
 principal neutral. The problems to which this 
 situation gave rise were so similar to the prob- 
 lems raised during the early years of the present 
 war that many of the diplomatic notes prepared 
 by Jefferson and Madison might, with a few 
 changes of names and dates, be passed off as 
 the correspondence of Wilson and Lansing. 
 Washington's administration closed with the 
 clouds of the European war still hanging heavy 
 on the horizon. Under these circumstances he 
 delivered his famous farewell address in which 
 he said: 
 
 "The great rule of conduct for us in regard 
 to foreign nations is, in extending our commer- 
 cial relations to have with them as little political 
 connection as possible. So far as we have al- 
 ready formed engagements let them be fulfilled 
 with perfect good faith. Here let us stop. 
 
 "Europe has a set of primary interests which 
 to us have none or a very remote relation. 
 Hence she must be engaged in frequent con- 
 troversies, the causes of which are essentially 
 foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, 
 it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves
 
 io From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of 
 her politics or the ordinary combinations and 
 collisions of her friendships or enmities. 
 
 "Our detached and distant situation invites 
 and enables us to pursue a different course. 
 If we remain one people, under an efficient 
 government, the period is not far off when we 
 may defy material injury from external annoy- 
 ance; when we may take such an attitude as 
 will cause the neutrality we may at any time re- 
 solve upon to be scrupulously respected; when 
 belligerent nations, under the impossibility of 
 making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly 
 hazard the giving us provocation; when we 
 may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided 
 by justice, shall counsel. 
 
 "Why forego the advantages of so peculiar 
 a situation ? Why quit our own to stand upon 
 foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our 
 destiny with that of any part of Europe, en- 
 tangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of 
 European ambitions, rivalship, interest, humor, 
 or caprice ? 
 
 "It is our true policy to steer clear of perma- 
 nent alliances with any portion of the foreign 
 world, so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty 
 to do it; for let me not be understood as capable 
 of patronizing infidelity to existing engage-
 
 Origin of the Policy of Isolation 1 1 
 
 ments. I hold the maxim no less applicable 
 to public than to private affairs that honesty 
 is always the best policy. I repeat, therefore, 
 let those engagements be observed in their 
 genuine sense. But in my opinion it is un- 
 necessary and would be unwise to extend them. 
 
 "Taking care always to keep ourselves by 
 suitable establishments on a respectable defen- 
 sive posture, we may safely trust to temporary 
 alliances for extraordinary emergencies." 
 
 It will be observed that Washington warned 
 his countrymen against permanent alliances. 
 He expressly said that we might "safely trust to 
 temporary alliances for extraordinary emergen- 
 cies." Further than this many of those who 
 are continually quoting Washington's warning 
 against alliances not only fail to note the 
 limitations under which the advice was given, 
 but they also overlook the reasons assigned. 
 In a succeeding paragraph of the Farewell 
 Address he said: 
 
 "With me a predominant motive has been 
 to endeavor to gain time to our country to 
 settle and mature its yet recent institutions, 
 and to progress without interruption to that 
 degree of strength and consistency which is 
 necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the 
 command of its own fortunes."
 
 12 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 The expression "entangling alliances" does 
 not occur in the Farewell Address, but was 
 given currency by Jefferson. In his first in- 
 augural address he summed up the principles 
 by which he proposed to regulate his foreign 
 policy in the following terms: "Peace, com- 
 merce, and honest friendship with all nations, 
 entangling alliances with none." 
 
 During the brief interval of peace following 
 the treaty of Amiens in 1801, Napoleon under- 
 took the reestablishment of French power in 
 Santo Domingo as the first step in the develop- 
 ment of a colonial empire which he determined 
 upon when he forced Spain to retrocede Louis- 
 iana to France by the secret treaty of San 
 Ildefonso in 1800. Fortunately for us the ill- 
 fated expedition to Santo Domingo encountered 
 the opposition of half a million negroes and ul- 
 timately fell a prey to the ravages of yellow 
 fever. As soon as Jefferson heard of the cession 
 of Louisiana to France, he instructed Living- 
 ston, his representative at Paris, to open nego- 
 tiations for the purchase of New Orleans and 
 West Florida, stating that the acquisition of 
 New Orleans by a powerful nation like France 
 would inevitably lead to friction and conflict. 
 "The day that France takes possession of New 
 Orleans fixes the sentence which is to restrain
 
 Origin of the Policy of Isolation 13 
 
 her forever within her low water mark. It 
 seals the union of two nations who in conjunc- 
 tion can maintain exclusive possession of the 
 ocean. From that moment we must marry 
 ourselves to the British fleet and nation. We 
 must turn all our attentions to a maritime 
 force, for which our resources place us on very 
 high grounds : and having formed and cemented 
 together a power which may render reinforce- 
 ment of her settlements here impossible to 
 France, make the first cannon, which shall be 
 fired in Europe the signal for tearing up any 
 settlement she may have made, and for holding 
 the two continents of America in sequestration 
 for the common purposes of the united British 
 and American nations. This is not a state of 
 things we seek or desire. It is one which this 
 measure, if adopted by France, forces on us, 
 as necessarily as any other cause, by the laws 
 of nature, brings on its necessary effect." 
 
 Monroe was later sent to Paris to support 
 Livingston and he was instructed, in case there 
 was no "prospect of a favorable termination of 
 the negotiations, to avoid a rupture until the 
 spring and "in the meantime enter into con- 
 ferences with the British Government, through 
 their ambassador at Paris, to fix principles of 
 alliance, and leave us in peace until Congress
 
 14 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 meets.'* Jefferson had already informed the 
 British minister at Washington that if France 
 should, by closing the mouth of the Mississippi, 
 force the United States to war, "they would 
 throw away the scabbard." Monroe and 
 Livingston were now instructed, in case they 
 should become convinced that France medi- 
 tated hostilities against the United States, to 
 negotiate an alliance with England and to 
 stipulate that neither party should make peace 
 
 or truce without the consent of the other. 
 
 -*. 
 
 Thus notwithstanding his French proclivities 
 and his warning against "entangling alliances," 
 the author of the immortal Declaration of In- 
 dependence was ready and willing in this 
 emergency to form an alliance with England. 
 The unexpected cession of the entire province 
 of Louisiana to the United States made the 
 contemplated alliance with England unneces- 
 sary. 
 
 The United States was no more successful 
 in its effort to remain neutral during the Na- 
 poleonic wars than it was during the present 
 war, though the slow means of communication 
 a hundred years ago caused the struggle for 
 neutral rights to be drawn out for a much longer 
 period of time. Neither England nor France 
 regarded us as having any rights which they
 
 Origin of the Policy of Isolation 1 5 
 
 were bound to respect, and American commerce 
 was fairly bombarded by French decrees and 
 British orders in council. There was really not 
 much more reason why we should have fought 
 England than France, but as England's naval 
 supremacy enabled her to interfere more effec- 
 tually with our commerce on the sea and as 
 this interference was accompanied by the 
 practice of impressing American sailors into 
 the British service, we finally declared war 
 against her. No effort was made, however, 
 to form an alliance or even to cooperate with 
 Napoleon. The United States fought the War 
 of 1812 without allies, and while we gained a 
 number of single-ship actions and notable 
 victories on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain, 
 we failed utterly in two campaigns to occupy 
 Canada, and the final result of the conflict was 
 that our national capitol was burned and our 
 commerce absolutely swept from the seas. 
 Jackson's victory at New Orleans, while gratify- 
 ing to our pride, took place two weeks after 
 the treaty of Ghent had been signed and had, 
 consequently, no effect on the outcome of the 
 war.
 
 II 
 
 FORMULATION OF THE MONROE 
 DOCTRINE
 
 II 
 
 FORMULATION OF THE MONROE 
 DOCTRINE 
 
 THE international situation which gave rise 
 to the Monroe Doctrine was the most unusual --- 
 in some respects that modern history records. * ^^ 
 
 The European alliance which had been organdy ' / 
 ized in 1813 for the purpose of bringing about 
 the overthrow of Napoleon continued to domi- 
 nate the affairs of Europe until 1823. Thig, 
 alliance, which met at the Congress of Vienna 
 in 1815 and held later meetings at Aix-la- 
 Chapelle in 1818, at Troppau in 1820, at Lay- 
 bach in 1821, and at Verona in 1822, undertook 
 to legislate for all Europe and was the nearest 
 approach to a world government that we have 
 ever had. While this alliance publicly pro- 
 claimed that it had no other object than the 
 maintenance of peace and that the repose of 
 the world was its motive and its end, its real 
 object was to uphold absolute monarchy an 
 to suppress every attempt at the establishment 
 of representative government. As long as 
 
 19
 
 2O From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 England remained in the alliance her statesmen 
 jf^ exercised a restraining influence, for England 
 
 4.^.4 was the only one of the allies which professed 
 to have a representative system of government. 
 As Castlereagh was setting out for the meeting 
 at Aix-la-Chapelle Lord Liverpool, who was 
 then prime minister, warned him that, "The 
 Russian must be made to feel that we have a 
 parliament and a public, to which we are re- 
 sponsible, and that we cannot permit ourselves 
 to be drawn into views of policy which are 
 wholly incompatible with the spirit of our 
 government.'* 
 
 .. The reactionary spirit of the continental 
 members of the alliance was soon thoroughly 
 aroused by the series of revolutions that fol- 
 t, lowed one another in 1820. In March the 
 Spanish army turned against the government 
 of Ferdinand VII and demanded the restoration 
 of the constitution of 1812. The action of the 
 army was everywhere approved and sustained 
 by the people and the king was forced to pro- 
 
 /* J&*to*& c l a i m tne constitution and to promise to uphold 
 v^ it. The Spanish revolution was followed in 
 July by a constitutional movement in Naples, 
 and in August by a similar movement in Portu- 
 gal; while the next year witnessed the outbreak 
 of the Greek struggle for independence. Thus
 
 Formulation of the Monroe Doctrine 2 1 
 
 in all three of the peninsulas of Southern Europe 
 the people were struggling for the right of self- 
 government. The great powers at once took 
 alarm at the rapid spread of revolutionary ideas 
 and proceeded to adopt measures for the sup- 
 pression of the movements to which these ideas 
 gave rise. At Troppau and Laybach measures 
 were taken for the suppression of the revolu- 
 tionary movements in Italy. An Austrian 
 army entered Naples in March, 1821, over- 
 threw the constitutional government that had 
 been inaugurated, and restored Ferdinand II 
 to absolute power. The revolution which 
 had broken out in Piedmont was also suppressed 
 by a detachment of the Austrian army. Eng- 
 land held aloof from all participation in the 
 conferences at Troppau and Laybach, though 
 her ambassador to Austria was present to watch 
 the proceedings. 
 
 The next meeting of the allied powers was 
 arranged for October, 1822, at Verona. Here 
 the affairs of Greece, Italy, and in particular 
 Spain came up for consideration. At this con- 
 gress all five powers of the alliance were repre- 
 sented. France was especially concerned about 
 the condition of affairs in Spain, and England 
 sent Wellington out of self-defense. The Con- 
 gress of Verona was devoted largely to a discus-
 
 22 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 sion of Spanish affairs. Wellington had been 
 instructed to use all his influence against the 
 adoption of measures of intervention in Spain. 
 When he found that the other powers were bent 
 upon this step and that his protest would be 
 unheeded, he withdrew from the congress. 
 The four remaining powers signed the secret 
 t treaty of Verona, November 22, 1822, as a 
 revision, so they declared in the preamble, of 
 the Treaty of the Holy Alliance, which had been 
 signed at Paris in 1815 by Austria, Russia, and 
 Prussia. This last mentioned treaty sprang from 
 the erratic brain of the Czar Alexander under the 
 influence of Baroness Kriidener, and is one of 
 the most remarkable political documents extant. 
 No one had taken it seriously except the Czar 
 himself and it had been without influence upon 
 the politics of Europe. The treaty of Verona, 
 however, which was avowedly a revision of the 
 Holy Alliance, is a document of the highest im- 
 portance. The principal articles were: 
 
 "Article I. The high contracting powers 
 ; being convinced that the system of representa- 
 tive government is equally as incompatible 
 jwith the monarchical principles as the maxim 
 ;of the sovereignty of the people with the divine 
 right, engage mutually, in the most solemn 
 manner, to use all their efforts to put an end to
 
 Formulation of the Monroe Doctrine 23 
 
 the system of representative governments, in 
 whatever country it may exist in Europe, and 
 to prevent its being introduced in those coun- 
 tries where it is not yet known. 
 
 "Article II. As it cannot be doubted that 
 the liberty of the press is the most powerful 
 means used by the pretended supporters of the 
 rights of nations, to the detriment of those 
 of Princes, the high contracting parties promise 
 reciprocally to adopt all proper measures to 
 suppress it, not only in their own states, but, 
 also, in the rest of Europe. 
 
 "Article III. Convinced that the principles 
 of religion contribute most powerfully to keep 
 nations in the state of passive obedience which 
 they owe to their Princes, the high contracting 
 parties declare it to be their intention to sustain, 
 in their respective states, those measures which 
 the clergy may adopt, with the aim of amelio- 
 rating their own interests, so intimately con- 
 nected with the preservation of the authority 
 of Princes; and the contracting powers join in 
 offering their thanks to the Pope, for what he 
 has already done for them, and solicit his con- 
 stant cooperation in their views of submitting 
 the nations. 
 
 "Article IV. The situation of Spain and 
 Portugal unite unhappily all the circumstances
 
 24 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 to which this treaty has particular reference. 
 The high contracting parties, in confiding to 
 France the care of putting an end to them, en- 
 gage to assist her in the manner which may the 
 least compromise them with their own people 
 and the people of France, by means of a sub- 
 sidy on the part of the two empires, of twenty 
 millions of francs every year, from the date of 
 the signature of this treaty to the end of the 
 war." 
 
 Such was the code of despotism which the 
 continental powers adopted for Europe and 
 which they later proposed to extend to America. 
 It was an attempt to make the world safe for 
 autocracy. Wellington's protest at Verona 
 marked the final withdrawal of England from 
 the alliance which had overthrown Napoleon 
 and naturally inclined her toward a rap- 
 prochement with the United States. The 
 aim of the Holy Allies, as the remaining mem- 
 bers of the alliance now called themselves, 
 was to undo the work of the Revolution and of 
 Napoleon and to restore all the peoples of 
 Europe to the absolute sway of their legitimate 
 sovereigns. After the overthrow of the consti- 
 tutional movements in Piedmont, Naples, and 
 Spain, absolutism reigned supreme once more 
 in western Europe, but the Holy Allies felt that
 
 Formulation of the Monroe Doctrine 25 
 
 their task was not completed so long as Spain's 
 revolted colonies in America remained un- 
 subjugated. These colonies had drifted into 
 practical independence while Napoleon's brother 
 Joseph was on the throne of Spain. Nelson's 
 great victory at Trafalgar had left England 
 supreme on the seas and neither Napoleon nor 
 Joseph had been able to establish any control 
 over Spain's American colonies. When Ferdi- 
 nand was restored to his throne in 1814, he un- 
 wisely undertook to refasten on his colonies the 
 yoke of the old colonial system and to break 
 up the commerce which had grown up with 
 England and with the United States. The dif- 
 ferent colonies soon proclaimed their independ- 
 ence and the wars of liberation ensued. By 
 1822 it was evident that Spain unassisted could 
 never resub jugate them, and the United States 
 after mature deliberation recognized the new 
 republics and established diplomatic intercourse 
 with them. England, although enjoying the 
 full benefits of trade with the late colonies 
 of Spain, still hesitated out of regard for the 
 mother country to take the final step of recog- 
 nition. 
 
 In the late summer of 1823 circular letters 
 were issued inviting the powers to a conference 
 at Paris to consider the Spanish-American
 
 26 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 question. George Canning, the British foreign 
 secretary, at once called into conference Richard 
 Rush, the American minister, and proposed 
 joint action against the schemes of the Holy 
 Alliance. Rush replied that he was not author- 
 ized to enter into such an agreement, but that 
 he would communicate the proposal at once to 
 his government. As soon as Rush's dispatch 
 was received President Monroe realized fully 
 the magnitude of the issue presented by the 
 proposal of an Anglo-American alliance. Be- 
 fore submitting the matter to his cabinet he 
 transmitted copies of Rush's dispatch to ex- 
 Presidents Jefferson and Madison and the fol- 
 lowing interesting correspondence took place. 
 In his letter to Jefferson of October I7th, the 
 President said: 
 
 i "I transmit to you two despatches, which 
 were receiv'd from Mr. Rush, while I was lately 
 in Washington, which involve interests of the 
 highest importance. They contain two letters 
 from Mr. Canning, suggesting designs of the 
 holy alliance, against the Independence of S. 
 America, & proposing a co-operation, between 
 G. Britain & the U States, in support of it, 
 against the members of that alliance. The 
 project aims, in the first instance, at a mere 
 expression of opinion, somewhat in the abstract,
 
 Formulation of the Monroe Doctrine 27 
 
 but which, it is expected by Mr. Canning, will 
 have a great political effect, by defeating the 
 combination. By Mr. Rush's answers, which 
 are also enclosed, you will see the light in which 
 he views the subject, & the extent to which he 
 may have gone. Many important considera- 
 tions are involved in this proposition, i" 
 Shall we entangle ourselves, at all, in European 
 politicks, & wars, on the side of any power, 
 against others, presuming that a concert, by 
 agreement, of the kind proposed, may lead to 
 that result? 2 d If a case can exist in which 
 a sound maxim may, & ought to be departed 
 from, is not the present instance, precisely 
 that case? 3 d Has not the epoch arriv'd when 
 G. Britain must take her stand, either on the 
 side of the monarchs of Europe, or of the U 
 States, & in consequence, either in favor of 
 Despotism or of liberty & may it not be pre- 
 sum'd that, aware of that necessity, her gov- 
 ernment has seiz'd on the present occurrence, as 
 that, which it deems, the most suitable, to 
 announce & mark the commenc'ment of that 
 career ? 
 
 "My own impression is that we ought to 
 meet the proposal of the British govt. & to 
 make it known, that we would view an inter- 
 ference on the part of the European powers, and
 
 28 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 especially an attack on the Colonies, by them, 
 as an attack on ourselves, presuming that, if 
 they succeeded with them, they would extend 
 it to us. I am sensible however of the extent 
 & difficulty of the question, & shall be happy 
 to have yours, & Mr. Madison's opinions on it." 
 
 Jefferson's reply dated Monticello, October 
 24th, displays not only a profound insight into 
 the international situation, but a wide vision 
 of the possibilities involved. He said : 
 
 "The question presented by the letters you 
 have sent me, is the most momentous which 
 has ever been offered to my contemplation 
 since that of Independence. That made us a 
 nation, this sets our compass and points the 
 'course which we are to steer through the ocean 
 of time opening on us. And never could we 
 embark on it under circumstances more aus- 
 picious. Our first and fundamental maxim 
 should be, never to entangle ourselves in the 
 broils of Europe. Our second, never to suffer 
 Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. 
 America, North and South, has a set of in- 
 terests distinct from those of Europe, and 
 peculiarly her own. She should therefore have 
 a system of her own, separate and apart from 
 that of Europe. While the last is laboring to 
 become the domicil of despotism, our endeavor
 
 Formulation of the Monroe Doctrine 29 
 
 should surely be, to make our hemisphere that 
 of freedom. One nation, most of all, could 
 disturb us in this pursuit; she now offers to 
 lead, aid, and accompany us in it. By acceding 
 to her proposition, we detach her from the 
 bands, bring her mighty weight into the scale 
 of free government, and emancipate a continent 
 at one stroke, which might otherwise linger 
 long in doubt and difficulty. Great Britain 
 is the nation which can do us the most harm of 
 any one, or all on earth; and with her on our 
 side we need not fear the whole world. With 
 her then, we should most sedulously cherish a 
 cordial friendship; and nothing would tend more 
 to knit our affections than to be fighting once 
 more, side by side, in the same cause. Not 
 that I would purchase even her amity at the 
 price of taking part in her wars. But the war 
 in which the present proposition might engage 
 us, should that be its consequence, is not her 
 war, but ours. Its object is to introduce and 
 establish the American system, of keeping out 
 of our land all foreign powers, of never per- 
 mitting those of Europe to intermeddle with 
 the affairs of our nations. It is to maintain 
 our own principle, not to depart from it. And 
 if, to facilitate this, we can effect a division 
 in the body of the European powers, and draw
 
 30 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 over to our side its most powerful member, 
 surely we should do it. But I am clearly of 
 Mr. Canning's opinion, that it will prevent 
 instead of provoking war. With Great Britain 
 withdrawn from their scale and shifted into 
 that of our two continents, all Europe com- 
 bined would not undertake such a war. For 
 how would they propose to get at either enemy 
 without superior fleets? Nor is the occasion 
 to be slighted which this proposition offers, 
 of declaring our protest against the atrocious 
 violations of the rights of nations, by the inter- 
 ference of any one in the internal affairs of 
 another, so flagitiously begun by Bonaparte, 
 and now continued by the equally lawless 
 Alliance, calling itself Holy." 
 /^ Madison not only agreed with Jefferson as 
 Vy to the wisdom of accepting the British proposal 
 pAr of some form of joint action, but he went even 
 
 ^ further and suggested that the declaration 
 
 should not be limited to the American republics, 
 but that it should express disapproval of the 
 late invasion of Spain and of any interference 
 with the Greeks who were then struggling for 
 independence from Turkey. Monroe, it ap- 
 pears, was strongly inclined to act on Madison's 
 suggestion, but his cabinet took a different 
 view of the situation. From the diary of
 
 Formulation of the Monroe Doctrine 3 1 
 
 John Quincy Adams, Monroe's secretary of 
 state, it appears that almost the whole of 
 November was taken up by cabinet discussions 
 on Canning's proposals and on Russia's aggres- 
 sions in the northwest. Adams stoutly opposed 
 any alliance or joint declaration with Great 
 Britain. The composition of the President's 
 message remained in doubt until the 27th, 
 when the more conservative views of Adams 
 were, according to his own statement of the 
 case, adopted. He advocated an independent 
 course of action on the part of the United States, 
 without direct reference to Canning's proposals, 
 though substantially in accord with them. 
 Adams defined his position as follows: "The 
 ground that I wish to take is that of earnest 
 remonstrance against the interference of the 
 European powers by force with South America, 
 but to disclaim all interference on our part 
 with Europe; to make an American cause and 
 adhere inflexibly to that." Adams's dissent 
 from Monroe's position was, it is claimed, due 
 partly to the influence of Clay who advocated a 
 Pan-American system, partly to the fact that 
 the proposed cooperation with Great Britain 
 would bind the United States not to acquire 
 some of the coveted parts of the Spanish posses- 
 sions, and partly to the fear that the United
 
 32 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 States as the ally of Great Britain would be 
 compelled to play a secondary part. He proba- 
 bly carried his point by showing that the same 
 ends could be accomplished by an independent 
 declaration, since it was evident that the sea 
 power of Great Britain would be used to prevent 
 the reconquest of South America by the Euro- 
 pean powers. Monroe, as we have seen, 
 thought that the exigencies of the situation 
 justified a departure from the sound maxim 
 of political isolation, and in this opinion he was 
 supported by his two predecessors in the presi- 
 dency. 
 
 The opinions of Monroe, Jefferson, and Madi- 
 son in favor of an alliance with Great Britain 
 and a broad declaration against the intervention 
 of the great powers in the affairs of weaker 
 states in any part of the world, have been 
 severely criticised by some historians and ridi- 
 culed by others, but time and circumstances 
 often bring about a complete change in our 
 point of view. Since the beginning of the 
 present world conflict, especially since our 
 entrance into it, several writers have raised 
 the question as to whether the three elder 
 statesmen were not right and Adams and Clay 
 wrong. If the United States and England 
 had come out in favor of a general declaration
 
 Formulation of the Monroe Doctrine 33 
 
 against intervention in the concerns of small 
 states and established it as a world-wide princi- 
 ple, the course of human history during the 
 next century might have been very different, 
 but Adams's diary does not tell the whole 
 story. On his own statement of the case he 
 might be justly censured by posterity for per- 
 suading the president to take a narrow American 
 view of a question which was world-wide in 
 its bearing. An important element in the 
 situation, however, was Canning's change of 
 attitude between the time of his conference 
 with Rush in August and the formulation of 
 the president's message. Two days after the 
 delivery of his now famous message Monroe 
 wrote to Jefferson in explanation of the form 
 the declaration had taken: "Mr. Canning's 
 zeal has much abated of late." It appears 
 from Rush's correspondence that the only 
 thing which stood in the way of joint action 
 by the two powers was Canning's unwillingness 
 to extend immediate recognition to the South 
 American republics. On August 27th, Rush 
 stated to Canning that it would greatly facilitate 
 joint action if England would acknowledge 
 at once the full independence of the South 
 American colonies. In communicating the ac- 
 count of this interview to his government Mr.
 
 34 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 Rush concluded: "Should I be asked by Mr. 
 Canning, whether, in case the recognition be 
 made by Great Britain without more delay, 
 I am on my part prepared to make a declara- 
 tion, in the name of my government, that it 
 will not remain inactive under an attack upon 
 the independence of those states by the Holy 
 Alliance, the present determination of my 
 judgment is that I will make such a declaration 
 explicitly, and avow it before the world." 
 About three weeks later Canning, who was 
 growing restless at the delay in hearing from 
 Washington, again urged Rush to act without 
 waiting for specific instructions from his govern- 
 ment. He tried to show that the proposed 
 joint declaration would not conflict with the 
 American policy of avoiding entangling alliances, 
 for the question at issue was American as 
 much as European, if not more. Rush then 
 indicated his willingness to act provided Eng- 
 land would "immediately and unequivocally 
 acknowledge the independence of the new 
 states.'* Canning did not care to extend full 
 recognition to the South American states until 
 he could do so without giving unnecessary 
 offense to Spain and the allies, and he asked 
 if Mr. Rush could not give his assent to the 
 proposal on a promise of future recognition.
 
 Formulation of the Monroe Doctrine 3 5 
 
 Mr. Rush refused to accede to anything but 
 immediate acknowledgment of independence 
 and so the matter ended. 
 ; As Canning could not come to a formal under- 
 standing with the United States, he determined 
 to make a frank avowal of the views of the Brit- 
 ish cabinet to France and to this end he had an 
 interview with Prince Polignac, the French am- 
 bassador at London, October 9, 1823, in which he 
 declared that Great Britain had no desire to has- 
 ten recognition, but that any foreign-interference, 
 by force, or by menace, would be a motive for 
 immediate recognition; that England "could 
 not go into a joint deliberation upon the sub- 
 ject of Spanish America upon an equal footing 
 with other powers, whose opinions were less 
 formed upon that question." This declaration 
 drew from Polignac the admission that he con- 
 sidered the reduction of the colonies by Spain 
 as hopeless and that France "abjured in any 
 case, any design of acting against the colonies 
 by force of arms." This admission was a dis- 
 tinct victory for Canning, in that it prepared 
 the way for ultimate recognition by England, 
 and an account of the interview was com- 
 municated without delay to the allied courts. 
 The interview was not communicated to Rush 
 until the latter part of November, and therefore
 
 36 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 had no influence upon the formation of Monroe's 
 message. 
 
 The Monroe Doctrine is comprised in two 
 widely separated paragraphs that occur in the 
 message of December 2, 1823. The first, 
 relating to Russia's encroachments on the 
 northwest coast, and occurring near the be- 
 ginning of the message, was an assertion to the 
 effect that the_ American continents had as- 
 sumed an independent condition and were no 
 longer open to European colonization. This 
 may be regarded as a statement of fact. No 
 part of the continent at that time remained 
 unclaimed. The second paragraph, relating 
 to Spanish America and occurring near the 
 close of the message, was a declaration against 
 the extension to the American continents 
 of tlie system of intervention adopted by the 
 Holy Alliance for the suppression of popular 
 government in Europe. 
 
 The language used by President Monroe is 
 as follows: 
 
 I. "At the proposal of the Russian Imperial 
 Government, made through the minister of the 
 Emperor residing here, a full power and instruc- 
 tions have been transmitted to the minister of 
 the United States at St. Petersburg to arrange 
 by amicable negotiation the respective rights
 
 Formulation of the Monroe Doctrine 37 
 
 and interests of the two nations on the north- 
 west coast of this continent. A similar pro- 
 posal had been made by His Imperial Majesty 
 to the Government of Great Britain, which has 
 likewise been acceded to. The Government 
 of the United States has been desirous by this 
 friendly proceeding of manifesting the great 
 value which they have invariably attached to 
 the friendship of the Emperor and their solicitude 
 to cultivate the best understanding with his 
 Government. In the discussions to whioh this 
 interest has given rise and in the arrangements 
 by which they may terminate the occasion has 
 been judged proper for asserting, as a principle 
 in which the rights and interests of the United 
 States are involved, that the American conti- 
 nents, by the free and independent condition 
 which they have assumed and maintain, are 
 henceforth not to be considered as subjects for 
 future colonization by any European powers." 
 
 2. "In the wars of the European powers in 
 matters relating to themselves we have never 
 taken any part, nor does it comport with our 
 policy so to do. It is only when our rights are 
 invaded or seriously menaced that we resent 
 injuries or make preparation for our defense. 
 With the movements in this hemisphere we are 
 of necessity more immediately connected, and
 
 38 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 r 
 
 by causes which must be obvious to all enlight- 
 ened and impartial observers. The political 
 system of the allied powers is essentially differ- 
 ent in this respect from that of America. This 
 difference proceeds from that which exists in 
 their respective Governments; and to the de- 
 fense of our own, which has been achieved by the 
 loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured 
 by the wisdom of their most enlightened citi- 
 zens, and under which we have enjoyed unex- 
 ampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. 
 We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the 
 amicable relations existing between the United 
 States and those powers to declare that we 
 should consider any attempt on their part to 
 extend their system to any portion of this 
 hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and 
 safety. With the existing colonies or depend- 
 encies of any European power we have not 
 interfered and shall not interfere. But with 
 the Governments who have declared their inde- 
 pendence and maintained it, and whose inde- 
 pendence we have, on great consideration and 
 on just principles, acknowledged, we could not 
 view any interposition for the purpose of op- 
 pressing them, or controlling in any other 
 manner their destiny, by any European power 
 in any other light than as the manifestation
 
 Formulation of the Monroe Doctrine 39 
 
 of an unfriendly disposition toward the United 
 States." 
 
 The message made a profound impression on 
 the world, all the more profound for the fact that 
 Canning's interview with Polignac was known 
 only to the chancelleries of Europe. To the 
 public at large it appeared that the United 
 States was blazing the way for democracy and 
 liberty and that Canning was holding back 
 through fear of giving offense to the allies. 
 The governments of Europe realized only too 
 well that Monroe's declaration would be backed 
 by the British navy, and all thought of inter- 
 vention in Latin America was therefore aban- 
 doned. A few months later England formally 
 recognized the independence of the Spanish- 
 American republics, and Canning made his 
 famous boast on the floor of the House of Com- 
 mons. In a speech delivered December 12, 
 1826, in defense of his position in not having 
 arrested the French invasion of Spain, he said : 
 "I looked another way I sought for compensa- 
 tion in another hemisphere. Contemplating 
 Spain, such as our ancestors had known her, I 
 resolved that, if France had Spain, it should 
 not be Spain with the Indies. I called the New 
 World into existence to redress the balance of 
 the Old."
 
 Ill 
 
 THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE 
 EUROPEAN BALANCE OF POWER
 
 Ill 
 
 THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE 
 EUROPEAN BALANCE OF POWER 
 
 PRESIDENT MONROE said in effect that the 
 western hemisphere must be made safe for 
 democracy. It was reserved for our own gene- 
 ration and for President Wilson to extend the 
 declaration and to say that the world must be 
 made safe for democracy. President Monroe 
 announced that we would uphold international 
 law and republican government in this hemi- 
 sphere, and as a quid pro quo he announced that 
 it was the settled policy of the United States to 
 refrain from all interference in the internal 
 affairs of European states. He based his decla- 
 ration, therefore, not mainly on right and justice, 
 but on the doctrine of the separation of the 
 European and American spheres of politics. 
 The Monroe Doctrine and the policy of isolation 
 thus became linked together in the public mind 
 as compensating policies, neither one of which 
 could stand without the other. Even Secre- 
 tary Olney as late as 1895 declared that "Ameri- 
 
 43
 
 44 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 can non-intervention in Europe implied Euro- 
 pean non-intervention in America." It is not 
 strange, therefore, that the public at large 
 should regard the policy of isolation as the sole 
 justification for the Monroe Doctrine. There 
 is, however, neither logic nor justice in basing 
 our right to uphold law and freedom in this 
 hemisphere on our promise not to interfere 
 with the violation of law and humanity in Eu- 
 rope. The real difficulty is that the Monroe 
 Doctrine as interpreted in recent years has 
 developed certain imperialistic tendencies and 
 that the imperialistic implications of the policy 
 resemble too closely the imperialistic aims of 
 the European powers. 
 
 For three quarters of a century after Monroe's 
 declaration the policy of isolation was more 
 rigidly adhered to than ever, the principal 
 departure from it being the signature and rati- 
 fication of the Clay ton-Bui we r Treaty in 1850. 
 By the terms of this treaty we recognized a 
 joint British interest in any canal that might 
 be built through the isthmus connecting North 
 and South America, undertook to establish the 
 general neutralization of such canal, and agreed 
 to invite other powers, European and American, 
 to unite in protecting the same. Owing to dif- 
 ferences that soon arose between the United
 
 Monroe Doctrine and European Balance 45 
 
 States and England as to the interpretation of 
 the treaty, the clause providing for the adher- 
 ence of other powers was never carried out. 
 
 For nearly a hundred years we have success- 
 fully upheld the Monroe Doctrine without a 
 resort to force. The policy has never been 
 favorably regarded by the powers of continental 
 Europe. Bismarck described it as "an interna- 
 tional impertinence." In recent years it has 
 stirred up rather intense opposition in certain 
 parts of Latin America. Until recently no 
 American writers appear to have considered the 
 real nature of the sanction on which the doctrine 
 rested. How is it that without an army and 
 until recent years without a navy of any size we 
 have been able to uphold a policy which has 
 been described as an impertinence to Latin 
 America and a standing defiance to Europe? 
 Americans generally seem to think that the 
 Monroe Doctrine has in it an inherent sanctity 
 which prevents other nations from violating it. 
 In view of the general disregard of sanctities, 
 inherent or acquired, during the past three 
 or four years, this explanation will not hold 
 good and some other must be sought. Ameri- 
 cans have been so little concerned with interna- 
 tional affairs that they have failed to see any 
 connection between the Monroe Doctrine and
 
 46 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 the balance of power in Europe. The existence 
 of a European balance of power is the only ex- 
 planation of our having been able to uphold 
 the Monroe Doctrine for so long a time without 
 a resort to force. Some one or more of the Eu- 
 ropean powers would long ago have stepped in 
 and called our bluff, that is, forced us to repudi- 
 ate the Monroe Doctrine or fight for it, had it 
 not been for the well-grounded fear that as soon 
 as they became engaged with us some other 
 European power would attack them in the rear. 
 A few illustrations will be sufficient to establish 
 this thesis. 
 
 The most serious strain to which the Monroe 
 Doctrine was ever subjected was the attempt 
 of Louis Napoleon during the American Civil 
 War to establish the empire of Maximilian in 
 Mexico under French auspices. He was clever 
 enough to induce England and Spain to go in 
 with him in 1861 for the avowed purpose of 
 collecting the claims of their subjects against 
 the government of Mexico. Before the joint 
 intervention had gone very far, however, these 
 two powers became convinced that Napoleon 
 had ulterior designs and withdrew their forces. 
 Napoleon's Mexican venture was deliberately 
 calculated on the success of the Southern Con- 
 federacy. Hence, his friendly relations with
 
 Monroe Doctrine and European Balance 47 
 
 the Confederate commissioners and the talk 
 of an alliance between the Confederacy and 
 Maximilian backed by the power of France. 
 Against each successive step taken by France in 
 Mexico Mr. Seward, Lincoln's Secretary of 
 State, protested. As the Civil War drew to a 
 successful conclusion his protests became more 
 and more emphatic. Finally, in the spring of 
 1866, the United States Government began 
 massing troops on the Mexican border and Mr. 
 Seward sent what was practically an ultimatum 
 to the French Emperor; he requested to know 
 when the long-promised withdrawal of the 
 French troops would take place. Napoleon 
 replied, fixing the dates for their withdrawal 
 in three separate detachments. 
 
 American historians have usually attributed 
 Napoleon's backdown to Seward's diplomacy 
 supported by the military power of the United 
 States, which was, of course, greater then than 
 at any other time in our history. All this un- 
 doubtedly had its effect on Napoleon's mind, but 
 it_appears that conditions in Europe, jjist _at 
 that particular moment had an even greater 
 influence in causing him to abandon his Mexi- 
 can scheme. Within a few days of the receipt 
 of Seward's ultimatum Napoleon was informed 
 of Bismarck's determination to force a war with
 
 48 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 Austria over the Schleswig-Holstein contro- 
 versy. Napoleon realized that the territorial 
 aggrandizement of Prussia, without any corres- 
 ponding gains by France, would be a serious 
 blow to his prestige and in fact endanger his 
 throne. He at once entered upon a long and 
 hazardous diplomatic game in which Bismarck 
 outplayed him and eventually forced him into 
 war. In order to have a free hand to meet 
 the European situation he decided to yield to 
 the American demands. As the European situa- 
 tion developed he hastened the final withdrawal 
 of his troops and left Maximilian to his fate. 
 Thus the Monroe Doctrine was vindicated ! 
 
 Let us take next President Cleveland's inter- 
 vention in the Venezuelan boundary dispute. 
 Here surely was a clear and spectacular vindi- 
 cation of the Monroe Doctrine which no one can 
 discount. Let us briefly examine the facts. 
 Some 30,000 square miles of territory on the 
 border of Venezuela and British Guiana were in 
 dispute. Venezuela, a weak and helpless state, 
 had offered to submit the question to arbitra- 
 tion. Great Britain, powerful and overbearing, 
 refused. After Secretary Olney, in a long 
 correspondence ably conducted, had failed 
 to move the British Government, President 
 Cleveland decided to intervene. In a message
 
 Monroe Doctrine and European Balance 49 
 
 to Congress in December, 1895, he reviewed 
 the controversy at length, declared that the 
 acquisition of territory in America by a Euro- 
 pean power through the arbitrary advance of a 
 boundary line was a clear violation of the Mon- 
 roe Doctrine, and asked Congress for an appro- 
 priation to pay the expenses of a commission 
 which he proposed to appoint for the purpose of 
 determining the true boundary, which he said 
 it would then be our duty to uphold. Lest 
 there should be any misunderstanding as to his 
 intentions he solemnly added: "In making these 
 recommendations I am fully alive to the respon- 
 sibility incurred and keenly realize all the conse- 
 quences that may follow." Congress promptly 
 voted the appropriation. 
 
 Here was a bold and unqualified defiance of 
 England. No one before had ever trod so 
 roughly on the British lion's tail with impunity. 
 The English-speaking public on both sides of 
 the Atlantic was stunned and amazed. Outside 
 of diplomatic circles few persons were aware 
 that any subject of controversy between the 
 two countries existed, and no one had any idea 
 that it was of a serious nature. Suddenly the 
 two nations found themselves on the point of 
 war. After the first outburst of indignation 
 the storm passed; and before the American
 
 50 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 boundary commission completed its investiga- 
 tion England signed an arbitration agreement 
 with Venezuela. Some persons, after looking 
 in vain for an explanation, have concluded 
 that Lord Salisbury's failure to deal more seri- 
 ously with Mr. Cleveland's affront to the British 
 Government was due to his sense of humor. 
 
 But here again the true explanation is to be 
 found in events that were happening in another 
 quarter of the globe. Cleveland's Venezuelan 
 message was sent to Congress on December i/th. 
 At the end of the year came Dr. Jameson's raid 
 into the Transvaal and on the third of January 
 the German Kaiser sent his famous telegram 
 of congratulation to Paul Kruger. The wrath 
 of England was suddenly diverted from America 
 to Germany, and Lord Salisbury avoided a 
 rupture with the United States over a matter 
 which after all was not of such serious moment 
 to England in order to be free to deal with a 
 question involving much greater interests in 
 South Africa. The Monroe Doctrine was 
 none the less effectively vindicated. 
 
 In 1902 Germany made a carefully planned 
 and determined effort to test out the Monroe 
 Doctrine and see whether we would fight for it. 
 In that year Germany, England, and Italy 
 made a naval demonstration against Venezuela
 
 Monroe Doctrine and European Balance 51 
 
 for the purpose of forcing her to recognize as 
 valid certain claims of their subjects. How 
 England was led into the trap is still a mystery, 
 but the Kaiser thought that he had her thor- 
 oughly committed, that if England once started 
 in with him she could not turn against him. 
 But he had evidently not profited by the ex- 
 perience of Napoleon III in Mexico. Through 
 the mediation of Herbert Bowen, the American 
 minister, Venezuela agreed to recognize in 
 principle the claims of the foreign powers and 
 to arbitrate the amount. England and Italy 
 accepted this offer and withdrew their squad- 
 rons. Germany, however, remained for a 
 time obdurate. This much was known at the 
 time. 
 
 A rather sensational account of what followed 
 next has recently been made public in Thayer's 
 "Life and Letters of John Hay." Into the 
 merits of the controversy that arose over 
 Thayer's version of the Roosevelt-Holleben 
 interview it is not necessary to enter. The 
 significant fact, that Germany withdrew from 
 Venezuela under pressure, is, however, amply 
 established. Admiral Dewey stated publicly 
 that the entire American fleet was assembled at 
 the time under his command in Porto Rican 
 waters ready to move at a moment's notice.
 
 52 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 Why did Germany back down from her posi- 
 tion? Her navy was supposed to be at least 
 as powerful as ours. The reason why the 
 Kaiser concluded not to measure strength 
 with the United States was that England had 
 accepted arbitration and withdrawn her support 
 and he did not dare attack the United States 
 with the British navy in his rear. Again the 
 nicely adjusted European balance prevented 
 the Monroe Doctrine from being put to the 
 test of actual war. 
 
 While England has from time to time ob- 
 jected to some of the corollaries deduced from 
 the Monroe Doctrine, she has on the whole 
 been not unfavorably disposed toward the 
 essential features of that policy. The reason 
 for this is that the Monroe Doctrine has been 
 an open-door policy, and has thus been in 
 general accord with the British policy of free 
 trade. The United States has not used the 
 Monroe Doctrine for the establishment of 
 exclusive trade relations with our southern 
 neighbors. In fact, we have largely neglected 
 the South American countries as a field for 
 the development of American commerce. The 
 failure to cultivate this field has not been due 
 wholly to neglect, however, but to the fact 
 that we have had employment for all our capital
 
 Monroe Doctrine and European Balance 53 
 
 at home and consequently have not been in a 
 position to aid in the industrial development 
 of the Latin-American states, and to the further 
 fact that our exports have been so largely the 
 same and hence the trade of both North and 
 South America has been mainly with Europe. 
 There has, therefore, been little rivalry between 
 the United States and the powers of Europe 
 in the field of South American commerce. Our 
 interest has been political rather than com- 
 mercial. We have prevented the establish- 
 ment of spheres of influence and preserved the 
 open door. This situation has been in full 
 accord with British policy. Had Great Britain 
 adopted a high tariff policy and been compelled 
 to demand commercial concessions from Latin 
 America by force, the Monroe Doctrine would 
 long since have gone by the board and been 
 forgotten. Americans should not forget the 
 fact, moreover, that at any time during the 
 past twenty years Great Britain could have 
 settled all her outstanding difficulties with 
 Germany by agreeing to sacrifice the Monroe 
 Doctrine and give her rival a free hand in 
 South America. In the face of such a combina- 
 tion our navy would have been of little avail.
 
 IV 
 
 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WITH 
 OUT THE SANCTION OF FORCE
 
 IV 
 
 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WITH- 
 OUT THE SANCTION OF FORCE 
 
 PRESIDENT MONROE'S declaration had a nega- 
 tive as well as a positive side. It was in effect 
 an announcement to the world that we would 
 not use force in support of law and justice 
 anywhere except in the Western Hemisphere, 
 that we intended to stay at home and mind our 
 own business. Washington and Jefferson had 
 recommended a policy of isolation on grounds 
 of expediency. Washington, as we have seen, 
 regarded this policy as a temporary expedient, 
 while Jefferson upon two separate occasions 
 was ready to form an alliance with England. 
 Probably neither one of them contemplated 
 the possibility of the United States shirking its 
 responsibilities as a member of the family of 
 nations. Monroe's message contained the im- 
 plied promise that if Europe would refrain from 
 interfering in the political concerns of this 
 hemisphere, we would abstain from all inter- 
 vention in Europe. From that day until our 
 
 57
 
 58 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 entrance into the present war it was generally 
 understood, and on numerous occasions offi- 
 cially proclaimed, that the United States 
 would not resort to force on any question arising 
 outside of America except where its material 
 interests were directly involved. We have 
 not refrained from diplomatic action in matters 
 not strictly American, but it has always been 
 understood that such action would not be 
 backed by force. In the existing state of world 
 politics this limitation has been a serious handi- 
 cap to American diplomacy. To take what we 
 could get and to give nothing in return has been 
 a hard rule for our diplomats, and has greatly 
 circumscribed their activities. Diplomatic ac- 
 tion without the use or threat of force has, 
 however, accomplished something in the world 
 at large, so that American influence has by no 
 means been limited to the western hemisphere. 
 During the first half of the nineteenth century 
 the subject of slavery absorbed a large part of 
 the attention of American statesmen. The 
 fact that they were not concerned with foreign 
 problems outside of the American hemisphere 
 probably caused them to devote more time and 
 attention to this subject than they would 
 otherwise have done. Slavery and isolation 
 had a very narrowing effect on men in public
 
 International Cooperation 59 
 
 life, especially during the period from 1830 
 to 1860. As the movement against slavery 
 in the early thirties became world-wide, the 
 retention of the "peculiar institution" in this 
 country had the effect of increasing our isola- 
 tion. The effort of the American Colonization 
 Society to solve or mitigate the problem of 
 slavery came very near giving us a colony in 
 Africa. In fact, Liberia, the negro republic 
 founded on the west coast of Africa by the 
 Colonization Society, was in all essentials an 
 American protectorate, though the United 
 States carefully refrained in its communications 
 with other powers from doing more than ex- 
 pressing its good will for the little republic. 
 As Liberia was founded years before Africa 
 became a field for European exploitation, it 
 was suffered to pursue its course without outside 
 interference, and the United States was never 
 called upon to decide whether its diplomatic 
 protection would be backed up by force. 
 
 The slave trade was a subject of frequent 
 discussion between the United States and Eng- 
 land during the first half of the nineteenth 
 century, and an arrangement for its suppression 
 was finally embodied in Article VIII of the 
 Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842. The only 
 reason why the two countries had never been
 
 60 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 able to act in accord on this question before 
 was that Great Britain persistently refused to 
 renounce the right of impressment which she 
 had exercised in the years preceding the War 
 of 1812. The United States therefore refused 
 to sign any agreement which would permit 
 British naval officers to search American vessels 
 in time of peace. In 1820 the United States 
 declared the slave trade to be a form of piracy, 
 and Great Britain advanced the view that as 
 there was no doubt of the right of a naval 
 officer to visit and search a ship suspected of 
 piracy, her officers should be permitted to visit 
 and search ships found off the west coast of 
 Africa under the American flag which were 
 suspected of being engaged in the slave trade. 
 The United States stoutly refused to acquiesce 
 in this view. In the Webster-Ashburton Treaty 
 of 1842 it was finally agreed that each of the 
 two powers should maintain on the coast of 
 Africa a sufficient squadron "to enforce, sepa- 
 rately and respectively, the laws, rights, and 
 obligations of each of the two countries for the 
 suppression of the slave trade." It was further 
 agreed that the officers should act in concert 
 and cooperation, but the agreement was so 
 worded as to avoid all possibility of our being 
 drawn into an entangling alliance.
 
 International Cooperation 61 
 
 The United States has upon various occa- 
 sions expressed a humanitarian interest in the 
 natives of Africa. In 1884 two delegates were 
 sent to the Berlin conference which adopted a 
 general act giving a recognized status to the 
 Kongo Free State. The American delegates 
 signed the treaty in common with the delegates 
 of the European powers, but it was not sub- 
 mitted to the Senate for ratification for reasons 
 stated as follows by President Cleveland in his 
 annual message of December 8, 1885: 
 
 "A conference of delegates of the principal 
 commercial nations was held at Berlin last winter 
 to discuss methods whereby the Kongo basin 
 might be kept open to the world's trade. Dele- 
 gates attended on behalf of the United States 
 on the understanding that their part should be 
 merely deliberative, without imparting to the 
 results any binding character so far as the 
 United States were concerned. This reserve 
 was due to the indisposition of this Government 
 to share in any disposal by an international 
 congress of jurisdictional questions in remote 
 foreign territories. The results of the confer- 
 ence were embodied in a formal act of the na- 
 ture of an international convention, which laid 
 down certain obligations purporting to be 
 binding on the signatories, subject to ratifica-
 
 62 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 tion within one year. Notwithstanding the 
 reservation under which the delegates of the 
 United States attended, their signatures were 
 attached to the general act in the same manner 
 as those of the plenipotentiaries of other govern- 
 ments, thus making the United States appear, 
 without reserve or qualification, as signatories 
 to a joint international engagement imposing 
 on the signers the conservation of the territorial 
 integrity of distant regions where we have no 
 established interests or control. 
 
 "This Government does not, however, regard 
 its reservation of liberty of action in the premises 
 as at all impaired; and holding that an engage- 
 ment to share in the obligation of enforcing 
 neutrality in the remote valley of the Kongo 
 would be an alliance whose responsibilities 
 we are not in a position to assume, I abstain 
 from asking the sanction of the Senate to that 
 general act." 
 
 The United States also sent delegates to the 
 international conference held at Brussels in 
 1890 for the purpose of dealing with the slave 
 trade in certain unappropriated regions of 
 Central Africa. The American delegates in- 
 sisted that prohibitive duties should be imposed 
 on the importation of spirituous liquors into 
 the Kongo. The European representatives,
 
 International Cooperation 63 
 
 being unwilling to incorporate the American 
 proposals, framed a separate tariff convention 
 for the Kongo, which the American delegates 
 refused to sign. The latter did, however, affix 
 their signatures to the general treaty which pro- 
 vided for the suppression of the African slave 
 trade and the restriction of the sale of firearms, 
 ammunition, and spirituous liquors in certain 
 parts of the African continent. In ratifying 
 the treaty the Senate reaffirmed the American 
 policy of isolation in the following resolution: 
 "That the United States of America, having 
 neither possessions nor protectorates in Africa, 
 4iereby disclaims any intention, in ratifying this 
 treaty, to indicate any interest whatsoever in the 
 possessions or protectorates established or 
 claimed on that Continent by the other powers, 
 or any approval of the wisdom, expediency or 
 lawfulness thereof, and does not join in any 
 expressions in the said General Act which might 
 be construed as such a declaration or acknowl- 
 edgement; and, for this reason, that it is desir- 
 able that a copy of this resolution be inserted 
 in the protocol to be drawn up at the time of 
 the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty 
 on the part of the United States." 
 
 The United States has always stood for 
 legality in international relations and has al-
 
 64 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 ways endeavored to promote the arbitration of 
 international disputes. Along these lines we 
 have achieved notable success. It is, of course, 
 sometimes difficult to separate questions of in- 
 ternational law from questions of international 
 politics. We have been so scrupulous in our 
 efforts to keep out of political entanglements 
 that we have sometimes failed to uphold prin- 
 ciples of law in the validity of which we were 
 as much concerned as any other nation. We 
 have always recognized international law as a 
 part of the law of the land, and we have al- 
 ways acknowledged the moral responsibilities 
 that rested on us as a member of the society of 
 nations. In fact, the Constitution of the United 
 States expressly recognizes the binding force 
 of the law of nations and of treaties. As inter- 
 national law is the only law that governs the 
 relations between states, we are, of course,* di- 
 rectly concerned in the enforcement of exist- 
 ing law and in the development of new law. 
 When the Declaration of Paris was drawn up by 
 the European powers at the close of the Crimean 
 War in 1856, the United States was invited to 
 give its adherence. The four rules embodied 
 in the declaration, which have since formed the 
 basis of maritime law, are as follows: First, 
 privateering is, and remains, abolished. Sec-
 
 International Cooperation 65 
 
 ond, the neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with 
 the exception of contraband of war. Third, 
 neutral goods, with the exception of contraband 
 of war, are not liable to capture under the 
 enemy's flag. Fourth, blockades, in order to be 
 binding, must be effective. The United States 
 Government was in thorough accord with the 
 second, third, and fourth rules but was unwill- 
 ing, as matters then stood, to commit itself 
 to the first rule. It had never been our policy 
 to maintain a large standing navy. In the War 
 of 1812, as in the Revolution, we depended upon 
 privateers to attack the commerce of the enemy. 
 In reply to the invitation to give our adherence 
 to the declaration, Secretary Marcy made a 
 counter proposition, namely, that the powers of 
 Europe should agree to exempt all private prop- 
 erty, except of course contraband of war, from 
 capture on the high seas in time of war. He 
 said that if they would agree to this, the United 
 States would agree to abolish privateering. The 
 powers of Europe refused to accept this amend- 
 ment. We refrained from signing the Declara- 
 tion of Paris, therefore, not because it went too 
 far, but because it did not go far enough. 
 
 During the Civil War the United States 
 Government used its diplomatic efforts to pre- 
 vent the recognition of the independence of the
 
 66 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 Confederacy and the formation of hostile alli- 
 ances. It made no effort to form any alliance 
 itself and insisted that the struggle be regarded 
 as an American question. The dispute with 
 England over the Alabama Claims came 
 near precipitating war, but the matter was 
 finally adjusted by the Treaty of Washington. 
 The most significant feature of this treaty, as 
 far as the present discussion is concerned, was 
 the formal adoption of three rules which were 
 not only to govern the decision of the "Ala- 
 bama Claims," but which were to be binding 
 upon England and the United States for the 
 future. It was further agreed that these rules 
 should be brought to the knowledge of other 
 maritime powers who should be invited to 
 accede to them. The rules forbade the fitting 
 out, arming, or equipping within neutral juris- 
 diction of vessels intended to cruise or carry on 
 war against a power with which the neutral is at 
 peace; they forbade the use of neutral ports or 
 waters as a base of naval operations; and they 
 imposed upon neutrals the exercise of due dili- 
 gence to prevent these things from being done. 
 While these rules have never been formally 
 adopted by the remaining powers, they are gen-, 
 erallyrecognized as embodying obligationswhich 
 are now incumbent upon all neutrals.
 
 International Cooperation 67 
 
 When the United States decided to accept 
 the invitation of the Czar of Russia to attend 
 the first peace conference at The Hague in 1899, 
 grave misgivings were expressed by many of ; 
 the more conservative men in public life. The 
 participation of the United States with the 
 powers of Europe in this conference was taken 
 by m<my Americans to mark the end of the 
 old order and the beginning of a new era in 
 American diplomacy. The conference, how- 
 ever, was concerned with questions of general 
 international interest, and had no bearing 
 upon the internal affairs of any state, European 
 or American. Lest there should be any mis- 
 apprehension as to the historic policy of the 
 United States, the final treaty was signed by 
 the American delegation under the express 
 reservation of a declaration previously read in 
 open session. This declaration was as follows: 
 "Nothing contained in this convention shall) 
 be so construed as to require the United States \ 
 of America to depart from its traditional policy I 
 of not intruding upon, interfering with, or i 
 entangling itself in the political questions or 1 
 policy or internal administration of any foreign j 
 state; nor shall anything contained in the said 1 
 convention be construed to imply a relinquish- I 
 ment by the United States of America of 1
 
 68 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 its traditional attitude toward purely American 
 questions." The establishment of the Perma- 
 nent Court of Arbitration at The Hague which 
 resulted from the first conference was a notable 
 achievement, although the Court has accom- 
 plished less than its advocates hoped. This 
 was the most important occasion on which 
 American delegates had sat together with 
 European diplomats in a general conference. 
 Our delegation was the object of considerable 
 interest and was not without influence in shap- 
 ing the provisions of the final treaty. It was 
 through the personal influence of Andrew D. 
 White that the Emperor of Germany was per- 
 suaded to permit his delegation to take part in 
 the proceedings establishing the Court of Arbi- 
 tration. 
 
 The second Hague Conference revised the 
 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Inter- 
 national Disputes, drew up a plan for an Inter- 
 national Prize Court, and attempted a codifica- 
 tion of the rules of international law on a number 
 of subjects relating to the conduct of war and 
 the rights of neutrals. The American dele- 
 gates, headed by Mr. Choate. not only took a 
 prominent part in these proceedings, but, 
 acting under instructions from Secretary Root, 
 they proposed to the Conference the creation
 
 International Cooperation 69 
 
 of a permanent international court of justice. 
 The creation of an international court of justice 
 whose decisions would have the force of law, as 
 distinguished from an international court of 
 arbitration whose decisions are usually arrived 
 at by a compromise of conflicting legal or poli- 
 tical points of view, had long been advocated 
 by advanced thinkers, but the proposition had 
 always been held by practical statesmen to be 
 purely academic. The serious advocacy of the 
 proposition at this time by a great nation like 
 the United States and the able arguments ad- 
 vanced by Mr. Choate marked an important 
 step forward and made a profound impression. 
 There were two difficulties in the way of estab- 
 lishing such a court at the second Hague 
 Conference. In the first place, the delegation 
 of the United States was the only one which 
 had instructions on this subject, and in the 
 second place it was found to be impossible to 
 agree upon a method of selecting the judges. 
 The great world powers, with the exception of 
 the United States, demanded permanent repre- 
 sentation on the court. The smaller nations, 
 relying on the doctrine of the equality of states, 
 demanded likewise to be represented. If each 
 nation could have been given the right to 
 appoint a judge, the court could have been
 
 70 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 organized, but there would have been forty- 
 four judges instead of fifteen, the number 
 suggested in the American plan. The Draft 
 Convention for the Establishment of the Court 
 of Arbitral Justice, as it was agreed the new 
 court should be designated, was submitted to 
 the Conference and its adoption recommended 
 to the signatory powers. This Draft contained 
 thirty-five articles and covered everything 
 except the method of appointing judges. This 
 question was to be settled by diplomatic nego- 
 tiation, and it was agreed that the court should 
 be established as soon as a satisfactory agree- 
 ment with regard to the choice of judges could 
 be reached. After the adjournment of the Con- 
 ference the United States continued its ad- 
 vocacy of the international court of justice 
 through the ordinary diplomatic channels. 
 The proposal was made that the method of 
 selecting judges for the Prize Court be adopted 
 for the court of justice, that is, that each power 
 should appoint a judge, that the judges of the 
 larger powers should always sit on the court 
 while the judges of the other powers should sit 
 by a system of rotation for limited periods. 
 It was found, however, that many of the smaller 
 states were unwilling to accept this suggestion, 
 and as difficulties which we will mention pres-
 
 International Cooperation 71 
 
 ently prevented the establishment of the Prize 
 Court, the whole question of the court of 
 justice was postponed. 
 
 Most of the conventions adopted by the 
 second Hague Conference were ratified by the 
 United States without reservation. The fact, 
 however, that certain of these conventions were 
 not ratified by all the powers represented 
 at the Conference, and that others were ratified 
 with important reservations, left the status of 
 most of the conventions in doubt, so that at 
 the beginning of the present war there was great 
 confusion as to what rules were binding and 
 what were not binding. The Conference found 
 it impossible to arrive at an agreement on many 
 of the most vital questions of maritime law. 
 Under these circumstances the powers were not 
 willing to have the proposed International 
 Prize Court established without the previous 
 codification of the body of law which was to 
 govern its decisions. 
 
 In order to supply this need the London 
 Naval Conference was convened in December, 
 1908, and issued a few months later the Declara- 
 tion of London. The London Naval Confer- 
 ence was attended by representatives of the 
 principal maritime powers including the United 
 States, and the Declaration which it issued was
 
 72 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 avowedly a codification of the existing rules 
 of international law. This was not true, how- 
 ever, of all the provisions of the Declaration. 
 On several of the most vital questions of mari- 
 time law, such as blockade, the doctrine of 
 continuous voyage, the destruction of neutral 
 prizes, and the inclusion of food stuffs in the 
 list of conditional contraband, the Declaration 
 was a compromise and therefore unsatisfactory. 
 It encountered from the start the most violent 
 opposition in England. In Parliament the 
 Naval Prize Bill, which was to give the Declara- 
 tion effect, was discussed at considerable length. 
 It passed the House of Commons by a small 
 vote, but was defeated in the House of Lords. 
 It was denounced by the press, and a petition 
 to the king, drawn up by the Imperial Maritime 
 League protesting against it, was signed by a 
 long list of commercial associations, mayors, 
 members of the House of Lords, general offi- 
 cers, and other public officials. One hundred 
 and thirty-eight naval officers of flag rank 
 addressed to the prime minister a public protest 
 against the Declaration. In the debate in 
 the House of Lords the main objections to 
 the Declaration were (i) that it made food stuffs 
 conditional contraband instead of placing them 
 on the free list, (2) that the clause permitting
 
 International Cooperation 73 
 
 the seizure of conditional contraband bound 
 for a fortified place or "other place serving as 
 a base for the armed forces of the enemy" would 
 render all English ports liable to be treated 
 as bases by an enemy, and (3) that it permitted 
 the destruction of neutral prizes. 
 
 The refusal of England to ratify the Declara- 
 tion of London sealed its fate. The United 
 States Senate formally ratified it, but this rati- 
 fication was, of course, conditional on the rati- 
 fication of other powers. At the beginning of 
 the present war the United States made a formal 
 proposal to the belligerent powers that they 
 should agree to adopt the Declaration for the 
 period of the war in order that there might be a 
 definite body of law for all parties concerned. 
 This proposal was accepted by Germany and 
 Austria, but England, France, and Russia 
 were not willing to accept the Declaration 
 of London without modifications. The United 
 States, therefore, promptly withdrew its pro- 
 posal and stated that where its rights as a 
 neutral were concerned it would expect the 
 belligerent powers to observe the recognized 
 rules of international law and existing treaties. 
 
 The Hague Conferences were concerned 
 with questions of general international in- 
 terest, and had no bearing upon the internal
 
 74 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 affairs of states. Such, however, was not the 
 character of the conference which convened at 
 Algeciras, Spain, in December, 1905, for the 
 purpose of adjusting the very serious dispute 
 that had arisen between France and Germany 
 over the status of Morocco."] France had been 
 engaged for some years in trie peaceful penetra- 
 tion of Morocco. By the terms of the Entente 
 of 1904 England recognized Morocco as being 
 within the French sphere of influence and France 
 agreed to recognize England's position in Egypt. 
 The German Kaiser had no idea of permitting 
 any part of the world to be divided up without 
 his consent. In March, 1905, while on a cruise 
 in the Mediterranean, he disembarked at Tan- 
 gier and paid a visit to the Sultan "in his 
 character of independent sovereign." As the 
 Russian armies had just suffered disastrous 
 defeats at the hands of the Japanese, France 
 could not count on aid from her ally and the 
 Kaiser did not believe that the recently formed 
 Entente was strong enough to enable her to 
 count on English support. His object in 
 landing at Tangier was, therefore, to check 
 and humiliate France while she was isolated 
 and to break up the Entente before it should 
 develop into an alliance. Delcasse, the French 
 foreign minister, wanted to stand firm, but
 
 International Cooperation 75 
 
 Germany demanded his retirement and the 
 prime minister accepted his resignation. In 
 recognition of this triumph, the German chan- 
 cellor Count von Billow was given the title of 
 Prince. Not satisfied with this achievement, 
 the Kaiser demanded a general European con- 
 ference on the Moroccan question. He wanted 
 to emphasize his victory over France and to 
 display publicly his diplomatic leadership. 
 The Algeciras conference turned out to be a 
 bitter disappointment to Germany. Not only 
 did France receive the loyal support of England, 
 but she was also backed by the United States 
 and even by Italy a warning to Germany that 
 the Triple Alliance was in danger. As the 
 conference was called nominally for the purpose 
 of instituting certain administrative reforms 
 in Morocco, President Roosevelt decided, in 
 view of our rights under a commercial treaty of 
 1880, to take part in the proceedings. The 
 American delegates were Henry White, at 
 that time ambassador to Italy, and Samuel 
 R. Gummere, minister to Morocco. As the 
 United States professed to have no political 
 interests at stake, its delegates were instrumen- 
 tal in composing many of the difficulties that 
 arose during the conference and their influence 
 was exerted to preserve the European balance of
 
 76 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 power. The facts in regard to America's part 
 in this conference have never been fully re- 
 vealed. There is nothing in any published 
 American document to indicate that the par- 
 ticipation of our representatives was anything 
 more than casual. Andre Tardieu, the well- 
 known French publicist, who reported the con- 
 ference and later published his impressions in 
 book form, makes it evident that President 
 Roosevelt was a positive factor in the proceed- 
 ings. He states that at the critical stage of the 
 conference the German Kaiser sent several 
 cablegrams to President Roosevelt urging him 
 to modify his instructions to Mr. White. 
 
 There can be no doubt that our participation 
 in the Moroccan conference was the most radical 
 departure ever made from our traditional policy 
 of isolation. Roosevelt's influence was exerted 
 for preserving the balance of power in Europe. 
 As we look back upon the events of that year 
 we feel, in view of what has since happened, 
 that he was fully justified in the course he 
 pursued. Had his motives for participating 
 in the conference been known at the time, 
 they would not have been upheld either by the 
 Senate or by public opinion. There are many 
 serious objections to secret diplomacy, but ' it 
 cannot be entirely done away with even under
 
 International Cooperation 77 
 
 a republican form of government until the 
 people are educated to a fuller understanding 
 of international politics. The German Kaiser 
 was relentless in his attempt to score a diplo- 
 matic triumph while France was isolated. 
 He was thwarted, however, by the moral sup- 
 port which England, Italy, and the United 
 States gave to France. 
 
 pDuring the proceedings of th^conference 
 the American delegates declared in open session 
 that the United States had no political interest 
 in Morocco and that they would sign the treaty 
 only with the understanding that the United 
 States would thereby assume no "obligation 
 or responsibility for the enforcement thereof." 
 This declaration did not satisfy the United 
 States Senate, which no doubt suspected the 
 part that was actually played by America in 
 the conference. At any rate, when the treaty 
 was finally ratified the Senate attached to its 
 resolution of ratification the following declara- 
 tion.: 
 
 "Resolved further, That the Senate, as a 
 part of this act of ratification, understands 
 that the participation of the United States 
 in the Algeciras conference and in the formation 
 and adoption of the general act and protocol 
 which resulted therefrom, was with the sole
 
 78 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 purpose of preserving and increasing its com- 
 merce in Morocco, the protection as to life, 
 liberty, and property of its citizens residing or 
 traveling therein, and of aiding by its friendly 
 offices and efforts, in removing friction and 
 controversy which seemed to menace the peace 
 between powers signatory with the United 
 States to the treaty of 1880, all of which are 
 on terms of amity with this Government; and 
 without purpose to depart from the traditional 
 American foreign policy which forbids partici- 
 pation by the United States in the settlement of 
 political questions which are entirely European 
 in their scope." 
 
 The determination of the United States not 
 to interfere in the internal politics of European 
 states has not prevented occasional protests 
 in the name of humanity against the harsh 
 treatment accorded the Jews in certain European 
 countries. On July 17, 1902, Secretary Hay 
 protested in a note to the Rumanian govern- 
 ment against a policy which was forcing thou- 
 sands of Jews to emigrate from that country. 
 The United States, he claimed, had more than 
 a philanthropic interest in this matter, for the 
 enforced emigration of the Jews from Rumania 
 in a condition of utter destitution was "the mere 
 transplantation of an artificially produced
 
 International Cooperation 79 
 
 diseased growth to a new place'*; and, as the 
 United States was practically their only place 
 of refuge, we had a clearly established right of 
 remonstrance^? In the case of Russia informa- 
 tion has repeatedly been sought through diplo- 
 matic channels as to the extent of destitution 
 among the Jewish population, and permission 
 has been requested for the distribution of relief 
 funds raised in the United States. Such in- 
 quiries have been so framed as to amount to 
 diplomatic protests. I In his annual message of 
 1904 President Roosevelt went further and 
 openly expressed the horror of the nation at 
 the massacre of the Jews at Kishenef. These 
 protests, however, were purely diplomatic in 
 character. There was not the slightest hint 
 at intervention. During the early stages of 
 the present war in Europe the Government of 
 the United States endeavored to adhere strictly 
 to its historic policy. The German invasion of 
 Belgium with its attendant horrors made a deep 
 impression upon the American people and 
 aroused their fighting spirit even more per- 
 haps than the German policy of submarine war- 
 fare, but it was on the latter issue, in which the 
 interests and rights of the United States were 
 directly involved, that we finally entered the -* 
 war.
 
 V 
 THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY
 
 V 
 THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY 
 
 IN THE Orient American diplomacy has had a\ 
 somewhat freer hand than in Europe. Com- 
 modore Perry's expedition to Japan in 1852- 
 1854 was quite a radical departure From the 
 general policy of attending strictly to our own 
 business^ It would hardly have been under- 
 taken against a country lying within the Euro- 
 pean sphere of influence. There were, it is 
 true, certain definite grievances to redress, but 
 the main reason for the expedition was that 
 Japan refused to recognize her obligations as a 
 member of the family of nations and closed her 
 ports to all intercourse with the outside world. 
 American sailors who had been shipwrecked 
 on the coast of Japan had failed to receive the 
 treatment usually accorded by civilized nations.^ 
 Finally the United States decided to send a 
 naval force to Japan and to force that country 
 to abandon her policy of exclusion and to open 
 her ports to intercourse with other countries. 
 Japan yielded only under the threat of superior 
 
 83
 
 84 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 / 
 force( The conduct of the expedition, as well 
 
 as our subsequent diplomatic negotiations with 
 Japan, was highly creditable to the United 
 States, and the Japanese people later erected a 
 monument to the memory of Perry on the spot 
 where he first landed. j 
 
 The acquisition of the Philippine Islands 
 tended to bring us more fully into the current of 
 world politics, but it did not necessarily disturb 
 the balancing of European and American 
 spheres as set up by President Monroe. Vari- 
 ous explanations have been given of President 
 McKinley's decision to retain the Philippine 
 group, but the whole truth has in all probability 
 not yet been fully revealed. The partition of 
 China through the establishment of European 
 spheres of influence was well under way when 
 the Philippine Islands came within our grasp. 
 American commerce with China was ^at this 
 time second to that of England alone, and the 
 concessions which were being wrung from 
 China by the European powers in such rapid 
 succession presented a bad outlook for us. 
 The United States could not follow the example 
 of the powers of Europe, for the seizure of a 
 sphere of influence in China would not have been 
 supported by the Senate or upheld by public 
 opinion. It is probable that President McKin-
 
 The Open-Door Policy 85 
 
 ley thought that the Philippine Islands would 
 not only provide a market for American goods, 
 which owing to the Dingley tariff were begin- 
 ning to face retaliatory legislation abroad, but 
 that they would provide a naval base which 
 would be of great assistance in upholding our 
 interests in China. 
 
 Talcott Williams has recently made public 
 another explanation of President McKinley's 
 decision which is interesting and appears to be 
 well vouched for. He was informed by a mem- 
 ber of McKinley's cabinet th awhile the Fresi- 
 dent's mind was not yet made up on the ques- 
 tion, a personal communication was received 
 from Lord Salisbury who warned the President 
 that Germany was preparing to take over the 
 Philippine Islands in case the United States 
 shouIcT with draw; tnat such a step would prob- 
 ably precipitate a world war and that in the 
 interests of peace and harmony it would be best 
 for the United States to retain the entire group. 
 
 The famous open-door policy was outlined 
 by Secretary Hay in notes dated September 6, 
 1899, addressed to Great Britain, Germany, and 
 Russia. Each of these powers was requested to 
 give assurance and to make a declaration to the 
 following effect: (i) that it would not interfere 
 with any treaty port or vested interests in its so-
 
 86 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 called sphere of influence; (2) that it would per- 
 mit the Chinese tariff to continue in force in 
 such sphere and to be collected by Chinese 
 officials; (3) that it would not discriminate 
 against other foreigners in the matter of port 
 dues or railroad rates. Similar notes were later 
 addressed to France, Italy, and Japan. Eng- 
 land alone expressed her willingness to sign 
 such a declaration. The other powers, while 
 professing thorough accord with the principles 
 set forth by Mr. Hay, avoided committing them- 
 selves to a formal declaration and no such decla- 
 ration was ever made. Mr. c Hay made a skill- 
 ful move, however, to clinch matters by in- 
 forming each of the powers to whom the note 
 had been addressed that in view of the favor- 
 able replies from the other powers, its acceptance 
 of the proposals of the United States was con- 
 sidered "as final and definitive." 
 
 * 
 
 Americans generally are under the impres- 
 sion that John Hay originated the open-door 
 policy and that it was successfully upheld 
 by the United States. Neither of these im- 
 pressions is correct. A few months before 
 John Hay formulated his famous note Lord 
 Charles B^resford came through America on 
 his return from China and addressed the lead- 
 ing chambers of commerce from San Francisco
 
 The Open-Door Policy 87 
 
 to New York, telling Americans what was actu- 
 ally taking place in China and urging this coun- 
 try to unite with England and Japan in an ef- 
 fort to maintain the open door. Like the 
 Monroe Doctrine, the open-door policy was thus 
 Anglo-American in origin. There is little doubt 
 that England and Japan were willing to form an 
 alliance with the United States for the purpose 
 of maintaining the open door in China, but our 
 traditional policy of isolation prevented our 
 committing ourselves to the employment of 
 force. President McKinley, following the ex- 
 ample of President Monroe, preferred an- 
 nouncing our policy independently and re- 
 questing the other powers to consent to it. 
 Had John Hay been able to carry out the plan 
 which he favored of an alliance with England 
 and Japan, the mere announcement of the fact 
 would have been sufficient to check the aggres- 
 sions of the powers in China. Instead of such 
 an alliance, however, we let it be known that 
 while we favored the open door we would not 
 fight for it under any conditions. 
 
 The utter worthlessness of the replies that 
 were made in response to Hay's note of Septem- 
 ber 6, 1899, became fully apparent in the 
 discussions that soon arose as to the status 
 of consuls in the various spheres of influence.
 
 88 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 Japan claimed that sovereignty did not pass 
 with a lease and that even if China should sur- 
 render jurisdiction over her own people, the 
 lessee governments could not acquire jurisdic- 
 tion over foreigners in leased territory. This 
 position was undoubtedly correct if the terri- 
 torial integrity of China was really to be pre- 
 served, but after negotiations with Russia and 
 the other powers concerned Mr. Hay wrote to 
 Minister Conger on February 3, 1900, that 
 "The United States consuls in districts adja- 
 cent to the foreign leased territories are to be 
 instructed that they have no authority to 
 exercise extra-territorial consular jurisdiction 
 or to perform ordinary non-judicial consular 
 acts within the leased territory under their 
 present Chinese exequaturs." Application was 
 then made to the European powers for the ad- 
 mission of American consuls in the leased ter- 
 ritories for the performance of the ordinary 
 consular functions, but in no case were they to 
 exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction within a 
 leased territory. 
 
 The exploitation of China which continued 
 at a rapid rate naturally aroused an intense 
 anti-foreign sentiment and led to the Boxer 
 uprising. Events moved with startling rapid- 
 ity and United States troops took a prominent
 
 The Open-Door Policy 89 
 
 part with those of England, France, Russia, and 
 Japan in the march to Peking for the relief of 
 the legations. In a note to the powers July 3, 
 1900, Secretary Hay, in defining the attitude 
 of the United States on the Chinese question, 
 said: "The policy of the government of the 
 United States is to seek a solution which may 
 bring about permanent safety and peace to 
 China, preserve Chinese territorial and admin- 
 istrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed 
 to friendly powers by treaty and international 
 law, and safeguard for the world the principle 
 of equal and impartial trade with all parts 
 the Chinese empire." Mr. Hay's notes were 
 skillfully worded and had some influence in 
 helping to formulate public opinion on the 
 Chinese question both in this country and 
 abroad, but we know now from his private 
 letters w*hich have recently been made public 
 that he realized only too fully the utter futility 
 of his efforts to stay the course of events. Dur- 
 ing the exciting days of June, 1900, when the 
 foreign legations at Peking were in a state of 
 siege, Mr. Hay wrote to John W. Foster as 
 follows : 
 
 "What can be done in the present diseased 
 state of the public mind ? There is such a mad- 
 dog hatred of England prevalent among news-
 
 90 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 papers and politicians that anything we should 
 now do in China to take care of our imperiled 
 interests would be set down to 'subservience 
 to Great Britain*. . . . Every Senator I 
 see says, 'For God's sake, don't let it appear 
 we have any understanding with England.' 
 How can I make bricks without straw? That 
 we should be compelled to refuse the assistance of 
 the greatest power in the world, in carrying out 
 our own policy, because all Irishmen are Demo- 
 crats and some Germans are fools is enough 
 to drive a man mad. Yet we shall do what we 
 can." 
 
 A little later (September 20, 1900) in confi- 
 dential letters to Henry Adams, he exclaimed : 
 
 "About China, it is the devil's own mess. 
 We cannot possibly publish all the facts without 
 breaking off relations with several Powers. 
 We shall have to do the best we can, and take 
 the consequences, which will be pretty serious, I 
 do not doubt. 'Give and take' the axiom of 
 diplomacy to the rest of the world is posi- 
 tively forbidden to us, by both the Senate and 
 public opinion. We must take what we can 
 and give nothing which greatly narrows our 
 possibilities. 
 
 "I take it, you agree with us that we are to 
 limit as far as possible our military operations
 
 The Open-Door Policy 91 
 
 in China, to withdraw our troops at the earliest 
 day consistent with our obligations, and in the 
 final adjustment to do everything we can for the 
 integrity and reform of China, and to hold on 
 like grim death to the Open Door. . . ." 
 
 Again, November 21, 1900: 
 
 "What a business this has been in China! 
 So far we have got on by being honest and nai'f. 
 . . . At least we are spared the infamy of 
 an alliance with Germany. T would rathpr, T 
 think be the dupe of China, than the chum of 
 the Kaiser. Have you noticed how the world 
 will take anything nowadays from a German? 
 Billow said yesterday in substance 'We have 
 demanded of China everything we can think of. 
 If we think of anything else we will demand 
 that, and be d d to you' and not a man in 
 the world kicks." 
 
 During the long negotiations that followed 
 the occupation of Peking by the powers, the 
 United States threw the weight of its influence 
 on the side of moderation, urging the powers not 
 to impose too many burdens on China and 
 declaring that the only hope for the future lay 
 in a strong, independent, responsible Chinese 
 government. Contrary to the terms of the 
 final protocol, however, Russia retained in 
 Manchuria the troops concentrated there dur-
 
 92 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 ing the Boxer movement with a view to ex- 
 acting further concessions from China. The 
 open-door policy was again ignored. The seri- 
 ousness of the situation led England and Japan 
 to sign a defensive agreement January 30, 
 1902, recognizing England's interest in China 
 and Japan's interest in Korea, and providing 
 that if either party should be attacked in de- 
 fense of its interest, the other party would re- 
 main neutral, unless a third power joined in, in 
 which event the second party would come to the 
 assistance of the first. A formal protest made 
 by the United States, February I, against some 
 of the demands Russia was making on China 
 led Russia to conclude that the American gov- 
 ernment had an understanding with England 
 and Japan, but Mr. Hay gave the assurance 
 that he had known nothing about the Anglo- 
 Japanese agreement until it was made public. 
 He succeeded in securing from Russia, however, 
 a definite promise to evacuate Manchuria, but 
 as the time for the withdrawal of her troops drew 
 near, Russia again imposed new conditions on 
 China, and deliberately misrepresented to the 
 United States the character of the new proposals. 
 After the suppression of the Boxer uprising, 
 China had agreed to extend the scope of her 
 commercial treaties with the powers. When
 
 The Open-Door Policy 93 
 
 the negotiation of a new treaty with the United 
 States was begun, our representative demanded 
 that at least two new ports in Manchuria be 
 opened to foreign trade and residence. The 
 Chinese commissioners declined to discuss the 
 subject on the alleged ground that they had 
 no instructions to do so. It was evident that 
 there was secret opposition somewhere, and after 
 considerable difficulty Mr. Hay finally secured 
 evidence that it came from Russia. When con- 
 fronted with the evidence the Russian Govern- 
 ment finally admitted the facts. We were told 
 that we could not be admitted to one of the 
 ports that we had designated because it was 
 situated within the Russian railway zone, and 
 therefore not under the complete jurisdiction of 
 China, but that another port would be substi- 
 tuted for it. Secretary Hay and President Roose- 
 velt were helpless. They accepted what they 
 could get and kept quiet. "The administra- 
 tive entity" of China was again utterly ignored. 
 The difficulty was that we did not have a strong 
 enough navy in the Pacific to fight Russia 
 alone, and President Roosevelt and Secretary 
 Hay realized that neither the Senate nor public 
 opinion would consent to an alliance with 
 England and Japan. Had these three powers 
 made a joint declaration in support of the open-
 
 94 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 door policy, the exploitation of China would 
 have ceased, there would have been no Russo- 
 Japanese war, and the course of world history 
 during the period that has since intervened 
 might have been very different. 
 
 When we backed down and abandoned Man- 
 churia to Russian exploitation Japan stepped 
 into the breach. After long negotiations the 
 Japanese Government finally delivered an ulti- 
 matum to Russia which resulted in the rupture 
 of diplomatic relations and war. After a series 
 of notable victories on land and sea Japan was 
 fast approaching the end of her resources, and 
 it is now an open secret that the Emperor wrote 
 a personal letter to President Roosevelt re- 
 questing him to intervene diplomatically and 
 pave the way for peace. The President was 
 quick to act on the suggestion and the commis- 
 sioners of Russia and Japan met at Portsmouth, 
 New Hampshire. Here President Roosevelt's 
 intervention should have ceased. The terms 
 of the Treaty of Portsmouth were a bitter 
 disappointment to the Japanese people and the 
 Japanese commissioners undertook to shift the 
 burden from their shoulders by stating that 
 President Roosevelt had urged them to sur- 
 render their claim to the Island of Saghalien 
 and to give up all idea of an indemnity. Japa-
 
 The Open-Door Policy 95 
 
 nese military triumph had again, as at the 
 close of the Chino-Japanese war, been followed 
 by diplomatic defeat, and for this defeat Japa- 
 nese public opinion held President Roosevelt 
 responsible. From the days of Commodore 
 Perry and Townsend Harris to the Treaty of 
 Portsmouth, relations between the United 
 States and Japan had been almost ideal. Since 
 the negotiations at Portsmouth there has been a 
 considerable amount of bad feeling, and at 
 times diplomatic relations have been subjected 
 to a severe strain. 
 
 Having fought a costly war in order to check 
 the Russian advance in Manchuria, the Japa- 
 nese naturally feel that they have a paramount 
 interest in China. They have consequently 
 sharply resented the attempts which the United 
 States has subsequently made, particularly 
 Secretary Knox's proposal for the neutraliza- 
 tion of the railways of Manchuria, to formulate 
 policies for China. They take the position that 
 we have had our day and that we must now re- 
 main hands off so far as China is concerned. 
 This attitude of mind is not unnatural and in 
 my judgment the United States has acted wisely 
 in acknowledging, as we recently did in the 
 Lansing-Ishii agreement, the 
 rf Jhpin in fhinn
 
 VI 
 ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
 
 VI 
 ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS 
 
 A FEW years ago George L. Beer, one of our 
 leading students of British colonial policy, said. 
 "It is easily conceivable, and not at all improb- 
 able, that the political evolution of the next 
 centuries may take such a course that the 
 American Revolution will lose the great sig- 
 nificance that is now attached to it, and will 
 appear merely as the temporary separation of 
 two kindred peoples whose inherent similarity 
 was obscured by superficial differences result- 
 ing from dissimilar economic and social condi- 
 tions." This statement does not appear as 
 extravagant to-day as it did ten years ago. As 
 early as 1894, Captain Mahan, the great author- 
 ity on naval history, published an essay entitled 
 " Possibilities of an Anglo-American Reunion," 
 in which he pointed out that these two countries 
 were the only great powers which were by 
 graphical position exempt from the burden of 
 large armies and dependent upon the sea fo 
 intercourse with the other great nations. 
 
 99 
 
 geo-I 
 
 n of/ 
 
 forf
 
 ioo From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 In a volume dealing with questions of Ameri- 
 can foreign policy, published in 1907, the pres- 
 ent writer concluded the last paragraph with 
 this statement: "By no means the least signifi- 
 cant of recent changes is the development of 
 cordial relations with England; and it seems 
 now that the course of world politics is destined 
 to lead to the further reknitting together of the 
 two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race in 
 bonds of peace and international sympathy, in a 
 union not cemented by any formal alliance, but 
 based on community of interests and of airns, 
 a union that will constitute the highest guar- 
 antee of the political stability and moral progress 
 of the world." 
 
 The United States has very naturally had 
 closer contact with England than with any 
 other European power. This has been due to 
 the fact that England was thef mother country, 
 that after independence was established a large 
 part of ourtrade continued to be with the 
 British Isles, that our nortbH~-houndary 
 touches British territory for nearly four thou- 
 sand miles, and that the British navy and 
 mercantile marine have dominated the Atlantic 
 (pecan which has been our chief highway of 
 mtercourse with other nations. Having had 
 more points of contact we have had more dis-
 
 Anglo-American Relations 101 
 
 putes with England than with any other nation. 
 Some writers have half jocularly attributed 
 this latter fact to our common language. The 
 Englishman reads our books, papers, and 
 magazines, and knows what we think of him, 
 while we read what he writes about us, and in 
 neither case is the resulting impression flatter- 
 ing to the national pride. 
 
 Any one who takes the trouble to read what 
 was written in England about America and the 
 Americans between 1820 and 1850 will wonder 
 how war was avoided. A large number of 
 English travellers came to the United States 
 during this period and published books about 
 us when they got home. The books were 
 bad enough in themselves, but the great Eng- 
 lish periodicals, the Edinburgh Review, Black- 
 wood's, the British Review, and the Quarterly, 
 quoted at length the most objectionable pas- 
 sages from these writers and made malicious 
 attacks on Americans and American institu- 
 tions. American men were described as "tur- 
 bulent citizens, abandoned Christians, incon- 
 stant husbands, unnatural fathers, and treach- 
 erous friends." Our soldiers and sailors were 
 charged with cowardice in the War of 1812. 
 It was stated that "in the southern parts of the 
 Union the rites of our holy faith are almost
 
 IO2 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 never practised. . . . Three and a half 
 millions enjoy no means of religious instruction. 
 The religious principle is gaining ground in the 
 northern parts of the Union; it is becoming 
 fashionable among the better orders of society 
 to go to church . . . The greater number 
 of states declare it to be unconstitutional to 
 refer to the providence of God in any of their 
 public acts." The Quarterly Review informed 
 its readers that "the supreme felicity of a true- 
 born American is inaction of body and inanity 
 of mind." Dickens's American Notes was an 
 ungrateful return for the kindness and enthusi- 
 asm with which he had been received in this 
 country. De Tocqueville's Democracy in Amer- 
 ica was widely read in England and doubtless 
 had its influence in revising opinion concerning 
 America. Richard Cobden was, however, the 
 first Englishman to interpret correctly the 
 significance of America as an economic force. 
 His essay on America, published in 1835, 
 pointed out that British policy should be more 
 concerned with economic relations with Amer- 
 ica than with European politics. As Professor 
 Dunning says, "Cobden made the United States 
 the text of his earliest sermon against militarism 
 and protectionism." 
 Notwithstanding innumerable disputes over
 
 Anglo-American Relations 103 
 
 boundaries, fisheries, and fur seals, trade with 
 the British West Indies and Canada, and ques- 
 tions of neutral rights and obligations, we 
 have had unbroken peace for more than a hun- 
 dred years. Upon several occasions, notably 
 during the Canadian insurrection of_i8^7 and 
 during our own Civil War, disturbances along 
 the Canadian border created strained relations, 
 but absence of frontier guards and forts has 
 prevented hasty action on the part of either 
 government. The agreement of 1817, effecting 
 disarmament on trie Great Lakes, has not only 
 saved both countries the enormous cost of 
 maintaining navies on these inland waters, 
 *but it has prevented hostile demonstrations in 
 times of crisis. 
 
 During the Canadian rebellion of 1837 Ameri- 
 cans along the border expressed openly their 
 sympathy for the insurgents who secured arms 
 and munitions from the American side. In 
 December a British force crossed the Niagara 
 River, boarded and took possession oFthe Caro- 
 tins, a vessel which had been hired by the 
 insurgents to convey their cannon and other sup- 
 plies. The ship was fired and sent over the 
 Falls. When the Caroline was boarded one 
 American, Amos Durfee, was killed and several 
 others wounded. The United States at once
 
 IO4 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 demanded redress, but the British Government 
 took the position that the seizure of the Caro- 
 line was a justifiable act of self-defense against 
 people whom their own government either 
 could not or would not control. 
 
 The demands of the United States were still 
 unredressed when in 1840 a Canadian named 
 Alexander McLeod made the boast in a tavern 
 on the American side that he had slain Durfee. 
 He was taken at his word, examined before a 
 magistrate, and committed to jail in Lockport. 
 McLeod's arrest created great excitement on 
 both sides of the border. The British minister 
 at Washington called upon the Government of 
 the United States "to take prompt and effectual 
 steps for the liberation of Mr. McLeod." 
 Secretary of State Forsyth replied that the of- 
 .ifense with which McLeod was charged had 
 ; been committed within the State of New York; 
 that the jurisdiction of each State of the United 
 States was, within its proper sphere, perfectly 
 independent of the Federal Government; that 
 the latter could not interfere. The date set for 
 the trial of McLeod was the fourth Monday in 
 March, 1841. Van Buren's term ended and 
 Harrison's began on the 4th of March, and 
 Webster became Secretary of State. The 
 British minister was given instructions by his
 
 Anglo-American Relations 105 
 
 government to demand the immediate release 
 of McLeod. This demand was made, he said, 
 because the attack on the Caroline was an act 
 of a public character; because it was a justifiable 
 use of force for the defense of British territory 
 against unprovoked attack by "British rebels 
 and American pirates"; because it was contrary 
 to the principles of civilized nations to hold 
 individuals responsible for acts done by order of 
 the constituted authorities of the State; and be- 
 cause Her Majesty's government could not ad- 
 mit the doctrine that the Federal Government 
 had no power to interfere and that the decision 
 must rest with the State of New York. The 
 relations of foreign powers were with the Fed- 
 eral Government. To admit that the Federal 
 Government had no control over a State would 
 lead to the dissolution of the Union so far as 
 foreign powers were concerned, and to the 
 accrediting of foreign diplomatic agents, not to 
 the Federal Government, but to each separate 
 State. Webster received the note quietly and 
 sent the attorney-general to Lockport to see that 
 McLeod had competent counsel. After con- 
 siderable delay, during which Webster replied 
 to the main arguments of the British note, 
 McLeod was acquitted and released. 
 
 In the midst of the dispute over the case of the
 
 106 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 Caroline serious trouble arose between the 
 authorities of Maine and New Brunswick over 
 the undetermined boundary between the St. 
 Croix River and the Highlands, and there en- 
 sued the so-called "Aroostook War." During 
 the summer of 1838 British and American lum- 
 bermen began operating along the Aroostook 
 River in large numbers. The governor of 
 Maine sent a body of militia to enforce the au- 
 thority of that State, and the New Brunswick 
 authorities procured a detachment of British 
 regulars to back up their position. Bloodshed 
 was averted by the arrival of General Winfield 
 Scott, who managed to restrain the Maine 
 authorities. The administration found it neces- 
 sary to take up seriously the settlement of the 
 boundary question, and for the next three years 
 the matter was under consideration, while each 
 side had surveyors employed in a vain attempt 
 to locate a line which would correspond to the 
 line of the treaty. As soon as the McLeod 
 affair was settled, Webster devoted himself 
 earnestly to the boundary question. He de- 
 cided to drop the mass of data accumulated by 
 the surveyors and historians, and to reach an 
 agreement by direct negotiation. 
 
 In April^ 1 842, Alexander Baring, Lord Ash- 
 burton, arrived in Washington and the follow-
 
 Anglo-American Relations 107 
 
 ing August the Webster^Ashhurton treaty was 
 signed. The boundary fixed by the treaty gave 
 Maine a little more than half the area which 
 she claimed and the United States appropriated 
 $i 50,000 to compensate Maine for the territory 
 which she had lost. 
 
 The settlement of these matters did not, how- 
 ever, insure peace with England. Settlers 
 were crowding into Oregon and it was evident 
 that the joint occupation, established by the 
 convention of 1818, would soon have to be ter- 
 minated and a divisional line agreed upon. 
 Great Britain insisted that her southern bound- 
 ary should extend at least as far as the Columbia 
 River, while Americans finally claimed the 
 whole of the disputed area, and one of the slo- 
 gans of the presidential campaign of 1844 was 
 " Fifty-Four-Forty__or_jjjght." At the same 
 time Tireat Britain actively opposed the an- 
 nexation of Texas by the_IInitecLStates. Her 
 main reason for this course was that she wished 
 to encourage the development of Texas as a 
 cotton-growing country from which she could 
 draw a large enough supply to make her in- 
 dependent of the United States. If Texas 
 should thus devote herself to the production 
 of cotton as her chief export crop, she would, 
 of course, adopt a free-trade policy and thus
 
 io8 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 create a considerable market for British 
 goods. 
 
 As soon as it became evident that Tyler con- 
 templated taking definite steps toward annexa- 
 tion, Lord Aberdeen secured the cooperation of 
 the government of Louis Philippe in opposing 
 the absorption of Texas by the American repub- 
 lic. While the treaty for the annexation of 
 Texas was before the Senate, Lord Aberdeen 
 came forward with a proposition that England 
 and France should unite with Texas and Mexico 
 in a diplomatic act or perpetual treaty ^securing 
 toTexasTecognition as an independent republic, 
 but preventing her from ever acquiring territory 
 beyond theTKio Grande or joining the American 
 union. While th^ United States would be in- 
 vited to join in this act, it was not expected that 
 the government of that country would agree to 
 it. Mexico obstinately refused to recognize the 
 independence of Texas. Lord Aberdeen was 
 so anxious to prevent the annexation of Texas 
 that he was ready, if supported by France, to 
 coerce Mexico and fight the United States, but 
 the French Government was not willing to go 
 this far, so the scheme was abandoned. 
 
 The two foremost issues in the campaign of 
 1844 were the annexation of Texas and the occu- 
 pation of Oregon. Texas was annexed by joint
 
 Anglo-American Relations 109 
 
 resolution a few days before the inauguration 
 of Polk. This act, it was foreseen, would prob- 
 ably provoke a war with Mexico, so Folk's first 
 task was to adjust the Oregon dispute in order 
 to avoid complications with England. The 
 fate of California was also involved. That 
 province was not likely to remain long in the 
 hands of a weak power like Mexico. In fact, 
 British consular agents and naval officers had 
 for several years been urging upon their govern- 
 ment the great value of Upper California. 
 Aberdeen refused to countenance any insur- 
 rectionary movement in California, but he 
 directed his agents to keep vigilant watch on the 
 proceedings of citizens of the United States in 
 that province. Had England and Mexico 
 arrived at an understanding and joined in a war 
 against the United States, the probabilities are 
 that England would have acquired not only the 
 whole of Oregon, but California besides. In 
 fact, in May, 1846, just as we were on the point 
 of going to war with Mexico, the president of 
 Mexico officially proposed to transfer California 
 to England as security for a loan. Fortunately, 
 the Oregon question had been adjusted and 
 England had no reason for wishing to go to war 
 with the United States. Mexico's offer was 
 therefore rejected. Polk managed the diplo-
 
 no From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 matic situation with admirable promptness and 
 firmness. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
 democratic platform had demanded "Fifty- 
 Four-Forty or Fight," as soon as Polk became 
 President he offered to compromise with Eng- 
 land on the 49th parallel. When this offer was 
 declinedrhe asked permission of Congress to give 
 England the necessary notice for the termina- 
 tion of the joint occupation agreement, to pro- 
 vide for the military defense of the territory 
 in dispute, and to extend over it the laws of the 
 United States. A few months later notice was 
 given to England, but at the same time the hope 
 was expressed that the matter might be adjusted 
 diplomatically. As soon as it was evident that 
 the United States was in earnest, England 
 gracefully yielded and accepted the terms which 
 had been first proposed. 
 
 As war with Mexico was imminent the public 
 generally approved of the Oregon compromise, 
 though the criticism was made by some in the 
 North that the South, having secured in Texas 
 a large addition to slave territory, was indifferent 
 about the expansion of free territory. In fact, 
 Henry Cabot Lodge, in his recent little book, "One 
 Hundred Years of Peace," says: "The loss of 
 the region between the forty-ninth parallel and 
 the line of 54-40 was one of the most severe
 
 Anglo-American Relations in 
 
 which ever befell the United States. Whether 
 it could have been obtained without a war is 
 probably doubtful, but it never ought to have 
 been said, officially or otherwise, that we would 
 fight for 54-40 unless we were fully prepared to 
 do so. If we had stood firm for the line of 54-40 
 without threats, it is quite possible that we 
 might have succeeded in the end; but the hy- 
 potheses of history are of little practical value, 
 and the fact remains that by the treaty of 
 1846 we lost a complete control of the Pacific 
 coast." 
 
 That the United States lived through what 
 Professor Dunning calls "the roaring forties" 
 without a war with England seems now little 
 less than a miracle. During the next fifteen 
 years relations were much more amicable, 
 though by no means free from disputes. The 
 most important diplomatic act was the signa- 
 ture in 1850 of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty 
 which conceded to England a joint interest in 
 any canal that might be built through the isth- 
 mus connecting North and South America. 
 One of the interesting episodes of this period was 
 the dismissal of Crampton, the British minister, 
 who insisted on enlisting men in the United 
 States for service in the Crimean War, an act 
 which pales into insignificance in comparison
 
 ii2 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 with some of the things which Bernstorff did 
 during the early stages of the present war. 
 "^ Relations between the United States and 
 / England during the American Civil War in- 
 volved so many highly technical questions that 
 it is impossible to do more than touch upon 
 them in the present connection. Diplomatic 
 discussions centred about such questions as 
 the validity of the blockade established by 
 President Lincoln, the recognition by England 
 of Confederate belligerency, the Trent affair, 
 and the responsibility of England for the depre- 
 dations committed by the Alabama and other 
 Confederate cruisers. When the United States 
 first demanded reparation for the damage in- 
 flicted on American commerce by the Confed- 
 erate cruisers, the British Government dis- 
 claimed all liability on the ground that the 
 fitting out of the cruisers had not been com- 
 pleted within British jurisdiction. Even after 
 the close of the war the British Government 
 continued to reject all proposals for a settle- 
 ment. The American nation, flushed with vic- 
 tory, was bent on redress, and so deep-seated 
 was the resentment against England, that the 
 Fenian movement, which had for its object 
 the establishment of an independent republic 
 in Ireland, met with open encouragement in this
 
 Anglo-American Relations 113 
 
 country. The House of Representatives went 
 so far as to repeal the law forbidding Americans 
 to fit out ships for belligerents, but the Senate 
 failed to concur. The successful war waged by 
 Prussia against Austria in 1866 disturbed the 
 European balance, and rumblings of the ap- 
 proaching Franco-Prussian war caused uneasi- 
 ness in British cabinet circles. Fearing that if 
 Great Britain were drawn into the conflict the 
 American people might take a sweet revenge by 
 fitting out "Alabamas" for her enemies, the 
 British Government assumed a more concilia- 
 tory attitude, and in January, 1869, Lord Clar- 
 endon signed with Reverdy Johnson a conven- 
 tion providing for the submission to a mixed 
 commission of all claims which had arisen since 
 1853. Though the convention included, it did 
 not specifically mention, the Alabama Claims, 
 and it failed to contain any expression of regret 
 for the course pursued by the British Govern- 
 ment during the war. The Senate, therefore, 
 refused by an almost unanimous vote to ratify 
 the arrangement. 
 
 When Grant became President, Hamilton 
 Fish renewed the negotiations through Motley, 
 the American minister at London, but the latter 
 was unduly influenced by the extreme views 
 of Sumner, chairman of the Senate committee
 
 1 14 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 on foreign relations, to whose influence he 
 owed his appointment, and got things in a bad 
 tangle. Fish then transferred the negotiations 
 to Washington, where a joint high commission, 
 appointed to settle the various disputes with 
 Canada, convened in 1871. A few months 
 later the treaty of Washington was signed. 
 Among other things it provided for submitting 
 the Alabama Claims to an arbitration tri- 
 bunal composed of five members, one appointed 
 by England, one by the United States, and the 
 other three by the rulers of Italy, Switzerland, 
 and Brazil. When this tribunal met at Geneva, 
 the following year, the United States, greatly 
 to the surprise of everybody, presented not 
 only the direct claims for the damage inflicted 
 by the Confederate cruisers, but also indirect 
 claims for the loss sustained through the transfer 
 of American shipping to foreign flags, for the 
 prolongation of the war, and for increased 
 rates of insurance. Great Britain threatened 
 to withdraw from the arbitration, but Charles 
 Francis Adams, the American member of the 
 tribunal, rose nobly to the occasion and decided 
 against the cpntention of his own government. 
 The indirect claims were rejected by a unani- 
 mous vote and on the direct claims the United 
 States was awarded the sum of $15,500,000.
 
 Anglo-American Relations 115 
 
 Although the British member of the tribunal 
 dissented from the decision his government 
 promptly paid the award. This was the most 
 important case that had ever been submitted 
 to arbitration and its successful adjustment 
 encouraged the hope that the two great branches 
 of the English-speaking peoples would never 
 again have to resort to war. 
 
 Between the settlement of the Alabama 
 Claims and the controversy over the Venezue- 
 lan boundary, diplomatic intercourse between 
 the two countries was enlivened by the efforts 
 of Blaine and Frelinghuysen to convince the 
 British Government that the Clayton-Bulwer 
 treaty was out of date and therefore no longer 
 binding, by the assertion of American ownership 
 in the seal herds of Bering Sea and the attempt 
 to prevent Canadians from taking these animals 
 in the open sea, and by the summary dismissal 
 of Lord Sackville-West, the third British minis- 
 ter to receive his passports from the United 
 States without request. 
 
 President Cleveland's bold assertion of the 
 Monroe Doctrine in the Venezuelan boundary 
 dispute, while the subject of much criticism 
 at the time both at home and abroad, turned 
 out to be a most opportune assertion of the 
 intention of the United States to protect the
 
 Ii6 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 American continents from the sort of exploita- 
 tion to which Africa and Asia have fallen a 
 prey, and, strange to say, it had a clarifying 
 effect on our relations with England, whose 
 attitude has since been uniformly friendly. 
 
 The Venezuelan affair was followed by the 
 proposal of Lord Salisbury to renew the nego- 
 tiations for a permanent treaty of arbitration 
 which had been first entered into by Secretary 
 Gresham and Sir Julian Pauncefote. In the 
 spring of 1890 the Congress of the United 
 States had adopted a resolution in favor of the 
 negotiation of arbitration treaties with friendly 
 nations, and the British House of Commons had 
 in July, 1893, expressed its hearty approval of a 
 general arbitration treaty between the United 
 States and England. The matter was then 
 taken up diplomatically, as stated above, but 
 was dropped when the Venezuelan boundary 
 dispute became acute. Lord Salisbury's pro- 
 posal was favorably received by President 
 Cleveland, and after mature deliberation the 
 draft of a treaty was finally drawn up and 
 signed by Secretary Olney and Sir Julian 
 Pauncefote. This treaty provided for the 
 submission of pecuniary claims to the familiar 
 mixed commission with an umpire or referee 
 to decide disputed points. Controversies in-
 
 Anglo-American Relations 117 
 
 volving the determination of territorial claims 
 were to be submitted to a tribunal composed 
 of six members, three justices of the Supreme 
 Court of the United States or judges of the 
 Circuit Court to be nominated by the president 
 of the United States, and three judges of the 
 British Supreme Court of Judicature or mem- 
 bers of the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
 Council to be nominated by the British sovereign, 
 and an award made by a majority of not less 
 than five to one was to be final. In case of an 
 award made by less than the prescribed ma- 
 jority, the award was also to be final unless 
 either power should within three months protest 
 against it, in which case the award was to be 
 of no validity. This treaty was concluded in 
 January, 1897, and promptly submitted to the 
 Senate. When President Cleveland's term ex- 
 pired in March no action had been taken. 
 President McKinley endorsed the treaty in 
 his inaugural address and urged the Senate to 
 take prompt action, but when the vote was 
 taken, May 5th, it stood forty-three for, and 
 twenty-six against, the treaty. It thus lacked 
 three votes of the two thirds required for rati- 
 fication. The failure of this treaty was a 
 great disappointment to the friends of inter- 
 national arbitration. The opposition within
 
 1 1 8 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 his own party to President Cleveland, under 
 whose direction the treaty had been negotiated, 
 and the change of administration, probably 
 had a good deal to do with its defeat. Public 
 opinion, especially in the Northern States of 
 the Union, was still hostile to England. Irish 
 agitators could always get a sympathetic hear- 
 ing in America, and politicians could not resist 
 the temptation to play on anti-British preju- 
 dices in order to bring out the Irish vote. 
 
 The Spanish War was the turning point in 
 our relations with England as in many other 
 things. The question as to who were our friends 
 in 1898 was much discussed at the time, and 
 when revived by the press upon the occasion 
 of the visit of Prince Henry of Prussia to the 
 United States in February, 1902, even the 
 cabinets of Europe could not refrain from 
 taking part in the controversy. In order to 
 diminish the enthusiasm over the Prince's 
 visit the British press circulated the story 
 that Lord Pauncefote had checked a movement 
 of the European powers to prevent any inter- 
 vention of the United States in Cuba; while 
 the German papers asserted that Lord Paunce- 
 fote had taken the initiative in opposing 
 American intervention. It is certain that the 
 attitude of the British Government, as well as
 
 Anglo-American Relations 119 
 
 of the British people, from the outbreak of 
 hostilities to the close of the war, was friendly. 
 As for Germany, while the conduct of the 
 government was officially correct, public sen- 
 timent expressed itself with great violence 
 against the United States. The conduct of 
 the German admiral, Diederichs, in Manila 
 Bay has never been satisfactorily explained. 
 Shortly after Dewey's victory a German squad- 
 ron, superior to the American in strength, 
 steamed into the Bay and displayed, according 
 to Dewey, an "extraordinary disregard of the 
 usual courtesies of naval intercourse." Dewey 
 finally sent his flag-lieutenant, Brumby, to 
 inform the German admiral that "if he wants 
 a fight he can have it right now." The German 
 admiral at once apologized. It is well known 
 now that the commander of the British squad- 
 ron, which was in a position to bring its guns 
 to bear on the Germans, gave Dewey to under- 
 stand that he could rely on more than moral 
 support from him in case of trouble. In fact, 
 John Hay wrote from London at the beginning 
 of the war that the British navy was at our 
 disposal for the asking. 
 
 Great Britain's change of attitude toward 
 the United States was so marked that some 
 writers have naively concluded that a secret
 
 I2O From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 treaty of alliance between the two countries 
 was made in 1897. The absurdity of such a 
 statement was pointed out by Senator Lodge 
 several years ago. England's change of attitude 
 is not difficult to understand. For a hundred 
 years after the battle of Trafalgar, England 
 had pursued the policy of maintaining a navy 
 large enough to meet all comers. With the 
 rapid growth of other navies during the closing 
 years of the nineteenth century, England real- 
 ized that she could no longer pursue this policy. 
 Russia, Japan, and Germany had all adopted 
 extensive naval programs when we went to 
 war with Spain. Our acquisition of the Philip- 
 pines and Porto Rico and our determination to 
 build an isthmian canal made a large American 
 navy inevitable. Great Britain realized, there- 
 fore, that she would have to cast about for 
 future allies. She therefore signed the Hay- 
 Pauncefote Treaty with us in 1901, and a de- 
 fensive alliance with Japan in 1902. 
 
 In view of the fact that the United States 
 was bent on carrying out the long-deferred canal ' 
 scheme, Great Britain realized that a further 
 insistence on her rights under the Clayton- 
 Bulwer Treaty would lead to friction and 
 possible conflict. She wisely decided, therefore, 
 to recede from the position which she had held
 
 Anglo-American Relations 121 
 
 for half a century and to give us a free hand 
 in the construction and control of the canal 
 at whatever point we might choose to build it. 
 While the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was limited 
 in terms to the canal question, it was in reality 
 of much wider significance. It amounted, in 
 fact, to the recognition of American naval su- 
 premacy in the West Indies, and since its signa- 
 ture Great Britain has withdrawn her squadron 
 from this important strategic area. The su- 
 premacy of the United States in the Caribbean 
 is now firmly established and in fact unques- 
 tioned. The American public did not appre- 
 ciate at the time the true significance of the 
 Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, and a few years later 
 Congress inserted in the Panama Tolls Act a 
 clause exempting American ships engaged in 
 the coast-wise trade from the payment of tolls. 
 Great Britain at once protested against the 
 exemption clause as a violation of the Hay- 
 Pauncefote Treaty and anti-British sentiment 
 at once flared up in all parts of the United 
 States. Most American authorities on inter- 
 national law and diplomacy believed that 
 Great Britain's interpretation of the treaty 
 was correct. Fortunately President Wilson 
 took the same view, and in spite of strong oppo- 
 sition he persuaded Congress to repeal the ex-
 
 122 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 emption clause. This was an act of simple 
 justice and it removed the only outstanding 
 subject of dispute between the two countries. 
 
 The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty was by no means 
 the only evidence of a change of attitude on 
 the part of Great Britain. As we have already 
 seen, Great Britain and the United States were 
 in close accord during the Boxer uprising in 
 China and the subsequent negotiations. During 
 the Russo-Japanese war public sentiment in 
 both England and the United States was 
 strongly in favor of Japan. At the Algeciras 
 conference on Moroccan affairs in 1905 the 
 United States, in its effort to preserve the 
 European balance of power, threw the weight of 
 its influence on the side of England -and France. 
 
 The submission of the Alaskan boundary dis- 
 pute to a form of arbitration in which Canada 
 could not win and we could not lose was another 
 evidence of the friendly attitude of Great Brit- 
 ain. The boundary between the southern 
 strip of Alaska and British Columbia had never 
 been marked or even accurately surveyed when 
 gold was discovered in the Klondike. The 
 shortest and quickest route to the gold-bearing 
 region was by the trails leading up from Dyea 
 and Skagway on the headwaters of Lynn Canal. 
 The Canadian officials at once advanced claims
 
 Anglo-American Relations 123 
 
 to jurisdiction over these village ports. The 
 question turned on the treaty made in 1825 
 between Great Britain and Russia. Whatever 
 rights Russia had under that treaty we ac- 
 quired by the purchase of Alaska in 1867. Not 
 only did a long series of maps issued by the 
 Canadian government in years past confirm the 
 American claim to the region in dispute, but 
 the correspondence of the British negotiator 
 of the treaty of 1825 shows that he made every 
 effort to secure for England an outlet to deep 
 water through this strip of territory and failed. 
 Under the circumstances President Roosevelt 
 was not willing to submit the case to the arbi- 
 tration of third parties. He agreed, however, 
 to submit if to a mixed commission composed 
 of three Americans, two Canadians, and Lord 
 Alverstone, chief justice of England. As there 
 was little doubt as to the views that would be 
 taken by the three Americans and the two Cana- 
 dians it was evident from the first that the trial 
 was really before Lord Alverstone. In case he 
 sustained the American contention there would 
 be an end of the controversy; in case he sus- 
 tained the Canadian view, there would be an 
 even division, and matters would stand where 
 they stood when the trial began except that 
 a great deal more feeling would have been en-
 
 124 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 gendered and the United States might have had 
 to make good its claims by force. Fortunately 
 Lord Alverstone agreed with the three Ameri- 
 cans on the main points involved in the contro- 
 versy. The decision was, of course, a disap- 
 pointment to the Canadians and it was charged 
 that Lord Alverstone had sacrificed their 
 interest in order to further the British policy of 
 friendly relations with the United States. 
 
 At the beginning of the present war the in- 
 terference of the British navy with cargoes con- 
 signed to Germany at once aroused the latent 
 anti-British feeling in this country. Owing 
 to the fact that cotton exports were so largely 
 involved the feeling against Great Britain was 
 even stronger in the Southern States than in the 
 Northern. The State Department promptly 
 protested against the naval policy adopted by 
 Great Britain, and the dispute might have as- 
 sumed very serious proportions had not Ger- 
 many inaugurated her submarine campaign. 
 The dispute with England involved merely prop- 
 erty rights, while that with Germany involved 
 the safety and lives of American citizens. The 
 main feature of British policy, that is, her appli- 
 cation of the doctrine of continuous voyage, was 
 so thoroughly in line with the policy adopted by 
 the United States during the Civil War that
 
 Anglo-American Relations 125 
 
 the protests of our State Department were of 
 little avail. In the present war Great Britain 
 has merely carried the American doctrine to its 
 logical conclusions. 
 
 We have undertaken in this brief review of 
 Anglo-American relations to outline the more 
 important controversies that have arisen be- 
 tween the two countries. They have been suf- 
 ficiently numerous and irritating to jeopardize 
 seriously the peace which has so happily sub- 
 sisted for one hundred years between the two 
 great members of the English-speaking family. 
 After all, they have not been based on any fun- 
 damental conflict of policy, but have been for 
 the most part superficial and in many cases the 
 result of bad manners. In this connection 
 Lord Bryce makes the following interesting 
 observations: 
 
 "There were moments when the stiff and 
 frigid attitude of the British foreign secretary 
 exasperated the American negotiators, or when 
 a demagogic Secretary of State at Washington 
 tried by a bullying tone to win credit as the pa- 
 triotic champion of national claims. But when- 
 ever there were bad manners in London there 
 was good temper at Washington, and when there 
 was a storm on the Potomac there was calm on 
 the Thames. It was the good fortune of the two
 
 126 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 countries that if at any moment rashness or vehe- 
 mence was found on one side, it never happened 
 to be met by the like quality on the other." 
 
 "The moral of the story of Anglo-American 
 relations," Lord Bryce says, "is that peace can 
 always be kept, whatever be the grounds of con- 
 troversy, between peoples that wish to keep it." 
 He adds that Great Britain and the United 
 States "have given the finest example ever 
 seen in history of an undefended frontier, 
 along which each people has trusted to the good 
 faith of the other that it would create no naval 
 armaments; and this very absence of armaments 
 has itself helped to prevent hostile demonstra- 
 tions. Neither of them has ever questioned the 
 sanctity of treaties, or denied that states are 
 bound by the moral law." 
 
 It is not strange that so many controversies 
 about more or less trivial matters should have 
 obscured in the minds of both Englishmen and 
 Americans the fundamental identity of aim and 
 purpose in the larger things of life. For not- 
 withstanding the German influence in America 
 which has had an undue part in shaping our edu- 
 cational methods, our civilization is still Eng- 
 lish. Bismarck realized this when he said 
 that one of the most significant facts in modern 
 history was that all North America was English-
 
 Anglo-American Relations 127 
 
 speaking. Our fundamental ideals are the 
 same. We have a passion for liberty; we up- 
 hold the rights of the individual as against the 
 extreme claims of the state; we believe in govern- 
 ment through public opinion; we believe in 
 the rule of law; we believe in government lim- 
 ited by fundamental principles and constitu- 
 tional restraints as against the exercise of arbi- 
 trary power; we have never been subjected to 
 militarism or to the dominance of a military 
 caste; we are both so situated geographically 
 as to be dependent on sea power rather than on 
 large armies, and not only do navies not en- 
 danger the liberty of peoples but they are 
 negligible quantities politically. Great Britain 
 had in 1914 only 137,50x3 officers and men in her 
 navy and 26,200 reserves, a wholly insignificant 
 number compared to the millions that formed 
 the army of Germany and gave a military color 
 to the whole life and thought of the nation. 
 
 Not only are our political ideals the same, 
 but in general our attitude toward world poli- 
 tics is the same, and most people are surprised 
 when they are told that our fundamental 
 foreign policies are identical. The two most 
 characteristic American foreign policies, the 
 Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door, were both, 
 as we have seen, Anglo-American in origin.
 
 VII 
 
 IMPERIALISTIC TENDENCIES OF THE 
 MONROE DOCTRINE
 
 VII 
 
 IMPERIALISTIC TENDENCIES OF THE 
 MONROE DOCTRINE 
 
 IN ITS original form the Monroe Doctrine was a 
 direct defiance of Europe, and it has never been 
 favorably regarded by the nations of the old 
 world. Latterly, however, it has encountered 
 adverse criticism in some of the Latin-American 
 states whose independence it helped to secure 
 and whose freedom from European control it 
 has been instrumental in maintaining. The 
 Latin-American attacks on the Doctrine during 
 the last few years have been reflected to a greater 
 or less extent by writers in this country, par- 
 ticularly in academic circles. The American 
 writer who has become most conspicuous in this 
 connection is Professor Binjgham of Yale, who 
 has travelled extensively in South America 
 and who published in 1913 a little volume en- 
 titled "The Monroe Doctrine, an Obsolete 
 Shibboleth." The reasons why the Monroe 
 Doctrine has called forth so much criticism 
 during the last few years are not far to seek.
 
 132 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 The rapid advance of the United States in the 
 Caribbean Sea since 1898 has naturally aroused 
 the apprehensions of the feebler Latin-American 
 states in that region, while the building of the 
 Panama Canal has rendered inevitable the 
 adoption of a policy of naval supremacy in jthe 
 Caribbean and has led to the formulation of 
 new political policies in the zone of the Carib- 
 bean what Admiral Chester calls the larger 
 Panama Canal Zone that is, the West Indies, 
 Mexico and Central America, Colombia and 
 Venezuela. Some of these policies, which 
 have already been formulated to a far greater 
 extent than is generally realized, are the estab- 
 lishment of protectorates, the supervision of 
 finances, trie control of all available canal routes, 
 the*&cquisition of coalingjstations, and the^polic- 
 
 The long-delayed advance of the United States 
 in the Caribbean Sea actually began with the 
 Spanish War. Since then we have made rapid 
 strides. Porto Rico was annexed at the close 
 of the war, and Cuba became a protectorate; 
 the Canal Zone was a little later leased on terms 
 that amounted to practical annexation, and 
 the Dominican Republic came under the 
 financial supervision of the United States; 
 within the past two years we have assumed
 
 Imperialistic Tendencies 133 
 
 the administration of Haitian affairs, leased 
 from Nicaragua for a terrnoTnTnety-nine years 
 a naval base on Fonseca Bay, and purchased 
 the DanishWest Indies. As a result of this 
 rapid extension of American influence the 
 political relations of the countries bordering 
 on the Caribbean will of necessity be profoundly 
 affected. Our Latin-American policy has been 
 enlarged in meaning and limited in territorial 
 application so far as its newer phases are 
 concerned. 
 
 President Roosevelt's Dominican policy was 
 the most radical and important extension of the 
 Monroe Doctrine that has ever been made. 
 Here was a bankrupt republic with its European 
 creditors pressing for the recognition and pay- 
 ment of their claims. Germany seemed es- 
 pecially determined to force a settlement of her 
 demands, and it was well known that Germany 
 had for years regarded the Monroe Doctrine 
 as the main hindrance in the way of her ac- 
 quiring a foothold in Latin America. The 
 only effective method of collecting the interest 
 on the foreign debt of the Dominican Republic 
 appeared to be the seizure and administration 
 of her custom houses by some foreign power or 
 group of foreign powers. President Roosevelt 
 foresaw that such an occupation of the Domini-
 
 134 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 can custom houses would, in view of the large 
 debt, constitute the occupation of American 
 territory by European powers for an indefinite 
 period of time, and would, therefore, be a vio- 
 lation of the Monroe Doctrine. He had before 
 him also the results of a somewhat similar 
 financial administration of Egypt undertaken 
 jointly by England and France in 1878, and 
 after Arabi's revolt continued by England 
 alone, with the result that Egypt soon became a 
 possession of the British crown to almost as 
 great a degree as if it had been formally an- 
 nexed, and since the beginning of the present 
 war it has in fact been declared a part of the 
 British Empire. President Roosevelt con- 
 cluded, therefore, that where it was necessary to 
 place a bankrupt American republic in the hands 
 of a receiver, the United States must under- 
 take to act as receiver and take over the ad- 
 ministration of its finances. He boldly adopted 
 this policy and finally forced a reluctant Senate 
 to acquiesce. The arrangement has worked 
 admirably. In spite of the criticism that this 
 policy encountered, the Taft administration 
 not only continued it in Santo Domingo, but 
 tried to extend it to Nicaragua and Honduras. 
 In January, 1911, a treaty placing the finances 
 of Honduras under the supervision of the
 
 Imperialistic Tendencies 135 
 
 United States was signed by Secretary Knox, 
 and in June a similar treaty was signed with 
 Nicaragua. These treaties provided for the 
 refunding of the foreign debt, in each case 
 through loans made by American bankers and 
 secured by the customs duties, the collector 
 in each case to be approved by the United States 
 and to make an annual report to the Depart- 
 ment of State. These treaties were not ratified 
 by the Senate. 
 
 Secretary Knox then tried another solution 
 of the question. On February 26, 1913, a 
 new treaty with Nicaragua was submitted to 
 the Senate by the terms of which Nicaragua 
 agreed to give the United States an exclusive 
 right of way for a canal through her territory 
 and a naval base in Fonseca Bay, in return for 
 the payment of three millions of dollars. The 
 Senate failed to act on this treaty, as the close 
 of the Taft administration was then at hand. 
 The Wilson administration followed the same 
 policy, however, and in July, 1913, Mr. Bryan 
 submitted to the Senate a third treaty with 
 Nicaragua containing the provisions of the 
 second Knox treaty and in addition certain pro- 
 visions of the Platt amendment, which defines 
 our protectorate over Cuba. This treaty 
 aroused strong opposition in the other Central
 
 136 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 American states, and Costa Rica, Salvador, 
 and Honduras filed formal protests with the 
 United States Government against its ratifica- 
 tion on the ground that it would convert Nic- 
 aragua into a protectorate of the United States 
 and thus defeat the long-cherished plan for 
 a union of the Central American republics. 
 The Senate of the United States objected to 
 the protectorate feature of the treaty and re- 
 fused to ratify it, but the negotiations were 
 renewed by the Wilson administration and 
 on February 18, 1916, a new treaty, which 
 omits the provisions of the Platt amendment, 
 was accepted by the Senate. This treaty 
 [grants to the United States in perpetuity the 
 exclusive rigfTt tcTTonstru^^a__c^naJMby_jway of 
 ic San JuarFRivergiid^Lake Nicaragua, and 
 iasestotKe United States for ninety-nine years 
 a naval^base on the Gulf of Fonseca,,and also 
 the Great Corn and Little Corjuislands as coal- 
 ing stations. T. hlTconsideration for these favors 
 was the sum of three millions of dollars to be 
 expended, with the approval of the Secretary of 
 State of the United States, in paying the public 
 debt of Nicaragua and for other public purposes 
 to be agreed on by the two contracting parties. 
 The treaty with the black Republic of Haiti, 
 ratified by the Senate February 28, 1916,
 
 Imperialistic Tendencies 137 
 
 carries the new Caribbean policies of the 
 United States to the farthest limits short of 
 actual annexation. It provides for the estab- 
 lishment of a receivership of_Haitian customs 
 under the control of the United States similar 
 in most respects to that established over the 
 Dominican Republic. It provides further for 
 the appointment, on the nomination of the 
 President of the United States, of a financial 
 adviser, wEo^sEall assist in the settlement of 
 the foreign debt and direct expenditures of 
 the surplus for the development of the agricul- 
 tural, mineral, and commercial resources of the 
 republic. It provides further for a native 
 constabulary under American officers appointed 
 by the President of Haiti upon nomination by 
 the President of the United States. It further 
 extends to Haiti the main provisions of the 
 Platt amendment. By controlling the internal 
 financial administration of the government the 
 United States hopes to remove all incentives for 
 those revolutions which have in the past had 
 for their object a raid on the public treasury, 
 and by controlling the customs and maintaining 
 order the United States hopes to avoid all 
 possibility of foreign intervention. The treaty 
 is to remain in force for a period of ten years 
 and for another period of ten years if either
 
 138 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 party presents specific reasons for continuing 
 it on the ground that its purpose has not been 
 fully accomplished. 
 
 Prior to the Roosevelt administration the 
 Monroe Doctrine was regarded by the Latin- 
 American states as solely a protective policy. 
 The United States did not undertake to control 
 the financial administration or the foreign 
 policy of any of these republics. It was only 
 after their misconduct had gotten them into 
 difficulty and some foreign power, or group 
 of foreign powers, was on the point of demand- 
 ing reparation by force that the United States 
 stepped in and undertook to see to it that foreign 
 intervention did not take the form of occupation 
 of territory or interference in internal politics. 
 The Monroe Doctrine has always been in prin- 
 ciple a policy of American intervention for the 
 purpose of preventing European intervention, 
 but American intervention always awaited the 
 threat of immediate action on the part of 
 some European pow r er. President Roosevelt 
 concluded that it would be wiser to restrain 
 the reckless conduct of the smaller American 
 republics before disorders or public debts should 
 reach a point which gave European powers an 
 excuse for intervening. In a message to Con- 
 gress in 1904 he laid down this new doctrine,
 
 Imperialistic Tendencies 139 
 
 which soon became famous as the Big Stick 
 policy. He said: "If a nation shows that it 
 knows how to act with reasonable efficiency 
 and 3ecency~in social andjjgjiticai matte?s, if 
 it keep^or3er and pays its obligations, it need 
 fear no Tnterference^rom~~^^_United States. 
 Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which 
 results in a general loosening of the ties of civil- 
 ized society, may in America, as elsewhere, 
 ultimately require intervention by some civil- 
 ized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere 
 the adherence of the United States to the Mon- 
 roe Doctrine may force the United States, 
 however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such 
 wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of 
 an international police power." In other words, 
 since we could not permit European powers to 
 restrain or punish American states in cases of 
 wrongdoing, we must ourselves undertake 
 that task. As long as the Monroe Doctrine 
 was merely a policy of benevolent protection 
 which Latin-American states could invoke after 
 their unwise or evil conduct had brought Euro- 
 pean powers to the point of demanding just 
 retribution, it was regarded with favor and no 
 objection was raised to it; but the Roosevelt 
 doctrine, that if we were to continue to protect 
 Latin-American states against European inter-
 
 140 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 vention, we had a right to demand that they 
 should refrain from conduct which was likely 
 to provoke such intervention, was quite a dif- 
 ferent thing, and raised a storm of criticism and 
 opposition. 
 
 The Roosevelt extension of the Monroe Doc- 
 trine was undoubtedly a perfectly logical step. 
 It was endorsed by the Taft administration 
 and has been extended by the Wilson adminis- 
 tration and made one of our most important 
 policies in regard to the zone of the Caribbean. 
 President Roosevelt was right in drawing the 
 conclusion that we had arrived at a point 
 where we had either to abandon the Monroe 
 Doctrine or to extend its application so as to 
 cover the constantly increasing number of 
 disputes arising from the reckless creation of 
 public debts and loose financial administration. 
 It was absurd for us to stand quietly by and 
 witness the utterly irresponsible creation of 
 financial obligations that would inevitably 
 lead to European intervention and then under- 
 take to fix the bounds and limits of that inter- 
 vention. It is interesting to note that President 
 Wilson has not hesitated to carry the new 
 policy to its logical conclusion, and he has gone 
 so far as to warn Latin-American countries 
 against granting to foreign corporations con-
 
 Imperialistic Tendencies 141 
 
 cessions which, on account of their extended 
 character, would be certain to give rise to foreign 
 claims which would, in turn, give an excuse 
 for European intervention. In discussing our 
 Latin-American policy shortly after the begin- 
 ning of his administration, President Wilson 
 said: "You hear of 'concessions' to foreign 
 capitalists in Latin America. You do not hear 
 of concessions to foreign capitalists in the 
 United States. They are not granted conces- 
 sions. They are invited to make investments. 
 The work is ours, though they are welcome to 
 invest in it. We do not ask them to supply 
 the capital and do the work. It is an invitation, 
 not a privilege; and states that are obliged, 
 because their territory does not lie within the 
 main field of modern enterprise and action, to 
 grant concessions are in this condition, that 
 foreign interests are apt to dominate their 
 domestic affairs a condition of affairs always 
 dangerous and apt to become intolerable. . . . 
 What these states are going to seek, therefore, 
 is an emancipation from the subordination, 
 which has been inevitable, to foreign enterprise 
 and an assertion of the splendid character which, 
 in spite of these difficulties, they have again 
 and again been able to demonstrate.^ 
 These remarks probably had reference to the
 
 142 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 oil concession which Pearson and Son of London 
 had arranged with the president of Colombia. 
 This concession is said to have covered practi- 
 cally all of the oil interests in Colombia, and 
 carried with it the right to improve harbors 
 and dig canals in the country. However, 
 before the meeting of the Colombian congress 
 in November, 1913, which was expected to 
 confirm the concession, Lord Cowdray, the 
 president of Pearson and Son, withdrew the 
 contract, alleging as his reason the opposition 
 of the United States. 
 
 Unfortunately President Roosevelt's asser- 
 tion of the Big Stick policy and of the duty of 
 the United States to play policeman in the 
 western hemisphere was accompanied by his 
 seizure of the Canal Zone. This action natur- 
 ally aroused serious apprehensions in Latin 
 America and gave color to the charge that the 
 United States had converted the Monroe Doc- 
 trine from a protective policy into a policy of 
 selfish aggression. Colombia felt outraged and 
 aggrieved, and this feeling was not alleviated 
 by Mr. Roosevelt's speech several years later 
 to the students of the University of California, 
 in which he boasted of having taken the Canal 
 Zone and said that if he had not taken it as he 
 did, the debate over the matter in Congress
 
 Imperialistic Tendencies 143 
 
 would still be going on. Before the close of 
 his administration President Roosevelt under- 
 took to placate Colombia, but the sop which 
 he offered was indignantly rejected. In Jan- 
 uary, 1909, Secretary Root proposed three 
 treaties, one between the United States and 
 Panama, one between the United States and 
 Colombia, and one between Colombia and Pana- 
 ma. These treaties provided for the recognition 
 of the Republic of Panama by Colombia and 
 for the transference to Colombia of the first 
 ten installments of the annual rental of $250,000 
 which the United States had agreed to pay to 
 Panama for the lease of the Canal Zone. The 
 treaties were ratified by the United States 
 and by Panama, but not by Colombia. 
 
 TheTaft administration made repeated efforts 
 to appease Colombia, resulting in the formula- 
 tion of a definite proposition by Secretary Knox 
 shortly before the close of President Taft's 
 term. His proposals were that if Colombia 
 would ratify the Root treaties just referred 
 to, the United States would be willing to pay 
 $10,000,000 for an exclusive right of way for 
 a canal by the Atrato route and for the perpetual 
 lease of the islands of St. Andrews and Old 
 Providence as coaling stations. These pro- 
 posals were also rejected. The American minis-
 
 144 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 ter, Mr. Du Bois, acting, he said, on his own 
 responsibility, then inquired informally whether 
 $25,000,000 without options of any kind would 
 satisfy Colombia. The answer was that Colom- 
 bia would accept nothing but the arbitration 
 of the whole Panama question. Mr. Knox, in 
 reporting the matter to the President, said that 
 Colombia seemed determined to treat with 
 the incoming Democratic administration. Sec- 
 retary Bryan took up the negotiations where 
 Knox dropped them, and concluded a treaty, 
 according to the terms of which the United 
 States was to express "sincere regret that any- 
 thing should have occurred to interrupt or 
 mar the relations of cordial friendship that had 
 so long subsisted between the two nations," 
 and lo pay Colombia $25,000,000. So far the 
 Senate of the United States has failed to ratify 
 this treaty. 
 
 The facts stated above show conclusively 
 that the two most significant developments of 
 American policy in the Caribbean during the 
 last twenty years have been the establishment 
 of formal protectorates and the exercise of 
 
 financial supervislon_over weak and disorderly 
 states. Our protectorate over Cuba was clearly 
 defined in the so-called Platt amendment, which 
 was inserted in the army appropriation bill of
 
 Imperialistic Tendencies 145 
 
 March 2, 1901, and directed the President to 
 leave control of the island of Cuba to its people 
 so soon as a government should be established 
 under a constitution which defined the future 
 relations with the United States substantially 
 as follows: (i) That the government of Cuba 
 would never enter into any treaty or other com- 
 pact with any foreign power which would im- 
 pair the independence of the island; (2) that 
 the said government would not contract any 
 public debt which could not be met by the 
 ordinary revenues of the island; (3) that the 
 government of Cuba would permit the United 
 States to exercise the right to intervene for 
 the preservation of Cuban independence, and 
 for the protection of life, property, and in- 
 dividual liberty; (4) that all acts of the United 
 States in Cuba during its military occupancy 
 thereof should be ratified and validated; (5) 
 that the government of Cuba would carry out 
 the plans already devised for the sanitation 
 of the cities of the island; and finally that the 
 government of Cuba would sell or lease to the 
 United States lands necessary for coaling or 
 naval stations at certain specified points, to 
 be agreed upon with the President of the 
 United States. 
 
 It is understood that these articles, with the
 
 146 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 exception of the fifth, which was proposed by 
 General Leonard Wood, were carefully drafted 
 by Elihu Root, at that time Secretary of War, 
 discussed at length by President McKinley's 
 Cabinet, and entrusted to Senator Platt of 
 Connecticut, who offered them as an amend- 
 ment to the army appropriation bill. The Wil- 
 son administration, as already stated, has em- 
 bodied the first three provisions of the Platt 
 amendment in the recent Haitian treaty. 
 Prior to the present war, which has upset all 
 calculations, it seemed highly probable that 
 the Platt amendment would in time be extended 
 to all the weaker states within the zone of the 
 Caribbean. If the United States is to exercise a 
 protectorate over such states, the right to inter- 
 vene and the conditions of intervention should 
 be clearly defined and publicly proclaimed. 
 Hitherto whatever action we have taken in 
 Latin America has been taken under the 
 Monroe Doctrine a policy without legal sanc- 
 tion which an international court might not 
 recognize. Action under a treaty would have 
 the advantage of legality. In other words, 
 the recent treaties with Caribbean states have 
 converted American policy into law. 
 
 The charge that in establishing protectorates 
 and financial supervision over independent
 
 Imperialistic Tendencies 147 
 
 states we have violated the terms of the Mon- 
 roe Doctrine is one that has been frequently 
 made. Those who have made it appear to be 
 laboring under the illusion that the Monroe 
 Doctrnie was wholly altruistic in its aim. As 
 a matter of fact, the Monroe Doctrine has never 
 been regarded by the United States as in any 
 sense a self-denying declaration. President 
 Monroe said that we should consider any at- 
 tempt on the part of the European powers "to 
 extend their system to any portion of this hemi- 
 sphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." 
 The primary object of the policy outlined by 
 President Monroe was, therefore, the peace and 
 safety of the United States. The protection of 
 Latin-American states against European inter- 
 vention was merely a means of protecting our- 
 selves. While the United States undertook to 
 prevent the encroachment of European powers 
 in Latin America, it never for one moment ad- 
 mitted any limitation upon the possibility of 
 its own expansion in this region. The whole 
 course of American history establishes the 
 contrary point of view. Since the Monroe 
 Doctrine was enunciated we have annexed at 
 the expense of Latin-American states, Texas, 
 New Mexico, California, and the Canal Zone. 
 Upon other occasions we emphatically declined
 
 148 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 to bind ourselves by treaty stipulations with 
 England and France that under no circumstance 
 would we annex the island of Cuba. Shortly 
 after the beginning of his first term President 
 Wilson declared in a public address at Mobile 
 that "the United States will never again seek 
 one additional foot of territory by conquest/' 
 This declaration introduces a new chapter in 
 American diplomacy.
 
 VIII 
 
 THE NEW PAN-AMERICANISM
 
 VIII 
 THE NEW PAN-AMERICANISM 
 
 WHEN President Wilson assumed office March 
 4, 1913, there was nothing but the Huerta 
 revolution, the full significance of which was 
 not then appreciated, to suggest to his mind 
 the forecast that before the close of his term 
 questions of foreign policy would absorb the 
 attention of the American people and tax to the 
 limit his own powers of mind and body. It 
 seems now a strange fact that neither in his 
 writings nor in his public addresses had Presi- 
 dent Wilson ever shown any marked interest in 
 questions of international law and diplomacy. 
 He had, on the contrary, made a life-long study 
 of political organization and legislative proce- 
 dure. Those who knew him had always thought 
 that he was by nature fitted to be a great 
 parliamentary leader and it soon appeared that 
 he had a very definite legislative programme 
 which he intended to put through Congress. 
 The foreign problems that confronted him so 
 suddenly and unexpectedly were doubtless felt
 
 152 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 to be annoying distractions from the work which 
 he had mapped out for himself and which was 
 far more congenial to his tastes. As time 
 went by, however, he was forced to give more 
 and more thought to our relations with Latin 
 America on the one hand and to the European 
 war on the other. His ideas on international 
 problems at first cautiously set forth, soon 
 caught step with the rapid march of events and 
 now lead the thought of the world. 
 
 The Mexican situation, which reached a crisis 
 a few days before Mr. Wilson came into office, 
 at once demanded his attention and led to the 
 enunciation of a general Latin-American policy. 
 He had scarcely been in office a week when 
 he issued a statement which was forwarded by 
 the secretary of state to all American diplomatic 
 officers in Latin America. In it he said : 
 
 "One of the chief objects of my administra- 
 tion will be to cultivate the friendship and 
 deserve the confidence of our sister republics of 
 Central and South America and to promote in 
 every proper and honorable way the interests 
 which are common to the peoples of the two 
 continents. . . . 
 
 "The United States has nothing to seek in 
 Central and South America except the lasting 
 interests of the peoples of the two continents,
 
 The New Pan-Americanism 153 
 
 the security of governments intended for the 
 people and for no special group or interest, and 
 the development of personal and trade rela- 
 tionships between the two continents which 
 shall redound to the profit and advantage of 
 both, and interfere with the rights and liberties 
 of neither. 
 
 "From these principles may be read so much 
 of the future policy of this government as it is 
 necessary now to forecast, and in the spirit of 
 these principles I may, I hope, be permitted 
 with as much confidence as earnestness, to ex- 
 tend to the governments of all the republics of 
 America the hand of genuine disinterested 
 friendship and to pledge my own honor and the 
 honor of my colleagues to every enterprise of 
 peace and amity that a fortunate future may 
 disclose." 
 
 The policy here outlined, and elaborated a 
 few months later in an address before the 
 Southern Commercial Congress at Mobile, 
 Alabama, has been termed the New Pan- 
 Americanism. The Pan-American ideal is an 
 old one, dating b act in fact to the Panama 
 Congress of 1826. The object of this congress 
 was not very definitely stated in the call, which 
 was issued by Simon Bolivar, but his purpose 
 was to secure the independence and peace of the
 
 154 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 new Spanish republics through either a perma- 
 nent confederation or a series of diplomatic con- 
 gresses. President Adams through Henry 
 Clay, who was at that time Secretary of State, 
 promptly accepted the invitation to send dele- 
 gates. The matter was debated at such length, 
 however, in the House and Senate that the 
 American delegates did not reach Panama until 
 after the congress had adjourned. In view of 
 the opposition which the whole scheme en- 
 countered in Congress, the instructions to the 
 American delegates were very carefully drawn 
 and their powers were strictly limited. They 
 were cautioned against committing their gov- 
 ernment in any way to the establishment of 
 "an amphictyonic council, invested with power 
 fully to decide controversies between the 
 American states or to regulate in any respect 
 their conduct." They were also to oppose the 
 formation of an offensive and defensive alli- 
 ance between the American powers, for, as Mr. 
 Clay pointed out, the Holy Alliance had aban- 
 doned all idea of assisting Spain in the recon- 
 quest of her late colonies. After referring to 
 "the avoidance of foreign alliances as a leading 
 maxim" of our foreign policy, Mr. Clay con- 
 tinued: "Without, therefore, asserting that an 
 exigency may not occur in which an alliance of
 
 The New Pan-Americanism 155 
 
 the most intimate kind between the United 
 States and the other American republics would 
 be highly proper and expedient, it may be 
 safely said that the occasion which would war- 
 rant a departure from that established maxim 
 ought to be one of great urgency, and that none 
 such is believed now to exist." 
 
 The British Government sent a special envoy 
 to reside near the Congress and to place himself 
 in frank and friendly communication with the 
 delegates. Canning's private instructions to 
 this envoy declared that, "Any project for put- 
 ting the U. S. of North Ameirca at the head of 
 an American Confederacy, as against Europe, 
 would be highly displeasing to your Govern- 
 ment. It would be felt as an ill return for the 
 service which has been rendered to those States, 
 and the dangers which have been averted from 
 them, by the countenance and friendship, and 
 public declarations of Great Britain; and it 
 would probably, at no distant period, endanger 
 the peace both of America and of Europe." 
 
 The Panama Congress was without practical 
 results and it was more than half a century be- 
 fore the scheme for international coopera- 
 tion on the part of American states was again 
 taken up. In 1881 Secretary Blaine issued 
 an invitation to the American republics to hold
 
 1 56 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 a conference at Washington, but the continu- 
 ance of the war between Chile and Peru caused 
 an indefinite postponement of the proposed 
 conference. Toward the close of President 
 Cleveland's first administration the invitation 
 was renewed and the First International Con- 
 ference of American States convened at Wash- 
 ington in 1890. It happened that when the 
 Conference met Mr. Elaine was again Secretary 
 of State and presided over its opening sessions. 
 The most notable achievement of this Confer- 
 ence was the establishment of the Bureau of 
 American Republics, now known as the Pan- 
 American Union. The Second International 
 Conference of American States, held in the City 
 of Mexico in 1901, arranged for all American 
 states to become parties to the Hague Conven- 
 tion of 1899 for the pacific settlement of inter- 
 national disputes and drafted a treaty for the 
 compulsory arbitration, as between American 
 states, of pecuniary claims. The Third Con- 
 ference, held at Rio Janeiro in 1906, extended 
 the above treaty for another period of five years 
 and proposed that the subject of pecuniary 
 claims be considered at the second Hague Con- 
 ference. Added significance was given to the 
 Rio Conference by the presence of Secretary 
 Root who, although not a delegate, made it the
 
 The New Pan-Americanism 157 
 
 occasion of a special mission to South America. 
 The series of notable addresses which he deliv- 
 ered on this mission gave a new impetus to the 
 Pan-American movement. The Fourth Con- 
 ference, held at Buenos Ayres in 1910, was occu- 
 pied largely with routine matters. It extended 
 the pecuniary claims convention for an indefi- 
 nite period. 
 
 The conferences above referred to were polit- 
 ical or diplomatic in character. There have 
 been held two Pan-American Scientific Con- 
 gresses in which the United States participated, 
 one at Chile in 1908 and one at Washington, 
 December, 1915, to January, 1916. A very 
 important Pan-American Financial Congress 
 was held at Washington in May, 1915. These 
 congresses have accomplished a great deal in the 
 way of promoting friendly feeling as well as the 
 advancement of science and commerce among 
 the republics of the Western Hemisphere. 
 
 The American Institute of International Law, 
 organized at Washington in October, 1912, is a 
 body which is likely to have great influence in 
 promoting the peace and welfare of this hemi- 
 sphere. The Institute is composed of five repre- 
 sentatives from the national society of interna- 
 tional law in each of the twenty-one American 
 republics. At the suggestion of Secretary Lan-
 
 158 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 sing the Institute at a session held in the city of 
 Washington, January 6, 1916, adopted a Decla- 
 ration of the Rights and Duties of Nations, 
 which was as follows : 
 
 I. Every nation has the right to exist and to 
 
 protect and to conserve its existence; 
 but this right neither implies the right 
 nor justifies the act of the state to 
 protect itself or to conserve its ex- 
 istence by the commission of unlawful 
 acts against innocent and unoffending 
 states. 
 
 II. Every nation has the right to independ- 
 
 ence in the sense that it has a right 
 to the pursuit of happiness and is free 
 to develop itself without interfer- 
 ence or control from other states, 
 provided that in so doing it does not 
 interfere with or violate the rights of 
 other states. 
 
 III. Every nation is in law and before law 
 
 the equal of every other nation be- 
 longing to the society of nations, and 
 all nations have the right to claim 
 and, according to the Declaration of 
 Independence of the United States, 
 "to assume, among the powers of the
 
 The New Pan-Americanism 1 59 
 
 earth, the separate and equal station 
 to which the laws of nature and of 
 Nature's God entitle them." 
 
 IV. Every nation has the right to territory 
 
 within defined boundaries, and to exer- 
 cise exclusive jurisdiction over its ter- 
 ritory, and all persons whether native 
 or foreign found therein. 
 
 V. Every nation entitled to a right by the law 
 
 of nations is entitled to have that right 
 respected and protected by all other 
 nations, for right and duty are correla- 
 tive, and the right of one is the duty 
 of all to observe. 
 
 VI. International law is at one and the same 
 
 time both national and international; 
 national in the sense that it is the law 
 of the land and applicable as such to 
 the decision of all questions involving 
 its principles; international in the 
 sense that it is the law of the society of 
 nations and applicable as such to all 
 questions between and among the 
 members of the society of nations in- 
 volving its principles. 
 
 This Declaration has been criticised as being 
 too altruistic for a world in which diplomacy
 
 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 has been occupied with selfish aims. President 
 Wilson has not hesitated, however, to attack 
 many of the fundamental ideas which have 
 hitherto guided so-called practical statesmen. 
 The Mexican situation has put the new princi- 
 ples to a severe test. On February 18, 1913, 
 Francisco Madero was seized and imprisoned 
 as the result of a conspiracy formed by one of 
 his generals, Victoriano Huerta, who forthwith 
 proclaimed himself dictator. Four days later 
 Madero was murdered while in the custody of 
 Huerta's troops. Henry Lane Wilson, the 
 American ambassador, promptly urged his gov- 
 ernment to recognize Huerta, but President Taft, 
 whose term was rapidly drawing to a close, took 
 no action and left the question to his successor. 
 President Wilson thus had a very disagree- 
 able situation to face when he assumed control 
 of affaris at Washington. He refused to recog- 
 nize Huerta, whose authority was contested by 
 insurrectionary chiefs in various parts of the 
 country. It was claimed by the critics of the 
 administration that the refusal to recognize 
 Huerta was a direct violation of the well-known 
 American policy of recognizing de facto gov- 
 ernments without undertaking to pass upon the 
 rights involved. It is perfectly true that the 
 United States has consistently followed the
 
 The New Pan-Americanism 161 
 
 policy of recognizing de facto governments as 
 soon as it is evident in each case that the new 
 government rests on popular approval and is 
 likely to be permanent. This doctrine of 
 recognition is distinctively an American doc- 
 trine. It was first laid down by Thomas Jef- 
 ferson when he was Secretary of State as an 
 offset to the European doctrine of divine right, 
 and it was the natural outgrowth of that other 
 Jeffersonian doctrine that all governments de- 
 rive their just powers from the consent of the 
 governed. Huerta could lay no claim to au- 
 thority derived from a majority or anything like 
 a majority of the Mexican people. He was a 
 self-constituted dictator, whose authority rested 
 solely on military force. President Wilson and 
 Secretary Bryan were fully justified in refusing 
 to recognize his usurpation of power, though 
 they probably made a mistake in announcing 
 that they would never recognize him and in de- 
 manding his elimination from the presidential 
 contest. This announcement made him deaf to 
 advice from Washington and utterly indifferent 
 to the destruction of American life and property. 
 The next step in the President's course with 
 reference to Mexico was the occupation of 
 Vera Cruz. On April 20, 1914, the President 
 asked Congress for authority to employ the
 
 1 62 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 armed forces of the United States in demanding 
 redress for the arbitrary arrest of American 
 marines at Vera Cruz, and the next day Ad- 
 miral Fletcher was ordered to seize the custom 
 house at that port. This he did after a sharp 
 fight with Huerta's troops in which nineteen 
 Americans were killed and seventy wounded. 
 The American charge d'affaires, Nelson 
 O'Shaughnessy, was at once handed his pass- 
 ports, and all diplomatic relations between the 
 United States and Mexico were severed. 
 
 A few days later the representatives of the 
 so-called ABC Alliance, Argentina, Brazil, 
 and Chile, tendered their good offices for a 
 peaceful settlement of the conflict and President 
 Wilson promptly accepted their mediation. 
 The resulting conference at Niagara, May 20, 
 was not successful in its immediate object, 
 but it resulted in the elimination of Huerta 
 who resigned July 15, 1914. On August 20, 
 General Venustiano Carranza, head of one of 
 the revolutionary factions, assumed control 
 of affairs at the capital, but his authority was 
 disputed by General Francisco Villa, another 
 insurrectionary chief. On Carranza's promise 
 to respect the lives and property of American 
 citizens the United States forces were with- 
 drawn from Vera Cruz in November, 1914.
 
 The New Pan-Americanism 163 
 
 In August, 1915, at the request of President 
 Wilson, the six ranking representatives of Latin 
 America at Washington made an unsuccessful 
 effort to reconcile the contending factions of 
 Mexico. On their advice, however, President 
 Wilson decided in October to recognize the 
 government of Carranza, who now controlled 
 three fourths of the territory of Mexico. As a 
 result of this action Villa began a series of at- 
 tacks on American citizens and raids across the 
 border, which in March, 1916, compelled the 
 President to send a punitive expedition into 
 Mexico and later to dispatch most of the regu- 
 lar army and large bodies of militia to the 
 border. 
 
 The raids of Villa created a very awkward 
 situation. Carranza not only made no real 
 effort to suppress Villa, but he vigorously op- 
 posed the steps taken by the United States 
 lo protect its own citizens along the border, 
 and even assumed a threatening attitude. 
 There was a loud and persistent demand in 
 the United States for war against Mexico. 
 American investments in land, mines, rubber 
 plantations, and other enterprises were very 
 large, and these financial interests were par- 
 ticularly outraged at the President's policy 
 of "watchful waiting." The President re-
 
 164 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 mained deaf to this clamor. No country had 
 been so shamelessly exploited by foreign capital 
 as Mexico. Furthermore, it was suspected and 
 very generally believed that the recent revolu- 
 tions had been financed by American capital. 
 President Wilson was determined to give the 
 Mexican people an opportunity to reorganize 
 their national life on a better basis and to lend 
 them every assistance in the task. War with 
 Mexico would have been a very serious under- 
 taking and even a successful war would have 
 meant the military occupation of Mexico for an 
 indefinite period. Since our entrance into the 
 European war many of those Americans who 
 dissented radically from the President's Mexican 
 policy have become convinced that his refusal to 
 become involved in war with Mexico was a 
 most fortunate thing for us. 
 
 It has been charged that there was a lack of 
 consistency between the President's Mexican 
 policy and his Haitian policy. The difference 
 between the two cases, however, was that the 
 Haitian situation, if taken in time, could be 
 handled without bloodshed, while the same 
 method applied to Mexico would have led to a 
 long and bloody conflict. The most novel 
 feature of the President's Mexican policy was 
 his acceptance of the mediation of the ABC
 
 The New Pan-Americanism 165 
 
 Alliance and his subsequent consultation with 
 the leading representatives of Latin America. 
 This action has brought the Pan-American 
 ideal to the point of realization. It has been 
 received with enthusiasm and it has placed 
 our relations with Latin America on a better 
 footing than they have been for years 
 
 It has been suggested by more than one critic 
 of American foreign policy that if we are to 
 undertake to set the world right, we must come 
 before the bar of public opinion with clean 
 hands, that before we denounce the imperialistic 
 policies of Europe, we must abandon imperialis- 
 tic policies : at home. The main features of 
 President Wilson's Latin-American policy, if 
 we may draw a general conclusion, have been to 
 pledge American republics not to do anything 
 which would invite European intervention, 
 and to secure by treaty the right of the United 
 States to intervene for the protection of life, 
 liberty, and property, and for the establishment 
 of self-government. Such a policy, if unsel- 
 fishly carried out, is not inconsistent with the 
 general war aims defined by the President.
 
 IX 
 
 THE END OF NEUTRALITY AND 
 ISOLATION
 
 IX 
 
 THE END OF NEUTRALITY AND 
 ISOLATION 
 
 IN WASHINGTON'S day the United States was 
 an experiment in democracy. The vital ques- 
 tion was not our duty to the rest of the world, 
 but whether the rest of the world would jet 
 us live. The policy of wisdom was to keep 
 aloof from world politics and give as little cause 
 for offense as possible to the great powers of 
 Europe. Washington pointed out that "our 
 detached and distant situation" rendered such 
 a course possible. This policy was justified 
 by events. We were enabled to follow unhin- 
 dered the bent of our own political genius, to 
 extend our institutions over a vast continent 
 and to attain a position of great prosperity 
 and power in the economic world. While we 
 are still a young country, our government ii, 
 with the possible exception of that of Grcar 
 Britain, the oldest and most stable in the world, 
 and since we declared ourselves a nation and 
 adopted our present constitution the British 
 
 169
 
 170 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 Government has undergone radical changes of a 
 democratic character. By age and stability we 
 have long been entitled to a voice and influence 
 in the world, and yet we have been singularly 
 indifferent to our responsibilities as a member 
 of the society of nations. We have been in the 
 world, but not of it. 
 
 Our policy of isolation corresponded with the 
 situation as it existed a hundred years ago, 
 but not with the situation as it exists to-day 
 and as it has existed for some years past. We 
 no longer occupy a "detached and distant 
 situation." Steam and electricity, the cable 
 and wireless telegraphy have overcome the 
 intervening space and made us the close neigh- 
 bors of Europe. The whole world has been 
 drawn together in a way that our forefathers 
 never dreamed of, and our commercial, finan- 
 cial, and social relations with the rest of the 
 world are intimate. Under such circumstances 
 political isolation is an impossibility. It has 
 for years been nothing more than a tradition, 
 but a tradition which has tied the hands of 
 American diplomats and caused the American 
 public to ignore what was actually going on in 
 the world. The Spanish War and the acquisi- 
 tion of the Philippines brought us into the full 
 current of world politics, and yet we refused
 
 The End of Neutrality and Isolation 171 
 
 to recognize the changes that inevitably fol- 
 lowed. 
 
 The emergence of Japan as a first-class power, 
 conscious of achievement and eager to enter 
 on a great career, introduced a new and disturb- 
 ing element into world politics. Our diplo- 
 macy, which had hitherto been comparatively 
 simple, now became exceedingly complex. For- 
 merly the United States was the only great 
 power outside the European balance. The exis- 
 tence of a second detached power greatly com- 
 plicated the international situation and presented 
 opportunities for new combinations. We have 
 already seen how Germany undertook to use 
 the opportunity presented by Russia's war 
 with Japan to humiliate France and that the 
 United States took a prominent part in the 
 Algeciras Conference for the purpose of prevent- 
 ing the threatened overthrow of the European 
 balance of power. Thus, even before the present 
 war began, it had become evident to close 
 observers of international affairs that the Euro- 
 pean balance would soon be superseded by a 
 world balance in which the United States would 
 be forced to take its place. 
 
 It took a world war, however, to dispel the 
 popular illusion of isolation and to arouse us 
 to a full sense of our international responsi-
 
 172 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 bilities. When the war began the President, 
 following the traditions of a hundred years, 
 issued, as a matter of course, a proclamation of 
 neutrality, and he thought that the more scru- 
 pulously it was observed the greater would be the 
 opportunity for the United States to act as im- 
 partial mediator in the final adjustment of peace 
 terms. As the fierceness of the conflict grew it 
 became evident that the role of neutral would 
 not be an easy one to play and that the vital 
 interests of the United States would be involved 
 to a far greater extent than anyone had foreseen. 
 Neutrality in the modern sense is essentially 
 an American doctrine and the result of our 
 policy of isolation. If we were to keep out of 
 European conflicts, it was necessary for us to 
 pursue a course of rigid impartiality in wars 
 between European powers. In the Napoleonic 
 wars we insisted that neutrals had certain rights 
 which belligerents were bound to respect and 
 we fought the War of 1812 with England in 
 order to establish that principle. Half a 
 century later, in the American Civil War, we 
 insisted that neutrals had certain duties which 
 every belligerent had a right to expect them to 
 perform, and we forced Great Britain in the 
 settlement of the Alabama Claims to pay us 
 damages to the extent of $15,500,000 for having
 
 The End of Neutrality and Isolation 173 
 
 failed to perform her neutral obligations. We 
 have thus been the leading champion of the 
 rights and duties of neutrals, and t'he principles 
 for which we have contended have been written 
 into the modern law of nations. When two 
 or three nations are engaged in war and the 
 rest of the world is neutral, there is usually 
 very little difficulty in enforcing neutral rights, 
 but when a majority of the great powers are 
 at war, it is impossible for the remaining great 
 powers, much less for the smaller neutrals, 
 to maintain their rights. This was true in the 
 Napoleonic wars, but at that time the law of 
 neutrality was in its infancy and had never 
 been fully recognized by the powers at war. 
 The failure of neutrality in the present war is 
 far more serious, for the rights of neutrals had 
 been clearly defined and universally recognized. 
 Notwithstanding the large German popula- 
 tion in this country and the propaganda which 
 we now know that the German Government had 
 systematically carried on for years in our very 
 midst, the invasion of Belgium and the atro- 
 cities committed by the Germans soon arrayed 
 opinion on the side of the Allies. This was not 
 a departure from neutrality, for it should be 
 remembered that neutrality is not an attitude 
 of mind, but a legal status. As long as our
 
 174 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 Government fulfilled its obligations as defined 
 by the law of nations, no charge of a violation 
 of neutrality could be justly made. To deny 
 to the citizens of a neutral country the right to 
 express their moral judgments would be to deny 
 that the world can ever be governed by public 
 opinion. The effort of the German propagan- 
 dists to draw a distinction between so-called 
 ethical and legal neutrality was plausible, but 
 without real force. While neutrality is based on 
 the general principle of impartiality, this prin- 
 ciple has been embodied in a fairly well-defined 
 set of rules which may, and frequently do, in any 
 given war, work to the advantage of one bellig- 
 erent and to the disadvantage of the other. In 
 the present war this result has been brought 
 about by the naval superiority of Great Britain. 
 So far as our legal obligations to Germany were 
 concerned she had no cause for complaint. If, 
 on the other hand, our conduct had been deter- 
 mined solely by ethical considerations, we would 
 have joined the Allies long before we did. 
 
 The naval superiority of Great Britain made 
 it comparatively easy for her to stop all direct 
 trade with the enemy in articles contraband of 
 war, but this was of little avail so long as Ger- 
 many could import these articles through the 
 neutral ports of Italy, Holland, and the Scan-
 
 The End of Neutrality and Isolation 175 
 
 dinavian countries. Under these circumstances 
 an ordinary blockade of the German coast 
 would have had little effect. Therefore , no 
 such blockade was proclaimed by Great Britain. 
 She adopted other methods of cutting off over- 
 seas supplies from Germany. She enlarged the 
 lists of both absolute and conditional contra- 
 band and under the doctrine of continuous voy- 
 age seized articles on both lists bound for Ger- 
 many through neutral countries. 
 
 As to the right of a belligerent to enlarge the 
 contraband lists there can be no doubt. Even 
 the Declaration of London, which undertook for 
 the first time to establish an international classi- 
 fication of contraband, provided in Article 23 
 that "articles and materials which are exclu- 
 sively used for war may be added to the list of 
 absolute contraband by means of a notified 
 declaration," and Article 25 provided that the 
 list of conditional contraband might be en- 
 larged in the same manner. Under modern 
 conditions of warfare it would seem impossible 
 to determine in advance what articles are to be 
 treated as contraband. During the present war 
 many articles hitherto regarded as innocent 
 have become indispensable to the carrying on of 
 the war. 
 
 Great Britain's application of the doctrine of
 
 176 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 continuous voyage was more open to dispute. 
 She assumed that contraband articles shipped 
 to neutral countries adjacent to Germany and 
 Austria were intended for them unless proof to 
 the contrary was forthcoming, and she failed to 
 draw any distinction between absolute and con- 
 ditional contraband. The United States pro- 
 tested vigorously against this policy, but the 
 force of its protest was weakened by the fact that 
 during the Civil War the American Government 
 had pursued substantially the same policy in 
 regard to goods shipped by neutrals to Nassau, 
 Havana, Matamoros, and other ports adjacent 
 to the Confederacy. Prior to the American 
 Civil War goods could not be seized on any 
 grounds unless bound directly for a belligerent 
 port. Under the English doctrine of continuous 
 voyage as advanced during the Napoleonic wars, 
 goods brought from the French West Indies 
 to the United States and reshipp^ed to conti- 
 nental Europe were condemned by the British 
 Admiralty Court on the ground that notwith- 
 standing the unloading and reloading at an 
 American port the voyage from the West Indies 
 to Europe was in effect a continuous voyage, 
 and under the Rule of 1756 Great Britain re- 
 fused to admit the right of neutral ships to en- 
 gage in commerce between France and her col-
 
 The End of Neutrality and Isolation 177 
 
 onies. Great Britain, however, seized ships 
 only on the second leg of the voyage, that is, 
 when bound directly for a belligerent port. 
 During the American Civil War the United 
 States seized goods under an extension of the 
 English doctrine on the first leg of the voyage, 
 that is, while they were in transit from one 
 neutral port to another neutral port, on the 
 ground that they were to be subsequently 
 shipped in another vessel to a Confederate 
 port. Great Britain adopted and applied the 
 American doctrine during the Boer War. The 
 doctrine of continuous voyage, as applied by the 
 United States and England, was strongly con- 
 demned by most of the continental writers on 
 international law. The Declaration of London 
 adopted a compromise by providing that abso- 
 lute contraband might be seized when bound 
 through third countries, but that conditional 
 contraband was not liable to capture under such 
 circumstances. As the Declaration of London 
 was not ratified by the British Government this 
 distinction was ignored, and conditional as 
 well as absolute contraband was seized when 
 bound for Germany through neutral countries. 
 While Great Britain may be charged with 
 having unwarrantably extended the application 
 of certain rules of international law and may
 
 178 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 have rendered herself liable to pecuniary dam- 
 ages, she displayed in all her measures a scrupu- 
 lous regard for human life. Her declaration 
 that "The whole of the North Sea must be 
 considered a military area," was explained as an 
 act of retaliation against Germany for having 
 scattered floating mines on the high seas in the 
 path of British commerce. She did not under- 
 take to exclude neutral vessels from the North 
 Sea, but merely notified them that certain areas 
 had been mined and warned them not to enter 
 without receiving sailing directions from the 
 British squadron. 
 
 The German decree of February 4, 1915, es- 
 tablishing a submarine blockade or "war zone" 
 around the British Isles, on the other hand, was 
 absolutely without legal justification. It did 
 not fulfill the requirements of a valid blockade, 
 because it cut off only a very small percentage 
 of British commerce, and the first requirement 
 of a blockade is that it must be effective. The 
 decree was aimed directly at enemy merchant 
 vessels and indirectly at the ships of neutrals. It 
 utterly ignored the well-recognized right of 
 neutral passengers to travel on merchant vessels 
 of belligerents. The second decree announcing 
 unrestricted submarine warfare after February 
 i, 1917, was directed against neutral as well as
 
 The End of Neutrality and Isolation 179 
 
 enemy ships. It undertook to exclude all 
 neutral ships from a wide zone extending far 
 out on the high seas, irrespective of their mis- 
 sion or the character of their cargo. It was an 
 utter defiance of all law. 
 
 The citizens of neutral countries have always 
 had the right to travel on the merchant vessels 
 of belligerents, subject, of course, to the risk of 
 capture and detention. The act of the German 
 ambassador in inserting an advertisement in a 
 New York paper warning Americans not to 
 take passage on the Lusitania, when the Presi- 
 dent had publicly asserted that they had a per-/ 
 feet right to travel on belligerent ships, was an 
 insolent and unparalleled violation of diplo- 
 matic usage and would have justified his instant 
 dismissal. Some action would probably have 
 been taken by the State Department had not 
 the incident been overshadowed by the carrying 
 out of the threat and the actual destruction of 
 the Lusitania. 
 
 The destruction of enemy prizes at sea is 
 recognized by international law under excep- 
 tional circumstances and subject to certain 
 definite restrictions, but an unlimited right 
 of destruction even of enemy merchant vessels 
 had never been claimed by any authority on 
 international law or by any government prior
 
 i8o From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 to the German decree. The destruction of 
 neutral prizes, though practised by some gov- 
 ernments, has not been so generally acquiesced 
 in, and when resorted to has been attended by 
 an even more rigid observance of the rules de- 
 signed to safeguard human life. Article 48 of 
 the Declaration of London provided that, "A 
 captured neutral vessel is not to be destroyed 
 by the captor, but must be taken into such 
 port as is proper in order to determine there 
 the rights as regards the validity of the cap- 
 ture." Unfortunately Article 49 largely nega- 
 tived this statement by leaving the whole matter 
 to the discretion of the captor. It is as follows: 
 "As an exception, a neutral vessel captured by a 
 belligerent ship, and which would be liable to 
 condemnation, may be destroyed if the ob- 
 servance of Article 48 would involve danger to 
 the ship of war or to the success of the operations 
 in which she is at the time engaged." The next 
 article provided the following safeguards: "Be- 
 fore the destruction the persons on board must 
 be placed in safety, and all the ship's papers 
 and other documents which those interested 
 consider relevant for the decision as to the 
 validity of the capture must be taken on board 
 the ship of war." 
 The Declaration of London was freely criti-
 
 The End of Neutrality and Isolation 181 
 
 cised for recognizing an unlimited discretionary 
 right on the part of a captor to destroy a neutral 
 prize. Under all the circumstances the main 
 grievance against Germany is not that she has 
 destroyed prizes at sea, but that she has utterly 
 ignored the restrictions imposed upon this 
 right and the rules designed to safeguard human 
 life. 
 
 Germany sought to justify her submarine 
 policy on the ground (i) that the American man- 
 ufacture and sale of munitions of war was one- 
 sided and therefore unneutral, and (2) that the 
 United States had practically acquiesced in 
 what she considered the unlawful efforts of 
 Great Britain to cut off the food supply of 
 Germany. The subject of the munitions trade 
 was brought to the attention of the United 
 States by Germany in a note of April 4, 1915. 
 While not denying the legality of the trade 
 in munitions under ordinary circumstances 
 the contentions of the German Government were 
 that the situation in the present war differed 
 from that of any previous war; that the recog- 
 nition of the trade in the past had sprung from 
 the necessity of protecting existing industries, 
 while in the present war an entirely new indus- 
 try had been created in the United States; and 
 it concluded with the following statement which
 
 1 82 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 was the real point of the note: "This industry is 
 actually delivering goods to the enemies of 
 Germany. The theoretical willingness to sup- 
 ply Germany also, if shipments were possible, 
 does not alter the case. If it is the will of the 
 American people that there should be a true 
 neutrality, the United States will find means of 
 preventing this one-sided supply of arms or at 
 least of utilizing it to protect legitimate trade 
 with Germany, especially that in food stuffs." 
 To this note Secretary Bryan replied that "Any 
 change in its own laws of neutrality during the 
 progress of the war which would affect unequally 
 the relations of the United States with the na- 
 tions at war would be an unjustifiable departure 
 from the principle of strict neutrality." 
 
 Two months later the discussion was re- 
 newed by the Austro-Hungarian Government. 
 The Austrian note did not question the inten- 
 tion of the United States to conform to the 
 letter of the law, but complained that we were 
 not carrying out its spirit, and suggested that a 
 threat to withhold food stuffs and raw materials 
 from the Allies would be sufficient to protect 
 legitimate commerce between the United States 
 and the Central Powers. To this note Secretary 
 Lansing replied at length. He held: (i) that 
 the United States was under no obligation to
 
 The End of Neutrality and Isolation 183 
 
 change or modify the rules of international 
 usage on account of special conditions. (2) 
 He rejected what he construed to be the con- 
 tention of the Austrian Government that "the 
 advantages gained to a belligerent by its su- 
 periority on the sea should be equalized by 
 the neutral powers by the establishment of a 
 system of non-intercourse with the victor." 
 (3) He called attention to the fact that Austria- 
 Hungary and Germany had during the years 
 preceding the present European war produced 
 "a great surplus of arms and ammunition which 
 they sold throughout the world and especially 
 to belligerents. Never during that period 
 did either of them suggest or apply the principle 
 now advocated by the Imperial and Royal 
 Government." (4) "But, in addition to the 
 question of principle, there is a practical and 
 substantial reason why the Government of the 
 United States has from the foundation of the 
 Republic to the present time advocated and 
 practised unrestricted trade in arms and mili- 
 tary supplies. It has never been the policy 
 of this country to maintain in time of peace a 
 large military establishment or stores of arms 
 and ammunition sufficient to repel invasion 
 by a well-equipped and powerful enemy. It has 
 desired to remain at peace with all nations and
 
 184 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 to avoid any appearance of menacing such peace 
 by the threat of its armies and navies. In con- 
 sequence of this standing policy the United 
 States would, in the event of attack by a foreign 
 power, be at the outset of the war seriously, if 
 not fatally, embarrassed by the lack of arms 
 and ammunition and by the means to produce 
 them in sufficient quantities to supply the re- 
 quirements of national defense. The United 
 States has always depended upon the right and 
 power to purchase arms and ammunition from 
 neutral nations in case of foreign attack. This 
 right, which it claims for itself, it cannot deny 
 to others." 
 
 The German and Austrian authorities were 
 fully aware that their arguments had no basis 
 in international law or practice. Indeed, their 
 notes were probably designed to influence public 
 opinion and help the German propagandists 
 in this country who were making a desperate 
 effort to get Congress to place an embargo on 
 the export of munitions. Having failed in this : ? 
 attempt, an extensive conspiracy was formed 
 to break up the trade in munitions by a resort 
 to criminal methods. Numerous explosions 
 occurred in munition plants destroying many 
 lives and millions of dollars' worth of property, 
 and bombs were placed in a number of ships
 
 The End of Neutrality and Isolation 185 
 
 engaged in carrying supplies to the Allies. 
 The Austrian ambassador and the German 
 military and naval attaches at Washington were 
 involved in these activities and their recall was 
 promptly demanded by Secretary Lansing. 
 
 The violations of international law by Ger- 
 many were so flagrant, her methods of waging 
 war so barbarous, the activities of her diplomats 
 so devoid of honor, and her solemn pledges 
 were so ruthlessly broken that the technical 
 discussion of the rules of maritime law was com- 
 pletely overshadowed by the higher moral issues 
 involved in the contest. All further efforts to 
 maintain neutrality finally became intolerable 
 even to President Wilson, who had exercised 
 patience until patience ceased to be a virtue. 
 Having failed in his efforts to persuade Congress 
 to authorize the arming of merchantmen, the 
 President finally concluded, in view of Ger- 
 many's threat to treat armed guards as pirates, 
 that armed neutrality was impracticable. He 
 accepted the only alternative and on April 
 2, 1917, went before Congress to ask for a formal 
 declaration of war against Germany. 
 
 Had Germany observed the rules of inter- 
 national law, the United States would probably 
 have remained neutral notwithstanding the 
 imminent danger of the overthrow of France
 
 1 86 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 and the possible invasion of England. The 
 upsetting of the European balance would 
 eventually have led to a conflict between Ger- 
 many and the United States. The violation of 
 American rights forced us to go to war, but 
 having once entered the war, we are not fighting 
 merely for the vindication of American rights, 
 but for the establishment of human freedom 
 and the recognition of human rights throughout 
 the world. In his war address President Wilson 
 said: "Neutrality is no longer feasible or 
 desirable where the peace of the world is in- 
 volved and the freedom of its peoples, and the 
 menace to that peace and freedom lies in the 
 existence of autocratic Governments backed 
 by organized force which is controlled wholly 
 by their will, not by the will of their people. 
 We have seen the last of neutrality in such 
 circumstances." Having once abandoned neu- 
 trality and isolation we are not likely to re- 
 main neutral again in any war which involves 
 the balance of power in the world or the des- 
 tinies of the major portion of mankind. Neu- 
 trality and isolation were correlative. They 
 were both based on the view that we were a 
 remote and distant people and had no intimate 
 concern with what was going on in the great 
 world across the seas.
 
 The End of Neutrality and Isolation 187 
 
 The failure of neutrality and the abandon- 
 ment of isolation mark a radical, though inevita- 
 ble, change in our attitude toward world politics. 
 We do not propose, however, to abandon the 
 great principles for which we as a nation have 
 stood, but rather to extend them and give them 
 a world-wide application. In his address to the 
 Senate on January 22, 1917, the President said: 
 
 "I am proposing, as it were, that the nations 
 should with one accord adopt the doctrine of 
 President Monroe as the doctrine of the world; 
 that no nation should seek to extend its polity 
 over any other nation or people, but that every 
 people should be left free to determine its own 
 polity, its own way of development, unhindered, 
 unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the 
 
 o 
 
 great and powerful. 
 
 "I am proposing that all nations henceforth 
 avoid entangling alliances which would draw 
 them into competitions of power, catch them 
 in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and 
 disturb their own affairs with influences in- 
 truded from without. There is no entangling 
 alliance in a concert of power." 
 
 In other words, the Monroe Doctrine, stripped 
 of its imperialistic tendencies, is to be inter- 
 nationalized, and the American policy of isola- 
 tion, in the sense of avoiding secret alliances,
 
 1 88 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 is to become a fundamental principle of the new 
 international order. If the United States is 
 going into a league of nations, every member of 
 the league must stand on its own footing. We 
 must not be a buffer between alliances and en- 
 tentes.
 
 X 
 
 THE WAR AIMS OF THE UNITED STATES
 
 THE WAR AIMS OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 THE advent of the United States into the family 
 of nations nearly a century and a half ago was 
 an event of world-wide significance. Our revo- 
 lutionary ancestors set up a government founded 
 on a new principle, happily phrased by Jefferson 
 in the statement that governments derive their 
 just powers from tfieT consent oiFtlie governed. 
 This principle threatened, although remotely, 
 the existence of the autocratic governments 
 of the Old World which were still based on the 
 doctrine of divine right. Hitherto we have 
 stoocTfor democracy and the rights of free 
 peoples defensively in this hemisphere. The 
 entrance of the United States into the present 
 war is an event of even more far-reaching signifi- 
 cance because it is a pledge that we are to stand 
 for these principles positively and throughout 
 the world. When the war began the issues 
 were not clearly defined. Autocratic Russia 
 was on the side of republican France and demo- 
 cratic England. But the Russian revolution 
 
 IQI
 
 192 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 cleared the atmosphere and gave President 
 Wilson an opportunity to proclaim it a war of 
 democracy against autocracy. His demand 
 that the warring nations state publicly what 
 they were fighting for caused a searching of 
 hearts everywhere, led to a restatement of aims 
 on the part of the Allies, and threw the Central 
 Governments on the defensive. Since our 
 entrance into the war President Wilson has 
 formulated the issues still more clearly, placed 
 the discussion of international policies on a 
 higher plane than it has ever before occupied, 
 and assumed a moral leadership that is without 
 parallel in the history of the world. 
 
 The fullest statement of the President's war 
 aims was in an address before both Houses of 
 Congress January 8, 1918: 
 
 I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, 
 
 after which there shall be no private 
 international understandings of any 
 kind, but diplomacy shall proceed 
 always frankly and in the public 
 view. 
 
 II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the 
 
 seas, outside territorial waters, alike 
 in peace and in war, except as the 
 seas may be closed in whole or in
 
 War Aims of the United States 193 
 
 part by international action for the en- 
 forcement of international covenants. 
 
 III. The removal, so far as possible, of all 
 
 economic barriers and the establish- 
 ment oFan equality of trade conditions 
 among all the nations consenting to 
 the peace and associating themselves 
 for its maintenance. 
 
 IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken 
 
 that national armaments will be re- 
 duced to the lowest point consistent 
 with domestic safety. 
 
 V. A free, open-minded and absolutely im- 
 
 partial adjustment of all colonial 
 claims, based upon a strict observance 
 of the principle that in determining 
 all such questions of sovereignty the 
 interests of the populations concerned 
 must have equal weight with the 
 equitable claims of the Government 
 whose title is to be determined. 
 
 VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory 
 
 and such a settlement of all questions 
 affecting Russia as will secure the 
 best and freest cooperation of the 
 other nations of the world in obtaining 
 for her an unhampered and unem- 
 barrassed opportunity for the inde-
 
 194 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 pendent determination of her own 
 political development and national 
 policy and assure her of a sincere 
 welcome into the society of free 
 nations under institutions of her own 
 choosing; and, more than a welcome, 
 assistance also of every kind that she 
 may need and may herself desire. 
 The treatment accorded Russia by 
 her sister nations will be the acid test 
 of their good will, of their comprehen- 
 sion of her needs as distinguished from 
 their own interests and of their in- 
 telligent and unselfish sympathy. 
 
 VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, 
 
 must be evacuated and restored, with- 
 out any attempt to limit the sov- 
 ereignty which she enjoys in common 
 with all other free nations. No other 
 single act will serve as this will serve 
 to restore confidence among the na- 
 tions in the laws which they have 
 themselves set and determined for 
 the government of their relations with 
 one another. Without this healing act 
 the whole structure and validity of in- 
 ternational law is forever impaired. 
 
 VIII. All French territory should be freed
 
 War Aims of the United States 195 
 
 and the invaded portions restored, 
 and the wrong~3one to France by 
 Prussia in 1871 in the matter of 
 Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled 
 the peace of the world for nearly fifty 
 years, should be righted, in order that 
 peace may once more be made secure 
 in the interest of all. 
 
 IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy 
 
 should be effected along clearly recog- 
 nizable lines of nationality. 
 
 X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose 
 
 place among the nations we wish to see 
 safeguarded and assured, should be 
 accorded the freest opportunity of 
 autonomous development. 
 
 XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should 
 
 be evacuated: occupied territories re- 
 stored; Serbia accorded free and secure 
 access to the sea; and the relations of 
 the several Balkan states to one an- 
 other determined by friendly counsel 
 along historically established lines of 
 allegiance and nationality; and inter- 
 national guarantees of the political 
 and economic independence and terri- 
 torial integrity of the several Balkan 
 states should be entered into.
 
 196 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 XII. The Turkish portions of the present 
 
 Ottoman Empire should be assured a 
 secure sovereignty, but the other na- 
 tionalities which are now under Turkish 
 rule should be assured an undoubted 
 security of life and an absolutely un- 
 molested opportunity of autonomous 
 development, and the Dardanelles 
 should be permanently opened as a 
 free passage to the ships and com- 
 merce of all nations under interna- 
 tional guarantees. 
 
 XIII. An independent Polish state should be 
 
 erected which should include the terri- 
 tories inhabited by indisputably Polish 
 populations, which should be assured 
 a free and secure access to the sea, and 
 whose political and economic inde- 
 pendence and territorial integrity 
 should be guaranteed by international 
 covenant. 
 
 XIV. A general association of nations must 
 
 be formed under specific covenants for 
 the purpose of affording mutual guar- 
 antees of political independence and 
 territorial integrity to great and small 
 states alike.
 
 War Aims of the United States 197 
 
 It should be remembered that this was avow- 
 edly a programme, not an ultimatum, a basis of 
 negotiation rather than an irreducible minimum. 
 In certain particulars it has already been modi- 
 fied by subsequent statements of the President. 
 The first point of the programme, for instance, that 
 dealing with secret diplomacy, was too broadly 
 phrased. When, a few weeks later, Senator 
 Borah introduced a resolution providing for a 
 revision of the rules of the Senate so that all 
 treaties might be considered in open session, the 
 President at once addressed a letter to the Secre- 
 tary of State requesting him to prepare a memo- 
 randum on this subject for the use of the Senate 
 committee. In it he said: "When I pronounced 
 for open diplomacy I meant not that there 
 should be no private discussions of delicate mat- 
 ters, but that no secret agreement of any sort 
 should be entered into and that all international 
 relations, when fixed, should be open, above- 
 board, and explicit." What the President 
 intended to condemn was, therefore, not secret 
 negotiations, but secret treaties. In the dis- 
 cussions on the Borah resolution the fact was 
 emphasized that in the United States treaties 
 are fully discussed by the entire Senate in ex- 
 ecutive session before ratification, and that 
 this can hardly be called secret diplomacy in
 
 198 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 the European sense. The real objection to se- 
 cret diplomacy is that it is irresponsible, that 
 treaties are negotiated and ratified by ministers 
 who have no responsibility to the people or who 
 have only a very remote responsibility to them. 
 The proposal was recently made in the British 
 House of Commons that a standing committee 
 on foreign affairs should be appointed in order 
 to enable the House "to exercise closer super- 
 vision over the general conduct of foreign af- 
 fairs." The possibility of such an arrangement, 
 which would approximate the method of pop- 
 ular control already employed in the United 
 States, was foreseen by Mr. Bryce years ago 
 and referred to in the American Commonwealth: 
 "The day may come when in England the 
 question of limiting the at present all but un- 
 limited discretion of the executive in foreign 
 affairs will have to be dealt with, and the ex- 
 ample of the American Senate will then de- 
 serve and receive careful study." 
 
 One reason why diplomacy has been secret 
 in the past is the fact that the public generally 
 takes very little interest in questions of foreign 
 policy until some great crisis is at hand and 
 then it is too late for the average man to inform 
 himself sufficiently to be able to express an 
 intelligent opinion. This has been particularly
 
 War Aims of the United States 199 
 
 true in the United States, and this was probably 
 what Mr. Root had in mind when he said in an 
 address before the American Society of Inter- 
 national Law several years ago: "A democracy 
 which undertakes to control its own foreign 
 relations ought to know something about the 
 subject." A democracy which is ignorant of 
 the complicated questions involved in an inter- 
 national situation is not competent to form a 
 judgment, and the responsible leaders of such a 
 democracy must act as they think right, or as 
 they think the majority of the people would act, 
 if they knew as much about the situation as they 
 themselves know. 
 
 In his address at Mount Vernon, July 4, 191 8, 
 delivered especially to the Diplomatic Corps, 
 the President restated what he conceived to be 
 "the ends for which the associated peoples of 
 the world are fighting and which must be con- 
 ceded them before there can be peace." The 
 new statement was not so detailed as the pro- 
 gramme set forth in the speech of January 8. 
 It was a declaration of principles rather than a 
 programme. It was as follows: 
 
 I. The destruction of every arbitrary power 
 anywhere that can separately, se- 
 cretly, and of its single choice disturb
 
 2OO From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 the peace of the world; or, if it cannot 
 be presently destroyed, at the least its 
 reduction to virtual impotence. 
 
 II. The settlement of every question, whether 
 
 of territory, of sovereignty, of econo- 
 mic arrangement, or of political rela- 
 tionship, upon the basis of the free ac- 
 ceptance of that settle mentHGiy the 
 people immediately concerned, and 
 not upon the basis of the material 
 interest or advantage of any other 
 nation or people which may desire a 
 different settlement for the sake of 
 its own exterior influence or mastery. 
 
 III. The consent of all nations to be governed 
 
 in their conduct toward each other by 
 the same principles of honor and of 
 respect for the common law of civilized 
 society that govern the individual 
 citizens of all modern states in their 
 relations with one another, to the end 
 that all promises and covenants may 
 be sacredly observed, no private plots 
 or conspiracies hatched, no selfish 
 injuries wrought with impunity, and a 
 mutual trust established upon the 
 handsome foundation of a mutual 
 respect for right.
 
 War Aims of the United States 201 
 
 IV. The establishment of an organization of 
 peace which shall make it certain that 
 the combined power of free nations 
 will check every invasion of right 
 and serve to make peace and justice 
 the more secure by affording a definite 
 tribunal of opinion to which all must 
 submit and by which every interna- 
 tional readjustment that cannot be 
 amicably agreed upon by the peoples 
 directly concerned shall be sanctioned. 
 
 Lloyd George and other allied statesmen have 
 expressed themselves in general accord with 
 President Wilson's statement of the war aims. 
 There is one question, however, on which no 
 agreement appears to have been reached, that 
 is the question of imposing economic restric- 
 tions upon Germany after the war. The resolu- 
 tions of the Economic Conference of the Allies 
 held at Paris in June, 1916, contemplated an 
 economic boycott of the Central Powers during 
 the war, economic discrimination against them 
 during the period of reconstruction following 
 the cessation of hostilities, and the guarantee of 
 the economic independence of the Allies for the 
 future through the control of raw materials, 
 manufactured articles, and tonnage. This ac-
 
 2O2 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 tion, taken by the Allies nearly a year before the 
 entrance of the United States into the war, has 
 so far not been annulled. In fact, Lloyd 
 George still holds the threat of an economic 
 boycott over the head of Germany and has 
 several times intimated that the longer Ger- 
 many holds out, the heavier will be the economic 
 burden imposed upon her. President Wilson 
 has not only not committed the United States 
 to any such course, but he has several times 
 expressed strongly his disapproval of it. In his 
 reply to the Pope, August 27, 1917, he said: 
 "Punitive damages, the dismemberment of 
 empires, the establishment of selfish and exclu- 
 sive economic leagues, we deem inexpedient 
 and in the end worse than futile, no proper basis 
 for a peace of any kind, least of all for an endur- 
 ing peace/* The removal of economic barriers, 
 and the establishment of equality of trade are 
 set forth in the third article of his peace pro- 
 gramme quoted above. It appears from several 
 of the President's utterances, however, that eco- 
 nomic equality may of necessity be conditioned 
 on the outcome of the war. In his reply to the 
 Pope from which we have already quoted, he 
 refers to the rights of peoples to "freedom and 
 security and self-government and to a partici- 
 pation upon fair terms in the economic oppor-
 
 War Aims of the United States 203 
 
 tunities of the world, the German people, of 
 course, included, if they will accept equality 
 and not seek domination." In his address 
 to Congress, December 4, 1917, after referring 
 to the possibility of the German people contin- 
 uing to live under "ambitious and intriguing 
 masters" he continues, "it might be impossible 
 to admit them to the partnership of nations 
 which must henceforth guarantee the world's 
 peace. That partnership must be a partnership 
 of peoples, not a mere partnership of govern- 
 ments. It might be impossible, also, in such 
 untoward circumstances, to admit Germany to 
 the free economic intercourse which must in- 
 evitably spring out of the other partnerships of 
 a real peace. But there would be no aggression 
 in that; and such a situation, inevitable because 
 of distrust, would in the very nature of things 
 sooner or later cure itself by processes which 
 would assuredly set in." 
 
 The last quotation given above suggests the 
 distinction which President Wilson has made 
 between the German Government and the Ger- 
 man people. This distinction has been the sub- 
 ject of adverse criticism, but it appears to be 
 justified as a measure of policy as well as a 
 measure of justice. As an attempt to create a 
 rift between the German people and their gov-
 
 204 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 ernment the distinction which the President 
 has drawn and publicly proclaimed has so far 
 not been productive of results. But when a 
 defeated Germany appears at the peace confer- 
 ence to sue for terms, the President's distinc- 
 tion may be of tremendous significance. Presi- 
 dent Wilson has said repeatedly and Lloyd 
 George, speaking for England, has also de- 
 clared that the destruction or disruption of 
 Germany has never been one of the war aims. 
 In his speech delivered January 5, 1918, the 
 British premier said "neither did we enter this 
 war merely to alter or destroy the imperial con- 
 stitution of Germany, much as we consider that 
 military, autocratic constitution a dangerous 
 anachronism in the twentieth century. Our 
 point of view is that the adoption of a real 
 democratic constitution by Germany would be 
 the most convincing evidence that in her the old 
 spirit of military domination had indeed died 
 in this war, and would make it much easier for 
 us to conclude a broad democratic peace with 
 her. But, after all, that is a question for the 
 German people to decide." President Wilson 
 has intimated that it would be impossible to 
 sign a conclusive peace with the Hohenzollerns, 
 but he has also said that the internal organiza- 
 tion of the German Government was a question
 
 War Aims of the United States 205 
 
 for the German people to decide. All agree 
 that no satisfactory peace can be made with an 
 irresponsible autocratic government, and if the 
 German people wish to be accorded equal 
 rights in the new order of things that will follow 
 this war, they must devise some system of con- 
 stitutional control over the conduct of foreign 
 affairs. 
 
 Practically all of the prominent allied states- 
 men stand committed to the idea of a league 
 of nations for the maintenance of law and inter- 
 national peace. The League to Enforce Peace, 
 which has branches in all the allied countries, 
 has done a great work in popularizing this idea. 
 It is probably too early to determine the scope 
 or the constitution of such a league. The plat- 
 form of the League to Enforce Peace probably 
 does not go far enough, for it still recognizes 
 the right of any sovereign nation to go to war, 
 merely stipulating that war shall not be waged 
 until the matters in controversy shall have been 
 submitted to a council of conciliation for hear- 
 ing, consideration, and recommendation. Why 
 should we recognize the right of a nation to 
 wage war ? In times past, when different peoples 
 lived in economic isolation, it was possible for 
 two or more nations to engage in a war without 
 materially disturbing the life of other nations,
 
 206 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 but under modern conditions it is impossible to 
 localize a conflict, and a war involving any of 
 the great world powers seriously threatens the 
 peace of all. The right of a state to wage war 
 is based on the doctrine of national sovereignty, 
 a nineteenth-century outgrowth of the old doc- 
 trine of the divine right of kings. If the state 
 is sovereign and absolute, and its will is law, 
 then the state can do no wrong, and there can 
 be no international restraints upon its action. 
 Under the German theory of national sov- 
 ereignty there can be no such thing as inter- 
 national law. 
 
 The constitutional theories of the English- 
 speaking peoples, on the other hand, lend them- 
 ""selves readily to the development of a system of 
 international law. Both the British Empire 
 and the United States embody the federal prin- 
 ciple in their organization. The so-called Brit- 
 ish Empire is in reality a commonwealth of 
 nations. The overseas dominions, Canada, 
 Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, enjoy a 
 full measure of autonomy, and each has an 
 individuality of its own more marked even 
 than that of our American states. Our govern- 
 ment is based on a federation of states union 
 in great things, autonomy in minor things. 
 If we can live under a national constitution
 
 War Aims of the United States 207 
 
 that limits the powers of government, State and 
 Federal, why can we not live under an inter- 
 national constitution or code that limits the 
 powers of nations? The political institutions of 
 the English-speaking peoples afford a far more 
 promising basis for the organization of an 
 international state than the union of the modern 
 Hun and the unspeakable Turk. If the vic- 
 tory of the Allies is decisive, then the United 
 States, England, France, Italy, Japan, and, we 
 hope, eventually a democratic Russia can form 
 a union that will be able to preserve the peace 
 of the world. Germany and Austria could be 
 admitted only when they should adopt respon- 
 sible governments pledged to the fulfilment of 
 their international obligations and the obser- 
 vance of international law. 
 
 President Wilson's influence has by no means 
 been limited to the formulation of issues and 
 the statement of war aims. It has been effec- 
 tive in other ways. There is little doubt that 
 his insistence on a unified command caused 
 General Foch to be placed in control of the 
 entire western front. The President's deter- 
 mination to stand by Russia has put a stop 
 to the suggestions of those who, resenting 
 Russia's desertion of the allied cause, were will- 
 ing to accept an inconclusive peace based on
 
 208 From Isolation to Leadership 
 
 the sacrifice of Russian territory and inde- 
 pendence. 
 
 America has a great opportunity ahead of her 
 to serve mankind if she will but remain true to 
 her best ideals. When the peace conference 
 gathers the United States will be in a position 
 to shape the destinies of the world, not by reason 
 of her military strength or of her economic 
 resources and wealth, but because, as President 
 Wilson has said, "We have no selfish ends to 
 serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. 
 We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no ma- 
 terial compensation for the sacrifices we shall 
 freely make. We are but one of the champions 
 of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied 
 when those rights have been made as secure as 
 the faith and the freedom of the nation can 
 make them.'* 
 
 THE END
 
 INDEX
 
 INDEX 
 
 Alfi 
 
 ABC alliance, 162, 164. 
 
 Aberdeen, Lord, opposes annexation 
 of Texas by United States, 108. 
 
 Adams, Charles Francis, 114. 
 
 Adams, Henry, letter from Hay to, 90. 
 
 Adams, John Quincy, oppose* joint 
 action with England, 31; accepts 
 invitation to send delegates to Pan- 
 ama Congress, 154. 
 
 "Alabama Claims, ' 66, 113, 114. 
 
 Alaskan Boundary Dispute, 122, 124. 
 
 Algecira* Conference, 74; American 
 articipation in, 76, 77. 
 iance, of 1778 with France, 5-8; 
 proposed alliance with England, 
 13, 26: Holy Alliance, 22, 24; 
 Anglo-Japanese alliance, 92, 1 20. 
 See "Entangling Alliances' . 
 
 Alverstone, Lord, member of Alaskan 
 boundary commission, 123. 
 
 American Colonization Society, 59. 
 
 American Institute of International 
 Law, 157. 
 
 American Republics, Bureau of, 156. 
 
 American Revolution, significance of, 
 99, 9. 
 
 Anglo-American ideals, 126, 127. 
 
 Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, 92, 
 
 120. 
 
 Arbitration, international, 64. See 
 Hague Court, Olney-Pauncefote 
 treaty. 
 
 Arms and ammunition. See Muni- 
 tions of war. 
 
 "Aroostook War," 106. 
 
 Austria-Hungary, protests against 
 trade in munitions, 182. 
 
 Beer, George L., quoted, 99. 
 
 Belgium, German invasion of, 79; 
 restoration of. demanded, 194. 
 
 Beresford, Lord Charles, advocate* 
 open door in China, 86. 
 
 Berlin Conference of 1884, 6t. 
 
 Btngham, Hiram, on Monroe Doctrine, 
 131. 
 
 Bismarck, Prince, on Monroe Doc- 
 trine. 45; on English control of 
 North America, 126; force* war on 
 Austria, 47; force* war on France, 
 48. 
 
 BUine, James G., effort* to modify 
 Clay ton-Bui wer treaty, 115; issue* 
 
 invitation to International Confer- 
 ence of American States, 155, 156. 
 
 Bolivar, Simon, 153. 
 
 Bonaparte, Napoleon, acquires Louisi- 
 ana, 12; fails to establish control 
 over Spain's Colonies, 25. 
 
 Borah. Senator William E., introduces 
 resolution on secret diplomacy, 197. 
 
 Bowen, Herbert, 51. 
 
 Boxer uprising in China, 88. 
 
 Brussels Conference on African slave 
 trade, 62. 
 
 Bryan, William Jennings, negotiates 
 treaty with Nicaragua, 135; with 
 Colombia, 144; refuses to modify 
 neutrality law* at demand of Ger- 
 many, 182. 
 
 Bryce, Lord, quoted, 125, 126, 198. 
 
 LJiilow, Prince von, 75, 91. 
 
 California, danger of English occupa- 
 tion of, 109. 
 
 Canada, insurrection of 1837, 103. 
 
 Canning, George, British foreign 
 secretary, propose* Anglo-American 
 alliance, 26; delay* recognition of 
 South American republics, 33, 34; 
 interview with Prince rolignac, 
 35; boasts of calling new world into 
 existence, 39; opposes Pan-Ameri- 
 can movement, 155. 
 
 Caribbean Sea, American supremacy 
 in, in; advance of United State* 
 in, 132; new American policies in, 
 U2 f 137, 44- 
 
 Caroline, the, 103. 
 
 Carranza, Venustiano, 162, 163. 
 
 Castlereagh, Viscount, 2O. 
 
 China. See Open-door policy. 
 
 Choate, Joseph H., at Second Hague 
 Conference, 68, 69. 
 
 Civil War. foreign policy of United 
 State* during, 65; dispute* with 
 England, III. 
 
 Clay, Henry, oppose* joint action 
 with England, 31; instruction* 
 to delegates to Panama Congress, 
 >S4- 
 
 Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 44, III. 
 
 Cleveland, Grover, intervene* in 
 Venezuelan boundary dispute, 48; 
 withholds Kongo treaty from Sen- 
 ate, 61 ; Venezuelan policy juiuhcd 
 
 211
 
 212 
 
 Index 
 
 by events, 115; favors general arbi- 
 tration treaty with England, 116. 
 
 Cobden, Richard, essay on America, 
 102. 
 
 Colombia, aggrieved at seizure of 
 Canal Zone, 142; attempts of 
 United States to settle controversy, 
 143. 144. 
 
 Consuls, status of, in European leases 
 in China, 87, 88. 
 
 Continuous voyage, doctrine of, 72, 
 124, 176 177. 
 
 Cowdray, Lord, seeks concession from 
 Colombia, 142. 
 
 Crampton, British minister to United 
 States, dismissal of, III. 
 
 Declaration of London, 71-73, I7S, 
 177- 
 
 Declaration of Paris, 64, 65. 
 
 Declaration of Rights and Duties of 
 Nations, adopted by American 
 Institute of International Law, 
 158, IS9. 
 
 Democracy against autocracy, 192. 
 
 Dewey, Admiral George, on with- 
 drawal of Germany from Venezuela, 
 51; demands apology from German 
 admiral in Manila Bay, 119. 
 
 Dickens, Charles, "American Notes," 
 
 102. 
 
 Diederichs, German Admiral, 119. 
 Diplomacy, secret, 76, 77, 197-199. 
 Dunning, William A., "British Em- 
 pire and the United States," quoted, 
 
 IO2, III. 
 
 Durfee, Amos, 103. 
 
 Economic Conference of the Allies 
 
 at Paris, 201. 
 Economic restrictions on the Central 
 
 Powers, 201-203. 
 Egypt, financial administration of, by 
 
 Great Britain. 134. 
 England. Sft Great Britain. 
 English-speaking peoples, solidarity 
 
 of, 206, 207. 
 "Entangling Alliances," warning of 
 
 Jefferson against, 12; Wilson's 
 
 views on, 187. 
 
 Entente treaty of 1904 between Eng- 
 land and France, 74. 
 European balance of power, interest 
 
 of United States in preserving, 76; 
 
 disturbed by Japan, 171. 
 
 Fenian movement, encouraged in 
 
 United States, 112, 113. 
 Ferdinand VII, king of Spain, 20, 25. 
 Fish, Hamilton, secretary of state, 
 
 renews negotiations for settlement 
 
 of "Alabama Claims," 113, 114. 
 Foch, General, appointment of, 207. 
 Fonseca Bay, United States acquires 
 
 naval base on, 135, 136. 
 
 Forsyth, John, secretary of state, 104. 
 Foster, John W., letter from Hay, to, 
 
 89- 
 France, treaty of alliance with, 5-8. 
 
 Genet, Edmond C., minister of the 
 French Republic, 6. 
 
 George, Lloyd, on war aims, 201, 202, 
 204. 
 
 Germany, intervenes in Venezuela, 
 50; excluded from South America; 
 by aid of England, 53; designs of, 
 on Philippine Islands, 85; adopts 
 naval policy, 120; influence of, in 
 America, 126; submarine policy of, 
 178, 179; attempts of, to justify, 
 181; protests against munitions 
 trade, iSi; organizes propaganda 
 and conspiracy in United States, 
 184. 
 
 Great Britain, withdraws from Euro- 
 pean alliance, 22; intervenes in 
 Mexico, 46; not unfavorable to 
 Monroe Doctrine, 52, 53; forms alli- 
 ance with Japan, 92; points of con- 
 tact with United States, 100; un- 
 friendly attitude, IOI; change of 
 attitude in Spanish War, 118; 
 naval policy of, 120; interference 
 with shipments to Germany re- 
 sented in United States, 124; size 
 of navy, 127; so-called blockade of 
 Germany, 174-178. See Anglo- 
 American ideals. 
 
 Great Lakes, disarmament on, 103. 
 
 Gummere, S. R., delegate to Algeciras 
 Conference, 75. 
 
 Hague Conference, of 1899, 67; of 
 1907, 68. 
 
 Hague Conventions, status of, 71. 
 
 Hague Court of Arbitration, 68. 
 
 Haiti, Republic of, United States ac- 
 quires financial supervision over, 
 136, 137- 
 
 Hamilton, Alexander, opinion on 
 French treaty of 1778, 6. 
 
 Harris, Townsend, 95. 
 
 Hay, John, secretary of state, protests 
 against persecution of Jews in Ru- 
 mania, 78; formulates open-door 
 policy for China, 85; defines status 
 of consuls in European leases in 
 China, 88; insists on "territorial 
 and administrative entity" of 
 China, 89; private correspondence 
 on Chinese situation, 89-91. 
 
 Hay-Pauncefote treaty, 120, 121. 
 
 Henry, of Prussia, Prince, visit of, to 
 United States, 118. 
 
 Holy Alliance, 22, 24. 
 
 Huerta, Victoriano, 160, 162. 
 
 International Conference of American 
 States, 156.
 
 Index 
 
 213 
 
 International Court of Arbitral Jus- 
 tice, plan for, 70. 
 
 International Law, attitude of United 
 States toward, 64; attempts to 
 codify, 68, Jl; attitude of Germany 
 toward, 206. 
 
 International Law, American Insti- 
 tute of, 157. 
 
 International Prize Court, plan for, 
 adopted by Second Hague Confer- 
 ence, 68. 
 
 Isolation, policy of, distinct from Mon- 
 roe Doctrine, 3, 5; policy no longer 
 possible, 170. 
 
 Jameson Raid, in the Transvaal, 50. 
 apan, beginning of American inter- 
 course with, 83, 84; forms alliance 
 with Great Britain, 92; goes to war 
 with Russia, 94; disturbing factor 
 in world politics, 171. 
 
 Jefferson, Thomas, opinion on French 
 treaty of 1778. 7; warns against 
 "entangling alliances," iz; plans 
 alliance with England against 
 France, 12-14; favors joint action 
 with England against Holy Alli- 
 ance, 28-30; author of doctrine 
 of recognition, 161. 
 
 Jews, diplomatic protests against 
 harsh treatment of, 78, 79. 
 
 Johnson-Clarendon convention, 113. 
 
 Knox, Philander C., proposes neu- 
 tralization of railways of Manchuria, 
 95; negotiates treaties with Hon- 
 duras and Nicaragua, 134, 135; 
 proposes settlement with Colombia, 
 >43- 
 
 Kongo Free State, treaty establish- 
 ing, signed by American delegates 
 but withheld from Senate by Presi- 
 dent Cleveland, 6 1, 6z. 
 
 Kruger, Paul, 50. 
 
 Lansing, Robert, secretary of state, 
 replies to Austro-Hungarian note 
 on munitions trade, 182, 183; dis- 
 misses Austrian ambassador and 
 German military and naval attaches, 
 185. 
 
 Lansmg-Ishii agreement, 95. 
 
 League of Nations, 188, 205. 
 
 I iberia, Republic of, 59. 
 
 Liverpool, Lord, :o. 
 
 Livingston, Robert R., minister to 
 France, 11. 
 
 Lodge, Senator Henry Cabot, on Ore- 
 gon dispute, no, in; denies exis- 
 Tiire of secret treaty with Eng- 
 land. 120. 
 
 London Naval Conference, 71. 
 
 Luinania. sinking of, 179. 
 
 Madero, Francisco, 160. 
 
 Madison, James, favors joint action 
 with England against Holy Alliance, 
 3- 
 
 Mahan, Alfred T., 99. 
 
 Maine, boundary dispute with New 
 Brunswick, 106. 
 
 Manchuria, Russian encroachments 
 on, 91-93 95. 
 
 Marcy, William L., secretary of state, 
 views on Declaration of Paris. 
 65. 
 
 Maximilian, Prince, placed by Louis 
 Napoleon on throne of Mexico, 
 46- 
 
 Merchant vessels, proposal to arm, 
 185. 
 
 Mexico, French intervention in, 46; 
 Huerta revolution in, 160; American 
 policy toward, 160-164. 
 
 Monroe, James, sent to Paris to aid 
 Livingston in negotiations for pur- 
 chase of New Orleans and West 
 Florida, 13; consults Jefferson and 
 Madison on subject of British pro- 
 posals for joint action against Holy 
 Alliance, 26-28; message of Decem- 
 ber 2, 1823, 36-39; emphasizes 
 
 ' separation of European and Ameri- 
 can politics, 43. 
 
 Monroe Doctrine, compared with pol- 
 icy of isolation, 3; justification of, 
 4; formulation of, 19; text of, 36- 
 39; reception of, in Europe, 39; 
 basis of 43; sanction of, 45; relation 
 of, to European balance of power, 
 40, 52; attitude of England toward, 
 52; negative side of, 57; adverse 
 criticism of, 131; not a self-denying 
 declaration, 147. 
 
 Moroccan question. See Algeciras 
 Conference. 
 
 Motley, John L., 113. 
 
 Munitions of war, sale of to bellig- 
 erents, 181-184. 
 
 McKinley, William, reasons for re- 
 taining Philippine Islands, 84, 85. 
 
 McLeod, Alexander, arrest of, 104; 
 acquittal of, 105. 
 
 Napoleon, Louis, intervenes in Mexico, 
 46; decides to withdraw, 47, 48. 
 
 National sovereignty, doctrine of, 2Or>. 
 
 Neutral prizes, destruction of, 72, l8o. 
 
 Neutrality, Washington's proclama- 
 tion of 1793, 8; failure of, in Na- 
 poleonic wars, 14, 15; Wilson's 
 proclamation of, 172; nature of, 
 172, 173; so-called ethical neutrality, 
 174; abandonment of, 186. 
 
 New Brunswick, boundary dispute 
 with Maine, 106. 
 
 Niagara conference on Mexican ques- 
 tion, 162.
 
 214 
 
 Index 
 
 CMney, Richard, on Monroe Doctrine, 
 4\; conducts correspondence on 
 Venezuelan boundary dispute, 48; 
 signs general arbitration treaty with 
 England, 116. 
 
 OIney-Pauncefote treaty. 1 16, 117. 
 
 Open-door policy in China, Hay's 
 note of September, 6, 1899, 85; 
 Anglo-American origin of, 87. 
 
 Oregon, joint occupation of, 107. 
 
 O'Shaughnessy, Nelson, 162. 
 
 Panama Canal, effect of, on naval 
 
 policy, 132. 
 
 Panama Canal Zone, seizure of, 142 
 Panama Congress of 1826, 153, IS4- 
 Panama Tolls Act, 121. 
 Pan-American Financial Congress, 
 
 Pan-American Scientific Congress, 
 
 Pan-American Union, 156. 
 
 Pan-Americanism, 153-157. 
 
 Pauncefote, Sir Julian, signs general 
 arbitration treaty with United 
 States, Il6; signs Canal treaty, I2O. 
 
 Platt Amendment, provisions of, 144, 
 
 Peace Conference. See Hague Con- 
 ference. 
 
 Perry, Commodore Matthew C., com- 
 mands expedition to Japan, 83, 84, 
 95. 
 
 Philippine Islands, McKinley's rea- 
 sons for retaining, 84, 85. 
 
 Polignac, Prince, interview with Can- 
 ning on subject of the Spanish col- 
 onies, 35. 
 
 Polk, James K., settles Oregon dis- 
 pute, no. 
 
 Portsmouth, treaty of, 94. 
 
 Prize Court. See International Prize 
 Court. 
 
 Prizes, destruction of, 179, 180. 
 
 Recognition, doctrine of, discussed 
 with reference to Mexican question, 
 161. 
 
 Roosevelt, Theodore, forces Germany 
 to withdraw from Venezuela, 51; 
 sends delegates to Algeciras Con- 
 ference, 75; exerts influence to pre- 
 serve European balance of power, 
 76; protests against persecution of 
 Jews in Rumania and Russia, 78, 
 79; invites Russia and Japan to 
 peace conference, 94; incurs ill 
 will of Jap?", v. submits Alaskan 
 boundary disput o limited arbi- 
 tration, 123; establishes financial 
 supervision over Dominican Repub- 
 lic, 133, 138; Big-Stick policy, 139; 
 extension of Monroe Doctrine, 
 140; seizure of Canal Zone, 142. 
 
 Root, Elihu, proposes international 
 court of justice, 69; author of Platt 
 Amendment, 146; visits South 
 America, 156. 
 
 Rush, Richard, conferences with Can- 
 ning on South American situation, 
 
 26,33,34- . 
 
 Russia, occupies Manchuria, 91, <);; 
 opposes opening of ManchutUn 
 ports to American commerce, 9.;; 
 goes to war with Japan, 94; under- 
 goes revolution, 191; President 
 Wilson's determination to stand by, 
 207. 
 
 Russo-Japanese war, 94. 
 
 Sackville-West, Lord, dismissal of, 
 
 IIS- 
 
 Salisbury, Lord, backs down in Vene- 
 zuelan dispute, 50; warns President 
 McKinley of Germany's designs oil 
 Philippines, 85. 
 
 Santo Domingo, financial supervision 
 over. 133, 134- 
 
 Seward, William H., protests against 
 French occupation of Mexico, 47. 
 
 Slave trade, provision for suppression 
 of, in Webster-Ashburton treaty, 
 59, 60; Brussels conference on, 
 62. 
 
 Slavery, and isol ation, 58. 
 
 South America, neglected by United 
 States as field for commercial devel- 
 opment, 52; open door in, 53. 
 
 Spanish colonies, revolt of, 25. 
 
 Spanish revolution of 1820, 20. 
 
 Spanish War, turning point in rela- 
 tions of United States and England, 
 118. 
 
 Sumner, Charles, 113. 
 
 Taft, William H., proposes to bring 
 Nicaragua and Honduras under 
 financial supervision of United 
 States, 134, 135; tries to reestab- 
 lish friendly relations with Colom- 
 bia, 143. 
 
 Tardieu, Andre, report of Algeciras 
 Conference, 76. 
 
 Texas, annexation of, opposed by 
 Great Britain, 107, 108^. 
 
 Thayer, William R., gives version 
 of Roosevelt-Holleben interview, 
 51- 
 
 Tocqueville, Alexis de, " Democracy 
 in America," 102. 
 
 Vera Cruz, American occupation of, 
 
 161; evacuation of, 162. 
 Verona, Congress of, 19, 21; secret 
 
 treaty of, 22-24. 
 Vienna, Congress of, 19. 
 Villa, Francisco, 162, 163.
 
 Index 
 
 215 
 
 War of 1812, ic. 
 
 Washington, George, requests opin- 
 ions of cabinet on French treaty, 
 6; issue* proclamation of neutrality, 
 8; Farewell Address, 9-11. 
 
 Washington, treaty of, 66, 114. 
 
 Webster, Daniel, secretary of ttate, 
 104, 105 
 
 Wehster-Ashburton treaty, 59, 60, 
 107. 
 
 Wellington, Duke of, at Congress of 
 Verona, 21; protest and withdrawal, 
 
 22. 
 
 V. . ^t Indies, American supremacy 
 in, 1 20. 
 
 Wiute, Henry, delegate to Algeciras 
 Conference. 75. 
 
 William II, German Kaiser, telegram 
 to President Rruger, 50; forced to 
 withdraw from Venezuela, 51; visits 
 Morocco, 74; demands retirement 
 of Delcasse, 75; insists on general 
 conference on Morocco, 75; thwarted 
 in efforts to humiliate France, 77. 
 
 Williams, Talcott, on McKinley's rea- 
 sons for retaining Philippines, 85. 
 
 Wilvm, Henry Lane, 160. 
 
 Wilson, Woodrow, secures modifica- 
 tion of Panama Tolls Act, 121; ex- 
 tends financial supervision over 
 Nicaragua and Haiti, 136, ;j7; 
 warns Latin-American states against 
 granting concessions to European 
 syndicates, 140, 141; attitude of, 
 on questions of international law 
 and diplomacy, 151, 152; general 
 Latin-American policy, 152, 165; 
 New Pan- Americanism, 153; Mex- 
 ican policy, 160-164; ks for decla- 
 ration of war on Germany, 185; 
 views on extension of Monroe Doc- 
 trine, 187; moral leadership of, 
 192; defines war aims, 192-196, 
 199-201; draws distinction between 
 German people and German gov- 
 ernment, 203, 204; exerts effective 
 influence over Allies, 207. 
 
 Wood, General Leonard, 146.
 
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