FROM ISOLATION ADERSHIP ; FROM ISOLATION TO LEADERSHIP A Review of American Foreign Policy BY JOHN HOLLADAY ; LATANE, PH.D., LL.D. PROFESSOR OF AMERICAN HISTORY IN THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY GARDEN CITY NEW YORK DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY 1918 COPYRIGHT, 1918, BY DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, INCLUDING THAT OF TRANSLATION INTO FOREIGN LANGUAGES, INCLUDING THE SCANDINAVIAN TO MY STEP-SONS LEWIS BERKELEY Cox First Lieut,, 6th Infantry WILLIAM JUNKIN Cox Second Lieut., 6o$th Engineers NOW WITH THE AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES IN FRANCE AND RICHARD THRELKELD Cox of the Student Army Training Corps, at the Virginia Military Institute WHO EXPECTS SHORTLY TO FOLLOW THEM THIS VOLUME IS INSCRIBED WITH PRIDE AND AFFECTION CONTENTS CHAPTER PACE I. ORIGIN OF THE POLICY OF ISOLATION . 3 II. FORMULATION OF THE MONROE DOC- TRINE 19 III. THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE OF POWER . 43 IV. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WITH- OUT THE SANCTION OF FORCE . . 57 V. THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY .... 83 VI. ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS ... 99 VII. IMPERIALISTIC TENDENCIES OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE 131 VIII. THE NEW PAN-AMERICANISM . . . 151 IX. THE END OF NEUTRALITY AND ISOLA- TION 169 X. THE WAR AIMS OF THE UNITED STATES 191 INDEX 211 I ORIGIN OF THE POLICY OF ISOLATION From Isolation to Leadership ORIGIN OF THE POLICY OF ISOLATION THE Monroe Doctrine and the policy of polit- ical isolation are two phases of American diplo- macy so closely related that very few writers appear to draw any distinction between them. The Monroe Doctrine was in its origin nothing^ more than the assertion, with special applica- tion to the American continents, of the right of independent states to pursue their own careers without fear or threat of intervention, domina- tion, or subjugation by other states. President Monroe announced to the world that this prin- ciple would be upheld by the United States in this hemisphere. The policy of isolation was the outgrowth of Washington's warning against permanent alliances and Jefferson's warning against entangling alliances. Both Washington and Jefferson had in mind apparently the form of European alliance common in their day, 4 From Isolation to Leadership which bound one nation to support another both diplomatically and by force in any dispute that might arise no matter whether it concerned the interests of the first state or not. Such alliances were usually of the nature of family compacts between different dynasties, or be- tween different branches of the same dynasty, rather than treaties between nations. In fact, dynastic aims and ambitions were frequently, if not usually, at variance with the real interests of the peoples affected. It will be shown later tha't neither Washington nor Jefferson intended that the United States should refrain perma- nently from the exercise of its due influence in matters which properly concern the peace and welfare of the community of nations. Washing- ton did not object to temporary alliances for special emergencies nor did Jefferson object to special alliances for the accomplishment of defi- nite objects. Their advice has, however, been generally interpreted as meaning that the United States must hold aloof from world politics and attend strictly to its own business. The Monroe Doctrine was a perfectly sound principle and it has been fully justified by nearly a century of experience. It has saved South America from the kind of exploitation to which the continents of Africa and Asia have, during Origin of the Policy of Isolation 5 the past generation, fallen a prey. The policy of isolation, on the other hand, still cherished by so many Americans as a sacred tradition of the fathers, is in principle quite distinct from the Monroe Doctrine and is in fact utterly in- consistent with the position and importance of the United States as a world power. The dif- ference in principle between the two policies can perhaps best be illustrated by the following sup- position. If the United States were to sign a permanent treaty with England placing our navy at her disposal in the event of attack from Germany or some other power, on condi- tion that England would unite with us in oppos- ing the intervention of any European power in Latin America, such a treaty would not be a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, but a dis- tinct recognition of that principle. Such a treaty would, however, be a departure from our traditional policy of isolation. Of the two policies, that of avoiding political alliances is the older. It was announced by Washington under circumstances that will be considered in a moment. In the struggle for independence the colonies deliberately sought foreign alliances. In fact, the first treaty ever signed by the United States was the treaty of alliance with France, negoti- 6 From Isolation to Leadership ated and ratified in 1778. The aid which France extended under this treaty to our revo- lutionary ancestors in men, money, and ships enabled them to establish the independence of our country. A few years later came the French Revolution, the establishment of the French Republic followed by the execution of Louis XVI, and in 1793 the war between Eng- land and France. With the arrival in this country of Genet, the minister of the newly established French Republic, there began a heated debate in the newspapers throughout the country as to our obligations under the treaty of alliance and the commercial treaty of 1778. President Washington requested the opinions in writing of the members of his cabinet as to whether Genet should be received and the new government which had been set up in France recognized, as to whether the treaties were still binding, and as to whether a procla- mation of neutrality should be issued. Hamilton and Jefferson replied at great length, taking as usual opposite sides, particularly on the ques- tion as to the binding force of the treaties. Hamilton took the view that as the government of Louis XVI, with which the treaties had been negotiated, had been overthrown, we were under no obligations to fulfill their stipulations Origin of the Policy of Isolation 7 and had a perfect right to renounce them. Jefferson took the correct view that the treaties were with the French nation and that they were binding under whatever government the French people chose to set up. This principle, which is now one of the fundamental doctrines of international law, was so ably expounded by Jefferson that his words are well worth quoting. "I consider the people who constitute a so- ciety or nation as the source of all authority in that nation, as free to transact their common concerns by any agents they think proper, to change these agents individually, or the organ- ization of them in form or function whenever they please: that all the acts done by those agents under the authority of the nation, are the acts of the nation, are obligatory on them, and enure to their use, and can in no wise be annulled or affected by any change in the form of the government, or of the persons adminis- tering it. Consequently the Treaties between the United States and France were not treaties between the United States and Louis Capet, but between the two nations of America and France, and the nations remaining in existence, tho' both of them have since changed their forms of government, the treaties are not annulled by these changes." 8 From Isolation to Leadership The argument was so heated that Washington was reluctant to press matters to a definite con- clusion. From his subsequent action it appears that he agreed with Jefferson that the treaties were binding, but he held that the treaty of alliance was purely defensive and that we were under no obligation to aid France in an offensive war such as she was then waging. He accord- ingly issued his now famous proclamation of neutrality, April, 1793. Of this proclamation W. E. Hall, a leading English authority on inter- national law, writing one hundred years later, said: "The policy of the United States in 1793 constitutes an epoch in the development of the usages of neutrality. There can be no doubt that it was intended and believed to give effect to the obligations then incumbent upon neutrals. But it represented by far the most advanced existing opinions as to what those obligations were; and in some points it even went farther than authoritative international custom has up to the present time advanced. In the main, however, it is identical with the standard of conduct which is now adopted by the com- munity of nations." Washington's proclama- tion laid the real foundations of the American policy of isolation. The very novelty of the rigid neutrality pro- Origin of the Policy of Isolation 9 claimed by Washington made the policy a diffi- cult one to pursue. In the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, which lasted for nearly a quarter of a century, the United States was the principal neutral. The problems to which this situation gave rise were so similar to the prob- lems raised during the early years of the present war that many of the diplomatic notes prepared by Jefferson and Madison might, with a few changes of names and dates, be passed off as the correspondence of Wilson and Lansing. Washington's administration closed with the clouds of the European war still hanging heavy on the horizon. Under these circumstances he delivered his famous farewell address in which he said: "The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commer- cial relations to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have al- ready formed engagements let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop. "Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent con- troversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves io From Isolation to Leadership by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. "Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoy- ance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time re- solve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel. "Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation ? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, en- tangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambitions, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice ? "It is our true policy to steer clear of perma- nent alliances with any portion of the foreign world, so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engage- Origin of the Policy of Isolation 1 1 ments. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs that honesty is always the best policy. I repeat, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But in my opinion it is un- necessary and would be unwise to extend them. "Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a respectable defen- sive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies." It will be observed that Washington warned his countrymen against permanent alliances. He expressly said that we might "safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergen- cies." Further than this many of those who are continually quoting Washington's warning against alliances not only fail to note the limitations under which the advice was given, but they also overlook the reasons assigned. In a succeeding paragraph of the Farewell Address he said: "With me a predominant motive has been to endeavor to gain time to our country to settle and mature its yet recent institutions, and to progress without interruption to that degree of strength and consistency which is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the command of its own fortunes." 12 From Isolation to Leadership The expression "entangling alliances" does not occur in the Farewell Address, but was given currency by Jefferson. In his first in- augural address he summed up the principles by which he proposed to regulate his foreign policy in the following terms: "Peace, com- merce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none." During the brief interval of peace following the treaty of Amiens in 1801, Napoleon under- took the reestablishment of French power in Santo Domingo as the first step in the develop- ment of a colonial empire which he determined upon when he forced Spain to retrocede Louis- iana to France by the secret treaty of San Ildefonso in 1800. Fortunately for us the ill- fated expedition to Santo Domingo encountered the opposition of half a million negroes and ul- timately fell a prey to the ravages of yellow fever. As soon as Jefferson heard of the cession of Louisiana to France, he instructed Living- ston, his representative at Paris, to open nego- tiations for the purchase of New Orleans and West Florida, stating that the acquisition of New Orleans by a powerful nation like France would inevitably lead to friction and conflict. "The day that France takes possession of New Orleans fixes the sentence which is to restrain Origin of the Policy of Isolation 13 her forever within her low water mark. It seals the union of two nations who in conjunc- tion can maintain exclusive possession of the ocean. From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation. We must turn all our attentions to a maritime force, for which our resources place us on very high grounds : and having formed and cemented together a power which may render reinforce- ment of her settlements here impossible to France, make the first cannon, which shall be fired in Europe the signal for tearing up any settlement she may have made, and for holding the two continents of America in sequestration for the common purposes of the united British and American nations. This is not a state of things we seek or desire. It is one which this measure, if adopted by France, forces on us, as necessarily as any other cause, by the laws of nature, brings on its necessary effect." Monroe was later sent to Paris to support Livingston and he was instructed, in case there was no "prospect of a favorable termination of the negotiations, to avoid a rupture until the spring and "in the meantime enter into con- ferences with the British Government, through their ambassador at Paris, to fix principles of alliance, and leave us in peace until Congress 14 From Isolation to Leadership meets.'* Jefferson had already informed the British minister at Washington that if France should, by closing the mouth of the Mississippi, force the United States to war, "they would throw away the scabbard." Monroe and Livingston were now instructed, in case they should become convinced that France medi- tated hostilities against the United States, to negotiate an alliance with England and to stipulate that neither party should make peace or truce without the consent of the other. -*. Thus notwithstanding his French proclivities and his warning against "entangling alliances," the author of the immortal Declaration of In- dependence was ready and willing in this emergency to form an alliance with England. The unexpected cession of the entire province of Louisiana to the United States made the contemplated alliance with England unneces- sary. The United States was no more successful in its effort to remain neutral during the Na- poleonic wars than it was during the present war, though the slow means of communication a hundred years ago caused the struggle for neutral rights to be drawn out for a much longer period of time. Neither England nor France regarded us as having any rights which they Origin of the Policy of Isolation 1 5 were bound to respect, and American commerce was fairly bombarded by French decrees and British orders in council. There was really not much more reason why we should have fought England than France, but as England's naval supremacy enabled her to interfere more effec- tually with our commerce on the sea and as this interference was accompanied by the practice of impressing American sailors into the British service, we finally declared war against her. No effort was made, however, to form an alliance or even to cooperate with Napoleon. The United States fought the War of 1812 without allies, and while we gained a number of single-ship actions and notable victories on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain, we failed utterly in two campaigns to occupy Canada, and the final result of the conflict was that our national capitol was burned and our commerce absolutely swept from the seas. Jackson's victory at New Orleans, while gratify- ing to our pride, took place two weeks after the treaty of Ghent had been signed and had, consequently, no effect on the outcome of the war. II FORMULATION OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE II FORMULATION OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE THE international situation which gave rise to the Monroe Doctrine was the most unusual --- in some respects that modern history records. * ^^ The European alliance which had been organdy ' / ized in 1813 for the purpose of bringing about the overthrow of Napoleon continued to domi- nate the affairs of Europe until 1823. Thig, alliance, which met at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and held later meetings at Aix-la- Chapelle in 1818, at Troppau in 1820, at Lay- bach in 1821, and at Verona in 1822, undertook to legislate for all Europe and was the nearest approach to a world government that we have ever had. While this alliance publicly pro- claimed that it had no other object than the maintenance of peace and that the repose of the world was its motive and its end, its real object was to uphold absolute monarchy an to suppress every attempt at the establishment of representative government. As long as 19 2O From Isolation to Leadership England remained in the alliance her statesmen jf^ exercised a restraining influence, for England 4.^.4 was the only one of the allies which professed to have a representative system of government. As Castlereagh was setting out for the meeting at Aix-la-Chapelle Lord Liverpool, who was then prime minister, warned him that, "The Russian must be made to feel that we have a parliament and a public, to which we are re- sponsible, and that we cannot permit ourselves to be drawn into views of policy which are wholly incompatible with the spirit of our government.'* .. The reactionary spirit of the continental members of the alliance was soon thoroughly aroused by the series of revolutions that fol- t, lowed one another in 1820. In March the Spanish army turned against the government of Ferdinand VII and demanded the restoration of the constitution of 1812. The action of the army was everywhere approved and sustained by the people and the king was forced to pro- /* J&*to*& c l a i m tne constitution and to promise to uphold v^ it. The Spanish revolution was followed in July by a constitutional movement in Naples, and in August by a similar movement in Portu- gal; while the next year witnessed the outbreak of the Greek struggle for independence. Thus Formulation of the Monroe Doctrine 2 1 in all three of the peninsulas of Southern Europe the people were struggling for the right of self- government. The great powers at once took alarm at the rapid spread of revolutionary ideas and proceeded to adopt measures for the sup- pression of the movements to which these ideas gave rise. At Troppau and Laybach measures were taken for the suppression of the revolu- tionary movements in Italy. An Austrian army entered Naples in March, 1821, over- threw the constitutional government that had been inaugurated, and restored Ferdinand II to absolute power. The revolution which had broken out in Piedmont was also suppressed by a detachment of the Austrian army. Eng- land held aloof from all participation in the conferences at Troppau and Laybach, though her ambassador to Austria was present to watch the proceedings. The next meeting of the allied powers was arranged for October, 1822, at Verona. Here the affairs of Greece, Italy, and in particular Spain came up for consideration. At this con- gress all five powers of the alliance were repre- sented. France was especially concerned about the condition of affairs in Spain, and England sent Wellington out of self-defense. The Con- gress of Verona was devoted largely to a discus- 22 From Isolation to Leadership sion of Spanish affairs. Wellington had been instructed to use all his influence against the adoption of measures of intervention in Spain. When he found that the other powers were bent upon this step and that his protest would be unheeded, he withdrew from the congress. The four remaining powers signed the secret t treaty of Verona, November 22, 1822, as a revision, so they declared in the preamble, of the Treaty of the Holy Alliance, which had been signed at Paris in 1815 by Austria, Russia, and Prussia. This last mentioned treaty sprang from the erratic brain of the Czar Alexander under the influence of Baroness Kriidener, and is one of the most remarkable political documents extant. No one had taken it seriously except the Czar himself and it had been without influence upon the politics of Europe. The treaty of Verona, however, which was avowedly a revision of the Holy Alliance, is a document of the highest im- portance. The principal articles were: "Article I. The high contracting powers ; being convinced that the system of representa- tive government is equally as incompatible jwith the monarchical principles as the maxim ;of the sovereignty of the people with the divine right, engage mutually, in the most solemn manner, to use all their efforts to put an end to Formulation of the Monroe Doctrine 23 the system of representative governments, in whatever country it may exist in Europe, and to prevent its being introduced in those coun- tries where it is not yet known. "Article II. As it cannot be doubted that the liberty of the press is the most powerful means used by the pretended supporters of the rights of nations, to the detriment of those of Princes, the high contracting parties promise reciprocally to adopt all proper measures to suppress it, not only in their own states, but, also, in the rest of Europe. "Article III. Convinced that the principles of religion contribute most powerfully to keep nations in the state of passive obedience which they owe to their Princes, the high contracting parties declare it to be their intention to sustain, in their respective states, those measures which the clergy may adopt, with the aim of amelio- rating their own interests, so intimately con- nected with the preservation of the authority of Princes; and the contracting powers join in offering their thanks to the Pope, for what he has already done for them, and solicit his con- stant cooperation in their views of submitting the nations. "Article IV. The situation of Spain and Portugal unite unhappily all the circumstances 24 From Isolation to Leadership to which this treaty has particular reference. The high contracting parties, in confiding to France the care of putting an end to them, en- gage to assist her in the manner which may the least compromise them with their own people and the people of France, by means of a sub- sidy on the part of the two empires, of twenty millions of francs every year, from the date of the signature of this treaty to the end of the war." Such was the code of despotism which the continental powers adopted for Europe and which they later proposed to extend to America. It was an attempt to make the world safe for autocracy. Wellington's protest at Verona marked the final withdrawal of England from the alliance which had overthrown Napoleon and naturally inclined her toward a rap- prochement with the United States. The aim of the Holy Allies, as the remaining mem- bers of the alliance now called themselves, was to undo the work of the Revolution and of Napoleon and to restore all the peoples of Europe to the absolute sway of their legitimate sovereigns. After the overthrow of the consti- tutional movements in Piedmont, Naples, and Spain, absolutism reigned supreme once more in western Europe, but the Holy Allies felt that Formulation of the Monroe Doctrine 25 their task was not completed so long as Spain's revolted colonies in America remained un- subjugated. These colonies had drifted into practical independence while Napoleon's brother Joseph was on the throne of Spain. Nelson's great victory at Trafalgar had left England supreme on the seas and neither Napoleon nor Joseph had been able to establish any control over Spain's American colonies. When Ferdi- nand was restored to his throne in 1814, he un- wisely undertook to refasten on his colonies the yoke of the old colonial system and to break up the commerce which had grown up with England and with the United States. The dif- ferent colonies soon proclaimed their independ- ence and the wars of liberation ensued. By 1822 it was evident that Spain unassisted could never resub jugate them, and the United States after mature deliberation recognized the new republics and established diplomatic intercourse with them. England, although enjoying the full benefits of trade with the late colonies of Spain, still hesitated out of regard for the mother country to take the final step of recog- nition. In the late summer of 1823 circular letters were issued inviting the powers to a conference at Paris to consider the Spanish-American 26 From Isolation to Leadership question. George Canning, the British foreign secretary, at once called into conference Richard Rush, the American minister, and proposed joint action against the schemes of the Holy Alliance. Rush replied that he was not author- ized to enter into such an agreement, but that he would communicate the proposal at once to his government. As soon as Rush's dispatch was received President Monroe realized fully the magnitude of the issue presented by the proposal of an Anglo-American alliance. Be- fore submitting the matter to his cabinet he transmitted copies of Rush's dispatch to ex- Presidents Jefferson and Madison and the fol- lowing interesting correspondence took place. In his letter to Jefferson of October I7th, the President said: i "I transmit to you two despatches, which were receiv'd from Mr. Rush, while I was lately in Washington, which involve interests of the highest importance. They contain two letters from Mr. Canning, suggesting designs of the holy alliance, against the Independence of S. America, & proposing a co-operation, between G. Britain & the U States, in support of it, against the members of that alliance. The project aims, in the first instance, at a mere expression of opinion, somewhat in the abstract, Formulation of the Monroe Doctrine 27 but which, it is expected by Mr. Canning, will have a great political effect, by defeating the combination. By Mr. Rush's answers, which are also enclosed, you will see the light in which he views the subject, & the extent to which he may have gone. Many important considera- tions are involved in this proposition, i" Shall we entangle ourselves, at all, in European politicks, & wars, on the side of any power, against others, presuming that a concert, by agreement, of the kind proposed, may lead to that result? 2 d If a case can exist in which a sound maxim may, & ought to be departed from, is not the present instance, precisely that case? 3 d Has not the epoch arriv'd when G. Britain must take her stand, either on the side of the monarchs of Europe, or of the U States, & in consequence, either in favor of Despotism or of liberty & may it not be pre- sum'd that, aware of that necessity, her gov- ernment has seiz'd on the present occurrence, as that, which it deems, the most suitable, to announce & mark the commenc'ment of that career ? "My own impression is that we ought to meet the proposal of the British govt. & to make it known, that we would view an inter- ference on the part of the European powers, and 28 From Isolation to Leadership especially an attack on the Colonies, by them, as an attack on ourselves, presuming that, if they succeeded with them, they would extend it to us. I am sensible however of the extent & difficulty of the question, & shall be happy to have yours, & Mr. Madison's opinions on it." Jefferson's reply dated Monticello, October 24th, displays not only a profound insight into the international situation, but a wide vision of the possibilities involved. He said : "The question presented by the letters you have sent me, is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of Independence. That made us a nation, this sets our compass and points the 'course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. And never could we embark on it under circumstances more aus- picious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of in- terests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. While the last is laboring to become the domicil of despotism, our endeavor Formulation of the Monroe Doctrine 29 should surely be, to make our hemisphere that of freedom. One nation, most of all, could disturb us in this pursuit; she now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in it. By acceding to her proposition, we detach her from the bands, bring her mighty weight into the scale of free government, and emancipate a continent at one stroke, which might otherwise linger long in doubt and difficulty. Great Britain is the nation which can do us the most harm of any one, or all on earth; and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world. With her then, we should most sedulously cherish a cordial friendship; and nothing would tend more to knit our affections than to be fighting once more, side by side, in the same cause. Not that I would purchase even her amity at the price of taking part in her wars. But the war in which the present proposition might engage us, should that be its consequence, is not her war, but ours. Its object is to introduce and establish the American system, of keeping out of our land all foreign powers, of never per- mitting those of Europe to intermeddle with the affairs of our nations. It is to maintain our own principle, not to depart from it. And if, to facilitate this, we can effect a division in the body of the European powers, and draw 30 From Isolation to Leadership over to our side its most powerful member, surely we should do it. But I am clearly of Mr. Canning's opinion, that it will prevent instead of provoking war. With Great Britain withdrawn from their scale and shifted into that of our two continents, all Europe com- bined would not undertake such a war. For how would they propose to get at either enemy without superior fleets? Nor is the occasion to be slighted which this proposition offers, of declaring our protest against the atrocious violations of the rights of nations, by the inter- ference of any one in the internal affairs of another, so flagitiously begun by Bonaparte, and now continued by the equally lawless Alliance, calling itself Holy." /^ Madison not only agreed with Jefferson as Vy to the wisdom of accepting the British proposal pAr of some form of joint action, but he went even ^ further and suggested that the declaration should not be limited to the American republics, but that it should express disapproval of the late invasion of Spain and of any interference with the Greeks who were then struggling for independence from Turkey. Monroe, it ap- pears, was strongly inclined to act on Madison's suggestion, but his cabinet took a different view of the situation. From the diary of Formulation of the Monroe Doctrine 3 1 John Quincy Adams, Monroe's secretary of state, it appears that almost the whole of November was taken up by cabinet discussions on Canning's proposals and on Russia's aggres- sions in the northwest. Adams stoutly opposed any alliance or joint declaration with Great Britain. The composition of the President's message remained in doubt until the 27th, when the more conservative views of Adams were, according to his own statement of the case, adopted. He advocated an independent course of action on the part of the United States, without direct reference to Canning's proposals, though substantially in accord with them. Adams defined his position as follows: "The ground that I wish to take is that of earnest remonstrance against the interference of the European powers by force with South America, but to disclaim all interference on our part with Europe; to make an American cause and adhere inflexibly to that." Adams's dissent from Monroe's position was, it is claimed, due partly to the influence of Clay who advocated a Pan-American system, partly to the fact that the proposed cooperation with Great Britain would bind the United States not to acquire some of the coveted parts of the Spanish posses- sions, and partly to the fear that the United 32 From Isolation to Leadership States as the ally of Great Britain would be compelled to play a secondary part. He proba- bly carried his point by showing that the same ends could be accomplished by an independent declaration, since it was evident that the sea power of Great Britain would be used to prevent the reconquest of South America by the Euro- pean powers. Monroe, as we have seen, thought that the exigencies of the situation justified a departure from the sound maxim of political isolation, and in this opinion he was supported by his two predecessors in the presi- dency. The opinions of Monroe, Jefferson, and Madi- son in favor of an alliance with Great Britain and a broad declaration against the intervention of the great powers in the affairs of weaker states in any part of the world, have been severely criticised by some historians and ridi- culed by others, but time and circumstances often bring about a complete change in our point of view. Since the beginning of the present world conflict, especially since our entrance into it, several writers have raised the question as to whether the three elder statesmen were not right and Adams and Clay wrong. If the United States and England had come out in favor of a general declaration Formulation of the Monroe Doctrine 33 against intervention in the concerns of small states and established it as a world-wide princi- ple, the course of human history during the next century might have been very different, but Adams's diary does not tell the whole story. On his own statement of the case he might be justly censured by posterity for per- suading the president to take a narrow American view of a question which was world-wide in its bearing. An important element in the situation, however, was Canning's change of attitude between the time of his conference with Rush in August and the formulation of the president's message. Two days after the delivery of his now famous message Monroe wrote to Jefferson in explanation of the form the declaration had taken: "Mr. Canning's zeal has much abated of late." It appears from Rush's correspondence that the only thing which stood in the way of joint action by the two powers was Canning's unwillingness to extend immediate recognition to the South American republics. On August 27th, Rush stated to Canning that it would greatly facilitate joint action if England would acknowledge at once the full independence of the South American colonies. In communicating the ac- count of this interview to his government Mr. 34 From Isolation to Leadership Rush concluded: "Should I be asked by Mr. Canning, whether, in case the recognition be made by Great Britain without more delay, I am on my part prepared to make a declara- tion, in the name of my government, that it will not remain inactive under an attack upon the independence of those states by the Holy Alliance, the present determination of my judgment is that I will make such a declaration explicitly, and avow it before the world." About three weeks later Canning, who was growing restless at the delay in hearing from Washington, again urged Rush to act without waiting for specific instructions from his govern- ment. He tried to show that the proposed joint declaration would not conflict with the American policy of avoiding entangling alliances, for the question at issue was American as much as European, if not more. Rush then indicated his willingness to act provided Eng- land would "immediately and unequivocally acknowledge the independence of the new states.'* Canning did not care to extend full recognition to the South American states until he could do so without giving unnecessary offense to Spain and the allies, and he asked if Mr. Rush could not give his assent to the proposal on a promise of future recognition. Formulation of the Monroe Doctrine 3 5 Mr. Rush refused to accede to anything but immediate acknowledgment of independence and so the matter ended. ; As Canning could not come to a formal under- standing with the United States, he determined to make a frank avowal of the views of the Brit- ish cabinet to France and to this end he had an interview with Prince Polignac, the French am- bassador at London, October 9, 1823, in which he declared that Great Britain had no desire to has- ten recognition, but that any foreign-interference, by force, or by menace, would be a motive for immediate recognition; that England "could not go into a joint deliberation upon the sub- ject of Spanish America upon an equal footing with other powers, whose opinions were less formed upon that question." This declaration drew from Polignac the admission that he con- sidered the reduction of the colonies by Spain as hopeless and that France "abjured in any case, any design of acting against the colonies by force of arms." This admission was a dis- tinct victory for Canning, in that it prepared the way for ultimate recognition by England, and an account of the interview was com- municated without delay to the allied courts. The interview was not communicated to Rush until the latter part of November, and therefore 36 From Isolation to Leadership had no influence upon the formation of Monroe's message. The Monroe Doctrine is comprised in two widely separated paragraphs that occur in the message of December 2, 1823. The first, relating to Russia's encroachments on the northwest coast, and occurring near the be- ginning of the message, was an assertion to the effect that the_ American continents had as- sumed an independent condition and were no longer open to European colonization. This may be regarded as a statement of fact. No part of the continent at that time remained unclaimed. The second paragraph, relating to Spanish America and occurring near the close of the message, was a declaration against the extension to the American continents of tlie system of intervention adopted by the Holy Alliance for the suppression of popular government in Europe. The language used by President Monroe is as follows: I. "At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power and instruc- tions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg to arrange by amicable negotiation the respective rights Formulation of the Monroe Doctrine 37 and interests of the two nations on the north- west coast of this continent. A similar pro- posal had been made by His Imperial Majesty to the Government of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to. The Government of the United States has been desirous by this friendly proceeding of manifesting the great value which they have invariably attached to the friendship of the Emperor and their solicitude to cultivate the best understanding with his Government. In the discussions to whioh this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American conti- nents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers." 2. "In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and 38 From Isolation to Leadership r by causes which must be obvious to all enlight- ened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially differ- ent in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments; and to the de- fense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citi- zens, and under which we have enjoyed unex- ampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or depend- encies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their inde- pendence and maintained it, and whose inde- pendence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of op- pressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation Formulation of the Monroe Doctrine 39 of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States." The message made a profound impression on the world, all the more profound for the fact that Canning's interview with Polignac was known only to the chancelleries of Europe. To the public at large it appeared that the United States was blazing the way for democracy and liberty and that Canning was holding back through fear of giving offense to the allies. The governments of Europe realized only too well that Monroe's declaration would be backed by the British navy, and all thought of inter- vention in Latin America was therefore aban- doned. A few months later England formally recognized the independence of the Spanish- American republics, and Canning made his famous boast on the floor of the House of Com- mons. In a speech delivered December 12, 1826, in defense of his position in not having arrested the French invasion of Spain, he said : "I looked another way I sought for compensa- tion in another hemisphere. Contemplating Spain, such as our ancestors had known her, I resolved that, if France had Spain, it should not be Spain with the Indies. I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old." Ill THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE OF POWER Ill THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE OF POWER PRESIDENT MONROE said in effect that the western hemisphere must be made safe for democracy. It was reserved for our own gene- ration and for President Wilson to extend the declaration and to say that the world must be made safe for democracy. President Monroe announced that we would uphold international law and republican government in this hemi- sphere, and as a quid pro quo he announced that it was the settled policy of the United States to refrain from all interference in the internal affairs of European states. He based his decla- ration, therefore, not mainly on right and justice, but on the doctrine of the separation of the European and American spheres of politics. The Monroe Doctrine and the policy of isolation thus became linked together in the public mind as compensating policies, neither one of which could stand without the other. Even Secre- tary Olney as late as 1895 declared that "Ameri- 43 44 From Isolation to Leadership can non-intervention in Europe implied Euro- pean non-intervention in America." It is not strange, therefore, that the public at large should regard the policy of isolation as the sole justification for the Monroe Doctrine. There is, however, neither logic nor justice in basing our right to uphold law and freedom in this hemisphere on our promise not to interfere with the violation of law and humanity in Eu- rope. The real difficulty is that the Monroe Doctrine as interpreted in recent years has developed certain imperialistic tendencies and that the imperialistic implications of the policy resemble too closely the imperialistic aims of the European powers. For three quarters of a century after Monroe's declaration the policy of isolation was more rigidly adhered to than ever, the principal departure from it being the signature and rati- fication of the Clay ton-Bui we r Treaty in 1850. By the terms of this treaty we recognized a joint British interest in any canal that might be built through the isthmus connecting North and South America, undertook to establish the general neutralization of such canal, and agreed to invite other powers, European and American, to unite in protecting the same. Owing to dif- ferences that soon arose between the United Monroe Doctrine and European Balance 45 States and England as to the interpretation of the treaty, the clause providing for the adher- ence of other powers was never carried out. For nearly a hundred years we have success- fully upheld the Monroe Doctrine without a resort to force. The policy has never been favorably regarded by the powers of continental Europe. Bismarck described it as "an interna- tional impertinence." In recent years it has stirred up rather intense opposition in certain parts of Latin America. Until recently no American writers appear to have considered the real nature of the sanction on which the doctrine rested. How is it that without an army and until recent years without a navy of any size we have been able to uphold a policy which has been described as an impertinence to Latin America and a standing defiance to Europe? Americans generally seem to think that the Monroe Doctrine has in it an inherent sanctity which prevents other nations from violating it. In view of the general disregard of sanctities, inherent or acquired, during the past three or four years, this explanation will not hold good and some other must be sought. Ameri- cans have been so little concerned with interna- tional affairs that they have failed to see any connection between the Monroe Doctrine and 46 From Isolation to Leadership the balance of power in Europe. The existence of a European balance of power is the only ex- planation of our having been able to uphold the Monroe Doctrine for so long a time without a resort to force. Some one or more of the Eu- ropean powers would long ago have stepped in and called our bluff, that is, forced us to repudi- ate the Monroe Doctrine or fight for it, had it not been for the well-grounded fear that as soon as they became engaged with us some other European power would attack them in the rear. A few illustrations will be sufficient to establish this thesis. The most serious strain to which the Monroe Doctrine was ever subjected was the attempt of Louis Napoleon during the American Civil War to establish the empire of Maximilian in Mexico under French auspices. He was clever enough to induce England and Spain to go in with him in 1861 for the avowed purpose of collecting the claims of their subjects against the government of Mexico. Before the joint intervention had gone very far, however, these two powers became convinced that Napoleon had ulterior designs and withdrew their forces. Napoleon's Mexican venture was deliberately calculated on the success of the Southern Con- federacy. Hence, his friendly relations with Monroe Doctrine and European Balance 47 the Confederate commissioners and the talk of an alliance between the Confederacy and Maximilian backed by the power of France. Against each successive step taken by France in Mexico Mr. Seward, Lincoln's Secretary of State, protested. As the Civil War drew to a successful conclusion his protests became more and more emphatic. Finally, in the spring of 1866, the United States Government began massing troops on the Mexican border and Mr. Seward sent what was practically an ultimatum to the French Emperor; he requested to know when the long-promised withdrawal of the French troops would take place. Napoleon replied, fixing the dates for their withdrawal in three separate detachments. American historians have usually attributed Napoleon's backdown to Seward's diplomacy supported by the military power of the United States, which was, of course, greater then than at any other time in our history. All this un- doubtedly had its effect on Napoleon's mind, but it_appears that conditions in Europe, jjist _at that particular moment had an even greater influence in causing him to abandon his Mexi- can scheme. Within a few days of the receipt of Seward's ultimatum Napoleon was informed of Bismarck's determination to force a war with 48 From Isolation to Leadership Austria over the Schleswig-Holstein contro- versy. Napoleon realized that the territorial aggrandizement of Prussia, without any corres- ponding gains by France, would be a serious blow to his prestige and in fact endanger his throne. He at once entered upon a long and hazardous diplomatic game in which Bismarck outplayed him and eventually forced him into war. In order to have a free hand to meet the European situation he decided to yield to the American demands. As the European situa- tion developed he hastened the final withdrawal of his troops and left Maximilian to his fate. Thus the Monroe Doctrine was vindicated ! Let us take next President Cleveland's inter- vention in the Venezuelan boundary dispute. Here surely was a clear and spectacular vindi- cation of the Monroe Doctrine which no one can discount. Let us briefly examine the facts. Some 30,000 square miles of territory on the border of Venezuela and British Guiana were in dispute. Venezuela, a weak and helpless state, had offered to submit the question to arbitra- tion. Great Britain, powerful and overbearing, refused. After Secretary Olney, in a long correspondence ably conducted, had failed to move the British Government, President Cleveland decided to intervene. In a message Monroe Doctrine and European Balance 49 to Congress in December, 1895, he reviewed the controversy at length, declared that the acquisition of territory in America by a Euro- pean power through the arbitrary advance of a boundary line was a clear violation of the Mon- roe Doctrine, and asked Congress for an appro- priation to pay the expenses of a commission which he proposed to appoint for the purpose of determining the true boundary, which he said it would then be our duty to uphold. Lest there should be any misunderstanding as to his intentions he solemnly added: "In making these recommendations I am fully alive to the respon- sibility incurred and keenly realize all the conse- quences that may follow." Congress promptly voted the appropriation. Here was a bold and unqualified defiance of England. No one before had ever trod so roughly on the British lion's tail with impunity. The English-speaking public on both sides of the Atlantic was stunned and amazed. Outside of diplomatic circles few persons were aware that any subject of controversy between the two countries existed, and no one had any idea that it was of a serious nature. Suddenly the two nations found themselves on the point of war. After the first outburst of indignation the storm passed; and before the American 50 From Isolation to Leadership boundary commission completed its investiga- tion England signed an arbitration agreement with Venezuela. Some persons, after looking in vain for an explanation, have concluded that Lord Salisbury's failure to deal more seri- ously with Mr. Cleveland's affront to the British Government was due to his sense of humor. But here again the true explanation is to be found in events that were happening in another quarter of the globe. Cleveland's Venezuelan message was sent to Congress on December i/th. At the end of the year came Dr. Jameson's raid into the Transvaal and on the third of January the German Kaiser sent his famous telegram of congratulation to Paul Kruger. The wrath of England was suddenly diverted from America to Germany, and Lord Salisbury avoided a rupture with the United States over a matter which after all was not of such serious moment to England in order to be free to deal with a question involving much greater interests in South Africa. The Monroe Doctrine was none the less effectively vindicated. In 1902 Germany made a carefully planned and determined effort to test out the Monroe Doctrine and see whether we would fight for it. In that year Germany, England, and Italy made a naval demonstration against Venezuela Monroe Doctrine and European Balance 51 for the purpose of forcing her to recognize as valid certain claims of their subjects. How England was led into the trap is still a mystery, but the Kaiser thought that he had her thor- oughly committed, that if England once started in with him she could not turn against him. But he had evidently not profited by the ex- perience of Napoleon III in Mexico. Through the mediation of Herbert Bowen, the American minister, Venezuela agreed to recognize in principle the claims of the foreign powers and to arbitrate the amount. England and Italy accepted this offer and withdrew their squad- rons. Germany, however, remained for a time obdurate. This much was known at the time. A rather sensational account of what followed next has recently been made public in Thayer's "Life and Letters of John Hay." Into the merits of the controversy that arose over Thayer's version of the Roosevelt-Holleben interview it is not necessary to enter. The significant fact, that Germany withdrew from Venezuela under pressure, is, however, amply established. Admiral Dewey stated publicly that the entire American fleet was assembled at the time under his command in Porto Rican waters ready to move at a moment's notice. 52 From Isolation to Leadership Why did Germany back down from her posi- tion? Her navy was supposed to be at least as powerful as ours. The reason why the Kaiser concluded not to measure strength with the United States was that England had accepted arbitration and withdrawn her support and he did not dare attack the United States with the British navy in his rear. Again the nicely adjusted European balance prevented the Monroe Doctrine from being put to the test of actual war. While England has from time to time ob- jected to some of the corollaries deduced from the Monroe Doctrine, she has on the whole been not unfavorably disposed toward the essential features of that policy. The reason for this is that the Monroe Doctrine has been an open-door policy, and has thus been in general accord with the British policy of free trade. The United States has not used the Monroe Doctrine for the establishment of exclusive trade relations with our southern neighbors. In fact, we have largely neglected the South American countries as a field for the development of American commerce. The failure to cultivate this field has not been due wholly to neglect, however, but to the fact that we have had employment for all our capital Monroe Doctrine and European Balance 53 at home and consequently have not been in a position to aid in the industrial development of the Latin-American states, and to the further fact that our exports have been so largely the same and hence the trade of both North and South America has been mainly with Europe. There has, therefore, been little rivalry between the United States and the powers of Europe in the field of South American commerce. Our interest has been political rather than com- mercial. We have prevented the establish- ment of spheres of influence and preserved the open door. This situation has been in full accord with British policy. Had Great Britain adopted a high tariff policy and been compelled to demand commercial concessions from Latin America by force, the Monroe Doctrine would long since have gone by the board and been forgotten. Americans should not forget the fact, moreover, that at any time during the past twenty years Great Britain could have settled all her outstanding difficulties with Germany by agreeing to sacrifice the Monroe Doctrine and give her rival a free hand in South America. In the face of such a combina- tion our navy would have been of little avail. IV INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WITH OUT THE SANCTION OF FORCE IV INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WITH- OUT THE SANCTION OF FORCE PRESIDENT MONROE'S declaration had a nega- tive as well as a positive side. It was in effect an announcement to the world that we would not use force in support of law and justice anywhere except in the Western Hemisphere, that we intended to stay at home and mind our own business. Washington and Jefferson had recommended a policy of isolation on grounds of expediency. Washington, as we have seen, regarded this policy as a temporary expedient, while Jefferson upon two separate occasions was ready to form an alliance with England. Probably neither one of them contemplated the possibility of the United States shirking its responsibilities as a member of the family of nations. Monroe's message contained the im- plied promise that if Europe would refrain from interfering in the political concerns of this hemisphere, we would abstain from all inter- vention in Europe. From that day until our 57 58 From Isolation to Leadership entrance into the present war it was generally understood, and on numerous occasions offi- cially proclaimed, that the United States would not resort to force on any question arising outside of America except where its material interests were directly involved. We have not refrained from diplomatic action in matters not strictly American, but it has always been understood that such action would not be backed by force. In the existing state of world politics this limitation has been a serious handi- cap to American diplomacy. To take what we could get and to give nothing in return has been a hard rule for our diplomats, and has greatly circumscribed their activities. Diplomatic ac- tion without the use or threat of force has, however, accomplished something in the world at large, so that American influence has by no means been limited to the western hemisphere. During the first half of the nineteenth century the subject of slavery absorbed a large part of the attention of American statesmen. The fact that they were not concerned with foreign problems outside of the American hemisphere probably caused them to devote more time and attention to this subject than they would otherwise have done. Slavery and isolation had a very narrowing effect on men in public International Cooperation 59 life, especially during the period from 1830 to 1860. As the movement against slavery in the early thirties became world-wide, the retention of the "peculiar institution" in this country had the effect of increasing our isola- tion. The effort of the American Colonization Society to solve or mitigate the problem of slavery came very near giving us a colony in Africa. In fact, Liberia, the negro republic founded on the west coast of Africa by the Colonization Society, was in all essentials an American protectorate, though the United States carefully refrained in its communications with other powers from doing more than ex- pressing its good will for the little republic. As Liberia was founded years before Africa became a field for European exploitation, it was suffered to pursue its course without outside interference, and the United States was never called upon to decide whether its diplomatic protection would be backed up by force. The slave trade was a subject of frequent discussion between the United States and Eng- land during the first half of the nineteenth century, and an arrangement for its suppression was finally embodied in Article VIII of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842. The only reason why the two countries had never been 60 From Isolation to Leadership able to act in accord on this question before was that Great Britain persistently refused to renounce the right of impressment which she had exercised in the years preceding the War of 1812. The United States therefore refused to sign any agreement which would permit British naval officers to search American vessels in time of peace. In 1820 the United States declared the slave trade to be a form of piracy, and Great Britain advanced the view that as there was no doubt of the right of a naval officer to visit and search a ship suspected of piracy, her officers should be permitted to visit and search ships found off the west coast of Africa under the American flag which were suspected of being engaged in the slave trade. The United States stoutly refused to acquiesce in this view. In the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842 it was finally agreed that each of the two powers should maintain on the coast of Africa a sufficient squadron "to enforce, sepa- rately and respectively, the laws, rights, and obligations of each of the two countries for the suppression of the slave trade." It was further agreed that the officers should act in concert and cooperation, but the agreement was so worded as to avoid all possibility of our being drawn into an entangling alliance. International Cooperation 61 The United States has upon various occa- sions expressed a humanitarian interest in the natives of Africa. In 1884 two delegates were sent to the Berlin conference which adopted a general act giving a recognized status to the Kongo Free State. The American delegates signed the treaty in common with the delegates of the European powers, but it was not sub- mitted to the Senate for ratification for reasons stated as follows by President Cleveland in his annual message of December 8, 1885: "A conference of delegates of the principal commercial nations was held at Berlin last winter to discuss methods whereby the Kongo basin might be kept open to the world's trade. Dele- gates attended on behalf of the United States on the understanding that their part should be merely deliberative, without imparting to the results any binding character so far as the United States were concerned. This reserve was due to the indisposition of this Government to share in any disposal by an international congress of jurisdictional questions in remote foreign territories. The results of the confer- ence were embodied in a formal act of the na- ture of an international convention, which laid down certain obligations purporting to be binding on the signatories, subject to ratifica- 62 From Isolation to Leadership tion within one year. Notwithstanding the reservation under which the delegates of the United States attended, their signatures were attached to the general act in the same manner as those of the plenipotentiaries of other govern- ments, thus making the United States appear, without reserve or qualification, as signatories to a joint international engagement imposing on the signers the conservation of the territorial integrity of distant regions where we have no established interests or control. "This Government does not, however, regard its reservation of liberty of action in the premises as at all impaired; and holding that an engage- ment to share in the obligation of enforcing neutrality in the remote valley of the Kongo would be an alliance whose responsibilities we are not in a position to assume, I abstain from asking the sanction of the Senate to that general act." The United States also sent delegates to the international conference held at Brussels in 1890 for the purpose of dealing with the slave trade in certain unappropriated regions of Central Africa. The American delegates in- sisted that prohibitive duties should be imposed on the importation of spirituous liquors into the Kongo. The European representatives, International Cooperation 63 being unwilling to incorporate the American proposals, framed a separate tariff convention for the Kongo, which the American delegates refused to sign. The latter did, however, affix their signatures to the general treaty which pro- vided for the suppression of the African slave trade and the restriction of the sale of firearms, ammunition, and spirituous liquors in certain parts of the African continent. In ratifying the treaty the Senate reaffirmed the American policy of isolation in the following resolution: "That the United States of America, having neither possessions nor protectorates in Africa, 4iereby disclaims any intention, in ratifying this treaty, to indicate any interest whatsoever in the possessions or protectorates established or claimed on that Continent by the other powers, or any approval of the wisdom, expediency or lawfulness thereof, and does not join in any expressions in the said General Act which might be construed as such a declaration or acknowl- edgement; and, for this reason, that it is desir- able that a copy of this resolution be inserted in the protocol to be drawn up at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty on the part of the United States." The United States has always stood for legality in international relations and has al- 64 From Isolation to Leadership ways endeavored to promote the arbitration of international disputes. Along these lines we have achieved notable success. It is, of course, sometimes difficult to separate questions of in- ternational law from questions of international politics. We have been so scrupulous in our efforts to keep out of political entanglements that we have sometimes failed to uphold prin- ciples of law in the validity of which we were as much concerned as any other nation. We have always recognized international law as a part of the law of the land, and we have al- ways acknowledged the moral responsibilities that rested on us as a member of the society of nations. In fact, the Constitution of the United States expressly recognizes the binding force of the law of nations and of treaties. As inter- national law is the only law that governs the relations between states, we are, of course,* di- rectly concerned in the enforcement of exist- ing law and in the development of new law. When the Declaration of Paris was drawn up by the European powers at the close of the Crimean War in 1856, the United States was invited to give its adherence. The four rules embodied in the declaration, which have since formed the basis of maritime law, are as follows: First, privateering is, and remains, abolished. Sec- International Cooperation 65 ond, the neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war. Third, neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the enemy's flag. Fourth, blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective. The United States Government was in thorough accord with the second, third, and fourth rules but was unwill- ing, as matters then stood, to commit itself to the first rule. It had never been our policy to maintain a large standing navy. In the War of 1812, as in the Revolution, we depended upon privateers to attack the commerce of the enemy. In reply to the invitation to give our adherence to the declaration, Secretary Marcy made a counter proposition, namely, that the powers of Europe should agree to exempt all private prop- erty, except of course contraband of war, from capture on the high seas in time of war. He said that if they would agree to this, the United States would agree to abolish privateering. The powers of Europe refused to accept this amend- ment. We refrained from signing the Declara- tion of Paris, therefore, not because it went too far, but because it did not go far enough. During the Civil War the United States Government used its diplomatic efforts to pre- vent the recognition of the independence of the 66 From Isolation to Leadership Confederacy and the formation of hostile alli- ances. It made no effort to form any alliance itself and insisted that the struggle be regarded as an American question. The dispute with England over the Alabama Claims came near precipitating war, but the matter was finally adjusted by the Treaty of Washington. The most significant feature of this treaty, as far as the present discussion is concerned, was the formal adoption of three rules which were not only to govern the decision of the "Ala- bama Claims," but which were to be binding upon England and the United States for the future. It was further agreed that these rules should be brought to the knowledge of other maritime powers who should be invited to accede to them. The rules forbade the fitting out, arming, or equipping within neutral juris- diction of vessels intended to cruise or carry on war against a power with which the neutral is at peace; they forbade the use of neutral ports or waters as a base of naval operations; and they imposed upon neutrals the exercise of due dili- gence to prevent these things from being done. While these rules have never been formally adopted by the remaining powers, they are gen-, erallyrecognized as embodying obligationswhich are now incumbent upon all neutrals. International Cooperation 67 When the United States decided to accept the invitation of the Czar of Russia to attend the first peace conference at The Hague in 1899, grave misgivings were expressed by many of ; the more conservative men in public life. The participation of the United States with the powers of Europe in this conference was taken by mS4- Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 44, III. Cleveland, Grover, intervene* in Venezuelan boundary dispute, 48; withholds Kongo treaty from Sen- ate, 61 ; Venezuelan policy juiuhcd 211 212 Index by events, 115; favors general arbi- tration treaty with England, 116. Cobden, Richard, essay on America, 102. Colombia, aggrieved at seizure of Canal Zone, 142; attempts of United States to settle controversy, 143. 144. Consuls, status of, in European leases in China, 87, 88. Continuous voyage, doctrine of, 72, 124, 176 177. Cowdray, Lord, seeks concession from Colombia, 142. Crampton, British minister to United States, dismissal of, III. Declaration of London, 71-73, I7S, 177- Declaration of Paris, 64, 65. Declaration of Rights and Duties of Nations, adopted by American Institute of International Law, 158, IS9. Democracy against autocracy, 192. Dewey, Admiral George, on with- drawal of Germany from Venezuela, 51; demands apology from German admiral in Manila Bay, 119. Dickens, Charles, "American Notes," 102. Diederichs, German Admiral, 119. Diplomacy, secret, 76, 77, 197-199. Dunning, William A., "British Em- pire and the United States," quoted, IO2, III. Durfee, Amos, 103. Economic Conference of the Allies at Paris, 201. Economic restrictions on the Central Powers, 201-203. Egypt, financial administration of, by Great Britain. 134. England. Sft Great Britain. English-speaking peoples, solidarity of, 206, 207. "Entangling Alliances," warning of Jefferson against, 12; Wilson's views on, 187. Entente treaty of 1904 between Eng- land and France, 74. European balance of power, interest of United States in preserving, 76; disturbed by Japan, 171. Fenian movement, encouraged in United States, 112, 113. Ferdinand VII, king of Spain, 20, 25. Fish, Hamilton, secretary of state, renews negotiations for settlement of "Alabama Claims," 113, 114. Foch, General, appointment of, 207. Fonseca Bay, United States acquires naval base on, 135, 136. Forsyth, John, secretary of state, 104. Foster, John W., letter from Hay, to, 89- France, treaty of alliance with, 5-8. Genet, Edmond C., minister of the French Republic, 6. George, Lloyd, on war aims, 201, 202, 204. Germany, intervenes in Venezuela, 50; excluded from South America; by aid of England, 53; designs of, on Philippine Islands, 85; adopts naval policy, 120; influence of, in America, 126; submarine policy of, 178, 179; attempts of, to justify, 181; protests against munitions trade, iSi; organizes propaganda and conspiracy in United States, 184. Great Britain, withdraws from Euro- pean alliance, 22; intervenes in Mexico, 46; not unfavorable to Monroe Doctrine, 52, 53; forms alli- ance with Japan, 92; points of con- tact with United States, 100; un- friendly attitude, IOI; change of attitude in Spanish War, 118; naval policy of, 120; interference with shipments to Germany re- sented in United States, 124; size of navy, 127; so-called blockade of Germany, 174-178. See Anglo- American ideals. Great Lakes, disarmament on, 103. Gummere, S. R., delegate to Algeciras Conference, 75. Hague Conference, of 1899, 67; of 1907, 68. Hague Conventions, status of, 71. Hague Court of Arbitration, 68. Haiti, Republic of, United States ac- quires financial supervision over, 136, 137- Hamilton, Alexander, opinion on French treaty of 1778, 6. Harris, Townsend, 95. Hay, John, secretary of state, protests against persecution of Jews in Ru- mania, 78; formulates open-door policy for China, 85; defines status of consuls in European leases in China, 88; insists on "territorial and administrative entity" of China, 89; private correspondence on Chinese situation, 89-91. Hay-Pauncefote treaty, 120, 121. Henry, of Prussia, Prince, visit of, to United States, 118. Holy Alliance, 22, 24. Huerta, Victoriano, 160, 162. International Conference of American States, 156. Index 213 International Court of Arbitral Jus- tice, plan for, 70. International Law, attitude of United States toward, 64; attempts to codify, 68, Jl; attitude of Germany toward, 206. International Law, American Insti- tute of, 157. International Prize Court, plan for, adopted by Second Hague Confer- ence, 68. Isolation, policy of, distinct from Mon- roe Doctrine, 3, 5; policy no longer possible, 170. Jameson Raid, in the Transvaal, 50. apan, beginning of American inter- course with, 83, 84; forms alliance with Great Britain, 92; goes to war with Russia, 94; disturbing factor in world politics, 171. Jefferson, Thomas, opinion on French treaty of 1778. 7; warns against "entangling alliances," iz; plans alliance with England against France, 12-14; favors joint action with England against Holy Alli- ance, 28-30; author of doctrine of recognition, 161. Jews, diplomatic protests against harsh treatment of, 78, 79. Johnson-Clarendon convention, 113. Knox, Philander C., proposes neu- tralization of railways of Manchuria, 95; negotiates treaties with Hon- duras and Nicaragua, 134, 135; proposes settlement with Colombia, >43- Kongo Free State, treaty establish- ing, signed by American delegates but withheld from Senate by Presi- dent Cleveland, 6 1, 6z. Kruger, Paul, 50. Lansing, Robert, secretary of state, replies to Austro-Hungarian note on munitions trade, 182, 183; dis- misses Austrian ambassador and German military and naval attaches, 185. Lansmg-Ishii agreement, 95. League of Nations, 188, 205. I iberia, Republic of, 59. Liverpool, Lord, :o. Livingston, Robert R., minister to France, 11. Lodge, Senator Henry Cabot, on Ore- gon dispute, no, in; denies exis- Tiire of secret treaty with Eng- land. 120. London Naval Conference, 71. Luinania. sinking of, 179. Madero, Francisco, 160. Madison, James, favors joint action with England against Holy Alliance, 3- Mahan, Alfred T., 99. Maine, boundary dispute with New Brunswick, 106. Manchuria, Russian encroachments on, 91-93 95. Marcy, William L., secretary of state, views on Declaration of Paris. 65. Maximilian, Prince, placed by Louis Napoleon on throne of Mexico, 46- Merchant vessels, proposal to arm, 185. Mexico, French intervention in, 46; Huerta revolution in, 160; American policy toward, 160-164. Monroe, James, sent to Paris to aid Livingston in negotiations for pur- chase of New Orleans and West Florida, 13; consults Jefferson and Madison on subject of British pro- posals for joint action against Holy Alliance, 26-28; message of Decem- ber 2, 1823, 36-39; emphasizes ' separation of European and Ameri- can politics, 43. Monroe Doctrine, compared with pol- icy of isolation, 3; justification of, 4; formulation of, 19; text of, 36- 39; reception of, in Europe, 39; basis of 43; sanction of, 45; relation of, to European balance of power, 40, 52; attitude of England toward, 52; negative side of, 57; adverse criticism of, 131; not a self-denying declaration, 147. Moroccan question. See Algeciras Conference. Motley, John L., 113. Munitions of war, sale of to bellig- erents, 181-184. McKinley, William, reasons for re- taining Philippine Islands, 84, 85. McLeod, Alexander, arrest of, 104; acquittal of, 105. Napoleon, Louis, intervenes in Mexico, 46; decides to withdraw, 47, 48. National sovereignty, doctrine of, 2Or>. Neutral prizes, destruction of, 72, l8o. Neutrality, Washington's proclama- tion of 1793, 8; failure of, in Na- poleonic wars, 14, 15; Wilson's proclamation of, 172; nature of, 172, 173; so-called ethical neutrality, 174; abandonment of, 186. New Brunswick, boundary dispute with Maine, 106. Niagara conference on Mexican ques- tion, 162. 214 Index CMney, Richard, on Monroe Doctrine, 4\; conducts correspondence on Venezuelan boundary dispute, 48; signs general arbitration treaty with England, 116. OIney-Pauncefote treaty. 1 16, 117. Open-door policy in China, Hay's note of September, 6, 1899, 85; Anglo-American origin of, 87. Oregon, joint occupation of, 107. O'Shaughnessy, Nelson, 162. Panama Canal, effect of, on naval policy, 132. Panama Canal Zone, seizure of, 142 Panama Congress of 1826, 153, IS4- Panama Tolls Act, 121. Pan-American Financial Congress, Pan-American Scientific Congress, Pan-American Union, 156. Pan-Americanism, 153-157. Pauncefote, Sir Julian, signs general arbitration treaty with United States, Il6; signs Canal treaty, I2O. Platt Amendment, provisions of, 144, Peace Conference. See Hague Con- ference. Perry, Commodore Matthew C., com- mands expedition to Japan, 83, 84, 95. Philippine Islands, McKinley's rea- sons for retaining, 84, 85. Polignac, Prince, interview with Can- ning on subject of the Spanish col- onies, 35. Polk, James K., settles Oregon dis- pute, no. Portsmouth, treaty of, 94. Prize Court. See International Prize Court. Prizes, destruction of, 179, 180. Recognition, doctrine of, discussed with reference to Mexican question, 161. Roosevelt, Theodore, forces Germany to withdraw from Venezuela, 51; sends delegates to Algeciras Con- ference, 75; exerts influence to pre- serve European balance of power, 76; protests against persecution of Jews in Rumania and Russia, 78, 79; invites Russia and Japan to peace conference, 94; incurs ill will of Jap?", v. submits Alaskan boundary disput o limited arbi- tration, 123; establishes financial supervision over Dominican Repub- lic, 133, 138; Big-Stick policy, 139; extension of Monroe Doctrine, 140; seizure of Canal Zone, 142. Root, Elihu, proposes international court of justice, 69; author of Platt Amendment, 146; visits South America, 156. Rush, Richard, conferences with Can- ning on South American situation, 26,33,34- . Russia, occupies Manchuria, 91, <);; opposes opening of ManchutUn ports to American commerce, 9.;; goes to war with Japan, 94; under- goes revolution, 191; President Wilson's determination to stand by, 207. Russo-Japanese war, 94. Sackville-West, Lord, dismissal of, IIS- Salisbury, Lord, backs down in Vene- zuelan dispute, 50; warns President McKinley of Germany's designs oil Philippines, 85. Santo Domingo, financial supervision over. 133, 134- Seward, William H., protests against French occupation of Mexico, 47. Slave trade, provision for suppression of, in Webster-Ashburton treaty, 59, 60; Brussels conference on, 62. Slavery, and isol ation, 58. South America, neglected by United States as field for commercial devel- opment, 52; open door in, 53. Spanish colonies, revolt of, 25. Spanish revolution of 1820, 20. Spanish War, turning point in rela- tions of United States and England, 118. Sumner, Charles, 113. Taft, William H., proposes to bring Nicaragua and Honduras under financial supervision of United States, 134, 135; tries to reestab- lish friendly relations with Colom- bia, 143. Tardieu, Andre, report of Algeciras Conference, 76. Texas, annexation of, opposed by Great Britain, 107, 108^. Thayer, William R., gives version of Roosevelt-Holleben interview, 51- Tocqueville, Alexis de, " Democracy in America," 102. Vera Cruz, American occupation of, 161; evacuation of, 162. Verona, Congress of, 19, 21; secret treaty of, 22-24. Vienna, Congress of, 19. Villa, Francisco, 162, 163. Index 215 War of 1812, ic. Washington, George, requests opin- ions of cabinet on French treaty, 6; issue* proclamation of neutrality, 8; Farewell Address, 9-11. Washington, treaty of, 66, 114. Webster, Daniel, secretary of ttate, 104, 105 Wehster-Ashburton treaty, 59, 60, 107. Wellington, Duke of, at Congress of Verona, 21; protest and withdrawal, 22. V. . ^t Indies, American supremacy in, 1 20. Wiute, Henry, delegate to Algeciras Conference. 75. William II, German Kaiser, telegram to President Rruger, 50; forced to withdraw from Venezuela, 51; visits Morocco, 74; demands retirement of Delcasse, 75; insists on general conference on Morocco, 75; thwarted in efforts to humiliate France, 77. Williams, Talcott, on McKinley's rea- sons for retaining Philippines, 85. Wilvm, Henry Lane, 160. Wilson, Woodrow, secures modifica- tion of Panama Tolls Act, 121; ex- tends financial supervision over Nicaragua and Haiti, 136, ;j7; warns Latin-American states against granting concessions to European syndicates, 140, 141; attitude of, on questions of international law and diplomacy, 151, 152; general Latin-American policy, 152, 165; New Pan- Americanism, 153; Mex- ican policy, 160-164; ks for decla- ration of war on Germany, 185; views on extension of Monroe Doc- trine, 187; moral leadership of, 192; defines war aims, 192-196, 199-201; draws distinction between German people and German gov- ernment, 203, 204; exerts effective influence over Allies, 207. Wood, General Leonard, 146. THE COUNTRY LIFE PRESS GARDEN CITY, N. Y.