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 LIBRARY 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 RIVERSIDE
 
 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT
 
 THE ORDEAL OF A 
 DIPLOMAT 
 
 BY 
 
 (c. NABOKOFF) 
 
 LONDON 
 
 DUCKWORTH AND COMPANY 
 3, HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, W.C. 2
 
 First published in 1921. 
 [ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.] 
 
 THE LONDON AND NORWICH PRESS, LIMITED, LONDON AND NORWICH, ENGLAND
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 PREFACE 7 
 
 PART I 
 
 CHAPTER I 9 
 
 The Russian Consul-General in India Transference of Capital The Con 
 sulates Calcutta Tibet " The Russian Spy " Dispelling Misunderstand- 
 ingsOutbreak of War Native Troops Lord Hardinge's Influence Coun- 
 sellorship of the Russian Embassy in London Future of the British Raj 
 Journeys in India Rajputana Darjeeling Farewell to India. 
 
 CHAPTER II 34 
 
 Count Benckendorff War Conditions in 1916 Russia's Popularity 
 Lord Kitchener Anglo-Russian Societies Deputation of Russian Journal- 
 ists Unhappy Rumours Deputation rom Duma Painful Incidents 
 baron Rosen Mr. Protopopoff Sazonov and Sturmer Count Bencken- 
 dorff's Reticence Lloyd George's Ministry Death of Count Benckendorff. 
 
 CHAPTER III 59 
 
 Lord Milner's Mission Britain and Russia the " Steam-roller " Sir 
 George Buchanan Anticipations of Revolution British Anxiety An 
 Embarrassing Position War News. 
 
 CHAPTER IV 69 
 
 Death of Lord Kitchener Abdication of Emperor Nicholas Effect in 
 Russian Colony Work of Russian Embassy British Attitude The First 
 Declaration of the Provisional Government Interview with Mr. Balfour 
 Russian Foreign Office and Reuter's My Own Attitude to Revolution 
 Lloyd George Telegram to Prince Lvov Provisional Government's 
 Blunders Ministerial Differences Soviet Pressure A New Ambassador 
 Appointed Sazonov Mr. Henderson's Visit to Russia Mr. Svatikov. 
 
 CHAPTER V 94 
 
 The Emigrfe Emigres' Committees Repatriation Mr. Deitch Victor 
 Tchernov The Defeatists Soviet Pressure A Warning from the Embassy 
 Chicherin Litvinov German Submarines and Russian Emigres Funds 
 for Emigres. 
 
 CHAPTER VI in 
 
 Reticence of Russian Foreign Office Mr. Miliukpv Belated Informa- 
 tion Mr. Tereschenko The Three Phases The British Foreign Office and 
 Russia U.S.A. and the War Kerensky General Knox Munitions 
 Diplomatic Rules A Second Ambassador British Diffidence and Irrita- 
 tion Inter-Allied Conference. 
 
 CHAPTER VII 131 
 
 The War in 1917 The Stockholm Conference Kerensky's Attitude 
 Telegram to Tereschenko Soviet Delegates A Note to Mr. Balfour War 
 Cabinet Meeting Mr. Henderson at the Labour Conference Prime Minis- 
 ter's Anger " Henderson Must Resign " Prime Ministei's Letter A 
 Labour Storm More Telegrams and Interviews Bonar Law's Explanations 
 Tereschenko's Criticism Prime Minister's Compliment Russian Criticism 
 A Third Ambassador.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 159 
 
 The War in the Autumn of 1917 The Kerensky Government The 
 Moscow Conference <ieneral Alexeiev Komilov The Demarche More 
 British Irritation More Ambassadors Foreign Office Conference The 
 Spanish Overtures Air-raids Narrow Escape of Embassy A Grave War 
 Situation Britain and Russia A Misunderstanding Kerensky's Deceit 
 Public Opinion on Russia. 
 
 PART II 
 CHAPTER IX 181 
 
 The Bolshevik Revolution Allies' Difficulties British Self-restraint In- 
 ternational Law Attitude of Governments to the Embassies Bolshevik 
 Ambassador An Interview with Mr. Balfour An Appeal to the Russian 
 People British Representatives in Petrograd Trotsky Strike at Russian 
 Foreign Office Consular Agents Finkelstein-Litvinov Kamenev " Re- 
 presentative of a Government which did not Exist " Russian Unity. 
 
 CHAPTER X 202 
 
 Efforts at Co-ordination Rights of Cypher Friendship Brest-Litovsk 
 Failure of Provisional Government Allied Negotiations An Attack 
 on th Embassy Mr. Krysin A Series of Restrictions Confiscation of 
 Funds Expenses of the Committee Humiliating Recollections Questions 
 in House of Commons An Interview with Lord Robert Cecil Lord 
 Robert's Explanation Pecuniary Assistance Requisition of Russian 
 Mercantile Fleet Painful Incidents. 
 
 CHAPTER XI 221 
 
 The Bolshevik Agency Mutiny at Liverpool British Resource Lord 
 Hardinge and Litvinov The Diplomatic List The " Vacant " Embassy 
 Diplomatic Passports Mr. Bruce Lockhart Letter to Lord Robert Cecil 
 Intervention in Russia Japanese Troops Russian Patriots Plan from 
 the Embassy Value of Stores Archangel the Red Army Communism 
 Japan and U.S.A. Inadequate Contingents Petrograd Panic An Excuse 
 for Propaganda Transcaucasia Confusions Omsk. 
 
 CHAPTER XII 250 
 
 Kerensky Kerensky and the Prime Minister British Labour Conference 
 Kuhlmann The Russian Luncheon Club M. Clemenceau Directorate 
 at Omsk Zavoiko Passports Kerensky's Excitement His Detractors. 
 
 CHAPTER XIII 263 
 
 Chicherin and Brest-Litovsk A War Prophet British Despondency 
 Indifference towards Russia Recognition of Bolsheviks The Union for the 
 Regeneration of Russia All-Russian Government A Telegram from Omsk 
 November n, 1918 Russian Feelings Absence of Russian Flags 
 Prisoners of War British Government and Omsk Admiral Kolchak 
 Embassy Meetings Peace Deliberations General Denikin. 
 
 CHAPTER XIV 283 
 
 The Peace Conference Representation of Russia Russian Political 
 Council Mr. Sazonov Paris Prinkipo The Russian Colony Authority 
 from Omsk Removal of Restrictions Finland Prof. Peter Struve 
 Telegrams to Omsk Baltic Problems. 
 
 CHAPTER XV 302 
 
 Allied Movements Sir H. Gough Labour Dictation The Daily Herald 
 Britain and Russia After the Victory Bolshevik Propaganda Public 
 Opinion Failure of the White Armies Strenuous work Letter from 
 Sazonov Resignation. 
 
 INDEX 317
 
 PREFACE 
 
 THE story of my four years' tenure of office at 
 the Russian Embassy in I/ondon, first as Coun- 
 sellor of the Embassy (December 15, 1915- 
 January 12, 1917) and later as Charge d' Af- 
 faires, is written in the shape of personal 
 recollections. Some episodes are corroborated 
 by documents. The Bolsheviks have pub- 
 lished the entire correspondence of the Rus- 
 sian Diplomatic Representatives. This pub- 
 lication naturally provoked intense indignation 
 abroad. Trotsky has paid me the compli- 
 ment of issuing a collection of my reports 
 from India in a special pamphlet. Personally, 
 I have no reason to complain of this iniquity. 
 My reports from India present but a remote 
 historical interest, as they relate to a period 
 which has passed for ever. They denote, how- 
 ever, my sincere admiration for the achieve- 
 ment of the British Raj in India and my 
 conviction that Great Britain and Russia 
 should work hand in hand in the East for 
 their mutual benefit as well as in the interests 
 of the peoples of Asia. As regards my tele- 
 
 7
 
 8 PREFACE 
 
 grams from I/mdon, the secrets therein con- 
 tained were only temporary secrets. The 
 gist of all my reports was the unshaken faith 
 in the future of Anglo-Russian friendship, 
 which I still retain in spite of all that has 
 happened. 
 
 I do not believe in the wisdom of writing 
 several hundreds of pages of memoirs. Even 
 great men, in my opinion, make a mistake 
 in writing too much. Whatever interest at- 
 taches to these pages is due to the fact that 
 unkind fate had placed me in a prominent 
 position during the greatest crisis in history. 
 The reader may accuse me of speaking too 
 often in the first person. It is, however, the 
 inherent feature of all personal recollections. 
 Since the Bolsheviks have published the diplo- 
 matic correspondence of Russian representa- 
 tives, I do not consider it an indiscretion to 
 reproduce some of these documents. I have 
 also quoted a few letters and telegrams sent 
 to Omsk from the Embassy. They are like- 
 wise but temporary secrets, and it is my firm 
 belief that to withhold their publication is 
 to deprive the public of the best means of 
 forming a judgment on the activities of a 
 diplomat.
 
 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 AMONG the posts in the Foreign service open 
 to a Russian diplomat, one of the most in- 
 teresting and attractive (if not the most 
 interesting, with the exception of the Am- 
 bassadorial offices with the Great Powers) 
 is the post of Russian Consul-General in India. 
 It would perhaps be more correct to say 
 " was," as it seems doubtful that this post 
 will retain the same importance when and 
 if the new conditions of international inter- 
 course, originated by the world war, will come 
 into being. Whatever happens, it is abun- 
 dantly clear that the post of Russian Consul- 
 General in India will assume an entirely 
 different character in the future. I am speak- 
 ing of it and describing it such as it was before 
 the Great War. 
 
 Under the old regime in Russia, the young 
 men who entered the Foreign Office were 
 required to present a diploma of an University 
 
 9
 
 io THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 or of one of the privileged high colleges. In 
 addition they had to possess elementary know- 
 ledge of the French language and of inter- 
 national law and treaties. The " diplomatic 
 examination " which they had to pass in 
 order to be qualified for service abroad was 
 superficial to a degree. Thus the men who 
 devoted their lives to the diplomatic career 
 had but scant knowledge of the complex 
 ethnographical, historical and geographical 
 conditions which governed the relationship 
 of the States of Europe, Asia, Africa and 
 both Americas. I doubt that one out of a 
 hundred Russian diplomats had even an ap- 
 proximate vague idea of the history of Hin- 
 dustan and of the main features of the present 
 British rule. During my stay in India, I 
 had the opportunity of recording an amusing 
 illustration of this ignorance. An Anglo-Chino- 
 Tibetan Conference met in Simla in 1913. I 
 telegraphed to the Far-Eastern section of the 
 Russian Foreign Office, mentioning that one 
 of the British Delegates was the British 
 Agent in Sikkim. A copy of the Foreign 
 Office reading of my telegram reached me 
 some time later. It said : " One of the 
 British delegates is Mr. Sikkimin." The Far-
 
 FIRST THOUGHTS OF INDIA n 
 
 Eastern section, obviously, was utterly un- 
 aware of the existence of Sikkim. 
 
 I confess that when the post of Consul- 
 General in India was offered to me I was 
 then First Secretary of the Embassy in 
 Washington I felt like going to the planet 
 Mars. In the course of the three months 
 which elapsed between my departure from 
 New York and my landing in Bombay, I 
 proceeded with feverish haste and ever-growing 
 interest to fill the gap in my education and 
 to study the history and the present condition 
 of India and of the British rule. The subject 
 is, of course, overwhelmingly fascinating. I 
 feel at present the more amazed at the inade- 
 quacy of statesmanship we are witnessing now 
 that the history of British penetration into 
 India and of the methods of British govern- 
 ment in that country have filled me with 
 sincere admiration. I have no hesitation in 
 expressing the view that there is not in the 
 whole history of mankind, a greater example 
 of cultural achievement than that which 
 Great Britain has attained in Hindustan. 
 This chapter is but an introduction to the 
 story of the severe ordeal I underwent in 
 lyondon. I must needs therefore refrain from
 
 12 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 supplementing this statement with a detailed 
 account of the present political situation in 
 India. Also, I am not quite certain that 
 the departure from the wise methods of the 
 nineteenth century which the British Raj is 
 now making deserves to be described as the 
 height of insight and statesmanship. 
 
 Until 1911, as is well known to British 
 readers, the Central Viceregal Government 
 had its seat in Calcutta, the capital of Bengal, 
 where it remained for about five months. 
 The rest of the year, owing to the unendurable 
 heat of Calcutta, was spent in the Himalayas, 
 at Simla, the " Summer Capital." In Decem- 
 ber, 1911, a proclamation was issued at the 
 Durbar in Delhi, announcing the transfer of 
 the capital of India to Delhi, the ancient 
 capital of the Moghul Empire. To the Rus- 
 sian reader this name " Delhi " is an empty 
 word. The temptation to dwell upon the 
 subject of this proclamation and of its signi- 
 ficance, which can only be understood in 
 connection with the history of India, is almost 
 irresistible. But I must confine myself to 
 the scope of this chapter. I refer the reader 
 to the talented and brilliant book, When Kings 
 rode to Delhi, by Miss Gabrielle Festing. It is
 
 CITIES OF INDIA 13 
 
 a book worth reading over and over again. 
 One should have seen Delhi, one should have 
 lived in solitude amid the ruins of the seven 
 capitals situated in the neighbourhood of 
 Delhi, one should be capable of reviving in 
 one's imagination the " Fort " of Delhi with 
 its marble colonnades and sandstone edifices 
 in order to become imbued with the his- 
 torical atmosphere. Only thus does one ac- 
 quire full understanding of the fact that only 
 such a Power as will establish its permanent 
 seat in Delhi may be recognized as ruling 
 over Hindustan. Agra, another wonder of 
 Oriental architecture, with its fort, its Pearl 
 Mosque, and its Taj Mahal the greatest 
 work of human genius is even more pictur- 
 esque than Delhi. It is to my mind the 
 artistic capital of the whole world. The full 
 beauty and poetry of Agra's monuments, and 
 more especially of the Taj Mahal, cannot, 
 however, be understood without knowledge 
 of history and without penetration into the 
 spirit of the period to which they belong. 
 
 According to the traditions established and 
 jealously observed under instructions from 
 Whitehall foreign Consuls are not allowed 
 to reside officially in the interior of the country
 
 14 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 and are confined to the ports Bombay and 
 Calcutta. As it is well-nigh impossible for 
 an European to remain in these towns during 
 the hot weather, an exception had to be made 
 from this rule. For the summer months 
 foreign Consuls were allowed to migrate to 
 one of the hill stations in the Himalayas. 
 Of these hill stations Simla serves as a summer 
 resort for the Viceregal Government and for 
 the Government of the Punjaub (of which 
 Lahore is the permanent capital). Darjeeling 
 (of fabulous and grandiose beauty) is the sum- 
 mer resort of the Government of Bengal. 
 The Governments of Bombay and Madras 
 spend the summer at hill stations within the 
 limits of their provinces. 
 
 During the last few years, prior to 1914, the 
 Russian, French, German, Austrian, and Persian 
 Consuls-General spent the summer in Simla. 
 As long therefore as the Viceregal Government 
 resided alternately at Calcutta and Simla, the 
 foreign representatives remained in the capital 
 all the year round and were in constant 
 contact with the Viceregal Government. 
 
 The situation changed with the transfer of 
 the capital to Delhi and the foreign Consuls 
 were cut off from direct intercourse with
 
 THE CAPITAL OF INDIA 15 
 
 the Viceregal Government during the cold 
 weather. 
 
 The Germans had consular representatives 
 in Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras. I was told 
 by my colleague, Prince Henry XXXI of 
 Reuss, that his staff at Calcutta numbered 
 nineteen. The French had a Consulate-General 
 in Calcutta and a Consulate in Bombay. 
 The seat of the only Russian Consulate was 
 at Bombay. My predecessor, Mr. Arseniev, 
 was appointed Consul-General in Calcutta, 
 and a bill was introduced in the Duma for 
 the sanctioning of the new status of the 
 Russian representation in India. The argu- 
 ment was put forward that the Russian 
 Consul-General, like his colleagues, ought to 
 have the opportunity of remaining in con- 
 stant contact with the Government of India. 
 The transfer of the capital of India from 
 Calcutta to Delhi was announced in December, 
 1911. When I came to India in May, 1912, I 
 received an official notification from the Rus- 
 sian Foreign Office to the effect that the 
 Russian Consulate-General was transferred 
 from Bombay to Calcutta, " in order to main- 
 tain constant intercourse with the Govern- 
 ment of India " ! ! The farce of this game of
 
 i6 THE ORDEAIv OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 hide-and-seek was, of course, due to the 
 gross ignorance of the Russian Foreign Office, 
 who must have imagined that Delhi was a 
 suburb of Calcutta. I was thus compelled 
 during the first three years of my stay in 
 India to sever active connection with the 
 Government of India during the short months 
 of the cold weather. In order to adhere 
 strictly to the principle that the Russian 
 Consul-General in India could only deal with 
 the Government of India, I carefully refrained 
 from any official communications with the 
 Government of Bengal. I was assisted in 
 this attitude by the Governor of Bengal, who 
 never took the slightest notice of my presence 
 in Calcutta. I must, however, confess that I 
 did not waste much time in compulsory 
 idleness in the paradise of the Bengali Babu. 
 I took advantage of the cold weather for 
 travelling all over India. 
 
 At the end of October, 1914, 1 left Simla as 
 usual for Calcutta. A few days after my arrival, 
 I received instructions from the Russian 
 Foreign Office which made it imperative for 
 me to remain in touch with the Foreign Depart- 
 ment in the Government of India. To carry 
 out these instructions by correspondence would
 
 LORD HARDINGE 17 
 
 have meant loss of time and possible mis- 
 understandings. I therefore hastened to come 
 up to Delhi. The Viceroy, L,ord Hardinge of 
 Penshurst, who had shown me during my 
 stay in India great kindness, and whose 
 attitude was most friendly, agreed to my 
 remaining in Delhi. He was, however, careful 
 to make it clear that the exception from the 
 rigid rule laid down from lyondon was strictly 
 personal, was due to the necessities of war- 
 time, and should in no case be regarded as a 
 precedent. In order that the Russian Con- 
 sul's presence in Delhi should not induce the 
 Consuls-General of other Allied Governments 
 to claim the same privilege, the private 
 character of my prolonged visit to Delhi had 
 to be emphasized. A simple and satisfactory 
 solution soon presented itself when the K.E.O. 
 XI I/ancers (Probyn's Horse) invited me to 
 share one of the bungalows in the regimental 
 compound and to become a member of the 
 regimental mess. Needless to say, I gladly 
 accepted the invitation. When anybody asked 
 the question in Calcutta : " Why is the Rus- 
 sian Consul-General staying in Delhi ? " the 
 answer was : " He is a guest of the XI th 
 Lancers."
 
 i8 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 These details, which may appear super- 
 fluous, illustrate the somewhat abnormal posi- 
 tion of the Russian representative in India. 
 Formally, he was only a " trade agent." In 
 fact, of course, he had the opportunity of 
 doing political work of the highest import- 
 ance . . . according to his personal ability, 
 and of keeping his Government informed on 
 all questions of the middle East affecting the 
 interests of Russia, in particular in Persia and 
 Afghanistan. As regards Tibet, the interests 
 of Russia in that part of the world are practic- 
 ally nil, and it is only due to the ignorance 
 of the Russian Foreign Office that at the 
 moment when the Anglo-Russian rapproche- 
 ment was being promoted, the Russians pro- 
 duced illusory arguments against British " pene- 
 tration " into Tibet, arguments which the 
 Russian diplomats themselves did not clearly 
 understand. An amusing illustration of this 
 ignorance is afforded by the story told by Sir 
 Francis Younghusband in his book on the 
 Tibetan Expedition. 
 
 Count Benckendorff, the Russian Ambas- 
 sador in London, received instructions to 
 protest against the British expedition to Tibet 
 led by Colonel Younghusband. In the course
 
 FOREIGN OFFICE IGNORANCE 19 
 
 of the conversation which took place between 
 Lord Lansdowne, Secretary of State for Foreign 
 Affairs, and the Ambassador, the former drew 
 out a map of Asia. It transpired that Count 
 Benckendorff did not know exactly where 
 Lhasa was, and expressed intense surprise 
 at the enormous distance which separated 
 the capital of Tibet from Russian territory. 
 All our subsequent meddling with the pere- 
 grinations of the Dalai Lama and our con- 
 versations with the dubious envoys from 
 Tibet had no real political significance, while 
 they created feelings of suspicion in Whitehall, 
 which in this case were perfectly justified. I 
 happened to be in the Crimea with the Russian 
 Foreign Minister, Count Lamsdorff, when the 
 Tibetan envoy, Dorjiev, arrived in Yalta. 
 Count Lamsdorff and his chief adviser, Mr. 
 Hartwig, had but vague notions regarding 
 Tibet, and their inability to form a true idea 
 of the qualifications and importance of this 
 self-seeking intriguer were in reality more 
 comical than dangerous. 
 
 Upon my arrival in India, I found that the 
 legend of Russia's " Drang nach Osten " 
 was still in existence. The Russian Consul- 
 General was regarded as the " Russian spy."
 
 20 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 Many amusing incidents occurred, which it 
 would be outside the scope of this chapter to 
 recount, showing that the British in India, 
 and particularly the civil and military au- 
 thorities, viewed the Russian representative 
 with great suspicion. The task which I 
 therefore undertook was twofold. In the 
 first place, the Russian Government had to 
 be persuaded that political questions affecting 
 both countries can only be satisfactorily settled 
 if they are approached in a spirit of sincere 
 friendship and frank discussion, that our 
 interests are in every way identical with 
 those of Great Britain, and that in fact the 
 strengthening of British influence in the 
 countries bordering on Hindustan not only 
 does not endanger the interests of Russia, but 
 affords the best possible guarantee of peaceful 
 progress and neighbourly intercourse. On 
 the other hand, the British had to be con- 
 vinced that Russian policy in the East had 
 been, as often as not, the result of groundless 
 forebodings of men who had no direct know- 
 ledge of the realities, and that the fullest 
 possible explanation of these realities by the 
 Russian representatives was the best means 
 of dispelling misunderstandings to the mutual
 
 WORK IN INDIA 21 
 
 benefit of both parties. Russian representa- 
 tives, of course, could only be in a position 
 to give these explanations provided the British 
 authorities treated them with confidence and 
 frankness. I am no judge of the degree to 
 which I have succeeded in bringing down the 
 double walls of Jericho, the official Russian 
 ignorance and the official British distrust. 
 The facts that during the war the Viceroy of 
 India transmitted several messages to the 
 Russian Foreign Office through the direct 
 medium of the Russian representative in 
 India and that I enjoyed the confidence of 
 the Foreign Secretary to such an extent that 
 he kept me informed as to the negotiations 
 with the Amir of Afghanistan, would appear 
 to indicate that one of the walls had partially 
 been destroyed. In a very cordial farewell 
 speech addressed to me, the Viceroy men- 
 tioned that circumstances had changed since 
 I came to India and that the Russian spy 
 legend had exploded. 
 
 I had the great good fortune of finding 
 myself in India at the fateful time of the 
 beginning of the war. When the news reached 
 us of Great Britain's declaration of war, the 
 question in everyone's mind was : what will
 
 22 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 be the attitude of India ? Will the native 
 troops be induced to take part in the struggle 
 the full meaning of which they did not under- 
 stand and which began on the territory of 
 Belgium, a land entirely strange to them ? In 
 fact, it was the entire future of the British 
 Raj, the fundamental issue of Indian loyalty, 
 that was being put to the test. 
 
 I do not know who took the initiative in 
 adopting a measure which brought about 
 amazingly beneficent results, namely, the 
 despatch of the great majority of Indian 
 troops to Europe, Egypt, Mesopotamia and 
 Africa, and the arrival of territorial troops 
 from England. The Viceroy told me about 
 three weeks after war was declared that he 
 intended to send out about 200,000 native 
 troops to be replaced by territorials from home. 
 What happened was this : there was not a 
 single regiment in India, British or native, 
 that was not eager to go to the front. 
 
 It is no exaggeration to say that there was 
 a regular scramble between these regiments 
 to " get there " first. 
 
 I have often heard it said in India, even 
 by those who did not fully agree with Lord 
 Hardinge's methods of administration, that
 
 HARDINGE'S INFLUENCE 23 
 
 never before had a Viceroy enjoyed the esteem 
 and affection of the native Princes to the same 
 degree as lyord Hardinge. It is a fact that 
 all these Princes from the Nizam of Hydera- 
 bad, whose dominions are equal to the terri- 
 tory of France, to the petty chiefs of Central 
 India gave an enthusiastic response to the 
 Viceroy's appeal for assistance to the Empire 
 in its struggle against the German coalition. 
 Contributions in men and money flowed as 
 from the horn of plenty from these vassals 
 of the British Crown into the Viceroy's chest. 
 The attitude of the native population and of 
 the troops was undoubtedly influenced to a 
 considerable degree by the example of the 
 native Princes. No tribute could be too 
 high for this achievement on the part of the 
 Viceroy whose personal influence resulted in 
 uniting the Princes and the peoples of India 
 in one patriotic impulse. It was a critical 
 moment, and what was taken for granted at 
 home was in reality a great triumph of wise 
 statesmanship. 
 
 The spirit manifested by the Indian troops 
 is the more noteworthy that in order to take 
 part in the war these troops had to forgo many 
 traditions dear to their hearts and to forget
 
 24 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 their caste distinctions which seemingly formed 
 the mainstay of their outlook. But the miracle 
 did take place, and Great Britain is justified 
 in taking pride in this miracle and in the 
 prowess of the native troops. 
 
 In the circles in which I moved, in " society " 
 and in bureaucratic centres, the war was 
 accepted calmly, one might almost say with 
 indifference. I recall the disaster of Tannen- 
 berg, the news of which reached us in Simla 
 with a long delay and in so abridged a ver- 
 sion that no one realised its importance and 
 its tragedy. Lady Hardinge died at home a 
 few weeks before the war. Several months 
 later, the Viceroy lost his eldest son, who died 
 of wounds. The Viceregal court was in mourn- 
 ing, and social life in Simla and Delhi was 
 therefore very quiet. 
 
 In September, 1915, I learnt from the 
 Viceroy that my name had been mentioned 
 in connection with the Counsellorship of the 
 Embassy in London, and that, knowing it to 
 be my greatest wish to get that appointment, 
 he had expressed the opinion that I was best 
 suited for the post. A few weeks later 
 the appointment was made. Pleasant and 
 interesting as my time in India had been,
 
 THE FUTURE IN INDIA 25 
 
 I was more than glad to be sent to Condon, 
 where my activities would bring me into 
 closer contact with the actualities which in 
 India seemed so remote. I sailed from Bombay 
 on November 28, 1915. 
 
 The future destinies of Hindustan and of 
 the British Raj are shrouded in mystery. It 
 is a mystery the clearing of which can never 
 cease to fascinate the mind of anyone who has 
 been in contact, however superficial, with 
 this " other world." The war has brought 
 about great changes in the mutual relations 
 between the British and the natives in India, 
 more especially in the Army. The idea of 
 self-determination so blindly professed by 
 obstinate doctrinaires like President Wilson 
 and supported by politicians without any 
 practical knowledge of the world outside 
 Whitehall, immediately threatens the very 
 existence of the British Empire. Ireland, 
 Egypt, India are already clamouring for " self- 
 determination " and will soon be clamouring 
 more loudly. If race and nationality are 
 accepted as sufficient grounds for separate and 
 independent statehood, there can be no reason- 
 able excuse for the presence in India of the 
 British ruling caste and of British guardian-
 
 26 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 ship of the Indian Principalities. If Esthonia, 
 why not Hyderabad ? As I have already 
 said, Great Britain has accomplished in Hindu- 
 stan the greatest miracle of pacification and 
 civilisation. The question is how long the 
 conscious intelligent classes and the apathetic 
 ignorant masses of India will continue to 
 prefer the continuation and consummation 
 of this miracle to political independence and 
 self-determination. British statesmen now- 
 a-days never miss the opportunity of alluding 
 to " dismembered " Russia and to the " late 
 Empire." May the British Raj survive the 
 dangers which owing to war and the policy of 
 Russia's former friends have overwhelmed, 
 for the time being, my unhappy country.. 
 
 Of my four years' stay in India I have kept 
 many pleasant and grateful memories. I re- 
 call with warm gratitude the kindness, hos- 
 pitality and friendliness of many of my 
 British acquaintance in India. Acquaintances, 
 some of whom have become lifelong friends. 
 I owe a special debt of gratitude to Regi- 
 mental messes the ist K.D.G.'s, the K.E.O. 
 XI Lancers, the II Lancers, the R.F.A. 
 at Agra, and others whose reception was 
 exceptionally gracious and friendly.
 
 JOURNEYS IN INDIA 27 
 
 Travelling in India is possible only during 
 the cold weather. In the three cold seasons 
 I spent in India I was, of course, unable to 
 see even one-tenth of all the glorious sights 
 and marvels of Hindustan. Marvels not only 
 of nature but of art and architecture, of 
 which there are so many. Also, the lot of a 
 lonely tourist unacquainted with the native 
 language is not an enviable one. Lastly, 
 distances are very great and travelling in 
 some regions very slow. Being unable to 
 lose touch with my office for any considerable 
 length of time, I was necessarily confined to 
 the beaten tracks. But even along these 
 beaten tracks I have seen sights I shall never 
 forget. 
 
 The one journey that had a certain political 
 significance was my visit to Peshawar, the 
 capital of the " North- West Frontier Pro- 
 vince." At a distance from the town of about 
 seven miles begins the Khyber Pass leading 
 into Afghanistan. The Khyber is, of course, 
 terra prohibita to foreigners. The Chief Com- 
 missioner, Sir George Roos Keppel, and his 
 entourage, however, did not consider me as 
 " the Russian spy." I stayed at Government 
 House and was treated as a friend and a
 
 28 THE ORDEAIy OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 representative of a friendly Power (that was 
 before the war). So Sir George saw no harm 
 in my motoring with a small party of his 
 British guests from Peshawar to Landi-Kotal, 
 the small British fort at the Afghan end of 
 the Pass. Horribile dictu, I lunched in the 
 mess at Landi-Kotal and went out for a walk 
 which brought us to the actual territory of 
 Afghanistan. We were escorted by two sepoys 
 with loaded rifles. 
 
 This, of course, is an insignificant fact. It 
 is worth mentioning because I was the first, 
 and in all probability the last Russian diplomat 
 in India who walked on Afghan territory 
 under the protection of the authorities of 
 the North- West Frontier Province, and saw 
 with his own eyes the British fortifications on 
 the frontier. 
 
 I shall not describe Peshawar. One could 
 write a volume on Peshawar, but none can 
 attempt to describe this wonderful city in a 
 few pages. 
 
 The small native State in the very heart of 
 Rajputana-Udaipur is truly a paradise on earth. 
 Again I must refer the reader to a book by 
 Miss Gabrielle Festing, Rajputana, the Land 
 of Princes. It gives the spirit, the legend, the
 
 RAJPUTANA-UDAIPUR 29 
 
 history of Rajputana, of which Udaipur is 
 perhaps the most " romantic " spot. When 
 you reach this wonderful white city on the 
 lake of Udaipur, with two white marble 
 islands, you feel as though you were in the 
 middle ages. There, flocks of small green 
 parrots fly across the lake, wild boars roam in 
 the surrounding fields, tigers and panthers 
 swarm in the jungle. Monkeys jump from 
 tree to tree and from roof to roof. At night, 
 jackals assert themselves in the loudest and 
 most uncanny manner imaginable. Amid this 
 bacchanale of the animal world, the poise and 
 dignity of the native of Udaipur are the 
 more impressive. White garments are fav- 
 oured most by men and women alike. Every- 
 one seems happy in Udaipur under the bene- 
 volent rule of the Maharana (such is the title 
 of the ruling Prince). I shall never forget 
 the impression left upon me by the inter- 
 view I had with the Maharana, whose guest I 
 was, together with a British officer. I was 
 received on the open white marble terrace 
 of his summer palace. The Maharana, an old 
 man with a snow-white beard, wonderful 
 features, kindly, deep eyes and an extra- 
 ordinarily dignified bearing, was dressed in
 
 30 THE ORDEAIv OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 white, with a white turban. He was leaning 
 on a sword in a red scabbard which afforded 
 the only touch of colour. Truly a vision from 
 the Arabian Nights. 
 
 From Udaipur I went to Agra. The un- 
 forgettable impression of my first visit grew 
 deeper every time I returned to that city of 
 unrivalled charm and beauty. No poetry, 
 no painting can convey the fascination of the 
 city of Akbar and Shah Jehan. Music alone 
 might perhaps render the atmosphere of the 
 Taj and of Fatehpur Sikri, the derelict tem- 
 porary city near Agra, where Akbar tried to 
 be happy for five years. 
 
 Benares produces an entirely different im- 
 pression. It is only the panorama of the 
 city that can be called beautiful. But it is 
 the beauty of nature, of light and colour 
 that impresses stronger than the work of man. 
 Benares is, of course, infinitely interesting 
 to the student of the religious beliefs, super- 
 stitions and traditions of Hinduism. The 
 " ghats " are undoubtedly an interesting sight, 
 but far from being picturesque their sight is 
 rather gruesome, especially if seen at a short 
 distance. 
 
 Of all the marvels of nature Darjeeling is
 
 DARJEEUNG 31 
 
 certainly one of the greatest. I mean, of 
 course, the marvels of nature that are acces- 
 sible to the average tourist. Those who 
 devote their energies and their time to Hima- 
 layan exploration have undoubtedly seen sights 
 which may be even more grandiose than 
 those one enjoys at Darjeeling. But a visit 
 to Darjeeling is nevertheless a pilgrimage to 
 one of the greatest temples of Divine archi- 
 tecture, surpassing everything human hands 
 may attempt. 
 
 I left Calcutta on a hot November after- 
 noon. Until the next morning, the train 
 ran through the rich plain of Bengal. At 
 about 6.30 a.m. we boarded the narrow gauge 
 train which crawls up to Darjeeling. The 
 railway is one of the greatest engineering feats 
 ever performed. It twists and turns, it " loops 
 the loop." You see below the tropical plain: 
 close by, orchids, palm trees, tropical vegeta- 
 tion of untold beauty, tea plantations. At 
 about 2.30 p.m. the train reached Darjeeling. 
 It was raining hard. In another hour or so, 
 darkness came. The hotel was dreary, empty 
 and cold. Terribly cold. Almost immedi- 
 ately after an early dinner I was compelled 
 to go to bed as it was the only means of
 
 32 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 keeping warm. Not only my blankets and 
 rug, but all my clothes had to be used in order 
 to make me feel comfortable. At five o'clock 
 in the morning, I got out of bed and opened 
 the blinds. The view that appeared before 
 me was so overwhelmingly majestic and beauti- 
 ful that I nearly burst into tears. I dressed 
 hurriedly and went to " Observatory Hill," 
 the centre of Darjeeling, where I remained 
 till about ii a.m. in rapture before the ever- 
 changing grandeur of the Himalayas and the 
 surrounding valleys and forests. It is a sight 
 which I cannot venture to describe. Upon 
 my return to the hotel I was told that I had 
 been exceptionally lucky, and would probably 
 have to wait for a fortnight or so before the 
 skies would be clear enough to enable me to 
 see the whole range and the summit of Kin- 
 chinjunga once more. Without the slightest 
 hesitation, I packed my trunk and returned 
 to Calcutta, so as to preserve the wonderful 
 impression of my short visit which would 
 undoubtedly have been marred by a fortnight's 
 boredom and expectation. Darjeeling in fog 
 and rain is no place for a lonely tourist. 
 
 During the last three days of my stay in 
 India I enjoyed the hospitality of Lord and
 
 LEAVING INDIA 33 
 
 I^ady Willingdon at Government House, Bom- 
 bay. Of all the bright impressions I have of 
 my three and a half years in India, none is 
 brighter than that of the generous, cordial 
 and . genial reception I had the honour to 
 receive in Bombay. It was the end of Novem- 
 ber, and yet fans were a necessity. One 
 could not venture to go out into the sunshine 
 before four o'clock. 
 
 The same bright and warm weather followed 
 us, on our way home, from Bombay to Port 
 Said. However anxious I was to come to 
 lyondon, already then the centre of world 
 politics, I could not help regretting to leave 
 India. Apart from indelible impressions of 
 art and nature, I carried with me grateful 
 memories of the warm and friendly kindness 
 of the many friends I was obliged to part 
 with. It is a commonplace saying that one 
 should never return to places where one has 
 been happy. Nevertheless, I shall never cease 
 to cherish the hope of seeing again the snow- 
 clad heights of the Himalayas, the dreamland 
 of Udaipur, and of spending long hours in the 
 gardens of the Taj, this marvellous symbol of 
 the devotion of Shah Jehan the Magnificent 
 to the faithful Mumtaz Mahall.
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 I REACHED lyondon on December 15, 1915, 
 after a dismal journey across France and a 
 still more dismal crossing. As nature, in India, 
 was radiant and the people friendly and 
 affable, so was London cold, dreary and 
 strange. There is nothing one cannot get 
 used to but it takes some time to get ac- 
 climatized in I/mdon after three years in the 
 glorious sunshine of Hindustan. 
 
 When I took up my duties as Counsellor 
 of the Russian Embassy, Count Alexander 
 Benckendorff was the Russian Ambassador. 
 Among the Russian diplomatists of the old 
 school Count Benckendorff occupied an ex- 
 ceptional position. He had thorough know- 
 ledge of the French, Italian, and German 
 languages, and spoke English fluently. He 
 could thus find a common language with the 
 British Ministers as well as with his col- 
 leagues. Unfortunately, he did not know 
 Russian quite so well, 1 and occasionally im- 
 
 'He was educated in France. 
 
 34
 
 COUNT BENCKENDORFF 35 
 
 pressed his compatriots as being a stranger 
 to his own country. This impression was, 
 of course, entirely superficial and unfounded, 
 as Count Benckendorff was a fervent and 
 broad-minded patriot. He was devoted not 
 merely to the Russian Empire, but to the 
 Russian people, whose interests he served to 
 the best of his ability and guided by absolute 
 faith in the great destinies of Russia. By 
 birth and by education, as well as by the ties 
 of friendship and relationship he had in 
 Russia, he belonged to the narrow circle of 
 the Court and to the high aristocracy. In 
 spite of these intimate connections with the 
 circles where every manifestation of pro- 
 gressive political thought was anathema, where 
 even the moderate party of " peaceful re- 
 generation " was considered " dangerous " 
 our Ambassador differed widely from his 
 relatives and friends in Russia in regard to 
 the internal policy of Russia. There can be 
 no doubt that the thirteen years he spent 
 in this country, where the monarchical prin- 
 ciple is so wisely and admirably coupled with 
 the widest possible political freedom, had a 
 strong influence upon Count Benckendorff' s 
 outlook and inspired him with such ideas on
 
 36 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 the Russian autocracy as would have appeared 
 criminal heresy to most of his friends in 
 Russia. Count Benckendorff enjoyed the es- 
 teem and respect of all those who knew him in 
 Britain. Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, Lord 
 Hardinge, Lord Carnock, Monsieur Cambon 
 were Count BenckendorfTs personal friends. 
 The Ambassador had one peculiarity. In 
 conversation, he expressed his thoughts with 
 extraordinary lucidity, and these thoughts 
 were, as a rule, so penetrating, showed such 
 deep knowledge and understanding of the 
 actual forces which governed the realm of 
 international politics during the last decade, 
 that he impressed even the most prejudiced 
 listener as a man of exceptional wisdom and 
 foresight. As soon, however, as he picked 
 up the pen (he always wrote in French) 
 almost invariably this depth of knowledge and 
 breadth of vision forsook him. His des- 
 patches and letters were written either in long 
 and confused sentences, or else in short and 
 unintelligible lines, so that one could not 
 always understand what he actually meant 
 to convey. This, the only failing of one of 
 Russia's wisest and noblest representatives 
 and actors in the great drama of the past
 
 COUNT BENCKENDORFF 37 
 
 years, was in reality a great misfortune. 
 During the last years of the old regime, he 
 had more than once expressed the opinion 
 that the continuation of the regime of oppres- 
 sion in Russia would inevitably result in a 
 catastrophe to the Monarchy, and that public 
 opinion in Great Britain could not view with 
 equanimity such manifestations of reactionary 
 absolutism, as, for example, the appointment 
 of Sturmer to the post of Prime Minister. 
 But his warnings were given in a language 
 that deprived them of the power of con- 
 viction. I feel certain that in reading them, 
 the late Emperor remained unmoved. 
 
 Count BenckendorfFs favourite son was 
 killed in the war in 1915, and he never re- 
 covered from this blow. During the war, 
 there also occurred a marked change in the 
 hitherto cordial relations between Count Benc- 
 kendorff and the Russian Foreign Minister 
 Sazonov, who had been Counsellor of the 
 Embassy in London under Count Benckendorff. 
 
 With reference to Count Benckendorff' s 
 account of certain negotiations in London in 
 1915, Sazonov wrote a letter to the Am- 
 bassador containing very strong criticism of 
 his action. Sazonov's manner had never been
 
 38 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 particularly courteous, neither did he shrink 
 from using curt language in his letters and 
 telegrams. On this occasion he distinctly 
 exceeded the limits of discourtesy. Count 
 Benckendorff shrugged his shoulders and af- 
 fected indifference, but in reality was deeply 
 aggrieved and never forgot the slight. 
 
 At the beginning of 1916, when I first 
 began to study the conditions in Great Britain 
 arising from the war, the situation was as 
 follows. The British troops, after performing 
 a series of heroic deeds and suffering cruel 
 losses, had evacuated Gallipoli. This evacua- 
 tion was a hard blow to the pride of Britain. 
 At the same time General Townshend's forces 
 were besieged at Kut, in Mesopotamia, and 
 General Aylmer's relief force failed to rescue 
 him. At home, there had been disturbances 
 on the Clyde. Ireland was excluded from 
 the Conscription bill. In the meantime the 
 British Army continued to grow in numbers 
 and efficiency, and the output of munitions 
 was increasing with amazing rapidity owing 
 to the prodigious energy of Mr. Lloyd George. 
 General Sir Douglas Haig succeeded General 
 Sir John French as Comniander-in-Chief. The 
 period of " trench war " continued on the
 
 RUSSIAN POPULARITY 39 
 
 Western front, and no spectacular results 
 were being achieved. In February, the epic 
 of the defence of Verdun began. The only 
 important and striking event favourable to 
 the Allies was the capture of Erzeroum by the 
 Russian troops. 
 
 It seemed to be already dimly realised that 
 victory could only be attained if all the Allies 
 put all their strength and all their resources 
 into the struggle. The relations between the 
 Allied Powers depended to a certain extent 
 upon that idea, and they were extremely 
 sensitive to any indication of relaxation of one 
 another's energy in the conduct of the war. 
 
 Russia's popularity was at that moment 
 at its zenith. Finding themselves our 
 " brothers-in-arms " for the first time in a 
 century, the British people seemed anxious to 
 obliterate from our memory and their own 
 all the bygone misunderstandings and ani- 
 mosity, the Crimea, the Congress of Berlin, 
 the sympathetic attitude towards Japan at 
 the time of the Russo-Japanese war, the pro- 
 tracted rivalries in Persia. Official circles, in 
 particular the War Office and the Admiralty, 
 were giving Russia generous support in muni- 
 tions and other war material and magnanim-
 
 40 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 ously helping us in every way. Among the 
 British Ministers Lord Kitchener was Russia's 
 staunchest and most powerful friend. As is 
 well known, Lord Kitchener was the only 
 statesman who predicted in August, 1914, that 
 the war was going to last three years at least. 
 His prophecy would have been fulfilled to the 
 letter had it not been for the collapse of the 
 Russian Army, which, as has now been recog- 
 nised by some at least of the British statesmen, 
 was on the verge of a decisive victory. Lord 
 Kitchener could not foresee this collapse, 
 because he was unaware of the disastrous 
 effect of the simultaneous mobilisation of 
 eighteen million men, the gravest and fatal 
 mistake of the Imperial Russian Government. 
 No Government could have succeeded in 
 clothing, equipping, feeding and training such 
 a huge army. Much less our bureaucratic 
 Government, especially since it had turned a 
 deaf ear to the enthusiastic offers of support 
 and assistance of all Russian social and local 
 organisations. 
 
 Cases have come to my personal knowledge 
 in which Lord Kitchener gave us more than we 
 had asked for. He attributed a very great v 
 importance to the Russian front and was
 
 RUSSIAN POPULARITY 41 
 
 prepared to make every sacrifice in order to 
 strengthen that front. There can be no doubt 
 that Lord Kitchener's tragic end was a great 
 calamity to Russia. It is, of course, idle to 
 speculate on the political effect his visit to Rus- 
 sia might have had. Personally, I am con- 
 vinced that even Lord Kitchener would have 
 failed to influence the Emperor Nicholas in 
 regard to internal politics. But he would 
 doubtless have seen the grave defects of the 
 purely military activities of the old regime and 
 in this direction would have been capable of 
 exercising a beneficent influence. 
 
 Sympathy with Russia was manifested in 
 every direction, in all classes of society. A 
 long series of books appeared which to a 
 certain degree filled the gap in the British 
 knowledge of Russia's history, art, literature 
 and political structure. Anglo-Russian 
 Societies were founded all over the country 
 with the object of promoting a cultural rap- 
 prochement. In several Universities chairs 
 of the Russian language were established. 
 It has been my privilege to address meetings 
 organised with the view to obtaining funds 
 for such " Russian chairs." The audience 
 invariably proved sympathetic and friendly.
 
 42 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 The argument that appealed more strongly 
 than any other was that in Russia English 
 literature was very popular, that Shake- 
 speare, Dickens, Byron, Shelley and other 
 British geniuses had for the last century 
 inspired Russian poets and writers, and that 
 there hardly was a town or village library that 
 did not contain the works of the great British 
 writers. 
 
 Broad circles of British educated society 
 were beginning to realise that Russian litera- 
 ture was not limited to the works of Tolstoi, 
 Dostoyevski and Tourgenev. The task of 
 promoting the interest of the British public in 
 Russian art and literature appealed to me 
 immensely, and the sympathetic response 
 with which these efforts invariably met on the 
 part of various meetings, societies and indivi- 
 duals was a veritable inspiration. It would 
 not be an exaggeration to say that in the first 
 two years of the war the cultural rapproche- 
 ment between Russia and Great Britain went 
 much further than the same process in regard 
 to France during the twenty-five years of our 
 " friendship and alliance " with the Republic. 
 Was this not due to the fact that our alliance 
 with France was purely utilitarian, was made
 
 DEPUTATIONS FROM RUSSIA 43 
 
 with a definite purpose ? The French never 
 took the slightest interest in the Russian 
 people, in the creative genius, the history or 
 literature of Russia. The liberty-loving British 
 people instinctively detested the old Russian 
 regime because they believed it to be an 
 odious tyranny. The patriotic enthusiasm 
 which the war provoked in Russia, the heroism 
 of her soldiers who faced the German heavy 
 guns and machine-guns with sticks instead 
 of rifles and who died by the thousand because 
 they were weaponless disclosed to the British 
 the " true face " of Russia . . . and they felt 
 ashamed of their ignorance and prejudice 
 against the Russian people. 
 
 In the spring of 1916 two Russian deputa- 
 tions visited Great Britain. The first was a 
 deputation of journalists, the second of the 
 Duma and the Council of the Empire. 
 
 The deputation of journalists consisted of 
 six members. They were : V. I. Nemirovitch- 
 Dantchenko, Count Alexis Tolstoi, K. I. 
 Tchoukovski, A. A. Bashmakov, E. T. Yegorov 
 and V. D. Nabokoff. The veteran war 
 correspondent, Nemirovitch-Dantchenko, did 
 not understand a word of English. Mr. Robert 
 Wilton, the Times correspondent in Petrograd,
 
 44 'THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 acted as interpreter, friend, guide and alter 
 ego to the Russian journalist. No tribute 
 could be too high for the patience and good 
 humour with which Mr. Wilton performed 
 the very arduous task of piloting the old and 
 ill-tempered Russian Xenophon. 
 
 My brother was the only member of the 
 delegation who could speak fluent English, 
 and was therefore in a position to derive the 
 greatest benefit from the hospitality and 
 courtesy of his British hosts. As a rule, he 
 also was the spokesman of the delegation at 
 various functions, and acquitted himself tact- 
 fully and at times eloquently of his duties. 
 
 Upon the arrival of this deputation in 
 London, a banquet was held at Lancaster 
 House, Sir Edward Grey presiding. The de- 
 putation made an extensive tour, visited the 
 Fleet, munition factories, etc. They were 
 everywhere accorded a most friendly recep- 
 tion. On the whole, this visit was useful. 
 Deaf and dumb as some of the members of 
 the deputation were in Britain, they had 
 eyes to see, and recorded their impressions 
 upon their return to Russia in a manner 
 which undoubtedly appealed to the general 
 public in Russia and helped to make them
 
 VISIT OF JOURNALISTS 45 
 
 understand and admire the magnitude of 
 Great Britain's share in the war. 
 
 Soon after the return to Russia of this 
 deputation, the Russian Embassy in London 
 suggested to the Russian Government that a 
 deputation of British journalists should be 
 invited to visit Russia. The Foreign Office at 
 Petrograd deliberately caused these negotia- 
 tions to be protracted. At first they sug- 
 gested that a mixed deputation of British 
 and French j ournalists should be invited . Their 
 excuse was that our party of newspaper-men 
 had visited France as well as Great Britain. 
 We pointed out that such a " mixed " deputa- 
 tion would be unpractical, that some of the 
 British journalists were not conversant with 
 the French language, that difficulties and 
 friction would inevitably ensue. After much 
 hesitation and long delays, consent was given 
 to the arrival of a British delegation. I had 
 the privilege of conducting pourparlers with 
 Lord Burnham, who had given his consent to 
 place himself at the head of the delegation. 
 The task of forming a delegation of British 
 newspaper correspondents representing dif- 
 ferent political views and desirous of visiting 
 Russia was not an easy one. When the
 
 46 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 matter was settled as far as the membership 
 of the delegation was concerned, the question 
 came up of the time most suitable for the 
 visit. The Russian Foreign Office again raised 
 objections and difficulties. Finally, Sir George 
 Buchanan telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey 
 that for political reasons the visit of the 
 delegation appeared to him inopportune. The 
 matter was then dropped. This fact, how- 
 ever insignificant, could not fail to serve as an 
 indication to the Government and to the 
 Press that things were not going well in 
 Petrograd, at the front and in the rear. For 
 such was the obvious construction which the 
 Government as well as the Press correspon- 
 dents whose visit had been indefinitely post- 
 poned could not fail to place upon Sir George 
 Buchanan's cautious veto. Rumours had been 
 afloat for some time of disturbances in the 
 rear of the armies, of Rasputin's evil orgies 
 and of the loss of prestige which the Monarchy 
 was suffering owing to the disastrous in- 
 fluence of this hysterical and vicious scoundrel 
 whom the Imperial Family sincerely and 
 blindly believed to be a saint and a miracle- 
 maker. After the visit of the representa- 
 tives of the British Press had been found
 
 THE DUMA DELEGATION 47 
 
 " inopportune," these rumours naturally gained 
 further credence and caused graver misgivings. 
 
 To return, however, to the spring of 1916, 
 and the visit of the second delegation. 
 
 The Duma and the Council of the Empire 
 had selected this Delegation from different 
 political parties. It comprised the critics 
 of the Government, leaders of the opposition 
 such as Miliukov, Shingarev and others. The 
 object of the Deputation was to reaffirm to 
 the Governments and to public opinion in 
 the Allied countries that in the matter of 
 pursuing the war to a successful issue all 
 parties were at one in Russia. In those days 
 nobody could foresee the rapid collapse of 
 the Moderate Liberal parties in Russia which 
 followed so closely upon the downfall of the 
 Monarchy. Everybody believed that the vic- 
 tory of these moderate elements over the 
 ultra-reactionary forces which dominated the 
 Emperor would be the solution of the im- 
 pending crisis. And such a solution was 
 already then ardently desired by the great 
 majority of Russian patriots who realised 
 that the old regime was doomed. The British 
 Government and public opinion were fully 
 aware of this feature of the situation. They
 
 48 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 therefore greeted with sincere satisfaction 
 the arrival of a Delegation which was in its 
 very composition a symbol of Russian national 
 unity. Gourko and Miliukov, Prince Lobanov 
 and Shingarev members of the same deputa- 
 tion. ... It was indeed an extraordinary 
 gathering, inasmuch as intolerance had hither- 
 to been the characteristic feature of Russian 
 political life. From that point of view, the 
 Delegation undoubtedly served the useful 
 purpose of fostering the faith of Great Britain 
 in Russia's will to win. Several painful in- 
 cidents of an "internal" order took place 
 when the Delegation came to London . To 
 begin with, the staff of the Embassy did 
 not meet the delegation at the railway station. 
 The delegation reached King's Cross at five 
 o'clock in the morning. At about seven, some 
 of the members alighted on the platform from 
 their sleeping-cars only to find the platform 
 empty. The Secretary of the Embassy who 
 rushed in at that moment only added oil to 
 the fire of these " statesmen's " indignation. 
 It must be admitted that the members of the 
 delegation showed on this occasion a touchi- 
 ness which was not quite in keeping with 
 their " high " position. As a matter of fact,
 
 SERIOUS INCIDENTS 49 
 
 the Russian Embassy in London had always 
 been unlucky as far as meetings were con- 
 cerned. We either went to the wrong railway 
 station, or else the telegram announcing the 
 arrival of the " personage " reached us half 
 an hour after the guests had arrived. After 
 a while we became reconciled to this ill fate, 
 and our faux pas in that direction were the 
 source of constant jokes among the staff. 
 
 Immediately upon the arrival of the delega- 
 tion another and more serious incident oc- 
 curred. In drafting the programme of the 
 reception of the Russian delegates, the British 
 Foreign Office first of all asked us whom they 
 should consider as their senior member ? In 
 other words, who should be given at the 
 banquet, presided over by the Prime Minister, 
 the seat of honour, and who would reply to 
 the speech of welcome ? In view of the fact 
 that Baron Rosen in his capacity of late 
 Russian Ambassador in Washington was un- 
 doubtedly the senior member of the Council of 
 the Empire Delegation, the Embassy put 
 forward his name. Baron Rosen lost no time 
 in calling on his colleague, Count Bencken- 
 dorff. They agreed that Baron Rosen should 
 receive the draft of Mr. Asquith's speech of 
 D
 
 50 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 welcome as soon as Count Benckendorff should 
 get it from the Prime Minister. Baron Rosen 
 was to draft his reply in consultation with 
 the Ambassador. Returning to the hotel from 
 the Embassy, Baron Rosen invited his col- 
 leagues of the Council of the Empire to his 
 room and informed them of the steps which 
 had already been taken. Here the storm 
 burst. One of the members of the Delegation, 
 a loud, resolute and trenchant person, bluntly 
 declared that Baron Rosen had no right and 
 had not been instructed to settle for himself 
 the question of seniority. Some very offen- 
 sive remarks were made in reference to Baron 
 Rosen's alien origin and German proclivities. 
 This to the veteran diplomatist was a terrible 
 blow. Count Benckendorff had, of course, 
 full authority and every reason to settle the 
 incident by pointing out to Baron Rosen's 
 recalcitrant opponent that the decisive voice 
 in such matters belonged to the Ambassador. 
 Baron Rosen, however, felt the insult so keenly 
 that he immediately and firmly decided to 
 separate himself from the Delegation. 
 
 He attended the first banquet, but after- 
 wards declined to join in the wanderings of his 
 colleagues. He did not follow them to Scot-
 
 BARON ROSEN 51 
 
 land and to the Midlands. Neither did he go 
 to the Continent. He remained in Ivondon 
 in a private capacity. 
 
 Of all the former colleagues and subordinates 
 of Baron Rosen, Prince Koudacheff, now 
 Russian Minister in Pekin, and myself were 
 those with whom he had preserved a friendly 
 and cordial relation. I differed considerably 
 from Baron Rosen in the estimation of the 
 Treaty of Portsmouth, which he had signed 
 as the second Russian plenipotentiary and in 
 the drafting of which I had played a modest 
 part. I likewise disagreed with the reaction- 
 ary views he held in regard to Russian internal 
 politics during the period of 1905-1911. I 
 had, however, a very great admiration for his 
 keen intellect, his wide experience and the 
 sincerity of his convictions. What he be- 
 lieved he believed sincerely and earnestly. 
 Our dissensions at the time of his last visit to 
 Condon became, however, so acute that our 
 personal relations underwent a considerable 
 change. After relinquishing the post of Rus- 
 sian Ambassador in Washington, Baron Rosen 
 settled down in Petrograd. Personal contact 
 with Russian realities induced him to alter his 
 reactionary views. Every Russian remembers
 
 52 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 the eloquent warnings which he addressed to 
 the Government from his seat in the Council 
 of the Empire. One might have thought that 
 Baron Rosen would be a convinced supporter 
 of "a fight to the finish," against German 
 absolutism. Whether he was so strongly in- 
 fluenced by the circumstances in which he 
 left the Delegation that his political horizon 
 was obscured, or whether he had originally 
 held a pro-German view I cannot tell. The 
 fact, however, remains that he unfolded to me 
 his intimate views, and tried to prove, with 
 all the fervour of strong conviction, that Ger- 
 many was invincible, that all our dreams of 
 Constantinople were a mirage and that our 
 alliance with Great Britain and France was a 
 fatal error. Baron Rosen said, " America is 
 right in re/raining from participation in the 
 senseless slaughter which can lead to nothing 
 else than to the collapse of Europe." At that 
 moment, however, to defend the position of 
 the United States under President Wilson's 
 leadership appeared to be a heresy, as the 
 powers of the Entente, fully convinced of the 
 righteousness of their cause and suffering 
 from the brutalities of the enemy, regarded 
 that position with indignant dismay.
 
 MR. PROTOPOPOFF 53 
 
 Russia, as I have already mentioned, was at 
 the zenith of her popularity in Britain. The 
 Delegation, therefore, was accorded a very 
 warm welcome. It fell to my lot to accompany 
 the Delegation in its journeys in Great Britain, 
 and to witness the exceptional kindness with 
 which it was surrounded and the interest it 
 evoked. I particularly remember the ban- 
 quet at Glasgow. Toasts for Russia and the 
 speeches of the Russian guests were greeted 
 with an enthusiasm which one could hardly 
 have expected to see in Scotland. The char- 
 acteristic feature of that particular banquet 
 was that the great majority of the five hundred 
 guests were middle-aged or old men. The 
 spokesman of the Russian Delegation on this 
 occasion was Mr. Protopopoff. 
 
 The impression produced at the Embassy 
 by this gentleman, who was destined to play 
 such a disastrous part in the political life of 
 Russia six months later, was a very strange 
 one. From behind the mask of Liberal pat- 
 riotism we caught glimpses of a buffoon's 
 grimace. Count Benckendorff described him 
 briefly : " C'est un imbecile." Protopopoff 
 adopted with us a tone of benevolent intimacy 
 and told us most amazing stories about the
 
 54 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 Court, the Metropolitan . . . and Rasputin. 
 Once or twice, however, his tongue slipped and 
 he referred to the Duma in terms of ironical 
 contempt which left us wondering. A pro- 
 minent British statesman is said to have 
 described Protopopoff as having " something 
 Persian about him." 
 
 Some of the members of the Delegation had 
 shortcomings which made it difficult for the 
 British officials attached to it to have patience 
 with them. The incidents which caused a 
 certain amount of friction were, however, 
 trivial. On the other hand, such men as 
 Miliukov, Shingarev and other prominent 
 leaders of the Duma gave the Delegation the 
 necessary weight and dignity. On the whole, 
 the impression produced by the Delegation 
 appeared to be favourable and served for 
 the time being to enhance the faith of public 
 opinion in Russia's determination to stand by 
 the Allies. That impression counteracted to 
 a certain degree the forebodings which reports 
 on the decline of Russia's military effort were 
 already causing. 
 
 The effects of this visit upon public opinion 
 in Great Britain were, however, soon obliter- 
 ated by the events which followed almost
 
 IMPERIAL BLINDNESS 55 
 
 immediately upon their departure : the Battle 
 of Jutland and Lord Kitchener's death. For 
 the next three months there was a period of 
 comparative inactivity on the Western Front. 
 Many battles were fought, fortunes varied, 
 but no decisive results were achieved. General 
 Brussilov's successful advance once again re- 
 lieved the anxieties for the fate of the Russian 
 Army. 
 
 The autumn months went by and the 
 winter of 1916-1917 began, which was to 
 prove fateful for the Russian monarchy. Al- 
 though Count Benckendorff by no means 
 considered Mr. Sazonov as an impeccable 
 oracle in foreign politics, the latter' s resigna- 
 tion and Mr. Stunner's appointment caused 
 the Ambassador to feel deeply discouraged. 
 When the telegram announcing this change 
 at the Ministry arrived from Petrograd, Count 
 Benckendorff said : " C'est de la demence." 
 (This is madness.) Occasionally rumours or 
 true news reached the Ambassador of various 
 efforts (by Samarin, Rodzianko, Princess Was- 
 siltchikoff, Sir George Buchanan) to influence 
 the Imperial Couple and to open their eyes 
 to the actual state of affairs. On these occa- 
 sions the Ambassador's hopes were revived
 
 56 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 that Nicholas II would listen to the dictates 
 of reason and call a responsible Liberal Minis- 
 try. The Ambassador's spirits rose when Miliu- 
 kov made his famous speech in the Duma which 
 resulted in Sturmer's resignation. How often 
 since that speech was made could the famous 
 sentence it contained, " This is either stupidity 
 or treason " be applied in the realm of world 
 politics. 
 
 After this brief respite things went from bad 
 to worse, and it became apparent that a crisis 
 was unavoidable. Count Benckendorff lost 
 heart. The last event which raised dim hopes 
 was the appointment of Mr. Pokrovsky to 
 the Foreign Office in Petrograd. " Celui la, 
 au moins, c'est un honnete homme," said 
 Benckendorff. At that moment, however, 
 Count Benckendorff seemed to have abandoned 
 all hope of such a reconstruction of the Russian 
 Government as would allow it to regain 
 the confidence of the Allied Powers. Count 
 Benckendorff, during the whole time of my 
 service at the Embassy under his guidance, 
 very seldom imparted to me the tenor of his 
 confidential talks with Sir Edward Grey, or 
 later, with Mr. Balfour. One could, however, 
 easily discern from his confidential messages
 
 ENTER UvOYD GEORGE 57 
 
 to the Russian Foreign Minister, that the 
 British statesmen were watching with grave 
 concern and anxiety the trend of events in 
 Russia. 
 
 At the end of 1916, a Government crisis 
 took place in Britain, and Mr. Lloyd George 
 became Prime Minister. In the new Coalition 
 Sir Edward Grey was replaced by Mr. Balfour. 
 Mr. Asquith's resignation was no misfortune 
 to Russia, as his sympathies in international 
 politics were not exactly towards Russia. 
 The country believed that Mr. Lloyd George 
 was the man capable of inspiring the bureau- 
 cratic machine with the maximum of energy 
 and the masses with patriotic enthusiasm 
 sufficient for further voluntary efforts in the 
 common cause. 
 
 In the beginning of January, 1917, Count 
 Benckendorff contracted pneumonia, and died 
 after an illness of five days on January 12. 
 Until the last minute he was unaware of his 
 approaching end, and continued to take a 
 lively interest in his work. His death at his 
 post was the culmination of the brilliant 
 career of an enlightened patriot, and it is a 
 matter of deep satisfaction to all those who 
 held him in high esteem that he should not
 
 58 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 have lived to see this day. Count Bencken- 
 dorff certainly could never have imagined all 
 the humiliations which hapless Russia has 
 suffered for the last three years. Had he been 
 a witness of these tragic events he would 
 have died broken-hearted. The Almighty has 
 generously spared him this ordeal. 
 
 On the day after Count BenckendorfFs 
 death I received several letters of condolence. 
 Lord Hardinge and Monsieur Cambon wrote 
 in terms of exceptional warmth, and expressed 
 genuine sorrow at the loss, not only of a 
 personal friend, but of a man whose contribu- 
 tion to the maintenance of cordial relations 
 between Russia and her Allies of the day, 
 Great Britain and France, had been immeasur- 
 ably great. Monsieur Cambon said : "I was, 
 perhaps, a better judge than anyone else of 
 Count BenckendorfTs great and charming 
 qualities. His death is a loss, not only to 
 Russia, but to France as well. He was 
 educated in France. France knew how much 
 experience, wisdom and sagacity he displayed 
 in the most difficult negotiations which were 
 conducted in London." The same expressions 
 of regret were repeated to me by Lord Hardinge 
 and Mr. Balfour.
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 ALMOST immediately after Count Bencken- 
 dorfFs death, Lord Milner's special mission 
 went to Petrograd. Not having to this day 
 access to the archives of the Russian Foreign 
 Ministry, i.e., to the documents published by 
 the Bolsheviks, I do not know whether the 
 records of the Anglo-Russian Conferences of 
 January and February, 1917, have been made 
 public. The chief object of that Conference, 
 which was, I believe, attended by representa- 
 tives of other Allied Powers, was to determine 
 the amount of armaments, equipments, war 
 material and credits which the Russian Govern- 
 ment expected to receive from Great Britain. 
 The historical meaning of Lord Milner's visit 
 and of his negotiations with the Russian 
 Government lies, not so much in the practical 
 result of the deliberations, as in the mutual 
 relationship between Great Britain and Russia, 
 which that Conference established. Russia 
 became entirely dependent on Great Britain for 
 the prosecution of the war. Russia was unable 
 
 59
 
 60 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 to repay by material means for the sacrifices 
 in war material, tonnage and capital which 
 Great Britain made in order to supply our 
 armies. Russia paid only with the rivers of 
 blood of her sons who died in battle. Russia 
 was always asking. Britain was giving. This 
 condition of affairs undoubtedly had an over- 
 whelming influence upon the psychology of 
 British public opinion and of the Government. 
 During the whole time of my tenure of office in 
 Ivondon I cannot recall a case of Great Britain 
 requesting us to do her a reciprocal service of 
 a material order. As to our sacrifices in blood, 
 . . . was anybody capable of counting them 
 in pounds sterling ? The same relationship, of 
 course, existed to a considerable degree between 
 Great Britain and her other Allies France, 
 Italy and Belgium. The aid that was being 
 given to Italy and Belgium at that time, and 
 perhaps even till the end of the War, was com- 
 paratively insignificant. As regards France, 
 there can be no doubt that in Great Britain it 
 was taken for granted that the interests of 
 both countries were identical. In other words, 
 everyone understood that, should France be 
 overpowered, it would mean defeat for Britain. 
 In the beginning of the war a few short-sighted
 
 THE RUSSIAN STEAM -ROLLER 61 
 
 journalists had fostered the idea of the Russian 
 " steam-roller." It was believed that Russia 
 would overwhelm Germany by the sheer weight 
 of her numbers. When the Russo-Japanese 
 War started the old Russian saying : " Shap- 
 kami Zakidaiem " (we shall cover them with 
 our caps) was prevalent. The Russian defeat 
 in that war was still remembered in 1914, and 
 the bombastic boast of the above-quoted saying 
 was no longer made when Russia faced her 
 traditional enemy Germany. The funda- 
 mental error which was, in my opinion, the 
 primary cause of the disruption of the Russian 
 Army, namely the simultaneous mobilisation 
 of eighteen million men, was thus accepted by 
 our Allies as the surest guarantee of success. 
 Disillusionment and irritation consequently 
 increased as it became apparent that the 
 "steam- roller," upon reaching Tannenberg and 
 the Carpathian mountains, was rolling back, 
 destroying everything in its train. 
 
 The British psychology was this : " We are 
 the creditors and the benefactors. Russia is 
 the debtor and the petitioner." As I have 
 already said, the British Government were very 
 generous in meeting our demands. However, 
 even in the course of the first two years of war,
 
 62 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 certain misgivings were expressed in regard to 
 the manner in which Russia made use of the 
 British treasure. 
 
 I/)rd Milner's mission had naturally another, 
 a more complicated political task to perform. 
 It had to ascertain how much truth there was 
 in the rumours already current in lyondon of 
 an impending revolution in Russia. 
 
 Testimonies on that score of those concerned 
 differ widely. Some assert that I^ord Milner 
 and the British military and civil officials who 
 accompanied him received definite information 
 from responsible leaders to the effect that a 
 revolution was inevitable. They said that the 
 Imperial Government had lost its authority 
 and that Protopopoff's regime could no longer 
 be tolerated as it threatened the army and 
 the rear with complete disruption. The Govern- 
 ment, on the other hand, is stated to have 
 assured the British mission that every revolu- 
 tionary attempt would be promptly suppressed. 
 Neither L,ord Milner nor any of his immediate 
 associates had sufficient knowledge of the 
 history of Russia's internal politics for the last 
 fifteen years and of the events which prepared 
 the ground for the revolution. It is therefore 
 only too natural that, so far as one may judge
 
 SIR GEORGE BUCHANAN 63 
 
 from subsequent events, I/>rd Milner believed 
 what he had heard from Government officials. 
 In the course of my first interview with the 
 Prime Minister after the revolution, Mr. I,loyd 
 George stated emphatically : " Lord Milner 
 assured the British Cabinet that there would be 
 no revolution in Russia during the war." 
 
 vSir George Buchanan, however, took another 
 view and continued to send earnest warnings 
 to his Government and to report that the 
 situation in Petrograd was daily growing more 
 acute. The Ambassador was exceptionally 
 well informed as he had personal relations, not 
 merely in the Court and bureaucratic circles, 
 but in the circles of the Duma as well. The 
 leaders of the Opposition expressed them- 
 selves with great frankness in conversation 
 with the British Ambassador. Moreover, the 
 headlong rush towards the abyss was obvious 
 to everyone and even the highest aristocratic 
 circles of Petrograd society felt the approach 
 of the catastrophe. Of all the memoirs written 
 by members of that society regarding the 
 weeks preceding the Revolution, the most 
 interesting are the memoirs of Princess Julia 
 Cantacuzene. A granddaughter of President 
 Grant, she married a Russian Guards officer
 
 64 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 and lived for many years in Petrograd, where 
 she moved in the highest circles of society. 
 The first chapters of this lively and brilliant 
 book, Revolutionary Days, Recollections of Ro- 
 manoffs and Bolsheviki, deal with the period 
 extending from the Autumn of 1916 to March, 
 1917. The perusal of these chapters makes 
 it quite clear that everyone, including even 
 the intimate circle of the Imperial family, 
 realised that : " This cannot go on." At 
 this moment, according to Princess Cantacu- 
 zene, the British Ambassador approached 
 Emperor Nicholas II and endeavoured to 
 persuade him to cast off the shackles of Proto- 
 popoff and to call a responsible ministry. 
 The Ambassador did this at his own risk. 
 He was apparently given to understand that, 
 should the Russian Government demand his 
 recall, such a request would be complied with. 
 So anxious, however, was the Ambassador to 
 do everything in his power in order to remove 
 the conditions which in his own opinion 
 imperilled the Russian army and the Russian 
 State, that he took the risk. It is, of course, 
 the diplomatic tradition that a representative 
 of a foreign country does not interfere with 
 the internal affairs of the country to which he
 
 GROWING ANXIETY 65 
 
 is accredited (provided that country does not 
 happen to be situated in the Balkans or in 
 Asia). Presumably, Sir George Buchanan on 
 this occasion disregarded the stern tradition. 
 The result, however, was pitiful. Nicholas II 
 listened attentively and quite courteously. 
 He thanked the Ambassador and changed the 
 conversation. 
 
 Towards the middle of February, I began 
 to notice the growing anxiety of British states- 
 men. It was quite obvious that the Russian 
 Government, whose most influential minister 
 was a political turncoat and a crazy deserter 
 from the Liberal ranks of the Duma, could com- 
 mand neither credit nor respect. Stories were 
 circulated in British society of the isolation 
 of the Imperial family, of the revolutionary 
 spirit which had penetrated even into the 
 circles of the Guards' officers. Reports from 
 Petrograd published in the London Press 
 painted the situation in the darkest possible 
 colours. Even the Conservative papers in 
 Condon were sounding the alarm. Leading 
 articles appeared severely condemning the 
 Russian Government and uttering grave warn- 
 ings. I remember telegraphing to the Russian 
 Foreign Office in extenso a leading article from
 
 66 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 The Morning Post which was exceptionally 
 brilliant and showed a remarkable insight into 
 the actual condition of Russia. In the course 
 of one of my conversations with Mr. Balfour, 
 he expressed very grave misgivings and told 
 me that the Government was very much 
 alarmed at Sir George Buchanan's reports. I 
 telegraphed to the Russian Foreign Minister, 
 adding that I had deemed it necessary to 
 assure Mr. Balfour that " the Emperor was 
 firmly determined to continue the War till 
 the end in spite of all the waverings of internal 
 politics." On the margin of this telegram 
 the above-quoted words were marked by the 
 Emperor, who wrote, " Of course." 
 
 Meanwhile the position of the Russian 
 Representative in London was becoming em- 
 barrassing. Lord Hardinge, 1 who knew me 
 personally better than did Mr. Balfour, was 
 more outspoken. Remaining within the limits 
 of " diplomatic tradition," he more than once 
 deplored the course of events in Russia, and 
 notes of bitterness and irritation sounded 
 more and more frequently in his discourse. 
 The necessity of openly and resolutely in- 
 forming the Russian Government of the atti- 
 
 'The Permanent Umler-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
 
 CONDITION OF THE WAR 67 
 
 tude of British Government circles and 
 of public opinion was daily becoming more 
 imperative. 
 
 On the Western Front there was no change 
 in the situation. The French and British 
 troops were courageously bearing the dis- 
 comforts and trials of the frozen trenches. 
 What was generally expected to be the 
 " agony " of Verdun ended in a victory for the 
 French. In Mesopotamia matters were im- 
 proving ; Kut was recaptured and a rapid 
 advance was started on Bagdad. At the same 
 time Germany announced her intention to 
 conduct a merciless submarine war. The lists 
 of merchant ships sunk by submarines were 
 lengthening daily. America was still " too 
 proud to fight." The consciousness deepened 
 in Great Britain of the fact that this war was 
 a question of life and death. The population 
 of Great Britain was as yet suffering no 
 privation, but the control of foodstuffs was 
 growing stricter every day. Men over forty 
 years of age were already being conscripted. 
 The atmosphere was, so to speak, " calm but 
 clouded." In the communiques from the 
 Western Front there was nothing to attract 
 the attention of public opinion in Britain.
 
 68 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 Reports of internal trouble in Russia were 
 therefore taken with equanimity and the 
 anxiety was limited to Government circles. 
 The first newspaper telegrams regarding dis- 
 turbances in Petrograd gave, however, the 
 signal for a sudden revival of intense interest 
 in Russian affairs. In Government circles as 
 well as in the Press great nervousness prevailed.
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 IN the course of two and a half years of the 
 great World War European nations had grown 
 accustomed to extra editions of evening papers 
 and to sensational news which spread over 
 capitals and continents in a few minutes. 
 Of all the sensations I witnessed in Condon, 
 none was more vivid, none caught the breath 
 of the public to such an extent as the news 
 of the sinking of the cruiser carrying L,ord 
 Kitchener to Russia and of the tragic death 
 of the British national hero. There can be 
 no doubt that in those days no other man in 
 Great Britain enjoyed a prestige so high and 
 universal as the late Field-Marshal. On the 
 one hand, the sensation was intensified by the 
 fact that very few people were aware of Lord 
 Kitchener's departure. His visit to Russia 
 was for obvious reasons shrouded in secrecy. 
 On the other hand, the news reached London 
 at mid-day, when the pulse of life in the 
 Capital beats at its quickest. The impression 
 was overwhelming ; as one walked along the 
 
 69
 
 70 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 streets one felt that the name of Lord Kitchener 
 was on everybody's lips and in everybody's 
 mind and that there was not a single person 
 who took an indifferent view of the calamity. 
 Not so with the news of the abdication of 
 Nicholas II. It came to London in the late 
 hours of the evening and was announced in 
 the papers on the next morning. It may be 
 confidently asserted that neither the writers 
 of the leading articles nor the public realised 
 on that morning that a new era had opened in 
 the history, not of Russia alone, but of man- 
 kind. The Russian Revolution is not yet 
 ended. The process of destruction, unequalled 
 in history in its cruelty and in its dimensions, 
 still continues. All sensitive Russians are 
 at present suffering moral torture which is 
 twofold : shame and sorrow on account of the 
 systematic destruction of Russian culture and 
 of the trampling of elementary rights of man- 
 hood and citizenship. Perhaps still more pain- 
 ful is the feeling of the uncertainty of the 
 immediate future and the doubt that the 
 liberators of Russia from the Bolshevik-German 
 yoke will be endowed with sufficient wisdom 
 to reconstruct Russia on the new foundations 
 of true liberty, equality, respect of the law and
 
 ABDICATION OF THE EMPEROR 71 
 
 education. On the day of the Emperor Nicholas 
 II 's abdication I doubt if anyone in Russia 
 understood the inevitability of the abyss into 
 which Russia has now fallen. Much less, of 
 course, could the London Press and public 
 opinion foresee this abyss. 
 
 The news of the abdication produced a 
 stunning effect upon the Russian colony in 
 London. It was divided into two distinctly 
 separate groups. The first consisted of Rus- 
 sian Government officials who found them- 
 selves in London for the performance of 
 duties connected with Russia's participation 
 in the War as Britain's ally. That group 
 counted about five hundred, including the 
 personnel of the Embassy and the repre- 
 sentatives of permanent Russian Government 
 offices in London, viz., military, naval, financial, 
 etc. In these circles monarchists, of course, 
 were in an overwhelming majority. Blind 
 adherents of the dynasty were, however, 
 comparatively few and were limited to the 
 military, some of whom preserved during the 
 whole troubled period feelings of ill-concealed 
 hatred for the Provisional Government and 
 secret dreams of a return to the old regime. 
 The Provisional Government, obeying a noble
 
 72 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 impulse, did not effect a cleansing and did 
 not remove such people as might still prove 
 technically useful. On the whole, they showed 
 great tolerance, perhaps even excessive toler- 
 ance. In some cases men who had sworn 
 allegiance to the Provisional Government had 
 done so with obvious insincerity. Their true 
 inclinations were, of course, no secret to the 
 British officials. This feature of the situation 
 naturally made intercourse between the two 
 Governments somewhat more complicated. 
 
 The other group of the Russian colony, more 
 numerous, consisted of emigres, political re- 
 fugees who had sought refuge in Britain from 
 the persecution of the Russian Secret Service. 
 In these circles the news of the collapse of 
 autocracy was naturally greeted with en- 
 thusiasm. The composition of the first Pro- 
 visional Government was such as to inspire 
 full confidence that real liberty had dawned 
 in Russia and that new methods of states- 
 manship had come into being which would 
 mean the realisation of all the longings and 
 ideals of these exiles. " The bloodless char- 
 acter of the Revolution " intensified these 
 feelings of joy. Again I repeat that in those 
 days none could imagine how speedily this
 
 POSITION OF THE EMBASSY 73 
 
 first Provisional Government would meet with 
 an inglorious end. In those days nobody took 
 care to scrutinise the meaning of the exist- 
 ence, alongside with the Provisional Govern- 
 ment, of the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' 
 Deputies. Nobody understood that from the 
 first day of the Revolution in Russia actual 
 power was in the hands of the Soviet and that 
 the Soviet was the institution from the ranks 
 of which men would emerge who would 
 destroy the entire structure of the Russian 
 State. 
 
 In the days of the Imperial regime the 
 Russian Embassy in L,ondon, as in all other 
 capitals, had in fact no connection whatsoever 
 with the colony and was completely isolated. 
 Whenever the bureaucracy, military and civil 
 officials, casual travellers and the like needed 
 the assistance of the Embassy, they applied 
 for it. It must, however, be admitted that 
 the Embassy was anything but a unifying 
 centre or a native island in foreign seas. 
 The attitude of the emigres towards the 
 Embassy was one of suspicion, hatred and 
 aloofness. The Revolution caused an imme- 
 diate and fundamental change in the position 
 of the Embassy, whose functions were greatly
 
 74 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 enlarged. By the force of events the activities 
 of the Russian representative in London as- 
 sumed an entirely different character. On 
 the one hand, he had to establish, consolidate 
 and develop relations between the new Russian 
 regime and the British Government, the Press 
 and public opinion. On the other hand, it 
 fell to his lot to endeavour to unite, reconcile 
 and, if possible, to direct Russian circles in 
 Britain. I will try to describe my efforts 
 in both directions. 
 
 It can hardly be gainsaid that the Russian 
 Revolution of March, 1917, was greeted unanim- 
 ously in Great Britain. The attitude of the 
 Radical and Liberal circles calls for no com- 
 ment. As regards the Government, the pre- 
 ceding narrative appears to me to indicate 
 sufficiently that Government circles were 
 greatly alarmed at the trend of events in 
 Russia. The Government was so afraid of 
 the weakening of Russia's military strength 
 under a Government which had lost its prestige 
 and support in the country that the first news 
 of the formation of the Provisional Government 
 was accepted with relief. An outward sign of 
 sympathy was given by the immediate recog- 
 nition of the new regime.
 
 THE FIRST DECLARATION 75 
 
 The French text of the first declaration of 
 the Provisional Government addressed to the 
 Powers of the Entente was received at the 
 Embassy in I/>ndon on a Sunday, when the 
 Foreign Office is closed to the Foreign Repre- 
 sentatives. Nevertheless, by reason of the 
 exceptional importance of this document I 
 made an attempt at seeing Mr. Balfour. My 
 luck on this occasion was equal to that which 
 I described in Chapter I, when during my 
 few hours' stay in Darjeeling Kinchinjunga 
 emerged from the clouds and showed to my 
 wondering eyes its sunlit summit. Mr. Bal- 
 four " dropped in " at about 6 p.m. I read 
 to him the declaration of the Provisional 
 Government. He took note of it without, 
 however, giving any indication as to the reply 
 which his Majesty's Government intended to 
 make. In the course of the conversation, I 
 expressed the view that it might be opportune 
 to read the declaration of the Russian Govern- 
 ment in the House of Commons on the next 
 afternoon. I felt that the attitude of the 
 British Parliament towards that act might 
 prove a strong moral asset to Russia. Mr. 
 Balfour appeared to favour the idea. Deep, 
 therefore, was my disappointment when upon
 
 76 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 reaching the Embassy I found the full text 
 of the Russian declaration in a Sunday evening 
 paper. This occurred because Mr. Miliukov, 
 during the first days of his tenure of office as 
 Foreign Minister, was unable to control the 
 workings of the Ministry, and allowed the 
 declaration to be communicated to Renter's 
 Agency. A document of such importance 
 should naturally have been communicated to 
 the Allied Governments officially before its 
 publication. The contemplated reading of 
 the document in the House of Commons had 
 thus to be cancelled. 
 
 At this point of my narrative I venture to 
 make a few short remarks, " pro domo mea." 
 My first conversation with Mr. Balfour gave 
 the key as it were to my subsequent attitude 
 towards the Russian Revolution and to the 
 comments I made upon that event in public. 
 I gave him definitely to understand that I 
 personally rejoiced at the change of regime. 
 My sympathies with the Russian Revolution 
 gave rise to extremely unfavourable comment 
 on the part of certain statesmen and even 
 more so in certain social circles. Indignation 
 was expressed at the fact that a former servant 
 of the Emperor should openly rejoice at the
 
 MY OWN POSITION 77 
 
 downfall of the old regime. I considered that 
 the men who were devoted to the old regime 
 would have acted in accordance with logic 
 and honour had they refused to serve the new 
 regime. Those, however, who like myself 
 held liberal views before the Revolution and 
 made no secret of their hope for a change in 
 the autocratic methods of the Russian Govern- 
 ment were fully entitled to be in sympathy 
 with the new regime under which they con- 
 tinued to serve Russia. However, from that 
 moment the attitude of some of my former 
 friends in I^ondon underwent a rapid change. 
 I noticed the same change in the attitude of 
 certain very high officials. An interesting 
 parallel to my position in London can be 
 found in the reports of the French Charge 
 d'Affaires in Petersburg at the Court of 
 Catherine II during the French Revolution. 
 He likewise represented first Louis XVI and 
 then the Revolutionary Government. On him, 
 as on me in I/mdon, many backs were turned. 
 The reports of this French diplomat, written 
 into a connected story, form a most interesting 
 pamphlet by a former Russian diplomat, Mr. 
 Islavine. From this moment I became also 
 an object of intense hatred on the part of
 
 78 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 all Russian reactionary and monarchist 
 circles. 
 
 A few days after the first news of the Russian 
 Revolution I met the British Prime Minister 
 for the first time. Curiously enough, the hint 
 that the Prime Minister might be interested 
 to make the acquaintance of the representative 
 of Russia, " the great Ally," came from a 
 private social source. It was all arranged on 
 the telephone. The Prime Minister's recep- 
 tion was somewhat chilly ; he obviously was 
 rather at a loss to find a suitable opening for 
 the conversation. The meeting took place in 
 the Conference Chamber at Downing Street 
 where other Russian representatives have 
 since been greeted by three Cabinet Ministers 
 at a time. We sat down and a pause ensued. 
 " Great events," said the Prime Minister, " are 
 taking place in Russia." ' With reference 
 to these events, Prime Minister, do you recol- 
 lect all the platitudes which were exchanged 
 between the Prime Ministers of Great Britain 
 and the successive Prime Ministers in Russia 
 by telegraph for the last few years ? Now is 
 a chance for you to send to the first Prime 
 Minister in the Russian Provisional Govern- 
 ment, Prince lyvov, a message which will have
 
 A DAY OF TELEGRAMS 79 
 
 an historical value and importance." The 
 Prime Minister agreed and asked me to call 
 again the next morning. At our next inter- 
 view, before showing me the draft of a telegram 
 to Prince Lvov he wished to know whether I 
 had any remarks to make. I told the Prime 
 Minister that the only request I intended to 
 make was that the telegram should emanate 
 not only from the United Kingdom, but from 
 the Empire. An Imperial Conference was 
 sitting in London, attended by representatives 
 of India, the Colonies and the Dominions. I 
 then saw from the text of the Prime Minister's 
 telegram that my request had been forestalled. 
 It only remained for me, therefore, to thank the 
 Prime Minister for the moral support he was 
 giving to Russia in the present difficult moment. 
 Mr. Lloyd George's telegram read as follows : 
 
 " It is with sentiments of the most profound 
 satisfaction that the peoples of Great Britain 
 and of the British Dominions across the seas, 
 have learned that their great Ally Russia now 
 stands with the nations which base their 
 institutions on responsible government. 
 
 " Much as we appreciate the loyal and 
 steadfast co-operation which we have received 
 from the late Emperor and the armies of Russia
 
 So THE ORDEAI, OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 during the past two and a half years, yet I 
 believe that the Revolution whereby the 
 Russian people have based their destinies on 
 the sure foundation of freedom is the greatest 
 service they have yet made to the cause for 
 which the Allied peoples have been righting 
 since August, 1914. 
 
 " It reveals the fundamental truth, that this 
 war is at bottom a struggle for popular govern- 
 ment, as well as for liberty. It shows that 
 through the war, the principle of liberty, which 
 is the only sure safeguard of Peace in the world, 
 has already won resounding victory. It is the 
 sure promise that the Prussian military auto- 
 cracy which began the war, and which is still 
 the only barrier of peace, will itself, before long, 
 be overthrown. 
 
 " Freedom is the condition of Peace, and I do 
 not doubt that, as the result of the establish- 
 ment of a stable constitutional Government 
 within their borders, the Russian people will 
 be strengthened in their resolve to prosecute 
 this war, until the last stronghold of tyranny 
 on the Continent of Europe is destroyed, and 
 the free peoples of all lands can unite to secure 
 for themselves and their children the blessings 
 of Fraternity and Peace/'
 
 IRRITATING BLUNDERS 81 
 
 On the next day, or soon afterwards, this 
 telegram appeared in the London Press. Al- 
 though I had cabled to Miliukov a detailed 
 account of my interviews with the Prime 
 Minister and had asked him to telegraph to me 
 the text of the reply of the Provisional Govern- 
 ment, no such reply ever reached me or was 
 communicated to the Press. I therefore do not 
 know whether Prince Lvov ever responded to 
 the greeting he had received from Mr. Lloyd 
 George. The Provisional Government com- 
 mitted many more such blunders, and some 
 of them were even more important. This, of 
 course, irritated the British Government, and 
 more particularly those who were anxious to 
 see diplomatic etiquette preserved. 
 
 The Prime Minister was undoubtedly sincere 
 when he welcomed the advent of the new order 
 in Russia. I am inclined to think that the 
 subsequent antipathy for Russia, which is 
 apparent from many of his public utterances, 
 such, for example, as the " Mansion House " 
 speech on the eve of the Armistice, is partly 
 due to his disappointment in the capacity 
 of those who took the power out of the 
 hands of the Emperor, to eradicate the errors 
 of the old regime and to hasten the victory
 
 82 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 of Western democracies over the German 
 coalition. From the very beginning, how- 
 ever, differences of opinion within Mr. Lloyd 
 George's Ministry became noticeable. These 
 differences of opinion grew more acute as 
 the months went by, and unnecessarily 
 complicated the relations between Great 
 Britain and Russia. The responsible heads 
 of the British Foreign Office adopted at the 
 outset of the new order in Russia a sceptical 
 attitude. They seemed convinced that internal 
 convulsions would inevitably result in the 
 weakening of Russia as a military power. 
 The criterion they applied to the Provisional 
 Government was therefore reduced to the 
 question : "To what extent would it prove 
 capable of continuing the war ? " Only to 
 that extent did they seem prepared to forgive 
 the destruction of those foundations of the 
 Russian State with which British bureaucracy 
 sympathised. This attitude was intensified as 
 the Provisional Government gradually proved 
 incapable of resisting the pressure of the Soviet 
 and of the extreme parties. 
 
 The British Foreign Office disapproved of my 
 personal attitude towards the Russian Revolu- 
 tion. The British Ambassador in Petrograd
 
 MR. SAZONOV 83 
 
 was therefore almost immediately informed 
 that His Majesty's Government expected a 
 new Russian Ambassador to be appointed 
 to I<ondon. Mr. Sazonov was appointed by 
 the first Provisional Government, and this 
 appointment was effusively welcomed by 
 the Foreign Office. A few weeks went 
 by ; Mr. Sazonov did not arrive. Having 
 been appointed Minister to Switzerland, I 
 naturally was personally interested in the 
 matter of Sazonov's arrival. I sent several 
 enquiries to the Russian Foreign Office, but 
 received evasive replies. I once asked I/ord 
 Hardinge whether he knew anything about 
 the approximate date of the new Ambassador's 
 departure. L,ord Hardinge replied that Sazonov 
 was coming as soon as a cruiser would be avail- 
 able for carrying him across the North Sea, as 
 he was fearful of the crossing. Upon leaving 
 lyord Hardinge's room I met, in the corridor of 
 the Foreign Office, the foreign editor of a 
 leading L,ondon newspaper. "Well," he said, 
 "is Sazonov coming?' 1 "Apparently very 
 soon." ' Tell me," was the next question, 
 " how can a diplomat of the old regime and of 
 the old school, a typical representative of the 
 late Russian Imperialism, who owes his reputa-
 
 8 4 
 
 tion to the Constantinople Agreement, re- 
 present in lyondon the Russian Revolutionary 
 democracy ? " "If the Russian Revolutionary 
 democracy and its leaders have seen fit to 
 appoint Sazonov as their representative in 
 London, I presume that they trust him and 
 that he is therefore in a position to undertake 
 the task of representing a Revolutionary 
 democracy. Whatever you or I may think 
 of this topsy-turvydom is a matter of our 
 private opinion." As is now known, Sazonov 
 was stopped at the railway station in Petro- 
 grad, as his departure coincided with Miliukov's 
 resignation. The Kerensky Government evi- 
 dently were of the opinion that the appoint- 
 ment was unsuitable. Personally, I doubted 
 from the very beginning if Sazonov would ever 
 come to London. As is evident from the above- 
 quoted remarks of the foreign editor of one of 
 the Condon papers, it was realised that Sazonov 
 was the spokesman of Russian Imperialism. 
 
 Meanwhile, very soon after the first Revolu- 
 tion, Kerensky made a statement, which was 
 widely commented on, to the effect that 
 Russia would not claim Constantinople, and a 
 tendency began to manifest itself in Russia 
 towards the renunciation of " Imperialistic
 
 MR. HENDERSON 85 
 
 acquisition." The cancellation of Sazonov's 
 appointment was therefore by no means sur- 
 prising. 
 
 Approximately at this time, Mr. Arthur 
 Henderson, M.P., then member of the War 
 Cabinet, went to Petrograd. The Labour 
 Leader has since publicly given an account of 
 his journey to Russia and of his resignation 
 from the Cabinet in connection with the Stock- 
 holm incident. I will endeavour to show in 
 the chapter devoted to the Stockholm Confer- 
 ence that in so far as Mr. Henderson's resignation 
 was concerned, there is documentary evidence 
 that it was not quite as voluntary as Mr. 
 Henderson asserted. With regard, however, to 
 his journey to Russia, Mr. Henderson is un- 
 doubtedly correct. He says that the Prime 
 Minister gave him to understand that he might 
 supersede Sir George Buchanan as British 
 Ambassador in Petrograd, if upon his arrival he 
 came to the conclusion that such a change 
 would be desirable. 
 
 In time to come a truthful Russian politician 
 or statesman, having been in close contact 
 with the Provisional Government in the Spring 
 of 1917, will undoubtedly impart to the 
 world the true story of Mr. Henderson's
 
 86 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 activities in Russia, of his relations with the 
 Provisional Government and the Soviet 
 of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. The 
 Russian Embassy in London took but a purely 
 formal part in this unsuccessful and useless 
 mission. Upon Mr. Henderson's return to 
 London, I was instructed to transmit to the 
 British Foreign Office a telegram conveying, in 
 purely conventional terms, the gratitude of the 
 Provisional Government for " the valuable 
 assistance " rendered by Mr. Henderson in the 
 cause of promoting friendship and understand- 
 ing between the democracies of Great Britain 
 and Russia. In reality, Mr. Henderson, having 
 no knowledge of the Russian language, of the 
 history, the customs, the political and social 
 structure of Russia, found himself a deaf and 
 dumb witness of a Revolutionary movement 
 which he failed to understand, and his impres- 
 sions were as erroneous as they were superficial. 
 Mr. Henderson, however, had the wisdom to 
 realise, and the courage to admit that he would 
 have been utterly incapable of replacing Sir 
 George Buchanan. Although the Secretary 
 of State for Foreign Affairs and his immediate 
 assistants appear to have been unaware at the 
 time of the instructions which Mr. Henderson
 
 MR. HENDERSON IN RUSSIA 87 
 
 carried to Petrograd, their attitude towards 
 Mr. Henderson's mission was not one of whole- 
 hearted approval. This mission helped Govern- 
 ment departments to realise that owing to the 
 Revolution a certain departure must be made, 
 in the relations with Russia, from the accepted 
 routine of international traditions. Any such 
 departure from traditions was, of course, ab- 
 horrent. Practical results of Mr. Henderson's 
 visit were nil. In expressing the view that 
 this visit was inopportune, I do not wish to 
 imply that the Prime Minister's fundamental 
 idea was wrong. Alongside with the official 
 representative, the Ambassador who dealt 
 with the Ministers in the Provisional Govern- 
 ment, Mr. I^loyd George's idea was that 
 personal contact should be established with 
 the leaders of the Russian Revolutionary 
 movement who stood outside the Government. 
 Such contact would give an opportunity of gain- 
 ing a better understanding of the actual moods 
 and wishes of the popular masses, and of their 
 leaders. The idea was good, but the choice was 
 not the best that could have been made. 
 
 As I have already remarked, the Provisional 
 Government in the first few weeks was loth to 
 effect drastic changes in the personnel of the
 
 88 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 Russian representation abroad. It seems to 
 me that if, instead of making the queer appoint- 
 ment of Mr. Sazonov, the Provisional Govern- 
 ment had sent to the Allied capitals such 
 "special" Ambassadors as in Henderson and 
 Albert Thomas were sent to Russia, select- 
 ing such prominent representatives of the 
 Russian Revolutionary movement as Plehanov, 
 Tchaikovsky or Savinkov the task of pro- 
 moting a general understanding between 
 Russia, Britain and France would have been 
 rendered considerably easier. The Press and 
 public opinion would certainly have treated 
 the activities and the declarations of such 
 leaders with greater respect, and their public 
 utterances would have carried greater weight 
 than the efforts in the same direction which 
 were made by diplomats who had preserved 
 their posts after the fall of the old regime. 
 
 Unfortunately, the Russian Government did 
 not avail itself of this opportunity of influen- 
 cing public opinion in the Allied countries. 
 During the first months after the Revolution, 
 the only person who visited Europe with a 
 special mandate from the Provisional Govern- 
 ment, was the Commissary Svatikov. His 
 journey had no political significance. The pen
 
 MR. SVATIKOV 89 
 
 of Gogol would alone be capable of adequately 
 describing the adventures in I/ondon of this 
 modern Khlestakov. 1 I will therefore devote 
 but a few lines to this buffoonery. 
 
 Mr. Svatikov had apparently received in- 
 structions to investigate the activities of the 
 foreign sections of the Old Russian " Okhrana," 
 (Secret Service) and more particularly of the 
 Paris branch ; also the mutual relationship 
 between these secret police stations in foreign 
 lands and the Russian Diplomatic and Consular 
 institutions. During the thirteen years of 
 Count Benckendorffs Ambassadorship, the 
 Embassy had had nothing whatsoever to do 
 with the " Okhrana." When I succeeded the 
 Ambassador I was unaware even of the presence 
 in lyondon of agents of that subterranean in- 
 stitution. Naturally, I took it for granted that 
 the " Revisor from Petrograd " would not 
 remain in L,ondon for any length of time and 
 that conversations with him would not drag. 
 Alas ! I was wrong. Mr. Svatikov had already 
 succeeded in reducing the Russian Diplomatic 
 institutions in Scandinavia to a state of abject 
 panic. He had assumed the tone of a " Super- 
 
 1 A character in Gogol's famous comedy, " Revisor " (Govern- 
 ment Inspector).
 
 90 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 Reviser," before whom all Russian officials, 
 big and small, were to tremble. The dignitary 
 was met at the station in London by one of the 
 Secretaries of the Embassy. He called at the 
 Embassy at about 2 p.m., at lunch time. Find- 
 ing only an English servant and no one else, the 
 great man was very angry. At 6 o'clock I 
 visited him in a boarding-house somewhere in 
 the neighbourhood of Russell Square. He was 
 polite but majestic. His outward appearance 
 was exceedingly comical, and the fun was 
 enhanced by the airs he was trying to put on. 
 He told me that he had come to make an 
 investigation of the Embassy and of other 
 institutions. He expressed the desire to have 
 interviews with Cabinet ministers, and with the 
 Prime Minister himself. Subsequent discus- 
 sions, however, elicited that his main purpose 
 was to establish the fact which to him seemed 
 beyond doubt, of the former connection be- 
 tween the Embassy and the " Okhrana." 
 After I had categorically stated to him that 
 there was not a word of truth in these sugges- 
 tions, he directed all his arrows against the 
 Consul-general, Baron Heyking. Baron Hey- 
 king was dismissed from the Service by the 
 Provisional Government on the strength of this
 
 MR. SVATIKOV 91 
 
 super-spy's report in a manner which certainly 
 was not to their credit. 
 
 Mr. Svatikov left us alone. Of course, he 
 had no interviews with any Cabinet Ministers. 
 Owing to the desire on the part of one or two 
 Russian Government officials in London to 
 gain the sympathies of the " Re visor," he was 
 invited to attend the inauguration meeting of 
 the Anglo-Russian Society " Bratstvo." This 
 meeting took place at Westminster and was 
 presided over by Lord Robert Cecil. Before I 
 had time to intervene, it was arranged that Mr. 
 Svatikov should address the gathering. It was 
 something terrible. With a most appalling 
 accent, he delivered in what he believed to be 
 the English language a speech about Russian 
 " liberty " which was the height of triviality. 
 Our British friends smiled sarcastically, whilst 
 all Russians, with a sense of the grotesque, 
 wished they could have sunk through the floor. 
 
 After a comparatively short stay in London, 
 during which he received van loads of reports 
 and denunciations from zealous informants on 
 the activities of the Russian Embassy and 
 Consulate-General, Mr. Svatikov left for Paris. 
 There, he was apparently taken very seriously, 
 exactly like Ivan Alexandrovitch Khlestakov.
 
 92 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 Upon his arrival in Rome he seems to have put 
 on even greater airs and went so far as to en- 
 deavour to dismiss officials. Meanwhile, the 
 tale of his eccentricities reached Petrograd. It 
 apparently dawned upon the Government that 
 all this farce was affecting the prestige of the 
 Provisional Government. Kerensky sent tele- 
 grams to London and Paris, instructing the 
 Embassies to declare to Svatikov that his 
 plenary powers were cancelled and that he 
 should return to Russia forthwith. Our repre- 
 sentative in Paris failed to convey this message 
 to the gentleman, with whom, as he put it, 
 " friendly relations had been established." 
 The pill was therefore offered to Mr. Svatikov 
 by one of the Secretaries of the Russian Em- 
 bassy in London. Mr. Svatikov was very sub- 
 dued. At the moment of his departure he 
 requested the secretary of the Embassy who 
 was seeing him off, to transmit to me his en- 
 treaty that I should intervene in favour of 
 Comrade Chicherin, 1 who had already at that 
 time become an inmate of Brixton Prison. 
 The Russian Provisional Government cannot 
 be severely blamed for sending abroad this 
 grotesque individual. The Ministers could not 
 
 1 The now famous Foreign Secretary hi the Soviet Government.
 
 MR. SVATIKOV 93 
 
 estimate the results of such a special mission. 
 vSubordinates, on the other hand, including, of 
 course, the personnel of the Russian Foreign 
 Office, did not dare to " hold any views." As 
 I have already said, Svatikov's mission had 
 no political importance. Nevertheless, it un- 
 doubtedly caused great harm. It gave rise to 
 a series of mendacious denunciations and 
 brought to light in other capitals to a greater 
 extent than in L,ondon the servile terror of the 
 Russian bureaucracy. Certain people literally 
 crawled before the crow whom they had them- 
 selves invested with peacock's feathers.
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 ONE of the first measures which engaged the 
 attention of the Provisional Government was 
 the repatriation of all Russian citizens who 
 had sought refuge abroad from the persecu- 
 tions of the old regime. These emigres' circles, 
 as I have already mentioned, held aloof from 
 the Embassy. Following upon official com- 
 munications regarding the formation of the 
 Provisional Government and the events which 
 had led to its coming into power, as well as 
 declarations to the Foreign Powers, the first 
 instructions I received from the Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs dealt with the subject of 
 repatriation. The Russian Charge d' Affaires 
 was requested to " take all necessary steps in 
 order to secure the return to Russia of all 
 Russians who desire to do so." To this end the 
 Charge d' Affaires was instructed to form an 
 " Emigres' Committee " whose function would 
 be to assist the Embassy in the work of re- 
 patriation. Owing to the attitude of the 
 emigres, the task imposed upon the Embassy 
 
 94
 
 REPATRIATION 95 
 
 by Mr. Miliukov's instructions was seemingly 
 a difficult one. The primary difficulty, how- 
 ever, proved not quite as insuperable as might 
 have been expected, as the Emigres took the 
 initiative in approaching the Embassy. On 
 the eve of the receipt of the above-mentioned 
 telegram, two representatives of the tmigrts, 
 Chicherin and Krougliakov, visited me. As a 
 result of our conversation it was decided to 
 form the Emigres Committee. Miliukov's idea 
 had thus been forestalled. 
 
 It very soon became apparent that the task 
 of repatriating Russian citizens was akin to 
 the dragging not merely of a camel, but of 
 whole caravans through a needle's eye. In the 
 United Kingdom alone there were thousands 
 of emigres. London, moreover, became the 
 centre to which Russians flocked from all 
 continental countries cut off from Russia by 
 enemy lands. At the same time, the spring 
 of 1917 marked the beginning of the " spurlos 
 versenkt " policy of Germany. In these cir- 
 cumstances it was quite obvious that the 
 British Government was compelled to apply 
 the strictest possible economy and circum- 
 spection in allotting passenger accommoda- 
 tion in the ships, escorted by destroyers,
 
 g6 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 which maintained communications between 
 the Scandinavian countries and Great Britain. 
 Technical difficulties were enhanced by the 
 necessity of strictly controlling the passports 
 of would-be travellers. Russian emigres 
 abroad, as often as not, were in possession of 
 numerous documents from which it was more 
 than difficult to derive definite knowledge of 
 their identity. Thus a most distinguished 
 Russian emigre, the afterwards illustrious lyit- 
 vinov, went under some four or five names. 
 That was the natural result of what was called 
 in Russia in the pre-revolutionary days " il- 
 legal " existence. The solution of technical 
 difficulties was rendered possible owing to the 
 inexhaustible, prodigious kindness, forbear- 
 ance and generosity of the British authorities 
 directly concerned the Admiralty and the 
 Home Office. To the former, in particular, 
 the Russian Embassy owes in this matter, as 
 in many matters of greater importance, a debt 
 of gratitude the extent of which cannot be 
 measured. At that time the Government as 
 a whole was trying to assist Russia. The 
 Admiralty, as well as the War Office, con- 
 tinued to show courtesy and to render valuable 
 support for many months after other less
 
 COMRADE CHICHERIN 97 
 
 sympathetic Departments had adopted a dif- 
 ferent attitude. 
 
 One of the difficulties was that the Ad- 
 miralty quite naturally refused to allow women 
 to cross the North Sea in British ships. Mean- 
 while, scores of Russian women, most of them 
 from Whitechapel, noisily clamoured (God 
 knows they can make a noise) for passages. 
 Exceptions were made very reluctantly by 
 the British authorities, and little by little the 
 noisiest and most insistent female population 
 was shipped across the North Sea. 
 
 At the same time, there soon arose a neces- 
 sity of safeguarding Russia from the influx 
 of the Bolshevik element. In those days they 
 called themselves " defeatists." Of this ele- 
 ment Chicherin was the arrogant and truculent 
 spokesman. 
 
 The repatriation of political refugees to 
 Russia may be, without exaggeration, con- 
 sidered one of the most difficult tasks the 
 Embassy had to undertake after the 
 Revolution. 
 
 Soon after the Revolution, I was given the 
 
 opportunity of coming into personal contact 
 
 with the leaders of the Russian revolutionary 
 
 movement who afterwards played an im- 
 
 G
 
 98 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 portant part in Russia. With a few excep- 
 tions, they all appealed to the Embassy for 
 assistance. A notable exception was Prince 
 Kropotkin, who was evidently unable to master 
 the deep-rooted aversion for Russian officialdom 
 which had been ingrained in him for decades. 
 
 Savinkov, Avxentiev and about fourteen 
 other prominent men obtained special facilities. 
 One of the members of that party, Deitch, 
 came to see me and pleaded for his wife to be 
 permitted to cross in the same ship. " Tell 
 me," said Deitch, " are you the son of D. N. 
 Nabokoff, who was Minister of Justice in 
 1877-1879 ? " I replied in the affirmative. 
 " Well," he said, " your father who, by the 
 way, was one of the most broadminded men 
 of that period questioned me in person. I 
 was exiled to Siberia. For over forty years 
 I have been in the revolutionary movement. 
 Four times I went to Russia ' illegally,' was 
 arrested and escaped again. I am glad that in 
 returning to Russia, for the first time after 
 forty-two years' exile, as a free citizen, I am 
 assisted by the son of the Nabokoff who saved 
 me from the scaffold." I shall never forget 
 that interview and the impression it produced 
 upon me.
 
 VICTOR TCHERNOV 99 
 
 Savinkov and Avxentiev visited the Em- 
 bassy for a few minutes, as they were in a 
 desperate hurry. I thus missed the oppor- 
 tunity of having a long talk with them. The 
 departure of that group of " notable " emigres 
 coincided with the presence in I/mdon of the 
 notorious Victor Tchernov. l All accommoda- 
 tion in the first outgoing steamer had already 
 been allotted. One day, as I was sitting in 
 my office, a grey-haired, sulky, repulsive 
 individual was introduced into the room. He 
 started to protest in very violent terms against 
 his retention in lyondon and insisted upon 
 having a seat in the next boat. " Unfortun- 
 ately, all seats are taken," said I. "I don't 
 care," said Tchernov. " For me, a seat must 
 be found. My name is Tchernov." The con- 
 trast between the arrogance of this detestable 
 " defeatist " and the unassuming, dignified 
 attitude of Deitch was so striking that I could 
 not fail to enjoy informing Tchernov that 
 " in spite of his name being Tchernov, he 
 would have to wait for the next boat." He 
 was enraged to learn that Savinkov and others 
 were leaving the next day. He waited a week. 
 
 By means of daily intercourse with the 
 
 1 The President of the Constituent Assembly of 1918.
 
 ioo THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 " Emigres Committee " the Embassy suc- 
 ceeded in introducing a system of some sort 
 into the task of repatriation. This intercourse 
 was rendered quite friendly by the tactful and 
 helpful demeanour of some of the members of 
 the Committee, Mr. Krougliakov, Dr. Gav- 
 ronsky and the veteran Mr. Zundelevitch. 
 Occasionally friction was caused by Chicherin, 
 who loathed the staff of the Embassy and was 
 in the habit of flooding it with lengthy epistles 
 apropos of nothing. The Embassy was also in 
 constant touch with the Emigres Committees in 
 Paris, Rome and Berne. These Committees 
 were endeavouring to disgorge as many people 
 as possible by sending them to London, and to 
 thrust upon the Embassy the burden of re- 
 patriating them as well as keeping them whilst 
 in London. We argued that London was 
 already filled to overflowing, that we had no 
 adequate funds. The answer was that if 
 Britain did not help, the emigres would have 
 no other alternative than to follow Lenin's 
 example and return to Russia via Germany. 
 In spite of the fact that the Emigres Com- 
 mittee in London had assumed the r61e of 
 intermediary between the emigres and the 
 Embassy, the appearance of parties of fifteen
 
 THE MIGRS COMMITTEE 101 
 
 to twenty angry and extremely noisy emigres 
 of the " southern " type was a frequent occur- 
 rence. Arguments were of no avail. These 
 gentry took it for granted that the " revolu- 
 tionary Government of Russia " was in honour 
 bound to take care of them, feed and clothe 
 them, and pay for their passage, and that 
 the representative of the Revolutionary Gov- 
 ernment had no right to invoke difficulties of 
 transport. 
 
 Technical difficulties, however, were not 
 insoluble. The complications which soon arose 
 and which made the dealings with the Com- 
 mittee a matter of constant concern and 
 worry were purely political. It soon became 
 apparent that the Bolshevik section in the 
 Emigres Committee was getting the upper 
 hand, and that Chicherin, lyitvinov and 
 others were straining every nerve in order 
 that as many " defeatists " as possible be 
 given the opportunity of slipping in and 
 getting to Russia. Also, the Embassy had 
 every reason to believe that the extensive 
 funds allotted by the Provisional Government 
 to the Emigres Committee and which we 
 were not in a position to control were being 
 recklessly squandered and unevenly distri-
 
 102 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 buted . . . according to Chicherin's personal 
 inclination. 
 
 As is well known, the Provisional Govern- 
 ment was unable, at the very beginning, to 
 withstand the pressure of the Soviet in the 
 matter of repatriating all Russian refugees 
 irrespective of political parties. Not that 
 some of the Ministers did not understand the 
 terrible blunder they committed in requesting 
 the release of such men as Trotsky-Bronstein. 
 They knew, but they could not help it. I am 
 unaware of the exact circumstances in which 
 lyenin was allowed to come to Petrograd from 
 Germany. This much is certain, that although 
 the British Government could not, at the 
 time, foresee the part L,enin played and is still 
 playing, the fact that the Provisional Govern- 
 ment allowed him to cross the Russo-German 
 border and to live in Petrograd unmolested 
 contributed more to the loss of prestige in 
 lyondon of the Russian Government than any 
 other of their errors. 
 
 Matters soon reached such a critical stage 
 that I felt compelled to address the following 
 warning to the Russian Government. " Some- 
 thing must be done to stop the influx of Bol- 
 sheviks into Russia. If you will continue to
 
 GAVRONSKY AND CHICHERIN 103 
 
 allow this immigration without any discrimina- 
 tion whatsoever, you will cut the branch upon 
 which you are sitting." Such was the trend of 
 my argument. The Russian Foreign Office 
 seemed to agree, but nothing happened. The 
 Almighty Soviet was watching, and Chicherin, 
 from lyondon, was indulging in his graphomania 
 and sending innumerable messages to Messrs. 
 Tchkeidze, Tzeretelli, Skobelev, to Vera Figner, 
 in a word, to the " influential " masters of the 
 subdued Kerenski Ministry. At this moment, 
 a split occurred in the Committee itself. 
 Dr. Gavronsky saw the danger of this mass 
 penetration of Bolsheviks into Russia and had 
 the courage to raise his voice in the Com- 
 mittee against Chicherin. He was compelled 
 to resign from the Committee, and shortly 
 afterwards went to Russia in order to give full 
 explanations to the Ministry. He returned 
 several weeks later as Commissioner for Emigra- 
 tion, but did not have the opportunity of 
 exercising these functions for any considerable 
 length of time, as the Bolshevik revolution 
 took place almost immediately upon his return. 
 Chicherin, in his innumerable letters and in 
 conversation, adopted a very arrogant tone. 
 He insisted upon the Embassy sending in
 
 104 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 cypher his messages to the members of the 
 Soviet regarding not only matters of repatria- 
 tion, but also matters purely political. The 
 struggle against this interference on the part 
 of avowed enemies of the Entente and of Great 
 Britain with political matters was indeed a 
 hard one. The growing predominance of the 
 Soviet over the Government in Petrograd was 
 reflected in London in the ever-increasing 
 arrogance of the extremists. At times, the 
 position was truly intolerable. 
 
 The British Government was fully aware 
 of this feature of the situation and of the 
 activities of the Bolsheviks. As these ten- 
 dencies, inimical to the Entente, became more 
 apparent, the Government became correspond- 
 ingly cautious in granting permission for the 
 repatriation of Russian emigres. This, natur- 
 ally, aggravated the trouble the Embassy was 
 already having with Chicherin and his friends. 
 Finally, some time in August or in September 
 (I do not remember the exact date) Chicherin 
 was arrested and lodged in Brixton prison. 
 When warning of the impending arrest was 
 given, a deputation consisting of three members 
 of the Committee (one of them, if I remember 
 correctly, was Litvinov-Finkelstein) visited
 
 CHICHERIN'S ARREST 105 
 
 the Embassy and asked me to demand that 
 Chicherin be left in peace. I tried to explain 
 that the British Government had reasons for 
 Chicherin's arrest which I was neither capable 
 nor desirous of contesting, and that the most 
 I could promise was a postponement. The 
 deputation then pleaded for a postponement 
 of Chicherin's arrest in order that he might be 
 given the time to hand over the funds and 
 files of the Committee to his successor, 
 lyitvinov. 
 
 The Embassy held the view which was 
 freely expressed both to the British Govern- 
 ment and to the Committee that the best way 
 out of the difficulty would be to send Chicherin 
 to Russia where he would be less harmful than 
 in London. Chicherin refused offers in that 
 direction. He evidently enjoyed being a 
 martyr of " Capitalism " and may have thought 
 that the time had not yet come for him to 
 assume the important role he has played 
 since. Be that as it may, Chicherin was 
 obdurate. Replying to a letter addressed 
 to him while in Brixton prison by one of the 
 Russian officials, he said among other things : 
 " I see no difference between Alexandra Feo- 
 dorovna and Alexander Feodorovitch." The
 
 io6 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 cynical jeu de mots is a reference to the old 
 regime and to the Kerensky Government 
 which were equally unacceptable to Chicherin. 
 It was quite obvious that L,enin was the only 
 master Chicherin was prepared to serve. 
 
 Soon after Chicherin had been deported, 
 his successor, L,itvinov, was also deemed 
 " undesirable." The Embassy was notified 
 that it was the intention of the Government to 
 deport Litvinov as well. 
 
 The British Government had arrived at the 
 decision to arrest, and later to deport, Chicherin 
 only when undeniable proofs came to hand of 
 his activities, which were detrimental to the in- 
 terests of the country as well as of the Entente 
 (in so far, of course, as that graphomaniac 
 could be dangerous) . The Russian Government 
 instructed me to demand " explanations " 
 from the British Government in this matter. 
 I replied that I considered it absolutely im- 
 possible to utter a single word of protest 
 against a measure which the Government had 
 every reason to adopt, and that should I carry 
 out the instruction, the rebuke would react 
 upon the prestige of the Russian Government. 
 I/itvinov was, of course, of the same litter 
 as Chicherin. I unwittingly transmitted to
 
 UTVINOV'S APPOINTMENT 107 
 
 the British Foreign Office (by leaving it on Sir 
 Ronald Graham's desk) the letter by which 
 the Embassy was officially notified by the 
 Home Office of L,itvinov's impending depor- 
 tation as an undesirable. The document would 
 have been an amusing addition to the archives 
 of the Embassy. A berth had already been 
 secured and a visa granted to L,itvinov, when 
 the Bolshevik Government appointed him 
 " Ambassador " by wireless. The ''undesir- 
 able " was allowed to remain. 
 
 There can be no doubt that the great 
 majority of the leaders of the Bolshevik move- 
 ment reached Russia owing to the weakness 
 and folly of the Provisional Government in 
 allowing them to do so. Whether the Govern- 
 ment was in a position to resist this influx or 
 not is another matter. Had it not been for 
 the German submarines and the ensuing 
 difficulty of getting to Russia from the con- 
 tinent across the North Sea, maybe the Bol- 
 shevik revolution would have taken place 
 much sooner. On the other hand, the Germans 
 must have been well aware of the nature of 
 the passengers who crossed the North Sea 
 under escort, and the boats were seldom 
 attacked.
 
 io8 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 The Russian Government displayed great 
 generosity towards the emigres. I am not in 
 possession of the accounts of the Embassy for 
 1917 and am therefore unable to state the 
 exact amount expended on the repatriation 
 of Russian emigres. It certainly amounted to 
 several million roubles. I recollect that a 
 couple of weeks before the collapse of the 
 Provisional Government I received the sum 
 of 50,000 sterling " for the needs of the 
 emigres.'' This sum was afterwards confis- 
 cated by the British Government together 
 with all other sums belonging to the Russian 
 Government. It is to be noted that by the 
 end of October the bulk of the Russian emigres 
 had already been repatriated. This shows 
 how lavish the expenditure must have been. 
 
 [As a result of the Bolshevik invasion of 
 Riga, about four hundred Russian refugees 
 were brought to Great Britain in the spring 
 of 1919 in a British ship. Owing to the kind 
 assistance given by the French in the Crimea 
 and in Odessa also in the spring of 1919 
 hundreds of refugees were likewise brought 
 to London from the South. It would perhaps 
 be more correct to describe them as counter- 
 refugees. They were all destitute, their
 
 THE QUESTION OF REFUGEES 109 
 
 property having been destroyed or confiscated 
 by the Bolsheviks. The Embassy approached 
 the British Government with a request that 
 the above-mentioned sum of 50,000 sterling 
 be " released " in order to allow the Embassy 
 to render assistance to these Russians, who 
 were penniless and forlorn. It was suggested 
 that the Embassy should give a detailed 
 account to the British Government of the 
 manner in which this sum was to be expended, 
 and the argument was put forward that the 
 above-mentioned sum had been transferred by 
 the Government for the definite purpose of 
 assisting Russian refugees. The request was 
 refused.] 
 
 To return to my narrative. 
 
 The attitude of various Russian circles in 
 I/ondon which were not strictly bureaucratic 
 towards the members of the Embassy differed 
 according to the degree of their prejudice 
 against the representatives of the old regime. 
 The staff of the Embassy made every effort 
 to render assistance and to win the confidence 
 of all those who came into contact with the 
 Embassy. They were, however, unable to 
 dissipate the mistrust and hatred of such 
 individuals as Chicherin, whose innermost
 
 no THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 feelings undoubtedly were : " Ote-toi pour 
 que je m'y mette." Fortunately, the great 
 majority of Russians were not as obdurate 
 as this specimen of degenerate fanaticism. 
 Cases in which one had to display extreme 
 calmness and restraint in the face of insolence 
 and mania grandiosa were isolated. 
 
 Many, on the other hand, were those whose 
 attitude towards the Embassy during my 
 tenure of office was such as to afford most 
 valuable moral support, more especially during 
 the times of trial and isolation which began 
 on November 7, 1917.
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 UNDER the old regime, the Russian Foreign 
 Office never took the trouble to keep the 
 Russian representatives abroad informed of 
 the course of events and of the internal policy 
 of the Russian Government. It was taken 
 for granted that the Ambassadors, Ministers 
 and their staff read the Russian papers and 
 derived from them sufficient information to 
 enable them to form a judgment of the internal 
 condition of the country. In forming this 
 judgment, they were supposed to rely chiefly 
 upon the views expressed by the " Novoe 
 Vremia," the servile sheet which liberals had 
 long since nicknamed " As you like it." In 
 the old days, of course, that was quite suffi- 
 cient. What Ambassador was ever questioned 
 on the internal condition of his country ? 
 Nobody ever dreamt of committing such a 
 breach of diplomatic etiquette. Much less 
 would it have occurred to anyone to question 
 a secretary of an Embassy, for they were not 
 supposed to hold any views whatsoever. 
 
 In the last months which preceded the 
 in
 
 H2 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 revolution, the Russian Foreign Office was 
 more reticent than ever. Count Benckendorff 
 occasionally received private letters from his 
 relatives in Petrograd, but was seldom in- 
 clined to impart to his staff the information 
 therein contained. We learnt the news of the 
 happenings in Petrograd from casual visitors. 
 I recollect that for several days we were unable 
 to satisfy the curiosity of newspaper corre- 
 spondents who wanted to know all about the 
 new Premier, Prince Galitzine, in the autumn 
 of 1916. We could not tell which of the 
 numerous Princes Galitzine had suddenly risen 
 to the unenviable position of ProtopopofFs 
 chief and abettor. 
 
 When Mr. Miliukov took charge of the 
 Foreign Office, we confidently expected this 
 feature of the activities of his Department- 
 reliable official information concerning the 
 condition of Russia to assume a satisfactory 
 complexion. On several occasions, the Em- 
 bassy pointed out to Miliukov, and later with 
 even greater emphasis to Tereschenko, that it 
 was absolutely essential that we should be 
 kept informed of the course of events in Russia 
 and in particular in Petrograd. It never was 
 realised with sufficient clearness in Petrograd
 
 MR. MILIUKOV 113 
 
 that the revolution brought about a complete 
 change in the status of the Embassy. News- 
 paper correspondents, who had hitherto kept 
 aloof from Russian officialdom, now became 
 frequent callers. They expected us to en- 
 lighten them upon the progress of the Re- 
 publican regime in Russia. 
 
 Alas, our hopes were disappointed. In spite 
 of our persistent requests and reminders, we 
 continued to derive our information from . . . 
 the British Press. During Mr. Miliukov's 
 term of office, he never wrote a single letter 
 to the Russian Charge d' Affaires in London. 
 I have since learnt that such a correspondence 
 was a physical impossibility, as the first Foreign 
 Minister in the Provisional Government was 
 so ovenvhelmed with work and worry that 
 he could never have found time for letter- 
 writing. All the same, the fact was deplorable. 
 
 It would have been quite easy, had it not 
 been for the conditions in which Mr. Miliukov 
 worked, to establish close contact, as we had 
 known each other for many years, and in- 
 timate friendship existed between Miliukov 
 and my brother, who was also a member of 
 the first Provisional Government (a kind of 
 " Chief Secretary "). I therefore felt, when 
 
 H
 
 ii4 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 Miliukov resigned, that a splendid oppor- 
 tunity had been wasted. 
 
 When Tereschenko succeeded Miliukov at the 
 Foreign Office, I again repeated my requests 
 for information. By transmitting the telegrams 
 containing these requests to Paris, I induced 
 my colleague to add his voice to mine. The 
 Russian Foreign Office made an attempt 
 at organising regular information. Unfortun- 
 ately, the telegrams they sent out regularly 
 about once a week were not always in strict 
 accordance with truth, and represented the 
 situation in brighter colours than were justified 
 by the reality. Also, information was in- 
 variably belated. As an illustration of this 
 condition of affairs, I may quote the following 
 fact. On the day after the London papers 
 had published a full account of the memorable 
 Kornilov episode, which had already culmin- 
 ated in Kerensky's dastardly declaration that 
 Kornilov was a traitor, a telegram reached the 
 Embassy which recounted the events of the 
 preceding week. It contained the statement 
 that " relations between the Government and 
 the High Command are assuming an entirely 
 satisfactory character." Kornilov was then 
 under arrest.
 
 LACK OF OFFICIAL NEWS 115 
 
 I must confess that after a while I ceased 
 to read these telegrams, and the Embassy 
 staff even left some of them undecoded, as 
 their contents were to be found in the columns 
 of Renter's messages in every paper in London. 
 These telegrams seldom served as material for 
 official information to be conveyed to the 
 Foreign Office, as Sir George Buchanan's tele- 
 grams were infinitely more accurate. Reports 
 from the Petrograd correspondents of the 
 leading London journals were likewise more 
 truthful and more up to date. 
 
 Thus, in forming an opinion of the internal 
 condition of Russia and of the degree of 
 stability of the Provisional Government the 
 Embassy had to be guided chiefly by news- 
 paper comments and by official information 
 emanating from British sources as far, of 
 course, as the British Government desired to 
 impart this information to the Embassy. I 
 need not enlarge upon the difficulty of carrying 
 out the task of representing the Government in 
 these circumstances. In fact, it was no easier 
 than in the days of Sturmer. 
 
 ATTITUDE OF THE BRITISH GOVERN- 
 
 MENT TOWARDS THE RUSSIAN PROVISIONAL
 
 116 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 GOVERNMENT DURING THE EIGHT MONTHS OF 
 THE MATTER'S EXISTENCE MAY BE, ROUGHLY 
 SPEAKING, DIVIDED INTO THREE PHASES. 
 
 THE FIRST WAS ONE OF BENEVOLENT EX- 
 PECTATION. 
 
 THE SECOND WAS ONE OF DIFFIDENCE, 
 MINGLED WITH IRRITATION. 
 
 THE THIRD WAS ONE OF DISILLUSIONMENT 
 AND RESENTMENT. 
 
 In the following pages I will deal chiefly with 
 the attitude of the British Foreign Office. In 
 those days, the Prime Minister did not direct 
 the Foreign policy of Great Britain quite as 
 personally as during the Peace Conference 
 and after. His attitude towards Russia, in 
 those days, did not exercise the decisive 
 influence it has assumed since 1918. 
 
 During March and April, 1917, the Foreign 
 Office was " watching " the new Russian 
 regime. In the course of these months events 
 took place on various fronts which tended 
 to create an atmosphere of optimism. On 
 the Western front, Hindenburg's " strategic 
 retreat " was proceeding. The capture of 
 Baghdad obliterated the painful memories of 
 Kut. The most important event, however, was
 
 AMERICA AND RUSSIA 117 
 
 the entry of the United States into the war. 
 Personally, I am convinced and this con- 
 viction is based upon the knowledge I have of 
 American psychology that the downfall of 
 the autocratic regime in Russia provided, in 
 the eyes of the Americans, the best proof of 
 the fact that Europe was righting for the 
 ideals of liberty and democracy. The Ameri- 
 can people were adverse to an alliance with 
 the Russian Monarchy, because they took the 
 view that it was the symbol of militarism and 
 oppression in the same degree as the German 
 Monarchy. 
 
 The entry of the United States into the 
 Entente Coalition naturally served to alleviate 
 to a considerable extent the burden borne by 
 Great Britain, and caused a corresponding 
 revival of the spirit of that country in Govern- 
 ment circles as well as with the general public. 
 Incidentally, the Russian Provisional Govern- 
 ment displayed lamentable shortsightedness 
 in failing to take advantage of this magnificent 
 opportunity of establishing the closest possible 
 contact with the United States. Possibilities 
 in this direction were truly limitless. Had 
 proper propaganda been started at that mo- 
 ment, we could have secured at once and
 
 n8 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 forever the support and sympathy of the 
 people of the United States. The Russian 
 Government did nothing. They only replaced 
 George Bakhmetiev by Boris Bakhmetiev at 
 Washington. The retired Ambassador, George 
 Bakhmetiev, was a fervent Monarchist, a 
 deadly enemy of every Russian liberal and in 
 particular of Miliukov. He was an excep- 
 tionally clever cynic. Questioned as to his 
 relationship with the new Ambassador, he is 
 reported to have replied that the relationship 
 was the same as between George Washington 
 and Booker T. Washington. 
 
 The British Government was " watching." 
 The Foreign Office was in sympathy with 
 every measure which tended to show that the 
 Russian Provisional Government did not in- 
 tend to destroy such foundations of the 
 Government structure as needed only to be 
 adjusted to the new democratic regime. In 
 other words, it was hoped that the moderate 
 element, the Constitutional-democratic party, 
 would remain in power. Every sign of the 
 readiness of that party to make concessions 
 to the Radical parties provoked apprehen- 
 sion. The resignation of Miliukov and the 
 advent of Kerensky as Premier practically
 
 PESSIMISTIC REPORTS 119 
 
 terminated the first of the above-mentioned 
 phases that of BENEVOLENT EXPECTATION. 
 
 I have reason to believe that Sir George 
 Buchanan expressed, in his reports, a favour- 
 able opinion of Mr. Tereschenko. I could 
 not, however, fail to notice that in the eyes 
 of the British statesmen to whom I made 
 representations on behalf of the young 
 and brilliant Russian Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs, his authority and prestige were some- 
 what lower than that which Mr. Miliukov 
 had enjoyed. The turn of events in Russia 
 was beginning to appear to British public 
 opinion as dangerous, and fears were being 
 freely expressed that Russia would be unable 
 to stand fast. The reports of British military 
 representatives in Russia were permeated with 
 deep pessimism. Kerensky's attitude towards 
 the Russian Generals, whom he treated with 
 contempt, constantly dismissing them or 
 sending them from one command to another, 
 the introduction of Army " Committees," the 
 systematic undermining of discipline gave to 
 the Foreign Military representatives ample 
 grounds for apprehending the disruption of the 
 Army. General (then Colonel) Sir Alfred Knox 
 was the British Military Attache. This quiet,
 
 energetic and exceptionally well-informed 
 officer commanded the esteem and admiration 
 of the best elements of the Russian Army. 
 He never hesitated to tell the truth, however 
 unpalatable to slackers and cowards. " II n'y 
 mettait pas de gants blancs." He was quick 
 to detect and to stigmatize opportunism and 
 inefficiency. He was deeply respected by 
 the best and detested by the worst. Knox 
 had no sentimental love for Russia. He had, 
 however, a great admiration for the qualities 
 of the Russian soldier and rendered just 
 tribute to the Generals who deserved it. The 
 detractors of General Knox have always pre- 
 tended that he assumed towards the Russian 
 officers an attitude of extreme haughtiness. 
 I am convinced that the accusation is utterly 
 devoid of real foundation. Most Russians were 
 simply unable to see the sterling qualities of 
 this gallant, straightforward and noble man 
 behind the heavy screen of typically British 
 impassivity and coldness. I shall never forget 
 the speech General Knox delivered in I/mdon 
 on February 20, 1920, at a small gathering 
 in memory of Admiral Kolchak. I would 
 venture to say that anyone who is praised 
 by General Knox must feel a couple of inches 
 taller for the compliment.
 
 EXPECTATIONS OF RUSSIA 121 
 
 General Knox sent gloomy reports. Ever 
 since May, 1917, his predictions were most 
 pessimistic. Meanwhile, even to observers not 
 half so keen as the British General who was 
 better informed than the Russian General 
 Staff themselves, it was becoming evident that 
 the growth of the influence of the Soviet was 
 proceeding at a rapid pace. 
 
 I have often heard it said not only by 
 Russians who had been in close touch with 
 the Provisional Government, but also by 
 some British politicians, such, for instance, 
 as Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, that the British 
 Government failed to give the Russian Govern- 
 ment adequate support. As I have already 
 stated, there was no love lost between the 
 British statesmen responsible for foreign policy 
 and the leaders of the Russian revolution. 
 Nevertheless, the insinuations made in certain 
 quarters both in Great Britain and in Russia 
 appear to me groundless. 
 
 As early as in the summer of 1916, Russian 
 public opinion fell into the grave error of 
 grossly over-estimating the measure of assist- 
 ance which Great Britain was in a position 
 to give to the other Powers of the Entente, 
 and more especially to Russia. As a result of
 
 122 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 this misconception, every time Great Britain 
 declined to comply with a Russian request for 
 further supplies of war material or of credit, 
 such a refusal was invariably regarded as an 
 expression of Britain's unwillingness to assist 
 Russia. Yet in most cases, if not always, 
 it was not unwillingness, but actual impossi- 
 bility, or else the granting of the request was 
 accompanied with such risks as made it appear 
 a danger to the interests of Great Britain. In 
 spite of all difficulties, Great Britain continued 
 steadily to pour munitions and other war 
 material into Russia. Every one knows to 
 what enormous proportions the amount of 
 Russian war material had risen towards the 
 summer of 1917. As regards political sup- 
 port, the position was somewhat different. 
 The authority of the Provisional Government 
 was waning. Not to speak of the admission 
 of lyenin to Russia, Kerensky's demagogic 
 ways contributed to undermine the prestige 
 of the Government in the eyes of British 
 statesmen. What means had they at their 
 disposal for " supporting " that prestige and 
 the power which the Soviet was steadily and 
 skilfully snatching from the feeble hands of 
 Kerensky and his Ministers ? What influence
 
 BRITAIN'S LACK OF SUPPORT 123 
 
 could have been exercised from without ? Sir 
 George Buchanan adopted an attitude of 
 sincere sympathy towards the Russian Minis- 
 try. The Ambassador certainly did point 
 out to these Ministers, in terms of friendly 
 solicitude, certain facts which tended to in- 
 dicate the loss of authority which was notice- 
 able to everybody. The Ministers, however, 
 continued to reply with self-assurance that 
 things were going as well as could be expected. 
 Thus the discrepancy between the Russian 
 Foreign Minister's official optimism and the 
 actual state of affairs became more and more 
 obvious, and no illusions were entertained in 
 Ivondon on that score. 
 
 Relations between Governments enjoying 
 more or less the same degree of cultural develop- 
 ment and civilisation are governed by rules 
 and customs sanctioned by history. All that 
 is artificial and perhaps even pernicious in 
 these rules and customs was ingrained to 
 such an extent in the minds of responsible 
 statesmen, that no departure from sacred 
 tradition was deemed possible. It is said 
 that Britain did not support the Provisional 
 Government. Great Britain and Russia were 
 Allies in a life and death struggle against
 
 124 THE ORDEAly OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 Germany and her associates. The Provisional 
 Government issued a series of orders which 
 ruined the discipline of the Russian Army. 
 The Provisional Government admitted to Rus- 
 sia I/enin, Trotsky and scores, if not hundreds 
 of avowed " defeatists " and traitors to the 
 Allied cause admitted them deliberately. 
 Great Britain was fully entitled even more 
 than any other Ally, on account of the assis- 
 tance she was giving to say to Russia : " We 
 cannot help you to create with one hand that 
 which you are destroying with the other hand. 
 As long as you allow agitators to preach treason 
 to the Army, we cannot supply that Army 
 with material which it may leave to the 
 enemy." In my opinion, such an ultimatum 
 would have served the interests of both 
 countries concerned better than silent dis- 
 illusion and shoulder-shrugging. But it would 
 have been against all accepted standards of 
 " non-interference," and none of the Allies 
 therefore ventured to use such language. 
 As will be seen from the subsequent narrative, 
 the British Prime Minister vaguely understood 
 that something of that kind should be done. 
 But it was done too late and in a fashion 
 which invalidated the otherwise legitimate step.
 
 ANOTHER AMBASSADOR 125 
 
 In the beginning of June, a second attempt 
 was made at appointing an Ambassador to 
 London. A telegram reached the Embassy 
 instructing me to request that Baron Alex- 
 ander Meyendorff, the late Vice-President of 
 the Duma, be accepted in that capacity. At 
 the Foreign Office I was informed that Sir 
 George Buchanan had telegraphed a few days 
 before, and that His Majesty's consent had 
 already been given. I am unaware of the 
 reasons which prevented Baron Meyendorff 
 from coming to Condon. Evidence is again 
 conflicting. I have been assured by those 
 who ought to know that he never intended to 
 accept the appointment. Be that as it may, 
 whether the Soviet had intervened, or Baron 
 Meyendorff had refused to move, or maybe 
 never had actually been appointed this in- 
 cident did not serve to enhance the prestige 
 of the Russian Ministry. On the other hand, 
 it did not make my personal task any easier, 
 as it showed that my tenure of office was a 
 pis-aller which both the British and the 
 Russian Government were anxious to remove. 
 A pis-aller it undoubtedly was, as I had 
 ceased to be persona grata (if I ever had 
 been). Yet none in Russia was so re-
 
 126 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 solute as to take the burden off unsuitable 
 shoulders. 
 
 The second phase in the attitude of the 
 British Government towards Russia, that of 
 Diffidence Mingled with Irritation, was ap- 
 proaching. On the Russian front, troops were 
 already beginning to fraternise with the enemy. 
 Reports from British military experts were 
 growing daily more alarmist. The change 
 in the attitude of Great Britain is illustrated 
 by the following incident. 
 
 At the end of July, 1917, an Inter-Allied 
 Conference was to be called in London. These 
 Conferences took place at regular intervals, 
 about once in a month, when questions cropped 
 up which made it necessary to reaffirm and to 
 foster complete solidarity by means of personal 
 consultations between the Prime Ministers 
 and Commanders-in-Chief of the Allied Powers. 
 Two days before the appointed date, the 
 French Charg6 d' Affaires (Monsieur Cambon 
 was away on a short leave) informed me of 
 Monsieur Ribot's arrival, and expressed sur- 
 prise at my not having been invited to take 
 part in the Conference. He added that he 
 would not fail to inform the French Prime 
 Minister. On the morning of the day when
 
 THE INTER-ALLIED CONFERENCE 127 
 
 the first meeting had been fixed for noon, I 
 received instructions from Petrograd which 
 required that I should have a personal inter- 
 view with the Secretary of State for Foreign 
 Affairs. I rang up the Foreign Office at about 
 11.15 an( i received the reply (it was a Monday) 
 that Mr. Balfour would be unable to see me 
 before Thursday, as he was very busy attend- 
 ing the Inter- Allied Conference. I thanked 
 my informant for the very interesting news 
 that an Inter-Allied Conference was sitting in 
 London. " The Russian Representative natur- 
 ally finds this information particularly interest- 
 ing, as Russia is one of the Powers of the 
 Entente." A few minutes later I was requested 
 to attend the Conference at 10, Downing 
 Street. Time was short so that I was unable 
 to conform with the etiquette and don a 
 morning coat. I just managed to get there 
 in time by jumping into a taxicab. Everybody 
 had already arrived, when I reached Downing 
 Street. 
 
 The entire British Cabinet was present, as 
 well as Lord Bertie, the British Ambassador 
 in Paris. The French Cabinet was repre- 
 sented by the Premier, Monsieur Ribot, Mr. 
 Painleve, Monsieur Albert Thomas, Marshal
 
 128 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 Foch and others. Baron Sonnino, Marquis 
 Imperial! and an Italian General were also 
 present. 
 
 Mr. I4oyd George presided. Before starting 
 the discussion on the matters which formed 
 the object of the gathering, the Prime Minister 
 suggested that " a stern protest " be sent to 
 the Russian Government " against the con- 
 tinuation in Russia of disruption and anarchy." 
 After the French Prime Minister and the 
 Italian Foreign Minister had spoken, Mr. 
 L,loyd George addressed to me the remark : 
 " I should like to hear the views of the Russian 
 Charge d' Affaires in this matter." I must 
 confess that at this moment the thought 
 flashed through my brain : no wonder no 
 Russian Ambassador has had the courage of 
 " tackling this job." To ask the representa- 
 tive of an Allied country what he thought of 
 a collective protest being addressed to his 
 country by her Allies was indeed an unpre- 
 cedented predicament. 
 
 As a result of the deliberations that fol- 
 lowed, Monsieur Thomas was requested to 
 draft a message to the Kerensky Government, 
 and the message was approved by the Con- 
 ference and despatched in the following terms :
 
 A PROTEST TO KERENSKY 129 
 
 " Les represent ants des Gouvernements 
 Allies reunis a I/mdres le 7 Aout, saluent de 
 toute leur sympathie 1' ardent effort de re- 
 organisation que poursuivent dans la Russie 
 libre le Gouvernement Provisoire et son chef. 
 
 " Us constatent avec satisfaction qu'en cette 
 heure tragique toutes les forces russes se 
 serrent autour du Gouvernement pour ren- 
 forcer son pouvoir et que la volonte populaire, 
 exprimee sous des formes de jour en jour plus 
 sures et par une representation plus com- 
 plete, proclame tres haut la necessite de la 
 defense nationale. 
 
 " Us adressent leurs voeux les plus chaleur- 
 eux a Monsieur Kerensky et a ses colla- 
 borateurs et expriment une ferme confiance 
 dans leur autorite croissante et dans le re- 
 tablissement d'une stricte discipline, indis- 
 pensable sans doute a toute armee, mais plus 
 encore aux armees des peuples libres. C'est 
 par la discipline que 1' armee Russe assurera 
 tout a la fois la liberte populaire, 1'honneur 
 de la nation, et la realisation des buts de guerre 
 communs a tous les Allies." 
 
 Such was the " strong protest." 
 
 The " lesson " given to Kerensky in this 
 message is, of course, perfectly obvious, but it 
 i
 
 130 THE ORDEAI. OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 is administered in terms which exclude the 
 possibility of any feeling of slighted national 
 honour. 
 
 The incident is illuminating. Also, it should 
 be noted that the matters discussed at the 
 subsequent meetings of the Conference were 
 purely military. No Russian military repre- 
 sentative, however, was invited to attend, 
 and my opinion was asked merely as a matter 
 of courtesy. General Dessino, who was then 
 the representative of the Russian General 
 Headquarters with the British High Command, 
 was very angry with me for not having " in- 
 sisted " upon his participation in these de- 
 liberations. It was by no means an easy task 
 for me to persuade him, that by avoiding any 
 mention of Russian military representatives 
 at the Conference I had merely saved him the 
 humiliation of hearing remarks about the 
 Russian Army which would have not been 
 to his liking.
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 IN order fully to understand the circum- 
 stances in which the Governments of the 
 Entente Powers refused to grant passports 
 to the Delegates for the Stockholm Conference, 
 thereby causing the Conference to be cancelled 
 it is necessary clearly to realise the general 
 character of international relations at that 
 moment, as well as to recall the military 
 situation on various fronts. The United States 
 had declared war on Germany. The Russian 
 Armies, although their offensive operations 
 had ceased since the autumn of 1916, still 
 occupied the front. The Allies continued to 
 supply these armies regularly with guns and 
 munitions, and there was every reason to 
 believe that by the end of 1917 they would 
 be thoroughly equipped. In spite of the 
 ravages wrought by the submarine warfare, 
 there was therefore good ground for the hope 
 that the German Coalition would ultimately 
 be defeated. In these circumstances, the 
 supporters, in the countries of the Entente,
 
 132 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 of a " peace by compromise," redoubled their 
 agitation, which was undoubtedly fostered 
 from Berlin. Had not Germany realised at 
 that moment that the entry of the United 
 States into the war and the weakening, if not 
 the complete paralysis, of Austria and Turkey 
 had rendered the ultimate victory of the 
 German Coalition impossible she would not 
 have agitated in favour of the Socialist Con- 
 ference. 
 
 This conviction formed the basis of all my 
 activities with regard to the Stockholm Con- 
 ference. My motives were twofold. First 
 and foremost, of course, was the interest of 
 Russia herself. Also, the maintenance of Rus- 
 sia as a powerful and authoritative member 
 of the anti-German Alliance. The removal 
 of Germany's hold on Russia and the con- 
 solidation of an economic, cultural and political 
 rapprochement between Russia and Great 
 Britain have been and shall always form, in 
 my mind, the two essential conditions for the 
 peaceful development and prosperity of Rus- 
 sia. The Russian Embassy in London was 
 not informed of the actual political and military 
 condition of Russia. As has already been 
 stated, the Russian Foreign Office telegrams
 
 THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE 133 
 
 containing " information " were nothing else 
 than naked bluff. Owing to the pressure of 
 the Soviet, Ministers in the Provisional Govern- 
 ment worked already under impossible con- 
 ditions, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs did 
 not dare to tell the truth officially to Russian 
 Representatives abroad. On the other hand, 
 these Ministers were too busy to allow them- 
 selves the luxury of private confidential letters 
 to their colleagues abroad. I was thus under 
 the impression that the Russian Army was 
 still a formidable force. At the same time, I 
 was convinced that Germany would make 
 every effort to spread the news of the opening 
 of a " peace Conference " at Stockholm in 
 the ranks of the Russian army and would 
 interpret this news as the beginning of peace 
 negotiations. This, of course, could but exer- 
 cise a demoralising influence. 
 
 The British Labour and Socialist leaders 
 who favoured peace by compromise were 
 endeavouring to persuade public opinion and 
 the Labour circles that the Kerensky Govern- 
 ment not only favoured the Conference at 
 Stockholm, but considered such a Conference 
 absolutely necessary. It was hinted that 
 Russia was prepared to present the Allies
 
 134 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 with an ultimatum in respect to the granting 
 of passports and was threatening to make a 
 separate peace with Germany in case the 
 passports were refused. Radical and Liberal 
 papers in London were misled by this agita- 
 tion. There was every reason to believe that 
 such an attitude of the Russian Government 
 was causing grave anxiety to the Allies, and 
 more especially to the British Government, 
 that it undermined its faith in Russia and 
 Russia's prestige. 
 
 Bearing these considerations in mind, and 
 in view of the fact that a Labour Conference 
 was due in London on August 10 (1917), I sent 
 the following telegram to Mr. Tereschenko on 
 August 3 : 
 
 " The question of the participation of repre- 
 sentatives of the British Labour Party in the 
 Stockholm Conference will be decided next 
 Friday. There is a strong agitation within 
 the party against this participation and the 
 opposition to British participation will un- 
 doubtedly be strengthened by the reply of 
 the American Federation of Labour to the 
 French Federation. It is stated categorically 
 in this reply that the Conference cannot, at the 
 present moment, have useful results, and that
 
 THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE 135 
 
 the American Federation does not intend to 
 send Delegates to Stockholm. Mr. Bonar 
 Law stated yesterday in the House of Com- 
 mons that the Government would not send 
 delegates, that the approval of the Conference 
 depends not on the Government, but on the 
 Labour Party, expressed the hope that this 
 approval would not be given, and pointed out 
 that the Government had not decided whether 
 anybody would be allowed to take part in the 
 Conference. The Leader of the House added 
 that ' This permission will not be given without 
 serious consideration and will probably be 
 refused.' I consider it absolutely necessary, 
 with a view to safeguarding the stability and 
 closeness of our union with Great Britain, 
 where the majority of public opinion is adverse 
 from the Conference, that I should be in a 
 position to declare most emphatically to Mr. 
 Balfour that the Russian Government as well as 
 His Majesty's Government regard this matter as 
 a party concern and not a matter of state, 
 and that the decisions of the Conference, should 
 it be convened, would in no way be binding 
 on the future course of Russian policy and of 
 Russia's relations with her Allies. I shall 
 be questioned by Mr. Balfour on the subject
 
 136 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 and therefore expect you to give me definite 
 instructions." 
 
 It must be noted that a few days before 
 this telegram was sent, Mr. Henderson, who 
 was then a member of the Cabinet, and Mr. 
 Ramsay Macdonald, M.P., had been to Paris 
 in order to confer with their French friends, 
 promoters of the Conference. The fact that 
 these gentlemen had been granted passports 
 had caused a storm in the Press and in Parlia- 
 ment which the Prime Minister took great 
 pains to calm. It was obvious that public 
 opinion and Parliament were opposed to the 
 Conference. These facts I also reported to 
 the Russian Foreign Minister. 
 
 Meanwhile, four Russian delegates of the 
 Soviet of Workmen and Soldiers' Delegates 
 Ehrlich, Goldenberg, Russanov and Smirnov 
 not one of them, of course, a workman or a 
 soldier arrived in London for the purpose 
 of agitating in favour of the Conference. 
 These men endeavoured to adopt a dictatorial 
 tone towards the Embassy, demanding the 
 right of using cipher for correspondence with 
 Tcheidze, Tzereteli and Kerensky. They con- 
 ferred with Messrs. Henderson and Macdonald. 
 The demeanour of these Soviet delegates gave
 
 LONDON LABOUR CONFERENCE 137 
 
 me for the first time a true understanding 
 of the measure in which the Provisional 
 Government was already under the heel of 
 the Soviet. 
 
 Only a very short time was left before the 
 first meeting of the Labour Conference in 
 London, and I therefore waited with feverish 
 anxiety for an answer to my telegram. The 
 answer came at 4 p.m. on August 9. It ran 
 as follows : 
 
 11 1 entirely approve of the declaration to 
 be made to His Majesty's Government in the 
 sense suggested by you, and you are hereby 
 authorised to inform the Secretary of State 
 for Foreign Affairs that although the Russian 
 Government does not deem it possible to prevent 
 Russian delegates from taking part in the 
 Stockholm Conference, they regard this Con- 
 ference as a party concern and its decisions 
 in no wise binding upon the liberty of action 
 of the Government." 
 
 Immediately, the following note was ad- 
 dressed by me to Mr. Balfour : 
 
 "In a telegram I sent to the Russian 
 Foreign Minister three or four days ago I gave 
 him an account of the statements made in the 
 House of Commons by the Prime Minister
 
 and Mr. Henderson concerning the latter' s 
 visit to Paris, as well as of Mr. Bonar Law's 
 statements regarding the Stockholm Confer- 
 ence and of the discussions which were taking 
 place in the different labour organisations of 
 Great Britain as to the desirability of sending 
 delegates to Stockholm. I also drew the 
 Russian Foreign Minister's attention to the 
 reply given by the American Federation of 
 Labour to the French Confederation Generate 
 du Travail. In conclusion I said the follow- 
 ing : ' I consider it absolutely necessary, with 
 a view to safeguarding the stability and close- 
 ness of our union with Great Britain, where the 
 majority of public opinion is adverse from the 
 Conference, that I should be in a position to 
 declare most emphatically to Mr. Balfour 
 that the Russian Government as well as 
 His Majesty's Government regard this matter 
 as a party concern and not a matter of state, 
 and that the decisions of the Conference, 
 should it be convened, would in no way be 
 binding on the future course of Russian policy 
 and of Russia's relations with her Allies.' ' 
 
 After quoting verbatim the reply I had re- 
 ceived from Mr. Tereschenko, I concluded : 
 ' I hasten to lay before you the above informa-
 
 MR. HENDERSON'S SPEECH 139 
 
 tion as I fear that the impression has hitherto 
 prevailed that, in the words of one of the 
 London newspapers, ' Russia ardently desires 
 the Stockholm Conference/ and this argument 
 has been put forward in order to influence 
 British public opinion in favour of the Labour 
 and Socialist Parties of Great Britain par- 
 ticipating in the Conference." 
 
 A meeting of the War Cabinet was there- 
 upon called, at which, presumably, Mr. Hender- 
 son was present. On the next day, the first 
 sitting took place of the Labour Conference. 
 Mr. Henderson advocated with the same per- 
 sistence the idea of the conference and made 
 a passing allusion with regard to Russia, to 
 the effect that " a slight change had occurred 
 in the attitude of the Russian Government 
 towards the Conference at Stockholm." The 
 impression that " Russia ardently desires the 
 Conference," which it was my object to dispel, 
 was thus maintained. 
 
 On the next morning I was invited to 10, 
 Downing Street. I found the Prime Minister 
 in a very angry mood. He showed me a 
 telegram from Paris signed by Albert Thomas : 
 " Kerensky ne veut pas de Conference." A 
 copy of my note to Mr. Balfour was in the
 
 140 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 hands of the Prime Minister, who said to me : 
 " This note is a document of the highest 
 importance. It proves that the Russian 
 Government is not ' stage-managing ' Stock- 
 holm, and it gives us full liberty to lay our 
 veto upon the Conference. The day before 
 yesterday I gave Henderson definite instruc- 
 tions to reveal to the Conference the position 
 as it now stands. Henderson has failed to 
 carry out these instructions, and must resign 
 immediately." The Prime Minister insisted 
 upon the publication of the full text of my 
 note to Mr. Balfour. After a lengthy dis- 
 cussion I agreed to the concluding passage of 
 my note being made public. In the course 
 of our conversation, Mr. Lloyd George men- 
 tioned other questions of the day. Returning 
 to the Embassy, I sent a telegram to the 
 Russian Foreign Minister, giving him a full 
 account of the conversation I had with the 
 Prime Minister. In conclusion, I added, " The 
 Prime Minister also mentioned the subject 
 which had been discussed at the last inter- 
 allied conference, and said to me : ' Britain, 
 France and Italy hold the Western Front, 
 Russia the Eastern. In order to gain victory, 
 complete and constant co-ordination is essen-
 
 A MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE 141 
 
 tial. I may tell you frankly, that such a 
 co-ordination is impossible, as long as the 
 Russian High Command is represented by 
 old Generals or by young ones who know less 
 about the conditions of the Russian Front, 
 the plans, intentions and possibilities of the 
 Russian Government and of the High Com- 
 mand, than we ourselves know. Never at 
 any one of the conferences on military matters, 
 have we heard the voice of a well-informed 
 and authoritative Russian General.' The 
 Prime Minister insisted upon the arrival of 
 such a General, to take part in the Conference 
 in Paris on September 15. I had intended, 
 some time before this conversation took place, 
 to urge the Russian Government to send 
 General Alexeiev to London and Paris. I 
 feel certain that his presence would be of 
 great value, not only on account of his know- 
 ledge, but because of the prestige he un- 
 doubtedly enjoys. Furthermore, it is im- 
 perative that you should give me fuller in- 
 formation. Only thus would I be able to 
 interpret the intentions of Russia. I request 
 an urgent reply, and a decision in regard to 
 the arrival of General Alexeiev, or General 
 Russki."
 
 142 THE ORDEAI, OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 As usual, I received neither information nor 
 an urgent reply, and no decision was taken in 
 regard to General Alexeiev. 
 
 A few days later, the Foreign Office acknow- 
 ledged receipt of my note to Mr. Balfour, and 
 stated, that His Majesty's Government sincerely 
 welcomed this further proof of the identity 
 of view upon the Stockholm Conference, 
 which existed between the two Governments. 
 
 The origin of Albert Thomas's telegram to 
 Mr. lyloyd George, " Kerensky ne veut pas de 
 Conference " remains a mystery to me. Sub- 
 sequent events have proved that Kerensky 
 did not communicate directly with Mons. 
 Thomas on the subject. Recently, I have 
 learnt from a authoritative source, that Keren- 
 sky had, in confidential conversation, expressed 
 himself against the Conference, and that his 
 views had been communicated to one of the 
 members of the Staff of the French Embassy 
 in Petrograd, who corresponded direct with 
 Mons. Thomas. That may be the explana- 
 tion of the mysterious telegram. It would 
 show that in this case Mr. Kerensky did not 
 have the courage of his opinions, and did not 
 hesitate to disown them, for fear of provoking 
 the displeasure of the Soviet.
 
 MR. HENDERSON RESIGNS 143 
 
 On the following day, the Press Bureau 
 issued the correspondence between Mr. Hen- 
 derson and the Prime Minister. 
 
 Offices of the War Cabinet, 
 
 2, Whitehall Gardens, 
 
 August n, 1917. 
 DEAR PRIME MINISTER, 
 
 At our interview last night, I gathered 
 you had reached the conclusion that my 
 retention of the position of Secretary to the 
 Labour Party was no longer compatible with 
 my membership of the War Cabinet. Recent 
 experiences have impressed me with the em- 
 barrassing complications arising from this du- 
 ality of office. In these circumstances, therefore, 
 I deem it advisable to ask you to release me 
 from further membership of your Government. 
 I continue to share your desire that the 
 war should be carried to a successful con- 
 clusion, and trust that in a non-Government 
 capacity I may be able to render some little 
 assistance to this end. I remain, 
 Yours sincerely, 
 
 ARTHUR HENDERSON.
 
 144 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 August n, 1917. 
 MY DEAR HENDERSON, 
 
 I am in receipt of your letter of this 
 morning, tendering your resignation of your 
 position as a member of the War Cabinet, 
 and have received the permission of His 
 Majesty, to whom I submitted your resigna- 
 tion, to accept it. My colleagues and I have 
 received with satisfaction the assurance of 
 your unabated desire to assist in the prosecu- 
 tion of the war to a successful conclusion, and 
 they greatly regret that you can no longer 
 be directly and officially associated with them 
 in that enterprise. There are, however, certain 
 facts with which it is essential that the public 
 should be acquainted in order that they may 
 form a correct appreciation of the events that 
 have led to this regrettable conclusion. 
 
 The first is that your colleagues were taken 
 completely by surprise by the attitude which 
 you adopted at the Labour Conference yester- 
 day afternoon. You know that they were 
 in the present circumstances unanimously 
 opposed to the Stockholm Conference, and 
 you had yourself been prepared to agree to 
 an announcement to that effect some days 
 ago. At our suggestion, however, and that
 
 LLOYD GEORGE'S LETTER 145 
 
 of your Labour colleagues, it was decided to 
 defer any such announcement until after the 
 meeting yesterday. 
 
 I was under the impression after several 
 talks with you that you meant to use your 
 influence against meeting enemy representa- 
 tives at Stockholm. What has happened in 
 Russia during the last few weeks has materially 
 affected the position in reference to that 
 Conference. You admitted to me that the 
 situation had completely changed even within 
 the last fortnight, and that whatever ground 
 you might have thought there was for dele- 
 gates from Allied countries attending such a 
 Conference a fortnight ago, the events of the 
 last few days had shown you the unwisdom 
 of such a course. 
 
 That was clearly what you led me to believe. 
 It was also the impression left on the minds 
 of your colleagues in the Cabinet and of your 
 Labour colleagues in the Ministry. It was 
 therefore with no small surprise that I received 
 a letter from you yesterday afternoon stating 
 that you " ought to inform me that after the 
 most careful consideration you had come to 
 the conclusion that you could take no other 
 course than to stand by the advice you had 
 K
 
 146 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 given the day after your return from Russia," 
 and that your colleagues subsequently read 
 the speech which you had delivered. 
 
 Surely this was a conclusion of which you 
 ought to have informed the Cabinet before 
 you went to the Conference. When you 
 spoke at that Conference, you were not merely 
 a member of the Labour Party, but a member 
 of the Cabinet, responsible for the conduct 
 of the war. Nevertheless, you did not deem 
 it necessary to inform the Conference of the 
 views of your colleagues, and the delegates 
 accordingly were justified in assuming that 
 the advice you gave was not inconsistent with 
 their opinion. 
 
 The second point is this. Yesterday morn- 
 ing, 1 we received a most important communica- 
 tion from the Russian Government, in which 
 we were informed that " Although the Russian 
 Government did not deem it possible to 
 prevent Russian delegates from taking part 
 in the Stockholm Conference, they regarded 
 it as a party concern, and its decision as in 
 no wise binding on the liberty of action of the 
 Government." And, further, the covering 
 letter which accompanied this communica- 
 
 J This is not correct. The communication was received on 
 the previous afternoon.
 
 UX)YD GEORGE'S BETTER 147 
 
 tion contained these words : "I hasten to lay 
 before you the above information because I 
 fear that the impression has hitherto pre- 
 vailed that in the words of one of the London 
 papers, ' Russia ardently desires the Con- 
 ference/ and this argument has been put 
 forward in order to influence British public 
 opinion in favour of the I/abour and Socialist 
 parties of Great Britain participating in the 
 Conference." 
 
 Immediately on receipt of this intimation 
 I sent it over to you with a request that you 
 should communicate it to the Conference. 
 You omitted to do so. It is true that in the 
 course of your speech you made a very casual 
 reference to " some modification " in the 
 attitude of the Russian Government. But 
 there is a manifest difference between the 
 effect which would necessarily be produced 
 upon any audience by an indifferent summary 
 of that description and the communication to 
 them of official information showing that the 
 attitude of the Russian Government towards 
 the Stockholm Conference was very different 
 from what had been supposed. 
 
 In these circumstances your action does not 
 appear to have been fair either to the Govern-
 
 148 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 ment or to the delegates whom you were 
 addressing. They were left in ignorance of a 
 vital fact which must necessarily have affected 
 their judgment. I am sending a copy of this 
 correspondence to the Press. 
 
 Yours sincerely, 
 
 D. LivOYD GEORGE. 
 
 Mr. Henderson replied : 
 
 DEAR PRIME MINISTER, 
 
 I beg to acknowledge the receipt of 
 your favour, intimating that you are sending 
 a copy of our correspondence to the Press. 
 
 I enclose a copy of the only statement I 
 propose to make to the Press at this juncture. 
 Yours sincerely, 
 
 ARTHUR HENDERSON. 
 
 The Prime Minister's letter to Mr. Henderson 
 was originally drafted before the first letter 
 addressed to the Prime Minister by his colleague 
 had reached its destination. This draft the 
 Prime Minister read to me at 9 a.m. Upon the 
 receipt of Mr. Henderson's letter, this original 
 draft must, obviously, have been altered. Mr. 
 Henderson stated in the autumn of 1919 that 
 his resignation from the Cabinet was volun-
 
 FRANTIC TELEGRAMS 149 
 
 tary. It seems beyond doubt that this state- 
 ment is incorrect, as the Prime Minister had 
 decided that Mr. Henderson must go. 
 
 When the evening papers published the 
 above quoted correspondence, a regular storm 
 broke out in the Labour and Socialist circles. 
 The Russian delegates Ehrlich, Goldenberg 
 and Russanov (Smirnov had been detained in 
 France) proceeded to send frantic telegrams 
 to Petrograd demanding explanations. On 
 Monday, the I3th, a telegram was published 
 in the London Press, stating that " Kerensky 
 is indignant at being misrepresented," that 
 " the Russian Charge d' Affaires had exceeded 
 his instructions," etc. The impression was 
 thus created that the Russian Ministers them- 
 selves did not know what they wanted and 
 were going back on their word under pressure 
 from the Soviet. On the same day, anticipat- 
 ing questions in the House of Commons, I 
 asked for an interview with Mr. Balfour. 
 Summoned to 10, Downing Street, I was 
 received by the Prime Minister himself. I 
 told him that it was quite clear from the 
 Petrograd telegrams that the circumstances 
 attending Mr. Henderson's resignation had 
 been misunderstood in Russia. I therefore
 
 150 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 thought that in order to remove this mis- 
 understanding it was most desirable that full 
 explanations should be given in the House of 
 Commons which I would be in a position to 
 wire to Petrograd. The Prime Minister agreed. 
 
 In the course of this interview the Prime 
 Minister appeared to be fully aware of the fact 
 that the declaration of the Russian Govern- 
 ment in regard to the Stockholm Conference, 
 which had enabled him to take the action he 
 considered as being in the best interest of the 
 Allied cause, was due primarily to my personal 
 initiative. He also realised that I had taken 
 this step in the face of the bitter opposition 
 of the Soviet. Mr. I,loyd George therefore 
 expressed his appreciation of the service I 
 had rendered in very warm and complimentary 
 terms. The interview took place on August 13, 
 1917. It was the last occasion on which I 
 had the honour of meeting the Prime Minister. 
 
 There can be no doubt that the " misunder- 
 standing" in other words, the mendacious 
 telegrams sent from L,ondon to Petrograd 
 by the Russian Soviet deputies was partly 
 due to the fact that the above-mentioned 
 telegram from Albert Thomas was communi- 
 cated to the Press and presented to the public
 
 BONAR LAW EXPLAINS 151 
 
 as the " Kerensky telegram." It was muddled 
 up with my note to Mr. Balfour. Kerensky, 
 never having sent it, and being unaware of its 
 origin, repudiated it. He was compelled to 
 disclaim all knowledge of it in order not to 
 fall out with the much dreaded Soviet. A 
 member of Kerensky's staff told me several 
 months later that Kerensky had never read 
 my correspondence with the Russian Foreign 
 Office on the subject. 
 
 The next day, Mr. Bonar Law, replying to 
 a question by Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, gave 
 the necessary explanations, and said that the 
 initiative in disclosing the real attitude of the 
 Russian Government towards Stockholm was 
 Russian. In other words, that it was taken 
 without pressure on the part of the British 
 Government. These explanations closed the 
 incident as far as the Allied Governments were 
 concerned. My personal troubles, however, 
 did not come to so quick an end. About 
 three days later I received the following tele- 
 gram from Mr. Tereschenko : 
 
 " It appears from the published corre- 
 spondence between Mr. Lloyd George and 
 Mr. Henderson that in transmitting to the 
 British Government our viewpoint on the
 
 Stockholm Conference, you have made certain 
 comments in your covering letter. Please 
 give me the text of your letter. I realise that 
 you were guided by considerations of the 
 British political situation. In view, however, 
 of the ' touchiness ' of our public opinion 
 in respect of the war-aims and of the difficulty 
 for the Foreign Office owing to the long 
 distance in keeping our diplomatic Represen- 
 tatives in constant touch with all the currents 
 of opinion regarding all these matters, it is 
 desirable that you should confine yourself to 
 transmitting to the Government to which you 
 are accredited the exact text of our declara- 
 tions on political questions of principle." 
 
 The reference to " long distance " is truly 
 pathetic. It is, of course, a hint at the 
 danger of sending outspoken and frank mes- 
 sages which might fall under the scrutinising 
 eyes of the Soviet. 
 
 I replied as follows : 
 
 " My telegram No. 2 gives you the text of a 
 strictly confidential note I addressed to Mr. 
 Balfour on the gth instant. In addressing the 
 Secretary of State in this confidential manner, 
 I deemed it necessary to convey to him that 
 the definite statement, which you entirely
 
 MY EXPLANATION 153 
 
 approved, was requested by me in order to 
 dispel the impression undoubtedly prevailing 
 in the country and in the Government that the 
 Conference was being stage-managed by the 
 Russian Government. A series of newspaper 
 articles here spread the idea that ' Kerensky 
 implores that the Conference be held.' In 
 thus exceeding, in a confidential document, 
 the strict limits of officialdom, I was actuated 
 by the desire to refute the reproach which was 
 duly made by Ramsay Macdonald in the 
 House of Commons, and duly denied by the 
 Leader of the House, that Russia's declaration 
 was forced upon her by the British Govern- 
 ment. You will see from Mr. Bonar Law's 
 statement that he has put matters right. 
 The Government was convinced that Russia 
 was not only in favour of the Conference, but 
 was aiding it. This erroneous impression had 
 to be dispelled. When I saw the Prime 
 Minister last Saturday, he asked me to agree 
 to the publication of my despatch, because he 
 considered it necessary that public opinion 
 should clearly understand that the Russian 
 Government (which the British Government 
 and myself identify with Russia) is not ' arrang- 
 ing ' the Stockholm meeting. It was a difficult
 
 154 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 moment, and I thought it necessary to give 
 whatever assistance I could to the British 
 Government. Had I refused to allow the last 
 paragraph of my despatch to be made public, 
 the country would have learnt your reply, but 
 not my comment which on this occasion was 
 necessary. The Government appreciated my 
 action, and Mr. I/loyd George said to me : 
 ' You have rendered Russia and Britain a 
 service which it is difficult to estimate, and 
 Henderson's unexpected conduct has been 
 most detrimental to the cause.' I would ask 
 you to appreciate the difficulty of my position. 
 For the last eight days I have not had a line 
 from you. Meanwhile, the papers here publish 
 interviews with Kerensky and yourself in which 
 the ' real official attitude of Russia ' is described 
 as conflicting with my declarations. The 
 British Government take into consideration 
 your declarations to the British Ambassador 
 as well as the declarations I make on your 
 behalf. You will see from Mr. Balfour's speech 
 in the House of Commons that discussions 
 between the Foreign Office and Foreign Repre- 
 sentatives are possible only on condition that 
 confidential matters are not made public. 
 ' Diplomats,' said Mr. Balfour, ' often fail if
 
 CONFIDENTIAL CONVERSATIONS 155 
 
 circumstances are stronger than individuals. 
 But the whole purpose and efforts of diplomats 
 consist in avoiding conflicts, not in creating 
 them, and this is better attained with those 
 responsible to their Governments by con- 
 fidential conversations than by proclaiming 
 your policy from Charing Cross.' I fully 
 realised the responsibility I was assuming 
 when I sent the note to Mr. Balfour and 
 agreed to its partial publication. I knew 
 that by transmitting your reply without any 
 comment I would protect myself from any 
 unpleasant consequence. But having weighed 
 the whole situation, which was serious enough, 
 I came to the conclusion that it would have 
 been pusillanimous to be afraid of the malignant 
 campaign against myself which would un- 
 doubtedly be conducted here and in Russia. 
 I wish to repeat that in this case I was guided 
 by the desire to uphold the prestige of the 
 Russian Government. Once more I ask you 
 to give me fuller information in matters which 
 are not common property." 
 
 This telegram crossed two short messages 
 from Mr. Tereschenko in which he stated that 
 no " declarations against the Stockholm Con- 
 ference or the policy of the Soviet could be
 
 156 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 made by Kerensky," and confirmed the pre- 
 vious admission that the Provisional Govern- 
 ment " regard the Conference as a party 
 concern, but do not see their way to approve 
 of it or to prevent it." " Our diplomatic 
 Representatives," added the Foreign Minister, 
 " should therefore exercise extreme modera- 
 tion in this matter." 
 
 This exchange of telegrams closed the 
 incident. The British, French and Italian 
 Governments refused to grant passports to 
 the delegates, and the Conference did not 
 meet. Several months later, a friend from 
 Petrograd sent me a copy of the Bolshevik 
 paper, Novaia Jisn of December 16, in which 
 my correspondence with Mr. Tereschenko was 
 published, including the telegram quoted above 
 recounting my interview with Mr. Lloyd 
 George. There appeared in the same paper an 
 article entitled : " Diplomats on the war." 
 It contained a series of accusations against 
 me " for being in sympathy with the im- 
 perialistic war." Here is an extract from this 
 article : 
 
 " No wonder Lloyd George and Poincare, 
 taking into account the war-weariness in their 
 respective countries, adopted the most strenu-
 
 NEWSPAPER CRITICISM 157 
 
 ous measures for preventing the Stockholm 
 Conference. The same Mr. Nabokoff informs 
 us that the Prime Minister was very bitter 
 against Henderson who dared to place the 
 interests of the working classes above those 
 of the Allied imperialists. Lloyd George de- 
 manded from the Labour leader such explana- 
 tions at the Labour Conference as would 
 satisfy the supporters of ' war at all costs.' 
 Henderson was ejected from the Cabinet. All 
 attempts at convening the workers' deputies 
 at Stockholm were resolutely prevented and 
 passports refused. These are the weapons 
 used by the Allied Governments for prolonging 
 the carnage and postponing peace. It should 
 be noted that in all these machinations the 
 soi-disant Representative of Revolutionary 
 Russia has played the part of obedient servant 
 to those who were prolonging the war and 
 ruining Russia. He advocated the postpone- 
 ment of the Allied Conference. He tried to 
 persuade England that Russia was ready to 
 fight till the end. He asked the Provisional 
 Government to prevent the delegates of the 
 Soviet from agitating in favour of the Stock- 
 holm Conference. He helped Lloyd George 
 to obstruct the Conference and in the end he
 
 158 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 quashed it. He said he tried to raise the 
 faith of Britain in Russia and in the final 
 triumph in Russia of the democratic national 
 idea and in the military power of Russia." 
 
 That is the verdict of the Bolshevik paper 
 on my activities in London . I must confess 
 that its admission that I " in the end quashed 
 the Stockholm Conference " is, of course, 
 an over-estimate of the part I played. It 
 is nevertheless a statement which gives me 
 great satisfaction. I was and remain con- 
 vinced that the Stockholm Conference would 
 have led to a peace by compromise which 
 Germany already then desired. And I should 
 be proud to feel that I had even to a small 
 degree contributed to averting such an inter- 
 national catastrophe. 
 
 It is still a mystery to me that Mr. Tere- 
 schenko succeeded in safeguarding me from 
 the effects of the scornful resentment of the 
 Petrograd Soviet. It is true that soon after 
 this incident a third attempt was made at 
 appointing an Ambassador to London. The 
 candidate, Prince Gregoire Troubetzkoi, can 
 hardly, however, be considered as persona grata 
 with the Soviet. He did not arrive, and I 
 continued in charge of the Embassy.
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 DURING the months of August, September 
 and October, 1917, the following important 
 developments took place in the world war : 
 The activities were disclosed of Count I^ux- 
 burg, the German Minister in the Argentine. 
 His expression, "sink at sight," became a 
 by-word and a symbol of the German men- 
 tality. I had met this gentleman in India, 
 where he had succeeded Prince Henry XXXI 
 of Reuss as German Consul-General at Calcutta 
 in the autumn of 1913. Prince Reuss went 
 from Calcutta to Teheran where he was 
 actively working against the Entente . . . 
 until his expulsion from Persia. There can 
 be no doubt that these gentlemen worked in 
 India against the British, who showed quite 
 extraordinary confidence in these agents. 
 Reuss was wearing the mask of kindliness and 
 simplicity. On the whole, he was rather 
 harmless. I^uxburg, on the contrary, was im- 
 pudent, haughty and malicious. He left India 
 in the spring of 1914. His departure, following
 
 i6o THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 so closely upon the annual migration from 
 Calcutta to the summer capital, was sudden, 
 and certain circumstances tended to show 
 that Luxburg was quite sure he would not 
 return to India. I personally have no doubt 
 he was aware of the coming conflagration. 
 
 " Spurlos versenkt " naturally caused great 
 alarm in Great Britain. The question of 
 food-supplies was already very acute, and 
 Luxburg's presence in the Argentine, whence 
 large supplies of wheat were being shipped to 
 Britain, became a serious danger. The fact 
 that this German agent's activities were dis- 
 closed was undoubtedly an event of con- 
 siderable importance and a gain for the 
 Entente. 
 
 British troops were continuing their vic- 
 torious progress in Palestine and were ap- 
 proaching Jerusalem. On the western front 
 they were stubbornly holding the ground, 
 whilst the Germans were sustaining enormous 
 losses in their effort to break through. The 
 British losses, however, were also very heavy. 
 
 In the autumn of 1917 the Austro-German 
 forces made their first powerful onslaught on 
 Italy. It was borne valiantly at first, but in 
 October the line was broken at Caporetto and
 
 THE RUSSIAN COLLAPSE 161 
 
 on the Isonzo, and British troops had to be 
 rushed to the rescue of the panic-stricken 
 Italians. 
 
 Brussilov was no longer there to launch 
 an offensive without heavy guns against a 
 superior enemy, as he had done in 1916. So 
 Italy, forgetful of the heroic effort made 
 by Russia a year before in order to save 
 her from defeat, and the other Allies as well, 
 blamed Russia for these disasters. In August, 
 1917, our troops were already " fraternising " 
 with the enemy, and Riga was lost as a result 
 of this demoralisation. The last effort of the 
 Russian Army, the offensive under the per- 
 sonal guidance of the Russian Premier, Keren- 
 sky, was short-lived. " The Russian collapse " 
 had already become a current expression in 
 the British Press. 
 
 This period from the end of August till 
 the Bolshevik revolution (November 7) is the 
 third phase of the attitude of the British 
 Government towards Russia, the period of 
 " Disappointment and Irritation." 
 
 Intercourse with the British Government 
 became an increasingly difficult task for the 
 Representative of the Russian Government. 
 At every interview with Mr. Balfour or with
 
 Lord Hardinge, notes of reproach, bewilder- 
 ment and resentment were noticeable in their 
 conversation. " The Kerensky Government " 
 was obviously being scorned. Russians must 
 have a particularly vivid recollection of this 
 tragic period from August till November 
 which ended in the odious capitulation 
 of the Kerensky Ministry to I^enin and 
 Trotsky. The British Government, as I have 
 already said, was openly indignant and alarmed 
 at the admission to Russia of these avowed 
 enemies of the Entente. Every sober-minded 
 man saw in the July rehearsal of the Bolshevik 
 coup d'etat a sufficiently clear warning. No 
 reasonable excuse compatible with the interests 
 of the State could be found for the complacent 
 attitude of the Kerensky Government towards 
 Bolshevik propaganda. It was impossible to 
 deny that propaganda was being tolerated. 
 
 The Moscow Conference brought a short 
 respite of optimism. But the results of the 
 Conference discouraged even the most stolid 
 optimists, the most patient and well-disposed. 
 One of the British statesmen said to me in 
 the course of a very frank and intimate con- 
 versation : " It is obvious that Kerensky is 
 played out. Where do you see the salvation ? "
 
 GENERAL ALEXEIEV 163 
 
 I replied that in my opinion there was but 
 one man whose name commands such respect 
 that he might perhaps succeed in retaining 
 Kerensky in the Cabinet and General Kornilov 
 as Commander-in-Chief, and that man was 
 General Alexeiev. The British statesman said 
 that Alexeiev' s Premiership would undoubtedly 
 serve to revive the confidence of the Allies 
 in the stability of the Russian Government. 
 That was certainly the case. Alexeiev' s pres- 
 tige was very high in Great Britain. 
 
 It is evident from the above-quoted tele- 
 gram I sent to the Russian Foreign Minister 
 after interviewing Mr. Lloyd George, that the 
 Prime Minister held General Alexeiev in high 
 esteem. At the end of August, I received a 
 belated reply to my telegram, informing me 
 that General Alexeiev was unable to comply 
 with the British Premier's request and to come 
 to London. It was clear that my idea of his 
 Premiership was out of date, and that the 
 General himself considered the situation in 
 Russia as hopeless. 
 
 I did not, however, lose all hope with regard 
 to the General's visit. A Russian General 
 Staff ofncer was going to Petrograd from 
 London, and I availed myself of this oppor-
 
 164 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 tunity for entrusting him with a personal and 
 urgent message to General Alexeiev. I ex- 
 plained to the Russian officer exactly how 
 matters stood and why it was so important 
 that Alexeiev should come to England. A few 
 days after the Bolshevik coup d'etat I received 
 a letter from Petrograd, from my " special 
 messenger," informing me that Alexeiev had 
 agreed, after much hesitation, to come to 
 England and to France, not as a plenipoten- 
 tiary of any sort or description, but merely 
 to accept the invitation to visit the Western 
 front. Fate, however, decreed otherwise. 
 
 When the first tidings reached London of 
 the Kornilov movement, the Foreign Office 
 naturally refrained from any comment whatso- 
 ever which might be interpreted as indicating 
 the direction in which their sympathies lay. 
 It was, however, comparatively easy to dis- 
 cover that direction. Soon after the Kornilov 
 incident, the collective " demarche " of the 
 Ambassadors of France, Britain and Italy was 
 made in Petrograd. They visited Kerensky 
 and addressed to him the same protest which 
 had been intended in August. The British 
 Foreign Office gathered from Sir George 
 Buchanan's report the distinct impression that
 
 SOVIET ARROGANCE 165 
 
 Kerensky, on this occasion, had been ex- 
 tremely arrogant and ill-mannered. The pres- 
 tige of the Russian Government suffered 
 accordingly. It is difficult to discover the truth 
 in this matter, as opinions of eye-witnesses 
 differ. Mr. Balfour, however, agreed post 
 factum that the objections that had been raised 
 in August against such a " collective remons- 
 trance " were justified, as the demarche of the 
 three Ambassadors proved utterly useless. 
 
 After the Kornilov episode the British 
 Government entertained no hope in regard to 
 military assistance from Russia, and was 
 awaiting the collapse of the Provisional Govern- 
 ment which seemed unavoidable. There came 
 another change in the tone of responsible 
 officials. Notes of resentment and irritation 
 became more frequent and more pronounced. 
 The Conference which was to have met in 
 Paris on September 15 and to which the 
 British Prime Minister desired to invite General 
 Alexeiev, was postponed for a month. 
 
 Meanwhile, the disruption at Petrograd was 
 steadily increasing, and the Soviet was becom- 
 ing daily more peremptory and more insistent. 
 The suggestion was put forward that Skobelev, 
 as representative of the Soviet, should accom-
 
 166 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 pany Tereschenko to Paris. I well remember 
 the categorical not to use a stronger ex- 
 pression answer I received from the British 
 Foreign Office on this matter. I was told that 
 the Allies, and in particular Great Britain, 
 intended to confer with responsible representa- 
 tives of the Government only. ' We do not 
 understand," they said, " in what capacity the 
 Soviet representative intends to come to 
 Paris. One thing is certain. He will not be 
 admitted to the Allied Conference." 
 
 At this moment the Russian Government, 
 presumably alarmed at their loss of prestige 
 which reports from their Representatives 
 abroad could not fail to indicate, decided to 
 adopt a purely formal measure in order to raise 
 the waning prestige. They appointed Ambas- 
 sadors to London and Paris. Maklakov, the 
 gifted lawyer and politician, was appointed to 
 Paris. He arrived in London shortly after- 
 wards, accompanied by M. A. Stakhovitch. 
 The latter had been appointed Ambassador 
 to Madrid. The circumstances which prompted 
 the Provisional Government to send to Spain 
 a Russian politician of wide reputation and 
 enjoying the esteem of all political parties in 
 Russia were the following.
 
 GERMAN PEACE OVERTURES 167 
 
 About the middle of September, the Repre- 
 sentatives in Condon of the Great Powers of 
 the Entente Mr. Cambon, Viscount Chinda, 
 Mr. Page, the Italian Charge d' Affaires and 
 myself were invited to the Foreign Office to a 
 Conference with Mr. Balfour. The Secretary 
 of State informed us that a telegram had been 
 received from His Majesty's Ambassador in 
 Madrid containing the following information. 
 The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs had 
 told Sir Arthur Hardinge that in conversation 
 with the vSpanish Ambassador in Berlin, a 
 " high personage " stated that Germany would 
 be glad to know on what conditions Great 
 Britain would be prepared to enter into 
 negotiations for peace. Mr. Balfour, upon 
 reading this telegram, added that he had 
 invited us to discuss this matter confidentially. 
 I took the liberty of addressing the chairman 
 of our small Conference before Monsieur Cam- 
 bon had spoken. I said : "All those who 
 are present here know that the pressure of 
 the extreme parties and of the Bolsheviks, 
 inspired by their German masters, upon the 
 Government at Petrograd is growing daily. 
 I must frankly warn my colleagues at this 
 meeting that it is my duty to send to the
 
 168 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 Russian Foreign Minister a full account of 
 to-day's proceedings. At the same time, I 
 am painfully aware of the fact that I cannot 
 guarantee that secrecy will be preserved at 
 the other end of the telegraph wires. If the 
 Soviet get wind of the ' German peace offer/ 
 which in reality is nothing but an attempt 
 at creating dissensions, the agitation in Russia 
 is likely to cause considerable trouble. I 
 therefore request that these circumstances 
 be kept in mind in the course of the discus- 
 sion." The exchange of views revealed our 
 unanimity in considering this " kite " as a 
 mere attempt at fostering differences of opinion 
 among the Allies, and it was decided that an 
 evasive reply should be given. The German 
 Government was to be told that no con- 
 versations were possible unless the Powers of 
 the German Coalition addressed themselves 
 to all the Powers of the Entente and presented 
 definite proposals. This information I trans- 
 mitted to Tereschenko in a strictly confidential 
 message which was subsequently made public 
 when the Bolsheviks " disclosed " the diplo- 
 matic correspondence of Russian representa- 
 tives abroad. A couple of months later I 
 was told on good authority that my message
 
 A FALSE INTERPRETATION 169 
 
 had been interpreted in Petrograd as meaning 
 that peace negotiations were to begin shortly in 
 Madrid. This would seem incredible. The 
 fact, however, remains that M. A. Stakhovitch 
 was sent to Madrid in order that " a prominent 
 Russian politician should be present at the 
 peace pourparlers." Such, at any rate, was 
 the explanation given to me by Mr. Stakho- 
 vitch himself of his belated debut in the diplo- 
 matic career. The story of this distinguished 
 Russian politician's ordeal in Madrid is outside 
 the scope of my personal recollections. It is, 
 however, to be hoped that public opinion in 
 Russia may some day be in a position to 
 appreciate the patriotic zeal and self-sacrifice 
 with which the veteran Member of the Duma 
 and of the Council of the Empire endured the 
 trials of his Ambassadorial office in Spain. 
 
 The Russian Government continued to be 
 deeply concerned about the appointment of 
 an Ambassador to lyondon. Also, there can 
 be little doubt that in the first months of the 
 existence of the Provisional Government, the 
 British Ambassador had been instructed to 
 express the wish that such an appointment be 
 made. The third candidate, Prince Gregoire 
 Troubetzkoi, declared at the eleventh hour
 
 170 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 that he would prefer to go to Rome. I there- 
 fore received instructions to request the con- 
 sent of His Majesty's Government to the 
 appointment of Mr. de Giers, the Russian 
 Ambassador in Rome. Thus Mr. Tereschenko 
 had once more failed to consult the Russian 
 Representative in London and was persisting 
 in introducing " cinema " methods of appoint- 
 ing Ambassadors. It was clear as daylight 
 that the Provisional Government was rapidly 
 approaching its end. In these circumstances 
 I was determined to act in such a manner as 
 not to place our distinguished " doyen," Mr. 
 de Giers, in a false position. I therefore 
 decided to convey the information unofficially 
 to Lord Hardinge. I added that it was my 
 intention to suggest, in a private letter, that 
 the matter be postponed till Mr. Tereschenko's 
 impending arrival in London. In replying to 
 this suggestion, Lord Hardinge showed quite 
 unusual irritation. " Three times," said the 
 Permanent Under-Secretary, " has the consent 
 of His Majesty been given to the appointment 
 of an Ambassador. None of these gentlemen 
 ever appeared in London, and the Provisional 
 Government never took the trouble to explain 
 the reason of this extraordinary procedure,
 
 EXTRAORDINARY PROCEDURE 171 
 
 much less to apologize for it. This cannot 
 continue indefinitely. I must warn you that 
 before we ask His Majesty to consent to the 
 appointment of your fourth candidate, we 
 intend to have a satisfactory explanation of 
 the reasons which prevent Prince Troubetzkoi 
 from coming to Ixmdon. I agree with your 
 suggestion regarding an exchange of private 
 letters." 
 
 This exchange subsequently took place, 
 and was communicated by the Embassy con- 
 fidentially to Mr. de Giers. 
 
 Tereschenko did not come to I/mdon, and a 
 fortnight later the Provisional Government 
 was overthrown. 
 
 In the beginning of the winter of 1917 the 
 situation on the main theatre of war the 
 Western Front was becoming very serious. 
 The communiques received twice daily from 
 France were being awaited with ever-growing 
 nervousness. The casualty lists were lengthier 
 every day. At this time, too, the incursions 
 of the German airmen upon the British Isles 
 and in particular upon lyondon were becoming 
 more frequent. As soon as the full moon 
 shone upon the City, the inhabitants of L,ondon
 
 172 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 were kept in feverish expectation of these 
 deadly visitors. When the German machines 
 reached the line of the observation posts, 
 warnings were sounded all over London. 
 These signals summoned Londoners to seek 
 shelter in cellars, underground and tube 
 stations, etc. When the aeroplanes were over 
 London, they were fired at by anti-aircraft 
 guns. Gigantic searchlights cast extraordinary 
 picturesque streams of light all over the sky. 
 It is difficult to imagine a more thrilling or a 
 more beautiful sight than that of an aeroplane 
 under the converging radiance of three or 
 four of these searchlights. It was like a 
 gigantic silver wasp. The air was filled with 
 the sound of shell fire, and the danger from 
 the falling fragments was in reality greater 
 than that from the bombs. These raids went 
 on sometimes for three or four hours. On 
 December 19, 1917, the Russian Embassy in 
 Chesham place had a marvellous escape. On 
 a cold and foggy afternoon, the warning was 
 given about 5.30 p.m. Most of the Secretaries 
 of the Embassy and the servants obeyed the 
 summons and retired to the cellars. Air- 
 raids, fortunately, left me undismayed, and I 
 preferred my library to the cellar. At about
 
 173 
 
 8 p.m. the Secretaries left the Embassy. 
 Having finished a game of chess at about 
 8.40, I left with my chess-partner. A few 
 minutes later a bomb fell in Lyall Street 
 in front of the Embassy gate. The hole 
 it dug in the pavement was about fifteen 
 feet deep, and extended to about three- 
 fourths of the breadth of the narrow street. 
 The explosion was so violent that scores of 
 windows were smashed in Chesham Place. 
 Within a few yards from the spot where the 
 bomb fell some seventy ladies were sitting 
 round a table in a depot, "Belgravia" depot, 
 organised and superintended by Mrs. West. 
 The policeman on duty at the gate of Chesham 
 House escaped unhurt by the extraordin- 
 ary happy coincidence of having stepped 
 inside the courtyard behind a pillar at the 
 moment of the explosion ; he immediately 
 went inside the workshop, and found the 
 ladies lying on the floor in a state of indescrib- 
 able panic. He made them stand up and 
 sing " God save the King " thus restoring 
 them to their senses. Had the bomb been 
 dropped earlier by the infinitesimal fraction 
 of a second, it would have fallen on the Em- 
 bassy, and the effects would have been disas-
 
 174 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 trous. As it happened, the damage was very 
 slight. Nevertheless, it took seven months 
 to repair the damage done to the pavement. 
 
 This, however, is a digression. 
 
 As stated above, the situation at the front 
 in November, 1917, was grave. Meanwhile, 
 the United States' troops were coming on 
 slowly and their fighting capacity was, natur- 
 ally, not quite as high as that of the British 
 and French. The Government was therefore 
 in a nervous and irritable mood. This irrita- 
 tion was, of course, directed chiefly against 
 Russia. Russia had not fulfilled the ludicrous 
 expectations of those who talked in the 
 beginning of the war of the " Russian steam- 
 roller." Russia had gone through an internal 
 crisis during the war. Having lost her fighting 
 spirit as a result of this convulsion, Russia had 
 succumbed to the poison of German-made 
 propaganda of militant anarchism. Russia 
 therefore had alienated the sympathy of the 
 ruling British bureaucracy. Nobody, at that 
 moment, took the trouble to understand that 
 the Russian nation was the victim of past 
 errors, that the task of the Provisional Govern- 
 ment was a hopeless one. Stern, tragic 
 realities were apparent, not their causes.
 
 SUPPLIES VIA MURMANSK 175 
 
 Would the Russian people be justified in 
 blaming the Allies, and especially Great 
 Britain, for their attitude towards Russia at 
 the time of the Bolshevik revolution ? What 
 help could the Allies, could Great Britain 
 have given to Russia in order to avert the 
 catastrophe ? I can find no answer to this 
 question. The end of 1917 was the period 
 during which Britain strained her resources 
 to the utmost in order to save France from 
 disaster and to prevent the German coalition 
 from winning the war. In spite of the tre- 
 mendous difficulties in supplying Russia via 
 Murmansk, Great Britain had given us colossal 
 stores of war material. I recall the words of 
 the then War Minister, I^ord Milner, at a 
 luncheon given in his honour by the Russian 
 Government Supply Committee soon after 
 the " Kerensky offensive " which ended so 
 disastrously. I/)rd Milner said : "As long 
 as Russia remains Britain's Ally, she will 
 receive our assistance according to our possi- 
 bilities. But you will understand that every 
 shell, every gun is to us of vital necessity, 
 and that it would be sheer folly on our part 
 to give such material as we are absolutely 
 certain to make the best use of to the Russian
 
 176 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 Army, if we have substantial reasons for 
 doubting that this material will be used to 
 the best advantage of the Allied cause." 
 Had we any right to resent such a point of 
 view ? It is not metaphysical, it is not 
 cynical, it is not opportunist. It is states- 
 manlike. We had nothing to say. 
 
 As regards political support, it is likewise 
 difficult to see in what direction such support 
 could have been given. The unfortunate fact 
 is that there was already at the very root 
 of the relations between Russia and the 
 Allies, a misunderstanding and a falsehood. 
 Many months later and months, in those 
 troubled times, counted for years when Rus- 
 sia was already in the throes of Bolshevism, 
 I gained the opportunity of discussing the 
 political situation of the end of 1917 with 
 certain Russian politicians of the Kerensky 
 period. I learnt that there had been a few 
 courageous and honest patriots who said to 
 Kerensky and his associates : " Since you have 
 allowed the army to become demoralised and 
 have proved powerless to resist the Soviet, 
 Lenin and German propaganda (Lenin was in 
 Petrograd for several months, and Kerensky 
 never dared to arrest and hang him) Russia
 
 BRITISH SYMPATHY 177 
 
 cannot continue to fight. This you must tell 
 the Allies. To conceal the truth of the 
 real condition of Russia is tantamount to 
 treachery." This advice was not taken. 
 Kerensky continued his demagogy, and the 
 Foreign Minister was sending to the Russian 
 Representatives abroad optimistic telegrams. 
 At the same time, the Allied Governments 
 were receiving from their Representatives in 
 Russia alarmist reports. The Representatives 
 of Russia abroad were thus unwittingly made 
 the tools of a policy based upon deceit. 
 
 I have endeavoured in the preceding chapters 
 to describe the attitude towards Russia of 
 Government-circles, and have omitted to men- 
 tion the attitude of public opinion, of the 
 " man in the street " towards the Russian 
 crisis. The Russian offensive came to a close 
 at the end of 1916. Since then British corre- 
 spondents in Russia sent reports from which 
 it was quite evident to the British public that 
 Russia's fighting capacity had been irre- 
 trievably reduced. It is a remarkable fact 
 that in spite of all this the sympathies of the 
 British public were still with Russia. Of this 
 I was able to obtain striking proofs from 
 
 M
 
 accounts given by personal friends, officers in 
 the British Army, of the spirit in which the 
 rank and file of the British soldiers commented 
 upon the events in Russia. These men tried 
 to find an excuse for the collapse of the Russian 
 Army in the exertions and losses of the first 
 two and a half years of the War. There can 
 be no doubt that the " man in the street " 
 and in the trench displayed a more generous 
 spirit than the man in the office. 
 
 I had the great good fortune of personally 
 testing the depth of the sympathy and friend- 
 ship of the " rank and file " in Great Britain. 
 It happened in this way. In the beginning of 
 vSeptember, 1917, I received an invitation from 
 a Professor of Edinburgh University who had 
 been to Russia and was then in sympathy 
 with my country, to come to Edinburgh and 
 Glasgow and deliver a lecture on the Russian 
 situation, on Russia's contribution to the 
 cause of the Entente, etc., to the members of 
 the Anglo-Russian Societies of the above- 
 named towns. News from Russia was more 
 and more discouraging, and I could not make 
 up my mind to accept the invitation. Fin- 
 ally, I had to agree, and the lectures were 
 fixed for the I5th of October three weeks
 
 BRITISH SYMPATHY 179 
 
 before the Bolshevik coup d'etat, when there 
 remained not the slightest doubt in my mind 
 as to the turn events were taking. The recep- 
 tion I was given in both towns was extremely 
 cordial, the attendance at both lectures was 
 large and very sympathetic. It was quite 
 obvious that my audiences realised the magni- 
 tude of Russia's services to the common cause 
 and that the sorrow provoked by Russia's 
 mortal malady was not mingled with any 
 bitterness or resentment. 
 
 This visit to Scotland was the last bright 
 moment of my career in Great Britain, the 
 last pleasant memory. Three weeks later 
 began the period of sufferings and humiliations 
 unprecedented in the history of diplomatic 
 relations between European Powers.
 
 PART II 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 ON November 7 (October 25 Russian style), 
 1917, the British Embassy in Petrograd re- 
 ceived in the morning reliable information 
 regarding the impending coup d'etat and the 
 arrest of the members of the Provisional 
 Government. Three Ministers were lunching 
 with the British Ambassador on that day. 
 Upon hearing from the Ambassador the dis- 
 quieting news they assured him that nothing 
 of the sort was possible, that the Government 
 had taken all necessary measures, and that 
 they were " complete masters of the situation." 
 In less than six hours, the Provisional Govern- 
 ment was arrested . . . with the exception of 
 Kerensky. Once more, as before, the Russian 
 Embassy in London learned the news of the 
 coup d'etat in Petrograd from Renter's Agency. 
 It is difficult to describe in concrete words 
 the impression produced in London by the 
 news that Lenin and Trotsky had seized power 
 in Russia. Naturally, it was clear to every- 
 
 181
 
 one that an event had taken place by which 
 Russia had become irretrievably excluded from 
 the group of Allied Powers waging war with all 
 their might against the common enemy. The 
 fact that Kerensky and his associates had 
 departed from the scene was hardly a matter 
 of regret to the Allies, as they appeared to have 
 already reached the conclusion that these 
 men were incapable of governing Russia. On 
 the other hand, the advent to power of men 
 who had been imported from Germany pro- 
 voked feelings of enmity and indignation 
 towards the Russian people. Neither public 
 opinion nor the Government had in those 
 days even a remote conception of the limits 
 to which the Bolshevik regime would drive 
 the ruin of Russia, and of the cruelties it 
 would inflict upon the Russian nation. At 
 the same time, the opinion prevailed that the 
 coup d'etat was a temporary phenomenon, that 
 Lenin, who seemingly had no support from the 
 masses of the people, would be unable to 
 retain for any length of time the power which 
 he had seized so easily. Guesses were made 
 as to the number of days the Bolshevik regime 
 would last and who would replace it. 
 
 Russians in London and elsewhere were
 
 THK BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION 183 
 
 dumfounded. Very few of them realised 
 the extent of the shame and of the calamity 
 which had befallen Russia. Neither did they 
 foresee how long the shame would last. " It 
 is a question of a few days ; " such was the 
 view more frequently expressed. If I remem- 
 ber correctly, a prominent Russian politician 
 in Paris expressed that view in a newspaper 
 interview. 
 
 The Bolshevik Revolution opened a new 
 page in the history of Anglo-Russian relations. 
 It is necessary before continuing the narra- 
 tive of the trying times which the Russians, 
 and in particular, the Russian Embassy 
 have lived in London ever since November 37 
 to make a few preliminary and general 
 remarks. In the light of these remarks, I 
 hope, the subsequent events, the waverings 
 and certain seemingly inexplicable measures 
 adopted by the Allied Governments and by 
 Great Britain in particular, may be more easily 
 understood. 
 
 In judging these subsequent events it should 
 be continually borne in mind that all the 
 activities of the Government and all the efforts 
 of the nation were directed towards one goal 
 victory over Germany. It seems, therefore,
 
 184 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 reasonable to apply to the explanation of the 
 attitude of the British Government towards 
 Russia two criteria depending upon two 
 periods into which I divide the history of 
 Anglo-Russian relations during the last two 
 years : before November n, 1918 the actual 
 date of the end of the war, and after. 
 
 " Russia has ceased to fight. Russia has 
 ceased to be our Ally. There are in Russia a 
 million and a half German and Austrian 
 prisoners. Russia also holds colossal stores, 
 armaments and equipment which she has 
 received from us. We must therefore make 
 every effort in order to prevent Lenin's 
 Government from handing over these enormous 
 numbers of able-bodied enemy soldiers and 
 the war materials to Germany. To that end 
 all means are justified." Such seems to me 
 to have been the trend of argument, the 
 motto of the Allies and the main impulse of 
 their action. I have no doubt that the future 
 impartial historian will discern this motive 
 and will find in it an excuse for a great deal of 
 what the Allies and in particular Great Britain 
 and France have done in Russia between 
 November 7, 1917, and November n, 1918. 
 It was as difficult for us, Russians abroad, in
 
 THE SITUATION IN 1918 185 
 
 those cruel twelve months, to acquire " an 
 historical perspective," as it is for a man who 
 is operated upon without an anaesthetic not 
 to scream. 
 
 The tremendous difficulties which the Allies 
 were facing during the period extending from 
 the signing of the Brest-Iyitovsk Treaty and 
 the military operations of the Allies in France 
 in the autumn of 1918, which ended in the 
 complete defeat of Germany, should be under- 
 stood and correctly estimated. The German 
 armies were within fifty miles of Paris. How 
 was it possible for the Allies to think of 
 " saving Russia " ? 
 
 Self-restraint is the characteristic quality 
 of the Briton, of the individual as well as of 
 the community. That quality was mani- 
 fested in the early months of 1918 with extra- 
 ordinary power and clearness. All the con- 
 scious elements of the nation, the Government, 
 the Press, and the Army itself, felt that the 
 issue of the war hung upon a thread and with 
 it the fate of Europe. Another successful 
 German thrust, another wide breach at the 
 Front and the fate of France was sealed. 
 As I have already mentioned, it was well 
 understood in Britain that a disaster to France
 
 i86 THE ORDEAIy OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 was tantamount to a defeat for Britain. The 
 entire male population of Britain (Ireland 
 excluded) physically fit for service had already 
 been conscripted. Old men were made to join. 
 Innumerable women were already serving in 
 various auxiliary corps. In a word, it was 
 evident that war must be waged with the 
 live material available and that gaps in those 
 numbers could no longer be filled. And yet, 
 during those critical months, not a single 
 panicy outcry, not a single clearly expressed 
 word of anger and hatred towards the Russian 
 people was uttered in Great Britain. When I 
 compare the attitude of Great Britain with 
 that of certain other countries, when I recall 
 certain things that have been said and written 
 in these countries, I cannot but come to the 
 conclusion that in spite of all the subsequent 
 errors of British statesmen, Great Britain, 
 with regard to Russia, was infinitely more 
 generous and more magnanimous than any 
 other of our Allies. 
 
 The conditions underwent a fundamental 
 change with the conclusion of the Armistice 
 on November n, 1918. From that moment 
 the attitude of the Allies towards Russia may 
 be analysed from an entirely different angle.
 
 GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA 187 
 
 Inasmuch as the lack of foresight and gener- 
 osity on the part of the powers-that-be could 
 be explained before that date, by anxiety and 
 by the fear of the morrow, so the shaking off 
 of the German menace imposed upon the 
 Allied Powers the moral obligation to come to 
 the rescue of Russia with all the means at 
 their disposal. This obligation has not been 
 carried out. The future will show whether 
 Russia alone will suffer from this collective 
 sin of the present makers of the destinies of 
 the world or whether other European nations 
 will be subjected to trials and convulsions for 
 the sins of individuals. 
 
 According to international law and all 
 traditions the collapse of the Provisional 
 Government in Russia had put an end to the 
 formal plenary powers of the Representatives 
 of Russia abroad. The foreign Powers had 
 therefore the choice between two courses. 
 Either to continue unofficial or semi-official 
 relations with the Representatives of the last 
 Russian Government they recognised, or to 
 recognise L,enin's Government. Had the latter 
 course been adopted the former Representatives 
 of Russia would have had to withdraw
 
 i88 THE ORDEAIv OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 and Bolshevik agents would have taken their 
 place. 
 
 All the Powers of the Entente with the 
 exception of Great Britain adopted the first 
 course. The attitude of Governments towards 
 the Representatives of the Provisional Govern- 
 ment varied according to local conditions and 
 later underwent further changes according to 
 events. In Rome, Tokyo and Washington 
 in the first month after the coup d'etat there 
 was no perceptible change in the attitude of 
 the Governments towards the Russian Am- 
 bassadors. In Washington a certain control 
 was exercised over Russia's credits. In 
 Paris the position of Mr. Maklakov was some- 
 what ambiguous. He had been appointed by 
 the Provisional Government, but owing to 
 the fact that he arrived in Paris on the 
 eve of the Bolshevik Revolution, he failed 
 to present his credentials. The attitude of 
 the French Government, especially in the 
 first few months, appears to have been deter- 
 mined to a greater extent by the personal 
 qualities of the Ambassador than by his 
 official title. 
 
 Very soon after November 7, 1917, the 
 British Government applied a somewhat
 
 A BOLSHEVIK AMBASSADOR 189 
 
 different method. Alongside with the Russian 
 Embassy, whose funds were confiscated and 
 whose privilege of corresponding in cipher with 
 other Russian institutions abroad was cancelled, 
 a Bolshevik " Ambassador," lyitvinov-Finkel- 
 stein, appeared in London. The Russian 
 Embassy was subjected to many limitations 
 and restrictions, whilst the Government was 
 in constant intercourse with the Bolshevik 
 Embassy. Although this " Ambassador " was 
 never officially recognised, there can be no 
 doubt that there existed official relations and 
 that he enjoyed certain privileges such as the 
 right to cipher and to send diplomatic couriers 
 which were denied to the Russian Embassy. 
 Obviously no private individual could have 
 enjoyed such privileges. 
 
 Upon the receipt by the British Foreign 
 Office of official confirmation from Petrograd 
 of the collapse of the Provisional Government, 
 I had an interview with Mr. Balfour. I asked 
 the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
 whether His Majesty's Government would 
 continue its relations with the Russian Em- 
 bassy in London. Mr. Balfour replied in the 
 affirmative and added that although formally
 
 IQO THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 he could not recognise me as a Representative 
 of the Russian Government, he would be 
 glad to hear anything I might wish to say 
 and to consider any suggestions I might deem 
 it necessary to make. In discussing the situa- 
 tion that had arisen in Russia I ventured to 
 express the view that it would be desirable 
 (i) to make every possible effort at supporting 
 the Rumanian front where Russian units 
 remained who had not yet succumbed to the 
 general disintegration ; (2) to secure the im- 
 mediate withdrawal from Russia of all official 
 Representatives of the Entente Powers, Great 
 Britain, of course, included, and to entrust 
 the Representatives of friendly neutral Powers 
 with the task of safeguarding and protecting 
 the nationals and the interests of the Powers 
 of the Entente ; and (3) to endeavour to 
 address an appeal to the Russian people in 
 the name of the Entente which would explain 
 to all conscious elements in Russia all the 
 terrible consequences Russia would have to 
 suffer from the continuation of the plundering 
 regime of German tools. 
 
 (On the next day I imparted to Monsieur 
 Cambon the tenor of this conversation and 
 asked the Ambassador to support my sugges-
 
 DIPLOMATIC TRADITION 191 
 
 tions with his own Government, more especi- 
 ally in regard to the collective appeal to the 
 Russian people. The Ambassador replied that 
 such an appeal on the part of a Foreign Power 
 would be an unusual procedure in contra- 
 diction with diplomatic tradition and would 
 therefore be unpracticable. I replied that in 
 normal conditions a Government may influence 
 public opinion in another country by means 
 of the publication of appeals addressed to 
 the Government, but in reality meant for the 
 people. In the present case, when the normal 
 life of a state has been interrupted, a depar- 
 ture from traditional methods seemed to me 
 justifiable. I failed, however, to convince the 
 Ambassador. Two months later, during a 
 short visit to Paris, I met Mr. Oscar Crosby, 
 who was then at the head of the American 
 Financial Mission in France, and enjoyed the 
 full confidence of President Wilson. I men- 
 tioned the matter of the " appeal " to Mr. 
 Crosby, who seemed to favour the idea. He 
 suggested that I should draft the appeal and 
 promised to send a telegram to President 
 Wilson. I declined this very complimentary 
 offer and remarked that President Wilson 
 would hardly be inclined to write at my dicta-
 
 192 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 tion, the more so that he was himself a past 
 master in diplomatic " appeals." President 
 Wilson, as is well known, addressed a few 
 days later an appeal to the Congress of the 
 Soviets in Moscow. I wonder whether this 
 appeal was not of the nature of a wrong address 
 placed upon a good letter.) 
 
 To return to my conversation with Mr. 
 Balfour. The Secretary of State informed 
 me that it would hardly be practicable to 
 support the Rumanian front, not merely 
 for technical reasons, but likewise owing to 
 the impossibility of removing even a small 
 force from the Western Front. With regard 
 to the recall of British official Representatives 
 in Petrograd, Mr. Balfour considered that the 
 decision in this matter must be left with Sir 
 George Buchanan in accordance with subse- 
 quent events. I endeavoured to point out 
 that the continued presence of official British 
 Representatives in Petrograd would undoubt- 
 edly afford favourable opportunities for political 
 blackmail on the part of the Bolsheviks and 
 that they would demand the recognition of 
 their agents and seek to obtain for these 
 agents diplomatic privileges under the threat 
 of reprisals in the event of these privileges
 
 SIR GEORGE BUCHANAN 193 
 
 being denied. I pointed out that the British 
 Diplomatic and Consular Institutions would 
 hardly be in a position to protect the lives and 
 the property of British subjects, as the licen- 
 tious sailors and Red Guards, and with them 
 all the other riff-raff of the capital, would 
 certainly be disinclined to respect the au- 
 thority of Representatives of a Foreign Power. 
 Finally, I most emphatically warned Mr. 
 Balfour that the lives of the Ambassador 
 himself and of other British officials would 
 undoubtedly be endangered, were they to fail 
 to take advantage of the uncertainty and 
 indecision at present prevailing in Petrograd, 
 and to leave the hot-bed of Bolshevism at the 
 earliest possible opportunity. The subsequent 
 murder of Captain Cromie and the pillage of 
 the British Embassy and of other Embassies 
 and Legations seem to have borne out my 
 prediction. Sir George Buchanan, as is well 
 remembered, remained for some time in Petro- 
 grad and left only when it became abundantly 
 clear to him that the Bolsheviks were entirely 
 in the hands of Germany, and that the presence 
 of a British Ambassador in Petrograd was 
 utterly aimless and useless. Mr. Bindley, 
 Counsellor of the Embassy, the French and 
 
 N
 
 194 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 the American Ambassadors, as is now known, 
 were prevented by the Reds from crossing the 
 Finnish border and were " evacuated," first to 
 Vologda and later, after a long series of trials, 
 to Archangel, where they stayed for several 
 months. 
 
 After Trotsky took possession of the Russian 
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, all communica- 
 tions between Petrograd and the Russian 
 Embassies and Legations abroad naturally 
 came to an end. A general strike took place 
 of the personnel of the Foreign Office, and only 
 one, Dolivo-Dobrovolsky, of the Economic De- 
 partment, remained in the service of the 
 Bolsheviks. He sent us a few telegrams on 
 current, non-political affairs which remained 
 unanswered. The Embassy likewise refrained 
 from accepting the offer contained in Trotsky's 
 circular telegram that Russian Representatives 
 abroad should recognise the Bolshevik Govern- 
 ment and continue to serve them. Only one 
 Russian Representative abroad, the Charge 
 d' Affaires at Lisbon, the Russian Baron 
 Ungern-Sternberg, endeavoured to send a reply 
 to Trotsky. He also sent me the text of his 
 reply. I informed him that such a procedure 
 was in my opinion tantamount to treason,
 
 A HIGH TRIBUTE 195 
 
 and that I would henceforward consider him 
 as having renounced his position as Russian 
 Representative. 
 
 Curiously enough, in his telegram to the 
 Russian Representatives, Trotsky indicated the 
 maximum salary to which those who would 
 remain in the service of the Bolsheviks would 
 be entitled. He evidently admitted the possi- 
 bility of some of us recognising the Bolshevik 
 regime. These hopes, however, proved in 
 vain. Only a few Consular agents, who con- 
 sidered themselves as having been badly 
 treated by the Russian Government most of 
 them of the Russian Consular Service in 
 Persia became Bolshevik Diplomats. A high 
 tribute should be paid to the Petrograd 
 Personnel of the Foreign Office for their 
 boycott of the Bolsheviks. They risked their 
 fortunes and probably their lives, whereas 
 Russian Representatives abroad ran only the 
 remote risk of losing their property in Russia. 
 When the news appeared in the British Press 
 that the " lands " belonging to the Russian 
 Representative in London had been confiscated, 
 and that this Agent, together with the Ambas- 
 sadors in France, Japan, etc., was summoned 
 to appear before a Revolutionary Tribunal, I
 
 196 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 received a series of letters of condolence from 
 my British friends, whose kind anxiety I dis- 
 pelled by informing them that the Bolsheviks 
 could confiscate no property of mine, as no 
 such thing existed. 
 
 Soon afterwards Trotsky made several en- 
 deavours at imposing Bolshevik " Ambas- 
 sadors" and " Ministers" upon foreign powers. 
 Of the neutral powers, as far as I remember, 
 only Sweden and Switzerland admitted Bol- 
 shevik Legations. At Berne, all intercourse 
 with the Representatives of the Provisional 
 Government was interrupted. They were com- 
 pelled to vacate the Legation and to surrender 
 the building to a band of drunken adventurers 
 who called themselves the Representatives of 
 Soviet Russia. Several months later these 
 ruffians were expelled from Switzerland in 
 circumstances which should cause not Russia, 
 but Switzerland, to blush profusely. 
 
 There were only two Bolshevik Ambassadors 
 " en fonction." In London Finkelstein. In 
 Berlin Joffe. 
 
 Trotsky's telegram informing Finkelstein- 
 Litvinov of his appointment was published 
 in all the London papers. The Press gave 
 this sensational and highly significant event a
 
 KAMENEV IN LONDON 197 
 
 place of honour in their columns. Portraits 
 of Mr. Litvinov, his wife and infant, accounts 
 of his dubious past, innumerable interviews 
 with this new-born diplomat appeared daily. 
 
 In order to have done with the subject of 
 Bolshevik representation an incident might 
 here be mentioned which took place some time 
 later, caused by the effort to send a Bolshevik 
 Ambassador to Paris. This gentleman, whose 
 real name I cannot state with any degree of 
 certainty, assumed the Russian name of 
 Kamenev. The British Government, presum- 
 ably without consulting France as to whether 
 Kamenev would be accepted, allowed this 
 Bolshevik to come to London. I asked the 
 Foreign Office whether Kamenev had been 
 granted a British visa, and whether the Foreign 
 Office thought that the French Government 
 would do the same. " I doubt it," was the 
 reply. "What then is the point in admitting 
 him to Britain where he is certain to indulge 
 in Bolshevik propaganda ? " I was given 
 to understand that certain Parliamentary 
 groups were insisting upon Kamenev's ad- 
 mission. These groups apparently were already 
 intent upon touching the pitch. Kamenev's 
 visit had a rather lamentable finale. Upon the
 
 198 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 receipt of Monsieur Clemenceau's categorical 
 refusal to allow the Bolshevik emissary to set 
 foot in France, and seeing that his continued 
 presence in London caused a certain sensation 
 in Bolshevik circles, the British Government 
 decided to repatriate him. I understand that 
 Kamenev's departure was attended by some 
 rather comical incidents. One of his associates, 
 who was determined to miss the train, went 
 to bed on the excuse of having sent his clothes 
 to the tailor. Apparently he was told to 
 proceed to the station in pyjamas. The 
 clothes turned up in time. 
 
 When I found myself in the position of a 
 Representative of a Government which had 
 ceased to exist, I thought it necessary to seek 
 moral support and assistance from the Russian 
 circles in London. The isolation of the Em- 
 bassy from Russian circles to which I have 
 alluded above, had already to a very great 
 extent ceased to exist. During the eight 
 months of the Provisional Government these 
 relations underwent a considerable change. I 
 therefore considered that the aim of trans- 
 forming the Embassy into a real " centre " 
 accessible and acceptable to all Russians 
 whatever their political views, had already
 
 A MEETING AT THE EMBASSY 199 
 
 partially been attained. One of the first 
 cares I took after the Bolshevik Revolution 
 was to unite all Russians in their attitude 
 towards this event. I therefore called a 
 meeting at the Embassy in the last days of 
 November. The meeting was attended by 
 representatives of various Russian political 
 and social groups and by the bureaucracy. 
 The following resolution was adopted : 
 
 " We, citizens of regenerated Russia living 
 abroad, cannot remain silent witnesses of the 
 humiliation and dishonour which are being 
 inflicted on our Country by usurpers who 
 have criminally seized power through violence 
 and treachery, and who, while proclaiming 
 justice and liberty, are in reality leading to 
 oppression and despotism. They have suc- 
 ceeded in spreading misery and sedition and 
 are fast plunging Russia into destruction. 
 
 " In order to break up our brotherhood in 
 arms with Western democracies, to dismember 
 Mighty Russia and deliver her to the mercies 
 of Germany, they have torn up the solemn 
 treaty entered into with Russia's Allies and, 
 to use their own words, ' have thrown secret 
 documents into the dustbin ' as so much waste
 
 200 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 paper. From all sides tidings reach us from 
 Russia of indignation and resistance to this 
 usurpation of power, and we feel it our duty 
 to join this movement and to declare that a 
 criminal faction cannot be permitted to speak 
 for the Russian people. 
 
 " We, Russian citizens in Great Britain, 
 realise that the active assistance which we can 
 render to our honest compatriots in Russia who 
 are struggling against these traitors, can be 
 but small owing to our limited numbers and to 
 the distance that separates us from our Country. 
 Nevertheless, we pledge ourselves to stand 
 together and to use every means in our power 
 actively to resist the treacherous forces at 
 present profiting by the help of our enemies 
 to destroy Russia's honour, independence, 
 unity and liberty. In this struggle we count 
 upon the help, counsel, and sympathetic re- 
 sponse of the true sons of Russia who do not 
 submit to the will of usurpers and who by 
 their heroic resistance strengthen in us and 
 in our Allies the faith in a speedy triumph of 
 truth and liberty." 
 
 Among those present were myself, the 
 Staffs of the Russian Embassy and Consulate-
 
 THE RUSSIAN COLONY 201 
 
 General; General Hermonius, the President, 
 and members of the Russian Government 
 Committee in England ; Professor Sir Paul 
 Vinogradoff, Hon. Secretary of Russian 
 Prisoners of War Help Committee ; Admiral 
 Kedroff ; I/ieut. -General Dessino, Chief of 
 Russian Military Mission in England, many 
 other Russian Diplomatic, Military and Naval 
 officials, a number of Russian journalists, 
 and independent Russians. The resolution 
 was communicated to the London Press 
 through Renter's Agency, who transmitted it 
 to Paris. The Morning Post was the only 
 paper which gave the full text. On the occa- 
 sion of this step the open public declaration 
 in the name of the Russian Representative 
 supported by prominent representatives of 
 the Russian Colony in I/ondon, of our deter- 
 mination to fight the Bolshevik regime with all 
 means at our disposal the difference of opinion 
 between the British Foreign Office and myself 
 was manifested for the first time. They 
 decidedly " disapproved " of this declaration, 
 as they considered that " polemics " with the 
 regime which had gained the upper hand in 
 Russia were against diplomatic tradition, and 
 embarrassing to the British Government.
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 IN the course of November, 1917, an effort 
 was made simultaneously by Mr. Maklakov, our 
 Ambassador in Paris, and myself to establish 
 full co-ordination of the activities of Russian 
 Representatives abroad and in particular of 
 the Representatives accredited to the Powers 
 of the Entente. This co-ordination and unity, 
 however, was not reached. Differences of 
 opinion arose almost immediately between 
 Messrs. Maklakov, de Giers and Bakhmetiev, 
 on the one hand, and myself on the other. 
 The three above-named gentlemen considered 
 that it was necessary to " await developments," 
 to refrain from " drastic steps." They also 
 thought that should some kind of coalition or 
 compromise be reached between the Bol- 
 sheviks and other parties we should consider 
 the attitude of such a coalition towards the 
 war, as well as the attitude of the Allies towards 
 this coalition. In reply to telegrams in this 
 sense which I received from the above-named 
 Russian Ambassadors, I telegraphed to Mr. 
 Maklakov : 
 
 202
 
 QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE 203 
 
 " In view of the fact that telegrams from 
 Mr. de Giers and Mr. Bakhmetiev contain 
 indications that they share your point of view 
 regarding the possibility of a new Government 
 being formed in Russia on the basis of a 
 compromise with the Bolsheviks and re- 
 garding our attitude towards such an issue, 
 I deem it my duty to state the following : I 
 have no doubt that such a Government, even 
 should it be formally recognised in order to 
 avoid complete rupture with Russia, could 
 enjoy in the opinion of the British Govern- 
 ment and of the public neither authority nor 
 prestige nor confidence. The task of speaking 
 and acting in I/ondon in the name of such a 
 Government would be one which I should 
 never be in a position to undertake. At the 
 present moment we are, of course, unable to 
 make any forecast. Nevertheless, I consider 
 that only a Government which would enjoy 
 the full confidence and the support of the 
 Allies, would be capable of restoring the 
 honour and the power of Russia. Inasmuch as 
 this consideration is capable of influencing 
 those who will assume power in Russia 
 after the Bolsheviks, I am convinced that 
 it will be our duty to give expression to
 
 204 THE ORDEAI, OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 this consideration as frankly as possible, 
 should the opportunity arise." 
 
 After this exchange of telegrams there were 
 practically no further discussions between 
 myself and the three Ambassadors on ques- 
 tions of principle. The majority of Russian 
 Representatives in Allied and neutral countries 
 expressed the idea that it would be desirable 
 to entrust Mr. Maklakov with the " direc- 
 tion " of the activities of Russian Repre- 
 sentatives. I considered, on the one hand, 
 that on formal grounds such a direction, were 
 it necessary and opportune, should belong to 
 Mr. de Giers, as the senior and duly accredited 
 Ambassador of Russia. On the other hand, 
 I did not see my way to accepting " direc- 
 tions," the fulfilment of which would necessitate 
 a compromise. I, therefore, expressed myself 
 definitely against any " direction " from Paris. 
 After a while, this question lost all practical 
 importance, as the British Government de- 
 prived me of the right of sending telegrams 
 in cipher to my colleagues abroad. 
 
 In January, 1918, a period of complete 
 " autonomy " for the Russian Embassy 
 in London, or to use the fashionable 
 expression, of " self-determination," which
 
 FRIENDS IN NEED 205 
 
 lasted ten months, was opened by this 
 restriction, placed by the British Government, 
 upon intercourse with the outer world. There 
 was no Russian Government from whom the 
 Embassy could receive instructions. All the 
 activities of the Embassy and the intercourse 
 with the British Government depended entirely 
 upon the judgment of the Embassy itself. 
 In the exceptionally difficult circumstances 
 in which the Embassy was thus placed, it was 
 naturally impossible to work without the 
 support and assistance of the Russian political 
 groups in London, with whom close contact 
 was therefore established. Of the individuals 
 who rendered me in these days of trial in- 
 valuable services and moral support for which 
 I shall always be deeply grateful, I may cite 
 Mr. G. Wesselitsky, the veteran correspondent 
 of the Novoie Vremia, a man endowed 
 with exceptional mental and moral qualities, 
 my old friend, Mr. Gregory Wilenkin, Mr. 
 Poliakov-Litovtzev, and lieutenant Abaza. 
 No tribute can be high enough for the constant 
 patriotic zeal and efficiency with which the 
 staff of the Embassy seconded my efforts. 
 In moments of severe trial, in the gloomy 
 days in which I was beginning to lose faith
 
 206 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPT/MAT 
 
 in the possibility of further work under the 
 banner of loyalty to the alliance between 
 Great Britain and Russia, when I was beginning 
 to think that a complete rupture would do 
 Russia less harm than the continuation of 
 humiliating tolerance these men more than 
 once saved me by their counsel, aid, and more 
 subdued patriotism than my own. In a word, 
 by prudence, which occasionally all but de- 
 serted me under the revolt of my national 
 pride, they prevented me from taking irre- 
 trievable steps. 
 
 Two months went by. The Bolsheviks 
 concluded an Armistice with Germany. There 
 followed a Declaration regarding the impend- 
 ing Peace negotiations at B rest-Li tovsk. At 
 the same time it became abundantly clear that 
 the usurpation of power by the Bolsheviks was 
 not " a monstrous episode of four or five days' 
 duration." The men who had assured the 
 British Ambassador on November 7 in Petro- 
 grad that they were " complete masters of the 
 situation," were still interned in the fortress 
 of Peter and Paul. The idol of yesterday, 
 the would-be Napoleon Kerensky had dis- 
 appeared without leaving any trace. (He 
 " emerged " in lyondon several months later.)
 
 COMPLETENESS OF REVOLUTION 207 
 
 No one rose to the defence of these godfathers 
 of Russian liberty. It was obvious that the 
 Russian people, driven by superhuman sacri- 
 fices and efforts to a state of complete in- 
 anition and desirous of only one thing ending 
 the war were not going to follow anyone who 
 would attempt to fight the Bolsheviks in the 
 name of " fidelity to the Allies." Having 
 deprived the army of the watchword " for the 
 Tzar," the Provisional Government failed to 
 replace it by the watchword " for the country." 
 By his order that the standard should be 
 carried with the transport, the War Minister 
 of the Provisional Government killed the 
 stimulus of the peasants of Saratov and Penza 
 to fight against the Germans for the integrity 
 of Smolensk. The banner from which the 
 Provisional Government washed off the Double 
 Eagle (in the place of which they tried to 
 embroider the words, " Liberty, Fraternity, 
 and Equality," words which the Russian 
 peasant did not understand) was torn to 
 pieces by the Bolsheviks and thrown into 
 the bloodstained dustbin. In its stead they 
 put forward a new watchword which proved 
 irresistible : "Go home, and rob and kill 
 anyone you choose on your way."
 
 208 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 It also became apparent that the intelligent 
 elements in Russia were isolated and powerless. 
 
 Great Britain was jconfronted with the 
 question : would it not be opportune to enter 
 into official relations with the Soviet Govern- 
 ment in order to exercise some influence upon 
 the course of the negotiations at Brest- 
 L,itovsk. This seems to me to have been the 
 main reason for the parleys which took 
 place between the Allies and which very 
 nearly resulted in recognition being granted 
 to the Soviet in February, 1918. 
 
 At this moment the first and only attempt 
 was made by the Bolshevik " Ambassador " 
 in London, Finkelstein-Iyitvinov, to gain pos- 
 session of the Russian Embassy at Chesham 
 House. This is how the attempt was made. 
 
 One Krysin, connected with the People's 
 Bank and with the Co-operatives, asked for an 
 interview with me by telephone. I had made 
 it a rule never to refuse personal interviews 
 to my compatriots, who were received by 
 the staff of the Embassy only when the 
 Chancery of the Embassy was fully competent 
 to grant their requests without consulting 
 the chief. Mr. Krysin was accordingly in- 
 vited to come the next morning. He arrived
 
 OVERTURES FROM LITVINOV 209 
 
 at the appointed hour and handed to me a 
 letter from Mr. Finkelstein, signed Maxim 
 Litvinov. Mr. Krysin seemed extremely per- 
 turbed. His voice was somewhat shaky and 
 he made futile efforts at adopting an over- 
 bearing manner, which he was, however, unable 
 to sustain owing to the polite and good- 
 natured sarcasm with which I treated this 
 embarrassed tool of the impudent Bolshevik 
 adventurer who pretended to represent Russia. 
 Lit vino v's position at that moment was truly 
 tragic. He was by no means a fool, and could 
 not take himself seriously. Meanwhile, the 
 British Government (excusez du peu !) were 
 officially negotiating with him. Mr. lyitvinov's 
 (I will in the future omit to mention his real 
 name for purposes of brevity) letter contained 
 the suggestion that I should "hand over" the 
 Embassy to him. The motive he adduced 
 was that the Provisional Government had 
 ceased to exist and that the power in Russia 
 was in the hands of the Bolsheviks. To my 
 question : '' What does Mr. Litvinov actually 
 mean by ' handing over ' ? " Mr. Krysin 
 replied : ' The British Government is most 
 anxious to enter into relations with the Soviet 
 Government. In order to establish these
 
 2io THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 relations, the representative of the Soviets 
 must have at his disposal the necessary 
 ' apparatus/ i. e. the Embassy buildings, the 
 personnel, the archives, ciphers, and funds." 
 " Why do you need cipher ? " was my re- 
 joinder. " Has not Mr. Bronstein declared 
 in favour of the principle of open diplomacy ? " 
 " There are important communications, upon 
 the receipt of which Mr. Trotsky (Bronstein) 
 should be at liberty to decide whether to pub- 
 lish them or not. He must at any rate, be the 
 first to receive them." " If the British Govern- 
 ment is so anxious to communicate with Mr. 
 Bronstein, I am certain that means may be 
 found for the secret transmission of important 
 communications. I am not, however, pre- 
 pared to play any accompaniments to such a 
 duet. As regards the Embassy buildings, the 
 personnel, the archives, the ciphers, and the 
 funds of the Embassy, all these have been en- 
 trusted to my care by the Russian Government 
 which I recognise. I should, therefore, con- 
 sider it tantamount to treason to hand them 
 over to the representatives of a gang of traitors 
 to Russia. Should this gang be recognised 
 by foreign Powers as the lawful authority, 
 such a recognition would not be binding upon
 
 BOI^HEVIK EMISSARIES 211 
 
 me and I should most certainly take every 
 step in my power, in order to prevent the 
 property of the Russian State from falling into 
 the hands of traitors." " Is that your last 
 word ? " asked Mr. Krysin. " Yes, it is, and 
 I should be obliged if you would transmit it to 
 L,itvinov." 
 
 Mr. Krysin retired. At the same time 
 another emissary from the Bolshevik Ambas- 
 sador arrived at the Russian Consulate-General 
 in Bedford Square. He likewise demanded 
 the surrender of the Consulate, and stated 
 that " Nabokoff is to-day handing over the 
 Embassy to L,itvinov." The Consul-General, 
 Mr. Onou, naturally did not believe this 
 statement and dismissed the Bolshevik in- 
 truder. Soon after these episodes the Embassy 
 was informed that the Bolsheviks intended to 
 " invade " the Embassy and seize it by force. 
 Personally, I doubt that such an intention 
 really existed. However, in order to put an 
 end to all attempts in that direction, orders 
 were given for the gates of the Embassy to be 
 locked after office hours. An extra policeman 
 was stationed upon the initiative of the Com- 
 missioner of Police at the gates of the Embassy, 
 and we lived in peace ever after.
 
 212 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 The British Government, of course, realised 
 that our expulsion from Chesham House was 
 only possible in the event of the official recog- 
 nition of the Soviet Government and the 
 ensuing complete cessation of all intercourse 
 with the Representatives of the Provisional 
 Government. At the same time, in view of 
 the fact that the Embassy had lost its voice 
 in international questions, it was considered 
 opportune to impose upon the Embassy a 
 series of restrictions. We were deprived of 
 the right to use cipher. The " autonomy " of 
 the Embassy thus became " complete isola- 
 tion." All the funds which stood to the 
 credit of the Embassy and of other Russian 
 Government Institutions in London were con- 
 fiscated and the Russian Government Com- 
 mittee was " forcibly " closed. 
 
 The methods which were applied to this 
 confiscation of funds and to the closing of 
 the Russian Government Committee were such 
 as to make it even now, after a lapse of two 
 years, an unpleasant task to recount them. 
 
 The British Government was, on principle, 
 entirely justified in its contention that the 
 Russian Government Committee, whose ob- 
 ject had been to superintend the supplies of
 
 CONFISCATION OF FUNDS 213 
 
 war material to the Russian Army, should 
 cease to exist. It cannot be gainsaid, more- 
 over, that drastic reforms were necessary 
 in the organisation of the Committee, whose 
 members, including the clerks, numbered over 
 seven hundred. The salaries they received 
 were undoubtedly in some cases out of pro- 
 portion with services rendered. The chairman 
 of the Committee, General Hermonius, a man 
 of considerable ability and of an integrity 
 beyond any doubt whatsoever, was so over- 
 whelmed with work that he was unable to 
 enter into all the details of administration 
 and to investigate with sufficient thoroughness 
 all the workings of the Committee. In the 
 flock of seven hundred, black sheep were to be 
 found. I had on several occasions drawn the 
 attention of the Provisional Government to 
 the defects of the Committee and to the fact 
 that funds were being spent with undue 
 lavishness. I asked for an investigation. In 
 this question, however, as in the matter of 
 the retirement, with promotion, of the Russian 
 Military Attache, whose advanced age made it 
 impossible for him to carry out his duties with 
 sufficient energy, all my representations were 
 unavailing. With the exception of the " comic
 
 214 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 turn " described above, the visit to London of 
 the Commissary Svatikov, and of two or 
 three minor officials sent from Russia with 
 restricted powers the Russian Government 
 never made the slightest attempt at gaining 
 adequate knowledge of the activities of the 
 Russian Government Committee. All this, 
 however, was not a sufficient excuse for the, 
 to say the least, " drastic " action taken by 
 the British Government with regard to the 
 Committee. A full report of this incident 
 compiled by the responsible members of the 
 Committee will undoubtedly be made public 
 in due time. I do not, therefore, consider it 
 necessary to dwell any longer in these memoirs 
 upon the regrettable incident. 
 
 Russian Government funds were confiscated 
 to the last penny, including the sums at the 
 disposal of the Embassy proper. The Govern- 
 ment, however, intimated to me that they 
 intended to " assist us." I confess that my 
 negotiations with the Government, the questions 
 in the House and comments in the Press on 
 this subject are among the most painful and 
 humiliating recollections of this unfortunate 
 period. 
 
 The question of pecuniary assistance granted
 
 HUMILIATING ATTACKS 215 
 
 by the Government to the Russian Embassy 
 did not fail to attract the attention of certain 
 members of the House of Commons who were 
 favourably disposed towards the Soviet regime. 
 The name of the Russian Charge d' Affaires 
 was continually mentioned and contemptuous 
 comment was invariably made. While the 
 leaders of the Bolsheviks in Petrograd and 
 Moscow were continually insulting the Powers 
 of the Entente in public meetings and in the 
 Soviet Congresses, the Representative of Anti- 
 Bolshevik Russia was the object of more 
 elaborate derision in the British House of 
 Commons. Not once during these days did 
 any member of Parliament deem it proper 
 to point out that the Russian Charge 
 d' Affaires remained at his post out of a 
 sense of duty and that personal attacks were 
 therefore not only contrary to international 
 polity, but substantially unjust. The New 
 Europe, on one occasion, made a few remarks 
 in that sense. These remarks were indeed 
 an isolated instance. Replying to one of 
 the innumerable questions, Lord Robert 
 Cecil declared (if I remember correctly it was 
 some time in May, 1918) that "Mr. Nabokoff 
 receives a grant from His Majesty's Govern-
 
 2i6 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 ment." I asked for an interview with Lord 
 Robert and pointed out that the wording of 
 his reply was misleading. " In my capacity 
 of the Russian Representative whose duty it 
 is to defend in the measure of his ability the 
 interests of Russia of the Russia that is 
 faithful to the alliance with Great Britain I am, 
 obviously, deprived of authority by reason of 
 the Bolshevik usurpation. As long, however, 
 as this usurpation is not recognised as lawful, 
 as long as I continue to deal with His Majesty's 
 Government, I must preserve the respect of 
 the British public and of the Russians. I 
 therefore cannot accept ' alms.' What is a 
 ' grant ' if not ' alms ' ? I cannot allow 
 the possibility of anyone being entitled to 
 assume that I am paid by a foreign Power. I 
 can accept payments which are made in the 
 guise of a loan, to be included as an integral 
 and very small part in the Russian national 
 debt. In omitting to mention that these 
 payments were made as a loan to be included 
 in the national debt, the reply allows of an 
 interpretation which is inconsistent with my 
 dignity, not only as the Representative of 
 Russia, but as a Russian possessed of self- 
 respect." Lord Robert Cecil agreed. At first
 
 LORD ROBERT CECIL 217 
 
 he suggested that the incident should be 
 closed by a letter in reply to the official Note 
 which I had addressed to Mr. Balfour on the 
 matter. Lord Robert added that to raise 
 the question once more in the House of 
 Commons would mean to provoke further un- 
 pleasant comment. I assured Lord Robert 
 that I was quite accustomed to my name 
 being mentioned in the debate and that it did 
 not much matter if it came up once more. 
 The declaration, moreover, having been made 
 in the House of Commons, I should feel 
 grateful if it were corrected likewise in the 
 House of Commons. Incidentally, in the 
 course of this conversation Lord Robert Cecil 
 entirely agreed with the view that no Russian 
 Government could be officially recognised 
 which would repudiate the Russian national 
 debt. A few days later in reply to a question 
 in the House, Lord Robert gave the explana- 
 tion for which I had pleaded. 
 
 The British Government continued to grant 
 pecuniary assistance to the Embassy until 
 March 31, of 1919. After that date credits 
 were opened by the Government at Omsk. 
 In the course of 1918-19 the total sum lent 
 to the Embassy by the British Government
 
 amounted to about 190,000. Approximately 
 at the same time another measure was adopted 
 by the British Government which will, I trust, 
 be fully explained in Russia when the detailed 
 story, based upon official documents, will be 
 written of our negotiations with Great Britain 
 during the Bolshevik regime. It was the 
 requisition of the Russian Mercantile Fleet. A 
 volume might be written on this subject. As 
 a matter of fact, the British Government 
 was justified in taking possession of the 
 Russian ships. Owing to the unsettled con- 
 dition of the crews, these ships ran a serious 
 risk of falling to the enemy. Also, they 
 could be of no use to Russia at that moment 
 as Russia the Bolsheviks had made peace 
 with Germany. It was perfectly natural that 
 all the available tonnage should be used for 
 purposes of war. The whole point lay in the 
 manner in which they were requisitioned. It 
 fell to my lot to conduct a fierce struggle with 
 some of my compatriots immediately interested 
 in the matter. They insisted that I should 
 protest energetically and resist this requisition. 
 Fully conscious of the fact that energetic 
 protests are of no avail unless those who make 
 them are backed by a Government capable
 
 RUSSIAN SHIPS 219 
 
 of enforcing its will, I was compelled to apply 
 the method of oral protests and written " repre- 
 sentations," and negotiations. As a result 
 of these negotiations I was officially in- 
 formed that the requisitioned ships would be 
 returned as soon as the war would end, or a 
 Government come into being in Russia which 
 would be recognised and would be capable of 
 undertaking the care of the Russian ships. The 
 British Government, of course, carried out 
 this undertaking. The mistakes which were 
 made in regard to the treatment of the officers 
 and crews of some of the requisitioned ships, 
 sudden compulsory repatriations from Great 
 Britain to the Arctic Regions of Russia, and 
 proceedings painful to all those Russians who 
 still reverenced their flag, in connection with 
 the actual " taking over " of the ships, are 
 unpleasant memories. 
 
 Even to this day, certain Russian circles 
 continue to level against me the accusation of 
 having surrendered the Russian Mercantile 
 Fleet to the British. It goes without saying 
 that my accusers are not altogether sufficiently 
 informed of the documentary side of the 
 negotiations to be entitled to so severe a 
 judgment. I feel no anxiety on that score
 
 220 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 as no jury would ever, on the basis of 
 documents, which I sincerely hope may some 
 day come to light, find me guilty of base 
 surrender.
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 THE simultaneous presence in Ixmdon of 
 representatives of the Provisional Government 
 and of the Soviet was, of course, abnormal, 
 and led to daily misunderstandings and com- 
 plications. The Bolshevik Agency, however, 
 caused trouble of a more serious nature, as the 
 following incident will clearly show. 
 
 In the spring of 1918, a mutiny occurred in 
 one of the Russian torpedo boats in I^iverpool 
 Harbour. For several days the officers were 
 conscious of the mutinous spirit with which the 
 crew had quite suddenly been seized. So evident 
 was the infection with the Bolshevik idea of 
 doing away with the officers by shooting or 
 throwing them overboard, that the officers 
 went about with revolvers. Finally, the crew 
 arranged a meeting in the wardroom, and 
 " instructed " the officers to attend. The 
 five officers were squeezed in, and could hardly 
 move. They thought their fate was sealed. 
 At that moment, a British officer came on 
 board. He asked to see the captain, and was 
 
 221
 
 222 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 conducted to the wardroom. The British 
 officer soon realised what was going on. He 
 gave orders for the officers to be allowed to 
 stand on the bridge, and went ashore. The 
 crew, by that time, was a howling mob of about 
 120 men, who were determined to do away 
 with their officers. The British officer had 
 warned his Russian friends that about half 
 an hour would be required for him to take the 
 necessary measures. Within seven minutes 
 the first British soldier's bayonet appeared on 
 deck. Twenty more followed. There was a 
 dead silence. The Russian crew was sur- 
 rounded. In silence, with trembling lips, these 
 men started to throw papers into the sea. 
 They were led off to prison like sheep. Thus 
 the lives of five Russian officers were saved by 
 the pluck and the resourceful promptitude of 
 a British officer. 
 
 The investigation disclosed the fact that 
 men from this torpedo boat had visited the 
 premises of I^itvinov's Embassy. These sim- 
 pletons, having seen I/itvinov's portraits in 
 the papers, really believed him to be the 
 Russian Ambassador in Ivondon. He received 
 them and incited them to mutiny. 
 
 A few days later, I recounted this incident
 
 THE vSTORY OF A MUTINY 223 
 
 to Lord Hardinge and committed the in- 
 credible indiscretion of remarking : " This is 
 the result of Litvinov's presence in London 
 where he is at liberty to conduct Bolshevik 
 propaganda among Russian sailors . . . and 
 elsewhere." Lord Hardinge promptly and 
 courteously taught me a lesson by remarking 
 that Litvinov's presence in London and inter- 
 course with Litvinov was the business of the 
 British Government, not mine. I apologetic- 
 ally agreed with him, the more so, I ventured 
 to suggest, that the consequences of this 
 " undesirable's " activities in London would 
 likewise be the business, not of Russia, but of 
 Britain. 
 
 A series of episodes more or less of the 
 same nature could not but result in a certain 
 tension and frigidity in the relations between 
 the Embassy and the British Foreign Office. 
 In July, another incident occurred which very 
 nearly resulted in the complete cessation of 
 official intercourse and in the closing of the 
 Embassy. 
 
 On July 15, as I was leaving the club, the 
 Secretary of the Japanese Embassy, who had 
 always been extremely friendly to me, asked 
 me whether it was with my knowledge and
 
 224 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 consent that the Russian Embassy had been 
 described in the newly-published Diplomatic 
 list as " Vacant," and the names of the 
 personnel excluded from the list. My col- 
 league added that he was intensely surprised, 
 as, according to the information that had 
 reached him from Tokyo, the position of the 
 Russian Ambassador in the Japanese capital 
 had suffered no change whatsoever. I told 
 him that I had not seen the Diplomatic list 
 and his query was the first intimation I had 
 received of the fact that the Russian Embassy 
 was vacant. 
 
 I immediately directed the first Secretary 
 of the Embassy to make inquiries at the 
 Foreign Office. He returned to the Embassy 
 and informed me that the decision had been 
 taken by the high authorities and appeared 
 to be irrevocable. It should be understood 
 that the inclusion in the Diplomatic list is no 
 mere formality. It is a kind of special 
 passport, so to speak, which involves the 
 privilege of being exempted from taxation, 
 admitted to clubs as honorary member, etc. 
 In a word, of enjoying the status of a diplomat. 
 
 I asked for an interview with Lord Hardinge. 
 I might have regarded the matter as a mere
 
 MORE HUMILIATIONS 225 
 
 formality, not having any serious bearing 
 upon my relations with the Government, and 
 trusted that public opinion, my colleagues, 
 etc., would likewise take no notice of it. The 
 friends of the Soviet in the House of Commons, 
 however, would certainty have seized this 
 opportunity for further disparaging comment 
 upon the status of the Embassy. 
 
 The exclusion from the Diplomatic list was 
 the culminating point in a whole series of 
 humiliating restrictive measures. I therefore 
 decided that the moment had come to take a 
 definite stand and to emphasize the fact that 
 as long as there remained in Ivondon an agency 
 of the Russian Government which had been 
 loyal to the obligation of honour contracted on 
 September 5, 1914, this agency was entitled 
 to the privileges which other diplomatic 
 agencies enjoyed de jure. Also, there existed 
 the closest possible intercourse between the 
 Embassy and the War Office, as well as the 
 Admiralty. Owing to the incompetence of 
 the Russian Military Agency, the Embassy 
 constantly communicated direct with the War 
 Office on many important subjects, such, for 
 instance, as the despatch of Russian officers to 
 the North of Russia. The summer of 1918 was 
 p
 
 226 THE ORDEAI, OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 precisely the time when this intercourse was 
 particularly lively. In the South of Russia 
 and in Siberia, forces were coming into being 
 which it was then the common interest of all 
 the Allies, as well as of Russia, to support and 
 reinforce. Also, the Allies had decided to 
 send contingents to the North of Russia. The 
 Admiralty, still mindful of the services ren- 
 dered by Russia in the beginning of the war, 
 was giving us every possible assistance. A 
 Russian Embassy deprived of the last vestige 
 of official status, naturally, would have been 
 unable to continue these negotiations. The 
 issue, therefore, was a grave one. 
 
 I told lyord Hardinge that I had come to 
 bid him farewell. The Embassy had been 
 declared "vacant" by order of the Secretary 
 of State for Foreign Affairs. I had only just 
 heard of this decision and had come to inform 
 I/)rd Hardinge that the Embassy would be 
 vacant to-morrow. The Military and Naval 
 Agencies and the Consulate-General would 
 likewise close their doors. Lord Hardinge was 
 extremely astonished that I should take this 
 matter so seriously. He assured me that the 
 Government had no intention whatsoever of 
 breaking off relations with the Embassy. He
 
 THE EMBASSY "VACANT" 227 
 
 said that I represented nobody at all, that rela- 
 tions with me were purely personal and private, 
 and that Litvinov had at least as much claim 
 to be included in the Diplomatic list as myself 
 and my colleagues. I ventured to point out 
 to Lord Hardinge that I found but scant satis- 
 faction in being placed in the same cart with 
 Litvinov, and that in this respect I was in 
 an exceptional position, as London was the 
 only Allied capital to which a Bolshevik 
 Ambassador had been admitted. That, how- 
 ever, was not the point. In the view of those 
 in Russia who did not recognise the Bolshevik 
 regime, in the view of Russians abroad and in 
 London, it was my sacred duty to remain the 
 spokesman of loyal Russia and to defend the 
 interests of my country and my countrymen. 
 This was possible only on condition that the 
 British Government granted me a certain 
 status, of which the fact of being struck off 
 the Diplomatic list undoubtedly deprived me. 
 The conversation continued on these painful 
 lines, for nearly an hour. At length, seeing 
 that Lord Hardinge was not inclined to alter 
 his standpoint, I left the Foreign Office with 
 the firm intention of adhering to the only 
 decision which I considered in keeping with the 
 dignity of the Embassy.
 
 228 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 About an hour later, Lord Hardinge asked 
 me to return. Mr. Balfour wished to know 
 whose representative I considered myself to 
 be and whether I persisted in claiming the 
 privileges of an accredited Representative in 
 spite of the fact that the Government that had 
 accredited me had ceased to exist. I replied 
 by quoting Mr. Balfour's statement made in 
 the House of Commons on January 16 of the 
 same year. Mr. Balfour then said : " His 
 Majesty's Government do not recognise the 
 Petrograd administration as a de jure or de 
 facto Government. Mr. Nabokoff will pre- 
 sumably remain at his post until he is super- 
 seded or confirmed." I added that I was 
 unaware of this statement having ever been 
 challenged or contradicted. Lord Hardinge 
 said that it was a mistake on the part of the 
 Foreign Office not to have given me to under- 
 stand eight months ago with sufficient clearness 
 that I was not entitled to any diplomatic 
 privileges and that conversations could only 
 be conducted unofficially. Incidentally the 
 Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs 
 stated that in his opinion I was not entitled 
 to issue diplomatic passports. Meanwhile, on 
 that very day I had received a request from
 
 A DIPLOMATIC COMPROMISE 229 
 
 another Department in the Government for 
 a diplomatic passport to be delivered by the 
 Embassy to a Russian who was proceeding to 
 Siberia under the auspices of that Department. 
 
 As a result of this second conversation which 
 gave me the ineradicable impression that the 
 last vestige of sympathy and goodwill, so 
 often and so generously manifested by Lord 
 Hardinge both in the course of my stay in India 
 during his Vice-Royalty and afterwards in 
 London, had completely disappeared a com- 
 promise was suggested. The names of the 
 Russian Charge d' Affaires and of his colleagues 
 were reinstated in the Diplomatic list, in which 
 it was mentioned that we were " the Repre- 
 sentatives of the late Provisional Government." 
 Such a formula was, of course, entirely appro- 
 priate. It indicated precisely what it had 
 been my wish to convey- -that we represented 
 the last Constitutional Russian Government 
 loyal to Great Britain as an Ally. Also, the 
 fact that our names were on the list, once 
 more served to show that the Bolshevik was 
 not placed on an equal footing with the Repre- 
 sentatives of the late Provisional Government. 
 
 This was my last interview with Lord 
 Hardinge. In the last six months preceding
 
 230 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 his departure for Paris as Mr. Balfour's imme- 
 diate assistant at the Peace Conference, I did 
 not have the privilege of being received by 
 the Permanent Under-Secretary of State. 
 Conversations were conducted with Lord 
 Hardinge's subordinates. 
 
 In the spring of 1918, after the Allied repre- 
 sentatives had departed from Russia via 
 Vologda and Archangel, Mr. Bruce Lockhart, 
 who had formerly been in charge of the British 
 Consulate-General in Moscow, was sent to 
 Moscow from London as a special Envoy. As 
 far as I know and I do not know very much 
 about it his instructions can only be com- 
 pared to the solution of the quadrature of the 
 circle. For practical purposes, it was necessary 
 that a British agent should remain in Moscow, 
 in order to " keep an eye " on the Bolsheviks 
 and Germans, and to protect the interests of 
 the British in Russia. Although the special 
 Envoy had no official status as the Bolshevik 
 Government was not recognised he never- 
 theless was to conduct official negotiations 
 with Trotsky. Obviously, this was possible 
 only on condition that Mr. Lockhart enter- 
 tained " friendly " relations with the Bolshevik 
 authorities. At the same time, Mr. Lockhart
 
 MR. LOCKHART'S MISSION 231 
 
 was, of course, in communication with his old 
 friends in Moscow. The British Envoy con- 
 scientiously endeavoured to solve this insoluble 
 problem. Mr. L,ockhart was arrested. The 
 British Government became greatly alarmed. 
 Public opinion had not demanded stern re- 
 prisals and had not insisted upon the expulsion, 
 from British soil, of the Bolshevik agent in 
 lyondon and his gang after the murder of 
 Captain Cromie. But the arrest of a British 
 official was likely to provoke intense indigna- 
 tion and to react upon the prestige of the 
 country. So negotiations were immediately 
 opened for Mr. Lockhart's release. The effort 
 at maintaining unofficial Government agents 
 in Soviet Russia failed. It was realised that 
 attempts at " influencing " the Bolsheviks 
 were unavailing. There can be no doubt that 
 Mr. L,ockhart's mission caused more than one 
 friend of the Entente and of Great Britain 
 in Russia to despair of the sincerity of our 
 former Allies. 
 
 Soon after Mr. Lockhart had been released 
 and returned to London, lyitvinov was invited 
 by the British Government to return to Russia 
 via Scandinavia. Obscure Bolshevik under- 
 lings remained in I^ondon, but they " kept to
 
 232 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 the cellars." After that, intercourse with the 
 Bolsheviks in Russia was maintained by Great 
 Britain through the medium of self-appointed 
 volunteer-diplomats. 
 
 After the spring of 1918, Lord Robert 
 Cecil, then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
 State for Foreign Affairs, took particular 
 interest in Russian affairs. It was with him 
 that I discussed these affairs whenever an 
 opportunity presented itself, and to him my 
 letters were addressed in Mr. Balfour's absence. 
 I sincerely hope that some of these letters 
 may come to light with the advent of real 
 open diplomacy, when the correspondence 
 between diplomats and Foreign Ministries 
 will no longer rust in archives, but will be 
 submitted, in due course, to the judgment of 
 public opinion in order to allow an estimate 
 of the work of the Representatives of the 
 Government abroad. 
 
 The following is the text of a letter I 
 addressed to lyord Robert Cecil on April 18, 
 1918. So much water has flowed under the 
 bridge since, and the matter which forms the 
 subject of this letter is so completely "out of 
 date," that I have no hesitation in giving 
 publicity to the document. It is an expression
 
 LORD ROBERT CECIL 233 
 
 of personal views, which I would have been, 
 as a matter of fact, quite prepared to state 
 publicly at the time the letter was written. 
 
 " In the last conversation I had with you, 
 you were kind enough to express your willing- 
 ness to listen to any suggestions I might find 
 it necessary to make, and to the exposition of 
 my views on the Russian situation. I hope 
 you will allow me to avail myself of this 
 privilege, and I also trust you will forgive me 
 if I take the liberty of writing to you with 
 absolute frankness. 
 
 ' You will remember that at the beginning 
 of the latest phase of the Russian revolution, 
 viz. the seizure of power in Petrograd by 
 the Bolsheviks, I endeavoured to persuade 
 His Majesty's Government that as long as 
 hostilities continued there still was not only an 
 excuse, but a very strong reason for making 
 an effort to support the Russian front. I 
 then suggested that even a small contingent 
 of British and French troops might form a 
 nucleus round which all the loyal elements of 
 the Russian Army would gather for effective 
 resistance to the German invasion. I under- 
 stand that innumerable memoranda from 
 British and Russian sources from men who
 
 234 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 were acting in no official capacity, but who 
 certainly held correct views on the Russian 
 situation were presented to various depart- 
 ments of the British Government and to the 
 War Cabinet. Whatever may have been the 
 differences in the scope of the assistance which 
 they advocated, there was one point on which 
 they were unanimous and that was that 
 without help from the Allies the Bolshevik 
 anarchy would achieve its aim, would bring 
 to complete ruin the severely shattered military 
 organisation in Russia, destroy the army, 
 thereby creating anarchy in the country, and 
 deliver it into the hands of Germany. All 
 this has happened. The hopes which the 
 Allies, and in particular Great Britain, enter- 
 tained that the Bolshevik anarchy in Russia 
 would spread to Germany, and later that Mr. 
 Trotsky's diplomatic talents would overpower 
 the stern logic of German militarism, have 
 been doomed to disappointment. These things 
 have been painfully clear to all loyal elements 
 in Russia, with whom I have not been in 
 personal touch, owing to the fact that they are 
 silent under the threat of immediate execution, 
 but I have now every reason to believe that I 
 gave a true expression to the hopes and fears
 
 AN APPEAL FOR HELP 235 
 
 of those whom I claim to represent in Great 
 Britain. 
 
 " For the last month I have not considered 
 it opportune to approach you with any sugges- 
 tions. I have understood that in the hour of 
 crisis due to the German thrust on the Western 
 front, I could hardly expect His Majesty's 
 Government to divert their anxious attention 
 from that field of battle. I surmised that any 
 cry for help to Russia would be a voice crying 
 in the wilderness. The situation at the present 
 moment, however, seems to warrant an appeal. 
 I see that a certain portion of the public 
 Press in London is beginning to understand 
 that in order to prevent the Germans from 
 drawing their reserves from Russia for months 
 to come, something practical must be done to 
 compel them to cease depleting their Russian 
 front, and that the best means of doing so is 
 to create a rallying point for the loyal elements 
 in Russia. 
 
 ' This view seems to me to express the 
 substance of what Russia, loyal to the Allies, 
 has felt all along. It has been corroborated 
 b}' prominent Russians who have recently 
 arrived in London, as well as by British 
 officers who have returned from Russia after
 
 236 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 having spent over three years with the 
 Russian Army. 
 
 " Might I quote the words of one of these 
 officers, who has exceptional qualifications for 
 a true understanding of Russia, as, unlike most 
 of his compatriots who have been there in an 
 official or semi-official capacity, he speaks 
 Russian like a native. ' I am prepared to 
 stake my life that should the British send a 
 small force of a few thousands of well- 
 disciplined and well-equipped troops to any 
 point in Russia, should the British Government 
 understand that it is not through cinemas 
 and leaflets, but through boots and clothing 
 that we ought to help and enlist the sympathies 
 of the Russian people, tens of thousands of 
 loyal able-bodied soldiers and officers would 
 flock to the point where this contingent would 
 land.' 
 
 "It is not too late. From the moment 
 when Japan realised the necessity of stemming 
 the German advance in Siberia, to this day, the 
 question of Japanese intervention has formed 
 the subject of discussion in the Press and in 
 Parliament. In my opinion, the ill-timed and 
 ill-advised comments of the Press in this 
 matter have exercised a most deleterious
 
 AN APPEAL FOR HELP 237 
 
 influence. It seems therefore obvious that 
 should the idea of giving effective assistance 
 gain ground, the conditio sine qua non of the 
 success of such an enterprise is absolute secrecy. 
 " It may have been expedient for His 
 Majesty's Government to continue negotia- 
 tions with the Bolsheviks, and I consider that 
 it is outside my province to discuss the matter. 
 I must, however, point out the effect that 
 this situation has had in Russia. The mere 
 fact of His Majesty's Government admitting 
 the presence of a Bolshevik emissary in London 
 is in itself enough to cause despondency among 
 all intelligent classes in Russia who are under 
 the impression that Russia is represented in 
 Great Britain solely by a Bolshevik agent. 
 It is my firm and fervent opinion that dealings 
 with this band of traitors can never bring 
 satisfactory results. They have betrayed Rus- 
 sia, and their public utterances and private 
 conversations which have been reported to me 
 by absolutely reliable men tend to show that 
 even those among them who may be mistaken 
 for honest idealists are most anxious to see a 
 revolution in Great Britain of the same nature 
 as the upheaval which has brought about the 
 Russian collapse. To place any reliance upon
 
 238 THE ORDEAI, OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 their endeavours to create an army would be 
 short-sighted, to say the least. 
 
 ' Whenever I have had an opportunity (and 
 I have often refrained from availing myself 
 of that opportunity for fear of embarrassing 
 you and taking up your time) of discussing the 
 Russian situation and the means of averting 
 through energetic action further dangers to the 
 Allied cause and to Great Britain, I have 
 invariably been asked the same question, 
 which negatived all further arguments : ' Who 
 are the men who are showing active resistance 
 to the Bolsheviks ? Where is the party upon 
 which we can rely, whom are we to support, 
 and how ? ' There is now overwhelming evi- 
 dence that the party which is anxiously await- 
 ing support is not a ' party,' but the ' thin 
 layer ' of several hundreds of thousands of 
 Russian patriots, including tens of thousands 
 of officers whose heroism in face of misery, 
 insults, and death can only be placed on 
 record by the impartial historian. This ' thin 
 layer ' covers 180 millions of illiterate peas- 
 antry, including several millions of the soldiery 
 who have been demoralised and deprived of a 
 sense of duty and patriotism by the very agents 
 who now call themselves the Russian Govern-
 
 A MILITARY PROJECT 239 
 
 ment. Is it the present Russian Government, 
 or the scattered remnants of patriotic Russia 
 that can be looked to as the mainstay of the 
 country ? It may be expedient not to break 
 with the existing regime, but if a long view is 
 taken, it will be clear that if those elements 
 which would reconstruct Russia are dis- 
 couraged, then, in the future, when the Bol- 
 shevik regime comes to its appointed doom, 
 nothing will stem the tide of German pene- 
 tration into Russia, and through Russia into 
 Central Asia. 
 
 " As the help I would suggest is in essence 
 a military measure, I do not claim to be in a 
 position to expound a definite plan. I know 
 that there are soldiers, both Russian and 
 British, who can elaborate this plan. In a 
 few words it is as follows : 
 
 " To make two of the ports in Northern 
 Russia, as well as Vladivostok, rallying points 
 by the despatch of contingents, the size of 
 which would depend on the practical possi- 
 bilities of the situation, as well as a base for 
 supplies, not of war material only, but of 
 such goods as would provide the necessaries 
 of life for a portion, at least, of the Russian 
 population.
 
 240 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 " It goes without saying that should it be 
 found practicable to send these contingents 
 to Russia's Northern ports, the primary object 
 of such an expedition would be to prevent 
 the Germans from cutting off Russia from all 
 intercourse with her Allies, and seizing those 
 important strategic points. There is no doubt 
 whatever that Germany is intent upon dealing 
 Russia this final blow. If the Bolshevik 
 leaders are at all sincere in their endeavours 
 to resist Germany, they should welcome what- 
 ever help the Allies may offer Russia in that 
 direction. If the Russian people learn that 
 Great Britain and the United States are taking 
 steps to satisfy their urgent need for the 
 necessaries of life, they will understand that 
 protection must be given to such stores as 
 wonld arrive in Russia, as owing to the chaos 
 now prevailing no equitable distribution of 
 goods would otherwise be possible. Pillage 
 and destruction are being practised in Russia 
 by the soldiery who form the main force upon 
 which the Bolsheviks rely. 
 
 " I fully realise the strain under which the 
 British Government is now working owing to 
 the increased demands upon the nation. 
 Nevertheless, I cannot help feeling that this is
 
 ERRORS OF JUDGMENT 241 
 
 a crucial moment, and that unless something 
 is done now to assist Russia, the effect may be 
 very far-reaching, and may even counter- 
 balance the highest victory that may be 
 achieved over the Germans on the Western 
 front, a victor}- which I consider certain." 
 
 There are two or three sentences in this 
 letter which may now, in the light of subse- 
 quent events, appear to indicate that the 
 " reliable " people upon whose testimony my 
 argument was based, committed grave errors 
 of judgment. One point is that which deals 
 with the " certainty " of hundreds of thousands 
 of loyal Russians flocking to the Allied stan- 
 dards after the Allied contingents landed in 
 Russia. As is well-known, no such rally took 
 place at Archangel, Murmansk, or Vladivostok. 
 In making the suggestion, however, I did not 
 foresee that the Allied contingents would be 
 merely handfuls of men, that they would not 
 arrive till three months before the end of the 
 war, and would not advance into the country 
 far enough to reach such districts where there 
 would be " hundreds of thousands " of Rus- 
 sians, and not the scarce population of the 
 marshes surrounding Archangel. Only when 
 the full story of the Allied " occupation " of 
 Q
 
 242 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 Archangel is written, only when impartial 
 recorders belonging to all the countries con- 
 cerned will have the courage to recount that sad 
 story and to describe the attitude of the Allies 
 which was that of ' ' conquerors ' ' and ' ' masters, ' ' 
 not of Allies and friends, then and only then 
 will it become evident that the failure of the 
 Archangel expedition cannot in justice be 
 attributed solely to the inefficiency and lack 
 of patriotism on the part of the Russians 
 which are now alleged to have caused this 
 lamentable failure. The features of the situa- 
 tion which I have but summarily indicated 
 above suffice, however, to show that it was 
 not the idea of sending an expedition to 
 Northern Russia while the war was still being 
 fought against Germany, but the manner in 
 which the idea was carried out that led to the 
 disastrous consequences so often cited as an 
 argument against any further assistance to 
 Russia. 
 
 Another point is the assertion that the 
 Bolsheviks could not be relied upon to create 
 an army. Now that we hear so much of the 
 splendid organisation of the invincible Red 
 Army which counts millions of enthusiastic 
 soldiers, the statement may appear ludicrous.
 
 THE RED ARMY 243 
 
 It may seem that in writing these lines I 
 grotesquely under-estimated Trotsky's genius 
 as well as the enthusiasm of the Russian 
 soldier for the communistic ideals preached by 
 the Bolsheviks. This, however, would be a 
 misconception. Everyone knows and those 
 among the anti-Bolshevik Russians who have 
 the courage to speak the truth, not to whisper 
 it en petit comite, know it, and admit it 
 that the Kolchak and Denikin Governments 
 and armies defeated themselves, and that their 
 collapse was due not to the prowess of the 
 Red Army, but to the defects of policy and 
 organisation which alienated the population 
 instead of driving it into the anti-Bolshevik 
 ranks wholesale. Since the Red Army came 
 into being, no one has ever heard the descrip- 
 tion of a single regular battle won by the Red 
 Army. This soldiery is sufficiently well- 
 organised to terrorise the hunger-stricken 
 population of Soviet Russia, and sufficiently 
 well trained in the art of plunder and rapine to 
 find in these achievements a powerful incentive 
 for the invasion of rich districts weakly 
 defended. But I still continue to endorse the 
 opinion which has been expressed by a few 
 thoughtful observers that, should this Red
 
 244 
 
 Army come up against an infinitely smaller 
 force of well disciplined troops, it would run 
 as fast as its legs would carry it. All accounts 
 of " battles " in Russia between the Red 
 Army and the anti-Bolsheviks always speak 
 of thousands of prisoners. The casualties are 
 seldom mentioned, and the figures of the 
 latter are, as a rule, very modest indeed. My 
 contention that Trotsky was unable, in the 
 spring of 1918, of raising an army in Russia 
 to fight the Germans, does not seem to have 
 been belied by subsequent events. 
 
 Letters such as the above quoted to Lord 
 Robert Cecil were never answered. As a 
 rule, a brief note in the third person informed 
 me that the letter had been received and was 
 being given consideration. 
 
 The question of Japanese intervention on a 
 large scale formed the subject of discussion 
 between the Allies ever since the month of 
 January, 1918. Suggestions had been put 
 forward as early as in the summer of 1917, 
 that 200,000 Japanese troops should be sent 
 to the Russian front to fight against the 
 Germans. A tentative suggestion in the
 
 245 
 
 shape of an expression of my personal view 
 based upon the private advice of certain 
 military experts in I/ondon was made by the 
 Embassy to the Russian High Command. It 
 was rejected as unpracticable. The negotia- 
 tions regarding the despatch of Japanese 
 troops which began in January, 1918, were 
 conducted without the participation of the 
 Russian Representatives. Moreover, it was 
 impossible for these Representatives to obtain 
 official information from British sources as to 
 the progress of these negotiations. I received, 
 however, authentic information from an ex- 
 ceptionally well-informed Allied source, and 
 the situation, according to my informant, 
 was as follows. 
 
 At first, the Japanese declared that they 
 were prepared to send troops to Siberia on 
 condition that no other Allied contingents 
 would be despatched. The United States 
 Government vetoed this plan. The British 
 and French Governments then suggested that 
 a mixed force comprising American troops 
 should be sent to Vladivostok. President 
 Wilson opposed the suggestion, but was 
 finally persuaded to agree to the despatch of 
 an American contingent, and the Japanese
 
 246 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPI/MAT 
 
 Government accepted the plan of Allied 
 intervention. More weeks went by. During 
 these weeks, nay, months, discussions were 
 carried on as to the relative strength of 
 different Allied contingents, the question of the 
 Chief Command, etc. Finally, the contingents 
 came too late and their strength was totally 
 inadequate. In other words, the Archangel 
 business was repeated almost in every detail. 
 
 As regards the Archangel expedition, the 
 reasons of its failure are briefly indicated above. 
 
 Eye-witnesses declare that when the news 
 was received in Petrograd of the landing of 
 British troops at Archangel (on August 2, 
 1918) the leaders of the Bolshevik Government 
 in Petrograd were in a panic and started to 
 " pack their trunks." They thought that 
 a strong army had arrived which was going 
 to advance and threaten Petrograd. When 
 they learnt that only 3,000 troops had landed, 
 they immediately understood that these drib- 
 lets of the Allied Armies would be unable to 
 advance and would therefore only serve as an 
 excellent excuse for further propaganda of 
 " Allied aggression." The error of the British 
 Command in forming a battalion of Bolshevik 
 deserters led to the massacre of British officers.
 
 TRANSCAUCASIA 247 
 
 This tragic episode caused the London Press 
 to raise the cry " hands off," and hastened the 
 evacuation which, however, had already been 
 decided under pressure of the Labour Party. 
 
 There was yet another region where British 
 troops conducted military operations on Rus- 
 sian territory Transcaucasia. 
 
 I will not venture to express any judgment 
 upon these operations, for the simple reason 
 that I am not in possession of reliable informa- 
 tion concerning the course of events in that 
 part of Russia during 1918 and the first half 
 of 1919. Owing to the complete absence of 
 direct communication between that part of 
 the world and the Russian Embassy in London, 
 never once during my tenure of office did I 
 receive a report from a responsible Russian 
 politician or General as to what was going on 
 in Transcaucasia. General Bitcherakhov, one 
 of the actors in that extremely complex drama, 
 arrived in London in 1919. His account, 
 however, was more picturesque and more 
 passionate than illuminating. Personal con- 
 siderations overshadowed his narrative and 
 deprived it of the weight which it would other- 
 wise have had as coming from a man who had 
 been on the spot at the most critical moment.
 
 248 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 This feature of the friendly assistance of 
 the British Government in reconstructing and 
 regenerating Russia requires therefore to be 
 described by more competent and better- 
 informed historians. At the time of writing, 
 the muddle is appalling. Self-determination, 
 the poison gas invented originally by Ger- 
 many and tried for the first time in the 
 Ukraine in 1917 by Austro-German emissaries, 
 later adopted by President Wilson, and finally 
 sanctioned by the British Empire statesmen, is 
 causing endless guerillas and anarchy in Trans- 
 caucasia. It is devoutly to be wished that 
 some wholesome wind may blow this poison 
 gas into another direction than that of Persia 
 or further south-east. Otherwise there will be 
 neither peace nor stability in that immense 
 region for years to come, and Russia and 
 Great Britain will have to pay the highest 
 penalty for General Smuts's sixpenny pamph- 
 lets, and President Wilson's fourteen points. 
 
 In the above-quoted letter I addressed to 
 Lord Robert Cecil, an allusion is made to the 
 fact that during the first months after the 
 Bolshevik revolution one of the excuses for the 
 inactivity of the Allies was that there was no 
 " party " or " power " in Russia with which
 
 THE OMSK DIRECTORATE 249 
 
 to negotiate. The Russian Directorate at 
 Omsk, recognised in Siberia, had been in 
 existence for about two months, and was 
 replaced by Kolchak's Government in the 
 middle of November. And yet the Allies were 
 at a loss to find an ally in Russia.
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 
 THE Kerensky (Ministers were arrested on 
 November 7, 1917, and cast into prison, from 
 which they escaped unscathed several weeks 
 later. The Premier Kerensky succeeded in 
 escaping the efforts, which must have been 
 lukewarm, of the Bolsheviks to capture him 
 on the first day of the coup d'etat. Kerensky 
 vanished from Petrograd. After the dismal 
 failure of his attempt to " capture " Petrograd, 
 British public opinion ceased to take any 
 interest whatsoever in his fate. His name 
 appeared occasionally in Press telegrams, but 
 the impression prevailed that as a statesman 
 he had ended his career. In July, 1918, the 
 rumour spread that he had fled to America. 
 By a queer coincidence, on the very morning 
 when the Daily Mail announced that Kerensky 
 had landed in New York, he arrived in London. 
 He travelled incognito with a Serbian passport. 
 Kerensky rang up the Embassy and informed 
 me, through the medium of his friend, Dr. 
 Gavronsky, in whose house he stayed, that 
 
 250
 
 KHRENSKY IN I/)NDON 251 
 
 he would like to see me, but hesitated to come 
 to the Embassy. He did not wish to reveal 
 his presence in London and therefore requested 
 me to call upon him. I was naturally interested 
 to meet the man who had played so important 
 a part in Russian events and of whom so many 
 contradictory rumours and legends had been 
 circulated. Our first meeting was very cordial. 
 The brilliant intellect and the temperament of 
 the late Premier of Russia impressed me very 
 favourably. He told me that he had arrived 
 in London and intended to proceed to Paris 
 with a " mandate " from the Union for the 
 Regeneration of Russia to which the Govern- 
 ments of Great Britain and France were 
 formally bound by promises (in the case of 
 France, these promises were alleged to have 
 been given in writing) of help and assistance. 
 According to Kerensky the importance of this 
 " pact " lay chiefly in the promise of the official 
 recognition (as the Constitutional Government 
 of Russia) of the Directorate at Oufa which 
 was to be formed by the Union for the Regener- 
 ation of Russia. Kerensky 's mission was to 
 insist upon military and financial assistance 
 against the Bolsheviks. He asked me to 
 arrange for him a meeting with the Prime
 
 252 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 Minister and expressed the wish that I should 
 be present at the interview and act as inter- 
 preter. I wrote to the Prime Minister. The 
 draft of my letter I presented to the Foreign 
 Office and added that should the request be 
 refused I should be grateful if the Prime 
 Minister would communicate with Kerensky 
 direct. I also declined to attend that meeting. 
 The Prime Minister received Kerensky. The 
 conversation, apparently, impressed the Prime 
 Minister, as on the same day Mr. Lloyd George 
 rebuked rather severely the opponents of inter- 
 vention in the House of Commons. The 
 Prime Minister hinted that he had obtained 
 information from Russia from an " authorita- 
 tive source." 
 
 The Labour leaders and newspaper editors 
 were aware of Kerensky's presence in London, 
 but complied with the mot d'ordre not to 
 mention the fact in public or in the Press. 
 About a week after Kerensky's arrival in 
 London a British Labour Conference took 
 place, and it was decided that Kerensky should 
 appear at this Conference as a dramatic hors 
 d'ceuvre. The appearance of the late chief 
 of the Russian Provisional Government pro- 
 duced a very strong impression upon the
 
 THE LABOUR CONFERENCE 253 
 
 Conference. Unfortunately, the impression 
 was somewhat marred by the fact that he 
 spoke Russian and his speech was translated 
 sentence for sentence by an interpreter who 
 incidentally was not a Russian. I had warned 
 Kerensky's friends that such a method would 
 undoubtedly have a bad effect, and my warning 
 appears to have been justified. 
 
 Nevertheless, this " Kerensky turn " had 
 an important and favourable sequel. Not 
 so much because of what Kerensky actually 
 said, but because on the eve of the first 
 meeting of the Conference the Press pub- 
 lished an account of the speech made in 
 the Reichstag by Kuhlmann. This speech 
 contained very plain hints at Germany's 
 readiness to accept Peace by compromise. 
 The speech had undoubtedly been made 
 with a view to placing a new weapon 
 into the hands of the British pacifists, 
 who were thus given the opportunity of 
 arguing at the Conference in favour of peace 
 by making use of Kuhlmann' s arguments. 
 Kerensky's appearance at the Conference occu- 
 pied the attention of the delegates to such an 
 extent that Kuhlmann and his provocatively 
 tempting remarks were utterly disregarded.
 
 254 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 On the following day, after the Conference 
 came to a close, Kerensky left for Paris, where 
 he remained for several weeks. I can form 
 no definite judgment of his activities in Paris, 
 as I know of them only by hearsay. He seems 
 to have incurred the displeasure of the Russian 
 Embassy as well as of the French Government 
 and of the majority of the papers. Judging 
 from the latter, he failed to adopt the right 
 tone in Paris. 
 
 Kerensky' s return to London coincided with 
 a short report which I made at the Russian 
 Luncheon Club in London in regard to the 
 international situation and to the attitude of 
 the Allies and in particular of Great Britain 
 towards Russia. Upon hearing that this re- 
 port was to be made, Kerensky telephoned 
 just before the appointed time to the Club 
 Committee, requesting the favour of an invita- 
 tion. Taken somewhat unawares, the Com- 
 mittee agreed. The reception given to Keren- 
 sky by the gathering was distinctly cool, for 
 the simple" reason that many members of this 
 Russian Club were officers. As is well-known, 
 Kerensky was far from popular in Russian 
 military circles. After I had spoken, Keren- 
 skv asked to be allowed to make a few
 
 KERENSKY AND CLEMENCEAU 255 
 
 remarks. I had explained that Italy, by 
 reason of her remoteness from Russia, was 
 more or less indifferent, that France was 
 hostile, whereas Britain was unable to arrive 
 at a definite policy, as neither the statesmen 
 nor the political parties were in a position to 
 acquire exhaustive information and come to 
 definite conclusions from the innumerable and 
 conflicting testimonies concerning the situa- 
 tion in Russia. I must confess that having 
 heard so much of Kerensky's wonderful talent 
 for oratory, I was greatly disappointed. There 
 was nothing but the " first person " in his 
 speech. The impression he apparently en- 
 deavoured to convey was that he had adminis- 
 tered a severe lesson to Monsieur Clemenceau. 
 Those who know the veteran French " Tiger " 
 may judge of the true complexion of the 
 interview between Clemenceau and Kerensk} r . 
 There was neither clear thought nor expressive 
 imagery in Kerensky's speech. Maybe, he 
 was influenced b} r the obvious animosity of his 
 hearers. 
 
 At this moment the Oufa Conference of the 
 representatives of the Union for the Regenera- 
 tion of Russia and of the Constituent Assembly, 
 consisting chiefly of Social revolutionaries,
 
 256 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 had formed a Directorate at Omsk which 
 claimed the right to be recognised as the 
 Ail-Russian Government. Kerensky con- 
 sidered himself not only invested with full 
 powers of information, but called upon to 
 defend before the British Government the 
 rights and the interests of the Directorate. 
 Mr. Kerensky's first effort in that direction was 
 a failure. 
 
 The British Government had given a British 
 passport for transit from Mesopotamia through 
 the United Kingdom into Siberia to a certain 
 Russian called Zavoiko. This gentleman was 
 piloted in London by the late Petrograd 
 correspondent of The Times, Mr. Wilton, 
 who detested Kerensky. I did not have the 
 opportunity of meeting Mr. Zavoiko in London. 
 According to reliable information he had been 
 one of General Kornilov's advisers during the 
 famous Kornilov episode. On the face of it, 
 there was, of course, no reason to grant a 
 British passport to a Russian citizen, and it 
 would have been more correct to direct this 
 gentleman to the Russian Consulate-General. 
 Complete chaos, however, reigned in those 
 days with regard to passports, and the British 
 Government may have had special reasons for
 
 KERENvSKY'S ANGER 257 
 
 taking the step which roused Kerensky's red- 
 hot anger. The War Office more than once 
 requested that I should give diplomatic pass- 
 ports to Russian officers proceeding to Siberia, 
 whilst the Foreign Office did not recognise 
 these passports and vised passports granted 
 by L,itvinov. The mere fact, however, of 
 Zavoiko receiving a passport from the British 
 authorities had no political importance what- 
 soever. Obviously the last person entitled to 
 raise his voice in protest was Kerensky himself, 
 who had arrived in I/mdon with the benevolent 
 assistance of the British authorities in Russia, 
 and had moreover himself accepted a foreign 
 passport. Kerensky, however, tried to raise 
 a row. He came to see me, bitterly attacked 
 the British Government and asserted that 
 one of the Departments in the British 
 Government was using Zavoiko as a tool in a 
 monarchist plot in Siberia. I tried to per- 
 suade Kerensky that all this nonsense was a 
 mere product of his vivid imagination. He 
 replied that I was " blind," that I was being 
 deceived by the British, etc. On the next 
 day he published a letter in the Daily News in 
 which he denounced the Government in violent 
 terms.
 
 258 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 The British Government was inclining to- 
 wards the official recognition of the Direc- 
 torate at Omsk. In order to enable me to 
 establish relations with this, the first serious 
 effort at organised resistance to the Bolsheviks, 
 approximately in the middle of October, 1918, 
 the British Government granted me once 
 again the privilege of using cipher for tele- 
 grams to Omsk and to my colleagues abroad. 
 Kerensky apparently was in touch with some 
 minor officials in the Foreign Office, and 
 consequently became aware of this measure. 
 He immediately addressed to me the request 
 that he should be allowed to use the Embassy 
 cipher, or a cipher which he pretended to 
 possess in order to send " information " to 
 Omsk. In support of this claim, he produced 
 a telegram which he had received from his 
 intimate friend, Mr. Avxentiev, the then 
 President of the Directorate, informing him 
 that his telegrams were expected. The letter 
 by which the Foreign Office had notified me 
 that I was entitled henceforward to use cipher, 
 contained the definite indication that this 
 privilege was granted " as a token of special 
 personal confidence," and that the Foreign 
 Office felt certain that cipher would be used
 
 PRIVACY OF CIPHER 259 
 
 only for the transmission of my political and 
 business telegrams. In view of this categorical 
 declaration, and also bearing in mind that the 
 transmission of political information emanating 
 from irresponsible sources by means of the 
 Embassy cipher was against elementary diplo- 
 matic ethics, and in practice detrimental, as 
 it would inevitably result in contradictory 
 information, I refused Kerensky's request. He 
 did not seem to understand at the moment 
 that his role as a politician had come to an 
 end in Russia. He adopted a very haughty 
 tone, invoked his " power," was very re- 
 proachful in regard to my " abetting British 
 conspiracies," etc. It was a painful inter- 
 view, as Kerensky displayed scant self-posses- 
 sion, great anger, and no wisdom whatsoever. 
 
 I promptly informed the President of the 
 Directorate at Omsk of this incident. The 
 reply was that " Kerensky is in L,ondon in 
 private capacity, that he has no mandate from 
 the Union for the Regeneration," and that I 
 was entirely justified in refusing to grant him 
 the use of cipher. I forwarded to Kerensky a 
 copy of this telegram it occurred on or about 
 October 25 and I have not seen him since. 
 
 After the overthrow of the Directorate and
 
 260 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 the assumption of supreme power by Admiral 
 Kolchak, Kerensky conducted in Paris and 
 in London an agitation against the Omsk 
 Government. This attitude was severely 
 criticised by the great majority of Russian 
 progressive elements who had temporarily 
 sacrificed their partisanship in the attempt at 
 giving support to the man who had raised 
 the standard of the unification and regenera- 
 tion of Russia on democratic lines. The 
 future will show whether Kerensky will ever 
 be in a position to return to Russia and to 
 play an important political part. Personally, 
 I doubt it. The hatred of the Russian military 
 circles, big and small, towards Kerensky, is 
 everlasting. To a great extent he deserves it, 
 if the stories which I have heard from dis- 
 tinguished Russian officers of his haughty and 
 contemptuous attitude towards Russian 
 generals are true. It is often alleged that 
 Kerensky is responsible for the disruption of 
 the Army. Such an accusation is not fully 
 justified. It is obviously childish to declare 
 one man responsible for a process which was 
 undoubtedly elemental and which none could 
 have been in a position to stop. There can be 
 no doubt that Kerensky was not up to the
 
 KERENSKY'S CHARACTER 261 
 
 mark as Prime Minister of Russia. There can 
 be no doubt that he was afflicted by the mania 
 grandiosa. It is equally certain that the 
 famous Order No. i and many other measures 
 sanctioned by the Provisional Government as 
 a whole contributed to the complete breakdown 
 of discipline in the Russian Army. If Kerensky 
 is responsible, others share his responsibility. 
 Kerensky may write many more volumes 
 about the Kornilov affair. He will never 
 succeed in refuting the charge of duplicity 
 and of weakness. I would, however, remind 
 the detractors and abusers of this gifted but 
 unbalanced favourite child of the first Russian 
 Revolution, that superhuman genius, energy, 
 and will power were needed in order to cope 
 with the problems with which Kerensky was 
 confronted. In spite of all his qualities and 
 shortcomings, he is not a superman. 
 
 In the course of 1919, Kerensky remained 
 outside the Russian political Conference in 
 Paris, which included, apart from Russian 
 diplomats and cold-storage statesmen, several 
 of his former friends and collaborators. 
 This compulsory aloofness and isolation ren- 
 dered him extremely nervous, and he con- 
 tinued systematically to attack such attempts
 
 262 THE ORDEAI, OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 at creating strong governmental nuclei in 
 Russia (in Siberia and in South Russia) as 
 it was the task of the political Conference to 
 represent and to support. Upon his arrival in 
 lyondon in the summer of 1918, Kerensky was 
 an ardent supporter of intervention. A year 
 later, seeing that this intervention was limited 
 to half measures and was accompanied by 
 sporadic and equivocal attempts at coming 
 into touch with L,enin, Kerensky became an 
 equally ardent opponent of intervention. I 
 would ask some of Kerensky 's detractors, 
 are they entitled by greater services to Russia 
 than those rendered by Kerensky to condemn 
 a man who saw the salvation of Russia in a 
 policy which differed from that in which they 
 failed more lamentably than Kerensky had 
 failed before ?
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 
 ONE of my colleagues in the Russian Diplo- 
 matic service wko had retired a couple of 
 years before the war from an important post, 
 told me the following story. In the month 
 of February, 1918, he happened to be in Petro- 
 grad, where he was living very quietly on a 
 modest pension. Having discovered his pres- 
 ence, the Bolsheviks invited him to the Foreign 
 Office "for a chat." He was received cour- 
 teously and had the honour of being admitted 
 to the presence of Chicherin himself. The 
 Bolshevik Ministry evidently imagined that he 
 would be willing to serve them, as he was con- 
 sidered as one of the "malcontents" owing to 
 the fact that his resignation had been more or 
 less forced upon him by the Sazonov Ministry. 
 My friend was invited to join the service. He 
 refused. With a frankness which was always 
 characteristic of this very able man, he in- 
 formed Chicherin that he considered the Brest- 
 lyitovsk treaty an act of folly and of treason. 
 Chicherin replied : " We have been com- 
 
 263
 
 264 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 pelled to make peace with Germany because 
 we could not go on fighting. But the Brest- 
 Litovsk treaty exists only on paper. Cannot 
 you realise that Germany is already beaten? 
 The entry of America into the war has already 
 settled the issue in favour of the Entente. 
 When the Allies win, the Brest-Litovsk Treaty 
 will be annulled either by them or by our- 
 selves." 
 
 Thus in Soviet Russia, where the leaders 
 were well informed in regard to the internal 
 conditions of Germany, the latter was con- 
 sidered as defeated at the very moment when 
 the Brest-Litovsk Treaty was signed. No 
 notion of that sort existed in the countries of 
 the Entente. In April or May (I cannot recall 
 the exact date) one of the London papers 
 published a series of articles, the author of 
 which, a business man by profession, had 
 been interned in Germany since the beginning 
 of the war. Owing to exceptional circum- 
 stances, he had the unique opportunity of 
 making extensive inquiries into the internal 
 conditions of Germany. As soon as he suc- 
 ceeded in escaping, he published a series of 
 articles. The gist of these articles was that 
 Germany might last for another six months or
 
 A TRUE PROPHECY 265 
 
 so (after March, 1918). The possibility of 
 further military successes was not excluded. 
 But the disintegration in the rear was such 
 that a sudden and complete collapse was in- 
 evitable. The question was whether this col- 
 lapse would come three, four, or six months 
 hence. But the collapse would be such that 
 Germany would capitulate. 
 
 These articles, although strenuously adver- 
 tised by the paper and events have proved 
 that the advertisement was well deserved 
 passed comparatively unobserved. They were 
 understood as an unsuccessful effort at raising 
 the spirit in Great Britain, where doubts were 
 being expressed of the possibility of complete 
 victory over Germany. There prevailed a 
 certain subdued despondency. From March 
 till August, it is no exaggeration to say that 
 the country lived with its heart in its mouth. 
 " Paris ! " The word was on everybody's 
 lips. When the Germans launched their last 
 offensive against Paris and the capital was 
 already being shelled by the uncanny " Big 
 Bertha," it seemed that France was doomed. 
 It was only in August, when the offensive 
 came to a standstill and the victorious 
 Allied troops commenced their march across
 
 266 THE ORDEAIv OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 the devastated districts of France, that Great 
 Britain breathed freely again. The above- 
 mentioned articles of March were to me person- 
 ally a source of constant and unshaken con- 
 fidence in the triumph of the Allied cause. 
 Somehow, I believed every word of the author's 
 seemingly too optimistic predictions. 
 
 After the Brest-Iyitovsk Treaty had been 
 signed, and as late as in August, 1918, I repeat, 
 the issue of the war hung fire. British Govern- 
 ment circles were concerned with nothing 
 else. Neither was public opinion. How could 
 the Russian Embassy, isolated not only from 
 Russia, but even from other Russian Em- 
 bassies and Legations, achieve any results in 
 the endeavour to obtain help and assistance 
 for Russia ? The Ministers, Members of the 
 War Cabinet and the Prime Minister himself 
 awaited with ever-growing anxiety the com- 
 muniques from the Western front which 
 appeared twice daily at about three p.m. 
 and just before midnight. Could they then 
 think of the morrow, could they take a 
 long view and understand, at that moment, 
 that by leaving Russia to the tender mercies 
 of Bolshevism they were running the risk of 
 jeopardising the fruits of their victory, however
 
 STRUGGLES OF THE EMBASSY 267 
 
 complete ? No, they could not. They 
 " waived Russia aside," and waived aside the 
 question of assistance to Russia. Our assur- 
 ances that the conscious elements in Russia 
 expected help and would not be reconciled to 
 the Brest-I4tovsk Treaty, were treated with 
 scepticism. They argued thus : as long as 
 we see no active and organised resistance, 
 what do we care about the feelings and the 
 fate of those who are unable to organise 
 resistance to the Bolsheviks ? 
 
 This mentality prevailed during the first 
 half of 1918 and as late as in August and 
 September. Consequently, the activities of 
 the Embassy were perforce limited during 
 these months to the struggle against the 
 violation of Russia's interests and of the 
 rights of Russian citizens. All the while, the 
 Embassy was under the threat of having to 
 close its doors as a result of the official recogni- 
 tion of the Bolsheviks. On more than one 
 occasion "competent" and "well-informed" 
 friends of the Embassy warned us that this 
 recognition was being " considered." The 
 only weapon at the disposal of the Embassy 
 was ardent faith in the inherent nobility of 
 the British nation and in the righteousness
 
 of the Russian cause which we were trying to 
 defend. 
 
 The first news of the formation in Russia 
 of a Governmental power and organisation to 
 fight the Bolsheviks was received at the 
 Embassy from Vladivostok. It was the first 
 time for seven months that an appeal was 
 addressed to the Russian Embassy in London 
 by a Russian administration. The " Union 
 for the Regeneration of Russia," which had 
 originated in Russia (Moscow) as early as 
 February or March, 1918, had never directly 
 approached the Embassy. Whether it was 
 by reason of material impossibility, or because 
 the idea never occurred to the promoters and 
 leaders of the " Union," I do not know. I 
 doubt, however, that the Moscow group was 
 really unable to send a message to the Embassy. 
 Mr. I/)ckhart was in Moscow, and he was in 
 a position to send official messengers and 
 messages. Be that as it may, the fact remains 
 that I never received a single line from the 
 " Union " and was therefore unable to speak 
 in its name. I learnt of its existence from 
 Kerensky in June. 
 
 The first Vladivostok Government was 
 headed by Mr. Berber, a Socialist who was
 
 ANTI-BOLSHEVISM 269 
 
 utterly unknown at the Embassy. In reply 
 to his first telegram I expressed the readiness 
 to approach the British Government on his 
 behalf and to assist him in so far as his activities 
 would be directed against the Bolsheviks. 
 
 Almost simultaneously, a message reached 
 me from General Horvat, who had formed 
 another anti-Bolshevik Government at Harbin. 
 This Government, as far as I could make out 
 from contradictory news, was more moderate 
 than the Government at Vladivostok. Tele- 
 grams travelled very slowly, and it was well- 
 nigh impossible to derive from them exact 
 knowledge or definite ideas as regards the 
 actual course of events or prospects of success 
 of these embryos of an All-Russian Govern- 
 ment. I had to grope in the dark, directed 
 chiefly by newspaper telegrams and informa- 
 tion sporadically derived from official British 
 sources. I did everything in my power to 
 make it clear to the two above-mentioned 
 Governments and later to the Government 
 which was formed at Omsk and described 
 itself as the " Siberian " Government that 
 partisanship and quarrels about the right of 
 each of these administrations to call itself the 
 " All-Russian " Government were ludicrous
 
 270 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 and detrimental to the cause which they pro- 
 fessed to have espoused. I expressed the 
 view that all these local Governments should 
 endeavour to establish law and order and 
 prevent economic and political disruption 
 each within its territorial limits, and that the 
 best thing they could do would be to conform 
 to the territorial divisions which existed before 
 the revolution. In such matters as, for ex- 
 ample, the railway traffic, it was their sacred 
 duty, dictated by common-sense, to achieve 
 complete co-ordination. My idea was that 
 autonomous administrative units should be 
 formed akin to the " Governor-Generalships " 
 of the old regime, but, of course, upon entirely 
 different lines as far as administrative methods 
 were concerned. 
 
 The Siberian papers published during that 
 period, as well as documents published in 
 large quantities by the Omsk Directorate, 
 give an exhaustive history of the events in 
 Siberia which culminated in the unification of 
 Siberia (which, alas, was of short duration), 
 and in the recognition, by the whole of Siberia, 
 of the Oufa Directorate which had migrated to 
 Omsk, as the " All-Russian " Government. 
 
 To recount all the negotiations which led to
 
 A NEW RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT 271 
 
 this consummation would be to exceed the 
 scope of this narrative. Suffice it to say that 
 inasmuch as the advice of the Russian Em- 
 bassy in London was capable of influencing 
 the course of events, it was given in the sense 
 of complete solidarity of all parties opposed to 
 the Bolsheviks and of loyalty to the Allied 
 cause which every patriotic Russian in those 
 days regarded as being the Russian cause as 
 well. 
 
 For the Russian Embassy in London the 
 first telegram of the President of the Direc- 
 torate at Omsk, Mr. Avxientiev, was the 
 opening of a new phase since the Bolshevik 
 revolution. We ceased to " hang in the air." 
 We were at last given the opportunit}' of 
 saying to the British Government : "In the 
 distant Far East a new Russian State is 
 coming into being. It seeks the support of the 
 Powers of the Entente. In order to counteract 
 the unholy alliance between the dwindling 
 German autocracy and the rising Russian 
 Bolshevism, lend this new Russia your sup- 
 port." 
 
 Political work was made possible once again. 
 At this moment I was given the oppor- 
 tunity of obtaining information from Omsk
 
 272 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 and Vladivostok about the true state of affairs 
 in those regions from sources in which I could 
 have full confidence. This information was 
 independent of the official communications of 
 the Directorate. And these reliable infor- 
 mants very soon began to send messages 
 which indicated that the Directorate was not 
 strong enough to create a Government capable 
 of coping with all the innumerable and com- 
 plex problems of the situation. In particular, 
 it was unable to raise an army. These 
 messages were confirmed from British sources. 
 A month had not elapsed since the advent 
 to predatory power of the Directorate, when 
 news was received that a coup d'etat was immi- 
 nent, and that such a coup d'ttat was essential 
 for the formation of a strong Government. 
 
 The date of November n is the greatest 
 date in the history of Europe of the twentieth 
 century. The firing of guns which started 
 at ii a.m. announced to the residents of 
 Ivondon that the war had ended. The Armis- 
 tice which meant the capitulation of Germany 
 had been signed. It is impossible to describe 
 the exultation that followed. For a whole 
 week this exultation continued. It assumed 
 the shape of wanderings of gay throngs, from
 
 THE ARMISTICE 273 
 
 noon till the early hours of the morning, of 
 innumerable crowds in the streets of London, 
 walking, motoring in taxi-cabs, lorries, 'buses. 
 Processions were formed, choruses sung, bon- 
 fires lit. As far as I was able to discern, the 
 crowds were mad with joy not so much on 
 account of the defeat of the " boche," being an 
 event of the greatest importance in the realm 
 of international politics, nor even so much on 
 account of the tremendous triumph for the 
 national pride of Great Britain, as by virtue of 
 a kind of primitive happiness resulting from 
 the fact that the slaughter had ceased, that 
 mothers and fathers, brothers and sisters, 
 wives and children would no longer open 
 telegrams with trembling hands lest these 
 telegrams contain the tragic news of the death 
 of their dear ones. The aspect of the London 
 restaurants, streets, theatres, habitually so 
 placid, silent, and restrained, changed com- 
 pletely. In this rowdiness, utterly devoid, 
 however, of vulgar excesses, there was some- 
 thing genuine and spontaneous. 
 
 The feelings of Russians in London naturally 
 defy description. A series of solemn festivities 
 took place, from which we were excluded. The 
 keynote was given in the Mansion House
 
 274 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 speeches made by Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lloyd 
 George. 
 
 London was profusely beflagged for about a 
 week. There were Serbian, Greek, Portuguese 
 flags, but no Russian. Only the War Office 
 the staunch friend endowed with better memory 
 than the rest of Whitehall flew the Russian 
 flag, and a handful of friends of Russia, private 
 persons, remembered among the seven million 
 Russian casualties the names of their personal 
 friends who had died for the cause of the 
 Entente. 
 
 Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lloyd George forgot 
 all about Russia in their Mansion House 
 perorations. The Press, of course, followed 
 the lead. There were, however, some people 
 who did remember. They were the officers 
 who had been attached to the Russian Army. 
 Still more sympathy was shown by the British 
 officers who had been prisoners in Germany 
 with the Russians. And the numbers of 
 these sympathisers were considerable. Their 
 sympathy was a valuable compensation for 
 official indifference. 
 
 At the first interview I had with Lord 
 Robert Cecil after the Armistice I handed him 
 a memorandum which I supplemented by
 
 RUSSIAN PRISONERS 275 
 
 a fervent appeal to the Government on behalf 
 of the Russian prisoners of war in Germany. 
 " If these men are given full liberty and not 
 taken care of, they will be irresistibly drawn 
 towards Russia. They will find themselves 
 in Soviet Russia where they will be con- 
 fronted with the alternative either to join the 
 Red Army, or to be shot, or die of hunger and 
 cold." 
 
 Events have confirmed my apprehensions. 
 The fate of the Russian prisoners in Germany 
 did not attract the attention of those who 
 drafted the military clauses of the Armistice. 
 They were not mentioned. Efforts were made 
 later to establish some kind of control over 
 those prisoners in order to prevent them 
 from reaching Soviet Russia. In one of the 
 departments of the War Office an officer who 
 had been in captivity in Germany together 
 with the Russians, took special interest in 
 the matter. I am bound to state that this 
 officer displayed greater energy, sympathy 
 and compassion than the entire personnel of 
 our Military Agency in London. Person- 
 ally, I feel more indebted to these British 
 friends for all the care they took of our 
 prisoners than words can express. Alas, their
 
 276 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 efforts were individual. The " powers that 
 be " . . . went on repeating ad nauseam the 
 same aphorisms about " Russia's dismember- 
 ment " and " disappearance." 
 
 There occurred, however, a lucid interval 
 in the attitude of the British Government 
 towards Russia during the first few days that 
 followed the Armistice. I strongly suspect 
 that the initiative in this case belonged to 
 Lord Robert Cecil. It seems to have dawned 
 upon the British Government at this moment 
 that the recognition of a Constitutional Govern- 
 ment in Russia was a necessary preliminary 
 to the solution of all questions concerning the 
 reconstruction of Europe. Although the 
 British representatives in Siberia reported 
 that the position of the Omsk Directorate was 
 by no means stable, that an acute conflict 
 had arisen between the Social-Revolutionaries 
 (who dominated the Government) and the 
 military elements, it was decided to recognise 
 the Directorate, and a telegram to that effect 
 had already been drafted on November 17. 
 
 The coup d'ttat of November 18 at Omsk 
 caused this telegram to be withheld. Admiral 
 Kolchak had been proclaimed Supreme Ruler. 
 When I saw I/)rd Robert Cecil on the next day,
 
 FALL OF THE DIRECTORATE 277 
 
 he said : " We were ready to recognise the 
 Directorate. It has been forcibly removed. 
 Who can tell how long the present power will 
 last, and whether the same thing will not 
 happen in another three weeks ? How do 
 you expect us to arrive at a decision in these 
 circumstances ? We must wait and see what 
 happens." 
 
 They have waited and seen. It is true that 
 since these words were spoken the opinion 
 has become engrained in the minds of British 
 politicians that the capture of Moscow is the 
 decisive event, and that " as long as Lenin 
 sits in Moscow, no other Government can be 
 recognised in Russia." . . . 
 
 Russian Liberal circles in London were 
 deeply perturbed by the news of the downfall 
 of the Directorate. They took it for granted 
 that Kolchak's Government was nothing else 
 than a military dictatorship. They were con- 
 vinced that Kolchak himself was a reactionary. 
 They said that the rightful succession of 
 power (which, in their opinion, had passed 
 from the Constituent Assembly dispersed by 
 Lenin to the members of the Directorate who 
 were also members of that Assembly) had 
 been broken. It soon, however, became ap-
 
 278 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 parent that Kolchak was being supported not 
 merely by a group of reactionary officers, but 
 by powerful social and political groups and 
 parties. The great majority of the Russian 
 Liberals in London (except, of course, the 
 small Kerensky section) allowed themselves 
 to be persuaded that agitation against Kolchak 
 was detrimental to the Russian cause, and 
 that the regeneration of Russia could not be 
 achieved by the Social revolutionaries alone, 
 but was only possible if all political parties 
 forgot their shibboleths and united in support 
 of law and order and in the task of forming 
 an army capable of overwhelming Trotsky's 
 Chinese and Lettish mercenaries. 
 
 A couple of days after the Armistice had 
 been signed, a meeting was held at the Embassy 
 at which representatives of all the political 
 Russian sections (to the exclusion, once more, 
 of the Kerensky group) were present. The 
 question was discussed of the bearing the 
 cessation of the war would have upon the 
 attitude of the Allies towards Russia. Such 
 meetings had become a customary occurrence 
 ever since I realised the impossibility for the 
 " autonomous " Embassy to remain isolated 
 from Russian circles in London. In the
 
 THE PEACE CONFERENCE 279 
 
 capacity of Chairman of the meetings held 
 at the Embassy, I opened the discussion by 
 stating that in my opinion to demand the 
 despatch of a single Allied soldier to Russia 
 would be tantamount' to placing Russia on the 
 same level as Persia or Mexico. " Whatever 
 we do, we must avoid the danger of becoming 
 the vassals of our would-be friends. We should 
 have to pay by decades of humiliation for the 
 life of every British soldier lost in the Russian 
 civil war. The demand for military assistance 
 in men as well as in war material, was perfectly 
 legitimate as long as the war lasted. Now that 
 the war is over, it would, in my opinion, be a 
 crime against the national dignity and sovereignty 
 of Russia." 
 
 This statement caused a certain amount of 
 very excited comment, and I regret to say 
 that very few of the members of the meeting 
 supported my views. Those who argued 
 against me on November 13, 1918, have since 
 been cured of the particular Daltonism which 
 affected their eyesight at that moment. 
 
 Meanwhile Western Europe, freed from the 
 nightmare of German militarism, was making 
 preparations for the Peace Conference. The 
 question was raised as to the admission of
 
 280 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 Russia to the Peace deliberations. A few 
 days before Mr. Balfour's departure for Paris, 
 I had a long interview with him. It was the 
 last occasion on which I had the privilege 
 of speaking to the Secretary of State for 
 Foreign Affairs. (Lord Curzon, who took 
 charge of the Foreign Office first ad interim, 
 and later as Mr. Balfour's successor, never 
 condescended to receive me.) I argued that 
 the presence of Russian representatives at 
 the Peace Conference was not a matter of 
 sentimental acknowledgment of " services ren- 
 dered," but a practical necessity, as all ques- 
 tions affecting the frontiers of Russia and the 
 status of such States as would receive complete 
 or partial " self-determination," could never 
 be satisfactorily settled in the absence of 
 Russia. I also endeavoured to show that the 
 Kolchak Government at Omsk, which had 
 already lasted more than twice as long as the 
 Directorate, represented the regeneration of 
 Russia. Mr. Balfour replied by making a 
 sweeping gesture over the map of Russia, 
 showing the extent of the Bolshevik domina- 
 tion, and added : "As long as Lenin sits in 
 Moscow, I shall not believe in the success of 
 the national movement in Russia." It is
 
 GENERAL DENIKIN 281 
 
 quite possible that some British statesmen 
 not only agreed with this idea of Mr. Balfour, 
 but also thought that to assist Russia, to help 
 her to rise from the abyss, was tantamount to 
 strengthening the inevitable Alliance between 
 Germany and Russia. From that point of 
 view the longer Russia is paralysed, the safer 
 Great Britain in the East. The policy of 
 Great Britain for the last two years shows 
 many signs of this theory having prevailed 
 over the idea that the advent of a constitu- 
 tional Government in Russia is a conditio sine 
 qua non of the restoration of stable peace in 
 Europe. 
 
 The Armistice opened the gates which 
 separated Southern Russia from Western 
 Europe. Then, General Denikin's Volunteer 
 Army and Political Council became another 
 important factor in the history of the regenera- 
 tion of Russia. Alongside with Archangel 
 and Omsk, a third nucleus was formed in the 
 South to which the Allies had even easier access 
 than to the remote regions of Siberia and the 
 dreary North. 
 
 Had the Russians who were beginning to 
 gather in Paris and to assume the part of 
 spokesmen for these nuclei proved worthy of
 
 282 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 their task, the reunion of all anti-Bolshevik 
 forces would have been achieved. Such, how- 
 ever, was not the case. 
 
 With the Armistice, a new phase had been 
 opened in the Russo-Entente relations.
 
 CHAPTER XIV 
 
 THE opening of the Peace Conference in Paris 
 which followed so quickly upon the conclusion 
 of the Armistice, marks the beginning of the 
 last phase of my activities as Russian Charge 
 d' Affaires in I/mdon. During that period, 
 diplomatic work proved extremely arduous, 
 if not impossible, for two fundamental reasons. 
 The first was the departure to Paris of the 
 responsible chiefs of the Foreign Office, with 
 whom I had hitherto negotiated, and the 
 transfer of the centre of British policy from 
 lyondon to Paris. I/)rd Curzon, as I have 
 already mentioned, never granted me the 
 privilege of an audience. Personal discussions 
 with Sir Ronald Graham and his immediate 
 assistants were therefore to a great extent 
 academic. When, following the custom which 
 had been established in " normal days," I 
 supplemented personal explanations by the 
 presentation of memoranda, notes, or letters, 
 I was invariably informed that these docu- 
 ments were being transmitted to Paris for 
 
 283
 
 284 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 decision. The second reason which paralysed 
 my work was the formation in Paris of the 
 Russian Political Council and the arrival in 
 the beginning of January, 1919, of Mr. Sazonov. 
 
 The question which was in the minds of all 
 Russians and upon which there was no differ- 
 ence of opinion in Russian circles was that of 
 the representation of Russia at the Peace 
 Conference. Bearing in mind the speeches 
 made by Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lloyd George, 
 I personally had no doubt whatsoever that 
 Russian delegates would not be admitted. 
 The solution of this question obviously de- 
 pended entirely upon the recognition of the 
 Omsk Government. Had this recognition been 
 granted, the best method in my opinion would 
 have been for that Government to appoint 
 as delegates the Russian Ambassadors in Paris 
 and Rome and Mr. Tchaikovsky, who was 
 then the head of the Archangel Government, 
 or Sazonov, as Kolchak's Foreign Minister : 
 these delegates to receive instructions from 
 Russia, in other words, from the Governments 
 of Kolchak and Denikin. 
 
 No such plan, however, materialised, and 
 the events took an entirely different course. 
 A Russian Political Council was formed in
 
 THE PEACH CONFERENCE 285 
 
 Paris under the presidency of Prince Lvov. 
 It included the Ambassadors in Paris, Rome, 
 Washington and Madrid (Messrs. Maklakov, 
 de Giers, Bakhmetiev, and Stakhovitch), the 
 Russian Minister in Sweden (Mr. Goulkevitch), 
 Mr. Iswolski (the late Russian Ambassador in 
 Paris), Messrs. Sazonov, Konovalov, Savinkov, 
 Tchaikovsky and Titov. In an official Russian 
 document, enumerating the members of the 
 Council, my name was cited as belonging to 
 that body. I hastened, however, to inform 
 the Government at Omsk that I took no 
 part in the deliberations of the Council, that 
 I disagreed with some of its fundamental 
 principles, and therefore considered it more 
 useful to remain in Ixmdon. 
 
 None of these gentlemen were invited to 
 the Peace Conference. The Council, however, 
 held daily meetings, presented notes, memo- 
 randa, and reports to the Conference. These 
 notes were signed by L/vov, Maklakov, Tchai- 
 kovsky and Sazonov. 
 
 About a fortnight after Mr. Sazonov' s arrival 
 in Paris, I was advised by some friends to 
 take a trip to Paris in order to establish 
 personal contact with the man in whom Denikin 
 and Kolchak placed their full trust and who
 
 286 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 had again become my ' chief ' by reason of 
 his acceptance of the post of Foreign Minister 
 in Kolchak's Government. 
 
 By an unfortunate coincidence I arrived in 
 Paris at the very moment when the Paris 
 evening papers published the famous radio- 
 telegram inviting all Russian parties to a 
 Conference at Prinkipo. 
 
 The capitulation of Germany afforded a 
 powerful stimulus to the Russian national 
 movement. The Russian people were begin- 
 ning to understand the fallacy of Bolshevism, 
 which had promised peace, liberty, and plenty, 
 but had given slavery, poverty and death. 
 Russia believed that the Powers of the Entente 
 delivered from the nightmare would assist 
 her. We got " Prinkipo " instead. As a 
 product of the collective brain and spirit of 
 the representatives of the triumphant, great 
 Western democracies, it is the most pitiable 
 act that has ever disgraced the pages of 
 world-history. It is an accepted fallacy that 
 Prinkipo strengthened the Bolsheviks ; to my 
 mind it is exactly the reverse that happened. 
 Every conscious, proud, and honest Russian 
 patriot was made to understand that Russia 
 must save herself and that all hopes for assist-
 
 PRINKIPO 287 
 
 ance from our late friends were in vain. Pas 
 de tete plutdt qu'une souillure au front became 
 the motto which burnt in the hearts of ever- 
 increasing numbers of Russian patriots. Such 
 is my opinion to-day of the effects of " Prin- 
 kipo." It can easily be understood how much 
 stronger were the feelings of indignation 
 evoked by this pernicious invention of anony- 
 mous advisers at the moment when it fell upon 
 our heads like a bolt from the blue. There 
 still remained in those days Russians who 
 thought that Western Europe could not remain 
 an indifferent witness of the sufferings of 
 Russia. " Prinkipo " sent all these hopes to 
 the four winds. 
 
 Sazonov, immediately informed of the publi- 
 cation of the famous radio-telegram by a British 
 friend of Russia (the French Government, of 
 course, sent him no intimation, as then he 
 was already being completely ignored) , adopted 
 on this occasion the right tone. In an inter- 
 view with the correspondent of the Matin 
 he emphatically declared that the suggestion 
 was inacceptable and insulting. On the next 
 day I attended the meeting of the Russian 
 Political [Council. Opinions were expressed 
 that we should abstain from hasty conclusions,
 
 288 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 await developments and, in particular, ascer- 
 tain the intentions of the French Government, 
 whose previous attitude towards the Soviet 
 power tended to show that the French them- 
 selves realised the impossibil^ of any com- 
 promise with the Bolsheviks. I ventured to 
 express the opinion that we should lose no 
 time in resolutely repudiating the suggestion, 
 and obtain, without further delay, resolutions 
 of protest from Russian organisations in 
 London and in Paris in support of our attitude. 
 "We cannot," I remarked, "leave all the 
 indignation to The Morning Post." As it 
 was generally believed that the initiative in 
 this case belonged to the British Government, 
 some of my colleagues did not miss the oppor- 
 tunity of making sarcastic remarks with 
 reference to my influence upon that Govern- 
 ment. It was therefore decided to await 
 developments. On the same day, a crowded 
 meeting of all the political groups of the 
 Russian Colony in Paris was held at the 
 Embassy. A resolution was carried unanim- 
 ously, proclaiming not only the refusal to 
 accept the invitation to L'ile verte, but also 
 the expression of an indignant protest. As 
 I had been present at the meeting, I intended
 
 PRINKIPO 289 
 
 to sign this declaration, but was told on high 
 authority that, as the Russian representative 
 in lyondon, I should refrain from " committing 
 myself." The argument which was put for- 
 ward in private conversation by some of my 
 British friends was the following : " You 
 should accept. The Bolsheviks will refuse. 
 Then the whole world and British public 
 opinion, including the circles in sympathy 
 with Lenin, will clearly understand the im- 
 possibility of making peace with the Bolsheviks. 
 Then Great Britain will be in a position to use 
 force in order to destroy Bolshevism. If you 
 refuse, you will be accused of being intent on 
 deliberately prolonging the civil war. You 
 will have to pay for the consequences." I 
 replied that should I agree with this argument, 
 forget the shame of Brest-L,itovsk and consent 
 to begin negotiations with the Bolsheviks 
 which would obviously be doomed to failure, 
 such a personal sacrifice on the part of one 
 Russian representative would be of no avail, 
 as the Russia which he represented would 
 immediately repudiate him. 
 
 Seeing that my further presence in Paris 
 was utterly useless, and that no personal 
 contact with Mr. Sazonov was possible, as 
 T
 
 290 THE ORDEAIv OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 he was already strongly prejudiced against 
 me, I returned to Condon forthwith. My 
 impressions of all I had seen and heard in 
 Paris were more than painful. 
 
 As I have already said, diplomatic work 
 in London was rendered extremely difficult. 
 I continued, however, my endeavours to 
 explain to the Kolchak Government the 
 actual state of affairs. Sazonov tried to pre- 
 vent me from doing so. In February, I 
 received instructions from him to the effect 
 that my telegrams on political questions should 
 be addressed to Paris, not to Omsk. As the 
 representative of the Omsk Government, I 
 was, of course, compelled to take into account 
 the instructions of the man who had been 
 appointed Foreign Minister. At the same 
 time, I was conscious of the fact that in the 
 task of informing the Government at Omsk 
 of the political currents and events in Britain, 
 I was more competent than Sazonov. I 
 therefore telegraphed to the then Prime Minis- 
 ter, Mr. Vologodski : "I am not giving you 
 political information, as Sazonov objects to 
 such a procedure. Should you desire to 
 obtain this information, kindly send me in- 
 structions to that effect." The Prime Minister
 
 REMOVAL OF RESTRICTIONS 291 
 
 replied as follows : " Your information is 
 very valuable. Please continue." 
 
 At the same time, the work of the Embassy 
 became more complicated in another direction. 
 After the Armistice, the British Government 
 removed certain restrictions which had been 
 imposed upon the arrival in Great Britain of 
 Russian citizens. Also, the routes from Russia 
 to Great Britain via Archangel, Vladivostok, 
 and the ports of the Black Sea became more 
 accessible. Russians flocked to London from 
 these localities, as well as from Finland and 
 Scandinavia. These Russians included many 
 prominent statesmen and politicians. The 
 Embassy made every effort at maintaining 
 close relations, not only with various political 
 groups in London, but at affording the newly- 
 arrived Russians the chance of coming into 
 contact with their compatriots in London. 
 Meetings were therefore frequently held at 
 the Embassy, attended by a limited number 
 of representatives of political groups, at which 
 the newcomers gave accounts of their im- 
 pressions of the conditions prevailing in such 
 parts of Russia as they had been in a position 
 to study,
 
 292 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 It soon became apparent that differences 
 of opinion between the Russian Political 
 Council, and especially Mr. Sazonov, on the 
 one hand, and myself on the other, were of 
 such a nature as to render political work in 
 London futile. The first important subject 
 upon which we fundamentally disagreed was 
 that of the recognition by Russia, immediate 
 and unconditional, of the independence of 
 Finland. I suggested to Admiral Kolchak 
 that Russia should conclude a free agreement 
 with Finland and submit this agreement to 
 the Peace Conference and the League of 
 Nations for sanction. 
 
 The views I held in the question of the 
 recognition of Finland's independence were 
 communicated to Omsk in the following 
 telegrams. 
 
 February 14, 1919. 
 
 " Professor Peter Struve has arrived in 
 London from Finland on his way to Paris. 
 He has addressed an official letter to me in his 
 capacity of official representative of the Rus- 
 sian organisations at Helsingfors. General 
 Yudenitch and Mr. Kartashev are at the head 
 of these organisations. Mr. Struve informs
 
 FINLAND 293 
 
 me that there is at Helsingfors a ' Russian 
 Committee ' presided over by Kartashev. This 
 Committee is sanctioned by the Finnish Govern- 
 ment. The task of the Committee, which 
 includes representatives of different political 
 and social groups, is to render assistance to 
 the Russians who have fled from the Bolshevik 
 regime. The Committee is working in full 
 accord with the Finnish Government and 
 under the latter's control. An important part 
 is played in the Committee by the representa- 
 tives of commerce and finance in Petrograd, 
 whose eyes are naturally turned to the capital. 
 
 " Apart from the ' Russian ' Committee, 
 there is in Finland a smaller political circle 
 whose members are endeavouring, in con- 
 junction with other forces in Russia, as well 
 as with Kolchak and Denikin, to work for the 
 liberation of Russia, and in particular of 
 Petrograd, from the Bolsheviks. In accord- 
 ance with its fundamental political and military 
 aims, this circle has recognised General Yuden- 
 itch as its leader. Kartashev exercises a great 
 influence within the circle. 
 
 " Both these organisations have empowered 
 Struve to appeal, through the Russian Political 
 Council in Paris as well as through the Russian
 
 29 J THE ORDEAIy OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 representatives with the Entente, to the 
 Allied Governments with the following re- 
 quests : 
 
 " i. That immediate help be given to the 
 Russians who have fled to Finland, chiefly by 
 sending food, and thereby relieving the burden 
 imposed upon Finland by this influx of refugees. 
 
 " 2. That assistance be given to the Russian 
 organisations in Finland under Yudenitch and 
 Kartashev in their task of collecting food- 
 stuffs without which the liberation of Petrograd 
 is impracticable, as it would not be a lasting 
 
 one. 
 
 
 Struve adds that (i) Yudenitch, as chair- 
 man of the above-mentioned organisation, 
 has formally recognised Kolchak as the 
 Supreme Ruler and placed himself at the 
 disposal of the Admiral. (2) That the Russian 
 politicians who are collaborating with Yuden- 
 itch and Kartashev have unreservedly adopted 
 the principle of loyal recognition of the inde- 
 pendence of Finland, and (3) that he, Struve, 
 was a member of both organisations. 
 
 " Struve thinks that the question of feeding 
 Petrograd could and should be settled only in 
 connection with the Russian non-party organi- 
 sations in Finland.
 
 RUSSIA AND FINLAND 295 
 
 " I have communicated the tenor of Struve's 
 letter to the British Foreign Office. I suppose 
 the Russian Council in Paris, after hearing 
 Struve, will agree with his platform. As the 
 Peace Conference is sure to insist upon the 
 independence of Finland, I consider that the 
 moment has arrived for Russia to take the 
 initiative. At the conclusion of peace with 
 Japan in 1905, 1 was present when the Japanese 
 requested that an Ambassador be appointed to 
 Tokyo. The Imperial Government declined 
 to take this step, which would signify the 
 recognition of Japan as a Great Power. All 
 the other Great Powers sent Ambassadors, 
 and we had to follow suit. Such mistakes 
 should not be repeated and the inevitable 
 should not be postponed. Struve assures me 
 and I have full confidence in his judgment 
 that the present Government in Finland is 
 favourable to us. My personal intercourse 
 with the Finnish representatives here leads 
 me to believe that Finland is most anxious 
 to obtain recognition. It would be short- 
 sighted not to take advantage of this frame 
 of mind. I consider that Kolchak and 
 Denikin should enter into contact with 
 Yudenitch and Kartashev and give them the
 
 296 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 rank of official representatives of Russia in 
 Finland." 
 
 Commenting upon a telegram from Karta- 
 shev addressed through the Embassy to the 
 Governments of the Entente and to the 
 Russian Military Chiefs regarding the aims 
 and composition of the " Russian Committee," 
 I telegraphed to the Omsk Government on 
 February 17. 
 
 " This telegram which completes the pre- 
 ceding messages and gives fuller data regarding 
 the broad problems confronting the Russian 
 organisations in Finland, should serve to 
 convince you that it is imperative that these 
 organisations should be immediately placed 
 in the most favourable position. As a neces- 
 sary preliminary, our relations with Finland 
 should be placed on a regular basis. I earn- 
 estly beseech you to gain full consciousness 
 that the independence of Finland is a fait 
 accompli. The Powers of the Entente will 
 sooner or later recognise Finland's independ- 
 ence, and they are not likely to be too much 
 perturbed by this or that attitude of Russia 
 in the matter, and to take into account the 
 views of the Russian Government which they 
 refuse to recognise."
 
 FINLAND AND THE ENTENTE 297 
 
 This advice was not heeded by the Kolchak 
 Government. On the one hand, Kolchak 
 considered that he had no right to take upon 
 himself the responsibility of recognising Fin- 
 land's independence. On the other hand, 
 my telegrams to Omsk were followed by 
 messages from Paris in which the Russian 
 Political Council expounded entirely different 
 views. The result was that Kolchak in his 
 replies to the Foreign Representatives at 
 Omsk and the Political Council in Paris in 
 their notes and memoranda addressed to the 
 Peace Conference insisted upon the question 
 of the recognition of Finland's independence 
 being dependent upon the sanction of the 
 future Russian Constituent Assembly. Such 
 a condition, however correct from the point 
 of view of strict constitutionalism, naturally 
 implied a practical non possumus which did 
 not help to remove the deadlock. My 
 prediction has come true. There are to-day 
 duly accredited Finnish representatives in the 
 capitals of the Entente, but the representa- 
 tives of " loyal " Russia are still outside the 
 pale. 
 
 Thus the opportunity was lost of enlisting 
 the co-operation of Finland in the early months
 
 298 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 of 1919. As late as in June, Sazonov, while 
 in London, stated to me most emphatically 
 that he was opposed to any " concessions " 
 being made by Russia to Finland. . . . Quos 
 vult perdere Jupiter dementat. 
 
 There followed the categorical refusal of 
 Finland to co-operate in the proposed opera- 
 tions for the capture of Petrograd. It was 
 decided to transfer the " base " to Esthonia. 
 Again the obstinacy of the Russian Political 
 Council in Paris in refusing to deal with the 
 " small " nationalities directly was the main 
 cause of the failure of the entire business. 
 It was, of course, by no means the only 
 cause. Political causes were manifold. But the 
 fundamental reason of this dismal and tragic 
 failure, which resulted in tens of thousands 
 of Russians being killed or dying of starva- 
 tion, exposure or typhus, was that Russia, 
 the Russian Government, was simply " left 
 out " by the Allies, who took the matter in 
 their own hands and made a ghastly muddle 
 of the whole affair. 
 
 As soon as the decision was arrived at to 
 transfer Yudenitch's base to Esthonia, I 
 ventured to point out to the British Foreign 
 Office that in dealing with the problems of
 
 BALTIC PROBLEMS 299 
 
 the Baltic, the following considerations should 
 be borne in mind : 
 
 There is a fundamental difference between 
 the status of Finland and that of the former 
 " Baltic Provinces " of Russia. Whereas the 
 former had always enjoyed very broad auto- 
 nomy, had a constitution of her own, a culture, 
 a class system, a " national " existence in the 
 truest sense of the word, no such conditions 
 obtained in Esthonia. The population of 
 Esthonia consisted before the war of peasants, 
 Esthonians proper, of landlords who were 
 chiefly German Barons, and of the middle- 
 class teachers, merchants, lawyers, etc. 
 who were either German or Russian, the 
 latter being in the majority. After the Bol- 
 shevik revolution, the landlords had been 
 expelled or had fled. All Germans had like- 
 wise been driven out, and the Esthonians 
 were intent upon destroying the last remnants 
 of the Russian middle-class elements. But 
 there was no such a thing in Esthonia as a 
 class sufficiently intelligent to " govern " the 
 country according to the principle of self- 
 determination. 
 
 Apart from that, to deprive Russia of access 
 to the ports in the Baltic would be a
 
 300 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 repetition of the adventures of Charles XII 
 of Sweden in the first decade of the eighteenth 
 century. 
 
 To encourage the exaggerated desiderata of 
 these peoples would be to play into the hands 
 of Germany. Russia, in the years to come, 
 would have infinitely graver internal problems 
 to cope with than Germany. Germany would 
 naturally strain every nerve in order to pene- 
 trate into these tempting regions, depleted as 
 they were of cultured elements capable of 
 withstanding such a penetration. The En- 
 tente, on the other hand, by encouraging the 
 formation of independent states, would incur 
 the moral obligation of supporting them 
 politically and financially. Financial support 
 would naturally depend upon compensations 
 to be obtained from those regions. Com- 
 pensations would mean concessions. Conces- 
 sions would naturally be interpreted as ex- 
 ploitation. 
 
 The only possible course, it seemed to me 
 was to make it quite clear to these " small " 
 nations that their future lay within the Russian 
 State or Federation on condition that they 
 should enjoy a broad measure of local auto- 
 nomy.
 
 BALTIC PLANS 301 
 
 Curiously enough, the author of the " four- 
 teen points " proved to be the statesman 
 whose views upon the fate of the border 
 States of the late Russian Empire were more 
 in keeping with the dictates of wisdom and 
 foresight than those of any other statesman 
 among the Allies. 
 
 The idea of a Baltic Federation including 
 Finland originated in the Chancelleries of Great 
 Britain. Would-be specialists in matters Rus- 
 sian drew up lengthy memoranda on the sub- 
 ject. All the dustbins of the world would 
 not suffice to hold all the innumerable articles, 
 notes, memoirs and other documents which 
 were prompted by the desire to see Russia 
 cut off from the Baltic.
 
 CHAPTER XV 
 
 HAVING satisfied themselves that the Russian 
 Political Council in Paris and the Kolchak 
 Government were unable to evolve a sensible 
 policy of their own in regard to the Baltic and 
 to Finland, the Allies took the matter into 
 their own hands, and the tragedy began. 
 
 Being at variance with Omsk and Paris 
 on these questions, I was unable to present 
 any " official " views to the British Govern- 
 ment. Also, official views had ceased to be 
 taken into account. Meanwhile, the Foreign 
 Office and the War Office received and con- 
 sulted innumerable irresponsible Russians. 
 To-day it was Mr. Trotsky Seniutovitch, a 
 capable and eloquent lawyer from Petrograd 
 (not to be mistaken for his great namesake), 
 to-morrow Struve, then Guchkov, Shebeko, 
 Neratov, Hessen, Prince Belosselsky. . . . 
 Their names were " legion." They all had 
 their say. No sooner would the door be 
 closed upon their exit, than all sorts of self- 
 appointed "representatives" and " dele- 
 
 302
 
 CONFUSED ADVICE 303 
 
 gates " of Esthonia, L,atvia, Lithuania, Georgia, 
 Azerbaidjan, etc., etc., etc., would occupy the 
 stage. A regular Tower of Babel. The un- 
 fortunate gentleman who was in charge of the 
 Russian section at the Foreign Office must 
 have suffered from many a headache. . . . 
 To disentangle the truth and to find a way out 
 of the labyrinth of conflicting testimonies and 
 suggestions was, however, a different matter. 
 The thread which might have helped to find 
 the way out of the labyrinth (namely, the 
 fundamental principle of the inevitable reunion 
 of these autonomous regions with Russia on 
 a Federal basis) having been broken by the 
 Russian politicians themselves, who continued 
 to prate about the Constituent Assembly and 
 refused, under the guidance of Sazonov, to 
 " make concessions " to the Finns, was not 
 picked up by the Allied Chancelleries. 
 
 In the meantime, Bullits, Steffenses and 
 others had free access to the " Big " four and 
 were making persistent suggestions of the 
 desirability of coming to terms with the Bol- 
 sheviks. In these circumstances, the Russian 
 official Representatives were deprived of the 
 last vestige of authority. 
 
 When the first news reached the Press of the
 
 304 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 formation of the North- Western Russian 
 Government and was later in the day corro- 
 borated by official messages to the Embassy, 
 I consulted the Foreign Office, who disclaimed 
 all knowledge of the extraordinary perform- 
 ance of Colonel Marsh (presumably under 
 instructions from General Sir Hubert Gough). 
 Authentic records of the proceedings which 
 accompanied the formation of that Govern- 
 ment under the threat of immediate withdrawal 
 of British support have since appeared in the 
 Press. The whole story is nothing but a series 
 of inane opportunist wanderings of irrespon- 
 sible underlings in political fields which had 
 better been left to more competent explorers. 
 
 It is a story upon which I do not care to 
 dwell. General Sir Hubert Gough has since 
 expressed his views upon the Russian national 
 movement of resistance to the Bolsheviks. 
 He was the British representative in the Baltic. 
 Honni soit qui mat y pense. 
 
 I am firmly convinced that since the Peace 
 Conference met in Paris, the influence of 
 Russian politicians, diplomats and casual ad- 
 visers upon the policy of the Entente was 
 reduced to naught. More especially was this
 
 LABOUR DICTATION 305 
 
 the case in Great Britain. In fact, immedi- 
 ately after the Armistice, a fierce controversy 
 began between two opposite currents of 
 public opinion which was reflected in the 
 Press as well as in Government circles. On 
 one side stood the Secretary of State for War, 
 Mr. Winston Churchill, and a small group of 
 members of Parliament. On the other, the 
 Radical and Liberal Press, the I/abour and 
 Socialist leaders. 
 
 The future historian who will devote his 
 attention to the study of the events which 
 followed upon the conclusion of the Armistice 
 and of the attitude of the British Government, 
 the Press and public opinion in Great Britain 
 towards Russia will undoubtedly be led to 
 the following conclusion : After November n, 
 1918, and all through 1919, the British Govern- 
 ment carried out the policy that was dictated by 
 the extremist section of the Labour and Socialist 
 parties. 
 
 The present reminiscences are not intended 
 as an historical treatise, with every thesis 
 supplemented and proved by documents 
 quoted in small print. Having borne for 
 nearly three years the responsibilities attached 
 to the office of Russian Representative, sub-
 
 3o6 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 jected to criticism by my own countrymen to 
 an extent unknown to any of my predecessors, 
 and having been, during the last eight months 
 of my tenure of office, incessantly stabbed in 
 the back instead of receiving the support and 
 encouragement to which I was entitled, I do not 
 pretend to pose as an historian. I recount what 
 I have seen, heard, suffered and accomplished. 
 The degree of interest which these notes may 
 present depends entirely upon the degree of 
 confidence my narrative may inspire. 
 
 The historian of these tragic days, more 
 fateful than any other period in the history of 
 Anglo-Russian relations, will have at his 
 disposal not only the diplomatic documents, 
 but the British papers and . . . Hansard. 
 This is what he will discover and supplement 
 by lengthy quotations, chiefly by printing in 
 parallel columns the Daily Herald and extracts 
 from Parliamentary debates : 
 
 " Alarmed at the exceptionally favourable 
 conditions for assisting Russian National forces 
 which had arisen in December, 1918, a certain 
 section of the British Press, and particularly 
 the Daily Herald (it was in those days a 
 weekly paper) began to agitate in favour of 
 the cessation of further military assistance to
 
 LABOUR DICTATION 307 
 
 Russia. ' Now that the war is over, the 
 excuse of a common enemy has ceased to 
 exist. No more troops should be sent to 
 Russia.' In this the Government promptly 
 acquiesced. ' All Allied forces to be with- 
 drawn from Russia,' pleaded the Herald. 
 The Northern region was evacuated and the 
 removal of British forces from the Caucasus 
 accomplished in so far as was compatible with 
 palpable, obvious British interests. ' All assist- 
 ance to Kolchak, Denikin and Yudenitch 
 must be stopped,' demanded the Herald and 
 its acolytes in a commanding voice. An 
 announcement to that effect by the Govern- 
 ment in the House of Commons was made 
 shortly afterwards. ' Peace with Russia, trade, 
 and recognition of Lenin ' is the fourth com- 
 mandment of the pro-Bolshevik prophets. 
 We are now entering upon the fourth phase 
 of British policy of assistance to Russia." 
 
 The above is a quotation from an article by 
 " A Friend of Britain" which appeared in the 
 New Russia, a weekly journal edited by the 
 Russian Liberation Committee in London. 
 It correctly expresses the views which, in 
 my opinion, the future historian is bound to 
 endorse.
 
 308 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 Why has all this happened ? 
 
 All stereotyped sayings, such as " perfidious 
 Albion," all suspicions of " British hatred for 
 Russia/' and of designs to prolong the agony 
 of Russia in order to dismember her, I reject 
 wholesale. I am convinced to this day that 
 the British people sincerely sympathise with 
 Russia and realise the magnitude of Russia's 
 sacrifice in the Allied cause and of her present 
 day sufferings. Tommy Atkins who pitied 
 " Fritz " more than he hated the poor deluded 
 cannon fodder in the hands of William II, 
 cannot and does not hate Russia. From 
 " Tommy " upwards, the British Army was 
 Russia's friend, a warmer friend than other 
 contributors to the Allied victory. General 
 Sir Charles Briggs, General Sir Alfred Knox, 
 General Sir John Hanbury Williams were and 
 remain friends of Russia. 
 
 I shall never forget the following incident. 
 On the day of the triumphal march of the 
 Allied contingents through the streets of 
 London the grandiose Peace celebration in 
 which the Russians did not participate I 
 chanced to meet General Sir John Hanbury 
 Williams in the street. In accents of deep and 
 ill-concealed emotion, the General assured me
 
 THE GREAT ENIGMA 309 
 
 of his sincere sympathy and of the feeling of 
 intense pain he felt in watching the procession 
 in which Russian troops were not marching. 
 
 Those who declared that they did not care 
 a scrap whether Petrograd was starving or 
 not (such a declaration was made to Prince 
 lyvov in December, 1918) were in a minority. 
 I am certain that should the news of the over- 
 throw of the Bolsheviks and of the establish- 
 ment of a Constitutional Government reach 
 this country, the rejoicing would be universal. 
 Where disillusioned and distracted Russians 
 see " perfidious " designs, far-seeing calcula- 
 tions and malice, I see nothing but ... a 
 void. 
 
 My reading of the enigma is that Allied 
 statesmanship have been groping in the dark, 
 not knowing what they were doing, and having 
 lost all capacity for seeing beyond the " needs 
 of the day." Why was that ? 
 
 In 1917 and 1918 the clamour was con- 
 stantly heard, the cry repeatedly raised : 
 " Yet another effort is needed. Russia has 
 capitulated. Russia is no more. But America 
 is with us. America will save us. Give us 
 more men, more money. The war costs 
 eight million pounds a day. There is no
 
 310 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 bread, no meat, no coal. Be patient. We 
 must save Europe and ourselves from German 
 aggression. We shall win, and there will be 
 peace, liberty and plenty. This is the war 
 that will end wars." 
 
 Victory came. On November 1 1 the bells rang 
 . . . and disarmament forthwith proceeded. 
 The " Big Four " assembled in Paris and started 
 to settle the destinies of the world. Instead 
 of making peace with Germany, they produced 
 litter upon litter of stillborn puppies of self- 
 determination. Julius Csesar, George Washing- 
 ton, Socrates, Napoleon . . . would not have 
 been immortal, had the cinema been in exist- 
 ence in their lifetime. No mortal can be 
 cinematographed, photographed, snapshotted 
 fifty times a day, smiling, frowning, lifting his 
 hat, walking down majestic staircases, or, if 
 on flat ground, lifting his legs as for the 
 goose-step . . . without imagining that he is 
 the man destined to be immortal. So the 
 " Big Four " really believed, in all sincerity 
 that if, like Joshua, they said, " Sun, stand 
 thou still," the Sun would stand still in the 
 midst of heaven. 
 
 Victory came. But peace, liberty and plenty 
 did not follow. Every day, the perplexed
 
 AFTER THE VICTORY 311 
 
 victors were discovering, to their intense 
 astonishment, that peaceful times were still 
 far off, and that the fruits of victory were dry. 
 The supplies of bread, meat and coal did not 
 increase by the magic of the fourteen points. 
 Life was more arduous than ever. The people 
 began to be angry. German militarism is no 
 more. The Kaiser, the hated symbol of all 
 the evils of his age, the target of caricaturists 
 and satirists a pitiable prisoner in a common- 
 place Dutch chateau is utterly forgotten. 
 But life is difficult. Heroes cannot find em- 
 ployment. Their sisters who had been earn- 
 ing /io per week in munition factories have 
 been dismissed. And the cost of living is 
 high. As a result, the cry was raised : 
 " Economy." The Government dare not 
 spend a penn} 7 . The Army must be reduced. 
 Away with superfluous civil servants. We 
 don't want a powerful Navy. We thought 
 we were going to skin the Germans, and lo . . . 
 we find they cannot pay, because the Peace 
 Treaty has deprived them of the resources 
 which would have enabled them to stand on 
 their feet again. Hence the irritation. 
 
 That was the psychology of which Bolshevik 
 propaganda took clever advantage in order to
 
 312 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 raise the cry, so easily understood by the 
 man in the street : " Assistance to Russia 
 means expenditure. We have no money to 
 throw away. Therefore, however much we 
 may sympathise with the sufferings of our 
 Russian friends, we cannot help them." That 
 is the leit-motiv of the propaganda. 
 
 We find that leit-motiv elsewhere. 
 
 Only two of the Entente Powers are, in fact, 
 closely and immediately concerned with the 
 fate of Russia Great Britain and France. 
 Others are either too remote or too small to 
 care or dare express views of any sort. France 
 opposes British plans of " peace and trade 
 with the Bolsheviks." The reply comes from 
 across the Channel : " Are you prepared to 
 send troops or to spend more money in order 
 to save Russia ? " " When it comes to the 
 essentials, to the outlay of money, you come 
 to us. Very sorry, we can go no further." 
 
 And they cannot. That is the tragedy. 
 Public opinion has been bred in that belief. 
 And it is now irritated and disillusioned, and 
 does not stop to think of the fatal conse- 
 quences which the triumph of Bolshevism may 
 lead to. Public opinion will not permit any 
 further " sacrifices " for Russia's sake. On
 
 A BUSINESS PROPOSAL 313 
 
 the contrary, it is anxious that Great Britain 
 should benefit by the Russian " raw material." 
 It is " raw material," and not principles or 
 any other out-of-date political considerations 
 that now serve as the guiding star and ultima 
 ratio of international politics. 
 
 In June, 1919, I endeavoured to make it 
 clear to the Omsk Government, whom I con- 
 tinued to inform of the trend of events and of 
 public opinion in this country, that we must 
 abandon all hope for the continuation of 
 assistance from the British Government, in a 
 measure commensurate with our needs. I 
 therefore suggested that we should cease 
 begging and try to place the whole matter of 
 material assistance on a business basis. It 
 was obvious that our requirements would 
 grow with the increase of the territory occupied 
 by the White armies. I considered that it 
 would be more practical to get into direct 
 touch with business organisations in Great 
 Britain (offers were forthcoming), or if need 
 be in America. We could offer these concerns 
 " values " in exchange for " values " obtained 
 from them. Omsk absolutely refused to 
 understand the point. As every advice, every
 
 314 THE ORDEAlv OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 suggestion I made was negatived from Paris, 
 so was this scheme. The Kolchak Government 
 replied : " We must obtain supplies from the 
 British Government." 
 
 In the middle of 1919 the fundamental 
 reason of the impending failure of the Whites 
 became apparent. They were unable to intro- 
 duce in the rear the elementary conditions of 
 economic welfare and political tranquillity 
 which alone could induce the population to 
 support the army and resist the Bolshevik 
 propaganda. In order to achieve these con- 
 ditions, an effort was required of our Allies, 
 not military, but purely commercial, of which 
 they were no longer capable, owing to com- 
 plex internal problems of which the powers 
 that be were, of course, fully aware. What 
 happened on a small scale in the North- West 
 the transition from the Red terror to pillage 
 and destruction by the Whites was repeated 
 on a larger scale in Siberia in mid-summer and 
 later in South Russia. 
 
 Since mid-summer, 1919, I ceased to have 
 any hope whatever for the triumphal entry of 
 Kolchak into Moscow. 
 
 My work became still more strenuous. Week 
 after week, excited friends, upon their return
 
 I AM SUPERSEDED 315 
 
 from a short stay in Paris, warned me of the 
 impending arrival of a successor appointed by 
 Sazonov with the consent of the Omsk Govern- 
 ment. Meanwhile, the Paris Political Council 
 and Sazonov were not very popular with the 
 heads of the Foreign Office in London. I 
 considered it rather peculiar that a man should 
 occupy the post of Foreign Minister of the 
 Kolchak Government who had stayed in Paris 
 all through the Peace Conference without 
 being admitted into the august presence of 
 any one of the " big " four or five, and I 
 said so. It was arranged between Mr. Balfour 
 and Mr. Sazonov in Paris (the Foreign Office 
 in lyondon was not informed, so I was told 
 afterwards) that I should be relieved of my 
 functions. This is the text of Mr. Sazonov's 
 letter which was handed to me by my successor : 
 " During my last stay in London (in June, 
 1919) I drew your attention to the fact that 
 the well-nigh complete absence of intercourse 
 between the British governing circles and 
 yourself results in a situation which is highly 
 detrimental to the interests of Russia. In 
 the present crucial days the personal influence 
 of our representatives abroad is of particular 
 importance, as it should to a certain degree
 
 3i6 THE ORDEAL OF A DIPLOMAT 
 
 supplement the temporary loss of Russia's 
 authority in international questions. 
 
 "I can no longer assume the responsibility 
 for this condition of things in London, and am 
 compelled to instruct Mr. Sabline to supersede 
 you at the Embassy. I request that you 
 should proceed in the nearest possible future to 
 Christiania and take charge of our Legation 
 in Norway to which you were appointed by 
 the Provisional Government in 1917. 
 
 ' The Supreme Ruler and Mr. Balfour have 
 been duly notified of the above." 
 
 On September 9, 1919, I sent a letter to 
 Lord Curzon informing him of my resignation. 
 The Secretary of State acknowledged receipt. 
 
 I was thus spared the trial of once more, 
 as in 1917 and 1918, representing not a Govern- 
 ment, but a " late " Government. The differ- 
 ence between 1917 and 1920 is that we then 
 believed fervently in the future " White " 
 movement. Now, we are mourning its past. 
 
 In 1918, Litvinov entered through the back 
 door, if ever. Now, Krassin drives up to 10, 
 Downing Street, in a motor and is " cinemato- 
 graphed."
 
 INDEX OF NAMES 
 
 Abaza, Lieut., 205 
 
 Akbar, 30 
 
 Alexeiev, General, 141, 142, 
 
 163-165 
 
 Arseniev, B., 15 
 Asquith, H. H., 36, 49, 57 
 Avxentiev, N., 98, 99, 258, 
 
 271 
 Aylmer, General, 38 
 
 Bakhmetiev, B., 118, 202, 
 
 203, 285 
 
 Bakhmetiev, G., 118 
 Balfour, A. J., 56-58, 66, 
 75, 76, 127, 135, 137-140. 
 142, 149-152, 154, 155, 
 161, 165, 167, 189, 192, 
 193, 217, 228, 230, 232, 
 274, 280, 281, 284, 315, 
 316 
 
 Bashmakov, A., 43 
 Belosselsky, Prince, 302 
 Benckendorff, Count, 18, 
 34-38, 49, 50, 53, 55-59, 
 
 89, 112 
 
 Bertie, Lord, 127 
 Bitcherakhov, General, 247 
 Briggs, General Sir Charles, 
 
 308 
 
 Brussilov, General, 55, 61 
 Buchanan, Sir George, 46, 
 
 55, 63, 65, 66, 85, 86, 
 
 115, 123, 125, 164, 192, 
 
 193 
 
 Bullit, 303 
 Burnham, Lord, 45 
 Byron, Lord, 42 
 
 Cambon, Paul, 36, 58, 126, 
 
 167, 190 
 Cantacuzene, Princess, 63, 
 
 64 
 
 Carnock, Lord, 36 
 Catherine II, 77 
 Cecil, Lord Robert, 91, 215- 
 
 217, 232, 244, 248, 274, 
 
 276 
 
 Charles XII, 301 
 Chicherin, 92, 95, 97, 100- 
 
 106, 109, 263 
 Chinda, Viscount, 167 
 Churchill, Winston, 305 
 Clemenceau, 198, 265 
 Cromie, Capt., 193, 231 
 Crosby, Oscar, 191 
 Curzon of Kedleston, Lord, 
 
 280, 283, 316 
 
 Dalai Lama, the, 19 
 
 Deitch, 98 
 
 Denikin, General, 243, 281, 
 
 284, 285, 293, 295, 307 
 Berber, 268 
 
 Dessino, General, 130, 201 
 Dickens, Charles, 42 
 Dolivo Dobrovolsky, 194 
 Dorjiev, 19 
 Dostoyevsky, 42 
 
 317
 
 3*8 
 
 Ehrlich, 136, 149 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Festing, Miss Gabrielle, 12, 
 
 28 
 
 Figner, Vera, 103 
 Finkelstein, see Litvinov. 
 Foch, General, 128 
 French, Sir John, 38 
 
 Galitzine, Prince, 112 
 
 Gavronsky, Dr., 100, 103, 
 250 
 
 George, David Lloyd, 38, 
 57. 63, 79. 81, 82, 87, 128, 
 140, 142, 148, 150, 154, 
 156, 157, 163, 252, 274, 
 284 
 
 Giers, Mr. de, 170, 171, 202- 
 204, 285 
 
 Gogol, 89 
 
 Goldenberg, 136, 149 
 
 Gough, General Sir Hubert, 
 
 304 
 
 Goulkevitch, 285 
 Gourko, V., 48 
 Graham, Sir Ronald, 107, 
 
 283 
 
 Grant, President, 63 
 Grey, Sir Edward, 36, 44, 
 
 46, 56, 57 
 Guchkov, 302 
 
 Haig, Sir Douglas, 38 
 Hanbury Williams, General 
 
 Sir John, 308 
 Hardinge, Sir Arthur, 167 
 Hardinge, Lady, 24 
 Hardinge, Lord, 17, 22, 23, 
 
 36, 58, 66, 83, 162, 170, 
 
 223, 224, 226-230 
 
 Hartwig, 19 
 
 Henderson, Arthur, 85-88, 
 136, 138-140, 143, 144, 
 148, 149, 151, 154, 157 
 
 Hermonius, General, 201, 213 
 
 Hessen, J., 302 
 
 Heyking, Baron, 90 
 
 Hindenburg, General von, 
 116 
 
 Horvat, General, 269 
 
 Hyderabad, Nizam of, 23 
 
 Imperiali, Marquis, 128 
 Islavine, 77 
 Izvolski, 285 
 
 Joffe, 196 
 Joshua, 310 
 Julius Caesar, 310 
 
 Kamenev, 197, 198 
 
 Kartashev, 292-296 
 
 Kedrov, Admiral, 201 
 
 Kerensky, 84, 92, 103, 106, 
 114, 118, 119, 122, 128, 
 129, 133, 136, 139, 142, 
 149-151, 153-156, 161- 
 165, 175-177. 181, 182, 
 206, 250-262, 268, 278 
 
 Kitchener, Lord, 40, 41, 55, 
 69, 70 
 
 Knox, General Sir Alfred, 
 119-121, 308 
 
 Kolchak, Admiral, 120, 243, 
 249, 260, 276-278, 284- 
 286, 290, 292-295, 297, 
 302, 307, 314, 315 
 
 Konovalov, 285 
 
 Kornilov, General, 114, 163- 
 165, 256, 261
 
 INDEX 
 
 319 
 
 Koudacheff, Prince, 51 
 Krassin, 316 
 Kropotkin, Prince, 99 
 Krougliakov, 95, 100 
 Krysin, 208-211 
 Kuhlmann, 253 
 
 Law, Bonar, 135, 138, 151, 
 
 153 
 
 Lamsdorff, Count, 19 
 
 Lansdowne, Lord, 19 
 
 Lenin, 100, 102, 106, 122, 
 124, 162, 176, 181, 182, 
 184, 187, 262, 277, 280, 
 289, 307 
 
 Litvinov (Finkelstein), 101, 
 104, 106, 107, 189, 196, 
 197, 208, 209, 211, 222, 
 223, 227, 231, 257, 316 
 
 Lindley, 193 
 
 Lobanov, Prince, 48 
 
 Lockhart, Bruce, 230, 231, 
 268 
 
 Louis XIV, 77 
 
 Luxburg, Count, 158, 160 
 
 Lvov, Prince, 78, 79, 81, 
 285, 309 
 
 MacDonald, Ramsay, 121, 
 
 136, 151, 153 
 Maklakov, 166, 188, 202, 
 
 204, 285 
 
 Marsh, Colonel F., 304 
 Meyendorff, Baron, 125 
 Miliukov, Paul, 47, 48, 54, 
 
 76, 81, 84, 95, 112-114, 
 
 118, 119 
 
 Milner, Lord, 59, 62, 63, 175 
 Mumtaz Mahall, 33 
 
 Nabokoff, C., 157, 211, 215, 
 
 228 
 
 Nabokoff, D., 98 
 Nabokoff, V., 43 
 Napoleon, 206, 310 
 Nemirovitch Dantchenko, 
 
 43 
 
 Neratov, 302 
 Nicolas, Emperor, 41, 56, 
 
 64, 65, 70, 71 
 
 Onou, 211 
 
 Page, Mr., 167 
 Painleve*. 127 
 Plekhanov, 88 
 Pomcare", 156 
 Poliakov-Litovtzev, 205 
 Pokrovsky, 56 
 Protopopoff, 53, 54, 62, 64, 
 112 
 
 Rasputin, 46, 54 
 
 Reuss, Henry XXXI, 15, 
 
 159 
 
 Ribot, 126, 127 
 Rodzianko, 55 
 Roos Keppel, Sir George, 
 
 27, 28 
 
 Rosen, Baron, 49-52 
 Russanov, 136, 149 
 Russky, General, 141 
 
 Sabline, 316 
 Samarin, 55 
 
 Savinkov, 88, 98, 99, 285 
 Sazonov, 37, 55, 83, 88, 263, 
 284-287, 289, 290, 292, 
 
 298, 33. 3*5 
 Shah Jehan, 30, 33
 
 320 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Shakespeare, 42 
 Shebeko, 302 
 Shelley, 42 
 Shingarev, 47, 48, 54 
 Skobelev, 103, 165 
 Smirnov, 136, 149 
 Smuts, General, 248 
 Socrates, 310 
 Sonnino, Baron, 128 
 Stakhovitch, 166, 169, 285 
 Steffens, 303 
 Struve, Prof. Peter, 292- 
 
 295, 302 
 
 Sturmer, 37, 55, 56, 115 
 Svatikov, 88-93, 214 
 
 Tchaikovsky, 88, 284, 285 
 Tchernov, 99 
 Tchkeidze, 103, 136 
 Tchukovski, 43 
 Tereschenko, 112, 114, 119, 
 
 134, 151, 155, 156, 158, 
 
 166, 168, 170 
 Thomas, Albert, 88, 127, 
 
 128, 139, 142, 150 
 Titov, 285 
 
 Tolstoi, Count A., 43 
 Tolstoi, Count Leo, 42 
 Tourgenev, 42 
 Townshend, General Sir 
 
 Charles, 38 
 Trotsky (Bronstein), 7, 102, 
 
 124, 162, 181, 194-196, 
 
 210, 230, 234, 243, 278 
 
 Trotsky Seniutovitch, 302 
 Troubetzkoi, Prince G., 158, 
 
 169, 171 
 Tzereteli, 103, 136 
 
 Udaipur, Maharana of, 29 
 Ungern Sternberg, Baron, 
 194 
 
 Vinogradov, Sir Paul, 201 
 Vologodski, 290 
 
 Washington, Booker T., 118 
 Washington, George, 118, 
 
 310 
 
 Wassiltchikoff, Princess, 55 
 Wesselitski, 205 
 West, Hon. Mrs., 173 
 Wilenkin, G., 205 
 William II, 308 
 Willingdon, Lady, 33 
 Willingdon, Lord, 33 
 Wilson, Woodrow, 25, 52, 
 
 191, 192, 245, 248 
 Wilton, Robert, 43, 44, 256 
 
 Yegorov, 43 
 Younghusband, Sir Francis, 
 
 18 
 Yudenitch, General, 292- 
 
 295. 298, 307 
 
 Zavoiko, 256, 257 
 Zundelevitch, 100 
 
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