Hall on Insurance 
 Adjustments 
 
 FIRST REVISED EDITION 
 
 By 
 
 THRASHER HALL 
 
 Adjuster M 
 
 Copyrighted 1916 
 By The Rough Notes Company 
 
 The f^gh Notes Co. 
 
 Publishers 
 Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 TO 
 
 "HALL ON INSURANCE 
 ADJUSTMENTS" 
 
 FIRST REVISED EDITION 
 
 This work was issued from the press in 1907, 
 and at once became popular with adjusters of 
 fire insurance losses. Its noted author had long 
 maintained a high reputation as a skilled and 
 accurate adjuster and, being widely known, his 
 work soon became popular with adjusters of fire 
 insurance losses and it was regarded as an au- 
 thoritative work in all the forty-eight states in 
 the Union; hence the necessity of its revision 
 much sooner than was anticipated. The con- 
 flicting nature of insurance codes of laws of so 
 many states, new laws enacted by their legis- 
 latures and rules made by state officials imposed 
 a herculean task upon its author in his work of 
 revision in order to adapt it to the exact require- 
 ments of the present day wholly up-to-date, 
 and wholly accounting for the great delay of 
 more than a year in publishing the revision after 
 it was commenced. 
 
 The merit of the work has been greatly en- 
 hanced by the time taken by the author in mak- 
 ing his revision as of to-day, at the expense of 
 much new matter, necessarily considerably en- 
 larging the book. It is with much confidence 
 that the publishers are putting forth the first 
 revised edition of Thrasher Hall's work, as we 
 believe that Mr. Hall has exhausted his powers 
 of research upon it and would not allow it to 
 be published until it satisfied him. 
 
 On behalf of the Publishers. 
 
 545687 
 
INDEX 
 
 TITLE TO CHAPTERS 
 
 Chapter Page 
 
 I Direct Loss 7 
 
 II Cash Value Measure of Damage 25 
 
 III Notice of Loss 37 
 
 IV Proofs of Loss and Requirements of Assured 41 
 
 V Notary Public's or Magistrate's Certificate 49 
 
 VI Examination Under Oath and the Production of 
 Books, Invoices, etc 53 
 
 VII Fraud and False Swearing 59 
 
 VIII Options 65 
 
 IX Duty of Insured to Protect Property at and After 
 the Fire Loss by Theft, etc 75 
 
 X Fall of Building 79 
 
 XI Explosions 81 
 
 XII Waiver Non- Waiver Agreement 85 
 
 XIII Appraisal Arbitration Award 93 
 
 XIV What is Not Other Contributing Insurance 137 
 
 XV Apportionment of Non-Current Insurance Vari- 
 ous Rules and Examples 139 
 
 XVI Court Definitions of Insurance Terms 163 
 
 XVII Expert Accounting in its Relation to the Adjust- 
 ment of Fire Losses 191 
 
 XVIII Form of Proof and Statement of Loss Actually Ad- 
 justed Iron-Safe Clause Appreciation 219 
 
 XIX Facts Worth Knowing '. 229 
 
 Topical Index 255 
 
 Table of Cases.. ..265 
 
"HALL ON INSURANCE 
 ADJUSTMENTS" 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 DIRECT LOSS. 
 
 "Direct" Defined. 
 
 The word "direct" in a policy of insurance has been con- 
 strued to mean merely "immediate" or "proximate," as distin- 
 guished from "remote." 
 
 Ermentraut et al. v. Girard F. & M. Ins. Co., 63 Minn. 305, 65 N. W. 
 635. 30 L. R. A. 346, 25 Ins. L,. J. 81 (Annotated in 56 Am. 
 St. 481). 
 
 What Is Direct Loss? 
 
 Where the contract of insurance was against loss by fire on 
 goods which were being transported by a steamboat which came 
 in collision with another boat, causing a fire, and the boat was 
 sunk -before the goods insured were injured by fire. Held*, That, 
 if means and appliances were at hand by which the sinking of 
 the boat could have been avoided, and the intervention of a new 
 agency, namely, that of fire, prevented their use, then the fire 
 was the proximate and immediate cause of the loss, and that it 
 was a question for the jury to decide, from all the circumstances 
 of the case, what was the proximate cause of the loss sustained 
 by the plaintiff, and whether it was the result of the fire. 
 
 New York & Boston Dispatch Express Co. v. Traders Ins. Co., 132 
 Mass. 377 (Annotated in 42 Am. R. Ext. Anno. 440, Notes). 
 
 Where it clearly appeared that the boat would have been 
 destroyed by fire had it not been sunk, and the evidence clearly 
 showed that ignition or combustion had begun before the boat 
 was sunk, this taken in connection with the evidences of fire 
 which were discovered, before the boat was sunk, the smoke 
 issuing from the hold, with the deck so hot that pitch oozed 
 from its seams, made it reasonably certain that a fire had broken 
 out in the vessel before it was sunk, and which was the proxi- 
 mate cause of the loss- 
 
 Singleton v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 132 N. Y. 298, 30 N. E. 839. 
 
 In an action to recover for a general average loss, sustained 
 by the sinking of the Propeller Potomac, it was held, that in 
 order to render the insurance company liable upon the policy, 
 
8 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 the loss complained of must have been occasioned by one of the 
 risks assumed by it. 
 
 Wex v. Boatmen's F. Ins. Co. (N. Y.), 11 St. Rep. 713. 
 
 Windstorm or Lightning. 
 
 Where the defendant had insured the plaintiff's property 
 against loss by fire. The contract of insurance containing- no 
 exception exempting the defendant from liability for fire occa- 
 sioned by storm or lightning. Held, That if the property was 
 destroyed by that element, no difference whether occasioned by 
 windstorm or lightning, the loss in question was one included in 
 the risk for which the defendant was liable. 
 
 Farrell v. Farmers Mut. F. Ins. Co., 66 Mo. App. 153. 
 
 Testimony by Wool Merchants. 
 
 Where in an action upon a fire insurance policy to recover 
 for loss and damage to a large quantity of wool, it was alleged, 
 was caused by fire. It was held that wool merchants and manu- 
 facturers, who having had years of experience in their business, 
 'were competent to give opinions based upon facts falling within 
 their experience, such as the effect of water on a large mass of 
 wool and the probability of spontaneous combustion in it. 
 
 Sun Ins. Office of London, England v. Western Woolen Mill Co., 
 72 Kan. 41, 82 Pac. 613. 
 
 Testimony by Chemist. 
 
 In an action upon a fire insurance policy to recover for loss 
 and damage to a large quantity of wool, it was alleged, was 
 caused by fire, where the question was as to whether spon- 
 taneous combustion occurred. It was held not error to refuse 
 to permit an expert chemist to define "fire," "ignition," ignition 
 point," the relation between "fire" and "flame," and kindred 
 terms, of which the meaning is commonly understood by all 
 well-informed persons. 
 
 Sun Ins. Office of London, England v. Western Woolen Mill Co., 
 72 Kan. 41, 82 Pac. 513. 
 
 Expert Testimony and Scientific Works. 
 
 In an action upon a fire insurance policy to recover for loss 
 and damage to a large quantity of wool, it was alleged, was 
 caused by fire, it was held that where scientific works of well- 
 known authority and the opinions of experts are widely at vari- 
 ance upon the question whether spontaneous combustion is pos- 
 sible in a certain substance, courts will not assume as a matter 
 
DIRECT Loss. 9 
 
 of law and fact which theory is true, but will leave its deter- 
 mination to the jury. 
 
 Sun Ins. Office of London, England v. Western Woolen Mill Co., 
 72 Kan. 41, 82 Pac. 513. 
 
 Instruction as to "A Total Loss." 
 
 Where the merits of the appeal was as to whether the loss 
 was "a total loss" by fire within the meaning of Section 5897, 
 or "a partial loss" only and falling within Section 5899 (Rev. 
 Stat. of Mo. 1889), and to ascertain the fact the Court instructed 
 the jury as follows: "By a total loss is meant that the building 
 had lost its identity and specific character as a building and 
 become so far disintegrated that it can not be properly desig- 
 nated as a building, although some part of it may remain stand- 
 ing." Held, The instruction was proper. 
 
 O'Keefe v. Liverpool, London & Globe Ins. Co., 140 Mo. 658, 41 
 S. W. 922, 26 Ins. L. J. 888. 
 
 Necessity for Instruction Defining Fire. 
 
 Where in an action upon a fire insurance policy to recover 
 for loss and damage to a large quantity of wool, it was alleged, 
 was caused by fire. It was held not error to refuse to give an 
 instruction that "wool can not set fire to itself," nor to define 
 "fire," nor to instruct that "no degree of heat, short of ignition, 
 producing an actual burning, is covered by the policy," where 
 the court of its own motion charged the jury that the definition 
 of the word "fire" was unnecessary, and that "it would make no 
 difference, if there was fire, whether it was in the form of flame 
 or merely smoldering, but there must be in fact the presence 
 of fire." 
 
 Sun Ins. Office of London, England v. Western Woolen Mill Co., 
 72 Kan. 41, 82 Pac. 513. 
 
 Destruction of Building Leaving Walls Standing. 
 
 Where building "A" was destroyed by fire, leaving some of 
 the walls standing, and two or three days thereafter one of the 
 gables fell, damaging building "B." Held, That the insurance 
 company was liable. 
 
 Johnston v. Ins. Co., 7 Sess. Gas. (Scotland) 52, 1 Bennett, 259. 
 The company is liable for such a loss where the walls fell 
 seven days after the fire. 
 
 Russell v. German F. Ins. Co., 100 Minn. 528, 111 N. W. 400. 
 
 Building Removed from Foundation by Windstorm. 
 
 Where in an action upon a fire insurance policy it appeared 
 
10 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 from the evidence that the building was not blown down by the 
 storm, but merely removed a few feet from its foundation and 
 left sufficiently intact as to be still subject to identification as 
 the building covered by the risk, by a reference to the descrip- 
 tion in the policy, and one or more of the agencies of the 
 storm, wind, or electricity caused fire to be communicated to 
 the building, either from that in the stove contained therein, 
 or in any other way, whereby such building became a loss. 
 The contract of insurance contained no exception exempting 
 the defendant from liability for fire occasioned by storm or 
 lightning. Held, That the loss in question was one included in 
 the risk and for which the insurer was liable. 
 
 Farrell v. Farmers Mut. F. Ins. Co., 66 Mo. App. 153. 
 
 Loss of Goods in Building Blown up by Municipality. 
 
 Insurers against loss by fire were held liable for goods 
 destroyed in the blowing up of a building with gunpowder by 
 direction of municipal authorities to prevent the spread of fire. 
 City Ins. Co. v. Corliee (N. Y.), 21 Wend. 367, 1 Bennett, 753. 
 
 Prohibition of Repair of Building by Ordinance. 
 
 Where a policy covered a building located within the fire 
 limits of a city, and the building was of a class the repair of 
 which was, under certain conditions, prohibited by the city 
 ordinance. Held, That the insurers were liable for a total loss 
 (value of the building) where the city ordinances would not per- 
 mit the same to be repaired. 
 
 Larkins v. Glens Fall Ins. Co., 80 Minn. 527, 83 N. W. 409, 29 Ins. 
 L. J. 527. 
 
 To the same effect. 
 
 Brady v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 11 Mich. 425, 4 Bennett 663; 
 Hamburg-Bremen Fire Ins. Co. v. Garlington, 66 Tex. 103, 18 S. W. 
 337, 15 Ins. L. J. 509. 
 
 Building Condemned and Repair Prohibited. 
 
 Where the building insured was condemned by the proper 
 authorities and an attempt to repair the same was prohibited 
 by them. Held, The insured could claim a total loss, although 
 the building when insured was not sound. 
 
 Monteleone v. Royal Ins. Co. of Liverpool and London, 47 La. 
 Ann. 1563, 18 So. 472, 24 Ins. L. J. 531. 
 
 Contract of Insurance and Election to Repair Made After Adop- 
 tion of Ordinance. 
 
 Where the contract of insurance and the election of the 
 
DIRECT Loss. 11 
 
 insurance company to repair a wooden building under the same, 
 were both made after the adoption of a city ordinance, the 
 parties contracted with reference to the law as it existed at 
 the time, and the question whether the city authorities would 
 permit the building to be repaired in wood was therefore a risk 
 the insurers assumed at the issuing of the policy, and which 
 they reassumed at the making of the election. 
 
 Fire Association v. Rosenthal, 108 Pa. St. 474, 1 Atl. 303, 15 Ins. 
 L. J. 658. 
 
 Exemption Clause Written Out of Policy by Valued Policy Law. 
 
 Where a policy contained the following exemption clause: 
 "This company shall not be liable, beyond the actual value de- 
 stroyed by fire, for loss occasioned by ordinance or law regu- 
 lating construction or repair of buildings." Held, That by 
 virtue of the valued policy law of Mississippi (Section 2592 of 
 the Code of 1906) the clause of exemption from liability was 
 written out of the policy. 
 
 Palatine Ins. Co. v. Nunn, 99 Miss. 493, 55 So. 44, 40 Ins. L,. J. 1447. 
 To same effect is 
 
 Dinneen v. American Ins.Co. (Neb. S. C.), 152 N. W. 307. 
 
 Increased Cost of Repairs Under Building Laws. 
 
 In an action upon Massachusetts Standard form policies 
 for a balance alleged to be due upon a partial loss by fire, it 
 was held that the referees had the right, in determining the 
 amount of damages to which the plaintiffs were entitled, to 
 take into consideration the increased cost of repairing by reason 
 of the building laws. 
 
 Hewins v. London Assurance Corporation et al., 184 Mass. 177, 
 68 N. E. 62. 
 
 Change in Physical Condition of Building Caused Wholly by 
 Fire. 
 
 Where the building laws were the same at the time of the 
 fire as at the time the policies were issued, and the only change 
 in the situation was in the physical condition of the building, 
 and that change was caused wholly by the fire, and the sole 
 operating cause of the change in the building was the fire. Held, 
 In the absence of any provision in the policy expressly exclud- 
 ing from the damages the part arising out of that condition, that 
 part was not to be excluded, but was to be regarded as primarily 
 the result of the fire, or as "loss or damage by fire." 
 
 Hewins v. London Assurance Corporation et al., 184 Mass. 177, 
 68 N. E. 62. 
 
 
12 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Ordinance Requiring Walls of Increased Thickness. 
 
 Where an ordinance was passed during the life of the 
 policy requiring walls of an increased thickness. Held, That 
 there was no good reason why the insurance company would not 
 be held liable for the actual loss incurred, up to the extent of the 
 amount designated in the policy, provided the proportional 
 amount of the loss falling upon the company reached that sum. 
 
 Pennsylvania, etc. v. Philadelphia, etc., 201 Pa. St. 497, 51 AtL 
 rep. 361. 
 
 Stock Destroyed by Fire Caused by Lightning. 
 
 Where in an action upon a policy of insurance upon live 
 stock against lightning. The barn had been destroyed by fire, 
 and the stock burned in it, and the main issue was whether the 
 barn was struck by lightning, and thereby set on fire. Held, 
 That if the stock was destroyed by fire which was immediately 
 caused by the lightning, or by the lightning itself, the defendant 
 was liable. 
 
 Hapeman v. Citizens Mut. F. Ins. Co., 126 Mich. 191, 85 N. W. 454, 
 30 Ins. L,. J. 452. 
 
 "Ice Clause" Applied to Boat Detailed by Gale. 
 
 Where in an action upon a marine policy, which was issued 
 upon a cargo of hay laden on a canal boat, it appeared that 
 while the boat was proceeding down a river a heavy gale sep- 
 arated her from the steam tugs which had her in tow and 
 drove her to shore, and her detention there until ice formed 
 around her was due to a consequence of the gale, stranding. 
 The policy contained the following ice clause: "It is understood 
 and agreed that if any boats the cargo of which are covered 
 by this policy are prevented or detained by ice, or the closing 
 of navigation, trom terminating the trip, then in such case the 
 policy shall cease to attach upon said cargo, and this company 
 shall return the premium for the unexpired portion of said trip." 
 Held, That as the efficient cause of the detention was the loss 
 of the motive-power through the stress of the storm, and the 
 ice acted only as an obstacle to its restoration, the insurers 
 were liable. 
 
 Brown et al. v. St. Nicholas Ins. Co., 61 N. Y. 332. 
 
 Loss Due to Moisture from Water in Extinguishing Fire. 
 
 Where a policy of fire insurance in the standard form cov- 
 ered property (a stock of fish) in a warehouse, and the property 
 insured was at the time of the fire in an annex. The question 
 
 
DIRECT Loss. 13 
 
 was as to whether the loss of the fish in the annex was due 
 directly to the fire. It appeared from the evidence that there 
 was no fire in the annex, and that no part of plaintiff's property 
 in the annex was injured by heat or fire, and it was conceded 
 by plaintiff that the fish were destroyed by moisture. But it 
 claimed that this moisture came directly from water used in 
 extinguishing the fire in the warehouse, which got into the 
 annex. In an action upon the policy, it was held that the policy 
 covered the property, and that the evidence was sufficient to 
 sustain the finding of the jury that the loss was directly due to 
 the fire. 
 
 Boak Fish Co. v. Manchester P. Assur. Co., 84 Minn. 419. 87 N. W. 
 932, 31 Ins. L. J. 253. 
 
 Removal of Stove Pipe as Breach of Condition that Pipe Be 
 Secured. 
 
 Where in an action upon a policy of insurance against loss 
 or damage by fire, upon the dwelling house and household furni- 
 ture of the plaintiff, it appeared that plaintiff's wife had 
 taken down a stove in a second story room, but neglected to 
 remove the stove in the room underneath, afterwards placed 
 a bed in the room over the hole through which the stove pipe 
 passed. Several days thereafter a fire was built in the stove 
 in the room underneath the bed, which set bed on fire and 
 destroyed the house- Policy provided that stoves and pipes 
 should be well secured, ff&ld, The insurance company was 
 liable. 
 
 Mickey v. Burlington Ins. Co., 35 Iowa 174, 5 Bennett 439, 2 Ins. 
 L. J. 15, (Annotated in 14 Am. R. Ext. Anno. 494, Notes). 
 
 Burning of Building After Destruction of Minor Portion. 
 
 Where in an action upon a policy of insurance it appeared 
 that a portion of the building had fallen, leaving the larger por- 
 tion more than three-fourths of it standing, and afterwards 
 it burned. The policy contained the following condition: "XII. 
 If a building shall fall, except as the result of a fire, all insurance 
 by this company on it, or its contents, shall immediately cease 
 and determine." Held, The building was not a fallen building 
 within the meaning of the thirteenth condition of the policy. 
 
 Breuner v. L. & L. & G. Ins. Co., 51 Cal. 101, 6 Ins. L. J. 475 
 (Annotated in 21 Am. R. Ext. Anno. 703, Notes). 
 
 Where the policy contained a clause that, if the building 
 or any part thereof fall except as the result of fire, all insurance 
 by this policy on such building or its contents shall immediately 
 
14 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 cease," and before the fire destroyed the insured building, it 
 had been visited by a cyclone, and the roof of thd two front 
 upper rooms had been blown away, the rafters, ceiling, and 
 parts of walls remaining. Held, That the insurance company 
 was not exempt under the policy, as its term* did not contem- 
 plate the fall of fragmentary portions of the building, but "some 
 functional portion of the structure." 
 
 London & L. Ins. Co. v. Crunk, 91 Tenn. 376, 23 S. W. 140. 
 
 (B) What Is Not Direct Loss? 
 
 Where in an action on a policy of insurance effected with 
 the defendant "against all the damage which the plaintiffs should 
 suffer by fire," on their "stock and utensils in their regular built 
 sugar house." It appeared that the loss to the sugar by the heat 
 of the usual fires employed for refining had been increased by 
 the mismanagement of the insured, who inadvertently kept the 
 top of the chimney closed, and it was held not a loss within 
 the meaning of the policy. 
 
 Austin et al. v. Drewe, 6 Taunt. 436, 1 Bennett 102. 
 
 It is suggested that insurance adjusters read the full decision 
 of the court in Austin et al. v. Drewe. It was the first and 
 leading case on this subject and is frequently quoted. A very 
 full report of it may be had in 1 Bennett 102. 
 
 Loss From Smoke and Soot From Defective Stove Pipe. 
 
 The insurer was held not liable for loss or damage occa- 
 sioned by smoke and soot escaping from a defective stove pipe 
 and emanating from a fire intentionally built in a stove and 
 kept confined therein; or for damages caused by the water used 
 in cooling a portion of the ceiling heated by the pipe, where in 
 the proofs of loss it was not claimed that anything was actually 
 ignited by this heat, and it did not appear that the use of the 
 water was necessary to prevent ignition. 
 
 Cannon v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 110 Ga. 568, 35 S. E. 775, 29 Ins. L. J. 
 1023, citing: Austin v. Drewe, 6 Taunt. 436 and Gibbons v. 
 Savings Inst., 30 111. App. 263. 
 
 But where the assured's servant burned some rubbish and 
 cannel coal in the furnace causing a loss from smoke and soot 
 it was held the insurance company was liable for the loss that 
 it was not a friendly fire, the furnace was for heating purposes 
 and not meant to burn rubbish. 
 
 O'Connor v. Queen Ins. Co., 140 Wis. 388, 122 N. W. 1038, Anno- 
 tated in 25 L,. R. A. (N. S.) 501, and 17 Am. & Eng. Anno. Cas. 
 1118. 
 
DIRECT Loss. 15 
 
 Smoke From Lamp. 
 
 Where in an action upon a policy insuring the plaintiff 
 against loss or damage by fire or lightning, etc. It appeared 
 upon the trial that all the damage was caused by smoke from 
 a lamp left lighted in plaintiffs office. Held, That a lighted lamp 
 was not a "fire" within the meaning of the policy, and that it 
 was not contemplated by the parties to the contract of insur- 
 ance that the policy would cover damages arising from a smok- 
 ing lamp. 
 
 Fitzgerald v. German Am. Ins. Co., 30 Miscl. (N. Y.) 72, 62 N. T. 
 Supp. 824. 
 
 Hop-House. 
 
 Where the insurance issued by the defendant to plaintiff 
 was specified to be "on his frame shingle roof hop-house, while 
 drying hops," and the defendant agreed to make good to plaintiff 
 aH loss or damage which should happen "by fire to the property 
 so specified, from the 15th day of August, to the 15th day of 
 October, 1875. The hop-house was destroyed by fire after the 
 plaintiff had ceased drying hops. Held,, That as the fire hap- 
 pened after the plaintiff had ceased drying hops, the defendant 
 was not liable. 
 
 Langrworthy v. O. & O. Ins. Co., 85 N. T. 632, 10 Ins. L. J. 546. 
 
 Lightning. 
 
 Where a policy insured against loss by lightning, an electric 
 discharge causing a concussion or shock of such violence as to 
 jar and injure the walls of plaintiff's building, was not within 
 the contemplation of such policy. 
 
 Kattleman v. Fire Ass'n, 79 Mo. App. 447. 
 
 Where an insurance policy contained a lightning clause 
 which limited the liability of the company to the direct loss 
 caused by lightning, and expressly excluded damage by cyclone, 
 tornado or windstorm. Held, There could be no recovery for 
 less by windstorm, although the windstorm completed the work 
 of destruction of the building, as the jury must be required to 
 limit the recovery of plaintiff to the direct loss or damage caused 
 by lightning. 
 
 Beaks v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 143 N. Y. 402, 24 Ins. L,. J. 73, 38 N. E. 
 453 (Annotated in 26 L. R. A. 267). 
 
 Where in an action upon a policy to recover for loss alleged 
 to have been caused by lightning. The property insured was a 
 
16 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 gristmill and sawmill. During a severe storm a sharp flash of 
 lightning was seen, followed immediately by a loud report near 
 by and in the vicinity of the mill, and soon thereafter a noise 
 was heard, as of the falling and crashing of a building, and in 
 the following morning the water in the river was quite high, 
 and the building lay in broken disorganized heaps of material 
 at various points, the timbers were broken and splintered, but 
 there were no marks of fire on any of the remaining portions 
 of the building. Held, That as there were no marks of fire any- 
 where, such as are customarily found when lightning has come 
 in contact with dry wood, there was no justification in the evi- 
 dence for the finding that the buildings were destroyed by the 
 latter cause, and since the evidence established clearly that the 
 undermining of the buildings by water caused the loss com- 
 plained of. 
 
 Clark v. Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., Ill Wis. 65, 86 N. W. 649, 
 14 Deitch 86. 
 
 Where in an action upon a policy of insurance, which in- 
 sured the plaintiff against "all direct loss or damage by fire" 
 on his store and office furniture and fixtures contained in a 
 three-story, brick, tin-roof building, it appeared that the build- 
 ing and its contents were damaged by fire, the plaintiff was 
 permitted to let his personal property remain in the building, 
 and twenty-five days after such fire and after a new roof was 
 put on the building, the building fell, destroying plaintiff's prop- 
 erty. Held, That there was no error in granting a non-suit, 
 since it did not appear that the fire was the proximate, or, in 
 any sense of the term, the "direct" cause of the loss; but the 
 evidence tended to show that the efficient and predominating 
 cause was the pouring and damming up of the water against the 
 wall from the heavy rains which fell subsequent to the fire. 
 Cuesta v. Royal Ins. Co., 98 Ga. 720, 27 S. E. Rep. 172. 
 
 Where in an action upon two policies of fire insurance upon 
 wool, against all direct loss or damage by fire, it appeared that 
 the wool insured had become entirely submerged by water, 
 caused by an unusual flood, and remained so for eight days, 
 and after subsidence of the water, it was found to be wet and 
 covered with mud, very much heated, and there was smoke in 
 the rooms where the wool was and an odor of burned wool, 
 but there was no flame to be seen, and no visible fire, and 
 whatever damage was done to the wool had been caused by 
 the action of water thereon. Held, That, since it appeared from 
 
DIRECT Loss. 17 
 
 the evidence that the internal development of heat never at 
 any time became so rapid as to produce a flame or a glow, 
 nor any visible heat or light in or about the wool, the plaintiff 
 had not shown any direct loss by fire within the meaning of the 
 word "fire," as used in the policies, and as that word is known 
 to the public generally. 
 
 Western Woolen Mills Co. v. Northern Assurance Co., 139, Fed. 
 637. 
 (Annotated in 72 C. C. A. 1). 
 
 An insurance policy covering against direct loss by fire 
 does not contemplate a loss to steam boiler caused by assured 
 or his servants negligently leaving the boiler with insufficient 
 water, so that any loss that was done to it must of necessity 
 have been caused by the fire or heat used for heating it, which 
 fire was in its usual or accustomed place and therefore not 
 a hostile one. 
 
 McGraw v. Home Ins. Co. (Kan. S. C.) 28 Ins. Digest 18, 144 
 Pac. 821. 
 
 "This company shall not be liable beyond the actual value 
 destroyed by fire, for loss occasioned by ordinance of law regu- 
 lating construction or repair of buildings." Insurance, $2,500; 
 value of building was $3,500; loss, $1,400. The insured was pro- 
 hibited from reconstructing building by the ordinances of the 
 city governing the repair and construction of buildings within 
 fhe fire limits of th city of Jackson, in which it was located. 
 It is thoroughly well settled that in such cases, where the loss 
 by fire is partial, but the injury by fire has rendered the build- 
 ing unfit for use for the purpose for which it was constructed 
 and there are ordinances or there is a law prohibiting its re- 
 construction, the loss in such cases is total. This is very clearly 
 set forth in Sandberg v. St. Paul and S. R. R. Co., 80 Minn. 442, 
 83 N. W. 411. The sole question before us in this, the only 
 material contention in the case, is whether or not this clause in 
 the contract of insurance was written out by virtue of the provi- 
 sions of our valued policy law, 2592 of Code of 1906. The ques- 
 tion is not one at all free from difficulty and we have given it 
 the most careful consideration. The authority chiefly relied on 
 by the learned counsel for appellant is the case of Hewins v. 
 London Assurance Corp., 184 Mass. 178, 68 N. E. 62, and that 
 case clearly holds that the defense here would be good, the con- 
 tract stipulation referred to being valid, in a state where there 
 is no valued policy law substantially like ours. 
 
 We have found one case, New Orleans R. E. M. & S. Co. v. 
 
18 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Teutonia Ins. Co., La. 54 S. 466, which does squarely hold, on 
 a valued policy law substantially like ours, though not identical 
 in its phraseology, that the very clause here relied on is written 
 out of the policy by the valued policy law. 
 
 Palatine Ins. Co. v. Nunn, 99 Miss. 493, 55 So. 44. To same effect 
 is Dinneen v. American Ins. Co. (Neb. S. C.), 152 N. W. 307. 
 
 Recovery on account of the increased cost of repairing, 
 by reason of the building laws, of a building partially destroyed, 
 is excluded by a policy providing that loss or damage shall in 
 no event exceed what it would cost the insured to repair or re- 
 place the same with material of like kind and quality, and the 
 insurer shall not be liable beyond the actual value destroyed by 
 fire for loss occasioned by law regulating construction or repair 
 of buildings. This, too, notwithstanding the fact that under the 
 Massachusetts standard policy it is a total loss, but where a 
 company issued a policy on property in Masachusetts, which 
 policy provided that in case of loss or damage, "loss shall in no 
 event exceed what it would cost the insured to repair or replace 
 the same with material of like kind and quality" and that the 
 company should not be liable beyond the actual value destroyed 
 by fire for loss occasioned by ordinance or law regulating con- 
 struction or repair of buildings. * * * The standard policy 
 law does not provide any rule of interpretation as do the valued 
 policy laws of other states, nor does it say that another form ot 
 policy shall be void. On the contrary, it provides for a fine for a 
 company issuing a different policy, but also declares it to be 
 binding on the company. Its legal effect is not changed. The 
 illegal policy is not changed by law so as to conform to the 
 legal. The assured may sue upon it, but it must be construed 
 as it reads. No statute is incorporated in it. The penalty suf- 
 fered by the company is a fine and not a liability to be held on 
 a contract different from that 'made by it. 
 
 Hewins v. London Assur. Corp etl al., 184 Mass. 178, 68 N. E. 62. 
 
 Some time since I asked the following question of "Rough 
 Notes": If a New York Standard form of policy covered meats 
 in cold storage warehouse "A" against direct loss by fire, and 
 building "B" located across the street was a refrigerating plant 
 supplying through pipes the cold air for storage warehouse "A," 
 the same owner owning and operating both buildings, would the 
 insurance company be liable for a loss to stock of meats in 
 building "A" by reason of the destruction by fire of building 
 "B"? Mr. Deitch answered, the company would not be liable 
 
DIRECT Loss. 19 
 
 and I think his answer is correct. Yet, a large list of companies 
 paid the Bold Packing Company at Kansas City for just such a 
 loss a few years ago, not one of them contested it, I presume 
 on account of the claim against each company being so small, 
 though the aggregate against all was considerable. 
 
 If such a loss be one of the perils insured against, why 
 would not the insurer be liable if assured chilled his meats by 
 natural ice from his ice house across the street, carried across 
 on chutes, if such icehouse be destroyed by fire and it be im- 
 possible to procure any other ice? 
 
 If the insurer be liable for such losses, at what distance 
 from the property insured must the cold storage plant be, be- 
 fore liability of the insurer for loss will cease in consequence 
 of its destruction by fire? Here in St. Louis (and I presume in 
 other cities) we have a corporation which has a large cold 
 storage plant, furnishing chilled air to cold storage warehouses, 
 restaurants, hotels, etc., throughout the city, by means of pipes 
 under the streets and if such losses as I have mentioned are 
 covered under a fire policy, then the losses which may occur in 
 any or all of such places at any time by the burning of the cold 
 storage plant is one for which the insurer is liable. 
 
 Loss by Negligence of Another. 
 
 He who by his negligence or misconduct creates or suffers a 
 fire upon his own premises, which, burning his own property, 
 spreads thence to the immediately adjacent premises and de- 
 stroys the property of another, is liable to the latter for the 
 damages sustained by him. (The cases of Ryan v. N. Y. C. 
 R. R. Co., 35 N. Y. 210, and Pa. R. R. Co. v. Kerr, 62 Pa. 353, 
 distinguished.) 
 
 Webb. v. R., W. & O. R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 420. 
 
 Loss of Blankets Used to Protect Building From Fire. 
 
 A fire happening in the neighborhood, the insured, with the 
 approbation of the insurer, procured blankets and spread them 
 (wet) on the outside of the building, whereby it and its con- 
 tents were saved, but the blankets were rendered worthless. 
 Held, loss of blankets not covered by policy, but that it was a 
 subject of general average, to which the insurer and insured 
 should contribute in the proportion to the amount which they 
 respectively had at risk in the store and contents, but that other 
 neighboring property upon which the insurer had risks which 
 
20 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 would have been in danger if the store had burned, were too re- 
 motely affected to be liable to contribution. 
 Wells v. Boston Ins. Co., 6 Pick (23 Mass.) 182. 
 
 Loss by Negligence of Assured's Agent. 
 
 Underwriters are answerable for any loss occasioned by the 
 negligence of those in charge of the property insured by them. 
 But the negligence must be unaffected by any fruad or design 
 on the part of the insured. 
 
 Henderson v. Western M. & F. Ins. Co., 10 Robinson (La.) 164. 
 
 Loss by Wilful Burning of Assured's Property by His Wifo. 
 
 A policy of fire insurance covers a loss occasioned by the 
 wife of the insured; and her acts and declarations at, and dur- 
 ing the fire are not evidence against the husband, unless done 
 by his consent, nor are they part of the res gestae. 
 Walker v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 63 Mo. App. 39. 
 
 To same effect is 
 
 Plinsky v. Germania P. Ins. Co., 32 Fed. 47; 
 
 Feibelman v. Manchester F. Assur. Co., 108 Ala. 180, 19 So. 540; 
 Perry v. Mechanics M. Ins. Co., 11 Fed. 485. 
 
 Loss by Carelessness f Assured's Son. 
 
 Where the loss was caused by the assured's son filling a 
 stove in the building destroyed, with combustible materials, and 
 thus recklessly causing the loss, the company will not be 
 relieved from liability, where the act was unaffected by fraud or 
 design on the part of the assured. 
 
 Malln v. Mercantile T. M. Ins. Co., 105 Mo. App. 625. 
 
 Loss by Negligence of Another. 
 
 The negligent burning of a house, and the spreading of the 
 fire to a neighboring house, and the burning thereof, does not 
 give the owner of the last house a cause of action against the 
 owner in which the fire originated. The damages are too re- 
 mote. 
 
 Ryan v. N. T. Central R. R. Co., 35 N. Y. MO. 
 
 Loss by Negligence of Another. 
 
 A railroad company, which has negligently set a fire to in- 
 flamable material which it has allowed to accumulate on its right 
 of way, is not liable to the owner of lands not abutting on its 
 premises, for damages caused by fire communicated through the 
 abutting and intervening woodlands of a third person, over 
 
DIRECT Loss. 21 
 
 which the railroad had no control and without which the fire 
 could not have extended. 
 
 Hoffman v. King, 160 N. T. 618, 55 N. E. 401. 
 
 Assured Must Protect Property at Fire. 
 
 The assured is bound diligently to labor in saving the prop- 
 erty by fire; but the insertion of a clause in the policy requiring 
 such labor and effort, does not impose any additional duty 
 upon him. 
 
 Cincinnati M. Ins. Co. V. May, 20 Ohio 211. 
 
 Loss by Assured's Recklessness. 
 
 Where an act of Congress passed to secure steamboats 
 against fire, in order to secure the lives of passengers; provides 
 that turpentine, etc., on such vessels shall be secured in metallic 
 containers at a secure distance from any fire. The act of plain- 
 tiff in placing a barrel of turpentine near the furnace and used 
 it to increase the head of steam so as to give greater speed to 
 his boat; whereby it was set on fire; he cannot recover the inr 
 surance on his boat. The only question for the jury to deter- 
 mine is, was the turpentine used in the manner shown, if it was 
 he cannot recover on his insurance. 
 
 Citizens Ins. Co. v. Marsh, 41 Pa. St. 386. 
 
 What is not General Average Loss. 
 
 The scuttling of a ship by the municipal authorities of a 
 port, without the direction of her master or other commanding 
 officer, to extinguish a fire in her hold, is not a general aver- 
 age loss. 
 
 R,lli v. Troop, 157 U. S. 386. 
 
 Damage by Fire Engine on Way to Fire. 
 
 Where a fire engine on its way to a fire was deflected from 
 its course, collided with and damaged plaintiff's building. Held, 
 such loss is not a direct fire loss within the meaning of a fire 
 insurance policy. 
 
 Foster v. Fidelity F. Ins. o.. 24 Pac. Supt. Ct. 685. 
 
 Damage by Smoking Lamp. 
 
 Smoke and soot from a lamp whose flame accidentally flared 
 up two or three feet above the lamp chimney, is not a direct 
 fire loss as used in an insurance policy. 
 
 Samuels v. Continental Ins. Co., 2 Pa. Dist. Ct. $97. 
 
22 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Damage by Soot and Smoke from Ignition of Accumulated Soot 
 
 in Chimney. 
 
 A distinction should be made between a fire intentionally 
 started and maintained for a useful purpose in connection with 
 the occupation of a building, and a fire which starts from such a 
 fire, without human agency, in a place where fires are never 
 lighted nor maintained, although such ignition may naturally be 
 expected to occur occasionally as an incident to the maintenance 
 of necessary fires. 
 
 Way v. Abington M. P. Ins. Co., 166 Mass. 67, 43 N. E. 1032. 
 
 Profits not Insured. 
 
 The liability upon a policy insuring a turn pike company 
 against loss by fire of a bridge, is to be measured by the 
 pecuniary value of the injury to the bridge, not by the loss of 
 tolls suffered before the bridge could be rebuilt. 
 
 Such turn pike company has no insurable interest in a public 
 county bridge on the line of its road but free to all travel, even 
 though it contributed to its cost, erection and maintenance. 
 Farmers M. Ins. Co. v. New H. T. Co., 122 Pa. St. 37, 15 Atl. 663 
 
 Company is Liable for Loss by Fire Where Assured's Insane 
 Wife Burns the Property. 
 
 Where the assured was for the time being entrusted with 
 the care of his insane wife and she burned his insured property, 
 the insurer will be held liable for the loss unless it can show 
 actual design or such a degree of negligence and carelessness 
 on the part of the husband, as will evince 'a corrupt design or 
 a fraudulent purpose on his part. 
 
 Gove v. Farmers M. F. Ins. Co., 48 N. H. 41. 
 
 Loss by Assured or His Servant's Negligence. 
 
 In relation to insurance against fire, the doctrine seems to 
 have prevailed for a great length of time that it covers losses 
 occasioned by the mere faults and negligence of the assured 
 and his servants unaffected by any fraud or design. Ins. Co. v. 
 Lawrence, 10 Pet. 507; see also, Mickey v. Burlington Ins. Co., 
 35 la. 174, and cases there cited. Hence the action of the 
 assured's president in burning rubbish, which fire spread to and 
 burned the assured's building, is not such an increase of risk as 
 to avoid the policy, where there was no design to burn the 
 building. 
 
 Des Moines Ice Co. v. Niagara Ins. Co., 99 la. 193, 68 N. W. 600. 
 
DIRECT Loss. 23 
 
 Smoke and Soot from Coal Oil Stove. 
 
 The question whether the smoke proceeded from a fire out- 
 side the place where, under the contract of insurance, it was 
 intended to burn was for the jury under the evidence in this 
 case. It was submitted to them in a charge of which the .de- 
 fendant has no reason to complain. If the smoke that did the 
 damage proceeded from a fire "out of place," it is no answer to 
 say that this originated in a fire in the place fitted and in- 
 tended for it. 
 
 Collins v. Delaware Ins. Co., 9 Pa. Supr. Ct. 576. 
 
HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
CHAPTER n. 
 CASH VALUE MEASURE OF DAMAGE. 
 
 "This company shall not be liable beyond the actual cash 
 value of the property at the time the loss occurs, * * * with 
 proper deduction for depreciation however caused, and shall in 
 no event exceed what it would then cost the assured to repair or 
 replace the same with material of like kind and quality." 
 
 Assured being a manufacturer, can not recover more than 
 the sum it would cost him to replace the property destroyed. 
 
 Standard Sew. Mch. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. (Pa. S. C.), 51 Atl. Rep. 
 345, 15 Deitch 29. 
 
 Cash value means what it would cost the insured in actual 
 cash to replace the goods, at the time and place of fire. 
 
 Niagara F. Ins. Co. v. Heflin (Ky. C. A.), 60 S. W. Rep. 393, 30 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 326; 
 
 Equitable F. Ins. Co. v. Quinn, 11 Low. Can. 170; 
 Fisher v. Crescent Ins. Co. (U. S. C. C.), (W. Dist. N. C.), 17 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 712; 
 
 Western Assurance Co. v. Studebaker, 124 Ind. 176, 20 Ins. L. J. 64; 
 Grubbs v. North Carolina Home Ins. Co. (S. C. of N. C.), 108 N. C. 
 
 4T2; 20 Ins. L. J. 784; 
 
 Queen v. McCoin (Ky. C. A.), 49 S. W. Rep. 800, 12 Deitch 67; 
 Post Printing- & Publishing Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. A. (Pa. S. C.), 
 
 42 Atl. Rep. 192; 
 
 Hedger v. Ins. Co., 12 Ins. L. J. 926, 17 Fed. 498; 
 Marchessen v. Merchants Ins. Co., 1 Rob. (La.) 438, 2 Bennett 166; 
 Fowler v. Old N. C. S. Ins. Co., 74 N. C. 81; 
 
 Burgess v. Alliance Ins. Co., 10 Allen (Mae.) 221, 5 Bennett 46; 
 Boyd v. Royal Ins. Co., Ill N. C. 372, 16 S. E. 389; 
 Hedger v. Ins. Co. (U. S. C. C.), 12 Ins. L. J. 926; 
 Mack v. Lancashire Ins. Co. (U. S. C. C.), 19 Ins. L. J. 68. 
 
 And this, too, regardless of cost of reproduction. 
 
 Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Cannon et al. (Tex. C. C. A.), 46 S. W. Rep. 
 
 851; 11 Finch 109; 
 Mitchell v. St. Paul German F. Ins. Co. (Mich. S. C.), 52 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 1017; 21 Ins. L. J. 1003. 
 
 The policy provided that the company should not be liable 
 "beyond the actual cash value of the property at the time any 
 loss or damage occurs, * * * and shall in no event ex- 
 ceed what it would then cost the insured to repair or replace the 
 same with material of like kind and quality." Plaintiff con- 
 tended that, as the goods burned could not be immediately re- 
 placed at the scene of the fire with goods of like kind and qual- 
 
 25 
 
26 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 ity, it is entitled to recover the cash market value of the goods, 
 which is what the goods could have been sold for in San 
 Antonio to dealers at wholesale, in quantities of a single article 
 or in car-load lots, or in less than car-load lots, in plaintiff's 
 ordinary course of business. The contention of defendant is 
 that the value is to be determined by what it would cost to re- 
 place said goods from other markets with goods of like kind 
 and quality within a reasonable time, which could be done, and 
 was done in this instance, within 30 days. Held, That the expres- 
 sion, "What it would then cost the assured" evidently was not 
 intended to mean what it would cost to replace immediately or 
 instanter upon l^ie destruction of the goods by fire, but what it 
 would cost to replace the burned articles from the markets 
 where such goods were usually manufactured or could be pur- 
 chased within a reasonable time. The goods were replaced 
 within 30 days after the fire at a sum less than that claimed by 
 plaintiff. This was within a reasonable time, and fixed the sum 
 of plaintiff's recovery. 
 
 Texas Moline Plow Co. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. (Tex. C. C. A.): 
 87 Southwestern Reporter (June 7, 1905), 192 
 
 ! 
 
 If the insured is liable to the government for tax on whisky, 
 such tax forms part of the cash value for which the insurer is 
 liable. 
 
 Hedger v. Ins. Co. (U. S. C. C.), 12 Ins. L. J. 926; 
 
 Queen v. McCoin (Ky. C. A.), 49 S. W. Rep. 800, 12 Deitch 67; 
 
 Security Ins. Co. v. Farrell (111. S. C.), 2 Ins. L. J. 302. 
 
 (Though in this case 2 Ins. L. J. 302 it was held assured was 
 not liable and in that case it necessarily follows that insurer 
 is not.) 
 
 ) 
 
 The aim should be to arrive as nearly as possible at the 
 value of the building as it stood on the day of the fire, taking 
 into consideration cost to rebuild or replace, and difference in 
 value between new building and the condition it was in at the 
 time of the fire. 
 
 Stenzel v. Pennsylvania F. Ins. Co. et al. (La. S. C.), 36 S. W. Rep. 
 
 Hilton v. Phoenix Ass'n Co. (Me. S. J. C.), 42 Atl. Rep. 412; 28 
 Ins. L. J. 309. 
 
 Linotype machines cost manufacturer $1.000 each. They 
 were sold to publisher for $3,000. The contract between the 
 two provides that title is to remain in manufacturer. Held, That 
 such an agreement is constructively fraudulent, and a mere at- 
 tempt to maintain a secret lien, and the title is really in the 
 
CASH VALUE MEASURE OF DAMAGE. 27 
 
 publishing company, which is entitled to recover $3,000, the 
 cost to them of replacing the machines. 
 
 Post Printing and Publishing Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. A. (Pa. S. C.), 
 42 Atl. Rep. 192. 
 
 ASSESSORS VALUE ASSURED'S TAX RETURNS. 
 
 The assessed value is not the measure of damage. Where 
 the destroyed building was in a small village it had an intrinsic 
 but no market value, therefore, estimates of cost to rebuild must 
 be relied on. 
 
 German M. Ins. Co. v. Niewiede, 11 Ind. App. 634, 39 N. E. 534; 
 Helm v. Anchor F. Ins. Co., 109 N. W. 605; 
 Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. McGinness, 87 111. 70. 
 
 CASH VALUE OF WHISKY. 
 
 The policy contains the fellowing provision: "This com- 
 pany shall not be liable beyond the actual cash value of the 
 property at the time any loss or damage occurs, and the loss or 
 damage shall be ascertained, or estimated, according to such 
 actual cash value, with proper deduction for depreciation, how- 
 ever caused, and shall in no event exceed what it would then 
 cost the insured to repair or replace the same with material 
 of like kind and quantity." This provision of the contract fur- 
 nishes the measure of damages and raises the important ques- 
 tion in the case. The policy is the contract between the parties, 
 and must be given an interpretation which will carry out their 
 intention. If the language of the policy is doubtful or obscure, 
 it will be construed most unfavorable to the insurer. Merrick 
 v. Germania Fire Insurance Co., 54 Pa. 277. A contract of in- 
 surance must have a reasonable interpretation such as was prob- 
 ably in the contemplation of the parties when it was made; 
 and when the words of a policy are, without violence, suscepti- 
 ble of two interpretations, that which will sustain a claim to the 
 indemnity it was the object of the assured to obtain should be 
 preferred. Humphreys v. National Benefit Association, 139 Pa. 
 214, 20 Atl. 1047, 11 L. R. A. 564. 
 
 The property covered by this policy is of a peculiar char- 
 acter, but the intention of both parties was to protect the in- 
 sured against its loss by fire, and the policy must be construed 
 so as to effect that purpose. It not like a machine, a house, or 
 property of that character. There is no difficulty whatever in 
 ascertaining the cost of repairing or replacing such property 
 as of the date it is injured or destroyed. Proof is readily ac- 
 cessible which will enable the insured to establish "what it 
 would then cost to repair or replace the same with material of 
 
28 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 like kind and quantity." A moment's reflection will show that 
 this is not true of whisky which has been destroyed. From the 
 uncontradicted evidence it appears, and therefore it must be 
 taken as a fact, that the age of whisky materially affects its 
 character and quality, and hence is an important factor in ascer- 
 taining or determining its value. It also appears in the case that 
 this, like other brands of whisky, has a distinctive character and 
 quality of its own, and that no brand of whisky can be substi- 
 tuted in the market for another brand. 
 
 , under the clause of the policy above quoted, how 
 should the plaintiffs' loss be measured? The whisky insured by 
 the several policies issued to the plaintiffs was of different in- 
 spections. There were 6,910 barrels destroyed. The most of it 
 was manufactured about six months prior to the fire; some in 
 1903 and 1904, and some in 1898 and 1899. The defendant com- 
 pany is not liable beyond the actual "cash value." What is that 
 value? That is fixed by the uncontradicted testimony of a num- 
 ber of witnesses. It ranges from 50 cents to $1.05 per gallon, 
 according to its age. This was the cash value of the A. Over- 
 hold & Co. whisky in the wholesale liquor market on November 
 19, 1905, when it was destroyed. As appears in the evidence, 
 there was whisky of that brand of the different inspections on 
 the market at that date. It must be conceded, we think, that, 
 if the cash value of the whisky at the date of the loss is the 
 only practical standard for maasuring the plaintiffs' damages, 
 the court 3fid jury must accept the value fixed by the plaintiffs' 
 witnesses. It will be observed, however, that the policy provides 
 that the cash value of the whisky "shall in no case exceed what 
 it would then cost the insured to repair or replace the same with 
 material of like kind and quality." The defendant company con- 
 tends that the loss could not be estimated at more than it would 
 have cost the insured to replace the whisky. In other words, the 
 position of the defendants is that, under this provision of the 
 contract, the plaintiffs' right of recovery is limited to the cost 
 of material, the expense of manufacturing the whisky, the 
 charges for carrying it in bond, insurance, and interest on the 
 amount invested in the whisky. This provision of the policy 
 is simply a limitation on the former provision, which fixes the 
 loss at the cash value of the property. In estimating the loss, the 
 insured is entitled to the cash value of the property destroyed, 
 provided it does not exceed what it would cost to replace it with 
 material of like kind and quality at the date it was consumed. 
 How shall this cost be ascertained? It is doubtless true that the 
 
CASH VALUE MEASURE OF DAMAGE. 29 
 
 cost of manufacturing a gallon of whisky is easily ascertained. 
 But that does not meet the requirements of this case. The 
 plaintiffs are net restricted to the simple cost of reproducing 
 the whisky. They are entitled to have the whisky which was 
 destroyed replaced as of the date of the loss with the same 
 material of like kind and quality. The whisky consumed by the 
 fire was, as we have seen, of different inspections. It had age 
 which, _gave it character and quality. It was of the A. Overholt 
 & Co. brand, dissimilar in character and quality from other 
 brands, and for which there is no substitute. The cost of 
 whisky of like character, quality and age is the measure of the 
 plaintiffs' right of recovery. It is manifest that this cost can 
 not be ascertained by simply taking into consideration the cost 
 of the elements suggested by the learned counsel for the de- 
 fendant company. It omits from the calculation the effect which 
 age has on that particular brand of whisky, which is a most 
 important factor in determining its cost. Nor can any witness, 
 as is apparent, definitely estimate what the age of each of the 
 several inspections in this case will add to the actual cost of the 
 material entering into the particular brand of whisky. It is an 
 important element entering into its value, but the precise extent 
 to which its value is increased cannot be fixed by testimony. 
 There is, therefore, but one way to ascertain the cost of replac- 
 ing the whisky at the date it was destroyed, considering the 
 brand, character, quality and age of the whisky; and that is to 
 ascertain by competent evidence its actual cash value on the 
 day of the fire. By that method oi computing the cost the 
 whisky destroyed will be replaced "with material of like kind 
 and quality" as of the date it was consumed, and that is there- 
 fore the measure of the plaintiffs' damages. 
 
 The rule adopted in ascertaining the cost of replacing the 
 insured property in Standard Sewing Machine Company v. 
 Royal Insurance Company, 201 Pa. 645, 51 Atl. 354, is not ap- 
 plicable here, for the reasons above stated. To enforce it under 
 the circumstances of this case would deprive the plaintiffs of 
 the protection against loss of their property by fire which the 
 policy stipulates. In the sewing machine case there was no 
 difficulty in applying the rule. Here, owing to the peculiar 
 character of the property insured, the cost of replacing it must 
 be determined by its value *t the date of loss. 
 
 The judgment of the court below is affirmed. 
 Frick v. United Firemen's Ins. Co., 87 Atl. 743, 218 Pa. 489. 
 
30 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 The court affirmed the cases of Frick v. Svea F. & L,. Ins. 
 Cos. and twenty-three other companies at same time on same 
 grounds. 
 
 To same effect is Mechanics Ins Co. v. Hoover, 182 Fed. 
 590, aff'g 173 Fed. 888. 
 
 CASH VALUE AS APPLIED TO MANUFACTURERS' 
 STOCK. 
 
 Houghton , J. The plaintiff is a manufacturer of straw hats, 
 and the defendant issued to him a policy of insurance, insuring 
 him against loss by fire to his manufactured and unmanufactured 
 stock in the sum of $2,000. On February 11, 1906, while such 
 policy was in force, a fire occurred by which the plaintiff's fac- 
 tory and contents were destroyed. A portion of the property 
 so destroyed consisted of a quantity of hats which had been fin- 
 ished, bargained for, cased for shipment, and marked with the 
 buyers' names prior to the fire. The delivery and shipment of 
 these goods would have commenced the morning after the fire 
 occurred, and would have continued for four months following. 
 The stipulated facts concede that it would have required four 
 months to reproduce the hats in the condition they were at the 
 time of the fire and that plaintiff's factory could not be rebuilt 
 in time to reproduce the goods for the coming season's trade, 
 and that after diligent effort the plaintiff was unable to procure 
 any other mill to reproduce the goods and was unable to replace 
 them by purchase in the market. The policy was the standard 
 form, and contained the following provision with respect to 
 ascertaining the loss: 
 
 "This company shall not be liable beyond the actual cash 
 value of the property at the time any loss or damage occurs, and 
 the loss or damage shall be ascertained or estimated according 
 to such actual cash value, with proper deductions for deprecia- 
 tion, however caused, and shall in no event exceed what it 
 would then cost the insured to repair or replace the same with 
 material of like kind and quality." 
 
 It is stipulated that the actual cost of manufacture to the 
 plaintiff of that portion of the hats for which defendant is liable 
 was $1,841.95, and that the actual selling price at which plaintiff 
 had made sales on which he was about to make delivery was 
 $1,966.79. There would be no difficulty in deciding the question, 
 and doubtless no controversy, except for the clause of the con 
 tract providing that the loss or damage "shall in no event 
 
CASH VALUE MEASURE OF DAMAGE. 31 
 
 what it would then cost the insured to repair or replace the same 
 with material of like kind and quality." 
 
 Without this clause the actual cash value must be con- 
 ceded to be the measure of damage. Whatever may be the rule 
 with respect to ordinary manufactured articles, and whether 
 under ordinary circumstances the cost of manufacture under this 
 clause would be the measure of loss, we are of the opinion, 
 under the facts as stipulated, that the plaintiff is entitled to 
 recover the actual cash value, and it not limited to the cost oi 
 manufacture. Straw hats are not an ordinary staple. Their 
 value depends upon style and finish, and they must be produced 
 for the summer market. In order to reach the retailer in time 
 for the summer trade, they must be manufactured in the fall 
 and winter, so they may come to the hands of the retailer in 
 the spring and early summer. It is conceded the plaintiff could 
 not repair his factory or obtain another in which to reproduce 
 the hats lost by fire in time for the season's trade, nor could 
 he go upon the market and replace them by purchase. Under 
 the stipulated facts it is impossible to apply the clause of the 
 contract respecting repair or replacement. The plaintiff could 
 neither buy them nor could he again manufacture them in time 
 to be of any value. It cannot be ascertained what it would cost 
 .the insured to "repair or replace" the hats "with material of 
 like kind and quality," because they could be neither repaired 
 nor replaced. There is no other mode, therefore, under the 
 contract of ascertaining the plaintiff's loss, except by taking 
 "the actual cash value" of the property destroyed, which is con- 
 ceded to be the price at which they were contracted to be sold. 
 
 In Frick v. United F. Ins. Co., 218 Pa. 409, 67 Atl. 743, a 
 quantity of whisky of various ages was destroyed by fire, and 
 the policy of insurance contained the same clause as that of the 
 policy under consideration. The question involved was whether 
 the measure of loss was the cost of manufacture or cash value. 
 Because of the fact that it was impossible to produce whisky of 
 the precise quality and mellowness of that destroyed, which 
 condition added largely to its value, it was concluded that the 
 only practical method of ascertaining the loss was to take the 
 actual cash value. In its decision the court was careful to dis- 
 tinguish it from its former decision in Standard Sewing Machine 
 Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 201 Pa. 645, 51 Atl. 354, where it had 
 limited the loss to the cost of manufacture, deeming the peculiar 
 situation a controlling feature. A like peculiar situation exists 
 under the stipulated facts in this case, and the goods being im- 
 
32 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 possible of replacement, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the 
 actual cash value, and is not limited to the cost of manufacture. 
 
 Judgment is ordered for the plaintiff in the sum of $1,966.79, 
 with interest from the 28th day of March, 1906, with costs. 
 
 Laughlin and Scott, JJ., concur. 
 
 McLaughlin, J. (dissenting). The contract in question was 
 one of indemnity only. 13 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law (2d Ed.) p. 
 101. Profits may be recovered only \then insured as such. Id. 
 105; Niblo v. North Am. Fire Co., 1 Sandf. 551; Buffalo El. Co. 
 y. Prussian Nat. Ins. Co., 64 App. Div. 182, 187, 71 N. Y. Supp. 
 918, affirmed 171 N. Y. 25, 63 N. E. 810. Upon the facts the 
 plaintiff would be indemnified by the payment to him of 
 $1,841.95, and any greater sum necessarily includes profits. He 
 was a manufacturer, and his actual los was obviously what he 
 had expended upon the goods destroyed, and not what he would 
 have realized had he sold them, since hi profits would be in- 
 cluded in the selling price. Standard Sewing Machine Co. v. 
 Insurance Co., 201 Pa. 645, 51 Atl. 354; Scottish Union Ins. Co. 
 v. Keene, 85 Md. 263, 37 Atl. 33; Mumford v. Hallett, 1 Johns. 
 433; Harris v. The Eagle Fire Co., 5 Johns. 368. 
 
 It is doubtless true that "actual cash value" is frequently to 
 be construed as equivalent to market value; but that term is used 
 in the policy to limit the liability of the insurer, and the pro- 
 vision that the loss "shall, in no event, 'exceed what it would 
 then cost the insured to repair or replace the same with ma- 
 terial of like kind and quality" shows it was never intended by 
 the use of such words to insure the manufacturer's profits. The 
 value of an article is ordinarily fixed by its market value, but in 
 the case before us the amount which would indemnify the plain- 
 tiff is conceded, and to allow him anything more is simply to al- 
 low him the profits which he would have realized, had the fire 
 not occurred. 
 
 I am, therefore, of the opinion that upon the agreed facts 
 the plaintiff is entitled to judgment for the sum of $1,841.95, 
 with interest from the 28th day of March, 1906. 
 
 Phillips v. Home Ins. Co., 112 N. Y. Supp. 769. 
 
 HOUSEHOLD GOODS. 
 
 The measure of 'recovery for loss on household goods can- 
 not be based on what a junk shop or second-hand dealer would 
 have given for them, nor what they would have brought at 
 forced sale. Nor is it limited to their market value, since their 
 
CASH VALUE MEASURE OF DAMAGE. 33 
 
 value to the owner and the cost of replacing them would exceed 
 their market value. 
 
 Sun Fire Office v. Ayers, 37 Neb. 184, 55 N. W. 635; 
 Birmingham & Co. v. Huitoh, 157 Ala. 630, 47 So. 676. 
 
 But the company may prove the value by showing the as- 
 sured offered to sell it for a certain price. 
 
 Joy v. Security F. Ins. Co., 83 la. 12, 48 N. W. 1049. 
 
 FREIGHT. 
 
 Freight is a part of the cost of the goods. 
 Case v. Mfrs. F. & M. Ins. Co., 82 Cal. 263, 22 Pac. 1083. 
 
 MANUFACTURER'S MEASURE OF LOSS. 
 
 The measure of the loss on stock of a manufacturer is the 
 fair market value at the place of its destruction. 
 
 Parrish v. Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co., 20 Ins. L. J. 95; 
 Grubbs v. North Carolina H. Ins. Co., 108 N. C. 472, 20 Ins. L. J. 
 784. 
 
 PARTY WALLS. 
 
 The owner of a one-half interest in a party wall has an 
 insurable interest in the easement of the other half. 
 Nelson v. Continental Ins. Co., 182 Fed. 783. 
 
 The owner of such a half interest may recover the full value 
 of the entire wall if it is a loss. 
 
 Citizens Ins. Co. v. Lochridge, 132 Ky. 1, 116 S. W. 303, 38 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 491, annotated in 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 226; 
 Kinzer v. National M. Ins. Co., 88 Kan. 93, 127 Pac. 762, annotated 
 
 in 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 121. 
 
 But see 
 
 Northwestern M. L. Ins. Co. v. Rochester Ger. Ins. Co., 88 Minn. 
 48, 88 N. W. 272. 
 
 i 
 
 The following was written in the year 1905, long before the 
 decisions in the whisky cases were decided (see first edition 
 "Hall on Insurance Adjustments") and is applicable to those 
 decisions and all others rendered since 1905. 
 
 I apprehend, after carefully reading the foregoing decisions, 
 that most of the courts will uphold the wording of the policy, 
 which means nothing more nor less than the cash market value 
 of the cost to replace or reproduce the article new, on the day 
 and at the place it was damaged or destroyed, less whatever 
 difference in value there may be between new and the condi- 
 tion in which the destroyed article was at the time of its de- 
 struction. At least that is the interpretation I place on the Ian- 
 
34 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 guage of the courts, after carefully reading the decisions, espe- 
 cially the cases of Stenzel v. Pennsylvania, Hilton v. Phoenix, 
 Grubbs et al. v. Ins. Co. and Mack v. Ins. Co., and, as was said 
 in these decisions, cash value does not necesarily mean prime 
 cash cost, plus freight, nor does it mean cost of (original) pro- 
 duction; the cash value on the day of the fire might be much 
 less and it might be much more than the goods cost. If the 
 goods have declined in price, the insurance company is entitled 
 to that decline. If prices have advanced, the assured is. entitled 
 to the benefit of such advance. In both cases the insurance 
 company is entitled to any depreciation it can show has taken 
 place in the goods from shop wear, change in styles or for any 
 other valid reason. 
 
 There may be great difference between cost of production 
 and cost of reproduction, not only for the reason that cost of 
 labor and material fluctuates, but other conditions may inter- 
 vene, as, for instance, a manufacturer's factory may burn and 
 he be thereby placed in a position where he can not reproduce 
 the destroyed goods. In such case, if his goods have a known 
 cash market value, such as flour, lumber or whisky, then the 
 measure of damage for which the company would be liable is 
 the sum a similar grade of goods would have cost him deliv- 
 ered at the time and place of fire. 
 
 If the property destroyed be whisky, the chances are it can 
 not be reproduced by the assured, even though his distillery may 
 not have been harmed, for the reason that the longer he has 
 had it the more valuable it is. New whisky has to be aged. 
 The same principle holds good with it that was expressed by the 
 court in Western Assurance Co. v. Studebaker, 124 Ind. 176, 20 
 Ins. L. J. 64, in sustaining the objection of plaintiff to the in- 
 troduction of evidence showing what the contract was between 
 plaintiff and a party in another State for green lumber used 'in 
 their business. The court said: "These contracts are for green 
 lumber to be manufactured and delivered in future. The lum- 
 ber destroyed was seasoned, dry lumber. It was, therefore, 
 proper to show what first-class poplar lumber, dry and of the 
 sam dimensions, was worth in the market at the time and 
 place of the fire." If there was no market at such time and 
 place, then it might probably be proper to show what it was 
 worth in the nearest market, with cost of transportation to scene 
 of the loss added. 
 
 Suppose, too, that a manufacturer has contracted for the 
 
CASH VALUE MEASURE OF DAMAGE. 35 
 
 sale of his entire output, and has only a certain time in which 
 to deliver a certain quantity of goods. In case of fire, his loss 
 will be what it costs him to go on the market and buy the goods, 
 and that will be the measure of damage for which the insurer 
 is liable for those goods that were destroyed by the fire. The 
 contract does not insure the goods themselves; it insures their 
 owner against loss on same. 
 
 An insurance policy is a personal contract. 
 Wilcox v. Hill, 44 Mass. 66. 
 
36 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 NOTICE OF LOSS. 
 
 "If fire occur the insured shall give immediate notice of any loss 
 
 thereby, in writing, to this company." 
 
 The requirement of immediate notice of loss contained in 
 a New York standard policy is satisfied by a notice given within 
 a reasonable time. (In this case, 53 days after the fire, where, 
 however, the policy was in the safe in the building which was 
 burned and could not be obtained until about the time the notice 
 was given), taking into consideration the situation of the insured 
 and all the circumstances by which he is surrounded, and if 
 he uses due diligence in discovering the policy, and serving 
 the notice of loss, this is sufficient. 
 
 Solomon v. Continental Ins. Co., 160 N. T. 695. 
 
 Citing: 
 
 O'Brien v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 76 N. T. 459; Carpenter v. German 
 Amer. Ins. Co., 135 N. Y. 298; Griffey v. N. T. Central Ins. Co., 
 100 N. Y. 417; N. Y. Cent. Ins. Co. v. Nat. Protection Ins. Co., 
 20 Barb. 468; Inman v. Western Ins. Co., 12 Wend. 452; Ben- 
 nett v. Lycoming County M. Ins. Co., 67 N. Y. 274; Matthews 
 v. American Central Ins. Co., 154 N. Y. 458; McNally v. Phoe- 
 nix Ins. Co., 137 N. Y. 389; Trustees Amherst College v. Ritch, 
 151 N. Y. 282; Paltrovitch v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 143 N. Y. 73; 
 Sergeant v. Liverpool and London and Globe Ins. Co., 156 N. Y. 
 349. 
 
 It is for the jury to determine whether, in view of all the 
 circumstances, the insured acted with due diligence and without 
 unnecessary delay in giving notice forthwith. 
 
 Griffey v. N. Y. Central Ins. Co., 100 N. Y. 417; affirming 30 Hun. 
 
 299; 
 O'Brien v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 76 N. Y. 469. 
 
 Eleven days after fire is not forthwith: 
 Trask v. Ins. Co., 6 Casey 198. 
 
 Eighteen days after fire is not forthwith: 
 
 Edwards v. Ly coming Co. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (Pa. S. C.), 3 Ins. 
 L. J. 534. 
 
 Standard form policy requiring immediate notice is not 
 complied with by giving notice thirty-three days after fire. 
 
 Quinlan v. Providence-Washington Ins. Co, (N. Y.), 39 St. Rep. 
 820; affirmed in 133 N. Y. 356. 
 
 37 
 
38 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 \ 
 
 Fourteen days after the fire, unaccompanied by any fact 
 or circumstances excusing delay is not such immediate notice. 
 La Force v. Williamsburgh City Fire Ins. Co., 43 Mo. App. 618. 
 
 Failure to notify insurer within the term prescribed unless 
 waived, will avoid the policy. 
 
 Blossom v. Lycoming Fire Ins. Co., 64 N. T. 162; 
 Burnham v. Royal Ins. Co., 75 Mo. App. 394. 
 
 Requirement of notice forthwith is not complied with by 
 serving proofs of loss seven weeks after fire. 
 
 Brown v. London Assurance Corp. (N. Y.), 40 Hun. 101. 
 
 Where assured has failed to notify insurer of the loss, 
 thereby forfeiting his claim under the policy, the insurer does 
 not waive his rights to claim forfeiture by refusing to pay loss 
 on other grounds. 
 
 Blossom T. Lycoming Fire Ins. Co., 64 N. T. 162; 
 Brown T. London Assurance Corp. (N. Y.), 40 Hun. 101. 
 
 Notice may be given the local agent who wrote the policy. 
 
 Kendall T. Holland Purchase Ins. Co. (N. Y.), 2 S. C. 376; affirmed 
 
 in 68 N. Y. 682; 
 Germania F. Ins. Co. v. Curran (Kan. S. C.), 1 Ins. L. J. 191. 
 
 A notice of loss sent by the local agent who informs the in- 
 sured that it is sent, though not purporting to be sent in be- 
 half of insured, if received by the company, is sufficient. 
 
 Loeb v. American Central Ins. Co., 99 Mo. 60, 21 Ins. L. J. 889. 
 
 Where policy makes the notice of loss a condition precedent 
 to recovery, no suit can be maintained without proof of such 
 notice. 
 
 Washington M. Ins. Co. T. Heckenath (N. Y.), 7 Leg. & Ins. Rep. 
 357. 
 
 Forthwith means in reasonable time, or with reasonable 
 diligence, dependent on the circumstances of the case. 
 Bennet v. Lycoming Mo. Mut. Ins. Co., 67 N. Y. 274. 
 
 It means due diligence, four days after the fire is sufficient. 
 St. Louis Ins. Co. v. Kyle, 11 Mo. 278. 
 
 In case of an infant, the guardian appointed after the loss 
 may give the requisite notice. 
 
 O'Brien v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 76 N. Y. 469. 
 
NOTICE OF Loss. 39 
 
 Knowledge by a fire insurance company's agent of the loss 
 by fire does not relieve the insured from the duty of giving 
 notice. 
 
 Smith v. Haverhill Ins. Co., 83 Mass. 297. 
 
 Verbal notice given by assured to insurance company's 
 agent who wrote the policy is not such notice as the policy 
 requires. 
 
 Ermentraut v. Girard F. and M. Ins. Co. (Minn. S. C.), 25 Ins. L. J. 
 87. 
 
 Where a fire insurance policy requires notice of loss forth- 
 with, it means with all reasonable diligence under the circum- 
 stances of the particular case. 
 
 Central City Ins. Co. v. Gates, 86 Ala. 558. 18 Ins. L. J. 761. 
 
HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 PROOFS OF LOSS AND REQUIREMENTS 
 OF ASSURED. 
 
 "If fire occur, the * insured shall * * * protect the property 
 from further damage, forthwith separate the damaged and 
 undamaged personal property, put it in the best possible or- 
 der, make a complete inventory of the same, stating the 
 quantity and cost of each article and the amount claimed 
 thereon; and, within sixty days after the fire, unless such 
 time is extended in writing by this company, shall render a 
 statement to this company, signed and sworn to by said 
 insured, stating the knowledge and belief of the insured as 
 to the time and origin of the fire; the interest of the insured 
 and of all others in the property; the cash value of each 
 item thereof and the amount of loss thereon; all incum- 
 brances thereon; all other insurance, whether valid or not, 
 covering any of said property; and a copy of all the de- 
 scriptions and schedules in all policies; any changes in the 
 title, use, occupation, location, possession, or exposures oi 
 said property since the issuing of this policy; by whom and 
 for what purpose any building herein described and the 
 several parts thereof were occupied at the time of fire; and 
 shall furnish, if required, verified plans and specifications oi 
 any building, fixtures, or machinery destroyed or damaged; 
 and shall also, if required, furnish a certificate of the magis- 
 trate or notary public (not interested in the claim as a 
 creditor or otherwise, nor related to the insured), living 
 nearest the place of fire, stating that he has examined the 
 circumstances and believes the insured has honestly sus- 
 tained loss to the amount that such magistrate or notary 
 public shall certify." New York Standard Policy. 
 "The insured shall forthwith separate the damaged and un- 
 damaged personal property, put it in the best possible order 
 and make a complete inventory of same." 
 
 Oshkosh Match Co. v. Manchester Assur. Co., 92 Wis. 510; 
 Thornton v. Security Ins. Co., 117 Fed. 773; 32 Ins. L. J. 557; 
 Astrich v. German Amer. Ins. Co., 33 Ins. L. J. 308; affirmed (U. S. 
 C. C. A. 3d Dist.), 33 Ins. L. J. 925. 
 
 The assured took an inventory and at the end of it stated 
 the claim for loss as follows: 
 
 41 
 
42 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Inventory Loss 
 
 33 1/3 % on dry goods, underwear, etc.$6,061 $2,020.53 
 
 25 % on furniture and fixtures 650 162.50 
 
 16 % on boots, shoes and rubbers. . 1,050 157.50 
 
 15 % on groceries, spices, etc 2,850 427.50 
 
 Total Loss $2,768.03 
 
 In this inventory are found some items of a collective char- 
 acter, such as "a lot of goods in show windows," "contents oi 
 a small show case," "lot of shirt bosoms, handkerchiefs, fly net- 
 ting, etc." The point taken is that policy requires each article 
 to be given, its quantity and cost and the amount claimed there- 
 on separately. Held, This stipulation is not to be construed 
 most strictly against the insured. Its object is to secure a full 
 statement of the loss he claims, so that company may have 
 notice and the neccessary opportunity to test its correctness. 
 
 Boyle v. Hamburg-Bremen F. Ins. Co. (Pa. S. C.), 24 Ins. L, J. 
 699. 
 
 If unable to give cost of each article, the number of such 
 articles of each kind may be given with the average price. 
 
 Clement's Digest, Rule 5, p. 15, citing Peoples F. Ins. Co. v. 
 Pulver, 127 111. 246 ; 20 N. E. Rep. 18. 
 
 The expense of putting in order and of inventorying must 
 be borne by the assured. 
 
 Clement's Digest, Rule 4, p. 15. 
 
 Hebner v. Palatine Ins. Co., 157 111. 144 ; 41 N. E. Rep. 627. 
 
 i 
 
 The expense of the insured in saving and protecting the 
 property and putting it in the best possible order is one inci- 
 dental to the loss, and, until the case of Hebner v. Palatine Ins. 
 Co., and Fire Ins. Assn' v. Wickham et al., I never heard of an 
 adjuster taking the position that his company was not liable 
 for such loss. The fact that the policy requires the assured to 
 do certain acts in the preservation of his property is all the more 
 reason for reimbursing him for the expense. If goods of an 
 unknown value were among the debris of a building, and the 
 insured, by hard work, succeeds in saving them at an expense 
 of $5,000 and they sell for $7,500, the salvage has, according to 
 this Illinois decision, two values, one of $7,500 to the insurance 
 companies, but only $2,500 to the insured, but fortunately for 
 the insured, the insurance companies do not take such an unrea- 
 sonable and unfair view of the matter in adjusting losses with 
 their claimants and policyholders, and if they were inclined to 
 settle losses according to the Illinois decision, I am of the 
 belief that other States would follow the doctrine laid down 
 
PROOFS OF Loss REQUIREMENTS OF ASSURED. 43 
 
 by the U. S. S. C. in the case of Fire 1 Ins. Ass'n, (Ltd.), v. 
 Wickham et al., 21 Ins. L. J. 193, in which they say: 
 
 In this case there are two distinct and separate claims of 
 similar amounts, namely, $15,364.78, one of which was for the 
 direct loss by fire to the property insured, and the other was 
 for incidental cost of saving and protecting it from further dam- 
 age. The plaintiff assumed on the face of the receipts (which 
 were in usual form one for payment of loss, the other for pay- 
 ment of return premium, both providing for cancellation and 
 surrender of the policy) to settle with the plaintiff for both of 
 these claims for the exact amount of one of them. In other 
 words, they assumed to settle for a moiety of the entire claim, 
 a claim, the legality and justness of which was so far beyond 
 dispute that it could hardly fail to be recognized by the ad- 
 justers for the companies * * *. The appraisement (which pro- 
 vided that it was "of binding effect only as far as regards the 
 actual cash value of or damage to such property insured." It 
 was further added that "the property on which loss or damage 
 is to be estimated and appraised is the hull of the propeller 
 St. Paul, including tackle, awnings, furniture, engine and boiler 
 connections and appurtenances thereto belonging," with a further 
 memorandum following the signature of Wickham, but preceding 
 those of the companies that this agreement does not apply to 
 or cover any question that may arise for saving boat and 
 cargo") the actions of the parties and the statement of the 
 adjusters that they had no authority whatever for considering 
 the claim for raising and saving the steamer, as the companies 
 were not liable for such expenses, all show that this claim was 
 not intended to be included in the receipts. 
 
 Judgment for plaintiff in court below was here affirmed. 
 
 In both these cases, Hebner v. Palatine and Fire Ins. Ass'n 
 v. Wickham, the property insured was a boat and the risk as- 
 sumed was against fire only. 
 
 But the insured is not required to put the goods in order (or 
 to make inventory) when the value is trifling and no proof is 
 offered that by so doing the value would be enhanced. 
 
 Clement's Digest, Rule 4, p. 15. 
 
 Citing: 
 
 Wright v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 36 Wis. 522. 
 
 Where goods (merchandise) are totally destroyed, an item- 
 ized inventory is not required. 
 Clement's Digest. Rule 6. p. 15. 
 
44 HAU, ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Citing: 
 
 Davis v. Grand Rapids Ins. Co., 15 Misc. 263 ; 36 N. Y. Supp. 792; 
 
 affirmed 157 N. Y. 685, no opinion. 
 Johnston v. Farmers Ins. Co., 106 Mich. 96; 64 N. W. Rep. 6. 
 
 Nor where they are so damaged as to render the making 
 of such an inventory impracticable. 
 Clement's Digest, Rule 6, p. 15. 
 
 Citing: 
 
 Powers D. G. Co. v. Imperial Ins. Co., 48 Minn. 380. 
 
 A clause in a fire policy requiring an itemized statement 
 of the cash value of each article and the amount of loss thereon, 
 applies only to the goods saved from the fire and not to those 
 which were burned. 
 
 Davis v. Grand Rapids Ins. Co., 36 N. Y. Supp. 792, affirmed In 
 157 N. Y. 685, no opinion. 
 
 Where the books and papers of the insured and all means 
 of making an accurate inventory were consumed with the in- 
 sured merchandise, a statement on oath, showing this fact, and 
 that the property insured and destroyed was, at least, of the 
 value of the sum named is sufficient. 
 
 Bumstead v. Dividend Mut. Ins. Co., 12 N. Y. 81 ; 
 
 Hoffman v. ^Etna Ins. Co., 1 Rob. 501 ; S. C. 19 Abb. Pr. 325 ; 
 
 Mortimer v. N. Y. Fire Ins. Co., 2 U. S. Law Magf. 452. 
 
 The furnishing of preliminary proofs of loss, unless waived, 
 is condition precedent to recovery. 
 
 Underwood v. Farmers Joint Stock Ins. Co., 57 N. Y. 500 ; 
 
 Irving v. Excelsior F. Ins. Co., (N. Y.), 1 Bos. 507; 
 
 Burnham v. Royal Ins. Co., 75 Mo. App. 394 ; 
 
 Kingsley v. N. B. Ins. Co., 62 Mass. 393 ; 
 
 Wellcome v. Peoples Ins. Co., 68 Mass. 480 ; 
 
 Shawmut S. R. Co. v. Peoples Ins. Co., 78 Mass. 535 ; 
 
 Home Ins. Co. v. Duke (Ind. S. C.), 3 Ins. L. J. 365 ; 
 
 Ins. Co. v. Hathaway, 43 Kans. 399 ; 
 
 Ins. Co. v. Seyferth, 29 111. App. 513 ; 
 
 Leigh v. Ins. Co., 37 Mo. App. 542 ; 
 
 Lee v. Ins. Co., 73 Tex. 641. 
 
 And they must be furnished within the time required by 
 the policy. 
 
 McDermott v. Lycomlng F. Ins. Co. (N. Y.), 12 J. and S. 221; 
 Smith v. Haverhill Ins. Co.. 83 Mass. 297 ; 
 Eastern R. R. v. Relief Ins. Co., 98 Mass. 420. 
 
 Where proofs are served 60 days after the fire has termi- 
 nated or abated to such an extent that an inspection of the dam- 
 aged property may be had, it is a sufficient requirement of the 
 policy that proofs must be furnished within 60 days after 
 the fire. 
 
 National Wall Paper Co. v. Associated Mfrs. Mut F. Ins. Co., 
 175 N. Y. 226. 
 
PROOFS OF Loss REQUIREMENTS OF ASSURED. . 45 
 
 The requirement in the policy that proofs be furnished 
 within 60 days after the fire, is not complied with by deposit- 
 ing such proofs in the mail on the 60th day after the loss, where 
 it does not reach its destination within the limited time. 
 
 Peabody v. Satterlee, 166 N. Y. 174. reversing (S. C.) 36 App. 
 Dlv. 426 ; 30 Ins. L. J. 885. 
 
 A statement in the proofs of loss, that the property be- 
 longed to the assured, and that no other person or persons had 
 any interest therein, is equivalent to a statement that there 
 were no incumbrances on the property. 
 
 Davis v. Grand Rapids Ins. Co., N. Y. S. C. 5, App. Div. 36 ; 
 affirmed in 157 N. Y. 685 (no opinion.) 
 
 Where several policies are issued to one person, upon the 
 same property, a single proof of loss referring to all the poli- 
 cies is sufficient. 
 
 Dakin v. L. and L. and G. Ins. Co., 13 Hun. 122 ; S. C. 77 N. 
 Y. 600. 
 
 Preliminary proofs may be signed by a member of a co- 
 partnership in the absence of any provision in the policy re- 
 quiring the names of the individual members of the firm to be 
 given. 
 
 Kerelsen v. Sun Fire Office, 122 N. Y. 545 ; affirming S. C. 16 
 St. Rep. 239. 
 
 The retention of proofs of loss for more than twenty-three 
 days without objection operates as a waiver of defects therein. 
 
 Davis v. Grand Rapids Ins. Co., N. Y. S. C., 5 App. Div. 36 ; 
 affirmed in 157 N. Y. 685 (no opinion.) 
 
 Where proofs of loss are kept without objection that they 
 were not served by the proper party, the insurer can not make 
 defense that they were not served by the "insured." 
 
 De Witt v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 89 Hun. 229 ; S. C. 71 St. Rep. 
 556 ; Affirmed in 157 N. Y. 353. 
 
 Where the insured in his proofs of loss makes a statement 
 of what he had been "informed" was the origin of the fire, and 
 no question of surprise was raised on the trial, he is not es- 
 topped or precluded from showing that, in fact, the fire origi- 
 nated from some other cause. 
 
 White v. Royal Ins. Co., 149 N. Y. 485 ; affirming S. C. 8 Misc. 611. 
 
46 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 The preliminary proofs are not evidence of the loss on the 
 trial. 
 
 Yonkers and N. Y. F. Ins. Co. v. Hoffman F. Ins. Co., (N. Y.), 
 
 6 Rob. 316 ; 
 Sexton v. Montgomery Co. Mut. Ins. Co., 9 Barb. 191. 
 
 Unless made so by the terms of the policy. 
 Sexton v. Montgomery Co. Mut. Ins. Co., 9 Barb. 191. 
 
 The furnishing of preliminary proofs according to the con- 
 ditions of the policy must be averred in the declaration; or it 
 will be bad on demurrer, 
 
 Inman v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 12 Wend. 452, (N. Y.) ; 
 Furlong v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 28 Abb. N. C. 444; S. C. (N. Y.), 
 
 45 St. Rep. 856. 
 
 A denial of liability waives proofs and suit may be brought 
 at once. 
 
 Hicks v. British America Assur. Co., 8 (N. Y. S. C.) App. Div. 
 
 444 ; S. C. 43 N. Y. Supp. 623. 
 Flaherty v. Continental Ins. Co., 20 App. Div. 275; (N. Y.) S. C. 
 
 46 N. Y. Supp. 934 ; 
 
 Ins. Co. v. Richardson (Neb. S. C.), 24 Ins. L. J. 690 ; 
 
 Ins. Co. v. Journal .Pub. Co. (Wash. S. C.), 20 Ins. L*. J. 395; 
 
 Ins. Co. v. Carey (111. S. C.), 6 Ins. L. J. 493. 
 
 Ins. Co. v. Maguire, 57 111. 342 ; 
 
 Cobb v. Ins. Co., 11 Kans. 93 ; 
 
 Ins. Co. v. Gracey (Cal. S. C.), 20 Ins. L. J. 28 ; 
 
 Donohoe v. Ins. Co. (Vt. S. C.), 13 Ins. L. J. 116. 
 
 The trustee in bankruptcy of an absconding bankrupt may, 
 by direction of the court, make proofs of loss under policies of 
 insurance held by the bankrupt. 
 
 Sims v. Union Assur. Soc. (U. S. C. C. Ga.), 129 Fed. Rep. 804. 
 
 Mortgagee may make proofs. 
 
 Nickerson v. Nickerson et al. (Me. S. J. C.), 12 Atl. Rep. 880. 
 Bull v. North British and Merc. Ins. Co. (Ont. S. C. of J.), 9 Can. 
 
 Law Times, 26; 
 Armstrong v. Agricultural Ins. Co. (N. Y. S. C.), 31 N. Y. St. Rep. 
 
 201. 
 
 The case of Peabody v. Satterlee, 30 Ins. L. J. 885, does not 
 pass upon the question as to who may make proofs. The at- 
 torney for the assured in that case made proofs which were 
 returned by the company, with the request that the insured 
 make the proofs. The fact that the assured accepted the re- 
 jected proofs made by his lawyer, and made new proofs in his 
 own name, waived any right that he might have had to claim 
 that the proofs were in order, hence, the court did not pass upon 
 this question. 
 
 A proof of loss is an entirely ex parte statement of facts 
 
PROOFS OF Loss REQUIREMENTS OF ASSURED. 47 
 
 concerning the property, the loss and the insurance, intended 
 only to afford information as a basis of settlement, if satisfac- 
 tory, and if not, a basis for investigation. This statement made 
 in behalf of the insured, by an agent fully conversant with all 
 the facts, and having charge of the property, serves these pur- 
 poses as well as if made by the insured himself. Accordingly, 
 it has been generally held, when the principal is absent, and 
 the facts are within the knowledge of the agent, a proof so 
 made is sufficient. 
 
 Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Sims (Ga. S. C.), 42 S. E. Rep. 269; 
 Lumbermen's Ins. Co. v. Bell (111.),- 45 N. E. Rep. 130; 
 German F. Ins. Co. v. Grunert (111.); 
 Sims v. State Ins. Co., 4 Am. Rep. 311; 
 
 Pearlstine v. Westchester F. Ins. Co. (S. C. S. C.), 34 I. L. J. 39; 
 Sims v. Union Assur. Soc. (U. S. C. C. Ga.), 129 Fed. Rep. 804. 
 
 / 
 
 But see cases under examination under oath, which places 
 it within the power of the adjuster to practically nullify the 
 ruling of the courts allowing a third party to make proofs for 
 the insured. 
 
 Objections to proofs of loss must be specific and not 
 general. 
 
 Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Meyer (Neb. S. C.), 46 N. W. Rep. 292; 
 Bean v. Travelers Ins. Co. (Cal. S. C.), 29 Pac. Rep. 1113; 
 Dwelling House Ins. Co. v. Gould (Pa. S. C.), 19 Atl. Rep. 793; 
 Paltrovitch v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 143 N. Y. 73; S. C. 60 St. Rep. 462; 
 affirming S. C. 68 Hun. 304. 
 
 J 
 
 It is the duty of the company immediately to notify the as- 
 sured wherein his proofs are defective. 
 
 Dwelling House Ins. Co. v. Gould (Pa. S. C.), 19 Atl. Rep. 793. 
 
 Company must object to defects in reasonable time. 
 
 Union Ins. Co. v. Barwick (Neb. S. C.), (Mar. 18. 1893), 6 Finch 
 
 Digest 67; 
 
 Nease v. Aetna Ins. Co. (W. Va. C. A.), 9 S. E. Rep. 233; 
 Peet v. Dakota F. and M. Ins. Co. (Dakota S. C.), 20 Ins. L. J. 253. 
 
 Company must object to defects promptly. 
 
 Kernochan v. N. Y. Bowery F. Ins. Co., 17 N. Y. 428; 
 Biddleford Savings Bank v. Dwelling House Ins. Co. (Me. S. C.), 
 18 Atl. Rep. 298. 
 
 Retention of proofs of loss without objection for: 
 Twenty-three days is waiver of defects. 
 
 Paltrovitch v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 143 N. Y. 73; S. C. 60 St. Rep. 462; 
 affirming S. C. 68 Hun. 304. 
 
 Thirty days is waiver of defects. 
 
 Peoples F. Ins. Co. v. Pulver (111. S. C.), 20 N. E. Rep. 18; 
 Carpenter v. Allemannia F. Ins. Co. (Pa. S. C.), 26 Atl. Rep. 781. 
 
48 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Thirty-eight days is waiver of defects. 
 Keeney v. Home Ins. Co., 71 N. Y. 396. 
 
 Forty-five days is waiver of defects. 
 Jones v. Howard Ins. Co., 117 N. Y. 103. 
 
 Forty-eight days is waiver of defects. 
 Capitol Ins. Co. v. Wallace (Kan. S. C.). 22 Ins. L. J. 397. 
 
 The failure of the insurance company to object to proofs of 
 loss after notice, in other words by undue length of silence after 
 presentation; or its refusal to pay on grounds other than de- 
 fective proofs, will waive proofs. But none of the courts hold 
 that its mere silence after receipt of notice of loss will waive 
 proofs. 
 
 Central City Ins. Co. v. Gates, 86 Ala. 668, 18 Ins. L. J. 761. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 NOTARY PUBLIC'S OR MAGISTRATE'S 
 CERTIFICATE. 
 
 The production of such certificate when required, unless 
 the insurer has waived it or prevented the obtaining it, is a^con- 
 dition precedent to recovery. 
 
 DeLand v. Aetna Ins. Co., 68 Mo. App. 277; 
 Johnson v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 112 Mass. 49; 
 Dplliver v. St. Joseph Ins. Co., 131 Mass. 39; 
 Fink v. Lancashire Ins. Co., 60 Mo. App. 673; 
 Hubbard v. North British and M. Ins. Co., 67 Mo. App. 1; 
 Cornell v. Hope Ins. Co., 3 Martin (La.) 223; 
 Columbian Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 10 Pet. 507; 
 Leadbetter v. Aetna Ins. Co., 13 Me. 265. 
 
 The clause requiring notary public or magistrate most con- 
 tiguous to the fire, will be liberally construed, the magistrate's 
 proximity to the place is all that can be required. 
 
 Turley v. North American F. Ins. Co. (N. T. S. C.), 25 Wend. 374. 
 
 His certificate that he is not concerned in the loss is suffi- 
 cient until disproved. 
 
 Cornell v. LeRoy (N. Y. S. C.), 9 Wend. 163. 
 
 Where the policy requires the certificate within 60 days 
 after fire, no recovery can be had unless it is furnished. 
 
 Gottlieb v. Dutchess Mut. Ins. Co. (N. Y. S. C.), 89 Hun. 36; 
 S. C. 69 St. Rep. 250. 
 
 The requirement as to nearest magistrate must be strictly 
 complied with, when the nearest not only does not refuse to act, 
 but actually gives a certificate which does not meet the require- 
 ment. 
 
 Noonan v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 21 Mo. 81. 
 
 The capricious refusal of the nearest magistrate to give the 
 certificate will not prevent a recovery if the certificate of an- 
 other magistrate is obtained. 
 
 Leigh v. Springfield F. and M. Ins. Co., 37 Mo. App. 642. 
 
 Where the nearest notary refuses certificate, that of next 
 nearest notary is a compliance with the policy. 
 
 Lang v. Eagle F. Ins. Co., 12 App. Div. 39; S. C. 42 N. Y. Supp. 638. 
 Walker v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 62 Mo. App. 209. 
 
 49 
 
50 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Not concerned in the loss as a creditor means that he shall 
 not have a specific interest by way of lien, and does not dis- 
 qualify a magistrate who is a general creditor. 
 Dolliver v. St. Joseph Ins. Co., 131 Mass. 39. 
 
 Where the insurer furnishes blank proof of loss containing 
 form for a certificate, and rejects two sets of proofs because 
 they each fail to contain such certificate, it will defeat recovery 
 on the policy, unless it is otherwise waived. 
 
 Sullivan v. Germania F. Ins. Co., 89 Mo. App. 106. 
 
 If the certificate be so drawn as to mean the same thing 
 without using the exact words of the policy, it is sufficient. 
 Aetna F. Ins. Co. v. Tyler (N. Y. S. C.) ( 16 Wend. 385. 
 
 Assured complies with the requirement if he goes to the 
 nearest de jure magistrate. 
 
 Walker v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 62 Mo. App. 209. 
 
 Without requirement assured did furnish certificate, which 
 insurer objected to on the ground that it did not mention the 
 damage. Held, This did not amount to a requirement for such 
 certificate, (^tna Ins. Co. v. Bank, 62 Fed. Rep. 222, dis- 
 tinguished). 
 
 Swearinger v. Pacific F. Ins. Co., 66 Mo. App. 90. 
 
 An objection to proof because certificate was not furnished 
 is not good unless such certificate has been requested before- 
 hand. (Cases reviewed and distinguished). , 
 Burnett v. American Central Ins. Co., 68 Mo. App. 343. 
 
 Retention for 23 days of certificate of notary not nearest 
 fire waives company's right to reject proofs on that ground. 
 
 Paltrovitch v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 143 N. Y. 73; S. C. 60 St. Rep. 462; 
 affirming S. C. 68 Hun. 304. 
 
 Where company rejects certificate on the ground that there 
 is a nearer notary, it should give the name and address of such 
 notary to enable the insured to comply with its demands. 
 
 Paltrovitch v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 143 N. Y. 73; S. C. 60 St. Rep. 462; 
 affirming S. C. 68 Hun. 304. 
 
 I 
 
 Where proofs of loss not containing certificates were re- 
 jected and nearly a year afterwards proofs of loss and certifi- 
 
NOTAEY PUBLIC'S OR MAGISTRATE'S CERTIFICATE. 51 
 
 cate were served and suit commenced the same day, it was held 
 suit was not prematurely brought. 
 
 McNally v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 137 N. T. 389; S. C. 50 St. Rep. 680; 
 reversing S. C. 42 St. Rep. 21. 
 
 Where nearest notary's certificate was not secured, but no 
 defect in this respect was pointed out until after commencement 
 of action, the objection was too late. 
 
 Barnum v. Merchant's F. Ins. Co., 98 N. T. 188; 
 Smith v. Home Ins. Co. (N. Y. S. C.), 47 Hun. 30. 
 
52 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 EXAMINATION UNDER OATH, AND THE 
 
 PRODUCTION OF BOOKS, INVOICES, 
 
 ETC. 
 
 "The insured, as often as required, shall exhibit to any person 
 designated by this company all that remains of any prop- 
 erty herein described, and submit to examinations under 
 oath by any person named by this company, and subscribe 
 the same ; and, as often as required, shall produce for exami- 
 nation all books of account, bills, invoices, and other vouch- 
 ers or certified copies thereof, if originals be lost, at such 
 reasonable place as may be designated by this company or 
 its representative, and shall permit extracts and copies 
 thereof to be made." 
 
 The trustee in bankruptcy of an absconding bankrupt may, 
 by direction of the court, make proofs of loss under policies of 
 insurance held by the bankrupt. 
 
 Sims v. Union Assur. Soc. (U. S. C. C. Ga.), 129 Fed. Rep. 804. 
 
 A proof of loss is an entirely ex parte statement of facts 
 concerning the property, the loss and the insurance, intended 
 only to afford information as a basis of settlement if satisfac- 
 tory, and if not, a basis for investigation. This statement, made 
 in behalf of the insured by an agent fully conversant with all 
 the facts, and having charge of the property, serves these pur- 
 poses as well as if made by the insured himself. Accordingly, 
 it has been generally held, when the principal is absent and 
 the facts are within the knowledge of the agent, a proof so 
 made is sufficient. 
 
 Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Sims (Ga. S. C.), 42 S. E. Rep. 269: 
 Lumbermen's Ins. Co. v. Bell (111.), 45 N. E. Rep. 130. 
 German F. Ins. Co. v. Grunert (111.), 
 Sims v. State Ins. Co., 4 Am. Rep. 311. 
 
 Pearlstine v. Westchester F. Ins. Co. (S. C. S. C.). 34 Ins. L. J. 39; 
 Sims v. Union Assur. Soc. (U. S. C. C. Ga.), 129 Fed. Rep. 804; 
 Burns v. Michigan Mfrs. Mut. F. Co. (Mich. S. C., May, 1902), 31 
 Ins. L. J. 663. 
 
 But the provision for examination under oath stands upon 
 an entirely different footing from that requiring proofs of loss; 
 the manifest purpose of this stipulation is to afford a method 
 
 53 
 
54 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 of detecting imposition and fraud. In demanding examination, 
 the insurer indicates dissatisfaction with the formal ex parte 
 statement of proof. In such case, the insured has agreed his 
 conscience may be searched by questions put to him face to 
 face, where there is no opportunity for studied concealment. 
 He, and not his agent, has an interest in the claim for the 
 insurance and, therefore, a motive for fraud. To hold that 
 a person to whom an insurance policy was issued could sub- 
 stitute an agent for himself to undergo such an examination 
 would be to disregard not only the letter, but the spirit of the 
 actual contract, and make another for the parties. We know 
 of no authority which holds that an agent may be substituted 
 for such an examination. 
 
 Pearlstine v. Westchester F. Ins. Co. (S. C. S. C.), 34 Ins. L. J. 39; 
 
 Citing 
 
 Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Sims (Ga. S. C.), 42 S. E. Rep. 269; 
 Gross v. Ins. Co. (U. S. C. C. Ga.), 22 Fed Rep. 74. 
 
 The company has the right to demand and have the insured 
 himself appear for examination under oath, and his failure to 
 appear for examination on demand of the company is a bar 
 to a right of action. 
 
 Sims v. Union Assur. Soc. (U. S. C. C. Ga.), 129 Fed. Rep. 804; 
 Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Sims (Ga. S. C.), 42 S. E. Rep. 269; 
 
 31 Ins. L. J. 1049; 
 Gross v. Ins. Co. (U. S. C. C.), 22 Fed. Rep. 74. 
 
 To constitute insured's refusal to be examined under oath 
 a ground of defense, the insurance company must show that it 
 named a reasonable time after notice of the fire, the place must 
 have been a reasonably convenient one within the county where 
 the insured resided, and it must have designated some person 
 authorized by law to administer oaths and before whom such 
 examination could be had. 
 
 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 49 Neb. 811; 69 N. W. Rep. 125. 
 
 And the insured must subscribe to such examination. 
 
 >p. 276; 
 
 :eene, 85 Md. 263; 26 Ins. L. J. 963. 
 
 Grigsby v. Ins. Co., 40 Mo. App. 276; 
 Scottish U. & N. Ins. Co. v. Ke< 
 
 Once he refuses to subscribe, he may still do so if he so 
 wishes. 
 
 O'Brien v. Ohio Ins. Co., 52 Mich. 131. 
 
 The insured, if required, is bound to furnish duplicate bills 
 
EXAMINATION; PRODUCTION OF BOOKS, ETC. 55 
 
 (the originals of which have been lost), certified by the ven- 
 dors, unless unable to do so. 
 
 O'Brien v. Commercial F. Ins. Co., 63 N. T. 108. 
 
 Plaintiff is bound to show that he made a reasonable effort 
 to comply with defendant's request to furnish duplicate bills, 
 the originals of which were lost. 
 
 Langan v. Royal Ins. Co. (Pa. S. C.), 29 Atl. Rep. 710. 
 
 A duplicate bill is not a certified copy; the demand should 
 be in the language of the policy to make it operative. 
 Ins. Cos. v. Weides, 14 Wallace U. S. 375. 
 
 Insured can not be compelled to say on what basis he set- 
 tled with other companies. 
 
 Ins. Cos. v. Weides, 14 Wallace U. S. 375. 
 
 The insured is only required to answer such questions as 
 have a material bearing on the risk. 
 
 Titus v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 81 N. T. 410; 
 Porter v. Traders Ins. Co., 164 N. Y. 504. 
 
 In the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, the proper 
 place for examination of assured's books is the trading place 
 of assured in the town or place where loss occurred. 
 
 Fleisch v. Ins. Co. of N. A., 58 Mo. App. 598; 23 Ins. L. J. 634; 
 Murphy v. North B. & M. Ins. Co., 61 Mo. App. 323. 
 
 Reasonable place means reasonable place in the locality 
 or town where the loss occurred. 
 
 Murphy v. North B. & M. Ins. Co.. 61 Mo. App. 323. 
 
 Tucker v. Colonial F. Ins. Co. (W. Va. S. C.), 34 Ins. L. J. 969. 
 
 The insurer can not require the insured to leave the State 
 where he resides and where fire occurs to submit to examina- 
 tion under oath. 
 
 Amer. Central Ins. Co. v. Simpson, 43 111. App. 98. 
 
 i 
 
 And the insured may not demand that such examination 
 shall be made at a distant place to which he has removed after 
 the fire. 
 
 Fleisch v. Ins. Co. of N. A., 58 Mo. App. 596; 23 Ins. L. J. 634. 
 
 Where the insured endeavors to comply with the require- 
 ment to furnish duplicate bills, the jury must decide whether 
 such efforts were reasonable under all the circumstances. 
 
 Coleman v. Ins. Co., 177 Pa. St. 239. 
 
ii HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 He is bound to comply with the request, if possible. 
 
 Langan v. Ins. Co., 162 Pa. St. 367; 23 Ins. L. J. 878; 
 Seibel v. Ins. Co. (Pa. S. C.), 29 Ins. L. J. 838. 
 
 The insurer's office in the adjoining county in which the 
 loss occurs is a reasonable place for the production of books and 
 bills. 
 
 Seibel v. Ins. Co. (Pa. S. C.), 29 Ins. L. J. 838; 
 
 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 49 Neb. 811; 69 N. W. Rep. 125. 
 
 The time must be reasonable, and the place be reasonably 
 conventient to where insured resides. 
 
 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 49 Neb. 811; 69 N. W. Rep. 125; 
 Aurora Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 46 Ind. 315; 
 State Ins. Co. v. Maackens, 38 N. J. L. 564. 
 
 The failure of the insured to produce books, papers and 
 vouchers, in the absence of a proper demand for their produc- 
 tion, does not constitute a defense to payment under a policy 
 of fire insurance. 
 
 [Judgment for plaintiff below. Here affirmed against company.] 
 Narinsky v. Fidelity Surety Co. (N. T. S. C. App. Tr.): 
 92 New York Supplement (April 10,1905), 771. 
 
 The postive refusal of an insurance company to pay the 
 loss is an absolute waiver of its right under the policy to exam- 
 ine the books of the insured. 
 
 [Judgment for plaintiff below. Here affirmed against company.] 
 Colonial Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ellinger (111. A. C.): 
 112 111. App. 302. 
 
 Although it might be found that it was impossible to pro- 
 duce duplicate bills of purchase of a certain class, that fact did 
 not excuse the non-production of those that could have been ob- 
 tained by a bona fide effort on the part of the insured. 
 Mispelhorn v. Ins. Co., 53 Md. 473. 
 
 Insured is not compelled to do an impossible thing, and if 
 he can show that it was impossible to get duplicate bills, he 
 may recover. A finding by the jury that he has done all that 
 was possible is conclusive. 
 
 Eggleston v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co., 65 Iowa 308; 14 Ins. L. J. 365; 
 Miller v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 70 Iowa 704. 
 
 The insured is not obliged, when unable to do so, to fur- 
 nish invoices of property destroyed. 
 
 Stepehens v. Union Assur. Soc. (Utah S. C.), 50 Pac. Rep. 626. 
 
EXAMINATION; PRODUCTION OF BOOKS, ETC. 57 
 
 The insured may have his attorney present at such examina- 
 tion. 
 
 Thomas v. Burlington Ins. Co., 47 Mo. App. 169; 
 Amer. Central Ins. Co. v. Simpson, 43 111. App. 98. 
 
 The defense to an action on a fire policy that insured had 
 failed to submit to an examination under oath, as required, is 
 waived, if no notice was given to the insured, but notice was 
 given to her husband, and as her agent he appeared and was ex- 
 amined. 
 
 Western Assur. Co. v. McGlathery (Ala. S. C.), 22 Southern Rep. 
 104. 
 
 The insurer waives the formal certification of the copy 
 of bills and invoices furnished it, where it receives and exam- 
 ines the same, without objection to the absence of certificates, 
 and makes no objection until a trial. 
 
 Johnson v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 69 Mo. App. 226. 
 
 Where the insured makes no attempt to comply with in- 
 surer's request to furnish certified copies of bills, the originals 
 of which were destroyed, he cannot recover. 
 
 Milwaukee Mechs. Ins. Co. v. Winfield (Kan. C. A.), 51 Pac. Rep. 
 667. 
 
 Certified copies of bills and invoices does not mean an in- 
 ventory of the stock insured owned when policy was issued. 
 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Center (Texas C. C. A.), 31 S. W. Rep. 446. 
 
 The examination under oath cures defects in proofs. 
 Carpenter v. German- American Ins. Co., 136 N. T. 298. 
 
 Misstatement of facts made in examination under oath will 
 not avoid the policy unless insured knew them to be false, and 
 made them with fraudulent intent. 
 
 Huston v. State Ins. Co. (Iowa S. C.), 69 N. W. Rep. 674. 
 
 Wilful false swearing will avoid the whole policy. 
 
 Hamberg v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. (Minn. S. C.), 26 Ins. L. J. 
 782. 
 
 The loss is due sixty days after proofs of loss are furnished 
 and the duplicate bills furnished on demand of insurer are no 
 part of the proofs of loss. 
 
 Aetna Ins. Co. v. McLeod et al. (Kan. S. C.), 25 Ins. L. J. 669. 
 
58 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
CHAPTER VII.. 
 
 FRAUD AND FALSE SWEARING. 
 
 The policy will not be avoided without proof of fraudulent 
 intent. 
 
 Dresser v. United Firemen's Ins. Co. (N. Y.), 45 Hun. 298. 
 
 An over-valuation of the goods destroyed in the proofs of 
 loss, unless shown to be wilful, is 'not even presumptive evi- 
 dence of false swearing or fraud. 
 
 Unger v. People's F. Ins. Co. (N. Y.), 4 Daly 96; 
 Gibbs v. Continental Ins. Co. (N. Y.), 13 Hun. 611. 
 
 The misstatement as to value in proofs of loss must be 
 false and fraudulent, but a misstatement which is but the ex- 
 pression of an opinion does not operate to avoid the policy. 
 
 Cheever v. Scottish U. and N. Ins. Co. (N. Y. S. C.), 86 App. Div. 
 328; 83 N. Y. Supp. 730. 
 
 An honest mistake, or other misstatement in proofs of loss 
 will not forfeit claim. 
 
 Little v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 123 Mass. 380; 
 
 Parker et al. v. Amazon Ins. Co. (Wis. S. C.), 3 Ins. L. J. 567. 
 
 But if no amended statement has been furnished the in- 
 surer before suit on policy, the action can not be maintained. 
 
 Campbell v. Charter Oak Ins. Co., 92 Mass. 213; 
 
 City F. C. Sav. Bank v. Pa. F. Ins. Co., 122 Mass. 165. 
 
 To work a forfeiture the false statement must be wilfully 
 made with respect to a material matter. 
 
 Winn v. Ins. Co., 27 Neb. 649; 
 
 Marion v. Great Rep. Ins. Co., 35 Mo. 148; 
 
 Walker v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 62 Mo. App. 209; 
 
 Hamberg v. St. Paul F. and M. Ins. Co. (Minn. S. C.), 26 Ins. L. 
 
 J. 782; 
 Phoneix Ins. Co. v. Summerfleld (Miss. S. C.), 22 Ins. L. J. 746. 
 
 And the false swearing must be either in the proofs of 
 loss or in the examination under oath. 
 
 Schulter v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 62 Mo. 236; 
 Ins. Cos. v. Weide (U. S. S. C.), 1 Ins. L. J. 767; 
 Ferris & Eaton v. North American Ins. Co. (N. Y. S. C.), 1 Hill 
 71; 2 Bennett 56. 
 
60 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Defense on ground of false swearing in proofs of loss will 
 not avail the defendant when not pleaded. 
 
 Bear v. Atlantic Home Ins. Co. (N. T.), 34 Misc. 613; 70 N. Y 
 Supp. 681. 
 
 The fact that the evidence showed that other dealers carried 
 a much smaller line of certain articles plaintiff claimed to have 
 had is not competent to show that plaintiff's sworn statement 
 of loss was fraudulent. 
 
 Townsend v. Merchants Ins. Co. (N. Y.), 4 J. & S. 172; S. C. 46 
 How. Pr. 601. 
 
 A finding by the jury that plaintiff's loss was less than one- 
 fourth amount claimed in his proofs of loss necessarily results 
 in an inference of fraud and requires a verdict in favor of the 
 defendant. 
 
 Steinfeld v. Park Ins. Co., N. Y., 50 Hun. 262; S. C. 19 St. Rep. 
 1*3; 2 N. Y. Supp. 766. 
 
 Contra: 
 
 Com'l Ins. Co. v. Friedlander, 156 111. 595. 
 
 Obersteller v. Com'l Assur. Co. (Cal. S. C.), 22 Ins. L. J. 392. 
 Moore v. Protection Ins. Co., 29 Me. 97; 2 Bennett 758. 
 Marchesseau v. Merchants Ins. Co., 2 Ben. 166 (La. S. C.). 
 
 The question of false swearing is one for the jury. 
 
 Dolan v. Aetna Ins. Co. (N. Y.), 22 Hun. 396. 
 
 Levy v. Brooklyn Ins. Co., 25 Wend. 687 ; 2 Bennett 93. 
 
 A false statement wilfully made as to the loss and value of 
 the insured property will defeat recovery on the policy. 
 
 Lion F. Ins. Co. v. Star (Tex. S. C.), 18 Ins. L. J. 873. 
 
 Hall v. Western U. Asset., 106 Mo. App. 476. 
 
 Home Ins. Co. v. Winn (Neb. S. C.), 24 Ins. L. J. 126. 
 
 Citing: 
 
 Claflin v. Ins. Co., 110 U. S. 81. 
 
 Geib v Ins. Co., 1 Dil 443 Fed. Cas. No. 5298. 
 
 Huchberger v. Ins. Co., 4 Biss. 265 Fed. Cas. No. 6822. 
 
 JDollof v. Ins. Co., 82 Me. 266 ; 19 Ins. L. J. 450. 
 
 Sleeper v. Ins. Co., 56 N. H. 401. 
 
 Moore v. Ins. Co., 28 Grat. 508. 
 
 Ins. Co. v. Mannasson, 29 Mich. 316 ; 3 Ins. L. J. 668. 
 
 If the plaintiff knowingly and willingly inserts in his sworn 
 statement of loss, as burned, any single article, which in fact 
 was not in the house, or was not burned, or if he knowingly 
 puts a false and excessive valuation on any single article, or 
 puts such false and excessive valuation on the whole as dis- 
 plays a reckless and dishonest disregard of the truth in regard 
 to the extent of the loss. Such acts are in themselves fraudulent 
 
FRAUD AND FALSE SWEARING. 61 
 
 and plaintiff cannot recover at all. Mere words are not neces- 
 sarily proof, and courts are not compelled to allow justice to 
 be perverted, because incredible evidence is not contradicted 
 by direct and postive testimony. Such cases call for the su- 
 pervisory power of the court. 
 
 Rovinsky v. Northern Assur. Co. and another (S. J. C. Me.), 
 34 Ins. L. J. 800. 
 
 Practically the same doctrine is upheld in 
 Schmidt v. Phil. Underwriters (La. S. C.), 32 Ins. L. J. 531. 
 
 Citing: 
 
 Claflin v. Ins. Co., 110 U. S. 81 and Regnier v. Ins. Co., 12 La. 
 336 ; 1 Bennett 670. 
 
 And this is so where the actual loss was in excess of the 
 amount of the policy as stated in false sworn statement. 
 
 Dollof v. Phenix Ins. Co. and one other (S. J. C. Me.), 19 Ins. 
 ' L. J. 450. 
 
 Plaintiff's affidavit that property which had been saved 
 was-destroyed worked a forfeiture of the policy. 
 
 Knop v. National F. Ins. Co. (Mich. S. C.), 25 Ins. L. J. 181. 
 Mullen v. Ins. Co., 58 Vt. 113. 
 
 West v British America Assur. Co. (U. S. C. C. Dist. Col.), 25 
 Ins. L. J. 689. 
 
 Plaintiff paid $3,000 for the building, but claimed it worth 
 $6,500 in his proofs of loss. On trial of the case $3,000 was 
 proven to be its real value. Held, such false statement worked a 
 forfeiture. 
 
 West v. British America Assur. Co. (U. S. C. C. Dist. Col.), 25 
 Ins. L. J. 689. 
 
 Of all the decisions one ever heard of, and one which, if 
 upheld and generally known, will cause more attempts to de- 
 fraud insurance companies than any other, the following takes 
 the lead and is the most unreasonable and unfair: 
 
 1. A deception, in order to amount to legal fraud, must 
 both deceive and damage. Where the company is not injured 
 in an adjustment by the fraudulent alteration of books, the ad- 
 justment (based on and arrived at by such books )will not be 
 defeated (disturbed). 
 
 2. The concealment of an inventory from the adjusters 
 is not a concealment of a "material fact" within the policy, 
 unless the company is injured thereby. 
 
 3. Evidence of the adjusters that they would not have 
 
62 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 made the adjustment had they known of the alterations is a 
 mere opinion of their course under different circumstances and 
 is not admissible. 
 
 4. Evidence of the manager as to his reasons for the altera- 
 tions is admissible. 
 
 Commercial Bank v. Firemen's Ins. Co. (Wis. S. C.), 23 Ins. 
 L. J. 543. 
 
 No wonder the court cites no decisions in support of its 
 ruling other than those of its own rendition. It was conceded 
 on the trial of the case that the insured's manager did, after 
 the fire by erasure and overwriting, reduce the manufacturing 
 account $13,000 and increase the lumber account $13,000. The 
 loss was on lumber in kilns. (Such erasurer and changes would 
 not throw the books out of balance.) 
 
 The inventory taken in January previous to the fire was 
 also concealed from the adjusters. 
 
 Would not assured's manager who had done these things, 
 swear to anything? Would he ever admit that the insurance 
 company had been defrauded by his fraudulent acts? For what 
 purpose would he perpetrate a fraud? For the protection of the 
 insurance companies (?) of course. 
 
 How different the reasoning in this case from that of courts 
 of New York, Massachusetts, Maine and Louisiana, and the 
 U. S. S. C. and especially that of the eminent and learned Judge 
 Cooley in Mannasson v. Ins. Co., 29 Mich. 316; 3 Ins. L,. J. 668. 
 
 Here is Wisconsin again. It was admitted that in stating 
 the amount of the loss in their proofs, insured included mer- 
 chandise as destroyed which had been ordered before the fire, 
 but had not been received at the time of the fire; and that 
 upon their examination under oath after making of the proofs, 
 they testified that these goods had actually been received before 
 the fire. Insured claimed that these false statements were made 
 through innocent mistake, while the companies claimed that 
 they were wilfully made with intent to defraud. The proofs of 
 loss were made out for insured by an expert employed by them, 
 from information furnished by insured. The evidence showed 
 that the bills and invoices of insured were freely submitted to 
 the adjusters who in this manner ascertained the inclusion of 
 the goods in dispute. Held, That while the evidence tended to 
 show the inclusion of the amount of these goods in the proofs 
 
FKAUD AND FALSE SWEARING. 63 
 
 of loss was wilful, it was a question for the jury whether they 
 were included with fraudulent intent. [Judgment for plaintiff 
 below. Here affirmed against company.] 
 
 Newton et al. v. Theresa Village Mut. Fire Ins. Co.; 
 
 Same v. Waterloo Mut. Fire Ins. Co.; 
 
 Same v. DeForest Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (Wis. S. C.) : 
 
 104 Northwestern Reporter (July 18, 1905), 107. 
 
64 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 OPTIONS. 
 
 Option To Repair or Rebuild. 
 
 Where the insurer elects to rebuild, the contract of insur- 
 ance is converted into a building contract, and the amount of 
 damage recoverable from the breach of contract is not limited 
 to the amount of insurance. 
 
 Heilman v. Westchester F. Ins. Co., 75 N. Y. 7, 8 Ins. L. J. 53. 
 Morrell v. Irving Ins. Co., 33 N. Y. 429. 
 
 Brown et al. v. Royal Ins. Co. (Queen's Bench, Eng.), 4 Bennett 
 371 ; 1 Ellis & Ellis 853. 
 
 Where two separate insurers eject to rebuild, in case of 
 breach, the owner may recover his full damages against one of 
 them, leaving it to seek contribution from the other on its own 
 motion. 
 
 Morrell v. Irving Fire Ins. Co., 33 .N. Y. 429. 
 
 The impossibility of performance by reason of action of 
 city authorities does not relieve the insurer, it having elected to 
 rebuild, it is liable for damages for not doing so. 
 
 Brown and others v. Royal Ins. Co. (Queen's Bench, Eng.), 4 
 
 Bennett 371 ; 1 Ellis & Ellis 853. 
 Fire Ass'n v. Rosenthal (Pa. S. C.), 15 Ins. L. J. 658. 
 
 The insurer is liable for damages including rent, resulting 
 through delay. 
 
 Fire Ass'n v. Rosenthal supra. 
 
 But there can be no claim for rent until at least after a 
 
 reasonable length of time has elapsed for making the repairs. 
 
 St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Johnson (111. S. C.), 6 Ins. L. J. 434. 
 
 The assured is not bound to take any steps to restore the 
 property to its previous condition. 
 
 Hoffman v. Aetna F. Ins. Co. (N. Y.); 1 Rob. 501. 
 
 The insurer will not be granted an injunction restraining 
 insured from removing the goods saved, to enable the insurers 
 to exercise their option. 
 
 N. Y. F. Ins. Co. v. Delaven, (N. Y.), 8 Paige 419. 
 
 65 
 
66 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 The notice of insurer's intention to exercise the option must 
 be given within the time named in the policy. 
 
 McAllaster v. Niagara F. Ins. Co., ,156 N. Y. 80 ; 28 Ins. L. J. 769. 
 
 The insurance company having elected to rebuild is no 
 longer under obligation to pay a money damage and it will be 
 discharged from garnishment proceedings. 
 
 Hurst et al. v. Home Protection F. Ins. Co. (Ala. S. C.), 16 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 688. 
 Godfrey v. Macomber and Ins. Co. (Mass. S. C.), 9 Ins. L. J. 287. 
 
 The insurer having rebuilt for sum less than the insurance, 
 the unexhausted amount of policy remains in force on the new 
 building in case of its destruction by fire for the unexpired term 
 of policy. 
 
 Trull v. Roxbury Mut. Ins. Co. (Mass. S. C.), 3 Ben. 15. 
 
 The company having elected to repair, but for more than 
 a month taking no steps to do so, is liable for damages from ex- 
 posure of building to weather. 
 
 Amer. Cent'l Ins. Co. v. McLanathan (Kan. S. C.), 2 Ins. L. J. 907. 
 
 The right of option to rebuild begins to run from time 
 proofs are served and 60 days thereafter when the loss becomes 
 payable the option terminates and right of action accrues. 
 
 McAllaster v. Niagara F. Ins. Co. (N. Y. C. A.), 28 Ins. L. J. 769. 
 Clover v. Greenwich Ins. Co. 101 N. Y. 277 ; 15 Ins. L. J. 214. 
 
 And when the insurance company waives proofs of loss, it 
 may still exercise the option within the time limited by the 
 policy and such time begins to run from the date of such waiver. 
 
 Farmers and Merchants Ins. Co. v. Warner (Neb. S. C.), 34 Ins. 
 L. J. 83. 
 
 There are two modes of settlement under the contract, one 
 is payment of damages for the loss, the other the restoration of 
 the subject of insurance to its former condition. It could not 
 have been contemplated by the parties that both methods of 
 performance were to be pursued. The selection by the insur- 
 ance company of one of these alternatives necessarily consti- 
 tuted an abandonment of the other. 
 
 Wynkoop v. Niagara F. Ins. Co. (N. Y. C. A.), 12 Ins. L. J. 253. 
 
 The resort to arbitration by the insurer is an election to 
 make payment in money. 
 
 McAllaster v. Niagara F. Ins. Co. (N. Y. C. A.), 28 Ins. L. J. f 769. 
 Iowa Central Bldg. & L. Ass'n v. Merchants and Bankers' Fire 
 
OPTIONS. 67 
 
 Ins. Co. (la. S. C.), 32 Ins. L. J. 852. 
 Alliance Cooperative Ins. Co. v. Arnold (Kan. S. C.), 31 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 943. 
 Platt v. Aetna Ins. Co. is to same effect, but that non-waiver 
 
 clause in appraisal agreement preserved company's option to 
 
 rebuild, 153 111. 133 (Aff'g 40 111. App. 191), 24 Ins. L. J. 
 
 132, 38 N. E. 580. 
 
 The Insurer, one of ten, and all having elected to rebuild, 
 but afterwards all except the defendant compromised the loss. 
 The defendant declined to settle and then demanded an ap- 
 praisal, which was agreed to. The award under the appraisal 
 exceeded the total insurance. Held, defendant's election to re- 
 build converted its policy into a building contract, and that the 
 appraisal was without reference to any questions or matters 
 of difference other than the loss and damage, and that plaintiff 
 by agreeing to appraise did not, as a matter of law, waive his 
 existing right. He was merely leaving all questions other than 
 the loss and damage to be determined by the parties themselves, 
 or by litigation. It was further held the liability was several and 
 not joint, and that plaintiff had the right after the insurer had 
 elected to rebuild to compromise and settle with any of the 
 companies thus bound to rebuild without releasing the others 
 from such proportionate share of the cost to rebuild. 
 
 Good v. Buckeye Mut. F. Ins. Co. (Ohio S. C.), 15 Ins. L. J., 3. 
 
 ! 
 
 In those States having the valued-policy law, the statute 
 forms not only part of the contract between the parties, but as 
 was said in Reilly v. Ins. Co. (43 Wis. 456) of a statute similar 
 in its terms, controls other provisions in the policy, so that 
 such other provisions as far as they are inconsistent with the 
 statute are necessarily avoided. 
 
 Ampleman v. Cit. Ins. Co., 18 Ins. L. J., 396 (Mo. App.). 
 
 Nor under such circumstances has the insurer the right to 
 rebuild. 
 
 Marshall et al. v. Amer. Guar. F. M. I. Co., 80 Mo. App. 18. 
 Milwaukee Mech. I. Co. v. Russell (Ohio S. C.), 62 N. E. Rep., 
 338, 31 Ins. L. J., 360. 
 
 Wisconsin's standard form of policy permits the insurer, in 
 case of total or partial loss, to rebuild or replace the property 
 destroyed with other of like kind and quality or pay the full 
 insurance, holding that such provision does not conflict with 
 the valued-policy law of the State. (R. S. Wis. 1898, Sec. 1941- 
 44.) 
 
 Temple v. Niagara Ins. Co. (Wis. S. C.), 85 N. W. Rep., 361. 
 
68 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Where the city ordinances will not permit the building to 
 be repaired or rebuilt, the insurer is liable for total loss, i. e., 
 the entire value of the building not exceeding the insurance. 
 
 O'Keefe v. L. & L. & G. Ins. Co., 140 Mo. 558 ; 41 S. W. Rep., 922. 
 
 Brady v. Ins. Co., 11 Mich., 445. 
 
 Brown v. Ins. Co., 1 Ellis & Ellis, 853. 
 
 Hamburg- Bremen F. L Co. v. Garlington (Tex.), 15 Ins. L. J., 509. 
 
 Larkin v. Glens Falls Ins. Co. (Minn. S. C.), 83 N. W. Rep., 409. 
 
 Monteleone v. Royal I. Co. (La. S. C.), 24 Ins. L. J., 531. 
 
 And this is true where such law was enacted during the life 
 of the policy. 
 
 Pennsylvania, etc. v. Phil, etc. (Pa. S. C.), 51 Atl. Rep., 351. 
 
 But in New York, where the standard form of policy is part 
 of the statute law of the State, the insurer is only liable for the 
 amount it would cost the insured to rebuild, repair or replace 
 the building with material of like kind and quality, this regard- 
 less of laws or ordinances regulating the repair and construc- 
 tion of buildings. 
 
 McCready et al. v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. (N. Y. S. C., App. Div.), 
 70 N. Y. Supp., 778; 30 Ins. L. J., 668. 
 
 And the same is true where the policy exempts the company 
 from loss caused by a law or ordinance regulating the repair 
 of damaged buildings, except in those States which have a 
 valued policy law. 
 
 Option Of Insurer To Take Over Salvage. 
 
 Option of "insurer to take all or any part of damaged prop- 
 erty at its ascertained or appraised value * * * on giving 
 notice within thirty days after receipt of proofs herein required, 
 of its intention so to do." 
 
 Where assured sells the goods without giving the company 
 the right to exercise this option, he thereby renders void his 
 policy, and all rights thereunder. 
 
 Astrich v. German-American Ins. Co. (U. S. C. C. A., July 5, 
 
 1904), 33 Ins. L. J. 925. 
 Morley v. L. & L. & G. Ins. Co. (Mich. S. C.), 20 Ins. L. J. 577. 
 
 After an appraisal the company must have taken some steps 
 to show that it wishes to avail itself of the option before it can 
 claim breach of the condition. 
 
 Davis v. Grand Rapids F. Ins. Co., 15 Misc'l 263, S. C. 36 N. Y. 
 Supp. 792. Affirmed, 157 N. Y. 685. 
 
 Defendants claim that assured should have kept the goods 
 
OPTIONS. 69 
 
 thirty days; awaiting its option to take them was unreasonable. 
 
 Davis v. American Central Ins. Co., 7 App. Div. 488, S. C. 40 
 N. Y. Supp. 248. Affirmed (no opinion), 158 N. Y. 688. 
 
 Neither can the insurer with a $1,500 policy on goods valued 
 at $16,000, insured, also, in twelve other companies, exercise 
 this right. 
 
 Davis v. American Central Ins. Co., 7 App. Div. 488, S. C. 40 
 N. Y. Supp. 248. Affirmed, 158 N. Y. 688. 
 
 When two-thirds of the goods were wholly destroyed, the 
 balance greatly damaged, and the assured had kept them 
 eighteen days, during which time none of the thirteen companies 
 in which assured held policies claimed the goods, the insured, 
 after advertising the sale in two daily papers, sold the goods at 
 public auction for $250. Held, That he did not thereby forfeit 
 his claim for loss. 
 
 Davis v. American Central Ins. Co., 7 App. Div. 488, S. C. 40 
 N. Y. Supp. 248. Affirmed, 158 N. Y. 688. 
 
 If an Insurance company fails within three days to demand 
 an appraisal, or to exercise its option to take the goods, it 
 waives its right to take them or to have them appraised. 
 
 Phoenix Assur. Co. v. Stenson (Tex. C. C. A.), 79 S. W. Rep. 866. 
 
 If there was no appraisement, the option to take the goods 
 did not attach, and this regardless of whose fault caused the 
 failure to appraise. 
 
 Swearinger v. Pacific F. Ins. Co., 66 Mo. App. 90. 
 
 The insurance company can not in one breath deny the 
 arbitration and in the next assert and claim rights growing out 
 of and depending on it. If it elects not to be bound by the arbi- 
 tration, this is necessarily a waiver of its option to take the 
 goods at their appraised value. 
 
 Model D. G. Co. v. N. B. and M. Ins. Co., 79 Mo. App. 550. 
 
 While nothing is said regarding the insurer's option to take 
 the damaged property at its ascertained or appraised value in 
 Chainless Cycle Co. v. Security Ins. Co. (N. Y. C. A.), 31 Ins. 
 L. J. 324, yet, if not entitled to an appraisal, insurer can not ex- 
 ercise the option to take the stock. The opinion of the court 
 very clearly enunciates the rights of the parties in the matter 
 of adjustment, waiver, etc., and is well worth reading by every 
 adjuster and lawyer. It may also be found in 169 N. Y. 304. 
 
 As regards the option in the policy to take any part of the 
 
70 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 goods at their ascertained or appraised value, I can find no de- 
 cisions affecting this option. My own opinion is that if a case 
 is ever defended on the ground that assured has forfeited his 
 rights by refusing to permit the insurer to exercise this option, 
 the insured will not be held to have forfeited his claim, the 
 reason being that if Insurance companies are allowed to exer- 
 cise this unfair option they thereby create a further damage 
 to the insured's property. 
 
 If an appraisal be fairly conducted, the award thereunder 
 is arrived at, having in view all the facts, circumstances, condi- 
 tions and environments of the goods or wares appraised, so that, 
 should the insurer feel that it has been unjustly dealt with, it 
 may take all of the stock by paying the insured the loss and 
 the value of the salvage as fixed by the appraisers, in which 
 event neither party is harmed. 
 
 But suppose the property damaged be a clothing and men's 
 furnishing stock, and the appraisers have determined the loss 
 to be as follows: Coats, 75 per cent.; vests, 30 per cent; pants, 
 60 per cent.; shirts, 20 per cent; undershirts, 662-3 per cent.; 
 underdrawers, 20 per cent; neckties, 25 per cent.; collars and 
 cuffs, 20 per cent., and hosiery, 70 per cent. When the award is 
 returned the adjuster says to the assured: "We have decided 
 to take the coats, pants, undershirts and hosiery at their ap- 
 praised value, leaving you the vests, shirts, drawers, neckties, 
 collars and cuffs." 
 
 If the courts uphold the option to take any part of the goods 
 and thus allow insurer to take the goods mentioned, it thereby 
 permits it legally to damage the goods they force the. insured 
 to keep to the extent of at least 50 per cent more. 
 
 In more than half of the appraisals there is a good deal of 
 ill-feeling and bad blood engendered between the insured and 
 the adjuster in an effort to adjust the loss; and, while some 
 appraisals are held where there is no ill-feeling and no desire 
 to do otherwise than to arrive at a fair estimate of the loss, 
 yet in a great many it is a question of "do or be done," and you 
 will see the same appraiser appraising a clothing stock, that 
 last week appraised a household furniture loss, that the week 
 before appraised a grocery loss, and maybe last month he ap- 
 praised a shoe loss, and the month before he may have ap- 
 praised a machinery loss. It is wonderful what a variegated 
 knowledge (?) these men have as to values in different lines. 
 Is it not true that they are selected not so much for their abil- 
 ity to judge values as for their skill in judging human nature? 
 
OPTIONS. 71 
 
 The great objection to these men is not that they are rob- 
 bers, because most of them are honest, but they would not be 
 human if they were not biased. This bias leads, them to such 
 long delays in selecting a competent umpire, and then they 
 further delay by assessing the damage article by article, which 
 is unfair to the insured in more ways than one, as, for instance, 
 what sensible merchant, if he is negotiating for the purchase 
 of a stock of goods, will go through the stock and place a value 
 on it article by article? He carefully examines each line of 
 goods, and, when he gets through, makes up his mind what 
 the entire stock is worth. That is the way the damage should 
 be fixed in case of fire, either as a whole or by departments. 
 The appraisers need not assess the damage article by article 
 (Enright v. Montauk F. Ins. Co., 40 N. Y. St. Rep. 642, 5 Finch 
 25), nor does the policy exact such appraisal. 
 
 The assured can not select a man, except in very rare cases, 
 who is competent to cope with these professional appraisers, 
 for they are attending to this work nearly every day. If they 
 make a mistake in the umpire they can easily protect their 
 clients by running up the damage on a few lines of goods so as 
 to enable their principals to take those articles, or force assured 
 into a settlement different from the award by threatening to 
 take them. 
 
 When adjusters take such advantage of a man not all of 
 them will do so, no matter what the provocation it is usually 
 because of some fancied or real wrong or meanness done them 
 by the assured, or at the instigation of some wrecker, who 
 promises big returns for conditioning and selling the stock at 
 fire sale. 
 
 The adjuster is frequently justified in taking any advantage 
 of the assured that he possibly can, were it not for. that old 
 aphorism, "two wrongs do not make a right," for sometimes the 
 assured can act meaner than a devil and more stubborn than 
 an ass, and in many such cases I have been compelled to admire 
 the adjuster who could handle the adjustment without appar- 
 ently losing his head or his temper. What is more, everybody 
 else will respect and honor him, including those claimants who 
 make fools of themselves by their mean, nasty ways. 
 
 In the case of Palatine v. Morton-Scott-Robertson Co., 106 
 Tenn. 558, it was held when there are several insurers, the right 
 of each is to take only its pro-rata of the appraised salvage 
 articles; that even if the insured sells a portion of the salvage, 
 it is immaterial so long as enough remains unsold to enable the 
 
72 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 complaining company to exercise its option under the policy to 
 take its pro-rata of the salvage. It would seem this is a rea- 
 sonable rule. , 
 
 The salvage was the property of the insured, and for its rea- 
 sonable value, he must account, so that it would be unfair to 
 require him to hold it in a deteriorating condition while the 
 companies delayed settlement, and thus give opportunity for its 
 further depreciation. 
 
 Where salvage is carried along with a new stock and sold 
 as opportunity offers, it should be charged with its fair share 
 of the expenses of the business. 
 
 North German Ins. Co. v. Morton-Scott-Robertson Co., 108 Tenn. 
 384 ; 67 S. W. Rep. 816 ; 31 Ins. L. J. 580. 
 
 SOME DANGERS ENCOUNTERED FROM TAKING 
 OVER SALVAGE. 
 
 Since the advent of Salvage Companies operated by the in- 
 surance companies, many appraisals have been avoided, espe- 
 cially on stocks of merchandise when circumstances warrant its 
 being taken over by the companies, in such cases where the as- 
 sured is not in position to handle the damaged stock, or where 
 the companies are in position to realize as good or better results 
 than could the assured. 
 
 It seems to the author that in taking over these salvages 
 not enough caution is used by the companies. For instance, it is 
 held that where two or more companies repair a damaged build- 
 ing this creates a joint building contract, so that if the building 
 is not rebuilt for any cause, the insured may sue one or all of the 
 companies, and the company against whom he obtains judgment 
 must look to the other company for its share of the damage 
 recovered. This being true the same rule of law will apply when 
 companies take over salvage their action will be joint and not 
 several. Therefore, should one of the companies afterwards be- 
 come bankrupt, the assured could unquestionably look to the 
 other companies for at least that portion of the proceeds of the 
 salvage apportioned to the bankrupt company, and possibly for 
 even more. Certainly, the insured having parted with his title 
 or interest, in the salvage, has no lien in that portion of the 
 proceeds apportioned to such bankrupt insurance company. The 
 fact that he once owned the stock gives him no greater right 
 to the proceeds of the sale than has any other creditor of such 
 bankrupt company. His only recourse is either to attach or 
 
OPTIONS. 73 
 
 garnish the money apportioned to the bankrupt, or let it be paid 
 to its assignee or receiver, and sue some one or all of the other 
 companies. Under such circumstances, the company not having 
 paid his loss, what would be the measure of his recovery? If 
 the value of the salvage had been agreed upon before the stock 
 was taken over, then unquestionably he could not recover more 
 than such bankrupt company's portion of such value. But if 
 the value of the salvage had not been agreed to, all sorts of 
 questions might be injected into the suit, such, for instance, as 
 whether the salvage had been handled to the best advantage. It 
 might be, that assured would have the right to say to the com- 
 panies, "You have jointly agreed with me on the value of my 
 stock and have taken it over for your benefit. Now I want its 
 entire value. It was your business, not mine that you entered 
 into this joint contract, this partnership deal, with an insolvent 
 company. Pay me my loss." 
 
 A carefully worded agreement as to the value of the salvage, 
 and that the companies would be looked to in a several and not 
 joint capacity, might prevent the possibility of a come-back on 
 the solvent companies for the default of an insolvent one. 
 
74 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 DUTY OF INSURED TO PROTECT PROP- 
 ERTY AT AND AFTER THE FIRE- 
 LOSS BY THEFT, ETC. 
 
 The New York standard policy has the following pro- 
 visions: "This company shall not be liable for loss caused 
 directly or indirectly * * * by theft; or by neglect of the insured 
 to use all reasonable means to save and protect the property at 
 and after a fire, or when the property is endangered by fire in 
 neighboring premises." 
 
 Lines 60 to 66 of the New York standard policy, provide 
 that when property is removed to a place of safety to protect 
 it from further loss the excess of its proportion for the loss and 
 damage already done, shall cover the property so removed for 
 five days only. 
 
 How inconsistent these clauses are. Every insurance man 
 knows that no insurance company will insure salvage goods 
 until after the value of same has been determined by the 
 adjusters. Hence it is absolutely impossible to insure them in 
 other companies and the insurers try to exempt themselves from 
 liability after five days, when their policies compel assured to 
 protect his property and to protect it he h'as been compelled to 
 remove it and can not insure it until his loss on same is ad- 
 justed. ' 
 
 Here are a few decisions that may be of interest. They re- 
 late to the exemptions in the clause quoted. 
 
 Losses in removing goods from approaching fire, though 
 not yet caught in the building where the goods are, whether by 
 theft, loss or destruction, is to be borne by the insurance com- 
 pany when the policy does not exempt the company from them. 
 
 Agnew v. Ins. Co., 3 Phil. 193 (Pa.). 
 
 Thompson v. Montreal Ins. Co., 6 Up. Can., 2 Q. B. 319. 
 
 Case v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 1.3 Ills. 676. 
 
 Lebanon Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Hankinson, 2 Cent. Rep. 828 (Pa.). 
 
 Newmark v. L. & L. & G. Ins. Co., 30 Mo. 160. 
 
 The exemption from loss by theft is independent of the 
 clause following it which exempts insuring company from lia- 
 
 75 
 
76 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 bility from losses by means of invasions, insurrections and 
 similar commotions. The object of the policy is to indemnify 
 assured against any losses by fire and any loss by theft not 
 attributable directly to the fire, would not be within the con- 
 tract, (there was great noise, crowd and disturbance in the 
 streets on the night of the fire), and when the insurer exempts 
 itself from liability for fires which happen by reason of inva- 
 sions, etc., it is superfluous to add that losses by theft occasioned 
 by such fires would also be without the protection of the policy. 
 Webb. v. Protection, and Aetna Ins. Cos. 14 Mo. 3. 
 
 Unless the policy exempts the company from such losses 
 the insurer is liable for loss by theft during and after the fire, 
 if the theft be occasioned directly by the fire. 
 
 Newmark v. L. and L,. and G. Ins. -Co., 30 Mo. 160, and fol- 
 lowing authorities there cited: 1 Phillips on Ins., Sec. 624, p. 
 1107; 3 Penn. 471; 13 111. 676; 1 Story 157. 
 
 The insurer is responsible for loss of goods stolen after a 
 fire, in a populous city; it is a natural consequence of the peril 
 insured against. 
 
 Tilton v. Hamilton F. Ins. Co., 1 Bos. 367 ; S. C. How. Pr. 363. 
 
 The insurer is liable for goods destroyed in blowing up a 
 building with gun powder by civil authorities, to prevent spread 
 of fire. 
 
 City Fire Ins. Co. v. Corlies, 21 Wend. 367. 
 
 The insurer is not liable for theft during fire. 
 Sklencher v. Fire Ass'n (N. J. S. C.), 60 Atlantic Rep. 232. 
 
 The assured must comply with the policy requirement, save 
 and protect his property at and after the fire, though the policy 
 provision does not impose any greater effort on his part than 
 does the law, and his duty to the company, both of which re- 
 quires that he do whatever is reasonable to minimize his and 
 therefore the company's loss. The penalty for not making all 
 reasonable efforts to save the property is not a forfeiture of the 
 policy, but is the amount of loss caused by his failure to use 
 such reasonable efforts. 
 
 It seems, however, he must, under penalty of forfeiture of 
 his policy save all that remains of the property insured, and 
 exhibit it to the company as often as required, not so much for 
 the value of the salvage as to enable the company to form some 
 accurate idea of what it consisted of, etc. See Thornton v. 
 
DUTY OF INSURED; Loss BY THEFT, ETC. 77 
 
 Security Ins. Co., 117 Fed. 773, 32 Ins. L. J. 557. The company 
 must have the right to examine the property and to have it and 
 the loss appraised if a difference arises, Ostrich v. German-Am. 
 Ins. Co., 65 C. C. A. 251, 131 Fed. 13, 33 Ins. L. J. 925. The 
 company, of course, must act promptly, Chainless Co v. Security 
 Ins. Co, 169 N. Y. 304, 31 Ins. L. J. 324, 62 N. E. 392. Flynn 
 v. Hanover F. Ins. Co., 121 N. Y. Supp. 621. A Texas case, 
 holds that three days' time is enough. But a reasonable time 
 should be given, taking all circumstances into consideration. 
 
78 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 FALL OF BUILDING. 
 
 "If a building or any part thereof fall, except as the result 
 of fire, all insurance by this policy on such building or its^ 
 contents shall immediately cease." New York Standard Policy. 
 
 The meaning of the clause in question, when reasonably 
 interpreted, is that the insurer is excused from its obligation by 
 either the fall of the building as a structure, or of such a 
 substantial and important part thereof as impairs its useful- 
 ness as such and leaves the remaining part of the building 
 subject to an increased risk of fire. 
 
 Nelson et al. v. Traders' Ins. Co. (N. Y. C. A.), 34 Ins. L. J. 933. 
 
 The question of fact for the jury to determine is, "was 
 the fall caused by the fire or by some other force?" If not by 
 fire, the insurer is not liable. A request to charge that if 
 building was on fire before the fall, the insurer was liable, 
 even if the fall was caused by the wind, was properly refused. 
 Keisel v. Sun Ins. Office (U. S. C- C. A. 8th Disk), 28 Ins. L. J. 434. 
 
 When an explosion causes a building to fall and catch fire, 
 it might be conceded that if the clause exempting the company 
 from liability stood alone, the policy would be terminated im- 
 mediately upon fall of the building. But that clause is gov- 
 erned by a specific clause, which exempts the insurer from 
 loss by explosion of any kind unless fire ensues, and in that 
 event for damage by fire only. 
 
 Davis v. Ins. Co. of N. A. (Mich. S. C.), 27 Ins. L. J. 184. 
 
 The clause in the policy contemplates the fall of a build- 
 ing caused by inherent defects, or by withdrawal of the neces- 
 sary support as by digging away the underlying or adjacent 
 soil. It might perhaps include the case of a building thrown 
 down by storm, flood or earthquake. 
 
 Dows v. Ins. Co., 127 Mass. 346. 
 
 Leonard v. Orient Ins. Co. (U. S. C. C. A. 7th Dist). 30 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 980. 
 Davis v. Ins. Co. N. A. (Mich. S. C.), 2'7 Ins. L. J. 184. 
 
 79 
 
80 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Where there was no evidence of fire about the ruins of a 
 building which had fallen for over an hour, and it had been,, 
 according to evidence, weakened by cutting timbers and remod- 
 eling, but six witnesses testified that a flame shot from the 
 roof before it fell, a finding that the fall was caused by fire 
 will not be disturbed. 
 
 Friedman v. Atlas Assur. Co., 32 Ins. L. J. 673 (Mich. S. C.). 
 
 Contents of building No. 93 were insured, one wall and half 
 of building No. 93, and all of building 95 fell, evidence varied 
 from 15 to 40 minutes after fall when fire occurred. Loss i& 
 within the policy. 
 
 Lewis et al. v. Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co., 76 Mass. 159. 
 
 As a direct result of fire the adjoining building fell, carry- 
 ing with it the party wall and part of the insured building. 
 Held, loss within the policy. 
 
 Ermentraut v. Girard F. & M. Ins. Co. (Minn. S. C.), 25 Ins. 
 L,. J. 81. 
 
 It must cease to be a building to be fallen within the 
 meaning of the policy. So long as standing, however depreci- 
 ated, it is not fallen. 
 
 Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Sholom, 80 111. 558. 
 
 If a building falls and afterwards burns, the insurer is 
 not liable. 
 
 Nave v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 37 Mo. 431. 
 
 Nichols et al. v. Sun Mut. F. Ins. Co. (Miss. S. C.), 14 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 263 ; 23 Ins. L. J. 633. 
 Trans-Atlantic F. Ins. Co. v. Bamberger (Ky. C. A.), 18 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 625. 
 Keisel v. Sun Fire Office (U. S. C. C. A. 8th Dist), 28 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 434. 
 
 Under Code Pleading, the burden of proof is on the defend- 
 ant, where it admits the amount of the loss, but claims fall of 
 building caused the fire. 
 
 Royal Ins. Co. v. Schwing (Ky. C. A.), 18 Ins. L. J. 451. 
 Trans-Atlantic F. Ins. Co. v. Bamberger (Ky C. A.), 18 Ins. 
 L. J. 625. 
 
 The burden of proof is on plaintiff. 
 
 Pelican Ins. Co. v. Co-Operative Assoc. (Tex. S. C.), 19 Ins. 
 L. J. 921. 
 
 Contra: 
 
 Friedman v. Atlas Assur. Co. (Mich. S. C.), 32 Ins. L. J. 673. 
 Western Assur. Co. v. Mohlman (U. S. C. C. A. 2d Dist), 27 
 Ins. L. J. 392. 
 
CHAPTER XI. 
 
 EXPLOSIONS. 
 
 "This company shall not be liable for loss * * * unless 
 the fire ensues, and in that event, for the damage by fire only- 
 by explosion of any kind, or lightning; but liability for direct 
 damage by lightning may be assumed by a specific agreement 
 hereto." New York Standard Policy. 
 
 So many people cannot understand why a loss to the in- 
 sured's building caused by explosion, which in turn was caused 
 by fire in an adjacent building, renders the policy void, as in 
 such case the fire was the first or moving cause of the loss.- 
 The insurer would be liable but for the policy contract which 
 exempts it from liability from loss by explosions, regardless 
 of what produced the explosion; and such exemption is wholly 
 contractual. An insurance company insuring against loss has 
 the right to exempt itself from any loss that may originate on 
 the insured's property. 
 
 Sohier v. Norwich Ins. Co., 93 Mass., 336. 
 
 So where the policy against loss by fire exempted the in- 
 sured from any loss occasioned by an explosion of steam boiler, 
 it was held that a loss by fire caused by the explosion of a 
 steam boiler in the factory insured was not within the policy. 
 SL John v. Mut. M. & F. Ins. Co., 11 N. T., 516. 
 
 Nor is a loss by fire caused by an explosion where the in- 
 surer exempts itself from loss by explosion of any kind. 
 
 Hayward v. Liverpool & London F. & L. Ins, Co., 7 Bosw., 385 ; 
 affd. 2 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. 349, 3 Keyes, 456 (N. Y.). 
 
 Nor where such a fire was extinguished but broke out a 
 second and third time within two days, as it was held the 
 existence of the fire as an effect of the explosion must be pre- 
 sumed to have continued as such an effect in the absence of 
 contrary proof. 
 
 Tanneret v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 34 La. Ann., 249. 
 
 But it is, if the fire is caused by explosion of a lamp. 
 Heffron v. Kitanning Ins. Co., 132 Pa., 580. 
 
 81 
 
82 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Insurer is not liable for loss resulting from explosion of 
 dynamite, gas or other substances coming in contact with 
 lighted match or lamp. 
 
 Huer v. Westchester F. Ins. Co. (111. S. C.), 33 N. E. 411; 24 
 
 Ins. L. J. 471. 
 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Greer (Ark. S. C.), 25 Ins. L. J. 311. 
 Mitchell v. Potomac Ins. Co. (U. S. S. C.), 31 Ins. L. J. 570. 
 Briggs v. N. B. & M. Ins. Co. (N. Y.), 53 N. Y., 446; affirming 
 
 66 Barb., 325; 2 Ins. L. J., 929. 
 
 Huer v. N. W. National Ins. Co. (111. S. C.), 22 Ins. L. J. 518. 
 German- Amer. Ins. Co. v. Hyman, 42 Col. 156, 94 Pac. 27, 37 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 362. 
 
 Home Lodge v. Queen Ins. Co., 21 S. D. 165, 110 N. W. 778. 
 Vorse v. Jersey Plate Glass Ins. Co., 119 la. 556, 93 N. W. 569. 
 
 (But see Contra, Furbush v. Ins. Co., 140 la. 240, 118 N. W. 
 
 371.) 
 
 Trans-Atlantic F. Ins. Co. v. Dorsey, 56 Md. 70, 12 Ins. L. J. 437. 
 United &c. Ins. Co. v. Foote, 22 Ohio St. 340, 2 Ins. L. J. 190. 
 
 Contra: 
 
 Scripture v. Lowell Ins. Co., 64 Mass. 356. 
 
 Renshaw v. Mo. State Mut. F. & M. Ins. Co., 103 Mo. 595, 20 
 
 Ins. L. J. 385. 
 Furbush v. Ins. Co., 140 la. 240, 118 N. W. 371. 
 
 Where fire in another building causes an explosion which 
 damages plaintiff's property the loss is not within the policy. 
 
 Miller v. London & Lancashire F. Ins. Co., 41 111. App. 395. 
 
 Dows. v. Faneuil Hall Ins. Co., 127 Mass. 346. 
 
 Leonard v. Orient Ins. Co. (U. S. C. C. A., 7th Dist.), 30 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 981. 
 
 Caballero v. Home Ins. Co., 15 La. Ann. 217, 4 Ben. 478. 
 Hall v. National F. Ins. Co., 35 Ins. L. J. 507, 115 Tenn. 513, 
 
 92 S. W. 402. 
 
 But if fire ensue, the insurer is liable for the loss by fire. 
 
 Miller v. London & Lancashire F. Ins. Co., 41 111. App. 395. 
 
 Dows v. Faneuil Hall Ins. Co., 127 Mass. -346. 
 
 Leonard v. Orient Ins. Co. (U. S. C. C. A. 7th Dist.), 30 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 981. 
 Davis v. Ins. Co. N. A. (Mich. S. C.), 27 Ins. L. J. 184. 
 
 The same principle is involved where explosion is caused 
 by lightning in another building 71 feet from the premises in- 
 sured. And where a lightning clause is attached to policy, cov- 
 ering loss by lightning, subject in all other respects to the 
 terms and conditions of the policjr. 
 
 German F. Ins. Co. v. Roost (Ohio S. C.), 26 Ins. L. J. 699. 
 
 The provisions of the written form, that the policy should 
 cover such merchandise as is usually kept for sale in retail 
 hardware stores, was sufficient permission, the custom to keep 
 dynamite being established by the evidence for the keeping of 
 dynamite on the premises. [Judgment for plaintiff below. Here 
 affirmed against company.] 
 
 Traders Ins. Co. v. Dobbins et al. (Tenn. S. C.) 
 
 86 Southwestern Reporter (May 3, 1905), 383. 
 
EXPLOSIONS. 83 
 
 Where policy provides that it should be void if dynamite 
 were kept on the premises, the keeping of a stick and a half 
 of dynamite whether it caused the fire or not, worked a for- 
 feiture. 
 
 Bastian v. British Amer. Assur. Co. (Gal. S. C.), 33 Ins. L. J. 1033 
 
 Where the explosives did not cause the fire, and were re- 
 moved in time to prevent an explosion, it was held that policy 
 was forfeited. 
 
 Kenneflck-Hammond Co. v. Norwich Union F. Ins. Society (Mo. 
 App.), 33 Ins. L. J. 664. 
 
 It is not necessary to show that the loss was due to the 
 violation. 
 
 Norwaysz v. Thuringia Ins. Co. (111. S. C.), 33 Ins. L. J. 83. 
 
 Nor is the insured owner relieved by the fact that the 
 violation was by a tenant, without his knowledge. 
 
 Norwaysz v. Thuringia Ins. Co. (111. S. C.), 33 Ins. L. J. 83. 
 La Force v. Williamsburg City F. Ins. Co., 43 Mo. App. 518. 
 
 A fire loss caused by explosion of gasoline stove on 
 premises without consent of insured is not within the policy. 
 
 McFarland v. St. Paul F. and M. Ins. Co. (Minn. S. C.), 21 Ins. 
 L. J. 879. 
 
84 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
CHAPTER XII. 
 
 WAIVER NON-WAIVER AGREEMENT. 
 
 Definition of Waiver. 
 
 A waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of some- known 
 right. 
 
 Rosen v. German Alliance Ins. Co. (Me.), 76 All. 688. 
 Scottish U. & M. Ins. Co. (Georgia), 68 S. E. 1097. 
 Dahrooge v. Rochester Ger. Ins. Co., 143 N. W. 608. 
 Gardner v. North St. M. L. Ins. Co. (N. C. S. C.), 79 S. B. 806. 
 
 One's Acts, Rather Than Denial of Waiver, Looked To. 
 
 It matters not if the Insurance Company says: "We waive 
 nothing." Its acts must be looked to to ascertain if there is a 
 waiver. Its actual waiver cannot be affected by its statements 
 that it is not doing that which it clearly is doing. 
 
 Summers v. Western Home Ins. Co., 45 Mo. App., 46. 
 Erwin v. Ins. Co., 24 Mo. App. 153. 
 Phillips v. Protection Ins. Co., 14 Mo. 220. 
 
 Must Know Facts Before Waiver Can Be Charged. 
 
 One cannot waive a right when ignorant of its existence, as 
 an essential element of waiver is knowledge of the fact waived. 
 
 Security Ins. Co. v. Mette, 27 111. App. 324. 
 
 Rudd v. American G. F. M. F. Ins. Co., 120 Mo. App. 1. 
 
 Security Ins. Co. v. Laird, 62 So. 182 (Ala.). 
 
 i 
 
 An insurance adjuster knowing the policy had been for- 
 feited by a breach of a condition, asked for and was refused 
 a non-waiver agreement. He then stated he would not waive 
 any of the policy conditions but required, assured to make a 
 list of destroyed property and then went away. Court held his 
 actions a waiver of the forfeiture, comparing them to those of 
 Julia in Byron's Don Juan 
 
 "A little still she "strove, and much repented, 
 And whispering, 'I will ne'er consent,' consented." 
 German-American Ins. Co. v. Evans (Texas C. C. A.); 61 S. W. 
 Rep. 536 ; 14 Deitch Ins. Digest, 41. 
 
 A forfeiture is waived by requiring proofs of loss or the 
 correction of defective proofs, after knowledge of such for- 
 feiture. 
 
 Roby. v. Ins. Co., 120 N. Y. 510. 
 Cobbs v. Ins. Co., 68 Mich. 463. 
 Cleaver v. Ins. Co., 71 Mich. 414. 
 
 35 
 
86 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Jerdee v. Ins. Co., 75 Wis. 345. 
 Carpenter v. Ins. Co., 61 Mich. 635. 
 
 To constitute waiver the assured must be put to some 
 trouble or expense, or have been misled. 
 
 Roby v. Ins. Co., 120 N. Y. 510. 
 
 Weidert v. Ins. Co., 19 Ins. L. J. 740 (Oregon). 
 
 Devens v. Ins. Co., 83 N. Y. 168. 
 
 Findeisen v. Ins. Co., 15 Ins. L. J. 90 (Vermont). 
 
 There can be no waiver unless the assured relied on acts 
 of the adjuster, or, as a prudent, careful man, had a right to 
 do so. 
 
 Devens v. Ins. Co., 83 N. Y. 168. 
 
 NON- WAIVER AGREEMENT. 
 
 Most non-waiver agreements are entered into between the 
 assured and adjuster sent to adjust the loss on behalf of the 
 company. The reason for entering into such an agreement is 
 very clearly set out by the Supreme Court of Alabama in the 
 Draper case, first the court quotes the agreement, then shows 
 the reason for taking a non-waiver agreement and how it may 
 itself be waived. 
 
 "R. W. Draper insured under policy No. 5656 of the Penn- 
 sylvania Ins. Co., hereby requests W. L. Reynolds, adj., to 
 make examination of books, papers, and other evidence of 
 loss including assured's sworn statement if deemed necessary, 
 which I submit to him for the purpose of ascertaining amount 
 of loss, sustained by me by fire May 21, 1910, with the express 
 understanding and agreement that such examination shall not 
 be considered an acknowledgment of any liability of the said 
 Pennsylvania Ins. Co. under said policy, nor a waiver or im- 
 pairment of any rights or defenses of that company under said 
 policy, nor a waiver or impairment of assured's obligation 
 thereunder. It is further understood and agreed that the exist- 
 ing legal rights, if any, the said R. W. Draper may have under 
 said policy are not impaired by his act in signing this request." 
 
 It thus appears that the agreement merely requests an 
 examination of books, papers and other evidence of loss, sub- 
 mitted for purpose of ascertaining the amount of loss, with 
 the understanding that such examination shall not be con- 
 sidered as fixing liability. * * * Giving to it a natural and 
 reasonable construction, we think its purpose was merely to 
 prevent a liability being fastened upon the company by virtue 
 of the fact that the investigation would be continued after 
 
WAIVER NON-WAIVER AGREEMENT. 87 
 
 knowledge by the adjuster of the breach, recognizing that by 
 so continuing after such knowledge it may be considered as 
 treating the policy as valid and binding, and, therefore, that the 
 mere continued examination might be held a waiver. (Georgia 
 Home Ins. Co. v. Allen, 119 Ala. 436, 24 So. 399). 
 
 There is nothing in the language of the agreement to indi- 
 cate the company could not be bound by positive declara- 
 tions or acts evincing a clear purpose to waive any breach and 
 treat the policy as valid. 
 
 Pennsylvania F. Ins. Co. v. Draper, 65 So. 923, will appear in 
 186, 187, or 188 Alabama Reports. 
 
 ONE CAN WAIVE ANY CONTRACT ONE HAS THE 
 RIGHT TO MAKE. 
 
 If the adjuster sent by a company to adjust a loss, has the 
 right to enter into a non-waiver agreement, he certainly has 
 the right to waive the non-waiver agreement or any rights 
 growing out of it, and this too when the non-waiver agree- 
 ment specifically provides that he has no such rights. There is 
 only one way an insurance company may or can prevent an 
 adjuster from waiving its rights, that is by appointing him to 
 do certain specified things towards adjusting or investigating 
 the loss and then notifying the assured just what the adjuster's 
 power and authority is. Where the assured is put on notice, 
 he cannot be heard to complain if he has done something the 
 adjuster had no right to require him to do. Nor can he be 
 misled by the' adjuster's unauthorized promise to pay. 
 
 Most waivers are thought of after the claim drifts into the 
 hands of some tricky lawyer, who tells the assured his policy 
 is void unless the adjuster said certain things. Though there 
 are many adjusters who do not know when they commit a 
 plain waiver. But as already stated most of these waivers 
 originate in the fertile brain of tricky lawyers and a rascally 
 assured. For these reasons an independent adjuster employed 
 at so much per day should have the company's certificate of 
 authority setting forth just what he is authorized to do, i. e.,. 
 investigate the circumstances concerning the origin and cir- 
 cumstances of the fire and the claim growing out of it, to agree 
 with the assured on the amount of loss if possible, failing in 
 which he would have authority to have it appraised in accord- 
 ance with the terms of the policy. But that he had no authority 
 1o admit or deny liability, nor to require the assured to do or 
 perform any thing or act that could be construed into a waiver 
 
88 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 of the company's rights to claim a forfeiture by reason of a 
 breach of the policy conditions, whether such breach was 
 known to the adjuster or not. That all questions concerning 
 the company's liability must be determined by the company 
 itself or the courts in case it failed or refused to pay. 
 
 Of course, salaried adjusters, and salaried special agents 
 called upon to adjust a loss, being regular employes of the 
 company with power to give drafts in payment of the loss, 
 could not, in the opinion of the author have their authority 
 curtailed unless possibly the certificate of authority and the 
 draft also, set out the fact that the draft should not be taken 
 by the assured as an admission by the company of liability, 
 but would be taken as the measure of the company's liability, 
 if liable at all, and the giving by the adjuster and acceptance 
 by the assured of the said draft was without reference to any 
 other questions or matters of difference than the fixing of the 
 amount of the company's liability if it should be found liable. 
 The company could then pay the draft or not as it saw fit, 
 if it refused payment, the draft would obviate the necessity of 
 assured proving his claim in court, and leave the court to deter- 
 mine only the question of liability. 
 
 The following is a case now before the courts in Alabama, 
 it shows the facts as given by the assured, and an opinion and 
 brief by the author, based on assured's statement of facts. 
 
 AN ALABAMA LOSS, SHOWING EFFECTS OF IRON- 
 SAFE CLAUSE AND NON-WAIVER AGREEMENT. 
 
 Where an inventory was taken December 31, 1913, the in- 
 sured has the whole of the calendar year 1914 in which to take 
 another inventory under the form of iron-safe clause usually 
 made a part of the policies issued in Alabama, a copy of which 
 is shown in the McGlathery case, 115 Ala. 213, 22 So. 104. 
 Therefore, if the next or second inventory is being taken and 
 while in process it is destroyed by a fire which occurs before 
 December 31, 1914, which also destroys the stock insured, such 
 destruction of the unfinished inventory is not a violation of the 
 iron-safe clause. The clause only provides for the production 
 of the inventory, that is, the completed inventory, for it is no 
 inventory at all if incomplete. 
 
 Wherever the language of the policy is susceptible of more 
 than one construction, that construction will be placed upon 
 it which will be most favorable to the insured. Western Assur- 
 
WAIVER NON-WAIVER AGREEMENT. 89 
 
 ance Co. v. McGlathery and cases there cited, 115 Ala. 213, 
 22 So. 104. 
 
 The Alabama courts only require a substantial compliance 
 with the iron-safe clause. Queen Ins. Co. v. Vines, 174 Ala. 
 570, 57 So. 444. 
 
 For the sake of argument we will assume the iron-safe 
 clause was violated in every particular in which event the 
 company could, according to the Alabama decisions, success- 
 fully resist payment for claim under such policy. Day v. Home 
 Ins. Co., 177 Ala. 600, 58 So. 549. But the Alabama courts 
 hold the violation of an iron-safe clause in a fire insurance 
 policy renders the policy voidable not void. They further hold 
 that an adjuster may waive the iron-safe clause, Liverpool & L,. 
 & G. Ins. Co. v. Tillis, 110 Ala. 20, 17 So. 672. Georgia Home 
 Ins. Co. v. Allen, 28 Ins. L. J. 199, 119 Ala. 436, 24 So. 399. 
 See same (Allen) case 128 Ala. 451, 30 So. 537, 31 Ins. L. J. 60. 
 
 The insurance company may, however, take a non-waiver 
 agreement, but such agreement is only a privilege granted the 
 insurance company to investigate and ascertain the cause of 
 the fire and the amount of damage done, without waiving or 
 invalidating any of the conditions of the policy. 
 
 Pennsylvania F. Ins. Co. v. Draper, 65 So. 923* will appear in 
 
 about 187 Ala. 
 Gish v. Ins. Co. of N. A., 16 Okla. 59, 87 Pac. 869, Annotated 13 
 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 826. 
 Rudd v. American G. F. M. F. Ins. Co., 120 Mo. App. 1, 96 S. W. 
 
 237, 35 Ins. L. J. 948. 
 Hatcher v. Sovereign F. Assur. Co., 127 Pac. 588. 
 
 There is nothing in the language of the non-waiver agree- 
 ment to indicate that the company could not be bound by 
 positive declarations or acts evincing a clear purpose to waive 
 any breach and treat the policy as valid. 
 
 Robert v. Sun M. Ins. Co. (Tex. C. C. A.), 35 S. W. 955. 
 Pennsylvania F. Ins. Co. v. Draper, 65 So. 923, Ala. Rep. about 187. 
 Rudd v. Amer. G. D. M. F. Ins. Co., 120 Mo. App. 1, 96 S. W. 
 
 237, 35 Ins. L. J. 948. 
 
 McMillan v. Ins. Co. of N. A., 58 S. E. 1020, 78 S. C. 433. 
 Gish v. Ins. Co. of N. A., 16 Okla. 59, 87 Pac. 869 annotated 13 
 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 826. 
 Hatcher v. Sovereign Ins. Co., 127 Pac. 588, 42 Ins. L. J. 137 
 
 (Wash. S. C.). 
 
 A perusal of the foregoing cases will show that the com- 
 pany or its adjuster may treat the policy as a valid contract 
 in several ways, that is by insisting upon the assured comply- 
 ing with some of the policy requirements such as the furnish- 
 ing proofs of loss, the waiving of proofs of loss, the furnishing 
 of certified copies of bills the originals of which have been 
 lost, or requiring him to submit to examination under oath, or 
 
90 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 by taking over and conditioning the salvage or exercising its 
 option under the contract of taking the salvage at its ascer- 
 tained or appraised value, or by a promise to pay. 
 
 In other words, if the policy has been avoided by a viola- 
 tion of the iron-safe clause, the non-waiver agreement merely 
 permits the company to investigate the circumstances concern- 
 ing the fire and examine all the books and papers in the in- 
 sured's possession pertaining to the claim for loss. But it 
 cannot in one breath deny the contract and in the next assert 1 ' 
 and claim rights growing out of and depending on it. If it 
 elects not to be bound by the policy, that is necessarily a 
 waiver of its right to insist upon the compliance with its 
 requirements or vice versa. That is the doctrine laid down 
 by the Missouri Appellate Court in passing on another point. 
 See Model D. G. Co. v. North B. & M. Ins. Co., 79 Mo. 
 App. 550. 
 
 THE ASSURED'S STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
 
 The insurance covered stock subject to the average clause 
 in buildings A and B an alley separating them. The stock in 
 A was almost a total loss, stock in B was not damaged. The 
 assured had completed his inventory December 31, 1913, which 
 had required more than a month to complete. While in process 
 of taking the next inventory, say December 14, 1914, a fire 
 burned the greater part of the stock and with it all the sheets 
 of the incomplete inventory. The adjusters claimed .this a 
 violation of the iron-safe clause and would not proceed with 
 the adjustment or investigation until a non-waiver agreement 
 was signed. 
 
 AFTER THE NON-WAIVER AGREEMENT WAS 
 ENTERED INTO. 
 
 The adjuster required assured to submit to examination 
 under oath. He required assured at great expense to furnish 
 certified copies of bills the originals of which were lost. Agreed 
 with assured that Underwriter's Salvage Co. should condition 
 the stock, both agreeing that this conditioning of stock did not 
 divest assured of title and was not to be a waiver of the 
 rights of either. Told assured that the proportion of his in- 
 surance covering in B was still in force. All of the local 
 agents told him the same thing concerning the insurance in 
 B. (It is well to remember that a policy covering stock only, 
 if void in part is void altogether) though the avoidance of the 
 
WAIVER NON-WAIVER AGREEMENT. 91 
 
 insurance on stock by reason of violation of iron-safe clause 
 does not avoid the insurance on building, both being insured 
 under separate amounts under same policy. 
 
 Hanover Ins. Co. v. Crawford, 121 Ala. 259, 25 So. 912. 
 
 The author gave it as his opinion, the companies would be 
 held liable if the assured's statement of facts was correct. 
 
 This loss has been settled and paid. The companies offered 
 $160,000, assured offered to take $180,000. It was compromised 
 for $170,000. 
 
92 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 APPRAISAL ARBITRATIONS-AWARD. 
 
 First Duty Is to Try to Effect Settlement. 
 
 Where the policy provides that loss shall be ascertained 
 or estimated by the insured and the company, or if they differ, 
 then by appraisers as thereinafter provided, such language con- 
 templates an actual effort to agree. When this effort fails and 
 not until then neither party possess the right to say we differ, 
 and our points of difference must be referred to arbitrament 
 under the terms of the policy. Until there is some disagree- 
 ment as to the amount of the loss, there is nothing to arbitrate. 
 
 Boyle v. Hamburg-Bremen F. Ins. Co., 169 Pa. 349; 32 Atl. R. 
 
 553 ; 24 Ins. L. J. 699. 
 
 Harrison v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 23 Ins. L. J. 161 ; 59 Fed. 732. 
 British Am. Assur. Co. v. Darragh, 128 Fed. Rep. 890; 33 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 557 ; 63 C. C. A. 426. 
 
 Summerfield v. N. B. & M. Ins. Co., 62 Fed. 249. 
 Stevens v. Norwich U. Ins. Soc., 120 Mo. App. 88 ; 96 S. W. R. 684. 
 Continental Ins. Co. v. Vallandmgham, 116 Ky. 287 ; 76 S. W. 22. 
 Moyer v. Sun Ins. Off., 176 Pa. 579 ; 35 Atl. R. 221. 
 Fletcher v. German Am. Ins. Co., 79 Minn. 337; 82 N. W. R. 647; 
 
 29 Ins. L. J. 752, Harrison v. German Am. Ins. Co., 67 Fed. 577. 
 Kelly v. Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co., 94 Minn. 141 ; 102 N. W. 
 
 380 ; 34 Ins. L. J. 421. 
 Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Hall, 1 Kans. App. 18; 41 Pac. R. 
 
 65, Phoenix Fire Assur. Co. v. Murray, (U. S. C. C. A.) 187 
 
 Fed. 809. 
 Mutual F. Ins. Co. v. Alvord, 23 Ins. L. J. 801 ; 61 Fed. 752 ; 21 
 
 U. S. App. 228, Vangindertallen v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 82 Wis. 
 
 112, 51 N. W. 1122. 
 Manchester F. Assur Co. v. Simmons, 12 Tex. C. A. 607 ; 35 S. W. 
 
 R 722. 
 Farnum v. Phoenix Ins Co., 83 Cal. 246 ; 26 Ins. L. J. 473 ; 23 
 
 Pac. R. 869. 
 Randall v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 10 Mont. 362; 25 Pac. R. 960; 20 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 613, Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v. Titus (Ohio), 92 N. E. 82. 
 Wright v. Susquehana M. F. Co., 110 Pa. 29; 20 Atl. R. 716. 
 Hanover F. Ins. Co. v. Harper, 77 111. App. 453. 
 American F. Ins. Co. v. Stuart (Tex. C. C. A.), 38 S. W. R. 395. 
 Torpedo Top Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 162 111. App. 338 ; 42 Nat'l 
 
 C. Rep. 593. 
 Zimeriski v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 91 Mich. 600 ; 21 Ins. L. J. 
 
 818 ; 52 N. W. 55. 
 Capital Ins. Co. v. Wallace, 50 Kans. 453 ; 21 Ins. L. J. 516 ; 37 
 
 Pac. R. 1070. 
 
 Valued Policy Law, Effect of. 
 
 In those States having a valued policy law in force, it is 
 held that there is no consideration for an appraisal and, if had, 
 the award will not be enforced. 
 
 Seyks v. Millers National Ins. Co. (Wis. S. C.), 41 N. W. Rep. 443. 
 Queen Ins. Co. v.- Leslie (Ohio S. C.), 24 N. E. Rep. 1072; 19 
 
 93 
 
94 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Ins. L. J. 673. 
 
 Queen Ins. Co. v. Jefferson Ice. Co. (Tex. S. C.), 15 Ins. L. J. 109. 
 Home F. Ins. Co. v. Bean (Neb. S. C.), 24 Ins. L,. J. 516. 
 German Ins. Co. v. Eddy (Neb. S. C.). 54 N. W. Rep. 856; 22 
 
 Ins. L. J. 468. 
 
 Baker v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 57 Mo. App. 559. * 
 Doxey v. Royal Ins. Co. (Tenn. Ch. App.), 36 S. W. Rep. 950. 
 Pennsylvania F. Ins. Co. v. Drackett et al. (Ohio S. C.), 57 
 
 N. E. Rep. 962. 
 
 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Stephens (Ky. C. A.), 57 S. W. Rep. 583. 
 Merchants Ins. Co. v. Stephens (Ky. C. A.), 59 S. W. Rep. 511. 
 Ohage v. Union Ins. Co. (Minn. S. C.), 85 N. W. Rep. 212. 
 
 The delay of the insured in offering to arbitrate, which 
 offer is a condition precedent to an action on a policy, does 
 not bar his right of action after an offer has been made and 
 refused, unless such delay has prejudiced the insurer. 
 
 Johnson v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 69 Mo. App. 226. 
 
 Schrepfer v. Rochford Ins. Co., 77 Minn. 291, 79 N. W. 1005. 
 
 Maine and Massachusetts Standard Policies. 
 
 The determination by arbitration of the amount of the 
 loss having been specially made by the parties a condition 
 precedent to suit (on the policy) it was incumbent upon the 
 plaintiff to prove performance or a valid excuse for non- 
 performance. 
 
 Fisher v. Merchants Ins. Co., 95 Me. 486 ; 50 Atl. 282. 
 Dunton v. Westchester F. Ins. Co. (Me.), 71 Atl. 1037. 
 Lamson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 171 Mass. 433, 50 N. E. 943, 28 
 
 Ins. L. J. 70. 
 
 Weissmann v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 208 Mass. 577, 95 N. E. 411. 
 Paris v. Hamburg B. F. Ins. Co., 204 Mass. 90, 90 N. E. 420. 
 
 Arbitration Appraisal Award, Annotated Case. 
 
 1. Validity of appraisal provision of the policy, 
 a In general. 
 
 b Agreement to submit amount of loss or damage, 
 
 valid, 
 c Agreement to submit all matters in dispute invalid. 
 
 2. Occasion of appraisal or arbitration. 
 
 a Preliminary requisites, presupposes a failure to 
 
 agree. 
 
 b Condition precedent to right of action, 
 c Collateral and independent condition. The provision 
 
 for appraisal must fix a definite method. As 
 
 affected where, loss is total, or by valued policy 
 
 law or statutory provision, 
 d Demand of party, 
 e Miscellaneous cases. 
 
 3. Requiring compliance with condition. 
 
APPRAISAL ARBITRATION AWARD. 95 
 
 a Duty mutual, 
 b Duty of insurer. 
 c Duty of insured. 
 
 ' d When arbitration fails through no fault of either 
 party. 
 
 4. Effect of failure of arbitration through fault of insured 
 
 is a bar to suit, as does his. 
 a Refusal to arbitrate. 
 b Or bad faith. 
 
 5. Waiver of appraisal provision. 
 
 a General cases. 
 
 b Accepting and returning proofs of loss without ob- 
 jection. Adjusting loss. 
 
 c Denying liability. 
 
 d Demanding or having an appraisal different from 
 that provided by the policy. 
 
 e Acts of the parties. 
 
 1. Refusal to arbitrate. 
 
 2. Time in which appraisal may be had or de- 
 manded. 
 
 3. Other "acts. 
 
 f Acts of insurance company's appraiser. 
 
 Graham v. German Am. Ins. Co., 75 Ohio St. 374, 79 N. E. 930, 
 36 Ins. L. J. 193, (Annotated in 15 L. R. A. (U. S.) 1055 on 
 all points named above.) 
 
 It Is No More the Duty of the Assured Than of the Company 
 
 to Demand Appraisal. 
 
 It is no more the duty of the insured than of the company 
 to demand an appraisal in case of differences under a policy like 
 the N. Y. Standard form. Each party is entitled to demand it, 
 but neither can compel it, and neither has the right to insist 
 that the other shall first demand it. If the insured refuses the 
 company's demand for an appraisal, his right of action is sus- 
 pended until he consents. If the company refuses the insured's 
 demand for an appraisal, he may institute suit. 
 
 Western Assur. Co. v. Decker, 98 Fed. 381, 39 C. C. A. 383-9 
 (citing and approving Kahnweiler v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 14 C. C. 
 A. 485, 67 Fed. 483.) Dissenting- op. by Sanborn Circuit J. 
 with valuable citations. 
 
 Common Law Agreement or Appraisal Different from that 
 Provided by the Policy. 
 
 The agreement for submission need not be in the terms 
 
96 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 of the policy; the parties can waive those provisions, even if 
 they were intended to prescribe a form. 
 
 Hall v. Norwalk F. Ins. Co. (Conn. S. C.). 17 Atl. Rep. 356. 
 London and Lancashire F. Ins. Co. v. Storrs (U. S. C. C. A. 8tb 
 
 Dist.), 25 Ins. L. J. 283. 
 British Amer. Assur. Co. v. Darragh (U. S. C. C. A. 5th Dist.), 
 
 33 Ins. L. J. 577. 
 Mutual F. Ins. Co. v. Alvord (U. S. C. C, A., 1st Dist), 2 a 
 
 Ins. L, J. 801. 
 Adams v. N. Y. Bowery F. Ins. Co. (Iowa S. C.), 51 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 1149. 
 
 Where the company's adjuster appeared at the loss, ex- 
 amined the premises, and agreed with the insured to leave 
 the question of amount of loss to a third person, a carpenter, 
 the company taking no further action, this was a waiver of 
 proofs of loss, and rendered inapplicable the arbitration clause 
 of the policy. 
 
 Wholley v. Western Assur. Co., 174 Mass. 263; 54 N. E. 548; 
 28 Ins. L. J. 1029. 
 
 If the appraisal agreement does not follow and is not in 
 accordance with the provisions of the policy for arbitration, it 
 cannot be offered in evidence under the plea of failure to 
 comply with the policy condition as to appraisal of the loss. 
 (In this case the policy provided if differences should arise 
 between the company and the insured as to the amount of 
 the loss, the same should be submitted to appraisal. The 
 appraisal agreement recited that the appraisers should ascer- 
 tain the amount of the loss, and were required "to make an 
 estimate of the actual cash cost of replacing or repairing 
 same.") 
 
 Western Assur. Co. v. Hall, 143 Ala. 168 ; 38 Southern 853. 
 
 Where the policy requires appraisers to first select an 
 umpire before proceeding with appraisal, this is generally not 
 material and merely directory. The parties proceeding before 
 an umpire improperly appointed by the appraisers waive all 
 objection to his appointment. The umpire ' can act only after 
 disagreement of the appraisers. Until then an umpire is not 
 necessary. He can act as well, and with the same effect, if 
 appointed when such a contingency occurs. The time, there- 
 fore, fixed in the contract, is not essential or material. The 
 case of Adams v. N. Y. Bowery Ins. Co., 85 Iowa 6, 51 N. W. 
 1149, 21 Ins. L/. J. 833, is the only case to be found in which 
 it is held that the omission to appoint an umpire before ap- 
 praisers entered upon their duties invalidated the award. The 
 opinion is very brief (and covers other questions also invaHdat- 
 
APPBAISAL ARBITRATION AWARD. 97 
 
 ing the award) and as to this point cites no authority and 
 gives no reason. We cannot follow such an authority in setting 
 aside an award for such a merely technical omission. 
 
 The fact that the appraisers agreed in every particular is 
 sufficient evidence that they alone were not partial or corrupt, 
 and that their award is just and fair. 
 
 Chandos v. American F. Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 184; 22 Ins. L. J. 425; 
 54 N. W. 390. 
 
 To same effect except last paragraph is Doying v. Broad- 
 way Ins. Co, 25 N. J. L. 569; 23 Ins. L. J. 394, 27 Atl. 927, 
 and Caledonian Ins. Co. v. Traub, 83 Md. 524: 25 Ins. L. J, 
 791; 37 Atl. 782. 
 
 An agreement between the assured and the adjuster on the 
 amount of the loss, whether arrived at between the parties, or 
 by leaving it to any other person or persons, in fact no matter 
 how the amount of the loss was agreed to it is binding on 
 both the company and the assured. It cannot be set aside 
 except for fraud, mistake or inadequacy. (The Author.) 
 
 Assured Must Demand an Appraisal. 
 
 In case of disagreement, the insured must demand an ap- 
 praisal, under a policy such as the New York standard form. 
 
 Connecticut F. Ins. Co. v. Hamilton (U. S. C. C. A. 6th Dist), 
 
 23 Ins. L. J. 241. 
 Johnson v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 69 Mo. App. 226; see also 69 Mo. 
 
 App. 232 ; 
 
 Murphy v. North B. & M. Ins. Co., 61 Mo. App. 323 ; 
 Dautel v. Pennsylvania F. Ins. Co., 65 Mo. App. 44 ; 
 McNees v. Southern Ins. Co., 69 Mo. App. 232 ; 
 Swearinger v. Pacific F. Ins. Co., 66 Mo. App. 90 ; 
 Hooker v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 69 Mo. App. 141 ; 
 Chippewa Lumber Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 80 Mich. 116 ; 44 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 1055 ; 19 Ins. L. J. 535 ; 
 
 Kahnweiler v. Phenix Ins. Co., 23 Ins. L. J. 391 ; 57 Fed. 562. 
 (But in this case, Kahnweiler v. Phenix) the policy provided 
 
 for appraisal on disagreement so that on appeal Kanhweiler 
 
 v. Phenix Ins. Co., it was held the assured was no more 
 
 obligated to demand appraisal than was the company ; 67 
 
 Fed. 483; 14 C. C. A. 485.); 
 Western Assur. Co. v. Hall, 112 Ala. 318 ; 25 Ins. L. J. 874 ; 20 
 
 Southern 447, Earley v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co. (R. I.). 
 
 76 Atl. Rep. 753 ; 
 American Cent'l Ins. Co. v. Bass, 90' Tex. 380 ; 26 Ins. L J 718 : 
 
 38 S. W. 1119; 
 
 Dee v. Key City F. Ins. Co., 104 Iowa 167; 73 N. W. 594; 
 Allen v. Patroup M. F. Ins. Co. (Mich.), 130 N. W. 196' 
 Pioneer &c. v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 106 N. C. 28 ; 10 S. E. 1057 ; 
 
 19 Ins. L. J. 408. 
 Veney v. Reginald, Eng., Q. B. Law R., Feby. 1888, part 2, p. 
 
 177 ; 1 Ins. Dig. 33 ; 
 Wolff v. L. & L. & G. Ins. Co., 50 N. J. Law 453 ; 14 Atl. R. 
 
 561 ; 17 Ins. L. J. 714; 
 Gasser v. Sun Fire Off., 42 Minn. 315 ; 44 N. W. R. 252 ; 19 
 
 Ins. L. J. 243 ; 
 Blackwell v. American C. Ins. Co., 2 Mo. App. 516 ; 
 
98 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Phenix Ins. Co. et al. v. Carnahan, 63 Ohio St. 258 ; 58 N. B. 805 ; 
 Westenhaver v. German Am. Ins. Co., 113 Iowa 726 : 84 N. W. 
 
 717; 30 Ins. L. J. 314; 
 Palatine Ins. Co. v. Morton, 106 Tenn. 558; 61 S. W. 787; 30 
 
 Ins. L. J. 481; 
 Mosness v. German Ins. Co., 50 Minn. 341; 52 N. W. 932; 21 
 
 Ins. L. J. 915 ; 
 
 Dunton v. Westchester F. Ins. Co. (Me.), 71 AtL Rep. 1037; 
 Connecticut F. Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 59 Fed. 258 ; 23 Ins. L. J. 241 ; 
 Nolan v. Ocean Ace. & G. Corp., 23 Canadian Law Times 187 ; 
 Kersey v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 135 Mich. 10 ; 97 N. W. 57 ; 
 Exchange Bk. v. Thuringia F. Ins. Co., 109 Mo. App. 654; 83 
 
 S. W. 534 ; 
 
 Law v. Commercial M. F. Co. (N. D.), 107 N. W. 69; 
 Graham v. German Am. Ins. Co., Royal Ins. Co. v. Silberman 
 
 (Ohio), 79 N. E. 930; 36 Ins. L. J. 193; 
 
 Paris v. Hamburg Bremen F. Ins. Co. (Mass.), 90 N. E. 420; 
 Novak v. Rochester G. Ins. Co. (111. App.), 40 Nat. Corp. R. 
 
 698, June, 1910 ; 
 
 Weismann v. Firemen's Ins. Co. (Mass. S. J. C.), 95 N. E. 411 ; 
 North B. & M. Ins. Co. v. Robinett (Va, S. C. A.), 72 S. E. 668; 
 
 Condition Precedent to Suit. 
 
 Appraisal when demanded is a condition precedent to re- 
 covery, where the policy so provides as does the New York 
 standard form. 
 
 Scottish U. & N. Ins. Co. v. Clancy (Tex. S. C.), 8 S. W. Rep. 630 ; 
 Wolff v. L. & L. & G. Ins. Co. (N. J. S. C.), 14 AtL Rep. 561 ; 17 
 
 Ins. L. J. 714 ; 
 Gasser v. Sun Fire Office (Minn. S. C.), 19 Ins. L. J. 247 ; 44 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 252 ; 
 Chippewa Lumber Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. (Mich. S. C.), 44 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 1055; 80 Mich. 116; 
 
 Hamilton v. L. & L. & G. Ins. Co. (U. S. S. C.), 136 U. S. 242; 
 Mosnes v. German Am. Ins. Co. (Minn. S. C. July 1892), 21 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 915; 
 
 Western Assur. Co. v. Hall (Ala. S. C.), 25 Ins. L. J. 874; 
 Chainless Cycle Co. v. Security Ins. Co., 169 N. Y. 304; 31 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 324 ; 
 Phenix and other Ins. Cos. v. Carnahan et al. (Ohio S. C.), 
 
 58 N. E. Rep. 805 ; 
 
 Davis v. Atlas Assur. Co. (Wash. S. C.), 47 Pac. Rep. 436; 
 Sun Mut. Ins. Co. v. Crist (Ky. C. A.), 39 S. W. Rep. 837; 26 
 
 Ins. L. J. 695. 
 
 Not a Condition Precedent. 
 
 The New York standard form of policy makes an appraisal 
 a condition precedent to recovery only when one has been re- 
 quired by the insurer, it is not the duty of the insured to 
 initiate one. 
 
 Chainless Cycle Co. v. Security Ins. Co., 169 N. T. 304; 31 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 324 ; 62 N. E. 392 ; 
 
 Kahnweiler v. Phenix Ins. Co., 14 C. C. A. 485, 67 Fed. Rep. 483 ; 
 Milwaukee Mechs. Ins. Co. v. Stewart (Ind. A. C.), 42 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 290 ; 
 Grand Rapid F. Ins. Co. v. Finn, 60 Ohio 513, 54 N. W. Rep. 
 
 545. (Ohio now holds to the contrary.) ; 
 
 Davis v. Atlas Assur. Co. v. (Wash. S. C.), 47 Pac. Rep. 436; 
 Sun Mutual Ins. Co. v. Crist (Ky. C. A.), 39 S. W. Rep. 837; 
 
 26 Ins. L. J. 695; 
 Lesure Lumber Co. v. Mut. F. Ins. Co., 101 Iowa 514; 70 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 761; 
 
 Norris v. Equitable F. Assn. (S. C. S. D.), 102 N. W. Rep. 306; 
 Nerger v. Equitable F. Assn., 20 S. D. 419; 35 Ins. L. J. 556; 
 
APPRAISAL ARBITRATION AWARD. 99 
 
 American Ins. Co. v. Rodenhause (Okla.), 128 Pac. 502; 
 Winchester v. North B. & M. Ins. Co., 160 Cal. 1; 116 Pac. 63; 
 Amusement &c. v. Prussian N. Ins. Co., 85 Kan. 367, 116 Pac. 620. 
 
 Where there is no disagreement as to amount of loss and 
 the company offered to pay on same basis that other companies 
 had settled, the policy requirement for an appraisal was thereby 
 waived; the offer to pay being virtually an admission of the 
 amount of insured loss. 
 
 Shook v. Retail Hardware M. F. Ins. Co. (Mo. App.), 134 S. W. 
 589. 
 
 To take advantage of the appraisal clause provision in a 
 fire insurance policy such as the New York standard form, the 
 defendant must allege in its plea that there was a disagreement 
 between it and the plaintiff as to the amount of such loss, 
 prior to institution of suit. 
 
 Torpedo Top Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 162 111. App. 338; 42 Nat'nl 
 Corp. Rep. 593. 
 
 Provision for Appraisal not Upheld by Pennsylvania and Ne- 
 braska Courts. 
 
 An appraisal is not a condition precedent to suit, it being 
 revocable by either party, and the bringing of the action a 
 revocation. 
 
 Needy v. German-Am. Ins. Co. (Pa. S. C.), 47 Atl. Rep. 739; 
 Yost v. McKee et al. (Pa. S. C.), 36 Atl. Rep. 317. 
 
 The Nebraska Supreme Court holds the effect of the ap- 
 praisal clause is to oust the courts of their legitimate jurisdic- 
 tion. . 
 
 German Am. Ins. Co. v. Etherton, 41 N. W. Rep. 406. 
 
 After failure of appraisal materially different in terms 
 from that provided in the policy, an insurance company waives 
 right to demand new appraisal pursuant to the terms of the 
 policy. 
 
 Davis v. Atlas Assur. Co. (Wash. S. C.), 47 Pac. Rep. 436. 
 
 A joint demand by several companies for an appraisal is 
 not authorized by the policy; the demand must be separate. 
 
 Connecticut F. Ins. Co. v. Hamilton (U. S. C. C. A. 6th Dist.), 
 
 23 Ins. L. J. 241; 
 Hamilton v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (U. S. C. C. A., 6th Dist), 23 
 
 Ins. U J. 561. 
 
 A joint demand is not good where the policies differ. 
 
 Palatine Ins. Co. v. Morton-Scott-Robertson Co. (Tenn. S. C.), 
 61 S. W. Rep. 787. 
 
100 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Where defendant insisted on assured signing a written 
 agreement containing provisions not in the policy, it waived its 
 rights to appraisal. 
 
 Walker v. German Ins. Co. (July, 1893), (Kan. S. C.) f 22 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 750; 
 Summerfleld v. North British & M. Ins. Co. (U. S. C. C. Western 
 
 Dist. Va.), 24 Ins. L. J. 442. 
 
 Where the insured, after filing proofs, but before their re- 
 ceipt by the company, upon failure of parties to agree, adver- 
 tised and sold the property against the company's protest, the 
 latter was deprived of its rights to appraisement and was re- 
 leased from liability under the policy. 
 
 Astrich v. German- Am. Ins. Co. (U. S. C. C. A. 3d Dist.), 33 
 Ins. L. J. 925. 
 
 I 
 
 The assured, after agreeing to appraisal, revoked the sub- 
 mission and refused to be bound. He then had the goods ap- 
 praised and sold them. Held, A forfeiture of the policy. 
 
 Morley v. L. & L. & G. Ins. Co. (Mich S. C.), 48 N. W. Rep. 502; 
 
 20 Ins. L. J. 577: 
 Providence-Washington Ins. Co. v. Wolf (Ind. A. C.), 72 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 606. 
 
 The demand for appraisal iterated and reiterated is met by 
 a denial that there was any "disagreement" or difference as to 
 the amount of the loss, which was a distinct evasion of the 
 demand; and it is the merest trifling with words to say that 
 this quibbling and evasion, which was continued until an ap- 
 praisal was rendered fruitless by the sale of the remnants by 
 insured, does not amount to a refusal on the part of the in- 
 sured to perform the condition as to arbitration or appraise- 
 ment of the loss. 
 
 Phoenix v. Carnahan (Ohio S. C.), 58 N. E. Rep. 805. 
 
 Citing: 
 
 Hamilton v. Ins. Co., 136 U. S. 242 ; 10 Supp. Ct. 945 ; 34 L. 
 
 Ed. 419; 
 Zalesky v. Ins. Co., 102 Iowa 613 ; 71 N. W. Rep. 566. 
 
 All verbal demands for an appraisal and for an examina- 
 tion under oath touching the cause and origin of the fire are 
 merged in a subsequent written demand therefor. 
 
 Citizens' Ins. Co. et al. v. Herposheimer (Neb.), 109 N. W. 160. 
 
 The insured's statement that he was "ready to proceed 
 under the provisions of the policy" is not a request for the 
 appointment of referees (arbitration). 
 
APPRAISAL ARBITRATION AWARD. 101 
 
 Vera et al. v. Mercantile F. & M. Ins. Co. 2nd cth^r Cos".,' 10:- 
 N. E. 292 ; 216 Mass. 154. 
 
 A local agent who issues policies is a proper person on 
 whom to serve notice of a demand upon the company for 
 arbitration provided for in the policy. 
 
 Phenix v. Stocks et al. (111. S. C.) f 36 N. E. Rep. 408. 
 
 After some unsatisfactory negotiations, the insured sug- 
 gested an appraisal, and afterwards wrote the insurer that un- 
 less an appraisal was agreed to within five days, he would pro- 
 ceed to dispose of the goods, to which no answer was made. 
 This was held to be a waiver of the insurer's right to appraisal". 
 
 Chainless Cycle Co. v. Security Ins. Co., 169 N. Y. 304; 31 Ins. 
 L. J. 324. 
 
 After once refusing to appraise, the insurer can not after- 
 wards compel an appraisal. 
 
 Continental Ins. Co. v. Wilson (Kan. S. C.), 25 Pac. Rep. 629; 
 
 20 Ins. Lr. J. 269 ; 
 Wainer v. Milford Mut. F. Ins. Co. (Mass. S. J. C.), 23 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 887 ; 
 McDowell v. Aetna Ins. Co. and other Ins. Cos. (Mass. S. J. C.), 
 
 41 N. E. Rep. 665 ; 
 Chainless Cycle Mfg. Co. v. Security Ins. Co., 169 N. Y. 304 ; 
 
 31 Ins. L. J. 324. 
 
 When the adjuster makes an offer in payment of the loss 
 which 'assured refuses, and then withdraws his proposition, 
 with notice that the company will insist upon every require- 
 ment of the policy, intending to terminate all negotiations for 
 a settlement, the arbitration clause of the policy is rendered 
 inoperative and cannot be invoked as a defense. 
 
 Dautel v. Pennsylvania F." Ins. Co., 65 Mo. App. 44 
 
 .1 
 
 Failure of the insurer after demanding appraisal at a given 
 time and place, to appear at the time and place, is a waiver 
 of its right to appraisal. 
 
 Northern Assur. Co. v. Samuels (Tex. C. C. A.), 33 S. W. Rep. 239. 
 
 The insurer knowing that the insured desires a prompt ap- 
 praisal or adjustment, so that the property may not suffer 
 further injury before it is sold, can not postpone its demand 
 for an appraisal, until after the insured, misled by its act, has 
 been placed in a position where one is impossible. 
 
 Chainless Cycle Co. v. Security Ins. Co., 169 N. Y. 304 ; 31 Ins. 
 L. J. 324. 
 
 The insurer can not compel an appraisal of loss by fire 
 
102 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 after the property has been damaged by fire a second time, 
 since the damage by both fires constitutes but one claim, to be 
 settled in one proceeding. 
 
 Mechanics Ins. C. v. Hodge (111. S. C.), 26 Ins. L. J. 406; 37 
 N. E. Rep. 61. 
 
 The insured's death before award is made does not revoke 
 the submission. 
 
 Citizens' Ins. Co. v. Coit (Jnd. A. C.), 39 N. E. Rep. 766. 
 
 The company can not take advantage of the want of arbi- 
 tration as provided by the policy, when its refusal defeated 
 such arbitration, and it is immaterial that a former action was 
 pending on the policy at the time the offer to arbitrate was 
 made. 
 
 Johnson v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 69 Mo. App. 226. 
 
 A submission to appraisal, though made jointly by several 
 companies, is under policies and not a common law agreement, 
 where the policies are all alike and the submission is such as 
 is provided for therein. 
 
 Wicking et al. v. Citizens' Mut. F. Ins. Co. (Mich. S. C.), 77 
 N. W. Rep. 275 ; 28 Ins. L. J. 230. 
 
 Appraisal is waiver of insurance company's right to rebuild. 
 
 Wynkoop v. Niagara F. Ins. Co. (N. Y. C. A.), 12 Ins. L. J. 253; 
 McAllaster v. Niagara F. Ins. Co. (N. Y. C. A.), 28 Ins. L. J. 769 ; 
 Iowa Cent'l B. & L. Assn. v. Merchants and Bankers F. Ins. Co. 
 
 (Iowa S. C.). 32 Ins. L. J. 852 ; 
 Alliance Co-operative Ins. Co. v. Arnold (Kans. S. C.), 31 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 943 ; 
 Elliott v. Merchants and Bankers F. Ins. Co. (la. S. C.), 28 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 677. 
 
 But where appraisal agreement expressly stipulates that it 
 is "Without reference to any other question or matter of 
 difference within the terms and conditions of insurance than 
 the amount of the loss," it neither waives the company's right to 
 rebuild instead of paying, as provided for in the policy, nor 
 excludes proof of a previous oral waiver of such right. 
 
 Platt v. Aetna Ins. Co. (111. S. C.), 24 Ins. L. J. 132; 38 N. E. 
 Rep. 750. 
 
 An appraisal had by the insured and other companies is not 
 competent evidence of the amount of the loss. 
 
APPRAISAL ARBITRATION AWARD. 103 
 
 Penn. Plate Glass Co. v. Spring Garden Ins. Co. (Pa. S. C.), 28 
 Ins. L. J. 223 ; 
 
 Chenowith v. i-henix Ins. Co., 4 Finch Digest, 22 (Ky. S. C.), 
 12 Ky. L. Rep. 232. 
 
 If the insurers deny liability as to a portion of the loss 
 and, in the agreement for submission to appraisal, exclude such 
 items from the purview of the agreement, and when the award 
 is returned the loss be paid in accordance therewith, and 
 receipts be taken discharging the insurer from all liability by 
 reason of the fire for which claim for loss was made, and 
 another receipt for payment of the return premium in con- 
 sideration of which the policy is canceled, still the insured may 
 recover for the loss on items omitted from the appraisal, and 
 which the insurer refused to pay, provided the court finds, as 
 a matter of fact, they were covered by the policy. 
 
 Fire Ins. Assn. v. Wickham (U. S. S. C.), 21 Ins. L. J. 193. 
 
 Plaintiff dismissed his action on a fire policy and brought 
 new suit. On receiving notice of intention to dismiss, defend- 
 ant served demand for appraisal under terms of policy. Held, 
 That demand was too late. 
 
 Davis v. Imperial Ins. Co. (Wash. S. C.), 47 Pac. Rep. 439. 
 
 Where the insured's action was dismissed for refusing to 
 submit loss to appraisal and thereafter she offered to submit 
 to appraisal, but the company refused to do so, claiming that 
 by her previous conduct the insured had lost all rights under 
 the policy, the insured brought this action to recover her loss. 
 Held, That the doctrine between inconsistent rights or remedies 
 is inapplicable. The plaintiff never had any election. Her re- 
 fusal at first to submit to appraisal merely amounted to a 
 waiver of her right to an appraisal, but did not extinguish her 
 rights to recover on the policy; that the refusal of the company 
 to submit to appraisal upon a subsequent offer of the insured 
 to do so, was waiver of its right to an appraisal, and thereupon 
 the insured could maintain an action on the policy without 
 appraisal. 
 
 Schrepfer v. Rockford Ins. Co., 77 Minn. 291; 79 N. W. Rep. 1005. 
 
 Where the representative of a company that demands a 
 separate appraisal did not join the other companies in an ap- 
 praisal, but afterwards co-operated with them, and took advan- 
 tage of whatever was done and was notified of all that occurred 
 and made no objections, the company can not allege that it 
 was not a party to the appraisal. 
 
104 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 North German Ins. Co. v. Morton-Scott-Robertson Co. (Tenn. 
 
 S. C.), 31 Ins. L. J. 580; 
 
 (See also the case of Levy v. Scottish U. & N. Ins. Co. (W. Va. 
 S. C. A.), 52 S. E. Rep. 449). 
 
 Statute, Michigan. 
 
 The Michigan statutes prescribing the form of a standard 
 policy to be used in that state which provides that an award of 
 appraisers should be prima facie the amount of the loss, does 
 not prevent the insured and insurer, after loss, from entering 
 an arbitration of the loss and making the award of appraisers 
 binding and conclusive as to the value of the property and the 
 loss thereto. 
 
 Montgomery v. Amer. Cent'l Ins. Co., 108 Wis. 146 ; 84 N. W. 
 175; 30 Ins. L. J. 122. 
 
 Iowa. 
 
 A statute that the amount of the policy shall be prima 
 facie evidence of the insurable value, at the date of the policy, 
 doesn't prevent the company from showing depreciation, and 
 actual value at time of fire, nor does it relieve the insured from 
 proving the loss, nor relieve him from the operation of a 
 clause making an appraisement a condition precedent to right 
 of action on the policy. 
 
 Zalesky v. Home Ins. Co., 108 Iowa 341; 79 N. W. 69. 
 
 Must Produce Books for Inspection of Appraisers. 
 
 On demand of insurer, the insured directed its bookkeeper 
 to allow appraisers to examine all its books. He, however, 
 withheld a book containing an estimate of the cost of the 
 destroyed articles. Held, Insured was^ bound by his acts and 
 that his action amounted to a representation that there was no 
 such book and that insurer was released from its agreement. 
 
 Stockton Comb. Harvester and Agricultural Works v. Glens Falls 
 Ins. Co. (Gal. S. C.), 33 Pac. Rep. 663. 
 
 On a retrial of this case it was proven that no books were 
 concealed from appraisers, hence judgment for plaintiff in lower 
 court here affirmed (Cal. S. C.), 53 Pac. Rep: 565. 
 
 When appraisal fails through plaintiff's bad faith, he can 
 not maintain an action. 
 
 Silver v. Western Assur. Co. (N. Y. C. A.), 58 N. E. Rep. 284. 
 
 Appraisal Value of Saloon Furniture in Dry Town. 
 
 The policy limited liability to the "actual cash value, with 
 
APPRAISAL ARBITRATION AWARD. 105 
 
 proper deductions for the depreciation however caused." Held } 
 That the value meant the price which the property would bring 
 at a fair market; as to fixed property the value would have to 
 be arrived at at its place of location; that as to movable 
 property it should be ascertained at the nearest fair market 
 for same, subject to a deduction for cost of transportation; 
 hence on loss of saloon fixtures in a town where the sale of 
 liquor had been prohibited, the insurer was not entitled to a 
 valuation of the property at that place, but was obliged to pay 
 on the basis of the value of the property at the nearest fair 
 market for such property less cost of transportation. 
 
 Prussian National Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, (U. S. C. C. A., 4th Cir.) : 
 221 Federal Reporter (June 10, 1915) 931. 
 
 Insured's Right to Introduce Evidence Before Appraisers. 
 
 The authorities generally are in accord in holding that 
 where there has been a total extinction of the property or any 
 part of it it is not only the right of the insured to introduce 
 evidence as to such property, but that it is the duty of the 
 appraisers to hear evidence as to the quantity and value of 
 such property. Where appraisers are appointed because of 
 their knowledge and familiarity with values such as was dam- 
 aged, or of the property itself, and enough of it remains from 
 which a fair and accurate estimate may be made of its extent 
 and value, then appraisers may refuse to hear evidence. The 
 question is annotated in Aetna Ins. Co. v. Jester, 47 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 1191. 
 
 Assured was not given an opportunity to be present with 
 their books, or other evidence, to show the extent of their loss 
 at any time from the beginning of the- arbitration proceedings 
 until the completion of the award in writing. This was im- 
 proper. Assured should have been given this opportunity. It 
 is true that the arbitrators were shown to be experienced men 
 in this line of business; and, if appellants should have been 
 permitted to be present with their evidence, it might not have 
 changed the result. From the evidence we are not prepared 
 to say that insurance companies or any one of the arbitrators, 
 were guilty of fraud or an intentional wrong in arriving at 
 the result of this arbitration; but we are convinced that mis- 
 takes, or errors, were committed to the prejudice of assured. 
 
 'Harth v. Continental Ins. Co. (Ky. C. A.), 36 Ins. L. J. 603. 102 
 S. W. 242. 
 
 The insured has a right to be heard when he has requested 
 
106 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 such right if the appraisers disagree, and an award of the com- 
 pany appraiser and the umpire who have denied him that right 
 will be set aside. 
 
 Chenoweth v. Phenix Ins. Co., 12 Ky. L. R. 232 ; 
 
 American F. Ins. Co. v. Bell (Tex. C. C. A.), 75 S. W. 319; 
 
 Harth v. Continental Ins. Co. et al. (Ky. C. A.), 102 S. W. 242, 
 36 Ins. L. J. 603. 
 
 The insured has the right to introduce evidence, before the 
 appraisers as to the extent of his loss, and where he is refused 
 such right, the award is not binding on him. Aetna Ins. Co. 
 v. Jester (Okla.), 132 Pac. 130. 
 
 The rejection and exclusion of pertinent and material testi- 
 mony on a hearing before appraisers is usually fatal to the 
 award. 
 
 Schoe-nick v. American Ins. Co. (Minn.), 124 N. W. 5; 
 Mosness v. German Ins. Co., 50 Minn. 341 ; 21 Ins. L. J. 915 ; 
 
 52 N. W. 932; 
 Redner v. New York Fire Ins. Co., 92 Minn. 306; 99 N. W. 
 
 886 ; 33 Ins. L. J. 780 ; 
 
 Continental Ins. Co. v. Garrett, 125 Fed. 589 ; 60 C. C. A. 395 ; 
 Stout v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 69 N. J. Eq. 566 ; 56 Atl. 691 ; 
 Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Payne (Kan. S. C.), 26 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 46 ; 
 Christiansen v. Norwich U. F. Ins. Soc., 84 Minn. 526, 31 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 218; 
 
 Redner v. N. Y. Fire Ins. Co. (Minn. S. C.), 33 Ins. L. J. 780; 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Romeis (Lucas Co. Ohio C. C.), 15 C. C. 
 Rep. 697. 
 
 In case of destroyed property, which an appraiser had never 
 seen, fairness would require that he be informed by evidence 
 of some sort (not necessarily under oath) as to the character 
 and value of the property and, unless an opportunity is afforded 
 to impart such information, the award will not be binding. 
 
 Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Payne, 57 Kans. 291 ; 26 Ins. 
 L. J. 46 ; 46 Pac. 315. 
 
 Where appraisers are appointed to adjust a loss to a prop- 
 erty only partially destroyed and sufficient of it remains to 
 disclose the size, general character and architecture, and quality 
 of material used, a hearing and an opportunity to introduce 
 evidence of value need not be granted; but where they are un- 
 acquainted with the insured property, and are selected to 
 estimate a loss arising from total destruction of the property, 
 notice of the time and place of the appraisers' meeting and an 
 opportunity to the parties to be heard is essential to a valid 
 award. 
 
 Carlston v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 37 Mont 118; 94 Pac. 756; 
 37 Ins. L. J. 366. 
 
 It seems that the appraisers are not obliged to give the 
 claimant any formal notice or to hear evidence, at least in all 
 
APPRAISAL ARBITRATION AWARD. 107 
 
 cases, and yet, unless the insured waive it, he must either have 
 notice or knowledge of the meeting of the appraisers and an 
 opportunity to draw their attention to the items of his loss 
 and make representations and explanations to them concerning 
 the nature thereof. 
 
 Kaiser v. Hamburg-Bremen F. Ins. Co., 59 (N. Y. S. C.), App. 
 Div. 525; 69 N. Y. Supp. 344. Affirmed 172 N. Y. 663, 65 N. E. 
 1118. 
 
 Citing: 
 
 Linde v. Republic F. Ins. Co., 50 N. Y. Super. Ct. 362; 
 Remington Paper Co. v. London Assur. Corp. 12 (N. Y. S. C.), 
 App. Div. 218. 
 
 An award of arbitrators will not be set aside on the ground 
 that the arbitrators refused to hear pertinent testimony, when 
 the party objecting to the award only announced his willingness 
 to introduce testimony without actually offering any. 
 
 Stemmer v. Scottish U. & N Ins. Co., 33 Ore. 65 ; 58 Pacif. R. 
 498 ; 27 Ins. L. J. 972. 
 
 The award will be set aside if appraisers refuse to consider 
 the books in arriving at the goods assured had on hand at time 
 of fire. 
 
 LevJne v. Lancashire Ins. Co. (Minn. S. C.), 26 Ins. L. J. 36. 
 
 Books of account are not the only evidence of the amount 
 of the loss, and if the appraisers are satisfied that they do not 
 show the correct amount of merchandise on hand, they may 
 resort to other evidence, and their mere refusal to examine 
 them in such case will not justify the setting aside of an award. 
 
 Tyblewski v. Svea F.. & L. Ins. Co., 220 111. 436; 35 Ins. L. J. 
 616; 77 N. E. 196. 
 
 Where persons are selected arbitrators by reason of special 
 knowledge or skill possessed by them with reference to the 
 matter in controversy, so that it is apparent that the parties 
 intended to rely upon their personal information, investigation 
 and judgment, they may even be justified in refusing altogether 
 to hear evidence. 
 
 Hall v. Norwalk F. Ins. Co., 57 Conn. 105; 18 Ins. L. J. 518; 17 
 
 Atl. 356, and cases there cited; 
 Townsend v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 83 N. Y. Supp. 909. 
 
 There being no requirement for notice nor necessity for 
 witnesses, an appraisement is not vitiated by the mere fact 
 that the appraisers met without notice to the company, while 
 officers of the insured corporation were present and pointed 
 
108 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 out the damaged property, where there is no suggestion of 
 undue influence or bad faith, and the appraisers, made their 
 award on their own knowledge of the subject. 
 
 American Steel Co. v. German-Am. F. Ins. Co. (U. S. C. C. A.) ; 
 
 187 Fed. 730 ; 
 Orient Ins. Co. v. Harmon (Tex. C. C. A.), 117 S. W. 192. , . 
 
 It is not necessary for either party to the submission {o 
 have notice of the meeting of the appraisers or an opportunity 
 \o present evidence. The submission did not provide for such 
 notice or for the parties to have the opportunity to produce 
 evidence upon the question at issue. On the contrary, the 
 terms of submission were such as to indicate the appraisers 
 were to proceed informally to fix the amount of plaintiff's loss, 
 and if unable to agree, to call in the umpire to settle their 
 differences. See Blakely v. Proctor, 134 Ga. 139, 67 S. E. 389.) 
 Of course, the award could have been set aside for fraud, 
 or by showing that unfair advantage had been given to one of 
 the parties, or for palpable mistake of law, Eberhardt v. Fed- 
 eral Ins. Co. (ct. of App. Ga. Feby. 4, 1914), 80 S. E. 856. 
 
 An award will not be set aside for irregularity or bad faith, 
 where one of the arbitrators privately made certain experiments 
 as to the effect of intense heat on certain goods, the result of 
 which he communicated to the other arbitrators at a meeting 
 at which the respective parties and their counsel were present, 
 without objection from them. The arbitrators also, with knowl- 
 edge and consent of both parties visited the scene of the fire 
 and made certain examinations. Two of the arbitrators talked 
 with third persons about the fire, but both testified this had no 
 effect on them in making up the award. Two of the arbitrators, 
 in the absence of the third, discussed the amount of the award, 
 but came to no conclusion until the final meeting when all three 
 were together. Two of them privately examined the books of 
 one of them who dealt in similar goods to those of insured, to 
 learn the prices thereof and communicated the facts and infor- 
 mation therefrom to the third arbitrator. 
 
 Farrell v. German-Am. Ins. Co., 175 Mass. 340 ; 56 N. E. 572. 
 
 The provision in the policy that "the appraisers together 
 shall then (after choosing the umpire) estimate and appraise 
 the loss," does not require them to view the damaged property 
 together nor forbid them viewing it separately. 
 Kent v. Aetna Ins. Co. (Mo. App.), 146 S. W. 78. 
 
 Inquiries, made by one of the appraisers for his own infor- 
 
APPRAISAL ARBITRATION AWARD. 109 
 
 mation, in the absence of the parties or other appraisers, will 
 not invalidate the award, unless the party is prejudiced or the 
 award affected thereby. 
 
 Hall v. Norwalk F. Ins. Co. (Conn. S. C.), 17 All. Rep. 356; 
 Farrell v. German- Am. Ins. Co. (Mass. S. C.), 29 Ins. L. J. 341. 
 
 Referees under Minnesota Standard Fire Policy have no 
 authority to make independent investigation and base their 
 award on the result thereof, but are required to give interested 
 parties reasonable opportunity to present evidence bearing on 
 case. 
 
 Schoenich v. American Ins. Co. (Minn.), 124 N. W. 5. 
 
 Where the award was rendered upon the report, infor- 
 mation and conclusion of the loss of one of the appraisers who 
 was the only one of the appraisers who had seen the loss, it 
 will be declared void. 
 
 Citizens Ins Co. v. Hamilton, 48 111. App. 593. 
 
 Where the insured furnishes an inventory which he certifies 
 is correct, he cannot have set aside for mistake in inventory an 
 award based thereon. 
 
 Kentucky C. Co. v. Rochester Germ. Ins. Co., 20 Ky. L. R. 1571 : 
 49 S. W. 780. 
 
 The company's appraiser and the umpire agreed on the 
 amount of loss on goods totally destroyed, and accepted an 
 expert's opinion of damage to goods saved. Held, no evidence 
 could be received which showed plaintiff's loss was greater than 
 the award. 
 
 Rogers v. Commercial U. A. Co., 15 Can. L. Times 228. 
 
 Referees under Massachusetts standard policy are not com- 
 pelled to receive evidence upon the amount of the loss, but may 
 proceed to determine that fact in any way in which they may 
 think best. 
 
 Hanley v. Aetna Ins. Co. (Mass.), 102 N. E. 641. 
 
 \ 
 
 Where the appraisers and umpire have before them a list 
 of the property destroyed and the insured's statement in detail 
 in respect to his loss, they may refuse to hear evidence. 
 Royal Ins. Co. v. Ries, 80 Ohio St. 272; 88 N. E. R. 638. 
 
 ARBITRATION OF ALL DIFFERENCES. 
 
 Before the New York standard form policy came inio 
 vogue, a great number of the fire policies required all differences 
 
110 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 to be submitted to arbitration and the courts in nearly every 
 such case decided such clause would not be enforced, as the 
 effect would be to oust the courts of jurisdiction. 
 
 National Masonic A. Ass'n v. Burr (Neb. S. C.). 62 N. W. Rep. 
 
 466; 24 Ins. L. J. 423; 
 
 Prader v. Nat'l Masonic A. Ass'n (Iowa S. C.), 63 N. W. Rep. 601 ; 
 Keefe v. Nat'l Ace. Ass'n (N. Y. S. C., App. Div.), 38 N. Y. 
 
 Supp. 854 ; 4 App. Div. 392 ; 
 Fox v. Mason's Frat. Ace. Ass'n (Wis. S. C.), 71 N. W. Rep. 363. 
 
 Appraisal, as Used in the Policies, Means Arbitration of Only 
 the Amount of the Loss. 
 
 But the New York standard form policy is now in general 
 use, except in a few of those states having a standard form of 
 their own, and all of the policies now provide that only the 
 sound vajue, loss and damage are to be submitted, to appraisers. 
 The policy now in use contemplates an arbitration limited to 
 the amount of the loss, rather than an appraisal, and the arbi- 
 trators are termed appraisers, I presume, on account of the 
 courts deciding that an arbitration ousted them of jurisdiction. 
 But the policy is perfectly plain in defining the duties of the 
 appraisers and in saying that they shall be the sole arbiters 
 only in so far as the loss and damage is concerned, leaving all 
 other questions, including the liability, to be determined by the 
 parties, or, if they fail, then by the courts, and this is in accord 
 with nearly all, if not all, of the decisions. 
 
 Subject of Appraisal Totally Destroyed Goods Damaged 
 Goods. 
 
 Where the amount of the loss is made payable 60 days from 
 date of adjusted claim and the method of adjustment provided 
 for in the policy in respect to the "damage to the property" is 
 in case the parties are unable to agree, by appraisement as 
 therein provided made a condition precedent to recovery, this 
 contemplates an appraisement of the total as well as the partial 
 loss. 
 
 Gasser v. Sun Fire Office, 42 Minn. 315 ; 19 Ins. L. J. 243 ; 44 
 
 N. W. 252 ; 
 
 Barley v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co. (R. I.), 76 Atl. Rep. 753; 
 Williamson v. L. & L. & G. Ins. Co.. 122 Fed. 69 ; 58 C. C. A. 241 ; 
 Rutter v. Hanover F. Ins. Co., 138 Ala. 202 ; 35 Southern 33 ; 
 Stout v. Phoenix Assur. Co.. 65 N. J. Eq. 566 ; 56 Atl. 691. 
 
 Where the policy provided that in case of disagreement the 
 loss or damages should be submitted to appraisers to be chosen 
 as provided by the policy, a submission entered into by the 
 parties which only provided for an appraisal of the damage to 
 goods saved, was void as not in accord with the conditions r< 
 the policy. 
 
APPRAISAL ARBITRATION AWARD. Ill 
 
 Adams v. N. Y. Bowery F. Ins. Co., 85 Iowa 6 ; 21 Ins. L. J. 833 ; 
 51 N. W. 1149. 
 
 When the appraisal agreement provides that "it is expressly 
 understood that this agreement and appraisement is for the 
 purpose of ascertaining and fixing the amount of said loss and 
 damage only , * * * and shall not determine, waive or invalidate 
 any other right or rights of either of the parties," the only 
 question which can be considered as submitted to the appraisers 
 is that of determining the value of the property totally de- 
 stroyed and the injury to that not destroyed. 
 
 Germania F. Ins. Co. v. Warner, 13 Ind. App. 466; 41 N. E. 969. 
 
 A policy that provides that the amount of the loss shall be 
 ascertained by appraisers, in case of disagreement, contemplates 
 the articles totally obliterated as well as those which have suf- 
 fered a damage only. 
 
 Palatine Ins. Co. v. Morton, 106 Tenn. 558; 61 S. W. 787; 30 
 Ins. L. J. 481. 
 
 A demand for appraisal of the salvage goods alone is not 
 authorized under a policy providing that the amount of the loss 
 shall be ascertained by appraisers in case of disagreement, and 
 the insured is justified in declining it. 
 
 Palatine Ins. Co. v. Morton, 106 Tenn. 558; 61 S. W. 787; 30 
 Ins. L. J. 481. 
 
 i 
 
 The insured is not concluded by an award of appraisers, 
 which, through the fault of the adjusters, is limited to the dam- 
 age to such goods only as are visible at the time of the appraisal. 
 Hong Sling v. Scottish U. & N. Ins. Co., 7 Utah 441 ; 27 Pac. 170. 
 
 Where a policy insures contents of a two-story building 
 known as the Hotel, the failure of appraisers to appraise the 
 contents in a one-story addition will render their award invalid. 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Moore (Texas C. C. A.), 46 S. W. Rep. 1131. 
 
 If the appraisers disregard the instructions in the agree- 
 ment for submission to appraisal, the award is not binding. 
 
 Rutter v. Hanover F. Ins. Co. (Ala. S. C.), 35 Southern Rep. 33. 
 
 A provision in the policy requiring "the amount of sound 
 value and of damage to the property" to be determined by ap- 
 praisal applies only to a case of partial damage and not where 
 the property has been totally destroyed by fire. 
 
 Rosenwald v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 50 Hun. 172; 19 St. Rep. 732; 3 
 N. Y. Supp. 215; 
 
112 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Lang v. Eagle F. Ins. Co., 12 (N. Y. S. C.), App. Div. 39; 42: 
 N. Y. Supp. 539. 
 
 The standard form (N. Y.) provides that loss on totally 
 destroyed goods, as well as the damage to the goods not de- 
 stroyed, are to be appraised. 
 
 Stout v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 65 N. J. Eq. 566 ; 56 Atl. Rep. 691 ; 
 Phenix Ins. Co. v. Carnahan (Ohio S. C.), 58 N. E. Rep. 805; 
 Chippewa Lumber Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. (Mich. S. C.). 44 N. W. 
 Rep. 1055; 80 Mich. 116; 19 Ins. L. J. 535. 
 
 An appraisement omitting property claimed by the insured 
 to have been destroyed is void. 
 
 American F. Ins. Co. v. Bell (Tex. C. C. A.), 75 S. W. Rep. 319; 
 Rutter v. Hanover F. Ins. Co. (Ala. S. C.), 35 Southern Rep. 33. 
 
 After signing the award the authority of the arbitrators 
 ceases, and it is not in their power to reopen it or to deal 
 further with the matter; the fact that one of them was misled 
 by the others in connection with the signing of the award, if 
 true, would form good ground for an application to the court 
 to set it aside, but did not justify him in calling in the third 
 arbitrator and making another award different from that to 
 which he was already a party. 
 
 Hall v. Queen Ins. Co., 39 Nova Scotia 295 ; 1 E. L. R. 295 ; 21 
 Ins. Dig. 88. 
 
 For goods which are totally destroyed by fire no appraise- 
 ment can be required, for the reason that to appraise the loss on 
 such goods would require appraisers to call witnesses and be- 
 come arbitrators. 
 
 Pennsylvania F. Ins. Co. v. Carnahan, 19 Ohio Cir. Ct. 97, 
 114; 10 Ohio C. D. 186, 225; but see when these cases came be- 
 fore Ohio Supreme Court. Phenix Ins. Co. et *al. v. Carnahan, 
 63 Ohio St. 258; 58 N. E. 805, it was held assured must not only 
 submit to appraisalj but that he must show that he has per- 
 formed the condition or has a legal excuse for non-performance 
 thereof. 
 
 The award cannot be impeached in an action at law on the 
 ground that appraisers refused to consider, or to include in the 
 a\vard, the loss on so much of the property as was totally de- 
 stroyed, when such loss was clearly within the submission and 
 was covered by the terms of the award. 
 
 Georgia Home Ins. Co. v. Kline et al. (Ala. S. C.), 21 Southern 
 Rep. 958. 
 
APPRAISAL ARBITRATION AWARD. 113 
 
 Total Loss Statute. 
 
 Two rules have been adopted defining total loss. The earlier 
 one, that the loss is total whenever the building has been so 
 injured as to lose its identity and specific character as such; 
 and the other, that it is not totally destroyed so long as a 
 substantial remnant remains which a prudent, uninsured person 
 would use in rebuilding. The whole question, however, is one 
 of fact for a jury to determine. Most of the recent cases follow 
 the latter rule. Where the statutes provide -for the amount of 
 the insurer's liability in case of total loss, there can be no con- 
 sideration for appraisal. 
 
 See case Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Homewood (anno- 
 tated) for important and valuable cases bearing on the question 
 of Constructive Total Loss, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1182 (Okla- 
 homa). 
 
 Fair Unfair Appraisers Conduct of Appraisers Selection of 
 
 Umpire. 
 
 The action of insurer's apraiser in nominating for umpire, 
 names of persons unknown to assured's appraiser, and who had 
 frequently acted as appraisers and umpires for insurance com- 
 panies in other loses, was tantamount to a refusal to agree upon 
 a disinterested umpire. This being true, the fact that an ap- 
 praisal was not had is no defense to the action. 
 
 Bishop v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 130 N. Y. 488 ; 21 Ins. L. J. 345. 
 
 Citing: 
 
 Unrig v. Ins. Co., 101 N. T. 362 ; 
 
 Bradshaw v. Agricultural Ins. Co. (137 N. T. 137), 22 Ins. L. J. 
 
 161. 
 McCullough v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (Mo. S. C.), 22 Ins. L. J. 781; 
 
 113 Mo. 606; 
 Brock v. Dwelling House Ins. Co., 102 Mich. 583; 24 Ins. L. J. ; 
 
 464; 61 N. W. Rep. 67; 
 Niagara F. Ins. Co. v. Bishop (111. S. C.), 154 111. 9; 25 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 24 ; 
 
 Hickerson v. Ins. Cos., 25 Ins. L. J. 422 (Tenn. S. C.); 
 Harrison v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. (Iowa <S. C.), 30 Ins. L. J. 255; 
 Read v. Ins. Co., 103 la. 314; 
 Chapman v. Rockford Ins. Co. (Wis. S. C.), 62 N. W. Rep. 422. 
 
 Where the appraiser for the insured insisted on taking as 
 umpire any one of a number of business men residing in the 
 city where the loss occurred, but the appraiser for the insurance 
 company named a number of persons not residents of said city. 
 They were for that reason rejected by insured's appraiser, who, 
 after trying for eleven days to agree on an umpire, resigned. 
 Held, The insured was not warranted in withdrawing from the 
 
114 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 appraisal, and that neither the company nor its appraiser was 
 at fault; that no evidence was introduced showing that either 
 the company's appraiser or the persons nominated by him as 
 umpire were not fair and competent. 
 
 Kersey v. Phenix Ins. Co. (Mich. S. C.), 97 N. W. Rep. 57; 
 (And see Vernon Ins. Co. v. Maitlen, 158 Ind. 393). 
 
 Where the evidence shows that the acceptance of a person 
 as one of the appraisers of a loss by the insured is induced by 
 the company by false statements as to his business and impar- 
 tiality, such fact affords ground for setting aside an award which 
 is grossly below the actual loss. 
 
 Kiernan v. Dutchess Co. Mut. Ins. Co. (N. Y. C. A.) ( 44 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 698 ; 
 Produce Refrigerator Co. v. Norwich Union F. Ins. Society (Minn. 
 
 S. C.), 97 N. W. Rep. 875. 
 Bradshaw v. Agricultural Ins. Co. (N. Y. C. A., Jan., 1893), 22 
 
 Ins. L. J. 161 ; 
 
 Ins. Co. of N. A. v. Hegewald (Ind. S. C.), 32 Ins. L. J. 621; 
 Glover v. Rochester German Ins. Co. (Wash. S. C.), 39 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 380. 
 
 , The fact that one of the appraisers was an endorser of a 
 note made by assured secured by a mortgage did not render 
 him an interested party in the subject of arbitration. 
 
 Bullman v. Ins. Cos. (Mass. S. C., May, 1893), 22 Ins. L. J. 668. 
 
 In selecting an umpire, the appraisers should seek an hon- 
 est and competent person and one living within a reasonable 
 distance. 
 
 Fowble v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 106 Mo. App. 527. 
 
 Where the insurer's appraiser, being a non-resident of the 
 place where the loss occurs, refuses to accept as umpire any 
 of the persons resident of such place proposed by insured's 
 appraiser, his conduct amounts to a refusal to appraise and 
 entitles the insured to sue. 
 
 Brock v. Dwelling House Ins. Co. (Mich. S. C.), 61 N. W. Rep. 
 
 67 ; 24 Ins. L. J. 464 ; 
 
 Chapman v. Rockford Ins. Co. (Wis. S. C.), 62 N. W. Rep. 422; 
 Hickerson v. German Am. Ins. Co. (Tenn. S. C. ), 33 S. W. Rep. 
 
 1041; 25 Ins. L. J. 422. 
 
 Each appraiser presented three names; those of the in- 
 sured's appraiser were objected to without cause, and those 
 proposed by the insurer's appraiser, for the reason that they 
 were non-residents. Held, Failure of appraisal was due to un- 
 reasonable conduct of the insurer's appraiser. 
 
 Braddy v. N. Y. Bowery F. Ins. Co. (N. S. S. C.). 20 S. E. 
 Rep. 477. 
 
APPRAISAL ARBITRATION AWARD. 115 
 
 The insured's appraiser may insist that the umpire be 
 selected from some place in the county in which the property 
 is situated. 
 
 Niagara Ins. Co. v. Bishop, 49 111. App. 388. 
 
 It is no defense in an action on a policy that no appraise- 
 ment was had pursuant to requirements, where the insured 
 refused to allow the appraisers to proceed by reason of an 
 improper proposal that was made by the company's appraiser 
 to insured's appraiser. 
 
 Davis v. Guardian Assur. Co., 87 Hun. 414 Aff'd. on opinion 
 below in 155 N. Y. 682. 
 
 The fact that an appraiser had before been employed as 
 such by the company does not necessarily render him ineligible. 
 
 Stemmer v. Scottish Union and National Ins. Co. (Oregon S. C.). 
 27 Ins. L. J. 972. 
 
 The insured selected one G to act as appraiser on his 
 behalf. G was an experienced builder and contractor and had 
 made, as such, an estimate of the damage to the property by 
 the fire, for which he had been paid prior to his selection as 
 appraiser. Held, That the fact that he had made such estimate 
 under the employment of the insured was a fact to be con- 
 sidered by the jury on the issue whether he was sufficiently 
 free of bias and prejudice to be disinterested party in the 
 appraisement. The fact that he had an intimate knowledge of 
 the subject-matter, and on that account a preconceived opinion, 
 did not of itself disqualify him, because it was such knowledge 
 and such experience which made him the better qualified to 
 ascertain the true value if he was free from bias and prejudice. 
 In other words, this preconceived opinion as an expert, derived 
 from personal inspection, was not a disqualification as an 
 appraiser. 
 
 National Fire Ins. Co. v. O'Brien et al. (Ark. S. C.), 87 South- 
 western Reporter (June 7, 1905) 129. 
 
 An award will not be set aside because one of the appraisers 
 had been in the employ of the insurance company, and where 
 the other was in the employ of the insured, and the two agreed 
 on the loss without calling an umpire. 
 
 Remington Paper Co. v. London Assur. Corp. (N. T. S. C., App. 
 Div.), 43 N. Y. Supp. 431. 
 
 The question of distinterestedness of appraiser is one of 
 fact for the jury. 
 
 Hall et al. v. Western Assur. Co. (Ala. S. C.), 32 Southern 
 Rep. 257. 
 
116 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 The burden of proof is on the party seeking to impeach the 
 award, which is, in the absence of fraud, prima facie binding 
 on both parties. 
 
 Connecticut F. Ins. Co. v. O'Fallon (Neb. S. C.), 69 N. W. 
 Rep. 118. 
 
 A party does not assume responsibility for the con- 
 sequences of irregularities and misconduct on the part of an 
 appraiser, merely because he knew him to be a professional 
 appraiser on behalf of interests of the other party. 
 
 Christiansen v. Norwich Union F. Ins. Soc. (Minn. S. C., De- 
 cember, 1901), 31 Ins. L. J. 218. 
 
 But -see 
 
 Western Assur. Co. v. Hall (Ala. S. C.), 38 S. E. Rep. 853; 
 
 Bradshaw v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 137 N. Y. 137; 22 Ins. L. J. 
 161; 
 
 Indiana Ins. Co. v. Boehm, 88 Ind. 578. 
 
 The whole question of responsibility for fairness or unfair- 
 ness of appraiser is covered in the two cases of Fowble v. 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. and Uhrig v. Ins. Co. 
 
 While the appraiser is not an agent for the party who 
 selected him, yet when it is the improper act or conduct of 
 such appraiser which prevents the selection of an umpire, the 
 consequence of a failure should be visited upon him who selects 
 such appraiser. 
 
 Fowble v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (Mo. App. C.), 81 S. W. Rep. 485. 
 
 The spirit of the statute relating to arbitration of fire losses 
 requires that the three referees shall be as free from pecuniary 
 interest and relationship as judges and jurors are required to 
 be, and also be as free from bias, prejudice, sympathy and par- 
 tisanship as judges and jurors are presumed to be. If there 
 is no other restriction as to the men to be nominated for the 
 other party to choose from, or as to the third man however 
 appointed, than that they shall not be relatives, and have no 
 pecuniary interest, then either party may have forced upon him 
 as referee at least one violent partisan of the other party, or 
 at least men incompetent, opinionated, or biased. The purpose 
 of the statute might thus be wholly defeated and made to work 
 an injustice. 
 
 From the foregoing considerations and others we are satis- 
 fied that the insurance statute and the insurance contract re- 
 quire that the referees shall be "disinterested," not only in the 
 narrow sense of being without relationship and pecuniary in- 
 terest, but also in the broad, full sense of being competent, im- 
 
APPRAISAL ARBITRATION AWARD. 117 
 
 partial, fair and opened-minded, substantially indifferent in 
 thought and feeling between the parties, and without bias or 
 partisanship either way. Brock v. Ins. Co., 102 Mich., 583; 61 
 N. W. 67; 26 L. R. A. 623; 47 Am. St. Rep. 562; Bradshaw v. Ins. 
 Co., 137 N. Y. 137; 32 N. E. 1055; Hall v. Assurance Co., 133 Ala. 
 637; 32 Southern 257; Hickerson v. Ins. Co., 96 Tenn. 193; 33 
 S. W. 1041; 32 L. R. A. 172. Turning now to the evidence in this 
 case, we find the following facts among others: The property in- 
 sured was situated in Calais, a city on the extreme eastern fron- 
 tier of the state. The referee chosen by the defendant from the 
 three men nominated by the plaintiff was Mr. Sawyer, of Calais. 
 The referee chosen by the plaintiff from the three men nomin- 
 ated by the defendant was Mr. Allen, of Portland, nearly 300 
 miles distant from Calais. Practically, Mr. Sawyer was the 
 choice of the plaintiff, and Mr. Allen the choice of the defendant. 
 When these two undertook to agree upon a man as third referee, 
 Mr. Allen declined to agree upon any man in Calais, though 
 freely admitting there were as good men in Calais as anywhere 
 else in the state. He gave as a reason for his refusal that the 
 defendant company objected to any local man. 
 
 This refusal, apart from the excuse given for it, was unrea- 
 sonable. Assuming, as Mr. Allen admitted, that there were as 
 good men in Calais as anywhere else in the state, it is not a 
 reasonable inference from the fact of their residence in Calais 
 and consequent probable better knowledge of local conditions 
 affecting values there, that none of them were proper persons 
 to act as appraising referees. His refusal to consider any of 
 them shows that Mr. Allen was not an impartial, indifferent 
 arbitrator, and coupled with the excuse given, it shows that he 
 regarded himself as the representative of the defendant com- 
 pany. From this circumstance alone, without considering other 
 appearing in the evidence, we think it clear that Mr. Allen was 
 not the disinterested referee required by the statute and the 
 policy, and hence that the award must be adjudged not binding 
 
 on the plaintiff, and must be set aside. Brock v. Ins. Co., 102 
 Mich. 583; 61 N. W. 67; 26 L. R. A. 623; 47 Am. St. Rep. 562; 
 McCullough v. Ins- Co., 113 Mo. 606; 21 S. W. 207; Ins. Co. v. 
 Bishop, 154 111. 9; 39 N. E. 1102; 45 Am. St. Rep. 105; Hick- 
 erson v. Ins. Co., 96 Tenn. 193; 33 S. W. 1041; 32 L. R. A. 172; 
 The defendant company refused to comply with the plain- 
 tiff's request for another arbitration of the amount of the loss, 
 
118 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 and it was stipulated in the report of the case that if the court 
 adjudged the award invalid, judgment should be awarded for 
 the plaintiff for the full amount of the insurance, $1,700, less 
 $1,353.06 already paid. 
 
 Judgment for the plaintiff and interest from the date of 
 the writ. 
 
 Young v. Aetna Ins. Co. et al., 64 All. 584 (Me. S. J. Ct.). 
 
 An appraiser ought not to consider himself as an agent of 
 the party by whom he was selected, but the authorities seem to 
 hold a party responsible when the appraiser whom he selected 
 assumes to be his representative and improperly prevents the 
 appraisal from being made. Under such circumstances, the act 
 of the appraiser is regarded as the act of the party at whose 
 instance he was named and in whose interest he assumes to 
 act, and no direct evidence of authorization or ratification is 
 required. 
 
 Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Bishop, x54 111. 9 ; 39 N. E. 1102 ; 45 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 105; 
 
 Uhrig v. Ins. Co.. 101 N. Y. 362; 4 N. E. 745; 
 Bishop v. Ins. Co., 139 N. Y. 488; 29 N. E. 844; 
 Harrison v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 112 Iowa 77; 83 N. W. 820; 
 McCullough v. Ins. Co., 113 Mo. 606 ; 21 S. W. 207 ; 
 Franklin v. Ins. Co., 70 N. H. 256 ; 47 Atl. 91 : 
 Braddy v. Ins. Co., 115 N. C. 355; 20 S. E. 477; 
 Hickerson v. Ins. Co., 96 Tenn. 193 ; 33 S. W. 1041 ; 32 L. R. A. 
 
 172; 
 Chapman v. Rockford Ins. Co., 89 Wis. 572; 62 N. W. 422; 28 
 
 L. R. A. 405. 
 
 After the first attempt at arbitration had failed and was out 
 of the way, the plaintiff requested the insurance company to 
 appoint new referees and proceed under the provisions of the 
 policy, and that the company refused to have anything further 
 to do with it. This being true, the right to an appraisal was 
 waived, and the insured was entitled to commence his action 
 to recover upon the policy. The fact that the building had been 
 in the meantime repaired did not justify the company in refus- 
 ing to proceed with the appraisal. 
 
 O'Rourke v. German Ins. Co. (Minn. S. C.), 109 N. W. 401. 
 
 It was an unreasonable and improper requirement of the 
 insurance companies, through their agent Young, that the 
 umpire should not live in Bell county or vicinity, and when 
 the appraisers broke up- in February without doing anything, 
 and it was apparent that they were not going to agree upon 
 anything, it was incumbent upon the insurance companies, 
 promptly within a reasonable time, to name another appraiser 
 not a partisan, and to request of Asher to do the same, that the 
 
APPRAISAL ARBITRATION AWARD. 119 
 
 two new appraisers might adjust the matter or agree upon an 
 umpire, if they were unable to agree upon the appraisement. 
 This was not done, and, when a reasonable time had elapsed, 
 the proposition for an appraisement must be regarded aban- 
 doned, and a subsequent demand for an appraisement could not 
 be made. It has been well said that an habitual appraiser is 
 not a disinterested person, within the meaning of the arbitra- 
 tion clause in insurance policies. The conclusions we have 
 indicated are supported by the following authorities: 
 
 McCullough v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 113 Mo. 606; 21 S. W. 207; 
 Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Bishop, 154 111. 9; 39 N. E. 1102; 45 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 105; 
 
 Braddy v. Bowery Ins. Co., 115 N. C. 354; 20 S. E. 477; 
 Bradshaw v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 137 N. T. 137; 32 N. E. 1055; 
 GJover v. Rochester German Ins. Co., 11 Wash. 143 ; 39 Pac. 380 ; 
 Powers v. Imperial Ins. Co., 48 Minn. 380; 51 N. W. 123; 13 Am. 
 
 & Eng. Ency. of Law 362-365; 19 Cyc. 880. 
 
 A demand by two or more insurance companies for sub- 
 mission of their several liabilities in one appraisement of arbi- 
 tration is not warranted. 
 
 Wicking v. Citizens' Fire Ins. Co., 118 Mich. 640; 77 N. W. 275; 
 Palatine Ins. Co. v. Morton-Scott-Robertson Co., 106 Tenn. 558; 
 
 61 S. W. 787; 
 Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Asher, (Ky.) 100 S. W. 233. 
 
 The requirement of the policies of insurance was that the 
 appraiser and the umpire should be disinterested. Such ap- 
 praisers were not in the strict sense arbitrators, and it is not 
 probable that either party to the policies contemplated, in case 
 of loss, that the appraisers should stand absolutely unbiased. It 
 is more than probable that each one selected an appraiser in 
 whom confidence was reposed as an honest man, but that, in 
 case of any difference, his sympathies would incline toward the 
 party by whom he was chosen. It would be expecting too 
 much, in the present stage of progress toward the millennium, 
 to assume that either party contemplated, when entering into 
 the contract of insurance, that the appraisers selected should 
 be absolutely indifferent. These tribunals are home-made, and 
 neither their composition nor their conduct should be more 
 closely scrutinized than is that of the tribunals selected in 
 accordance with the statutes and long-standing judicial prac- 
 tice. If such appraisers are honest men, who make an honest 
 effort to arrive at an honest award, I believe that nothing 
 further can be demanded or expected. At the same time, all 
 appearances of fraudulent or unfair practice should be met with 
 the disapproval of the courts. How far the parties intended to 
 differentiate between bias and interest is not apparent, but I 
 
120 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 think there is a distinction; and, if each party was satisfied that 
 the opposing appraiser was free from interest, he should not 
 have been surprised to find that he was not entirely free from 
 bias. It would not be an extremely easy undertaking to find 
 either an appraiser or an umpire, in a business as limited as is 
 that of preserving fruit, who would be an entire stranger to 
 both parties in the case. 
 
 Whalen v. Goldman, 116 N. Y. Supp. 1006. 
 
 To set aside an award of appraisers on the ground that tht 
 appraiser appointed by the company and the umpire were not 
 "competent and disinterested," or that articles damaged were 
 by them excluded as not insured by the policy, it must be shown 
 that the company knew of such incompetency and interested- 
 ness, and that it was responsible for the decision excluding such 
 articles, that a demand was made on the company that they be 
 appraised, or it must be shown the company waived the condi- 
 tion of appraisement. 
 
 Early v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co. (R. I.). 76 Atl. Rep. 753. 
 
 If either of the parties to an appraisal under a clause in 
 the policy acts in bad faith so as to defeat the object of the 
 clause, the other is absolved from compliance therewith; when 
 one appraisal fails by reason of default of one of the parties, 
 the other is not bound to enter into a new appraisal agreement. 
 
 Unrig v. Williamsburgh City F. Ins. Co., 101 N. T. 362, affirming 
 31 Hun. 98. 
 
 Every presumption must be made in favor of fairness and 
 the award should not be set aside, except upon clear and strong 
 proof of partiality, conspiracy or fraud. 
 
 Mosness v. German-American Ins. Co. (Minn. S. C., July, 1892), 
 
 21 Ins. L. J. 915. 
 Citing: 
 Brush v. Fisher, 70 Mich. 469; Overby v. Thrasher, 47 Ga. 10; 
 
 Ins. Co. v. Goehring, 99 Pa. St. 13; 
 
 Barnard v. Ins. Co. (U. S. C. C. A. 8th Dist.), 29 Ins. L. J. 631; 
 Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Bonner Mercantile Co., 15 U. S. App. 134. 
 
 Section 3643, Rev. St. Ohio, providing arbitrators and 
 umpire must have been residents of the county in which loss 
 occurred at least one year prior to said loss, is constitutional. 
 
 Germania Ins. Co. v. Cincinnati P. B. S. & P. P. Co. (Cinn. Su- 
 preme Ct. Gen. Term), 7 Ohio Decisions 571. 
 
 Where two appraisers made independent estimates, one of 
 $5,000, the other of $115,000, and without discussing their differ- 
 
APPRAISAL ARBITRATION AWARD. 121 
 
 ences, submitted them to the umpire, who took both estimates 
 and the books to his room at a hotel, and requested both ap- 
 praisers to remain within call; he had six clerks to assist him 
 and after three days made an award of $60,624.73, in which in- 
 sured's appraiser joined. Held, Award valid. 
 
 Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Bonner Mercantile Co. (U. S. C. C. A. 9th 
 Cir., May, 1893), 22 Ins. L. J. 801. 
 
 Where one appraiser in bad faith refuses to meet the other 
 appraiser and fails or refuses to proceed with the appraisal, the 
 other appraiser and the umpire may make a valid appraisement. 
 
 Doying v. Broadway Ins. Co. (C. of E. & A. N. J.), 23 Ins. L. J. 
 
 396; 27 Atl. Rep. 927; 
 American Central Ins. Co. v. Landau (N. J. Ch.), 49 Atl. Rep. 738. 
 
 Where one appraiser and the umpire refuse to deal with 
 the other appraiser and bring in an award, it is not binding 
 and will be set aside. 
 
 Providence-Washington Ins. Co. v. Board of Education (W. Va. 
 
 S. C. A.), 30 Ins. L. J. 577; 
 
 Schmitt v. Boston Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. Supp. 767; 
 Christiansen v. Norwich Union P. Ins. Society (Dec. 6, 1901), 
 
 (Minn. S. C.), 31 Ins. L. J. 218; 
 Mfrs. and Builders F. Ins. Co. v. Mullen (Neb. S. C.), 67 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 445; 
 Caledonian Ins. Co. v. Traub (Md. C. A.), 25 Ins. L. J. 791; 35 
 
 Atl. Rep. 13; 
 Strome v. London Assur. Corp. (N. Y. S, C. App. Div.), 47 N. Y. 
 
 Supp. 481; affirmed in 162 N. Y. 627; 
 N. Y. Mut. S. & L. Co. v. Manchester F. Ins. Co. (N. Y. S. C. 
 
 App. Div.), 87 N. Y. Supp. 1075; 
 Western Und. Ass'n. v. Hankins (111. S. C.), 35 Ins. L. J. 378. 
 
 Where one appraiser resigns, the other appraiser and the 
 umpire can not render a valid award on items concerning which 
 there had been no preceding conference and disagreement with 
 the withdrawing appraiser. 
 
 Seibert v. Germania and other Go's., (Iowa S. C.), 35 Ins. L. J. 
 384. 
 
 Where one appraiser is called away on business engage- 
 ment, and in his absence the other appraiser and umpire agreed 
 on an award, it is a question for jury whether such award is 
 valid or not. 
 
 Caledonian Ins. Co. v. Traub (Md. C. A.), 25 Ins. L. J. 791; 
 Schmitt Bros. v. Boston Ins. Co. (N. Y. S. C. App. Div.), 81 N. Y. 
 Supp. 767. 
 
 Arbitrators are not obliged to follow strict rules of law un- 
 less it is a condition of the submission that they do so. 
 
 Hall v. Norwalk F. Ins. Co. (Conn. S. C.), 17 Atl. Rep. 356; 
 Levine v. Lancashire Ins. Co. (Minn. S. C.), 21 Ins. L. J. 36; 
 
122 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Stemmer v. Scottish U. & N. Ins. Co. (Oregon S. C.), 27 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 972; 
 Farrell v. German American Ins. Co. (Mass. S. C.), 29 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 341. 
 
 Where the arbitrators and umpire agreed that each should 
 mark on a card his idea of damage and that the aggregate of 
 these amounts should be divided by three and the result should 
 be the amount of the award, it was held to be valid. 
 Aetna F. Ins. Co. v. Davis (Ky. C. A.), 29 Ins. L. J. 560. 
 
 Where appraisers disregard their instructions "to state sep- 
 arately sound value and damage" and bring in an award showing 
 the damage, but ignoring the sound value, the award will be 
 set aside. 
 
 Continental Ins. Co. v. Garrett (U. S. C. C. A. 6th Cir.), 125 Fed. 
 Rep. 589. 
 
 In appraisal agreement was an unsigned direction to ap- 
 praisers to affix to each article a specific damage, per yard, 
 pound, etc. This appraisers did not do. Held, The award was 
 not avoided. 
 
 Enright v. Montatlk F. Ins. Co. (N. Y. S. C.), 40 N. Y. State Rep. 
 642. 
 
 Appraisal Must Be in Detail in Rhode Island. 
 
 An appraisal agreement is made to secure two things; First: 
 an appraisement; and second, an award, which is the finding 
 or judgment based upon the appraisement. Where there are 
 numerous articles of different kinds and quality to be appraised, 
 it is obvious that an appraisement to be of value must be founded 
 upon an individual appraisal of the various articles. There is no 
 provision in the agreement expressly requiring an itemized ap- 
 praisal; but its implications as indicated by citations above (the 
 only cases cited are South of v. American Centra*! Ins. Co., 34 
 R. I. 324; 83 Atl. 441; Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, vol. 12, 442, 3; 
 Cyc. 374; Continental Ins. Co. v. Garrett, 125 Fed. 589; 60 C. C. 
 A. 395, 396) therefrom, in our judgment show that an itemized 
 or individual appraisement was contemplated thereby. The num- 
 ber or articles to be appraised after different fires may be ex- 
 pected to vary greatly, particularly when the articles are per- 
 sonal property. The itemized list in such cases must also vary 
 greatly in length. Perhaps for this reason no space for the 
 appraisement is provided for on the form of agreement. The 
 api raisers are apparently left to make that up themselves. In 
 the form of the award, after the last printed word, "dollars," is 
 
APPRAISAL ARBITRATION AWARD. 123 
 
 a space with a dotted line upon which to write whatever may 
 be necessary in addition. There is ample room allowed to make 
 the itemized appraisement a part of the award by reference. 
 * * * The evidence in this case does not warrant the pre- 
 sumption or inference that the form of the award, if presented 
 by the defendant, was by it intended or calculated to deceive 
 or mislead the appraisers or the insured as to the character of 
 the appraisement and award desired. The court therefore held, 
 it was the insured's duty to demand a new appraisal of his loss, 
 the first being invalid for the reason that it failed to show that 
 appraisers had appraised the value of each article and the loss 
 and damage to each in detail. Riddell v. Rochester Ger. Ins. 
 Co. (R. I. S. C.), 89 Atl. 833. 
 
 In one of the cases cited by the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
 (i. e. Continental Ins. Co. v. Garrett, 125 Fed. 589; 60 C. C. A. 
 395) as a case in point, it is true in that case the Federal Court 
 did hold the award invalid for the reason the appraisers did not 
 carry out the provisions of the appraisal agreement as well 
 as those of the policy, both of which required appraisers to de- 
 termine the sound value, as well as the loss thereto, whereas 
 they omitted to find the amount of the sound value, but did find 
 the amount of the loss. The court held the award invalid and 
 permitted the insured to bring suit, holding that he was not re- 
 quired to enter into a second appraisal, the first one not being 
 valid through no fault of his. In Enright v. Montauk Ins. Co., 40 
 N. Y. State Rep. 642, it was held the award was not avoided 
 because the appraisers had not appraised the loss article by 
 article when there was in the appraisal agreement an unsigned 
 direction to affix to each article a specific damage. There are 
 no other cases in line with the Rhode Island Court's decision 
 with the single exception of one the same court decided and re- 
 ferred to. The Author. 
 
 By failing to furnish an arbitrator who would proceed with 
 reasonable promptness in the discharge of his duties, any right 
 it may have had to insist on the damages being appraised was 
 lost. The record leaves no doubt but that the appraiser chosen 
 by this company resorted to the familiar expedient of prevent- 
 ing or delaying action by demanding an umpire from afar off, 
 and then, when something might be accomplished finding it im- 
 possible to proceed because of pressing business engagements at 
 hils home in Kansas City, Mo., there detaining him several 
 months. That the defendant was precluded by such conduct 
 from insisting on arbitration as a condition precedent to the 
 
124 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 maintenance of the action is well settled authority. Harrison v. 
 Hartford F. Ins. Co., 30 Ins. L. J. 253, 112 Iowa 77 (citing Read 
 v. Ins. Co., 103 la. 314; Brook v. Ins. Co., 102 Mich. 583; Brad- 
 shaw v. Ins. Co., 137 N. Y. 137; McCullough v. Ins. Co., 113 Mo. 
 606; Bishop v. Ins. Co., 130 N. Y. 488; Uhrig v. Ins. Co., 101 
 N. Y. 362). 
 
 The provision in a fire policy that the loss is payable sixty 
 days after * * * an award of appraisers, doesn't give the in- 
 surer after it has agreed to appraisal and named its appraiser, an 
 absolute right to sixty days in which to commence the appraisal, 
 but it must proceed without unnecessary delay, and in a reason- 
 able time depending on the facts in the case, so where, after 
 the fire the parties appointed appraisers and agreed that they 
 should commence at once to appraise the goods and insured got 
 his appraiser and left him waiting for six days at great expense, 
 and the insurer stated the appraiser appointed by it could not 
 attend, and promised to procure a substitute but failed to do 
 so, and when communicated with by telegram failed to reply, 
 though knowing that insured was at great expense, and that the 
 goods which were not fully insured, were being injured by delay, 
 and that an early appraisement was necessary for insured to 
 save anything from the stock. Such action is a refusal to ap- 
 praise. 
 
 Providence- Wash. Ins. Co. v. Wolf, 168 Ind. 690; 80 N. E. 27 over- 
 ruling Ind. App., 72 N. E. 606. 
 
 Where the company fraudulently represents its appraiser 
 as an unprejudiced one and a business man, whereas he was 
 a professional appraiser, and it appearing the award was inade- 
 quate, it will be set aside because of a prejudiced appraiser hav- 
 ing been fraudulently imposed on insured. 
 
 "The scheme of appraisal contemplates that the two apprais- 
 ers shall estimate the amount of the loss, and in case of dis- 
 agreement their differences shall be submitted to the umpire. 
 It is not the purpose of the provision that one appraiser shall 
 present no estimate to his co-appraiser, but confer with the um- 
 pire in the absence of and without any notice whatever to the 
 other appraiser." 
 
 Kaiser v. Hamburg- Bremen F. Ins. Co., 69 N. Y. Supp. 344; 
 Hall v. Western Assur. Co., 133 Ala. 637; 32 Southern 267; 
 Glover v. Rochester Ger. Ins. Co., 11 Wash. 143; 39 Pacif. 380. 
 
 Where the arbitration fails by reason of fraud or intermed- 
 dling of the insured, the right to sue on the policy is lost. Where 
 the fraud or intermeddling with the appraisers is at the instance 
 
APPRAISAL ARBITRATION AWARD. 125 
 
 of the company, the insured may abandon the arbitration and 
 sue on the policy. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Kirkpatrick 
 (Tenn. S. C), 164 S. W. 1186. 
 
 But this, substantially, is what was done here, and such 
 action barely rose to the dignity of a real conference between 
 Thomas Fleming (one of the appraisers) and David Nicholson, 
 the umpire. Each obtained information upon "his own hook," so 
 to express it, and then each made figures based on his private 
 information, to a large extent, and ignoring the other appraiser 
 proceeded to make an award. Really Fleming was ignorant of 
 the evidence or information on which Nicholson acted, and 
 Stultz (the other appraiser) knew little, if anything, of the real 
 information on which either or both of the others acted. This 
 award was not the result of information furnished to all or con- 
 sidered by all or by any two, or of the joint deliberation of the 
 three or of any two. True, two signed the award, and so two 
 agreed in the final result, but it by no means follows that the 
 two would have agreed on that result had they consulted all the 
 evidence and information possessed by each and deliberated 
 thereon. 
 
 I think that an examination and consideration of the evi- 
 dence of Mr. Fleming is conclusive against the fairness and 
 justice of the award made. He testified that he gave full credit 
 to Palmer's (a gentleman engaged by the insurance companies) 
 report, and no credit whatever to the sworn proofs of loss and 
 the affidavits presented by the insured. 
 
 Without going into detail, the evidence also shows that on 
 the prior file of one of the cases against one of the companies 
 involved in this loss Mr. Fleming made statements almost ex- 
 actly opposite to the statements made on the trial of this case 
 in important matters, * * * If it be true that he was unable 
 \to understand and comprehend the questions put to him on the 
 trial (as he claims), a fair inference may be drawn that he was 
 incompetent to act as an appraiser in this important matter. 
 * * * My conclusions are that the appraisal made should be 
 set aside, and the matter should be determined before a court 
 and jury. 
 
 Davis v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 210 Fed. 653. 
 
 It is the duty of the appraiser, undoubtedly, to bring out all 
 the facts, favorable to the party nominating him; but he is not 
 the agent of the party so naming him. A refusal or willful 
 neglect of the appraiser or umpire to listen to and consider 
 
126 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 material sworn statements presented, is evidence of prejudice, 
 bias and interest. Davis v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 210 Fed. 
 653 (citing Kaiser v. Hamburg-Bremen Fire Ins. Co., 59 App. 
 Div. 525, 69 N. Y. Supp. 344, Aff'd 172 N. Y. 663, 65 N, E. 1118). 
 
 While an award of appraisers will be presumed to be just 
 and proper, yet where the evidence shows that the company's 
 appraiser was an expert in adjusting losses, and that, in enter- 
 ing upon the appraisement of the destroyed property he practi- 
 cally ignored the insured's appraiser, and refused to take any 
 account of the estimated depreciation made by an appraisal com- 
 pany who had personally examined the property about a year 
 before the fire, but arbitrarily depreciated the property 50 per 
 cent., it was no such effort at a fair and impartial appraisement 
 as the standard policy contemplates. Davis v. Stuyvesant Ins, 
 Co., 145 N.-Y. Supp. "192. 
 
 Mere inadequacy alone is not sufficient to set aside an 
 award; but, if the inadequacy be so gross and palpable as to 
 shock the moral sense, it is sufficient evidence to be submitted 
 to the jury on the issues relating to fraud and corruption or 
 partially and bias. The arbitrators awarded insured damages 
 in the amount of $73.50. The jury found that insured's loss 
 amounted to' $750. Held, That the award in such case ought 
 not to be permitted to stand. 
 
 Perry v. Greenwich Ins. Co. (N. C. S. C.) 49 Southeastern Reporter 
 (March 11, 1905), 889. 
 
 Where an award was signed by one appraiser with the un- 
 derstanding that certain items not considered were improperly 
 omitted, it should not be final, and afterwards sach omission 
 was found improper, such award can not be claimed as final. 
 
 Herndon v. Imperial F. Ins. Co. (N. C. S. C. March, 1892), 21 
 Ins. L. J. 193. 
 
 Where the award was based on an inventory furnished by 
 the insured and certified by him to be correct, he can not have 
 the award set aside for a mistake in the inventory. 
 
 Kentucky Chair Co. v. Rochester German Ins. Co. (Ky. C. A.), 
 28 Ins. L. J. 361. 
 
 Neither party can avoid the award on the ground that ap- 
 praisers erred in judgment as to the law or facts. 
 
 Hall v. Norwalk F. Ins. Co. (Conn. S. C.), 17 Atl. Rep. 356; 
 Stemmer v. Scottish U. & N. Ins. Co. (Oregon S. C.), 27 Ins. 
 L. J. 973. 
 
 An appraiser or umpire may inform himself by calling in 
 
APPRAISAL ARBITRATION AWAIID. 127 
 
 the aid of a third person skilled in a special branch embraced 
 in the appraisal and give to such estimate of such third person 
 such weight and evidence as he sees fit, even to adopting it as 
 his own judgment. 
 
 Bangor Savings Bank v. Niagara P. Ins. Co. (Me. S. C.), 23 
 
 Ins. L. J. 292; 
 Rogers v. Com'l Union Assur. Co. (Manitoba O. B.), 15 Canadian 
 
 L. Times 228. 
 
 The award of appraisers was not binding where they did 
 not appraise the damage to all the articles embraced in the 
 schedule, but held that some of them were not covered by the 
 policy. A policy of insurance covering "tools used in the manu- 
 facture of boots and shoes" covers patterns for making boots 
 and shoes. 
 
 Adams v. N. Y. Bowery F. Ins. Co. (Iowa S. C.), 51 N. W. 
 Rep. 1149. 
 
 In this state courts of equity will set aside awards not only 
 for fraud and for corrupt practices on the part of arbitrators 
 or parties, but for mistake, or willful misconduct of the arbitra- 
 tors. Commercial Assur. Co. v. Parker, 119 111. App. 126, citing 
 Citizens Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 48 111. App. 593; Catlett v. Dough- 
 erty, 114 111. 568. 
 
 The policy requires the parties to choose appraisers only 
 Dnce and if that fail through no fault of assured, he may bring 
 suit. 
 
 Braddy v. N. Y. Bowery F. Ins. Co., 115 N. C. 354, 20 S. E. 477; 
 
 Harrison v. German Am. Ins. Co., 67 Fed. 577; 
 
 Hickerson v. Royal Ins. Co., 96 Tenn. 193, 33 S. W. 1041; 
 
 Niagara F. Ins. Co. v. Bishop, 154 111. 9, 39 N. E. 1102. 25 Ins. 
 L. J. 24; 
 
 Connecticut F. Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 97 Md. 294, 55 Atl. 675; 
 
 Western Assur. Co. v. Decker, 39 C. C. A. 383, 98 Fed. 381; 
 
 Brock v. Dwelling Ho. Ins. Co., 102 Mich. 583, 61 N. W. 67; 
 
 Davis v. Atlas Assur. Co., 16 Wash. 232, 47 Pacif. 436, 885; 
 
 Capitol Ins. Co. v. Wallace, 50 Kans. 454, 31 Pacif. 1070; 
 
 McCullough v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 113 Mo. 606, 21 S. W. 207; 
 
 Chapman v. Rockford Ins. Co., 89 Wis. 572, 62 N. W. 422; 
 
 Uhrig v. Williamsburgh City F. Ins. Co., 101 N. Y. 362, 4 N. E. 745; 
 
 Davenport v. Long Island Ins. Co., 10 Daly 538; 
 
 Bishop v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 130 N. Y. 488, 29 N. E. 844; 
 
 Randall v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 10 Mont. 362, 25 Pacif. 960; 
 
 Fire Assn. v. Appel, 76 Ohio St. 1, 80 N. E. 952, 36 Ins. L. J. 769; 
 
 O'Rourke v. German Ins. Co., 99 Minn. 293, 104 N. W. 900; 
 
 Bernhard v. Rochester G. Ins. Co., 79 Conn. 388, 65 Atl. 134; 
 
 Pretzfelder v. Merchants Ins. Co., 116 N. C. 491, 21 S. E. 302, 28 
 Ins. L. J. 169; 
 
 Shawnee F. Ins. Co. v. Pontfleld, 110 Md. 356, 72 Atl. 835; 
 
 Sharp v. Niagara F. Ins. Co. (Mo. App.), 147 S. \V. 154; 
 
 Continental Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 45 Kans. 250, 25 Pacif. 629, 20 
 Ins. L. J. 269; 
 
 St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Kirkpatrick (Tenn. S. C.), 164 S. W. 
 1186; 
 
 German Am. Ins. Co. v. Jerrills. 82 Kans. 320. 108 Pac. 114, an- 
 notated in 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 104; 
 
 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Jester, 37 Okla. 413, 132 Pac. 130, annotated in 39 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1191. 
 
128 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Where the policy makes appraisal a condition precedent, and 
 the appraisers after making an honest effort to agree on an um- 
 pire and fail to do so, the assured is not justified in refusing to 
 proceed with the appraisal by selection of a new appraiser, and 
 in suing for the amount of his loss. 
 
 Westenhaver v. German Am. Ins. Co., 113 Iowa 726; 84 N. W. 717; 
 Vernon Ins. Co. & T. Co. v. Maitlen, 168 Ind. App. 393; 62 N. E. 
 
 755; 
 Baumgarth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (Mich.), 116 N. W. 449, 37 
 
 Ins. L. J. 577 (citing Davenport v. Ins. Co., 10 Daly (N. Y.) 
 
 535); 
 
 Grady v. Home F. & M. Ins. Co., 27 R. I. 435; 
 Kersey v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 135 Mich. 10, 97 N. W. 67. 
 
 It is not unreasonable for the insured to refuse to submit 
 to a second appraisal (the first having failed) unless the insurer 
 waives the provision in the policy that loss should not become 
 due until sixty days after award of appraisers. 
 
 Michel v. American Cent'l Ins. Co. (N. Y. S. C. App. Div.), 44 
 N. Y. Supp. 832. 
 
 If an appraisal fails, through no fault of insurer, assured has 
 no standing in court until a new appraisement is had. 
 
 Levine v. Lancashire Ins. Co. (Minn. S. C.), 26 Ins. L. J. 36; 
 Carp v. Queen Ins. Co. (Mo. C. of A.), 79 S. W. Rep. 757. 
 
 But, if it fail through no fault of either party, this does not 
 justify insured from refusing further arbitration and bringing 
 suit; other appraisers should be selected. 
 
 Westenhaver et al. v. German -Am. Ins. Co. (la. S. C.), 30 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 314; 
 
 Fisher v. Merchants Ins. Co. (Me. S. J. C.), 31 Ins. L,. J. 45; 
 Vernon Ins. and Trust Co. v. Maitlen (Ind. S. C.), 31 Ins. L. J. 672; 
 Carp r. Queen Ins. Co., 104 Mo. App. 602. 
 
 The Mass. Rev. Law as c 118 S. 60 provides that where the 
 referees are unable to agree on a third referee within ten days, 
 the insurance commissioner will on request of either party ap- 
 point the third referee. The Mass, standard policy makes arbi- 
 tration as to the amount of the loss a condition precedent to 
 suit. Upon a disagreement the insured and the company each se- 
 lected referees who failed to agree on a third within ten days, 
 whereupon the insured notified one of the referees that he 
 wished the third appointed by the insurance commissioner but 
 no written application was made by plaintiff to the commissioner 
 as is required by statue, but he asked for the appointment of new 
 referees. About twenty days after their appointment the two 
 referees agreed on a third. The plaintiff refused to abide by the 
 selection because it was not made in ten days of the appoint- 
 
APPRAISAL ARBITRATION AWARD. 129* 
 
 ment of the referees. The company declined to waive its right 
 to have the loss determined by the referees. It was held that 
 the selection of the third referee after ten days was legal, and 
 that the arbitration as condition precedent was not waived. 
 Paris v. Hamburg-Bremen F. Ins. Co. (Mass.), 90 N. B. 420. 
 
 Waiver. 
 
 Where the insurer knew the policy was avoided by breach 
 of a condition and then entered into an appraisal, it is estopped 
 from setting up such a defense. 
 
 McFarland v. Kittanning Ins. Co. (Pa. S. C.) f 21 Ins. L. J. 655; 
 
 Hickerson v. Ins. Cos. (Tenn. S. C.), 25 Ins. L. J. 422. 
 
 Insurer's demand for appraisal waives proofs. 
 Walker v. German Ins. Co. (July, 1893), (Kan. S. C.), 22 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 750; 
 
 Home P. Ins. Co. v. Bean (Neb. S. C.), 24 Ins. L. J. 516; 
 Smith v. Herd et al. (K. C. A.), 30 Ins. L. J. 393; 
 Branigan v. Jefferson Mut. Ins. Co'., 102 Mo. App. 70; 76 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 643. 
 
 An appraisal which provides that no questions are to be de- 
 termined other than the loss is no waiver of forfeiture. 
 
 Queen Ins. Co. v. Young (Ala. S. C.), 5 Southern Rep. 102; 
 Holbrook v. Baloise F. Ins. Co. (Cal. S. C.), 49 Pac. Rep. 555. 
 
 Even though such forfeiture be known to the insurer before 
 agreeing to appraisal where agreement specified, it should not 
 decide liability under the policy. 
 
 Johnson v. American F. Ins. Co. (Minn. S. C.), 41 Minn. 396, 43 
 N. W. Rep. 59. 
 
 Nor where the insurer learned of such forfeiture after en- 
 tering into appraisal and did not withdraw from the appraisal 
 and the award was not rendered for a month afterwards. 
 
 Gibson Electric Co. v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. (N. T. 
 C. A.), 28 Ins. L. J. 629. 
 
 The insurer may deny liability and still insist on the ap- 
 praisement as conclusive of the amount of the loss under Texas 
 standard policy. 
 
 American Cenfl Ins. Co. v. Bass et al. (Tex. S. C.), 38 S. W. 
 Rep. 1119. 
 
 Nor does it waive proofs of loss. 
 
 Wicking et al. v. Citizens' Mut. F. Ins. Co. (Mich. S. C.), 28 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 230; 
 
 Fournier v. German Am. Ins. Co. (R. I. S. C.), 30 Ins. L. J. 715; 
 Cook v. North B. & M. Ins. Co. (Mass. S. C.), 31 Ins. L. J. 385. 
 
 Where a policy of insurance contains one provision requir- 
 
130 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 ing proofs of loss and another requiring an appraisal, both can- 
 not be in operation at the same time, so that where the com- 
 pany offers to pay what it believes to be the loss, it implies that 
 it is satisfied with the integrity of the loss, but if the insured 
 declines the offer it brings into operation the appraisal clause, 
 and insured must allege an award of appraisers, or that he has 
 endeavored to secure one. 
 
 Murphy v. North B. & M. Ins. Co., 70 Mo. App. 78. 
 
 So where an answer pleads failure to arbitrate, it impliedly 
 admits the necessary proofs of loss. 
 
 Exchange Bank v. Thuringia F. Ins. Co., 109 Mo. App. 654; 83 
 S. W. 534. 
 
 As the award, both by the terms of the submission to ap- 
 praisers and by the terms of the policy, merely limited the deter- 
 mination of the amount of loss without reference to other ques- 
 tions or matters of differences, it had only the effect of fixing 
 the amount of the liability in the event the company should be 
 found liable. 
 
 Smith v. British Am. Assur. Co., 110 Ky. 56, 60 S. W. 841. 
 
 Where the appraisal agreement provided that the appraiser 
 should ascertain, pursuant to the terms and conditions of the 
 policy, the actual cash value, etc., and further that the appraise- 
 ment "does not in any respect waive any of the provisions or 
 conditions of said policies of insurance or of any forfeiture 
 thereof, or the proof of such loss and damages required by the 
 policies of insurance thereon." The company may refuse to 
 accept proofs not made out in conformity with the award of 
 appraisers, but if the proofs were not served within the sixty 
 days after the fire as provided for in the policy, the company's 
 construction of the policy contract was sound when it informed 
 the insured, "if it shall be alleged or claimed by you that award, 
 of appraisers for any reason is not binding upon you, then this 
 company objects to the papers purporting to be proofs of loss, 
 and declines to accept them for the reason that they were not 
 served upon this company within sixty days after the fire as 
 required by the term.s and conditions of said policy. The papers 
 are returned herewith." 
 
 Commercial Union Assur. Co. v. Dalzell, 210 Fed. Rep. 605 (C. C. 
 A. 3d Circuit Jany. 29, 1914, Nos. 1792, 1793.). 
 
 Having once waived the appraisal by its conduct (in select- 
 
APPRAISAL ARBITRATION AWARD. 131 
 
 ing a professional appraiser), the insurer can not require another 
 appraisal. 
 
 Continental Ins. Co. v. Vallandingham (Ky. C. A.), 32 Ins. L,. J. 
 1032. 
 
 The refusal of an insurance company to join in an appraisal 
 of the loss with the insured and the other companies does not 
 estop it from disputing the loss as estimated by the appraisers 
 so appointed and such an appraisement is never conclusive, and 
 is not even evidence at all, unless made so by the parties uniting 
 in it. It gets its entire force from the joint act of the parties 
 through their agents, and where it is exparte, and though 
 averred by plaintiff in his statement, is denied by defendant, it 
 goes for naught, and is not evidence at all, either on motion 
 for judgment or at the trial. 
 
 Penn. P. G. Co. v. Spring G. Ins. Co. 189 Pa. 255; 42 Atl. 138; 28 
 Ins. L. J. 223. 
 
 It merely waives Co.'s right to afterwards insist upon an 
 appraisal. 
 
 McDowell v. Aetna Ins. Co. et al., 164 Mass. 444; 41 N. E. 665; 
 25 Ins. L. J. 156. 
 
 An offer to submit a loss to appraisement made by the com- 
 pany in ignorance 'of facts rendering the policy void, and 
 promptly withdrawn upon learning the facts, is no waiver of its 
 right to deny liability for the loss. 
 
 Greenwood v. Georgia R. Ins. Co., 72 Miss. 46; 17 Southern 83. 
 
 Neither the company nor the insured is bound by an award 
 under appraisal between the insured and another company. 
 
 Chenoweth v. Phenix Ins. Co., 12 Ky. L. R. 232; 
 Penn Plate G. Co. v. Spring G. Ins. Co., 189 Pa. 255; 42 Atl. 
 138; 28 Ins. L. J. 223. 
 
 Where the insurance company's adjuster did not take part 
 in the early negotiations for a joint appraisal, but was kept in- 
 formed on the steps taken, and was co-operating with the other 
 insurers and taking advantage of whatever was done that could 
 benefit him and later was present with the other adjusters and 
 co-operated with them, and after leaving the conference was 
 notified of what was being done, his company is bound by and 
 participated in the joint appraisal, notwithstanding the fact he 
 had demanded a separate appraisal. 
 
 North German Ins. Co. v. Morton, 108 Tenn. 384; 68 S. W. 816; 
 31 Ins. L. J. 580. 
 
132 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 The failure of the insured to object to the appraiser selected 
 by the company for bias, prejudice or incompetency before the 
 award is made, will not estop him from afterwards setting up 
 the existence of such incompetency in avoidance of the award. 
 Whether appraisers were competent and disinterested is a ques- 
 tion for the jury. 
 
 Royal Ins. Co. et al. v. Parlin & Orendorff Co., 12 Tex. C. A. 572; 
 34 S. W. 401, 3 and 4. 
 
 But where in such case appraisal being a condition prece- 
 dent the adjuster and the insured negotiated as to the amount of 
 the loss without agreeing, and the company demanded further 
 proofs of loss, refusing to pay anything until they were fur- 
 nished, but never offered to submit the loss to appraisal, it can- 
 not claim that a suit brought on the policy four months there- 
 after was a violation of its terms as to arbitration. 
 
 Milwaukee Mchs. Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 13 Ind. App. 640; 42 N. E. 
 '290. 
 
 Where the policy provides that an appraisement by arbitra- 
 tors shall not determine the validity of the policy, the company's 
 liability nor any question but the amount of the loss, an agree- 
 ment for submission to appraisal under such policy by the com- 
 pany's adjuster appointing appraisers, but stipulating that no 
 other question shall thereby be affected is no waiver of a for- 
 feiture of the policy. 
 
 Queen Ins. Co. v. Young:, 86 Ala. 424; 5 Southern R. 116; 
 Johnson v. American F. Ins. Co., 41 Minn., 396; 43 N. W. R. 69. 
 
 When after disagreement with the insured the company de- 
 mands an appraisal to which both parties agree, this waives the 
 provision of the policy requiring proofs of loss. 
 
 Ross v. Phenix Ins. Co. (Kans. S. C.), 114 Pac. R. 1054. 
 
 An award of appraisers appointed under a provision of 
 the policy, nullifies the twelve months limitation clause of the 
 policy in which the insured must institute suit. 
 
 Fellman v. Royal Ins. Co. (U. S. C. C. A.), 184 Fed. 577. 
 
 Waiver of Assured's Sale of Salvage. 
 
 The insured"s breach of policy in selling salvage was 
 waived by a subsequent demand of the company for arbitration 
 and appraisal of the loss. 
 
 St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Kirkpatrick (Tenn. S. C.) ( 164 
 S. W. 1186. 
 
APPRAISAL ARBITRATION AWARD. 133 
 
 A demand for appraisal 65 days after receipt of proofs of 
 loss, and 72 days after the fire under N,. Y. standard policy 
 is too late. The company has only a reasonable period de- 
 pending on the facts in the case in which to demand an 
 appraisal. 
 
 Langsner v. German Alliance Ins. Co., 123 N. T. Supp. 144. 
 
 The loss being due sixty days after proofs are furnished 
 the company, its demand for any appraisal made fifty-nine 
 days thereafter is too late, the demand must be made early 
 enough to permit arbitration to be had before the expiration 
 of the time. 
 
 Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Caye (Ky. S. C.), 14 Ky. L. R. 810. 
 
 The policy stipulating that insured shall have sixty days 
 after fire in which to deliver proofs, and that the loss shall 
 not be payable until sixty days after such delivery of proofs, 
 including an award by appraisers, where an appraisal has been 
 required, the company has the right at any time within sixty 
 days after proofs are delivered to demand an appraisal. 
 
 North B. & M. Ins. Co. v. Robinett (Va. S. C. A.), 72 S. E. 668. 
 
 Competent and Disinterested Appraiser. 
 
 As a "competent and disinterested appraiser," the fact 
 that the appraiser (a public insurance adjuster) one who had 
 acted in that capacity for other persons on similar occasions 
 does not, as a matter of law, render him incompetent or 
 interested; but that question is one of fact for the jury. 
 
 Meyerson v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 39 N. Y. Supp. 329; 17 Misc'l 121. 
 
 Law Requiring Appraiser to Be Resident of State Is Valid. 
 
 The Minnesota laws which provide that referees appointed 
 to adjust fire losses under the Minnesota standard policy must 
 be residents of that state is mandatory, and a failure to comply 
 therewith renders the award void. 
 
 Schoenich v. American Ins. Co. (Minn.); 124 N. W. 5. 
 
 Mortgagor Mortgagee. 
 
 Where policy is payable to mortgagee as his interest may 
 appear, notice to or consent of such mortgagee of the appraise- 
 ment is not necessary to its validity. 
 
 Chandos v. Amer. Fire Ins. Co. (Wis. S. C., January, 1893), 22 
 
 Ins. L. J. 425; 
 Collinsville Savings Bank v. Boston Ins. Co. (S. C. of E. Conn.), 
 
 34 Ins. L. J. 1031; 60 Atl. Rep. 647. 
 
134 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Mortgagee, to whom a policy is payable, it not concluded 
 by an appraisal between the owner and insurance company. 
 
 Bergman v. Com'l Ins. Co. et al. (Ky. C. A.), 13 Ky. Law Rep. 
 
 720; 21 Ins. L. J. 271; 
 Georgia Home Ins. Co. v. Stein et al. (Miss. S. C.), 18 Southern 
 
 Rep. 414; 
 Morris v. German Am. Ins. Co. (Ky. Sup. C.), 14 Ky. L. R. 859. 
 
 Where a mortgage clause is attached to the policy and 
 provides that the insurance as to the interest of the mortgagee 
 or trustee, should not be invalidated by any act or neglect of 
 the owner, the trustee is not bound by an agreement between 
 the owner and the company as to the amount of the loss. The 
 effect of attaching the mortgage clause to the policy was to 
 effect a new and separate contract with the mortgagee, and 
 to effect a separate insurance of the interest of the mortgagee 
 dependent for its validity solely upon the course of action of 
 the company and the mortgagee, unaffected by any act or 
 , neglect of the mortgagor of which the mortgagee is ignorant. 
 Scottish U. & N. Ins. Co. v. Field, 18 Colo. App. 68; 70 Pacif. 149. 
 
 Under a policy which was made payable to a mortgagee 
 "as their mortgage interest may appear," where the policy 
 provided "if with the consent of the company an interest under 
 this policy shall exist in favor of a mortgagee or of any person 
 or corporation having an interest in the subject of insurance 
 other than the interest of the insured as described herein, the 
 conditions hereinbefore contained shall apply in the manner 
 expressed in such provisions and conditions of insurance relat- 
 ing to such interest as shall be written upon, attached or 
 appended hereto." The mortgagee is not entitled to participate 
 in the adjustment nor to question the validity of an award of 
 appraisers to whom the insured apd the company have sub- 
 mitted the amount of the loss. 
 
 Collinsville S. S. v. Boston Ins. Co., 77 Conn. 676; 60 Atl. 647. 
 
 The fact that the mortgagee does not comply with the 
 requirements of the policy after the fire, such as the furnishing 
 of proofs of loss, or his failure or refusal to submit the loss 
 to appraisal will not avoid the policy in so far as the mortgage 
 or trustee is concerned, if the standard mortgage clause be 
 attached to the policy. 
 
 Gillespie v. Scottish Union & N. Ins. Co. 61 W. Va. 169; 56 S. E. 
 
 213, 36 Ins. L. J. 300 (annotated in 11 L. R. A. [N. S.] 143); 
 Bacot v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 96 Miss. 223; 50 So. 729, 39 Ins. L. J. 
 
 214, (annotated in 25 L. R. A. [N. S.] 1226); 
 Franklin F. Ins. Co. v. Martin, 40 N. J. L. 575; 
 Kupferschmidt v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 80 N. J. L. 441, 78 Atl. 
 
 225, (annotated in 34 L. R. A. [N. S.] 503); 
 Stanley v. Royal Exch. Assur. Co. (Kans. S. C.), 145 Pac. 563. 
 
APPRAISAL ARBITRATION AWARD. 135 
 
 Nor can the assured bind the mortgagee or trustee under 
 a mortgage clause, by a settlement with the company or by an 
 award of appraisers. 
 
 Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Alcott, 97 111. 439 (citing and approving 
 Hastings v. Westchester F. Ins. Co.), 73 N. Y. 141, 7 Ins. 
 IM J. 430. 
 Massachusetts and Ohio hold that such mortgagee is bound 
 
 to furnish notice, and proofs and submit loss to arbitration if 
 the assured fails to do so. 
 
 Union Inst. Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 196 Mass. 230, 81 N. B. 994 
 
 (annotated in 14 L. R. A. [N. S.] 459) ; 
 Erie Brewing Co. v. Ohio F. Ins. Co., 81 Ohio St. 1; 89 N. E. 
 
 1065, 39 Ins. L. J. 200 (annotated in 25 L,. R. A. [N. S.] 740, 
 
 -nd in 18 Am. & Eng. Anno. Cas. 265). 
 
 The safest and surest way is to have the submission to 
 appraisal agreed to by both the owner or mortgagor and the 
 mortgagee. 
 
 The ordinary clause, "Loss if any payable to mortgagee, as 
 his interest may appear" seems to have no such contingencies, 
 as under such circumstances the party to whom the loss is 
 payable has only the right to have whatever may be found to 
 be due the assured payable to him as his interest may appear. 
 But even in such cases it is better to have both parties agree 
 to the adjustment, or submission to appraisal. 
 
 While it is held in New Jersey that the mortgagee or 
 trustee to whom the loss is payable under a mortgage clause 
 is not bound to furnish proofs, nor required to submit to ap- 
 praisal of the loss, the Illinois case does not go so far, it 
 merely holds no act of the owner or mortgagee may diminish 
 his claim, such as effecting other insurance, or adjusting the 
 loss by agreement or by appraisal. (The Author.) 
 
136 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 WHAT IS NOT OTHER CONTRIBUTING 
 INSURANCE. 
 
 "This company shall not be liable under this policy for a greater 
 proportion of any loss on the described property * * * 
 than the amount hereby insured shall bear to the whole 
 insurance, whether valid or not, or by solvent or insolvent 
 insurers." (N. Y. Standard Policy.) 
 
 As to the term valid or not, see Deitch, Standard Fire 
 Policy, p. 92, in which he cites Parks v. Ins. Co., 100 Mo. 
 373 and Phenix Ins. Co. v. Lamar, 106 Ind. 513, to show that 
 absolutely void insurance can not be made to contribute, 
 thereby reducing the assured's claim. 
 
 If a company fails and is placed in the hands of a receiver, 
 that very act cancels all outstanding policies, and the holders 
 of such policies only have a claim for the unearned premium, 
 but not for any loss that may occur subsequent to the appoint- 
 ment of such receiver. 
 
 Doane v. Milville Mut. M. and P. Ins. Co. (N. J. Ch. C.), 11 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 739; 1 Ins. Digest 27; 
 Taylor v. Ins. Co. et al. (Minn. S. C.), 48 N. W. Rep. 772; 20 
 
 Ins. L. J. 562; 
 
 Reliance Lumber Co. v. Brown (Ind. S. C.), 30 N. E. Rep. 625; 
 In re. Commercial Ins. Co. (R. I. S. C.), 36 Atl. Rep. 930; 10 Ins. 
 
 Digest 368; 
 Davis v. Shearer et al. (Wis. S. C.), 62 N. W. Rep. 1050; 8 Ins. 
 
 Digest 92; 
 Boston and Albany R. R. Co. et al. v. Merc. Trust Co. et al. 
 
 (Md. C. A.), 34 Atl. Rep. 778; 9 Ins. Digest 305; 
 See also Joyce on Ins., Sec. 1454; 
 Michel, Secty. of State v. Southern Ins. Co., 128 La. 562, 54 So. 
 
 1010 annotated in 24 Am. & Eng. Anno. Cas. 810; 
 Gleason v. Prudential F. Ins. Co. (Tenn.), 151 S. W. 1030. 
 Contra: 
 Fink v. National M. P. Ins. Co., 90 S. C. 544, 74 S. E. 33. 
 
 As a natural consequence, therefore, if the policy is can- 
 celed, it ceases to be other insurance, and the assured is not 
 liable legally to have such canceled insurance brought in for 
 contribution, thereby reducing his claim against the solvent 
 insurance held by him, and this is so whether such cancellation 
 is by agreement between the parties or by operation of law. 
 
 To require contribution from another policy it must have 
 been on the same interest, in the same property, or some part 
 thereof. 
 
 137 
 
138 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Lowell Mfg. Co. v. Safeguard F. Ins. Co., 88 N. Y. 591; 
 Sunderlin v. Aetna Ins. Co. (N. Y.), 18 Hun. 522; 
 Cannon v. Home Ins. Co. (La. S. C.), 26 Ins. L. J. 737. 
 
 If an equitable owner insure the property, his policy is not 
 affected by a subsequent insurance by an adverse claimant of 
 the title. 
 
 Acer v. Merchants Ins. Co. (N. Y.), 57 Barb. 68. 
 
 Where two policies cover separate and distinct interests, 
 that of the mortgagee and that of the owner, it is not other in- 
 surance within the meaning of the clause. 
 
 Hastings v. Westchester P. Ins. Co., 73 N. Y. 141; 
 Cannon v. Home Ins. Co. (La. S. C.), 26 Ins. L. J. 737; 
 Connecticut F. Ins. Co. v. Merchants and Mech's Ins. Co. (Va. 
 S. C. A.), 15 Ins. L. J. 615. 
 
CHAPTER XV. 
 
 APPORTIONMENT OF NON-CONCURRENT 
 
 INSURANCE VARIOUS RULES AND 
 
 EXAMPLES CONTRIBUTION. 
 
 READING RULE IN FORCE IN MASSACHUSETTS AND 
 VERMONT. 
 
 Specific insurance for $2,250 covered as follows: $825 on 
 Item A; $987.50 on Item B; $437.50 on Item C. In addition, 
 there was insurance for $12,700 covering blanket on all the 
 items. The loss on the respective items was total as follows: 
 Item A, $3,491.48; Item B, $6,230.37; Item C, $2,014.70. Held, 
 That the blanket policies should be made to cover specifically 
 on each item in the proportion that the value of each bears to 
 the aggregate value of all the items; that Item A was 29.748 
 per cent, of the whole value; Item B 53.085 per cent, and Item 
 C 17.166 per cent; it necessarily followed that these percentages 
 of the blanket insurance attached respectively to the several 
 items, hence, the following apportionment: 
 
 Item A Item B Item C 
 
 Insures Pays Insures Pays Insures Pays 
 
 Specific Insurance $ 825.00 6 625.77 $ 987.50 $ 796.00 $ 437.50 $ 336.73 
 
 Blanket Insurance 3,778.09 2,865.71 6,741.82 5,434.37 2,180.09 1,677.97 
 
 $4,603.09 $3,491.48 $7,729.32 $6,230.37 $2,617.59 $2,014.70 
 
 Chandler v. Ins. Co. of N. A. (Vt. S. C.), 28 Ins. L. J. 1028; 
 
 Blake v. Exchange M. Ins. Co., 12 Gray (Mass.) 265, 4 Bennett 
 
 306; 
 Taber V. Continental Ins. Co., 213 Mass. 487, 100 N. E. 636. 
 
 CROMIE RULE. 
 
 The blanket policy must first pay the loss on items not 
 covered by the specific policy and the unexhausted amount will 
 contribute with the specific policy in paying the loss on the 
 items covered by both policies. 
 
 Anglerodt v. Delaware M. Ins. Co., 31 Mo. 593, 4 Bennett 589; 
 Meigs v. London Assur. Corp. 126 Fed. 781, 33 Ins. L. J. 251 ; 
 Cromie v. Ky. L. M. Ins. Co.. 15 B. Monroe (Ky.) 432, 3 Bennett 
 785. 
 
 CONNECTICUT AND NEW JERSEY RULE. 
 
 One set of policies covered blanket on building, machinery 
 and stock; one set covered a specific amount on each item. 
 
 It is conceded assured must be paid his loss. Any method 
 
 139 
 
140 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 of apportionment which in a given case fails to afford him the 
 full measure of his just indemnity, must give place to another 
 that will. 
 
 The court rejected the rule making the blanket policies 
 cover specifically on each item in the proportion as the value 
 of each bore to the aggregate value of all, also making them 
 specific on each in proportion as the loss on each bears to the 
 loss on all. It also rejected the rule proposed by the specific 
 insurance, that the blanket insurance be made to contribute for 
 the full amount of the blanket policy on each item with the 
 specific insurance, and held that the blanket insurance should 
 pro rate with the specific insurance on the item of greatest 
 loss, the unexhausted amount with the specific insurance on the 
 item of next greatest loss and so on with each item, where this 
 produces substantial equity to all parties. But no rule of 
 unvarying application can be made. 
 
 Schmaelze v. London and Lancashire P. Ins. Co., 75 Conn. 397, 
 
 53 Atl. 853, 33 Ins. L. J. 632; 
 Grollimund v. Germania F. Ins. Co., 82 N. J. L. 618, 83 Atl. 1108. 
 
 PAGE RULE. 
 
 Company A insures $10,000 specific on lumber on Block No. 
 1. Company B insures $40,000 blanket on lumber on Blocks 
 Nos. 1 and 2. If fire destroys lumber on Block 1, doing no 
 damage to lumber on Block 2, Company A will pay one-fifth 
 the loss and Company B four-fifths. 
 
 Page v. Sun Ins. Office (U. S. C. C. A., 8th Dist), 20 C. C. A. 
 
 397; 25 Ins. L. J. 865; 
 Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Delta, etc. (Tex. C. C. A.), 121 
 
 S. W. 599; 
 Scottish Union & N. Ins. Co. v. Moore (Okla.), 43 Pac. 12. 
 
 MEIGS OR CROMIE RULE. 
 
 Class A companies insured $130,000 on main buildings and 
 $50,000 on contents, permission granted to make additions, 
 alterations and repairs, and this insurance to cover on and in 
 same, and for other insurance. Class B companies insured 
 $60,000 on wing addition built subsequent to date of Class A 
 policies, and $7,500 on contents thereof, and permitted other 
 insurance. 
 
 Both the plaintiff and agent for Class B companies treated 
 the insurance on the wing or addition as specific insurance and 
 supposed the Class A companies did not cover the wing. The 
 agent of Class A companies informed plaintiff no endorsement 
 was necessary, as his policies granted privilege to make addi- 
 tions and to take out other insurance. 
 
APPORTIONMENT OF NON-CURRENT; RULES. 141 
 
 After the completion of the wing or addition a fire occurred 
 which damaged the property as follows: East wing (addition), 
 $26,668.50; contents thereof (including $4,500 on students' cloth- 
 ing), $13,250; main building, $1,815.65; contents of main build- 
 ing, $2,332.30. 
 
 Held, Loss should be apportioned as follows: Class A com- 
 panies first pay $1,815.65 on main building, leaving a balance of 
 $218,184.35; and $2,332.30 on contents of main building, leaving 
 a balance on contents of $47,667.70. Class B companies must 
 pay the loss of $4,500 on students' clothing, as those articles are 
 not covered under Class A, hence following apportionment of 
 balance of loss: 
 
 Addition Contents of Addition. 
 
 Insures Pays Insures Pays 
 
 Class A $128,184.35 $19,527.94 $47,667.70 $8,231.93 
 
 Class B 60.000.00 9,140.56 3,000.00 518.07 
 
 Double insurance is, or ought to be, wherever there are 
 two separate insurers, liable for the same loss. The fact that 
 one policy covers more property than the other does not pre- 
 vent the insurance being double on the subjects covered by 
 both. 
 
 Meigs v. London Assur. Co. (U. S. C. C. Eastern Dist. Pa.), 32 
 Ins. L. J. 251. 
 
 
 
 The doctrine laid down by U. S. C. C., Eastern Dist. Pa., 
 in the case of Meigs v. London Assur., 32 Ins. L. J., 251, i. e., 
 that Class A Companies covered the addition is borne out by 
 N. Y. C. A. in Arlington v. Colonial Assur. Co., 180 N. Y. 
 337; 73 N. E. Rep. 34. 
 
 PENNSYLVANIA NOT IN ACCORD WITH FEDERAL 
 COURT ON MEIGS RULE. 
 
 Pennsylvania S. C. held that Class A policies did not cover 
 the property covered by Class B policies. 
 Meigs v. Ins. Co., 206 Pa. 378. 
 
 MARYLAND. 
 
 Where a warehouseman takes out insurance on goods his 
 own, held in trust, or in which he has an interest, the words 
 held in trust will also cover those goods with which he is 
 entrusted in the ordinary sense of the word and not those goods 
 only that are held in trust in a strict technical sense. And 
 where the owner of a part of these goods stored with the ware- 
 houseman from whom he has borrowed money on them, takes 
 
142 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 out insurance on those specific goods, the policies being made 
 payable to the warehouseman in case of loss, such insurance 
 will inure to the benefit of the warehouseman. They will be 
 considered as in favor of the same assured, on the same inter- 
 est, in the same subject, and against the same risks as the 
 insurance issued directly to the warehouseman; and with the 
 latter policies constitute a double or other insurance; and both 
 sets of policies will contribute their respective proportions of 
 the loss. 
 
 Hough v. Peoples F. Ins. Co., 36 Md. 398, 2 Ins. L.. J. 353; 
 Home Ins. Co. v. Baltimore W. Ho. Co., 93 U. S. 527, 6 Ins. 
 L. J. 39. 
 
 NEW YORK. 
 
 The Reading rule is adopted in modified form. That is, 
 where the insurance exceeds the value, it is held the Reading 
 rule works entire equity between the insurers. That rule is 
 where several parcels of property are insured together (blanket) 
 under one policy for one entire sum, and one or each one of 
 these parcels is specifically or separately insured by one or more 
 policies, the sum insured by the more general or blanket policy 
 is to be distributed among the several parcels in the proportion 
 that the value of each parcel of property bears to the aggre- 
 gate value of all the parcels of property. But where there is 
 no over insurance and where the loss exceeds the aggregate 
 insurance, there is no occasion for any apportionment. 
 
 Ogden v. East River Ins. Co., 50 N. T. 388, 5 Bennett 439, 2 Ins. 
 L. J. 134; 
 
 The New York Supreme Court (which is not a court of last 
 resort), citing the Ogden v. East River Ins. Co. as its authority, 
 applied the Finn rule of apportionment, which was applied by 
 the arbitration committee of the New York Board of Fire 
 Underwriters in the instant case (which merely shows how 
 lawyers and courts become confused in applying these intricate 
 rules, and there is no wonder when so few insurance men, who 
 are supposed to understand them, cannot agree on a method, 
 and not all of them even understand the application of a rule 
 when it is explained to them). 
 
 Meyer v. American Ins. Co., 4 N. T. Supp. 617a; appeal dismissed, 
 23 N. T. Supp. 71, 18 Ins. L. J. 166. 
 
 When There Is No Occasion for Apportionment 
 
 To make this question perfectly clear, we will say there arc 
 five parcels of property, which we will designate A, B, C, D, 
 
APPORTIONMENT OF NON-CURRENT; RULES. 143 
 
 and E. One set of policies is divided into two items. Item 
 No. 1 covers a specific amount on parcel A. Item No. 2 covers 
 a specific amount on parcel B. Another set of policies cover 
 a specific amount under item No. 1 on parcel C, a specific 
 amount under item No. 2 on parcel D. Another set of -policies 
 is divided into three items, covering a specific amount each 
 on parcels D and E. Another set of policies cover blanket 
 on parcels A, B and C, another set of policies cover blanket on 
 all of the parcels A, B, C, D and E. 
 
 Under such conditions if the loss on all the parcels exceeds 
 the aggregate specific insurance on each and all, and in addi- 
 tion the blanket insurance, there is in the absence of any co- 
 insurance or average clause, no occasion for an apportionment, 
 the loss will be total under all of the policies, whether blanket 
 or specific, according to most of the decisions. 
 
 Ogden v. East R. Ins. Co., 60 N. Y. 388; 6 Bennett 439; 2 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 134; 
 
 Niagara F. Ins. Co. v. Heenan, 81 111. App. 678; 
 American C. Ins. Co. v. Heath, 29 Tex. C. A. 445; 69 S. W. 235; 
 Royal Ins. Co. v. Roedel, 78 Penn. 19; 4 Ins. L. J. 840; 
 Baltimore F. Ins. Co. v. Loney, 20 Md. 20; 4 Bennett 646; 
 Hough v. Peoples F. Ins. Co., 36 Md. 398; 2 Ins. L. J. 353; 
 LeSuer, etc. v. Mutual F. Ins. Co., 101 Iowa 514; 70 N. W. 761; 
 Anglerodt v. Delaware Ins. Co., 31 Mo. 593; 4 Bennett 589; 
 Cromie v. Ky. & L. M. Ins. Co., 15 B. Monroe (Ky.) 432 ; 3 Bennett 
 
 785; 
 Page v. Sun Ins. Office, 20 C. C. A. 397; 36 U. S. Ap. 672; 25 
 
 Ins. L. J. 865; 74 Fed. 203; 
 Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Delta, etc. (Tex. C. C. A.), 121 
 
 S W. 599; 
 
 Scottish U. & N. Ins. Co. v. Moore (Okla.), 43 Pac. 12; 
 Meigs v. London Assur. Corp., 126 Fed. 781 ; 33 Ins. L. J. 251. 
 
 Apportionment Under Co-Insurance Clause. 
 Where the policy is subject to the co-insurance clause (or 
 same thing, the reduced rate agreement), which provides a 
 different method of apportionment if the insurance be less than 
 the amount required under such agreement (the full, or 100 
 per cent, clause, requires the assured to carry insurance equal 
 to or exceeding the full value of the property. The 90 per cent, 
 clause requiring the insurance to equal or exceed 90) per cent, 
 of the value of the property, the 80 per cent, clause requiring 
 the insurance to equal or exceed 80 per cent, of the value of 
 the property, and so on, down to the 50 per cent, clause), then 
 such policy will pay the loss in accordance with the provision 
 of such co-insurance without regard to the amount apportioned 
 to the other policies. And if the other policies are not subject 
 to the co-insurance clause or reduced rate agreement, they will 
 pay the loss in the proportion that the amount of insurance 
 thereunder bears to the aggregate amount of all the insurance 
 
144 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 without reference to the co-insurance clause. The amount of 
 loss which the assured bears under one policy by reason of 
 the operation of the co-insurance clause or reduced rate agree~ 
 ment, cannot be added to the liability of the company which 
 has no such clause or agreement in its policy. 
 
 Farmers, etc. v. Scottish U. & N. Ins. Co., 173 N. T. 241; 66 N. 
 
 E. 1106; 
 Kansas City, etc. v. American F. Ins. Co., 100 Mo. App. 691; 76 
 
 S. W. 186; 
 Barnes v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 3 McCray 22; 9 Fed. 813; 11 
 
 Ins. L. J. 110. 
 
 Co-Insurance Clause or Reduced Rate Agreement. 
 
 Is in conflict with 7023, R. S. Mo. 1909, and therefore void. 
 Alsop v. Continental Ins. Co. (Mo. App.), 162 S. W. 313. 
 
 It is void for the same reason in Kentucky and Mississippi* 
 
 Sachs v. London & L. Ins. Co., 113 Ky. 88; 67 S. W. 23; 
 Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Schlencker, 80 Miss. 667; 32 So. 155. 
 
 It is held not to conflict with the Georgia statute, which 
 provides that the full amount of the fire loss, not exceeding 
 the amount of the policy, must be paid by the insurance com- 
 pany, any policy provision to the contrary notwithstanding. 
 
 Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Pekor, 106 Ga. 1 ; 31 S. E. 779. 
 
 The co-insurance clause or reduced rate agreement is valid 
 unless in conflict with the statutes. 
 
 Peoria F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 5 Minn. 3; 4 Bennett 497; 
 Pennsylvania F. Ins. Co. v. Moore, 21 Tex. C. A. 528; 51 S. W. 
 
 878; 
 
 Armour v. Reading F. Ins. Co., 67 Mo. App. 215; 
 Chesebroug-h v. Home Ins. Co., 61 Mich. 333; 28 N. W. 110; IS 
 
 Ins. L. J. 515; 
 
 Quinn v. Fire Asset., 180 Mass. 560; 62 N. E. 980; 
 Barnes v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 9 Fed. 813; 11 Ins. L. J. 110. 
 
 The Average or Distribution Clause. 
 
 The following clause was held to apply at the time the 
 policy was issued, but not at the time of the loss, which oc- 
 curred some time after the issuance of the policy. But, the 
 court added, the insurance company could have made it to 
 apply at the time of the fire had it chosen so to write it. The 
 form on which the decision was based is as follows: 
 
 "It is hereby agreed that in case of loss this policy shall 
 attach in or on each building or division in such proportion 
 as the value in or on each building or division bears to the 
 aggregate of the subjects insured." 
 
 Scottish U. & N. Ins. Co. v. Moore (Okla.), 143 Pac. 12. 
 
APPORTIONMENT OF NON-CURRENT; RULES. 145 
 
 It was held otherwise as to almost identically the same 
 clause in Missouri and Iowa, where it seems it does not conflict 
 with the statute law prohibiting the use of the co-insurance or 
 other clause providing for the payment of a sum less than the 
 
 loss. 
 
 U. S. Cooperage Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (Mo. App.), 174 
 
 S. W. 193; 
 Dahms v. German F. Ins. Co. (Iowa S. C.), 132 N. W. 870. 
 
 Three-Quarter Clause. 
 
 The three-fourths clause is valid. 
 Coffey v. East Tex. Ins. Co., 61 Tex. 287. 
 
 But it is not valid when in conflict with the statutes. 
 Queen v. Jefferson Ice Co., 64 Tex. 578, 15 Ins. L. J. 109; 
 Darden v. L. & L. & G. Ins. Co. (Miss. S. C.), 68 So. 485. 
 
 FORMS SUGGESTED AS COMPLYING WITH THE 
 
 OKLAHOMA COURT'S SUGGESTIONS. 
 
 i 
 
 Average Clause. It is understood and agreed that this 
 insurance shall at the happening of any loss cover and attach 
 in or on each building or location in the proportion that the 
 value in or on each building or location shall at that time bear 
 to the aggregate value of the property insured in or on all of 
 within described buildings or locations. If this policy be 
 divided into two or more items, the foregoing average clause 
 shall apply to each item separately. 
 
 Full or 100% Co-Insurance Clause. It is understood and 
 agreed that in case of loss or damage by fire, this company 
 shall not be liable for any greater proportion thereof than the 
 amount hereby insured shall then bear to 50, 75, 80, 90 or any 
 other per cent, of (as the case may be if you want a 50, 75, 
 80 or 90 per cent, clause) the whole cash value of the property 
 hereby insured, and in no event shall this company be liable 
 for a greater proportion of any loss on the described property 
 than the amount hereby insured shall bear to the whole in- 
 surance, whether valid or not, or by solvent or insolvent in- 
 surers, covering such property. If this policy be divided into 
 two or more items the foregoing co-insurance clause shall apply 
 to each item separately. 
 
 Reduced Rate Agreement In consideration of the rate ol 
 premium at which this policy is written it is expressely stipu- 
 lated and made a condition of this contract that this company 
 
 10 
 
146 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 shall not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss than 
 the amount hereby insured shall then bear to (50, 75, 80 or 
 90 per cent, of as the case may be) the whole cash value of the 
 property hereby insured, and in no event shall this company 
 be liable for a greater proportion of any loss on the described 
 property, than the amount hereby insured shall bear to the 
 whole insurance, whether valid or not, or by solvent or in- 
 solvent insurers, covering such property. If this policy be 
 divided into two or more items the foregoing reduced rate 
 agreement shall apply to each item separately. 
 
 While there is a slight difference in the phraseology there 
 is none in the result of the application of the co-insurance and 
 the reduced rate agreement. The assured collects the same 
 amount under each. The object of both is the same, to force 
 the assured to carry a reasonable amount of insurance. A 
 clause not worded like our full value co-insurance clause, but 
 having the same effect, is used in Germany, France and Eng- 
 land. 
 
 CO-INSURANCE AND AVERAGE CLAUSES 
 
 The following report made by the Committee on Fire 
 Insurance to the National Association of Credit Men, and a 
 reply thereto by the author, gives two views upon the subject 
 of co-insurance and the workings of co-insurance and average 
 clauses: 
 % 
 
 "Average Clause in Blanket Insurance Not Recommended." 
 
 "One of the members of a California Association has 
 written to this committee, and submitted what is known as an 
 Average Clause, which is a rider attached to a Blanket Insur- 
 ance Policy, whereby stocks and merchandise in two separate 
 buildings are supposed to be insured jointly. He has requested 
 that a detailed explanation be furnished as to the settlement 
 which would be effected in the event of loss on either or both 
 properties. 
 
 "The principal clause in this Average Clause rider, reads as 
 follows: 
 
 "'It is hereby understood and agreed that in case of loss 
 this policy shall attach in each of the two buildings in such 
 proportion as the value in each building bears to the aggregate 
 value of the property hereby insured/ 
 
 "This clause alone, in the event of a fire or total loss would 
 
APPORTIONMENT OF NON-CURRENT; RULES. 147 
 
 mean the loss of considerable money to the party insured, and 
 we would explain the matter in the following manner: 
 
 "The clause referred to in this form is what is known as 
 the Average Clause. Its chief effect is to eliminate the blanket 
 feature from what might otherwise be a blanket form, and 
 really transforms a blanket form into a specific one. 
 
 "The practical workings of this Clause are as follows: 
 Suppose the insured had two buildings, A and B, with a total 
 value therein of $10,000 and total insurance of $10,000. If 
 the Values in building A and building B are equal, namely, 
 $5,000 each, the recovery under this set of facts would be full, 
 namely, in a loss on building B the insured would recover 
 under the terms of the clause 5-10 or y-2. of the amount of in- 
 surance, or $5,000, which really amounts to two specific items 
 of $5,000 each on the contents of each building. 
 
 "If the values were $6,000 in building A and $4,000 in 
 building B and the amount of insurance equal to the aggregate 
 value, the recovery would still be in full, and not be affected 
 by this clause. 
 
 "Suppose, however, that the aggregate value were $15,000, 
 distributed as follows: Building A, $10,000 and building B, 
 $5,000, with total insurance of $10,000. In this case, in a total 
 loss on building B the insured would recover one-third of the 
 amount of insurance, or $3,333.33, and in the same proportion 
 on building A. Without this clause the insured would recover 
 the full amount of $5,000 in a loss on building B, and could in 
 any case recover the full amount of his insurance and would 
 only lose the difference between the amount of insurance and 
 the aggregate value. Many persons carry a blanket form with 
 this clause inserted, and labor under the impression that they 
 have all the advantages of a blanket form, whereas in reality 
 it is a specific form. It can be also seen that it differs radically 
 from flat insurance. 
 
 "We, therefore, feel justified in stating that in the event 
 of a total loss, the insured would be able to recover a far 
 greater proportion of his loss if he would carry either co-insur- 
 ance or straight insurance than he would be able to recover 
 under the present conditions with this Average Clause attached, 
 and we hope that our members will investigate their insurance, 
 and be satisfied that this clause would operate against them in 
 the event of a loss. Yours very truly, 
 
 "FIRE INSURANCE COMMITEE, 
 
 "Geo. W. Ryan, 
 
 "Chairman." 
 
148 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Chicago, 111., March 20, 1907, 
 
 Editor "Bulletin National Association of Credit Men," 41 Park 
 Row, New York: 
 
 Dear Sir I notice an article in the March "Bulletin," under 
 title, "Average Clause in Blanket Insurance Not Recom- 
 mended," and the statement is signed, "Fire Insurance Com- 
 mitee, Geo. W. Ryan, Chairman." 
 
 Answering the statement in seventh paragraph, will say Mr. 
 pany will insure a stock contained in two separate and distinct 
 buildings, without either the average clause, or at least a 90 
 per cent, co-insurance clause, and in most instances they would 
 insist on writing the policy with either the average or full 
 value co-insurance clause. Otherwise, by issuing a $5,000 
 policy they would be carrying double liability for one premium. 
 
 Answering the statement in seventh paragraph, will say Mr. 
 Ryan is right in his statement, that with value in building A 
 $10,000. Value in building B $5,000. Insurance $10,000, blanket 
 policy covering both buildings with the average clause, the 
 policy would pay $3,333.33 in case building B's contents were 
 totally destroyed. 
 
 If any company were foolish enough to write a blanket 
 policy without an average clause, but containing an 80 per cent, 
 co-insurance clause, the assured would recover the loss in 
 proportion as his insurance of $10,000 would bear to 80 per cent, 
 of the value, or $12,000, or 10/12, equalling $4,166.66. 
 
 Under the 90 per cent, co-insurance clause he would re- 
 cover in proportion as his insurance would bear to 90 per cent, 
 of the value or 100/135, equalling $3,703.70. 
 
 Under the 100 per cent, or full co-insurance clause, he would 
 recover in proportion as his insurance would bear to the full 
 value, or 10/15, equalling $3,333.33. 
 
 But suppose with the same insurance and same values the 
 loss in building B was only $3,333.33, and the value of the 
 salvage was $1,666.67, then we find that under the average 
 clause the assured would collect $3,333.33. 
 
 Under the 80 per cent, co-insurance clause he would collect 
 $2,777.77. 
 
 Under the 90 per cent, co-insurance clause he would collect 
 $2,466.67. 
 
 Under the full co-insurance clause he would collect 
 $2,222.22. 
 
APPORTIONMENT OF NON-CURRENT; RULES. 149 
 
 Here is an example of the workings of the 90 per cent, 
 co-insurance clause: 
 
 Insurance Co. insures $10,000 Pays $2,466.67 
 
 Assured co-insures 3,500 Pays 866.66 
 
 Insurance required under 
 90 per cent, clause $13,500 Pays $3,333.33 
 
 Suppose that with what Mr. Ryan calls "flat insurance" (the 
 term is new to me, but I presume he means specific insurance), 
 of say $5,000 in each building, a fire should entirely destroy the 
 contents of both, the assured's books would show the aggregate 
 value of the stock in both buildings, but there would be no 
 way of telling how much was in each. Hence, how much does 
 the Chicago Insurance Company owe and how much does the 
 New York Insurance Company owe? With the average clause, 
 both companies' interests are identical and both know they must 
 pay a total loss. Truly yours, 
 
 THRASHER HALL. 
 
 WISCONSIN RULE. 
 
 The insured is entitled to full indemnity under his contract, 
 and a rule of apportionment which fails to furnish this is error. 
 
 The Insurance. 
 
 Company A insured on live stock $1,500, no limitation. 
 Company B insured on live stock $1,667, being not to exceed 
 $500 on any one animal. Company ' C insured on live stock 
 $1,667, no one animal to be valued at more than $500. 
 
 The Loss. 
 
 One bull, $2,000; three steers, $336; total loss $2,336. 
 
 The companies first pay the loss on the three steers. 
 
 Insures Pays 
 
 Company A $1,500 $104.00 
 
 Company B 1,667 116.00 
 
 Company C 1,667 116.00 
 
 $4,834 $336.00 
 
 Company A pays $1,345 on bull, Company B pays $482, and 
 Company C $173 (in round numbers). 
 
 Sherman v. Madison M. Ins. Co.. 39 Wis. 104; 6 Ins. L. J. 285. 
 
150 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 CANADIAN (OR ALBANY RULE). 
 
 The defendant insured $2,000 on building and $2,000 on fur- 
 niture, the British America insured $2,000 in one amount cover- 
 ing blanket on building and furniture. There was a partial 
 loss to both building and furniture. The defendant was held for 
 two-thirds the loss. 
 
 Trustees First Unitarian Church v. Western Assur. Co., 26 Upper 
 Can. 2 B. 175; 6 Bennett 94. 
 
 FLOATING POLICY. 
 
 Floating or excess insurance will not contribute in the pay- 
 ment of any loss on property until such property is brought 
 within its protection. 
 
 Peabody v. Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co., 171 Mass. 114; 50 N. B. 
 526. 
 
 When a Specific Policy is Exhausted. 
 
 A specific policy is exhausted when neither the loss nor the 
 policy is paid in full by reason of a co-insurance or other clause 
 which may have the effect of limiting the amount to be paid 
 under such policy. 
 
 Cutting, Ins. Comr. v. Atlas M. Ins. Co. In re. Downs, 199 Mass. 
 380; 85 N. E. 174; 37 Ins. L. J. 924. 
 
 READING RULE. 
 Value to Value. 
 
 The compound or blanket policy will be made to cover as 
 many parcels, groups or items of property as are fixed by 
 specific insurance, in the proportion that the value of each 
 parcel, item or group of property. For instance, if stock be 
 insured specifically under policy of Company A, which also in- 
 sures a specific amount on furniture and fixtures, and a third 
 specific amount on machinery, this makes three items, parcels 
 or groups. Therefore, Company B's policy, which insures all of 
 these items, parcels or groups under a single sum, is called a 
 blanket or compound policy. The Reading rule makes this 
 blanket policy cover on each item in proportion as the value of 
 each bears to the aggregate value of all three items, and the 
 amounts thus found will contribute with the specific insurance 
 on each item in the payment of the loss thereon. 
 
 In the opinion of the author there is very little reason in 
 this apportionment and it is an arbitrary, unfair rule. Nothing 
 in the policy contract provides for any such rule of apportion- 
 ment, and it is liable to cause the assured to lose heavily. Why 
 
APPORTIONMENT OF NON-CURRENT; RULES. 151 
 
 blanket insurance should be made to cover the several items 
 in a different method from what they would ordinarily, merely 
 because there was other insurance which separated these blanket 
 items by covering them specifically, is beyond the writer's 
 knowledge. The Federal Courts and those of Missouri, Mary- 
 land and Connecticut have adopted the most equitable rule, and 
 the only one which seems to the writer to be in accordance 
 with the idea that assured must not bear any part of his loss 
 so long as there is enough insurance to pay it. However, it has 
 the approval of the courts of Massachusetts and Vermont. 
 
 FINN RULE. 
 
 Substitute the word loss wherever the word value appears 
 in the Reading rule and you have this rule, i. e., the blanket 
 policy covers each item, parcel or group of property, in propor- 
 tion as the loss on each group, item or parcel of property bears 
 to the aggregate loss on all of the groups, items or parcels 
 of property, and the amounts thus found will pro rate with the 
 specific insurance on each group, item or parcel. There will be 
 as many groups, items or parcels as there are specific items in 
 the specific policy on which there is a loss, and sometimes one 
 more, as where one policy insures a specific amount on stock, 
 and a specific amount on store furniture, and the blanket or 
 compound policy insures both of these items, groups or parcels 
 as well as another group consisting of machinery. 
 
 This rule seems more in line with the Page rule, but differs 
 from the Cromie and Missouri rule in that it does not first pay 
 the loss on the items covered only by the blanket policy and the 
 remainder or unexhausted amount is not then made to pro rate 
 with the specific policy in paying the loss on the other items. 
 This rule is the first rule of apportionment of the Kinne rule, 
 which has been approved and agreed to by all of the insurance 
 companies operating west of the Rocky Mountains. It seems 
 the Finn rule is used in the New York Board of Fire Under- 
 writers. See Meyer v. American Ins. Co., 23 N. Y. Supp. 71; 18 
 Ins. L. J. 156. 
 
 If the loss is on but one item, group or parcel of property, 
 the Finn rule makes the entire blanket or compound policy con- 
 tribute with the specific policy, and therein it conforms to the 
 Page rule. 
 
 ALBANY RULE. 
 
 This rule means, that in so far as the assured is concerned, 
 
152 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 that in dealing with each company all other insurance, to its 
 full amount, must be treated as other contributing insurance. 
 To illustrate: If Company A's policy covered $1,000 on house- 
 hold furniture, Company B's policy covered $1,000 on house- 
 hold furniture and wearing apparel, and Company C's policy 
 covered $1,000 on household furniture, wearing apparel and 
 jewelry. The loss being $1,000 on furniture, $500 on wearing 
 apparel, $500 on jewelry. Under the Albany rule there would be 
 three apportionments. First, Company A would apportion the 
 loss as follows: 
 
 Insures on Pays on 
 
 Furniture Furniture 
 
 Company A $1,000 $333.33 
 
 Company B 1,000 333.33 
 
 Company C 1,000 333.34 
 
 Totals $3,000 $1,000.00 
 
 Company B would apportion the loss as follows: 
 
 Insures on Pays on 
 
 Furniture Furniture 
 
 & Wearing & Wearing 
 
 Apparel Apparel 
 
 Company A $1,000 $500.00 
 
 Company B 1,000 500.00 
 
 Company C 1,000 500.00 
 
 Totals $3,000 $1,500.00 
 
 Company C would apportion the loss as follows: 
 
 Insures on Pays on 
 
 Jewelry Jewelry 
 
 Furniture Furniture 
 
 & Wearing & Wearing 
 
 Apparel Apparel 
 
 Company A $1,000 $666.66 2/3 
 
 Company B 1,000 666.66 2/3 
 
 Company C 1,000 666.66 2/3 
 
 Totals $3,000 $2,000.00 
 
 Under this apportionment the insured would receive from 
 Company A, as per its apportionment, $333.33. From Company 
 B, as per its apportionment, $500. From Company C, as per its 
 apportionment, $666.67, or a total of $1,500 for his loss of 
 $2,000. 
 
APPORTIONMENT OF NON-CURRENT; RULES. 153 
 
 This apportionment may seem very unfair, but it is in accord 
 with the New York standard policy provision, which reads: 
 "This company shall not be liable under this policy for a greater 
 proportion of any loss on the described property than the 
 amount hereby insured shall bear to the whole insurance 
 whether valid or not, or by solvent or insolvent insurers." The 
 standard policies of other states are not materially different. 
 The only construction that can be placed on the language of 
 the policy is that given it in the Albany rule. Where two 
 separate companies are liable for the same loss, the fact that 
 one of them covers more property and in more locations than 
 the other does not give it the right to have less than its policy 
 pro rate with the more specific policy in paying the loss. 
 
 Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Delta, etc. (Tex. C. C. A.), 121 
 
 S. W. 599; 
 
 Scottish U. & N. Ins. Co. v. Moore (Okla.), 143 Pac. 12; 
 Page v. Sun Ins. Office, 20 C. C. A. 397; 36 U. S. App. 672; 25 Ins. 
 L. J. 865. 
 
 Giving a correct construction to the language of the contri- 
 bution provision of the policy quoted above, and applying the 
 reasoning of the courts in the foregoing cases, how can a result 
 be reached differing with the Albany rule? 
 
 FINN RULE. 
 
 Applying the Finn rule to the loss stated in the preceding 
 case illustrating the Albany rule, we get the following result. 
 
 Insures on Pays on Insures on Pays on 
 Furniture Furniture Wear. Ap. Wear. Ap. 
 
 Company A $1,000.00 $ 461.53 
 
 Company B 666.67 307.70 $333.33 $285.71 
 
 Company C 500.00 230.77 250.00 214.29 
 
 
 Totals $2,166.67 $1,000.00 $583.33 $500.00 
 
 Insures Pays on 
 
 Jewelry Jewelry 
 
 Company C insures jewelry alone for $250.00 $250.00 
 
 KINNE RULE. 
 
 Applying the Kinne rule, we get the following result: 
 As the loss to loss method of the Finn rule does not pay 
 but half the loss on jewelry, we must take enough of Company 
 C's policy to pay the $500 loss on that group, parcel or item 
 (i. e., jewelry). Company B's policy and the $500 unexhausted 
 
154 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 insurance under Company C's policy is then made to apply on 
 furniture proportionately as the loss on that group of property, 
 $1,000, bears to aggregate loss on that group, and the group 
 consisting of wearing apparel (on which the loss is $500), or a 
 total on both groups of $1,500. The loss on furniture being 
 two-thirds of the whole loss on furniture and wearing; apparel, 
 and the loss on wearing apparel being one-third of this whole 
 loss, two-thirds of Company B's policy, or $666.67, and of the 
 remaining $500 under Company C's policy, or $333.33, covers 
 furniture; one-third of Company B's policy, or $333.33, and one- 
 third of the remainder under Company C's policy, or $166.67, 
 covers wearing apparel, the loss is, therefore, re-apportioned 
 as follows: 
 
 Company A insures furniture $1,000.00 Pays...$ 500.00 
 
 Company B insures furniture 666.67 Pays... 333.33 
 
 Company C insures furniture 333.33 Pays... 166.67 
 
 Company B insures wearing apparel 333.33 Pays... 333.33 
 Company C insures wearing apparel 166.67 Pays... 166.67 
 Company C insures jewelry 500.00 Pays... 500.00 
 
 Assured therefore collects $2,000.00 
 
 CROMIE RULE. 
 
 Applying the Cromie (Kentucky and Missouri) rule, i. e., 
 "the more general policies first pay the loss not covered by the 
 other policies, leaving the remainder or unexhausted amount to 
 pro rate with the other insurance in paying the balance of the 
 loss," we obtain the following result: 
 
 Company C- first pays the $500 loss on jewelry, which is 
 not insured by either Company A or B. The unexhausted 
 amount of Company C's policy, i. e., $500, pro rates with Com- 
 pany B's $1,000 policy in paying the loss of $-3^00 on wearing 
 apparel, Company B paying two-thirds of the loss, or $333.33, 
 and Company C paying one-third, or $166.66. This leaves 
 Company B with $666.66 unexhausted insurance and Company 
 C with $166.66 to pro rate with Company A's $1,000 to pay 
 the $1,000 loss on furniture, Company A, therefore, pays $545.46, 
 Company B pays on furniture $363.63, Company C pays on 
 furniture $90.91. 
 
 CONNECTICUT AND NEW JERSEY RULE. 
 
 Under the New Jersey and Connecticut rule, "the blanket 
 
APPORTIONMENT OF NOX-CURRENT; RULES. 155 
 
 policy pays the largest loss first, the second largest loss next 
 and so on until the entire loss is paid, but states there can be 
 no fixed rule to govern all cases." Hence the following appor- 
 tionment: The largest loss being on furniture, each policy is 
 made to pay that loss first, and each policy being for $1,000 and 
 the loss being $1,000, each pays on that item, $333.33. The next 
 step is for Company C, with its $666.67 unexhausted insurance, 
 to pay the $500 loss on jewelry, which neither of the other com- 
 panies insure, thus leaving it with $166.67 unexhausted insurance 
 to pro rate with Company B's $666.67 unexhausted insurance to 
 pay $500 loss on wearing apparel, not insured by Company A, 
 but which is insured by Companies B and C, hence Company B 
 pays on wearing apparel $400 and Company C $100. 
 
 WISCONSIN RULE. 
 
 Under the Wisconsin rule, the smallest loss is first paid by 
 the more general or blanket policy; applying that rule we get the 
 following result: The smallest loss to the companies in the 
 instant case would be wearing apparel, as there are two com- 
 panies to pay it, whereas there is but one to pay the jewelry 
 loss, the loss on both items being the same, i. e., $500. Both 
 Companies B and C have $1,000 insurance each, so that each 
 pays $250 on wearing apparel. The next smallest loss being on 
 jewelry, Company C pays the whole $500, that item not being 
 insured by either of the other policies. 
 
 This leaves $750 unexhausted insurance under Company B's 
 policy, and $250 unexhausted insurance under Company C's pol- 
 icy to pro rate with Company A's $1,000 policy in paying the 
 $1,000 loss on furniture. So that company having half the insur- 
 ance, pays $500. Company B having 37*/& per cent., pays $375, 
 and Company C having 12^ per cent., pays $125 on the furni- 
 ture. 
 
 READING RULE. 
 
 In order to apply the Reading rule, we must assume values; 
 we will therefore assume the whole value was $4,000, the value 
 of the furniture being $3,000, with a loss of $1,000, the value and 
 loss being $500 each on jewelry and wearing apparel. Company 
 B's liability being fixed on furniture and wearing apparel pro- 
 portionate to value, and Company C's on those two items and 
 jewelry in the same manner. 
 
156 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Furniture Wearing Apparel Jewelry 
 Insures Pays Insures Pays Insures Pays 
 
 Co. A $1,000.00 $ 383.57 
 
 Co. B 857.14 328.76 $142.86 $142.86 
 
 Co. C 750.00 287.67 125.00 125.00 $125.00 $125.00 
 
 $2,627.14 $1,000.00 $267.86 $267.86 $125.00 $125.00 
 
 RECAPITULATION OF NET RESULTS OF THE VARI- 
 OUS RULES, APPLIED TO THE SAME LOSS. 
 
 The Value and Loss. 
 
 Value Loss 
 
 Household furniture $3,000 $1,000 
 
 Wearing Apparel 500 500 
 
 Jewelry 500 500 
 
 Totals $4,000 $2,000 
 
 The Insurance 
 
 Wearing 
 Furniture Apparel Jewelry 
 
 Company A $1,000 Nil Nil 
 
 Specific on furniture 
 
 Company B $1,000 Nil 
 
 Blanket on furniture and wearing 
 apparel. 
 
 Company C $1,000 
 
 Blanket on furniture, wearing ap- 
 parel and Jewelry. 
 
 Reading Rule. 
 
 Company A pays $ 383.57 
 
 Company B pays 471.62 
 
 Company C pays 537.67 
 
 Total . $1,392.86 
 
 Albany Rule. 
 
 Company A pays $ 333.33 
 
 Company B pays 500.00 
 
 Company C pays 666.67 
 
APPORTIONMENT OF NON-CURRENT; RULES. 157 
 
 Finn Rule. 
 
 Company A pays $ 461.53 
 
 Company B pays 593.41 
 
 Company C pays 464.21 
 
 Total $1,519.15 
 
 Kinne Rule. 
 
 Company A pays $ 500.00 
 
 Company B pays 666.67 
 
 Company C pays 833.33 
 
 Total $2,000.00 
 
 Wisconsin Rule. 
 
 Company A pays $ 500.00 
 
 Company B pays 625.00 
 
 Company C pays 875.00 
 
 Total $2,000.00 
 
 New Jersey and Connecticut Rule. 
 
 Company A pays $ 333.33 
 
 Company B pays 733.34 
 
 Company C pays 933.33 
 
 Total $2,000.00 
 
 Cromie, or Kentucky and Missouri United States Rule. 
 
 Company A pays '. $ 545.46 
 
 Company B pays 696.96 
 
 Company C pays 757.58 
 
158 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 The author, as already stated, is of the opinion that if the 
 provisions of the contract are to be followed, the Albany rule 
 should govern. Of course, this works a hardship on the assured, 
 but the contract in each policy provides that it shall pay in pro- 
 portion as its policy bears to the total insurance. The fact that 
 some other policy covers other property does not give the as- 
 sured the right to have that part lopped off from contribution. 
 
 If the contract is not to be followed, pay your money and 
 take your choice of any of the foregoing rules. It would seem 
 to the author if the courts and insurance men depart from the 
 contract, then the thing to do is take that rule which is the 
 simplest and the easiest to apply, or the complicated Kinne rule. 
 The assured will collect his full loss under either as long as 
 there is any insurance unexhausted which will cover his loss. It 
 will require a very competent expert to apply the Kinne rule in 
 some cases, but not in a simple case like that in the foregoing 
 example, but in the preceding example the Cromie rule comes 
 nearer equalizing the amounts paid by the several companies 
 than does any of the others. 
 
 The Kinne rule and some examples of its workings by its 
 author follow: 
 
 THE KINNE RULE. 
 The Principle. 
 
 The principle governing all apportionments of non-concur- 
 rent policies is that general and specific insurances must be 
 regarded as co-insurances; and general insurance must float over 
 and contribute to loss on all subjects under its protection, in the 
 proportions of the respective losses thereon, until the insured is 
 indemnified, or the policy exhausted. 
 
 Steps to be Taken. 
 
 The correct method of applying the principle has been 
 formulated in the following: 
 
 First Ascertain the non-concurrence of the various policies 
 and classify the various items covered, into as many groups as 
 the non-concurrence demands, whether of property, location or 
 ownership. 
 
 Second Ascertain the loss on each group of items sep- 
 arately. 
 
APPORTIONMENT OF NON-CURRENT; RULES. 159 
 
 Third If but a single group is found with a loss upon it, 
 the amount of all policies covering the group contribute pro 
 rata. 
 
 Fourth If more than one group has sustained a loss, and 
 such loss on one or more groups be equal to or greater than the 
 totals of general and specific insurance thereon, then let the 
 whole amount of such insurances apply to the payment of loss 
 on such groups. 
 
 Apportionment. 
 
 Fifth If more than one group has sustained a loss, and 
 such loss be more than the totals of unexhausted general and 
 specific insurances thereon, then apportion the amount of each 
 policy covering on such groups generally, to cover specifically 
 on each group, in the same proportion that the sum of the 
 losses on such groups bears to the loss on each individual group. 
 
 Note. When a group is covered by one or more general 
 policies it would be well to see at once if an apportionment as 
 above on that group would equal the loss, as in case it will not, 
 it will show, without further calculation, that the whole amount 
 of loss on such group must be met by such policies pro rata, and 
 the remainder only apportioned. In such cases, carrying out 
 step 6 simply accomplishes by a longer process what is indi- 
 cated above. 
 
 Reapportionment. 
 
 Sixth If the loss on any group or groups is then found to 
 be greater than the sum of the now specific insurance is appor- 
 tioned, add sufficient to such specific insurances to make up the 
 loss on the group, taking the amount of the deficiency from the 
 now specific insurances of the heretofore general amounts pre- 
 viously covering the now deficient groups, which cover on 
 groups having an excess of insurance, in the proportion that 
 their sums bear to their individual amounts. 
 
 Note. Very rarely are new deficiencies created by the re- 
 apportionment, but if so, repeat step 6. 
 
 Seventh Cause the amounts of all the now specific insur- 
 ances to severally contribute pro rata to pay the partial losses, 
 and it will be found that the whole scheme has resulted in the 
 claimant being fully indemnified in accordance with the various 
 contracts and on a basis which preserves the equity between 
 the companies throughout. 
 
160 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 The Argument. 
 
 Mr. Griswold says that "it is only a question of how to 
 properly apply a proportional rule to cause it to become en- 
 tirely general," and in this connection I beg attention to the 
 following, in which the theory of evolution is plainly evident. 
 
 Rules. 
 
 Reading Value to Value. 
 
 Finn Loss to Loss no reapportionment. 
 
 Albany Insurance to Insurance. 
 
 Rule IV Insurance to Value. 
 
 National Board Value to Value Value to Insurance. 
 
 Griswold.... Loss to Ins. Loss to Loss Ins. to Ins. 
 
 Kinne Loss to Loss Loss to Loss Loss to Loss. 
 
 Compound policies give rise to three general classes of 
 problems, viz.: When their non-concurrency is Partial, Gen- 
 eral or Mixed. 
 
 SOME PRACTICAL WORKINGS OF THE KINNE RULE. 
 
 The following examples, if thoroughly analyzed, will enable 
 the adjuster more fully to understand the propriety and un- 
 changing equity of the rule: 
 
 Example 1. ' 
 
 Example, Page 732, Text Book (Griswold). 
 
 Groups 
 School Books 
 
 A B CD Ins. to Pay. 
 1) ) 8 000 
 
 Other Books 
 
 f [ 5,000 
 > 5 000 ) 2 000 
 
 Stationery 
 
 5,000 ( 
 3 500 
 
 Pictures 
 
 500 
 
 Fancy Goods 
 
 2,000 
 
 10,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 25,000 16,000 
 
 2-16 of $10,000 is less than $2,000, required to pay loss on 
 fancy goods, we have $2,000 of A to pay loss on fancy goods. 
 Dividing the remaining $8,000 of A and the $5,000 each of B and 
 C as stated in step 5, we have the following: 
 
APPORTIONMENT OF NON-CURRENT; RULES. 
 
 161 
 
 Apportionment. 
 
 Groups 
 School Books. 
 Other Books.. 
 Stationery . . . 
 Pictures . 
 
 .A 
 .4,671.41 
 1,142.87 
 2,000.00 
 285 72 
 
 2, 
 1, 
 
 B 
 
 867.16 
 714.28 
 250.00 
 178 56 
 
 C 
 2,962.96 
 740.74 
 1,296.30 
 
 D 
 
 6,000 
 
 Ins. 
 15,391.63 
 2,697.89 
 4,546.30 
 464.28 
 
 To pay 
 8,000 
 2,000 
 3,500 
 500 
 
 Def. 
 36.72 
 
 Fancy Goods. 
 
 2,000.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 2,000.00 
 
 2,000 
 
 
 Totals ...10,000.00 6,000.00 5,000.00 5,000 25,000.00 16,000 35.72 
 
 The deficiency of $35.72 on pictures is made up under step 6, 
 by taking pro rata sums from the now specific amounts of A 
 and B, which have an excess of insurance, which is quickly done* 
 and we have the following: 
 
 Reapportionment. 
 
 Groups 
 School Books . . 
 Other Books . . 
 
 A 
 
 . .. 4,558.38 
 . . . 1,139.62 
 
 B 
 
 2,849.02 
 712.24 
 1,246.44 
 192.30 
 
 5,000.00 
 
 2,962.96 
 
 740.74 
 1,296.30 
 
 5,000.00 
 
 D 
 
 5,000.00 
 
 5,000.00 
 
 Ins. To pay 
 
 15,370.36 8,000 
 2,692.60 2,000 
 4,637.04 3,600 
 500.00 500 
 2,000.00 2,000 
 25,000.00 16,000 
 
 Stationery 
 
 1 994 30 
 
 Pictures 
 
 . . 307.70 
 
 Fancy Goods . . 
 Totals 
 
 . 2,000.00 
 ...10,000.00 
 
 Paying- 
 Saving 
 
 . . , 7,098.45 
 . 2,901.55 
 
 3, 
 
 1. 
 
 686.60 
 813.40 
 
 3, 
 
 1, 
 
 112.31 
 887.69 
 
 2,602.64 
 2.397.36 
 
 16 
 
 9 
 
 .500.00 
 .000.00 
 
 16,000 
 
 Example 2. 
 
 An actual case of recent date. 
 
 Apportionment. 
 
 Item 1. Hotel 
 
 Item 2. Hall 
 
 Item 3. Addition . . . ) 
 Item '4. Coops f 
 
 Item 5. Barn / 
 
 1,500 1,100 1,500.00 1,100.00 2,600.00 770 
 
 A covers $1,000 on Item No. 1, and $500 on Items Nos. 2, 3, 
 4 and 5; B covers $1,000 on Items Nos. 1 and 2, and $100 on 
 Items Nos. 3 and 4. 
 
 
 1,000.00 
 
 666.67 
 
 1,666.67 400 
 
 
 1,000 
 
 
 
 
 270.27 
 
 333.33 
 
 603.60 200 
 
 ) 
 
 108.11 
 
 66.67 
 
 174.78 80 
 
 500 
 
 100 
 
 
 
 ) 
 
 54.06 
 
 33.33 
 
 87.39 40 
 
 
 67.56 
 
 
 67.56 50 
 
162 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 COURT DEFINITIONS OF INSURANCE 
 TERMS. 
 
 "This entire policy, unless otherwise provided by agreement 
 hereon, or added hereto, shall be void * * * if (any usage 
 or custom of trade or manufacture to the contrary notwithstand- 
 ing) there be kept, used or allowed, on the above described 
 premises, benzine, benzole, dynamite, ether, fireworks, gasoline, 
 greek fire, gun powder, exceeding twenty-five pounds in quan- 
 tity, naphtha, nitroglycerine or other explosives, phosporus, 
 
 "Premises" means the building insured or containing the 
 property insured and not the yard or other buildings adjacent 
 thereto. 
 
 Allemannia Fire Ins. Co. v. Pittsburg Expo. Co. (Pa. S. C.), 11 
 
 Atl. Rep. 572; 
 Sperry v. Ins. Co. of N. A. (U. S. C. C.), 14 Ins. L. J. 141; 22 
 
 Fed. Rep. 516; 
 Rau v. Westchester F. Ins. Co. (N. T. S. C.), 36 N. T. S. C. 
 
 App. Div. 516; 28 Ins. L. J. 182; 
 Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Shearman, 20 Tex. C. C. A. 243, 60 
 
 S. W. Rep. 598; 
 
 Thomas v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. (Ky. C. A.), 53 S. W. Rep. 297; 
 Northwestern Mut. Life. Ins. Co. v. Germania F. Ins. Co., 40 
 
 Wis. 446. 
 
 When the use of any such prohibited articles is usual and 
 necessary in the conduct of the insured's business, or, if they 
 be usually kept in similar establishments, it will not avoid the 
 policy. On the doctrine that when a repugnancy exists between 
 the written portion of the policy or rider attached thereto, and 
 the printed conditions of the policy, the provisions of the rider 
 or written portion will prevail. It would be an absurdity to say 
 that a policy is void because of the keeping of such prohibited 
 articles, when the policy itself insured them, as for instance, "on 
 stock of paints, oil, varnishes and other articles usually kept in 
 a paint shop," and by insuring them it is "otherwise provided by 
 agreement, indorsed on the policy," that such articles may be 
 kept on the premises. 
 
 Plinsky v. Germania Ins. Co. (U. S. C. C.), 32 Fed. Rep. 47; 
 Faust v. American F. Ins. Co. (Wis. S. C.), 64 N. W. Rep. 883; 
 Maril v. Connecticut F. Ins. Co. (Ga. S. C.), 23 S. E. Rep. 463; 
 Fink v. Lancashire F. Ins. Co., 60 Mo. App. 673; 
 
 163 
 
164 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Tubb v. L. & L. & G. Ins. Co. (Ala. S. C.), 17 Southern Rep. 615; 
 Yoch v. Home Mut. Ins. Co. (Cal. S. C.), 44 Pacif. Rep. 189; 
 Fraim v. National P. Ins. Co. (Pa. S. C.), 32 Atl. Rep. 613; 
 Mascot v. Granite State F. Ins. Co. (Vt. S. C.), 35 Atl. Rep. 75; 
 Barnard v. National F. Ins. Co., 27 Mo. App. 26; 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Fleming et al. (Ark. S. .C.), 27 Ins. L. J. 584; 
 
 44 S. W. Rep. 464; 
 Amer. Cent'l Ins. Co. v. Green et al. (Tex. C. C. A.), 41 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 74; 
 Davis v. Pioneer Furn. Co. (Wis. S. C.), 28 Ins. L. J. 474; 78 
 
 N. W. Rep. 596; 
 
 Ackley v. Phenix Ins. Co. (Mont. S. C.), 64 Pacif. Rep. 665; 
 Traders Ins. Co. v. Dobbins (Tenn. S. C.), 86 S. W. Rep. 383; 
 Haley v. Dorchester M. Ins. Co., 12 Gray 545; 
 Collins v. Farmville Ins. & Bkg. Co., 79 N. C. 279; 
 Baumgartner v. Ins. Co., 1 W. N. C. (Penn.), 119. 
 
 It is not admissible to show custom among merchants to 
 keep such prohibited articles in limited quantities as part of 
 the stock. 
 
 Beer v. Ins. Co., 39 Ohio St. 109; 
 
 Birmingham F. Ins. Co. v. Kroegher, 83 Pa. St. 64; 
 Lancaster F. Ins. Co. v. Lenheim, 89 Pa. St. 497; 
 Mason v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 29 Up. Can. Q. B. 585; 
 Western Assur. Co. v. Rector, 9 Ky. Law Rep. 3. 
 
 It is for the jury to determine whether such prohibited ar- 
 ticles were included in the description of the property insured. 
 
 Carrington v. Lycoming F. Ins. Co., 53 Vt. 418; 
 Niagara F. Ins. Co. v. De Groff, 12 Mich. 124. 
 
 i 
 
 It is not sufficient to show that the prohibited article was 
 one) usual to the trade; it must be shown that it is included in 
 the specific words used to describe the property insured. 
 
 Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Van Os., 63 Miss. 431. 
 
 "Mechanics" as used in a policy does not mean common 
 painters, and a condition rendering policy void if "gasoline be 
 kept, used or allowed in the building" does not prevent the 
 keeping in the building of gasoline to be used in the filling 
 of gasoline torches for use by painters in removing paint from 
 the building. (The fire originated in cornice about fifteen feet 
 from where painter had last used the torch.) The use of such 
 torch does not, as a matter of law, increase the hazard. 
 
 Smith, County Treasurer, v. German Ins. Co. (Mich. S. C.), 25 
 Ins. L. J. 192; 65 N. W. Rep. 236. 
 
 As to definition of total loss and rights of insured in 
 party wall, see N. W. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ins. Cos., 88 N. W. 
 Rep. 265 and 272. 
 
 "Fire-proof safe" means a safe of the kind generally known 
 as fire-proof. 
 
 Knoxville F. Ins. Co. v. Hird (Tex. C. C. A.), 23 S. W. Rep. 393; 
 23 Ins. L. J. 16. 
 
COURT DEFINITIONS OF INSURANCE TERMS. 165 
 
 "Plate" does not mean articles of common or ordinary use 
 such as silver forks or spoons, but only the more pretentious 
 articles which are displayed on the tables of the wealthy or os- 
 tentatious, and which are to be considered rather as articles 
 of luxury than as household furniture. 
 
 Hanover F. Ins. Co. v. Manassen (Mich. S. C.), 3 Ins. L. J. 668. 
 
 "Store" means shop and includes a bakery or restaurant. 
 Richards v. Washington Ins. Co., 60 Mich. 420. 
 
 "250. Insurance against any one accident." (One of the 
 plaintiff's cars overturned, injuring forty persons) means that 
 250 is the limit of liability for accident to any one person, 
 and that, if more than one is hurt, plaintiff may recover for 
 its liability not exceeding 250 to each person. 
 
 South Staffordshire Tramways Co., Ltd. v. Sickness & Accident 
 Ass'n, Ltd. (Eng. C. A. Q. B. Div.), 1 Queen's Bench Div. 
 Law Reports (March 2, 1891), 402. 
 
 "Any and all risks and perils of fire, and inland navigation, 
 and transportation, while on vessels, steam-boats, railroads, or 
 in hotels, stores, or depots in the United States, and while in 
 custody of the assured or traveling salesman. The printed con- 
 ditions of the policy providing that the insurer would be lia- 
 ble for loss to the property insured laden on board the good 
 vessel or vessels, boat or boats, railroad or carriages, lost or 
 not lost, at and from port or places, to ports and places on a 
 regular and lawful route, named herein," covers a loss to the 
 property from water wetting the goods where the salesman 
 with the goods in a carriage, crossed a stream at the usual 
 place of crossing. 
 
 Kratzenstein v. Western Assur. Co. (N. Y. C. A.), 22 N. E. Rep. 
 221. 
 
 "Subject to three-fourths value clause" is meaningless, 
 there being nothing in the policy to explain the meaning there- 
 of, furnishes no intelligent agreement for the court to construe. 
 
 Parks et/al. v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. (Mo. S. C.), 12 S. W. Rep. 
 1058. 
 
 "Concurrent insurance" is that which to any extent in- 
 sures the same interest, against the same casualty, at the same 
 time, and that would bear the loss proportionately with the 
 primary insurance. 
 
 New Jersey Rubber Co. v. Commercial U. Assur. Co. (N. J. C. B. 
 and A.), 46 Atl. Rep. 777. 
 
166 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 "Their own, held in trust or on commission," plaintiff must 
 show that he adopted warehouseman's act in procuring such in- 
 surance, and so notified him, before he can claim any benefit 
 under a policy issued to defendant. 
 
 Pittman v. Harris (Tex. C. C. A.), 59 S. W. Rep. 1121. 
 
 "Plate glass in windows and doors, the dimensions whereof 
 are nine square feet or more," does not mean a plate glass front 
 which was immovable and stationary, though the glass therein 
 was of greater dimensions than nine square feet. 
 
 Hale v. Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co., 46 Mo. App. 608. 
 
 "Sporting House," has an innocent as well as a guilty mean- 
 ing. Without proof of the sense in which it was used, it does 
 not show conclusively that premises were occupied for unlawful 
 purposes. 
 
 White v. Western Assur. Co. (Minn. S. C.), 54 N. W. Rep. 195; 
 22 Ins. L. J. 305. 
 
 "Gasoline clause in policy," the word "allowed" is to be 
 construed as meaning "allowed to be kept or used," and the 
 
 condition is not violated by merely permitting gasoline to be 
 carried through the building on the premises. 
 
 London & Lane. F. Ins. Co. v. Fischer (U. S. C. C. A. 6th Cir.), 
 92 Fed. Rep. 500. 
 
 "$750 on building on lot 6; $250 on boiler contained there- 
 in; $1,000 on machinery, patterns and other tools," will in- 
 clude patterns not in the building. 
 
 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Strout, 16 Ind. App. 160; 44 N. E. Rep. 934. 
 
 "Adjacent" means "near," "close," "in proximity." 
 
 Hanover F. Ins. Co. et al. v. Stoddard et al. (Neb. S. C.), 27 
 Ins. L. J. 120 ; 73 N. W. Rep. 291. 
 
 "$3,300 on horses being not over $110 per head," does not 
 limit the risk to 30 head of horses. 
 
 Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Crozier (Ky. Super. Ct.), 12 Ky- 
 L. J. 143. 
 
 "$2,500 total concurrent insurance permitted" in a policy 
 for $2,500 held to mean assured could take out $5,000 total in- 
 surance. 
 
 L'Engle v. Scottish U. & N. F. Ins. Co. (Fla. S. C.), 37 S. W. 
 Rep. 462. 
 
 "Twelve o'clock noon" means the common or solar time. 
 
 Grabbs v. Farmers Mut. F. Ins. Assn. (N. C. S. C.), 34 S. B. 
 Rep. 603. 
 
COURT DEFINITIONS OF INSURANCE TERMS. 167 
 
 Parol evidence is admissible to show that standard time 
 had been adopted by established custom. 
 
 Rochester German Ins. Co. v. Peaslee-Gaulbert Co. (Ky. C. A.), 
 and Pacific Ins. Co. v. Louisville Lead and Color Co. (Ky. C. 
 A.), 87 S. W. Rep. 1115. 
 
 WHAT IS NOT INSURED. 
 
 "Fixtures" does not include casks, bottles and packing cases 
 in a brewery. 
 
 Fitzgerald v. Atlanta Home Ins. Co. (N. T. S. C., App. Div.), 70 
 N. Y. Supp. 55'2: 
 
 "All other implements of trade" does not include sta- 
 tionery and glove boxes of a glove manufacturer. 
 
 Stemmer v. Scottish U. & N. Ins. Co. (Ore. S. C.), 53 Pacif. 
 Rep. 498. 
 
 "Saloon fixtures" does not include chairs. 
 
 Manchester F. Assur. Co. v. Feibelman (Ala. S. C.), 23 Southern 
 Rep. 759. 
 
 "Carriages and all such goods usually kept in a livery barn 
 and sales stable" does not include goods held in trust or on 
 commission, and $3,000 additional concurrent insurance" the 
 assured having taken out that much additional insurance which 
 covered not only those goods belonging to the assured, but 
 goods held in trust or on commission did not render them non- 
 concurrent with first policy. 
 
 Corkery v. Security F. Ins. Co. (Iowa S. C.), 68 N. W. Rep. 792. 
 
 "Harvester while in use" does not mean while it is stored 
 in a shed. 
 
 Slinkard v. Manchester F. Assur. Co. (Cal. S. C.), 55 Pacif. Rep. 
 417. 
 
 "Harvesting machine operating in grain fields and in transit 
 from place to place in connection with harvesting," does not 
 cover a loss to the machine after it had been taken from place 
 of storage and sent to shop for repair, and there burned about 
 the day the harvesting season opened. 
 
 Mawhinney v. Southern Ins. Co. (Cal. S. C.), 32 Pacif. Rep. 
 945; 22 Ins. L. J. 596. 
 
 "Household furniture" does not include furniture pur- 
 chased after policy was issued. 
 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Dunn. (Tex. C. C. A.), 41 S. W. Rep. 109. 
 
168 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 "Machinery, shafting, belting, iron working lathes, planers, 
 upright drills, milling machinery and fixtures and other machin- 
 ery and implements used in his business as a machinist" does 
 not include articles carried in stock for sale. 
 
 Michel v. American Central Ins. Co., 17 Hun. 87. 
 
 "Builders' risk" on a house plaintiff contracted to remove 
 does not cover his loss on tools in the house at time of fire. 
 
 Planters & Merchants Ins. Co. v. Thurston (Ala. S. C.), 9 South- 
 ern Rep. 268; 20 Ins. L. J. 746. 
 
 "Stock of vinegar in store and in tank, mash and low wines" 
 does not cover mixtures in process of manufacture. 
 
 Purves v. Germania Ins. Co. (La. S. C.), 10 Southern Rep. 495; 
 21 Ins. L. J. 306. 
 
 "Decorations to walls and ceilings" does not include paint- 
 ing of the outside walls of the building. 
 
 Sherlock v. German Amer. Ins. Co. (N. Y. S. C.), 47 N. Y. Supp. 
 315. 
 
 "Frame barn, and contents therein," does not cover against 
 loss on a horse usually kept in the barn, when the loss to such 
 horse was sustained when it was 50 feet distant from the barn. 
 
 Farmers Mut. F. Ins. Ass'n. v. Kryder (Ind. App. C.), 31 N. B. 
 Rep. 851. 
 
 "Materials" do not include benzine, unless it is commonly 
 used in the business. 
 
 McFarland v. Peabody Ins. Co., 6 W. Va. 425. 
 
 "On property belonging to the insured, or on any property 
 for which they may be liable," does not include those articles 
 from which the policy exempts the insurer from liability, unless 
 specifically insured. 
 
 The Commonwealth v. Hide & Leather Ins. Co. (S. J. C. Mass.), 
 3 Ins. L. J. 671. 
 
 But it does include merchandise in transit over their road 
 whether in their own cars or on the cars of other common 
 carriers. 
 
 The Commonwealth v. Hide and Leather Ins. Co. (S. J. C. Mass.), 
 3 Ins. L. J. 671. 
 
 "Three-story brick building occupied as a pottery, and 
 known as 'Pottery Building' " does not include a boiler house 
 adjoining, used on one floor as a boiler house and one floor for 
 
COURT DEFINITIONS OF INSURANCE TERMS. 169 
 
 storage of pottery, power being furnished from said boiler 
 house to the pottery, and to box and yarn factories in adjoin- 
 ing buildings. 
 
 Forbes v. American Ins. Co. (S. J. C. Mass.), 41 N. E. Rep. 656. 
 
 "Blankets purchased with insurer's consent, to protect in- 
 ured's property from fire burning in adjacent building," is not 
 a loss within the policy. 
 
 Welles v. Boston Ins. Co., 6 Pick. 182. 
 
 "Unfinished house" does not include timbers lying in ad- 
 joining building to be used in its construction. 
 
 Ellmaker v. Franklin F. Ins. Co., 5 Penn. St. 183; 6 W. S. 439. 
 
 "Jewelry and clothing, being stock in trade," limits liability 
 to. jewelry and clothing only. 
 
 Rafel v. Nashville M. & F. Ins. Co., 7 La. An. 244. 
 
 "English, American and West India goods" does not in- 
 clude tea or nutmegs unless they are English, American and 
 West Indian goods. 
 
 Huckins v. People's M. F. Ins. Co., 31 N, H. 238. 
 
 "Merchandise" means all those things which assured, as a 
 merchant, sells, and not articles of personal property not in- 
 tended for sale. 
 
 Kent v. Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co., 26 Ind. 294. 
 
 "Stock of wearing apparel and household furniture" does 
 not include linen sheets and shirts smuggled and kept for clan- 
 destine sale. 
 
 Clary v. Protection Ins. Co., 1 Wright 228; 
 Watchorn v. Langford, 3 Camp. 422. 
 
 "Stock and Materials" do not include retorts in a smelting 
 plant. 
 
 American Smelter Co. v. Providence-Wash.' Ins. Co., 64 Mo. 
 App. 438. 
 
 "Lumber, Lath and Pickets" do not include shingles, though 
 if the word lumber alone is used it might. 
 
 West Branch Lumberman's Exch. v. American Ins. Co., 183 Pa. 
 St. 136; 27 Ins. L. J. 305; 38 Atl. Rep. 1081. 
 
 "Stock of hair manufactured or in process" does not include 
 goods of other material, even though usually kept in such stocks. 
 Medina v. Builders Ins. Co., 120 Mass. 225. 
 
170 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 "Household Furniture" does not include a watch. 
 Clary v. Protection Ins. Co., 1 Wright Ohio 228. 
 
 "Oil in tank cars in transit" * * * "insurance to con- 
 tinue and endure until said goods and merchandise are safely 
 
 landed at , as aforesaid," means that the latter clause^ 
 
 when properly filled out, applied only to sea carriage, and was 
 no part of contract made by this policy, which insured "oil in 
 tank cars in transit," and when a tank car of oil covered by the 
 policy had been delivered by the railroad which transported ta 
 the insured, by being placed by its direction upon its private 
 switch alongside its warehouse, the oil was. no longer "in tran- 
 sit." 
 
 Crew v. British and Foreign M. Ins. Co. (U. S. C. C. A., 3rd 
 Di'st.), 103 Fed. Rep. 48. 
 
 "Occupied as a dwelling" is a warranty that the building is. 
 so occupied at the time. 
 
 Hamburg-Bremen F. Ins. Co. v. Lewis (D. C. C. A.), 4 App. 
 D. C. 66. 
 
 "Occupied as a dwelling" does not permit building to be 
 used in part as a grocery store. 
 
 Greenwich Ins. Co. v. Dougherty (N. J. S. C.), 42 Atl. Rep. 485. 
 
 Permission to use the building for "any mercantile purpose"" 
 does not authorize its use as a restaurant. 
 
 Garretson v. Mcts. & Bkrs. Co. (Iowa S. C.), 45 N. W. Rep. 
 1047. 
 
 WHAT IS INSURED. 
 
 "On lines owned, leased or operated by," means owned,, 
 leased or operated at the time the policy was issued, though not 
 so owned, leased or operated at time of fire; to hold otherwise 
 would make insurer liable for loss it never had in contempla- 
 tion. 
 
 Northern Pacif. Exp. Co. v. Traders Ins. Co. (111. S. C.), 65 N. E. 
 Rep. 702. 
 
 "Baled cotton held for compression or compressed, but not 
 loaded on cars, and for which a compress shipper's receipt has 
 been issued for certain railroads, while contained on open plat- 
 forms, and under sheds of insured, loss, if any, payable to said 
 railroads as their several interests may appear at the time of 
 the fire," covers all cotton held by plaintiff for any owner, situ- 
 
COURT DEFINITIONS OF INSURANCE TERMS. 171 
 
 ate as described for which compress receipt had been issued for 
 shipment over any of the railroads, that the word "for" in con- 
 nection "for which," etc., is not used to indicate ownership of 
 the cotton, but simply the lines over which it is to be routed. 
 
 Hope Oil Mill Comp. & Mfg. Co. v. Phoenix Assur. Co. (Miss. 
 S. C.), 21 Southern Rep. 132. 
 
 "On cotton in bales for which bills of lading have been/ is- 
 sued by its duly authorized agents, and for which it may be lia- 
 ble." (Policy containing this, clause was issued to H. & T. C. 
 R. R. Co. The bills of lading provided the carriers were not to 
 be liable for any loss or damage by fire. The R. R. Co., accord- 
 ing to custom placed the cotton in the yards of a compress to 
 be compressed. While there it was accidentally damaged by 
 fire). It was held that insurer was liable. 
 
 Germania Ins. Co. v. Anderson (Tex. C. C. A.), 40 S. W. Rep. 200. 
 
 "Rolling stock on line of assured's road, its branches, spurs, 
 side tracks and yards, owned or operated by assured, but not on 
 line of any road leased by assured unless such road is specified 
 as being insured in part under this policy," covers rolling stock 
 which is destroyed in a yard operated by the insured in con- 
 nection with its own line of road, but not owned by it, though 
 the owner of the yard is not specified. 
 
 L. & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. McNeill (U. S. C. C. A. 9th Cir.), 89 
 Fed. Rep. 131. 
 
 "Cars leased and for which assured is liable" must be con- 
 strued with reference to the known business of the insured and 
 covers foreign cars coming into its possession in such business. 
 The assured owned orly a few cars, and was engaged in the 
 handling of cars for other railroad companies. 
 Phenix Ins. Co. v. Belt Ry. Co., 82 111. App. 266. 
 
 "Freight cars owned or used by assured" will cover cars 
 owned by others while in transit on assured's tracks. 
 
 The Commonwealth v. Hide & Leather Ins. Co. (S. J. C. Mass.), 
 3 Ins. L. J. 671. 
 
 "Insurance by warehouseman to secure property held in 
 trust for others" are floating policies, and broad enough to 
 cover property of others stored with him, subsequently to their 
 issue. 
 
 Smith v. Carmack et al. (Tenn. Ch. App.), 64 S. W. Rep. 372. 
 
 "Held in trust" embraces goods held by the insured as 
 bailee. 
 
 Beideman v. Powell, 10 Mo. App. 280. 
 
172 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 "Their own, held in trust, on commission, or on joint ac- 
 count with others, or sold but not delivered, contained in their 
 warehouse," covers goods stored with assured. 
 
 Pelzer Mfg. Co. v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. and other Ins. Cos. 
 (U. S. C. C. Dist. S. C.), 19 Ins. L. J. 372. 
 
 "Held in trust, or sold and not delivered," covers lumber 
 sold, piled by itself and marked for purchaser ready for ship- 
 ment. 
 
 Michigan Pipe Co. v. Michigan F. & M. Ins. Co. (Mich. S. C.), 
 
 52 N. W. Rep. 1070; 
 Waring et al. v. Indemnity F. Ins. Co. (N. Y. C. A.), 1 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 672. 
 
 "Its own, held in trust, on commissions, or in storage or for 
 repairs, or sold, but not removed," will cover full value of goods 
 left for repair or sale, and not merely the insured's insurable 
 interest therein. 
 
 Johnson v. Arbresch (Wis. S. C.), 101 N. W. Rep. 395, 34 Ins. 
 L. J. 203. 
 
 "Held in trust" will cover goods held by an agent employed 
 to manage a store, carrying on business in his own name, who 
 is required to keep an account of all transactions to his prin- 
 cipal and( turn over all the property at the end of his employ- 
 ment. 
 
 Roberts v. Firemen's Ins. Co. et al. (Pa. S. C.), 30 Atl. Rep. 450. 
 
 "Their own, or held by them in trust, or on which they 
 have an interest or liability, and have agreed to insure under 
 this policy, and not removed, stored or hereafter stored during 
 the continuance of this policy," insures to the extent of in- 
 sured's storage liens on merchandise stored with them as ware- 
 housemen, and for which they have issued warehouse receipts, 
 expressly stipulating they would not be liable for loss by fire. 
 
 Pittsburgh Storage Co. v. Scottish U. & N. Ins. Co. (Pa. S. C.), 
 32 Atl. Rep. 58. 
 
 "Assured, a warehouseman, insured his goods and those of 
 others." One of the depositors who had paid the warehouse- 
 man for insurance was only entitled to share with the ware- 
 houseman and other depositors in the amount paid on the loss, 
 less the amount paid for the insurance. 
 
 Boyd v. McKee et al. (Va. S. C. A.), 37 S. E. Rep. 810. 
 
 "For account of whom it may concern, or equivalent terms," 
 clearly indicates a purpose to keep insured the entire title to 
 
COURT DEFINITIONS OF INSURANCE TERMS. 173 
 
 the property, and one who purchases an interest therein and 
 adopts the insurance may recover, though printed stipulation of 
 the policy is inconsistent with such right. 
 
 Hagan v. Scottish U. & N. Ins. Co. (U. S. D. C., Eastern Dist, 
 Pa.), 98 Fed. Rep. 129. 
 
 "Held in trust" will include goods stored with assured, a 
 warehouseman. 
 
 Southern Cold Storage W. Ho. v. Dechman (Tex. C. C. A.), 73 
 S. W. 545. 
 
 "Held in store" will embrace the property of others kept in 
 assured's warehouse at time of fire. 
 
 Strohn v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 3 Ins. L. J. 288. 
 
 "Held in trust" means goods with which the insured is in- 
 trusted in the ordinary sense of the word and not in the strict 
 technical sense. 
 
 Hough et al. v. Peoples Ins. Co. (Md. C. A.), 2 Ins. L. J. 353. 
 
 This is one of the well known Baltimore Warehouse cases, 
 citing: 
 
 Waters v. Assur. Co., 85 Eng. C. L. Rep. 879. 
 
 "Contained in their factory" will include all buildings con- 
 stituting the factory, as factory does not necessarily mean one 
 building or edifice. 
 
 Liebenstein v. Baltic F. Ins. Co., 45 111. 301. 
 
 "Articles used in packing hogs, cattle, etc.," includes coal or 
 fuel used to generate steam for purpose of packing. 
 
 Home Ins. Co. v. Favorite, 46 111. 263; 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Favorite, 49 111. 259. 
 
 Clause in policy reading, "$800 on household and kitchen fur- 
 niture" * * * and "$ on family wearing apparel" cov- 
 ers wearing apparel. 
 
 German F. Ins. Co. v. Seibert (Ind. A. C.), 56 N. E. Rep. 686. 
 
 "Three-story building occupied as a store at No. 72 E. 
 street" includes a one-story addition in rear and opened into it 
 by a window and a door, and for a long time occupied as part of 
 the store. 
 
 Boyer v. Grand Rapids F. Ins. Co. (Mich. S. C.), 83 N. W. Rep. 
 
 And the keeping of gasoline in such addition will render 
 the policy void. 
 
 Boyer v. Grand Rapids F. Ins. Co. (Mich. S. C.), 83 N. W. Rep. 
 124. 
 
174 HALI, ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 "Church Building" includes altars therein. 
 
 Caraker v. Royal Ins. Co., 63 Hun. 82; 17 N. Y. Supp. 858; aff'd 
 no op. 136 N. Y. 645. 
 
 "Brick building and additions, including gas, steam and 
 water pipes, yard fixtures, railings, stoops and sidewalks in front 
 of and all fixtures contained in or attached thereto at 160 M 
 Street, occupied for stores and dwellings" covers either or both 
 of two buildings owned by assured at that number, one at front 
 and other at rear of the lot and connected externally by an in- 
 tervening structure. 
 
 Rickerson v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 149 N. Y. 307. 
 
 "Brick building and additions thereto occupied as a dwell- 
 ing" includes a building occupied by his servants, and as a laun- 
 dry, even though it is not annexed to the brick dwelling pro- 
 vided there is no other building in assured's yard which can 
 possibly be claimed as an addition to the main building and not 
 built in it as part of the house originally. 
 
 Phenix Ins. Co. v. Martin (Miss. S. C.), 16 Southern Rep. 417; 
 24 Ins. L. J. 319. 
 
 "Steam Saw Mill" includes no{ only building but machin- 
 ery. 
 
 Bigler v. N. Y. Central Ins. Co., 20 Bail. 635; aff'd 22 N. Y. 402. 
 
 "Starch factory, including machinery and fixtures," includes 
 all fixtures used in the manufacture of starch. 
 Peoria M. & F. Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 18 111. 553. 
 
 "Frame dwelling house," covers frame wing sodded up on 
 three sides. 
 
 McNamara v. Dakota F. & M. Ins. Co. (S. Dak. S. C.), 47 N. W. 
 Rep. 288. 
 
 "Planing mill building and addition, and machinery therein" 
 
 covers engine room and machinery therein, 22 feet distant, the 
 only connection between them being a shaft for motive power 
 and a spout or shavings conveyor. 
 
 Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roe (Wis. S. C.), 36 N. W. Rep. 594. 
 
 "Ill 
 
 "Two-story brick dwelling house and its additions, adjoin- 
 ing and communicating," includes a frame addition, adjoining 
 and communicating. 
 
 Carpenter v. Allemannia F. Ins. Co. (Pa. S. C.), 26 Atl. Rep. 781. 
 
 "Main building and all additions thereto, adjoining and com- 
 
COURT DEFINITIONS OF INSURANCE TERMS. 175 
 
 municating," includes dryhouse, twelve feet away, and the en- 
 gine house, four feet from dryhouse. 
 
 Marsh v. New Hampshire P. Ins. Co. (N. H. S. C.), 49 Atl. 
 Rep. 88. 
 
 "Two-story frame building and additions thereto with shin- 
 gle roof occupied by insured as a dwelling" covers a room called 
 his carriage house in which he kept his carriages and horses, 
 and which, was under the same shingle roof as the rest of the 
 building, and was separated from the woodshed which connected 
 with the kitchen by a single partition of plain boards. This par- 
 tition did not extend to the second story. Insured's hired man 
 slept in room over carriage house, which was furnished same as 
 any bed room in the house. 
 
 Hannan v. Williamsburgh City Fire Ins. Co. (Mich. S. C.), 45 
 N. W. Rep. 1120. 
 
 "Three-story brick building, basement, additions, founda- 
 tions and area walls" includes gas piping and fixtures, heating 
 apparatus, elevator and plumbing, and this, too, when those arti- 
 cles are specifically insured under another item of the policy, 
 when the insurance under that item is not sufficient to cover the 
 value of such articles. 
 
 Niagara v. Heenan (111. S. C.), 54 N. B. Rep. 1052. 
 
 "One-story brick building, and attached additions occupied 
 as saloon, No. 129 l / 2 L street," is question for the jury to deter- 
 mine, whether or not a one-story frame building occupied as a 
 restaurant, No. 131 L street, attached to and communicating 
 with the brick building, was insured. 
 
 Connecticut P. Ins. Co. v. Hilbrant (Tex. C. C. A.), 7$ S. W. 
 Rep. 558. 
 
 "Eggs in pickle," where agent who wrote policy testifies he 
 understood the insurance was to cover the stock "while being 
 pickled and disposed of," covers the entire stock whether in 
 pickling vats or not. 
 
 Hall v. Concordia F. Ins. Co. (Mich. S. C.), 51 N. W. Rep. 524. 
 
 "Wholesale stock of drugs, paints, oils, dye stuffs, and other 
 goods on hand for sale" covers not only the wholesale stock but 
 all other goods contained in the building, and this, too, notwith- 
 standing assured's wholesale and retail stores were separated by 
 a partition. 
 
 Wilson Drug Co. v. Phoenix Assur. Co. (N. C. S. C.), 14 S. E. 
 Rep. 790. 
 
176 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 "Tools used in the manufacture of boots and shoes" covers 
 patterns for making boots and shoes. 
 
 Adams v. N. T. Bowery F. Ins. Co. (Iowa S. C.), 51 N. W. Rep. 
 1149. 
 
 Contra: 
 
 Johnston v. Niagara F. Ins. Co. (N. C. S. C.), 25 Ins. L. J. 558 1 
 24 S. E. Rep. 424. 
 
 "Grain" in barn includes corn and millet hay. 
 Norris v. Farmers Mut. F. Ins. Co., 65 Mo. App. 632. 
 
 "Stock in two-story brick building," includes stock in a one- 
 story rear addition. 
 
 Carr v. Hibernia Ins. Co., 2 Mo. App. 466. 
 
 "Grain" includes broom corn in bale, but not the baled pani- 
 cles from which the seed has been threshed. 
 
 Reavis v. Farmers M. F. Ins. Co., 78 Mo. App. 14. 
 
 "Grain and seed" includes flax seed which was afterwards 
 converted into oil cake, especially so, as the agent who took the 
 risk knew that the oil cake was the only subject to be included 
 in the description. 
 
 Marsh Oil Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co,, 79 Mo. App. 21. 
 
 Policy issued to painter, "on his paints, oils, brushes, var- 
 nish and such other merchandise," covers such other articles of 
 convenience or necessity as are used in his business, whether 
 intended for sale or not. 
 
 Hartwell v. California Ins. Co. (Me. S. J. C.), 24 Atl. Rep. 954. 
 
 "Merchandise" includes butter and eggs. 
 
 Lake Sup. P. & Cold Storage Co. v. Concordia F. Ins. Co. (Minn. 
 S. C.), 104 N. W. Rep. 560. 
 
 "Blacksmith and carriage maker's stock, manufactured and 
 in process of manufacture," will include unmanufactured or raw 
 stock. 
 
 Spratley v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 1 Dil. C. C. 392. 
 
 "Stock in trade as a baker" includes tools and implements 
 necessary for carrying on the business of a baker. 
 Moadinger v. Mechanics F. Ins. Co., 2 Hall 490. 
 
 "Stock of watches, watch trimmings, etc.," was not limited 
 to watches and watch trimmings, but included general stock. 
 Crosby v. Franklin Ins. Co., 5 Gray 504. 
 
COURT DEFINITIONS OF INSURANCE TERMS. lit 
 
 "Engine and machinery for the manufacture of tinware" in- 
 cludes dies. 
 
 Seavy v. Central Mut. F. Ins. Co., Ill Mass. 540. 
 
 "Stock of merchandise consisting of family groceries, lamps, 
 scales and other such merchandise" includes lamps and scales 
 used by assured as store furniture and not kept for sale. 
 
 Georgia Home Ins. Co. v. Allen (Ala. S. C.), 24 Southern Rep, 
 399. 
 
 Lumber piled in mill building, on cars under mill sheds, and 
 in sheds adjoining to said mill sheds." Held, To cover five sheds 
 where lumber was piled, and not merely to lumber piled in mill 
 under ten or twelve feet of projecting roofs at either side of 
 mill, built to protect men and lumber when loading and unload- 
 ing cars in stormy weather. 
 
 Wolverine Lumber Co. v. Palatine Ins. Co. (Mich. S. C.), 102 
 N. W. Rep. 991. 
 
 "Stock in brick building and additions attached" will include 
 stock in a frame building on next lot, extending over and 
 against the rear of the brick building two inches and used in con- 
 nection therewith as a store room, it being the only building 
 attached or connected with the brick. 
 
 Maisel v. Fire Ass'n (N, Y. S. C., App. Div.), 69 N. T. Supp. 
 
 lol* 
 
 "Farming utensils" includes hay press used on assured's 
 farm. 
 
 Phenix Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 53 111. App. 273. 
 
 "Engine and machinery used for the manufacture of tin- 
 ware, sheet iron, japaned and fancy painted ware," includes 
 "dies" and all essential parts of the machinery used in manufac- 
 turing such articles as the insured manufactured. 
 
 Seavy et al. v. Central Mut. F. Ins. Co. (S. J. C. Mass.), 3 Ins. 
 L. J. 576. 
 
 "Butter and cheese manufactured and in process of manu- 
 facture, and all materials and supplies used in the manufacture 
 of same, including packages," includes milk cans. 
 
 Cronin v. Fire Ass'n (Mich. S. C.), 70 N. W. Rep. 448. 
 
 "Implements including binders and such goods kept for sale 
 in a general implement store" includes binding twine. 
 
 Davis v. Anchor Mut. F. Ins. Co. (Iowa S. C.), 64 N. W. Rep. 687. 
 12 
 
178 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 "Ship tackle, ordnance, ammunition, artillery and furniture 
 of ship" includes provisions for use of crew. 
 Brough v. Whitmore, 4 Term. 206. 
 
 "On grain, while contained in frame iron-clad building oc- 
 cupied by storage and handling grain, known as 'St. Anthony 
 Elevator' " covers in either "Main Building" or "Annex A," 300 
 feet distant connected by an iron-clad gallery. Both buildings 
 were of same construction and the entire plant was known as 
 St. Anthony Elevator. 
 
 Pettit et al. v. State Ins. Co. (Minn. S. C.), 19 Ins. L. J. 138; 
 
 43 N. W. Rep. 378; 
 Cargill et al. v. Millers & Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. (Minn. S. C.). 19 
 
 Ins. L. j. 876. 
 
 "Fixtures" include anything that is a fixture as between 
 the insured and his landlord. 
 
 Clark v. Svea Ins. Co. (Cal. S. C.), 36 Pacif. Rep. 587. 
 
 "Threshing outfit" includes self-feeder. 
 
 Minneapolis Threshing Mch. Co. v. Darnall (S. Dak. S. C.), 83 
 N. W. Rep. 266. 
 
 / 
 
 "Household furniture, useful and ornamental" includes Jap- 
 anese vase. 
 
 Bowne v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 46 Mo. App. 473. 
 
 "Household furniture, useful and ornamental, and family* 
 stores" includes books, games, writing materials, child's swing, 
 and child's walker. 
 
 Huston v. State Ins. Co. (Iowa S. C.), 69 N. W. Rep. 674. 
 
 Household furniture includes carpets and bedding. 
 
 Patrons Mut. Aid Society v. Hall (Ind. A. C.), 49 N. E. Rep. 279. 
 
 "Household furniture" includes all articles necessary and 
 convenient for housekeeping such as sausage mill, churn, cook- 
 stove, dishes, kettles, etc., not particularly specified. 
 
 Reynolds et al. v. Iowa & Neb. Ins. Co. et al. (Iowa S. C.), 46 
 N. W. Rep. 659. 
 
 "Loss of rents * * * during such period as may be nec- 
 essary to restore the premises to same condition! as before the 
 fire" includes the period necessary to make the contract as well 
 as the time actually necessary in making the repairs. 
 
 Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Pires (Tex. C. A. A.), 165 S. W. 565. 
 
COURT DEFINITIONS or INSURANCE TERMS. 179 
 
 "Merchandise of every description incidental to assured's 
 business consisting chiefly of grain and grain products," will 
 include malt. 
 
 Johnson v. Stewart, 243 Pa. 486, 90 Atl. 349. 
 
 "Held in trust" as used in a warehouseman's policy will 
 
 cover goods stored with him, such a policy cannot be subject to 
 
 the construction that it was only intended to cover goods of 
 
 shippers who had made arrangements with assured to that effect. 
 
 Johnson v. Stewart, 243 Pa. 485, 90 Atl. 349. 
 
 "In cars on side tracks within 100 feet" covers only in such 
 cars as are within 100 feet, and not in cars on side track within 
 100 feet. The policy refers to the cars rather than to the tracks. 
 
 Smith v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (Mo. App.) 168 S. W. 831. 
 
 "Premises" as used in an insurance policy means merely the 
 space leased by the insured and does not include other parts of 
 the building over which he has no control. 
 
 Central & Co. v. North B. & M. Ins. Co., 245 Pa. St. 272; 91 Atl. 
 662. 
 
 "Renewal of lease" does not constitute a change of lessees 
 interest. 
 
 Home Ins. Co. v. Coker, 43 Okla. 331, 142 Pac. 1195^ 
 
 Coinsurance Concurrent Insurance; coinsurance is where 
 the assured bears a portion of the loss; concurrent insurance is 
 other insurance covering the same property against same risks. 
 
 Oppenheim v. Fireman's F. Ins. Co. (Minn. S. C.), 138 N. W. 777. 
 
 "Lien for rent" is not a chattel mortgage within the mean- 
 ing of a fire insurance policy. 
 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Fleenor, 104 Ark. 119, 148 S. W. 650; 
 Raulet v. Northwestern N. Ins. Co., 157 Cal. 213, 107 Pac. 292. 
 
 "Open for business." A store is not open for business with- 
 in the meaning of a fire insurance policy, where the assured 
 closes his store to go to lunch, only intending to be gone a half 
 hour. 
 
 Joffee v. Niagara F. Ins. Co., 116 Md. 155; 81 Atl. 281. 
 
 "Within 60 days after the fire," means after the fire has ter- 
 minated. Slocum v. Saratoga & W. F. Ins. Co., 134 N. Y. Supp. 
 78, National W. P. Co. v. Associated Mfrs. M. F. Ins. Co., 175 
 N. Y. 226. The time begins to run after destruction of the prop- 
 
180 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 erty. Johnson v. Humboldt Ins. Co., 91 111. 92. It begins to run 
 from the time the fire started. Western, etc., v. Traders Ins. 
 Co., 122 111. App. 138. The Illinois Court of Appeals is not as 
 high as the Illinois Supreme Court, (The Author.) 
 
 "Ready to proceed under the provisions of the policy," a 
 
 statement to that effect is not a compliance with the policy pro- 
 visions requiring the loss to be submitted to referees. 
 
 Vera v. Mercantile P. & M. Ins. Co., 216 Mass. 154, 103 N. E. 292. 
 
 "Void" as used in a fire insurance policy means null and 
 of no effect. 
 
 Tolliver v. Granite St. F. Ins. Co., Ill Me. 275, 89 Atl. 8. 
 
 "Insurance proceeds exempt" when collected for destruc- 
 tion of a homestead. 
 
 Johnson v. Hall (Tex. C. C. A.), 163 S. W. 399. 
 
 "While occupied as" constitutes a warranty that the prop- 
 erty would be used as warranted. Occupied implies an actual 
 use for the purpose designated. 
 
 Washington F. Ins. Co. v. Cobb (Tex. C. C. A.), 163 S. W. 608. 
 
 "Toilet articles, labels, bottles and powder" will also include 
 corn starch. 
 
 Aachen & Munich F. Ins. Co. v. Arabian T. G. Co., 64 So. 635, 
 (10 Ala. App. 395). 
 
 "Red Top Seed," whether it is grain or not is for the jury. 
 Coen v. Denver T. M. F. Ins. Co., 155 111. App. 332. 
 
 "Stock Merchandise," in mercantile law "stock" is the 
 goods which a tradesman holds for sale or traffic, "merchan- 
 dise" is the object of commerce. 
 
 Spring Garden Ins. Co. v. Brown (Tex. C. C. A.), 143 S. W. 292. 
 
 "Inventory." An inventory is not an invoice, an inventory 
 means a list of goods in the store, an invoice is also a list of 
 goods but is made out by the seller or consignor and does not 
 show that the goods so listed were ever received in the as- 
 sured's store. Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Adams (Tex. C. C. A.), 
 158 S. W. 231; Day v. Home Ins. Co., 177 Ala. 600, 58 So. 549, 
 and the same doctrine applies where the assured himself shipped 
 the goods from a branch store. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Dorsey 
 (Miss. S. C.), 58 So. 778. 
 
COURT DEFINITIONS OF INSURANCE TERMS. 181 
 
 "Furniture" will include an iron safe not attached in any 
 way to the building. 
 
 Mecca. Ins. Co. v. First State Bank (Tex. C. C. A.), 135 S. W. 
 
 1083. 
 
 "Stock of grain" will include bran, a product thereof. 
 German P. Ins. Co. v. Walker (Tex. C. C. A.), 146 S. W. 606. 
 
 "Inventory." The bunching of articles without itemizing 
 i. e. giving the total value of each group is not an inventory as 
 
 Shawnee F. Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 30 Okla. 466, 119 Pac. 985. 
 Houff v. German Am. Ins. Co., 3 Va. App. 986, 66 S. E. 831. 
 
 "Inventory." But while the grouping of articles is not a 
 compliance with the policy provisions requiring an inventory, 
 this does not affect that part of the inventory which is item- 
 ized and therefore does not avoid the policy. 
 
 Arnold v. Indemnity F. Ins. Co., 152 N. C. 232, 67 S. E. 574. 
 
 "Vacant and unoccupied." Vacancy can only occur when 
 the building is empty, contains substantially nothing; while oc- 
 cupancy, when speaking of residences, refers more particularly 
 to human habitation, or actually living in the house. 
 
 Norman v. Missouri T. M. Ins. Co., 74 Mo. App. 456. 
 
 "Vacant or unoccupied" when applied to a dwelling house 
 means that no ones lives in it, a mere supervision of it does not 
 constitute occupancy. 
 
 Cook v. Continental Ins. Co., 70 Mo. App. 610; 
 
 Hoover v. Mercantile T. M. Ins. Co., 93 Mo. App. Ill; 69 S. W. 42; 
 Craig v. Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co., 34 Mo. App. 481; 
 Wheeler v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 53 Mo. App. 446; 
 
 Waddle v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 170 S. W. 682, 184 Mo. App. 
 571. 
 
 "Dental books" are not covered under the description, "fur- 
 niture, chairs, gas apparatus, pictures, paintings, instruments, 
 appliances, and material incidental to a dental office." 
 
 American F. Ins. Co. v. Bell (Tex. C. C. A.), 75 S. W. 319. 
 
 "Grain," includes millet hay. 
 Norris v. Farmers M. F. Ins. Co., 65 Mo. App. 639. 
 
 "Valued policy law of Texas," means that neither notice nor 
 proofs of loss is necessary, the claim being due on demand, in- 
 terest begins to run from the date of the fire or from the date 
 of the demand. 
 
 Camden F Ins. Ass'n. v. Bomar (Tex. C. C. A.)! 176 S. W. 156. 
 
182 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 "Machinery" is realty when owned by the same owner who 
 owns the building and is within the purview of the valued policy 
 law, when the policy insures the building and machinery of a 
 mill. A special agreement between the insured and the insurer 
 attempting to fix the legal status of machinery in a building as 
 personality is void under the valued policy law. 
 
 Havens v. Germania F. Ins. Co., 135 Mo. 649, 37 S. W. 497; 24 
 
 Ins. L. J. 321; 
 
 Murphy v. N. Y. Bowery Ins. Co., 62 Mo. App. 495. 
 Darden v. L. & L. & G. Ins. Co. (Miss. S. C.), 68 So. 485. 
 
 "A building" is personal property when it stands on leased 
 ground. (The Author.) See also Fixtures, Bouvier's Law Di- 
 rectory and Sharp v. Niagara F. Ins. Co., 147 S. W. 154, 164 Mo. 
 App. 475. But it is held otherwise by Tex. Civil Appeals Court 
 in Orient Ins. Co. v. Parlin, 38 S. W. 60, and Fidelity-Phenix Ins. 
 Co. v. O'Bannon, 178 S. W. 731, although the Texas valued pol- 
 icy specifically excludes from its protection personal property. 
 
 "Mortgage clause" relates to the owners subsequent acts or 
 neglect and does not apply to his application for insurance or his 
 statements of omission therein. The policy may be void from its 
 inception. Liverpool L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Agricultural S. & L. 
 Co., 33 Can. S. C. 94. When after the loss the mortgage is fore- 
 closed, the mortgagee can only recover the balance due> on the 
 mortgage. Hadley v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 55 N. H. 110. 
 The mortgage clause creates a separate and distinct contract for 
 the benefit of the mortgagee, Bacot v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 96 Miss. 
 223, 50 So. 729; 39 Ins. L. J. 214; Reed v. Ins. Co., 76 N. J. L. 11, 
 69 Atl. 724; Smith v. Union Ins. Co., 25 R. I. 260, 55 Atl. 718; 
 Franklin F. Ins. Co. v. Martin, 40 N. J. L. 575; Kupferschmidt v. 
 Agricultural Ins. Co., 80 N. J. L. 441, 78 Atl. 225; Burnham v. 
 Royal Ins. Co., 57 Mo. App. 394. If the owner or mortgagor 
 takes out other insurance it cannot pro rate in paying the loss, 
 as he can not do anything by which the mortgagee's insurance 
 will be diminished. Laurenzi v. Atlas Ins. Co. (Tenn. S. C.), 
 176 S. W. 1022; Hastings v. Westchester F. Ins. Co., 73 N. Y. 
 141, 7 Ins. L. J. 430; Union Inst., etc., v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 196 
 Mass. 230, 81 N. E. 994; Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Olcott, 97 111. 
 439. Neither can he make an adjustment, nor enter into an ap- 
 praisal agreement which will bind the mortgagee or trustee. 
 Laurenzi v. Atlas Ins. Co. (Tenn. S. C.), 176 S. W. 1022; Hart- 
 ford F. Ins. Co. v. Olcott, 97 111. 439; Hastings v. Westchester, 
 73 N. Y. 141, 7 Ins. L. J. 430. But it is held otherwise in Massa- 
 chusetts and Ohio, not only this, but that the mortgagee has no 
 
COURT DEFINITIONS OF INSURANCE TERMS. 183 
 
 standing in court until the amount of the loss has been arbitrat- 
 ed or arbitration waived. Union Inst. Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 
 196 Mass. 230, 81 N. E. 994; Erie Brewing Co. v. Ohio/ F. Ins. 
 Co., 81 Ohio St. 1, 89 N. E. 1065, 39 Ins. L. J. 200. New Jersey 
 holds to the contrary and that the mortgage clause relieves the 
 mortgagee from every compliance with conditions to be per- 
 formed after the fire. Reed v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 81 N. J. L. 
 523, 80 Atl. 462. 
 
 "Loss if any payable to as interest may appear." This 
 merely gives the payee the right to have paid over to him any 
 money that may be found due under the contract and takes from 
 the assured none of his rights. He is not the assured, but only 
 his appointee. Brecht v. Law M. & C. Ins. Co., 160 Fed. 399, 87 
 C. C. A. 351 (annotated in 18 L. R. A. ([N. S.] 197); Woods v. 
 Ins. Co. St. of Pa., 87 Wash. 563, 144 Pac. 650. Such a loss pay- 
 able clause is not even notice to the insurance company that the 
 payee holds a chattel mortgage on the property. Woods v. Ins. 
 Co. St. of Pa., 82 Wash. 563, 144 Pac. 650. But it is held in 
 Mississippi by reason of a statute, and in Kentucky that a mort- 
 gagee to whom a policy is made payable is not bound by an 
 adjustment or appraisal made by the owner or mortgagor. In 
 entering into an appraisal it is always best to be on the safe 
 side and have the mortgagee to whom the policy is payable a 
 party to the appraisal agreement, so that he cannot be heard 
 to complain. (The Author.) , 
 
 "Merchandise and materials for making same" as used in 
 a policy of fire insurance means all articles which are neces- 
 sarily or conveniently used in insured's business, embracing 
 tools, apparatus, and implements used by him in his business. 
 Oklahoma F. Ins. Co. v. McKey (Tex. C. C. A.), 152 S. W. 440. 
 
 Proximate cause of loss is the one which puts the other 
 cause into motion. 
 
 Hocking v. British Am. Assur. Co., 62 Wash. 73, 113 Pac. 259. 
 
 "Life estate and reversioner," both are entitled to have the 
 funds from a fire insurance policy applied to the repair of the 
 damaged building. 
 
 Brough v. Higgins, 2 Gratt. (Va.) 408; 2 Bennett 443. 
 
 "Insurance on boat," does not cover materials and lumber 
 
184 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 in the shipyard where it was being built and intended for use 
 in its construction. 
 
 Mason v. Franklin F. Ins. Co., 12 Gill & J. (Md.) 468; 2 Bennett 
 214. 
 
 Same principle of law: 
 
 Ellmaker's Exec. v. Franklin F. Ins. Co. (Pa. S. C.), 5 Barr. 183; 
 2 Bennett 519. 
 
 "Loss by mob." A destruction of a building by fire caused 
 by mob is not a loss by "any usurped power whatsoever." 
 
 Drinkwater v. London Assur. Corporation (Eng.), 2 Wilson 363; 
 1 Bennett 12. 
 
 "Civil commotion." A clause in a policy exempting the in- 
 surers in case of a loss by "civil commotion," applies to a de- 
 struction by a riot. 
 
 Landsdale v. Mason et al. (Eng.), 1 Marshall on Ins. 688; 1 
 Bennett 16. 
 
 "Linen," as used in a fire insurance policy covering house- 
 hold furniture, will not protect linen drapery goods subsequent- 
 ly purchased on speculation. 
 
 Watchorn v. Langford (Eng.), 3 Campbell 422; 1 Bennett 91. 
 
 "Held in trust." A policy taken out by the consignee in his 
 own name insuring goods held "in trust" will only cover his in- 
 interest in such goods, and not any loss which the consignor 
 alone sustains. 
 
 Parks v. General Interest Assur. Co., 5 Pick. (Mass.) 34; 1 Ben- 
 nett 184. Contra. 
 
 De Forest v. Fulton F. Ins. Co. (S. C. f N. Y.), 1 Hall 84, and 
 many other cases; in fact, the author knows of but one 
 other in harmony with the Massachusetts case, i. e. a Louisi- 
 ana case. 
 
 "Blowing up, drowning, etc." A shipment of negroes in- 
 sured against the dangers of navigation, such as blowing up, 
 drowning, etc., will cover the loss of a negro by drowning with- 
 out any disaster happening to the boat. 
 Moore v. Perpetual Ins. Co., 16 Mo. 98. 
 
 "Property on premises owned or occupied by assured" will 
 include a dredge fastened to a wharf owned by them. 
 
 Farmers' Loan & Tr. Co. v. Harmony F. & M. Ins. Co. (S. C., 
 N. Y.), 51 Barbour 33; 5 Bennett 174. 
 
 "Prosecuted," as used in a fire insurance policy, is synony- 
 mous with the word suit. 
 
 Merchants M. Ins. Co. v. Lacroix, 35 Tex. 249; 5 Bennett 455. 
 
COURT DEFINITIONS OF INSURANCE TERMS. 185 
 
 "Assured's working interest" in leased property, which he 
 agreed to restore at end of lease in good condition, and to re- 
 place with other of equal if destroyed, will include the entire 
 value of the property. 
 
 Imperial Ins. Co. v. Murray, 73 Pa. St. 13; 5 Bennett 526. 
 
 "Merchandise, his own, in trust, or on commission, for 
 which he is responsible," does not include merchandise sold and 
 paid for where warehouse receipts were endorsed over to the 
 purchaser. 
 
 -North B. & M. Ins. Co. v. Moffat, (Eng.) Law Reports 7; Com- 
 mon Pleas 25; 5 Bennett 381. 
 
 "Stock of watches, watch trimmings, etc.," will include as- 
 sured's entire stock of jewelry. 
 
 Crosby v. Franklin Ins. Co., 5 Gray (Mass.) 504; 4 Bennett 35. 
 
 "Manufacturer of brass clocks," as describing the insured's 
 business in a fire insurance policy, covers and permits the use 
 of all articles ordinarily employed in that manufacture. 
 
 Bryant v. Poughkeepsie M. P. Ins. Co. (S. C., N. Y.), 21 Barb. 
 154; 4 Bennett 37. 
 
 "Tax title," where the tax collector was not shown to have 
 made his return of the sale within the time prescribed by law, 
 must be regarded as fatally defective. See Shimmin v. Inman, 
 26 Me. 228; Andrews v. Senter, 32 Me. 394. 
 
 Pinkham v. Morang & Monmouth M. F. Ins. Co., 40 Me. 587; 
 4 Bennett 43. 
 
 "Clerk sleeps in store" in an application for fire insurance is 
 merely descriptive of present occupancy and not a warranty for 
 the future. 
 
 Frisbie v. Fayette M. Ins. Co., 27 Pa. St. 325; 5 Bennett 159. 
 
 "Insurance against fire by lightning" does not contemplate 
 a loss by lightning unless fire ensued. 
 
 Babcock v. Montgomery Co. M. Ins. Co., 4 Comstock (N. Y.) 326; 
 3 Bennett 154. 
 
 "Policy to co-partners" does not cover the interest of one 
 who purchases his partner's interest, where the policy provides 
 it shall be void if the property be alienated by sale or other- 
 wise. 
 
 Tillou v. Kingston M. Ins. Co., 5 N. Y. 405; 3 Bennett 238. 
 
 "For account of whom it may concern," as used in a fire in- 
 
186 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 surance policy, only protects such interests as were intended to 
 be insured at the time the insurance was effected. 
 
 Steele v. Franklin F. Ins. Co., 17 Pa. St. 290; 3 Bennett 278. 
 
 "Held in trust" includes goods held by pawnbroker, and are 
 not covered by a policy which provides goods held in trust or 
 on commission are not covered unless mentioned in the policy 
 as being insured, nor does the term, "Jewelry and Clothing, Be- 
 ing Stock in Trade," include such articles as musical instru- 
 ments, surgical instruments, guns, pistols and books. 
 
 Rafel v. Nashville M. & F. Ins. Co., 7 La. An. 244; 3 Bennett 336. 
 
 "Dissolution of partnership" and division of the property is 
 such a change of title as will avoid the policy provisions, ren- 
 dering it void if there be any transfer or change of title in prop- 
 erty insured. 
 
 Dreher v. Aetna Ins. Co., 18 Mo. 128; 3 Bennett 514. 
 
 "Insured and or assured" is the person who owns the prop- 
 erty, applies for the insurance, pays the premiums and signs the 
 deposit note,, and not another to whom the money may be made 
 payable in case of loss, though he may have a lease on the 
 premises, 
 
 Sanford v. Mechanics Mutual F. Ins. Co., 12 Cush. (Mass.) 641 j 
 3 Bennett 619. 
 
 "Crude petroleum Camphene." The keeping of u little 
 crude petroleum for medical purposes is not a storing within 
 the meaning of a policy, and it seems that using camphene for 
 a light in a sleeping apartment will not avoid a policy pro- 
 hibiting its use. 
 
 Williams v. Fireman's F. Ins. Co., 54 N. Y. 569; 5 Bennett 537. 
 
 "Foreclosure." Filing a mechanic's lien is not a commence- 
 ment of foreclosure proceedings, nor is a levy obtained under an 
 execution to enforce the lien on real estate within the meaning 
 of a policy referring to levy on personal property. 
 
 Colt v. Phoenix F. Ins. Co., 54 N. T. 595; 5 Bennett 537. 
 
 "Until a certain date" includes that date. 
 Isaacs v. Royal Ins. Co., Law Reports; 5 Exchequer 296. 
 
 "Warranty Representation." A representation is part of 
 the preliminary proceedings to a contract, a misrepresentation 
 
COURT DEFINITIONS OF INSURANCE TERMS. 187 
 
 of an immaterial matter not fraudulently made will not avoid- the 
 policy, but a warranty must be literally performed. 
 
 Dewees v. Manhattan Ins. Co., 34 N. J. Law 244; 6 Bennett 244; 
 American Ins. Co. v. Barnett, 73 Mo. 364; 
 Hamilton v. Home Ins. Co., 92 Mo. 353. 
 
 "Gunpowder." The policy insuring "general stock of hard- 
 ware" does not include gunpowder nor permit the keeping of 
 same in stock, where the policy provisions rendered the policy 
 void if it were kept in stock. 
 
 Mason v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 29 Up. Can. O. B. 585; 5 Bennett 294. 
 
 Same principle of law: 
 
 Pindar v. Continental Ins. Co. et al., 47 N. Y. 114; 5 Bennett 185; 
 
 Dewees v. Manhattan Ins. Co., 35 N. J. Law 366; 5 Bennett 314; 
 
 Appleby v. Astor F. Ins. Co., 54 N. Y. 253; 45 Barbour 454; 5 Ben- 
 nett 490; 
 
 McFarland v. Peabody Ins. Co. et al., 6 West Va. 425, 437; 5 Ben- 
 nett 490. 
 
 "Immediate notice," as used in a fire insurance policy, 
 means reasonable time under the circumstances. 
 
 Cashau v. Northwestern N. Ins. Co., 5 Bissell (U. S. C. C.) 476; 
 5 Bennett 501. 
 
 "In quantities exceeding one barrel." In view of the punc- 
 tuation, the permit was applicable to all the prohibited mate- 
 rials specified. 
 
 Ins. Co. v. Slaughter (U. S. S. C.), 12 Wallace 404; 5 Bennett 340. 
 
 "Laws relating to fire insurance" do not apply to tornado 
 insurance. 
 
 Nally v. Home Ins. Co., 250 Mo. 452; 157 S. W. 769. 
 
 "Keeping or storing." Keeping a wooden barrel of benzine 
 on the premises only for the time required to fill the receptacle 
 permitted by the policy was not a keeping or storing within 
 the meaning of the policy. 
 
 Maryland F. Ins. Co. v. Whiteford, 31 Md. 219; 5 Bennett 240. 
 
 "Refined coal or earth oils," as used in a fire insurance 
 policy, refers only to articles as dangerous, as naphtha, benzine 
 or benzole. 
 
 Morse v. Buffalo F. & M. Ins. Co., 30 Wis. 534; 5 Bennett 424. 
 
 "Leasehold or other interest not absolute" in the property 
 insured by a fire insurance policy. A mortgagor under such pol- 
 icy holds an equitable fee simple, which need not be represented 
 to the company or expressed in the policy. 
 
 Washington F. Ins. Co. et al. v. Kelly, 32 Md. 421; 5 Bennett 303. 
 
188 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 "Machine and repair shop" has no technical insurance 
 meaning. It is for the jury to determine whether assured's busi- 
 ness was or was not included in the term. 
 
 Chaplin v. Provincial Ins. Co., 23 Up. Can. C. P. 218; 5 Bennett 503. 
 
 "Particular and detailed account of the loss." A policy re- 
 quiring such is complied with where the assured's account 
 showed value of stock at a given date; the amount of stock re- 
 ceived since that date; the amount of stock saved, and the 
 amount of the loss claimed. 
 
 Stickney v. Niagara F. M. Ins. Co., 23 Up. Can. C. P. 372; 5 Ben- 
 nett 503. 
 
 "Mortgagee." His indorsement of mortgage note to his as- 
 signee of the mortgage gives him an insurable interest in the 
 mortgaged property. 
 
 Williams v. Roger Williams Ins. Co., 107 Mass. 377; 5 Bennett 373. 
 
 "Owner" has no definite meaning, and is a question for the 
 jury, where the assured represented himself as the owner of a 
 building that stood on leased ground. 
 
 Hopkins v. Provincial Ins. Co., 18 Up. Can. C. P. 74; 5 Bennett 159. 
 
 "Plate," as used in a policy which excludes it as not insured, 
 does mean silver forks, tea and tablespoons. 
 
 Hanover F. Ins. Co. v. Mannasson, 29 Mich. 316; 5 Bennett 541. 
 
 "Change within the control of assured" material to the risk, 
 as used in a fire policy, refers to police regulations to prevent 
 fires, and not to the erection of buildings, or the use of neigh- 
 boring premises. 
 
 Commercial Ins. Co. v. Mehlman, 48 111. 313; 5 Bennett 190. 
 
 "Contained; in," as used in a fire insurance policy, contem- 
 plates a limitation of the risk taken, so that the insurer will not 
 be liable for a loss occurring while the engine and car are out 
 of the house in which they were described as contained in. 
 
 Annapolis, Etc., R. R. Co. v. Baltimore F. Ins. Co., 32 Md. 37; 5 
 Bennett 258. 
 
 "Deliver in," as used in a fire insurance policy, means de- 
 liver in writing. 
 
 Davis v. Scotland Provincial Ins. Co., 16 Up. Can. C. P. 176; 5 
 Bennett 61. 
 
 "Dwelling." The fact that the owner of the store and his 
 
COURT DEFINITIONS OF INSURANCE TERMS. 189 
 
 clerk slept in a back room of the store does not constitute the 
 store a dwelling. 
 
 Cerf v. Home Ins. Co., 44 Cal. 320; 5 Bennett 426. 
 
 "Factory," as used in a fire insurance policy, may mean a 
 single building, or several when all are used for a common pur- 
 pose and together constitute the factory. 
 
 Liebenstein v. Baltic Fire Ins. Co., also v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 
 45 111. 301, 305; 5 Bennett 115. 
 
 "Fireworks." Where a policy prohibited the keeping of fire- 
 works, evidence showing that such articles constitute the busi- 
 ness of a "German jobber and importer" is inadmissible where 
 the policy covered that kind of stock and permitted assured to 
 keep firecrackers for sale. 
 
 Steinbach v. Ins. Co., 13 Wallace (U. S. S. C.) 183; 6 Bennett 394. 
 
 "Fire insurance on a certain quantity of coal" will cover not 
 only the coal deposited at the time, but that deposited since, and 
 covers also the risk arising from spontaneous combustion of 
 such coal. 
 
 British Am. Ins. Co. v. Joseph, 9 Lower Can. R. 448; 4 Bennett 161. 
 
 "Consisting of" excludes everything not enumerated, so that 
 while "Stock in Trade" would include the articles sued for, but 
 where this term is limited in its meaning by the words "con- 
 sisting of" and the articles sued on are not named and do not 
 come under the meaning of those articles enumerated, the in- 
 surer is not liable. 
 
 Joel v. Harvey (England), 5 Weekly Rep. 488; 4 Bennett 185. 
 
 "Privileged for a printing office" will permit the use of a 
 prohibited article by the policy, where such article is in common 
 use among printers, and this too where the case of such article 
 accidentally caused the fire. 
 
 Harper v. Albany M. Ins. Co., 17 N. Y. 194; 4 Bennett 247; 
 Harper v. N. Y. City Ins. Co., 22 N. Y. 441; 
 Whitmarsh v. Conway F. Ins. Co., 16 Gray (Mass.) 359; 
 Niagara F. Ins. Co. v. De Graff, 12 Mich. 124; 4 Bennett 707. 
 
 "Stone dwelling house" will include a frame kitchen at- 
 tached; it will include the building and such attachments as are 
 usually occupied and used by the family for the ordinary pur- 
 poses of a house. A dwelling house is an entire thing. 
 
 Chase v. Hamilton Ins. Co., 20 N. Y. 52; 4 Bennett 416. 
 
190 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 "Store fixtures" in a policy of fire insurance are applied to 
 all furniture and other articles in a shop or warehouse. Evi- 
 dence is admissible of a well settled custom to that effect. 
 
 Whitmarsh v. Conway F. Ins. Co., 16 Gray (Mass.) 359; 4 Bennett 
 486. 
 
 "Change of title." Partition between co-tenants is an alien- 
 ation or change of title within the meaning of a fire insurance 
 policy. 
 
 Barnes v. Union M. F. Ins. Co., 51 Me. 110; 4 Bennett 728. 
 
CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 EXPERT ACCOUNTING IN ITS RELATION 
 TO THE ADJUSTMENT OF LOSSES. 
 
 I will now take up the method of making up a statement of 
 loss from the books, and will show the wrong and right way 
 to treat that question, and first, will show a statement of loss 
 as actually adjusted by the adjusters (see Exhibit "A"). In or- 
 der to arrive at a basis of settlement, they first ascertained 
 the profits of the preceding year, including freights, but exclud- 
 ing cash discounts, to be 18.63 per cent., but stated they figured 
 discounts on purchases and a/ 1 per cent, wastage in the state- 
 ment of loss, because that was the only way they could get a 
 depreciation which they were, in their judgment, entitled to; 
 hence settled the loss as shown in Exhibit "A." 
 
 Exhibit "A." 
 
 Inventory of stock on hand Dec. 26, 1900 $42,189.71 
 
 Subsequent purchases to April 30, 1901. . .$80,436.17 
 
 Less cash discounts . 793.31 79,642.86 
 
 $121,832.57 
 
 Deduct sales $99,321.23 
 
 Less profit per rridse. ace. 18.63 per cent, on 
 cost, no items being debited or cred- 
 ited to mdse. other than mdse., except 
 freights 15,597.69 $83,723.54 
 
 Stock on hand at time of fire $38,109.03 
 
 Deduct 1 per cent, for wastage, etc 381.09 
 
 Cash value at time of fire $37,727.94 
 
 Agreed value of stock saved 8,889.35 
 
 Total loss $28,838.59 
 
 The profits covered the 1 per cent, wastage, because the 
 profit of 18.63 per cent, was made on top of wastage of all 
 kinds. Hence the $381.09 wastage should not have been deduct- 
 ed from the statement. 
 
 191 
 
192 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 The correct method of arriving at the loss is shown in Ex-, 
 hibit "B." 
 
 Exhibit "B." 
 
 Inventory, Dec. 26, 1900 $42,189.71 
 
 Add purchases, including freights 80,436.17 
 
 $122,625.8& 
 
 Sales $99,321.23 
 
 Less 18.63 per cent 15,597.69 83,723.54 
 
 $38,902.34 
 Value of Salvage 8,889.35 
 
 $30,012.99- 
 Less .00986 per cent, cash discount 295.93 
 
 Assured should have collected $29,717.06 
 
 Assured did collect 28,838.59 
 
 Net loss to assured $878.47 
 
 The reason for including freights with the purchases in the 
 correct statement is that freights were considered in arriving 
 at preceding year's profit, but discounts were not, and should 
 therefore be applied to goods destroyed in the statement of loss. 
 
 The correct measure of damage is the market value not ex- 
 ceeding what it would cost the assured to replace the property 
 destroyed with other of like kind and quality at the time imme- 
 diately preceding the fire, which, in merchandise, means bill 
 cost less rebates and discounts, if any, and plus freight and dray- 
 age, if any. 
 
 It is not always wrong to apply freights and discounts to 
 purchases; its correctness depends on how you get at your ratio- 
 of profits. So also cross entries in merchandise account of re- 
 turn sales, return purchases, rebates, allowances, etc., are all im- 
 portant factors in getting at the profits, and, in figuring a state- 
 ment of loss, the important question is in knowing how and 
 when to apply them. 
 
 The whole question is one of bookkeeping. The following 
 are some hypothetical statements of how profits are arrived at. 
 
EXPERT ACCOUNTING. 193 
 
 Showing 1 Hypothetical Book Statements of Loss, and Methods 
 of Showing Profits. 
 
 I will now not only prove the correctness of the statement as 
 shown in Exhibit "B' k by giving some hypothetical statements 
 of the method of correctly figuring profits of the preceding^ 
 year's business and how to apply those profits in arriving at the 
 amount of stock on hand at the time of the fire, showing the 
 correct method (see Exhibit "D") and the method adopted by 
 the adjusters in arriving at the profit (see Exhibit "C") and 
 the wrong manner in which they applied the discounts (see Ex- 
 hibit "E"). 
 
 To make the statement perfectly clear I will treat it as 
 though the entire stock dealt in consisted of one kind of mer- 
 chandise and will have to assume that each article weighed the 
 same, cost the same, was sold for the same and did not fluctuate 
 in price. I will, therefore, call the articles sacks of coffee which 
 cost $12.50 per sack or bag, less 4 per cent, cash discounts if 
 paid in 10 days and 5 per cent, freight drayage on the net cash 
 price, making the net cash cost of each bag $12.60. In the 
 course of a year's business 1 per cent, of the amount of the 
 coffee handled is lost through wastage and other ways of han- 
 dling, resacking, etc., hence 
 
 Exhibit "C." 
 
 Profit statement for year 1904. (In this statement freights 
 are included but not discounts.) 
 Stock on hand January 1, 1904, 10,000 bags coffee 
 
 at $13.10 $131,000.00 
 
 Purchased during the year, including freights, 20,000 
 
 bags at $13.10 262,000.00 
 
 Goods to be accounted for January 1, 1905, not for-~ 
 
 getting that 1 per cent., or 300 bags, were lost in 
 
 wastage, rehandling, etc $393,000.00 
 
 The inventory of January 1, 1905, accounts for 8,700 
 
 bags at $13.10 113,970.00 
 
 The difference shows the cost of all goods that were 
 
 sold, wasted, stolen or given away to have been. .$279,030.00 
 We also know that this $279,030.00 represents 21,300 
 
 bags of coffee; we also know that 300 bags went 
 
 to wastage in some shape or other as the books 
 
 show that 21,000 bags of coffee were sold for $330,102.00 
 
 These 21,000 bags having cost, as shown above 279,030.00 
 
 The profit exclusive of discounts is the difference $51,072.00 
 
194 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 The ratio of profit on cost is 18.3034 per cent., but as before 
 explained this profit excludes cash discounts, but includes freight 
 as part of the cost of the goods, hence our statement of loss 
 must be treated in same manner and made up exclusive of dis- 
 counts until the amount of the goods burned is ascertained and 
 then the ratio of cash discounts must be deducted! as shown in 
 Exhibit "D," which follows: 
 
 Exhibit "D." 
 
 (Same method as Exhibit "B," and proves correctness of 
 Exhibit "B.") 
 Stock on hand January 1, 1905, 8,700 bags coffee at 
 
 $13.10 $113,970.00 
 
 Subsequent purchases, 17,400 bags at $13.10 227,940.00 
 
 $341,910.00 
 
 Sales (18,270 bags) $287,204.00 
 
 Less 18.3034 per cent, profit 44,435.04 242,769.36 
 
 $99,140.64 
 Cash discounts 4 per cent, on bill cost, but only 3.8168 
 
 per cent, on bill and freight cost 3,784.00 
 
 Net loss $95,356.64 
 
 Exhibit "E." 
 (Same method as used in Exhibit "A.") 
 
 Stock on hand January 1, 1905 $113,970.00 
 
 Subsequent purchases and freights $227,940.00 
 
 Less 3.8168 per cent, discount 8,700.00 219,240.00 
 
 $333,210.00 
 
 Sales $287,204.00 
 
 Less 18.3034 per cent, profit 44,435.04 242,769.36 
 
 $90,440.64 
 Wastage 1 per cent 904.40 
 
 Net loss $89,536.24 
 
 Now we know we have 7,569 bags coffee on hand, 
 
 worth $12.60 each $95,369.40 
 
 Hence the assured would be a loser by this method to 
 
 the tune of . $5,833.16 
 
EXPERT ACCOUNTING. 195 
 
 Exhibit "F." 
 (Profit statement, all articles figured net.) 
 
 1904 inventory, 10,000 bags at $12.60 $126,000.00 
 
 Purchases, 20,000 bags at $12.60 252,000.00 
 
 30,000 bags of coffee to be accounted for Jan. 1, 
 
 1905 $378,000.00 
 
 1905 inventory accounts for 8,700 bags at $12.60 $109,620.00 
 
 Leaving 21,300 bags coffee that went out of the 
 
 house that cost $268,380.00 
 
 Sold 21,000 bags and 300 bags went to waste, sales.. 330,102.00 
 
 Profit : $61,722.00 
 
 Ratio of profits 22.998 per cent. 
 
 Exhibit "G." 
 
 Statement of loss: 
 
 Inventory 1905 $109,620.00 
 
 Purchases 219,240.00 
 
 $328,860.00 
 
 Sales $287,204.40 
 
 Less 22.998 per cent 53,701.09 233,503.40 
 
 On hand at time of fire $95,356.60 
 
 Exhibit "H." 
 Statement of loss by quantities: 
 
 1905 inventory and purchases 26,100 bags 
 
 Sold 18,270 bags 
 Wasted 261 bags ...18,531 bags 
 
 Leaving on hand at time of fire .... 7,569 bags 
 
 At $12.60 '. $95,369.40 
 
 Note the small difference of 4 cents in statements of loss 
 in Exhibits "D" and "G" from th,e actual loss as shown in Ex- 
 hibit "H," which is due, no doubt, to the ratio of profits, but 
 a 4-cent error in a loss of $95,000 is of no importance. 
 
196 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Before giving any more hypothetical statements of loss 
 and methods of arriving at profits it may be worth while to 
 make a few statements concerning the treatment of inventories, 
 discounts, freights, etc. 
 
 The inventory should be closely scrutinized and the prices 
 carefully compared with the bills of purchases made prior to 
 the date of the inventory. Of course, it is out of the question 
 to compare every item or even half of them, but enough com- 
 parisons may'be made to convince you either of its correctness 
 or of its having been loaded. I remember settling a loss in one 
 of the Southern States (and by the way Southern merchants 
 have quite a proneness for loading their inventories from 5 per 
 cent, to 20 per cent, to cover cost and carriage, but making no 
 deductions whatever for cash discount) where the adjusters 
 offered assured a sum that I thought should settle the loss, but 
 I could not induce the assured to settle. Finally I went through 
 their books again. Beginning with the inventory, I found that 
 the price of each article would divide by 6. I then taxed them 
 with having loaded their inventory 20 per cent. They never 
 did admit it, but the loss was adjusted upon the figures offered 
 by the adjusters. Draw your own conclusions as to whether 
 I was right or wrong. 
 
 If the prices in an inventory have been loaded 5 per cent, 
 each price per article can be divided by 1.05, if loaded 10 per 
 cent, then by 11, if loaded 20 per cent, then by 6, and if loaded 
 33 1/3 per cent., each price* can be divided by 4. 
 
 In taking their inventories very few if any merchants ever 
 deduct anything from the cost of the goods for cash discounts, 
 and I have never known any of them to do so, but quite a num- 
 ber do add a percentage to cover cost of freight and drayage. 
 
 If the loss requires you to go into the books, commence 
 with the inventory and get it down to a cost basis, not by depre- 
 ciation (I will treat of depreciation later) but by deducting cash 
 discounts and adding the freights, then go back to the next pre- 
 ceding inventory and treat it in the same manner. Remember 
 both inventories must always be treated alike, add to the last 
 preceding inventory the^purchases less the cash discounts the 
 assured could have gotten if he had discounted all bills, then 
 add freight and drayage on purchases only, being careful to 
 eliminate freight and drayage on goods sold or on goods sold 
 and returned. Get the net purchases, deducting goods pur- 
 chased and returned to seller, and allowances made on pur- 
 chases. The inventory and purchases of, I will say year 1904, 
 
EXPERT ACCOUNTING. 197 
 
 gotten at in this manner show the cost of the goods to be ac- 
 counted for on January 1, 1905. The January 1, 1905, inventory 
 deducted from the sum of 1904 inventory and purchases, shows 
 the cost of the goods that went out of the house. (See Exhibit 
 "C.") This amount deducted from the net amount of sales 
 shows the profit. 
 
 To arrive at the percentage of profit on cost divide the cost 
 of goods sold into the profit. In getting the sales take the gross 
 sales, less goods sold and returned, also deduct from the sales 
 allowances and rebates made on same, but never deduct cash 
 discounts allowed assured's customers, the reason being if 1904 
 was a good year, with money plentiful, a larger proportion of 
 his customers would discount their bills than in 1905 if busi- 
 ness was dull and money tight, as in that case assured would 
 be a considerable loser by the operation. If, on the other hand, 
 conditions were reversed and a greater proportion of bills were 
 discounted in 1905 than in 1904, your company would be the 
 loser. If the profits arrived at in the methods shown be abnor- 
 mally large, unless the assured can give you some satisfactory 
 reason therefor, you may rest assured the last inventory has 
 been loaded. Then you had better go back two or three) years 
 and ascertain what profits he had been in the habit of making. 
 
 And don't go off half cocked and offer to settle your loss 
 arrived at by the ratio of profits made last year until your 
 investigation is complete, suppose, for instance, his business 
 last year was entirely retail, on which his profits were 37 J / 2 and 
 this year he had branched out into the jobbing business as well 
 as retail and is making or^ly 20 per cent., or he may be handling 
 an article this year on which he makes a small profit, but which 
 swells his sales', very materially, and you are liable to do your 
 company out of quite a neat little sum of money. Better make 
 a thorough inquiry into the class of goods handled as compared 
 with last year. And as to making up statement of loss don't 
 you think the safer plan is first to draw the other fellow's fire? 
 L,et him make up his claim against you, see what he wants, it's 
 easier to criticise and, maybe he won't ask you to pay as much 
 as you contemplated paying. The assured, better than any one 
 else, knows what his loss actually is if everything is burned. 
 You are in the dark and had better find out, if you can, all he 
 knows about it before expressing your own opinion. If he is 
 honest you can get him to present an honest claim; if he's not, 
 you are no worse off. 
 
198 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 DISCUSSION OF DEPRECIATION AND ITS RELATION 
 TO PROFITS. 
 
 As to the question of profits, it is not only not always right 
 to base your profits in the statement of loss on the result of the 
 preceding year's business on account of the harm it may do 
 your company, but sometimes it may harm the assured just as 
 much, as he may have made a much larger profit during the cur- 
 rent year than he did during the year preceding. 
 
 Almost every adjuster has met with losses where the as- 
 sured kept a daily record of his profits by putting the cost price 
 of the articles sold in one column, and the selling price in an- 
 other, the difference being the profit. This method is not sat- 
 isfactory and is never correct, notwithstanding the assured's 
 statement that it is infallible. Nothing will prove its mistakes 
 until the year's business is wound up, when the inventory will 
 be found to be far short of what the system would show the 
 stock on hand ought to be, and the reason is this: such a system 
 deals merely with the goods actually sold and in so far as they 
 are concerned it might be correct provided the profits were 
 figured accurately in every instance, which is almost impossible, 
 but in every business,. small or large, there is more or less steal- 
 age and mistakes, not only by employes, but by shoplifters and 
 non-employes, there is more or less wastage and leakage; from 
 causes too numerous to mention, and if you don't believe it, just 
 interview the proprietors of some of the large department stores. 
 All these leaks and wastage from different causes amount to a 
 very large sum in the course -of the year, and are not provided 
 for by the system of figuring profits daily. This system, how- 
 ever, is a very good one and enables merchants to locate the 
 leaks as far as it is possible to do so, at the end of the year 
 when the inventory is taken, as the inventory will show the 
 amount of stock actually on hand in each line, whereas the daily 
 profit system will show how much ought to be on hand in each 
 line or department. 
 
 There is no method of figuring profits which will always 
 pan out exactly correct. I suggest as the one which I have 
 found most satisfactory, that shown in Exhibit "F," i. e. : where 
 both inventories are figured on a cash cost basis as well as the 
 purchases. Though the method used in Exhibit "C" is just as 
 correct. You will note the profits in one are shown to be 
 18.3034 per cent., in the other 22.998 per cent., and yet in ap- 
 plying these different ratios to the two statements of loss as 
 shown in Exhibits "D" and "G," both dealing in the same quan- 
 
EXPERT ACCOUNTING. 199 
 
 tities of goods as to inventories, purchases, wastage and sales, 
 that there is only 4 cents difference in the final result. The 
 reason the methods pointed out in Exhibits "C" and "F" will 
 not always pan out exactly right, is that the wastage is figured 
 on the total goods handled that is, inventory and purchases; 
 now then your profits of 18.3034 per cent, in "C" and 22.998 
 per cent, in "F" were figured on sales of $330,102.00. If these 
 sales had been larger, the wastage would not have interfered 
 with the profits in the same ratio and consequently the profit 
 ratio would have been increased. And you will notice the ratios 
 are the same in the loss statements as those in the profit state- 
 ment, i. e., the purchases are double the amount of the inven- 
 tory, the sales are 70 per cent, of the sums of the inventory and 
 purchases combined. Had this not been the case I could not 
 have made the statements figured in dollars and cents agree 
 so closely with that figured in quantities. (See Exhibits "D," 
 "G" and "H" for the reasons already explained, i. e., the wast- 
 age interfering with the profits.) But the difference is not 
 great and the methods used in arriving at profits shown in 
 Exhibits "C" and "F" are more accurate than any other known 
 method, but as I have already observed, I consider that shown 
 in "F" the most satisfactory. 
 
 As an evidence of the importance in knowing how and 
 where to apply freight, discounts and rebates, and how to figure 
 profits, I remember in one of the suits of the famous Kahn- 
 weiler v. one of the Companies, in the statement of loss the 
 adjusters had applied the discounts to the purchases, assured's 
 lawyer, in cross questioning the company's adjuster, put this 
 hypothetical question to him: "Suppose I buy 10 pianos at 
 $100 each, on which the discounts for cash payment are 10 per 
 cent., and I sell 9 for $100 each, according to your method 
 of figuring losses I am entirely sold out and have none on 
 hand, whereas, you and I know that I still have one and that 
 it is worth $90. Is this not so?" And Mr. Adjuster was so 
 confused he could not explain it. He should have answered, 
 "No." And if the lawyer demanded an explanation he could 
 have "sewed him up" by saying 10 pianos bought at $100, less 
 10 per cent, off for cash, equals $900. Nine pianos sold at 
 $100, less 10 per cent, profit would make the sales $810, leaving 
 the stock on hand $90, and that's the method I used in figuring 
 that statement. 
 
 If the assured depreciates his stock 10 per cent, each year 
 you have no right to take off a further depreciation of 10 per 
 
200 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 cent, unless you think you are entitled to a depreciation on top 
 of a depreciation, because the books will show a stock on hand 
 amounting to 10 per cent, less than an inventory would amount 
 to if it were taken at time fire occurred that is, unless the pur- 
 chases during the current year were out of proportion with 
 former years. You don't believe this, you say; well, I'll prove 
 it, and to do so will take statements shown in Exhibits "F" 
 and "G" and depreciate both inventories 10 per cent. (See 
 Exhibits "I" and "J" following.) 
 
 Exhibit "I." Profit Statement. 
 
 Inventory stock on hand Jan. 1, 1904 $126,000 
 
 Deduct 10 per cent, depreciation 12,600 
 
 $113,400 
 Purchases 252,000 
 
 Goods to be accounted for" Jan. 1, 1905 $365,400 
 
 Inventory of Jan. 1, 1905, accounts for $109,620 
 
 Deduct 10 per cent, depreciation 10,962 98,658 
 
 Cost of goods that went out of store $266,742 
 
 These goods were sold for 330,102 
 
 Profit $ 63,360 
 
 Ratio of profit to cost, 23.754 per cent. 
 
 Exhibit "J" Statement of Loss. 
 
 Inventory of stock on hand Jan. 1, 1905 $109,620.00 
 
 Deduct 10 per cent, depreciation 10,962.00 
 
 $98,658.00 
 Subsequent purchases 219,240.00 
 
 $317,898.00 
 
 Sales $287,204.40 
 
 Less 23.754 per cent, profit 55,127.54 232,076.86 
 
 Stock on hand at time of fire $85,821.14 
 
 Stock on hand at time of fire as shown 
 
 by Exhibit "H" $95,386.60 
 
 Less 10 per cent, depreciation 9,538.66 85,849.94 
 
 Difference $ 26.80 
 
EXPERT ACCOUNTING. 201 
 
 If the current year's inventory be depreciated 10 per cent., 
 but no depreciation whatever be taken off the 1904 inventory, it 
 will show a reduction of over 20 per cent, in the amount of stock 
 On hand at time of fire as shown by the books that is, of 
 course, taking a reasonable length of time after the last inven- 
 tory when the sales have reached the proportion shown in 
 Exhibit "G." This may be easily proven by depreciating the 
 1905 inventory as shown in Exhibit "F," 10 per cent., which 
 will show a profit of $50,760, which is 18.171 per cent, on the 
 cost, then use same statement as shown in Exhibit "G," except 
 depreciate the inventory 10 per cent, and use 18.171 per cent, 
 profit on cost instead of 22.998 per cent, and the statement will 
 show a stock on hand at time of fire of $74,856.64 instead of 
 $95,356.60, as shown in Exhibit "G." The better way to treat 
 the loss would be to restore the depreciation on both inven- 
 tories for the purpose of arriving at the profit, then restore 
 depreciation on the last inventory in making up statement of 
 loss and then depreciate only the goods burned. 
 
 I very well remember a loss that occurred in one of the 
 Western cities some years ago, where the assured had deducted 
 10 per cent, from his last inventory and it was plainly evident 
 that he had done so, but he had not taken his former inven- 
 tories in that way. After the fire he claimed that he had arbi- 
 trarily marked off 10 per cent., not as a depreciation, but 
 merely to be on the safe side. Some of the adjusters were for 
 standing pat on the value he had placed on his goods, some 
 were in favor of restoring the depreciation on his inventory, and 
 that was what was finally done. I favored restoring the de- 
 preciation for the purpose, merely, of arriving at the true ratio 
 of profits, then taking the depreciated inventory as a basis to 
 start our statement of loss. If a merchant is not bound by 
 the value he places on his own goods, what value is binding? 
 Can he say to himself and his stockholders, we will depreciate 
 these goods 10 per cent, and enter them in their books at the 
 depreciated value, then in case of fire say to the insurance com- 
 panies, it was all a mistake, the goods were worth 100 cents 
 on the dollar and not 90 cents, as shown by the books? 
 
 Of course, with up-to-date merchants the custom is to keep 
 the price of goods down to real value in taking inventories. 
 Most of them ignore both freight and cash discounts, and the 
 insurance company is in such cases entitled to whatever per 
 cent, the discounts exceed freights. But the great majority 
 of merchants do not take off enough depreciation; they tell 
 you they have marked everything way down, but make them 
 
202 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 show you what goods were marked down and how much. Study 
 the inventory and study the purchases and sales, and where 
 there is any part of the stock left, study its character and suit- 
 ableness for the market in which it was to have been sold* 
 Sometimes a day or so spent in this sort of work and posting 
 yourself as to conditions, will repay your company for the cost 
 of your time and expenses. 
 
 Unquestionably your company is a subscriber to one of 
 the mercantile agencies. If not, they should be, and you should 
 be furnished with a full and complete report on every mercan- 
 tile loss you are called upon to adjust. I remember a few 
 years ago at a Hannabal (Mo.) fire, the assured either added 
 a flat $50,000 to their last inventory or else lied to their cred- 
 itors, because after the fire they issued a circular letter to 
 their creditors, giving a copy of their statement of loss as 
 adjusted with the insurance companies, the amount of the in- 
 ventory showed $50,000 in excess of what they had stated 
 it amounted to in their statement to Dun and Bradstreet. Their 
 explanation to their creditors was, they had concealed $50,000 
 they had owed, and had reduced their inventory that amount in 
 their statement to mercantile agencies to make things even. 
 If they would lie once they would lie twice, maybe they lied 
 about owing that $50,000 which they concealed from their 
 creditors, and maybe they lied to the insurance companies when 
 they handed in the amount of their inventory as being $50,000 
 in excess of the amount they had stated it to be to their cred- 
 itors. At any rate the truth would have been known and possi- 
 bly the companies wou4d have been saved $50,000 if the ad- 
 justers had taken the precaution to have gotten a special report 
 from Bradstreet or Dun. 
 
 How many independent adjusters representing a long list 
 of companies in every large fire are subscribers to a mercantile 
 agency? I dare say not half a dozen in the whole country, and 
 yet it is information they should not be without. Every one 
 of them should be a subscriber to Dun or Bradstreet. If not, 
 they are just as certain to overpay some loss as that daylight 
 follows night. 
 
 Sample Page Merchandise Account on Ledger and Statement 
 of Loss Therefrom Profits in Manufacturing Plant. 
 
 The following is a fair sample of a merchandise account as 
 it appears in the ledger of a merchant's book: 
 
EXPERT ACCOUNTING. 
 
 203 
 
 1904. 
 
 1904. 
 
 " 31 
 " 31 
 Feb. 28 
 " 28 
 Mar. 31 
 " 31 
 Apr. 30 
 " 30 
 May 31 
 " 31 
 June 30 
 " 30 
 July 31 
 " 31 
 Aug. 31 
 " 31 
 Sep. 30 
 " 30 
 Oct. 31 
 " 31 
 Nov. 30 
 " 30 
 Dec. 31 
 " 31 
 " 31 
 
 Me 
 P. 
 
 Ise. Pur. 
 Ret. 
 Pur. 
 
 & A'. 
 
 10,800 
 700 
 8,600 
 375 
 9,675 
 567 
 6,756 
 437 
 7,693 
 842 
 6,957 
 359 
 10,764 
 653 
 12,786 
 689 
 19,436 
 347 
 10,798 
 878 
 11,745 
 1,087 
 8,649 
 983 
 51,306 
 
 " 31 
 Feb. 28 
 " 28 
 Mar. 31 
 31 
 Apr. 30 
 " 30 
 May 31 
 31 
 June 30 
 " 30 
 July 31 ' 
 " 31 
 Aug. 31 
 " 31 
 Sep. 30 
 " 30 
 Oct. 31 
 31 
 Nov. 30 
 " 30 
 Dec. 31 
 " 31 
 " 31 
 
 1 Inv 
 
 Ret 
 
 250 
 10,575 
 325 
 16,425 
 435 
 12,150 
 193 
 14,236 
 178 
 20,789 
 237 
 15,283 
 364 
 19,476 
 113 
 8,679 
 147 
 17,124 
 236 
 22,187 
 475 
 4,851 
 122 
 32,232 
 
 Sales. . . . 
 Ret 
 Sales. .. . 
 Ret 
 
 Ret. 
 ' Pur 
 
 & A. 
 
 Ret. 
 Pur. 
 Ret. 
 Pur. 
 Ret. 
 
 & A. 
 & A.'. 
 & A'. 
 
 Sales.... 
 Ret . 
 
 Sales.... 
 Ret 
 
 Sales.... 
 Ret . 
 
 Ret. 
 Pur 
 
 & A. 
 
 Sales 
 Ret 
 
 Ret. 
 Pur 
 
 & A. 
 
 Sales. . . . 
 Ret. . . . 
 
 Ret. 
 Pur 
 
 & A. 
 
 Sales. .. . 
 Ret . . . 
 
 Ret. 
 
 &A. 
 
 Sales.... 
 Ret 
 
 Ret. 
 Pur. 
 Ret. 
 Pur 
 
 &A. 
 
 &'A. 
 
 Sales 
 Ret 
 
 Sales.... 
 Ret 
 
 Ret. 
 & L 
 
 & A. 
 
 entory 
 
 
 
 
 $210,882 
 1905. 
 Jan. 1 To Inventory $32,232 
 
 31 
 31 
 Feb. 28 
 " 28 
 Mar. 31 
 " 31 
 
 Mdse. Pur 9,786 
 
 Ret. & A. 329 
 
 Pur 9,873 
 
 Ret. & A. 597 
 
 Pur 11,397 
 
 Ret. & A. 324 
 
 $210,882 
 1905. 
 Jan. 31 By Mdse. Pur $14,287 
 
 " 31 " " Ret 342 
 
 Feb. 28 " " Pur 11,364 
 
 " 28 " " Ret 239 
 
 Mar. 31 " " Pur 17,747 
 
 " 31 " " Ret.. 539 
 
 On the night of March 31, 1905, a fire occurs which destroys 
 the greater portion of the stock. All bills were entered, plus 
 freight, and minus cash discounts, so that merchandise account 
 shows net cost of stock. But all cross entries should be de- 
 ducted, as the sales that were returned are debited to merchan- 
 dise, not at cost, but with the profit added and to add them to 
 the purchases is unfair to the companies; also purchases that 
 were returned to the seller and are credited to merchandise 
 and should come out of the sales as it reduces the assured's 
 profits. A great many adjusters are in the habit of taking the 
 ledger footings as the purchase and sales and deducting the 
 sum of the returns on both sides from the debit and credit side 
 and while this method will bring the same results as getting 
 at the exact purchases, yet it is not correct in this case to call 
 the purchases for 1905 $32,306, because they were not that 
 amount, being merely the debit side of the merchandise account, 
 less the amount of the inventory, and if the statement be made 
 up in that way it is confusing and is liable to cause you to 
 make a mistake. I will give an example of both ways of 
 figuring, which will show exactly the same result. (See Ex- 
 hibits "K" and "L.") 
 
204 
 
 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 Exhibit "K" Correct Method. 
 
 PROFIT STATEMENT. 
 
 Inventory January 2, 1904 $26,000.00 
 
 Subsequent purchases $125,659.00 
 
 Less purchases returned 3,075.00 
 
 122,584.00 
 
 Goods to be accounted for Jan. 1, 1905 $148,584.00 
 
 Inventory of January 1, 1905, accounts for 32,232.00 
 
 Showing 1 that goods that went out of store 
 
 cost $116,352.00 
 
 Merchandise sales $175,575.00 
 
 Less goods sold and returned 7,917.00 
 
 167,658.00 
 The difference is the profit, or $51,306.00 
 
 A profit ratio of 30.60 per cent, on sales, or 44.09 per cent, on cost, 
 hence following 
 
 STATEMENT OF LOSS. 
 
 Stock on hand Jan. 1, 1905, per inventory $32,232.00 
 
 Subsequent purchases $ 31,056.00 
 
 Less purchases returned 1,120.00 
 
 29,936.00 
 
 $62,168.00 
 
 Merchandise sold $ 43,398.00 
 
 Less goods sold and returned 1,250.00 
 
 Net sales $ 42,148.00 
 
 Less 30.60 per cent, profit on sales 12,897.29 
 
 29,250.71 
 Book value of stock on hand at time of fire $32,917.?9 
 
 Exhibit "L." 
 
 PROFIT STATEMENT. 
 
 1904 inventory and purchases $159,576.00 
 
 (It is not; it is debit side of Mdse. acct. for 
 
 1904.) 
 Less cross entries, returns and allowances 10,992.00 
 
 Goods to be accounted for Jan. 1, 1905 $148,584.00 
 
 Inventory Jan. 1, 1905, accounts for 32,232.00 
 
 Showing that goods that went out of store 
 
 cost $116,352.00 
 
 Merchandise sales in 1904 $178,650.00 
 
 (The sales were only $175,575.) 
 Less cross entries 10,992.00 
 
 167,658.00 
 
 The difference is the profit, or $51,306.00 
 
 Same as Exhibit "K," therefore same ratio, hence following 
 
EXPERT ACCOUNTING. 
 
 STATEMENT OF LOSS. 
 
 205 
 
 Stock on hand Jan. 1, 1905, per inventory 
 
 Subsequent purchases $ 32,306.00 
 
 (The purchases were $31,056 and $32,306 is 
 the debit side of Mdse. acct., less the inven- 
 tory.) 
 
 Less cross entries, returns and allowances 2,370.00 
 
 Merchandise sales $ 44,518.00 
 
 (This is cr. side of Mdse. acct., and not sales.) 
 Less cross entries, returns and allowances 2,370.00 
 
 $42,148.00 
 Less profit, 30.60 per cent, on sales 12,897.29 
 
 Book value stock on hand at time of 
 fire 
 
 the 
 
 $32,232.00 
 
 29,936.00 
 $62,168.00 
 
 29,250.71 
 
 $32,917.29 
 
 If the loss be on the stock of a manufacturer, the profit is 
 arrived at in the same manner except that pay-roll is added 
 to the cost of the goods the same as purchases; also, fuel, 
 water, heat and power, but if labor and fuel costs about the 
 same per centage of amount of purchases of raw material dur- 
 ing the current year that it did during the preceding year, it 
 makes very little difference in the general result whether cog- 
 nizance be taken of these items or not, it merely decreases the 
 profit (see Exhibit "M"), which is same statement as Exhibit 
 "K," except 20 per cent, is added to purchases for labor in 
 manufacturing. 
 
 Exhibit "M." 
 
 Inventory Jan. 2, 1904 
 
 Subsequent net purchases $122,584.00 
 
 Labor, fuel, etc., in manufacturing 24,5i6.80 
 
 Goods to be accounted for Jan. 1, 1905. 
 Inventory of Jan. 1, 1905, accounts for. 
 
 Showing that goods sold .cost. 
 The net sales amounted to 
 
 The difference is the profit. 
 
 $26,000.00 
 
 147,100.80 
 
 $173,100.80 
 32,232.00 
 
 $140,868.80 
 167,658.00 
 
 $26,789:20 
 
 A profit ratio of 15.98 per cent, on sales, hence the following- 
 STATEMENT OF LOSS. 
 
 Jan. 1, 1905, inventory 
 
 Subsequent purchases net 
 
 Labor, fuel, etc., in manufacturing. 
 
 $32,232.00 
 
 29,936.00 
 
 5,987.20 
 
 $68,155.20 
 
206 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Net sales $ 42,148.00 
 
 Less 15.98 per cent, profit on sales.. 6,735.25 
 
 35,412.75 
 Book value of stock at time of fire $32,742.45 
 
 Or $174.84 less than statement of loss as shown in Exhibits "K" 
 and "L." 
 
 A i 
 
 If the amount paid for labor during current year be a 
 greater per centage of the purchases of raw material than pre- 
 ceding year the advantage is with the insured, if the propor- 
 tion was larger the preceding year, the advantage is with the 
 company. 
 
 Why is it that insurance companies and adjusters lay so 
 much stress on figuring on cost, rather than on sales as the 
 merchants and manufacturers do? A merchant marks his goods 
 to sell for what they will bring, and at the end of the day if 
 his sales have been $1,500 on goods that cost him $1,000, he 
 calls his profits 33 1/3 per cent. that is, on sales. The insur- 
 ance adjuster calls it 50 per cent. that is, on cost. What 
 is the difference, pray? The bookkeeper, at the end of the 
 year, figures his profit ratio on sales. Why stand for an old 
 fogy way of doing things when it is entirely different from the 
 methods in general use by merchants and manufacturers 
 throughout the country? It is just as easy to determine the 
 ratio of profit on sales as it is on cost, and a great; deal easier 
 to figure loss by multiplying the amount of the sales by the 
 profit ratio as was done in Statement of Loss in Exhibit "K," 
 than it would be to divide the profit ratio on cost i. e., 44.09 
 per cent, plus $1.00, into the amount of the sales when both 
 methods give practically the same results or should do so with- 
 in a dollar or so, owing entirely to the accuracy of your figures. 
 In this particular case the difference is but .24 cents. 
 
 I have known adjusters to ascertain a merchant's profits 
 from his books to be 33 1/3 per cent, of the sales and in mak- 
 ing up his statement of loss apply that ratio of profit to the 
 cost, and I am firmly of the opinion they did it because they 
 did not know any better and not through any desire to harm 
 the assured. 
 
 I know one adjuster who was selected by a committee of 
 adjusters because of his supposed ability as an expert accountant 
 to go through a set of books and draw off a statement of the 
 loss. He worked on these books for more than a month, the 
 adjusters who employed him had to raise his figures on the book 
 statement alone $22,000 because he had reduced the preceding 
 
EXPERT ACCOUNTING. 
 
 207 
 
 year's sales by deducting the rebates and allowances on sales, 
 thereby reducing the profit ratio, and refusing to treat the 
 current year's sales in the same manner. 
 
 Another adjuster in adjusting a loss wanted to deduct from 
 the purchases (the debit side of merchandise account) the re- 
 turned sales charged to merchandise without deducting them 
 from the sales or credit side of merchandise. A man who would 
 make a mistake of that kind against the insured is just as apt 
 to make one against his company. And this happened only 
 a short time ago and the adjuster referred to is looked on as 
 a leader in his territory. But an older and more experienced 
 adjuster happened to be on the loss and finally convinced 
 him of his mistake. 
 
 Accurate Method of Apportionment Treatment of Fraud 
 Losses, and Losses Where Books Should Be Ignored. 
 
 As to certain criticism of my statements of loss I will say 
 I attempted to make it clear that all of them were supposed 
 to be computed in dollars from the books. The statement by 
 count was given merely as an illustration to prove the correct- 
 ness of the book statement. If a count might be had of the 
 goods on hand at the time of the fire, there would be no use 
 in trying to determine the ratio of profits, or making a long 
 drawn out statement concerning them. It would be necessary 
 only to apply the market price to each article, making it short 
 and to the point as was shown in Exhibit "H." 
 
 The following is a very good rule for the apportionment 
 of the loss to the policies, and is as nearly perfect as it is pos- 
 sible for human rules to be. The loss is $71,836.93, the insur- 
 ance $87,593.78, consisting of one policy of $60,000, one of 
 $8,625, one of $7,031.42 and one of $11,937.36. We first find the 
 loss ratio to each $1,000 of insurance which is $820.1145. 
 
 3,000 
 4,000 
 5,000 
 6,000 
 7,000 
 8,000 
 9,000 
 10,000 
 
 1,640.2290 ' 
 2,460.3435 
 3,280.4580 ' 
 4,100.5725 
 4,920.6870 
 5,740.8015 
 6,560.9160 
 7,381.0305 
 
 820.1145 
 820.1145 
 820.1145 
 820.1145 
 820.1145 
 820.1145 
 820.1145 
 820.1145 
 
 2,460.3435 
 3,280.4580 
 4,100.5725 
 4,920.6870 
 5,740.8015 
 6,560.9160 
 7,381.0305 
 8,201.1450 
 
 Hence following apportionment, a $60,000 policy will pay 10 
 times as much as $6,000, or $49,206.87. 
 
208 
 
 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 We divide the $11,937.36 policy as follows: $10,000.00 pays $8,201.14 
 
 The $7,031.42 policy is divided as follows: 
 
 The $8,625 policy is divided as follows: 
 
 Total paid by all the policies, 
 
 1,000.00 
 
 820.11 
 
 900.00 
 
 738.10 
 
 30.00 
 
 24.60 
 
 7.00 
 
 5.74 
 
 .30 
 
 .2R 
 
 .06 
 
 .05 
 
 7,000.00 
 
 6,740.80 
 
 30.00 
 
 24.60 
 
 1.00 
 
 .82 
 
 .40 
 
 .33 
 
 .02 
 
 .02 
 
 8,000.00 
 
 6,560.92 
 
 600.00 
 
 492.08 
 
 20.00 
 
 16.40 
 
 5.00 
 
 4.10 
 
 $71,836.93 
 
 All done by changing the decimal in the table from right 
 to left or vice versa as the< case may be. I never use but one 
 column of figures shown in the table and that is the last or 
 right hand column. The figures prove themselves, as when you 
 have added what $1,000 pays to the amount paid by $9,000, the 
 result will be ten times the sum that $1,000 pays, otherwise 
 you will have made a mistake. The other figures in the table 
 are given to make the method perfectly clear. 
 
 Having given a number of book statements in my former 
 letters and I hope having made them clear to the mind of the 
 average man, I will take up the adjustment of some losses 
 where the books ought to be left out of the adjustment or 
 method of arriving at the loss. 
 
 Some years ago, I was appointed by the companies as ap- 
 praiser on a fraud loss in an Illinois town. We found on ar- 
 riving at the place that all of the goods had been removed 
 from the building where the loss occurred, to a building some 
 distance away, the goods all straightened out and inventoried. 
 The insurance was about $10,000 or $12,000. The saved goods 
 inventoried about $1,800 or $2,000. The adjusters claimed as- 
 sured's stock never was over $3,500, and I think they were 
 right. I found assured had shipped a lot of old goods that 
 he had collected together in St. Louis, that he bought a few 
 goods subsequently and I believe obtained a lot of fraudulent 
 bills for a great deal more than he bought, judging from the 
 class of people he bought of. I obtained from other merchants 
 information to the effect that their purchases from St. Louis 
 amounted to so many dollars and that the freight paid on same 
 was a certain per cent. 
 
 Taking the assured's freight bills and giving him credit 
 for the same ratio of purchases to the amount of freight paid 
 by him, it would have given him a stock of about $3,500. And 
 
FORM OF PROOF; STATEMENT; IRON-SAFE CLAUSE. 209 
 
 that would have been a perfectly fair method of settling his 
 loss, because his were the commonest kind of goods, whereas 
 the several merchants from whom I obtained the information 
 dealt in a much better grade or class of goods. Therefore, it 
 is plain that if goods costing 25c to 50c per yard, and boots 
 and shoes costing $25.00 to $36.00 per dozen, can be shipped 
 from St. Louis to the town where the fire was for one-half per 
 cent, of their value the same kind of goods costing only half 
 as much would cost one per cent, of their value for transporta- 
 tion. So that a $25.00 freight bill paid on the better class of 
 goods would mean the bill of g.oods amounted to $5,000, where- 
 as on the poorer quality it would mean but $2,500. But my 
 co-appraiser wouldn't stand for 'that way of figuring at all, 
 and the umpire stood with him. And as the adjusters had 
 ordered the assured to remove his stock to another building, 
 the damaged goods separated from the undamaged and an in- 
 ventory made of the stock, the assured forthwith complied with 
 their requirements, thereby destroying all evidence of the total 
 loss or rather placing the claim in such condition that they 
 were not in position to disprove his claim for a large amount 
 of totally destroyed goods. Just think of them placing them- 
 selves at the mercy of that rascal, with over $10,000 insurance 
 involved, for the sake of .preserving the salvage on a stock that 
 was not worth $2,000! Had they insisted on the stock remain- 
 ing where it was, they would have shown to the appraisers the 
 impossibility of assured's claim for total loss by the space 
 the saved stock occupied and the conditions and appearances 
 of the store. The other appraiser and umpire salted the com- 
 panies for about $8,000, and would have given assured about 
 $1,700 more, only the other appraiser got too smart and I 
 tripped him on some figures. 
 
 Suppose on arriving at the scene of the loss you find the 
 fire has caused practically a total loss in so far as the value 
 is concerned, but the greater part of the property can be identi- 
 fied for the purpose of taking an inventory, and from its con- 
 dition and relative position it then occupies, it gives you a 
 pretty fair idea of what the total loss is as well as the char- 
 acter and amount of the entire stock on hand immediately b'e- 
 fore the fire. In such cases don't permit the goods to be re- 
 moved or put in order until you have some good evidence by 
 other merchants of the condition of affairs, or until your loss 
 is adjusted. If an appraisal has to be had, let the appraisers 
 see it as you saw it. Don't look at the books, bring into play 
 all the good "horse" sense at your command. If the goods 
 
 14 
 
210 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 have been knocked off the shelves or have been thrown on the 
 floor, sometimes, but not always, get the insured to replace them 
 on the shelves in as near the same order as they were before 
 the fire. When this is done it will refresh his memory as to 
 what he had there that was totally obliterated by the fire, and 
 will help you to judge as to the truth or falsity of the claim. 
 
 How many times has the friction of a $3,000 stock, rubbing 
 against $10,000 insurance, caused a fire? How many times in 
 such cases, where the fire caused a 50 per cent, to 75 per cent, 
 damage to such a stock, has all evidence of the value been 
 destroyed by removing and conditioning the stock. To save 
 $750 to $1,500 from the salvage, many young and inexperienced 
 adjusters have destroyed all evidence their companies had to 
 establish the value of the stock. If they had insisted on the 
 stock being kept intact until they could have called in two or 
 three responsible people to take an inventory, cautioning them 
 to look carefully into conditions and circumstances of the stock, 
 noting the class of goods and what proportion if any of it, 
 could have been or was actually burned beyond identification, 
 thus making of them good witnesses for you, should you be 
 forced into court. It might also be a good idea to photograph 
 the stock before allowing it to be handled even for the pur- 
 pose of inventorying it. 
 
 Remember it is hard to burn the heels of boots and shoes. 
 It is hard to burn a book. A fire that will burn a full bolt of 
 cloth is very apt to entirely destroy the shelving which held 
 it, and while the remnants of such articles may not be a cor- 
 rect basis on which to fix the value of the thing destroyed" it 
 will at least serve you in forming a fair estimate as to quan- 
 tities destroyed. 
 
 I very well remember that when I first commenced adjust- 
 ing losses I was called to San Antonio, Texas, on a wholesale 
 and retail grocery loss. It was badly damaged by a flash 
 fire. There were two or three; other youngsters who had fully 
 as much experience as I did, so we appointed our committees, 
 I being in charge of the one on the books. We had assured 
 send their books to us at the Menger Hotel and we proceeded 
 to -wade through them, they showed a hopelessly total loss. We 
 could see everyone looking at us as we supposed wondering 
 how such young men secured such important positions. 
 
 Every adjuster has no doubt at some time or other, felt 
 his importance and knows, therefore, how we felt. Well, as I 
 say, we had figured out a total loss, we hadn't asked the as- 
 sured if they would accept a total as we were waiting merely 
 
EXPERT ACCOUNTING. 211 
 
 out of courtesy though, for the arrival of another adjuster, one 
 of the older ones (Mr. J. R. Polak) (now of Atlanta, Georgia). 
 When he came he looked over our statement, took our word 
 that the schedule of insurance was correct, examined his own 
 policy and then asked us to show him the loss. We introduced 
 him to the assured, he asked for a small blank book and com- 
 menced taking down the various items, he and the assured 
 agreeing on damages and the amount of goods totally destroyed 
 as they went along. In about two and a half hours the loss 
 was adjusted at about 65 cents on the dollar and then I began 
 wondering how in the world I secured my job and how I was 
 going to hold it, but did not look quite so important about 
 the hotel as I had for several days previous thereto. This 
 merely shows that we either had no brains, or that we were 
 acting like machines following a beaten path and forgetting to 
 bring into play what common sense we had. It. shows, too, 
 that an adjuster wants to consider carefully what is the best 
 method for handling the particular loss he is rolled upon to 
 adjust and that no fixed rule will govern all casos. 
 
 I also had a loss where nearly if not quite all of a stock 
 of nearly $100,000 that was badly damaged by fire could be in- 
 ventoried. Assured claimed to have taken an inventory which 
 was completed twenty-four hours before the fire, but the ex- 
 tensions and additions were not complete. The adjusters did 
 not like the looks of things and had another inventory made, 
 which was $9,000 less than the one assured made before the 
 fire. Then recourse was had to the books, which showed the 
 inventory made by the adjusters was about correct. So you 
 see the books sometimes play an important part and sometimes 
 they don't. 
 
 As to buildings, if you don't know how to make an estimate 
 of the cost to rebuild, learn. Get a carpenter, a brick mason, 
 a plasterer and a painter to show you how to make an estimate, 
 then when you are sent to adjust a loss, tell the assured to 
 hire a builder to represent him, let assured sit down with you 
 and his builder and give you a description of his building, then 
 you and his builder make your estimate agreeing on each item 
 as you go along. This method will save money for your com- 
 pany, and will post you so that in a very short time you will 
 know all about it, and nearly always get your loss adjusted. 
 
 Don't take any stock in estimates of so much per cubic 
 foot. If you get within 500 cubic feet of the right measure you 
 will still have to guess at the price per cubic foot, for if 7 l / 2 
 
212 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 cents per cubic foot don't land you where you wish it to, maybe 
 9 cents will and there you are, it's a guess from start to finish. 
 You would not dare agree with assured on the price per cubic 
 foot unless you first knew the number of cubic feet, which is 
 proof enough the rule won't work. 
 
 The estimate in detail, is the most accurate method known 
 and is easily mastered in a few months' time. 
 
 POINTS RAISED ON A LOSS IN ACTUAL PROCESS OF 
 ADJUSTMENT. 
 
 There is now in process of adjustment a loss involving the 
 rules qr principles laid down in Exhibits "I" and "J" in my 
 third letter, but the adjusters refuse to see it that way. They 
 insist on figuring it the wrong way, claiming 2^4 per cent, de- 
 preciation on top of a depreciation of over 6 per cent., which 
 will not be conceded by the assured, as it would be manifestly 
 unfair to do so. 
 
 The figures which are shown in the profit Statement No. 
 1 and Statement No. 2 are agreed to by both sides. The only 
 question left open for adjustment being the one of deprecia- 
 tion, if any. Before taking up the statements, I will say as- 
 sured charged their purchases less all discounts to merchan- 
 dise account, hence all bills are entered net, exclusive of freights. 
 The inventory was taken each year net, i. e., bill cost, less 
 discounts, and plus actual freights except such items as were 
 reduced for depreciation, the inventory plainly showing which 
 goods were depreciated. After the inventory taken at cost and 
 value was completed, a flat $2,500 was deducted each year. 
 Statements of profits and the loss follow: 
 
 (Profit) Statement No. 1. 
 
 Total debit side of merchandise account year 1904. . . .$286,892.05 
 From which deduct inventory of Jan. 1, 1904, entered 
 
 in ledger at 50,646.52 
 
 $236,245.53 
 Also deduct returns and allowances on 
 
 sales debited to merchandise account. $1,156.58 
 And items that should have been charged 
 
 to Profit and Loss 70.98 1,227.56 
 
 Making the gross sales $235,017.97 
 
EXPERT ACCOUNTING. 213 
 
 Less reclamations on purchases credited to merchan- 
 dise account . 21.95 
 
 Net purchases for year 1904 $234,996.02 
 
 Freight paid on purchases for 1904 16,172.54 
 
 Inventory January 1, 1904 $53,146.52 
 
 Less depreciation 2,500.00 50,646.52 
 
 Stock to be accounted for Jan. 1, 1905 $301,815.08 
 
 Of which the inventory of Jan. 1, 1905, ac- 
 counts for $48,342.63 
 
 Less depreciation 2,500.00 45,842.63 
 
 Showing the goods that went out of the store 
 
 cost $255,972.45 
 
 Credit side of merchandise account year 1904 $325,812.82 
 
 Less reclamations on purchases credited to 
 
 merchandise $21.95 
 
 And amounts which should have been credited 
 
 to profit and loss 188.47 210.42 
 
 Making the gross sales $325,602.40 
 
 Deduct returned sales and allowances debited to mer- 
 chandise account 1,156.58 
 
 Thus showing net sales for 1904 to be $324,445.82 
 
 As shown aKove these goods cost assured 255,972.45 
 
 Making the gross profit for year 1904 $68,473.37 
 
 The ratio of profit on sales being 21.105 per cent, and on 
 cost 26^4 P er cent., hence following book statement agreed to 
 between assured and adjusters. The only question left to be 
 determined is that of depreciation, or sound cash value at time 
 of fire, hence 
 
 (Loss) Statement No. 2 
 
 Debit side of merchandise account year 1905 $246,459.74 
 
 Less inventory of Jan. 1, 1905, as entered in ledger. . . 45,842.63 
 
 $200,617.11 
 
214 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Deduct returned sales and allowances on 
 
 sales $1,042.45 
 
 And items not merchandise . 55.75 1,098.20 
 
 Making gross purchases for 1905 $199,518.91 
 
 Deduct reclamations on purchases 108.10 
 
 Net purchases year 1905 $199,410.81 
 
 Net freight on purchases of 1905 13,521.65 
 
 Credit side merchandise account 1905 $237,381.29 
 
 Less reclamations on purchases $108.10 
 
 And items not merchandise 166.21 274.31 
 
 Gross sales for year 1905 $237,106.98 
 
 Less returned sales and allowances 1,042.45 
 
 Net 1905 sales $236,064.53 
 
 Inventory stock on hand Jan. 1, 1905 $ 48,342.63 
 
 Less depreciation 2,500.00 
 
 Value of stock Jan. 1, 1905, as entered in ledger. $ 45,842.63 
 
 Net purchases as previously shown 199,410.81 
 
 Net freight on purchases 13,521.65 
 
 $258,775.09 
 
 Net sales as shown above $236,064.53 
 
 Less profit on cost, 26^4 per cent. 49,820.33 186,244.20 
 
 Stock on hand at time of fire $ 72,530.89 
 
 Agreed value of stock in annex building not covered. . 2,414.00 
 
 Book value of stock insured as agreed $ 70,116.89 
 
 Which adjusters want to depreciate 2^ per cent. 1,752.92 
 
 Company adjusters want to adjust loss at $ 68,363.97 
 
 My claim is that the profit takes care of the depreciation. 
 (See my third letter, Exhibits "I" and "J") and that if an in- 
 ventory could have been taken of the stock on hand at time 
 of fire it would have amounted to $75,030.89, from which the 
 companies would be entitled to $2,500 depreciation following as- 
 sured's usual custom of depreciating the stock $2,500 each year. 
 In this the adjusters say I am wrong. To prove the correct- 
 
EXPERT ACCOUNTING. 215 
 
 ness of my position, I will make up a statement for the year 
 1904 treating it precisely as the adjusters want to treat the 
 assured's loss. 
 
 Statement No. 3. 
 
 Inventory stock on hand Jan. 1, 1904 $ 53,146.52 
 
 Less depreciation 2,500.00 
 
 Value of stock as entered in ledger. $ 50,646.52 
 
 Net purchases for 1904 as heretofore shown 234,996.02 
 
 Net freight on 1904 purchases 16,172.54 
 
 $301,815.08 
 
 Net sales 1904 as heretofore shown $324,445.82 
 
 Less 26^4 per cent, profit on cost or 21.105 
 
 on sales . 68,473.37 255,972.45 
 
 Stock on hand at time of fire book value $ 45,842.62 
 
 Deduct 2Y-2 per cent, depreciation 1,146.06 
 
 Net value on basis adjusters want to adjust as- 
 sured's loss $ 44,696.57 
 
 Now we know that statement No. 3 is not correct, because 
 that statement only shows a stock on hand of $44,696.57, and 
 we know that assured did at that time take an inventory of 
 their stock then on hand, and that it amounted to $48,342.63,. 
 that after they had depreciated all articles that ought to be 
 depreciated, they arbitrarily deducted $2,500 more depreciation.. 
 
 This proves that the profits take care of the depreciation.. 
 It proves that the insurance companies get the benefit of the 
 depreciation in a book statement. It proves that assured, if he 
 could have taken an inventory of the stock he had on hand at 
 the time of fire, would have had a larger amount to depreciate 
 than his books will show, and it proves the correctness of the 
 position taken in Exhibits "I" and "J." 
 
 To further substantiate the correctness of my position, I 
 will suppose that each article of merchandise dealt in is a 
 suite of furniture and that its net cost is $10.00 each, and apply 
 those prices, as nearly as possible, to the foregoing statement.. 
 See (Hypothetical) Statement No. 4, following: 
 
216 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 (Hypothetical) Statement No. 4. 
 
 January, 1904, inventory, 5,314 suites at $10.00 $ 53,140.00 
 
 Net purchases 1904, 25,117 suites at $10.00 251,170.00 
 
 To be accounted for Jan. 1, 1905, 30,431 suites 
 
 at $10.00 $304,310.00 
 
 Inventory Jan. 1, 1905, accounts for 4,834 suites at 
 
 $10.00 48,340.00 
 
 Making the sales for 1904, 25,597 suites at $10.00. $255,970.00 
 These goods were sold for . 319,962.50 
 
 Gross profit is the difference, or $63,992.50 
 
 Which is 25 per cent, on cost or 20 per cent, on sales. 
 Jan. 1, 1904, stock on. hand, 4,834 suites at $10.00....$ 48,340.00 
 Net purchases 1905, 21,293 suites at $10.00 212,930.00 
 
 Total inventory and purchases, 26,127 suites at 
 
 $10.00 $261,270.00 
 
 Sold 18,624 suites at $12.50 $232,800.00 
 
 Less 25 per cent, profit 46,560.00 186,240.00 
 
 Stock on hand at time of fire $ 75,030.00 
 
 Foregoing statement shows that: 
 
 Inventory and purchases were 26,127 suites 
 
 That sales were 18,624 suites 
 
 Necessarily there were left 7,503 suites at $10.00..$ 75,030.00 
 
 On the $75,030, the companies would be entitled to a de- 
 preciation of $2,500 because the assured had been in the habit 
 of taking that amount off each year. 
 
 As was noted in Letter No. 3, Exhibits "I" and "J," the 
 only fair way to treat a loss where assured has arbitrarily taken 
 off a percentage of flat depreciation, is to restore it in the 
 beginning of the statement and take off the depreciation that 
 assured has been in the habit of taking off, and more besides if' 
 you are entitled to it. 
 
 The- loss referred to in this letter is on a wholesale furni- 
 ture stock, common and medium priced stuff. You will note 
 from the statements that assured's sales are six times greater 
 than the inventories, that the sales less the profits show that 
 assured turned the stock five times in a year. To do this they 
 could Mot have had a very heavy depreciation. An old or out 
 of date stock won't sell that fast, but when a wholesale furni- 
 
EXPERT ACCOUNTING. 217 
 
 ture merchant can get rid of his stock five times in one year, 
 he is going some. This particular merchant is ordering the 
 same kind of goods as were destroyed by the fire and is pay- 
 ing about 5 per cent, more for about half of them than he 
 paid before the fire and none are any cheaper. Why should his 
 stock be depreciated under these circumstances? If you owned 
 it would you stand for depreciation? Yet one of the adjusters 
 on this loss insists that assured is unfair and unreasonable be- 
 cause he will not submit to a further depreciation than he 
 himself deducted in January. I esteem him as a level-headed 
 adjuster and among the top-notchers in the profession. I am 
 sure he wants to be fair, but in this case it seems to me/ he is 
 biased. All of us are human and sometimes even an adjuster 
 errs, or as David Harum expresses it, "There's as much human 
 nature in some folks! as th' is in others, if not more." 
 
 The foregoing described loss was finally adjusted, the basis 
 of settlement being as follows: The depreciation of $2,500 de- 
 ducted from the inventory in January, 1905, was restored, and 
 then 5 per cent, depreciation deducted from the total stock on 
 hand at time of fire, which makes the loss to the insurance 
 companies $68,986.05, a fair and square deal for both sides. 
 
218 HALL ON INSUKANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
CHAPTER XVIII. 
 
 FORM OF PROOF AND STATEMENT OF 
 LOSS ACTUALLY ADJUSTED IRON- 
 SAFE CLAUSE APPRECIATION. 
 
 The following is a model form of proof of loss, which may 
 look simple enough, but at the time worried the adjusters not 
 a little, as at least seven different sets of proofs could have 
 been made, but all were embraced in the one form set out as 
 follows: 
 
 CLAIM FOR LOSS 
 
 Under policy No of the 
 
 Insurance Company of 
 
 By your policy of insurance, issued at your Podunk, Texas, 
 agency, the number, date, expiration, amount of policy and the 
 amount claimed thereunder being shown in "Schedule of In- 
 surance and Apportionment of Claim" here to attached, you in- 
 sured Richard Roe Company, the party herein and therein 
 named, against loss or damage by fire in the amount shown in 
 said "Schedule of Insurance and Apportionment of Claim" on 
 the following described property: 
 
 $ On stock in trade in building No. 232 W. Commerce 
 
 street, $150,000. Total concurrent insurance per- 
 mitted. 
 
 $ On stock in trade in building Nos. 234 and 236 W. 
 
 Commerce street, $250,000. Total concurrent in- 
 surance permitted. 
 
 $ On stock in trade in building Nos. 238 and 240 W. 
 
 Commerce street, $150,000. Total concurrent in- 
 surance permitted. All in the city of Podunk, 
 Texas. 
 
 (Iron-safe clause attached to policy. Exact wording of 
 policy is not given on account of its length.) 
 
 A fire occurred at about 2 o'clock a. m., November 19, 1900, 
 and originated in building Nos. 238 and 240 W. Commerce 
 street, occupied by us as a wholesale grocery, from cause un- 
 known to assured or his affiant, which damaged and destroyed 
 assured's property insured by you under said policy, as shown 
 in "Statement of Loss" hereto attached. 
 
 219 
 
220 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 There was no other insurance except such as is shown in 
 "Schedule of Insurance and Apportionment of Claim" hereto 
 attached. All of the insurance on each stock is concurrent in 
 form. Note Those policies dated prior to July 3, 1900, only 
 permitted $220,000 total insurance on stock in building Nos. 234 
 and 236 W. Commerce street and were changed by endorsement 
 to permit $250,000 total insurance, and those which permitted 
 but $100,000 total insurance on stock in building Nos. 238 and 
 240 W. Commerce street were, by endorsement, changed to 
 permit $150,000 total insurance. The "Schedule of Insurance 
 and Apportionment of Claim" shows which stock and how much 
 each policy covered at the time of fire, if any of them did 
 not insure the property in that manner when first written, they 
 were subsequently made to do so by endorsement. 
 
 At the time your policy was issued and at the time of the 
 fire, the said property insured by you was owned by Richard 
 Roe Company and there has been no change in the title, use, 
 occupation, location, possession or exposure of said property 
 since the issuance of your policy. 
 
 There was no mortgage or other encumbrance on any part 
 of said property. 
 
 The actual cash value of the property insured by you and 
 the amount of loss claimed thereon is shown in "Statement of 
 Loss" hereto attached. 
 
 The assured occupied all of the following buildings on W. 
 Commerce street for wholesale purposes as follows: No. 232 
 as boot, shoe, hat, cap and clothing store; Nos. 234 and 236 
 as dry goods and notion store; Nos. 238 and 240 as a grocery 
 store, and for no other purpose. 
 
 Richard Roe Company's claim against your company or 
 association, by reason of said loss, damage and policy of insur- 
 ance, is shown in "Schedule of Insurance and Apportionment of 
 Claim" hereto attached. 
 
 All statements and schedules hereto attached are hereby 
 sworn to and made part of these proofs. 
 
 Podunk, Texas, December 21, 1900. 
 
 RICHARD ROE COMPANY, 
 
 (By John Doe, President.) 
 
 (Usual form of oath before notary, and certificate of notary 
 follows.) 
 
FORM OF PROOF; STATEMENT; IRON-SAFE CLAUSE. 221 
 
 STATEMENT OF LOSS. 
 
 Richard Roe Company (Exhibit "A.") 
 
 Statement of loss in building No. 232 W. Commerce street: 
 Stock on hand at time of fire per inventory taken 
 
 after fire $108,092.82 
 
 Freight and marine insurance in excess of cash dis- 
 counts 2,215.90 
 
 Agreed book value of stock $110,308.72 
 
 Add 5 per cent, appreciation per agreement 5,515.44 
 
 Agreed cash market value $115,824.16 
 
 Salvage apportioned to this stock 85,726.47 
 
 Net loss and damage $ 30,097.69 
 
 Note. As to disposition and apportionment of salvage see 
 Exhibit "B." 
 
 Exhibit "B." 
 
 Statement of loss in Building Nos. 234 and 236 W. Com- 
 merce street: 
 
 Inventory stock on hand January 1, 1900 $285,531.10 - 
 
 Add subsequent purchases 616,203.01 
 
 And purchases received in stock subsequent to Jan- 
 uary 1, but paid for and charged to merchandise 
 prior thereto 2,364.75 
 
 $904,098.86 
 Contra. 
 
 Returns and allowances on sales charged 
 
 to merchandise , $ 11,040.74 
 
 Merchandise in transit 6,766.10 
 
 Received prior to January 1, 1900, but 
 paid for and charged subsequent 
 thereto 53,066.91 
 
 Cash charged to merchandise by default- 
 ing clerk 2,000.00 
 
 Sales since Jan. 1, 1900 $684,842.64 
 
 Less credited to mer- 
 chandise a/c to 
 entry of default- 
 ing clerk . ..$2,000.00 
 
222 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Returns and allow- 
 ances on sales. . .11,040.74 
 Sold, not removed.... 1,044.76 14,085.50 
 
 Net sales $670,757.14 
 
 Less 28.88 per cenl. 
 
 profit 150,306.02 
 
 520,451.12 
 
 Stock in warehouse at 508-10 Market 
 
 street 10,220.63 
 
 Stock in building 238 and 240 W. Com- 
 merce street 2,682.26 606,227.76 
 
 $297,871.76 
 Freights and marine insurance exceed cash discounts 
 
 2.05 per cent 6,106.35 
 
 $303,977.45 
 Deduct in compromise to agree with adjusters 236.95 
 
 Book value of stock in buildings 232, 234 and 236 $303,740.50 
 
 Agreed appreciation 5 per cent 15,187.02 
 
 Agreed cash market value $318,927.52 
 
 Deduct cash market value of stock in building No. 
 
 232 W. Commerce street 115,824.16 
 
 Cash market value stock in 234 and 236 W. Com- 
 merce street $203,103.36 
 
 Salvage apportioned to this stock 81,136.83 
 
 Agreed loss and damage $121,966.53 
 
 Note. The Notion stock in second story of Nos. 234 and 
 236 W. Commerce street was damaged to such an extent that 
 it was found impossible to inventory it correctly; but the first 
 story and basement stock was saved in a damaged condition 
 and inventoried (cost price), $96,782.24. The companies took 
 the stock in both buildings at its agreed value, invited mer- 
 chants and wreckers from Chicago, Kansas City, San Antonio, 
 Waco, Galveston, Dallas and Houston to bid for the stock at 
 open sale December 19, 1900. After deducting all expenses, the 
 salvage netted $166,863.30, of which $81,136.83 was apportioned 
 ta the stock in building Nos. 234 and 236 W. Commerce street 
 and $85,726.47 to stock in No. 232 W. Commerce street. 
 
FORM OF PROOF; STATEMENT; IRON-SAFE CLAUSE. 223 
 
 Exhibit "C." 
 
 Statement of loss in building Nos. 238 and 240 W. Com- 
 merce street: 
 
 Grocery department. Assured took an inventory 
 every Saturday evening as to quantities, but did 
 not place the prices on the articles; hence, hav- 
 ing taken an inventory on Saturday evening, No- 
 vember 17, 1900, and the fire having occurred 
 early the following Monday morning, no sales 
 or purchases having in the meanwhile been 
 made, all that was necessary was to price the 
 goods, make the extensions and additions, which 
 
 when completed amounted to $ 87,328.59 
 
 Add for merchandise from dry goods department, 
 
 as shown in Exhibit "B." 2,682.26 
 
 Goods on consignment 1,586.23 
 
 $ 91,597.08 
 
 Inventory of stock saved $31,433.04 
 
 Less agreed damage 15,751.99 15,681.05 
 
 Agreed loss and damage $ 75,916.03 
 
 SCHEDULE OF INSURANCE AND APPORTIONMENT OF CLAIM. 
 
 I 
 
 Stock in Bldg. 
 232 W. Commerce 
 
 Stock in Bldg. 
 234-36 W. Oom'erce 
 
 Stock in Bldg. 
 238-40 W.Com'ce 
 
 Grand Total 
 
 Ins. 
 
 Claimed 
 
 Ins. 
 
 Claimed 
 
 Ins. 
 
 Claimed 
 
 Ins. 
 
 Claimed 
 
 A... 
 B 
 
 $62,250 
 
 $16,521.88 
 
 
 
 
 
 $62,250 
 116,250 
 34,000 
 32,500 
 16,000 
 12,500 
 127.000 
 
 $16,521.88 
 67,573.50 
 83,402.07 
 14,158.53 
 11,205.83 
 8,336.66 
 76,786.78 
 
 $116,250 
 
 $67,573.50 
 
 
 
 ft 
 
 
 
 $34,000 
 
 $33,402.07 
 
 D.. 
 TJ 
 
 15,000 
 
 8,981.18 
 
 17,500 
 11,250 
 
 10,172.35 
 6,539.37 
 
 4,750 
 7,000 
 81,525 
 
 4,666.46 
 6,876.90 
 30,970.60 
 
 F.. 
 
 a.. 
 
 5,500 
 80,650 
 
 1,459.76 
 8,134.87 
 
 64,825 
 
 37,681.31 
 
 $113,400 
 
 $30,097.69 
 
 $209,825 
 
 $121,966.53 
 
 877,275 
 
 $75,916.03 
 
 $400,500 
 
 $227,980.25 
 
 The dates and numbers are not given on account of space it would 
 require. 
 
 There are ninety-seven policies. I have consolidated them into 
 seven. 
 
224 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 THE EFFECT OF THE IRON-SAFE CLAUSE. 
 
 It will be seen from the foregoing statements, that assured'^ 
 books for their grocery stock were kept separate from the 
 others, and consequently they complied with the iron-safe clause 
 in so far as that stock was concerned. But there was a techni- 
 cal, if not a flagrant, violation of the iron-safe clause on the 
 other two stocks, because both were kept track of by one set 
 of books, and had both buildings been wholly destroyed the as- 
 sured could have shown by their books the sum total of both 
 stocks, but it would have been impossible to have shown the 
 value of either one separately. But the fact that the contents 
 of one store was saved intact, no goods' being destroyed there- 
 in, enabled the assured to show the value of the stock in each, 
 building. (See Exhibits "B" and "A.") 
 
 While a great many of the adjusters took non -waiver agree- 
 ments, yet there was no attempt made by them to penalize the 
 assured for a violation of the iron-safe clause. As we all know,, 
 the clause is a warranty. The Missouri Court of Appeals holds 
 that a warranty is in the nature of a condition precedent in the 
 contract and no inquiry is allowed as to the materiality of the 
 fact warranted. Brooks v. Standard Ins. Co., 11 Mo. App. 349. 
 1st Phillips, Sec. 755, gives practically the same definition. 
 
 I am not ready to admit that this is so, in so far as the 
 definition of a warranty relates to the iron-safe clause, for 
 where is the insurer harmed by reason of a breach of such 
 warranty, if the loss be only a damage to the goods in sight 
 or if a partial loss and some of the goods be wholly destroyed 
 and the assured abandons claim for such goods and only claims 
 a damage on those that can be identified? Yet, on the other 
 hand, the insurance companies might claim, and with some 
 reason, they would not have been on the risk at all had they 
 known the facts in the case. 
 
 However, for the sake of argument, let us concede the 
 Missouri doctrine as to the meaning of a warranty does apply 
 to the iron-safe clause and that assured in this particular case 
 did not so keep their books as to show a true record of sales 
 and purchases in each store, but that they were so kept as to 
 show the aggregate in both stores, then those policies of com- 
 panies "A" and 'B" would be void entirely, "E" void as to the 
 amount covered in building Nos. 234 and 236, "F" void as to 
 the amount covered in building No. 232. Those of companies 
 "D" and "G" would be valid. The reason being the iron-safe 
 
FORM OF PROOF; STATEMENT; IRON-SAFE CLAUSE. 225 
 
 clause does not require the assured, who has one set of policies 
 which insures two or more stores, to keep a record of pur- 
 chases and sales in each store, and this, too, even when such 
 policies insure a specific amount on each store. If, however, 
 under a statement of facts he should have two other sets of 
 policies, one set covering entirely in one store, the other cov- 
 ering entirely in the other store, both sets of such policies 
 would be void by reason of breach of the iron-safe clause. 
 
 The iron-safe clause is unlike lines 7 and 11 of the standard 
 policy, in that it does not render the entire policy void by rea- 
 son of breach of its conditions, but merely renders void that 
 portion insuring the property to which the clause itself refers. 
 
 Most of the courts hold that the clause is a warranty and 
 that it must be strictly complied with. Tennessee holds that a 
 substantial compliance is all that is necessary. (See McNutt v. 
 Va. F. and M. Ins. Co.), and so too do some of the United 
 States Courts (see L. and L. and G. Ins. Co. v. Kearney et al. 
 U. S. C. C. A. 8th District, 94 Fed. Rep. 314), Kentucky holds 
 that its violation does not work a forfeiture, it not being com- 
 petent to contract with the insured for the preservation of 
 testimony in behalf of either party. Phenix Ins. Co. v. Angel 
 et al., Ky. C. A., 38 S. W. Rep. 1067. 
 
 Where a promise in a policy of insurance is declared to be 
 a warranty, the only concern of the courts, in the absence 
 of a contract statutory enactment, is to ascertain whether or 
 not it has been complied with. 
 
 Where a policy is issued for a gross amount in considera- 
 tion of a single premium, paid or to be paid, for the whole, 
 though part of the amount is placed on a building and part 
 on a stock of merchandise therein contained, and by its terms 
 becomes void, whether by reason of a breach of the promise 
 to make, preserve and produce an inventory of the merchan- 
 dise or by reason of a breach of the condition as to the owner- 
 ship of the ground upon which the insured building stands, 
 the contract is indivisible, and, though there be but one such 
 breach, there can be no recovery. 
 
 St. Landry Wholesale Mercantile Co. (Ltd.) v. New Hampshire 
 Fire Ins. Co., 113 La. 1053, 38 Southern Reporter (April 8, 1905) 
 87. 
 
 I apprehend, however, that in case part of the assured's 
 stock be burned beyond identification and the remainder be not 
 so badly damaged but what it can be identified, that most, if 
 not all, of the courts would hold the contract valid if the insured 
 should abandon all claim for loss on those goods wholly de- 
 
226 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 stroyed, and try to enforce collection of claim on only such 
 goods as could be identified. 
 
 One Set of Books for Two Stores. 
 
 Where the assured has two or more stores, with one set 
 of policies covering the stocks in such stores and one set of 
 books which merely shows the aggregate sales and purchases 
 of all, but not that of each and such stores be separate and 
 distinct risks, being divided by fire walls, all openings protected 
 by fire doors, there is but one safe rule to follow for both the 
 insurance company and the insured, and that is to write a 
 blanket form covering all of the stock under one amount in 
 all the locations which might, by any possible chance, be de- 
 stroyed by one fire, with an average clause making the insur- 
 ance attach in each location as the value in each bears to the 
 aggregate value in all. If you do not do this, Mr. Agent; and 
 Mr. Daily Report Examiner, you are liable to cause all kinds 
 of trouble for both your adjuster and the assured. If the risks 
 be remote from each other so that in no possible contingency 
 will more than one of them be destroyed by one fire, then 
 it is all right to write each for a specific amount, but not other- 
 wise, unless assured's books be so kept that they keep track 
 of what goes in and out of each building. Remember, too, 
 that if the risks be located in a territory where the iron-safe 
 clause is required, that such clause does not apply separately 
 to each stock insured, but to the aggregate business of all the 
 stocks insured and this, too, whether such stocks be insured 
 under one policy or a specific amount on each or under a 
 blanket policy of one amount on all. It seems most, if not all, 
 the courts hold, that compliance with the iron-safe clause is a 
 condition precedent to recovery. 
 
 Appreciation. 
 
 There is one point I wish to refer to the item of 5 per 
 cent, appreciation which the adjusters agreed to. The insured 
 had been engaged in business for a great many years and, while 
 the average rate of advance in prices had been even greater 
 than 5 per cent., yet I very seriously question the wisdom of 
 allowing appreciation, as I believe the depreciation in this case 
 should have offset any advance in the price it cost to buy a 
 new stock. 
 
FORM OF PROOF; STATEMENT; IRON-SAFE CLAUSE. 227 
 
 The assured is entitled, though, to whatever it would cost 
 him in cash to replace his property, less) whatever depreciation 
 from any cause there may have been to the property. 
 
 In this particular case, however, the adjusters were con- 
 fronted' with either a law suit or allowing the claim for appre- 
 ciation, after selecting appraisers and they, being unable to 
 agree on an umpire, adjuster finally decided to allow the claim, 
 rather than be annoyed by a long legal fight, especially one in- 
 volving no law point, but entirely on a question of fact for 
 the jury, for we all know in advance what the decision will be. 
 
228 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 ^ 
 
 FACTS WORTH KNOWING. 
 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES. 
 
 MEASURES OF LENGTHS. 
 
 12 inches 1 foot 
 
 3 feet 1 yard 
 
 16% feet 1 rod 
 
 6& yards 1 rod 
 
 1.760 yards 5,280 feet 1 mile 
 
 320 rods 1 mile 
 
 40 rods 1 furlong 
 
 8 furlongs 1 sta. mile 
 
 3 miles 1 league 
 
 LAND SURVEYOR'S MEASURE. 
 
 7.92 inches 1 link 
 
 100 links 66 ft. 4 rods 1 chain 
 
 10 chains 220 yards 1 furlong 
 
 8 furlongs 1 mile 
 
 10 sq. chains 160 sq. rods 1 acre 
 
 25 links 1 rod 
 
 80 chains 1 mile 
 
 640 acres 1 sq. mile 
 
 36 sq. miles 1 township 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS. 
 
 1,000 mils 1 inch 
 
 4 inches 1 hand 
 
 6 inches \ span 
 
 3 inches 1 palm 
 
 18 inches 1 cubit 
 
 21.8 inches 1 Bible cubit 
 
 2% feet 1 military pace 
 
 2 yards 1 fathom 
 
 SQUARE MEASURE. 
 
 144 sq. inches or 183.3 circular inches 1 sq. foot 
 
 9 sq. feet 1 sq. yard 
 
 3034 sq. yards or 272% sq. feet 1 sq. rod 
 
 10 sq. chains or 160 sq. rods or 4,840 sq. yards 
 
 or 43,560 sq. feet 1 acre 
 
 640 acres 1 sq. mile 
 
 An acre equals a square whose side is 208.71 feet. 
 
 SOLID OR CUBIC MEASURE. 
 
 1,728 cubic inches 1 cubic foot 
 
 27 cubic feet 1 cubic yard 
 
 1 cord wood a pile 4x4x8 128 cubic feet 
 
 1 perch of masonry 16%xl%xl ft 24% cubic feet 
 
 40 cubic feet -. i ton (shipping) 
 
 J.160.42 cubic inches 1 standard bushel 
 
 cubic inches 1 standard gallon 
 
 1 cubic foot equals about 4/5 of a bushel. 
 
 229 
 
230 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 LIQUID MEASURE. 
 
 4 gills 1 pint 
 
 2 pints 1 quart 
 
 4 quarts 1 gallon 
 
 31% gallons 1 barrel 
 
 42 gallons 1 tierce 
 
 2 barrels or 63 gallons 1 hogshead 
 
 84 gallons or 2 tierces : 1 puncheon 
 
 2 hogsheads or 126 gallons 1 pipe or butt 
 
 2 pipes or 3 puncheons 1 tun 
 
 A gallon of water at 62 P. weighs 8.3356 Ibs. 
 The U. S. gallon contains 231 cu. ins., 7.4805 gal., 1 cu. ft. 
 
 APOTHECARIES' FLUID MEASURE. 
 
 60 minums 1 fluid drachm 
 
 8 drachms 1 fluid ounce 
 
 DRY MEASURE, U. S. 
 
 2 pints 1 quart 
 
 8 quarts , 1 peck 
 
 4 pecks 1 bushel 
 
 A bushel contains 2,150.42 cubic inches. 
 
 A bushel contains 1.2445 cubic feet. 
 
 36 bushels equal 1 chaldron. 
 
 MEASURES OF WEIGHT AVOIRDUPOIS OR COMMERCIAL 
 WEIGHT. 
 
 16 drachms or 437.5 grains 1 ounce 
 
 16 ounces or 7,000 grains 1 pound 
 
 28 pounds 1 quarter 
 
 4 quarters 1 hundredweight 112 Ibs. 
 
 20 hundredweight 1 ton of 2,240 Ibs. or long ton 
 
 2,000 pounds 1 metric ton 
 
 2,240.6 pounds 1 net or short ton 
 
 14 pounds iron, lead, etc 1 stone 
 
 2iy 2 stone iron, lead, etc 1 pig 
 
 8 pigs 1 f other 
 
 100 pounds grain or flour 1 cental 
 
 100 pounds, raisins 1 cask 
 
 100 pounds dry fish 1 quintal 
 
 100 pounds nails 1 keg 
 
 196 pounds flour 1 barrel 
 
 200 pounds pork, beef or fish .M barrel 
 
 240 pounds lime 1 cask 
 
 280 pounds salt 1 barrel 
 
 TROY WEIGHT. 
 
 24 grains 1 pennyweight 
 
 20 pennyweights 1 ounce 480 grains 
 
 12 ounces 1 pound 5,760 grains 
 
 APOTHECARY'S WEIGHT. 
 
 20 grains 1 scruple 
 
 3 scruples 1 drachm 60 grains 
 
 8 drachms 1 ounce 480 grains 
 
 12 ounces 1 pound 5,760 grains 
 
 The ounce and pound in this case are the same as in Troy Weight. 
 
 CIRCULAR MEASURE. 
 
 60 seconds 1 minute 
 
 60 minutes 1 degree 
 
 90 degrees 1 quadrant 
 
 360 degrees 1 circle 
 
 30 degrees 1 sign 
 
 4 quadrants equal 12 signs or 360 degrees or circumference. 
 
FACTS WORTH KNOWING. 231 
 
 TIME MEASURE. 
 
 60 seconds 1 minute 
 
 60 minutes 1 hour 
 
 24 hours 1 day 
 
 7 days . . . , 1 week 
 
 366 days 5 hours, 48 minutes, 48 seconds 1 year 
 
 30 days equal 1 month in computing interest. 
 366 days in leap year. 
 
 CLOTH MEASURE. 
 
 2% inches 1 nail 
 
 4 nails 1 quarter 
 
 4 quarters 1 yard 
 
 MARINER'S MEASURE. 
 
 6 feet 1 fathom 
 
 120 fathoms 1 cable length 
 
 7% cable lengths 1 mile or knot 
 
 5,280 feet 1 stat. mile 
 
 6,086 feet 1 naut. mile 
 
 9 inches 1 span 
 
 3 miles 1 league 
 
 LINEAR MEASURE METRIC EQUIVALENTS. 
 
 1 centimeter 0.3937 in. 
 
 1 decimeter 3.937 in. 0.328 feet 
 
 1 meter 39.37 in. 1.0936 yards 
 
 1 dekameter 1.9884 rods 
 
 1 kilometer 0.62136 mile 
 
 1 inch 2.54 centimeters 
 
 1 foot 3.048 decimeters 
 
 1 yard 9144 meter 
 
 1 rod 0.5029 dekameter 
 
 1 mile 1,6098 kilometer 
 
 SQUARE MEASURE. 
 
 1 sq. centimeter 0.1560 sq. inch 
 
 1 sq. decimeter 0.1076 sq. foot 
 
 1 sq. meter 1.96 sq. yards 
 
 1 are equals 3,954 sq. rods 
 
 1 hektar 2.47 acres 
 
 1 sq. kilometer 0.386 sq. mile 
 
 1 sq. inch 6.452 sq. centimeters 
 
 1 sq. foot 9.?903 sq. decimeters 
 
 1 sq. yard 0.8361 sq. meter 
 
 1 sq. rod 0.2629 are 
 
 1 acre 0.4047 hektar 
 
 I sq. mile 2.59 sq. kilometer 
 
 WEIGHTS. 
 
 1 gram 0.0527 ounce 
 
 1 kilogram 2.2046 pounds 
 
 I metric ton 1.1023 English tona 
 
 1 ounce 28.85 grams 
 
 1 pound 4536 kilogram 
 
 1 English ton 0.9074 metric ton. 
 
 APPROXIMATE METRIC EQUIVALENTS. 
 
 1 decimeter 4 inches 
 
 1 meter 1.1 yards 
 
 1 kilometer % mile 
 
 1 hektar 2% acre 
 
 1 stere or cubic meter *4 cord 
 
 1 liter 1.06 quarts liquid 
 
 0.9 quart dry 
 
 1 hektoliter 2 % bushels 
 
 1 kilogram ,2 1/5 pounds 
 
 1 metric ton 2,200 pounds 
 
232 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 TO FIND CAPACITY OF TANKS AND BINS. 
 
 TO FIND CAPACITY OF TANKS AND BINS. 
 
 To find number of cubic feet in four-sided tank or bin, multiply 
 width by length by height. 
 
 To find number of cubic feet in round tank or bin, multiply the 
 square of diameter by .7854 by height. 
 
 To find number of bushels in tank or bin, multiply the number of 
 cubic feet in same by .8035. 
 
 To find number of gallons in tank or bin, multiply the number of 
 cubic feet in same by 7.4805. 
 
 CAPACITY OF CIRCULAR TANKS. 
 
 (For each ten inches in depth.) 
 
 2 feet in diameter holds 19 gals. 
 
 2% feet in diameter holds 30 gals. 
 
 3 feet in diameter holds 44 gals. 
 
 4 feet in diameter holds 78 gals. 
 
 4% feet in diameter holds 99 gals. 
 
 6 feet in diameter holds 122 gals. 
 
 6% feet in diameter holds 176 gals. 
 
 7 feet in diameter holds 206 gals. 
 
 8 feet in diameter holds 239 gals. 
 
 9 feet in diameter holds 313 gals. 
 
 10 feet in diameter holds 396 gals. 
 
 11 feet in diameter holds 489 gals. 
 
 12 feet in diameter holds 592 gals. 
 
 13 feet in diameter holds 705 gals. 
 
 14 feet in diameter holds 820 gals. 
 
 16 feet in diameter holds 959 gals. 
 
 20 feet in diameter holds 1101 gals. 
 
 26 feet in diameter holds 3059 gals. 
 
 Tabular view of the number of barrels contained between the walls 
 for each foot in depth. 
 
 SQUARE TANKS. 
 
 6 feet by 6 feet holds 5.92 barrels 
 
 6 feet by 6 feet holds 8.54 barrels 
 
 7 feet by 7 feet holds 11.63 barrels 
 
 8 feet by 8 feet holds 15.19 barrels 
 
 9 feet by 9 feet holds 19.39 barrels 
 
 10 feet by 10 feet holds ' 23.74 barrels 
 
 MEASUREMENTS AND WEIGHTS. 
 
 Five stricken measures are equal to four heaped measures. 
 The standard bushel of the United States contains 2,150.42 cubic 
 Inches, and the imperial bushel of Great Britain, 2,216.192 cubic inches. 
 
 BUSHELS AND BINS. 
 
 To find the number of bushels in a bin, divide the contents in 
 cubic inches by the number of cubic inches in a bushel, or in the 
 United States, for all practical purposes, diminish the number of cubic 
 feet by one-fifth. 
 
 And to find the number of cubic feet in a given number of bushels, 
 multiply the number of bushels by the number of cubic inches in a 
 bushel, and divide the product by 1,728, or in the United States, for 
 all practical purposes, increase the number of bushels by one-fourth. 
 
 To find the number of bushels of apples or potatoes in a bin (in 
 the United States), multiply the number of cubic feet by 4-5 or by .8. 
 
 A ton of coal contains 36% cubic feet, and a box 4 feet long, 3 
 feet wide and 3 feet deep contains 36 cubic feet. 
 
FACTS WORTH KNOWING. 
 
 233 
 
 TO MEASURE CORN IN CRIB. 
 
 Find the length, breadth and depth of the body of corn, in feet, 
 und multiply these three dimensions together; then multiply this 
 product by .63. This will give the heaped bushels of corn. Some- 
 times 1^4 bushels of ear corn are allowed for a bushel of shelled corn, 
 and sometimes two bushels, the amount depending upon the shape of 
 the ear, the size of the cob, etc. 
 
 THE WEIGHT OF HAY. 
 
 In estimating the weight of hay, allow 640 cubic feet for a ton, 
 if on the wagon or newly stored , but if well settled in mow or stack, 
 allow 512 cubic feet. Two hundred and seventy cubic feet of baled hay 
 will weigh a ton. 
 
 NOTE To find the number of cubic feet in a circular stack, mul- 
 tiply the average circumference in yards by itself, and this product by 
 four times the height in yards; -then divide this product by 100 and 
 multiply the quotient by 27. 
 
 To find diameter of a circle, multiply circumference by .31831. 
 To find circumference of a circle, multiply diameter by 3.1416. 
 To find area of a circle, multiply square of diameter by .7854. 
 To find surface of a ball, multiply square of diameter by 3.1416. 
 To find side of an equal square, multiply diameter by .8862. 
 To find cubic inches in a ball, multiply cube of diameter by .5236. 
 
 CONTENTS IN FEET OF JOISTS, SCANTLING, AND TIMBER. 
 LENGTH IN FEET 
 
 SIZE 
 
 12 
 
 14 
 
 16 
 
 18 
 
 20 
 
 22 
 
 24 
 
 26 
 
 28 
 
 80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 FBI 
 
 ET BO 
 
 \RD ]V 
 
 [EAST 
 
 FRE 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 x 4 .. 
 2x6 
 
 8- 
 12 
 
 9 
 14 
 
 11 
 16 
 
 12 
 18 
 
 13 
 20 
 
 15 
 
 22 
 
 16 
 24 
 
 17 
 26 
 
 19 
 
 28 
 
 20 
 80 
 
 2x 8.... 
 
 16 
 
 19 
 
 21 
 
 24 
 
 27 
 
 29 
 
 82 
 
 35 
 
 37 
 
 40 
 
 2 x 10 
 
 20 
 
 23 
 
 27 
 
 80 
 
 83 
 
 87 
 
 40 
 
 43 
 
 47 
 
 50 
 
 2 x 12 
 
 24 
 
 2A 
 
 32 
 
 86 
 
 40 
 
 44 
 
 48 
 
 62 
 
 66 
 
 60 
 
 2 x 14 
 
 .28 
 
 83 
 
 87 
 
 42 
 
 47 
 
 51 
 
 56 
 
 61 
 
 65 
 
 70 
 
 8x8 
 
 24 
 
 28 
 
 82 
 
 36 
 
 40 
 
 44 
 
 48 
 
 52 
 
 66 
 
 60 
 
 8 x lo . 
 
 80 
 
 35 
 
 40 
 
 45 
 
 50 
 
 65 
 
 60 
 
 65 
 
 70 
 
 75 
 
 8 x 12 
 
 86 
 
 42 
 
 48 
 
 54 
 
 60 
 
 66 
 
 72 
 
 78 
 
 84 
 
 90 
 
 8 x 14 
 
 42 
 
 49 
 
 56 
 
 63 
 
 70 
 
 77 
 
 84 
 
 91 
 
 9d 
 
 105 
 
 4 x 14 
 
 56 
 
 65 
 
 75 
 
 84 
 
 93 
 
 103 
 
 112 
 
 121 
 
 181 
 
 140 
 
 6x 6... 
 
 36 
 
 42 
 
 48 
 
 54 
 
 60 
 
 66 
 
 72 
 
 78 
 
 84 
 
 90 
 
 6x8 
 
 48 
 
 56 
 
 64 
 
 72 
 
 80 
 
 88 
 
 96 
 
 104 
 
 112 
 
 120 
 
 6 x 10 
 
 60 
 
 70 
 
 80 
 
 90 
 
 100 
 
 110 
 
 120 
 
 130 
 
 140 
 
 150 
 
 6 x 12 
 
 72 
 
 84 
 
 96 
 
 108 
 
 120 
 
 132 
 
 144 
 
 156 
 
 168 
 
 180 
 
 6 x 14 
 
 84 
 
 98 
 
 112 
 
 126 
 
 140 
 
 154 
 
 168 
 
 182 
 
 196 
 
 210 
 
 8x8 
 
 64 
 
 75 
 
 85 
 
 96 
 
 107 
 
 117 
 
 128 
 
 139 
 
 149 
 
 160 
 
 8 x 10 
 
 80 
 
 93 
 
 107 
 
 120 
 
 183 
 
 147 
 
 160 
 
 173 
 
 187 
 
 200 
 
 8 X 12 ... 
 
 96 
 
 112 
 
 128 
 
 144 
 
 T60 
 
 176 
 
 192 
 
 208 
 
 224 
 
 240 
 
 8 x 14 
 10 x 10.... 
 
 112 
 100 
 
 131 
 117 
 
 149 
 183 
 
 168 
 150 
 
 187 
 167 
 
 205 
 183 
 
 224 
 200 
 
 243 
 
 217 
 
 261 
 233 
 
 280 
 250 
 
 10 x 12 
 
 120 
 
 140 
 
 160 
 
 180 
 
 200 
 
 2-20 
 
 240 
 
 260 
 
 280 
 
 300 
 
 10 x 14 
 32 x 12.... 
 
 140 
 144 
 
 163 
 
 168 
 
 187 
 192 
 
 210 
 216 
 
 233 
 
 240 
 
 257 
 264 
 
 280 
 288 
 
 303 
 312 
 
 827 
 836 
 
 850 
 
 360 
 
 12 x 14...., 
 
 14 x 14 
 
 168 
 196 
 
 196 
 
 229 
 
 224 
 261 
 
 252 
 294 
 
 280 
 327 
 
 308 
 359 
 
 836 
 
 392 
 
 864 
 425 
 
 392 
 457 
 
 420 
 490 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
234 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 TABLE OF WEIGHTS. 
 
 Avg. Wt. 
 
 of a 
 Cub. ft. 
 
 Ibs. 
 
 Air, at.nospheric; at 60 Fah. and under the pressure of one 
 atmosphere or 14.7 Ib. per sq. inch, weighs 1/815 part 
 
 as much as water at 60 0766 
 
 Alcohol,, pure 49.43 
 
 of commerce 52.1 
 
 proof spirit 57.2 
 
 Ash, perfectly dry average . . 47. 
 
 1,000 feet, board measure, weighs 1.748 tons. 
 
 Ash, American white, dry " . . 38. 
 
 1,000 feet, board measure, weighs 1.414 tons. 
 
 Alabaster, falsely so called, but really marbles 168. 
 
 real; a compact white plaster of Paris 144. 
 
 Aluminum 162. 
 
 Antimony, cast, 6.66 to 6.74 average.. 418. 
 
 native " .. 416. 
 
 Asphaltum, 1 to 1.8 " 87.$ 
 
 Basalt " .. 181. 
 
 Bath Stone, Oolite " .. 131. 
 
 Bismuth, cast. Also native " . . 607. 
 
 Bitumen, solid. See Asphaltum 
 
 Brass, (Copper and Zinc) cast, 7.8 to 8.4 " .. 504. 
 
 rolled " ..524. 
 
 Bronze, Copper 8 parts; Tin 1 (Gun Metal) " .. 629. 
 
 Brick, best pressed 150. 
 
 common hard 125. 
 
 soft inferior 100. 
 
 Boxwood, Dry average . . .60 
 
 Calcite, transparent . . 169.9 
 
 Charcoal, of pines and oaks. average. .15 to 30. 
 
 Chalk, 2.2 to 2.8 average.. 156. 
 
 Clay, potters' dry, 1.8 to 2.1 " . . 119. 
 
 dry, in lump, loose .. 63. 
 
 Coke, loose, of good coal average. .23 to 32. 
 
 Coke, a heaped bushel, loose 35 to 42 Ibs. 
 
 Cherry, perfectly dry average. . 42. 
 
 1,000 feet, board measure weighs 1.562 tons. 
 
 Coal, anthracite, 1.3 to 1.84 of Penn. 1.3 to 1.7 usual 93.5- 
 
 broken, any size, loose average.. 52 to 56. 
 
 moderately shaken ... " ..56 to 60. 
 A cubic yard, solid, averages about 1.75 cubic yards when 
 
 broken to any market size, and loose. 
 A ton loose, averages from 40 to 43 cubic feet. 
 At 54 Ibs. per cubic foot, a cubic yard weighs 1,458 pounds 
 0.651 ton. 
 
 Coal, bituminous, 1.2 to 1.5 =0.651 ton 84. 
 
 broken, any size, loose " 47 to 52. 
 
 moderately shaken " 51 to 56. 
 
 A cubic yard, solid, averages about 1.75 yards when broken 
 to any market size, and loose. 
 
 Chestnut, perfectly dry average . . 41. 
 
 1,000 feet,' board measure, weighs 1.525 tons. 
 
 Cement, hydraulic, American, Rosendale; ground, loose " .. 56. 
 
 Louisville, struck bush. 62 Ibs... 49.$ 
 
 Copley, struck bush. 67 Ibs 53.6 
 
 English Portland, U. S. struck bush., 
 
 by Gilmore, 100 to 128 81 to 102. 
 
 hydraulic, English Portland, various, weighed by 
 
 writer 95 to 102 76 to 81.6 
 
 hydraulic, English Portland, a barrel 400 to 430 Ib. 
 French Boulogne Portland, struck bush., 
 
 95 to 110 76 to 88. 
 
 Cork 15.6. 
 
 Elm, perfectly dry average. . 35. 
 
FACTS WORTH KNOWING. 
 
 235 
 
 Glass. 2.5 to 3.46 .. 186. 
 
 " common, window . . 157. 
 
 " Millville, N. J., thick flooring glass . . 158. 
 
 Hemlock, perfectly dry . . 25. 
 
 1,000 feet, board measure, weighs 1.971 tons. 
 
 India Rubber . . 68. 
 
 Lard .. 59.3 
 
 Mahogany, Spanish, dry . . 63. 
 
 Honduras, dry . . 35. 
 
 Maple, dry .. 49. 
 
 Mica, 2.75 to 3.1 183. 
 
 Naphtha 52.9 
 
 Oak, live, perfectly dry, .88 to 1.02 average.. 69.3 
 
 " white, " " .66 to .88 " .. 48. 
 
 " red, black, etc average. .32 to 43. 
 
 Oils, whale, olive average. . 57.3 
 
 " of turpentine . . 64.3 
 
 Petroleum 64.8 
 
 Peat, dry, unpressed 20 to 30. 
 
 Pine, white, perfectly dry, .35 to .46 25. 
 
 1,000 feet, board measure, weighs .930 ton. 
 
 " yellow, Northern, .48 to .62 34.3 
 
 1,000 feet, board measure, weighs 1,276 tons. 
 
 yellow, Southern, .64 to .80 45. 
 
 1,000 feet, board measure, weighs 1.674 tons. 
 
 " Heart of long-leafed Southern yellow, unseasoned 65. 
 
 1,000 feet, board measure, weighs 2.418 tons. 
 
 Pitch 71.7 
 
 Powder, slightly shaken 62.3 
 
 Salt, coarse, per struck bushel; Syracuse, N. Y 56 Ibs 45. 
 
 Turk's Island, Cadiz. .76 to 80 62. 
 
 St. Barts 84 to 90 70. 
 
 West India 90 to 96 74. 
 
 Liverpool 50 to 56 42. 
 
 Liverpool, fine, for table use 60 to 62 49. 
 
 Tallow average . . 58.6 
 
 Tar " .. 62.4 
 
 Wines, .993 to 1.04 " .. 62.3 
 
 Walnut, black, perfectly dry " . . 38. 
 
 Wax, bees " .. 60.6 
 
 MATERIAL 
 
 MEASUREMENTS 
 
 WOOL 
 
 Bale East India 
 
 ' Australia 
 
 South America. . . . 
 
 ' Oregon 
 
 " California 
 
 Bag Wool 
 
 Stack of Scoured Wool. 
 
 Floor 
 Space 
 
 3.0 
 5.8 
 7.0 
 6.9 
 7.5 
 5.0 
 
 Cubic 
 feet 
 
 12. 
 26. 
 34. 
 33. 
 33. 
 30. 
 
 Gross 
 
 340 
 385 
 1000 
 482 
 550 
 200 
 
 WEIGHTS 
 
 Per 
 
 Per cubic 
 sq. ft. foot 
 
 113 
 66 
 
 143 
 70 
 73 
 40 
 
 28 
 
 16 
 
 29 
 
 15 
 
 17 
 
 7 
 
 5 
 
 WOOLEN GOODS 
 
 Case Flannels 
 
 heavy 
 Dress Goods . . . 
 
 " . Cassimeres 
 
 Underwear 
 
 Blankets 
 
 Horse Blankets 
 
 6.6 
 
 7.1 
 
 5.5 
 
 10.5 
 
 7.3 
 
 10.3 
 
 4.0 
 
 12.7 
 15.2 
 22.0 
 28.0 
 21.0 
 35.0 
 14.0 
 
 220 
 330 
 460 
 560 
 360 
 450 
 250 
 
 40 
 46 
 84 
 62 
 48 
 44 
 63 
 
 17 
 22 
 21 
 20 
 16 
 13 
 18 
 
236 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 COTTON, ETC. 
 
 Bale 
 
 8.1 
 
 Compressed 4.1 
 
 Dederick Compressed. . . 1.26 
 
 Jute 2.4 
 
 Jute Lashings 2.6 
 
 Manilla 3.2 
 
 Hemp 8.7 
 
 Sisal 5.3 
 
 44.2 
 
 21.6 
 
 3.13 
 
 9.9 
 
 10.5 
 
 10.9 
 
 34.7 
 
 17.0 
 
 515 
 550 
 125 
 300 
 450 
 280 
 700 
 400 
 
 64 
 
 134 
 
 100 
 
 125 
 
 172 
 
 88 
 
 81 
 
 75 
 
 12 
 25 
 40 
 30 
 43 
 26 
 20 
 24 
 
 COTTON GOODS 
 
 Bale Unbleached Jeans 
 
 Piece Duck , 
 
 Bale Brown Sheetings , 
 
 Case Bleached Sheetings 
 
 Case Quilts 
 
 Bale Print Cloth 
 
 Case Prints 
 
 Bale Tickings 
 
 Skeins Cotton Yarn 
 
 Burlaps 
 
 Jute Bagging , 
 
 4.0 
 1.1 
 3.6 
 4.8 
 7.2 
 4.0 
 4.5 
 3.3 
 
 1.4 
 
 12.5 
 
 2.3 
 
 10.1 
 
 11.4 
 
 19.0 
 
 9.3 
 
 13.4 
 
 8.8 
 
 5.3 
 
 300 
 75 
 235 
 330 
 295 
 175 
 420 
 325 
 
 iso 
 
 100 
 
 70 
 
 24 
 33 
 23 
 30 
 16 
 19 
 31 
 37 
 11 
 30 
 24 
 
 RAGS IN BALES 
 
 White Linen 8.5 39.5 910 107 23 
 
 White Cotton 9.2 40.0 715 78 18 
 
 Brown Cotton 7.6 30.0 442 59 15 
 
 Paper Shavings 7.5 34.0 507 68 15 
 
 Sacking 16.0 -65.0 450 28 7 
 
 Woolen .' 7.5 30.0 600 80 20 
 
 Jute Butts 2.8 11.1 400 143 36 
 
 PAPER 
 
 Calendered Book 
 
 Super-calendered Book 
 
 Newspaper 
 
 Straw Board 
 
 Leather Board 
 
 Writing 
 
 Wrapping 
 
 Manilla . 
 
 GRAIN 
 
 Wheat in Bags. 
 " " Bulk 
 
 mean 
 
 Barrels Flour on side , 
 
 on end 
 
 Corn in Bags 
 
 Cornmeal in Barrels 
 
 Oats in bags , 
 
 Bale of Hay 
 
 Hay, Dederick Compressed. 
 Straw " 
 Tow 
 Excelsior " 
 
 4.2 
 
 4.1 
 
 3.1 
 
 3.6 
 
 3.7 
 
 3.3 
 
 5.0 
 
 1.75 
 
 1.75 
 
 1.75 
 
 1.75 
 
 4.2 
 
 5.4 
 7.1 
 3.6 
 5.9 
 3.6 
 20.0 
 5.25 
 5.25 
 5.25 
 5.25 
 
 165 
 
 218 
 218 
 112 
 218 
 96 
 284 
 125 
 100 
 150 
 100 
 
 39 
 
 50 
 69 
 38 
 33 
 
 59 
 64 
 10 
 37 
 
 DYE STUFFS 
 
 Hogsheads Bleaching Powder 11.8 39.2 1200 102 31 
 
 Soda Ash 10.8 29.2 1800 167 62 
 
 Box Indigo 3.0 9.0 385 128 43 
 
 " Cutch 4.0 3.3 150 38 45 
 
 " Sumac 1.6 4.1 160 100 39 
 
FACTS WORTH KNOWING. 237 
 
 80 
 23 
 S3 
 70 
 50 
 69 
 73 
 63 
 48 
 34 
 42 
 
 Caustic Soda in iron drum... 
 Barrel Starch . ' 
 
 4.3 
 
 3.0 
 
 6.8 
 
 10.5 
 
 600 
 250 
 
 140 
 83 
 
 
 3.0 
 
 10.5 
 
 350 
 
 117 
 
 Box Extract Logwood 
 
 1.06 
 
 .8 
 
 55 
 
 52 
 
 Barrel Lime 
 
 3.6 
 
 4.5 
 
 225 
 
 63 
 
 " Cement, American . . . 
 English .... 
 " Plaster 
 
 3.8 
 3.S 
 3.7 
 
 5.5 
 5.5 
 6.1 
 
 325 
 400 
 325 
 
 86 
 
 105 
 88 
 
 
 3.0 
 
 9.0 
 
 430 
 
 143 
 
 " Lard Oil ... 
 
 4 3 
 
 12.3 
 
 422 
 
 98 
 
 Rope . 
 
 
 
 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS. 
 
 
 2.7 
 
 0.5 
 
 139 
 
 99 
 
 " Glass 
 
 
 
 
 
 Crate Crockery ... . . 
 
 9.9 
 
 39.6 
 
 1600 
 
 162 
 
 
 13.4 
 
 42.5 
 
 600 
 
 52 
 
 Bale Leather .... 
 
 7 3 
 
 12 2 
 
 190 
 
 26 
 
 
 11.2 
 
 16.7 
 
 300 
 
 27 
 
 " Raw Hides 
 
 6 
 
 30 
 
 400 
 
 67 
 
 " Compressed 
 ' Sole Leather 
 
 6.0 
 12.6 
 
 30.0 
 8.9 
 
 700 
 200 
 
 117 
 22 
 
 Pile Sole Leather 
 
 
 
 
 
 Barrel Granulated Sugar. . . . 
 Brown Sugar 
 
 3.0 
 3.0 
 
 7.5 
 7.5 
 
 317 
 340 
 
 106 
 113 
 
 Cheese . 
 
 
 
 
 
 278 
 60 
 40 
 14 
 16 
 18 
 13 
 23 
 16 
 17 
 42 
 
 MEASURES AND WEIGHTS OF VARIOUS MATERIALS. 
 
 (Approximate) 
 
 Brickwork: Brickwork Is estimated by the thousand, and for vari- 
 ous thickneses of wall runs as follows: 
 
 8% in. wall, or 1 brick In thickness, 14 bricks per superficial foot. 
 
 12% in. wall, or 1% brick In thickness, 21 bricks per superficial foot. 
 
 17 in. wall, or 2 brick in thickness, 28 bricks per superficial foot. 
 
 21% in. wall, or 2% brick In thickness, 35 bricks per superficial foot. 
 
 An ordinary brick measures about 8^4x4x2 inches, which is equal 
 
 to 66 cubic inches, or 26.2 bricks to a cubic foot. The average weight 
 
 is 4% pounds. 
 
 Fuel: A bushel of bituminous coal weighs 76 pounds and contains 
 2686 cubic inches = 1.554 cubic feet. 29.47 bushels = 1 gross ton. 
 A bushel of coke weighs 40 Ibs. (35 to 42 Ibs.) 
 
 One acre of bituminous coal contains 1600 tons of 2240 Ibs. per foot 
 of thickness of coal worked. 15 to 25 per cent, must be deducted for 
 waste in mining. 
 
 41 to 45 cu. ft. bituminous coal when broken down 1 ton, 2240 Ibs. 
 
 31 to 41 
 123 
 
 70.9 
 
 1 cubic foot of anthracite coal = 5fi to 66 Ibs. 
 
 anthracite, prepared for market = 1 ton, 2240 Ibs. 
 of charcoal = 1 ton, 2240 Ibs. 
 
 of coke = 1 ton, 2240 Ibs. 
 
 bituminous coal 50 to 55 Ibs. 
 
 " Cumberland coal = 53 Ibs. 
 
 " Cannel coal = 50.3 Ibs. 
 
 " Charcoal (hardwood) =18.5 Ibs. 
 
 " Charcoal (pine) = 18 Ibs. 
 
 A bushel of charcoal. In 1881 the American Charcoal-Iron Work- 
 ers' Association adopted for use in its official publications for the 
 standard bushel of charcoal 2748 cubic inches, or 20 pounds. A ton of 
 charcoal to be taken at 2000 pounds. This figure of 20 pounds to the 
 bushel was taken as a fair average of different bushels used through- 
 out the country, and it has since been established by law in some 
 states. 
 
238 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 ORES, EARTHS, ( ETC. 
 
 13 cubic feet of ordinary gold or silver ore, in mine= 1 ton = 2000 Ibs. 
 
 20 ' broken quartz = 1 ton = 2000 Ibs 
 
 18 feet of gravel in bank = 1 ton. 
 
 27 cubic feet of gravel when dry = 1 ton. 
 
 25 sand =1 ton. 
 
 18 ' earth in bank 1 ton. 
 27 " earth when dry 1 ton. 
 17 " " " clay = 1 ton. 
 Cement. English Portland, sp. gr. 1.25 to 1.61 per bbl. .400 to .430 Ibs. 
 Rosendale, U. S., a struck bushel .62 to .70 Ibs. 
 Lime. A struck bushel .72 to .75 Ibs. 
 Grain. A struck bu. of wheat=60 Ibs.; cornr=56 Ibs.; of oats=30 Ibs. 
 Salt. A struck bushel of salt, coarse, Syracuse, N. Y =.56 Ibs. 
 
 WEIGHT OF EARTH FILLING. 
 
 Average Weight in Pounds 
 Per Cubic Foot 
 
 Earth, common loam, loose 72 to 80 
 
 shaken 82 to 92 
 
 " rammed moderately .... 90 to 100 
 
 Gravel 90 to 106 
 
 Sand 90 to 106 
 
 Soft flowing mud 104 to 120 
 
 Sand, perfectly wet 118 to 129 
 
 WEIGHTS OF LOGS, LUMBER, ETC. 
 
 WEIGHT OF GREEN LOGS TO SCALE 1000 FEET, BOARD MEAS. 
 
 Yellow Pine (Southern) 8000 to 10000 pounds 
 
 White Pine (Michigan) off stump 6000 to 7000 
 
 out of water 7000 to 8000 
 
 Norway Pine (Michigan) 7000 to 8000 
 
 White Pine (Pennsylvania) bark off 5000 to 6000 
 
 Hemlock (Pennsylvania) bark off 6000 to 7000 
 
 Four acres of water are required to store 1,000,000 feet of logs. 
 
 WEIGHT OF 1000 FEET OF LUMBER, BOARD MEASURE. 
 
 Yellow or Norway Pine Dry, 3000 pounds Green, 5000 pounds 
 
 White Pine Dry, 2500 pounds Green, 4000 pounds 
 
 Weight of One Cord of Seasoned Wood 128 Cubic Feet Per Cord. 
 
 i 
 
 Hickory or Sugar Maple 4500 pounds 
 
 White Oak 3850 
 
 Beech, Red Oak or Black Oak 3250 
 
 Poplar, Chestnut or Elm 2350 
 
 Pine (white or Norway) 2000 
 
 Hemlock bark, dry 2200 
 
 One cubic foot of anthracite coal weighs about 53 pounds. 
 
 One cubic foot of bituminous coal weighs from 47 to 50 pounds. 
 
 A gallon of water (United States standard) weighs 8 1/3 pounds 
 and contains 231 cubic inches. 
 
PACTS WORTH KNOWING. 239 
 
 AMOUNT OF PAPER REQUIRED FOR A ROOM. 
 HEIGHT OF WALL TO CEILING. 
 
 No. ft. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 around 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 room 
 
 8ft. 
 
 9ft. 
 
 10ft. 
 
 lift. 
 
 12ft. 
 
 13ft. 
 
 14ft. 
 
 28 
 
 7 
 
 8 
 
 9 
 
 10 
 
 11 
 
 11 
 
 12 
 
 32 
 
 8 
 
 9 
 
 10 
 
 11 
 
 12 
 
 13 
 
 
 36 
 
 9 
 
 10 
 
 11 
 
 12 
 
 13 
 
 14 
 
 16 
 
 40 
 
 10 
 
 11 
 
 12 
 
 14 
 
 15 
 
 16 
 
 17 
 
 44 
 
 11 
 
 12 
 
 14 
 
 15 
 
 16 
 
 18 
 
 19 
 
 48 
 
 12 
 
 13 
 
 15 
 
 16 
 
 18 
 
 19 
 
 21 
 
 62 
 
 13 
 
 16 
 
 16 
 
 18 
 
 19 
 
 21 
 
 22 
 
 56 
 
 14 
 
 16 
 
 17 
 
 19 
 
 21 
 
 22 
 
 24 
 
 60 
 
 IB 
 
 17 
 
 19 
 
 20 
 
 22 
 
 24 
 
 26 
 
 el 
 
 16 
 
 17 
 
 18 
 19 
 
 20 
 21 
 
 22 
 23 
 
 24 
 25 
 
 26 
 27 
 
 28 
 29 
 
 i 
 
 18 
 19 
 
 20 
 21 
 
 22 
 23 
 
 24 
 26 
 
 27 
 28 
 
 29 
 30 
 
 i 
 
 
 
 22 
 
 25 
 
 27 
 
 30 
 
 32 
 
 34 
 
 II 
 
 21 
 22 
 
 23 
 24 
 
 26 
 
 27 
 
 28 
 30 
 
 31 
 32 
 
 33 
 35 
 
 ii 
 
 92 
 
 23 
 
 26 
 
 28 
 
 31 
 
 34 
 
 37 
 
 39 
 
 96 
 
 24 
 
 ' 27 
 
 30 
 
 32 
 
 35 
 
 38 
 
 41 
 
 100 
 
 25 
 
 28 
 
 31 
 
 34 
 
 37 
 
 40 
 
 43 
 
 104 
 
 26 
 
 29 
 
 32 
 
 35 
 
 38 
 
 41 
 
 44 
 
 108 
 
 27 
 
 30 
 
 33 
 
 36 
 
 40 
 
 43 
 
 46 
 
 112 
 
 28 
 
 31 
 
 34 
 
 38 
 
 42 
 
 44 
 
 48 
 
 116 
 
 29 
 
 32 
 
 36 
 
 39 
 
 43 
 
 46 
 
 60 
 
 120 
 
 30 
 
 33 
 
 37 
 
 40 
 
 45 
 
 48 
 
 61 
 
 EXPLANATION. 
 
 Look for height of ceiling at top of column, number of feet of wall 
 around the room in the left-hand column; in angle will be found the 
 number of single rolls required. 
 
 EXAMPLE. 
 
 Number of feet around the room, 36; height of wall of ceiling, 11 
 feet; in the angle will be found twelve rolls. Subtract one roll for each 
 opening. 
 
 FOR CEILING. 
 
 Multiply the length of room by the breadth, divided by 30, and the 
 result will be the number of rolls required. 
 
 FOR BORDER. 
 
 Divide the number of feet around the room by 3, and it gives you 
 the number of yards of border required. 
 
 There are 8 yards in a roll of 18-inch border, and yards in a 
 roll of 9 -inch border. 
 
240 
 
 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Table showing number of square feet in veneered doors upon 
 which prices are based. 
 
 HEIGHT. 
 
 Width 
 
 6.8 
 
 6.10 
 
 7 
 
 7.2 
 
 7.4 
 
 7.6 
 
 7.8 
 
 7.10 
 
 8 
 
 8.2 
 
 8.4 
 
 8.6 
 
 8.8 
 
 8.10 
 
 9 
 
 2.2 
 
 17.6 
 
 17.6 
 
 17.6 
 
 If '.6 
 
 17.6 
 
 17.6 
 
 17.6 
 
 17.6 
 
 17.6 
 
 18. 
 
 18. 
 
 18.6 
 
 19. 
 
 19. 
 
 19.6 
 
 2.4 
 
 17.6 
 
 17.6 
 
 17.6 
 
 17.6 
 
 17.6 
 
 17.6 
 
 1&. 
 
 18.6 
 
 19. 
 
 19, 
 
 19.6 
 
 20. 
 
 20.6 
 
 20.6 
 
 21. 
 
 2.6 
 
 17.6 
 
 17.6 
 
 17.6 
 
 18. 
 
 18.6 
 
 19. 
 
 10. 
 
 19.6 
 
 20. 
 
 20.6 
 
 21. 
 
 21.6 
 
 22. 
 
 22. 
 
 22.6 
 
 2.8 
 
 18. 
 
 18.6 
 
 19. 
 
 19. 
 
 19.6 
 
 20. 
 
 20.6 
 
 21. 
 
 21.6 
 
 22. 
 
 22.6 
 
 23. 
 
 23.6 
 
 23.6 
 
 24. 
 
 2.10 
 
 19. 
 
 19.6 
 
 20. 
 
 20. 
 
 21. 
 
 21.6 
 
 22. 
 
 22. 
 
 23. 
 
 23. 
 
 23.6 
 
 24. 
 
 24.6 
 
 25. 
 
 25.6 
 
 3. 
 
 20. 
 
 20.6 
 
 21. 
 
 21.6 
 
 22. 
 
 22:6 
 
 23. 
 
 23.6 
 
 24. 
 
 24.6 
 
 25. 
 
 25.6 
 
 26. 
 
 26.6 
 
 27. 
 
 3.2 
 
 21. 
 
 22. 
 
 22. 
 
 23. 
 
 23. 
 
 24. 
 
 24.6 
 
 25. 
 
 25.6 
 
 26. 
 
 26.6 
 
 27. 
 
 27.6 
 
 28. 
 
 28.6 
 
 3.4 
 
 22.6 
 
 23. 
 
 23.6 
 
 24. 
 
 24.6 
 
 25. 
 
 25.6 
 
 26. 
 
 27. 
 
 27.6 
 
 28. 
 
 28.6 
 
 29. 
 
 29.6 
 
 30. 
 
 3.6 
 
 23.6 
 
 24. 
 
 24.6 
 
 25. 
 
 26.6 
 
 26.6 
 
 27. 
 
 27.6 
 
 28. 
 
 29., 
 
 29. 
 
 30. 
 
 30.6 
 
 31. 
 
 31.6 
 
 3.8 
 
 24.6 
 
 25. 
 
 26. 
 
 26.6 
 
 27. 
 
 27.6 
 
 28. 
 
 29. 
 
 29.6 
 
 30. 
 
 30.6 
 
 31. 
 
 32. 
 
 32.6 
 
 33. 
 
 3.10 
 
 25.6 
 
 26. 
 
 27. 
 
 27.6 
 
 28. 
 
 29. 
 
 29.6 
 
 30. 
 
 31. 
 
 31.6 
 
 32, 
 
 32.6 
 
 33.6 
 
 34; 
 
 34.6 
 
 4 
 
 27. 
 
 27.6 
 
 28. 
 
 29. 
 
 29.6 
 
 30. 
 
 31. 
 
 31.6 
 
 32. 
 
 33. 
 
 33.6 
 
 34. 
 
 35. 
 
 35.6 
 
 36. 
 
 4.2 
 
 28. 
 
 28.6 
 
 29. 
 
 30. 
 
 30.6 
 
 31.6 
 
 32. 
 
 33. 
 
 33.6 
 
 34. 
 
 35. 
 
 35.6 
 
 36. 
 
 37. 
 
 37.6 
 
 4.4 
 
 29. 
 
 29.6 
 
 30.6 
 
 31. 
 
 32. 
 
 32.6 
 
 33.6 
 
 34. 
 
 35. 
 
 35.6 
 
 36. 
 
 37. 
 
 37.6 
 
 38.6 
 
 39. 
 
 4.6 
 
 30. 
 
 31. 
 
 31.6 
 
 32.6 
 
 33. 
 
 34. 
 
 34.6 
 
 35.6 
 
 36. 
 
 37. 
 
 37.6 
 
 38.6 
 
 39. 
 
 40, 
 
 40.6 
 
 4.8 
 
 31.6 
 
 32. 
 
 33. 
 
 33.6 
 
 34.6 
 
 35, 
 
 36. 
 
 36.6 
 
 37.6 
 
 38. 
 
 3,9. ' 
 
 40. 
 
 40.6 
 
 41.6 
 
 42. 
 
 4.10 
 
 32.6 
 
 33. 
 
 34. 
 
 35. 
 
 35.6 
 
 36.6 
 
 37. 
 
 38. 
 
 39. 
 
 39.6 
 
 40.6 
 
 41. 
 
 42. 
 
 43. 
 
 43.6 
 
 6. 
 
 33.6 
 
 34. 
 
 35. 
 
 36. 
 
 37. 
 
 37.6 
 
 38.6 
 
 39. 
 
 40. 
 
 41. 
 
 42. 
 
 42.6 
 
 43.6 
 
 44. 
 
 45. 
 
 6.2 
 
 34.6 
 
 35.6 
 
 36. 
 
 37. 
 
 38. 
 
 39. 
 
 39.6 
 
 40.6 
 
 41.6 
 
 42. 
 
 43. 
 
 44.. 
 
 45. 
 
 46. 
 
 46.6 
 
 5.4 
 
 35.6 
 
 36.6 
 
 37.6 
 
 38.6 
 
 39. 
 
 40. 
 
 41. 
 
 42. 
 
 43. 
 
 43.6 
 
 44.6 
 
 45.6 
 
 46.6 
 
 47.6 
 
 48. 
 
 6.6 
 
 37. 
 
 37.6 
 
 38.6 
 
 39.6 
 
 40.6 
 
 41.6 
 
 42. 
 
 43. 
 
 44. 
 
 45. 
 
 46. 
 
 47. 
 
 48. 
 
 48.6 
 
 49.6 
 
 6.8 
 
 38. 
 
 39. 
 
 40. 
 
 40.6 
 
 41.6 
 
 42.6 
 
 43.6 
 
 44.6 
 
 45.6 
 
 46.6 
 
 47.6 
 
 48. 
 
 49. 
 
 50. 
 
 51. 
 
 6.10 
 
 39 
 
 40 
 
 41 
 
 42 
 
 43 
 
 44 
 
 45. 
 
 46 
 
 47. 
 
 48 
 
 48 6 
 
 49 6 
 
 50 6 
 
 51.6 
 
 52.6 
 
 6. 
 
 40. 
 
 41. 
 
 42. 
 
 43. 
 
 44. 
 
 45. 
 
 46. 
 
 47. 
 
 48. 
 
 49. 
 
 50. 
 
 51. 
 
 52. 
 
 53; 
 
 54. 
 
 6.2 
 
 41. 
 
 42. 
 
 43. 
 
 44. 
 
 45.6 
 
 46.6 
 
 47.6 
 
 48.6 
 
 49.6 
 
 50.6 
 
 51.6 
 
 52.6 
 
 53.6 
 
 54.6 
 
 55.6 
 
 6.4 
 
 42.6 
 
 43.6 
 
 44.6 
 
 45 6 
 
 46 6 
 
 47.0 
 
 48,6 
 
 50 
 
 51. 
 
 5? 
 
 53. 
 
 54. 
 
 55 
 
 56 
 
 58. 
 
 6.6 
 
 43.6 
 
 44.6 
 
 45.6 
 
 46.6 
 
 48. 
 
 49. 
 
 50. 
 
 51. 
 
 52. 
 
 53. 
 
 54. 
 
 55.6 
 
 56.6 
 
 57.6 
 
 58.6 
 
 6.8 
 
 44.6 
 
 45.6 
 
 47. 
 
 48. 
 
 49. 
 
 50. 
 
 51. 
 
 52.6 
 
 53.6 
 
 54.6 
 
 55.6 
 
 57. 
 
 58. 
 
 59. 
 
 60. 
 
 6.10 
 
 45.6 
 
 47. 
 
 48. 
 
 49. 
 
 50. 
 
 51.6 
 
 52.6 
 
 53.6 
 
 55. 
 
 56. 
 
 57. 
 
 58. 
 
 59.6 
 
 60.6 
 
 61.6 
 
 7. 
 
 47. 
 
 48. 
 
 49. 
 
 50. 
 
 51.6 
 
 52.6 
 
 54. 
 
 55. 
 
 56. 
 
 57. 
 
 58.6 
 
 59.6 
 
 61. 
 
 62, 
 
 63. 
 
 7.2 
 
 48 
 
 49 
 
 50 
 
 51 6 
 
 52 6 
 
 54. 
 
 55 
 
 56 
 
 57 6 
 
 58 6 
 
 60 
 
 61 
 
 62 
 
 63 6 
 
 64 6 
 
 7.4 
 
 49. 
 
 50. 
 
 51.6 
 
 52.6 
 
 54. 
 
 55. 
 
 56.6 
 
 57.6 
 
 59. 
 
 59.6 
 
 61. 
 
 62.6 
 
 63'. 6 
 
 65. 
 
 66. 
 
 7.6 
 
 50. 
 
 51.6 
 
 52.6 
 
 54. 
 
 55. 
 
 56.6 
 
 57.6 
 
 59. 
 
 60. 
 
 61.6 
 
 62.6 
 
 64. 
 
 65. 
 
 66.6 
 
 67.6 
 
 7.8 
 
 51. 
 
 52.6 
 
 54. 
 
 55. 
 
 56.6 
 
 57.6 
 
 59. 
 
 60. 
 
 61.6 
 
 62.6 
 
 64. 
 
 65. 
 
 66.6 
 
 68. 
 
 69. 
 
 7.10 
 
 52.6 
 
 53.6 
 
 55. 
 
 56. 
 
 57.6 
 
 59. 
 
 60. 
 
 61.6 
 
 63. 
 
 64. 
 
 65.6 
 
 66.6 
 
 68. 
 
 69. 
 
 70.6 
 
 8. 
 
 53.6 
 
 55. 
 
 56. 
 
 57.6 
 
 59. 
 
 60. 
 
 61.6 
 
 63. 
 
 64. 
 
 65.6 
 
 67. 
 
 68. 
 
 69.6 
 
 71. 
 
 72. 
 
 As labor is the principal item in cost of doors, we figure no door 
 less than 17.6 square feet. 
 
FACTS WORTH KNOWING. 
 
 241 
 
 NUMBER OF BRICK REQUIRED TO CONSTRUCT 
 ANY BUILDING. 
 
 (Reckoning 7 Brick to Each Superficial Foot.) 
 
 Superficial 
 Feet of 
 Wall. 
 
 NUMBER OF BRICKS TO THICKNESS OF 
 
 4 in. 
 
 Sin. 
 
 12 in. 
 
 16 in. 
 
 20 in. 
 
 24 in. 
 
 1 
 
 7 
 
 15 
 23 
 30 
 38 
 45 
 53 
 60 
 68 
 75 
 150 
 225 
 300 
 375 
 450 
 525 
 600 
 675 
 750 
 1500 
 2250 
 3000 
 3750 
 4500 
 5250 
 6000 
 6750 
 7500 
 
 15 
 30 
 45 
 60 
 75 
 90 
 105 
 120 
 135 
 150 
 300 
 450 
 600 
 750 
 900 
 100O 
 1200 
 1350 
 1500 
 3000 
 4500 
 6000 
 7500 
 9000 
 10500 
 12000 
 13500 
 15000 
 
 23 
 45 
 
 68 
 90 
 113 
 135 
 158 
 180 
 203 
 225 
 450 
 675 
 900 
 1125 
 1350 
 1575 
 1800 
 2025 
 2250 
 4500 
 6750 
 9000 
 11250 
 13500 
 15750 
 18600 
 20250 
 22500 
 
 30 
 60 
 90 
 120 
 150 
 180 
 210 
 240' 
 270 
 300 
 600 
 900 
 1200 
 1500 
 1800 
 2100 
 2400 
 2700 
 3000 
 6000 
 9000 
 12000 
 15000 
 18000 
 21000 
 24000 
 27000 
 30000 
 
 38 
 75 
 113 
 150 
 188 
 225 
 263 
 300 
 338 
 375 
 750 
 1125 
 1500 
 1875 
 
 3000 
 3375 
 3750 
 7500 
 11250 
 15000 
 18750 
 22500 
 26250 
 30000 
 33750 
 37500 
 
 45 
 90 
 135 
 180 
 225 
 270 
 315 
 360 
 405 
 450 
 900 
 1350 
 1800 
 2250 
 2700 
 3150 
 3600 
 4050 
 4500 
 9000 
 13500 
 18000 
 22400 
 27000 
 31500 
 36000 
 40500 
 45000 
 
 2:::::::::: 
 3 
 4 
 
 5 
 6. . 
 
 7 
 
 8 
 
 9 
 10 
 20 
 30 
 
 40 
 50 
 
 60. . 
 
 70 
 
 80 
 90 
 
 100 
 
 200. . 
 
 300 
 
 400. . 
 
 600 
 
 600 
 
 700 
 
 800 
 
 900. . 
 
 1000 
 
 
 In brick work, corners are not measured twice as in stone work. 
 Openings over two feet square are deducted. Arches are counted from 
 spring. Fancy work counted one and one-half bricks for one. Pillars 
 are measured on their face only. 
 
 16 
 
242 
 
 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
FACTS WORTH KNOWING. 
 
 243 
 
 MADE TO ORDER SHADES. 
 
 List price of shades made to order of Victor cloth, mounted on 
 Hartshorn rollers, ready to hang. 
 
 PRICE PER SHADE, YEAR 1913. 
 
 Width in 
 Inches. 
 
 38 
 
 42 
 
 45 
 
 48 1 54 
 
 63 
 
 72 
 
 81 
 
 90 
 
 102 
 
 114 
 
 120 
 
 150 
 
 4 feet. .. 
 
 $. 88 
 
 $1.32 
 
 $1.38 
 
 $1.56 
 
 $1.82 
 
 $2.38 
 
 $3.18 
 
 $3.80 
 
 $4.32 
 
 $5.36 
 
 $8.82 
 
 $10.30 
 
 $17.40 
 
 5 " 
 
 1.00 
 
 1.50 
 
 1.56 
 
 1.78 
 
 2.08 
 
 2.70 
 
 3.56 
 
 4.26 
 
 4.86 
 
 6.08 
 
 9.76 
 
 11.62 
 
 10.60 
 
 6 " 
 
 1.10 
 
 1.66 
 
 1.74 
 
 2.00 
 
 2.34 
 
 3.02 
 
 3.96 
 
 4.72 
 
 5.40 
 
 6.78 
 
 10.70 
 
 12.90 
 
 21.78 
 
 7 " 
 
 1.24 
 
 1.84 
 
 1.94 
 
 2.22 
 
 2.60 
 
 3.34 
 
 4.36 
 
 5.20 
 
 5.94 
 
 7.52 
 
 11.64 
 
 14.22 
 
 23.98 
 
 8 " 
 
 1.34 
 
 2.00 
 
 2.12 
 
 2.44 
 
 2.82 
 
 3.68 
 
 4.76 
 
 5.66 
 
 6.48 
 
 8.24 
 
 12.58 
 
 15.54 
 
 26.16 
 
 9 " 
 
 1.46 
 
 2.30 
 
 2.44 
 
 2.78 
 
 3.30 
 
 .4.18 
 
 5.40 
 
 6.38 
 
 7.34 
 
 9.32 
 
 13.90 
 
 17.20 
 
 28.36 
 
 10 " 
 
 1.76 
 
 2.48 
 
 2.62 
 
 2.98 
 
 3.56 
 
 4^50 
 
 5.80 
 
 6.86 
 
 7.88 
 
 10.06 
 
 14.84 
 
 18.52 
 
 30.54 
 
 11 " 
 
 1,88 
 
 2.66 
 
 2.82 
 
 3.20 
 
 3.80 
 
 4.84 
 
 6.20 
 
 7.32 
 
 8.42 
 
 12.90 
 
 15.78 
 
 19.84 
 
 38.98 
 
 12 " 
 
 1.98 
 
 2.94 
 
 3.12 
 
 3.56 
 
 4.24 
 
 5.34 
 
 6.82 
 
 8.02 
 
 9.26 
 
 13.98 
 
 17.08 
 
 21.48 
 
 41.16 
 
 13 " 
 
 2.54 
 
 3.28 
 
 3.48 
 
 3.84 
 
 4.92 
 
 5.88 
 
 7.46 
 
 8.50 
 
 9.80 
 
 14.72 
 
 18.02 
 
 22.80 
 
 43.36 
 
 14 " 
 
 2.64 
 
 3.46 
 
 3.68 
 
 4.06 
 
 5.20 
 
 6.20 
 
 7.84 
 
 8.96 
 
 10.34 
 
 15.44 
 
 18.96 
 
 24.12 
 
 45.54 
 
 15 " 
 
 2.88 
 
 3.74 
 
 3.96 
 
 4.52 
 
 5.62 
 
 6.70 
 
 8.46 
 
 9.68 
 
 11.20 
 
 16.50 
 
 20.28 
 
 25.78 
 
 47.74 
 
 All shades under 38 inches, charged at 38-inch price. When shades 
 are longer than even feet, take next length price. 
 
 DUPLEX OR DOUBLE FACED OIL OPAQUE SHADE. 
 
 List price of Duplex shades made to order, mounted on Hartshorn 
 rollers, ready to hang. 
 
 PRICE PER SHADE. 
 
 Width in 
 Inches. 
 
 38 
 
 42 
 
 45 
 
 48 
 
 54 
 
 63 
 
 72 
 
 81 
 
 90 
 
 102 
 
 114 
 
 120 
 
 150 
 
 4 feet . 
 
 $1.18 
 
 $1.74 
 
 $1.84 
 
 $2.06 
 
 $2.40 
 
 $3.10 
 
 $4.12 
 
 $4.94 
 
 $5.62 
 
 $6.96 
 
 $11.58 
 
 $13.56 
 
 $23.06 
 
 5 " 
 
 1.36 
 
 1.98 
 
 2.06 
 
 2.34 
 
 2.74 
 
 3.50 
 
 4.60 
 
 5.52 
 
 6.32 
 
 7.88 
 
 12.78 
 
 15.26 
 
 25.96 
 
 6 " . 
 
 1.50 
 
 2.18 
 
 2.30 
 
 2.62 
 
 3.08 
 
 3.92 
 
 5.10 
 
 6.10 
 
 7.00 
 
 8.87 
 
 14.00 
 
 16.94 
 
 28.84 
 
 7 " 
 
 1.68 
 
 2.42 
 
 2.56 
 
 2.92 
 
 3.42 
 
 4.32 
 
 5.60 
 
 6.70 
 
 7.68 
 
 9.72 
 
 15.20 
 
 18.64 
 
 31.74 
 
 8 " . 
 
 1.80 
 
 2.64 
 
 2.80 
 
 3.20 
 
 3.74 
 
 4.76 
 
 6.12 
 
 7.28 
 
 8.38 
 
 10.62 
 
 16.42 
 
 20.36 
 
 34.62 
 
 9 ' . 
 
 1.98 
 
 3.02 
 
 3.22 
 
 3.64 
 
 4.34 
 
 5.42 
 
 6.94 
 
 8.20 
 
 9.48 
 
 12.02 
 
 18.14 
 
 22.54 
 
 37.52 
 
 10 ' .. 
 
 2.38 
 
 3.26 
 
 3.44 
 
 3.90 
 
 4.68 
 
 5,82 
 
 7.44 
 
 8.82 
 
 10.18 
 
 12.96 
 
 19.34 
 
 24.24 
 
 40.38 
 
 11 ' ... 
 
 2.56 
 
 3.50 
 
 3.70 1 
 
 4.20 
 
 5.00 
 
 6.26 
 
 7.94 
 
 9.40 
 
 10.86 
 
 16.70 
 
 20.54 
 
 25.96 
 
 51.60 
 
 12 ' ... 
 
 2.70 
 
 3.86 
 
 4.1Q 
 
 4.66 
 
 5.58 
 
 6.90 
 
 8.74 
 
 10.30 
 
 11.94 
 
 18.10 
 
 22.24 
 
 28.10 
 
 54.48 
 
 13 ' ... 
 
 3.44 
 
 4.32 
 
 4.5S 
 
 5.04 
 
 6.50 
 
 7.60 
 
 9.56 
 
 10.90 
 
 12.64 
 
 19.04 
 
 23.44 
 
 29.83 
 
 57.38 
 
 14 ' ... 
 
 3.58 
 
 4.54 
 
 4.84 
 
 5.32 
 
 6.84 
 
 8.02 
 
 10,04 
 
 11.48 
 
 13.32 
 
 19.96 
 
 24.66 
 
 31.54 
 
 60.26 
 
 Duplex combination, with colors, shown in this book, will be fur- 
 nished at above prices. 
 
 VICTOR HAND MADE OIL OPAQUE SHADE CLOTH. 
 
 Made from the finest grade of shade muslin and painted with best 
 oil paint. Will not crack or face. About 60 yards to piece. 
 
 PRICE PER YARD. 
 
 Width in 
 Inches. 
 
 38 
 
 42 
 
 45 
 
 48 
 
 54 
 
 63 
 
 72 
 
 81 
 
 90 
 
 102 
 
 114 
 
 120 
 
 150 
 
 fall piece per 
 yard . . 
 
 $0.44 
 .48 
 
 $0.60 
 .64 
 
 $0.64 
 .68 
 
 $0.72 
 .78 
 
 $0.84 
 .92 
 
 $1.20 
 1.30 
 
 $1.40 
 1.50 
 
 $1.60 
 1.76 
 
 $1.80 
 2.00 
 
 $2.20 
 2.50 
 
 $2.80 
 3.20 
 
 $3.80 
 4.50 
 
 $6.00 
 6.00 
 
 Less per yard.. 
 
244 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 BUILDING HINTS. 
 
 One thousand shingles laid four inches to the weather will cover 
 100 square feet of surface, and five pounds of shingle nails will fasten 
 them on. 
 
 One-fifth more siding and flooring is needed than the number of 
 square feet of surface to be covered, because of the lap in the siding 
 and matching-. 
 
 One thousand lath will cover 70 yards of surface, and 11 pounds 
 of lath nails will fasten them on. Eight bushels of good lime, 16 
 bushels of sand and 1 bushel of hair will make enough good mortar to 
 plaster 100 square yards. 
 
 A cord of stone, three bushels of lime, and a cubic yard of sand 
 will lay 100 cubic feet of wall. 
 
 Five courses of brick will lay 1 foot in height on a chimney; 16 
 bricks in a course will make a flue 8 inches wide and 16 inches long. 
 
 Cement 1 bushel and sand 2 bushels will cover 3% square yards 
 1 inch thick, 4% square yards % inch thick, and 6% square yards % 
 Inch thick. One bushel of cement and one of sand will cover 2^4 
 square yards 1 Inch thick. 
 
 Stone walls are measured by the perch (24% cubic feet). Openings 
 less than 3 feet wide are counted solid; over 3 feet, deducted; but 18 
 inches are added to the running measure for e'ach jamb built. Arches 
 are counted solid from the spring; corners of buildings are measured 
 twice; pillars less than 3 feet are counted on three sides as lineal, mul- 
 tiplied by fourth side and depth. 
 
 It is customary to measure all foundations and dimensions of stone 
 by the cubic foot; water table and base courses by lineal feet; all sills 
 and lintels or ashler by superficial feet, and no wall less than 18 inches 
 thick. 
 
 PRICES QUOTED THE WM. WINDHORST DRY GOODS 
 CO. BY RELIANCE TEXTILE AND DYE WORKS 
 CO., BOTH OF CINCINNATI, OHIO, FOR CON- 
 DITIONING SALVAGE, DEC. 4TH, 1907. 
 
 Linens 2c Linings 2c 
 
 Toweings %c Dress goods 3c 
 
 Buntings %c Outing flannel 
 
 Crash %c Blankets, cotton 15c 
 
 Danish cloth l*4c Blankets, wool 26c 
 
 Poplar cloth l%c Quilts 12%c 
 
 Woolen serge 3c Comforts 12%c 
 
 Canton flannel l%c Cashmeres l%c 
 
 Cotton domestic l%c Mor. sateens 2%o 
 
 Wool flannel 2%c Sheetings %c 
 
 Bleached sheeting l%c Ticking Ic 
 
 Unbleached sheeting %c Ginghams Ic 
 
 Prints %c 
 
 Doubling Ic per yard extra. 
 
 This stock was conditioned as per the above bid. The author never 
 saw a damaged fire stock put into better condition. Captain Comway 
 and his salvage corps put part of the stock in condition and did grand 
 work. 
 
 When iron or machinery has been damaged, dip in the following 
 solution, or apply solution with a brush. 
 
 1 part muriatic acid 
 20 parts kerosene oil 
 40 parts paraffine oil. 
 
 Then when you want to clean them off (this solution will protect 
 from further rust), redip them in paraffine oil and rub off with waste. 
 
 A good wash, but expensive, is water with oxalic acid. This is 
 good for knives and saw blades. Let lay in solution about ten minutes, 
 then take out and dip in paraffine oil and rub off. 
 
 Black goods, such as hangers, etc. Iron filler thinned with tur- 
 pentine. This gives a bluish tint. If you want a Jet black color, mix 
 in some lampblack ground in oil. , 
 
 To clean brass goods, dip in oil of vitriol. 
 
FACTS WORTH KNOWING. 245 
 
 RECEIPT FOR LAUNDERING CLOTHES SMOKED BY 
 
 FIRE. 
 
 This receipt by a colored woman, a former slave, owned by the 
 
 "Fust Ah puts the smoked and soiled clothes into a tub of cold 
 watah, into which Ah has already put a handful of common bakin' 
 soda. Then Ah lets 'em soak all night. Next momin' Ah puts on a 
 boiler of watah, into which Ah poah's a cup of kerosene oil, two- 
 thirds of a bar of soap and a handful of washing powder. Ah lets 
 them clothes boil in that watah a while, then Ah takes 'em out and 
 washes 'em. They come out clean, too." 
 
 WHAT CHICAGO BUILDING COST. 
 
 COMPILED BY HARRY FOX, 
 
 Cook Co. Manager, Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co. 
 Up-to-date table for estimating the approximate value of buildings 
 at present 1915 prices for labor and materials. 
 
 Good judgment must be exercised in estimating values by taking 
 Into consideration the manner of construction and the quality of ma- 
 terials put into the building. 
 
 Cost of buildings new at price in cents per cu. ft. in structure. To 
 obtain cu. ft. multiply length of building by the width and then by 
 the average height, measuring from the bottom of basement to square 
 of roof. 
 
 DWELLINGS. 
 
 FRAME. Shingle roof, pine floors and trim, two coats of paint in- 
 side and outside, no bath room or furnace, plain finish 8c to lOc 
 
 BRICK. Same class lOc to 12c 
 
 FRAME. rShingle roof, hardwood floor in hall and parlor, bath, 
 furnace, fair plumbing 9c to lie 
 
 BRICK. Same class, composition roof lie to 13c 
 
 FRAME. Shingle roof, hardwood floor and trim on first floor, pine 
 floor and Georgia pine trim on second floor, good plumbing, furnace, 
 artistic design, some interior ornamentation, well painted.. I3c to 16c 
 
 HANDSOME BRICK. Pressed brick and stone trim front, artistic 
 design, hardwood floors and trim throughout, good plumbing, furnace, 
 tasty interior ornamentation, very desirable residence 14c to 17o 
 
 FIRST-CLASS BRICK. The kind you find on the boulevards, 
 pressed brick and stone trimmed front, hot water or steam heat, elab- 
 orate design and interior ornamentation, hardwood floors and trim 
 throughout, best of plumbing 17c to 22c 
 
 PALATIAL STONE FRONT. Quarter-sawed oak or mahogany 
 trim, hardwood floors, steam heat, extra plumbing, very artistic de- 
 sign, every modern convenience 25c to 35c 
 
 BARNS. 
 
 PRIVATE BARNS FRAME Shingle roof, painted, good founda- 
 tions, stall and bins complete 6c to lOc 
 
 PRIVATE BARNS BRICK. Composition roof, stalls and bins 
 complete lOc to 12c 
 
 FLATS. 
 
 (Complying with City Ordinance.) 
 
 FRAME. Shingle or composition roof, hardwood floors and trim, 
 good plumbing, furnace, artistic design, well painted lOc to 12c 
 
 BRICK. Pressed brick front, composition roof, good plumbing, 
 furnace, bath, Georgia pine or oak trim, hardwood floors.... 12c to 15c 
 
 FIRST-CLASS BRICK. Pressed brick and stone front, hot water 
 or steam heat, elaborate design, interior ornamentation, hardwood 
 throughout, best of plumbing 15c to 18c 
 
 PALATIAL STONE FRONT Quarter- sawed oak or mahogany 
 trim and hardwood floors, steam heat, extra plumbing, artistic de- 
 sign, every modern convenience, marble entrance 20c to 30c 
 
246 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 CHURCHES AND SCHOOLS. 
 
 FRAME lOc to 12c 
 
 BRICK 12c to 14c 
 
 STONE 15c to 25c 
 
 If slate or metal roof, add *4c per foot to above. 
 
 STORES AND FLATS. 
 
 (Stores 1st floor and flats above, 2 to 3 stories in height.) 
 FRAME. Composition roof, pine floors and trim, bath, furnace, 
 
 fair plumbing lOc to 12c 
 
 BRICK. Pressed brick, stone trimmings, hardwood floors and 
 
 trim, good plumbing, hot water or steam heat 12c to 15c 
 
 STORE BUILDINGS. 
 
 (Stores and Lofts, 2 to 3 stories in height.) 
 FRAME. Ordinary construction, gravel or metal roof, hydraulic 
 
 elevator 6c to 8c 
 
 BRICK. Same construction 7c to lOc 
 
 REINFORCED CONCRETE 12c to 15c 
 
 REINFORCED CONRETE. Above 3 story, heavy carrying ca- 
 pacity 17c to 20c 
 
 BUILDINGS OF LARGE AREA. 
 
 (Mill Construction) 
 
 BRICK AND STONE. For factories and warehouses 7c to 9c 
 
 Smaller area lOc to 12c 
 
 FIREPROOF OFFICE BUILDINGS. 
 
 BRICK AND STONE. Steel construction, every modern conven- 
 ience, measuring from floor to basement to top of roof, omitting 
 courts 35c to 66c 
 
 FIREPROOF STORES, FACTORIES AND WAREHOUSES. 
 
 BRICK, STONE AND STEEL CONSTRUCTION Modern Equip- 
 ment 18c to 22c 
 
 FIREPROOF APARTMENT BUILDINGS. 
 
 BRICK, STEEL AND CONCRETE CONSTRUCTION. Modern 
 conveniences 20c to 26c 
 
 ESTIMATES OF DEPRECIATION. 
 
 The figures given above are for new buildings. To ascertain the 
 present value, a discount between old and new buildings should be 
 made as follows: 
 
 BRICK, occupied by owner, % to 1 per cent, per year. 
 
 FRAME, occupied by owner, 1 to 2 per cent, per year. 
 
 BRICK, occupied by tenant, 1% to 1% per cent, per year. 
 
 FRAME, occupied by tenant, 1% to 2% per cent, per year. 
 
 These figures for depreciation are to include buildings where ordi- 
 nary repairs have been made. If extraordinary repairs have been 
 made the discount should not be so heavy. Exercise good Judgment 
 as to depreciation, as no accurate rule can be established, and when 
 you have determined what the present worth of the building is, insure 
 it for about 80 per cent, of same in the old reliable. 
 
 COST OF LABOR AND MATERIAL 
 For Estimating Repairs to Buildings. 
 
 NOTE. The following prices for lumber and material are the 
 retail prices, labor being figured at Contractor's prices for repair work. 
 A space 30x10 feet constitutes one square. 
 
FACTS WORTH KNOWING. 247 
 
 WALL PAPER. 
 
 Cost of hanging, 16c to 30c per single roll for ordinary work, ac- 
 cording to quality of paper. 
 
 Three and one -half rolls will cover one square. 
 
 PLASTERING. 
 
 Two coats of plastering repair work cost 60c per sq. yd. 
 
 Three-coat work costs 60c per sq. yd. 
 
 For cement plaster add lOc per sq. yd. extra. 
 
 Small jobs add for cartage. 
 
 Plaster labor costs 75c per hour, plus contractor's profit. 
 
 Plasters' helper costs 45c per hour. 
 
 Lathers' labor $6.00 per day of 8 hours. 
 
 NOTE. To ascertain the number of yards of plaster, multiply 
 the length of ceiling by the width. Do the same with each side wall 
 and add all together, divide by nine and the result will be the number 
 of yards. Make no deductions for openings unless very large. 
 
 PLUMBING. 
 
 30 gal. iron boiler, connected $20.00 each 
 
 Enameled sinks, 18x24 in., connected 15.00 each 
 
 6 foot enameled bathtub, connected 35.00 each 
 
 Porcelain washout closet with tank, connected 30.00 each 
 
 Hopper closet, connected 20.00 each 
 
 Laundry tubs, 2 divisions, cement, connected 35.00 each 
 
 Wash bowls, plain marble slabs, connected 25.00 each 
 
 Brass faucets, put on 2.00 each 
 
 Plated faucets, put on 2.25 each 
 
 6 in iron soil pipe, put in, $1.00 per running foot. 
 
 4 in iron soil pipe, put in, 60c per running foot. 
 
 Plumbing labor costs $6.40 per day of eight hours, plus contractor's 
 profit. 
 
 SEWERS. 
 
 6 in. sewer, ordinary digging, laid with proper drain, well cemented, 
 60c per lineal foot. 
 Traps, $1.50 each. 
 Elbows, $1.25 each. 
 Catch basins, 5x6, stone cover, $15.00. 
 
 ELECTRIC WIRING. 
 
 To estimate the cost of electric wiring in ordinary buildings as- 
 certain the number of lights and multiply same by $3.00; conduit, $5.00. 
 
 GAS PIPING. 
 
 To estimate cost of gas piping in ordinary buildings, ascertain 
 the number of lights and multiply by $2.50. 
 
 Gas pipe put in, connected, 20c per running foot. 
 Gas fitters' labor costs $6.50 per day of eight hours. 
 
 ROOFING. 
 
 Gravel roof, 3-ply, $3.50 per square. 
 Gravel roof, 4-ply, $4.00 per square. 
 Gravel roof, 5-ply, $4.25 per square. 
 
 Slate roof, ordinary black slate, $10.00 to $12.00 per square. 
 Slate roof, fancy green and red, $15.00 to $30.00 per square. 
 Best galvanized iron roofing, standing seams, $9.00 to $12.00 per 
 square, painted. 
 
 Best tin roofing, standing seams, $8.00 to $11.00 per square, painted. 
 Tile roofing, $12.00 to $15.00 per square, according to design. 
 
 METAL CEILINGS. 
 
 Fancy metal ceilings with cornice cost $8.00 to $12.00 per square. 
 Corrugated iron ceiling, $6 00 to $7.00 per square. 
 
248 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 CARPENTRY. 
 
 Carpenter labor costs 70c per hour, plus contractor's profit. 
 Eight hours constitute one day. 
 
 13/16x6% in. common yellow pine flooring costs $25.00 per M., 
 13/16x3% $23.00 per M. 
 
 1x4 or 1x6 in. white Norway C. pine flooring costs $40.00 per M. 
 
 Labor for laying 6 in. pine flooring, $2.00 per square; 4 in., $2.60 
 per square. 
 
 13/16x2% in. face clear maple flooring C9sts $47.00 per M. 
 
 Labor for laying 2% in. face maple flooring, smooth for oil finish, 
 $3.50 to $4.50 per square. 
 
 13/16x2% in. plain white oak flooring costs $60.00 per M. 
 
 13/16x2% in. faced quarter-sawed white oak flooring costs $94.00 
 per M. 
 
 Labor for laying and scraping oak floor, 2% in. face, for wax or 
 varnish, $7.00 to $8.00 per square. 
 
 Smoothing and scraping oak floors alone costs $2.50 to $3.60 per 
 square. 
 
 Base, pine, 2 member moulded, put down, 8c per running foot; 3 
 member, 12c. 
 
 4 and 6 in. clear Northern pine beveled siding costs $32.00 per M. 
 
 4 and 6 in. clear Washington redwood beveled siding costs $33.00 
 per M. 
 
 4 and 6 in. clear Washington spruce beveled siding costs $26.00 
 per M. 
 
 Labor for putting on siding, $2.75 per square for 4 to 6 in. siding; 
 for narrow mitred siding, $3.75 per square. 
 
 Labor for putting on shingles, $2.60 to $3.00 per thousand shingles. 
 
 Best grades of clear red cedar shingles cost $4.00 per thousand. 
 
 Common No. 2 pine doors, complete with frames, placed in posi- 
 tion, with hardware, not painted, cost $8.00 to $12.00 each. 
 
 Fancy oak front doors complete, placed in position, with hardware, 
 cost $15.000 to $25.00 each, according to style. 
 
 Oak veneered doors, 1% in. pine core, 20c to 35c per square foot 
 for door only. Labor and hardware extra. 
 
 Oak veneered doors, as above, complete with frame, placed in 
 position, with hardware, $14.00 to $18.00 each. 
 
 Mantles Hardwood, artistic design, complete with mirror and 
 grate, set $45.00 to $65.00 each. 
 
 Grilles Fancy oak, $1.25 to $1.76 per lineal foot set. 
 
 Windows With sash, frame, casing, cords, weights complete, put 
 in, $9.00 to $12.00 each. If hardwood frame and trim, with sash, 
 $12.00 to $14.00. 
 
 Stairs Common oak, for dwellings, without rail, $2.50 per riser, 
 labor included. 
 
 Stair Rail Oak, moulded design, 30c to 36c per running foot, labor 
 Included. 
 
 Stair Rail Pine moulded design, 16c to 25c per running foot, labor 
 included. 
 
 Balusters Pine, fancy turned 12c to 16c each; oak 15c to 30c each, 
 labor included. 
 
 Newels 5 in. quarter-sawed oak, moulded cap $6.00 to $9.00; 
 plain oak $5.00 to $7.00; pine $4.00 to $6.00 each, labor included. 
 
 Porches Front, frame, ordinary construction, 6 to 7 feet wide, 
 shingle roof, ceiled, square or turned columns, frieze and cornice, 
 balusters at floor, complete, $8.00 to $10.00 per front foot measure, 
 12x12 in. stone pillars under porches, $1.00 per lineal foot. 
 
 PAINTING AND GLAZING. 
 
 Painting, two-coat work, costs 20c per sq. yd. 
 
 Painting, three- coat work, costs 25c per sq. yd. 
 
 Painters' labor cost 70c per hour, plus contractor's profit. 
 
 Calcimining costs $3.00 to $5.00 per room for small rooms and 80c 
 per square for large rooms. 
 
 NOTE. To ascertain the number of yards painted surface, mul- 
 tiply the length by the width, in feet, and divide by nine, and the re- 
 sult will be the number of yards. 
 
 Lattice work and stair balusters are counted double. 
 
 For* reglazing old work, add 20 to 50 per cent, to cost of glass, 
 according to quantity set. 
 
FACTS WORTH KNOWING. 249 
 
 STONE WORK. 
 
 Common rubble stone, 100 cu. ft. to the cord, costs, laid in wall, 
 $20.00 to $25.00 per cord, according to location and necessary hauling. 
 
 Rock face, 4 in. Bedford stone for facing, furnished and set in 
 wall, costs $1.75 to $2.25 per square foot face measurement. 
 
 Mason labor costs $6.00 per day, plus contractor's profit. 
 
 Mason helper costs 40c per hour, plus contractor's profit. 
 
 BRICK WORK. 
 
 Common brick, furnished and laid in 12 in. wall, costs $14.00 per 
 M. wall count. 
 
 Pressed brick, for facing, laid in wall, colored mortar, rodded 
 Joints, add to cost of brick $10.00 to $20.00 per thousand for laying, 
 according to character and design of front. 
 
 CEMENT BLOCK WALLS. 
 
 12 in. block walls cost about the same as 12 in. common brick wall, 
 laid, less 25 per cent, of the cost of brick for similar wall. 
 
 Concrete basement walls cost 28c per cubic foot, wall measurement. 
 Cement sidewalk costs 12c to 15c per square foot. 
 Cement basement floors cost lOc per square foot. 
 
 CHIMNEYS. 
 
 Ordinary single flue chimneys cost $1.00 per lineal foot. For 
 double flue $1.75 per lineal foot. 
 
 INTERIOR MARBLE WORK. 
 
 (For Wainscoting and Floors in Apartment Houses and Office 
 
 Buildings.) 
 
 Wainscoting, Italian, white, $1.00 per sq. ft. set. 
 Wainscoting, English Vein Italian, white, $1.05 per sq. ft. set. 
 Wainscoting, Tennessee Marble, 80c per sq. ft. set. 
 Wainscoting, Vermont white marble, 95c per sq. ft. set. 
 Wainscoting, Vermont green marble, $1.60 per sq. ft. set. 
 Floors Marble tile, 80c per sq. ft. laid; mosaic, 75c per sq. ft. laid. 
 
 TO ESTIMATE COST OF RADIATION PER CUBIC FOOT. 
 
 (Direct Radiation.) 
 
 Steam Heat Allow 1 foot radiation for each 50 cu. ft. of space. 
 Figure radiation at 72c per radiation foot. 
 
 Hot Water Heat Allow 1 foot radiation for each 30 cu. ft. of 
 space. Figure radiation at 75c per radiation foot. 
 
 The above is for average rooms. If rooms have extraordinary 
 large window exposure, increase radiation. If smaller window space 
 than average, decrease radiation. 
 
 Be careful in the distribution of radiation, as the success of a 
 heating plant depends largely upon arrangement and location of 
 radiators. 
 
 FROM REPORT OF NATIONAL BOARD OF FIRE 
 UNDERWRITERS. 
 
 Some Important Losses on Fire Proof Buildings. 
 
 Damage 
 Value PerCt. 
 Pittsburg, Pa. Holmes estate, owners six 
 
 story department store building, exposure 
 
 fire, May 3, 1897 $386,980 57 
 
250 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Pittsburg, Pa. Holmes Estate, owners 4-story 
 building, mercantile purposes, 1st and 2d, 
 offices above. Exposure fire May 3, 
 1897 120,322 49 
 
 New York City Home L,ife Ins. Co., owners 15 
 story building, mercantile purposes, 1st, 
 offices above. Exposure fire, Dec. 4, 1898. 900,000 22 
 
 Pittsburg, Pa. Holmes Estate, owners, 6-story 
 Department Store building. Internal fire, 
 April 7, 1900 475,000 32 
 
 New York City American Fine Arts Society, 
 4-story Art School building. Internal fire, 
 May 8, 1901 185,000 11 
 
 Chicago, 111. Iroquois Theatre. Internal fire, 
 Dec. 30, 1903. 
 
 Building 311,114 18 
 
 Scenery 100 
 
 Other contents 70 
 
 Patterson, N. J. City Hall, 4-story detached 
 office occupancy. Conflagration Feb. 9, 
 1902 310,183 58 
 
 New York City Broadway Improvement Co., 
 owners, 8-story mercantile building. In- 
 ternal fire, Feb. 26, 1903 300,000 23 
 
 Rochester, N. Y. Granite Building Co., owners, 
 12-story department store, 1st and 2d, of- 
 fices above. Exposure fire, Feb. 29, 1904.. 600,000 41 
 
 Rochester, N. Y Granite Building Co., owners, 
 7-story stable and storage, unprotected iron. 
 Exposure fire, Feb. 29, 1904. 
 
 Rochester, N. Y. Granite Building Co., owners, 
 7-story wholesale dry goods and depart- 
 ment store, unprotected iron. Exposure 
 fire, Feb. 20, 1904 247,360 92 
 
 Baltimore Conflagration, February 7, 1904 
 
 Calvert Building Co., owners, 12-story of- 
 fice building 634,075 57 
 
 National Bank of Commerce, owners, 1- 
 
 story bank building 92,000 50 
 
 Union Trust Co., owners, 11-story bank and 
 
 office building 348,795 61 
 
 International Trust Co., owners, 1-story 
 
 bank building ._.'. 120,364 70 
 
FACTS WORTH KNOWING. 251 
 
 Herald, owners, 6-story newspaper and 
 
 printing office building 217,131 59 
 
 Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co., 
 owners, 7-story office and telephone build- 
 ing 115,000 39 
 
 National Mechanics Bank, owners, 4-story 
 
 and attic office building 156,854 95 
 
 National Union Bank, owners, 1-story bank 
 
 building 119,744 54 
 
 Merchants National Bank, owners, 7-story 
 
 bank and office building 405,000 54 
 
 Continental Trust Co., owners, 16-story of- 
 
 fice building ' 1,028,461 65 
 
 Calvert Building Co., owners, "Equitable 
 
 Building," 10-story office building 1,037,965 74 
 
 Baltimore Trust Co., owners, Maryland 
 Trust Co., building 10-story bank and of- 
 fices 404,000 60 
 
 Firemen's Ins. Co., owners, 6-story office 
 
 building 106,000 52 
 
 The insurance loss ratio to values insured on all classes of 
 property in the Baltimore conflagration was 90 per cent. that 
 is, the total value of all classes of property involved in the con- 
 flagration was $37,382,426.49, covered by $32,245,273.39 insur- 
 ance, on which the losses paid amounted to $29,074,358.51. 
 
 Excluding seven of the largest and best fire-proof build- 
 ings involved, the loss ratio to insurance involved, was 90.4 
 per cent. 
 
 The insurance loss on these seven buildings was 88.4 per 
 cent. The loss ratio to insurance involved on these seven fire- 
 proof buildings and sixteen other so-called fire-proof buildings, 
 was 76.3 per cent. Loss ratio to insurance involved, excluding 
 these seven fire-proof buildings, and the sixteen so-called fire- 
 proof buildings, was 92 per cent. Loss ratio to value of the 
 twenty-three fire-proof and so-called fire-proof buildings re- 
 ferred to, was 56.4 per cent. 
 
252 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 WHAT SOME FIREPROOF BUILDINGS COST 
 PER CUBIC FOOT. 
 
 Cost per 
 
 Date Cubic 
 City Building 
 
 City Built Foot 
 
 Memphis Memphis Trust Bldg. 1905 $0.349 
 
 Cincinnati Traction Bldg-. 1903 .3906 
 
 Cincinnati First National Bank 1904 .31779 
 
 Boston Chamber of Commerce 1892 .32 
 
 Boston Exchange Bldg. 1891 .32 
 
 Chicago Borden Block 1891 .15 
 
 Chicago Stock Exchange 1893 .33 
 
 Chicago Rookery 1893 .32 
 
 Chicago Masonic Temple .58 
 
 New York Herald Bldg. 1893 .46 
 
 Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce .26 
 
 San Francisco Croker Bldg. .63 
 
 Chicago Auditorium .36 
 
 The following shows the itemized construction cost of a 
 fireproof office building in the insurance district of New York 
 City, built in the panic year 1893, when both labor and material 
 were to be had at low cost at least forty per cent, lower than 
 at this time, December, 1904. The cost per cubic foot (from the 
 bottom of the concrete foundation to the. top of the roof) was 
 40 cents. 
 
 . 
 
 Mason's work $ 80,000.00 
 
 Granite : 4,588.00 
 
 Terra Cotta 8,185.00 
 
 Steam heating t 23,278.00 
 
 Carpenter work 40,041.00 
 
 Iron work 89,340.00 
 
 Exterior marble 43,325.00 
 
 Interior marble 39,112.00 
 
 Plumbing 16,535.00 
 
 Elevators 21,000.00 
 
 Electric lighting, etc % 22,311.50 
 
 Plastering ! 9,596.00 
 
 $397,311.50 
 
FACTS WORTH KNOWING. 
 
 253 
 
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 M EnccS^feof 
 
254 
 
 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
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TOPICAL INDEX 
 
 Assessed Value 27 
 
 Appraisal Arbitration Award : 
 
 Before appraisal clause in policy can be brought into operation, 
 an effort must be made to adjust loss, as only differences 
 
 can be appraised 93, 97 
 
 Effect of valued policy law 11, 17, 93, 113 
 
 Condition precedent to suit in Maine and Massachusetts 94 
 
 Annotated case 94 
 
 Neither party has the right to insist the other shall first 
 
 demand it 95 
 
 Effect of common law A 95, 96 
 
 Effect of proceeding before appointment of umpire 96 
 
 Agreement of appraisers evidence of impartiality. '. 97 
 
 In case of disagreement assured must demand appraisal. .97, 98 
 
 Condition precedent to suit 98 
 
 Not a condition precedent to suit 98 
 
 Must be a disagreement to bring clause into operation 99 
 
 Pennsylvania docs not uphold A clause 99 
 
 Nebraska does not uphold A clause 99 
 
 Waiver of appraisal 98, 99, 101, 102, 103, 118, 130, 131 
 
 Joint demand by several companies is not good 99 
 
 Effect of assured's sale of goods before appraisal 100 
 
 Effect of insisting on appraisal different in terms from policy 
 
 provision 100 
 
 Effect of assured's refusal of company's demand 100 
 
 Verbal demando are merged in subsequent written demand.. . 100 
 
 What is not a demand 100, 111 
 
 Assured may serve demand on company's local agent 101 
 
 Effect of company's failure to answer assured's statement that 
 he would dispose of goods if appraisal not granted in 
 
 flve days 101 
 
 Once refusing to appraise company not thereafter compel 
 
 an appraisal 101 
 
 Two fires to same property constitutes a single claim 101 
 
 Effect of asured's death 102 
 
 What is not joint or common law appraisal 102 
 
 Appraisal is waiver of option to rebuild 66, 102 
 
 Unless the agreement contains a non- waiver clause 102 
 
 Effect of appraisal with other companies 102, 131 
 
 Effect of company denying part of the property was covered 
 
 by its policy 10S 
 
 When demand for A too late 103 
 
 Assured may refuse A and afterwards grant it 103 
 
 Parties may agree to A different from that provided in Michi- 
 gan standard policy 104 
 
 Effect of statute making the amount of the policy prima facie 
 
 evidence of insurable value at date policy was issued. . . . 104 
 
 Assured must produce books for appraisers inspection 104 
 
 Effect of failure of appraisal due to assured's bad faith 104 
 
 Value of saloon furniture and fixtures in dry town 104 
 
 Assured's right to introduce evidence before the appraisers 
 
 105, 106, 107, 108, 109 
 
 Conduct of appraisers 107, 108, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 
 
 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127 
 
 Agreement to arbitrate all differences is void 110 
 
 Meaning of appraisal as used in the policy 110 
 
 Total loss goods 110, 111, 112 
 
 Damaged goods 110, 111, 112 
 
 Professional unfair appraiser 113, 114, 
 
 115, 116, 117, 118,. 119, 120, 124, 125, 126, 127, 132 
 Burden of proving unfairness 116 
 
 255 
 
256 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS 
 
 Appraisers not obliged to follow strict rules of law 121 
 
 Appraisal in detail 122 
 
 If A fails through no fault of assured, company cannot force 
 
 another 127, 128 
 
 Held to the contrary t 128 
 
 Massachusetts on same question 128 
 
 Appraisal waives a prior breach of policy 129 
 
 Appraisal waives proofs of loss 129, 130, 132 
 
 Non-waiver clauce 129 
 
 When company may deny liability and still insist on ap- 
 praisal 129 
 
 When A waives nothing 130, 132 
 
 Company's refusal to appraise waives nothing except the 
 
 right to thereafter have an appraisal 131 
 
 What is not a waiver of prior breach of policy 131 
 
 Award of appraisers nullifies the clause limiting time in which 
 
 suit may be brought 132 
 
 Waiver of assured's sale of goods 132 
 
 When demand for A too late 133 
 
 When demand for A not too late 133 
 
 Public adjuster may be competent and disinterested A 133 
 
 Mortgagee to whom policy is payable in case of loss, his 
 
 rights 133, 134, 135 
 
 Any one accident 165 
 
 Allowed 166 
 
 Adjacent 166 
 
 Additional insurance 167 
 
 Any mercantile purposes 170 
 
 Account of whom it may concern 172, 185 
 
 Assured Insured 186 
 
 Appreciation 226 
 
 Apportionment; see Contribution. 
 
 Average clause 144, 145 
 
 Articles used in packing 173 
 
 Blown up by city authorities to prevent spread of fire 10 
 
 Boiler burned by fire in its furnace 17 
 
 Builder's risk 168 
 
 Brick building and additions 174 
 
 Building and all additions thereto adjoining and communicating. . 174 
 
 Building and additions 175, 177 
 
 Building 176 
 
 Building known as St. Anthony's elevator 178 
 
 Building when personal property 182 
 
 Boat 183 
 
 Books 181 
 
 Blowing up, drowning, etc 184 
 
 City ordinance as to building repairs 10, 17 
 
 Condemned building 10 
 
 City ordinances, causing increased cost of repairs 11, 12 
 
 Consequential loss 18 
 
 Cash value ; see Measure of damage 25 
 
 Certificate of magistrate or notary public : 
 
 When condition precedent 49 
 
 Not concerned in loss as creditor 50 
 
 What is necessary to compel its furnishing 50, 51 
 
 Cancellation of policy : 
 
 By failure of company 137 
 
 Contribution of Non-concurrent insurance : 
 
 Reading rule 139 
 
 Massachusetts rule 139 
 
 Vermont rule 139 
 
 Cromie or Kentucky rule 139 
 
 Connecticut rule 139 
 
 New Jersey rule 139 
 
 Oklahoma Page rule 140 
 
 Texas Page rule 140 
 
 U. S. C. C. A. Page rule 140 
 
 U. S. C. C. Meig's rule 140 
 
 Pennsylvania Meig's rule 141 
 
 Maryland rule 141 
 
 New York rule 142 
 
TOPICAL INDEX 257 
 
 New York rule j'f :\'' V..V }!!! 
 
 Coinsurance clause rule 143, 144, 145, 179 
 
 Average distribution clause 144, 145 
 
 Three-fourths clause 14& 
 
 Average, coinsurance, reduced rate clauses, suggested 
 
 forms 145, 146 
 
 Average clause advised against by National Credit Men's Asso- 
 
 ciation 146, 147 
 
 Author's answer J* 
 
 Wisconsin rule If* 
 
 Canadian rule Joj> 
 
 Floating policy 150 
 
 When specific policy is exhausted }pU 
 
 Reading rule If} 
 
 Finn rule 151 
 
 Exemplified 153 
 
 Albany rule 151 
 
 Exemplified Jj>* 
 
 Kinne rule 153 
 
 Exemplified 15* 
 
 Kentucky rule exemplified 154 
 
 Wisconsin rule exemplified 155 
 
 Reading rule exemplified 155 
 
 Hypothetical case showing what each of the various rules 
 
 would pay 156, 157 
 
 What the policy contract provides 158 
 
 Suggestions as to course to follow 158 
 
 Kinne rule, its author's explanation, and directions as to 
 
 apply, and exemplification of its application. .158, 159, 160, 161 
 
 Concurrent insurance 165, 179 
 
 Cotton baled, held for compression or compressed but not loaded 
 
 on cars, etc 170 
 
 Coton in bales for which bills of lading have been issued 171 
 
 Cars leased and for which assured is liable 171 
 
 Cars owned or used by assured 171 
 
 Contribution assured's Goods in trust 172 
 
 Contained in their factory 173 
 
 Church building 178 
 
 Cars on side track within 100 feet 179 
 
 Civil commotion 184 
 
 Cargo of negroes, insured against blowing up, drowning, etc 184 
 
 Clerk sleeps in store : 185 
 
 Co-partner's purchase of partner's interest 185 
 
 Crude petroleum Camphene 186 
 
 Coal oil, refined 187 
 
 Change within the control of assured 188 
 
 Contained in 188 
 
 Certain quantity of coal 189 
 
 Consisting of 189 
 
 Change of title . 190 
 
 Coinsurance clause 143, 144, 145, 179 
 
 Commission clause ; see Held in trust. 
 
 Chattel mortgage 179 
 
 Change of title. 190 
 
 Direct defined 7 
 
 Direct loss, what is 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 75, 76 
 
 Direct loss, what is not 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 
 
 Direct lo^ s, what is 10 
 
 Decorations to walls and ceilings 168 
 
 Dissolution of partnership 186 
 
 Deliver in 188 
 
 Dwelling 188 
 
 Dwelling house, stone 189 
 
 Depreciation 25, 199 
 
 Duplicate bills 54, 56, 57 
 
 Damaged goods ; see "Options." 
 
 Examination under oath (of assured and of his books and 
 
 papers) 46, 47, 53 
 
 Assured himself must appear and be examined under oath... 54 
 
 Company must name reasonable time and place 54 
 
 Assured must subscribe to such examination 54 
 
 17 
 
258 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS 
 
 Must furnish duplicate bills when? 54, 56, 57 
 
 What is a certified duplicate bill 55, 57 
 
 Assured need not disclose settlement with other company 55 
 
 Assured need not answer immaterial 55 
 
 Proper place for such examinations 55 
 
 Reasonable place 55, 56 
 
 Question for the jury 55 
 
 Improper demand by company 56, 57 
 
 Denial of liability waives right to examination 56 
 
 When impossible to produce books, effect of 56 
 
 Assured's right to have his attorney present 57 
 
 Waiver of right to demand certified bills 57 
 
 Effect of misstatement in examination 57, 59 
 
 Willful false swearing 57 
 
 Duplicate bills are no part of proofs of loss, the claim becomes 
 
 due 60 days after proofs are furnished 57 
 
 Explosion 79, 81, 82, 83 
 
 English, American and West India goods 169 
 
 Eggs in pickle 175 
 
 Earth oils 187 
 
 Expert accounting in its relation to the adjustment of losses : 
 
 Showing incorrect statement of loss 191, 194 
 
 Showing correct method 192 
 
 Profit statement, how to make 193, 195, 200 
 
 Statement of loss, how to make 194, 195, 200 
 
 Statement of loss by quantities 195 
 
 Discussion of book statements 196, 197 
 
 Discussion of depreciation 198, 199, 201 
 
 Value of Mercantile Agency Reports . 202 
 
 Sample page of (Mdse. a/c on) ledger 202, 203 
 
 Different method of figuring loss and arriving at same re- 
 sult 203, 204 
 
 How to figure manufacturing loss 205, 206 
 
 Some pointers worth knowing 206, 207 
 
 Accurate method of apportionment 207, 208 
 
 Pointers on adjusting losses ignoring books or where no books 
 
 are kept 208, 209, 210, 211 
 
 Cubic foot estimate on buildings 211, 212 
 
 Points raised on a loss in process of adjustment 
 
 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217 
 
 Statements and proofs of a loss of a large department store 
 
 in Texas 219, 220, 221, 222, 223 
 
 Excess insurance 150 
 
 Exhausted insurance 150 
 
 Fire caused by windstorm or lightning 8 
 
 Fire Heating of wet wool 8, 9, 16 
 
 Fallen building 13, 16, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83 
 
 Friendly fire 14 
 
 Fire caused by negligence of third party 19 
 
 Fire, expense of subduing it 19 
 
 Fire set by assured's wife 20, 22 
 
 Fire caused by insured's insane wife 22 
 
 Fire caused by negligence of assured's agents 20, 22 
 
 Fire caused by negligence of assured's son 20 
 
 Fire caused by negligence of railroad 19, 20 
 
 Fire caused by recklessness of assured 21 
 
 Fire engine going to fire colliding with assured's building 21 
 
 Falling walls * ! 9 
 
 Fraud and false swearing : 
 
 To avoid policy must be willful 59 
 
 Failure to correct before suit 59 
 
 Relates only to proofs of loss or examination under oath 59 
 
 Must be pleaded by defendant 60 
 
 Proof as to F. F 60 
 
 Inference as to 60 
 
 It is for the jury 60 
 
 What is 60, 61 
 
 Wisconsin S. C. on fraud and false swearing 61, 62, 63 
 
 Fire-proof safe 164 
 
 Frame barn and contents therein 168 
 
 Factory including machinery and fixtures 174 
 
 Frame dwelling house 174 
 
TOPICAL INDEX 259 
 
 Farming utensils 177 
 
 Fixtures 167, 168, 178, 190 
 
 Furniture . 181 
 
 Fire by lightning 185 
 
 Foreclosure 186 
 
 Factory 189 
 
 Fireworks 189 
 
 Floater policy 150 
 
 General average (Marine) loss, what is not 21 
 
 Grain 176, 181 
 
 Grain and seed 176 
 
 Gunpowder 187 
 
 Hop house while drying hops 15 
 
 Held in trust 166, 167, 171, 172, 173, 179, 184, 185, 186 
 
 Harvester while in use 167 
 
 Harvester operating in grain fields and in transit in connection 
 
 with harvesting 167 
 
 Household furniture purchased after policy was issued 167 
 
 Household furniture 170 
 
 Held in store 173 
 
 Household furniture and $ on wearing apparel 173 
 
 Household furniture useful and ornamental 178 
 
 Homestead, insurance proceeds exempt 180 
 
 Ice clause Marine Insurance 12 
 
 Inland navigation and transportation 165 
 
 Implements of trade 167 
 
 Implements including binders and such goods kept for sale in an 
 
 implement store 177 
 
 Insurance proceeds, when exempt 180 
 
 Inventory Invoice 180, 181 
 
 Insured Assured 186 
 
 Immediate notice 187 
 
 Iron-safe clause as applied to several stores with only one set 
 
 of books 224, 225, 226 
 
 Increased cost of repairs due to building laws 11, 12 
 
 Insolvent company in hands of receiver cancels policy 137 
 
 Jewelry and clothing being stock in trade 169, 186 
 
 Known as pottery building 168 
 
 Keeping or storing 187 
 
 Loss when total 9 
 
 Loss, liability for, caused by falling walls of burned building 9 
 
 Lightning as cause of fire 12 
 
 Lightning loss 15 
 
 Lumber, lath and pickets 169 
 
 Lines leased, owned or operated 170 
 
 Lumber piled in mill building, in mill sheds and in sheds adjoin- 
 ing mill sheds 177 
 
 Lease, renewal of 179 
 
 Lien for rent > " > 
 
 Loss payable clause 183 
 
 Life estate 183 
 
 Linen 184 
 
 Laws relating to fire insurance do not apply when 187 
 
 Leasehold Interest not absolute 187 
 
 Loss as adjusted 219 
 
 Loss caused by blowing up with explosives by order of city 
 
 authorities 10 
 
 Moisture, from water used to extinguish fire. 12 
 
 Measure of damage 25 
 
 Measure of damage, whiskey 26, 27 
 
 Measure of damage, building 26 
 
 Measure of damage, linotype machine 26 
 
 Measure of damage, assessor's value, tax return value 27 
 
 Measure of damage, manufacturer 30, 33 
 
 Measure of damage, household effects 32 
 
 Measure of damage, freight 33 
 
260 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS 
 
 Measure of damage, party walls 33 
 
 Measure of damage, discussion as to 33 
 
 Measure of damage, saloon fixtures in dry town 104 
 
 Mechanics 164 
 
 Machinery, implements and fixtures 168 
 
 Materials 168 
 
 Merchandise 169, 176, 180 
 
 Mill building and additions 173 
 
 Machinery for the manufacture of tinware 177 
 
 Manufactured, unmanufactured and in process 176, 177 
 
 Merchandise of every description 179 
 
 Machinery when realty 182 
 
 Mortgage clause construed 182 
 
 Merchandise and materials for making same 183 
 
 Mob 184 
 
 Manufacturer of brass clocks 185 
 
 Mechanic's lien 186 
 
 Machine and repair shop 188 
 
 Mortgagee 188 
 
 Mercantile purposes 
 
 Notice and proof of loss 37, 45 
 
 Separation of goods 41 
 
 Statement of loss > 41, 44 
 
 Inventory 42 
 
 Expense of inventory 42 
 
 Expense of putting in order 42, 43 
 
 Itemized inventory 43, 44 
 
 Time in which proofs must be furnished 44, 45 
 
 Waiver of defects : . . . 45 
 
 Proofs are not evidence of amount of loss 46 
 
 Denial of liability waives proofs 46 
 
 Who may make proofs 46, 53 
 
 Examination of assured under oath 46, 47 
 
 Objections to proofs must be made promptly 47 
 
 Magistrate's or notary's certificate 49, 50, 51 
 
 Non-concurrent insurance ; see Contribution. 
 
 Not over $110 on each 166 
 
 Notice, immediate 187 
 
 Notary or magistrate's certificate 49, 50, 51 
 
 Option to repair or rebuild : 
 
 As affected by city ordinance 10, 11, 12, 65, 67, 68 
 
 As affected by condemnation of building before fire 10 
 
 As affected by valued policy law 11, 67, 68 
 
 Election to repair converts policy into building contract. . . .65, 67 
 And assured may recover full damages against one or all 
 
 of the companies, the contract being joint 65 
 
 When company liable for rent 65 
 
 Assured not compelledi to repair 65 
 
 Company cannot enjoin assured from repairing 65 
 
 Company must notify assured when 66 
 
 Company will be discharged from garnishment, when 66 
 
 Company liable for damages, when 66 
 
 When the right of option begins and terminates 66 
 
 Effect of waiver of proof doesn't waive option 66 
 
 Two modes of settlement, the election of one waives other. ... 66 
 
 The retort to arbitration waives right to repair 66 
 
 Unless arbitration agreement provided against such waiver. . . 67 
 
 Option to take over salvage : 
 
 Company cannot enjoin assured from removing goods 65 
 
 Assured's sale of goods and preventing company from exer- 
 cising option forfeits claim 68 
 
 After appraisal company must elect 68 
 
 Company's demand that goods be kept 30 days 69 
 
 When; company cannot exercise option 69 
 
 Cannot take with having goods appraised 69 
 
 Cannot deny appraisal and claim rights thereunder 69 
 
 Discussion of the rights of the parties 69, 73 
 
 Danger of taking over stock 73 
 
 Other insurance ; see also Contribution : 
 
 The term valid or not 137 
 
 Effect of failure of insurance company 137 
 
 What constitutes O. 1 137 
 
TOPICAL INDEX 261 
 
 Insurance to owners of separate interests 137 
 
 Mortgagee and owner 137 
 
 On commission 166, 1 
 
 Oil in tank cars in transit, etc 170 
 
 Occupied as a dwelling . 170 
 
 Own, held in trust, on commission or sold but not delivered ; see 
 Held in trust. 
 
 Open for business 179 
 
 One barrel, exceeding 187 
 
 Owner 188 
 
 Protection and care of property at flre is assured's duty 21,75, 77 
 
 Profits from bridge tolls 22 
 
 Party walls 33, 164 
 
 Proofs of loss ; see "Notice and proofs of loss" also 37, 51, 188 
 
 Prohibited articles ...82, 83, 163, 164, 166, 173, 187, 189 
 
 Premises 163, 179 
 
 Plate 165, 188 
 
 Plate glass of 9 square feet or more 166 
 
 Patterns when insured 166 
 
 Policy that extends to property not in building 166 
 
 Property belonging to assured or for which he may be liable 168 
 
 Protecting property during flre, expense of 169 
 
 Paints, oils, brushes, and such other merchandise 176 
 
 Proximate cause 183 
 
 Premises owned or occupied by assured 184 
 
 Prosecuted 184 
 
 Pottery building 187 
 
 Particular and detailed account of loss 188 
 
 Privileged for a printing office 189 
 
 Risks and perils of fire 165 
 
 Rolling stock on line of assured's road, its branches, etc 171 
 
 Rents during period necessary to restore building 178 
 
 Rent, lien for 179 
 
 Ready to proceed under the provisions of the policy 180 
 
 Red top seed 180 
 
 Reversioner 183 
 
 Representation Warranty 186 
 
 Risk, change within control of assured 188 
 
 Repair Replace Rebuild ; see "Options." 
 
 Removal loss 75 
 
 Railroad lorses; see "Cars." 
 
 Stove pipe removed, flre built in stove causing loss 13 
 
 Smoke and soot from defective stove pipe 14 
 
 Smoke and soot from mismanagement of insured 14 
 
 Smoke and soot from assured's furnace 14 
 
 Smoke and soot from lamp or stove 15, 21, 23 
 
 Subrogation, rights of 19 
 
 Store 165 
 
 Shop 165 
 
 Subject to three-fourths clause 165 
 
 Sporting house 166 
 
 Standard time 166 
 
 Saloon fixtures 167 
 
 Stock of vinegar in store and in tank, mash and low wines 168 
 
 Stock of wearing apparel and household furniture 169 
 
 Stock and materials 169 
 
 Stock of hair manufactured or in process 169 
 
 Steam saw mill 174 
 
 Stock manufactured and in process 176, 177 
 
 Stock in trade 176 
 
 Stock of watches, watch trimmings, etc 176, 185 
 
 Stock of merchandise, lamps, scales and other such merchandise. . 177 
 Ship tackle, ordnance, ammunition, artillery and furniture of ship. 178 
 
 Stock 180 
 
 Stock of grain 181 
 
 Sold, paid for and warehouse receipts delivered 185 
 
 Storing or keeping 187 
 
 Statement of loss 188 
 
 Stone dwelling house 189 
 
 Store fixtures 190 
 
262 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS 
 
 Some statistics as to cost of fire-proof buildings and losses, in 
 
 various cities 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254 
 
 Salvage ; see "Option," "Protection and! care of property at fire. 
 Separation of damaged and undamaged personal property 41 
 
 Tornado preceding fire loss 10 
 
 Total loss 9, 10 
 
 Transportation and inland navigation 165 
 
 Total concurrent insurance permitted 166 
 
 Twelve o'clock noon . . . 166 
 
 Three story building 173 
 
 Tools 176 
 
 Threshing outfit 178 
 
 Toilet articles, labels, bottles and powder 180 
 
 Texas, valued policy law construed 181 
 
 Tax title 185 
 
 Title, change of 190 
 
 Tables ; see Weights and Measures. 
 
 Theft at and after fire 75, 76 
 
 Three-fourths clause 145 
 
 Tornado insurance not affected by fire insurance laws 187 
 
 Unfinished house . 169 
 
 Usurped power 184 
 
 Until a certain date 186 
 
 Until safely landed at 170 
 
 Valued policy law nullifies provisions of policy in conflict with 
 
 it 11, 17, 93, 181 
 
 Void 180 
 
 Vacant and unoccupied 181 
 
 Valid insurance 137 
 
 Waiver : 
 
 Definition of 85 
 
 How determined 85 
 
 Can't waive right which is not known 85 
 
 Construed 85 
 
 What constitutes 86 
 
 Non-waiver agreement: 
 
 Adjuster may waive his non-waiver agreement 86, 87 
 
 Discussion of the question 87 
 
 How to avoid waivers 87 
 
 Statement of facts as to violation of iron-safe clause, and 
 attempt to adjust under non-waiver agreement, with brief 
 
 of the law on the questions raised 88 
 
 Rights under non-waiver agreement 89 
 
 Effect of demanding compliance with provisions of a void 
 
 policy 89, 90 
 
 Assured's statement of facts 90 
 
 Wholesale stock and other goods on hand for sale 175 
 
 Within sixty days after the fire 179 
 
 While occupied as . 180 
 
 Working interest of assured 185 
 
 Warranty Representation 186 
 
 Weights and measures : 
 
 Lengths 229 
 
 Surveyors Land 229 
 
 Miscellaneous 229 
 
 Square 229 
 
 Solid or cubic 229 
 
 Liquid 230 
 
 Apothecary's 230 
 
 U. S. Dry , 230 
 
 Troy weight 230 
 
 Apothecary's weight 230 
 
 Circular measure 230 
 
 Time measure 231 
 
 Cloth measure 231 
 
 Mariner's measure 231 
 
 Linear Metric equivalents 231 
 
 Square 231 
 
 Weights 231 
 
 Approximate metric equivalents 231 
 
TOPICAL INDEX 263 
 
 Capacity of tanks and bins 232 
 
 Capacity of circular tanks 232 
 
 Capacity of square tanks 232 
 
 Measurements and weights 232 
 
 Bushels and bins 232 
 
 Corn in crib 23S 
 
 Hay 233 
 
 Circular stack, cubic feet in 233 
 
 Timber 233 
 
 Table of weights 234, 235, 236, 237 
 
 Weights of various materials 237, 238 
 
 Wall paper 239 
 
 Veneered doors 240 
 
 Brick in walls. 241 
 
 Depreciation of materials in building. . . . 242 
 
 Window shades 243 
 
 Building hints 244 
 
 Conditioning department store stock 244 
 
 Conditioning damaged machinery and iron goods 244 
 
 Conditioning smoked clothes 245 
 
 Cost of building in Chicago 245, 246, 247, 248, 249 
 
 Walls of burned building falling 1 on building not otherwise injured 
 
 by fire 9 
 
264 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
TABLE OF CASES 
 
 Aachen & Munich F. Ins. Co. v. Arqbian T. G. Co. (64 S. 635; 10 
 
 Ala. App. 395) 180 
 
 Acer v. Merchants Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (57 Barb. 68) 138 
 
 Ackley v. Phenix Ins. Co. (Mont.), (64 Pac. 665) 164 
 
 Adams v. N. Y. Bowery F. Ins. Co. (la.), (85 la. 6; 21 Ins. L. J. 
 
 833; 51 N. W. 1149) 96, 111, 127, 176 
 
 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Bank (62 Fed. 222) 50 
 
 Aetna F. Ins. Co. v. Davis (Ky.), (29 Ins. L. J. 560) 122 
 
 Aetna Ins/ Co. v. Jester (47 L. R. A. [N. S.] 1191; 132 Pac. 130; 37 
 
 Okla. 413) 105, 106, 127 
 
 Aetna Ins. Co. v. McLeod et al. (Kan. S. C.), (25 Ins. L. J. 669) 57 
 
 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Simmons (49 Neb. 811; 69 N. W. 125) 54, 56 
 
 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Stephens (Ky. C. A.), 57 S. W. 583) 94 
 
 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Strout, (16 Ind. App. 160; 44 N. E. 934) 166 
 
 Aetna F. Ins. Co. v. Tyler (N. Y. S. C.), (16 "Wend. 385) 50 
 
 Agnew v. Ins. Co. (Pa.), (3 Phil. 193) 75 
 
 Allemannia Fire Ins. Co. v. Pittsburgh Expo. Co. (11 All. 572) 163 
 
 Allen v. Patroup M. F. Ins. Co. (Mich.), (130 N. W. 196) 97 
 
 Alliance Co-Operative Ins. Co. v. Arnold (Kan.), (31 Ins. L. J. 
 
 943) 67, 102 
 
 Alsop v. Continental Ins. Co. (Mo. App.), (162 S. W. 313) 144 
 
 Amer. Cent. Ins. Co. v. Bass (90 Tex. 380; 26 Ins. L,. J. 718; 38 S. 
 
 W. 1119) 97, 129 
 
 Amer. Cent. Ins. Co. v. Green et al. (Tex.), (41 S. W. 74) 164 
 
 Amer. Cent. Ins. Co. v. Landau (N. J. Ch.), (49 Atl. 738) 121 
 
 Amer. Cent. Ins. Co. v. McLanathan (Kan. S. C.), (2 Ins. L. J. 907) . . 66 
 
 Amer. Cent. Ins. Co. v. Simpson (43 111. App. 98) 55, 57 
 
 Amer. F. Ins. Co. v. Bell (Tex.), (75 S. W. 319) 106, 112, 181 
 
 Amer. F. Ins. Co. v. Stuart (Tex. C. C. A.), (38 S. W. 395) 93 
 
 Amer. Ins. Co. v. Barnett (73 Mo. 364) 187 
 
 Amer. Ins. Co. v. Heath (29 Tex. 445 ; 69 S. W. 235) 143 
 
 Amer. Ins. Co. v. Rodenhause (Okla.), (128 Pac. 502) 99 
 
 Amer. Smelter Co. v. Prov.-Wash. Ins. Co. (64 Mo. App. 438) 169 
 
 Amer. Steel Co. v. Ger.-Amer. F. Ins. Co. (U. S. C. C. A.), (187 
 
 Fed. 730) 108 
 
 A-mpleman v. Citizens Ins. Co. (18 Ins. L. J. 396), (Mo. App.) 67 
 
 Amusement &c. v. Prussian Natl. Ins. Co. (85 Kan. 367; 116 Pac. 620) 99 
 
 Anglerodt v. Delaware M. Ins. Co. (31 Mo. 593; 4 Ben. 589) 139, 143 
 
 Annapolis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Baltimore F. Ins. Co. (32 Md. 37; 5 Ben. 
 
 258) 188 
 
 Appleby v. Astor F. Ins. Co. (54 N. Y. 253; 45 Barbour 454; 5 
 
 Ben. 490) 187 
 
 Arlington v. Colonial Assur. Co. (180 N. Y. 337; 73 N. E. Rep. 34) .... 141 
 
 Armour v. Reading F. Ins. Co. (67 Mo. App. 215) 144 
 
 Armstrong v. Agricultural Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (31 N. Y. St. 201) 46 
 
 Arnold v. Indemnity F. Ins. Co. (152 N. E. 232; 67 S. E. 574) 181 
 
 Astrich v. Ger.-Amer. Ins. Co. (U. S.), (33 Ins. L. J. 308, 925) ...42, 68, 100 
 
 Aurora Ins. Co. v. Johnson (46 Ind. 315) ; 56 
 
 Austin et al. v. Drewe (6 Taunt. 436; 1 Bennett 102) 14 
 
 Babcock v. Montgomery Co. M. Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (4 Comstock 326; 
 
 3 Ben. 154) 185 
 
 Bacot v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (96 Miss. 223; 50 S. 729; 39 Ins. L. J. 
 
 214; 25 L. R. A. 1226) 134, 182 
 
 Baker v. Phoenix Assur. Co. (57 Mo. App. 559) . 94 
 
 Baltimore F. Ins. Co. v. Loney (20 Md. 20; 4 Ben. 646) 143 
 
 Bangor Sav. Bank v. Niagara F. Ins. Co. (Me.), (23 Ins. L. J. 292) 127 
 
 Barnard v. Ins. Co. (U. S.), (29 Ins. L. J. 631) 120 
 
 Barnard v. Natl. F. Ins. Co. (27 Mo. App. 26) '. 164 
 
 Barnes v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. (3 McCray 22; 9 Fed. 813; 11 Ins 
 
 L. J. 110) 144 
 
 Barnes v. Union M. F. Ins. Co. (51 Me. 110; 4 Ben. 728) 190 
 
 265 
 
266 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Barnum v. Merchant's F. Ins. Co. (98 N. Y. 188) 51 
 
 Bastian v. British Amer. Assur. Co. (Cal. S. C.), (33 Ins. L. J. 1033).. 83 
 Baumgarth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (Mich.), (116 N. W. 449; 37 
 
 Ins. L. J. 577) 128 
 
 Baumgartnor v. Ins. Co. (1 W. N. [Pa.] 119) 164 
 
 Beaks v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (143 N. Y. 402; 24 Ins. L. J. 73; 38 N. E. 
 
 453; Ann. 26 L. R. A. 267) 15 
 
 Bean v. Travelers Ins. Co. (Cal.), (29 Pac. 1113) 47 
 
 Bear v. Atlantic Home Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (34 Misc. 613; 70 N. Y. 
 
 Supp. 581) 60 
 
 Beer v. Ins. Co. (39 O. St. 109) 164 
 
 Beideman v. Powell (10 Mo. 280) 171 
 
 Bennett v. Lycoming County M. Ins. Co. (67 N. Y. 274) 37, 38 
 
 Bergman v. Commercial Ins. Co. et al. (Ky.), (13 Ky. L,. R. 720; 
 
 21 Ins. L. J. 271) 134 
 
 Bernhardt v. Rochester Ger. Ins. Co. (79 Conn. 388; 65 Atl. 134) 127 
 
 Biddleford Sav. Bank v. Dwelling House Ins. Co. (Me. S. C. ; 18 Atl. 
 
 298) 47 
 
 Bigler v. N. Y. Central Ins. Co. (20 Bail. 635; 22 N. Y. 402) 174 
 
 Birmingham & Co. v. Huitch (157 Ala. 630; 47 So. 576) 33 
 
 Birmingham F. Ins. Co. v. Kroegher (83 Pa. St. 64) 164 
 
 Bishop v. Agricultural Ins. Co. (130 N. Y. 488; 29 N. E. 844) 127 
 
 Bishop v. Ins. Co. (139 N. Y. 488; 29 N. E. 844; 130 N. Y. 488) 118, 124 
 
 Blackwell v. American C. Ins. Co. (2 Mo. App. 516) 97 
 
 Blake v. Exch. M. Ins. Co. (Mass.), (12 Gray 265; 4 Ben. 306) 139 
 
 Blakely v. Proctor (134 Ga. 139 ; 67 S. E. 389) 108 
 
 Blossom v. Lycoming F. Ins. Co. (64 N. Y. 1-62) 38 
 
 Boak Fish Co. v. Manchester F. Assur. Co. (84 Minn. 419; 87 N. W. 
 
 932; 31 Ins. L. J. 253) 13 
 
 Boston and Albany R. R. Co. et al. v. Merc. Trust Co. et al. (Md.), 
 
 (34 Atl. 778; 9 Ins. Dig. 305; Joyce Sec. 1454) 137 
 
 Boyd v. McKee et al. (Va.), (37 S. E. 810) 172 
 
 Boyd v. Royal Ins. Co. (11 N. C. 372 ; 16 S. E. 389) 25 
 
 Boyer v. Grand Rapids F. Ins. Co. (Mich.), (83 N. W. 124) 173 
 
 Boyle v. Hamburg-Bremen F. Ins. Co. (169 Pa. 349; 32 Atl. 533; 24 
 
 Ins. L,. J. 699) 42, 93 
 
 Braddy v. N. Y. Bowery F. Ins. Co. (N. C.), (20 S. E. 477; 115 N. 
 
 C. 354, 355) 114, 118, 119, 127 
 
 Brady v. Ins. Co. (11 Mich. 445) 68 
 
 Brady v. Northwestern Ins. Co. (11 Mich. 425; 4 Bennett 663) 10 
 
 Bradshaw v. Agricultural Ins. Co. (137 N. Y. 137; 22 Ins. L. J. 161; 
 
 32 N. E. 1055) 113, 116, 119 
 
 Bradshaw v. Ins. Co. (1?7 N. Y. 137; 32 N. E. 1055) 117, 124 
 
 Branigan v. Jefferson Mut. Ins. Co. (102 Mo. App. 70; 76 S. W. 643)... 129 
 Brecht v. Law M. & C. Ins. Co. (160 Fed. 399; 87 C. C. A. 351; 18 L. 
 
 R. A. 197) 183 
 
 Breuner v. L. & L. & G. Ins. Co. (51 Cal. 101; 6 Ins. L. J. 475; Ann. 
 
 21 Am. R. Ext. Anno. 703 Notes) 13 
 
 Briggs v. N. B. & M. Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (53 N. Y. 446; 66 Barb. 325; 
 
 2 Ins. L. J. 929) 82 
 
 Brit. Amer. Assur. Co. v. Darragh (128 Fed. 890; 33 Ins. L. J. 557; 
 
 63 C. C. A. 426) 93, 96 
 
 British Amer. Ins. Co. v. Joseph (9 Low. Can. R. 448; 4 Ben. 161) 189 
 
 Brock v. Dwelling House Ins. Co. (102 Mich. 583; 24 Ins. L. J. 464; 
 
 61 N. W. 67) 113, 114, 127 
 
 Brock v. Ins. Co. (102 Mich. 583; 61 N. W. 67; 26 L. R. A. 623; 47 
 
 Am. St. 562) 117 
 
 Brook v. Ins. Co. (102 Mich. 583) 124 
 
 Brooks v. Standard Ins. Co. (11 Mo. App. 349; 1st Phillips Sep. 755)... 224 
 
 Brough v. Higgins (2 Gratt. 408; 2 Ben. 443) 183 
 
 Brough v. Whitmore (4 Term. 206) 178 
 
 Brown v. Ins. Co. (1 Ellis & Ellis 853) 68 
 
 Brown v. London Assur. Corp. (N. Y.), (40 Hun. 101) 38 
 
 Brown et al. v. Royal Co. (Q. B. Eng.), (4 Ben. 371; 1 Ellis 853) 65 
 
 Brown et al. v. St. Nicholas Ins. Co. (61 N. Y. 332) 12 
 
 Browne v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. (46 Mo. App. 473) 178 
 
 Brush v. Fisher (70 Mich. 469) 120 
 
 Bt:ffalo El. Co. v. Prussian Natl. Ins. Co. (64 App. Div. 182, 187; 71 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 918; aff' d 171 N. Y. 25; 63 N. E. 810) 32 
 
 Bull v. North British & Merc. Ins. Co. (Ont. S. C. of J.), (9 Can. Law 
 
 Times 26) 46 
 
 Bullman v. Ins. Cos. (Mass.), (22 Ins. L. J. 668) 114 
 
 Bumstead v. Dividend Mut. Ins. Co. (12 N. Y. 81) 44 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 267 
 
 Burgess v. Alliance Ins. Go. (10 Allen [Mass.] 221; 5 Bennett 46) 25 
 
 Burnett v. Amer. Central Ins. Co. (68 Mo. App. 343) 50 
 
 Burnham v. Royal Ins. Co. (75 Mo. App. 394; 57 Mo. App. 394).. 38, 44, 182 
 
 Burns v. Michigan Mfrs. Mut. F. Co. (Mich. S. C.), (31 Ins. L. J. 633) 53 
 Bryant v. Poughkeepsie M. P. Ins. Co. (S. C.), (21 Barb. 154; 4 
 
 Ben. 37) 185 
 
 Caballero v. Home Ins. Co. (15 La. Ann. 217; 4 Ben. 478) 82 
 
 Caledonian Ins. Co. v. Traub (83 Md. 524; 25 Ins. L. J. 791; 37 Atl. 
 
 13, 782) 97, 121 
 
 Camden F. Ind. Ass'n. v. Bomar (Tex.), (176 S. W. 156) 181 
 
 Campbell v. Charter Oak Ins. Co. (92 Mass. 213) 59 
 
 Cannon v. Home Ins. Co. (La.), (26 Ins. L. J. 737) 138 
 
 Cannon V. Phoenix Ins. Co. (110 Ga. 563; 35 S. E. 775; 29 Ins. L. J. 
 
 1023) 14 
 
 Capitol Ins. Co. v. Wallace (50 Kan. 453; 21 Ins. L. J. 516; 31 Pac. 
 
 1070; 22 Ins. L. J. 397) 48, 93, 127 
 
 Caraker v. Royal Ins. Co. (63 Hun. 82; 17 N. Y. Supp. 858; 136 N. Y. 
 
 645) 174 
 
 Cargill et al. v. Millers & Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. (Minn.), (19 Ins. L. 
 
 J. 876) 178 
 
 Carlston v. St. Paul F. & Ins. Co. (37 Mont. 118; 94 Pac. 756; 37 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 366) 106 
 
 Carp. v. Queen Ins. Co. (Mo.), (78 S. W. 757; 104 Mo. App. 502) 128 
 
 Carpenter v. Allemannia F. Ins. Co. (Pa.), (26 Atl. 781) 47, 174 
 
 Carpenter v. Ger.-Amer. Ins. Co. (135 N. Y. 298) 37, 57 
 
 Carpenter v. Ins. Co. (61 Mich. 635) 86 
 
 Carr v. Hlbernia Ine. Co. (2 Mo. App. 466) 176 
 
 Carrington v. Lycoming F. Ins. Co. (53 Vt. 418) 164 
 
 Case v. Mfrs. F. & M. Ins. Co. (82 Cal. 263; 22 Pac. 1083) 33 
 
 Cashau v. N. W. N. Ins. Co. (U. S.), (5 Bissell 476; 5 Ben. 501) 187 
 
 Catlett v. Dougherty (114 111. 568) 127 
 
 Central & Co. v. North British & M. Ins. Co. (245 Pa. St. 272; 91 
 
 Atl. 662) 179 
 
 Central City Ins. Co. v. Gates (86 Ala. 558; 18 Ins. L. J. 761) 39, 48 
 
 Cerf v. Home Ins. Co. (44 Cal. 320 ; 5 Ben. 426) 189 
 
 Chainless Co. v. Security 3ns. Co. (169 N. Y. 304; 31 Ins. L. J. 324; 
 
 62 N. E. 392) 77 
 
 Chainless Cycle Co. v. Security Ins. Co. (160, 168, 169 N. Y. 30,4; 31 
 
 Ins. L. J. 324; 62 N. E. 392) 69, 98, 101 
 
 Chandlery. Ins. Co. of N. A. (Vt.), (28 Ins. L. J. 1028) 139 
 
 Chandos v. American F. Ins. Co. (84 Wis. 184; 22 Ins. L. J. 425; 
 
 54 N. W, 390) f 97, 133 
 
 Chaplin v. Provincial Ins. Co. (23 Up. Can. C. P. 218; 5 Ben. 503) .... 188 
 Chapman v. Rockford Ins. Co. (Wis.), (62 N. W. 422; 89 Wis. 572; 
 
 28 L. R. A. 405) 113, 114, 118, 127 
 
 Chase v. Hamilton Ins. Co. (20 N. Y. 52; 4 Ben. 416) 189 
 
 Chase v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. (13 111. 676) 75 
 
 Cheever v. Scottish U. & N. Ins. Co. (N. Y. S. C.). 86 App. Div. 328; 
 
 83 N. Y. Supp. 730) 59 
 
 Chenoweth v. Pheonix Ins. Co. (Ky.), (4 Finch Dig. 22; 12 Ky. L. R. 
 
 232) 103, 105, 131 
 
 Cheesebrough v. Home Ins. Co. (61 Mich. 333; 28 N. W. 110; 15 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 515) 144 
 
 Chippewa Lumber Co. v. Pheonix Ins. Co. (80 Mich. 116; 44 N. W. 
 
 1055; 19 Ins. L. J. 535) 97, 98, 112 
 
 Christiansen v. Norwich U. F. Ins. Soc. (84 Minn. 526; 31 Ins. L. J. 
 
 218) 106, 116, 121 
 
 Cincinnati M. Ins. Co. v. May (20 O. 211) 21 
 
 Citizens Ins. Co. v. Hamilton (48 111. App. 593) 109, 127 
 
 Citizens Ins. Co. v. Lockridge (132 Ky. 1; 116 S. W. 303; 38 Ins. L. 
 
 J. 491 ; Ann. 20 L. R. A. [N. S.] 226) 33 
 
 Citizens Ins. Co. v. Marsh (41 Pa. St. 386) 21 
 
 Citizens Ins. Co. et al. v. Herposheimer (Neb.), (109 N. W. 160) 100 
 
 City F. C. Sav. Bank v. Pa. F. Ins. Co. (122 Mass. 165) . . . '. 59 
 
 City Fire Ins. Co. v. Corlies (21 Wend. 367) 76 
 
 City Ins. Co. v. Corlies (N. Y.), (21 Wend. 367; 1 Bennett 753) 10 
 
 Citizens Ins. Co. v. Colt (Ind. A. C.), (39 N. E. 766) 102 
 
 Claflin v. Ins. Co. (110 U. S. 81) 60. 61 
 
 Clark v. Farmers' Mut. F. Ins. Co. (Ill Wis. 65; 86 N. W. 549; 14 
 
 Deitch 86) 16 
 
 Clark v. Svea Ins. Co. (Cal.), (36 Pac. 587) 17? 
 
 Clary v. Protection Ins. Co. (1 Wright 228) 169, 170 
 
268 HALL OK I.NSI RAXCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Cleaver v. Ins. Co. (71 Mich. 414) 85 
 
 Clover v. Greenwich Ins. Co. (101 N. Y. 277; 15 Ins. L. J. 214) 66 
 
 Cobb v. Ins. Co. (11 Kan. 93) 46 
 
 Cobbs v. Ins. Co. (68 Mich. 403) 85 
 
 Coen v. Denver T. M. P. Ins. Co. (155 111. App. 332) 180 
 
 Coffey v. East Tex. Ins. Co. (61 Tex. 287) 145 
 
 Coleman v. Ins. Co. (177 Pa. St. 239) 55 
 
 Collins v. Delaware Ins. Co. (9 Pa. 576) 23 
 
 Collins v. Farmville Ins. & Bkg. Co. (79 N. C. 279) 164 
 
 Collinsville Sav. Bk. v. Boston Ins. Co. (S. C.), (34 Ins. L. J. 1031; 
 
 60 Atl. 647) 133 
 
 Collinsville S. Soc. v. Boston (77 Conn. 676; 60 Atl. 647) 134 
 
 Colonial Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ellinger (112 111. App. 302) 56 
 
 Colt v. Phoenix F. Ins. Co. (54 N. Y. 595; 5 Ben. 537) 186 
 
 Columbian Ins. Co. v. Lawrence (10 Pet. 507) 49 
 
 Commercial Assur. Co. ,v. Parker (119 111. App. 126) 127 
 
 Commercial Bank v. Firemen's Ins. Co. (Wis. S. C.), (23 Ins. L. J. 
 
 543) 61 
 
 Commercial Union Assur. Co. v. Dalzel (210 Fed. 605; C. C. A. 3rd Cir. 
 
 1792, 1793) 130 
 
 Commercial Ins. Co. v. Friedlander (156 111. 595) 60 
 
 Commercial Ins. Co. v. Mehlman (48 111. 313; 5 Ben. 190) 188 
 
 The Commonwealth v. Hide & Leather Ins. Co. (Mass.), (3 Ins. L. 
 
 J. 671) 168, 171 
 
 Conn. F. Ins. Co. v. Cohen (97 Md. 294; 55 Atl. 675) 127 
 
 Conn. F. Ins. Co. v. Hamilton (U. S.), (59 Fed. 258; 23 Ins. L. J. 
 
 241) 97, 98, 99 
 
 Conn. F. Ins. Co. v. Hilbrant (Tex.), (73 S. W. 558) 175 
 
 Conn. F. Ins. Co. v. Merchants & Mechanics Ins. Co. (Va), (15 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 615) 138 
 
 Conn. F. Ins. Co. v. O'Fallon (Neb.), (69 N. W. 118) 116 
 
 Continental Ins. Co. v. Garrett (U. S.), (125 Fed. 589; 60 C. C. A. 
 
 395, 396) 106, 122, 123 
 
 Continental Ins. Co. v. Vallandingham (Ky.), (32 Ins. L. J. 1032; 
 
 116 Ky. 287; 76 S. W. 22) 93, 131 
 
 Continental Ins. Co. v. Wilson (45 Kan. 250; 25 Pac. 629; 20 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 269) 101, 127 
 
 Cook v. Continental Ins. Co. (70 Mo. App. 610) 181 
 
 Cook v. North B. & M. Ins. Co. (Mass.), (3J. Ins. L. J. 385, 396) 129 
 
 Corkery v. Security F. Ins. Co. (la.), (68 N. W. 792) 167 
 
 Cornell v. Hope Ins. Co. (3 Martin [La.] 223,) 49 
 
 Cornell v. LeRoy (N. Y. S. C.), (9 Wend. 163) 49 
 
 Craig v. Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co. (34 Mo. App. 481) 181 
 
 Crew v. British and Foreign M. Ins. Co. (U. S. 3rd Dist. 103 Fed. 48).. 170 
 
 Cromie v. Ky. L. M. Ins. Co. (15 B. Monroe [Ky.] 432; 3 Ben. 785). 139, 143 
 
 Cronin v. Fire Assn. (Mich.), 70 N. W. 448) 177 
 
 Crosby v. Franklin Ins. Co. (Mass.), (5 Gray 400, 504; 4 Ben 35).. 176, 185 
 
 Cross v. Ins. Co. (U. S. C. C., Ga.) (22) Fed. 74) 54 
 
 Cuesta v. Royal Ins. Co. (98 Ga. 720 ; 27 S. R. 172) 16 
 
 Cutting Ins. Comr. v. Atlas M. Ins. Co. in re. Downs (199 Mass. 380; 
 
 86 N. E. 174; 37 Ins. L. J. 924) ' 150 
 
 Dahms v. German F. Ins. Co. (la.), (132 N. W. 870) 145 
 
 Dahrooge v. Rochester Ger. Ins. Co. (143 N. W. 608) 85 
 
 Dakin v. L. & L. & G. Ins. Co. (13 Hun. 122; [S. C.] 77 N. Y. 600) 45 
 
 Darden v. L. & L. & G. Ins. Co. (Miss.), (68 S. 485) 145, 182 
 
 Dautel v. Pa. F. Ins. Co. (65 Mo. App. 44) 97 
 
 Davenport v. Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (10 Daly 535) 128 
 
 Davenport v. Long Island Ins. Co. (10 Daly 538) 127 
 
 Davis v. American Central Ins. Co. (7 App. Div. 488; S. C. 40 N. Y. 
 
 Supp. 248; 158 N. Y. 688) 69 
 
 Davis v. Anchor Mut. F. Ins. Co. (la.), (64 N. W. 687) 177 
 
 Davis v. Atlas Assur. Co. (Wash. S. S. C.), (47 Pac. 436) 98, 99 
 
 Davis v. Atlas Ins. Co. (16 Wash. 232; 47 Pac. 436, 885) 127 
 
 Davis v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (210 Fed. 653) 125, 126 
 
 Davis v. Grand Rapids Ins. Co. (15 Misc. 263; 36 N. Y. Supp. 792; 
 
 157 N. Y. 685; 5 App. Div. 36) 44, 45, 68 
 
 Davis v. Guardian Assur. Co. (87 Hun. 414; 155 N. Y. 682) 115 
 
 Davis v. Imperial Ins. Co. (Wash. S. C.), (47 Pac. 439) 103 
 
 Davis Ins. Co. of N. A. (Mich.), (27 Ins. L. J. 184) 79, 82 
 
 Davis v. Pioneer Furn. Co. (Wis.), (28 Ins. L. J. 474; 78 N. W. 596)... 164 
 
 Davia v. Scotland Provincial Ins. Co. (16 Up. Can. C. P. 176; 5 Ben. 61) 188 
 
 Davis v. Shearer et al. (Wis.), (62 N. W. 1050; 8 Ins. Dig. 92) 137 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 269 
 
 Davis v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co. (145 N. Y. Supp. 192) 126 
 
 Day v. Home Ins. Co. (177 Ala. 600; 58 S. 549) 89, 180 
 
 Dee v. Key City F. Ins. Co. (104 la. 167; 73 N. W. 594) 97 
 
 DeForest v. Fulton F. Ins. Co. (S. C.), (1 Hall 84) 184 
 
 DeLand v. Aetna Ins. Co. (68 Mo. App. 277) 49 
 
 Des Moines Ice Co. v. Niagara Ins. Co. (99 la. 193; 68 N. W. 600) 22 
 
 Deutel v. Pa. F. Ins. Co. (65 Mo. App. 44) 101 
 
 Devens v. Ins. Co. (83 N. Y. 168) 86 
 
 DeWees v. Manhattan Ins. Co. (34 N. J. 244; 5 Ben. 244; 35 N. J. 
 
 366; 5 Ben. 314) 187 
 
 DeWitt v. Agricultural Ins. Co. (89 Hun. 229; S. C. 71 St. 556; affd. 
 
 157 N. Y. 353) 45 
 
 Dinneen v. Amer. Ins. Co. (Neb. S. C.), (152 N. W. 307) 11, 18 
 
 Doane v. Milville Mut. M. & F. Ins. Co. (N. J. Ch.), (11 Atl. 739; 1 
 
 Ins. Dig. 27) 137 
 
 Dolan v. Aetna Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (22 Hun. 396) 60 
 
 Dolliver v. St. Joseph Ins. Co. (131 Mass. 39; 31 Mass. 39) 49, 50 
 
 Dolof v. Ins. Co. (82 Me. 266 ; 19 Ins. L. J. 450) 60 
 
 Dollof v. Phenix Ins. Co. and one other (S. J. C. Me.), (19 Ins. L. 
 
 J. 450} 61 
 
 Donohoe v. Ins. Co. (Vt. S. C.), (13 Ins. L. J. 116) 46 
 
 Dows v. Faneuil Hall Ins. Co. (127 Mass. 346) . . . '. 82 
 
 Downs v. Ins. Co. (127 Mass. 346) 79 
 
 Doxey v. Royal Ins. Co. (Tenn. Ch. App.), (36 S. W. 950) 94 
 
 Doying v. Broadway Ins. Co. (25 N. J. L. 569; 23 Ins. L. J. 304, 395; 
 
 27 Atl. 927) 97, 121 
 
 Dreher v. Aetna Ins. Co. (18 mo. 128; 3 Ben. 514) 186 
 
 Dresser v. United Firemen's Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (45 Hun. 298) 59 
 
 Drinkwater v. London Assur. Corp. (Eng.), (2 Wilson 363; 1 Ben. 12).. 184 
 
 Dunton v. Weschester F. Ins. Co. (Me.), (71 Atl. 1037) 94, 98 
 
 Dwelling House Ins. Co. v. Gould (Pa. S. C.), (19 Atl. 793) 47 
 
 Earley v. Prov.-Wash. Ins. Co. (R. I.), (76 Atl. 753) 97, 110 
 
 Early v. Prov.-Wash. Ins. Co. (R. I.), (76 Atl. 753) 120 
 
 Eastern R. R. v. Relief Ins. Co. (98 Mass. 420) 44 
 
 Eberhardt v. Federal Ins. Co. (Ga.), (80 S. E. 856) 108 
 
 Edwards v. Lycoming Co. Mut. F. Ins. Co. (Pa.), (3 Ins. L. J. 534)... 37 
 
 Eggleston v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co. (65 la. 308; 14 Ins. L. J. 365) 56 
 
 Elliott v. Merchants & Bankers F. Ins. Co. (la. S. C.), (28 Ins. L. J. 
 
 677) 102 
 
 Ellmaker v. Franklin F. Ins. Co. (5 Pa. St. 183; 6 W. S. 439) 169 
 
 Ellmaker Exch. v. Franklin Ins. Co. (Pa.), (5 Barr. 183; 2 Ben. 519).. 184 
 Enright v. Montauk F. & Ins. Co. (40 N. Y. 642; 5 Finch 25) ...71, 122, 123 
 
 Equitable F. Ins. Co. v. Quinn (11 Low. Can. 170) 25 
 
 Erie Brewing Co. v. Ohio F. Ins. Co. (81 O. St. 1; 89 N. E. 1065; 
 
 39 Ins. L. J. 200; 25 L. R. A. 740; 18 Am. & Eng. Anno. Gas. 
 
 265) 135, 183 
 
 Ermentrout et al. v. Girard F. & M. Ins. Co. (63 Minn. 305; 65 N. 
 
 W. 635; 30 L. R. A. 346; 25 Ins. L. J. 81, 87; 56 Ann. St. 481).. 7, 39, 80 
 
 Erwin v. Ins. Co. (24 Mo. App. 153) 85 
 
 Exchange Bk. v. Thuringia F. Ins. Co. (109 Mo. App. 654; 83 S. 
 
 W. 534) 98, 130 
 
 Farmers & Merchants Ins. Co. v. Warner (Neb. S. C.), (34 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 83) 66 
 
 Farmers, etc. v. Scottish TJ. & N. (173 N. Y. 241; 65 N. E. 1105) 144 
 
 Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Harmony F. & M. Ins. Co. (S. C.), (51 
 
 Barbour 33; 5 Ben. 174) 184 
 
 Farmers' Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Kryder (Ind.), (31 N. E. 851) 168 
 
 Farmers' M. Ins. Co. v. New H. T. Co. (122 Pa. St. 37; 15 Atl. 
 
 563) 22 
 
 Farnum v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (83 Cal. 246; 26 Ins. L. J. 473; 23 Pac. 
 
 869) 93 
 
 Farrell v. Farmers' F. Ins. Co. (66 Mo. App. 153) 8, 9, 10 
 
 Farrell v. Ger.-Amer. Ins. Co. (175 Mass. 340; 56 N. E. 572; 29 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 341) 108, 122 
 
 Faust v. Amer. F. Ins. Co. (Wia), (64 N. W. 883) 163 
 
 Feibelman v. Manchester F. Assur. Co. (18 Ala. 180; 19 So. 540) . 20 
 
 Fellman v. Royal Ins. Co. (U. S. C. C. A.), (184 Fed. 577) 132 
 
 Ferris & Eaton v. North Amer. Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (1 Hill 71; 2 Bennett 
 
 56) 59 
 
 Fidelity-Phenix Ins. Co. v. O'Bannon (178 S. W. 731) 182 
 
 Flndeisen v. Ins. Co. (15 Ins. L. J. 90 Vt.) 86 
 
 Fink v. Lancashire Ins. Co. (60 Mo. App. 673) 49, 163 
 
 Pink v. Natl. M. F. Ins. Co. (90 S. C. 544; 74 S. E. 33) 137 
 
 Fire Assn. v. Appel (76 O. St. 1; N. E. 952; 36 Ins. L. J. 769) 127 
 
270 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Fire Assn. v. Kosenthal (108 Pa. St. 474; 1 Atl. 303; 15 Ins. L. J. 
 
 658) 11 
 
 Fire Assn \ . Koscntlial supra 65 
 
 Fire Ins. Assn. v. Wiokham (V. S.), (21 Ins. L. J. 193) 42, 103 
 
 Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Caye (Ky. S. C.), (14 Ky. L,. R. 810) 132 
 
 Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Pekor (106 Ga. 1; 31 S. E. 779) 144 
 
 Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Shearman (20 Tex. C. C. A. 243; 50 S. 
 
 W. 598) 163 
 
 Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Sims (Ga.), (42 S. E. 268, 269; 31 Ins. 
 
 L,. J. 1049) 47, 53, 64 
 
 Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Sholom (80 111. 558) 80 
 
 Fisher v. Crescent Ins. Co. (IT. S. C. C.) (17 Ins. L,. J. 712) 25 
 
 Fisher v. Merchants' Ins. Co. (95 Me. 486; 50 Atl. 282; 31 Ins. L,. 
 
 J. 45) 94, 128 
 
 Fitzgerald v. Atlanta Home Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (70 N. Y. Supp. 552) . . . 167 
 Fitzgerald v. German Amer. Ins. Co. (30 Misc. N. Y. 72; 62 N. Y. 
 
 Supp. 824) 15 
 
 Flaherty v. Continental Ins. Co. (20 App. Div. 275; 46 N. Y. Supp. 934). 46 
 Fletcher v. Ger.-Amer. Ins. C. (79 Minn. 337; 82 N. W. 647; 29. Ins. 
 
 L. J. 752) 93 
 
 Fleisch v. Ins. Co. of N. A. (58 Mo. App. 598; 23 Ins. L. J. 634) 55 
 
 Flynn v. Hanover F. Ins. Co. (121 N. Y. Supp. 221) 77 
 
 Forbes v. American Ins. Co. (Mass.), (41 N. E. 656) 169 
 
 Foster v. Fidelity F. Ins. Co. (24 Pac. 585) 21 
 
 Fournier v. German-Amer. Ins. Co. (R. I.), (30 Ins. L. J. 715) 129 
 
 Fowhle v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (106 Mo. App. 527; 81 S. W. 578) 114 
 
 Fowler v. Old N. C. S. Ins. Co. (74 N. C. 81) 25 
 
 Fox v. Mason's Frat. Ace. Assn. (Wis. S. C.). (71 N. W. 363) 110 
 
 Fraim v. Natl. F. Ins. Co. (Pa.), (32 Atl. 613) 164 
 
 Franklin F. Ins. Co. v. Martin (40 N. J. L,. 575) 134, 182 
 
 Friedman v. Atlas Assur. Co. (Mich.), (32 Ins. L. J. 673) 80 
 
 Frick v. United Firemen's Ins. Co. (67 Atl. 743: 218 Pa. 489) 29, 31 
 
 Frisble v. Fayette M. Ins. Co. (27 Pac. 325; 5 Ben. 159) 185 
 
 Furbush v. Ins. Co. (140 la. 240; 118 N. W. 371) 82 
 
 Furlong v. Agricultural Ins. Co. (28 Abb. N. C. 444; S. C. N. Y. 45 
 
 St. 586) 46 
 
 Gardner v. North St. L. Ins. Co. (N. C. S. C.). (79 S. E. 806) -85 
 
 Garretson v. Mcts. & Bkrs. Co. (la.), (45 N. W. 1047) 170 
 
 Gasser v. Sun Fire Office (42 Minn. 315; 44 N. W. 252; 19 Ins. L. J. 
 
 243, 247) 97, 98, 110 
 
 Geib v. Ins. Co. (1 Dill. 443 Fed. Cas. No. 5298) 60 
 
 Georgia Home Ins. Co. v. Allen (28 Ins. L. J. 199; 119 Ala. 436; 24 S. 
 
 399; 128 Ala. 451; 30 S. 537; 31 Ins. L. J. 60) 89, 177 
 
 Georgia Home Ins. Co. v. Kline et al. (Ala.), (21 S. 958) 112 
 
 Georgia Home Ins. Co. v. Stein et al. (Miss.), (18 S. 414) 134 
 
 Ger.-Amer. Ins. Co. v. Etherton (41 N. W. 406) 99 
 
 Ger.-Amer. Ins. Co. v. Evans (Tex. C. C. A.), (61 S. W. 536; 14 Ins. 
 
 Dig. 41) 85 
 
 Ger.-Amer. Ins. Go. v. Hyman (42 Col. 156; 94 Pac. 27; 37 Ins. L. 
 
 J. 362) 82 
 
 Ger.-Amer. Ins. Co. v. Jerrils (82 Kan. 320; 108 Pac. 114; 28 L. R. A. 
 
 N. S. 1191) 127 
 
 Ger. F. Ins. Co. v. Grunert (111.) 47, 53 
 
 Ger. F. Ins. Co. v. Roost (O. S. C.), (26 Ins. L. J. 699) 82 
 
 Ger. F. Ins. Co. v. Seibert (Ind.), (56 N. E. 686) 173 
 
 Ger. F. Ins. Co. v. Walker (Tex.), (146 S. W. 606) 181 
 
 Germania F. Ins. Co. v. Curran (Kan. S. C.), (1 Ins. L.. J. 191) 38 
 
 Germania F. Ins. Co. v. Warner (13 Ind. App. 466; 41 N. E. 969) Ill 
 
 Germania Ins. Co. v. Anderson (Tex.), (40 S. W. 200) 171 
 
 Germania Ins. Co. v. Cincinnati P. B. S. & P. P. Co. (7 O. Decisions 
 
 571) 120 
 
 German Ins. Co. v. Eddy (Neb. S. C.), (54 N. W. 856; 22 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 468) 94 
 
 German M. Ins. Co. v. Niewiede (11 Ind. App. 634; 39 N. E. 634) 27 
 
 Gibbons v. Savings Inst. (30 111. App. 263) 14 
 
 Gibbs v. Continental Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (13 Hun. 611) 59 
 
 Gibson Electric Co. v. Liverpool & L,. & G. Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (28 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 629) 129 
 
 Gilllsple v. Scottish U. & N. Ins. Co. (61 W. Va. 169; 56 S. E. 213; 
 
 36 Ins. L. J. 300; 11 L. R. A. 143) 134 
 
 Gish v. Ins. Co. of N. A. (16 Okla. 59; 87 Pac. 869; Ann. 13 L. R. 
 
 A. [N. S.] 826) 89 
 
 Gleason v. Prudential F. Ins. Co. (Term.), (151 S. W. 1030) 137 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 271 
 
 Glover v. Rochester German Ins. Co. (Wash.), (11 Wash. 143; 39 Pac. 
 
 380) 114, 119, 124 
 
 Godfrey v. Macomber and Ins. Co. (Mass. S. J. C.), (9 Ins. L. J. 287). 66 
 
 Good v. Buckeye Mut. F. Ins. Co. (O. S. C.) (15 Ins. L. J. 3) 67 
 
 Gottlieb v. Dutchess Mut. Ins. Co. (N. Y. S. C.) (89 Hun. 36; S. C. 
 
 69 St. 250) 48 
 
 Grabbs v. Farmers' Mut. F. Ins. Co. (N. C.), (24 S. E. 503) 166 
 
 Grady v. Home F. & M. Ins. Co. (21 R. I. 435) . 128 
 
 Graham v. Ger.-Amer. Ins. Co. (75 O. 374; 79 N. E. 930; 36 Ins. L,. J. 
 
 193; Ann. 15 L. R. A. [U. S.] 1055) 95, 98 
 
 Graham v. Ger.-Amer. Ins. Co., Royal Ins. Co. v. Silberman (O.), (79 
 
 N. E. 930; 36 Ins. L. J. 193) 98 
 
 Grand Rapids F. Ins. Co. v. Finn (60 O. 513; 54 N. W. 545) 98 
 
 Greenwich Ins. Co. v. Dougherty (N. J.), (42 Atl. 485) 170 
 
 Greenwood v. Georgia R. Ins. Co. (72 Miss. 46; 17 S. 83) 131 
 
 Griffey v. N. Y. Central Ins. Co. (76 N. Y. 459; 100 N. Y. 417) 37 
 
 Grigsby v. Ins. Co. (40 Mo. App. 276) 54 
 
 Grollmund v. Germania F. Ins. Co. (82 N. J. L. 632) 140 
 
 Grove v. Farmers' M. F. Ins. Co. (48 N. H. 41) '. . 22 
 
 Grubbs v. North Carolina Home Ins. Co. (N. C. S. C.), (108 N. C. 
 
 472 ; 20 Ins. L. J. 64, 784) 25, 33 
 
 Hadley v. New Hampshire Ins. Co. (55 N. H. 110) 182 
 
 Hale v. Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co. (46 Mo. App. 508) 166 
 
 Haley v. Dorchester M. Ins. Co. (12 Gray 545) 164 
 
 Hall v. Assurance Co. (133 Ala. 637; 32 S. 257) 117 
 
 Hall v. Concordia F. Ins. Co. (Mich.), (51 N. W. 524) 175 
 
 Hall v. Natl. F. Ins. Co. (35 Ins. L. J. 507; 115 Tenn. 513; 92 S. 
 
 W. 402) 82 
 
 Hall v. Norwalk F. Ins. Co. (57 Conn. 105; 18 Ins. L. J. 518; 17 Atl. 
 
 356) 96, 107, 109, 121, 126 
 
 Hall v. Queen Ins. Co. (39 Nova Scotia 295; 1 E. L. R. 295; 21 
 
 Ins. Dig. 88) 112 
 
 Hall et al. v. Western Assur. Co. (Ala.), (133 Ala. 637; 32 S. 257;). 115, 124 
 
 Hall v. Western U. Assn. (106 Mo. App. 476) 60 
 
 Hamberg v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. (Minn. S. C.), (26 Ins. L. J. 
 
 782) 57, 59 
 
 Hamburg-Bremen Fire Ins. Co. v. Carlington (66 Tex. 103; 18 S. W. 
 
 337 ; 15 Ins. L. J. 509) 10, 68 
 
 Hamburg-Bremen F. Ins. Co. v. Lewis (D. C.) f (4 App. D. C. 66) .... 170 
 
 Hamilton v. Home Ins. Co. (92 Mo. 253) 187 
 
 Hamilton v. Ins. Co. (136 U. S. 242; 10 Supp. 945; 34 L/. Ed. 419) 100 
 
 Hamilton v. L. & L. & G. Ins. Co. (U. S. S. C.), (136 U. S. 242) 98 
 
 Hamilton v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (U. S. C. C. A. 6th Dist.) (23 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 561) 99 
 
 Hanley v. Aetna Ins. Co. (Mass.), (102 N. E. 641) 109 
 
 Hannan v. Williamsburgh City F. Ins. Co. (Mich.), (45 N. W. Rep. 
 
 1120) 175 
 
 Hanover Ins. Co. v. Crawford (121 Ala. 259; 25 S. 912) 91 
 
 Hanover F. Ins. Co. v. Harper (77 111. App. 453) 93 
 
 Hanover F. Ins. Co. v. Manassen (Mich.), (3 Ins. L. J. 668) 165 
 
 Hanover F. Ins. Co. v. Mannasson (29 Mich. 316; 5 Ben. 541) 188 
 
 Hanover F. Ins. Co. et al. v. Stoddard et al. (Neb.), (27 Ins. L. J. 
 
 120; 73 N. W. 291) 166 
 
 Hapeman v. Citizens Mut. F. Ins. Co. (126 Mich. 191; 85 N. W. 454; 
 
 30 Ins. L. J. 452) 12 
 
 Harper v. Albany M. Ins. Co. (17 N. Y. 194; 4 Ben. 247) 189 
 
 Harper v. N. Y. City Ins. Co. (22 N. Y. 441) 189 
 
 Harris v. The Eagle Fire Co. (5 Johns 368) 32 
 
 Harrison v. Ger.-Amer. Ins. Co. (67 Fed. 577) 93, 127 
 
 Harrison v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. (la.), (112 la. 77; 23 Ins. L. J. 
 
 161; 30 Ins. L. J. 253, 255; 59 Fed. 732; 83 N. W. 820) 93, 113, 118, 124 
 
 Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Adams (Tex.), (158 S. W. 231) 180 
 
 Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Alcott (97 111. 439; 73 N. Y. 141; 7 Ins. L. J. 
 
 430) 135 
 
 Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Bonner Merc. Co. (15 U. S. App. 134; 22 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 801) 120,121 
 
 Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Cannon et al. (Tex. C. C. A.) (46 S. W. 851; 
 
 11 Finch 109) 25 
 
 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Meyer (Neb. S. C.), (46 N. W. 292) 47 
 
 Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Olcott (97 111. 439) 182 
 
 Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Pires (Tex.), (165 S. W. 565) 178 
 
 Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Schlencker (80 Miss. 667; 32; S. 155) 144 
 
 Hartford Ins. Co. v. Asher (Ky.), (100 S. W. 233) 119 
 
272 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Harth v. Continental Ins. Co. (Ky. C. A.), (36 Ins. L. J. 603; 102 
 
 S. W. 242) 105, 106 
 
 Hartwell v. California Ins. Co. (Me.), (24 Atl. 954) 176 
 
 Hastings v. Westchester F. Ins. Co. (73 N. Y. 141; 7 Ins. L. J. 
 
 430) 135, 138 
 
 Hastings v. Westchester P. Ins. Co. (73 N. Y. 141; 7 Ins. L. J. 430).. 182 
 Hatcher v. Sovereign Ins. Co. (127 Pa. 588; 42 Ins. L. J. 137) (Wash. 
 
 S. C.) 89 
 
 Havens v. Germania F. Ins. Co. (135 Mo. 649; 37 S. W. 497; 24 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 321) 182 
 
 Hayward v. L,. & L. F. & L. Ins. Co. (7 Bosw. 385; 2 Abb. App. 349; 
 
 3 Keyes 456 [N. Y.]) 81 
 
 Hebner v. Palatine Ins. Co. (157 111. 144; 41 N. E. 627) 42 
 
 Hedger v. Ins. Co. (U. S.), (12 Ins. L. J. 926; 17 Fed. 498) 25, 26 
 
 Heffron v. Kittanning Ins. Co. (132 Pa. 580) 81 
 
 Hellman v. Winchester F. Ins. Co. (75 N. Y. 7; 8 Ins. L. J. 53) 65 
 
 Helm v. Anchor F. Ins. Co. (109 N. W. 605) 27 
 
 Henderson v. Western M. & F. Ins. Co. (10 Robinson [La.] 164) 20 
 
 Herndon v. Imperial F. Ins. Co. (N. C.), (21 Ins. L. J. 193) 126 
 
 Hewins v. London Assur. Corp. et al. (184 Mass. 177; 68 N. E. 62)... 
 
 11, 17, 18 
 
 Hickerson v. Ger.-Amer. Ins. Co. (Tenn.), (33 S. W. 1041; 25 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 422) 114 
 
 Hickerson v. Ins. Co. (96 Tenn. 193; 33 S. W. 1041; 32 L. R. A. 172) 
 
 117 118 
 
 Hickerson v. Ins. Cos. (Tenn.), (25 Ins. L. J. 422) 113, 129> 
 
 Hickerson v. Royal Ins. Co. (96 Tenn. 193; 33 S. W. 1041) 127 
 
 Hicks v. British Amer. Assur. Co. (8 N. Y. App. Div. 444; S. C. 
 
 43 N. Y. Supp. 623) 46 
 
 Hilton v. Phoenix Assn. Co. (Me. S. J. C.), (42 Atl. 412; 28 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 309) 26, 34 
 
 Hocking v. British Am. Assur. Co. (62 Wash. 73; 113 Pac. 259) 183: 
 
 Hoffman v. Aetna Ins. Co. (1 Rob. 501; [S. C.] 19 Abb. Pr. 325) 44, 65 
 
 Hoffman v. King (160 N. Y. 618; 55 N. E. 401) 21 
 
 Hogan v. Scottish U. & N. Ins. Co. (U. S.), (98 Fed. 129) 173 
 
 Holbrook v. Baloise F. Ins. Co. (Cal.), (49 Pac. 555) 129 
 
 Home Ins. Co. v. Allen (119 Ala. 436; 24 S. 399) 87 
 
 Home Ins. Co. v. Baltimore W. Ho. Co. (93 U. S. 527; 6 Ins. L. 
 
 J. 39) 142 
 
 Home F. Ins. Co. v. Bean (Neb.), (24 Ins. L. J. 516) 94, 129 
 
 Home Ins. Co. v. Coker (43 Okla. 331; 142 Pac. 1195) 17 
 
 Home Ins. Co. v. Duke (Ind. S. C.), (3 Ins. L. J. 363) 44 
 
 Home Ins. Co. v. Favorite (46 111. 263) 173 
 
 Home Ins. Co. v. Winn. (Neb. S. C.), (24 Ins. L. J. 126) 60 
 
 Home Lodge v. Queen Ins. Co. (21 S. D. 165; 110 N. W. 778) 82 
 
 Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roe (Wis.), (36 N. W. 594) 174 
 
 Hong Sling v. Scottish U. & Natl. Ins. Co. (7 Utah 441; 27 Pac. 170).. Ill 
 
 Hooker v. Phoenix (69 Mo. App. 141) 97 
 
 Hoover v. Mercantile T. M. Ins. Co. (93 Mo. App. Ill; 69 S. W. 42)... 181 
 Hope Oil Mill Comp. & Mfg. Co. v. Phoenix Assur. Co. (Miss.), (21 
 
 S. 132) 171 
 
 Hopkins v. Provincial Ins. Co. (18 Up. Can. C. P. 74; 5 Ben. 159) 188 
 
 Hough v. Peoples F. Ins. Co. (36 Md. 398; 2 Ins. L. J. 353) 142, 141 
 
 Hough et al. v. Peoples Ins. Co. (Md.), (2 Ins. L. J. 353) 173 
 
 Houff v. Ger.-Amer. Ins. Co. 3 Va. App. 986; 66 S. E. 831) 181 
 
 Hubbard v. North Brit. & M. Ins. Co. (57 Mo. App. 1) 49 
 
 Huchberger v. Ins. Co. (4 Biss. 265 Fed. Cas. No. 6822) 60 
 
 Huckins v. Peoples M. F. Ins. Co. (31 N. H. 238) 169 
 
 Huer v. N. W. Natl. Ins. Co. (111. S. C.), (22 Ins. L. J. 518) 82 
 
 Huer v. Westchester F. Ins. Co. (111. S. C.), (33 N. E. 411; 24 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 471) 82 
 
 Humphreys v. Natl. Benefit Assn. (139 Pa. 214; 20 Atl. 1047; 11 L,. R. 
 
 A. 564) 27 
 
 Hurst et al v. Home Protection F. Ins. Co. (Ala. S. C.), (16 Ins. L. 
 
 J. 688) 66 
 
 Huston v. State Ins. Co. (la.), (69 N. W. 674) 57, 178. 
 
 Imperial Ins. Co. v. Murray (73 Pa. St. 13; 5 Ben. 526) 185 
 
 Indiana Ins. Co. v. Boehm (88 Ind. 578) 116- 
 
 Inman v. Western Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (12 Wend. 452) 37, 4& 
 
 In re. Commercial Ins. Co. (R. I.), (36 Atl. 930; 10 Ins. Dig. 368) 137 
 
 In re. Downs (199 Mass. 380; 85 N. E. 174; 37 Ins. L. J. 924) 150- 
 
 Ins. Co. of N. A. v. Hegewald (Ind.), (32 Ins. L. J. 621) 114 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 273 
 
 Ins. Co. v. Bishop (154 111. 9; 39 N. E. 1102; 45 Am. St. 105) 117 
 
 Ins. Co. v. Carey (111. S. C.), (Ins. L. J. 493) 46 
 
 Ins. Co. v. Goehring (99 Pa. St. 13) 120 
 
 Ins. Co. v. Gracey (Cal. S. C.), (20 Ins. L. J. 28) 46 
 
 Ins. C. v. Hathaway (43 Kan. 399) 44 
 
 Ins. Co. v. Journal Pub. Co. (Wash. S. C.), (20 Ins. L. J. 395) 46 
 
 Ins. Co. v. Lawrence (10 Pet. 507) 22 
 
 Ins. Co. v. Maguire (57 111. 342) 46 
 
 Ins. Co. v. Mannasson (29 Mich. 316; 3 Ins. L. J. 668) 60 
 
 Ins. Co. v. Richardson (Neb. S. C.), (24 Ins. L. J. 690) 46 
 
 Ins. Co. v. Seyferth (29 111. App. 513) 44 
 
 Ins. Co. v. Slaughter (U. S.), (12 Wallace 404; 5 Ben. 340) 187 
 
 Ins. Cos. v. Weide (U. S. S. C.), (1 Ins. L. J. 767) 59 
 
 Ins. Cos. v. Weides (14 Wallace U. S. 375) 55 
 
 Iowa Central Bldg. & L. Assn. v. Merchants & Bankers P. Ins. Co. 
 
 (la. S. C.), (32 Ins. L. J. 852) .66, 67, 102 
 
 Irving v. Excelsior F. Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (1 Bos. 507) 44 
 
 Isaacs v. Royal Ins. Co. (L. R. ; 5 Exchequer 296) ~186 
 
 Jerdee v. Ins. Co. (75 Wis. 345) -. , 86 
 
 Joel v. Harvey (Eng.), (5 Weekly Rep. 488; 4 Ben. 185) 189 
 
 Joffee v. Niagara F. Ins. Co. (116 Md. 155; 81 Atl. 281) '179 
 
 Johnson v. Amer. F. Ins. Co. (Minn.), (41 Minn. 396; 43 N. W. 
 
 59) 129, 132 
 
 Johnosn v. Arbresch (Wis.), (101 N. W. 395; 34 Ins. L. J. 203) 172 
 
 Johnson v. Hall (Tex.), (163 S. W. 399) 180 
 
 Johnson v. Humboldt Ins. Co. (91 111. 92) 180 
 
 Johnson v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (112 Mass. 49; 69 Mo. App. 226, 232; 
 
 49, 57, 94, 97, 102 
 
 Johnson v. Stewart (243 Pa. 485; 90 Atl. 349) 179 
 
 Johnston v. Farmers Ins. Co. (106 Mich. 96; 64 N. W. 5) 44 
 
 Johnston v. Ins. Co. (7 Sess. Cas. [Scot.] 52; 1 Bennett 259) 9 
 
 Johnston v. Niagara F. Ins. Co. (N. C.), (25 Ins. L. J. 558; 24 S. 
 
 E. 424) 176 
 
 Jones v. Howard Ins. Co. (117 N. Y. 103) 48 
 
 Joy v. Security F. Ins. Co. (83 la. 12; 48 N. W. 1049) 33 
 
 Kahnweiler v. Phenix Ins. Co. (67 Fed. 483; 23 Ins. L. J. 391; 57 
 
 Fed. 562; 67 Fed. 483; 14 C. C. A. 485) 95, 97, 98 
 
 Kaiser v. Hamburg-Bremen F. Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (59 App. Div. 525; 
 
 69 N. Y. Supp. 344; 172 N. Y. 663; 65 N. E. 1118) 107, 124, 126 
 
 Kansas City etc. v. Amer. F. Ins. Co. (100 Mo. App. 691; 75 S. W. 
 
 186) 144 
 
 Kattleman v. Fire Assn. (79 Mo. App. 447) 15 
 
 Keefe v. Natl. Ace. Assn. (N. Y.), (38 N. Y. Supp. 854; 4 App. Div. 
 
 392) 110 
 
 Keeney v. Home Ins. Co. (71 N. Y. 396) 48 
 
 Keisel v. Sun Ins. Office (U. S. C. C. A. 8th Dist.) (28 Ins. L. J. 
 
 434) 79, 80 
 
 Kelly v. L. & L. & G. Ins. Co. (944 Minn. 141; 102 N. W. 380; 34 
 
 Ins. L. J. 421) 93 
 
 Kendall v. Holland Purchase Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (2 S. C. 375; aff'd. in 
 
 58 N. Y. 682) 38 
 
 Kenneflck-Hamrnond Co. v. Norwich Union F. Ins. Soc. (Mo. App.) 
 
 (13 Ins. L. J. 664) 83 
 
 Kent v. Aetna Ins. Co. (Mo. App.), (146 S. W. 78) 108 
 
 Kent v. L. & L. & G. Ins. Co. (26 Ind. 294) 169 
 
 Kentucky C. Co. v. Rochester Ger. Ins. Co. (20 Ky. L. R. 1571; 49 
 
 S. W. 780) 109 
 
 Kentucky Chair Co. v. Rochester Ger. Ins. Co. (Ky.), (28 Ins. L,. J. 
 
 361) 126 
 
 Kerelsen v. Sun Fire Office (122 N. Y. 545; aff'd. S. C. 16 St. 239) 45 
 
 Kernochan v. N. Y. Bowery F. & M. Co. (17 N. Y. 428) 47 
 
 Kersey v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (135 Mich. 10; 97 N. W. 57) 98, 114, 128 
 
 Kiernan v. Dutchess Co. Mut. Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (44 N. E. 698) 114 
 
 Kingsley v. N. E. Ins. Co. (62 Mass. 393) 44 
 
 Kinzer v. Natl. M. Ins. Co. (88 Kan. 93; 127 Pac. 762; Ann. 44 L. 
 
 R. A. [N. S.] 121) 33 
 
 Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. McGinnis (87 111. 70) 27 
 
 Knop v. Natl. Ins. Co. (Mich. S. C.), (25 Ins. L. J. 181) 61 
 
 Knoxville F. Ins. Co. v. Hircl (Tex.), (23 S. W. 393; 23 Ins. L. 
 
 J. 16) ". 164 
 
 18 
 
274 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Kratzenstein v. Western Assur. Co. (N. Y.), (22 N. E. 221) 165 
 
 Kupferschmidt v. Agricultural Ins. Co. (80 N. J. L. 441; 78 Atl. 225; 
 
 34 L. R. A. 503) 134, 182 
 
 LaForce v. Williamsburgh City F. Ins. Co. (43 Mo. App. 518) 38, 83 
 
 Lake Sup. P. & Cold Storage Co. v. Concordia F. Ins. Co. (Minn.), 
 
 104 N. W. Rep. 560) 176 
 
 Lamson v. Prudential Ins. Co. (171 Mass. 433; 50 N. E. 943; 28 Ins. 
 
 I.. J. 70) 94 
 
 Lancaster F. Ins. Co. v. Lenheim (89 Pa. 497) 164 
 
 Landsdale v. Mason et al. (Eng.), (1 Marshall 688; 1 Ben. 16) 184 
 
 Lang v. Eagle F. Ins. Co. (12 App. Div. 39; S. C. 42 N. Y. Supp. 
 
 539) Tg, 112 
 
 Langan v. Ins. Co. (162 Pa. St. 357; 29 Ins. L. J. 878) 56 
 
 Langan v. Royal Ins. Co. (Pa. S. C.), (29 Atl. 710) 55 
 
 Langsner v. German Alliance Ins. Co. (123 N. Y. Supp. 144) 133 
 
 Langworthy v. O. & O. Ins. Co. (85 N. Y. 632; 10 Ins. L. J. 546) 15 
 
 Larkin v. Glens Falls Ins. Co. (Minn. S. C.), (83 N. W. 409) 68 
 
 Larkins v. Glens Falls Ins. Co. (80 Minn. 527; 83 N. W. 409; 29 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 527) 10 
 
 Laurenzi v. Atlas Ins. Co. (Tenn.), (176 S. W. 1022) 182 
 
 Law v. Commercial M. F. Co. (N. D.) ( (107 N. W. 59) 98 
 
 Leadbetter v. Aetna Ins. Co. (13 Me. 265) 49 
 
 Lebanon Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Hankinson (2 Cent. 828 [Pa.]) 75 
 
 Lee v. Ins. Co. (73 Tex. 641) 44 
 
 Leigh v. Ins. Co. (37 Mo. App. 542) 44 
 
 Leigh v. Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co. (37 Mo. App. 542) 49 
 
 Lelican Ins. Co. v. Co-Operative Assn. (Tex. S. C.), (19 Ins. L. J. 921) 80 
 
 L'Engle v. Scottish U. & N. Ins. Co. (Fla.), (27 S. W. 462) 166 
 
 Leonard v. Orient Ins. Co. (U. S. C. C. A. 7th Dist.), (30 Ins. L. J. 
 
 980, 981) 79, 82 
 
 LeSuer, etc., v. Mut. F. Ins. (101 la. 514; 70 N. W. 761) 143 
 
 Lesure Lumber Co. v. Mut. F. Ins. Co. (101 la. 514; 70 N. W. 761) 98 
 
 Levine v. Lancashire Ins. Co. (Minn.), (26 Ins. L. J. 36) 107, 121, 128 
 
 Levy v. Brooklyn Ins. Co. (25 Wend. 687; 2 Ben. 93) 60 
 
 Levy v. Scottish U. & N. Ins. Co. (W. Va. S. C. A.), (52 S. E. 449)... 104 
 
 Lewis et al. v. Springfield F. & M. Co. (76 Mass. 159) 80 
 
 Liebenstein v. Baltic F. Ins. Co. (45 111. 301, 305; 5 Ben. 115) 173, 189 
 
 Linde v. Republic F. Ins. Co. (50 N. Y. Super. 362) 107 
 
 Lion F. Ins. Co. v. Star (Tex. S. C.), (18 Ins. L. J. 873) 60 
 
 Little v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (123 Mass. 380) 59 
 
 L. & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Agricultural S. & L. Co. (33 Can. S. C. 94) ... 182 
 
 L. & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Delta etc. (Tex.), (121 S. W. 599).. 140, 143, 153 
 
 L. & L. & G. Co. v. Hall (1 Kan. App. 18; 41 Pac. 65) 93 
 
 L. & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Kearney et al. (U. S. C. C. A. 8th Dist.) (94 
 
 Fed. 314) 225 
 
 L. L. & G. Ins. Co. v. McNeill (U. S.), (89 Fed. 131) 171 
 
 L. & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Tillis (110 Ala. 20; 17 S. 672) 89 
 
 L. & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Van. Os. (63 Miss. 431) 164 
 
 Loeb v. American Central Ins. Co. (99 Mo. 50; 21 Ins. L. J. 889) 38 
 
 London & L. Ins. Co. v. Crunk (91 Tenn. 376; 23 S. W. 140) 14 
 
 London & Lane. F. Ins. Co. v. Fischer (U. S.), (92 Fed. 500) 166 
 
 London & Lancashire F. Ins. Co. v. Storrs (U. S. C. C. A. 8th Dist.), 
 
 (25 Ins. L. J. 283) 96 
 
 Lowell Mfg. Co. v. Safeguard F. Ins. Co. (88 N. Y. 591) 138 
 
 Lumbermen's Ins. Co. v. Bell (111.), (45 N. E. 130) 47, 53 
 
 McAllaster v. Niagara F. Ins. Co. (156 N. Y. 80; 28 Ins. L. J. 769).. 66. 102 
 McCready et al. v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. (N. Y. App. Div.), (70 N. Y. 
 
 Supp. 778; 30 Ins. L. J. 668) 68 
 
 McCullough v. Ins. Co. (113 Mo. 606; 21 S. W. 207) 117, 118, 124 
 
 McCullough v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (Mo. S. C.), (21 Ins. L. J. 781; 113 
 
 Mo. 606; 21 S. W. 207) 113, 119, 127 
 
 McDermott v. Lycoming F. Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (12 J. and S. 221) 44 
 
 McDowell v. Aetna Ins. Co. et al. (Mass.), (164 Mass. 444; 41 N. E. 
 
 665; 25 Ins. L. J. 156) 101, 131 
 
 McFarland v. Kittanning Ins. Co. (Pa.), (21 Ins. L. J. 555) 129 
 
 McFarland v. Peabody Ins. Co. (6 W. Va. 425) 168 
 
 McFarland v. Peabody Ins. Co. et al. (6 W. Va. 425, 437; 5 Ben. 490). 187 
 
 McGlathery v. Western Assur. Co. (115 Ala. 213; 22 S. 104) 88 
 
 McGraw v. Home Ins. Co. (Kan. S. C.), (28 Ins. Dig. 18; 144 Pac. 821) 17 
 
 McMillan v. Ins. Co. of N. A. (58 S. E. 1020; 78 S. C. 433) 89 
 
 McNally v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (137 N. Y. 389; [S. C.] 50 St. 680; [S. C.] 
 
 42 St. 21) 37, 51 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 275 
 
 McNamara v. Dakota F. & M. Ins. Co. (S. D.), (47 N. W. 288) 174 
 
 McNees v. Southern Ins. Co. (69 Mo. App. 232) 97 
 
 McNutt v. Va. F. & M. Ins. Co 225 
 
 MacFarland v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. (Minn. S. C.), (21 Ins. L. 
 
 J. 879) 83 
 
 Mack v. Ins. Co 34 
 
 Mack v. Lancaster Ins. Co. (U. S. C. C.), (19 Ins. L. J. 68) 25 
 
 Maclinger v. Mechanics F. Ins. Co. (2 Hall 490) 176 
 
 Maisel v. Fire Assn. (N. Y.), (69 N. Y. Supp. 181) 177 
 
 Malin v. Mercantile T. M. Ins. Co. (105 Mo. App. 625) 20 
 
 Manchester F. Assur. Co. v. Feibelman (Ala.), (23 S.. 759) 167 
 
 Manchester F. Assur. Co. v. Simmons (12 Tex. C. A. 607; 35 S. W. 722) 93 
 
 Mannasson v. Ins. Co. (29 Mich. 316; 3 Ins. L,. J. 668) 62 
 
 Mfrs. and Builders F. Ins. Co. v. Mullen (Neb.), (67 N. W. 445) 121 
 
 Marchesseau v. Merchants Ins. Co. (2 Ben. 166) 60 
 
 Marchessen v. Merchants Ins. Co. (1 Rob. [La.] 438; 2 Ben. 46, 166)... 25 
 
 Maril v. Conn. F. Ins. Co. (Ga.), (23 S. E. 463) 163 
 
 Marion v. Great Rep. Ins. Co. (35 Mo. 148) 59 
 
 Marsh v. New Hampshire F. Ins. Co. (49 Atl. 88) 175 
 
 Marsh Oil Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co. (79 Mo. App. 21) 176 
 
 Marshall et al. v. Amer. Guar. F. & M. I. Co. (30 Mo. App. 18) 67 
 
 Maryland F. Ins. Co. v. Whiteford (31 Md. 219; 5 Ben. 240) 187 
 
 Mascot v. Granite State F. Ins. Co. (Vt.) t (35 Atl. 75) 164 
 
 Mason v. Franklin F. Ins. Co. (12 Gill & J. [Md.] 468; 2 Ben. 214) 184 
 
 Mason v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. (29 Up. Can. Q. B. 585; 5 Ben. 294).. 164, 187 
 
 Matthews v. Amer. Central Ins. Co. (154 N. Y. 458) 37 
 
 Mawhinney v. Southern Ins. Co. (Gal.), (32 Pac. 945; 22 Ins. L. 
 
 J. 596) 167 
 
 Mecca Ins. Co. v. First State Bank (Tex.), (135 S. W. 1083) 181 
 
 Mechanics Ins. Co. v. Hodge (111. S. C.), (26 Ins. L. J. 406; 37 N. 
 
 E. 51) 102 
 
 Mechanics Ins. Co. v. Hoover (182 Fed. 590; aff'g 173 Fed. 888) 30 
 
 Medina v. Builders Ins. Co. (120 Mass. 225) 169 
 
 Meigs v. Ins. Co. (205 Pa. 378) 141 
 
 Meigs v. London Assur. Corp. (126 Fed. 78, 781; 33 Ins. L. J. 251; 
 
 32 Ins. L. J. 251) 139, 143 
 
 Merchants Ins. Co. v. Stephens (Ky. C. A.), (59 S. W. 511) 94 
 
 Merchants M. Ins. Co. v. LaCroix (35 Tex. 249; 5 Ben. 455) 184 
 
 Merrick v. Germania Fire Ins. Co. (54 Pa. 277) 27 
 
 Meyer v. Amer. Ins. Co. (4 N. Y. Supp. 617; 23 N. Y. Supp. 71; 
 
 18 Ins. L. J. 156) 142, 151 
 
 Meyerson v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. (39 N. Y. Supp. 329; 17 M,isc. 121)... 133 
 Michel v. American Cent. Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (44 N. Y. Supp. 832; 17 
 
 Hun. 87) 128, 168 
 
 Michel, Secy of State v. Southern Ins. Co. (128 La. 562; 54 S. 1010; 
 
 24 Am. & Eng. Anno. Gas. 305) '. 137 
 
 Michigan Pipe Co. v. Michigan F. & M. Ins. Co. (Mich.), (52 N. W. 
 
 1070) 172 
 
 Michey v. Burlington Ins. Co. (35 la. 174, 5 Bennett 439; 2 Ins. L. 
 
 J. 15; Ann. 14 Am. R. Ext. Anno. 494 Notes) 13, 22 
 
 Miller v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. (70 la. 704) 56 
 
 Miller v. London & Lancashire F. Ins. Co. (41 111. App. 395) 82 
 
 Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co. v. Russell (O. S. C.), (62 N. E. 338; 
 
 31 Ins. L. J. 360) 67 
 
 Milwaukee Mechs. Ins. Co. v. Stewart (Ind.), (42 N. E. 290; 13 Ind. 
 
 App. 640) f 98, 132 
 
 Milwaukee Mechs. Ins. Co. v. Winfleld (Kan. C. A.), (51 Pac. 567) ... 57 
 Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co. v. Darnall (S. D.), (83 N. W. 
 
 266) 178 
 
 Mispelhorn v. Ins. Co. (53 Md. 473) 56 
 
 Mitchell v. Potomic Ins. Co. (U. S. S. C.) (31 Ins. L. J. 570) 82 
 
 Mitchell v. St. Paul German F. Ins. Co. (Mich. S. C.), (52 N. W. 
 
 1017; 21 Ins. L. J. 1003) 25 
 
 Model D. G. Co. v. N. B. & M. Ins. Co. (79 Mo. App. 550) 69, 90 
 
 Monteleone v. Royal Ins. Co. of Liverpool and London (La.), (47 La. 
 
 Ann. 1563; 18 So. 472; 24 Ins. L. J. 531) 10, 68 
 
 Montgomery v. Amer. Cent. Ins. Co. (108 Wis. 146; 84 N. W. 175; 30 
 
 Ins. L. J. 122) 104 
 
 Moore v. Ins. Co. (28 Grat. 508) 60 
 
 Moore v. Perpetual Ins. Co. (16 Mo. 98) 184 
 
 Moore v. Protection Ins. Co. (29 Me. 97; 2 Bennett 758) 60 
 
276 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Morley v. L. & L. & G. Ins. Co. (Mich.), (48 N. W. 502; 20 Ins. L. 
 
 J. 677) 68, 100 
 
 Morrell v. Irving Ins. Co. (33 N. Y. 429) 65 
 
 Morris v. Ger.-Amer. Ins. Co. (Ky.), (14 Ky. L. R. 859) 134 
 
 Morse v. Buffalo F. & M. Co. (30 Wis. 534; 5 Ben. 424) 187 
 
 Mortimer v. N. Y. Fire Ins. Co. (2 U. S. Law Mag. 452) 44 
 
 Mosness v. Ger.-Amer. Ins. Co. (Minn.), (21 Ins. L. J. 915) 98, 120 
 
 Mosness v. German Ins. Co. (50 Minn. 341; 21 Ins. L. J. 915; 52 
 
 N. W. 932) 98, 106 
 
 Moyer v. Sun Ins. Office (176 Pa. 579; 35 All. 221) 93 
 
 Mullen v. Ins. Co. (58 Vt. 113) 61 
 
 Mumford v. Hallett (1 Johns 433) 32 
 
 Murphy v. N. Y. Bowery Ins. Co. (62 Mo. App. 495) 182 
 
 Murphy v. North B. & M. Ins. Co. (61 Mo. App. 323; 70 Mo. App. 98) 
 
 55, 97, 130 
 
 Mutual F. Ins. Co. v. Alvord (23 Ins. L. J. 801; 61 Fed. 752; 21 U. S. 
 
 App. 228) 93, 96 
 
 Nally v. Home Ins. Co. (250 Mo. 452; 157 S. W. 769) 187 
 
 Narinsky v. Fidelity Surety Co. (92 N. Y. Supp. 771) 56 
 
 National Fire Ins. Co. v. O'Brien et al. (Ark.), (87 S. W. 129) 115 
 
 National Masonic A. Assn. v. Burr (Neb.), (62 N. W. 466; 24 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 423) 110 
 
 National Wall Paper Co. v. Associated Mfrs. Mut. F. Ins. Co. (175 
 
 N. Y. 226) 44, 179 
 
 Nave v. Home Mut. Ins. Co. (37 Mo. 431) 80 
 
 Nease v. Aetna Ins. Co. (W. Va. C. A.), (9 S. E. 233) 47 
 
 Needy v. German-Amer. Ins. Co. (Pa. S. C.), (47 Atl. 739) 99 
 
 Nelson v. Continental Ins. Co. (182 Fed. 783) 33 
 
 Nelson et al. v. Traders' Ins. Co. (N. Y. C. A.), (34 Ins. L. J. 933)... 79 
 
 Nerger v. Equitable F. Assn. (20 S. D. 419; 35 Ins. L. J. 556) 98 
 
 New Jersey Rubber Co. v. Commercial U. Assur. Co. (N. J.), (46 Atl. 
 
 777) 165 
 
 Newmark v. L. & L. & G. Ins. Co. (30 Mo. 160; 1 Phillips Sec. 624 
 
 p. 1107; 3 Penn. 471; 13 111. 676; 1 Story 157) 75, 76 
 
 New Orleans R. E. M. Co. v. Teutonia Ins. Co. (La. 54 S. 466) 18 
 
 Newton et al. v. DeForest Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (Wia S. C.), (104 N. 
 
 W. 107) 63 
 
 Newton et al. v. Theresa Village Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (104 N. W. 107) ... 63 
 
 Newton et al. v. Waterloo Mut. F. Ins. Co. (104 N. W. 107) 63 
 
 New York & Boston Dispatch Express Co. v. Traders Ins. Co. (132 
 
 Mass. 377; Ann. 42 Am. R. Ext. Anno. 440, Notes) 7 
 
 N. Y. Cent. Ins. Co. v. Natl. Protective Ins. Co. (20 Barb. 468) 37 
 
 N. Y. F. Ins. Co. v. Delaven (N. Y.), (8 Paige 419) 65 
 
 N. Y. Mut. S. & L. Co. v. Manchester F. Ins. Co.,' (N. Y.), (87 N. Y. 
 
 Supp, 1075) 121 
 
 Niagara v. Heenan (111.), (54 N. E. 1052) 175 
 
 Niagara F. Ins. Co. v. Bishop (111.), (154 111. 9; 39 N. E. 1102; 45 
 
 Am. St. 105; 25 Ins. L. J. 24; 49 111. App. 388) 113, 114, 118, 127 
 
 Niagara F. Ins. v. Heenan (81 111. App. 678) 143 
 
 Niagara F. Ins. Co. v. DeGroff (12 Mich. 124) 164, 189 
 
 Niagara F. Ins. Co. v. Heflin (Ky. C. A.) (51 Atl. 345; 30 Ins. L. 
 
 J. 326) 25 
 
 Niblo v. North Amer. F. Co. (1 Sandf. 551) 32 
 
 Nichols et al. v. Sun Mut. F. Ins. Co. (Mass. S. C.), (14 S. W. 263; 
 
 23 Ins. L. J. 633) 80 
 
 Nickerson v. Nickerson,et al. (Me. S. J. C.), (12 Atl. 880) 46 
 
 Nolan v. Ocean Ace. & G. Corp. (23 Can. L. T. 187) 98 
 
 Noonan v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. (21 Mo. 81) 49 
 
 Norman v. Missouri T. M. Co. (74 Mo. App. 456) 181 
 
 Norris v. Equitable F. Assn. (S. C. S. D.), (102 N. W. 306) 98 
 
 Norris v. Farmers' Mut. F. Ins. Co. (65 Mo. App. 632) 176, 181 
 
 North B. & M. Ins. Co. v. Moffat (Eng.), (L. R. 7; Com. P. 25; 5 
 
 Ben. 381) 185 
 
 North B. & M. Ins. Co. v. Robinett (Va.), (72 S. E. 668) 98, 133 
 
 Northern Assur. Co. v. Samuels (Tex. C. C. A.), (38 S. W. 239) 101 
 
 Northern Pac. Exp. Co. v. Traders Ins. Co. (111.), (55 N. E. 702) 170 
 
 North German Ins. Co. v. Morton (108 Tenn. 384; 68 S. W. 816; 31 
 
 Ins. L. J. 580) 131 
 
 North German Ins. Co. v. Morton-Scott-Robertson Co. (108 Tenn. 384; 
 
 67 S. W. 816; 31 Ins. L. J. 580) 72, 104 
 
 N. W. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Germania F. Ins. Co. (40 Wis. 446) 163 
 
 N. W. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ins. Cos. (88 N. W. 265, 272) 164 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 277 
 
 Northwestern M. L. Ins. Co. v. Rochester Ger. Ins. Co. (88 Minn. 48; 
 
 88 N. W. 272) 33 
 
 Norwayze v. Thuringia Ins. Co. (111. S. C.), (33 Ins. L. J. 83) 83 
 
 Novak v. Rochester German Ins. Co. (111. App.), (40 Nat. Corp. 698)... 98 
 
 Obersteller v. Com'l Assur. Co. (Cal. S. C.), (22 Ins. L. J. 392) 60 
 
 O'Brien v. Commercial F. Ins. Co. (63 N. Y. 108) 55 
 
 O'Brien v. Ohio Ins. Co. (52 Mich. 131) 54 
 
 O'Brien v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (76 N. Y. 459) 37, 38 
 
 O'Connor v>_ Queen Ins. Co. (140 Wis. 388; 122 N. W. 1038; Ann. 25 
 
 L. R. A. [N. S.] 501; 17 Am. & Eng. Anno. Gas. 1118) 14 
 
 Ogden v. East River Ins. Co. (50 N. Y. 388; 5 Ben. 439; 2 Ins. L. 
 
 J. 134) .142, 143 
 
 Ohage v. Union Ins. Co. (Minn. S. C.), (85 N. W. 212) 94 
 
 Ohio Farmers' Ins. Co. v. Titus (92 N. E. 82) 93 
 
 O'Keefe v. Liverpool L,., L. & G. Ins. Co. (140 Mo. 558; 41 S. W. 922; 
 
 26 Ins. L. J. 888) 9, 68 
 
 Okla. F. Ins. Co. v. McKey (Tex.), (152 S. W. 440) 183 
 
 Oppenheim v. Firman's Fund Ins. Co. (Minn.), (138 N. W. 777) 179 
 
 Orient Ins. Co. v. Harmon (Tex. C. C. A.), (117 S. W. 192) 108 
 
 Orient Ins. Co. v. Parlin (38 S. W. 60) 182 
 
 O'Rourk v. German Ins. Co. (Minn.), (1091 N. W. 401; 99 Minn. 293; 
 
 104 N. W. 900) 118 
 
 Oshkosh Match Co. v. Manchester Assur. Co. (92 Wis. 510) 41 
 
 Ostrich, v. German-Amer. Ins. Co. (65 C. C. A. 251; 131 Fed. 13; 33 
 
 Ins. L. J. 925) 77 
 
 Overby v. Thrasher (47 Ga. 10) 120 
 
 Pacific Ins. Co. v. Louisville Lead & Color Co. (Ky.), (87 S. W. 1115)., 167 
 Page v. Sun Ins. Office (U. S. C. A. 8th Dist.), (20 C. C. A. 397; 25 
 
 Ins. L. J. 865; 36 U. S. App. 672; 74 Fed. 203) 140, 153 
 
 Palatine Ins. Co. v. Morton (106 Tenn. 558; 61 S. W. 787; 30 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 481) 71, 98, 111 
 
 Palatine Ins. Co. v. Morton-Scott-Robertson Co. (Tenn.), (61 S. W. 
 
 787; 106 Tenn. 558) 99,119 
 
 Palatine Ins. Co. v. Nunn (99 Miss. 493; 55 So. 44; 40 Ins. L. J. 
 
 1447) 11, 18 
 
 Paltrovitch v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (143 N. Y. 73; S. C. 60 St. 462; aff'g. 
 
 S. C. 68 Hun. 304) 37, 47, 50 
 
 Paris v. Hamburg-Bremen F. Ins. Co. (204 Mass. 90; 90 N. E. 420) 
 
 94, 98, 129 
 
 Parrish v. Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co. (20 Ins. L. J. 95) 33 
 
 Parker et al. v. Amazon Ins. Co. (Wis. S. C.), (3 Ins. L. J. 567) 59 
 
 Parks v. General Interest Assur. Co. (5 Pick 34; 1 Ben. 184) 184 
 
 Parks et al. v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. (Mo.), (12 S. W. 1058) 165 
 
 Parks v. Ins. Co. (100 Mo. 373) 137 
 
 Patrons Mut. Aid Soc. v. Hall (Ind.), (49 N. E. 279) 178 
 
 Peabody v. L. & L. & G. Ins. Co. (171 Mass. 114; 50 N. E. 526) 150 
 
 Peabody v. Saterlee (166 N. Y. 174 [S. C.] 36 App. Div. 426; 30 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 885) 45, 46 
 
 Pearlstine v. Westchester F. Ins. Co. (S. C. S. C.), (Ins. L. J. 39) ...49, 53 
 
 Peet v. Dakota F. & M. Ins. Co. (Dak. S. C.), (20 Ins. L. J. 253) 47 
 
 Pelzer Mfg". Co. v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. et al. (U. S.), (19 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 372) 172 
 
 Penn. etc. v. Philadelphia, etc. (201 Pa. St. 497; 51 Atl. 351) 12, 68 
 
 Penn. F. Ins. Co. v. Carnahan (19 O. C. C. 97, 114; 10 O. C. D. 186, 
 
 225) 112 
 
 Penn. F. Ins. Co. v. Drackett et al. (O. S. C.), (57 N. E. 962) 94 
 
 Penn. F. Ins. Co. v. Drapper (65 S. 923) 87, 89 
 
 Penn. Plate Glass Co. v. Spring Garden Ins. Co. (Pa.), (28 Ins. L. J. 
 
 223; 189 Pa. 255; 42 Atl. 138) 103, 131 
 
 Penn. R. R. Co. v. Kerr (62 Pa. 353) 19 
 
 Peoria F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Wilson (5 Minn. 3; 4 Ben. 497) 144 
 
 Peoria F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Wilson 5 Minn. 3; 4 Ben. 497) 144 
 
 Peoria M. & F. Ins. Co. v. Lewis (18 111. 553) 174 
 
 Peoples' F. Ins. Co. v. Pulver (Clement's Dig. 15 [Rule 5]; 127 111. 246; 
 
 20 N. E. 18) 42, 47 
 
 Perry v. Greenwich Ins. Co. (N. C.), (49 S. E. 889) 126 
 
 Perry v. Mechanics M. Ins. Co. (11 Fed. 485) 20 
 
 Pettit et al. v. State Ins.! Co. (Minn.), (19 Ins. L. J. 138; 43 N. W. 
 
 378) 178 
 
278 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Phenix Ins. Co. v. Angel et al. (Ky.), (38 S. W. 1067) ., . 225 
 
 Phenix Ins. Co. v. Belt Ry. Co. (82 111. App. 265) 171 
 
 Phenix Ins. Co. et al. v. Carnahan (63 O. 258; 58 N. E. 805) 98 
 
 Phenix et al v. Carnahan et al. (O.) ( (58 N. E. 805) 98 
 
 Phenix Ins. Co. v. Martin (Miss.), (16 S. 417; 24 Ins. L J 319) 174 
 
 Phenix v. Stocks et al. (111. S. C.), (36 N. E. 408) 101 
 
 Phillips v. Home Ins. Co. (112 N. Y. Supp. 769) 32 
 
 Phillips v. Protection Ins. Co. (14 Mo. 220) 
 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Summerfleld (Miss. S. C.), (22 Ins. L. J. 746) ..... 59 
 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. et al. v. Carnahan (63 O. 258; 58 N. E. 805) 112 
 
 Phoenix Assur. Co. v. Stenson (Tex. C. C.A.), (78 S. W. 866) 69 
 
 Phoenix F. Assur. Co. v. Murray (U. S. C. C. A.), (187 Fed. 809) 93 
 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Carnahan (O.), (58 N. E. 805) 100, 112 
 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Center (Tex. C .C. A.), (31 S. W. 446) 57 
 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Dorsey (Miss.), (58 S. 778) 180 
 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Dunn (Tex.), (41 S. W. 109) 167 
 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Favorite (49 111. 259) 173 
 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Fleenor (104 Ark 119; 148 S. W. 650) 179 
 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Fleming et al. (Ark.), (27 Ins. L,. J. 584; 44 S. 
 
 W. 464) 164 
 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Greer (Ark. S. C.), (25 Ins. L. J. 311) 82 
 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Moore (Tex.), (46 S. W. 1131) Ill 
 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Lamar (106 Ind. 513) 137 
 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Romeis (O.), (15 C. C. 697) 106 
 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Stewart (53 111. App. 273) 177 
 
 Pindar v. Continental Ins. Co. tt al. (47 N. Y. 114; 5 Ben. 185) 187 
 
 Pinkham v. Morang & Monmouth M. F. Ins. Co. (40 Me. 587; 4 Ben. 
 
 43) 185 
 
 Pioneer &c. v. Phoenix Assur. Co. (106 N. C. 28; 10 S. E. 1057; 19 
 
 Ins. L. J. 408) 97 
 
 Pittman v. Harris (Tex.), (59 S. W. 1121) 166 
 
 Pittsburgh Storage Co. v. Scottish U. & N. Ins. Co. (Pa.), (32 Atl. 58) 172 
 Platt v. Aetna Ins. Co. (153 111. 133; 40 111. App. 191; 24 Ins. L. J. 
 
 132; 38 N. E. 580) 67, 102 
 
 Planters & Merchants Ins. Co. v. Thurston (Ala.), (9 S. 268; 20 Ins. 
 
 I* J. 746) 168 
 
 Plinsky v. Germania F. Ins. Co. (32 Fed. 47) 20, 163 
 
 Porter v. Traders' Ins. Co. (164 N. Y. 504) 55 
 
 Post Printing & Pub. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. A. (Pa. S. C.), (42 Atl. 
 
 192) 25, 27 
 
 Powers v. Imperial Ins. Co. (48 Minn. 380; 51 N. W. 123; 13 A., Eng. 
 
 E. L. 362, 365; 19 Cyc. 880) 44, 119 
 
 Prader v. Natl. Masonic A. Assn. (la.), (63 N. W. 601) 110 
 
 Pretzf elder v. Merchants Ins. Co. (116 N. C. 491; 21 S. E. 302; 28 
 
 Ins. L. J. 169) 127 
 
 Produce Refrigerator Co. v. Norwich Union F. Ins. Soc. (Minn.), (97 
 
 N. W. 875) 114 
 
 Prov.-Wash. Ins. Co. v. Board of Education (W. Va.), (30 Ins. L. 
 
 J. 577) 121 
 
 Prov.-Wash. Ins. Co. v. Wolf (Ins. A. C.), (72 N. E. 606; 80 N. E. 
 
 27; 168 Ind. 690) 100, 124 
 
 Prussian Natl. Ins. Co. v. Lawrence (U. S. C. C. 4th Cir.), (221. Fed. 
 
 931) 105 
 
 Purves v. Germania Ins. Co. (La.), (10 S. 495; 21 Ins. L. J. 306) .... 168 
 
 Queen v. Jefferson Ice Co. (64 Tex. 578; (15 Ins. L. J. 109) 94, 145 
 
 Queen v. McCoin (Ky. C. A.), (49 S. W. 800; 12 Deitch 67) 25 
 
 Queen Ins. Co. v. Leslie (O. S. C.), (24 N. E. 1072; 19 Ins. L. J. 673). 93, 94 
 
 Queen Ins. Co. v. Vines (174 Ala. 570; 57 S. 444) 89 
 
 Queen Ins. Co. v. Young (86 Ala. 424; 5 S. 102, 116) 129, 132 
 
 Quinlan v. Providence- Washington Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (39 St. 820; aff'd. 
 
 133 N. Y. 356) 37 
 
 Quinn v. Fire Assn. (180 Mass. 560; 62 N. E. 980) 144 
 
 Rafel v. Nashville M. & F. Ins. Co. (7 La. Ann. 244; 3 Ben. 336)... 169, 186 
 
 Ralli v. Troop (157 U. S. 386) 21 
 
 Randall v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (10 Mont. 362; 25 Pac. 960; 20 Ins. L. J. 
 
 613) 93, 127 
 
 Rau v. Westchester F. Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (36 N. Y. App. 516; 28 L. J. 
 
 183) 163 
 
 Raulet v. Northwestern N. Ins. Co. (157 Gal. 213; 107 Pac. 292) 179 
 
 JRead v. Ins. Co. (103 la. 314) 113, 124 
 
 Reavis v. Farmers M. F. Ins. Co. (78 Mo. App. 14) 176 
 
 Redner v. N. Y. Fire Ins. Co. (92 Minn. 306; 99 N. W. 886; 33 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 780) 106 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 279 
 
 Reed v. Firemen's Ins. Co. (81 N. J. L. 523; 80 All. 462) 183 
 
 Reed v. Ins. Co. (76 N. J. L. 11 ; 69 Atl. 724) 182 
 
 Regnier v. Ins. Co. (12 La. 336 ; 1 Ben. 670) 61 
 
 Reilly v. Ins. Co. (43 Wis. 456) 67 
 
 Reliance Lumber Co. v. Brown (Ind.), (30 N. E. 625) 137 
 
 Remington Pepper Co. v. London Assur. Corp. (N. Y.), (12 App. Div. 
 
 218; 43 N. Y. Supp. 431) 10, 115 
 
 Renshaw v. Mo. State Mut. F. & M. Ins. Co. (103 Mo. 595; 20 Ins. 
 
 Ins. L. J. 385) 82 
 
 Reynolds et al. v. Iowa & Neb. Ins. Co. et al. (la.), (46 N. W. 659) 178 
 
 Richards v. Washington Ins. Co. (60 Mich. 420) 165 
 
 Rickerson v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. (149 N. Y. 307) 174 
 
 Riddell v. Rochester German Ins. Co. (R. I.), (89 Atl. 833) 123 
 
 Robert v. Sun M. Ins. Co. (Tex. C. C. A.), (35 S. W. 955) 89 
 
 Roberta v. Firemen's Ins. Co. et al. (Pa.), (30 Atl. 450) 172 
 
 Roby v. Ins. Co. (120 N. Y. 510) 85, 86 
 
 Rochester German Ins. Co. v. Peaslee-Gaulbert Co. (Ky.), (87 S. W. 
 
 1115) 167 
 
 Rogers V. Commercial U. A. Co. (15 Can. L. T. 228) 109, 127 
 
 Rosen v. German Alliance Ins. Co. (Me.), (76 Atl. 688) 85. 
 
 Rosenwald v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (50 Hun. 172; 19 St. 732; 3 N. Y. 
 
 Supp. 215) Ill 
 
 Ross v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (Kan.), (114 Pa. 1054) .. t 132: 
 
 Rovlnsky v. Northern Assur. Co. and another (S. J. C., Me.), (34 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 800) 61 
 
 Royal Ins. Co. et al. v. Parlin & Orendorff Co. (12 Tex. C. A. 572; 
 
 34 S. W. 401, 3, 4) 132 
 
 Royal Ins. Co. v. Ries (80 Ohio 272; 88 N. E. 638) 109 
 
 Royal Ins. Co. v. Roedel (78 Pa. 19; 4 Ins. L. J. 840) 143 
 
 Royal Ins. Co. v. Schwing (Ky. C. A.), (18 Ins. L. J. 451) 80 
 
 Rudd v. Amer. G. F. M. F. Ins. Co. (120 Mo. App. 1; 96 S. W. 237; 
 
 35 Ins. L. J. 948) 85, 89' 
 
 Russell v. German F. Ins. Co. (100 Minn. 528; 111 N. W. 400) 9' 
 
 Rutter v. Hanover F. Ins. Co. (138 Ala. 202; 35 S. 33) 110, 111, 112 
 
 Ryan v. N. Y. C. R. Co. (35 N. Y. 210) 19, 20 
 
 St. John v. Mut. M. & F. Ins. Co. (11 N. Y. 516) 81 
 
 St. Landry Wholesale Mercantile Co., Ltd. v. New Hampshire F. Ins. 
 
 Co. (113 La. 1053; 38 S. 87) 225. 
 
 St. Louis Ins. Co. v. Kyle (11 Mo. 278) 38 
 
 St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Johnson (111. S. C.), (6 Ins. L. J. 434).... 65 
 St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Kirkpatrick (Tenn.), (164 S. W. 1186) 
 
 124, 127, 132 
 
 Sachs v. L. & L. & G. Ins. Co. (113 Ky. 88; 67 S. W. 23) 144 
 
 Samuels v. Continental Ins. Co. (2 Pa. 397) 21 
 
 Sandberg v. St. Paul & S. R. R. Co. (80 Minn. 442; 83 N. W. 411).. .. IT 
 Sanford, v. Mechanics Mut. F. Ins. Co. (Mass.), (12 Gush. 541; 3 Ben. 
 
 619) 186 
 
 Schier v. Norwich Ins. Co. (93 Mass. 336) 81 
 
 Schmaelze v. Lon. & Lane. F. Ins. Co. (75 Conn. 397; 53 Atl. 853; 
 
 33 Ins. L. J. 632) 140 
 
 Schmitt v. Boston Ins. Co. (81 N. Y. Supp. 767) 121 
 
 Schmitt Bros. v. Boston Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (81 N. Y. Supp. 767) 121 
 
 Schoenick- v. American Ins. Co. (Minn.), (124 N. W. 5) 106, 109, 133 
 
 Schrepfer v. Rochford Ins. Co. (77 Minn. 291; 79 N. W. 1005) 94, 103: 
 
 Schulter v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. (62 Mo. 236) 59- 
 
 Scottish U. & N. Ins. Co. v. Clancy (Tex. S. C.), (8 S. W. 630) 98 
 
 Scottish U. & N. Ins. Co. v. Field (18 Col. App. 68; 70 Pac. 149) 134 
 
 Scottish U. & M. Ins. Co. (Ga.), (68 S. E. 1097) 85 
 
 Scottish Union Ins. Co. V. Keene (85 Md. 263; 37 Atl. 33; 26 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 963) 32, 54 
 
 Scottish U. & N. Co. v. Moore (Okla.) (43 Pac. 12) 140, 143, 144, 153 
 
 Scripture v. Lowell Ins. Co. (64 Mass. 356) 82 
 
 Seavy v. Central Mut. F. Ins. Co. (Ill Mass. 540; 3 Ins. L. J. 576).. 177 
 
 Security Ins. Co. v. Farrell (111.), (2 Ins. L. J. 302) 26 
 
 Security Ins. Co. v. Laird (Ala.), (62 So. 182) 85 
 
 Security Ins. Co. v. Mette (27 111. App. 324) 85 
 
 Seibel v. Ina Co. (Pa.), (29 Ins. L. J. 838) ". 56 
 
 Seibert v. Germania Ins. Co. et al. (la.), (35 Ins. L. J. 384) 121 
 
 Sergeant v. L. & L. & G. Ins. Co. (155 N. Y. 349) 37 
 
 Sexton v. Montgomery Co. Mut. Ins. Co. (9 Barb. 191) 46 
 
 Seyks v. Millers Natl. Ins. Co. (Wis.). (41 N. W. 443) 93 
 
 Sharp v. Niagara F. Ins. Co. (147 S. W. 154; 164 Mo. App. 475).. 127, 182 
 Shawmut S. R. Co. v. Peoples Ins. Co. (78 Mass. 535) 44. 
 
280 HALL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Shawnee F. Ins. Co. v. Pontfleld (110 Md. 356; 72 Atl. 835) 127 
 
 Shawnee F. Ins. Co. v. Thompson (30 Okla. 466; 119 Pac. 985) 181 
 
 Sherlock v. German-Amer. Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (47 N. Y. Supp. 315) 168 
 
 Sherman v. Madison M. Ins. Co. (39 Wis. 104; 5 Ins. L< J. 285) 149 
 
 Shook v. Retail Hdw. M. F. Ins. Co. (Mo. App.), (134 S. W. 589) 99 
 
 Silver v. Western Assur. Co. (N. Y.), (58 N. E. 284) 104 
 
 Sims v. State Ins. Co. (4 Am. 311) 47, 53 
 
 Sims v. Union Assur. Soc. (Ga.), (129 Fed. 804) 46, 47 
 
 Singleton v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (132 N. Y. 298; 30 N. E. 839) 7 
 
 Sklencher v. Fire Assn. (N. J. S. C.), (60 Atl. 232) 76 
 
 Sleeper v. Ins. Co. (56 N. H. 401) 60 
 
 Slinkard v. Manchester F. Assur. Co. (Gal.), (55 Pac. 417) 167 
 
 Slocum v. Saratoga & W. F. Ins. Co. (134 N. Y. Supp. 78) 179 
 
 Smith, County Treas. v. German Ins. Co. (Mich.), (25 Ins. L. J. 192; 
 
 65 N. W. 236) 164 
 
 Smith v. British Am. Assur. Co. (110 Ky. 56; 60 S. W. 841) 130 
 
 Smith v. Carmack et al. (Tenn.), (64 S. W. 372) 171 
 
 Smith v. Haverhill Ins. Co. (83 Mass. 297) 39, 44 
 
 Smith v. Herd et al. (Kan.), (30 Ins. L. J. 393) 129 
 
 Smith v. Home Ins. Co. (N. Y. S. C.), (47 Hun. 30) 51 
 
 Smith v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (Mo. App.), (168 S. W. 831) 179 
 
 Smith v. Union Ins. Co. (25 R. I. 260 , 55 Atl. 718) 182 
 
 Solomon v. Continetal Ins. Co. (160 N. Y. 959) 37 
 
 Southern Cold Storage W. Ho. v. Dechman (Tex.), (73 S. W. 545).... 173 
 South of v. Amer. Cent. Ins. Co. (34 R. I. 324; 83 Atl. 441; 12 Am. & 
 
 Eng. Ency. L. 442 ; 3 Cyc. 374) 122 
 
 Southstaffordshire Tramways Co., Ltd. v. Sickness & Acct. Assn., Ltd. 
 
 (Eng.), (Q. B. D. 402) 165 
 
 Spratley v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. (1 Di. C. C. 392) 176 
 
 Sperry v. Ins. Co. of N. A. (U. S.), (14 Ins. L. J. 141; 22 Fed. 516) 163 
 
 Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Crozier (Ky.), (12 Ky. L. J. 143) 166 
 
 Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Homewood (Annotated) 113 
 
 Springfield F. & M. Co. v. Payne (Kan. S. C.), (26 Ins. L. J. 46; 46 
 
 Pac. 315 ; 57 Kan. 291) 106 
 
 Spring Garden Ins. Co. v. Brown (Tex.), (143 S. W. 292) 180 
 
 Standard Sew. Mch.\ Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. (Pa. S. C.), (201 Pa 645; 
 
 51 Atl. 345; 15 Deitch 29) 25, 29, 31, 32 
 
 Stanley v. Royal Exch. Assur. Co. (Kan.), (145 Pac. 563) 134 
 
 State Ins. Co., v. Mackens (38 N. J. L. 564) 56 
 
 Steinbach v. Ins. Co. (U. S.), (13 Wallace 183; 5 Ben. 394) 189 
 
 Steele v. Franklin F. Ins. Co. (17 Pa. St. 290; 3 Ben. 278) 186 
 
 Steinfeld v. Park Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (50 Hun. 262; [S. C.] 19 St. 333; 2 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 766) 60 
 
 Stemmer v. Scottish U. & N. Ins. Co. (33 Ore. 65; 58 Pac. 498; 27 
 
 Ins. L. J. 972, 973; 53 Pac. 498) 107, 115, 122, 126, 167 
 
 Stenzel v. Pennsylvania F. Ins. Co. et al. (La. S. C.), (35 S. W. 271). 26, 34 
 
 Stephens v. Union Assur. Soc. (Utah S. C.), (50 Pac. 626) 56 
 
 Stevens v. Norwich U. Ins. Soc. (120 Mo. App. 88; 96 S. W. 684) 93 
 
 Stickney v. Niagara F, M. Ins. Co. (23 Up. Can. C. P. 372; 5 Ben. 
 
 503) 188 
 
 Stockton Comb. Harvester & Agricultural Works v. Glens Falls Ins. 
 
 Co. (Cal. S. C.), (33 Pac. 663; 53 Pac. 565) 104 
 
 Stout v. Phoenix Assur. Co. (96 N. J. Eq. 566; 56 Atl. 691).... 106 110 112 
 
 Strohn v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. (3 Ins. L. J. 283) 173 
 
 Strome v. London Assur. Corp. (N. Y.), (47 N. Y. Supp. 481; 162 N. 
 
 Y. 627) 121 
 
 Sullivan v. Germania F. Ins. Co. (39 Mo. App. 106) 50 
 
 Summerfield v. N. B. & M. Ins. Co. (62 Fed. 249, (Va.), (24 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 442) 93, 100 
 
 Summers v. Western Home Ins. Co. (45 Mo. App. 46) 85 
 
 Sunderlin v. Aetna Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (18 Hun. 522) 138 
 
 Sun Fire Office v. Ayers (37 Neb. 184 ; 55 N. W. 635) 33 
 
 Sun Ins. Office of London, Eng. v. Western Woolen Mill Co. (72 Kan. 
 
 41; 82 Pac. 513) 8 
 
 Sun Mut. Ins. Co. v. Crist (Ky. C. A.), (39 S. W. 837; 26 Ins. L. J. 
 
 695) 98 
 
 Swearinger v. Pacific F. Ins. Co. (66 Mo. App. 90) 50, 69, 97 
 
 Taber v. Continental Ins. Co. (213 Mass. 487; 100 N. E. 636) 139 
 
 Tanneret v. Merchants' Ins. Co. (34 La. Ann. 249) 81 
 
 Taylor v. Ins. Co. et al. (Minn.), (48 N. W. 772; 20 Ins. L. J. 562) 137 
 
 Temple v. Niagara Ins. Co. (Wis. S. C.), (85 N. W. 362) 67 
 
 Texas Moline Plow Co. v. Niagara F. Ins. Co. (Tex. C. C. A.), (87 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 281 
 
 S. W. 192) 26 
 
 Thomas v. Burlington Ins. Co. (47 Mo. App. 169) 57 
 
 Thomas v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. (Ky.), (53 S. W. 297) 163 
 
 Thompson v. Montreal Ins. Co. (6 Up. Can., 2 Q. B. 319) 75 
 
 Thornton v. Security Ins. Co. (117 Fed. 773; 32 Ins. L. J. 557) 41, 77 
 
 Tillou v. Kingston M. Ins. Co. (5 N. Y. 405; 3 Ben. 238) 185 
 
 Tilton v. Hamilton F. Ins. Co. (1 Bos. 367; S. C. How. Pr. 363) 76 
 
 Titus v. Glens Falls Ins. Co. (81 N. Y. 410) 55 
 
 Tolliver v. Granite State F. Ins. Co. (Ill Me. 275; 89 Atl. 8) 180 
 
 Torpedo Top Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. (162 111. App. 338;' 42 Natl. C. R. 
 
 593) 93, 99 
 
 Townsend v. Greenwich Ins. Co. (83 N. Y. Supp. 909) 107 
 
 Townsend v. Merchants Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (4 J. & S. 172; 45 How. Pr. 
 
 501) 60 
 
 Traders Ins. Co. v. Dobbins (Tenn.), (86 S. W. 383)... 82, 164 
 
 Trans-Atlantic F. Ins. Co. v. Bamberger (Ky. C. A.), (18 Ins. L. J. 625) 80 
 
 Trans- Atlantic F. Ins. Co. v. Dorsey (56 Md. 70; 12 Ins. L. J. 437) 82 
 
 Trask v. Ins. Co. (5 Casey 198) 37 
 
 Trull v. Roxbury Mut. Ins. Co. (Mass. S. C.), (3 Ben. 15) 66 
 
 Trustees Amherst College v. Ritch (151 N. Y. 282) 37 
 
 Trustees First Unitarian Church v. Western Assur. Co. (2 Up. Can. 
 
 2 B. 175; 5 Ben. 94) 150 
 
 Tucker v. Colonial F. Ins. Co. (W. Va. S. C.), (34 Ins. L. J. 969) 55 
 
 Tubb v. L. & L. & G. Ins. Co. (Ala.), (17 S. 615) 164 
 
 Turley v. North Amer. F. Ins. Co. (N. Y. S. C.), (25 Wend. 374) 49 
 
 Tyblewski v. Svea F. & L. Ins. Co. (220 111. 436; 35 Ins. L. J. 616; 77 
 
 N. E. 196) 107 
 
 Uhrig v. Ins. Co. (101 N. Y. 362; 4 N. E. 745) 113, 116, 118, 124 
 
 Unrig v. Williamsburgh City F. Ins. Co. (101 N. Y. 362; 31 Hun. 98; 
 
 4 N. E. 745) 120, 127 
 
 Underwood v. Farmers Joint Stock Ins. Co. (57 N. Y. 500) 44 
 
 Unger v. People's F. Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (4 Daly 96) 59 
 
 Union Ins. Co. v. Barwick (Neb. S. C.), (6 Finch Dig. 57) 47 
 
 Union Inst. Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (196 Mass. 230; 81 N. E.- 994; 14 
 
 L. R. A. 459) 135, 182, 183 
 
 United, &c.. Ins. Co. v. Foote (22 O. 340; 2 Ins. L. J. 190) 82 
 
 U. S. Cooperage Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (Mo. App.), (174 S. W. 
 
 193) 145 
 
 Vangindertallen v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (82 Wis. 112; 51 N. W. 1122)) 93 
 
 Veney v. Reginald, Eng. (Q. B., Pt. 2, 177; 1 Ins. Dig. 33) 97 
 
 Vera v. Mercantile F. & M. Ins. Co. (216 Mass. 154; 103 N. E. 292) 180 
 
 Vera et al. v. Merchants F. & M. Co. et al. (103 N. E. 292; 216 Mass. 
 
 154) 101 
 
 Vernon Ins. Co. v. Maitlen (158 Ins. 393; 62 N. E. 755; 31 Ins. L. J. 
 
 672) 114, 128 
 
 Vorse v. Jersey Plate Glass Co. (119 La. 556 ; 93 N. W. 569) 82 
 
 Waddle v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. (170 S. W. 682; 184 Mo. App. 571).. 181 
 
 Wainer v. Milford Mut. F. Ins. Co. (Mass. S. J. C.), (23 N. E. 887) 101 
 
 Walker v. German Ins. Co. (Kan.), (22 Ins. L. J. 750) 100, 129 
 
 Walker v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (62 Mo. App. 209) 20, 49, 50, 59 
 
 Waring et al. v. Indemnity F. & M. Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (1 Ins. L. J. 672) 172 
 
 Washington F. Ins. Co. v. Cobb (Tex.), (163 S. W. 608) 180 
 
 Washington F. & M. Ins. Co. et al. v. Kelly (32 Md. 421; 5 Ben. 303). 187 
 
 Washington M. Ins. Co. v. Heckenath (N. Y.), (Leg. & Ins. 357) 38 
 
 Watchorn v. Langford (Eng.) (3 Campbell 422; 1 Ben. 91) 169, 184 
 
 Waters v. Assur. Co. (85 Engr. C. L. 879) 178 
 
 Way v. Abington M. F. Ins. Co. (166 Mass. 67; 43 N. E. 1032) 22 
 
 Webb v. Protection and Aetna Ins. Co. (14 Mo. 3) 76 
 
 Webb v. R., W. O. W. R. R. Co. (49 N. Y. 420) 19 
 
 Weidert v. Ins. Co. (Ore.), (19 Ins. L. J. 740) 86 
 
 Weissmann v. Firemen's Ins. Co. (208 Mass. 577, 95 N. E. 411) 94, 98 
 
 Wellcome v. Peoples Ins. Co. (68 Mass. 480) 44 
 
 Welles v. Boston Ins. Co. (6 Pick. 182) 169 
 
 Wells v. Boston Ins. Co. (6 Pick. [23 Mass.] 182) 20 
 
 West v. British Amer Assur. Co. (U. S. C. A., Dist. Col.), (25 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 689) 61 
 
 West Branch Lumberman's Exch. v. Amer. Ins. Co. (183 Pa. St. 136; 27 
 
 Ins. L. J. 305; 38 Atl. 1081) 169 
 
 Westchester v. North B. & M. Ins. C. (160 Cal. 1; 116 Pac. 63) 99 
 
 Westenhaven et al. v. Ger.-Amer. Ins. Co. (la.), (30 Ins. L. J. 314).. 128 
 Westenhaver v. Ger.-Amer. Ins. Co. (113 la. 726; 84 N. W. 717; 30 
 
282 HAUL ON INSURANCE ADJUSTMENTS. 
 
 Ins. L. J. 314) 98, 129 
 
 Western Assur. Co. v. Decker (98 Fed. 381; 39 C. C. A. 383, 389).. 95, 127 
 Western Assur. Co. v. Hall (Ala.), (143 Ala. 168; 32 S. 853; 25 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 874; 20 S. 447) 96, 97, 116 
 
 Western Assur. Co. v. McGlathery (Ala.), (115 Ala. 213; 22 S. 104 
 
 57, 88, 89 
 
 Western Assur. Co. v, Mohlman (U. S. C. C. A., 2nd Dist.), (27 Ins. 
 
 L. J. 392) 80 
 
 Western Assur. Co. v. Rector (9 Ky. L. 3) 164 
 
 Western Assur Co. v. Studebaker (124 Ind. 176; 20 Ins. L. J. 64) 25, 34 
 
 Western, etc. v. Traders Ins. Co. (122 111. App. 138) 180 
 
 West. Undw. Assn. v. Hankins (111.), (35 Ins. L. J. 378) 121 
 
 Western Woolen Mills Co. v. Northern Assur. Co. (139 Fed. 637; Ann. 
 
 72 C. C. A. 1) 17 
 
 Wex v. Boatmen's F. Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (11 St. Rep. 713) 8 
 
 Whalen v. Goldman (115 N. Y. Supp. 1006) 120 
 
 Wheeler v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (53 Mo. App. 446) 181 
 
 White v. Royal Ins. Co. (149 N. Y. 485; affg. S. C. Misc. 613) 45 
 
 White v. Western Assur. (Minn.), (54 N. W. 195; 22 Ins. L. J. 305) 166 
 
 Whitemarsh v. Conway F. Ins. Co. (Mass.), (16 Gray 35; 4 Ben. 485).. 189 
 Wholley v. Western Assur. Co. (174 Mass. 263; 54 N. E. 548; 28 Ins. L. 
 
 J. 1029) 9& 
 
 Wicking v. Citizens' F. Ins. Co. (118 Mich. 640; 77 N. W. 275) 119 
 
 Wicking et al. v. Citizens' Mut. F. Ins. Co. (Mich. S. C.), (77 N. W. 
 
 275; 28 Ins. L. J. 230) 102, 129 
 
 Wilcox v. Hill (44 Mass. 66) 35 
 
 Williams v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (54 N. Y. 569; 5 Ben. 537) 186 
 
 Williams v. Roger Williams Ins. Co. (107 Mass. 377; 5 Ben. 373) 188 
 
 Williamson v. L. & L. & G. Ins. Co. (122 Fed. 69; 58 C. C. A. 241) 110 
 
 Wilson Drug Co. v. Phoenix Assur. Co. (N. C.), (14 S. E. 790) 175 
 
 Winn v. Ins. Co. (27 Neb. 649) 59 
 
 Wolff v. L. & L. & G. Ins. Co. (50 N. J. 453; 14 Atl. 561; 17 Ins. L. 
 
 J. 714) 97, 98 
 
 Wolverine Lumber Co. v. Palatine Ins. Co. (Mich.), (102 N. W. 991).. 177 
 Woods v. Ins. Co. State of Pa. (87 Wash. 563; 82 Wash. 563; 144 Pac. 
 
 650) 183 
 
 Wright v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (36 Wis. 522) 43 
 
 Wright v. Susquehana M. F. Co. (110 Pa. 29; 20 Atl. 716) 93 
 
 Wynkoop v. Niagara F. Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (12 Ins. L. J. 253) 66, 102 
 
 Yoch v. Home Mut. Ins. Co. (Cal.), (44 Pac. 189) 164 
 
 Yonkers and N. Y. F. Ins. Co. v. Hoffman F. Ins. Co. (N. Y.), (6 Rob. 
 
 316) 46 
 
 Yost v. McKee et al. (Pa. S. C.), (36 Atl. 317) 99 
 
 Young v. Aetna Ins. Co. et al. (Me.), (64 Atl. 584) 118 
 
 Zalesky v. Home Ins. Co. (108 la. 341; 70 N. W. 69) 104 
 
 Zalesky v. Ins. Co. (102 la. 613 ; 71 N. W. 566) 100 
 
 Zimeriski v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. (91 Mich. 600; 21 Ins. L. J. 818; 
 
 52 N. W. 55) 93 
 
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