B 
 
 53 
 
 C& riJE UNIVERSITY OP CHICAGO 
 
 UC-NRLF 
 
 mKM . ,yi< LOGICAL 
 
 HEORY 
 
 
 x-ate Edition, Distributed by 
 
 SITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARIES 
 
 K1 
 
 
 Chicago, Illinois 
 1918. 
 
EXCHANGE 
 
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 
 
 THREE TYPES OF LOGICAL 
 THEORY 
 
 A DISSERTATE >\ 
 MITTED TO I UK FACULTY 
 
 oi- Till-: QRADUATE SCH< >< >i. OF 
 
 ARTS AND 1.1 PERATURE 
 \\i)ii).\i v FOR THE I>K<;KKE OF 
 
 DOCTOR OF I'Hll.osoi'HY 
 DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 i;v 
 IK >LLY ESTIL Cl'XXIXUIAM 
 
 Private Kditinn. Distributed by 
 THK U.NIVERSITY or CHICAGO LIURAKIK: 
 
 Chicago. Illinoi- 
 1918. 
 
". . 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Tin- appeal to time <>r m the verdict of history is legitimate 
 in cases of political, economic, scientitic. an<l even of mathemat- 
 ical theorus. f.r it is reco^ni/ed that these are cases in which 
 the temporal element enters that their Successes and failures 
 will come out in the ijive and take of experience. The contract 
 theory of the state, the Malthusian principle, the IVlema . 
 in-Homy, the Kuclidian geometry, Aristotelian L.-ic all these and 
 man\ other "truths" have been toted in the laboratory of time. 
 Ilistoiy M-i-nis Mrewn with the wreck- -i' " Prole-omenas in any 
 future Metaphvsic". with I'nknowahlcs, with Ahsolutes, 
 Limit-, \\itli Force and Matter, with Souls all t 1 niyin; 
 
 in their day the efforts of nun to interpret the data of experi 
 l > hilos,,phical tOO, yield to the hum.; of tin: 
 
 Siiic do for th-e that are tinicL \v.v can n..t appeal to time 
 cither for \erification or rejection. Such systems. in 
 would find it impro|)er to treat historically the social and p"' 
 conditions out of which ami from which the system in qu 
 originated, for Midi pi rt in n < rmane to a 
 
 tinu-l< VCr, he profitable from the stand- 
 
 pnint of the history ..f the kno\\ ;.art of his personal 
 
 aphy, to have in mind for >oeial occasions, the historical 
 si-ttin- -f his >\>t(.-m. 
 
 Flic tact that questions i >uee ci iHsidercd ot vital si^niticance 
 have not heen solved hut shuiiicd, lived over, lias value to him 
 whose interests lead to an historical consideration of problems. 
 It has simiitieance :t is evidence of the constant shift- 
 
 ing of problems due to conditions which the older students of 
 the problem did not have to face. For a thousand years the 
 best intellects of the world were cnnayed on the "other world" 
 problem, with the result that little was accomplished for there 
 were few means, save by dialectics, for accomplishing anything. 
 A shift in the problems which confront a people carries with 
 
 shift from older theories to ones which attempt to meet the 
 situation at the present time. N'ot that the old is wholly aban- 
 doned, but it is modified in the presence of newer data, so that a 
 more agreeahle and satisfactory method of behavior is establish- 
 ed. When an attempt is made to select a certain type of suc- 
 
 1 behavior, analyze it. and thereupon set it aside as a 
 
 C 
 
 4G1766 
 
mode] for all future generations, we have that type of philo- 
 sophical system which cannot appeal to time because of the 
 nature of Us assumptions, \\1ieu that attempt is made the 
 issumption always present, th,, not necessarily made explicit is 
 that at that moment all history, all progress; all achievement is 
 orever ended. The influence of metaphysical concepts on the 
 I'lace, nature', and function of science indicates well tl u - temporal 
 nature oi systems. Both change with the coming of contradic- 
 lons, l.ut the type of metaphysical doctrine in which the age is 
 planted determines the sphere in which science is ahle to move 
 Admitting that progress has been made in the world of science 
 t can he shown that this progress is possible only in terms of 
 Changed metaphysical conceptions; or. on the other hand if a 
 correct' doctrine of a metaphysical nature had been launch- 
 ed in the beginning, there is reason to believe that scientific pro- 
 gress would not have occurred, for the facts of experience 
 would. ,n the first instance, have been interpreted in terms of the 
 correct metaphysical theory. 
 
 For the Greek scientist the purpose was to discover the 
 
 essence of the object the object being outside of the experi- 
 ence ot the individual. The essence of the object could be dis- 
 covered by careful and numerous perceptual observations, and 
 when this was discovered a judgment consisted in predication of 
 an attribute to the thing. But essential to the observation of 
 phenomena was the fact that the observer had the idea or the 
 form. He could not, that is, observe facts as they were them- 
 selves, but he could observe them only in and thru the form 
 which was already known. "He tests his theory by the observed 
 individual which is already an embodied theory, rather than by 
 what we are wont to call the facts."* As logic was subsump- 
 tive. so was science a matter of Classification. The space oi 
 the Euclidian Geometry determined the advance that was po'ssi- 
 hle in mathematics. The axioms of mathematics were interpret ed 
 in terms of content; that is, the axioms are statements of the 
 essence of the objects to which they refer or include a state- 
 ment of the law of the object. It thus came about that it was 
 impossible for the Greek mind to treat mathematics "sui 
 tntially" rather than "existentially." The conception o: finite 
 space and of the earth as the center of the planetary system 
 rendered it impossible to employ the heliocentric hypothesis sug- 
 gested by Aristarchus and others. During the middle ages the 
 
 'Creative Intelligence, Professor Mead's paper, p. 177. 
 
 4 
 
dogma of tin- church marked the limits within which sciei 
 procedure could take place. The Aristotelian ct inception of finite 
 space which was taken over hy the church, the view that the 
 earth was tin- center of the system, rendered astronomical 
 theories half scientific and half mythological. 
 
 The notion ol nee has had various melaplu -ic.d 
 
 statements each of which has had its influence on science. It is 
 true that when the substance doctrines were most strenuously ad- 
 vanced, physics reacted against this notion and sought to 
 interpret is data, not in terms ..f forms. attributes, 
 
 hut in terms of the relation between things. I'.ut what is true 
 of physics is not true of all When the s-.ul i> define. 1 
 
 as "thinking suli stance" miturc thinks. Mich a 
 
 ment closes the do.,r . .n any scientific statement as to ..rigin. his- 
 tor\. or -fo\\th. It is already defined, nothing m 
 he attempted. Variations ..n the Mil'stance theme occur. >ueh as 
 determining the faculties of the s, .ul. hut this process ,,f apparent 
 analysis is nothing more than an anah md there- 
 
 upon attributing to the soul tacts which 
 
 perience revealed. 
 
 In fact the substance doctrine - : origin m a 
 
 life in which everything must hcl>>n,t to something. A slave 
 hcloii-s to the master, the master in turn to a higher in 
 until the whole s-.cial group becomes "possessed" b\ some oile 
 else. So it was with attriliutes r matter, \\hich func- 
 
 tion, d in physical theories until recent da\s. and of mind which 
 to this da\ tind < in certain type-; of psychology. The 
 
 mind or O'n>ci'U>nesN has nages. \\'hen tin- 
 
 notion of s U ltance is dri\en from psycho], ,-\ liecaiise of its 
 failure to take into itself the peculiar case, then will the way he 
 clear for a scientific p^ 
 
 This apparent diyn ->si. .n has as its ohject to make clear the- 
 relation between certain elements of progress. If we -rant that 
 such has heen made, it is evident that it i> made only on the 
 breakdown of older systems, for. as has been pointed out, if a 
 fact is to be explained it mu>t be explained in terms of tin- 
 theory then in vo^ue. The astronomer who notices for the first 
 time a small >peck on the photographic plate, who notices it on 
 successive nights at different places, can calculate its orbit, can 
 interpret it in terms of the system of which it is a part, where- 
 upon it becomes an embodied theory, possessing all the richness 
 the system itself posseses ; and is no longer a bare fact. In such 
 a case as this example three possible results may happen: 
 
nt in the 
 
 tin- individu. nit mix-lit IK- a- in the 
 
 in terms of tin- theory; third, 
 
 hirh in a lonu time will lead to a rcinterpretatioii >f 
 the whole sy>tcm in term- ..|" n-'wer hypotheses It is in this 
 
 i< ntitie pr< >^re-x ta' and not 
 
 Of indi\iduals wliich are already an embodied 
 
 theory. 'r 1>\ a predicate to a substance which pred- 
 
 ':ias been derived fr..ni an analysis of thr concrete situation- 
 ill which the s, .-called substance functioned. 
 
 That the practical precedes the theoretical will lie granted 
 by all The demands of the en\ irotiment led to counting a: 
 surveying, at first very crudely attempted, hut later developed into 
 our arithmetical and ueonutrical systems. The early attempt- 
 at curing by ma-ic and witchcraft led to the theory of 
 
 the four humor-. The trial an* 1 error methods in weapons led 
 to the >tudy of projectiles. So it is with all the lines of in- 
 _:innin- a- a need and with a trial and error method, 
 the methods ha\e been refined, theories have heen projected. 
 hypothcsi- adxanccd, the hetter to act in the premises. It i- 
 ally admitted that in so far a- the theory fulfills the 
 function for which it was projected, it is true. When. ho\\ 
 a new condition arises, at first in the experience of an individ- 
 ual, which is not explicable on the prevailing theory, either the 
 theory is modified or the experience of the individual is regarded 
 "psychological". It is peculiar that what is applicable 
 ace is not c-msideml applicable in the systems 
 
 of pliilox.pln . This is probably accounted for from the fact 
 
 that there is rarely if ever an experience, either individual or 
 
 '. that will .v-ive a philosophical theory an experimentum 
 
 crucis. such as was possible, for example, in the two rival 
 
 theories of liv;ht. The -nly experiment applicable to such a 
 
 theory is that which nature performs in her on-ijoinjjs and multi- 
 
 tudiii"ii- changes. She shows by the shift of interest that what 
 
 a problem is no longer one. tho not showing thereby 
 
 that what wa- once a problem was not one at the time, but show- 
 
 the while that s\-tems are in time, that they serve their need, 
 
 and matter of history. Problems in this Held are not 
 
 1 but lived over, forgotten in the oil-rush of eve, Us which 
 
 1 adjustment. 
 
 It is but natural to expect that these sober theories of 
 tiling- w-'iild be the lea-t readily changed. We naturally expect 
 
to find more conservatism in religion than in science 1 , for once 
 postulating infallibility, it is with great difficulty that religion 
 can modify itself in any respect to account for matters not orig- 
 inally contemplated in the premises. But the fact remains that 
 both philosophical and religions -.y stems undergo drastic modifi- 
 cations from time to time. An idealism that grew up 
 pre-e\olutionary basis must necessarily undergo radical revision 
 or drive from itself the respect of men of science. 
 
 A reli.uious system founded .n an Aristotelian space and a 
 I'tokmaic astronomy must undergo modification in the light of a 
 different conception of space or face the possibilities of finding 
 itself without believers. Hut tin jious and 
 
 philosophical systems come about with greatest difficulty. I. on- 
 after the ..ccasi>n which -i 
 
 . are the traces of it found in later thought. The 
 dualism shov ncction with the dualism of th; 
 
 the other world of medieval thought; the dualism of Locke and 
 the English empiricists >ho\\ -, the tcnacit\ of the : nhor- 
 
 ity : the Kantian Thing-in-itself and the phenomenon i> evidence 
 of ti of incoinplct lack of control. of in- 
 
 feriority a heritage not only from the church but from tin 
 torn of primitive tribes. It is to be cmpliasi/ed that such 
 terns : mancnt \alue, but it i> further 
 
 urged that the type of pp.bl- >\ which a theory 
 
 the condr I that problem oi problems, 
 
 ought to be Considered in forming an estimate of the place and 
 value of the sy>tem in question. It i> urged that >uch a study- 
 will render evident the temporal natr. -lenis, with the re- 
 sult that Absolute .f whatever type- -whether of Un- 
 realistic with the empli.L he priority of logical and mathe- 
 matical entities .r of space; or the idealistic, emphasizing the 
 priority of consciousness, individual or super-individual, will take 
 their places along with the others ..f the p 'tempts to meet 
 certain critical and vital issues which arose from the on-gi.ings 
 Of 1 
 
 In the two great periods of origin from the standpoint of 
 science and philosophy, namely, the Greek extending approxi- 
 mately from (-,00 to 300 B. C., and the period of discovery in the 
 renaissance, we find many suggestions of kinship between the 
 various problems . .f interest. The Greek sought to unify the 
 manifold of life and experience about certain common principles 
 such as air. fire, earth, and water. Most generally the histor- 
 ian of philosophy tells us that the Greek mind possessed a pecul- 
 
 7 
 
ml temporal nd because IK 
 
 this instinct T bias for unil\ and harmony IK- is rightly 
 ! the founder of tin- philosophic attitude. I'ut it is int< 
 
 te that this attitude is forced . >n him liy the peculiar 
 
 he hail t.i meet, h" it were mcrcK the- Mas for unity 
 
 .in instinct that craved satisfaction, it i> difficult t<> 
 
 rein this instinct was not satisfied win m- principle 
 
 :ulv migi well In- employed a> aiiotlier. One must 
 
 ;oii this original bias. ho\\c\er. and state that their explana- 
 
 wn at the point of novel experiences which conlr 
 
 vomited for on ^thc pa-vailing principles ,,f explanation. 
 
 When such problems as choice, purpose, desire, need, et cetera. 
 
 . that is t" sa\ . the prohlems sometimes designated a> 
 
 the principles used in the world of physical nature ap- 
 d inade(|uate to the needs of the situation. When, 
 science had taught the harmony and rhythm of the spheres and 
 since harmony is an indication ,,f intelligence, it was discovered 
 that the principles of Kmpedocles failed to account for the 
 phenomenon, intelligence. The fact that it was thought that 
 change involved change in quality as well a> of quantity, told 
 t the Kmpcdoclean elements, with the result that an in- 
 definite numher of elements was postulated, together with an in- 
 telligence t" get things started. 
 
 It is a commonplace that the (ireek had no method by which 
 dilations, his hypotheses. The atomism of Demo- 
 critus and Leucippu-. suggesting as it does, the attitude of mod- 
 ern chemi.str\. was unfruitful for two thousand years. The 
 crilan theory of perception held until the time of Locke 
 and Berkeley -the theory of effluxes which accounted for the 
 difference between sensation and thought on the basis of the 
 
 - in the case of the former, causing a confusion 
 on the part of the subject, while in the case of the latter, the 
 finer ive rise to a gentle movement of the soul. To one 
 
 is in the temporal nature of systems, however, 
 Jf'/iv test the hypoti vital. From the 
 
 dpoint of harmony and beauty and completeness, why 
 
 t the theory of efflr good as any other? ll'hy 
 
 lie atomic hypothesis: 1 Why is a technique necessary for 
 
 of a purely intellectual ink rot or instinct? 
 
 Thesi- qii' is, are vital for they indicate the practical 
 
 nature of theory; they indicate the road that thought has al- 
 
 when thought is genuinely itself. 
 
The .yiowinii individual^ in part I 
 
 al conditions tin- sturdy and active tyrant who made his 
 will the law of the land with the result that little concern fmm 
 ::tndl>nint <>f revennce. could he had fr law --led to a criti- 
 first, of the foundations of le-al authority and. second, of 
 the foundations of religion and morality. The i; rowing demo- 
 cracy, the hreakdown of trihal conceptions of -nilt and retribu- 
 tion, the attitude of the popular assembly in constant i 
 
 and various ..ther movements itnphasi/in- tile individual. 
 has e\pre*.>i..n on the philosophical side in the work of the 
 Sophists. Tin- time called for the man who cared for \ictoi \ 
 
 than the means by which it \\; ; 
 
 the dcmar n which earlu r 
 
 of a moral natui it moraht) should be 
 
 .1 matter of prudence. It \\a. e\ ident that the principle 
 
 nol a working , in-, for the unjust apparently met with the 
 
 han the man of 
 
 i inclinations. Tin- result is a i>rinciple of morality which 
 emphasixis tin of the natural inclinations of u 
 
 Jit. 
 
 not insignificant that the movement with 
 
 chiefly ethical. Had the mo\eim.nt been primarily 
 
 1. it would until within recent years ha\e heen rather 
 
 difficult to render evident the practical nature of (,reck think- 
 
 inu. It has. in fact, taken the world twenty five hundred year- 
 
 to reco^ni/e this fact the fact of the practical nature of lo-ie 
 
 hut since the prime interest lay then in a type of hel: 
 which would make for stahility in the rapidly d ( .reck 
 
 \. the pniliK-ms of t-thics would first he attacke*!. Indeed 
 in Socrates ; t nd especially in his successor, ethics is a propae- 
 diutic to nutaph\sics. Kr.owlci'. i- action. "X'irtue is 
 
 'r.nowhd.-e." Th.e "virtue" of the shoemakt r is that he makes 
 o>, ,d <hoes. of the soldier that he meets the enemy as a (ireek 
 should, of the physician that he -ives rules for health and that 
 he cures di>ea>is. "Virtue", in other words, consists in doiiiii 
 that for which the person or thin- is intended, and knowled-e 
 is the discovery of the "form" of the object, the better to under- 
 stand its "virtue" what is expected of it in the way of actual 
 practice. 
 
 Had Plato belon-ed to a different class of society, his ans- 
 wer to the Heracleitean tendencies in the Sophist mi.uht have 
 taken a different turn. Had (ircck society heen founded on an- 
 other basis than slavery we should have expected in turn a dif- 
 
find that the 
 
 differ ami "opinion". the difference 
 
 Let ween the t! t" the ma^es and the reality 
 
 whieh i> abiding and uneh.r difference of insight < n 
 
 tlu- ; he man in \\ I .1 condition Plato was. The 
 
 i his li\clihood occupied from the psych 
 
 humhle position ( ,f tin- Laser feelings below 
 
 the midriff: the .soldier who fought for the advantage of the 
 ruler, occupied a higher position in the "spirited" portion, or the 
 : the ruler, however, in whose cla-s was I'lato, occupied the 
 the head, to whose keeping was intrusted the peculiar 
 t into the fixity and permanency of the supersensuous 
 realm, th< knowledge of which created tlie prohlems of 
 
 in the part of the Sophists. It is in keeping with the 
 al spirit of the age that Plato should find the essence of jus- 
 rfi r that is. the spirit of the age as represented by 
 the .social class of Plato. \\'liat was essential for the wellheing 
 of the ruling and ari.stocratic classes was that those in the lower 
 strata of society should stay tenaciously hy their places and leave 
 to tho>e aLove them to do the thinking for the nation. One of 
 the win-' d horse's .,f the charioteer is of nohle origin, the other 
 nohle. The former is ever striving to mount to the eternal 
 where it may Lehold the Idea in its purity, while the other 
 strives as diligently to keep a footing on the earth amid the 
 pleasure of tlv s t nsual. Just so it is with the philosopher-aris- 
 tocrat and with those who work with their hands. It seems 
 clear that Plato lias answered the questions () f the Sophists, the 
 questions, first, uf individualism, and second, the skeptical atti- 
 tude towards morality. The individual exists only in and for 
 State; there is a permanent element in morality which the 
 
 pher can discern. 
 
 With the decadence of (ireek life, philosophy hecomes more 
 
 and more a way of living. Men turn from the investigations of 
 
 nature for the purpose of control to the more primitive method 
 
 of magic and witchcraft. The philosopher is more and more a 
 
 :ier whose Lusine.ss it is not to inquire Lut to convince, and 
 
 h th,e I., ,rd" is the authority for their mess 
 
 The sehools which flourished during the medieval period were 
 founded to meet a moral and religious need: the Epicurean to 
 men how to live in a world in which he has nothing to fear 
 either bei death: the Stoic, to believe in God and to 
 
 foll..w his Jaws, the former -oiim to Democritus for his reality, 
 the latter I -itiiv 
 
 10 
 
Christian philosophy, which came to the front in the latter 
 part of the period, was preeminently a philosophy of life, and 
 the concepts underlying it gave the limits to further progn 
 the realms of science. Whatever of speculation was present in 
 any of the systems of thought during the middle ages, was there 
 for the fuller life. Tin Mole life according to nature carried 
 with it an explanation of nature; the Hpicurcan life of plea- 
 sure, an account of pleasure; the Christian and Xeo Platonic 
 philosophy, technical as they may he. wrre after all. hut an ac- 
 the wax that man must travel to reach the abode in 
 the world heyond. Metaphxsics lure, as with Plato, depends 
 upon ethics and religion. 
 
 Ivnou-h has been said to indicate in part the method to lie 
 pursued in the treatment of the - H examination. 
 
 They will he treated a- parts of a 1. al movement 
 
 which the\ are dt rived, being as llu \ an-, the reflective aspi-ct 
 of what i> an attitude of s,,eiet\. \\'ith the nvn- recent s\ stems, 
 this will h^ difficult to acO'tupl: .dl\ tlu- portion of the 
 
 work which attempts to show that the >\ >u-m in <|uestion breaks 
 ( : own at the point of >odal ad\ance. It has lu-i-n hriefly indi- 
 cated that philosophy has be-en and must lie if true to her m 
 a method of creation of \alurs, a method of control of that which 
 thwarts tin- growing purp. ->cx ,,f the individual or group. 
 
 There' are certain assumptions, hypot! ndpoints, which 
 
 serve as a work-in- ha-- OL Tlu-se assumptions 
 
 might he called the postulati> of the s\stem. The\ are not ar- 
 bitrarily chosen hut ar<_- selected after a survey of tlu- field, as 
 the best nuthod , .f interpretation of the data at hand. They 
 are meanin.-s. ideas. s U u-isted b\ things, and when verified, they 
 
 me the facts . r rather the facts become them they are the 
 facts. Thes. -tandpoints or as-umptions have a history in the 
 {TobKirs of t!:e aix. and are temporal in their nature. The as- 
 sumption- more gnu-ral as the problems of life gri\v in 
 complexity. The early ( ireek thinker did not find it essential to 
 effect a working relation between mind and things not mind, 
 l.ut with the i.rowth of problems, (.specially wlun the problem of 
 'fion and its error a more general assumption which 
 took account of the newer data, became necessary. At length, the 
 r.i of the relation of mind and matter became acute in the 
 time of IX^carUs. and the same has been a leading problem of 
 philosophy from his time to our own. Just what meanings a 
 sit of data will suggest, it is impossible to say. but one thing is 
 sure, the meanings or viewpoints will always be such as fall 
 
 11 
 
ire pi'"j< 
 
 nincd by tin- individual bia> 
 :u. in tli nd pc,.p! 
 
 personal, 
 
 .f this paper, tlu- principle 't classification 
 
 tin- relation. d l>\ llu- 
 
 and its object. * >\ UK 
 and object,, there an- cer- 
 
 ; may obtain, which make the chief assump- 
 5tem. < )n<- of these possibilities is that 
 
 drpimUr.- a* |)ri"rity is concerned (temporally) 
 
 li as obtains in parallel lino is present : 
 
 dualism, mind and matter. This is the char- 
 
 iption ..r postulate ot" i mpiricism. Another po>- 
 
 he two entities is that o>nsciuusi!< 
 
 . that "things" are merely om.M'i .usnes.s. This is the 
 lie \arious forms of idealism and constitutes their most 
 
 mption. Another i> the prioritx 
 
 - the leading postulate of reali>m of tin- mod- 
 
 . Tl;e laM of the possibilities for ,,ur puropse is that 
 
 and things arc functions in a larger experi- 
 
 tuation which has reached the point of reflection. The 
 
 :niption of this last type of theory is. then, that experi- 
 
 IS prior and that consciousness and object both function 
 
 therein, and that apart from this experience neither coiiscious- 
 
 nor object h.i :niticance. This is the postulah 
 
 .standpoint of pragmatism. To state these possibilities in another 
 
 form, we should say that idealism of whatever variety works on 
 
 the assumption that things do not have an existence except for 
 
 consciousness, cither individual, or absolute: new realism 
 
 rts that things have an independent exigence and that things 
 
 'rinr to consciousness since the latter is a development; 
 
 empiricism assorts that ideas an- copies of things and that the 
 
 -imuhaneou- ; ])raymatism works on the assumption that 
 
 .-'.ml object are functions which become at cer- 
 
 rucial points in experience, and that the two are simultan- 
 
 that the thinu is only a tiling, an olijective. when it is 
 
 'or in a tcnsioiial situatin. and that both tiling and con- 
 
 ; ;>pear \\hen the objective is met by an act which 
 
 :sm so that it may enter more direct experi- 
 
 n the non-problematic. noti-rerlecti\ e, 
 
EMPIRICISM 
 
 Science is supposed to take its origin it) the atlemp: 
 plain in terms of natural caii-so and principles. \\'lu-n nat 
 Tuna a ix- interpreted in terms of liunian activiti- 
 ample, tin- i anh i> "mother", the sun " father", tli. 
 tic .n of these plu ii' in other than "natural" terms. I'.u: 
 
 when tlu- . ill. MI- In 
 
 .pK- ali>nt which t correlate- the data . ; 
 >n tlu- w- >i Id i- i" 'i n. ' It tin i 
 
 . the lai- meaning tlu 
 
 hypi.ii difficult} 
 
 which I!' ii. \\h 
 
 l.\ an 
 
 account fi.r that which 1'lii^ 
 
 is d-.ne a> in case "i I )eni. 'criti: - unlimited niunlu i 
 
 tlu 
 i nunihe: lp t-> this puint 
 
 had pi 
 
 l.nt a small p:n i "Mind" v i ni.inne: 
 
 a> a i-i .m : . 1'ut hy 
 
 the time -f knx\l' MH- acuti. 
 
 a\eK had made him '. with the la\\> and 
 
 '(' \.ui"ii^ countries, and he noticed that while each dii 
 t'n.m the rest, rach >eemel t prosper under the o>de> or" its 
 own formation; and this, coupled with his kno\\li-dm- of percep- 
 tion, led him to his famous statement th.it "man is the m< 
 <r\ tiling" ;ui earl\ st.itenunt of lt piiuciile which 
 
 romincnt part in shaping ti of the h 
 
 <.f thought. The an>\ver to the Protagorean difticulties ren:. 
 practically unchanged until the stru^ylc hetweeii realism 
 nominalism, the former of which in its future development he- 
 came the philosophy of the "static universe", while the latter he- 
 came the attitude of the practical mind, of natural scieno 
 democracy. 
 
 Modern pliil.iM.pliy originates in the shift of inter, 
 the supernatural to the natural: and in emphasizing this change, 
 the interest lies more in the direction of differentiating science 
 from theology rather than in ijm->tims as to the difference he- 
 twc<.n science and philosophy. The method of science and the* 
 
 13 
 
construction of systems held the first place in the early stages 
 of modern science and philosophy, and not until the time of 
 Locke is the prohlem of the origin, extent, and validity of 
 knowledge, raised. Prior to this time and to all intents and pur- 
 poses, since the time of Locke, the scientist has gone on without 
 serious consideration of the problem of knowledge. 
 
 Although the empiricist attenpts to begin anew, as in the case 
 of Bacon, he is not able wholly to sever his connection with an 
 attitude which had found a firm lodgment in the mind of man. 
 In spite of Bacon's polemic against scholasticism, he believed in 
 a fixed number of "forms", and to find it the business of science 
 to discover these " forms". Although Descartes asserts it as 
 his purpose to build anew, he can not free himself from a dual- 
 ism of mind and matter, a heritage of the dualism of the middle 
 ages expressed by this and the other world. Dualism is one form 
 of the doctrine of authority. It takes its origin in primitive 
 nature worship where beneficent and harmful natural forces are 
 in striking contrast with each other. Each must be appealed 
 to the one in order that its acts of grace may continue, the 
 other so that it may at least remain neutral. The idea of "matter" 
 is of something to which our thoughts must conform. It is the 
 "given", and strive as we will, we can not escape its compulsion. 
 It is not the compulsion of an Absolute, however, but is the hard 
 and fast fact of immediate experience. Matter may occupy a 
 lowly place, as the prison house of the soul, as that which drags 
 down the upward striving mind in its attempts to contemplate 
 the eternal plan of things, as that waiting for the application of 
 the "form" ; but with the growth of science and with the increase 
 of knowledge of the methods of controlling nature for our own 
 purposes, matter became the object of study, but matter still in 
 the sense of the "given". When epistemology became thoroughly 
 launched after Locke, the problem of the relation between mind 
 and matter became more acute. Realism of the common sense 
 kind served the purposes of science up to this time, . but the 
 difficulties involved in the relation between perception and the 
 object, difficulties formulated by the Greeks, led to the view- 
 held by the empiricists, namely, of representative perception. In- 
 stead of a direct experience of the object, we have on the re- 
 presentative theory, an image of the object which answers for 
 its reality. The "given" is not perceived directly but only 
 through the idea a conception not unlike the means of salvation 
 in the religious world of the period, and comparable in many 
 ways with the idea of absolute' authority developed in the polit- 
 
 14 
 
ical philosophy of 1 Thus it was that religion, the state, 
 
 and science, each had its "given", its principle of authority, which 
 determined the problems against which the methods in the res- 
 pective spheres could he - 
 
 The early beginning of F.nglish philosophy is indicative of 
 tlu- general trend of their later thinking. While it is true that 
 science- is more universal in its appeal, it is less true with philo- 
 sophy where national characteristics and interest- of a temporal 
 nature arc influential in determining the point of view. Duri'ig 
 tlu- period of church supremacy there was community of inter- 
 'hroughout Kurope. due in part to a common language as 
 a vehicle for thought; l.ut with the publication of the "Advance- 
 ment of Learning" in the Knglish tongue 1 , the way was opened for 
 a more characteristic Knglish philosophy. \\'hile the empirical 
 attitude- is seen in the church philosophy as represented by the 
 i in the ninth century, and by Alexander of Hales 
 and i "ii in the thirteenth and of William of Occam in 
 
 the fourteenth, it is n,,t until the break with scholasticism on the 
 part of F. I '-aeon that the empirical type of thinku i firm 
 
 foothold. < >ecam ' 'eve-lop Uie doctrine of the 
 
 "two-fold" truth which was fatal to the schoi. -uiption of 
 
 the identity of faith and knowledge. \\'ith the growth of science- 
 and mathematics the difference between the worlds becar 
 proiiiiiincei! tliat no etT.-n was made to treat one in the terms 
 of tlu- other. The "idols" of the tu the 
 
 need of a con of problems in freedom from the re- 
 
 straint of authority, for they rcali/rd what is n.-w a common- 
 place that the limits , .; are- fixed by the metaphysical 
 
 conception of the day. 
 
 Kmpiricism, then, is the outcome of a practical type- of mind 
 :ed in the businos of this world in the solution of scientific, 
 social, and political problems. While its exponents belie. 
 c- 'inplete break hajj been effected between themselves and the 
 older type of thinking, it requires only to be pointed out that 
 the chief diff. : a shift in the locus of the Absolute, the 
 
 Idea, the < ioal. Men had been taught obedience too l,ng to regard 
 reality a> an achie\ment. For the former period of thinking, 
 reality is the fixed world beyond, and matter, while following 
 Aristotle, is never without form. it occupies a subordinate 
 place in the s.:ale of things. It approaches the (Hood in organi- 
 zation. until in man the limits of its possibility are reached. Rut 
 when Matter i> taken as the reality itself, and when the former 
 reality has been relegated to the world of faith when this 
 
 15 
 
.vorld is the world <>f reality 1 > which thought must conform, 
 we have the attitude of the "plain" man engaged in the pro- 
 blems of scitnce ad politics. The case is not unlike that in 
 which, after the regular physicians have given up hope for the 
 recovery of the patunt. the older women come forward. each 
 with her remedy. The difficulty might he- one- of diagnosis, in 
 which case if recovery happened, it would lie a case of accident. 
 or of such a mild nature of treatment that in any case it effected 
 nothing. It seems safe to say that the diagnosis of the patient 
 in the hands of the scholastics was faulty and that the empiri- 
 cists inheriud the same faults. They inherited the hahit of think- 
 ing in terms of completion, and regardless of the locus of au- 
 thority similar difficulties must arise. They misinterpreted the 
 method of science that is they took as an example a hit of scien- 
 tific achievement, analy/.ed the product in the completed form, 
 and from this dictated what must he the method in the actual 
 performance of the original discovery. 
 
 After on experiment has been made, certain elements in the 
 performance of it may he selected and grouped as "data"; cer- 
 tain elements ma\ "answer the "conclusion"; hut before the ex- 
 periment has been performed we can not speak of data and con- 
 clusion in the case in particular The fallacy of empiricism is 
 that of regarding the world of matter as data for science the 
 > world" in "general, "given" , so to speak, wllidl stands m3T"m need 
 of construction, hut to he "represented" in consciousness. 
 
 It might be said that the standpoint of empiricism is dualism. 
 On the one hand there is the world as given; on the other, there 
 is a mind the business of which is to represent this world, a; 
 mind, moreover, which is passive, which is a "white piece of 
 paper" which receives the impressions from the outer world and 
 which records them wax-like. Under the leadership of a differ- 
 ent idea of authority and of a changed conception of conscious- 
 ness we should expect to find a different type of philosophical 
 thinking. With the shift of authority from the church to the 
 state over which was a ruler who held by divine right, we have 
 a transformation which is notable in its consequences, but we 
 still have a form of authority, something given, which is a limit 
 beyond which nothing need be attempted. All endeavor is cir- 
 cumscribed by the circle of authority. This method of social 
 and political living is reflected in the scientific and philosophical 
 thinking where a norm is present in the form of matter. >>f 
 nature, on the one hand which dictates to a passive subject, 
 mind, on the either. As the sin-sick and penitent semi received 
 
 ir, 
 
from the representative of the church <>r the unworthy 
 suhjcct r.cei\i- -.;racc from the hands of the sovereign, so ton 
 tin- mind rommands from it- sovereign, matter. An 
 
 'ute matter and a subject mind will answer as a principle of 
 explanation as Ion- as the sodal conditions are such that that 
 explanation is a reflection of them; hut with the dawn of a dif- 
 ferent attitude of a political, social, and religions nature, due. in 
 part .to the exceptional individual who pioneer-like reaches a 
 little hcyond his fellows to "thin-s unattempted yet in pr< 
 Hume", we have a changed conception of the nature of reality 
 and of the function . .f intelligence ii; nee. With the 
 
 .th of democracy in Knglaml tlifoii.iji the effort^ of -me of 
 the very leader.- of the empirical school, we note a Correspotid- 
 
 . haime in tlu n of matter ' thinker- 
 
 we pa-- fr.>m an undi--_;u:>ed empirici-m [ type, 
 
 rnallx "there" to matt ;>ermamnt pos- 
 
 <\". The duali-tic hypot uihedded in the 
 
 \ir\ fai-ric "f the life <.f tlu a^e in which it flourished, hut Ike 
 
 idea! the child of the age and ha- fallen with m wer 
 
 tin nature 'f political and 
 
 authorit). and with a --nception of the nature 
 
 and function 
 
 An exatnination of tin the -\-tem will reveal the 
 
 CoiitraditioUs which hi>tory has already made evident. We have 
 in the ca-e ' empiricism two ".uivrii>". namely, thin-s and mind. 
 \\'ith these the i>rol)lem U .alid knowledge a working 
 
 n-latii-n hetween mind and thin-- of such a nature a- will ex- 
 plain what i- admitted to exist, namely, knowledge. Knowledge 
 comes ah. -ut in the judgment and an examination into the jiultf- 
 nunt siioiild rexeal the dith'cul' 
 
 Locke's -tatenuiits are well known and have often hecn 
 criticised, hut they contain the essential elements of modern 
 epistemology. "Since mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, 
 hath no other immediate ohjcct hut its own ideas, which it alone 
 doth or can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only- 
 conversant aln.iit them. ****Knowlediie then seems to me to be 
 nothing hut the perception of the connection of and agreement, 
 or disagreement and repugnancy, of any of our ideas. In this 
 ; alone it * From this standpoint the act of judgment 
 
 cons : sts in referring one idea to another, and when true, the 
 ideas ague. Win n the judgment is not true the ideas (the 
 
 i'.k. IV. I'll. 1. Sees. 1 and 2. 
 
 17 
 
subject and predicate being both ideas) do not agree. Ideas are 
 built uj) i" two ways: first from "sensation", and secondly, from 
 the perception of the operations of our own minds within our- 
 selves. "( htr suises*** do convey into the mind several distinct 
 perceptions of things, according to the various ways wherewitli 
 those objects do affect them; and thus we come by what idea> 
 we have of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and 
 all those we call sensible qualities; which when I say the senses 
 convey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects con- 
 vey into the mind what produces there those perceptions.***** 
 These two, 1 say, vi/.. external material things as the objects of 
 sensation, and the operation of our own minds within as the ob- 
 jects of reflection, are, to me, the only originals from whence 
 all our ideas take their beginnings."* An idea is not the "thing", 
 therefore, but is representative of the thing. Judgments accord- 
 ingly have nothing to do with so called "reality", but is only 
 the perception of the agreement or disagreement of represent- 
 atives of reality. Locke, however, attempts to make the matter 
 clear by an explanation of "wherein this agreement or disagree- 
 ment consists" ; and in doing this he has recourse to the four- 
 fold nature of agreement, one of which is Real existence. The 
 essence of this type of agreement as stated by Locke is "that of 
 actual real existence agreeing to any idea."f The first type of 
 judgment, as Locke soon recognizes, makes no place for the ob- 
 jective world ; the result is that he must, in case the judgment is 
 to render knowledge objective, modify the former statement of 
 the nature of knowledge, by an assertion to the effect that it is 
 the perception of the agreement of the idea with an object. 
 
 We shall ask the following question of the Lockian theory 
 of knowledge : (a) What determines which of the ideas gained 
 in the manner stated shall be applied either to another idea as 
 in the first statement of the nature of judgment or to real exis- 
 tence as stated in the second definition? (b) What determines 
 agreement or repugnancy? (c) W'hat is actually accomplished 
 by an act of judgment? 
 
 In answer to (a) it may be said that there is no method : n 
 the madness of the coming together of ideas or of objects and 
 ideas. Thinking on the principle of "givens" is an idle pas- 
 time of putting together blocks which have been made to order, 
 or rather given to fit. There is no difficulty as to the final out- 
 come, only try long enough, but trying itself is a mystery on the 
 
 *Op. C. Bk. II, Ch. I, Sees. 3 and 4. 
 tO. C. Sec. 7. 
 
 18 
 
as-umptions. It is as if in making a judgment we started with 
 an idea or a reality in the nature of an object, pinned down, so 
 t<> -peak, and fitted to them or it. the various supply of ideas 
 which we have in our heads, until at length we eoine to one 
 which "agreS w , whereupon we. Archimedes like. pioush, 
 claim. Kurcka. luireka. In short, there is no method in any 
 particular ca>e to tell which of the stock of ideas we shall em- 
 ploy as a predicate. The same is true of the subject, only in 
 this case any idea or object may l>e chosen arhitrarily. In either 
 
 it is a n-att.r of assortment, for h<th idea and ohjev 
 the two ideas were given in the ordinal expel - identical 
 
 and u nt. 
 
 A> to (]>) the question concerns the truth or falsity of an 
 idea, in the 'he- aguinurt of one idea u ith another 
 
 in the fit- nt !" the nature of ; or jud.umt.nt. 
 
 it is e\ ulent that if the ide.i A ith itself we have made no 
 
 ^s hut have as^rted a nun- : deiiu\. It i- evident, 
 that th's is all that can he done, for if the ideas do not agne, 
 that is. if there is any ditTerein .m not have knowledge, 
 
 for tin re is disagreement. Kverv judgment is either the . 
 
 of identity, such a- A is \. Of IS fal.se. In the second 
 statement of the agreement of an idea with an object, we have 
 the same difficulty when it o-nv For truth and 
 
 falsity. The idea heing a copy . ,r a f the oliject ought 
 
 certainly to "ague" with it for there is nothing eKe for it to 
 with; hut in a.ss.ertin. ive done nothing 
 
 more than to assert identity. If wr a^e-rt another idea it will 
 not agree with the ohject. and consequently there will 
 not he truth hut falsity. In hoth cases the following strange 
 paradoxes confront us: il^.t all judgments are true, hut do not 
 extend our knowledge: second, that all judgments are false hut 
 that our knowledge is extended hy them. In a world of mean- 
 n the one hand and a world of things on the other, it 
 appears that truth and falsity have no significance. Truth is 
 reduced to identity which is given in the original experience, 
 identity, thai is, latween the idea and the thing, or between the 
 idea as subject and the idea as predicate; and consists merely in 
 the perception of agreement. 
 
 In answer to (c) it may be said that there is nothing ac- 
 complished by the act of judgment. If the idea is in the fact, it 
 is difficult to see how it ever got away from it; if it is not in 
 the fact but in a world of divorced meanings, the mystery is pre- 
 sent none the less in accounting for a principle of reference. In 
 
 19 
 
tile lirst caM' a judgment is reiteration; in the 
 
 it must In- false. 
 
 hi the second chapter nf the fourth book of the lissnv. 
 Locke considers mediate knowledge. The first kind of know- 
 ledge i> iininediaie or intuitive and it is on "this intuition that 
 depends all the certainty and evidence of all our knowledge." 
 Demonstrative or mediate knowledge is that type or de-ree 
 "where tjie mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of 
 any ideas, hut not immediately". Xo\v the mind can not always 
 perceive presently the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, 
 a fact which renders necessary, if agreement is to he perceived 
 finally, the introduction of a few or many intermediate steps 
 in each of which "there is an intuitive knowledge of that agree- 
 ment or disagreement it seeks with the next intermediate idea, 
 which is used as a proof." liy a perception of agreement or dis- 
 agreement throughout the series of steps, the final conclusion 
 is reached. 
 
 The classic attempt in logical theory from the empirical 
 standpoint is Mill's l.<n/ic. His efforts in this direction are 
 hetter understood as the logical aspects of the doctrine of the 
 philosophical radicals who were social and political reformers 
 first and logicians and moralists second. Philosophy as con- 
 ceived hy them is hut a means to social and political reforms; 
 the reforms of the law. of the methods of punishment and of 
 the English constitution. The different philosophical aspects of 
 intuitionism and empiricism, in the view of Mill, are of great 
 significance from a practical standpoint ; and it is the practical 
 aspect of the controversy hetween the two contending views 
 that led him to write the l.ot/ic. He says, "The System of 
 Logic Mipplies what was much wanted, a text hook of the op- 
 posite doctrine (to the apriori view of knowledge) that' which 
 derives all knowledge from experience, all moral and intellectual 
 qualities principally from 'the direction to the associations.**** 
 The notion that truths external to the mind may he known by 
 intuition or consciousness independently of observation and ex- 
 perience, is. I am persuaded, in these times, the great intellectual 
 support of false doctrines and bad institutions. By the aid of 
 this theory every inveterate- belief, and every intense feelim 
 which the origin is not remembered, is able to dispose of the obli- 
 gation of justifying itself by reason, and is erected into its own 
 all-sufficient voucher and justification. There was never such an 
 instrument devised for consecrating all deep-seated prejudir 
 
 'Autobiography, p 
 
 
 
Mill i> quite ri-^lit in his contention; a> no ..tic will deny, hut 
 
 tin- question is as t the method for overcoming the difficulty. 
 
 .1 of the 'mind' of the idealist. Mill suhstitutc-s another 
 
 ,nd LMMII as the min<l itself, namely, nature. In- 
 
 of the mil to nature as Kant would ha\e it. we 
 
 MI Mill thi- common -hift in the 1"< uthority. with 
 
 :eMih that nature dictate- l the nr.: 
 
 Philosophical spi-culati- . and his aim 
 
 :n tii lop the il i-s..eiation 
 
 Moditk-d l.y his father in the 
 
 t\\ ei n psych M Hi 
 
 tin- mental p- If. of the 
 
 conditioti> it depends '-n. and th-- which it consists, is tlu 
 
 1'rection of the 
 mded.*** > the 
 
 ".tided on 
 'he relat 
 wliu-h in turn i> atx-tl: po-,tula'' 
 
 the empn >\> out in alm> .>t e\ ery 
 
 chapter, for whctl "things" be i])licated he ha- 
 
 A lun "mind" n in the 
 
 .. nt of the pi'o\iuee 
 
 of loyic. wh"- ither to nvent, noi 
 
 r. hut to jiuL if the IdiNitii^- of I'-'-jic 
 
 to inform the Miryeon wh. found to accom- 
 
 pany a \ioK-m death. "I'hi- hr imi>t learn from IIJN own e.xper- 
 I'vatii'ii. oi from that of others, his predrco-vor-> in 
 hi^ peculiar pursuit. I'.ut lo^ie >its in judiituent on the Mii'ticn nc\ 
 of that nh><.rvation and experience to justify his rules, and on the 
 'nis ride> to justify his conduct, [t does not give him 
 proof. s. hut teaches him what makes them proofs, and how he 
 jud-e them."t Log n.it attempt to find evidence, l.ut 
 
 merely to determine whether or not evidence has heen found. 
 The alio\f statements were written when the "mind" side- of the 
 dualism had ; I'.ut when he comes to treat induction 
 
 which is inference, he discovers that a formal lo^ic of proof 
 -urticknt. When, in other words, he discovers that the "mind" 
 - the jo!) ..f the logician >, .tnewhat as that of the 
 
 . Intrudue". ; 
 [ntroduct 
 
coroner, and rcali/ing that tin- met hod of science had been dif- 
 ferent, he introduces another statement of the business of logic. 
 "\\e have found that all Inference, consequently all Proof, and 
 all discovery of truths not self-evident, consists of inductions."* 
 Thereupon lie skives as a statement of induction "the opera- 
 tion of discot'criinrf and proving general propositions."^ a pro- 
 Cess, however, which is made very complex, when it is remember- 
 ed that the individual facts upon which the general proposition is 
 based are themselves, or at least may be, the results of the in- 
 ductive process. On the one hand logic does not observe, on the 
 other, this is the essence of scientific discovery; on the one 
 hand logic does not discover, but merely proves, discovery being 
 the result of "sagacity"; on the other, the object of logic is to 
 discover the "invariable antecedents". 
 
 An examination of .the treatment of the "categories" will 
 show the same* shift in position >n the face of the difficulties 
 which confront one who works from the dualistic standpoint. .We 
 have as a general division the two classes of categories, the 
 subjective and the objective, the former being states of con- 
 sciousness, the latter being something different from states of con- 
 sciousness, or substances an attributes. The difficulties come 
 about in getting a working affiliation between the two classes. 
 The first class is made up of feelings or states of consciousness, 
 under which sensation, motion, and thought are subordinate 
 species. Thought includes "whatever we are internally conscious 
 of when we are said to think ; from the consciousness we have 
 when we think of a red color without having it before our 
 eyes, to the most recondite thoughts of the philosopher or 
 poet".* In this connection Mill takes great care to distinguish 
 sensation from the object which causes the sensation, but in so 
 doing he is committed to the agnostic position of the believer in 
 the-thing-in-itself. He is introducing the concept of cause as 
 applying to a world or in a world from which he is forever ex- 
 cluded by the nature of his assumptions. 
 
 The next division of "nameable things" is substances which 
 are the external causes to which we ascribe our sensations. 
 The sensations are all of which one is conscious, but these consid- 
 ered as produced by something external to the body and the 
 mind, which external soireth'ng is called body. "All lue know 
 
 *Op. cit. Bk. 3, Ch. 1, Sec. 1. 
 
 tltalics mine. 
 
 JL. C. Sec. 2. 
 
 *0. C. Ch. 3, Sec. 3. 
 
 22 
 
of objects, is the sensations which they uive us and the order of 
 occurrence of those sensations. "T I'.ut the question as to how 
 sensations have objective reference must he answered and it is 
 answered strangely f..r an eni])iricist for Mill says it is by intui- 
 tion. "The answer is***that the helief is intuitive; that mankind 
 in all 'nave felt themselves compelled, hy a necessity 
 
 of their nature to refer their sensations to an external 
 cause." In contrasting the two kinds of siihstanc.es. mind and 
 matter. Mill makes u-e ..f the f. ill. win- : "a l.ody is that of an 
 unknown recipient or percipient of them; and not of them 
 hut of all our other feeling. As body is understood t" 
 he the mysterious s, .nu-thiiiii which excites the mind to tY 
 the mind is the mysterious snim-thinn which feels and thinks."* 
 Duali-m, consequently, lead- -ticism. i 
 
 lie method, in short, all attempts at thinking must he 
 doomed to failure when all are founded on "unknowns" and 
 "mysu n- 
 
 Attr:' BOS by w!;ich Mill attempi - 
 
 ie himself": tluy nbject matter of judgments; hut 
 
 at hottotn they are powers in that mysteri--" .r\. suh- 
 
 stance. t- excit of (|uan- 
 
 tity. of qualitx. or of relation. Krotn the standpoint of lo-ie. 
 quality and >uisation are synonyms. The same may he said of 
 quantity, hut en tain nl ,-uliar place. The rela- 
 
 mltaneity. and resemblance, do not haw 
 
 ohjective refei. . tlu- other attributes hut the\ an- innate. 
 
 As Mill puts it. "Our of the n of these 
 
 ions is not a third iefl nlded to them; we 
 
 ha\e not t'ir.st the two feelings, and then a feelin- of th 
 
 siou. To ha\e two feelinus at all. iinplio either havin- tliem 
 
 successively or else simultaneously. Sensations or other feelings, 
 
 ision or simultanoiusiu-ss are the two eondi- 
 
 tlu- alternative of which they are subjected l>y the 
 
 nature of our faculties.''-? "Uesemblance is nothing hut our 
 
 feeling of resemblance; succession i> nothing but our feeling of 
 
 succession". j Mill is forced here to the apriori view which lie 
 
 so violently criticises as the source of prejudice. because he 
 
 has no other method of reach inu objectivity, on his premises, 
 
 . 7. 
 mine. 
 
 tltalics mine. Cli. .>. Sec. 10. 
 tOpus 
 
except by the "high apriori road". If the question be asked, 
 What is the business of thought?, on the foundation laid by 
 Mill, tin- only answer that can be given is that it is merely a 
 registration of impressions, a reception of what is in the object. 
 Attributes are in the objects, they are powers which the objects 
 have to excite sensibility. If attributes are already objec- 
 tive (all attributes, that is. except certain relations which are 
 innate), how can any mistake ever occur in the registration of 
 attributes by the mind? In other words, the problem of error 
 is impossible on Mill's theory of the categories. 
 
 I\ an appeal to the "universal belief of mankind", an act. 
 of "intuition" Mill at last gets on the outside to objectivity, He 
 is stron- in bis criticism of the view of the philosophers of the 
 Lockian type that propositions are expression of the relation be- 
 tween ideas; and insists on the other band that the relation is< 
 one between phenomena themselves. He characterizes the opposite 
 view as one of the most fatal errors ever introduced into the 
 philosophy of logic; and the principal cause why the theory of 
 the science has made such slow progress during the last two cen- 
 turies. II is own statement of the nature of a proposition is, 
 "The object of belief in a proposition is generally, either the co- 
 existence or the sequence of two phenomena".* But when he 
 discussed these relations among the categories, these same ones 
 were such as did not refer to objectivity but were of the original 
 nature of the mind the mind's contribution in the formation of 
 objects. 
 
 His discussion of the categories leads to the following alter- 
 natives: (a) All is mental: in which case he is in the same 
 position as the subjective idealists; or (b) All is objective: in 
 which case there is no place for error, or in fact, for thought 
 at all, except as a matter of registering inmpressions ; or (c) 
 Part is mental and part is objective; in which case there is no 
 way to find how they are connected or related; or (d) All is 
 appearance : in which case we know nothing of either mind or 
 matter, subjectivity or objectivity, but live in a world of 
 Kantian phenomena. 
 
 Mill's treatment of inference affords the best example of 
 the difficulties of the dualistic postulate or assumption. In the 
 treatment of the categories he makes it clear that attributes are 
 subjective, but that they are caused by powers in an unknown 
 substance and refer to objects. These attributes are the subject 
 
 'Ch. 5, Sec. 5. 
 
 24 
 
matter of proposition.-* which arc matters to which proof or lo^ic 
 is applicable. It is true that in other connections Mill has a dif- 
 ferent statement of the nature of objectivity as the "permanent 
 possibilities of sensation".* But the paradox involved in such 
 a >tatement is evident, it is by mean-* of sensation that we build 
 up a world of possibilities of sensation. The question of chief 
 importance, howe\tr, at this time, is the possibility of making 
 am inference whate\er. If we view the matter from the stand- 
 point of consciousness there is nothing in the wa\ of discovery 
 Me for all i-* already in the mind. NOW tlu- mind is mere- 
 ly receiver, a recipient from the ab* -lute of the system, nature; 
 it P" creati\e abdity. not even tile ability to recall. In 
 
 the mind actuall) could perform any sort of operation on 
 its materials, it is forever hound down to a fixed "given" from 
 which it can n< \"o truth or error could ever come to 
 
 pass for sensations ari . m .jther true nor false. If the mind was 
 dynamic, the only possibility of error would lie in false recall of 
 the "i-iven". Hut reproduction of what is "th not infer- 
 
 \\hen the attempt is made, as Mill does, to shift to phe- 
 nomena, to the world ..f objectivity, the difficulty i-* not obvi- 
 ated; but it appe.f only under a different "uiven". If 
 objects are -i\en. why inference? If inference is a movement 
 from the known to the unknown, what is the result of such a 
 process; how can Mich a process take place' If u e already have 
 the known, why disturb it? Let the known be either stat' 
 Consciousness Of objects, rl -led by making any kind of 
 sail) from what is already fixed!" 
 
 But Mill treats inference as an objective matter, and the 
 ground of all inference, of all induction, is the universal law 
 of causation. \ow Mill ulls us that this -round is a case of 
 induction itself but he meets the paradox by a reference to his 
 treatment of the major premise <f the syllogism that the major 
 premise is nothing more than the sum of the cases of particular 
 instances, and consequently that "no reasoning from generals to 
 particulars can prove anything, since from a ueneral principle 
 we cannot infer any particulars, but those which the principle 
 itself assumes as known."* With this in mind it is difficult to 
 see just what is accomplished by making as a major premise of 
 e\erv induction a generalization of the uniformity of nature. 
 If the ground of every induction is the uniformity of nature. 
 
 f Hamilton's FMiiN.s. Ch. 11. 
 
and if the ground has no other proof than is expressed in the 
 cases which have gone into its composition, it certainly seems 
 a useless process to labor so diligently for some ground which 
 renders legitimate the inductive process. But later in speaking 
 of the uniformities of nature of which the law of causation 
 stands at the head in point of universality, he says, "we shall 
 find ourselves warranted in considering this fundamental law, 
 though itself obtained by induction from particular laws of 
 causation, as not less certain, but, on the contrary, more so, 
 than any of those from which it was drawn. "f Now if the uni- 
 versal law is founded on particular laws, and if these particular 
 laws are sometimes modified, what is the result? If the general 
 is the sum of the particulars and if the particulars change, then 
 what of the general? Mill asks this question and attacks it as 
 follows : "For there is probably no one even of the best established 
 laws of causation which is not sometimes counteracted, and to 
 which, therefore, apparent exceptions do not present themselves, 
 which would have necessarily and justly shaken the confidence of 
 mankind in the universality of these laws, if the inductive pro- 
 cess founded on the universal law had not enabled us to refer 
 these exceptions to the agency of counteracting causes, and there- 
 by reconcile them with the law with which they apparently 
 conflict". $ In other words the universal law is founded on 
 lesser laws which may be counteracted, but the universal law, 
 the sum of the particulars, remains as a check against the very 
 particulars of which it is composed. 
 
 We are confronted here with these difficulties : 
 
 (a) The major premise proves nothing; yet that nature is 
 uniform is the major premise which serves as the ground of all 
 inductions. 
 
 (b) The major premise is the ground of all induction; yet 
 it is itself a case of induction. 
 
 (c) The ground of induction (the major premise that 
 nature is uniform) is nothing more than the particular cases; 
 yet these particular cases may be counteracted without any 
 effect on the universal law which in fact is used as a check on 
 the particulars of which the universal is made up. 
 
 The difficulties of the dualistic standpoint is again seen in 
 the treatment of the hypothesis. The hypothesis as Mill views 
 it is not a case of inference but it is an auxiliary thereto. It 
 
 tBk. 3, Ch. 21. Sec. 3. 
 JL. C. 
 
 26 
 
-kilful .uuess. It is a .uuess which .ui\cs mental unity and 
 wholeness KI a chaos of facts, of scattered particulars. It is a 
 which is made, moreover, only by minds which abound in 
 knowledge and which are disciplined in intellectual combina- 
 tions. On the otlK-r hand, the hypothesis is absolutely indis- 
 pensable in >cience. Without them science could never have 
 attained its present state. "They are necessary steps in the pn>- 
 -"inethinvj more certain; and nearly everything which is 
 now theory was once hypothesis."* It is stran.ue that an instru- 
 ment SO \aluable occupies the position of an auxiliary to inference. 
 Mill tell.s us that hypotheses are employed in order that the de- 
 ductive method may be applied earlier. When we remember that 
 no inference is possible by the deductive method, but only in 
 the formation of the major, premise in place of which in this 
 
 -lands the hypothesis, the mystery conccrnin.L; the function 
 of the hypothesis urows deeper. Then ayain. ue have a ina-- 
 of -cattered facl>. a cl particulars .uiven. and the busi- 
 
 >i the hypoth' ib-ate" tlie>e fact- by means of 
 
 conceptions in the mind of him who abounds in knowledge and 
 who is disciplined in intellectual combinations. P.ut on the other 
 hand, the conception is in the facts and the mind sees it there. 
 "If tin- tact- are rightly classed under the conception, it is be- 
 cause there i- in the fact> themselves somethin- of which the 
 conception i> itself a copy; and which if we cannot directly per- 
 ceive, it is because of the limited power of our organs, and mt 
 becau-e the thiim itself is not there. The conception itself is 
 often obtained by abstraction from the very facts which it is 
 afterwards called in to connect."* If the conception is in the 
 facts, -iven. there is no guess, lucky or otherwise; and the dis- 
 coverer would be merely the man whose sense of perception 
 happened to be a little keener. If the conception is not in the 
 fact-, the mystery as to where it came from and how it happens 
 to fit the facts is still there. In fact the whole treatment of the 
 hypothesis is based on "luck" and "mystery." 
 
 >Bk. 3. Ch. 15, Sec. 5. 
 >Bk. 3. Ch. _'. Sec. 4. 
 
 27 
 
IDEALISM 
 
 The standpoint of idealism is the priority of consciousness. 
 The different aspects of this postulate have received the greatest 
 amount of consideration all the way from Plato and especi- 
 ally from Berkeley to our own time. When Plato gave the 
 (ireek world the answer to the questions propounded hy the 
 sophists.* he answered as the aristocratic (ireek would, namely, 
 that knowledge is above the world of the fleeting experi- 
 ences of the democrat, the artisan, the toiler; that it can he dis- 
 covered only hy the keen eye of the philosopher who removed 
 himself from the vagaries of the world of the common lot who 
 occupied the same position in the social world that matter occu- 
 pied in the physical world of Aristotle. f While it is true that 
 the idealism of Plato is not the idealism of the modern, his em- 
 phasis on the intellectual aspect of experience has had a pro- 
 found influence in shaping modern systems. $ The atmosphere in 
 which his intellectualism was formulated has always heen a 
 favorite one for the idealistic philosophy. While the Platonic 
 intellectualism is meant to he primarily practical, the method of 
 reaching the practical was thru the intellect, with the result that 
 it could he found only hy those who had the time and the op- 
 portunity to permit the Orphic soul again to visit that realm 
 whence it fell and there to view reality as it was in itself and not 
 the manifestations in the fleeting order of temporality. 
 
 In the latter part of the middle ages we find Platonic idea- 
 lism confronted with a type of mind more pronounced in demo- 
 cratic and individualistic tendencies than was the case when the 
 system was formulated.* We have the outright denial of the 
 existence of Platonic ideas, a renewal of the spirit of individual- 
 ism which in later centuries resulted in the great industrial up- 
 
 *Such questions as the relation between the particular and the universal, the 
 relation between 'knowledge' and 'opinion'. 
 
 "Sir \\~indelband : History of Philosophy, (Tufts' Translation, p. 140). 
 
 tScv Russell. The Problems of Philosophy, Ch. IX. On the view that 
 Plato's doctrine of ideas was methodological rather than metaphysical, 
 see Mackintosh. The Problem of Knowledge, pp. 81-2, and references 
 there cited. 
 
 BWindelband, op. cit., p. 107. 
 
 *The developnient of Nominalism was connected especially with Porphyry's 
 Introduction to the logical writings of Aristotle as concerned with the 
 "Fi\r 1'rcdicables". See Ueberweg, History of Philos. pp. 365-9. 
 
 28 
 
hca\al. tin- newer democracy, and tin- freedom of intellectual 
 pursuits from religious supervision. In iliis strut^le it is to he 
 noticed tliat tlu- church maintained the 1'latonk- position one 
 of tin- first manifestations of what would IK- the position of the 
 church and of idealism in the future strn.yyles U-tweeii religion 
 and science. 
 
 In the ('artesian philosophy. cmpKi>ii/n- as it does the dual- 
 ism of mind and matter, we have the culture sperms of the vari- 
 ous idealistic types of thinking of the more modern \ariety. 
 This dualism, a heritage oj the period of church supremacy. 
 onl\ to he emphasi/ed on the subjective side t render 
 idealism dominant. l\calit\ which is clear and distinct 
 
 the- test of the realitx of the ohject is the clearness o f tlu-t 
 idea.t \\'e Imd. also, ni h ing n the 
 
 tenet of (.od. and the necesviu of the < i..d idea for the N\ su-m as 
 a whole, the more modi in n of the Ahsolute. a sieoini 
 
 postulate of the more recent development "f idealism." In fact, 
 the Ahsolute d to the phi1os,.ph\ irtes. "Je 
 
 pense. done Je SUIS"T ,(] me is not knowledge, and if any ad- 
 \anre is made l>e\ond the cotitines of the induidual. somethin- 
 
 :v. l'.\ the tlsr of the axi-nn 
 
 the exisumv of < .od who in turn vi.nrhe- for the truth of our 
 ideas ami who serves a> an ideal l>y which ! measure and c 
 human thinkin.u. Thus the philosuph;. furnishes the' 
 
 chief stoek in trade .f the idealist, namely, tin- primacy of cori- 
 sciousiH-sv. i.n Ideal, and last. the religious BUITOUndingS 
 which alone idealism can flourish. Hut with the rapid urmvth of 
 science which tended towards mechanism. thu> alienating the 
 wnrld from the spiritual realm, came the pressing need, in 
 the world was to he interpreted in terms of religious philosophy, 
 to render the world of science spiritual. The t-mphasi- 
 scientific method hy Hacon.+ the mechanical philosophy of Hohhes. 
 
 ^"'I'lu- first rulr \va>. IH-VJ.T t 'ruth which I did iv.t 
 
 cU-arly kimw tn !. suc)i: that is. tn avoid haste and prcjudico, and not to 
 i-Minprfhcnd anythini: wore in my juilxnu-nts than that which should 
 prrsi-nt itsrlf sc. cli-arly and so distinctly to my mind that I should have 
 in to ciitt-rtain a doubt about it." Discourse mi Method, Part 
 II, Torrcy's Translation, p. 46. 
 
 * Meditations. 1. 
 
 t('f. Augustine's principle of the immediate certainty of consciousness. 
 \Vindelband. op. cit pp. _T 
 
 J"Tlu- former, (empirics), like ants, only heap up and use their store; the latter, 
 (Scholastics), like spiders, spin out their own web. The bee, (induction), 
 a mean between both, extracts matter from the flowers of the garden and 
 and the field, but works and fashions it by its own efforts." Novum 
 Organtun, Sec. 95. See also. Sec 68. On induction from empirical 
 particulars, see Advancement of Learning, Vol. VI. p. 265. 
 
 29 
 
and the achievements of men engaged in the pursuit of the vari- 
 ous sciences, were not condurive to a spiritual interpretation of 
 the world. But when the idealist, asserting the priority of con- 
 sciousness, formulates the doctrine latent in Cartesian dual- 
 ism, namely, that reality is idea, the problem of the scientist. 
 his solution, and his data, hecome matter for the idealistic post- 
 ulate. Since knowing was regarded as spiritual, a notion inherit- 
 ed from the Greeks, reinforced, moreover, by the neo-Platonic 
 philosophy as represented by Plotinus, and the Christian philo- 
 sophy as well, and further since perception was regarded as a case 
 of knowing or kno\vK .!ge ; the way was opui for a thoroughly 
 feligio-idealistic interpretation of nature.* 
 
 With Berkeley who was first a man of the church and a 
 philosopher next, we have a definite formulation of the stand- 
 point of idealism. His doctrine grew up as a defense of Chris- 
 tianity against the free-thinkers and in the effort to interpret 
 science from the religious standpoint. The concepts of space 
 and matter, the foundation of the mathematico-physical science 
 of the day, were first attacked by Berkeley after the Lockian 
 manner of discovering the origin of our ideas. Newton who 
 had just produced his work on mathematical physics, found it 
 necessary to postulate an absolute space and time, not objects of 
 the senses, as a basis for distinguishing real from apparent mo- 
 tion ; and in addition, matter.f The result, in short, of the 
 Newtonian science was a mechanical view of nature which 
 Berkeley sought to avoid. He attacked the view at the very basis, 
 namely, on its postulates, showing that distance and magnitude 
 are not apprehended from the beginning, but that the idea of 
 them arises from a combination of sensations of sight with sen- 
 
 Winde1band, op. cit., pp. 388-9. 
 
 *The Platonic soul occupied an intermediate position between the world of 
 Becoming and the world of Being, Phaedo, 76 ff. It is that which moves 
 of itself and moves other things. It is also that which perceives and 
 knows. Cf. Aristotle Conception of the "active" reason; cf. Cicero's 
 view of the spirituality of knowledge, Windelband, op. cit. 223. The 
 Stoic logos doctrine that the rational part of the soul is an emanation 
 from the divine World Reason is another expression of the spirituality 
 of knowledge or knowing. See Ueberweg, op. cit., p. 194. 
 
 "When Greek philosophy deified the speculative intellect, it made the 
 supreme effort to work clear of all that was vague and mythical in religion, 
 only to find that the intellect had become a deity and followed the older 
 Gods of emotional faith to the seventh heaven." Cornford, From Religion 
 to Philosophy, p. 261. 
 
 f'Before there could be real motion there must be an absolute space and an 
 absolute time which are not determined by their relation to anything 
 external. ***The true space and the true time are mathematical space and 
 mathematical time, but these are not objects of the senses". Hoffding, 
 History of Modern Philosophy, Vol. 1, pp. 410-11. 
 
 30 
 
sations "f strain.* Tliis combination depends upon practice, and 
 what Newton calls .v/v/cv is < >nly a subjective association of ideas 
 furnished by the two senses. Thus Berkeley has accomplished 
 his aim. 1>y abolishing the "matter" side of the (."artesian dualism, 
 rendering the Lockian primary qualities dependent upon sensa- 
 tion, and reducing the foundations of science to subjectivity: tin- 
 aim, namely, to render possible a religion?. Of idealistic interpre- 
 tation of nature. 
 
 The idealism of Berkeley. ho\ve\er. suffered from another 
 type of dualism, as Hume SOOD saw, that of the thing that thinks 
 and t!ie ideas. Hume reduced the thing that thinks to a 
 of imprt. ssj, ,ns,* with the net result that speculation which began 
 with Descartes and ended with Hume wa> disastrous to spirit 
 and science alike. It i> at this point in the breakdown of psycho- 
 logical idealism that the Kantian movement was inaugurated; 
 and it is to Kant rather than to Hcrkeley that most idealists pre- 
 fer to trace their lineage. Kant attempts to mark off the field 
 of the conflict I his da\, the chief of wh'ch wa> the 
 
 conflict hitwecn materialism on the one hand and spiritualism on 
 the other. As early as 12(W) men had questioned the abiliu of 
 ;i to deal with religion, t urging the latter to be a matter 
 of faith rather than of diabetic; and from that time to the 
 Kantian period the attitude towards religion wa> alwa\> a prom- 
 inent part of the system of the thinker. The leading current.-, of 
 thought at the time of Kant wire: skepticism, tin- thought of the 
 Knlightenim-nt. empiricism, and mysticism. These currents, creat- 
 ing the problem of Kant, determined the nature and 
 bis system; each is catalogued and placed. He is skeptical as 
 far a.s knowing a world apart from our ideas in this he a 
 with Hume. He meets the ;>r -blem of the Enlightenment by assign- 
 ing to reason its proper bounds. He is empirical in respect to 
 the origin of our ideas. He answers mysticism and religion by 
 asserting the practical ned-s^tv of (iod. Freedom, and Immor- 
 tality. It would possibly not be admitted that Kant's primary 
 
 *"It is certain l.y experience, that when we look at a near object with both 
 it approaches or recedes from us, we alter the position of our 
 It-ssening or widening the interval between the pupils. This dis- 
 -:tion or turn of the eye is attended with a sensation, which seems to 
 me to lie that which in this case brings the idea of greater or lesser dis- 
 tance into the mind." Fraser, Selections from Berkeley, r- 182. Cf. also 
 \>\<. 184, 191. See Lotze, Microcosmos, Sec. 4, pp. 306-10. 
 
 e nothing is ever present to mind but perceptions, and since all ideas 
 are derived from something antecedently present to the mind; it follows 
 that 'tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of 
 anything specifically different from ideas and impressions." Hume, 
 Treatise on Human Nature, p. 67. Also see pp. 252-3. 
 ..ntfe. History of Materialism, Vol. 1. pp. 218 ff. 
 
 31 
 
interest was religious, his own statement to the contrary notwith- 
 standing* hut it will he admitted that the religious prohlem was 
 one of the matters of chief interest he paves the way for a re- 
 concilation between science and religion by assigning to each its 
 field of activity. 
 
 From the time of Kant to the present, idealism has taken 
 various forms as the individual thinker has seen proper to 
 develop one aspect or another of the Kantian philosophy; but in 
 each case the initial postulate is present the priority of con- 
 sciousness. With Fichte, it is the will; with Hegel, the intellect; 
 with the followers of Hegel, the additional postulate is made 
 the absolute. All the systems, however. struggle with the 
 difficulty of Berkeley which Hume criticized so forcefully -dual- 
 ism. In the Critical idealism, it is the thing-in-itself and the 
 phenomenon : in the absolutistic type, the dualism of the psycho- 
 logical knower and the absolute knower. Berkeleyan subjec- 
 tivity is present in all as well, but with the difference that the 
 subject is merely extended; instead of an individual mind which 
 received impressions at the will of God, we have an absolute mind 
 endowed with the categories of logic, to whom the universe is 
 present in one immediate experience. 
 
 Assuming that it will be granted that idealism works on 
 two postulates mentioned above, and that it arose in response to 
 a religious problem and that it has been intimately the ally of 
 religion in the conflict between the latter and science, it remains 
 to consider the following questions : Have the problems of relig- 
 ion in support of which idealism is formulated so shifted that 
 both the problem and the solution are no longer of interest ? 
 Is there any evidence for the postulates themselves? In regard to 
 the former question, a different conception of religion will carry 
 a different type of thinking; and a difference in the method of 
 solution will vary accordingly. To render the world of science 
 subject to a religious interpretation, it was only necessary to re- 
 gard thinking spiritual in its nature, a notion rich in traditions, 
 based upon a primitive soul concept which was definitely formu- 
 lated in the doctrine of Plato;* and to regard the subject matter 
 of thinking as the product of the same spiritual principle. Thus 
 both the process and the material are spiritual. 
 
 The religion with which the idealistic philosophy is sympa- 
 thetic is primarily the "other world" religion. Tt was under the 
 
 *Dessoir, Outline of a History of Psychology, Introduction. 
 Also Ch. 1, Sec. 3. pp. 11-13. 
 
 32 
 
dominance- of such an idea that this type of thinking jjot its 
 definite formulation, and in present day types the emphasis on the 
 absolute is a metaphysical reflection of the same religious concep- 
 tion. It is just within recent years that a different conception of 
 the nature of religion has been f. emulated. L<>om the time of the 
 Romantic Movement and in fact earlier, it has been the custom 
 to treat problems historically, and especially i> this true since 
 the rise of the doctrine i \olntion. Hut the religious field has 
 bei n >iulited until the ; '1'he hypothesis "that re- 
 ligion is the conseiousm-s. of the h . lal values 
 
 That these Inches! appear to embody more or less 
 
 idealized expr< the most cKmmtal and urgent life im- 
 
 -."* will render m. the type of thought used for a 
 
 different conoptioti of rclivr : ience. To quote further, 
 
 "In all Stages, the di mand is for daily bread and for companion- 
 ship and achievement in family and communit\ relationships. "7 
 Religion, that is t.. . hnnuui institution. It is to be inter- 
 
 preted as an att- nipt to meet certain fundamental needs of the 
 peoplr. wllosr it is. to IK- ail expression of the interests of that 
 people, and t \ar> a> the Idealism 
 
 has lost in the conflict with '. for the very 
 
 interest the former attempted to vjuard has been preempted by 
 the latter and has been -i\rn an interpretation in its terms. Re- 
 ligion is to be interpreted naturalistically and in the spirit of 
 seience. "Food and sex are the .v-rcat in- the individual 
 
 and of society. Tin se may wrk out in various forms, but the 
 \uround pattern' of every man's life are determined by these t\\o 
 elemental 
 
 It has been shown that the t\ * upation determines 
 
 "the scheme or pattern of the structural organization of the 
 mental traits."* In the . Union of the < iod idea, polytheism 
 yields to monotheism, not unlike the "categories" in their gradual 
 decrease to "l"nit\-".'r <>r "Inalterable System of Relations" in the 
 philosophy of idealism. The inexplicable, not only in primitive 
 life but in modern as well is explained or rather thrown on to 
 the -eiurous shoulders of the absolute where no explanation is 
 
 *Ames, Psychology of Religious Experience, p. 7. 
 
 tLoc. cit. 
 
 tOp. cit. p. 33. 
 
 It is not essential to the argument that religion is a human institution 
 that food and sex are the only bases upon which religion is founded. It 
 may he that there are many other factors which enter. See McDougall, 
 Social Psychology. 
 
 *Dewey, Psych. Rev.. May 1902, p. 217. 
 
 IGrant Allen, The Evolution of the Idea of God. 
 
necessary. As the thunder holt of the all-compelling Jove is 
 rendered intelligible from the standpoint of science, that attri- 
 hute of divinity is removed to another world, the world of know- 
 ledge ; when Ceres became explicable on the basis of soil fer- 
 tility, one god less inhabited Olympus. And finally when science 
 explained religion on the basis of human needs, human desires, 
 as a human institution, the chief support of idealism was taken 
 from under it. Historically the system refutes itself, for that 
 which gave it its raison d'etre has been accounted for by its rival. 
 Consciousness can be regarded as spiritual, i. e. as other- 
 wordly in the religious sense, only with a denial of an evolution- 
 ary method of approach. When consciousness was regarded as a 
 divine element which rendered man a little lower than the angels, 
 and which separated him from the animal kingdom which, in 
 short, is the differentia of man, and when the postulate is that 
 consciousness is prior and that things exist for it alone, it ren- 
 ders the task of the idealist an easy one to give to nature a 
 spiritual interpretation. But when a newer conception of con- 
 sciousness is advanced, when it is shown that it is not a static 
 bit of divine spiritual nature, but a dynamic factor in meeting 
 the needs of an organism in the struggle to develop specific values, 
 when it is viewed as a function which has a natural history 
 which can be stated in terms of cause and effect, of the give 
 and take of experience, and when causes are actually assigned, 
 causes moreover, which are not ''final" but natural ; then it is 
 that we hold to our idealism on other grounds than as be- 
 lievers in the results of modern research. With the newer con- 
 ceptions of animal mind,* the place and function of the instincts 
 in the behavior of humans and animals,f the interpretation of 
 the emotions in terms of physiology,^ and the view of the cogni- 
 tive processes as means of gaining control over conditions for 
 action, of the very categories which found their lodgment in 
 the absolute mind as having . a history, as growing out of and 
 up from the conditions of adequate responses ; it seems that the 
 conditions giving idealism its place in the growth of systems have 
 so changed, its problems met in a more satisfactory manner on 
 other hypotheses, that the system itself thru lack of contact with 
 present problems and methods, has an historical interest only. 
 
 *Washburn. The Animal Mind. 
 
 tMcDougal. Social Psychology. 
 
 tjames. Mind, O. S. ix., 1884. 
 
 SDewey, How We Think, Part II; Miller. The Psychology of Thinking; 
 Pillshury, The Psychology of Reasoning; Dewey, et al. Studies in 
 Logical Theory; Creative Intelligence, Professor Bode's paper. 
 
 34 
 
With regard to the postulates themseK e>. it is (lifticult to find 
 a greater hit of antllropomorphisni in all the history of thinking. 
 It is. however, impossible to escape a certain type of anthropo- 
 morphism if that term is used to mean an interpretation of 
 facts in connection with the problems ..f man, but to assign to na- 
 ture a purpose in itself apart from human problems, or to con- 
 sider it the product of an intelligence wholly external to human 
 intelligence. ..r to consider the function of knowing as bringing 
 
 pervading extra human universal to 
 
 which all ditferenc . though it may be in implicit form. 
 
 ir t.. hold that a perfect experience is one in which the "that" 
 and the "what" are undiffenntiatcd in an immediacy of an ab- 
 solute intelligence all of this is merely a refined and more poetic 
 interpretation of the primitive manner of interpreting the facts 
 of experience. Ti. Idrui ..f tin- sun and the 
 
 moon; man ma> gain control over the "powers" by sacrificing, 
 giving food, for this ur.dcrs ;;;/;/ d"Cile ; the winds are held in 
 a great ca\e guarded by a deit\ man who occasionally 
 
 turns them .nit. The iarlieM f..rm of theory is perhaps ;mimi.sin,* 
 and tl tones imcntcd by those ancient idealists, 
 
 interpret the phenomena "f nature in term- of the activities and 
 interests of man. Childhood is notably anthropomorphic and 
 mythopoeN >:uck in the ground by (i.nl; thunder is 
 
 -peaking loudly; lightning is < iod striking many matches at 
 me time. Thus it is that primitive man and childhood are ideal- 
 
 from both the populates of tl: from the priority 
 
 of mind in which things are my things; from the absolute in 
 that ;;/y powers are magnified to infinity and are used as a lever 
 to move my world. 
 
 By a survey of th<- uiits of science, by a comparative 
 
 study of present with past customs, by setting aside as conquered 
 a portion of the field of experience, by a consideration of what 
 
 lied "progress", it has appeared to some that there is a 
 "goal" towards which all progr aching, a purpose in 
 
 things, which lends significance to the world of chaos as it is 
 thrown down before the individual. It is difficult at times to 
 keep a steady eye on the universal purpose amid the evil and ap- 
 pearance of the world, but by a careful inquiry one can cull the 
 wheat from the chaff, by an inquiry, that is to say, into the 
 yencral character of Reality; and by a method, the criterion of 
 which is that "what is. real is not self contradictory, and what 
 
 Marvin. History of European Philosophy, p. 41, 
 
 35 
 
is self contradictory is not real."* There is an instinctive de- 
 mand on the part of the intellect for coherence and consistency 
 and as a gratification of this instinct, such an attempt into the 
 characteristics of Reality is to he commended. The problem 
 that interests us here, however, is the value of the hypothesis as 
 a means of relating the facts it attempts to relate, for it is as- 
 serted that such an inquiry into the general nature of things is 
 science or a science,* and since every science works on the as- 
 sumption that its principles will he or can he verified, and that 
 knowledge to the effect that verification has been made can he 
 the possession of any one who takes the time and spends the 
 energy necessary to think through the solution. With this in view, 
 the chief objection to this assumption of an absolute, a goal, an 
 end is the impossibility of verifying the hypothesis for the fol- 
 lowing reasons: (a) there is no method for doing it; (b) even 
 if it could be verified or if it approached verification, we 
 should never be any the wiser in this respect ; (c) since the in- 
 vestigation is directed towards Reality in general, there is no 
 point for beginning, that is to say, no hypothesis is possible, since 
 this. too. is part of the Reality to be investigated. 
 
 The first of these difficulties, the lack of a method, presents 
 itself as a serious one. Metaphysics claims to be a science, yet the 
 metaphysician is the first to deny the ability of scientific method 
 to handle his data. "Unlike religion and imaginative literature, 
 Metaphysics deals with the ultimate problems of existence in a 
 purely scientific spirit; its object is intellectual satisfaction, and 
 its method is not one of appeal to immediate intuition or unan- 
 alyzed feeling, but to the critical and systematic analysis of our 
 conceptions. Thus it clearly belongs, in virtue of its spirit and 
 method, to the realm of science.* But that the method of science 
 is not applicable is evident when we note that "In all (italics 
 mine) our science we are constantly compelled to use hypothe- 
 tical constructions, which often are, and for all we know always 
 may be, merely 'symbolic' in the sense that, though useful in the 
 coordination of exerienced data, they could never become ob- 
 jects of direct experience.''! If a "systematic analysis of our 
 conceptions" is undertaken, it is difficult to see how we shall 
 ever get anything in addition to or beyond the elements which 
 that analysis reveals ; but this method is advanced as a means of 
 
 *Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, p. 19. 
 
 *T"aylor, op, cit., p. 5. 
 
 *Taylor, op, cit., p. 5. 
 
 fTaylor, op. cit.. p. 36. 
 
 36 
 
reaching something in no respect comparable with the original 
 data, namely. nr concepts. Just h<>\v an analysis of our con- 
 cept- reveals an absolute something not in the original, is diffi- 
 cult to see. I'.ut that Metaphysics, though a science, is not 
 amenable to scientitics method, is seen from the latter quota- 
 tion above. Tbe hypothetical constructions of the scientist may 
 be merely 'symbolic' useful but never the objects of a direct ex- 
 perience. Waiving the difficulties invoked even in attempting to 
 -tale the hypothesis, how is it to be verified? In scientific 
 method, when prediction, based on the hypothesis or in terms of 
 it, are fulfilled, it i> said to be verified. When action carried 
 on in the light of the hypothec leads t. results which were 
 calculable before action began, is a statement of the >ame tiling, 
 f'.nt in such an hypothesis as ih, -[notion, thci . 
 
 havior .< r action which can 
 
 d which will give the hypothesis a t 
 
 are <>nr tests, these ma\ share the lot of all scientific hypotheses 
 that is, the\ may be merely 'symbolic'. Since truth and error, 
 appearance and reality, are both admitted and present as elements 
 to be considered in th< -sible 
 
 that the i - d shall ': -inch at 1 
 
 truth. It then bee appeal to another principle 
 
 - in the ca.se. outside of the data at hand. >uch 
 
 ; ntie of the original experience. 
 
 In the second place, by \\ '. >hall we reco-ni/.e that 
 
 whic! t partial verification"- Admittedly things 
 
 are n il and less real. "A completely ade- 
 
 quatc apprehension of reality would In. one that contained all 
 reabty and nothing but reality, and thus involved no element 
 whatever of deceptive appearance."* Such an expcrienc 
 
 le only for the a' '.lowing marks indicate the 
 
 nee of the absolute in the chaos ,,f appearance: (a) the 
 comprehensiveness of the system; (b) internal systematization. 
 Concerning the latter, it may be said that it is possible to build 
 vin on any chosen si-t of axioms ,,r principles, which pos- 
 all the 'internal systematization' the biased intellect might 
 crave, but this fact would argue, not for the existence of an 
 absolute, but for the accuracy of the deductive method on well 
 defined and assumed generals. Grant the axioms of the Euclid- 
 ian geometry, and the proofs that follow do not argue for any 
 principle other than the ability to deduce from assumptions which 
 are unquestioned, conclusions possibly less patent than the "as- 
 
 *Taylor, op. cit. p. 34. 
 
 37 
 
sumptions. Comprehensiveness of the system has been urged 
 just as strongly to show the opposite doctrine. Matter, Force, 
 Energy, are postulates which have been employed to account for 
 the facts of experience, with the usual result that the absolute 
 is either found unessential to the system, or is reduced to the 
 "unknowables."* The ancient atomic hypothesis of Democritus 
 and Leucippus is as comprehensive as an intellect craving harmony 
 and consistency could desire. It accounts for everything from 
 alcoholic intoxication to the construction of the heavens, yet one 
 would not urge the fact of its comprehensive character as evi- 
 dence in support of an absolute intellect. In short, whatever 
 postulate one might select will result in a system as comprehen- 
 sive as one based on another assumption. The same field is 
 there to work over, the same problems are present, and the com- 
 prehensiveness of the system is measured only by the industry 
 and ability of the author of it. The criteria of the absolute 
 apply euqally to any system even to those which deny its exist- 
 ence. 
 
 But since human thought is always connected with specific 
 problems, even the problem of the absolute being specific, how 
 are we to place any achievement of it in the scale of absolute 
 values? In the present difficulty, and even in its solution, by 
 what marks shall we behold the absolute as it pervades the par- 
 ticular? Human experience is linear, so to speak, a one-dimen- 
 sional affair ; while systems are other-dimensional. Because this 
 is so, we can never experience totals, systems, but present pro- 
 blems here and now. An accumulation of particulars may be- 
 come correlated with a nervous system, resulting in a habit, either 
 a habit of thought or of thinking, or a habit of direct action ; 
 but it does not argue for an absolute intelligence. 
 
 The very nature of the undertaking precludes the possibility 
 of solution; not only of reaching a conclusion, but of stating 
 the problem, granting that a problem exists. Once launch -out on 
 the problem of reality in general, for "Metaphysics deals with 
 everything"* and there is no place to begin or to end, but there is 
 a constant shifting of particulars, now here, now there, to this 
 principle, to that, a justification of this by that and that by 
 this, until by sheer exhaustion the whole chaos is thrown on the 
 shoulders of the absolute, as offering a safe refuge for the dis- 
 
 *Cf. Buchner, Force and Matter. Also Herbert Spencer, First Principles, 
 
 Ch. III. 
 *Taylor, op. cit. p. 7. 
 
 38 
 
cordant elements, for (here no problems arc attacked, but the 
 \Yhole is present in Immediate- Experience. 
 
 In an attack upon a discordant situation, one in which there 
 
 is a licnuine problem present, certain factors in the situation, 
 
 ut of it, are taken as fixed, for granted, and are used as a 
 
 of operations. Certain meanings have been fixed by past 
 
 solutions, and these meanings furnish the lever for the removal 
 
 of the present difficulty These very meanings. however, may 
 
 themselves become the object of inquiry at a later period in the 
 
 Ition of other difficulties, but in such a cas< ilu-r meanings 
 
 are taken as fixed and are held SO until they fail to function in 
 
 the tensioiial situation. It is in this manner that hypotheses are 
 
 verified, that mear clarified, that candidates for 
 
 : vity become elected to their positiin>. 
 
 In speaking of the priority all have in 
 
 mind the cognitive aspect ' 'ther aspects have 
 
 been eiiiphasixid. but e\cn in the < of the activ 
 
 peel, the romutur >ide is the a.umt. The problem of the idealist 
 
 rythinu t- ' \\'e should note 
 
 that consciousness viewed in its co-niti\e aspect includes per- 
 cept:. with the result that all conduct 
 is lo^ici/ul and Consequently the ubiquity i if ' 'tie of the 
 chief ar.nuiiKiit.x that has been ur.ued recently a-aiiist the pri- 
 orit\ $ "lie which has een called the argument 
 from trie predicament".* This was pointed out by 
 (ireiii wlun lie said that "no object can be conccircd as t\vistin</ 
 except in relation to a thinking .subject" should not be confused 
 with the proposition "that it cannot < t in the relation."* 
 The ideal' . that is to >ay. from the proposition that every 
 tliiiii; that is known to exist (perception bein.u a case of know- 
 ledge) is idea, to the c that nothing can exist independ- 
 ently of hcini; known. \\'hat the idealist really shows, it - 
 is that what is kna-icn is an idea, but he has not proved that 
 e\ ei ythin- is idea. It seems that this difficulty is a genuine one 
 for idealism, from the standpoint of the finite knower only, and 
 that his conclusion is based on an enumeration of cases in in- 
 dividual experience, due to a faulty view of perception. From 
 the point of view of the absolute knower, the idealist can escape the 
 argument from the egocentric predicament, but this is simly 
 dogmatism. In this connection it might be mentioned that the 
 
 'Perry. Journal 1'hilus. VII. 1910. pp. 5-14. 
 
 *Quoted from Mackintosh, Problem of Knowledge, p. 96. 
 
argument d<>i-s not prove th t there arc things independently of 
 1 icing known, when kinnsiini is employed in the same sense. 
 Tin- realist who employs the argument, therefore, to show his 
 own doctrine can no more conclude from the same premises that 
 there are things independently of being known than the idealist 
 can conclude that there are not the argument applies with equal 
 force against both theories, and not only against these, but 
 against all theories which render ubiquitous the knowledge rela- 
 tion. 
 
 Certain facts seem to tell against the priority of conscious- 
 ness. These facts are those connected with the biological view 
 of consciousness. Certain types of behavior, such as automatic 
 and reflex, not to mention instinctive behavior, appear to be 
 more elemental in the life of the organism and of the species. 
 In the lower forms of animal life we find the reflex and auto- 
 matic behavior such as will meet the peculiar needs of the organ- 
 ism. In the higher forms of life other types of behavior occur, 
 until in man the ability is present to form ''free" ideas until 
 consciousness appears. In the child the lower and more element- 
 al types appear first and not until a later period does conscious- 
 ness develop. The laws of forgetting, and the' law of dissolu- 
 tion* indicate negatively the same fact of the late arrival of 
 cognition. 
 
 From the above discussion of idealism from the stand- 
 points (a) of its history in which the attempt has been made to 
 show that the interests out of which it grew have ceased to exist 
 in their former manner, and (b) that it cannot account for its 
 postulates that they have been outgrown; it remains to consider 
 briefly the logic of the system. In a general way the remark 
 will pass that a true logic of idealism is the logic of the abso- 
 lute of a mind endowed with the categories of logic. All cog- 
 nitive attempts of the human variety separate the "that" from 
 the "what", even in sensation, but in the true judgment or in- 
 ference, no separation is made but there is an immediate experi- 
 ence of differences within a universal. Processes, either deduc- 
 tive or inductive, are not essential to a true logic ; but since we 
 actually do something called thinking, it is a task of interest to 
 arrange these processes in a system which approximates the pure 
 experience of the absolute ; but a true logic is no logic at all. 
 It is because we see through a glass darkly and not face to face 
 
 'Baldwin, Mental Development, Methods and Processes, pp. 387-404. 
 
 40 
 
that we must place mir values in a scale for comparison with 
 the eternal ones. 
 
 The- problems of idealistic loi-ic iiro\\- mit of the concep- 
 tion of reality as a fixed system, a non-Contradictory and self- 
 sufficient totality. This totality is "there." "ijven". in the same 
 way that the data of the empiricist are uiven. hut for the ideal- 
 ist it is an already organized and abiding totality. It is I 
 in th if bein.u the product of the logical absolute mind. 
 
 The problem that true l".^ic is no lo-ic at all. to 
 
 Show a connection between the temporal human intellect and the 
 lute mind. ..r anain. to show the method by which a know- 
 'f the true real: atic universe, is achievetl truth 
 
 and derives of reality heinjn for thi- J1C identical.* 
 
 Summan! re the Reality. 
 
 id Individual Thinker. Tli< md in a po>i- 
 
 tioti with Reality n one side, the Individual 
 
 with his ima^e in the middle, and Ideas on the other side. The 
 problem ! ' ^. to apply to Reality an Idea. The metl: 
 
 the ji'.iliMiunt : the individual with his ima--. The human- 
 
 !; t\ which is outsidr, there, to 
 
 be kno\vn. and he C"im > into , ith Rc.alit\ in p< 
 
 lii.n. world must ! i"rom these percep- 
 
 I kni iwled^f- -the point of im- 
 
 nu-dia- rl with reality. \Y. k the following ques- 
 
 -ut the com. | \\ < t n th< ' in the 
 
 -.i-tivity : (a) Is Realit -In- judgment 
 
 side? (1 ) Are Ideas //, tin.- R.alit\ <ir di. the\ exist in then-- 
 
 \" tlier uorld when no- ferred to Reality? 1 
 
 Ideas fornud? (d) What is the relation bctuetii 
 
 the Ima^e and the 1K:. .t part of 
 
 Reality? 
 
 d such that reality is inside the judgment, 
 there n for judgment because of the coincident 
 
 ility. If. however, a jud.ununt is made, it is made 
 in tlie l."ckian - nu-nt of our 
 
 >-an never know whether or not the ideas 
 
 are the same as the reality. Since the idealist regards perception 
 
 as kn.'\vKdt:e. he is compel!- ,\er (a) such that reality is 
 
 .Hunt as Bosanquet does. "If the object-matt 
 
 -I'tuly outside the s\stem of ihou^ht, not only our 
 
 ut thou-ht itself, would he unable to lay hold of 
 
 "Bradl- ..rid Reality, ("h. 15. 
 
 41 
 
reality."* It seems evident that thought does somehow "lay 
 hold of reality". 
 
 Now "the real world for every individual is emphatically 
 his world. "f That is to say, the world for every individual is an 
 extension of his present perception, " which perception is to him 
 not indeed reality as such, hut his point of contact with reality 
 as such." In perception, therefore, the individual does not get 
 reality as such, hut his content or idea of it. In this case, when 
 he applies an idea, he is applying an idea to another, and not ty 
 reality. If it is enswered that reality is outside the thought pro- 
 cess, we can never get at it by thought and can consequently 
 make no judgments about it. Stating this again, we may say 
 that if perception is a case of knowing, we never can know the 
 object, but only the idea, and our judgments are merely the 
 reference of one idea to another. 
 
 As to (b) if it is answered that ideas are /;/ reality, then 
 why make any judgments, for what is to be referred to reality 
 is already there? If it is not in reality, how does it ever get there, 
 and if it does get there how do we know that it is a correct refer- 
 ence? That is, what determines just which one of the ideas in 
 the world of ideas shall be applied to the "this" of immediate 
 experience? If ideas arc without being referred to reality, if 
 they are in a world of existence, what idea (since an idea is in 
 essence a meaning) can be referred to them in a judgment which 
 can in any way characterize them? Regarding the world of ideas, 
 Bosanquet says : "It is not easy to deny that there is a world 
 of ideas or of meanings which simply consists in that identical 
 reference of symbols by which mutual understanding between 
 rational beings is made possible. A mere suggestion, a mere 
 question, a mere negation, seem all of them to imply that we 
 sometimes entertain ideas without affirming them of reality." 
 "I only adduce these considerations in order to explain that 
 transitional conception of an objective world, distinct from the 
 real world, or world .of facts, with which it is impossible wholly 
 to dispense in an account of thought starting from the individual 
 subject."* 
 
 But the "world of objective reference and the world of 
 reality are the same world. "f Bosanquet has assumed a meta- 
 physical reality as a fixed totality of subject-matter which is 
 
 *Bosanquet, Logic, Vol. 1, pp. 2 j. 
 
 tOp, cit., p. 3. 
 
 *Logic, Vol. 1, pp. 4, 5. 
 
 tLoc. cit. 
 
 42 
 
iogiciscd by an absolute consciousness, tin re to be known by the 
 individual knower. On this assumption. meaning and reality 
 must coincide, but in this case no judgment can he made. In 
 order that judgment may be possible, and therefore knowledge 
 (individual), meanings must be "floating" to be seized and re- 
 ferred as occasion demands. \Ve then have on .ur hands a 
 reality which means nothing, in which case we deny the original 
 assumption, and if we affirm the original assumption we deny 
 the function of judgment. In answer to (c) ideas are formed 
 -election of element- which are common in a large number 
 of particular cases. "The name stands for tlio.se elements in tin- 
 idea which correspond in all our separate worlds, and in our own 
 world "f \esterday and of td;i\, ci-nsiderei': -landing. "J 
 
 Ho\\ i- this -election made-? Reality is presented in perception. 
 Selection takes place. This is continued until a meaning is 
 formed. I'.ut the reply is made that it was reality (which just 
 is meaning) which i- presented. 11.. w form a meaning when it 
 is the meaning which is direct!) proum-d? If this objection 
 will not be granted, the only Oth< of the question is that 
 
 meaning wa- not presented (or reality) immediately, it 
 tr.u-t have hem presented mediately, through an idea, resulting in 
 the fact that our meanings are meanings of nKas and n..t of 
 reality. Again, the meanin- 1 in this manner are twice 
 
 removed from nality. e\m in the case of perceptual knowledge 
 and they can never get back to rear ; \>\ vine mystcr- 
 
 ioiiN act l-\ which they telescope the >co>n<l hand copy and the 
 subject of the first presentation. P.osanipiet answers (c) by 
 : that i(Uas are not mere particular mental image- which 
 through consciousness, but they are employed solely for tin- 
 sake of their gunral signification.* 
 
 The image is the fleeting, the idea, that which remains cm 
 -tart in its n ft mice throughout the differences ,,f imagi-ry. 
 The imagery has n logical value, but is purely personal, purely 
 psychological. The idea, however, frees from the subjectivity 
 of the individual, and, by its universal reference, gives objec- 
 tivity- objectivity, that is to say. from the standpoint of the in- 
 div'dual knower. Xow. taken from the standpoint of the indi- 
 vidual, the idia is a> much a product of his as is the image per- 
 sonal to him. a fact which becomes patent the moment one con- 
 siders the method by which an idea is formed. If it is formed 
 
 tOp. i- it. p. 46. 
 I.I.JMC. p. 73. 
 
 43 
 
liy the elimination of incongruities in particular instances, or is 
 the combination of elements common to all our worlds, it is as 
 particular as any image which serves as an element in the whole. 
 and in fact is composed of just the factors which are asserted 
 to possess no logical value. By a process of elimination and ad- 
 dition, a meaning is formed from particulars, any one of which is 
 infected with subjectivity, but which, when combined, lose their 
 subjectivity, and become attributes of reality, now in the facts, 
 now referred to the facts as a means of interpretation, securing in 
 the process of combination universality and objectivity such as 
 was possessed by none of the constituents. If the idea is my 
 idea, and if the image has no logical value, then neither has the 
 idea. It is in perception that immediate contact with reality 
 (that is. reality from the standpoint of the individual) takes 
 place. The idea, being the common elements of many percep- 
 tions, becoming the more general as the process is continued, 
 would, it seems, be a most unsatisfactory method of interpret- 
 ing realit\. for the very reason that the farther the process is 
 carried the farther the idea recedes from reality. The above re- 
 marks, however, apply only to the conception of reality as 
 "there". When it is regarded itself as constructed by the indi- 
 vidual as an extension of his present perceptions, the situation 
 begins to grow in complexity. If reality as such is not presented 
 in perception but only the individual's contact with reality as 
 such, then the idea which the individual forms is not formed by 
 contact with reality as such but only of reality from the stand- 
 point of the individual. The puzzle is as to how such an idea 
 could be adequate to reality as such, having at no time in its 
 genesis been in connection with that which it is to qualify or to 
 which it is to refer. It seems that the difficulties of the situation 
 might best be stated in an answer to the question, What is 
 given in perception? If reality is given, why refer to it an idea 
 which it is? If the subject of the judgment is not given in per- 
 ception, that is, if the subject is a construct of the individual by 
 an extension of his perceptions, where does he get the predicate 
 1 \ which to construct the subject? On the one hand he is con- 
 structing the subject of the judgment by predicates of the judg- 
 ment which he has constructed by a combination of elements which 
 he has gained in his contact with the subject of the judgment in his 
 perceptual experiences. On the other hand he is constructing the 
 predicates of his judgments from the combination of elements 
 gained in his perceptual experiences of the subject of the judg- 
 ment, and is using these predicates as valid in their reference 
 
 44 
 
to their source, ami is thereby building up a larger world. All 
 this process of construction takes place through the image which 
 has no logical standing. The image, while it has, on this theory, 
 no logical standing as meaning, possesses in addition to meaning, 
 
 nee as a psychological fact- that it is a part of reality. As 
 such it is either a construct itself, or the "given" in immediate 
 experience. If it i> a construct, it is constituted in the same man- 
 ner that any other subject or predicate i> constructed, and if it 
 is a "given" it is amenable to treatment as the subject, and thus 
 of the fiber of reality, to which can be referred a predicate 
 gained by the elements which correspond in all our common 
 worlds. 
 
 It would be unnecessary to carry over the difficulties involved 
 in the jit-: treated ' |tut to his treatment of in- 
 
 ference. The close connection between the two processes, the 
 one a direct and the other an indirect or nicdi.,rc reference to 
 reality of an ideal content, renders it impossible to eliminate the 
 difficulties in inference which are present in judgment. The re- 
 lation between the two processes is made clear in the words, of 
 Mediate judgment .r inference is the indirect re- 
 ferciii !;ty of d- within a universal by means of 
 
 the exhibition of this unuersal in di:' directly referred to 
 
 reality."* Immedi.r - the foundation of mediate re- 
 
 ference, and if the foundation of mediate reference is faulty, it 
 
 rtain that the structure cannot escape the strain. 
 
 Summarizing the critic- DSt idealism we may say that 
 
 a criticism of the system is a criticism from the standpoint of 
 because of the ubiquity of the knowledge relation. Hven 
 "The unc. -ation by reproduction fill- 
 
 tills some of the functions of inference."! In early soul life 
 where the reproduction is unconscious, the reproduction of a 
 universal, that is. we have the problem of logic. With this in 
 mind, the attempt has been made to show that idealism, being a 
 philosophy of religion, fails because the data of religion have 
 beui interpreted in terms of science that the data against 
 which idealism was formulated have been reinterpreted. The 
 attempt has been ' made to show that idealism, struggling with 
 science in the early days of the scientific movement, sought to 
 interpret nature in terms of mind, from the standpoint of the 
 priority of mind, believing that by showing the subject matter of 
 science to be mental, and by working on the principle of the 
 
 :. 2. P. 4 
 
 -i-Op. ci: p. 16. 
 
 45 
 
spirituality of mind, that the problems of the scientist were a 
 part of the problem of the metaphysician and religious philoso- 
 pher. This doctrine was shown to be faulty from the standpoint 
 of the biological conception of mind and from the inherent 
 difficulties in the postulate itself. With the breakdown of the 
 subjectivist view of mind, an additional postulate, the absolute. 
 was used to render objective the world of nature objective, 
 that is, from the point of the individual knower. It was shown 
 that such an hypothesis is a poetic form of anthropomorphism, 
 and that it can never be verified. In the last place, an examina- 
 tion of the purely logical treatment based on such a metaphysical 
 theory, shows that the logical processes of judgment and infer- 
 ence cannot take place. 
 
 46 
 
THE NEW REALISM 
 
 Tlu- Xew Realism is the latest addition to the philosophical 
 household. A few tendencies in modern life might he cited as 
 furnishing a social hackground for the system. It is n. 
 however, to account for a movement which is recent as it is for 
 one \\ho-. md setting ate h"th marked hy great epochs 
 
 in history. Croce* gays, in speaking .f the origin .f Logistic 
 which he considers the logical and mathematical hack-ground of 
 what we call New Realism, that harrenness of the period of any 
 thing worthy of the name philosophy is a leading element in its 
 development. "\Ve mu>t n. the circumstances which at- 
 
 tended its hlossoming time, or. to speak more correctly, the time 
 at which it spread out its thorns towards the sun. Philosophical 
 controversy had then b external and empty, had des- 
 
 cended to siieh pedantic and tiresome quiliMing. that soon after- 
 wards an insurrection arose among the spirits it had held cap- 
 tive." Al-out thi> time ohjective idealism had suffered at the 
 Irands of P,radh\. and a spirit of philosophical unrest was pre- 
 sent. The ancient moorings had heen se\i-red idealism re- 
 futed", empirici-m with its duality of thing and mind in had re- 
 pute, pragmatism not as yet with a fool who 
 free from the pre^me oi life might develop in their own 
 seclusion any >ystem which might 
 
 The definite result- of the positive scientists have contrast- 
 ed strongly with the ch nflicting opinions in the field of 
 philosophy. Psychology ,,n the one hand and mathematics on 
 the other have shared in the genesis of this type of thinking. 
 The "conUnt of consciousness", the supposed field of the psy- 
 chologic covered the -ame material as that of the other sciences. 
 Attempts to state the relation hetween psychology and the other 
 sciences hrinu; into relief some of the characteristic doctrines of 
 the new realism. The application <>f mathematics to physics and 
 astronomy, and later hy Herhart and Fechner to the material of 
 psychology, had its influence in hringing mathematics to hear on 
 the suhject matter of logic. 
 
 There have always heen those to \\hom the exactness .and 
 of ma;' iled. At certain times in the Ifstory 
 
 'Kncyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Vol. 1, pp. 199-200. 
 
 47 
 
of philosophy this attitude has taken possession of a people, hut 
 in all times a few. shut out from the affairs of active living, take 
 comfort in the construction of worlds far superior to that in 
 which it is the lot .of the ordinary man to achieve values. Such 
 theorixers say in effect, "If I can't control the affairs of the world 
 of action, I can control a much hetter one the world of con- 
 struction". Not satisfied with the world of action, shut out hy 
 circumstances which control them or hy their own individual 
 choice, they build a world in keeping with their desires of per- 
 fection and completeness. Indeed it might not he far amiss to 
 Mi.ygest that one motif for the polemical attitude towards idea- 
 lism is the very fact that the latter builds so perfectly a uni- 
 verse with so few "loose ends". So eager a desire for such a uni- 
 might lead one to revolt when one found by chance a 
 "loose end", leading on to the building of "more stately man- 
 sions." Surely the interest is not in the problems of this world, 
 as such statements as the following indicate :* 
 
 "The world of being is unchangeable, rigid, exact, 
 delightful to the mathematician, the logician, the builder 
 of metaphysical systems, and all who love perfection 
 more than life. The world of existence is fleeting, vague. 
 without sharp boundaries, without any clear plan or 
 arrangement, hut it contains all thoughts and feelings, all 
 data of sense, and all physical objects, everything that 
 can do either good or harm, everything that makes any 
 difference to the value of life and the world. Accord- 
 ing to our temperaments, we shall prefer the contempla- 
 t : on of the one or the other." 
 
 As in the days of Plato wlun the ground became sinking- 
 sand, he could look for the static in the idea ; or as could the mystic 
 charmed with the vision of eternal completeness in contrast 
 with the llccting tilings of time; so can the philosopher-mathe- 
 matician escape the chaos of Conflicting systems and find a 
 haven of rest in the "entities that merely are." The boldness 
 of the hold of the romanticists is theirs, for they create if the 
 present order of things fails to satisfy they create, moreover, 
 in the name of discover}, a world from which tluv sought free- 
 dom, a world of struggle, of successes and of failures. 
 
 But it is proper that the realist himself should tell us what 
 it is he expects to accomplish. We can then be assured that his 
 mission is not undervalued. "The old logic put thought in fetters, 
 while the new logic gives it wings. It has. in my opinicn. in- 
 troduced the same kind of advance into philosophy as (/aliieo 
 
 *Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, p. 156. 
 
 48 
 
introduced int<> physics, mak'ng it possible at least to sec \vliat 
 kinds of problems may In.' capable of solution, and \vliat kiiul 
 must lie abandoned as beyond human power-. And wher-.- the 
 solution appears possible, the new logic provides a method which 
 inahK-s us to obtain results that do IT >t merely embody personal 
 idiosynci asu -. but must command the assent of all who arc com- 
 petent to form an opinion."* In fact the realistic movement 
 might be characterized as a griuTa! philosophical IIOUM- clean- 
 
 m -\\ 1 i p^ wide-. "There i- 
 ground i". 
 
 an opportunity of reform" all the wa\ from th "-crupulo;;- 
 of words" to 1 linate 
 
 allible 
 ntit'ic pr .redure ; and in 
 
 !n the phy. 
 
 '. ) \\ ill 
 
 a pr< 
 
 mplex 
 
 d, the 
 
 in sli ' in the ord:i 
 
 all ti 
 
 in viiw of il> 
 
 'ne of th' 
 
 :!u- finite knower. in boil, 
 the logical ]>; 
 r. but h- MI) in the 
 
 11 of hitt< 
 
 nnity. The individual knower may at times 
 
 thru the -thin, 
 
 but tl n just th- hether the peepin- 
 
 alistic logician 
 
 : lough 
 
 -ible.* but the theory in its purity separates 
 
 from the psychological. \V\v Realism, ho\v- 
 
 the mind <.f its functions and 
 
 . Vol. 1. I-. 5. 
 
 49 
 
having placed tlum in the vi>rld at lurg'-, t<> relate promiscuously 
 whatever tcims they perchance may staler on, lias no further 
 need of it and consequently drops it from its vocahulary. 
 
 The second point of agreement consists in the adoption by hoth 
 of what the realists term the "fallacy of exclusive particularity." 
 This point of contact is, indeed, a result of the exclusion of the 
 knower as an individual from logical processes per sc. If the 
 knower is on the outside, some means must he taken to account 
 for knowldge which is admitted present. The idealist as was 
 seenf attempts to make a connection by means of imagery which 
 is "psychological" ; while the realist defines the individual as a 
 knower. That is to say, the making of the individual a kno-^cr 
 is definitive that is all that can he said about him. He cannot 
 enter into other relations with objects which are objects of know- 
 ledge only4 
 
 Sensations and perceptions are cases of knowing. There is 
 numerical duplicity which leads to a discussion of the relation 
 of a thing to its appearances a problem peculiarly idealistic, 
 but which the realist must face in view of his conception of 
 knowledge. "The problem of knowledge" says Perry,* "reduces 
 in the last analysis to the problem of the relation between a 
 mind and that which is related to a mind as its object. The 
 constant feature of this relationship is mind." Mind, that is, 
 being a uniform relation may be dropped out. The idealist, how- 
 ever, insists just as strongly that the other aspect of the duplicity 
 can be dropped ; showing that both idealism and realism are ar- 
 guing from a common assumption that of "exclusive particul- 
 arity." Professor Dewey in speaking of this common point in 
 the two doctrines says: "Otherwise (i. e. unless knowing is con- 
 sidered as a differentiation in a biological process) we are rais- 
 ing the quite foolish question as to what is the relation of a rela- 
 tion to itself, or the equally foolish question of whether being a 
 thing modifies the thing as it is. And moreover, epistemological 
 realism and idealism say the same thing: realism that a thing 
 does not modify itself, idealism that, since the thing is what it 
 is. it stands in the relation that is does stand in."f 
 
 Another suggestion that may not be unfruitful in linking the 
 new realism with the two systems treated in former chapters is 
 the emphasis by the former on discrete ultimates as the data of 
 
 tCh. 1. 
 
 tin this connection, see Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, pp. 268 ff. 
 
 *Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 272. 
 
 tOp. cit. p 276. 
 
 50 
 
knowledge. Relations, terms, sense data, etc., function in real- 
 ism as do sensations in the empirical logic and in the logic of ob- 
 jective idealism from the standpoint of the individual knower. 
 
 In the empirical logic it was found that certain relations 
 are in the mind, hut others arc in things; that is, there are 
 l>oth internal and external relations. In idealism, however, they 
 are all internal. In realism all relations are external.* For as- 
 ;ouism analysis reveals certain elementary sensations which 
 are the real; for realism the analytic <K terminations are the 
 real and for both, objects are complexes o>mpos<.<d or made up 
 of these uhimates. The problems are merely transferred to a 
 different locus but they remain the .-amc. For the subjective 
 idealist the problem of how these uisati.in> ban- t"getln r was 
 line- and He-Hub \ answered that they find unity in 
 the soul. Hume showed that the soul was a po. -r 'unit'ieT*. and 
 _h !:n .NHL following his father, had ree-'.urse to a "thread of 
 consciousness." The Kantian finds relations in the mind and ali 
 uirati/ed l.y means ,,f the- Transcendental 1'nity of Ap- 
 perception. The- n ies along and throws >ut the whole 
 to shift for themselves, "no where and no when". There is 
 merely a transtYr. The' realist -coops elements in the nature 
 use impressions and relations from the warm and hospit- 
 able mind of the psychological knower and dumps them into the- 
 co, .1 i.\ternali;\ ; lie seizes the logical catcgorie-s of the 
 mind of an all-eompell'ng Jo\e-. and han'shing the- possessor to 
 the regions of an outsider, sets up for business in another 
 I with a new absolute in the ;ier>..n of terms, relations, and 
 propositions-absolutes that are- just "there", but which are power- 
 ful withal for they generate a uni\< 
 
 If these points of contact are granted, it follows that all the 
 
 arguments ir.ade against tin- other systems in respect to these 
 
 particular matters can be urged with equal force against the new 
 
 realism: the relation between the content of knowledge and its 
 
 ; the placr of the individual knower. and the problem of 
 
 ;ructing a world in terms of uhimates. 
 
 Coming neiw to a more direct treatment of the new realism, 
 we- are confronted at the outset with a diversity of opinion on 
 many of the essentials. What is the nature of consciousness? 
 Here- we find but little unanimity of doctrine. On the one ex- 
 
 *This statement indicates the logical position for an epistomological monism 
 of the realistic type, but not all realists hold this view. They may be 
 divided into the "tough minded" and the "tender minded" the former 
 gcing the whole length, the latter refusing to externalize everything. 
 These types will be considered later. 
 
 51 
 
trcme we see it as a somewhat to which something is presented. 
 On the other extreme it is itself one of the entities in a "neutral 
 
 mosaic". What are "primary" and what are "secondary" quali- 
 and are some ot" the latter subjective? Here the "tender 
 minded" hesitate hut the "tough minded" are sure they are all 
 objective. How account for error? Here again is discord; here 
 it depends upon a subject, there it is purely objective. 
 
 The logic of the new realism is confronted with an initial 
 pctitio priitcipii* It strikes one as strange, too, that this should 
 be the case. In order to get the discussion under way it is es- 
 sential that we begin with a pctitio. It is significant, however, 
 for the initial error is never removed, as we shall attempt to 
 show in connection with the determination of the data of science. 
 It is also significant that this admission is made by a member of 
 the school. It makes it the more noteworthy of consideration, 
 for if it came from an outsider, such outsider would he accused 
 of not having ability to "form an intelligent opinion". If it came 
 from a scientist, he might be accused of being ignorant of the 
 fundamentals of philosophy; if it came from a philosopher. 
 ignorance of mathematics could be imputed to him; and if it 
 came from a psychologist, general ignorance of everything rel- 
 evant to logic is his predicament. 
 
 "We shall not attempt here to give a rigorously lo<jical ex- 
 position of the principles of Logic. Such an exposition is very 
 difficult in any science, but it would possibly be impossible in 
 Logic, for when we are dealing with the primary concepts of 
 thought in general it is impossible to find others by which these 
 can be defined. What would be the g<>"d, for instance, of ac- 
 cepting the notion of implication as indefinable, and then going 
 on to define the proposition as 'everything which implies itself': 3 
 Paradoxical as 'it may appear, it is impossible to have a loi/ical 
 exposition of the principles of logic: vve are condemned in ad- 
 vance to a pctitio principii or to a I'icions circle."! The author, 
 however, is frank to state that it is useless to attempt to dis- 
 guise the fact, but insists that it is better to admit it in the be- 
 ginning, "without any idle logical vanity". 
 
 In the face of these difficulties it seems best to treat first 
 the type of realism wiheh we shall call the "tender minded." 
 The principle employed in distinguishing the two types hinges 
 on the locus and function of the psychical in the system. It i> 
 
 *I am using the "analytic" logic or mathematical logistic here as the logic of 
 
 the iH-vv realism. 
 iCuuturat Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Vol. 1, p. 138. 
 
to lie kept in mind that the fundamental principle of new real- 
 ism is the independence or priority of things, things being either 
 nts or subsistents, and both falling under the general cate- 
 gory of bsinti. Idealism had made bciiKj kno:^n, or being ivilled, 
 the fundamental category, and it is from this standpoint that 
 realism takes its departure. Its aim, in short, is to exclude the 
 act of knowing from loyic. to divorce metaphysics and epistem- 
 ology; and to do this, remembering the while that there is some- 
 thing properly known as psychical involves the ta.sk of assimiinv; 
 t' the logical and to the psychological each its proper place in the 
 
 I. It is. therefore, upon this matter that the division 1; 
 ()n the one hand then- are those who have not broken with the 
 idealistic tradition, and who consequently treat the mind 
 
 '! aiciircr. There are other- . :f\ mind, who 
 
 it in an objecti\e atmosphere as one of the simple or com- 
 plex entities which go to make up the universe at lai 
 
 Tilt!) and 
 
 the i. IK : treatin is depend- 
 
 uit upon the psychical <>r a function "" the mind; the >ther treat- 
 it is, indted, in the interest^ ,,f this very 
 that tin may 
 
 .say. instead of making the principle of division hinge on the place 
 and function of mind in experience, that it hinges on the problem 
 of truth and error that those who recall the Alci!>iadean mind 
 to make room for error belong to the half hearted realists; whiie 
 who are with the fundamentals of the system and 
 
 make error obj,et:\e. are the thor .1 whole-heart- 
 
 id realist-. 
 
 The two t\pes are ckarly seui in the treatment of Mich 
 
 problems as secondary qualities. The realist believe- that if there 
 
 are no ideas, images or mental constructs of any kind between 
 
 ii> and reality, the knowledge problem disappears. because we 
 
 are in immediate cognitive relation with an independent reality 
 
 asistcnt realism will find it impossible to do otherwise than 
 
 !;rm the independent reality of all sense qualities; but here 
 
 who waver in order to account for error, 
 
 who boldly assert the objectivity of sense qualities and 
 
 treat error as objective. The reaction against idealism is complete 
 
 in many cases in a to the effect that in perception the 
 
 .>{ is the independently real physical thing perceived, and 
 
 not only percepts, but also images and judgments are fully phy- 
 
 3 and error.- are introduced by mind but the 
 
 53 
 
errors so introduced arc always objective.* Krror arises from 
 misdescription, yet when an object is seen differently, it is diffcr- 
 tnt and looks different, but its full reality is the continuous total- 
 ity of its partial appearances,, each of which is also independent- 
 ly rcal.t The sensation of blue is an awareness of blue and the 
 awareness of blue is not itself blue. The idealist asserts that to 
 say blue exists is the same in meaning as to say blue plus con- 
 sciousness- exists, but this, says the realist, is a self-contradic- 
 f'on, and results from a confusion of the psychical act with its 
 content.* It is asserted that both primary and secondary qualities 
 of bodies exist in them, regardless of an "awarer", and that the 
 difference is one of ease on the part of the primary qualities 
 in submitting to measurement! It is to be remembered, however, 
 that the author holds the view of the activity of mind. Such a 
 view leads him to conclude that "Why error is 'permitted' is a 
 problem no philosophy has ever solved. "$ 
 
 Before going to a more detailed discussion of the first type 
 of realism, we shall get together different views of conscious- 
 ness, although what has been said of secondary qualities applies 
 here, for the problem of consciousness in one aspect is the pro- 
 blems of secondary qualities. It is worth remarking that the cog- 
 nitive relation is ubiquitous sensation, perception, imagination, 
 etc., are all cases of knowing. Sensation, for example, is "a case 
 of knowing, or being aware of, or experiencing something," 
 hut to be aware of a sensation is not to be aware of its content, 
 but to be aware of the awareness of a sense content. || Rut in 
 trying to introspect the sensation of blue, about all we get is 
 blue, the awareness of the awareness being somewhat diaphanous. 
 The criteria of the mental are (1) it must be an act of Con- 
 sciousness, (2) it must belong to some mind, (3) it must, per- 
 haps, be known to one person only.* In fact it is characteristic 
 of the English new realists to consider the mind as the subject 
 of experience. The mental act is all that belongs to conscious- 
 ness, the Content being objects.f 
 
 The American realists generally are more radical in their 
 
 "Alexander, Mind, N. S. XXI. 1912, p. 2. 
 
 tlbid. Proc. Arist. Soc. 1909-10, pp. 25, 33, 34. 
 
 *Moore, Refutation of Idealism, Mind, N. S. XII pp. 445-9. 
 
 tNunn, Are Secondary Qualities independent of Perception? 
 
 Proc. Arist. Soc. 1909-10 pp. 191-217. 
 JIbid. pp. 210-11. 
 
 Moore, Proc. Arist. Soc. 1902-3, p. 82. 
 Illbid, Mind, N. S. XII. p. 449. 
 *Moore, Mind, N. S. XII, p. 449. 
 tRussell, Problems of Philos. p. 65. 
 
 Alexander. Proc. Arist. Soc. 1909-10, p. 202, Mind, N. S. XX, p. 2. 
 
 54 
 
conceptions of consciousness. They Find fault with the idea of 
 'mental activity' common amon^ the Kntjlish realists. It is amoii^ 
 the American realists that we hnd the second type the thor- 
 ou.uh-'-ioin- realist, those who are consistent with their assump- 
 tion-. The former, in general, regard consciousness as a rela- 
 i'tit it is a relation between a subject of experience and an 
 ! : tlie latter make of consciousness an external relation 
 there is no subject, but only objects in relation. 
 
 The above remarks have beui made to show the neiu ral doc- 
 = nr'n- qualities and consciousness, with a view to urg- 
 ing what has been mentioned in the early passes, that the epis- 
 temolo^ical problem is still with the realist \- lon.y as he con- 
 siders mind a- a knower only, he has precisely the problem 
 
 the idealist ha>. As Ion- as he 
 
 knowing as psychical. hi> I hybrid science : for <;, 
 
 not occur on "general principles" but involve specific means, 
 def'mite vehichs for tli, ;>li>hnKiit. If the act is ps\chi- 
 
 i the means for its accomplishment are psychi- 
 cal, with the reMih that the lems from which escape was 
 sought crop , , u i aj 
 
 ' d study of t\\o 'Ctrine 
 
 of the first t\pe will be made for the purp- ninu into 
 
 touch with the following probk: The realistic 
 
 nd; (l>) The realistic tlu-ory of reality; (c) The 
 
 realistic interpretation of the relation between mind and reality. 
 
 The first to be considered i> the theory of mind. There 
 
 are two methods, it is aerud.* of studying mind: one the 
 
 method of introspection, the other atin. Intro-;. 
 
 the content of mint', better than does the other me- 
 thod, but it does not define its nature. It yields an inventory 
 only. It shows contents that coincide with other manifolds; 
 that is. with nature, history, etc. It finds the quality 'blue' but 
 it is ascribed to a book or a coat. This indicates that the ele- 
 ments in the introspective manifold are neither peculiarly mental 
 nor peculiarly mine. The only peculiarity present in the content 
 is that of grouping mental content when compared with phy- 
 sical nature is fragmentary. The abstract of nature which I have 
 in my mind does not coincide with the abstract in my neigh- 
 bor's mind; but my fragments of nature acquire a peculiar pat- 
 tern. Attain natural objects do not enter -wholly into my mind. 
 
 * Perry. Present Philosophical Tendencies. The account given here is based 
 on his treatment in this volume, Ch. XII. 
 
 55' 
 
hut 1 gather into my mind a characteristic 
 
 ments of nature-. When things arc in the mind, one may mean 
 
 or represent another. 
 
 When we attempt to study the action of mind for "every 
 t\pe of Consciousness exhibits the duality, 'thinking' and 
 'thought', 'perceiving' and 'percept', 'remembering 1 and 'mem- 
 bry'",* by the method of introspection, \\ c are disappointed, for 
 the nature of mental acthity '- s 11() t discovered by an introspec- 
 tive analysis of mental contents. We must, consequently, have 
 recourse to another method, namely, the method of observation 
 which makes it possible to view in another light both mental 
 activity and mental content. "Elements become mental content 
 when the)- are reacted to in the specific manner characteristic of 
 the central nervous system."* The nervous system, that is. is 
 selective, and the part of the environment it selects is the con- 
 tent of perception. Another way of stating the same thing is to 
 say that "Mental Content is that part of the surrounding en- 
 vironment 'illuminated' by the action of the organism". A com- 
 pMc definition of content is given as "that portion of the >ur- 
 rounding cmironment which is taken account of bv the organ- 
 ism in serving its interests". Whin action (which is selection) 
 is integrated with content we have the natural mind as an organ- 
 ism possessing these aspects: interest, nervous system, contents. 
 
 It was indicated that a movement from a given whole, car- 
 ried on !)) a process of analysis which is the realistic "method", 
 and terminating in simples from which can be deduced or from 
 which generate a universe, constitutes the new realistic dialectic. 
 In the considerations now undertaken that of determining what 
 is the world of the realist we shall see the method at work. 
 Rather than give an abstract account of the nature of analysis 
 in general, an actual example of it as it works in the solution 
 of a problem will be more enlightening. Should the nv 
 prove disappointing in the question of finding a world, and turn 
 out to be a much advertised article which we have always used 
 in the solution of corn-rite problems, we may feel warranted in 
 geiuralix'ng our finding, pronouncing it a "new name for old 
 It is admitted that the philosopher has 
 
 no superfine brand of knowledge and that all he can do is "to 
 examine and purify our common knowledge by an internal 
 scrutiny,* assuming the canons by which it was obtained, and 
 
 "Op. c-it. pp. 274, 299, 300. 
 "Italii-s mine. 
 
 56 
 
applying them with more care and precision/'^ 
 
 Consequently a careful and precise internal scrutiny re- 
 the fact that when a is known, a itself enters into a rela- 
 tion which constitutes it an idea or mental content: and also 
 that although ( / may SO enter into the relation, it is not dependent 
 upon this status for its hein.n or nature.! \\iien these facts are 
 established it i> asserted that tlu- jji..st^ which have haunted 
 philosophy from the time i Descartes t the present immediately 
 vanish. It eliminate the dualistic prohlem. for analysis re- 
 veals mind and l>ody a- composed o! more primitive terms 
 which are interchangeable. An ..l.ject may be body by one relation 
 and content of perception hy another. "When 1 percei\e Mars, 
 the Min's satellite ( body ) i> im peio-pt (mind).* Likewise is the 
 dualism of knowledge and thin.^ escaped a lad made possible 
 hy the discovery h\ at: immanence". 
 
 The old view is that kn -wlrd..;. other than it- 
 
 self, a notion which has -i\m rise t,, the doctrine of tlu-thinii- 
 in-itself which is other than the content of knowledge. Imman- 
 ence heals this,, defects l>\ that the difference between 
 knov, ! . tiling i> a functional and relational difference. 
 
 s tin- prol.K-ni of immediate and 
 
 mediate knowledge. In the former < the tiling 
 
 that is th I just the th.i . In mediate knou- 
 
 . there is "in mice" l-etueeti the n!>- 
 
 ject and the content, or hetween the tiling and the tiling known. 
 There an deed, where there is little or no identical coiitem. 
 
 This -trai <. that is for a realist) i^ 
 
 explained h\ asserting that the tiling thought ahout and the 
 thought are both experienced. t Independence, however, is need- 
 ed to make the case for realism. This theory asserts that things 
 are "directly experienced without owin- their bein.u or their na- 
 ture to that circumstance. "t The elements, those common to 
 mind and hody. n>\- not anywhere, hut are what they are. They 
 find a place when in relationship and hriny with them a character- 
 istic which they possess. Reality, therefore, or the Real are ele- 
 ments logical and mathematical entities. 
 
 A far more careful and exhaustive statement of the nature 
 of the Real, is to he found in Mr. Russell's hook, "Scientific 
 
 tRussell, Scientific Method in Philosophy, pp. 66-7. 
 tPerry, Philosophical Tendencies, Ch. XIII. 
 *Op. cit. p 311. 
 tOp. cit. p. 312. 
 JOp. cit. p. 315. 
 
 57 
 
Method in Philosophy."* The Chapter. "Our Knowledge .if the 
 Kxtcrnal World", not only informs us as to what the real is, 
 hut also it is an application of the logico-analytic method. He 
 applies the method, taking as data the common sense knowledge 
 of the world furniture, houses, nature, history, geography, and 
 physical science. Hata are to he scrutinized in the light of other 
 data, because data have different degrees of certainty a fact 
 which internal scrutiny reveals. The most certain are 
 data and degrees of certainty are also data. Analysis reveals 
 first, our common knowledge, second, degrees of certainty of 
 data, and third, primitive and- derivative knowledge. Primi- 
 tive knowledge ;< sense knowledge, hut just what is <jircn in 
 sense is a question because of unconscious inferences/!" The next 
 step in the logico-analytic method is to discover how the deriva- 
 tive parts of our knowledge arise. This involves difficulties 
 because of entangling alliances between logic and psychology. A 
 psychological derivative may be a logical primitive which is a part 
 of our knowledge not arrived at by logical inference. It is to 
 be kept in mind that a separation of these types is fundamental, 
 (p. o ( M, for logical beliefs, that is logical primitives, must he 
 deduced from psychological primitives, (p. 70). 
 
 Such an analysis, i. e. critical and internal scrutiny, leads to 
 what are known as "hard" data and "soft" data, the difference 
 being one of the degree and, moreover, a datum itself. The 
 former are those which resist the "solvent influence of critical 
 reflection".* Analysis, then, is a name for critical reflection. 
 It reveals two kinds of hard data: (1) the facts of sense, (2) 
 the laws of logic. Most if not all psychological derivative 
 beliefs, but logically primitive, belong to soft data, but we must 
 use our hard data to construct a world for we must be cer- 
 tain about our world at least. The hard data, moreover, are 
 our :_']! sense data, for the belief in other minds is a deriva- 
 tive psychologically tho logically a primitive. Scrutiny. how- 
 ever, allows sonic addition to the slender stock of our 
 sense data, namely, memory, and some facts of introspection. 
 Facts of sense also include space and time relations, and facts of 
 arison 'such as likeness. But these are all subjective so if 
 there are other minds their supply of hard data might be differ- 
 ent, for belief in other minds is not one of the hard data. 
 
 This then appears to be the terminus of the analytic pro- 
 
 *Open Court Pub. Co. 1914. 
 tOp. cit. p. 68. 
 *Op. cit. p. 70. 
 
 58 
 
;md wo may now ask this question: "Can the existence 
 of any other than our own hard data be inferred from the ex- 
 istence "f those data"'"? So now we bei^in on the C(>nstrnctirc 
 portion of the process we he.yin, that is, to build a world out of 
 the ^upply of data which analysis has furnished us. Let us 
 start with that stock in trade of philosophers, a table, and see 
 what the result will be. "A table viewed from one place pre- 
 
 a ditt'eront appearance from that which it presents from 
 another place. This is the lan.niuitu- "f common sense, but this 
 lan.LUia.ye already assumes that there is a real table of which we 
 see the appearances."* Hut since this admittedly be-> the whole- 
 issue, we must state the facts in terms of what we know only 
 namely, >cii>e data. Therefore we must say that while we have 
 muscular sensations which make us >ay we are walking, our 
 visual sei 'lan.uc in a continuous way. "What is really 
 
 known is a correlation of muscular and other bodily >ensatioii> 
 with changes in visual sensations. "t We must remember also 
 that a sensation is the QWQ1 an object and not the ob- 
 
 ject.:): The cxpiTience called seein- a color, that is. is found by 
 analysis to be a complex of at least two elements -the color ,,r 
 the sensible object and the awa: .lion. Thus in 
 
 the above quotation, all we know in the case are the sensations. 
 This distinction between the object and the awa' 
 
 important one and a Confusion, it is claimed, leads to serious 
 results for philosophy^ The problem is oiu- of reconstruction, 
 and the first thin-- :nt for are illusions that there are none. 
 
 It appears that with at use data, w<_- are not able to 
 
 build a ver\ stately universe, .so an hypoth projected 
 
 (mirabile dictu) and instead of inquiring what is the minimum 
 assumption by which we can explain the world of sense, we pro- 
 ject a model as an aid to the imagination -a construction as a 
 possible explanation of the facts. My the aid of our model hypo- 
 
 tOp. cit. p. 
 
 *Op. cit. p. 77. 
 
 tOp. cit. p. 
 
 tOp. cit. i>. 76. 
 
 Sin an rarlu-r work, The Problem of Philosophy, Home University Library 
 Strks. Mr. Russell came to an agnostic conclusion with reference to the 
 thing-in-itself. All we know are our sense data and they are subjective 
 and "caused" by something outside which possibly resembles them. It is 
 my belief that he has not escaped the agnostic predicament, even with his 
 conception of the thing-in-itself as a logical construct. Sensation is a. 
 case of knowing in a situation in which an object known is differentiated 
 from an act of knowing. The legitimacy of the whole procedure is 
 questionable, but it is not germane to our point here. Granted that the 
 object and the thing sensed are indentical, our problem is to find what 
 kind of an object it is as a factor in a logical process. 
 
 59 
 
thesis we proceed as follows: Suppose that each mind looks out 
 on a world from a point of view peculiar to itself. (Of course, 
 we do not know anything ahout other minds, whether in fact 
 there are such). Then suppose that each of these perceived 
 worlds exists precisely as it is perceived. (This assumption aims 
 ; away from the thing-in-itself ). Suppose an infinite num- 
 ber of worlds unperceived. Then . the system of worlds, per- 
 reived and unperceived, we call the systems of "perspectives". 
 By a correlation of similars between things in one perspective 
 and those of another, we reach a system of points in space, not 
 "private" but "public" space which (public space) can not be 
 perceived, but if it is known it is only our inference. Space can 
 thus be rendered continuous as a relation between perspectives 
 space, that is not in the private worlds but outside them, is a 
 continuity by virtue of the relations between points of view. 
 The momentary common sense thing can be defined. "Given 
 any object in one perspective, from the System of all the objects 
 correlated with it in all the perspectives ; that system . may be 
 identified with the momentary common sense thing. Thus the as- 
 pect of a "thing" is a member of a system of aspects which is the 
 "thing" at the moment. All the aspects of a thing are real, where- 
 as the thing is a mere logical construction.,,* 
 
 In this manner Russell has established the world of "matter". 
 There are yet two other points to be made clear before the 
 world of physics is rendered complete, namely, time and space; 
 but for our purpose we may omit the method of reaching them, 
 for it is along the same line as that employed in finding a 
 world. We find when the two are accounted for, the three 
 "elements" of physics, namely: space, time, point; taking the place 
 of the former constants, centimeter, gram, second. 
 
 We have discovered Reality as this type of realist views it 
 and it is next in place to discover where knowledge comes in 
 and what it does when it does enter. We want to discover the 
 place and function of judgment and other logical processes in a 
 world such as analysis has delivered to us. But before the 
 task is attempted a few words should be said about the method 
 of reaching this technical view of the things of common sense 
 or of the reality of which the things of common sense are as- 
 pects in a system of points of view. 
 
 Following the order of development we have adopted, the 
 first question is that of mind. For this type of realism the mind 
 
 *Ibid, p. 89. 
 
 60 
 
actually plays a part in the universe for it is the source of error. 
 The idealist makes it the source of both truth and error, believ- 
 ing if it is good (or bad) enough for one it is good (or had) 
 enough for both. The half hearted realist must account for error, 
 s<> he accepts half of the idealistic doctrine, giving error over 
 tn tin' mind, or making the mind the source of error, while 
 truth is a function <>f objectivity or is objectivity. 
 
 It seems that the only difference between mind and what is 
 not mind is a matter of grouping. A Comparison of one with 
 the otlu-r sh.>ws that the mental content is f ramnentary. and 
 moreo'ver tin- abstract in my neighbor's mind dors not coincide 
 with the abstract in my own mind. There is considerable mys- 
 tery in all this, for we are told that mind just is things in a cer- 
 tain relation, ami it pu/./les one to determine a method of com- 
 paring an abstract (which is just mind >r nature whichever 
 om choos with nature. That is. the performance eoii- 
 
 :n comparing nature with itself for the contents of mind 
 <le with nature, b tC, It is not to be disputed that 
 
 the comparison of A with A would be a highly interesting piece 
 of labor but one wonders what <ionf about it 
 
 after the job is over. Tlun my pattern or abstract does not coin- 
 cide with my neighbor's. Just how my abstract could be com- 
 pared with my neighbor's I cannot see. especially when both my 
 abstract and his ,//-, nature, for nature is our common abstract. 
 In fact the very i<;< tract OT peculiar </r,>n^iii>/ is another 
 
 .statement of the idealistic predicament of the correspondent 
 the world of the individual mind with that of tin- absolute con- 
 sciousness. Yd the realist is compelled to resort to "abst: 
 to account for error. \Ve an' told that an individual' mind gathers 
 into itself a characteristic assemblage- of fragments of nature, 
 yet these characteristic- ire <>r coincide with it; and just 
 
 what .;/v the characteristics or the differentia of nature or of 
 abstiv. re left to imagine. Of course, it is asserted that 
 
 tin 0'iium is determined by a reaction "characteristic of he 
 central nervous s\stem". but this throws no l ; ght on the matt, 
 but states a problem. \Vhcn things are in the mind, one may 
 mean or represent another, leaving it to one to infer that when 
 - are not in the mind this could not occur; but we are told 
 that it may enter consciousness without dependency upon the fact 
 for its heiin/ or nature. Elements are mental when ihey are re- 
 acted to in the specific manner characteristic of the central 
 nervous system. How does such a statement of the case differ 
 from the old conception of soul or consciousness or mind? The 
 
 61 
 
fact is the same problems arc present with the diflVrence tliat 
 instead of a faculty of attention which is selective, we have sub- 
 stituted the more modern conception, a nervous system. The 
 close connection of the realistic conception of mind with the 
 faculty psychology of the past has heen pointed out befrr. 
 "The realist works on the platform of a faculty psycholo- . 
 taining intelligence knit into certain indefinahles such as impli- 
 cation, relation, class, and term, and has transported the faculty 
 from the human soul to a mysterious realm of subsistence."* 
 The "illuminated" part of the environment is the content of con- 
 sciousness, yet the "illuminator" is on the outside and is in the 
 same position as the early "mind" or "soul". 
 
 We are able readily to see why the theory of immancnca 
 does away with the dualism of mind and matter and of knowing 
 and the thing known. If knowing and the thing known are 
 identical of course there is no dualism; but what about the 
 abstract? Dualism is escaped only at the point of surrendering 
 an explanation of error, and is taken up gladly when the need 
 arises for it. 
 
 Let us examine how mediate knowledge is possible on this 
 view of the nature of mind. In immediate knowledge we have 
 the thing that is the idea is just the thing known or a thing 
 in relation to a mind ; but in mediate knowledge there is a dif- 
 ference. In cases of memory and imagination the outcome is 
 sorry enough and in perception, I think no objection would be 
 offered if (and the if is important) perception were treated as a 
 natural event such as walking, and not made a case of presenta- 
 tion to a nervous system (knower). But in mediate knowledge 
 the case seems hopeless. Keeping in view what mind is, portions 
 of the surrounding environment illuminated, or things in rela- 
 tion to a nervous system are mind, we fail to see a place for in- 
 ference. The explanation is that the thing thought about and the 
 thought are both experienced. Let us see what this means. 
 The thing thought about is the illuminated environment ; the 
 thought is the illuminated environment (for the thought and the 
 thing are identical). Now both of these illuminated environments 
 are experienced, that is, both illuminated environments become an- 
 other illuminated environment by virtue of being present to a 
 nervous system. Certainly we are in possession of sufficient illu- 
 mination for almost any process to take place, but just how one 
 casts any light on the other or how they all make for a process 
 
 *Creative Intelligence, p. 119. The quotation holds only of the thorough-going 
 realist. 
 
 62 
 
<>f inference. I am unable to see. Possibly another way of stating 
 
 the case will clear up the difficulty. The thing thought about, 
 
 ; (for the thing thought about and the object are 
 
 Identical), and the thought or the content or the thing thought 
 
 conunt is just the thing in relation to a mind), are both in 
 
 relation to a mind. i. e. ( are both the thing thought about and the 
 
 'it, both are mind and object Of content. 
 
 The above is the dialectic when strict adherence is given to 
 
 the definition of mind, when the implications of that definition 
 
 made explicit. Hut we must remember that there is another 
 
 of meanings. When things are in tlu- mind one 
 
 may represent or mean another. Hut as has been pointed out. 
 
 this conception involves all the difficulties of idealism on the 
 
 ground of the u!'!i|uit\ of the knowledge relation. It seems 
 
 that the n.ali>t is committed either to idealism from which he 
 
 de>ir. < .ipe ..r to the embarrassing situation of usir 
 
 many words which mean nothing or aii of which mean 
 .'.me thing, and consequent!; information. 
 
 It has poxvil.lv become apparent that realism is invoked in 
 a circle. In tl 'he i elation between kimwer and 
 
 in this chapter that they were 
 
 guilty of the -.mie fallac\ attributed by them to the idealists, 
 namely. "< particularity." The examination of the method 
 
 of timlin-., il fortify the contention that new realism 
 
 might be characterized as philosophic* circulorum. 
 
 l!y \\hat right can the realist assert that we undertake an 
 operation called "logical ai \\'hat are r.v that we are 
 
 able to make Mich an analysis? JIY are those who have been shut 
 out from the logical proee-s altogether. Our ;iv'ty, 
 
 our modi operandorum have been transferred to objectivity. 
 There is nothing /<>./;><;/ left in the dispossessed mind, .and it 
 must take satisfaction in turning its "eye" in the general direc- 
 tion of the logical behold it as it throws forth or ejects 
 a unherse by virtue of the activity of its "elements". It can 
 not analyze for it has nothing to analyze with. It can. only 
 r behold. The analysis has already taken place it is al- 
 ready finished, and the job of the mind is that of a mere beholder 
 of the ejected univer-e. To be able to speak of our having a 
 part to play in logical analysis, we must endow ourselves with 
 the equipment necessary to make this possible but this is to deny 
 the fundamentals of the system. It is miraculous that the dis- 
 m-nd could even sec the logical process i. e. under- 
 stand it. It has nothing to understand with. It is a sensitive 
 
 63 
 
which rereiu.s iiu- a-ti\ ity of propositions, hut which con- 
 tributes nothing for it lias nothing to contribute. The plate 
 Understands nothing of \\liat it has received, nor does the light 
 understand what it lias illuminated. Xeith'.-r can the mind 
 understand what it has done, for like the plate or the light, the 
 means for understand mi' are transferred to other realm- 
 uheti the real that we analyze a whole into elements. 
 
 rt!ng what he dinies in other connections- -that intclli- 
 sluires in the affairs of reality. Let us analyze, hut we 
 
 iiDth'n.^ to analy/.e with; let us behold, hut we have no- 
 thing to hi hold with. Have we not eyes and ears? Yes, hut 
 and ears are lila the sensitive plate, they receive, hut they do not om- 
 trihute. Tiny ha\e no part to play in the logical drama. In short 
 it is urged that the very fact that the mind can hehold the logical 
 drama is evidence that the 'mind' and 'things' have grown to- 
 gether, one to 'tit' the 'other out of chaotic processes, on a com- 
 mon level, co-partners in a hiological process. Just as the in- 
 vention Tits' the conditions out of which it arose, so does the 
 'mind 1 tit the conditions out of which it arose. 
 
 Analyst, the Shibboleth of the realist, is impossible on his 
 theory of mind. Kut granted thai he can do it, we want to know 
 how it is done. \\'e shall take our common knowledge -that of 
 furniture, nature, history, physical science, as data, and we shall 
 find by analysis what is in it. We assume the canons by which 
 this common knowledge was obtained, and apply them with more 
 care and precision. \\'e must remember now that these com- 
 mon data an- called in question- ( m the wholesale. They are not 
 reality. Then again we are assuming the canons by which this 
 common knowledge was obtained, and this common knowledge is 
 not knowledge of 'true' reality or 'real' reality or no question 
 would ha\e arisen about it. That is. we are calling in qu 
 our common knowledge but we are assuming the canons by which 
 it was established. /// order to eall it in question and eritieise it. 
 ()f cour.se we must begin .somewhere. Xo one questions that but 
 the question here is the legitimacy of calling the whole body of 
 our common knowledge in question, leaving nothing to work 
 from, but assuming as a valid principle of criticism the very can- 
 ons by which this erroneous knowledge was established. It is 
 a wholesale problem and the method of meeting it is that by 
 means of which the faulty knowledge wa> originally established. 
 The procedure is this: after we have a good deal of knowledge. 
 in show that the whole thing is questionable. After we have 
 learned a unat deal about the external world, about scienc 
 
ralir g , weacan tnen .inoa max tats Knowledge is nor 
 
 --T 
 
 of the actiikj of propositions iinani.lnl wkh *sofr" data. 
 
 . ~ : ~ . - ~ 1 ~ . T .<T" -i' 1^ r . !~ ^ ~~ : ~ : - " " ~ i. 
 
 Our data are onestionable and we acimjuiec this with a naad 
 
 of ontological^ entities. Scrutiny reveals the facts of sense and 
 the laws of logic as the *nanT data, /for the mind beholds the 
 laws of logic k is iiimmimlr to say, or rather how k fmds them. 
 It involves the same type of question as to dUcimine how the 
 nose would arroaaf for the Pnrkin j e phenomenon; or the eye 
 rrpbm the mysteries of the odor of sauerkraut. The 
 
 ~~ - " "~, -" " -..- - r~ ' ' ;_ 
 
 How is experience possible? The realist aasacis that k is pos- 
 sible because the laws of logic are in atnrc. as Kant c ipjuni'd 
 k by naking natnre conform to the p<iuu|4cs of the nmad. A 
 more hopet nl answer is f onnd ni the fact llm. *mnKi is "nature 
 performing the act of itaectkm. No one has e ver been serions- 
 ly agitalfil orer the ttnesbon as to whether the lavs ot diges~ 
 tion belong to the objective world of nature or to the subjective 
 otdei of the digestion U^Lt pfr s*. it is generally recognized 
 that the only fruitful discussion in that field is centered abont 
 ~ ~ " " " " " *~ - " . "" -. *. - ~ ~ ~ 7 - .. ' j ---?.:. ~~ . " ; 
 
 the process. Neither is the qnestion as to how food "fits* the 
 tract nor the tract the food, one which an j one woold consider 
 -r" _' - jr.f. :.~ _ "- - -L ----- 
 
 Suutin> reveals as hard data, die facts of sense alone. 
 On ill I ing the difficulties involved in determining what are facts 
 of sense, and when we know we have them, let us see how we 
 get them and what we do with them when we do get them 
 get them from the world of common sense which is not the real 
 world. We have fled from this world. L e^ the worlc 
 mon sense, to the real world where we find facts 
 Bat the piobkm now is to construct a world oat of these 
 We have left the world of common sense, have found c 
 now we are to make amotkfr world, not that : 
 for we had that to begin with, bat jmst what kind, it is hnpos-i 
 sible to say. 
 
 place? It is already c^mstm^fd so why destroy it and bafld 
 another &mt of tkf note that tkr lor* t&am tvorM AM** : 
 Is k not probable that die camsfrvrtrtf* world win be precisely the 
 HOI hi of common sense wktlk which we started . It this is the 
 or labor has been in vain: and if not. the data oat of 
 
>:mr.* 
 
 r tfce 
 
 rat xv 
 
 . 
 
 ;* ferae taem liifMnaui m JST ~s- 
 ioB 4te- ivst c-is; we axe c?mnjcfed 
 
 
 . - 
 
 rt :c i wodst We lone %t ? 
 
 -e ?^ofcn sevteC \\ 
 
 ---_ 
 
**scmak 
 
 - >^ -^ *^1* 
 
 vat a* 
 t dear tint we OB MX 99 
 
 rid 
 
 nfrm a* seat 
 
 Hf* '^f 
 
 
 iMt, Vpr 
 
 
 or of ts as a c*m*ruA. for darre if & aprat 
 
 if v 
 
 as a 
 
 for f 
 
 - 
 
 v . :: give 
 
 
 
 aord i~~ ! afl <rf hit 
 I 
 
 
 - 
 
 Jed. - 
 
 :- 
 
 --. 
 - 
 
 .- 
 
 
 
data and the laws of logic, he is unable to construct on the basis 
 of his hard data, a world that differs in any characteristic way 
 from the world of Berkeley. He must have recourse, that is, to 
 matters not ultimate (to soft data) to get the world of physics. 
 If this is the method and result of analysis, it appears that it 
 states more difficulties than it resolves ; and would lead to an in- 
 terpretation of analysis in terms which avoid an initial petitio. 
 Before undertaking a second katabasis into the shadowy 
 world of simple entities and a complementary anabasis into the 
 world of common sense, it is essential that the rod and staff 
 which guides the realist thru these realms and which frees him 
 from the fear of evil, be more carefully examined. That rod and 
 staff is analysis. Should it appear to be a feeble support, should 
 it turn out to be watered stock in an apparently great enterprise, 
 it is probable that the enterprise itself is misconstrued and will 
 go bankrupt. If analysis is found to be a false god, an idol 
 worshipped because it functions in certain enterprises, the struc- 
 ture erected on its foundations will be correspondingly false. 
 That it does function in many enterprises no one doubts, but to 
 take it from its locus of successful functioning and make it a 
 lever to lift the universe is to commit that error so repeatedly 
 charged against others, namely, the error of "pseudo-simplicity". 
 It is my contention that there is no occasion, no point, to a dis- 
 cussion of the logical implications of a system which refutes 
 itself of a system built upon an initial fallacy. To discuss the 
 logical implications of such a system is to admit that the system 
 has established a world in which logical operations are possible. 
 It is true that we may 'suppose' that the case has been made, 
 that there is, for example, such a 'thing' as the 'neutral mosaic*, 
 that analysis has actually revealed certain logical laws and mathe- 
 matical principles in objective nature; and on that supposition, 
 work out the place in the supposed system of logical processes, 
 such as judgment, inference, error, et cetera. But the point here 
 is the original question that the process called analysis, as that 
 process behaves in the hands of those who employ it, is an illegi- 
 timate process, in that it (1) questions what it assumes, namely, 
 the real reality of its data, and (2) that it cannot occur because 
 there are no means at the disposal of the individual for carrying 
 it on. The conclusion of the former process has been indicated in 
 the statement that if the world of common sense is not the 
 real world, then the data derived from an examination of that 
 world are not the real data, so that a world constructed on the 
 data found in the questioned world will be a doubtful world in so 
 
 68 
 
far as the data themselves arc doubtful : or, that if the data are 
 the renl data, then the world from which the data are obtained 
 is the real world, and the reconstructed world will be precisely 
 the world we had to begin with. The first process has possibly 
 been made clear in the- example of the circular efforts of Mr. 
 I\uell. "The second difficulty the lack of means for carrying 
 on the process of analysis will niijage us from the point of view 
 of Holt's idea of conscious 
 
 A legitimate pn>ress of analysis lakes place under condi- 
 tions, sucli us the follow'ng : The continuity in the exi>erience 
 of the individual is interrupted. His non-retlectional proc 
 liis desiriii-j. his hoping, his p-. rcei\ in-, experience is interrupted 
 by the intrusi uthinu which challenges the type of ex- 
 
 perience Mich as has been indicated. In other words, a difficulty, 
 a problem ha- \ hieh. if continuity is to be re-established, 
 
 must be nut. Just why problems arise is not in question, but 
 the admitted fact that t; rise is all we care for in this ron- 
 
 n. In such a situation, there is soinethinu which is g 
 
 a datum. I'm it is just because all the data are nnt given, that 
 
 the d.flicult) is presi nt : and it is just here that the fallacy of the 
 
 old empirical '. r.nd in the assumption that the facts are 
 
 all there to b, ized on. Let it be noticed that the whole 
 
 tied, but that the difficulty is a particular 
 
 'Cow tin- question comes to lie that of discovery of the data, 
 
 and this will depend entirely upon the' occasion which gave ori- 
 
 the question. \\ \- are not looking for data /'/; f/cncral, but 
 
 the difficulties into which experience has 
 
 fallen. If the question is whether or not this tree will burn fire 
 being lu- of tlie problem -an analysis of the tree will 
 
 '. 'the tree is poplar', et 
 
 which means something, suggests something. 
 
 \Vlui! f such neutral entities as 'Contour", 
 
 . and 'above or t<> the riuht of. is not pertinent 
 
 to tne question at issue-- -will it burn? The discovery of data in 
 
 1 influences particular probU-ms in the same way as such 
 
 that "every effe-ct has a cause" influences problems in 
 
 :iairel\. rot at all. for the .Luneral law tells us nothing 
 
 in hand. Analysis functions in a situation which 
 
 is refiectional. as a method of finding what is i>iven, 'there', for 
 
 on the foundation of the given, such a 
 
 ill make possible an entrance upon direct experi- 
 
 lt imfli; ---.ething to be analyzed, tho not the wh-^le 
 
 universe. (2) means of doing it. which in turn implies judgment 
 
 69 
 
and inference. 
 
 With this statement <>f the nature of analysis as it actually 
 is employed in experience ordinary experience as well as in 
 science we shall examine especially the possihility of analysis 
 from the second standpoint means for its accomplishment --from 
 Holt's conception of the nature of consciousness. It is custom- 
 ary to treat a phenomenon from the standpoint of its genesis. 
 We shall, accordingly, attempt to determine how consciousness 
 arises in the hope that its genesis will throw some light on its 
 nature. "Our starting point is a world of pure being."* "Tak- 
 ing consciousness as a theme of discourse it will he possible to 
 frame a deductive system consisting of terms and propositions 
 as premises, and themselves not 'conscious', nor made of 'ideal' 
 stuff, such that all the essential features of consciousness will 
 follow as logical consequences. "f Again, he says the object is: 
 "the interpretation of the universe as a purely neutral universe, 
 or in other words, the deductive showing of how a neutral 
 universe can contain both 'physical' and 'mental' objects. ***This 
 point of departure involves no theory of reality, nor knowledge, 
 no sensationalism or other veiled form of dualism.***We shall 
 derive the 'knowledge' relation without assuming it in our pre- 
 mises."* It seems clear that the purpose is to derive conscious- 
 ness or mind from something that is not mind, from a neutral 
 somewhat. But it is clear that we must account for what is 
 familiarly known as mind. As Holt says: "This means (a de- 
 ductive account of consciousness) the framing of a set of terms 
 and propositions from which a system is deducible that contains 
 such an entity, or class of entities, as i<.v familiarly knoic under 
 the name of consciousness or uiind."^ 
 
 At the outset it is to be noticed that we start with what is 
 'familiarly' known as mind. We do not want to press this as- 
 pect of the difficulty further, but it is an excellent example of 
 the circular dialectic of the whole of new realism. The question 
 is : to form a set of terms from which mind is deducible. The 
 oddity of the situation hinges about the fact that we have before 
 we begin, all the information about mind that we can ever get 
 even after the deduction is complete. We don't begin, that is, 
 with the simples, but with mind and objects themselves which are 
 already known. The inductive or empirical aspect is either for- 
 
 *Holt, the Concept of Consciousness, p. 86. 
 tlb. p. 87. 
 
 *Holt, the Concept of Consciousness, p. 136. 
 lib. p. 166. 
 
 Italics mine. 
 
gotten or omitted, and instead of starting with a world of pure 
 being, we begin with the affairs of the common sense world. 
 
 Coming- directly t<> the genesis of consciousness we find that 
 systems of ! icing arise from certain '(iivens' consisting of terms 
 and pr< -posit it ins. which "generate of their o-;cn motion all fur- 
 ther terms and propositions that are in the system."* These 
 fundamental terms are undefined, and the activity involved in gen- 
 eration doe> not invoke time or space. That is "Logical activ- 
 ity is neither spatial nor temporal.''? The idealist expresses 
 
 :une thought when he says nothing real can move. Thus 
 we have a timeless and spaceless generation of a universe that 
 is in time ami - all the subsequent portion of the exposi- 
 
 tion shows. If it is objected that logic furnishes no principle 
 of unity since the terms and propositions are discrete, it is re- 
 plied that an explicit variety of terms is implicit in one proposi- 
 tion. The question of the applicability of the logical system to 
 i peculiar question indeed for a realist is 
 
 answered ' mis can correspond 
 
 by a "in iatioii. The difference between the two 
 
 logic and that of actual things- is like that be- 
 
 two piciures which are identical save that one is colored 
 
 while the other is in white and black. The main point in the doc- 
 
 trliu- -pondence is that there is no difference, or rather 
 
 that there are no two things as knowledge and tile object of 
 
 knou ledge. .r of thought and the thing thought of ; the point being 
 
 that nothing can r present a thing but the thing itself. This 
 
 maintained on the basis of a difficulty involved in in- 
 
 ction of distinguishing between consciousness, and the oh- 
 of consciousness, or. it could be said, the foundation of this 
 type of realism the who],- hearted type is that of the objectiv- 
 ity of secondary qualities. On the basis of the identity of con- 
 sciousness and the object of consciousness, one wonders why the 
 problem of correspondence should ever become a problem, but 
 this will be considered later. 
 
 MU now discovered (or in fact assumed) that logical 
 and mathematical concepts are objective, i. e. not in conscious- 
 
 ,md that primary and secondary qualities are also in the 
 same status (which is termed "neutral"), the way is made clear 
 for the deduction of consciousness, for finding among the neu- 
 tral entities the knowledge relation. The most simple of the en- 
 
 Mtalics mine. 
 
 Hi'lt. The t'niicrpt of Consciousness, p. 16. 
 tH>. p. 
 
titles of the 'mosaic' arc certain ones which we seem to have 
 vaguely made out such as identity, differences, numbers, and the 
 ive. Tin nee follow in perfect Cotntian order, the algebras. 
 secondary qualities. Kuclidian geometry, mass. physics, chemistry, 
 objects forming the subject matter of geography, geology, astro- 
 nomy, etc., and here the chasm between the organic and inor- 
 ganic is bridged on the assumption that "Life is some sort of 
 chemical process, and nothing further", whereupon we enter 
 botany, biology, etc. Here then appears, in the simple to complex 
 series, a complex entity called consciousness or mind. 
 
 \Yithout stopping to examine the many difficulties involved 
 in such a phantastical "genesis", such, for example, as the chasm 
 1 iet ween the inorganic and the organic, or the introduction of 
 qualities: or the fact of a backward reading of the world of com- 
 mon sense as a basis for the genesis; we shall keep our eye on 
 the position of consciousness or mind. And here it is fundamental 
 to note that // is one of the complex entities in the "neutral 
 mosaic", occupying a position about midway in the series of sim- 
 ple to complex entities. Thus, in answer to the question as to 
 what light genesis throws on the nature of mind, we find that 
 it shows it to be one of the complex entities. Whether it has 
 come to be as a result of the activity of propositions which mean 
 nothing, is not essential to our present purpose. Whether 
 formal implication is not a false god, is not so much our aim 
 to determine. But to undertake a "genesis" of concrete reality 
 on the fundamental of formal propositions from which every 
 vestige of meaning has been squeezed, creates in the mind of a 
 reader the suspicion that the idea in the mind of the author is 
 to reduce the whole position to absurdity. One of the favorite 
 ways of killing a thing is to let it kill itself. And in this case 
 it seems that the following out of the logical implications . of 
 the system leads to such difficulties that no serious thinker could 
 be deluded. Implication is in order only in the presence of 
 meanings. One thing may mean, imply, indicate, point to, an- 
 other thing; but seriously to assert that the universe is implied 
 in "A-right-of-B", "A-A", "A not A", when A and the rest 
 mean nothing, is a bit of sheer nonsense. 
 
 \Ye have found consciousness in the "neutral mosaic". Rut 
 uist further consider its nature, with the idea in mind of 
 (b . Krnvining the possibility of analysis, analysis being the key 
 which unlocks the mysteries of the universe. For a further de- 
 termination of the characteristics of mind, we ma}- consider the 
 a "navigator exploring his course at night with the help 
 
 72 
 
of a searchlight." "It illuminates a considerable expanse of 
 
 ami cloud, and objects that lie above the horizon. The 
 
 sum total of all surfaces thus illuminated in the course of a 
 
 night is a cross-section f the region thru which the vessel 
 
 The manifold .so defined is neither ship nor searchlight, 
 
 nor any part of them hut is a portion of the region thru which 
 
 the ship is parsing."* This cross-section resembles those that 
 
 are found in any manifold in which there is organic life. The 
 
 use is the nervous system or me- 
 chanisms to IK r\ ous systems in the lower forms of 
 organic life. \"W a cross-section defined by the response of a 
 : is consciousness. To determine what entities 
 
 .11 \ to determine 
 fic reaction. "This 
 
 ;.(! by the .specific reaction of rellcx- 
 S the manifold of our sensations, 
 "I In this manner has 
 the k; - bein rt ached deductively. 
 
 Such >nt ..r~ the nature ist account 
 
 v-.il proper! .. The wonder is that it should 
 
 n the basis of empirical 
 
 nature that tlu 'deduction' made possible, i'ut at this 
 
 the ir.ui\-t is in the problem of analysis from the stancl- 
 
 :;!nil. 1 think it can he shown that analysis 
 
 ; take i the i'titie nicemn of realism being 
 
 nil. the structure built on that foundation falls, or rather no 
 stiuctur* ble. 
 
 In the first place we musl note that the means of analysis 
 
 Veil t ran.s i\ i red t > objectivity. Th.e mind has nothing to 
 
 /ith. hs tools of judging and 
 
 \ unities in tlie neutral mosaic. The job of 
 
 the unrolling of the universal scroll as this 
 
 lf-acti\ity f propositions whose content 
 
 by which the thinking mind explores those 
 
 m that ensue from the Given is called deduc- 
 
 t'i n".* Judgment and inference, two prime necessities of any 
 
 re not functions ,f the process hut are onto- 
 
 The mind., like the searchlight, casts the pale light 
 
 of r. -\ faculties on the universe and defines itselj. 
 
 Tb.e- K-nt and inference are there; the business of 
 
 *Op. cit. p. i: 
 
 Til, id. p. 182. 
 
 *n>. P. 16. 
 
 73 
 
mind is to behold them as the concrete universe shapes itself 
 about them as iron filings arrange about the magnet. It can not 
 judge, nor infer, nor hypothecate. Meanings, too, are there, and 
 they whip themselves into unity about the rallying-point of an 
 empty, timeless and spaceless, tho active proposition, as the 
 charmed worshipper falls at the feet of the medicine-man. 
 Where is memory? It is 'there'. Where is imagination? It is 
 'there'. When the roll is called out yonder, all are there all, 
 that is, but the searchlight. How it shines is a mystery. Its 
 means of shining are taken away and they render possible the 
 definition of an object. 
 
 One should note this difference between the searchlight and 
 the responding nervous system. The former does not select, but 
 shines on what is in the way ; the latter is selective, and is cap- 
 able of regulating itself in view of what it defines. This is an 
 empirical fact, but the means of regulation are also in the cross- 
 section. The knower is deprived of all his possessions yet he is 
 commanded to analyze. Why analyze? What results from it? 
 Even if it were possible to do it, why should it be done? Surely 
 not the better to act, for action is reserved for the proposition. 
 Is it to know? If so, it is like asking the butterfly to demon- 
 strate the binomial theorem, or commanding the earthworm to 
 show an aesthetic appreciation of Parsifal. As well command the 
 ape to gaze into the heavens and .plot the orbit of Jupiter or to 
 behold the satellites of Saturn, as to cry "analysis, analysis." when 
 the only means, and the only purpose, for the accomplishment of 
 it are moved to that to which the method is applicable. 
 
 But there is another strange side to this story of conscious- 
 ness. We have just been talking as if it were outside of the pro- 
 cession. It is outside when it must be to account for certain 
 facts, empirical facts, but we find it in the "mosaic". Conscioir.s- 
 n'ess is now the objects the illuminated part of the environment. 
 There is no difference between thought and the object; "no con- 
 tent of knowledge that is other than its object".* Behold now 
 an object analyzing itself. Consciousness is trees and rivers, pro- 
 positions and axioms, love and astronomy. We must analyze, 
 or analysis must take place, but consciousness is the object, and 
 the tree must perform that delicate feat upon its own person- 
 ality, reducing itself to elements in violent motion, which it fur- 
 ther reduces to "private perspectives" from which it deduces 
 "public space". When astronomy analyzes itself it finds itself 
 
 Mb. p. 150. 
 
able to overcome the paradoxes of Zeno by certain mathemat- 
 ical theories of infinity based on an elimination of spatiality 
 from the Euclidean point. Thus the story goes throughout the 
 whole of objectivity each object must be capable thru analysis 
 of discovering neutral entities, simple logical and mathematical 
 laws which are its real reality. 
 
 It appears that analysis is impossible on the realistic interpre- 
 tation of consciousness. When consciousness is outside the pro- 
 n. it has no means of doing anything; when it is inside or 
 rather when it is the object the foolish question of an object 
 an-.dys'n^ itsrl; I'ut lest it would seem that consciousness 
 
 has not been handled as the realist intends it, a few more state- 
 ments of its nature and function might be offered. What is the 
 the one-to-one correspondence SO tr.uch spoken of?* 
 Knee between :cln;t. pray? There are at least two 
 txpes. and PIT haps an infinite number depending upon the nature 
 of the pi fundamental. P>ut these are two 
 
 that car. (1) The correspondence 
 
 in the lo-ical-matluir. positions and concrete real 
 
 things; (2) tlu- corres] the content of the conscious 
 
 Action witli 'reality'. In the first type the two realms are 
 <:<ntical. except that the concrete lias additional 
 matter laid on its fundamental structure. We begin ostensibly 
 with a number of simple logical and mathematical entities which 
 rid; then after the world is generated, the thought 
 occurs that tliis is a formal world. \oid of bone and blood; and 
 ; content, denied in the original, we must resort to a make- 
 shift of a tlieoiy of correspondence which is .supposed to be 
 'acknowledged' by a mind which turns out to be the things 
 which correspond. The ; reposition \\hich generates the partic- 
 ulars which are those </ a universal which is the proposition 
 itself -the old problems of the idealistic logic of the concrete 
 universal- turns out to be not reality but that to which reality 
 must correspond. If the activity of propositions generates a real 
 m, the question of correspondence is senseless; if it does 
 not generate a real system it is useless or meaningless. The 
 " Repetition of Identicals" will not solve the problem if the iden- 
 ticals are not reality, and if they are reality there is no corres- 
 pondence because there is identity. 
 
 The representative theory ,.f knowledge is laughed out ot 
 coiir. us to believe that they (secondary qual- 
 
 *Ihi.! pp. 31 If. Also Ch. 3. and many other places. 
 
 75 
 
ities ) are 'knm\n' l>y means of entities \vh!;:h have neither t x- 
 Unsion, shape, size, motion, color, sound, odor, taste or touch."* 
 \Ye are not defending the representative theory of knowledge, 
 but we assert that the realist is making the same statements. 
 The realist, however, is a little more subtle. He asks us to be- 
 lieve that real reality is a group of propositions without content, 
 non spatial, non temporal. His colors are not qualitative // he 
 is consistent leiih Jiis premise, but they define, /;; their ultimate 
 reality, a series of points. Sounds, odors, tastes all are reduc- 
 ible to points in space. But behold the idea of a mile a mile 
 long, of a thousand years just that long in time.. Ideas of space 
 are spatial, the real reality is non spatial; ideas of time are tem- 
 poral, tho real reality is timeless and so on with all the rest. 
 The difficulty has been all along that of squeezing the content from 
 the proposition, making it meaningless, and then later having to 
 beg what was thrown away, to account for qualities by means of 
 a subtle doctrine of correspondence. 
 
 Let us behold the genesis of this second type of correspond- 
 ence that between the content of consciousness and reality. 
 "Now since the process of cognition assuredly involves both a 
 knower and a known, a subject and an object, it is implied that 
 an individual mind, witnessing acts of cognition in order to 
 describe the process, can include both subject and object, and can 
 watch the changes in both."* Yet we are told repeatedly that 
 consciousness and objects are identical. The known are objects 
 which are consciousness. Knower and known, on the premises 
 of whole hearted realism are identical and to introduce the two 
 to make a place for correspondence is to commit the idealist's 
 fallacy. 
 
 "Nothing can represent a thing but the thing itself ".f This 
 is true realistic doctrine, but we are haunted by the whys of the 
 painful discussion of representation or correspondence. Then 
 we hear of symbolic ideas in such cases as that of a blind man's 
 idea of color. Let us recall what consciousness is the illuminat- 
 ed environment i. e. the objects. Then compare such statements 
 as this: "Our ideas are never completely identical with the ob- 
 jects,"* So we are faced with this difficulty of explaining how 
 objects which are consciousness .agree with themselves. We have- 
 on hands the old idealistic problem of degrees of reality and 
 
 *Ib. p. 141. 
 
 *Ib. P. 87. 
 
 tlb. p. 142. 
 
 *Ib. p. 149. 
 
knowledge. To define consciousness as an object or as objects 
 and then to ask how it happens that objects disagree with them- 
 selves, and to assert that knowledge is never complete when 
 knowledge is the object, is, I submit, a bit of polite quibbling. 
 How a tree disagrees with itself, or how it is incomplete, I am 
 unable to say. Then again, thought follows after the activity of 
 neutral entities. Of course it is already in the neutral mosaic 
 one of the entities, and is a group of objects. It would be a 
 spectacle long to lie remembered to behold the process of a 
 neutral entity which is itself active, being chased in non-temporal 
 time and non-spatial space, by another neutral entity under similar 
 disabilities; when both neutral entities are the same thing. 
 The snake -wallowing itself would be in comparison a mere side 
 -how. To see an object eternally after itself in such a timeless 
 and spacelc-- universe i- a vision that rarely comes to a mortal 
 man. 
 
 It would be useless t" enumerate further paradoxes of re- 
 presentation. The above are difficulties in perception only. If 
 perception pre-ents such anomalies what are the revelations of 
 memory and reflective processes These difficulties were touched 
 upon in another connection with the half-hearted realistic con- 
 ception of mediate knowledge and the same difficulties are here 
 phi- many other-; but all hinge on the fatal doctrine of repre- 
 sentation on the principle of consciousness as set forth in this 
 type of realism. 
 
 A word may be said about reflection since this is a strictly 
 logical category. Reflection is distinct from sensation and per- 
 ception. It is asserted that the fallacy of confusing immediate 
 with reflective consciousness has borne serious fruits for phil- 
 osophy a statement to which we gladly assent, for it has been 
 the contention here that this fallacy committed alike by realist 
 and idealist leads to the pseudo-problems of epistemology. But 
 ; ak of introspection and reflection to introduce such cate- 
 gories on the theory of consciousness earlier described is certainly 
 not to make for clearness. What introspects, and what reflects? 
 Do objects reflect themselves, do they perform introspective opera- 
 tions on themselves to determine their content (which is them- 
 selves) at an earlier time of their activity? We are told that the 
 "original content of consciousness and later introspective judg- 
 ments about that content are to be distinguished".* I believe it 
 has been shown in the criticism of analysis that processes of judg- 
 
 *Ih. p. 216. 
 
 77 
 
nu-nt arc impossible. For an original content to be at any future 
 time different from itself is senseless. If it could be possible- 
 just how the difference could be stated can never be made out, 
 for there is nothing to which they are differences, since that to 
 which they are differences are the things themselves. Reflection 
 turns out to be an affair of representing the thing as a map re- 
 presents a country. How different from the cross-section! How 
 different from the doctrine that consciousness and objects are 
 identical! The old doctrine of representative knowledge, de- 
 rided and scoffed at comes to the rescue in accounting for the 
 "empirical properties of consciousness." 
 
 The questions of judgment and inference need not be consid- 
 ered for there appears to be no place in the system for them. 
 Likewise truth and error considered by the authors of the sys- 
 tem, of course can be discussed only on the assumption that the 
 system makes a place for them. The half-hearted realist whose 
 purpose is the same as that of his more sturdy comrade, namely, 
 to banish the act of knowing from logic, recalls the empty mind 
 to make room for error.* The other, with characteristic bold- 
 ness, follows his premises to their logical conclusion, and makes 
 error objective.! 
 
 The findings with reference to consciousness lead to thoughts 
 of its relation to the fundamentum of new realism, namely, the 
 priority of things. Idealism against which realism arose is, as 
 we have attempted to show, founded on the principle of the pri- 
 ority of mind, and it is to the other extreme that realism swings. 
 But we are to notice that animals 'react to definite cross-sections 
 and thereby define a conscious area; plants, too, have organs of re- 
 action analogous to nervous systems and react thus, forming a 
 conscious cross section. They react to light, to intensity, to grav- 
 ity, and thus these factors are the environment, the cross-section 
 of the plant. The chasm between the inorganic and the organic 
 has been bridged so it is asserted and inorganic matter reacts 
 to definite stimuli, as mercury to heat, hydrogen to oxygen and 
 stones to gravity. In short everything reacts in some definite 
 way to every thing else, resulting in the ubiquity of consciousness. 
 We began, Launfal-like (or was it Quixote-like?) in search for 
 the grail of consciousness and we have found it at our door- 
 ex cry-where. Can we marvel at such statements of critics of 
 realism when they ask "what remains of the supposed gulf be- 
 
 *See Perry, The Truth Problem, Tn'l. Philos. etc. XIII, 19-20, and Russell, 
 
 The Problems of Philosophy, Chs. XII-XIII. 
 tSee Holt, Concept of Consciousness, Ch. XIII. 
 
 78 
 
t ween absolute idealism and analytic realism?"* or, "Thus when 
 the realist conceives the perceptual occurrence as an intrinsic cast 
 of knowledge or of presentation to a mind or knower, he lets the 
 of the idealist's camel into the tent. He has then no great 
 cause for surprise when the camel comes in and devours the 
 tent."t 
 
 It seems that there is no -;ulf between the two, and that the 
 position maintained in the early part of the chapter to the effect 
 that idealism and realism are talking ahout the same tiling, on the 
 principle of the fallacy attributed hy the realist to the idealist, 
 that of "exclusive particularity," has been justified. That which 
 the realist attempts to discard as the source of our metaphysical 
 is the whole universe- a knower. a reaet(>r, to which things 
 aie presented and which are consciousness. If tlu- 1,,-ic of (ireen 
 or I'.osanqiut can offer a more complete universal consciousness 
 that .ueiierates differences which are differences of this universal, 
 1 am unable to see it. for they speak the same lanvjua.ue as the 
 ha\e shown that true logical processes are impos- 
 sil)!e on idealistic premises, and if we have shown that idealism 
 and realism are complementary undertakings, does it not follow 
 that Laical pr re impossible on the i>remises of realism ? 
 
 And does it n..t seem evident that if knmvin.u "makes no differ- 
 to the objects", that it is senseless to limit consciousness to 
 a "ei-ov section" that it is universal just as idealism teaches, 
 and that this i> a realistic statement of the idealistic problem of 
 the relation between a finite mind and the universal conscious- 
 Does it not appear evident that both these types of theory 
 are he.^inninv with the results of knowing, with formed material, 
 and are attempting to deduce the nature of the material from its 
 form? They ha\e both accepted the results of approval science- 
 knowled-t and ha\e ai.au /e<l this product, and thereupon have 
 attempted to show that the processes hy which the original res of 
 experience is fashioned into instruments for adequate responses, 
 are the ont..l..-ical predicates which define and exhaust a world 
 of pure bein- or of an absolute experience. 
 
 Summari/in- briefly, we may say that the attempt in this 
 chapter has been made to show that idealism and realism are 
 speaking the same language ; and that if this is true, the logical 
 difficulties of the one are those of the other. In connection with 
 
 *Crcative Intelligence, p. 1U7, Professor Moore's paper. 
 tDewey. Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 255. 
 
 79 
 
difficulties of tin- system itself, it has been maintained that the 
 method of the system can not i>e employed without a petitio. 
 Further, that on the account given of mind or consci<m>m ss, tin- 
 latter can not function in such a process, even in a genuine pro- 
 cess of analysis, an example of which was offered ; because 
 there are neither means nor data. We have suggested that in 
 order to account for the empirical properties of consciousness, 
 that the very fundamentals of the system have been denied. All 
 of which has led to the conclusion that in a neo realistic world of 
 neutral entities, among which either consciousness is, or, all of 
 which are consciousness; that there is no place for logical pro- 
 cesses. 
 

 
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