^ ■> 
 
 'V 
 
 ^% 
 
 
 C3 
 
 a \ 
 
 
 ^^ 
 
 
 
 
 <: 
 
 oa 
 
 
 <_3 
 
 
 
 
 Cc 
 
 > 
 
 «aan# ''xjuawsoi'S'' ^mMNdMi- ''^OAHvaaiH*^ '^ 
 
 AtttUNIVEKJ//, 
 
 1 M' i 
 
 3S 
 
 (-^ 
 
 ^ -^^ -^ *$> - ^ ^ 
 
 39 
 
 '^Z. 
 
 irir iii^ri r,. . Ar.rAiirn;) 0;.
 
 I I— u^ 
 
 lY? 
 
 I J -n <-J 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 — 3 
 
 lOV 
 
 30 
 
 A 
 
 % &^ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 %il33Nv's01^^' '<^^ 
 
 
 ^i 
 
 v>;lu: 
 
 - .^.JfJOll^ 
 
 §• 
 
 V". 
 
 '^Ok 
 
 ^yn\ 
 
 C/^ 
 
 ■5. 
 
 ^/; 
 
 I f\r* I I !/■ ri »< . 
 
 L 
 
 dU'- 
 
 CO 
 > 
 -< 
 
 ^1
 
 J^ 17 iAjum::c^^'w' 
 
 c
 
 111* ^ 
 
 REPORTS 
 
 OF 
 
 DECISIONS IN PROBATE 
 
 BT 
 
 JAMES V. COFFEY, 
 
 JUDGE OP THE SUPERIOR COURT, 
 
 IN AND FOR THE 
 
 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, STATE OF 
 
 CALIFORNIA. 
 
 REPORTED AND ^ANNOTATED BY 
 
 PETER Y. ROSS AND JEREMIAH V. COFFEY, 
 
 Of the San Francisco Bar. 
 
 VOLUME ONE. 
 
 SAN FRANCISCO: 
 
 BANCROFT-WHITNEY COMPANY, 
 
 Law Publishees and Law Booksellers. 
 
 1908.
 
 s 
 
 c% 
 
 Copyriglit, 1908. 
 
 BY 
 
 JEREMIAH VINCENT COFFEY. 
 
 San Francisco: 
 
 The Filmes Brothers Electrotype Company, 
 
 Typographers and Stereotypers.
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 Probate law, under the ancient English practice, was a(i- 
 ministered in three different tribunals, some matters being 
 cognizable by the common-law courts, some by the ecclesiasti- 
 cal courts, and still others by the chancery courts. This obvi- 
 ously awkward system never obtained in all its fullness in 
 America, for the ecclesiastical courts did not secure a foot- 
 hold on our soil. But courts of equity, in the early history 
 of American jurisprudence, assumed to exercise probate pow- 
 ers to a very considerable extent, and in many states of the 
 Union they still appear to retain some vestige of this author- 
 ity. The general tendency, however, has been to concentrate 
 all probate powers in a single, common-law tribunal, saving 
 to equity only a revisory function to grant relief from orders 
 and decrees in probate in case of fraud, mistake, or other 
 ground of equitable intervention ; and this system, whereby 
 one court has exclusive original jurisdiction in all matters 
 touching the administration of estates of deceased and in- 
 competent persons, and also the guardianship of minors and 
 incompetents, now generally prevails in the western com- 
 monwealths. 
 
 The California constitution of 1849 clothed the county 
 judge in each county with probate powers, and from time to 
 time thereafter the legislature enacted statutes regulating the 
 practice in probate. By an amendment to the constitution 
 in 1862, and an enactment of the legislature the year follow- 
 ing, a separate probate court was created in San Francisco, 
 which superseded the jurisdiction of the county judge in pro- 
 bate proceedings in that city and county. With this single 
 exception the county judges throughout the state continued 
 to exercise probate functions until the constitution of 1879 
 went into operation. 
 
 (iii) 
 
 778631
 
 iv Preface. 
 
 By the constitution of 1879, the probate and county courts 
 were abolished, and jurisdiction of all probate matters was 
 vested in the superior courts throughout the state. This con- 
 stitution went into effect on the first day of January, 1880. 
 In San Francisco it provided for twelve judges and twelve 
 departments of the superior court; and the original appor- 
 tionment of judicial business among these departments 
 was as follows: To departments one to eight were assigned 
 ordinary civil causes; to department nine, probate matters; 
 to department ten, insolvency and special proceedings ; and 
 to departments eleven ajid twelve, criminal cases. This ap- 
 portionment has been modified more or less from time to 
 time; but not so far as to encroach upon department nine as 
 a probate forum. While a considerable amount of probate 
 business, especially in recent years, has been assigned to 
 other departments, practically no business other than pro- 
 bate has ever been assigned to department nine. Therefore 
 this department has now for nearly thirty years been dis- 
 tinctly the probate court in the city and county of San Fran- 
 cisco. 
 
 In the formative period of this department it was argued, 
 and with no little plausibility, that a judge of the superior 
 court sitting in probate could wield the powers of a court 
 of general jurisdiction ; that he could, for example, try dis- 
 puted titles to property, and administer general equitable 
 remedies. But it has long since become settled doctrine that 
 the probate jurisdiction of the superior court is a jurisdic- 
 tion separate and distinct from its jurisdiction in ordinary 
 civil actions. Hence, in an action of ejectment by an admin- 
 istrator, the superior court has no power to set aside the land 
 in controvers}'- as a probate homestead; this can be done only 
 by the superior court while sitting as a court of probate. On 
 the other hand, when acting as a probate court, the superior 
 court ordinarily cannot determine disputes involving the title 
 to real estate. True, a superior judge, while sitting in pro- 
 bate, may properly inquire into the real ownership of prop- 
 erty under some circumstances, as when it is necessary to 
 determine whether it shall be inventoried as part of an estate 
 in process of administration; but the inquiry is not pursued
 
 Preface. - v 
 
 for the purpose finally to determine title. And he may ex- 
 ercise equity powers incidentally necessary to a complete ad- 
 ministration of the estate, but he does not, when so doing, 
 exercise the general jurisdiction of a court of chancery. 
 Hence the superior court, on its probate side, is, in a sense, a 
 court of limited jurisdiction, somewhat the same as was the 
 probate court which it has superseded. But of matters prop- 
 erly cognizable in the probate forum it has exclusive orig- 
 inal jurisdiction. It shares none of this jurisdiction with any 
 other tribunal as does the probate court of some states, and 
 even as formerly did the probate court of California ; but ad- 
 ministers, in the first instance, all matters touching the ad- 
 ministration of the estates of deceased persons, and all mat- 
 ters pertaining to the guardianship of the estates and persons 
 of minors and incompetents. Moreover, the procedure on the 
 probate side of the superior court, except so far as expressly 
 declared otherwise by statute, is essentially the same as that of 
 the superior court in trying ordinary civil actions; and the 
 orders and decrees of the superior court, while sitting in pro- 
 bate, are entitled to the same favorable intendments and pre- 
 sumptions commonly accorded the orders and decrees of courts 
 of general jurisdiction. It is therefore apparent that the pro- 
 bate court in California is not a court of limited jurisdiction, 
 in the proper sense of that term, notwithstanding it is often so 
 styled. Neither is it a statutory tribunal. It derives its au- 
 thority from the constitution. The proceedings in probate, 
 however, are purely statutory; and the rule of the statutes, 
 in so far as they furnish any, must be followed before re- 
 sorting for guidance to the principles of the common law. 
 
 After the probate court of San Francisco came into exist- 
 ence in 1863, as indicated in preceding paragraphs, Hon. 
 Maurice C. Blake became the first probate judge, acting as 
 such from January 1, 1864, to December 31, 1867. Hon. 
 Selden S. Wright succeeded him, holding the office until De- 
 cember 31, 1871. From January 1, 1872, until December 31, 
 1879, Hon. Milton II. Myrick presided over the court. 
 
 When the superior court was created by the constitution 
 of 1879, the Hon. John F. Finn was the first judge to pre- 
 side in department nine, the probate department. This he
 
 vi . Preface. 
 
 did from January 1, 1880, to September 1, 1883, when he ex- 
 changed departments with the Hon. James V. Coffey (then 
 presiding in department three), and the latter has presided 
 continuously in department nine to the present time. Judge 
 Coffey has therefore presided over the probate department 
 of the superior court in San Francisco for over a quarter of 
 a century. 
 
 Naturally Judge Coffey's decisions have been eagerly 
 sought by members of the bar, and consequently many of them 
 have, in one form or another, been published from time to time. 
 But nothing like a complete publication of his works has been 
 attempted until now, when his opinions are sufficient in num- 
 ber to fill not less than five volumes, they will be given to the 
 world in full. 
 
 It has been thought that the practical utility of these re- 
 ports would be increased by a system of annotation. There- 
 fore the editor has appended notes, some of them of quite an 
 extended character, to many of the decisions. It will of 
 course be understood that Judge Coffey is in no wise responsi- 
 ble for any statement in these annotations, and that they have 
 not the authority of judicial pronouncement. 
 
 P. V. ROSS. 
 
 San Francisco, December, 1908.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Page 
 Armstrong, Estate of 157 
 
 Blythe, Estate of 110,115 
 
 Chittenden, Estate of 1 
 
 Curtis, Estate of 533 
 
 Danneker, Guardianship of 4 
 
 Doe, Estate of 54 
 
 Donahue, Estate of 186 
 
 Fay, Estate of 428 
 
 Fisher, Estate of 97 
 
 Fitzpatrick, Estate of 117 
 
 Fleishman, Estate of 18 
 
 Gibson, Estate of 9 
 
 Green, Estate of 444 
 
 Hansen, Guardianship of 182 
 
 Hayes, Estate of 551 
 
 Held, Estate of 206 
 
 Hill, Estate of 380t 
 
 Ingram, Estate of 222 
 
 Ingram, Matter of 137 
 
 Jennings, Estate of 155 
 
 Lane, Estate of 88 
 
 Love, Estate of 537 
 
 Lund, Estate of 152 
 
 Lynch, Estate of 140 
 
 Maxwell, Estate of 126, 135, 145 
 
 McGarrity, Guardianship of 200 
 
 McGovern, Estate of 150 
 
 McDougal, Estate of 109, 456 
 
 McLaughlin, Estate of 80, 257 
 
 Murphy, Estate of 12 
 
 Murphy, Guardianship of 107 
 
 Neustadt, Estate of 95 
 
 (vii)
 
 viii Table of Cases. 
 
 Page 
 
 Partridge, Estate of 208 
 
 Pickett, Estate of 93 
 
 Eicaud, Estate of 212, 220 
 
 Eiddle, Estate of 215 
 
 Kothschild, Estate of 167 
 
 Scott, Estate of 271, 368 
 
 Sealy, Estate of 90 
 
 Shillaber, Estate of 101, 120 
 
 Skar, Estate of 405 
 
 Smith, Estate and Guardianship of o . . . 169 
 
 Solomon, Estate of . 85 
 
 Tate, Estate of 217 
 
 Tiffany, Estate of 478 
 
 Traylor, Estate of 164, 252 
 
 Treweek, Estate of , 132 
 
 Wallace, Estate of 118 
 
 Whalen, Estate of 202 
 
 White, Estate and Guardianship of 128 
 
 Zimmer, Estate and Guardianship of 142
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Page 
 
 Abila V. Burnett, 33 Cal. 659 2 
 
 Amber v. Weischaar, 74 111. 110 19 
 
 American Bible Co. v. Price, 3 West. Eep. 69 497 
 
 American Seaman's Friend Soc. v. Hopper, 33 N. Y. 619 497, 520 
 
 Anthony v. Dunlap, 8 Cal. 26 108 
 
 Attorney General v. Harley, 5 Russ. 173 254 
 
 Bailey v. Bailey, 97 N. Y. 467 67, 70 
 
 Ballentine, Estate of, 45 Cal. 696, 699 128, 218, 453, 552 
 
 Bank of Ukiah y. Eice, 143 Cal. 270 420, 422 
 
 Barf ord. Ex parte, 8 Cox C. C. 405 177 
 
 Bates V. Bates, 97 Mass. 395 455 
 
 Behrens, Estate of, 130 Cal. 416 429 
 
 Billings, Estate of, 64 Cal. 427 429 
 
 Black, Estate of, Myr. 24-31 229, 238, 402, 404 
 
 Boland, Estate of, 43 Cal. 643 95, 454, 553, 554 
 
 Boldry v. Parris, 2 Cush. 433 244 
 
 Bond V. Sewell, 3 Burr. 1773 22 
 
 Bowman, In re, 69 Cal. 244 453 
 
 Broderick v. Broderick, 1 P. Wms. 239, 4 Vin. Abr. 534 21 
 
 Brooks V. Duffell, 23 Ga. 441 22 
 
 Burmester v. Orth, 5 Redf . 259 186 
 
 Burton, Estate of, 63 Cal. 36 552 
 
 Busse, Estate of, 35 Cal. 310 453 
 
 Carpenter, Estate of, 94 Cal. 407 326 
 
 Case V. Dennison, 9 R. I. 88 535 
 
 Casey, Ex parte, 71 Cal. 269 537 
 
 Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 651 174 
 
 Children's Aid Soc. v. Loveridge, 70 N. Y. 387 237, 404 
 
 Clapp V. Fullerton, 34 N. Y. 190 228, 334, 366 
 
 Clark V. Ellis, 9 Or. 147 366 
 
 Clark V. Ward, 1 Bro. P. C. 137 21 
 
 Clif t V. Moses, 116 N. Y. 157 424 
 
 Cohn, Estate of, 55 Cal. 193 134 
 
 Coit V. Patchen, 77 N. Y. 537 366 
 
 Cole V. Superior Court, 63 Cal. 86 154 
 
 Cole, Will of, 49 Wis. 181 283, 327, 334 
 
 Collier v. Munn, 41 N. Y. 143 548 
 
 (ix)
 
 Table of Cases Cited. 
 
 Page 
 
 Colman's Case, 3 Curt. 118 . . : 21 
 
 Comstock V. Hadylone etc. Soc, 8 Conn. 254 235 
 
 Cotter, Estate of, 54 Cal. 217 93, 94 
 
 Cozine v. Horn, 1 Bradf . 143 186 
 
 Crittenden, Estate of, Myr. 51 402 
 
 Crooke v. County of Kings, 97 N. Y. 427 67, 69 
 
 Cunliffe v. Branchker, L. E. 3 Ch. D. 399 66 
 
 Curry v. Powers, 70 N. Y. 217 535 
 
 Daniel v. Daniel, 39 Pa. 191 366 
 
 Daniel v. Smith, 64 Cal. 346 535, 536 
 
 Dary v. Smith, 3 Salk. 395 19 
 
 Davis, Estate of, 65 Cal. 309 16 
 
 Davis, Estate of, 69 Cal. 458 552 
 
 Davis, In re, 69 Cal. 460 453 
 
 Dean v. Negley, 41 Pa. 314, 316 507, 519 
 
 Dean v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. 473 137, 262 
 
 Delaney, Estate of, 37 Cal. 176 451 
 
 Dew V. Clark, 3 Add. 79 361 
 
 Disbrow 's Estate, 58 Mich. 96 238 
 
 Dixon, Estate of, 143 Cal. 511 423 
 
 Dodge V. Pond, 23 N. Y. 69 412, 415, 419 
 
 Dole V. Lincoln, 31 Me. 428 535 
 
 Downing v. Marshall, 23 N. Y. 377 67, 68, 70 
 
 Dunphy, Estate of, 147 Cal. 95 74 
 
 Eastman, Estate of, 60 Cal. 310 10 
 
 Edelen v. Hardy, 7 Har. & J. 61 24 
 
 Edelston v. Spake, Holt. 222, Mod. ^59, Comb. 156 21 
 
 Ellis' Case, 2 Curt. 395 21 
 
 Fair, Estate of, 132 Cal. 546 408 
 
 Fealey v. Eealey, 104 Cal. 360 554 
 
 Fiero v. Fiero, 5 Thomp. & C. 151 535 
 
 Foster v. Mott, 3 Bradf. 409 186 
 
 Fuentes v. Gaines, 25 La. Ann. 85 432 
 
 Gardiner v. Gardiner, 34 N. Y. 155 238 
 
 Garraud, Estate of, 36 Cal. 278 116 
 
 Garvey v. McCue, 3 Eedf. 315 117 
 
 Gasq, Estate of, 42 Cal. 288 116 
 
 Gass V. Gass, 3 Humph. 278 22 
 
 Gay V. Gillilan, 92 Mo. 250 508 
 
 Gold 's Case, 1 Kirby (Conn.), 100 212 
 
 Gooch V. Gooch, 33 Me. 535 256 
 
 Graham v. Graham, 10 Ired. 219 23 
 
 Greenwood v. Cline, 7 Or. 28 353
 
 Table of Cases Cited. xi 
 
 Page 
 
 Gregg V. Bostwick, 33 Gal. 221 451 
 
 Gurnee v. Malonej, 38 Cal. 87 2,116, 154 
 
 Hamor v. Moore, 8 Ohio St. 242 535 
 
 Hardwick, Estate of, 59 Cal. 292 552 
 
 Hatch V. Atkinson, 56 Me. 327 535 
 
 Heffner v. Heffner, 48 La. Ann. 1088 430,431 
 
 Higgins V. Higgins, 46 Cal. 265 454 
 
 Hill V. Barge, 12 Ala. 695 20 
 
 Hinckley, Estate of, 58 Cal. 516 83 
 
 Hogan V. Grosvenor, 10 Met. 56 19 
 
 Holley V. Chamberlain, 1 Eedf . 333 186 
 
 Hollis, Ex parte, 59 Cal. 406 537 
 
 Hoppe V. Hoppe, 104 Cal. 94 554 
 
 Home V. Home, 9 Ind. 99 366 
 
 Horsf ord 's Case, L. R. 3 Prob. 211 22 
 
 Hudson, Estate of, 63 Cal. 454 .' 137, 262 
 
 Hutchinson v. McNally, 85 Cal. 619 553 
 
 Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 539 11 
 
 Janes v. Throckmorton, 57 Cal. 368 418 
 
 Jones V. Tuck, 3 Jones, 202 23 
 
 Julke V. Adam, 1 Redf. 456 403 
 
 Keyes v. Cyrus, 100 Cal. 325 553 
 
 Killick's Case, 3 Sw. & Tr. 578 22 
 
 King V. King, 13 R. I. 510 424 
 
 Kinne v. Kinne, 9 Conn. 104 367 
 
 Lacoste, Estate of, Myr. 68 134 
 
 Lahiff 's Estate, In re, 86 Cal. 151 553 
 
 Lakemeyer, Estate of, 135 Cal. 28 429 
 
 Lamb v. Girtman, 26 Ga. 629 20, 23 
 
 Lambert's Lessee v. Paine, 3 Cranch, 131 422 
 
 Le Breton v. Cook, 107 Cal. 416 422 
 
 Lee V. Lee, 4 McCord (S. C), 183 283,367 
 
 Lef evre v. Lef evrc, 59 N. Y. 434 11 
 
 Linden, Guardianship of, Myr. 221 186 
 
 Lord, Estate of, 2 West Coast Rep. 131 128, 219 
 
 Lord V. Lord, 65 Cal. 84 128, 219 
 
 Machell v. Temple, 2 Show. 288 21 
 
 Macready v. Wilcox, 33 Conn. 321 186 
 
 Maloney v. Hefner (Cal.), 15 Pac. 763 450, 451 
 
 Martin, Estate of, 58 Cal. 530 429 
 
 Mawson v. Mawson, 50 Cal. 539 128, 218, 554, 555 
 
 Maxwell, Estate of, 1 Coffey's Prob. 132 218
 
 xii Table of Cases Cited. 
 
 Page 
 
 Maynard v. Vinton, 59 Mich. 139 238 
 
 McCauley, Estate of, 50 Cal. 546 128, 218 
 
 McCrea v. Haraszthy, 51 Cal. 149 82 
 
 McDowles, Matter of, 8 Johns. 328 178 
 
 McElf resh v. Guard, 32 Ind. 412 20 
 
 McGrath v. Keynolds, 116 Mass. 566 535 
 
 McKinnie v. Shaffer, 74 Cal. 614 554 
 
 Metealf v. Framingham Parish, 128 Mass. 370 146 
 
 Meyer v. Kinzer, 12 Cal. 252 198 
 
 Miller, In re, 4 Eedf. 304 99 
 
 Miner, Estate of, 46 Cal. 564, 572 2,104,125 
 
 Missionary Soc. v. Chapman, 128 Mass. 265 11 
 
 Moore, Estate of, 57 Cal. 443 128, 454, 553, 554 
 
 Moore, Estate of, 96 Cal. 522 553 
 
 Morgan. Estate of, 53 Cal. 243 94 
 
 New York Institution etc. v. How, 10 N. Y. 88 11 
 
 Neil V. Neil, 1 Leigh, 6 23 
 
 Noah, Estate of, 73 Cal. 583 516 
 
 Nock V. Nock, 10 Gratt. 106 20 
 
 Norton v. Bazett, (Dea & S.) 5 Am. Law Keg. 52 21 
 
 O'Neil V. Murray, 4 Eedf. 318 403 
 
 Onions v. Tyrer, 1 P. Wms. 343 21 
 
 Orndorff v. Hummer, 12 B. Mon. 619 23 
 
 Page, Estate of, 57 Cal. 241 2, 154 
 
 Payne v. Treadwell, 16 Cal. 243 198 
 
 Peck V. Carey, 27 N. Y. 9 403 
 
 Pforr, Estate of, 144 Cal. 121 412, 415 
 
 Phelan v. Smith, 100 Cal. 170 552, 553 
 
 Pool V. Gott, 14 Monthly Law Eep. (4 N. S.) 269 175, 181 
 
 Power V. Cassidy, 79 N. Y. 610 11, 414, 424, 426 
 
 Prevost V. Gratz, 6 Wheat. 481 163 
 
 Pritchett, Estate of, 51 Cal. 568 141 
 
 Pryer v. Clapp, 1 Dem. (N. Y.) 390 263 
 
 Eand, Estate of, 61 Cal. 468 429 
 
 Eedfield, Estate of, 116 Cal. 637 298, 326 
 
 Eeed v. Eoberts, 26 Ga. 294 22 
 
 Eex V. Smith, 2 Strange, 982 178 
 
 Eeynolds v. Eeynolds, 1 Spear, 253 23 
 
 Keynolds v. Root, 62 Barb. 250 238,501 
 
 Eicaud, Estate of, Myr. 158 198 
 
 Eobertson, Succession of, 49 La. Ann. 868 430 
 
 Eobinson v. King, 6 Ga. 539 22 
 
 Eough V. Simmons, 65 Cal. 227 198 
 
 Eussell V. Falls, 3 Har. & McH. 457 24
 
 Table of Cases Cited. xiii 
 
 Page 
 
 Saunder 's Appeal, 54 Conn. 108 238 
 
 Scarrit, In re, 76 Mo. 593 179 
 
 Schadt V. Heppe, 45 Cal. 433 552 
 
 Schmidt, Estate of, 94 Cal. 334 , 554 
 
 Sheehy v. Miles, 93 Cal. 288 554 
 
 Shires v. Glasscock, 2 Salk. 688 19 
 
 Simons, Estate of, 43 Cal. 548 2, 99, 116 
 
 Smith, Estate of, 53 Cal. 208 134 
 
 Smith V. Smith, 12 Cal. 224 198 
 
 St. Luke's Home v. Association etc., 52 N. Y. 191 11 
 
 State V. Libbey, 44 N. H. 321 178 
 
 Stevens v. Vancleava, 4 Wash. C. C. 262 367 
 
 Stuart V. Allen, 16 Cal. 504 116 
 
 Sulzberger v. Sulzberger, 50 Cal. 385 453,554 
 
 Taylor, Estate of, Myr. 160 134 
 
 Taylor v. Henry, 48 Md. 550 535 
 
 Thorndike v. Eice (Mass.), 14 Law. Eep., N. S., 19 177 
 
 Tittel, Estate of, Myr. 12, 16 229, 238, 402 
 
 Todd V, Winchelsea, 2 Car. & P.— 19 
 
 Tribe v. Tribe, 13 Jur. 793, 1 Rob. 775 21 
 
 Trumbull v. Gibbons, 22 N. J. L. 117 364 
 
 Twine's Case, 3 Coke Rep. 82 353 
 
 Vernon v. Vernon, 53 N. Y. 361 146 
 
 Violette v. Therrian, 1 Pug. & Bus. (N. B.) 389 22 
 
 Walkerly, Estate of, 108 Cal. 627 420, 421 
 
 Wallace v. Harris, 32 Mich. 393 507 
 
 Waterman v. Whitney, 11 N. Y, 165 238 
 
 Watson V. Pipes, 32 Miss. 468 20 
 
 White, Will of, 121 N. Y. 412 290 
 
 Wilson, In re, 117 Cal. 269 431 
 
 Wittfield V. Forster, 124 Cal. 418 72 
 
 Wright V. Lewis, 5 Rich. 212 20 
 
 Wright V. Monifold, 1 M. & S. 294 21 
 
 Wurts V. Page, 19 K J. Eq. 375 413, 416
 
 CITATIONS. 
 
 CALIFORNIA. 
 
 Constitution. — Art. VI, sec. 5 
 
 137 
 
 CODE OF CI^rCL PROCEDUEE. 
 
 SECTION PAGE 
 
 338 137 
 
 453 261 
 
 473 127 
 
 1209 134 
 
 1303 82 
 
 1307 281 
 
 1327 262 
 
 1328 262 
 
 1365 88, 89, 109, 110, 169 
 
 1369 
 1371 
 1374 
 1377 
 1379 
 1383 
 1386 
 1389 
 1411 
 1413 
 1415 
 
 207 
 216 
 216 
 168 
 169 
 168 
 168 
 .216 
 92 
 207 
 104 
 
 1426 109, 110 
 
 1443 211 
 
 1464 460 
 
 1465 128, 219, 452, 454, 
 
 551, 552, 554, 555 
 
 1468 128, 553 
 
 SECTION PAGE 
 
 1474 552 
 
 1490 196 
 
 1491 196 
 
 1581 98 
 
 1616 16, 98, 99 
 
 1618 16, 106 
 
 1632 549 
 
 1658 195, 197 
 
 1659 197 
 
 1660 197 
 
 1661 197 
 
 1662 195, 198 
 
 1664 195 
 
 1666 134 
 
 1704 81 
 
 1705 82 
 
 1718 100, 116 
 
 1721 134 
 
 1748 143, 177 
 
 1749 143 
 
 1751 175, 185 
 
 1763 387 
 
 1764 387 
 
 1766 387 
 
 1962 134 
 
 CIVIL CODE. 
 
 SECTION 
 
 40 .. 
 
 138 .. 
 
 197 .. 
 
 246 .., 
 
 253 . . 
 
 PAGE 
 
 386 
 
 107 
 
 175 
 
 ,143, 144, 174, 177, 185 
 144 
 
 SECTION 
 
 258 . . 
 
 689 . . . 
 
 690 . . , 
 
 693 . . , 
 
 694 . . 
 
 PAGE 
 
 . 138 
 
 . 78 
 
 . 78 
 
 . 78 
 
 . 78 
 
 (XV)
 
 XVI 
 
 Citations. 
 
 CIVIL CODE— Continued. 
 
 SECTION PAGE 
 
 695 "7, 78 
 
 741 77 
 
 742 77 
 
 767 76 
 
 857 66, 70, 73, 74, 409, 410 
 
 864 411 
 
 871 72 
 
 1147 534 
 
 1149 534, 535 
 
 1262 452 
 
 1270 84, 228, 388 
 
 1272 403 
 
 1276 18, 24, 401 
 
 1277 429, 432 
 
 SECTION PAGE 
 
 1278 401 
 
 1318 , 253 
 
 1321 147, 375 
 
 1323 147 
 
 1324 147, 253 
 
 1325 147, 149 
 
 1338 412 
 
 1384 554, 555 
 
 1402 554, 555 
 
 1468 554, 555 
 
 1575 233, 403, 404 
 
 2221 73 
 
 2224 137 
 
 SECTION 
 
 1030 . . . 
 2210 ... 
 
 POLITICAL CODE. 
 
 SECTION 
 
 2222 ... 
 
 PAGE 
 . 152 
 . 139 
 
 PAGE 
 . 139
 
 COFFEY'S 
 PROBATE DECISIONS. 
 
 Estate of N. W. CHITTENDEN, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 4,783; decided February 24, 1887.] 
 
 Executors — Right to Counsel Fees. — The trust imposed upon an ex- 
 ecutor makes the probate of the will a part of his duty, for which he 
 may employ attorneys and charge their fees against the estate. 
 
 Executors. — The Fees of Attorneys Employed by an Executor in 
 probating the will, being a charge against the testator's estate, can be 
 fixed only by the probate court. 
 
 Executors — Right to Counsel Fees In Procuring Letters. — Counsel 
 fees incurred by an executor in applying for letters are a proper 
 charge against the estate, notwithstanding he renounces his trust be- 
 fore letters are issued. 
 
 Executors. — There is a Distinction Between Executors and Admin- 
 istrators. An executor is appointed by the will to carry out its pro- 
 visions and the wishes of the testator, who burdens the executor with 
 the trusts created by the will and charges his estate with the ex- 
 penses necessary to carry out his views as expressed in his will; but 
 an administrator has no trust imposed upon him by the decedent, and 
 he looks solely to the statute for his duties, authority, and compensa- 
 tion. 
 
 Application for an allowance to petitioners for services 
 performed as attorneys for an executor, in filing a petition 
 for the probate of the will, and proceedings in connection 
 therewith and with the probate of the instrument. The ex- 
 ecutor did not qualify for his trust, but renounced his right 
 to letters upon or before the hearing of the petition ; and this 
 was a direct application to the court by the attorne.ys so em- 
 ployed by him. The administrator with the will annexed de- 
 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. I — 1
 
 2 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 murred to the application, and the following decision was 
 given on the demurrer. 
 
 M. S. Eisner, for the demurrer. 
 
 John M. Burnett, for the application. 
 
 COFFEY, J. This is an application on behalf of William 
 and George Leviston for counsel fees for services rendered 
 in probating the will of the testator. 
 
 The demurrer should be overruled. This case is to be 
 distinguished from the Estate of Simmons (43 Cal. 548), 
 decided in April, 1872, Avhich applies only to an application 
 for letters of administration, and refers to a class of cases 
 where one is seeking for his own gain to exercise a privilege. 
 
 There is a distinction between executors and administra- 
 tors. The executor is appointed by the will to carry out its 
 provisions, under the supervision of the court, and the trust 
 is conferred on him by that instrument. It is the duty of 
 an executor to protect the beneficiaries named in the will, 
 and this he can do in no other way than by offering it for 
 probate. If he do not renounce the trust he is bound to prove 
 the will, and is not called upon to do it at his own expense. 
 To do so properly he is necessarily obliged to employ coun- 
 sel, and a counsel fee in that behalf is a proper charge against 
 the estate. 
 
 The probate of the will by the executor is the performance 
 of a duty and the fulfillment of a trust, and the payment of 
 attorney's fees just as necessary as that of clerk's fees. 
 
 This being a charge against the estate, the judge sitting in 
 this department alone has power to fix the fees: Gurnee v. 
 Maloney, 38 Cal. 87, 99 Am. Dec. 352; Estate of Page, 57 
 Cal. 241. 
 
 The executor is entitled to attorney's fees on probate of 
 will or on contest of same: Abila v. Burnett, 33 Cal. 659; 
 Estate of IVliner, 46 Cal. 564. 
 
 The executor only carries out the wish and will of the 
 testator, who has the absolute power to make a will and to 
 dispose of his property as he may choose. The testator, by
 
 Estate op Chittenden. 3 
 
 the exercise of that power, burdens the executor with the 
 trusts created, and impliedly charges his own estate with 
 all the costs and expenses necessary to carry out his views as 
 exposed in his last will and testament. To hold otherwise 
 would practically nullify the statute of wills, and prevent 
 the testator from disposing of his property as he may elect, 
 or from appointing a disinterested trustee to carry out his 
 views. 
 
 Certain legatees and devisees might wish the will enforced, 
 but conflicting interests and contentions might render the 
 assumption of. the trust too burdensome. 
 
 No one will ever assume the arduous labors and responsibili- 
 ties of the office of executor, when he himself must pay from 
 his own means for having his muniment of title assured, when 
 nothing of benefit can accrue to him, even in case of success. 
 
 The privilege of administration is different; there the in- 
 testate creates no trust to be enforced, and burdens his es- 
 tate with no conditions; he expresses no wish in favor of 
 particular objects, but the party who assumes the privilege 
 is any one of a large number, and is directly interested, out- 
 side of his commissions, in taking charge of the estate; the 
 estate is to be divided, and he is a party receiving a share. 
 Further, his duties are not as onerous; he has no document 
 limiting his powers and authority; he has no trust imposed 
 upon him by the will of the intestate; he looks solely to the 
 statute. The duties of an executor are regulated not only 
 by the law but by the will also ; he, as executor, has no in- 
 terest, beyond his commissions, to stimulate his exertions; as 
 executor, he can claim none of the estate, it belongs to others. 
 The compensation of an executor is the same as that of an 
 administrator, l)ut the expenses of the former are necessarily 
 more, and his labors may be harder. He cannot probate 
 the will himself, he nuist employ counsel. No such charge 
 is imposed upon the administrator. There seems, therefore, 
 to be a clear distinction between the two cases. 
 
 Demurrer overruled; ten days to answer.
 
 4 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 The Rule that an Estate cannot be charged with the fees of an 
 attorney for procuring letters of administration, which is announced 
 in Estate of Simmons, 43 Cal. 543, has been followed in Bowman v. 
 Bowman, 27 Npv. 413, 76 Pac. 634; Wilbur v. Wilbur, 17 Wash. 683, 
 50 Pac. 589. One appointed as administrator, and successfully con- 
 testing an appeal from the order appointing him, was denied an al- 
 lowance for attorney fees and costs in Estate of Barton, 55 Cal. 87. 
 
 Guardianship of LAURA DANNEKER, a Minor. 
 
 [No. 4,344; decided March 29, 1887.] 
 
 Guardianship — Custody and Welfare of Child. — In appointing a 
 guardian and awarding the custody of a child, the court is bound to 
 do what in its judgment appears to be for the best interest of the 
 child in respect to its temporal, its mental and moral welfare. 
 
 Guardianship. — The Affection of a Child for the Person seeking its 
 custody as guardian is always given consideration by the court. 
 
 Guardianship — Social and Private Life of Guardian. — It is the duty 
 of the court to inquire into the social relations and private life of a 
 person seeking to be appointed guardian of a child, so far as they may 
 affect the child's welfare. 
 
 Evidence — Inference from Failure to Produce. — The failure of a 
 party to produce evidence within his power to produce is a circum- 
 stance to be taken against him. 
 
 Record. — Matters Prejudicial to the Character of any person will 
 be excluded from the record when not essential to a proper decision. 
 
 Henry Vrooman and W. H. Jordan, for the motion. 
 
 A. H. Loughborough, contra. 
 
 COFFEY, J. This is a motion for a new trial in the mat- 
 ter of Laura Danneker, a minor, wherein, upon the petition 
 of one Teresa Magee, letters were granted to her as guardian 
 of the person of the said minor. Upon the hearing of that 
 petition Jacob Michaelson appeared and opposed the issue 
 of such letters, but the court, upon the conclusion of the 
 testimony, granted the prayer of the petitioner, Teresa Ma- 
 gee. The court is now asked to grant the motion of the 
 respondent to set aside the decision, the findings and the 
 judgment therein, and for a new trial. This motion has
 
 Guardianship op Danneker. 5 
 
 been prosecuted with great earnestness and evident convic- 
 tion on the part of counsel that the court erred in its or- 
 iginal conclusion, and counsel, Mr. Jordan, in presenting 
 his argument, said that such was the gravity of the case to 
 the respondent and to the ward, and so deep the interest felt 
 in its final determination, that he invoked the exercise of 
 some patience on the part of the court in reviewing the evi- 
 dence in extenso produced at the trial, and in presenting 
 fairly and logically the reasons which, in his judgment, actu- 
 ated the respondent in making the motion. The counsel argu- 
 ing the motion for new trial were not the counsel engaged 
 at the time of the hearing of the application, and on that ac- 
 count, as well as out of consideration for their request, I 
 gave them more than the usual time to prepare their state- 
 ment on motion for new trial and argument; and, notwith- 
 standing the pressure of other matters before the court, have 
 bestowed great care upon the re-examination of the evidence 
 and the written argument of the counsel. In this connection, 
 I may say that this is the uniform habit of this court in all 
 cases of this class. The court endeavors to try these cases 
 with strict reference to the interest of the child. In award- 
 ing the custody of a minor, or in appointing a guardian, the 
 court is bound to do what, in its judgment, appears to be 
 for the best interest of the child in respect to its temporal, 
 its mental and moral welfare. 
 
 The counsel, at the argument, dwelt with great emphasis 
 upon expressions found in the oral opinion of the court, which 
 he construed favorably to the respondent, and which he says 
 may be presumed to reflect the impressions made upon the 
 mind of the court by the evidence touching the character 
 and fitness of the respondent. Such remarks were insi^ired 
 by the reluctance of the court to fasten upon the record mat- 
 ter prejudicial to the character of any person, when such 
 matter seems to be not essential to the conclusion. The 
 court does not wish, unnecessarily, to affix a stigma to the 
 character of any person, and would rather suffer injustice 
 itself than perpetrate it, and it was with this view that the 
 court, at the original hearing (when the counsel now appear- 
 ing for respondent was not present, and had not the op-
 
 6 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 portunity of observing all that occurred in court), made a 
 statement which it will now repeat, which statement was pred- 
 icated upon some injurious publications with regard to the 
 case Avhich were in their nature sensational and outside of 
 the record, and calculated to obstruct the current of justice. 
 The court then said in a kindly manner, as it supposed, that 
 with reference to the respondent the court was not willing 
 that he should be prejudiced by any statement not in the rec- 
 ord. 
 
 Some statements obtained admission to the newspapers 
 pending the trial of the case, which the court regretted to 
 see, and remarked: "I have no control over newspapers in 
 any way, and, consequently, I cannot control their publica- 
 tions. I do not wish anybody that comes into this court- 
 room to be prejudiced by circumstances or testimony of any 
 kind that is not relevant to the issue. One of the statements 
 that appeared in one of the papers was that Mr. Michaelson 
 is a gambler. There is not any evidence to support that. 
 It was the statement that was alleged to have been made 
 by the son of the lady who kept the school in Oakland, which 
 was denied by her." The same care which the court ex- 
 ercised in purifying the record from any unnecessary reflec- 
 tion upon the character of the respondent, it tried to main- 
 tain in other respects in commenting upon the evidence that 
 was before the court; and, believing it had sufficient ground 
 upon which to found its judgment without reflecting upon 
 the personal character of the respondent, it excluded from 
 view, as far as possible, allusion to anything that may have 
 been testified to or suggested by the evidence derogatory to 
 his reputation with respect to his relations to the opposite 
 sex, or as to the character of some of that sex Avith whom this 
 child may have been, or was liable to be, brought into contact. 
 
 As the result of my re-examination of the evidence and 
 consideration of the argument of the counsel, and of the 
 imputed errors of the court committed during the trial and 
 in the decision, I am constrained to say that I discover no 
 reason why I should change my original conclusion. I may 
 repeat, that, while I have had a great deal of sympathy for 
 the respondent in this case on account of the affection which
 
 Guardianship of Danneker. 7 
 
 the child has shown for him, and the emotion exhibited by 
 the respondent, which state of the mind of the child is al- 
 ways considered by the court in deciding these cases, I can- 
 not see wherein he has established any right to the legal cus- 
 tody of the minor, and that I think that that custody should 
 be in the hands of those from whom it was taken at the 
 time ]\Irs. Trendal received it. In my opinion, the evidence 
 shows that the minor, Laura Danneker, was at the time of 
 the application a resident of the city and county of San 
 Francisco ; that it was and is expedient, and was and is for 
 the interest of the said minor, that a guardian of her per- 
 son be appointed; that the petitioner, Teresa Magee, was 
 and is a suitable and competent person to be appointed such 
 guardian. The residence of the child was the residence it 
 had at the time it was given to the Sisters, and at the time 
 it was placed in charge of Mrs. Trendal. The obligation 
 which Mrs. Trendal contracted when she received the child 
 from the Sisters was violated when she gave that child to the 
 respondent. Of that fact I can have no doubt. In order to 
 understand this case fully, the whole of the evidence must be 
 considered, and I am of opinion that, taken altogether, the 
 evidence justifies the conclusion of the court. 
 
 One point I desire to allude to as considerately as pos- 
 sible, and that is the social relations of respondent during the 
 time that the child was in his custody. The child was re- 
 ceived by him without the knowledge, consent or connivance 
 of the Sisters, and in violation of the agreement between them 
 and Mrs. Trendal. At the time the respondent received the 
 child he was not a married man, and his social relations, as 
 the evidence discloses, were not such as are ordained by the 
 sanction of the law. Pending the trial, however, he became 
 a married man. To repeat the language of my former opin- 
 ion : "Have the changed relations of the respondent altered 
 the law or the duty of the court?" It is no business of the 
 court, so far as he is personally concerned, to deal with his 
 relations to society prior to that time; but it is part of the 
 duty of the court to consider his social relations as they may 
 have aifected the child's welfare, and while upon him, as he 
 stands isolated from liis child, the court is not called upon
 
 8 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 to pronounce judgment, it has a right, in awarding the cus- 
 tody of a child, to inquire into his private life. The child 
 was at the time of the application nine years of age. She 
 was brought into contact, into association, with persons whose 
 habits of life, as developed by the evidence, were such as if 
 not to contaminate her mind or morals, at least to not ele- 
 vate them, and she certainly should not have been brought 
 into such company. There was another circumstance here, 
 one which necessarily impressed the court very strongly. 
 That is the fact that Mrs. Wasserman, after process was 
 served upon her, and after the testimony had shown that 
 she had sustained some friendly relations with respondent, 
 had absconded. She was a witness for the applicant, Teresa 
 Magee, and summoned here in her behalf. So far as the 
 court could see she left here after she was served with sub- 
 poena, and after she had some consultation with respondent. 
 He saw her. It did not transpire what conversation he had 
 with her, but he did see her. The law says that whenever 
 it is in the power of a party to produce evidence, that is a 
 circumstance which shall be taken against him whose fault 
 it is that the evidence is not forthcoming. I could not ig- 
 nore this fact, since the evidence which she might have given 
 M^as of importance in this case. It was argued earnestly, 
 and impressed me strongly at the time, that the fact that 
 for so long a period the child was allowed to remain in the 
 custody of the respondent, should be taken against the ap- 
 plicant, Teresa Magee. It was claimed that the Sisters lacked 
 diligence in reclaiming the child. This was explained by 
 the testimony on behalf of the applicant, that the Sisters 
 did not discover where the child was, and that when they 
 did make the discovery they took these proceedings and in 
 good faith prosecuted them to a conclusion. 
 
 I have no time to analyze all the evidence, but I am satis- 
 fied that from the whole record the conclusion of the court 
 in granting the application of Teresa Magee was correct, 
 and that the motion for a new trial should be denied. If I 
 have erred in this conclusion, as is argued by the counsel 
 for the respondent, I trust he will have ample opportunity 
 of making that error manifest in the appellate tribunal.
 
 Estate op Gibson. 9 
 
 In Appointing a Guardian, the court is guided primarily by what 
 appears to be for the best interests of the child, and may award its 
 custody to a person other than the parent if its well-being demands 
 such a course. The wishes of the child, when of sufficient age to 
 form an intelligent preference, although not conclusive on the court, 
 will always be given due consideration; and it is not necessary, in 
 order for the child to enjoy this privilege, that it should have reached 
 the age of fourteen: 2 Eoss on Probate Law and Practice, 950-952, 
 citing In re Lundberg, 143 Cal. 402, 77 Pac. 156; Estate of Dellow, 1 
 Cal. App. 529, 82 Pac. 558; Andrino v. Yates, 12 Idaho, 618, 87 Pac. 
 787; Eussner v. McMillan, 37 Wash. 416, 79 Pac. 988; Willet v. 
 Warren, 34 Wash. 647, 76 Pac. 273; Stapleton v. Poynter, 111 Ky. 
 264, 98 Am. St. Eep. 411, 62 S. W. 730, 53 L. E. A. 784. 
 
 Estate of ALMIRA GIBSON, Deceased. 
 [No. 3,211; decided November 2, 1885.] 
 
 Charitable Bequest — Necessity of Naming Corporation. — A char- 
 itable institution which is made a residuary legatee need not be 
 designated in the will by its corporate name. 
 
 Charitable Bequest — Evidence to Identify Beneficiary. — If either 
 from the will itself or from extrinsic evidence the object of a char- 
 itable bequest can be ascertained, the court will not invalidate the 
 gift or defeat the donor's intention. 
 
 Charitable Bequest — Ascertainment of Beneficiary. — A residuary be- 
 quest to "The Old Ladies' Home, at present near Eincon Hill, at St. 
 Mary's Hospital," is held to have been intended for the "Sisters of 
 Mercy," a corporation embracing, as part of its charitable design, the 
 "Old Ladies' Home." 
 
 Executor — Compensation Fixed by Will. — When an estate is solvent,, 
 the compensation of the executor, fixed by the will in lieu of stat- 
 utory commissions, should be paid as "expenses of administration." 
 
 Charitable Bequests, so Far as They Exceed One-third the dis-- 
 tributable estate, are void. 
 
 John M. Burnett, for the applicant. 
 
 W. S. Goodfellow, for the opposing heirs. 
 
 Selden S. Wright, for absent heirs. 
 
 COFFEY, J. The provision of the will under discussion 
 here is in these terms :
 
 10 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 "Twelfth. — I give and devise the remainder of all my es- 
 tate, after the above legacies have been paid, to the Old 
 Ladies' Home, at present near Rincon Hill, at St. Mary's 
 Hospital. ' ' 
 
 The "Sisters of Mercy" claims this bequest, alleging that 
 it is an incorporation incorporated March 7, 1868, under 
 the laws of California, and that it has since continued to 
 exist under the laws then in force, having its principal place 
 of business in San Francisco; that among its objects is the 
 care of sick, unprotected and needy persons, and that to 
 carry out said object the corporation, prior to January 1, 
 1878, organized and instituted the Old Ladies' Home, men- 
 tioned and described in the provision herein quoted from 
 the will of Almira Gibson; that the said Old Ladies' Home 
 is and has been conducted by the Sisters of Mercy, corpora- 
 tion, as part of its work, and as one of the means to carry out 
 its object, and that it is carried on and conducted in the 
 building belonging to said corporation; and that the bequest 
 in said will to the "Old Ladies' Home" was intended to go 
 to the corporation for the benefit of said part of its work, 
 namely, the Old Ladies' Home. To this claim the heirs at 
 law respond that the legatee has no legal capacity to take, 
 and that they are entitled to the residue of the estate. The 
 heirs contend that the bequest is direct, not in trust nor 
 for the use of anybody, but it is a direct bequest to an institu- 
 tion, the "Old Ladies' Home," having no capacity to take, 
 nor being a corporation or society, but simply an institution 
 under the charge of the Sisters of Mercy, the petitioners, 
 who are not named in the will. 
 
 The will is olographic, and is a careful composition, leav- 
 ing little or no need of interpretation or construction apart 
 from the provision under review. It remains to be seen 
 whether that provision inadequately describes the object of 
 testator's bounty, or is so expressed as to bar the petitioner 
 corporation from claiming it as the proper channel of be- 
 stowing the benefaction on "The Old Ladies' Home." The 
 bequest is in accord with and to carry out the objects of 
 the corporation petitioning here, which had the capacity to 
 take under the law: Estate of Eastman, 60 Cal. 310. So long
 
 Estate of Gibson. 11 
 
 as the testator sufficiently indicates the institution or in- 
 dividual intended, that intention should be executed : Jack- 
 son V. Phillips, 14 Allen, 539. A charitable institution need 
 not be named by its corporate name : Power v. Cassidy, 79 N. 
 Y. 610, 35 Am. Rep. 550; St. Luke's Home v. Association 
 etc., 52 N. Y. 191, 11 Am. Rep. 897; 2 Redfield on Wills 
 *515, *516. 
 
 The intent and purpose of the donor should be accom- 
 plished. Of the intention of the testator to make the claim- 
 ant the object of her bounty, and to contribute of her sub- 
 stance to the charity administered by said "Sisters of Mercy" 
 corporation, there can be no doubt upon the evidence. If 
 either from the will itself or from extrinsic evidence the 
 object of her bounty can be ascertained, the court will not 
 invalidate the provision or defeat the intention of the tes- 
 tatrix. The institution here was described Avith entire ac- 
 curacy, and the evidence is conclusive that the testatrix knew 
 that the only conduit of her charity was the corporation 
 claimant. In the N. Y. Inst, for the Blind v. How's Exrs., 
 Denio, J., expressed himself substantially to this effect, re- 
 marking also that he did not think it necessary to go over 
 the cases to show how considerable an error might be over- 
 looked or reconciled: "There is much solemn triflino; in the 
 old books upon this question": 10 N. Y. 88. I think the case 
 of Lefevre v. Lefevre, 59 N. Y. 434, sustains this view, and 
 I do not consider the Missionary Soc. v. Chapman, 128 Mass. 
 265, as authority against the petitioner, since it is shown 
 here that the "Old Ladies' Home" is an existing institution 
 forming part of the work of the "Sisters of Mercy" corpora- 
 tion, and one of the means of carrying out its charitable de- 
 signs, conducted in the building designated in the will, which 
 is part of the premises belonging to petitioner, and that the 
 testatrix intended her bequest to go to said corporation for 
 the benefit of said part of its work, namely, the "Old Ladies' 
 Home." 
 
 The conclusion reached as to this point is that the petition 
 of the "Sisters of ]\Iercy" corporation be granted. 
 
 2. As to executors' compensation. When the estate is 
 solvent, as in this (ase, the compensation fixed by the will,
 
 12 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 in lieu of statutory commissions, should be paid as ' ' expenses 
 of administration." 
 
 3. So far as the charitable bequests exceed one-third of 
 the distributable estate, they must be adjudged void ; the be- 
 quests in items "Fourth" and ''Twelfth" are in favor of 
 charitable institutions. 
 
 Subject to the views hereinabove expressed the petition for 
 distribution is granted. 
 
 The Principal Case was Affirmed by the supreme court of California 
 in 75 Cal. 329, 17 Pac. 438. For a discussion of the certainty and 
 unity required in the creation of charitable trusts, see the note in 
 64 Am. St. Eep. 756-772. It is well-understood that a degree of vague- 
 ness is allowable in charitable bequests: Snider v. Snider, 70 S. C. 
 555, 106 Am. St. Eep. 754, 50 S. E. 504; Kemmerer v. Kemmerer, 233 
 111. 627, 121 Am. St. Rep. 600, 84 N. E. 256. A consideration of what 
 are charitable uses or trusts will be found in the note in 63 Am. St. 
 Eep. 248. 
 
 Estate of DANIEL T. MURPHY, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 4,313; decided October 23, 1886.] 
 
 Account of Executor — Objections to Expense of Lease. — Upon the 
 settlement of the account of an executor containing items of ex- 
 penditures in executing a lease under authority of the will, which 
 items the heirs contest on the ground of the invalidity of the leased 
 the court will not consider the lease invalid. 
 
 Executor — Renunciation of Compensation. — The fact that an ex- 
 ecutor at one time entertained and expressed an intention to renounce 
 his commissions does not bar his right to claim them if he has made 
 no renunciation in writing nor made any agreement prior to ap- 
 pointment to waive compensation. 
 
 Executor — Liability for Interest on Funds. — An executor who with- 
 draws funds from the capital account of a firm of which the testator 
 was a member, and permits them to lie idle in a bank, is chargeable 
 with interest thereon. 
 
 Account of Executor — Expense of Repairs. — Where an executor, as 
 an inducement to the heirs to join with him in the execution of a 
 lease, represents to them that the expense of alterations and fitting up 
 for the tenant will not exceed a certain sum, he cannot be allowed 
 for expenditures beyond that sum.
 
 Estate of Murphy. 13 
 
 Account of Executor. — Expenditures that do not Add to the Rental 
 Value of ijremises to be leased, and injudiciously made, should be 
 disallowed. 
 
 Fixtures. — The Question as to What are or are not "Fixtures" de- 
 pends for its determination upon the circumstances of the construction 
 and intended use of the articles. 
 
 Daniel T. Murphy died on June 3, 1885, in the city of New 
 York, of which place he was a resident at the time of his 
 death, leaving an estate in San Francisco, California. He 
 left a will, bearing date May 15, 1883, and two codicils, dated 
 respectively May 18, 1885, and May 23, 1885. 
 
 On the eighth day of June, 1885, the will and codicils were 
 filed, together with a petition for their probate, and for the 
 appointment of John T. Doyle and Adam Grant, two of the 
 nominees of the testator, as executors. The applications were 
 granted on June 19, 1885, and the executors named duly 
 qualified. 
 
 On November 6, 1885, John T. Doyle tendered his res- 
 ignation as one of the executors, and, after the settlement of 
 his account, he was discharged; Adam Grant continuing as 
 sole executor. 
 
 During his lifetime Mr. IMurphy began the erection of a 
 building of great value on the corner of McAllister, Jones 
 and Market streets in San Francisco, the lower floors of 
 which it w^s intended should be occupied by the firm of 
 Murphy, Grant & Co., a wholesale house of which he was a 
 member, as a retail store. Shortly before Mr. Murphy's 
 death, however, one of the members of the firm mentioned 
 died, and Mr. IMurphy being seriously ill in May, 1885, and 
 this building being then still unfinished, and the purpose of 
 the firm to occupy it having been abandoned, the decedent ex- 
 ecuted the codicil of May 18, 1885, in which he gave his ex- 
 ecutors the power to complete the building, and to modify the 
 original plans, if necessary, and also to lease it for the term 
 of five years. 
 
 Mr. Grant, as sole remaining executor, leased the lower 
 portion of the building, first the western, and then also the 
 eastern part, to the firm of J. J. O'Brien & Co., for five 
 years, and covenanted for the fitting up of the premises to
 
 14 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 suit the purposes of the business of the tenants. Upon the 
 representations of the executors as to the advantages to be 
 derived from the lease, the devisees of the property joined 
 in it for a further period of five years. The executor also 
 represented to the heirs that the expense of altering the 
 premises for the use of J. J. O'Brien & Co. would not ex- 
 ceed $12,000 (instead of that it amounted to over $20,000) 
 and that the expense of fitting up a "parlor" would not ex- 
 ceed more than $4,000. 
 
 Previous to the execution of this lease negotiations were 
 pending with other persons for the leasing of the premises 
 upon terms which some of the heirs thought more advan- 
 tageous, but acting upon the representations, among others, 
 of the executor (who was a member of decedent's firm, which 
 firm was in the same line of business at wholesale as that of 
 J. J. O'Brien & Co. at retail), that the firm, in which the 
 estate had an interest, would profit thereby, the lessors closed 
 the transaction with Mr. O'Brien. 
 
 The executor, thereafter finding that his position as such 
 conflicted with his interest as a surviving partner in the firm 
 of Murphy, Grant & Co., filed his account and tendered his 
 resignation. 
 
 During the negotiations for the O'Brien lease Mr. Grant 
 intimated to the heirs that he would charge no commissions 
 as executor. 
 
 The heirs contested the items of his account relating to 
 the fitting up of the leased premises, claiming that the lease 
 was invalid, on the grounds that better terms could have 
 been obtained from other parties, and that the executor was 
 bound to the highest degree of care, diligence and prudence; 
 also, that the expenses of fitting up the premises for the 
 occupation of J. J. O'Brien & Co. were too high, and the 
 improvements made for their benefit unusual on the part of 
 a landlord, and not "fixtures"; that the expenses were much 
 greater than the executor had represented to the heirs that 
 they would be, and that he misrepresented certain facts to 
 them ; further, that as a member of the firm of Murphy, Grant 
 & Co., the executor was interested in giving Mr. O'Brien the
 
 Estate op Murphy. 15 
 
 preference, and that as remaining executor he had no power 
 to execute the first five years lease alone. 
 
 It was also claimed that he had waived his commissions as 
 executor, which he asked to be allowed him in his account, 
 which waiver was one of the inducements to the heirs for en- 
 tering into the lease. 
 
 It also appeared that the executor had withdrawn the sum 
 of $100,000 from the capital account of ]\Iurphy, Grant & 
 Co., and out of the same had paid a debt of the estate of 
 some fifty-odd thousand dollars owing to Donohue, Kelly & 
 Co., and had deposited the balance with these bankers, where 
 it was lying idle, and the heirs sought to charge him with 
 interest on this balance. 
 
 Jarboe, Harrison & Goodfellow, for executor. 
 
 McAllister & Bergin, for contesting heirs. 
 
 COFFEY, J. On the 26th of March. 1886, Adam Grant, 
 desiring to retire from his office as executor, filed his re- 
 port and account; on the 10th of April, 1886, Anna L. 
 Murphy, widow, and Helen and Fannie Murphy, daughters 
 of decedent, filed exceptions to said account, and on the 
 17th of April, 1886, they filed a supplemental and additional 
 objection. Isabella Murphy, another daughter of decedent, 
 on the said last-mentioned dates, filed in her own behalf 
 separate exceptions and supplemental exceptions to said ac- 
 count. The matter came up for hearing on the 17th of April, 
 1886, and occupied, from time to time, until August 28, 
 1886, when, after argument, it was submitted for the con- 
 sideration and decision of the court. The testimony is com- 
 prised in a volume of six hundred and six typewritten pages, 
 which the court has considered. 
 
 I cannot undertake to do more than to state the results of 
 my reflection upon the evidence and arguments. 
 
 The objections and exceptions to the account as a whole 
 are overruled and denied. 
 
 Whatever ma^' have been the inducements which caused 
 the contestants to execute the ten years lease, this court can- 
 not here treat that instrument as invalid.
 
 16 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 While the executor admits that at one time he entertained 
 and expressed the intention to renounce his commissions or 
 to make no claim therefor, he insists that he changed his 
 mind, and now demands as his due the statutory allowance. 
 
 I do not perceive any way in which, under the circum- 
 stances of this case, the court can deny to the executor what 
 the statute allows him. I find no case sustaining counsel's 
 view— the Estate of Davis, 65 Cal. 309, 4 Pac. 22, 3 W. C. R. 
 61, was a case where the renunciation was made in considera- 
 tion of the appointment — a promise made before the appoint- 
 ment that the appointee would not charge. Schouler says: 
 "If one has been appointed on a distinct understanding with 
 those interested to serve as executor or administrator with- 
 out recompense .... he must abide by his engagement": 
 Schouler on Executors, sec. 545. 
 
 That is not this case. Adam Grant made no stipulation 
 or agreement prior to his appointment, nor has he renounced 
 in writing (section 1616, Code Civ. Proc.) his claim to com- 
 pensation; but he insists that, notwithstanding his declared 
 intention at one time, he has now a strictly legal right to 
 commissions. The statute says (section 1618, Code Civ. Proc.) 
 he must be allowed commissions upon the amount of the es- 
 tate accounted for by him. 
 
 The court finds that the executor has not waived or re- 
 nounced his commissions, and that he is entitled to them — 
 the amount to be ascertained hereafter. 
 
 The executor is chargeable with interest on the balance of 
 the money withdrawn from the capital account of Murphy, 
 Grant & Co., which has been lying idle on deposit in the 
 bank of Donohoe, Kelly & Co. This balance is the difference 
 between the amount necessary to discharge the Donohoe debt 
 .and the amount drawn out of the capital account. 
 
 It is clear to the court that all expenditures in fitting up 
 the store for the occupancy of O'Brien & Co. in excess of 
 twelve thousand dollars, and all outlay in and about the 
 ' ' parlor ' ' beyond the sum of four thousand dollars, should be 
 disallowed. 
 
 The lowering of the skylight was not indispensable to the 
 -enjoyment of the premises by the tenants of the first floor,
 
 Estate of Murphy. 17 
 
 as sufficient light might have been had by placing a glass 
 roof over that part of the store now covered by the skylight, 
 so the architect, Percy, testifies. I do not think, from my own 
 observation when in company with the counsel for the re- 
 spective parties, that the lowering of the skylight was ju- 
 dicious. It certainly has not added to the rental value of the 
 second floor. It should be disallowed. 
 
 With reference to the mirrors and stools, while ordinarily 
 they might not be regarded as "fixtures," I think that under 
 the evidence in this case they must be so considered. For the 
 purposes of the l)usiness to which the premises are devoted, 
 the stools are about as necessary as the counters, and the tes- 
 timony is that the space occupied by the mirrors had to be 
 filled, and the cost would have been no less if paneling had 
 been inserted. 
 
 All items not mentioned in this memorandum are allowed. 
 
 An Executor or Administrator, like any other trustee, may waive 
 or renounce his right to compensation for performing the duties of 
 his trust: Noble v. Whitten, 38 Wash. 262, 80 Pac. 451; Estate of 
 Field, 33 Wash. 63, 73 Pac. 768; and a promise by him to the person 
 primarily entitled to the administration of the estate, before his ap- 
 pointment, that he will not charge for his services, is equivalent to 
 a renunciation of his claim: Estate of Davis, 65 Cal. 309, 4 Pac. 22. 
 A waiver of commissions in a petition for letters of administration 
 does not deprive the administratrix of the right to commissions, where 
 the waiver was without objection, and by leave of court withdrawn 
 before she was appointed: Estate of Carver, 123 Cal. 102, 55 Pac. 770. 
 
 Executors, having Improperly Withdrawn Money from the estate 
 to pay a bookkeeper, were held liable for interest thereon at the legal 
 rate until it was repaid to the estate, in Estate of Scott, 1 Cal. App. 
 740, 83 Pac. 85. For a further consideration of the liability of ex- 
 ecutors and administrators for interest on funds belonging to the 
 estate, see Ross on Probate Law and Practice, 702-704. 
 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. I — 2
 
 18 Coffey ^s Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 Estate op LENA FLEISHMAN. 
 
 [No. 11,697; decided January 13, 1892.] 
 Will — Attestation in Presence of Testator. — There must be two 
 attesting witnesses to a will, each of whom must sign his name as 
 a witness at the end of the will, at the testator's request and in his 
 presence. In the presence of the testator means that he must not 
 only be present corporally, but mentally as well, capable of under- 
 standing the acts which are taking place before him. 
 
 A Will is not Attested in the Presenec of the Testatrix when the 
 witnesses subscribe their names in an apartment adjoining the room 
 in which she is lying ill, where it is impossible for her to see them, 
 she having previously signed her name while reclining on her bed, 
 not being able to rise therefrom. 
 
 Lena Fleishman died on November 16, 1891, leaving a hus- 
 band and two brothers. On December 5, 1891, a petition 
 was filed by the husband for the probate of a will dated 
 November 15, 1891. On December 23, 1891, the brothers 
 filed written grounds of opposition to the probate of the will. 
 The grounds of contest appear from the opinion of the court. 
 
 Sullivan & Sullivan, for contestants. 
 
 Craig & Meredith, for proponent. 
 
 COFFEY, J. The question here is whether the instru- 
 ment propounded for probate as the will of Lena Fleish- 
 man, deceased, was signed by the persons whose names are 
 appended thereto as subscribing witnesses in the presence of 
 the testatrix. 
 
 Section 1276 of the Civil Code of California provides, in 
 the matter of an attested will, subdivision 4, that there must 
 be two attesting witnesses, each of whom must sign his name 
 as a witness, at the end of the will, at the testator's request 
 and in his presence. 
 
 In presence of the testator means that the testator must 
 not only be present corporally, but mentally as well, capable 
 of understanding the acts which are taking place before 
 him. 
 
 In this case the instrument was signed by the subscrib- 
 ing witnesses in an apartment adjoining the room in which
 
 Estate of Fleishman. 19 
 
 the testatrix was lying ill upon her bed. Between the bed, 
 and opposite where her head lay, there was a partition wall, 
 an absolutely opaque substance, dividing the two apart- 
 ments, and on the other side of that wall, at a table near 
 the window, without the sight or hearing of the testatrix, 
 the two witnesses subscribed their names, the testatrix hav- 
 ing previously signed her name while reclining on her bed, 
 not being able to rise therefrom. It was impossible for her 
 to see what was transpiring on the other side of the wall by 
 iiatural vision. 
 
 These are the facts in evidence. Subjoined is a review 
 of the cases cited by proponent in support of the propo- 
 sition that there was a valid execution of the paper prof- 
 fered. 
 
 In Hogan v. Grosvenor, 10 Met. 56, 43 Am. Dec. 411, the 
 attesting witnesses signed in the presence of the testator. 
 
 In Ambre v. Weishaar, 74 111. 110, "the testatrix could 
 have seen the witnesses in the dining-room at the table, while 
 they were signing the will." 
 
 Kedfield on Wills declares the rule as follows: "The rule 
 requires that the witnesses should be actually within the 
 range of the organs of sight of the devisor, and where the 
 devisor cannot by any possibility see the act, that is out of 
 his presence": Redfield on Wills, 247 (star * page). 
 
 In Shires v. Glasscock, 2 Salk. 688, the court decided "that 
 it is enough if the testator might see — it is not necessary 
 that he should actually see — them (the attesting witnesses)." 
 
 In Dary v. Smith, 3 Salk. 395, the court sustained the 
 will, saying, "it was a sufficient subscribing within the mean- 
 ing of the statute, because it was possible that the testator 
 might see them (the attesting witnesses) subscribe their 
 names. ' ' 
 
 In Todd V. Winchelsea, 2 Car. & P. there was a question 
 as to whether the will was attested in the room where the 
 will was executed, or whether in a part of the ad.ioining 
 room where the testator "might have seen" the witnesses 
 attest the will. The court in that case, instructing the jury, 
 said: "You will therefore have to say whether the will was 
 attested in the bedroom; if so, there is no doubt. But, if
 
 20 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 you think it was attested in the other room, whether it was 
 attested in such part of that room that the testator might 
 have seen the witnesses attest it. In either of those eases 
 plaintiffs are entitled to a verdict; but if you think other- 
 wise, I am of the opinion that, in point of law, you ought 
 to. find a verdict for the defendants." 
 
 In Hill V. Barge, 12 Ala. 695, 696, we find: ''The design 
 of the statute in requiring the attestation to be made in the 
 presence of the testator was to prevent the substitution of a 
 surreptitious will. In the presence of the testator, there- 
 fore, is within his view. He must be able to see the wit- 
 nesses attest the will, or, to speak with more precision, their 
 relative position to him, at the time they are subscribing 
 their names as witnesses, must be such that he may see them 
 if he thinks proper." 
 
 In Nock V. Nock, 10 Gratt. 106, the witness signed at a 
 bureau in an adjoining room, sixteen or seventeen feet from 
 the bed where the testator was lying with his head raised 
 up, and from which he could, through an open door, plainly 
 see the witnesses, excepting their forearms and hands, while 
 writing. 
 
 In Lamb v. Girtman, 26 Ga. 629, it was held that the lower 
 court erred because it refused to charge that, if the testator 
 might have seen the attestation, it is sufficient. 
 
 In Wright v. Lewis, 5 Rich. 212, 216, 55 Am. Dec. 714, the 
 testator stepped into and remained in the adjoining room, 
 from which he might have seen the witnesses subscribe their 
 names. 
 
 In Watson v. Pipes, 32 Miss. 468, the court say. "It is 
 settled by all the authorities that it is not absolutely essential 
 that the testator should actually see, but if the witnesses 
 be shown to have been within the scope of the testator's view 
 from his actual position, it will be sufficient." 
 
 In McElfresh v. Guard, 32 Ind. 412, the trial court in- 
 structed the jury that "the law requires attestation in the 
 presence of the testator to prevent obtaining another will 
 in place of the true one. It is therefore enough that the 
 testator might see," etc. The instruction was sustained.
 
 Estate of Fleishman, 21 
 
 Contestants refer to the following cases as instances of 
 what has been deemed not a sufficient signing in the tes- 
 tator's presence: 
 
 In Edelston v. Spake,, Holt, 222, 223, :\rod. 259, Comb. 
 156, the witnesses subscribed their names in a hall adjoin- 
 ing the room where the testator lay, but in such a place that 
 he could not see them. 
 
 In Machell v. Temple, 2 Show. 288, the witnesses with- 
 drew out of sight into another room, at the request of the 
 testator, because the noise in his sick room disturbed him. 
 
 In Broderick v. Broderick, 1 P. Wms. 239, 4 Vin. Abr, 
 534, the witnesses, for the ease of the testator, went down- 
 stairs into another room, to attest his will. See, also. Onions 
 V. Tyrer, Id. 343. 
 
 In Clark v. Ward, 1 Bro. P. C. 137, the witnesses sub- 
 scribed at a window, in a passageway, where they could see 
 but part of the bed, and the testator, lying thereon, could 
 not see them. 
 
 In Tribe v. Tribe, 13 Jur. 793, 1 Rob. 775, the testatrix 
 lay in bed with the curtains drawn, and her back turned 
 toward the witnesses, who were signing at a table in the same 
 room. 
 
 In Wright v. ]\Ianifold, 1 M. & S. 294, the testator could 
 not, from his room, have seen into the room where the wit- 
 nesses signed, without putting his head out into a passage- 
 way which connected the two rooms, although, as the wit- 
 nesses were retiring from his room, he called upon his at- 
 tendant to assist him in rising. 
 
 In Ellis' Case, 2 Curt. 395, the witnesses were in an ad- 
 joining room, where they could neither see the testator nor 
 be seen by him, although they were so near that they could 
 hear him breathe. 
 
 In Colman's Case, 3 Curt. 118, folding doors between the 
 two rooms were open, being tied back, but the table on which 
 the witnesses wrote was so situated that the testator could 
 not possibly have seen it. 
 
 In Norton v. Bazett, Dea & S. (5 Am. Law Reg. 52), the 
 witnesses were clerks of the testator, and called by him from 
 an outer office into his own, where he was sitting with his
 
 22 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 back toward the door. The will was written on two sepa- 
 rate sheets, the second (see Bond v. Sewell, 3 Burr. 1773; 
 Gass V. Gass, 3 Humph. 278; Horsford's Case, L. R. 3 Prob. 
 211) of which he signed, and they (his table being full of 
 papers) took it into their room for attestation. When they 
 returned he was standing up, but otherwise relatively in the 
 same position as before, and from which it was impossible 
 for him to have seen them while signing. 
 
 In Killiek's Case, 3 Sw. & Tr. 578, the deceased could, by 
 changing her position in bed, have seen the witnesses sign 
 her will in another room, but the proof was that she did not 
 do so. 
 
 In Violette v. Therriau, 1 Pug. & Bus. (N. B.) 389, the 
 testator had been paralyzed and was, when his will was exe- 
 cuted, unable to rise from his bed without assistance. A 
 small table stood at the foot of his bed, and was concealed 
 therefrom by the footboard of the bed rising above it, so 
 that, although he could see the persons of the witnesses, 
 their arms and hands and the paper on which they wrote 
 on the table were invisible. 
 
 In Robinson v. King, 6 Ga. 539, the testator signed his 
 will in bed, and was not able to get up without assistance. 
 The witnesses wrote their names thereto on a piazza ad- 
 joining his room, about ten feet from him. There was a 
 door communicating with the room, but their relative posi- 
 tions were such that they could not see each other. 
 
 In Brooks v. Duffell, 23 Ga. 441, a will was executed by 
 the testator in bed, toward evening, and, for the sake of 
 seeing better, the witnesses stepped to a door, which, when 
 open swung against the side of his bed, so that, without 
 changing his position, it would have been impossible to see 
 them, and he was too weak to notice anything that was go- 
 ing on. 
 
 In Reed v. Roberts, 26 Ga. 294, 71 Am. Dec. 210, the 
 testator, in extremis, was lying in a bed with four high posts, 
 having a counterpane stretched across those at the head to 
 protect him from the air. After he had signed, the will 
 was taken behind the head of the bed, to a chest against 
 the wall some seven or eight feet distant and attested. The
 
 Estate of Fleishman. 23 
 
 proof showed that he was too feeble to change his position 
 without help. 
 
 In Graham v. Graham, 10 Ired. 219, the witnesses went 
 into another room to sign at a chest standing against the 
 partition, two or three feet from the open door. The bed 
 in which the testator lay stood also against, the partition, 
 with its head nearly opposite to the chest, so that the testator 
 could, by turning his head, see the backs of the witnesses 
 as they sat at the chest writing, l)ut he could not see their 
 faces, arms or hands, nor the paper on which they were 
 writing. 
 
 In Lamb v. Girtman, infra, the testator signed his will 
 at a small table in a hallway, and then, being in feeble health, 
 withdrew to his room, adjoining, accompanied by a witness, 
 who returned to the others, and then they all signed. The 
 testator, when afterward noticed by them, was lying in the 
 ordinary attitude on his bed, and in that position could not 
 have seen the witnesses when signing. 
 
 In Reynolds v. Reynolds, 1 Spears, 253, 40 Am. Dec. 599, 
 the testator, after being raised to sign his will, sank back 
 in his bed, and the witnesses went to a table in a hall and 
 signe'd their names. The testator could not see them as he 
 lay, and, although he had strength to rise sufficiently to see 
 them, yet he did not rise. 
 
 In Jones v. Tuck, 3 Jones, 202, the testator could not see 
 the witnesses while signing his will in another room, with- 
 out raising himself up on his elbow, but this the witnesses 
 thought him capable of doing, because they saw" him turn 
 several times in his bed. 
 
 In Orndorff v. Hummer, 12 B. Mon. 619, the table on which 
 the witnesses wrote stood just behind the head of the lounge 
 on which the testator lay, and four or five feet therefrom. 
 He could not, from his position, have seen the witnesses at 
 all, and it seemed doubtful whether he could, without assist- 
 ance, have changed hi.s posture. 
 
 In Neil v. Neil, 1 Leigh, 6, the testator, when two of the 
 witnesses signed at a table by his bed, lay with his back to 
 them, and his sight was poor, and the light in the room dim; 
 he could not rise alone.
 
 24 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 In Boldry v. Parris, 2 Cush. 433, the testatrix and one 
 witness signed in her room, and then that witness took the 
 will into an adjoining room, where it was signed by the other 
 two witnesses, out of the testatrix's sight altogether. 
 
 In Edelen v. Hardy, 7 Har. & J. 61, 16 Am. Dec. 292, 
 the testator, after signing, requested the witnesses to retire 
 and they went into an adjoining room, separated from the 
 other by a plank partition; there was no direct communica- 
 tion between the rooms, nor could testator have possibly seen 
 them : See Russell v. Falls, 3 Har. & McH. 457, 1 Am. Dec. 
 380. See, also, Redfield on Wills, sec. 245, et seq ; Jarman on 
 Wills, 5th ed. (Bigelow), star * p. 87, et seq., and notes; 
 also section 1276, Civil Code. 
 
 In conclusion, the court may refer to the record in the 
 matter of the estate of J. B. Firnkas, deceased, No. 2774, 
 of this court, decided August 19, 1884. 
 
 In that case the attesting witnesses signed the alleged will 
 of the deceased, not in the actual presence of the testator, 
 but in an adjoining room where they could not be seen by 
 him at the time they signed their names as witnesses to the 
 will. 
 
 This court held that the instrument was not attested in 
 the manner required by law, and denied probate thereof. 
 
 The facts in the Firnkas will case and in the case at bar 
 are curiously coincidental, and the judgment here should 
 correspond. 
 
 Judgment for contestants. 
 
 ATTESTATION AND WITNESSING OF WILLS. 
 
 Object and Purpose of Attestation. — In Appeal of Canada, 47 Conn. 
 450, the court declares that the primary reason for the presence of a 
 witness to a will is not that he has known the testator long or inti- 
 mately; not that he is required to use or have any skill in detecting 
 the presence of insanity or other forms of mental disease or weakness; 
 not that he is to have any opportunity for discovering the fraudu- 
 lent scheme which may have culminated in the act of the testator. 
 If the presence of one or three witnesses provides any degree of se- 
 curity against the procurement of a will from a competent testator 
 by fraud, or against the procurement of one from a testator without 
 mental capacity, it is an incidental benefit; it was not in the mind of 
 the law. That only intended that the witness should be able, with
 
 Estate op Fleishman. 25* 
 
 a great degree of certainty at all times, possibly at great length of 
 time after his attestation, to testify that the testator put his name- 
 upon the identical piece of paper upon which he placed his own. 
 Similarly, in Pollock v. Glassel, 2 Gratt. 439, the court holds that the 
 object of witnessing a will is "not to obtain from the witnesses a 
 certificate of the essential facts of the transaction, but to provide the- 
 means of proving them by persons entitled to confidence and selected 
 for the purpose. The subscription of their names by the witnesses 
 denotes that they were present at, and prepared to prove, the due ex- 
 ecution of the instrument so attested, and nothing more"; See, also, 
 Huff V. Huff, 41 Ga. 696. Some authorities, however, take a broader 
 view of the purposes of attestation and witnessing. Thus, in Ee 
 Pope's Will, 139 N. C. 484, 111 Am. St. Rep. 813, 52 S. E. 23.5, the 
 court holds: "One principal purpose in requiring the attestation of 
 wills is to surround the testator with witnesses who are charged with 
 the present duty of noting his condition and mental capacity. An- 
 other is to insure the identity of the instrument and to prevent the 
 fraudulent substitution of another document at the time of its execu- 
 tion. ' ' To the same effect are Odenwaelder v. Schorr, 8 Mo. App. 
 458; Cornelius v. Cornelius, 52 N. C. 593. This latter view is also 
 sustained by other decisions set forth in the discussion of the partic- 
 ular requisites of attestation and witnessing below. 
 
 Attestation vs. Subscription. — In some earlier decisions, attestation 
 is distinguished from subscription. It is said: "To attest the publica- 
 tion of a paper as a last will, and to subscribe to that paper the names 
 of the witnesses, are very different things, and are required for ob- 
 viously distinct and different ends. Attestation is the act of the 
 senses, subscription is the act of the hand; the one is mental, and the 
 other mechanical; and to attest a will is to know that it was published 
 as such, and to certify the facts required to constitute an actual and 
 legal publication; but to subscribe a paper published as a will is only 
 to write on the same paper the name of the witness for the sole pur- 
 pose of identification"; Swift v. Wiley, 1 B. Mon. 114; Upchurch v. 
 LTpchurch, 16 B. Mon. 102; In re Downie's Will, 42 Wis. 66. In later 
 decisions, however, this distinction is abandoned. In Skinner v. 
 American Bible Soc, 92 Wis. 209, 65 N. W. 1037, the court says: "It 
 would be difficult, no doubt, to satisfactorily define that element in 
 the attestation of a will which is not also present in the mere sub- 
 scription to a will. No physical act is required in the one which is 
 not also required in the other, and it is not clear what mental act or 
 fact appropriate to the one is absent from the other": To the same- 
 effect, Luper v. Werts, 19 Or. 122, 23 Pac. 850. Similarly, in Drury v. 
 Connell, 177 111. 43, 52 N. E. 368, Sloan v. Sloan, 184 111.579, 56 N. E. 
 952, and Calkins v. Calkins, 216 111. 458, 108 Am. St. Rep. 233, 75 
 N. E. 182, 1 L. E. A., N. S., 393, the court holds that a requirement of 
 statutory law that a will shall be "attested" renders essential the 
 "subscriptions" thereof by the attesting witness, that act being in-
 
 26 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 volved in attestation. And lest the idea of attestation be confused 
 with the mere physical act of subscription, the court in Skinner v. 
 Lewis, 40 Or. 571, 62 Pac. 523, 67 Pac. 951, holds: "The attestation 
 .... is not a matter of mere formality in affixing one's name to 
 the will as a witness. There must be an active mentality connected 
 with it. " 
 
 Necessity Witnesses. — It is prerequisite to the validity of a will 
 that it be attested and witnessed in conformity with statute: Orth v. 
 Orth, 145 Ind. 184, 57 Am. St. Rep. 185, 42 N. E. 277, 32 L. R. A. 
 298; Clark v. Miller, 65 Kan. 726, 68 Pac. 1071; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 
 1 Spear, 253, 40 Am. Dec. 599; Davis v. Davis, 6 Lea, 543; Simmons 
 V. Leonard, 91 Tenn. 183, 30 Am. St. Rep. 875, 18 S. W. 280; Blanch- 
 ard's Heirs v. Blanchard 's Heirs, 32 Vt. 62; Pollock v. Glassel, 2 Gratt. 
 439; Rosser v. Franklin, 6 Gratt. 1, 52 Am. Dec. 97; McMechen v. 
 McMechen, 17 W. Va. 683, 41 Am. Rep. 682. This rule also applies in 
 cases of interlineations, corrections, and alterations to wills: Eschbach 
 V. Collins, 61 Md. 478, 48 Am. Rep. 123; Gardiner v. Gardiner, 65 N. 
 H. 230, 19 Atl. 651, 8 L. R. A. 383; Jackson v. Holloway, 7 Johns. 304. 
 See, also, In re Penniman, 20 Minn. 245 (Gil. 220), 18 Am. Rep. 368, 
 holding that after alterations and interlineations have been made in 
 a will, it must not only be resubscribed by the witnesses, but also 
 again signed by the testator. The provision often found in the stat- 
 utes of wills, that the witness to a will must be "credible" means 
 that they must be "competent," the words "credible" and "com- 
 petent" being synonymous when used in this connection: Sloan v. 
 Sloan, 184 III. 579, 56 N. E. 952; Standley v. Moss, 114 111. App. 612; 
 Rueker v. Lambdin, 12 Srnedes & M. 230; Fowler v. Stagner, 55 Tex. 
 393. The requirements of attestation and witnessing generally apply 
 to wills of personalty as well as of realty (Hooks v. Stamper, 18 Ga. 
 471; Lewis v. Maris, 1 Dall. 278; Town of Pawtucket v. Ballou, 15 
 R. I. 58, 2 Am. St. Rep. 868, 23 Atl. 43; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 1 
 Spear, 253, 40 Am. Dec. 599; Rosser v. Franklin, 6 Gratt. 1, 52 
 Am. Dec. 97; Blanchard 's Heirs v. Blanchard 's Heirs, 32 "Vt. 62), 
 though formerly they were not prescribed in cases of personalty: 
 Davis V. Davis, 6 Lea, 543; Moore v. Moore's Exr., 8 Gratt. 307 
 (before the statute of 1835). In the absence of statutory require- 
 ment, a will is valid without witnessing or attestation: In re High, 
 2 Doug. 515. Moreover, the requirements of attestation and wit- 
 nessing, as set forth in this article, do not apply to nuncupative 
 wills, nor in jurisdictions where they are recognized to olographic 
 wills. 
 
 Number of Witnesses. — Under the law prevailing in most jurisdic- 
 tions, two competent witnesses to a will are sufficient: In re Walker 
 110 Cal. 387, 52 Am. St. Rep. 104, 42 Pac. 815, 30 L. R. A. 460; 
 Clark V. Miller, 65 Kan. 726, 68 Pac. 1071; Griffith's Exr. v. Griffith, 
 5 B. Mon. 511; Odenwaelder v. Schorr, 8 Mo. App. 458; Williams v. 
 Miles, 68 Neb. 463, 110 Am. St. Rep. 431, 94 N. W. 705, 96 N. W,
 
 Estate of Fleishman. 27 
 
 151; In re Look's Will, 5 N. Y. Supp. 50; In re Williams' Will, 2 
 Conn. Sur. 579, 15 N. Y. Supp. 828, judgment affirmed, 64 Hun, 636, 
 19 N. Y. Supp. 613; In re Nevin's Will, 4 Misc. Rep. 22, 24 N. Y. 
 Supp. 838; Luper v. Werts, 19 Or. ,122, 23 Pac. 850; In re Irvine's 
 Estate, 206 Pa. 1, 55 Atl. 795; Davis v. Davis, 6 Lea, 543; Simmons 
 V. Leonard, 91 Tenn. 183, 30 Am. St. Eep. 875, 18 S. W. 280; Pol- 
 lock V. Glassel, 2 Gratt. 439; Rosser v. Franklin, 6 Gratt. 1, 52 Am. 
 Dec. 97; Skinner v. American Bible Soc, 92 Wis. 209, 65 N. W. 
 1037. Likewise under the custom prevailing in California before the 
 formation of the state government, two witnesses were sufficient: 
 Adams v. Norris, 64 U. S. 353, 16 L. Ed. 539, 1 Fed. Cas. No. 51; 
 McAll. 253. In other jurisdictions, however, the old English rule 
 requiring three or four competent witnesses still prevails: Fortner 
 V. Wiggins, 121 Ga. 26, 48 S. E. 694; Stirling v. Stirling, 64 
 Md. 138, 21 Atl. 273; Fleming v. Morrison, 187 Mass. 120, 105 Am. 
 St. Rep. 386, 72 N. E. 499; Gardiner v. Gardiner, 65 N. H. 230, 19 
 Atl. 651, 8 L. R. A, 383; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 1 Spear, 253, 40 Am. 
 Dec. 599; Dean v. Heirs of Dean, 27 Vt. 746; Blanchard's Heirs 
 V. Blanchard's Heirs, 32 Vt. 62. In Reynolds v. Reynolds, 1 Spear, 
 253; 40 Am. Dec. 599, the reason for requiring three or four wit- 
 nesses is said to be to protect men against fraudulent wills, for con- 
 federates in fraud usually conspire in pairs and can seldom trust 
 with safety any third person. 
 
 A will executed with only one witness is invalid (Potts v. Felton, 
 70 Ind. 166), and where three witnesses are requisite, a will executed 
 with only two is void as a muniment of title; a judgment admitting 
 it to probate is a nullity, and cannot be validated by lapse of time: 
 Fortner v. Wiggins, 121 Ga. 26, 48 S. E. 694. 
 
 Sufficiency of Substantial Conformity with Law. — Only a substan- 
 tial compliance with the requirements of the law in the attestation and 
 witnessing of wills is requisite, and formalities are not required which 
 the legislature has not plainly prescribed: Montgomery v. Perkin, 2 
 Met. (Ky.) 448, 74 Am. Dec, 419; Savage v. Bulger, 76 S. W. 361, 
 25 Ky. Law Rep. 763; Lewis v. Lewis, 11 N. Y. 220, 13 Barb. 17; 
 Hoystradt v. Kingman, 22 N. Y. 372; Gilbert v. Knox, 52 N. Y. 125; 
 Lane v. Lane, 95 N. Y. 494; In re Jones' Will, 85 N. Y. Supp. 294; 
 In re Williams' Will, 2 Conn. Sur. 579, 15 N. Y. Supp. 828, 64 Hun, 
 636, 19 N. Y. Supp. 613; In re Voorhis' Will, 125 N. Y. 765, 26 N. 
 E. 935, 54 Hun, 637, 7 N. Y. Supp. 596; In re Moore's Will, 109 
 App. Div. 762, 96 N. Y. Supp. 729. "It is not necessary that any 
 particular form be followed, or that any rigid rule of construction 
 of the statute be imposed. Any other interpretation would be to 
 confine the execution of testamentary documents within a narrow 
 compass, and would in many instances defeat the expressed inten- 
 tions of a person": In re Menge's Will, 13 Misc. Eep. 553, 35 N. 
 Y. Supp. 493. Yet, in construing the statutes of wills, it is the 
 intention of the legislature that must be kept in mind, and not that
 
 28 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 of the testator: In re Blair's Will, 84 Hun, 581, 32 N. Y. Supp. 845; 
 In re Fish's Will, 88 Hun, 56, 34 N. Y. Supp. 536. And in Savage 
 V. Bowen, 103 Va. 540, 49 S. E. 668, it is said that courts should 
 strictly follow the requirements of the law in the execution of wills, 
 but should not supplement those requirements with others. 
 
 Subscription or Acknowledgment by Testator.— It is provided by 
 the various statutes of wills in effect in the several states that a 
 will must be signed or subscribed (as differently provided) by the 
 testator with his name or mark, or, as permitted in some states, may 
 be signed or subscribed at the direction of the testator by another 
 in his stead. 
 
 Necessity of Its Being Before or to Witnesses. — In order to validate 
 a will, either this act of signing or subscribing must be done in the 
 presence of the witnesses to the will, or in lieu thereof the testator 
 must acknowledge the instrument or signature to the witnesses: Yoe 
 V. McCord, 74 111. 33; Webster v. Yorty, 194 111. 408, 62 N. E. 907; 
 Eeed v. Watson, 27 Ind. 443; In re Convey 's Will, 52 Iowa, 197, 2 
 N. W. 1084; Denton v. Franklin, 9 B. Mon. 28; Etchison v. Etchison, 
 53 Md. 348; Stirling v. Stirling, 64 Md. 138, 21 Atl. 273; Dewey v. 
 Dewey, 1 Met. (Mass.) 349, 35 Am. Dec. 367; Hogan v. Grosvenor, 
 10 Met. (Mass.) 54, 43 Am. Dec. 414; Nickerson v. Buck, 12 Cush. 
 332; Ela v. Edwards, 16 Gray, 91; Mundy v. Mundy, 15 N. J. Eq. 
 290 (so holding under the law of 1851, but under the statute of wills 
 of 1741 an acknowledgment was not sufficient) ; Chaffee v. Baptist 
 Missionary Convention, 10 Paige, 85, 40 Am. Dec. 225; Baskin v. 
 Baskin, 36 N. Y. 416; In re Look's Will, 5 N. Y. Supp. 50; In re 
 Look, 54 Hun, 635, 7 N. Y. Supp. 298, judgment affirmed, 125 N. Y. 
 762, 27 N. E. 408; In re Williams' Will, 2 Conn. Sur. 579, 15 N. Y. 
 Supp. 828, judgment affirmed, 64 Hun, 636, 19 N. Y. Supp. 613; In re 
 Carll's Will, 38 Misc. Rep. 471, 77 N. Y. Supp. 1036; Eelbeck's Dev- 
 isees V. Granberry, 3 N. C. 232; Eaudebaugh v. Shelley, 6 Ohio St. 
 307; In re Irvine's Estate, 206 Pa. 1, 55 Atl. 795 (such is the law 
 in case of wills disposing of property to charitable or religious uses) ; 
 Roberts v. Welch, 46 Vt. 164; In re Claflin's Will, 73 Vt. 129, 87 
 Am. St. Rep. 693, 50 Atl. 815; Rosser v. Franklin, 6 Gratt. 1, 52 Am. 
 Dec. 97. Where a testator makes his mark to his will in the presence 
 of the witnesses, no acknowledgment is necessary (Savage v. Bulger, 
 25 Ky. Law Rep. 763, 76 S. W. 361), and where the testator makes 
 such acknowledgment to the witnesses, they need not see him sign 
 it (Yoe V. McCord, 74 111. 33; Webster v. Yorty, 194 111. 408, 62 N. 
 E. 907; Etchison v. Etchison, 53 Md. 348; Stirling v. Stirling, 64 
 Md. 138, 21 Atl. 273; Nickerson v. Buck, 12 Cush. 332; Cravens v. 
 Faulconer, 28 Mo. 19; Sisters of Charity v. Kelly, 67 N. Y. 409, 
 reversing 7 Hun, 290; Simmons v. Leonard, 91 Tenn. 183, 30 Am. 
 St. Rep. 875, 18 S. W. 280; Roberts v. Welch, 46 Vt. 164; Skinner v. 
 American Bible Soc, 92 Wis. 209, 65 N. W. 1037), although he signed 
 his mark only: In re Kane's Will, 20 N. Y. Supp. 123.
 
 Estate of Fleishman. 29 
 
 The acknowledgment need not be made to both nor to all wit- 
 nesses at the same time: Chase v. Kittredge, 11 Allen, 49, 87 Am. 
 Dec. 687; In re Diefenthaler's Will, 39 Misc. Eep. 765, 80 N. Y. 
 Supp. 1121. Moreover, where the witnesses are in the presence of 
 the testator while he signs the will, it is immaterial that the wit- 
 nesses do not actually see him sign: Etchison v. Etchison, 53 Md. 
 348; In re Bedell's Will, 2 Conn. Sur. 328, 12 N. Y. Supp. 96; Sim- 
 mons V. Leonard, 91 Tenn. 183, 30 Am. St. Eep. 875, 18 S. W. 280. 
 But if the witnesses are not present at the time of the signing of 
 the testator's will, and there is no subsequent acknowledgment suf- 
 ficient to fulfill the requirements of the law, the will is not executed 
 at all: Sisters of Charity v. Kelly, 67 N. Y. 409; Luper v. Werts, 
 19 Or. 122, 23 Pac. 850; Eichardson v. Orth, 40 Or. 252, 66 Pac. 925, 
 69 Pac. 455; Eoberts v. Welch, 46 Vt. 164. 
 
 Object of Requirement. — The object of the foregoing requirement 
 in the execution of will is to identify and authenticate the instru- 
 ment as one actually subscribed by the testator: Baskin v. Baskin, 
 36 X. Y. 416. 
 
 Sufficiency of Acknowledgment. — There is a diversity of decision 
 as to the sufficiency of an acknowledgment to the witnesses, depend- 
 ing upon the terms of the statutes of wills in the respective juris- 
 dictions, some of them providing that the testator must acknowl- 
 edge the will to be his act and deed, and others providing that he 
 must acknowledge his signature to the will to be his act and deed. In 
 Hobart v. Hobart, 154 111. 610, 45 Am. St. Eep. 151, 39 N. E. 581, affirm- 
 ing 53 111. App. 133, the court points out and comments on this distinc- 
 tion, saying in substance: In England and in New York, and perhaps 
 some other of the states, the statute requires that there must be an ac- 
 knowledgment of the signature. Decisions based on this provision of 
 law hold in substance that there is not a sufficient acknowledgment of 
 the signature by the testator when he produces a will and requests 
 the witnesses to sign it, unless his signature is visibly apparent on 
 the face of the paper, and is seen, or can be seen, by the witnesses, 
 especially if he does not explain the instrument to them. These de- 
 cisions are not, however, applicable where the statute merely re- 
 quires that the testator acknowledge the will or codicil to be his act 
 and deed, and does not specially and in terms require the signature to 
 be acknowledged. A man may acknowledge an entire written in- 
 strument to be his act and deed without necessarily calling the at- 
 tention of those before whom he produces it to any particular part of 
 the instrument. But if he is required to make acknowledgment of a 
 specified part of it, it may be requisite that attention should be di- 
 rected to that part. 
 
 Thus where the law is that the will must be acknowledged, it is 
 not necessary that the witnesses see_ the signature of the testator 
 to the will, or that the testator acknowledge his signature, or that 
 the witnesses know that the instrument is a will, but where the
 
 30 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 testator acknowledges to the witnesses the execution of the instru- 
 ment by himself the requirement of the law is satisfied: Gould v. 
 Chicago Theological Seminary, 189 111. 282, 59 N. E. 536; In re Barry's 
 Will, 219 111. 391, 76 N. E. 577; Simmons v. Leonard, 91 Tenn. 183, 
 30 Am. St. Eep. 875, 18 S. W. 280; Rosser v. Franklin, 6 Gratt. 1, 
 52 Am. Dec. 97. Thus a declaration by the testator to the wit- 
 nesses that the instrument is his last will (Dewey v. Dewey, 1 Met. 
 (Mass.) 349, 35 Am. Dec. 367; Nickerson v. Buck, 12 Gush. 332), or 
 that it is his act and deed (In re Barry's Will, 219 111. 391, 76 N. 
 E. 577; Rosser v. Franklin, 6 Gratt. 1, 52 Am. Dec. 97), or a request 
 by the testator to the witnesses to attest his last will, he producing 
 it for their signature (Tudor v. Tudor, 17 B. Mon. 383; Dewey v. 
 Dewey, 1 Met. (Mass.) 349, 35 Am. Dec. 367; Nickerson v. Buck, 
 
 12 Gush. 332; Simmons v. Leonard, 91 Tenn. 183, 30 Am. St. Rep. 
 875, 18 S. W. 280), is sufficient. Moreover, the declaration or re- 
 quest need not be spoke'n by the testator himself, but may be made 
 by another in his presence, he himself remaining silent, where it 
 appears from the surrounding circumstances that the other was act- 
 ing for the testator at his instance: Denton v. Franklin, 9 B. Mon. 
 28. See, also, to same effect, In re Kane's Will, 20 N. Y. Supp. 123. 
 Furthermore, this acknowledgment need not be made in language 
 at all, but any act, sign, or gesture of the testator which indicates 
 an acknowledgment of the will with unmistakable certainty, will 
 suffice: Gould v. Chicago Theological Seminary, 189 111. 282, 59 N. 
 E. 536; In re Barry's Will, 219 Dl. 391, 76 N. E. 577; Ela v. Ed- 
 wards, 16 Gray, 91; Ludlow v. Ludlow, 36 N. J. Eq. 597. Thus 
 where the testator, having heard read the attesting clause of his 
 will reciting that he had executed the instrument as his will, handed 
 the subscribing witnesses the pen and saw them sign it, but uttered 
 not a word, he acknowledged it as satisfactorily as though he had 
 
 said, "I, , do acknowledge this instrument to be my last 
 
 will and testament": Allison v. Allison, 46 111. 61, 92 Am. Dec. 
 237. 
 
 Where, however, the law is that the signature to the will must 
 be acknowledged, it is requisite that the testator's signature affixed 
 to the will be shown to the witnesses and identified and recognized 
 by the testator, and in some apt and proper manner acknowledged 
 by him to be his signature: Lewis v. Lewis, 11 N. Y. 220, affirming 
 
 13 Barb. 17; Baskin v. Baskin, 36 N. Y. 416; In re Mackey's Will, 
 110 N. Y. 611, 6 Am. St. Rep. 409, 18 N. E. 433, 1 L. R. A. 491; In re 
 Eakin's Estate, 13 Misc. Rep. 557, 35 N. Y. Supp. 489; Raudebaugh 
 v. Shelley, 6 Ohio St. 307. Thus where at the time a witness sub- 
 scribed a will she had just entered the house where the testator 
 was, and as she entered said to the testator, "Are you making your 
 will?" to which he responded, "Yes," and added that he wanted 
 her to put her name to the paper he had in his hand at the place 
 he pointed out, which she did, there is no sufficient acknowledgment
 
 Estate of Fleishman. 31 
 
 of his signature to the will: In re Simmons' Will, 56 Hun, 642, 9 
 N. Y. Supp. 352, affirmed without opinion, 124 N. Y. 663, 27 N. E. 
 413. The exhibition, however, of a will and of the testator's sig- 
 aature attached thereto, made by the testator to a witness, and his 
 ,ieclaration to the witness that it was his last will and testament 
 and his request to the witness to attest the same, constitute together 
 a sufficient acknowledgment by the testator of the signature to the 
 will: Baskin v. Baskin, 36 N. Y. 416, 48 Barb. 200 (Parker and 
 Grover, J J., dissenting); Willis v. Mott, 36 N. Y. 486; Sisters of 
 Charity v. Kelly, 67 N. Y. 409; In re Phillips, 98 N. Y. 267; In re 
 Lang's Will, 9 Misc. Rep. 521, 30 N. Y. Supp. 388; In re Aker's 
 Will, 74 App. Div. 461, 77 N. Y. Supp. 643. 
 
 Request to Witnesses to Sign. — In some states there must be a re- 
 quest from the testator to the witnesses to sign his will: Mundy v. 
 Mundy, 15 N. J. Eq. 290; In re Williams' Will, 2 Conn. Sur. 579, 15 
 N. Y. Supp. 828, 64 Hun, 636, 19 N. Y. Supp. 613; Vogel v. Lehritter, 
 139 N. Y. 223, 34 N. E. 914. "The object of the statute is that an 
 officious signing by the witnesses, without any privity with the tes- 
 tator, should not be recognized as sufficient": Peck v. Gary, 27 N. 
 Y. 9, 84 Am. Dec. 220, affirming 38 Barb. 77. The manner and form 
 in which the request must be made, and the evidence by which it 
 must be proved, are not, however, prescribed, and no precise form 
 of words addressed to each of the witnesses at the very time of 
 attestation is required; but any communication importing such re- 
 quest, addressed to one of the witnesses in the presence of the other, 
 and which, by a just construction of all the circumstances, is in- 
 tended for both, is sufficient. So where one of the subscribing wit- 
 nesses, in the presence of the other, asked the testator if he wished 
 him to sign or witness the paper as his will, and the testator answered 
 in the affirmative, and both thereupon subscribed the will, the publi- 
 cation is sufficient: Coffin v. Coffin, 23 N. Y. 9, 80 Am. Dec. 235. 
 See, also. In re Kane 's Will, 20 N. Y. Supp. 123. Likewise where, 
 before the witnesses signed a will, the draftsman said to the testator, 
 "Here are M. and H.; do you wish them to act as witnesses to this, 
 your will?" to which he replied, "Yes, I do," and then subscribed 
 himself, after which the witnesses did, the request is sufficient: In re 
 Menge's Will, 13 Misc. Rep. 553, 35 N. Y. Supp. 493. Moreover, 
 where the words of request are made in the presence of the testator, 
 they may proceed from another than the testator, and will be re- 
 garded as those of the testator, although the testator said not one 
 word and did not indicate his acquiescence by act or motion, pro- 
 vided that the circumstances show that he adopted them and that 
 the party speaking them was acting for him with his assent: Bundy 
 V. McKnight, 48 Ind. 502; In re Hull's W^ill, 117 Iowa, 738, 89 N. 
 W. 979; In re Murphy's Will, 15 Misc. Rep. 208, 37 N. Y. Supp. 
 223; Cheatham v. Hatcher, 30 Gratt. 56, 32 Am. Rep. 650. So wliorc 
 the person who had drawn up a will for a testator and was attending
 
 '32 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 to his execution for him, they both being in a bank, called up three 
 persons who were in their hearing to witness the will, which they 
 did, the subscribing by them was done at the testator's request: 
 Peck V. Gary, 27 N. Y. 9, 84 Am. Dec. 220, 38 Barb. 77. Likewise, 
 where counsel who drew a will for a testator and acted as witness 
 with the consent of the testator requested his stenographer to attest 
 as a witness, such request being made in an adjoining room out of 
 the hearing of the testator, after which the witness entered the 
 room where the testator was and signed her name in the testator's 
 presence, nothing further being said to her and no objection being 
 made by the testator, the request to the witness is sufficient: Ames 
 V. Ames, 40 Or. 495, 67 Pac. 737. 
 
 In other states, the statutes of wills there prevailing do not re- 
 quire that a testator should ask the witnesses to his will to attest it; 
 his assent, either express or implied, is sufficient; yet the act must 
 :be done with his knowledge, and not in a clandestine or fraudulent 
 manner: Higgins v. Carlton, 28 Md. 115, 92 Am. Dec. 666; Etchison 
 V. Etchison, 53 Md. 348; In re Meurer's Will, 44 Wis. 392, 28 Am. 
 liep. 591. 
 
 In yet other states, it is immaterial whether or not the witnesses 
 to a will attested it at the request of the testator: Sandley v. Moss, 
 114 111. App. 612; Dyer v. Dyer, 87 Ind. 13; In re Allen, 25 Minn. 
 .39; Savage v. Bowen, 103 Va. 540, 49 S. E. 668. See, also, Huff v. 
 Huff, 41 Ga. 696, where the court held that the law implies a re- 
 •quest from the testator to the witnesses to attest hia will from their 
 iconsummation of the act, that no special request by the testator is 
 .necessary to constitute the attesting witnesses competent, that if he 
 ■does not object his assent is equivalent to a request and satisfies the 
 requirements of the law, and that an instruction that if the jury 
 believed from the evidence that one of the witnesses was suggested 
 to the testator as a witness to his will, and the testator assented to 
 such suggestion, such assent was, in law, a request, or equivalent to 
 -a request, is not erroneous. 
 
 Publication, or Declaration of Character of Instrument. — In some 
 states it is prerequisite to the execution of a will that there be some 
 •declaration by the testator to the witnesses that the instrument at- 
 tested by them is his last will and testament: Cravens v. Faulconer, 
 28 Mo. 19; Mundy v. Mundy, 15 N. J. Eq. 290; Ludlow v. Ludlow, 
 36 N. J. Eq. 597; Clark v. Clark, 64 N. J. Eq. 361, 52 Atl. 225; 
 Bemsen v. Brinckerhoff, 26 Wend. 325, 37 Am. Dec. 251, affirming 
 Erinckerhoff v. Eemsen, 8 Paige, 488; Seymour v. Van Wyck, 6 N. Y. 
 120; Lewis v. Lewis, 11 N. Y. 220, 13 Barb. 17; Coffin v. Coffin, 
 ■23 N. Y. 9, 80 Am. Dec. 235; Baskin v. Baskin, 36 N. Y. 416; Gilbert 
 V. Knox, 52 N. Y. 125; In re Look's Will, 5 N. Y. Supp. 50; In re 
 Look, 54 Hun, 635, 7 N. Y. Supp. 298, judgment affirmed, 125 N. Y. 
 762, 27 N. E. 408; In re Dale's Will, 56 Hun, 169, 9 N. Y. Supp. 
 .■396, affirmed without opinion, 134 N. Y. 614, 32 N. E. 649; In re 
 Williams' Will, 2 Conn. Sur. 579, 15 N. Y. Supp. 828, 64 Hun, 636,
 
 Estate of Fleishman. 33 
 
 19 N. Y. Supp. 613; Vogel v. Lehritter, 135 N. Y. 223, 34 N. E. 914; 
 In re Carll's Will, 38 Misc. Eep. 471, 77 N. Y. Supp. 1036; In re 
 Moore's Will, 109 App. Div. 762, 96 N. Y. Supp. 729 (requisite iu 
 case of olographic wills). Such declaration is what is known in 
 technical language as a publication of a will (Eemsen v. Brincker- 
 hoff, 26 Wend. 325, 37 Am. Dec. 251), and without it the will is 
 invalid: Peck v. Gary, 27 N. Y. 9, 84 Am. Dec. 220, affirming 38 
 Barb. 77. Publication "is important, first, in denoting that the 
 testator knows the nature of the instrument he is executing, and to 
 check any deception upon him. In the second place, and also in 
 Older that there may be no imposition perpetrated, it is important 
 that the subscribing witnesses understand that they are attesting the 
 signature to the will of the person at whose request they severally 
 subscribe their names. They realize, if the document is a will, that 
 they are expected to remember what occurred at its execution and 
 be ready to vouch for its validity in court. The declaration of the 
 testator that the instrument is his will is not solely, therefore, for 
 the purpose of showing that he knew that he was executing his 
 will": In re Moore's Will, 109 App. Div. 762, 96 N. Y. Supp. 729. 
 See, also, Baskin v. Baskin, 36 N. Y. 416; Gilbert v. Knox, 52 N. Y. 
 125. 
 
 A substantial compliance with the requirement of publication is 
 not only requisite but sufficient: In re Beckett, 103 N. Y. 167, 8 N. 
 E. 506; In re Dale's Will, 56 Hun, 169, 9 N. Y. Supp. 396, affirmed 
 without opinion, 134 N. Y. 614, 32 N. E. 649. "It is a substantial 
 compliance with the statute, if in some way or mode the testator 
 indicates that the instrument that the witnesses are requested to 
 subscribe as such is intended or understood by him to be his executed 
 
 will The legislature only meant that there should be some 
 
 communication to the witnesses indicating that the testator intended 
 to give effect to the paper as his will, and that any communication 
 of this idea or to this effect will meet the object of the statute; 
 that it is enough if in some way or mode the testator indicates 
 that the instrument the witnesses are requested to subscribe as such 
 is intended or understood by him to be his will. The word 'declare' 
 is said to signify 'to make known, to assert to others, to show 
 forth'; and this in any manner, cither by words or acts, writing or 
 in signs; in fine, that to declare to a witness that the instrument 
 subscribed was the testator's will must mean to make it distinctly 
 known to him by some assertion or by clear assent in words or 
 signs": In re Kane's Will, 20 N. Y. Supp. 123. See, also, Cravens 
 V. Faulconer, 28 Mo. 19; Reinsen v. Brinckerhoff, 26 Wend. 325, 37 
 Am. Dee. 251; In re Murphy's Will, 15 Misc. Rep. 208, 37 N. Y. 
 Supp. 223; In re Cavil's Will, 38 Misc. Rep. 471, 77 N. Y. Supp. 
 103(5; In re Moore's Will, 109 App. Div. 762, 96 N. Y. Supp. 729. In 
 Rp Beckett, 103 N. Y. 167, 8 N. E. 506, the court further says: 
 -"Where the testator cannot speak at all, or only with difficulty, he 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. I — 3
 
 34 Coffey ^s Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 may communicate his knowledge by signs or by words to some listen- 
 ers unintelligible. He must communicate it, however; but if he does 
 that in a manner capable of conveying to the minds of the witnesses 
 his own present consciousness that the paper being executed is a will, 
 that must necessarily be sufficient." Likewise in Mundy v. Mundy, 
 15 N. J. Bq. 290, the court holds that the provision of the New 
 Jersey statute of wills of 1851 that the writing must be declared 
 by the testator to be his last will and testament requires no more 
 formality than the act of 1741 which provided that the will must 
 be published. So where one of the subscribing witnesses in the 
 presence of the other asked the testator if he wished him to sign 
 or witness the paper as his will, and the testator answered in the 
 affirmative, the publication was sufficient as to both witnesses: Coffin 
 V. Coffin, 23 N. Y. 9, 80 Am. Dec. 235. Or, where the draftsman of 
 a will asked the testatrix "if she wanted B and him to witness the 
 will," which then lay before them with the subscription of the testa- 
 trix upon it, and she answered in the affirmative, the publication is 
 sufficient: In re Menge's Will, 13 Misc. Eep. 553, 35 N. Y. Supp. 493. 
 To the same effect, In re Murphy's Will, 15 Misc. Eep. 208, 37 N. 
 Y. Supp. 223. And where it was understood by the witnesses to a 
 codicil when they were sent for that it was to witness a codicil, th< 
 statement of the testator upon their arrival, "It lays there on the 
 desk; I have signed it, and there are only two lines left; you sign 
 it on one, and Frank on the other," constitutes a sufficient publica- 
 tion: In re Carll's Will, 38 Misc. Eep. 471, 77 N. Y. Supp. 1036. 
 Likewise where the testator knew and the witnesses understood from 
 his acts and conduct, as he intended they should, that the instru- 
 ment then executed was his will, there is a sufficient publication: 
 Lane v. Lane, 95 N. Y. 494. Moreover, the fact that the testatrix's 
 act of declaration of an instrument as her will included a reference 
 to a previous conversation between her and the attesting witnesses, 
 which reference was of such a character that without it there would 
 be no publication of the will, does not render the publication in- 
 sufficient: In re Beckett, 103 N. Y. 167, 8 N. E. 506. On the other 
 hand where the messenger who called a witness told him that he 
 was wanted to subscribe a will, but while he was in the room sub- 
 scribing it nothing was said to him of the nature of the paper, there 
 is no sufficient declaration that the paper was a will: In re Nevin's. 
 Will, 4 Misc. Eep. 22, 24 N. Y. Supp. 838. 
 
 Again, it is not necessary that the testator should, by his own 
 words or acts, publish the will, for this in some cases might be 
 impossible through sickness or bodily infirmity, but it may be done 
 by another in his presence and hearing, acting for him with his 
 assent, he being able to dissent but not dissenting: Mundy v. Mundy,. 
 15 N. J. Eq. 290; Ludlow v. Ladlow, 36 N. J. Eq. 597; Gilbert v. 
 Knox, 52 N. Y. 125. 
 
 The act of publication is not complete until the witnesses under- 
 stand from the testator that the instrument they attest is a will: In
 
 Estate of Fleishman. 35 
 
 re Moore's Will, 109 App. Div. 762, 96 N. Y. Supp. 729. And "it 
 will not suffice that the witnesses have elsewhere and from some 
 other sources learned that the document which they are called to 
 attest is a will, or that they suspect or infer from the circumstances 
 and occasion that such is the character of the paper. The fact must 
 in some manner, although no particular form of words is required, be 
 declared by the testator in their presence, that they may not only 
 know the fact, but that they may know it from him, and that he 
 understands it, and, at the time of its execution, which includes pub- 
 lication, designs to give effect to it as his will": Lewis v. Lewis, 
 11 N. Y. 220, 13 Barb. 17. To the same effect, see Gilbert v. Knox, 
 52 N. Y. 125. 
 
 While olographic wills are not recognized in New York as such, 
 yet where a will is wholly in the testatrix's own handwriting, "crit- 
 icism of the terms and manner of what is claimed to have been a 
 sufficient publication need not be so close or severe as where the 
 question whether the testatrix knew that she was executing a will 
 depends solely upon the fact of publication": In re Beckett, 103 N. 
 Y. 167, 8 N. E. 506. To the same effect, In re Aker's Will, 74 App. 
 Div. 461, 77 N. Y. Supp. 643; In re Moore's Will, 109 App. Div. 762, 
 96 N. Y. Supp. 729. 
 
 In other states no declaration to the witnesses or otherwise of the 
 nature of the document the witnesses are called upon to and actually 
 do witness is requisite, and the fact that its nature and character is 
 unknown to either or all of them docs not impair its validity: Ap- 
 peal of Canada, 47 Conn. 450, holding it error to instruct the jury that 
 it was necessary that the subscribing witness of a will should know 
 that the instrument which he subscribed was a will: Dickie v. Carter, 
 42 111. 376; In re Storey's Will, 20 111. App. 183; Kobinson v, Brewster, 
 140 111. 649, 33 Am. St. Eep. 265, 30 N. E. 683; Webster v. Yorty, 194 
 111. 408, 62 N. E. 907; In re Barry's Will, 219 111. 391, 76 N. E. 577; 
 Brown v. McAlister, 34 Ind. 375; Turner v. Cook, 36 Ind. 129; In re 
 Hulse's Will, 52 Iowa, 662, 3 N. W. 734, holding that a statutory re- 
 quirement that a will be "witnessed" does not require its publica- 
 tion; Eay V. Walton, 2 A. K. Marsh. 71; Flood v. Pragoff, 79 Ky. 607, 
 relating to a codicil; Osborn v. Cook, 11 Cush. 532, 59 Am. Dec. 155, 
 holding that while it was to some extent the usage of courts of pro- 
 bate to inquire of the witnesses to a will whether the testator had 
 declared the instrument to be his will, and while such declaration 
 frequently makes a part of the attestation clause of wills, it is unnec- 
 essary; Ela V. Edwards, 16 Gray, 91; Chase v. Kittredge, 11 Allen, 49, 
 87 Am. Dec. 687; Watson v. Pipes, 32 Miss. 451; Luper v. Werts, 19 
 Or. 122, 23 Pac. 850; Skinner v. Lewis, 40 Or. 571, 62 Pac. 523, 67 
 Pac. 951; Loy v. Kennedy, 1 Watts & S. 396; Appeal of Linton, 104 
 Pa. 228, in case of wills of married women; Dean v. Heirs of Dean, 27 
 Vt. 746; In re Claflin's Will, 75 Vt. 19, 52 Atl. 1053, 58 L. R. A. 261. 
 Compare, however. In re Claflin's Will, 73 Vt. 129, 87 Am. St. Rep.
 
 36 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 693, 50 Atl. 815; Beane v. Yerby, 12 Gratt. 239; Allen v. Griffin, 69 
 Wis. 529, 35 N. W. 21; overruling In re Downie's Will, 42 Wis. 66. 
 In a few decisions the superfluousness of a declaration of the char- 
 acter of the instrument is explained or excused on the ground that 
 the writing out and signing of the will on paper by the testator con- 
 stitutes a sufficient publication thereof: Eay v. Walton, 2 A. K. 
 Marsh. 71; Watson v. Pipes, 32 Miss. 451; Dean v. Heirs of Dean, 27 
 Vt. 746. And in Loy v. Kennedy, 1 Watts & S. 396, the court says: 
 "To require more [in the execution of a will] would frequently do 
 mischief, as a testator is frequently disposed to conceal the fact that 
 the instrument executed is a will. ' ' 
 
 Where, however, after subscription of a will by a subscribing wit- 
 ness, the testator declares to the witness that it was ' ' a fake will, 
 made for a purpose," his attestation and subscription of the will is 
 invalid: Fleming v. Morrison, 187 Mass. 120, 105 Am. St. Eep. 386, 72 
 N. E. 499. 
 
 Necessity of Signing and Attestation by Witnesses. — In most states 
 it is necessary that the witnesses to a will subscribe and attest the 
 same: See the statutes of the various states. And in Iowa, under a 
 statute requiring a will to be in writing and "witnessed" by two 
 witnesses, the court has held it necessary to the validity of a will 
 that the witnesses should "subscribe" the will. For,_as there said by 
 the court, "to say that a writing is witnessed includes, as it seems 
 to us, almost necessarily, the idea that it is witnessed in writing, and 
 to exclude the conclusion that it is witnessed in any other manner. 
 .... This is sustained by the thought that the witnesses to a will 
 become such from the time they thus sign it. They testify from that 
 moment, and hence, though they should die before the testator or be- 
 fore the probate of the will, it is still good If without anything 
 
 more than mere memory to identify the instrument, disregarding the 
 consideration that the testator deliberately and formally made his 
 will, desiring and wishing particular persons to attest it in writing, 
 these most solemn of all writings may be established by the recol- 
 lection of witnesses months and years afterward, immeasurable would 
 be the temptations to frauds and perjuries": In re Boyens' Will, 23 
 Iowa, 354. In Pennsylvania, however, where the statute of wills re- 
 quires the signature of the testator to be proved by at least two com- 
 petent witnesses, neither subscribing nor attesting witnesses are neces- 
 sary to give validity to a will: Hight v. Wilson, 1 Dall. 94, 1 L. Ed. 
 51; In re Irvine's Estate, 206 Pa. 1, 55 Atl. 795. And under the 
 custom prevailing in California, before the formation of the state 
 government, to validate a will it was only necessary that the testator 
 and the witnesses should alike hear and understand the testament, and 
 that under such conditions its publication as the will of the testator 
 should be made. It might be drawn in another language from that 
 understood by the testator and witnesses, the notary drawing it under- 
 standing both, and the witnesses understanding the language of the
 
 Estate op Fleishman. 37 
 
 testator: Adams v. Norris, 64 U. S. 353, 16 L. Ed. 539; affirming same 
 case under name of Adams v. De Cook, 1 Fed. Cas. No. 51, McAll. 253. 
 
 Mode of Subscription. — A witness to a will may sufficiently sub- 
 scribe a will by making his mark thereon: In re Pope's Will, 139 
 N. 'C. 484, 111 Am. St. Eep. 813, 52 S. E. 235; Ford v. Ford, 7 Humph. 
 92. Moreover, a witness' name may be written thereon by another 
 at his instance and direction, and in his presence: Upchurch v. Up- 
 church, 16 B. Mon. 102; In re Pope's Will, 139 N. C. 484, 111 Am. St. 
 Eep. 813, 52 S. E. 235; Simmons v. Leonard, 91 Tenn. 183, 30 Am. St. 
 Eep. 875, 18 S. W. 280. For such subscription by another "furnishes 
 
 as much assurance of identity as the making of a mark A 
 
 literal adherence to the words of the statute would operate harshly, 
 and exclude all persons unable to write their names, as witnesses to 
 wills, however, worthy of credence. A more liberal construction will 
 as effectually accomplish the ends of the statute, and not violate its 
 language": Upchurch v. Upchurch, 16 B. Mon. 102. In North Caro- 
 lina, it is held that the fact that the witness himself is able to write 
 does not impair the validity of such signature by another (In re 
 Pope's Will, 139 N. C. 484, 111 Am. St. Eep. 813, 52 S. E. 235); but 
 in Tennessee, it is held that where the witness' name is written by 
 another, the witness himself must countersign it with his mark or 
 other identifying sign, and further, that a competent witness cannot 
 effectively procure his signature to be made thereon by one incom- 
 petent to have himself been a witness to a will, for "to permit the 
 devisee to write the name of the subscribing witness would expose the 
 will to little less danger of wrongful alteration and substitution than 
 would exist if the devisee himself were allowed to become the wit- 
 ness; the same evil consequences would follow in the one case as in 
 The other. If he may sign the name of one subscribing witness, he 
 may sign the name of both, and in that way become a more potent 
 factor in the execution and probate of the will than if he were al- 
 lowed to become a subscribing witness himself. He may not lawfully 
 take the matter so largely into his own hands. A proper construction 
 of the statute excludes the devisee from the doing of any act, even 
 for the subscribing witness, which is essential to a valid subscrip- 
 tion": Simmons v. Leonard, 91 Tenn. 183, 30 Am. St. Eep. 875, 18 
 S. W. 280. 
 
 In Ee Walker, 110 Cal. 387, 52 Am. St. Eep. 104, 42 Pac. 815, 30 
 L. E. A. 460 (McFarland, Garoutte, and Van Fleet, JJ., dissenting), 
 the court held that a witness could sign only in one way, viz., by 
 affixing his name; and, accordingly, that where a witness, inadvert- 
 ently signed his name as "C. G. Walker," instead of "C. G. Warren," 
 the will was invalidated. 
 
 Place on Will of Subscription. — In the absence of an express stat- 
 utory requirement that the witnesses attach their signatures at the 
 foot or end of the will, it is immaterial upon what part of a will 
 the attesting witnesses sign their names; all that is necessary is
 
 38 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 that the witnesses sign their names upon the paper upon which the 
 will is written. So the fact that two provisions of a will were writ- 
 ten after the attestation clause and signatures of the witnesses does 
 not impair its validity: Kolowski v. Fausz, 103 111. App. 528; Fowler 
 V. Stagner, 55 Tex. 393, where the clause appointing executors was 
 appended after the place left for the signatures of the subscribing 
 witnesses, and they signed after the writing of the whole and with 
 the intention of attesting the whole will, the part after their signa- 
 tures as well as that before. Likewise it is of no importance that 
 the witnesses sign their names in the attestation clause of the will, 
 and not after: Franks v. Chapman, 64 Tex. 159. And where, at 
 the conclusion of a will, after the testator's signature, was written 
 a statement by the testator's wife, in substance that she was satis- 
 fied with it, and agreed to its provisions, and a subscribing witness 
 to the will signed his name after the above addendum, instead of 
 after the will itself, that fact does not invalidate the will: Potts v. 
 Felton, 70 Ind. 166. Also where one of the witnesses to a will signed 
 a sworn certificate on the back thereof, stating in substance that on 
 the date of the will the testator signed, sealed and delivered it for 
 the consideration and purposes stated therein, as his own proper act 
 and deed, the attestation of such witness is sufficient: Murray v. 
 Murphy, 39 Miss. 214. 
 
 In states, however, where it is requisite that the witnesses sign the 
 will at the foot or end thereof, or that they "subscribe" it, a more 
 rigid rule is applicable. Where a will occupied the first and part of 
 the second page of a four-page sheet of paper, and, after being signed, 
 was folded with the fourth page outside and sealed, and was later 
 presented by the testator to three persons to be by them witnessed as 
 his will, there is no sufiieient subscribing of the will by the witnesses: 
 Soward v. Soward, 1 Duvall, 126. For ''between the paper as sub- 
 scribed by Soward [the testator], and the names of the witnesses, 
 there is an intervening space of nearly two blank pages. So far from 
 subscribing their names to the will, it may be said, with much more 
 propriety and accuracy of speech, that they merely indorsed the paper 
 enclosing and enveloping the will, without any accompanying writ- 
 ing or memorandum to indicate the purpose of the indorsement or 
 showing any connection whatever between the indorsement and the 
 will. If the paper had been inclosed in a sealed envelope, and the 
 witnesses had written their names on the envelope, it would have 
 been quite as near an approximation to the requirements of the stat- 
 ute. There would also have been just as little room to doubt the 
 identity of the paper in the one case as in the other. And whilst it 
 is true that one of the chief objects of requiring the subscription of 
 the names of the witnesses is to insure identity, it is equally true that 
 another object is to prevent fraudulent additions to or alterations of 
 the instrument to be subscribed. But the mode in which these objects 
 are to be attained is definitely and certainly prescribed by the law, 
 and it admits the substitution of no other mode."
 
 Estate of Fleishman. 39 
 
 Moreover, where, after a testator's will was written, he caused 
 another paragraph to be written at the end, which clause was of a 
 testamentary character; and he signed both at the end of the orig- 
 inal will, and after the new paragraph, but the witnesses signed only 
 at, the end of the original will, they failed, to subscribe the will, and 
 the will is invalid: In re Blair's Will, 84 Hun, 581, 32 N. Y. Supp. 
 845. And where a will was written on the first and third pages of a 
 double sheet of paper, and at the foot of the first page were the words 
 ' ' continued on the next page, ' ' followed by an attestation clause and 
 the signatures of the testator and three subscribing witnesses, and it 
 further appeared from the terms of the will that the matter on the 
 third page was surplusage, yet the will, not being signed by the 
 witnesses at the end of the whole writing, is invalid. The testator 
 intended the clauses on the third page to be part of his will, and it 
 was not completed to his satisfaction until they were added. What 
 shall form part of the instrument which the testator intends as his 
 will must be determined by him: In re Albert's Will, 38 Misc. Kep. 
 61, 76 N. Y. Supp. 965. 
 
 Time of Subscription and Attestation. — It is not necessary, in most 
 states, that both or all the witnesses to a will should subscribe it at 
 the same time, but a will attested by a sufficient number of witnesses, 
 who at different times subscribe their names as witnesses, is well 
 executed: Johnson v. Johnson, 106 Ind. 475, 55 Am. Eep. 762, 7 N. E. 
 201; Grubbs v. Marshall (Ky.), 13 S. W. 447; Dewey v. Dewey, 1 Met. 
 349, 35 Am. Dee. 367; Cravens v. Faulconer, 28 Mo. 19; Eelbeck's 
 Devisees v. Granberry, 3 N. C. 232. In Virginia, however, the wit- 
 nesses to a will must attest at the same time, for otherwise ' ' the 
 testator might be capable of making a will at the time of one of the 
 attestations, and incapable at the time of the other, and only one 
 attesting witness could prove the important fact of mental capacity 
 at either time": Parramore v. Taylor, 11 Gratt. 220. 
 
 Presence of Testator — Necessity and Purpose. — It is prerequisite 
 to the validity of a will that both or all the witnesses thereto sub- 
 scribe and attest the same in the presence of the testator: Standley 
 V. Moss, 114 HI. App. 612; Calkins v. Calkins, 216 111. 458, 108 Am. 
 St. Eep. 233, 75 N. E. 182, 1 L. E. A., N. S., 293; Cravens v. Faul- 
 coner, 28 Mo. 19; In re Beggans' Will, 68 N. J. Eq. 572, 59 Atl. 874; 
 Eelbeck's Devisees v. Granberry, 3 N. C. 232; In re Pope's Will, 
 139 N. C. 484, 111 Am. St. Eep. 813, 52 S. E. 235; Town of Pawtucket 
 v. Ballon. 15 E. I. 58, 2 Am. St. Eep. 868, 23 Atl. 43. An instruction 
 that a will to be valid must be attested in the ' ' personal and actual ' ' 
 presence of the testator, is not objectionable, although the adjectives 
 are unnecessary, as, if attested in his presence, it cannot otherwise 
 than in his "personal and actual" presence: Greene v. Greene, 145 
 111. 264, 33 N. E. 941. 
 
 "The object of the statute in requiring that a will should be 'at- 
 tested by the witnesses in the presence of the testator,' so far as the
 
 40 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 form of the attestation is concerned, was to identify the instrument 
 as that signed and published by the testator, and to prevent fraud 
 and imposition in establishing spurious wills, and, at the same time, 
 to show the person by whom the facts necessary to establish the will 
 could be proved, when it should be produced for probate": Fatheree 
 V. Lawrence, 33 Misc. Kep. 585. To the same effect, see Eobinson 
 V. King, 6 Ga. 639; Calkins v. Calkins, 216 111. 458, 108 Am. St. Eep. 
 233, 75 N. E. 182, 1 L. E. A., N. S., 393; Arndorff v. Hummer, 12 
 B. Mon. 619; Watson v. Pipes, 32 Miss. 451; Crovens v. Faulconer, 
 28 Mo. 19; Mandeville v. Parker, 31 N. J. Eq. 242. A further object 
 it said to be that the testator may know that the instrument has been 
 witnessed by the persons whom he has chosen for that purpose: 
 Orndorff v. Hummer, 12 B. Mon. 619. 
 
 Presence Mentally. — From the standpoint of a testator as a 
 rational being, the performance of the act of subscription and attesta- 
 tion in his presence necessarily involves his full consciousness at the 
 time of such performance of the nature and quality of the act: Watson 
 V. Pipes, 32 Miss. 451; Nock v. Nock's Exrs., 10 Gratt. 106. For 
 "when the condition of the testator is such that immediately after 
 the acknowledgment and before the subscription of the will, from sleep 
 or other cause, he becomes insensible to what is passing around him, 
 and unconscious of the act of subscribing, which he has a right to 
 supervise, and thus in fact is unable to determine whether he will or 
 will not supervise it, the subscription thus made is not in the sense 
 
 or within the objects of the statute made in his presence 
 
 Although, as far as mere space were concerned, the subscription was 
 in his presence, we are satisfied that the same reasons which require 
 that he should have been physically capable by his own exertion or 
 by the aid of others to see what was going on if he chose to do su, 
 operate even more powerfully to require that he should have been 
 conscious of it, and that he should have had the will or mental power 
 to determine whether he would or would not see it. If this be not 
 requisite, the subscription by the witnesses would be sufficient, though 
 made after the death of the testator, or after he had relapsed into 
 perfect delirium, or had become wholly insensible to external objects 
 from the near approach of death. And if this were sufficient, the 
 objects of the statute would be as fully accomplished if the will 
 were subscribed a year from the testator's death, or at any distance 
 from his presence during his life": Orndorff v. Hummer, 12 B. Mon. 
 619. So where at the time of subscription the testator was in bed 
 and did not speak to the witness while he was in the room, nor did 
 the witness see him, and while both before and after the subscription 
 the testator was able to converse and walk about, but it did not 
 appear that he was sensible or awake at the time thereof, the sub- 
 scription is insufficient: Griffith's Exr. v. Griffith, 5 B. Mon. 511. 
 Where the feebleness of mind and body of a testator at the time of 
 attestation of his will was so great that there was a total prostra-
 
 Estate of Fleishman. 41 
 
 tion of bodily and mental powers, the will is void: Spoonemore v. 
 Cables, 66 Mo. 579. And where a testator declared an instrument 
 to be his will and requested the witnesses to sign, but before the 
 second witness had signed died, and he afterward subscribed, the will 
 is invalid: In re Fish's Will, 88 Hun, 56, 34 N. Y. Supp. 536. In Mc- 
 Mechen v. McMechen, 17 W. Va. 683, 41 Am. Eep. 682, the court in 
 substance says: If before the attestation of a will, and while it is 
 being done, the testator, by reason either of unconsciousness or phys- 
 ical inability, was unable to dissent from the attestation and to arrest- 
 or prevent the same by indicating his dissent or disapproval, if he 
 had desired to do so, the will is not valid. It is not necessary that 
 the testator shall actually assent to the attestation, but when the 
 attestation is made he must be in a mental and physicial condition 
 which will enable him to dissent from the attestation if he desires; 
 and if his condition is such that he could give such dissent or dis- 
 approval, if he chose to do so, but does not, his assent will be implied. 
 
 In Ambre v. Weishaar, 74 111. 109, it has further been held that an 
 attestation, even in the same room with the testator, if done in a 
 clandestine and fraudulent manner, will not be regarded as done in. 
 his presence. 
 
 Presence Physically. — From the standpoint of the testator as a 
 sentient creature, there must be such contiguity between the tes- 
 tator and the witnesses at the time of their attestation as in fact or 
 in the common experience of men will bring the act of the witnesses 
 in subscribing and attesting to the perception of the testator's 
 senses. In Healey v. Bartlett, 73 N. H. 110, 59 Atl. 617, the court 
 says: "When a testator is not prevented by physical infirmities 
 from seeing and hearing what goes on around him, it is the general, 
 if not the universal, rule, that his will is attested in his presence 
 if he understands and is conscious of what the witnesses are doing 
 when they write their names, and can, if he is so disposed, readily 
 change his position so that he can see and hear what they do and say. 
 .... In other words, if he had knowledge of their presence, and can, 
 if he is so disposed, readily see them write their names, the will is 
 attested in his presence, even if he does not see them do it, and could 
 not without some slight physical exertion. It is not necessary that 
 he should actually see the witnesses for them to be in his presence. 
 They are in his presence whenever they are so near him that he is 
 conscious of where they are, and of what they are doing, through any 
 of his senses, and are where he can readily see them if he is so dis- 
 posed. The test, therefore, to determine whether the will of a person 
 who has the use of all his faculties is attested in his presence, is to 
 inquire whether he understood what the witnesses were doing when 
 thoy affixed their names to his will, and could, if he had been so 
 disposed, readily have seen them do it." 
 
 In view of the tendency, observable in the foregoing and many 
 other decisions, to confuse presence with eyesight, the court, in May-
 
 42 Coffey ^s Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 nard v. Vinton, 59 Mich. 139, 60 Am. Eep. 276, 26 N. W. 401, says: 
 ' ' Courts have held that where the testator is a blind person, still the 
 witnesses must subscribe in such position and proximity that, had 
 the testator been possessed of eyesight, he would have seen them; 
 thus making the test of sight the limit of personal presence. If this 
 is the correct criterion, then the rule, instead of being uniform, would 
 be subject to great fluctuations, according to the degree of eyesight 
 a person has. What would be in the presence of a far-sighted per- 
 son would be in the absence of a near-sighted one; and what would 
 be a valid execution of a will for one would be wholly worthless for 
 another with equal mental capacity; and a person wearing his eye- 
 glasses or spectacles would have a larger presence than when he laid 
 them aside. Under such a rule, the oculist would appear to be the 
 most important witness to establish or destroy the legal attestation 
 
 and execution of a will I confess I do not see why the word 
 
 'presence' should not be held to convey the idea attached to its or- 
 dinary signification in the ordinary use of language. It is not a 
 technical term or scientific word. Why should such a meaning be put 
 upon this word 'presence' that implies that every person who is called 
 upon to witness the execution of a will is presumed to be willing 
 and anxious to foist upon the testator a spurious document, and hence 
 required to write his name under the eye (if he has one) of the 
 testator. ' ' 
 
 Other decisions, while recognizing that an attestation may be good 
 although the testator is blind or does not choose to look at the act of 
 attesting, yet hold that to be in the testator's presence the act of 
 attesting must be in the line of the testator's vision if he could or 
 cared to look. In Calkins v. Calkins, 216 111. 458, 108 Am. St. Eep. 
 233, 75 N. E. 182, 1 L. E. A., N. S., 393, the court says: "In the case 
 of a blind person, his will would be attested in his presence if the 
 act was brought within his personal knowledge through the medium 
 
 of other senses On the other hand, no mere contiguity of the 
 
 witnesses will constitute presence if the position of the testator is 
 such that he cannot possibly see them. An attestation is not in the 
 presence of the testator, although the witnesses are in the same 
 room and close to him, if some material obstacle prevents him from 
 knowing of his own knowledge or perceiving by his senses the act of 
 attestation. To the same effect, In re Tobin, 196 HI. 484, 63 N. E. 
 1021; Eiggs V. Eiggs, 135 Mass. 238, 46 Am. Eep. 464; Eeynolds v. 
 Eeynolds, 1 Spear, 253, 40 Am. Dec. 599. The necessity, in case of a 
 blind testator, that the act of attesting should be within the percep- 
 tion of his remaining senses does not appear to be appreciated in the 
 remarks in Healey v. Bartlett, 73 N. H. 110, 59 Atl. 617, in respect 
 to the wills of blind testators. In Eay v. Hill, 3 Strob. 297, 49 Am. 
 Dec. 647, the will of a blind man was sustained, the will having -been 
 within two feet of the testator at the time the witnesses subscribed 
 their names, and the court said: "In the ease of a blind man, the
 
 Estate of Fleishman. 43 
 
 superintending control which in other cases is exercised by sight 
 must be transferred to the other senses; and if they are, or may, 
 at his discretion, be made sensible that the witnesses are subscribing 
 the same will that he had signed, I should think it ought to suflEice. " 
 Presence in Case of Clear Vision. — Where a testator is so situated 
 with respect to the witnesses to his will that by a mere movement of 
 Ms head, which he had the physical ability to make if he chose, they 
 would be in his unobstructed sight during the act of attestation, they 
 are sufficiently in his presence, though he fails to overlook their act of 
 attestation: Eobinson v. King, 6 Ga. 539; Ambre v. Weishaar, 74 111. 
 109; In re Storey's Will, 20 111. App. 183, 200; McElfresh v. Guard, 
 
 32 Ind. 408; Turner v. Cook, 36 Ind. 129; OrndorfP v. Hummer, 12 B. 
 Mon. 619; Edelen v. Hardley's Lessee, 7 Har. & J. 61, 16 Am. Dec. 
 292; Dewey v. Dewey, 1 Met. (Mass.) 349, 35 Am. Dec. 367; Hogan 
 v. Grosvenor, 10 Met. (Mass.) 54, 43 Am. Dec. 414; In re Allen, 25 
 Minn. 39; Watson v. Pipes, 32 Miss. 451; Walker v. Walker, 67 Miss. 
 529, 7 South. 491; Spoonemore v. Cables, 66 Mo. 579; Cornelius v. 
 Cornelius, 52 N. C. 593; Blanchard's Heirs v. Blanchard 's Heirs, 32 
 Vt. 62; Eay v. Hill, 3 Strob. 297, 49 Am. Dee. 647. This rule ap- 
 plies equally where the witnesses were not in the same room with 
 the testator: Orndorff v. Hummer, 12 B. Mon. 619; Bynum v. Bynum, 
 
 33 N. C. 632; In re Meurer's Will, 44 Wis. 392, 28 Am. Rep. 591. If 
 actual sight were necessary, it would vitiate a will if the testator did 
 but turn his back or look off, though literally present by being at the 
 spot where the thing was done: Bynum v. Bynum, 33 N. C. 632. 
 
 Presence in Case of Obstructed. Vision. — Where, however, the tes- 
 tator and witnesses are in the same apartment and fairly contiguous, 
 but some physical object obstructing the sight lies between them dur- 
 ing the act of subscribing, the witnesses are not in the testator's 
 presence, and the attestation is insufficient, although the testator was 
 physically capable of changing his position or removing the obstruc- 
 tion had he chose to do so: Robinson v. King, 6 Ga. 539; Brooks v. 
 Duflfell, 23 Ga. 441; Reed v. Roberts, 26 Ga. 294, 71 Am. Dec. 210; 
 Calkins v. Calkins, 216 111. 458, 108 Am. St. Rep. 233, 75 N. E. 182, 
 1 L. R. A., N. S., 293; Ray v. Hill, 3 Strob. 297, 49 Am. Dec. 647. 
 Yet in Michigan, where the sight was interrupted by the fact that 
 the first witness stood between the testator and the second witness 
 while the second was subscribing, the attestation was not thereby 
 invalidated: Maynard v. Vinton, 59 Mich. 139, 60 Am. Rep. 276, 26 
 N. W. 401. And the fact that, while subscribing, a witness is so 
 placed with respect to the testator that the witness' body cuts off 
 the testator's view of the will, the hand of the witness with which 
 he was subscribing, and the act of subscription, does not render the 
 attestation any the less in the presence of the testator: In re Tobin, 
 196 111. 484, 63 N. E. 1021; Nock v. Nock's Exrs., 10 Gratt. 106; 
 Baldwin v. Baldwin 's Exr., 81 Va. 405, 59 Am. Rep. 669.
 
 44 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 Presence in Case of Inability to Look in Direction. — In some de- 
 cisions it is held that where the testator's ability actually to see the 
 witnesses to his will subscribe the same is dependent upon his ability 
 to turn himself, and his ailment so operates as to prevent him from 
 making this movement, the will is not witnessed in his presence: 
 Aikin v. Weckerly, 19 Mich. 482; Watson v. Pipes, 32 Miss. 451; 
 Walker v. Walker, 67 Miss. 529, 7 South. 491; Neil v. Neil, 1 Leigh, 
 6, the court being equally divided. But in Riggs v. Riggs, 135 Mass. 
 238, 46 Am. Eep. 464, the court held that where a will was attested 
 nine feet from a testator's bed ia an adjoining room, and in the 
 unobstructed line of vision from his bed, but because of injuries 
 he was unable to turn his head or to look in any direction except up- 
 ward, it is attested in his presence, for sight is not the only test 
 of presence. "A man may take note of the presence of another 
 by the other senses, as hearing or touch. Certainly, if two blind 
 men are in the same room, talking together, they are in each other 's 
 presence. If two men are in the same room, conversing together, and 
 either or both bandage or close their eyes, they do not cease to be in 
 each other's presence." 
 
 Position in Same or Another Room — Presumption Therefrom. — In 
 order that the attestation may be in the presence of the witnesses, it 
 is not indispensable that the witnesses should, at the time of their 
 subscription, be in the same room or even in the same house as the 
 testator: Robinson v. King, 6 Ga. 539; Ambre v. Weishaar, 74 111. 
 109; McElfresh v. Guard, 32 Ind. 408; Watson v. Pipes, 32 Miss. 451. 
 Yet where the witnesses subscribe in a different room from that in 
 which the testator is and out of the line of his vision, they are not 
 in his presence: Robinson v. King, 6 Ga. 539, where the witnesses 
 went onto the piazza to subscribe; Edelen v. Hardley's Lessee, 7 
 Har. & J. 61, 16 Am. Dec. 292; Boldry v. Parris, 2 Gush. 433; Mande- 
 ville V. Parker, 31 N. J. Eq. 242, where the will was on a table, behind 
 the partition of the adjoining room, although the backs of the wit- 
 nesses sitting at the table and subscribing their names might have 
 been visible from the position of the testator; Graham v. Graham,. 
 32 N. C. 219, under same circumstances; Jones v. Tuck, 48 N. C. 202; 
 Reynolds v. Reynolds, 1 Spear, 253, 40 Am. Dec. 599, where a testator 
 in bed could have seen, by raising himself on his elbow, which he 
 had the strength to do, but did not. In Wright v. Lewis, 5 Rich. 1, 
 212, 55 Am. Dec. 714, where a testator, being in ordinary health, 
 walked on to a piazza to subscribe his will and sat down at a table 
 and did it, and then rose and let the witnesses sit there to sign, 
 meanwhile walking into the room off the piazza from parts of which 
 he could see the witnesses sign, and after the attestation was done 
 was found by the witnesses sitting in a place in the room from which 
 he could not have seen the witnesses when subscribing, the court held 
 the attestation sufficiently in the testator's presence, and distin- 
 guished the case from the others on the ground that in them the will
 
 Estate of Fleishman. 45 
 
 was taken from the actual presence of the testator to be attested, 
 while here the will remained exactly where the testator signed it, and 
 he left the witnesses when he knew they were attesting it. 
 
 Moreover, in a number of decisions it is held that where the wit- 
 nesses are in the same room with the testator at the time of the act 
 of subscribing, they are prima facie in his presence, and the burden 
 if on a contestant of the will to rebut that presumption, while if 
 they are not all in the same room at that time, they are prima facie 
 out of the presence of the testator, and the burden is on the propo- 
 nent of the will to establish their mutual presence: Orndorff v. Hum- 
 mer, 12 B. Mon. 619; Watson v. Pipes, 32 Miss. 451; Mandeville v. 
 Parker, 31 N. J. Eq. 242; In re Beggan's Will, 68 N. J. Eq. 572, 59 
 Atl. 874; Bynum v. Bynum, 33 N. C. 632; Jones v. Turk, 48 N. C. 
 202. 
 
 Acknowledgment of Signature as Equivalent to Presence. — In some 
 states, where the witnesses to a will subscribed the same out of 
 the presence of the testator, their subsequent acknowledgment of 
 the signatures to the testator, although done as part of the same 
 transaction, the signatures being exhibited to the testator, does not 
 amount to subscription in the testator's presence and is insufficient 
 to validate the will: Calkins v. Calkins, 216 111. 458, 108 Am. St. 
 Kep. 223, 75 N. E. 182, 1 L. E. A.. N. S., 393; Chase v. Kittredge, 11 
 Allen, 49, 87 Am. Dec. 687; Town of Pawtucket v. Ballon, 15 E. I. 
 58, 2 Am. St. Eep. 868, 23 Atl. 43; In re Downie's Will, 42 Wis. 66. 
 In other states, however, the subscription and attestation is in such 
 case, under the circumstances mentioned, sufficiently done in the 
 testator's presence: Cook v. Winchester, 81 Mich. 581^ 46 N. W. 106, 
 8 L. E. A. 822; Moore v. Moore's Exr., 8 Graft. 307, the court being 
 equally divided; Sturdivant v. Birchett, 10 Gratt. 67 (Daniel and 
 Allen, JJ., dissenting). 
 
 Mutual Presence of Witnesses. — In most states, it is not requisite 
 that the witnesses to a will sign or attest the same in the pres- 
 ence of each other or of one another, but it is sufficient that they 
 do so separately: Moore v. Spier, 80 Ala. 129; Appeal of Gaylord, 
 43 Conn. 82; Flinn v. Owen, 58 111. Ill; In re Hull's Will, 177 Iowa, 
 738, 89 N. W. 979; Hogan v. Grosvcnor, 10 Met. (Mass.) 54, 43 Am. 
 Dec. 414; Ela v. Edwards, 16 Gray, 91; Cravens v. Faulconer, 28 Mo. 
 19; Hoysradt v. Kingman, 22 N. Y. 372; In re Potter's Will, 12 N. 
 y. Supp. 105; In re Diefenthaler 's Will, 39 Misc. Eep. 765, 80 N. 
 Y. Supp. 1121; Eaudebaugh v. Shelley, 6 Ohio St. 307; Logue v. 
 Stanton, 5 Sneed, 97; Simmons v. Leonard, 91 Tenn. 183, 30 Am. St. 
 Eep. 875, 18 S. W. 280; Parramore v. Taylor, 11 Gratt. 220; Beane 
 V. Yerby, 12 Gratt. 239; Green v. Crain, 12 Gratt. 252 (Allen, P., and 
 Daniel, J., dissenting, by reason of peculiar statutory language) ; 
 In re Smith's Will, 52 Wis. 543, 38 Am. Eep. 756, 8 N. W. 616, 9 
 N. W. 665. "A requisition that the witnesses shall subscribe in the 
 presence of each other would be a fruitful source of litigation, would
 
 46 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 dfcfeat many fair wills, and would, I think, be productive of no 
 corresponding good. It would very much clog the exercise of the 
 testamentary power, without throwing around it, so far as I can 
 perceive, a single additional safeguard. It would render it necessary 
 to inquire in every case whether the witnesses, when they sub- 
 scribed the will, were not only in the presence of the testator or in 
 the range of his vision, but also in the presence of each other or in 
 the range of each other's vision. It would be questionable whether 
 range of the vision would be sufficient in regard to the witnesses 
 inter se, and whether actual sight would not be necessary": Para- 
 more V. Taylor, 11 Gratt. 220. 
 
 In a few states, however, the witnesses must be together in each 
 other's or one another's presence at the time of their subscription 
 and attestation of the will, to validate the same: Ludlow v. Ludlow, 
 36 N. J. Eq. 597; Eoberts v. Welch, 46 Vt. 164. In these latter states, 
 where all the witnesses to a will were so situated that they might 
 have seen one another sign, it is not material whether they did in 
 fact or not: Blanchard's Heirs v. Blanchard's Heirs, 32 Vt. 62; In" re 
 Claflin's Will, 73 Vt. 129, 87 Am. St. Eep. 693, 50 Atl. 815. But to 
 constitute presence, it is not sufficient that the witnesses merely were 
 in the same room with the testator. The room might have been so 
 large; but the witnesses must have been together in the presence of 
 one another in such a way and in such a sense that they could see 
 one another sign; whether they actually looked and saw or not, they 
 must have been right where they could have seen one another sign: 
 In re Claflin's Will, 75 Vt. 19, 52 Atl. 1053, 58 L. E. A. 261. 
 
 Knowledge of Contents by Witnesses. — It is not essential to the 
 validity of a will that it should be read over to the witnesses thereto, 
 nor that they should know its contents: Dickie v. Carter, 42 111. 376; 
 Brown v. McAlister, 34 Ind. 375; In re Higdon's Will, 6 J. J. Marsh, 
 444, 22 Am. Dee. 84; Flood v. Pragofif, 79 Ky. 607; Hogan v. Gros- 
 venor, 10 Met. (Mass.) 64, 43 Am. Dec. 414; Osborn v. Cook, 11 Cush. 
 532, 59 Am. Dec. 155; Eaudebaugh v. Shelley, 6 Ohio St. 307; Luper 
 V. Werts, 19 Or. 122, 23 Pac. 850; Skinner v. Lewis, 40 Or. 571, 62 
 Pac. 523, 67 Pac. 951; Appeal of Linton, 104 Pa. 228, relating to a 
 will of a married woman; Simmons v. Leonard, 91 Tenn. 183, 30 Am. 
 St. Eep. 875, 18 S. W. 280. 
 
 In order to validate his attestation to a will, a witness thereto 
 need not know the testamentary capacity af the testator: Huff v. 
 Huff, 41 Ga. 696. It is error to instruct the jury that prior to the 
 signing of a will by the witnesses thereto, each of the witnesses must 
 know that the other was to be an attesting witness, and each must 
 know that the other had been requested to act in that capacity: Savage 
 V. Bowen, 103 Va. 540, 49 S. E. 668. 
 
 It is not requisite to the validity of a will that the witnesses 
 thereto attest to exactly the same act or declaration on the part of
 
 Estate op Fleishman. 47 
 
 the testator, indicating his acknowledgment of the instrument: In re 
 Hull's Will, 117 Iowa, 738, 89 N. W. 979. 
 
 Attestation Clause. — "Where it is customary to place at the end of 
 a will, before the signatures of the witnesses thereto, an attestation 
 clause setting forth with more or less completeness the performance 
 of the statutory requisites to its due execution and witnessing, yet 
 the total absence of such clause, or of any word of attestation, does 
 not invalidate the will: Calkins v. Calkins, 216 111. 458, 108 Am. St. 
 Rep. 233, 75 N. E. 182, 1 L. R. A., N. S., 393; In re Barry's Will, 219 
 III. 391, 76 N. E. 577; Barricklow v. Stewart, 163 Ind. 438, 72 N. E. 
 128; In re Hull's Will, 117 Iowa, 738, 89 N. W. 979; Ela v. Edwards, 
 16 Gray, 91; Berberet v. Berberet, 131 Mo. 399, 52 Am. St. Rep. 634, 
 33 S. W. 61; Williams v. Miles, 68 Neb. 463, 110 Am. St. Rep. 431, 94 
 N. W. 705, 96 N. W. 151; In re Look, 54 Hun, 635, 7 N. W. Supp. 298; 
 affirmed without opinion, 125 N. Y. 762, 27 N. E. 408; In re Aker's 
 Will, 74 App. Div. 461, 77 N. Y. Supp. 643; In re Cornell's Will, 89 
 App. Div. 412, 85 N. Y. Supp. 920; Webb v. Dye, 18 W. Va. 376. 
 Where such a clause is used, the particular form of completeness there- 
 of is immaterial to the validity of the will: Keely v. Moore, 196 U. 
 S. 38, 25 Sup. Ct. 169, 49 L. Ed. 376, affirming 22 App. Dist. Col. 
 9; Robinson v. Brewster, 140 111. 649, 33 Am. St. Rep. 265, 30 N. E. 
 638; Barricklow v. Stewart, 163 Ind. 438, 72 N. E. 128; In re Hull's 
 Will, 117 Iowa, 738, 89 N. W. 979; Osborn v. Cook, 11 Cush. 532, 59 
 Am. Dec. 155; Chase v. Kittredge, 11 Allen, 49, 89 Am. Dec. 687; 
 Fatheree v. Lawrence, 33 Miss. 585, Chaffee v. Baptist Missionary 
 Convention, 10 Paige, 85, 40 Am. Dec. 225; Jackson v. Jackson, 39 
 N. Y. 163; Franks v. Chapman, 64 Tex. 159. The same rules hold 
 true with respect to an attestation clause to a codicil: In re Crane, 
 68 App. Div. 355, 74 N. Y. Supp. 88. 
 
 So where the attestation clause of a will consisted merely of the 
 word "witness" (Osborn v. Cook, 11 Cush. 532, 59 Am. Dec. 155; 
 Chase v. Kittredge, 11 Allen, 49, 87 App. Div. 687; In re Aker's Will, 
 74 App. Div. 461, 77 N. Y. Supp. 643), or "attest" (Robinson v. 
 Brewster, 140 111. 649, 33 Am. St. Rep. 265, 30 N. E. 683), or "test" 
 (Fatheree v. Lawrence, 33 Miss. 585), written before the names of 
 the witnesses, it is sufficient. Where at the end of a will, below 
 the testator's subscription were subscribed the phrases "Written by 
 S. S. Ashton," and "Witness Anna R. Ashton," and it appeared 
 that the first witness was the draftsman of the will and w-rote the 
 words "Written by S. S. Ashton for" on the will, intending to add 
 the testatrix's name in case she was unable to write her: own, but 
 the testatrix, being able to write it, scratched out the word "for" 
 and left the remainder as a subscription and attestation of the 
 will, it is sufficient: P()lh)ck v. Glassel, 2 Gratt. 439. An attestation 
 clause in the form of a formal certificate of acknowledgment of the 
 testator's signature, the witness being one authorized to take acknowl- 
 edgments, has also been sustained: In re Hull's Will, 117 Iowa, 738,
 
 48 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 89 N. W. 979; Franks v. Chapman, 64 Tex. 159. Likewise an at- 
 testation clause stating in substance that on the date of the will the 
 testator signed, sealed and delivered it for the consideration and 
 purposes stated therein as his own proper act and deed does not in- 
 validate the attestation, as such superfluous language cannot invali- 
 date the witness' signature thereto: Murray v. Murphy, 39 Miss. 214. 
 Furthermore, the use of one clause in one form signed by two wit- 
 nesses, and of another clause in another form signed by the third, does 
 not (three witnesses being necessary) render the attestation of the 
 will insufficient: Keeley v. Moore, 196 U. S. 38, 25 Sup. Ct. 169, 49 
 L. Ed. 376, affirming 22 App. Dist. Col. 9. 
 
 But in the early case of Withinton v. Withinton, 7 Mo. 589, where 
 a paper offered as a will was in form a deed to take effect at the 
 grantor's death, and had attached to it a certificate of a notary, 
 wherein the notary acknowledged his signature and his act, and that 
 he did it for the purposes in the writing set forth, which certificate 
 was signed by the notary, the court held that the notary 's signature 
 cannot, for the purpose of sustaining the writing as a will, be con- 
 : sidered the signature of an attesting witness, since the function of a 
 witness to a will is not only to prove that the instrument was ex- 
 ecuted, but that the testator was of sound and disposing mind, while 
 here the notary certified merely to the due execution and not to the 
 mental capacity of the grantor. 
 
 Order of Execution by Testator and by Witness. — While the gen- 
 eral and regular course in the attestation of a will is for the testa- 
 tor first to execute the will on his part and then call on the wit- 
 nesses to attest the execution by subscribing their names (O'Brien v. 
 Gallagher, 25 Conn. 229), yet in some states the fact that one or more 
 of the witnesses subscribe their names before the testator signs or 
 acknowledges the will does not, where the testator afterward, as part 
 of the same transaction and in the continued presence of the wit- 
 nesses, himself signs or acknowledges it, invalidate the will: O'Brien 
 v Gallagher, 25 Conn. 229; Swift v. Wiley, 1 B. Mon. 114; Sechrest 
 V. Edwards, 4 Met. (Ky.) 163; Cutler v. Cutler, 130 N. C. 1, 89 Am. 
 St. Rep. 854, 40 S. E. 689, 57 L. R. A. 209; Rosser v. Franklin, 6 
 Gratt. 1, 52 Am. Dec. 97; Parramore v. Taylor, 11 Gratt. 220; Beane 
 V Yerby, 12 Gratt. 239. Compare, however, Chisholm's Heirs v. Ben, 
 7 B. Mon. 408. In Swift v. Wiley, 1 B. Mon. 114, the court said: 
 ' ' As all three of the subscribing witnesses were present at the final 
 publication of the will, attested the fact of signing and publishing 
 by the testator, and either then subscribed or acknowledged the sub- 
 scription of their respective names, on the same paper, so as to in- 
 sure the identification of the will as then published and attested, 
 every purpose of the statute has been fulfilled, and not even a let- 
 ter of it violated or disregarded. To resubscribe the names .... 
 would have been a superfluous and puerile act of mechanical repeti- 
 tion, not necessary for identification; because they had once sub-
 
 Estate op Fleishman. 49 
 
 scribed the same paper in the presence and at the request of the 
 testator, and which fact was recognized by him, as well as by tliem- 
 sflves, after his own name had been subscribed, and when the docu- 
 ment, thus recognized and identified, was finally and conclusively 
 published as his will; nor can we perceive any other end of either 
 utility or security that could have been promoted by again subscrib- 
 ing names already sutficientlj^ subscribed." 
 
 Moreover, in Grigg v. Williams, 51 jST. C. 518, the court held that 
 where after one of the witnesses to a will had subscribed his name 
 the testator inserted the name of an additional executor as part of 
 the same transaction, the attestation by such witness was good. 
 
 In other states, however, where one or more of the necessary wit- 
 nesses to a will subscribes it before the testator subscribes or ac- 
 knowledges the same to the witnesses, the attestation of the will is 
 iusuflficient, although the testator afterward, as part of the same 
 transaction, signs or acknowledges the will: Duffie v. Corridon, 40 Ga. 
 122, where the testator signed the next day in the presence of the 
 witness who had signed the previous day; Brooks v. Woodson, 87 
 Ga. 379, 13 S. E. 712, 14 L. E. A. 160; Chase v. Kittredge, 11 Allen, 
 49, 87 Am. Dec. 687, where one of the witness signed in the absence 
 of and before the testator, and the witness afterward acknowledged 
 his signature to the testator after the testator had signed in his 
 presence; Lacey v. Dobbs, 63 N. J. Eq. 325, 92 Am. St. Eep. 667, 
 50 Atl. 497, 55 L. E. A. 580, overruling Mundy v. Mundy, 15 N. J. 
 Eq. 290, to the contrary; Baskin v. Baskin, 36 N. Y. 416; Jackson 
 V. Jackson, 39 N. Y. 153; Sisters of Charity v. Kelly, 67 N. Y. 409; 
 In re Williams' Will, 2 Conn. Sur. 579, 15 N. Y. Supp. 828, judg- 
 ment affirmed, 64 Hun, 636, 19 N. Y. Supp. 613; Simmons v. Leon- 
 ard, 91 Tenn. 183, 30 Am. St. Eep. 875, 18 S. W. 280. See, also, 
 In re Irvine's Estate, 206 Pa. 1, 55 Atl. 795, holding that the Pennsyl- 
 vania statute of 1855 governing the execution of a will disposing of 
 property to charitable or religious uses, presupposes the existence 
 of a writing signed by the testator at the time of attestation. In 
 support of this doctrine, the court in Brooks v. Woodson, 87 Ga. 379, 
 13 S. E. 712, 14 L. E. A. 160, declared that the signature of the 
 testator is the principal, if not the only, matter to which the at- 
 testation applies, and such being the case, the attestation is insuf- 
 ficient if made a moment before the signing by the testator, as well 
 as though made a day before. "To witness a future event is equally 
 impossible, whether it occur the next moment or the next week." 
 And in Jackson v. Jackson, 39 N. Y. 153, the courts says: "Their 
 signatures do not attest the signing by the testator, if they are 
 placed there before the will is signed by him. For some period, longer 
 or shorter, as the case may be, those signatures attest no execution — 
 
 they certify what is not true Execution and the attestation 
 
 thereof bear a plain relation to each other in point of time, in the 
 good sense and common apprehension of everyone, and the statute 
 prescribing the requisite formalities to a valid execution and authen- 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. I — 4
 
 50 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 tication plainly contemplates that the acts of the witnesses shall at- 
 test the signing and declaration of the testator as a fact accom- 
 plished. ' ' 
 
 Similarly in Reed v. Watson, 27 Ind. 443, where a testator pro- 
 cured the signature of a witness to his will before he signed it, and 
 then took the will away with him and afterward attached his own 
 signature without the knowledge of such witness, the court held the 
 attestation insufficient. 
 
 In Re Phillips, 98 N. Y. 267, the court, however, held that the 
 statute of wills is complied with, if the declaration that the instru- 
 ment is a will and the acknowledgment of the testator 's signature 
 are simultaneous with the signature of the subscribing witness, espe- 
 cially if these acts are done before the witness has completed his 
 signature and all on the same occasion. 
 
 Order of Publication and Other Requisites. — It is sufficient in those 
 states where publication is essential to the validity of a will that 
 it be done as part of the transaction of witnessing the will, whether 
 before or after the signing or acknowledgment of the will by the 
 testator to the witnesses: In re Johnson's Estate, 57 Cal. 529, where 
 the publication was made immediately after a witness finished sub- 
 scribing; Jackson v. Jackson, 39 N. Y. 153, where publication was 
 made immediately before the subscription of the will by the testator; 
 In re Look's Will, 5 N. Y. Supp. 50; In re Look, 54 Hun, 635, 7 N. 
 Y. Supp. 298, judgment affirmed, 125 N. Y. 762, 27 N. E. 408, holding 
 that publication must be made at the time of subscription or ac- 
 knowledgment by the testator; In re Dale's Will, 56 Hun, 169, 9 
 N. Y. Supp. 396, affirmed without opinion, 134 N. Y. 614, 32 N. E. 
 649; In re Williams' Will, 2 Conn. Sur. 579, 15 N, Y. Supp. 828, 
 judgment affirmed, 64 Hun, 636, 19 N. Y. Supp. 613, where publica- 
 tion was made immediately before subscription by the testator; In 
 re Carll's Will, 38 Misc. Rep. 471, 77 N. Y. Supp. 1036. It is, how- 
 ever, insufficient to publish the will to one of the witnesses thereto 
 several weeks after the attestation by the witness: In re Dale's Will, 
 56 Hun, 169, 9 N. Y. Supp. 396, affirmed without opinion, 134 N. Y. 
 614, 32 N. E. 649. 
 
 Order of Request to Witnesses and Other Requisites. — The fact that 
 a testatrix requested the witnesses to her will to subscribe as such 
 before she subscribed it does not impair its validity, where they 
 did not actually subscribe until after the testatrix: In re Williams' 
 Will, 2 Conn. Sur. 579, 15 N. Y. Supp. 828, 64 Hun, 636, 19 N. Y. 
 Supp. 613. 
 
 Mode of Attestation. — ' ' The code provides no special formalities 
 about the witnesses to a will. It is sufficient if they attest and 
 subscribe the will in the presence of the testator": Huff v. Huff, 
 41 Ga. 696. The law looks to the substance of the transaction, and 
 requires only evidence that all the safeguards against improvidence
 
 Estate of Fleishman. 51 
 
 and fraud, prescribed by statute, have been substantially observed: 
 Lewis V. Lewis, UN. Y. 220, 13 Barb. 17. 
 
 Mode of Request to Witnesses and Publication. — It is proper and 
 sufficient for a testator to publish his will and to request the witnesses 
 thereto to attest, in tne same sentence, or by the same acts, or in 
 response to one question by one of the witnesses. "These acts are 
 distinct in their nature or quality, but the performance may be joint 
 or connected": Coffin v. Coffin, 23 N. Y. 9, 80 Am. Dec. 235; In re 
 Kane's Will, 20 N. Y. Supp. 123; In re Menge's Will, 13 Misc. Eep. 
 553, 35 N. Y. Supp. 493; In re Murphy's Will, 15 Misc. Eep. 208, 37 
 N. Y. Supp. 223. 
 
 The Testimony of the Attesting Witnesses, — Where a will is regu- 
 lar on its face, its due execution may ordinarily be proved by the 
 uncontroverted testimony of one of the witnesses thereto: Griffith's 
 Exr. v. Griffith, 5 B. Mon. 511; Hight v. Wilson, 1 Call. 94, ] L. Ed. 
 51; Dean v. Heirs of Dean, 27 Vt. 746. In Illinois, however, it is 
 requisite that the testimony of all the witnesses shall be taken to 
 the point that the testator was of sound mind and memory at the 
 time of the execution of the will: Allison v. Allison, 46 111. 61, 92 
 Am. Dec. 237. 
 
 Right to Put in Evidence Outside Testimony of Witnesses. — Before 
 any evidence other than the testimony of the witnesses to a will 
 may be produced to prove its due execution, all the witnesses must 
 first be examined, or else their absence accounted for and their sig- 
 natures proved: Tudor v. Tudor, 17 B. Mon. 383, relating to a codicil; 
 In re Moore's Will, 109 App. Div. 762, N. Y. Supp. 729; Alexander 
 V. Beadle, 7 Colo. 126. No controlling force, however, is to be given 
 to the testimony of the witnesses, and it is liable to be rebutted by 
 other evidence, either direct or circumstantial; yet their direct par- 
 ticipation in the transaction gives great weight to their testimony: 
 Orser v. Orser, 24 N. Y. 51; Webb v. Dye, 18 W. Va. 376. Thus 
 where the testimony of one or even all of the witnesses to a will 
 is adverse to its valid execution, it may be sustained by other evi- 
 dence adequate to show its due execution: Griffith's Exr. v. Griffith, 
 5 B. Mon. 511; Jauncey v. Thorne, 2 Barb. Ch. 40; In re Carll's Will, 
 38 Misc. Eep. 471, 77 N. Y. Supp. 1036; In re Moore's Will, 109 
 App. Div. 762, 96 N. Y. Supp. 729; Skinner v. Lewis, 40 Or. 571, 
 62 Pac. 523, 67 Pac. 951; Hight v. Wilson, 1 Dall. 94, 1 L. Ed. 51; 
 Rose V. Allen, 1 Colo. 23; Alexander v. Beadle, 7 Colo. 126; Simmons 
 V, Leonard, 91 Tenn. 183, 30 Am. St. Eep. 875, 18 S. W. 280; Dean 
 v. Heirs of Dean, 27 Vt. 746; In re Claflin 's Will, 73 Vt. 129, 87 
 Am. St. Eep. 693, 50 Atl. 815; Webb v. Dye, 18 W. Va. 376; In re 
 Meurer's Will, 44 Wis. 392, 28 Am. Eep. 591. So where a witness 
 to a will testifies that his signature thereto is not genuine, and that 
 he knew nothing of its execution, proof of his handwriting is ad- 
 missible to controvert his testimony: Jones v. Arterburn, 11 Humph, 
 97. Thus a will may be proved by other witnesses than the sub-
 
 52 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 scribing witnesses, notwithstanding one of them gives testimony that 
 the testator was unconscious at the time of attestation: Cheatham 
 V. Hatcher, 30 Gratt. 56, 32 Am. Eep. 650. Likewise where the wit- 
 nesses to a will disagree as to the material facts in its execution, 
 that fact alone is not enough to defeat the will: In re Bedell's Will, 
 2 Conn. Sur. 328, 12 N. Y. Supp. 96; In re Meurer's Will, 44 Wis. 
 392, 28 Am. Eep. 591. And where the witnesses to a will were un- 
 able to write, and their hands having been guided by the draftsman 
 of the will while writing their respective signatures, were unable to 
 identify them, and expressed the opinion on hearing the will read 
 that certain of its provisions had been changed since it was read to 
 Ihem at the time of its execution, the testimony of the draftsman 
 i)f the will is properly admitted to sustain it: Montgomery v. Perkins, 
 2 Met. (Ky.) 448, 74 Am. Dec. 419. Furthermore, where the wit- 
 nesses to a will when called as witnesses cannot remember the facts 
 respecting the execution of the will, it may nevertheless be supported 
 by other evidence, including the presumptions of law proi^erly ap- 
 plicable: Hobart v. Hobart, 154 111. 610, 45 Am. St. Eep. 151, 39 N. 
 E. 581; In re Hull's Will, 117 Iowa, 738, 89 N. W. 979; Jauncey v. 
 Thorne, 2 Barb. Ch. 40, 59; Orser v. Orser, 24 N. Y. 51; Peck v. 
 Cary, 27 N. Y. 9, 84 Am. Dec. 220, 38 Barb. 77; Eugg v. Eugg, 83 
 N. Y. 592; In re Kane's Will, 20 N. Y. Supp. 123; Skinner v. Lewis, 
 40 Or. 571, 62 Pac. 523, 67 Pac. 951. 
 
 In Illinois, however, where a petition for probate of a will is first 
 heard in a probate court, the evidence in that court is properly con- 
 fined to that of the attesting witnesses, but if the probate is there 
 denied and the matter goes to the circuit court, on the hearing in 
 the circuit court the proponent of the will is not limited to nor 
 bound by the testimony of the witnesses to the will, but may right- 
 fully resort to any relevant and competent evidence to sustain the 
 will: Gould v. Chicago Theological Seminary, 189 111. 282, 59 N. E. 
 536; Webster v. Yorty, 194 111. 408, 62 N. E. 907; In re Tobin, 196 
 111. 484, 63 N. E. 1021; In re Barry's Will, 219 111. 391, 76 N. E. 577. 
 
 Opinion of Witness as Evidence. — ' ' The opinions of subscribing wit- 
 nesses as to the condition of the testator's mind, at the time of the 
 execution of the will, may be received in evidence, when the facts 
 are stated on which such opinions are founded, though such wit- 
 nesses do not fall within the class known to the law as experts. 
 In such cases, however, the evidence on which most reliance should 
 be placed are the facts proved, rather than the opinions expressed 
 by the witnesses": Cilley v. Cilley, 34 Me. 162. Also Stirling v. 
 Stirling, 64 Md. 138, 21 Atl. 273. In Illinois such opinion must, 
 however, be taken in every case of probate: Allison v. Allison, 46 
 111. 61, 92 Am. Dec. 237. Where a witness to a will expresses an 
 opinion adverse to the testamentary capacity of the testator, that 
 fact is not necessarily fatal to the will, but as the witness prima 
 facie attests the testamentary capacity of the testator by becoming 
 a witness, his adverse testimony will be received with suspicion:
 
 Estate of Fleishman. 53 
 
 Odenwaelder v. Schorr, 8 Mo. App. 458; Mays v. Mays, 114 Mo. 536, 
 21 S. W. 921. 
 
 Declarations of Witness as Evidence. — Where the variant statements 
 of a witness to a will are put in evidence to impeach him, they can- 
 not, be used as substantive evidence of the facts stated: Stirling v. 
 Stirling, 64 Md. 138, 21 Atl. 273; In re Moore's Will, 109 App. Div. 
 762, 96 N. Y. Supp. 729; In re Claflin 's Will, 75 Vt. 19, 52 Atl. 1053, 
 58 L. E. A. 261. 
 
 The Attestation Clause as Evidence. — Where, on a proceeding where- 
 in the validity of a will is at issue, the witnesses thereto are pro- 
 duced, the attestation clause may be used as a means of refresh- 
 ing the memories of the attesting witnesses in respect to the formali- 
 ties actually observed in the execution of the will to which it is 
 attached: In re Look, 54 Hun, 635, 7 N. Y. Supp. 298, affirmed with- 
 out opinion, 125 N. Y. 762, 27 N. E. 408. Moreover, where there is a 
 dispute as to what occurred at the time of the execution of a will, 
 and the will is on its face in due form, the recitals of the attesta- 
 tion clause must be given some weight in determining the dispute: 
 In re Menge 's Will, 13 Misc. Kep. 553, 35 N. Y. Supp. 493. 
 
 Where, by reason of the failure of the memories of the subscribing 
 witness to a will, their insanity, death, or absence beyond the reach of 
 process, their testimony cannot be obtained, proof of their signatures 
 subscribed to the attestation clause renders the recitals of that clause 
 prima facie evidence of the observance in the execution of such will 
 of all the formalities set forth in such clause. It is not, however, 
 conclusive evidence of the due execution of the will, but is subject 
 t(< be rebutted by evidence showing that the actual execution was 
 insufficient: In re Hull's Will, 117 Iowa, 738, 89 N. W. 979; Mundy 
 V. Mundy, 15 N. J. Eq. 290; Tappen v. Davidson, 27 N. J. Eq. 459; 
 Allaire v. Allaire, 37 N. J. L. 312, 39 N. J. L. 113; Mandeville v. 
 Parker, 31 N. J. Eq. 242; Chaffee v. Baptist Missionary Convention, 
 10 Paige, 85, 40 Am. Dec. 225; In re Kane's Will, 20 N. Y. Supp. 
 123; In re Jones' Will, 85 N. Y. Supp. 294, holding that this pre- 
 sumption arises even though the will was of recent date; Skinner v. 
 Lewis, 40 Or. 571, 62 Pac. 523, 67 Pac. 951; Appeal of Linton, 104 
 Pa. 228; In re Claflin 's Will, 73 Vt. 129, 87 Am. St. Rep. 639, 50 
 Atl. 815; In re Meurer's Will, 44 Wis. 392, 28 Am. Rep. 591, holding 
 that want of recollection on the part of the witnesses to a will 
 would not defeat it, especially where there was a complete attestation 
 clause. Because of its effect as evidence, an attestation clause to a 
 will, comprising a statement of all that is necessary to the execution 
 of the instrument as a will, is therefore in the highest degree useful: 
 Allaire v. Allaire, 37 N. J. L. 312, 39 N. J. L. 113. For the purpose 
 of rebutting the presumption thus arising from the attestation clause, 
 oral evidence is admissible: Fleming v. Morrison, 187 Mass. 120, 105 
 Am. St. Rep. 386, 72 N. E. 499; Pollock v. Glassel, 2 Gratt. 439.
 
 54 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 In Pennsylvania it has been held that where it is shown on the 
 probate of a will that one of the witnesses thereto is dead and that 
 his signature to the will is genuine, that proof is equivalent to posi- 
 tive proof by one witness of every fact stated in the attesting clause: 
 Appeal of Linton, 104 Pa. 228. In New York, however, it has been 
 held that it is clear that the attesting clause is not equivalent to 
 the testimony of a living witness, and cannot stand as against the 
 positive testimony of a witness to the contrary. "If equivalent, it 
 should have equal weight as against conflicting testimony, a force 
 which cannot reasonably be attributed to it. The statute makes it 
 evidence; but it is evidence of a secondary and inferior nature, which 
 is received from the nature of the case": Orser v. Orser, 24 N. Y. 
 51; Lewis v. Lewis, 11 N. Y. 220, 13 Barb. 17. 
 
 Where a will has no attestation clause, or if the attestation clause 
 does not recite the performance of all the requisites to the making 
 of a valid will, and the testimony of the witnesses to the will can- 
 not be obtained, in some states the burden is on the proponent of 
 the will to show, by the circumstances of the case or other proof if 
 necessary, the observance of all the requisites to the valid execution 
 of a will or of those the performance of which is not recited in the 
 attestation clause, as the case may be: Ela v. Edwards, 16 Gray, 91; 
 Mundy v. Mundy, 15 N. J. Eq. 290; Allaire v. Allaire, 37 N. J. L. 
 312, 39 N. J. L. 113; Ludlow v. Ludlow, 36 N. J. Eq. 597; In re 
 Breining's Estate, 68 N. J. Eq. 553, 59 Atl. 561; In re Beggans' Will, 
 68 N. J. Eq. 572, 59 Atl. 874; Chaffee v. Baptist Missionary Conven- 
 tion, 10 Paige, 85, 40 Am. Dec. 225. In other states, however, where 
 a will is regular on its face, the performance of the necessary 
 requisites to its due execution will, in the absence of an attestation 
 clause, be implied from proof of the signatures of the witnesses 
 thereto: Fatheree v. Lawrence, 33 Miss. 585; Nock v. Nock's Exrs., 
 10 Gratt. 106. See, also, Webb v. Dye, 18 W. Va. 376, 388. 
 
 In the Matter of the Estate of JOHN S. DOE. 
 
 [No. 14,365; decided November 27, 1905.] 
 
 Wills — Construction as to Intestacy. — Of the two modes of inter- 
 preting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent a total 
 intestacy; but if the legal effect of the expressed intent of a tes- 
 tator is intestacy, it will be presumed that he designed that result. 
 
 Construction of Statute Adopted from Another State. — The rule 
 that a statute adopted from another state will be given the con- 
 struction placed upon it by the courts of that state prior to its 
 adoption, is not absolute, especially where there has been a single
 
 Estate of Doe. 55 
 
 decision which has since been questioned or repudiated in the for- 
 eign state. 
 
 Trusts — Construction as to Duration. — In determining the duration 
 of a trust term, the inherent character of the trust and its essential 
 limitations may form an element in the construction to be given to 
 the language creating it. 
 
 Trusts — On Whose Lives Term may be Limited. — A trust created 
 under subdivision 3 of section 857 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 
 to receive the rents and profits of real property, and apply them to 
 the use of designated beneficiaries, may be limited on lives of per- 
 sons other than the beneficiaries. 
 
 Trusts — Duration Limited by Purposes. — A trust in real property 
 to pay the rents and profits thereof to designated beneficiaries can- 
 not endure longer than the lives of the beneficiaries, where, upon 
 the assumption that they will outlive the trusts, the lives of the lat- 
 ter are made the measure of the trust. 
 
 Trusts — Whether Bare and Void. — A devise "in trust" for others 
 is not invalid as a bare trust, when it imposes on the trustee the 
 duty of paying the rents and profits of the property to the benefi- 
 ciaries. 
 
 Trusts — Effect of Partial Invalidity, — An invalid provision in a 
 Irust, which is not an integral or essential part of the trust scheme, 
 ^vill not necessarily vitiate the other provisions. 
 
 Trusts — Unlawful Accumulations. — A direction to trustees to pay 
 taxes, street assessments, and other charges and expenses incurred 
 in improvements, out of the income of the trust estate, does not pro- 
 vide for an unlawful accumulation. 
 
 Trusts — Unlawful Accumulations. — A provision in a trust for re- 
 taining the income of the estate and paying it over to the benefi- 
 ciaries annually is not void. 
 
 Wills — Devise on Termination of Trust. — A devise to the widow 
 and daughter of the testator, one-half to the daughter absolutely 
 and the other half to the widow for life with remainder to the daugh- 
 ter, is valid, regardless of the validity of a devise in trust of an 
 intermediate or precedent estate. 
 
 Wills — Creation of Vested Remainder. — The devise in this case to 
 the widow and daughter of the testator upon the "termination of 
 the trust" is held to be a devise of a vested remainder, postponed 
 in possession merely. 
 
 Trusts — Purpose and Validity. — If a testator, after making specific 
 gifts, devises the residue of his estate to trustees "for" certain 
 beneficiaries, and elsewhere in the will provides that the executors, 
 who are also named as trustees of the trust, shall pay to the per- 
 sons designated as those "for" whom the property is held, a speci- 
 fied sum per month, the payment of that sum constitutes a trust pur-
 
 56 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 pose of the trust of the residuum, and the latter is not void as a 
 naked trust. 
 
 Wills — Acceleration of Devise When Trust Invalid. — If a devise 
 is limited to take effect upon the termination of a trust and the 
 trust proves invalid, the devisees come immediately into their own. 
 
 Trusts — Liberal Interpretation of Statutes. — Provisions of the codes 
 in respect to testamentary trusts should be construed liberally. 
 
 Application for final distribution. 
 
 Garret W. McEnerney and Heller & Powers, for the sur- 
 viving executor and trustee, Bartlett Doe, and for other con- 
 tingent devisees, applicants. 
 
 The trust of specific property is not created to endure 
 for an illegal period. If the wife and daughter predecease 
 the trustees, the trust terminates on the death of the bene- 
 ficiaries : Civ. Code, sees. 871, 2279 ; Crooke v. County of 
 Kings, 97 N. Y. 421. Even if a trust were dependent upon 
 the lives of the trustees, the trust would be valid : Bailey v. 
 Bailey, 97 N. Y. 467 ; Crooke v. County of Kings, 97 N. Y. 
 421, both cases overruling Downing v. Marshall, 23 N. Y. 
 366, 377, 80 Am. Dec. 290. The construction given a stat- 
 ute at the time of its adoption from a foreign state will not 
 be followed where that construction has afterward been held 
 erroneous: Goble v. Simeral, 67 Neb. 276, 93 N. W. 236; 
 Whitney v. Fox, 166 U. S. 637, 17 Sup. Ct. 713, 41 L. Ed. 
 1145; Iron Works v. White, 31 Colo. 82, 71 Pac. 384. The 
 case is distinguishable from that of Wittfield v. Forster (124 
 Cal. 418, 57 Pac. 219), since trust purposes are here de- 
 clared. If there be directions for an unlawful accumula- 
 tion of income, this does not invalidate the trust of specific 
 property: Civ. Code. sec. 733. A provision for the annual 
 payment of income is not void as an unlawful accumula- 
 tion : Estate of Steele, 124 Cal. 533, 541, 57 Pac. 564 ; In re 
 Howell's Estate, 180 Pa. 515, 520, 37 Atl. 181; Livingstone 
 V. Tucker, 107 N. Y. 549, 552, 14 N. E. 443. Thus annuities 
 are valid under the New York law corresponding to our code 
 section: Alvord v. Sherwood, 21 i\Iisc. Rep. 354, 47 N. Y. 
 Supp. 749 ; Garvey v. Trust Co., 29 App. Div. 513, 52 X. Y. 
 Supp. 260; Nichols v. Nichols, 42 Misc. Rep. 381, 86 N. Y..
 
 Estate of Doe. 57 
 
 Supp. 719; In re Tracy, 87 App. Div. 215, 83 N. Y. Supp. 
 1049 ; Provost v. Provost, 70 N. Y. 144 ; Townshend v. From- 
 mer, 125 N. Y. 446, 26 N. E. 805; In re Foster's Estate, 37 
 Misc. Rep. 581, 75 N. Y. Supp. 1067; Stewart v. Phelps, 71 
 App. Div. 91, 75 N. Y. Supp. 526; Salisbury v. Slack, 160 
 N. Y. 278, 54 N. E. 741; Cochrane v. Schell, 140 N. Y. 516,. 
 35 N. E. 971 ; Hooker v. Hooker, 41 App. 235, 58 N. Y. Supp. 
 536; Horsfield v. Black, 40 App. Div. 264, 57 N. Y. Supp. 
 1006 ; Vernon v. Vernon, 53 N. Y. 351. The trust of specifie. 
 property is not invalid under the doctrine of Carpenter v. 
 Cook (132 Cal. 621, 84 Am. St. Rep. 118, 64 Pac. 997), as, 
 unlike that case, the trust here does not make the payment 
 of the expenses which are claimed to be accumulations a trust 
 purpose. Even if the trust of specific property were invalid, 
 the devise in remainder would be unaffected: Civ. Code, sees. 
 741, 742, 767. The estate of the mother and daughter in the 
 property covered by the specific trust is a vested and not 
 a contingent remainder: Civ. Code, sees. 689, 690, 693-695. 
 Even if the trust of the specific property Avere void, the 
 remainder of mother and daughter would be accelerated 
 merely and not defeated: Underbill on Wills, sec. 878; 24 
 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., 418 ; Hamlin v. Mans- 
 field, 88 Me. 131, 137, 138, 33 Atl. 788; Marvin v. Ledwith, 
 111 111. 151; Fox V. Rumery, 68 Me. 121; Jull v. Jacobs, 
 L. R. 3 Ch. D. 703, 710; Everett v. Croskey, 92 Iowa, 333, 
 335, 336, 60 N. W. 732; Key v. Weathersbee, 43 S. C. 414, 
 49 Am. St. Rep. 846, 21 S. E. 324; Norris v. Beyea. 13 N. 
 Y. 273. Even if the doctrine of acceleration were not ap- 
 plicable, and if the trust of specific property were void, the 
 estate devised would fall into the trust of the residuum : 
 Civ. Code, sec. 1332; Estate of Upham, 127 Cal. 90, 92. 59 
 Pac. 315; Matter of Benson, 96 N. Y. 499, 509, 48 Am. Rep. 
 646. If the doctrine of acceleration were not applicable, and 
 the trusts, both of the specific property and of the residuum, 
 were invalid, the testator would be held merely to have died 
 intestate as to the intermediate estate, but not as to the es- 
 tate in remainder to the mother and daughter. 
 
 The trust of the residuum is valid. The payment of one 
 thousand dollars per month provided for in the eiglith para-
 
 58 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 graph of the codicil gives the trust an active purpose: Teel 
 V. Hilton, 21 R. I. 227, 42 Atl. 1111; Matter of Dewey, 153 
 N. Y. 63, 46 N. E. 1039; In re Schneider, 71 Hun, 62, 24 
 N. y. Supp. 540 ; United States Trust Co. v. Maresi, 33 Misc. 
 Rep. 539, 68 N. Y. Supp. 918. The trust is valid and covers 
 all of the property, even though the estate covered by it 
 be more than sufficient to pay the thousand dollars per 
 month: Estate of Pichoir, 139 Cal. 682, 688, 73 Pac. 606; 
 Cochrane v. Schell, 140 N. Y. 516, 35 N. E. 971. Even if 
 the trust of the residuum were invalid, the testator did not 
 die intestate as to the property embraced within it. Either 
 the remainders to mother and daughter would be acceler- 
 ated, or the testator would die intestate as to the interme- 
 diate estate only, which intermediate estate terminates upon 
 the arrival of the daughter at the age of eighteen years. 
 
 Charles S. Wheeler and J. F. Bowie, for Eleanor H. Stet- 
 son, respondent and counter-applicant. 
 
 In construing the will the court must arrive at the inten- 
 tion of the testator without reference to the validity of such 
 intention. The rule that testacy is preferred to intestacy 
 has reference only to cases of ambiguity: Civ. Code, sees. 
 1317, 1318, 1326; Estate of Young, 123 Cal. 343, 55 Pac. 
 1011; Cunliffe v. Brancker, L. R. 3 Ch. D. 399; Speakman 
 V. Speakman, 8 Hare, 185; Schouler, on Wills, sec. 470; 3 
 Jarman on Wills, 5th Am. ed., 706; Gray's Rule Against 
 Perpetuities, sec. 629. The direction for payment of the 
 income annually by the trustees to the executors is not a 
 trust purpose, but a mere power: Estate of Sanford, 136 
 Cal. 97, 68 Pac. 494. That the testator misapprehended the 
 legal effect of his language is immaterial: Estate of Young, 
 123 Cal. 343, 55 Pac. 1011 ; Estate of Walkerly, 108 Cal. 627, 
 49 Am. St. Rep. 97, 41 Pac. 772 ; Estate of Fair, 132 Cal. 
 546. 84 Am. St. Rep. 70. 60 Pac. 442, 64 Pac. 1000; Hunter 
 V. Attorney General, [1899] App. Cas. The direction for 
 the payment of one thousand dollars does not furnish a 
 trust purpose for the attempted trust of the residuum: Civ. 
 Code, sec. 1322. One of the purposes of the trust of the 
 specifically devised property being void, as providing for
 
 Estate of Doe. 59 
 
 an unlawful accumulation, the entire trust is void: Estate 
 of Fair, 132 Cal. 523, 540, 541, 84 Am. St. Rep. 70, 60 Pac. 
 442, 64 Pac. 1000; Estate of Dixon, 143 Cal. 511, 77 Pac. 
 412; Estate of Sanford, 136 Cal. 97, 68 Pac. 494. The trust 
 to' pay rents and profits to the executors, to be paid to the 
 beneficiaries, is not valid under subdivision 3 of section 857 
 of the Civil Code: "Field Code" of New York, sec. 285, subd. 
 3, and annotations. A trust under this section and subdi- 
 vision must be made dependent on the lives of the benefi- 
 ciaries : Downing v. Marshall, 23 N. Y. 366, 80 Am. Dec. 290. 
 In adopting the statute from New York, we adopted the con- 
 struction which Downing v. Marshall, supra, placed upon 
 it: Henrietta Min. Co. v. Gardner, 173 U. S. 123, 19 Sup. 
 Ct. 327, 43 L. Ed. 637 ; Sanger v. Flow, 48 Fed. 152 ; Coul- 
 ter V. Stafford, 48 Fed. 266, 270 ; Tucker v. Oxley, 5 Cranch, 
 34, 42, 3 L. Ed. 1018; Culam v. Doull, 133 U. S. 216, 10 
 Sup. Ct. 253, 33 L. Ed. 596; Kennedy's Heirs v. Kennedy's 
 Heirs, 2 Ala. 571; Armstrong's Ex. v. Armstrong's Heirs, 
 
 29 Ala. 538; Bailey's Heirs v. Bailey's Ex., 35 Ala. 687; 
 Tyler v. Tyler, 19 111. 151; Duval v. Hunt, 34 Fla. 85, 15 
 South. 876; Freese v. Trip, 70 111. 496; Bemis v. Becker, 1 
 Kan. 86 ; Commonwealth v. Hartnett, 69 Mass. 450 : State v. 
 Macon Co., 41 IMo. 453; Coffield v. State, 44 Neb. 417, 62 
 N. W. 875; Everding v. McGinn,' 23 Or. 15, 35 Pac. 178; 
 Pomeroy v. Pomeroy, 93 Wis. 262, 67 N. W. 430. The cases 
 of Crooke v. County of Kings, 97 N. Y. 421, and Bailey v. 
 Bailey 97 N. Y. 460, are not here applicable or competent 
 to change the construction placed upon the statute in Down- 
 ing V. Marshall: Stutsman Co. v. Wallace, 142 U. S. 293, 
 12^Sup. Ct. 227, 35 L. Ed. 1018 ; Myers v. McGavock, 39 Neb. 
 843, 42 Am. St. Rep. 627, 58 N. W. 522. The trust created 
 by the second paragraph of the codicil provides for unlaw- 
 ful accumulations in directing payment of (1) mortgages 
 (Hascall v. King, 162 N. Y. 134, 143, 76 Am. St. Rep. 302, 
 56 N. E. 515) ; (2) charges on the property (Hascall v. King, 
 162 N. Y. 134, 76 Am. St. Rep. 302, 56 N. E. 515; Matter 
 of Hoyt, 71 Hun, 13, 24 N. Y. Supp. 577; Wells v. Wells, 
 
 30 Abb. N. C. 225, 24 N. Y. Supp. 874 ; In re Fishor, 4 :\Iise. 
 Rep. 46, 25 N. Y. Supp. 79) ; (3) street assessments (Mat-
 
 60 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 ter of Rogers, supra ; Hascall v. King-, supra ; Norwood v. 
 Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 19 Sup. Ct. 187, 43 L. Ed. 443 ; Peck 
 V. Sherwood, 56 N. Y. 615 ; Thomas v. Evans, 105 N. Y. 601, 
 612, 59 Am. Rep. 519, 12 N. E. 571; Cromwell v. Kirk, 1 
 Dem. 599, 603; Stilwell v. Doughty, 2 Bradf. 311, 317) ; (4) 
 expenses incurred in making improvements on the property 
 (Drake v. Trafusio, L. R. 10 Ch. App. 364, 366; Stevens v. 
 Melcher, 80 Hun, 514, 525, 30 N. Y. Supp. 625). The trust 
 being created to pay over only such rents and profits as may 
 remain after the paymeiit of these items which amount to 
 accumulations, the trust is void : Carpenter v. Cook, 132 Cal. 
 625, 81 Am. St. Rep. 118, 64 Pac. 997; Limbrey v. Gurr, 6 
 Madd. 151. Section 733 of the Civil Code does not save the 
 trust. 
 
 The trust of the residuum is a trust to distribute, and 
 therefore void : Estate of Fair, 132 Cal. 523, 84 Am. St. Rep. 
 70, 60 Pac. 442, 64 Pac. 1000 ; Hofsas v. Cummings, 141 Cal. 
 25, 75 Pac. 110. A trust cannot be created to hold property, 
 receive the rents and profits, and pay them over as annuities. 
 The only trust in real property for the payment of annuities 
 permissible in this state is that provided by subdivision 2 of 
 section 857 of the Civil Code, which is not a trust to "hold," 
 but a trust to lease, which involves an alienation and not a 
 holding: Hascall v. King, 162 N. Y. 149, 76 Am. St. Rep. 
 302, 56 N. E. 515; Hawley v. James, 16 Wend. 62. The de- 
 vise in remainder after the expiration of the trust of the 
 specific property falls with the invalidity of the trust : ]\Ioney- 
 penny v. Dering, 2 De Gex, M. & G. 180; Cowen v. Rinaldo, 
 82 Hun, 479, 31 N. Y. Supp. 554; Carpenter v. Cook, 132 
 Cal. 621, 84 Am. St. Rep. 118, 64 Pac. 997. 
 
 COFFEY, J. John S. Doe died January 21, 1894, leav- 
 ing a widow and child, two brothers, two sisters, several 
 nephews and nieces, and other collateral kindred. He had 
 made a will, dated January 26, 1892, and a codicil dated No- 
 vember 21, 1893, which were admitted to probate February 
 9, 1894. The entire estate was the separate property of de- 
 cedent, and was appraised in 1894 at $1,383,184, and in the 
 final account set down at $1,954,317.
 
 Estate op Doe. 61 
 
 The executors named in the will, his brothers, Bartlett 
 Doe and Charles F. Doe, immediately qualified and acted 
 jointly until January 16, 1904, when Charles died, and there- 
 after Bartlett acted alone until March 16, 1905, when he filed 
 his 'final account and petition for final distribution to the 
 persons entitled thereto. 
 
 To this petition the former widow, now remarried, made 
 response, claiming that decedent died intestate as to all the 
 property which he owned except what was disposed of by the 
 second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth 
 and eleventh paragraphs of his will, and she asked, therefore, 
 that there be distributed to her in fee simple absolute one- 
 half of all his estate not included in the clauses enumerated. 
 
 The codicil confirms the will down to the twelfth para- 
 graph, which it revokes, substituting therefor other provi- 
 sions. 
 
 The paragraphs necessary to consider are here inserted. 
 
 The will contained the following provisions : 
 
 "Twelfth — The rest and residue of my estate, real, per- 
 sonal and mixed, of every nature and kind whatsoever of 
 which I may die seized or possessed, I give, devise and be- 
 queath to my brothers Bartlett Doe and Charles F. Doe, 
 hereinafter named as the Executors of this my last Will, in 
 trust nevertheless, to be held by them until my daughter 
 ^lary Marguerite now One year old, shall have reached the 
 age of Eighteen years, when the same shall be distributed 
 as follows, to-wit: 
 
 *'To my said daughter, Mary Marguerite one-half thereof, 
 and to my wife Eleanor Doe, the other half for her life, 
 with remainder to my said daughter ]\Iary INIarguerite. 
 Should my said wife Eleanor die before my daughter arrives 
 at the age of Eighteen years, then the interest hereby devised 
 and bequeathed to my said wife, to go to my said daughter. 
 
 "Thirteenth. — Should my said daughter ^lary ^Marguerite 
 die before she arrives at the age of p]ighteen years then the in- 
 terest hereby devised to my said brothers Bartlett and Charles 
 F. Doe, in trust for my said daughter, to go to my heirs, who 
 may be living at the time of her death, and to be by my said
 
 62 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 brothers distributed to my said heirs, according to the Stat- 
 utes in such cases made and provided. 
 
 "Fourteenth.— I hereby nominate and appoint my broth- 
 ers Bartlett Doe and Charles F. Doe, the Executors of this 
 my last Will, hereby expressly waiving the giving of any 
 bond or bonds, for the discharge of their duties as such 
 Executors. 
 
 "Fifteenth — I give and grant to my said Executors and 
 Trustees full power and authority to sell and convey all or 
 any part or portion of my said ."'^^^state, as in their judgment 
 they shall think best, and to re-in /est the proceeds from time 
 to time to the best interest of those concerned. 
 
 "And I hereby direct my said Executors to pay over to my 
 said wife monthly, until my said daughter arrives at the age 
 of Eighteen years, the sum of One Thousand Dollars for the 
 following purpose, to-wit : Five Hundred Dollars for the sup- 
 port of my said wife, and Five Hundred Dollars for the sup- 
 port and maintenance of my said daughter." 
 
 In the codicil to the will it is provided : 
 
 "First — I hereby re-publish and affirm all that is contained 
 in said Will down to the ]2th paragraph thereof, and I 
 hereby revoke and annul all the rest and remainder thereof, 
 to-wit: all that is contained in said Will beginning with said 
 12th paragraph and down to the end thereof, and in lieu 
 of the said part and portion so annulled and revoked do 
 make, publish and declare this Codicil to my said Will in 
 manner following: 
 
 "Second — I give and devise to my brothers Bartlett Doe 
 and Charles F. Doe hereinafter named as the Executors of 
 this my last Will and Testament all my right, title and inter- 
 est in and to all the certain lots, pieces and parcels of land 
 situate, lying and being in the City and County of San 
 Francisco State of California, and described as follows: 
 
 [Here follow the descriptions of a number of pieces of 
 improved and unimproved real property in San Francisco.] 
 
 "In trust nevertheless for my wife Eleanor Doe and my 
 daughter INIary Marguerite Doe. Said trust to continue dur- 
 ing the life time of my said trustees, and upon the death of
 
 Estate op Doe. 63 
 
 either of said trustees the trust to conJ;inue and to be carried 
 out and into effect by the survivor, and to terminate only 
 on his death. 
 
 "Giving' and granting unto my said trustees and to the 
 survivor upon the death of either of them full power and 
 authority to take possession of, improve, mortgage and con- 
 vey my said interest in the said pieces and parcels of land or 
 either of them as they may deem most beneficial to the inter- 
 est of all concerned, and to invest and reinvest the proceeds 
 received from the sale of the same from time to time as in 
 their judgment shall be for the best interest of the benefi- 
 ciaries under this trust, and annually to pay over and deliver 
 to the Executors of this my last Will, the rents, issues and 
 profits thereof that may remain after paying all taxes, street 
 assessments and other charges upon the same, and costs and 
 expenses incurred in making improvements thereon, which 
 rents, issues and profits my said Executors are hereby re- 
 quired and directed to pay over as they may be received to 
 my said wife Eleanor Doe and my said daughter Mary Mar- 
 guerite Doe. 
 
 "And upon the death of the survivor or last of my said 
 trustees and the termination of the trust thereby created, I 
 give, devise and bequeath to my said wife Eleanor and to 
 my said daughter Mary Marguerite all my right, title and 
 interest in and to said pieces and parcels of property herein- 
 before described, and such portion of the rents, issues and 
 profits thereof as may remain in the hands of my said trus- 
 tees, or the survivor of them undisposed of at the termination 
 of this trust, and also my right, title and interest in and to 
 any and all other pieces and parcels of property that my said 
 trustees may purchase and acquire from the proceeds of the 
 sale of any part or portion of said real estate that they may 
 sell during the continuance of this trust, it being my will, 
 wish and purpose that on the death of the last of my said trus- 
 tees and the termination of said trust that all my right, title 
 and interest in said trust estate shall be paid over and deliv- 
 ered to my said wife Eleanor and my said daughter Mary Mar- 
 guerite, provided, however, that the interest hereby devised 
 to my said wife Eleanor to be for and continue during
 
 564 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 her lifetime, and upon her death to go to my said daughter 
 Mary Marguerite. 
 
 "Third — The rest and residue of my estate, real, personal 
 and mixed of every nature and kind whatsoever of which I 
 may die seized or possessed, I give, devise and bequeath to my 
 brothers Bartlett Doe and Charles F. Doe, hereinafter named 
 as the Executors of this my last Will, in trust nevertheless 
 to be held by them until my daughter Mary Marguerite shall 
 have reached the age of Eighteen years, when the same shall 
 be distributed as follows, to-wit: 
 
 "To my said daughter Mary Marguerite one-half thereof 
 and to my wife Eleanor Doe the other half for her life with 
 remainder to my said daughter Mary Marguerite. Should 
 my said wife Eleanor die before my daughter arrives of the 
 age of Eighteen years then the interest hereby devised and 
 bequeathed to my said wife to go to my said daughter. 
 
 "Fourth — Should my said daughter Mary Marguerite die 
 before she arrives at the age of Eighteen years, then the 
 •interest hereby devised to my said brothers Bartlett and 
 Charles F. Doe in trust for my said daughter to go to my 
 heirs, who may be living at the time of her death, and to be 
 by my said brothers distributed to my said heirs according 
 to the statutes in such cases made and provided. 
 
 "Fifth — My said brothers Bartlett Doe and Charles F. Doe 
 are interested in said pieces and parcels of land mentioned 
 and referred to in paragraph 2 hereof, and are owners thereof 
 with me as tenants in common, our interests therein being in 
 common and undivided, and it being the wish, purpose and 
 intent of the several owners of said pieces and parcels of 
 land to keep our interests therein intact and undivided during 
 the lifetime of all and each of us, I have made the provision 
 herein contained to accomplish that purpose, and my said 
 brothers being like-minded have made their Wills with like 
 provisions to effectuate the said object. Said Wills having 
 been made upon a mutual understanding between us to the 
 above effect. 
 
 "Sixth — I hereby nominate and appoint my said brothers 
 Bartlett Doe and Charles F. Doe, the Executors of this, my 
 last Will and Testament without bonds, hereby waiving the
 
 Estate of Doe. 65 
 
 giving of any bond or other undertaking for the faithful dis- 
 charge of their duties under this Will and as Executors and 
 Trustees hereunder. 
 
 "Eighth — I hereby direct my said Executors to pay over 
 to n>y said wife monthly until my said daughter arrives at 
 the age of Eighteen years, the sum of One thousand Dollars 
 for the following purpose, to-wit: Five hundred Dollars for 
 the support of my said wife, and Five hundred Dollars for 
 the support and maintenance of my said daughter." 
 
 The purpose of testator is patent. Whether or not he has 
 legally accomplished that purpose, is the question. For ten 
 years the trust remained unassailed, but now it is challenged 
 as invalid because it is contrary to the code, as (1) the term 
 is not properly constituted, (2) the devise to the trustees 
 "for" the widow and daughter is void, (3) the direction to 
 the trustees to pay taxes, street assessments and other charges 
 oat of the income is a direction for an unlawful accumula- 
 tion, (4) the gift of income annually is a gift of an unlaw- 
 fully accumulated fund and is void, (5) the direction to the 
 trustees to pay over the residue of the income after deducting 
 moneys expended for purposes shown to be unlawful is void, 
 (6) if the mode in which the testator has framed his gift 
 fails for illegality, the court cannot provide a valid mode 
 in order to effectuate his intent; (7) the trust to pay the 
 residue of the income to the executor, followed by the direc- 
 tion to the executor to pay it to the widow and daughter, is 
 void; (8) the subsequent limitations of the trust property 
 fall with the illegal trust, for where valid and invalid pro- 
 visions are so blended that it is impossible to separate them 
 and give effect to the one without doing violence to the in- 
 tention of the trustor, the whole trust must fall; (9) there is 
 no devise over of the trust property in the event of the 
 failure of the trust; (10) the gift is contingent "upon the 
 termination of the trust"; the court cannot transmute it into 
 a vested remainder; (11) the intended mode of passing the 
 property has failed for illegality, and the court cannot sup- 
 ply a valid mode; (12) the property embraced in the void 
 trust does not pass under the third paragraph of the codicil ; 
 (13) the trust which the testator has attempted to create in 
 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. I — 5
 
 Q6 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 the third and fourth paragraphs to the codicil is void (14) 
 the trust to distribute is unauthorized by section 857, Civil 
 Code. 
 
 We are reminded in undertaking to construe this instru- 
 ment of the duty of the court to disregard the design of the 
 testator unless it comports with the rules of law. The func- 
 tion of the court is to determine the intention of the testator 
 and then to apply the canons of construction, and not to con- 
 stitute a valid for an invalid devise. We are told that the 
 best method to be pursued in such case is that in Cunliffe v. 
 Brancker (L. R. 3 Ch. D. 899), where Sir Geo. Jessel said: 
 
 "All we have to do is to construe the instrument fairly, 
 find out what it means, and then to apply the established 
 rules of law to the instrument, and see what the effect will 
 be. 
 
 "How far judges may be, or ought to be, able to defeat a 
 rule of law of which they disapprove I cannot say. It is 
 the duty of a judge not to allow himself to be so influenced, 
 but to construe the instrument in a proper way, to arrive at 
 its meaning independently of the results, and then apply the 
 law. This has been laid down over and over again with re- 
 gard to another rule of law — the rule against remoteness or 
 perpetuity — but I do not see that, because in the opinion of 
 the judge the one rule of lav/ is reasonable and the other un- 
 reasonable, the rules of construction are to be altered." 
 
 Of two modes of interpreting a will, says the code, that is 
 to be preferred which will prevent a total intestacy; but the 
 supreme court has said that if the legal effect of the expressed 
 intent of testator is intestacy, it will be presumed that he de- 
 signed that result. If a fair interpretation of the will results 
 in total or partial intestacy because of rules prohibiting the 
 devises attempted, the court may not alter the construction to 
 avoid or evade that consequence. 
 
 The first point made by respondent is that the trust is 
 necessarily void for the reason that its term is not properly 
 constituted, as the trust attempted to be created is measured 
 by the lives of two persons — the two trustees — and by the life 
 of the survivor of them, and neither of said persons had any 
 beneficial interest in the trust whatever. It was not to cease-
 
 Estate of Doe. 67 
 
 with the death of the widow or the daughter, but was in- 
 tended to continue during the lives of the trustees, whether 
 the daughter should die or whether the widow should die, 
 or whether they both should die during the lifetime of these 
 trustees. Upon this point it is argued that the meaning of 
 the testator is manifest. The authorit}^ for this proposition 
 is Downing v. Marshall, 23 N. Y. 377, but it seems that that 
 decision has been discredited in later eases and declared dic- 
 tum. At the time, however, that the California codifiers cop- 
 ied from the New York law the present code provision, that 
 case was supposed to be sound, and, it is asserted, should be re- 
 ceived as controlling in this court, for it is a general canon 
 of construction that if statute adopted from another state 
 had been construed by the courts of that state prior to its 
 adoption here, the same construction should be given ordin- 
 arily in this state, but this rule has not always been followed, 
 and has been modified in cases, as, for example, where the 
 courts of the state from which the statute had been taken 
 have since altered their opinion as to its construction. The 
 rule is not an absolute one, especially where there is but a 
 single decision, and that subsequently discarded as authority 
 in the same state. When, therefore, it is argued that at the 
 time we took our statute of uses and trusts from New York, 
 we accepted the construction given in Downing v. Marshal, 
 the answer is acute that, as the appellate tribunal of that 
 state has renounced that case as authority, it has no force 
 here, and it being the sole support of respondent on this 
 point, his contention is without basis. 
 
 It is not the wish of this court to lengthen its opinion by 
 extracts from cases, but, so far as petitioner relies upon 
 Downing v. IMarshal. it would seem that the views of that 
 case cannot govern here: Crooke v. County of Kings, 97 N. 
 Y. 421 ; Bailey v. Bailey, 97 N. Y. 467. 
 
 These cases are substantially identical, and in the latter 
 one, as counsel for respondent says on page 63 of brief, the 
 judge writing the opinion saw fit "to criticise in a liostile 
 manner the decision of Downing v. ^Marshall and implies that 
 the opinion in that case relating to the lives measuring the 
 trust was dictum."
 
 68 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 It is worth while, perhaps, to make this criticism clear in 
 connectiou with the case at bar, to quote from the opinion, 
 which was concurred in by all the judges: 
 
 "We do not concur in the view expressed by the learned 
 judge (in Downing v. Marshall) as to the construction of the 
 statute cited, and upon a careful examination of the same 
 we are of the opinion that the limitation provided is a limi- 
 tation of time and not a personal one. We think that a cor- 
 rect interpretation of the same authorizes the naming of the 
 lives of strangers as well as beneficiaries as the limitation of 
 the devise. No reason exists why the lives named in a devise 
 of this character should be confined to those who are inter- 
 ested in the estate, and it was the evident purpose of the 
 statutes to confer upon the testator the power to fix such lives 
 as he chose to designate within its terms. This is very mani- 
 fest upon examination of the various provisions relating to 
 the subject. Under the statute relating to uses and trusts, 
 an express trust may be created 'to receive the rents and 
 profits of land and apply them to the use of any person 
 during the life of such person or for a shorter term, subject 
 to the rules prescribed in the first article of this title ' : 1 
 Rev. Stats. 728, sec. 55, subd. 3. Among the rules referred 
 to is that contained in a previous provision of the statute. 
 (1 Rev. Stats. 723, see. 15) which declares that 'the absolute 
 power of alienation shall not be suspended by any limitation 
 or condition whatever for a longer period than during the 
 continuance of two lives in being at the creation of the estate. ' 
 These two statutes must be considered and read in connection 
 with each other in giving an interpretation to their meaning. 
 The first (section 55) provides for a trust for the use of 
 a person during the life of such person or a less period, and 
 the second (section 15) limits the time during which the trust 
 may be held. In the former nothing is said about benefi- 
 ciaries, and, standing alone, it is not apparent that the limi- 
 tation is confined to their lives. The latter section alone con- 
 tains the limitation, and it is not restricted to any class of 
 lives and embraces any lives upon which the trust created is 
 limited. To bring a case within the rule provided for, it is 
 not required, we think, that the lives during which the power
 
 Estate of Doe. 69 
 
 of alienation is suspended should be those of beneficiaries, 
 and if the estate may be alienated absolutely at the expiration 
 of any two lives in being at the time of its creation, the pro- 
 vision is complied with. To illustrate : if a trust is created 
 to receive rents and profits and apply them to the use of four 
 joint lives, upon the death of either, then to the use of the 
 survivors and so on until the death of the last survivor, the 
 trust in the ease of each beneficiary is simply during his life, 
 or for a shorter period — that is, as to the share to which he 
 is entitled at the outset it is during his life. If he survives 
 either of the other beneficiaries, then he has an additional 
 portion during the remainder of his life. But the trust 
 would be void as it would suspend the power of alienation 
 for more than two lives. If, however, a condition be added 
 to the trust that in any event it shall terminate upon the death 
 of tvvo persons who are strangers to the trust, then the rule 
 referred to is complied with. In that case in no event can 
 the power of alienation be suspended beyond these two speci- 
 fied lives. Upon the death of the survivor of the two 
 strangers named, although all the beneficiaries be living, the 
 trust estate terminates. The trust, then, while it can only 
 exist during the lives of the two strangers, is also for the life 
 of each beneficiary subject to be terminated by the death of 
 the lives named during his or her life. Its continuance is not 
 dependent upon the lives of the beneficiaries, but upon the 
 lives of strangers. When they are ended, the two lives named 
 have passed away and the limitation ceases. The fact that a 
 number of persons are to be benefited under the trust during 
 the lives of the strangers named does not create a trust 
 beyond two lives in being contrary to the statute. It follows 
 that the limitation contained in the sixth clause of the tes- 
 tator's will was not a violation of the statute, and that the 
 provisions therein were valid, and the same should be upheld. 
 "Since the foregoing was written, the cases of Crooke v. 
 County of Kings and Crooke v. Prince, which were first 
 argued before this court in the month of June, 1883. have 
 been heard upon a reargument. These cases involved the con- 
 struction of the provisions of a will where a trust was created 
 which depended upon the life of a stranger named therein.
 
 70 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 No question was made on the argument that the provision 
 referred to was invalid upon the ground that the trust 
 created depended upon the life of a person who M^as not a 
 beneficiary, and a reargument was ordered upon another and 
 a different question. Upon the last argument, however, the 
 ciuestion now considered, which was previously overlooked, 
 was fully presented and the court arrived at the conclusion 
 that a trust, of the character referred to, was valid, and not 
 in violation of the statute. The subject is fully considered 
 in the opinion of the court by Finch, J., and it disposes of the 
 question presented in the case at bar. As that authority is 
 directly in point, it is decisive in this case": Bailey v. Bailey, 
 97 N. Y. 467. 
 
 Counsel for respondent rel}^ absolutely upon Downing v. 
 Marshall, and quote this passage to ilkistrate this point: 
 
 ' ' But, although trusts to receive and apply rents and profit^i 
 ma.y be created under the statute of uses and trusts,, the one 
 in question is not constituted in the manner which that stat- 
 ute prescribes. The application of rents and profits must 
 be 'to the use of any person during the life of such person, 
 or for any shorter term': 1 Rev. Stats., p. 728, sec. 55, subd. 
 3. The trust must, therefore, be made dependent on the life 
 of the beneficiary. In this case the beneficiaries are asso- 
 ciations, incorporated or unincorporated; while the lives on 
 which the trust depends are those of two natural persons 
 having no interest in its performance. Such a limitation is 
 plainly unsupported by any construction which we can give 
 to the language of the statute": Downing v. Marshall, 23 N. 
 Y. 377, 80 Am. Dec. 290. 
 
 Counsel contend that section 857, subdivision 3, of the 
 California Civil Code is even more explicit in this connection 
 than is the section of the New York Revised Statutes cited 
 in the foregoing extract. Subdivision 3 of section 857 of 
 our code is identical with subdivision 3 of section 285 of the 
 proposed Civil Code of New York, the so-called "Field 
 Code," printed 1865, which had been revised in view of 
 Downing v. Marshall, and counsel insist that thereby our code 
 must be construed in the light of that decision; but we have 
 seen that this rule is not uniform, and that our code provision,
 
 Estate of Doe. 71 
 
 though taken from New York, receiving there the construc- 
 tion claimed before its adoption here, such decision does not 
 necessarily control; it may be persuasive, but not conclusive. 
 Depending upon that decision, respondent asserts that the 
 trust here is void, for it does not rest on the lives of the bene- 
 ■ ficiaries ; the widow and daughter may both die ; the executors, 
 to whom the payment of income is to be made in the first 
 instance, may change from time to time and die, but the trust 
 is to terminate only upon the death of the surviving trustee; 
 but this view does not accord with the accredited authorities 
 cited, which declare that the inherent character of the trust 
 and its essential limitations may form an element in the con- 
 struction to be given to the language creating it. As said 
 in Crooke v. County of Kings, "that character and those 
 limitations are such that the trust cannot exceed in duration 
 the lives of the beneficiaries, because upon their death its 
 purpose is accomplished, and a trust supposes a beneficiary, 
 and so its very creation implies necessarily, without express 
 words, a termination at such period. If, then, in creating 
 the trust, one or two lives of persons not beneficiaries are 
 designated as its measure of duration, it follows that such 
 designation can never be intended to lengthen the trust 
 lieyond its possibility of existence, and that the language 
 which confines its benefits to persons who are or may be living, 
 sufficiently indicates an intention to end it at their deaths, 
 unless it is earlier terminated by the close of the selected life, 
 or lives. And when, in the present case, the vesting of the 
 fee was fixed at the death of the trustee, the close of the 
 selected life, that must be read and construed in connection 
 with the other necessary limit indicated by the language 
 declaring the purpose of the trust, and held to mean that the 
 vesting is to take place at the end of the designated life, or 
 at the period less than that marked by the earlier death of 
 all the beneficiaries. We are not to gather, from the language 
 of the will, the absurd and destructive intention to continue 
 a trust beyond the limit implied by its own nature and in- 
 herent character, unless compelled to it by the language which 
 will admit of no other interpretation."
 
 72 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 The language of the trust does not necessarily bear the 
 meaning attributed to it by respondent. We should not de- 
 stroy the trust, unless there is no other recourse in interpret- 
 ing the words of testator. If the words of this will can be 
 construed to preserve its purpose, the court should not be 
 swift to subvert it. 
 
 The intention of the testator w^as not to create a trust to 
 continue beyond the life of his wife and child. Such a con- 
 struction does not seem to this court reasonable. The as- 
 sumption appears to have been that they would survive the 
 trustees. Certainly the duration of the trust cannot be as- 
 sumed to be beyond the lives of the beneficiaries, for it w^as 
 possible that they might predecease the trustees, in which 
 case the trust would terminate. 
 
 Upon this point, the court cannot sustain the contention 
 of respondent. 
 
 What was the object of this trust? To pay over the rents 
 and profits to the surviving wife and daughter. When they 
 die, it ceases, because the object is accomplished. When the 
 purpose for which an express trust was created ceases, the 
 estate of the trustee also ceases: Civ. Code, sec. 871. The 
 measure of the estate of the trustees is the necessity of the 
 trust, and in making the provision for the payment of the 
 income it is certain that only the mother and daughter were 
 intended as recipients, and, therefore, the trust term could 
 not extend beyond their existence. 
 
 Is the devise of the trustees "for" the widow and daugh- 
 ter void? Respondent relies upon the case of Wittfield v. 
 Forster 124 Cal. 418, 57 Pac. 219, but after a careful reading 
 of that case this court fails to see its application. The syl- 
 labus shows with sufficient clearness that the case cited is 
 not analogous to the one at bar. "A conveyance of all the 
 real and personal property of the grantor to a trustee in 
 trust for an unincorporated association named, to have and 
 to hold to the trustee named, 'his successors and assigns, 
 forever,' without further specification as to the purpose of 
 the trust, or as to the duration of the estate, or as to the 
 nature and quantity of interest of the beneficiaries, or as 
 to the manner in which the trust is to be performed does not 
 create a valid trust as to the real property, within any of
 
 Estate of Doe. 73" 
 
 the provisions of section 857 of the Civil Code, and under 
 section 2221 of that code, the whole trust, both as to the 
 real and personal property, is void for uncertainty." In 
 the case here there seems to be a substantial difference. In 
 that case there was a devise "in trust for" another. There 
 were no trust purposes specified and no other duties imposed 
 upon the trustee. It was a bare trust for another. In this 
 case, while the language is "in trust for" others, the trust 
 purposes are specified and trust duties are imposed. 
 
 Is the direction to the trustees to pay taxes, street assess- 
 ments and other charges, and expenses incurred in improve- 
 ments out of the income a direction for an unlawful accumu- 
 lation? This point has been presented with fullness and 
 force by counsel for respondent, who, while admitting that, 
 generally speaking, it is undoubtedly the rule that a direc- 
 tion for an invalid accumulation is void only pro tanto, and 
 passes -over the income to the owners of the next eventual 
 estate, insist that the peculiar effect of the void provision 
 here is to render void the entire instrument. Great stress 
 is laid upon this provision, and it is argued that assuming 
 the power to be susceptible of being construed as a trust pur- 
 pose, the trust is annually to pay over and deliver to the ex- 
 ecutors the rents, issues and profits of the trust propert}' 
 that may remain after paying all taxes, street assessments 
 or other charges upon the same and expenses incurred in 
 making improvements thereon. This is not a trust to pay 
 over rents and profits, but only to pay over what may be 
 left of the rents and profits after the same have been applied 
 to the payment of the items mentioned. 
 
 Each case of this class must be considered according to its 
 own circumstances, and the expressions of the testator should 
 not be interpreted in a manner subversive of his intention 
 unless that be plainly contrary to law. As was said in a 
 case recently decided by. our supreme court, Matter of Iley- 
 Avood, "in construing testamentary dispositions of property, 
 it is a cardinal rule, that a liberal construction should be 
 given to them, and all reasonable intendments indulged in, 
 with a view of sustaining the purpose which it is disclosed 
 the testator had in view. No particular form of expression 
 is necessary to constitute a valid trust. It is sufficient that,.
 
 74 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 from the language used, the intention of the testator is ap- 
 parent, and that the disposition in trust which he endeavors 
 to make of his estate is consistent with the rules of law. 
 The intent of the testator is the matter for primary consid- 
 eration, and it is innnaterial what method of expression is 
 employed as long as that intention can be ascertained." 
 
 In Hill on Trustees, 101, it is remarked that it is one of the 
 fixed rules of equitable construction that there is no magic in 
 particular words, and our appellate court has declared that 
 it is, of course, "a fundamental principle that a construc- 
 tion of a will favorable to testacy will always obtain when 
 the language used reasonably admits of such construction, 
 and that it will not be held to contain a void trust unless 
 the invalidity of the trust is beyond question .... and 
 cannot be reasonably construed otherwise": Estate of 
 Dunphy, 147 Cal. 95, 81 Pac. 315. 
 
 It is insisted in the case at bar that the trusts are void, 
 being for purposes not specified in section 857 of the Civil 
 Code, and as they are inextricably interwoven with the trust 
 to pay the remainder of the rents, that trust falls with them. 
 
 If we are to be guided by the explicit indication of the 
 purpose of the testator, it would be doing violence to his in- 
 tention so to construe the terms of the will in the trust under 
 consideration. He devised the specifically described prop- 
 erties to trustees, for the benefit of two beneficiaries, his wife 
 and daughter. The provisions clearly indicate that it was 
 the intention of the testator that they should receive the in- 
 come from the trust property. 
 
 What were these trustees to do in the management of this 
 trust? It clearly appears that the motive was the main- 
 tenance of the minor and her mother. They were to receive 
 the rents, issues and profits after the discharge of incidental 
 expenses, such as are set forth. They alone are entitled to 
 the income from the trust property, and they are entitled 
 in due season to the corpus of the trust estate. It is argued 
 that the direction of the will to discharge out of the income 
 the costs and expenses incurred and incident to the admin- 
 istration of the trust is void, and that no matter how clearly 
 a testator may have expressed himself in this regard, his 
 intent cannot prevail; in other words, the essential purpose
 
 Estate of Doe. 75 
 
 of the trust is to be sacrificed to the incidental necessities 
 of its fulfillment. It is the duty of the trustees to hold the 
 property and administer it; subject to the trust, the estate 
 is vested in them. How can they discharge their duty if 
 they are restricted to the extent contended for by counsel ? 
 Even if this part of the clause were invalid, it is not so 
 inextricably interwoven or so essentially a part of the trust 
 scheme that all the other trust provisions would fall if it 
 could not be sustained. In any event the entire income 
 would go to mother and daughter. That is the express di- 
 rection of the testator. If he authorized an invalid accu- 
 mulation of a portion of that income, that provision failing 
 the amount would necessarily be payable to them. The in- 
 valid clause is not an integral part of the scheme ; it is a 
 provision entirely separable from it; it is plain that the 
 primary trust would be unaffected and the primary purpose 
 of the testator fulfilled, even if this direction should be held 
 void ; but for the reasons suggested, it seems to this court, 
 that, in the circumstances of this case, the direction is not 
 unlawful. 
 
 It is contended that the provision for retaining the in- 
 come and paying it over annually is void; but this is a mere 
 matter of management, and it seems to this court that to 
 accept this argument would be to carry the doctrine in- 
 voked to an extreme. Where the entire net income is dis- 
 tributed annually, the courts have held that there is no 
 accumulation. The purpose of the statute is to prevent per- 
 manent accumulations, not to interfere with judicious man- 
 agement. The cases are numerous on this point and cita- 
 tions need not be multiplied. 
 
 Counsel are insistent upon the proposition that the tes- 
 tator did not give to his widow and his child the whole 
 income of his estate, but only the residue after certain 
 charges were to be paid, and that, therefore, the direction 
 to the trustees to pay over the residue of the income after 
 deducting moneys expended for purposes shown to be unlaw- 
 ful is void; and, hence, if the mode prescribed is illegal, the 
 court cannot substitute a valid mode, no matter how obvious 
 his intent; and, that the trust to pay the residue of the in- 
 come to the executors by them to be paid to the widow, is
 
 76 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 void; and that the subsequent limitations of the trust prop- 
 erty fall with the illegal trust, for the reason that they 
 are inseparably blended. These points might be judicially 
 treated at greater length, but it would serve no purpose, 
 since their substance has been discussed in the preceding 
 pages. This court does not agree with counsel for the 
 widow in the conclusions they deduce and apply from the 
 abstract rules of law. As counsel say, the scheme of the will 
 is perfectly clear; but they claim that the testator would 
 not, if properly advised, have made the disposition that he 
 did, for they believe that he would not have liked the idea 
 that at the age of eighteen years this child would have come 
 into the whole of this vast estate, for he manifested regard 
 for and confidence in his widow, and it seems likely, if they 
 could indulge in speculation, that he would have preferred 
 in such circumstances that the mother of his child, her nat- 
 ural protector, should have one-half of his property. But 
 this is speculation on the part of counsel. What testator 
 meant is to be tested by what he said. 
 
 In the paragraph of the codicil which creates the trust 
 embracing specific property, it is provided that, "upon the 
 death of the survivor or last of my said trustees, and the 
 termination of the trust hereby created, I give, devise and 
 bequeath to my said wife Eleanor and to my said daughter 
 Marguerite" all the property embraced in the trust, "pro- 
 vided, however, that the interest hereby devised to my said 
 wife Eleanor to be for and continue during her lifetime, 
 and upon her death to go to my said daughter Mary Mar- 
 guerite. ' ' 
 
 It will be observed, therefore, that, subject to the devise 
 of the trustees, all of the property embraced within the 
 trust w^as devised to the widow and daughter, one-half to 
 the daughter absolutely and the other half to her, but sub- 
 ject to a life estate in her mother. Such a devise is per- 
 fectly valid. 
 
 "A future estate may be limited by the act of the party 
 to commence in possession at a future day, either without 
 the intervention of a precedent estate, or on the termina- 
 tion, by lapse of time or otherwise, of a precedent estate 
 created at the same time": Civ. Code, sec. 767.
 
 Estate of Doe. 77 
 
 Nor would the estate devised to the wife and daughter 
 of the testator be defeated by the invalidity of the devise 
 in trust of the intermediate estate. The rule that a future 
 estate is not affected by the destruction of a precedent es- 
 tate is recognized in the following provisions of the Civil 
 Code: 
 
 "No future interest can be defeated or barred by any 
 alienation or other act of the owner of the intermediate or 
 precedent interest, nor by any destruction of such prece- 
 dent interest by forfeiture, surrender, merger, or otherwise, 
 except as provided by the next section, or where a forfeiture 
 is imposed by statute as a penalty for the violation there- 
 of": Civ. Code, sec. 741. 
 
 "No future interest, valid in its creation, is defeated by 
 the determination of the precedent interest before the hap- 
 pening of the contingency on which the future interest is 
 limited to take eft'ect; but should such contingency after- 
 ward happen, the future interest takes effect in the same 
 manner, and to the same extent, as if the precedent interest 
 had continued to the same period": Civ. Code, sec. 742. 
 
 Counsel for the widow argue that there is no devise over 
 of the trust property in the event of the failure of the 
 trust, and that the gift is contingent "upon the termination 
 of the trust" and that the court cannot transmute it into 
 a vested remainder, but this argument seems to be answered 
 by saying that the testator did not contemplate a contin- 
 gency such as is suggested; he must have assumed the valid- 
 ity of the trust and that it would terminate upon the death 
 of his brothers, naturally anticipating that the widow and 
 child would survive them. The event upon which the estate 
 of the beneficiaries is limited is certain, the death of the 
 trustees; the time is uncertain. A future interest is con- 
 tingent, whilst the person in whom, or the event upon which, 
 it is limited to take effect remains uncertain : Civ. Code, sec. 
 695. 
 
 In this ease neither the persons to whom the future es- 
 tate is limited nor the event are uncertain. The sections 
 of the Civil Code controlling this point may here be in- 
 serted.
 
 78 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 A present interest entitles the owner to the immediate 
 possession of the property: Section 689. 
 
 A future interest entitles the owner to the possession of 
 the property only at a future period: Section 690. 
 
 A future interest is either: 1. Vested; or 2. Contingent: 
 Section 693. 
 
 A future interest is vested when there is a person in be- 
 ing who v/ould have a right, defeasible or indefeasible, to 
 the immediate possession of the property upon the ceasing 
 of the intermediate or precedent interest : Section 694. 
 
 Section 695 as above quoted. 
 
 The argument against the widow that the estate devised 
 to the beneficiaries is a vested remainder — one vested in in- 
 terest, but postponed in possession, seems to be supported 
 by these sections. 
 
 If this be so, it follows that the surviving wife and daugh- 
 ter take a vested remainder in the specifically described 
 properties. 
 
 Counsel for the widow contend that the trust declared in 
 clauses 3 and 4 of the codicil is void, and say that these 
 paragraphs contain the entire provisions of the trust. These 
 paragraphs are identical with 12 and 13 of the original will, 
 but paragraph 5 of the codicil is new. Paragraph 6 ap- 
 points Bartlett and Charles F. Doe without bonds as execu- 
 tors and trustees, and 7 requests to employ Daniel Titus as 
 their attorney. Paragraph 8 follows and that is practically 
 the final clause, and provides that the executors pay to his 
 wife monthly, until his daughter arrives at the age of eigh- 
 teen years, the sum of one thousand dollars for the follow- 
 ing purpose to wit: Five hundred dollars for the support 
 of his said wife, and five hundred dollars for the support 
 and maintenance of his said daughter. Counsel argue that 
 the relative position of these clauses raises the strongest kind 
 of a presumption against any connection between them, and 
 that the only rational construction of paragraph 8 is that 
 it is an attempt by the testator to prescribe the amount of 
 family allowance which should be paid. If, however, the 
 provision for maintenance is to be executed, it must be out 
 of the residuum. There is no other way of carrying out the 
 purpose of the testator. This duty was imposed upon them 
 as executors. It was an active duty and such as usuallv
 
 Estate op Doe. 79 
 
 pertaius to the offiee of trustees, and such they must be 
 deem'ed to be for the performance of these duties. This 
 seems to be the essence of the authorities on this point. It 
 does not seem to this court that the position of the clauses 
 in the will shows that in the mind of the testator they had 
 no connection. He certainly designed that his wife and 
 daughter should be supported out of the estate, and re- 
 course to the residuum was the only means by which that 
 object could be accomplished. That was his evident pur- 
 pose, and a strained construction should not be resorted to 
 to defeat his design. 
 
 It is contended with confidence that the trust herein is to 
 distribute and is, consequently, void, but this court cannot 
 accept this contention for reasons already advanced. Even 
 if this residuary trust were invalid, the effect would not be 
 fatal to the devise to the mother and daughter. It would 
 simply shorten the period of possession; to translate the 
 technical terms of the law, they would arrive earlier at 
 their enjoyment of the estate; the intermediate estate be- 
 ing out of the way by reason of the assumed intestacy as 
 to that, the beneficiaries would come immediately into their 
 own; that is to say, the daughter would have her half at 
 once in fee, and the mother hers for life with remainder to 
 her child. 
 
 It is said sometimes that the trust statutes should be con- 
 strued rigorously, and that the law does not favor trusts of 
 this character; but this is not the general rule of construc- 
 tion established by the codes. On the contrary, the rule of 
 the code is that its provisions should be liberally construed. 
 The interpretation of the instrument should be benignant 
 and conservative, not destructive. Having ascertained the 
 intent of the testator, and here it is obvious, we should not 
 be too industrious in seeking reasons for its nullification. 
 
 This court is of opinion that the trusts created in and by 
 this instrument are valid, and that the distribution should 
 be decreed in conformity with the terms of the will. 
 
 The Rule Against Perpetuities is the subject of a note in 49 Am. 
 St. Eep. 117-138. 
 
 And the Severability of Perpetuities and Forbidden Trusts is the 
 subject of a note in 6i Am. St. Eep. 6.34-646.
 
 80 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 Estate of CHARLES McLAUGHLIN, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 3,061; decided June 16, 1885.] 
 
 Probate of Will — Setting for Hearing, Evidence of. — When it is 
 claimed that the clerk did not set a petition for probate for hear- 
 ing, a notice in fact issued by him and fixing the day is the best 
 evidence that the law has been complied with. 
 
 Probate of Will — Setting for Hearing. — Any Omission in matters 
 of form in fixing the date for hearing a petition to probate a will 
 may be disregarded by the court or ordered supplied when the proper 
 fact is made satisfactorily to appear. 
 
 Probate of Will. — The Publication of the Notice fixing the day for 
 hearing the probate of a will, when made in a weekly paper, must 
 appear on at least three different days of publication, but not neces- 
 sarily in three consecutive weekly issues. 
 
 Probate of Will. — A Creditor cannot Petition for a Revocation 
 of the probate of a will. 
 
 The Probate of a Will and the Appointment of an Executor are 
 distinct emanations from the will of the court, usually, though not 
 necessarily embodied in one order, but determined upon entirely dif- 
 ferent sets of facts. 
 
 Application by creditor to revoke the probate of a will. 
 A. B. Hotchkiss, for petitioning creditors. 
 L. D. McKisick, for executrix. 
 
 T. H. REARDEN, J. (in vacation sittings of Department 
 9, Probate). — This is an application, by petition, by Emile 
 Erlanger and others, setting forth that they are residents 
 of the city of Paris, and are creditors of the decedent, who 
 died in 1883, leaving a will, and being at his death a resi- 
 dent of this state. 
 
 That decedent's will is on file in this court; that it ap- 
 pears by the records that proceedings were had for the pro- 
 bate of the will; that witnesses touching its execution were 
 examined, and their testimony reduced to writing, on June 
 16, 1884; and that the court ordered letters testamentary 
 to be issued to Kate McLaughlin, the executrix named in 
 the will. 
 
 That the will was filed January 9, 1884, together with a 
 petition for letters testamentary.
 
 Estate of McLaughlin. 81 
 
 That it appears from an inspection of the record that 
 the clerk did not set the petition for hearing; nor did the 
 court set it for hearing; that proper notice of said hear- 
 ing has not been given; that no proof was made at the 
 hearing that notice was given ; that a notice was published 
 in the "Daily Alta California," a daily newspaper, but 
 such notice was not published as required by law; that no 
 order of any court or judge was made directing the man- 
 ner, or number of times, of said publication ; that the only 
 proof of publication was an affidavit filed February 5, 1884, 
 which affidavit is insufficient to give the court jurisdiction, 
 as it does not show the year of publication, or that said 
 notice was published as often during the period of publica- 
 tion as the paper was regularly issued. 
 
 Petitioners therefore pray that the probate be revoked, 
 and for such other order as may be proper. 
 
 This petition is demurred to by the executrix. On the 
 hearing upon demurrer, the petitioners claimed that the 
 clerk should have made an order fixing the day of hearing, 
 and that no such order was in existence. It appeared, how- 
 ever, as a fact before the court, that the clerk had entered 
 the day of hearing in a calendar kept by him. This entry 
 was not transferred to the register, but there would seem to 
 be no reason why, if such entry had been made in rough 
 minutes, it could not be put into the more formal register, 
 either by the clerk himself or- by the court, when attention 
 had been directed thereto. But the best evidence in the 
 matter of the fixing of the day for probate is the notice is- 
 sued by the clerk, which is complete in that regard. Any 
 omission in matters of form should either be disregarded by 
 the court, or the omission should, by direction, be supplied, 
 when the proper fact is made satisfactorily to appear. Sec- 
 tion 1704, Code of Civil Procedure, provides only that or- 
 ders of the court or judge must be entered at length on the 
 minute-book of the court. 
 
 The next objection to the proceedings for probate lies in 
 the number of times the notice was published. The affi- 
 davit of proof of piiblications shows that a notice fixing 
 Tuesday, February 5, 1884, at 10 o'clock A. M., which no- 
 tice is dated January 9, 1884 (the date of filing petition for 
 
 Prob. Dec. Vol. 1—6
 
 82 Coffey ^s Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 probate), was published in the "Daily Alta California" 
 five times, to-wit: January 10, 15, 24, and 31, and Febru- 
 ary 5, 1884, which last day was the day set for hearing. 
 The notice was directed by the clerk to be published Thurs- 
 days and Tuesdays till date (of hearing). It is probable 
 that the notice was published oftener as there were more 
 Tuesdays and Thursdays than are indicated. 
 
 The provisions of the code in that behalf are: 
 "Notice of the hearing shall be given by the clerk by 
 publishing the same in a newspaper of the county; if there 
 is none, then by three written or printed notices posted at 
 three of the most public places in the county. 
 
 "If the notice is published in a weekly newspaper, it must 
 appear therein on at least three different days of publica- 
 tion; and if in a newspaper published oftener than once a 
 week, it shall be so published that there must be at least ten 
 days from the first to the last day of publication, both the 
 first and the last day being included": Code Civ. Proc. 
 1303. 
 
 The petitioners claim that section 1705 should be made 
 to supplement section 1303, in that it provides that "when 
 any publication is ordered, such publication must be made 
 daily, or otherwise as often during the prescribed period 
 as the paper is regularly issued, unless otherwise provided 
 in this title." The court or judge thereof may, however, 
 order a less number of publications during the period. 
 
 Counsel for executrix claim that it is "otherwise pro- 
 vided" in section 1303. 
 
 It will be seen that even in the case of a weekly news- 
 paper, section 1303 does not provide that the publications 
 shall be made in three consecutive weekly issues, but merely 
 "on at least three different days of publication." 
 
 Also, if the court or .judge can order a less number of 
 publications, "unless otherwise provided" by section 1303, 
 the order might be for less than three publications in a 
 weekly paper, and only one in a daily paper (should the 
 judge have discretion in the premises, which section 1303, 
 germane to the notice of probate, would clearly negative) : 
 McCrea v. Haraszthy, 51 Cal. 149, does not aid us. In that
 
 Estate of IMcLaughlin. 83 
 
 case the court held that the statute supplemented the judge's 
 order, when the latter was silent ; and that if the notice was 
 published for the statutory time, it was good. Here the 
 question is, whether the publication is for the statutory 
 number of times. 
 
 At the same time, the general impression has prevailed 
 that a notice of probate in a daily paper should be pub- 
 lished daih^ as often as the paper is issued. I would be 
 loath to run counter to so general an opinion in any event ; 
 and, therefore, decline at this point, in the absence of the 
 usual judge of this department, to pass absolutely upon the 
 sufficiency of the notice. If such notice is bad, it behooves 
 the learned counsel for the executrix to discover and remedy 
 the error at the earliest possible moment, and to vacate the 
 proceedings in the matter of the estate, and commence de 
 novo from the notice by the clerk. 
 
 But the petition of these creditors is, as I regard it, 
 fatally defective in its point of attack. It seeks, as its declared 
 object, to avoid the will as probated; it does not strike at 
 the only point where a creditor can be interested in an es- 
 tate — the executorship or the competency of the executrix 
 (counsel for petitioners admitted, at the hearing, that his 
 clients had no quarrel with her, or her appointment, but 
 only denied the regularity of the probate). A creditor can- 
 not be affected injuriously by any testamentary dispositions 
 of his debtor. The debtor cannot posthumously hinder, de- 
 lay or defraud his creditor. An executor, once inducted 
 into his trust, must quoad the creditors, proceed on pre- 
 cisely the same lines as an administrator. He must pub- 
 lish notice to creditors, file exhibits, render accounts, allow 
 or reject claims, pay all dues to strangers to the estate, as 
 rigidly as if he were an officer of the court, appointed in- 
 dependently of the decedent's wish. If he be distrusted by 
 the creditor, application will be entertained to put him un- 
 der bonds ; if he be incompetent, the creditor may demand 
 his removal. The creditor may come in when the executor 
 is to be qualified, and object. But the creditor has nothing 
 to do with the will. The will attaches only to the dece- 
 dent's net estate, after all debts and expenses of administra- 
 tion have been liquidated: See Estate of Hinckley, 58 Cal.
 
 84 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 516. As to the will, the creditor is a stranger. It is no 
 affair of his : See,, also, Civ. Code, sec. 1270. 
 
 The probate of a will and the appointment of an execu- 
 tor are distinct emanations from the will of the court — ■ 
 usually, but not necessarily, embodied in the one order, but 
 determined upon entirely different sets of facts. 
 
 Can the present petition be used to initiate an attack 
 upon the executrix, so as to nullify any notice to creditors 
 given by her whereby these particular creditors are barred 
 of their claims? The petition does not disclose the fact or 
 motive of the creditors, but it was hinted at upon the hear- 
 ing. 
 
 If the present proceedings are nugatory, then the only 
 way whereby the court can acquire properly jurisdiction 
 is by a petition for probate, or some application of that 
 kind, wherein sufficient facts are set forth to put the ma- 
 chinery of the court — its ordinary procedure — in motion. 
 
 The present petition is insufficient. By itself, it would 
 not warrant the court's proceeding anew to reappoint the 
 present executrix, or an administrator in her stead. De- 
 murrer is therefore sustained, with leave to petitioners to 
 amend. 
 
 Where a Notice of the Hearing of a Petition for the Probate of a 
 
 will is published only twice in a weekly newspaper, when the stat- 
 ute requires at least three times, an order admitting the will to 
 probate and appointing an administrator with the will annexed is 
 void: Estate of Charleblis, 6 Mont. 373, 12 Pac. 775. But a notice 
 is sufficiently proved to have been published in a daily paper for 
 the requisite period by an affidavit showing that it was published 
 in a paper purporting by its name to be a daily paper, for eleven 
 days: Crew v. Pratt, 119 Cal. 139, 51 Pac. 38. And if a decree re- 
 cites due service of notice by publication or posting, the recital is 
 sufficient to prove the same as against a collateral attack: Crew v. 
 Pratt, 119 Cal. 139, 51 Pac. 38.
 
 Estate of Solomon. 85 
 
 Estate op JACOB SOLOMON, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 3,881; decided July 22, 1886.] 
 
 Will Contest — Burden of Proof. — One who contests the probate of 
 a will has the burden of proof to establish the ground of contest. 
 
 Insane Delusion — Wrong Conclusions as Evidence. — If any fact 
 exists as a foundation for a testator's belief that a child borne by 
 his wife is not his, he cannot be said to be the victim of an insane 
 delusion, however mistaken he may be in his conclusion. 
 
 Insane Delusion. — A Person may Act on Weak Testimony, yet be 
 
 under no delusion. 
 
 This was a contest filed to an application for the pro- 
 bate of a document, presented as the last will of Jacob Sol- 
 omon, deceased. The will and a petition for the admission 
 to probate were filed on January 6, 1885, by Lazarus Solo- 
 mon, named in the instrument as executor. On the eleventh 
 day of February, 1885, there was filed the written contest 
 (as amended) of Jennie Asch, the person referred to by 
 testator in the seventh clause of his will, hereinafter given. 
 
 Six grounds of contest were specified by contestant, but 
 the only ground covered by the opinion of the court be- 
 low is the "second" one, stated in the contest as follows: 
 "That at the time of signing of the said alleged will, the 
 said Jacob Solomon was laboring under and controlled by 
 the insane delusion that this contestant was not the child 
 of said deceased." 
 
 This ground of contest is aimed at the seventh clause of 
 the will, which is in the following language : " I hereby 
 declare that, prior to my coming to California, I was mar- 
 ried to a woman named Hannah — whose other name I have 
 forgotten ; she was divorced from me by a decree of the 
 Twelfth District Court of the State of California, on the 
 11th day of August, 1860 ; during our marriage a child was 
 born of her; this child was not begotten by me, and was 
 not my child ; she is now living in this city ; her present 
 name is, I believe, Mrs. Jennie Von Stratton; I do not make 
 in this my will, and do not intend to make, any provisions 
 for said child."
 
 86 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 The important fact in the case turned out to be the date 
 of the marriage of the testator with the contestant's mother, 
 as upon this hinged the testator's belief with respect to con- 
 testant's birth. The exact date of the marriage could not 
 be shown, and it w^as capable of being fixed only by refer- 
 ence to certain events. The court found that the marriage 
 took place at the time of the Jewish feast of "Hanucah," 
 which was shown to have fallen during the Christian year 
 1854, in the tenth month of the Jewish calendar — the last 
 half of the month of December, 1854, and the first half of 
 the month of January, 1855. The birth of the child took 
 place on the following first day of July, 1855, about six and 
 one-half months after the marriage. It also appeared that 
 about two months previous to the birth of contestant, the 
 testator being away from home on business, had sent money 
 to his wife, but that when he was informed afterwards of 
 the date of the child's birth, he declared that the child was 
 not his; that subsequently he came to California, his wife 
 afterward following and obtaining here a divorce against 
 him by default, the complaint for divorce fixing the date of 
 
 marriage as " day of August, 1854," and alleging the 
 
 birth and existence of the child. 
 
 Geo. Flournoy and J. B. Mhoon, for contestant. 
 
 K. C. Harrison (Jarboe & Harrison), for proponent. 
 
 COFFEY, J. The burden of proof is on contestant to 
 establish ground of contest. After a re-examination of the 
 evidence, I am of the opinion that the contestant's case is 
 not supported by the preponderance of proof. Whether the 
 statement of the testator was well or ill based, there was in 
 the order of nature, according to the testimony in this con- 
 test, some reason for his belief. He knew when he was mar- 
 ried; he knew when his daughter was born; hence he could 
 have inferred the fact he alleges in the paper propounded. 
 However much he might have been mistaken in the conclu- 
 sion at which he arrived, if any fact existed as a foundation 
 therefor, he was not the victim of insane delusion. A per- 
 son may act upon weak testimony, yet be under no delusion 
 (]\Tyr. 15), and there does not appear to me to be sufficient 
 evidence in support of the statement that Jacob and Han-
 
 Estate op Solomon. 87 
 
 nail were married in "the latter part of November," 1854. 
 and even then it would be a very close call for the child ; the 
 probable time, I am constrained to conclude, was near the 
 feast of "Hanucah," which began about the middle of De- 
 cember, 1854, and lasted until January 1, 1855; this was 
 in or about the month of "Tebet," the tenth month of 
 the Jewish calendar, corresponding to the English calen- 
 dar months of December-January — two weeks of each. If 
 it be true, as I take it from the testimony, that Jacob and 
 Hannah were united in marriage at that time, in December, 
 1854, the birth of a child July 1, 1855, was sufficient pre- 
 mise for the conclusion announced in the seventh clause of 
 the will — the subject matter of this contest. 
 
 Let an order be drawn admitting the will to probate. 
 
 A Delusion Which will Destroy Testamentary Capacity must spring 
 up spontaneously in the mind, without extrinsic evidence of any 
 kind to support it. If it has any foundation in fact, if it has any 
 evidence, however slight, as its basis, it is not an insane delusion. 
 One cannot be said to be under such a delusion if his condition of 
 mind results from a belief or inference, however irrational or un- 
 founded, drawn from the facts which are shown to exist: Estate of 
 Scott, 128 Cal. 57, 60 Pac. 527; In re Cline's Will, 24 Or. 175, 41 
 Am. St. Kep. 851, 33 Pac. 542; Skinner v. Lewis, 40 Or. 571, 67 Pac. 
 951. 
 
 False logic or faulty ratiocination is far from the manifestation 
 of insanity, so long as the process is formally correct, not inco- 
 herent or inconsequential. Hence if a wife has evidence, however 
 slight, on which to base a suspicion of her husband's unfaithfulness, 
 and has no settled conviction on the subject, her suspicion does not 
 amount to an insane delusion: Estate of Scott, post, p. 271. But 
 where a man wills his entire estate to his children of a former mar- 
 riage because he believes that his present wife is unfaithful and 
 his children by her illegitimate, which belief has no evidence to 
 support it, the will may be avoided as the product of an insane 
 delusion: Johnson v. Johnson, 105 Md. 81, 121 Am. St. Eep. 570, 65 
 Atl. 918.
 
 88 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 Estate of JOHN LANE, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 3,490; decided August 7, 1884.] 
 Letters of Administration. — The Order in Which Letters of admin- 
 istration are granted is a matter of statutory regulation, and to the 
 statute the court must resort for decision. 
 
 Succession — Vesting of Estate in Heirs. — Heirs succeed to the 
 property of their intestate immediately upon his death; then their 
 interest becomes vested, subject only to the lien of the administra- 
 tor for the payment of the debts of the decedent and the expenses 
 of administration. 
 
 Succession. — The Next of Kin Entitled to Share in the Distribution 
 
 of the estate of an intestate are such only as are next of kin at the 
 time of his death. 
 
 Letters of Administration — Next of Kin. — Where a man dies intes- 
 tate, and subsequently his widow dies before letters are taken out 
 on his estate, her niece is not entitled to administer his estate as 
 next of kin, for she was not such when he died. 
 
 Charles F. Hanlon, for Miss Margaret Murray. 
 
 Geo. D. Shadbiirne and Mr. W. A. Plunkett, associate, 
 for absent heirs. 
 
 T. E. K. Cormac, for Public Administrator Roach. 
 
 J. ]\I. Burnett, amicus curiae. 
 
 COFFEY, jr. John Lane died intestate, leaving solely 
 surviving him his widow Ellen, who, shortly after his death 
 and before letters were taken out on his estate, died, leaving 
 no issue nor parents. Now comes Margaret Murray, spin- 
 ster, niece of Ellen Lane, and claiming to be her heir at 
 law, and files a petition for letters of administration on the 
 estate of the first aforesaid John Lane, which petition is- 
 contested by the public administrator, who claims that he 
 is entitled, under the statute (Code Civ. Proc, sec. 1365). 
 The question before the court is : To which of these antago- 
 nistic applicants should letters issue? 
 
 The order in which letters of administration are granted 
 is a matter of statutory regulation, and to the statute we 
 must resort for the rule of decision. This principle should
 
 Estate of Lane. 89' 
 
 be borne in mind when examining the authorities cited from 
 other states, for unless they interpret statutes similar to 
 our own they carry no weight. Section 1365 of the Cali- 
 fornia Code of Civil Procedure provides that relatives of 
 the deceased shall be entitled to administer only when they 
 are entitled to succeed to his personal estate, or some por- 
 tion thereof; and the section then fixes the order in which 
 letters shall be granted, the seventh subdivision being "the 
 next of kin entitled to share in the distribution of the es- 
 tate." It has been held from the earliest history of our 
 jurisprudence that the heirs succeed to the property of the 
 intestate immediately upon his death; then their interest 
 becomes vested, subject only to the lien of the administra- 
 tor for the payment of the debts of the intestate and charges 
 and expenses of administration. It follows from this in- 
 dependent of the statute, that "the next of kin entitled to 
 share in the distribution of the estate" must be the persons 
 who are "next of kin" at the death of the intestate. Miss 
 Margaret Murray was not next of kin to John Lane when he 
 died : how can she become so after his death ? The first part 
 of section 1365, Code of Civil Procedure, provides that the 
 relatives of the deceased (not the relatives of a deceased 
 heir of the deceased) shall be entitled to administer only 
 when they are entitled to succeed to his personal estate. 
 Miss Murray was not a relative of the deceased John Lane; 
 she was not an heir at law; if her aunt Ellen had died be- 
 fore John Lane, Margaret would come in for nothing. Miss 
 ]\Iurray will ultimately obtain a portion of the estate, but 
 only as an heir at law or "next of kin" of her aunt Ellen, 
 if it be established in that estate that she is so related. Her 
 interest comes and is worked out through that estate and 
 in no other way. There is no descent cast by right of rep- 
 resentation in this case; the law provides for such only 
 where the common relative dies before the intestate. It 
 would seem, thep, that as Miss Margaret IMurray was not a 
 relative of the decedent, John Lane, and can claim only 
 through the estate of her deceased aunt, Ellen Lane, she 
 does not come within the statute, and hence her application 
 must be denied.
 
 90 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 In Estate of Wakefield, 136 Cal. 110, 68 Pac. 499, a mother and 
 daughter perished in a wreck, the daughter dying first. The daugh- 
 ter died intestate, leaving her mother sole heir. Her mother left a 
 last will bequeathing her property to her two sons. It was held 
 that the sons were not entitled to administration on the estate of 
 the daughter, under section 1365, California Code of Civil Procedure, 
 as they became possessed of her estate, not as her heirs, but by rea- 
 son of being devisees under their mother's will. 
 
 Estate of CHARLES SEALY, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 3,186; decided July 5, 1884.] 
 
 Jurisdiction — Residence of Deceased. — The Issuance of Special 
 Letters of administration to the public administrator in one county 
 is not a final determination of his right to general letters of admin- 
 istration as against the public administrator of another county. 
 
 Jurisdiction — Residence of Deceased. — The Issuance of Special 
 Letters of administration leaves the jurisdictional facts still to be 
 ascertained prior to the issuance of general letters. 
 
 Jurisdiction — Residence of Deceased — Conclusiveness of Deter- 
 mination. — Where the public administrators of two counties each file 
 an application for letters of administration, there being a doubt as 
 to which county the decedent was a resident of, and one applicant 
 contests the application of the other, the adjudication of the court 
 that it has jurisdiction is a bar to the contestant's own application 
 in the other county. 
 
 John A. Wright, for San Francisco public administrator. 
 
 E. C. Robinson and W. R. Davis, for Alameda public ad- 
 ministrator. 
 
 J. M. Seawell, for Robert Sealy, brother. 
 
 AY. A. Plunkett, for absent heirs. 
 
 Barrows & Dare, for ''somebody in shadow," 
 
 COFFEY, J. Charles Sealy died in San Francisco on 
 February 22, 1880, he having moved over to Oakland, Ala- 
 meda county, about four months before his death, intending 
 to take up his residence there, in order to avoid jury duty
 
 Estate of Sealy. 91 
 
 in San Francisco, declaring that he would never live in San 
 Francisco again. 
 
 On February 23, 1884, Philip A. Roach, public adminis- 
 trator, filed in the superior court of the city and county of 
 San Francisco his petition for special letters of administration 
 upon the estate of Charles Sealy, and he was appointed 
 special administrator on February 25th. At about the same 
 time, Louis Gottshall, public administrator of Alameda county, 
 was ordered by the superior court of that county to take 
 charge of the estate therein, Charles Sealy having resided in 
 Alameda county. At the same time Mr. Gottshall filed his 
 petition in the Alameda superior court for general letters of 
 administration. Subseciuently he filed a petition in the 
 superior court of San Francisco to set aside and revoke the 
 special letters of Mr. Roach, which petition was denied. On 
 February 28th Mr. Roach filed in Alameda county his written 
 objections to the application of Mr. Gottshall for letters of 
 administration, and upon the issues of fact raised by the 
 objection the case was heard and tried before that court. 
 On i\Iarch 31st the Alameda superior court. Noble Hamilton, 
 judge, rendered a decision in favor of public administrator 
 Gottshall, but, disregarding this decision, public administrator 
 Roach insisted on the hearing of his petition in the San 
 Francisco court for general letters. When the matter came 
 up for hearing the attorney for the Alameda administrator 
 filed objections to the application of the San Francisco 
 administrator, and pleaded in bar, as a final adjudication 
 upon the question of residence, the decision of the Alameda 
 court. The points of the argument were, whether the Ala- 
 meda adjudication could be pleaded in bar, and, if so pleaded, 
 what would be its effect. 
 
 Messrs. Robinson and Davis, for Alameda administrator, 
 filed herein a brief of forty-three pages; Mr. Seawell, for 
 Robert Sealy, one of twenty pages; and Messrs. Wright and 
 Cormac, for San Francisco administrator, one of twelve 
 pages. If attorneys expect their learned and long essays and 
 reviews to be well considered, their citations verified, and 
 their conclusions cogitated and considered by tlie court, thev
 
 92 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 must be content to wait awhile for a decision. Hence the 
 delay in deciding this controversy. 
 
 The issue of special letters to the public administrator of 
 San Francisco was not a final determination of the rights of 
 the parties herein. His function is "to collect and take 
 charge of the estate of the decedent," and to preserve the 
 same, pending proceedings for the appointment of a general 
 administrator : Code Civ. Proc, sec. 1411. 
 
 The jurisdictional facts were still to be ascertained, prior 
 to the issue of general letters. The first inquiry upon such 
 an application was had in Alameda county. To the court in 
 that county went the San Francisco public administrator, 
 and, opposing the application of the Alameda administrator, 
 controverted the latter 's right to letters, and in that contro- 
 versy was worsted. He must abide the event of a contro- 
 versy to which he was a voluntary party. There was an 
 issue to which the parties here were parties; they had their 
 day in court ; the facts were investigated and found in favor 
 of that jurisdiction ; and the judgment is here regularly and 
 properly pleadable, and pleaded in bar of this court's action. 
 Let an order be drawn accordingly. 
 
 Under Some Circumstances, Two or More Courts may have Juris- 
 diction to entertain an application for letters testamentary or of 
 administration. When such is the case, and one of the courts re- 
 ceives an application and assumes jurisdiction, that jurisdiction is 
 exclusive, for there cannot be two valid administrations of an es- 
 tate at the same time. The court first applied to for letters has ex- 
 clusive authority to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, 
 subject to review upon appeal, and the other courts must abide by 
 its determination of the question. The statutes of many states pro- 
 vide that in certain cases the courts in which application is first 
 made has exclusive jurisdiction of the settlement of the estate, 
 and under this rule, the first filing of a petition for letters con- 
 stitutes the "first application" for them. The appointment of an 
 administrator in one county is without validity while a prior ap- 
 pointment in another county is in effect. And a decree escheating 
 property to the state is ineffectual when the court of another county 
 has already granted letters of administration: 1 Eoss on Probate Law 
 and Practice, 226, citing Dungan v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. 98, 84 
 Pac. 767; Estate of Davis, 149 Gal. 485, 87 Pac. 17; Estate of Griffith, 
 84 Gal. 107, 23 Pac. 528, 24 Pac. 381; Oh Chow -v. Brockway, 21 Or. 
 440, 28 Pac. 384; Territory v. Klee, 1 Wash. 183, 23 Pac. 417.
 
 Estate of Pickett. 93 
 
 Estate op MICHAEL PICKETT, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 4,371; decided November 7, 1885.] 
 
 Words and Phrases.— The Terms "Surviving Wife" and "Widow" 
 are synonymous. 
 
 Appointment of Administratrix. — When a Widow Marries, she ceases 
 to be the widow of her first husband; and then being a married 
 woman, she loses her right to administer his estate, or to nominate 
 an administrator. 
 
 This was a contest between two applicants for letters of 
 administration, one being the nominee of the decedent's 
 widow, who had remarried, and the other the public admin- 
 istrator of San Francisco, Philip A. Roach. 
 
 Wright & Cormac, for Public Administrator Roach. 
 
 Burnett & Bartlett, for O'Connell, nominee of former 
 widow. 
 
 Geo. D. Shadburne, for absent heirs. 
 
 COFFEY, J. When Mrs. Pickett married Minihan, she 
 ceased to the widow of the decedent and lost her right to 
 administer. Being a Inarried woman she had no right her- 
 self, and had nothing to confer upon her nominee, 'Connell. 
 The terms "surviving wife" and "widow" are synonymous, 
 and are so treated in the statute and in the decisions, the 
 supreme court commonly employing the term "widow" in 
 the same signification as ' ' surviving wife. ' ' I have carefully 
 conned and considered the brief of counsel for Mrs. Minihan 's 
 nominee, and have examined all the authorities accessible 
 with a view to discerning the distinction drawn by them be- 
 tween the principles involved in the authorities cited by 
 counsel for absent heirs, and the point raised here; but my 
 conclusion is that the sense of the statute, and the result of 
 the decisions of the supreme court, is to exclude the widow 
 upon her second marriage from the right of nomination. 
 The Estate of Cotter does, as counsel contend, settle the 
 point that a nonresident widow is entitled to nominate 
 although disqualified from serving, because, as the court
 
 94 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 said, the right to nominate "does not depend upon the 
 matter of residence," but it does depend upon the status 
 of the nominator. The court there refers to "the widow of 
 the deceased," "the right of the widow to nominate" (54 
 Cal. 217), thus treating "surviving wife" and "widow" as 
 convertible terms. Mrs. Minihan is a married woman, and, 
 as such, could neither administer nor nominate ; being a 
 married woman, how can she be accounted the "widow" 
 of her predeceased husband? 
 
 I have searched the dictionaries and the decisions in vain 
 for relief in this extremity. In the circumstances, her nom- 
 ination is "of no legal consequence whatever": Estate of 
 Morgan, 53 Cal. 243. 
 
 Counsel for the nominee express their assurance that 
 before the court will refuse this claim of right in Mrs. IMini-' 
 han, it will be fully statisfied that its decision expresses the 
 intention of the legislature, and that the court will resolve 
 its doubts, if any there be, in favor of a class whose rights 
 it is especially organized to defend and protect. 
 
 In the Estate of Flaherty, decided February 11, 1884. 
 this court, in the conclusion it reached, justified the assurance 
 here avouched by counsel. That case was elaborately argued 
 by John A. Wright, Esq., for the public administrator, and 
 ]\Iessrs. Jarrett and C. W. Bryant for one claiming to be a 
 nonresident widow, although in marital relations with an- 
 other man, to whom she was ceremonially united during the 
 lifetime of Flaherty (being under the impression that he 
 was dead), and with whom she continued to cohabit after 
 she learned that Flaherty was still in existence, and until 
 his death and up to the time of making her nomination, and 
 thereafter, and bearing the name of the second supposed 
 spouse; but this court held that the second marriage was 
 void, as she was then the lawful wife of Flaherty, and at his 
 death as "surviving wife" or "widow" entitled to nominate. 
 Conversely, it should seem, if she was, as counsel there co'n- 
 tended, under the law of New York, the wife of another at 
 the time of application, she would be disentitled to nominate. 
 After full consideration I cannot discover any doubt of the 
 intention of the legislature. If hardship result, the legis-
 
 Estate of Neustadt. 95 
 
 lature is responsible, not the court. As was said in the 
 Estate of Boland, 43 Cal. 643 (in which estate one of the 
 counsel here, W. C. Burnett, Esq., was concerned), "what- 
 ever right she (the quondam widow) may once have 
 had .... she lost when she lost the status upon which the 
 right depended." 
 
 Disregarding the demurrer, the petition of Mrs. Minihan's 
 nominee, Patrick O'Connell, should be and is denied. 
 
 The Statute of California, upon which the decision in the princi- 
 pal case is based, has been amended. As the law now stands in that 
 state, and in many other states, the marriage of a woman seems to 
 have nothing to do with her competency as an executrix, as mani- 
 festly it should not. She is entitled to administer on the estate of 
 her deceased husband, though married to another man: Estate of 
 Dow, 132 Cal. 309, 64 Pac. 402. 
 
 Estate of AUGUSTA R. NEUSTADT, Deceased 
 
 [No. 6,608; decided August 16, 1884.] 
 
 Administrator's Sale — Release of Bidder. — If a bidder at a pri- 
 vate sale by an administrator states that she has not had time to 
 examine the title because of the shortness of the notice, and does 
 not wish to be bound unless the title is good, to which the admin- 
 istrator assents, she should be released from her bid when her coun- 
 sel advises against the title, whether or not his view of the law is 
 correct. 
 
 This was an application by the administrator to confirm a 
 private sale of realty returned by him. The application was 
 opposed by the purchaser. 
 
 Wm. H. Sharp, for administrator. 
 
 Gunnison & Booth, for purchaser, opposing. 
 
 COFFEY, J. As suggested at the hearing, the only 
 ground which the court deems it necessary to consider is : 
 Whether the purchaser, who now seeks to be excused, was 
 misled, inadvertently or otherwise, into inaking her bid. She
 
 <)6 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 sets up in her opposition "that at the time of the delivery of 
 said bid to said administrator she stated that by reason of 
 the short time of said notice she had not time to examine the 
 title to said property, and for that reason did not wish to be 
 bound by the bid if the title thereto was not good, ' ' to which 
 proposition she avers the administrator assented; the admin- 
 istrator joins issue upon this allegation. 
 
 If the bidder had been granted sufficient time, or if she 
 had not been induced to make the bid by reason of the prom- 
 ise of the administrator that she would have ample time to 
 examine title, she would not have made the offer, acting upon 
 her attorney's advice as to condition of title. 
 
 It is immaterial, in my judgment, to consider the sound- 
 ness of this advice, unnecessary for me to adjudicate upon 
 the attorney's accuracy of judgment; enough to know the 
 purchaser's conduct would have been influenced thereby. 
 Did the administrator mislead her? Not intentionally, per- 
 haps, but the evidence seems to show that the required op- 
 portunity of examination was not accorded to her; if it had 
 been she would have acted differently from what she did, 
 so she testifies; and whether her counsel's view of the law 
 be sound or unsound, it was the motive to her act, and ex- 
 cuses her from the performance of a purchase predicated 
 upon a promise that she should have time for full examina- 
 tion. 
 
 Upon the evidence as to this point, and upon no other 
 ground, is the opposition sustained. 
 
 Purchasers at an Administrator's Sale are usually subject to the 
 maxim of caveat emptor, and the deed can contain no warranty of 
 title: Towner v. Eodegeb, 33 Wash. 153, 99 Am. St. Eep. 936, 74 Pac. 
 50; Miller v. Gray, 136 Cal. 261, 68 Pac. 770.
 
 Estate of Fisher. ' 97 
 
 Estate of CAROLINE H. FISHER, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 3,000; decided December 23, 1884; January 8, 1886.] 
 
 Executors — Duty to Collect Assets. — It is not only the duty of an 
 executor to seek to recover assets of the estate, but should he forbear 
 the endeavor he would be liable as for malfeasance or nonfeasance. 
 
 Executors — Good Faith in Bringing Action. — Where a suit brought 
 by an executor presented issues of a "serious" and ** difficult" char- 
 acter, and occupied many days in trial, a nonsuit being refused, it 
 must have afforded grounds to the executor's judgment in its institu- 
 tion and prosecution. 
 
 Executors — Eight to Counsel. — An executor, acting in good faith, 
 is entitled to aid of counsel in all litgation concerning the estate. 
 
 Executors — Allowance for Counsel Fees. — It being an executor's 
 duty to defend or prosecute for the estate in all matters where in 
 good faith he believes it necessary, he should be reimbursed though 
 the suit be lost. 
 
 An "Exhibit and Account" Presented by an Executor does not 
 Operate as an Estoppel upon the hearing and settlement of a subse- 
 quent account by him; the items of the first account are impeachable, 
 and the settlement of such account does not impart a dignity not 
 inherently belonging to the account. 
 
 Accounts. — "Where an "Exhibit" and "Account" Presented by an 
 Executor was merely "experimental," to raise certain questions as 
 to previous acts of the administration, the executor will, under in- 
 structions as to his rights, be ordered to render another account, which 
 shall have the quality of finality. 
 
 Counsel Fees. — There is no Authority in the Probate Court to allow 
 an attorney appointed by the court under section 1718, Code of Civil 
 Procedure, compensation for services performed in a suit brought by 
 the executor. The attorney's remuneration must be restricted to pro- 
 ceedings before the court of administration. 
 
 This was an application for the settlement of an account 
 filed by executor, Selden S. Wright. A contest was filed 
 on the part of Estelle L. Dudley, a daughter of testatri.x, and 
 al^o a grantee under a certain deed made by testatrix shortly 
 before her death, which deed was the subject matter of the 
 suit brought by the executor, referred to in the opinion of 
 the court. The contest was raised respecting the expenses 
 of this suit, and presented the question of the executor's 
 duty to bring the suit, and his good faith in the matter. 
 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. I— 7
 
 98 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 Under the first opinion of the court (December 23, 1884), 
 a new accounting by the executor was directed, and, upon 
 the presentation of this second account, the questions dis- 
 cussed in the first opinion were again raised and reargued ; 
 and the question as to the right of an attorney appointed 
 by the court in a probate proceeding to have compensation 
 Per services in connection with matters not taking place in 
 and before the court of administration was more particu- 
 larly presented. The second opinion of the court (of Janu- 
 ary 8, 1886), rendered upon this new accounting, reconsid- 
 ered all the questions raised on the first account, and reiter- 
 ated the former decision ; therefore, only that part of the 
 second opinion is given which especially considers the question 
 of the right of compensation of the attorney appointed by the 
 court. The suit referred to in the opinion of the court was 
 a civil action begun and tried in department No. 5 of the same 
 court. 
 
 M. G. Cobb and Geo. T. Wright, for the executor. 
 
 E. J. McCutchen, for minor heir. 
 
 Daniel Titus and James C. Cary, for contestant. 
 
 COFFEY, J. Counsel must be content with a summary 
 of conclusions of the court, as I have no leisure to extend 
 the reasoning, although I have well considered the case and 
 the arguments. 
 
 1. The duty of the executor: 
 
 It was not only the duty of the executor to seek to recover 
 assets of the estate, but had he forborne such endeavor, he 
 would have been liable as for malfeasance or nonfeasance : 
 Code Civ. Proc, title 11 (of part 3), c. 8, Powers and Duties 
 of Executors, etc. ; sees. 1581 et seq. ; c. 10, Accounts, etc. ; 
 art. 1, sees. 1616 et seq. 
 
 The discussion as to the bona fides of the suit against the 
 Dudleys seems to be concluded by the opinion or "decision" 
 of Judge Hunt in Wright v. Dudley, which says: "While 
 the proceedings in this case were hastily commenced, yet I 
 am not prepared, from all the evidence in the case, to say 
 that they were instituted in bad faith"; also, the "decision"
 
 Estate op Fisher. 99 
 
 says that "the questions of law presented on the trial were 
 difficult, and in some respects serious, and their solution by 
 no means an easy matter." A case presenting issues of a 
 "serious" and "difficult" character, and occupying many 
 days in trial, in which a nonsuit was refused, must have 
 afforded some grounds to the judgment of the executor for 
 its institution and prosecution. If the prosecution were with- 
 out merit, it would seem inequitable to cast the defense in 
 any costs; but Judge Hunt decided, for the reasons sug- 
 gested, to wit, the difficulty and seriousness of the questions, 
 to apportion the costs of that action. 
 
 The questions here argued with great elaboration by coun- 
 sel for contestants seem to me disposed of by the department 
 presided over by Judge Hunt, in which the suit of Wright 
 V. Dudley was determined. 
 
 As to the haste with which the suit was brought : It was 
 the duty of the executor to proceed with diligence, as delay 
 might have incurred the loss of property by enabling the 
 grantee to part with it to a purchaser who could not be pur- 
 sued. 
 
 The court considers that the action of Wright v. Dudley 
 was begun and carried on by the plaintiff executor as a duty, 
 and that the expenses incurred and obligations assumed were 
 contracted in good faith. An executor acting in good faith 
 is entitled to the aid of counsel in all litigation concerning 
 the estate: Code Civ. Proc, sec. 1616. 
 
 It being the duty of a representative to defend the estate 
 against claims, or to prosecute suits upon claims, which he 
 believes should be defended or prosecuted, in the exercise of 
 his honest judgment, he should be reimbursed, even though 
 the suit be lost: Re Miller. 4 Redf. 304. 
 
 Mr. McCutchen having appeared in the litigation at the 
 Instance of the executor, ;md having rendered service, is en- 
 titled to be considered in this connection : Estate of Simmons, 
 43 Cal. 543. 
 
 The second objection and exception is overruled and de- 
 nied.
 
 100 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 2. "The Exhibit and Account" of May 3, 1884: 
 
 The paper indorsed "Exhibit and Account of Executors," 
 filed May 3, 1884, does not operate an estoppel upon the ex- 
 ecutor, nor does the "Order Settling Exhibit and Account," 
 filed May 16, 1884, give a dignity to that paper to which it 
 is not inherently entitled. The items thereof may now be 
 impeached. If counsel deem it necessary, let the order set- 
 tling it be set aside. 
 
 3. "The Exhibit and Account of Executor," filed August 
 19, 1884: 
 
 I understood from his remarks upon the hearing that the 
 presentation of this paper by the executor was "experi- 
 mental," merely to raise the points as to whether he had 
 any claims to include in an account. Let him now, there- 
 fore, under the instruction of this opinion as to his powers, 
 duties and rights, prepare and file an account of his admin- 
 istration from the beginning, and, when such account is pre- 
 sented and filed, a day will be set for the hearing, or the ac- 
 count sent to a referee, as to the respective counsel may seem 
 expedient. 
 
 The prayer of the "Petition and Report accompanying 
 Exhibit and Account" should be formally denied, with leave 
 to the executor to file a first and final account, as indicated 
 in the foregoing opinion. 
 
 OPINION on second APPLICATION. 
 
 The argument of the counsel, Mr. Titus, in regard to the 
 compensation of the attorney for the minor heir in the trial 
 of Wright V. Dudley, has convinced this court that it is not 
 competent to consider such claim under section 1718, Code of 
 Civil Procedure, and that the attorney's remuneration must 
 be restricted to probate proceedings. As attorney for minor 
 heirs, there is no authority in the court to allow him for 
 services rendered in the action of Wright v. Dudley; and 
 for the services he did render, he must look to the executor. 
 However harsh this may seem, I am satisfied, upon reargu- 
 ment and reflection, that it is the law.
 
 Estate of Shillaber. 101 
 
 Estate of CYNTHIA HOFF SHILLABER, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 4,015; decided January 7, 1886.] 
 
 Special Administrator. — It is the Duty of a Special Administrator 
 to Collect and preserve, for the executor or administrator, all person- 
 alty and choses of every kind belonging to the decedent and his 
 estate; also to take the charge of, enter upon and preserve from dam- 
 ages, waste and injury the realty. 
 
 Special Administrator — Actions by and Against. — For all purposes 
 of the performance of the duty of a special administrator to collect 
 and preserve the assets, real and personal, of the decedent, and for 
 all necessary purposes, he may commence and maintain or defend 
 suits and other legal proceedings, as in the case of a general adminis- 
 trator. 
 
 Special Administrator — Accounts. — The Accuracy of a special ad- 
 ministrator's account will be tested by strictly legal methods, under 
 the rule of section 1415, Code of Civil Procedure, and his duty as 
 therein found, and as defined in the first and second headnotes above. 
 
 Special Administrator — Allowance for Clerical Assistance. — In this 
 case the court allowed the special administrator for clerical help in 
 collection of rents, and keeping the accounts, four per cent upon the 
 collections; but reserved the right in other cases to deal differently 
 with a similar item. 
 
 Special Administrator. — An Item of Expense for Detective Service, 
 claimed to be incurred for the estate's interest, was in this case dis- 
 allowed by the court. 
 
 Special Administrator — Expenditure on Personalty. — Until distrib- 
 ution, an article of personalty specifically bequeathed by decedent 
 must be treated as part of the estate, and not allowed to deteriorate. 
 Hence, where the special administrator has made an expenditure upon 
 such article to prevent its deterioration, the item should be allowed 
 in his account. 
 
 An Executor is Entitled to the Assistance of Counsel, Even When 
 He is Himself an Attorney; and he will be granted an allowance for 
 counsel employed by him; but in dealing with the question, the court 
 will be mindful of the fact that the executor is an attorney of ability. 
 
 The Administrator was Allowed Counsel Fees, Although His Coun- 
 sel was His Law Partner, in the case at bar, it being proved that in 
 this service such counsel was not the business partner of the admin- 
 istrator. 
 
 Special Administrator — Expenditures for Business Trip. — Where a 
 special administrator has in good faith journeyed to a distant state 
 upon business of the estate, an allowance will be made to him therefor;
 
 102 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 but he will be entitled to no greater remuneration than, in the court's 
 opinion, would be proper for the dispatch of the business of such 
 journey. 
 
 Special Administrator. — For the Compensation of a Special Admin- 
 istrator, the court can accept no other standard than that furnished 
 by section 1618, Code of Civil Procedure (for general administration). 
 Commissions are here allowed on the amount accounted for, includ- 
 ing an additional sum of one-half of such commissions for extra 
 service, as permitted under such section. 
 
 Devisee — Right to Possession. — A Tenant of Realty, specifically de- 
 vised to her for life, is not entitled to possession on testator's death. 
 But as she will be entitled to the rents, issues and profits upon dis- 
 tribution of the estate, her intermediate occupancy might not ordi- 
 narily challenge criticism; yet aliter, if objection made. 
 
 Administrator — Liability for Rents When He Places Devisee in Pos- 
 session. — In the face of objection an administrator will be held ac- 
 countable for the rental value of realty specifically devised by his 
 testator, which he has placed in the possession of the devisee. But 
 where the premises contained certain articles of personalty, which 
 the testator directed to have left there and which the administrator 
 claimed should be cared for, the court will take into account the care 
 bestowed upon the property by the devisee. 
 
 This was a contest to the settlement of the account of the 
 special administrator. Mr. Carroll Cook, the special admin- 
 istrator of the estate (also the nominated executor of de- 
 cedent's will), filed his first and final account as special ad- 
 ministrator upon the twenty-fourth day of September, 1885 ; 
 and on October 5, 1885, written objections thereto were filed 
 by Frances H. Lowndes (a sister of testatrix) in her own 
 right as heir of testatrix, and as guardian of the person and 
 estate of Theodora Lowndes, a minor, interested in the es- 
 tate. The objections were exhaustive, but only those are 
 here (and in the decision) explained which involved some 
 principle or question of law; those not explained being the 
 subject only of some controverted question of fact. 
 
 As to the first objection, it appears that the administra- 
 tor had made an expense of $320 for gardening, etc., with 
 respect to the premises referred to by the court in the 
 consideration of the tenth objection. The objection to this 
 item, so far as it involved a question of law, was that the 
 administrator was blowing hot and cold; claiming that the 
 realty upon which the expense was alleged to have been
 
 Estate of Shillaber. 103 
 
 made had been specifically devised by testatrix, and there- 
 fore the title had vested in the devisee, and the premises 
 constituted no part of the estate; while, on the other hand, 
 contending that the property belonged to the estate for the 
 purpose of its care and preservation during the administra- 
 tion. The court having subsequently, under the tenth ob- 
 jection, held that the premises were part of the estate, and 
 the administrator accountable for their rental value, in ac- 
 cordance with the reason of that ruling, allowed this item 
 as proper from a legal point of view, the property of the 
 expense having been first determined by the court. 
 
 The fifth objection was to an item in the account for 
 services of a detective employed by the administrator and 
 claimed, to be in the interest of the estate and the adminis- 
 tration. The sixth objection was to an item of $60, for 
 repairs to an organ removed by the administrator from the 
 place of its situs at testatrix's death, on account of its con- 
 stant deterioration from want of care, climatic influence, etc. 
 The objection was on the ground that the article had been 
 specifically bequeathed, and the legatee could only claim 
 the gift in the condition in which it was left by the testa- 
 trix, and that it was not the function of the administrator 
 to keep property for legatees in any particular state of 
 preservation. 
 
 The seventh objection was to an item of $500, charged as 
 fees of the attorney tor the administrator. The objection 
 was on the ground that the attorney was a brother and law 
 partner of the administrator; furthermore, that the admin- 
 istrator was himself an attorney, and hence there was no ne- 
 cessity for getting the usual professional assistance, and that 
 even here much of the work of the administration was done 
 by the administrator and not by the attorney. 
 
 The tenth objection was to an item of $2,500, placed at 
 the end of the credit side of the administrator's account 
 as a charge by him as administrator to cover all his services 
 in the special administration of the estate, and to include 
 all his expenses in making a journey to New York (referred 
 to in the opinion) to attend to certain litigation and in- 
 terests there in behalf of the estate, and also including com-
 
 104 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 pensation for time and labor with respect to certain suits 
 to which the estate was a party. 
 
 Wm. Hoff Cook, for special administrator. 
 
 Carroll Cook, special administrator, in pro. per. 
 
 W. S. Wood and B. Noyes, for objectors. 
 
 COFFEY, J. It is the duty of the special administrator 
 to collect and preserve for the executor or administrator all 
 the goods, chattels, debts and effects of the decedent, all 
 incomes, rents, issues and profits, claims and demands of 
 the estate; he must take the charge and management of, 
 enter upon and preserve from damage, waste and injury 
 the real estate, and for any such and all necessary purposes 
 may commence and maintain or defend suits and other legal 
 proceedings as an administrator: Code Civ. Proc, sec. 1415 
 
 The account here under examination runs from and in- 
 cluding February 26, 1885, to and including September 1, 
 1885 — say six months. Its accuracy must be tested by 
 strictly legal methods, under the rule of the foregoing cited 
 section of the code. 
 
 First Objection : Payler payments, numbers 7, 30, 46, 64, 
 78, 92, 99 : disallowed, i. e., objection overruled : Estate of 
 Miner, 46 Cal. 572. 
 
 Second Objection : As to voucher 5 : objection overruled ; 
 item allowed. As to vouchers 23, 26, 28, 45, 56, 71, 91 and 
 96: "When in the care and management of a large estate, 
 it is shown to be impracticable to do without clerical as- 
 sistance to collect rents and keep accounts, the court usually 
 makes some allowance, but the exercise of this discretion 
 should be guarded. The executor is expected to perform 
 some labor, and to use the utmost economy consistent with 
 the protection of the estate intrusted to his custody and 
 care. I have never made such allowances without rigorous 
 proof of necessity, even when no objection was interposed 
 but such allowances have been made in probate courts re- 
 peatedly and in such circumstances as are suggested in this 
 case. Even if proper, however, the charge is out of pro- 
 portion to the result. I shall allow at the rate of four per 
 cent upon the collections; reserving to myself the right in 
 other accounts to deal otherwise with any similar item, and
 
 Estate of Shilljvber. 105 
 
 acting now upon the evidence before me and my present 
 view of the duty. 
 
 Third Objection : Overruled under the evidence. 
 
 Fourth Objection : Overruled under the evidence. 
 
 Fifth Objection: Sustained. The court cannot under- 
 stand the reason or necessity in such a case for such a 
 charge. 
 
 Sixth Objection : Until distribution the organ must be 
 treated as part of the estate, and not allowed to deteriorate. 
 Objection disallowed and overruled. 
 
 Seventh Objection: Attorney's fee, $500. The executor 
 is entitled to such assistance, even when he is himself an at- 
 torney, and he needs other counsel. In this case, while he 
 has been actively participant in all the proceedings, yet the 
 counsel claiming the allowance has done, before the court, 
 work entitling him to consideration, and his evidence is that 
 in this service he is not a business partner of the executor. 
 The executor, however, is a lawyer of competency and ex- 
 perience; that he must expect, hereafter, that the court will 
 consider this fact in dealing with his accounts. In this in- 
 stance I think the item should be allowed. 
 
 Eighth Objection: Overruled. 
 
 Ninth Objection: Overruled. 
 
 Tenth Objection: With reference to this objection the 
 court has given careful attention to the brief presented by 
 the special administrator, and is disposed to consider this 
 claim in the most liberal spirit consistent with its view of 
 the law. The special administrator undoubtedly acted in 
 good faith in journeying to New York in response to the 
 telegram from Buffalo; but he should have consumed no 
 more time than was actually necessary in the discharge of 
 his business, and he is entitled to no more remuneration 
 than, in the opinion of the court, would be proper for the 
 dispatch of his errand to the east. The court regulates his 
 charges in this manner:
 
 106 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 21 days necessarily consumed; loss of time, at 
 
 $20 $420 00 
 
 7 days in New York, at $5 per day; board, etc, 35 00 
 
 $455 00 
 For his compensation as special administrator 
 the court can, in the due exercise of its discretion, 
 accept no other standard than that furnished by 
 section 1618, Code of Civil Procedure, and allow 
 accordingly : 
 
 Commissions on amount accounted for, $10,394 14. 
 
 First $1,000 00 $70 00 
 
 9,000 00 450 00 
 
 394 14 15 77 
 
 $535 77 
 Extra comp., one-half rates 267 88 
 
 $803 65 
 
 $1,258 65 
 
 Tenth objection: While the tenant of the life estate is 
 not entitled to immediate possession, she will be entitled on 
 distribution to the rents, issues and profits; and, ordinarily, 
 her intermediate occupancy might not seem to challenge 
 criticism; but in the face of objection, the court cannot dis- 
 regard the strictly legal aspect of the case; and must, there- 
 fore, hold the administrator accountable for the rental value 
 of the premises ; being disposed, however, to take into ac- 
 count the care bestowed upon the property by the tempo- 
 rary tenant or custodian. In allowing for the first (Payler) 
 items objected to, the court has bestowed some consideration 
 upon this point. The court will hold the administrator for 
 the ascertained rental value of the premises on Sixteenth 
 Street. Let the account of the special administrator be re- 
 stated or amended in accordance with this opinion. 
 
 An Administrator is Entitled to an Allowance for necessary ex- 
 penses incurred in traveling on business connected with the preserva- 
 tion of the estate: Estate of Byrne, 122 Cal. 260, 54 Pac. 957; Es- 
 tate of Rose, 80 Cal. 166, 22 Pac. 86; Eice v. Tilton, 14 Wyo. 101,
 
 Guardianship op Murphy. 107 
 
 82 Pac. 577. Traveling expenses connected with the administration 
 of foreign assets should be allowed out of those assets: Estate of 
 Ortiz, 86 Cal. 316, 21 Am. St. Eep. 44, 24 Pac. 1034. An administra- 
 trix is not entitled to expenses incurred in traveling when taking 
 steps to apply for letters of administration, or in attending the hear- 
 ing of a contest over letters of administration: Estate of Byrne, 122 
 Cal. 260, 54 Pac. 957. 
 
 An Administrator may, Under Some Circumstances, "be Allowed in 
 his accounts for the services of a bookkeeper: Estate of Moore, 72 
 Cal. 335; 13 Pac. 880; or of an expert accountant: Estate of Levinson, 
 108 Cal. 450, 41 Pac. 483, 42 Pac. 479. As a rule, the question 
 whether an administrator is entitled to employ a bookkeeper depends 
 on the circumstances of the estate; and should be left to the discre- 
 tion of the court: Estate of More, 121 Cal. 609, 54 Pac. 97. He can- 
 not charge the estate with the expense of hiring assistance in keeping 
 his ordinary accounts: Lucich v. Medin, 3 Nev. 93, 93 Am. Dec. 376; 
 Steel V. Holladay, 20 Or. 462, 20 Pac. 562. 
 
 In Case an Executor or Administrator is Himself an attorney, he 
 cannot charge the estate with the expense of another attorney to as- 
 sist him in conducting the ordinary administration, unattended with 
 any legal or other complications: Noble v. Whitten, 38 Wash. 262, 
 80 Pac. 451: Estate of Young, 4 Wash. 534, 30 Pac. 643; Estate of 
 Coursen (Cal.), 65 Pac. 965. 
 
 Guardianship op ANNIE MURPHY, Minor. 
 
 [No. 4,385; decided September 4, 1885.] 
 
 Guardianship. — The Probate Court has no Jurisdiction to appoint 
 a guardian for a child who has been awarded to a parent in divorce 
 proceedings, while the divorce court retains the right to control the 
 custody of the child. 
 
 This was an application by the father of Annie Murphy, 
 a minor, to be appointed her guardian. Mary Murphy, the 
 mother of the child, contested the application. 
 
 It appeared that in an action for divorce, pending be- 
 tween the petitioner and contestant, in department 8 of the 
 superior court of San Francisco, the custody of the child had 
 been awarded to the contestant. 
 
 Counsel for contestant claimed that the court granting the 
 divorce, and awarding the custody of the child to one of the
 
 108 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 parties, retained full and exclusive control over the subject 
 matter, and, besides citing numerous authorities, quoted sec- 
 tion 138 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows : 
 
 "In an action for a divorce, the court may, before or after 
 judgment, give such directions for the custody, care and 
 education of the children of the marriage as may seem neces- 
 sary or proper, and may at any time vacate or modify the 
 same. ' ' 
 
 Petitioner's counsel proceeded under sections 1747 et seq., 
 Code of Civil Procedure, relating to the subject of guardian 
 and ward. 
 
 They maintained that the action of the court in the di- 
 vorce proceeding is merely ancillary to the main purpose 
 of the suit — the procurement of a divorce; and that the 
 point in controversy in that proceeding was not as to who 
 should have the custody of the minor — that she was not a 
 party thereto — but merely as to whether one of the spouses 
 was entitled to a divorce, and that therefore the order of 
 department 8 was not conclusive as to the custody of the 
 child, and does not debar the court having the control of 
 minors from exercising its jurisdiction. It may be added 
 that, by rule of the superior court of San Francisco (con- 
 sisting of twelve departments), all probate matters and those 
 relating to the guardianship of minors are assigned to de- 
 partment No. 9, which hears only probate and guardianship 
 proceedings. 
 
 Taylor & Craig, for petitioner. 
 
 Leonard S. Clark, for contestant. 
 
 COFFEY, J. This court cannot entertain jurisdiction 
 while the divorce court still retains the right to control the 
 custody of the minor: Anthony v. Dunlap, 8 Cal. 26. 
 
 Application denied.
 
 Estate of McDougal. 109 
 
 Estate of DAVID McDOUGAL, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 2,278; decided Sept. 12, 1884.] 
 
 Administrator. — A Surviving Wife has the Right to Nominate an 
 administrator of her husband's estate, although she has been removed 
 from her position as executrix of his will because of her permanent 
 removal from the state. 
 
 David McDougal died on August 7, 1882, in San Fran- 
 cisco, a resident thereof, leaving a last will wherein his wife, 
 Caroline M. McDougal, was named as executrix. 
 
 On May 25, 1883, letters testamentary were issued to her; 
 and on October 1, 1883, she left this state for Washington, 
 D. C. 
 
 Thereafter proceedings were instituted under Sections 
 1136 et seq.. Code of Civil Procedure, for the revocation of 
 her letters, on the ground that she had permanently removed 
 from this state, and on July 16, 1884, an order was made 
 removing her from her position as executrix. 
 
 A request in writing by her, for the appointment of W. 
 K. Van Alen as administrator with the will annexed, was 
 subsequently filed, with a petition for his appointment. 
 
 A counter-application was filed, but was denied. The 
 grounds of contest of this application appear from the facts 
 above recited and the opinion. 
 
 P. J. Van Loben Sels, for Mrs. K. C. McDougal. 
 
 J. B. Reinstein, for nominee of surviving wife. 
 
 COFFEY, J. I have read carefully the briefs of respec- 
 tive counsel in these applications, but do not consider it 
 necessary to express any opinion as to the correctness of the 
 conclusions of either; since section 1426 of the Code of Civil 
 Procedure (to which they did not refer in their briefs, but 
 which was discussed orally in open court) disposes of the 
 matter. As the court said at the hearing, it can only exer- 
 cise its discretion under the limitations of the statute, and 
 section 1426 brings this case within the conditions of section 
 1365, Code of Civil Procedure. The conduct of the execu- 
 trix and the cause of her removal do not affect her right of 
 nomination, since the statute does not so declare.
 
 110 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 It does not appear that Van Alen is incompetent under 
 the statute; and this being so, he is entitled as of right, 
 as the nominee of the surviving wife, to letters of administra- 
 tion with the will annexed : Code Civ. Proc., sees. 1365, 1426. 
 
 A Surviving Spouse, though incompetent to act as administrator 
 because of nonresidence, is entitled to nominate some competent person 
 for the position: Estate of Dorris, 93 Cal. 611, 29 Pac. 244; Estate of 
 Healey, 122 Cal. 162, 54 Pac. 736. 
 
 Estate of THOMAS H. BLYTHE, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 2,401; decided February 12, 1885.] 
 
 Coimsel Fees. — The Difficulty and Delicacy of the Court's Duty, in 
 adjusting applications of attorneys for allowance of fees, expressed. 
 
 Attorneys — Duty to Submit to Court. — Among the duties of an at- 
 torney is that of submission to the court in the exercise of a discre- 
 tion not abused, without demur or murmur. He is to advise and 
 counsel simply, leaving the court, in its own way, to come to a con- 
 clusion. 
 
 Counsel Fees. — In the Consideration of Applications for Fees by at- 
 torneys appointed by the court, the appointee and applicant should 
 be especially indulgent to the court which has chosen him in its en- 
 deavor to properly adjust the rights of the applicant. The duty of 
 submission to the court, stated in the second headnote above, is es- 
 pecially applicable to these attorneys. 
 
 Counsel Fees. — Whether an Estate in Probate is Large or Small, 
 whether it may escheat or not, or go to claimants then unknown, the 
 principles of law governing the compensation of an attorney are the 
 same, and should be applied rigorously by the court. 
 
 Counsel Fees. — In Fixing Attorneys' Fees There are no Established 
 Rules; the character and circumstances of every case, founded upon 
 general principles of justice, and the reasonable value of a capable 
 attorney's services, must furnish the rule. 
 
 Counsel Fees. — In Determining the Compensation of an Attorney it 
 has been the practice, and has become the rule of the court, that ex- 
 pert testimony as to the value of the services will not be considered. 
 The judge will determine the matter for himself. 
 
 Administration — Extravagant Costs. — The Impression, Widely Preva- 
 lent, of the extravagant cost of administering estates, referred to and 
 the court's position stated.
 
 Estate of Blythe. Ill 
 
 Attorneys. — The Probate Judge is the Guardian of all Decedents' 
 Estates; but the law contemplates an aid in the selection of a com- 
 petent attorney to protect the court against spurious claimants, or 
 fraudulent devices or practices of any sort. 
 
 Attorneys. — It is the Duty of an Attorney Appointed by the Court 
 in the administration of a decedent's estate, as the legal representa- 
 tive of the heirs, to discover and demonstrate to the court the true 
 heir, and to expose and denounce all pretenders. 
 
 This was an application by John C. Burch, who was the 
 appointee of the court to represent absent and other heirs, 
 for an allowance of $1,750 on account of services performed 
 under his appointment. After overruling a demurrer to the 
 petition, the matter was sent to a referee for adjustment, and 
 was reported back for allowance. The referee's ruling was 
 excepted to, and the opinion below was rendered on a review 
 of the report of the referee, Mr. A. H. Loughborough. 
 
 John A. Wright, for administrator. 
 
 T. I. Bergin, W. H. H. Hart and David McClure (appointee 
 of court), for Florence Blythe. 
 
 John C. Burch, in pro. per. 
 
 COFFEY, J. The adjustment of attorneys' accounts and 
 applications for compensation is one of the most delicate and 
 difficult incidents of the office of judge, particularly in the 
 probate department, where so many such applications are 
 made. The attorney is naturally anxious for a fee, which 
 is sometimes resisted with vigor, and sometimes there is no 
 one to resist, save the court, in the exercise of what it con- 
 ceives to be the interest of the estate. In discharging this 
 duty the court is constantly withstood by practitioners who 
 seem to forget, in the pursuit of their private gain, the higher 
 obligations they are under to the law which permits them to 
 practice, and to the court whose officers they are ; occasionally 
 an attorney appears who considers (or seems to consider) 
 the court as a convenience for him, and who resents the 
 court's regulation of his fees as an exercise of arbitrary au- 
 thority. Such attorneys mistake their vocation or its duties ; 
 they have rights which the court is always careful to regard ; 
 but they have also duties which are the source of those rights,
 
 112 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 and which duties the court will endeavor to see are faithfully 
 performed. 
 
 Among these duties is that of submitting to the court in 
 the exercise of its discretion, when it is not abused, without 
 demur or murmur; but instead of doing so, they undertake 
 to direct the court, instead of simply advising and counsel- 
 ing it, and then leaving the court, in its own way, without 
 molestation or undue urging, to its time for reflection or de- 
 liberation, so that it may come to a correct conclusion free 
 from obstruction or irritation produced by importunity or 
 intercession out of court. 
 
 These remarks are peculiarly applicable to petitions for 
 fees by appointed attorneys, who should be especially indul- 
 gent to the court which has chosen them to perform impor- 
 tant duties ; and the remarks are made now and here, because 
 this is an estate of magnitude and many complications, in 
 which the court is apt to be called upon, and has been called 
 upon, to act on applications for large allowances. Whether 
 the estate be large or small, however; whether it may ulti- 
 mately escheat to the state, or go to some of the present claim- 
 ants, or to others not yet before the court, the principles of 
 law are the same, and should be applied rigorously by the 
 court. In fixing fees there are no established rules; every 
 case, in its character and circumstances, must furnish its 
 own rule, founded upon general principles of justice and 
 the reasonable value of a capable attorney's services. In 
 arriving at such a rule, experience has taught and courts 
 have declared — this particular probate department repeat- 
 edly — that so-called expert testimony is unreliable ; and the 
 judge should trust to his own knowledge, experience and 
 judgment in establishing the value of services. The judge 
 here presiding has not (except in two or three earlier in- 
 stances) called upon experts in such cases, and where in some 
 instances the applicant called in other attorneys to testify, 
 the court has discarded their testimony and substituted its 
 own judgment. It is not necessary to discuss further the 
 reason of this practice; the supreme court has declared it to 
 be correct, and that is the end of the controversy. But the 
 court has so serious a responsibility, that it is bound to de-
 
 Estate op Blythe. 113 
 
 cide these questions (as all other questions arising) with the 
 utmost care and deliberation; and even then it is not free 
 from liability to error. 
 
 Estates, large or small, complex or simple, should be ad- 
 ministered with efficiency and economy; and the impression, 
 too widely prevalent, of the extravagant expenses of admin- 
 istering estates should not be countenanced by the court, nor 
 in any wise encouraged by its conduct. Some of the ap- 
 plications are extraordinary in their amount, and, even when 
 largely reduced by the court, seem excessive ; but the court 
 does its utmost to keep the cost of administration within 
 bounds, to do justice to worthy and capable attorneys, and 
 to save all that can be saved to the widows and orphans and 
 absent persons who rely upon the protection afforded to 
 them by the law and the courts. Unpleasant as it may be to 
 contend with counsel in this regard, this court intends to be 
 firm and inflexible in the application of the principles herein 
 suggested. 
 
 Now, as to this particular application : The attorney ap- 
 plicant is a practitioner of large experience, of high repute 
 for integrity, and possessing the confidence of the court with 
 regard to his capacity (as is amply evidenced by his selec- 
 tion by the court), and entitled to adequate compensation 
 for his services; but what "adequate" compensation is may 
 constitute matter of difference between him and the court, 
 without reflection upon him. The claim he made here for 
 compensation was referred, with other matters, to the referee, 
 who is also a lawyer of ability, approved integrity and large 
 experience, just and fair in his reasonings and conclusions, 
 and moderate in his estimate of the value of services; and 
 he has undertaken to make, and has made, a thorough ex- 
 amination of the claim, and as a conclusion therein recom- 
 mended its allowance, approval and payment. 
 
 In his report the referee says, that at first it seemed to 
 him that the compensation sought seemed very large, but 
 after mature reflection and careful consideration of all the 
 circumstances, he concludes that.it was well earned; the ref- 
 eree further says, in alluding to the appropriateness of the 
 appointment, that this is an extraordinary case; a very large 
 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. I — 8
 
 114 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 estate is waiting for the legal heirs, the decedent left no will, 
 his domestic relations are involved in doubt ; apart from his 
 vast property he was an obscure man, it is not even known 
 with certainty where he was born, or under what name ; his 
 family source is difficult to discover, and of the numerous 
 and conflicting claimants who have appeared and asserted 
 rights to the inheritance, not one is an admitted heir, and 
 the pretensions of each must be scrutinized. As the referee 
 remarks, the judge is the guardian of this estate, but the 
 code contemplates that he shall be aided by a competent at- 
 torney to protect the court against spurious claimants or 
 fraudulent devices or practices of any sort, such as are, in 
 every court and in every country, constantly attempted and 
 occasionally consummated. It is the duty of such attorney 
 to expose and denounce the pretender claimant and to dis- 
 cover and demonstrate the true heir. The referee finds that 
 the attorney appointed has discharged his duty, so far. dili- 
 gently and efficiently, and has rendered all the services men- 
 tioned in his petition, and that he is, therefore, entitled to 
 the amount claimed as the reasonable value of his services. 
 Now, expressly reserving the question of the attorney's 
 right to pay for services rendered in the litigation in another 
 department, and also expressly declaring that any future ap- 
 plication for compensation shall not be predicated upon the 
 allowance here made, the court considers that the judgment 
 of the referee, based upon a complete examination of the 
 evidence, and fortified by his own matured experience, 
 ripened knowledge and discriminating intellect, should be 
 respected, and at the same time the court desires counsel dis- 
 tinctly to understand that all applications of this nature will 
 be subjected to rigid scrutiny, and that expert evidence will 
 not be invited, for reasons already set forth with sufficient 
 succinctness. Eeport confirmed.
 
 Estate op Blythe (No. 2). 115 
 
 Estate of THOMAS H. BLYTHE, Deceased (No. 2). 
 
 [No. 2,401; decided January 6, 1885.] 
 
 Attorney for Absent Heirs — Power to Appoint. — Under section 1718, 
 Code of Civil Procedure, the probate court has power to appoint an 
 attorney for absent or unrepresented heirs of a decedent. 
 
 Attorney for Absent Heirs — Discretion in Appointing. — Although 
 the probate court has power to appoint an attorney for unrepresented 
 heirs of a decedent, the power should be prudently and discreetly ex- 
 ercised, in the interests of the estate and of all concerned. The rule 
 is, never to make such an appointment unless the necessity is mani- 
 fest. 
 
 Attorney for Absent Heirs When no Known Heirs. — The probate 
 court generally refrains from appointing an attorney for unrepre- 
 sented parties when there are no known heirs; not doubting its power, 
 but questioning the expediency of its exercise in such cases. 
 
 Attorney for Absent Heirs — Compensation. — An attorney appointed 
 to represent heirs is entitled to an allowance at any time after ser- 
 vices rendered, and during the administration. An application for 
 such an allowance before final settlement of the estate is not prema- 
 ture. 
 
 Attorney for Absent Heirs. — The Compensation of an Attorney ap- 
 pointed by the court to represent heirs must be paid out of the es- 
 tate, as necessary expenses of administration. Upon distribution of 
 the estate the attorney's fee may be charged against the party rep- 
 resented by him. 
 
 This was a demurrer to an application by Jno. C. Biirch, 
 appointed by the court to represent absent and unrepresented 
 heirs, for an allowance of $1,750, on account of services per- 
 formed by him under the appointment. It was claimed that 
 such an allowance could not be granted during the adminis- 
 tration — not until distribution of the estate; hence the de- 
 murrer. 
 
 T. I. Bergin, W. H. H. Hart, and D. McClure, for demur- 
 rant. 
 
 Jno. C. Burc'h, for claimant, in pro. per. 
 
 COFFEY, J. This court was rather reluctant to make 
 any appointment in the first instance, but upon motion of 
 one of the many attorneys for the numerous claimants, none 
 of the other attorneys dissenting audibly, or objecting other-
 
 116 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 wise until now, the appointment was made of a competent 
 and reputable practitioner at this bar. This court never 
 makes such appointments unless the necessity is manifest. 
 
 The court has the power to make such appointment under 
 section 1718, Code of Civil Procedure, although it is a power 
 that should be prudently and discreetly exercised, with a 
 view to the conservation of the estate and of the interests of 
 all concerned in it; and this court trusts it has so exercised 
 the power conferred upon it by the code in this as in other 
 instances. The court has in most cases refrained from ap- 
 pointing attorneys where there were no known heirs, not 
 doubting its power, but questioning the expediency of its ex- 
 ercise in such cases ; but in some other cases the result of the 
 appointment was the discovery of true heirs, who, except for 
 the action of the court, might have lost their inheritance. 
 That the power resides in the court to make such appoint- 
 ment is hardly dubitable: Stuart v. Allen, 16 Cal. 504, 76 
 Am. Dec. 551 ; Estate of Gasq. 42 Cal. 288 ; Estate of Simmons, 
 43 Cal. 547; Gurnee v. Maloney, 38 Cal. 87, 99 Am. Dec. 
 352. 
 
 This application is not premature. The attorney is en- 
 titled to an allowance at any time after services rendered: 
 Estate of Simmons, 43 Cal. 543. 
 
 The attorney may receive a fee, to be fixed by the court, 
 for his services, which must be paid out of the funds of the 
 estate as necessary expenses of administration, and upon 
 distribution may be charged to the party represented by the 
 attorney: Code Civ. Proc, sec. 1718. 
 
 The fee may be "paid" at any time prior to the "distribu- 
 tion," and then "charged" to the party represented: Es- 
 tate of Garraud, 36 Cal. 278. 
 
 Mr. Burch was appointed according to law; has rendered 
 services to the estate in pursuance of such appointment, and 
 is entitled to compensation therefor; the measure of which 
 compensation was referred to the referee, from whom it was 
 temporarily taken by the order of suspension of his proceed- 
 ings, and to whom it should now be restored. Let it be re- 
 stored; and the referee is ordered to take testimony in this 
 regard and report thereupon at his convenience.
 
 Estate of Fitzpatrick. 117 
 
 Estate of ANN FITZPATRICK, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 2,623; decided May 19, 1885.] 
 
 Funeral Expenses. — The Surviving Husband is Liable for the fun- 
 eral expenses of his wife, where he has resources sufficient to respond. 
 
 Ann Fitzpatrick, a married woman, died intestate, on May 
 27, 1883, in San Francisco, a resident thereof, leaving sepa- 
 rate estate therein. 
 
 She left a surviving husband, Patrick D. Fitzpatrick, and 
 also a sister named Bridget Curley, as her heirs. 
 
 Letters of administration were duly issued to the surviv- 
 ing husband on July 19, 1883. 
 
 On March 26, 1885, the administrator filed his final ac- 
 count, which contained an item of $284 for the funeral ex- 
 penses of his deceased wife. The sister of the decedent ob- 
 jected to this item, on the ground that the surviving hus- 
 band is liable therefor, he having the pecuniary ability to 
 pay, and it being averred that he had such ability. The ob- 
 jection was sustained, and the item disallowed. 
 
 Matt. I. Sullivan and J. E. Abbott, for administrator. 
 
 E. N. Deuprey and J. M. Burnett, for contestant. 
 
 COFFEY, J. I am unable to find any authority any- 
 where exempting the surviving husband from liability for- 
 the funeral expenses of the deceased wife, where he has re-, 
 sources sufficient to respond; and the court is destitute of 
 discretion in such case : Garvey v. McCue, 3 Redf . 315. 
 
 Services Rendered by Physicians and Undertakers to a married 
 woman should be paid by her husband, if he is able to pay them, 
 rather than out of her estate: Estate of Weringer, 100 Cal. 345, 84 
 Pac. 825; note in 98 Am. St. Rep. 647; Constantinides v. Walsh, 146 
 Mass. 281, 4 Am. St. Rep. 311, 15 N. E. 631; Gallaway v. Estate of ; 
 McPherson, 67 Mich. 546, 11 Am. St. Rep. 596, 35 N. W. 114.
 
 118 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 Estate of WM. H. WALLACE, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 1,198; decided January 28, 1884.] 
 
 A Distribution of a Partnership Interest, owned by the estate, may 
 be ordered without a previous accounting by the surviving partners 
 to the administratrix. 
 
 Distribution Disposes of the Subject Matter, and Nothing Remains 
 within the jurisdiction of the court, except to compel obedience to 
 its decree, when necessary. 
 
 An Administratrix must be Held to have Concurred, as such, in a 
 request made by her in her own behalf as widow and as guardian of 
 a minor heir. 
 
 An Administratrix, as Such, is Estopped from Attacking a Decree 
 Made upon Her Request, as widow and as guardian of a minor heir, 
 and concurred in by her as administratrix. 
 
 Wm. H. Wallace died intestate in San Francisco, on Octo- 
 ber 2, 1881. On October 24, 1881, letters of administration 
 were duly issued to his widow, Emeline Wallace. 
 
 He left him surviving, as his heirs, his widow and two chil- 
 dren, Cora A. and Wm. H. Wallace, Jr., the latter a minor. 
 
 Mrs. Wallace was also appointed guardian of her minor 
 son. 
 
 The estate was the owner of a one-third interest in the 
 firm of Sisson, Wallace & Co., composed at the time of de- 
 cedent's death of A. W. Sisson, C. W. Crocker and said Wm. 
 H. Wallace. 
 
 An inventory and appraisement, in which the interest of 
 the estate in this firm was set out, was duly filed. 
 
 The administratrix entered into negotiations with the sur- 
 viving partners for the sale to them of the interest of the 
 estate in said partnership. 
 
 The result of these negotiations was that on May 2, 1882, 
 the widow, for herself, and as guardian of her minor son 
 and also the daughter of the decedent, filed a petition for 
 the distribution to them, of the interest of the decedent in 
 said partnership, in the proportions to which they were re- 
 spectively entitled. 
 
 The parties all appeared before the Judge then presiding 
 in Department No. 9 (the Hon. Jno. F. Finn), in his cham-
 
 Estate of Wallace. 119 
 
 bers, and explained to him the purpose of the application for 
 distribution, namely, to sell to the surviving partners the in- 
 terest of the estate in said firm, and the same met with his 
 approval. 
 
 Thereupon, on May 15, 1882, the court rendered its decree, 
 listributing said interest to said heirs as prayed for. 
 
 The administratrix delivered to the distributees their sev- 
 'iral shares, according to said decree, and on June 2, 1882, 
 I he widow and her daughter conveyed all their right, title 
 and interest in said firm to said surviving partners. 
 
 The widow, also, as guardian of her minor son, obtained 
 an order of court authorizing her, as such guardian, to sell 
 said son's interest in said firm under the decree of distribu- 
 tion, and accordingly did so, which sale was thereafter duly 
 confirmed. 
 
 Thereafter the administratrix became dissatisfied with the 
 sale, claiming that certain matters were misrepresented to 
 her, and also that she was compelled to submit to the terms 
 of the surviving partners, and on October 26, 1883, she ob- 
 tained an order for them to show cause why they should not 
 render to her an account of the business, property and affairs 
 of the said copartnership. 
 
 The application for the order was based upon section 1585, 
 Code of Civil Procedure. 
 
 Counsel for the administratrix claimed that the decree of 
 distribution above mentioned was prematurely made, and 
 without authority of law, and void, and also that the court 
 had no jurisdiction to distribute until a partnership account- 
 ing had been rendered, and that until then there wer»' no 
 assets in the hands of the administratrix. 
 
 A. N. Drown, for administratrix, petitioner, 
 
 Mastick, Belcher & Mastick, for respondents. 
 
 COFFEY, J. 1. The court is of opinion that the decree of 
 distribution of ^lay 15, 1882, was properly made, and was 
 within the jurisdiction of this court. I cannot assent to the 
 view of the counsel for the petitioner upon this point. 
 
 2. Having by that decree disposed of the subject matter, 
 nothing remains within the jurisdiction of this court, except
 
 120 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 to compel obedience to the decree, in case it should have been 
 disobeyed, which is not the case. 
 
 3. The petitioner is estopped, as administratrix, by that 
 decree, from complaining of the exercise of a power pos- 
 sessed by the court and invoked upon her own request in be- 
 half of herself as widow, and as guardian of the minor, and 
 by the adult child, and in which, as administratrix, she must 
 be held to have concurred. 
 
 No other result can be reached by the court consistently 
 with my opinion of the law or of the principles of equity. 
 Order discharged. 
 
 Estate of CYNTHIA HOFF SHILLABER, Deceased 
 
 (No. 2). 
 
 [No. 4,015; decided July 14, 1887.] 
 
 Administrator — Allowance for Traveling Expenses. — Where an ad- 
 ministrator has, in good faith, journeyed to a distant state upon busi- 
 ness of the estate, and has incurred an attorney's charge in 
 connection therewith, an allowance will be made to him therefor; 
 and this whether or not he misconceived his legal duty. 
 
 Executor — Insurance — Proof of Loss. — It is an executor's duty to 
 prepare proofs of loss in case of a destruction of insured property 
 and hence he will not be allowed a charge incurred for having such 
 proofs prepared. 
 
 Executor — Costs of Copying Papers. — All proceedings necessary to 
 be taken by the executor in the administration of the estate are 
 part of his duty, and any papers drawn in connection therewith are 
 covered by the statutory compensation provided for his services; and 
 the costs of engrossing or copying the same are not taxable against 
 the estate. 
 
 Executor — Allowance for Clerical Help. — When, in a large estate, 
 the impracticability is shown of doing without clerical assistance to 
 collect rents and keep accounts, the court usually makes some allow- 
 ance therefor; but guardedly, and never without rigorous proof of 
 necessity, although no objection be interposed. 
 
 The Administrator may be Allowed a Charge for Costs Paid in 
 Serving Notices required by law to oust a defaulting tenant, and al- 
 though paid to an agent of the estate, receiving a compensation for 
 collection of the rents.
 
 Estate op Shillaber. 121 
 
 An Item in an Account for "Executor's Loss of Time" will be 
 stricken out. 
 
 Appraisers. — Where Compensation of Appraisers has been Fixed af- 
 ter Notice to all parties interested, the question will be thereafter 
 treated as res judicata. 
 
 Appraisers. — It is the Duty of Appraisers, in all cases where their 
 labor extends over a number of days, to preserve a minute account 
 of their services. 
 
 An Executor is Entitled to the Assistance of Counsel, even When 
 He is Himself an Attorney; but in dealing with the question the court 
 will be mindful of the fact that the executor is an attorney of abil- 
 ity. So, in this case, conforming to this rule and qualification, the 
 court reduced the attorney's charge by one-third. 
 
 Executor — Allowance for Counsel Fees. — In the case at bar the 
 executor was allowed an item for counsel fees, although his counsel 
 was his law partner, it being proved that in this service such coun- 
 sel was not the business partner of the executor. 
 
 Executor. — An Item for Commissions of an Executor, found in an 
 annual account by him, will be disallowed. Allowance of an exec- 
 utor's statutory commissions is authorized only upon settlement of 
 his final account in the administration. 
 
 There was a contest arising upon objections to the settle- 
 ment of the first annual account of the executor. ]\Ir. Carroll 
 Cook, as executor, filed his first annual account on Septem- 
 ber 13, 1886, and upon the twenty-seventh day of September, 
 1886, written objections were filed by Frances H. Lowndes 
 (a sister of the above-named testatrix) in her own right as 
 an heir, and also as guardian of the person and estate 
 of Theodora Lowndes, a minor, a party interested in the 
 estate of said decedent. After sustaining, as to one point, 
 a demurrer to tlje objections (on October 8, 1886), the hear- 
 ing was had, extending over a considerable period of time; 
 final argument being heard on March 24, 1887. Such state- 
 ment of the objections and items of the account referred to 
 in the opinion is here made, as is considered to be helpful 
 to a more complete understanding of the judge's decision. 
 
 As to the first objections considered, respecting certain 
 telegrams, it appeared that the executor was absent from 
 San Francisco, and telegraphed certain instructions respect- 
 ing affairs of the estate. As to the amount paid Josiah Cook, 
 an attorney at Buffalo, it appeared that at the time of dece-
 
 122 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 dent's death a certain suit began in New York state was 
 pending against her, and, in answer to a telegram from rela- 
 tives of decedent's family, the executor went on to New York 
 in the belief that some immediate necessity existed for the 
 sending of the telegram, which called for his prompt appear- 
 ance in New York. For the contestants to the account, it 
 was urged that no necessity of attention could arise with 
 respect to that suit or matters involved in it, because the suit 
 suspended by decedent's death, and could only be revived by 
 instituting an administrator in New York, and having him 
 substituted in the suit; furthermore, the whole matter of the 
 suit was beyond the jurisdiction of this court, and the forum 
 of this administration, and so no part of the executor's duty. 
 The court took the view, however, that the executor should 
 be protected in his action, it having been taken in good 
 faith, although under an erroneous impression of the law. 
 
 The items of moneys paid O'Beirne and Jewett, and dis- 
 allowed by the judge, deserve attention, as they involve an 
 erroneous impression on the part of the executor, not so 
 uncommon, perhaps, in probate proceedings, as might be 
 wished on the part of the court, who is often left to pick 
 out objectionable items of a like character without any help 
 from observing counsel in opposing interests. 
 
 The item of $2 paid O'Beirne was for making a "fair 
 copy" of the executor's account; the item of $5.50 for copy- 
 ing the executor's amendments to a certain statement on 
 appeal; and the item of $16, for copying the inventory filed 
 in the estate and a brief presented to the judge. The item 
 of $34 paid Jewett was for making a copy of all proceedings 
 and papers of record in the administration, which copy the 
 executor wanted for his convenience. 
 
 The rejection of these items was, as stated in the head- 
 note, on the ground that the subject matter was within the 
 line of the executor's duty, and so was covered by the com- 
 pensation, and commissions provided by law. If, e. g., it was 
 part of the executor's duty to file an account, he could not 
 make a charge for moneys, paid in engrossing that; neither 
 could he ask the estate to pay for any copy thereof he should
 
 Estate of Shillaber. 123 
 
 desire to keep; all these items disallowed are upon this legal 
 ground. 
 
 The facts as to all other items objected to are sufficiently- 
 stated in the opinion of the court. 
 
 The legal propositions contained in the second, fifth, sixth, 
 eleventh and twelfth headnotes were previously announced 
 January 7, 1886, in a decision delivered in the same estate, 
 upon the settlement of the executor's final account in the 
 special administration, reported ante as Estate of Shillaber 
 (No. 1). 
 
 William Hoff Cook, for executor. 
 
 Carroll Cook, executor, in pro. per. 
 
 W. S. Wood, for objections. 
 
 B. Noyes, also for objections. 
 
 COFFEY, J. Objections sustained to items for telegrams 
 July 6th, $1.30; July 6th, 50c.; July 6th, 75c.; July 6th, 
 50c. ; July 7th, 85c. ; July 9th, 35c. ; July 9th, 25c. 
 
 Fifteen per cent should be taken from all premiums of 
 insurance, it appearing from the testimony that Mr. Gun- 
 ther was agent for the estate, and that he received, or is 
 about to receive, not less than that amount of premiums as 
 commissions for procuring the insurance. 
 
 As to the $100 paid to Josiah Cook, an attorney at Buffalo, 
 the court repeats what it said with reference to the special ad- 
 ministrator in a similar connection, that, having acted in 
 good faith in journeying to New York, in response to the tele- 
 gram from Buffalo, he should be allowed whatever proper 
 expense was incurred in that regard; and, whether or not he 
 was mistaken in his view of the law, the court esteems it just 
 to allow this item. 
 
 Item, August 31st, E. W. Gunther $50, for preparing 
 proofs of loss. I do not think this is a proper charge against 
 the estate, for the reason that, if I correctly understand it, 
 it is the duty of the executor to make and prepare such 
 proofs. 
 
 Items for September 25th, J. F. 'Beirne, $2 ; September 
 30th, J. F. 'Beirne, $5.50; October 3d, George Jewett, $34; 
 December 14th, J. F. 'Beirne, $16 should be disallowed.
 
 124 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1, 
 
 With references to the charges of commissions paid E. W. 
 Gunther for collecting rents, as well as the three items of 
 cash paid Mr. Gunther on May 25th, June 5th and 12th for 
 serving notices, the court will repeat what it said upon the 
 settlement of the account of the special administrator: 
 "When in the care and management of a large estate it is 
 shown to be impracticable to do without clerical assistance 
 to collect rents and keep accounts, the court usually makes 
 some allowance, but the exercise of this discretion should be 
 guarded. 
 
 "The executor is expected to perform some labor and to 
 use the utmost economy consistent with the protection of the 
 estate entrusted to his custody and care. I have never 
 made such allowances without rigorous proof of necessity, 
 even when no objection was interposed; but such allowances 
 have been made in probate courts repeatedly under such cir- 
 cumstances as are suggested in this case. 
 
 "Even if proper, however, the charge is out of proportion 
 to the result. I shall allow at the rate of four per cent up- 
 on collections ; reserving to myself the right in other accounts 
 to deal otherwise with any similar item, and acting now up- 
 on the evidence before me and my present view of duty." 
 
 I am inclined to think that under all the circumstances 
 of this estate it is reasonable to allow something for such 
 service, but, taking into consideration the relation of the 
 recipient of tliis commission to the executor, three per cent 
 seems to be sufficient. The item is reduced to that amount. 
 The charges for serving notices are allowed. 
 
 With reference to the items embraced under ob.jection 4, 
 so much of the charge as is for executor's loss of time should 
 be struck out; and as for other expenses, for the trip to Los 
 Angeles, while I consider that executors should be more fru- 
 gal in disbursing the moneys of estates, yet in this case it 
 may be that the expenditures were justified by the circum- 
 stances, so I shall disallow objections as to all but what I 
 have herein indicated. . 
 
 As to the charges of the appraisers, I am of opinion that 
 that matter was adjudicated by the order allowing the 
 amount, after notice given, and that, apart from that, while 
 the appraisers should have preserved a minute account of
 
 Estate op Shillaber. 125 
 
 their services, day by day, in this as in all other eases, the 
 court would feel compelled from the evidence, if it consid- 
 ered the matter open for inquiry at this stage, to allow the 
 items. 
 
 As to the ninth objection: "August 25th, William Hoff 
 Cook, services $1,500," the court repeats the language of its 
 opinion in the matter of the account of the special adminis- 
 trator. "The executor is entitled to such assistance, even 
 when he himself is an attorney and he needs other counsel. 
 In this case, while he has been actively participant in all 
 the proceedings, yet the counsel claiming the allowance has 
 done, before the court, work entitling him to consideration, 
 and his evidence is that in this service he is not a business 
 l)artner of the executor. The executor, however, is a lawyer 
 of competency and experience; and he must expect, here- 
 after, that the court will consider this fact in dealing with 
 his accounts." 
 
 So considering in the present instance, the court reduces 
 this item by one-third, making it $1,000. 
 
 With regard to objection 10, commissions of executor. 
 This item is unauthorized by law. 
 
 "An administrator's commissions should not be allowed 
 him in the settlement of his annual account, but when he 
 has rendered his final account": Estate of Minor, 46 Cal. 
 564. 
 
 All objections and exceptions not herein specifically dealt 
 with are overruled and denied. 
 
 For Authorities upon the questions involved in the principal case, 
 see Estate of Shillaber, ante, p. 120, and note. That an adminis- 
 trator may charge the estate with the traveling expenses of his at- 
 torney incurred in preserving the assets of the estate, see Estate of 
 Moore, 72 Cal. 335, 13 Pac. 880; Estate of Byrne, 122 Cal. 260, 54 
 Pac. 957.
 
 126 Coffey ^s Probate Decisions, Vol,. 1. 
 
 Estate of RICHARD T. MAXWELL, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 2,625; decided March 10, 1884.] 
 
 Homestead. — The Probate Court must, upon proper application, 
 set apart to the widow a homestead, if none has been selected during 
 the lifetime of the decedent. It has no discretion in the premises. 
 
 Homestead. — It does not Impair or Diminish the Right of the 
 Widow to have a homestead set apart that there are no minor chil- 
 dren. 
 
 Homestead. — Even if the Testator Devises His Entire Estate, which 
 was separate property, his widow will still be entitled to a homestead. 
 
 Homestead. — If a Homestead is Selected from the Separate Property 
 of the decedent, the court can set it apart only for a limited period, 
 to be designated in the order. 
 
 The above-named decedent left certain real property in 
 Napa county. 
 
 Two days before his death he entered into what he sup- 
 posed to be a valid marriage with a woman who called her- 
 self Miss Elena Donnelly. 
 
 After his death a sister of the deceased claimed that Miss 
 Donnelly had a husband living at the time she entered into 
 the pretended marriage with decedent, and that in conse- 
 quence such marriage was void. This marriage, however, 
 is immaterial here, as this fact, if it existed, had not been 
 discovered at the time of the application for a homestead. 
 
 On October 30, 1883, I\Irs. Elena Maxwell, alleging her- 
 self to be the widow of the decedent, filed an application 
 that a homestead be set apart to her out of this Napa prop- 
 erty. 
 
 Appraisers were appointed to select the homestead, which 
 they did, appraising it at $5,000. 
 
 Previous to this alleged marriage with the applicant, the 
 decedent had been married and divorced. In the matter of 
 this divorce the parties settled their property rights, which 
 settlement was made a part of the divorce decree. 
 
 By the terms of this settlement Mrs. M. W. Maxwell, the 
 divorced wife, released all claim to the testator's property, 
 and he agreed to pay her $125 per month during her life, 
 and as security for such payment executed a mortgage up- 
 on his Napa property.
 
 Estate of Maxwell. 127 
 
 The testator left a will, in which it was provided that the 
 monthly income from the property, after payment of this 
 charge of $125 per month upon it, should be equally divided 
 between ]\Iiss Donnelly and one Miss Margaret McKenzie. 
 
 On January 28, 1884, Miss McKenzie filed a contest to the 
 application for a homestead, alleging the above facts in re- 
 gard to the charge of $125 per month upon the property, 
 and that she was a legatee, and further that there was no 
 issue of the marriage of Miss Donnelly with the testator, 
 and that the Napa property was his separate estate, that the 
 applicant and decedent never lived upon the land or oc- 
 cupied it as a homestead, and that it was of greater value 
 than $5,000; that the portion selected as a homestead was 
 the most valuable portion of the property, and that the in- 
 come from the remainder was insufficient to pay the monthly 
 allowance to Mrs. M. W. Maxwell. 
 
 On January 19, 1884, the executors also filed objections 
 to the application, alleging that it was the desire of the de- 
 cedent that the lands should not be sold. 
 
 On March 14, 1884, the court made an order setting apart 
 a homestead to the applicant during her widowhood. 
 
 T. I. Bergin, for applicant, Mrs. Elena Maxwell. 
 
 Daniel Rogers, for executors, in opposition. 
 
 A. F. Morrison, for Miss Margaret McKenzie, legatee, also 
 in opposition. 
 
 COFFEY, J. There is a proper petition before the court. 
 If there were a defect of signature, it was cured under the 
 Code (Code Civ. Proc, sec. 473.) by leave of the court. 
 
 The evidence of Appraiser Cornwell, a highly respecta- 
 ble citizen and property owner of Napa county, entirely 
 disinterested and perfectly conversant with the circum- 
 stances of the Maxwell Ranch, is clear that the land se- 
 lected can be segregated without detriment to the rest of the 
 ranch, or impairment of any right in others than the ap- 
 plicant here. 
 
 This court must, upon proper application, set apart to 
 the widow a homestead, if none has been selected in life- 
 time of decedent. The court has no discretion to deny the
 
 128 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 application : Estate of Ballentine, 45 Cal. 699 ; Estate of Mc- 
 Cauley, 50 Cal. 546; Mawson v. Mawson, 50 Cal. 539. 
 
 It does not impair or diminish the right of the widow 
 that there be no minor children. The homestead is to be 
 set apart to the survivor. It is immaterial that the petition 
 be on behalf of the widow alone. It could not here be other- 
 wise. Her status is that of the ''surviving wife" (Code 
 Civ. Proc, sec. 1465). If a testator devised his entire estate 
 — his separate property — his widow would still be entitled 
 to a homestead: Estate of Moore, 57 Cal. 443. 
 
 If the property set apart be selected from the separate 
 property of the decedent, the court can only set it apart for 
 a limited period, to be designated in the order: Code Civ. 
 Proc, sec. 1468; Estate of Lord, 2 West Coast Rep. 131; 
 Lord V. Lord ; 65 Cal. 84, 3 Pac. 96. 
 
 It is suggested that there is a crop of wheat sown on the 
 land. The crop should be reserved. 
 
 Application granted. 
 
 The Principal Case is followed in Estate of Tate, post, p. 217. 
 
 Estate and Guardianship of WM. A. WHITE, Minor. 
 [No. 3,411; decided September 3, 1884.] 
 
 Marital Obligation — Filial Devotion. — A husband should not allow 
 the duty he owes to his wife to be overcome by his love for his 
 parents. Where one's marital obligation comes into conflict with his 
 filial devotion, the latter should give way to the former. 
 
 Guardianship. — Assuming that a Father's Right to the Custody of 
 his child revives upon the death of the mother, who had been 
 awarded the custody under a divorce decree, yet it must be shown 
 that the minor's interest will be conserved by recognizing the father's 
 right. 
 
 Guardianship. — Where a Husband Deserts His Wife, who is left 
 to care and provide for their infant child, this will be considered as 
 an abandonment of the child, upon the father's application for guar- 
 dianship after the mother's death. 
 
 Guardianship. — Reluctant as the Court Always is to Interfere with 
 a Father's natural right to his child's custody, it will do so where 
 the child's interest demands.
 
 Guardianship of White. 129 
 
 Guardianship. — In the Case at Bar the Court Refused Guardian- 
 ship of a minor of divorced parents to its father, applying after the 
 death of the mother, and granted letters to the maternal grandmother 
 of the minor, for the following reasons: The child had been awarded 
 to the mother by a divorce decree against the father; the father 
 never provided for the child, except when compelled by judicial pro- 
 cess; he never showed any interest in the child from the time of 
 his desertion of the mother, and by his continued course of conduct 
 manifested a lack of paternal instinct; the maternal grandmother 
 had received the mother and child when deserted by the father, and 
 had ever afterward given them shelter and assistance, and she was 
 the nominee of the mother, by the latter 's dying request. 
 
 H. C. Firebaugh, for first application. 
 K. M. Smith, for second application. 
 
 COFFEY, J. We have here two applications for letters 
 of guardianship of the person of Wm. C. A. White, a minor. 
 The first application was filed on behalf of Mrs. Ellen 
 Doran, the maternal grandmother of the minor; the second 
 by Wm. F. White, the father of the minor, who was mar- 
 ried to the minor's mother April 13, 1879, separated from 
 her July, 1880, four months after the birth of the child, 
 which occurred April 2, 1880; subsequent to the separation, 
 a divorce was obtained by the mother of the minor on the 
 ground of the father's desertion of her; child awarded to 
 mother. The mother died May 22, 1884, prior to which time 
 the father married again. 
 
 The father of the minor appears to be a respectable 
 young man, engaged in a responsible position for many 
 years, earning for about six years of that time $100 per 
 month, a salary sufficient for the maintenance of his small 
 family in comfort. Between the time of the separation, 
 July, 1880, and October, 1882, and while Mr. White was in 
 possession of abundant means, he contributed nothing to 
 the support of his child, and then (October 9, 1882) only 
 under judicial process and constraint of court. It appears 
 in evidence that, when Mr. White married, he took his wife 
 to his mother's house, and owing to inability to live amicably 
 with her mother in law, the wife left there and went with 
 her child of four months to her own mother's home, where 
 she remained until the moment of her death, May 22, 1884. 
 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. I — 9
 
 130 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 The minor's mother supported herself and child by prose- 
 cuting the vocation of bookbinder, and was expert and in- 
 dustrious always, except when her health compelled her to 
 suspend work, and sometimes even when in ill health. Ac- 
 cording to all accounts in evidence, she was a most exem- 
 plary woman, a good wife, a dutiful daughter and an 
 affectionate mother. She offered to live with her husband 
 and to provide for her mother in law, but her husband 
 ''wouldn't have it." The husband seemed to care more for 
 his mother than for his wife. 
 
 While his filial devotion is not to be censured in itself, 
 when it came into conflict with his marital duty he should 
 have observed the canonical command and the Scriptural 
 injunction, and, if the occasion demanded, to leave his father 
 and mother, and all the rest of his kin. and to "cleave unto 
 his wife": Eph. v., 31. His regard for his mother should 
 not have overcome his obligation to his wife. He allowed 
 his wife to go away elsewhere for shelter with a four 
 months' old infant, and then for over two years, in more 
 or less infirm health, to labor arduously at a binding busi- 
 ness, only yielding pecuniary aid when he was coerced to 
 comply with the order of the court (awarding to her the 
 custody of the child, and $15 per month alimony), under the 
 fear of punishment for contempt of court. Whatever the 
 extraneous influence operating upon his mind, he showed no 
 interest in nor affection for his wife and child, from the time 
 of separation, until after the death of his wife; and then he 
 claims custody of the child as the father, and, therefore, 
 naturally entitled to possession. By decree of court he had 
 been deprived of that possession ; he claims the death of the 
 mother revived his right. Assuming the accuracy of his at- 
 titude, it should be shown that the interest of the minor 
 will be conserved by the recognitioh of the right of the 
 father. In this case it appears that the child is in the same 
 custody that he was placed in by the mother at the age of 
 four months; that the child has been tenderly nurtured, and 
 is and has been treated with the most affectionate care by 
 the petitioner, Mrs. Ellen Doran, the maternal grandmother, 
 a widow with a family of grown children, all of whom.
 
 Guardianship op White. 131 
 
 appear to be respectable persons in comfortable circum- 
 stances, and greatly devoted to the child ; that when the 
 mother died, and while realizing her approaching end, she 
 manifested solicitude as to care of child, and expressed a 
 desire that her mother (Mrs. Ellen Doran) should retain 
 the child ; that practically her mother has cared for the child 
 for years, nursed him and his mother, the deceased Mrs. 
 White, when both were ill, and when the child's life was 
 in danger, procured competent medical attendance, during 
 which time the father, W. F. White, although cognizant 
 of the situation, never went to see the mother or the minor, 
 and made use of expressions indicating (to employ mild 
 terms) an absence of sensibility and sympathy in his rela- 
 tions to the mother and their child. Practically, when Mr. 
 White allowed his wife to go forth from his protection, in 
 delicate health, with her infant, also in delicate health, and 
 to seek her mother's care, which was granted to her, he 
 abandoned his child (as the court had decreed he deserted 
 his wife), and the grandmother, Mrs. Ellen Doran, gave the 
 child a good home, and has ever since that time treated 
 the infant as if she were the mother. The father's natural 
 right must bend to the interest of the child, as the court 
 discerns that interest. Reluctant, as the court always is, to 
 interfere with such natural right, the law and the evidence 
 make clear the duty in this interest. The original award of 
 the custody of the child to the mother; the dying request of 
 that mother in favor of Mrs. Doran ; the long-continued 
 indifference of the father, and his contumacy in complying 
 with the orders of the divorce court; his expressions before 
 the death and during the illness of the wife (before and 
 after divorce) ; his continued course of conduct manifesting 
 a lack of the paternal instinct — all of these established cir- 
 cumstances warrant the court in granting the prayer of 
 the maternal grandmother, Mrs. Ellen Doran, subject to 
 such limitations in favor of the father's visiting the child 
 as may be consistent with its secure custody and welfare. 
 
 While Parents are Presumed Competent to have Charge of Their 
 Child, and the j)arcntal righl will not lightly be disregarded, never- 
 theless the court, in appointing a guardian, is guided primarily by
 
 132 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 what appears to be for the best interests of the child, and may award 
 it to a third person whenever its well-being demands such a course: 
 See 2 Eoss on Probate Law and Practice, 950; Guardianship of Dan- 
 neker, ante, p. 3, and note. 
 
 Estate of NICHOLAS TREWEEK, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 2,159; decided November 11, 1885.] 
 
 Executor — Failure to Comply •with Decree of Distribution — An exec- 
 utor who refuses to make payment to distributees in accordance 
 with the decree of distribution is punishable for contempt, and he 
 cannot plead inability to pay, when his account on file shows the 
 contrary. 
 
 Nicholas Treweek died in San Francisco on December 30, 
 1882, leaving an olographic will dated April 2, 1882, in 
 which he made his brothers, Francis, John and George Tre- 
 week, and his sisters, Jane Treweek and Elizabeth West, 
 his legatees and devisees. The same persons were his heirs. 
 
 To his brother Francis he left the sum of $5,000, and to 
 each of his other brothers and sisters $2,500, making in all 
 $15,000. He also made all his brothers and sisters his 
 residuary legatees and devisees, share and share alike. 
 
 In this will the testator also named Arthur W. Bowman 
 executor. 
 
 On January 6, 1883, Mr. Bowman filed the will, together 
 with a petition for its probate, and for letters testamentary. 
 
 The petitioner stated the probable value and character 
 of the property of the estate to be about the sum of $15,000 
 in money in his hands, and certain stocks and real property. 
 
 On January 24, 1883, the will was duly admitted to pro- 
 bate, and the petitioner appointed executor, and letters were 
 issued to him on the 29th of the same month. 
 
 An inventory and appraisement was filed in the estate 
 on September 4, 1883, in which the executor stated that 
 part of the estate consisted of about the sum of $16,775.23 
 in money in his hands.
 
 Estate of Treweek. 133 
 
 On January 3, 1884, the executor filed his final account, 
 and a petition for final distribution in accordance with the 
 will. 
 
 In this account he stated the balance of moneys in his 
 hands to be $15,000. 
 
 The account was settled, and decree of distribution made 
 as prayed for on January 15, 1884. 
 
 On June 15, 1885, Lovell Squire, Jr., filed a verified 
 petition reciting the facts above stated, and also alleging 
 that he was the attorney in fact of the distributees; that 
 he had, as such, made demand upon the executor for the 
 sum of $15,000, in accordance with the decree of distribu- 
 tion, and that he had refused to pay, giving as his only 
 ground of refusal that he did not have the money; Mr. 
 Squire therefore prayed that an order be made requiring 
 the executor to show cause why he should not pay the 
 money, or be punished for contempt for his failure to do 
 so. 
 
 The order to show cause was made, and citation issued 
 thereon. 
 
 On July 22, 1885, the executor filed his answer to this 
 petition. He stated in his answer that at the time of the 
 testator's death he. Bowman, owed the sum of $15,000. to 
 the testator for moneys loaned ; that in his petition for pro- 
 bate he alluded to said moneys as moneys in his hands, but 
 as a matter of fact there were no moneys of the estate in his 
 hands, although he was at that time amply able to pay the 
 debt; that after his appointment as executor, the matter 
 remained in precisely the same condition, to-wit : as a debt, 
 he having made no segregation of his moneys, or set any 
 apart to the estate in payment of the debt; that at the time 
 of the distribution the distributees were absent from the state 
 of California, and respondent did not know that they had 
 an agent in this state, and if they had been here he would 
 have paid them out of his general resources; that on October 
 27, 1884, a petition was filed in the superior court of Ala- 
 meda county by certain of his creditors, to have him 
 declared an insolvent, and that on November 10, 1884, he 
 was adjudicated an insolvent, and one Wm. Thomas was 
 appointed his assignee; that his estate was worth at least
 
 134 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 $100,000, and the insolvency proceedings were still pending; 
 and since the filing of the petition in insolvency he had no 
 moneys in his hands, and that his whole estate was in the 
 hands of his assignee; that it was impossible for him, re- 
 spondent, to comply with the decree of distribution, and 
 that this impossibility was the only reason for his failure 
 to comply, and he intended no contempt of or disrespect to 
 the court. 
 
 To this answer a general demurrer was filed by the 
 petitioner, which was sustained on November 11, 1885, with 
 leave to respondent to amend within ten days thereafter. 
 
 Respondent having declined and failed to amend, he was 
 committed for contempt on November 30, 1885. 
 
 Columbus Bartlett, with whom was W. E. Lindenberger, 
 for demurrant. 
 
 E. W. McGraw, for respondent. 
 
 COFFEY, J. The executor is an officer of the court, 
 and as such responsible to the court for failure to comply 
 with the terms of the decree of distribution, which was final 
 and conclusive. It was his duty to make payment as there- 
 in directed: Code Civ. Proc. 1209, 1666, 1721, 1962; Estate 
 of Taylor, Myr. 160 ; Estate of Smith, 53 Cal. 208 ; Estate of 
 Cohn, 55 Cal. 193; Estate of Lacoste, Myr. 68. 
 
 The other authorities cited and considered do not affect 
 the adjudications in this court and state, which seem to me 
 conclusive against respondent. Demurrer sustained, ten 
 days to amend. 
 
 When a Decree of Distribution is Made, it becomes the duty of the 
 executor or administrator to deliver tlie estate to the parties desig- 
 nated by the court: McCabe v. Healy, 138 Cal. 81, 90, 70 Pac. 1008. 
 No special or express order to that effect is authorized or required. 
 Upon the entry of the decree, the law fixes this duty on him. He 
 still remains an officer of the court, subject to its jurisdiction, until 
 his final discharge; and hence the court has authority, if necessary, 
 to compel him, by punishment as for a contempt, to make a delivery 
 to the distributees of their respective shares: Ex parte Smith, 53 
 Cal. 204; Wheeler v. Bolton, 54 Cal. 302; Estate of Kennedy, 129 Cal. 
 384, 62 Pac. 64; Estate of Cohn, 55 Cal. 193; McLaughlin v. Barnes, 
 12 Wash. 373, 41 Pac. 62. And he can take no appeal from an order 
 adjudging him in contempt, and committing him to jail until he com- 
 plies with the decree: Estate of Wittmeier, 118 Cal. 255, 50 Pac. 393.
 
 Estate of Maxwell. 135 
 
 Estate of RICHARD T. MAXWELL, Deceased (No. 2). 
 
 [No. 2,625; decided December 1, 1884. Affirmed, 74 Cal. 384, 16 Pac. 
 
 206.] 
 
 Probate Court — Jurisdiction. — The Superior Court, sitting in pro- 
 bate, has no greater jurisdiction tban the probate court which it suc- 
 ceeds. 
 
 Probate Court — Jurisdiction. — The Superior Court, while engaged in 
 the exercise of probate jurisdiction, cannot entertain a cause of ac- 
 tion to obtain relief upon the ground of fraud, such as a petition to 
 disregard and declare void a devise alleged to have been procured 
 through fraud, and to make distribution to the heirs. 
 
 Richard Tybout Maxwell died in San Francisco on June 
 29, 1883. 
 
 He left an olographic will, bearing date July 23, 1882. 
 Daniel Rogers and Charles Ashton were therein named as 
 executors, and upon petition filed on July 5, 1883, and due 
 proceedings had, the will was admitted to probate and the 
 executors named appointed, and letters testamentary issued 
 to them on July 17, 1883. 
 
 In the petition for probate the executors stated that on" 
 June 27, 1883, the testator intermarried with Miss Nellie 
 Donnelly, who was the principal devisee in the will. 
 
 On November 5, 1884, the executors filed their final ac- 
 count and a petition for distribution, in accordance with 
 the terms of the will. 
 
 On November 13, 1884, Mrs. Elizabeth C. Tybout, sister 
 of deceased, filed certain exceptions to the petition of the 
 executors for distribution, and asked that distribution be 
 made to her as sole heir at law. 
 
 She alleged that all provisions in the will in favor of Miss 
 Donnelly were made by the testator upon Miss Donnelly's 
 false and fraudulent representations, knowingly made to 
 the testator, that she was an unmarried woman and capable 
 of entering into a valid contract of marriage with him, and 
 in view of such marriage being entered into. 
 
 That as a matter of fact, however, the so-called Miss 
 Donnelly was, on August 31, 1880, married in Alameda 
 countv to one Charles H. Keane, and is still his lawful wife.
 
 136 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 That the testator never knew this, and, believing the so- 
 called Miss Donnelly's false and fraudulent representa- 
 tions, made the provisions in her favor; and that on June 
 27, '1883, she entered into a pretended marriage with the 
 testator, but that she was then the wife of Charles H. Keane, 
 and well knew it, and that her said pretended marriage with 
 testator was void. 
 
 That up to the time of his death the testator did not 
 know of the fraud that had been practiced upon him, and 
 believed Miss Donnelly to be his wife, and that neither 
 Mrs. Tybout nor the executors had any knowledge or in- 
 formation of the marriage of the so-called Miss Donnelly 
 to Keane, nor of the fraudulent representations, prior to 
 September 8, 1884, more than a year after the probate of 
 the will. 
 
 That the marriage with Miss Donnelly was the testator's 
 sole motive in making her his devisee. 
 
 Mrs. Tybout therefore asked that the devise to Miss Don- 
 nelly be declared void, and that she, Mrs. Tybout, have dis- 
 tribution as sole heir at law of decedent. 
 
 To these exceptions and petition Miss Donnelly filed a 
 demurrer on November 26, 1884. 
 
 The principal grounds of demurrer were, that more than 
 one year had elapsed since the probate of the will, and that 
 the time for attacking such probate and said will on any 
 ground had long since elapsed ; also that the wilL cannot be 
 set aside in the mode attempted; further, that the facts 
 stated are insufficient to authorize the court, under any cir- 
 cumstances, to disregard or refuse to the terms of the will, 
 or to the order admitting it to probate, full force and effect, 
 and that they are no longer open to attack in any proceed- 
 ing. 
 
 This demurrer was sustained on December 1, 1884. 
 
 McAllister & Bergin, for the demurrant, M. E. Donnelly 
 
 Joseph R. Brandon, opposed, for Mrs. Elizabeth C. Ty- 
 bout. 
 
 COFFEY, J. Counsel for the petitioners, excepting to 
 the application for distribution in this estate, claims that 
 the "exceptions" constituting a cause of action or pro-
 
 Matter of Ingram. 137 
 
 ceeding under section 338, Code of Civil Procedure, to obtain 
 relief on the ground of fraud or mistake, and not a pro- 
 ceeding collaterally or directly to assail the probate of the 
 will, are at this time and in this manner cognizable by this 
 court; and he asks this court, while engaged in exercising 
 probate jurisdiction, to declare a trust in Miss Donnelly for 
 the benefit of the Tybout heirs, under section 2224 of the 
 Civil Code, and under the general jurisdiction vested in the 
 superior court by the constitution and codes. 
 
 The superior court, sitting in probate matters, has no 
 greater jurisdiction than the probate court which it suc- 
 ceeds: Estate of Hudson, 63 Cal. 454; Dean v. Superior 
 Court, 63 Cal. 473. 
 
 It follows that the subject matter of the "exceptions" 
 and petition of the Tybout heirs is not entertainable by 
 this court while it is engaged in the exercise of probate 
 jurisdiction ; it does not constitute a cause of action that 
 can here and in the manner presented be tried by the 
 court which can only consider the probate law and prac- 
 tice. "Cases in equity," "cases at law," "matters of pro- 
 bate," are all separately described in the constitution (ar- 
 ticle 6, section 5), and while the court is engaged in the 
 consideration of a case belonging to one of these classes it 
 cannot, in the same matter, hear and determine what is es- 
 sentially a case of another class mentioned in the constitu- 
 tion. The supreme court seems to have so settled the law; 
 and it is the duty of this court to decide accordingly. 
 
 Matter of Mrs. HANNAH W. INGRAIM. 
 [Decided December 1, 1884.] 
 
 Insanity. — In Order to Commit a Person to an Asylum for the in- 
 sane, the court must be satisfied, upon examination, pursuant to sec- 
 tion 258, Civil Code, that such person is of unsound mind, and unfit 
 to be at large. The provisions of the codes as to such examination 
 summarized. 
 
 Insanity. — There are no "Commissioners of Insanity." Physicians 
 are merely summoned to hear the testimony, and to make a personal
 
 138 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 examination of the alleged insane person; and, if they believe him 
 to be dangerously insane, they make a certificate of certain facts, 
 whereupon it is reserved to the judge, upon whom rests the responsi- 
 bility, to adjudicate upon the charge. 
 
 Insanity. — Although a Person is Subject to Certain Delusions, 
 
 where the court is not satisfied that he is "so far disordered in mind 
 as to endanger health, person or property," or "unfit to be at large," 
 it is bound to give him the benefit of such reasonable doubt as it en- 
 tertains upon the whole charge. 
 
 Application to confine Mrs. Hannah W. Ingram, an al- 
 leged insane person, in the insane asylum. 
 
 COFFEY, J. Before the court can order the commit- 
 ment of any person to an asylum for the insane it must 
 be satisfied, upon examination in open court, and in the 
 presence of such person, from the testimony of two repu- 
 table physicians, that such person is of unsound mind, and 
 unfit to be at large : Civ. Code, sec. 258. 
 
 Whenever it appears by affidavit, to the satisfaction of 
 a magistrate of the county, that any person within the 
 county is so far disordered in his mind as to endanger 
 health, person or property, he must issue and deliver to 
 some peace officer for service a warrant, directing that such 
 person be arrested and taken before any judge of a court 
 of record within the county for examination. 
 
 Subpoenas must issue thereupon to two or more wit- 
 nesses best acquainted with such person to appear and tes- 
 tify before the judge at such examination; the judge must 
 also subpoena at least two graduates of medicine to appear 
 and attend such examination ; and all such persons so 
 subpoenaed must appear and answer all pertinent questions; 
 the physicians so called in by process of subpoena must hear 
 such testimony and must make a personal examination of 
 the alleged insane person, and must make a certificate of 
 their conclusions; and then the judge, after such examina- 
 tion and certificate made, if he believes the person accused 
 to be so far disordered in mind as to endanger health, per- 
 son or property, must make an order that such person be 
 confined in the asylum. A record of all such proceedings 
 must be kept by the county clerk. The physicians attend-
 
 Matter of Ingram. 139 
 
 ing the examination of "an insane person" are allowed a 
 fee, to be paid by the county. 
 
 The foregoing is a summary of all the pertinent provi- 
 sions of the codes, with reference to this character of cases : 
 Pol. Code, 2210-2222. 
 
 An impression seems to prevail that there are certain 
 "Commissioners of Insanity" who pass upon these cases. 
 An examination of the codes will make manifest the error 
 of this impression. The so-called "commissioners" are 
 simply physicians, "graduates of medicine," in good stand- 
 ing, who are summoned in the same manner as other wit- 
 nesses to attend the hearing; but it is reserved to the judge 
 of the court to find the fact and to adjudicate thereupon. 
 Upon the judge or the court the law casts the responsibility, 
 and to discharge it faithfully is not always a light duty; in 
 this case it has been more than ordinarily onerous, from the 
 peculiar circumstances, the character of the evidence, and 
 the conduct pending the examination and in view of the 
 court of the parties immediately connected with the subject 
 matter of the investigation. 
 
 As a result of the examination, and the subsequent re- 
 flections thereupon, the court is convinced that Mrs. Ingram 
 is the victim of a delusion as to the relations of Miss Pratt 
 with her husband, and has, while possessed of that delusion, 
 subjected that lady and her family to great annoyance and 
 indignity ; but the court is in doubt as to the dangerous 
 nature of the delusion, is not fully persuaded that the ac- 
 cused person is "so far disordered in mind as to endanger 
 health, person or property." or is "unfit to be at large," 
 and the court is bound to give the accused person the benefit 
 of such reasonable doubt as it entertains upon the whole 
 charge. This is the conclusion from a full investigation and 
 mature deliberation ; and, accordingly, the proceeding against 
 Mrs. Hannah W. Ingram is dismissed.
 
 140 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 Estate of ELLEN LYNCH, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 3,079; decided June 30, 1884.] 
 
 Partial Distribution — Time for Making. — An application for partial 
 distribution of a decedent's estate in course of administration may- 
 be made at any time after the period of administration mentioned in 
 the statute, upon allegations showing the existence of the conditions 
 and circumstances required by the statute. 
 
 Partial Distribution— Time for Making.— The rule prescribed by the 
 statute, as to whom and under what circumstances a partial distrib- 
 ution of a decedent's estate may be had, is the same whether the 
 decedent left a will, or died intestate. And a petition for the partial 
 distribution of a testate's estate is not premature merely because the 
 year given by the statute, within which a contest to the probate of 
 the decedent's will may be filed, has not elapsed. 
 
 The opinion of the court in this case was rendered upon 
 objections made to two separate petitions for distribution 
 after the lapse of four months of administration — "partial 
 distribution," as usually designated. The first filed petition 
 was that of Margaret Daly, presented June 6, 1884, showing 
 that petitioner was a legatee under decedent's will, which 
 had been duly proved, to the extent of $1,000, and certain 
 specified household furniture; that four months had elapsed 
 since the issuance of letters testamentary to John D. Cough- 
 lin and Daniel J. Coughlin, the executors named in the will, 
 who qualified May 24, 1884, and prayed for distribution of 
 the legacies upon giving the bond required by the statute. 
 The second petition was filed June 7, 1884, on behalf of 
 and subscribed by (1) Catherine Riley, (2) Margaret Ware, 
 (3) Margaret Weston, (4) Hannah Sullivan, (5) Adina 
 Gertrude Ware, (6) Frances Ellen Ware, (7) Henry Ware 
 (8) Mary Cunningham, (9) Miss Lizzie Armor, Superioress 
 of the Convent of the Holy Family, and (10) Daniel J. 
 Coughlin ; and set forth the same facts respecting the ad- 
 ministration as in the petition of Margaret Daly, first above 
 mentioned. No attorney's name appeared upon either of 
 the petitions, but it is recited by the record that Selden S. 
 Wright, as the appointee of the court, appeared for them. 
 
 The two petitions came on regularly for hearing on the 
 twentieth day of June, 1884, and a decree of "partial
 
 Estate of Lynch. 141 
 
 distribution" was made according to the prayers of the 
 petitioners, under date of June 20, 1884, and was filed on 
 the twenty-fourth day of June, 1884. 
 
 The record shows that Selden S. Wright, was appointed 
 by order of June 6, 1884, as attorney to represent in the 
 administration all unrepresented heirs and legatees, naming 
 the parties interested, so far as known, to be Mary Riley, 
 Ellen Riley, Anastasia Riley, Johanna Riley, David Riley, 
 Henry Riley, Michael Riley and Patrick Riley. All of 
 these parties named were legatees and also nephews and 
 nieces respectively, and heirs of deceased; and resided at St. 
 Peters, Cape Breton, Nova Scotia. None of them were peti- 
 tioners for or participants in the ' ' partial distribution. ' ' 
 
 Selden S. Wright, for petitioners. 
 
 E. E. Haft, contra, for executors. 
 
 COFFEY, J. It is suggested, on behalf of executors that 
 the petition for partial distribution is premature; that a 
 year (the time to contest the validity of the will) should 
 elapse before the application. 
 
 Under the authority of the Estate of Pritchett, 51 Cal. 
 568, the petition is not prematurely preferred, the essential 
 facts and the principle of this matter corresponding to the 
 facts and principle in that case. Petition granted. 
 
 The Rule that the Final Distribution of an estate may be had upon 
 the settlement of the final account of the executor, or at any subsequent 
 time (Estate of Thayer, 1 Cal. App. 104, 81 Pac. 658; McAdoo v. 
 Sayre, 145 Cal. 344, 78 Pac. 874), was invoked in Ee Pritchett, 51 
 Cal. 568, 52 Cal. 94, although the time for contesting the will had 
 not yet expired.
 
 142 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 Estate and Guardianship of SUSANNA ZIMMER, Minor. 
 
 [No. 2,860; decided December 22, 1883.] 
 
 Guardian — Nomination by Minor. — A minor, aged sixteen years, 
 who is intelligent and of fair education, is legally competent to nomi- 
 nate her own guardian, subject to the court 's approval. 
 
 Guardian — Nomination by Minor. — Although an intelligent minor 
 over fourteen years of age is competent to nominate its own guardian, 
 and its intelligent preference for a guardian must be considered, yet 
 the court must be guided in its determination by what appears to be 
 for the child 's best interests, as to its temporal, mental and moral 
 welfare. 
 
 Guardian. — The Nomination and Preference of the Minor in this 
 case of her aunt for guardian as against the child's mother, who had 
 remarried after divorce from the child 's father to one who was the 
 object of the child's aversion — discussed, but not decided. 
 
 Guardian — Nomination by Minor. — In this case it was held that an 
 application for guardianship by the minor's nominee should be de- 
 nied, although the applicant and minor were closely related and af- 
 fectionately disposed toward each other, having lived and loved as 
 if mother and child for years; it appearing that, from the circum- 
 stances of the applicant, a grant of guardianship would not be for 
 the best interests of the child as to its temporal welfare. 
 
 Guardian — Nomination by Minor— Nonresidence. — Where an appli- 
 cant for guardianship of a minor, claiming as the minor 's nominee, 
 is a nonresident of the state, and only awaits the determination of 
 the application to return home, the court will not be justified in con- 
 firming the minor's choice, even if legally permitted to do so. 
 
 Guardian — Nomination by Minor. — In this case the court, in de- 
 termining an application for guardianship upon the nomination of 
 the minor over fourteen years of age — involving the minor's compe- 
 tency and the applicant 's rights, with the court 's duty in the prem- 
 ises^considered and construed sections 1748, 1749, Code of Civil Pro- 
 cedure, and section 246, 253 (subdivision 6), Civil Code. 
 
 In this case the record shows the filing of two separate 
 petitions for the guardianship of the above-named minor, 
 Susanna Zimmer. The first application was filed by Mrs. 
 Susanna Smith on October 12, 1883. It is alleged that the 
 minor was a resident of the city and county of San Fran- 
 cisco ; that the minor was and had been for ten years last 
 past in the exclusive custody of the petitioner, and had 
 been by petitioner maintained and educated; that the minor
 
 Guardianship of Zimmer. 143 
 
 was aged sixteen (16) years and four (4) months, and that 
 her mother was married to the stepfather of the minor. An- 
 nexed to the petition was a written request and nomination 
 of the minor, dated October 9, 1883, in favor of the peti- 
 tioner. The second application for guardianship of the 
 minor was made and filed by Julia Krone, and alleged that 
 the applicant was the mother of the minor, the minor being 
 a resident of the city and county of San Francisco; that the 
 applicant was by a decree of the "fifteenth district court" 
 granted a divorce from Ernst Zimmer, the father of the 
 minor, on the ground of adultery on the part of said father, 
 and that by the same decree the custody of said minor was 
 awarded to her (the applicant). Neither of the applicants 
 filed any answer to the petition of the other, so far as the 
 record in the guardianship shows; and the opinion of the 
 court expressly states that it was delivered only with respect 
 to the application of Mrs. Susanna Smith, without decisively 
 passing upon the merits or legal standing of the mother's 
 petition. As to the decision of the court being based upon 
 the nonresidence of the applicant, it should be noticed that 
 both of the applicants carefully alleged the residence of 
 the minor as hereinabove stated. 
 
 Matt. I Sullivan, for Susanna Smith. 
 
 E. J. Linforth, for Julia Krone. 
 
 COFFEY, J. Application of Susanna Smith for letters 
 of guardianship of the person of Susanna Zimmer, a minor, 
 The minor is an intelligent girl of about the age of sixteen 
 years, of fair education, and legally competent to nominate 
 her own guardian, subject to the approval of the court : Code 
 Civ. Proc, sees. 1748, 1749. She is capable of expressing an 
 intelligent preference, and the court should consider that 
 preference in determining the question : Civ. Code, sec. 246. 
 
 But the court must be guided in so determining by what 
 appears to be for the best interest of the child, in respect to 
 its temporal and its mental and moral welfare: Civ. Code, 
 sec. 246. The nominee of the minor is doubtless a worthy 
 woman, and affectionately disposed toward the child, with 
 whom she has l)eon familiarly associated for mauv vears.
 
 144 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 The minor has been treated by this lady, who is her aunt, 
 as if she were her own child ; has lived in her family with 
 the consent of her own parents for several years; and has 
 been educated largely through the kindness, affection and 
 liberality of the applicant and her husband. All of this 
 the minor acknowledges and appreciates; and she desires 
 to remain in the relation she has sustained for so long a 
 period. She manifests no want of affection towards her 
 mother, who is a counter-applicant here, but has an aversion 
 toward her stepfather, her own father being legally separated 
 from her mother, who is married a second time, to the object 
 of this minor's aversion. 
 
 Without considering now the counter-application of the 
 mother, it is sufficient to say that the court considers that 
 with reference to the competency of the nominee of the minor, 
 it does not appear from the evidence to be for the best inter- 
 est of the child, in respect to its temporal welfare (Civil Code, 
 section 246) to commit her to such custody; and it further 
 appearing from the evidence that the nominee of the minor 
 is a resident of the state of Nevada, having her home for 
 many years in that state, and only awaiting the determination 
 of this application to return thither, the court would not be 
 justified in confirming, even if legally permitted to confirm, 
 the choice of the minor: See Civ. Code, sec. 253, subd. 6. 
 Application denied. 
 
 The Wishes or Judgment of a Child of sufficient maturity to realize 
 in a measure his situation cannot, independent of or despite other 
 circumstances, control the court in the determination of his custody: 
 Stapleton v. Poynter, 111 Ky. 264, 98 Am. St. Eep. 411, 62 S. W. 
 730, 53 L. R. A. 784.
 
 Estate of Maxwell. 145 
 
 Estate of RICHARD T. MAXWELL, Deceased (No. 3). 
 
 [No. 2,625; decided January 27, 1885.] 
 
 Will — Supplsring Defects l)y Implication. — When, from the whole 
 will, the court can determine that the testator necessarily intended 
 an interest to be given, which is not bequeathed by express and 
 formal words, the court should supply the defect by implication, and 
 so mold the testator's language as to carry into effect, as far as pos- 
 sible, the intention which he has in the whole will sufficiently de- 
 clared. 
 
 Will — Construction Avoiding Partial Intestacy. — The law prefers a 
 construction of a will which will prevent a partial intestacy, to one 
 which will permit such a result, unless a construction involving par- 
 tial intestacy is absolutely forced upon the court, for the fact of 
 making a will raises a very strong presumption against any expecta- 
 tion or desire, on the part of the testator, of leaving any portion 
 of his estate beyond the operation of his will. 
 
 Wills — Construing Parts in Relation to Each Other. — All the parts 
 of a will are to be construed in relation to each other, and so as 
 if possible to form one consistent whole. 
 
 Will — Contradictory Clauses. — Where several parts of a will are ab- 
 solutely irreconcilable, the latter part must prevail; but the former 
 of several contradictory clauses is never sacrificed except on the 
 failure of every attempt to give all such a construction as will 
 render every part effective. 
 
 Will.— When the Meaning of Any Part of a Will is Ambiguous 
 or doubtful, it may be explained by any reference thereto or recital 
 thereof in another part of the will. 
 
 Will.— The Words of a Will are to be Taken in Their Ordinary 
 and Grammatical Sense, unless a clear intention to use them in an- 
 other sense can be collected, and that other can be ascertained. 
 
 Will. — The Words of a Will are to Receive an Interpretation 
 which will give to every expression some eft'ect, rather than one 
 which will render any of the expressions inoperative. 
 
 Will. — Where a Testator Gives to B a Specific Fund or property 
 at the death of A, and in a subsequent clause disposes of all his 
 property, the combined effect of the several clauses, as to such fund 
 or property, is to vest it in A for life, and after his decease in B. 
 
 Will. — A Will Consisting of Several Parts, separately executed by 
 the testator, must be considered as a single instrument completed 
 in all its parts at one time. 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. I— 10
 
 146 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 Daniel Rogers, for applicants, the executors. 
 Thos. I. Bergin, for Miss Elena Donnelly. 
 A. F. Morrison, for Miss Margaret McKenzie. 
 J. R. Brandon, for the Tybout heirs. 
 
 COFFEY, J. This is an application on the part of Daniel 
 Rogers and Charles Ashton, executors of the last will and 
 testament of Richard Tybout Maxwell, deceased, for distri- 
 bution, according to "the provisions of said will"; and the 
 application involves a construction of the terms of said in- 
 strument, which (as usually occurs in cases where a man 
 draws his own will) has been variously interpreted according 
 to the desire of the interested interpreter. The views of the 
 court as to the correct construction are appended. 
 
 "Where it is possible for the court, upon a reading of the 
 whole will, to arrive at a conclusion that the testator neces- 
 sarily intended an interest to be given, which is not be- 
 queathed by express and formal words, the court should 
 supply the defect by implication, and so mold the language 
 of the testator as to carry into effect, as far as possible, the 
 intention which it is of opinion that he has on the whole 
 will sufficiently declared : Metcalf v. Framingham Parish, 128 
 Mass. 370. See opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Gray, p. 374. 
 
 The law prefers a construction of a will which will prevent 
 a partial intestacy to one which will permit such result 
 (Vernon v. Vernon, 53 N. Y. 361, opinion by Mr. Justice 
 Andrews), unless such construction involving partial intes- 
 tacy is absolutely forced upon the court, which rule of prefer- 
 ence has been adopted partly from considerations of policy, 
 but mainly because it is calculated to carry into effect the 
 presumed intention of the testator; for the fact of mak- 
 ing a will raises a very strong presumption against any 
 expectation or desire, on the part of the testator, of leaving 
 any portion of his estate beyond the operation of his will : 
 2 Redfield on Wills, 3d ed., *116, and see note thereunder 32. 
 
 All the parts of a will are to be construed in relation to 
 each other, and so as if possible to form one consistent 
 whole, but where several parts are absolutely irreconcilable,
 
 Estate op Maxwell. 147 
 
 the latter must prevail : Civ. Code, sec. 1321. Where the 
 meaning of any part of a will is ambiguous or doubtful, it 
 may be explained by any reference thereto, or recital thereof, 
 in another part of the will : Civ. Code, sec. 1323. The words 
 of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical 
 sense, unless a clear intention to use them in another sense 
 can be collected, and that other can be ascertained : Civ. Code, 
 sec. 1324. The words of a will are to receive an interpreta- 
 tion which will give to every expression some effect, rather 
 than one which will render any of the expressions inoper- 
 ative: Civ. Code, sec. 1325. The rule which sacrifices the 
 former of several contradictory clauses is never applied but 
 on the failure of every attempt to give to the whole such a 
 construction as will render every part of it effective. Where 
 a testator gives to B a specific fund or property at the death 
 of A, and in a subsequent clause disposes of the whole of his 
 property, the combined effect of the several clauses as to such 
 fund or property is to vest it in A for life, and after his 
 decease in B : 2 Jarman on Wills, 49, 5th Am. ed., *476. 
 
 In applying these principles of construction to the instru- 
 ment before me (a copy of which is hereunder inserted) : 
 
 "San Francisco, July 23, 1882. 
 
 "Fully aware of the uncertainty of life, and being of 
 sound mind and memory, I declare this to be my last will and 
 testament, hereby revoking all wills and codicils to wills by 
 me heretofore made. 
 
 "The dilatory habits of my counsel employed in the di- 
 vorce suit, recently decided in my favor in the Superior 
 Court, having left thus far the matter incomplete in this, 
 that the quit-claim deed from the former Mrs. M. W. Max- 
 well has not yet been signed and returned by her, nor has the 
 mortgage in her favor upon my land in Napa County, secur- 
 ing to her the sum of one hundred and twenty-five dollars per 
 month, been submitted to me for signature, I desire that my 
 executors may at once, if it is possible, have this matter 
 settled on this basis. Should this be impossible, she is of 
 course entitled to her half of the property I leave behind 
 me, which is all community property. Shou.ld it, under these 
 circumstances, be necessary to sell in order to divide, it is
 
 148 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 my desire that my executors shall, after paying all my 
 debts, be appointed trustees by the Court, and that they shall 
 receive as my bequest in trust the balance of the estate which 
 I desire shall (if the property has been necessarily in their 
 judgment sold to effect a division) be invested in first mort- 
 gages on real estate of unquestionable title, and the monthly 
 income derived therefrom be equally divided between Miss 
 Nellie Donnelly, residing at 2103 Jones street, with her par- 
 ents, and Miss Margaret McKenzie, living at the northwest 
 corner of Folsom and Second streets, that I may, so far as 
 is in my power, prove my appreciation of their kindness 
 and my sincere friendship for them both, trusting that I may 
 lessen the burden of life to each of them. In case of the 
 death of either of them, I wish the whole income paid to the 
 survivor, and after her death the whole amount or then value 
 of the property to be equally divided between the living 
 children of my sister, Mrs. Elizabeth C. Tybout, living in New 
 Castle County, Delaware. 
 
 "I hereby appoint Daniel Rogers, Esq., and Mr. Charles 
 Ashton my executors, and direct that no bonds shall be re- 
 quired. RICHARD TYBOUT MAXWELL. 
 
 "It is my earnest desire that if possible the real estate 
 in Napa County shall not be sold, but held for some years, 
 and rented on shares or otherwise by some competent person, 
 and that it shall, after the lien upon it in the shape of the 
 mortgage given or to be given to Mrs. Maxwell (formerly) 
 shall have been removed by her death, be still so managed 
 by my executors, or rather as they will then be the trustees 
 for the heirs, and that Miss Margaret McKenzie shall, under 
 these circumstances, receive during her life an income of one 
 hundred dollars per month, if this does not exceed one-half 
 of the income from the property, and the estate be in that 
 case conveyed entire to Miss E. Donnelly, to whom I hope to 
 be married, should my life be spared, in a few months. All 
 of this expression of my desires as to settlement of my prop- 
 erty is in consequence of my knowledge of the dangers at- 
 tendant upon a surgical operation, to which I expect to be 
 subjected in a short time. 
 
 "RICHARD TYBOUT MAXWELL."
 
 Estate of Maxwell. 149 
 
 I must consider it as one single instrument, completed in 
 all its parts at one time, and, as such it was probated. From 
 this instrument it appears that the testator had in view three 
 objects: (1) the satisfaction of the lien upon the estate in 
 favor of his former wife; (2) the provision of an income for 
 Miss Donnelly and Miss McKenzie, that he might 'lessen 
 the burden of life to each of them," in recognition of their 
 kindness to him and his friendship for them; and (3) the 
 division of the proceeds of his property after the death of the 
 others named to the children of his sister, Mrs. Tybout. The 
 latter part of this instrument is to be reconciled, if possible, 
 to the foregoing provisions : Civ. Code, sec. 1325 ; 2 Jarman 
 on Wills, 49, *476. 
 
 This latter portion, which is claimed to operate as a revo- 
 cation, should not be so construed, unless it is absolutely irrec- 
 oncilable with the rest. It evidently was designed by the 
 testator that the Tybouts should have the benefits of his 
 bounty, after his other assumed obligations had been dis- 
 charged by the death of the beneficiaries, and the latter 
 part of the will may be reconciled with this intention by 
 considering the contingency, and providing for it, of the 
 death of the former Mrs. Maxwell, and in that event a larger 
 amount coming into the hands of the trustees, in which case 
 a fixed certain sum might be paid to Miss McKenzie, thus 
 dispensing with the necessity of trustees to divide the estate, 
 and enabling them to convey it entire to Miss Donnelly ; that 
 is to say (by way of interpretation), the estate held by the 
 trustees is to be conveyed to Miss Donnelly to enjoy during 
 her life, subject to the payment of $100 per month to Miss. 
 McKenzie. This seems to me to be the combined effect of the 
 several clauses of the will (Jarman on Wills, 476), and I 
 conceive it to be the correct construction of this instrument. 
 
 Throughout the paper the testator's intention seems to 
 be to make life provision for Miss Donnelly and ^liss 
 McKenzie, to "lessen the burden of life to each of them," 
 as he expresses it ; and his intention is quite manifest to pro- 
 vide for his sister's children, after provision for Miss Don- 
 nelly and Miss McKenzie should be no longer necessary; to 
 secure these two named ladies against want was his clear
 
 150 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 design, by imposing a life lien upon his estate, and after that 
 to give the remainder to the children of his sister. If this 
 be not the true interpretation of his intention, he has cer- 
 tainly chosen his words cleverly to conceal his meaning; but 
 I think that, upon a study of the whole instrument, I have 
 arrived at the correct conclusion. 
 
 Daniel Rogers renounces his trust as trustee under the 
 will, and his coexecutor, Charles Ashton, accepts the trust 
 devolved upon him by the testator, and the estate should be 
 distributed to him for the purposes named in said will, 
 according to the provisions thereof as construed by the court 
 in the foregoing opinion. 
 
 Application granted. 
 
 All the Various Parts of a Will are Construed in relation to each 
 other, so as to form, if possible, one consistent whole; but if differ- 
 ent parts are irreconcilable, the latter prevails: Cal. Civ. Code, 
 1321; Mont. Civ. Code, 1773; N. D. Eev. Code, 5133; Okl. Eev. 
 Stats. 6841; S. D. Civ. Code, 1040; Utah Eev. Stats. 2771. 
 
 The Making of a Will Raises a Presumption that the testator in- 
 tended to dispose of all his property. And constructions which lead 
 to intestacy, total or partial, are not favored. Therefore such an 
 interpretation should, when reasonably possible, be placed upon the 
 provisions of a testamentary instrument as will prevent that result. 
 These principles have been made a part of the statutory law. Of 
 course, if the expressed intent of a testator is intestacy, he must 
 be presumed to have intended that result: 1 Eoss on Probate Law 
 and Practice, 78. 
 
 Estate of BRIDGET McGOVERN, Deceased. 
 [No. 2,643; decided October 23, 1883.] 
 
 A Cost Bill is not Piled, if not delivered to the clerk nor received 
 by him. 
 
 Filing a Paper Consists in Presenting It at the Proper Office and 
 leaving it there, deposited with the papers in such office. 
 
 Filing Papers. — Section 1030 of the Political Code Defines and Fixes 
 the hours during which public offices shall be kept open; and a paper 
 which is left in a public office one hour after the time fixed by law 
 for its closing, is left there when the office is legally closed.
 
 Estate of McGovern. 151 
 
 Where a Cost Bill is Left in the Clerk's Office About One Hour 
 After the Time specified by law for the closing of the office, there 
 being no person present authorized to receive and file it, the paper 
 is not filed; and if the date of the alleged filing is the last day 
 allowed by the statute for filing the bill, a motion to strike it out 
 should be granted. 
 
 The opinion of the court in this case was rendered upon 
 a notice of motion to strike out cost bill filed August 28, 
 1883. The notice was given by M. Cooney, the attorney 
 theretofore appointed by the court to appear "for Ellen 
 McPartry, of Ireland, John Simpson, of Philadelphia, Ann 
 Halligan, of Philadelphia, Rose Kenney, Boston, to repre- 
 sent them upon the contest and application for the probate 
 of the alleged will on file herein, and upon all subsequent 
 proceedings in the estate; such persons being heirs of de- 
 ceased (Bridget McGovern)." 
 
 The notice of motion was directed to a cost bill claimed 
 to have been filed August 23, 1883, but which appears by the 
 record to have not been actually filed till January 12, 1884; 
 this cost bill was presented by John McQueeny and Edward 
 McFernan, proponents and executors of the last will of the 
 deceased, and purported to be a memorandum of costs in- 
 curred on the contest to the probate of the will; the contest 
 having been made by the heirs named aforesaid, represented 
 by M. Cooney. The ground specified in the notice of motion 
 to strike out was, among other grounds, first, that the cost 
 bill "was not filed or served within five days after the de- 
 cision and judgment of the court was made, and the ^der 
 admitting the will to probate was made and entered." The 
 opinion of the court is directed solely to this first ground, 
 and the facts supporting that ground are fully set out in 
 the opinion. 
 
 M. Cooney, for the motion. 
 
 C. F. Hanlon, contra. 
 
 COFFEY, J. The cost bill in this matter was not deliv- 
 ered to the clerk, nor received by him. "Filing a paper 
 consists in presenting it at the proper office, and leaving it 
 there deposited with the papers in such office." Accordino-
 
 152 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 to the evidence, the office was legally closed when the paper 
 was left there: Pol. Code, sec. 1030. No person authorized 
 to receive it and file it was present — it being about one hour 
 after the closing of the office (Pol. Code, sec. 1030), and there 
 w^as no person present to whom it could be "presented," 
 nor does it appear it was "deposited with the papers" in 
 the office. This paper never was filed, in the sense of the 
 statute. 
 
 Motion to strike out granted. 
 
 Estate of WILLIAM LUND, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 351; decided October 20, 1884.] 
 
 Attorney. — An Administratrix has Power to Employ an Attorney 
 
 to institute proceedings to recover damages for the death of her 
 intestate. 
 
 Attorney — Compensation. — An Attorney Who Renders Services 
 for the Benefit of an estate, at the request of the administratrix 
 thereof is entitled to reasonable compensation therefor. The pro- 
 bate department is the proper forum in which to present his claim 
 for such services; they are "expenses of administration," and the 
 probate department has exclusive jurisdiction to adjust and enforce 
 such demands. 
 
 Attorney — Contingent Fee. — An Administratrix has no Power to 
 Make a Contract with an Attorney for the payment of a contingent 
 fee to him out of the assets of the estate. But the employment of 
 an attorney to perform services, and a promise to pay him a contin- 
 gent fee for such services, are separable. The retainer of the attor- 
 ney, and rendering of services by him in pursuance of such retainer, 
 may be considered by the court apart from the promise to pay a 
 contingent fee, and the compensation will be adjudged according 
 to the proof of the reasonable value of the services. An attorney 
 accepting employment and rendering services, under such circum- 
 stances, must rely upon the subsequent action of the court in ad- 
 judging proper compensation, and consents to perform his duty with- 
 out other compensation than may so be allowed. 
 
 William Lund died intestate in San Francisco, a resident 
 thereof, and leaving estate therein, on the sixth day of April, 
 1880. 
 
 He left a surviving w^ife, Catherine Lund, who, upon peti- 
 tion filed on June 16, 1880, was appointed administratrix
 
 Estate of Lund. 153 
 
 of his estate on June 28, 1880, and letters of administration 
 were issued to her on July 6, 1880. 
 
 The petition for probate stated that the estate of the dece- 
 dent consisted of certain personal property, and a claim for 
 damages against the Spring Valley Water Works, arising 
 by reason of negligence of that corporation, which caused 
 the death of Mr. Lund. 
 
 On July 21, 1884, P. B. Nagle filed a petition in the matter 
 of the estate, in which he alleged that the administratrix, 
 as such, employed him to institute and prosecute an action 
 against the Spring Valley Water AVorks, on the above-men- 
 tioned claim; that the administratrix agreed to pay all the 
 costs and expenses of the action, and to pay the petitioner 
 one-half of all that was recovered therein, as compensation 
 for his services. 
 
 That accordingly petitioner commenced said action on her 
 behalf, on the twenty-eighth day of February, 1881, and that 
 he diligently prosecuted the same; that the action was tried 
 before a .jury, but that the .jury failed to agree; that there- 
 after petitioner was ready and willing to enter upon a second 
 trial of said action, provided the administratrix paid the 
 costs and expenses of such trial, but that she refused to do so, 
 and on July 13, 1882, discharged the petitioner as her attor- 
 ney in said action, and employed P. F. Dunne in his place 
 and stead, who was regularly substituted therein ; that on 
 February 15, 1883, the administratrix recovered judgment 
 against the Spring Valley Water Works in said action for 
 the sum of $4,000 and costs, which .judgment was paid in 
 March, 1884; that the reasonable value of the services of 
 petitioner in said action up to the time of his discharge was 
 $500, and that the administratrix refused to pay the same, 
 hence he asked that said sum be allowed him, and that the 
 administratrix be ordered to pay it. 
 
 To this petition the administratrix filed a denuirrer on 
 July 28, 1884, specifying as grounds therefor that it ap- 
 peared from the petition that P. F. Dunne, and not the 
 petitioner, performed the services which resulted in the re- 
 covery of the judgment, and that under petitioner's contract, 
 as alleged by him, his compensation was dependent upon a
 
 154 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 recovery by him, and, further, that it appeared that the 
 contract was illegal and void. 
 
 James L. Nagle, for petitioner. 
 
 R. H. Taylor, for administratrix. 
 
 COFFEY, J. This department is the proper forum in 
 which to present the claim of petitioner: Gurnee v. Maloney, 
 38 Cal. 87, 99 Am. Dec. 352. 
 
 Services rendered at the request of an administratrix, 
 for the benefit of an estate, are "expenses of administra- 
 tion," and the probate department has exclusive original 
 jurisdiction to adjust and enforce such demands: Ibid. 
 
 If it shall appear that the petitioner performed any ser- 
 vice for the advantage of the estate at the instance and 
 request of the administratrix, the court will award such com- 
 pensation as, in its opinion, such service may be reasonably 
 worth. 
 
 The administratrix had the power to employ counsel for 
 the purpose indicated in the petition, although not to make 
 a contract for the payment of a contingent fee out of the 
 assets of the estate. These two things are to be separately 
 considered; they are separable. The retainer of an attorney, 
 and the rendering of service by him in pursuance of such 
 retainer, is what the court may consider; and, according to 
 the proof, his compensation will be adjudged by the court: 
 Estate of Page, 57 Cal. 238. 
 
 An attorney accepting employment and rendering ser- 
 vices under such circumstances, must rely upon the subse- 
 quent action of the court in ascertaining and adjudging 
 proper compensation. In accepting the employment he con- 
 sented to perform his duty without other compensation than 
 such as might be allowed by the court : Cole v. Superior 
 Court, 10 Pac. C. L. J. 732 (S. C, 63 Cal. 86, 49 Am. Rep. 
 78). 
 
 I understand the claim of petitioner to be on the score 
 of services rendered for the benefit of the estate, and at 
 the request of administratrix; and he should be allowed to 
 prove whether he rendered any such services at any such 
 request, and their value. 
 
 Demurrer overruled; fifteen days to answer.
 
 Estate of Jennings. ' 155 
 
 An Executor or Administrator is Entitled to an Allowance for Legal 
 Services rendered him both in conducting the ordinary probate pro- 
 ceedings and in conducting necessary litigation. In fact, he is enti- 
 tled to reasonable attorney fees in any matter, arising in the ad- 
 ministration of the estate, which calls for legal advice or counsel: 
 Elizadale v. Murphy, 4 Cal. A pp. 114, 87 Pac. 245; Estate of Miner, 
 46 Cal. 564; Estate of Simmons, 43 Cal. 543; Hicox v. Graham, 6 
 Cal. 167; Steel v. Holladay, 20 Or. 462, 26 Pac. 562; Nash v. Wake- 
 field, 30 Wash. 556, 71 Pac. 35; Estate of Davis, 33 Mont. 539, 88 
 Pac. 957. 
 
 Estate of A. A. JENNINGS, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 8,962, former Probate Court; decided Nov. 22, 1883.] 
 
 Administrator's Sale — Advance Bids and Resale. — When, upon the 
 hearing of a return of an administrator's sale of personal property, 
 the purchaser increases his bid from $3,000 to $5,000, it is manifest 
 that the price obtained is greatly disproportionate to the value of 
 the property; and in such case the court will refuse confirmation 
 of the sale, and will order a new sale to be had under circumstances 
 calculated to bring the utmost value of the property. • 
 
 In this case, on the nineteenth day of July, 1882, Barbara 
 Jennings, the administratrix with the will annexed, filed a 
 petition praying for an order of sale of certain personal 
 property, being the only property of the estate, and desig- 
 nated, "Assessments and contracts for street work done in 
 said city and county (of San Francisco) by said deceased." 
 And in the petition particularly described there were four 
 contracts set out, upon which there were due the following 
 amounts, to-wit: Upon the first, $12,576.88; upon the second, 
 $590.52 ; upon the third, $12,887.56 ; and upon the fourth, 
 $10,077.34. After five days' notice given by posting, the 
 court (by Hon. Jno. F. Finn, Judge) on July 25, 1882, 
 made an order of sale of the property described in the 
 petition aforesaid, and directed that the admininstratrix sell 
 the same "by public auction, and after public notice given 
 for at least two days by publication in the 'Daily Chron- 
 icle,' a newspaper published in said city and county (of San 
 Francisco)." A verified return and account of the sale of 
 the property under the aforesaid order was made by the
 
 156' Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 administratrix and filed August 9, 1882, and showed that all 
 of the property was sold to one C. J. Shipman, for $500. 
 On October 2, 1882, Mr. C. H. Parker, as attorney for certain 
 creditors of the estate, filed written objections to a confirma- 
 tion of the sale returned, detailing a great many exceptions 
 to the proceedings taken in the premises. Upon the eleventh 
 day of IMay, 1883, the hearing of the said return coming on 
 "after due continuances and upon due notice," and the 
 court (Finn, Judge) finding that the price obtained was 
 disproportionate to the value of the property, and that upon 
 a resale at least $1,000 v/ould be obtained, made an order 
 that the sale be not confirmed, but that it be set aside, and 
 that the administratrix resell the property under the orig- 
 inal order of sale. 
 
 Upon August 30, 1883, the administratrix filed a return 
 and account of sales made under the order of resale of May 
 11, 1883, showing that the property was sold at public 
 auction in several parcels as follows : Lot No. 1, to C. G. 
 Shipman for $100; lot No. 2, to C. G. Shipman, for $10; 
 lot No. 3 to J. C. Fruchey for $3,000 ; and lot No. 4, to C. 
 G. Shipman for $100. On the fourteenth day of Septem- 
 ber, 1883. Mr. C. H. Parker, as attorney for certain creditors, 
 objected to the confirmation of the sale of the property sold 
 to Fruchey for $3,000. There were thirteen written excep- 
 tions and objections to this sale, detailed at great length, and 
 included all the technical points made in the objections 
 filed by said attorney to the previous sale of the property; 
 bvit these grounds and technicalities are not stated here, as 
 the only matter considered by the court was the objections 
 taken by the twelfth and thirteenth grounds, viz.: (1) that 
 the amount bid was disproportionate to the value of the prop- 
 erty; (2) that a sum exceeding ten per cent, exclusive of 
 expenses of new sale, could be obtained if a new sale were 
 ordered. 
 
 On September 21, 1883, C. H. Parker filed a written bid 
 for the property sold Fruchey, of $4,000, and expenses of 
 readvertising, and stipulating to pay $5,000 if the property 
 w^ere sold in a particular manner (that is to say, the prop- 
 erty sold was a contract and assessment for grading a certain
 
 Estate of Armstrong. 157 
 
 block of land; and it was claimed that the property should 
 be so sold as to give each property owner in the block, 
 against whom there was an assessment, an opportunity to 
 bid upon it). 
 
 Upon September 25, 1883, J. C. Fruchey, the purchaser 
 aforesaid, made and filed an advance bid of $5,000, and 
 authorized the return of sale to be amended by inserting the 
 said amount in place of the sum of $3,000, bid by him at 
 the auction. On November 23, 1883, the court ordered an- 
 other resale of the entire four parcels of property in con- 
 formity with the opinion of his honor, Judge Coffey, below, 
 and at such resale it appears that the property before sold 
 to Fruchey was sold to Chipman for $6,500. 
 
 C. H. Parker, attorney in support of objections. 
 
 J. M. Wood, for the administratrix, contra. 
 
 COFFEY, J. It is manifest from the offer of Mr. 
 Fruchey 's attorney to increase his bid of $3,000 to $5,000, 
 that the price obtained at the sale was greatly disproportion- 
 ate to the value of the articles sold. I have fully considered 
 all the points made by counsel on both sides, in oral argu- 
 ment and in briefs, and, while conceding the cogency of Mr. 
 Wood's presentation of views, cannot consider it conclusive. 
 I adhere to the view intimated by me at the hearing, as the 
 correct conclusion — the sale cannot be confirmed ; and a new 
 sale should take place under circumstances calculated to 
 bring the utmost value of the property. 
 
 Estate of MARGARET AR^ISTRONG, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 2,054; decided December 12, 1883.] 
 
 Trustee — Use and Management of Funds. — An agent or trustee has 
 no right to use the funds intrusted to him as his own, nor to min- 
 gle them with his own funds, without clear authorization; it is his 
 duty to keep the funds separate and intact, and free from any lia- 
 bility such ns he incurs in the use of his own moneys. 
 
 Trustee — Management of Funds. — An agent or trustee must pur- 
 sue with exactitude the instructions given as to funds intrusted
 
 158 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 with him, or show that his particular act was ratified with full 
 -knowledge on his principal's part as to the nature of the act. 
 
 Trustee — Loaning Funds. — Where an agent or trustee is instructed 
 to "loan out" funds held by him, it means that he is to invest 
 them for his principal 's account, and to make an accounting to the 
 principal of such investment. He is not authorized to borrow the 
 funds for his own purposes. 
 
 Trustee — Investment of Funds. — Where confidence is reposed in a 
 trustee to judiciously invest the funds in his hands, this confidence 
 is abused when he places himself in the position of a debtor to 
 the principal, without fully advising the latter of the risk he runs, 
 and giving him an opportunity of knowing the hazard that the 
 funds are subjected to. 
 
 Where a Trustee to Invest has Made Himself a Debtor to His 
 Principal, and thereby subjected the funds to a risk and hazard, he 
 must show that he fully advised his principal in the premises, in 
 order to avoid responsibility for the loss his conduct may cause. 
 
 Trust — Limitation of Actions. — Where one occupies a fiduciary re- 
 lation, the statute of limitations cannot avail as a defense. Lapse 
 of time is no bar to a subsisting trust, clearly established. 
 
 Trust — Limitation of Actions. — Where one has occupied a fiduciary 
 relation, the statute of limitations cannot be availed of, unless and 
 until a demand on the part of the principal, and a refusal by the 
 trustee, are shown. 
 
 Trust. — The Following Language in a Letter Written by One Who 
 has Collected and holds moneys for another, establishes a trust: 
 "It leaves a balance in your favor of $15,000, besides what has 
 accumulated since the estate was fixed up, which I will loan out [at] 
 about nine per cent, being the best I can do at present." 
 
 Where It Appeared that a Special Administrator had been a Trus- 
 tee for the decedent in her lifetime, and there was a large balance 
 at the time of decedent's death, for which he should be held ac- 
 countable, and he has made no statement of his indebtedness or 
 trust in his account rendered as special administrator, he should be 
 charged with the amount of such indebtedness upon the settlement 
 of his account. 
 
 In this case the record shows that Robert Stevenson filed 
 an application for letters of special administration upon the 
 twenty-first day of November, 1882, the petition alleging: 
 That decedent, Margaret Armstrong, died at Foxlake, Dodge 
 county, Wisconsin, on October 3, 1882, being then and there 
 resident, and leaving estate in the city and county of San 
 Francisco, within the jurisdiction of the court, consisting
 
 Estate of Armstrong. 159 
 
 of an undivided one-eighth (%) interest in the lot of land 
 (and the improvements thereon) situated on the southwest 
 corner of California and Montgomery streets, in the afore- 
 said city and county, and known as ' ' Stevenson Block ' ' ; that 
 the rents and profits of decedent's interest in said realtj^ 
 amounted to $150 a month ; that petitioner was a brother 
 of the decedent, and also agent for all the owners of said 
 "Stevenson Block"; and that decedent left no will. Upon 
 the filing of said petition and showing made, and in accord- 
 ance with the prayer of the petition, the said Robert Steven- 
 son was appointed special administrator, and upon the same 
 day, to-wit : November 21, 1882, letters of special adminis- 
 tration were issued to him by the clerk. 
 
 Thereafter, Maurice B. Blake filed a petition in the matter 
 of the estate, to have a will of decedent admitted to probate, 
 upon a copy of said will and of the probate thereof by a Wis- 
 consin court (all duly authenticated) ; and after due pro- 
 ceedings the same was so admitted to probate upon June 5, 
 1883, and said M. B. Blake was appointed administrator with 
 the will annexed of the estate of said decedent, and there- 
 upon qualified on June 9, 1883. On July 17, 1883, the said 
 administrator, Blake, filed a petition praying that a citation 
 issue against the aforesaid Robert Stevenson, directing him 
 to render an account of his special administration of said es- 
 tate. Upon this petition citation was issued against Steven- 
 son, returnable on July 26, 1887 ; citation was served, and 
 on the return day the prayer for an account was granted. 
 
 On August 3, 1883, an "Account of Robert Stevenson, 
 Special Administrator," was filed, showing that he received 
 the sum of $385 rents from James W. Hart, collector for the 
 "Stevenson Block," and that he paid out $133.45, leaving a 
 balance amounting to $251.55 ; and with this account was 
 filed a detailed account by the aforesaid James W. Hart, 
 the agent and collector of all the rents for the owners of the 
 said "Stevenson Block." On August 7, 1883, there were 
 filed by the administrator, Blake, "Exceptions to Account of 
 Special Administrator," contesting the said account filed Au- 
 gust 3, 1883, on the grounds, first, that Stevenson has not 
 charged himself with all the property of the estate coming
 
 160 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 to his hands, for that on or about August 15, 1877, in de- 
 cedent's lifetime, he collected, as her agent, a large sum of 
 money and also other personal property, and an interest (un- 
 divided) in a parcel of real property, distributed to her as 
 heir of one Andrew J. Stevenson, deceased; that large sums 
 were afterward received as her agent in her lifetime, for 
 rents of realty and interest and dividends on moneys and 
 stocks; that said Stevenson never fully accounted to her for 
 any of such property so received by him as aforesaid; that 
 the amount of Stevenson's indebtedness cannot be stated, but 
 is believed to exceed $20,000, and he has not accounted for 
 any of it ; second, the item for attorney fees of special admin- 
 istration is excessive ; and prayed that the account presented 
 be not allowed, but that said Stevenson be compelled to charge 
 himself with the amount of his indebtedness and with all 
 property that should be in his hands, or the proceeds of the 
 same. 
 
 The facts proved before the court, and which led to the 
 opinion in the case, can be best given as they were presented 
 in the ' ' Findings and Decision on Account of Special Admin- 
 istrator, " drawn in conformity with the opinion and filed 
 January 17, 1884, viz.: 1. That about August 15, 1877, said 
 Robert Stevenson, as agent of said Margaret Armstrong, the 
 decedent, took possession of the sum of $24,618.80 one-eighth 
 interest in the lands and premises known as '* Stevenson 
 Block," and certain mining stocks, jewelry and furniture, 
 distributed to her as one of the heirs of the late Andrew J. 
 Stevenson, deceased. 2. That none of the said property so 
 received by him is accounted for in his account as special 
 administrator; but that the jewelry had been given to said 
 Stevenson by the decedent ; that the mining stocks had been, 
 after rendition of the account, delivered to the administrator, 
 Blake, and since the latter 's qualification he has been in pos- 
 session of the interest in the realty and of the household 
 furniture. 3. That on August 15, 1877, there remained in 
 Stevenson's hands, out of said amount of $24,618.80, the sum 
 of $15,000 ($9,618.80 having been previously disbursed to 
 his principal) ; and that said money was held and retained 
 by him in a fiduciary capacity, upon the understanding that
 
 Estate of Armstrong. 161 
 
 he should loan out the same upon interest for the benefit 
 of his principal, the aforesaid decedent, and account to her 
 therefor. 4. That, without notice to his principal, and in 
 violation of his duties as agent, he mingled the said sum of 
 $15,000 with his own funds, and never kept them separate 
 therefrom; that he did not loan out the money for her to 
 others, but used it in all respects as his own, employing it in 
 hazardous mining and stock speculations in his own behalf, 
 by which means it was ultimately lost. 5. That he never 
 paid to his principal any part of said $15,000, or the inter- 
 est thereon, except the interest to October 1, 1878. 6. That 
 no demand for an accounting of said moneys was ever made 
 upon him by his principal, or refused by him; that he never 
 informed her of the mingling and using of said moneys with 
 his own, and such intermingling and use were never ratified 
 by her, the said principal. 7. That from the fifteenth day of 
 August, 1877, aforesaid, up to the date of his principal's 
 death, viz. : October 4, 1882, he held and managed the prop- 
 erty collected and received as aforesaid, as her agent, to- 
 gether with the rents, income and dividends thereof ; and 
 that he has not entered any of the said rents or dividends, 
 or the disbursements connected therewith, in his account 
 aforesaid, but has specified them in an exhibit filed in the 
 estate September 21, 1883. 8. That for a considerable period 
 the rents and dividends received by him were not paid over 
 to his principal, but allowed to accumulate, and on January 
 1, 1881, there had so accumulated and remained unpaid net 
 rents and dividends amounting in all to the sum of $11,727.67, 
 with interest; that thereafter he paid over the current rents 
 and dividends up to May 1, 1882, but subsequently there ac- 
 cumulated and remained unpaid in his hands, from net rents 
 and dividends, the sum of $1,004.75. 9. That the same facts 
 existed as to the rents and dividends, so received by him as 
 aforesaid, as existed with reference to the principal and orig- 
 inal moneys and property which came into his possession, as 
 found in and by the third and fourth findings above. 10. 
 That his principal died, and he, after petitioning therefor, 
 was appointed the special administrator of her estate and 
 duly qualified, and at and after such qualification he was 
 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. I — H
 
 162 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 possessed of sufficient property to have realized and taken 
 into his possession, as such special administrator, at least the 
 sum of $1,004.75, aforesaid. 11. That after his qualification 
 as special administrator he received and disbursed the moneys 
 set forth in his account filed herein, and afterward paid 
 over the balance therein stated to the administrator of the 
 estate, M. B. Blake. 
 
 And, as conclusions of law, the court found : 1. That the 
 indebtedness of said Stevenson to said decedent was not, nor 
 any part of it, barred by section 339, Code of Civil Pro- 
 cedure, or the statute of limitations ; 2. That the account 
 should not be settled as rendered, but the said Robert Steven- 
 son, as such special administrator, should be charged with 
 the various sums of money and accumulations received by 
 him, as set out in the findings of fact, with interest; and 
 that a decree should be entered against him settling his ac- 
 count at a total balance of $37,218.74, due the estate of Mar- 
 garet Armstrong, deceased, from him as special adminis- 
 trator thereof. 
 
 Alfred Wheeler, attorney for special administrator (Stev- 
 enson) ; afterward E. D. Saw.yer, on the "Exceptions" to 
 the account. 
 
 J. M. Allen, attorney for Frederick James Armstrong, an 
 heir at law. 
 
 j\I. C. Blake, attorney for Maurice B. Blake, the adminis- 
 trator with the will annexed, for the "Exceptions." 
 
 COFFEY, J. In the matter of the application for the 
 settlement of the account of Robert Stevenson, as special ad- 
 ministrator of the estate of Margaret Armstrong, deceased, 
 the special administrator had no right to use the funds of 
 the decedent as his own, nor to mingle them with his own 
 funds, without clear authorization from her. It was his duty 
 to keep them separate and intact and free from any liabil- 
 ity such as he incurred in the use of his own moneys. He 
 should have pursued with exactitude the instructions given 
 as to them, or show that his act was ratified, with full knowl- 
 edge on the part of the decedent of the nature of that act.
 
 Estate of Armstrong. 163 
 
 The evidence shows that the authority was to "loan out" 
 the money, which seems to me to mean that he was to in- 
 vest for her and to account therefor, and not to borrow it 
 for his own purposes. ]\Irs. Armstrong reposed confidence 
 in him to judiciously invest her funds, and this confidence 
 was abused when he placed himself in the position of a debtor 
 to her, without fully advising her of the risk she ran, and 
 affording her an opportunity of knowing that he was sub- 
 jecting her funds to hazard, and depriving her of the means 
 of averting catastrophe to her fortune. He should show 
 that he did so, in order to avoid responsibility for the loss 
 his conduct caused to her. Occupying a fiduciary relation, 
 the statute of limitations cannot avail as a defense; at least, 
 not unless or until a demand and refusal are shown. 
 
 Lapse of time is no bar to a trust clearly established. Pre- 
 vost V. Gratz, 6 Wheat. 481, 5 L. Ed. 311. Is this trust 
 clearly established? I think so. See extract from letter, 
 page 48, transcript: 
 
 "It leaves a balance in your favor of $15,000, besides what 
 has accumulated since the estate was fixed up, which I will 
 loan out at about 9 per cent, being the best I can do at 
 present. ' ' 
 
 Clearly, the ordinary meaning of language will not bear 
 the strain that "loan out" means he will borrow for him- 
 self, appropriate to his own use, treat as a personal account. 
 It must be interpreted that he will invest it for her account. 
 He was to "loan out," not to borrow. He had no other in- 
 structions. He did not ad\'ise her of the risk to which he 
 was subjecting her funds, nor of his mingling the funds with 
 his own indiscriminately: See vol. 2, Trans., p. 70. Mrs. Mc- 
 Lean testifies that her sister, Margaret, wanted her brother, 
 Robert, to "lay out" the money. She reposed in him great 
 trust and confidence, which he was bound to use with the 
 utmost discretion, lie did not advise her of the hazardous 
 nature of his use of the money, nor of his own failing con- 
 dition (vol. 2, Trans., pp. 62. 69-70, 77, 78. 80. 85, 86). The 
 evidence is by no means clear, is very vague and unsatis- 
 factory, as to the extent of ]Mr. Hunter's or of IMrs. Arm- 
 strong's knowledge of the facts in time to retrieve conse-
 
 164 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 quences of Robert's conduct (vol. 2, Trans., 89, STVo, 103, 
 104). Altogether, he failed in his duty to protect her in- 
 terest. 
 
 Robert Stevenson was the trustee of Margaret Armstrong; 
 his trusteeship has never been revoked ; and the statute of 
 limitations cannot operate in his favor. He is clearly liable 
 for loss. His account should not be allowed as rendered, ex- 
 cept the item for attorney's fee, a charge properly and nec- 
 essarily incurred. Let findings be prepared in conformity 
 with the text of this opinion. 
 
 The Decision in the Principal Case was affirmed by the supreme 
 court of California in 69 Cal. 239, 10 Pac. 335, where it is held that 
 a special administrator, who is individually indebted to the decedent, 
 must charge himself in his account with the amount of such indebted- 
 ness. 
 
 Estate of ELIZABETH D. TRAYLOR, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 4,705; decided January 11, 1887.] 
 
 Claim for Counsel Fees — Jury Trial. — A claim of an attorney for 
 fees for services rendered an estate is an expense of administration, and 
 is not a proper matter for trial by jury. But the claim of an attor- 
 ney for fees for services rendered to a decedent during his lifetime 
 differs materially from a claim for services rendered to the estate. 
 
 Claim. — The Allowance of a Claim Against Decedent prima facie 
 establishes its correctness and validity, and shifts the onus of proving 
 its incorrectness or invalidity upon the party contesting the same. 
 
 Claim — Jury Trial. — The Allowance of a Claim does not interfere 
 with the question of the right to a trial by jury. 
 
 Account — Jury Trial. — An Account, as Such, is a Matter to be 
 Settled by the Court without a jury. 
 
 A Claim Arising During the Lifetime of the Decedent is a matter 
 which may be segregated from the account of the executors. 
 
 Claim. — The Parties are Entitled to a Jury on the Trial of a contest 
 which arose during the lifetime of the deceased, and at the trial the 
 claim alone should be submitted, and not as part of an account in 
 which it is set forth. 
 
 Elizabeth D. Traylor died in San Francisco, a resident 
 thereof and leaving estate therein, on the twenty-first day of 
 October, 1885.
 
 Estate of Traylor. 165 
 
 She left a last will and testament bearing date July 20, 
 1885, and a codicil thereto dated September 30, 1885. 
 
 George W. Prescott, P. N. Lilienthal and Robert Harrison 
 were named therein as executors. 
 
 Upon petition filed on October 28, 1885, the will and 
 codicil were admitted to probate, and the persons named 
 appointed executors thereof, and letters testamentary issued 
 to them on November 10, 1885. 
 
 On November 20, 1885, George W. Prescott resigned his 
 trust as executor, and the two remaining executors con- 
 tinued to act as such. 
 
 Robert Harrison, one of the executors, presented to Hon. 
 J. V. Coffey, judge of the probate department of the su- 
 perior court, in the first instance pursuant to section 1510, 
 Code of Civil Procedure, for allowance, a claim against the 
 estate for the sum of $8,250, for professional services ren- 
 dered decedent in her lifetime, which claim was allowed by 
 the judge on March 5, 1886, for $7,250. The claim was 
 also presented to the other executor and the Judge, under 
 section 1496, Code of Civil Procedure, and by them allowed 
 and approved for said sum on said day. 
 
 On May 14, 1886, the executors filed an exhibit, pursuant 
 to section 1622, Code of Civil Procedure. The exhibit con- 
 tained a statement of the expenses of administration, in 
 which was an item "Retaining fee of Swift and Harrison, 
 as counsel for estate and executors, $1,000." It further 
 contained a statement of claims presented against the estate 
 and allowed, among which was the "claim of Robert Har- 
 rison, for professional services as attorney and counselor, 
 rendered Elizabeth D. Traylor, in her lifetime, allowed for 
 $7,250." 
 
 On May 18, 1886, Elizabeth H. Siddall, claiming to be 
 sole heir of decedent, filed a contest, on various grounds, to 
 various items in the exhibit, among them the two above 
 mentioned, and, as to those two, separately demanded a jury 
 trial to determine the merits of the claims: and, as to the 
 latter, also asked that proper pleadings be framed for that 
 purpose by the respective parties. 
 
 On September 29, 1886, the executors filed tlicir fii-st 
 annual account, which contained the above-mentioned items.
 
 166 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 By subsequent amendment, however, the names of Swift 
 and Harrison were stricken out from the first item, and 
 that of John F. Swift inserted in place thereof. 
 
 On October 8, 1886, said Elizabeth H. Siddal filed her 
 contest to the same items in said account, and also made 
 a similar demand for jury trials. 
 
 The motions for jury trials were argued and submitted 
 to the court on November 10, 1886, and on January 11, 
 1887, the motion as to the claim of John F. Swift was de- 
 nied, and the one as to the claim of Robert Harrison granted. 
 Subsequently, the latter claim was transferred to depart- 
 ment No. 1 for trial. 
 
 D. W. Douthitt, for motions; also, with him, J. C. Bates. 
 
 W. W. Cope, opposed, for executors. 
 
 Robert Harrison, also opposed, for executors. 
 
 Selden S. Wright, also opposed, for certain heirs. 
 
 COFFEY, J. With reference to the motion to refer 
 claims to jury: I have come to the conclusion in regard to 
 the claims of John F. Swift, for counsel fees, for services 
 rendered to the estate, being a claim for legal services in- 
 curred during the administration, which is an expense of ad- 
 ministration, it is not a proper matter for trial by jury. 
 Motion denied. As to the claim of Robert Harrison, for legal 
 services rendered in the lifetime of deceased : This differs 
 materially from Mr. Swift's claim. It is a matter which may 
 be segregated from the account, so if it be submitted to a jury 
 it should be submitted alone and not as part of the account. 
 The account is a matter to be settled by the court without a 
 jury, that is, the account as an account. This claim of Mr. 
 Harrison, although it is allowed by the court and prima facie 
 established by reason of the approval of the court, that is only 
 a shifting of the onus, that does not interfere with the ques- 
 tion of the right to a trial by jury. 
 
 The decision of the court is, that the motion for a jury 
 trial as to that claim be and it is granted. Exception.
 
 Estate of Rothschild. 167 
 
 Estate of GEORGIANA ROTHSCHILD, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 3,944; decided May 25, 1885.] 
 
 Letters of Administration — Revocation in Favor of Person having 
 Prior Right. — Where letters of administration have been granted to 
 a person who is not entitled to them in his own right, and who was 
 not nominated by the person entitled, they will be revoked upon 
 the application of the person entitled to letters. 
 
 Georgiaua Rothschild died in La Porte county, Indiana, 
 a resident thereof, and leaving personal estate in San Fran- 
 cisco, on April 1, 1883. 
 
 On February 3, 1885, Asher Frank filed a petition for 
 letters of administration upon the estate of the decedent in 
 San Francisco, in which he alleged the foregoing facts, and 
 also that John and Rosalie Summerfield were the grand- 
 parents of the decedent, and her heirs and next of kin, and 
 resided in Indiana, and that petitioner was the great-uncle 
 of the decedent, and that the heirs had authorized him to 
 make this application. 
 
 No written request of the heirs for the appointment of 
 petitioner was filed, but he held a power of attorney from 
 the grandparents dated January 23, 1885, authorizing him 
 to act in any manner that he saw fit, to collect their inherit- 
 ance from the decedent for them. This power of attorney' 
 was filed April 10, 1885. 
 
 The estate in San Francisco consisted of $2,000, in the 
 hands of Joseph Rothschild. On February 17, 1885, the 
 application of Asher Frank was granted, and he was ap- 
 pointed administrator, and on the following day letters of 
 administration were issued to him. 
 
 On ]\Iarch 30, 1885, Henry Rothschild filed a petition for 
 the revocation of such letters. He alleged that decedent 
 was the infant daughter of George and Bertha Rothschild, 
 both deceased ; that petitioner and Mrs. Nathan Meyer, resi- 
 dents of San Francisco, were heirs of decedent; that peti- 
 tioner was decedent's uncle and a brother of her father, and 
 ]Mrs. Nathan Meyer was an aunt of decedent, and a sister 
 of her father and of petitioner; that Asher Frank was a 
 resident of Oakland; that decedent was a minor under the
 
 168 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 age of eighteen years, and unmarried at the time of her 
 death, and that the money left by her was inherited from 
 her father, who had previously died in San Francisco; that 
 no notice of the application of Asher Frank had been given 
 to petitioner, or to Mrs. Nathan Meyer, and the first knowl- 
 edge he had of it was when he was informed by Joseph 
 Rothschild that Asher Frank had been appointed adminis- 
 trator. 
 
 An order to show cause was issued on this petition, re- 
 turnable on April 10, 1885. 
 
 On that day the administrator filed his answer, in which 
 he denied that petitioner, Henry Rothschild, and Mrs. 
 Nathan Frank were heirs of decedent, or entitled to a 
 distributive share of her estate, and alleged that the de- 
 cedent was an actual resident of the state of Indiana at 
 the time of her death ; that her death was known to peti- 
 tioner immediately after it occurred, and petitioner took 
 no steps for the issuance of letters; further, that John and 
 Rosalie Summerfield were the grandparents of decedent, and 
 next of kin under the laws of Indiana. 
 
 It was contended, on behalf of the administrator, that 
 letters were properly granted to him, under section 1377, 
 Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that "letters of 
 administration must be granted to any applicant, though it 
 appears that there are other persons having better rights 
 to the administration, when such persons fail to appear 
 and claim the issuance of letters to themselves"; and that 
 the letters should not be revoked. Counsel cited sections 
 1383 and 1386, Code of Civil Procedure, the first of which 
 provides in substance that when letters have been granted 
 to any other person than the surviving husband or wife, 
 child, father, mother, brother or sister of the intestate, any 
 one of them who is competent may obtain the revocation of 
 the letters and be entitled to the administration; and the 
 latter of which provides that "the surviving husband or 
 wife, when letters have been granted to a child, father, 
 brother or sister of the intestate, or any of such relatives, 
 when letters have been granted to any other of them, may 
 assert his prior right and obtain letters of administration, 
 and have the letters before granted revoked," and claimed
 
 Guardianship of Smith. 169 
 
 that when letters are once granted only the persons above 
 named could apply for their revocation. 
 
 On behalf of the petition for revocation, section 1365, 
 Code of Civil Procedure, was cited, to the effect that let- 
 ters could only be granted to some one or more of the per- 
 sons mentioned in that section, and that relatives of the de- 
 ceased are "entitled to administer only when they are en- 
 titled to succeed to his personal estate, or some portion there- 
 of"; and that the administrator did not come within subdivi- 
 sion 7 of that section, giving the right to administer to "the 
 next of kin entitled to share in the distribution of the es- 
 tate," petitioner and his sister being the only heirs of de- 
 cedent. Counsel further contended that under section 1379, 
 Code of Civil Procedure, the administrator, not being entitled 
 to letters in his own right, could only have been appointed 
 "at the written request of the person entitled, filed in the 
 court," and that no such written request had been filed. 
 
 Joseph Rothschild, for petitioner. 
 
 William H. Sharp, opposed, for administrator. 
 
 COFFEY, J. Upon the facts presented to the court, the 
 petition for revocation should be granted, and it is so or- 
 dered. 
 
 On the Revocation of Letters of Administration on the application 
 of the person primarily entitled to letters, see 1 Eoss on Probate 
 Law and Practice, 379-386. 
 
 Estate and Guardianship of GERTRUDE A. SMITH, 
 
 Minor. 
 
 [No. 3,697; decided February 24, 1885.] 
 
 Guardianship — ^Welfare of Child. — The First Point to be Considered, 
 
 in adjudging the custody or guardianship of a minor, is the best 
 interests of the child with respect to its temporal, mental and moral 
 welfare. 
 
 Guardianship — Preference of Minor. — In determining what is for 
 the best interests of a child, in adjudging its custod}' or guardian- 
 ship, the court may consider the child 's preference, if it is of 
 suflSieient age to form an intelligent preference.
 
 170 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 Guardianship — Welfare of Child. — In guardianship matters the court 
 acts for and on behalf of the child, and must regard, as the paramount 
 consideration, the interest and welfare of the child. To this every 
 other consideration must yield. 
 
 Guardianship. — The Father Is Prima Facie Entitled to the Custody 
 of His Child. But this is not an absolute right; it may be controlled 
 by other considerations; and, if the father is unable or unfit to take 
 charge of the child and educate it suitably, the court will not inter- 
 fere to take the child from those who are fit and able to so main- 
 tain and educate it. 
 
 Guardianship — Father's Right to Child's Custody. — As a general 
 rule, courts assent to the proposition that natural right and public pol- 
 icy, as well as the safety of the social structure, require that the 
 father should have the custody of his child. But this is not impera- 
 tive upon the court; it bends to the interests of the child. 
 
 Guardianship — Considerations in Awarding Custody of Child. — It 
 
 is within the court's sound discretion whether the custody of a child 
 will be given to the father. The court should consider not only the 
 father's fitness, but the condition of the child with its present custo- 
 dians, its relation to them, the present and prospective provision for 
 its support and welfare; the facts as to its present home — its dura- 
 tion, and whether with the father's consent, and upon understanding of 
 permanency; the strength of the ties formed, and the child's wishes 
 if it is of an age of discretion. 
 
 Guardianship. — Where the Best Interests of a Child require that 
 it should remain in the home where it has been fostered from in- 
 fancy, that consideration will be deemed paramount to the father 's 
 natural right, although the father is in every way competent and 
 suitable. 
 
 Guardianship. — The Custody of Minors is Always Within the 
 Discretion of the court; and this discretion is to be exercised in 
 the light of the particular and peculiar circumstances of each case. 
 The court is not bound to deliver the custody to any particular per- 
 son, not even the father. 
 
 Guardianship — Election and Nomination by Child. — It has become 
 the rule, in awarding the custody of a minor, to give the child, if 
 of proper age, the right of election in the matter. In California, 
 fourteen years is the age fixed, when the minor has a right of nomi- 
 nation, subject to the court's approval; and the law also permits 
 a minor, "if of sufficient age to form an intelligent preference," to 
 express such preference, which may be considered by the court. 
 
 Guardianship — Child's Choice of Custodian. — Mere mental pre- 
 cocity is not the test of a child 's capacity to express a choice of 
 custodian; acuteness of apprehension, sharpness of intellect on the 
 part of the child, will not alone be sufficient for the judge. The 
 minor must be capable of exercising a discretion in the premises;
 
 Guardianship of Smith. 171 
 
 its mere impulses will not weigh. In this case, a child thirteen years 
 and eight months old was held "of a sufficient age to form an intel- 
 ligent preference," within the meaning and intent of section 246, 
 Civil Code, relating to the custody and guardianship of minors. 
 
 Guardianship. — The Welfare of a Minor Means Its Permanent, 
 
 not temporary, welfare. The court is governed by that which, look- 
 ing to the previous condition, and the future continued residence 
 of the child, will contribute to its permanent happiness and welfare. 
 
 Guardianship — Examination of Minor. — In this case, in accordance 
 with the practice of the court in matters of guardianship, the minor 
 was examined, separate and apart, at length, first by the respective 
 counsel and the judge, with the official reporter; then by the judge 
 alone, counsel being absent; and finally was requested to express 
 her own wishes in writing, she being alone and without any influ- 
 ence whatever. Her written views, with her transcribed testimony, 
 were then filed as part of the record. 
 
 Guardianship. — One of the Objects of the Court's Private Exam- 
 ination of the Minor, in guardianship matters, is to discover the 
 child's capacity; its appreciation of the object of the proceedings; 
 the strength of the natural affections, and its idea of filial duty and 
 parental right; and the child's freedom of expression, that is, ab- 
 sence of influence or teachings adverse to parents. The court looks 
 with distrust upon any choice of the minor contrary to the natural 
 affections in favor of a parent. 
 
 Guardianship Awarded to Aunt Rather than to Father. — In this 
 case an application for guardianship of a minor was filed by its 
 aunt, and a counter-application and opposition presented by its 
 father, the mother being deceased. The minor was aged thirteen 
 years and eight months, and held to have proven herself fully ca- 
 pable of expressing an ' ' intelligent preference ' ' in the matter, which 
 she did in favor of her aunt, after undergoing a thorough exam- 
 ination. The child was born in the dwelling of her aunt while her 
 parents were members of the aunt's domestic circle; and the mother 
 and child ever afterward continued to live with the aunt until the 
 mother's decease, when these proceedings were instituted. The 
 child 's mother had, some years before her death, obtained a divorce 
 from the father, by default, and with it the custody of the child; 
 and it was her last wish that her child should remain with the aunt. 
 
 Guardianship Awarded to Aunt — Right of Father to Visit Ward. — • 
 
 In this case the court found that the best interests of the child re- 
 quired that it should remain with the aunt, with the right of tlie 
 father to visit and enjoy the society of the child at all reasonable 
 times; and, in awarding the minor's custody to the aunt, the court 
 said that the parties ought to reach an amicable understanding 
 whereby the child should spend part of her time with her father.
 
 172 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 and so allow opportunities for mutual affections and interests to grow 
 up between her and her paternal relatives. 
 
 In the above matter, Caroline A. Taber filed a petition on 
 October 16, 1884, praying to be appointed guardian of the 
 person and estate of the minor, Gertrude A. Smith ; setting 
 forth, among other things, that the minor had no guardian 
 appointed by will; that its mother was deceased; that the 
 mother in her lifetime had been divorced from the father 
 of the child, and had been awarded the custody of the minor ; 
 and that the only relatives of the minor were the petitioner, 
 who was the aunt of the minor, petitioner's husband, and 
 the children of petitioner. Upon the twenty-second day of 
 October, 1884, Henry L. Smith filed a petition for the 
 guardianship of the person and estate of the minor, alleging 
 that he was the child's father and entitled to be appointed 
 the guardian, and giving the names of the child's relatives 
 as they were set out in the aunt's petition aforesaid. 
 
 On November 19, 1884, Smith filed objections to the grant- 
 ing of Mrs. Taber 's petition, alleging; first, that he was the 
 father of the minor, and entitled to guardianship in prefer- 
 ence to Mrs. Taber, the child's mother being deceased; sec- 
 ond, that Mrs. Taber was unsuitable to be guardian; third, 
 that it was for the best interests of the minor, and most con- 
 ducive to its temporal, mental and moral welfare, that he 
 (Smith) should be appointed guardian; and fourth, that it 
 was not the minor's best interests, etc., that Mrs. Taber be 
 made guardian. Upon September 8, 1885, the court, in con- 
 formity with the opinion below, made an order and decree 
 appointing Mrs. Taber guardian ; and in the decree further 
 ordered that : ' ' Henry L. Smith, father of minor, be and he 
 is hereby allowed to visit and enjoy the society of the said 
 minor, at all reasonable hours, and to take her to fit and 
 proper places with him at reasonable times." 
 
 Letters of guardianship were issued to Mrs. Taber Octo- 
 ber 10, 1885. 
 
 A. N. Drown, attorney for father, H. L. Smith. 
 
 J. E. McElrath, attorney for aunt, Mrs. C. A. Taber. 
 
 COFFEY, J. Gertrude A. Smith, the minor here, was 
 born March 19, 1871, in this city, in the dwelling-house of
 
 Guardianship of Smith, 173 
 
 Jacob S. Taber, the father and mother of the minor being 
 inmates of the domestic circle, the mother a sister of Mrs. 
 Caroline A. Taber, one of the petitioners here, and the wife 
 of Jacob S. Taber. At the time of the birth of Gertrude 
 the family consisted of Mr. and Mrs. Taber, Mr. and Mrs. 
 Smith, and the only child of the Tabers ; subsequently, an- 
 f'ther child was born, and while the two families remained 
 together there were three children and the grown persons, 
 all living in comfort and in harmony. Subsequently, in 
 about two years thereafter, the family moved to Oakland, 
 and there resided for several years, until at the desire of 
 i^he ladies, Mr. Taber decided to break up housekeeping, and 
 removed to the Palace Hotel in San Francisco. Mr. Smith 
 strenuously objected to this course, as he was averse to 
 hotel life, but his wife persisting in her purpose, he per- 
 mitted her to take up her abode with her child in the family 
 of Mr. Taber, at the hotel, he remaining, as he has since re- 
 mained, in Oakland, and living with his mother, an aged 
 and estimable lady. Mr. Smith frequently visited his wife 
 and child in San Francisco, and treated them with respect 
 and consideration ; but after a while his wife instituted a 
 suit for divorce on the ground of failure to provide, which 
 he did not resist, and the divorce was granted, and the cus- 
 tody of the child awarded to the mother. There is reason, 
 from the evidence, to believe that the result of this suit was 
 reached by mutual understanding; but however this may 
 have been, the record must speak for itself. The parties to 
 the suit continued friendly, and, indeed, throughout, Mr. 
 Smith's conduct was amiable and conciliatory. The main 
 burden of the support of wife and child was borne by Mr. 
 Taber, although many items for tuition, clothing, etc., were 
 paid by Mr. Smith. In August, 1884, while Mrs. Smith, 
 Mrs. Taber and the children were in the country, the mother 
 of the minor died at a place called Wawona, a station 
 coming out of the Yosemite Valley. After this event ]\Ir. 
 Smith desired to obtain the custody of his child, and nego- 
 tiations between himself and the aunt-applicant were carried 
 on for a long time ; but failing of amicable arrangement cul- 
 minated in these proceedings. All the parties seem to be of 
 good social standing, and. as the matter is before the court.
 
 174 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 they are all entitled to respect. Mr. Smith occupies a sta- 
 tion of trust, secretary of the board of trade, with good 
 salary and fair prospects. Mr. Taber, the husband of the 
 other applicant, is president of the same board, and is in 
 constant business relations with the father of the minor and 
 on friendly terms with him. It should seem that, under 
 such circumstances, this controversy should have been set- 
 tled out of court, and without recourse to the harsh and 
 costly procedure of the law ; but it is reserved now for the 
 court to pass upon the facts and apply the law. In doing 
 so, I may say in the language of Brevver, J., in Chapsky v. 
 Wood (26 Kan. 651, 40 Am. Rep. 321, and note), a petition 
 of a father for the possession of his minor child, that : 
 "Counsel have in their arguments expressed very feelingly 
 and truthfully the embarrassments and difficulties which 
 surround the decision of a case like this. ' ' 
 
 And further to quote from the same learned judge , I may 
 apply his description of the minor in that case to the one 
 at bar : ' ' The burden of the case is that the decision is one 
 which involves the future welfare of a little girl; and I 
 think no man can look upon the face of a bright and happy 
 little girl, like the one before us, and come to the decision of 
 a question which may make or mar her future life, without 
 hesitation and feeling; certainly we are not so insensible as 
 to be able to do it" (page 652). 
 
 Gertrude Smith is certainly entitled to the description 
 here quoted. She is more than ordinarily intelligent and 
 advanced in study; she has a happy temperament, a cheer- 
 ful temper, a firm yet entirely reasonable disposition, and a 
 full appreciation of the position which she is placed in by 
 these proceedings. She was examined for hours, first by the 
 respective counsel themselves, and the judge with the official 
 reporter being alone; then by the judge without the inter- 
 vention of counsel, they being absent; finally she was asked 
 to remain entirely by herself, and without any influence 
 whatever, to write her own views and indicate her own choice 
 of custodian, which she did in plain and concise terms, as 
 hereinafter transcribed. The first point to be considered 
 by the court is, according to section 246 of the Civil Code 
 of California, "tlie best interest of the child in respect to
 
 Guardianship of Smith. 175 
 
 its temporal, and its mental and moral welfare"; and "if 
 the child be of a sufficient age to form an intelligent prefer- 
 ence, the court may consider that preference in determining 
 the question." 
 
 This court acts for and on behalf of the child, and must 
 regard as the paramount consideration the interests and wel- 
 fare of the child. To this every other consideration must 
 yield. There is no doubt, as was said by the eminent Chief 
 Justice Shaw, of Massachusetts, in Pool v. Gott et ux. (Au- 
 gust 20, 1851, at Chambers; 14 Monthly Law Reporter (Vol. 
 4, New Series), p. 269; not elsewhere reported), that the 
 father is prima facie entitled to the custody of the child. 
 This is the law of California (Code Civ. Proc, sec. 1751; 
 Civ. Code, sec. 197) ; but this is not an absolute right; it 
 may be controlled by other considerations; if unable or un- 
 fit to take charge of the child and educate it in a suitable 
 manner, the court will not interfere to take the child from 
 the care of persons who are fit and able to maintain and 
 educate it properly ; but it may be said in this case, as Chief 
 Justice Shaw said in the one before him, this is an excep- 
 tion which need not here be considered, for 'the evidence 
 shows in this case that the father of Gertrude is in a good 
 situation, pecuniary, domestic and social, and of a character 
 and reputation against which no objection can be made. 
 
 On the other hand, the aunt-applicant and her husband 
 are persons of respectability, in sufficient pecuniary circum- 
 stances, and have so far mainly educated and guarantee 
 hereafter to educate the child in a proper manner. In their 
 family the child has been reared from her birth, and, as she 
 says, she "has known no other home." To them the child 
 is devotedly attached, as appears by her private examina- 
 tion, conducted with great care and thoroughness, and with 
 an earnest endeavor on the part of the examiners to elicit 
 the exact truth; and I am satisfied, as Judge Shaw said in 
 that case, "that a termination of this relation would be, for 
 a long time at least, the cause of great suffering to her and 
 them" (14 Law Rep. 269, 270, 271). But the counsel for 
 the father-applicant contends for the natural right to the 
 custody of the child, as expressed in the Code of Civil Pro- 
 cedure (section 1751) and the Civil Code (section 197) ; and
 
 176 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 the learned counsel argues strenuously that his client has 
 done nothing to impair that right, and that the court is bound 
 now to respect the assertion of the father's right and to re- 
 spond to his demand by delivering to him the minor. Both 
 natural right and public policy, says counsel, as well as the 
 safety of the social structure, require that the father should 
 have the custody of the child (Schouler, Dom. Rel., cited). 
 As a general rule courts assent to such demands, but they 
 are not imperative upon the court. As was said by Judge 
 Finn, in the matter of the Piercy minor, the custody is al- 
 ways within the discretion of the court — a discretion to be 
 exercised in the light of the particular and peculiar circum- 
 stances of each case. The court is not bound to deliver the 
 infant over to any particular person, for it is not a matter 
 of right which even the father himself can claim at the hands 
 of the court as against the interest of the child. In the case 
 of Irma Linden, Judge Myrick [the predecessor of Judges 
 Finn and Coffey in the probate forum, San Francisco] de- 
 cided that where the father had intrusted his infant daugh- 
 ter to the custody of an aunt, at the request of his dying 
 wife, that when the child had been a member of the aunt's 
 family for six years, the custody would not be changed even 
 in favor of the father, who appeared to the court to be en- 
 tirely competent to support and educate his child. Judge 
 Myrick 's decision was placed on the ground that the best 
 interests of the child required that she should remain in the 
 home where she had remained from infancy, and that con- 
 sideration was deemed by the court paramount to. the father's 
 natural right. 
 
 This decision is in accord with the best American author- 
 ities, and Judge Finn [the predecessor, in the probate de- 
 partment of Judge Coffey] thought it correctly stated the 
 law. The cardinal principle relative to these matters is to 
 regard the benefit of the infant; to make the welfare of the 
 child paramount to the claims of either parent (Schouler, 
 Dom. Rel., 248), and the primary object of the American 
 decisions is to secure the welfare of the child and not the 
 special claims of the parent (Schouler, Dom. Rel., sec. 248). 
 It is sometimes a cjuestion (says Schouler, Dom. Rel., sec.
 
 Guardianship of Smith. 177 
 
 250), in proceedings relative to the custody of minors, how 
 far the child's own wishes should be consulted. AVhere the 
 object is simply that of custody, the rule, though not arbi- 
 trary, rests manifestly upon a principle elsewhere often ap- 
 plied, namely : That after a child has attained to years of 
 discretion she may have, in case of controversy, a voice in 
 the selection of her own custodian ; the practice is to give the 
 child the right to elect where she will go, if she be of proper 
 age. What is proper age! Fourteen years is the age in- 
 dicated by the code (Code Civ. Proc, sec. 1748) at which 
 the minor has the right of nomination, subject to the court's 
 approval. The Civil Code (section 246) allows the minor, 
 "if of sufficient age to form an intelligent preference," to 
 express such preference, which expression may be consid- 
 ered by the court in determining the question of custody. 
 Let us inquire, now, what is meant by "intelligent prefer- 
 ence." Mere mental precocity, as was observed by Lord 
 Chief Justice Cockburn in Ex parte Barford (8 Cox C. C. 
 405, 408, 9 Week. Rep. 99, 3 L. T., N. S., 467), is not the 
 test of the capacity of the child to express effectually a choice 
 of custodian. If the child have arrived at an age to exer- 
 cise a discretion in the premises, her wish may be consulted; 
 but acuteness of apprehension, sharpness of intellect alone, 
 is not sufficient to justify the judge in confirming her choice 
 The action of the court will not be controlled by the mere 
 impulses of a child of tender years. The welfare of the child 
 means the permanent and not the temporary welfare. It 
 is not what will please or gratify the child for a day or an 
 hour which is to govern the court, but that which, looking 
 to its previous condition and to its future continued resi- 
 dence, will contribute to its permanent happiness and wel- 
 fare. Thorndike v. Rice, Supreme Court Massachusetts, 14 
 Law Rep., N. S., 19 ; opinion by Mr. Justice Bigelow. One 
 of the objects of the private examination is to discover how 
 far the child is capable; her appreciation of the situation 
 in which she is placed; the strength of her natural affec- 
 tions; her idea of filial duty and of parental right; her free- 
 dom of expression, i. e., freedom from influence adverse to 
 her father which might have taught her to determine in 
 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. 1—12
 
 178 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 favor of another. The court is concerned to ascertain her 
 real desire; her free, voluntary choice of custodian; and so 
 natural is the tendency of a child, normally constituted, to 
 seek the protection of the author of its being, that the court 
 looks with distrust upon any choice to the contrary. 
 
 Frequently courts have conformed to the wishes of minors 
 under the age of fourteen, as in the case of Rex v. Smith, 
 2 Strange, 982, cited in the Matter of the McDowles, 8 Johns. 
 328, 331, where a boy under fourteen was brought up on 
 habeas corpus, sued out by his father against his aunt, but 
 the court merely left the boy at liberty to go where he pleased, 
 and the boy chose to stay with his aunt. 
 
 In the Matter of the McDowles the infants were respec- 
 tively eleven and eight years of age, and yet the court de- 
 clared they were at liberty to go where they please.d, and the 
 chief justice, asking the infants where they chose to go, they 
 answered that they wished to return to their masters; after- 
 ward, upon the suggestion of the counsel for the father, that 
 improper means and constraint had been used to influence 
 their election, and that the answers were not freely given by 
 them to the court, three counselors were appointed to exam- 
 ine the boys and discover their real desire; thereafter the 
 examiners reported to the court that the boys, after being 
 carefully informed of the purpose of the inquiry, expressed 
 a decided and unequivocal desire to return to their masters, 
 and a strong and unaccountable repugnance to go back to 
 their father, and the court so ordered (8 Johns. 332). 
 
 In the State v. Libbey, 44 N. H. 321, 82 Am. Dec. 223, it 
 w^as held to be within the sound discretion of the court, 
 w^hether the custody of the child will be given to the father, 
 and in determining the question the court should consider 
 not only the fitness of the father for the trust, but the con- 
 dition of the child with the person from whose custody it 
 is sought to be taken, its relation to them, the present and 
 prospective provision for its support and welfare ; the length 
 of its residence there, and whether with the consent of its 
 father, and the understanding, tacit or otherwise, that it 
 should be permanent; the strength of the ties that have been 
 formed between them, and, if the child has come to years
 
 Guardianship of Smith, 179 
 
 of discretion, her wishes in the matter. This is a clear enun- 
 ciation of the law, and commends itself to one's sense of jus- 
 tice (In re Scarritt, 76 Mo. 593, 43 Am. Rep. 768), and it 
 has been recognized as correct doctrine in every well-con- 
 sidered American case. 
 
 Gertrude Smith is of sufficient age to form an intelligent 
 preference; she is within a short interval of the time when 
 she will have the right of nomination; her preference has 
 been expressed, and the transcript of her testimony occupies 
 one hundred and five pages of legal cap paper, and has been 
 examined carefully by this court. In the private examina- 
 tion the judge strenuously endeavored to impress upon the 
 mind and heart of this child her filial obligation, her duty 
 to her surviving parent, the strength of his affection for her, 
 his kindn^s to her, and his natural right to her custody, and 
 his ability and willingness to provide for her in every way 
 (see page 73 and following pages of the Reporter's Tran- 
 script of Testimony) ; but, while professing respect for her 
 father, she resolutely refused to elect him as her guardian, 
 declaring that in no wise was her refusal inspired by any 
 influence, save her own judgment of what was best for her 
 interests. In order to illustrate her determination. I will 
 quote from her testimony (Trans., pp. 90-93) : 
 
 The Court (questioning) — "It is a very serious matter for 
 me to decide these questions. I don't want to decide so that 
 hereafter you will say that my decision was unjust or unfair 
 to you, or inconsistent with your happiness; nor do I want 
 your father to say, if I should decide against him, that my 
 decision was not right, and not based on sufficient grounds. 
 Do you understand that ? ' ' Ans.— ' ' Yes, sir. ' ' The Court— 
 "You understand, also, that the law allows you to say some- 
 thing about what you prefer?" Ans.— "Yes, sir." . . . . 
 The Court — "You have reasoned over this matter, you say?" 
 Ans. — "I have thought a good deal, and have come to a con- 
 clusion which I think I can never change, am certain of that. 
 That conclusion is that I want to live with my aunt, and 
 don't want to go to my father." (Page 94, this testimony 
 I here condense, preserving the language, avoiding repeti- 
 tions.) In answer to the Court — "If you should decide to
 
 180 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 give me to my father, I don't think I will be reconciled to 
 it in a few months, nor say that you were right, and under- 
 stood better than I. I should be very unhappy at such a de- 
 cision. Indeed, I would feel very bad about it. " The Court 
 (page 96) — "Don't you think your father has some feelings, 
 too 1 Didn 't you ever consider that ?".... Ans. — ' ' I feel 
 this way : I am sure he would not feel any the worse for see- 
 ing me regularly, as he has always done, and maybe stay 
 with him a week or two, and something like that, and then 
 stay sometime with auntie, and then go back with him; and 
 I know that she would be willing; but of course it must be 
 different the other way." The Court — ''You made me an 
 answer, a while ago, that when you should be fourteen years 
 of age you would be entitled to name your own guardian. 
 
 How do you know that?" Ans. — "Mamma told jne 
 
 She said to me she would be very happy when I was four- 
 teen, and I asked why, and she said if anything I would be 
 able to choose my own guardian." (Rptrs. Trs. Testy., p. 
 98.) 
 
 All through her examination the minor adhered to her de- 
 sire to remain with those with whom she has been domiciled 
 since her birth, and stated that her mother so desired in her 
 last hours: "She wanted me to remain with auntie because 
 aunt had been so good to her" (Reptrs. Trs., pp. 67, 68), etc. 
 
 Finally, at the instance of the court, the minor while alone 
 wrote freely her desire, in these words : 
 
 "San Francisco, December 3, 1884. 
 "Judge Coffey: — My desire is to live with my aunt, Mrs. 
 C. A. Taber, and hope you will consent to it. I am thirteen 
 years and eight months. I am now going to the Denman 
 School and getting along in my studies very well, being now 
 number one of my room. We now live on 737 Ellis street, 
 between Larkin and Polk. Hoping you w^ll be of the same 
 opinion as I am, in regard to living with my aunt, I remain, 
 
 ' ' Yours respectfully, 
 
 "GERTRUDE A. SMITH." 
 
 It Avill be seen from the foregoing that the court has done 
 everything in its power to ascertain what is for the best in- 
 terests of this child, feeling an extreme reluctance to sepa-
 
 Guardianship of Smith. 181 
 
 rate that interest from the father's right, and pajdng great 
 heed to the argument of his counsel. The right of the father 
 has been considered fairly and fully; and the court very 
 much regrets that its views of the minor's interests, and her 
 own earnest entreaty, compel it to deny his petition. As 
 was said in the case of Pool v. Gott, supra, this is eminerftly 
 a case for amicable arrangement between the parties. Some 
 agreement might have been made, might still be made, by 
 which the child should spend part of her time with her 
 father, to allow opportunities for mutual affections and in- 
 terests to grow up between herself and her paternal rela- 
 tions; but it is not in the power of the court in this proceed- 
 ing to decree any arrangement, except to permit the father 
 freely to visit his child, at such times and places as may be 
 suitable ; and his counsel will propose such restrictions which, 
 if agreed upon, will be accepted by the court ; and, if not 
 agreed upon, the court will settle the terms of the restric- 
 tions, subject to which the prayer of Mrs. Taber is granted. 
 
 The Father or Mother of the Minor if found by the court compe- 
 tent to discharge the duties of guardianship, ordinarily is entitled 
 to be appointed guardian, in preference to any other person: Cal. 
 Code Civ. Proc. 1751. This right of the parent may be lost by 
 abandoning the child, or by such a course of conduct as makes him 
 or her unfit to have its care and custody. The rigid rule of the com- 
 mon law which gave the father the right to the custody and services 
 of his child, superior to that of the mother and all others, has been 
 decidedly relaxed in modern times, and it is now universally con- 
 ceded that the parental right must yield and be subordinated to the 
 best interests of the child, even to the extent of its being placed in 
 the hands of strangers. Indeed, neither parent has any right that 
 can be made to conflict with the welfare of the child: In re Lund- 
 berg, 143 Cal. 402, 7 Pac. 156; In re Van Loan, 142 Cal. 423, 76 
 Pac. 37; Ex parte Becknell, 119 Cal. 496, 51 Pac. 692; Ex parte 
 Miller, 109 Cal. 643, 42 Pac. 428; In re Vance, 92 Cal. 195, 28 Pac. 
 229; In re Galleher, 2 Cal. App. 365, 84 Pac. 352; Jones v. Bowman, 
 13 Wyo. 79, 77 Pac. 439, 67 L. E. A. 860; Eusner v. McMillan, 37 
 Wash. 416, 79 Pac. 988; Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo. 173, 62 Am. St. 
 Eep. 17, 33 Pac. 23, 20 L. E. A. 199. 
 
 The Wishes of a Child, if he is of a sufficient age to form an in- 
 telligent preference, although not conclusive on the court, will al- 
 ways be given due consideration in determining who shall be named
 
 182 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 guardian: Stapleton v. Poynter, 111 Ky. 264, 98 Am. St. Eep. 411, 
 62 S. W. 730. It is not necessary, in order for a child to enjoy this 
 privilege, that he has reached the age of fourteen: Willet v. Warren, 
 34 Wash, 647, 76 Pac. 273. 
 
 Guardianship of THEODORA F. HANSEN, Minor. 
 
 [No. 4,243; decided January 26, 1886.] 
 
 Guardian — Eligibility of Nonresident. — Where the mother of a 
 minor is a nonresident, she is legally incapable of obtaining letters 
 of guardianship over the child in this state. 
 
 Guardian — Eligibility of Married Woman. — Where the mother of 
 a minor is a married woman, she is ineligible to become guardian. 
 
 Guardian — Choice of Child. — A child ten years of age who has been 
 educated carefully and is a bright girl may be capable of expressing 
 "an intelligent preference" for a guardian, which the court will con- 
 sider. 
 
 Guardian — Best Interests of Ward. — In awarding the custody of a 
 minor, or appointing a general guardian, the court is guided by what 
 appears to be for the child 's best interests as to its temporal, mental 
 and moral welfare. 
 
 Guardian. — Where Application is Made for Guardianship of a 
 Minor, if there is no person before the court who is legally entitled 
 to the guardianship, it must be shown, to justify a resistance of the 
 application, even by the nonresident mother, that no guardian is 
 needed for the child, or that the applicant is an unfit person. 
 
 Guardian — Stranger Preferred to Mother. — Where a mother, after 
 desertion by her husband, committed her child to the care of the pe- 
 titioner, agreeing that he should adopt it (which he never legally 
 did), and afterward, under judgment in an action for divorce by 
 the mother, the child was awarded to petitioner; and the petitioner 
 kept the child for nearly six years, until the mother wanted to get 
 the child again, when he applied for guardianship of her, the mother 
 opposing it, and the divorce decree being modified pending the 
 guardianship proceedings, so as to remit the question of custody to 
 the guardianship department; and during all the period aforesaid pe- 
 titioner and his wife treated and educated the child as if she were 
 their own; and the mother is legally incapable and ineligible to 
 become guardian, being a nonresident and married; and the child has 
 expressed a preference for petitioner, and it would not be for the 
 child's best interests to place her anywhere but with petitioner, 
 guardianship should be granted to petitioner; but so restricted that 
 the mother may communicate with and visit the child.
 
 Guardianship of Hansen. 183 
 
 Guardianship — Interest of State. — In the matter of the guardian- 
 Bhip of minors, the state is interested in having beneficial influences 
 surround and impress its future citizens. 
 
 In the matter of the guardianship of the above minor, it 
 appears that letters of guardianship were granted to J. W. 
 Baldwin, on May 13, 1885, after the usual notices required 
 by the statute to relatives within the state (the mother, it 
 would seem, being absent therefrom). Immediately after 
 the granting of these letters, and on May 15, 1885, affida- 
 vits and a petition, on behalf of the child's mother (Fran- 
 ces E. Fairbanks), were filed, for a revocation of the letters 
 to Baldwin; and on May 18, 1885, an order to show cause 
 was made, and a citation issued against said Baldwin. There- 
 after, it would seem, from the record in the case, that pro- 
 ceedings were taken before Judge Coifey, as if there had 
 never been a grant of guardianship to Baldwin ; this course 
 no doubt having been deemed necessary or advisable, in view 
 of the claim of the child's mother, appearing of record, that 
 the divorce court, referred to in Judge Coffey's opinion, had 
 never surrendered or lost jurisdiction over the minor; and 
 in furtherance of the modification (subsequently had) of the 
 decree of the divorce court, remitting the question of the 
 child's custody to the determination of the probate depart- 
 ment of the court. Two written requests of the child, both 
 in favor of Baldwin, appear of record, filed on June 6th and 
 December 24, 1885. Each of them is entirely in the child's 
 handwriting, addressed to the judge, giving the name and 
 residence of the child, and expressing its wish to stay with 
 ''Papa Baldwin." 
 
 M. A. Dorn and P. B. Nagle, for applicant Baldwin. 
 
 Thos. P. Ryan, for the mother, Mrs. Fairbanks. 
 
 COFFEY, J. This application has been a long time be- 
 fore the court, but the delay in deciding it is not due to the 
 court, except so far as the disposition to come to a cor- 
 rect conclusion has induced deliberation; and in that regard 
 the court has not gone beyond the constitutional limitations. 
 
 The facts are, as adduced in evidence : The minor was born 
 July 5, 1875, the parents being Theodore E. Hansen and
 
 184 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 Frances E. Hansen, who had contracted marital relations in 
 September, 1874; the parents did not live happily together, 
 and after a while parted, the husband deserting the wife, as 
 she alleges, leaving with her two children, one of them, the 
 minor, Theodora, aged at that time four years, September, 
 1879; the mother being in poor circumstances, under the ad- 
 vice of a friend, gave the custody of the child to J. W. Bald- 
 win, the applicant here, and agreed that he should adopt the 
 child ; but he did not do so according to law, and subsequently 
 the mother claims that she repented her agreement, and de- 
 sired to regain the custody of the child; but upon this point 
 there is a conflict of evidence, as Baldwin denies that the 
 mother ever expressed to him a change of mind, but, on the 
 contrary, he swears she always caused him to believe, until 
 the year 1885, that he could have the sole custody of said 
 minor, and that the child has been reared and educated by 
 himself and wife for six years, and that she has received 
 the constant care and attention of his wife, whose sole com- 
 panion she has been during such period; that they have no 
 child of their own, and that they have become greatly at- 
 tached to said minor, who reciprocates their attachment; and 
 that in sickness and in health they have treated the minor 
 as if she were their natural born child. The uncontroverted 
 fact is that the applicant, Baldwin, received the child from 
 her mother, and has retained the custody up to this time. 
 On the 11th of March, 1885, the minor's mother commenced 
 an action for divorce in this county against the minor's 
 father, Theodore E. Hansen, and on the 10th of April, 1885, 
 the superior court, department one, Wilson, Judge, rendered 
 a decree of divorce, and awarded the custody of said child 
 to said Baldwin until the further order of the court ; subse- 
 quently the lady was married to Mr. Fairbanks, a respect- 
 able gentleman, residing and doing business in the state of 
 Nevada, where she has since continued to reside. The decree 
 of the court in the divorce suit was modified pending these 
 proceedings, with respect to the custody of the child, by re- 
 mitting to this department that question. 
 
 There was but one application for guardianship — that pre- 
 ferred by Baldwin ; the mother of the minor is a nonresident.
 
 Guardianship of Hansen. 185 
 
 and incapable under the code by reason of such nonresidence ; 
 and, moreover, ineligible, because she is a married woman : 
 Code Civ. Proc, sec. 1751. She is here, however, simply re- 
 sisting the application of Baldwin, in whose custody the child 
 is in the first place by her own act, and afterward by the 
 order of the court in the action for divorce. 
 
 The child is now ten years of age, and has been examined 
 by the court in the manner customary in such cases, and has 
 orally and in writing twice expressed her preference as to 
 custodians — June 6, 1885, and on December 24, 1885 — each 
 time declaring her desire to remain with Mr. Baldwin ; these 
 written requests or expressions of preference are filed among 
 the papers in the case, as is usual in such matters. 
 
 For six years the child has lived in that family, and has 
 been treated tenderly and educated carefully. She is a 
 bright girl, and capable of expressing "an intelligent pref- 
 erence," in the sense of the statute (Civ. Code, sec. 246), 
 which preference the court may consider. 
 
 In awarding the custody of a minor, or in appointing a 
 general guardian, the court is to be guided, as a paramount 
 consideration, by what appears to be for the best interests 
 of the child, in respect to its temporal and its mental and 
 moral welfare. The mother is a nonresident and a married 
 woman, and is beyond the jurisdiction of this court in this 
 proceeding, and if there were no other consideration, she 
 could not be considered as an applicant; and, in order to 
 justify her resistance to this application, it should be shown 
 that no guardian is needed, or that the applicant, Baldwin, 
 is an unfit person to be appointed guardian. 
 
 It appears from the evidence that the Baldwins, to whose 
 custody this child was primarily committed by the mother, 
 and subsequently confirmed by the divorce court, have a 
 comfortable home; they have had Theodora for six years 
 continuously; she is attached to them and they to her; she 
 knows no home but theirs; their care and management of 
 her have been unexceptionable; if she were to leave them 
 she could gain no better home temporarily, mentally or mor- 
 ally, while great risks would be run by a change; she would 
 have to part from her present friends and find new associa- 
 tions; to be summarily wrested from the only home life she
 
 186 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 has ever known, and separated from influences that have 
 been beneficial; and the state is interested in having such in- 
 fluences surround and impress its future citizens. 
 
 This is substantially the sentiment and language employed 
 by my predecessor on this bench in the Guardianship of 
 Irma Linden (Myrick's Reports, p. 221), which only follows 
 the current of decisions in similar cases, such as Cozine v. 
 Horn, 1 Bradf. 143. Foster v. Mott, 3 Bradf. 409, Holley 
 v. Chamberlain, 1 Redf. 333, Burmester v. Orth, 5 Redf. 
 259, and Macready v. Wilcox, 33 Conn. 321. These and 
 numerous other cases that might be cited to the same pur- 
 port leave no room for doubt as to the law. 
 
 However hard the conclusion may seem to the mother, the 
 Court must find from the evidence that it is necessary a 
 guardian should be appointed, and that the gentleman to 
 whose care she six years ago consigned the child, and in 
 whose custody the judge who decided the divorce suit or- 
 dered the child should remain, and with whom such child 
 desires to remain, should be appointed the guardian; and it 
 is so ordered. 
 
 Let a decree be prepared according to the conclusion here- 
 in reached, with the restriction that the mother shall from 
 time to time communicate with and be permitted to visit 
 the child, and the bond of guardian is fixed at one thousand 
 dollars. . 
 
 For Authorities bearing upon the decision in the principal case, 
 see Guardianship of Smith, ante, p. 169, and note. 
 
 Estate of PETER DONAHUE, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 4,796; decided May 10, 1887.] 
 
 Partial Distribution — Petition by Widow. — Where one petitions for 
 partial distribution of an estate, and alleges that she is the widow 
 of deceased, and is desirous of having her share of the community 
 property therein described assigned and distributed to her, it suffi- 
 ciently appears that the petitioner is an heir. As widow she is 
 included in the statutory term "heir." 
 
 Partial Distribution — SuflRciency of Petition as Showing Title and 
 Seisin. — Where the widow of a decedent petitions to have her share 
 of the community property assigned to her, by way of partial dis-
 
 Estate of Donahue. 187 
 
 tribution, alleging that certain property described in the inventory 
 of the estate, and then particularly describing it, was conveyed to 
 decedent by a particular person named, and on a particular date 
 mentioned, such averments of title in the decedent and seisin at the 
 time of his death are sufficient. 
 
 Partial Distribution — Sufficiency of Petition as Showing Community 
 Property. — An allegation in the petition of a widow to have her 
 share of the community property assigned to her by way of partial 
 distribution, that the property (describing it) "was acquired by 
 the said deceased after his marriage with your petitioner, to wit" 
 on a day named, "and was not acquired by gift, bequest, devise or 
 descent; but, on the contrary, by purchase for a valuable considera- 
 tion, and as she is advised and insists was, and is the community 
 property," is sufficient, ae a statement of the character of the prop- 
 erty. It is sufficient treating the petition as a pleading; but es- 
 pecially so as an application for partial distribution. 
 
 Partial Distribution — Informality of Petition. — A petition for par- 
 tial distribution of a decedent 's estate should not be treated as 
 severely as a common-law pleading. All that it need show is that 
 the person applying has the status of an applicant as described in 
 the statute, and that the administration of the estate is in a sufficient 
 state of forwardness to authorize a distribution. 
 
 Partial Distribution. — Whenever the Administration of an Estate 
 has Advanced so far as to be in a sufficient state of forwardness to au- 
 thorize distribution, it is the duty of the court, upon petition of any 
 party interested, to proceed to a partial distribution, and for that 
 purpose to make the necessary investigation of facts. 
 
 Partial Distribution — Petition by Executrix. — A party is not in- 
 capacitated to apply for partial distribution of a decedent's estate 
 because she is an executrix of his will. 
 
 Partial Distribution. — Assuming that the Question of Giving a Bond 
 upon partial distribution can be considered upon demurrer to an ap- 
 plication for partial distribution, and the objection taken that the 
 party to give the bond is both distributee and executrix — obligor 
 and obligee; the answer is that the law is so written. 
 
 Partial Distribution — Petition by Administrator. — The Practice of 
 the Court since its institution, in recognizing the right of an heir or 
 devisee, although he is also the representative of the estate, to apply 
 for and have partial distribution, referred to and cases cited. 
 
 Partial Distribution — Petition. — Various Grounds of Special De- 
 murrers for ambiguity, presented to a petition for partial distribution 
 of a decedent's estate, are overruled in this case. 
 
 Decedent's Widow Applied for Partial Distribution of the Estate, 
 alleging that "a portion" of it was separate property, and "the 
 other portion" community property, particularly describing and 
 claiming the portion alleged to be community. Demurrer, on the
 
 188 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 ground that it appeared from the petition to be necessary to ascer- 
 tain and determine the title to the property asked to be distributed, 
 and that title could only be determined upon final distributipn, or 
 under section 1664, Code of Civil Procedure, overruled. (See Es- 
 tate of Jessup, 81 Cal. 408, 21 Pac. 976, 22 Pac. 742, 1028, 6 L. E. 
 A. 594, affirming Coffey, J.) 
 
 The opinion of the court in this matter was rendered up- 
 on two demurrers (considered together) to an amended pe- 
 tition for a partial distribution of the estate. The petition 
 was presented by the widow of the decedent, asking to have 
 her community rights in the property assigned and distrib- 
 uted to her by way of partial distribution. The following 
 quotations are made from the petition in order to give the 
 exact language of certain important allegations referred to 
 in the opinion of the court: 1. As to the motive and ob- 
 ject of the petition — "That she (petitioner) is desirous of 
 having her share or portion of the community property of 
 herself and the said Peter Donahue assigned and distributed 
 to her (page 2, of petition)"; and your petitioner declines 
 to release, relinquish or assign any claim or interest in com- 
 mon or community property; but, on the contrary, claims 
 her share thereof. Wherefore, your petitioner prays that 
 the said J. Mervyn Donahue and Mary E. Von Schroeder 
 (coexecutors) may be required to answer this petition, and 
 that partial distribution of said estate may be made oy or- 
 der of this court, and that one-half of all of the property 
 hereinabove described and claimed as community property, 
 exclusive of such household furniture as may be set apart 
 to her, be distributed and assigned to her as her share there- 
 of, and that she may have such further and other relief in 
 the premises as may be just and proper (Id., p. 35). 2. As 
 to the relationship and heirship of the petitioner — her status 
 — "The amended petition of Annie Donahue, widow of Peter 
 Donahue, deceased, respectfully shows (page 1 of petition) ; 
 That your petitioner was married to the said Peter Dona- 
 hue in the state of California, of which they were both resi- 
 dents, on the sixth day of August, 1864; and since which 
 time they resided in said state continuously until the death 
 of said Peter Donahue (Id., p. 2)"; signed, "Annie Dona- 
 hue" (also by her attorneys) (Id., p. 35) ; and verified hy
 
 Estate of Donahue. 189 
 
 her (Id., p. 36). 3. As to the character and quality of the 
 property the title and seisin of the decedent and his estate, 
 etc. — "That the estate of the said deceased has been ap- 
 praised in the aggregate at the sum of 3,778,312 dollars, 
 whereof a portion is separate property of the said deceased, 
 and (the) other portion is community property of the de- 
 ceased and your petitioner (page 1 of petition), as to how 
 much and what particular parts of the said estate are com- 
 munity property, she alleges that the parcel of land in the 
 city and county of San Francisco, described in the inven- 
 tory of the estate of the said deceased as follows, viz. : 1, 
 (describing it) .... conveyed by Edward Martin to said 
 Peter Donahue January 25, 1879 ; recorded in Liber X of 
 Deeds, page 10, was acquired by the said Peter Donahue, 
 deceased, after his said marriage with your petitioner, to 
 wit : on or about the twenty-fifth day of January, 1879, and 
 was not acquired by gift, bequest, devise or decedent; but, 
 on the contrary, by purchase for a valuable consideration, 
 and, as she is advised and insists, was and. is community 
 property (pages 2 and 3 of petition)"; then follow the de- 
 scriptions of twenty-nine other parcels of realty, with aver- 
 ments in the same language as above, as to the inclusion of 
 each in the inventory of the estate, the date and record of 
 the conveyance of each to the decedent, and the character 
 and nature of the acquisition (Id., pp. 3-26) ; then follows 
 a particular and detailed description of "notes, accounts, 
 stocks, bonds, choses in action, and other personal property 
 embraced in the inventory of said estate and therein de- 
 scribed (Id., pp. 26-33)," with the allegation that "all 
 thereof were acquired by the said Peter Donahue in his life- 
 time, and after his marriage with your petitioner, and was 
 not, nor was any, or either, or any part thereof, acquired 
 by gift, bequest, devise or descent; but, on the contrary, by 
 purchase for a valuable consideration, and, as she is advised 
 and insists, the same, and each and every thereof, were and 
 are community property (Id., pp. 33, 34)"; then follow 
 similar averments respecting an additional chose in action, 
 separately specified on page 34 of the petition. Following 
 these allegations and specifications of the property of de- 
 ceased is the averment: "Your petitioner further shows that
 
 190 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 she has reason to believe, and does believe, that there are 
 other assets and property of the said Peter Donahue, the par- 
 ticulars of which are at present unknown to her, some or 
 all of which are community property; and she prays leave 
 whenever the same, or any part thereof, may be discovered, 
 to have the same, so far as may be necessary, included here- 
 in by proper amendment (page 34 of petition)." 
 
 There were ten (10) grounds of demurrer taken, seven of 
 the grounds being by way of special demurrer for ambig- 
 uity. All of these grounds are fully and separately set out, 
 and enumerated in their order, in the opinion of the court. 
 The opinion also analyzes the various grounds of the de- 
 murrers and makes them more clear by stating their 
 "objective points." After an oral argument upon the de- 
 murrers, a printed brief was prepared and submitted on be- 
 half of the demurrants, and a reply to this was presented 
 (March 11, 1887) on behalf of Mrs. Donahue. In this 
 printed brief but two points were urged upon the court, 
 viz.: (1) The averment that the property was purchased 
 after marriage for a valuable consideration is ambiguous and 
 uncertain, in not showing and virtually tracing the source 
 of the consideration ; and so vulnerable to special demurrer. 
 
 "Such valuable consideration may or may not constitute 
 the property, separate property. If the funds constituting 
 the valuable consideration were funds of the community, 
 then of course the property would be community property. 
 While if. on the contrary, such funds constituted the funds 
 of the separate estate of either of the spouses, then the prop- 
 erty would not be common property, but would give the 
 separate estate of the spouse out of whose separate funds 
 such consideration proceeded." 
 
 (2) That the statute which gives an heir a right to have 
 partial distribution of the succession is conditioned upon 
 giving a bond for the payment of his proportion of the 
 debts; that this bond must run to the executor or adminis- 
 trator for the creditor 's benefit ; that where an heir is al- 
 so the representative of the estate, he cannot give the bond 
 required by the statute (which must be presumed to be the 
 ordinary legal bond), for he would be both obligor and ob- 
 ligee, and thus rob the bond of its usual — and, it must be
 
 Estate of Donahue. 191 
 
 held, indispensable — attributes; therefore, the statute must 
 be construed as excepting from its provisions an heir or lega- 
 tee who is at the same time the legal representative of the 
 estate — ^such heir is under a disability, has a want of ca- 
 pacity, to apply for a partial distribution. 
 
 Inasmuch as all the ten grounds of demurrer are enumer- 
 ated in the opinion of the court, and apparently considered 
 advisable to be passed upon, it may be of value to notice the 
 positions taken on the oral argument by the demurrants, 
 which were seemingly abandoned or tacitly consented to be 
 put aside, by their printed brief aforesaid. As the peti- 
 tioner's counsel in their "reply" to this printed brief 
 claimed every advantage that could be considered gained 
 from this apparent waiver of original positions, it has been 
 deemed best to state these positions in the language of such 
 reply brief; especially as there is also given, in a succinct 
 form, the answer of petitioner to each of these positions, as 
 advanced upon the oral argument. We quote from pages 2, 
 3 and 4 of "Reply to Points on Demurrer" (presented by 
 Mrs. Donahue's counsel, Messrs. Galpin, Scripture and 
 Loughborough), viz.: 
 
 "The paper (demurrants' brief) is as remarkable for what 
 it omits, as for its contents. It practically abandons num- 
 erous points urged with great apparent earnestness on the 
 oral arguments. Respondents had claimed : 1. That their 
 general demurrer, ' that the petition stated no cause of 
 action,' was good, upon the authority of Dye v. Dye; to 
 which we replied, that Dye v. Dye had been overruled by 
 Gimmy v. Doane, 22 Cal. 637-639; and that the petition 
 stated a cause of action within the latter case. 2. They 
 argued, also, 'that the petition did not allege that Peter 
 Donahue was seised at his death of the various pieces of 
 property described in the petition.' We replied, that the 
 petition did allege 'the date of each conveyance to Peter 
 Donahue as being subsequent to his marriage, and that said 
 property w^as now in the inventory as part of his estate.' 
 3. They argued that the petition did not allege 'that the 
 grantor of Peter Donahue was ever seised in fee of the 
 premises described.' We replied, that 'we were not declar- 
 ing in ejectment, but petitioning for distribution of com-
 
 192 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 munity property; and that the widow was entitled to her 
 share of all property in possession, whether held by titles 
 good, bad, indifferent or worthless.' 4. They argued that 
 'the petition should state the probative facts required by 
 the statute, as was decided in Dye v. Dye, and also it should 
 not state probative but ultimate facts, as was decided in 
 authorities read from eastern states.' We replied that the 
 argument defeated itself, for both propositions contended 
 for could not be true; and, further, that we did plead the 
 probative facts of marriage, subsequent acquisition of prop- 
 erty, etc., and that we also did plead the ultimate fact, that 
 the property specified was community property, that is, 
 property of the community; and that ownership, like seisin, 
 was the ultimate fact. 5. They argued that although 'we 
 had alleged that the property was purchased for a valuable 
 consideration after marriage, we should also have alleged 
 that said property was not purchased with the separate 
 estate of Peter Donahue.' We replied that, as a general 
 rule, the pleader was not required to plead negative matter, 
 because he was not required to prove it; and that this case 
 came within no exception to that rule. 6. They argued 
 on the next day, shifting their point from negative to 
 affirmative, that we 'must prove and allege that the prop- 
 erty was purchased with community funds.' We replied, 
 that we were compelled to plead such affirmative matter 
 only as we were required to prove; that because of the legal 
 presumption that the purchase was made with community 
 funds, we were not compelled to plead as claimed; on the 
 contrary, that respondents should allege and prove that said 
 property was separate estate, in order to raise and try that 
 
 issue The points now presented in support of the 
 
 demurrer are, by the printed argument, reduced to two. The 
 others, discussed at such length orally, we may deem aban- 
 doned. ' ' 
 
 Finally, attention is directed to the fact that section 1664. 
 Code of Civil Procedure, referred to in the final (tenth) 
 ground of demurrer, is the new section added to the probate 
 law, approved March 18, 1885 (Stats. 1885, pp. 208-210). The 
 section provides for a proceeding, in the nature of a civil
 
 Estate of Donahue. 193 
 
 action, to determine heirship and the status of all claimants 
 to any estate of a decedent in course of administration, be- 
 ing intended to meet such cases as the Blythe estate, for 
 which litigation it was avowedly devised. In the language 
 of the section, "at any time after the expiration of one 
 year from the issuing of letters testamentary or of adminis- 
 tration upon a decedent's estate, any person claiming to be 
 heir, or to be entitled to distribution of any part of the 
 estate, may 'file a petition in the matter of such estate, 
 praying the court to ascertain and declare the rights of all 
 persons to said estate and of all interests therein, and to 
 whom distribution thereof should be made ' " ; whereupon, 
 the elaborate proceedings mentioned in the section for bring- 
 ing in all claimants, and determining the respective inter- 
 ests of each, shall be taken. 
 
 A. H. Loughborough, P. G. Galpin, John T. Doyle, H. D. 
 Scripture, for petitioner, Mrs. Donahue, widow and execu- 
 trix. 
 
 R. H. Lloyd, for J. Merv,yn Donahue, executor. 
 
 0. P. Evans, for Mrs. Von Schroeder, executrix. 
 
 T. I. Bergin, of counsel (against the petition). 
 
 COFFEY, J. Annie Donahue, widow of Peter Donahue, 
 deceased, on the fifth day of February, 1887, filed her 
 amended petition in this court, praying for a partial dis- 
 tribution to her of one-half of all of certain property de- 
 scribed in said petition claimed by her to be community 
 property. To this petition, on the eleventh day of Febru- 
 ary, were interposed two separate demurrers on behalf 
 severally of J. Mervyn Donahue, and Mrs. Mary Ellen Von 
 Schroeder, devisees named in the last will of said Peter 
 Donahue, deceased. 
 
 GROUNDS OF THE DEMURRERS. 
 
 The points of both demurrers are the same: 1. The in- 
 sufficiency of the statement of facts. 2. The lack of legal 
 capacity in the petitioner. 3. The petition is ambiguous, 
 uncertain and unintelligible in this : That it is uncertain 
 therefrom whether or not said Peter Donahue left any com- 
 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. I — 13
 
 194 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 miinity or other property, and there is no direct averment 
 in the petition that he left common or any property ; and 
 the fact, if such be the fact, that he did leave common prop- 
 erty, appears from said petition only by recital and infer- 
 ence, and not by any direct or positive averment on that 
 behalf. 4. Also, that the petition does not distinctly allege 
 that there was any community property; but alleges merely 
 conveyance of certain parcels of land to the said Peter Don- 
 ahue, at the dates in the petition specified, with the aver- 
 ment that the same was acquired by said Peter Donahue, 
 deceased, after the said marriage with petitioner, and was 
 not acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent; but, on the 
 contrary by purchase for a valuable consideration, and 
 without stating or alleging whether or not the considera- 
 tion for each and every of the respective purchases in said 
 petition mentioned was or was not funds of the community; 
 or that the persons, or any of them, so conveying, had any 
 title to be conveyed, or that by force of such conveyance 
 said deceased became the owner of the property so con- 
 veyed; also, that it is uncertain and not alleged that the 
 consideration for each of said purchases in said petition 
 mentioned was not part of the separate property and 
 separate funds of said Peter Donahue, and not any portion 
 of the community property or funds of the community. 
 5. Also, that the petition does not allege that the lands 
 in said petition described, or any part of the same, were 
 or was the property or estate of said Peter Donahue, de- 
 ceased, at the time of his death ; or that the same, or part 
 of the same, is now any part or portion of the property or 
 estate of said deceased, or that said Peter Donahue con- 
 tinued to own such several parcels of land from the time of 
 the alleged purchase of the same, as in said petition men- 
 tioned, up to the time of his death, or that such lands are 
 of the character as to entitle the petitioner to partial dis- 
 tribution of the same, or part of the same; and the mere 
 fact that said lands, or any part of said lands, may be found 
 in the inventory or described in the inventory of the estate 
 of said Peter Donahue, deceased, does not prove title in said 
 Peter Donahue, deceased, at the time of his death, or upon 
 petition for distribution thereof, at the time of said appli-
 
 Estate op Donahue, 195 
 
 cation. 6. Also, that it is uncertain in this : that the aver- 
 ment therein contained in respect to the several parcels of 
 property therein mentioned and described — that the same 
 were severally acquired at the dates therein alleged, and 
 the same were acquired subsequent to the marriage therein 
 alleged, and that the same were not acquired by gift, be- 
 quest, devise or descent ; but, on the contrary, by purchase 
 for a valuable consideration, and, as the petitioner is ad- 
 vised and insists, was and is community property — is not 
 an averment that the same or any part of the same is com- 
 munity property, and no allegation that the petitioner is 
 informed and verily believes that the same or any part of 
 the same is community property; that, while said petitioner 
 may be advised and may insist that the same is community 
 property, such advice and insistence constitute no averment 
 of any issue of material fact, and the same is not the equiva- 
 lent of the apt averment that said petition should in this 
 behalf contain. 7. And that the petition is uncertain in 
 this : that in and from said petition it is uncertain whether 
 the same be merely designed to definitely ascertain what is 
 or what is not common property of said estate, or whether 
 the same is designed for partial distribution of the prop- 
 erty of the community heretofore existing between said 
 Annie Donahue and said petitioner, or for partial distri- 
 bution of said estate. 8. And that the same does not defi- 
 nitely describe the particular property whereof partial dis- 
 tribution is therein and thereby asked. 9. And that it is 
 not certain therefrom whether the proceedings therein and 
 thereby contemplated are the proceedings provided for in 
 and by sections 1658 to 1662, inclusive, of the Code of Civil 
 Procedure, or of the proceedings authorized and provided 
 for in and by section 1664 of said Code of Civil Procedure. 
 10. And, as a final ground of demurrer, it is claimed that 
 it appears, from the face of said petition, that it is necessary 
 to ascertain and determine the title to the particular prop- 
 erty, whereof said petitioner prays partial distribution, and 
 such title can only be determined either upon final distrib- 
 ution of said estate, or under the provisions of section 1664 
 of said Code of Civil Procedure, and not under said provi-
 
 196 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 sions of said code relating to partial distribution of the 
 estate of said deceased. 
 
 THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE PETITION. 
 
 The petition itself sets forth that Peter Donahue died 
 November 26, 1885, leaving a last will and testament, which 
 has been admitted to probate in this court, whereby, among 
 other things, he nominated the petitioner, Annie Donahue, 
 and James Mervyn Donahue, his son, and Mary Ellen Von 
 Schroeder, executors thereof, all of whom have qualified and 
 are acting as such; that the estate of said deceased has been 
 appraised in the aggregate at the sum of $3,778,312, where- 
 of a portion is separate property of the said deceased, and 
 the other portion is community property of the deceased 
 and the petitioner ; that the executors have caused notice 
 to be published as required by sections 1490, 1491, Code of 
 Civil Procedure, and that the time limited for the presenta- 
 tion of claims against the said decedent has expired; that 
 all the claims against the said deceased that have been pre- 
 sented, allowed and approved have been paid, and that the 
 claims which are disputed are few in number and insignifi- 
 cant in amount, in view of the magnitude of the estate ; that 
 more than ten months have elapsed since said will was 
 proved and letters testamentary issued; that the petitioner 
 was married to the said Peter Donahue in the state of 
 California, of which they were both residents, on the 6th 
 of August, 1864, and since which time they resided in said 
 state continuously until the death of said Peter Donahue; 
 that she is desirous of having her share or portion of the 
 community property of herself and the said Peter Donahue 
 assigned and distributed to her; and as to how much and 
 what particular parts of the said estate are community prop- 
 erty, she alleges that certain pieces of property described 
 in her petition were acquired by said Peter Donahue after 
 his said marriage with the petitioner, and were not acquired 
 by gift, bequest, devise or descent ; but, on the contrary, by 
 purchase for a valuable consideration, and that such pieces 
 of property were and are, as she is advised and insists, 
 community property. The petitioner in her petition de- 
 clines to release or relinquish or assign any claim or interest
 
 Estate of Donahue. 197 
 
 in common or community property, but, on the contrary, 
 claims her share thereof. 
 
 OBJECTIVE POINTS OF THE DEMURRERS. 
 
 As stated in argument b}^ the counsel for the demurrants, 
 the objective points of- the demurrers are: (1) It does not 
 allege title in the decedent; (2) there is no averment that 
 decedent continued to own the property, or that it consti- 
 tutes any part of the estate; (3) that it does not state the 
 source of the title of the community ; that it should state the 
 facts; that the averments of community property are insuffi- 
 cient; (4) that the petitioner is incapacitated to make this 
 application by reason of the fact that she is petitioner for 
 partial distribution and executrix at the one time ; therefore, 
 practically, plaintiff and defendant in the same suit. 
 
 THE STATUTE UNDER V^HICH PETITION PRESENTED. 
 
 This is a petition presented under chapter 11, article 1, 
 part 3, title 11, the pertinent sections of which read as fol- 
 lows : 
 
 Section 1658. "At any time after the lapse of four 
 months from the issuing of letters testamentary or of ad- 
 ministration, any heir, devisee, or legatee may present his 
 petition to the court for the legac.y or share of the estate to 
 which he is entitled, to be given to him upon his giving bonds, 
 with security, for the payment of his proportion of the debts 
 of the estate." 
 
 Section 1659. "Notice of the application must be given 
 to the executor or administrator, personally, and to all per- 
 sons interested in the estate, in the same manner that notice 
 is required to be given of the settlement of the account of 
 an executor or administrator." 
 
 Section 1660. " The executor or administrator, or any per- 
 son interested in the estate, may appear at the time named 
 and resist the application; or any heir, devisee or legatee 
 may make a similar application for himself." 
 
 Section 1661. "If, at the hearing, it appear that the es- 
 tate is but little indebted, and that the share of the party
 
 198 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Yol. 1. 
 
 applying may be allowed without loss to the creditors of the 
 estate, the Court must make an order in conformity with the 
 prayer of the applicant, requiring: 
 
 "1. Each heir, legatee, or devisee obtaining such order, be- 
 fore receiving his share, or any portion thereof, to execute 
 and deliver to the executor or administrator a bond, in such 
 sum as shall be designated by the court, or a judge thereof, 
 with sureties to be approved by the judge, payable to the 
 executor or administrator, and conditioned for the payment, 
 whenever required, of his proportion of the debts due from 
 the estate, not exceeding the value or amount of the legacy 
 or portion of the estate to which he is entitled; 
 
 "2. The executor or administrator to deliver to the heir, 
 legatee, or devisee, the whole portion of the estate to which 
 he may be entitled, or only a part thereof, designating it. 
 If, in the execution of the order, a partition is necessary be- 
 tween two or more of the parties interested, it must be made 
 in the manner hereinafter prescribed. The costs of these 
 proceedings shall be paid by the applicant, or, if there be 
 more than one, shall be partitioned equally amongst them." 
 
 Under section 1662 of the same code provision is made as 
 to the use of this bond and the manner in which it is to be 
 enforced. 
 
 It appears from this petition that the petitioner is an heir. 
 She is the widow, and in the sense of the statute is included 
 under the term heir: Estate of Rieaud, Myr. 158. 
 
 The averments of title in the decedent and of his seisin 
 at the time of his death are sufficient. 
 
 For the purposes of this petition the statement of the char- 
 acter of the property is sufficient : Meyer v. Kinzer and Wife, 
 12 Cal. 252, 253, 73 Am. Dec. 538; Smith v. Smith, 12 Cal. 
 224, 73 Am. Dec. 533; Payne and Dewey v. Treadwell, 16 
 Cal. 243 ; Rough v. Simmons, 65 Cal. 227, 3 Pac. 804. 
 
 Treating this petition as a pleading, it is sufficient. But 
 it is not necessary to treat a petition for partial distribution 
 with the same severity that one would treat a common-law 
 pleading. All that such a petition need show is that the 
 person applying has the status of an applicant, and that the 
 administration is in a sufficient state of forwardness to au-
 
 Estate of Donahue. 199 
 
 thorize distribution. Whenever the administration has ad- 
 vanced so far, it is the duty of the court, on petition of any 
 party interested, to proceed to partial distribution, and for 
 that purpose to make the necessary investigation of facts. 
 But it is contended that the petitioner is incapacitated to 
 make this application, by reason of the fact that she is peti-' 
 tioner for partial distribution and executrix at the one time, 
 therefore, practically, plaintiff and defendant in the same 
 suit. 
 
 The demurrants argue that she cannot act in the dual 
 capacity of executrix and petitioner for partial distribu- 
 tion; that she cannot be virtually plaintiff and defendant 
 in the same suit; and support this proposition by an 
 abundance of citations, which it is claimed establish the 
 principle that the applicant is not in a position to seek 
 this remedy; that her attitudes as executrix and as an appli- 
 cant for partial distribution are irreconcilable; that she 
 labors under a disability which should determine the appli- 
 cation against her; and that, therefore, in form and substance 
 this application is obnoxious to the demurrer. All the cases 
 in support of this proposition have been examined and con- 
 sidered by the court, but it has been unable to reconcile them 
 with the circumstances of this case. 
 
 If the position of the demurrants be true, this court has 
 been proceeding against its institution upon an erroneous 
 theorv% for numerous applications of precisely similar char- 
 acter have been made and granted; one of the latest of 
 which I find in the matter of the Estate of Daniel T. Murphy, 
 deceased, where Anna L. Murphy, the widow of Daniel T. 
 ]\Iurphy, deceased, and Samuel J. Murphy and others, the 
 children of the deceased, filed their petition and application 
 for partial distribution of the estate of said deceased, which 
 petition and application was granted upon the execution and 
 delivery to Anna L. Murphy, as executrix, of a bond, with 
 proper sureties, from Anna L. Murphy, as widow, and the 
 others as children and heirs and devisees of the deceased. 
 The attorneys for the applicant, Anna L. IMurphy, in that 
 case appearing individually and as the sole executrix of the 
 last will of David T. Murphy, detn^ased, were Messrs. McAl-
 
 200 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 lister & Bergin; Estate of Daniel T. Murphy, Deceased, No. 
 4,313. Decree of Partial Distribution. Filed March 4, 
 1887. See, also. Estate of Silas W. Sanderson, Deceased (No. 
 5,464). 
 
 Assuming, then, that the question of the giving of a bond 
 is in order at this stage of the proceedings, the answer to 
 the objection of the demurrants is that the law is so writ- 
 ten, and that as written it has been uniformly applied in 
 cases differing in no essential particular from the one now 
 before the court. 
 
 The demurrer overruled. Ten days to answer. 
 
 An Heir, Devisee or Legatee may, at any time after the lapse of four 
 months from the issuance of letters testamentary or of administra- 
 tion, present a petition for the share of the estate to which he is 
 entitled, or any portion thereof, to be given him upon his furnish- 
 ing security for the payment of his proportion of the debts of the 
 estate: Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 1658. No one but an heir, devisee or 
 legatee (Estate of Foley, 24 Nev. 197, 51 Pac. 834, 52 Pac. 649), or 
 his assignee or grantee (Estate of Straus, 144 Cal. 553, 77 Pac. 1122) 
 can petition for a partial distribution. An executor or administrator, 
 as such, has no authority to file a petition: Alcorn v. Buschke, 133 
 Cal. 655, 66 Pac. 15; In re Letellier, 74 Cal. 312, 15 Pac. 847. 
 
 The Codes Make no Attempt to Prescribe the Form and Contents 
 of petitions for partial distribution, and clearly do not contemplate 
 or require elaborate pleadings in such proceedings: Estate of Mur- 
 phy, 145 Cal. 464, 78 Pac. 960. For forms of petitions, see Estate 
 of Levison, 98 Cal. 654, 33 Pac. 726; Estate of Crocker, 105 Cal. 
 368, 38 Pac. 954. 
 
 Guardianship of the Person of WILLIE McGARRITY, 
 
 Minor. 
 
 [No. 3,386; decided June 4, 1884.] 
 
 Guardianship — Wishes of Deceased Mother. — In the appointment of 
 a guardian for a minor^ the court must regard the dying declaration 
 of the mother as to her wishes in the premises, when not inconsistent 
 with the welfare of the child. 
 
 Guardianship — Religious Instruction of Ward. — Where a child is bap- 
 tized in a particular faith to which its mother belonged, the guar- 
 dian of the child should secure to her instruction in the faith of the 
 mother, until the child arrives at an age when she is presumptively 
 competent to determine her own doctrine of religion.
 
 Guardianship of McGarrity. 201 
 
 On May 27, 1884, Mary L. Graves filed a petition to be 
 appointed guardian of the person of Willie McGarrity. 
 
 The petitioner averred that the minor is a resident of San 
 Francisco; that both her parents are dead; that petitioner is 
 the sister of the deceased mother of the minor; that Sarah 
 C. Bachelder is also a sister of the deceased mother, and 
 Thos. F. Conklin a brother. The petition also contained the 
 further necessary averments. 
 
 A citation was issued to the aunt not petitioning- and the 
 uncle, returnable on June 3, 1884, at which time the appli- 
 cation was heard; the facts proved on the hearing appear 
 from the opinion of the court. 
 
 John M. Burnett, for petitioner. 
 
 COFFEY, J. In this matter it appears from the evidence 
 of Mrs. Graves, the applicant, and of her brother, Thomas 
 F. Conklin, and Mrs. Cathcart, a friend of the family, that 
 the mother of the minor upon her deathbed desired her sister, 
 the petitioner here, to take care of "Willie," the minor. 
 She desired her brother (Mr. Conklin) and her sister (Mrs. 
 Graves) to take care of the child. There is no formal oppo- 
 sition to the application, but the minor appears in court 
 accompanied by her aunt, Mrs. Bachelder, sister of decedent 
 and of applicant; and Mrs. Bachelder testifies that the child 
 was committed to her care and custody by the mother during 
 the latter 's illness and pending an operation upon her, and 
 the child has remained there ever since, and desires to remain 
 there. 
 
 All the parties are respectable and harmonious in their 
 mutual relations, and there is no individual incapacity in 
 either case. This being the fact, the court must regard the 
 proved dying declaration of the mother, when it is not incon- 
 sistent with the welfare of the child. While the child mani- 
 fests a tender devotion to Mrs. Bachelder, she evinces no 
 aversion toward ]\Irs. Graves, her mother's particular and 
 final choice, and the latter is amply competent, pecuniarily 
 and otherwise, to maintain the child. The child's true name 
 is Lucy; she was baptized in the Catholic Church, to which 
 her mother belonged (according to the child's statement to
 
 202 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 the court), and the guardian must be required to secure the 
 minor instructions in the faith of the mother until the child 
 arrives at an age when she shall be presumptively competent 
 to determine her own doctrine of religion. The minor is a very 
 intelligent girl between ten and eleven years of age, with 
 strong sentiments of affection toward her aunt, Mrs. Bach- 
 elder, who must be allowed to see her as frequently as prac- 
 ticable; and also Mr. Conklin will have the same privilege 
 guaranteed in the order of the court. The custody of the 
 child is awarded to Mrs. Graves, under the intimated re- 
 strictions, and with bond fixed at $500. 
 
 Estate of JEREMIAH WHALEN, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 2,328; decided February 11, 1885.] 
 
 Unsolemnized Marriage — Evidence to Establish. — Where it appears 
 that parties, without the sanction of any ecclesiastical ceremony, 
 agreed between themselves to live together as man and wife, and 
 did live as such in one place of domicile for years, and in .other 
 places, and so held themselves out to others moving in the same 
 limited social sphere; and it further appears that each of the parties 
 testified in a legal controversy, wherein they were both called as wit- 
 nesses, to being, respectively, married persons, and stated their re- 
 spective places of habitation to be where in fact they lived together 
 at the time, their marriage is proved. 
 
 Unsolemnized Marriage — Evidence to Establish. — Where persons 
 called to prove that a man and woman lived as husband and wife 
 and held themselves out as such to others living in the same social 
 sphere, are credible witnesses, no matter how circumscribed is their 
 social environment, their testimony is sufficient to establish repute. 
 
 Unsolemnized Marriage — Declarations to Support. — Where it ap- 
 pears that an alleged spouse of an unsolemnized marriage has testi- 
 fied as a witness, subsequently to the alleged marriage, that he was 
 a married man, such declaration is the most important evidence that 
 can be offered in support of such a marriage. 
 
 Marriage. — Where the Relation of Husband and Wife is Once Es- 
 tablished, no subsequent conduct of either spouse, which does not 
 culminate in a legal dissolution, can affect the judicial determination 
 of the question of their status.
 
 Estate of Whalen. 203 
 
 Letters of administration were granted herein to Philip A. 
 Roach, as public administrator, on March 20, 1883. Subse- 
 qnently Henrietta C. Whalen gave and filed notice of her 
 appearance in the administration, as the surviving wife of 
 the decedent ; and thereafter, at the proper stage of the 
 administration, on November 19, 1883, filed her application 
 for a distribution of the estate, claiming a share thereof as 
 the widow of the deceased. This application was opposed 
 by Joseph L. Whalen, a brother, and Jane E. Gregory, a 
 niece of the decedent, upon the ground that the petitioner 
 was not the surviving wife of the decedent, as claimed by her. 
 The opinion of the court below was rendered after consid- 
 eration of the testimony produced in support of the issue 
 tendered by the opposition; and, in accordance with the deci- 
 sion of the court, distribution of the estate was thereafter 
 ordered, on February 11, 1885. 
 
 M. S. Eisner, for the petitioner, Henrietta C. Whalen. 
 
 M. Lynch, contra, for decedent's brother and niece. 
 
 COFFEY, J. In this matter all the propositions of law 
 are undisputed ; the only question is as to two or three matters 
 of fact. The applicant, Henrietta C. Whalen, claims that 
 she entered upon the marriage state with the decedent in 
 the city and county of San Francisco after a brief acquaint- 
 ance — a year or more — without the sanction of any eccle- 
 siastical ceremony, but after an agreement between them to 
 live together as man and wife, followed by an immediate 
 assumption of marital relations; and they continued to co- 
 habit for several years, except at intervals when she went to 
 the country on account of her health, being troubled with a 
 neuralgic affection which was aggravated at seasons by the 
 climate of San Francisco, according to her testimony. For 
 years these two lived together in the northeast corner of 
 Kearny and Jackson streets, and in other places, as man and 
 wife, and held themselves out as such to others moving in 
 the same limited social sphere; this is proved by the evi- 
 dence of j\Tr. ThurstoTi, Mr. Findley and IMrs. Taylor (or 
 McCarthy as she is now) and her daughters and son. They 
 are credible witnesses, and no matter how circumscribed their
 
 204 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 social environment it is sufficient to establish repute. Mrs. 
 Whalen herself testified that she was not in the habit of 
 making acquaintances, but "was a great hand to stay at 
 home," and that neither before nor after marriage did she 
 visit families, except those in the house wherein she was 
 domiciled. 
 
 There is one fact in evidence which is more important than 
 any other — the pivotal fact of this case, namely, the oath- 
 bound declaration of Jeremiah Whalen, the decedent, made 
 at a time while he and Henrietta were living on the north- 
 east corner of Kearny and Jackson streets, which shows 
 not only that they had a habitation there, but that they 
 held to each other the relation of husband and wife. This 
 is more important, I say, in support of applicant's case than 
 any other fact in evidence, because you cannot take a man's 
 declaration in a more solemn way than when on the witness- 
 stand under the sanction of an oath, and examined under 
 the forms of law and with a knowledge of the pains and pen- 
 alties of perjury, and the consecpiences of his declaration 
 with regard to his family circumstances and the influence of 
 his statement upon his private fortune. Under such circum- 
 stances in the case of Wight v. Wight, before Court Com- 
 missioner Robert C. Rogers, in 1866, Jeremiah Whalen, the 
 decedent, swore that he was a married man and lived in this 
 house , northeast corner Kearny and Jackson streets. 
 
 The applicant here Avas examined in the same controversy 
 before Commissioner Rogers, and testified that she was a 
 married woman living with her husband, and that her name 
 was Henrietta C. Whalen, and that she lived in that house 
 at the time of her testimony. She signed her name "Henri- 
 etta C. Whalen." It should seem that these two persons were 
 no other than the decedent and the applicant; and by their 
 own statements contemporaneously made, and in the same 
 proceedings under judicial oath, they sustained to each other 
 the relation of husband and wife. These declarations seem 
 to me to be sufficient corroboration of applicant's testimony 
 as to the contraction and consummation of the marriage 
 and the subsequent continuous cohabitation for years. In 
 addition, while she was absent from the city Mr. Whalen
 
 Estate of Whalen. 205 
 
 constantly corresponded with her, although, except in one 
 instance, he did not address her as "my dear wife," or sub- 
 scribe himself as husband, yet he superscribed his letters to 
 her by his own surname, "Mrs. Henrietta C. Whalen." That 
 is a public recognition, which was fortified by declarations 
 made more than once to persons who addressed him ; j\Ir. 
 John H. Harney, for one, a fellow-clerk in a public office, 
 when the latter found on INIr. Whalen 's desk a letter so 
 superscribed ; also at another time to Mons. Perrier, the res- 
 taurateur. These declarations were made at a very late date 
 long after the informal nuptials. Mrs. Whalen, for reasons 
 already suggested by her, left this city and went into the 
 interior and to the mountains, and pursued an irregular 
 life for years; but, as I have had occasion to say in an- 
 other case, "once establish the relation of husband and wife 
 between these parties and the subsequent conduct of either 
 of them, which does not culminate in a legal dissolution, can- 
 not affect the judicial determination of the question of their 
 status." She may have misconducted herself, may have 
 been a bigamist, subsequently, still her legal rights were 
 vested by the law, which courts sit to administer, not to set 
 aside; the judge's personal views as to such marriages or such 
 misconduct should not affect the court's administration or 
 application of the law. The court finds the fact and applies 
 the law ; it finds the facts proved as alleged, and that the 
 applicant is the surviving Avife of the decedent intestate, 
 Jeremiah Whalen. His own conduct inconsistent with his 
 relation to Henrietta — the fact that he led Mrs. Stees, a 
 witness in this proceeding, to believe that he was unmarried, 
 does not detract from the strength of what has been said. 
 Mrs. Stees' testimony may be taken as true, and. so far as 
 this discussion is concerned, there is no necessity of imputing 
 inveracity to any witness in this proceeding; Mrs. Stees' 
 statement need not be challenged — her own eccentricity of 
 matrimonial conduct has no bearing upon her credit as a wit- 
 ness; and accepting her testimony as truthful, it would appear 
 that Jeremiah Whalen, for the purpose of deceiving her and 
 contracting an alliance with her, discarded his first spouse 
 and led the witness to believe that he was a free man. Cases
 
 206 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 f 
 
 of that kind are so numerous that it is not necessary to dilate 
 thereupon. 
 
 So far as such a marriage can or need be established, it 
 has been established in this case. The prayer of the peti- 
 tioner is granted. Let the appropriate decree be framed and 
 submitted to the court. 
 
 Estate op JEANNETTE HELD, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 3,025; decided June 30, 1884.] 
 
 Special Administrator — Person Entitled, to Letters. — In making the 
 appointment of a special administrator, the court must give pref- 
 erence to the person entitled to letters testamentary or of adminis- 
 tration, unless he is shown incompetent for the position. The court 
 has no discretion. 
 
 Special Administrator — Want of Integrity and Improvidence. — The 
 
 evidence in this case is held insufficient to establish improvidence 
 or want of integrity on the part of the applicant for special letters 
 of administration. 
 
 On June 9, 1884, John E. Hammersmith filed his petition 
 for special letters upon the estate of the above-named dece- 
 dent. He alleged that she died in San Francisco, a resident 
 thereof and leaving estate therein, on December 9, 1883 ; that 
 she left a last will and testament dated July 2, 1883, wherein 
 he, petitioner, was named as executor; that he was a son of 
 decedent ; that on December 19, 1883, he filed the will together 
 with a petition for its probate and for his appointment as 
 executor thereof, but that the probate of such will was being 
 contested and a special administrator was necessary. Peti- 
 tioner based his application on sections 1411, 1412 and 1413, 
 Code of Civil Procedure, and the petition contained the 
 further usual averments. 
 
 This application was opposed by Amelia Haxe, a daughter 
 of deceased, who asked that special letters be issued to the 
 public administrator. 
 
 It was asserted that the applicant claimed certain property 
 to be his own, which was alleged to be a part of the estate ,
 
 Estate of Held. 207 
 
 of the decedent, and that he claimed interests adverse to said 
 estate; also that he had without right or authority assumed 
 to take charge of the estate of decedent since her death, and 
 had improvidently managed the same; as to the claim of 
 the applicant to certain property alleged to belong to the 
 estate, it was shown that shortly before her death the dece- 
 dent had executed a deed to him of certain real estate, under 
 which he asserted title in his own right, which deed was 
 claimed to be void on various grounds ; and the invalidity of 
 this deed was set up as a circumstance to prove the lack of 
 integrity of the applicant ; as to his improvidence, it was 
 claimed that while he had assumed control of the estate, he 
 had permitted certain premises belonging to it to remain idle 
 for some time, and that this was "improvidence" within the 
 meaning of the code ; the applicant had also expended $1,000 
 of the moneys of the estate as a retainer to his attorneys, on 
 the contest of the will, and it was claimed that he had no 
 right to pay attorneys' fees out of the estate until he should 
 be appointed executor, and that this was also ' ' improvidence. ' ' 
 
 Thos. I. Bergin, for John E. Hammersmith, applicant. 
 
 Geo. Flournoy, for Mrs. Amelia Haxe, opposed. 
 
 Thos. V. O'Brien, for Gustave Held, absent heir. 
 
 Thos. F. Barry, for Haxe minors. 
 
 H. E. Highton, for Russ minors. 
 
 COFFEY, J. Applicant is the son of decedent and named 
 in the will offered for probate as executor. He is of legal age 
 and prima facie competent and eligible under the statute : 
 Code Civ. Proc, sec. 1413. 
 
 It is suggested that he is not a proper person to take letters 
 by reason of lack of integrity and also "improvidence" 
 (Code Civ. Proc, sec. 1369, subd. 4) ; but this is not estab- 
 lished; it is "not proven"; and, in view of that, the court 
 has no discretion to deny this application. 
 
 Granted. 
 
 In Appointing a Special Administrator, the court must give pref- 
 erence to the jiiTKon entitled to letters testamentary or of admin-
 
 208 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 istration (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 1413; Ariz. Eev. Stats. 1689; Ida. 
 Rev. Stats. 5392; Mont. Code Civ. Proc. 2502; Nev. Comp. Laws, 
 2857; Okl. Rev. Stats. 1573; S. D. Pro. Code, 121; Utah Rev. Stats. 
 3823; Wyo. Rev. Stats. 4641); but no appeal lies from the order of 
 appointment: Estate of Carpenter, 73 Cal. 202, 14 Pac. 677; Estate 
 of Ohm, 82 Cal. 160, 22 Pac. 927. 
 
 The Courts have no Authority to Add to the Disqualifications of 
 Administrators which have been prescribed by the legislature, nor 
 to decline to issue letters to one who possesses the statutory right 
 to them: Estate of Muersing, 103 Cal. 585, 37 Pac. 520; Estate of 
 Brundage, 141 Cal. 538, 75 Pac. 175; Estate of Carmody, 88 Cal. 616, 
 26 Pac. 373. As to what improvidence or lack of integrity will dis- 
 qualify a person to act as administrator, see Estate of Carmody, 88 
 Cal. 616, 26 Pac. 373; Estate of Newman, 124 Cal. 688, 57 Pac. 686, 
 45 L. R. A. 780; Root v. Davis, 10 Mont. 228, 25 Pac. 105; Estate 
 of Courtney, 31 Mont. 625, 79 Pac. 317. 
 
 Estate of PETER G. PARTRIDGE, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 3,308; decided August 26, 1886.] 
 
 Inventory. — An Administrator must Make a True Inventory and 
 appraisement of all estate of the decedent coming to his possession 
 or knowledge; and he is accountable with respect to this duty. 
 
 Inventory — Adverse Claim Against Property. — If any portion of a 
 decedent's estate is the subject of an adverse claim, it is prudent on 
 the part of the administrator to add a memorandum to the inventory, 
 stating the asserted claim. But the property must be inventoried; 
 the administrator cannot stand neutral because the decedent 's title 
 is disputed. 
 
 Inventory — Property Claimed Adversely to Estate. — An adminis- 
 trator cannot omit to inventory property said to belong to his in- 
 testate which is the subject of an adverse claim, on the pretense 
 that he wants to stand neutral between the estate and the adverse 
 claimant, leaving the merits of the controversy to the court's de- 
 termination. The administrator cannot assume an attitude of neu- 
 trality; the statute points out his duty; and for the court to pass 
 upon the merits of the adverse claim would be to assume a jurisdic- 
 tion which, in probate, it cannot exercise. 
 
 Inventory — Disputed Title. — The Probate Court ought not, it seems, 
 to reject an inventory of a decedent's estate, or order it modified, 
 because it contains property, the title to which is disputed.
 
 Estate of Partridge. 209 
 
 Inventory — Trying Questions of Title. — Where part of an inven- 
 toried estate of a decedent is in dispute, the adjudication of the 
 title belongs to common-law tribunals; a probate court cannot con- 
 clude the question. 
 
 On September 28, 1885, Annie E. Partridge filed an 
 affidavit and petition, the statements in each being the same, 
 viz. : That she was interested in the estate as one of the dis- 
 tributees thereof; that decedent at time of his death owned 
 and possessed certain bonds of the city of Sacramento, of the 
 face value of $25,300 (with interest), and of the actual value 
 of over fifty cents on the dollar; that upon information and 
 belief, the said bonds have, since decedent's death, been in 
 possession or under control of John Partridge, the agent of 
 the administrator in the matters of the estate; that on Sep- 
 tember 14, 1885, she made demand on the administrator 
 (Antoine Borel) to inventory said bonds as a part of said 
 estate, "and the said Borel informed affiant that he would 
 take no action, either for or against said estate, in the matter 
 of said demand." That said bonds are not mentioned or 
 included in the inventory of said estate on file. In response 
 to a citation issued, the administrator made answer on Octo- 
 ber 6, 1885, setting forth substantially that the decedent left 
 a will, which was duly admitted to probate, in and by which 
 decedent's brother, Patrick M. Partridge, was made the sole 
 legatee and devisee; that decedent left him surviving a son, 
 Louis G. Partridge, of the age of majority, who was the hus- 
 band of petitioner, Annie E. Partridge; that by reason of 
 a claim of the invalidity of the will set up by the son, nego- 
 tiations were entered into between the said son and the 
 aforesaid devisee, which resulted in an agreement whereby 
 the son withdrew his opposition to the will and consented to 
 its probate, in consideration that the devisee should assign 
 the son one-half of the decedent's estate; that the John Part- 
 ridge mentioned in Annie E. Partridge's petition is the son of 
 the devisee. Patrick M., and for many years prior to dece- 
 dent's death was employed by him in his business matters ; that 
 in course of the negotiations between the said Louis G. and 
 Patrick M., it became known that said John was in possession 
 of the bonds referred to in Annie E. Partridge's petition, 
 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. I — 14
 
 210 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 and that he claimed to be the owner of them; also that he 
 had a large claim against decedent for services performed; 
 that therefore, to effect a settlement of all matters of contro- 
 versy, it was agreed between John and Louis G. that upon 
 the admission of the decedent's will to probate John should 
 receive $1,500 from Louis Gr., and the latter should consent 
 that the said bonds were and should be considered as the 
 property of John and not of decedent's estate, and John 
 should waive all claims against the decedent's estate, and 
 against Louis G. 
 
 On October 17, 1885, the said administrator, Borel, filed 
 an amended answer to the aforesaid petition of Annie E. 
 Partridge, in which he set forth that the inventory of the 
 decedent's estate returned and filed by him contained all 
 the property of the estate coming to his knowledge or posses- 
 sion; that there was no other property except that returned 
 in the inventory; a denial that decedent owned the bonds 
 mentioned in the petition ; or that the bonds had ever been in 
 his (Borel's) possession, or under his control; or that John 
 Partridge had been his agent as administrator or otherwise. 
 Alleged, upon information and belief, that the bonds were 
 never the property of decedent, and never formed part of his 
 estate. The opinion below was delivered upon the hearing 
 of the order to show cause made upon the petition, and the 
 answers of the administrator. 
 
 T. Z. Blakeman, for applicant, A. E. Partridge. 
 
 E. S. Pillsbury, for John Partridge, claimant. 
 
 S. V. Smith, for A. Borel, administrator. 
 
 COFFEY, J. This is an application to compel the admin- 
 istrator to include in his inventory certain bonds — "Sacra- 
 mento County Bonds" — alleged to belong to the estate of 
 Peter G. Partridge, deceased. The administrator makes 
 response that the reason of his omission was and is that John 
 Partridge, nephew of deceased testator and son of Patrick 
 M. Partridge, the sole devisee and legatee under the will of 
 Peter G., asserted title to the lands, which title was recog- 
 nized by the disinherited only son of deceased testator, Louis
 
 Estate of Partridge. 211 
 
 Partridge, now deceased, whose surviving widow is the mov- 
 ing part}' in this proceeding. The agreement between Louis 
 and John was in writing. There were only two persons in- 
 terested in the subject matter at that time, Louis, the disin- 
 herited child, and Patrick M., resident in Canada, who was 
 the universal devisee and legatee. Betw^een these two a 
 settlement was made outside of court, and without opposition 
 the will was admitted to probate. Thereafter the controversy 
 between Louis and John about the ownership of the bonds 
 was apparently adjusted. In this hearing the administrator 
 stood aside, as a "neutral" spectator, professing willingness 
 to submit to any order the court might make, after taking 
 testimony, as to the transaction between Louis and John. 
 John Partridge then came in, represented by special counsel, 
 and has undertaken to show that, inasmuch as he owned and 
 owns the bonds in question, the administrator cannot be 
 obliged to include them in the inventory. The administrator 
 cannot assume an attitude of neutrality. He must, under 
 the statute (Code Civ. Proc, sec. 1443 et seq.), make a true 
 inventory and appraisement of all the estate which has come 
 to his possession or knowledge, and he is accountable therefor. 
 If any portion of the estate is claimed by others, it seems 
 prudent to include this item in the list, with words or a 
 memorandum stating the asserted claim: Schouler's Execu- 
 tors and Administrators, sec. 233. 
 
 Without reference in any manner to the character of the 
 transaction between John Partridge and the deceased Louis, 
 it is clear that the administrator should have included the 
 disputed item in his inventory. The only reason why the 
 decision has been deferred is that the court was desirous of 
 placing the parties upon an equal footing in any litigation 
 as to the title in another tribunal. After a full and anxious 
 consideration of the whole matter, a consideration of the argu- 
 ments and briefs and review of the testimony, I am convinced 
 that the correct conclusion is that the administrator should 
 inventory these l)onds. Any other conclusion would, in my 
 judgment, be equivalent to assuming a jurisdiction which 
 this court sitting in probate may not exercise.
 
 212 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 A court of probate ought not, it would appear, to reject 
 an inventory, or order it modified, because it contains prop- 
 erty, the title to which is disputed: for to common-law tri- 
 bunals belongs the adjudication of the title, and the probate 
 court cannot conclude the question: Schouler's Executors and 
 Administrators, sec. 236; Gold's Case, Kirby (Conn.), 100 
 (see opinion on page 103). 
 
 Application granted. 
 
 When Dou"bt Arises as to Whether any Particular Piece or Arti- 
 cle of Property should be inventoried as a part of the estate of a 
 decedent, the court may institute an inquiry, and hear evidence to 
 ascertain the ownership of such property; not for the purpose finally 
 to determine the title, for that would exceed the jurisdiction of the 
 probate court, but to determine, prima facie, whether the property 
 belongs to the estate and should be inventoried. The investigation 
 involves the bona fides of the claimants and the faithfulness to his 
 trust of the executor or administrator; and the determination of 
 these questions may serve as a basis for compelling him to inventory 
 the property, or for removing him from office. But the adjudica- 
 tion of the court, or the recitals of the inventory, are not conclu- 
 sive in another forum of the decedent's ownership, either as against 
 third persons or against the executor or administrator: Estate of 
 Eathgeb, 125 Cal. 302, 57 Pac. 1010; Lamme v. Dodson, 4 Mont. 560, 
 2 Pac. 298; Estate of Bolander, 38 Or. 493, 63 Pac. 689; Estate of 
 Belt, 29 Wash. 535, 70 Pac. 74. The valuations given in the inven- 
 tory are not conclusive for any purpose: Estate of Hinckley, 58 Cal. 
 457, 516; Estate of Simmons, 43 Cal. 543. 
 
 Estate of JEAN PIERRE RICAUD, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 7,754, former Probate Court; decided November 7, 1883.] 
 
 A Legatee of a Specific Beciuest can Take Only Such Interest in 
 
 the property bequeathed as the testator had a right or power to dis- 
 pose of by will. 
 
 Where Property Specifically Bequeathed is Sold Under Order of 
 Court, the legatee is not entitled to the proceeds before distribution, 
 but the same must be held subject to administration. 
 
 An Executor can be Allowed Commissions only upon the amount 
 the estate accounted for by him; and he cannot be said to have 
 accounted for property as part of the estate of his testator, to which 
 it has judicially been determined that the estate has no title.
 
 Estate of Ricaud. 213 
 
 Jean Pierre Ricaud died April 1, 1877, in San Francisco, 
 a resident thereof, and leaving estate therein. 
 
 He left a last will and testament, dated March 26, 1877, 
 in which Francois Larroche and Leon Auradou were named 
 as executors. Upon petition filed by them on April 6, 1877, 
 the will was admitted to probate, and they were appointed 
 executors thereof on April 26, 1877, and letters testamentary 
 were issued to them on April 28, 1877. 
 
 A part of the estate consisted of a saloon, which the dece- 
 dent bequeathed to his brother, Michael Ricaud. 
 
 On May 2, 1877, the executors, at the request of this legatee, 
 filed a petition praying for an order of sale of this saloon, 
 on the ground that its chief value consisted in its goodwill, 
 and that unless it could be kept open it would depreciate in 
 value and become worthless, and that its stock of wines and 
 liquors was diminishing by daily sales, and that they did 
 not feel authorized to expend the money of the estate in 
 replenishing it. An order of sale was accordingly made on 
 said day, and the saloon was thereafter sold, with the assent 
 of the legatee, for $2,000, and the sale confirmed by the court. 
 
 On August 30, 1878, the executors filed their first account, 
 from which it appeared that the saloon had been sold under 
 the order of court for $2,000, and the proceeds paid to the 
 legatee by the executors. 
 
 On September 13, 1878, ]\Iaria Ricaud, the widow of the 
 ilecedent, filed exceptions to this account, and contested this 
 ])ayment to the legatee, on the ground that the same was unau- 
 thorized and illegal, but the question was reserved by the 
 court for future consideration, and the account, with the 
 exception of this item, settled. 
 
 On August 13, 1883, the executors filed their second 
 account, to which exception was again taken by the widow, 
 on the same ground. 
 
 The contestant also excepted to the amount claimed by 
 the executors as commissions, the facts in relation to which 
 matter are as follows: There was included in the inventory 
 and appraisement filed in the matter of the estate certain 
 real property valued at $7,500, and commissions were 
 claimed on this amount as part of the estate accounted for.
 
 214 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 From the account and report of the executors, it appeared 
 that a suit in ejectment had been commenced against the 
 decedent for this property in his lifetime, and that after trial 
 and appeal to the supreme court, subsequent!}' to the death of 
 the testator, the litigation terminated in a final judgment 
 against the estate, and the property was surrendered to the 
 successful parties. 
 
 The account was settled in accordance with the principles 
 laid down in the following opinion: 
 
 Jarboe & Harrison, attorneys for executors. 
 
 H. A. Powell and A. P. Needles, attorneys for widow. 
 
 COFFEY, J. 1. The claimant of the specific legacy (the 
 saloon) can take only such interest in the property as the 
 testator had a right or power to dispose of by will. It 
 follows, therefore, that the proceeds of the sale of the saloon, 
 to-wit, $2,000, should be retired from the account and held 
 subject to distribution, to be disposed of by the court 
 according to the circumstances at such time existing. 
 
 2. Commissions can only be allowed, according to the statute, 
 "upon the amount of estate accounted for" by the executor. 
 He cannot be said, in the sense of the statute, to have 
 accounted for estate to which it has been determined the 
 estate had no title, which it appears never belonged to the 
 estate, and is not returned or accounted for in this account. 
 
 The Principal Case was Affirmed by the supreme court of Califor- 
 nia in Estate of Eicaud, 70 Cal. 69, 11 Pac. 471, holding that an 
 executor cannot claim commissions on real estate involved in litiga- 
 tion that ultimately results in a decision adverse to the estate. To 
 the same effect is Estate of Delaney, 110 Cal. 563, 42 Pac. 981. Com- 
 missions are allowable, as a rule, upon all the property which comes 
 into the possession of the executor or administrator and for which 
 he is accountable, but upon no other: Estate of Simmons, 43 Cal. 
 543; Estate of Isaacs, 30 Cal. 106; Blackenburg v. Jordan, 86 Cal. 
 171. 24 Pac. 1061.
 
 Estate of Riddle. 215 
 
 Estate of JAMES L. RIDDLE, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 1,209; decided April 27, 18S5.] 
 
 Letters of Administration — Who may Apply for. — The person to 
 whom letters of administration are issued must apply by his own 
 petition, signed by himself or his counsel; a petition by an heir 
 for the appointment of another person is insuificient, and an order 
 appointing an administrator on such petition must fall. Such pe- 
 tition is in effect no petition, and is not subject to amendment. 
 
 Administrator's Sale. — The Court Should Require an Additional Bond 
 from the administrator upon ordering the sale of any real property be- 
 longing to the estate. 
 
 James L. Riddle died in Santa Clara county, in this state, 
 but being a resident of San Francisco, and leaving estate 
 therein, on October 8, 1881. 
 
 He left a will, bearing date February 2, 1881, in which 
 Channing G. Fenner was named as executor. 
 
 On petition filed by Mr. Fenner, on October 13, 1881, the 
 will was admitted to probate, he appointed executor thereof, 
 and letters testamentary thereon issued to him, on October 
 ■28, 1881. 
 
 The executor died on April 22, 1883, while still acting as 
 such. 
 
 On May 26, 1883, Grace L. Riddle, a daughter of the 
 testator, filed a petition signed by Samuel H. Dwinelle, as 
 her attorney, and verified by her, setting forth the facts, and 
 praying for the appointment of David IMcClure as adminis- 
 trator of the estate with the will annexed. 
 
 On June 8, 1883, an order was made as prayed for by the 
 petitioner appointing Mr. McClure, and on August 13, 1883, 
 letters of administration with the will annexed were issued 
 to him. 
 
 On December 17, 1884, Mr. McClure filed a petition for 
 an order to sell certain real property belonging to the estate, 
 and on January 28, 1885, an order of sale was made accord- 
 ingly. 
 
 A sale was had pursuant to such order, and on April 8, 
 1885, Mr. McClure filed his return and account of sales, 
 together with a petition for the confirmation thereof.
 
 216 Coffey's Pkobate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 On April 23, 1885, a purchaser (J. C. Johnson) filed 
 written objections to such confirmation, on the ground that 
 the sale was not legally made, in this: 
 
 1. That no petition in writing had ever been filed by 
 David McClure, signed by him or by his counsel, for his 
 appointment as administrator. 
 
 2. That there was no administrator of the estate, and that 
 the sale was without authority. 
 
 3. That no bond was required in the order of sale, or ever 
 given by Mr. McClure upon the sale, and that his original 
 bond was only $3,500, while the amount bid for the property 
 was $32,500. 
 
 The facts w^ere correctly stated in the grounds of contest. 
 Proceedings de novo were accordingly commenced, and new 
 letters issued to David McClure May 29, 1885. 
 
 F. J. French, attorney for objecting purchaser. 
 
 S. H. Dwindle, for administrator cum test. ann. 
 
 COFFEY, J. 1. There is no petition on file here signed by 
 David McClure or by his counsel. Grace Riddle 's application 
 that David McClure be appointed is not sufficient, as the 
 person to whom letters are issued must apply by his own 
 petition, signed by himself or his counsel: Code Civ. Proc, 
 sees. 1371, 1374. - 
 
 The order of June 8, 1883, had no proper basis as required 
 by the foregoing cited sections, and it must fall. 
 
 2. An additional bond should have been provided for in 
 the order of sale of the real estate : Code Civ. Proc, see. 1389. 
 
 The objections to the confirmation of the sale are sustained ; 
 they cannot now be cured by amendment ; there being no- 
 petition, there is nothing to amend.
 
 Estate of Tate. 217 
 
 Estate of ROBERT N. TATE, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 5,084; decided February 24, 1887.] 
 
 Homestead. — A Widow Without Minor Children is Entitled to have 
 a homestead selected and set apart by the court out of decedent's 
 separate estate, there being no community property. 
 
 Homestead. — The Court must Set Apart a Homestead upon the ap- 
 plication of a widow, if none has been selected in the lifetime of 
 the deceased spouse. There is no discretion in the matter. 
 
 The Right of the Surviving Spouse to a Homestead in separate es- 
 tate of the decedent is limited to an estate for years, for life, or until 
 the happening of some event, as the marriage of the survivor, as may 
 be decreed by the court. But the exercise of the court's power is lim- 
 ited by a sound discretion acting upon the circumstances of the 
 particular case; if the survivor is young and likely to remarry, a 
 limitation for life might be indiscreet, otherwise where she is of an 
 advanced age. 
 
 Homestead. — The Purpose of the Statute in Giving a Homestead 
 right to the surviving spouse out of the decedent 's separate estate 
 is to provide a home for the survivor, which no one can touch; merely 
 depriving the survivor of the power of alienation. 
 
 J. A. Hosmer, for applicant, Margaret E. Tate. 
 
 W. C. Burnett, opposed. 
 
 COFFEY, J. This is an application by Margaret E. Tate, 
 surviving widow of Robert N. Tate, deceased, for an order 
 of court setting apart to her absolutely, as and for a home- 
 stead, a certain piece of real property mentioned in the estate 
 of said deceased, situated on Post street, between Broderick 
 and Baker, particularly described in her petition, with the 
 dwelling and improvements thereon. This property is 
 appraised at the aggregate value of $4,550. The petitioner 
 claims the same as community property, and by virtue of 
 having a homestead declared thereon in the lifetime of said 
 Robert N. Tate, which declaration of homestead compljang 
 substantially with the provisions of the Civil Code of this 
 state, was recorded on the first day of May, 1883, in tlie 
 recorder's office of the city and county of San Francisco. 
 The application is contested by a daughter of said deceased, 
 on the ground that i1 was not community property, but the
 
 218 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 separate property of the deceased, Robert N. Tate, and on 
 the further ground that being separate property the widow, 
 having no children by the deceased, is not entitled to a 
 homestead out of his separate estate. 
 
 After a patient hearing of the case in open court, and 
 a careful reading and examination of the able briefs pre- 
 sented by the respective counsel, and of the documentary 
 evidence of a very voluminous character which was submitted 
 to the court, I am unable to come to the conclusion that it 
 was community property. Upon the whole, after a complete 
 survey of the situation of the parties, and of the history of 
 the accumulations of the deceased, I am of the opinion that 
 the property was his separate estate. This being the court's 
 deduction from the facts as presented by the evidence, the 
 remaining question is, whether a widow without minor 
 children is entitled to have a homestead set apart to her out 
 of the separate estate of her deceased husband. 
 
 This question has been decided in this court in the Estate 
 of Richard T. Maxwell, Deceased, No. 2,625 [ante, p. 126], 
 in an application in a proceeding wherein Elena Maxwell, 
 the widow, applied for an order setting aside a homestead 
 out of the separate estate, the fact being that there were 
 no minor children. The counsel who participated in the 
 argument of that case were T. I. Bergin, Esq., for the appli- 
 cant; Daniel Rogers, Esq., for the executors in opposition; 
 and A. F. Morrison, Esq., for a legatee, also in opposition. 
 Each and all of these counsel argued the point involved in 
 the application elaborately^ and thoroughly covering the entire 
 ground, so that the court has, in addition to the advantage 
 of the argument in this present proceeding, the benefit of 
 former argument and of its own examination, and the court 
 has seen no reason to recede from its ruling in that case. 
 
 This court must, upon proper application, set apart to the 
 widow a homestead, if none has been selected in the lifetime 
 of the deceased. The court has no discretion to deny the 
 application : Estate of Ballentine, 45 Cal. 699 ; Estate of 
 McCauley, 50 Cal. 546 ; Mawson v. Mawson, 50 Cal. 539. 
 
 In the present case the application is founded upon a 
 statutory declaration of homestead, which, operating upon
 
 Estate op Tate. 219 
 
 (separate) property appraised at not more than $5,000, should 
 be the subject matter of the court's decree. The power of 
 the court is limited by a sound discretion acting upon the 
 circumstances of the particular case. The fee passes to the 
 heirs, in this case the petitioner and the applicant, in equal 
 shares, with a limited estate as a homestead in the surviving 
 widow, which would be for years, for life, or until the 
 happening of some event, as the marriage of the widow. As 
 the counsel for the applicant says, the purpose of the statute 
 undoubtedly is to provide a home for the widow which no 
 one can touch, depriving her of the power of alienation 
 merely. 
 
 It does not impair or diminish the^ right of the widow 
 that there be no minor childen. The homestead is to be set 
 apart to the survivor. It is immaterial that the petition be 
 on behalf of the widow alone. It could not here be otherwise. 
 Her status is that of the "surviving widow": Sec. 1465 
 (Amdt. 1881) ; Estate of Lord, 2 W. C. R. 131 (Lord v. 
 Lord, 65 Cal. 84, 3 Pac. 96). 
 
 If the petitioner were young, and likely to remarry and 
 obtain a home and support by that act, a limitation for life 
 might be indiscreet, but considering her age — she is now 
 sixty-two — her domestic condition, and the probability that 
 the condition will not be modified by marriage, the court is 
 of opinion that she is entitled to have a homestead set apart 
 for life, and it is so ordered. Let an order be drawn accord- 
 ingly. 
 
 The Principal Case affirms the decision in Estate of Maxwell, ante, 
 p. 126. The duty of the court to set apart a probate homestead 
 when a proper application therefor is made is imperative. It has 
 no discretion to refuse the application, but must grant it, for the 
 words "may set apart," as employed in the statute, are construed 
 "must set apart": Demartin v. Demartin, 85 Cal. 71, 24 Pac. 594; 
 Tyrrell v. Baldwin, 78 Cal. 470, 21 Pac. 116; Estate of Burton, 63 
 Cal. 36; Ballentine's Estate, 45 Cal. 696; Estate of Walley, 11 Nev. 
 260; Estate of Syndegaard, 31 Utah, 490, 88 Pac. 616. In case 
 there are no. children the surviving spouse, nevertheless, has a right 
 to a homestead: Estate of Armstrong, 80 Cal. 71, 22 Pac. 79; Kearney 
 V. Kearney, 72 Cal. 591, 15 Pac. 769.
 
 220 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 When a Probate Homestead is Selected from the separate estate 
 of the decedent, the court can set it apart for a limited period only. 
 The remainder in fee vests in the heirs, even to the exclusion of 
 devisees named in the will. They take a vested estate, which may be 
 aliened by them voluntarily or by judicial sale. Only the homestead 
 is exempt; their interest in the property is subject to the claims of 
 creditors of the decedent, and may be ordered sold to pay a family 
 allowance made to the widow: Estate of Tittel, 139 Cal. 149, 72 Pac. 
 909; McHarry v. Stewart (Cal.), 35 Pae. 141; Lord v. Lord, 65 Cal. 
 84, 3 Pac. 96; Estate of Schmidt, 94 Cal. 334, 29 Pac. 714. 
 
 Estate of JEAN PIERRE RICAIJD, Deceased (No. 2). 
 
 [No. 7,754 former Probate Court; decided February 5, 1887.] 
 
 The Widow can Claim to Own an Undivided Half Only of Such 
 Property as is distributed in kind. If she receive one-half of the 
 community property, her right as survivor is satisfied. 
 
 Executors are Entitled to have the Costs of an Appeal Allowed them 
 in their account, the prosecution of which is necessary to obtain a 
 final determination of their rights in relation to commissions. 
 
 On October 20, 1885, Maria Ricaud, widow of the above- 
 named decedent, died intestate, and A. P. Needles was 
 thereafter appointed administrator of her estate. 
 
 On August 2, 1886, the administrator filed a petition for 
 distribution herein. 
 
 Decedent herein, by his will, left the sum of $5,000 to 
 his Avidow, and the sum of $2,000 to her daughter by a 
 previous marriage. 
 
 Before distribution herein this daughter also died, and 
 Selden S. Wright was appointed administrator of her estate. 
 
 On September 8, 1886, the executors tiled a supplemental 
 account, containing a charge of $45.10 for costs expended 
 on appeal (affirmed against them, 70 Cal. 69, 11 Pac. 471) 
 from an order made by the court, refusing to allow them 
 commissions on property inventoried as part of the estate, 
 but afterward judicially determined not to belong to it (see 
 Estate of Ricaud, ante, p. 212).
 
 Estate of Ricaud. 221 
 
 This item was objected to by the administrator of the 
 widow, as arising out of an appeal taken by the executors 
 for their exclusive benefit. 
 
 The estate left by decedent was community property. 
 The executors had, under order of court, sold a saloon for 
 $2,000, which had been specifically bequeathed by the tes- 
 tator to his brother, Michael Ricaud, and the executors had 
 paid said legatee the full proceeds. 
 
 The administrator of the widow now claimed that as this 
 saloon was community property the testator could only be- 
 queath one-half of it, and that the legatee was only entitled 
 to one-half the proceeds. 
 
 The contention of the executors was that the widow had 
 already received more than one-half of the estate in money 
 on partial distribution, and that the bequest by the hus- 
 band of a specific piece of his estate does not make the 
 legatee a cotenant with the widow; that "the widow has the 
 right to claim any other portion equal in value to that which 
 the husband has given, but has not the right to claim the 
 half of the specific piece, so long as she receives the half of 
 the entire estate." 
 
 They further maintained that even if, as claimed by 
 counsel for contestants, the widow is entitled to an un- 
 divided one-half of all the community property, this is only 
 the rule when the property is distributed in kind, and that 
 it cannot be the rule when the property, or the bulk thereof, 
 is converted into money, and the widow receives, in money, 
 one-half of the whole estate as its money value. 
 
 "If the entire estate is converted into money, all that the 
 widow can receive is one-half of the money. She cannot, 
 after having received that one-half, claim that she is en- 
 titled to a portion of the very estate or its proceeds, out of 
 which the money received by her was realized." 
 
 Jarboe & Harrison, for executors. 
 
 H. A. Powell and A. P. Needles, for administrator of 
 widow. 
 
 Selden S. and Geo. T.' Wright, for administrator of wid- 
 ow's daughter.
 
 222 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 COFFEY, J. The final brief in this matter was filed 
 November 29, 1886, which should be considered the date of 
 actual submission of the controversy. 
 
 1. The theory of the contestants' counsel does not fit the 
 facts in this case. If I correctly apprehend the respective 
 arguments of counsel, the position assumed by the executors 
 is the true legal one. "The widow can claim to own an 
 undivided half only of such property as is distributed in 
 kind, and then only after distribution." If she have re- 
 ceived one-half of the community property her right as sur- 
 vivor is satisfied. 
 
 Exception and objection denied and overruled. 
 
 2. The prosecution of the appeal seems to have been 
 necessary to obtain a final judicial determination of the 
 rights and duties of the executors. 
 
 Exception and objection denied and overruled. Account 
 allowed. 
 
 Estate of HANNAH G. INGRAM, Deceased. 
 [No. 4,993; decided December 13, 1886.] 
 
 Will. — Every Person Over the Age of Eighteen Years, of Sound 
 Mind, may, by last will, dispose of all his estate remaining after 
 payment of his debts. 
 
 Will. — A Person is of Sound and Disposing Mind who is in the pos- 
 session of all the natural mental faculties of man, free from de- 
 lusion, and capable of rationally thinking, reasoning, acting and de- 
 termining for himself. A sound mind is one wholly free from de- 
 lusion. Weak minds differ from strong minds only in the extent 
 and power of their faculties; unless they betray symptoms of de- 
 lusion their soundness cannot be questioned. 
 
 Will — Delusion. — It is not the Strength of a Mind which deter- 
 mines its freedom from delusion; it is its soundness. 
 
 Will — Delusion of Mind is a Species of Insanity. — The main char- 
 acter of insanity, in a legal view, is the existence of a delusion. 
 
 Will. — A Person is the Victim of Delusion when he pertinaciously 
 believes something to exist which does not. Belief of things which 
 are entirely without foundation in fact is insane delusion; that is, 
 where things exist only in the imagination of a person, and the non-
 
 Estate of Ingram. 223 
 
 existence of which neither argument nor proof can establish in his 
 mind. 
 
 Will. — If a Person is Under a Delusion, though there is but Partial 
 Insanity, yet if it is in relation to the act in question, it will defeat 
 a will which is the direct offspring of that partial insanity. 
 
 Will. — Belief Based on Evidence, However Slight, is not Delusion; 
 delusion rests upon no evidence whatever; it is based on mere sur- 
 mise. The burden of proof is upon the party alleging insanity or 
 insane delusion. 
 
 Will. — A Will Produced by Undue Influence cannot stand. 
 
 Will. — Undue Influence is any Kind of Influence, either through 
 fear, coercion, or importunity, by which the testator is prevented 
 from expressing his true mind. It must be an influence adequate to 
 control the free agency of the testator. If a weak-minded person 
 is importuned to such an extent that he has not sufficient strength 
 of mind to determine for himself, so that the proposed script ex- 
 presses the views and wishes of the person importuning, rather than 
 his own, and is not his free and unconstrained act, it is not his will. 
 Undue influence, or supremacy of one mind over another, is such as 
 prevents that other from acting according to his own wish or judg- 
 ment. 
 
 Will — Undue Influence. — Neither Advice, Argument, nor Persuasion 
 will vitiate a will made freely and from conviction, though such 
 will might not have been made but for such advice and persuasion. 
 Neither does undue influence arise from the influence of gratitude, 
 affection or esteem. 
 
 Will. — If the Testator has Sufficient Memory and Intelligence fairly 
 and rationally to comprehend the effect of what he is doing, to ap- 
 preciate his relations to the natural objects of his bounty, and un- 
 derstand the character and effect of the provisions of his will; if he 
 has a reasonable understanding of the nature of the property he 
 wishes to dispose of, and of the persons to whom and the manner in 
 which he wishes to distribute it, and so express himself, his will is 
 good. It is not necessary that he should act without prompting. 
 
 Will. — Undue Influence may be Defined as that which compels the 
 testator to do that which is against his will, through fear or a de- 
 sire of peace, or some feeling which he is unable to resist, and but 
 for which the will would not be made as it is, although the testator 
 may know what he is about when he makes the will, and may have 
 sufficient capacity to make it. 
 
 Will. — What would be an Undue Influence on One Man might be 
 no influence at all on another. This depends upon the capacity, in 
 other respects, of the testator. 
 
 WiU. — Undue Influence must be an Influence Exercised in Relation 
 to the will itself, and not in relation to other matters or transactions.
 
 224 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 But it need not be shown to have been actually exercised at the point 
 of time that the will was executed. 
 
 Will. — Undue Influence cannot be Presumed, but must be Proved, 
 and the burden of proving it lies on the party alleging it. Such 
 evidence must often be indirect and circumstantial, for undue in- 
 fluence can rarely be proved by direct and positive testimony. The 
 circumstances to be considered, stated, 
 
 Will — Insane Delusion — Undue Influence. — The Evidence in this 
 Case reviewed at length and the conclusion reached, that the testa- 
 trix was the victim of an insane delusion, of which the instrument 
 propounded was the offspring, and that the testatrix was unduly in- 
 fluenced to make the will in favor of proponent. 
 
 Geo. H. Perry and W. W. Bishop, for contestant, John 
 W. Ingram, husband of testatrix. 
 
 J. M. Seawell, for contestants, Samuel F. Clough and 
 others, nephews and nieces of testatrix. 
 
 Selden S. Wright and E. Thompson, for proponent, Jun- 
 ius L. Hatch. 
 
 COFFEY, J. On February 6, 1886, a petition was filed 
 by Junius L. Hatch in this court, praying for the admission 
 to probate of a certain document purporting to be the will 
 of Hannah G. Ingram, deceased, which petition set forth 
 that Hannah G. Ingram died on the 1st of February, 1886, 
 in this city and county, where she was at that date a resi- 
 dent, leaving a last will and testament in the possession of 
 Junius L. Hatch, who was named therein as executor and 
 principal devisee and legatee, the others being Samuel F. 
 Clough, James A. Clough, Olympia Wilson, Lillie D. Hatch 
 and John W. Ingram. That the next of kin of the testatrix 
 and heirs at law were said John W. Ingram, the husband of 
 decedent, residing at San Francisco, Samuel F. Clough, 
 James A. Clough, nephews, all residing in this state. 
 
 That at the time said will was executed, February 13, 
 1885, the testatrix was of the age of fifty-two, and other- 
 wise competent to make a will. The will is in the hand- 
 writing of the proponent, signed by the testatrix, and attested 
 by the subscribing witnesses, according to the statute in such 
 case made and provided, and the petitioner further prays 
 that letters testamentary be issued to him.
 
 Estate of Ingram. 225 
 
 The will provides (1) that all the just debts and funeral 
 expenses be paid; (2) the testatrix gives to her husband. 
 John W. Ingram, the sum of $5; (3) to her nephew, Samuel 
 F. Clough, $5; (4) to her nephew, James A. Clough, $5; 
 (5) to Mrs. Olympia Wilson, of Farback, Germany, form- 
 erly France, the sum of $10 per month, to be paid monthly 
 out of her estate by her executor during the legatee's nat- 
 ural life; (6) she gives to Lillie D. Hatch, the daughter of 
 said J. L. Hatch, executor, all her personal property, con- 
 sisting of clothing, books, pictures, jewelry, etc.; (7) she 
 directs that an appropriate monument be erected by her 
 executor to her first husband John Dominic Wilson, and 
 herself, in her lot in the Odd Fellows' Cemetery, of such 
 cost and character as her executor may approve, to be paid 
 for out of her estate; (8) she gives, devises and bequeathes 
 to Junius L. Hatch, journalist, now of San Francisco, her 
 house and lot No. 1724 Hyde street, including the cottage 
 in the rear, No. 1235 Vallejo street, and she also makes the 
 .said Junius L. Hatch her residuary legatee, and finally nom- 
 inates the said Junius L. Hatch the executor of her will 
 without bonds. 
 
 The will purports to have been executed on the 13th of 
 February, 1885, in the presence of Amanda Arnold and 
 Algernon Hopkins. 
 
 On February 16, 1886, J. W. Ingram filed an opposition 
 to the admission of this instrument to probate, on the 
 grounds, first, that he was the husband of the deceased at 
 the time of her death, having been married to her on the 
 thirtieth day of July, 1884; that at the time of her death 
 she possessed real estate and personal property of about 
 $15,000 in value, and that at the time the said Hannah G. 
 Ingram executed the said will she was not of sound and 
 disposing mind, and was not competent to execute the said 
 will by reason of her unsoundness of mind, and that, at 
 that time, her signature was obtained by means of threats 
 made by one Hatch, the person named in said instrument as 
 the residuary legatee; further, that in order to obtain said 
 signature, said Hatch falsely and fraudulently, and with 
 intent to deceive said Hannah G. Ingram, and to prejudice 
 ^nd defraud the opponent, represented to said Hannah G. 
 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. I — 15
 
 226 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 Ingram that he, the opponent and husband of decedent, was 
 unfaithful to his marriage vows, and that he was an idle and 
 dissolute person; and the petitioner further alleged that the 
 said Hannah G. Ingram believed the said false and fraudu- 
 lent representations of said Hatch to be true; and further, 
 the opponent alleged that from the date of the execution of 
 the said purported will up to the time of the death of the 
 said Hannah G. Ingram, the said Hatch falsely and fraudu- 
 lently and with intent to unduly influence the mind of said 
 Hannah G. Ingram, and with intent to weaken and destroy 
 the love and affection borne by the said Hannah G. Ingram 
 toward the opponent, her husband, continued to represent 
 and declare that the opponent was associating with lewd 
 women and was unfaithful and untrustworthy, and was not 
 a fit and proper person to associate and live with said dece- 
 dent, and was not a fit and proper person to whom the prop- 
 erty and estate of said decedent should be bequeathed; and 
 further, opponent alleged that said deceased was influenced 
 by false and fraudulent representations of said Hatch, and. 
 believing them to be true, forced the opponent, her hus- 
 band, to leave said deceased, and the said Hatch caused said 
 deceased to remain away from opponent, her husband, and 
 to conceal her whereabouts from opponent, her husband, and 
 at the time of the death of the said Hannah G. Ingram, and 
 for a long time prior thereto, the whereabouts of said de- 
 ceased w^ere unknown to opponent, her husband, and said 
 deceased so conducted herself, owing to the representations 
 and influence of said Hatch, as hereinbefore set forth. The 
 opponent therefore prayed that the probate of the purported 
 will be denied, and that he be appointed administrator of 
 the estate of said Hannah G. Ingram. 
 
 On February 25, 1886, Samuel F. Clough, James A. 
 Clough, Lulu B_ Clough and Albatena M. Weaver filed an 
 opposition on their own behalf, alleging that they are the 
 next of kin and heirs at law of Hannah G. Ingram, de- 
 ceased, being her nephews and nieces, and alleging as 
 grounds of opposition all of the statutory causes, the issue 
 of undue influence being tendered in these words : 
 
 "That said alleged will and testament was procured to be 
 made by said Junius L. Hatch by undue influence exerted
 
 Estate of Ingram. 227 
 
 by him upon said Hannah G. Ingram, as follows, to wit : 
 'That said Hannah G. Ingram, prior to and at the time of 
 making said alleged will and testament, was of unsound 
 mind ; that prior to and at the time of the making of said 
 alleged will and testament, the said Junius L. Hatch, with 
 the sole intent and design of procuring said Hannah G. In- 
 gram to make said alleged will and testament, had professed 
 great friendship for said Hannah G. Ingram, and by divers 
 acts and practices unknown to these contestants acquired 
 an ascendency, influence and control over said Hannah G. 
 Ingram, and over her mind and will ; that prior to and at 
 the time of making said alleged will and testament, said 
 Junius L. Hatch importuned her to make and execute the 
 same, and himself wrote the same and presented the same to 
 her and urged and importuned her to sign the same; and 
 that owing to her said condition of mind and the influence 
 and control which he, said Junius L. Hatch, had over her, 
 she, the said Hannah G. Ingram, was unable to resist the 
 said importunity of said Junius L. Hatch, and signed said 
 alleged will and instrument.' " 
 
 To both and to each of these contests or oppositions 
 answer was made by Junius L. Hatch, the proponent of 
 the will, specifically denying all the allegations of the re- 
 spective oppositions or contests, and the issues thus joined 
 came up for trial before the court, a jury having been ex- 
 pressly waived in open court, on September 29, 1886. and 
 it was consented in open court that the two contests be con- 
 solidated for the purposes of the trial. 
 
 The issues to which response must be made are reduced 
 by the evidence to two: insanity and undue influence. 
 
 (1) Was the testatrix the victim of an insane delusion, 
 and was this will the product of that delusion? 
 
 (2) Was the testatrix unduly influenced by Dr. Hatch 
 to make this will? 
 
 As to the first of these questions — Was there an insane 
 delusion, and was this will the product of that delusion? — 
 we must first settle what constitutes an insane delusion ac- 
 cording to the law, and the decisions of the courts declaring 
 the law; and this is included within the general question as 
 to mental competency.
 
 228 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 The law of our state provides that every person over the 
 age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may, by last will, dis- 
 pose of all Ms estate, real and personal, chargeable, however, 
 with the payment of all his debts: Civ. Code, sec. 1270. 
 
 A person is of sound and disposing mind who is in the 
 possession of all the natural mental faculties of man, free 
 from delusion, and capable of rationally thinking, reasoning, 
 acting and determining for himself. A sound mind is one 
 wholly free from delusion. Weak minds differ from strong 
 minds only in the extent and power of their faculties; un- 
 less they betray symptoms of delusion their soundness can- 
 not be questioned. It is not the strength of a mind which 
 determines its freedom from delusion, it is its soundness. 
 Thus, it is often said that such or such a distinguished man 
 has a sound mind; yet a man in the plainer walks of life, 
 of faculties of less extent or power, may be equally sound. 
 The latter is of sound mind equally with the former, if free 
 from delusions. Delusion of mind is to an extent insanity 
 The main character of insanity, in a legal view, is said to 
 be the existence of a delusion, that is, that a person should 
 pertinaciously believe something to exist which does not 
 exist, and that he should act upon that belief. Belief of 
 things which are entirely without foundation in fact, and 
 which no sane person would believe, is insane delusion; that 
 is, when a person believes things to exist only, or at least 
 in that degree only, in his own imagination, and of the 
 nonexistence of which neither argument nor proof can con- 
 vince him, that person is of unsound mind. If he be under 
 a delusion, though there be but partial insanity, yet if it be 
 in relation to the act in question, it will defeat a will which 
 is the direct offspring of that partial insanity. Thus, in 
 one case, where the testator conceived the groundless delu- 
 sion that his nephew had conspired to effect his death, the 
 will was set aside. On the other hand, in Clapp v. Fuller- 
 ton, 34 N. Y. 190, 90 Am. Dec. 681, it was held that the 
 will could not be rejected on the ground that the testator 
 entertained the idea that one of his daughters was illegiti- 
 mate, if this belief was not founded on insane delusion, but 
 upon slight and insufficient evidence acting upon a jealous 
 and suspicious mind. Belief based on evidence, however
 
 Estate of Ingram. 229 
 
 slight, is not delusion. One person, from extreme caution 
 or from a naturally doubtful frame of mind, will require 
 proof before acting, amounting, perhaps, to demonstration; 
 while another, of different faculties but of equally sound 
 mind, will act upon very slight evidence. Delusion rests 
 upon no evidence whatever; it is based on mere surmise: 
 Estate of Tittel, Myr. 12 ; Estate of Black, Myr. 24. 
 
 To apply these general principles to the case in hand: 
 If Mrs. Ingram believed that her husband, John W. Ingram, 
 was unfaithful to her, and if the belief of his infidelity was 
 entirely without foundation in fact ; if the belief was the 
 product of her own imagination ; and if the paper here pro- 
 pounded as her will was made under such belief; and if she 
 was influenced and controlled by such belief in making it, 
 then she was not of sound mind, but was under a delusion, 
 and the paper, so far, is not her will. 
 
 Did any fact exist which could cause a sane mind to be- 
 lieve that such was the case? If any fact did so exist, 
 she was not laboring under a delusion regarding the same. 
 If any fact existed, and was known to her, upon which she 
 could base such a suspicion of her husband's fidelity, she 
 was not laboring under a delusion respecting the same. A 
 person may act upon weak testimony, yet be under no de- 
 lusion. If the court finds that no fact existed upon which 
 a sane mind would form such a belief as is imputed to the 
 testatrix, then she was under an insane delusion, and the 
 court is bound to find that this is not a valid will. 
 
 John W. Ingram, one of the contestants, when about 
 twenty-six years of age, intermarried with the widow Wil- 
 son, July 30, 1884, she being about forty years his senior, 
 or say sixty-five years of age. He had been brought up 
 from about his tenth year by herself and her former hus- 
 band, John D. Wilson, who had practically, but not statu- 
 torily, adopted him as their son. She had a considerable 
 property, and it is in testimony that one reason why she 
 married her adopted son was to secure to him firmly his 
 rights of property. She appears to have had more than 
 a mother's fondness for him, since it appears in evidence 
 she was intensely jealous of him, a jealousy apparently more 
 conjugal than maternal. Why she should have been ap-
 
 230 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 prehensive that he would attract more than ordinary in- 
 terest, or inspire unusual affection in the heart of other 
 women, is not clear to the mind of the court, which must 
 depend upon normal conditions for its conclusions. Prior 
 to Ingram's marriage to the deceased, it appears he had 
 suffered a brief experience of like character with a lady, 
 from whom, after six weeks of cohabitation, he had been 
 divorced upon his own application upon the ground of ex- 
 treme cruelty. 
 
 Ingram was a plumber by trade, and seems to have pur- 
 sued his calling with reasonable diligence; in his work it 
 appears he was often embarrassed by the attentions of his 
 wife, the testatrix, who followed him about, and by her un- 
 usual conduct annoyed his fellow-workmen ; one of his em- . 
 ployers testified that he was a nice, quiet man, but the em- 
 ployer was compelled to discharge him several times, be- 
 cause Mrs. Ingram was in the habit of coming around and 
 bothering her husband on account of a "Spanish woman," 
 whom she imagined to be after him. Upon this subject of 
 this "Spanish woman" the case as to insane delusion rests. 
 All the witnesses testify that, while upon the other subjects 
 she acted in a fairly rational manner, she labored under 
 hallucinations, fixed false ideas (testimony of Ilollwege and 
 others) as to the "Spanish woman"; she never tired of this 
 topic; and the almost uniform testimony is that she was 
 not in her right mind on the question of the "Spanish wo- 
 man." 
 
 See testimony of P. R. O'Brien, James Watson, Andrew 
 T. Field, J. H. Williams, Thomas O'Brien, Mrs. Stangen- 
 berger. Lottie M. Golden, INIrs. Letitia Ralph, Patrick Lee, 
 Charles C. Levy, W. H. Allen, George Dixon, Joseph Buck- 
 ley, Andrew McKinnon, Officer T. A. McKinnon, E. M. 
 Gallagher, William G. Thomas, John Evans, Benjamin 
 Davis, Guillaume Abadie, Mrs. Ida Carpenter, John W, 
 Shields, George H. Perry, Dr. S. S. Stambaugh, Miss Fran- 
 ces Pratt (the "Spanish woman"), and her mother, Mrs. 
 Josephine Pratt. 
 
 The burden of proof is upon the party alleging insanity 
 or insane delusion. The reports have rarely furnished a 
 case in which the weight of evidence is stronger in favor
 
 Estate of IngRxVM. 231 
 
 of such an allegation than the one here presented. That 
 the testatrix was under an insane delusion with regard to 
 the "Spanish woman," which delusion controlled her in 
 disposing of her property, and that that delusion was fos- 
 tered by Dr. Hatch, I have no manner of doubt. It seems 
 to me impossible to go through the evidence, upon a re- 
 examination, without reaffirming the conviction that I sug- 
 gested when the case was submitted, that the testatrix was 
 the victim of an insane delusion, of which the instrument 
 here propounded was the offspring. There is not an atom 
 of evidence that her husband was unfaithful, not an iota of 
 testimony that the young woman, Miss Pratt, the "Span- 
 ish woman," was the cause of the jealousy of the decedent, 
 and, as all the counsel conceded at the trial, there is the 
 highest degree of improbability that she should have been 
 the active cause of provoking the jealousy with regard to 
 Ingram ; moreover it does appear, without contradiction, 
 that she was a total stranger to all the parties concerned, 
 and an innocent victim of a most extraordinary persecu- 
 tion. The deceased testatrix had absolutely nothing upon 
 which to base her suspicion of the infidelity of her husband, 
 and of the complicity of Miss Pratt, and the testimony of 
 I\Irs. Humphreys weighs not even a feather in the scale 
 against the overwhelming evidence to the contrary; there 
 is not, as counsel for proponent insists, in favor of this 
 theory, even one of those 
 
 "Trifles ligbt as air, which 
 Are, to the jealous, confirmation strong 
 As proofs of holy writ." 
 
 — Othello, Act III, Scene 3. 
 
 There was every reason, in the natural order, why In- 
 gram should have been the object of her bounty. The 
 testimony of most of the witnesses, disinterested and un- 
 impeached, was to the effect that she had contracted this 
 otherwise incongruous and unnatural alliance in order to 
 secure to her and her deceased husband's adopted child 
 "hi.s rights of property." (See testimony, uncontradicted, 
 of witnesses for contestant.) Amid all her vagaries and 
 eccentricities there stood out, in clear lines, affection for 
 this young man; nothing but the wholly imaginary "Span-
 
 232 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 ish woman" interfered with her intention to make him the 
 beneficiary of her bounty, and it would be a "judicial out- 
 rage," as intimated by one of the counsel, to defeat that 
 marital purpose. The "Spanish woman" was a myth, a 
 sheer delusion, a creature of diseased imagination, now, in 
 the light of legal evidence, entirely dissipated. 
 
 2. Was the testatrix unduly influenced to make this will? 
 
 A will produced by undue influence cannot stand. Un- 
 due influence is any kind of influence, either through fear, 
 coercion or importunity, by which the testator is prevented 
 from expressing his true mind. A question of this kind is 
 not likely to arise, except in regard to persons of naturally 
 weak, mind or facile disposition, or where such has become 
 their condition, either from age or disease. It must, of 
 course, be an influence adequate to control the free agency 
 of a testator. It is very properly said: "A testator should 
 enjoy full liberty and freedom in making his will, and pos- 
 sess the power to withstand all contradiction and control. 
 That degree, therefore, of importunity or undue influence 
 which deprives the testator of his free agency, which is such 
 as he is too weak to resist, and will render the instrument 
 not his free and unconstrained act, is sufficient to invalidate 
 it." 
 
 I have a legal right to ask of a person making his will, 
 that he direct his property to go in any given channel, I 
 may even urge and importune him, and if he has sufficient 
 strength of mind to determine for himself the will is good^ 
 even though he adopt my suggestion ; but if I ask or im- 
 portune a weak mind, one exhausted by disease or otherwise, 
 to such an extent that he do not have sufficient strength of 
 mind to determine for himself, so that the proposed script 
 expresses my views and wishes rather than his own, it is 
 not his will. If the testatrix had sufficient memory and in- 
 telligence to fairly and rationally comprehend the effect of 
 whp,t she was doing, to appreciate her relations to the nat- 
 ural objects of her bounty, and understand the character 
 and effect of the provisions of the will; if she had a reason- 
 able understanding of the nature of the property she wished 
 to dispose of, and of the persons to whom, and the manner in 
 which she wished to distribute it, and did so express her-
 
 Estate of Ingram. 233 
 
 self, it is good. It is not necessary that she should have 
 acted without prompting. Importunity or influence, to have 
 the effect of invalidating a will, must be in such a degree 
 as to take away her free agency. 
 
 The question here is, whether at the time of executing this 
 will Hannah G. Ingram was free to do as she pleased, or 
 whether she was then so far under the influence of Junius 
 L. Hatch that the will is not the act and will of Hannah G. 
 Ingram, but is the will of Junius L. Hatch. 
 
 Undue influence has been defined by our code (Civ. Code, 
 1575) to consist: 
 
 1. In the use, by one in whom confidence is reposed by 
 another, or who holds a real or apparent authority over him, 
 of such confidence or authority for the purpose of obtaining 
 an unfair advantage over him. 
 
 2. In taking an unfair advantage of another's weakness 
 of mind; or, 
 
 3. In taking a grossly oppressive and unfair advantage 
 of another's necessities or distress. 
 
 On this point evidence must often be indirect and circum- 
 stantial. Naturally, persons who intend to control the actions 
 of another, especially in the matter of the execution of wills, 
 do not proclaim that intent. Very seldom does it occur 
 that a direct act of influence is patent. The existence of 
 influence must generally be gathered from circumstances, 
 such as whether the testatrix had formerly intended a differ- 
 ent disposition of her property ; whether she was surrounded 
 by those having an object to accomplish to the exclusion of 
 others; whether she was of such weak mind as to be subject 
 to influence; whether the paper offered as a will is such a 
 paper as would probably be urged upon her by the persons 
 surrounding her; w^hether they are benefited thereby to the 
 exclusion of formerly intended beneficiaries. 
 
 Undue influence can rarely be proved by direct and posi- 
 tive testimony. It may be inferred from the nature of the 
 transaction, from the true state of the affections of the tes- 
 tatrix, from groundless suspicions against members of her 
 family, if any such have been proved, and from all the sur- 
 rounding circumstances.
 
 234 Coffey ^s Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 Undue influence may be defined to be that kind of influence 
 or supremacy of one mind over another by which that other 
 is prevented from acting- according to his own wish or 
 judgment. A testator should enjoy full liberty and freedom 
 in making his will and possess the power to withstand all 
 contradiction and control. 
 
 That degree, therefore, of importunity or influence which 
 deprives the testator of his free agency, which is such as 
 he is too weak to resist, and which renders the instrument 
 not his free and unrestrained act, is sufficient to invalidate it. 
 
 It is only that degree of influence which deprives the tes- 
 tator of his free agency, and makes the will more the act of 
 others than of himself, which will avoid it. 
 
 Neither advice, nor argument, nor persuasion would 
 vitiate a will made freely and from conviction, though such 
 will might not have been made but for such advice and per- 
 suasion. 
 
 Undue influence must not be such as arises from the 
 influence of gratitude, affection or esteem ; biit it must be 
 the control of another will over that of the testator, whose 
 faculties have been so impaired as to submit to that control, 
 so that he has ceased to be a free agent, and has quite 
 succumbed to the power of the controlling will. 
 
 Pressure of whatever character, if so exerted as to over- 
 power the volition without convincing the judgment, is a 
 species of constraint under which no valid will could be 
 made. 
 
 Undue influence may also be defined as that which compels 
 the testator to do that which is against his will through fear 
 or a desire of peace, or some feeling which he is unable to 
 resist, and but for which the will would not have been made 
 as it was. 
 
 The testator may have known what he was about when 
 ,he made the will, and may have had sufficient capacity to 
 make it; this may be true, and still, if his mind were not 
 free to act, if it was constrained to act, or if it had become 
 submissive to the will of another who then exercised the 
 commanding control over the testator, by reason of which 
 freedom of thought and action in making the will was
 
 Estate of Ingram. 235 
 
 suppressed, under such circumstances the will should be 
 declared invalid. 
 
 Considering together the two issues of mental soundness, 
 and unsoundness and undue influence, it must be noted that 
 although mere weakness of intellect does not prove undue 
 influence, yet it may be that, in that feeble state, the testator 
 more readily and easily becomes the victim of the improper 
 influences of unprincipled and designing persons who see 
 fit to practice upon him. 
 
 It may be necessary to consider what degree of influence 
 will vitiate a will, and this depends upon the capacity, in 
 other respects, of the testator. What would be an undue 
 influence on one man would be no influence at all on another. 
 A man of strong will, whose mind is in its wonted vigor, 
 could not be shown to have been influenced by what might 
 be such influence as to wholly invalidate the will of one 
 whose mind has been weakened by sickness, dissipation, or 
 age. 
 
 But as well in the case of the sick, dissipated, or aged, as 
 in that of one in health and vigor ; in the case of him whose 
 intellect is weak, as of him whose mind is strong, that influ- 
 ence which will be sufficient to invalidate a will must be such 
 as, in some degree or to some extent, to deprive the party 
 affected thereby of his free agency, and to make the will 
 not the product of his own untrammeled thoughts: Com- 
 stock v. Hadylone etc. Society, 8 Conn. 254, 20 Am. Dec. 100. 
 
 In all cases of this kind the validity of the will depends 
 more upon the abuse of a controlling influence than upon 
 the fact of its existence ; more upon the fact that the testator 
 was not fairly dealt with, and not left free to pursue his 
 own natural and healthful instincts and reasonable desires, 
 than that the person benefited by the will had the power to 
 control such will. 
 
 It need not be proved that there was actual exercise of 
 influence at the point of time the will was executed. 
 
 Influence at any time, the effect of which was to produce 
 the M'ill without the fair concurrence of the mind of tlio 
 testator, is sufficient to void the will.
 
 236 Coffey ^s Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 But the exercise of undue influence must be upon the 
 very act of making the will ; and must be proved, and cannot 
 be inferred from opportunit}^ and interest. 
 
 Undue influence must be an influence exercised in relation 
 to the will itself, not in relation to other matters or transac- 
 tions. But this principle must not be carried too far. 
 When it is seen that, at and near the time when the will 
 sought to be impeached was executed, the alleged testatrix 
 was, in other important transactions, so under the influence 
 of the persons benefited by the will, that as to them she was 
 not a free agent, but was acting under undue control, the 
 circumstances may be such as to fairly warrant the conclusion, 
 even in the absence of evidence bearing directly on the 
 execution of the will, that in regard to the will also the 
 same influence was exercised. 
 
 We should be satisfled by a comparison of the will in 
 all its provisions, and under all the exterior influences which 
 were brought to bear upon its execution, with the maker of 
 it as she then was, that such a will could not be the result 
 of the free and uncontrolled action of such a person so oper- 
 ated upon, before it can be declared invalid. 
 
 All influence is not undue influence. The procuring a 
 will to be made, unless by foul means, is nothing against its 
 validity. A man may by fair argument and persuasion, or 
 even by flattery, induce another to make a will, and even to 
 make it in his favor. 
 
 If the testator act upon the suggestion of others, this will 
 not invalidate the will, if there be no evidence of improper 
 dealing or undue influence. 
 
 On this subject no distinct or precise line can be drawn. 
 It is enough to say, that the influence exercised must be an 
 unlawful importunity on account of the manner or mode of 
 its exertion, and by reason of which the testatrix's mind 
 was so embarrassed and restrained in its operation that she 
 was not mistress of her own opinions in respect to the dispo- 
 sition of her estate. The only inquiry for the court is, was 
 the testatrix, from infirmity or age, or other cause, constrained 
 to act against her will, to do that which she was unable to 
 refuse by importunity or threats, or any other way, by which
 
 Estate of Ingram. 237 
 
 one acquires dominion and control over another? If so, va- 
 lidity of the will may be impeached. 
 
 It is not possible to define or describe with exactness 
 what influence amounts to undue influence in the sense 
 of the law; this can only be done in general and approxi- 
 mate terms. In each case the decision must be arrived at 
 by application of these general principles to the special 
 facts and surroundings in the case. 
 
 No influence can be considered as undue influence which 
 does not overpower the inclinations and judgment of the 
 testatrix, and induce a disposition of her property contrary 
 to her own wishes and desires. 
 
 Undue influence cannot be presumed, but must be proved 
 in each case; and the burden of proving it lies on the party 
 alleging it. 
 
 Undue influence is not a presumption, but a conclusion 
 from the facts and circumstances proved. 
 
 In Children's Aid Society v. Loveridge (70 N. Y. 387), 
 Miller, J., said: 
 
 "The position of the contestant is that the execution of 
 the will was procured by the exercise of undue influence on 
 the part of those who were the beneficiaries, and who, at the 
 very time of the making of the same, were possessed of her 
 confidence and surrounded her. 
 
 "In order to avoid a will upon any such ground, it must 
 be shown that the influence exercised amounted to a moral 
 coercion which restrained independent action and destroyed 
 free agency, or which, by importunity which could not be re- 
 sisted, constrained the testatrix to do that which was against 
 her will, but which she was unable to refuse or too weak to 
 resist. 
 
 ' ' It must not be the promptings of affection ; the desire of 
 irratifving the wishes of another; the ties of attachment 
 arising from consanguinity, or the memory of kind acts and 
 friendly offices, but a coercion produced by importunity, or 
 by a silent, resistless power which the strong will often 
 exercise over the weak and infirm, and which could not be 
 resisted, so that the motive was tantamount to force or fear. ' '
 
 238 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 To sum up the elements which go to constitute undue 
 influence, the facts proved must be such as: 
 
 1. To destroy the freedom of the will of testatrix, and 
 thus render her act obviously more the offspring of the will 
 of others than of her own. 
 
 2. That it must be an undue influence specially directed 
 toward the object of procuring a will in favor of the par- 
 ticular parties. 
 
 3. If any degree of free agency or capacity remained in 
 the testatrix, so that when left to herself she was capable 
 of making a valid will, then the influence w^iich so controls 
 her as to render her making a will of no effect, must be 
 such as was intended to mislead her to the extent of making 
 a will essentially contrary to her duty; and it must have 
 proved successful to some extent, certainly : 1 Redfield on 
 Wills, 523, 524; 1 Jarman on Wills ; Reynolds v. Root, 62 Parb. 
 250 ; 2 Phill. 449-451 ; Gardiner v. Gardiner, 34 N. Y. 155 ; 
 Saunders' Appeal, 54 Conn. 108, 6 Atl. 185; Disbrow's Estate, 
 58 Mich. 96, 24 N. W. 624 (see notes to this case, p. 629) ; 
 Maynard v. Vinton, 59 Mich. 139, 60 Am. Rep. 27, 26 N. 
 W. 401; Estate of Tittel, Myr. 16; Estate of Black, Myr. 
 31 ; Waterman v. Whitney, 11 N. Y. 165, 62 Am. Dec. 71. 
 
 Having stated these legal propositions, their application 
 to the facts in controversy remains to be seen. Had Mrs. 
 Ingram, at the time this instrument was executed, sufficient 
 memory to fairly and rationally comprehend the effect of 
 what she was doing? Did she understand and appreciate her 
 relations to her husband and her relatives ? And did she un- 
 derstand the character and effect of the provisions of the will ? 
 Did she have a reasonable understanding of the nature of 
 the property to be disposed of, and of the persons to whom 
 she wished to distribute it? Did she exercise her own choice 
 and did she express her own wishes? If she did have such 
 understanding, she had the legal right to make any disposition 
 of her property that she pleased. 
 
 If she acted freely and with proper understanding, she 
 had a legal right to ignore her husband and all her kin 
 — "to cut them off with a shilling"— and send her property 
 to strangers. Neither courts nor juries can say whether
 
 Estate of Ingram. 239 
 
 this legacy or that is a prudent or wise one to make; 
 by attempting to do so we should attempt to make our will 
 take the place of that of the testatrix. Such an instrument 
 should not be lightly set aside. It is only when the court is 
 brought irresistibly to the conclusion, from the evidence, that 
 the will proffered for probate was procured by the applica- 
 tion of a dominant and controlling intelligence to an inferior 
 understanding or a feebler will in an improper manner, that 
 the instrument will be declared void. 
 
 The proponent of this instrument, Junius L. Hatch, is a 
 keen, shrewd, cool man of a large and varied experience 
 and extensive worldly knowledge, a fair judge of human 
 nature, with quick perceptions of the. weak points of his 
 fellow-mortals ; ready to seize advantages, and steadfast in 
 holding on; in address plausible, in deportment perfect, in 
 manner insinuating, in aspect benevolent ; in all exterior 
 attributes calculated to secure the trust of a woman whose 
 mind was weakened by the natural advance of senility and 
 tainted by the disease of jealousy. 
 
 Take such a man, as his counsel describes him, with his 
 manner and demeanor, and everything bearing the impress 
 of truth ; his actions invested with the appearance of honesty, 
 his utterance sympathetic and apparently sincere ; an out- 
 ward seeming of candor, calmness and consistency; qualities 
 which indicated a man of humane heart, kindly nature and 
 disinterested disposition. It was natural he should have 
 made a deep impression upon the morbid mind of this aged 
 woman. Once he discovered the vulnerable point in her 
 character, he operated adroitly and persistently. As against 
 the clever intrigues of such a man, the imperfect intellect 
 and infirm purpose of the youthful husband of this old lady 
 had no prospect of success. From the moment Junius L. 
 Hatch first met Hannah G. Ingram, the young husband was 
 deposed, his authority was gone, and to it succeeded the para- 
 mount influence of a will strong and resolute, an intelligence 
 always alert and vigilant in the prosecution of the design 
 to gain the confidence and to control the fortune of Hannah 
 G. Ingram. Between these two men there is the strongest 
 contrast of character and culture. The career of Hatch was
 
 240 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 that of a man of great adaptability to changing circumstances. 
 At this time, in his sixty-second year, he has been actively 
 employed in the ministry of the gospel, in the civil service 
 of the government, in the profession of a school teacher, 
 also as a journalist, being both an editorial writer and a 
 newspaper reporter. The title of "doctor," b}^ which he is 
 often described, he disclaims. He was regularly ordained at 
 Gloucester, Massachusetts, and for several years had charge 
 of a Congregational church. Changing his religious views, 
 he became a Unitarian minister, and accepted a settlement 
 over a Unitarian church in Massachusetts and in New Hamp- 
 shire, which he retained for about ten years. The last charge 
 he undertook was in San Jose in 1882, which charge he vol- 
 untarily relinquished, because of inadequacy of remuneration. 
 Subsequently he taught in the public schools, and privately, 
 for a number of years. Thereafter he became a clerk in the 
 custom-house of this port, and finally engaged in journal- 
 ism, which is his present occupation. 
 
 It was while plying his vocation as a journalist, acting as 
 a reporter for the "Morning Call" newspaper, that he first 
 encountered Mrs. Ingram, pending an inquiry into her sanity 
 in this court and department. He was sent by his employer 
 to interview her, to ascertain if, according to his opinion, 
 she was insane. Upon that occasion he had an hour's inter- 
 view with her. He called again the next day, and after that 
 saw her every day or two for several weeks. These visits 
 were made, according to his story, at her special instance and 
 request. Complying with her desire, he wrote articles to 
 correct public opinion as to her case, which articles he caused 
 to be inserted in various newspapers. His visits were con- 
 tinued by her wish, because she felt she needed a friend for 
 counsel and advice, and she had confidence in Dr. Hatch. 
 Their relations became very friendly and confidential. She 
 visited his family sometimes, and occasionally his daughter 
 visited her, and she expressed herself as grateful for the 
 kindness of his daughter in sending her delicacies during her 
 illness. 
 
 Dr. Hatch was assiduous in his attentions to Mrs. Ingram 
 being sometimes as frequent in his visitations as three or
 
 Estate of Ingram. 241 
 
 four times a day, and the result of his visits seems to have 
 been a fastening of the delusion in her mind that her husband 
 was unfaithful to her, principally with the "Spanish 
 woman," otherwise Miss Pratt. 
 
 It is in evidence that Dr. Hatch himself said that he had 
 no doubt that there was truth in the "Spanish woman's" 
 story; that he had followed it up and found some basis for 
 it; and he also declared to one of the witnesses (see evidence 
 of George H. Perry) that Ingram was a lazy, shiftless 
 fellow, and that he had abused his wife. 
 
 "While he denies that he ever said or did anything to 
 encourage her in her impressions about her husband, it is 
 diiiicult to reconcile this statement with the declarations just 
 adverted to, made to witness Perry, and with the strain and 
 tenor of the letter from him, dated San Francisco, January 
 28, 1886, to Ingram. 
 
 (See Exhibit "F," a printed copy of which is here 
 inserted, as well as the letter to which it is an answer.) 
 
 Exhibit "D." 
 
 The first letter from Ingram to Rev. Dr. Hatch reads: 
 
 "San Francisco, Jan. 22d, 1886. 
 
 "Mr. Hatch: — The snake in the grass, you are a lier, a 
 villian and a coward of the deepest die. You put a piece 
 in the papers about me, and you lied when you did it. You 
 have been trying to seperate me and my wife by lieing to 
 her about the Spanish woman, you are a dam lier of the worst 
 kind. I defy you or anyone to prove that I know that Spanish 
 woman or had anything to do with her you are trying to 
 separate my wife and me so you can get hold of her proporate. 
 I tell you, you shall not get hold of her proporate as long 
 as I live. I am not afraid of you or your kind in Court or out. 
 I will make your grey hairs stand on ends when I get you 
 in Court. You dare not tell me to my face what you are and 
 have been telling in this city about me. they know you are 
 after my wife properately and lieing about me and now do 
 your damist you are a black villian and a coward and a pre- 
 tendend friend, you mean low life scoundle you can fine 
 me at 754 Folsom st at night or at Scott and Clay st in the 
 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. I — 16
 
 242 Coffey ^s Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 day time. I defy you to face me like a man and tell to my 
 face the lies you are telling I will handle you Hatch in a 
 differend way that I did Abbott which will be in Court I will 
 fight you face to face in any proceeding that you wish to 
 take I am working steady and am not a loafer as you say I 
 am. You mean low life villian you will have to prove all those 
 things if you do not think I can put you behind with your 
 grey hairs behind the bars as people has been trying to do 
 with me. I defy you to starte in. 
 
 "From JOHN W. INGRAM, 
 
 "754 Folsom st." 
 
 Exhibit "F." 
 
 The answer of Rev. Dr. Hatch to Ingram's epistle reads; 
 
 "San Francisco, January 28, 1896. 
 
 ' ' John W. Ingram : — Your very abusive and insulting let- 
 ter is really unworthy of notice or reply, but I have con- 
 cluded to answer it so far as to remind you that you have 
 never received anything but kindness from me, and to say 
 that your language to me is, therefore, particularly dis- 
 creditable to you. 'Ingratitude is a monster,' and you are 
 certainly monstrously ungrateful for the many favors I have 
 done you, from the day I first saw you behind the bars in 
 the city prison, to the last time, when I gave you money to 
 pay for food and lodging. 
 
 "Have you forgotten who it was that exerted himself 
 to assist your wife's heroic efforts to save you from a fel- 
 on's cell at San Quentin, where, but for us, you would 
 probably at this time be wearing motley prison garb and 
 serving out a sentence of fourteen years? Have you for- 
 gotten that when there was a possibility that you might be 
 let off with a fine of $500 — I say, have you forgotten who it 
 was stood ready with his $500 to pay that fine? And when 
 you had to go to jail, instead, have you no recollection who 
 bought a bed .and other things to make you comfortable? 
 And, when Mrs. Ingram could not be admitted after hours, 
 who used his privilege as a reporter to carry you in food, 
 fruit, etc.? 
 
 "Is it possible, Ingram, that your memory is so treach- 
 erous and that you have really forgotten also the many
 
 Estate of Ingram. 243 
 
 favors I have done you since your discharge, taking your 
 property out of pawn repeatedly; letting you have money 
 as you needed, and, when you had no work, going round 
 to one shop after another to get it for you? Or is it pos- 
 sible that, with all these favors in your mind, as you have 
 repeatedly acknowledged them to me in the strongest terms, 
 declaring that you would never, never forget my kindness, 
 would return it whenever you could, and be my friend for 
 life, you turn on me in this abusive way ? You remind me of 
 the venomous reptile the farmer found almost dead with 
 cold in the field. ]Moved with compassion, he carried it home 
 and w^armed it at his hearth, when it turned its fangs on its 
 benefactor and stung him for his pains. 
 
 "But why should I expect you to be grateful to me when 
 you have been ungrateful to your generous and long-suffer- 
 ing wife? Why kind to me when you have been so cruel 
 to her, who has done so much more for you than I ? You 
 falsely charge me with having tried to separate you and her. 
 On the contrary, I have always tried, when you had es- 
 tranged her from you by your bad conduct and your ex- 
 asperating taunts about being 'crazy,' etc.; I have tried, I 
 say, to smooth over matters and keep you together. You 
 pretend to think me actuated by mercenary and selfish mo- 
 tives — judging me by yourself, probably, for you have 
 thrown off the mask now completely, and in the letter you 
 wrote me, as well as in the letter you wrote her, you show 
 clearly that your great anxiety is to get hold in some way 
 of her property, which she is determined you shall never do^ 
 after treating her as you have, and I cannot blame her for 
 it. 
 
 "Instead of going to work and keeping to work and re- 
 paying her, as you promised, a part at least of the expense 
 you had been to her, you have not earned your board since 
 you got out of jail, but have been au additional expense 
 and burden to her. 
 
 "I did not call you a 'loafer,' but I did say you seemed 
 to prefer to live on your wife's slender income without 
 work rather than to work and earn your own living, and 
 I say so still.
 
 244 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 "The proposition you have repeatedly made to her that 
 you would go to work and give her your wages if she would 
 deed the property to you, or have the deed made out in your 
 names together, shows your disposition plainly enough. If 
 you had not been so greedy and avaricious, you would have 
 fared much better, probably. With regard to what you say 
 of the woman Pratt, Mrs. Ingram showed me a note, written 
 by you while you were in jail, acknowledging that what she 
 (Mrs. Ingram) had said about the woman and of your re- 
 lations with her (Pratt) was all true, and at her request I 
 carried an item to that effect to the paper. She has that 
 note in her possession still, and the handwriting is unmis- 
 takably yours. You have made the last year and more of 
 your wife's life very unhappy, and the disease under which 
 she is now suffering severely, and which may terminate 
 fatally, I have every reason to believe was brought on by 
 mental worry on your account. I have done all I could for 
 her comfort and relief, and shall continue to do as long as 
 she lives. I have never given her an unkind word or wor- 
 ried her by an unkind act. It were well for your peace of 
 mind, methinks, if you could say the same. She does not 
 wish to see you at present, and has enjoined me not to in- 
 form you where she is, lest you should trouble and annoy 
 her, as you did the last time she saw you. When she wishes 
 to see you I will notify you, and she can tell you, if she 
 has not already told you, that I have never sought to influ- 
 ence her against you, or with regard to the disposition of 
 her property. 
 
 "I hold a note signed jointly by you and her for one 
 hundred and some odd dollars, on which she has paid me 
 sixty dollars. The remainder you promised to pay from 
 your earnings, with other moneys advanced since you were 
 living with her on O'Farrell and Polk streets. You kept 
 an account of this, I believe, and, if I am not mistaken, it 
 amounts to about thirty dollars. You owe me five dollars 
 more on your watch chain, which I took out of pawn for 
 the third time, and which I hold as security for the debt. 
 If you mean to be honest with me you will pay me out of 
 your wages as soon as you can. I will charge you no in- 
 terest if you do that, and will hold the chain for you.
 
 Estate of Ingram. 245 
 
 "I am glad you are at work, as you say your are, and 
 hope you will keep at it, and show by your future con- 
 duct that you are determined to redeem your character, 
 and live so that you will have no occasion to be ashamed 
 of yourself in the future. If any person, man or woman, 
 advises you to any other course, and tries to induce you to 
 attempt to get possession of your wife's property, by force 
 or by fraud, or in any way except with her free will and 
 consent, on the ground of affection and regard, such per- 
 son is a poor counselor, and your enemy instead of your 
 friend. J. L. HATCH. 
 
 "P. S.— At Mrs. Ingram's request, I read the letter you 
 sent me, and also the one you sent her, to her, and I have 
 also read to her this reply. She says I have spoken the 
 truth, but have put it more mildly than she would have done 
 if w'riting to you. You have my permission to read this let- 
 ter to Mrs. Fitzgerald and her niece, or any others. 
 
 "J. L. H." 
 
 The association between Dr. Hatch and Mrs. Ingram, 
 under the circumstances, was extraordinarily confidential 
 In all his intercourse wdth her he appears to have been 
 her business adviser, and to have been substituted in her 
 confidence, if not in her afi^ections, for her husband. He 
 controlled her movements; when her husband was in jail 
 she communicated with him through Hatch; when she was 
 finally taken sick — so sick that she had to be carried to the 
 German Hospital — Dr. Hatch was still sedulous in his at- 
 tentions to her, and in his supervision over her affairs. It 
 was he who took her to the hospital, where, it appears, she. 
 never saw her husband. There she lay prostrated by dis>--. 
 tressing corporal maladies ; she had liver trouble, liver ob- . 
 siruction, and jaundice, to which diseases she succumbed on 
 the 1st of February, 1886. From the day he became ac- 
 quainted with her, in December, 1884, to the day of her 
 death, Dr. Hatch never lost sight or control of Mrs. Ingram. 
 This is the tenor of the testimony. In all her various lodg- 
 ing places he was her most frequent visitor ; his interviews ; 
 were commonly out of the presence of her husband; even 
 when Ingram was in the house, his wife and Hatch woulci^
 
 246 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 have their interview without his presence (testimony of Mrs. 
 Golden) ; and it is in evidence that whereas, before Dr. 
 Hatch's visit, she would be very friendly with her husband, 
 or "Johnnie," as she was accustomed to call him, after 
 Hatch's departure her manner toward "Johnnie" would 
 change (testimony of Mrs. Carpenter). Her talk about the 
 imaginary "Spanish woman" became, also, more pronounced 
 at these times; "she said if her husband had not run with 
 the 'Spanish woman,' she would leave it all (her property) 
 to him." 
 
 That Dr. Hatch did not discourage her in the entertain- 
 ment of this delusion as to the "Spanish woman" is shown 
 by the letter to Ingram, Exhibit "F," hereinbefore in- 
 serted. In this most extraordinary effusion, in reply to In- 
 gram's accusation (Exhibit "D") that he (Hatch) had 
 been trying to separate Ingram and wife by lying to her 
 about the "Spanish woman," so he (Hatch) could get hold 
 of the property, Hatch says: "With regard to what you say 
 of the woman Pratt, Mrs. Ingram showed me a note written 
 by you while you were in jail, acknowledging that what she 
 (Mrs. Ingram) had said about the woman and of your re- 
 lations with her (Pratt) was all true, and at her request 
 I carried an item to that effect to the paper. She has that 
 note in her possession still, and the handwriting is unmis- 
 takably yours." This note, the authorship of which is here 
 imputed to Ingram, but which is denied by him, was not 
 produced on the trial. It was not found among her papers, 
 and its nonproduction is significant. In the same connec- 
 tion the postscript to this letter from Hatch is noteworthy. 
 "P. S. — At Mrs. Ingram's request, I read the letter you 
 sent me, and also the one you sent her, to her; and I have 
 also read to her this reply. She says I have spoken the 
 truth, but have put it more mildly than she would have done 
 if writing to you." 
 
 Whatever may be said of Dr. Hatch's letter. Exhibit 
 "F," it can hardly be accused of drawing it mild. This 
 letter certainly speaks for itself, and it is of great conse- 
 quence in showing the closeness of his relation to and the 
 strength of his influence over the wife of Ingram. What 
 was the object of his frequent visits to Mrs. Ingram? It
 
 Estate of Ingram. 247 
 
 was all business. Although, by virtue of his sacerdotal call- 
 ing, he might have administered to her spiritual consolation, 
 no hint of such ministration is shown by the evidence; no 
 such suggestion is contained in the letter to Ingram (Ex- 
 hibit "F") ; nowhere does it appear that in Dr. Hatch's 
 mind was there aught but business; "property" is his over- 
 mastering idea, his ruling thought in all his intercourse and 
 correspondence with the Ingrams. In his letter to Ingram 
 (Exhibit "F") he says: "If any person, man or woman, 
 advises you to any other course, and tries to induce you to 
 get possession of your wife's property, by force or by fraud, 
 or in any way except with her free will and consent, on the 
 ground of affection and regard, such person is a poor coun- 
 selor, and your enemy instead of your friend. ' ' In this curi- 
 ous contribution to the literature of will contests, it is diffi- 
 cult to discern the spiritual element. It is of the earth, 
 «arthy. 
 
 But how came the will into existence? One day, about 
 the middle of February, 1885, according to Dr. Hatch's 
 testimony, he called upon Mrs. Ingram; she gave him some 
 "specifications" from which he was to draw up the form; 
 lie did so, he did not write the specifications. Who did? 
 His son, William K. Hatch, a young man of twenty-one 
 years of age, who never thitherto had drawn a will — a bag- 
 gage and brakeman on the railroad — it was this inexperi- 
 -enced youth who was selected to take down the "memo- 
 randa" from which the will was elaborated. He purchased 
 the blank form, and from the "specifications" or "memo- 
 randa" the will was drawn by Junius L. Hatch, the propo- 
 nent, the principal beneficiary, residuary legatee, and execu- 
 tor. Where are the "specifications" or "memoranda"? 
 Their nonproduction must be regarded as important. Who 
 so much interested in their preservation and production as 
 the proponent? It was in his power to preserve this paper; 
 it was his interest to produce it ; and the circumstance that 
 it is not preserved and produced must tell against him. 
 The will itself is filled out in a printed form, the filling be- 
 ing in his handwriting, and the inspection of the paper 
 shows that it was carefully drawn in his interest. If 
 -drawn from the "specifications" dictated by her to a youth
 
 248 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 who had no experience in drawing wills, presumably un- 
 familiar with technical legal terms, it is strange that such 
 exactitude of legal expression should obtain, as is particu- 
 larly shown in the paragraph "Eighthly," in words as fol- 
 lows : " I hereby give, devise and bequeath to Junius L. 
 Hatch, journalist, now of the City and County of San Fran- 
 cisco, my house and lot, No. 1724 Hyde street, including 
 the cottage in the rear, now numbered 1235 Vallejo street; 
 and I do also hereby make the said Junius L. Hatch my 
 residuary legatee." It is hard to believe that this residuary 
 clause came from the lips of the decedent, and was set down 
 in such terms by the inexperienced hand of the young man 
 Avho had never before drawn a will; and the appearance of 
 the script adds to the improbability of such fact, and 
 strengthens the impression that it was the inspiration and 
 the act of the proponent of this instrument. While he dis- 
 claims having anything to do with the dictating of the terms 
 of that instrument, his own son testifies that he (the son) 
 went to Mrs. Ingram at the request of his father, and then 
 from her instructions prepared the "memoranda" for the 
 will. The proponent testifies that before Mrs. Ingram went 
 to Paso Robles Springs, she told him what she had deter- 
 mined to do about her property, because of her husband's 
 infidelity and his ill-treatment of her; she also spoke of the 
 Cloughs, her nephews, and their conduct. 
 
 To corroborate his statements that he had nothing to do 
 with the disposition of the property, he introduces a witness, 
 Dr. Thomas Grant, who testified that he knew Mrs. Ingram, 
 and also Dr. Hatch, the latter of whom lived in the same 
 house for awhile with them. Grant saw Mrs. Ingram on Polk 
 street before she went to Paso Robles Springs, and she said 
 she had everything all fixed in case she did not come back; 
 she left everything to Dr. Hatch, he and his family had 
 been kind to her; only $5 to her husband; he had been 
 unkind to her; all he wanted was her property; he had tried 
 to get her in the asylum; she left $5 each to her nephews; 
 they had been unkind; this was about the sum and substance 
 of what she said to the witness Grant, according to his 
 testimony. She asked him to remember what she told him 
 in case she didn't come back from the springs. Upon the-
 
 Estate of Ingram. 249 
 
 cross-examination of this witness it appeared that his re- 
 lations with Dr. Hatch were quite friendly, and that he 
 went to see Mrs. Ingram at the instance of and in company 
 with him. What was the purpose of this joint visit? Al- 
 though this witness, according to his statement, had been 
 at one time a regular physician, it is many years since he 
 pursued that calling as a profession, and not at all in this 
 city, his nearest connection with the practice being that he 
 deals in medicines in a small way, being occupied at other 
 times in the building of houses, and his medical attentions 
 to Mrs. Ingram were of the slenderest character. 
 
 The conclusion that the court drew from his testimony 
 was that the real object and purpose of his visit to Mrs. 
 Ingram was to substantiate the premeditated plan of the 
 proponent of this will : that Mrs. Ingram was acting of her 
 own volition without restraint exercised by Dr. Hatch or 
 any one else, and upon rational premises as against her 
 husband and her nephews. If the deliberate design of Dr. 
 Hatch were to prepare his proofs in advance for the es- 
 tablishment of this paper as a valid will, he could not have 
 acted with greater care, the vice of his process being the 
 excess of precaution in laying his foundations in some par- 
 ticulars; as, for example, in the case of the witness Grant, 
 and the endeavor to materialize the mythical "Spanish 
 woman"; and for other instances, see his own testimony 
 and that of his son, and the testimony throughout. 
 
 In the infrequent intervals afforded by the other occu- 
 pations of this department, and in the face of interruptions 
 necessarily suffered bj^ and in the discharge of other 
 duties, I have endeavored to make a careful examination 
 and collation of the legal principles applicable to the issues 
 in this case, and a fair statement of the facts adduced in 
 evidence. If there is any omission to comment upon any 
 particular statements of witnesses, it is because I have at- 
 tached more importance to what I have set down than to 
 what I have passed by lightly or omitted to enlarge upon; 
 but upon the whole case, as presented, I do not see how the 
 conclusions can be escaped: (1) That at the time of making 
 this will the testatrix was laboring under an insane delusion, 
 and that this will was the product of that delusion ; and (2)
 
 250 Coffey ^s Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 that she was unduly influenced to make this will in favor of 
 the proponent, Junius L. Hatch, and that, consequently, the 
 instrument here propounded should be and it is refused ad- 
 mission to probate. Let judgment be entered accordingly. 
 
 "An Insane Delusion is the spontaneous production of a diseased 
 mind, leading to the belief in the existence of something which 
 either does not exist or does not exist in the manner believed — a 
 belief which a rational mind would not entertain, yet which is so 
 firmly fixed that neither argument nor evidence can convince to the 
 contrary": Estate of Kendrick, 130 Cal. 360, 62 Pae. 605; Potter 
 V. Jones, 20 Or. 239, 25 Pac. 769, 12 L. E. A. 161; note to People v. 
 Hubert, 63 Am. St. Eep. 30, on insane delusions. A delusion which 
 will destroy testamentary capacity must spring up spontaneously in 
 the mind, without extrinsic evidence of any kind to support it. If 
 it has any foundation in fact, if it has any evidence, however slight, 
 as its basis, it is not an insane delusion. One cannot be said to be 
 under such a delusion if his condition of mind results from a belief 
 or inference, however irrational or unfounded, drawn from the facts 
 which are shown to exist: Estate of Scott, 128 Cal. 57, 60 Pac. 527; 
 In re Cline's Will, 24 Or. 175, 41 Am. St. Eep. 851, 33 Pac. 542; 
 Skinner v. Lewis, 40 Or. 571, 67 Pac. 951, 62 Pac. 523. Moreover, 
 the belief must be real, not simulated; and it must be persistent, 
 not a "fleeting vagary" or a temporary hallucination: Estate of Eed- 
 field, 116 Cal. 637, 48 Pac. 794; Estate of Caleb, 139 Cal. 673, 73 
 Pac. 539. And furthermore, a delusion, to be fatal to the validity 
 of a will, must be operative in the testamentary act: Estate of Eed- 
 field, 116 Cal. 637, 48 Pac. 794; Estate of Dolbeer, 149 Cal. 227, 86 
 Pac. 695. It is not enough that a delusion may exist; its connection 
 with the will must be made manifest, and shown to have influenced 
 its provisions: Potter v. Jones, 20 Or. 239, 25 Pac. 769, 12 L. E. A. 
 161. 
 
 "In ordinary language, a person is said to be under delusion who 
 entertains a false belief or opinion which he has been led to form 
 by reason of some deception or fraud, but it is not every false or un- 
 founded opinion which is in legal phraseology a delusion, nor is 
 every delusion an insane delusion. If the belief or oijinion has no 
 basis in reason or probability, and is without any evidence in its sup- 
 port, but exists without any process of reasoning, or is the sponta- 
 neous ofl^spring of a perverted imagination, and it is adhered to 
 against all evidence and argument, the delusion may be truly called 
 insane; but if there is any evidence, however slight or inconclusive, 
 which might have a tendency to create the belief, such belief is 
 not a delusion. One cannot be said to act under an insane delusion 
 if his condition of mind results from a belief or inference, however
 
 Estate of Ingram. 251 
 
 irrational or unfounded, drawn from facts which are shown to exist": 
 Estate of Scott, 128 Cal. 57, 60 Pac. 527. 
 
 The Undue Influence Which Invalidates a Will must be such as 
 relates to the will itself, and operates upon the testator at the time 
 of his making the will: Estate of Kaufman, 117 Cal. 288, 59 Am. 
 St. Eep. 179, 49 Pac. 191; Estate of Flint, 100 Cal. 391, 34 Pac. 863; 
 Estate of Shell, 28 Colo. 167, 89 Am. St. Eep. 181, 63 Pac. 413, 53 E. 
 E. A. 387; Gwin v. Gwin, 5 Idaho, 271, 48 Pac. 295; Estate of Hol- 
 man, 42 Or. 345, 70 Pac. 908. General influence, not directly brought 
 to bear upon the testamentary act, though strong and controlling, is 
 not enough: Estate of McDevitt, 95 Cal. 17, 30 Pac. 101; Estate of 
 Black, 132 Cal. 392, 64 Pac. 695; Estate of Donovan, 140 Cal. 390, 
 
 73 Pac. 1081; In re Darst's Will, 34 Or. 58, 54 Pac. 947. The in- 
 fluence must be used directly to procure the will, and must amount 
 to coercion destroying the free agency of the testator at the time 
 of the execution of the instrument: Estate of Carpenter, 94 Cal. 406, 
 29 Pac. 1101; Estate of Motz, 136 Cal. 558, 69 Pae. 294; Estate of 
 Keegan, 139 Cal. 123, 72 Pac. 828; Goodwin v. Goodwin, 59 Cal. 561; 
 Hurley v. O'Brien, 34 Or. 58, 54 Pac. 947; Estate of Holman, 42 Or. 
 345, 70 Pac. 908; Waddington v. Busby, 45 N. J. Eq. 173, 14 Am. St. 
 Eep. 706, 16 Atl. 690. 
 
 When a Will is Contested on the Ground of Undue Influence, the 
 burden of proof is generally on the contestant: Estate of Motz, 136 
 Cal. 558, 69 Pac. 294; Estate of Latour, 140 Cal. 414, 73 Pac. 1070, 
 
 74 Pac. 441; Dausman v. Eankin, 189 Mo. 677, 107 Am. St. Eep. 
 391, 88 S. W. 696; note to Eichniond's Appeal, 21 Am. St. Eep. 94- 
 104. See, however. Estate of Holman, 42 Or. 345, 70 Pac. 908. Such 
 influence cannot be inferred merely from opportunity and motive: 
 Herwick v. Langford, 108 Cal. 608, 41 Pac. 701; Estate of Nelson, 
 132 Cal. 182, 64 Pac. 294; Estate of Black, 132 Cal. 392, 64 Pac. 
 695; Estate of Donovan, 140 Cal. 390, 73 Pac. 1081; Estate of Shell, 
 28 Colo. 167, 89 Am. St. Eep. 181, 63 Pac. 413, 53 L. E. A. 387; 
 Hubbard v. Hubbard, 7 Or. 42. But while undue influence is not 
 presumed, still, like fraud, it rarely is susceptible of proof by direct 
 and positive evidence. Hence it is that courts are liberal in allow- 
 ing a wide range of investigation, and permitting the introduction 
 in evidence of all facts and circumstances, even though of slight 
 significance in themselves, which tend to throw light upon the is- 
 sue: Clough V. Clough, 10 Colo. App. 433, 51 Pac. 513; Blackman 
 v. Edsall, 17 Colo. App. 429, 68 Pac. 790; Estate of Shell, 28 Colo. 
 167, 89 Am. St. Eep. 181, 63 Pac. 413, 53 L. E. A. 387; Dausman 
 V. Eankin, 189 Mo. 677, 107 Am. St. Eep. 391, 88 S. W. 696. How- 
 ever, although circumstantial evidence may be suflieient, it must 
 amount to proof; and it has the force of proof only when circum- 
 stances are proved which are inconsistent with the claim that the 
 will was the spontaneous act of the testator: Estate of McDevitt,
 
 252 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 95 Cal. 17, 30 Pac. 101; Estate of Calkins, 112 Cal. 296, 44 Pac. 
 577. 
 
 "The question of undue influence is one of peculiar character; it 
 does not arise until after the death of the one who alone fully 
 knows the influences which have produced the instrument; it does 
 not touch the outward act, the form of the instrument, the signa- 
 ture, the acknowledgment; it enters the shadowy land of the mind 
 
 in search of its condition and processes This opens a broad 
 
 field of inquiry and gives to such a contest over a will a wider 
 scope of investigation than exists in ordinary litigation": Mooney 
 V. Olsen, 22 Kan. 69, approved in Estate of Miller (Utah), 88 Pac. 
 338. For cases considering the sufiiciency of the evidence to estab- 
 lish undue influence, see Estate of Welch, 6 Cal. App. 44, 91 Pac. 
 336; Estate of Carriger, 104 Cal. 81, 37 Pac. 785; Estate of Sil- 
 vany, 127 Cal. 226, 59 Pac. 571; Estate of Kendrick, 130 Cal. 360, 
 62 Pac. 605; Estate of Tibbetts, 137 Cal. 123, 69 Pac. 978; Estate 
 of Calef, 139 Cal. 676, 73 Pac. 539; Estate of Morey, 147 Cal. 495, 
 82 Pac. 57; Ames v. Ames, 40 Or. 495, 67 Pac. 737; Estate of Abel 
 (Nev.), 93 Pac. 227. 
 
 Estate of ELIZABETH D. TRAYLOR, Deceased (No. 2). 
 
 [No. 4,705; decided April 18, 1887.] 
 
 Will. — A Bequest of "Ornaments" is in this case construed to 
 embrace jewelry and "jewels in general." 
 
 Will. — A Bequest of "Her Wardrobe" by the testatrix is held in 
 this case not to include her ' ' ornaments. ' ' 
 
 J. F. Swift, for executors. 
 
 Wm. Thomas, for Louise E. Matthews, legatee. 
 
 Selden S. Wright, for certain absent devisees and legatees. 
 
 D. Wm. Douthitt, for heirs at law. 
 
 J. C. Bates, of counsel with Douthitt, for heirs. 
 
 COFFEY, J. Elizabeth D. Traylor died, leaving a will, 
 duly admitted to probate in this court, November 10, 1885. 
 in which (inter alia) she made a bequest in terms as follows: 
 
 "To my niece, Louise E. Matthews, of this city, I give ten 
 thousand dollars, my piano, sewing machine, finger rings 
 (save the diamond ring I habitually wear), and so many of
 
 Estate of Traylor. 253 
 
 my books, pictures and ornaments (not otherwise bequeathed 
 specifically) as she shall choose to take. I also charge my 
 executors, hereinafter named, to purchase, or otherwise pro- 
 vide for said Louise E. Matthews, a house, such as in their 
 judgment shall best befit her condition in life, and to permit 
 her to furnish the same from the furniture of my home." 
 In a codicil admitted to probate at the same time, she pro- 
 vides that: 
 
 "Mrs. Margaret A. Wilson shall have so much and so 
 many articles of my wardrobe as she shall care to take." 
 
 The question presented is, "What passes to the legatees 
 under the terms "ornaments" and "wardrobe"? 
 1. What are "ornaments"? 
 
 "The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary 
 and grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to use them 
 in another sense can be collected, and that other can be ascer- 
 tained": Civ. Code, sec. 1324. 
 
 "In case of uncertainty arising upon the face of a 
 will, .... the testator's intention is to be ascertained from 
 the words of the will, taking into view the circumstances under 
 which it was made, exclusive of oral declarations ' ' : Civ. 
 Code, sec. 1318. 
 
 We must, in such case, take the will, holding it "by the 
 four corners," and read it in the light of the circumstances 
 surrounding its execution. 
 
 The word "ornaments" is of Latin derivation, and, going 
 to the source for a definition, we find in Andrews' Latin- 
 English Lexicon : 
 
 "Ornamentum, n. (1) Apparatus, accoutrement, equip- 
 ment, furniture, trappings, etc. ; ceterae copiae. orna- 
 menta, praesidia, Cic. Cat. 2, 11, etc. (2) An ornamental 
 equipment, ornament, decoration, embellishment, jewel, 
 trinket; pecuniam, omniaque ornamenta ex fano herculis 
 in oppidum cartuUt, jewels, Caes. B. C. 2, 18; quae 
 (nrhs. praesidio et ornamento est civitati, Caes. B. C. 7, 
 15 ; ipse ornamenta a chorago haec sumpsit, i. e., a dress, 
 costume, Plant, Trin. 4, 2, 16, etc. ; ornamenta trium- 
 pJiaiia constdaria, the insignia of triumphing generals, 
 etc."
 
 254 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 "Worcester defines: 
 "Ornament. (1) Embellishment; decoration; that which 
 adorns or beautifies. 
 
 '^Illustration: I hold every man a debtor to his profession, 
 from the which, as men of course do seek to receive coun- 
 tenance and profit, so ought they of duty to endeavor them- 
 selves, by way of amends, to be a help and ornament there- 
 unto. — Bacon. 
 
 "(2) [Fine Arts.] Any accessory part of a work which 
 has the merit of adding to its beauty or effect. 
 " Illnstration: Pedestals, pediments, draperies, fringes, gar- 
 lands, vases, cameos, utensils of elegant and picturesque 
 form, are the usual subject of ornament in painting. 
 
 —Fairholt." 
 Webster's definition is: 
 
 ' ' That which embellishes ; that which adds grace or beauty ; 
 embellishment; decoration. 
 
 "The ornament of a meek and quiet spirit, which is in the 
 sight of God of great price. — 1 Peter, Hi, 4. 
 
 "Is it for that such outward ornament 
 Was lavished on their sex? — Milton. 
 
 "Ornamental, a. [Lat. as if ornamentalis from ornamen- 
 tum. ] Serving to ornament ; giving additional beauty ; 
 embellishing. 
 "Some think it most orname^ital to wear their bracelets on 
 
 their wrists ; others about their ankles. — Browne." 
 
 There are many terms of frequent occurrence in legacies, 
 in regard to which there have been almost an indefinite 
 number of decisions; but cases generally depend so much 
 upon their peculiar circumstances, and the accompanying 
 context, that one can afford very slight aid toward the deter- 
 mination of another not precisely similar. Thus, the word 
 "jewels" is often brought under discussion, as in Attorney 
 General v. Harley, 5 Russ. 173, where the testatrix directed 
 all her jewels to be sold, except certain rings, and her neck- 
 laces of every description, pearls, garnets, carnelians and 
 watches, which she gave specifically; and it was held that a 
 diamond necklace and cross came under the direction for
 
 Estate of Traylor. 255 
 
 sale, and the pearl necklace passed under the specific be- 
 quest: 2 Redfield on Wills, *123, *124, sec. 13. 
 
 Webster defines: 
 "Jewel, n. 1. An ornament of dress in which the precious 
 stones form a principal part. 
 "Plate of rare device, 
 And jewels of rich and exquisite form. — Shakespeare. 
 
 "Sweet are the uses of adversity, 
 Which, like the toad, ugly and venomous. 
 Wears yet a precious jewel in his head. — Ibidem. 
 
 "2. A precious stone; a gem." 
 
 From a careful study of the will and codicil, and from an 
 elaborate examination of the authorities cited by counsel, I 
 have come to the conclusion that the contention of the attor- 
 ney for the heirs at law (that the word "ornaments" in the 
 bequest "does not apply to jewelry," and is not used in that 
 sense) is not sustainable; and that, applying the canons of 
 construction to this instrument, the court must, and it does, 
 conclude that jewelry, "jewels in general," are within the 
 meaning of the clause "ornament (not otherwise bequeathed 
 specifically) as she shall choose to take." 
 
 2. The second point presented for construction is : What 
 is included in the word "wardrobe," in the bequest to ]\Irs. 
 Margaret A. Wilson? 
 
 Counsel for this legatee argues strenuously that "ward- 
 robe" is a general term and includes "ornaments." Among 
 the authorities relied upon by the ingenious and able counsel 
 was Thomas Carlyle, not generally recognized in controver- 
 sies of this character, but entitled to respect for his skill and 
 exactitude in the use of words. The counsel cited Carlyle 's 
 Sartor Resartus, and I find on pages 25-27 (of the People's 
 Edition, London, Chapman & Hall, see in the [San Francisco] 
 Law Library) reference to Herr Teuf elsdroch 's dissertation 
 on "Clothes," beginning with the remark: 
 
 "The first purpose of clothes was not warmth or decency, 
 but ornament."
 
 256 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 Webster defines wardrobe to be: 
 
 "1. A room or apartment where clothes are kept, or wear- 
 ing apparel is stored ; a portable closet for hanging up clothes. 
 
 "2. Wearing apparel in general; articles of dress or decora- 
 tion." 
 
 In Gooch V. Gooch, 33 Me. 535, it was decided that a 
 watch, which the testator had been in the habit of carrying 
 with his person, did not pass by a bequest of his wearing 
 apparel. We see that, according to Webster, "wardrobe" is 
 "wearing apparel in general," so that the Maine case is in 
 point. As the reasoning of the court in Gooch v. Gooch is 
 applicable, we shall appropriate it to the present purpose. 
 Ihe judge, in delivering his decision, said that if the watch 
 belonged to the plaintiff it must have been given by being 
 included in the words "wearing apparel." It appears that 
 the testator purchased the watch a few years before his death, 
 and generally used it by carrying it upon his person. Words 
 used in wills are to be taken in their common and ordinary 
 sense. The ordinary meaning of wearing apparel is vesture, 
 garments, dress; that which is worn by or appropriated to 
 the person. Ornaments may be so connected and used with 
 the wearing apparel as to belong to it. There are implements, 
 such as pencils and penknives, carried about the person but 
 not connected with the wearing apparel. These are not to 
 be considered as clothing. To which class does a watch 
 belong? It may not properly be called an implement, for 
 it is used merely to look at. Neither is it used as clothing 
 or vesture (wearing apparel or "wardrobe"). The .judge 
 deduced the conclusion that the watch did not pass under the 
 phrase "wearing apparel." 
 
 If the context of the will of Mrs. Traylor did not show 
 clearly that she intended a limitation or restriction of her 
 bequest to articles of bodily vesture, the authorities cited 
 would render the conclusion inevitable, but the terms of the 
 will, in this instance at least, are plain enough to exclude 
 "ornaments" from the bequest of the "wardrobe." 
 
 The Principal Case was Affirmed by the supreme court in 7.5 Cal. 
 189, 16 Pac. 774.
 
 Estate of McLaughlin (No. 2). 257 
 
 Estate of CHARLES McLAUGHLIN, Deceased (No. 2). 
 
 [No. 3,061; decided April .5, 3 887.] 
 
 Probate Court — Jurisdiction. — The Superior Court, sittiag in pro- 
 bate, cannot exercise other than purely probate jurisdiction; its ju- 
 risdiction, as succeeding the powers of the former probate court, is 
 not enlarged. 
 
 Revocation of Probate Because Obtained by Fraud. — The superior 
 court, sitting in probate, has no jurisdiction to revoke the probate 
 of a will because procured by fraud or artifice; the remedy of the 
 party aggrieved is by independent suit in equity. 
 
 Charles McLaughlin died in San Francisco, on December 
 13, 1883, leaving a will, bearing date February 8, 1866, with 
 a codicil executed December 22, 1869. 
 
 The operative portions of the will and codicil made Kate 
 D. McLaughlin, wife of the testator, his sole devisee, legatee 
 and executrix. 
 
 The heirs of the decedent were his widow, above named; 
 a brother, named Michael McLaughlin; a niece, named Mary 
 Grace McLaughlin, and two sisters, named respectively Ellen 
 J. Hogan and Arabella Hinkle. 
 
 On January 9, 188-4, the will was filed, together with a 
 petition for its probate and the appointment of Mrs. Kate 
 D. McLaughlin as executrix. Within due time, the above- 
 named heirs (with the exception of the widow, the petitioner) 
 filed written grounds of opposition to the will and codicil, 
 and to their probate, contesting the same. 
 
 Thereafter, and before the sixteenth day of June, 1884, the 
 opposition on the part of said heirs, was v/ithdrawn by 
 them, and their contest dismissed ; and on the last-named day 
 the will and codicil were admitted to probate, and the peti- 
 tioning widow appointed executrix. 
 
 On June 15, 1885, two of the heirs, Arabella Iliukle and 
 Ellen J. Hogan filed a petition for the revocation of the 
 probate. 
 
 On March 16, 1886, the executrix filed her answer thereto, 
 and on September 18, 1886, the matter came on for hearing. 
 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. I — 17
 
 258 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 It was continued from time to time until October 6, 1886, 
 when the executrix moved for judgment on the pleadings. 
 This motion was met by a counter-motion on the part of the 
 contesting heirs, for leave to file an amended petition. The 
 latter motion was granted and the former denied, and on said 
 day the amended petition was filed. 
 
 On October 26, 1886, the executrix filed her notice of motion 
 to strike out certain portions of the amended petition, specified 
 in the opinion of the court below. The motion was thereafter 
 argued and submitted to the court, and granted on April 6, 
 1887. 
 
 The matter sought to be stricken out, and stricken out — 
 was in substance to the following effect: 
 
 It was alleged that the contestants and the other heirs 
 (excepting the widow) had filed their contest to the will 
 and codicil, and to their probate, in due time, as hereinabove 
 stated. 
 
 That the executrix filed her answer to the contest, and 
 a trial by jury had been demanded, and the widow had 
 been appointed special administratrix until the petition for 
 probate should be determined. 
 
 That certain real estate, of the value of about $200,000, 
 owned by the decedent, was, at the time of his death, held 
 in secret trust by Tully R. Wise, his attorney and the attor- 
 ney for the executrix ; and that at said time certain personal 
 property of the decedent, of the value of about $800,000, 
 was held in trust by his widow, and that this personal prop- 
 erty, as also all books of account, stocks, bonds, etc., of the 
 decedent, passed into the possession of the widow at the 
 time of decedent's death, and remained in her exclusive con- 
 trol until the filing of the inventory on May 11, 1885. 
 
 That the petition for probate alleged the value of the 
 estate to be $1,000,000, while the widow knew it to be of far 
 greater value ; and that she has continuously and persistently 
 concealed its true value from the contestants and the court, 
 and that contestants have had no knowledge or means of 
 knowledge as to its value, except such as the executrix fur- 
 nished them.
 
 Estate of McLaughlin (No. 2) . 259 
 
 That while the contest was pending, the executrix made 
 overtures to contestants and set on foot negotiations to 
 purchase and secure their rights and interests in the estate, 
 as the heirs of deceased. 
 
 That while such negotiations were pending, and for the 
 purpose of acquiring accurate information as to the value of 
 the estate, so as to make a just and intelligible sale of their 
 interests, contestants requested the executrix to furnish them 
 with a statement in writing of the assets and liabilities of 
 the estate. 
 
 That she furnished them a statement showing the value 
 of the estate, over its liabilities, to be about $240,000, a copy 
 of which is attached to the amended petition and made part 
 thereof, marked Exhibit "A." 
 
 That the executrix represented this to be a true and 
 correct exhibit of the actual condition of the estate, and 
 that she further caused it to be represented to contestants 
 that the estate is not large, and is involved in litigation, 
 and that the litigation would consume nearly the whole estate, 
 and in the end it would be worth little or nothing, and that 
 $23,000 was the fair and reasonable value of the interest 
 of each of the contestants as such heirs. 
 
 That the contestant, Ellen J. Hogan, at that time resided 
 in Illinois and was never in California, and was sixty-three 
 years of age ; had no business experience, and was ignorant 
 and illiterate, being unable to read or write, and that con- 
 testants were wholly unacquainted with the character or 
 value or extent of the estate. 
 
 That they relied upon the information given them by the 
 executrix, and so relying and supposing that she had made 
 a full and perfect disclosure of the property of the estate, 
 and had concealed nothing, and induced thereto by her state- 
 ments and representations, contestants consented to sell the 
 whole of their interest in the estate to the widow for $23,000 
 each, and to withdraw and dismiss their contests to the 
 probate of the will and that without reliance upon such 
 statements they would not have done so; and that accordingly 
 they executed a conveyance of their interests and dismissed 
 their contests.
 
 260 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 That thereafter, the executrix returned her inventory, 
 and procured the court, by some means, to appoint as two 
 of the appraisers two persons who were in her employ. 
 
 That on the eleventh day of May, 1885, the inventory and 
 appraisement was filed; that the estate was appraised at 
 $2,476,162.72 by said appraisers. 
 
 That the newspapers of this city and county published the 
 appraised value of the estate, and therefrom contestants for 
 the first time learned that the estate was worth more than 
 $2,000,000 over and above what the executrix had repre- 
 sented its value to be. 
 
 That upon examination of the inventory, contestants 
 learned for the first time of the large and valuable por- 
 tions of the estate held in trust by said Tully R. Wise and 
 by said widow, and that said two appraisers were her em- 
 ployees. 
 
 That the inventory does not contain all the property of 
 the estate, and the appraisement is far below its actual 
 value, and that its real value is upward of $4,000,000. 
 
 The last paragraph sought to be stricken out concludes : 
 
 "By reason of the foregoing facts, it is manifest that the 
 foregoing conveyances from these petitioners to Kate D. Mc- 
 Laughlin, wherein and whereby they conveyed to said Kate 
 D. McLaughlin their interests in the estate of said Charles 
 McLaughlin, were all procurefl by the fraud, imposition and 
 deceit of said Kate D. McLaughlin, and that by reason 
 thereof said conveyances are, as to these petitioners, in 
 equity, null and void." 
 
 S. M. Wilson, L. D. McKisick, for motion. 
 
 D. M. Delmas, J. B. Mhoon and Flournoy & Mhoon, con- 
 tra. 
 
 COFFEY, J. This is a motion to strike out certain por- 
 tions of the amended petition of Arabella Hinkle and Ellen 
 J. Hogan to revoke the probate of the will of Charles Mc- 
 Laughlin, deceased. The parts of the petition which it is 
 proposed to strike out are all of paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, ex- 
 cept lines 20 to 27 inclusive, on the seventh page of the peti- 
 tion, and all of paragraphs 10 and 11, also all of the paper
 
 Estate of McLaughlin (No. 2). 261 
 
 marked Exhibit "A," and annexed to said amended peti- 
 tion and made a part thereof. 
 
 If this motion should prevail, the petition will then con- 
 tain allegations (1) of the time and place of the death of 
 Charles ]\IcLaughlin ; (2) of his residence at the time of 
 his death; (3) the persons interested iii his estate; (4) the 
 value of the property left by him; (5) the filing of the 
 paper purporting to be a will with codicil, and of a petition 
 for the probate thereof, and for the appointmnet of the 
 proponent as executrix; (6) the admission of said paper 
 to probate, and the appointment of the proponent as execu- 
 trix, her qualification as such executrix, and that she con- 
 tinues acting as such executrix: (7) allegations (paragraph 
 12 of amended petition) that said will so probated was not 
 executed, attested and published as required by law; that it 
 was not an olographic will, and was not subscribed at the 
 end thereof by said McLaughlin in the presence of both the 
 attesting witnesses thereto ; that the signature of the said 
 McLaughlin was not acknowledged to said witnesses to have 
 been made by him or by his authority; that the attesting 
 witnesses did not sign their names at the end of said paper 
 at the request of said McLaughlin, or in his presence, or in 
 the presence of each other, or at all; that said will is not 
 the last will of said Charles McLaughlin; that said will was 
 by him in his lifetime revoked; that said will was by said 
 McLaughlin, in his lifetime, torn, canceled, obliterated and 
 destroyed, with the intent and for the purpose of revoking 
 the same; that said will was never published by said Mc- 
 Laughlin as his will; that said will so filed for probate on 
 the 9th of January, 1884, is not the last will of said Mc- 
 Laughlin ; but that he, many years subsequent to the date of 
 said paper, to wit, on the 12th of October, 1878, made, 
 executed and published another and different will, where- 
 by the said IMcLaughlin revoked and annulled the said paper 
 presented and filed on the 9th of January, 1884, by said 
 Kate D. McLaughlin. 
 
 The grounds of the motion nre that each of the first 
 above enumerated portions of the amended petition are 
 irrelevant and redundant within the meaning of section 453 
 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the state of California ;
 
 262 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 and on the further ground, that said portions of said 
 amended petition are wholly immaterial and irrelevant to 
 the proceedings provided for in sections 1327 and 1328 of 
 the Code of Civil Procedure of this state, and contrary to 
 the same, and are not matters of probate, or within the 
 jurisdiction of this court sitting as a court of probate. 
 
 Section 1327, Code of Civil Procedure, reads: "When a 
 will has been admitted to probate, any person interested 
 may, at any time within one year after such probate, con- 
 test the same or the validity of the will. For that purpose 
 he must file in the court in which the will was proved a 
 petition in writing containing his allegations against the 
 validity of the will, or against the sufficiency of the proof, 
 and praying that the probate may be revoked." 
 
 For the purpose of such application he need only put in 
 issue (1) the competency of the decedent to make a last 
 will and testament; (2) the freedom of the decedent at the 
 time of the execution of the will from duress, menace, fraud 
 or undue influence; (3) the due execution and attestation 
 of the will by the decedent, or subscribing witnesses; (4) 
 any other question substantially affecting the validity of the 
 will. 
 
 This court sitting in probate may consider only the 
 will and the sufficiency of the proofs upon its probate. It 
 cannot exercise other than purely probate jurisdiction. If 
 the judgment or order was obtained by the employment of 
 frauds or artifices such as would justify a court of equity in 
 annulling it, the remedy of the party aggrieved is by in- 
 dependent action in equity. The matter has passed beyond 
 the jurisdiction of the superior court as a court of probate: 
 Dean v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. 477. 
 
 The jurisdiction of the superior court, as succeeding to 
 the powers of the probate court, is not enlarged. In such 
 cases courts of equity have jurisdiction to afford proper re- 
 lief; and, if it be true that the probate court was imposed 
 upon, and induced to make a decree which it would not 
 otherwise have done, resort must be had to a court of equity 
 for relief: Estate of Hudson, 63 Cal. 454. 
 
 This is a statutory proceeding for a specific purpose; it 
 has its scope and limitations, and can go no further. The
 
 Estate of McLaughlin (No. 2). 263 
 
 jurisdiction of the probate judge, relating to revocation of 
 probate, is wholly statutory. In exercising the power, he 
 can in no way alter or disregard the provisions of the stat- 
 ute : Pryer v. Clapp, 1 Dem. (N. Y.) 390. 
 
 It follows, therefore, that all the parts of the petition 
 assailed by this motion should be struck out as not within 
 the jurisdiction of this court sitting in probate. Motion 
 granted. 
 
 The Conclusiveness of the Probate of a Will, when attacked on 
 the ground of fraud, is a question that recently has been before 
 the supreme court of California in Estate of Davis, 151 Cal. 318, 121 
 Am. St. Eep. 105, 86 Pac. 183, 90 Pac. 711; Tracy v. Muir, 151 
 Cal. 363, 121 Am. St. Eep. 117, 90 Pac. 832. 
 
 RELIEF IN EQUITY FROM THE ORDERS AND DECREES OF 
 
 PROBATE COURTS. 
 
 The Power of Courts of Equity to Grant Relief from the orders ; 
 and decrees of probate courts, in case of fraud or other ground of ' 
 equitable jurisdiction, has often been recognized, so that it may ! 
 safely be affirmed that the orders and decrees of courts of probate i 
 may, as a rule, be relieved from by independent suits in equity under • 
 the same circumstances, to the same extent, and subject to the same 
 limitations as relief may be had from other judicial determinations: . 
 Shegogg V. Perkins, 34 Ark. 117; Silva v. Santos, 138 Cal. 536, 94 Am.—^ 
 St. Rep. 45, 71 Pac. 703; Gafford v. Dickinson, 37 Kan. 287, 15 Pac. 
 175; Grady v. Hughes, 80 Mich. 184, 44 N. W. 1050; Searles v. Scott, 
 14 Smedes & M. 94; Foute v. McDonald, 27 Miss. 610; Froebrich v. 
 Lane, 45 Or. 634, 106 Am. St. Rep. 634, 76 Pac. 351. Thus equity has 
 jurisdiction to set aside orders in probate procured by the fraudulent 
 suppression of the decedent's will: Ewing v. Lamphere, 147 Mich. 659, 
 118 Am. St. Rep. 563, 111 N. W. 187. 
 
 Decrees Settling Accounts. — The most familiar application of the 
 rule just stated relates to orders and decrees settling the accounts 
 of administrators, executors, and guardians, and of trustees perform- 
 ing analogous duties. These settlements, when once made and ap- 
 proved by courts of competent jurisdiction, have the force of res judi- 
 cata both at law and in equity, and will not be vacated or annulled 
 by courts of equity, except upon the establishment of some well-rec- 
 ognized ground for equitable relief: Alexander v. Alexander, 70 Ala. 
 357. The temptation to fraud is, however, not less in these cases 
 than in others coming before courts, and the opportunity for exer- 
 cising it is much greater than in litigation where all of the parties 
 are generally well informed both respecting the facts of the contro- 
 versy and the legal rights attending them, and furthermore, arc rep-
 
 264 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 resented by counsel attentive in safeguarding their interests. So, 
 though there is no fraud, there may be accident or mistake such as 
 authorize the granting of relief from other judicial determinations. 
 "The courts of chancery have no power to take such cases out of 
 probate courts, for the purpose of proceeding with the administration. 
 But their powers and functions to relieve against fraud, accident, 
 mistake, or impending irremediable mischief is universal, extending 
 over suitors in all of the courts and over the decrees in those courts ob- 
 tained by fraud, or rendered under circumstances which render it in- 
 equitable that they should be enforced. Hence, any fraud in the 
 settlements of administrators or executors may be corrected": Eein- 
 hardt v. Gartrell, 33 Ark. 727; Shegogg v. Perkins, 34 Ark. 117; 
 Jones v. Graham, 36 Ark. 383; Green v. Creighton, 10 Smedes & M. 
 159, 48 Am. Dec. 742; Oldham v. Trimble, 15 Mo. 225; Dingle v. Polliek, 
 49 Mo. App. 479; Froebrich v. Lane, 45 Or. 13, 106 Am. St. Eep. 634, 
 76 Pae. 351; Bertha Z. & M. Co. v. Vaughan, 88 Fed. 566. If trustees 
 under a will, with intent to defraud the person benefited, present a false 
 account and secure its settlement by the court, they are guilty of 
 fraud upon the court extrinsic to the case, as well as upon the bene- 
 ficiary, and if he has no knowledge of the fraud until after the expir- 
 ation of the time for moving to vacate the order of settlement 
 or for appealing therefrom, he may maintain a suit in equity to 
 compel the trustees to pay the amount of which he has been de- 
 frauded by the settlement: Aldrich v. Barton, 138 Gal. 220, 94 Am. 
 St. Eep. 43, 71 Pac. 169. The same principles apply to a decree set- 
 tling the account of the guardian of an infant or incompetent person, 
 who, through fraud or mistake has failed to account for the funds 
 or assets of his ward: Nelson v. Cowling, 77 Ark. 351, 113 Am. St. 
 Eep. 155, 91 S. W. 773; Willis v. Eice, 141 Ala. 168, 109 Am. St. 
 Eep. 26, 37 South. 507; Silva v. Santos, 138 Cal. 536, 94 Am. St. 
 Eep. 45, 71 Pac. 703; Anderson v. Anderson, 178 111. 160, 52 N. 
 E. 1038; Neylans v. Burge, 14 Smedes & M. 201. This rule is not 
 abrogated by statutes purporting to make decrees and orders of 
 courts of probate conclusive. Such statutes merely place the de- 
 termination of those courts on the same footing as the determin- 
 ations of other judicial tribunals without interfering with the 
 power of equity, in proper cases, to relieve from them: Black v. 
 Whitall, 9 N. J. Eq. 572, 59 Am. Dec. 423. 
 
 In some of the states statutes have been enacted under which the 
 authority of equity is clearly expressed and which remove any doubts 
 that otherwise might exist upon this subject. Thus, in Iowa, a sec- 
 tion of the code provides that mistakes in the final settlement of 
 accounts may be corrected after the settlement "by equitable pro- 
 ceedings and showing such grounds as would justify the interference 
 of the court": Tucker v. Stewart, 113 Iowa, 449, 86 N. W. 371. 
 These statutes authorize relief to be granted against an order settling 
 an account, and so does a statute authorizing judgments to be va-
 
 Estate of McLaughlin (No. 2). 265 
 
 cated for fraud practiced by the successful parties in obtaining 
 them: Eoll v. Stum, 20 Ky. Law Rep. 661, 46 S. W. 223. But these 
 statutes are not essential to the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, 
 where, as in California, in which state no special statute existed 
 upon the subject and where its courts of probate were of exclusive 
 jurisdiction, a bill was filed to compel an accounting for certain 
 property, notwithstanding its omission from the accounts of an ad- 
 ministrator, which had been settled by the court. The supreme court 
 of the United States, reversing the judgment of the trial court, said: 
 "It is well established that a settlement of an administrator's ac- 
 count, by the decree of a probate court, does not conclude as to 
 property accidentally or fraudulently withheld from the account. If 
 the property be omitted by mistake, or be subsequently discovered, 
 a court of equity may exercise its jurisdiction in the premises, and 
 take such action as justice to the heirs of the deceased or to the 
 creditors of the estate may require, even if the probate court might, 
 in such cases, open its decrees and administer upon the property 
 omitted. And a fraudulent concealment of property, or a fraudulent 
 disposition of it, is a general and always existing ground for the in- 
 terposition of equity": Grifiith v. Godey, 113 U. S. 89, 5 Sup. Ct. 
 383, 28 L. Ed. 934. 
 
 Orders Directing the Sale of the Property of a decedent or incom- 
 petent, and confirming such sales when made, are, not less than 
 those of other judicial tribunals, subject to attack in courts of equity, 
 not, indeed, for the purpose of showing them to be erroneus or irreg- 
 ular, but of proving that they were obtained under such circum- 
 stances that relief ought to be granted against them to the extent 
 of setting aside the sales, or requiring persons acquiring title under 
 them to hold it as trustees, or to otherwise so act that equity shall 
 not be offended: Van Horn v. Ford, 16 Iowa, 578; Grant v. Lloyd, 
 12 Smedes & M. 191; Hull v. Voorhis, 45 Mo. 555; Lander v. Abra- 
 hamson, 34 Neb. 553, 52 N. W. 571. Where suit was commenced by 
 creditors of a decedent to set aside for fraud a sale of his property 
 authorized and confirmed by a probate court of Louisiana, the su- 
 preme court of the United States said: "The administration of 
 General Morgan 's succession undoubtedly belonged to the probate 
 court of the parish of Carroll, and, in a general sense, it is true that 
 the decisions of that court in the matter of the succession are con- 
 clusive and binding, especially upon those who were parties. But 
 this is not universally true. The most solemn transactions and judg- 
 ments may, at the instance of the parties, ba set aside or rendered 
 inoperative for fraud. The fact of being a party does not estop a 
 person from obtaining in a court of equity relief against fraud. It 
 is generally parties that are the victims of fraud, whether committed, 
 in pais or in or by means of judicial proceedings. In such cases the 
 court does not act as a court of review, nor docs it inquire into 
 any irregularities or errors in proceedings in another court; but it
 
 266 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 will scrutinize the conduct of the parties, and if it finds that they 
 have been guilty of fraud in obtaining a judgment or decree, it will 
 deprive them of the benefit of it, and of any inequitable advantage 
 which they have derived under it": Johnson v. Waters, 111 U. S. 
 640, 4 Sup. Ct. 619, 27 L. Ed. 547. 
 
 Decrees of Distribution. — In many of the states, courts whose 
 orders and decrees we are here considering are authorized and re- 
 quired, after the settlement of the estate of a decedent, to make, 
 a decree distributing the property remaining undisposed of among 
 the heirs, devisees, and other parties entitled thereto, and the stat- 
 utes conferring this authority impart conclusive effect to the action 
 of the court, to the end that thereafter there shall be no question 
 remaining respecting the persons entitled to such property. As in 
 every other judicial proceeding, fraud may be employed, mistakes 
 may occur, or accidents may prevent the due presentation of the 
 claims of the persons entitled, and an adjudication may result which 
 equity will not allow to be enforced. It may declare that the per- 
 son in whose favor a decree of distribution is, or his successor in 
 title with notice, holds the property in trust for an heir or other 
 person to whom it should have been distributed (Baker v. O'Eiordan, 
 65 Cal. 368, 4 Pac. 232; Sohler v. Sohler, 135 Cal. 323, 87 Am. St. 
 Eep. 98, 67 Pac. 282; Maney v. Casserly, 134 Mich. 252, 96 N. W. 
 478), or in some jurisdictions the decree of distribution may be set 
 aside so far as inequitable: Benson v. Anderson, 10 Utah, 135, 37 
 Pac. 256; Beem v. Kimberly, 72 Wis. 343, 39 N. W. 542. 
 
 f Orders Granting Probate of Wills and Letters of Administration. — 
 
 There is no doubt that courts of equity have always disclaimed 
 
 / jurisdiction over the probate of wills and have refused to cancel or 
 
 j set aside such probate, though assailed on the ground that the wills 
 
 Lin question were forgeries, and their admission to probate had been 
 procured by fraud and perjury: Watson v. Bothwell, 11 Ala. 650; 
 Ewell V. Tidwell, 20 Ark. 136; State v. McGlynn, 20 Cal. 233, 81 
 Am. Dec. 118; Langdon v. Blackburn, 109 Cal. 19, 41 Pac. 814; Sharp 
 V. Sharp, 213 111. 332, 72 N. E. 1058; Hughey v. Sidwell's Heirs, 18 
 B. Mon. 259; Lyne v. Marcus, 1 Mo. 410, 13 Am, Dec. 509; Graland 
 V. Smith, 127 Mo. 583, 28 S. W. 195, 29 S. W. 836; Loosemore v. 
 Smith, 12 Neb. 343, 11 N. W. 493; Post v. Mason, 91 N. Y. 539, 
 43 Am. Eep. 689; McDowall v. Peyton, 2 Desaus. 313; Archer v. 
 Meadows, 33 Wis. 166; Traver v. Traver, 9 Pet. 174, 9 L. Ed, 91; 
 Ellis V. Davis, 109 U. S. 485, 3 Sup. Ct. 327, 27 L. Ed. 1006; In 
 re Broderick's Will, 21 Wall. 504, 22 L. Ed. 599; Allen v. McPherson, 
 1 H. L, Cas. 191; Kerrick v. Bransby, 1 Brown P. C. 588; and 
 the same rule has been applied to grants of letters of administra- 
 tion: Simmons v. Saul, 138 U. S. 439, 11 Sup. Ct. 369, 34 L. Ed, 
 1054. 
 
 Such proceedings as will contests cannot be inaugurated in courts 
 of equity; the jurisdiction of probate courts is exclusive in such
 
 Estate op McLaughlin (No. 2). 267 
 
 matters: Curtis v. Schell, 129 Cal. 208, 79 Am. St. Eep. 107, 61 
 Pac. 951; Langdon v. Blackburn, 109 Cal. 19, 41 Pae. 814; Sohler 
 V. Sohler, 135 Cal. 323, 87 Am. St. Rep. 98, 67 Pac. 282; Froebrich 
 V. Lane, 45 Or. 13, 106 Am. St. Eep. 634, 76 Pac. 351; Benson v. 
 Anderson, 10 Utah, 135, 37 Pac. 256; Carrau v. O'Calligan, 125 Fed. 
 657, 60 C. C. A. 347. 
 
 There is doubtless much in the opinions in these cases from which 
 the inference might be supported that, under no circumstances, can 
 any relief be had in equity from an order admitting a will to pro- 
 bate. It must be remembered, however, that every ground upon 
 which relief in equity might be urged is also available in the 
 probate court in opposition to the probate of a will, and that in most, 
 If not all, of the states a considerable period of time is allowed after 
 such probate in which applications for its revocation may be made. 
 In nearly, if not in all, of the cases cited, the persons seeking re- 
 lief were guilty of laches in long delaying their application for such 
 relief, or in failing without adequate excuse in the court having 
 jurisdiction of the probate of the will to take advantage of the 
 remedies there available to them. Hence, we think none of these 
 cases warrants the broad proposition that in no event can relief 
 in equity be obtained against the probate of a will. Of course, it 
 may be conceded that, unless specially authorized by statutes, a 
 court of equity cannot directly cancel or set aside such probate. 
 This, however, is by no means conclusive of the question. It was, 
 and perhaps still is, the rule that a court of equity could not and 
 would not attempt to set aside a judgment at law. This, however 
 did not prevent it from granting effective relief in personam. Re- 
 lief of this character would, doubtless, in many instances j)ractically 
 annul the probate of a will, or, at least, prevent its inequitable oper- 
 ation. The right to proceed in equity against the probate of wills 
 has been given by various American statutes which we shall not 
 here undertake to summarize: Sharp v. Sharo, 213 111. 332, 72 N. E. 
 1058; Bartlett v. Manor, 146 Ind. 621, 45 N. E. 1060; Pryer v. Howe, 
 40 Hun, 383; Ocobock v. Eells, 37 N. Y. App. Div. 114, 55 N. Y. 
 Supp. 1118; Dillard v. Dillard, 78 Va. 208; Couch v. Eastham, 27 
 W. Va. 796, 55 Am. Rep. 346. Where, upon the trial of an issue 
 devisavit vel non, a will was set aside, it was held that relief might 
 be granted in equity and the probate of a will reinstated upon proof 
 of fraudulent combinations between the proponents and the con- 
 testants: Smith v. Harrison, 2 Heisk. 230. 
 
 The question remains whether, though the probate of a will can- 
 not be set aside in equity, some other adequate relief niay not be 
 there obtained, as by declaring the party receiving the benefit of the 
 will to be a trustee holding in trust for those who have been de- 
 frauded by its probate. That this may be accomplished has been 
 intimated in certain English and American cases: Barnesly v. Powell, 
 I Ves. Sr. 284; Sohler v. Sohler, 135 Cal. 323, 87 Am. St. Rep. 98,
 
 268 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 67 Pac. 282; and necessarily determined in Smith v. Boyd, 127 Mich. 
 417, 86 N. W. 953. The bill in this case was to set aside certain 
 codicils to a will on the ground of fraud, and for an accounting. 
 A demurrer to the complaint was overruled, and the defendants ap- 
 pealed. The bill stated that the complainant was a grandchild of 
 W. M., deceased, and that the defendants were his children and 
 grandchildren, and they, with the complainant, constituted his heirs 
 at law; that complainant's mother died when he was about eight 
 months old, and that at the age of seven he went to live with 
 his grandfather, with whom he remained until the death of the lat- 
 ter; that the grandfather, when complainant was five years of age, 
 made a will, and that several years later, and when the grandfather 
 was in feeble health and of unsound mind, he was, by undue in- 
 fluence, fraud, and deceit, induced to change his will to the preju- 
 dice of the complainant; that in July, 1889, the grandfather died, 
 and the will and codicils were admitted to probate on the petition of 
 one of the defendants; that the complainant had no general guardian; 
 that his father was absent from the state; that no guardian ad 
 litem was appointed, and that complainant had no knowledge of 
 the proceedings in the probate court. The defendants, in support 
 of their demurrer, insisted that the proceeding in the probate court 
 was substantially in rem, and that the remedy was by appeal. The 
 supreme court affirmed the judgment overruling the demurrer to the 
 bill apparently on the ground that the complainant was without any 
 remedy in the probate court, and that his case was to be treated 
 substantially as if it were one to set aside the settlement of an 
 account in the probate court when obtained by fraud. So far as 
 the opinion of the court shows, there was no consideration by it of 
 the English and American authorities with which its conclusions 
 seemed to conflict. 
 
 " The Limitations upon the Right to Obtain Relief in Equity from 
 orders and decrees of probate courts and other tribunals exercis- 
 
 I ing a like jurisdiction is the same as when relief is sought from judg- 
 
 \ ments at law. Equity will not assert a mere revisory jurisdiction 
 by attempting to correct or relieve from mere errors or irregulari- 
 ties, there being otherwise no sufficient ground for the interposition 
 of equity: Seals v. Weldon, 121 Ala. 319, 25 South. 1021; Greely 
 Burnham G. Co. v. Graves, 43 Ark. 171; Dajy_X!_E£finiej_86_CaL_552j 
 
 > 21 Am. St. Eep. 61, 25 Pac. 67; Eatliff v. Magee, 165 Mo. 461, 65 S. 
 
 / W. 713; Froebrich v. Lane, 45 Or. 13, 106 Am. St. Rep. 634, 76 Pac. 
 
 '' 351; Gee v. Humphries, 28 S. C. 606, 5 S. E. 615; Central Nat. Bank 
 v. Fitzgerald, 94 Fed. 16. Nor will it act where the complainant 
 still has an adequate remedy in the courts having jurisdiction of 
 the estate: Hankins v. Layne, 48 Ark. 544, 3 S. W. 821; Ladd v. 
 j, Nystol, 63 Kan. 23, 64 Pac. 985j]]nor where he has been guilty of 
 laches, either in not presenting his claims and not pursuing his rem- 
 edy in that court, or in not seeking his remedy in equity within a
 
 Estate OP McLaughlin (No. 2). 269 
 
 reasonable time after having notice of his rights and of the wrongs 
 of which he complains. In other words, he must always aver and 
 prove facts which excuse his not appearing and protecting his in- 
 terests in the court of probate: Moore v. Lesueur, 33 Ala. 237; 
 Lyne's Admr. v. Wann, 72 Ala. 43; Boswell v. Townsend, 57 Ala. 
 308; Tynan v. Kerns, 119 Cal. 447, 51 Pac. 693; Froebrich v. Lane, 
 45 Or. 15, 106 Am. St. Rep. 634, 76 Pac. 351; and where sufficient 
 cause exists for resorting to equity, he must proceed with reason- 
 able diligence; otherwise relief will be denied him because of his 
 laches: Hankins v. Layne, 48 Ark. 544, 3 S. W. 821; Tucker v. 
 Stewart (Iowa), 86 N. W. 371; Duryea v. Granger's Estate, 66 Mich. 
 .393, 33 N. W. 730; Williams v. Petticrew, 62 Mo. 460; Slaughter v. 
 Cannon, 94 N. C. 189; Handley v. Snodgrass, 9 Leigh, 484; Hays v. 
 Freshwater, 47 W. Va. 217, 34 S. E. 831; Eames v. Manly, 54 C. C. 
 A. 561, 117 Fed. 387.|_Furthermore, if fraud is relied upon, it musf^ 
 be extrinsic or collateral to the questions examined and determined \ 
 in the adjudication complained of: Gruwell v. Seyboldt, 82 Cal. 10, \ 
 22 Pac. 938; In re Griffith, 84 Cal. 107, 23 Pac. 528, 24 Pac. 381; j 
 Hanley v. Hanley, 114 Cal. 690, 46 Pac. 736; Mulcahey v. Dow, 131 ' 
 Cal. 73, 63 Pac. 158; Sohler v. Sohler, 135 Cal. 323, 87 Am. St. Rep. 98, 
 67 Pac. 282. The strict application of this rule must prevent the 
 award of all relief in equity, for such relief is never granted, unless 
 the adjudication complained of is unjust, and the only method by 
 which its unjustness can be established is by re-examination of the 
 issues involved. Thus, where an executor or administrator presents 
 and obtains an allowance of his accounts, and relief in equity is 
 sought therefrom, it must always be alleged and proved that the ac- 
 count as presented and allowed is unjust, as well as that there was 
 some fraud, accident, or mistake to which the allowance was due, 
 and yet all -the cases cited in the second paragraph of this note show 
 that, in a proper ease, relief may be obtained, though it must neces- 
 sarily involve a re-examination of the question. The same may truly 
 be said where relief is sought and obtained from a decree of distribu- 
 tion or an order directing the sale of property of a minor or decedentj 
 In no part of the proceedings in probate is there more temptation 
 to fraud or more opportunity to successfully employ it than in 
 proceedings to set aside to the widow property to which she claims 
 to be entitled, either because it was a homestead of the decedent 
 selected by him in his lifetime, or ought to be selected as ht>r home- 
 stead because he had never made any selection. There are several 
 cases denying relief from orders setting aside a homestead on the 
 ground that the fraud complained of was not extrinsic, and that the 
 court hence could not proceed without the re-examination of is- 
 sues already tried and determined: Fealey v. Fealey, 104 Cal. 355, 
 43 Am. St. Eep. Ill, 38 Pac. 49; Wickersham v. Comerford, 104 
 Cal, 494, 38 Pac. 101; Hanley v. Hanley, 114 Cal. 690, 46 Pac. 736. 
 The case last cited is an extreme one, and, if carried to its logical
 
 270 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 result, should prevent relief being granted in nearly, if not in all, 
 cases where fraud is practiced in probate proceedings. The action 
 was brought to set aside a decree in the administration of the es- 
 tate of Patrick Hanley, deceased, by which certain property was set 
 aside to his widow as a homestead; and the complaint, among other 
 things, alleged that the premises were the separate property of the 
 deceased, that his widow willfully, falsely, and fraudulently rep- 
 resented to the court, and testified, that they were community prop- 
 erty; and also falsely represented to it that a certain declaration 
 of homestead had been filed on the premises while she and her de- 
 ceased husband were actually residing thereon; and it was further 
 contended that the complainants had no notice of the proceeding to 
 set aside the homestead. A demurrer to tiie complaint was sustained, 
 on the ground that the proceeding, being in rem, all parties inter- 
 ested were bound by it without personal notice, and that the fraud 
 alleged was not extrinsic or collateral to the matter which was tried 
 and determined by the court. As the question was presented upon 
 demurrer, there was no suggestion that the widow testified as she 
 did through any mistake; on the contrary, the demurrer necessarily 
 admitted that she acted willfully, fraudulently, and falsely. Pro- 
 ceedings of this character are ordinarily ex parte, and we do not 
 think that the rule to which we refer should be applied to them 
 where such is the case. As those who are adversely interested are 
 not present in court and usually have no actual knowledge of the 
 proceeding, it ought to be regarded as a fraud, entitling them to 
 relief when one, taking advantage of their absence, willfully misrep- 
 resents facts to the court, though the facts so represented involve 
 the merits and go to the very foundation of the proceedings. The 
 case of Sohler v. Sohler, 135 Cal. 323, 87 Am. St. Kep. 98, 67 Pac. 
 282, though it does not profess to overrule any of the decisions re- 
 ferred to, seems to be necessarily in conflict with them, unless it can 
 be said that the principles applicable to decrees of distribution dif- 
 fer from those applicable to orders setting apart homesteads. In 
 the case last cited relief was obtained from a decree of distribution, 
 on the ground that a widow conspired with her son, who was not the 
 son of the decedent, to procure for him a share of the latter 's prop- 
 erty as one of his children, filed a petition naming him as such, and ob- 
 tained a decree in accordance therewith. The court proceeded, how- 
 ever, partly upon the ground that the widow, being the executrix 
 of the decedent, was the trustee of all the heirs and of other par- 
 ties in interest, was the mother and natural guardian of such heirs, 
 and was obligated to protect their legal rights and see that the legal 
 claims to the estate were properly presented to the probate court.
 
 Estate of Scott. 271 
 
 Estate of ANGELIA R. SCOTT, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 19,473; decided August 29, 1898.] 
 
 Insanity of Testator — Evidence and Burden of Proof. — The legal 
 presumption is in favor of the sanity of a testator, and the burden 
 of proof is on the contestant of his will to demonstrate the con- 
 trary; and if the contestant prevails, in a case of doubt, it must 
 be by a preponderance of proof, and the number. Character and in- 
 telligence of witnesses, and their opportunity for observation, should 
 be taken into account. 
 
 Witnesses — Credibility as Affected by Station in Life. — Persons 
 employed in domestic service and other categories of honest labor 
 are entitled, as witnesses, to credence equally with those who plume 
 themselves on their higher level, affecting to look down on those 
 who work for wages as. inferior. Before the law there is no such 
 distinction, and in courts of justice all must be co-ordinated, irre- 
 spective of the accidents of artificial and conventional social rela- 
 tions. 
 
 Witnesses — Manner of Testing Credibility. — Each witness is a man 
 or woman to be treated as an individual, a moral unit, tested for 
 integrity and veracity on his merits or her title to credit by the in- 
 herent and extrinsic elements of belief, or the circumstantial criteria 
 of credibility. These are the only considerations for the court in 
 weighing evidence. 
 
 Insane Delusions — Business Capacity. — Business capacity may co- 
 exist with monomania or insane delusions. 
 
 Insane Delusions — Vulgarity of Testatrix. — Where the vulgarity in 
 behavior and speech of a testatrix is relied upon to establish the 
 presence of insane delusions, her whole c'onduct, at home and aboard, 
 should be considered, and not merely her conduct within her own 
 house, the alleged acts of immodesty in this case being confined to 
 the home premises of the testatrix, while her behavior abroad was 
 not subject to adverse criticism. 
 
 Insane Delusions — Eccentricities not Suddenly Acquired. — Eccentric 
 habits of speech, if not suddenly acquired, are not evidence of in- 
 sanity. 
 
 Expert Evidence — Its Nature and Value. — Expert evidence is really 
 an argument of the expert to the court, and is valuable only with 
 regard to the proof of the facts and the validity of the reasons ad- 
 vanced for the conclusions. 
 
 Insane Delusions — Suspicions as to Husband's Constancy. — Where 
 there was at least one instance in the conduct of a husband which 
 might arouse in the mind of the wife a suspicion as to his con- 
 stancy, the fact that her suspicions may have been unjust and her
 
 272 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 inferences too general, is merely an error of logic, and not an evi- 
 dence of insanity or of an insane delusion. She has a right to in- 
 fer, however erroneously, or from inadequate premises, to a universal 
 conclusion. 
 
 Insanity — Faulty Logic. — False logic or faulty ratiocination is far 
 from the manifestation of insanity, so long as the process is formally 
 correct, not incoherent or inconsequential. 
 
 Insane Delusions — Fear of Poisoning. — A fear of poisoning on the 
 part of a testati'ix, even though a delusion, must, in order to in- 
 validate her testamentary act, be continuous, persistent, and opera- 
 tive upon her volitional capacity. 
 
 Insane Delusions — Fear of Poisoning. — The mistaken belief of a 
 testatrix, when suffering with chronic stomach trouble, that her food 
 has been tampered with, does not, as a matter of law, amount to 
 an insane delusion. 
 
 Insanity — Unreasonable Suspicions.— Unfounded and unreasonable 
 suspicions are not insanity. 
 
 Insanity — Insomnia. — The mind of a testatrix is not necessarily 
 diseased because she is at times troubled with insomnia while af- 
 flicted with an intestinal ailment. 
 
 Insane Delusions — Unfounded Suspicions. — The sanity of the testa- 
 trix in this case being questioned because she suspected that her 
 husband was unfaithful to her, and that he was attempting to poison 
 her and to send her to an insane asylum, the court observed: There 
 is a very large class of people whose sanity is undoubted, who are 
 unduly jealous or suspicious of others, and especially of those closely 
 connected with them, and who upon the most trivial, even whimsical, 
 grounds wrongfully impute the worst motives and conduct to those 
 in whom they ought to confide. This insanity, which is developed 
 in a great variety of forms, is altogether too com;non, and too many 
 persons confessedly sane are to a greater or less degree afflicted with 
 it, to justify us in saying that because the deceased was so af- 
 flicted she was insane, or the victim of an insane delusion. 
 
 Insane Delusions — Suspicions — Evidence and Burden of Proof. — The 
 line between unfounded and unreasonable suspicions of a sane mind 
 and insane delusions is sometimes quite indistinct and difficult to 
 define. However, the legal presumption is in favor of sanity, and on 
 the issue of sanity or insanity the burden is upon him who asserts 
 insanity to prove it. Hence, in a doubtful case, unless there ap- 
 pears a preponderance of proof of mental unsoundness, the issue 
 should be found the other way. 
 
 Insane Delusions — Suspicions — Tests of Insanity. — Suspicion is the 
 imagination of the existence of something, especially something 
 wrong, without proof, or with but slight proof; it is an impression 
 in the mind which has not resulted in a conviction. It is svnonvmcus
 
 Estate of Scott. 273 
 
 with doubt, distrust, or mistrust — the mind is in an unsettled con- 
 dition. Suspicion existing, slight evidence might produce a rational 
 conviction or conclusion; this without evidence, however slight, would 
 be a delusion. Is there evidence, however slight? This is the test. 
 The suspicion may be illogical or preposterous, but it is not, there- 
 fore, evidence of insanity. 
 
 Insane Delusions — Suspicions as to Husband's Constancy. — If a 
 wife has evidence, though slight, on which to base a suspicion of her 
 husband 's unfaithfulness, and has no settled conviction on the sub- 
 ject, her suspicion does not amount to an insane delusion. 
 
 Insane Delusion — Conspiracy to Confine Wife in Asylum. — The con- 
 tention in this case that the testatrix was afflicted with an insane 
 delusion in that she believed her husband conspired to confine her 
 in an insane asylum, was found by the court to be unsupported by 
 the evidence, especially in view of the fact that the husband had 
 twitted her of being crazy and threatened to break her will. 
 
 Insane Delusions — Testimony of Business Men. — The value of the 
 testimony of business men and acquaintances, acquired in commercial 
 dealings with a person alleged to be the victim of insane delusions, is 
 favorably regarded by the courts, on the issue of insanity. 
 
 Testamentary Capacity — Inquisition Before Execution of Will. — 
 The examination by medical experts of a testatrix prior to her exe- 
 cution of her will, for the purpose of determining her testamentary 
 capacity, is discussed by the court, both as a suggestion of insanity, 
 and as a wise precaution. 
 
 Testamentary Capacity — Will as Evidence. — A will may be consid- 
 ered in proof of its own validity and of the sanity of its maker. 
 
 Testamentary Capacity — Suspicion of Husband. — If there are causes 
 sufficient to induce a sane woman to ignore her husband in her will, 
 or reduce what otherwise would have been a just allowance, the 
 fact that she entertains an unjust or an unfounded suspicion in re- 
 gard to his treatment of her, or an unjust prejudice against him, does 
 not affect the will nor demonstrate that she is necessarily of un- 
 sound mind. 
 
 Testamentary Capacity — Test for Determining. — The tests of tes- 
 tamentary capacity are: (1) Understanding of what the testatrix 
 is doing; (2) how she is doing it; (3) knowledge of her property; 
 (4) how she wishes to dispose of it; (5) and who are entitled to her 
 bounty. 
 
 Testamentary Capacity — Testimony of Attesting Witnesses. — The 
 testimony of the attesting witnesses, and, next to them, the testimony 
 of those present at the execution of the will, are most to be relied 
 upon in determining the question of testamentary capacity. 
 
 Testamentary Capacity — Insane Delusions. — In this case the hus- 
 band of the testatrix contests her will on the ground that she was 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. I — 18
 
 274 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 of unsound mind by reason of being the victim of insane delusions 
 that her husband was unfaithful, that he was trying to poison her, 
 and that he was conspiring to confine her in an insane asylu-m, but 
 the court finds against the contestant and sustains the will. 
 
 Morris M. Estee, A. Everett Ball, and Charles A. Shurt- 
 leff, for contestant, Emerson W. Scott. 
 
 A. E. Bolton, C. S. Peery, J. H. Henderson, J. B. Gart- 
 land, R. E. Houghton, P. G. Galpin, H. M. Owens, and Guy 
 C. Earl, for proponents and respondents. 
 
 E. D. Sawyer, for persons otherwise unrepresented. 
 
 COFFEY, J. This is a contest instituted by E. W. Scott 
 to the probate of certain papers filed herein on December 
 22, 1897, purporting to be the last will and codicils of 
 Angelia R. Scott, deceased, the proponents being the execu- 
 tors named therein, C. S. Tilton, Frank Garcia, Junior, and 
 C. M. Gerrish, who simultaneously present a petition for 
 admission to probate and the issue of letters testamentary 
 to them thereon and thereunder. 
 
 The petition for probate sets forth that decedent died on 
 December 16, 1897, in San Francisco, of which city and 
 county she was a resident and left estate therein and also 
 in the counties of Santa Clara and Tulare, consisting of 
 real and personal property not exceeding $450,000 in ag- 
 gregate value, all of which was her separate estate; that she 
 left a will and codicils, copies of which are hereinafter in- 
 serted in this opinion; that the petitioners named as execu- 
 tors consent to act; the names of the devisees and next of 
 kin are given; and it is alleged that decedent had no other 
 devisees or heirs at law; it is further alleged that decedent 
 left a husband, E. W. Scott, but no children, and that her 
 father and mother had predeceased her; it is finally alleged, 
 in proper phrase and form, that she was of sound mind at 
 the time of executing the papers propounded and that in 
 all respects and circumstances her testamentary acts were 
 free from legal fault or blemish, and, therefore, should be 
 consummated through the court. 
 
 The will and codicils are as follows :
 
 Estate of Scott. 275 
 
 "In the Name of God, Amen. I, Angelia R. Scott, of 
 the City and County of San Francisco, State of California, 
 being of sound and disposing mind and memory, do make, 
 publish and declare this my last will and testament. 
 
 "I. I give, devise and bequeath to the officers of Apollo 
 Lodge of the Independent Order of Odd Fellows in the City 
 and County of San Francisco, and their successors in office, the 
 sum of Two Thousand (2,000) Dollars, to be by them invested 
 and the proceeds thereof to be used in the preservation and 
 care of the cemetery lots in the Odd Fellows Cemetery in the 
 City and County of San Francisco, in which my late hus- 
 band, Salvin P. Collins, and my nephew, John Quincy Wor- 
 mell, are buried. 
 
 "II. I give, devise, and bequeath to Horatio Stebbins the 
 sum of Three Thousand (3,000) Dollars, to be used by him 
 at his discretion to advance the interests of the First Uni- 
 tarian Church in this City and County. 
 
 "III. I give, devise, and bequeath to Carl Anderson, my 
 coachman, who has served me faithfully for five years, Five 
 Hundred (500) Dollars. 
 
 "IV. I give, devise, and bequeath my diamond earrings, 
 one bar pin with one diamond, one finger ring set with three 
 large diamonds, my chain and charms to my niece, Helen 
 Garish, and my watch to my niece, Ella Perkins. 
 
 "V. I give, devise, and bequeath my cluster diamond 
 ring and one small solitaire diamond finger ring, the gift 
 of my late hiLsband, S. P. Collins, to his sister, Mrs. Rachel 
 Johonnot. 
 
 "VI. I give, devise, and bequeath one diamond solitaire 
 finger ring to Mrs. Frank Garcia, wife of my nephew, Frank 
 Garcia. 
 
 "VII. I give, devise, and bequeath all the rest and 
 residue of my property as follows : One fiftieth thereof to 
 each of the following persons, children of my late brother, 
 Amos P. Wormell. namely : One-fiftieth to Andrew Wor- 
 mell of Dover, New Hampshire: one-fiftieth to Charles Wor- 
 mell, of Sunbury, Ohio; one-fiftieth to AVilliam Wormell 
 of the same place ; one fiftieth to Eugene Wormell of Liver- 
 more, Maine; one-fiftieth to Lettie AVormell of Colorado; 
 one-fiftieth to Salvin Ulysses Wormell of Phillips, Maine;
 
 276 Coffey's ProbxVte Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 two-fiftieths thereof to Louisa E. Roe, daughter of my late 
 brother, Amos P. Wormell, of Island Pond, Vermont; six- 
 fiftieths thereof to my sister Mary A. Cowan and her daugh- 
 ter Amanda Meily, share and share alike; six-fiftieths there- 
 of to M. S. Chamberlain, nephew of my late husband, 
 S. P. Collins, now residing at Concord, New Hampshire; 
 one-fiftieth thereof to Mrs. Rachel Johonnot, sister of my 
 late husband, residing at Montpelier, Vermont; one-fiftieth 
 thereof to Florence Swall, wife of George Swall of Moun- 
 tain View, California, niece of S. P. Collins, deceased; one- 
 fiftieth thereof to Eugene Wormell, son of my brother Na- 
 thaniel Wormell, now residing at Seattle, Washington; one- 
 eighth to my nephew Franlv Garcia ; one-eighth to my niece 
 Helen Gerrish, wife of Charles Gerrish of Port Townsend, 
 Washington; one-eighth thereof to Mrs. Ella Perkins, of 
 Santa Clara County, California, wife of Caleb F. Perkins; 
 one-tenth thereof to Mrs. Louisa Garcia, my sister; one 
 fortieth thereof to Chester and Nellie Swall, son and daugh- 
 ter of George and Florence Swall of Mountain View, Cali- 
 fornia, share and share alike, two-fiftieths thereof to my 
 husband, E. W. Scott. 
 
 "In case any of my legatees contest the probate of this 
 will, I, hereby revoke the legacy of such contestant, and di- 
 rect that such legacy become a part of my estate. 
 
 "VIII. I nominate and appoint Charles S. Tilton, Caleb 
 F. Perkins, and Frank Garcia, Jr., as executors of this my 
 last Will and Testament without bonds. 
 
 "In Testimony Whereof, I have made, published and de- 
 clared the foregoing as' my last Will and Testament. 
 
 "ANGELIA R. SCOTT. (Seal.) 
 
 "Signed, sealed, published and declared to be her last 
 Will and Testament by the aforesaid Angelia R. Scott, in 
 our presence, who in her presence and in the presence of 
 each of us, and at her request have hereto set our hands and 
 seals, as witness this seventh day of November, A. D. 1891. 
 
 "JACOB C. JOHNSON, 1519 Van Ness Ave. 
 
 "EDWARD H. HORTON, 30 Post Street. 
 
 "Whereas, I Angelia R. Scott, by my will subscribed on 
 the 7th day of November, 1891, appointed Caleb F. Perkins
 
 Estate of Scott. 277 
 
 together with Charles S. Tilton and Frank Garcia, Jr., to 
 be executors of my last Will and Testament. 
 
 "Now, then, I hereby revoke the nomination and appoint- 
 ment of said Perkins as one of my said executors, and it is 
 my desire that this Codicil be annexed to and made a part 
 of my last Will and Testament as aforesaid to all intents 
 and purposes. ANGELIA R. SCOTT. 
 
 "Signed, sealed, published and declared to be and as and 
 for a codicil to her last Will and Testament by Angelia R. 
 Scott, in our presence, who in her presence, and in the 
 presence of each of us and at her request have hereto set 
 our hand and seals as witnesses this 25th day of February, 
 A. D. 1892. J. C. JOHNSON. 
 
 "E. H. HORTON. 
 
 "Whereas, I. Angelia R. Scott, of the City and County of 
 San Francisco, have made my last AVill and Testament in 
 writing, bearing date the seventh day of November, in the year 
 of our Lord, one thousand, eight hundred and ninety-one. and 
 in and by which I give and bequeath to my sister, Mary A. 
 Cowan and her daughter, Amanda Meily, six-fiftieths of the 
 residue of my estate (after providing for certain legacies) 
 to be divided share and share alike between them, and where- 
 as, since then said Mary A. Cowan has died, and I desire to 
 revoke so much of said Will as devises six-fiftieths to her 
 and her daughter Amanda Meily. 
 
 "And Whereas, by the same instrument, I have devised 
 one-fiftieth of said residue to Florence Swall, wife of George 
 Swall of Mountain View, and since that time said Florence 
 has died, leaving three children ; and whereas I also devised 
 to Eugene Wormell, son of my brother, Nathaniel Wormell. 
 residing at Seattle, Washington, one-fiftieth part of said 
 residue, and since then he has died, and whereas, I also de- 
 sire to change the devise to Frank Garcia, of one-eighth of 
 my estate, and to decrease the amount thereof and whereas 
 I did devise one-eighth of my said estate to Helen Garish. 
 Avife of Charles Garish; and I desire to increase the amount 
 devised to her; and whereas, I did devise one-eighth of the 
 residue of my said estate to mj^ niece Ella Perkins. I now 
 desire to devise something to her four children ; and whereas, I
 
 278 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 now desire to make a bequest to the Old People's Home of 
 San Francisco, and to the three children of my present 
 husband, E. W. Scott; and whereas, I desire to revoke the 
 gift of two thousand dollars to the Apollo Lodge of the 
 Independent Order of Odd Fellows, and desiring to preserve 
 the general features of my former will making new dis- 
 tributions when necessary by deaths which have happened 
 since the making of that will, I prefer to do this by way of 
 another codicil to my former Will instead of executing a new 
 Will; but in any respect in which this codicil shall conflict 
 with the provisions of my former Will, I fully intend that 
 this codicil shall control the provisions of the former Will and 
 that otherwise the former Will and the codicil thereof shall 
 stand unaffected by it. 
 
 "I revoke the bequest I made in my said Will of Two 
 Thousand Dollars to the Apollo Lodge of the Independent 
 Order of Odd Fellows, and I give, devise and bequeath Two 
 Thousand Dollars to the Apollo Lodge of the Independent 
 Order of Odd Fellows in the City and County of San Fran- 
 cisco, and I request them to take care of my cemetery lot in 
 the Odd Fellows Cemetery in this city and County of San 
 Francisco. 
 
 "I give, devise and bequeath the sum of One Dollar to 
 each of the following persons : To Mrs. Amanda Miley, 
 daughter of Mary A. Cowan ; to Mrs. Nellie Swall, wife of 
 George Swall; to Mrs. Eliza Paisley, wife of Donald Paisley, 
 sister of my late husband. 
 
 "I give, devise and bequeath to my maid, Estella Burn- 
 ham, Five Hundred Dollars if she is in my employment 
 down to the time of my decease. 
 
 "I give, devise and bequeath my emerald finger ring set 
 with diamonds, and also my large solitaire diamond finger 
 ring to Mrs. Helen Garish. 
 
 "I give, devise and bequeath all the rest and residue of 
 my estate subject to all unrevoked legacies and bequests o* 
 my Will, and subject to those herein contained as follows : 
 
 "Of such residue, two-fiftieths thereof to my nephew, An- 
 drew Wormell of Dover, New Hampshire. 
 
 "Two-fiftieths thereof to Charles Wormell, of Sunbury, 
 Ohio.
 
 Estate of Scott. 279 
 
 "Two-fiftieths thereof to my nephew, William Wormell of 
 the same place. 
 
 "Two-fiftieths thereof to mj'' nephew, Salvin Ulysses Wor- 
 mell, of Phillips, IMaine. 
 
 "Three-fiftieths thereof to my niece, Louisa E. Roe, of 
 Island Pond, Vermont, daughter of my brother, Amos P. 
 Wormell. 
 
 "One-fiftieth thereof to Lulu Wormell, of Oakland, daugh- 
 ter of my nephew Eugene Wormell, now deceased. 
 
 "Six-fiftieths thereof to Mortimer S. Chamberlain, resid- 
 ing at Concord, New Hampshire, nephew of my late hus- 
 band, S. P. Collins. 
 
 ''Three-fiftieths thereof to Mrs. Rachael Johonnet, sister 
 of my late husband, S. P. Collins. 
 
 "Three-fiftieths thereof to Ella Perkins, of Santa Clara 
 County, wife of C. F. Perkins, 
 
 "Three-fiftieths thereof to be divided share and share 
 alike between the four children of said Ella Perkins, or the 
 survivors of them at my decease. 
 
 "Seven-fiftieths thereof to Helen Garish, my niece, wife 
 of Charles Garish of Port Townsend, Washington. 
 
 "Four-fiftieths thereof to my sister, Mrs. Garcia, wife of 
 Frank Garcia, (senior). 
 
 "Three-fiftieths thereof to be divided share and share 
 alike between the children, now^ living or the survivor of 
 them, at my death, of Florence Swall, and George Swall, of 
 Mountain View, California, said Florence Swall being a niece 
 of my late husband, S. P. Collins. 
 
 "Four-fiftieths thereof to Frank Garcia, Jr. son of Frank 
 Garcia. 
 
 "Two-fiftieths thereof to my husband, E. W. Scott. 
 
 "One fiftieth thereof to Lloyd N. Scott, for himself, for 
 his brother, Wesley B. Scott, and his sister, Laura May 
 Scott, share and share alike; but he is to receive and hold 
 in trust the shares of Wesley B. Scott and Laura B. Scott., 
 invest the same, and use the income or principal, if neces- 
 sary, for their education and support until both beneficia- 
 ries shall die or become of age; and in case of death of 
 either beneficiary the share of such decedent shall be di- 
 vided equally between the survivors, unless decedent leaves
 
 280 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 issue him or her surviving:, and in that event the share of said 
 decedent shall go to said issue. 
 
 ''One-fiftieth thereof to the Old People's Home of San 
 Francisco. 
 
 "One-fiftieth thereof to the San Francisco Protestant 
 Orphan Asylum. 
 
 "And in case any of my devisees or legatees shall contest 
 the probate of this Will the bequest or devise to them is 
 hereby revoked, and the amount bequeathed or divised to 
 such contestant shall go back and become a part of my es- 
 tate, and be divided pro rata among the residuary devisees. 
 
 "I also nominate and appoint Charles Garish to be an- 
 other executor of my estate. 
 
 "I also revoke the bequest of my one large solitaire dia- 
 mond finger ring to Mrs. Frank Garcia, formerly wife of, 
 Frank Garcia, Jr., and I give, devise and bequeath the same 
 to Helen Garish. 
 
 "(Seal) ANGELIA R. SCOTT. 
 
 "Signed, sealed and published and declared to be and as 
 for a codicil to her last Will and Testament by Angelia R. 
 Scott in our presence, who in her presence and in the pres- 
 ence, of each of us and at her request, have hereto set our 
 hands and seals as witnesses this 22nd day of October, A. 
 D. 1897. 
 
 "JACOB C. JOHNSON, 1519 Van Ness Ave. 
 
 "EDWARD H. HORTON, 2110 Devisadero St. 
 
 "PHILIP G. GALPIN, 1738 Broadway." 
 
 The contestant alleges that he is the surviving husband of 
 deceased, of the age of sixty-one years, and as such survivor 
 is an heir at law of said deceased and interested in the es- 
 tate, and is a legatee under the instrument propounded to 
 the extent of two-fiftieths of said estate. He denies each 
 and all the matters set forth in the petition for probate ex- 
 cept the death, age and the residence of decedent. He then 
 sets up two grounds of opposition and contest: (1) Un- 
 soundness of mind; (2) Undue influence exercised by Louisa 
 Garcia, a sister, Helen Gerrish, a niece, and Frank Garcia, 
 a nephew of said decedent, the undue influence consisting in 
 falsely representing to decedent that her husband was un-
 
 Estate of Scott. 281 
 
 true to her for the purpose of misleading, deceiving, and 
 prejudicing her against him and controlling her in making 
 her Will and inducing her to neglect to provide suitably 
 for him, the natural object of her bounty, and that such false 
 representations had the purposed effect. The contestant 
 further alleges that at the time of the alleged testamentary 
 acts the testatrix was laboring under certain insane delu- 
 sions, (a) that her husband was untrue to her, (b) that he 
 was trying to poison her, and (c) that he was engaged in a 
 conspiracy with others to commit her to an insane asylum, 
 and that the said Louisa Garcia, Helen Gerrish, and Frank 
 Garcia in furtherance of their purpose fostered and encour- 
 aged these insane delusions. All of these allegations are 
 traversed in due form by proponents and respondents. 
 
 Contestant claims a right to institute and prosecute a eon- 
 test under section 1307, Code of Civil Procedure, as a per- 
 son interested, as one who would take under the statute of 
 succession if decedent had died intestate. 
 
 Issue having been joined, this contest came on for trial 
 before the court, a jury being waived, on Tuesday, the 
 twTntj^-second day of March, 1898, and continued with in- 
 termissions until Thursday, the nineteenth day of May, 1898, 
 when after ample argument extending over four days, the 
 issues were submitted for deliberation and decision. 
 
 The entire time of trial, including the taking of testimony 
 and the audition of argument, was eighty-one hours and 
 forty-five minutes ; divided as follows : 
 
 Examination of witnesses: Sixty-six hours. 
 
 Arguments of counsel : P^'ifteen hours and forty-five min- 
 utes. 
 
 There were forty-two witnesses for contestants, thirty-six 
 for respondents, seventy-eight in all. 
 
 These minutiae are material only as intimating the im- 
 portance imputed to the issues by counsel and their clients 
 and suggesting the magnitude of the interests involved em- 
 ])loying the energies and abilities of lawyers, of experience 
 and eminence, whose intellectual resources and professional 
 skill seemed to be taxed to the utmost in honorable endeavor 
 1o achieve success for what each in good faith from his point 
 of view conceived to be the right.
 
 282 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 It may be that, in these cases, the right might be developed 
 and determined in a shorter space, but those whose fortunes 
 are at stake in such a struggle and who bear the brunt of 
 its expense of time and treasure are more immediately con- 
 cerned in the calculation of cost than the critics to whom 
 the result is indifferent, except that it affords a theme for 
 censorious comment upon the tedious process of eliciting 
 evidence and the unrestricted scope accorded to advocates in 
 their examinations and arguments. Keform in this particu- 
 lar may be necessary, but it must not be so sharp or sudden 
 as to collide with justice to individual suitors who demand 
 thoroughness of treatment. 
 
 The issues raised by the pleadings are reduced in proof, 
 as stated by counsel for contestant in final argument, to the 
 following : 
 
 That the testatrix was of unsound mind by reason of cer- 
 tain delusions, to wit: 1. That her husband was unfaithful; 
 2. That he was trying to poison her; 3. That he was con- 
 spiring to confine her in an insane asylum. 
 
 If it has been established that any one of these delusions 
 infected her mind and operated upon the testamentary act, 
 the will should be set aside. 
 
 Added to these delusions were certain peculiarities which 
 served to aggravate the cardinal crotchets of her cerebral 
 constitution, to magnify her malady, and to intensify her 
 insanity, which are thus summed up by counsel in his clos- 
 ing condensation of the case: (a) She was profane and vul- 
 gar in her language; (b) She danced perfectly nude before 
 mirrors; (c) She imagined that she saw visions; (d) She 
 heard noises in the hall at night; (e) She asked many of 
 her associates if they thought she was insane; (f) She thus 
 evidenced her own belief that she was insane; (g) She 
 sought to be examined by experts before she made her will- 
 (h) She was inordinately suspicious; (i) She was troubled 
 with insomnia; and (j) She was insanely jealous; — all of 
 which symptoms indicate a mind diseased. 
 
 The pith of contestant's contention may be stated in his 
 counsel's words: That the testamentary acts were the prod- 
 uct of a mind diseased by delusion caused by morbid jeal- 
 ousy.
 
 Estate of Scott. 283 
 
 This, then, is what'we have to consider in this case: Is 
 it established by the evidence that the mind of decedent was 
 so far diseased by delusion on the dates of the documents 
 in dispute as to destroy her tastamentary capacity? The 
 dates to which this question is addressed are: November 7, 
 1891, date of the original will; Febniary 25, 1892, date of 
 the first codicil; October 22, 1897, date of the second and 
 final codicil. 
 
 The legal presumption is in favor of sanity, and therefore, 
 as is conceded by contestant, the burden of proof is upon 
 him to demonstrate the contrary, he occupies the affirmative 
 of the issue in this case, and it is incumbent upon him to 
 establish the proposition that the testatrix was of unsound 
 mind by reason of certain delusions, and he claims to have 
 discharged this obligation by abundant evidence of numer- 
 ous witnesses. 
 
 If contestant prevail, in case of doubt, it must be by a 
 preponderance of proof ; and the number, character, and in- 
 telligence of witnesses, and their opportunity for observa- 
 tion, should be taken into the account: Will of Cole, 49 Wis. 
 181, 5 N. W. 346; Lee v. Lee, 4 McCord (S. C), 183, 17 
 Am. Dec. 722. 
 
 Criticism was made upon some of the witnesses because 
 they were assumed to be subordinate socially to others sup- 
 posed to belong to a superior caste, but we have no such 
 Hindoo scale in our American tribunals, and persons em- 
 ployed in domestic service and other categories of honest 
 labor are entitled to credence equally with those who plume 
 themselves on their higher level affecting to look down on 
 those who work for wages as inferior; but before the law, 
 human and divine, there is no such distinction, and in 
 courts of justice all must be co-ordinated irrespective of the 
 accidents of artificial and conventional social relations. 
 
 Each witness is a man or woman to be treated as an in- 
 dividual, a moral unit, tested for integrity and veracity on 
 his merits or her title to credit by the inherent and intrinsic 
 elements of belief, or the circumstantial criteria of credi- 
 bility. These are the only considerations for the court in 
 weighing evidence.
 
 284 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 It is claimed by counsel for contestant that at the time of 
 the date of the original will, November 7, 1891, testatrix 
 was laboring under well-defined delusions, in relation to her 
 husband and affecting her testamentary capacity. These 
 delusions had their origin prior to that date, as is sought to 
 be shown by the testimony of witnesses for contestant, and 
 covered the years 1889, 1890, and 1891, forming a complete 
 chain showing their continuation and persistence; they had 
 their inception in unjust and unfounded suspicions and 
 grew to such an extent and proportion as to render her ir- 
 rational and insane, a victim of insane delusion, which, as 
 said by the expert witness Dr. F. W. Hatch, often arises 
 from misinterpreted suspicions, the gradual building up of 
 which finally results in a fixed delusion, a condition that is 
 not amenable to argument nor mutable by reason; and it is 
 further claimed by counsel that the proof for proponents 
 supports the theory of contestant as" to the existence and 
 effect of these delusions and is, in the main, corroborative 
 of his contention. 
 
 Angelia R. Scott died on December 16, 1897, rising sixty- 
 five years of age, having been born July 14, 1833, in Strong- 
 ville, Maine ; she was over fifty-eight years when she made the 
 original will, over fifty-nine years when she made the first 
 codicil, and over sixty-four years when the final paper was 
 executed, October 22, 1897. She was the widow of Salvin 
 P. Collins, when on March 6, 1889, at the age of fifty-five 
 years, she married Emerson W. Scott, a widower, fifty-two 
 years old, several years her junior. Each had passed the 
 period of probation in the spousal relation; they were no 
 longer young ; both were mature and experienced in married 
 life, with knowledge of the weakness as well as the worth of 
 the opposite sex, with no general illusions of the perfectness 
 of the individual man or woman ; what faults they had were 
 carefully concealed, and each was concerned to appear to 
 best advantage in the presence of the other, as persons seeking 
 each other's society in the way of sparking usually exhibit 
 only the favorable aspects of their character, and are adroit 
 in avoiding the exposure of the shady and the seamy sides 
 of selfishness and coarseness in the grain of the garb of human
 
 Estate of Scott. 285 
 
 nature; such is life in love previous to marriage which is, as 
 we are advised by one of the counsel, "a leap in the dark," 
 which young men and maidens should not venture upon too 
 rashly, but these parties had each survived their first venture 
 and hesitated not to embark upon another. She had been 
 well reared, her parents were persons of respectability and 
 refinement and afforded her the means and opportunity of 
 education suited to her situation and sex ; she had come to 
 California at an early date, in the primitive and pioneer 
 period of American settlement and domination, and had mar- 
 ried her first husband, Mr. Collins, a well-known restaurateur 
 and wine merchant, who founded an establishment which still 
 bears his name and continues flourishing and perpetuating 
 the goodwill and good cheer that brought him local fame and 
 the considerable fortune that made his wife a wealthy widow, 
 and which was at the time of her second marriage some com- 
 pensation for the impairment of those graces of person which 
 caused her to be envied of her own sex and the admired of 
 the other, for she is described as having been endowed with 
 physical form and symmetrical proportions, with stately 
 presence and dignified carriage, conscious of her charms, 
 proud and vain of her beauty, alive to and avaricious of 
 admiration and jealous of attentions bestowed by her husband 
 upon others of her sex, of whom she was not fond, having 
 little confidence in the virtue of women and less faith in the 
 honor of men. 
 
 This woman, who in her youth possessed such a striking- 
 personality as to command attention from the passing throng, 
 believed in her advancing years that she still retained the 
 fatal gift which might claim no worse a husband than the 
 best of men, and at the age of fifty "and upward" she met 
 and married Scott. She was now neither fresh, nor fair, nor 
 perfect in health, whatever might be her conceit that age had 
 not withered nor custom staled her. He had passed the 
 meridian of life, but was tall, shapely, broad-shouldered, a 
 fine figure of a man, somewhat soldierly in bearing, dis- 
 tinguished in appearance, amiable and suave in manner, 
 rather soft and subdued of speech, "genteel in personage, 
 conduct and equipage," in deportment dignified, always cour-
 
 286 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 teous, especially to women, all of whom as witnesses speak 
 favorably of his conduct, to them he seemed to be the pink 
 of perfection and propriety, calculated to please their eye and 
 attract their admiration, conscious of his natural physical 
 gifts, not averse to feminine regard,— altogether the style of 
 man to captivate the still ardent imagination and to arouse 
 the flickering embers in the heart of this ancient dame, for 
 she realized what was said by an author, that so long as the 
 hearts of women preserve the feeblest spark of life, they 
 preserve also shivering near that pale ember, a longing for 
 appreciation and affection ; and although she was aged, if 
 we may believe one of the witnesses, the heyday in her blood 
 was neither tame, nor humble, nor did it always wait upon 
 the judgment, but it was sometimes as riotous in her veins 
 as in younger days. She had been a widow for five years, 
 childless and alone, and she yearned for love and companion- 
 ship ; she had abundance of material means but the heart 
 hunger was unappeased; she craved for something more than 
 money, and she met Scott and surrendered at discretion to 
 his smooth speech and subduing tongue. 
 
 She was a childless widow of fifty-six years ; he was a 
 widower of uncertain age, for in this contest he sets himself 
 at sixty-one years, in the marriage license with this decedent 
 in 1889 at fifty, and in the petition for letters of administra- 
 tion upon the estate of his first wife in 1881 his age was 
 stated at forty years, but whichsoever of these ages and dates 
 is correct, whether it be 1841, 1839, or 1837, he was much 
 younger than his second wife, who was born in 1833 ; she was 
 wealthy, he had no assessable property in his own right and 
 derived no independent fortune through the will of his 
 former wife, who had left her estate, which was separate 
 property, to her three children, to be held in trust by three 
 trustees, Scott being one. The youngest child, a daughter, 
 was in the Atlantic states at the time of his second marriage, 
 and the two boys, aged eleven and thirteen years respectively, 
 he took to his new home, the palatial mansion erected as a 
 homestead bj^ Mr. Collins, and left by him to his widow, 
 who occupied it as her abode until her death. To the new 
 community Mr. Scott added nothing but his portly presence
 
 Estate of Scott. 287 
 
 and his two sons, and they made this house thenceforward 
 their home, contributing nothing substantial to its main- 
 tenance, although their father as their guardian had a con- 
 siderable allowance for their support from the estate of their 
 mother. He himself had been unfortunate in business and 
 at the time he married it does not seem that he possessed 
 any tangible property, although there appears somewhat 
 obliquely, if not obscurely, in the evidence that there was 
 always speculation in his eye and that he had a number of 
 good things in sight, but on his own personal account he had 
 nothing in hand. He had passed through insolvency, into 
 which he had been driven by the conduct of a partner, and 
 came out in his own personal reputation legally unscathed, 
 but had not retrieved his fortunes up to the time when he 
 assumed, through his marriage with the widow Collins, charge 
 and control of her property and affairs. It is said by his 
 intimate friend of twenty-eight years' standing, who has also 
 been his attorney, Mr. Ball, that he was at one time in large 
 business as an importer and commission merchant and was 
 worth considerable money, but he failed through no fault of 
 his own and subsequently engaged in various ventures and 
 enterprises of great pith and moment, and with no notable 
 success, until the opportunity presented by his union with 
 the rich relict of the deceased wine merchant Collins. Mr. 
 Ball, recalling and recounting the business career of his 
 friend and office associate for many years, says that after 
 Scott's mining operations and other various speculations he 
 was "dealing in real estate and mines and such like" up to 
 the time of his marriage to ]\Irs. Collins, "after that he was 
 a good deal occupied with her affairs." The first essay in 
 that occupation was a journey to New York to dispose of a 
 stock of wines, with which transaction she was not satisfied, 
 although Mr. Scott considered it a success and claims to be 
 the author of the achievement. He says that he shipped 
 three thousand barrels of wine to himself in New York City 
 and went there to sell it, and did so, at thirteen and one- 
 eighth cents net ; this was in 1889 ; he sold a part of it him- 
 self personally and then his new wife telegraphed him to come 
 home and he came, leaving the remainder with a firm of
 
 288 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 brokers there who completed the transaction, which he initi- 
 ated, on the lines laid out by him. It seemed, however, that 
 she was dissatisfied and disposed to be querulous about the 
 matter then and ever after. She advanced him a large 
 amount of money for expenses which he claimed to have ap- 
 propriated to that end, and the money was so charged in her 
 books, but the returns and account sales seem to show that 
 the expenses were included in the transaction of sale. She 
 complained to several persons, so Scott says, that he squan- 
 dered her money, "it was all over town," and this like others 
 of her petulant plaints was born of mental disease and delu- 
 sion, but, however this may be, it is plain that immediately 
 after the marriage Scott assumed dominion over his wife's 
 affairs and estate. Without a dollar in his own name prior 
 thereto, the nominal ownership is at once vested in him, and 
 E. W. Scott's name is even engraven over the portal of the 
 new wine-house in Santa Clara county. This transmutation 
 of title was hot on the heels of the marriage. 
 
 Subsequently^ his wife has his name excised and her own 
 inserted in its lieu, and she resumes the reins which upon her 
 marriage she had relinquished to him, asserting that her only 
 safety lay in dispossessing him of control, and expressing 
 her grievous disappointment in having married a man who 
 was not capable of acting as an auxiliary in the management 
 of her extensive interests much less of exercising absolute 
 dominion thereover. 
 
 Whether this was a just accusation or not, it must be con- 
 cluded as to her own commercial capacity, executive energy, 
 and administrative ability that her general prosperity throve 
 apace and that her fortune flourished where others faded and 
 failed, albeit they were sane and sagacious men of affairs 
 and she a woman tormented with chronic disease and delu- 
 sions. Some instances are cited to show that she held out 
 against the market and special circumstances are adduced to 
 suggest a lack of business shrewdness, which simply serve to 
 evidence her stubborn confidence in her own estimate of values 
 and the conditions of their creation, but even occasional error 
 in judgment only signifies a tangent here and there in the 
 consecutive course of her commercial career. By the death
 
 Estate of Scott. 289 
 
 of her first husband she acquired a large estate, $334,000 — 
 less $25,000, special bequests and expenses of administration. 
 In all the vicissitudes of viticulture and other branches of 
 trade and industry, from that day until the date of her own 
 decease, from the zenith to the nadir, she managed so wisely 
 as to preserve the fortunfe left to her by Collins with slight 
 diminution in value; the property devised to her by her first 
 husband is still there in kind and quantity and much im- 
 proved in quality, and is now the bone of contention in this 
 contest ; but assuming all this as in proof, is it inconsistent 
 with contestant's claim that she was insane or a monomaniac, 
 since business capacity may coexist with monomania or delu- 
 sions such as are alleged in this case ? 
 
 What manner of woman have we here who, with unbal- 
 anced mind, held against the elements of adversity an estate 
 of such magnitude virtually unimpaired as she received it 
 from him who with her conjointly created it, when men of 
 perfect poise and unchallenged equity of intellect went to 
 the wall in the time of trial during the decade preceding her 
 death? 
 
 One of the counsel, occupying a position in the controversy 
 somewhat separated from partisan bias (former Judge E. D. 
 Sawyer), ultimates his analysis of her character in this wise: 
 A woman of passion, uncontrollable temper, suspicious, jeal- 
 ous, gross in manners, coarse in conduct, vulgar and obscene, 
 and yet a good business woman, penurious, exacting espe- 
 cially in household affairs : altogether an unlovely creature 
 is present in this sketch of the testatrix. 
 
 Mr. Bolton, of counsel for proponents, describes her as a 
 woman of naturally strong mind, of resolute purpose, great 
 determination, and indomitable will power ; and Mr. Estee, in 
 his written comment on ex- Judge Sawyer's observations, char- 
 acterizes her as a "most aggressive person, sane or insane; 
 as aggressive as any person whose life was ever brought to the 
 attention of a court of justice." Mr. Scott's own testimony 
 shows that she was a woman of great clearness and strength 
 of mind, possessing a power of reasoning and logical faculty. 
 
 We have here, then, a case where the possession of general 
 vigor of mind and intellectual capacity is conceded, but it 
 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. 1—19
 
 290 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 is insisted that in respect to the contestant the decedent, was 
 under such an insane delusion that she could not act sensibly 
 in disposing of her property hy will: Will of White, 121 N. 
 Y. 412, 24 N. E. 935. 
 
 Mr. Shurtleff, in the course of his able argument, under- 
 takes to demonstrate a progressive insanity as manifested by 
 a change of temperament, and supports this theory by citing 
 her early education and rearing and the subsequent lapse 
 into habits of low language and indecorous conduct ; he claims 
 that a comparison of her early life with her later years ex- 
 hibits a marked change in temperament which is an evidence 
 of insanity. 
 
 Mrs. Helen L. Gerrish says her aunt was well reared and 
 particular as to dress, and the evidence generally as to her 
 early career proves that she was a lady in appearance and ac- 
 tion. The change came later betokening the development of 
 insanity; the precise point of time at which the change of 
 temperament was made manifest is not so easy to ascertain. 
 Such a change is usually so gradual in the system that the 
 terms of the transition are almost imperceptible until the 
 revolution is complete and we become all at once conscious of 
 the progress from normal to abnormal, and recall stages and 
 phases in personal history unnoted at the time of original 
 observation. Such, it is argued, was the case here. 
 
 The testimony as to the acts of immodesty in speech and 
 behavior must be considered as produced to establish the the- 
 ory of general insanity ; otherwise it is not of paramount im- 
 portance, since this case has been reduced to delusion, and 
 fixed or habitual general insanity can no longer be main- 
 tained against this testatrix ; but her personal history is im- 
 portant, and if there be such a transition in it, as is claimed 
 by Mr. Shurtleff, it is worth while to note it as a circum- 
 stance or link in the entire chain of proof. She was un- 
 doubtedly coarse and vulgar in her home, where she talked 
 and acted differently from what she was accustomed to on 
 the promenade or in her shopping expeditions about the town, 
 when she affected the airs of an aristocrat and the demeanor 
 and deportment of a duchess, but the pomp of parade was 
 discarded when she reached the cover of her own roof and
 
 Estate of Scott. 291 
 
 appeared among the people of her own selection and hiring, 
 or a few intimates, before whom she threw off her affecta- 
 tion of reserve and reticence and assumed an abandon of act 
 and expression that would put Billingsgate to the blush and 
 cause its fishmongers to hide their diminished heads in shame. 
 
 More than a passing allusion to these features of foulness 
 is necessary only becavise of their being indicated as idiosyn- 
 crasies symptomatic of insanity and denoting a radical revo- 
 lution in her normal nature ; but if it appear that these pecu- 
 liarities were of long duration and had attained gradual 
 growth or been in process of development for many years 
 antecedent to her second marriage, the effect of the argument 
 of counsel for contestant will necessarily suffer eclipse, par- 
 tial or total, as related to the question of insane delusion. 
 
 We find in the revelation of the, secrets of her home life 
 an account from the lips of servants and other inmates of 
 her household establishment, stories of speeches, profane and 
 vulgar, obscene eccentricities of allusion, departures from 
 modesty in dress, some sportive gambolings before her mir- 
 rors in nature's simplicity of vesture, accompanied by re- 
 marks of an original and unique, but morally uncouth, if not 
 grossly indecent, constniction. All these exhibitions were in 
 the freedom of her own home, where she might do as she 
 pleased, where there was no one her right to dispute ; her 
 conduct and conversation in such circumstances may be criti- 
 cised, even censured, but predicating insanity thereon is an- 
 other matter. Sanity and insanity are to be determined by 
 other criteria than these occurrences in such premises. We 
 must take a more comprehensive survey of 'the situation of 
 sanity, a broader and longer view, than is afforded by the 
 circumscribed boundaries and narrow precincts of the inclosed 
 house and home. We must take the whole life of the sub- 
 ject of inquiry in every observable manner and from every 
 possible point of view to acquire a just judgment. 
 
 It is claimed against the contention of contestant that de- 
 cedent's conduct after her second marriage was similar to 
 what it was prior thereto and while she was the wife of Mr. 
 Collins and during widowhood : the proponents have both by 
 the cross-examination of contestant's witnesses and the direct
 
 292 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 examination of their own attempted to show that while she 
 was a widow and also before the decease of her first husband 
 she was profane and obscene in her language, had had trouble 
 with her servants, had broken dishes and smashed furniture, 
 and had suspected that Mr. Collins was unfaithful to her. 
 
 This was testified to by Mrs. Meily, a Witness for contest- 
 ant, who knew Mrs. Scott for twenty-seven years, was her 
 niece, her sister's child, now over fifty years of age, and who 
 said that decedent would indulge in the most dreadful oaths 
 and obscenities of speech, and was always addicted to this 
 mode of expression from the time she first saw her when she 
 visited her at her home in Columbus, Ohio, in 1871. Mrs. 
 Meily did not know Mrs. Scott in her early years, but the 
 first time she saw decedent the latter used profane language 
 and the habit continued %strong upon her always. Her vio- 
 lence of temper w^as not exhibited at that time and Mrs. Meily 
 first became conscious of decedent's infirmity in that particu- 
 lar when the former came to California, twenty-four years 
 ago; then she saw her aunt Angelia in those spells of sulki- 
 ness and anger in which she gave scope to her destructive pro- 
 pensities. She was always having trouble with her servants 
 and became angry with them without cause. This was be- 
 fore the death of Mr. Collins and also after. Decedent was 
 a woman of very suspicious disposition and distrusted her 
 best friends; she was very irritable and petulant; she drank 
 every day and was in the habit of imbibing intoxicants daily 
 as long as Mrs. Meily knew her; drank whisky three or four 
 times every day. This habit she had during the lifetime of 
 Mr. Collins. She used to pretend to size or measure it in a 
 tablespoon. Mrs. Meily saw decedent several times when she 
 thought she was under the influence of liquor, but this was 
 not during the lifetime of Mr. Collins. Her habit of drink- 
 ing grew gradually. In the latter years of her life decedent 
 drank harder than before. She was suspicious of the fidel- 
 ity of Mr. Collins and told witness so many times; all the 
 same w^ith Mr. Scott. Decedent was a woman of striking 
 appearance at the time witness first met her and always 
 dressed very neatly, taking a great deal of pains with her 
 attire. She was proud of her personal beauty, fond of money,
 
 Estate op Scott. 293 
 
 avaricious. Witness knew that decedent smashed dishes and 
 furniture in the lifetime of Collins. Decedent was insanely 
 jealous of her second husband and accused witness of inti- 
 macy with him, which accusation was utterly false, and there 
 was no reason for any such imputation. Witness denied ever 
 having been alone with Mr. Scott. Mrs. Meily is a member 
 of St. Peter's Episcopal Church, and when the decedent, her 
 aunt, learned that she had joined the church she cursed and 
 swore violently; this was at Easter time in 1896. Decedent 
 spoke to witness of her suspicion of Scott's intimacy with 
 the domestics and told her that she had employed detectives 
 to track him, and that she herself, in company with her sister, 
 Mrs. Garcia, went in her carriage to three different houses 
 to inquire if there was a woman kept there by Mr. Scott, 
 without result. On one occasion three years ago, in front 
 of her first husband's picture, the portrait of Salvin Perry 
 Collins, decedent swore roundly at it and cursed him and 
 said she hoped he was in the nethermost portion of the in- 
 fernal regions, or words to that effect. 
 
 Mrs. Nellie Swall, a niece of the first husband of the de- 
 cedent, testified that she knew her ever since she could re- 
 member. The witness was born in 1858; her father, Lemuel 
 Perry Collins, died before her uncle, Salvin Perry Collins. 
 Witness used to visit the house of decedent from the time 
 she was a child and spent weeks there together. Decedent 
 and her first husband used to quarrel at times in regard to 
 his drinking. On such occasions each indulged high words 
 and low language. Decedent had a quick temper and when 
 she was cross she swore and cursed at anybody at whom she 
 was angry. ITer habits were always the same as wife and 
 widow and wife again; she was very nervous; she had dys- 
 pepsia and indigestion and stomach troubles; when feeling 
 well she was very nice and pleasant to everyone. When she 
 became the wife of Mr. Scott she often came in to see witness 
 at her home in Mountain View when she got off the train 
 on the way to her ranch; she got mad at witness frequently 
 and then would swear at her. In the lifetime of the uncle 
 of Avitness the decedent would accuse him of keeping a woman 
 down town, and of running with that class of women. De-
 
 294 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 cedent left her first husband at one time and went to the 
 house of her sister, Mrs. Garcia, and remained there until 
 Collins induced her to return and sought to win her by vari- 
 ous kind acts and to reclaim her affection, and he would take 
 her out riding and thus reinstated himself in her good graces. 
 Decedent was very fond of dress and dressed younger than 
 her age. She began taking the massage treatment while she 
 was a widow. As to her sanity, witness thought she was sane ; 
 she was smart in business ways. 
 
 Mrs. Swall was a witness for proponent and is the wife of 
 George Swall and lived for a part of the time with her sister, 
 who before her decease was the wife of the present husband 
 of witness and had charge of the children, of whom she is 
 stepmother and aunt, and who are minors and legatees un- 
 der the will in contest. Witness used to live off and on for 
 years with her uncle, Salvin Perry Collins, and subsequently 
 for some time with his widow, and she says that Mr. Collins 
 was a kind and courteous gentleman. He seldom quarreled 
 or gave offense to anyone. Mrs. Collins was not an untruth- 
 ful woman, but her temperament was excitable. She did ac- 
 cuse witness of trying to poison her, which witness denied, 
 and she thinks that decedent believed her, although she after- 
 ward repeated the accusation. Decedent said that Mr. Scott 
 was trying to poison her and trying to put her in an insane 
 asylum. Witness asked her why she married him, and she 
 said it was in a business manner, as she wanted somebody 
 to attend to her affairs and she thought he was capable, but 
 she found he was very different. Decedent did say that Mr. 
 Scott was running after other women ; but did not specify 
 any particular person. She had made similar remarks about 
 Mr. Collins, her first husband. She said that Scott was try- 
 ing to get her out of the way and that he had told her that 
 all that he had married her for was her money. 
 
 Mrs. Helen Louise Gerrish, a niece of decedent and a daugh- 
 ter of her sister, Mrs. Frank Garcia, knew Mrs. Scott always. 
 The witness lived in San Francisco prior to her marriage, 
 which was in 1881, and from that time went and lived north 
 in Port Townsend, in the state of Washington. During that 
 period she made frequent visits here, about every year, three
 
 Estate op Scott. 295 
 
 months at a time; one visit was for four months. Witness 
 met decedent always on her visits. Remembers her when she 
 Avas Mrs. Collins, but he died before witness was married; 
 is now forty-two years of age. When she was a girl she often 
 went to visit IMr. and Mrs. Collins; knew of their having 
 difficulties. Decedent was suspicious of her husband, 'Mr. 
 Collins. Once she went away from him and came over to 
 the house of the mother of witness and remained there three 
 months. Mr. Collins used to come there to visit his wife 
 and finally induced her to return home. Decedent did net 
 enjoy good health:- she had stomach troubles and dyspepsia. 
 Saw her when she was suffering many times while she was a 
 wife and after she became a widow. Saw her at such times 
 exhibit a violent temper when she was the wife of ]\Ir. Col- 
 lins, also when she was his widow and when she became the 
 wife of Mr. Scott. Never saw her break anything in her 
 transports of passion, but she would swear and curse and 
 have trouble with the servants. Decedent had to be strict in 
 diet. Witness thought she was perfectly sane. Mrs. Ger- 
 rish was also a witness for proponent. 
 
 It should seem from these testimonies coming from inti- 
 mate kin that the decedent's peculiarities of behavior were 
 of long standing, and that for, twenty-seven years at least, 
 according to her niece, Mrs. Meily, she was habituated to for- 
 bidden forms of discourse in colloquial converse, and that 
 there is no line of demarcation to be drawn at or after the 
 time of second marriage. 
 
 These eccentric habits of speech were not suddenly ac- 
 quired, and are not, therefore, to be considered as presump- 
 tive evidence of insanity: Taylor's Medical Jurisprudence, 
 632. 
 
 Mr. Shurtleff. however, insists that it cannot he said that 
 this woman manifested merely eccentricities, and that her 
 acts and language are much more serious in their relation 
 to insanity than eccentricity, which is, according to the defin- 
 ition of Dr. Hatch, a peculiarity of character pertaining to 
 an individual, and may be marked by strong or weak indi- 
 vidualitv. where, as Dr. Maudsley says, the person does not
 
 296 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 run in the common tracks of thought and feeling, yet is not 
 insane: Mauclsley's Pathology, 59. 
 
 Maudsley remarks that eccentricities of this sort may be 
 of all kinds and degrees, from mild and odd to grotesque 
 and silly, running through a scale reaching from actual in- 
 sanity to the borderland of genius; on the one hand it may 
 ripen into insanity when it is not counterbalanced by a 
 strong judgment which fits the individual to weigh things, 
 himself included, in their just proportions from the outside, 
 and, if need be, to satirize himself as a fool among fools. 
 In Dr. Taylor's Medical Jurisprudence it is said that an eccen- 
 tric man may be convinced that what he is doing is absurd 
 and contrary to the general rules of society, but he professes 
 to set these at defiance. In eccentricity there is the will to 
 do or, not to do. Eccentric habits suddenly acquired are, 
 however, presumptive of insanity. 
 
 Instances and illustrations of eccentricities in individuals 
 otherwise noted for intellectual excellence may be numerously 
 cited, such as Dr. Samuel Johnson's habit of touching all 
 the lamp-posts in Fleet street. Balfour Browne says that 
 as long as this was merely automatic it was an eccentricity, 
 but when it came to demand an expenditure of energy it be- 
 came insanity: Browne's Medical Jurisprudence of Insan- 
 ity, sec. 255. 
 
 A man ever so eccentric will generally reason calmly and 
 rationally upon the subjects upon which he entertains pecu- 
 liar views ; but a monomaniac will, upon an attempt to rea- 
 son with him, become excited, and reject all reason because 
 the delusion takes full control of his reasoning powers; he 
 is unable to reason upon a subject; the delusion is dominant 
 over all the other faculties ; but in a mere eccentric the con- 
 trary occurs, and he is even amused and laughs at his own 
 oddities. Many examples of eccentricity in men of* high sta- 
 tion and of large mental calibre may be recalled from ex- 
 perience or reading, such as dispensing with some nonessen- 
 tial article of attire, or what may be deemed superfluous ap- 
 panage of apparel, such as a necktie or collar, as in the case 
 of the governor of Massachusetts, George N. Briggs, who was 
 for six terms a representative in Congress, and never wore
 
 Estate of Scott. 297 
 
 a collar, or in the instance of a local celebrity, noted as a pub- 
 licist and orator, who uniformly dispenses with a necktie; 
 but tested by any definition of eccentricity, suspicion that 
 she would be poisoned by her husband or by those whom he 
 might induce to do so ; that he and others were attempting 
 to place her in an insane asylum ; that he was unfaithful to 
 her, — all of Avhich suspicions were unfounded, cannot be said 
 to be eccentricities : they plainly indicated a diseased condi- 
 tion of the mind, so far as her husband was concerned. These 
 were well-defined insane delusions, and they operated upon 
 the testamentary act. Suspicions may be entertained to such 
 a degree as to render one insane. As said by the expert wit- 
 ness, Dr. F. W. Hatch, often these delusions arise from mis- 
 interpreted suspicions, and the gradual building up of those 
 suspicions finally results in a fixed delusion. 
 
 Dr. Hatch is eminent in his profession, and for several 
 years has been connected with the management of insane 
 asylums in this state, and is at this time in chief direction 
 of all the hospitals for the insane in California, and he has 
 given it as his opinion, predicated upon the accuracy of the 
 hypothetical questions, that the decedent was insane and 
 possessed of three fixed delusions: (1) That her husband was 
 unfaithful to her; (2) That he was trying to poison her; (3) 
 That he was trying to put her in an insane asylum ; and 
 that if such delusions continued for years they would consti- 
 tute habitual insanity. Dr. Hatch says that it is a fact that 
 a person of ordinary perception may be acute and accurate, 
 with a retentive memory, his statements reliable in the main, 
 and even his judgment on matters connected with his pecu- 
 liar train of delusions, belief, or feeling, accepted as trust- 
 worthy, but notwithstanding this mental activity he may har- 
 bor delasions, not always exposed in casual conversations, 
 which, may be called forth by anyone cognizant of their ex- 
 istence and of his cerebral conditions, and all the authorities 
 so hold, and such has been the personal observation and ex- 
 perience of Dr. Tlatcli himself: 1 Beck's IMedical Jurispru- 
 dence, 729. 
 
 Expert evidence is really an argument of the expert to the 
 court, and is valuable only with regard to .the proof of tlie
 
 298 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 facts and the validity of the reasons advanced for the con- 
 clusions; therefore, if we find the facts assumed in the ques- 
 tion to be unsupported by proofs in any essential particular 
 the conclusion must be rejected; so it must be with the tes- 
 timony of Dr. Hatch if it shall appear, when the grounds 
 are tested, that there is no adequate reason for his opinion. 
 
 Each side in this case, as in all others of like kind, chooses 
 to criticise evidence of this character and to suggest that the 
 average expert is necessarily a partisan in the case. It is 
 not necessary, however, to asperse the integrity, intellectual 
 or moral, of any professional gentleman called upon to tes- 
 tify herein ; it is sufficient to allude to the commonplaces of 
 judicial expression that no tribunal would be justified in de- 
 ciding against the capacity of the testatrix upon the mere 
 opinion of witnesses, however numerous or respectable, and 
 that it is the province and the duty of the court or jury to 
 draw the inference of fact from the evidence before them 
 regulated by the rules of law — being assisted but not super- 
 seded in that function by the opinions of experts : In re Red- 
 field, 116 Cal. 655, 48 Pac. 794. 
 
 Dr. Hatch says that monomania or partial insanity is char- 
 acterized by some peculiar illusion or erroneous conviction 
 imposed upon the understanding and giving rise to a partial 
 aberration of judgment, and the individual thus affected 
 would be rendered unable to think correctly on subjects con- 
 nected with the particular illusion, while in other respects 
 he would not betray any palpable disorder of the mind; this 
 is according to authority and is the result of this doctor's 
 experience : Hammond on Insanity, 13-24. 
 
 It is a fact that in conversing with patients on topics for- 
 eign to their delusions one will find no difference between 
 them and other persons untainted by mental malady; they 
 seem sane on all subjects until one strikes the spring which 
 is the source of their intellectual disturbance : Ray, sec. 285. 
 
 In the case assumed in th>e hypothetical questions pro- 
 pounded by counsel for contestant, where a woman born and 
 reared in respectable circumstances, fairly well educated, and 
 surrounded by wealth and luxury, with all the advantages 
 of wealth and position enjoyed by her for many years, mani-
 
 Estate of Scott. 299 
 
 fests at an advanced period of life, say at the age of fifty or 
 sixty years, a complete revolution in her external character, 
 and frequently, when under excitement, and at other times 
 when calm, and without apparent cause or reason, both in 
 the presence of servants and of acquaintances and compara- 
 tive strangers, indulges in vulgar, profane, obscene and blas- 
 phemous language, breaks dishes and smashes things gener- 
 ally, and goes around naked and unadorned, and perpetrates 
 other acts and antics of an abnormal character, she is insane. 
 Dr. Hatch's answers to the hypothetical questions pro- 
 pounded to him were based upon his understanding that the 
 phenomena presented therein appeared after the marriage 
 of the lady to Mr. Scott. He took it from that time as to 
 one of the hypothetical questions, the first question went be- 
 fore her marriage to IMr. Scott, to 1884 or 1887 or somewhere 
 along there; but he took the whole business of it, and his 
 judgment of her mental state proceeded on the accuracy of 
 the assumptions postulated in the entire proposition. His 
 conclusion was dependent upon their truth; if the hypotheti- 
 cal questions were so framed as to show that for many years 
 she had been obscene in her language, violent in her conduct, 
 profane, suspicious of her servants, and of everybody around 
 her. charging her former husband in his lifetime with im- 
 moral conduct and infidelity, and that for long years she had 
 been drinking to excess, such facts should be taken into con- 
 sideration and would affect the conclusion as to her sanity; 
 and if it should appear that her associations had been mainly 
 and almost entirely with her servants and with men whose 
 customary conversation was unrefined, and that for a quar- 
 ter of a century prior to 1896 she had been suspicious, irri- 
 table, annoyed at trifles, unable to retain domestics on ac- 
 count of her crankiness, and that she had been during this 
 period immodest at times in her deportment, .all these facts 
 would be taken into estimation as lessening the importance of 
 the symptoms. ' 
 
 Dr. H. N. Eueker, an accomplished physician and surgeon, 
 now president of the board of health in Oakland, and for- 
 merly for a term of four years superintendent of the Stock- 
 ton Asylum, and three years and upward director of that in-
 
 800 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 stitution and now engaged in general practice, but continu- 
 ous in his special studies of insanity and often called in con- 
 sultation in such cases, concurs in the opinion expressed by 
 Dr. Hatch, that a person such as is described in the hypo- 
 thetical questions must be insane. Dr. Rucker says that such 
 a person would have habitual mania characterized by fixed 
 delusions. In conversation with insane persons there is no 
 difference between them and others in speaking on topics 
 foreign to their delusions; that is to say, this is true of per- 
 sons possessed of delusions upon certain subjects, or mono- 
 maniacs. Of course, in answering hypothetical questions, the 
 correctness of the premises is assumed. 
 
 In commenting upon this evidence, Mr. Shurtleff natu- 
 rally lauded *his own side and said that the testimony com- 
 ing from the other side of an expert character showing at 
 the times they came in contact with her she was rational, is 
 of no importance, when it appears that their acquaintance 
 was of a slight and casual kind, not aftording an oppor- 
 tunity to judge of her mind from all around observation. 
 These mere business acquaintances, seeing her for a few 
 minutes only at a time and then on some special subject, 
 foreign to her delusion, are clearly inferior in value and 
 weight, and cannot furnish a safe criterion to establish a con- 
 clusion of sanity ; they did not see her in circumstances cal- 
 culated to enable them to form an intelligent opinion of her 
 calibre or capacity. A person possessed must be under ob- 
 servation for some time and under a variety of conditions in 
 order that her delusion may be detected. An insane delusion 
 may be concealed from many who occasionally meet a person 
 and whose conversation and observation are contracted by 
 the circumstances of the occasion, while a few who are within 
 a closer social circle with superior chances for inspection of 
 all sides of the subject will be better able to pronounce a 
 more perfect opinion, because the delusion is more liable to 
 develop itself under the provocation or inducement of gen- 
 eral or protracted and local intercourse in the home circle, 
 where the conventional circumspection and guards which ob- 
 tain outside are not always maintained. At home, where 
 she was at ease, she spoke freely; abroad on business she 
 kept a guard on her mouth.
 
 Estate of Scott. 301 
 
 It were well if she could have pursued the precept of the 
 preacher and practiced his lesson of virtue always and 
 everywhere, at home and abroad, to set guard on her mouth, 
 a sure seal upon her lips, that she might not fall by them, 
 and her tongue destroy her not, and that she might have 
 put up her petition as did David, when he cried out, — 
 
 "Set 'a watch, O Lord, before my mouth; 
 And a door round about my lips; 
 Incline not my heart to evil words, 
 To make excuses in sins. ' ' 
 
 But she cared little, according to all accounts, for preacher 
 or psalmist, and preferred a tongue sharpened like a ser- 
 pent with the poison of adders under her lips. 
 
 That decedent uttered apprehensions of being poisoned 
 and implicated Scott appears from the evidence. In 1889 
 she made statements to that effect to Mrs. Meily and A. E. 
 Ball; in 1890 to Lloyd Scott, Wesley Scott and Mrs. Paisley: 
 in 1890-91 to Joseph INTortier, and from 1890 to 1897 to Geo. 
 F. Dyer; in 1891 to Major Hammond, Miss Richards, and T. 
 H. Froelich; in 1892 to John A. O'Dea and Thomas Talman; 
 in 1893 to Revilo F. Morton ; in 1895 to Mrs. Ogilvie and Miss 
 Anderson; in 1896 to Mrs. Cook, and in 1897 and 1896 to 
 Miss Gustafson; in 1897 to William Warwick, Mrs. Burn- 
 ham, Dr. Spencer, Dr. Mays. Dr. Spencer examined mat- 
 ter for poison, at request of Dr. Greth, who took the mat- 
 ter for examination at instance of Mrs. Scott. Many of the 
 witnesses for proponents testified to similar statements; in 
 1891-93 Mrs. Scott so spoke to Edward Lewis Brown; stie 
 also made mention of her fear of poisoning to several others 
 on the same side, Mrs. Gerrish, Mrs. Putman, Mrs. Nellie 
 Swall, and in 1897 to Wealthy Wormell. A. E. Ball tes- 
 tified that she made the remark to him that she had to keep 
 her whisky under lock and key to keep it from being poi- 
 soned, for she was afraid that somebody whould put poison, or 
 something of that kind in it. Lloyd Scott said that she 
 complained that his father was trying to poison her, that 
 he would get the cook to do it for $10. Lloyd and his 
 brother Wesley always tasted her food at the table at her 
 request to see if it was poisoned; she claimed her whisky
 
 302 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 had been poisoned with arsenic. Lloyd's brother, Wesley, 
 testified she said his father was trying to poison her, and 
 he used to have to taste her food every day to see if there 
 was poison in it. He thinks it was about the month of July, 
 1890, when he came back from New York when he first 
 heard Mrs. Scott say that his father was trying to poison 
 her; she talked about it most every day. In, cross-examina- 
 tion Wesley modified his statement about having to taste 
 the food every day, and said that his stepmother would have 
 periods of two or three months that she would make him 
 taste it, and then the rest of the time she would not care 
 about it. This might seem to show a suspension of the 
 alleged delusion for nine or ten months at a time. So in 
 regard to this ' item, it was not continuous, persistent, or 
 fixed. 
 
 Mrs. Paisley said that Mrs. Scott stated that there was 
 poison in her food, principally mush. Mrs. Paisley could not 
 tell how frequently this statement was made to her by Mrs. 
 Scott. 
 
 Joseph Mortier testified that she said Mr. Scott was try- 
 ing to poison her, this was some time after Scott came back 
 from New York, in the latter part of 1890 or 1891 ; she 
 said it at different times during that period. 
 
 George F. Dyer testified that she accused Scott of trying 
 to poison her. Dyer went to her house one morning; she 
 sent for him and she sent word downstairs that she was sick 
 and wanted him to come upstairs, and she said that she had 
 been poisoned by Scott or somebody else in the household 
 that he had employed to do it. She said her husband was 
 trying to get away with her, trying to kill her, to get her 
 property and poison her. 
 
 A. C. Hammond testified that she said that she was afraid 
 of her life, except for the presence of the children she did 
 not know that she would be safe from poisoning. This was 
 in a conversation Math Mrs. Scott in 1891, relative to her 
 husband; the second or third interview Hammond had with 
 her, somewhere about August, 1891, she spoke of the use of 
 poison by her husband. 
 
 Miss Kichards said that Mrs. Scott said that they intended 
 to poison her, accusing Mr. Scott and those all around her.
 
 Estate of Scott. 303 
 
 Theodore Froelich said she told him that Scott and Mr. 
 Ball were poisoners; this was in 1890 or 1891. 
 
 John O'Dea testified that she said the people were trying 
 to poison her and did want to poison her. Thomas Talman 
 testified that she said Mr. Scott or some one else was trying 
 to poison her. She asked Talman if he would taste the 
 milk; he tasted it and said that there was nothing the mat- 
 ter with it at all. She said to this witness that he would 
 poison her as quick as anybody, to which the witness replied 
 that he had no object in poisoning her, because he did not 
 think that she would ever leave him anything. 
 
 To Revilo F. Morton in 1893 she said that Scott was try- 
 ing to poison her, and that she had been poisoned before 
 Morton knew her. 
 
 To Mrs. Ogilvie she accused Scott of having put some- 
 thing in her enema several times. Mrs. Ogilvie would be 
 there fixing tea for her and she told her to hide it for fear 
 Scott would put something in it. 
 
 To Ulrica Anderson she said he tried to poison her. Ulrica 
 had to take an egg every morning and beat it in her room, 
 so that he should not be "able to poison it ; she had to taste 
 her food so that no poison could be in it. Mrs. Scott was 
 afraid there was poison in it. She charged Mr. Scott with 
 trying to poison her. Ulrica had tasted the food before 
 Mrs. Scott ate it and was none the worse for it. 
 
 To Mrs. Cook decedent said that Scott would poison her 
 whisky. Mrs. Scott kept the whisky locked up and used a 
 little every morning with an egg. 
 
 To Ida Gustafson she said he tried to poison her and she 
 used to ask Ida to taste her beef tea for her. She would 
 accuse Mr. Scott of poisoning her steak and her beef tea, 
 and Ida would have to taste it in the mornings before ^Irs. 
 Scott would drink it. IMrs. Scott said that it would not 
 affect Ida as she was stronger than herself. 
 
 Mrs. Scott asked William Warwick if he thought that 
 Scott would put any poison or anything into her liquor when 
 she drank. 
 
 Mrs. l^urnham testified that Mrs. Scott would talk to her 
 about how ]\Ir. Scott was trying to poison her. She thought 
 that the food and almost everything she ate was tampered
 
 304 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 with. She suspected that Mr. Scott had some one put 
 poison in it — if he did not put poison in it himself; that he 
 had the cook or the coachman put poison in it. Mrs. Burn- 
 ham always had to taste Mrs. Scott's steak, her cream, or her 
 mush before she would use it herself. 
 
 Dr. Spencer testified to the signing of a certificate to the 
 effect that the articles brought to him by Dr. Greth at the 
 request of Mrs. Scott contained absolutely no poisonous mat- 
 ter. Dr. Maj^s said that Mrs. Scott told him that people 
 were trying to poison her and that she had some one to taste 
 her food before she would eat it. Dr. Greth took the arti- 
 cles in the certificate signed by Dr. Spencer at Mrs. Scott's 
 request, because she begged him to have it done for her. 
 These were all witnesses for contestant. 
 
 To Edward Lewis Brown, a witness for proponent, she 
 made a statement that some one was trying to poison her 
 food. She said she was afraid Scott would poison her, and 
 she gave as a reason that Scott was a young man and she 
 was an old woman, and she thought that therefore he would 
 try and poison her, and that he was no husband to her. 
 Mrs. Helen Gerrish says she heard Mrs. Scott say she thought 
 Mr. Scott might poison her. She accused Mrs. Nellie Swall of 
 trying to poison her and made this lady sometimes taste her 
 food. Mrs. Swall told her that she was not trying to poison 
 her, and thinks she believed her, although she afterward 
 repeated the accusation and she talked to her about Scott's 
 trying to poison her. Mrs. Scott told Mrs. Swall as a rea- 
 son w^hy she thought Mr. Scott was trying to poison her was 
 that he was after her money; that he married her for her 
 money and was trying to get her out of the way. She told 
 her this down at the house in Mountain View the year Scott 
 returned from the east after doing some business for her. 
 
 Wealthy Wormell heard Mrs. Scott say once there might 
 be poison in the food ; she did not say who might be poison- 
 ing her food. 
 
 Mrs. Scott told Mrs. Putman that Scott had been trying 
 to poison her. 
 
 Mr. Grossman does not remember much about any state- 
 ment of the kind, although he might have heard something, 
 but found it hard to "memorize" anything.
 
 Estate of Scott. 305 
 
 It is claimed by counsel for contestant that the delusions 
 existing in the mind of the decedent as to Scott's unfaith- 
 fulness to his marriage vows with servant maids and other 
 women and as to a conspiracy to send her to an insane 
 asylum are also established by these witnesses, whose testi- 
 mony may here be summarized in these respects: 
 
 Miss Ulrica Anderson was employed by INIrs. Scott at her 
 house in this city as an upstairs girl; went there in April in 
 1895, and left there in August, 1895. Mrs. Scott was a 
 woman of very violent temper and used coarse language. 
 Ulrica was her maid. Mrs. Scott M^as in the habit of using 
 oaths and obscene words : she would fly into a passion and 
 become wild, tear her hair, slap her face, pound the tables, 
 and break articles, throw them down on the floor, smash 
 crockery, whatever was near at hand; any trifle would start 
 her. She was most excitable, a proud and vain woman, very 
 vain of her personal charms; she would at times undress 
 and dance before her mirror and display her figure in that 
 manner with evident self-admiration ; she had a fine form, 
 and soft, white skin, clear and free from blemish, tall and 
 well developed, proportions ample without angles, easy 
 curves; she had massage treatment, not from her maid, but 
 from a regular masseur ; she was very jealous of Mr. Scott ; 
 she was anxious to obtain some knowledge of wrongdoing 
 on his part; she said she would give Ulrica $1,000 if the 
 maid would try to inveigle him into sleeping with her, but 
 the girl declined to engage in any such enterprise and told 
 her that she was virtuous and would not allow herself to 
 entertain so vile a proposition. Mrs. Scott was quick-tem- 
 pered, strong-minded, obstinate, violent in her anger ; and she 
 broke out constantly and without cause, but Mr. Scott was 
 a modest and nice gentleman. 
 
 Mrs. Estella Burnham, who is now living at 1743 Franklin 
 street, the Scott mansion, knew the late Mrs. Scott and was 
 engaged as her maid from June 18, 1897, to the summer of 
 that year, and was with her from 6 o'clock in the morning 
 until 9, 10, or even 11 o'clock at night when she retired. 
 She spent her nights at the house of Mrs. Scott and had a 
 separate bedroom. Mrs. Scott's constant topic was the sup- 
 posed infidelity of IMr. Scott, whom she accused of unfaith- 
 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. I — 20
 
 306 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 fulness with the various girls in service and also with a ]\Irs. 
 Meily, a niece of her own, and with a Mrs. Paisley, a sister 
 of her first husband, an elderly lady. Mrs. Scott never ac- 
 cused Mrs. Burnham to her face, but she did say that all 
 women were bad and that she would not trust any woman, 
 and that she would give $1,000 to any girl who would seduce 
 Scott so that she could catch him in the act. She just 
 suspected that Scott was running around all the time with 
 the women when he was down at the ranch, that was her 
 sole subject of conversation from morning until night. She 
 was always talking of her suspicions of her husband's in- 
 fidelity and of his poisoning of her and putting poison in 
 her food and drink, and Mrs. Burnham had to taste what 
 Mrs. Scott ate and drank before she would touch anything 
 for fear of poison. There was nothing of the kind in reality, 
 no poison in the house ; there was not the least provocation 
 for her spells. Mrs. Burnham could always tell in advance 
 in the morning when Mrs. Scott was going to have a bad 
 day; her eyes would show when she slept ill and she would 
 be wild in her appearance, and then they would have a time. 
 She was always harping on the same subject — Scott's 
 amours. She was desirous of finding out whether he was 
 really true. After Mrs. Burnham left on the 4th of De- 
 cember, 1897, she visited the house several times but did not 
 return to the service during the lifetime of the decedent. 
 While she was there witness was asked by Mrs. Scott to act 
 as a detective three times in two weeks, and pretended to 
 comply and put on a sort of disguise and went out and came 
 back without any discovery, but made no attempt to pursue 
 him, as she would not do so except by way of pleasing Mrs. 
 Scott, as she was in her employ and necessitated to make 
 this pretense of watching him to retain her situation; so she 
 consented to play the part. 
 
 Frederick J. Bockwoldt was foreman of the Scott ranch 
 in Mountain View for a while. Mrs. Scott used to send for 
 him to come to her room every time she came down to the 
 ranch to talk with her. He often went and spent an hour 
 or two at a time; at first she would talk about biLsiness, but 
 after a while she would converse about Scott, and said she 
 believed that he was unfaithful to her with certain ladies
 
 Estate of Scott. 307 
 
 in the vicinity, and she asked Boekwoldt to find out if this 
 was not true. He told her that Scott never went off the ranch 
 except accompanied by him and Lloyd. Mrs. Scott's con- 
 duct was immodest in the extreme, and she would talk in 
 the most shocking manner. 
 
 When Mr. Scott was in the east Mrs. Scott sent for A. E. 
 Ball and complained of Scott's infidelity and that he was 
 running with other women, and that he had taken a woman 
 east with him, in 1889. 
 
 Mrs. Cook worked for Mrs. Scott in 1896 ; was employed 
 as a servant doing the upstairs work. Mrs. Scott was in the 
 habit of using very bad language, and said that Mr. Scott 
 was running after every woman in the city; she said she 
 never could keep any girl more than a month, then they 
 slept with Mr. Scott. She wanted her to sleep with him, 
 offered to give her money if she would do so, but Mrs. Cook 
 told her that she did not want to make money that way and 
 refused to consider seriously her proposal. Mr. Scott was 
 calm and considerate to all and always tried to pacify his 
 Mdfe, but she was not to be quieted. She was always talking 
 of Mr. Scott's running with other women and wanted to 
 catch him. 
 
 George F. Dyer knew Mrs. Scott from about 1890 until 
 three or four months before she died : saw her as often as 
 one hundred to one hundred and fifty times. In the 
 earlier times his opportunities of seeing her were consider- 
 able; she engaged him to sell her ranch in Santa Clara; she 
 used to get him to call at her house with data about the 
 ranch ; this was about the spring of 1891 ; perhaps in June 
 or July. Dyer had some purchasers for the property; she 
 said she wanted to sell; she sent the persons down to see the 
 property and on their return Dyer entered negotiations, and 
 when they came to the house to do business she **flew off the 
 handle, ' ' and raised the price. She talked to him on a great 
 many subjects besides business; she used to say that she 
 was perfectly willing to sell, but she was afraid that the 
 money would fall into somebody else's hands; she talked 
 about Scott running after women and wanted to find out 
 what he was doing; she would send for Dyer down to his 
 house to come there at all hours of the day and sometimes
 
 308 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 at night and wanted him to track Scott on his alleged amor- 
 ous adventures; she said that she suspected that Scott and 
 Ball and another man were concocting a plan to rob her, and 
 she was afraid of being poisoned. Mrs. Scott told Dyer that 
 her husband had said that she was insane, and that they were 
 trying to put her into the asylum or plotting to get rid of 
 her in some way. Dyer had known Scott for fourteen or 
 fifteen years and he was always a gentlemen in his behavior. 
 Mrs. Scott would use very coarse and indelicate language, 
 obscene and vulgar, and witness gave a sample of the coars- 
 est quality which he said made the hair stand on end. She 
 called Scott by the most opprobrious epithets before this 
 witness in speaking of him; nothing was too vile or vulgar 
 for her tongue; this was from 1890 to 1893. Her manner 
 of talking on subjects was such that Dyer quit trying to do 
 business with her, as he did not consider her competent to 
 transact business. Dyer was invited to her house to din- 
 ner; she invited him there to talk about the ranch and then 
 asked him to remain to dinner. He sat down to the dinner 
 table and after two or three minutes she ordered him up 
 and out of the house and he went out. He saw no reason 
 for this conduct and she gave none except that he was a 
 friend of Scott and that he was trying to get the ranch 
 away from her or something of that kind. Dyer thought 
 the woman was crazy; that she did not have her right mind; 
 and his reasons were because she floated from one proposi- 
 tion to another ; she would take the property away from him 
 one day and give it to him the next, and wanted to employ 
 him as a detective to pursue Scott and find out and tell her 
 about this woman; and she frequently visited Dyer's house 
 — came down there without any apparent cause whatever. 
 She would curse Scott at her own home and she would send 
 for Dyer at all hours, and when he got there he found there 
 was nothing to it, therefore, he thought she was not a woman 
 of strong mind. 
 
 It appears that Dyer first made the acquaintance of Mr. 
 Scott in 1884, M^hen the business of witness was mining, and 
 that he was intimately acquainted with Mr. Ball and his 
 mining operations with him and with Mr. C. C. Tripp, and 
 had been to the office occupied in common by these gentle-
 
 Estate of Scott. 309 
 
 men during all the years since 1884, and whenever he called 
 there he always saw Mr. Scott. Mr. Ball told Mr. Dyer that 
 Mrs. Scott wanted to sell the ranch, and Scott introduced 
 him to Mrs. Scott, but he cannot recall who introduced him 
 to Mr. Scott. Dyer says he was looking for a piece of prop- 
 erty and Mr. Ball told him that the Scott ranch was for sale. 
 Then Scott introduced him to his wife, and Dyer had a talk 
 with her at that time alone, her husband left after the in- 
 troduction; Dyer went in with her into the little office off 
 the hall in her house and Scott went outside somewhere. 
 She and Dyer had quite a talk for about an hour; she did 
 not give him a description of the ranch but gave him the 
 outlines; she did not seem to have her mind made up as to 
 price at that time and asked Dyer to call again. He went 
 back there the next day or a day or two afterward alone; 
 was there about an hour and a half or two hours. Mrs. 
 Scott and he were discussing the ranch, she going into the 
 minutest details about all its phases of income, area, acreage, 
 number of vines, their age, condition of improvements, char- 
 acter of soil and climate, expense of operating ranch, num- 
 ber of men employed, amount of machinery upon the prop- 
 erty, cooperage, storage, the buildings, and all the details; 
 she gave him a paper, a report of all the property and all 
 of those items were in it. The two conversed for an hour 
 and a half on that topic and incidentally on others. 
 
 Theodore H. Froelich, a wine broker, who formerly lived in 
 San Jose, and was engaged as a wine-maker there, knew Mrs. 
 Scott before she married her second husband. He had had 
 many conversations before and after that time. She told 
 him at one time that she had thoughts of getting married 
 again, and said she was a foolish woman to think of such 
 a thing. When she married she told Froelich of it and that 
 she had met a man to her liking, and she introduced Scott 
 to him, and he told her that he thought she had made a 
 good match and that Mr. Scott would make a good husband. 
 Froelich gave up his business in San Jose in 1891, and re- 
 turned and set up as a broker in San Francisco in the fall 
 of 1892. He had been ten years in business in San Jose 
 and the acquaintance begun with Mrs. Scott there was con- 
 tinued here. She was frequently in his office here on busi-
 
 310 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 ness; he acted as her wine broker and she called two or 
 three times a week and sometimes every day. Froelich 
 handled her wane for local and eastern markets. When she 
 called she would often talk about her domestic affairs. She 
 was very jealous of her husband and said that he was 
 running after other women and that she knew that he and 
 Ball had concocted a conspiracy to send her to an insane 
 asylum and deprive her of her property. Her language 
 was very vulgar, profane, and obscene beyond description. 
 She was a good friend of witness so far as giving him the 
 business was concerned. One could not cheat her for a cent, 
 but still Froelich did not consider her a good business 
 woman. She was mean and parsimonious, and they had a 
 quarrel finally on their business relations, which resulted in 
 a lawsuit still pending. 
 
 Ida Gustafson was employed as a servant in the house of 
 Mrs. Scott at two different times, first from October to De- 
 cember, 1896, and last from April to June, 1897. Mrs. 
 Scott was very rough in her talk and Ida could not repeat 
 her language, it was so bad. She was very violent in con- 
 duct — half crazy. She said she paid $100 a month to a 
 detective to watch Scott and that she was willing to pay a 
 girl to trap him into intercourse. She was very jealous of 
 Scott, broke all the furniture in his room at one time; 
 she would go around naked and dance about the room 
 before the mirror because she was so well built. Ida was of 
 opinion that Mrs. Scott was insane; her constant talk was 
 that her husband was unfaithful. 
 
 Anselm C. Hammond was employed by Mrs. Scott, then 
 Mrs. Collins, to copy the will of her first husband and to 
 find out what became of the proceeds; this was in July, 1891. 
 He did so. He frequently conversed with her from that 
 time until 1897, the burden of her talk was that her second 
 husband was unfaithful to her. She spoke of his having 
 intercourse with her nieces and others. She told him that 
 Scott and Ball, one of the attorneys in this contest, were 
 trying to railroad her into the insane asylum. Her lan- 
 guage in reference to her husband and his habits with women 
 was such as Hammond had never been accustomed to in a 
 woman. It was vulgar and obscene to a degree. She
 
 Estate of Scott. 311 
 
 charged Scott even in 1891 with running with women. 
 Hammond formed the opinion in 1891 that she was not 
 mentally sane after he had made returns to her about the 
 Spring Valley Water stock which were unsatisfactory, and 
 because of her dissatisfaction at his work, Hammond be- 
 came annoyed; she spoke about poison and Scott's infidelity 
 to her; she was continually talking about being railroaded 
 to the asylum by Scott and Ball. Hammond had never seen 
 anything wrong in the conduct of Scott. His office was and 
 is at Room 39, Merchants' Exchange, and Mr. Scott has a 
 desk in the same office. Hammond is an expert accountant 
 and was employed by the decedent in 1891. He made a 
 report to her before August, 1891, the report was unsatis- 
 factory to her and that annoyed witness greatly. 
 
 ]\Irs. Ella Joseph went to live at the house of Mrs. 
 Scott at the time the husband of the decedent was in the 
 east; she was very vile and violent in her language — in fact 
 the conduct and conversation of the decedent were so coarse 
 and vulgar that witness told her that she would lose her 
 grace if she remained there. The witness was a church 
 member — Third Baptist Church. She never stopped in the 
 house of Mrs. Scott at nights, but was there about a year 
 and a half. Mr. Scott had gone east but a short time when 
 this witness went to live there, and after he returned she 
 remained there about eight or nine months. "When witness 
 went there after a little while she asked Mrs. Scott if she 
 had a husband. She answered, "Yes, of course I have." 
 Witness then said, "You will excuse me if I intrude, but 
 where is your husband?" Mrs. Scott said that he was in 
 the east with a woman. She was always talking of his 
 running with a woman or women; accused him to the wit- 
 ness of improper conduct with the servants in the house and 
 with other women. So far as witness saw, Mr. Scott was a 
 very nice gentleman in his behavior. 
 
 Joseph Mortier is an orchardist and wine-maker; was so 
 engaged at Mountain View at the Scott ranch from July, 
 1889, to September, 1892. Mrs. Scott used to come on an 
 average about once in two montlis; she used to talk to Mor- 
 tier about Mr. Scott, and asked him if Scott did not visit a 
 certain widow and some young ladies in the neighborhood,
 
 312 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 very respectable persons, and witness told her not so far as 
 he had observed. The witness considered the decedent in- 
 sane, because she could never carry on a talk for ten min- 
 utes at a time, and she would jump from one subject to 
 another. Witness thought she was off on the point of jeal- 
 ousy of her husband. 
 
 Kevilo F. Morton went into the service of Mrs. Scott in 
 January, 1893, as bookkeeper. She used to talk to him for 
 hours; she began to talk about her husband as early as 
 March, 1893, and continued that way until her death. The 
 first conversation was when she sent for the witness and 
 talked to him for three hours. Among other things, she 
 said that Scott wasted and squandered $100,000 of her 
 money in the first year of her marriage. The decedent also 
 said that her husband was not faithful to her and was famil- 
 iar with the servant girls. She said that he had sold the 
 Spring Valley Water stock. Mrs. Scott also said that she 
 had been defrauded in her first husband's estate, which 
 ought to have been worth at least $500,000, but only came 
 out about $275,000, and that through Mr. Estee and his 
 partner, Mr. Wilson, she had been robbed of th-e remainder. 
 She said that her first husband had said he was going to 
 buy the Stevenson building, and she thought he must have 
 had another box in the safe deposit vault wherein were con- 
 tained other securities that were not in the inventory of his 
 estate. She had no confidence in anyone. She said that 
 Scott was trying to poison her and that she had been poi- 
 soned before the witness knew her. She told Mr. Morton 
 once that she had a circus with Scott at the breakfast table 
 and she smashed all the crockery, and she said that when 
 she had one of those spells she must smash something. She 
 told the witness that she was making a codicil and she was 
 going to give Scott very little and cut Mrs. Meily off with a 
 dollar because they had been intimate. In her figuring on 
 the prices of her wines she was frequently at fault; she 
 would ask such prices above the market rate that she could 
 not secure a purchaser. In his opinion she was during this 
 period insane, his reasons being then and now that she en- 
 tertained those suspicions of certain acts and persons which 
 had no grounds for her beliefs. In all the time that Mr,
 
 Estate of Scott. 313 
 
 Morton knew her he found no ground for her belief or ac- 
 cusations of fraud and poisoning and of the infidelity of 
 Mr. Scott ; quite the contrary was the result of his researches 
 and observations. She used in her talk so much profanity 
 and vulgarity that the witness could not believe that any 
 woman who talked that way habitually could be sane. If 
 she were asked a price for the wine she would take the 
 market rates and then she would add several cents and in- 
 sist upon this higher rate, which could not be obtained. 
 She would insist upon such quotations in advance of the 
 local market prices. She made a price higher than others 
 in the business. He did not think she used good business 
 judgment in such a case. Her custom at the banks was to 
 borrow money on her own note without security to carry 
 on the ranch. She borrowed money from the Bank of Cali- 
 fornia and the First National Bank. She borrowed $25,000 
 at one time and at the time of her death she owed the 
 latter $35,000. Mr. Morton kept the books from data fur- 
 nished by her. 
 
 Mrs. Anna Elizabeth Ogilvie was a seamstress for the late 
 Mrs. Scott, who was all the time complaining of her hus- 
 band, Mr. Scott, and telling how he had connection with all 
 the girls who were there, the servants in the house and then 
 went down town after other women. She said he had inter- 
 course with the colored girl in the front room, of which she 
 had auricular evidence as she had heard the bed shake. She 
 also said he had improper relations with her own niece, Mrs, 
 Meily, as she had stood at the latter 's door and had heard 
 the sounds which satisfied her of the fact. .She would fol- 
 low Scott all around the house calling him vile names. This 
 would happen nearly every day. Mrs. Scott told the wit- 
 ness that she had a bad temper, which she inherited. 
 
 Mrs. Catherine O'Connor worked for Mrs. Scott from 
 1889, two weeks after her marriage to Mr. Scott, off and 
 on until last October, 1897. She would go to work in the 
 morning at 8 o'clock and leave at 5 o'clock in the afternoon; 
 never slept in the house, as she had her own house and home 
 for many years. Mrs. Scott talked to this witness a great deal 
 and the strain was always the same — the alleged infidelity 
 of her husband, whom she continually accused of dalliance
 
 314 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 with other women. She was jealous of a colored girl in 
 the house and used to stand nude looking over the banisters, 
 and witness asked her why she stood there in danger of cold, 
 and she said she was watching Scott and the colored girl 
 downstairs. She used very vile language; witness never 
 heard anything so low. She told the witness that the reason 
 why she had hired the colored girl was because Scott was 
 after all the white girls and she was going to give him 
 enough of it now. Mrs. O'Connor never heard her say any- 
 thing about Scott except that he was untrue to her and all she 
 feared was that he would put her into an insane asylum: 
 in the opinion of the witness Mrs. Scott was crazy — strictly 
 crazy. 
 
 Mrs. Eliza J. Paisley deposed that she lived in California 
 once upon a time from April to August, 1890, on Franklin 
 street with Mrs. Scott. Mrs. Paisley is the sister of the first 
 husband of decedent, Salvin Perry Collins. Witness went 
 there by her invitation. She had a great many conversations 
 with Mrs. Scott, who talked a good deal about Mr. Scott, 
 finding fault with him about being untrue to her in a great 
 many instances. She accused him of numerous illicit actions. 
 Witness could not tell as to their truth. Mrs. Paisley lived 
 there three months and saw the decedent and Mr. Scott every 
 day and was always treated "extra well" by him, he never 
 making any improper advances to her. She never saw any- 
 thing improper in his attitude toward anybody. His conduct 
 was everything that was right toward everybody and he al- 
 ways behaved himself. While she was there Mrs. Scott did 
 not conduct herself in relation to her person as she thought 
 becoming to a woman. She had seen her do a great many 
 things that were improper ; as exhibiting herself in a naked 
 manner, dancing about in the room before a glass — when she 
 did that she was naked. The deponent had heard her make 
 threats against Mr. Scott and his children. She saw her use 
 a pistol not exactly to him, but she would say she could shoot 
 and would shoot Scott sometime. She did not threaten to 
 kill him, but she threatened the children. Sometimes when 
 she would be carrying on she would say, to spite Mr. Scott 
 she would do something to the children. At one time she said
 
 Estate of Scott. 315 
 
 she could poison those children, by putting something on their 
 lips. When the deponent left to go home they came to see 
 her off. In the last conversation she had with Mrs. Scott 
 at the ferry, the latter said that she would draw blood, or 
 felt like doing so, before she got home. Mrs. Scott was highly, 
 wrought up at that time. 
 
 Edward G. Perkins first met Mrs. Scott at Pescadero in 
 1872 ; she was then Mrs. Collins. He did not have any fur- 
 ther acquaintance with her until 1891, when he went to see 
 her about purchasing a horse that he heard she had for sale ; 
 nothing came of that. It was with Mrs. Scott that the wit- 
 ness had the conversation about the horse and its pedigree — 
 Mr. Scott not knowing anything about the pedigree of the 
 horse although he knew of the negotiations; he took no part 
 in that. Mr. Perkins was about three months pottering over 
 the matter of the negotiations for the sale of the ranch. His 
 compensation was to be dependent upon the success of the 
 sale, and that never came to pass. He was then engaged in 
 buying and selling mining stocks on his own account through 
 a broker. Mr. Scott knew of the negotiations about the sale 
 of the ranch, and he said to him once that he did not think 
 it worth the while of the witness to be carrying on the affair 
 as the decedent would change her mind so often, and after 
 a while it so turned out; the matter dropped off and after 
 about three months of vain negotiations the end came. When 
 Mr. Perkins first met her in 1891 he thought she was one of 
 the most villainous women in her tongue he had ever encoun- 
 tered, but after a while he came to the conclusion that she 
 was insane; her vile language and violent actions convinced 
 him that she was insane. Sometimes she would put her hands 
 to the side of her head and pace up and down the room and 
 talk to herself incoherently and then break out into a torrent 
 of indescribable vulgarity. 
 
 Mrs. Annie J. Robinson knew decedent from October, 1889, 
 to January, 1890; witness was acting as maid for her; at 
 the time she was there Mr. Scott was in New York and 
 returned two weeks before witness left. Mrs. Scott was 
 in the habit of saying that Scott had a woman with liini. 
 She was very vulgar and profane in her expressions. She
 
 316 Coffey's Pkobate Decisions, Vol. 1, 
 
 « 
 
 removed her clothing and exposed her person, saying she 
 was a perfect Venus. She took massage at times, but it 
 was not for that purpose that decedent undressed before 
 witness; it was for no other reason, so far as witness could 
 ^observe, but that Mrs. Scott should ask her opinion about 
 her form as to being a perfect Venus. Witness did not 
 think decedent was a Venus nor did she consider hers a 
 pretty form, but did not say anything. After witness left 
 Mrs. Scott's house she went to work elsewhere. She had no 
 quarrel with Mrs. Scott, but could no longer put up with her — 
 existence ceased to be endurable with her. 
 
 Miss Elizabeth Jane Richards, dressmaker, went to work 
 sewing for Mrs. Scott about a year after her marriage to 
 Mr. Scott, say from 1890, and the decedent frequently rode 
 out to the home of witness on Point Lobos avenue and spent 
 the whole day there. When witness first went to the house 
 of deceased Mr. Scott was absent in the east. Witness was 
 there then for a week. She met him first on the second or 
 third occasion of her working there. He came into the room 
 and Mrs. Scott introduced witness to him; prior to that time 
 witness had never met him. Witness used to stay at the 
 house of decedent as much as two weeks at a time, sewing 
 all day, and decedent would spend the time with her. Wit- 
 ness never spent a night there but took her luncheon and 
 dinner at that house. On the very first night or the first 
 day that she spent there decedent presented herself in the 
 room before the witness stark naked and asked witness if 
 she did not think she had a fine figure and form and was a 
 well-built woman, and if there was any occasion for Mr. 
 Scott to go after other women. The witness said she did 
 not know, as she made no studies of ladies below the waist 
 line, and told her that she wished she would not act in that 
 way before her. The decedent was always talking about 
 Mr. Scott, and his consorting with women, the servants in 
 the house and others whom she suspected. She made threats 
 of killing him often, and said she would shoot him to death 
 if she caught him with a woman; said she would give $1,000 
 to any girl who would seduce him and sleep with him. 
 She said that Judge E. D. Sawyer and Mr. Ball were con-
 
 Estate of Scott. 317 
 
 spiring to railroad her to an insane asylum but that she 
 would see them in hell first. She was very coarse and violent 
 in her speech — most profane and vulgar. She would dance 
 before the mirror, wring her hands and carry on at a great 
 rate; she would also indulge in high kicking; she would 
 square off before her mirror and spar and swear at herself. 
 Witness did not remember the names of the girls who were 
 there at that time — decedent had so many girls; she would 
 have three in a day. Witness could not keep track of the 
 girls; decedent had about one for every day in the month. 
 She would discharge them; they would not stay with her 
 because her wrangling and her actions were so bad that they 
 could not stand her and the food was insufficient. Decedent 
 had to get three different girls in a day in order to get her 
 work done. She would have to do it herself and go on her 
 hands and knees, yet notwithstanding that fact witness 
 remained with decedent eight years. 
 
 E. D. Sawyer, who is an attorney and counselor at law 
 and has been practicing for forty-odd years in this city and 
 state and was formerly for a term of six years judge of the 
 old fourth judicial district, prior some years to the adoption 
 of our present state constitution, and is now representing in 
 this estate and contest absent and minor heirs by appoint- 
 ment of the court, cannot say that he had any acquaintance 
 with the late Mrs. Scott. Mr. Ball was at one time his part- 
 ner, but witness had nothing to do with Mrs. Scott and had 
 no hand, act or part in any plot against her. 
 
 Lloyd Nudd Scott is now twenty-one years of age, a student 
 in the University. He first saw Mrs. Scott about a month 
 before her marriage to his father, who took his brother and 
 himself to see her. This was in October, 1889, when witness 
 was fourteen years old. Witness and his brother accom- 
 panied their father to the train when he went east. She said 
 that he had a woman in the car with him; she talked about 
 his father all the time in 1889 and 1890, as to his running 
 with other women; she took the lock off his door so that she 
 could go in and see if he had any servant girl with him ; she 
 told Lloyd that she put a thread on the stairs to see 
 whether the girls went up or down at night; she said that
 
 318 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 he and Ball were trying to railroad her to an insane asylum ; 
 she used to say that the servants in the house were lewd 
 women who came there to rest up and that father was intimate 
 with them. These tantrums or spells would last for a long 
 time and then she would quiet down for a w^hile and express 
 her regret for her conduct, saying that she did not know 
 what she was doing while she was in such a condition. She 
 would throw herself into a terrible tantrum and become so 
 violent and irritable that everyone was obliged to let her 
 have her own way for fear of the consequences, and after one 
 of those tantrums his father, his brother, and himself were 
 obliged to leave the house and go to the Hotel Langham. and 
 after that to the Geysers, whence they returned to the house 
 on Franklin street, upon the receipt of a message from her. 
 After a short respite she would renew her conduct. Father 
 used to ask her to come with him to the theater, but she 
 would decline on the ground that she had to arise early. 
 She spent her evenings at home and so did father. She was 
 not given to reading but a great talker on one topic. Father 
 would not remain to listen to this but would get up and go 
 out. Wesley testified to the same effect as his brother. 
 
 Thomas M. Talman lives at 1743 Franklin street, the house 
 of the late Mrs. Scott, and is attending to the garden there. 
 He was first engaged by Mrs. Scott in 1892 and continued in 
 his employment until 1894. His occupation consisted in 
 attending to things generally. Mrs. Scott began to talk about 
 her husband to him from the first. At the ranch she talked 
 to him for hours on the same subject. On one occasion while 
 he was attending on Mr. Scott, who was ill and under the 
 weather, he occupied one room and she another room; the 
 witness was up nights looking after him ; the decedent came 
 into the room clad only in a chemisette and went to the fire- 
 place and raised her garments in the rear with her back to 
 the fire, the witness being in front of her. According to 
 Talman she was always flighty in her talk, jumping from one 
 subject to another, no connection in her talk. The witness 
 took charge of the chickens and some of the horses. They 
 had three or four hundred chickens. The pay of the wit-
 
 Estate of Scott. ■ 319 
 
 ness was ten dollars a month. He has been now (March 31, 
 1898) about three or four weeks at Mr. Scott's. 
 
 John F. Uhlhorn was introduced to Mrs. Scott at her house 
 by Mr. Scott in the year 1891, and after the introduction 
 Scott went out and Mrs. Scott at once engaged in conversa- 
 tion with the witness and began by asking him if he knew 
 that Scott and Ball were trying to railroad her to an insane 
 asylum. Witness answered that he did not. Mrs. Scott said 
 that it was so, and she went on with a tirade, swearing 
 vociferously, saying that Scott was running after women and 
 cohabiting with all the women that he met and with the 
 servant girls in the house. Uhlhorn formed the opinion she 
 was insane on account of her conduct and conversation at 
 that interview. About a month afterward he had a similar 
 conversation ; her talk was the same, and that corroborated 
 his opinion previously formed. In the year she called upon 
 him at the Cafe Zinkand on Market street and spent an hour 
 at a time talking with him on the same topic. She asked 
 him if he did not know that Scott and Ball kept a harem 
 at the Hotel Grosvenor on Sutter street, but the witness did 
 not know anything of the kind. "Witness had known Mr. 
 Scott for about twelve years. When he first met Mrs. Scott 
 her husband took him up to see- her, saying that he wanted 
 to make him acquainted with her. After a few moments, 
 Scott excused himself and left witness and Mrs. Scott alone 
 in the conservatory. On the second occasion she met Uhlhorn 
 on the street one day and invited him to dinner, and he went 
 the next day. Scott was not present on that occasion. She 
 said that she expected Scott to dinner but he did not come. 
 On an occasion about three months subsequent Scott invited 
 Uhlhorn to dinner at his house and he went and they had 
 dinner. Everything was agreeable at the table. Afterward 
 they went into the parlor. Mr. Scott went upstairs and she 
 and Uhlhorn conversed for about ten iiiiiintes. She was 
 harping on the su}).ject of her husband's assumed escapades 
 and his running after women with Ball. After IMr. Scott 
 came into the parlor he remained a few minutes and they 
 then left the house. After the conversation the first time 
 witness spoke to Scott saying it was strange his wife should
 
 320 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 mention such matters to him the first time they met. Witness 
 chaffed him a little about his running with women and he 
 said that was all nonsense. Witness did not repeat to him 
 what she said about the insane asylum, as he considered it 
 was too delicate. In 1893 she invited him to go down to the 
 ranch with Scott, as she thought it would do them both good 
 to have a little outing. He accepted the invitation, and went 
 down with him. Decedent wanted him to write for her a 
 detailed description of the ranch in a letter and he did so. 
 She paid a visit to the ranch while he and Scott were staying 
 there, saying she wanted to see what the men were doing — 
 having a good time, running around with women. This was 
 the general trend of her talk, and she did not seem to have 
 any respect for herself or anyone else in her manner of talk. 
 Mr. Uhlhorn wrote a detailed description of the ranch for 
 her in or about October, 1897, and gave it to her, and she 
 seemed satisfied with it. 
 
 William Warwick worked for a while for Mrs. Scott in the 
 year 1897. He went to seek employment in response to an 
 advertisement for men at a vineyard. He first met her about 
 September 15th, 1897. He heard that she had a vineyard at 
 Mountain View and he went there to see if he could obtain a 
 job. She told him that she did not have work in the vine- 
 yard but that she could give him work watching Mr. Scott. 
 Warwick accepted the situation and entered upon the duty. 
 He went on his trail and followed him about from that day, 
 September 15th, until about the 6th or 7th of October, 1897, 
 without detecting in him any impropriety or discovering 
 him visiting any place of doubtful repute. The witness fol- 
 lowed him all around San Francisco every day that Mr. Scott 
 was in town, kept constantly in his wake all the time. Left 
 the house every morning that he did and took the same car 
 and returned in the evening when he did; wherever Scott 
 went Warwick pursued. He did this at her request. She 
 told him she wanted to catch Scott going with Mrs. Meily 
 particularly. She instructed him to keep his eye on Scott and 
 watch whithersoever he went and report results to her. She 
 wanted to catch him with a woman so that she could take 
 down the bed and move his trunk for him. She said that
 
 Estate of Scott. 321 
 
 Scott was of illegitimate extraction, using a vulgar epithet 
 to describe his immediate female ancestor. She kept the wit- 
 ness running around after him, but as he found nothing 
 unbecoming a gentleman in Mr. Scott's conduct he quit the 
 pursuit and relinquished the employment. 
 
 John A. O'Dea is a plumber and a resident of San Fran- 
 cisco for nearly forty years. He knew Mrs. Scott from 
 January 12, 1892, when he went to do some work for her and 
 continued the acquaintance for the balance of her life. Had 
 many conversations with her on topics other than business. 
 She would insist on talking of her domestic affairs when the 
 witness wanted to talk business and he strove by evasive 
 answers to avoid such talk, but she persisted until he managed 
 to excuse himself and left her. Her language was usually 
 very profane and vulgar. She was very violent in her speech 
 and manner at all times. His first experience was when he 
 went there in response to a message through her coachman, 
 and when he reached the house he was met with a volley of 
 violent vulgarity, much to his amazement. With a torrent 
 of torrid expletives she assailed his ears in so fierce a manner 
 as to cause him to make a hasty retreat because of the 
 linguistic bombardment, which was a novel experience to 
 him — so much so that he declined to stay or return, but was 
 induced to do so by the coachman, who assured him that that 
 was only her customary way of expressing her emotions, that 
 she spoke thus strongly on all occasions. The witness so 
 found in his subsequent dealings with her. She would curse 
 and swear and indulge in vulgar remarks to an extent and 
 with a variety previously unknown to him. She always paid 
 her plumbing bills. The last job he did for her was in 1896. 
 She was not extraordinarily acute in her dealings. 
 
 Mrs. Gerrish heard Mrs. Scott say she could not keep her 
 servants on account of the familiarity of Scott with them, 
 and that her husband was running with other women, Mrs. 
 Meily being one of them. 
 
 To Edward Lewis Brown decedent expressed herself that 
 Scott was unfaithful to her and that he was no husband to 
 her. 
 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. 1—21
 
 322 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 Mrs. Scott complained to Nellie Swall that Scott was 
 running with other women and that he was trying to put 
 her into an insane asylum. 
 
 To Charles E. Elliot decedent said that she could not keep 
 a woman in the house without Scott's trying to get in bed 
 with her. This was when Elliot advised her to have a com- 
 panion. 
 
 Decedent told Amanda Johnson that Ball and Scott were 
 going up to the Napa Insane Asylum to pick out a room for 
 her. 
 
 To Sumner C. Murray she said that her husband was run- 
 ning around with "chippies," and to Wealthy Wormell she 
 said that Mr. Scott was running around with other women. 
 
 When Mrs. Putman went to Mrs. Scott's the latter told her 
 on the first day that Scott had improper relations with servant 
 girls. She also mentioned a relative of Mr. Collins and said 
 that Mrs. Paisley and Mr. Scott were conniving to do away 
 with her. Mrs. Putman did not know exactly how, but the 
 tale of Mrs. Scott was to the effect that she thought they 
 w^ere in common against her. Mrs. Putman had some griev- 
 ance against Mrs. Meily on account of some stories that were 
 repeated as coming from her, and thought she would be justi- 
 fied in retaliating by retailing some account of Mr. Scott's 
 visit to Mrs. Meily, and she went and saw Mrs. Scott and 
 began telling her about Mr. Scott visiting Mrs. Meily. Mrs. 
 Scott said she knew that already and told the witness that 
 she had made a visit there and was confident that Mr. Scott 
 was with ]Mrs. Meily on that occasion. She told the witness 
 that Mr. Scott had at one time tried to put her in an insane 
 asylum. 
 
 Adolph Herman Grossman says that Mrs. Scott did some- 
 times complain of Mr. Scott going with women, but she did 
 not speak of any particular woman. 
 
 Mrs. Mary J. Larmer says that Mrs. Scott was very vulgar 
 and profane in her conversation, cursed and swore, and was 
 violent. 
 
 Charles August Armstrong heard her swear on occasions. 
 He was a cooper and did cooperage for her. Mrs. Scott did 
 her business on strictly business principles, and whatever
 
 Estate of Scott. 323 
 
 engagements she made she kept to the letter. She said she 
 had to attend to all the business herself as she had no one 
 to do it for her, as her husband did not seem disposed or 
 able to assist her. If Armstrong and Mrs. Scott had a dis- 
 agreement about the price of her work she would swear at times 
 at his propositions, but he would not mind it, because it was 
 her way, and he thought it was a sane act for her to swear 
 at him. 
 
 From these particulars of evidence counsel for contestant 
 deduces proof of delusions sufficient to overthrow the will as 
 an offspring of a mind diseased. Mr. Estee claims that there 
 is here a perfect concatenation of circumstances, conduct, and 
 conversation. No one link may suffice, but the chain is per- 
 fectly joined in all its parts. He claims to have shown that 
 there was no foundation, howsoever slight, for her suspicion 
 in any of the particulars specified, not a jot or tittle, not an 
 iota of evidence to sustain the suspicion of the infidelity of 
 Scott or the unchastity of the venerable sister in law or the 
 niece of the decedent. The idea of either of these ladies being 
 intimate with Scott was too absurd to be entertained by a 
 normal mind. She knew that she had no proof of such a fact 
 and with the cunning of insanity endeavored to fabricate 
 proofs of his infidelity by trying to induce others for money 
 to subscribe to statements incriminating him, but she did 
 not succeed, because there was no proof possible and those 
 whom she tempted were unpurchasable for such a purpose. 
 
 All this is stated in the strongest manner for contestant: 
 but were her suspicions of Scott founded on a fixed belief? 
 Was there nothing to induce belief in her mind, no scintilla 
 on which to base suspicion — a very meager item, even — which 
 would warrant her in concluding that he was unfaithful? 
 There was something in the incident in the hugging of a 
 servant girl at the fireplace or grate in the parlor which 
 was related in the testimony of Carl Anderson, when upon 
 her approach the girl repulsed Scott and he escaped through 
 the window into the conservatory and the girl explained that 
 he was only pushing her; this little incident is significant 
 and might easily induce a jealous woman to suspect the con- 
 stancy of her husband and to believe that he was in the habit
 
 324 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 of being unduly familiar with the female domestics in her 
 household. Her suspicions may have been unjust and her 
 inferences too general, but that was merely an error of logic 
 and not an evidence of insanity or of insane delusion. She 
 had a right to infer however erroneously or from inadequate 
 premises to a universal conclusion, for false logic or fault}^ 
 ratiocination is far from the manifestation of insanity, so long 
 as the process is formally correct, not incoherent nor incon- 
 sequential. Her suspicions or apprehensions that he and 
 others were contemplating sending her to an insane asylum 
 or poisoning her may have been unfounded in fact and yet 
 have some germ sufficient to develop and fructify in her mind 
 a rational fear that her life or liberty was or would be in 
 peril from that source. 
 
 Mrs. Scott may have reasoned in her mind, however faultily, 
 that some one meditated terminating her existence in some 
 furtive manner. It is not hard to conjecture how she may 
 have sat down and wrought out a theory of poisoning ; her con- 
 sciousness that her death was regarded as a consummation de- 
 voutly to be wished for by those who would expect to profit by 
 her decease ; no regrets in such a case except for the undue pro- 
 traction of the period anterior to the inevitable event; but 
 did she say that he premeditated poisoning her with real 
 belief in it, or was it merely her habit of speaking in an 
 exaggerated vein, characteristic of persons of more or less 
 coarse cultivation? What is there in this testimony as to her 
 suspicions of poisoning? If she really believed that she was 
 in danger of being poisoned, she would not be apt to allow 
 the attempt to be successful but would quickly rid herself 
 of the presence of the designer. A woman of her resolute 
 will would not hesitate to act at once and thus end the oppor- 
 tunity of the nefarious plotter. This testimony is colored 
 and its importance magnified as such points are apt to be 
 by those interested in presenting the features that for their 
 purpose seem salient ; but a fear of poisoning is not unreason- 
 able where elderly persons of wealth are aware that their 
 juniors are expectant of their demise. The instances are not 
 few where such hastening of the exit of wives and others is 
 accomplished, and it is not unnatural or irrational in persons
 
 Estate of Scott. 325 
 
 situated as was this decedent to apprehend that impatient 
 expectants might so act. 
 
 It is not necessary to accuse the contestant of an intent to 
 assassinate his wife by poison or otherwise, for it may be 
 conceded that there is nothing to justify a suspicion or to 
 warrant an insinuation of such a design, and that he is the 
 mildest mannered man that ever entered the circuit of the 
 clientele of counsel, but that he contemplated her earthly 
 exit in the order of nature with some sense of satisfaction 
 and prospect of relief is shown by the deposition of Charles 
 E. Elliot, a venerable gentleman of nearly four score years, 
 cousin of the decedent, who saw her at her house in San 
 Francisco in the latter part of March, 1896, where he met 
 her husband, the contestant. He had no conversation with 
 him then and there, but did have a talk with him about that 
 time at Mrs. Scott's vineyard, called the "Pebble Side 
 Ranch," regarding the relations between himself and wife. 
 As near as deponent could remember, Scott said his wife was 
 crazy or insane ; that she was very mean ; that she gave him 
 but very little money; that she treated his sons badly; that 
 she was vulgar and had no religious principles, was very 
 jealous, and in short he said about everything he could that 
 was bad concerning her. Elliot said to him, "Why do you 
 live with her, if she is so bad as you say?" Scott answered 
 that he was going to hold on ; that she would die very soon 
 and that his lawyer had told him that she could not make a 
 will that would stand, and Mr. Scott said to the deponent on 
 that occasion, "If she don't make a will to suit me. I shall 
 break it." Most of the conversations deponent had with 
 decedent occurred when they were driving on several occasions 
 early in April, 1886. She spoke about Mr. Scott and how 
 she was disappointed in him; no help to her; no business 
 capacity; complete failure; she had to do all details herself. 
 In the opinion of Elliot she was level-headed, smart — a woman 
 of sound mind. 
 
 It is argued that she had a fixed belief in nonexistent facts 
 without any atom of evidence to support it, out of whioh it 
 was impossible to reason her and that her mind was infected 
 bv this insane delusion and no argument could avail for its
 
 326 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 disinfection; but when her physical condition is considered, 
 we may take into account the opinion of Doctor Levi Cooper 
 Lane, given in answer to the questions propounded in cross- 
 examination by counsel for contestant : 
 
 Dr. Lane said that in case of a person, described as in the 
 question presented, who had stomach troubles and female 
 difficulties, who mistakenly believed she was being poisoned, 
 and who almost daily insisted on her relatives tasting her 
 food before she would touch it, when it did not poison them, 
 and she saw that it did not have that effect, and she yet 
 still maintained that her food was being poisoned, and that 
 this continued for a number of years, with her surroundings 
 and v/hat she told the doctor, if she did not entertain such 
 a suspicion, she would have been insane ; her suspicions would 
 not be evidence of insanity in view of all the circumstances; 
 if there were no truth in the statements there might possibly 
 be evidence of some incoherence of intellect. A person 
 suffering from stomach trouble is almost necessarily irritable 
 and may lose temper and swear and cut up generally and 
 break dishes, destroy bric-a-brac, and play havoc with furni- 
 ture, and yet be of sound mind. The doctor had known cer- 
 tainly of one occasion where one of the most intelligent men 
 in this citv, as he was regarded in his lifetime, behaved in 
 such a manner, smashing chinaware and the like ; he was sane ; 
 he lived a long time after this incident and he was regarded 
 as an intelligent man. Dr. Lane spoke from his knowledge 
 of insanity based upon long and extensive observation. 
 
 It may be conceded that she at times feared poison, but if 
 it were a delusion, in the circumstances of this issue, it must 
 have been continuous and persistent and operative upon the 
 volitional capacity; otherwise it is not to be permitted to 
 invalidate the testamentary act : Estate of Redfield, 116 Cal. 
 637. 48 Pac. '794. 
 
 When suffering from the chronic condition of her stomach, 
 she may have imagined or believed that her food had been 
 tampered with, but her mistaken belief would not, as matter 
 of law, amount to an insane delusion : Estate of Carpenter, 
 94 Cal. 407, 29 Pac. 1101.
 
 Estate of Scott. 327 
 
 Unfounded and unreasonable suspicions are not insanity : 
 Will of Cole, 49 Wis. 181, 5 N. W. 346. 
 
 The deceased suffering from her stomach trouble was at 
 times peevish and petulant and sometimes suspicious even of 
 her best friends and intimated fears of poisoning, but never 
 acted on such apprehensions, thus showing that she had no 
 fixed delusions thereon. She was a naturally suspicious per- 
 son and showed this characteristic in the lifetime of her first 
 husband, whom she undoubtedly loved. She left his home 
 on one occasion for several weeks on account of suspicion of 
 the fidelity of Collins, but he courted her with a lover's assidu- 
 ity, and, induced by aroused affection and his amorous allure- 
 ments, she returned to bed and board and there remained 
 until he died and in token of his love and devotion left her 
 almost his entire fortune, which constitutes the foundation 
 and bulk of the wealth in this estate. 
 
 For five years she remained constant to his endeared mem- 
 ory. During that period of viduity the characteristics and 
 peculiarities adverted to continued in manifestation; indeed 
 these attributes were aggravated by her isolated condition. 
 She was alone without associates or congenial companions; her 
 husband and his friends had gone out of her life and she 
 naturally sought a substitute and successor. 
 
 She told Dr. Lane that, after the death of Mr. Collins, 
 she had a great deal of care and trouble with the manage- 
 ment of her property, and she had been advised by some of 
 her friends to marry and get somebody to assist in her affairs. 
 She had adopted this advice and had accepted Mr. Scott 
 as her spouse, and had assumed that he possessed the regular 
 business qualifications to make an efficient auxiliary or to act 
 as manager of her property, but she soon discovered that 
 he was destitute of ability to aid her to any degree or in any 
 manner. She found, in fact, as she said to Dr. Lane, that 
 his chief object and main design was to secure possession 
 of her property and that his purpose was entirely mercenary 
 and selfish, and not any benefit to herself. She was not 
 willing to allow him to accomplish his object in this regard 
 and so her domestic life was encompassed by unhappiness. 
 She was very unhappy nt his conduct. In reference to
 
 328 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 making a will she solicited Dr. Lane's advice as to what 
 measures of precaution or circumspection she could adopt 
 against any assault upon its stability or legal integrity, and 
 he advised her to select some two or three gentlemen of pro- 
 nounced professional character and standing in their spe- 
 cialty, who would be conceded experts in their department of 
 medical jurisprudence, to decide the question of her mental 
 status as to sanity, or at least to be prepared to testify in the 
 event of its ever becoming a practical issue in any litigated 
 controversy in court. Dr. Lane suggested in this connection 
 certain names — Dr. Clark of Stockton, Dr. Gardner of Napa, 
 and one or two others. In their conversations about the tes- 
 tamentary disposition of her property, the doctor said to her, 
 "Mrs. Scott, you have a great deal of property; you ought 
 to give some to charity. ' ' She had been talking about giving 
 it to Mr. Collins' relatives and her own. She replied that 
 she had a great number of relatives and she wanted to give 
 her property so it would help those that were in need. Dr. 
 Lane said to her that she ought to give something to charity. 
 "Well," she answered to this suggestion, "I have enough 
 poor relations for that purpose and I don't propose to give 
 anything in that way." She visited the doctor a number of 
 times on the subject of her sanity until it finally became tire- 
 some. During the years 1896 and 1897 he told her that he 
 was tired of the topic, and he summed up the situation by 
 saying she was as smart as any woman he ever saw. She 
 called to see Dr. Lane several times about the will and about 
 her property. He knew nothing of the facts except as she 
 told him — nothing personally about her domestic affairs or 
 her household. From what Dr. Lane observed of, her and 
 learned from her, he considered her to be perfectly sane — 
 entirely sound in mind. He had known her for many years, 
 when she was Mrs. Collins, and in the lifetime of her first 
 husband, and during the last two years of her life she visited 
 him at his office and he visited her at her residence. He was 
 not attending her then as a physician. She wanted to make 
 a will that would stand in law, as she had been threatened 
 that whatever will she made would be broken by her husband, 
 Mr. Scott. She said that he had made such a threat, and
 
 Estate of Scott. 329 
 
 in these conversations she talked to Dr. Lane about her prop- 
 erty. If this woman assumed that people were trying to put 
 her in an insane asylum without any iota of basis for her 
 assumption, and continued for many years to indulge this 
 belief, still, in the circumstances of this case, she might be 
 merely the victim of erroneous inference and be perfectly 
 sane. It might or might not be symptomatic of insanity; 
 the diagnosis would be dependent upon the entire congeries 
 of causes or summation of symptoms. If she accused her 
 husband falsely of holding improper relations with her 
 servants, black and white, with her near relatives, very old 
 women, it would seem that she was very jealous ; it would not 
 be evidence of insanity. She might forget herself tempo- 
 rarily, but that would not be insanity, even though her husband 
 had given no reason for her jealous suspicion. Dr. Lane should 
 say, regardless of the reason or want of reason, while she 
 might be irresponsible for the moment she would not be in- 
 sane, she had simply a very jealous temperament. If in the 
 presence of some persons she pointed out of her window on 
 the lawn and said, "There's my husband and so and so," 
 naming a third person on the lawn with him, when there 
 was no one at all there, it would be a temporary delusion. If 
 she pointed on the carpet in her own room to persons who 
 were present and said, "There is Scott with so and so," 
 naming a certain woman, "engaged in sexual intercourse," 
 or tantamount words, when there was no such spectacle nor 
 any person there, it would to the doctor import the offspring 
 of an inordinately jealous mind ; it would be an hallucination ; 
 the mind not absolutely normal ; it would be a deviation from 
 her ordinary and normal condition, but be restricted to that 
 occasion. 
 
 Consider her circumstances: She was inordinately jealous, 
 even in the lifetime of her first husband, of whom she was 
 very fond, and who was a man after his kind, engaged in an 
 occupation that was fraught with temptations to indulgence 
 in liquor and developed in inducements to pleasures of the 
 palate. It is not surprising that he drank occasionally or 
 often to excess; he did drink and at times became intoxicated 
 and then would express himself in indelicate terms. His
 
 330 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 wife acquired these habits and took on the roughness and 
 grossness which were the accompaniments of the times and 
 places. She was a woman of strong characteristics, strong be- 
 liefs, strong sentiments, strong speech, and strong purposes, 
 and indifferent to the conventionalities of the society of the 
 later and present era of settled social form and orthodox ob- 
 servances. It might have been different with her in a more 
 conservative community, although it is not fair to generalize 
 from the small premise of her special surroundings that the 
 society of San Francisco was crude and unrefined, for we 
 know that from a very early date this city contained its fair 
 proportion of as good and true women as ever adorned any 
 community. It is historical, and the court has a right to note 
 it, that in the early summer months of 1849 family homes 
 began to appear in every direction in San Francisco, and by 
 the fall of that year they could be said to be numerous, and 
 from that time forward they steadily increased, and a year 
 afterward they were a leading feature of the young city, and 
 for the next few years not even twenty per cent of the 
 population could be subjected to criticism from the severest 
 censors. It is true that the obnoxious elements made them- 
 selves so conspicuous and kept so constantly in evidence and 
 on parade that one just arriving in the city might imbibe 
 the impression that the proportion was much larger, but that 
 this ratio is right may be ascertained by authentic annals, 
 such as a work of the late Hon. William F. White, entitled 
 "A Picture of Pioneer Times in California," which is valua- 
 ble for its accurate data and details, verified by a writer who 
 with his family, one of whom is now a senator of the United 
 States, formed a part of this community; but nevertheless 
 it does not appear that the decedent cultivated this element. 
 Her associations were mainly such as centered and converged 
 and crystallized in that class which found its social circle 
 and status and ethical standard and moral atmosphere in the 
 saloon, which however reputably conducted, was not naturally 
 nice or choice in its conventional criteria of the proprieties 
 of conversation or conduct. In other circumstances a more 
 pleasing portrait might have been presented of the heroine 
 of this contest, but such as she was we have her here ; her
 
 Estate op Scott. 331 
 
 stomach was weak and sensitive until this condition became 
 chronic, presenting symptoms not ordinarily understood by 
 the common mind; her diet delicate, mostly mush, crackers, 
 juice of beefsteak, and a very little bread; her disposition) 
 somewhat affected by her dyspepsia; prone to anger, in the 
 ebullitions of which she breaks dishes and destroys bric-a-brac, 
 and makes life very tropical for her intimates, employees, 
 and dependents generally; while so suffering irritable and 
 disagreeable, otherwise a pleasant person. 
 
 In all these circumstances it is not remarkable that she was 
 troubled with megrims and that her slumbers were broken 
 by nightmare, when she had an hallucination that a murder 
 had been committed in the hall of her house, which incident 
 may have resulted from her oversizing her drams of whisky, 
 for, according to Mrs. Meily, she was an habitual and hard 
 drinker of alcohol during her latter years, and an extra 
 dose of this sort of poison may have been the cause of this 
 nocturnal aberration. Mrs. ]\Ieily testified that she had seen 
 her aunt Angelia several times under the influence of liquor, 
 and it may have been that upon this occasion, when his step- 
 mother told Wesley Scott that some one was being murdered 
 in the hallway, when no such transaction was in progress, that 
 her aspect was so dazed and distraught as to suggest that 
 the whisky had been exceptionally potent. The distemper 
 of drink may have wrought this transient condition of her 
 nerves and temporarily disturbed the diapason of her wits. 
 
 She was at times troubled with insomnia, as was natural 
 with one who was afflicted with an intestinal disease, and 
 then momentarily, like Lady Macbeth, "she was troubled 
 with thick-coming fancies that kept her from her rest," but 
 her mind was not necessarily diseased. 
 
 She was a very nervous and unhappy woman, and what 
 did her husband do to alleviate her distress ? She was living 
 unhappily M'ith him and he was tolerating her for the sake 
 of the future when he hoped to possess and enjoy her for- 
 tune. Why did she marry Scott? Was it for love, or was 
 it merely a commercial union? Was it solely that she might 
 have a domestic partner who could manage her affairs, pro- 
 tect her property, and relieve her of the strain of business
 
 332 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 cares? The truth seems to be that her motive was com- 
 posite, and the reasons she gave from time to time are recon- 
 cilable to this theory. She needed some one as an affectionate 
 associate in married life — some one to supply the love element 
 in her nature and to attend to her material interests at the 
 same time, and when she came in contact with Scott she 
 imagined that she had attracted her affinity in both regards, 
 but this may have been an insane delusion, for a short 
 experience caused her to rue the day she married him; they 
 were married but not mated, and hence infelicity. Two 
 motives entered as ingredients in her choice of him, only 
 one in his selection of her; his was a merely mercenary 
 motive. She craved for something more than money ; she 
 believed that Scott could fill the aching void in her heart ; 
 that she could find in him a suitable successor to her deceased 
 spouse; but it was a bitter disappointment in every respect. 
 The contract so far as sentiment went was unilateral; she 
 wanted a conjugal mate who would relieve her head from 
 business cares and occupy the vacant space in her heart and 
 the vacant chair at the table once filled by Collins, but Scott 
 married her for money; his motive was mercenary and mar- 
 ital misery followed from his incompatibility and incapacity. 
 In true love and as a business union this marriage was a 
 failure. She was jealous, and in the philosophy of love it is 
 said that this malign sentiment is its bitter fruit, and it sur- 
 vives youth, especially in women. But it was different with 
 him; he was not jealous, for he loved her not, although he 
 had once listened to her, pretending to reciprocate, when she 
 said she loved him, for 
 
 "When a woman loves a man 
 The man must hear her, though he love her not. ' ' 
 Why did she love him? Is human love the growth of 
 human will? These are questions that only a woman can 
 answer, and the age is not yet so far advanced that she can 
 make response in judicial decision. 
 
 "It is not virtue, wisdom, valour, wit. 
 Strength, comeliness of shape, or amplest merit 
 That woman's love can win, or long inherit 
 But what it is, hard to say, harder to hit."
 
 Estate of Scott. 333 
 
 It is enough to say that there is evidence in this record that 
 she did love him, but the love was not mutual and did 
 not bring life's discords into perfect tune. Her passion was 
 unrequited and she was conscious that he did not return in 
 sincerity the sentiment that he professed before marriage 
 and at the altar. Jealousy is said to be the offspring of love, 
 and this was decedent's only child. She was enamored of 
 Scott and in her passion was constantly thinking and talking 
 of him, for it is true, as George Eliot tells us, that jealousy 
 can no more lose sight of its object than love. 
 
 In regard to him it may be said that for the purpose of 
 passion it would not be natural to seek satisfaction in the 
 embraces of antiquity, and it is fair to assume that her com- 
 plaint that he was not a husband to her was founded on 
 fact, although he testified that he was a husband to her up to 
 the day of her death, with all that that implies, but this state- 
 ment is antagonized by her declarations and by circum- 
 stances that render its truth improbable. It may be con- 
 ceded that her suspicions of the fidelity of contestant per- 
 sisted in, as it is claimed they were, without evidence to 
 support them and against all reasonable probabilities of 
 truth have the semblance of insane delusion. Yet it is not 
 necessarily so. 
 
 Observation teaches us that there is a very large class of 
 people, whose sanity is undoubted, who are unduly jealous 
 or suspicious of others, and especially of those closely con- 
 nected with them, and who upon the most trivial, even 
 whimsical, grounds will wrongfully impute the worst mo- 
 tives and conduct to those in whom they ought to confide. 
 This insanity, which is developed in a great variety of forms, 
 is altogether too common, and too many persons confessedly 
 sane are to a greater or less degree afflicted with it, to 
 justify us in saying that because the deceased was so afflicted 
 she was insane, or the victim of insane delusion. The line 
 between unfounded and unreasonable suspicions of a sane 
 mind (for doubtless there are such) and insane delusions 
 is sometimes quite indistinct and difficult to be defined. 
 However, the legal presumption is in favor of sanity, and 
 on the issue of sanity or insanity the burden is upon him 
 who asserts insanity to prove it. Hence in a doubtful ease.
 
 334 Coffey's Probate' Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 unless there appears a preponderance of proof of mental 
 unsoundness, the issue should be found the other way: Will 
 of Cole, 49 Wis. 181, 5 N. W. 346. 
 
 She was suspicious of his constancy. Suspicion is the im- 
 agination of the existence of something, especially something 
 wrong, without proof, or with but slight proof; it is an im- 
 pression in the mind which has not resulted in a conviction. 
 It is synonymous with doubt, distrust, or mistrust — the mind 
 is in an unsettled condition. Suspicion existing, slight evi- 
 dence might produce a rational ultimate conviction or con- 
 clusion ; this without evidence however slight, would be a de- 
 lusion. Is there evidence, however slight? This is the test. 
 The suspicion may be illogical or preposterous, but it is not, 
 therefore, evidence of insanity: Clapp v. Fullerton, 34 N. 
 Y. 190, 90 Am. Dec. 681. 
 
 A most unwilling witness was Mrs. Louisa M. Putman, 
 who was very reluctant to testify and who said that her 
 husband, Dr. Putman, had been greatly opposed to her com- 
 ing forward in that capacity. She came, however under 
 constraint, and under the subpoena of proponents, being 
 served with great difficulty, and here is her story in short 
 meter : 
 
 Mrs. Putman first saw Mr. Scott at Mrs. Meily's house, 
 730 Union street, between Powell and Mason, in or about 
 January 1895, at the bedside of Mrs. Meily's sick son, who 
 Vi'as the husband of the witness and who died in Januarj^; 
 1895, and was buried from that house. She could not say 
 definitely how often she saw Mr. Scott in 1895 and 1896, 
 but it was several times. He usually called in the morning 
 about 10 or 11 o'clock, on week days; sometimes in the after- 
 noon; he would remain sometimes fifteen or twenty minutes 
 or perhaps half an hour, sometimes an hour. Mrs. Putman 
 knew the decedent and visited her shortly before she died. 
 Mr. and Mrs. Scott were there several times during the ill- 
 ness of the husband of the witness. Mrs. Scott introduced 
 Mr. Scott to the witness there. He always conducted him- 
 self with propriety in the presence of the witness. Wit- 
 ness was not residing with Mrs. Meily but would stay a week 
 or so at a time when she was not otherwise occupied at work. 
 If witness happened to be unemployed at her occupation
 
 Estate of Scott. 335 
 
 she would pay Mrs. Meily a short visit, merely that and 
 nothing more. "When employed witness was engaged at 
 dressmaking. She could not say definitely how long she 
 spent at a time at Mrs. Meily 's but was there, she thought, 
 in the months of January, February, or March, 1896. Two 
 months was the longest period of time she was in that house 
 continuously after she was married to the son of Mrs. INIeily, 
 but she could not name the two montlis. Sometimes she 
 would call of an afternoon. Witness -was nursing at the 
 time and it would depend when she would obtain relief — 
 sometimes in the forenoon and other times in the afternoon. 
 While she was on friendly terms whenever she had a little 
 time off she visited ]Mrs. Meily. She first saw Mrs. Scott 
 at her house in August, 1897. No one told her to go but she 
 guessed she was moved by a malicious feeling on her part 
 toward Mrs. Meily, against W'hom she had a grievance. Wit- 
 ness had heard that Mrs. ]\Teily had spoken unkindly of her 
 and she felt unfriendly about it. They never had any 
 words, no quarrel, but some stories were repeated as coming 
 from Mrs. ]\Ieily that annoyed Mdtness, so she thought she 
 would be justified in retaliating by retailing some account 
 of Mr. Scott's visits to Mrs. Meily. She first went to Mrs. 
 Garcia, who refused to tell Mrs. Scott; told witness to tell 
 her herself; witness then went and saw ]\Irs. Scott and be- 
 gan telling her about Mr. Scott visiting Mrs. Meily. Mrs. 
 Scott said she knew that already and told witness that she 
 would give her $500 if she would put in writing charges 
 against Mr. Scott that would incriminate him with j\Irs. 
 ]\Ieily. Witness could not remember all that Mrs. Scott 
 wanted on the paper which she desired her to sign. It was 
 not exactly the writing of the witness, who never made any 
 remark that improper relations existed between ]\Ir. Scott 
 and Mrs. Meily, or that she ever saw anji;hing of the kind. 
 After the first visit ^Nlrs. Scott began sending the house- 
 keeper, Mrs. Burnham, down to ask the witness to call and 
 see her. She visited jNIrs. Scott again after the August visit 
 in response to a request conveyed to her in letters. The 
 witness wrote a letter to INIrs. Scott about the first part of 
 September, 1897, in the following words:
 
 336 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 "You told me .you would say nothing that would bring 
 me into family affairs, in fact would not mention my name. 
 Now I am willing to face anything I say, but to be mixed 
 up in family troubles, I beg you will refrain from asking me 
 to do such. What I told you was for your own personal 
 
 good Mr. Scott said Mrs. Meily was crying all the 
 
 time over it. How did he know it? If you did not give 
 him the address here, who did ? Perhaps ]Mrs. Meily ? ' ' 
 
 That letter speaks of Scott ; he called on witness and said 
 that ]\Irs. Garcia has told his wife a great deal or that Mrs. 
 Garcia had said to him that witness had told or said a great 
 many things about him, and he asked witness if she had 
 anything against him. She said she had not. He was a 
 perfect stranger to her in the first place, and he told her 
 that his wife and he had some trouble and that she had ac- 
 cused him of acts that were purely imaginative, simply what 
 she herself thought, and remarks that the witness was sup- 
 posed to have made with regard to improper relations, and 
 witness denied that she ever said so; but there is the letter, 
 and it speaks for itself. Mrs. Scott told the witness that 
 she had been to Mrs. Meily 's house twice in one day, that 
 she could not get in and went away and came back again, 
 she said that she knew Scott was inside because she felt 
 something from within, the influence of his personality, mag- 
 netism, or something of that sort. 
 
 It is not necessary to inculpate the suspects in such a 
 case; it is enough that there were circumstances in the asso- 
 ciation of the persons to impress the jealous mind, and the 
 evidence of ]\Irs. Putman so reluctantly and cautiously 
 educed, even were it but a feather's weight, shows that de- 
 cedent had material for suspicion. There was at least slight 
 evidence that her husband was visiting another lady clan- 
 destinely and surreptitiously, and that was enough to remove 
 the stigma of insane delusion, although by no means suffi- 
 cient to justify this court in concluding that her niece was 
 guilty of misconduct. Mrs. Meily 's entire innocence in in- 
 tent and act is consistent with the ill-timed and indiscreet 
 visits of Scott to her house, so far out of his direct course 
 from his own home to his office.
 
 Estate of Scott. 337 
 
 Xo matter how tenuous these threads of testimony are, 
 they are sufficient to support her suspicion. In regard to the 
 caressing of the servant girl it was denied by Mr. Scott when 
 on the witness-stand. In reference to the Meily matter Mrs. 
 Burnham testifies that Mrs. Putman came to Mrs. Scott with 
 a story about Mrs. Meily. Mrs. Meily testifies that Scott 
 did visit her repeatedly, at her home, 730 Union street, on 
 his way down town from Franklin and Sacramento street 
 to his office in the Merchants' Exchange. It is only neces- 
 sary to indicate these points of departure and terminus in 
 his daily travel to illustrate at what inconvenience of time 
 and circuitousness of route he paid these visits to her alone 
 and in the absence of her husband. Mrs. Putman knew of 
 these visits and testified that she went to Mrs. Scott with a 
 story about Mrs. Meily for the purpose of maliciously injur- 
 ing that lady, but whatever was her purpose or her griev- 
 ance, she added fuel to the flame of jealousy already exist- 
 ing in the mind of Mrs. Scott, who was impressed by her 
 tale. Still there was no ultimate conviction in her mind; 
 she had doubts; and constantly sought information to re- 
 solve them. She employed detectives, who seemed to have 
 deceived her and conveyed their stories to her husband, with 
 whom they have been since on intimate terms. She offered 
 rewards of proof of the facts; tried her own hand at detec- 
 tive work; visited Mrs. Meily to ascertain the truth; inter- 
 viewed Mr. Scott's gentlemen friends to elicit information; 
 and in many ways showed that she had no fixed belief of 
 Scott's infidelity, and the statements on that subject which 
 she made were mainly to Scott's particular friends and her 
 servants who faithfully communicated them to him and have 
 since reproduced them in evidence. William Warwick is a 
 sample of those who practiced the system of espionage in 
 her behalf. ]\Irs. Burnham is another who made a pretense 
 of acting as a spy, disguising herself and deceiving her 
 mistress, to save her situation. This lady naively confesses 
 that she practiced deceit and duplicity and did not even 
 make an attempt to act the part she pretended to play; but 
 she failed to save her situation, leaving there on the 4th of 
 December, 1897, and did not return to the service during 
 the lifetime of decedent. Subsequently she did so return 
 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. I — 22
 
 338 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 and is now an inmate of the Scott mansion. In respect to 
 this item of infidelity, it may be said that there being slight 
 evidence to support suspicion there was no delusion ; and there 
 being no settled conviction, there is no delusion. 
 
 Was the expressed apprehension of the decedent that con- 
 testant had conspired to confine her in an asylum an insane 
 delusion ? 
 
 There is evidence ample in the record that Scott twitted 
 her from time to time with being crazy, and said that he 
 could break any will that she would make, and he is here 
 now engaged in the execution of that threat. That he 
 taunted her with his ability to set aside her will, as he could 
 prove her insanity and that he nagged her on this point with 
 the view of instilling into her mind some doubt of its sound- 
 ness is established to the satisfaction of the court. Undoubt- 
 edly this worried and annoyed her, and it was but natural 
 that she should entertain an apprehension that he and his 
 close friends might conspire to that end. The testimony of 
 Carl Anderson, the coachman, although denied stoutly by 
 contestant, is circumstantially credible in respect to the con- 
 versation in the coupe; that they had a quarrel on the way 
 out to the Cliff House, where Scott left and she returned 
 alone in the vehicle driven by Anderson, is certainly true, 
 and I can perceive no evidence of animus in this witness 
 against contestant to justify me in rejecting his testimony 
 Anderson may himself have said, as is testified to by the im- 
 peaching witnesses, that she was "crazy" or "absent- 
 minded," or he may merely have advised some of the per- 
 sons employed by her or others not to mind her quick tem- 
 per or swearing as she did not mean it, but that does not 
 authorize the court to discard or discredit his entire state- 
 ment. Mr. Ball, recalled to impeach this witness, testified 
 that Carl Anderson said to him in his office on or about 
 February 1, 1890, that Mrs. Scott was crazy. Anderson 
 came to the office of Ball on some errand for Mr. Scott, who 
 was absent at the moment. Ball asked Anderson, "How is 
 the old lady?" and Anderson answered, "Just as crazy as 
 ever." In this connection it may be worth while to allude 
 again to Mr. Ball's evidence. Mr. Ball was present when 
 the decedent was married to contestant, who had an office
 
 Estate of Scott. 339 
 
 with him at that time, dating back to 1884 or 1885. When 
 Seott was east, Ball visited her two or three times a week 
 and remained there from 6 or 7 to any hour up to 12 in the 
 evening', and continued to visit her up to 1892, but did not 
 remember being there in 1893. She visited Ball's office in 
 1892 and asked him if she looked crazy enough to be put 
 into an insane asylum. "I thought perhaps it was one of 
 her lucid intervals." In 1890 she said to Scott in the pres- 
 ence of Ball, "That E. W. wanted to look out or she would 
 use a pistol on him." During Scott's absence in the east 
 Ball was at her house twice a week for four months ; her 
 conversation was continually on the same topic and was very 
 tedious and tiresome — indeed, became very monotonous. 
 One time they had a drink together; they were in the din- 
 ing-room and she went out of the room and brought the 
 whisky in a small decanter. Sometimes he would go there 
 and dine with her ; other times he would go there immediately 
 after taking his dinner, say about half-past seven in the 
 evening, and on one occasion in the course of her conversa- 
 tion, doubtless after draining the decanter, Mr. Ball paints 
 a vivid picture of an incident that occurred consequent upon 
 a remark he made to her. "She instantly became like an 
 enraged tigress — jumped up from the table. Her counte- 
 nance changed, and she looked like a fiend. Her eyes hung 
 out of her head, and she smashed the table, a marble-topped 
 table and she said: Mr. Ball then recites the language of 
 this fiend-like woman after she had jumped up in the man- 
 ner of an enraged tigress and with her paw fractured the 
 marble-topped table. Mr. Ball's delineation of this unfor- 
 tunate victim of morbid delusion was realistic in the extreme. 
 Her appearance, attitude, and action so artistically arranged 
 in Mr. Ball's description portray one demoniacally possessed. 
 Uhlhorn testifies that when he was introduced to Mrs. Seott 
 by ]\Ir. Scott in August, 1891, the first thing she said to him 
 was that Mr. Scott and Mr. Ball were trying to railroad her 
 to the insane asylum. 
 
 It is a curious fact if this woman were as crazy as they 
 would make her out through all these years, from 1890 to 
 her death in December, 1897, and if she had murderous 
 designs, as some of them say, that they would care to visit
 
 340 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 her or live with her or be under the same roof in such close 
 and constant intimacy with a dangerous lunatic. 
 
 Anderson testifies without appearance of bias, and on the 
 whole seems well disposed toward Scott, who, he says, was 
 quiet and good tempered, as a rule, although at times he 
 would provoke her. Scott is a superficially smooth, plausible 
 man, with a pleasing exterior, and understood his interest 
 sufficiently to curb such temper as he had, at times mani- 
 fested some spirit, when thrown off his guard; but Carl 
 Anderson does not appear to have any ill-will toward him, 
 and when he relates what occurred on the trip to the beacb. 
 and what he told Scott at the stable in answer to his inquiry 
 as to what she said, after Scott left the coupe at the Cliff, 
 there seems no sufficient ground to doubt it. Mr. Scott on 
 his recall denied the main feature of Carl's statement and 
 said ''he was never in the habit of making a confidant of 
 servants," but it appears that the coachman was an old ser- 
 vant of eleven years' standing, and such servants are often 
 the voluntary or involuntary recipients of family confi- 
 dences. It is fair to infer from this and other statements 
 in the record that Scott did say what was imputed to him 
 and tormented her with insinuations as to her sanity. She 
 was thus led to believe that he desired to have her so 
 situated that he could enjoy the fortune for the sake of 
 which he married her, and that when he should be no longer 
 handicapped by her presence he would pursue the path of 
 pleasure unmolested so long as her wealth would be under 
 his control without interference from her. There was some 
 evidence then to support this belief, and it was, therefore, 
 not an insane delusion. 
 
 It is proper to note, without invidious reflection, that the 
 witnesses for the contestant may be placed in two categories : 
 
 1. The intimate and personal friends of the contestant, 
 E. W. Scott. 
 
 2. Persons who for a period were in the employ of the 
 testatrix, Mrs. Scott, and who failed to retain their situa- 
 tions, and who for one reason or other have been dissatisfied. 
 
 Among these in the first category we find Hammond, the 
 friend and office companion of contestant; Dyer, personal 
 friend introduced by Scott ; Perkins, personal friend ; Estella
 
 Estate of Scott. 341 
 
 Burnham, private seamstress, and now in the employ of con- 
 testant ; Morton, the bookkeeper, personal friend introduced 
 by Scott; and Uhlhom, another personal friend of contest- 
 ant. 
 
 In the second category, Catherine O'Connor, who was 
 employed in a sort of general capacity doing all that there 
 was to do and doing all the talking with Mrs. Scott, and did 
 more talking with her than anything else, arid who from the 
 voluble manner in which she gave her testimony was quite 
 capable in that respect ; Joseph Mortier, orchardist and wine- 
 maker of the vineyard; Ida Gustafson, Sena Cook, Ulrica 
 Anderson, house servants ; Talman, the chicken-man ; Mrs. 
 Mary J. Larmer, nurse in house of Mrs. Meily's mother; 
 Fred Bockwoldt, erstwhile foreman at the Scott ranch; Mrs. 
 Ella Joseph, colored domestic in the Scott mansion; Froe- 
 lieh, the wine broker who had litigation with Mrs. Scott ; 
 O'Dea, the plumber; and finally Elizabeth Jane Richards, 
 who worked for her from 1890 until the death of testatrix, 
 in December, 1897, and whose testimony can hardly be 
 treated with the traditional tongs, but as a specimen of her 
 feeling toward the deceased this charitable observation may 
 be culled from the record: "Mrs. Scott said that she would 
 be dead and stiff in hell by Christmas day. I guess she was. ' ' 
 This witness made this remark professing at the same time 
 to have been very friendly with the decedent. As a sample 
 of her reckless statements on the stand reference may be 
 made to her testimony that decedent employed and dis- 
 charged as many as three girls in a day, and that they would 
 not stay because her language and habits were so bad, and 
 that there was not food enough for them. When the court 
 called the attention of this witness to the fact that three 
 girls a day would be many in a month, she responded that 
 she did not think that decedent had so many in a month 
 but she had one every day in the month. This woman's 
 extraordinary nerve in voluntarily narrating incidents 
 from which even a degenerate masculine mind would revolt 
 was so abnormal as to shock every one within hearing and 
 to cause the counsel for contestant to suggest that if it were 
 to continue, the case had better proceed with closed doors; 
 yet she affected delicacy in reciting the remarks of dece-
 
 342 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 dent, saying she could not explain all the language used. "A 
 man might do it; not a lady." Yet notwithstanding the 
 brutish behavior and ineffable grossness of the decedent, 
 from the first day to the last, this lady remained with her 
 for eight years. 
 
 Mr. Estee, of counsel for contestant, in commenting on the 
 mode of conducting trials of this kind, made some remarks, 
 the substance of which the court has preserved, because of 
 their general value. He said that the asperities generated 
 in the course of controversy should cease when the time for 
 argument arrives; then the heat of the trial being over the 
 cool reason only should govern ; the abuse of one attorney 
 by another is not argument and can avail nothing before a 
 court constituted to try a cause, nor is the' abuse of witnesses 
 serviceable in the illustration of the important issues in such 
 a case. Most men and women are honest, women as a rule 
 more so than men, but the intentions of most are upright 
 and desirous of honest dealing's. Some men make poor wit- 
 nesses, most women show to poor advantage on the witness- 
 stand, but that is not because they are not telling the truth 
 but because they are so constituted that their feelings are 
 enlisted and their sensibilities are superior to those of men 
 and not so easily controlled. It is proverbial, therefore, 
 that women are poor witnesses; so with old men, who seldom 
 do well when under examination of counsel in court; they 
 mean to testify truthfully, but because of age or sex are 
 easily disturbed in their train of thought and current of con- 
 nected discourse. Counsel therefore did not undertake to 
 descant upon the duplicity or deceit or falsehood of wit- 
 nesses whom he did not believe to be in any way guilty of 
 perjury, but who by reason of feeling or age, or other natural 
 accident of constitution, may have colored or exaggerated 
 or innocently diminished or distorted the facts in their 
 testimony. Counsel has the greatest respect for Dr. Lane 
 personally and in' his professional character, but thought his 
 feelings dominated his evidence; as for Mrs. Richards, he 
 did not think she was a good witness, but she was entitled 
 to animadversions to no such extent as was indulged, and 
 counsel for contestant knew her to be a good woman not-
 
 Estate of Scott. 343 
 
 withstanding the unpleasant tenor of her testimony, which, 
 being the truth, she was bound to disclose. 
 
 The court is in perfect accord with the sentiments of the 
 learned counsel, and if the lady whose testimony has been 
 presented has been dealt with unfairlj^, she may abide by 
 the record which will be the final test for all concerned. 
 
 Opposed to the witnesses enumerated are those for the pro- 
 ponents, whose character and standing are not challenged, 
 save in some exceptional cases, such as poor Pontus Ahlstedt, 
 whose prenomen provoked a pun, and Carl Anderson, whom 
 counsel for contestant thought it not necessary to abuse be- 
 cause he was a poor, ignorant man who got mixed up in 
 his memory and substituted' imagination, as much as he had 
 of it, for actual occurrences, and counsel thinks it is charity 
 to Carl to say he was mistaken; but as to the others, they 
 are let off lightly, with the suggestion that they are mere 
 business acquaintances and not up to the standard of Uhl- 
 horn, Dyer, Perkins, Richards, and the others already cited 
 and quoted; but many of them had large opportunities to 
 •observe and belonged to an intelligent and discerning order 
 of observers ; if their testimony was of the negative kind, 
 in some instances, it was of a high character and from per- 
 sons not apt to be deceived or mistaken, and met the improb- 
 ability of much of contestant's positive or affirmative evi- 
 dence. 
 
 In connection with the witnesses for the contestant there 
 are many circumstances of suspicion giving color to their 
 testimony. Some of these suspicious circumstances may be 
 mentioned ; such as the method of introduction of Major 
 Hammond, IMr. Scott's office companion; the peculiarities 
 surrounding the sudden desire of Scott to introduce Uhlhorn 
 leaving Uhlhorn alone with her; the dinner which followed 
 at which Scott did not participate ; after that the dinner 
 at the invitation of Scott; the scene in the parlor when she 
 was left alone again with Uhlhorn ; the suggestion of Uhl- 
 horn at his first visit that she was crazy; the line of real 
 estate men introduced by Scott to sell her property, and 
 the care and zeal with which they pursued their wealthy 
 (juarry : the fre(|uent visits and the time they spent in the 
 pursuit, notwithstanding their settled conviction at the very
 
 344 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 outset that she was crazy and could not competently trans- 
 act any business of importance; the fortunate circumstance 
 of Annie Robinson going to the office to obtain a witness 
 to an instrument ; the chance meetings on the streets and 
 on boats; the remarkable ability to discover and marshal ser- 
 vants of years gone by who had been dismissed from em- 
 ployment; many of these discarded domestics are brought 
 in to testify to trivial transactions, inconsiderable incidents 
 and segregated circumstances, designed to promote the pur- 
 pose of contestant in traducing the memory of deceased and 
 to expose her infirmities of temper and magnify her foibles 
 into the dimensions of disease of mind, every atom of acerb- 
 ity on her part and every ebullition of anger, no matter how 
 evanescent, is exaggerated and accentuated as evidence of 
 insanity. 
 
 The value of the evidence of business men and acquaint- 
 ances acquired in commercial dealings has been favorably re- 
 garded by the courts in all cases of this character, and the 
 persons here produced by proponents are certainly entitled 
 to credit within the sphere of their observation. A brief 
 resume may here be given of the evidence adduced in favor 
 of the sanity of the testatrix : 
 
 Edwin Lewis Brown was an accountant and bookkeeper 
 for the decedent for some years after 1879. Brown used to 
 go to her house at stated periods to make up the books. She 
 was a shrewd and suspicious woman, distrustful to a degree. 
 She was aggrieved apparently at her husband, Mr. Scott, 
 and spoke of her suspicions of his fidelity to her. She said 
 she married him because she loved him and she wanted some 
 one to handle her afl'airs, and Scott was reported to her as 
 a business man and was introduced as such. She said she 
 did not think he reciprocated her affection, and she sus- 
 pected he was not true to her, as he was no husband to her 
 and she knew enough about men to know that this was be- 
 cause he was going with other women. She stated on mora 
 than one occasion that Mr. Scott had charged her with be- 
 ing crazy or said that she was crazy, and told her so to her 
 face, and such remarks had a tendency to provoke and worrjr 
 her ; she was sane.
 
 Estate of Scott. 345 
 
 George Swall knew Mrs. Scott since 1885, and thought she 
 was sane. 
 
 Mrs. Nellie Swall knew decedent all her own life and be- 
 lieved her to have been sane. 
 
 Gustave Messinger, a fire insurance agent, knew her for 
 twenty-three years, and handled her insurance about three 
 years prior to her death ; saw her three or four times a year, 
 and carried about $123,000 for her. She always selected 
 her own companies, giving particular personal attention to 
 the paying of premiums and the exacting of receipts, for 
 she would not trust anyone to pay the premiums, not even 
 this witness, and in his opinion, from her appearance and 
 manner of doing business, she was rational. 
 
 Sumner C. Murray, a carpenter and builder for thirty 
 years in San Francisco, knew the decedent and worked for 
 her at least a dozen times in the two or three years before her 
 death, always dealing with her personally. Her conduct 
 and appearance was rational, and in his opinion she was of 
 sound mind. 
 
 "William li. Rhodes, engaged in the safe deposit depart- 
 ment of the California Safe Deposit and Trust Company, 
 knew decedent as a customer of that concern for two years. 
 Had many conversations with her on her visits to that place, 
 sometimes for a few minutes and sometimes for as much as 
 half an hour at a time. Saw her once a month or once in 
 two months; in his opinion Mrs. Scott was perfectly sound 
 in mind. 
 
 Mrs. Olivette M. Folsom testifies that she has been mar- 
 ried about ten years. Her mother in law died about two 
 years ago of a stomach trouble. She had sufi'ered several 
 years prior to her death. The senior ]\Irs. Folsom came to 
 this coast on the same steamer with Mrs. Scott and the 
 friendship continued until death. Each had this similar 
 chronic complaint? and both had the same physician. They 
 used to compare notes as to their symptoms. After the sen- 
 ior Mrs. Folsom 's death Mrs. Scott used to visit the junior 
 repeatedly, which visits were returned, and the young wo- 
 man went to drive on a number of occasions with the elder 
 one, and they talked habitually of the symptoms of Mrs 
 Folsom ill her last illness. The mother in law of witness
 
 346 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 had to be very careful in her diet in the last year of her life. 
 Witness heard from them that her mother in law and Mrs. 
 Scott came out to California together. She heard Mrs. 
 Scott complaining of her stomach troubles; the two talked 
 before her on the subject matter of their abdominal ailments. 
 She never heard Mrs. Scott accuse anybody of attempting 
 to poison her; never heard her use profane, vulgar, or ob- 
 scene language or say or do anything unbeseeming a- lady. 
 She was perfectly sane. Witness gave as her reasons that 
 she always conducted herself in a rational manner and talked 
 sensibly, her conversation was the same as that of any other 
 sane person. In all these conversations there was no sug- 
 gestion made by Mrs. Scott that she had been poisoned, that 
 she thought her trouble arose from poison, or anything what- 
 ever about poison. 
 
 Robert Frank Clark, in the insurance line for twenty years 
 last past transacted some matters for and with decedent. She 
 did business the same as anyone else. Clark saw her at her 
 house, talked with her for as much as half an hour at a time. 
 The conversation occurred in a little room off the hall, ap- 
 parently a reception-room. Decedent may have talked about 
 her properties in a general incidental way. She alluded to 
 her physical infirmities, giving Clark to understand that she 
 was possessed of a very sensitive stomach and was of the 
 dyspeptic order. Witness thought she was very suspicious 
 in business matters, a nervous woman. She never told Clark 
 that she feared being poisoned. He never saw her excited. 
 She was emphatically sane. Clark gave as reasons for his 
 opinion that she conducted her business with scrupulous care 
 in regard to data and details, very exact in money matters. 
 She never talked to him about her domestic affairs. The 
 transactions of witness with her were from November, 1886, 
 to November, 1893. ■ . 
 
 Amanda Johnson was employed by Mrs. Scott for nine 
 months in 1893. Decedent was delicate, just sick. She did 
 not tell witness what was the matter. She took massage 
 treatment while witness was there, who used to have to stay 
 in the room during the time. While the rubbing was going 
 on decedent would have some covering over her. Never 
 heard her say that she was in danger of being poisoned.
 
 Estate of Scott. 347 
 
 She was not easy to get along with. She used to become 
 angry sometimes. She said she had too much business to 
 attend to ; that she thought Scott did not care for her be- 
 cause she was too old ; that he drank sometimes ; that they 
 would try to break her will when she was dead by trying 
 to prove that she was crazy, that Scott would try and do 
 this. Once when the witness was with her passing in sight 
 of an insane asylum, decedent pointed in that direction and 
 said that Ball and her husband had picked out a room in 
 that institution for her. In the opinion of the witness Mrs. 
 Scott was sane. 
 
 George A. Folsom came out to this coast on the steamer 
 with decedent, 1857, and afterward the acquaintance con- 
 tinued here. He saw her three or four times after her mar- 
 riage to Mr. Scott in 1889 ; the last time in November, 1897. 
 She was perfectly sane. 
 
 Joseph Henry Marshall, a resident for thirty years of this 
 city, a salesman for the Dunham-Carrigan Company, deal- 
 ers in hardware, knew Mrs. Scott as a customer of that firm 
 years ago. Her transactions with the witness were purely 
 on business and continued for a period of six years. The 
 acquaintance was begun in the store where witness was em- 
 ployed. She came about once in two or three months, per- 
 haps about thirty times in all. She was very bright in mak- 
 ing purchases, in looking after cash discounts. She came 
 about once in three months. IMarshall thought she was per- 
 fectly sound in mind and very bright. 
 
 James S. Bock, floor superintendent of Newman & Lev- 
 inson, on Kearny street, for twelve years, knew decedent as 
 a customer since before she married Scott and had many 
 conversations with her on matters connected with her pur- 
 chases. She was very reserved and aristocratic in her de- 
 meanor and mannerisms. She was always dressed up to 
 date, very particular as to appointments of apparel and a 
 close and exact buyer, a hard customer to please, with an 
 excellent knowledge of fabrics and a good judgment user in 
 the selection of materials. She always wanted the latest 
 styles and she was a good judges of modes. Had no con- 
 versation with her except in the line of his calling. She 
 was sane.
 
 348 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 John M. Ver Mehr deposed that he was an assistant ac- 
 countant at the California Safe Deposit Company, and knew 
 the decedent as a customer; saw her many times but had no 
 considerable conversation with her, but so far as he could 
 judge Mrs. Scott was perfectly sane. 
 
 John J. Doyle knew Mrs. Scott since 1888 and had busi- 
 ness with her down to November, 1896. Witness has been 
 engaged since 1881 in selling the product of the vineyard 
 Las Palmas, which is by the road three miles and a half 
 from the Scott ranch, the Pebbleside. She often came to 
 his office in the Safe Deposit Building to consult about the 
 price of wine and other cognate matters. Had no conver- 
 sations with her except on business. She impressed him as 
 an intelligent and shrewd woman of business and had a good 
 knowledge of the market generally. She was thoroughly 
 sane; conversant with the condition of the market and con- 
 nected in her discourse, discussed the future of the market 
 and reasoned well upon the probabilities of prices. 
 
 Sarnuel G. Murphy, president First National Bank, knew 
 Mrs. Scott since January, 1896, and she was sane beyond 
 any question. 
 
 Miss Clara L. "Wilson knew Mrs. Scott twenty years. Had 
 seen her often in (he last ten or twelve years. When' she 
 was out riding in this city she frequently stopped at the 
 house of the witness. She ased to talk to the father of 
 witness, Ezekiel Wilson, about her vineyard and some prop- 
 erty she had on Point Lobos Avenue and some horses. Wit- 
 ness last saw decedent in 1897, and in her opinion Mrs. 
 Scott was perfectly sane. 
 
 Thomas Brown, cashier of the Bank of California, knew 
 Mrs. Scott as a customer of that institution in which her ac- 
 count was closed prior to her death. She was sane. His 
 opinion was based on observation of her in transactions with 
 the bank. He had no other means of judging of her mental 
 condition. 
 
 William Plageman, engaged in the milling business in this 
 city, knew Mrs. Scott, and had conversations with her on mat- 
 ters of business. In his opinion she was sane, and the wit- 
 ness saw nothing in her action or talk to indicate insanitv.
 
 Estate op Scott. 349 
 
 Ezekiel Wilson, nearly eighty-two years of age, and a resi- 
 dent of San Francisco for forty-eight years, and very well 
 known during all that time, knew the decedent intimately for 
 twenty-five years. Never heard her swear or use unseemly 
 language. She was always a lady. She talked about her 
 health, stomach trouble, dyspepsia, had to use care in her diet. 
 She was a very bright, intelligent, first-class business woman, 
 rational and shrewd in her ideas. She was sane and he never 
 thought otherwise. Her conversation and conduct showed 
 sanity. 
 
 C. A. Armstrong, already alluded to elsewhere, thought 
 she was sane. 
 
 As to the habits of contestant it is not open to doubt upon 
 the evidence that he sometimes took a drop too much. In his 
 own testimony he says that for two or three years when he 
 was selling wine and associating with drinking men he may 
 have drank a shade too much, but he was never under the in- 
 fluence of liquor to an inordinate extent; he was always able 
 to take care of himself, and did not need aid of any person 
 to assist him home or otherwise. The testimony of Berry, 
 Coyle, and Kelly, hackdrivers; Wallace, car conductor, and 
 farmer Ahlstedt, is hardly overcome by this general denial 
 of contestant. It is not surprising that this gentleman at 
 times was tempted beyond his powers of resistance, for such 
 a dragon as he makes out decedent would drive a regiment 
 of teetotalers to drink. "The man had a shrew for a wife 
 and there could be no quiet in the house with her." This 
 phase of the case may be passed without further remark. 
 
 In regard to the evolution of these testamentary instru- 
 ments we must consider at some length the evidence of those 
 immediately concerned in and about the act of execution. 
 
 Philip G. Galpin began his practice in San Francisco as 
 early as 1858, and has been identified with his profession iri 
 tills place since that time, and for more than twenty years 
 continuously has resided in this city, engaged in active and 
 extensive legal business. Mrs. Angelia R. Scott came to his 
 office in relation to the drawing of the document dated Octo- 
 ber 22, 1897. to which his name is subscribed as a witness in 
 association with J;icob C. Johnson and Edward li. Horton.
 
 350 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 He made a draft from the instructions given to him by her. 
 She gave the details of the devises and legacies. He first 
 made her acquaintance after she married Scott — to the best 
 of his memory a short time before the making of the will in 
 1891. The witness identified his signature on the instrument 
 dated October 22, 1897, and also the signatures of the other 
 subscribing witnesses, Jacob C. Johnson and Edward H. Hor- 
 ton, just above his own, and stated that he saw the testatrix 
 write her name in their presence. At that time the decedent 
 said that she published and declared it for her last will and 
 testament. From the time witness first knew Mrs. Scott she 
 came occasionally to his office, during the last few years a 
 great many times. He prepared the paper of October 22d, 
 at her direction. 
 
 Mr. Reuben H. Lloyd was also consulted. Mr. Galpin 
 never had any conversation with Mrs. Garcia in connection 
 wdth the drafting of the codicil. Neither she nor Mrs. Ger- 
 rish was ever present at any of the interviews. Mrs. Scott 
 always came alone. She gave the data and information ob- 
 tained in drawing the will. At first, she stated generally 
 what she wanted to do ; then when it came down to a divi- 
 sion among the different parties in interest, she made a list 
 of the names that she gave to witness and indicated what 
 fractional interest each was to receive, and then from time 
 to time she would keep changing these interests, substitut- 
 ing different fractions opposite different names. She was 
 engaged in this way for two or three weeks. She would come 
 to his office, perhaps twenty times in all, and suggest changes 
 in the will. The witness formed the opinion she was sane, 
 and judged so from her manner and appearance and her 
 conversation and mode of doing business. He had no rea- 
 son to suspect her -sanity. Witness had no other business 
 with decedent for some short space prior to the time she 
 commenced talking about the will. She began to consult 
 him on that subject more than a month before the date of 
 the execution of the codicil, October 22, 1897. During that 
 period that was the only transaction between them as attor- 
 ney and client. She said she desired to give ]\Ir. Scott ex- 
 pressly what she had given him in the will which was drawn
 
 Estate of Scott. 351 
 
 by the witness in 1891. She said that she was attached to 
 his children and did not regard them as responsible for his 
 shortcomings; that she was inclined to give them something- 
 which she had not done by the former will, and desired Mr. 
 Galpin to so fix that Scott's share should be the same and 
 that the amount to his children should be specified. She 
 also said she was very apprehensive that the codicil would 
 be broken and desired great pains taken. She desired a will 
 so drawn, if possible, that it could not be broken, and also 
 she wanted great care taken that it should not be stolen, which 
 she apprehended might happen. Decedent informed the wit- 
 ness that she was told that Mr. Estee and Mr. Ball would un- 
 dertake to break this will. She was very anxious about the 
 safety of the will and codicil and told the witness that she 
 proposed to put it in her box in the Safe Deposit Building, 
 and consulted him as to how she could do that and prevent 
 some person obtaining access to the box and purloining the 
 paper after her death. The codicil was drawn in duplicate, 
 at his suggestion, to anticipate its possible loss. One copy 
 was attached to the original will of 1891 and the other copy 
 was retained by him for a while and kept in his safe and 
 then IMrs. Scott took it away. She was a very suspicious 
 woman. She said she would put that will where she thought 
 it would be safe. She did not disclose the place where she 
 was going to put it. Subsequently it was returned to him 
 and is now in his possession. The witness had no recollec- 
 tion of Mrs. Scott's saying anything about community or 
 separate property, but she did say that a large part of her 
 property was derived from her first husband, Salvin P. Col- 
 lins, and she thought that it was but right that she should 
 remember his relatives in the will. 
 
 Edward H. Horton has been manager of the house of J. 
 C. Johnson & Company on Market street for about fifteen 
 years. J. C. Johnson has been dead for some months. The 
 late Mrs. Angelia R. Scott used to call frequently there and 
 the house had transactions with her in selling goods. After 
 the death of Mr. Collins she used to come to obtain advice 
 from Mr. Johnson about her business affairs, and in the last 
 ten vears Mr. Johnson was absent a good deal on account of
 
 352 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 illness, so she consulted witness many times. She spoke to 
 him about the will and she told him that Mr. Scott was con- 
 tinually nagging her about making a will and that sometimes 
 Scott made her sick by this talk. Horton identified the sig- 
 natures to the different instruments. One was that of his 
 uncle, Jacob C. Johnson, and the other his own, and the other 
 that of Mrs. Angelia R. Scott, subscribed to the instrument 
 dated September 7, 1891; also the same may be said of the 
 paper dated February 25, 1892; likewise the same as to the 
 third paper appended dated October 22, 1897, to which a 
 third signature, P. G. Galpin, is subscribed. Decedent de- 
 clared the first to be her will, and signed it and asked him- 
 self and Mr. Johnson to be witnesses and they signed in her 
 presence. It was the same of the second and third papers. 
 Horton 's recollection is that one will was executed in du- 
 plicate, she saying that if one were lost the other would serve. 
 Mrs. Scott told witness that Scott was worrying her to death 
 about her will; that he was making her life a perfect hell 
 on earth ; that he said he could smash any will that she could 
 make. She told him that Mr. Scott was always at her and 
 annoying her about the making of a will and saying to her 
 that she was ' ' crazy as a bedbug. ' ' Witness advised her that 
 she might have that settled by an examination by competent 
 physicians and this was done afterward at the time of the 
 execution of the third paper, October 22, 1897, in the office 
 of Mr. Galpin, the attorney. After the examination she 
 came into the room where the witnesses were in waiting and 
 said that she was all right and that she was sane, and those 
 present assented to that proposition with the remark that if 
 she were not sane no one was. The witness gave it as his 
 opinion that she was sane. 
 
 We come now to an important item of evidence in this 
 case : The examination of the decedent by the doctors, which 
 it appears was the result of suggestions emanating from Mr. 
 Horton and Dr. Lane. Counsel for contestant comments on 
 the singularity of this circumstance, and thinks its unusual 
 character significant, and cites a case in Oregon in which a 
 similar proceeding was regarded as an unusual precaution 
 and itself importing a consciousness of the existence of the
 
 Estate of Scott. 353 
 
 very fact inquiry into which it was intended to foreclose, and 
 that, as in Twine's case in Coke's Reports, it was like a clause 
 in a deed that it was made honestly, truly, and bona fide, and 
 would lead to a suspicion against the integrity of the instru- 
 ment: Greenwood v. Cline, 7 Or. 28. 
 
 As against these dicta and in connection with the con- 
 sideration of expert testimony in general, reference may be 
 made to the opinion of Dr. Clouston, an eminent alienist, in 
 his Clinical Lectures on Mental Diseases, in which he says, 
 in regard to will-making, that the great trouble is that medi- 
 cal men are usually not consulted at the time of making the 
 will, when the real capacity of the testator could be exam- 
 ined into, but are placed on the witness-stand after he is 
 dead, with one-sided imperfect information, and with every 
 motive on the side calling the experts to prevent their getting 
 at all the facts. It is most important, says Dr. Clouston, 
 that a skilled and experienced physician should be asked to 
 examine into the testamentary capacity of such cases before 
 the destination of great sums of money is irrevocably decided 
 by a document that above all things needs soundness of judg- 
 ment for its validity. It would be well were qualified physi- 
 cians oftener called for this purpose. 
 
 In the Oregon case it may be noted that the will was not 
 set aside upon the ground of insanity but upon that of un- 
 due influence, and in the case at bar there is no evidence of 
 undue influence. The facts as to the certificate in this case 
 were brought out first by the cross-examination of Dr. Will- 
 iam Henry Mays, who was called as an expert by contestant, 
 and whose ability is admitted and experience exceptional in 
 mental diseases. 
 
 Dr. Mays was for two years the assistant physician for 
 the insane asylum at Stockton and also for an equal period 
 superintendent of that in.stitution, and he is a graduate in 
 medicine of the University of California. In his direct ex- 
 amination he said in answer to the hypothetical questions that 
 he considered the person described insane, a.ssuming hypothe- 
 sis. About all the constituents of insanity were present in 
 that (luestion ; fixed delusions as to various fictitious circum- 
 stances, thought by the person to be facts without any basis 
 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. T — 23
 
 354 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 for belief. On cross-examination Dr. Mays said he knew the 
 late Mrs. Scott; met her at Mr. Galpin's office on the occa- 
 sion of the execution of the codicil. His acquaintance with 
 this case began in this way : He was called by Mrs. Scott her- 
 self to testify or to give a certificate as to her sanity at a 
 particular moment. He knew Mrs. Scott prior to that time. 
 He called at her house once or twice before at her request. 
 On the first occasion he had a conversation with her for three- 
 quarters of an hour or perhaps a full hour and on the sec- 
 ond occasion for perhaps an equal space. The first time was 
 about a week before the meeting at the lawyer's office and 
 the second two or three days prior to that. The purpose and 
 object of these conversations was on her part to acquaint the 
 witness with her and to enable him to form a judgment of 
 her sanity. She did not tell him that in so many words, but 
 she exhibited her books and accounts and went over them 
 with him to a certain extent to show apparently that she was 
 a bright business woman. He met her after those conversa- 
 tions in Mr. Galpin's office in conjunction with other medi- 
 cal gentlemen for the purpose of testifying to her mental 
 condition at that time with the view of her making a codicil. 
 That was the third time he met her. The date is in the codi- 
 cil but he did not remember the date. The interview on that 
 occasion took about one hour and a half. There were pres- 
 ent Mr. Galpin, Dr. Robertson and Dr. Gardner, of Napa, 
 himself, and INIrs. Scott. Mrs. Scott was left in the room 
 with the witness and the other physicians for the greater 
 part of an hour, perhaps, hardly as long as three hours; it 
 may have been two hours. The three physicians were there 
 to investigate into her mental condition at that time prior 
 to her signing a codicil to her will, it being her wish that 
 her sanity be established by these examining physicians. She 
 announced that as her object, saying she was apprehensive 
 of the will being attacked after her death on the ground of 
 her insanity. They conversed with her with a view of as- 
 certaining her mental condition ; talked with her about her 
 husband and about her relations with him; talked about a- 
 Mrs. Meily. The doctors referred to all these matters ; they 
 made as thorough an examination as was possible then and
 
 Estate of Scott. 355 
 
 there with no counter-evidence. The physicians were called 
 by Mrs. Scott and after the examination they signed a cer- 
 tificate of the result in answer to a request in writing, which 
 request and certificate are as follows : 
 
 "To Drs. Gardner, Robertson, and Mays: 
 
 ' ' Gentlemen : Having been informed that the husband of 
 Mrs. Angelia R. Scott proposes to break any Will that IMrs. 
 Scott may make, and being desirous to perpetuate evidence 
 as to her mental condition at the time of executing the Codi- 
 cil to her Will this 22nd day of October, 1897, I would be 
 pleased to know what her mental condition is. 
 
 "October 22nd, 1897. 
 
 "THILIP G. GALPIN." 
 
 "San Francisco, October 22nd, 1897. 
 "In compliance with the above request, we have this day 
 carefully examined into the mental condition of Mrs. Angelia 
 R. Scott, and in our opinion she is of perfectly sound and dis- 
 posing mind. 
 
 W. H. MAYS, M. D. 
 J. W. ROBERTSON, M. D. 
 "A. M. GARDNER, M. D." 
 
 Another paper was written and signed by the witness and 
 delivered to Mrs. Scott through the mail on the day of its 
 date, October 22, 1897, and reads as follows: 
 
 "San Francisco, October 22nd, 1897. 
 "I have this day in compliance and in company with Dr. 
 Gardner and Dr. Robertson, at the office of Attorne}' Gal- 
 pin, made a careful examination of Mrs. A. R. Scott, with 
 regard to her mental condition. I find her of sound mind 
 and in full possession of her mental faculties. I also con- 
 versed with her at her home. I also conversed with her at 
 some length some two or three weeks ago at her residence 
 with the «ame end in view. On each of these occasions I 
 made a special endeavor to get some evidence of mental im- 
 pairment, but without success. On the contrary, she im- 
 pressed me as a person of more than ordinary mental keen- 
 ness and unusual power of memory." 
 
 < i
 
 356 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 Another paper introduced reads as follows : 
 
 "1118 Sutter Street, San Francisco, October 22nd, 1897.— 
 Mrs. A. R. Scott to Dr. Mays, for professional services, ex- 
 amination, consultation, and certificate of mental condition. 
 
 "$100. 
 
 "Paid, W. H. Mays." 
 
 Witness said that that was his bill, signature, and receipt 
 for the services specified. Dr. Mays thought that the first 
 conversation he had about her mental condition after her 
 death was with Mr. Galpin and Dr. Robertson. He told Dr. 
 Robertson how he had seen Mrs. Scott after making that 
 certificate and found that she had fooled them, and that she 
 had been playing a part, and how he had seen her since and 
 found undoubted evidence of insanity of the most atrocious 
 character, and that he must go to Mr. Galpin to explain mat- 
 ters. He went to Mr. Galpin and told him that he had seen 
 Mrs. Scott since and found her undoubtedly insane, and that 
 would very much modify his previous statement of her men- 
 tal condition made October 22, 1897. The witness did not 
 say at that conversation and in the presence of Mr. Galpin 
 to him or to Dr. Robertson, or at any time before, that he 
 had a talk already with Mr. Estee on the subject. Witness 
 did not know how long Mrs. Scott had been dead at the 
 time now alluded to. It was some little time after, perhaps 
 very soon after, may have been a month after that event. 
 The doctor changed his mind about the mental condition of 
 the lady about two weeks subsequent to the giving of that 
 certificate. He saw her two weeks after that and found her 
 insane. He did not go then and inform Mr. Galpin. He 
 first told him some little time after she died, about two or 
 three weeks after that event. Witness thought she died De- 
 cember 14, 1897. He talked with Dr. Robertson and told 
 him how he had found undoubted evidence of insanity, and 
 they talked the matter over about the way she had pla.ved 
 her part, and then he proposed going to see Mr. Galpin, say- 
 ing to Dr. Robertson, "We must not leave the matter in this 
 condition," and they went down there and witness related 
 the circumstance to Mr. Galpin. The witness had thought
 
 Estate of Scott. 357 
 
 over this matter a good deal; had been in consultation with 
 Dr. Rucker, Dr. Hatch, and Mr. Estee. They all took a hand 
 in framing the hypothetical question. 
 
 Dr. John W. Robertson is a physician and surgeon, gradu- 
 ate of the University of California medical department, pro- 
 prietor of the sanitarium at Livermore, and formerly con- 
 nected with the public hospitals for the insane, having had 
 large and diversified experience in cases of insanity. Knew 
 the late Mrs. Angelia R. Scott and at her request made an 
 examination of her sanity. With the other physicians, they 
 attempted to test her intellect, her memory, her ability to 
 make a will. In speaking of ]\Ir. Scott she began with a dis- 
 cussion of his first marriage — she was speaking with refer- 
 ence to her own — she said that Mr. Scott was not a good 
 business man, that he had been married previously and had 
 almost ruined the fortune that he had gotten of his first wife ; 
 that he had charge of her business affairs and that he had 
 managed them very poorly; that it was only the untimely 
 death of his first wife that saved anything at all to his chil- 
 dren ; that when she herself married she had been anxious 
 to place her business affairs in the hands of Mr. Scott, but 
 she soon found that it would meet the fate of his first wife's 
 fortune; that when he went to New York he conducted all 
 the business affairs in his own way; that his bank account 
 grew very large, while her account decreased ; that Mr. Scott 
 had no money at all when he married her; that he had then 
 in a little while thereafter several thousand dollars in bank; 
 that in the course of time she found it absolutely necessary 
 for her protection that she take her business affairs away 
 from him ; that she had been a kind mother to his children, 
 that she loved them and desired to do something for them, 
 and that, therefore, she wanted to make a will, a codicil to 
 the will which would increase their share of the estate; she 
 said that she did not particularly hate Mr. Scott, she disliked 
 him on business grounds; that he had been unfaithful to her, 
 that he had been unkind to her; that he had done everything 
 to her that a husband should not do; that she did not intend 
 to take away the part that she had given Mr. Scott and that 
 while he had fallen in her estimation the children had risen
 
 358 CoprEY's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 very much; she spoke of her relation with the children, of 
 how well they were doing in the University, of what hope 
 she had for their future ; and that she had been instrumental 
 in helping them along and desired that a part of her fortune 
 should go to them ; she again spoke of her sister in law, Mrs. 
 Paisley, the sister of her deceased first hu>sband, and at this 
 time the witness again questioned her and she again said 
 she did not believe that there had been any carnal intercourse 
 between the two, but she felt that Mrs. Paisley had undoubt- 
 edly taken Scott's part and that he had made certain over- 
 tures to that lady and that she ought to have resented them 
 more strongly than she had; she felt that they were nearer 
 together than further away after those advances and over- 
 tures; that as Mrs. Paisley stayed along in the house she 
 seemed to take Scott's part rather than hers and on that ac- 
 count Mrs. Scott made her go back home ; and she did not 
 care to leave any of her property to her. Mrs. Scott asked 
 the witness if there was any insane delusion in that. He an- 
 swered that he could discern no delusion in that disposition. 
 Then the Meily question came up again. She again went 
 fully into all the reasons for her suspicions there. She spoke 
 of the thin partition and of the fact that when she went there 
 she heard a noise of creaking of the bed — she heard it squeak 
 and she heard voices after she had knocked and the noise 
 kept up. She stood there awaiting the cessation of the noise 
 and she heard a man's step going out to the kitchen and down 
 a back way into the street. A little while later the door was 
 opened and she went in. She found that the bedclothes had 
 been rumpled; she believed that it was her husband. She 
 asked the witness if this was an insane delusion provided 
 all those were facts, and the doctor answered that all she 
 needed for a basis was a fair suspicion. She claimed that 
 certain persons had been to her and told her that Scott had 
 visited Mrs. Meily on the afternoon in question ; and she ar- 
 gued this point that it was not absolutely essential for her 
 to have seen this with her own eyes but simply to have such 
 evidence as would fairly warrant a suspicion. She asked the 
 witness if there was any such evidence, if she could prove 
 to him that she heard those noises while she stood there and
 
 Estate of Scott. 359 
 
 heard a man's step going away, and it was also shown that 
 her husband had visited Mrs. Meily that afternoon, would he 
 regard it as an insane delusion"? The witness answered, 
 ''Certainly not," but that it would be a matter for legal in- 
 vestigation and he could not go into all these facts. She 
 spoke with reference to her husband — she felt, she said, that 
 in place of taking away from him she was adding to his share. 
 The three points asked of her were the three changes made 
 in the will: 1. With reference to Scott; 2. Mrs. Meily; 3. 
 ]Mrs. Paisley. The physicians went over the point as to Mrs. 
 Paisley time and again for the three hours they discussed 
 the matter, and the witness finally came to the conclusion 
 that no amount of discussion would enlighten him further. 
 So he concluded to write another letter practically the same 
 as this. In that other letter he said nothing about insane 
 delusions. The witness identified a letter shown to him as 
 the second letter dated October 22, 1897, entirely written, 
 dated and signed by his hand; it must have been written 
 about that date; it was written on the night he got home 
 while everything was fresh in his memory; that is, the first 
 letter was so dated and written; the second letter was writ- 
 ten about three weeks afterward, and was a copy substan- 
 tially of the first with certain matter eliminated, to which 
 she took exception, and is as follows: 
 
 "October 22nd, 1897. 
 "Mrs. Angelia R. Scott, 
 
 "My dear Madam: By your request, I have made a thor- 
 ough examination of your mental condition with reference 
 to your capacity for drawing or altering your Will and signed 
 a paper certifying your competency, and I now more explic- 
 itly state my reasons for so doing. I have carefully read 
 your Will made several years ago, and thoroughly investi- 
 gated your reasons for the changes made. I find you usu- 
 ally intelligent, rational and possessing excellent memory and 
 able to sustain continuously a line of thought and saw noth- 
 ing either in demeanor, method of expression, or mental pe- 
 culiarity to in any way suspect mental weakness. I judge 
 you to be a most remarkable business woman and unusually 
 free from intuitively conceived rea.soning, clear-headed, broad-
 
 360 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 minded, and just. The best proof of which I judge to be 
 the Will you propose. 
 
 "(Signed) Respectfully, 
 
 "J. W. ROBERTSON." 
 
 The doctor's reasons for leaving out of this letter the por- 
 tion she objected to in the former were: After the first in- 
 terview the only suspicion in his mind was the possibility of 
 insane jealousy, but that was only a possibility and a matter 
 that he could not determine. After these conversations he 
 still had no more reasons to omit what he did omit than he 
 had at the first letter. He did so simply because of a per- 
 sonal request and because of the fact that as he saw more 
 and more of her he became more and more fully convinced 
 of her mental soundness and naturally did not care to put 
 a stigma where he saw no valid reason for so doing. He be- 
 came as satisfied as he could possibly be of her soundness. 
 He had no mental reservation in his judgment of her sanity. 
 He knew nothing of Mrs. Meily or whether Mrs. Scott had 
 made those visits, but the statements of Mrs. Scott were plaus- 
 ibly put and well thought out, and whether the premises 
 were false or true the syllogism was perfect, reasons excel- 
 lent and explicit, and he could perceive no reason for a base 
 fabrication. What he omitted in her second letter was simply 
 a matter of courtesy to her ; but he reserved his letter, placed 
 it on file, and desired to use it. In the conversations with 
 her she said that Mr. Scott said that she was insane and that 
 he would break any will that she made. She was for that 
 reason very anxious for the medical gentlemen to pass on 
 that proposition. She exposed her mind fully to them and 
 promised to answer as they should propound to her without 
 reserve, evasion, or equivocation, and she certainly did so 
 and gave them every opportunity of determining the ques- 
 tion presented. After a full and thorough examination Dr. 
 Robertson came to a positive conclusion that at the time he 
 observed her she was sane. He did not suspect even mental 
 weakness in her case. In his first letter there occurs this ex- 
 pression : ' ' The only question that could arise was, whether 
 or not this judgment of yours was based on a delusion ; as 
 this was the only question that could be raised as to your
 
 Estate of Scott. 361 
 
 sanity." That was omitted from the second letter simply 
 because after his various conversations with her he saw no 
 reason to entertain the slightest suspicion of any mental weak- 
 ness. Her reasoning was logical, her statements plausible 
 and possible. Regarding her sister in law, Mrs. Paisley, she 
 ^made no charges whatever of immorality. "With regard to 
 ^fMrs. Meily it was impossible for him to test its truth; he had 
 to accept the statements of Mrs. Scott as bases of belief. 
 She argued the whole matter over with them. In regard to 
 the hypothetical questions presented by the respective coun- 
 sel, the answer is always based upon the assumptions of the 
 premises. 
 
 Counsel for contestant comments upon the testimony of 
 Dr. Robertson, saying that so far from contradicting or vary- 
 ing from the revised opinion or ultimate judgment of Dr. 
 Mays, Robertson agrees with it in every essential particular, 
 and if he had seen what Dr. Mays saw in his last observa- 
 tion or visit to Mrs. Scott, he would not have subscribed to 
 her sanity, and counsel says that so far from Dr. Mays' con- 
 duct being censurable, it is highly to be commended as the 
 act of a conscientious and dignified gentleman and reputable 
 physician, for when he found that he had been deceived by 
 her in the "most atrocious" manner and discovered the de- 
 ception, he did his duty and corrected his original opinion 
 and gave his evidence as he was bound in honor and con- 
 science to do. When upon that visit to Mrs. Scott's house 
 she pointed out through the window to an imaginary object 
 standing outside near the barndoor, when there was no one 
 there, and "the whole was the inveterate phantom of a mor- 
 bid imagination," he became convinced that she Avas the vic- 
 tim of an insane delusion : Dew v. Clark, 3 Add. 79, re- 
 printed in Eng. Ecc. Rep. 436. 
 
 This cited case is entitled to attentive perusal for its bear- 
 ing on the facts here adduced in evidence on the issue of in- 
 sane delusion ; the elaborate treatment of the topic and the 
 minute and thorough examination of the phenomena of men- 
 tal perversion occurring in that ease with the reasoning lead- 
 ing to the conclusion reached by Sir John Nicholl, the trial 
 judge, are pertinent and instructive.
 
 362 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 The court has read this opinion with renewed interest, hav- 
 ing previously examined it with care, and indorses the en- 
 comium of counsel as to the ability with which the author 
 treated the issues and evidence. 
 
 Counsel for contestant says, further, that the examination 
 in Mr. Galpin's office shows a lack of thoroughness. It was 
 not comprehensive nor profound — so superficial that it was 
 easy for Mrs. Scott to conceal the point upon which she was 
 really daft. She carefully avoided allowing them to ap- 
 proach some of her most salient symptoms of insanity. This 
 is one of the features of persons possessed of delusions, to 
 throw the searcher off the scent; but when the insane per- 
 son is off guard, the delusion is detected. This is how Dr. 
 Mays came to change his opinion, and his reason for believ- 
 ing that he had been deceived by this designing woman in 
 the first instance is satisfactory; but when he saw the clear 
 manifestation of her mania as she pointed out the window 
 of her residence and professed to see persons on the outside 
 when no one was in the direction indicated, he became con- 
 vinced that he was dealing with a person whose mind was 
 infected by an insane delusion. Counsel contends that Dr. 
 Mays was right in his final opinion, but erred egregiously 
 in his certified conclusion, although he accounts satisfactorily 
 for the cause of the original error, and he acted in a pro- 
 fessional manner in seeking on the stand to correct the mis- 
 take into which he had been led by the cunning character- 
 istic of this species of insanity. 
 
 While the court does not choose to adopt the severe stric- 
 tures applied by proponents to the conduct of Dr. Mays, as 
 there is no necessity of ascribing his alteration of attitude 
 to a corrupt motive, yet it cannot acquiesce in the views of 
 counsel for contestant, so speciously presented, that there 
 was a lack of thoroughness in the examination of the dece- 
 dent in Mr. Galpin's office and that it was neither compre- 
 hensive nor profound. Dr. Mays himself testifies that the 
 examination was thorough and occupied hours, and his tes- 
 timony throughout shows, including the certificate and his 
 own letter, that his first judgment was better based than his 
 second, founded as the latter was upon a casual incident
 
 Estate of Scott. 363 
 
 scarcely sufficient to operate so extensive an inference. The 
 inadequacy of his grounds for modifying his judgment, as 
 compared with the predicate of his first opinion, seems to 
 the court plain, taken in connection with his delay in com- 
 municating his change of conviction until after the death of 
 testatrix. As the court reads the record there is no satis- 
 factory explanation for not divulging his discovery before 
 the death of Mrs. Scott. 
 
 The testimony of Dr. Robertson is certainly strong and 
 clear and without any vein of vacillation or symptom of par- 
 tisan bias, and he came to a positive conclusion, as he himself 
 says, ' ' after a full and thorough examination, ' ' that she was 
 sane, in the fullest sense of that word, and he adhered to 
 this opinion after a most searching cross-examination. Dr. 
 Robertson is a friend of Dr. Mays and a weekly visitor to the 
 latter 's office in this city, which seems to be his local head- 
 quarters and the place where he received word to call and 
 see Mrs. Scott, and whence he went, with the result that she 
 took him to task for the form of his letter which he recast, 
 leaving out the portion to w^hich she took exception herein- 
 before quoted. Notwithstanding this intimacy of relation 
 and closeness of communication between these two doctors. 
 Dr. Robertson has never altered his certified conviction in 
 favor of the sanity of testatrix, and, on the whole, the court 
 considers his conclusion correct. 
 
 It appears, as a reason for the omission to call the third 
 signer of the certificate, Dr. Gardner, that he was absent 
 from the city at the time of the trial when his presence was 
 sought. 
 
 As to the utility of an inquisition into the testamentary 
 capacity of a person prior to decease, undoubtedl.v an impres- 
 sion exists that it is a wise precaution, and in this case it has 
 proved useful as tending to establish the fact that decedent 
 was certainly not a victim of an insane delusion with respect 
 to the designs of her husband, who has verified her appre- 
 hensions in his attempt to set aside this will. That there is 
 an impression current that such an ante-mortem examination 
 would be a salutary provision of the law has been shown in 
 a bill introduced in the logisbituro of this state to admit wills
 
 364 Coffey's Peobate Decisions, Vol. 1, 
 
 to probate prior to the death of testator, which measure, how- 
 ever good in principle, was impracticable in details and was 
 not passed: Assembly Bill, No. 199, introduced in Januar3% 
 1895. 
 
 The will may be considered in proof of its own validity 
 and of the sanity of its maker. A careful reading of the 
 entire instrument will justify the opinion rendered by Dr. 
 Eobertson that it was the product of a clear-headed person, 
 and that the best proof of her clearness of mind is in the 
 instrument itself. She may have been mistaken in her prem- 
 ises and violent in her prejudices, but strong, violent and 
 unjust prejudices do not show mental incapacity: Trumbull 
 V. Gibbons, 22 N. J. L. 117. 
 
 Her antipathy to Scott was not deep-seated, and w^as by 
 her rationally explained. If she were the victim of an in- 
 sane delusion in 1897 she would have taken away the part 
 that she had given him in 1891 ; but so far from doing that 
 she really added to it, as she herself said, because although 
 he had abated in her affection, her regard for the children 
 had risen. So far as the will of November 7, 1891, is con- 
 cerned it can hardly be pretended that there is sufficient evi- 
 dence to prove that at that time testatrix was not competent. 
 The only witnesses who testified that in their opinion she was 
 insane in 1891, were Hammond, Mortier, Perkins, Dyer, Uhl- 
 horn and Mrs. O'Connor. It cannot be claimed that the tes- 
 timony of the experts was in any manner applicable to the 
 original will which was executed in that year. The court 
 has already commented sufficiently upon the testimony of the 
 witnesses named. By that will testatrix makes legacies of 
 a few thousand dollars and the residuary interest in the es- 
 tate. She gives thirty-three two-hundredths or about one- 
 sixth to relatives of her former husband, Mr. Collins, and the 
 remaining one hundred and sixty-seven two-hundredths to 
 her relatives, less two-fiftieths to Mr. Scott. 
 
 By the second will she gives twelve-fiftieths or about one- 
 fourth to relatives of Collins and of the remaining thirty- 
 eight-fiftieths she gives thirty-three-fiftieths to her own kin, 
 and to Scott the same as in the first will and to his sons 
 and daughter one-fiftieth and one-fiftieth to charity. The
 
 Estate of Scott. 365 
 
 extraordinary care to do what was right all around and the 
 soundness of her reasons for discriminations are shown in 
 the evidence of Mr. Galpin, whose office she visited a score 
 of times and who visited her house several times for consulta- 
 tion, until he was quite worn with the work of arranging the 
 iata and information which she gave and in readjusting the 
 particulars until she was finally satisfied with the disposi- 
 tion. Her idea of equity was exhibited in remembering the 
 relatives of her deceased husband. The power and tenacity 
 of her memory were manifested in carrying all the various 
 intricacies and details in her mind. Her understanding of 
 her relation to objects of bounty and the natural and moral 
 rights of others was shown by the evidence of Dr. Lane in 
 regard to what she said about charities when he besought her 
 out of her abundance to give to some benevolent institution 
 and she replied that she had enough of poor relations for 
 that purpose, and bestowed her benefactions accordingly. 
 Her reasons for curtailing the expectancy of Scott have been 
 dealt with sufficiently. Scott was not the natural object of 
 her bounty, yet she did not discard him nor make any change 
 in her two wills to his disadvantage, but, on the contrary, 
 rather increased his proportion by the share she gave to his 
 children, and in this regard it is a circumstance tending to 
 show that she was not as black as she has been painted — that 
 one of the reasons for changing her testament proceeded from 
 her kindness of heart toward these children, and that while 
 the boys were inmates of her household, which was from the 
 moment of their father's marriage to her, they had met with 
 affectionate treatment at her hands. The amount paid for 
 board is a comparative bagatelle. The books show that not- 
 withstanding that the two boys made their home at this house, 
 and that Scott had an allowance of $2,400 per annum from 
 the estate of his wife to support them, that in 1891 he paid 
 on account of board, $25. In 1892 and 1893 he paid noth- 
 ing. In 1894, he paid $339. In 1895, he paid $200,— mak- 
 ' ing a total of $564 paid into this house for the board of 
 these two boys for a period of six years, a little less than 
 $78 per year, these boys having in their own right, as they
 
 \i66 Coffey ^s Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 testified, from fifty to seventy-five thousand dollars, which 
 they received from their mother and from some relatives. 
 
 If she were a mean woman, a miser, or a heartless step- 
 mother, she would not have allowed the children to remain in 
 such circumstances, and if she was so base as is said, the 
 father and guardian disregarded his duty in allowing the 
 children to stay in an establishment which one of his wit- 
 nesses testified she thought on the first day she went there 
 was a fast house. 
 
 Testatrix was not forgetful of Mr. Scott 's children although 
 they had an ample fortune of their own, and notwithstand- 
 ing the alleged delusions, and all the reasons that would have 
 prompted to cut ofi' Mr. Scott, she accords him substantial 
 recognition. 
 
 If there were causes sufficient to have induced a sane 
 woman to ignore him in her will or reduce what otherwise 
 would have been a just allowance, the fact that she enter- 
 tained an unjust or an unfounded suspicion, in regard to 
 his treatment of her, or unjust prejudice against him, would 
 not affect the will nor demonstrate that she was necessarily 
 of unsound mind : Clapp v. Fullerton, 34 N. Y. 196, 197, 90 
 Am. Dec. 681 ; Coit v. Patchen, 77 N. Y. 537, 538. 
 
 The tests of testamentary capacity are : 1. Understanding 
 of what testatrix is doing; 2. How she is doing it; 3. Knowl- 
 edge of her property; 4. How she wishes to dispose of it; 
 5. Who are entitled to her bounty : Clark v. Ellis, 9 Or. 147. 
 Applying these tests to the facts of this case there can be 
 no doubt of the result. 
 
 In Daniel v. Daniel, 39 Pa. 191. it is said that testamentary 
 capacity implies that the testator fully understands what he 
 is doing, and how he is doing it ; he must know his property 
 and how he wishes to dispose of it among those entitled to 
 his bounty. If he understands in detail what he is doing, 
 and chooses with understanding and reason between one dis- 
 position and another, it is sufficient. 
 
 In Home v. Home, 9 Ired. 99, with reference to the amount 
 of testamentary capacity necessary, it is said it is sufficient 
 if the testator knew what he was doing, and to whom he was 
 giving his property; and in 1 Redfield on Wills, 125, 127, it
 
 Estate op Scott. 367 
 
 is said that this is about as accurate and brief a definition 
 as can be given. 
 
 In Kinne v. Kinne, 9 Conn. 104, 21 Am. Dec. 732, the court 
 say: "Had he an understanding of the nature of the busi- 
 ness he was engaged in, a recollection of the property he 
 meant to dispose of, and of the persons to whom he meant 
 to* convey it, and of the manner he meant to distribute it be- 
 tween them?" 
 
 In Stevens v. Vancleava, 4 Wash. C. C. 262, Fed. Cas. No. 
 13,412, Washington, J., said: "To sum up the whole in the 
 most simple and intelligent form, were his mind and memory 
 sufficiently sound to enable him to know and to understand 
 the business in which he was engaged at the time he executed 
 the will?" 
 
 The point of time, then, to be considered at which the 
 capacity of the testatrix is to be tested, is the time when 
 the will was executed. This is the important epoch. Judge 
 Washington saj^s: "The evidence of the attesting witnesses 
 and next to them, of those who were present at the execution, 
 all other things being equal, are most to be relied upon." 
 
 In this case the attesting witnesses were present at the 
 execution, and the two who survive have testified to the 
 soundness of her mind at that time. The evidence of the 
 attorney who drew the will according to her instructions, 
 and who was a witness to the last codicil, and the positive 
 and uncontradicted testimony of the subscribing witness 
 to all the instruments, of the soundness of the testator's mind 
 at the time the will was executed, in addition to the other 
 witnesses whose evidence has been examined and reviewed, 
 establish beyond doubt that the testatrix was rational, and 
 did know and understand what she was doing at that time. 
 As was said in the ease of Lee's Heirs v. Lee's Executors, 
 supra. "There was so much delil)eration and thought in all 
 this, that even if the testatrix had been before afflicted with 
 habitual insanity, yet this conduct was sufficient to establish 
 a complete intermission." 
 
 The prayer of the contestant's petition is denied and judg- 
 ment ordered for proponents.
 
 368 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 The Principal Case has been before the appellate courts in 12-4 
 Cal. 671, 57 Pac. 654; 128 Cal. 57, 60 Pac. 527j 1 Cal. App. 740, 83 
 Pac. 85; 77 Pac. 446. 
 
 Estate of ANGELIA R. SCOTT, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 19,473; decided Jan. 14, 1903.] 
 
 Wills — Implied Revocation by Codicil. — When a new will is made 
 in the form of a codicil, it does not require an express revocation to 
 make the intent to revoke the prior will clear; it is sufficient that 
 the intent to make a disposition of the estate in the new instrument, 
 which is inconsistent with the prior gifts, is made as clear as the 
 original. 
 
 Wills — Meaning of "Residue" or "Residuum." — Residue or resi- 
 duum, technically, is the remainder or that which remains after tak- 
 ing away- a part; in a will, such portion of the estate as is left af- 
 ter paying the charges, debts, devises, and legacies; and the pre- 
 sumption is that the testatrix used it in that sense, unless a contrary 
 intention clearly appears. 
 
 Wills — Meaning of Residue, How Determined. — Where a will is 
 drawn for a testatrix by an attorney, the word "residue," as used 
 in the instrument, will be taken technically, and no resort can be 
 had to artificial aid in its interpretation when natural reason and 
 the circumstances of its insertion make clear its meaning. 
 
 Wills — Revocation by Codicil Which Omits Legatee. — In this case 
 the codicil of the testatrix, which in effect was a new will, omitted 
 one of the residuary legatees named in the original will. The court 
 found that the codicil was inconsistent and irreconcilable with, and 
 worked the revocation of, the original will in respect to this be- 
 quest, and therefore denied the right of the legatee to participate in 
 the distribution of the residuum. 
 
 Application for partial distribution by Eugene Wormell. 
 
 L. Seidenberg and R. P. Clement, for applicant. 
 
 Galpin and Bolton, Houghton & Houghton, contra. 
 
 COFFEY, J. Whether or not Eugene Wormell is entitled 
 to relief in this proceeding is dependent upon the discovery 
 of the intent of the testatrix as expressed in her will and 
 codicils or deduced therefrom by process of construction as 
 matter of law. 
 
 To understand the question the instruments should be 
 presented in full, and they are as follows:
 
 Estate of Scott. 369 
 
 ' ' In the Name of God, Amen. I, Angelia R. Scott, of the 
 City and County of San Francisco, State of California, being 
 of sound and disposing mind and memory, do make, publish 
 and declare this my last will and testament. 
 
 "I. I give, devise and bequeath to the officers of Apollo 
 Lodge of the Independent Order of Odd Fellows in the City 
 and County of San Francisco, and by their successors in office, 
 the sum of Two Thousand (2,000) Dollars, to be by them 
 invested and the proceeds thereof to be used in the preserva- 
 tion and care of the cemetery lots in the Odd Fellows Ceme- 
 tery in the City and County of San Francisco, in which my 
 late husband, Salvin P. Collins, and my nephew, John 
 Quincy Wormell, are buried. 
 
 "II. I give, devise, and bequeath to Horatio Stebbins the 
 sum of Three Thousand (3,000) Dollars, to be used by him at 
 his discretion to advance the interests of the First Unitarian 
 Church in this City and County. 
 
 "III. I give, devise, and bequeath to Carl Anderson, my 
 coachman, who has served me faithfully for five years. Five 
 Hundred (500) Dollars. 
 
 "IV. I give, devise, and bequeath my diamond earrings, 
 one bar pin with one diamond, my finger ring set with three 
 large diamonds, my chain and charms to my niece, Helen 
 Garish, and my watch to my niece. Ella Perkins. 
 
 "V. I give, devise, and bequeath my cluster diamond 
 ring and one small solitaire diamond ring, the gift of my 
 late husband, S. P. Collins, to his sister, Mrs. Rachel Johonnot. 
 
 "VI. I give, devise and bequeath one diamond solitaire 
 finger ring to Mrs. Frank Garcia, wife of my nephew, Frank 
 Garcia. 
 
 "VII. I give, devise and bequeath all the rest and residue 
 of my property as follows : One fiftieth thereof to each of the 
 following persons, children of my late brother, Amos P. Wor- 
 mell, namely: One fiftieth to Andrew Wormell of Dover, 
 New Hampshire; one-fiftieth to Charles Wormell, of Sun- 
 bury, Ohio; one-fiftieth to William Wormell of the same 
 place; one-fiftieth to Eugene Wormell of Livermore, Maine; 
 one-fiftieth to Lettie Wormell of Colorado, and one- 
 fiftieth to Salvin Ulysses Wormell of Phillips, IMaine; 
 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. 1—24
 
 370 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 two-fiftieths thereof to Louisa E. Roe, daughter of my late 
 brother, Amos P. Wormell, of Island Pond, Vermont; six- 
 fiftieths thereof to my sister Mary A. Cowan and her 
 daughter Amanda Meily, share and share alike; six-fiftieths 
 thereof to M. S. Chamberlain, nephew of my late husband, 
 S. P. Collins, now residing at Concord, New Hampshire ; one- 
 fiftieth thereof to Mrs. Rachel Johonnot, sister of my late 
 husband, residing at Montpelier, Vermont ; one-fiftieth thereof 
 to Florence Swall, wife of George Swall of Mountain View, 
 California, niece of S. P. Collins, deceased; one-fiftieth 
 thereof to Eugene Wormell, son of my brother, Nathaniel 
 Wormell, now residing at Seattle, Washington; one-eighth 
 to my nephew, Frank Garcia ; one-eighth to my niece Helen 
 Gerrish, wife of Charles Gerrish of Port Townsend. Wash- 
 ington ; one-eighth thereof to Mrs. Ella Perkins, of Santa 
 Clara County, California, wife of Caleb F. Perkins; one- 
 tenth thereof to Mrs. Louisa Garcia, my sister; and one- 
 fortieth thereof to Chester and Nellie Swall, son and 
 daughter of George and Florence Swall of Mountain View, 
 California, share and share alike, two-fiftieths thereof to my 
 husband, E. W. Scott. 
 
 "In case any of my legatees contest the probate of this 
 will, I, hereby revoke the legacy of such contestant, and 
 direct that such legacy become a part of my estate. 
 
 "VIII. I nominate and appoint Charles S. Tilton, Caleb 
 P. Perkins, and Frank Garcia, Jr., as executors of this my 
 last Will and Testament without bonds. 
 
 "In Testimony Whereof, I have made, published and de- 
 clared the foregoing as my last Will and Testament. 
 
 "ANGELIA R. SCOTT, (Seal.) 
 
 "Signed, sealed, published and declared to be her last 
 Will and Testament by the aforesaid Angelia R. Scott, in 
 our presence, who in her presence and in the presence of each 
 of us, and at her request have hereto set our hands and 
 seals, as witnesses this seventh day of November, A. D. 1891. 
 
 "JACOB C. JOHNSON, 1519 Van Ness Ave. 
 
 "EDWARD H. HORTON, 30 Post Street. 
 
 "Whereas, I, Angelia R. Scott, by my will subscribed on 
 the 7th day of November, 1891, appointed Caleb F. Perkins
 
 Estate op Scott. 371 
 
 together with Charles S. Tilton and Frank Garcia, Jr., to be 
 executors of my last AVill and Testament. 
 
 "Now, then, I hereby revoke the nomination and appoint- 
 ment of said Perkins as one of my said executors, and it is 
 my desire that this Codicil be annexed to and made a part 
 of my last Will and Testament as aforesaid to all intents 
 and purposes. ANGELIA R. SCOTT'. 
 
 "Signed, sealed, published and declared to be and as and 
 for a codicil to her last Will and Testament by Angelia R. 
 Scott, in our presence, who in her presence, and in the 
 presence of each of us and at her request have hereto set our 
 hands and seals as witnesses this 25th day of February, A. D. 
 1892. "jr. C. JOHNSON, 
 
 "E. H. HORTON. 
 
 "Whereas, I, Angelia R. Scott, of the City and County of 
 San Francisco, have made my last Will and Testament in 
 writing, bearing date the seventh day of November, in the 
 year of our Lord, one thousand, eight hundred and ninety- 
 one, in and by which I give and bequeath to my sister, Mary 
 A. Cowan and her daughter, Amanda Meily, six-fiftieths of 
 the residue of my estate (after providing for certain legacies) 
 xo be divided share and share alike between them, and whereas, 
 since then said Mary A. Cowan has died, and I desire to re- 
 voke so much of said Will as devises six-fiftieths to her and 
 to her daughter Amanda Meily. 
 
 "And Whereas, by the same instrument, I have devised 
 one-fiftieth of said residue to Florence Swall, wife of George 
 Swall of Mountain View, and since that time said Florence 
 has died, leaving three children; and whereas I also devised 
 to Eugene Wormell, son of my brother, Nathaniel Wormell, 
 residing at Seattle, Washington, one-fiftieth part of said 
 residue, and since then he has died; and whereas, I also 
 desire to change the devise to Frank Garcia, of one-eighth of 
 my estate, and to decrease the amount thereof and whereas, 
 I did devise one-eighth of my said estate to Helen Garish, 
 wife of Charles Garish; and I desire to increase the amount 
 devised to her; and whereas, I did devise one-eighth of the 
 residue of my said estate to my niece Ella Perkins, I now 
 desire to devise something to her four children ; and whereas, I
 
 372 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 now desire to make a bequest to the Old People 's Home of San 
 Francisco, and to the three children of my present husband, E. 
 W. Scott; and whereas, I desire to revoke the gift of two 
 thousand dollars to the Apollo Lodge of the Independent Or- 
 der of Odd Fellows, and desiring to preserve the general fea- 
 tures of my former will making new distributions when neces- 
 sary by deaths which have happened since the making of that 
 will, I prefer to do this by way of another codicil to my former 
 Will instead of executing a new Will; but in any respect in 
 which this codicil shall conflict with the provisions of my 
 former Will, I fully intend that this codicil shall control the 
 provisions of the former Will, and that otherwise the former 
 Will and the codicil thereof shall stand unaffected by it. 
 
 "I revoke the bequest I made in my said Will of Two 
 Thousand Dollars to the Apollo Lodge of the Independent 
 Order of Odd Fellows, and I give, devise and bequeath Two 
 Thousand Dollars to the Apollo Lodge of the Independent 
 Order of Odd Fellows in the City and County of San Fran- 
 cisco, and I request them to take care of my cemetery lot in 
 the Odd Fellows Cemetery in this City and County of San 
 Francisco. 
 
 "I give, devise and bequeath the sum of One Dollar to each 
 of the following persons: To Mrs. Amanda Meily, daughter 
 of Mary A. Cowan; to Mrs. Nellie Swall, wife of George 
 Swall; to Mrs. Eliza Paisley, wife of Donald Paisley, sister 
 of my late husband. 
 
 ' ' I give, devise and bequeath to my maid, Estella Burnham, 
 Five Hundred Dollars, if she is in 'my employment down to 
 the time of my decease. 
 
 "I give, devise and bequeath my emerald finger ring set 
 with diamonds, and also my large solitaire diamond finger 
 ring to Mrs. Helen Garish. 
 
 "I give, devise and bequeath all the rest and residue of 
 my estate subject to all unrevoked legacies and bequests of 
 my Will, and subject to those herein contained as follows : 
 
 "Of such residue, two-fiftieths thereof to my nephew, 
 Andrew Wormell of Dover, New Hampshire. 
 
 "Two-fiftieths thereof to Charles Wormell, of Sunbury, 
 Ohio.
 
 Estate of Scott. 373 
 
 "Two-fiftieths thereof to my nephew, William Wormell of 
 the same place. 
 
 "Two-fiftieths thereof to my nephew, Salvin Ulysses Wor- 
 mell, of Phillips, Maine. 
 
 "Three-fiftieths thereof to my niece, Louisa E. Roe, of 
 Island Pond, Vermont, daughter of my brother, Amos P. 
 Wormell. 
 
 "One-fiftieth thereof to Lulu Wormell, of Oakland, 
 daughter of my nephew Eugene Wormell, now deceased. 
 
 "Six-fiftieths thereof to Mortimer S. Chamberlain, resid- 
 ing at Concord, New Hampshire, nephew of my late husband, 
 S. P. Collins. 
 
 "Three-fiftieths thereof to Mrs. Rachel Johonnet, sister of 
 my late husband, S. P. Collins. 
 
 "Three-fiftieths thereof to Ella Perkins, of Santa Clara 
 County, wife of C. P. Perkins. 
 
 ' ' Three-fiftieths thereof to be divided share and share alike 
 between the four children of said Ella Perkins, or the sur- 
 vivors of them at my decease. 
 
 "Seven-fiftieths thereof to Helen Garish, my niece, wife 
 of Charles Garish of Port Townsend, Washington. 
 
 "Four-fiftieths thereof to my sister, Mrs. Louisa Garcia, 
 wife of Frank Garcia (senior). 
 
 "Three-fiftieths thereof to be divided share and share alike 
 between the children, now living or the survivor of them, at 
 my death, of Florence Swall, and George Swall, of Mountain 
 View, California ; said Florence Swall being a niece of my late 
 husband, S. P. Collins. 
 
 " Four-fif tieiths thereof to Frank Garcia, Jr., son of Frank 
 Garcia. 
 
 "Two-fiftieths thereof to my husband, E. W. Scott. 
 
 "One-fiftieth thereof to Lloyd N. Scott, for himself, for 
 his brother, Wesley B. Scott, and his sister, Laura May Scott, 
 share and share alike; })ut he is to receive and hold in trust 
 the shares of Wesley R. Scott and Laura B. Scott, invest 
 the same, and use the income or principal, if necessary, for 
 their education and support until both beneficiaries shall die 
 or become of age; and in case of the death of either beneficiary 
 the share of such decedent shall be divided equally between
 
 374 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 the survivors, unless decedent leaves issue him or her surviv- 
 ing, and in that event the share of said decedent shall go to 
 said issue. 
 
 "One-fiftieth thereof to the Old People's Home of San 
 Francisco. 
 
 "One-fiftieth thereof to the San Francisco Protestant 
 Orphan Asylum. 
 
 "And in case any of my devisees or legatees shall contest 
 the probate of this Will the bequest or devise to them is 
 hereby revoked, and the amount bequeathed or devised to such 
 contestant shall go back and become a part of my estate, and 
 be divided pro rata among the residuary devisees. 
 
 "I also nominate and appoint Charles Garish to be another 
 executor of my estate. 
 
 ' ' I also revoke the bequest of my one large solitaire diamond 
 finger ring to Mrs. Frank Garcia, formerly wife of, Frank 
 Garcia, Jr., and I give, devise and bequeath the same to Helen 
 Garish. 
 
 "(Seal) ANGELIA R. SCOTT. 
 
 "Signed, sealed and published and declared to be and as 
 and for a codicil to her last Will and Testament by Angelia 
 R. Scott in our presence, who in her presence and in the 
 presence of each of us and at her request, have hereto set 
 our hands and seals as witnesses this 22d day of October, A. 
 D. 1897. 
 
 "JACOB C. JOHNSON, 1519 Van Ness Ave. 
 
 "EDWARD H. HORTON, 2110 Devisadero St. 
 
 "PHILIP G. GALPIN, 1738 Broadway." 
 
 The general scheme of testatrix in the will was preserved 
 in the codicil, which declares that she desired to preserve 
 the general features of her former will, making new distri- 
 butions made necessary by deaths occurring since its execu- 
 tion ; that she preferred to do this by way of another codicil 
 of her former will instead of executing a new will, but in any 
 respect in which the last executed document should conflict 
 with the first she declared her intent that the codicil should 
 control, but otherwise the former should stand unaffected. 
 
 Now the question is. Are the provisions of this codicil 
 which omit any allusion to Eugene Wormell consistent with
 
 Estate of Scott. 375 
 
 the claim upon his part that she did not design to revoke 
 her bequest to him? This codicil is, in effect, a new will. 
 Testatrix declared that for reasons she preferred to make 
 a new will in the form of a codicil, and we should construe 
 it in that view. 
 
 The general features of the old instrument are preserved, 
 but the dispositions are somew^hat varied. 
 
 In each case she divided the residuum into fractions, but 
 in the original will the parts were not symmetrically segre- 
 gated, while in the codicil they were divided into fiftieths 
 This plan is perfectly plain, and by keeping it in mind any 
 difficulty in divining her design will disappear. It does not 
 require an express revocation to make the intent to revoke 
 clear; it is sufficient that the intent to make a disposition of 
 the estate in the new instrument which is inconsistent with 
 the prior gifts is made as clear as the original. 
 
 Counsel for petitioners quote the decision in Re Ladd, 94 
 Cal. 674, that a codicil is never construed to disturb the dis- 
 positions of the will further than is absolutely necessary to 
 give effect to the codicil, and that a clear disposition made 
 by the will is not revoked by a doubtful expression or in- 
 eonsistent disposition in a codicil, and, taking this expression 
 of the court in connection with section 1321 of the Civil 
 Code, counsel deduces this truth. 
 
 In order to revoke a clear disposition in a will, the codicil 
 must contain a provision that is not simply inconsistent, but 
 one that is absolutely irreconcilable, with the disposition in 
 the will. 
 
 Such a condition, counsel contend, is not presented by the 
 case at bar, for the dispositions are not even inconsistent 
 let alone irreconcilable. 
 
 Is it evident, as counsel contend, even upon the most 
 casual consideration, that in this case there is no absolute 
 necessity, nor any necessity, to disturb the bequest in the 
 will to petitioner, in order to give effect to the codicil, and 
 that, therefore, it must stand? 
 
 If this were as patent to the court as to the counsel, there 
 would be no hesitancy in determining the issue in their 
 favor, but that there is some lingering doubt in the mind 
 of counsel as to the validity of their position is suggested
 
 376 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 by their appeal to equity in one of their earlier briefs, in 
 which they claim that there is no difficulty in carrying out 
 the provisions of the will and codicil, for it is only necessary 
 to ascertain the value of the estate after the payment of 
 debts, expenses of administration and providing for the un- 
 revoked general and specific bequest of the will, then deduct 
 two-fiftieths, one for the petitioner and the other for the 
 children of Lettie Wormell Byron, and the remainder con- 
 stitutes the residue disposed of by the codicil and makes 
 the petitioner substantially a general legatee under the will 
 of an amount equaling one-fiftieth of the estate after the 
 payment of debts, expenses of administration, and the pay- 
 ment of the other unrevoked general and specific legacies 
 under the will, there being no reason why, in this manner, 
 the petitioner may not receive the share given in the original 
 will ; ' ' but if this cannot be done, it is certainly within the 
 equitable powers of the court to let the petitioner in to share 
 equitably in the residue under the codicil, it being clear that 
 it was the intention of the testatrix not to annul or impair 
 the legacy given in the will." All the grounds urged for 
 Eugene Wormell apply with equal force to the Byron chil- 
 dren. This court has no equitable power in the premises, 
 and it is not clear that the omission of this Eugene Wormell 
 and the children of Lettie Wormell Byron was an oversight 
 of testatrix. 
 
 There is no room for the suggestion of an alternative. It is- 
 no case of equity. It is a matter for interpretation and con- 
 struction ; it is for the court to find out the sense in which 
 the testatrix employed certain words ; that is, the idea which 
 she intended to convey by the use of certain expressions or 
 terms, and to draw from the whole text a conclusion which 
 shall construe the intent of the maker of the instrument. 
 The object is not to make or mar or modify the testament, 
 but to discover its sense; hence, the whole document is to 
 be construed integrally. There is no case here for extrinsic 
 evidence; and, consequently, the intimation of oversight 
 must be resolved without recourse to that species of proof. 
 
 In their final brief counsel for Eugene Wormell repeat 
 their suggestion of an alternative, but rely upon their 
 primary proposition that petitioner has a clear right to the-
 
 Estate of Scott. 377 
 
 legacy in the will, and that in her readjustment of the be- 
 quests in the codicil his name was omitted through over- 
 sight. 
 
 Counsel do not persist in the contention that there may be 
 two residues, one for one purpose and another for another, 
 but insist that they have consistently adhered to the position 
 that there is only one residue to deal with ; but they assert 
 that the language of the codicil shows clearly that the tes- 
 tatrix used the word "residue" without understanding its 
 exact meaning; that evidently the testatrix, in using this 
 term in the codicil, had in mind not a residue in its technical, 
 legal sense, but simply the remainder of her estate after the 
 payment of debts and expenses of administration. 
 
 Residue or residuum, technically, is the remainder or that 
 M'hich remains after taking away a part ; in a will, such por- 
 tion of the estate as is left after paying the charges, debts, 
 devises, and legacies, and the presumption is that the tes- 
 tatrix used it in this sense, and a contrary intention must 
 clearly appear. 
 
 Considering the circumstances in which the codicil came 
 into existence, it is hardly just to impute ignorance of the 
 meaning of the word or lack of understanding of its legal 
 import to testatrix. It was drawn, according to the record 
 in the contest, by one of the counsel for respondent here 
 (Mr. Galpin) from the instruction given to him by her; she 
 gave the details of the devises and legacies, and he prepared 
 the paper at her direction. If it were an instrument written 
 by herself without legal assistance, there might be some rea- 
 son in which to intimate her ignorance of the technical 
 term, but that may not be done with impunity where there 
 was a skilled draughtsman and expert lawyer. 
 
 The word "residue," therefore, is to be taken technically, 
 and no resort can be had to artificial aid in its interpreta- 
 tion when natural reason and the circumstances of its in- 
 sertion make clear its meaning. 
 
 Counsel for Eugene Wormell argued that the purpose of 
 testatrix clearly was to have paid out of that remainder 
 all unrevoked legacies and bequests of her will and general 
 legacies and bequests of the codicil, to which, in terms, the 
 so-called "residue" in the mind of the testatrix was made
 
 378 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 subject; then to have two-fiftieths of the remainder paid to 
 Eugene Wormell and Lettie Wormell Byron, and then to 
 dispose of the remainder, which would constitute the real 
 residue, in fiftieths; and, counsel continue in this strain, 
 that if all of this estate were reduced to cash, and all debts 
 and expenses of administration paid, it would be in exact 
 conformity with the codicil to pay, out of what remained, 
 the unrevoked legacies and bequests of the will, and the 
 general and specific legacies of the codicil, then to pay two- 
 fiftieths of what remained, one to the petitioner and one to 
 the children of Lettie Wormell Byron, and to distribute the 
 remainder, which would constitute the actual residue of the 
 codicil, in fiftieths ; and counsel confess their entire inability 
 to see how this simple course of carrying out what strikes 
 them as the unmistakable intention and purpose of the tes- 
 tatrix would make two residues, which, it appears to be ad- 
 mitted, are repugnant to the law, if possible to mathematics. 
 
 This simple device would also, it is said, eliminate the 
 need of the assumption of any equitable authority by the 
 court, as such division would be plainly in pursuance of 
 the plan adopted by the testatrix. 
 
 If it were the intent of the testatrix to cut Wormell off 
 from her bounty, would she not have done the same with 
 his interest as she did with some others, and expressly revoke 
 her bequest to him, is the query of counsel, to which they 
 return response that undoubtedly she would have so done, 
 if that had been her deliberate design; but it will be asked 
 in turn. Why did she not, then, carry him into the codicil? 
 To this self-propounded interrogatory, counsel answer, that 
 he may have been omitted from the codicil by oversight. 
 
 If mention were unnecessary, omission should be harmless, 
 and conjecture useless. 
 
 Counsel aver their belief that it may have been the in- 
 tention of testatrix to carry him into the codicil and to thus 
 make him a sharer in her bounty in equal proportion with 
 the other residuary legatees. If such were her intention, 
 she never executed it, and how can he benefit by her failure 
 to execute such fancied purpose? But is her omission, 
 caused by an oversight, to be construed as an intention to 
 deprive him entirely from sharing in her bounty? Or, con-
 
 Estate of Scott. 379 
 
 tiniie counsel, it may have been her actual intention to give 
 Eugene Wormell and Lettie Wormell Byron two-fiftieths of 
 the residue, and to divide the remaining forty-eight — fiftieths 
 among the residuary legatees of the codicil; but all this is 
 indulging the imagination to no practical benefit, for, as 
 counsel finally admit, in any event we must take her will 
 as she made it and not as we fancy she might, could, would, 
 or should have made it. 
 
 All of these speculations are, in a manner, interesting and 
 some of them abstruse, but to this complexion do we come 
 at last : Was there any intent at the time of making the 
 codicil in the mind of the testatrix that Eugene Wormell 
 should receive any part of the residue of her estate? 
 
 To resolve this problem we must resort to the will and 
 codicils and confine ourselves to their terms. 
 
 By the former w411 one-fiftieth of the residue was be- 
 queathed to Eugene Wormell of Livermore, Maine, and an- 
 other fiftieth to Eugene Wormell of Seattle, Washington; 
 by the latter every fiftieth is given to some person other 
 than Eugene Wormell of Livermore, Maine, and in regard 
 to the other Eugene, it is explained that he died in the in- 
 terval between the dates of the two transactions. No men- 
 tion is made in the codicil of Eugene Wormell of Livermore, 
 Maine, nor of Lettie Wormell, of Colorado, who had died on 
 the 6th of October, 1892, five years prior to the date of the 
 latter instrument. An inspection of the two papers shows 
 that in preparing the codicil the order of the will was 
 closely pursued; the variations serve to indicate an ad- 
 herence to the text of the original; and in going down the 
 line she passed over the names of "Eugene Wormell of 
 Livermore, Maine, and Lettie Wormell of Colorado," to 
 whom she had given each one-fiftieth of the will, in nominal 
 juxtaposition, and the necessary inference is that this de- 
 parture from the sequence of names was designed and that 
 she meant to omit them from her bounty. 
 
 It is manifest that the distribution of the codicil was 
 intended to be a new one and a substitute for the old, while 
 retaining the general form of the original, but the division 
 was different in fractions, names of donees, and amounts 
 allotted to each and the quantity of residue distributed.
 
 380 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 The intent to make a disposition of the residue in fiftieths 
 is clear to the court, and such an intent is inconsistent with 
 the prior bequests made in the will to those whose names 
 were not found in the codicil. The court has no authority 
 to divide the residue under the codicil into fifty-two parts, 
 and assign one part to Eugene Wormell and one part to 
 the children of Lettie Wormell Byron, for to do this would 
 be to alter the disposition of testatrix and make for her a 
 new will, which is beyond judicial power. 
 
 The claim of petitioner is inconsistent, in my judgment, 
 with the plan of the testatrix, as outlined in the codicil, and 
 no reasonable construction can reconcile the two propositions 
 where the repugnance is so evident, and she herself has said 
 that in any respect in which this codicil should conflict with 
 the provisions of her former will, she fully intended that 
 the codicil should control, and this court is, finally, of opin- 
 ion that it is executing her intention in letter and spirit by 
 denying the prayer of petitioner, and it is so ordered. 
 
 The Principal Case was affirmed by the supreme court in 141 Cal. 
 485, 75 Pac. 44. The general rule is, that a codicil does not disturb 
 the will, except so far as inconsistent with it or in terms or by 
 necessary intendment revokes it: Estate of McCauley, 138 Cal. 432, 
 71 Pac. 512. 
 
 Estate of THOS. J. HILL, Deceased, 
 
 [No. 4,382; decided February 27, 1886.] 
 
 Will — Undue Influence. — The Evidence in this contest of a will, 
 examined and held insufficient to establish a charge of undue in- 
 fluence. 
 
 Will — Inebriety of Testator. — The Evidence in this will contest 
 examined and held not to sustain a charge that the testator was 
 so addicted to. the excessive use of intoxicants as to deprive him of 
 testamentary capacity. 
 
 Will — Unsoundness of Mind. — The Evidence in this will contest 
 held insufficient to establish a charge of unsoundness of mind on the 
 part of the testator. 
 
 Will — Insane Delusion. — A Belief based on evidence, however slight, 
 is not delusion.
 
 Estate of Hill. 381 
 
 Will. — The Fact that a Guardian has been Appointed for a person 
 because of his incompetency to manage his affairs is not conclusive of 
 his incapacity to make a will. 
 
 The Words "Insane" and "Incompetent" defined and distin- 
 guished. 
 
 Contest of will. 
 
 Giles H. Gray, for proponent, J. ]\I. Haven. 
 
 John R. Glascock, for contestant, Jno. AVoolley. 
 
 H. L. Adams, also for contestant. 
 
 COFFEY, J. On the second day of July, 1885, James 
 M. Haven, through his attorney, Giles H. Gray, Esq., filed 
 in this court a petition setting forth that one Thomas J. Hill 
 died on or about the twenty-fourth day of June, 1885, in 
 this city and county, of which he was then a resident, leav- 
 ing estate therein consisting of personal property of the 
 probable value of $5,000 cash; that said Hill left a will, 
 dated March 22, 1884, in possession of the petitioner, nam- 
 ing him, the said petitioner, executor, and Wm. H. Aiken, 
 Thos. J. Conroy, IMary E. Connor, John Woolley, Mrs. John 
 AVoolley, and the children of Mr. and Mrs. Woolley, the 
 Grand Army Cemetery Association and the Veteran Home 
 Association, corporations, devisees or legatees; that John 
 Connor and Maggie E. McCann were subscribing witnesses 
 to said will; that the next of kin of said testator and heir 
 at law is John Woolley, aged about fifty years, residing in 
 Placer county, California, a son of a deceased sister of said 
 testator; that at the time of the execution of said will, 
 March 22, 1884, said testator was over the age of eighteen 
 years, and aged sixty years or thereabouts, and was of sound 
 and disposing mind, and not acting under duress, menace, 
 fraud, or undue influence, and was in every respect compe- 
 tent by last will to dispose of all his estate; and that it was 
 executed in the manner and form prescribed by the statute; 
 and that the executor named consents to act. The petition of 
 said Haven further avers : That said decedent Hill also left 
 another will in the possession of one Mrs. Mary E. Connor, 
 dated November 13, 1884, in which said Haven is named as 
 executor, and Wm. II. Aiken, Mary E. Connor. John Wool-
 
 382 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 ley, Maggie E. McCann, all adults; Eugene McCarty and 
 Annie Riley, minors, and "The Soldier's Home" of Cali- 
 fornia, a corporation, are named as devisees or legatees ; that 
 the witnesses to said will are John E. Donnelly and Maurice 
 J. Burns, and that at the time said will was executed, No- 
 vember 13, 1884, said testator was of competent age and of 
 sound and disposing mind; and, in view of the premises, 
 petitioner prays the admission of both instruments to pro- 
 bate, and that letters issue to him as executor. 
 
 The application of said Haven is opposed by John Wool- 
 ley, who contests the probate of the wills above mentioned 
 upon the grounds (after alleging that he is the nephew 
 and next of kin and heir at law of decedent Hill), that the 
 said wills were not executed according to law, nor signed by 
 Hill nor by his direction, and were not his last will; that at 
 the time of their execution Hill was and for a long time 
 prior thereto had been of great age, blind, feeble, debilitated 
 and deranged, both in bodily and mental health, and in- 
 capacitated thereby from executing a will ; that at the time 
 of the alleged signing said Hill was, and had been for a 
 long time prior thereto, habitually intemperate from the 
 constant and excessive use of intoxicating liquors, and was 
 thereby so mentally deranged as to be incapacitated from 
 making a will; that at the time of the alleged signing of 
 said wills said Hill was unlawfully influenced and coerced 
 by certain persons, beneficiaries named in said wills, who 
 took advantage of his weakness and his trust in them to 
 compel him to make such disposition of his property ac- 
 cording to their desires, and not his own; that in and prior 
 to the month of February, 1884, contestant Woolley had the 
 custody and care of the person of said deceased; that during 
 said time and prior thereto he enjoyed the confidence and 
 trust of said deceased; that in or about said month of Feb- 
 ruary, 1884, said deceased was removed from his care and 
 custody by the order of said Haven, who was then guardian 
 of the person and estate of said Hill, and consigned to the 
 care of Mary E. Connor (one of the beneficiaries named in 
 said will), where Hill remained until his decease in June, 
 1885, that after the removal of Hill to the care and custody 
 of said Mary E. Connor, the contestant made repeated ef-
 
 Estate of Hill. 383 
 
 forts to see him, but was repulsed, and in every instance re- 
 fused permission to enter the house of said Mary E. Connor, 
 where said Hill was kept; that said Haven and the others 
 named as beneficiaries in said wills, with intent to de- 
 ceive and to influence Hill to make said wills, prevented 
 contestant from seeing said deceased, and excluded him from 
 the society of Hill ; that none of said persons named as bene- 
 ficiaries is of kin to deceased, nor entitled to a distributive 
 share of his estate ; that all of them knew that at the time 
 of the alleged sig-nino; of said wills Hill was, from the causes 
 already specified, easily influenced by those by whom he was 
 surrounded, and that so knowing they so wrought upon his 
 bodily and mental weakness to influence, by false tales and 
 accusations directed against said contestant, that he became 
 causelessly embittered and angry with contestant, and was 
 thus induced and influenced to make said wills; that a long 
 time prior to the alleged signing of said will the superior 
 court of San Francisco granted to said Haven letters of 
 guardianship of the person and estate of said Hill, on the 
 ground that said Hill was then and there an incompetent 
 person ; that at the time of said alleged signing of said wills 
 and prior thereto said Haven was the legally appointed, 
 qualified and acting guardian of said Hill, and continued to 
 act as such to the time of Hill's decease; that Aiken, named 
 as one of the beneficiaries in said wills, had acted as Hill's 
 attorney, legal adviser and confidential friend in matters 
 connected with the pension and arrearage thereof due said 
 deceased from the government of the United States; and 
 that the other persons aforementioned as beneficiaries were 
 in more or less close and intimate relations with said de- 
 ceased, and used every means to obtain his confidence up 
 to the time of the said alleged execution of the said wills, 
 and did so obtain his confidence, and that they knew his 
 mind was weak anl easily influenced; and that they and 
 each of them did perpetrate a fraud upon said deceased by 
 inducing him to sign said paper; that they and each of them 
 suggested to said deceased, prior to the time of said alleged 
 signing, that contestant was an impostor, and was attending 
 to and caring for said deceased for the purpose of getting 
 his money and estate, that contestant was constantly rob-
 
 384 Coffey ^s Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 bing deceased of his money, and other suggestions of like 
 nature; which suggestions were false and fraudulent, and 
 made with intent to deceive said deceased and had that ef- 
 fect, embittering his mind against contestant, and inducing 
 him while in such frame of mind to sign said will. 
 
 The foregoing is the substance of both counts of the con- 
 test, to which answer was made by the proponents and by 
 the legatees named in said will, denying specifically all the 
 charges and averments of the said contest tending to estab- 
 lish its invalidity, and alleging that said will or wills were in 
 all respects valid and entitled to admission to probate. 
 
 Thos. J. Hill, the testator, came to California as a soldier 
 in the Stevenson Eegiment in 1847, having enlisted in New 
 York in the year preceding; in October, 1848, he was dis- 
 charged, and went, in 1849, to the mines, being mainly 
 engaged in Tuolumne county, where he took an active inter- 
 est in public affairs, and was a candidate for sheriff of the 
 county, without success, and the occupant of the post of 
 deputy sheriff, and otherwise locally conspicuous; his career 
 was marked by the vicissitudes common to the experience of 
 early days in California, until, in 1861, he re-entered his 
 country's service as a volunteer, and continued until the 
 expiration of his term of enlistment. The exposure and 
 hardship undergone by him during a portion of this period, 
 while stationed in Arizona, resulted in an impairment of his 
 vision which compelled him to enter the County Hospital, 
 and ultimately his entire loss of sight and transfer to the 
 almshouse. Upon being awarded a pension by the govern- 
 ment, sufficient to enable him to live comfortably, according 
 to his station, he left the Almshouse and came to the city. 
 
 Here he lodged at different places, having hired attendants, 
 until his nephew, John Woolley, the contestant, was sent for 
 to the country and came to care for him in May, 1883, remain- 
 ing until February, 1884, when he left, according to his own 
 testimony, because the service was too confining and he 
 couldn't get along with the boy, Thos. J. Conroy, whom Hill 
 had hired about three years before, and who was and had 
 been for nearly all that time the personal attendant of the 
 blind man, who had acquired an attachment for the boy, in
 
 Estate of Hill. 385 
 
 spite of certain censurable traits in the latter 's character. 
 The pension was procured thfough the agency of W. H. 
 Aiken, an attorney at law employed by Hill for that purpose, 
 who began his acquaintance with Hill in 1869, when the 
 latter visited him at his office to secure his services in that 
 behalf, and from that time on they continued intimate, and 
 when, the pension being obtained, Hill came out of the Alms- 
 house, it was Aiken who selected a room for him and visited 
 him frequently, and obtained from time to time financial 
 favors from him, and seems to have been his main adviser 
 until, on account of the transaction between Hill and Pension 
 Agent Cox, which came to a head in 1882, the decedent was 
 placed under guardianship. That transaction, with which 
 Aiken testifies he had nothing to do, consisted in Hill's allow- 
 ing Cox to invest $5,000 of his pension moneys in a mortgage 
 on a mill that burned down, and a mine that "petered out"; 
 which conduct of Cox coming to the notice of the govern- 
 ment, a special agent of the treasury, a Mr. Magan, was sent 
 out to investigate, and, as a consequence, a restitution of the 
 amount was made by Cox to Hill. Thereafter, in January, 
 1883, the special agent Magan introduced to Hill the pro- 
 ponent, James M. Haven ; this was at a house on Vallejo 
 street, where Hill was in charge of Conroy and a Mrs Clark, 
 a house attendant. January 29, 1883, the petition of said 
 Magan was filed, asking, for the reasons that Hill being 
 upward of sixty years of age, totally blind and in feeble 
 health, and by reason of extreme old age and of recent sick- 
 ness which had impaired his mind, being mentally incompetent 
 to manage his property, that a guardian of his person and 
 estate be appointed, and praying that said Haven be ap- 
 pointed. On the 5th of February the (iourt found that 
 said Hill had estate that needed care, and "that said Thomas 
 J. Hill, by reason of blindness, old age and physical infirmity, 
 is incompetent to manage his business or take charge of his 
 estate," and ordered that Haven be appointed guardian, and 
 that letters issue upon filing a proper bond. From that time 
 Haven took charge of Hill as guardian, and directed his 
 nflPairs until the death of the ward; visiting him frequently 
 i\t his various places of residence, counseling him, and seeing 
 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. 1—25
 
 386 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 to the service of attendants. During this period Conroy, 
 and after him one Adams, owaited on Hill until Woolley 
 came as stated, and Woolley had principal personal charge 
 until February, 1884. Woolley went to the office of the 
 guardian. Haven, and said he couldn't remain longer with 
 Hill because of the latter 's abuse; and immediately Haven 
 caused Hill to be removed to the house of Mrs. Mary E. 
 Connor, whither Hill was content to go. There, it is said^ 
 he improved greatly in condition, and at that house he 
 executed the will of March 22, 1884, and of November 13, 
 1884, which instruments are here under contest. 
 
 The first question to be considered is the effect of the 
 existence of the letters of guardianship upon the capacity 
 of Hill to make a will. 
 
 Counsel for contestant contends that the testator, having 
 been declared mentally incompetent, he could not execute 
 a will until his restoration to capacity, and that such 
 restoration must be determined in the same manner as his. 
 incapacity, according to section 40 of the Civil Code, which 
 reads : 
 
 "Section 40. After his incapacity has been judicially de- 
 termined, a person of unsound mind can make no conveyance 
 or other contract, or waive any right, until his restoration 
 to capacity. But a certificate from the medical superintend- 
 ent or resident physician of the insane asylum, to which such 
 person may have been committed, showing that such person 
 had been discharged therefrom, cured and restored to reason, 
 shall establish the presumption of legal capacity in such per- 
 son from the time of such discharge. ' ' 
 
 The section as here quoted was adopted in 1878, and was 
 an amendment of the statute which theretofore read as fol- 
 lows : 
 
 "Section 40. After his incapcity has been judicially 
 determined, a person of unsound mind can make no convey- 
 ance or other contract, nor delegate any power, nor waive 
 any right, until his restoration to capacity is judicially 
 determined. But if actually restored to capacity he may 
 make a will, though his restoration is not thus determined."'
 
 Estate of Hill. 387 
 
 Counsel for contestant claims that the section as amended 
 in 1878, and as it has continued since, is a conclusive bar to 
 testator's act, until he shall be restored to capacity by judicial 
 decree. But the section of the Civil Code speaks of "a 
 person of unsound mind," and would seem to refer to those 
 persons whose minds are so deranged as to necessitate com- 
 mittal to an asylum for the insane, and even in such case it 
 is not at all clear that "restoration to capacity" means a 
 judicial ascertainment and declaration to that effect. If it 
 were intended to have such meaning, one word only was 
 necessary to place it beyond doubt ; the legislator could easily 
 have employed the epithet "judicial," qualifying "restora- 
 tion to capacity"; instead of which he has amended by strik- 
 ing out the clause "is judicially determined" after those 
 words, leaving it to be implied, if it be not explicit and in 
 no need of implication, that actual restoration to capacity is 
 the true intent of the section. 
 
 But it is not clear to my mind that "insane" and "incom- 
 petent" are, as counsel for contestant contends, convertible 
 terms. A person may be incompetent by reason of insanity, 
 or from some other cause incapable of caring for his prop- 
 erty — the statute speaks of the "insane or incompetent" 
 person (Code of Civil Procedure, section 1763) ; it speaks 
 further (section 1766) of the proceeding for judicial restora- 
 tion to capacity before the court of the county in which the 
 person "was declared insane"; it requires notice to be given 
 to the guardian and relatives of "the person so declared 
 insane or incompetent." From a consideration of the w^hole 
 of the statute, I am of opinion that there is a distinction and 
 a difference between "insane" and "ineompetent, " and that 
 they are not. in the sense of the statute, convertible terms. 
 Now, what did the court declare in the proceedings to adjudge 
 Hill incompetent? Was he declared insane? It seems not; 
 for the finding of the court is in these words: "That said 
 Thomas J. Hill, by reason of blindness, old age and physical 
 infirmity, is incompetent to manage his business or take charge 
 of his estate." 
 
 Upon the finding, the result of the "full hearing and 
 examination" (Code of Civil Procedure, section 176-4), by
 
 388 Coffey's Probate Decisions^ Vol. 1, 
 
 the court, Haven was appointed the guardian of Hill. Now, 
 I apprehend that, in judging of the effect upon Hill's testa- 
 mentary capacity of the guardianship proceedings, this 
 court must have resource to the decree or "declaration of 
 incompetency ' ' and be bound by its terms ; and the whole 
 of that decree or declaration, as hereinabove quoted, contains 
 no item importing insanity. I have given to this question 
 the greater consideration, because the full and forcible pres- 
 entation- of the views of counsel for contestant impressed 
 me strongly at the hearing, and I have felt in duty bound to 
 examine carefully the grounds of his judgment, as stated in 
 argument; but after examination I am constrained to differ 
 from him. I do not think that the guardianship proceedings 
 which resulted in the order of February 5, 1883, took away 
 the testamentary capacity of Thomas J. Hill, or that it is 
 "a conclusive bar" to this proceeding. It is proper, there- 
 fore, to consider the evidence as to the sanity of the testator 
 at the times of the execution of the instruments propounded 
 for probate. 
 
 Was Thomas J. Hill, the testator, of sound mind on March 
 22, 1884, and November 13, 1884, or on either of those occa- 
 sions, when the papers offered for probate were signed? 
 Civ. Code, sec. 1270. , 
 
 Contestant alleges that at those times decedent was of 
 great age, blind, feeble, debilitated and deranged in bodily 
 and mental health, and thereby incapacitated from executing 
 a will; and that also at said times decedent was intemperate 
 from constant use of intoxicating liquors, and thereby so 
 mentally deranged as to be incapacitated from making a will. 
 
 In support of these allegations contestant, after producing 
 the documents to assail their validity, introduced James M. 
 Haven, who testified that Hill died June 24, 1885 — Haven is 
 the proponent — Maggie E. McCann, a subscribing witness to 
 the first will, who identified the instrument and narrated the 
 circumstances under which she signed as a witness. She 
 testified that Hill was blind; that he said to her, "Margaret, 
 sign this," and that at the time he was of sound mind and 
 acting of his own will and declared it to be his will, etc. John 
 E. Donnelly, a subscribing witness to the will of November
 
 Estate of Hill. 389 
 
 13, 1884, testified that he knew Hill, and that he signed the 
 paper at 224 Eleventh street, San Francisco, at Hill's request, 
 in his presence and in the presence of the other witness, 
 Maurice J. Burns, Hill declaring the paper to be his last 
 will and testament. Witness Donnelly drew this last will, 
 and every word of it was dictated by Hill ; witnesses Donnelly 
 and Burns were inmates of the same house where Hill was 
 residing, and had known him in that way for some months 
 prior to this occasion. Donnelly further testifies that Hill 
 dictated the outlines of the will and he wrote it. Hill said, 
 ' ' Give to so and so, ' ' and then the scribe filled it out ; the 
 testator said to Burns, the other witness, "Maurice, sign 
 this. ' ' The will was read to Hill by witness ; Hill made his 
 mark -|- to the paper, and one Charles H. Middleton wrote 
 his name as witness to the mark. The testator w^as very 
 particular about his will, so testifies Donnelly. After the 
 testimony of Donnelly contestant offered in evidence the 
 papers in the guardianship matter, to show that the testator 
 was of unsound mind at the time of signing the wills ; and 
 then called Eleanor White, who testified that she knew Hill, 
 who rented apartments of her at 1141 Folsom street, where 
 Mr. Woolley was his nurse, to whom he was very friendly. 
 This began in June, 1883 ; Hill was intemperate in his habits ; 
 he drank to excess ; his mind was very weak ; she saw him once 
 or twice a week for the first two months, and not so often the 
 last month; saw him an hour or two at a time; herself and 
 husband frequently called upon Hill ; in her opinion Hill was 
 not of sound mind ; her reason for this opinion was what she 
 saw of him and his conduct; his nephew, the contestant, was 
 with him all the time, and was very kind to him ; Hill ap- 
 peared to her at all times like a man who was under the 
 infiuence of liquor; Conroy was Hill's attendant during this 
 time ; witness never had seen an insane person, and her opinion 
 of Hill's unsoundness was based upon his habits of drinking 
 and his changeable views. 
 
 The next witness was Dr. N. P. Foster, a physician whom 
 Woolley took to see Hill in November. 1883, and he found 
 Hill suffering from alcoholic poisoning. The witness defined 
 the different phases of alcoholism; Hill was delirious; wholly
 
 390 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 oblivious to everything ; not conscious of any of his surround- 
 ings; taking his condition altogether, he might be the victim 
 of chronic alcoholism ; he was in an advanced stage of alco- 
 holism; the witness judged from his observation of Hill that 
 he had been a hard drinker for years; chronic alcoholism 
 impairs the mind and gradually leads to general imbecility. 
 
 Dr. Foster further testified that he saw Mr. Hill at 106 
 Langton street; he was there about half an hour; Hill's con- 
 dition couldn't have been brought about by a single debauch; 
 the room was comfortably furnished, and Hill was cleanly 
 clad. Woolley was sober enough to know what he was about, 
 although the witness paid no particular attention to him, as 
 Woolley was not his patient. 
 
 Thomas J. Conroy, the attendant of Hill, testified that he 
 first went to work for him in 1881 ; left him three or four 
 times ; worked for him over three years oif and on, took charge 
 of his room, led him around wherever he wanted to go ; never 
 heard any of the Connor family talking to him about any- 
 body ; Plill called Mrs. Connor ' ' mother, ' ' she called him 
 "papa," and the children called him "Papa Hill"; the chil- 
 dren were up there nearly all the time. Eugene McCarthy 
 waited on Hill a good deal. Eugene is a beneficiary in one 
 of the wills, as is Conroy in the first will. Conroy testifies 
 that Hill was not a firm man, very changeable in mind; he 
 would never have his right mind talking ; he said he would 
 never have Woolley come near the house ; this was said in 
 presence of the Connors; Hill drank very much; if liquor 
 was not given to him he would jump up and get mad, curse 
 and swear, and say, "if he couldn't have liquor he might 
 as well die"; he would rather drink whisky than eat. Mr. 
 Aiken would come and borrow money sometimes, and he 
 would stay half an hour talking; witness was present some- 
 times during their conversations. Aiken had an influence 
 over him; everything Aiken would tell him to do he would 
 do ; Hill was easily influenced by those around him. Witness 
 is a few months over eighteen years of age ; witness was pres- 
 ent at the time Mr. Haven drew the will of March, 1884, in 
 which he (witness) is a legatee for $500; Hill sent for Haven 
 to make out a new will; witness couldn't remember the con-
 
 Estate of Hill. 391 
 
 versation ; Haven was there half or three-quarters of an hour. 
 Hill was very firm in insisting on his whisky ; he was strong 
 on that subject, and he was very stubborn on the question of 
 refusing admission to the Woolleys ; witness read the paper 
 to Hill every morning, and got books from the library; Hill 
 used to talk politics with persons sometimes ; he also planned 
 to go out on Decoration Day, and we went out: he used to 
 know when witness went out and when he came in ; still, wit- 
 ness thought there was no great intelligence about him; he 
 could recognize a man by his voice, not by his step. 
 
 John Bush, another witness, was the landlord of the place 
 I305I/2 Vallejo street, which was occupied for a while by the 
 deceased; witness saw Hill occasionally, used to visit him to 
 keep his spirits up when he had no society; Hill was blind, 
 paralyzed a little on the right side, a little lame in the arm ; 
 he had a nurse, a lady, and a boy to attend him; Hill was 
 so fickle-minded that witness didn't think he knew his own 
 mind; Hill used to say, "They are robbing me entirely"; he 
 said Haven, his guardian, threatened to take his pension 
 away; in witness' opinion Hill could be led by those about 
 him : Mr. Aiken rented the place from me for Hill ; witness 
 saw Aiken there on several occasions. Hill said that Aiken 
 charged him $750 for the furniture in the "flat," which, in 
 witness' opinion, was worth no more than $150; Hill said 
 that if he didn't do as Haven told him the latter would stop 
 his pension and put him back in the Almshouse ; witness took 
 a drink occasionally with Hill; at one time Hill got a Mr. 
 McManus to see a lawyer to change his guardianship, but 
 Hill changed his mind, and the man said: "Hill, I want no 
 more to do with you; you're a fickle-minded man and don't 
 know your own mind." 
 
 Sarah Clark testified that she was nurse for Hill for nine 
 months, and kept house for him ; saw him every da.y ; he was 
 in the habit of drinking every day; deprived of his dram 
 he became very ugly; he alwaj^s spoke well of Aiken and 
 Haven ; he had no confidence in anybody but Aiken ; wanted 
 Aiken to come every day; if he wanted to buy anything in 
 the shape of dry goods he wanted Aiken to make the pur- 
 chase; he told her on one occasion that Haven said that if
 
 392 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 he didn't do as he (Haven) wanted him to do, he would put 
 him in a private asylum ; Hill told witness that he gave Aiken 
 $1,000 for procuring his pension; when special agent Magan 
 visited Hill, the latter told him that Pension Agent Cox had 
 $5,000 and Aiken $1,000, and he spent money for furniture; 
 that Cox had invested in a mining mill at four per cent, or 
 something, and he thought Aiken earned his thousand dol- 
 lars. Magan introduced Haven to Hill. Hill seemed to know 
 what was going on; he knew the voices of persons but not 
 their step ; he said he had no relations ; he drank a great deal, 
 whisky every fifteen or twenty minutes ; we always put water 
 in it ; once he had delirium tremens ; Conroy, the boy attend- 
 ant, used to give him whisky; couldn't help it, because he 
 would get ugly for it ; Conroy used to treat Hill cruelly, would 
 provoke him; sometimes the boy would go away and stay the 
 whole night ; this would make the old man wild, but he would 
 easily forgive him, as he liked the boy very much. Tommy 
 (Conroy) used to carry the money; during the time of Mr. 
 Magan he didn't drink so much, perhaps five cents worth of 
 beer a day, for say two months, January and February, 1883 ; 
 witness left him in May, 1883. 
 
 Dr. James D. Whitney, physician and surgeon, of over 
 twenty years' practice here, visited Hill once when the lat- 
 ter had broken his arm, but another doctor nearer by was 
 called and there was no occasion for witness; this was in 
 Vallejo street; Hill was in a very nervous condition and re- 
 quired anodynes; witness was afraid he would go into de- 
 lirium tremens; he was evidently suffering from alcoholism; 
 couldn't say, except from information, whether he was in a 
 primary or advanced stage; assuming he was suffering from 
 alcoholism and partial paralysis, witness should say he was 
 of unsound mind ; if his mind was not too much affected be- 
 fore, a change to comfortable conditions would tend to restore 
 him to a normal state. 
 
 Patrick Lynch, a resident of San Francisco off and on since 
 1847, testified that he knew Hill from 1846, when he first 
 saw him on Governor's Island, New York, then afterward in 
 1847 at the Presidio; after that saw him on Guerrero street 
 during the year 1883, called there frequently to see him ; had
 
 Estate of Hill. 393 
 
 conversation with him; would not think he was insane but 
 wouldn't put him up for a man of strong mind; witness' 
 opinion was that Hill was a man of changeable mind ; didn 't 
 think he was in his right, sound mind at any time he visited 
 him on Guerrero street, when Woolley had charge of him, say 
 in 1882; Woolley 's treatment of Hill was kind, food good, 
 rooms clean ; their relations very friendly ; Hill spoke kindly 
 of Woolley, called him "nephew," and Woolley called him 
 "Uncle Tom." Witness was a subscribing witness to a revo- 
 cation of a will, together with Woolley; the revocation was 
 drawn by John Quincy Adams and was signed by Hill on 
 Guerrero street ; had conversations with Hill about his blind- 
 ness; he told witness it was caused by neuralgia, and heat 
 and exposure in Arizona; saw James Adams and others on 
 Guerrero street ; Adams had been acting as nurse ; there were 
 four rooms in the house which they occupied ; house well kept, 
 fc.nd Hill's personal condition neat and cleanly; Hill was gen- 
 erally intelligent in conversation; he and witness would talk 
 over the topics of the day and over old times when they were 
 soldiers together; from 1849 to 1873 or 1874 witness lost 
 sight of Hill; once Hill was angry because he wanted to set 
 up Woolley in business and let him have $2,500 or $3,000, 
 and Haven wouldn't allow it; witness didn't advise one way 
 or other, but simply said he thought it might be a good thing. 
 
 James Hill knew deceased in 1883; they were neighbors 
 in 1141 Folsom street; they were veterans of the war, wit- 
 ness of 1861-65, deceased of the Mexican War; witness knew 
 of no particular delusion, except when Hill was in liquor. 
 
 John Woolley, contestant, testified that deceased was wit- 
 ness' mother's brother; first met him on Guerrero street; he 
 had sent a letter inquiring for witness, who didn't care to 
 stay with him, as witness had a family in- Placer county ; wit- 
 ness took charge of him May 11, 1883, and left him in Feb- 
 ruary, 1884; their relations were good; witness treated him 
 as kindly as if he were a child, and the feeling was kind in 
 return, until Plill's mind was poisoned against witness; wit- 
 ness gave Mr. Haven as a reason for leaving Hill that the 
 life was too wearing for him and he was too closely confined ; 
 witness didn't know who poisoned ITill's mind against him.
 
 394 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 but he thought so from Hill's changes; he cursed him and 
 his wife ; witness didn 't receive any particular compensation ; 
 witness went there from love, because Hill was his mother's 
 brother; Hill offered him twenty dollars per month; witness 
 told Hill he couldn't take any such sum, but witness did draw 
 some; the day witness left he had a conversation with Hill 
 in Haven 's presence, when witness asked Hill for some money, 
 
 and Hill answered that he didn 't owe him ' ' a d d cent ' ' ; 
 
 witness told his uncle he thought that was pretty hard after 
 his kind treatment of him, and Hill said witness treated him 
 well; witness was housekeeper and nurse, and did the cook- 
 ing. There was also introduced in evidence by contestant 
 a paper purporting to be a will of Hill, dated August 20, 
 1882, to show that a large number of persons named as bene- 
 ficiaries were relatives of Aiken, named therein as executor; 
 this paper came from the possession of James M. Haven, who 
 proceeded to explain certain pencil marks and memoranda on 
 the margins of the paper, made and used in the drawing of 
 another will by Haven for Hill ; this document was called the 
 "Blood," or "Aiken," or " Blood- Aiken " will to distinguish 
 it from the others. 
 
 I think the foregoing is a fair short statement of the sub- 
 stance of the testimony for contestant and plaintiff herein. 
 
 For the proponent and defendant Donnelly testified as be- 
 fore substantially, and also that Hill was a very neat and 
 tidy man, of cleanly habits, intelligent and well posted in 
 affairs, could hold his own in argument; fond of music, de- 
 lighted with witness' banjo playing; witness is an actor and 
 variety performer; witness was of opinion that Hill was per- 
 fectly sane at time of making the wills of March 22 and No- 
 vember 13, 1884; judged so from his conversation and con- 
 duct and manner; he was logical and clear in argument. 
 Maurice J. Burns, the other subscribing witness to will of No- 
 vember 13, 1884, corroborated witness preceding. Both these 
 witnesses were friends of the Connor household. 
 
 Edward Barthrop came to California in same regiment with 
 Hill, knew him continuously thereafter until 1849 ; were min- 
 ing partners in Tuolumne and other mines; afterward wit- 
 ness met Hill at the beginning of the war of 1861-65, in which
 
 Estate of Hill. 395 
 
 they both served in different branches of the Union Army; 
 next saw him in Guerrero street ; had a conversation with him 
 of about an hour's length at that time; he was perfectly sane 
 in mind; witness' reason for this opinion was that he could 
 discern no difference between Hill then and when he had seen 
 him before, except that physically he was blind and para- 
 lyzed; saw him again on Guerrero street; paid a third visit 
 c>nd he had moved to Langton street, where he was not as 
 comfortably situated; WooUey was attending to him there; 
 James Adams was his attendant on Guerrero street ; had con- 
 versed with him on Langton street for about twenty minutes ; 
 he was of sound mind; next saw him on Eleventh street at 
 Mrs. Connor's; his condition as compared with what it was 
 on Langton street was materially improved in his surround- 
 ings, and as to his manner and his cheerfulness; called there 
 about twice in November, 1884, about two or three times a 
 week witness called there; had one conversation of three 
 hours' duration; Hill said he was contented; his memory w^as 
 good, he set witness right as to dates, had a retentive mem- 
 ory; he was sane in mind; witness never had any reason to 
 doubt it; Hill said to witness that he was glad to get rid of 
 WooUey; that if he had stayed there with Woolley he would 
 have died, if he had remained on Langton street, whence 
 Haven had removed him; Hill told witness he had been left 
 alone in the house at night, and that his money had not been 
 properly accounted for; Hill said he was satisfied with his 
 guardian and was contented; witness disclaimed any knowl- 
 edge of the terms of the will, or intimacy with the parties. 
 
 Frederick L. Post first met Hill in New York in 1846, at 
 the headquarters of Company A, Stevenson 's Regiment, where 
 Hill was mustered in as a drummer, witness was orderly ser- 
 geant; in October, 1848, the regiment disbanded; next saw 
 deceased in 1861, and again in 1874 or 1875; after that he 
 went to Almshouse ; in 1878 he was brought in to get his pen- 
 sion, and Colonel Stevenson and witness identified him; in 
 1882 witness had a Thanksgiving dinner with Hill ; their con- 
 versations were usually about the old regiment, its survivors, 
 and like topics ; Hill desired witness to make inquiries about 
 his relatives, as he desired to leave them what he had ; at his
 
 396 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 instance I wrote to Wm. Woolley, his sister's husband, at 
 Campo Seco, who was a member of their old company; next 
 saw Hill on Guerrero street; his nephew had charge of him; 
 witness used to stay there an hour or two at a time ; once Wm. 
 Woolley was there on a visit ; on Decoration Day of 1883 wit- 
 ness accompanied Hill in a carriage to Odd Fellows' Ceme- 
 tery, was with him three or four hours that day, the best 
 part of the day ; witness next saw him on Langton street ; 
 he seemed to feel uncomfortable ; whisky was the trouble ; saw 
 him again when he removed to Eleventh street, in 1885, and 
 in Jun-e 1884, was there two or three hours. The witness said 
 that Hill complained of Woolley in some particulars; Hill 
 seemed to think Woolley 's family were too great a tax upon 
 his resources ; Hill was well treated at the house of Mrs. Con- 
 nor, but he had too much whisky ; this was true at all times ; 
 on Thanksgiving Day, 1882, when witness was at dinner with 
 him. Hill was mentally sane; witness said he could not but 
 be struck with Hill's extraordinary memory; was struck with 
 its retentive power,, especially with regard to the details in 
 obtaining his pension from the agent ; his memory was strong 
 in accounting for those whom he had kno^vn, or in recount- 
 ing the scenes through which he and witness had passed; 
 this was while Hill was at Mrs. Connor's house; witness used 
 to visit there on Sundays ; Hill was generally clear and lucid ; 
 sometimes witness said (in answer to counsel for contestant) 
 he didn 't think he was of sound mind ; he was weak and vacil- 
 lating, except upon the question of drink, and upon that point 
 he was very positive; witness thought that persons who con- 
 stantly plied him with liquor could do anything they pleased 
 with him; when witness was at Mrs. Connor's, Hill was sup- 
 plied with liquor upon his demand; not more than two or 
 three times upon any occasion; he was subject to vagaries; 
 the one who was nearest to him and humored him most could 
 do almost anything with him ; witness thought Hill had more 
 liquor at Vallejo street than elsewhere; when he was under 
 care of Mrs. Clark and the boy Conroy ; on Folsom street Hill 
 talked as if he was ill-used ; "v\ntness saw him there only once ; 
 he seemed aggrieved about Conroy 's conduct; witness thinks 
 Hill was unduly influenced by the Connor family; there was
 
 Estate of Hill. 397 
 
 too much cajolery, in the opinion of witness, more than could 
 be paid for by so much a month; Hill was very well taken 
 care of; there was so much done to make him happy, there 
 seemed to be something behind that witness couldn't explain 
 exactly. 
 
 Miss Mary E. Morrison, a school teacher, an intimate friend 
 and frequent visitant at the. home of Mrs. Connor, saw Hill 
 often while there ; never saw him under the influence of 
 liquor; thought he was mentally sane, because he talked to 
 her so lucidly; he discussed political issues and seemed well 
 informed; Hill improved very greatly in the Connor house; 
 when he first came he was not so cheerful as he afterward 
 became ; he grew stout ; he told witness that at one time he 
 wanted to put a pistol to his head and Woolley put one in 
 his hand, and Master Conroy corroborated this stqgtement. 
 
 Mrs. Ann Hennings, another intimate friend of the Con- 
 nor household, testified to same effect as to sanity of Hill. 
 
 Chas. H. Middleton, as to will of November 13, 1884, tes- 
 tified that he witnessed the mark, and Hill was mentally sane 
 at the time; witness lived in the same house, and saw much 
 of *Hill and conversed with the old man ; for the last five 
 weeks of Hill's life witness was with him night and day, ex- 
 cept two nights, when witness was relieved. 
 
 Dr. M. A. Cachot visited Hill for the first time on May 20, 
 1885, made in all thirteen or fourteen visits; the patient al- 
 ways answered promptly and to the point all questions; wit- 
 ness never saw any sign of insanity in him; he was sane; 
 witness was family physician of the Connors, is a graduate 
 of college, at one time in charge of St. Mary's Hospital; Hill 
 was not suffering from alcoholism when witness saw him ; bore 
 no symptoms of alcoholism. 
 
 Dr. S. R. Gerry, a thirty-six years' practitioner in San 
 Francisco, a physician since 1839, knew Hill in the Almshouse, 
 of which institution witness is and was resident physician; 
 Hill had amaurosis, paralysis of the optic nerve; otherwise 
 he was in good corporal condition ; had frequent conversa- 
 tions with him, reminiscences of Mexican War and topics 
 like that ; afterward witness visited Hill on Chestnut street 
 about twice, two or three years ago; in the Almshouse pre-
 
 398 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 scribed occasionally a little whisky and brandy for him, not 
 regularly or continuously ; Hill was in the Almshouse ten 
 or twelve years; he was bright and intelligent, mentally sane 
 at all those times; witness based his opinion on the general 
 tenor of Hill's conversation; he was a very tractable patient, 
 easily governed, but he had a strong will of his own, as wit- 
 ness judged from his positive manner; witness didn't think 
 that he was easily influenced. 
 
 Dr. L. L. Dorr, a physician and surgeon, first met Hill be- 
 fore the pension board, of which witness was a member, in 
 1880; afterward in 1882 for a half hour, perhaps, treated 
 Hill for some ailment of the bowels ; conversed with him on 
 his physical condition, about his blindness; this was July 18, 
 1882 ; he was perfectly sane ; if he were not sane in the ex- 
 aminatioi^ before the pension board, witness would so report. 
 Witness said a person suffering from chronic alcoholism might 
 be competent to make a will. 
 
 Miss Maggie E. McCann repeated substantially her testi- 
 mony as to execution of will of March 22, 1884; she knew 
 Hill all the time he was at her mother's house, of which wit- 
 ness was an inmate ; conversed with him frequently ; he spoke 
 of Mr. Woolley, said he tried to beat him once on Langton 
 street, and Conroy saved him, and that was the reason he 
 liked the boy; at the time of the execution of the will of 
 March 22, 1884, Hill asked Haven if he would accept any- 
 thing, and Haven said: "I don't wish any of your money; 
 don't need it." On November 13, 1884, Hill was sane in 
 witness' opinion. 
 
 Dr. Julian Perrault, physician and surgeon in San Fran- 
 cisco since 1859, saw Hill September 25, 1882; treated him 
 for quite a severe injury to the arm ; thought Hill had been 
 drinking too much ; Hill was rather an intelligent old man, 
 and witness sometimes chatted with him when time permitted ; 
 never saw him intoxicated; he was an old soldier, and wit- 
 ness thought his condition required stimulants, and witness 
 allowed him a certain quantity of whisky; Hill was a man 
 of strong will and good understanding; there was nothing 
 about him to indicate chronic alcoholism when witness saw 
 him; the quantity of liquor witness prescribed would be
 
 Estate of Hill. 399 
 
 about two gallons a month; the first night witness saw Hill 
 he was suffering from acute alcoholism — that is, the result 
 of one debauch; whether three gallons a month would be 
 too much liquor would depend on a man's physical organiza- 
 tion; some men can stand that much without injury. 
 
 James H. Adams knew Hill in 1846, a fellow-soldier; had 
 the care of Hill on Guerrero street and on Vallejo street; 
 he was correct in his habits; after Woolley came the quan- 
 tity of whisky was greatly increased; Woolley drank and 
 others, outsiders; Hill was very generous and liked to treat 
 his friends well; he was never intoxicated before Woolley 
 came ; never under the influence of liquor ; afterward wit- 
 ness saw Hill intoxicated, sometimes very far gone; always 
 considered Hill perfectly sane ; he was as clear and level- 
 headed as any man witness ever had to do with ; witness was 
 with Hill six w^eeks ; four weeks before Woolley came, and 
 two weeks after that event. 
 
 Wm. Kane worked for Hill two days and a night, and 
 lived hard-by Hill on Langton street for about two months; 
 went there after Woolley left; Hill wasn't very clean; clothes 
 old and shabby ; no shoes on ; wore slippers when we took him 
 to Mrs. Connor's; Hill was afraid of Woolley 's coming back; 
 witness remained to protect him as much as anything else; 
 Hill told witness to throw Woolley out if he came back. 
 
 Eugene McCarthy took care of Hill from May 1, 1884, until 
 his decease; attended on him, gave him a tablespoonfiil of 
 whisky when he wanted it; used to read to him and wait 
 on him; witness has been at Mrs. Connor's about three years; 
 Hill paid him same as Conroy, fifteen dollars per month ;*saw 
 Hill intoxicated three times — Decoration Day, his birthday, 
 and Fourth of July. 
 
 W. H. Aiken testified as to his relations with Hill, and 
 gave his opinion that he was sane at all times, remarkal)le 
 memory, and acute hearing and sensible conversation were 
 characteristics of Hill ; he could tell a person by his step ; 
 was very bright and intelligent. 
 
 John Hogan, a resident in the Connor house, testified sub- 
 stantially the same as other inmates therein, who saw Hill 
 frequently and conversed with him.
 
 400 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 Mrs. Mary E. Connor testified that she was the person 
 mentioned by that name in the instruments propounded ; she 
 became acquainted with Hill on Langton street; called there 
 with the sister of Conroy to see Hill ; Mr. Woolley was there 
 and said he was going to leave ; Hill complained of Woolley ; 
 said he could drink more than himself ; could take beer three 
 or four times a day, and whisky in the morning; Hill was 
 neat and intelligent; had taste for reading, and liked per- 
 sons to read for him newspapers and books; liked music 
 greatly; was perfectly sane; he didn't want to see Woolley; 
 didn 't want him in the house ; didn 't think it right that Wool- 
 ley brought his family to live on him, and to make him sup- 
 port them ; she felt friendly toward Woolley. 
 
 James M. Haven testified that he was the executor named 
 in instrument dated March 22, 1884; Hill told him he was 
 never married; witness became acquainted with Hill in Jan 
 uary, 1883 ; was introduced by special treasury agent Magan, 
 in Vallejo street, when Conroy and Mrs. Clark had charge 
 of Hill; after the Woolley family came, Hill complained of 
 the circumstances, and of what Woolley 's wife once said 
 when Hill spoke of the noise made by the children; Mrs. 
 Woolley said she wished "his old carcass was at the bottom 
 of the bay ' ' ; once when witness was present Woolley and 
 Hill had very rough talk ; Woolley said he couldn 't stay with 
 Hill, nor could anybody else; afterward Woolley came to 
 witness' office and said he couldn't stay longer with Hill, 
 because Hill abused him, called him vile names and so on ; 
 the next day after Woolley left, Hill was removed to Mrs. 
 Connor's house; witness selected the place and caused the 
 removal, and Hill was content to go there ; after that he im- 
 proved verj^ greatly ; witness was with him when he died ; 
 saw him for two hours and a half before ; on March 22, 1884, 
 Hill was perfectly sane; as to the instrument called the 
 "Blood" or "Aiken" will, witness made the pencil marks 
 at the direction of Hill, when he was giving witness instruc- 
 tions for drawing the will of March 22, 1884; on November 
 13, 1884, Hill was sane ; he acted at all times like a sane man ; 
 his conversation was intelligent; there were times when Hill 
 was under the influence of liquor when his mind was not
 
 Estate of Hill. 401 
 
 sound; Hill told witness that Woolley wanted him to revoke 
 the "Blood-Aiken" will. Hill told witness to give Wool- 
 ley, his wife and children $1 each; witness suggested larger 
 sums for the wife and children, saying he didn't think they 
 should suffer for Woolley 's wrongdoing, but Hill said, "No, 
 I'll give them but a dollar apiece." Hill was not a man 
 easily susceptible to influence; it was very hard to influence 
 him; witness never said that if Hill didn't do as he wished, 
 he w^ould put him in a lunatic asylum; but did insist on 
 Hill's leaving Vallejo street, and getting into a better locality. 
 
 H. J. Stafford, a justice of the peace of San Francisco, 
 and an attorney at law, knew Hill; met him two or three 
 times before last election (1884) ; had conversation with him 
 on general topics; upon politics so far as it was safe for 
 witness to venture; Hill was very radical in his views, and 
 witness, being of opposite opinions, didn't think it prudent 
 to pursue such discussions; Hill was sane; there was noth- 
 ing about him to indicate insanity, and witness never had a 
 suspicion of Hill's sanity; he was a man of very strong 
 convictions and wanted to argue; ready for argument; clear 
 and logical in his processes of reasoning. 
 
 The foregoing is a fair view of the substance of the testi- 
 mony on both sides. 
 
 So far as the execution of the documents propounded are 
 concerned, they are both executed in all particulars conform- 
 ably to the statute : Civ. Code, sees. 1276, 1278. 
 
 The case of the contestant with respect to the soundness 
 of mind of the testator is not established ; the great prepond- 
 erance of evidence being that he was at all times — when not 
 under the influence of liquor — intelligent, clear and strong 
 in mental faculties, with a retentive memory and a positive 
 will ; the physicians particularly are upon this point plain- 
 spoken. Doctors Cachot, Perrault, Gerry and Dorr saw 
 much of him, and speak with precision and emphasis; Doc- 
 tors Foster and Whitney each but once, and under circum- 
 stances not so favorable as the others for absolute judgment 
 All these gentlemen are in good professional standing, and 
 entitled to credence and respect; but the conditions under 
 which the two last named saw their patient dift'er from the 
 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. 1—26
 
 402 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 others to such an extent as to render their testimony much 
 less valuable; and their testimony as experts is entitled to 
 no greater consideration than that of the other physicians 
 who oppose their opinions. I do not think any other con- 
 clusion can fairly be drawn from the evidence than that 
 Thomas J. Hill was a man of sound mind. Even if at times 
 vacillating and vagarious, as the witness Lynch and Post in 
 substance said, and other witnesses on the same point cor- 
 roborated, the general tenor of their testimony supports the 
 theory of sanity; Barthrop, James Hill, James H. Adams 
 and John Hogan are clear upon this question, and they saw 
 the decedent frequently during his latter years; two of them 
 — Barthrop and Adams — being his comrades in the Mexican 
 War; in addition is the evidence of Miss Morrison and Mrs. 
 Hennings, which is assailed as interested; but the nature of 
 their interest is not such as to discredit them; that they are 
 ''friends of the family" is not of itself sufficient to justify a 
 judge or jury in rejecting their testimony. I do not deem it 
 necessary to advert further to the testimony upon this point, 
 an abstract of which I have endeavored to make in the pre- 
 ceding pages; nor is it necessary to quote here long defini- 
 tions of soundness or sanity of mind, in order to show how 
 far short contestant's proofs fall in establishing his al- 
 legation. I shall only cite: Estate of Black, Myr. 27, 28; 
 1 Redfield on Wills, 59, 60 et seq. ; 1 Jarman on Wills, 103 ; 
 Estate of Crittenden, Myr. 51; 1 Redfield on Wills, pp. 84, 
 85; Estate of Tittel, Myr. 12. 
 
 The testator seems to have had some reason arising from 
 his nephew's conduct for his antipathy toward him; the evi- 
 dence of Kane and Post is clear upon this point, the latter 
 especially strong, and there is other testimony to same pur- 
 port, and explaining this fact as the secret of Hill's affec- 
 tion for the erratic youth, Conroy. Belief based on evi- 
 dence, however slight, is not delusion. The testator's mind 
 was not "possessed" in this particular: Estate of Tittel, Myr. 
 14. 
 
 As to the allegation of habitual inebriety, while it appears 
 .that the decedent was profound in his potations, it is not 
 established that his habits so impaired his mind as to inca- 
 pacitate him from making a will at the times of the execution
 
 Estate of Hell. 403 
 
 of these instruments. Notwithstanding his frequent and 
 copious indulgence in liquor, without which he declared life 
 not worth living, he seems to have retained an intelligence 
 and an interest in human affairs that made him to many 
 persons an entertaining companion. Mr. Post spent hours 
 with him, and others visited him on account of his agreeable 
 converse. The testimony of the physicians, Gerry, Perrault, 
 Cachot and Dorr, is certainly worth considering, with their 
 knowledge of Hill's habits. Upon this issue the Estate of 
 Black, Myr. 27 et seq., is very instructive; and the work 
 of Balfour Bro\^^le on the Medical Jurisprudence of In- 
 sanity, sections 351-360, and Dr. Ordronaux's Judicial As- 
 pects of Insanity, 382, may be consulted with profit. The 
 case of Peck v. Carey 27 N. Y. 9, 84 Am. Dec. 220, should 
 also be read. Julke v. Adam 1 Redf. 456, and O'Neill v. 
 Murray, 4 Redf. 318, are good cases in support of these 
 views; and it is not necessary to add to those cited. 
 
 Was either will made under undue influence'? Civ. Code, 
 sees. 1272, 1575. 
 
 Counsel for contestant made strenuous contention that the 
 circumstances surrounding Hill, at the time of the execution 
 of those instruments, were such as to carry the inference 
 that the wills were not the offspring or emanation of the 
 mind of the testator; but that the craft of Counselor Haven, 
 the arts and artifices of Aiken, and the manner in which he 
 practiced upon the susceptible nature and the guileless heart 
 of Hill, the subtle influence of the presiding genius of the 
 Connor household, "the fairy godmother of the boy Con- 
 roy," Miss Maggie McCann, over the blind paralytic, and 
 the whole atmosphere of undue influence surrounding Hill, 
 produced the wills, by which comparative strangers acquire 
 his estate to the disherison of the next of kin. But it does not 
 appear that there were such ties between WooUey and Hill 
 as should raise a presumption of obligation on testator '=? 
 part to him; his life with Woolley was on the whole not a 
 happy one; and there was a great change when the transfer 
 was made to the Connor house ; the last days of his life were 
 made cheerful ; and in this all the witnesses agree who visited 
 Hill at his home with that family. Whatever the motive, 
 it was the fact that Hill benefited bodily and mentally by
 
 404 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 the change. I think a careful examination of the facts in 
 evidence will fail to substantiate the averments of contest- 
 ant that the will was procured to be made by undue in- 
 fluence; and it will not do to base a conclusion upon sur- 
 mises and suspicions of sordid motives for kind acts, where 
 there is no direct evidence to fortify such deduction. As 
 to what constitutes "undue influence," the counsel must be 
 content with citations, as everything (even a judicial opin- 
 ion) must have an end. Judge Myrick's valuable probate 
 reports furnish excellent and convenient definitions and illus- 
 trations and references : Estate of Black, Myr. 31 ; 1 Jar- 
 man on Wills, 132-134; 1 Redfield on Wills, 518-520; Chil- 
 dren's Aid Soc. V. Loveridge, 70 N. Y. 387. 
 
 The opinion of Miller, J., in this last cited case is worthy 
 of perusal : See 1 Jarman on Wills, 141 ; 1 Redfield on Wills, 
 523, 524. 
 
 The allegations of undue influence are not established, and 
 the like remark may be made with respect to the charges 
 of fraud: Civ. Code, 1575. Lack of time and pressure of 
 other duties compel me to abbreviate the discussion of the 
 principles involved in this case, and to refer counsel to the 
 summary of the evidence to support the court's conclusion 
 that the wills should be admitted to probate. Let an order 
 to that eft'ect be prepared : 1 Redfield on Wills, *435. 
 
 As to What Undue Influence will vitiate a will, see Estate of In- 
 gram, ante, p. 122, and note. 
 
 The Appointment of a Guardian for a Person alleged to be non 
 compos mentis, by a court having jurisdiction, is perhaps prima 
 facie, but certainly not conclusive evidence of his lack of testa- 
 mentary capacity: Estate of Johnson, 57 Cal. 529; Ames v. Ames, 
 40 Or. 495, 67 Pac. 737. 
 
 One may Place Himself so Far Under the Influence of Intoxicating 
 Liquor that for the time being he cannot do any legal act, or he may, 
 by an excessive use of alcoholic stimulants for an extended period 
 of time, perhaps permanently dethrone his reason. A person may, 
 therefore, by an inordinate indulgence in intoxicants, temporarily 
 and possibly permanently incapacitate himself to make a will. Yet 
 the fact that one is addicted to the excessive use of liquor, or that 
 he is in some measure under its influence, manifestly does not, as 
 a matter of law, establish a want of testamentary capacity. Never- 
 theless, such inebriety is always admissible in evidence as tending to
 
 Estate of Skae, 405 
 
 show unsoundness of mind, or vulnerability to undue influence, its 
 effect being a question of fact for the jury: Estate of Tiffany, post, 
 p. 478; Estate of Cunningham, 52 Cal. 465; Estate of Gharky, 57 
 Cal. 271; Estate of Johnson, 57 Cal. 529; Estate of Lang, 65 Cal. 
 19, 2 Pae. 491; Estate of Wilson, 117 Cal. 262, 49 Pac. 172; In re 
 D 'Avignon's Will, 12 Colo. App. 489, 55 Pac. 936; Estate of Van 
 Alstine, 26 Utah, 193, 72 Pac. 942; Estate of Eathjens, 45 Wash. 55, 
 87 Pac. 1070. 
 
 Estate of ALICE SKAE, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 29,150; decided February 15, 1905.] 
 
 Equitable Conversion — Whether Takes Place by Implication. — Equi- 
 table conversion may take place by implication as well as by express 
 words. 
 
 Equitable Conversion — When Worked by Implication. — If a will au- 
 thorizes the executors to sell real estate, and the general scheme of 
 the testament manifests an intention on the part of the testator 
 tnat there shall be an equitable conversion of the realty into per- 
 sonal property, such a conversion will take place, although the power 
 to sell is not imperative. 
 
 1. Application for partial distribution by Alice Warren 
 Skae, sole heir at law. Opposition by Mercantile Trust 
 Company. 
 
 2. Application for final distribution by Mercantile Trust 
 Company of San Francisco, testamentary trustee. Oppo- 
 sition by Alice Warren Skae. 
 
 Wilson & Wilson, for heir, cited the following authorities: 
 Civ. Code, sees. 857, 864, 1384; Carpenter v. Cook, 182 Cal 
 621, 84 Am. St. Rep. 118, 64 Pac. 997 ; Morfew v. San Fran- 
 cisco & S. R. R. Co., 107 Cal. 595, 596; Estate of Fair, 132 
 Cal. 523, 546, 84 Am. St. Rep. 70, 60 Pac. 442, 64 Pac. 1000 ; 
 Cooke V. Piatt, 98 N. Y. 35 ; Chamberlain v. Taylor, 105 N. 
 Y. 185, 194, 11 N. E. 625; Henderson v. Henderson, 113 N. 
 Y. 11, 20 N. E. 814; Woerz v. Rademacher, 120 N. Y. 62, 
 23 N. E. 1113; Steinhardt v. Cunningham, 130 N. Y. 292, 
 29 N. £. 100; Hofsas v. Cummings, 141 Cal. 525, 75 Pac. 
 110; McCurdy v. Otto, 140 Cal. 50, 73 Pac. 748; Estate of 
 Walkerly, 108 Cal. 627, 628, 652, 49 Am. St. Rep. 97, 41
 
 406 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 Pac. 772; Estate of Young, 123 Cal. 343, 55 Pac. 1011; 
 Estate of Sanford, 136 Cal. 100, 68 Pac. 494; Estate of 
 Dixon, 143 Cal. 511, 77 Pac. 412 ; Estate of Pichoir, 139 Cal. 
 684, 73 Pac. 606 ; Estate of Fair, 136 Cal. 79, 68 Pac. 306 ; 
 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 1st ed., p. 510, and cases cited; 
 Janes v. Throckmorton, 57 Cal. 368, 383; Bank of Ukiah 
 V. Eice, 143 Cal. 270, 271, 101 Am. St. Rep. 118, 76 Pac 
 1020; Scholle v. Scholle, 113 N. Y. 270, 21 N. E. 84; Clift 
 V. Moses, 116 N. Y. 157, 22 N. E. 393 ; Eraser v. McNaugh- 
 ton, 58 Hun, 31, 11 N. Y. Supp. 384; White v. Howard, 46 
 N. Y. 162; Estate of Pforr, 144 Cal. 121, 77 Pac. 826; 
 Crouse v. Peterson, 130 Cal. 175, 80 Am. St. Rep. 89, 62 
 Pac. 475, 615; Estate of Lahiff, 86 Cal. 151, 24 Pac. 850; 
 Fletcher v. Ashburner, 1 White & Tudor 's Leading Cases 
 in Equity, part 2, p. 1118 (and eases cited on p. 1134) ; 2 
 Story's Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 1214; 1 Beach on Mod- 
 ern Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 523 ; Wheldale v. Partridge, 
 5 Ves. Jr. *397, and note. Walker v. Denne, 2 Ves. Jr. 
 *186; Samuel v. Samuel, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 253, 254; King 
 V. King, 13 R. I. 501; Becker's Estate, 150 Pa. 526, 24 Atl. 
 687; Mills V. Harris, 104 N. C. 629, 10 S. E. 704; Tickel 
 V. Quinn, 1 Dem. (N. Y. Sur.) 428; Keller v. Harper, 64 
 Md. 82, 1 Atl. 65; Lynn v. Gephart, 27 Md. 563. 
 
 Morrison & Cope, for trustee, cited the following authori- 
 ties: Civ. Code, sec. 1338; In re Pforr 's Estate, 144 Cal. 
 121, 77 Pac. 827 ; Dodge v. Pond, 23 N.' Y. 69 ; Dodge v. 
 Williams, 46 Wis. 97, 50 N. W. 1103, 1106 ; Bogert v. Her- 
 tell, 4 Hill, 492-497, and cases cited; Ford v. Ford, 70 Wis 
 19 , 5 Am. St. Rep. 117-124, 33 N. W. 188 ; Lent v. Howard, 
 89 N. Y. 169, 177 ; Moncrief v. Ross, 50 N. Y. 431-436 ; 
 Doughty V. Bull, 2 Wms. 430; Delafield v. Barlow, 107 N. 
 Y. 535, 14 N. E. 498 ; Morse v. Morse, 85 N. Y. 53, 59 ; Allen 
 V. Watts, 98 Ala. 384, 11 South. 646; Harrington v. Pier, 
 105 Wis. 485, 76 Am. St. Rep. 924, 82 N. W. 345, 50 L. R. 
 A. 307, 313 ; Given v. Hilton, 95 U. S. 591, 24 L. Ed. 458 : 
 Power V. Cassidy, 79 N. Y. 602, 613, 35 Am. Rep. 550; 
 Clarke v. Clarke, 46 S. C. 230, 57 Am. St. Rep. 675, 24 S. 
 E. 202, 205-207 ; Eraser v. Trustees U. P. Church, 124 N. Y. 
 479, 26 N. E. 1034; Cherry v. Greene, 115 111. 591, 4 N. E.
 
 Estate of Skae. 407 
 
 257; Going v. Emery, 16 Pick. (33 Mass.) 107, 112, 113, 
 26 Am. Dec. 645; Wurt's Exrs. v. Page, 19 N. J. Eq. 365, 
 375 ; Falmestock v. Fahnestock, 152 Pa. 56 , 34 Am. St. Kep. 
 623, 25 Atl. 313 ; Chick v. Ives, 2 Neb. (Unofficial) 879, 90 
 N. W. 751, and authorities therein cited; Becker v. Chester, 
 115 Wis. 90, 117-126, 91 N. W. 87, 97-100, 650. 
 
 COFFEY, J. Alice Warren Skae is the only child, and 
 sole heir at law of Alice Skae, decedent, who died in New 
 York City on the sixth day of July, 1903, leaving estate, 
 real and personal, in San Francisco and elsewhere, which 
 she sought to dispose of by a will admitted to probate pri- 
 marily in the New York county surrogates' court and by 
 authenticated copy subsequently in this jurisdiction on Sep- 
 tember 12, 1903, wherein letters testamentary were issued 
 to Mercantile Trust Company of San Francisco, a corpora- 
 tion, which thereupon qualified as executor and ever since 
 has acted and now is acting in that capacity. The jurisdic- 
 tional facts being established, Alice Skae, as heir at law, asks 
 that certain property described in her petition be distributed 
 to her. 
 
 The executor resists this application and avers that the 
 property described was disposed of by testatrix in and by 
 her will, admitted to probate as aforesaid, which made a 
 complete distribution of all her property in trust as follows: 
 To the said Mercantile Trust Company of San Francisco in 
 trust to receive the rents, income and profits thereof, and 
 to pay therefrom the proper and necessary expenses of 
 managing and caring for said property and of putting and 
 keeping in repair the burial vault owned by said deceased 
 in the cemetery at Oakland and a proper compensation for 
 its services as trustee and to apply the balance of such rents, 
 income and profits to the use of said Alice W. Skae, during 
 her natural life, with authority in said trustee to sell, at 
 public or private sale, the whole or any part of the real es- 
 tate of the decedent and the proceeds to invest for the pur- 
 poses of said trust; also to lease the real estate and mort- 
 gage the same to secure any loan required to pay an exist- 
 ing mortgage thereon or to rebuild or improve the buildings 
 thereon; and after the decease of the said daughter, Alice
 
 V 
 
 408 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 Warren Skae, the decedent testatrix directed the said trus- 
 tee to pay out of the principal of said trust fund the sum of 
 $50,000 to the lawful husband of said daughter, who should 
 survive, if any, and to distribute the remainder among her 
 children, who should survive her, if any, it being understood 
 that the issue of a deceased child should take together the 
 share per stirpes which such child would have taken, if he or 
 she had survived said daughter of testatrix ; and in case said 
 Alice "Warren Skae should leave no issue, then the testatrix 
 directed that the trustee should out of the trust property 
 which would have gone to such issue, if any had survived, 
 pay certain gifts to and for certain persons and purposes 
 and then to divide the remainder among indicated individ- 
 uals. 
 
 In order to arrive at the intention of the testatrix it may 
 be better to reproduce here the language of the will, for the 
 rule is, as stated by our supreme court, to ascertain the 
 meaning of the writer by the terms he employs to signify 
 his purpose. It is not, what did he mean? but, what do his 
 words mean ? Estate of Fair, 132 Cal. 546, 84 Am. St. Rep. 
 70, 60 Pac. 442, 64 Pac. 1000. 
 
 The first item of the will need not be rendered literally, 
 as it was revoked by the codicil ; but the subsequent para- 
 graphs will be better understood if given in their exact 
 phrase than by abstract or synopsis. These items are as fol- 
 lows, in their order: 
 
 Item — "I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue 
 and remainder of my property and estate, real and personal, 
 of which I may die seized or possessed, or to which I may 
 be in any wise entitled at the time of my decease, unto the 
 Mercantile Trust Company of San Francisco, California, in 
 trust, to receive the rents, income and profits, thereof, and 
 to pay therefrom the proper and necessary expenses of 
 managing and caring for said property and a proper com- 
 pensation for its services of Trustee, and to apply the bal- 
 ance of such rents, income and profits to the use of my 
 daughter Alice Warren Skae during her natural life. 
 
 "I authorize and empower the said Trustee to sell at pub- 
 lic or private sale, the whole or part of my real estate and 
 the proceeds to invest for the purposes of said trust. Also
 
 Estate of Skae. 409 
 
 to lease my real estate and to mortgage the same to secure 
 any loan which may be reasonably required to pay off an 
 existing mortgage thereon, or to rebuild and improve the 
 buildings thereon. 
 
 "After the decease of my daughter Alice Warren Skae, 
 I direct that said Trustee pay out of the principal of said 
 Trust Fund, the sum of Fifty thousand dollars to the law- 
 ful husband of said Alice Warren Skae, who shall survive 
 her, if any, and to distribute the remainder of said Trust 
 property among the children of said Alice Warren Skae, 
 who shall survive her, if any, it being understood that the 
 issue of a deceased child of said Alice Warren Skae shall 
 together take the share per stirpes which said deceased child 
 would have taken, if he or she had survived said Alice War- 
 ren Skae." 
 
 Item — "In case my daughter Alice Warren Skae shall 
 leave no issue of her body her surviving, then I direct that 
 the said Trustee shall out of the said Trust property which 
 would have gone to such issue, if any had survived, pay the fol- 
 lowing gifts, viz": (Naming persons and objects.) 
 
 Item — "After all the preceding gifts shall be fully paid 
 so far as may be lawful or possible, I direct the said Trus- 
 tee to divide all the residue which shall then remain of said 
 Trust property (including all gifts that may lapse, and the 
 sum given in trust for Mary Skae, after the termination of 
 said trust) unto and among the following named persons, 
 viz " : .( Naming them. ) 
 
 The property of this estate, according to the inventory and 
 appraisement filed June 30, 1904, was in personalty valued 
 at .$31,427.87 and in land $150,000, with improvements there- 
 on $50,000. So far as this discussion is concerned, the ac- 
 tual status of the property at this date may be considered 
 as realty, amounting in value to $200,000. 
 
 In support of the application for partial distribution, it 
 is conceded that the trust to receive the rents, income and 
 profits and to apply the same to the use of the daughter 
 during her natural life is valid unless it fail by reason of 
 the invalidity of the other trusts, which are claimed to be 
 repugnant to the statute. The trust for the husband is 
 assailed as clearly void under section 857 of the Civil Code,
 
 410 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 and not authorized by any of its subdivisions. Subdivision 
 1 provides for a trust to sell real property and apply or 
 dispose of the proceeds in accordance with the instrument 
 creating the trust. It is argued that in this case there is 
 not only no direction that the real estate be sold and the 
 $50,000 paid out of the proceeds, but the will contains no 
 imperative direction whatever that the real estate be sold, 
 and a trust under this subdivision must be imperative and 
 mandatory and not left to the discretion of the trustee, and 
 if so left, it is not a trust under this statute. 
 
 The second subdivision of this section relates to trusts to 
 mortgage or lease real property and the clause concerning 
 the husband is not within its purview. 
 
 The third subdivision relates to trusts to receive the rents 
 and profits of real property and apply them to the use of 
 certain persons. This provision covers the trust for the 
 benefit of the daughter, but does not seem to have any bear- 
 ing upon the clause for the possible surviving husband as 
 that is not to receive rents and profits and apply the same 
 to his use but is a trust to pay him a certain sum out of the 
 principal. 
 
 The fourth subdivision provides for a trust to receive the 
 rents and profits of real property and to accumulate the 
 same for certain purposes, and has no application to the 
 husband trust. 
 
 If section 857 of the Civil Code be depended upon to 
 support the fifty thousand dollar clause, it would seem as 
 if that trust provision is void. 
 
 Following the clause providing for the husband is the di- 
 rection to the trustee "to distribute the remainder of said 
 trust property among the children of said Alice Warren 
 Skae," and it is maintained, on her behalf, that this is a 
 trust to convey real property and is, therefore, void under 
 the authorities, since the property would not vest in the 
 children on the death of the mother, and it would be neces- 
 sary, under this trust, for the trustee to convey the land to 
 them and such an act is inhibited by law. The only trusts 
 of real property are those stated in section 857 of the Civil 
 Code, which contains no alll^sion to trusts "to distribute."
 
 Estate of Skae. 411 
 
 If this provision is to be construed as a trust to convey, 
 it seems to be the settled law of this state that it is invalid, 
 and it is insisted on behalf of the daughter that the words 
 "to distribute," as used in the will, are the equivalent of 
 "to convey"; for, it is said, they certainly contemplate that 
 the trustee upon her death shall execute a conveyance of 
 the remainder of the trust property to each one of the chil- 
 dren then living and the issue of any deceased children; for 
 it was evidently contemplated that there might be a number 
 of persons who would be entitled to the trust property at 
 the death of the daughter and the testatrix directs the trus- 
 tee to distribute the property in proper proportions to each 
 one of such persons and it is not easy to conceive of any 
 method of carrying out this direction except by the execu- 
 tion of a conveyance. 
 
 Section 864 of the Civil Code provides that the author of 
 a trust may prescribe to whom the property shall belong on 
 the termination of the trust, but it is contended that there 
 is no such prescription when there is a plain direction to the 
 trustee as in this case. 
 
 It is admitted that the intent of the testatrix is evident, 
 but the courts of last resort have ruled that this intention 
 is immaterial unless the disposition be valid. If the trustee 
 could "distribute" by one mode only, and real estate must 
 pass by conveyance alone, and if we treat this trust in that 
 class, the disposition is void. It is asserted on authority 
 that the will containing no words of direct devise, which are 
 essential, a conveyance to the children from the trustee 
 would be indispensable to transfer title. 
 
 The trustee submits three reasons why the application of 
 the daughter should be denied and the will in its integrity 
 be sustained : 
 
 1. The court should strive to sustain rather than over- 
 throw the will; it should be industrious to carry out rather 
 than defeat the plain purposes of the testatrix, and to pre- 
 vent rather than create intestacy. 
 
 2. There is no trust to convey in this will. 
 
 3. The authority given to the trustee to sell the real es- 
 tate, coupled with the other provisions of the will showing 
 the intention of the testatrix that the property should be
 
 412 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 distributed as personal property rather than real estate, is 
 sufficient to create an equitable conversion. 
 
 In support of the third reason or proposition the trustee 
 relies upon the Estate of Pforr decided by our supreme 
 court, California Decisions, volume 28, No. 1509, page 105, 
 opinion written by Commissioner Harrison (144 Cal. 121, 
 77 Pac. 825), which it is claimed has become the law of the 
 state and is the latest expression of the court itself upon 
 the important questions therein discussed. In that case the 
 testator desired and directed the executors to take charge of 
 the property, to collect its rents and income, defray expenses, 
 renew mortgages, and execute new ones when necessary for 
 a term of two years from the date of his demise, and then 
 he desired them to have the property sold at public auction 
 or otherwise and to divide the net proceeds into six equal 
 parts and distribute the same among his heirs and devisees 
 as therein set forth. 
 
 The commissioner held that the provision for the sale of 
 the property and the distribution of its proceeds among the 
 six beneficiaries operated as an equitable conversion of the 
 real estate into personalty, under section 1338 of the Civil 
 Code, which provides that when a will directs the conversion 
 of real property into money, such property and all its pro- 
 ceeds must be deemed personal property from the time of 
 testator's death; and this result is not overcome by reason 
 of the testator having used the word "desire" instead of 
 ''direct" in authorizing the sale, for the w^ords "I desire" 
 that my real estate shall be sold are the equivalent of the 
 words "I will" that it be sold, as while the desire of a tes- 
 tator for the disposal of his estate is a mere request when 
 addressed to his devisee, it is to be construed as a command 
 when given to his executor. The commissioner further held 
 that whether such a conversion is effected depends upon the 
 intention of the testator as gathered from the entire provi- 
 sions of his will ; and, if it is apparent from its terms that 
 it was his will that the estate be sold and the proceeds given 
 to his beneficiaries an equitable conversion results, even if 
 the direction for the sale is not imperative, citing a New 
 York case. Dodge v. Pond, 23 N. Y. 69, in support of this
 
 Estate of Skae. 413 
 
 point, and adding, from a New Jersey opinion, that the ques- 
 tion of conversion is one of intention, the real question be- 
 ing. Did the testator intend his land should be converted into 
 money at all events before distribution! Wurts v. Page, 19 
 N. J. Eq. 375. The applicant admits that the words "at all 
 events" in this quotation state the law correctly, in the sense 
 that the direction, whether express or implied, must be man- 
 datory, but as to the part of his opinion given upon the au- 
 thority of Dodge V. Pond, counsel says that the language of 
 the learned commissioner is based on a syllabus not corre- 
 sponding to the text. As this case is considered of author- 
 itative importance, it may be worth while to compare the 
 syllabus, page 69, with the terms of the opinion on page 76 
 of the report. The syllabus is: "Where a testator author- 
 izes his executors to sell real estate, and it is apparent from 
 the general provisions of the will that he intended such es- 
 tate to be sold, the doctrine of equitable conversion ap- 
 plies, although the power of sale is not in terms imperative." 
 Judge Selden, in delivering the decision said: "It is, per- 
 haps, not very important, so far as the questions argued at 
 the hearing are concerned, to determine whether the power 
 of sale conferred upon the executors by the first clause of 
 the will is to be regarded as imperative, or merely discre- 
 tionary, or whether we treat the property as partly real and 
 partly personal, as at the death of the testator, or as all con- 
 verted into personalty. If, however, it is deemed to have 
 any bearing on the questions presented, there can be no 
 doubt, from the terms of the power and the general provi- 
 sions of the will, that the testator intended that the whole 
 real estate, except that portion devised to the widow, should 
 be sold and converted into mone^', prior to the general dis- 
 tribution provided for in the twentieth clause, and that, 
 upon the established principles of equitable conversion, this 
 should be considered as done." The first clause of the will 
 authorized and empowered the executors to sell and convert 
 into money all the testator's estate, real and personal (ex- 
 cept that given to his wife), either at public or private sale, 
 and upon sucli terms as they might think conducive to the 
 interests of his estate. Counsel for the daughter discredits
 
 414 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 this decision and asserts that it is not authority even in New 
 York, and is not followed there by any one of the leading 
 cases, to which his adversary answers that it has been fre- 
 quently approved in that and other states, and that none 
 of the cases cited in any way modify or overrule the doctrine 
 therein enunciated, and in that connection calls the atten- 
 tion of the court to Power v. Cassidy, 79 N. Y. 602, 35 Am. 
 JR-ep. 550, particularly pages 613 and 614 of the opinion of 
 Miller, J. It may be said, by the way, that the syllabus on 
 page 603 is in words almost identical with that in Dodge 
 V. Pond, supra. Judge Miller held that the court below was 
 clearly right in deciding that bj^ the terms of the will there 
 v/as an equitable conversion of all the testator's real estate 
 into personalty. The whole scope and tenor of the will 
 evinces that the testator intended such a conversion and that 
 the estate should be divided as personal estate. The doc- 
 trine of equitable conversion is quite familiar and the rule 
 on the subject well settled. It is obvious upon the face of 
 the will that the testator intended that such conversion should 
 be made. The executors are vested with full power and au- 
 thority to sell as they may deem proper, and after making 
 ample provisions for the wife of testator and directing the 
 payment of certain legacies, the residue is to be divided : one- 
 third to the widow, one-third to a nephew, and the "bal- 
 ance" among a class of institutions to be designated and in 
 proportions to be fixed as directed. The language could not 
 have been more emphatic, said Judge Miller, nor more di- 
 rect to carry out the design of a division of the remainder 
 as personal estate. The estate could only be effectually di- 
 vided, and the purposes of the will efficiently carried out, 
 by converting the real into personal property ; and the .judge 
 proceeds to point out what, in his judgment, would be the 
 impropriety and embarrassment and possible loss attendant 
 upon a contrary construction which would necessarily inter- 
 fere with the designs and purposes which the testator had 
 in mind when he made his will, and would, moreover, be ad- 
 verse to the general rule of interpretation which is applicable 
 in cases of this description. Judge Miller concluded his de- 
 cision on this head by remarking that the circumstance that
 
 Estate of Skae. 415 
 
 the direction to sell was not imperative, was by no means 
 conclusive, for the reasons already recited in the syllabus in 
 Dodge V. Pond, supra, which he cites and repeats in the ex- 
 act words found on page 69. It appears in this instance, 
 at least, that the syllabus does correspond to the text; but 
 counsel for the daughter says that the Pforr case does not 
 uphold the executor's contention that there is in the will of 
 Mrs. Skae an implied direction to convert sufficient to effect 
 a conversion of her real estate into personal property. In 
 Pforr 's estate the direction to the executor to sell was man- 
 datory and imperative ; nothing was left to the discretion 
 of the executor except the manner of sale ; the sale had to 
 be made in any event ; and this worked a conversion, accord- 
 ing to counsel, under the rule laid down in the leading Cali- 
 fornia cases, but has no bearing on a case where the equi- 
 table conversion is effected by implied direction. An ex- 
 amination of the record in the Estate of Pforr shows that no 
 point had been raised as to equitable conversion in either 
 trial or appellate court ; but the learned commissioner, never- 
 theless, held that the express and mandatory directions in 
 the will caused a conversion; that is to say, he imported a 
 new question into the controversy which was not referred 
 to by counsel in the argument nor considered by the court 
 below nor in any manner alluded to in the briefs or tran- 
 script on appeal. In that case, however, although the atten- 
 tion of the court was called in the petition for rehearing 
 to the fact that the doctrine of equitable conversion was not 
 relied upon or mentioned by the parties or their counsel, the 
 application was denied and thus the executor considers the 
 discussion of the value of the decision is at an end, and it 
 is binding on this court in this case. In the Pforr estate 
 the commissioner quoted from Pomeroy's Equity Jurispru- 
 dence, but inasmuch as an erroneous deduction is imputed 
 to him, it may be well to consider the text of the entire sec- 
 tion of which his quotation forms the last two sentences. 
 Professor Pomeroy says in section 1160, in treating of what 
 words are sufficient to effect a conversion, that the whole 
 scope and meaning of the fundamental principle underlying 
 the doctrine are involved in the existence of a duty resting
 
 416 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 upon the trustee to do the specified act; for unless the equi- 
 table ought exists, there is no reason for the operation of 
 the maxim, equity regards that as done which ought to be 
 done. The rule is therefore firmly settled, that in order to 
 work a conversion while the property is yet actually un- 
 changed in form, there must be a clear and imperative di- 
 rection in the will to convert the property — that is, to sell 
 the land for money, or to lay out the money in the purchase 
 of land. If the act of converting is left to the option, dis- 
 cretion, or choice of the trustee, then no equitable conver- 
 sion will take place, because no duty to make the change 
 rests upon him. It is not essential, however, that the di- 
 rection should be express, in order to be imperative; it may 
 be necessarily implied. Where a power to convert is given 
 without words of command, so that there is an appearance 
 of discretion, if the trusts or limitations are of a descrip- 
 tion exclusively applicable to one species of property, this 
 circumstance is sufficient to outweigh the appearance of an 
 option, and to render the whole imperative. Thus if a power 
 is given to lay out money in land, but the limitations ex- 
 pressed are applicable only to land, this will show an in- 
 tention that the money should be so laid out, and will amount 
 to an imperative direction to convert, for otherwise the terms 
 of the instrument could not be carried into effect. In fact, 
 the whole result depends upon the intention. If by express 
 language, or by a reasonable construction of all its terms, 
 the instrument shows an intention that the original form of 
 the property shall be changed, then a conversion takes place. 
 In the New Jersey case, Wurts v. Page, from which Com- 
 missioner Harrison made a short quotation in the Pforr es- 
 tate, the chancellor said that the doctrine of equitable or 
 notional conversion is well established, the difficulty being 
 in its application. Wherever a testator has positively di- 
 rected his real estate to be sold and distributed as money, 
 it will be considered for the purposes of succession as per- 
 sonal; but in that case there was no such direction. The 
 direction to sell simply authorized and empowered his execu- 
 tors to sell any part of his real estate in case they should 
 at any time deem it advisable. The court held that this was
 
 Estate of Skae. 417 
 
 not a direction to convert, but, on the contrary, a seeming 
 direction to let it remain as real estate, until it became ad- 
 visable from time to time to sell it; and the chancellor said 
 if this were the only part of the will to guide him, the real 
 property could not be considered as converted until actually 
 sold ; but the question of conversion is one of intention ; the 
 real point is, Did the testator intend his lands to be con- 
 verted into money at all events before the distribution ? In 
 the Wurts case, it seemed to the chancellor that the direc- 
 tions in other parts of the will show clearly that he did so 
 intend. The spirit of the whole directions showed that con- 
 version was intended. All the directions showed that the 
 testator intended that his estate should be converted into 
 money before it was distributed by his trustees, and they 
 would be required to convert it into money before distribu- 
 tion and to pay it over in that form ; and the rule is well 
 settled that if the will requires the real estate to be converted 
 into money at all events, notwithstanding the executors may 
 have a discretion as to the time, it must be considered as 
 'Converted into money from the death of the testator. One 
 of the directions was that the portions of his sons and his 
 grandson were to be paid to them upon their arriving re- 
 spectively at the age of twenty-two years. 
 
 In connection with these authorities, it is argued by the n 
 respondent in the case at bar that the duty to convert re- 
 sults from the duty of the trustee to carry out the provisions 
 of the will; and it is claimed that the decisions abundantly 
 establish the doctrine that where there is an authority to 
 sell and the language of the entire instrument shows that 
 it was the intention of the testatrix that the bequests should 
 be paid in personal property rather than in real estate, the 
 duty results to convert real estate into personal property. 
 The words used by her indicate the purpose of testatrix to 
 have the entire property distributed as personal rather than 
 transferred as real estate. The testatrix throughout uses 
 the words "pay" and "paid," the idea of which necessarily 
 involves liquidation in money or personal equivalent. She 
 provides that the trustee shall "pay" out of the principal of 
 said trust fund $50,000 to the surviving husband and "dis- 
 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. I — 27
 
 418 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 tribute the remainder of said trust property among the chil- 
 dren," if any, of her daughter. In case her daughter die 
 leaving no issue, the trustee shall "pay" out of the trust 
 property which would have gone to such issue certain "gifts," 
 and after all these gifts shall be fully "paid" the trustee is 
 directed to "divide" the residue. If it had been the inten- 
 tion of the testatrix that the property should go in kind to 
 the children, the apt words would have been "transfer and 
 convey, ' ' and it would have been the plain duty of the drafts- 
 man of the document to have used such phrase, if that had 
 been the idea communicated to him as the direction of de- 
 cedent. If this contention be correct, there is no trust to 
 convey in the will of Alice Skae. In this view of the case, 
 it does not seem possible to carry out all the terms of the 
 testament without a sale of at least a portion of the real 
 estate; but, the trustee contends that even if it were possible 
 to do so in a certain contingency, such possibility should not 
 be seized upon as a reason for overthrowing the manifest 
 intention of the testatrix as collected from the entire instru- 
 ment. The scheme of the will evinces a far-reaching purpose 
 to provide for every contingency that might possibly arise. 
 After the provision for the daughter during her lifetime, 
 she establishes a fund the result of an investment of the pro- 
 ceeds of sale of the w^hole or any part of her estate, which 
 she authorized and empowered them to make, and out of those 
 proceeds are to be "paid," "distributed," and "divided," 
 in the contingencies mentioned, her various bounties and bene- 
 factions. This comes close to the Wurts case cited in the 
 Pforr estate, wherein the chancellor remarked upon the 
 direction to invest as iinplying a sale of the real estate. 
 
 Counsel for the daughter disputes the authority of the 
 Pforr estate, declaring that its dicta are at variance with 
 the decisions of our supreme court in important cases, which 
 announced the fundamental principles of the law after 
 thorough consideration and deliberation, the first cited being 
 Janes v. Throckmorton, 57 Cal. 368, decided in 1881, a case 
 of magnitude as to the interests and principles involved, in 
 which, it is claimed, the rule is established that in order to 
 work a conversion it must be obligatory on the trustee to-
 
 Estate of Skae. . 419 
 
 sell the land in any event, and it was held there was no 
 conversion because the deed was not imperative that the land 
 be sold. The case involved the construction of a covenant 
 in the nature of a declaration of trust. The statement of the 
 question made by counsel for the trustee herein seems to be 
 substantially correct. The covenant provided that Throck- 
 morton should sell so much of the real estate as he might 
 deem necessary to pay off certain debts and encumbrances, 
 and that he should account and pay over to two persons 
 named the one-fifth part of the moneys reniaining after pay- 
 ing the indebtedness and expenses ; that the said Throckmor- 
 ton should sell all of the lands within three years of the 
 date, or at his option convey the undivided one-fifth part 
 of all lands remaining unsold, after the discharge of the 
 debts and expenses, to those persons, and the question before 
 the court was as to the character of their interest under this 
 covenant. It was held to be an interest in the lands. The 
 action was brought to enforce an alleged trust in favor of 
 plaintiff against defendant in the one-fifth part of all money 
 proceeds of sales of the lands and an undivided one-fifth 
 part of all the lands remaining unsold. Among other de- 
 fenses, one was that the covenant was a personal one purely, 
 providing for no interest in real estate, and that no trust 
 respecting the lands thereby arose. In discussing this de- 
 fense, the court reviewed cases upon equitable conversion, 
 among them Dodge v. Pond, but expressed no dissent from 
 the conclusion of that decision ; and, indeed, it had no need 
 to consider that phase of the doctrine, which is to the effect 
 that where the power to sell is discretionary, but it appears 
 from a consideration of all the terms of the instrument that 
 it was the intention of the donor that the property should be 
 sold before distribution an equitable conversion would result. 
 The court repeated the rule from 2 Story's Equity Juris- 
 prudence, section 1214. tlint the inclination of courts of equity 
 upon this branch of jurisprudence is not generally to change 
 the quality of the property, unless there is some el(>;ir iiit(Mi- 
 tion or act by which a definite character, either as inoney 
 or as land, has been unequivocally fixed upon it tliroughout ; 
 and, if this intention do not clearly appear, tlie property
 
 420 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 retains its original character. As counsel for the daughter, 
 remarks, this is an authority of the greatest weight and is 
 either alluded to or quoted in nearly every American decision 
 on its subject. In the case in 57 California, the court said 
 that the most that could be claimed was, that Throckmorton 
 had the discretion to sell all of the land; but so far from 
 its being obligatory upon him to do so, it was manifestly 
 contemplated that a portion of it might be saved from sale. 
 The Estate of Walkerly, 108 Cal. 627, 49 Am. St. Rep. 97, 
 41 Pac. 772, decided in 1895, by the full court, is claimed 
 to be a similar case in which the question here discussed was 
 fully argued and considered and the law laid down with 
 precision, in these terms : ' ' The rule of equitable conversion 
 merely amounts to this, that where there is a mandate to sell 
 at a future time, equity, upon the principle of regarding that 
 done which ought to be done, will for certain purposes and 
 in aid of justice consider the conversion as effected at the 
 time when the sale ought to take place, whether the land be 
 then really sold or not; but whenever the direction is for a 
 future sale, up to the time fixed it is governed by the law of 
 real estate." This extract is quoted with approval in Bank 
 of Ukiah v. Rice, 143 Cal. 270, 101 Am. St. Rep. 118, 76 Pac. 
 1020, which says that it clearly expresses the doctrine that 
 there can be no conversion until the executor shall have 
 the power to make the sale. The opinion in the Bank of 
 Ukiah V. Rice was written by Commissioner Harrison, May, 
 1904, and confirmed by department 2 of the supreme court, 
 and counsel for the daughter insists that it firmly establishes 
 the law on this point in this state. In the Ukiah case the com- 
 missioner said that if the will postpones the time of sale 
 until the happening of some future event or until some fixed 
 date, the conversion is likewise postponed. In the case at 
 bar, it is claimed by the daughter that there is not only no 
 mandate to sell, but the beneficiaries could, at any time before 
 an actual sale, elect to take the land, instead of its proceeds, 
 and thus extinguish the authority of the trustee to make 
 a sale. This proposition is advanced on the authority of 
 the Bank of Ukiah v. Rice, page 271, of 143 Cal, but is 
 answered by the suggestion that it is difficult to conceive
 
 Estate of Skae. 421 
 
 that the beneficiaries in this case would exercise an elec- 
 tion to take the land instead of its proceeds when such 
 an act would defeat their right to take at all, even if it were 
 true that the property could be distributed in kind by the 
 trustee without violating any of the testamentary provisions. 
 In the Estate of Walkerly it seemed to be claimed that the 
 equitable conversion took place at the death of the testator. 
 The will contained an imperative direction to the trustees 
 to sell and convey all the trust estate at the expiration of 
 twentv-five years from the date of the death of the testator. 
 The court held that this clause unlawfully suspended the 
 power of alienation, and was therefore void, remarking that 
 the doctrine of equitable conversion could not be invoked 
 to aid that trust. The counsel in that case had urged that 
 under that doctrine the land should be treated as sold and 
 converted into personal property, and that such a trust in 
 personal property would be valid, and that, therefore, the 
 Walkerly trust must be upheld; but the court observed that 
 would not only be a surprising application of the doc- 
 trine, but would be a novel and startling method of evading 
 the law against perpetuities by invoking an equitable fiction ; 
 and then the court proceeded to explain the rule in the 
 language already quoted, ending with the sentence : ' ' But 
 whenever the direction is for a future sale, up to the time 
 fixed the land is governed by the law of real estate. ' ' In the 
 matter of the will of Alice Skae, there is no fixed period 
 during which the property must be retained as real estate. 
 Tt is claimed by the trustees that this is the precise condition 
 which calls for the application of the doctrine as defined in 
 the Walkerly case, in which, it may be repeated, it was held 
 that where the will provided that the property should not 
 be converted for a determinate period an equitable convei'sion 
 could not be raised prior to the point of time prescribed; 
 and, it is argued, that in the numerous cases of the con- 
 struction of wills in which the doctrine of equitable conver- 
 sion has been applied there was no positive direction for a 
 sale and there was no particular time within which a sale 
 was required to be made, but the courts have held that all 
 that is necessary is to put the doctrine into operation is an
 
 422 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 intention implied from the whole instrument that the sale 
 should be made at some time before the ultimate distribution, 
 and, if such an intention appears, the conversion will be 
 deemed to have been made at the death of the testator. Pom- 
 eroy says, concerning the time from which conversion takes 
 effect, that this, like all other questions of intention, must 
 ultimately depend upon the provisions of the particular 
 instrument. The instrument might in express terms contain 
 an absolute direction to sell or to purchase at some specified 
 future time; and if it created a trust to sell upon the hap- 
 pening of a specified event, which might or mighlrnot happen, 
 then the conversion would only take place from the time of 
 the happening of that event, but would occur when the event 
 happened as though there had been an absolute direction to 
 sell at that time. Subject to this general modification, the 
 rule is settled that a conversion takes place in wills as from 
 the death of the testator. The same commissioner who wrote 
 the opinion in the Bank of Ukiah case in May, 1903, exactly 
 two months later delivered the decision in the Pforr estate, 
 July, 1904. The later expression of his views is hardly to be 
 presumed inconsistent with the earlier, and both may be 
 reconciled with the matter of Walkerly, so far as they are 
 made applicable to the case at bar. The fact is, however, that 
 after all our examination of cases and authorities, we receive 
 but little assistance in reaching a conclusion in the matter in 
 hand, except (as has been said repeatedly by courts) for 
 the establishment of general principles in the construction 
 of wills ; for it seldom or never happens that two cases can 
 be found precisely alike: Le Breton v. Cook. 107 Cal. 416, 
 40 Pac. 552, quoting Washington, J., in Lambert's Lessee 
 V. Paine, 3 Cranch, 131, 2 L. Ed. 389, decided in 1803. As it 
 was one hundred years ago, so it is to-day. Each case must 
 be considered as a whole with reference to the object of the 
 testator. The general principles are evident enough; the 
 difficulty is, as remarked by our supreme court, in their 
 application to a given case. The end of the inquiry of the 
 court is the discovery of the intent of the testator, and its 
 investigation must be limited to the language of the testa- 
 ment. When that end is attained, the duty of the court is
 
 Estate of SkxVe. 423 
 
 to execute that intent. It may be that the result of the 
 judicial inquiry may be contrary to the real design of the 
 decedent, but the intention to be sought after is not that 
 merely which existed in the mind, but that which took form 
 in the written words of the testator ; and if those words admit 
 of no other construction than one which clearly shows that 
 she attempted to dispose of her property in a manner for- 
 bidden by statute, the intention of the testatrix should be 
 interpreted in defeasance of her purpose. This may seem 
 a harsh result, as was said in the Walkerly case, to interpret 
 an instrument contrary to the will of the testator; but if 
 the intent be expressed in terms at variance with the law, 
 the trust must fail; for, even though it be true that such 
 was not the testator's intent, he must do more than merely 
 evince an intention in a certain direction, he must make a 
 valid disposition of his property. It is always with reluctance 
 that courts declare a will or a provision thereof void, and in 
 all cases they endeavor to carry out the intentions of a 
 deceased person, as expressed in the will, if it can be done 
 without disregarding the law and the statutes of the state; 
 and they would violate their duty and the trust reposed in 
 them if they should disregard the law enacted by the legis- 
 lature and its mandates to carry into effect a will in violation 
 thereof: Estate Dixon, opinion by Commissioner Cooper, de- 
 partment two, supreme court, June 10, 1904, 143 Cal. 511, 
 77 Pac. 412. 
 
 Is this court, in considering and construing the will of 
 Alice Skae, deceased, placed in the predicament described in 
 which, it is confessed, the natural and true intention of the 
 testatrix was made to yield to legal interpretation of her 
 language ; for it is admitted here that tlie intent of the 
 testatrix is evident, but that such intent is to be nullified 
 by judicial construction of her words. At the risk of repeti- 
 tion there may be introduced here from Beach on Modern 
 Equity Jurisprudence, what counsel for the daughter in the 
 case at bar says is a statement of the doctrine under dis- 
 cussion which declares the rule in the most clear and con- 
 cise terms. p]quitable conversion, remarks Beach, may take 
 place by implication as well as by express words. When-
 
 424 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 ever the general scheme of the will requires a conversion, 
 the power of sale, although not in terms imperative, oper- 
 ates as a conversion. The necessity of a conversion to ac- 
 complish the purposes expressed in a will is equivalent to 
 an imperative direction to convert. But the provisions of 
 the will must, at least, be of suoh a character as to leave no 
 doubt of the testator's intent that there should be a con- 
 version. In a late case in New York (1892) it was said that 
 to justify a conversion there must be a positive direction 
 to convert, which though not expressed may be implied, but, 
 in the latter case, only when the design and purpose of the 
 testator is unequivocal and the implication so plain as to 
 leave no substantial doubt : Clift v. Moses, 116 N. Y. 157, 22 
 N. E. 393. Where only a power of sale is given, without 
 explicit and imperative directions for its exercise, and the 
 intention of the testator can be carried out without a con- 
 version, none will be ad,iudged; and where there are no ex- 
 press directions for a conversion none will result because it 
 would be convenient as an aid to the distribution of the 
 estate; it must be necessary and essential. In support of 
 this text is cited, among many other cases, Power v. Cassidy, 
 heretofore considered in this opinion. 
 
 As recognizing and tending to illustrate the doctrine and 
 its application contended for by the trustee herein, he calls 
 particularly the attention of the court to the decision in 
 King V. King, 13 R. I. 510, in which it was said that the 
 equitable conversion of a testator's realty into personalty 
 depends, as to both extent and existence, upon his intention 
 judicially determined from his will. In that case it was 
 not contended that the clause under construction contained 
 any direction expressly given that the real estate should be 
 converted at all events. The language was permissive, not 
 mandatory; it conferred an authority, but did not, at least 
 in express terms, issue a command ; indeed, the authority was 
 not unqualifiedly given. The trustees were empowered to sell 
 and convey and change investments, not arbitrarily or ab- 
 solutely, but "as they may deem to be for the interest of 
 the said trust," "or to the advantage of the said trust," or 
 "when the sale of any of said estate may be necessary for 
 the payment of any legacy hereunder." The court said
 
 ' Estate of SkxVe. 425 
 
 that this was not such language as would naturally have 
 been used if an out and out conversion had been intended, 
 but it thought, however, that the specific legacies were in- 
 tended to be paid in money, and that, therefore, for lack of 
 personal estate to pay them, there would have been neces- 
 sarily implied a direction, operating pro tanto as a conver- 
 sion, to sell enough of the real estate to pay them; but there 
 was in the same clause a significant provision, which in it- 
 self was consistent with conversion at all events, that the 
 legatees might take the real estate in payment at a valuation 
 in lieu of money, and in addition there was no lack of per- 
 sonalty. 
 
 In the case at bar there is next to no personal property, 
 and there is no provision contemplating an election of land 
 in lieu of money in the instrument^ The dominant idea of 
 the testatrix seems to have been to bestow her benefactions 
 in money, and the terms employed by her leave no room for 
 doubt of her intention. Now, is that intention to be defeated 
 by imputing to her words a meaning foreign to her manifest 
 and persistent purpose? Can this court, without distorting 
 her diction, destroy her will and produce intestacy where it 
 is clear she intended to dispose of every particle of her 
 property in pursuance of an intelligent design in a well 
 wrought out scheme? Is not the exercise of the power of 
 sale rendered necessary and essential by the scope of the 
 will and its declared purposes; and is there not here an 
 implied direction to convert, by reason of the unequivocal 
 manner in which the designs and purposes of the testatrix 
 are expressed, making the implication so strong as to leave 
 no substantial doubt? Is not the direction necessarily im- 
 plied? In order to answer accurately these questions, we 
 must consider carefully the whole scheme of the will and 
 weigh the words of the testatrix with the facts and cir- 
 cumstances of the case. At the time of her death she had, 
 in round numbers, about $30,000 in cash, no other person- 
 alty of consequence; one parcel of real estate, 120x206.3. 
 part of Western Addition block, on Larkin street, fronting 
 from Fulton street to Birch avenue, valued at $150,000, 
 with improvements thereon appraised at $50,000.
 
 / 
 
 .426 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 The personalty would have been virtually consumed by 
 the first bequest, if it had not been changed by the codicil; 
 but, notwithstanding the revocation, it exhibited the inten- 
 tion of the testatrix at the time she executed the will. It 
 provided for the discharge of debts and funeral expenses, 
 and as part of the latter directed the demolition of the 
 burial vault wherein lay the remains of her husband and 
 two deceased children and the erection of a new vault at a 
 cost of from twenty to twenty-five thousand dollars. After 
 this the testatrix had practically only real property to deal 
 with, so far as the actual present species was concerned; but 
 she used the technical expressions appropriate to carry both 
 real and personal, "give, devise and bequeath," thus imply- 
 ing her knowledge of the legal force and effect of the differ- 
 ent testamentary words and the import of the distinct ideas 
 so represented. She then authorized and empowered the 
 trustee to sell the real estate, and then follows the clause 
 which furnishes the bone of contention in this case. Giv- 
 ing all due weight to the argument of counsel for the daugh- 
 ter, this court cannot accept his conclusion without, in its 
 judgment, doing violence to the intention of the testatrix. 
 Taking the words in their logical and actual relation, they 
 indicate a connection in her mind between the idea of a 
 sale and the distribution of the proceeds thereof. The en- 
 tire context admits of no other interpretation. The sale 
 produces the fund and the funds to be distributed in dollars, 
 cash payments. Testatrix then provides, for the event of 
 the death of the daughter without issue, all hioney bequests, 
 "gifts" to be paid, in cash, so many dollars to each donee. 
 Without a sale of real estate, these legacies could not be 
 paid; conversion is necessary to their satisfaction. Finally, 
 testatrix directs that after all of these gifts shall be fully 
 paid, the trustee shall divide all the residue which shall then 
 remain of said trust property (including all gifts that may 
 lapse, and the sum given in trust for ]\Iary Skae, after the 
 termination of said trust), unto and among six persons, 
 Qames and addresses given. A partition of the property 
 can hardly be ascribed to testatrix under this item. The re- 
 marks of the New York court of appeals in Power v. Cas- 
 sidy, supra, page 614, are here somewhat in point. The
 
 Estate op Skae. 427 
 
 evidence in the ease at bar shows that a partition of the 
 real estate into six pieces, with the structures thereon as 
 they were at her death and are now would be impracticable, 
 and, even if there were no improvements, such a course 
 might seriously diminish the value of the property, and 
 lessen the avails to be distributed. The words used in this 
 clause, moreover, apply to gpal rather than to personal prop- 
 erty; no one word being exclusively pertinent to realty, some 
 never so applied, and all pointing to a disposition of per- 
 sonalty. 
 
 Taking the instrument in its entire form and substance, 
 letter and spirit, construing and interpreting its language 
 in the light of reason and authority, this court is of opinion 
 that the whole scope and tenor of the will imports an equi- 
 table conversion; and, thus the application for partial dis- 
 tribution must be and is denied. 
 
 Eciuitable Conversion is that change in property by which, for cer- 
 tain purposes, real estate is considered as personal, and personal as 
 real: Haward v. Peavey, 128 111. 430, 15 Am. St. Eep. 120, 21 N. E. 
 503, note in 5 Am. St. Eep. 141. Whether such a result is worked 
 by a will depends upon the intention of the testator. If it is ap- 
 parent from the express terms of the instrument, or by necessary 
 implication, that he intended his real estate to be sold and the pro- 
 ceeds given his beneficiaries, an equitable conversion results, al- 
 though perhaps the direction to sell is not imperative, as where 
 the word "desire" instead of "direct" is addressed to the exec- 
 utors: Estate of Pforr, 144 Cal. 121, 77 Pac. 825. "Where the will 
 directs the sale of real estate expressly, or by clear implication, or 
 where a sale is absolutely necessary to the execution of the provisions 
 of the will, such real estate is equitably converted into personalty 
 from the time of the testator's death": Penfield v. Tower, 1 N. D. 
 216, 46 N. W. 413. But see Estate of Lahiflf, 86 Cal. 153, 24 Pac. 850. 
 

 
 428 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 Estate of JOHN FAY, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 26,323; decided March 12, 1902.] 
 
 An Olographic Will Which by Mistake Bears a Date at least twenty- 
 eight years prior to the time of its execution should be denied 
 probate. [See note at end of opinion.^ 
 
 Louis S. Beecly, for the proponents. 
 
 Bart Burke and Chas. J. Pence, for the contestants. 
 
 COFFEY, J. This is a proceeding for the probate of a 
 certain instrument alleged in the petition to be the last will 
 and testament of John Fay, deceased. 
 
 The proposed will is olographic in form, was entirely 
 written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator him- 
 self. It bears date "May twenty-fifth eighteen hundred and 
 fifty-nine. ' ' 
 
 This alleged will makes certain bequests and devises to 
 the surviving wife and children of the deceased, naming 
 them, and, among others, to a daughter, Mary Montealegre. 
 
 It appears that at the date of said will the said testator 
 was unmarried and none of his said children was yet born; 
 that Mary Montealegre, his daughter, was married on the 
 thirty-first day of January, 1887, to Charles F. Montealegre, 
 from whom she was divorced on the twenty-ninth day of 
 July 1890, and by the provisions of the decree of divorce 
 she was authorized to resume her maiden name of Mary 
 Fay. She died March 29, 1900, nearly two years prior to 
 the death of the testator, leaving her surviving no child or 
 children or lineal descendants. Luke Fay, the oldest son of 
 said deceased, was born February 28, 1861, nearly two years 
 subsequent to the date of said will. 
 
 It is apparent, therefore, that the will in question could 
 not have been executed earlier than January 31, 1887, the 
 date of the marriage of his daughter as aforesaid, and prob- 
 ably not later than the decree of divorce rendered July 29, 
 1890, when she resumed her maiden name, as it is not likely 
 that after such date the deceased would have named her in 
 his will as "Mary Montealegre."
 
 Estate of Fay, 429 
 
 The question to be determined is, Was this instrument 
 duly executed as an olographic will? 
 
 This will bears a date at least twenty-eight years prior to 
 its execution. Does this comply with section 1277 of the 
 Civil Code? That section is as follows: "An olographic will 
 is one that is entirely written, dated, and signed by the 
 hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, 
 and may be made in or out of this state, and need not be 
 witnessed. ' ' 
 
 That a date is one of the requisites of an olographic will, 
 and that such date must be written by the testator himself 
 is the settled law of this state. 
 
 In Estate of Martin, 58 Cal. 530, there was no date to 
 the will, which was olographic, and it was held invalid, al- 
 though it contained a declaration that the testator was "of 
 the age of sixty years." 
 
 In Estate of Rand, 61 Cal. 468, 44 Am. Rep. 555 and in 
 Estate of Billings, 64 Cal. 427, 1 Pac. 701, it was held that 
 an olographic will in which the date was partly written and 
 partly printed was invalid. 
 
 In Estate of Behrens, 130 Cal. 416, 62 Pac. 603, it was 
 conceded that the olographic will in question in that case, 
 bearing date in the writing of the testator of "Febr. 12, 
 '98," was sufficiently dated under the code. 
 
 In Estate of Lakemeyer, 135 Cal. 28, 87 Am. St. Rep. 96, 
 66 Pac. 961, it was held that the words and figures, "New 
 York, Nov. 22, '97," used in an olographic will, constitute a 
 date, and that the will was sufficiently dated. 
 
 In no case reported in this state or elsewhere have I been 
 able to find the question involved in the case at bar decided. 
 Its solution, however, does not seem to me to be difficult. It 
 was evidently the intention of the legislature that an olo- 
 graphic will should not only be dated, but that it should 
 state the true date of the execution thereof. In Estate of 
 Martin. 58 Cal. 530, the court say: 
 
 "It is claimed that the dating of a will is a mere formal 
 matter, not absolutely necessary. We do not think so. 
 The legislature has seen fit to require three things to con- 
 cur, for the execution of an olographic will, viz.: That it be 
 written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator. We
 
 430 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 are not at liberty to hold that the legislature intended any 
 one of these requirements to be of any greater or less im- 
 portance than the others. If we may omit one, why not 
 either of the others? 
 
 "The paper is not aided by the declaration contained in 
 it, of the age of sixty years. It does not appear in the 
 paper when he was of the age of sixty years. It may have 
 been one day before his decease; it may have been ten 
 years." 
 
 The language of the court above implies that the will 
 must not only be dated, but must bear the date of its execu- 
 tion; and this in reason ought to be so. The word "date" 
 is defined in the Universal Dictionary as follows: "1. The 
 formula appended to a letter, deed, etc., to denote the year, 
 month, and day when such letter or deed was signed or 
 executed." Webster defines the word "date" thus: "That 
 addition to a writing which specifies the year, month and 
 day when it was given or exercised." 
 
 There are several reasons why the correct date should be 
 stated in olographic wills. Some of them are noted in the 
 case of Succession of Robertson, 49 La. Ann. 868, 62 Am. 
 St. Rep. 672, 21 South. 586, as follows: 
 
 "The law enjoins the date on two grounds: The first, the 
 most essential, is in order that the precise date the testator 
 made a disposition of his property may be known, rendering 
 it possible to determine whether the testator had the capacity 
 of giving at the date the testament was made. The second 
 ground is secondary. If there are two testaments, it should 
 be manifest which is the last, in case of opposing or incom- 
 patible dispositions. ' ' 
 
 In that case the date was partly written and partly 
 printed, and the proposed will therein was held invalid by 
 the court. 
 
 In Hefii'ner v. Hefi:ner, 48 La. Ann. 1088, 20 South. 281. 
 other reasons were noted. The will in that case closed as fol- 
 lows: "Written, dated and signed in my own handwriting. 
 
 on this day of June, 1893. William Heffner." The 
 
 court in that case used .the following language : 
 
 "When the code comes to prescribe the olographic testa- 
 ment, the notary, the witnesses and all forms of authentica-
 
 Estate of Fay. 431 
 
 tion are dispensed with, and the requirement is that such 
 a will to have the validity must be wholly written, dated, 
 and signed by the hand of the testator. The policy of the 
 law to secure the true representation of the testator's wishes 
 and guard against fraudulent wills is marked in the requisite 
 of the testator's handwriting, including the expression of 
 the date when he writes the paper and affixes the signature 
 it bears. The date in the testator's handwriting is part of 
 the evidence the law requires of the verity of the instrument. 
 If the paper is forged, the date it must bear may furnish 
 the means of detection, on any issue of the sanity the dates 
 indicate and restrict the period of inquiry." 
 
 If the instrument in the case at bar were admitted to 
 probate as the last will of deceased, and within the time 
 allowed by law, a contest should be inaugurated in which 
 the mental capacity of the testator to make the same were 
 challenged, at what point in time would the court direct or 
 restrict the evidence to the point in issue'? The sanity of the 
 testator must appear at the time of the execution of the 
 will: In re Wilson, 117 Cal. 269, 49 Pac. 172, 711. 
 
 But no person living knows, so far as the court is in- 
 formed, when this will was executed. It was probably writ- 
 ten between January 31, 1887, the date of the marriage of 
 the daughter of the testator and July 29, 1890, the date 
 of her divorce, but it may have been executed at any time 
 after the former date and prior to the testator's death, which 
 occurred January 28, 1902. Thus the court in the event 
 of a contest would have to indulge in probabilities in fixing 
 an event that might have occurred at any time within the 
 period of fifteen years, or thereabouts. 
 
 In Ileft'ner v. Heffner 48 La. Ann. 1088, 20 South. 281, 
 the will must have been written within the month of June, 
 1893, yet the court declared it was not dated. 
 
 Again, there may have been another will, olographic or 
 otherwise, of this testator. Suppose one were found bearing 
 the subsequent date, yet executed prior to January 31. 1887. 
 This would in fact be a prior will, but should such a will 
 be admitted and produced, would it affect this will if ad- 
 mitted to probate bearing date as it does, "May twenty-fifth 
 eighteen hundred and fifty-nine"?
 
 432 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 There are many reasons, it may be urged, why the true 
 date of an olographic will should be stated; none whatever 
 for a wrong date. Suppose the date of this instrument 
 were A. D. 1000; this would be a technical compliance with 
 the law, but would it meet the legislative intent incorporated 
 in section 1277 of the code? Manifestly not. It would in 
 effect be no date at all. And so in the case at bar, where 
 almost thirty years must have intervened from the date of 
 the instrument and the actual time of its execution : Fuentes 
 et al. V. Gaines, 25 La. Ann. 85, 107. 
 
 In the case last cited it was sought to establish a lost olo- 
 graphic will. Referring to the testimony of the witnesses 
 the court said: "In this ease two witnesses. Harper and 
 Bellechasse, state that the will was wholly written, dated 
 and signed by Clark. Bellechasse states it was dated in 
 1813. Harper says it was dated in July, 1813. Is this suffi- 
 cient? Is a statement, which is dated A. D. 1813, or July, 
 A. D. 1813, to be deemed dated in the sense of the law? 
 Certainly not, if the term "dated" is to be understood in 
 its common and usual signification. 
 
 The reason why a wrong date to an olographic will ren- 
 ders the same invalid might be further illustrated and 
 amplified, but it is unnecessary. If the motives and rea- 
 sons given the cases cited are valid, and consonant with the 
 legislative intent in enacting section 1277 of the Civil Code, 
 then the instrument in the case at bar is certainly invalid, 
 and the same should be rejected and probate thereof refused. 
 
 For the reasons and upon the authorities hereinabove re- 
 cited and set forth the paper propounded is denied probate. 
 
 The Principal Case was reversed by the supreme court in 145 Cal. 
 82, 104 Am. St. Rep. 17, 78 Pae. 340. It is doubtful, however, 
 whether the action of the supreme court in this case is consistent, 
 either with its prior or subsequent decisions, on the law of olographic 
 wills: See Estate of Martin, 58 Cal. 530; Estate of Billings, 64 Cal. 
 427, 1 Pac. 701; Estate of Plumel, 151 Cal. 77, 121 Am. St. Rep. 100, 
 90 Pac. 192. 
 
 OLOGRAPHIC WILLS. 
 
 An Olographic Will is One Written Entirely by the hand of the 
 testator: Bouvier's Law Dictionary, title "Holograph"; Rapalje & 
 Lawrence's Law Dictionary, title "Holograph"; Neer v. Cowhick, 4 
 Wyo. 49, 31 Pac. 862, 18 L. R. A. 588; note to Lagrave v. Merle, 52
 
 Estate op Fay. 433 
 
 Am. Dec. 591. Where, however, there is a codicil, the will and the 
 codicil may be considered separately, and one be olographic and 
 the other not. Hence to a will not in the handwriting of the tes- 
 tator, but duly witnessed and attested, there may be a codicil wholly 
 in his handwriting, and therefore, though not witnessed, entitled to 
 admission to probate as an olographic will: In re Soher, 78 Cal. 477, 
 21 Pac. 8. 
 
 A Paper is not Necessarily Entitled to Probate because it is testa- 
 mentary in scope and wholly written by the testator and attested 
 by his signature, for the whole subject of wills is under statutory 
 control, and every paper presented as a will, whether olographic or 
 not, must conform to the requisites of the statute. At the com- 
 mon law and by the earliest statutes upon the subject of wills wit- 
 nesses thereto were not required, and an olographic will must have 
 been good, though not witnessed, because it would have been equally 
 good though not olographic, provided it had been executed by the 
 testator. The necessity for witnesses resulted from the statute of 
 29 Charles II, chapter 3, relating to frauds and perjuries. It is be- 
 lieved that in each of the states of this Union statutes have been 
 enacted without compliance with which no will is entitled to admis- 
 sion to probate or to otherwise be given effect as a will. Such being 
 the case, the requisites of olographic wills must be found in those 
 statutes, and where they prescribe any general rule respecting the 
 execution and attestation of wills, such rule is equally applicable to 
 olographic wills, and the fact that a will is wholly in the hand- 
 writing of the testator does not exempt it from the rule. Thus if 
 a statute declares that all wills to be valid must be in writing, 
 witnessed by two competent witnesses, and signed by the testator 
 or by some person in his presence and by his direction, and that an 
 olographic will may be proved in the same manner that other pri- 
 vate writings are proved, wills of the latter class are still subject 
 to the provision requiring witnesses: Neer v. Cowhick, 4 Wyo. 49, 
 31 Pac. 862, 18 L. E. A. 588. So a statute may impose limitations 
 upon olographic which do not apply to other wills, or may provide 
 that persons competent to make the latter are not competent to make 
 the former. Thus, if a statute declares that a married woman may 
 dispose of her separate estate by will without the consent of her 
 husband, and may alter or revoke the will as if she were single, and 
 that her will must be attested, witnessed and proved in like manner 
 as are other wills, she cannot make an olographic will, though the 
 same statute recognizes the general right to make such wills: Scott 
 V. Harkness, 6 Idaho, 736, 59 Pac. 556. 
 
 Provided It Conforms to the Statutory Requisites in Other Re- 
 spects, any writing or combination of writings (Estate of Skerrctt, 67 
 Cal. 585, 8 Pac. 181) may constitute an olographic will, if it ex- 
 presses, however informally, a testamentary purpose in language suffi- 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. 1—28
 
 434 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 ciently clear to be understood. Sums bequeathed may be stated in 
 figures as well as in words: Succession of Vanhille, 49 La. Ann. 107, 
 62 Am. St. Eep. 642, 21 South. 191. "To the validity of a will 
 the law does not require it should assume any particular form, or 
 that any technically appropriate language should be used therein, 
 if the intention of the maker is disclosed and the distribution of 
 his property at his death is designated." Hence a paper which com- 
 mences with a synopsis of some of the principal events of the writ- 
 er's life and a statement of property acquired by him, and that 
 Charlie Webster has helped him to improve it, and concluding, "I 
 have requested my executors to give a clear deed for the property 
 after my death to Maggie, his wife, and Charlie, " is entitled to ad- 
 mission to probate as the will of the writer. The fact that he la- 
 bored under a mistaken impression that it was necessary for his exec- 
 utors to make 'a conveyance does not prevent the writing from oper- 
 ating as his will: Webster v. Lowe, 107 Ky. 293, 53 S. W. 1030. 
 
 It will be seen from this that it is not necessary for the writer to 
 know that the paper which he writes will amount to a will or other- 
 wise fully accomplish his purposes. It is sufficient that he mani- 
 fests his wish that, on his death, his property, or some part of it, 
 shall go to another person by him designated: Outlaw v. Hurdle, 1 
 Jones (46 N. C), 150; Estate of Knox, 131 Pa. 220, 17 Am. St. Rep. 
 798, 18 Atl. 1021, 6 L. E. A. 353. Nor is it necessary that such desig- 
 nation be so complete that parol evidence is not necessary to make 
 it understood. Thus the words, "Dear old Nance: I wish to give 
 you my watch, two shawls, and also five thousand dollars, ' ' properly 
 dated and subscribed by the writer, is an olographic will, and parol 
 evidence is admissible to prove who is the person whom he designated 
 as "Old Nance": Clarke v. Eansom, 50 Cal. 595. It is sufficient 
 that the will merely states that the person named therein is the 
 testator's heir if it is also indorsed in his handwriting as his will: 
 Succession of Ehrenberg, 21 La. Ann. 280, 99 Am. Dec. 729. 
 
 A will may take the form of a direction to the testator's executors 
 to pay the beneficiaries a sum specified at a future designated date: 
 Pena v. Cities of New Orleans and Baltimore, 13 La. Ann. 86, 71 Am. 
 Dec. 506. An olographic will may be contained in, or be a part of, a 
 letter written by the testator to the beneficiary or to another: Buffing- 
 ton V. Thomas, 84 Miss. 157, 105 Am. St. Eep. 423, 36 South. 1039; 
 Barney v. Hayes, 11 Mont. 571, 28 Am. St. Eep. 495, 29 Pac. 282; 
 Alston V. Davis, 118 N. C. 202, 24 S. E. 15; or may consist of an 
 entry in the testator's diary: Eeagan v. Stanley, 11 Lea, 316. 
 
 Whether Directions for the Writing of a Will may of themselves 
 constitute an olographic will is not free from doubt. A paper en- 
 titled, "Directions how I want my will wrote," was denied admis- 
 sion to probate in Virginia, but the reasons for such denial were 
 not stated by the court, and, as they may have related to the uncer- 
 tainty of the directions thus referred to and the impossibility of
 
 Estate of Fay. 435 
 
 ascertaining from them, even if so admitted, what disposition was 
 made of the property therein referred to, the case can hardly be 
 regarded as authority on one side or the other side of the question: 
 Hocker v. Hocker, 4 Gratt. 277. In Barney v. Hayes, 11 Mont. 99, 
 571, 28 Am. St. Eep. 495, 29 Pac. 282, 384, it appeared that the testa- 
 tor, after having executed a will which was duly attested by wit- 
 nesses, married and subsequently wrote to his attorneys referring to 
 his marriage, and stating, "Now, what I want is for you to change 
 my will so that she will be entitled to all that belongs to her as 
 my wife. I am in very poor health and would like this attended to 
 as soon as convenient." Application was made for the admission 
 to probate of this letter as a codicil to the pre-existing will. It was 
 conceded that the marriage had revoked the original will, but that 
 if the letter could be admitted as a codicil, it republished the will, 
 and that the will and codicil together constitute the last will and 
 testament of the decedent. "The whole gist of the case," said the 
 court, "therefore, is whether said letter was a codicil; that is, 
 whether it was testamentary in character. The court submitted to 
 the jury a great number of questions, which seemed to have included 
 all matters of fact in the case. The court also required the jury to 
 determine whether said letter was a codicil. The jury said it was." 
 The trial court set aside this finding and held that the letter was 
 not a codicil. Its action was reversed upon appeal, the appellate 
 court holding that the words contained in the letter "disclosed an 
 animus testandi, " that the reasonable construction of the letter was 
 that the testator wished his wife to have a certain portion of his 
 estate, and that no one could read the letter and be in any doubt 
 as to what the decedent intended should be the disposition of his 
 property to his wife, and that such intention being clear, the intent 
 must not be ignored because the language was not technical: 
 
 The Omission of Any of the Requirements of the Statute in the 
 execution of an olograph will not be overlooked on the ground 
 that it is beyond question that the paper was executed by the de- 
 cedent as his will while he possessed abundant testamentary ca- 
 pacity and was free from fraud, constraint, or undue influence, and 
 there is no question of his testamentary purpose and no obstacle 
 to carrying it into effect had his will been executed in the manner 
 prescribed by the statute: Estate of Eand, 61 Cal. 468, 44 Am. Eep. 
 555; Succession of Armant, 43 La. Ann. 310, 26 Am. St. Eep. 183, 
 9 South. 50; Baker v. Brown, 83 Miss. 793, 36 South. 539; Warwick 
 V. Warwick, 86 Va. 602, 10 S. E. 843, 6 L. E. A. 795. When, on 
 the other hand, the paper offered has been executed in compliance 
 with all the requisites imposed by the statutes, the courts will con- 
 strue it on the same principles applicable to other wills, by seeking 
 to ascertain, though its language is untechnical and ungrammatical, 
 or words are omitted from it, what was the intention of the testa- 
 tor, and by giving effect to that intention, whenever lawful, and
 
 436 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 thus capable of ascertainment. Therefore, the words, "Crolldepdro, 
 february 3, 1892, this is to serifey that ie levet to mey wife Eeal 
 and persnal and she to dispose for them as she wis," may be con- 
 strued as if it had been written, "Corral de Piedra, February 3, 
 1892. This is to certify that I leave to my wife (my) real and 
 personal (property), and she to dispose of them as she wishes": 
 Mitchell V. Donohue, 100 Cal. 202, 38 Am. St. Eep. 279, 34 Pac. 614. 
 
 Though Certain Words Taken by Themselves have no apparent 
 connection with other portions of the will, ' ' the testatrix must be 
 deemed to have written them with the intention that some effect 
 should be given them, and that intention, so far as it can be gathered 
 from the will itself and the circumstances under which it is exe- 
 cuted, is to be ascertained by the court and effect given thereto 
 accordingly. The order in which the words of a will are written is 
 not determinative of the testator 's intention, and under a well-recog- 
 nized rule this order will be transposed if thereby the intention of 
 the testator can be ascertained. So, too, a word that has been mani- 
 festly omitted and is essential to an understanding of the intention 
 of the testator will be supplied": In re Stratton, 112 Cal. 513, 44 
 Pac. 1028. 
 
 A Will cannot be Olographic if Any Part of It is not in the Hand- 
 writing of the testator. The material with which it is written is 
 immaterial. It may be in pencil as well as in ink: Philbriek's Heirs 
 v. Spangler, 15 La. Ann. 46; Estate of Knox, 131 Pa. 220, 17 
 Am. St. Eep. 798, 18 Atl. 1021, 6 L. E. A. 353. But whether in ink 
 or in pencil, every part of it must be in the testator 's handwriting. 
 Therefore, if a printed form has been used, so that the paper con- 
 sists partly of such printing and partly of clauses written by the 
 testator, no part of it can be admitted to probate as his olographic 
 will: In re Band's Estate, 61 Cal. 468, 44 Am. Eep. 555; Williams' 
 Heirs v. Hardy, 15 La. Ann. 286. The same result must follow if 
 the will is written on a printed letterhead, some of the words or 
 figures of which constitute an essential part of the will: In re Bill- 
 ing's Estate, 64 Cal. 427, 1 Pac. 701; Succession of Eobertson, 49 
 La. Ann. 868, 62 Am. St. Eep. 672, 21 South. 586. Perhaps, where 
 it appears that all the words necessary to a completely executed will 
 are in the handwriting of the testator, it may be admitted to pro- 
 bate, though it is proved that a few other words are in the hand- 
 writing of another: McMichael v. Bankston, 24 La. Ann. 451; and 
 certainly this is true where the words are written preceding the will 
 as a mere caption: Baker v. Brown, 83 Miss. 793, 36 South. 539. 
 
 The Question Whether an Olograph may, by Referring to An- 
 other Paper not in the handwriting of the testator, make it a part 
 of the will is not free from doubt. In Virginia, where it appeared 
 that a will had been drawn purpoi'ting to give all the testatrix 's 
 property to her sisters Margaret and Sallie, but had not been sub-
 
 Estate of Fay. 437 
 
 scribed or otherwise executed, and that the testatrix had written on 
 the same sheet of paper, "As Margaret is dead, I give her share 
 to my niece Lizzie Leigh Gibson," and followed this with her signa- 
 ture and the proper date, it was held that this latter writing could 
 not be admitted to probate. It was conceded that had the original 
 will been duly executed, the additional writing would have been en- 
 titled to probate as a codicil thereto, but a majority of the court 
 was of the opinion that, as the original will was never duly executed, 
 nor in the handwriting of the testatrix, the subsequent writing could 
 not be admitted to probate as a codicil or otherwise: Gibson v. Gib- 
 son, 28 Gratt. 44. Where a paper purporting to be a codicil is 
 executed with the formalities required of a will, or imports a refer- 
 ence to some already existing document regarded by the testator as 
 his will, to identify that instrument and to interpret that reference 
 as applying to it, all the surrounding circumstances may be shown: 
 Estate of Plumel, 151 Cal. 77, 121 Am. St. Eep. 100. 
 
 Like doubt seems not to exist when the paper referred to is in 
 the handwriting of the testator. In Estate of Skerrett, 67 Cal. 585, 
 8 Pac. 181, it appeared that the decedent signed and acknowledged 
 a deed of gift to his sister which never became operative for want 
 of delivery. Afterward he sent her a letter containing a copy of the 
 deed, declaring that nothing further was necessary than to have it 
 recorded, and that the property therein described would then be- 
 come hers, and that he wanted her to know that she was provided for 
 under all circumstances, and that if it should please God to call him 
 away, she would have her own property to depend on, sufficient 
 to make her independent while she lived. The copy of the deed, 
 as well as the letter, was in the decedent's handwriting. It was 
 held, reversing the judgment of the trial court, that the deed itself 
 could not be admitted to probate as a will, because it contained no 
 words of testamentary character, but that the copy and the letter, 
 though neither in itself constituted a will, because the one was not 
 testamentary in character and the other had no date, together as 
 one complete document, clearly showed an animus testandi, and were 
 entitled to admission to probate. Where a paper is written on the 
 reverse side of an olographic will, not effectively executed, and is 
 styled, "codicil,'' this word imports a reference to some prior paper 
 as a will, and if executed with the formalities requisite for a will, 
 makes good an invalidly executed olographic will written on such re- 
 verse side: Estate of Plumel, 151 Cal. 57, 121 Am. St. Kep. 100. 
 
 The Statutes Seem Unanimous in Requiring Olographs to be Dated; 
 failure to respect this requirement is fatal to the will: In re Martin's 
 Will, 58 Cal. 530; Fuentes v. Gaines, 25 La. Ann. 85; Hcffner v. 
 Heffner, 48 La. Ann. 1088, 20 South. 281. Though all the rest of 
 it is conceded to be in the handwriting of the testator, if the date 
 is proved to have been written by another, it must be denied ad- 
 mission to probate: Estate of Behrens, 130 Cal. 416, 62 Pac. 603. The
 
 438 Coffky's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 whole of the date must be in the testator's handwriting; and if 
 he writes his will on a letterhead, using the figures printed thereon 
 as part of the date and without considering such figures, the date 
 cannot be known, the will cannot be supported as an olographic will: 
 Succession of Eobertson, 49 La. Ann. 868, 62 Am. St. Eep. 672, 26 
 South. 586. See, too, Estate of Plumel, 151 Cal. 77, 121 Am. St. 
 Eep. 100. 
 
 Abbreviations in the Date are permissible if they are such as 
 are in common use, easily understood, and leave no question of the 
 date intended to be expressed. The words, "New York, Nov. 
 22/97," constitute a good dating. "In this case the expression un- 
 der consideration is entirely unambiguous, and to everyone familiar 
 with the usage of language it expresses the month, day and year as 
 clearly as though these had been written out in full. It is, or rather, 
 during the century just expired, it was, the common usage — univer- 
 sally understood — to designate the year by the last two figures of 
 its number, omitting the figures designating the century": In re 
 Lakemeyer's Estate, 135 Cal. 28, 87 Am. St. Eep. 96, 66 Pac. 961. 
 
 A Dating is not Sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the stat- 
 ute if it omits either the day, the month or the year: Fuentes v. 
 Gaines, 25 La. Ann. 85; Heffner v. Heffner, 48 La. Ann. 1088, 20 
 South. 281; though when the existence of the will is in issue, as 
 where its admission to probate as a lost will is sought, it is sufficient 
 that the testimony shows that it was dated on some day in a desig- 
 nated month and year without specifying that day, if the inference, 
 supported by the testimony, is that the day was specified in the 
 will, though the witnesses testifying do not remember what it was: 
 Gaines v. Lizardi, 3 Woods, 77 Fed. Cas. No. 7175. If a will in 
 the handwriting of the testator closes with the proper dating and 
 signing, and is followed by a further clause signed by the testator, 
 but bearing no separate date, such clause will be presumed to have 
 been written at the same time as the original will, and therefore the 
 whole will be deemed to be properly dated: Lagrave v. Merle, 
 5 La. Ann. 278, 52 Am. Dec. 589. It is not essential that the date 
 stated truly represented the time when the will was written or 
 signed. An obvious mistake in this respect is not fatal to the will: 
 Estate of Fay, 145 Cal. 82, 104 Am. St. Eep. 17, 78 Pac. 340. Whether 
 his action is due to a mistake or not, the testator may adopt as the 
 date of his will any date previously written by him: Estate of 
 Clisby, 145 Cal. 407, 104 Am. St. Eep. 58, 78 Pac. 964. 
 
 The Place Where the Date must be Written is not prescribed by 
 the statute, and hence it is not material in what part of the instru- 
 ment it appears: Zerega v. Percival, 46 La. Ann. 590, 15 South. 476. 
 It may follow the signature: Succession of Fuqua, 27 La. Ann. 271; 
 or even be found on a piece of paper different from that which ex- 
 presses the testamentary purpose and to which the signature of the
 
 Estate op Fay, 439 
 
 testator is written. Thus, where a testator sent to his sister what 
 purported to be a copy of a deed conveying certain property to her, 
 dated April 26, 1881, and acknowledged on the day following, in- 
 closed in a letter bearing no date, but showing his intention that 
 she should have such property at his death, such copy and letter 
 were together held to constitute an olographic will, and to justify 
 such holding, it was necessary for the court to adopt, and it did 
 adopt, the date as expressed in such copy as the date of the olo- 
 graphic will: Estate of Skerrett, 67 Cal. 585, 8 Pac. 181. 
 
 Necessity for Signature. — At the common law a will of personal 
 property in the testator's handwriting was good, though without 
 his signature and unwitnessed, and in some of the states a common- 
 law will is still sufficient in exceptional circumstances, as when made 
 by a soldier in actual service, or a mariuer at sea, for the purpose 
 of disposing of his wages and personal estate: Leathers v. Green- 
 acre, 53 Me. 561. The general rule, however, is that wills must be 
 signed by the testator, and special reasons exist for the rule and 
 its enforcement when the will is not witnessed. The absence of the 
 testator's signature upon what is claimed as an olographic will must 
 be regarded as fatal, except in cases where the common law has been 
 left in force as to soldiers and sailors. 
 
 The Statutes Requiring the Signing of Wills by the testator have 
 rarely, if ever, declared what constitutes a signing or signature, and, 
 while there are many decisions upon that subjec^t in its relation to 
 other wills, there are few indicating whether the results reached are 
 equally applicable to wills which have been admitted to probate only 
 on the ground that they are olographic. The question whether a 
 signature to a will may consist of the testator's mark cannot arise, 
 because the existence of the balance of the will in his handwriting 
 demonstrates his ability to write, and hence the absence of any neces- 
 sity for using a mark. There is certainly no need of his writing his 
 name in full, but it is doubtless sufficient that the signature written 
 is that ordinarily used by him in other business transactions. It 
 may probably consist of initials, or even of a fictitious or assumed 
 name. ' ' The title by which a man calls himself and is known in the 
 community is his name, whether it be the one he inherited or had 
 originally given him or not. So the form which a man customarily 
 uses to identify and bind himself in writing is his signature, what- 
 ever shape he may choose to give it. Nor is there any fixed require- 
 ment how much of the full name shall be written." Hence, an olo- 
 graphic will signed only by the testatrix's given name "Harriet" 
 was upheld: Estate of Knox, 131 Pa. 220, 17 Am. St. Eep. 798, 18 
 Atl. 1021, 6 L. R. A. 353. 
 
 The Place of the Signature is not Material unless made so hy stat- 
 ute. It need not be at the end: Estate of Stratton, 112 Cal. 513, 
 44 Pac. 1028; Estate of Camp, 134 Cal. 233, 66 Pac. 227. It is true
 
 MO Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 that the name of the testator written in the body of the will can- 
 not be treated as his signature when not intended to be such: In 
 re Armant's Will, 43 La. Ann. 310, 26 Am. St. Eep. 193, 9 South. 
 50; and that where, as in Virginia, the statute declares that the 
 name of the testator written in a will shall not be regarded as his 
 signature unless there is something on the face of the paper indi- 
 cating that it was intended to be such, the mere presence of such 
 name in the will in his handwriting cannot be accepted as his sign- 
 ing or signature in the absence of any such intention so appearing: 
 Waller v. Waller, 1 Gratt. 454, 42 Am. Dec. 564; Eamsay v. Eam- 
 say, 13 Gratt. 664, 70 Am. Dec. 438; Eoy v. Eoy, 16 Gratt. 418, 84 
 Am. Dec. 696. Still, the general rule is, in the absence of some statu- 
 tory prohibitions, that the name of the testator written by him, 
 either in the introductory or closing clause of his will, constitutes 
 his signature: In re Camp's Estate, 134 Cal. 233, 66 Pac. 227; Law- 
 son V. Dawson's Estate, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 361, 53 S. W. 64; and 
 even under the Virginia statute, the concluding clause of a will stat- 
 ing "I, William Dinning, say this is my last will and testament," 
 sufficiently indicates that the name so written was intended as the 
 signature of the testator, and entitles the will to admission to probate 
 as olographic: Dinning v. Dinning, 102 Va. 467, 46 S. E. 473. Not at 
 all reconcilable with the foregoing statements is the decision in 
 Booth's Estate, 127 N. Y. 109, 24 Am. St. Eep. 429, 27 K E. 826, 
 12 L. E. A. 452. The will there in question was witnessed and 
 attested by two persons and was wholly in the handwriting of the 
 testatrix, and though not otherwise signed by her, contained her 
 name in the ojaening clause and also her maiden name at the end. 
 One of the subscribing witnesses testified that the testatrix said 
 to her: "This is my will; take it and sign it." The court held 
 that this evidence was insufficient to sustain a finding or verdict 
 that the testatrix's name written by her in the first line of the 
 document was there written with the intent that it should have 
 effect as her signature in the final execution of the will, saying: 
 "Whenever the name of a testator appears, whether in the body 
 or at the end of a will, it must have been written with intent to 
 execute it, otherwise it is without force. When a testator or the 
 maker of a contract subscribes it at the end and in the manner in 
 which legal instruments are usually authenticated, a presumption 
 arises that the signature was affixed for the purpose of creating a 
 valid instrument. But when the name is written near the begin- 
 ning of the document, where, as a rule, names are inserted by 
 way of description of the person who is to execute it, and rarely as 
 signatures, it must, before it can be held to have been inserted for 
 the purpose of validating the instrument, be proved to have been 
 written with that intent." 
 
 The Following Summary of the French Doctrine upon the subject 
 appears to meet the approval of the supreme court of Louisiana:
 
 Estate of Fay. 441 
 
 "Although the natural place of the signature be at the end of the 
 act, because it expresses the final approval given by the testator to 
 the dispositions of last will which he has made, it is, however, ad- 
 mitted that the writing by the testator of his name toward the 
 end of the act may be considered as a signature, if it is placed after 
 all the dispositions constituting the testament. It does not matter 
 that after the name there may follow some words connected with it, 
 if the words thus following are superfluous or useless. ' ' In the case 
 whence this quotation is made it appeared that the will in question 
 commenced with a caption as follows: "Testament d'Aglae Armant. " 
 The court was of the opinion that the name as thus written could 
 not be accepted as signature, partly upon the ground that it v/as 
 not written in the ordinary manner of a signature and was ' ' without 
 a paragraph," the evidence showing that the testatrix ordinarily em- 
 ployed one, and further, ' ' that the coupling of the ' d ' with the 
 name in itself excludes the idea of its being intended as a signature. ' ' 
 The decision was also partly upon another ground, which the court 
 thus expressed: "Even apart from the name's not being at the end 
 of the testament, we think the proof does not show that she intended 
 to sign at all. It simply shows that she did not think or know 
 that a signature was essential. If she had known that it was neces- 
 sary that the testament should be signed, it is impossible to conceive 
 how, in so important a matter, she should have acted so ambiguously 
 and so differently from the course universally pursued by her in 
 signing other acts and documents of every description. The sim- 
 ple fact is, she did not know that a signature was necessary, and 
 therefore did not sign. Her mistake in this respect is unfortunate 
 in the interests of justice, but it cannot save the will." 
 
 Necessity for Witnessing and Attesting. — The authorities, in so 
 far as they speak upon the subject, indicate that the recognition 
 of olographic wills does not exempt them from the general provisions 
 contained in the statutes respecting the manner of witnessing and 
 attesting wills. Hence, in the absence of any statutory provision to 
 the contrary, olographic wills must be published, witnessed and at- 
 tested in the same manner as others, but criticism of the term of what 
 is claimed to be a sufficient publication need not be so severe as 
 where the will is not wholly in the testator's handwriting: Trus- 
 tees v. McKinstry, 75 Md. 188, 23 Atl. 471; Matter of Application 
 of Becket, 103 N. Y. 167, 8 N. E. 506; Matter of Hunt, 110 N. Y. 
 281, 18 N. E. 106; Matter of Turrell, 47 App. Div. 560, 62 N. Y. 
 Supp. 1053; 166 N. Y. 330, 59 N. E. 910; In re Aker's Will, 173 
 N. Y. 620, 66 N. E. 1103, 74 App. Div. 461, 77 N. Y. Supp. 643; 
 Neer v. Cowhick, 4 Wyo. 49, 31 Pac. 862, 18 L. E. A. 588. In many 
 of the states, however, olographic wills need not be published nor 
 witnessed, nor otherwise attested than by the testator's signature. In 
 other words, such a will is entitled to admission to probate on proof 
 in the manner required by statute that it is wholly written, dated,
 
 442 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 and signed in the handwriting of the testator: Ariz. Eev. Stats., ed, 
 1887, sees. 3234, 3235; Cal. Civ. Code, sec. 1277; Idaho Eev. Stats., 
 sec. 5728; Scott v. Harkness, 6 Idaho, 736, 59 Pac. 566; Toebbe v. 
 Williams, 80 Ky. 661; Webster v. Lowe, 107 Ky. 293, 53 S. W, 1030; 
 La. Civ. Code, arts. 1581, 1588; Williams v. Hardy, 15 La. Ann. 286; 
 Buffington v. Thomas (Miss.), 36 South. 1039; Barney v, Hays, 11 
 Mont. 571, 28 Am. St. Eep. 495, 29 Pac. 282; Outlaw v. Hurdle, 1 
 Jones (N. C), 150; Alston v. Davis, 118 N. C. 202, 24 S. E. 15; 
 Estate of Knox, 131 Pa. 220, 17 Am. St. Eep. 798, 18 Atl. 1021, 6 
 L. E. A. 353; Eegan v. Stanley, 11 Lea, 316; Lawson v. Davi- 
 son's Estate, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 361, 53 S. W. 64; Dinning v. Dinning, 
 102 Va. 467, 46 S. E. 473; West Va. Laws, ed. 1882, c. 84, sec. 3. 
 
 A Will, Though Olographic, may be Followed by an Attestation 
 Clause, or may otherwise indicate that the testator intended to 
 have it witnessed and attested in the same manner as if not olo- 
 graphic. In such circumstances, if there are no subscribing witnesses, 
 or not a sufficient number of them, or one is incompetent to act as 
 such, it may be claimed that the testator had designed to complete 
 the execution of the will as if it were not olographic, and that, be- 
 cause of his failure to do so, it cannot be admitted to probate. 
 The answers, however, have been uniform to the effect that if th^ 
 will was executed in the manner required of olographic wills, it was 
 entitled to admission to probate, notwithstanding the fact that the 
 testator intended to execute it in the presence of subscribing wit- 
 nesses, and believed such presence essential to its validity: In re 
 Soher, 78 Cal. 477, 21 Pac. 8; Toebbe v. Williams, 80 Ky. 661; 
 Andrew's Exrs., 12 Mart. (O. S.) 713; Succession of Eoth, 31 La. 
 Ann. 315; Brown v. Beaver, 48 K C. 516, 67 Am. Dec. 255; Hill 
 V. Bell, 61 N. C. 122, 93 Am. Dec. 583; Allen v. Jeter, 6 Lea, 
 672; Perkins v. Jones, 84 Va. 358, 10 Am. St. Eep. 863, 4 S. E. 833. 
 
 A testamentary document in the handwriting of the testator, 
 and having subscribing witnesses, may be proved either as an olo- 
 graphic or as an attested will: Estate of Dama, 4 Cof. Pro. 
 
 The Place Where the Will was Lodged or Found is generally not 
 material, but in two of the states it must have been found among 
 the valuable papers and effects of the decedent, or have been by 
 him lodged with another person for safekeeping: Winstead v. Bow- 
 man, 68 N.- C. 170; Tate v. Tate, 11 Humph. 464. The meaning 
 of these requirements has not been much litigated. The decedent 
 may have two or more places in which he keeps papers and valuables, 
 and one may be so far superior to the other, or so much more resorted 
 ' to by him as a depository of his valuables that an olographic will 
 found in the other will not be admitted to probate: Little v. Lock- 
 man, 49 N. C. (4 Jones) 494. Nevertheless, the circumstances must 
 be rare in which the courts will consider, as between two places where 
 valuable papers and effects are kept, which is the only one in which
 
 Estate of Fat. 443 
 
 an olographic will may be safely placed, and if found in either place, 
 it will generally not be refused probate because the court deems the 
 other the safer place or the one which the decedent has been in the 
 habit of leaving the more valuable papers and effects: Winstead v. 
 Bowman, 68 N. C. 170. 
 
 The depository may be a drawer in a desk or bureau (Hughes v. 
 Smith, 64 N. C. 493; Harrison v. Burgess, 8 N. C. (1 Hawks Eq.) 
 384), or a trunk left for safekeeping with a friend (Hill v. Bell, 61 
 N. C. (Phil. L.) 122, 93 ^m. Dec. 583), if therein are left the valuable 
 papers and effects of the decedent. Of course, the real question is, 
 whether from the place where the will is found, the inference is 
 reasonable that the testator left or caused it to be left there as and 
 for his olographic will: Marr v. Marr, 2 Head, 303; Hooper v. Mc- 
 Quary, 5 Cold. 129; Douglass v. Harkrender, 3 Baxt. 114. The sur- 
 roundings and habits of one person may be such as to make it ex- 
 ceedingly improbable that he used a depository, the use of which in 
 the case of another person would be entirely reasonable. It is suf- 
 ficient that the testator kept or preserved his will in the same man- 
 ner that he kept other valuable papers: Winstead v. Bowman, 68 N. 
 C. 170; Tate v. Tate, 11 Humph. 464. As to the will itself, it 
 need not be a separate or formal document, but may be written in 
 a book of accounts, if such book is found with other valuable 
 papers of the decedent: Brown v. Eaton, 91 N. C. 26. From the 
 finding of the will among the papers of the decedent, it will be pre- 
 sumed that he placed it there on the day it bears date: Sawyer v. 
 Sawyer, 52 N. C. (7 Jones) 134. 
 
 By valuable papers is not necessarily meant deeds, important con- 
 tracts, etc., or papers of great pecuniary value, but simply such 
 papers as the decedent seems to have regarded as important to him 
 and to the preservation of which he has given the same atten- 
 tion as to his olographic will: Marr. v. Marr, 2 Head, 303. But an 
 olograph is not found among valuable papers when it is found in box 
 in which the testator kept stamps and stationery belonging to a post- 
 office of which he had charge, while he kept his deeds, notes and the 
 like in a trunk at his residence, some distance away: Brogan v. Bar- 
 nard, 115 Tenn. 260, 112 Am. St. Eep. 822, 90 S. W. 858. 
 
 The mere finding of a will among the papers of a third person 
 is not sufficient to show that it had been left with him by the testa- 
 tor for safekeeping: St. John's Lodge v. Callender, 26 N. C. (4 Ired.) 
 335. The person with whom the will is deposited may be the wife 
 of the testator: Harrison v. Burgess, 8 N. C. (1 Hawks Eq.) 384. 
 Where the will is a part of a letter written by the testator to an- 
 other, it is not necessary that the latter should have received any 
 instructions from the former respecting its preservation or safekeep- 
 ing: Alston V. Davis, 118 N. C. 202, 24 S. E. 15.
 
 444 Coffey's Pkobate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 Estate of WILLIAM ARTHUR GREEN, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 5,719; decided April 7, 1888.] 
 
 Homestead — Residence of Deceased — Conclusiveness of Finding. — 
 
 Where, upon the admission of a will to probate, the legal residence 
 and domicile of testator is found as a fact, and certified and judi- 
 cially determined, the question is placed outside the pale of contro- 
 versy thereafter. So held, upon an executor's opposition to an ap- 
 plication for a homestead by the testator's widow. 
 
 Homestead — Nature of Right. — The right to a homestead is wholly 
 statutory; it cannot be asserted as a natural right. The law-making 
 power is competent to repeal the provisions of the statute regu- 
 lating the right, and thereafter homesteads would be unknown. 
 
 Homestead — Probate and Voluntary Distinguished. — There is a 
 distinction between a homestead under section 1262, Civil Code, and 
 the homestead selected by the court in the administration of a de- 
 cedent's estate. The latter is governed wholly by the provisions of 
 section 1465, Code of Civil Procedure. In the case of a homestead 
 selected in the decedent 's lifetime, the claimant 's title accrues by 
 survivorship; as to a homestead selected in the administration of 
 decedent's estate, the claimant's title accrues only upon the de- 
 cree of the court or judge setting it apart. 
 
 Homestead. — The Probate Court has no Discretion to deny an ap- 
 plication for a homestead by the family of a decedent, presented 
 under section 1465, Code of Civil Procedure. 
 
 Homestead — Testamentary Power. — The power or duty of the court 
 to set apart a homestead for the family of a decedent is not lim- 
 ited by the fact that the decedent disposed of his property by will. 
 
 Homestead. — The Power of Testamentary Disposition is Given and 
 defined by statute, and is subordinate to the authority vested in the 
 probate court to appropriate property for the support of testator's 
 family, including a homestead, and for the payment of debts. 
 
 Homestead. — The Right of a Widow to have a Homestead Set Apart 
 
 to her from the estate of her former husband must be determined 
 from the facts as they exist at the date of the action of the court. 
 
 Homestead. — The Executor's Answer to the Widow's Application 
 for a homestead alleged that two adult daughters (one being married), 
 referred to in the widow 's petition, were always considered and 
 treated as part of the decedent 's household and family. The court 
 ignored this claim for the daughters, and set apart the homestead 
 to the widow alone. 
 
 Homestead. — In this Case the Widow Applied to have a Home- 
 stead set apart to her, and the executor answered, setting up that
 
 Estate of Green. 445 
 
 decedent's residence and home was in England, where he died and left 
 a homestead, which he devised to his wife and daughters. The court 
 found on the probate of the will here that the decedent had a domicile 
 and legal residence in California, and was only temporarily in England 
 for his health; and held that the applicant, being the decedent's widow 
 at the date of the application, and a resident of the state, and there 
 being property suitable for a homestead, all the conditions required by 
 the statute existed to entitle her to a homestead. 
 
 Homestead — Separate Property.— In this case the court ordered 
 that the property, being decedent 's separate estate, be set apart only 
 during the applicant's widowhood. 
 
 Homestead — Value of Premises. — In this case the court held that 
 the value of the premises ordered set apart as a homestead should 
 be taken as of the date of the application; any subsequent increase 
 in value being immaterial. 
 
 This was an application by the widow to have a homestead 
 selected and set apart by the court. The executor, R. H. 
 Lloyd, filed two answers to the petition; the first answer 
 was the same as the second one, except that it left out an 
 important special defense attempted to be made by the 
 executor, viz. : ( 1 ) that it was the intent and expressed wish 
 of the testator that the legacy made by his wife should be 
 in lieu of all rights she might claim against his estate; (2) 
 that it was testator's express desire that his wife should have 
 a homestead out of his estate. After argument upon a 
 motion and demurrer addressed to this special defense, Mr. 
 W. S. Wood, counsel for the executor, asked leave to withdraw 
 the answer, and filed a new one (being the one referred to 
 in the court's opinion), which omitted these special allega- 
 tions. Throughout the entire proceedings had on the home- 
 stead petition, the attitude taken by the executor, Lloyd, was 
 objected to, it being claimed that the positions he took, and the 
 defenses he attempted to set up, and the manner in which he 
 and his counsel contested the matter, were that of a partial, 
 prejudiced and interested party, and that he really repre- 
 sented the daughters of testator, wlio were opposed to the 
 widow; that an executor's duty required him to be impartial 
 and take no sides in a controversy^ further than to offer such 
 information as he might have, for the benefit and instniction 
 of the court ; and that he was not interested to defeat the 
 applicant out of a homestead, where he made no denial of
 
 446 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 her status as a widow, or the fact that no homestead had 
 been actually selected in decedent's lifetime. The court, in 
 its opinion below, calls attention to this objection made to 
 the attitude of the executor; but elects to consider the facts 
 independently of the objection. 
 
 After filing of the opinion the question came up on pres- 
 entation of findings prepared for the widow, as to what the 
 extent of her estate should be, and the court refused to 
 grant any other limitation than for widowhood. 
 
 The executor further opposed the setting apart of the 
 property selected by the court, upon the ground that since 
 the appraisement the land had increased in value. But the 
 court held that the date of the filing of the application was 
 the period to be considered, and not the time of setting 
 apart. 
 
 Timothy J. Lyons, for applicant. 
 William S. Wood, for executor, opposing. 
 
 COFFEY, J. This is an application by Julia Green, the 
 widow of William Arthur Green, deceased, to have a 
 homestead set apart by the court for her use. 
 
 The petition recites that letters testamentary were issued 
 out of this court on December 7, 1886, to R. H. Lloyd, one of 
 the executors named in the last will of decedent, who imme- 
 diately entered upon the discharge of his duties as such 
 executor, and has ever since continued to act in that capacity ; 
 that the executor has published notice to creditors according 
 to order of the court ; that he has made and returned herein 
 the inventory and appraisement as required by the statute; 
 that it appears by the said inventory and appraisement that 
 the whole estate of the decedent is about $270,000, yielding 
 a monthly income of about $1,200 net; that the executor 
 claims the whole estate to be separate property of decedent, 
 but as to this the applicant has no information other than 
 the statement of the said executor ; that the petitioner is the 
 surviving wife of the decedent, and that his family consisted 
 and consists of herself alone, who was, at the date of the 
 petition, temporarily residing in England (but who has since
 
 Estate of Green. 447 
 
 returned to California, and was at the time of the hearing 
 actually residing in San Francisco). The decedent also left 
 him surviving two daughters, Amy Eliza Green and Frances 
 Peddar, wife of Sydney Hampden Peddar, of London, 
 England, both of whom are above the age of legal majority 
 by the law of California, as well as by the law of England, 
 in which last-named country they are both resident, accord- 
 ing to the information and belief of the applicant; that 
 at the time of his death, and continuously and uninter- 
 ruptedly for many years immediately prior thereto, the 
 decedent was a resident of and had his domicile in the state 
 of California, as well also that of his family, which family 
 consisted at the time of his death solely of himself and the 
 petitioner, but that he died in England, where he was then 
 temporarily residing on account of and for the benefit of 
 his health ; that his surviving wife, the petitioner, constituting 
 his said family, has not changed the California domicile, 
 w^hich she had and retained with decedent at the time of 
 his death, but has always and continuously retained and still 
 retains her California domicile aforesaid, and at the date of 
 the hearing was actually a resident and domiciled in the 
 city and county of San Francisco, State of California; that 
 no homestead was selected, designated or recorded in the 
 lifetime of the decedent, either by him or by the petitioner, 
 and that no homestead has been selected, designated or re- 
 corded, or set apart by this court out of the estate of the 
 decedent now being administered upon herein, nor has any 
 property of any kind been set apart or ordered set apart by 
 this court out of decedent's estate. The petition proceeds to 
 set forth certain parcels of property alleged to be suitable 
 for the purposes of homestead, out of which she prays the 
 court to select, designate and set apart to her such home- 
 stead. To this petition the executor, R. H. Lloyd makes 
 answer in substance : That he was the attorney for the dece- 
 dent for a long time prior to his marriage to the applicant 
 and up to the time of his death, and as such attorney was 
 familiar with the property owned by the decedent; that all 
 said property was owned and possessed by said deceased prior 
 to his marriage with the applicant; that the family of the
 
 448 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 decedent did not consist solely of the applicant; that he had 
 an unmarried daughter, Amy Eliza Green, and also a mar- 
 ried daughter, Frances Peddar, whom he had always con- 
 sidered and treated as part of his household, and was con- 
 stantly aiding and assisting in supporting and maintaining 
 them, and said daughters and petitioner constituted and were 
 his family; that the applicant is and has been ever since 
 marriage a resident of England; that long prior to the death 
 of decedent he purchased a homestead at a place called 
 Wyresdale, in England, and fitted and furnished the same, 
 and took up his residence there, and was residing there at 
 the time of his death ; that the decedent left a last will other 
 than that admitted to probate by this court, specifying and 
 concerning his property and effects in England, and in and 
 by said last will he devised to petitioner and his daughters 
 the said homestead with its contents, and that the said 
 applicant was, at the time of filing her application herein, 
 residing in said homestead in England, and that such was 
 her home and her place of residence ; but no homestead was 
 designated or recorded in this state by the decedent, because 
 of the selection of a homestead in England ; and that pending 
 these proceedings, and since the filing of the petition for a 
 homestead herein, the said homestead in England has been 
 sold and the applicant has received or is about to receive her 
 portion of the proceeds of such sale. The counsel for the 
 applicant objected to the interference of the executor in 
 this application, insisting that, as executor, he had no part 
 to play in this proceeding, and counsel still insists upon such 
 objection ; but the court has chosen to inquire fully into the 
 facts, notwithstanding such objection. 
 
 The will admitted to probate in this court December 6, 
 1886, begins with the recital : 
 
 "I, William Arthur Green, a resident of the City and 
 County of San Francisco, State of California, now tem- 
 porarily in England, being of sound mind and disposing mem- 
 ory, do make and publish and declare this my last will and 
 testament, in manner and form following: (1) I declare 
 that all my property, be it real, personal or mixed, is my
 
 Estate of Green. 449 
 
 separate property and estate, having been acquired by me 
 prior to the marriage between myself and wife, Julia." 
 
 The instrument then proceeds to make various devises 
 and bequests. The petition of R. H. Lloyd, one of the 
 executors named in the will, for the probate thereof, filed 
 November 17, 1886, alleges, among other things, that William 
 Arthur Green died on or about the tenth day of November, 
 1886, in England ; that at the time of his death he was a 
 resident of the city and county of San Francisco, in said 
 state of California (being temporarily in England at the time 
 of his death) ; that he left estate in said city and county, 
 consisting principally of real estate and a small amount of 
 personal property. Upon the hearing on the sixth day of 
 December, 1886, the court found as a fact, and so certified 
 and judicially determined, that William Arthur Green died 
 on the tenth day of November, 1886, in England, where he 
 was temporarily for his health, and at the time of his death 
 was a resident of the city and county of San Francisco. This 
 finding and judgment places the question of the legal resi- 
 dence and domicile of the decedent at the time of his death 
 outside the pale of controversy; and the question is, there- 
 fore, reduced to whether the fact of the actual residence of 
 the deceased at the time of his death affects the status or 
 impairs the rights asserted by the applicant. William 
 Arthur Green was a native of England, but a naturalized 
 citizen of the United States, and a pioneer of California, 
 having resided here from the year 1849, and acquired very 
 valuable possessions, mainly in city real property. It appears 
 he was married twice, being separated by decree of divorce 
 from his first spouse, the mother of the two children, Amy 
 Eliza Green and Frances Peddar. In IMay, 1882, he departed 
 from the state of California, in company with his second 
 wife, the applicant, whom he had married almost immediately 
 prior to the departure. He never returned to California. 
 He and his wife never occupied any abode in common in this 
 state. They went to England, where Mr. Green purchased 
 a place and remained until he died. Counsel for the re- 
 spondent claims that whether the decedent purposed to change 
 his domicile is not involved in the present discussion, but 
 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. 1—29
 
 450 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 that it is enough for the purposes of this controversy to say 
 that the decedent acquired and occupied a place of residence 
 in England, which Avas designed to be permanent during his 
 stay there, and that he and the petitioner used that place 
 as their home at the time of his death; that they had no 
 home or residence in California ; they resided in England ; 
 and that the determination of the issue now before the court 
 depends upon the fact of residence rather than that of domi- 
 cile. Counsel contend that the right to homestead is wholly 
 statutory; no one can assert it as a natural right. The legis- 
 lature might repeal all the provisions of the act regulating 
 the right, and thereafter homestead would be unknown. This 
 is true. Counsel further contend that an examination of 
 the provisions of the code and the numerous decisions in this 
 state upon the question leads to the inevitable conclusion 
 that residence is the controlling principle of the homestead 
 claim ; the idea of the foundation of all legislation and adju- 
 dication upon the subject is to protect from forced sale 
 the home in which the family reside; it was designed at the 
 outset to save from creditors the roof which covers the family, 
 and upon that all homestead legislation has been founded, 
 and that in view of all the legislature has done, and the 
 courts have said, it must be conceded that the whole purpose 
 and intent of both departments of the government have been 
 directed toward the protection of the families of residents 
 of the state; that it will be conceded that a nonresident can- 
 not claim the benefit of a homestead; and that the first fact 
 necessary to a declaration is residence upon the property: a 
 temporary absence from the home at the time of the filing 
 of the declaration destroys its force and does away the claim 
 of exemption. Endeavoring to enforce his proposition, the 
 counsel presents numerous cases; a good sample of which is 
 Maloney v. Hefer (Cal.), 15 Pac. 763, in which the supreme 
 court say: "It has been frequently decided by this court 
 that to constitute a valid homestead the claimant must 
 actually reside in the premises when the declaration is made. 
 It -is true they went away temporarily and were gone only 
 about four months, but during that time they certainly did 
 not actually reside on any part of the lot filed upon."
 
 Estate of Green. 451 
 
 Counsel says it will be seen that the supreme court has 
 drawn a very clear line between actual and legal residence. 
 In the case cited the property claimed for a homestead was 
 the legal residence of the family, and while residing there 
 the wife executed the declaration, but before filing it she 
 went away to visit friends in another county, and during 
 the absence the declaration was filed, and the supreme court 
 held that such filing in her temporary absence defeated the 
 right. 
 
 Counsel says this decision points with great force the ar- 
 gument that residence, actual and in fact, is the corner- 
 stone of the homestead, and he claims that the decision in 
 Maloney v. Hefer is in direct pursuance of the general 
 definition of homestead declared in the leading case of Gregg 
 V. Bostwick, 33 Cal. 221, 91 Am. Dec. 637, from which it 
 will be gathered that residence is the essential and primary 
 fact upon which the right to a homestead is founded. Now, 
 says counsel, it will be conceded that William Arthur Green 
 could not, while residing in England, have filed any valid 
 claim for a homestead covering any property in this state, 
 and have thereby defeated the claims of his creditors, and 
 the claim of the widow depends wholly upon the state of 
 facts existing at the time of Mr. Green's death; her rights 
 cannot be any greater than his were. She cannot be per- 
 mitted to assert any claim to a greater protection than he 
 enjoys; her rights all rest in the fact that she was his wife 
 and is his widow ; and whether she is entitled to a homestead, 
 or must be refused one, depends on the status which he occu- 
 pied at the moment of his death, and whether at that moment 
 he could have claimed the right. In support of this view, 
 counsel quotes from the Estate of Delaney, 37 Cal. 176, in 
 which the supreme court said : ' ' The homestead and the tests 
 by which it is ascertained are the same, whether the question 
 arises between those claiming the homestead, or one of them 
 and a » vendee, a mortgagee, a creditor, or the heirs of the 
 deceased husband or wife. There is not one homestead as 
 against a creditor, and a different one, when the survivor 
 asserts his or her claim, as against the heirs of the deceased."
 
 452 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 In the concluding portion of the opinion in the case just 
 cited the court makes a suggestion, which counsel thinks of 
 considerable importance in this discussion, as showing that 
 the supreme court looked at this question in the light in which 
 it is now sought to place it before this tribunal. There the 
 widow had petitioned for a homestead, as in the present case, 
 and the supreme court remarked : " It is proper to add, though 
 the point is not made, that the petition is radically defective 
 because it does not state that she and her husband were enti- 
 tled to or held any land as their homestead at the time of his 
 death." 
 
 It will be observed, says counsel, that the court distinctly 
 holds that the petition for a homestead must show a right 
 thereto existing at the time of the husband's death, and 
 counsel claims that he has shown that residence is a necessary 
 and material fact; then the result must follow that the non- 
 residence of the parties prior to the husband's death deprived 
 them of the right; and such nonresidence continuing up to 
 his death, must be held to deprive the widow of the right. 
 
 The decedent died testate. His will had been admitted to 
 probate, and, by lapse of time for contest, its validity is no 
 longer sub.ject to question, and counsel insists that by the 
 will he has made disposition of all his property, and that 
 disposition is subject only to the rights of such persons as 
 bring themselves clearly within the statutory provisions. 
 The fallacy of counsel's argument is in the apparent assump- 
 tion that there is no distinction between a statutory home- 
 stead and a probate homestead, all the cases cited by him 
 involving the question of statutory homastead, under section 
 1262 et seq., of the Civil Code ; but this application is brought 
 under section 1465 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which 
 provides that, upon the return of the inventory, or any 
 subsequent time during the administration of an estate, if 
 no homestead has been selected, designated and recorded, the 
 court must, on its own motion, or on petition therefor, select, 
 designate, set apart and cause to be recorded a homestead 
 for the use of the surviving husband or wife and the minor 
 children; or, if there be no surviving husband or wife, then 
 for the use of the minor children. When application is
 
 Estate of Green. 453 
 
 made that a homestead be set aside under this section, the 
 court has no discretion in the matter, but must grant the 
 application. Nor is the power or duty of the court in this 
 respect limited by the fact that the decedent left a will by 
 which he disposed of the property sought to be set aside. 
 The power of testamentary disposition of property is con- 
 ferred and defined ]\v statute, is not paramount, but is 
 subordinate to the authority conferred upon the probate court 
 to appropriate the property for the support of the famil}^ 
 of the testator, and for a homestead for the widow and minor 
 child or children, as well as for the paj^ment of the debts of 
 the estate : Estate of Ballentine, 45 Cal. 696 ; Sulzberger v. 
 Sulzberger, 50 Cal. 385 ; In re Davis, 69 Cal. 460, 10 Pac. 671. 
 The Matter of Davis, last cited, went to the supreme court 
 upon appeal from this probate department, in which the 
 homestead was set apart for the minor children of the de- 
 ceased, notwithstanding the will, which directed that all the 
 property should be sold and a portion of the proceeds given 
 to her brother: See Estate of Bridget Davis, Deceased, No. 
 3,232, Superior Court, Department 9. Probate, San Fran- 
 cisco. Decree entered March 18, 1885, Coffey Judge. The 
 section under which this application is preferred was con- 
 strued In re Bowman 69 Cal. 244, 10 Pac. 412. This case 
 of In re Bowman would seem to afford a complete response 
 to the claim of the counsel for the opponent herein. The 
 court, through Mr. Justice Ross, declared that this statute 
 does not attach the condition that the decedent must have 
 resided upon the premises before a given piece of property 
 can be set apart for the use of the survivor, or, in ease of 
 his death, to the minor children of the decedent; but in ex- 
 press terms provides that if no homestead has been selected, 
 designated and recorded (under the general homestead 
 laws), or, in ease the homestead so designated and recorded 
 was selected by the survivor out of the separate property of 
 the decftdent, the decedent not having joined therein, the 
 court must select, designate and set apart and cause to be 
 recorded a homestead, etc. Such a homestead, as was held 
 in the matter of the Estate of Busse, 35 Cal. 310, may be 
 carved out of any property left by the decedent, which is 
 capable of being made a homestead. In the Estate of Bo-
 
 454 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 land, 43 Cal. 640, the court, construing the sections of the 
 old probate act, which are now incorporated in section 1465 
 et seq.. Code of Civil Procedure, through Mr. Justice Niles, 
 said : ' ' That a probate homestead differs from a case of a 
 homestead created during the existence of the community 
 by a compliance with the provisions of the homestead act, 
 the title to which vests in the wife upon the death of the 
 husband, by right of survivorship. In the latter case the 
 property becomes the property of the widow by operation 
 of law. In the case presented it could only become hers by 
 the decree of the court or judge." 
 
 The right of the applicant to have a homestead set apart 
 to her from the estate of her former husband must, there- 
 fore, be determined from the facts as they existed on the 
 day when the order of the probate court was made. In 
 the case of Higgins v. Higgins, 46 Cal. 265, the supreme 
 court, speaking through Mr. Justice Crockett, held that a 
 woman could claim a homestead out of her second husband's 
 estate, although one had been set apart to her out of the 
 estate of her first husband. Said the court: "It is said 
 that if she can claim both she will be protected in the en- 
 joyment of two homesteads at the same time — a result which, 
 it is claimed, was not comtemplated by the statute. But it 
 is to be observed that a homestead to be set apart under the 
 probate act, for the use of the widow and minor children, is 
 a mere reservation out of the property of the estate, for 
 their benefit, and is for the use of the minor children as 
 well as the widow. Under the general homestead act, how- 
 ever, the homestead goes to the wife alone, if she survives 
 her husband; and her children by a former marriage would 
 have no interest in it, while the children of her last mar- 
 riage would have no interest in the homestead set apart from 
 the estate of the first husband. Looking to the policy which 
 dictated the two classes of homesteads, we think the fact 
 that a homestead had been set apart from the estate of her 
 former husband, for the use of Mrs. Higgins and her minor 
 children, did not stop her from claihiing a homestead out of 
 the estate of her second husband." 
 
 In the Estate of Moore, 57 Cal. 443-446, the supreme 
 court, through Mr. Justice Myrick, said : ' ' The right to a
 
 Estate op Green. 455 
 
 probate homestead, so called, is not the subject of sale. 
 This court has already held that the status of the widow, 
 at the time of the application, must be considered, and if 
 she, by subsequent marriage, has ceased to be the widow of 
 the deceased, she cannot have a probate homestead set apart 
 to her. If a testator devised his entire estate, his separate 
 property, his widow would still be entitled to a homestead; 
 but if she were to execute a deed of all her interest in the 
 estate, her grantee could not have a homestead set apart to 
 him. If she should, after the conveyance, die or marry 
 again, there would be no right of homestead to survive her 
 or her widowhood. Before the action of the probate court 
 no estate has vested in the family, so far as homestead is 
 concerned. It is merely a right to have the court, as a part 
 of the administration, set apart property; and not until 
 such action can it be said that any estate has become vested, 
 either at law or in equity. The right to have a homestead 
 set apart is no estate, either in law" or in equity. As the 
 court said, in Bates v. Bates, 97 Mass. 395: The estate of 
 homestead is one of a peculiar nature. It is a provision, by 
 the humanity of the law, for a residence for the owner and 
 his family." 
 
 This opinion of Mr. Justice Myrick was subsequently con- 
 firmed unanimously by the court in bank, he being again the 
 exponent of the law, and he draws a clear distinction be- 
 tween a statutory and a probate homestead, refusing to ap- 
 ply to the latter a section which he considered was designed 
 for the former description of homestead, saying: "We are 
 therefore of opinion that the section does not apply to the 
 case before us. It might be said that, even if the legislature 
 intended that a right to apply for a probate homestead was 
 the subject of bargain and sale, it was not intended that 
 any less interest than the entire right should be acquired by 
 a vendee; for, if one of the parties entitled to apply — say 
 the mother of minor children — could sell her right, and her 
 grantee applied, such grantee would be entitled to the pos- 
 session of the homestead as against the mother, and would 
 have a joint interest with the children, to the exclusion of 
 the mother, which would be repugiumt to the very idea of a 
 homestead. It being the office of the legislature to provide
 
 456 Coffey ^s Peobate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 for a homestead, i. e., a place of home for a family, we can- 
 not hold that a statute enacted for that purpose shall have 
 the construction and effect of destroying the object in view." 
 It appearing in the case at bar that the applicant, Julia 
 Green, was, at the date of her application, the surviving 
 wife and widow of the decedent, William Arthur Green, a 
 resident of this state and county, and that there is property 
 suitable for the purpose and adapted to the use of a home- 
 stead, she has fulfilled all the conditions which, under the 
 law which she invokes, entitle her application to be granted ; 
 and it is so ordered. Let a decree be drawn and presented 
 to the court according to the conclusion of this opinion. 
 
 Estate of DAVID McDOUGAL, Deceased (No. 2). 
 
 [No. 2,278; decided February 27, 1884.] 
 
 Appraisers— Choice by Court.— In the opinion of this court, it would 
 best subserve the interests of estates if in all cases the court actually 
 chose all the appraisers, instead of having the representatives of the 
 estate or their counsel choose some of them. 
 
 Family Allowance— Necessity of Notice.— Under section 1464, Code 
 of Civil Procedure, no notice of an application for family allowance 
 is necessary; yet, in the opinion of the court, it would be a salutary 
 rule to require, and the court of its own motion requires notice to 
 be given to the attorneys for absent or minor heirs, or for persons 
 in adverse interest, in all practicable cases. 
 
 Executor — Duty to Account for Assets. — It is the duty of an exec- 
 utrix to make a showing to the court of the disposition of the dif- 
 ference between what the estate is prima facie entitled to, and what 
 it is claimed was the whole amount received by her. 
 
 Executor — Removal for Fraud. — The evidence reviewed, and the 
 charge of fraud against the executrix held not proved. The obliga- 
 tion of proving any fact lies upon the party who substantially as- 
 serts the affirmative of the issue, and a court is not justified in plac- 
 ing upon a person charged with fraud the onus of showing that she 
 is guiltless; on the contrary, it is incumbent upon the person mak- 
 ing a charge of fraud to maintain it by a preponderance of proof. 
 
 Executor. — The Unfriendliness of an Executrix Toward a Mother, 
 who is striving to obtain what she can by legal means for her chil-
 
 Estate op McDougal. 457 
 
 dren, will not justify the court in adjudging tlie executrix incompe- 
 tent. 
 
 Minor Heirs. — The Court will Endeavor to Conserve the Interests 
 of Minors, and will at all times aid their attorney in obtaining for 
 them their full rights; and any application in that behalf will be 
 welcomed by the court, which regards with the highest favor, the 
 claims of minor heirs. 
 
 Evidence.— It would be Contrary to all Rules of Evidence to Ac- 
 cept Testimony that lacks clearness and certainty, and that is with- 
 out corroboration, as against adverse evidence, positive and par- 
 ticular in its nature, and without successful assailment, and going to 
 the main fact in issue itself. 
 
 Fraud — Evidence. — Other Things Being Equal, where oath is op- 
 posed to oath, on a charge of fraud, the charge must fall. 
 
 Witness. — A Court is not Warranted in Imputing Want of Veracity 
 to a witness, unless it appears that willful falsehood has been told. 
 
 A Witness False in One Part of His Testimony is to be Distrusted, 
 but the court should be satisfied that the witness has testified falsely, 
 and may discriminate between distrust and utter rejection of tes- 
 timony. 
 
 Evidence. — Entries Made in an Account-book at the Request of One 
 Person by another, as to the ownership of property, are of no more 
 value than any other verbal admissions which the writer orally tes- 
 tified to, which ought to be received with great caution. An entry 
 in favor and not against the interest of a party dictating it is dis- 
 entitled to consideration on that account. And a party cannot be 
 affected by the declaration or entry of a party in his own favor, 
 made without the cognition or consent of the former. Evidence of 
 such character, even when admitted without objection, cannot be 
 too carefully scrutinized, for it is in all cases the most dangerous 
 species of evidence that can be admitted in a court of justice, and 
 the most liable to abuse. 
 
 Application for removal of executrix. 
 
 P. J. Van Loben Sels, for petitioner. 
 
 A. J. Le Breton, for executrix. 
 
 COFFEY, J. In the trial of the issues raised by the 
 petition of the attorney for the minor heirs, the reading of 
 briefs of counsel (seventy-three pages in all), the re-exam- 
 ination of the evidence, and the consideration of the au- 
 thorities, an amount of labor has been imposed upon the 
 judge of this court, in addition to his ordinary tasks, that
 
 458 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 it is to be feared, counsel little appreciate in the intensity 
 of their zeal for their respective interests. The petitioner 
 requests of the court a written opinion and "full findings," 
 to which first request the court endeavors here to make re- 
 sponse. Counsel also made an oral request that a "finding" 
 be made as to his personal and professional conduct of the 
 cause committed to his custody by the court. Without con- 
 ceding the necessity of such a "finding" or opinion, the 
 court cheerfully awards him credit for earnestness, energy 
 and exemplary fidelity in prosecuting this petition, which he 
 undoubtedly prepared in good faith and upon premises that 
 apparently justified him in his attempt to add to the assets 
 of the estate, or to prevent their appropriation or spoliation 
 by the executrix in her own interest or to the prejudice of 
 the minor heirs. 
 
 The petitioner, in behalf of the minor heirs, the children 
 of Charles J. McDougal, deceased, demands the removal of 
 the executrix on the grounds, generally, of (1) fraud, (2) 
 incompetency, and (3) waste and mismanagement of the 
 estate. 
 
 In support of the charge of fraud, the petitioner alleges 
 that the executrix procured, with intent to reduce the valua- 
 tion of the assets of the estate, the appointment of incompe- 
 tent appraisers, who, acting under the direction and in- 
 fluence of executrix undervalued the assets of the estate. 
 Two of these appraisers were nominated by the executrix, or 
 by her counsel, and the third, appointed of the court's own 
 desire, was not called upon to act by the executrix. It 
 turned out on the trial of this matter that the two nominees 
 of the executrix acted in good faith ; and the reason the third 
 did not act that he was not found in the city, and was sup- 
 posed to be temporarily absent therefrom. This charge was 
 not pressed by petitioner; but it suggests to the court the 
 comment that it might be better if in all cases the court 
 actually chose all the appraisers. 
 
 The petitioner further charges, among the fraudulent acts 
 of the executrix, that she omitted from the inventor}^ men- 
 tion of large sums of money belonging to the estate, par- 
 ticularly specifying a portion of the "Japanese Indemnity 
 Fund," amounting to $6,300. The whole amount was $21,-
 
 Estate of McDougal. 459 
 
 000, and it is claimed, on behalf of the executrix, that the 
 portion omitted was appropriated in pursuance of a contract 
 for the payment of agents who were employed to obtain the 
 amount from the government. 
 
 It is also charged that the executrix obtained, through im- 
 position upon the judge at the time temporarily acting in 
 this department, and without notice to the attorney for the 
 minor heirs, an excessive "family allowance." 
 
 The petitioner's gravest charge is: "That since the death 
 of David McDougal, but before any letters testamentary^ 
 were issued to her, to wit, on the twelfth day of September, 
 A. D. 1882, said executrix, with intent to cheat and defraud 
 said minor children, executed and delivered a conveyance to 
 one of her daughters, to wit, Mrs. Di W. Van Voorhies, of a 
 large and valuable tract of land, belonging to the community 
 property of the said David McDougal, deceased, and that no 
 mention of this transaction is made in said inventory, and 
 that said property does not appear in said inventory among 
 the assets of said estate." 
 
 1. The first specification, alleging fraudulent conduct in 
 the appointment and acts of appraisement, is not proved. 
 
 2. In reference to the "Japanese Indemnity Fund," the 
 court is of opinion that, while no fraudulent conduct is 
 established, the executrix should make a showing of the 
 disposition of the difference between what the estate is 
 prima facie entitled to, and what it is claimed was the 
 whole amount received. This should have been done with- 
 out compelling the petitioner to have recourse to this mode 
 of procedure to ascertain the facts. In this respect the 
 executrix is guilty of error of judgment, but under the evi- 
 dence I cannot find fraud in her conduct. As to the char- 
 acter or classification of this property, I do not deem it neces- 
 sary' in this proceeding to venture an opinion. This is an 
 inquiry as to the fraud alleged to have been practiced by 
 the executrix, and I find no fraud. 
 
 3. As to the allowance made by order of July 8, 1883, 
 which the petitioner alleges was obtained by false and 
 fraudulent representations and imposition practiced upon 
 the judge temporarily presiding here, and contrary to the 
 custom, rules and practice of this dopnrtmout, it seems to
 
 460 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 have been procured in conformity with the section of the 
 statute, which does not necessitate notice such as is suggested 
 by the petitioner: Code Civ. Proc, sec. 1464. Yet, in the 
 opinion of this judge, it would be a salutary rule to adopt 
 in such cases as the one under consideration, and the pres- 
 ent judge of his own motion requires the attorney for ab- 
 sent or minor heirs, or other attorney for persons in adverse 
 interest, to be notified in all practicable cases. But the law 
 does not literally require it ; and, however censurable the 
 conduct of counsel may be, fraud is not lightly to be im- 
 puted to a client for his counsel's conduct. Under the cir- 
 cumstances of this case, the court can only suggest that the al- 
 lowance would seem to be in excess of the needs of the 
 widow, considered with reference to the other interests. The 
 order was legally applied for and obtained in the customary 
 mode. 
 
 4. As to the charge that the petition for the setting apart 
 of a homestead was for the purpose of fraudulently monopo- 
 lizing assets of the estate, as the issue involved herein is 
 under consideration in another application, it would be more 
 appropriate to withhold an opinion in this proceeding, ex- 
 cept to formally indicate that there is no fraud proved as to 
 that particular matter. 
 
 5. The charge of fraudulently conveying a certain tract 
 of land in Oakland to her daughter, Mrs. Van Voorhies, is 
 the last item of the specifications, according to the order in 
 which the court has chosen to consider them. The answer 
 to this accusation was, that the property involved in this 
 issue was purchased by the money of Mrs. Van Voorhies, and 
 placed in her mother's name on account of certain appre- 
 hensions of the purchaser proceeding from her unhappy 
 domestic circumstances. It was testified by Mrs. Van Voor- 
 hies that the money wherewith she made this purchase was 
 the result of her savings of sums donated to her from time 
 to time by her deceased father, David McDougal. Assaults 
 and counter-assaults upon the credibility of the witnesses 
 have been made by counsel with reference to the evidence 
 adduced concerning this matter, but it is just possible to 
 decide this issue either way without imputing perjury to any 
 witness. If there be suf^cient support for the story of Mrs
 
 Estate of McDougal. 461 
 
 Van Voorhies that the property back of Tubbs' Hotel, in 
 Oakland, was purchased with the $200 derived by her as 
 she has stated, the executrix will be relieved of the charge 
 of fraud; but it may be questioned whether the court is 
 justified in placing upon her the onus of showing that she 
 is guiltless. Without reference to this question of burden, 
 I shall attempt an examination of the probability of her 
 story of the purchase. 
 
 Mrs. Van Voorhies testifies that she purchased the prop- 
 erty "back of Tubbs' Hotel" in 1862, with her own money, 
 $200, savings accumulated from donations of small sums at 
 different times from her father; that the title was put in 
 her mother's name because of the uncertainty and unhappi- 
 ness of her domestic relations, and to protect her child; she 
 considered it prudent, because of her domestic relations, to 
 put this piece of property in her mother's name, "for that 
 reason only." Here is a fact testified to and a motive as- 
 signed for it — the purchase and payment with her own 
 means and the placing of title in her mother's name and 
 the reason for such conduct. Counsel cross-examining the 
 witness upon this point, she reaffirmed the statement as to 
 the uncertainty and unhappiness of her domestic relations 
 and her apprehensions for the protection of herself and 
 child, as the motive for the conduct. 
 
 As to the fact of purchase and the manner of her acqui- 
 sition of the means of purchase, Mrs. Van Voorhies' testi- 
 mony is corroborated by Mrs. Le Breton, her sister, who 
 testified that her father, David McDougal, told her it be- 
 longed to his daughter "Di," Mrs. Van Voorhies, who had 
 bought it with her own savings, and that it was put in the 
 mother's name for prudential motives; upon cross-examina- 
 tion she said: "My father always spoke of the property 
 back of Tubbs' Hotel." 
 
 Mr. Le Breton, in his testimony, relates a conversation 
 had with David McDougal, in which he said this property 
 was purchased by his daughter "Di" with her own savings. 
 
 Mrs. Caroline M. JMcDougal testifies that the property 
 "back of Tubbs' Hotel" was purchased by her daughter, 
 "Di" W. Van Voorhies, with her own savings; that neither 
 she (the witness) nor her husband (David ]\IcDougal) put
 
 462 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 any money at all into that property; that the failure to re- 
 convey it until after his death was a mere oversight; that 
 "he often said that he would make a deed of it, but put it 
 off without doing so." This statement was not varied on 
 cross-examination. 
 
 The testimony of Robert Foster Patten is not very defi- 
 nite; but, so far as it has any tendency, it is in support of 
 the claim that Mrs. Van Voorhies was the owner of the 
 property involved in this inquiry; and, so far as Wm. Pat- 
 ten's testimony is concerned, it is too indefinite to be taken 
 into account. 
 
 Mrs. Van Voorhies testified further, with regard to the 
 purchase (p. 31, vol. 3, Reporter's Notes), that she paid the 
 purchase price, $200, with her own hands, to one Hezikiah 
 P. Jones, from whom she bought the property, he acting for 
 his sister who owned it. 
 
 Mr. Jones was called by petitioner, and the tendency of 
 his testimony is to support the statement of Mrs. Van Voor- 
 hies. (Vol. 4, Reporter's Notes.) 
 
 Counsel for the petitioner, claiming that the testimony of 
 Mrs. Caroline McDougal, Mrs. Van Voorhies, Mrs. Le Bre- 
 ton and ]\Ir. Le Breton is a concocted story, for the purpose 
 of carrying out the alleged conspiracy to appropriate the 
 assets of the estate, and is overthrown by the evidence sub- 
 mitted on the part of the petitioner, and by the cross-exam- 
 inations conducted by himself, serving to show how untrust- 
 worthy the story of the purchase told by Mrs. Van Voorhies. 
 asks the court to reject it. 
 
 Mrs. Kate Coffee McDougal testifies that Mrs. Caroline 
 McDougal stated to her that she had bought that property for 
 a very small sum; that she had bought it herself; that she 
 made such a statement at various times, but she cannot lo- 
 cate time or place of conversation, and is quite indistinct 
 in her recollection upon this point, and her testimony in 
 this respect is contradicted by the other party, who says she 
 does not remember ever having had any such interview, and 
 does not think there ever was any, and she did not talk busi- 
 ness before her (vol. 3, Reporter's Notes). 
 
 Mrs. Kate C. McDougal, being cross-examined, says she 
 did not hear David McDougal speak of it very much, indeed
 
 Estate op McDougal. 463 
 
 very seldom, but she heard Mrs. McDougal speak of it very 
 often, for she (Mrs. Caroline McDougal) was very confi- 
 dential with witness' husband about her affairs and spoke to 
 him very often, and she said in her presence that she (Mrs 
 Caroline McDougal) wanted to keep that property back of 
 Tubbs' Hotel for herself; she wanted to keep that; she con- 
 sidered that a valuable piece of property; originally it was 
 bought for a small sum, and it had increased beyond their 
 expectations, and the other members of the family spoke of 
 it as Mrs. McDougal 's property; nothing was said about 
 David McDougal's interest in it; he did not speak of it very 
 much; she thinks he was present at some of these conver- 
 sations; he did not claim it; he spoke of it as his wife's 
 property. Witness could not recollect any time or place at 
 which those conversations occurred. This testimony is met 
 by Mrs. Caroline McDougal as already alluded to (vol. 3, p. 
 21, Reporter's Notes). Witness also testified to her inti- 
 macy with Mrs. Van Voorhies, which intimacy did not in- 
 volve any discussion of family relations until 1866, in which 
 year witness intermarried with Charles J. McDougal, the son 
 of the executrix and brother of Mrs. Van Voorhies. Witness 
 testifies that at that time the domestic relations of Mrs. Van 
 Voorhies were pleasant and harmonious so far as she knew; 
 that she had a conversation with Mrs. Van Voorhies in 1877 
 or 1878, at which the latter referred to some money tliat 
 Mr. Van Voorhies sent to her from Aurora in 1863, with 
 which she purchased the property in Oakland, "in front 
 of Tubbs' Hotel"; this was after Mrs. Van Voorhies' return 
 from Europe, whither she had gone in 1869, and witness 
 further testified that ]\Irs. Van Voorhies, after her return 
 from Europe, spoke about her unhappy relations with her 
 husband (vol. 2, Reporter's Notes) ; that such conversations 
 occurred in September, 1875, and in speaking of such re- 
 lations Mrs. Van Voorhies was relating back to a period of 
 eight or ten years; the impression witness derived from her 
 conversations with Mrs. Van Voorhies was that the relations 
 of the latter were and had been "not very happy." 
 
 Mr. Van Voorhies was called, and testified that in 1862 and 
 1863 his relations with his wife were agreeable, and that he, 
 before and after that year, and he concluded in that year,
 
 464 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 contributed to the support of herself and child ; he sent her 
 money from Aurora, to which place he went about 1863 ; 
 and it was admitted that the amount he sent was as much 
 in all as $3,000. Witness, under cross-examination, testified 
 that he supported his family always according to his ability, 
 and that, while he was practicing law and occupying public 
 office, he provided for them. He said that his marital rela- 
 tions, with the exception of some intervals which were, per- 
 haps, chargeable to him, were agreeable up to 1868 or 1869, 
 when they went to Europe, where they spent seven or eight 
 years; while there he sent them various sums of money; he 
 lived at the Cosmopolitan Hotel, in San Francisco, for awhile 
 after marriage, but had no idea at this time whether his 
 wife's bills there were paid by her father or otherwise. 
 
 Mrs. Van Voorhies, being recalled for cross-examination 
 by petitioner, said that from 1857 to 1862 her husband con- 
 tributed little or nothing to her support, that their bills 
 were paid by her father and mother ; that in 1862 her mother 
 raised the money to enable witness' husband to go to Aurora; 
 that after he went to Aurora he sent her money on two occa- 
 sions, but these she did not call "regular remittances"; 
 after he returned from Aurora, a few months subsequently, 
 he led the same dissolute life; he gave witness nothing, and 
 her father and mother supported her all the time, and edu- 
 cated her daughter; in 1869 she went to Europe to remove 
 her daughter from such influences, and at intervals he would 
 send her one or two pounds at times; she denied that cordial 
 relations existed between them while she was in Europe, or 
 that she wrote him very cordial letters; and she did not 
 remember that at stated intervals he sent ranging from five 
 to seven and twenty and fifty pounds to her, and that she 
 acknowledged the receipt of same in letters ; and, in explana- 
 tion of letter introduced, she tried to write letters as kind 
 and encouraging as she could. 
 
 Several such letters were introduced by petitioner and 
 they seem to be of an affectionate nature, acknowledging 
 receipts of considerable sums, suggesting straits on account 
 of her daughter's education, and encouraging her husband 
 in certain aspirations, admonishing him as to her apprehen-
 
 Estate of McDougal. 465 
 
 sion of a return of his habits, and giving certain advice as 
 to material considerations, laying stress upon his regarding 
 money rather than fame, and the necessity of providing for 
 their declining years. She was in Europe nearly seven years, 
 and from the time of her departure hence until in the court- 
 room in the progress of this controversy, she had never seen or 
 spoken to ^Ir. Van Voorhies; from 1869 they never resumed 
 marital relations; while in Europe, and long before, her 
 father and mother mainly supported her; her husband's con- 
 tributions "amounted to nothing" (the witness' language) ; 
 in San Francisco, while staying with her husband at the 
 Cosmopolitan Hotel, her mother paid her board and all her 
 bills; this was in 1868; at the Eureka Hotel, in Oakland, he 
 would procure her bill, and have it made out to her mother, 
 and his own bill separately, and her mother would pay the 
 witness' bill and the husband would pay his own; between 
 the years 1862 and 1868 he was very intemperate, "scarcely 
 drew- a sober breath during that time"; that was his mode 
 of life, witness said she might say, as far back as 1854; his 
 sober intervals were rare ; she tried to conceal this, and shield 
 him all she possibly could, and she reared her daughter to 
 respect him. This is a summary of her story of domestic 
 infelicities. 
 
 Mr. Van Voorhies, on recall, denied that from 1857 to 
 1862 his mother paid all his expenses or those of his wife; 
 but thought his mother in law advanced money to aid him to 
 go to Aurora, and the money for her and child to go to 
 Europe; he did not remember that he accompanied them to 
 Sacramento, nor that he took $100 from her of that money, 
 but would not deny it if his former wife said so : he would be- 
 lieve her; his condition was such while his wife was in 
 Europe that he could not support his wife and child, no 
 matter how cheaply they were living; but while they were 
 in Europe property they had bought with money he liad 
 supplied them was mortgaged to raise money to pay their 
 expenses in Europe; he reiterated that his relations with her 
 at all times had been agreeable; they continued to he so; 
 the correspondence between them continued until a month or 
 two prior to her return from Europe, she returned from 
 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. I — 30
 
 466 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 Europe incognito, and witness did not know when she came 
 until he was advised by Col. Coffee that she was in San 
 Francisco. Their relations, notwithstanding their tender 
 correspondence, seem to have terminated here in fact, and 
 in law they were shortly afterward separated in 1877. 
 
 A Mr. Wood was introduced to prove remittances from 
 Aurora by Mr. Van Voorhies, and the fact that ]\Irs, Van 
 Voorhies had large amounts of valuable mining stocks stand- 
 ing in her name, which he believed was hers; but this testi- 
 mony was contradicted by Mrs. Caroline McDougal and Mrs. 
 Van Voorhies, who swore that the property belonged to Mrs. 
 Caroline McDougal. 
 
 Mrs. Kate Coffee McDougal was recalled, and testified that 
 her husband, Charles J. McDougal, kept accounts and man- 
 aged the property "back of Tubbs' Hotel"; and witness 
 identified a book produced by petitioner as an account-book, 
 and that certain entries were made by him in her presence 
 and at the instance of Mrs. Caroline McDougal before she 
 went to Europe ; this book, it is claimed, contained an account 
 of all the property that Mrs. McDougal possessed at that 
 time, and that Mrs. Van Voorhies possessed; also the direc- 
 tions that Mrs. McDougal gave him at the time as to the 
 management of the property and what she wanted done with 
 it, and a full and complete account of everything, of what 
 the lots sold for, and all appertaining to the business (vol. 
 3, Keporter's Notes, pencil page 6). Witness said the instruc- 
 tions and directions were set down in her presence. 
 
 Mrs. Caroline McDougal, being called, said she never saw 
 this account-book before; the items therein were never made 
 in her presence, and -the account was never made in her 
 presence ; when witness went to Europe she left everything in 
 her son's hands, and she didn't positively know if she said 
 anything about the particular property "back of Tubbs' 
 Hotel," she considered it of so little importance, and her 
 daughter always told her if she wanted money to sell the lot 
 and not be cramped for money; it yielded only road assess- 
 ments, which witness had to pay as her daughter had no 
 money. Witness repeated the mode of acquisition by her 
 daughter of the money wherewith the property was pur-
 
 Estate of McDougal. 467 
 
 chased ; David IMcDougal, witness ' husband, gave his daughter 
 $100 at one time to buy a winter cloak, and she put it by, 
 and he frequently gave her small sums, ten or twenty dollars, 
 which she saved, and with the savings bought this property 
 in 1862. 
 
 j\Ir. W. K. Van Alen testified that he knew the history of 
 the property in question, and that they all said that piece 
 of property belonged to Mrs. Van Voorhies. Mr. Van Alen 
 was the agent of the family. 
 
 The petitioner claims that the whole story of the purchase 
 for $200, in 1862, by Mrs. Van Voorhies, is falsified by the 
 testimony of Mrs. Kate Coffee McDougal, corroborated by 
 the account-book kept by Charles J. McDougal ; by the letters 
 from Mrs. Van Voorhies, while in Europe, to her husband; 
 by the testimony of Mr. Van Voorhies; by the remittances 
 from him to her. 
 
 Mrs. Kate Coffee McDougal's testimony, standing by 
 itself, lacks clearness and certainty in its details, and it 
 would be contrary to all rules of evidence to accept it, with- 
 out corroboration, as against adverse evidence, positive and 
 particular in its nature and without successful assailment, 
 and going to the fact itself of the purchase of the property 
 with the means and in the manner testified by the opposing 
 witnesses. It is claimed by petitioner that the testimony of 
 Mrs. Kate Coffee McDougal is corroborated by the account- 
 book of Charles J. McDougal, and by the statements or 
 memoranda contained therein, written in purple ink on four 
 separate pages, the whole of which I here transcribe : 
 
 ''Mrs. Caroline McDougal possesses the following property, 
 viz. : 
 
 "Three houses and lots, corner of Waverly Place and 
 Sacramento street, unincumbered. 
 
 "Block E in the Whitcher Tract, in the Township of Oak- 
 land, Alameda County, on which is a mortgage held by the 
 Savings & Loan Society of San Francisco for $4,000. Inter- 
 est at the rate of li/4 per cent, per month, payable monthly. 
 The note for the above sum falls due on the 28th November, 
 1870. W. K. Van Alen attends to this, pays interest, etc.
 
 468 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 "Southern half of Block 142, County of Alameda, Town 
 of Clinton, unincumbered. A man named Russel has had 
 the use of this land on payment of the taxes. 
 
 "Two lots in the Excelsior Homestead Association in San 
 Francisco, unincumbered," on one page. 
 
 On the next page : 
 
 "Thirty shares stock Vallejo Savings and Commercial 
 Bank. Fifteen per cent, of the par value has been paid on 
 this stock, amounting to $450. 
 
 "Block 20, Town of Brooklyn, Alameda County. This 
 block is in the name of Mrs. Caroline McDougal, but belongs 
 to Mrs. D. W. Van Voorhies. This block is mortgaged for 
 $3,000 to Lovell Hardy, Esq., interest at the rate of V/^ per 
 cent., payable quarterly. On the 14th November, 1870, the 
 next pa.^Tnent of interest, $112.50, is due. 
 
 "One lot in the Excelsior Homestead, standing in the name 
 of Mrs. D. W. Van Voorhies; and two lots numbered 1,025 
 and 1,030 on Gift Map No. 3, in the name of Mary Caroline 
 Van Voorhies; and four lots numbered 1,069, 1,071, 1,073 
 and 1,075 on Gift Map No. 8, in the name of Margaret Stock- 
 ton McDougal. Mrs. McDougal has the care." 
 
 On another page : 
 
 "Pays taxes on, etc. These lots are known as Harvey 
 Brown's $10 lots." 
 
 On another page : 
 
 ' ' GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS. 
 
 "If possible, the Whitcher Tract, or any part of it, is to 
 be sold to pay off the $4,000 mortgage. $12,000 is the price 
 of the entire tract, a smaller quantity at a proportionate price. 
 The result of any sale of this property to go toward satisfy- 
 ing the mortgage. 
 
 "Block 20, in Clinton, is to be sold if possible, and the 
 proceeds used to satisfy the mortgage on it for $3,000, held 
 by L. J. Hardy, Esq. $10,000 is the price of the block." 
 
 And on a fifth other page is the following: 
 "Mrs. D. W. Van Voorhies owns three houses and lots on 
 Silver street, numbered 25, 27 and 29, on which there is a
 
 Estate op McDougal. 469 
 
 mortgage for $6,000, held by the Savings and Loan Society 
 on Clay street, Mr. Burr, President; interest at the rate one 
 per cent, per month. The interest is paid by W. K. Van 
 Alen, who attends to the property and collects the rent of 
 houses Nos. 25 and 29. House rent of No. 27 is paid to C. 
 J. McDougal. 
 
 "At present the following rents are received from this 
 property : 
 
 "House 25 $35 00 
 
 House 27 27 50 
 
 House 29 50 00." 
 
 The foregoing is, as nearly as practicable, a literal tran- 
 scription of that portion of Charles J. McDougal 's account- 
 book, said to have been taken down by him at the instance 
 of and in the presence of Mrs. Caroline McDougal, and in 
 presence of Mrs. Kate C. McDougal; and for the purpose of 
 illustrating the comments of the court, I will insert, from the 
 testimony of the last named lady, an extract from the Re- 
 porter's Notes, after the introduction and reading of the fore- 
 going : 
 
 "Q. (By Petitioner.) This is entered by your husband? 
 
 "A. That is my husband's handwriting; his own account. 
 
 "By the Court. Did you say that all these entries Avere 
 made in your presence? 
 
 'A. That was the instructions and directions. 
 'By Mr. Van Loben Sels. Were you present when these 
 instructions were given and taken down? 
 
 "A. Yes, sir; I was present when they were taken down. 
 
 "The Court. There are no dates to them. 
 
 "Witness. There are dates. 
 
 "The Court. Not in the articles you have read. 
 
 "A. Not in the articles I have read. 
 
 "Mr. Van Loben Sels. The book is allowed to go in by 
 the gentleman on the other side. 
 
 "Mr. Le Breton. I do not see any date to it, and so it 
 goes in only for what it is worth. 
 
 "Q. Now, Mrs. McDougal, can you state about the time 
 when those instructions were given and taken down? 

 
 470 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 "A. At the time of Mrs. McDougal's departure for Europo. 
 
 "Q. What time about was that? 
 
 "A. I think it was in 1870, in the fall. 
 
 "Q. About that time? 
 
 "A. In the fall of 1870." 
 
 Now, the account-book coming in without objection, "for 
 what it is worth," the question is, "What is it worth in cor- 
 roboration of Mrs. Kate Coffee McDougal, and in proof of 
 the claim here made as to the actual property? If the in- 
 troduction of this account-book had been objected to, it is 
 difficult to understand upon what principle or rule of evi- 
 dence its admission could be sustained. I have examined 
 carefully the code and treatises, with a view of ascertaining 
 accurately how this book should be treated, without arriv- 
 ing at any conclusion favorable to its admission; but it is in, 
 and is to be considered for "what it is worth." 
 
 In the argument of counsel for petitioner, great stress was 
 laid upon this memorandum or account-book, as corrobora- 
 tive of Mrs. Kate Coffee McDougal, and contradictory of the 
 adverse witnesses. The book contains certain memoranda 
 claimed to have been set down by dictation of Mrs. Caro- 
 line McDougal. Are its contents as to these memoranda to 
 be treated as her declaration as to the property "back of 
 Tubbs' Hotel"? That is the only pretext for its considera- 
 tion. What does it establish? There is no date to that por- 
 tion which Mrs. Kate Coffee McDougal testified was taken 
 down at the dictation of Mrs. Caroline McDougal. There 
 is a considerable blank before the first page in purple ink, 
 and a page or two after the fifth page in purple ink, before 
 the next entry, which is in another colored ink. As the 
 court remarked, in that portion of the testimony of Mrs. Kate 
 Coffee McDougal hereinbefore quoted, there are no dates to 
 that portion of the book taken down (as testified) in the pres- 
 ence of Mrs. Kate C. McDougal, and by direction of Mrs. 
 Caroline McDougal; but the former witness says that the 
 matter was written at the time of Mrs. Caroline McDougal 's 
 departure for Europe, "in the fall of 1870." 
 
 This evidence of Mrs. Kate McDougal is met by the denial 
 of Mrs. Caroline McDougal of any knowledge of the book
 
 Estate or McDougal. 471 
 
 or of its contents, or of any interview with her son such as 
 was stated, at which the entries were taken down. 
 
 Now, assuming the fact to be as stated, irrespective of the 
 flat denial by the party charged with making the admissions 
 contained in those entries or memoranda, what do the entries 
 impart ? 
 
 The purple ink memoranda begin: "Mrs. Caroline Mc- 
 Dougal possesses the following property, viz.": then follows 
 enumeration including the property in question. It is a fact 
 that Mrs. Caroline McDougal did "possess" that property, 
 in so far as holding it in her name, so that that statement 
 cannot operate as a negation of the ownership by Mrs. Van 
 Voorhies; but on the page following the "general instruc- 
 tions" is the statement: "Mrs. D. W. Van Voorhies owns 
 three houses and lots," etc. Here the writer seemed, by his 
 manner of entering the memoranda, to make a distinction 
 between the "possession" of property and the "ownership." 
 Is there any argument deducible from the omission in this 
 last referred to page, of the property back of Tubbs' Hotel? 
 Certainly no implication injurious to the right of Mrs. Van 
 Voorhies can arise therefrom, because there is no doubt she 
 had nothing to do with the making of the memoranda; at 
 that time she was in Europe. But it is true Mrs. Caroline 
 McDougal possessed that property, and did so in the man- 
 ner always, from the time of its alleged purchase, as testi- 
 fied to, until the conveyance to Mrs. D. W. Van Voorhies; 
 but so far as these memoranda are concerned, it is worth 
 while to consider critically how far they impute to her "owner- 
 ship." If these memoranda were all made at one time — the 
 memoranda embraced in these five pages — there must have 
 been some distinction running through the mind of the writer 
 as to "possession" and "ownership." But the utmost im- 
 portance that can attach to these entries is their significance 
 as admissions by Mrs. Caroline IMcDougal. They are not 
 the declarations of the deceased, Charles J. I\rcDougal, for 
 they come under no rule entitling them to be so considered. 
 If they have any value, they are the admissions of Mrs. Caro- 
 line ^McDougal, and are to be considered as of no greater 
 worth than if the writer were living and orally testifying to
 
 472 Coffey ^s Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 them. They are of no more account than any other verbal 
 admissions, which, as the treatises on evidence repeatedly 
 remark, ought to be received with great caution, as it is sub- 
 ject to much imperfection and mistake, the party himself 
 either being misinformed or not having clearly expressed his 
 own meaning or the witness having misunderstood. 
 
 Another point in which this testimony may be considered 
 and criticised: At the time of the admission or entry, it was 
 in favor of and not against the interest of the party who, it 
 is claimed, dictated it, and such declaration might be assailed 
 as disentitled to consideration on that account. 
 
 The statute, also, in treating of the effect of evidence, de- 
 clares that the evidence of the oral admissions of a party 
 must be received with caution: Code Civ. Proc, sec. 2061. 
 But how could the admission of Mrs. Caroline McDougal 
 in her own favor charge the property of Mrs. Van Voorhies? 
 Or how is the latter to be affected by entries made without 
 her cognition or consent? This character of evidence can- 
 not be too carefully scrutinized or too closely criticised. In 
 all cases it is the most dangerous species of evidence that 
 can be admitted in a court of justice, and the most liable to 
 abuse. In most cases it is impossible, however honest the 
 witness may be, for him to give the exact words in which 
 the declaration or admission was made. Much more might 
 be said to the same purport, but it is not necessary to repeat 
 statements of principles well understood by counsel, or to 
 transcribe from text-books or books of decisions. 
 
 So far as the contents of this memorandum or account- 
 book of Charles J. McDougal are concerned, it could not oc- 
 cupy any place in this controversy without the illustrative 
 testimony of Mrs. Kate Coffee ]\IcDougal. That testimony 
 tends to connect with the entries Mrs. Caroline McDougal, 
 but she denies the whole statement. Oath opposed to oath, 
 so far as that interview is concerned, if all other things are 
 equal, the charge must fall. As to the import and import- 
 ance of its contents, enough has been said. 
 
 The title stood in the name of Mrs. Caroline McDougal. 
 it was "possessed" by her, and at the time indicated in the 
 testimony it was not esteemed of great value, and the right
 
 Estate op McDougal. 473 
 
 to dispose of it, in case of emergency, was given by Mrs. Van 
 Voorhies to Mrs. Caroline McDougal. It is not remarkable, 
 therefore, that it was treated as if it belonged to the latter. 
 But it is noteworthy that nowhere in the testimony is there 
 any claim or assertion that David McDougal ever laid any 
 claim to its ownership. Repeatedly, and under various con- 
 ditions, has it been reported that he spoke of it as his daugh- 
 ter's property, sometimes, it is said, although this testimony 
 is very vague, as his wife's, but never as his own. The peti- 
 tioner says the recital of a consideration raises a presump- 
 tion in favor of its being community property ; 'the law says 
 that the recital of a consideration is not conclusive as to the 
 fact, and the testimony here is to the effect that Mrs. Caro- 
 line McDougal never paid anything to the grantor, and who- 
 soever paid it, it might be construed as given to her, so that 
 at all events there is something to show it never was com- 
 munity property — no testimony is in to that purport — so 
 that argument as to that is vain ; it is founded at most on a 
 presumption overthrown by evidence, unless the court greatly 
 errs in its view of the testimony. 
 
 With regard to the letters produced from Mrs. Van Voor- 
 hies to her husband, and their effect upon the main item of 
 her testimony, with respect to the purchase of the property, 
 while they show she received some sums of money from him 
 from time to time and breathe a spirit of affection, there is 
 throughout an intimation of straitened circumstances and de- 
 pendence on some other source. One letter, underlined by 
 petitioner in pencil, says: ''I enclose you the last bill I have 
 received for Carrie's schooling, without her music, whicli T 
 wish you would attend to at once. Charlie sent the £7 in his 
 last letter which you intended to go towards her other bill ; 
 but as it is not nearly the sum, I wish you would lose no time 
 in sending the amount of this one." 
 
 The sentences subsequent to this are not underlined: "I 
 find I am ver>^ much cramped for money, but Carrie must 
 have her school bills paid. I can do without a great deal 
 that others have, but Carrie must be educated. It is a sacred 
 duty of a parent to a child, and you are fortunate in only 
 having one, and one. too, who has never cost you very much."
 
 474 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 This is a letter from Florence, November 29th, no year 
 indicated. There are many other sentences in the letters in 
 a similar strain ; also intimations as to his infirmity of in- 
 temperance, and admonitions which, in this opinion, have 
 been already alluded to, and showing without doubt that her 
 condition of mind was not very happy ; that she was in finan- 
 cial straits; that she had other source of subsistence than his 
 contributions afforded. Were their relations cordial, con- 
 trary to her evidence? Do these letters show that, or are 
 they a thin veneering put on, as she said, to "keep up ap- 
 pearances," and to do what she could to maintain an atti- 
 tude of amity on account of her child? Is it not a pregnant 
 fact, supporting her statement on the stand, that from the 
 time she went to Europe until in this very courtroom in this 
 controversy, she never saw her husband, and marital rela- 
 tions were never resumed, and, although writing tender mis- 
 sives until within a month of her return to this city, she 
 came incognito, and neither sought the other out? 
 
 Is it not, also, to be w^eighed that he himself testified that 
 he could not, by reason of his condition, support her while 
 in Europe ; that such money as he sent came from another 
 source; that he was furnished with funds to go to Aurora 
 by her mother, the executrix here; that the money he sent 
 from Aurora went to purchase the property in front of 
 Tubbs ' Hotel ; that her mother gave her funds to go with 
 her and his child to Europe; that he took $100 of that 
 money from her; that during a long period, from 1857 to 
 the time of the dissolution of the community, his habits were 
 such as to destroy his ability to support her, and that it is 
 in proof that was largely, at least, if not mainly or wholly, 
 dependent upon her parents? I am requested to disregard 
 the testimony of Mrs. Van Voorhies as to the purchase of 
 the property, because of her contradictions in the respect of 
 the letters and her relations with her husband, and remit- 
 tances from her husband, and certain other remittances; but 
 the testimony must be regarded as a whole, and the court 
 is not warranted in imputing inveracity to a witness, un- 
 less it appears that willful falsehood has been told. "A 
 witness false in one part of his testimony is to be dis-
 
 Estate of McDougal. 475 
 
 trusted"; but the court should be satisfied that the witness 
 has testified falsely, and then the evidence must be distrusted. 
 To distrust and reject utterly may be discriminated; but 
 it is unnecessary to discuss the meaning of terms, if the 
 substance of her statement be corroborated. There is no in- 
 herent improbability in the story of the purchase; the price 
 was not inadequate; the motive was not incredible; the 
 means of acquiring the money to purchase were such as 
 might well be believed; the deposit of title in her mother 
 in itself, as a prudential measure, was not an extraordinary 
 act. She swears she bought it in the manner, and with the 
 money acquired as already told; her mother tells a like tale; 
 her sister confirms her story as to the reputation of owner- 
 ship in the family, and what her father told her (vol. 2, 
 Reporter's Notes, p. 4) ; Mr. Le Breton testifies in the same 
 strain ; but the petitioner says all the testimony must be re- 
 jected; because they are concerned with the executrix. The 
 court cannot perceive how Mr. Le Breton and his wife can 
 be interested in the appropriation of these assets, and the 
 court must apply legal rules in testing such questions; but 
 there are circumstances of corroboration in the testimony 
 of Mr. Van Alen, already referred to, and in the testimony 
 of one of the Pattens, called by petitioner, and in the testi- 
 mony of Hezekiah P. Jones, called by petitioner, from whom 
 Mrs. Van Voorhies claimed to have made the purchase; and, 
 in the same connection, it ought to be noted that there was 
 no attempt apparent, upon the part of respondent, to shut 
 out testimony; and much has come in that might have been 
 questioned with respect to relevancy and competency. A 
 disposition to meet and not to evade the issue was so far 
 manifested. 
 
 It was incumbent upon petitioner to maintain his charge 
 by a preponderance of proof. The obligation of proving 
 any fact lies upon the party who substantiality asserts the 
 affirmative of the issue. This is a familiar and cardinal rule 
 of evidence. Has the petitioner complied with this legal obli- 
 gation? His own opinion of his success may be quoted from 
 his first brief (page 31), and it is here inserted: "We re- 
 peat what we stated in our argument: If the fraud and in- 
 competency proven in this case are not sufficient to convince
 
 476 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 the court of the unfitness of the executrix for her trust, let 
 these provisions, under which we proceed, be stricken from 
 the statute book, and let it be known to litigants that such 
 is the case. It will thenceforth be safe for any number of 
 heirs, actuated by selfish motives, to conspire and spirit 
 away property belonging to an estate, and although it may 
 then be proven from old residents, from old family records 
 and memoranda, accounts from old agents, that the property 
 for over twenty years belonged to the estate, that as such 
 all acts of ownership were performed by the deceased, and 
 although the veracity of the conspiring heirs has been at- 
 tacked by contradicting their testimony in almost every 
 point, in a most convincing manner, let it be known that it 
 will be sufficient for those heirs to deny, and to concoct a 
 theory of their own, uncorroborated by any testimony or any 
 document to insure for them immunity for their covin, and 
 the court will pronounce them proper persons to hold posi- 
 tions of honor and trust." 
 
 Most assuredly, if the counsel's assumptions of the facts 
 established here were well based, this court would make no 
 such announcements ; and whatever announcement the court 
 makes, it must respond to the touchstone of evidence and 
 the rules by which evidence is tested. But, in the opinion 
 of the court, the counsel errs in assuming so much as proved 
 "from old residents"; it is not proved by the Pattens, nor 
 by Van Alen, for their testimony tends in a contrary direc- 
 tion ; ' ' old family records " I do not understand to be in 
 evidence, the evidential character of the account-book of 
 Charles J. McDougal has been already discussed by the 
 court; "accounts from old agents that the property for over 
 twenty years belonged to the estate, that as such all acts of 
 ownership were performed by the deceased ' ' ; this is an er- 
 roneous assumption of counsel; for the twenty years alluded 
 to the deceased never claimed or acted as owner, nor was the 
 property at any time in his name; there is no evidence here 
 that he asserted title in himself, the most that can be claimed 
 is that he said it was Mrs. McDougal's; but I have already 
 dwelt upon this point, also upon the quantity and quality 
 of the evidence for the respondent, which, in my view of the 
 law of evidence, I am compelled to consider preponderant
 
 Estate of McDougal. 477 
 
 as to the point of the purchase of the property. Of course, 
 if I am warranted in finding the story of the purchase, told 
 by Mrs. Van Voorhies, sustained by the whole evidence, the 
 charge of covinous conduct against this executrix must fall. 
 This disposes of the last charge specified. 
 
 I do not think the charge generally of incompetency and 
 mismanagement is supported by proofs. The executrix may 
 have been in some instances misadvised by counsel, as to 
 the making up of the inventory, for example, and the ap- 
 plication for allowance as to the amount, and there may be 
 in our mind an unfriendly feeling toward the mother of the 
 minors, vfho is striving to obtain what she can by legal 
 means for her children ; but the court cannot for those rea- 
 sons of sentiment adjudge the executrix incompetent. The 
 court will endeavor to conserve the interests of the minors, 
 and will, at all times, aid their attorney in obtaining for 
 them their full rights; and it is proper here to say that any 
 application in that behalf will be welcomed by this court, 
 which regards with the highest favor, as such courts should 
 always regard, the claims of minor heirs. Impressed with 
 the conviction that the petitioner began and has prosecuted 
 this proceeding in good faith and upon grounds apparently 
 justifying it; and recognizing the force of his argument 
 that the adverse counsel should have shown greater consid- 
 eration, courtesy and candor toward the mother of the 
 minors, who is entitled to be treated with respect, and has 
 an incontestable legal right to urge the claims of her chil- 
 dren; and, also, believing that if the counsel for the execu- 
 trix had advised her that the petitioner was at least mor- 
 ally entitled to be enlightened as to all the facts eompul- 
 sorily developed in this investigation, and that, therefore, a 
 certain responsibility for this proceeding rests upon the re- 
 spondent, the costs are imposed upon her, and with this un- 
 derstanding the petition must be denied. Let findings be 
 prepared to correspond with the conclusions herein an- 
 nounced.
 
 478 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 Estate of ROBERT J. TIFFANY, Deceased. 
 [No 5,317; decided December 24, 1887.] 
 
 Will — Testamentary Capacity — Intoxication. — A man temporarily 
 overcome by a single debauch is, for the time being, of unsound 
 mind, and has not testamentary capacity; so a person to whom in- 
 toxication has become such a habit that his intellect is disordered 
 and he has lost the rational control of his mental faculties, is of 
 unsound mind. 
 
 Will Contest. — Where the Questions of Unsoundness of Mind and 
 Undue Influence are presented in the same case, and in their con- 
 sideration may overlap one the other, it has been said that as legal 
 propositions they are to be kept distinct and apart. But considering 
 the two issues together, it is noted that although mere weakness of 
 intellect does not prove undue influence, yet it may be that in such 
 feeble state, with the mind weakened by sickness, dissipation or age, 
 the testator more readily and easily becomes the victim of the im- 
 proper influences of those who see fit to practice upon him. 
 
 Will — Unreasonableness does not Vitiate. — The will of one having 
 testamentary capacity cannot be avoided because unaccountably con- 
 trary to the common sense of the country. If not contrary to the 
 law, it stands for the descent of his property, whether his reasons 
 for it are good or bad, provided they are his own reasons, not in- 
 fluenced by the unlawful influence of others. 
 
 Will — ^Undue Influence. — There is a Distinction Between the In- 
 fluence of a Lawful Relation and that of an unlawful relation. A 
 lawful influence, such as that arising from legitimate family and 
 social relations, must be allowed to produce its natural results, even 
 in influencing the execution of a will. However great the influence 
 thus generated, there is no taint of unlawfulness in it; nor can 
 there be any presumption of its unlawful exercise merely because 
 it is known to have existed and to have manifestly operated on the 
 testator's mind as a reason for his testamentary disposition. It is 
 only when such influence is exerted over the very act of devising, 
 preventing the will from being truly the testator's act, that the law 
 condemns it as vicious. 
 
 Will — Undue Influence. — While the Natural Influence of a Lawful 
 Relation must be lawful, even where affecting testamentary disposi- 
 tions, the natural or ordinary influence of an unlawful relation must be 
 unlawful, in so far as it affects testamentary dispositions favorably 
 to the unlawful relations and unfavorably to the lawful heirs. So, 
 it would be doing violence to the morality of the law, and thus to 
 the law itself, if courts should apply the rule recognizing the natural 
 influence arising out of legitimate relationship to unlawful as well as
 
 Estate of Tiffany. 479 
 
 to lawful relations; and thereby make them both equal, in this re- 
 gard at least, which is contrary to their very nature. 
 
 Maxim. — No One Shall Derive any Profit, Through the Law, by the 
 influence of an unlawful action or relation. 
 
 Wills — Undue Influence. — If the Law Always Suspects and Inex- 
 orably Condemns undue influence, and presumes it from the nature 
 of the transaction, in the legitimate relations of attorney, guardian 
 and trustee, much more sternly should it deal with unlawful rela- 
 tions, where they are, in their nature, relations of influence over the 
 kind of act under investigation. In their legitimate operation, trust 
 positions of influence are respected; but where apparently used for 
 selfish advantage they are viewed with deep suspicion; and it would 
 be strange if unlawful relations should be more favorably regarded. 
 
 WiU — ^Undue Influence. — General Cases and Authorities, as to what 
 does and what does not constitute undue influence, are inapplicable in 
 a case where the influence charged originated and was exercised under 
 an unlawful relation. 
 
 Will — Insane Delusion. — If a Person Persistently Believes Supposed 
 Facts which have no real existence except in his perverted imagina- 
 tion, and against all evidence and probability, and conducts him- 
 self, however logically, upon the assumption of their existence, he 
 is, as far as they are concerned, under a morbid delusion; and de- 
 lusion in that sense is insanity. So, if a testator labored under such 
 a delusion in respect to his wife and family connections, who would 
 naturally have been the objects of his testamentary bounty, and the 
 court can see that the dispository provisions of his alleged will were 
 or might have been caused or affected by the delusion, the instru- 
 ment is not his will. 
 
 Will — Evidence of Undue Influence. — Upon the issue of undue in- 
 fluence in the execution of wills, the evidence must often be indirect 
 and circumstantial. Very seldom does it occur that a direct act of 
 influence is patent; persons intending to control the actions of an- 
 other, especially as to wills, do not proclaim the intent. The ex- 
 istence of the influence must generally be gathered from circum- 
 stances, such as whether the testator formerly intended a dift'erent 
 disposition; whether he was surrounded by those having an object 
 to accomplish, to the exclusion of others; whether he was of such 
 weak mind as to be subject to influence; whether the instrument is 
 such as would probably be urged upon him by those around him; 
 whether they are benefited to the exclusion of formerly intended 
 beneficiaries. 
 
 W'ill — Intoxication and Undue Influence. — The testator in this case 
 had been a prominent and respected citizen, but for some years be- 
 fore his death he became an habitual drunkard, and after becoming 
 such his whole being changed witli respect to his affection for his 
 wife and children, as well also in his personal habits and his social
 
 480 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 nature and disposition. During this period lie became acquainted, 
 while taken away from home, with a woman whom he permitted to act 
 as his nurse; and who subsequently obtained a control over him, to 
 the exclusion of his family, and so that he never again returned to 
 his wife or children. Six months before his death he executed a will 
 wherein this woman was made residuary legatee, and for nearly all 
 his estate; his wife and children were expressly excluded by the in- 
 strument. They contested the probate of the will, and tendered as is- 
 sues unsoundness of mind, and undue influence exercised by the 
 residuary legatee. The court found in favor of the contestants upon 
 both issues, and denied the probate of the will. 
 
 W. W. Foote and T. C. Coogan, for contestants. 
 
 E. N. Deuprey, for respondents and proponents, J. W. 
 Brumagim and W. M. Pierson. 
 
 COFFEY, J. On the tenth day of June, 1886, there was 
 filed in this court the petition of William M. Pierson and 
 John AV. Brumagim, setting forth that Robert Joyce Tiffany 
 died on the sixth day of June, 1886 ; that he was a resident, 
 at the time of his death, of the city and county of San Fran- 
 cisco, state of California, and left an estate in said city and 
 county consisting of real and personal property, the real 
 estate consisting of about fourteen parcels of land, one par- 
 eel of land improved with buildings and the others vacant; 
 that the improved real estate brings in a rental of about 
 $200 a month, all of which real estate is valued at about 
 $30,000, and personal property at about $500; all of which 
 real and personal property is alleged to be the separate 
 property of the deceased. That said deceased left a will 
 dated the 15th of November, 1885, and a codicil bearing the 
 date the 15th of December, 1885, in the possession of the 
 petitioner, Pierson, which the petitioners believe and allege 
 to be the last will and testament of the deceased; that the 
 petitioners, Pierson and Brumagim, are named in said will 
 as executors; that Cecilia Harvey McGregor, infant daugh- 
 ter of Emma M. McGregor, Alice Tiffany, the Old People's 
 Home of San Francisco, the managers of the Kindergarten 
 School on Mission street near Twenty-ninth street, San 
 Francisco, the Boys' and Girls' Aid Society of San Fran- 
 cisco, Willie Patterson, Mrs. John Marshall and Mrs. Lura 
 Churchill are named in said will as legatees and devisees;
 
 Estate of Tiffany. 481 
 
 that said Cecilia Harvey McGregor and Willie Patterson 
 are minors, and reside in said city and county of San Fran- 
 cisco ; that Alice Tiffany is the adult sister of the deceased, 
 and resides out of the state of California, and in the state 
 of New York; that Mrs. John Marshall and Mrs. Lura 
 Churchill are adults and reside in San Francisco; that the 
 said Old People's Home, the managers of said Kindergarten 
 School and the Boys' and Girls' Aid Society are charitable 
 and educational institutions existing in San Francisco ; that 
 the subscribing witnesses to said will are Walter B. Ander- 
 son and Charles Rowell, and to said codicil George W. Rey- 
 nolds and S. H. Regensburger, all residing in San Francisco; 
 that the next of kin of said testator and his heirs at law are ; 
 Phoebe Jane Tiffany, his surviving wife, Peer Tiffany and 
 William Tiffany, his sons of adult years, and his daughter 
 Emma M. McGregor, of adult years, residing in said city 
 and county; that at the time said will was executed, to wit, 
 on said fifteenth day of November, 1885, and at the time 
 said codicil was executed on said fifteenth day of Decem- 
 ber, 1885, the said testator was over the age of eighteen 
 years of age, to wit, over sixty years, and was of sound and 
 disposing mind and not acting under duress, menace, undue 
 influence or fraud, and in every respect was competent by 
 last will to dispose of all his estate, and that said will was 
 duly executed according to law. Wherefore, the petitioners 
 pray that the will and codicil be admitted to probate. 
 
 The will and codicil referred to in the foregoing petition 
 are in the following words: 
 
 "(1.) I bequeath to said Cecilia Harvey McGregor, my 
 grandchild, the daughter of my daughter Emma M. Mc- 
 Gregor, the sum of five hundred dollars, to be paid to the 
 said Emma M. McGregor for the use of her said daughter. 
 
 " (2.) I bequeath to my sister, Alice Tiffany, five hundred 
 dollars. 
 
 " (3.) I bequeath to the Old People's Home of San Fran- 
 cisco five hundred dollars. 
 
 "(4.) I bequeath to the Manager or Managers of the 
 Kindergarten School on IMission street, near Twenty-ninth 
 street, San Francisco, five hundred dollars. 
 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. I — 31
 
 482 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 "(5.) I bequeath to the Boys' and Girls' Aid Society of 
 San Francisco five hundred dollars. 
 
 "(6.) I direct that a scholarship in the best business col- 
 lege in San Francisco be bought by my executors in the 
 name and for the benefit of little "Willie Patterson, the 
 grandson of P. J. Cody. 
 
 " (7.) All the rest and residue of my real estate, personal 
 and mixed, I devise and bequeath to Mrs. Lura A. Churchill, 
 who has been to me in all my sickness a true and tender 
 friend and nurse. 
 
 "(8.) Should any of the bequests to any of the educa- 
 tional or charitable organizations in this will fail for any 
 reason, then such bequests are to go into the rest and resi- 
 due of my estate. 
 
 '' (9.) I have made no provision in this will for my wife, 
 nor for my children. Peer, William and Emma, for the rea- 
 son that by a deed and agreement of separation made some 
 years ago between myself and wife, she was fully provided 
 for, and for the further reason that the conduct of my said 
 wife and children towards me since that time does not com- 
 mend them, or either of them, to my consideration. 
 
 ' ' ( 10. ) I now make and appoint John W. Brumagim and 
 William M. Pierson the executors of this will, and direct 
 that no bonds be required of them for the performance of 
 their duties as such executors ; and I further direct that if 
 it shall be considered advisable by my said executors to sell 
 all or any portion of my estate, they may do so without the 
 order of any Court. 
 
 "In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and 
 seal, this fifteenth day of November, in the year eighteen 
 hundred and eighty-five. 
 
 "[Seal] R. J. TIFFANY. " 
 
 (Here follows attestation clause.) 
 
 ' ' Witnesses : 
 
 "WALTER B. ANDERSON, 426 Kearny Street. 
 "CHARLES ROWELL, 1330 Pine Street. 
 "By this codicil to the above last will and testament, I 
 bequeath to Mrs. John W. Marshall, of San Francisco, the
 
 Estate of Tiffany. 483 
 
 sum of five hundred dollars, and in all other respects con- 
 firm and publish said will. 
 
 "San Francisco, December 15, 1885." 
 
 (Here follows attestation clause.) 
 
 ' * Witnesses : 
 ''GEORGE W. REYNOLDS, 609 Sacramento Street. 
 "S. H. REGENSBURGER, 2141/2 Grove Street." 
 
 STATEMENT OF CONTEST. 
 
 On the fifteenth day of September, 1886, there was filed 
 an amended contest by the widow and children of the de- 
 ceased to the probate of the instruments hereinabove copied, 
 in which were alleged as reasons for contest and grounds 
 of opposition (1) that at the time of the execution of said 
 will and of the codicil said deceased was not competent to 
 execute said will or said codicil and was not at either of 
 said times of sound and disposing mind, but was incompe- 
 tent to execute said will or said codicil, he being at both said 
 times insane; (2) that at both the times last above mentioned 
 said deceased was, and for many years prior thereto had 
 been, habitually intemperate from the excessive use of in- 
 toxicating liquors, and was by reason thereof incapacitated 
 from and incompetent to execute said will and said codicil. 
 And, for a further and separate ground of opposition and 
 contest, it was alleged that at the time of the execution of 
 the said will and codicil the said deceased was not free from 
 duress, menace, fraud and undue influence, but said de- 
 ceased was at both times unduly influenced by the residuary 
 legatee named in said will to execute both said will and said 
 codicil; and in support of the allegation of undue influence 
 on the part of the residuaiy legatee the contestants allege as 
 follows, that : 
 
 (a) Prior to the execution of said will and said codicil 
 the said residuary legatee induced the deceased to separate 
 from his said wife and children, and to occupy the same 
 apartments occupied by her at a lodging-house situated at 
 the southeast corner of Fifth and Market streets, in the city 
 and county of San Francisco, and thereafter prevailed upon 
 the deceased to continue his said separation and occupation
 
 484 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 of said apartments with her, and he was so occupying them 
 at the times of the execution of said will and said codicil. 
 
 (&) Prior to the execution of said will and said codicil, 
 and prior to the time he separated from his wife and chil- 
 dren, and while he was so living separate from them, as last 
 above stated, the said residuary legatee poisoned the mind 
 of the deceased against the contestants by falsely asserting 
 to the deceased that the contestants had caused him, the de- 
 ceased, to be placed in an insane asylum and in the Home 
 for the Inebriates, situated in the city and county of San 
 Francisco, without any cause; and that they, the contest- 
 ants, were inimical to him, and would again place him in 
 an insane asylum or Home for the Inebriates if he should 
 return and live with his wife and children ; that deceased be- 
 lieved these assertions of the residuary legatee, and at the 
 times of the execution of said will and said codicil the de- 
 ceased was laboring under the delusion that they were true; 
 and the contestants allege that said assertions, each and all 
 of them, were false, and known to the residuary legatee to 
 be such. 
 
 (c) Prior to the execution of said will and said codicil 
 said residuary legatee abused contestants in the presence of 
 deceased, and told him that contestants had turned him out 
 of his own home and into the streets; that contestants had 
 no love for him, and that she was the only true friend that 
 he had; and that the reason why contestants desired the de- 
 ceased to live again with his wife and children was that 
 they, the contestants, might thereby obtain control of his 
 property, and, if they did so, they would then turn him into 
 the streets penniless ; and at the times last above mentioned 
 said deceased was laboring under the delusion that these 
 statements were true; and the contestants allege that said 
 assertions, each and all of them, were false, and known to 
 the residuary legatee to be such. 
 
 (d) While deceased was living at the same apartments as 
 the residuary legatee, as above stated, and for some time 
 prior to the execution of the said will or codicil, and even 
 subsequent thereto, said residuary legatee was not willing 
 that any of the contestants should see the deceased except
 
 Estate of Tiffany. 485 
 
 in her presence ; and on one occasion she ordered his said 
 wife out of the said apartments, and told deceased, in the 
 presence and hearing of his wife, that he must choose be- 
 tween "that woman," referring to his, deceased's, wife, and 
 herself. 
 
 (e) Prior to the execution of the said will and the codi- 
 cil said residuary legatee persuaded deceased to transfer to 
 her, without any consideration, certain of his real estate and 
 certain of his personal property ; that she concealed all these 
 transfers from contestants, and at the times of the execu- 
 tion of said will and the codicil she had complete control 
 of the deceased's mind. 
 
 (/) Said deceased for several years prior to his death was 
 in the habit of using intoxicating liquors to excess, and was 
 easily influenced by anyone who would supply him with such 
 liquors; and that said residuary legatee, contrar^^ to the ad- 
 vice and directions of the physicians of deceased, prior to, 
 at the time of and subsequent to the execution of said will 
 and the codicil, constantly supplied the deceased with intoxi- 
 cating liquors, and thus obtained such control over deceased 
 as to unduly influence him. 
 
 RESPONSE OF PROPONENTS. 
 
 On November 1, 1886, the proponents answering denied 
 generally and specifically each and every of the allegations 
 of the contest. 
 
 The trial of the issues thus joined began on the 18th of 
 January and ended on the 3d of September, 1887, occupy- 
 ing from first to last ninety-two days. Of course this period 
 did not include a continuous consumption of time, for the 
 struggle was intermittent in its character, owing partly to 
 conflicting engagements of one or the other of the counsel, 
 and partly to the demands of other business pressing upon 
 the court. The actual time consumed in the trial and the 
 arguments was about three hundred and fifteen hours, or 
 sixty-three days of five hours each, which was the average 
 daily length of the trial, as appears from the two hundred 
 and thirty-five pages of the legal-cap notes taken by the 
 judge. There were forty-eight Avitnesses examined for con-
 
 486 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 testants, fifty-three for proponents and ten in rebuttal, mak- 
 ing a total of one hundred and eleven. The cause was most 
 stubbornly contested by the counsel for the respective par- 
 ties, and every legitimate weapon of forensic warfare was 
 used with skill and dexterity by the advocates for either side. 
 In such a conflict the vanquished party can attribute the 
 result only to the lack of merit in his cause or to the mis- 
 taken judgment of the judge, who may have failed to weigh 
 accurately the facts or to apply correctly the law. However 
 the court may err, the counsel have capably and conscien- 
 tiously discharged their duty. 
 
 points op controversy. 
 
 This controversy is reduced by the evidence to two points: 
 
 1. Was the testator of unsound mind at the dates of the 
 execution of the instruments propounded as his will and codi- 
 cil? 
 
 2. Was he unduly influenced in the disposition he made 
 of his property by the residuary devisee and legatee named 
 in the said instruments? 
 
 Robert Joyce Tiffany died in San Francisco, June 6, 1886, 
 having been born about sixty-six years prior to that date 
 in Albany, New York. He was married to the contestant, 
 Phoebe, in New York City, April, 1845. He came to Cali- 
 fornia in 1849, and after a few years returned to New York, 
 and came back in 1856. His wife followed him in a few 
 months, and thereafter they lived in domestic harmony in 
 San Francisco until he retired with a considerable fortune 
 from the business of manufacturing and vending hats, in 
 which he engaged on his second advent from New York, in 
 or about 1856. He was also a director in the Savings and 
 Loan Society, a most important and flourishing financial in-, 
 stitution, known popularly as the Clay Street Savings Bank, 
 from 1863 to 1878. Some time after he retired from active 
 employment in the hat business he began a habit of unusual 
 indulgence in liquor, and in the summer of 1878 a trip was 
 made to Europe with a view to correcting this infirmity, and 
 by a temporary separation from unfavorable influences and 
 associations to restore him to his former temperate habits.
 
 Estate of Tiffany. 487 
 
 But the result was not the reform anticipated or hoped for, 
 for upon his return to San Francisco, in the fall of 1878, 
 he resumed his habits of drinking, indulging at times to ex- 
 cess and for protracted periods. Before this time, when it 
 is alleged the radical change occurred in his character, and 
 while he was actively engaged in affairs which demanded 
 regularity and punctuality in performance, the evidence 
 shows that he was a careful and continuously energetic man 
 of business and successful in his pursuit ; he was very neat 
 and precise in dress, courtly and gallant in address, a model 
 of deportment, and a man of reasonable judgment and due 
 discretion in all his concerns. Upon these points, up to a 
 certain time, there is no divergence of testimony. Prior to 
 the present decade the evidence does not indicate that the 
 mind of the decedent had suffered material injury or had 
 become unhinged by abuse of ardent spirits. But about the 
 year 1880 a change began to be observed by many persons 
 among his acquaintances; then those who had previously 
 noted his neatness of apparel and circumspectness of conduct 
 remarked an alteration. About this time he became quite dis- 
 sipated ; he was seen frequently in public under the influence 
 of intoxicants; he was often encountered in shabby habili- 
 ments, and disordered by drink to such a degree that some 
 of his old friends avoided him, his condition and conversa- 
 tion making intercourse intolerable. Herein was a radical 
 change from his earlier years, when he was one of the most 
 amiable and pleasant gentlemen to be met with, refined and 
 polished in manner and utterance. Those who were form- 
 erly entertained by his conversation became disgusted at 
 his coarse and salacious speech and accompanying eccentric- 
 ities of conduct. Many instances are related in the testi- 
 mony for contestants which tend to show a material moral 
 modification of character in the testator from 1880, increas- 
 ing in intensity to the time of his last illness. From the 
 period of his return from Europe, in the latter end of 1878, 
 until his final separation from his wife, the domestic history 
 was one of affliction and trial, caused by his irregularities 
 and the endeavors of his wife and family to reclaim him 
 from his evil courses and associations. The European tour
 
 488 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1, 
 
 failed of its purpose, for upon his return he evinced no im- 
 provement. From that on the family lived at different board- 
 ing-houses; first at the Chamberlain, where they remained 
 until the latter part of 1881 ; this was at the corner of Bush 
 and Stockton streets, when, upon the marriage of his daugh- 
 ter, the family being broken up in a measure, he took a room 
 at Mrs. Harding's, on Taylor street, and his wife went to 
 her daughter's place, and subsequently, at his request, joined 
 her husband; after a month or six weeks he made another 
 change to a Mrs. Allen's, on Powell street, where he and his 
 wife stayed for about a month ; he became very ill there, and 
 was taken to a place in the country in Napa county, where 
 they sojourned for about two months, when, upon his re- 
 quest, they returned to town to attend to some business, and 
 made their stay at their daughter's house; after his return 
 he came in one day and told his family that he had taken 
 rooms at the corner of Fifth and Market streets, at the house 
 of Mrs. Either; this was in September, 1881, and his wife 
 assenting to this arrangement accompanied him to that place. 
 This was the house known as No. 1 Fifth street. Here they 
 remained until November 24, 1881. After the first week at 
 the house 1 Fifth street he became quite sick; he would go 
 out and come home intoxicated, and from that became so 
 very ill that it was thought he would not recover; it was 
 here and during this period that his wife first met Mrs. Lura 
 A. Churchill, the residuary legatee. Upon his recovery from 
 this fit of sickness, which lasted several weeks, he went to 
 the house of his daughter, Mrs. McGregor, and was there 
 several months; for a while he seemed to improve, but after 
 a few months he began again to drink to excess; he became 
 in his demeanor violent to the inmates of the McGregor house- 
 hold; he would get up in the night and alarm the members 
 of the family; he would arise and go to the front door in 
 his night clothes; would go into the kitchen and hunt for 
 the carving knife, declaring his purpose to kill them all ; 
 it was very difficult to quiet him on such occasions ; there 
 appeared to be no provocation proceeding from his family 
 for these outbursts at such times, and it was in striking con- 
 trast to his former conduct toward them — before liquor had
 
 Estate of Tiffany. 489 
 
 made him its victim he was always kind and loving to his 
 wife and children; after that he became the reverse. Many 
 instances are recited in the testimony showing the growth 
 and progress of the disease, which finally, it is claimed, un- 
 balanced his mind to such an extent as to destroy testamen- 
 tary capacity. On one occasion at the Chamberlain house, 
 in October, 1880, he entered his son William's room at 4 
 o'clock in the morning in his nightgown and got into the 
 bed, and asked if there was a pistol, saying that it was time 
 he or "mother" (his wife) should die; upon another occa- 
 sion he went into the same son's coalyard, took off his coat 
 and began to shovel coal ; this was done without request or 
 necessity; again he told his son that he had engaged a room 
 opposite his son's coalyard on Ellis street, and one night he 
 awoke and wanted to know where "mother" (Mrs. Tiffany) 
 was, and didn't know where he was himself; upon a visit to 
 this son's coalyard he would give imitations of celebrated 
 characters, such as Edwin Booth, the tragedian, and John 
 L. Sullivan, the pugilist; this mimetic performance was a 
 favorite pastime of his, as several witnesses testify — not in 
 itself standing isolated significant, perhaps, but to be con- 
 sidered in connection with other circumstances; this was in 
 the fore part of 1882 ; during this period he was frequently 
 intoxicated; he spent his time largely around saloons, until 
 in October, 1882, he went to the eastern states, whence he 
 returned in January, 1883, in very bad order; he was to all 
 appearances demoralized, his dress and person were untidy 
 and unclean, his clothing being in very bad condition, and 
 he complained that he had lost his trunk on the way, he 
 didn 't know where ; he was very feeble, much emaciated, cov- 
 ered with vermin, and his apparel so infested that it had 
 to be burned up ; he told a story of how he fell on the ears, 
 and that they were attacked by "cowboys," and in other ways 
 manifested symptoms of mental disturbance. At a subse- 
 quent time, while he was lodging at the Lick House, he would 
 arise at night and give his imitations of his favorite actors, 
 pugilists and wrestlers — his son William was with him at this 
 time; one night William awoke in the front room of the 
 Ruite, being aroused by his father's striking against the cot
 
 490 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 whereon the son was lying; the father was standing over 
 him with a cane in his hand ; the son asked him what he was 
 doing ; he answered : " I thought you were that damned black- 
 guard Blaney, and I was going to kill you"; Blaney was 
 the name of the attorney who had appeared in the insanity 
 proceedings. At another time he said to his son that this 
 same "Blaney was going to marry mother, and he would 
 kill him and prevent it." 
 
 At table he would take a carving knife, and raising it 
 above his head assume a tragic attitude and recite: "Is this 
 a dagger which I see before me?" And again he would 
 pose as the patriot Tell, the slogger Sullivan, the wrestler 
 Muldoon, and other men of mark; these imitations or exhibi- 
 tions were noticeable for their incongruity as to time and 
 place; other instances are related by witnesses which tend 
 to show a lowered tone as to decency of conduct (see Judge's 
 Notes of Testimony, page 25, lines 19, 20, 21, for a notable 
 illustration) ; his language was at times grossly vulgar and 
 obscene; whereas, in former years he was habitually chaste 
 and clean in expression and free from profanity, in which 
 latterly he was wont to indulge inordinately; friends of 
 many years' intimate acquaintance were shocked at the change 
 which they observed in this respect (see Judge's Notes, page 
 50, lines 12-19 ; also, same page, lines 23, 24, and page 51, 
 lines 1, 2, 3). In the year 1882, on his trip to the east, it 
 was noticed that his conduct was peculiar ; among other eccen- 
 tricities, he sat on the lower step of the car platform, with 
 his feet dangling down (Judge's Notes, page 59) ; while in the 
 east at this time he acted very strangely, once appropriating 
 from the hotel bar a lemon-squeezer and carrying it with 
 him to his room, and so deporting himself as to attract 
 attention among his acquaintance to the marked alteration 
 in the man from what they had known in early days (Judge's 
 Notes, page 77). He made strange choice of companions; 
 brought to the house of his daughter a character known about 
 town as "Sconchin," and presented him wdth a cane, and 
 introduced him to the family, to their great astonishment, 
 who, when they discovered the identity of their uninvited 
 guest, hastily withdrew, leaving host and guest alone; at
 
 Estate op Tiffany. 491 
 
 another time he introduced to his friends an individual known 
 as "Shorty Simpson," whom he kissed and embraced and 
 denominated ' ' his dear friend ' ' ; another person known as 
 "the Maori," a prizefighter, was presented in like manner; 
 and again he brings up the rear of a procession of the ad- 
 mirers of a noted fistic champion, one Charley Mitchell, upon 
 that person's arrival in San Francisco, the deceased in a 
 buggy, accompanied by a tattered urchin whom he had picked 
 up on the way and raised to a seat beside him in his vehicle. 
 During his visit to New York, he started out with his son 
 Peer one night to go to a place called "Harry Hill's," a 
 noted free and easy variety show; on the way he encoun- 
 tered a prayer-meeting in progress on the street and stopped, 
 and entered the hall after the meeting adjourned to the in- 
 side; after a while the leader of the meeting, "the Salva- 
 tion Army," asked persons to join, and the deceased stepped 
 forward and signed the roll and asked his son to join, which 
 the latter declined; the leader gave the new recruit a religi- 
 ous volume, which he promised to read; when he returned to 
 his hotel he read the book and then threw it aside, saying it 
 was ' ' damned trash ' ' ; after this diversion he resumed his 
 visits to Harry Hill's theater, or dancing and variety hall, 
 and there frequently so acted as to suggest that his mind was 
 not normal. An incident is related of his conduct in San 
 Francisco, where, at a banquet of the Pioneer Society, he 
 became intoxicated and cut a guest, and had to be taken home 
 in a carriage; he was frantic, and was with difificulty sub- 
 dued. Another time, upon the occasion of the funeral cere- 
 monies of General Grant, he dressed himself in the regalia 
 of a past president of the Pioneers, and behaved so boister- 
 ously upon the public street that he had to be removed from 
 the procession. This was noticed by many of his old pioneer 
 friends as a remarkable transformation in character from 
 the period before he had become addicted to the use of ardent 
 spirits (see Judge's Notes, pages 64, 66) ; some observed him 
 in public very greatly intoxicated, his attire awry, hair 
 disheveled, necktie disarranged, vest loose, unbuttoned, and 
 he generally demoralized ; these were among the elements 
 of change in conduct and appearance noted by some who
 
 492 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 had known him as a model in the opposite direction (Judge's 
 Notes, page 73) ; he became very greatly changed in all respects 
 (Judge's Notes, pages 74, 75, 76, 77). These are a few among 
 many incidents and instances adduced in evidence to show 
 the inroads gradually made by his drinking habits upon the 
 deceased's condition and character, until his mind was so 
 impaired as to destroy its balance and render him an easy 
 prey to the designs of those who were intent upon securing 
 his property. For years he had been drinking inordinately 
 and habitually; from the time he had retired from active 
 employment and business, he had devoted himself to drink 
 with such diligence as to subject himself almost entirely to 
 its dominion; and an important question in this case is, how 
 far did this habit impair his intellect? While this issue is 
 intimately related to, it is also separable from the other of 
 the two issues to which this contest is confined, to wit : undue 
 influence. 
 
 medical evidence. 
 
 The testimony of the physicians for the contestant is de- 
 signed to establish the conclusion that the deceased was af- 
 flicted with softening of the brain, the result of long-con- 
 tinued indulgence in intoxicants. The autopsy made June 
 9, 1886, the death occurring June 6th, showed that "the 
 body was greatly emaciated. On the left anterior portion of 
 the chest four distinct abrasions found. The tissues cover- 
 ing sacrum were in a state of extensive ulceration, evidently 
 bed-sore. 
 
 "Thoracic cavity — Heart in a state of fatty degeneration. 
 Muscular walls soft and flabby. 
 
 "Lungs — Normal in size, and no adhesions to costal pleura. 
 Fatty degeneration of blood vessels. 
 
 "Abdominal cavity — Stomach and bowels empty; evidence 
 of chronic catarrh of both; no signs of ulceration or acute 
 inflammation. 
 
 "Liver found to be far advanced in a state of fatt.y de- 
 generation. 
 
 "Kidneys — Left kidney atrophied and contracted, the re- 
 sult of both general and circumscribed inflammation. Gen- 
 eral inflammation, as the pyramids were entirely obliterated ;
 
 Estate of Tiffany. 493 
 
 circumscribed, as an abscess was present upon superior an- 
 terior surface connected with pelvis of kidney and filled with 
 pus. Large deposits of fat found in pelvis of kidney; right 
 kidney contracted and in a state of fatty degeneration ; blad- 
 der empty. 
 
 "Cranial cavity — Dura-mater adherent to cranial bone 
 separated with great difficulty ; opaque and thickened, 
 weight one ounce; pia-mater highly injected, brain weight, 
 forty-five ounces ; softening of base of lateral ventricles, 
 punc'tiform injections, softening of cerebellum." 
 
 CONDITIONS PRODUCED BY ALCOHOLISM. 
 
 It is testified by two physicians, Dr. James Stanton, the 
 county coroner, and Dr. James Murphy, that these condi- 
 tions were produced by alcoholism, resulting in softening of 
 the brain, and that this disease must have been in progress 
 for about two years. Softening of the brain was defined by 
 one of these physicians as a progressive disease — retrograde 
 progression — and that even when indulgence in intoxicants 
 ceases the disease progresses (Judge' Note's, page 93). Dr. 
 Stanton testified that the condition of the kidneys "would 
 indicate that he was afflicted with chronic interstitial neph- 
 ritis, caused by alcoholism and sufficient to cause death ; pye- 
 mia is blood poisoning caused by absorption of pus by the 
 blood; uremia is blood poisoning caused by absorption of 
 urea (a constituent of urine) by the blood" (Judge's Notes, 
 page 91). Dr. J. Grey Jewell, a resident physician of the 
 Home of the Inebriates, testified that deceased died from 
 softening of the brain, produced by extreme chronic alco- 
 holism, and that the causes were in operation for five years 
 preceding, and that in his judgment deceased was insane 
 six or eight months prior to his death. This physician testi- 
 fied that he knew the deceased for four or five years before 
 his death; deceased had been in the Home of the Inebriates 
 three times; first, for one day, February 3, 1883; second, for 
 one month from January 21, 3884; third, for one month from 
 j\Iarch 15, 1884. This witness testified that he had had 
 many cases of alcoholic patients ; that he had visited deceased 
 at 1 Fifth street; that deceased appeared to be utterly sat-
 
 494 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 urated, thoroughly soaked, with alcohol ; that he warned the 
 attendant that she would be held responsible if death ensued ; 
 that the patient was dying from the effects of the potions 
 (alcohol) given to him. Another physician, Dr. Julian Per- 
 rault, who had known deceased sixteen or seventeen years, 
 intimately from 1870, testified that in 1883 deceased was 
 insane from abuse of alcoholic stimulants. Dr. R. Beverly 
 Cole, who had known deceased since 1852, testified that 
 from his observations of the deceased's mental state during 
 the last year of his life he was unqualifiedly of the opinion 
 that he was non compos mentis— not of sound mind (Judge's 
 Notes, page 96). As the cause of decedent's death, the only 
 important testimony at variance with what has been referred 
 to was given by Dr. Washington Ayer. Strangely enough, 
 the physician. Dr. Charles Rowell, who attended the deceased 
 in his last sickness, and who certified to the cause of his 
 death, was not examined as to the assigned cause, but was 
 questioned on the direct examination only as to the fact and 
 circumstances of the execution of the will, to which he was 
 a subscribing witness. No question was put to him as to 
 the tnith of the certificate of decedent's death, which stated 
 that he died of "typhoid fever." In this connection the 
 testimony of Dr. Ayer should be considered, as he is the 
 only physician introduced to combat the medical testimony 
 for contestants. (Dr. Sharkey was not examined as an 
 expert to this point: see Judge's Notes, page 114.) Dr. Ayer 
 is a doctor of high degree, forty years' practice, Professor 
 of Hygiene in University of California, and an author of 
 medical treatises and assays, and a pioneer associate, ac- 
 quaintance and friend of the deceased, and well qualified 
 to oppose his opinion to that of any other physician as 
 to the question here involved, and it becomes of consequence, 
 therefore, to note whether he is in substantial accord or in 
 essential conflict with the medical witnesses for contestants. 
 Dr. Ayer testified in substance upon this point : He was first 
 called in to attend the deceased professionally on April 20, 
 1886, and down to June 7, 1886, from recollection, he should 
 say he paid him about fifteen visits ; the deceased was suffer- 
 ing from a deep-seated abscess in the pelvis, in the left side
 
 Estate of Tiffany. 495 
 
 of the pelvis, lumbar muscle. From Dr. Ayer's diagnosis 
 of the case, that was the principal disease. The deceased 
 was very much prostrated, in a state approaching anemia, 
 assimilating low grades of typhoid, but could hardly be 
 classified as typhoid. The witness prescribed remedies for 
 the deceased to tone up his system; among other things, he 
 prescribed whisky combined with egg, or ' ' egg nog, ' ' and gave 
 directions that some stimulant might be given occasionally, 
 in the discretion of the nurse. In his opinion anemia was 
 the cause of the death of the deceased ; he did not think 
 the cause of the death was uremia ; he did not treat deceased 
 for alcoholism, and found no evidence of alcoholism. After 
 having examined the memorandum of autopsy made by Dr. 
 Stanton and Dr. Murphy, the witness said that the clinical 
 conditions presented no such symptoms, and that these autop- 
 sical phenomena might possibly have been postmortem. From 
 the minutes of that autopsy the witness should say that 
 physicians might have found uremia as the cause of death; 
 another physician might have said it was pyemia ; the ab- 
 scess was the principal cause of the conditions of the de- 
 ceased's last illness, but his advanced age and the faltering 
 forces of nature producing incapacity to resist the invasions 
 of disease, also contributed to the end. It was not a case of 
 typhoid fever; death was not caused by typhoid fever. The 
 only professional relation the witness ever had with the de- 
 ceased was during the latter 's last illness; he preserved no 
 memorandum of his visits, nor did he make any charge. He 
 had a friendly consideration for the deceased, as well as a 
 professional relation. After his first call upon the deceased, 
 he made the usual inquiries about his illness, and after in- 
 quiry and examination he prescribed poultices — flaxseed 
 meal, and anodynes, sulphate of morphia and bromide of 
 ammonium — the office of these anodynes is to allay pain ; the 
 bromide is to produce sleep without allaying pain. When 
 the witness so prescribed Dr. Rowell was present. In the 
 judgment of Dr. Ayer, as a medical man, the deceased did 
 not die of typhoid fever. The witness said that postmor- 
 tem is not always the means of determining the cause of 
 death; where there are obscurities it is usually the positive 
 means of ascertaining the cause of death; where much time
 
 496 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 elapses, changes may occur between the time of death and 
 the time of examination, which would cause decomposition and 
 disintegration, thus obscuring the cause of death. Dr. Ayer 
 agreed with Dr. Murphy and the other physicians that soften- 
 ing of the brain is a progressive disease, yet thought there 
 might be cases in which the progress of the disease might be 
 arrested, and the brain restored to its normal condition 
 (Judge's Notes, pages 171, 173 and 176). Dr. Ayer's testi- 
 mony disposes of the typhoid theory completely, and, taken as 
 a whole, it does not contradict the positive testimony of the 
 physicians for the contestants, that the deceased's death was 
 caused by alcoholism. 
 
 The result of all the doctors' evidence is that the de- 
 ceased came to his end by alcoholism, accelerated by the 
 conditions described by Dr. Ayer as the accompaniments 
 of old age, lessening the capacity to resist the inroads of 
 many years of undue indulgence in intoxicants. 
 
 From the time the decedent left the regular routine of 
 business he became more and more addicted to the habit 
 of drink, until it gradually effected a change in his char- 
 acter and conduct that was noticed by all his old-time 
 friends. It is true some testify that this was observable 
 only in his periods of intoxication, and that in his sober 
 moments he was as sensible as any other person ; but in- 
 toxication became such a constant quantity with him as 
 to affect his physical and mental organization to such a 
 degree as to render him easily susceptible to the most im- 
 mediate influence which encouraged indulgence. The evi- 
 dence shows that when in normal condition the testator's 
 general business capacity was equal, if not superior, to the 
 average of mankind. He was the owner of what may be 
 considered large property, not requiring, perhaps extra- 
 ordinary ability, but yet good judgment, prudence and dili- 
 gence for its successful management; and this property was 
 not only preserved, but the amount was augmented by him. 
 Notwithstanding that it was thought necessary to take steps 
 more than once to place testator in custody of the law as 
 an incompetent, yet some persons of fair judgment and un- 
 impeached integrity have given their opinion that he was 
 the same throughout life; but this business capacity may co-
 
 Estate of Tiffany. 497 
 
 exist with monomania; and even assuming that liquor had 
 not produced a total obscuration of the testator's intellect, 
 yet there may have been a partial eclipse sufficient to avoid 
 This instrument as a will : American Bible Soc. v. Price, 3 
 West. Rep. 69. A monomaniac may make a valid will, when 
 its provisions have no connection with the particular de- 
 lusion, and there is no reason to think such provisions are 
 influenced by it; but when the delusion relates to the per- 
 sons who would in the natural and usual course become the 
 objects of the maker's care, solicitude and bounty, and 
 especially upon whom the law vfould cast the inheritance of 
 his property, the instrument must be regarded as invalid to 
 pass the estate, because it does not express the will of a 
 sound, disposing mind: American Seamen's Friend Soc. v. 
 Hopper, 33 N. Y. 619, 640. A person whose mind is enfeebled 
 by the drink disease or other cause may have sufficient testa- 
 mentary capacity remaining, except as to the object concern- 
 ing which he is under delusion, and that delusion may be fos- 
 tered by a beneficiary to the extent of unduly influencing the 
 direction of the testator's bounty; that is to say, the insane 
 delusion may operate either against the natural and legitimate 
 recipient of the testator's wealth, or in favor of a stranger 
 exercising undue influence and encouraging the delusion to 
 enhance that influence. 
 
 It is claimed by the contestants that they have established 
 here that, at the date of the execution of the instruments, 
 the mind of the testator was so impaired by habitual in- 
 temperance that he had not sufficient capacity to make any 
 testamentary disposition; and that, furthermore, he was the 
 victim of an insane delusion, and from these causes that he 
 was peculiarly liable to be, and that he was, unduly in- 
 fluenced by the residuary legatee herein to make and execute 
 the instruments here propounded. 
 
 EFFECT OF INORDINATE USE OP INTOXICANTS. 
 
 The law books and medical treatises, and our own ob- 
 servation, confirm the fact that the inordinate use of in- 
 toxicating liquors does incapacitate men from making wills 
 It is known that it vitiates the blood, produces softening of 
 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. 1—32
 
 498 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 the brain, disorders the intellect, saps the vital forces, un- 
 settles the healthy action of the body and mind, and destroys 
 them both. Yet not in every case of the use of liquors do 
 these results follow. Some men live on from year to year, 
 drinking deeply, attending to their own affairs, and occa- 
 sionally reach a ripe old age; others break soon. There is 
 no rule by which to determine how much the system of any 
 one man can endure. One man may be perceptibly affected 
 by a single debauch, while another may remain sound in 
 mind after many of them. A man temporarily overcome by 
 a single debauch is, for the time being, of unsound mind, 
 and has not testamentary capacity; so, a person to whom in- 
 toxication has become such a habit that his intellect is dis- 
 ordered and he has lost the rational control of his mental 
 faculties, is of unsound mind. There are several kinds of 
 drunkenness, and different kinds of drunkards. Balfour 
 Browne, in his Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity, discusses 
 drunkenness and its relations in this wise : " It is, it seems to 
 us, necessary to distinguish several kinds of drunkenness, 
 and the appreciation of the distinctions which exist between 
 each of these will go far to make the relations of drunkards 
 to the law and to their fellow citizens easily understood. 
 
 "First, there is the accidental drunkard. Any man may 
 get drunk by accident. Children who know little of the 
 effects of alcoholic liquor are apt, when these are first pre- 
 sented to them, to drink to excess, and it is only when the 
 next morning's wakening comes, with a head full of wonder- 
 ful aches instead of wonderful dreams, that the child learns 
 that there is 'death in the pot.' Men may be led astray by 
 the hilarity of some occasion, by the persuasion of friends, 
 by physical feelings which prompt to relief by means of 
 stimulants, and may become drunk. It has been remarked 
 with truth that in a fit of ordinary drunkenness we have 
 an epitome of an attack of mania. And it is to be remem- 
 bered that during the continuance of the influence of this 
 poison the man is, to all intents and purposes, insane. It 
 is true that the attack is only temporary, but so are many 
 incursions of mental disease; it is true that the cause of the 
 aberration is one which the ordinary habit of the system will 
 counteract and remove, but that remark is equally true of
 
 Estate of Tiffany. 499 
 
 many of the causes of insanity. Second, we have regular 
 drunkards; they get drunk when it suits them; they are 
 sober all day, and transact their business with sense and dis- 
 cretion, but they get drunk regularly at night; or it may be 
 that the indulgence of this propensity comes at rarer inter- 
 vals; still, there is a regularity to be noted in connection 
 with these bouts. These are really sane drunkards. They 
 have complete control over their passions, but they volun- 
 tarily throw the reins on its neck, they could resist tempta- 
 tion if they chose; they do resist temptation upon all occa- 
 sions when indulgence would be inconvenient or dangerous, 
 but on other occasions they do not care to resist. Third, 
 there is a class of drinkers who scarcely deserve to be called 
 drunkards, but who must, nevertheless be regarded by those 
 who understand the true relations of this indulgence in 
 liquors to pathology. Sir David Lindsay, in one of his 
 poems, speaks of some men who were 'ever dying and never 
 dead'; and this third class might be well spoken of as 'ever 
 drinking and never drunk.' But these men who soak or 
 tipple very frequently come under the cognizance of the 
 medical psychologist, although their names may not appear 
 on the books that are kept at the police cells. It is much 
 to be feared that this class is on the increase. Many men 
 boast of being 'seasoned casks,' meaning thereby that they 
 can drink a great deal without showing the symptoms of 
 intoxication ; but the boast is vain, for even these men can- 
 not escape the consequences of their acts, and the decadence 
 of bodily and mental health is the too common result of their 
 frequent indulgence. Fourth, we have habitual drunkards. 
 As we have seen, in considering the psychology of drunken- 
 ness, a single gratification of the appetite for stimulants is 
 followed by renewed craving for the same pleasures. The 
 urgency of this craving increases, and as time goes on the 
 measure of such indulgence becomes more excessive, and the 
 interval between them more limited. This is not the place 
 to discuss the large questions connected with the doctrine 
 of the nature of volition and the freedom of the will: but 
 no one can doubt that, whether the will is only a general 
 name for the plus quantity in ruling motives or not, that 
 motives have a very great deal to do with the exercise of
 
 500 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 helping- volition or controlling power. But what is the re- 
 sult of repeated indulgences upon the motives of the man? 
 The habit to indulge becomes stronger, the bodily cravings 
 grow in strength, and other motives lose their weight. In 
 this way the moral sense of the individual becomes obscured, 
 the self-respect and the self-restraint which depend so much 
 upon this moral estimate of one's worth are no longer guid- 
 ing principles of the life; the man has become the slave of 
 an artificial appetite, and is no longer the free ruler of his 
 own conduct; his organism rules over him, and the rule is 
 not that of a constitutional monarch who is ruling in con- 
 formity with the laws of health, but the tyranny of a despot, 
 who is ruling with the caprice of disease. Here, again, we 
 find the real distinction between health and disease, and the 
 basal principle of the legal distinction between sanity and 
 insanity. We here pass from habitual drunkenness to dip- 
 somania. This point was very well brought out by Dr. 
 Crichton Browne in his evidence before a House of Commons 
 Committee; the essential distinction, he said, appears to be 
 that in habitual drunkenness the indulgence of the propen- 
 sity is voluntary, and may be foregone, and in dipsomania 
 it is not so The points of distinction between dip- 
 somania and drunkenness are several. I find that as a rule 
 dipsomaniacs urge the internal craving as an excuse; they 
 say, we cannot resist it. The drunkard, as a rule, urges 
 some external excuse for his debauch ; he says that he met a 
 friend, or that it was his birthday; whereas, with the dip- 
 somaniac it is the internal craving. The dipsomaniac is 
 driven into the debauch by an impulse; the drunkard seeks 
 the intoxicating effects. This seems to us to be not only a 
 correct philosophical, but physiological distinction, and it 
 serves as a good description, not only of drunkenness, but 
 of that disease known as dipsomania ' ' : Section 353. 
 
 Professor Ordronaux, in his "Judicial Aspects of In- 
 sanity" (page 382), treating of habitual drunkenness, re- 
 marks: "Another point deserving consideration is the fact 
 that in habitual drunkards the sudden abstraction of the 
 accustomed stimulant, particularly in weakened conditions 
 of the body, leaves the brain within that degree of factitious 
 stimulation which has become, through habit, a sine qua non
 
 Estate of Tiffany, 501 
 
 for the performance of any acts requiring the least mental 
 effort. Between the stimulating periods produced by fresh 
 cups a habitual drunkard is in a state of depression, or prop- 
 erly disease. He cannot do his best mentally, because there 
 is no natural force to call upon, and his mental process and 
 his will are as flaccid as his muscles. Can such a mind 
 intelligently survey the field of varied property — of duty to 
 others and to society, and, more difficult still, can it, after 
 long imbrutement, respond to the dictates of natural affec- 
 tion toward either offspring, or kindred, or relatives, or 
 resist the artful trammels of the designing and dishonest 
 seducer who plays upon its weakness in order to lead it 
 astray"? Surely no occasion ever comes when the work of 
 deception can be so successfully accomplished under the 
 mask of friendship and sympathy, as when the mind of an 
 habitual drunkard is worked upon in its waning moments 
 upon earth by a cunning and interested party." 
 
 It is claimed by contestants that they have established the 
 substance of the issue involving insane delusion and undue 
 influence, and that this was an occasion when the work of 
 deception was successfully accomplished under the mask of 
 friendship and sympathy by a cunning and interested party 
 (the residuary legatee), who wrought upon the mind of an 
 habitual drunkard (the testator) in its waning moments upon 
 earth. 
 
 It has been said that the law indicates as two distinct 
 grounds of opposition, unsoundness of mind and undue in- 
 fluence ; and that while, when advanced in the same case, the 
 consideration of each of them may overlap the other, yet as 
 legal propositions they are to be kept distinct and apart. 
 Considering the two issues together, it must be noted that, 
 although mere weakness of intellect does not prove undue 
 influence, yet it may be that, in such feeble state, with the 
 mind w^eakened by sickness, dissipation or age, the testator 
 more readily and easily becomes the victim of the improper 
 influences of unprincipled and designing pei-sons who see fit 
 to practice upon him : Reynolds v. Root, 62 Barb. 250. It 
 is claimed that the residuary legatee induced the deceased to 
 separate from his wife and children, and to occupy the same 
 apartments occupied by her at the lodging-house on the
 
 502 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 corner of Fifth and Market streets, the house known as No. 
 1 Fifth street, and thereafter prevailed upon the deceased 
 to continue such separation and occupation of said apart- 
 ments with her, and that he was so situated at the times of 
 the execution of the papers propounded, November-Decem- 
 ber, 1885. We first find deceased at this house, as related in 
 his wife's testimony, in September, 1881, after he came 
 from his sojourn in the country place of Mr. Strand, in 
 Napa county; after he and his wife returned to town he 
 came to his daughter's house one day and said he had hired 
 a room at the corner of Fifth and Market streets- — 1 Fifth 
 street— the house kept by Mrs. Either, and thither the wife 
 went a day or two after he had taken the room. For the 
 first week deceased behaved very well and was quiet; then 
 he became sick and was very ill; his illness was caused by 
 liquor; he would go out and return intoxicated, and from 
 that became so ill that his life was despaired of. During 
 this time he was attended by Dr. Perrault, and it was there 
 and then that his wife first met the residuary legatee — Mrs. 
 Churchill — who was, it appears, in a manner managing the 
 house, and with whom, the wife testifies, she had an inter- 
 view upon one occasion in reference to the deceased, who at 
 the time had been ill for three or four weeks. The wife 
 testifies that she was in the kitchen making some beef tea 
 for her husband when Mrs. Churchill came in and said to 
 her: "You are a foolish woman to worry yourself and your 
 children over your husband in this manner. I had a 
 drunken husband once; I sent him home to his children; he 
 soon died. You will only get curses, and he will die in the 
 gutter. If I had him to deal with I w^ould set a barrel of 
 rotgut beside his bed, and let him drink himself to death." 
 
 After these remarks the wife said she wanted nothing 
 more to say to her, and that she (the wife) was there for 
 the purpose of taking care of her husband, and that she 
 would do it to the best of her ability. The wife further 
 testified that during this period Mrs. Churchill objected to 
 going into the room where the deceased was lying — it being 
 part of her household duty to attend to the lodgers' apart- 
 ments — saying she was afraid to enter the room, as the 
 deceased was crazy; she would hand the linen to the wife,
 
 Estate op Tiffany. 503 
 
 who told her that she would take care of the room herself. 
 At this time there was another person than Mrs. Churchill 
 employed in the house in a domestic capacity, one Mrs. Katie 
 Donnelly, who, it is testified, was present at the kitchen in- 
 terview. On November 24, 1881, husband and wife left this 
 place and went to the home of their daughter, on Mason 
 street. This ended the first sojourn of deceased at No. 1 
 Fifth street. They went to Mason street and continued 
 there to reside until October, 1882. Two or three months 
 after going to the daughter's, deceased left home one day 
 and did not return, and after a hunt for him his wife found 
 him at 1 Fifth street, where he was ill; she nursed him, and 
 at his request they went back after two or three days to 
 their daughter's. Mrs. Lura Churchill was at the house, 1 
 Fifth street, during this time ; she was, according to her own 
 testimony, the housekeeper at 1 Fifth street in 1881, and 
 remained as such until January, 1883, when she left, and 
 returned in May, 1884, when she became housekeeper again, 
 and so acted until September 1, 1885, when the house 
 changed proprietors ; after which date she resided there 
 until June 16, 1886, but had no position there during this 
 period. During the times that deceased remained at this 
 place this lady had opportunities for cultivating his ac- 
 quaintance, which, it is claimed, she improved with a view 
 to obtaining mastery over his mind, in order to secure for 
 herself a large portion of his property. During the first 
 stay of deceased at 1 Fifth street she professed a great aver- 
 sion to coming in contact with him or entering his room, al- 
 though it was within the scope of her duty to do so, in 
 managing the house and looking after the rooms; but upon 
 the occasions subsequently that he visited and lodged at the 
 house this aversion was apparently changed into a friendly 
 concern for him, and to so great an extent that she sur- 
 rendered her own apartment to his use, although she denies 
 that she ever shared it with him meretriciously (Judge's 
 Notes, page 184). She explains how he happened to occupy 
 her room in the first place, that he had come in from the 
 street to see Mrs. Either, and he was taken with a conges- 
 tive chill; Mrs. Either was not in the house at the time; he 
 was taken very suddenly, and so Mrs. Churchill allowed him
 
 504 Coffey's Pkobate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 to occupy her apartment, room No. 2, while she occupied 
 room No. 19, with Miss Baty, who, it seems, was for a time 
 engaged in a capacity similar to that of Mrs. Churchill 
 (Judge's Notes, page 184). Miss Baty testifies that the de- 
 ceased came frequently, from March, 1884, to the house 1 
 Fifth street; that he was out and in nearly every day; that 
 he called to see Mrs. Bither, for whom she was then acting 
 as housekeeper. She says that the deceased was ill there 
 several times, very ill ; the first time, according to her knowl- 
 edge, was in the fall of 1885, for a period of two or three 
 weeks. At that time Dr. Beverly Cole was called, and came 
 twice; subsequently the deceased had a very serious attack of 
 sickness, in 1885, when Dr. Charles Rowell was called. Mrs. 
 Churchill nursed and attended him at his request, and IMiss 
 Baty says that she assisted her and did a great deal for him ; 
 she saw him all the time in 1885 and 1886, when he was sick, 
 and conversed with him every day. In 1885, at the time of 
 the first attack, deceased occupied room 2, and at the time 
 of his last illness he occupied room 4, when, as Mrs. Chur- 
 chill and Miss Baty testify, they occupied together room 19. 
 This was Miss Baty's room, but upon Mrs. Churchill yield- 
 ing her own apartment to the deceased, under the circum- 
 stances narrated, she accepted a share of the room of Miss 
 Baty, who states that Mrs. Churchill never occupied the same 
 room with the deceased, except when he was very ill and 
 she had to take care of him at night, but she never occupied 
 the same bed with him. This lady never saw anything im- 
 proper between them, although she claims that she would 
 have observed it if anything of the kind had occurred, but 
 that Mrs. Churchill was nothing more than a nurse taking- 
 care of a sick man (Judge's Notes, page 178). It is claimed 
 on the part of proponents that, thus situated, Mrs. Churchill 
 did but an act of kindness for the deceased when he was 
 sick and needed nursing, and that there is not an atom of 
 evidence that there was the least taint upon the morality of 
 her relations to or with him, and that, so far as the record 
 shows, she is perfectly pure, and that there is not a particle 
 of proof that she ever used any influence upon the testator 
 at any time, and most certainly not at the time of the mak- 
 ing of the will and codicil, to keep him separate from his
 
 Estate of Tiffany. 505 
 
 wife and family, or to exclude them from his presence or 
 to divert the disposition of his property; and that the evi- 
 dence shows that he was kindly cared for and nursed at No. 
 1 Fifth street when he was deserted and abandoned by his 
 own wife and family, and that the residuary legatee urged 
 his return home and always spoke kindly of his family, striv- 
 ing to reconcile him to them, but that he would not go to 
 those who had thrust him out, and that therefore he was 
 harbored in the house of Mrs. Either, who had a sisterly 
 fondness for him, and who felt it to be her duty to receive 
 him and accord him attention when he was ailing, and that 
 it was in consonance with Mrs. Either 's desire that Mrs. 
 Churchill devoted herself to nursing the deceased when he 
 was ill. On the other hand, it is contended by the contes- 
 tants that the evidence shows that the residuary legatee and 
 the deceased sustained other than lawful mutual relations; 
 that it was a case of man and mistress rather than of pa- 
 tient and nurse, and that all the circumstances of the con- 
 duct of the residuary legatee make irresistible the inference of 
 undue influence and sustain the charge that she used her 
 proximity and position toward him to foster and fasten in- 
 sane delusions in his mind with reference to his wife and 
 family, and that of this influence and these delusions the 
 will was the ofl'spring. If this contention be borne out by 
 the evidence, much of the argument of the proponents as to 
 the character and extent of importunity that will fall short 
 of undue influence goes for naught, because there is a dis- 
 tinction between the influence of a lawful relation and the 
 influence of an unlawful relation. 
 
 The will of a man who has testamentary capacity cannot 
 be avoided because it is unaccountably contrary to the com- 
 mon sense of the country. His will, if not contrary to law, 
 stands for the law of descent of his property, whether his 
 reasons for it be good or bad, if indeed they be his own, unin- 
 fluenced by an unlawful influence from others. Lawful 
 influence, such as that arising from legitimate family and 
 social relations, must be allowed to produce its natural re- 
 sults, even in influencing last wills. However great the in- 
 fluence thus generated may be, it has no taint of unlawful- 
 ness in it, and there can be no presumption of its actual un-
 
 506 Coffey's Probatk Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 lawful exercise merely from the facts that it is known to 
 have existed, and that it has manifestly operated on the 
 testator's mind as a reason for his testamentary dispositions. 
 Such influences are naturally very unequal and naturally 
 productive of inequalities in testamentary dispositions; and 
 as they are also lawful in general, and the law cannot criti- 
 cise and measure them so as to attribute to them their proper 
 effect, no will can be condemned because the existence of 
 such an influence is proved, and because the will contains in 
 itself proof of its effect. It is only when such influence is 
 unduly exerted over the very act of devising, so as to pre- 
 vent the will from being truly the act of the testator, that 
 the law condemns it as a vicious element of the testamentary 
 act; so the law always speaks of the natural influence aris- 
 ing out of legitimate relations. But we should do violence 
 to the morality of the law, and therefore to the law itself, 
 if we should apply this rule to unlawful relations; if we 
 should thereby make them both equal in this regard at least, 
 which is contrary to their very nature. If the law always 
 suspects and inexorably condemns undue influence, and pre- 
 sumes it from the nature of the transaction, in the legiti- 
 mate relations of attorney, guardian and trustee, where 
 such persons seem to go beyond their legitimate functions 
 and work for their own advantage, how much more ought it 
 to deal sternly with unlawful relations, where they are, in 
 their nature, relations of influence over the kind of act that 
 is under investigation? In their legitimate operation those 
 positions of influence are respected; but, where apparently 
 used to obtain selfish advantages, they are regarded with 
 deep suspicion; and it would be strange if unlawful rela- 
 tions should be more favorably regarded. 
 
 The voice of the law on this general subject is dis- 
 tinct and emphatic, transmitted through many generations 
 and embodied in many Latin maxims, all of which may be 
 summed up in one sentence: No one shall derive any profit 
 through the law by the influence of an unlawful action or 
 relation. The ordinary influence of a lawful relation must 
 be lawful, even where it affects testamentary dispositions; 
 for this is its natural tendency. The natural and ordinary 
 influence of an unlawful relation must be unlawful, in so
 
 Estate of Tiffany. 507 
 
 far as it affects testamentary dispositions favorably to the 
 unlawful relations and unfavorably to the lawful heirs. 
 Ordinary influence may be inferred in both cases, where the 
 nature of the will seems to imply it; but in the former it 
 is right, because the influence is lawful; and in the latter 
 it may be condemned, together with its effects, because the 
 relation is unlawful. There can be no doubt that a long- 
 cmtinued relation of meretricious intercourse is a relation 
 of great mutual influence of each over the mind and person 
 and property of the other. History abounds with proofs of 
 it, and it requires no very long life or very close observa- 
 tion of persons around us in order to reveal the fact. If 
 there was such a relation between the testator and the resid- 
 uary legatee at the time of the making of the will, it would 
 render inapplicable the cases cited for proponents, and go 
 far to establish the case of contestants: Dean et ux. v. Neg- 
 ley et al., 41 Pa. 316, 80 Am. Dec. 620. 
 
 A charge that the parties sustained toward each other 
 illicit relations ought not, as was said in Wallace v. Harris, 
 32 Mich. 393, to be lightly hazarded, and when once made 
 it should be substantiated by very cogent evidence; unless 
 sustained by clear and satisfactory proof, it should be dis- 
 missed. There can be no doubt that it would be pertinent 
 to show the existence of such relation as a fact to prove the 
 prevalence of undue influence. But the proof may fall 
 short of establishing meretricious intercourse, and yet show 
 anomalous conduct between the parties as to justify the in- 
 ference that, if they were not carnally intimate, they were 
 upon such close terms of acquaintanceship as rarely obtains 
 between nurse and patient. Reputable persons have testi- 
 fied to scenes and incidents and circumstances that support 
 the theory of unlawful relations, and while this is denied 
 and disputed by the witnesses for the proponents, yet it is 
 clear upon the whole record that there was on the part of 
 deceased a fatuous fondness for the residuary legatee and 
 a simulated reciprocation, which strongly tend to establish 
 contestants' charge that she was. during the long period of 
 his ultimate illness, as well as for some time prior thereto, 
 something nearer and dearer far than a mere nurse and at- 
 tendant. The residuary legatee is a woman of masculine
 
 508 Coffey ^s Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 vigor of understanding, of a native shrewdness of character 
 and enriched by an extensive experience in worldly affairs, 
 and it is by no means inconceivable that she exercised a po- 
 tent influence over the deceased, and that she practiced for 
 her own profit upon the weak mind of this old man, de- 
 mented by drink and made incapable by his condition of 
 overcoming the effect of her crafty designs and artificial 
 allurements; and that this influence covered an extended 
 period before and after and including the time, and reaching 
 to the act of making the will and codicil ; and, if this in- 
 fluence is shown to have once existed, by whatsoever means 
 produced or acquired — whenever the mind of one person is 
 reduced to a state of vassalage to that of another, and a gift 
 is shown to have been made by the weaker party to the 
 stronger — there the burden of proof will be shifted, the gift 
 will become presumptively void, and the onus of upholding 
 its fairness and validity will rest upon the shoulders of the 
 recipient of the gift. This rule is firmly established in re- 
 gard to gifts made by deed, and the same principle should 
 hold in regard to wills, and so courts have declared: Gay v. 
 Gillilan, 92 Mo. 250, 1 Am. St. Rep. 712, 5 S. W. 11. 
 
 In connection with the issue of undue influence must now 
 be noticed the insane delusion imputed to deceased, and, as 
 thereto related, the insanity proceedings taken against him. 
 It is said by counsel for proponents that there was no de- 
 lusion whatever in the mind of deceased; that so far as his 
 testamentary disposition adverse to his wife and family was 
 concerned, it was based upon fact and not upon fancy; and 
 that his declaration that he made no provision in his will 
 for his wife or for his children, for the reason that the con- 
 duct of his wife and children toward him since the time of 
 the deed of separation (March 30, 1881) did not commend 
 them, nor either of them, to his consideration, was founded 
 upon the truth. What was this conduct? What had they 
 done to alienate them from that consideration which this 
 language implies would have been accorded if the conduct 
 of the one had not been un wifely, and of the others unfilial? 
 Was there any foundation for this disherison, or was it the 
 product of delusion sedulously nurtured by the residuary 
 legatee, whom he describes as having been to him in all his
 
 Estate of Tiffany. 509 
 
 sickness "a true and tender friend and nurse"? The coun- 
 sel for proponents declares that the testator was moved to 
 this declaration because a great and unpardonable wrong 
 had been done him by his family ; that his spouse had acted 
 as an unloving wife, and his sons and daughters as ungrate- 
 ful children ; that they were constantly harassing him ; that 
 he was laboring under no delusion; they were endeavoring 
 to incarcerate him as a lunatic, and that the language of the 
 will shows that the testator fully understood the situation, 
 and had good reasons for what he did. In the same con- 
 nection counsel for contestants asks the court to compare the 
 will with the complaint in the divorce case between the de- 
 ceased and his wife, and claims that they are both the pro- 
 duct of the same mind; this is the document published as an 
 advertisement in the "Evening Post" newspaper of Sep- 
 tember 13, 1884, and for the purposes of reference is ap- 
 pended, as printed, to this opinion. This document counsel 
 for contestants denounces as the emanation of the brain of 
 Brumagim, one of the proponents, and it is urged that the 
 authorship is a fact and circumstance in this case that goes 
 to demonstrate that this controversy is the result of a vile 
 conspiracy concocted by the said Brumagim, who has not 
 appeared on the witness-stand because, it is argued by coun- 
 sel for contestants, he did not dare to come in where his 
 testimony would expose his own infamy in connection with 
 this case. It is claimed that this is a most pregnant cir- 
 cumstance against proponents. Mr. Brumagim seems to have 
 been attorney of record for the deceased in the divorce case, 
 and is one of the executors here, and his counsel say that 
 there is no justification for the assault upon him, forasmuch 
 as he has done nothing in the matter except what was de- 
 volved upon him as duty. 
 
 The composition of this complaint, so far as its pecu- 
 liar phraseology goes, may be attributed to the attorney who 
 signed it; while the publication in the periodical and its 
 circulation broadcast may have been solely the act of the 
 plaintiff, without being aided and abetted l)y his attorney 
 in so unusual a mode of advertising a client's domestic his- 
 tory and maritfil miseries. This complaint purports to con- 
 tain a recital of the ultimate facts constituting the cruelty
 
 510 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 which was the cause of action, and begins by charging the 
 wife defendant with endeavoring, by false statements in her 
 petition, filed in March, 1881, to have her husband adjudged 
 insane and incompetent, thereby to injure him and get pos- 
 session of his property and estate; and that she only dis- 
 missed such petition when he deeded one-half of his prop- 
 erty to her by an agreement, a copy of which is subjoined to 
 the complaint. The actual language of the petition of March 
 3, 1881, is, in this regard, as follows: "That said Robert J. 
 Tiffany is of unsound mind and is mentally incompetent to 
 manage his property, and, as your petitioner believes, has 
 been thus incompetent for more than six months last past. 
 That he is and for a considerable time past has been squan- 
 dering, wasting and mismanaging his estate; that, as your 
 petitioner is informed and believes, he is, by reason of his 
 mental incompetency, frequently taken advantage of by im- 
 pecunious and irresponsible persons, and induced to loan 
 them money without any security for or reasonable prospect 
 of repayment; and that he is liable at any time to make 
 conveyances of real estate and transfers of his personal 
 property upon inadequate considerations, or upon no con- 
 sideration at all. That the mental condition of said Robert 
 J. Tiffany is not amending, and, as your petitioner believes, 
 is likely to grow worse and still further to unfit him for the 
 management of his property; that unless a guardian be ap- 
 pointed there is great and imminent danger that all the per- 
 sonal property of said estate will be wasted and dissipated, 
 and that the means of maintenance of said Robert J. Tiffany 
 and his family will be destroyed or at least largely reduced. 
 That by reason of his mental condition the said Robert J. 
 Tiffany is violent, imprudent and erratic in his conduct, and 
 is incapable of taking care of himself, and is exposed to in- 
 jury at his own hands and from others. ' ' 
 
 The complaint further charges the wife with instigating 
 the insanity inquisition of February, 1883, and the subse- 
 quent and consequent guardianship proceedings in which Mr. 
 Eastland was appointed guardian, all of which proceedings, 
 it is alleged, were secretly kept from him, and were willfully 
 and maliciously promoted by his wife, and that the letters 
 were willfully and surreptitiously obtained for the sole pur-
 
 Estate of Tiffany. 511 
 
 pose of injuring plaintiff and getting possession and control 
 of his property. In connection with this accusation by the 
 husband against the wife, it appears from the official record 
 of insane commitments (volume 6, folio 159, Superior Court, 
 Department 10) that upon the sworn complaint of one M. 
 A. Sweet, made on the third day of February, 1883, the de- 
 ceased was brought before F. M. Clough, judge of the su- 
 perior court, who, after having heard the testimony of Dr. 
 James J. Birge and Mrs. Tiffany, and upon the certificate of 
 Drs. L. J. Henry and I. S. Titus, graduates in medicine, and 
 being satisfied that the said Robert J. Tiffany was insane and 
 dangerous to be at large, and of the truth of the certificate 
 of the doctors, which, among other things, declared that he 
 had been more or less affected during the previous six years, 
 ordered him to be taken and placed in an insane asylum at 
 Stockton, and charged the sheriff with the execution of the 
 order. In the matter of the letters of guardianship, the ap- 
 plication for which, it is said, was secretly kept from the 
 plaintiff and surreptitiously obtained, it appears that a peti- 
 tion was filed on February 9, 1883, by MeClure & Dwindle, at- 
 torneys for Phoebe J. Tiffany, in which she alleged, among 
 other things: "That the said Robert J. Tiffany is insane, by 
 reason of which insanity he is mentally incompetent to man- 
 age his property, whereby it becomes necessary that some suit- 
 able person should be appointed guardian of his person and 
 estate; and it is the desire of your petitioner and of his said 
 children that your petitioner be appointed guardian of his 
 person and estate. And your petitioner further shows that 
 on the third day of February, 1883, the said Robert J. Tif- 
 fany, having had a legal examination by and before a board 
 of physicians duly and legally constituted to examine him as 
 to his sanity, was by it pronounced to be insane, whereupon, 
 and on the day and year aforesaid, he was by one of the 
 judges of this court committed to the authorities of the State 
 Insane Asylum at Stockton, and under such commitment he 
 was conveyed and is now in charge of the authorities of said 
 asylum at Stockton; and your petitioner further shows that 
 she is informed by Dr. Shurtleff, the principal resident 
 physician at said asylum, that in his opinion the said Robert 
 J. Tiffany is hopelessly insane, and that he will probably never
 
 512 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 recover his reason, and that your petitioner believes he will 
 be unable to attend this court on the hearing of this petition. 
 Wherefore your petitioner prays that she, or some other 
 competent person, be by this court appointed guardian of 
 the person and estate of said Robert J. Tiffany, with the 
 powers and duties in such cases by law made and provided; 
 that a time and place be appointed for the hearing of this 
 petition, and that notice of the hearing of the same be served 
 upon the said Robert J. Tiffany at least five days before the 
 time that shall be appointed for such hearing. ' ' 
 
 Upon this petition it appears that on the same day an 
 order was made setting the nineteenth day of February, 1883. 
 for the hearing of said petition, and ordering notice to be 
 given to the said Robert J. Titt'any of the time and place of 
 hearing, at least five days before the time appointed, by serv- 
 ing upon him personally a copy of the citation addressed to 
 him. In accordance with this order it appears from the re- 
 turn of the Sheriff of San Joaquin County that on the 
 twelfth day of February, 1883, he personally served such 
 citation upon said Tiffany. It further appears that it was 
 filed in this court upon the nineteenth day of February, 1883, 
 the return day named in said order, a paper indorsed "Cer- 
 tificate of Dr. Shurtleff," couched in these words: 
 
 "Insane Asylum of the State of California, 
 
 "Stockton, Cal., February 15, 1883. 
 "I hereby certify that Robert J. Tiffany is now under my 
 care and treatment for insanity, he having been regularly 
 committed to the State Insane Asylum at Stockton on the 
 3rd instant by Judge F. M. Clough, of San Francisco; that 
 he is of unsound mind and physically feeble; and that, in 
 my opinion, he is not able to attend Court in San Francisco 
 on Monday, the 19th instant, and will not then be able, with- 
 out injury to his health generally, and greatly aggravating 
 his mental disorder. 
 
 "G. A. SHURTLEFF, M. D., 
 
 "Med. Supt." 
 
 Subsequently, on April 2, 1883, an order was made which 
 recited that "the petition of Phoebe Jane Tiffany for the 
 appointment of herself or some other person as the guardian
 
 Estate of Tiffany. 513 
 
 of the person and estate of the said Robert J. Tiffany com- 
 ing on regularly to be heard, and also her further petition 
 that Joseph G. Eastland, of said city and county, be ap- 
 pointed such guardian, being also heard, and the matter sub- 
 mitted for decision, and it appearing to the court and to the 
 judge that the said Tiffany is an insane person, and that a 
 guardian of his person and estate should be appointed, and 
 that the said Eastland is a competent and proper person to 
 be appointed such guardian, it is ordered that the said East- 
 land be and he is appointed guardian of the person and es- 
 tate of said Tiffany, and that letters of guardianship be 
 issued to him" upon his giving the proper bond. It will 
 appear from this comparison that the allegations of the com- 
 plaint are somewhat at variance with the probate records 
 of the proceedings. The complaint proceeds further to set 
 forth the recovery of the health of the plaintiff and his judi- 
 cial restoration to capacity upon the 31st of October, 1883, 
 and the discharge of the guardian upon the delivery of the 
 property of his ward to him. The complaint goes on to re- 
 late the proceedings in Department No. 8, beginning with 
 the petition filed on the 29th of December, 1883, which, it 
 is charged, was instigated by the wife for reasons similar 
 to those which prompted the preceding proceedings and which 
 resulted in a trial by jury and a verdict on the 12th of 
 March, 1884, that plaintiff was not insane. Then the com- 
 plaint proceeds to recount numerous charges of false rumors 
 spread abroad by his wife and children, cruelly done for the 
 purpose of annoying and injuring him before the business 
 community, and to cast disgrace upon his life and character, 
 and to get possession of his property. And the complaint 
 further charges defendant with having caused the plaintiff 
 to be confined in the inebriate asylum, and to be hounding 
 the plaintiff with her bitter persecutions, and to have, by her 
 envenomed tongue, caused him great mental anguish and 
 suffering, and that her wicked, cruel treatment toward him, 
 and her conduct had been so utterly at variance with the prin- 
 ciples of common decency and kindness that it caused his life 
 to be one of perpetual social sorrow ; and so bitterly perse- 
 cuting had been her conduct and personal treatment toward 
 him that she made it utterly intolerable for him to live with 
 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. I — 33
 
 514 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 her in the marital relations, and that her ceaseless aim had 
 not been his social happiness and their mutual enjoyment, but 
 one of bitter persecution and ''general cussedness" in her 
 conduct toward him; that she had blighted his life in her 
 fiendish persecution, so that it would be utterly impossible 
 for him to ever have that relation of social, moral and in- 
 tellectual communication with her that should exist between 
 man and wife. The summing up of the ills visited upon him 
 in the phrase "general cussedness" is a unique contribution 
 to the forms of pleading and an addition to the language of 
 the law that hereafter may aid the draftsman of divorce 
 complaints. 
 
 It is asserted by counsel for proponents that the deceased 
 never was actually confined in an insane asylum, but after 
 the commitment sojourned at a hotel in Stockton; and it is 
 asked, if he were insane would that have been allowed? It 
 seems from the testimony that he stopped at the Yosemite 
 House in Stockton by permission of the authorities of the 
 asylum and in charge of a nurse from that institution, and 
 that he was taken care of there by his wife. The certificate 
 of Dr. Shurtleff, the medical superintendent, hereinabove in- 
 serted, is of itself a sufficient statement of his condition at 
 that time. All of the proceedings in the insanity inquisi- 
 tion and the application for guardianship were regular, and 
 did not show that the charges in the complaint as to secrecy 
 or surreptitious conduct w^ere true. It appears rather that 
 they were based upon well-grounded apprehensions that the 
 conduct of the deceased was calculated to impair the substance 
 of his estate, and to produce injury to himself and to those 
 dependent upon him. Until he became a hard and habitual 
 drinker, and in many respects a sot, his relations with his 
 wife and family were always loving and affectionate, and it 
 is testified that nothing ever took place between the husband 
 and children to alienate his affections from them. It was 
 after that time when the change in his habits and character 
 became apparent, that when they remonstrated with him for 
 his behavior and endeavored to reclaim him from his debas- 
 ing courses, that the difficulties occurred. There is no cred- 
 ible evidence here that his wife was lacking in conjugal af- 
 fection; there is no evidence whatever that she was an un-
 
 Estate of Tiffany. 515 
 
 faithful spouse, although there is testimony that the mind 
 of the testator was infected with the delusion that she was a 
 party to a low intrigue with a hackman, and that she sub- 
 mitted herself to an embrace with one of the witnesses for 
 the contestants over the corpse of her husband immediately 
 after his decease (Judge's Notes, page 142, line 25 to 32; 
 see page 145, lines 17 to 22). The whole course of her eon- 
 duct, as revealed by the evidence, and her appearance and 
 demeanor on the stand command credence in the claim that 
 Mrs. Phoebe J. Tiffany was a true wife and a good mother. 
 
 It may be, as counsel for proponents argues, that while 
 upon the stand she was acting for effect, but it is hard to 
 believe that this is true when we compare her testimony with 
 the record of her years of tribulation caused by her hus- 
 band's erratic conduct and the patience with which she en- 
 dured the trials consequent thereupon. Her conduct was 
 characterized by that charity which suffers long and is kind; 
 which does not behave unseemly, and is not easily provoked; 
 which bears and believes, and hopes and endures all things 
 for the sake of its object, which in this case was the reclama- 
 tion of her erring husband. It does not seem probable that 
 this woman has been acting a part as a witness in order to 
 delude the court into a judgment contrary to the truth. It 
 is scarcely credible that this wife of forty years has become 
 in her old age so clever an amateur actress that she can make 
 falsehood appear fact without detection. Notwithstanding 
 the charges in the divorce complaint, the court does not be- 
 lieve that her ceaseless aim was to destroy her husband's 
 social happiness and their mutual enjoyment, and that her 
 conduct toward him was characterized by bitter persecutions 
 and "general cussedness"; or that she had blighted his life 
 in her fiendish persecution ; or that she had an * * envenomed 
 tongue"; or that her conduct toward him was so utterly at 
 variance with the principles of common decency and kind- 
 ness that it caused his life to be one of perpetual social sor- 
 row. It would seem rather that, owing to his unfortunate 
 infirmity, the contrary of this statement was the case. Her 
 eonduct was marked by tender care and solicitude for her 
 husband, notwithstanding the charges so painfully elaborated 
 in the bill of complaint advertised in the "Post" newspaper.
 
 516 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 There is nothing inconsistent with this in the filing of the 
 petitions to place her husband under restraint on account of 
 his condition. It is the part of a good wife (when moral 
 means have been unavailing) in the last recourse to resort 
 to the law for the protection of the husband and of the prop- 
 erty which is in danger of destruction through his conduct. 
 Her conduct in withdrawing the first application, and in the 
 negotiations which led to the making of the agreement of 
 partition of property and separation, which was done under 
 advice of counsel, should not prejudice her position in this 
 controversy. 
 
 Tiffany's mental condition in 1881 was not so fully de- 
 veloped as four years later, although his aberrations were 
 so apparent as to cause apprehension in the minds of those 
 who were most observant of his conduct, and it was the 
 part of sheer prudence to place beyond the reach of wreck 
 some portion of his estate. The circumstances of the Estate 
 of Noah, decided by this court and affirmed by the supreme 
 court (73 Cal. 583, 2 Am. St. Eep. 829, 15 Pac. 287), dif- 
 fered very materially from those surrounding this case, and 
 cannot be considered as affecting the decision of the issues 
 here presented. When the second application for letters of 
 guardianship was made, the deceased was in Stockton, at 
 the Yosemite Hotel, in care of the nurse provided by the 
 superintendent of the asylum, and that application was made 
 in accordance with his request by his wife, as she testifies. 
 Apart from the official certificate of the service of the cita- 
 tion upon Mr. Tiffany, which is conclusive as contradicting 
 the statement that the proceedings against him were secretly 
 and stealthily conducted, his wife testifies that she was pres- 
 ent in their parlor at the Yosemite House when the citation 
 was served. She watched him and cared for him, and sub- 
 sequently in the country at Haywards, and at Oakland and 
 elsewhere. When he was judicially restored to capacity, 
 November 13, 1883, she made no opposition, and says that 
 the proceeding was taken at her request, being in the line of 
 her efforts to reclaim him by considerate and indulgent treat- 
 ment. The application which was tried before a jury in De- 
 partment 8 was not made at the request of the wife, accord- 
 ing to her testimony, but by the desire of the children ; and,
 
 Estate of Tiffany. 517 
 
 curiously enough, these parties mingled amicably every day, 
 husband and wife and children going to court together. Not- 
 withstanding the nature of the proceeding, there was no ap- 
 parent acrimony in the family circle at that time. The pro- 
 ceedings were prosecuted and resisted without any bitterness 
 of sentiment, and during the intervals of recess husband and 
 wife and children discussed the situation in a friendly man- 
 ner. A few days after the verdict the wife testifies that she 
 saw her husband at the Home of the Inebriates, where he 
 remained for about a month, but she had nothing to do with 
 his confinement in that institution at any time. 
 
 THE FIFTH STREET ENVIRONMENT. 
 
 Concerning the circumstances which environed deceased 
 at number 1 Fifth street, it is said on behalf of proponents 
 that his family did not visit him while he was lying sick, 
 although they were not barred out ; that the latch was always 
 down; that no obstacle was placed in the way of free com- 
 munication between him and his wife and children; that 
 so far from preventing the members of his family from see- 
 ing him, or keeping him from returning to them, the resid- 
 uary legatee was always trying to induce him to return, 
 trying to reconcile him to his family, but he said that he 
 could not trust them (Judge's Notes, page 186) ; and the 
 witness Ann Baty, who appears to have been assisting the 
 residuary legatee in her attendance upon the deceased dur- 
 ing his last illness, testifies that she never saw his wife be- 
 fore that time ; that she saw his son William in the fall of 
 1885 in the house twice; that on the first visit no one was 
 in the room but the deceased, herself and the son, and that 
 on the second visit the daughter accompanied her brother; 
 then only the deceased, the son and the daughter, the resid- 
 uary legatee and the witness were in the room; that the de- 
 ceased did not wish to speak to his daughter, but Mrs. 
 Churchill said, "Mr. Tiffany, your daughter is here," and he 
 said ' ' Emma, since you have come, I will speak to you ; how is 
 Cecil [that was her child, his little granddaughter] ? I should 
 like to see her." Mrs. McGregor said she would bring the 
 child next time ; then she said, ' ' Father, why don 't you come 
 up to the house? We have a nice room for you there." He
 
 518 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 said he would not trust himself to them any more, as he was 
 afraid they would poison him. This witness said she had 
 heard the deceased speak of the treatment of him by his 
 family. She testified that he said his wife had a very violent 
 temper, that at times she had "bit and scratched him in the 
 face until the blood ran down to his collar." This witness 
 also testified that the deceased told her that his son Willie 
 once jumped on his back when he (the son) tried to throw 
 him down. The witness said that she had heard the deceased 
 repeat "time and time again" that his wife had bitten him 
 in the arm, and he told her shortly after he came to 1 Fifth 
 street, in 1884, about his wife scratching and biting him. 
 Miss Baty further testified that the physician, Dr. Rowell, 
 told them not to leave the room when Mr. Tiffany's family 
 came, as he, the doctor, would feel responsible on account of 
 the threats made by them that they "would shut his wind 
 of," and also Mrs. Churchill's, or that he should leave the 
 house. It was in the fall of 1885, she testified, that Dr. 
 Rowell told her about the threats of Mr. Tiffany's family, 
 and told her and Mrs. Churchill not to leave him alone with 
 the members of his family in his room (Judge's Notes, pages 
 179 to 182). 
 
 TESTIMONY NOT EASILY RECONCILABLE. 
 
 If this witness speaks the truth, her testimony is not easily 
 reconcilable with the claim that the family had access to 
 the deceased at all times, and that they were always welcome, 
 because there was certainly some restraint imposed by the 
 restrictions which were imputed to the physician, Dr. Rowell. 
 It does seem that when the members of the family visited the 
 deceased before and after the making of the will, with the 
 expectation of having confidential and private conversations 
 with him, the residuary legatee or the witness Miss Baty re- 
 mained in the room, so that no such intercourse took place 
 without it being exposed to them. It would appear that the 
 wife of deceased and his daughter were always anxious, 
 ready and willing to go and nurse him during his illness, 
 and to reside with him, or have him reside with them, on 
 condition that he would sever his connection with the resid- 
 uary legatee, and of this he was fully aware, but he still
 
 Estate of Tiffany. 519 
 
 refused to break the association with the residuary legatee. 
 On many, if not on all, of the occasions when the friends of 
 the deceased called on him, the residuary legatee or the wit- 
 ness Miss Baty made it a practice of remaining in the room 
 during the whole time of the visit, and overhearing all that 
 passed between them: 41 Pa. 314, 315. Why didn't his 
 family visit him at 1 Fifth street? The contestants respond 
 to this question by citing the circumstances of his sojourn 
 at that house and the repellant influences there meeting them. 
 There was certainly some impediment in the way of those 
 who were supposed to be connected with his family in obtain- 
 ing access to him. (See Judge's Notes, page 69, testimony of 
 Alfred M. Learned, who, upon his first visit, was refused ad- 
 mission by Mrs. Churchill.) With regard to the statements 
 in the testimony of Miss Baty credited to the deceased, there 
 is not a scintilla of evidence supporting such act of physical 
 cruelty on the part of his wife or his relatives; and, if he 
 made such statements, they must have been the product of 
 an insane delusion which led him to regard as certain trutlis, 
 and actually believe in the existence, on the part of his wife 
 and of his relatives, of conduct and intentions substantially 
 such as he imputed to them. I am perfectly satisfied that 
 there was no foundation in fact for the gross imputations 
 upon his wife or the charge against his relatives, all or any 
 of them, of a design upon his life, or an intention to do him 
 any bodily injury; and that the idea of a conspiracy upon 
 their part to injure him in such manner was purely imagina- 
 tive, if it at all existed. If a person persistently believes 
 supposed facts which have no existence except in his per- 
 verted imagination, and against all evidence and probability, 
 and conducts himself, however logically, upon the assump- 
 tion of their existence, he is, so far as they are concerned, 
 under a morbid delusion; and delusion in that sense is in- 
 sanity. Such a person is essentially mad or insane on those 
 subjects, though on other subjects he may reason, act and 
 speak like a sensible man. If the deceased in the present 
 case was unconsciously laboring under a delusion, as thus 
 defined, in respect to his wife and his family connections, who 
 would naturally have been the objects of his testamentary 
 bounty, when he executed his will or when he dictated it (if
 
 520 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 he did dictate it), and the court can see that its dispository 
 provisions were or might have been caused or affected by the 
 delusion, the instrument is not his will, and cannot be sup- 
 ported as such in a court of justice. The conduct and de- 
 signs which he imputed to his wife and relations were such 
 as, upon the assumption of their existence, should have justly 
 excluded them from all share in the succession to his estate : 
 33 N. Y. 624, 625. 
 
 NOT A PARTICLE OF PROOF. 
 
 There is not a particle of proof in this case that the wife 
 of deceased was ever guilty of the act of which she was 
 accused by Mr. Tiffany, according to the testimony of Miss 
 Baty. I am bound to believe that this is either a figment of 
 his diseased imagination, or a fabrication by her. The wife 
 testifies that she went to this house No. 1 Fifth street, to see 
 her husband, with her son in law, Mr. McGregor. She went 
 to the door and knocked ; her son in law was just behind her. 
 Mrs. Churchill came to the door. When she saw who it was 
 she pushed it to in her face, but the wife pushed past and 
 entered the room. The husband was lying on a lounge much 
 too short for a man of his height, with his head toward tht. 
 door. The wife went up to him and said, "Papa, how are 
 you, papa? I heard you were ill." He put out his arms 
 and he said, ' ' Oh, my dear mamma, I am so glad to see you. ' ' 
 The wife said, "I know you are," and she kissed him; he 
 took her hand, and she took her glove off, and he took her 
 hand and he said, "Sit down. I am so glad to see you; I 
 knew you would come to see your old papa when you knew 
 he was sick, anywhere, even into this house, to this room." 
 Then she sat down, and they talked of the loved ones that 
 had passed away, and she talked to him about the dead 
 and those that were remaining and during this time Mrs. 
 Churchill got up twice and gave him whisky ; the second time 
 the wife said, ' ' Oh, don 't give him that. ' ' Mrs. Churchill took 
 notice of the remark, and sat down again. Then the deceased 
 looked around the room and seemed to recognize the resid- 
 uary legatee and the wife, and said, "Oh, Mrs. Churchill, 
 this is mamma, my wife." Mrs. Churchill got up off her 
 chair and said, "There is no use of your introducing the lady
 
 Estate of Tiffany, 521 
 
 to me; I know her well, and when she knew me I was no 
 prostitute." The wife turned and looked at her. Mrs. 
 Churchill sat down again, and presently got up and gave him 
 some more whisky, and then took her seat. The husband still 
 held the wife's hand, and kissed it occasionally. She went 
 on talking to him about the family, and after awhile Mrs. 
 Churchill got up and said, "Now, Robert, I will not stand 
 this; that woman cannot come to my rooms again; you have 
 got to choose this very night between her and me ; now, right 
 now; she shall not come; and you, too, McGregor, you shall 
 not come." The wife then said to her husband, "Will you 
 not come home? This is no place for you; you will never 
 get well here ; I will go with you to any hotel, and I will take 
 rooms in this house if you will let me take care of you, papa ; 
 I will nurse you back again to health, as I have so many 
 times before." And the husband said, "Mamma, this is no 
 place for you; go home to the children; I will be out in a 
 day or two." He then kissed her hand, and the wife said, 
 "Papa, let me take care of you; come away from this place; 
 I will take care of you." He said, "I will be out in a day 
 or two." The husband took the wife's hand and kissed it, 
 and said, "Mamma, you know if I was living with you and 
 my wife should come it would not be pleasant; go home, I 
 will see you in a day or so." The wife said, "Papa, I am 
 your wife; it is my place to be beside you; I will take care 
 of you." He said, "I will be well in a day or two; I will 
 come and see you and the children." The wife bade him 
 goodnight and said, "Papa, I will go away." It was then 
 nearly 10 o'clock at night. He kissed her, and she said to 
 him, "Papa, shall I come to see you?" He said, "Yes, mam- 
 ma." The wife said, "Do you want to see me?" He said, 
 "Yes, mamma, come and see me as often as you can; I will 
 be out in a day or two," and then she went away. Both 
 Mrs. Churchill and Miss Baty in their testimony, who were 
 present at the time, contradict this statement (Judge's Notes, 
 page 185) ; but there is at least enough in the whole statement 
 to show that Tiffany had not lost affection for his wife. His 
 daughter Emma visited him altogether six or seven times. 
 When she would go there he would put his arms around her 
 and kiss her, and ask how "dear mamma" was and ask after
 
 522 Coffey's Pkobate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 his daughter's husband; he was under the influence of liquor 
 every time; the daughter brought him some wine jelly once, 
 but did not bring him anything else ; she last visited the 
 house the day before Thanksgiving, 1885, but did not see 
 her father there that time ; she saw him two days before, and 
 he was so ill he could not walk; he was greatly emaciated, 
 and Mrs. Churchill and Miss Baty were there. She went 
 twice to the theater with her father in the spring of 1886, 
 the second time the 20th of March; she went with her child 
 to see "Buffalo Bill" on Saturday afternoon; she met her 
 father at the theater door; that day at the theater he took 
 her by the hand and said, "Mrs. Churchill cannot turn me 
 against you; I have made my will and provided for you." 
 
 BRUMAGIM AT 1 FIFTH STREET. 
 
 In April, 1886, was the first time she saw Brumagim at 
 No. 1 Fifth street ; Mrs. Churchill followed him out ; he only 
 remained a few minutes; she never saw her father alone in 
 that place ; she made a visit there in May, 1886 ; her father 
 said he wanted her to speak to Mrs. Churchill and Mrs. 
 Churchill to speak to her, and they did so; Mrs. Churchill 
 said, "Robert, Mrs. McGregor is the only one of the family 
 who understands this case." On Sunday, the 23d of May, 
 1886, the daughter being on a visit to the father, he turned 
 to Mrs. Churchill and asked her to leave the room, as he had 
 occasion to speak to his daughter ; she did not leave the room, 
 nor make answer. When the daughter visited No. 1 Fifth 
 street, Mrs. Churchill and Miss Baty, one or both, were al- 
 ways there; sometimes Mr. Brumagim was there, sometimes 
 a Mr. Pat Lynch; one time the daughter at her own home 
 heard her father say he was going to marry Mrs. Churchill 
 at Pioneer Hall, and would drive the family there in a coach 
 and four (Judge's Notes, pages 9 to 13). A witness Mrs. 
 Catherine Donnelly, testifies that she was employed at No, 
 1 Fifth street by Mrs. Bither as chambermaid; that Mrs. 
 Churchill at that time was also a chambermaid; that there 
 was a kitchen on the second floor, and she saw the wife of 
 deceased there when Mrs. Churchill was in the kitchen, and 
 the wife was making beef tea. Mrs. Churchill said to her, 
 "If she was his wife she would buy him a barrel of rotgut,
 
 Estate of Tiffany. 523 
 
 and let him drink himself to death; that he would go to the 
 gutter, anyhow." On one occasion she testifies that she 
 heard the deceased say to Mrs. Churchill, "Don't call me Mr. 
 Kobert; call me your dear Robert," and kissed her. On 
 another occasion she had conversation with Mrs. Churchill 
 about the deceased, and Mrs. Churchill had said that his wife 
 had thrown him out, and she had picked him out of the gut- 
 ter; and his wife was only a common whore, and that he had 
 caught her in a house of assignation with a hackman. This 
 last conversation spoken of was in March, 1885. Again she 
 met her on Kearny street and had a conversation with her, 
 and the witness said to Mrs. Churchill, "I see you have 
 bought a lot ; how did you get the money so quick ? " to which 
 inquiry the response was, "I have made a great deal of 
 money in stocks, and have bought the lot and paid for it." 
 Once again, on Fifth street, Mrs. Churchill said, "I have had 
 a handsome Christmas present, a pair of blankets, two oil 
 paintings and a diamond ring, which Mr. Tiffany gave me." 
 This was in April or May, 1886 (Judge's Notes, pages 16, and 
 17). All of these statements are denied by Mrs. Churchill 
 (Judge's Notes, page 184). The deceased went to room at 
 628 Sutter sti*eet, in the house of Mrs. Kate E. Learned, 
 in December, 1884, and was there about a year and a half; 
 he came with a Mr. Rapp ; he stayed in the first room six or 
 seven months, then he took a small room for eight or nine 
 months ; he went away five or six months after he came, and 
 then returned; his attorney, Joseph ]\I. Wood, paid for three 
 or four months : Mrs. Churchill paid one month, the rest of 
 the time he paid himself; he did not stay there half the time 
 in the first period referred to; during the second period he 
 was absent for a month at a time; Mrs. Churchill had a key 
 to his room, also of his trunk; Mr. Tiffany introduced Mrs. 
 Churchill to Mrs. Learned; he said that ]\Irs. Churchill was 
 a dear friend of his; she lived at 1 Fifth street, and did the 
 chamber work for INIrs. Bither; Mrs. Churchill may have re- 
 mained there fifteen or twenty minutes at the time in his 
 room ; she was introduced to the witness two or three months 
 after Mr. Tiffany first came, and the witness saw her there 
 afterward during the first period of his stay at the house; 
 she would come sometimes two, or three, or four times a
 
 524 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 month ; she would be accompanied by him, and remain a half 
 hour at a time, and he would go out with her; she would 
 always be at his room. The witness learned from Mr. Tif- 
 fany that he went from her house to 504 Sutter street, to a 
 Mrs. Meyers; he subsequently returned to the house of Mrs. 
 Learned to see if he could get a room, and said, "I was sorry 
 I left your house, but Mrs. Churchill desired it, as she and 
 Mrs. Meyers were friends, but now they have quarreled and 
 I now want to come back." He and the witness had a con- 
 versation about Mrs. Churchill; he said, "What is the rent 
 of the front suite of rooms, and what will you board me and 
 Mrs. Churchill for? I am going to get a divorce, and am 
 going to marry Mrs. Churchill." The witness had a great 
 many conversations with him upon that topic. She had also 
 a conversation with Mrs. Churchill in the latter part of 1885. 
 Mrs. Churchill came to her house and said she wanted his 
 things. The witness said she was glad, as she did not want 
 him in her house; Mrs. Churchill said she had taken a room 
 for him in O'Farrell street, that his family had tried to put 
 him in the insane asylum, that she would take care of him, 
 that his family were willing that she should take care of him, 
 but were not willing to do anything for him ; that she would 
 show them she should take care of him, and would do so to 
 spite his wife. Mrs. Churchill took his trunk and other 
 things belonging to him. The witness said Mr. Tiffany would 
 very seldom come in before 12 or 1 o'clock at night; he was 
 always intoxicated when he came in; he wore ornaments on 
 his person during the second period, a tooth in his necktie. 
 The tooth, he said, was Mrs. Churchill's, a diamond ring, 
 which he said she gave him as a present. He told her he 
 gave to Mrs. Churchill all the money, and she paid the bills 
 and collected the rents. There was another conversation on 
 that subject, in which he said he had given her certain prop- 
 erty, and had her name put in large letters, "Churchill 
 Court." The witness told her that on the occasion of the 
 divorce trial he told her he was going to appeal, and would 
 beat them, and said, "I will beat them, you bet your bottom 
 dollar, and on the first of the month I will marry Mrs. 
 Churchill." This was in August or September, 1885 (Judge's 
 Notes, page 31). Another witness, Mrs. Sallie Johnson, an
 
 Estate of Tiffany. 525 
 
 old friend of the deceased, saw him frequently in 1885, and 
 observed him closely, and was frequently with him, and 
 visited him in November, 1885. On one occasion he was lying 
 on a lounge too short for him, in the room, his clothes were 
 badly disordered and uncleanly. This was on November 7, 
 1885. He was very glad to see her; he wanted to kiss her, 
 and said, "I am very glad to see you, good lady, that you 
 have come to see me." She said she was very sorry to see 
 him so ill; he spoke of some of his family very abusively. 
 There was a woman in the room to whom she was introduced 
 as Mrs. Churchill. The second time this witness called the 
 deceased was very ill and very excitable, and said to her, 
 "Do you see that on the mantle-piece there [pointing to 
 what appeared to be a glass of jelly] 1 They have brought 
 that to poison me." He said his daughter brought it; he 
 asked witness to drink with him, liquor of some kind, which 
 she declined; the liquor was handed to him by Mrs. Church- 
 ill; the deceased got angry and abusive to the witness when 
 she declined, and said, "Damn it, cannot you take a drink 
 with an old friend?" He abused the members of his 
 family, said they were going to rob him and poison him ; the 
 witness communicated to the daughter the information of the 
 conversation with her father (Judge's Notes, pages 33 and 
 34). Another witness, Mrs. Sarah B. Cooper, an old ac- 
 quaintance and friend of the deceased and his wife, and 
 superintendent arid manager of the kindergarten system of 
 schools, relates many peculiarities of the deceased as a basis 
 of her opinion that he was insane in November and Decem- 
 ber, 1885. From May to November of that year he visited 
 her school as often as forty-eight times; that she believed 
 him to be unsound of mind (Judge's Notes, pages 34 to 38). 
 A witness, E. H. Neville, a twenty-five years' acquaintance 
 of the deceased, very intimate with him from 1878, testifies 
 to peculiarities indicating a change in his character, from 
 daily observations, and recites numerous incidents and in- 
 stances of his conduct indicating insanity. For five years the 
 deceased occupied a desk in the office of the witness, and was 
 in there every day, or nearly every day. Once in 1884, the 
 deceased showed to the witness a human tootli, mounted as 
 a pin on his scarf, which he told him came from the mouth of
 
 526 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 Mrs. Churchill, whom he described as "the loveliest and most 
 angelic woman on earth," and that he was going to marry 
 her. The deceased also showed to the witness a picture of 
 a woman pasted in his hat, on which was written, "From 
 Lura to Kobert. " The witness related that the deceased 
 brought several persons to his office upon one occasion and 
 introduced them to him, one as his dear friend "Shorty 
 Simpson," whom he kissed and embraced; another was Her- 
 bert Slade (known as the "Maori," a prizefighter) ; also an- 
 other one, "Sconchin" Maloney, and others of more or less 
 like character. One time, after the divorce suit was brought, 
 the deceased came to the witness' office with his wife, and 
 said it was the happiest day of his life, all his troubles were 
 arranged, he and his wife were going to see his Mission prop- 
 erty, and they went out together; subsequently on the same 
 day the deceased came into the witness' office and said he 
 was much pleased that it was all arranged. The witness 
 asked him, "How about the divorce suit?" The deceased 
 said that was "all nonsense," he would not have brought it, 
 but he ' ' was persuaded to do so by that Brumagim, ' ' using an 
 opprobrious epithet. Another witness, John Mason, an old 
 citizen and acquaintance of the family, testified that after 
 the witness had gone into business as a brewer at the Mis- 
 sion, Twenty-ninth and Tiffany avenue, in ]\Iarch, 1884. he 
 saw the deceased as often as four times a week, from that 
 time to his last sickness, except when he was sick and away 
 from there; he had drank with the deceased may times, 
 too numerous to mention ; sometimes at the place called 
 Cody's, on Twenty-ninth and Mission streets; he had numer- 
 ous conversations with the deceased, which occurred during 
 the progress of the work of construction of the Tiffany block, 
 when the witness, at the instance of deceased, noted the man- 
 ner in which the work was done. The witness saw Mrs. 
 Churchill once at Cody's, and was introduced to her by the 
 deceased, who came down to the brewery and insisted on the 
 witness going to be introduced, which the witness did not 
 desire. The witness said to deceased that he did not want 
 to go; that the deceased had no grounds for separation or 
 divorce from his wife ; but he went, and in the back room ad- 
 joining the bar-room saw Mrs. Churchill ; he was introduced
 
 Estate of Tiffany. 527 
 
 by the deceased to her as the lady to whom he was going to 
 be married as soon as he got a divorce ; she made no remark ; 
 the three had a drink together. The witness saw her subse- 
 quently several times out there, and saw the deceased in the 
 fall of 1885, sometimes at the brewery and sometimes at 
 Cody's. Once the deceased came out to the brewery; the 
 deceased said that he was something of a pugilist himself, 
 and took off his coat and vest and rolled up his shirt sleeves 
 to show his muscles, and said he was as vigorous as a man 
 of twenty-five or thirty years of age; that when John L. 
 Sullivan came out he would have a set-to with him ; he could 
 not live without sleeping with a wOman and Mrs. Churchill 
 "just filled the bill." The witness said to him that he was 
 foolish to talk in that manner. Subsequently, and in the 
 same conversation, the deceased said he was going back 
 to his "mamma"; that she was a good wife to him and 
 true, and he was going back, as his advisers were not ad- 
 vising him right. The deceased also said he had made his 
 will, and everything was going to his two sons, his "mam- 
 ma," his daughter and his grandchild. Another witness, D. 
 B. Jackson, an acquaintance of the deceased from 1843, when 
 he worked with him in New York City, after testifying to 
 many events during that period, says that in the fall of 1884 
 he met the deceased at the Bay District Race Course, ac- 
 companied by Mrs. Churchill, whom the witness identified in 
 the courtroom as the person to whom the deceased introduced 
 him at the time; the deceased showed the witness her card 
 photograph in his hat. Prior to the introduction the de- 
 ceased said to the witness, "I want to introduce you to my 
 daisy"; that was after the State Fair in October, 1885. He 
 often said to the witness, of Mrs. Churchill, that "she was 
 the dearest creature on earth, taking the nicest and best care 
 of him." A few days before the deceased was taicen down 
 finally, he came to the office of the witness with his daughter 
 and grandchild, and said that they were provided for: he had 
 made everything all right. 
 
 A large number of witnesses, in addition to those already 
 alluded to, relate the declarations and conversations of the 
 deceased on a great variety of occasions to the same general 
 purport as those stated. The proponents have examined a
 
 528 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 large number of witnesses, many of whom knew the deceased 
 but slightly, although the period of their acquaintance was 
 of long duration, and while their social and business stand- 
 ing may be good their opportunities for intimate obser- 
 vation were not sufficient upon which to predicate a judg- 
 ment as to his state of mind; such gentlemen as John K. 
 Orr, with whom the deceased transacted business in a retail 
 way for many years, but whom he did not meet socially, 
 except as he was pleasant in intercourse when he came into 
 his store, and would talk about his travels in Europe, and 
 his visits to Ireland; and Colonel Wason, whom he would 
 meet on the street frequently or at the Pioneer Hall; or 
 Charles H. Burton, whom he met casually on the street; or 
 R. T. Van Norden, Solomon Tesmore, H. A. Cobb, A. A. En- 
 quist and others of like good character who speak of their 
 occasional contact with him. This class of witnesses when 
 they found him able to transact the ordinary affairs of busi- 
 ness, and saw nothing extravagant or peculiar in his manner 
 readily pronounced him of sane mind. Witnesses of equally 
 good character, many of whom had enjoyed a long and inti- 
 mate acquaintance with the person of whom they were called 
 upon to speak, testified with great positiveness to the contrary; 
 and while these witnesses are sought to be discredited by the 
 counsel for the proponents as belonging to one of two classes 
 outside of the family, either their partisans or the friends 
 of Mr. McGregor, yet they do not appear to be otherwise 
 discredited, and there is no reason why the court should con- 
 sider their opinions as of less value than those of others with 
 no superior opportunities of observation. Take the testimony 
 of John ]\Iason, or Raphael Weill, of Henry White, Thomas 
 D. Mathewson, Philip A. Roach, E. B. Vreeland, Cyrus W. 
 Carmany, John J. Haley, Amory F. Bell, M. H. De Young, 
 A. C. Bradford, Davd Scannell, R. F. Bunker, John Perry, 
 Jr. — scarcely any of these men can be said to be partisans, 
 and they all concur in the conclusion that in November and 
 December, 1885, the deceased was of unsound mind. I have 
 examined, with great attention, the mass of evidence in this 
 case, but have found it impracticable to make such an anal- 
 ysis as I have desired. There is much of the evidence to 
 which I have not alluded, and to which, on account of its
 
 Estate of Tiffany. 529 
 
 volume, it is almost impossible to allude with advantage. I 
 think the facts in evidence warrant the conclusion that the 
 deceased was of unsound mind at the time he executed the 
 papers offered for probate; and even if this issue were not 
 satisfactorily established, I think it is clear that he was act- 
 ing under undue influence. Upon this second issue the evi- 
 dence must often be indirect and circumstantial. As it is 
 laid down in the authorities, naturally, persons who intend 
 to control the actions of another, especially in the matter of 
 the execution of wills, do not proclaim that intent. Very 
 seldom does it occur that a direct act of influence is patent. 
 The existence of influence must generally be gathered from 
 circumstances, such as whether the testator had formerly in- 
 tended a different disposition of his property; whether he 
 was surrounded by those having an object to accomplish, to 
 the exclusion of others; whether he was of such weak mind 
 as to be subject to influence; w^hether the paper offered as 
 a will is such a paper as would be probably urged upon him 
 by the persons surrounding him ; whether they are benefited 
 thereby to the exclusion of formerly intended beneficiaries. 
 Undue influence can rarely be proved by direct and positive 
 testimony. It may be inferred from the nature of the trans- 
 action, from the true state of the affections of the testa- 
 tor, from groundless suspicions against members of his 
 family if any such have been proved, and from all the sur- 
 rounding circumstances. 
 
 The legal principles which relate to insanity, insane de- 
 lusions and undue influence have been so frequently laid 
 down by this and other courts, and are so familiar as to ren- 
 der repetition idle. I do not deem it necessary to consider 
 critically the evidence of the witness Swasey, w^hose "daily 
 journal," or diary, furnished the basis of his recollection 
 of what occurred during the last sickness of the deceased. 
 I do not agree with the counsel for contestants in the theory 
 that that book was written up pending the contest for the 
 use of the witness, but ray impression is that it was written 
 up from day to day during the period of the deceased's last 
 illness, with a view to its possible use in some dispute aris- 
 ing over the disposition of his property, and that its oppor- 
 tunity was found and improved in this controversy. Coun- 
 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. 1—34
 
 530 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 sel for proponents claim that the evidence of Mr. Pierson, 
 one of the executors, and the gentleman who drafted the will, 
 should carry conviction, because he stands in his profession 
 where the most ambitious might wish to attain for learning 
 and integrity. Notwithstanding Mr. Pierson 's character as 
 a man and his learning as a lawyer, it is not impossible that 
 he erred in opinion as to the soundness of the mind of the 
 person whose will he drafted, and that he was not fully 
 aware of the circumstances that surrounded and the influences 
 that governed the testator. 
 
 MR. PIERSON 'S EVIDENCE. 
 
 Mr. Pierson testified that he had been a practicing lawyer 
 in San Francisco for twenty -five years; that he had a nod- 
 ding and speaking acquaintance with Mr. Tiffany for that 
 length of time prior to the latter 's death; that he had busi- 
 ness relations with him; was employed as counsel for him in 
 the divorce case in 1885 ; that he had frequent consultations 
 with him until the case was actually tried, in August, 1885; 
 some time after he was employed in that case, the witness was 
 engaged in an action brought by his wife against him, and 
 had a consultation with the deceased once or twice; also, he 
 was consulted in another case, on a promissory note against 
 him, and he also drew his will on the 15th of November, and 
 the codicil on the 15th of December, 1885. The preliminary 
 consultation for the will was on Sunday, November 15, 1885 ; 
 it was an exceedingly stormy day; it was 11 o'clock when 
 the witness arrived at No. 1 Fifth street and went to the 
 room, one of the suite where the deceased was; they had a 
 cursory conversation about half an hour before the witness 
 asked the deceased if he was about to make his will, while 
 the witness was seated by the fire getting warm and dry ; the 
 deceased gave the witness instructions about the composition 
 of the will; while he was giving such instructions the lady 
 whom the witness subsequently knew as Mrs. Churchill came 
 into the room; while the testator was saying to the witness, 
 "Leave the rest to Mrs. Churchill," she said, "Mr. Tiffany, 
 if you are making a will, don't name me in it, as it will only 
 cause me trouble"; the deceased said, "What business is it 
 of yours ? Leave the room, ' ' and she left. The witness went
 
 Estate of Tiffany. 531 
 
 into another room, wrote it out, came back, found there- 
 
 in Mr. Tiffany's room— Dr. Rowell, Mr. Anderson and the 
 testator. Mr. Tiffany was "perfectly sound" in mind; at 
 different times deceased spoke of his wife and family hav- 
 ing conspired against him, put him in the Home of Inebriates, 
 having had him declared insane for the purpose of robbing 
 him and getting possession of his property; he spoke of try- 
 ing to obtain a loan and being met at all points by members 
 of his family, who interfered with his purpose by threatening 
 bankers and others with suit. This was substantially what 
 he said to the witness, who never saw^ the deceased under the 
 influence of liquor. The codicil was drawn in the office of 
 the witness December 15, 1885, at which time the mind of 
 the testator was ' ' perfectly sound " ; it was so at all times 
 that the witness had business relations with him. The de- 
 ceased wanted the witness to have $1,000 in the will, but he 
 declined to draw any will wherein he would be named as a 
 beneficiary, and told the testator that if he wanted him to 
 benefit by his bounty he must get some one else to draw the 
 will. The subscribing witness, Dr. Rowell, is the man who 
 certified that the deceased died of typhoid fever, and the 
 other subscribing witness, Anderson, is a person who was 
 without occupation and was accommodated by Rowell with 
 lodgings in his office, and was not produced at the contest 
 owing to his absence in unknown parts (Judge's Notes, page 
 199). 
 
 CONCLUSION OF COURT. 
 
 In all that Mr. Pierson did he may have been acting in a 
 perfectly professional manner, and yet have erred in his 
 opinion as to the soundness of the mind of the testator, for 
 experience teaches even those who come into daily contact 
 with insane persons how difficult it is to discern the fact of in- 
 sanity, and the slightness of Mr. Pierson 's acquaintance with 
 the testator is shown when he states that although he had 
 known him for twentj^-five years he had never seen him under 
 the influence of liquor. IMy own conclusion is, upon the 
 whole case, that the testator was not of sound mind at the 
 time of the execution of the paper offered for probate, and 
 that he was unduly influenced thereto by the residuary lega- 
 tee.
 
 532 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 basis of conclusion. 
 
 This conclusion is based upon the entire body of evidence, 
 which has been thoroughly examined by me. I have not 
 undertaken to digest the testimony of every witness, but no 
 one of them has been excluded from consideration in reach- 
 ing the result, which seems to me the inevitable event of an 
 examination of the facts elicited in the progress of a contest 
 which was characterized throughout on both sides by a de- 
 termination and spirit rarely equaled. 
 
 Probate denied. 
 
 One may Place Himself so Far Under the Influence of Intoxicating 
 Liquor that for the time being he cannot do any legal act, or he may, 
 by an excessive use of alcoholic stimulants for an extended period 
 of time, perhaps permanently dethrone his reason. A person may, 
 therefore, by an inordinate indulgence in intoxicants, temporarily and 
 possibly permanently incai^acitate himself to make a will. Yet the 
 fact that one is addicted to the excessive use of liquor, or that he 
 is in some measure under its influence, manifestly does not, as a 
 matter of law, establish a want of testamentary capacity. Never- 
 theless, such inebriety is always admissible in evidence as tending 
 to show unsoundness of mind, of vulnerability to undue influence, its 
 effect being question of fact for the jury: Estate of Hill, ante, p. 
 380; Estate of Cunningham, 52 Cal. 465; Estate of Gharky, 57 Cal. 
 274, 278; Estate of Lang, 65 Cal. 19, 2 Pac. 491; Estate of Wilson, 
 117 Cal. 262, 49 Pac. 172; In re D 'Avignon's Will, 12 Colo. App. 
 489, 55 Pac. 936; Estate of Van Alstine, 26 Utah, 193, 72 Pac. 942; 
 Estate of Eathjens, 45 Wash. 55, 87 Pac. 1070. "We cannot say, 
 as a rule of law, that because a man is a drunkard, therefore he is 
 of unsound mind. It is a question of fact for the jury or court 
 below to determine whether the inebriety has had the efl'ect of ren- 
 dering his mind unsound, either permanently or temporarily, cov- 
 ering the time of the execution of the alleged will": Estate of John- 
 son, 57 Cal. 529. 
 
 A Will is not Invalid Because It may Appear Unwise, Unjust, or 
 Unnatural in its provisions, for the law does not make the right of 
 testamentary disposition dependent upon its judicious exercise: Es- 
 tate of McDevitt, 95 Cal. 17, 30 Pac. 101; Estate of Spencer, 96 Cal. 
 448, 31 Pac. 453; Estate of Kaufman, 117 Cal. 288, 59 Am. St. Eep. 
 179, 49 Pac. 192; Estate of Donovan, 140 Cal. 390, 73 Pac. 1081; 
 Estate of Morey, 147 Cal. 495, 82 Pac. 57; Ames v. Ames, 40 Or. 
 495, 67 Pac. 757; In re Turner's Will (Or.), 93 Pac. 461; Estate of 
 Gorkow, 20 Wash. 563, 56 Pac. 385. Nevertheless the injustice or un- 
 naturalness of a will is a circumstance which may be considered with
 
 Estate of Curtis. 533 
 
 other evidence tending to show, on the part of the testator, an 
 unbalanced mind or a mind susceptible to or swayed by undue in- 
 fluence: Field V. Shorb, 99 Cal. 661, 34 Pac. 504; Estate of Wilson, 
 117 Cal. 262, 49 Pac. 172, 711; Estate of Langford, 108 Cal. 608, 41 
 Pac. 701; Hubbard v. Hubbard, 7 Or. 42; Eathjens v. Merrill, 38 Wash. 
 442, 80 Pac. 754. "That a will is what may be called undiitiful is 
 material only when the circumstances are such as to show that the 
 testator, if uninfluenced, would most likely have made what is called 
 a dutiful will": Estate of Euffino, 116 Cal. 304, 48 Pac. 127. 
 
 On Undue Influence as invalidating a will, see Estate of Hill, ante, 
 p. 380, and note. 
 
 Estate of PATRICK CURTIS. Deceased. 
 
 [No. 16,787; decided July 30, 1896.] 
 Probate Court — Jurisdiction to Try Title. — The superior court, 
 sitting in probate, has no authority to adjudicate the question of title 
 to personal property in dispute between a third person and the estate 
 of a decedent. 
 
 The administratrix of the estate of Patrick Curtis, de- 
 ceased, filed a petition alleging that certain personal property 
 belonging to the estate was in the possession of Patrick Reddy, 
 who refused to deliver it to her. The petitioner prayed for 
 an order requiring him to do so. A citation was issued and 
 served upon the respondent, who filed his answer wherein 
 he denied that he had any property of the estate in his cus- 
 tody, and alleged that decedent had given him the property 
 claimed by the petitioner. 
 
 Quitzow & Hurlbut, for administratrix. 
 
 J. C. Campbell and W. II. Metson, for respondent. 
 
 COFFEY, J. In obedience to the order and citation of 
 this court, certain writings of Patrick Curtis, now deceased, 
 have been submitted to the court for examination and inter- 
 pretation, and the questions are: 
 
 First. Do these writings make and constitute a valid gift 
 causa mortis? And if not, then,
 
 534 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 Second. Do they make and constitute a testamentary 
 disposition of the property of the decedent — or, in other 
 words, can those writings be proved and probated as the last 
 will and testament of the deceased? 
 
 The writings are all dated November 6, 1896, and it is 
 claimed by Mr. Reddy that he obtained possession of all 
 the property by gift on the eleventh day of November 1895, 
 and the evidence shows that Patrick Curtis died November 
 25, 1895; so that in case Mr. Reddy did obtain possession of 
 this property by gift on November 11, 1895, he obtained pos- 
 session prior to the death of the donor. 
 
 Section 1149 of the Civil Code is as follows: "A gift 
 in view of death is one which is made in contemplation, 
 fear or peril of death, and with intent that it shall take 
 effect only in case of the death of the giver." 
 
 In this matter we find Mr. Curtis in bed suffering from 
 the effects of a severe surgical operation, sending to Mr. 
 Reddy, through the agent of Mr. Reddy (not the agent of 
 Mr. Curtis), the property that he then possessed. The means 
 of obtaining possession and control of the thing was thus 
 given to Mr. Reddy, and there was an actual delivery of the 
 thing to him during the life of Mr. Curtis. Hence section 
 1147 of the Civil Code was complied with. Mr. Reddy actu- 
 ally reduced the property to his possession before the death 
 of Mr. Curtis. The gift was made in contemplation of the 
 near approach of death by the donor. The proof showed 
 the existence of a bodily disorder, an illness which imperiled 
 the donor's life and which eventually terminated it. The 
 gift was made, therefore, by Mr. Curtis in contemplation, fear 
 and peril of death, and if Mr. Curtis had not expressed his 
 intent respecting a gift of that character it made no differ- 
 ence. The expression of his intent respecting the gift would 
 neither add to the strength nor detract from it. Section 
 1149 of the Civil Code is conclusive upon that matter. It 
 determines the intent. It declares that "with intent that it 
 shall take effect only in case of the death of the giver. ' ' 
 
 To repeat: There was a very sick man; there was a deliv- 
 ery of the property from him to Mr. Reddy for the donee 
 during the lifetime of the giver. The giver parted with all
 
 Estate of Curtis. 535 
 
 dominion over the property at that time, and Mr. Reddy 
 actually reduced the property to his possession and tontrol 
 during the lifetime of the donor. The transaction, there- 
 fore, was legally complete in every respect when the prop- 
 erty passed from the control of Curtis to that of Mr. Reddy, 
 the intent being fixed by statute, and Mr. Curtis actually 
 dying from that same sickness : See Daniel v. Smith, 64 Cal. 
 346, 30 Pac. 575. 
 
 Counsel for administratrix argue strenuously that no posses- 
 sion, actual or symbolical, was given to Mr. Reddy by the 
 decedent. It is difficult for the court to understand how, 
 in the conceded circumstances of this case, delivery to the 
 donee could have been more effectual. 
 
 With reference to an acceptance of the gift on the part 
 of the donee, in case of a beneficial gift, the assent of the 
 donee is presumed until the contrary appears. The authori- 
 ties so hold : 9 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 1351. 
 
 A gift in view of death is one which is made in contem- 
 plation, fear or peril of death, and with intent that it shall 
 take effect only in case of the death of the giver: Civ. Code, 
 sec. 1149. 
 
 "There must be a delivery of the property, either to the 
 donee or to some person for his use or benefit, and the 
 donor must part with all dominion over the property, and 
 the title must vest in the donee, subject to the right of the 
 donor at any time during his life to revoke the gift. (Dole 
 V. Lincoln, 31 Me. 428, 429 ; Curry v. Powers, 70 N. Y. 217, 
 26 Am. Rep. 577; Hatch v. Atkinson, 56 Me. 327, 96 Am. 
 Dec. 464; Taylor v. Henry, 48 Md. 550, 30 Am. Rep. 486.) 
 All the authorities agree that there must be a delivery of 
 the property intended to be the subject of the gift. (Hamor 
 V. Moore's Admr., 8 Ohio St. 242; Fiero v. Fiero, 5 Thomp. 
 & C. 151; Case v. Dennison, 9 R. I. 88, 11 Am. Rep. 222; 
 McGrath v. Reynolds, 116 Mass. 566.)" Daniel v. Smith, 
 supra. 
 
 Is there any such delivery established by the evidence 
 in this case, with intent by decedent Curtis to part with all 
 dominion over the property?
 
 536 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 Counsel for administratrix insist that neither the writings 
 submitted in evidence nor the oral testimony show a deliv- 
 ery to the donee in any sense whatever, and insist that the 
 respondent Reddy was the agent of the donor; but counsel 
 mistake the evidence, or this court misapprehends its effect, 
 for, if I have rightly understood the facts, the respondent 
 was constituted the agent of the donee, and as such agent 
 was the recipient of the gift, thus making a perfect donation 
 causa mortis, according to the statute and the decision of the 
 supreme court in Daniel v. Smith, supra, which I have care- 
 fully read, and which agrees with all the authorities sustain- 
 ing the contention of counsel, that to constitute a valid gift 
 causa mortis the gift must be made (1) with a view to the 
 donor's death; (2) the donor must die of that ailment; (3) 
 there must be an actual delivery to the donee; (4) there 
 must be an acceptance of the gift by the donee; and (5) 
 all these elements must concur or transpire during the life- 
 time of the donor; all of these conditions must be fulfilled to 
 make the donation perfect. The fallacy, if it be a fallacy, 
 of the argument of counsel for the administratrix lies in 
 their reversal of Reddy 's relation to the deceased ; he was not 
 his agent, he was acting for the donee; the delivery to re- 
 spondent was a delivery to that donee; there was an actual 
 transfer of the property to the donee, or to some person 
 for his use and benefit, which complied with the requisite 
 essential to the validity of the gift causa mortis. 
 
 The gift was made in contemplation of the near approach 
 of death by the donor Patrick Curtis, to take effect absolutely 
 only upon his death; there was a delivery of the property — 
 "a manual tradition" (according to Mr. Justice Thornton 
 in Daniel v. Smith, page 350, 64 Cal., 30 Pac. 575)— to the 
 respondent Reddy for the use and benefit of the donee John 
 Edward Curtis, a reduction to actual possession, an accept- 
 ance in law, during the life of the donor Patrick Curtis, and 
 the title had so vested in the donee, subject to the right of 
 the donor at any time during his life to revoke the gift. He 
 died without having made any revocation and the title be- 
 came absolute in the donee, a complete and perfect investi- 
 ture.
 
 Estate of Love. 537 
 
 Out of respect to the counsel who have presented so elab- 
 orate and erudite an essay upon the subject matter of this 
 opinion, I have taken the pains to examine a question which 
 this court, sitting in its purely probate character, has no 
 power to deal with determinatively, for it has been held more 
 than once, notably in Ex parte Casey, 71 Cal. 269, 12 Pac. 
 118, that the probate forum has no function in these premises, 
 and therefore whatever judgment I might attempt to pro- 
 nounce would be vain and void. 
 
 Shortly stated, this court, sitting in probate, has no right 
 conferred by the constitution or by the statute to adjudicate 
 the question of title to property in a proceeding of this kind, 
 and, of course, such a point may not be M'aived, even if it 
 were not expressly saved herein by the party respondent, 
 Reddy ; for, as the supreme court has said, such an issue, vital 
 to the exercise of the court's power, cannot legally be deter- 
 mined in such a proceeding. He is entitled to be heard 
 according to the forms of law, in an appropriate tribunal: 
 Ex parte Hollis, 59 Cal. 406. 
 
 Upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction in this particular 
 department of the superior court, the application of the 
 administratrix is denied and the citation is dismissed. 
 
 Estate of HARLOW S. LOVE. 
 
 [No. 2,287; decided April 10, 1883.] 
 
 Executor — Compensation for Legal Services Rendered by Himself. — 
 Where an executor is hinist'lf an attorney, he caiiiKit chiiin extra 
 compensation for the use of his legal knowledge in administering 
 his testator's estate. 
 
 Executor — Commissions When Value of Estate Disputed. — Wlicrc 
 an executor claims coininissious on tlie ajipraised value of the estate, 
 which value is disputed, his commissions should be based on the true 
 value of the property as proved by experts on the hearing of his 
 account. 
 
 Executor — Performance of Decedent's Contract. — Where an execu- 
 tor carries out the contract of his decedent to perform legal services, 
 the money received therefor should belong in part to the estate and 
 in part to the executor.
 
 538 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 Executor — Delay in Settling Estate. — Negligence was not, under 
 the peculiar circumstances of the case, held imputable to the executor, 
 notwithstanding the administration of the estate was not closed for 
 nearly sixteen years. 
 
 Executor. — Where an Executor Allowed Judgment to Go Against 
 Him for realty which had come into his possession, he having acted 
 in good faith, he should not be charged with the value of the lot, 
 but only for an amount which he received in consideration of hisi 
 consent to the judgment. 
 
 Executor. — An Executor's Eight to Commissions, given by the 
 statute, is absolute; neglect of duty, or delay in closing the adminis- 
 tration, will not take it away. 
 
 Executor — Commissions. — A Quitclaim of All the Executor's In- 
 terest in his decedent's property will not operate or be construed as 
 a waiver of commissions. 
 
 Executor. — Where Items in an Executor's Account are payments 
 arising out of mortgages given by the universal devisee and legatee, 
 they should nevertheless be allowed, where the moneys were devoted 
 to the maintenance of the widow and family, and paid at her re- 
 quest, she being universal devisee. 
 
 Executor. — Items in an Executor's Account of expense for ab- 
 stracts of title and driving squatters off of realty should be allowed, 
 when paid for the widow's benefit and at her request, she being the 
 universal devisee. 
 
 Executor. — Items in an Executor's Account of Expense of flowers 
 for grave, of insuring personalty never in his possession, examining 
 tax lists and recording a deed to a legatee, should be disallowed. 
 
 Executor. — Items of Expense in an Executor's Account for printing 
 a brief, the amount or payees not being shown; interest on a note 
 made by a legatee, for $100, without voucher, and tax charges with- 
 out sufiicient voucher, were disallowed. 
 
 Executor. — An Item of Expense in an Executor's Account, for re- 
 demption under tax sales, may be allowed. 
 
 Executor. — Where Property of an Estate has been Taken by the 
 City for a Park, the executor should not be charged with the value 
 of the land, but only with the amount received by him from such 
 source. 
 
 Executor — Commissions. — Where a Bank Loaned Money to a uni- 
 versal devisee on the executor's representation that a speedy distri- 
 bution could be had and he would obtain it, and the executor filed 
 a worthless petition therefor, he is estopped from claiming commis- 
 sions as against the bank. 
 
 Executor. — An Expense of $147.50 for a Wall Around a Cemetery 
 Lot may be allowed as a proper and usual charge against a decedent 's 
 estate.
 
 Estate of Love. 539 
 
 Executor. — A Mortgagee of Land Inventoried in the Estate, under 
 a mortgage made by the universal devisee and legatee of the testa- 
 tor, is a party interested in the estate, and entitled to be heard 
 upon the executor's accounts, and on any distribution of the estate. 
 Likewise, a judgment debtor of such devisee, who has acquired, 
 under execution upon the judgment, title to a parcel of the realty 
 inventoried in the estate, is also a party interested in the estate; so, 
 also, is a mortgagee of such judgment debtor. 
 
 The opinion of the court in this ease was rendered upon 
 a motion to confirm the report of John M. Burnett, referee 
 to examine and report upon the final account of John Lord 
 Love, executor, and the exceptions thereto, which report was 
 filed December 7, 1882. As a general statement of the whole 
 case (apart from the special facts considered with reference 
 to the specific objections to the account), the following is 
 taken from Mr. Burnett's report: 
 
 "From the proofs, both oral and documentary, and the 
 admissions of the parties, I find the following facts : 
 
 "Harlow S. Love, the testator, died on the 15th day of 
 March, 1866, leaving a last will by which he devised and 
 bequeathed to his wife, Martha C. M. Love, all his estate, with 
 the exception of a small legacy to each child, and appointed 
 his son, John Lord Love, executor. 
 
 "The will was filed in the then Probate Court of this city 
 and county, on the 12th day of June, 1866, and on the 28th 
 day of September, 1866, was duly admitted to probate. Let- 
 ters testamentary were issued May 16, 1867, to John Lord 
 Love, who qualified on said day, and has ever since been 
 executor. On the 29th day of March, 1870, an order of 
 publication of notice to creditors was made, and on the 24th 
 day of October, 1871, a decree showing due publication of 
 such notice was entered and filed. 
 
 "On the 18th day of December, 1877, the executor filed in 
 the Probate Court his petition for a distribution of the estate, 
 setting forth he was about to make an inventory, and was 
 'about to file his accounts as said executor,' and containing 
 the allegation that all the 'debts of said deceased and of said 
 estate, and all the expenses of the administration thus far 
 incurred,' had been paid and discharged, and that the estate 
 was in a condition to be closed.
 
 540 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 "The inventory was filed October 10, 1882, and no account 
 was filed until November 1, 1882, when the present account 
 was filed after a citation was issued by this court. 
 
 "On the 17th day of August, 1868, Mrs. Love made a 
 mortgage to the German Savings and Loan Society (in which 
 she was joined by John L. Love, as an individual) for $2,500; 
 on the 23d of September, 1868, another mortgage (in which 
 she was also joined by him as an individual) for $2,500; on 
 the 31st day of September, 1868, to the French Bank (in 
 which she was joined by Mr. Love as executor) for $3,000; 
 on the 24th of November, 1869, to the German S. & L. Society 
 aforesaid (in which she was joined by Mr. Love as an indi- 
 vidual) for $4,500. Finally, in December, 1877, she made a 
 mortgage to the Hibernia Savings and Loan Society to secure 
 the payment of $30,000, which mortgage covered the lands 
 described in the objections of the said Hibernia Bank. This 
 mortgage was foreclosed in due course, and the title of 
 the mortgagors to the mortgaged property finally vested 
 in the bank by sheriff's deed, which corporation now holds 
 the same. 
 
 "On the 3d day of December, 1878, Louis T. Lazme com- 
 menced an action against M. C. M. Love to recover certain 
 moneys, and. on a judgment being rendered in his favor, sold 
 under execution the property thirdly and fourthly described 
 in the inventory. In due course of time a sheriff's deed was 
 made, conveying the same to Leila L. Foster, the contestant 
 herein, who is now the owner thereof, subject to mortgages 
 made by her to the Pacific Bank, which mortgages are unpaid. 
 
 "About the year 1872, fifty-vara lot number 1 in block 599, 
 and an irregular long strip running into blocks 521 and 600, 
 were taken for the Buena Vista Park, under order 800 of the 
 Board of Supervisors ; and in the year 188 — , a decree quiet- 
 ing title as against the estate was rendered in the case of 
 Bornheimer v. Baldwin et al., for a part of the land described 
 in the inventory. 
 
 "I find that by these transactions the entire interest of 
 Mrs. Love, the residuary legatee and devisee, in the estate was 
 divested, and that the contestants are interested in the estate'^ 
 (pp. 2-5).
 
 Estate op Love. 541 
 
 The special findings of fact and conclusions of law by 
 the referee, with respect and directed particularly to the 
 various specific objections and exceptions to the executor's 
 account, are also here given, to be read in connection with 
 the opinion of the court. 
 
 As to the value of the estate referred to in the court's 
 opinion, the referee's report said: 
 
 "Proof was made as to the value of the lands described 
 in the inventory, and I find the value, at the date of filing 
 it, to be $49,000. On this amount the commissions of the 
 executor if allowed would amount to the sum of $2,090" 
 (p. 9). 
 
 As to the executor's right to retain the fee received in 
 Clark V. Reese (arising out of a personal contract of dece- 
 dent), the referee said: 
 
 "I further find that in February, 1866, the testator made 
 a contract with Mrs. Clark to bring a suit against Michael 
 Reese, and associated Alexander Campbell, Jr., with him. 
 The suit was commenced during the lifetime of the decedent, 
 but was not tried until after his death. Mr. Love, the execu- 
 tor, made no contract with Mrs. Clark or with ]\Ir. Campbell 
 on his father's death, but went into the case and assisted 
 to prepare it for trial ; participated in the trial ; prepared 
 amendments to the statement on motion for a new trial, and 
 assisted generally in the case until its final disposition in 
 the supreme court. The decedent and Mr. Campbell were 
 to get one-half of the amount recovered, and were to divide 
 equally among themselves. The plaintiff eventually received 
 $6,000 in currency, and of the $3,000 coming to the attorneys, 
 $1,500 was paid to Mr. Love. He contends the whole belongs 
 to him — the contestants aver he holds the entire sum for the 
 benefit of the estate. 
 
 "It is evident some part of the money belongs to the estate. 
 The testator had performed a portion of the service by which 
 the money was earned ; on the other hand, the contract of an 
 attorney is personal, and the relation between him and his 
 client is severed by death. I think the executor should only 
 be charged with $350 in gold, being one-third of the amount 
 as near as may be" (pp. 11, 12).
 
 542 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 As to the delay in settling the estate, which was excused by 
 the court, the referee's statement will be found below in the 
 quotation from the referee's report as to the executor's right 
 to commissions (pp. 13, 14). 
 
 As to the Bornheimer lot, referred to by the court, over- 
 ruling the referee, the report of the referee said: 
 
 ''The suit of Bornheimer v. Love et al.. Executor, was for 
 the property firstly described in the inventory. I find the 
 executor not only allowed judgment to be taken, but received 
 $825 for so doing, for which he has given no account. 
 
 "While the judgment was without costs, yet, as the law 
 requires executors to exercise the greatest care, I hold he 
 had no right to consent to such a judgment. Having received 
 the property in his possession, his account of its loss is not 
 sufficient, and he must be charged with its value, which is 
 $3,000. I recognize the fact that this is a hard case, but it 
 seems to me the law is clear" (pp. 12-13). 
 
 As to the executor's absolute right to commissions, as 
 held by the court, the referee 's report said : 
 
 "The contestants object to any allowance of commissions 
 to the executor, on the ground that there has been gross 
 neglect, delay and carelessness in the administration of the 
 estate. I find that the executor has kept no accounts what- 
 ever ; that as testified to by him, the account filed was made up 
 from vouchers and his memory; that nearly a year elapsed 
 from the filing of the will until letters testamentary were 
 issued to him ; that nearly four years elapsed from the filing 
 of the will until notice to creditors was published; that no 
 inventory was filed for over sixteen years, and that no account 
 was filed until citation was issued. It is also in proof that he 
 is a lawyer, the only son of decedent and the residuary 
 legatee and devisee ; his mother was not acquainted with busi- 
 ness, and was not fit to manage her affairs alone. Mr. Love 
 was called on frequently to join his mother in the mortgages 
 given by her, and on each occasion must have felt the neces- 
 sity of a settlement of the estate. Our law contemplates the 
 speedy settlement of estates. I feel compelled to hold, under 
 the authorities cited by counsel, that commissions should not 
 be allowed" (pp. 13, 14).
 
 Estate of Love. 543 
 
 As to the executor's waiver of commissions claimed by 
 objectors and contestants, the referee said : 
 
 ' ' Contestants read in evidence a quit-claim deed from John 
 S. Love to M. C. M. Love, dated in 1877, and executed just 
 prior to the 'Hibernia Bank Loan,' and claim it operates, 
 per se, as a waiver of commissions. I do not so consider it. 
 While the deed covered all the land of the estate, it only con- 
 veyed the interest of the grantor, acquired by a prior deed 
 from Olds, or such other as he had in the law, and not his 
 right to commissions as executor" (p. 15). 
 
 As to payments made to the German and French Banks, 
 arising out of mortgages given by the universal devisee and 
 legatee, the referee found and held : 
 
 "All the items of payments made through the German 
 Savings & Loan Society and French Bank (not specially 
 withdrawn), and which aggregate: Paid German Bank 
 $4,396.35, paid French Bank $943— $5,339.35, I reject, on 
 the ground that they were payments made on mortgages 
 given by the residuary legatee, and are not proper charges 
 against the estate" (p. 7). 
 
 As to items numbers 18, 37 and 25; items numbers 4, 26, 
 86, 118 and 112 ; items numbers 13, 66, 72 and 80 ; items 82, 
 83, 84, 85, and item 92, referred to in the court's opinion, 
 the referee said : 
 
 "I also reject item 4, of $7 for flowers for grave. Item 
 26, of $29 insurance on personal property, which the executor 
 never took into his possession, but turned over to the residuary 
 legatee ; item 18, of $10 paid Brooks & Rouleau for abstract, 
 which I find was for the use of Mrs. Love to secure loan from 
 German Bank; item, 25, of $75 paid Michael Dalton, for 
 driving off squatters and burning of fences; item 37, for 
 $15 paid Rouleau & Mills for abstract, which I find was for 
 Mrs. Love's purposes; item 86, of $5 paid G. F. Sharp for 
 looking up tax lists, which was executor's duty; and also 
 item 118, of $5 paid Hart for similar services, and item 112, 
 of $2.25 paid for recording deed from Olds to John L. Love, 
 on the ground that they were not proper charges against the 
 estate.
 
 544 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 "I also rejected item 13, for $20 paid for printing brief 
 in Judson v. Molloy, because the testimony did not show the 
 amount nor persons to whom paid; $50 of item 66, paid 
 Kouleau, as interest on note made by Mr. Love, on the ground 
 that the executor had no right to pay interest; item 72, 
 paid Jarboe & Harrison $100, on the ground that there was 
 no voucher, and no proof as to amount paid; item 80, paid 
 J. P. Dameron for taxes 1871-2, $25.89, on the ground that 
 there was no sufficient voucher. 
 
 "The items for redemption of property from tax sales 
 1871-2, being items 82, 83, 84, 85, amounting in the aggregate 
 $142.64, I have allowed in part and rejected in part. The 
 executor should have distributed the estate, as nearly six 
 years had elapsed when the items were paid since the will 
 was admitted to probate, or should have made a sale to pro- 
 vide money for taxes. I have credited him with the taxes, 
 and have rejected the fifty per cent, required for redemption, 
 as shown by the annexed account. 
 
 ''I have rejected item 92, for $47.75, taxes 1872-73, on 
 block 520, because there is no voucher" (pp. 7-9). 
 
 As to land taken for Buena Vista Park, the referee said: 
 
 "The executor has failed to charge himself in his accounts 
 with any receipts of money, but admits in his report of having 
 received $780 for property taken for Buena Vista Park 
 With this amount he should certainly be charged, but the con- 
 testants seek to charge him with the value of the land taken, 
 which is estimated by an expert to have been $2,000. The 
 executor testified that he only received the $780.20 ; that there 
 were benefits assessed against the property of the estate, as 
 well as damages awarded for the land taken, and that, ac- 
 cording to his best recollection, the amount he received was 
 for the difference. The public records by which the matter 
 could be settled have been lost or destroyed, and I am com- 
 pelled to decide upon the evidence as it now stands. As the 
 executor cannot be held responsible for the loss of the records, 
 and as the law provides for such assessments and awards, I 
 hold that he shall only be charged with the sum received" 
 (pp. 10-11).
 
 Estate of Love. 545 
 
 As to the estoppel claimed by the Hibernia Savings and 
 Loan Society in its favor, against the executor, the referee 
 said: 
 
 "In 1877 the Hibernia Bank was about to loan money on 
 mortgage to Mrs. Love. The attorney of the bank was as- 
 sured by Mr. Love that there was no obstacle in the way of 
 a speedy distribution of the property to his mother, and that 
 he would attend to the matter. The bank 's attorney required 
 a petition for a distribution to be filed, and a letter from the 
 clerk of the Court certifying to that fact, before the loan was 
 passed. The petition was filed and the letter was sent, but 
 as the document was worthless as a petition it was never 
 acted upon. The loan was made under these circumstances. 
 As to the bank, the executor should be estopped from claim- 
 ing commissions" (p. 14). 
 
 There is also another item, not specially referred to in the 
 opinion of the court, but as to which the action of the referee 
 is in general terms confirmed. The item is thus set forth in 
 the referee's opinion: 
 
 '*I allow $147.50 for wall around cemetery lot (included in 
 item 47), on the ground that it is a proper and usual charge, 
 although the Estate of Barclay, 11 Phil. 123, is directly 
 against such allowance. I find the rulings of our own Courts 
 sustain my position" (pp. 9-10). 
 
 As to the fact and legal conclusion that the contestants 
 were parties interested in the estate, and so treated by the 
 court, the referee's statement of facts and his conclusions on 
 that point will be found above in the first quotation from the 
 referee's report, 
 
 OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED BY REFEREE. 
 
 There were presented objections to the executor's account 
 on behalf of all the parties claiming to be interested in the 
 
 estate. 
 
 On November 13, 1882, Leila L. Foster filed exceptions as 
 daughter, and successor in interest by various deeds, convey- 
 ances, etc., of M. C. M. Love, the widow and residuar^^ lega- 
 tee and devisee of decedent, to the lands thirdly and fourthly 
 in the inventory described, upon the grounds: (1) That no 
 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. I — 35
 
 546 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 vouchers were presented in support of the account; (2) that 
 the payments specified in the account were made with moneys 
 obtained by M. C. M. Love from mortgages given by her on 
 property of the estate, or moneys advanced by her and 
 by the objector, to the executor; (3) that executor has not 
 charged himself with various moneys received (among others, 
 moneys received by Mrs. Love on mortgages) ; (4) that ex- 
 ecutor has grossly neglected and violated his duties and trust, 
 and no commissions or compensation for extra services should 
 be allowed him; (5) that executor has caused valuation and 
 appraisement of the estate to be increased to three times 
 its true value in orSer that his commissions may be thereby 
 increased; (5a) that executor's services were to be free, and 
 for the advantage of his mother, the universal devisee; that 
 no charge for services should be allowed, as all the estate 
 was realty, and the executor in December, 1877, released 
 all his interest in it to his mother; (7) disbursements and 
 advances claimed by executor are barred by sections 337, 
 338, 339, 343, Code of Civil Procedure; (8) the credits 
 claimed by the executor are stale; and (9) the estate should 
 have been closed before January 1, 1869, and so executor 
 is not entitled to claim for advances or services. 
 
 On November 16, 1882, the Hibernia Savings and Loan 
 Society (of San Francisco) filed objections on same grounds 
 made by Mrs. Leila L. Foster, and also as follows: (1) Ob- 
 jector is successor in interest of M. C. M. Love, and has ac- 
 quired her title to land in inventory described, under fore- 
 closure of mortgage made by her to the bank to secure a 
 sum of money borrowed; (2) "Said loan was negotiated for 
 in part by said John L. Love, and was made upon an ex- 
 press agreement, personally made between said corporation 
 and said John L. Love, that said property was free from all 
 liabilities to said John L. Love, arising from his connection 
 with said estate or otherwise, and that said property should 
 be distributed to said M. C. M. Love as soon as possible after 
 the making of said loan ; and that he, the said John L. Love, 
 would take the necessary proceedings for that purpose; and 
 said loan was made upon the faith of said agreement." 
 (4 [3] ) Said John L. Love conveyed to said M. C. M. Love,
 
 Estate of Love. 547 
 
 by deed, all his right, title and interest in and to said real 
 property at the time said loan was made. 
 
 On November 25, 1882, objections were filed by Pacific 
 Bank (of San Francisco), showing: That objector is mort- 
 gagee of Leila L. Foster, under mortgage upon two parcels 
 of land in inventory described; that at dates of mortgage 
 Leila L. Foster had acquired title of M. C. M. Love, the 
 universal devisee, to the aforesaid lots of land, and, there- 
 fore, Foster is entitled to distribution. So objector, as such 
 mortgagee, is interested in the estate. 
 
 There were also objections to the referee's report filed on 
 behalf of the executor December 14, 1882. These objections 
 by the executor were detailed and elaborate, but not neces- 
 sary to be set out here. 
 
 It should also be noted, what does not appear in the re- 
 port of the referee, or the opinion of the court, that the 
 aggregate valuation of the estate (all realty, seven lots), 
 as fixed by the official appraisement returned by the executor, 
 was $86,000. The experts independently examined by the 
 referee, and whose testimony was accepted by the court, were 
 different persons from the appraisers previously appointed. 
 
 John M. Burnett, referee. 
 
 Geo. R. B. Hayes (Stanly, Stoney & Hayes), for Leila 
 L. Foster. 
 
 Tobin & Tobin, for Hibernia Bank. 
 
 Winans, Belknap & Godoy, for Pacific Bank. 
 
 John S. Bugbee, with him Mr. T. B. Bishop, for executor 
 Love. 
 
 COFFEY, J. This is a motion to confirm the report of 
 the referee to whom the matter of the final account of the 
 executor was referred, and to settle said account in accord- 
 ance with said report, and for a decree distributing the prop- 
 erty of said estate to the parties entitled thereto. The mo- 
 tion comes before this department on stipulation. The par- 
 ties interested are the executor, John Lord Love: Leila L. 
 Foster, who appears as the successor in interest by purchase
 
 548 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol, 1. 
 
 of Martha C. M. Love, the widow and residuary legatee and 
 devisee of the decedent; the Pacific Bank and the Hibernia 
 Savings and Loan Society, mortgagees. 
 
 On the hearing of the motion the executor appeared by 
 John S. Bugbee, Esq., and T. B. Bishop, Esq., who opposed 
 confirmation of the report of the referee; and Leila L. Fos- 
 ter, contestant, appeared by Geo. R. B. Hayes, Esq. 
 
 As to claim for extraordinary services : There is no error 
 here. In my judgment the executor is entitled to no com- 
 pensation for extraordinary services. 
 
 It is true he performed a duty advantageous to the estate, 
 but he would have been grossly negligent if he had not used 
 his ability in and knowledge of the law to have done so ; and 
 it appears a particular stress was laid by his mother upon 
 the fact that he was a lawyer, and there was no necessity of 
 going to extra expense of employing another to do the duty 
 the executor was competent to perform. The principle and 
 the policy which oppose the allowance of such a claim are 
 too well settled to be now disturbed or assailed: Collier v. 
 Munn, 41 N. Y. 143. 
 
 As to value of estate : I think the proof is that the value 
 of the estate was no more than $49,000, according to evi- 
 dence of Middleton and Magee ; and I think the commissions 
 of executor should be based upon this proof. As to valua- 
 tion, there is no error. 
 
 As to fee in Clark v. Eeese, it seems to me Harlow S. Love 
 earned a right, dependent upon the result, to the portion al- 
 lowed by the referee; and that when the executor was paid 
 the one-half of the contingent fee, his associate, Campbell, 
 paid it in recognition of the interest the decedent had in the 
 case as attorney. The moral right of the estate to a portion 
 of this fee is very clear; and the apportionment by the ref- 
 eree seems to be based upon a correct principle. If there is 
 any doubt in my mind, it is that the estate has had less than 
 its due awarded to it. 
 
 As to the delay in settling the estate, some indulgence may 
 be extended to the executor, after examining his evidence. 
 "While ordinarily in such a case he might seem to be charge- 
 able with great negligence, and an extreme lack of diligence
 
 Estate op Love. 549 
 
 in closing the estate, the peculiar circumstances here induce 
 me to view his apparent dilatoriness with charity; and I 
 should not feel justified in imputing to him very great blame. 
 Much of the delay was caused by the exaggerated notions of 
 his mother as to the value of the property, and while a more 
 methodical business man would not regard such considera- 
 tions, we cannot entirely remove from our view the influence 
 his mother had over him in protracting the settlement, in 
 view of her interest in the estate. 
 
 As to the Bornheimer lot, I think the referee did not err 
 in charging the executor with the simi of $825. Beyond 
 that, I think the referee erred in charging the executor with 
 the full value of the lot. I think the executor acted in good 
 faith and used his best judgment in that case, and should not 
 be held accountable for error in the exercise of that judg- 
 ment, if it were an error. 
 
 The items aggregating $351.31 (page 7 of referee's report) 
 were properly rejected, the claims not having been properly 
 presented or allowed, except the items of $20 and under, Nos. 
 6, 20, 115, 117 : Code Civ. Proc, sec. 1632. 
 
 As to commissions of executor: The right to commissions 
 on the part of executor is absolute under the statute. 
 
 The strongest cases uphold this view where the compen- 
 sation is fixed by law. In this respect the referee erred, 
 and the executor is entitled to his commissions on the proved 
 value of the estate, to wit, forty-nine thousand dollars 
 ($49,000). 
 
 As to payments made to German Savings and Loan So- 
 ciety and the French Savings Bank : I think the referee erred 
 in rejecting the claims for the payments to these accounts, 
 because it appears the moneys obtained were devoted to the 
 maintenance of the widow and her family, and with a view 
 to the preservation, care and management and settlement of 
 the estate ; and it was done for and at the request of his 
 mother, who was the universal devisee and legatee. 
 
 As to items rejected. No. 18 (for abstract in loan from 
 German Bank), No. 37 (for abstract), and item No. 25 (paid 
 Dalton for driving off squatters), the referee erred, as I think 
 these items were proper charges against the estate. Items
 
 550 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 Nos. 4, 26, 86, 118, 112 were properly rejected by the referee. 
 Items Nos. 13, 66, 72 and 80 were also properly rejected, for 
 the reasons set forth in the report of referee. 
 
 I think the referee erred in rejecting the percentage for 
 redemption in the items Nos. 82, 83, 84, 85, as under the cir- 
 cumstances adverted to in the executor's testimony I do not 
 feel at liberty to hold him culpable to this extent. 
 
 Item No. 92 was properly rejected. 
 
 As to $780 received for property taken for Buena Vista 
 Park, the referee has not erred in his findings in that par- 
 ticular. The executor is properly chargeable with that sum, 
 and I find nothing in the record which justifies a reversal of 
 the referee's judgment as to that. 
 
 As to the estoppel claimed for the Hibernia Savings and 
 Loan Society: I think the loan made by the bank was upon 
 the faith of representations made to its attorney by the ex- 
 ecutor, which estop him from claiming commissions as against 
 the bank. In this finding of the referee I see no error. 
 
 In all respects, except as herein modified, the report of 
 the referee should be confirmed, and it is so ordered. 
 
 In Case an Executor or Administrator is Himself an Attorney, he 
 
 cannot charge the estate with the expense of another attorney to 
 assist him in conducting an ordinary administration, unattended 
 with any legal or other complications. He is required to exercise 
 his own professional skill, and this without extra compensation. 
 Undoubtedly complications or litigation may arise which will en- 
 title an administrator, though himself a lawyer, to the assistance of 
 legal advice and counsel, but he cannot enlist such assistance, and 
 have the cost thereof allowed in his account, in conducting ordinary 
 jjrobate proceedings; 1 Eoss on Probate Law and Practice, 765. 
 
 An Executor or Administrator does not Necessarily Forfeit His 
 Eight to Compensation by dereliction of duty. In the event of the 
 estate sustaining loss by his default or neglect, he should be charged 
 with such loss in his account, and be allowed his commissions: Estate 
 of Carver, 123 Cal. 102, 55 Pac. 770. 
 
 The Value of an Estate, for the Purpose of Calculating the Com- 
 missions of the executor or administrator, is determined prima facie 
 by the appraisement contained in the inventory. The appraised 
 value is not conclusive, however, and if it is questioned, the court
 
 Estate of Hayes. 551 
 
 may institute an inquiry into the actual value: Estate of Carver, 123 
 Cal. 102, 55 Pac. 770; Estate of Fernandez, 119 Cal. 579, 51 Pac. 581; 
 Noble V. Whitten, 38 Wash. 262, 80 Pae. 451; Estate of Mason, 26 
 Wash. 259, 66 Pae. 435; Estate of Smith, 18 Wash. 129, 51 Pac. 348; 
 Wilbur V. Wilbur, 17 Wash. 683, 50 Pac. 589. 
 
 Estate of THOMAS HAYES, Deceased. 
 
 [No. 4,017; decided Nov. 25, 1895.] 
 
 Homestead. — When Application is Made by a Minor child of a de- 
 cedent to have a homestead set apart from community property, the 
 surviving widow having died, and the other children having attained 
 majority, without applying for a homestead, the court must grant 
 the application and set aside the homestead absolutely, not limiting 
 it to the period of minority or otherwise. 
 
 Homestead — Selection from Separate Property, — It is only when a 
 homestead is set apart from the separate property of the decedent 
 that it is required to be for a limited period. 
 
 Homestead — Success or to Eight. — The right to a probate homestead 
 may be lost, and there can be no successor to that right. 
 
 Homestead — How Far an Estate. — The right to have a probate 
 homestead set aside is not an estate; it becomes such when a decree 
 is made setting aside the homestead and title then vests in the bene- 
 ficiaries. 
 
 Homestead — Effect of Setting Aside. — When property is set apart 
 as a probate homestead, the property is then taken out of the juris- 
 diction of the court. 
 
 Homestead. — The Right to a Probate Homestead is tested or con- 
 sidered not as of the date of the death of the decedent but as of the 
 time of the application. 
 
 Courts.— It is the Duty of Courts to Administer the Statute Law 
 as they find it, and not to account for its incongruities. 
 
 Stafford & Stafford, for petitioner. 
 
 P. J. Mogan, for adult heirs, contra. 
 
 COFFEY, J. This is a petition to have certain property 
 set aside for the use and benefit of Agnes Hayes, a minor, 
 under section 1465, Code of Civil Procedure. The facts are 
 briefly these: Thomas Hayes died on September 30, 1884,
 
 552 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 leaving him surviving as his only heirs his widow, Margaret 
 Hayes, who died on May 15, 1885, and five children. All 
 these children are now over the age of majority, except the 
 petitioner herein. 
 
 Decedent Thomas Hayes left only one piece of property, 
 which is situated in San Francisco. It was community prop- 
 erty, and it is sought herein to have it set aside as a home- 
 stead. 
 
 Neither the widow in her lifetime nor any of the children 
 during their minority, except petitioner, applied to have a 
 homestead set aside. 
 
 It is asked that the property be set aside absolutely to 
 Agnes Hayes. 
 
 Counsel for the other and adult children oppose this, and 
 wish the decree to state that the homestead be set aside to 
 petitioner during her minority. 
 
 1. It is the right of the minor to have, and it is the duty 
 of the court to set aside absolutely to her, said homestead, 
 without limitation: Code Civ. Proc, sec. 1465. 
 
 "When application is made that a homestead be set aside 
 under this section, the court has no discretion in the matter, 
 but must grant the application : Estate of Ballentine, 45 Cal. 
 696"; Estate of Davis, 69 Cal. 458, 10 Pac. 671. 
 
 2. When once set aside it ceases to be a part of the assets 
 of the estate. It is therefore excluded from the jurisdiction 
 of the court : Estate of Hardwick, 59 Cal. 292 ; Estate of Bur- 
 ton, 63 Cal. 36 ; Schadt v. Heppe, 45 Cal. 433. 
 
 The homestead must be set aside for the use of the minor 
 children. 
 
 If the clause be added ''during her minority," the man- 
 datory provisions of the section are not followed, because 
 said clause is a limitation — just as much as if this court un- 
 dertook to set it aside for one year or two years. It must 
 be conceded that this could not be done. Section 1474, Code 
 of Civil Procedure, alone provides when the court may set 
 a homestead aside for a limited period, to wit: when it is 
 taken from the separate property of the decedent: Phelan v. 
 Smith, 100 Cal. 170, 34 Pac. 667.
 
 Estate of Hayes. 553 
 
 The court say: "It is only where a homestead is set apart 
 from the separate property of the deceased that it is required 
 to be for a limited period." 
 
 In that ease a decree was upheld which set apart the home- 
 stead for the use of decedent's widow and family. (See page 
 170 of report.) See, also, on same point: Code Civ. Proc, 
 sec. 1468; In re Lahiff's Estate, 86 Cal. 151, 24 Pac. 850; 
 Lord V. Lord, 65 Cal. 84, 3 Pac. 96 ; Hutchinson v. McNally, 
 85 Cal. 619, 24 Pac. 1071 ; Estate of Moore, 96 Cal. 522, 31 
 Pac. 584. 
 
 Agnes Hayes has a right to have a homestead set aside. 
 This right is not an estate : Estate of Moore, 57 Cal. 443. 
 
 When the deceased mother, Margaret Hayes, and the now 
 adult children failed to apply for a homestead — neglected 
 to avail themselves of this right — they waived it; they lost it. 
 
 ''If a widow die before applying for a probate homestead, 
 any right to apply which she ma}^ have had is gone ; no per- 
 son succeeds to that right; no adult child of hers can have 
 a right": Estate of Moore, supra, p. 445; Estate of Boland, 
 43 Cal. 642. 
 
 A right to a homestead is one that may be lost, and there 
 cannot be any such thing as a successor to that right. 
 
 Again, all rights of the widow as survivor of the commun- 
 ity, all rights of heirship and testamentary disposition, as 
 well as all rights of creditors, are subordinate and subject to 
 this right to have a homestead set aside under section 1465, 
 Code of Civil Procedure : Estate of Moore, 57 Cal. 442, 443. 
 
 The court say: "Setting apart a homestead is a part of 
 the probate proceeding, as much as is the family allowance. 
 .... The homestead, when set apart, is to be set apart for 
 the benefit of the widow and children. Every minor child 
 has an interest, and has a right to be named in the decree": 
 Keyes v. Cyrus, 100 Cal. 325, 38 Am. St. Rep. 296, 34 Pac. 
 722. 
 
 The case of Estate of Moore, 57 Cal., is directly affirmed 
 in Phelan v. Smith, 100 Cal. 158, 34 Pac. 667. On page 164 
 it is held that the surviving wife takes one-half of the com- 
 munity property, subject to the paj^ment of debts, and sub- 
 ject to the exercise by the probate court of the powers over
 
 55-4 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 it vested in that court, and qualified or subject to be quali- 
 fied by tlie exercise of those powers. 
 
 What those powers are the court then proceeds to define. 
 The heirs take under section 1384, Civil Code, and the widow 
 under section 1402, Civil Code, subject to those powers. 
 
 When the proceedings of the probate court are set in mo- 
 tion for the exercise of this right, viz., to have a homestead 
 set aside, and a decree is made, then the homestead becomes 
 an estate, a vested title in those to whom it is set aside. 
 
 "And not until such action (setting aside homestead) can 
 it be said that any estate has become vested, either at law or 
 in equity": Estate of Moore, 57 Cal. 443. 
 
 Setting apart a homestead vests the title in the party to 
 whom set apart: Fealey v. Fealey, 104 Cal. 360, 43 Am, St. 
 Rep. Ill, 38 Pac. 49 ; Estate of Poland, 43 Cal. 640 ; Sheehy 
 V. Miles, 93 Cal. 288, 28 Pac. 1046; Estate of Schmidt, 94 Cal. 
 334, 29 Pac. 714 ; Mawson v. Mawson, 50 Cal. 539 ; McKinnie 
 V. Shaffer, 74 Cal. 614, 16 Pac. 509. 
 
 When a homestead is set apart under section 1465, Code 
 of Civil Procedure, the title thereto vests in accordance with 
 the provisions of section 1468, Code of Civil Procedure. 
 
 "The homestead is to be set apart in pursuance of the stat- 
 ute in force at the time when the order is made, and the in- 
 terest therein which the widow and the surviving child will 
 take is to be determined by the same statute": Sulzberger 
 V. Sulzberger, 50 Cal. 388. 
 
 "The decree setting apart the homestead vested the title 
 thereto in the minor children as well as in the mother, .... 
 and the application for the homestead, together with the order 
 setting it apart, were made under the provisions of section 
 1465, Code of Civil Procedure, .... and by the provisions 
 of section 1468, when property is thus set apart to the use 
 of the family, 'the one-half of such property shall belong 
 to the widow or surviving husband, and the remainder to the 
 child, or in equal shares to the children, if there be more than 
 one' ": Hoppe v. Hoppe, 104 Cal. 94, 37 Pac. 894. 
 
 In other words, the title to land set apart out of the com- 
 munity does not vest according to the provisions of sections 
 1384 or 1402 of the Civil Code. When the right to have a
 
 Estate of Hayes. 555 
 
 homestead set apart under section 1465 is applied for by 
 any of the parties entitled thereto, it is the duty of the court 
 to set it aside absolutely, if taken out of the community prop- 
 erty; and for a limited period, if taken from the separate 
 property of decedent. The property is then out of the juris- 
 diction of the court. The right to have a homestead then 
 becomes a vested estate. 
 
 The title thereto vests, then, absolutely according to the 
 provisions of 1468, Code of Civil Procedure. If all the par- 
 ties entitled thereto lost this right given under section 1465, 
 then this property would vest under sections 1384 and 1402, 
 Civil Code, and not under section 1468, Code of Civil Pro- 
 cedure. 
 
 The title under this section vests in the party to whom the 
 property is set aside under section 1465, except it be dece- 
 dent's separate property. 
 
 If there be no minor children, although there may be adult 
 children, the title no doubt vests in the surviving widow or 
 husband. 
 
 If there be a widow and minor child or children, the title 
 vests, one-half in the widow, and one-half in the child, or 
 in the children, in equal shares. 
 
 This is so though there may be adult children. If there 
 be only a minor child or children, the whole belongs to the 
 child or children. 
 
 The statute is plain. The rights of the parties are to be 
 tested or considered not as of the date of the death of Thomas 
 Hayes, but as of the time of the application : Sheehy v. Miles, 
 supra. 
 
 If the title to property set apart as a homestead under 
 section 1465, Code of Civil Procedure, vests as provided in 
 section 1468, Code of Civil Procedure, how can the adult 
 Hayes children acquire any interest in the property, when 
 that section does not give them any ? Neither does the decree. 
 
 "It is our duty to administer the statute law as we find it. 
 and not to account for its incongruities": Mawson v. ^Maw- 
 son, supra. 
 
 Application granted.
 
 556 Coffey's Probate Decisions, Vol. 1. 
 
 The Duty of the Court to Set Apart a Homestead when a proper 
 application therefor is made is imperative. It has no discretion to 
 refuse the application, but must grant it, for the words "may set 
 apart," as employed in the statute, are construed "must set apart": 
 Demartin v. Demartin, 85 Cal. 71, 24 Pac. 594; Tyrrell v. Baldwin, 78 
 Cal. 470, 21 Pac. 116; Estate of Burton, 63 Cal. 36; Ballentine's Es- 
 tate, 45 Cal. 696; Estate of Walley, 11 Nev. 260; Estate of Synde- 
 gaard, 31 Utah, 490, 88 Pac. 616. 
 
 Minor Children are Entitled to the Benefit of a Probate Homestead: 
 Estate of Still, 117 Cal. 509, 49 Pac. 463; Lies v. De Diablar, 12 Cal. 
 327; Gee v, Moore, 14 Cal. 472; and the court may set one apart to 
 them, although they have no living parent: Estate of Pohlmann, 2 
 Cal. App. 360, 84 Pac. 354. Their guardian may file the petition; and 
 the fact that they are temporarily absent from the state when the 
 hearing is had does not affect their rights nor the authority of the 
 court to make the proper order: Estate of Pohlmann, 2 Cal. App. 360, 
 84 Pac. 354, A homestead cannot be set apart to minor children who 
 lived with the decedent, but who are not his children either in fact 
 or by adoption: Estate of Eomero, 75 Cal. 379, 17 Pac. 434. And 
 children who become of age without making an application for a 
 homestead lose their right: Estate of Hey wood (Cal.), 84 Pac. 834; 
 Estate of Still, 117 Cal. 509, 49 Pac. 463.
 
 INDEX TO THE NOTES. 
 
 Accounts of Administrator, 
 
 jurisdiction of equity to grant relief from orders settling ac- 
 counts, 263. 
 
 Acknowledgment. 
 
 of will by testator, 29. 
 
 of signature by witness to will, 45. 
 
 Attestation of Wills. See Wills, Attestation and Witnessing. 
 
 Compensation of Executor. 
 
 loss of right to compensation by dereliction of duty, 550. 
 
 value of estate for the purpose of calculating commissions, 550. 
 
 property on which commissions may be claimed, 214. 
 
 Contempt of Court. 
 
 punishment of executor for refusing to comply with decree of 
 distribution, 134. 
 
 Counsel Fees. 
 
 right of executor to counsel fees when he himself is an attorney, 
 550. 
 
 right of executor to allowance for attorney fees in probate pro- 
 ceedings, 155. 
 
 right of administrator to counsel fees in procuring letters, 4. • 
 
 Distribution. 
 
 jurisdiction of equity to vacate decrees of distribution, 266. 
 
 compelling executor to obey decree of distribution, 134. 
 
 may be had before the expiration of time for contesting will, 141. 
 
 Distribution, Partial. 
 
 persons entitled to petition for partial distribution, 200. 
 form and contents of petition for partial distribution, 200. 
 
 Equity, Jurisdiction of Court of Equity to Grant Relief from Orders 
 in Probate, 
 power of equity courts in general, 
 vacation of decrees settling accounts, 263. 
 vacation of orders directing sale of property', 265. 
 vacation of decrees of distribution, 266. 
 vacation of orders granting probate of wills, 266. 
 vacation of orders granting letters of administration, 266. 
 limitation upon the right to obtain relief in equity, 268, 
 
 (557)
 
 558 Index to the Notes. 
 
 Executors and Administrators. 
 
 jurisdiction of equity to vacate appointment of administrator, 
 
 260. 
 competency of married woman as executrix, 95. 
 persons disqualified to act, 208. 
 right of nonresident surviving spouse to nominate administrator 
 
 110. 
 
 Expenses of Administration. 
 
 traveling expenses, allowance for, 106. 
 services of bookkeeper, allowance for, 107. 
 
 Fraud. 
 
 jurisdiction of equity to vacate orders and decrees in probate on 
 the ground of fraud, 263. 
 
 Funeral Expenses. 
 
 ~ liability of husband for wife 's funeral expenses, 117. 
 
 Guardian and Ward. 
 
 jurisdiction of equity to grant relief from orders and decrees 
 
 in guardianship proceedings, 263. 
 considerations in awarding custody of child, 9. 
 father's right to custody of child, when lost, 181. 
 wishes of child considered in appointing guardian, 181. 
 
 Holographic Wills. See Wills, Olographic. 
 
 Homestead. 
 
 duty of court to set apart is imperative, 556. 
 
 minor children, when are entitled to homestead, 556. 
 
 nature of homestead set apart from separate estate, 220. 
 
 right of surviving spouse to homestead in absence of children, 219. 
 
 £nsane Delusions. 
 
 definition and general nature, 250. 
 what constitutes insane delusion, 87. 
 
 Intoxication. 
 
 testamentary capacity of persons addicted to the use of intoxi- 
 cants, 404, 532. 
 
 Inventory. 
 
 title to property, determination of, for purposes of inventory, 212. 
 
 Mistake. 
 
 jurisdiction of equity to grant relief from orders and decrees in 
 probate on the ground of mistake, 263. 
 
 Olographic Wills. See Wills, Olographic. 
 
 Presumption. 
 
 that testator intended to dispose of entire estate, 150.
 
 Index to the Notes. 559 
 
 Probate of WiU. 
 
 jurisdiction of equity to grant relief from probate, 266. 
 
 publication of notice of hearing of petition for probate, 84. 
 Publication. 
 
 of will by testator, 32. 
 
 Sales of Real Property. 
 
 jurisdiction of equity to vacate sales, 265. 
 rule of caveat emptor, 96. 
 
 Special Administrator. 
 
 preference to persons entitled to letters, 207. 
 
 Undue Influence. 
 
 evidence establishing, 251. 
 presumption and burden of proof, 251. 
 when invalidates will, 251. 
 
 Wills. 
 
 injustice or unnaturalness of will as affecting its validity, 532. 
 
 construction of conflicting clauses in will, 150. 
 
 presumption that testator intended to dispose of entire estate, 
 
 150. 
 appointment of guardian as evidence of want of testamentary 
 
 capacity, 404. 
 acknowledgment of will by testator, 29. 
 subscription by testator, 28. 
 
 Wills, Execution of Olographs. 
 
 definition of olographs, 432. 
 
 statutory requirements must be complied with in execution, 433. 
 
 formal requisites, 434. 
 
 informal writings, 433. 
 
 directions for the writing of a will, whether may of themselves 
 
 constitute olograph, 434. 
 letters, olographs in form of, 434. 
 
 omission of statutory requirements in execution of olographs, 435. 
 wills olographic in part and attested in part, 436. 
 incorporation of extrinsic writings by reference, 437. 
 date of olographs, necessity for, 437. 
 abbreviations in date, 438. 
 sufficiency of dating, 438. 
 place where date must be written, 438, 
 signature of testator, necessity for, 439. 
 signature of testator, sufficiency of, 439. 
 signature of testator, place of, 439. 
 witnessing and attesting, necessity for, 441. 
 attestation clause, effect of, 442. 
 place where will was lodged or found, 442.
 
 560 Index to the Notes. 
 
 Wills, Attestation and Witnessing. 
 
 object and purpose, attestation, 24. 
 
 olographic wills, 441. 
 
 subscription and attestation distinguished, 25. 
 
 necessity of witnesses, 26. 
 
 number of witnesses required, 26. 
 
 substantial conformity with the law, whether sufficient, 27. 
 
 subscription by testator, 28. 
 
 acknowledgment by testator, 28. 
 
 necessity that subscription be before witnesses, 28. 
 
 sufficiency of testator's acknowledgment, 29. 
 
 request of testator to witness, 31. 
 
 publication of instrument by testator, 32. 
 
 declaration by testator of character of instrument, 33. 
 
 necessity of signing attestation by witnesses, 36. 
 
 mode of subscription by witness, 37. 
 
 place on will of subscription by witness, 37. 
 
 time of subscription and attestation by witness, 39. 
 
 presence of testator, necessity and purpose, 39. 
 
 presence of testator, what amounts to, 39. 
 
 presence in case of clear vision, 43. 
 
 presence in case of obstructed vision, 43. 
 
 presence in case of inability to look in direction, 44. 
 
 position in same or in other room, presumption therefrom, 44. 
 
 acknowledgment of signature by witness equivalent to presence, 
 
 45. 
 mutual presence of witnesses, 45. 
 knowledge of contents of will by witnesses, 46. 
 attestation clause, 47. 
 
 order of execution by testator and by witness, 48. 
 order of publication and other requisites, 50. 
 order of request to witnesses and other requisites, 50. 
 mode of attestation, 50. 
 mode of request to witnesses, 51. 
 mode of publication, 51. 
 testimony of attesting witnesses, 51. 
 evidence outside testimony of witnesses to prove execution of 
 
 will, 51. 
 opinion of witness as evidence, 52. 
 declaration of witness as evidence, 53. 
 attestation clause as evidence, 53. 
 Witnesses to Will. See Wills, Attestation and Witnessing.
 
 INDEX. 
 
 ABSENT HEIRS. 
 
 See Attorneys, 2. 
 
 ACCOUNTS OF ADMINISTRATOR, 
 
 Accounts. — Where an '* Exhibit" and "Account" Presented by an 
 Executor was merely "experimental," to raise certain questions as 
 to previous acts of the administration, the executor will, under in- 
 structions as to his rights, be ordered to render another account, which 
 shall have the quality of finality. — Estate of Fisher, 97. 
 
 An "Exhibit and Account" Presented by an Executor does not 
 Operate as an Estoppel upon the hearing and settlement of a subse- 
 quent account by him; the items of the first account are impeachable, 
 and the settlement of such account does not impart a dignity not 
 inherently belonging to the account. — Estate of Fisher, 97. 
 
 Executor, — A Mortgagee of Land Inventoried in the Estate, under 
 a mortgage made by the universal devisee and legatee of the testa- 
 tor, is a party interested in the estate, and entitled to be heard 
 upon the executor's accounts, and on any distribution of the estate. 
 Likewise, a judgment debtor of such devisee, who has acquired, 
 under execution upon the judgment, title to a parcel of the realty 
 inventoried in the estate, is also a party interested in the estate; so, 
 also, is a mortgagee of such judgment debtor. — Estate of Love, 537. 
 
 Account — Jury Trial, — An Account, as Such, is a Matter to be 
 Settled by the Court without a jury, — Estate of Traylor, 164. 
 
 See Expenses of Administrations; Funeral and Burial Expenses; 
 
 Special Administrators, 2. 
 Niate, 
 
 jurisdiction of equity to grant relief from orders settling ac- 
 counts, 263. 
 
 ACCUMULATIONS. 
 
 See Trusts, 2. 
 
 ACKNOWLEDGMENT. 
 
 Note. 
 
 of will by testator, 29. 
 of signature by witness to will, 45. 
 Prob. Dec, Vol. I — 86 (561)
 
 562 Index. 
 
 ACTIONS BY EXECUTOR. 
 
 See Executors and Administrators; Special Administrators, 1. 
 
 ADMINISTRATORS. 
 
 See Executors and Administrators. 
 
 APPRAISERS OF ESTATE. 
 
 Appraisers — Choice by Court. — In the opinion of this court, it would 
 best subserve the interests of estates if in all cases the court actually 
 chose all the appraisers, instead of having the representatives of the 
 estate of their counsel choose some of them. — Estate of McDougal, 
 450. 
 
 Appraisers. — It is the Duty of Appraisers, in all cases where their 
 labor extends over a number of days, to preserve a minute account 
 of their services. — Estate of Shillaber, 120. 
 
 Appraisers. — Where Compensation of Appraisers has been" Fixed* Af- 
 ter Notice to all parties interested, the question will be thereafter 
 treated as res judicata. — Estate of Shillaber, 120. 
 
 ATTESTATION OF WILL. 
 
 See Wills. 
 
 ATTORNEYS. 
 
 1. Appointment and Duty. 
 
 Attorneys — Duty to Submit to Court. — Among the duties of an at- 
 torney is that of submission to the court in the exercise of a discre- 
 tion not abused, without demur or murmur. He is to advise and 
 counsel simply, leaving the court, in its own way, to come to a con- 
 clusion. — Estate of Blythe, 110. 
 
 Attorneys. — The Probate Judge is the Guardian of all Decedents' 
 Estates; but the law contemplates an aid in the selection of a com- 
 petent attorney to protect the court against spurious claimants, or 
 fraudulent devises or practices of any sort. — Estate of Blythe, 110. 
 
 Attorneys. — It is the Duty of an Attorney Appointed by the Court 
 in the administration of a decedent's estate, as the legal representa- 
 tive of the heirs, to discover and demonstrate to the court the true 
 heir, and to expose and denounce all pretenders. — Estate of Blythe, 
 110. 
 
 2. Appointment for Absent Heirs. 
 
 Attorney for Absent Heirs — Power to Appoint. — Under section 1718, 
 Code of Civil Procedure, the probate court; has power to appoint an
 
 Index. 563 
 
 attorney for absent or unrepresented heirs of a decedent. — Estate of 
 Blythe, 115. 
 
 Attorney for Absent Heirs — Discretion in Appointing. — Although 
 the probate court has power to appoint an attorney for unrepresented 
 heirs of a decedent, the power should be prudently and discreetly ex- 
 ercised, in the interests of the estate and of all concerned. The rule 
 is, never to make such an appointment unless the necessity is mani- 
 fest.— Estate of Blythe, 115. 
 
 Attorney for Absent Heirs When no Known Heirs. — The probate 
 court generally refrains from appointing an attorney for unrepre- 
 sented parties when there are no known heirs; not doubting its power, 
 but questioning the expediency of its exercise in such cases. — Estate 
 of Blythe, 115. 
 
 3. Compensation of Attorney for Absent Heirs. 
 
 Attorney for Absent Heirs — Compensation. — An attorney appointed 
 to represent heirs is entitled to an allowance at any time after ser- 
 vices rendered, and during the administration. An application for 
 such an allowance before final settlement of the estate is not prema- 
 ture. — Estate of Blythe, 115, 
 
 Attorney for Absent Heirs. — The Compensation of an Attorney ap- 
 pointed by the court to represent heirs must be paid out of the es- 
 tate, as necessary expenses of administration. Upon distribution of 
 the estate the attorney's fee may be charged against the party rep- 
 resented by him. — Estate of Blythe, 115. 
 
 See Counsel Fees. 
 
 BOND. 
 
 See Sales by Administrator. 
 
 CEMETERY WALL. 
 
 See Funeral and Burial Expenses. 
 
 CHARITABLE BEQUESTS. 
 
 Charitable Bequest — Necessity of Naming Corporation. — A char- 
 itable institution which is made a residuary legatee need not be 
 designated in the will by its corporate name. — Estate of Gibson, 9. 
 
 Charitable Bequest — Evidence to Identify Beneficiary. — If either 
 from the will itself or from extrinsic evidence the object of a char- 
 itable bequest can be ascertained, the court will not invalidate the 
 gift or defeat the donor's intention. — Estate of Gibson, 9. 
 
 Charitable Bequest — Ascertainment of Beneficiary.— A residuary be- 
 quest to "The Old Ladies' Home, at present near Rincon Hill, at St. 
 Mary's Hospital," is held to have been intended for the "Sisters of
 
 564 Index. 
 
 Mercy," a corporation embracing, as part of its charitable design, the 
 "Old Ladies' Home. "—Estate of Gibson, 9. 
 
 Charitable Bequests, so Far as They Exceed One-third the dis- 
 tributable estate, are void. — Estate of Gibson, 9. 
 
 CLAIMS AGAINST ESTATE. 
 
 A Claim Arising During the Lifetime of the Decedent is a matter 
 which may be segregated from the account of the executors. — Estate 
 of Traylor, 164. 
 
 Claim. — The Allowance of a Claim Against Decedent prima facie 
 establishes its correctness and validity, and shifts the onus of proving 
 its incorrectness or invalidity upon the party contesting the same. — 
 Estate of Traylor, 164. 
 
 Claim. — The Parties are Entitled to a Jury on the Trial of a contest 
 which arose during the lifetime of the deceased, and at the trial the 
 claim alone should be submitted, and not as part of an account in 
 which it is set forth. — Estate of Traylor, 164. 
 
 Claim — Jury Trial. — The Allowance of a Claim does not interfere 
 with the question of the right to a trial by jury. — Estate of Traylor, 
 164. 
 
 CODICILS. 
 
 See Wills, 12. 
 
 COLLECTION OF ASSETS. 
 
 See Executors and Administrators, 5. 
 
 COMPENSATION OF EXECUTORS. 
 
 1. When Fixed by Will. 
 
 Executor — Compensation Fixed by Will. — When an estate is solvent, 
 the compensation of the executor, fixed by the will in Heu of stat- 
 utory commissions, should be paid as "expenses of administration." 
 Estate of Gibson, 9. 
 
 2. For Legal Services Rendered by Himself. 
 
 Executor — Compensation for Legal Services Rendered by Himself. — 
 Where an executor is himself an attorney, he cannot claim extra 
 compensation for the use of his legal knowledge in administering 
 his testator's estate. — Estate of Love, 537. 
 
 3. Commissions in General. 
 
 An Executor can be Allowed Commissions only upon the amount 
 the estate accounted for by him; and he cannot be said to have 
 accounted for property as part of the estate of his testator, to which
 
 Index. 565 
 
 it has judicially been determined that the estate has no title. — Estate 
 of Eicaud, 212. 
 
 Executor. — An Item for Commissions of an Executor, found in an 
 annual account by him, will be disallowed. Allowance of an exec- 
 utor's statutory commissions is authorized only upon settlement of 
 his final account in the administration. — Estate of Shillaber, 120. 
 
 Executor — Commissions When Valua of Estate Disputed. — Where 
 an executor claims commissions on the appraised value of the estate, 
 which value is disputed, his commissions should be based on the true 
 value of the property as proved by experts on the hearing of his 
 account. — Estate of Love, 537. 
 
 Executor — Commissions. — Where a Bank Loaned Money to a uni- 
 versal devisee on the executor's representation that a speedy distri- 
 bution could be had and he would obtain it, and the executor filed 
 a worthless petition therefor, he is estopped from claiming commis- 
 sions as against the bank. — Estate of Love, 537. 
 
 4. Loss of Eight to Compensation. 
 
 Executor. — An Executor's Right to Commissions, given by the 
 statute, is absolute; neglect of duty, or delay in closing the adminis- 
 tration, will not take it away. — Estate of Love, 537. 
 
 Executor — Commissions. — A Quitclaim of All the Executor's In- 
 terest in his decedent's property will not operate or be construed as 
 a waiver of commissions. — Estate of Love, 537. 
 
 Executor — Renunciation of Compensation. — The fact that an ex- 
 ecutor at one time entertained and expressed an intention to renounce 
 his commissions does not bar his right to claim them if he has made 
 no renunciation in writing nor made any agreement prior to ap- 
 pointment to waive compensation. — Estate of Murphy, 12. 
 
 Note. 
 
 loss of right to compensation by dereliction of duty, 550. 
 
 value of estate for the purpose of calculating commissions, 550. 
 
 property on which commissions may be claimed, 214. 
 
 CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS. 
 See Wills, 6. 
 
 CONTEMPT OF COURT. 
 
 See Distribution, 2. 
 
 Note. 
 
 punishment of executor for refusing to comply with decree of 
 distribution, 134.
 
 566 Index. 
 
 CONTEST OF WILL. 
 
 Will Contest — Burden of Proof. — One who contests the probate of 
 a will has the burden of proof to establish the ground of contest. — 
 Estate of Solomon, 85. 
 
 CONTRACTS OF DECEDENT. 
 
 See Executors and Administrators, 5. 
 
 CONVERSION. 
 
 Equitable Conversion — ^Whether Takes Place by Implication. — Equi- 
 table conversion may take place by implication as well as by express 
 words. — Estate of Skae, 405. 
 
 Equitable Conversion — When Worked by Implication. — If a will au- 
 thorizes the executors to sell real estate, and the general scheme of 
 the testament manifests an intention on the part of the testator 
 that there shall be an equitable conversion of the realty into per- 
 sonal property, such a conversion will take place, although the power 
 to sell is not imperative. — Estate of Skae, 405. 
 
 COSTS. 
 
 A Cost Bill is not Filed, if not delivered to the clerk nor received 
 by him. — Estate of McGovern, 150. 
 
 Where a Cost Bill is Left in the Clerk's Office About One Hour 
 After the Time specified by law for the closing of the office, there 
 being no person present authorized to receive and file it, the paper 
 is not filed; and if the date of the alleged filing is the last day 
 allowed by the statute for filing the bill, a motion to strike it out 
 should be granted. — Estate of McGovern, 150. 
 
 COSTS OF APPEAL. 
 
 See Expenses of Administration. 
 
 COUNSEL FEES. 
 1. Right of Executor to Allowance for Counsel Fees. 
 
 Executors — Right to Counsel Fees. — The trust imposed upon an ex- 
 ecutor makes the probate of the will a part of his duty, for which he 
 may employ attorneys and charge their fees against the estate. — 
 Estate of Chittenden, 1. 
 
 Executors — Right to Counsel Fees in Procuring Letters. — Counsel 
 fees incurred by an executor in applying for letters are a proper 
 charge against the estate, notwithstanding he renounces his trust be- 
 fore letters are issued. — Estate of Chittenden, 1.
 
 Index. 567 
 
 An Executor is Entitled to the Assistance of Counsel, Even When 
 He is Himself an Attorney; and he will be granted an allowance for 
 counsel employed by him; but in dealing with the question, the court 
 will be mindful of the fact that the executor is an attorney of ability. 
 Estate of Shillaber, 101, 120. 
 
 The Administrator was Allowed Counsel Fees, Although His Coun- 
 sel was His Law Partner, in the case at bar, it being proved that in 
 this service such counsel was not the business partner of the admin- 
 istrator.— Estate of Shillaber, 101, 120. 
 
 Counsel Fees. — There is no Authority in the Probate Court to allow 
 an attorney appointed by the court under section 1718, Code of Civil 
 Procedure, compensation for services performed in a suit brought by 
 the executor. The attorney's remuneration must be restricted to pro- 
 ceedings before the court of administration. — Estate of Fisher, 97. 
 
 Executors— Right to Counsel. — An executor, acting in good faith, 
 is entitled to aid of counsel in all litgation concerning the estate. 
 Estate of Fisher, 97. 
 
 Executors — Allowance for Counsel Fees. — ^It being an executor's 
 duty to defend or prosecute for the estate in all matters where in 
 good faith he believes it necessary, he should be reimbursed though 
 the suit be lost. — Estate of Fisher, 97. 
 
 Attorney. — An Administratrix has Power to Employ an Attorney 
 to institute proceedings to recover damages for the death of her 
 intestate. — Estate of Lund, 152. 
 
 Claim for Counsel Fees — Jury Trial. — A claim of an attorney for 
 fees for services rendered an estate is an expense of administration, and 
 is not a proper matter for trial by jury. But the claim of an attor- 
 ney for fees for services rendered to a decedent during his lifetime 
 differs materially from a claim for services rendered to the estate. — 
 Estate of Traylor, 164. 
 
 Attorney — Compensation. — An Attorney Who Renders Services 
 for the Benefit of an estate, at the request of the administratrix 
 thereof is entitled to reasonable compensation therefor. The pro- 
 bate department is the proper forum in which to present his claim 
 for such services; they are "expenses of administration," and the 
 probate department has exclusive jurisdiction to adjust and enforce 
 such demands. — Estate of Lund, 152. 
 
 Attorney — Contingent Fee. — An Administratrix has no Power to 
 Make a Contract with an Attorney for the payment of a contingent 
 fee to him out of the assets of the estate. But the employment of 
 an attorney to perform services, and a promise to pay him a contin- 
 gent fee for such services, are separable. The retainer of the attor- 
 ney, and rendering of services by him in pursuance of such retainer, 
 may be considered by the court apart from the promise to pay a 
 contingent fee, and the compensation will be adjudged according
 
 568 Index. 
 
 to the proof of the reasonable value of the services. An attorney 
 accepting employment and rendering services, under such circum- 
 stances, must rely upon the subsequent action of the court in ad- 
 judging proper compensation, and consents to perform his duty with- 
 out other compensation than may so be allowed. — Estate of Lund, 152. 
 
 2. Amount of Fees. 
 
 Counsel Fees. — In the Consideration of Applications for Fees by at- 
 torneys appointed by the court, the appointee and applicant should 
 be especially indulgent to the court which has chosen him in its en- 
 deavor to properly adjust the rights of the applicant. The duty of 
 submission to the court, stated in the second headnote above, is es- 
 pecially applicable to these attorneys. — Estate of Blythe, 110. 
 
 Counsel Fees. — Whether an Estate in Probate is Large or Small, 
 whether it may escheat or not, or go to claimants then unknown, the 
 principles of law governing the compensation of an attorney are the 
 same, and should be applied rigorously by the court. — Estate of 
 Blythe, 110. 
 
 Counsel Fees. — In Fixing Attorneys' Fees There are no Established 
 Rules; the character and circumstances of every case, founded upon 
 general principles of justice, and the reasonable value of a capable 
 attorney's services, must furnish the rule. — Estate of Blythe, 110. 
 
 Counsel Fees. — In Determining the Compensation of an Attorney it 
 has been the practice, and has become the rule of the court, that ex- 
 pert testimony as to the value of the services will not be considered. 
 The judge will determine the matter for himself. — Estate of Blythe, 
 110. 
 
 Counsel Fees. — The Difficulty and Delicacy of the Court's Duty, in 
 adjusting applications of attorneys for allowance of fees, expressed. 
 Estate of Blythe, 110. 
 
 Executors. — The Fees of Attorneys Employed by an Executor in 
 probating the will, being a charge against the testator 's estate, can be 
 fixed only by the probate court. — Estate of Chittenden, 1. 
 
 See Attorneys, 3; Executors and Administrators, 2. 
 
 Note. 
 
 right of executor to counsel fees when he himself is an attorney, 
 550. 
 
 right of executor to allowance for attorney fees in probate pro- 
 ceedings, 155. 
 
 right of administrator to counsel fees in procuring letters, 4. 
 
 COURTS. 
 
 Courts. — It is the Duty of Courts to Administer the Statute Law 
 as they find it, and not to account for its incongruities. — Estate of 
 Hayes, 551.
 
 Index. 569 
 
 custody of child. 
 
 See Guardian and Ward. 
 
 DEBTS. 
 
 See Claims Against Estate; Expenses of Administration. 
 
 DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION. 
 
 See Distribution. 
 
 DEFINITIONS. 
 
 See Words and Phrases. 
 
 DELUSIONS. 
 
 See Insanity and Insane Delusions. 
 
 DESCENT. 
 
 See Succession. 
 
 DETECTIVE SERVICE. 
 
 See Special Administrators, 2. 
 
 DEVISEES. 
 
 See Legatees and Devisees. 
 
 DISTRIBUTION. 
 
 Note. 
 
 jurisdiction of equity to vacate decrees of distribution, 2G6. 
 
 compelling executor to obey decree of distribution, 134. 
 
 may be had before the expiration of time for contesting will, 1-11. 
 
 DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE. 
 1. In General. 
 
 A Distribution of a Partnership Interest, owned by the estate, may 
 be ordered without a previous accounting by the surviving partners 
 to the administratrix. — Estate of Wallace, 118. 
 
 Distribution Disposes of the Subject Matter, and Nothing Remains 
 within the jurisdiction of the court, except to compel obedience to 
 its decree, when necessary. — Estate of Wallace, 118. 
 
 An Administratrix must fee Held to have Concurred, as such, in a 
 request made by her in her own behalf as widow and as guardian of 
 a minor heir. — Estate of Wallace, 118. 
 
 An Administratrix, as Such, is Estopped from Attacking a Decree 
 Made upon Her Request, as widow and as guardian of a minor heir, 
 and concurred in by her as administratrix. — Estate of Wallace, 118.
 
 570 Index. 
 
 2. Failure of Executor to Comply With Decree. 
 
 Executor — Failure to Comply with Decree of DistrilDution — An exec- 
 utor who refuses to make payment to distributees in accordance 
 with the decree of distribution is punishable for contempt, and he 
 cannot plead inability to pay, when his account on file shows the 
 contrary. — Estate of Treweek, 132. 
 
 3. Partial Distribution. 
 
 Partial Distribution — Time for Making. — An application for partial 
 distribution of a decedent's estate in course of administration may 
 be made at any time after the period of administration mentioned in 
 the statute, upon allegations showing the existence of the conditions 
 and circumstances required by the statute. — Estate of Lynch, 140. 
 
 Partial Distribution — Time for Making. — The rule prescribed by the 
 statute, as to whom and under what circumstances a partial distrib- 
 ution of a decedent's estate may be had, is the same whether the 
 decedent left a will, or died intestate. And a petition for the partial 
 distribution of a testate's estate is not premature merely because the 
 year given by the statute, within which a contest to the probate of 
 the decedent 's will may be filed, has not elapsed. — Estate of Lynch, 
 140. 
 
 Partial Distribution — Petition by Executrix. — A party is not in- 
 capacitated to apply for partial distribution of a decedent's estate 
 because she is an executrix of his will. — Estate of Donahue, 186. 
 
 Partial Distribution. — Assuming that the Question of Giving a Bond 
 upon partial distribution can be considered upon demurrer to an ap- 
 plication for partial distribution, and the objection taken that the 
 party to give the bond is both distributee and executrix — obligor 
 and obligee; the answer is that the law is so written. — Estate of 
 Donahue, 186. 
 
 Partial Distribution — Petition by Administrator. — The Practice of 
 the Court since its institution, in recognizing the right of an heir or 
 devisee, although he is also the representative of the estate, to apply 
 for and have partial distribution, referred to and cases cited. — Estate 
 of Donahue, 186. 
 
 Partial Distribution — Petition. — Various Grounds of Special De- 
 murrers for ambiguity, presented to a petition for partial distribution 
 of a decedent's estate, are overruled in this case. — Estate of Dona- 
 hue, 186. 
 
 Decedent's Widow AppUed for Partial Distribution of the Estate, 
 alleging that "a portion" of it was separate property, and "the 
 other portion" community property, particularly describing and 
 claiming the portion alleged to be community. Demurrer, on the 
 ground that it appeared from the petition to be necessary to ascer- 
 tain and determine the title to the property asked to be distributed, 
 and that title could only be determined upon final distribution, or
 
 Index, 571 
 
 under section 1664, Code of Civil Procedure, overruled. (See Es- 
 tate of Jessup, 81 Cal. 408, 21 Pae. 976, 22 Pac. 742, 1028, 6 L. E. 
 A. 594, affirming Coffey, J.) — Estate of Donahue, 186. 
 
 Partial Distribution — Petition by Widow. — Where one petitions for 
 partial distribution of an estate, and alleges that she is the widow 
 of deceased, and is desirous of having her share of the community 
 property therein described assigned and distributed to her, it suffi- 
 ciently appears that the petitioner is an heir. As widow she is 
 included in the statutory term "heir." — Estate of Donohue, 186. 
 
 Partial Distribution — Sufficiency of Petition as Showing Title and 
 Seisin. — Where the widow of a decedent petitions to have her share 
 of the community property assigned to her, by way of partial dis- 
 tribution, alleging that certain property described in the inventory 
 of the estate, and then particularly describing it, was conveyed to 
 decedent by a particular person named, and on a particular date 
 mentioned, such averments of title in the decedent and seisin at the 
 time of his death, are sufficient. — Estate of Donahue, 186. 
 
 Partial Distribution — Sufficiency of Petition as Showing Community 
 Property. — An allegation in the petition of a widow to have her 
 share of the community property assigned to her by way of partial 
 distribution, that the property (describing it) "was acquired by 
 the said deceased after his marriage with your petitioner, to wit" 
 on a day named, "and was not acquired by gift, bequest, devise or 
 descent; but, on the contrary, by purchase for a valuable considera- 
 tion, and as she is advised and insists was, and is the community 
 property, ' ' is sufficient, as a statement of- the character of the prop- 
 erty. It is sufficient treating the petition as a pleading; but es- 
 pecially so as an application for partial distribution. — Estate of 
 Donohue, 186. 
 
 Partial Distribution — Informality of Petition. — A petition for par- 
 tial distribution of a decedent's estate should not be treated as 
 severely as a common-law pleading. All that it need show is that 
 the person applying has the status of an applicant as described in 
 the statute, and that the administration of the estate is in a sufficient 
 state of forwardness to authorize a distribution. — Estate of Donohue, 
 180. 
 
 Partial Distribution. — Whenever the Administration of an Estate 
 has Advanced so far as to be in a sufficient state of forwardness to au- 
 thorize distribution, it is the duty of the court, upon petition of any 
 party interested, to proceed to a partial distribution, and for that 
 purpose to make the necessary investigation of facts. — Estate of 
 Donahue, 186. 
 
 DISTRIBUTION, PARTIAL. 
 
 Note. 
 
 persons entitled to petition for partial distribution, 200. 
 form and contents of petition for partial distribution, 200.
 
 572 Index. 
 
 EQUITABLE CONVERSION. 
 
 Seo Conversion. 
 
 EQUITY RELIEF IN FROM ORDERS IN PROBATE. 
 
 Note. 
 
 power of equity courts in general, 
 vacation of decrees settling accounts, 263. 
 vacation of orders directing sale of property, 265. 
 vacation of decrees of distribution, 266. 
 vacation of orders granting probate of wills, 266. 
 vacation of orders granting letters of administration, 266. 
 limitation upon the right to obtain relief in equity, 268. 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 1. In General. 
 
 Evidence — Inference from Failure to Produce. — The failure of a 
 party to produce evidence within his power to produce is a circum- 
 stance to be taken against him. — Guardianship of Danneker, 4. 
 
 Evidence. — It would "be Contrary to all Rules of Evidence to Ac- 
 cept Testimony that lacks clearness and certainty, and that is with- 
 out corroboration, as against adverse evidence, positive and par- 
 ticular in its nature, and without successful assailment, and going to 
 the main fact in issue itself. — Estate of McDougal, 456. 
 
 Evidence. — Entries Made in an Account-book at the Request of One 
 Person by another, as to the ownership of property, are of no more 
 value than any other verbal admissions which the writer orally tes- 
 tified to, which ought to be received with great caution. An entry 
 in favor and not against the interest of a party dictating it is dis- 
 entitled to consideration on that account. And a party cannot be 
 affected by the declaration or entry of a party in his own favor, 
 made without the cognition or consent of the former. Evidence of 
 such character, even when admitted without objection, cannot be 
 too carefully scrutinized, for it is in all cases the most dangerous 
 species of evidence that can be admitted in a court of justice, and 
 the most liable to abuse. — Estate of McDougal, 456. 
 
 2. Expert Testimony. 
 
 Expert Evidence — Its Nature and Value. — Expert evidence is really 
 an argument of the expert to the court, and is valuable only with 
 regard to the proof of the facts and the validity of the reasons ad- 
 vanced for the conclusions. — Estate of Scott, 271. 
 
 See Witnesses.
 
 Index. 573 
 
 EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. 
 
 1. Distinction Between. 
 
 Executors. — There is a Distinction Between Executors and Admin- 
 istrators. An executor is appointed by the will to carry out its pro- 
 visions and the wishes of the testator, who burdens the executor with 
 the trusts created by the will and charges his estate with the ex- 
 penses necessary to carry out his views as expressed in his will; but 
 an administrator has no trust imposed upon him by the decedent, and 
 he looks solely to the statute for his duties, authority, and compensa- 
 tion. — Estate of Chittenden, 1. 
 
 2. Appointment and Issuance of Letters — Persons Qualified. 
 
 Letters of Administration — Wlio may Apply for. — The person to 
 whom letters of administration are issued must apply by his own 
 petition, signed by himself or his counsel; a petition by an heir 
 for the appointment of another person is insufl&eient, and an order 
 appointing an administrator on such petition must fall. Such pe- 
 tition is in effect no petition, and is not subject to amendment. — 
 Estate of Eiddle, 215. 
 
 Administrator. — A Surviving Wife has the Right to Nominate an 
 administrator of her husband's estate, although she has been removed 
 from her position as executrix of his will because of her permanent 
 removal from the state. — Estate of McDougal, 109. 
 
 Appointment of Administratrix. — When a Widow Marries, she ceases 
 to be the widow of her first husband; and then being a married 
 woman, she loses her right to administer his estate, or to nominate 
 an administrator. — Estate of Pickett, 93. 
 
 Letters of Administration. — The Order in Which Letters of admin- 
 istration are granted is a matter of statutory regulation, and to the 
 statute the court must resort for decision. — Estate of Lane, 88. 
 
 Letters of Administration — Next of Kin. — Where a man dies intes- 
 tate, and subsequently his widow dies before letters are taken out 
 on his estate, her niece is not entitled to administer his estate as 
 next of kin, for she was not such when he died. — Estate of Lane, 88. 
 
 Executor. — The Unfriendliness of an Executrix Toward a Mother, 
 who is striving to obtain what she can by legal means for her chil- 
 dren, will not justify the court in adjudging the executrix incompe- 
 tent. — Estate of McDougal, 456. 
 
 3. Removal and Revocation of Letters. 
 
 Letters of Administration — Revocation in Favor of Person having 
 Prior Right. — Where letters of administration have been granted to 
 a person who is not entitled to them in his own right, and who was 
 not nominated by the person entitled, they will be revoked upon
 
 574 Index. , 
 
 the application of the person entitled to letters. — Estate of Eothschild, 
 167. 
 
 Revocation of Probate Because Obtained by Fraud. — The superior 
 court, sitting in probate, has no jurisdiction to revoke the probate 
 of a will because procured by fraud or artifice; the remedy of the 
 party aggrieved is by independent suit in equity. — Estate of Mc- 
 Laughlin, 257. 
 
 Executor — Removal for Fraud. — The evidence reviewed, and the 
 charge of fraud against the executrix held not proved. The obliga- 
 tion of proving any fact lies upon the party who substantially as- 
 serts the affirmative of the issue, and a court is not justified in plac- 
 ing upon a person charged with fraud the onus of showing that she 
 is guiltless; on the contrary, it is incumbent upon the person mak- 
 ing a charge of fraud to maintain it by a preponderance of proof. 
 Estate of McDougal, 456. 
 
 4. Powers, Duties and Liabilities. 
 
 Executors — Duty to Collect Assets. — It is not only the duty of an 
 executor to seek to recover assets of the estate, but should he forbear 
 the endeavor he would be liable as for malfeasance or nonfeasance. — 
 Estate of Fisher, 97. 
 
 Executors — Good Faith in Bringing Action. — Where a suit brought 
 by an executor presented issues of a "serious" and "difficult" char- 
 acter, and occupied many days in trial, a nonsuit being refused, it 
 must have afforded grounds to the executor's judgment in its institu- 
 tion and prosecution. — Estate of Fisher, 97. 
 
 Administrator — Liability for Rents When He Places Devisee in Pos- 
 session. — In the face of objection an administrator will be held ac- 
 countable for the rental value of realty specifically devised by his 
 testator, which he has placed in the possession of the devisee. But 
 where the premises contained certain articles of personalty, which 
 the testator directed to have left there and which the administrator 
 claimed should be cared for, the court will take into account the care 
 bestowed upon the property by the devisee. — Estate of Shillaber, 101. 
 
 Executor — Liability for Interest on Funds. — An executor who with- 
 draws funds from the capital account of a firm of which the testator 
 was a member, and permits them to lie idle in a bank, is chargeable 
 with interest thereon. — Estate of Murphy, 12. 
 
 Executor — Duty to Account for Assets. — It is the duty of an exec- 
 utrix to make a showing to the court of the disposition of the dif- 
 ference between what the estate is prima facie entitled to, and what 
 it is claimed was the whole amount received by her. — Estate of Mc- 
 Dougal, 456. 
 
 Executor — Delay in Settling Estate. — Negligence was not, under 
 the peculiar circumstances of the case, held imputable to the executor,
 
 Index. 575 
 
 notwithstanding the administration of the estate was not closed for 
 nearly sixteen years. — Estate of Love, 537. 
 
 Executor. — Where an Executor Allowed Judgment to Go Against 
 Him for realty which had come into his possession, he having acted 
 in good faith, he should not be charged with the value of the lot, 
 but only for an amount which he received in consideration of his 
 consent to the judgment. — Estate of Love, 537. 
 
 Executor. — Where Property of an Estate has been Taken by the 
 City for a Park, the executor should not be charged with the value 
 of the land, but only with the amount received by him from such 
 source. — Estate of Love, 537. 
 
 Executor — Performance of Decedent's Contract. — Where an execu- 
 tor carries out the contract of his decedent to perform legal services, 
 the money received therefor should belong in part to the estate and 
 in part to the executor. — Estate of Love, 537. 
 
 See Compensation of Executors; Special Administrators, 2. 
 
 Note. 
 
 jurisdiction of equity to vacate appointment of administrator, 
 
 260. 
 competency of married woman as executrix, 95, 
 persons disqualified to act, 208. 
 
 right of nonresident surviving spouse to nominate administrator, 
 110. 
 
 EXHIBITS. 
 See Accounts of Executor. 
 
 EXPENSES OF ADMINISTRATION AND THEIR ALLOWANCE. 
 
 Administration — Extravagant Costs. — The Impression, Widely Preva- 
 lent, of the extravagant cost of administering estates, referred to and 
 the court's position stated. — Estate of Blythe, 110. 
 
 Executor — Insurance — Proof of Loss. — It is an executor's duty to 
 prepare proofs of loss in case of a destruction of insured property 
 and hence he will not be allowed a charge incurred for having such 
 proofs prepared. — Estate of Shillaber, 120. 
 
 Account of Executor — Objections to Expense of Lease. — Upon the 
 settlement of the account of an executor containing items of ex- 
 penditures in executiug a lease under authority of the will, which 
 items the heirs contest on the ground of the invalidity of the lease, 
 the court will not consider the lease invalid. — Estate of Murphy, 12. 
 
 Accouiit of Executor — Expense of Repairs. — Where an executor, as 
 an inducement to the heirs to join with him in the execution of a 
 lease, represents to them that the expense of alterations and fitting up 
 for the tenant will not exceed a certain sum, he cannot be allowed 
 for expenditures beyond that sum. — Estate of Murphy, 12,
 
 576 Index. 
 
 Account of Executor. — Expenditures that do not Add to the Bental 
 Value of premises to be leased, and injudiciously made, should be 
 disallowed. — Estate of Murphy, 12. 
 
 Executor. — Where Items in an Executor's Account are payments 
 arising out of mortgages given by the universal devisee and legatee, 
 they should nevertheless be allowed, where the moneys were devoted 
 to the maintenance of the widow and family, and paid at her re- 
 quest, she being universal devisee. — Estate of Love, 537. 
 
 Executor. — Items In an Executor's Account of expense for ab- 
 stracts of title and driving squatters off of realty should be allowed, 
 when paid for the widow's benefit and at her request, she being the 
 universal devisee.^ — Estate of Love, 537. 
 
 Executor. — Items in an Executor's Account of Expense of flowers 
 for grave, of insuring personalty never in his possession, examining 
 tax lists and recording a deed to a legatee, should be disallowed. — 
 Estate of Love, 537. 
 
 Executor. — Items of Expense in an Executor's Account for printing 
 a brief, the amount or payees not being shown; interest on a note 
 made by a legatee, for $100, without voucher, and tax charges with- 
 out sufficient voucher, were disallowed. — Estate of Love, 537. 
 
 Executor. — An Item of Expense in an Executor's Accoimt, for re- 
 demption under tax sales, may be allowed. — Estate of Love, 537. 
 
 Executors are Entitled to have the Costs of an Appeal Allowed them 
 in their account, the prosecution of which is necessary to obtain a 
 final determination of their rights in relation to commissions. — 
 Estate of Eicaud, 220. 
 
 Administrator — Allowance for Traveling Expenses. — Where an ad- 
 ministrator has, in good faith, journeyed to a distant state upon busi- 
 ness of the estate, and has incurred an attorney's charge in 
 connection therewith, an allowance will be made to him thereforj 
 and this whether or not he misconceived his legal duty. — Estate of 
 Shillaber, 120. 
 
 Executor — Costs of Copying Papers. — All proceedings necessary to 
 be taken by the executor in the administration of the estate are 
 part of his duty, and any papers drawn in connection therewith are 
 covered by the statutory compensation provided for his services; and 
 the costs of engrossing or copying the same are not taxable against 
 the estate. — Estate of Shillaber, 120. 
 
 Executor — Allowance for Clerical Help. — When, in a large estate, 
 the impracticability is shown of doing without clerical assistance to 
 collect rents and keep accounts, the court usually makes some allow- 
 ance therefor; but guardedly, and never without rigorous proof of 
 necessity, although no objection be interposed. — Estate of Shillaber, 
 120. 
 
 The Administrator may be Allowed a Charge for Costs Paid in 
 Serving Notices required by law to oust a defaulting tenant, and al-
 
 Index. 577 
 
 though paid to an agent of the estate, receiving a compensation for 
 collection of the rents. — Estate of Shillaber, 120. 
 
 An Item in an Account for "Executor's Loss of Time" will be 
 stricken out. — Estate of Shillaber, 120. 
 
 See Counsel Fees; Special Administrators, 2. 
 Note. 
 
 traveling expenses, allowance for, 106. 
 services of bookkeeper, allowance for, 107. 
 
 EXPERT EVIDENCE. 
 
 See Evidence, 2. 
 
 FAMILY ALLOWANCE. 
 
 Family Allowance — Necessity of Notice.— Under section 1464, Code 
 of Civil Procedure, no notice of an application for family allowance 
 is necessary; yet, in the opinion of the court, it would be a salutary 
 rule to require, and the court of its own motion requires notice to 
 be given to the attorneys for absent or minor heirs, or for persons 
 in adverse interest, in all practicable cases. — Estate of McDougal, 
 456. 
 
 FEES OF COUNSEL. 
 
 See Counsel Pees. 
 
 FEES OF EXECUTOR. 
 
 See Compensation of Executors. 
 
 FILING PAPERS. 
 
 Filing a Paper Consists in Presenting It at the Proper Office and 
 leaving it there, deposited with the papers in such olfice. — Estate of 
 McGovern, 150. 
 
 Filing Papers. — Section 1030 of the Political Code Defines and Fixes 
 the hours during which public offices shall be kept open; and a paper 
 which is left in a public office one hour after the time fixed by law 
 for its closing, is left there when the office is legally closed. — Estate 
 of McGovern, 150. 
 
 See Costs. 
 
 FIXTURES. 
 
 Fixtures.— The Question as to What are or are not "Fixtures" de- 
 pends for its determination upon the circumstances of the construction 
 and intended use of the articles. — Estate of Murphy, 12. 
 
 FLOWERS FOR GRAVE. 
 
 See Expenses of Administration, 
 Prob. Dec. Vol. I — 37
 
 578 Index. 
 
 FRAUD. 
 
 Fraud — Evidence. — Other Things Being EcLual, where oath is op- 
 posed to oath, on a charge of fraud, the charge must fall. — Estate 
 of McDougal, 456. 
 
 Note. 
 
 jurisdiction of equity to vacate orders and decrees in probate on 
 the ground of fraud, 263. . 
 
 FUNERAL, BURIAL EXPENSES. 
 
 Funeral Expenses. — The Surviving Hushand is Liable for the fun- 
 eral expenses of his wife, where he has resources sufficient to respond. 
 Estate of Fitzpatrick, 117. 
 
 Executor. — An Expense of $147.50 for a Wall Around a Cemetery 
 Lot may be allowed as a proper and usual charge against a decedent 's 
 estate. — Estate of Love, 537. 
 
 Note. 
 
 liability of husband for wife's funeral expenses, 117. 
 
 GUARDIAN AND WARD. 
 
 1. In General. 
 
 Guardianship. — The Probate Court has no Jurisdiction to appoint 
 a guardian for a child who has been awarded to a parent in divorce 
 proceedings, while the divorce court retains the right to control the 
 custody of the child. — Guardianship of Murphy, 107. 
 
 Guardianship — Religious Instruction of Ward. — Where a child is bap- 
 tized in a particular faith to which its mother belonged, the guar- 
 dian of the child should secure to her instruction in the faith of the 
 mother, until the child arrives at an age when she is presumptively 
 competent to determine her own doctrine of religion. — Guardianship 
 of McGarrity, 200. 
 
 Guardianship. — The Custody of Minors is Always Within the 
 Discretion of the court; and this discretion is to be exercised in 
 the light of the particular and peculiar circumstances of each case. 
 The court is not bound to deliver the custody to any particular per- 
 son, not even the father. — Estate of Smith, 169. 
 
 Guardianship — Interest of State. — In the matter of the guardian- 
 ship of minors, the state is interested in having beneficial influences 
 surround and impress its future citizens. — Guardianship of Hanson, 
 
 182. 
 
 2. Eligibility of Person as Guardian. 
 
 Guardian — Eligibility of Nonresident. — Where the mother of a 
 minor is a nonresident, she is legally incapable of obtaining letters
 
 Index. 579 
 
 of guardianship over the child in this state. — Guardianship of Han- 
 sen, 182. 
 
 Guardian — Eligibility of Married Woman.— Where the mother of 
 a minor is a married woman, she is ineligible to become guardian. — 
 Guardianship of Hansen, 182. 
 
 Guardian. — Where Application is Made for Guardianship of a 
 Minor, if there is no person before the court who is legally entitled 
 to the guardianship, it must be shown, to justify a resistance of the 
 application, even by the nonresident mother, that no guardian is 
 needed for the child, or that the applicant is an unfit person. — 
 Guardianship of Hansen, 182. 
 
 3. Choice and Nomination of Guardian by Child. 
 
 Guardian — Nomination by Minor. — A minor, aged sixteen years, 
 who is intelligent and of fair education, is legally competent to nomi- 
 nate her own guardian, subject to the court's approval. — Estate of 
 Zimmer, 142. 
 
 Guardian — Nomination by Minor. — Although an intelligent minor 
 over fourteen years of age is competent to nominate its own guardian, 
 and its intelligent preference for a guardian must be considered, yet 
 the court must be guided in its determination by what appears to be 
 for the child's best interests, as to its temporal, mental and moral 
 welfare. — Estate of Zimmer, 142. 
 
 Guardian. — The Nomination and Preference of the Minor in this 
 case of her aunt for guardian as against the child's mother, who had 
 remarried after divorce from the child 's father to one who was the 
 object of the child's aversion — discussed, but not decided. — Estate of 
 Zimmer, 142. 
 
 Guardian — Nomination by Minor. — In this case it was held that an 
 application for guardianship by the minor's nominee should be de- 
 nied, although the applicant and minor were closely related and af- 
 fectionately disposed toward each other, having lived and loved as 
 if mother and child for years; it appearing that, from the circum- 
 stances of the applicant, a grant of guardianship would not be for 
 the best interests of the child as to its temporal welfare. — Estate of 
 Zimmer, 142. 
 
 Guardian — Nomination by Minor — Nonresidence. — Where an appli- 
 cant for guardianship of a minor, claiming as the minor's nominee, 
 is a nonresident of the state, and only awaits the determination of 
 the application to return home, the court will not be justified in con- 
 firming the minor's choice, even if legally permitted to do so. — 
 Estate of Zimmer, 142. 
 
 Guardian — Nomination by Minor. — In this case the court, in de- 
 termining an application for guardianship upon the nomination of 
 the minor over fourteen years of age — involving the minor 's compe-
 
 580 Index. 
 
 tency and the applicant's rights, with the court's duty in the prem- 
 ises — considered and construed sections 1748, 1749, Code of Civil Pro- 
 cedure, and section 246, 253 (subdivision 6), Civil Code. — Estate of 
 Zimmer, 142. 
 
 Guardian — Choice of Child. — A child ten years of age who has been 
 educated carefully and is a bright girl may be capable of expressing 
 "an intelligent preference" for a guardian, which the court will con- 
 sider. — Guardianship of Hansen, 182. 
 
 Guardianship — Election and Nonunation by Child. — It has become 
 the rule, in awarding the custody of a minor, to give the child, if 
 of proper age, the right of election in the matter. In California, 
 fourteen years is the age fixed, when the minor has a right of nomi- 
 nation, subject to the court's approval; and the law also permits 
 a minor, "if of sufficient age to form an intelligent preference," to 
 express such preference, which may be considered by the court. — 
 Estate of Smith, 169. 
 
 Guardianship — Child's Choice of Custodian. — Mere mental pre- 
 cocity is not the test of a child's capacity to express a choice of 
 custodian; acuteness of apprehension, sharpness of intellect on the 
 part of the child, will not alone be sufficient for the judge. The 
 minor must be capable of exercising a discretion in the premises; 
 its mere impulses will not weigh. In this case, a child thirteen years 
 and eight months old was held "of a sufficient age to form an intel- 
 ligent preference," within the meaning and intent of section 246, 
 Civil Code, relating to the custody and guardianship of minors. — 
 Estate of Smith, 169. 
 
 Guardianship — Preference of Minor. — In determining what is for 
 the best interests of a child, in adjudging its custody or guardian- 
 ship, the court may consider the child's preference, if it is of 
 sufficient age to form an intelligent preference. — Estate of Smith, 169. 
 
 4. Examination of Minor by Court. 
 
 Guardianship — Examination of Minor, — In this case, in accordance 
 with the practice of the court in matters of guardianship, the minor 
 was examined, separate and apart, at length, first by the respective 
 counsel and the judge, with the official reporter; then by the judge 
 alone, counsel being absent; and finally was requested to express 
 her own wishes in writing, she being alone and without any influ- 
 ence whatever. Her written views, with her transcribed testimony, 
 were then filed as part of the record. — Estate of Smith, 169. 
 
 Guardianship. — One of the Objects of the Court's Private Exam- 
 ination of the Minor, in guardianship matters, is to discover the 
 child's capacity; its appreciation of the object of the proceedings; 
 the strength of the natural affections, and its idea of filial duty and 
 parental right; and the child's freedom of expression, that is, ab- 
 sence of influence or teachings adverse to parents. The court looks
 
 Index. 581 
 
 with distrust upon any choice of the minor contrary to the natural 
 affections in favor of a parent. — Estate of Smith, 169. 
 
 5. Considerations in Awarding Custody of Child. 
 
 Guardianship — Custody and Welfare of Child. — In appointing a 
 guardian and awarding the custody of a child, the court is bound to 
 do what in its judgment appears to be for the best interest of the 
 child in respect to its temporal, its mental and moral welfare. — 
 Guardianship of Danneker, 4. 
 
 Guardianship. — The Affection of a Child for the Person seeking its 
 custody as guardian is always given consideration by the court. — 
 Guardianship of Danneker, 4. 
 
 Guardianship — Social and Private Life of Guardian. — It is the duty 
 of the court to inquire into the social relations and private life of a 
 person seeking to be appointed guardian of a child, so far as they may 
 affect the child's welfare. — Guardianship of Danneker, 4. 
 
 Guardianship — Wishes of Deceased Mother. — In the appointment of 
 a guardian for a minor, the court must regard the dying declaration 
 of the mother as to her wishes in the premises, when not inconsistent 
 with the welfare of the child. — Guardianship of McGarrity, 200. 
 
 Guardianship — Considerations in Awarding Custody of Child. — It 
 
 is within the court's sound discretion whether the custody of a child 
 will be given to the father. The court should consider not only the 
 father's fitness, but the condition of the child with its present custo- 
 dians, its relation to them, the present and prospective provision for 
 its support and welfare; the facts as to its present home — its dura- 
 tion, and whether with the father's consent, and upon understanding of 
 permanency; the strength of the ties formed, and the child's wishes 
 if it is of an age of discretion. — Estate of Smith, 169. 
 
 Guardianship. — Where the Best Interests of a Child require that 
 it should remain in the home where it has been fostered from in- 
 fancy, that consideration will be deemed paramount to the father's 
 natural right, although the father is in every way competent and 
 suitable. — Estate of Smith, 169. 
 
 Guardianship. — The Welfare of a Minor Means Its Permanent, 
 not temporary, welfare. The court is governed by that which, look- 
 ing to the previous condition, and the future continued residence 
 of the child, will contribute to its permanent happiness and welfare. 
 Estate of Smith, 169. 
 
 Guardian — Best Interests of Ward. — In awarding the custody of a 
 minor, or appointing a general guardian, the court is guided by what 
 appears to be for the child's best interests as to its temporal, mental 
 and moral welfare. — Guardianship of Hansen, 182. 
 
 Guardianship — Welfare of Child. — The Pirst Point to be Considered, 
 in adjudging the custody or guardianship of a minor, is the best
 
 582 Index. 
 
 interests of the child with respect to its temporal, mental and moral 
 welfare. — Estate of Smith, 169. 
 
 Guardianship — Welfare of Child. — In ^ardianship matters the court 
 acts for and on behalf of the child, and must regard, as the paramount 
 consideration, the interest and welfare of the child. To this every 
 other consideration must yield. — Estate of Smith, 169. 
 
 6. Parents' Kight to Custody of Child as Against Third Persons. 
 
 Guardianship. — Assuming that a Father's Eight to the Custody of 
 
 his child revives upon the death of the mother,' who had been 
 awarded the custody under a divorce decree, yet it must be shown 
 that the minor's interest will be conserved by recognizing the father's 
 right.— Estate of White, 128. 
 
 Guardianship. — Where a Husband Deserts His Wife, who is left 
 to care and provide for their infant child, this will be considered as 
 an abandonment of the child, upon the father's application for guar- 
 dianship after the mother's death. — Estate of White, 128. 
 
 Guardianship. — Reluctant as the Court Always is to Interfere with 
 a Father's natural right to his child's custody, it will do so where 
 the child's interest demands. — Estate of White, 128. 
 
 Guardianship. — In the Case at Bar the Court Refused Guardian- 
 ship of a minor of divorced parents to its father, applying after the 
 death of the mother, and granted letters to the maternal grandmother 
 of the minor, for the following reasons: The child had been awarded 
 to the mother by a divorce decree against the father; the father 
 never provided for the child, except when compelled by judicial pro- 
 cess; he never showed any interest in the child from the time of 
 his desertion of the mother, and by his continued course of conduct 
 manifested a lack of paternal instinct; the maternal grandmother 
 had received the mother and child when deserted by the father, and 
 had ever afterward given them shelter and assistance, and she was 
 the nominee of the mother, by the latter 's dying request.^Estate of 
 White, 128. 
 
 Guardianship. — The Father is Prima Facie Entitled to the Custody 
 of His Child. But this is not an absolute right; it may be controlled 
 by other considerations; and, if the father is unable or unfit to take 
 charge of the child and educate it suitably, the court will not inter- 
 fere to take the child from those who are fit and able to so main- 
 tain and educate it. — Estate of Smith, 169. 
 
 Guardianship — Father's Right to Child's Custody. — As a general 
 rule, courts assent to the proposition that natural right and public pol- 
 icy, as well as the safety of the social structure, require that the 
 father should have the custody of his child. But this is not impera-
 
 Index. • 583 
 
 tive upon the court; it bends to the interests of the child. — Estate of 
 Smith, 169. 
 
 Guardianship Awarded to Aunt Rather than to Father. — In this 
 case an application for guardianship of a minor was filed by its 
 aunt, and a counter-application and opposition presented by its 
 father, the mother being deceased. The minor was aged thirteen 
 years and eight months, and held to have proven herself fully ca- 
 pable of expressing an "intelligent preference" in the matter, which 
 she did in favor of her aunt, after undergoing a thorough exam- 
 ination. The child was born in the dwelling of her aunt while her 
 parents were members of the aunt's domestic circle; and the mother 
 and child ever afterward continued to live with the aunt until the 
 mother's decease, when these proceedings were instituted. The 
 child's mother had, some years before her death, obtained a divorce 
 from the father, by default, and with it the custody of the child; 
 and it was her last wish that her child should remain with the aunt. 
 Estate of Smith, 169. 
 
 Guardianship Awarded to Aunt — Right of Father to Visit Ward. — 
 In this case the court found that the best interests of the child re- 
 quired that it should remain with the aunt, with the right of the 
 father to visit and enjoy the society of the child at all reasonable 
 times; and, in awarding the minor's custody to the aunt, the court 
 said that the parties ought to reach an amicable understanding 
 whereby the child should spend part of her time with her father, 
 and so allow opportunities for mutual affections and interests to grow 
 up between her and her paternal relatives. — Estate of Smith, 169. 
 
 Guardian — Stranger Preferred to Mother. — Where a mother, after 
 desertion by her husband, committed her child to the care of the pe- 
 titioner, agreeing that he should adopt it (which he never legally 
 did), and afterward, under judgment in an action for divorce by 
 the mother, the child was awarded to petitioner; and the petitioner 
 kept the child for nearly six years, until the mother wanted to get 
 the child again, when he applied for guardianship of her, the mother 
 opposing it, and the divorce decree being modified pending the 
 guardianship proceedings, so as to remit the question of custody to 
 the guardianship department; and during all the period aforesaid pe- 
 titioner and his wife treated and educated the child as if she were 
 their own; and the mother is legally incapable and ineligible to 
 become guardian, being a nonresident and married; and the child has 
 expressed a preference for petitioner, and it would not be for the 
 child's best interests to place her anywhere but with petitioner, 
 guardianship should be granted to petitioner; but so restricted that 
 the mother may communicate with and visit the child. — Guardian- 
 ship of Hansen, 182.
 
 584 Index. 
 
 Note. 
 
 jurisdiction of equity to grant relief from orders and decrees 
 
 in guardianship proceedings, 263. 
 considerations in awarding custody of child, 9. 
 father's right to custody of child, when lost, 181. 
 wishes of child considered in appointing guardian, 181. 
 
 HOLOGRAPHS. 
 
 See Wills, 5. 
 Note. 
 Holographic Wills. See Wills, Olographic. 
 
 HOMESTEADS. 
 1. In General. 
 
 Homestead — How Far an Estate. — The right to have a probate 
 homestead set aside is not an estate; it becomes such when a decree 
 is made setting aside the homestead and title then vests in the bene- 
 ficiaries. — Estate of Hayes, 531. 
 
 Homestead — Effect of Setting Aside. — When property is set apart 
 as a probate homestead, the property is then taken out of the juris- 
 diction of the court. — Estate of Hayes, 551. 
 
 Homestead. — The Purpose of the Statute in Giving a Homestead 
 right to the surviving spouse out of the decedent's separate estate 
 is to provide a home for the survivor, which no one can touch; merely 
 depriving the survivor of the power of alienation. — Estate of Tate, 
 217. 
 
 Homestead — Residence of Deceased — Conclusiveness of Finding. — 
 Where, upon the admission of a will to probate, the legal residence 
 and domicile of testator is found as a fact, and certified and judi- 
 cially determined, the question is placed outside the pale of contro- 
 versy thereafter. So held, upon an executor's opposition to an ap- 
 plication for a homestead by tlie testator's widow. — Estate of Green, 
 444. 
 
 Homestead — Probate and Voluntary Distinguished. — There is a 
 distinction between a homestead under section 1262, Civil Code, and 
 the homestead selected by the court in the administration of a de- 
 cedent's estate. The latter is governed wholly by the provisions of 
 section 1465, Code of Civil Procedure. In the case of a homestead 
 selected in the decedent's lifetime, the claimant's title accrues by 
 survivorship; as to a homestead selected in the administration of 
 decedent's estate, the claimant's title accrues only upon the de- 
 cree of the court or judge setting it apart. — Estate of Green, 444. 
 
 Homestead. — The Probate Court has no Discretion to deny an ap- 
 plication for a homestead by the family of a decedent, presented 
 under section 1465, Code of Civil Procedure. — Estate of Green, 444.
 
 Index. 585 
 
 Homestead — Value of Premises. — In this case tlie court held that 
 the value of the premises ordered set apart as a homestead should 
 be taken as of the date of the application; any subsequent increase 
 in value being immaterial. — Estate of Green, 444. 
 
 2. Nature of Homestead Right — Date at Which Determined. 
 
 Homestead — Nature of Right. — The right to a homestead is wholly 
 statutory; it cannot be asserted as a natural right. The law-making 
 power is competent to repeal the provisions of the statute regu- 
 lating the right, and thereafter homesteads would be unknown. — 
 Estate of Green, 444. 
 
 Homestead — Successor to Right. — The right to a probate homestead 
 may be lost, and there can be no successor to that right. — Estate of 
 Hayes, 551. 
 
 Homestead. — The Right of a Widow to have a Homestead Set Apart 
 to her from the estate of her former husband must be determined 
 from the facts as they exist at the date of the action of the court. — 
 Estate of Green, 444. 
 
 Homestead. — The Right to a Probate Homestead is tested or con- 
 sidered not as of the date of the death of the decadent but as of the 
 time of the application. — Estate of Hayes, 551. 
 
 3. Persons Entitled to Homestead. « 
 
 Homestead. — When Application is Made by a Minor child of a de- 
 cedent to have a homestead set apart from community, property, the 
 surviving widow having died, and the other children having attained 
 majority, without applying for a homestead, the court must grant 
 the application and set aside the homestead absolutely, not limiting 
 it to the period of minority or otherwise. — Estate of Hayes, 551. 
 
 Homestead. — A Widow Without Minor Children is Entitled to have 
 a homestead selected and set apart by the court out of decedent's 
 separate estate, there being no community property. — Estate of Tate, 
 217. 
 
 Homesjtead. — It does not Impair or Diminish the Right of the 
 Widow to have a homestead set apart that there are no minor chil- 
 dren. — Estate of Maxwell, 126. 
 
 Homestead. — The Probate Court must, upon proper application, 
 set apart to the widow a homestead, if none has been selected during 
 the lifetime of the decedent. It has no discretion in the premises. 
 Estate of Maxwell, 126. 
 
 Homestead. — The Court must Set Apart a Homestead upon the ap- 
 plication of a widow, if none has been selected in the lifetime of 
 the deceased spouse. There is no discretion in the matter. — Estate 
 of Tate, 217.
 
 586 Index. 
 
 Homestead. — The Executor's Answer to the Widow's Application 
 for a homestead alleged that two adult daughters (one being married), 
 referred to in the widow 's petition, were always considered and 
 treated as part of the decedent's household and family. The court 
 'gnored this claim for the daughters, and set apart the homestead 
 to the widow alone. — Estate of Green, 444. 
 
 Homestead. — ^In this Case the Widow Applied to have a Home- 
 stead set apart to her, and the executor answered, setting up that 
 decedent's residence and home was in England, where he died and left 
 a homestead, which he devised to his wife and daughters. The court 
 found on the probate of the will here that the decedent had a domicile 
 and legal residence in California, and was only temporarily in England 
 for his health; and held that the applicant, being the decedent's widow 
 at the date of the application, and a resident of the state, and there 
 being property suitable for a homestead, all the conditions required by 
 the statute existed to entitle her to a homestead. — Estate of Green, 
 444. 
 
 4. Selection from Separate Estate. 
 
 Homestead — Separate Property. — In this ease the court ordered 
 that the property, being decedent's separate estate, be set apart only 
 during the applicant 's widowhood. — Estate of Green, 444. 
 
 Homeste^. — If a Homestead is Selected from the Separate Property 
 
 of the decedent, the court can set it apart only for a limited period, 
 to be designated in the order. — Estate of Maxwell, 126. 
 
 Homestead — Selection from Separate Property. — It is only when a 
 homestead is set apart from the separate property of the decedent 
 that it is required to be for a limited period. — Estate of Hayes, 551. 
 
 The Eight of the Surviving Spouse to a Homestead in separate es- 
 tate of the decedent is limited to an estate for years, for life, or until 
 the happening of some event, as the marriage of the survivor, as may 
 be decreed by the court. But the exercise of the court 's power is lim- 
 ited by a sound discretion acting upon the circumstances of the 
 particular case; if the survivor is young and likely to remarry, a 
 limitation for life might be indiscreet, otherwise where she is of an 
 advanced age. — Estate of Tate, 217. 
 
 5. Testamentary Power. 
 
 Homestead. — Even if the Testator Devises His Entire Estate, which 
 was separate property, his widow will still be entitled to a homestead. 
 Estate of Maxwell, 126. 
 
 Homestead — Testamentary Power. — The power or duty of the court 
 to set apart a homestead for the family of a decedent is not lim- 
 ited by the fact that the decedent disposed of his property by will. 
 Estate of Green, 444.
 
 Index. 587 
 
 Homestead. — The Power of Testamentary Disposition is Given and 
 
 defined by statute, and is subordinate to the authority vested in the 
 probate court to appropriate property for the support of testator's 
 family, including a homestead, and for the payment of debts. — Es- 
 tate of Green, 444. 
 
 Note. 
 
 duty of court to set apart is Imperative, 556. 
 
 minor children, when are entitled to homestead, 556. 
 
 nature of homestead set apart from separate estate, 220. 
 
 right of surviving spouse to homestead in absence of children, 219. 
 
 HUSBAND AND WIFE. 
 
 Marital Obligation — Filial Devotion. — A husband should not allow 
 the duty he owes to his wife to be overcome by his love for his 
 parents. Where one's marital obligation comes into conflict with his 
 filial devotion, the latter should give way to the former. — Estate of 
 White, 128. 
 
 See Marriage. 
 
 INSANITY AND INSANE DELUSIONS. 
 
 1. Insanity in General. 
 
 The Words "Insane" and "Incompetent" defined .and distin- 
 guished.— Estate of Hill, 380. 
 
 Insanity — Unreasonable Suspicions. — Unfounded and unreasonable 
 suspicions are not insanity. — Estate of Scott, 271. 
 
 Insanity — Insomnia. — The mind of a testatrix is not necessarily 
 diseased because she is at times troubled with insomnia while af- 
 flicted with an intestinal ailment. — Estate of Scott, 271. 
 
 Insanity of Testator — Evidence and Burden of Proof. — The legal 
 presumption is in favor of the sanity of a testator, and the burden 
 of proof is on the contestant of his will to demonstrate the con- 
 trary; and if the contestant prevails, in a case of doubt, it must 
 be by a preponderance of proof, and the number, character and in- 
 telligence of witnesses, and their opportunity for observation, should 
 be taken into account. — Estate of Scott, 271. 
 
 2. Committing Lunatic to Asylum. 
 
 Insanity. — In Order to Commit a Person to an Asylum for the in- 
 sane, the court must be satisfied, upon examination, pursuant to sec- 
 tion 258, Civil Code, that such person is of unsound mind, and unfit 
 to be at large. The provisions of the codes as to such examination 
 summarized. — Matter of Ingram, 137. 
 
 Insanity. — There are no "Commissioners of Insanity." Physicians 
 are merely summoned to hear the testimony, and to make a personal
 
 588 Index. 
 
 examination of the alleged insane person; and, if they believe him 
 to be dangerously insane, they make a certificate of certain facts, 
 whereupon it is reserved to the judge, upon whom rests the responsi- 
 bility, to adjudicate upon the charge. — Matter of Ingram, 137. 
 
 Insanity. — Although a Person is Subject to Certain Delusions, 
 where the court is not satisfied that he is ''so far disordered in mind 
 as to endanger health, person or property," or "unfit to be at large," 
 it is bound to give him the benefit of such reasonable doubt as it en- 
 tertains upon the whole charge. — Matter of Ingram, 137. 
 
 3. Insane Delusions in General. 
 
 Will — Delusion. — It is not the Strength of a Mind which deter- 
 mines its freedom from delusion; it is its soundness. — Estate of In- 
 gram, 222. 
 
 Will — Delusion of Mind is a Species of Insanity. — The main char- 
 acter of insanity, in a legal view, is the existence of a delusion. — 
 Estate of Ingram, 222. 
 
 Will. — A Person is the Victim of Delusion when he pertinaciously 
 believes something to exist which does not. Belief of things which 
 are entirely without foundation in fact is insane delusion; that is, 
 where things exist only in the imagination of a person, and the non- 
 existence of which neither argument nor proof can establish in his 
 mind. — Estate of Ingram, 222. 
 
 Will. — If a Person is Under a Delusion, though there is but Partial 
 
 Insanity, yet if it is in relation to the act in question, it will defeat 
 a will which is the direct offspring of that partial insanity. — Estate 
 of Ingram, 222. 
 
 Insane Delusions — Business Capacity. — Business capacity may co- 
 exist with monomania or insane delusions. — Estate of Scott, 271. 
 
 Insanity — Faulty Logic. — ^False logic or faulty ratiocination is far 
 from the manifestation of insanity, so long as the process is formally 
 correct, not incoherent or inconsequential. — Estate of Scott, 271. 
 
 Insane Delusions — Fear of Poisoning. — A fear of poisoning on the 
 part of a testatrix, even though a delusion, must, in order to in- 
 validate her testamentary act, be continuous, persistent, and opera- 
 tive upon her volitional capacity. — Estate of Scott, 271. 
 
 Insane Delusions — Fear of Poisoning. — ^The mistaken belief of a 
 testatrix, when suffering with chronic stomach trouble, that her food 
 has been tampered with, does not, as a matter of law, amount to 
 an insane delusion. — Estate of Scott, 271. 
 
 Insane Delusions — Unfounded Suspicions. — The sanity of the testa- 
 trix in this case being questioned because she suspected that her 
 husband was unfaithful to her, and that he was attempting to poison 
 her and to send her to an insane asylum, the court observed: There 
 is a very large class of people whose sanity is undoubted, who are
 
 Index. 589 
 
 unduly jealous or suspicious of others, and especially of those closely 
 connected with them, and who upon the most trivial, even whimsical, 
 grounds wrongfully impute the worst motives and conduct to those 
 in whom they ought to confide. This insanity, which is developed 
 in a great variety of forms, is altogether too common, and too many 
 persons confessedly sane are to a greater or less degree afflicted with 
 it, to justify us in saying that because the deceased was so af- 
 flicted she was insane, or the victim of an insane delusion. — Estate 
 of Scott, 271. 
 
 Insane Delusions — Suspicions — Evidence and Burden of Proof. — The 
 line between unfounded and unreasonable suspicions of a sane mind 
 and insane delusions is sometimes quite indistinct and difficult to 
 define. However, the legal presumption is in favor of sanity, and on 
 the issue of sanity or insanity the burden is upon him who asserts 
 insanity to prove it. Hence, in a doubtful case, unless there ap- 
 pears a preponderance of proof of mental unsoundness, the issue 
 should be found the other way. — Estate of Scott, 271. 
 
 Insane Delusions — Suspicions — Tests of Insanity. — Suspicion is the 
 imagination of the existence of something, especially something 
 wrong, without proof, or with but slight proof; it is an impression 
 in the mind which has not resulted in a conviction. It is synonymous 
 with doubt, distrust, or mistrust — the mind is in an unsettled con- 
 dition. Suspicion existing, slight evidence might produce a rational 
 conviction or conclusion; this without evidence, however slight, would 
 be a delusion. Is there evidence, however slight? This is the test. 
 The suspicion may be illogical or preposterous, but it is not, there- 
 fore, evidence of insanity. — Estate of Scott, 271. 
 
 Insane Delusions — Suspicions as to Husband's Constancy. — If a 
 wife has evidence, though slight, on which to base a suspicion of her 
 husband's unfaithfulness, and has no settled conviction on the sub- 
 ject, her suspicion does not amount to an insane delusion. — Estate of 
 Scott, 271. 
 
 Insane Delusion — Conspiracy to Confine Wife in Asylum. — The con- 
 tention in this case that the testatrix was afflicted with an insane 
 delusion in that she believed her husband conspired to confine her 
 in an insane asylum, was found by the court to be unsupported by 
 the evidence, especially in view of the fact that the husband had 
 twitted her of being crazy and threatened to break her will. — Estate 
 of Scott, 271. 
 
 Insane Delusions — Testimony of Business Men. — The value of the 
 testimony of business men and acquaintances, acquired in commercial 
 dealings with a person alleged to be the victim of insane delusions, is 
 favorably regarded by the courts, on the issue of insanity. — Estate 
 of Scott, 271. 
 
 Insane Delusions — Vulgarity of Testatrix. — Where the vulgarity in 
 behavior and speech of a testatrix is relied upon to establish the
 
 590 Index. 
 
 presence of insane delusions, her whole conduct, at home and aboard, 
 should be considered, and not merely her conduct within her own 
 house, the alleged acts of immodesty in this case being confined to 
 the home premises of the testatrix, while her behavior abroad was 
 not subject to adverse criticism. — Estate of Scott, 271. 
 
 Insane Delusions — ^Eccentricities not Suddenly Acquired. — Eccentric 
 habits of speech, if not suddenly acquired, are not evidence of in- 
 sanity. — Estate of Scott, 271. 
 
 Insane Delusions — Suspicions as to Husband's Constancy. — Where 
 there was at least one instance in the conduct of a husband which 
 might arouse in the mind of the wife a suspicion as to his con- 
 stancy, the fact that her suspicions may have been unjust and her 
 inferences too general, is merely an error of logic, and not an evi- 
 dence of insanity or of an insane delusion. She has a right to in- 
 fer, however erroneously, or from inadequate premises, to a universal 
 conclusion. — Estate of Scott, 271. 
 
 4. Belief Based on Some Evidence. 
 
 Insane Delusion — Wrong Conclusions as Evidence. — If any fact 
 exists as a foundation for a testator's belief that a child borne by 
 bis wife is not his, he cannot be said to be the victim of an insane 
 delusion, however mistaken he may be in his conclusion. — Estate of 
 Solomon, 85. 
 
 Insane Delusion. — A Person may Act on Weak Testimony, yet be 
 under no delusion. — Estate of Solomon, 85. 
 
 Will. — Belief Based on Evidence, However Slight, is not Delusion; 
 delusion rests upon no evidence whatever; it is based on mere sur- 
 mise. The burden of proof is upon the party alleging insanity or 
 insane delusion. — Estate of Ingram, 222. 
 
 Will — Insane Delusion. — If a Person Persistently Believes Supposed 
 Facts which have no real existence except in his perverted imagina- 
 tion, and against all evidence and probability, and conducts him- 
 self, however logically, upon the assumption of their existence, he 
 is, as far as they are concerned, under a morbid delusion; and de- 
 lusion in that sense is insanity. So, if a testator labored under such 
 a delusion in respect to his wife and family connections, who would 
 naturally have been the objects of his testamentary bounty, and the 
 court can see that the dispository provisions of his alleged will were 
 or might have been caused or aifected by the delusion, the instru- 
 ment is not his will. — Estate of Tiffany, 478. 
 
 Will — Insane Delusion. — A Belief based on evidence, however slight, 
 is not delusion. — Estate of Hill, 370. 
 
 Note. 
 
 definition and general nature, 250. 
 what constitutes insane delusion, 87.
 
 Index. 591 
 
 insurance, proof of loss. 
 
 See Expenses of Administration. 
 
 INTEREST. 
 
 See Executors and Administrators, 5. 
 
 INTOXICATION. 
 
 See "Wills, 3. 
 Note. 
 
 testamentary capacity of persons addicted to the use of intoxi- 
 cants, 404, 532. 
 
 INVENTORY. 
 
 Inventory. — An Administrator must Make a True Inventory and 
 
 appraisement of all estate of the decedent coming to his possession 
 or Jcnowledge; and he is accountable with respect to this duty. — Es- 
 tate of Partridge, 208. 
 
 Inventory — Adverse Claim Against Property. — If any portion of a 
 decedent's estate is the subject of an adverse claim, it is prudent on 
 the part of the administrator to add a memorandum to the inventory, 
 stating the asserted claim. But the property must be inventoried; 
 the administrator cannot stand neutral because the decedent's title 
 is disputed. — Estate of Partridge, 208. 
 
 Inventory — Property Claimed Adversely to Estate. — An adminis- 
 trator cannot omit to inventory property said to belong to his in- 
 testate which is the subject of an adverse claim, on the pretense 
 that he wants to stand neutral between the estate and the adverse 
 claimant, leaving the merits of the controversy to the court's de- 
 termination. The administrator cannot assume an attitude of neu- 
 trality; the statute points out his duty; and for the court to pass 
 upon the merits of the adverse claim would be to assume a jurisdic- 
 tion which, in probate, it cannot exercise. — Estate of Partridge, 208. 
 
 Inventory — Disputed Title. — The Probate Court ought not, it seems, 
 to reject an inventory of a decedent's estate, or order it modified, 
 because it contains property, the title to which is disputed. — Estate 
 of Partridge, 208. 
 
 Inventory — Trying Questions of Title. — Where part of an inven- 
 toried estate of a decedent is in dispute, the adjudication of the 
 title belongs to common-law tribunals; a probate court cannot con- 
 clude the question. — Estate of Partridge, 208. 
 
 See Appraisers of Estate. 
 
 Note. 
 
 title to property, determination of, for purposes of inventory, 212.
 
 592 Index. 
 
 INVESTMENT OF FUNDS. 
 See Trusts, 3. 
 
 JURISDICTION. 
 
 1. Of Probate Court in General. 
 
 Probate Court — Jurisdiction. — Tlie Superior Court, sitting in pro- 
 bate, cannot exercise other than purely probate jurisdiction; its ju- 
 risdiction, as succeeding the powers of the former probate court, is 
 not enlarged. — Estate of McLaughlin, 257. 
 
 Probate Court — Jurisdiction. — The Superior Court, sitting in pro- 
 bate, has no greater jurisdiction than the probate court which it suc- 
 ceeds. — Estate of Maxwell, 135. 
 
 Probate Court — Jurisdiction. — The Superior Court, while engaged in 
 the exercise of probate jurisdiction, cannot entertain a cause of ac- 
 tion to obtain relief upon the ground of fraud, such as a petition to 
 disregard and declare void a devise alleged to have been procured 
 through fraud, and to make distribution to the heirs. — Estate of 
 Maxwell, 135. 
 
 2. Of Probate Court to Try Title. 
 
 See Inventory. 
 
 Probate Court — Jurisdiction to Try Title. — The superior court, 
 sitting in probate, has no authority to adjudicate the question of title 
 to personal property in dispute between a third person and the estate 
 of a decedent. — Estate of Curtis, 533. 
 
 3. As Depending on Residence of Decedent. 
 
 Jurisdiction — Residence of Deceased. — The Issuance of Special 
 Letters of administration to the public administrator in one county 
 is not a final determination of his right to general letters of admin- 
 istration as against the public administrator of another county. — 
 Estate of Sealy, 90. 
 
 Jurisdiction — Residence of Deceased. — The Issuance of Special 
 Letters of administration leaves the jurisdictional facts still to be 
 ascertained prior to the issuance of general letters. — Estate of Seely, 
 90. 
 
 Jurisdiction — Residence of Deceased — Conclusiveness of Deter- 
 mination. — Where the public administrators of two counties each file 
 an application for letters of. administration, there being a doubt as 
 to which county the decedent was a resident of, and one applicant 
 contests the application of the other, the adjudication of the court 
 that it has jurisdiction is a bar to the contestant's own application 
 in the other county. — Estate of Seely, 90.
 
 Index. 593 
 
 LEGATEES AND DEVISEES. 
 
 Devisee — Right to Possession. — A Tenant of Eealty, specifically de- 
 vised to her for life, is not entitled to possession on testator's death. 
 But as she will be entitled to the rents, issues and profits upon dis- 
 tribution of the estate, her intermediate occupancy might not ordi- 
 narily challenge criticism; yet aliter, if objection made. — Estate of 
 Shillaber, 101. 
 
 A Legatee of a Specific Bequest can Take Only Such Interest in 
 
 the property bequeathed as the testator had a right or power to dis- 
 pose of by will. — Estate of Eicaud, 212. 
 
 Where Property Specifically Bequeathed is Sold Under Order of 
 Court, the legatee is not entitled to the proceeds before distribution, 
 but the same must be held subject to administration. — Estate of 
 Eicaud, 212. 
 
 See Wills. 
 
 LETTERS TESTAMENTARY AND OF ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 See Executors and Administrators; Jurisdiction, 3. 
 
 LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. 
 
 See Trusts, 4. 
 
 LUNATICS. 
 
 See Insanity and Insane Delusions. 
 
 MARRIAGE. 
 
 Unsolemnized Marriage — Evidence to Establish. — Where it appears 
 that parties, without the sanction of any ecclesiastical ceremony, 
 agreed between themselves to live together as man and wife, and 
 did live as such in one place of domicile for years, and in other 
 places, and so held themselves out to others moving in the same 
 limited social sphere; and it further appears that each of the parties 
 testified in a legal controversy, wherein they were both called as wit- 
 nesses, to being, respectively, married persons, and stated their re- 
 spective places of habitation to be where in fact they lived together 
 at the time, their marriage is proved. — Estate of Whalen, 202. 
 
 Unsolemnized Marriage — Evidence to Establish. — Where persons 
 called to prove that a man and woman lived as husband and wife 
 and held themselves out as such to others living in the same social 
 sphere, are credible witnesses, no matter how circumscribed is their 
 social environment, their testimony is sufficient to establish repute. — 
 Estate of Whalen, 202. 
 
 Unsolemnized Marriage — Declarations to Support. — Where it ap- 
 pears that an alleged spouse of an unsolemnized marriage has testi- 
 Prob. Dec, Vi i. 1—88
 
 59-1 Index. 
 
 fied as a witness, subsequently to the alleged marriage, that he was 
 a married man, such declaration is the most important evidence that 
 can be offered in support of such a marriage. — Estate of Whalen, 
 202. 
 
 Marriage. — Where the Relation of Husband and Wife is Once Es- 
 tablished, no subsequent conduct of either spouse, which does not 
 culminate in a legal dissolution, can affect the judicial determination 
 of the question of their status. — Estate of Whelan, 202. 
 
 See Husband and Wife. 
 
 MAXIMS. 
 
 Maxim. — No One Shall Derive any Profit, Through the Law, by the 
 
 influence of an unlawful action or relation. — Estate of Tiffany, 478. 
 
 MINOR HEIRS. 
 
 Minor Heirs. — The Court will Endeavor to Conserve the Interests 
 of Minors, and will at all times aid their attorney in obtaining for 
 them their full rights; and any application in that behalf will be 
 welcomed by the court, which regards with the highest favor, the 
 claims of minor heirs. — Estate of McDougal, 456. 
 
 MISTAKE. 
 
 Note. 
 
 jurisdiction of equity to grant relief from orders and decrees in 
 probate on the ground of mistake, 263. 
 
 MORTGAGEE. 
 
 See Accounts of Executor. 
 
 NOMINATION OF ADMINISTRATOR. 
 
 See Executors and Administrators, 1. 
 
 NOMINATION OF GUARDIAN. 
 
 See Guardian and Ward, 3. 
 
 NOTICE. 
 
 See Probate of Will, 2. 
 
 OLOGRAPHS. 
 
 See Wills, 5. 
 
 PARENT AND CHILD. 
 
 See Guardian and Ward.
 
 Index. 595 
 
 PARTIAL DISTRIBUTION. 
 
 See Distribution, 3. 
 
 PARTNERSHIP INTEREST. 
 
 See Distribution. 
 
 PERPETUITIES. 
 
 See Trusts. 
 
 PETITION. 
 
 See Distribution, 3. 
 
 PRESUMPTION. 
 
 JNote. 
 
 that testator intended to dispose of entire estate, 150. 
 
 PROBATE COURT. 
 
 See Courts; Jurisdiction. 
 
 PROBATE OF WILL. 
 
 1. In General. 
 
 The Probate of a Will and the Appointment of an Executor are 
 distinct emanations from the will of the court, usually, though not 
 necessarily embodied in one order, but determined upon entirely dif- 
 ferent sets of facts. — Estate of McLaughlin, 80. 
 
 2. Notice and Hearing. 
 
 Probate of Will — Setting for Hearing, Evidence of. — When it is 
 claimed that the clerk did not set a petition for probate for hear- 
 ing, a notice in fact issued by him and fixing the day is the best 
 evidence that the law has complied with. — Estate of McLaughlin, 20. 
 
 Probate of Will — Setting for Hearing. — Any Omission in matters 
 of form in fixing the date for hearing a petition to probate a will 
 may be disregarded by the court or ordered supplied when the proper 
 fact is made satisfactorily to appear. — Estate of McLaughlin, 80. 
 
 Probate of Will. — The Publication of the Notice fixing the day for 
 hearing the probate of a will, when made in a weekly paper, must 
 appear on at least three different days of publication, but not neces- 
 sarily in three consecutive weekly issues. — Estate of McLaughlin, 
 80.
 
 596 Index. 
 
 3. Revocation of Probate. 
 
 Probate of Will. — A Creditor cannot Petition for a Revocation 
 
 of the probate of a will. — Estate of McLaughlin, 80. 
 
 See Contest of Will; Undue Influence. 
 Note. 
 
 jurisdiction of equity to grant relief from probate, 266. 
 publication of notice of hearing of petition for probate. 84. 
 
 PUBLICATION. 
 
 Note. 
 
 of will by testator, 32. 
 
 RECORD. 
 
 Record. — Matters Prejudicial to the Character of any person will 
 be excluded from the record when not essential to a proper decision. 
 Guardianship of Danneker, 4. 
 
 REDEMPTION FROM TAX SALE. 
 
 See Expenses of Administration, 
 
 REMOVAL OF EXECUTOR. 
 
 See Executors and Administrators, 4. 
 
 RENTS. 
 See Executors and Administrators, 5. 
 
 RENUNCIATION OF COMPENSATION. 
 
 See Executors and Administrators, 4. 
 
 REPAIRS. 
 
 See Expenses of Administration. 
 
 RESIDUARY CLAUSES. 
 
 See Wills, 8. 
 
 REVOCATION OF LETTERS. 
 
 See Executors and Administrators, 4. 
 
 REVOCATION OF PROBATE. 
 
 See Probate of Will, 3. 
 
 REVOCATION OF WILL. 
 
 See Wills, 12.
 
 Index. 597 
 
 SALES BY ADMINISTRATOR. 
 
 Administrator's Sale — Advance Bids and Resale. — When, upon the 
 hearing of a return of an administrator's sale of personal property, 
 the purchaser increases his bid from $3,000 to $5,000, it is manifest 
 that the price obtained is greatly disproportionate to the value of 
 the property; and in such case the court will refuse confirmation 
 of the sale, and will order a new sale to be had under circumstances 
 calculated to bring the utmost value of the property. — Estate of Jen- 
 nings, 155. 
 
 Administrator's Sale — Release of Bidder. — If a bidder at a pri- 
 vate sale by an administrator states that she has not had time to 
 examine the title because of the shortness of the notice, and does 
 not wish to be bound unless the title is good, to which the admin- 
 istrator assents, she should be released from her bid when her coun- 
 sel advises against the title, whether or not his view of the law is 
 correct. — Estate of Neustadt, 95. 
 
 Administrator's Sale. — The Court Should Rectuire an Additional Bond 
 from the administrator upon ordering the sale of any real property be- 
 longing to the estate. — Estate of Eiddle, 215. 
 
 Note. 
 
 jurisdiction of equity to vacate sales, 265. 
 rule of caveat emptor, 96. 
 
 SETTLEMENT OF ACCOUNTS. 
 
 See Accounts of Executor. 
 
 SPECIAL ADMINISTRATORS. 
 
 1. In General. 
 
 Special Administrator — Person Entitled to Letters. — In making the 
 appointment of a special administrator, the court must give pref- 
 erence to the person entitled to letters testamentary or of adminis- 
 tration, unless he is shown incompetent for the position. The court 
 has no discretion. — Estate of Held, 206. 
 
 Special Administrator— Want of Integrity and Improvidence.— The 
 evidence in this case is held insufficient to establish improvidence 
 or want of integrity on the part of the applicant for special letters 
 of administration. — Estate of Held, 206. 
 
 Where It Appeared that a Special Administrator had been a Trus- 
 tee for the decedent in her lifetime, and there was a large balance 
 at the time of decedent's death, for which he should be held ac- 
 countable, and he has made no statement of his indebtedness or 
 trust in his account rendered as special administrator, he should be 
 charged with the amount of such indebtedness upon the settlement 
 of his account.— Estate of Armstrong, 157.
 
 598 Index. 
 
 Special Administrator. — It is the Duty of a Special Administrator 
 to Collect and preserve, for the executor or administrator, all person- 
 alty and choses of every kind belonging to the decedent and his 
 estate; also to take the charge of, enter upon and preserve from dam- 
 ages, waste and injury the realty. — Estate of Shillaber, 101. 
 
 Special Administrator — Actions by and Against. — For all purposes 
 of the performance of the duty of a special administrator to collect 
 and preserve the assets, real and personal, of the decedent, and for 
 all necessary purposes, he may commence and maintain or defend 
 suits and other legal proceedings, as in the case of a general adminis- 
 trator. — Estate of Shillaber, 101. 
 
 2. Accounts, Expenditures and Compensation. 
 
 Special Administrator — Expenditures for Business Trip. — Where a 
 special administrator has in good faith journeyed to a distant state 
 upon business of the estate, an allowance will be made to him therefor; 
 but he will be entitled to no greater remuneration than, in the court's 
 opinion, would be proper for the dispatch of the business of such 
 journey. — Estate of Shillaber, 101. 
 
 Special Administrator. — For the Compensation of a Special Admin- 
 istrator, the court can accept no other standard than that furnished 
 by section 1618, Code of Civil Procedure (for general administration). 
 Commissions are here allowed on the amount accounted for, includ- 
 ing an additional sum of one-half of such commissions for extra 
 service, as permitted under such section. — Estate of Shillaber, 101. 
 
 Special Administrator — Accounts. — The Accuracy of a special ad- 
 ministrator's account will be tested by strictly legal methods, under 
 the rule of section 1415, Code of Civil Procedure, and his duty as 
 therein found, and as defined in the first and second headnotes above. 
 Estate of Shillaber, 101. 
 
 Special Administrator — Allowance for Clerical Assistance. — In this 
 case the court allowed the special administrator for clerical help in 
 collection of rents, and keeping the accounts, four per cent upon the 
 collections; but reserved the right in other cases to deal differently 
 with a similar item. — Estate of Shillaber, 101. 
 
 Special Administrator. — An Item of Expense for Detective Service, 
 
 claimed to be incurred for the estate 's interest, was in this case dis- 
 allowed by the court. — Estate of Shillaber, 101. 
 
 Special Administrator — Expenditure on Personalty. — Until distrib- 
 ution, an article of personalty specifically bequeathed by decedent 
 must be treated as part of the estate, and not allowed to deteriorate. 
 Hence, where the special administrator has made an expenditure upon 
 such article to prevent its deterioration, the item should be allowed 
 in his account. — Estate of Shillaber, 101. 
 
 See Jurisdiction, 3.
 
 Index. 599 
 
 Note. 
 
 preference to persons entitled to letters, 207. 
 
 STATUTES. 
 
 Construction of Statute Adopted from Another State. — The rule 
 that a statute adopted from another state will be given the con- 
 struction placed upon it by the courts of that state prior to its 
 adoption, is not absolute, especially- where there has been a single 
 decision which has since been questioned or repudiated in the for- 
 eign state. — Estate of Doe, 54. 
 
 SUCCESSION. 
 
 Succession — Vesting of Estate in Heirs. — Heirs succeed to the 
 property of their intestate immediately upon his death; then their 
 interest becomes vested, subject only to the lien of the administra- 
 tor for the payment of the debts of the decedent and the expenses 
 of administration. — Estate of Lane, 88. 
 
 Succession. — The Next of Kin Entitled to Share in the Distribution 
 of the estate of an intestate are such only as are next of kin at the 
 time of his death. — Estate of Lane, 88. 
 
 The Widow can Claim to Own an Undivided Half Only of Such 
 Property as is distributed in kind. If she receive one-half of the 
 community property, her right as survivor is satisfied. — Estate of 
 Eicaud, 220. 
 
 TRAVELING EXPENSES. 
 See Expenses of Administration. 
 
 TRUSTS. 
 1. In General. 
 
 Trust. — The Following Language in a Letter Written by One Who 
 has Collected and holds moneys for another, establishes a trust: 
 "It leaves a balance in your favor of $15,000, besides what has 
 accumulated since the estate was fixed up, which I will loan out [at] 
 about nine per cent, being the best I can do at present." — Estate 
 of Armstrong, 157. 
 
 Trusts Liberal Interpretation of Statutes. — Provisions of the codes 
 
 in respect to testamentary trusts should be construed liberally.— 
 Estate of Doe, 54. 
 
 Trusts Purpose and Validity. — If a testator, after making specific 
 
 gifts, devises the residue of his estate to trustees "for" certain 
 beneficiaries, and elsewhere in the will provides that the executors, 
 who are also named as trustees of the trust, shall pay to the per- 
 sons designated as those "for" whom the property is held, a speci- 
 fied sum per month, the payment of that sum constitutes a trust pur-
 
 600 Index. 
 
 pose of the trust of the residuum, and the latter is not void as a 
 naked trust. — Estate of Doe, 54. 
 
 Trusts — Whether Bare and Void. — A devise "in trust" for others 
 is not invalid as a bare trust, when it imposes on the trustee the 
 duty of paying the rents and profits of the property to the benefi- 
 ciaries. — Estate of Doe, 54. 
 
 Trusts — Effect of Partial Invalidity. — An invalid provision in a 
 trust, which is not an integral or essential part of the trust scheme, 
 will not necessarily vitiate the other provisions. — Estate of Doe, 54. 
 
 2. Duration — Unlawful Accumulations. 
 
 Trusts — Construction as to Duration. — In determining the duration 
 of a trust term, the inherent character of the trust and its essential 
 limitations may form an element in the construction to be given to 
 the language creating it. — Estate of Doe, 54. 
 
 Trusts — On Whose Lives Term may be Limited. — A trust created 
 under subdivision 3 of section 857 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 
 to receive the rents and profits of real property, and apply them to 
 the use of designated beneficiaries, may be limited on lives of per- 
 sons other than the beneficiaries. — Estate of Doe, 54. 
 
 Trusts — ^Duration Limited by Purposes. — A trust in real property 
 to pay the rents and profits thereof to designated beneficiaries can- 
 not endure longer than the lives of the beneficiaries, where, upon 
 the assumption that they will outlive the trusts, the lives of the lat- 
 ter are made the measure of the trust. — Estate of Doe, 54. 
 
 Trusts — Unlawful Accumulations. — A direction to trustees to pay 
 taxes, street assessments, and other charges and expenses incurred 
 in improvements, out of the income of the trust estate, does not pro- 
 vide for an unlawful accumulation. — Estate of Doe, 54. 
 
 Trusts — Unlawful Accumulations. — A provision in a trust for re- 
 taining the income of the estate and paying it over to the benefi- 
 ciaries annually is not void. — Estate of Doe, 54. 
 
 3. Use and Investment of Funds by Trustee, 
 
 Trustee — ^Use and Management of Funds. — An agent or trustee has 
 no right to use the funds intrusted to him as his own, nor to min- 
 gle them with his own funds, without clear authorization; it is his 
 duty to keep the funds separate and intact, and free from any lia- 
 bility such as he incurs in the use of his own moneys. — Estate of 
 Armstrong, 157. 
 
 Trustee — Management of Funds. — An agent or trustee must pur- 
 sue with exactitude the instructions given as to funds intrusted 
 with him, or show that his particular act was ratified with full 
 knowledge on his principal's part as to the nature of the act. — Es- 
 tate of Armstrong, 157.
 
 Index. 601 
 
 Trustee — Loaning Funds. — Where an agent or trustee is instructed 
 to "loan out" funds held by him, it means that he is to invest 
 them for his principal's account, and to make an accounting to the 
 principal of such investment. He is not authorized to borrow the 
 funds for his own purposes. — Estate of Armstrong, 157. 
 
 Trustee — Investment of Funds. — Where confidence is reposed in a 
 trustee to judiciously invest the funds in his hands, .this confidence 
 is abused when he places himself in the position of a debtor to 
 the principal, without fully advising the latter of the risk he runs, 
 and giving him an opportunity of knowing the hazard that the 
 funds are subjected to. — Estate of Armstrong, 157. 
 
 Where a Trustee to Invest has Made Himself a Debtor to His 
 Principal, and thereby subjected the funds to a risk and hazard, he 
 must show that he fully advised his principal in the premises, in 
 order to avoid responsibility for the loss his conduct may cause. — 
 Estate of Armstrong, 157. 
 
 4. Limitation of Actions. 
 
 Trust — Limitation of Actions. — Where one occupies a fiduciary re- 
 lation, the statute of limitations cannot avail as a defense. Lapse 
 of time is no bar to a subsisting trust, clearly established. — Estate 
 of Armstrong, 157. 
 
 Trust — Limitation of Actions. — Where one has occupied a fiduciary 
 relation, the statute of limitations cannot be availed of, unless and 
 until a demand on the part of the principal, and a refusal by the 
 trustee are shown. — Estate of Armstrong, 157. 
 
 See Charitable Bequests; Wills, 11. 
 
 UNDUE INFLUENCE. 
 1. In General. 
 
 Will. A Will Produced by Undue Influence cannot stand. — Estate 
 
 of Ingram, 222. 
 
 Will. — ^Undue Influence is any Kind of Influence, either through 
 fear, coercion, or importunity, by which the testator is prevented 
 from expressing his true mind. It must be an influence adequate to 
 control the free agency of the testator. If a weak-minded person 
 is importuned to such an extent that he has not sufficient strength 
 of mind to determine for himself, so that the proposed script ex- 
 presses the views and wishes of the person importuning, rather than 
 his own, and is not his free and unconstrained act, it is not his will. 
 Undue influence, or supremacy of one mind over another, is such as 
 prevents that other from acting according to his own wish or judg- 
 ment.— Estate of Ingram, 222. 
 
 Will— Undue Influence. — Neither Advice, Argument, nor Persuasion 
 will vitiate a will made freely and from conviction, though such
 
 602 Index. 
 
 will miglit not have been made but for such advice and persuasion. 
 Neither does undue influence arise from the influence of gratitude, 
 affection or esteem. — Estate of Ingram, 222. 
 
 Will. — Undue Influence may be Defined as that which compels the 
 testator to do that which is against his will, through fear or a de- 
 sire of peace, or some feeling which he is unable to resist, and but 
 for which the .will would not be made as it is, although the testator 
 may know what he is about when he makes the will, and may have 
 sufficient capacity to make it. — Estate of Ingram, 222. 
 
 Will. — Wliat would be an Undue Influence on One Man might be 
 no influence at all on another. This depends upon the capacity, in 
 other respects, of the testator. — Estate of Ingram, 222. 
 
 Will. — Undue Influence must be an Influence Exercised in Relation 
 to the will itself, and not in relation to other matters or transactions. 
 But it need not be shown to have been actually exercised at the point 
 of time that the will was executed. — Estate of Ingram, 222. 
 
 Wills — Undue Influence. — If the Law Always Suspects and Inex- 
 orably Condemns undue influence, and presumes it from the nature 
 of the transaction, in the legitimate relations of attorney, guardian 
 and trustee, much more sternly should it deal with unlawful rela- 
 tions, where they are, in their nature, relations of influence over the 
 kind of act under investigation. In their legitimate operation, trust, 
 positions of influence are respected; but where apparently used for 
 selfish advantage they are viewed with deep suspicion; and it would 
 be strange if unlawful relations should be more favorably regarded. 
 Estate of Tiffany, 478. 
 
 Will Contest. — Where the Questions of Unsoundness of Mind and 
 Undue Influence are presented in the same case, and in their con- 
 sideration may overlap one the other, it has been said that as legal 
 propositions they are to be kept distinct and apart. But considering 
 the two issues together, it is noted that although mere weakness of 
 intellect does not prove undue influence, yet it may be that in such 
 feeble state, with the mind weakened by sickness, dissipation or age, 
 the testator more readily and easily becomes the victim of the im- 
 proper influences of those who see fit to practice upon him. — Estate 
 of Tiffany, 478. 
 
 2. Lawful or Unlawful Relation of Parties. 
 
 Will — ^Undue Influence. — While the Natural Influence of a Lawful 
 Relation must be lawful, even where affecting testamentary disposi- 
 tions, the natural or ordinary influence of an unlawful relation must be 
 unlawful, in so far as it affects testamentary dispositions favorably 
 to the unlawful relations and unfavorably to the lawful heirs. So, 
 it would be doing violence to the morality of the law, and thus to 
 the law itself, if courts should apply the rule recognizing the natural 
 influence arising out of legitimate relationship to unlawful as well as
 
 Index. 603 
 
 to lawful relations; and thereby make them both equal, in this re- 
 gard at least, which is contrary to their very nature. — Estate of Tif- 
 fany, 478. 
 
 "Will — Undue Influence. — There is a Distinction Between the In- 
 fluence of a Lawful Relation and that of an unlawful relation," A 
 lawful influence, such as that arising from legitimate family and 
 social relations, must be allowed to produce its natural results, even 
 in influencing the execution of a v/ill. However great the influence 
 thus generated, there is no taint of unlawfulness in it; nor can 
 there be any presumption of its unlawful exercise merely because 
 it is known to have existed and to have manifestly operated on the 
 testator's mind as a reason for his testamentary disposition. It is 
 only when such influence is exerted over the very act of devising, 
 preventing the will from being truly the testator's act, that the law 
 condemns it as vicious. — Estate of Tiffany, 478. 
 
 Will — Undue Influence. — General Cases and Authorities, as to what 
 does and what does not constitute undue influence, are inapplicable in 
 a case where the influence charged originated and was exercised under 
 an unlawful relation. — Estate of Tiffany, 478. 
 
 3. Evidence and Burden of Proof. 
 
 Will. — Undue Influence cannot be Presumed, but must be Proved, 
 and the burden of proving it lies on the party alleging it. Such 
 evidence must often be indirect and circumstantial, for undue in- 
 fluence can rarely be proved by direct and positive testimony. The 
 circumstances to be considered, stated. — Estate of Ingram, 222. 
 
 Will — Insane Delusion — Undue Influence. — The Evidence in this 
 Case reviewed at length and the conclusion reached, that the testa- 
 trix was the victim of an insane delusion, of which the instrument 
 propounded was the offspring, and that the testatrix was unduly in- 
 fluenced to make the will in favor of proponent. — Estate of Ingram, 
 222. 
 
 Will — Evidence of Undue Influence. — Upon the issue of undue in- 
 fluence in the execution of wills, the evidence must often be indirect 
 and circumstantial. Very seldom does it occur that a direct act of 
 influence is patent; persons intending to control the actions of an- 
 other, especially as to wills, do not proclaim the intent. The ex- 
 istence of the influence must generally be gathered from circum- 
 stances, such as whether the testator formerly intended a different 
 disposition; whether he was surrounded by those having an object 
 to accomplish, to the exclusion of others; whether he was of such 
 weak mind as to be subject to influence; whether the instrument is 
 such as would probably be urged upon him by those around him; 
 whether they are benefited to the exclusion of formerly intended 
 beneficiaries.— Estate of Tiffany, 478.
 
 604 Index. 
 
 Will — ^Undue Influence. — The Evidence in this contest of a will, 
 examined and held insufficient to establish a charge of undue in- 
 fluence.— Estate of Hill, 380. 
 
 Note. 
 
 evidence establishing, 251. 
 presumption and burden of proof, 251. 
 when invalidates will, 251. 
 
 WILLS. 
 
 1. Testamentary Capacity in General. 
 
 Testamentary Capacity — Test for Determining. — The tests of tes- 
 tamentary capacity are: (1) Understanding of what the testatrix 
 is doing; (2) how she is doing it; (3) knowledge of her property; 
 (4) how she wishes to dispose of it; (5) and who are entitled to her 
 bounty. — Estate of Scott, 271, 
 
 Will. — Every Person Over the Age of Eighteen Years, of Sound 
 Mind, may, by last will, dispose of all his estate remaining after 
 payment of his debts. — Estate of Ingram, 222. 
 
 Will. — A Person is of Sound and Disposing Mind who is in the pos- 
 session of all the natural mental faculties of man, free from de- 
 lusion, and capable of rationally thinking, reasoning, acting and de- 
 termining for himself. A sound mind is one wholly free from de- 
 lusion. Weak minds differ from strong minds only in the extent 
 and power of their faculties; unless they betray symptoms of de- 
 lusion their soundness cannot be questioned. — Estate of Ingram, 222. 
 
 Will. — ^If the Testator has Sufficient Memory and Intelligence fairly 
 and rationally to comprehend the effect of what he is doing, to ap- 
 preciate his relations to the natural objects of his bounty, and un- 
 derstand the character and effect of the provisions of his will; if he 
 has a reasonable understanding of the nature of the property he 
 wishes to dispose of, and of the persons to whom and the manner in 
 which he wishes to distribute it, and so express himself, his will is 
 good. It is not necessary that he should act without prompting. — 
 Estate of Ingram, 222. 
 
 Testamentary Capacity — Will as Evidence. — A will may be consid- 
 ered in proof of its own validity and of the sanity of its maker. — 
 Estate of Scott, 271. 
 
 2. Unsoundness of Mind. 
 
 See Insanity and Insane Delusions. 
 
 Will Unsoundness of Mind. — The Evidence in this will contest 
 
 held insufficient to establish a charge of unsoundness of mind on the 
 part of the testator. — Estate of Hill, 380.
 
 Index. 605 
 
 Will. — The Fact that a Guardian has heen Appointed for a person 
 because of his incompetency to manage his affairs is not conclusive of 
 his incapacity to make a will. — Estate of Hill, 380. 
 
 Testamentary Capacity — IncLuisition Before Execution of Will. — 
 The examination by medical experts of a testatrix prior to her exe- 
 cution of her will, for the purpose of determining her testamentary 
 capacity, is discussed by the court, both as a suggestion of insanity, 
 and as a wise precaution. — Estate of Scott, 271. 
 
 Testamentary Capacity — Insane Delusions. — In this case the hus- 
 band of the testatrix contests her will on the ground that she was 
 of unsound mind by reason of being the victim of insane delusions 
 that her husband was unfaithful, that he was trying to poison her, 
 and that he was conspiring to confine her in an insane asylum, but 
 the courts find against the contestant and sustains the will. — Estate 
 of Scott, 271. 
 
 Testamentary Capacity — Suspicion of Husband. — If there are causes 
 sufficient to induce a sane woman to ignore her husband in her will, 
 or reduce what otherwise would have been a just allowance, the 
 fact that she entertains an unjust or an unfounded suspicion in re- 
 gard to his treatment of her, or an unjust prejudice against him, does 
 not affect the will nor demonstrate that she is necessarily of un- 
 sound mind. — Estate of Scott, 271. 
 
 Testamentary Capacity — Testimony of Attesting Witnesses. — The 
 testimony of the attesting witnesses, and, next to them, the testimony 
 of those present at the execution of the will, are most to be relied 
 upon in determining the question of testamentary capacity. — Estate 
 of Scott, 271. 
 
 3. Intoxication, 
 
 Will — Testamentary Capacity — Intoxication. — A man temporarily 
 overcome by a single debauch is, for the time being, of unsound 
 mind, and has not testamentary capacity; so a person to whom in- 
 toxication has become such a habit that his intellect is disordered 
 and he has lost the rational control of his mental faculties, is of 
 unsound mind. — Estate of Tiffany, 478. 
 
 Will Inebriety of Testator. — The Evidence in this will contest 
 
 examined and held not to sustain a charge that the testator was 
 so addicted to the excessive use of intoxicants as to deprive him of 
 testamentary capacity. — Estate of Hill, 380. 
 
 Will — Intoxication and Undue Influence. — The testator in this case 
 had been a prominent and respected citizen, but for some years be- 
 fore his death he became an habitual drunkard, and after becoming 
 such his whole being changed with respect to his affection for his 
 wife and children, as well also in his personal habits and his social 
 nature and disposition. During this period he became acquainted,
 
 606 Index. 
 
 while taken away from home, with a woman whom he permitted to act 
 as his nurse; and who subsequently obtained a control over him, to 
 the exclusion of his family, and so that he never again returned to 
 his wife or children. Six months before his death he executed a will 
 wherein this woman was made residuary legatee, and for nearly all 
 his estate; his wife and children were expressly excluded by the in- 
 strument. They contested the probate of the will, and tendered as is- 
 sues unsoundness of mind, and undue influence exercised by the 
 residuary legatee. The court found in favor of the contestants upon 
 both issues, and denied the probate of the will. — Estate of Tiffany, 
 478. 
 
 4. Execution and Attestation. 
 
 Will — Attestation in Presence of Testator. — There must be two 
 attesting witnesses to a will, each of whom must sign his name as 
 a witness at the end of the will, at the testator's request and in his 
 presence. In the presence of the testator means that he must not 
 only be present corporally, but mentally as well, capable of under- 
 standing the acts which are taking place before him. — Estate of 
 Fleishman, 18. 
 
 A Will is not Attested in the Presenec of the Testatrix when the 
 witnesses subscribe their names in an apartment adjoining the room 
 in which she is lying ill, where it is impossible for her to see them, 
 she having previously signed her name while reclining on her bed, 
 not being able to rise therefrom. — Estate of Fleishman, 18. 
 
 5. Olographs. 
 
 An Olographic Will Which by Mistake Bears a Date at least twenty- 
 eight years prior to the time of its execution should be denied 
 probate. — Estate of Fay, 428. 
 
 6. Construction of Testament. 
 
 Will. — The Words of a Will are to Receive an Interpretation 
 
 which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one 
 which will render any of the expressions inoperative. — Estate of 
 Maxwell, 145. 
 
 Wills — Construing Parts in Relation to Each Other. — All the parts 
 of a will are to be construed in relation to each other, and so as 
 if possible to form one consistent whole. — Estate of Maxwell, 145. 
 
 Will — Contradictory Clauses. — Where several parts of a will are ab- 
 solutely irreconcilable, the latter part must prevail; but the former 
 of several contradictory clauses is never sacrificed except on the 
 failure of every attempt to give all such a construction as will 
 render every part effective. — Estate of Maxwell, 145.
 
 Index. 607 
 
 Will. — When the Meaning of Any Part of a Will is Ambiguous 
 or doubtful, it may be explained by any reference thereto or recital 
 thereof in another part of the will. — Estate of Maxwell, 145. 
 
 Will. — The Words of a Will are to be Taken in Their Ordinary 
 and Grammatical Sense, unless a clear intention to use them in an- 
 other sense can be collected, and that other can be ascertained. — 
 Estate of Maxwell, 145. 
 
 Will. — A Will Consisting of Several Parts, separately executed by 
 the testator, must be considered as a single instrument completed 
 in all its parts at one time. — Estate of Maxwell, 145. 
 
 Will. — A Bequest of "Her Wardrobe" by the testatrix is held in 
 this case not to include her "ornaments." — Estate of Taylor, 252. 
 
 Will. — Where a Testator Gives to B a Specific Fund or plroperty 
 at the death of A, and in a subsequent clause disposes of all his 
 property, the combined effect of the several clauses, as to such fund 
 of property, is to vest it in A for life, and after his decease in B. — 
 Estate of Maxwell, 145. 
 
 Will. — A Bequest of "Ornaments" is in this case construed to 
 embrace jewelry and "jewels in general." — Estate of Traylor, 252. 
 
 7. Avoiding Intestacy. 
 
 Will — Construction Avoiding Partial Intestacy. — The law prefers a 
 construction of a will which will prevent a partial intestacy, to one 
 which will permit such a result, unless a construction involving par- 
 tial intestacy is absolutely forced upon the court, for the fact of 
 making a will raises a very strong presumption against any expecta- 
 tion or desire, on the part of the testator, of leaving any portion 
 of his estate beyond the operation of his will. — Estate of MaxweU, 
 145. 
 
 Wills — Construction as to Intestacy. — Of the two modes of inter- 
 preting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent a total 
 intestacy; but if the legal effect of the expressed intent of a tes- 
 tator is intestacy, it will be presumed that he designed that result.— 
 Estate of Doe, 54. 
 
 8. Residuary Clause. 
 
 Wills — Meaning of "Residue" or "Residuum." — Eesidue or resi- 
 duum, technically, is the remainder or that which remains after tak- 
 ing away a part; in a will, such portion of the estate as is left af- 
 ter paying the charges, debts, devises, and legacies; and the pre- 
 sumption is that the testatrix used it in that sense, unless a contrary 
 intention clearly appears. — Estate of Scott, 368. 
 
 Wills — Meaning of Residue, How Determined. — Where a will is 
 drawn for a testatrix by an attorney, the word "residue," as used 
 in the instrument, will be taken technically, and no resort can be
 
 608 Index, 
 
 had to artificial aid in its interpretation when natural reason and 
 the circumstances of its insertion make clear its meaning. — Estate 
 of Scott, 368, 
 
 9. Supplying Defects by Implication. 
 
 Will — Supplying Defects by Implication, — When, from the whole 
 will, the court can determine that the testator necessarily intended 
 an interest to be given, which is not bequeathed by express and 
 formal words, the court should supply the defect by implication, and 
 so mold the testator's language as to carry into eifect, as far as pos- 
 sible, the intention which he has in the whole will sufficiently de- 
 clared. — Estate of Maxwell, 145. 
 
 10, Unreasonableness of Will, 
 
 Will — Unreasonableness does not Vitiate. — The will of one having 
 testamentary capacity cannot be avoided because unaccountably con- 
 trary to the common sense of the country. If not contrary to the 
 law, it stands for the descent of his property, whether his reasons 
 for it are good or bad, provided they are his own reasons, not in- 
 fluenced by the unlawful influence of others. — Estate of Tiffany, 478. 
 
 11, Devises in Trust. 
 
 Wills — Acceleration of Devise When Trust Invalid, — If a devise 
 is limited to take effect upon the termination of a trust and the 
 trust proves invalid, the devisees come immediately into their own. — 
 Estate of Doe, 54. 
 
 Wills — Devise on Termination of Trust. — A devise to the widow 
 and daughter of the testator, one-half to the daughter absolutely 
 and the other half to the widow for life with remainder to the daugh- 
 ter, is valid, regardless of the validity of a devise in trust of an 
 intermediate or precedent estate. — Estate of Doe, 54. 
 
 WiUs — Creation of Vested Remainder, — The devise in this case to 
 the widow and daughter of the testator upon the "termination of 
 the trust" is held to be a devise of a vested remainder, postponed 
 in possession merely. — Estate of Doe, 54. 
 
 12. Eevocation by Codicil. 
 
 Wills — Implied Revocation by Codicil. — When a new will is made 
 in the form of a codicil, it does not require an express revocation to 
 make the intent to revoke the prior will clear; it is sufficient that 
 the intent to make a disposition of the estate in the new instrument,
 
 Index. 609 
 
 wMch is inconsistent with the prior gifts, is made as clear as the 
 original. — Estate of Scott, 368. 
 
 Wills — Revocation by Codicil Which Omits Legatee. — In this case 
 the codicil of the testatrix, which in effect was a new will, omitted 
 one of the residuary legatees named in the original will. The court 
 found that the codicil was inconsistent and irreconcilable with, and 
 worked the revocation of, the original will in respect to this be- 
 quest, and therefore denied the right of the legatee to participate in 
 the distribution of the residuum. — Estate of Scott, 368. 
 
 See Charitable Bequests; Contest of Will; Homesteads, 5; Undue 
 
 Influence. 
 
 Note. 
 
 injustice or unnaturalness of will as affecting its validity, 532. 
 
 construction of conflicting clauses in will, 150. 
 
 presumption that testator intended to dispose of entire estate, 
 
 150. 
 appointment of guardian as evidence of want of testamentary 
 
 capacity, 404. 
 acknowledgment of will by testator, 29. 
 subscription by testator, 28. 
 
 WILLS, ATTESTATION AND WITNESSING. 
 
 Note. 
 
 object and purpose, attestation, 24. 
 
 olographic wills, 441. 
 
 subscription and attestation distinguished, 25. 
 
 necessity of witnesses, 26. 
 
 number of witnesses required, 26. 
 
 substantial conformity with the law, whether sufficient, 27. 
 
 subscription by testator, 28. 
 
 acknowledgment by testator, 28. 
 
 necessity that subscription be before witnesses, 28. 
 
 sufficiency of testator's acknowledgment, 29. 
 
 request of testator to witness, 31. 
 
 publication of instrument by testator, 32. 
 
 declaration by testator of character of instrument, 33. 
 
 necessity of signing attestation by witnesses, 36. 
 
 mode of subscription by witness, 37. 
 
 place on will of subscription by witness, 37. 
 
 time of subscription and attestation by witness, 39. 
 
 presence of testator, necessity and purpose, 39. 
 
 presence of testator, what amounts to, 39. 
 
 presence in case of clear vision, 43. 
 
 presence in case of obstructed vision, 43. 
 
 39
 
 610 Index. 
 
 presence in case of inability to look in direction, 44. 
 position in same or in other room, presumption therefrom, 44. 
 acknowledgment of signature by witness equivalent to presence, 
 
 45. 
 mutual presence of witnesses, 45. 
 knowledge of contents of will by witnesses, 46. 
 attestation clause, 47. 
 
 order of execution by testator and by witness, 48. 
 order of publication and other requisites, 50. 
 order of request to witnesses and other requisites, 50. 
 mode of attestation, 50. 
 mode of request to witnesses, 51. 
 mode of publication, 51. 
 testimony of attesting witnesses, 51. 
 evidence outside testimony of witness to prove execution of 
 
 will, 51. 
 opinion of witness as evidence, 52. 
 declaration of witness as evidence, 53. 
 attestation clavise as evidence, 53. 
 
 WILLS, EXECUTION OF OLOGRAPHS. 
 
 Note. 
 
 definition of olographs, 432. 
 
 statutory requirements must be complied with in execution, 433. 
 
 formal requisites, 434. 
 
 informal writings, 433. 
 
 directions for the writing of a will, whether may of themselves 
 
 constitute olograph, 434. 
 letters, olographs in form of, 434. 
 
 omission of statutory requirements in execution of olographs, 435. 
 wills olographic in part and attested in part, 436. 
 incorporation of extrinsic writings by reference, 437. 
 date of olographs, necessity for, 437. 
 abbreviations in date, 438. 
 sufficiency of dating, 438. 
 place where date must be written, 438. 
 signature of testator, necessity for, 439. 
 signature of testator, sufficiency of, 439. 
 signature of testator, place of, 439. 
 witnessing and attesting, necessity for, 441. 
 attestation clause, effect of, 442. 
 place where will was lodged or found, 442. 
 
 WITNESSES. 
 
 Witness. — ^A Court is not Warranted in Imputing Want of Veracity 
 
 to a witness, unless it appears that willful falsehood has been told. 
 Estate of McDougal, 456.
 
 Index. 611 
 
 A Witness False in One Part of His Testimony is to be Distrusted, 
 
 but the court should be satisfied that the witness has testified falsely, 
 and may discriminate between distrust and utter rejection of tes- 
 timony. — Estate of McDougal, 456. 
 
 Witnesses — Manner of Testing Credibility. — Each witness is a man 
 or woman to be treated as an individual, a moral unit, tested for 
 integrity and veracity on his merits or her title to credit by the in- 
 herent and extrinsic elements of belief, or the circumstantial criteria 
 of credibility. These are the only considerations for the court in 
 weighing evidence. — Estate of Scott, 271. 
 
 Witnesses — Credibility as Affected by Station in Life. — Persons 
 employed in domestic service and other categories of honest labor 
 are entitled, as witnesses, to credence equally with those who plume 
 themselves on their higher level, affecting to look down on those 
 who work for wages as inferior. Before the law there is no such 
 distinction, and in courts of justice all must be co-ordinated, irre- 
 spective of the accidents of artificial and conventional social rela- 
 tions.— Estate of Scott, 271. 
 
 See Wills, 4. 
 
 WITNESSES TO WILL. 
 See Wills, Attestation and Witnessing. 
 
 WORDS AND PHRASES. 
 
 "Surviving Wife" and "Widow," 93. 
 "Improvidence" and "Want of integrity," 206. 
 "Insane" and "Incompetent" distinguished, 380. 
 ■ ' ' Wardrobe, ' ' 252. 
 "Residue" or "Residuum," 368. 
 "Ornaments," 252.
 
 03 
 
 CD 
 CD 
 
 ^ 
 
 t^s
 
 ^^A^•IJ^!V^:!?v//., KVlUSA.VCflfr. 
 
 :a3 
 
 
 jU I' 
 
 i?" 
 
 '<d 
 
 '■<k 
 
 
 
 •V o 
 
 ->■ 
 
 >Tl^i 
 
 x-r 
 
 ^c, 
 
 .^^ 
 
 -n <— ' 
 
 O L^- 
 
 I .1,0 pf p-
 
 <^ 
 
 ^^J.Jj.,U,tt>, 
 
 • * nam /n 
 
 CO 
 
 < 
 
 
 O 
 
 ,L 
 
 iiir 
 
 >>. 
 
 '^A 
 
 ^iOj 
 
 UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL IIBRARY FACIUTY 
 
 AA 000 412 561 6 
 
 .nrr,','! 
 
 >- 
 
 ■nt liN'vtVj// 
 
 
 d-off 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 <;^ 
 
 :3 
 ~5 
 
 
 
 
 'n.