LIBRARY 
 
 U*IVF siry OF 
 
 SAN DIEGO

 
 ESSAYS 
 
 ON THE
 
 ESSAYS 
 
 ON THE 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THEISM 
 
 BY THE LATE 
 
 WILLIAM GEORGE WARD, PH.D. 
 
 SOMETIMK FELLOW OF BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD 
 
 AND PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND DOGMATIC THEOLOGY 
 AT OLD HALL COLLEGE, WARE 
 
 REPRINTED FROM THE "DUBLIN REVIEW" 
 
 EDITED, WITH AN INTRODUCTION, BY 
 
 WILFKID WAKD 
 
 IN TWO VOLUMES 
 VOL. I. 
 
 LONDON 
 
 KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH & CO., 1, PATERNOSTER SQUARE 
 
 1884
 
 (The rights of translation and of reproduction are reserved.)
 
 TO 
 
 BARON FRIEDRICH YON HUGEL. 
 
 MY DEAR BARON VON HUGEL, 
 
 In offering these volumes of my father's philosophical 
 essays for your acceptance, I am doing what I believe he would 
 himself have done had he lived to republish them. They treat 
 for the most part of subjects which you frequently discussed 
 with him, and on which I know he valued your opinion. 
 But a yet stronger motive which would have led him to ask 
 you to accept them would have been the opportunity thereby 
 afforded him of giving expression to the great esteem in which 
 he held the friendship enjoyed by him, during the closing years 
 of his life, with yourself and Baroness von Hiigel. 
 
 I trust that your regard for his memory will render this 
 dedication not unacceptable to you : and I may add that it gives 
 me great pleasure on personal grounds to be the means of 
 offering the book to you so far as I can be said to offer that 
 which is not my own. 
 
 Believe me, dear Baron von Hiigel, 
 
 Yours very sincerely, 
 
 WILFRID WARD. 
 
 JIarch, 1881.
 
 NOTE. 
 
 THE Editor bas to offer his best thanks to the Revv. 
 J. Connelly and E. Pennington for their kind assistance 
 in looking through and correcting the proofs of the 
 following essays. The analytical contents at the com- 
 mencement of each volume are in nearly every case 
 by the Author himself. The date given after the title of 
 each essay is the date of its original publication in the 
 Dublin Review. 
 
 March, 1884.
 
 CONTENTS OF VOL. I. 
 
 L'AOK 
 
 INTRODUCTION .. ... xi 
 
 ESSAY I. THE RULE AND MOTIVE OF CERTITUDE. 
 
 (July, 1871.) 
 
 Two schools of philosophy ... ... ... ... ... 1 
 
 Question stated as to the test of certitude ... ... ... 2 
 
 Answer given by scholastics to that question ... ... ... <> 
 
 Primary truths known by the light of reason ... ... ... '.' 
 
 Answer to objections ... ... ... ... ... ... 11 
 
 Propositions inconceivable are not therefore untruu ... ... 17 
 
 Doctrine of various English philosophers on our subject ... ... -'! 
 
 Mr. Mill's doctrine on our subject ... ... ... ... 2<> 
 
 ESSAY II. MR. MILL'S DENIAL OF NECESSARY TRUTH. 
 (October, 1871.) 
 
 Characteristics of Mr. Mill's philosophical writing ... ... ... :>:> 
 
 Mathematical axioms self-evidently necessary ... ... ... i!5 
 
 Consideration of Mr. Mill's reply based on the " association " psychology 'M 
 Consequence of Mr. Mill's admitting that mathematical axioms are 
 
 cognizable by purely mental experimentation ... ... />'< 
 
 Mr. Mill's argument from the " Geometry of Visiblcs" ... ... . r >7 
 
 The allegation considered that mathematical axioms are tautological .">'.) 
 
 Three inferences from what ha.s preceded ... ... ... ... HO 
 
 Phcnomeniatio anti-theists ... ... ... ... ... <>'.'> 
 
 Three arguments against phenomenism ... ... ... ... ('">
 
 viii Contents. 
 
 ESSAY III. MR. MILL ON THE FOUNDATION OF MORALITY. 
 (January, 1872.) 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Domestic controversies on this matter ... ... 77 
 
 The issue joined with Mr. Mill 
 
 Moral goodness a simple idea 
 
 Certain moral truths self-evidently necessary ... 85 
 
 Intuitive knowledge that all acts, morally evil, are prohibited by a 
 
 Personal Being ... 91 
 
 This Being inferred to be Supreme Legislator of the universe ... 92 
 
 Mr. Mill's appeal to man's primordial faculties ... ... 98 
 
 Mr. Bain's appeal to divergences of moral judgment ... 100 
 
 Mr. Mill implicitly embraces the doctrine which he speculatively opposes 1 13 
 
 Criticism of his speculative position ... ... ... ... 116 
 
 ESSAY IV. MR. MILL'S REPLY TO THE " DUBLIN REVIEW." 
 (July, 1873.) 
 
 Prefatory remarks on the late Mr. Mill ... ... ... ... 120 
 
 Purpose of this essay ... ... ... ... ... 126 
 
 1 5 ule and motive of certitude ... ... ... ... ... 127 
 
 Mr. Mill on the motive of certitud e ... ... ... ... 133 
 
 Mr. Mill on the rule of certitude ... ... ... ... ... 146 
 
 Argumentative preliminaries on the matter ... ... ... 155 
 
 Direct controversy with Mr. Mill on the matter ... ... ... 1GO 
 
 Mr. Mill's positive thesis ... ... ... ... ... 176 
 
 Some subordinate issues considered 180 
 
 ESSAY V. MR. MILL'S PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION. 
 (January, 1874.) 
 
 Mr. Mill's autobiography ... ... ... ... ... 185 
 
 His aggressive and affirmative philosophical position ... ... 205 
 
 His position examined on mathematical axioms and the rule of certitude 209 
 
 His attempted distinction between two kinds of complex ideas ... 220 
 
 Summary of the preceding argument ... ... ... ... 222 
 
 Other propositions concerning necessary truth ... ... ... 223 
 
 Can the uniformity of nature be proved by experience? ... ... 227 
 
 Mr. Mill's reply to the Dublin Review on this question ... ... 229
 
 Contents. ix 
 
 ESSAY VI. MR. MILL'S DENIAL OF FREEWILL. 
 
 (April, 1874.) 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Mr. Mill's theory of determinism stated in detail ... ... ... 237 
 
 Great part of this theory may be accepted as true ... ... 246 
 
 Exact point at issue ... ... ... ... ... ... 247 
 
 Determinism opposed to observed facts ... ... ... 251 
 
 Determinism and fatalism ... ... ... ... ... 264 
 
 Answers to objections ... ... ... ... ... 265 
 
 Statement of two further objections ... ... ... ... 282 
 
 ESSAY VII. APPENDIX ON FREEWILL. 
 
 (July, 1874.) 
 
 Criticism in the Spectator ... ... ... ... ... 285 
 
 Distinction between resolve and desire ... ... ... 288 
 
 Men often act against their prevailing desire ... ... ... 289 
 
 ESSAY VllL MB. MILL ON CAUSATION. 
 
 (July, 1876.) 
 
 Recapitulation of former essays ... ... ... ... ... 303 
 
 Mr. Mill's sense of the word " cause "... ... ... ... 312 
 
 The universal belief of mankind in a causation different from this ... 320 
 
 In what precise sense of the word do mankind universally believe the 
 
 existence of causation ... ... ... ... ... 325 
 
 The principle of causation established ... ... ... ... 326 
 
 Causation in no way depends on the uniformity of nature ... 333 
 
 The principle of causation entirely ampliative ... ... ... 334 
 
 ESSAY IX. FREEWILL. 
 (April, 1879.) 
 
 REPLY TO A REPLY OF DR. BAIN'S. 
 
 Summary of our original argument ... ... ... ... 337 
 
 Dr. Hain does not once refer to our central argument ... ... 316 
 
 His first criticism ... ... ... ... ... ... 347 
 
 His second criticism ' r >0
 
 x Contents. 
 
 PA OK 
 
 His proof of determinism drawn not from direct observation, but merely 
 
 from analogy ... ... ... ... ... ... 352 
 
 The degree of moral evil existing on earth seems to us by far the 
 
 greatest difficulty connected with our subject ... ... 35!) 
 
 The relations between moral habit and anti-impulsive effort ... ... 364 
 
 CAUSATION AND FREEWILL. 
 
 Having established indeterminism, our next step is to develop that 
 
 truth into the full doctrine of freewill ... ... ... 369 
 
 Mill's conception of cause recognizes no influx or agency ... ... 371 
 
 Regular sequence of phenomena looked upon by the intuitionist as the 
 
 result of causation ... ... ... ... ... 375 
 
 Contrast between a blind cause and an originative cause ... ... 378 
 
 The soul acts as a blind cause in generating its spontaneous impulse, as 
 
 an originative cause in resisting it ... ... ... 381 
 
 Summary of what has been said on causation and freewill ... ... 382
 
 INTEODUCTION. 
 
 THE following essays, with the exception of the last four in 
 the second volume, were written as part of a systematic 
 course projected by the author with a double object : 
 firstly, to point out the fundamental fallacies in the Ex- 
 perience system of philosophy, as represented especially by 
 the late Mr. Stuart Mill, and the absolute necessity of 
 admitting the power of the human mind to perceive with 
 certainty some immediately evident truths beyond the 
 phenomena of consciousness ; and, secondly, to draw out, 
 on the principles thus established, an argumentative train, 
 exhibiting the various intuitions in the intellectual and 
 moral order, truths of observation, and deductions, whereby 
 the existence of a Personal God, with the characteristics 
 which Theists attribute to Him, may be established. The 
 first of these two tasks the author considered himself to 
 have accomplished. Of the second he had barely indicated 
 the lines, in two essays on "Ethics in its bearing on 
 Theism" and "The Philosophy of the Thcistic Contro- 
 versy," when he was deprived of all power of intellectual 
 work by the illness which terminated in his death. 
 
 It may be worth while to say a few words as to the exact 
 scope and aim of the essays which are here republished, 
 for the purpose of making clear what they do and what 
 they do not profess to accomplish. No exhaustive review
 
 xii Introduction. 
 
 is attempted of Mr. Mill's philosophical work as a whole. 
 Such a review would have exhibited many points of agree- 
 ment between that writer and the author,* who always 
 considered that Mill's carefully disciplined and naturally 
 candid and thoughtful mind had done much for the super- 
 structure of psychology and logic, although the basis he 
 adopted, which was substantially that of his father, and in 
 part an inheritance from Hume, was most unsatisfactory, 
 or rather was no basis at all. What the author did 
 attempt was to show that the root-doctrines of the Experience 
 School are devoid of all scientific foundation and incapable 
 of defence, while the representatives of that school have in 
 all the useful work they have done for philosophy been in 
 reality acting upon those very principles of intuition 
 which they deride as superstitious and unscientific in 
 their opponents. If we note the consequences of this 
 (supposing the charge to be true), we at once see the 
 peculiar importance of the work which he undertook. If 
 it be granted that Mill's logic is in many respects an 
 advance upon previous works pf the same description, and 
 that the experimental method of psychology attains to 
 valuable and new results is, in fact, a distinct step 
 forward in that science, there seems at first sight no 
 escape from admitting that the methods and principles 
 of inquiry adopted by these philosophers are really an 
 improvement upon those which they have replaced. The 
 writers themselves acquire all the authority which attends 
 on success, and public opinion declares in their favour. 
 They appeal to results as the positive proof that the first 
 principles whence they started were sound. And the con- 
 sequence is that people do not look closely at the real 
 connection between their success and their avowed prin- 
 
 * The Review of Mill's Logic contributed to the British Critic of October, 
 1843, by Mr. Ward, when fellow of Balliol, shows his very high intellectual 
 appreciation of Mill, in spite of the severity of its criticisms.
 
 Introduction. xiii 
 
 ciples. The world sees their success, and takes them at 
 their word as to the way in which it was gained. Dr. Ward's 
 central aim, we may say, was by a concentrated attack 
 upon their first principles to draw attention to them, and 
 to their absolute incompatibility with the mode of philoso- 
 phizing of those who professed them. He singled out a 
 few of their fundamental axioms, and insisted on holding 
 them up to the light and examining them. 
 
 " These men are conjurors," he said in effect. A 
 conjuror who is performing feats of sleight of hand 
 before an audience of simple villagers passes a shilling, 
 apparently, through the table. He gives them plenty of 
 time to examine the shilling and to mark it. They see it 
 and touch it, and know unmistakably that there it is on 
 one side of the table. And when it comes out on the 
 other side, they examine it again, and recognize their own 
 mark. But at the really critical part of the performance, 
 he diverts their attention, and, while bidding them watch 
 closely something unconnected with the real secret of the 
 trick, imperceptibly passes the coin from the right hand to 
 the left, so that when a few moments later he is pressing 
 his right hand on the top of the table and holding a plate 
 in his left underneath to catch the coin, as he says, when 
 it passes through, the whole work is already done ; there is 
 no coin in the right hand ; it is really under the table. 
 He then explains to them that his method is simple 
 enough. He scratches the table three times in one spot, 
 and says, ' Presto open/ and the table opens and allows 
 the coin to pass. The villagers listen with open mouths. 
 They have no doubt this is the true explanation. See there, 
 he is doing it again, to show them that this is really the 
 secret of the matter. He scratches, pronounces the words, 
 and they hear the coin drop in the plate beneath the table. 
 He can do it, and so they do not doubt that lie himself 
 gives the true account as to how he does it. So also it is 
 i. I-
 
 xiv Introduction. 
 
 with Mill and Bain. They have done a work for philosophy. 
 They have shown up a good deal of inaccurate thinking in 
 their predecessors, and added considerably to the analysis 
 of mental operations. This they make clear, and take care 
 that the world should recognize. And all the time they 
 profess to have been philosophizing on the principles of the 
 Experience School, and to reject the power of the mind to 
 know immediately anything beyond its own consciousness. 
 Here is the trick. Their readers read these principles as 
 they state them, and study the results ; but the sleight of 
 hand whereby the results are reached, the imperceptible 
 insertion of intuitions into the process when nobody was 
 looking, escapes notice. And the impossible account which 
 they themselves give of this part of their performance is 
 accepted, not after close scrutiny, but in virtue of the 
 authority naturally possessed by those who have been 
 successful in a particular department of study. 
 
 Dr. Ward's work, then, was confined to the detection of 
 this sleight of hand. He insists repeatedly on the necessity 
 of watching this part of the process, and on the absolute 
 impossibility of accepting their own account of the philo- 
 sophical method they employ, which entirely eliminates 
 intuitive perception of truth. In all their useful and careful 
 analysis, Mill and Bain act, he says, as unmistakably on 
 a belief in the validity of intuitions, in the mind's power 
 to perceive directly certain objective truths, as I do or 
 any other Christian philosopher does. They use all the 
 authority they have gained by successful deductions from 
 intuition, in advocating principles which are not more 
 subversive of religious philosophy than they are of the 
 methods they themselves have employed. 
 
 The illustration which he himself pressed most con- 
 stantly upon his opponents was the immediate and absolute 
 trust, which is assumed in all philosophy, nay, in all 
 coherent thought, to be rational, in the veracity of memory ;
 
 Introduction. xv 
 
 or to put it in such a form as will most clearly exhibit its 
 connection with the point at issue our trust that our 
 present impression of what we saw or heard five minutes 
 ago tells truly the objective fact that we did see or hear 
 the thing in question. On this point the author had the 
 advantage of learning from the rejoinder of Mr. Mill, 
 and the express treatment of the subject by Mr. Huxley, 
 that his apparent rcductio ad absurdum was not based 
 on an overstatement of the natural consequences of the 
 Experience view. Mr. Huxley quite accepted the position 
 that his principles allowed of no intuitive confidence in 
 an act of memory, and was led in his defence of his 
 own belief therein into what must be allowed on all 
 hands to be an amusing slip in logic. We trust our 
 memory with good reason, he argued, because we so con- 
 stantly experience its truthfulness. The retort was obvious. 
 Unless Mr. Huxley begins by trusting it instinctively, how 
 can he be sure that he ever has experienced its truthfulness ? 
 Mr. Mill, on the other hand, admitted our belief in memory 
 to be ultimate, because no reason can be given for it which 
 does not presuppose its validity. This position is, as Dr. 
 Ward pointed out, if literally accepted and carefully 
 reflected on, most paradoxical. Dr. Ward had contended 
 that the mind's positive declaration, if rightly analyzed, is 
 the ultimate test of truth, and gave as an instance the act 
 of memory. If, he said, you do not trust your mind's 
 immediate declaration there you cannot even speak co- 
 herently, much less give any reason for your belief that 
 memory tells truly. This was, of course, a rcductio ad 
 absurdnm ; but Mill replied as though the ground for the 
 belief were the dilemma which its absence would lead to, 
 whereas of course it would be equally true of any fahc 
 belief that you can give no reason for it which docs not 
 presuppose its truth indeed this would bo the special 
 characteristic of a false belief. Some superstitious old
 
 xvi Introduction. 
 
 woman tells me that she is convinced of the existence of 
 fairies. I ask her what is her reason. " Oh," she replies, 
 "I hear them knocking at my door in the night; and I 
 hear them singing at Christmas time." I reply, " How do 
 you know that the knocking is done by fairies or that the 
 Christmas songs are not performed by the waits ? You give 
 no reason for your belief, which does not presuppose the 
 existence of the fairies the very thing in question." 
 
 What Mr. Mill, of course, means is that the belief 
 in the veracity of memory is plainly not derived from 
 any prior truth, and is in that sense ultimate. But its 
 being ultimate does not prove it to be well grounded, and it 
 is manifestly illogical in him to regard a belief as well 
 founded on the sole ground that his philosophy cannot get on 
 without it. Such a mode of procedure would sanction any 
 fanaticism that was ever devised. " All our schemes 
 would fail, and all our faith be vain," says the follower of 
 Mahomet, " if we did not believe Mahomet to be a prophet ; " 
 therefore forsooth he is a prophet ! And the special case 
 of memory presents in addition the peculiar characteristic, 
 that reasoning in its favour from consequences is suicidal. 
 In the act of recognizing the consequences, as in any 
 other train of thought, the memory is used and trusted. 
 The consequences cannot be known until the veracity of 
 memory is established. 
 
 The only possible warrant, then, for our trust in memory, 
 and its all-sufficient warrant, is the mind's own positive 
 declaration in the very act of remembering, that it is 
 telling truth ; and it remained for Mr. Mill to show by 
 what right, save that of expediency, he admitted the 
 validity of that declaration, to save his neck, as it were, in 
 this one instance, and refused to admit it, in the absence 
 of similar external pressure, in others. This he never did. 
 And seeing that he considered the intuition controversy of 
 the last importance, and devoted a long appendix to Dr.
 
 Introduction. xvii 
 
 Ward's strictures, which he said were the best which were 
 likely to be made by any future champion, Dr. Ward held 
 himself justified in assuming that he did not press his 
 explanation of this particular question further, because he 
 had some faint perception of the probable issue of a sus- 
 tained analysis of the position he had taken up. 
 
 Another instance which the author selected of the want 
 of fidelity to his avowed principles in Mr. Mill's philosophy 
 was his belief in nature's uniformity. This belief is, by 
 the confession of all, at the root of induction, and induction 
 and the inductive method is the very watchword of modern 
 philosophy, and the field in which Mill has been above all 
 others a successful analyst of the mind's method of pro- 
 cedure. Dr. Ward draws out carefully, in the second and 
 fifth essays of this collection, the impossibility of giving a 
 reasonable ground for this belief without allowing the prin- 
 ciple of intuition. Not that he held the belief to be itself 
 intuitive, but it necessarily depends for its establishment 
 on certain intuitive principles among others the principle 
 of causation. Mr. Bain gives up this controversy and 
 admits,* that we must assume the uniformity of nature, as 
 we can find no other basis for physical science. And 3 r et 
 we may remark in passing what contempt do not 
 thinkers of his school exhibit for those who say that we 
 must assume Theism to be true because there is no other 
 satisfactory basis for moral science ! Mr. Mill was led, in 
 reference to this controversy, into another curious logical 
 blunder. He had summarized the uniformity of nature as an 
 exhibition of what he called the lair of causation. This law, 
 he explained, implies no more than uniform phenomenal 
 sequence, as he refuses to allow any other meaning to the 
 word " cause," than immediate precedence in order of time. 
 Speaking however, later on, in reference to the question 
 raised by Dr. Ward, he declared that a miracle would be 
 
 * Poo Buiu's " Logic," pp. 27H, 271.
 
 xviii Introduction. 
 
 no breach of the law of causation, as a new antecedent 
 viz. the volition of a supernatural being is, by hypothesis, 
 interposed in such a case. Thus, a law which was defined 
 as the law of phenomenal uniformity in nature, and the 
 basis on which physical science proceeds, is allowed by him 
 to be consistent with as many interruptions of that uni- 
 formity as might result from the constant interference (as 
 the author puts it) of as many deities as Homer himself 
 supposed to inhabit Olympus. A truly marvellous basis 
 for the inductive method ! Of course such an argument is 
 a reductio ad absurd urn, but, as Dr. Ward points out, in 
 such a delicate matter and in treating of principles which 
 in their legitimate issue must overthrow religious philo- 
 sophy, one has a right to expect careful thought and 
 accurate expression : whereas in both the instances that 
 have been named no evidence appears of either. The author 
 frequently pointed out, that of questions such as the veracity 
 of memory and the general uniformity of phenomena all 
 men have abundant evidence through the intuitive and in- 
 ferential powers of their own mind, working in the normal 
 way; therefore controversy in their regard is apparently 
 sterile and unnecessary. But this is the very reason of 
 Dr. Ward's challenge : " You trust your intuitive percep- 
 tions," he says, " and climb by means of them to an 
 eminence. Then you kick down the ladder by which you 
 have climbed, and tell those who did not notice you while 
 you were climbing, that you jumped up, and that the ladder 
 is rotten, and would be of no use." Mr. Mill and Mr. Bain 
 are no doubt right in trusting in memory and in nature's 
 uniformity, but their only warrant for doing so is a process 
 of mind involving intuition, and if they pretend to have 
 sufficient warrant on the Experience principles let them 
 show it. If they fail to do so, let them own that these 
 principles are an insufficient account of the basis of their 
 own reasoning. Dr. Ward thus expresses his view on this
 
 Introduction. xix 
 
 matter, so far as nature's uniformity is concerned, in an 
 essay which we have not here repuhlished : 
 
 "Any one who observes either the language or the 
 general tone of Phenomenistic philosophers will see clearly 
 (we think) that they do not in fact rest their belief in the 
 uniformity of nature on any argumentative basis whatever, 
 which they can distinctly contemplate or defend. The 
 truth of the doctrine is made clear to them by reasons which 
 they do not attempt to analyze, and which they could not 
 analyze if they did attempt to do so. The uniformity of 
 nature is borne in upon them (if we may so express our- 
 selves) by the e very-day experience of their active life. 
 Every day they receive fresh proofs of it and live (as we 
 may say) in contact with it. Accordingly, if they ever give 
 their minds to an inquiry as to what those arguments are 
 on which the doctrine can reasonably be based, any one 
 may see that they pursue the examination in a spirit of 
 languid indifference. They are already profoundly con- 
 vinced of the doctrine, before they have even asked them- 
 selves any question as to its reasonable basis. 
 
 " Now, on this we have three remarks to make : (1) We 
 think that their procedure is, so far, entirely reasonable. 
 We are confident that there are several truths of vital im- 
 portance to mankind, which are reasonably accepted as 
 certain on implicit grounds of assurance. They are reason- 
 ably accepted, we say, as certain, on grounds of assurance, 
 winch have not as yet been scientifically analyzed ; nay, of 
 which, perhaps, scientific analysis transcends the power of 
 the human mind. See what Catholic philosophers say on 
 the sensns communis nntnr<c. 
 
 "But then (2) these philosophers are not less than 
 wildly unreasonable when, as they are so fond of doing, 
 they contrast their own speculative method with others, 
 as being characteristically precise, logical, scientific-. On 
 the contrary, it is in these very qualities that their specula-
 
 xx Introduction. 
 
 tion is as yet so conspicuously wanting. Here is a doctrine 
 of their philosophy so fundamental, so simply at the root 
 of their whole investigations, that unless it be known as 
 certainly true, their whole system is one organized sham 
 and pretence. Yet it is this very doctrine, for which they 
 are unable to produce any precise, logical, scientific basis 
 whatever. 
 
 " And (3) they show themselves still more narrow, 
 prejudiced, and bigoted, when they assume (which they 
 often do) as a kind of first principle that this method of 
 implicit reasoning, which is so indispensably necessary for 
 themselves, is in its nature insufficient for the certain 
 establishment of conclusions. As one out of a thousand 
 instances, consider what are sometimes called the " internal 
 evidences " of religion. Even Protestants may in their 
 measure (we are confident) reasonably appeal to these ; but 
 we will ourselves, of course, exhibit what we mean as 
 exemplified by a Catholic. Take, then, the case of a Catholic 
 who habitually frequents the sacraments, who practises 
 regular self-examination and moral discipline, who makes 
 it the one chief work of his life to discover and correct his 
 faults, who constantly remembers God's presence, and 
 trusts to His strength in his own efforts to acquire virtue. 
 We say with complete confidence, that such a person 
 possesses a quasi-experimental acquaintance with the 
 Existence, Power, and Holiness of some great supernatural 
 Being ; an acquaintance entirely analogous to that know- 
 ledge which scientists possess of their fundamental prin- 
 ciple, the uniformity of nature. Of course these philo- 
 sophers are at full liberty to deny our allegation or to refute 
 it if they can. But what we are here denouncing as so 
 intolerably prejudiced and illogical is that they will not take 
 the trouble to examine, and (if they can) refute it ; that 
 they stigmatize it as being self-evidently irrational and 
 fanatical. The unreason and fanaticism are really on their
 
 Introduction. xxi 
 
 side. In one particular the argumentative grounds which 
 exist for Theism possess a marked superiority over those 
 which (as yet at least) exist for the uniformity of nature. 
 For the former apart altogether from implicit reasoning 
 there exists (we maintain) a substantial, cogent, conclusive 
 chain of explicit argument. No such chain of argument 
 has hitherto been set forth by any Phenomenist, for the 
 establishment of his one fundamental scientific premiss." 
 
 I have selected the two instances of belief in memory 
 and in nature's uniformity, because Mill joined issue on 
 both, and accepted Dr. "Ward's statement of the case as a 
 fair one, thus rendering the charge of misrepresentation or 
 travesty, so serviceable in evasion and so disheartening to 
 those who are trying to probe a theory to its depths 
 impossible. 
 
 We are now in a position to consider further the line of 
 the author's reasoning. If, he argued, you base your philo- 
 sophy on beliefs which have no warrant save the mind's 
 own positive declaration, you must extend your rule of 
 certitude farther than the testimony of consciousness as to 
 its own subjective experience. The mind's positive declara- 
 tion will include this testimony, therefore you will express 
 what is your rule of certitude, and not what you pretend that 
 it is, by saying that what your faculties positively avouch 
 is certainly true. But this needs a qualification. No doubt, 
 as Mill says, intuition has been degraded by dishonesty and 
 superstition, and men have hugged prejudices and refused 
 to give them up because they were, they said, intuitively 
 known as truths. Here, then, is an important work for the 
 philosopher to find out what is the mind's positive declara- 
 tion on the one hand, and, on the other, what are those 
 prejudices, inaccurate though spontaneous inferences, 
 inseparable associations of feeling, and so forth, which 
 have claimed the rank of intuitions, and being found out 
 have damaged -a good cause, as the votaries of ;i true
 
 xxii Introduction. 
 
 religion may discredit it by their private eccentricities or 
 vices. The rule of certitude, in view of this consideration, 
 is thus stated : " ^Yhatever our existing cognitive faculties, 
 heing riyhtly interrogated, declare to he certain, is certain ; " 
 and the motive for our certainty is the light of our reason 
 which bids us unhesitatingly believe under such conditions. 
 The establishment of this doctrine as to " The llule and 
 Motive of Certitude," forms the main object of the first 
 essay. 
 
 The next question was to show that our faculties do 
 positively declare the existence of certain synthetical a 
 priori necessary truths, as Kant terms them. That is to 
 say, that the mind has the power of seeing the necessary 
 and universal truth of certain propositions which are not 
 identical and consequently sterile, but in which the predi- 
 cate expresses something which is not connoted by the 
 subject. He agreed with Kant as to the paramount im- 
 portance of this power, in the theory of philosophical 
 knowledge.* Mill had challenged the intuitiouists in 
 the field of mathematics, and in that field Dr. Ward 
 defended his proposition. His crucial instance was, as 
 appears in the second essay, " All three-sided figures 
 have exactly three angles." The three angles are a part 
 of neither definition nor connotation of the subject, 
 and yet the mind pronounces with certainty that it is a 
 necessary and universal truth that " all trilateral are 
 triangular." Mill treated such truths as generalizations 
 from experience, as their objective necessity would accord ill 
 with his principles ; and this is the view against which Dr. 
 "Ward's essay is primarily directed. He argues carefully 
 in the same essay that the proposition in question is an 
 absolute and ultimate decision of the mind, and no product 
 
 * I need hardly say that lie did not agree with Kant, that they re-luted to 
 mere " forms of thought." This doctrine destroys, of course, their objective 
 character, although it leaves untouched their attributes of necessity and 
 universality, which Mill denied.
 
 Introduction. xxiii 
 
 of association, nor, again, an inference rapidly and uncon- 
 sciously made. In the succeeding essay he vindicates the 
 same claim to the character of a priori synthetic judg- 
 ments for the decisions of the mind with respect to moral 
 truths. " To kill my father under such circumstances is 
 wrong," is, he maintains, a proposition seen by the mind's 
 own immediate light to be necessarily true, although the 
 word " wrong" expresses an idea not contained in the defini- 
 tion of killing my father under the circumstances supposed. 
 The two next essays consist of a re-statement and 
 development of the theses already advocated with especial 
 reference to Mr. Mill's reply to the Dublin Review, in the 
 sixth edition of his work on Hamilton. Next in order comes 
 the treatment of determinism ; the doctrine that the action 
 of the will is infallibly determined by the circumstances, 
 internal and external including under the former both 
 natural disposition and the bent of inclination arising from 
 habit or education in which the agent finds himself. Dr. 
 Ward argued against this, that we are conscious by our 
 own " self-intimacy " as he expressed it of the spontaneous 
 tendency of the will which is the natural and infallibly 
 determined outcome of the action upon it of the forces in 
 question. So far he goes with the determinists. He main- 
 tains that the spontaneous impulse of the will is infallibly 
 determined, and is the natural resultant of the internal and 
 external forces or attractions motives, as Mr. Bain terms 
 them which solicit it. But, he adds, that very process 
 of self-inspection whereby this becomes evident shows also, 
 if it be carried further, that the mind has a sovereign power 
 over this natural movement of the will. If you hold your- 
 self passively, the balance of motives or as Dr. Ward 
 prefers to style them " attractions " carries the day. But, 
 on the other hand, a person may fix his attention on some 
 end to be attained, not so vividly realized as to offer the 
 strongest attraction to the will, but, as it were, cleaved to
 
 xxiv Introduction. 
 
 doggedly by the mind's inherent power, and may in pur- 
 suance of this end make an effort of will in opposition to 
 its spontaneous movement an " anti-impulsive effort," as 
 he called it. The development of this thesis, together 
 with the replies called for hy the criticisms which it pro- 
 voked from Mr. Bain, Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, and others, 
 and the treatment of causation in its connection with 
 Free-will, occupy the rest of the volumes now published, 
 with the exception of the last six papers. Of the first of 
 these six only a portion is here reprinted, as its earlier 
 pages consisted almost entirely of a repetition of remarks 
 made elsewhere in the series. The portion now published 
 indicates the view of the author although without any full 
 development of it that the sense of Moral Obligation, as 
 distinct from the mere perception of right and wrong, 
 carries with it an intimation of the existence of a personal 
 superior of supremely holy character. This is, it would 
 seem, substantially identical with the view advocated by 
 Cardinal Newman in the Grammar of Assent. 
 
 The succeeding essay on the " Philosophy of the 
 Theistic Controversy" is the last of the series and 
 sums up the previous ones, indicating, on the one hand, 
 the lines on which he considered that the positive 
 defence of Theism should proceed, and, on the other, 
 the dispositions necessary in order that that defence 
 should be * understood and felt to be satisfactory. I 
 think I am right in saying that as he approached close 
 to the positive and immediate argument for God's exist- 
 ence, he felt more than he had done previously the neces- 
 sity of something in the student which should fit him to 
 apprehend and feel the force of directly religious argu- 
 ment. This was partly due to his own experience in 
 conversation with friends of various schools of thought and 
 habits of mind, and partly to the influence of M. Olle 
 Laprnne's excellent book, " De la Certitude Morale," which
 
 Introduction. xxv 
 
 occupied much of his attention in the closing years of his 
 life. 
 
 The essays which follow tell their own story. The 
 first was one which attracted much attention at the time of 
 its appearance, and formed the subject of considerable 
 correspondence between the author and Mr. Mill, who was 
 much interested in it as a piece of argument. A few words 
 with reference to the subject of this essay will not be out of 
 place. Dr. Ward held strongly that the irreligious in- 
 ferences so frequently made by scientific men from the 
 constantly growing knowledge which fresh discoveries give 
 us of the details of nature's uniformity, were really logical 
 leaps, and not warranted by the facts of the case. The 
 close intimacy which the man of science has with the links 
 in the chain of physical causation, renders it difficult for 
 him, unless his mind is unusually large and candid, to rise 
 to the conception of a First Cause, self-determining, and 
 setting in motion, so to speak, the whole series of changes 
 by direct action on the first of the physical links in the 
 chain. But this difficulty has its basis, not in reason, but 
 in defective imaginative powers. He could not see that the 
 discovery of a considerable number of uniform successions 
 in such phenomena as those concerning the weather, in the 
 least degree interfered with the ordinary Christian concep- 
 tion of a God Who is behind the veil, working always. He 
 quotes Mill as allowing that the great test of scientifically 
 ascertained regularity in physical phenomena, is their 
 capability of prediction, and so far as " earthly " pheno- 
 mena go that is, those phenomena which have special 
 connection with our planet, as, for example, the weather 
 or the course of disease this capability is very limited. 
 The barometer will tell that it is to be wet within a limited 
 time, but nothing, he held, is known tending to show any 
 very lengthened chain of physical causes in such pheno- 
 mena, succeeding regularly each to each, and necessarily
 
 xxvi Introduction. 
 
 determined by prior physical facts in the natural evolution 
 of the universe. Because men of science are intimately 
 acquainted with a certain number of regular physical ante- 
 cedents, they draw the conclusion that the phenomena 
 previous to those which they have observed, will be found 
 upon further examination to be equally regular. Dr. Ward 
 held, on the contrary, that the rough and ready conclusion 
 of the uneducated mind, that a thing so variable as the 
 weather, which has for so many years failed to evince 
 obedience to any ascertainable laws such as would enable 
 us to predict its changes long beforehand, is determined by 
 a voluntary agent external to the sphere of regular physical 
 causation, is quite as reasonable in itself as the other 
 nay, more reasonable, if it be correctly analyzed ; and that 
 prayers for rain and health, if their validity is on other 
 grounds acknowledged, are in no way discredited by such 
 limited regularity as has been observed in the course of 
 the weather or of human disease. To bring his meaning 
 into greater distinctness, he points to the uniform succes- 
 sions in a pianoforte, between the pressure on the note, 
 the movement of the corresponding hammer, the vibration 
 of the corresponding wire, and so forth, all which are 
 perfectly regular, while, nevertheless, the first of the series 
 is invariably set in motion by the external and free agency 
 of the performer. If these regular successions are multiplied 
 into hundreds, then the parallel becomes more complete ; 
 and, accordingly, to bring the principle vividly before his 
 readers, Dr. Ward supposes an instrument with many such 
 connecting links between the player's " premovement " and 
 the resulting sound, and supposes a number of mice of 
 philosophical tendencies to be shut up within it. The con- 
 clusion which in the infancy of science they had drawn 
 that the sounds were due to external agency gradually 
 becomes discredited as link after link of uniform succession 
 is discovered. Elated by each fresh discovery, they look
 
 Introduction. xxvii 
 
 forward to finding fixed laws determining the succession of 
 tunes. The parallel is obvious ; and Dr. Ward contends 
 that the original conception of immediate free external 
 action was nearer the truth than the later conception, 
 which was based on an intimate acquaintance with the 
 mechanical part of the action, but dropped out of sight the 
 all-important originator of the series of movements. 
 
 The essay on " Implicit and Explicit Thought " is 
 based, as appears in the essay itself, on Cardinal Newman's 
 sermon on the same subject, preached many years ago at 
 Oxford. The essay on "Certitude in Religious Assent " is 
 a review of the same writer's Grammar of Assent. 
 
 I have not felt at liberty to make any material changes 
 in the essays, and some of them, in consequence, neces- 
 sarily bear marks of the special occasions for which they 
 were written. The most that has been done by way of 
 alteration in addition to the necessary changes in the 
 references from one essay to another is the occasional 
 omission of repetitions, serviceable in a review as explain- 
 ing earlier stages of the author's argument to those who 
 had not followed the course as a whole, but needless and 
 tedious where the complete series is collected. 
 
 The arguments on which the author mainly built 
 for establishing Theism were, first and foremost, that from 
 the sense of moral obligation ; and secondly, that from the 
 existence of necessary truths which are, he considered, 
 dependent for their necessity upon the nature of God, the 
 one necessary Being. This argument he never developed ; 
 but it is curious to note that these two considerations are 
 substantially identical with those two most important 
 Kantian doctrines of the categorical Imperative, and 
 synthetic a priori truths. The argument from causation 
 came next in his scheme. In the eighth essay he dwells 
 strongly on the ineradicable idea which exists in tlu 1 
 human mind, of causation as distinguished from mere
 
 xxviii Introduction. 
 
 phenomenal sequence. This idea is most distinctly con- 
 ceived, he considered, in personal action. The will's 
 volition that the hand should rise here is the clearest 
 instance. The hand's action in knocking down an opposing 
 object comes near to this in conveying the idea of the influ- 
 ence involved in causation ; and causes in external nature are 
 conceived as causes, and not merely antecedent phenomena 
 from their analogy to these personal experiences of causa- 
 tion. "Whatever commences to exist must have a cause " 
 js the shape in which he held the causation axiom to be 
 declared positively by the human mind as correctly anatyzed, 
 and hence it rises to the conception of the Self-Existent 
 First Cause, which had no beginning. The design argument, 
 the aesthetic argument, and others of a similar nature, 
 were chiefly useful, in this scheme, as subsidiary, and in- 
 dicating the intelligence and beauty of the Creator. He 
 agreed with Mill that the design argument by itself fails 
 to establish infinite power united with infinite goodness in 
 the Author of Nature ; indeed, he considered that the facts 
 on which this argument is based point to some limit in 
 one or the other ; and that the sphere of objective con- 
 tradiction must probably be larger than has been generally 
 supposed, which hypothesis would account for this apparent 
 deficiency. That is to say, the number of things in- 
 trinsically impossible, or, to use Suarez's phrase, "extra 
 objectum omnipotentiae," might well, he thought, be far 
 larger than is apparent to our limited intelligence and 
 knowledge. 
 
 WILFRID WARD.
 
 ESSAYS ON 
 
 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THEISM. 
 
 i. 
 
 THE RULE AND MOTIVE OF CERTITUDE.* 
 
 ENGLISH philosophers, for our present purpose, may be 
 divided into two sharply contrasted classes, whom we may 
 call objectivists and phenomenists respectively. The latter 
 think that man has no knowledge whatever, except of 
 phenomena, physical or psychical ; nay, more correctly 
 psychical alone : f whereas the former stoutly maintain 
 that man has cognizance of objective truth. We desire to 
 take our own humble part in this momentous controversy. 
 We hope, firstly, to demonstrate by argument, that there 
 exists a body of necessary truth cognizable by man ; and, 
 secondly, to consider particular portions of that truth, such 
 as the intrinsic distinction between moral good and evil, 
 
 * La P1rilooplde Scolastique Expoge'e ct De/endue. Par LE R. P. KLEVT- 
 CEN, S.J. Paris: Gaume. 
 
 An Esxay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent. By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, 
 D.D., of the Oratory. Third Edition. Loiidou : Burnt", Gates & Co. 
 
 Essays Philosophical and Theological. By JAMES MAUTINEAU. London : 
 Triibner & Co. 
 
 An Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy. By JOHN STCAKT 
 MILL. Third Edition. London : Longmans. 
 
 t It admits of "no doubt," pronounces Professor Huxley ex cathedra, 
 " that all our knmcledije is u knowledge of states of consciousness " (" Luy 
 Sermons," p. 373). 
 
 VOL. 1. H
 
 2 The Ph ilowphy of Theism . 
 
 the axiom of causation, and the existence of God. We 
 shall throughout consider Mr. Mill our chief antagonist ; 
 as being at once by far the ablest and by far the most 
 highly esteemed of English phenomenists. We consider it, 
 indeed, a singular benefit to the cause of truth, that we 
 have to contend with one so singularly clear in statement, 
 accessible to argument, and candid, or rather generous, 
 towards opponents. And we should add, both as a farther 
 benefit to truth and as a peculiar attraction to ourselves, 
 that he is always so intensely in earnest ; that he regards 
 philosophy as no mere matter of otiose speculation, as no 
 mere instrument of intellectual drill and intellectual excite- 
 ment, but as all-important in its bearing on man's daily 
 life and practice. But before joining direct issue with 
 him, a preliminary question has inevitably a prior claim 
 on our attention. We wish to prove that necessary truth 
 is cognizable by man with certitude ; but it is evidently 
 impossible even to argue this question, until it is first 
 agreed between him and ourselves what is the test of 
 certitude ; what are the conditions requisite and sufficient, 
 that certitude may be established. To this preliminary 
 question we must confine ourselves in our present essay. 
 
 The question itself may be stated thus. Orthodox 
 philosophers we must be permitted to use the term have 
 built up a large body of theological (we refer, of course, 
 exclusively to natural theology), metaphysical, psychical, 
 social, physical verities, resting on sustained processes of 
 reason ; and these processes of reason have been partly 
 deductions from intuitive truths, partly inductions from 
 experienced fact, partly various combinations of the two. 
 But before any scientific trust can be reposed in these 
 conclusions, a previous inquiry must be answered. How is 
 a thinker to know that these assumed truths are intuitive ; 
 that these assumed facts have been experienced ; that these 
 deductive and inductive processes are really valid, or, in
 
 The Rule and Motive of Certitude. 3 
 
 other words, adapted to the inferring of true conclusions 
 from true premisses ? 
 
 Phenomenists will at once throw off part of the difficulty, 
 by saying that there are no intuitive truths to be assumed. 
 But they in no respect lessen their difficulty by this allega- 
 tion. They may deny to man all other intuitional faculties ; 
 but they must still ascribe to him that intuitional faculty 
 which is called memory, and which indubitably no less 
 needs authentication than the rest. This is a point of 
 quite central importance, and to which we beg our readers ' 
 most careful attention. The distinction is fundamental, 
 between a man's power of knowing his present and his past 
 experience. Certainly he needs no warrant to authenticate 
 the truth of the former, except that present experience 
 itself. To doubt my present inward consciousness, as Mr. 
 Mill most truly affirms (p. 186), " would be to doubt that I 
 feel what I feel." So far, then, the phenomenist and our- 
 selves run evenly together ; but here we may come to a 
 very broad divergence. " I am conscious of a most clear 
 and articulate mental impression that a very short time ago 
 I was suffering cold ; " this is one judgment : "a very short 
 time ago I was suffering cold ; " this is another and totally 
 distinct judgment. That I know my present impression by 
 no manner of means implies that I know my past feeling. 
 
 We would thus, then, address some phenomenistic 
 opponent. You tell us that all diamonds are combustible, 
 and that the fact is proved by various experiments which 
 you have yourself witnessed. But how do you know that 
 you ever witnessed any experiment of the kind ? You reply 
 that you have the clearest and most articulate memory of 
 the fact. Well, we do not at all doubt that you have that 
 present impression, which you call a most clear and 
 articulate memory. But how do you know how can you 
 legitimately even guess that the present imjnnmion corre- 
 sponds with a past /</<7.' See what a tremendous assuiup-
 
 4 The Philosophy of Tlicism. 
 
 tion this is, which you, who call yourself a cautious man 
 of science, are taking for granted. You are so wonderfully 
 made and endowed such is j r our assumption that in 
 every successive case your clear and articulate impression 
 and belief of something as past, corresponds with a past 
 fact. You find fault with ohjectivists for gratuitously and 
 arbitrarily assuming first principles : was there ever a 
 more gratuitously and arbitrarily assumed first principle 
 than your own ? 
 
 You gravely reply,* that you do not assume it as a first 
 principle. You tell us you trust your present act of 
 memory because in innumerable past instances the avouch- 
 ments of memory have been true. How do you know 
 how can you even guess that there is one such instance ? 
 Because you trust your present act of memory : no other 
 answer can possibly be given. You are never weary of 
 urging that a priori philosophers argue in a circle ; whereas 
 no one ever so persistently argued in a circle as you do 
 yourself. You know forsooth that your present act of 
 memory testifies truly, because in innumerable past in- 
 stances the avouchment of memory has been true ; and you 
 know that in innumerable past instances the avouchment 
 
 * What follows docs not apply personally either to Mr. Mill or Mr. Bain. 
 The former, with that candour which characteristically distinguishes him, 
 frankly confesses (p. 203, note) that "our belief in the veracity of memory is 
 evidently ultimate ; no reason can be given for it which does not presuppose 
 the belief and assume it to be well-founded." This admission was the more 
 signally candid because Mr. Mill must have seen that it furnishes his 
 antagonists with a very powerful "argumentum ad hominem,'' of which 
 indeed we hope to avail ourselves in our next essay. Mr. Bain makes the 
 same admission ("Deductive Logic," p. 273). On the other hand, Professor 
 Huxley (''Lay Sermons," p. 359) says that "the general trustworthiness of 
 memory " is one of those "hypothetical assumptions which cannot be proved 
 or known with that highest degree of certainty which is given by immediate 
 consciousness; but which, nevertheless, are of (he highest practical vnlue, 
 inasmuch as the conclusions logically drawn from them are always verified 
 by experience." The argument in the text applies directly to this view. 
 Professor Huxley cannot legitimately even guess that anything whatever has 
 been " verified by experience," unless he Jiret knows that certain acts of 
 memory testify truly.
 
 The Rule and Motive of Certitude. 5 
 
 of memory has been true, because you trust your present 
 act of memory. The blind man leads the blind, round and 
 round a " circle " incurably " vicious." 
 
 Kernarks entirely similar may be made on the validity 
 of the inductive process. The proposition, that all the 
 diamonds, which I have myself seen consumed by fire, were 
 at that moment combustible of this proposition we can 
 well understand phenomenists saying, that it requires no 
 further authentication than the trustworthiness of my 
 memory. But the proposition that all diamonds on earth 
 are always combustible or even that the very diamonds 
 which I saw burned were combustible one daij earlier who 
 can say that this proposition requires for its knowledge 
 nothing more than experience ? It is inferred from ex- 
 perience ; and its truth cannot possibly be known by me, 
 unless I first know the validity of the inferring process, 
 whatever that process may be.* 
 
 Without at all prejudging, then, any question really at 
 issue between objectivists and phenomenists as such, we 
 may say that "primary truths" consist of two classes: 
 viz. (1) primary premisses ; and (2) the validity of one or 
 more inferring processes. We may add, that the cognition 
 of a primary truth as such is precisely what is called an 
 " intuition." If these primary truths are guaranteed with 
 certitude but not otherwise there is a stable foundation 
 
 * Mr. Bain admits this statement of ours as frankly as Mr. Mill admitted 
 the former. " This moot fundamental assumption of all human knowledge " 
 is "expressed by such language as 'nature is uniform;' 'the future will 
 resemble the past ;'' nature has fixed laws.' . . . Without this assumption, 
 experience can prove notlt imj. . . . This must be receivfd without proof . ... If 
 we seem to offer any proof for it, we merely bug it in another shape " (' De 
 ductive Logic," p. 227). 
 
 In case any of our readers should think it douMful whether it In- nl>s >- 
 lutely necebi-ary for phenomenists to assume as a separate principle tl o 
 validity of their inferring process Mr. Mill, indeed, apparently tines >/ >t 
 account this necessary we would jx>int out (what will he very obvious is 
 our essay proceeds) that no part whatever of our argument depends on th s 
 particular statement.
 
 G The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 for human knowledge in its entireness and totality. The 
 inquiry, then, to be instituted is this. Firstly, what 
 characteristics must be possessed by those truths, which the 
 thinker may legitimately accept as primary ? and secondly, 
 on what ground does he know that the propositions are true 
 which possess those characteristics ? Or to express the 
 same thing in F. Kleutgen's words (n. 2G3), firstly, what 
 is the rule of certitude ? and, secondly, what is its motive ? 
 There never was any answer but one given to this 
 question by Catholics, before the deplorable darkness 
 spread abroad by Descartes over the whole region of 
 philosophy. (1) Primary truths are those which the 
 human intellect is necessitated by its constitution to accept 
 with certitude, not as inferences from other truths, but on 
 their own evidence : this is the rule of certitude. (2) These 
 truths are known to be truths ; because a created gift 
 called the light of reason is possessed by the soul, whereby 
 every man, w r hile exercising his cognitive faculties accord- 
 ing to their intrinsic law r s, is rendered infallibly certain 
 that their avouchments correspond with objective truth : 
 this is the motive of ceiiitude. " It is conceivable," says 
 Professor Huxley ("Lay Sermons," p. 35G), "that some 
 powerful and malicious being may find his pleasure in 
 deluding us, and in making us believe the thing which is 
 not every moment of our lives." Quite conceivable, doubt- 
 less ; but the light of reason makes man infallibly certain 
 that such a supposition is absolutely contradictory to fact. 
 
 This is the doctrine accurately and carefully elaborated 
 by F. Kleutgen in the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th chapters of 
 his Third Dissertation. "It is the light of reason which 
 makes us certain of what the sensus intimus attests" 
 (n. 263). "Proceeding from the facts furnished by ex- 
 perience, we advance to further knowledge by the principles 
 of pure thought ; but the truth of these principles and the 
 reality of those facts are not certain to the mind, except
 
 The Ride and Motive of Certitude. 7 
 
 through the light of reason which is inherent in the human 
 mind " (n. 264). " The mind in thinking by reason has 
 the consciousness of possessing truth, so long as it knows 
 the agreement [which exists] between its thoughts and 
 those principles which we call the laws of thought " 
 (n. 274). Since the creature's " faculty of knowledge is 
 created and therefore limited, no creature can be infallible 
 in this sense, that by his own strength he can judge of 
 everything with certitude. In the creature infallibility is 
 always united with fallibility, as being is united with not- 
 being. Yet, just as the creature's being, though finite, is 
 nevertheless true being, so his infallibility, though limited, 
 is nevertheless real infallibility" (n. 277). "The principles 
 wherewith we begin, the logical laws which we follow in 
 deduction, are infallible, as the rule whereby we judge the 
 truth of our experimental knowledge " (n. 278).* 
 
 We may be allowed to call this doctrine the doctrine of 
 intrinsic certitude. We would so call it, in order to dis- 
 tinguish it from those theories which rest certitude on 
 some basis extrinsic to the mind itself; from Descartes's, 
 e.g., who rests it on the veracity of God ; and from La- 
 mennais's, who rests it on the consent of mankind. Accord- 
 ing to this, which we must be allowed to call the one 
 Catholic doctrine on the subject, the mind's intrinsic light 
 
 * We should not fail, however, to quote the important elucidation which 
 F. Kleutgen subjoins: "And that we may understand how little this pre- 
 rogative [of partial infallibility] would justify human pride, let us observe 
 the limits of that sphere within which [alone] it is ascribed to him. In our 
 investigations we need experimental knowledge, not only in commencing our 
 inquiries, but during their whole progress; especially when we would apply 
 science to the conduct of life. Now, how many tilings arc necessary in order 
 to our arriving at full certitude by means of personal experience and other 
 men's observations! What calm! what attcntivcness ! what impartiality! 
 what efforts! what perseverance ! How often it happens that a new obser- 
 vation, a more profound examination, an unexpected discovery, have over- 
 thrown the most accredited systems by taking from Un-m their basis! If, 
 then, our age glorifies itself fur its progress in the experimental sciences, 
 men should not IK; unmindful at the same time of the lesson in humility 
 which should be learnt from that very progress," etc.
 
 8 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 declares the objective truth of whatever man's cognitive 
 faculties subjectively avouch. Would we demonstrate that 
 there are necessary verities ? Would we demonstrate that 
 this or that particular proposition is among this number ? 
 In either case it is requisite, and it is sufficient, to demon- 
 strate that the human intellect, acting on the laws of its 
 constitution, so declares. This is the foundation we wish 
 to lay in our present essay for the controversy with Mr. 
 Mill which is to follow. But before proceeding to vindicate 
 its truth, we must guard against two possible misconcep- 
 tions of our meaning. 
 
 In the first place, it is abundantly possible that men 
 may misinterpret the avouchment of their intellect ; and 
 this, indeed, would constitute an important addition to the 
 causes alleged by F. Kleutgen (see our preceding footnote) 
 for their proclivity to error. Both schools of philosophy 
 admit this. The objectivist says to his opponent, If you 
 will only look fairly at this and that intellectual fact to 
 which I draw your attention, you will not be able to deny 
 that such and such is the declaration of your cognitive 
 faculties. And the phenomenist is not slow in making a 
 similar retort. We hope ourselves, indeed, in our next 
 essay vigorously to illustrate this fact ; we hope to show, 
 by appealing to this, that, and the other mental experience, 
 that phenomenists have not a leg to stand on, when they 
 deny that their cognitive faculties declare the existence of 
 necessary truth. What we are maintaining in this essay 
 is, that such is the sole legitimate controversial ground ; 
 that the avouchment of man's cognitive faculties is his 
 final and his infallible standard of truth. 
 
 But, secondly, we appeal to the mind's positive, not its 
 negative constitution ; or, in other words, we lay our stress 
 on its affirmations, not on its incapacities. It does not 
 follow, because the human mind cannot conceive a propo- 
 sition, that such proposition may not be true ; nay, that it
 
 The Rule and Motive of Certitude. 
 
 may not be most certain and inappreciably momentous. 
 We express this qualification here, that we may distinctly 
 explain the precise bearing of our main thesis ; but we reserve 
 our argument on the matter to a later part of our paper. 
 
 Our main thesis, then, is this. " Man's cognitive 
 faculties, while acting on the laws of their constitution, 
 carry with them in each particular case their own evidence 
 of absolute trustworthiness. All human knowledge has its 
 commencement in various truths, whether of memory* or 
 of other kinds, which are self-evidently known as true, 
 each by itself, under the light of reason." It would, of 
 course, be a contradiction in terms, if we professed to 
 adduce direct arguments for this thesis ; because such 
 profession would imply that the self-evidence of these 
 truths is a verity inferred from premisses, whereas the 
 thesis itself states that the knowledge of one or other of 
 them as self-evident is an absolutely essential preliminary 
 to all inference whatever. But we will (1) adduce for it 
 strong indireci argument ; and (2) (which is much more 
 important) suggest to our readers such mental experiments 
 as shall (we trust) satisfy them of its truth. "We state our 
 indirect argument as follows. 
 
 Every one really knows that he knows something 
 besides his present consciousness ; that he has had this or 
 that definite past experience ; that through this or that 
 moral or intellectual training he has arrived at this or thnt 
 interior result ; and the like. There are some few most 
 singularly constituted men who, at particular moments of 
 their life, persuade themselves that they doubt whether they 
 
 * We arc amazed that both Sir W. Hamilton and Mr. Mill concur in 
 censuring Reid for his statement that " memory is immediate knowledge 
 of the past" ("Mill on Hamilton," p. 134). The statement seems to us 
 not only indubitable, hut even elementary ; and we are sanctioned in this 
 opinion by the high authority of Mr. Martineau (vol. ii. pp. 2."iS-'Jt;:!). That 
 which I immediately think of, in remember! rr.:, is surely my past experience. 
 But the question is wholly irrelevant to our present purpose.
 
 10 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 possess such knowledge, and we will presently consider 
 their case : for the moment, however, we will put them out 
 of account. Speaking generally, then, every one knows 
 that he knows something besides his present consciousness. 
 But he cannot possess that knowledge, except through the 
 exercise (past or present) of his cognitive faculties ; and he 
 cannot accept it as being knowledge and not delusion, except 
 by knowing that the declarations of those faculties are 
 true. Now, how can he know this ? By the authentication 
 of God ? by the testimony of his fellow-men ? But it is 
 only by trusting the declaration of his cognitive faculties 
 that he can know or even guess the existence of God and 
 his fellow-men ; and still more, that he can know or even 
 guess what God and his fellow-men testify. Unless, there- 
 fore, his cognitive faculties authenticate thcmsclces, they 
 cannot be authenticated at all. And if they are not 
 authenticated at all, no man on earth knows anything 
 whatever, except his own experience of this particular 
 moment. Than this there can be no more clenching 
 reductio ad absurdum. 
 
 Passing now to the direct establishment of our thesis, 
 we appeal to each man's consciousness in our favour. 
 That which his faculties indubitably declare as certain, 
 he finds himself under an absolute necessity of infallibly 
 knowing to be true. I experience that phenomenon of 
 the present moment, which I thus express : I say that I 
 remember distinctly and articulately to have been much 
 colder a few minutes ago when I was out in the snow, than 
 I am now when sitting by a comfortable fire. Well, in 
 consequence of this present mental phenomenon, I find 
 myself under the absolute necessity of knowing that a very 
 short time ago I had that experience which I now remember. 
 Professor Huxley may talk of " some powerful and malicious 
 being," who " finds his pleasure in deluding me " and 
 making me fancy what never happened; but I am abso-
 
 The Rule and Motive of Certitude. 1 1 
 
 lutely necessitated to know that I am under no such 
 delusion in regard to this recent experience.* And so with 
 my other intellectual operations. My faculties pronounce 
 that my present impression of colour differs from another 
 of which I retain a distinct idea ; or they pronounce that 
 this trilateral figure which I distinctly image in my mind, 
 is triangular ; or when I see two strips of wood lying in an 
 ohlong hox close together and parallel to the sides, my 
 faculties pronounce that the one which reaches beyond 
 the other is nearer than that to the further end of the box. 
 In all these cases I am necessitated to know that which 
 my faculties declare as true. 
 
 As we have already said, there are some few most 
 singularly constituted persons who, when contemplating 
 their own mental phenomena, become for the moment dizzy 
 with self-inspection ; seized with vertigo, as one may say, 
 with gazing down the abyss : and these men persuade 
 themselves that they do possess a power of distrusting 
 their cognitive faculties. We would thus address such a 
 sceptic, if we could obtain his attention. We appeal from 
 Philip drunk to Philip sober. You are giddy for the 
 moment and beside yourself, like a man in liquor. If you 
 would correctly appreciate your mental constitution, look 
 back at some given period of your life, when your faculties 
 
 * In a passage which we quoted in a previous note, Professor Huxley 
 seems to say that the truth of what memory distinctly testifies is not known 
 " with that highest decree of certainty which is given by immediate nmti-iou*- 
 new" but is nevertheless in the very highest degree pnHmlib 1 . If we rightly 
 understand him with very greiit respect for his usutil power and clearness 
 of thought we must nevertheless say that this seems to us the most 1111- 
 reagonable opinion on the subject which can possibly be held. If my memory 
 may be trusted, those things which it distinctly testities are known with 
 most absolute certainty; if it cannot be trtK-ted, its avouchinent does not 
 render them even remotely probable. Indeed, what can be more violently 
 unscientific from the standpoint of mere experimental science than t<> 
 assume without grounds, as even probable, the very singular proposition, that 
 mental phenomena (by some entirely unknown law) have proceeded in such a 
 fashion that my clear impri-fi'm of the past invariably cm-responds with my 
 past erperii nre f
 
 1 2 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 were braced and in full play, not paralyzed by morbid intro- 
 spection. You were engaged in that anxious commercial 
 speculation, or in that important lawsuit, or you were 
 taking measures to avert imminent gout. Had you at that 
 time the power of doubting whether you had previously 
 entered on that speculation, or engaged in that lawsuit, or 
 experienced premonitory symptoms of gout ? Or when your 
 mother was at last pronounced out of danger, could you 
 really prevent yourself from infallibly knowing that you 
 had been anxious ? Or had you really the power of doubt- 
 ing whether you had ever seen that sweet face before ? 
 You will reply perhaps and indeed you are bound (we 
 admit) in consistency to reply that you have no reason to 
 know you ever icere in such circumstances ; that you know 
 nothing whatever about yourself, except your present con- 
 sciousness. In that case we will practise on you a future 
 experiment. Employ yourself in whatever most interests 
 you ; in studying mathematics or taking a part in glees. 
 While you are so engaged, we will suddenly come up and 
 seize you by the arm. Can you noiv, we will say, prevent 
 yourself from infallibly knowing that a very short time ago 
 you were immersed in mathematical study or engaged in 
 singing that glee ? 
 
 However, whether or no we would succeed in curing this 
 monomaniac, is an irrelevant question : for that he is a 
 mere monomaniac, and, moreover, that he has no real 
 power of persevering in such scepticism, will be admitted by 
 all our readers. For the consistent sceptic cannot possibly 
 be a reader. He cannot understand one single sentence 
 unless, while reading the last words, he trusts his memory 
 for the first. Now, if he trusts his memory so far as this, 
 he has ipso facto abandoned his sceptical position. 
 
 Phenomenists, then, as we have urged, act suicidally in 
 disparaging the light of reason ; for it is only by surrender- 
 ing themselves to that light, and so trusting their memory,
 
 The, Rule and Motive of Certitude. 13 
 
 that they can know anything whatever about phenomena. 
 They are very much given, however, to such disparage- 
 ment ; and they are very fond of alleging certain supposed 
 difficulties. I see a straight stick in the water, and my 
 faculties (they urge) confidently pronounce that the stick is 
 crooked ; or if a cherry is placed on my crossed fingers, my 
 faculties confidently pronounce that my hand is touched hy 
 two substances. It is apparently for some such reason 
 that Mr. Mill lays so much stress on Berkeley's theory of 
 vision. Men fancy themselves such is Berkeley's theory 
 to see distance immediately ; but in fact that conviction 
 of distance is an inference, and no immediate judgment 
 whatever. Now, we do not admit this theory except for 
 argument's sake ; and Mr. Abbott, in his little volume called 
 " Sight and Touch," professes to disprove it.* But we 
 cannot at all agree with the latter writer, when he says 
 (Preface) that if Berkeley's theory were admitted, " con- 
 sciousness " would be proved " delusive " and " doubt must 
 reign supreme : " for on the contrary so far as the con- 
 troversy with scepticism is concerned we consider the 
 question one of complete indifference. All these superficial 
 difficulties are readily solved by resorting to a philosophical 
 consideration, which is familiar to Catholics, though 
 (strangely enough) we do not remember to have seen it in 
 non-Catholic works. We refer to the distinction between 
 what may be called " undoubting " and what may be called 
 " absolute " assent. 
 
 By " absolute " assent we understand an assent so firm 
 as to be incompatible with the co-existence of doubt : but by 
 
 * The present writer has never given liis mind to it, and has no bins 
 whatever on either side. Dr. M'Cosli ("Intuitions of the Mind," p. Ill, 
 note) thinks Mr. Ablnitt's argument sufficient for part, not the whole, of 
 his conclusion. Mr. Mill (p. v{00) considers tlmt Mr. Abbott has been con- 
 clusively answered by Professor Fraser in the Xorth lirittth J{<n'i>r for 
 August, 18<>4. On the other Imnd, the lust writer on the subject, 1'rofe.isor 
 Huxley, takes part ntjainxt Mr. Mill and Professor Frascr. Sec M acini lUm'a 
 for June, 1871, p. 153.
 
 14 The Philosophy of Theium. 
 
 " undoubting " assent we mean no more than that with 
 which in fa<'t doubt does not co-exist. Now, the mere 
 undoubtingness of an assent does not at all imply any 
 particular firmness, but arises from mere accident. For 
 instance, a friend, coming down to me in the country, 
 tells me that he has caught a sight of the telegrams as he 
 passed through London, and that the Versailles government 
 has possession of Paris. I had long expected this, and I 
 assent to the fact without any admixture of doubt. In an 
 hour or two, however, the morning paper comes in; and 
 I find that my friend's cursory glance has misled him, for 
 that the army has only arrived dose up to Paris. The 
 extreme facility with which I dismiss my former " un- 
 doubting " assent, shows how very far it was from being 
 " absolute." Its true analysis, in fact, was no more than 
 this : " there is an a priori presumption that Paris is 
 taken." But as no particular motive for doubt happened 
 to cross my mind, I was not led to reflect on the true 
 character of the assent which I yielded. 
 
 Now to apply this. Evidently it cannot be said that my 
 cognitive faculties declare any proposition to be certainly 
 true, unless they yield to that proposition "absolute" 
 assent. But a moment's consideration will show that my 
 assent to the crookedness of the stick or the duplicity of the 
 cherry, may accidentally indeed have been undoubting, 
 but was extremely far from being absolute. Its true 
 analysis was: "there is an a priori presumption that the 
 stick is crooked or that there are two objects touched by 
 my fingers ; " and this declaration of my faculties indisput- 
 ably corresponded with objective truth. A remark precisely 
 similar may be made on my putatively immediate percep- 
 tion of distances ; and we may bring the matter to a crucial 
 experiment by some such supposition as the following. 
 
 I am myself but youthful, whether in age or power of 
 thought ; but 1 have a venerable friend and mentor, in
 
 The Rule and Motive of Certitude. 15 
 
 whose moral and intellectual endowments I repose perfect 
 confidence. I fancy myself to see a crooked stick, or to feel 
 two touching objects ; but he explains to me the physical 
 laws which explain my delusion, and I surrender it with 
 the most perfect facility. He further expounds and demon- 
 strates Berkeley's theory of vision ; and here, though I have 
 a little more trouble with myself, yet after a short con- 
 sideration I entirely acquiesce. He proceeds, however let 
 us suppose, for the purpose of probing the depth of my 
 convictions to tell me that I have no reason whatever for 
 knowing that I ever experienced a certain sensation, which 
 my memory most distinctly declares me to have experienced 
 a very short time ago : or again, that, as to the particular 
 trilateral figure which I have in my thoughts, I have no 
 reason whatever for knowing it to be triangular, and that he 
 believes it to have five angles. Well, first of all I take for 
 granted that I have not rightly understood him. When I 
 find that I have rightly understood him, either I suspect 
 him (as the truth indeed is) to be simulating, or else (if 
 I am too great an intellectual coward for this) I am 
 reduced to a state of hopeless perplexity and bewilderment, 
 and on the high-road to idiocy. So great is the distinction 
 between merely " undoubting " and " absolute " assent ; 
 between my faculties testifying that there is an a priori 
 presumption for some theory and their testifying that it is 
 certainly true. 
 
 Another objection, raised by phenomenists, turns on the 
 divergence which exists among objectivists, as to what their 
 faculties do testify. Thus many men do not think them- 
 selves to intue any axiom of causation at all ; and of those 
 who do allege such axiom, there are different schools, each 
 differently analyzing it. Many, again, do not think theiu- 
 selve to intue the intrinsic distinction between moral good 
 and evil ; and among those who do recognize this dis- 
 tinction, there are differences which may in some sense be
 
 1(5 The Philosophy of Tfteism, 
 
 called fundamental. This objection cannot, however, be 
 maintained, unless its advocate first makes good a pre- 
 liminary position. He must show that the difference, on 
 which he insists, is a difference between what the intellect 
 of different men declares, and not merely between what they 
 interpret it as declaring. But we are perfectly confident 
 that he cannot show this, for that it is not true. We shall 
 examine the phenomena on which he relies when we come 
 to treat the respective questions of morality and causality. 
 
 A third objection has been urged against us, founded on 
 the indubitable fact that we may not, at this rudiniental 
 stage of our argument against phenomenists, assume the 
 Creator's Veracity. Could not a mendacious creator, it has 
 been asked Professor Huxley's " powerful and malicious 
 being who finds his pleasure in deluding " mankind so 
 have constituted the human intellect as that it should 
 testify falsehood, and nevertheless have given men the same 
 trust in its declarations which they now feel ? We reply 
 easily in the negative. To say that mendacious faculties 
 can be infallibly known as trustworthy, is a contradiction 
 in terms. No possible creator could anymore achieve such 
 a result than he could form a crooked straight line. 
 
 We have now, then, sufficiently illustrated our funda- 
 mental thesis, that every thinker infallibly knows each 
 successive declaration of his faculties to be true. And we 
 have also sufficiently illustrated the first explanation, which 
 we appended to that thesis ; viz. that what he can ulti- 
 mately trust is the declaration of these faculties, and not his 
 own analysis thereof. We proceed to the second qualifica- 
 tion which we made at starting. We appeal, we said, to 
 the mind's positive, not its negative constitution : we cannot 
 admit that what is inconceivable is therefore untrue. We 
 side here with the vast majority of phenomenists,* against 
 
 * Mr. Herbert Spencer is, we believe, the only exception j and that on 
 grounds of his own which we need not here consider.
 
 The Rule aiid Motive of Certitude. 17 
 
 certain objectivists ; but we believe that our divergence 
 from the latter is exclusively verbal. They say, e.g., that 
 no trilateral figure is quadrangular, and that two straight 
 lines never enclose a space, because in either case the 
 supposition is inconceivable : but what they intend is, that 
 such supposition contradicts what I know as true, by my 
 very conception of a trilateral figure or a straight line. "We 
 think it, however, a real calamity that they have used the 
 expression which we criticize, because it permits such 
 writers as Mr. Mill to rest contented with a most inadequate 
 apprehension of the objectivist argument. 
 
 In justice, however, to these writers, we must distinguish 
 carefully between two different senses of this word "incon- 
 ceivable ; " and this procedure will lead us into what our 
 readers may at first be tempted to suppose a digression, 
 but which they will ultimately find to be no digression at 
 all. Sometimes the word "inconceivable" is taken to 
 mean " unimaginable," at other times " unintelligible " or 
 " unthinkable." Now, there is a large class of unimaginable 
 things, which are by no means unthinkable ; and no objec- 
 tivist ever alleged that the unimaginablencss of a proposition 
 is incompatible with its truth. We may express the dis- 
 tinction in Mr. Martineau's words ; though we are not 
 aware that this most able philosopher has ever adopted the 
 particular formula which we are criticizing, of incouceiv- 
 ableness being conclusive against truth. Ideas, he says 
 (vol. i. p. 193), may be clear and thinkable, which " do not 
 come before the imaginative or representative facult} 7 ." 
 " You may deny the idea of the ' infinite,' " he adds (p. 194), 
 " as not clear : and clear it is not, if nothing but the mental 
 picture of an outline deserve that word. But if a thought is 
 clear when it sits apart without danger of being confounded 
 icitJi another, when it can exactly keep its own in speech 
 and reasoning with forfeit and without encroachment if, 
 in short, logical clearness consists not in the idea of a limit 
 
 VOL. I. C
 
 IS The Philosophy of Theitmi. 
 
 but in the limit of the idea, then no sharpest image of 
 any finite quantity ... is clearer than the thought of the 
 infinite." And so at p. 205, the author contrasts an "idea 
 of the reason " with " one of the phantasy." " It is no objec- 
 tion," he adds (p. 238), "to either the reality or the 
 legitimacy of a thought, that it is not of a kind to be 
 brought before the mind's eye" So Dr. M'Cosh. " The 
 thinking, judging, believing power of the mind is not the 
 same as the imaging power " (" Intuitions," p. 195, note). 
 Similarly speaks Mr. Mill from the opposite school. Take 
 the case of some large number : suppose, e.g., it were said 
 that over a certain tract of ground there had been counted 
 27,182,818 potatoes. It is simply impossible to have this 
 number in my phantasy or imagination, so as to distinguish 
 it from 27,182,817 and 27,182,819. Yet says Mr. Mill (p. 
 100), " We have a " sufficient " conception of it, when we 
 have conceived it by some one of its modes of composition, 
 such as that indicated by the position of its digits." This 
 " limited conception enables us to avoid confounding the 
 number in our calculations with any other numerical 
 whole ; " and we can also " by means of this attribute of 
 the number ascertain and add to our conception as many 
 more of its properties as we please." In other words, this 
 large number is most easily thinkable, though by no means 
 imaginable. 
 
 This distinction, between propositions imaginable and 
 propositions only thinkable, is in some degree correspondent, 
 though not precisely so, with a distinction made by F. 
 Newman, between what he characterizes respectively as 
 " real " and " notional " assent.* He adds, also, this 
 obvious qualification, that multitudes of men, from indolence 
 or other causes, give no more than a " notional " assent to 
 
 * He thinks, however (p. 43), that men cannot have even a " notional " 
 apprehension of a very large number, such as a hillion or a trillion. We 
 are certainly disposed to dissent from him on this small episodical question.
 
 The Rule and Motive of Certitude. 19 
 
 propositions most easily " imaginable." And this circum- 
 stance, as F. Newman emphatically repeats in various 
 passages, is often a very serious moral or intellectual 
 calamity. 
 
 Now, as we have said, those objectivists against whom 
 we are now arguing, undoubtedly used the word " incon- 
 ceivable " to express not " unimaginable," but "unthink- 
 able." We are led, then, to consider whether any proposi- 
 tion can (in this sense) be truly called inconceivable, except 
 those which actually contradict what is known by my very 
 conception of their " subject." If there are none such, 
 then our only quarrel with these philosophers will be, that 
 their language understates the positivcness with which man's 
 cognitive faculties declare certain propositions to be neces- 
 sarily false. But we think there are propositions which 
 may most fitly be called inconceivable and unthinkable, yet 
 which all Theists regard as indubitably true. "We refer to 
 religious mysteries.* 
 
 Let us begin with an illustration, which has often been 
 given by F. Newman. It is most easily supposable that 
 there may be rational creatures to whom, as being incor- 
 poreal themselves, the union of soul and body is a veritable 
 mystery. If it were revealed to them or, again, if it were 
 deducible from premisses with which they were acquainted 
 that the soul of man is on one hand spiritual and indi- 
 visible, while on the other hand it is integrally present 
 throughout every particle of an extended body, such a 
 
 * It is said in Goschler's " Dictionary of Catholic- Theology " (article 
 " Mysteries "), that theologians are extremely far from accord in their 
 acceptation of this word. F. 1'errone (" De Vera Religione," prop. )J) uses 
 it substantially in the same sense with F. Newman, and we ourselves so 
 adopt it in the text. F. Franzelin, however (see e.f/. "Do Deo Trino," 
 thesis xvii.), employs the word quite otherwise ; viz. to designate thoso 
 truths which can in no sense he intrinsically established by reason, cither 
 before or after their revelation. But it is very diflicult indeed to find it 
 substitute for the word, as expressing FF. Perrone's and Newman's ideii : 
 whereas F. Franzelin may most easily express hi* by a phrase which also ho 
 often uses, viz. " superrational verities."
 
 20 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 proposition would be inconceivable to them. It would be 
 inconceivable, in what Mr. Mill calls (p. 90) " the proper 
 sense " of the term : it would be " that which the mind is 
 unable to put together in a representation." Their first 
 impulse would be to think that it is a contradiction in 
 terms.* But subsequent consideration might bring to their 
 mind that, as F. Newman expresses it (" Grammar," p. 44), 
 their " notion " of a thing so entirely external to their 
 experience "may be" nay, is almost sure to be "only 
 partially faithful to the original;" that the word "pre- 
 sence " may have a far wider sense than any which they 
 can ever so distantly apprehend. That their notions, there- 
 fore, of subject and predicate are more or less mutually 
 contradictory, is no proof whatever that there is incompati- 
 
 * " The soul is not only one, and without parts, but, moreover, as if by a 
 great contradiction even in terras, it is in every part of the body. It is 
 nowhere, yet everywhere. . . . No part of a man's body is like a mere 
 instrument, as a knife or a crutch might be, which he takes up and may lay 
 down. Kvery part of it is part of himself; it is connected into one by his 
 soul, which is one. Supposing we take stones and raise a house, the 
 building is not really one ; it is composed of a number of .separate parts, 
 which viewed as collected together we call one, but which are not one 
 except in our notion of them. But the hands and feet, the head and trunk, 
 form one body under the presence of the soul within them. Unless the soul 
 were in every part, they would not form one body ; so that the soul is in 
 every part, uniting it with every other, though it consists of no parts at all. 
 I do not, of course, mean that there is any real contradiction in tho.^e 
 opposite truths ; indeed, we know there is not, and cannot be, because they 
 are true, because human nature is a fact before us. But it is a contradiction 
 trhen put into icords ; we cannot so express it as not to involve an apparent 
 contradiction ; and then, if we discriminate our terms, and make distinctions, 
 and balance phrases, and so on, we fehall seem to be technical and artificial 
 and speculative, and to use words without meaning. . . . What (we should 
 ask) was the meaning of Baying that the soul had no parts, yet was in every 
 part of the body ? what was meant by saying it was everywhere and no- 
 where? how could it be one, and yet repeated, as it were, ten thousand 
 times over every atom and pore of the body, which it was said to exist in? 
 how could it be confined to the body at all? how did it act upon the body? 
 how happened it, as was pretended, that when the soul did but will, the arm 
 moved or the feet walked ? how can a spirit, which cannot touch anything, 
 yet avail to move so large a ma>s of matter, and so easily, as the human body ? 
 These are some of the questions which might be asked, partly on the ground 
 that the alleged fact was impossible, partly that the idea was self-con- 
 tradictory." (F. Newman's Oxford "Parochial Sermons," vol. iv. pp. 325-328.)
 
 The Rule and Motive of Certitude. 21 
 
 bility between the archetypes of those notions. And we 
 human beings indeed, in this case, are so well aware of the 
 ludicrous mistake which would be made by these immaterial 
 creatures if they reasoned otherwise, that we are mightily 
 tempted to forget how prone we are ourselves in other 
 instances to a similar paralogism. 
 
 A proposition, then, maybe called "mysterious" to 
 some given thinker, when it would be rightly accounted by 
 him self-contradictory, if he suppposed that the notions 
 which it conveys to him adequately represent their arche- 
 types. It should be carefully observed, however, that his 
 faculties themselves convey to him an assurance of his 
 notions being thus utterly inadequate, and of no contra- 
 dictoriness being therefore necessarily involved in the 
 proposition itself. And it is further worth pointing out, 
 that such mysterious propositions may nevertheless give 
 real possibly, therefore, vitally important information ; 
 though it would carry us too far from our theme, if we here 
 enlarged on this truth. 
 
 Now, as the union of soul and body might be utterly 
 inconceivable to certain immaterial creatures, however 
 strong their evidence for the fact, so there are various 
 propositions concerning God, rigidly demonstrable by 
 human reason, which are nevertheless inconceivable to the 
 human intellect. That He Who is absolutely Simple and 
 Indivisible, is present throughout all space ; that He in 
 Whom is no succession of time, is ever diversely energizing ; 
 that in God there is no real distinction whatever between 
 His Nature and His Acts ; here are propositions at once 
 humanly demonstrable and humanly inconceivable. We 
 should add that no mysteries added by revelation arc 
 more inconceivable than those irresistibly authenticated by 
 reason.* 
 
 * We earnestly hope we shall not V>e understood to rlmrnrtcri/r "// 
 propositions concerning d'od as inconceivable. Cml, in most of His u.-itccts.
 
 *2'2 Tlic Philosophy of 
 
 Mr. Mill excellently explains (p. 82) why it is abundantly 
 possible that such inconceivable propositions may be true. 
 " The inference " that " what we are incapable of conceiving 
 cannot exist," " would only be warrantable if we knew 
 a priori that we must have been created capable of con- 
 ceiving whatever is capable of existing ; that the universe 
 of thought and that of reality must have been formed in 
 complete accordance with each other. . . . But an assump- 
 tion more destitute of evidence could scarcely be made ; 
 nor can one easily imagine any evidence that would prove 
 it, unless it were revealed from above."* 
 
 We implied, a few pages back, that a proposition is 
 necessarily false which contradicts what is known by my 
 very conception of its "subject." We should here explain 
 that this does not at all conflict with what we have just 
 been saying about mysteries. The reason is this. When 
 the archetype is apprehended by me as indefinitely 
 transcending my conception thereof, various propositions 
 are not " known by its very conception," which otherwise 
 would be. 
 
 We have given, then, two reasons for deeply regretting 
 the phrase used by many objectivists, that what is incon- 
 ceivable is necessarily false. Firstly, even if no proposi- 
 tion could be called " inconceivable " except that which 
 
 can be apprehended by man (to use the common phrase) though not com- 
 prehended. Accordingly a great majority of the propositions concerning 
 Him are readily conceivable, thinkable, intelligible, though not compre- 
 hensible in all the fulness of their meaning ; while some few are inconceivable 
 as explained in the text. Nothing e.g. in the world conveys a more 
 intelligible and practical idea than the affirmation that God is Loving, 
 Veracious, Omniscient, Omnipotent, Holy. The same distinction applies to 
 retealfd propositions concerning Him. F. Newman (pp. 120-137) considers 
 those various statements which combine to express the dogma of the Blessed 
 Trinity ; and in a very masterly way determines which of these statements 
 admit of " real," and which of only " notional " assent. 
 
 * We were much disappointed on coming, a few pages later (p. 1 19, note), 
 to Mr. Mill's disparagement of "mystical metaphysics" and "mystical 
 theology ; " for there cannot be a better defence of " mystical metaphysics " 
 than the jwissage quoted in the text.
 
 The Rule and Motive of Certitude. 23 
 
 actually contradicts what is known by my very conception 
 of its " subject," still it was extremely to be desired that 
 a stronger expression than " inconceivable " should be used 
 to express this. But, secondly, the word "inconceivable " 
 may very naturally be understood as applying to every 
 "mystery; " and if it be so understood, all Theists know 
 that certain " inconceivable " propositions are demon- 
 stratively true. 
 
 Here, then, we sum up. Our direct thesis has been, 
 that whatever men's cognitive faculties indubitably declare, 
 is thereby known to be infallibly true. To prevent mis- 
 conception, however, we have added two explanations. 
 (1) This infallibility appertains to what they declare, not to 
 what they may be understood as declaring ; and (2) it 
 appertains to their positive declarations, and not to their 
 incapacities. Now, since Mr. Mill is to be our principal 
 opponent in various succeeding essays, it is absolute!}' 
 necessary, before we conclude, to see how far we are in 
 harmony with 1dm on this preliminary question. We are 
 hereafter to argue against him, that the existence of neces- 
 sary truths is cognizable with certitude by mankind ; but 
 in order to discuss this with any satisfactory result, it is 
 extremely momentous that he and ourselves should arrive 
 at an agreement as to what constitutes a sufficient /<.-/ of 
 certain knowledge. And we shall be able, on our side, to 
 make our position clearer if we begin by distinguishing 
 it from a ground importantly different, which has been 
 occupied by more than one English non-Catholic objectivist. 
 
 Mr. Martineau, indeed whom, notwithstanding extreme 
 theological divergence and some serious philosophical sepa- 
 ration, we cannot but recognize as at once the ablest and 
 most learned of these entirely agrees with ourselves (if 
 we rightly understand him) on the question we have been 
 discussing. " ~\\'e have entire faith," lie says (vol. i. p. '211),
 
 '2\- Tltr Philosophy of T 
 
 " in the veracity and the consistency of the reports given 
 in by our highest faculties." And he uses similar expres- 
 sions in pp. 47, 48, 101, 282, 237. He says again, pointedly 
 (p. 104), " be the proof what it may which authenticates 
 the belief, it is the faculty in the last resort which authen- 
 ticates the proof." Yet even as to Mr. Martineau, we wish 
 he had spoken more uncompromisingly. " Our faculties," 
 he says (p. 238), " must be either taken at their word, or 
 dismissed as cheats." We wish he had expressly said what 
 he evidently holds, viz. that it is physically impossible to 
 " dismiss them as cheats "or to doubt their declaration. 
 It is a very serious loss to metaphysical science that Mr. 
 Martineau has never found time for writing a systematic 
 treatise. 
 
 Dr. M'Cosh, in his most valuable work on "the Intui- 
 tions of the Mind," speaks as strongly as F. Kleutgen 
 himself, on one part of our subject, viz. the ride of certitude. 
 He maintains emphatically that whatever the human 
 faculties avouch is infallibly certain as they avouch it. The 
 capacity of cognition in the mind, he says (p. 17), " is not 
 that of the bent mirror to reflect the object under modified 
 forms, but of the plane mirror to reflect it in its proper 
 shape and colour. The truth is preserved by the mind, not 
 formed ; it is cognized, not created.'" But when question 
 arises on the motive of certitude, he often seems to turn off 
 into a different groove. He often partakes, in fact, the 
 error of Descartes, and implies that my reason for knowing 
 the veracity of my mental constitution is my previous con- 
 viction of God's Veracity. See third edition, pp. 30, 113, 
 116 : see also p. 333, where his remarks are singularly un- 
 satisfactory. In fact, we suspect that this view possesses, 
 more or less systematically and consciously, not a few 
 speculative minds of non-Catholic England. Yet surely 
 never was there an error more suicidal ; and Mr. Mill in a 
 few pregnant words utterly explodes it. We quote the
 
 The Rule and Motive of Certitude. 25 
 
 passage with a few verbal changes (pp. 161, 162), and we 
 italicize two sentences. 
 
 " If the proof of the trustworthiness of our faculties is the 
 veracity of the Creator, on what does the Creator's veracity 
 itself rest ? Is it not on the evidence of our faculties ? The 
 Divine veracity can only be known in two ways : (1) By 
 intuition, or (2) through evidence. If it is known by intuition, 
 it is itself an immediate declaration of our faculties ; and to 
 have ground for believing it we must assume that our faculties are 
 trustworthy. ... If we hold that God is not known by intuition 
 but proved by evidence, that evidence must rest in the last 
 resort on the' immediate declaration of our faculties. Religion 
 thus, itself resting on the evidence of our faculties, cannot be 
 invoked to prove that our faculties ought to be believed. We 
 must already trust our faculties before we can have any evidence of 
 the truth of religion." 
 
 We are bound in fairness to add that Dr. M'Cosh, in 
 his "Examination of Mr. Mill's Philosophy" (p. 54), ex- 
 presses full concurrence with this reasoning. 
 
 Dean Mansel has undoubtedly conferred important 
 benefits on philosophy, and we hope in our succeeding essays 
 to profit largely by his labours. Yet we must frankly say 
 that, on the matter discussed in our present essay, his 
 doctrine differs from Dr. M'Cosh's, signally for the worse. 
 He concurs with that writer in holding that God's Veracity 
 is my reason for regarding my faculties as in any sense 
 trustworthy ; but he considers that argument as availing, 
 not for the conclusion that their declaration is always true, 
 but only that they are not so utterly mendacious as to be 
 the mere "instruments of deception." " We may believe, 
 and we ought to believe," he says (" Prolegomena Logica," 
 p. 81), " that the powers which our Creator has bestowed 
 upon us are not given as instruments of deception. . . . But 
 in believing this we desert the evidence of Iteason to rest 
 on that of Faith." According to this view, I could not 
 know or even guess that my faculties are not mere instru-
 
 26 The Philosophy of Theism, 
 
 raents of deception, except for my belief that they are given 
 by God. But on what ground do I believe that they are 
 given by God ? Because they by their exercise lead me to 
 that conclusion. But how do I know that, in thus leading 
 me, they are not mere instruments of deception ? Because 
 they were given me by God? But how do I know that 
 they were given me by God? And so on with a vicious 
 circle ad infmitum. 
 
 We would only add here, to prevent possible miscon- 
 ception of our meaning, that God's Veracity is undoubtedly 
 a most legitimate philosophical premiss for the establish- 
 ment of any conclusion, which is not itself required as a 
 premiss for the demonstration of God's Veracity. For our 
 own part, we think that a consideration of God's Attributes 
 might with advantage be much oftener employed in philo- 
 sophical argument than is commonly the case. But this 
 by the way. 
 
 We are now, then, to consider how far we may count on 
 Mr. Mill's agreement with ourselves, in holding that the 
 genuine declaration of man's faculties is in every case 
 infallibly true. It is by no means so easy to answer this 
 question confidently as might at first be supposed. At 
 p. 152, indeed, he seems to speak unmistakably in our 
 sense. " The verdict of ... our immediate and intuitive 
 conviction is admitted on all hands to be a decision without 
 appeal." Again, in p. 166 : " As regards almost all, if not 
 all philosophers," he says and by his very phrase he 
 implies that he at all events is no dissentient "the 
 questions which divided them have never turned on the 
 veracity of consciousness."* What Sir W. Hamilton 
 " calls the testimony of consciousness to something beyond 
 itself, may be and is denied ; but what is denied has almost 
 
 * It should }>e explained that here and elsewhere he adopts under pro- 
 test Sir W. Hamilton's use of the word "consciousness," to express not 
 merely " self-consciousness," but man's intuitive faculty.
 
 Ttte Rule and Motive of Certitude. 27 
 
 always been that consciousness gives the testimony, not 
 that if given it must be believed." In the preceding page, he 
 says that no philosopher, not even Hume or Kant, had 
 "dreamed of saying that we are compelled by our nature 
 to believe" error. At page 161, note, he cites with approval 
 Mr. Stirling's excellent statement, that it is the business of 
 man's cognitive faculties to consider carefully what it is 
 which they themselves declare : and adds, pointedly and 
 justly (p. 166), that "we certainly do not know by intuition 
 what knowledge is intuitive." 
 
 Yet, in p. 171, he introduces a very ominous qualification 
 of this doctrine. Men should only accept, it seems, " what 
 consciousness," i.e. their intellect, " told them at the time 
 when its revelations iverc in their pristine purity." There are 
 " mental conceptions which become so identified in thought 
 with all our states of consciousness, that we seem and cannot 
 but seem to receive them by direct intuition." (Ib.) Some 
 thinkers (p. 177) " may be personally quite incapable of not 
 holding " a fundamental error. " We have no means of 
 interrogating consciousness," i.e. our intellect, " in the only 
 circumstances in which it is possible for it to give a trust- 
 worthy answer" (p. 172). "Something u-hich ice now 
 confound with consciousness may have been altogether 
 foreign to consciousness in its primitive state " (p. 185). lie 
 seems really to distinguish between the primitive and the 
 adult state of man's cognitive faculties. He seems to imply 
 that the laws of man's mental constitution are changed 
 during his progress from infancy to manhood ; and that it 
 is to their earlier, not their later, declarations that we are 
 to look for authentication of truth. 
 
 We cannot believe that Mr. Mill really intends this ; 
 and we will, therefore, for the moment content ourselves 
 with a brief reply to his possible meaning. We will say 
 this, then. If the laws of man's mental constitution do 
 really change in his progress from infancy to manhood,
 
 2S Tlir Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 then never was there a philosophical proposition more 
 preposterously unfounded than that assumed by Mr. Mill 
 throughout, viz. that man's primitive faculties testify truth. 
 On what ground does an adult trust his faculties? We 
 know of no other answer than we gave in an earlier part 
 of our essay. In eacli individual case he finds himself 
 necessitated to know infallibly what his faculties indubitably 
 declare as certain ; and he generalizes this by degrees into 
 the universal proposition that they are veracious. But all 
 this applies to his adult, not his primitive, mental constitu- 
 tion ; and if the former in any respect contradicts the 
 latter, his reasoning so far does not apply to the latter at 
 all. Mr. Mill professes, as strongly as we do, that no 
 knowledge or experience is possible, unless the thinker first 
 trust the distinct declarations of his memory. Is it only, 
 then, the clear declarations of man's primitive memory 
 which Mr. Mill accounts self-evidently true ? 
 
 For ourselves we cannot but entirely agree with Mr. 
 Mill's critic, whom he mentions in his note to p. 173. We 
 think it would be " contrary to all analogy," if man's 
 cognoscitive faculties did not need and did not receive, as 
 time advances, " development and education." 
 
 An argument, precisely resembling the above, applies 
 a fortiori to a view which Mr. Mill ascribes (p. 175, note) 
 to Mr. Herbert Spencer : viz. that " our primary forms of 
 thought " are in many cases " inherited by us from 
 ancestors by the laws of the development of organization," 
 and need not, therefore, correspond with objective truth. It 
 is plain we may observe in passing that such a theory 
 applies no less to memory than to man's other cognitive 
 faculties ; and the view thus stated impresses us as indi- 
 cating the lowest point of speculative degradation at which 
 " the progress of thought " has yet arrived. We should 
 add, however, that all readers of Mr. Spencer are unani- 
 mous in accounting him a writer of rare subtlety and genius.
 
 Tfte Ride and Motive of Certitude. 29 
 
 Returning to Mr. Mill, we cannot persuade ourselves 
 that he really means what he seems to say ; that he really 
 regards man's mental constitution as undergoing a change 
 between infancy and maturity, in such sense that its de- 
 clarations of a later period can possibly contradict those 
 of an earlier. Nor, again, do we interpret a singular ex- 
 pression in his " Logic," as indicating a real difference 
 between him and ourselves, on what has been the theme of 
 this article. Yet we cannot refrain from adverting to that 
 expression. He says (vol. ii. pp. 97-98, seventh edition) that 
 " the truth of a belief " would not follow even from an 
 "irresistible necessity" of entertaining it; and that man- 
 kind might conceivably be " under a permanent necessity 
 of believing what might possibly not be true." But though 
 Mr. Mill here speaks very obscurely, we understand him as 
 referring to a certain imaginary state of things, which 
 might have existed; and not as denying that in fact man's 
 reason infallibly authenticates its own authority. It seems 
 to us, from his language in both works, that Mr. Mill has 
 failed indeed (as we should estimate the matter) in clearly 
 and consistently apprehending and bearing in mind the 
 true doctrine ; but that he has never intended to advocate 
 a different one in preference. We shall take for granted, 
 therefore, in our next essay, unless we are admonished 
 of being mistaken, that the controversy between him and 
 ourselves turns in no respect on the authority of man's 
 faculties, but exclusively on their avouchment. 
 
 On the other hand, we fully admit that again and again 
 inferences are so readily and imperceptibly drawn as to be 
 most easily mistaken for intuitions ; and that, in arguing 
 hereafter against Mr. Mill, we shall have no right of 
 alleging aught as certainly a primitive truth, without 
 prorinfi that it cannot be an opinion derived mferentially 
 from experience. It is our strong impression that this, 
 and no more, is what Mr. Mill intends to urge in the
 
 30 Tl<c Philosophy of Theixm. 
 
 distinction which ho draws between the primitive and the 
 adult avouchment of men's faculties. 
 
 We think so highly of F. Newman's philosophical 
 acumen, that it would not bo fair if we did not in conclu- 
 sion place before our readers a passage in which he 
 apparently gives the weight of his authority to a different 
 view from that which we have supported throughout this 
 essay : 
 
 Sometimes our trust in our powers of reasoning and memory, 
 that is, our implicit assent to their telling truly, is treated as a 
 first principle ; but we cannot properly bo said to have any 
 trust in them as faculties. At most we trust in particular acts 
 of memory and reasoning. Wo are sure there was a yesterday, 
 and that we did this or that in it; we are sure that three times 
 six is eighteen, and that the diagonal of a square is longer than 
 the side. So far as this wo may bo said to trust the mental act 
 bv which the object of our assent is verified ; but, in doing so, 
 
 v O 
 
 we imply no recognition of a general power or faculty, or of any 
 capability or affection of our minds over and above the particular 
 act. We know indeed that we have a faculty by which wo 
 remember, as we know we have a faculty by which we breathe ; 
 but we gain this knowledge by abstraction or inference from its 
 particular acts, not by direct experience. Nor do we trust in 
 the faculty of memory or reasoning as such, even after that wo 
 have inferred its existence ; for its acts are often inaccurate, nor 
 do we invariably assent to them. 
 
 However, if I must speak my mind, I have another ground 
 for reluctance to speak of our trusting memory or reasoning, 
 except, indeed, by a figure of speech. It seems to me un- 
 philosophical to speak of trusting ourselves. We are what wo 
 are, and we use, not trust our faculties. To debate about 
 trusting in a case like this is parallel to the confusion implied 
 in wishing we had had a choice if we would be created or no, 
 or speculating what I should be like if I were born of other 
 parents. " Proxiraus sum egomet mihi." Our consciousness of 
 self is prior to all questions of trust or assent. We act accord- 
 ing to our nature, by means of ourselves, when we remember or 
 reason. We are as little able to accept or reject our mental 
 constitution as our being. We have not the option ; wo can 
 but misuse or mar its functions. We do not confront or
 
 The Rule and Motive of Certitude. 31 
 
 bargain with ourselves ; and therefore I cannot call the trust- 
 worthiness of the faculties of memory and reasoning one of our 
 first principles (pp. 58-59). 
 
 We cannot doubt that these comments are aimed by 
 F. Newman at opinions entirely similar to those of this 
 essay, which were advocated by Dr. Ward in his " Philo- 
 sophical Introduction." We heartily concur, however, with 
 the first of the two paragraphs, as all will have seen who 
 have read our remarks ; nor did Dr. Ward express himself 
 otherwise in his work. Of F. Newman's second paragraph 
 we confess ourselves unable to apprehend the bearing ; 
 though very probably our inability to do so arises from 
 some narrowness of intellectual vision. We can hardly 
 be mistaken, however, in saying that the objection is 
 directed against our method of expressing our doctrine, and 
 not against that doctrine itself; and we will beg our 
 readers to give F. Newman's comment their attentive 
 consideration. 
 
 In our present essay, then, we have maintained that 
 whatever man's cognitive faculties indubitably declare as 
 certain is thereby known to be infallibly true. In our next 
 we are to maintain against Mr. Mill that there is no one 
 thing which they more indubitably declare as certain than 
 the existence of necessary verities.
 
 II. 
 
 MR. MILL'S DENIAL OF NECESSARY TRUTH.* 
 
 MR. MILL has set an excellent example, in singling out an 
 individual writer (Sir W. Hamilton) as bis special opponent. 
 Even those philosophers who are most nearly agreed, differ 
 from each other so considerably in their exposition of 
 doctrine, that an antagonist who attempts to answer them 
 all directly is unable to exhibit the full strength of his 
 case. If he replies to them successively, he becomes 
 tedious ; if he encounters them collectively, he must use 
 much vagueness and indistinctness of expression. A far 
 more satisfactory issue will be reached, if he singles out for 
 conflict one in particular ; nor will he thereby be prevented 
 from adding such supplementary remarks as may be neces- 
 sary for a complete exposition of his view. All which he 
 need consider is, that the particular opponent whom he 
 selects may both be, and receive general recognition as being, 
 a worthy representative of the adverse school. If Mr. Mill 
 did well in this respect by choosing Sir W. Hamilton, 
 much more shall we do well by choosing Mr. Mill. 
 
 In one respect, it is both easier and more hopeful to deal 
 with phenomenists than with their extreme opposites, the 
 transcendental pantheists. Phenomenists appeal honestly 
 
 * An Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy. By JOHN STUART 
 MILL. Third Kdition. London : Longmans. 
 
 A St/fifi-m of Logic, Jiatiocinatire and Inductive. By JOHN STUAHT MILL. 
 Seventh Edition. London : Longmans.
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. 33 
 
 and consistently to the one legitimate standard, the observed 
 facts of human thought ; and there is therefore a really 
 appreciable prospect of conducting our argument against 
 them to some definite result.* But Mr. Mill in particular 
 is a more satisfactory opponent than any other of his school, 
 in proportion as, more distinctly than any other of their 
 number, he points to the precise psychical facts on which 
 he would build, and the precise conclusion which he would 
 infer from each. His singular power of clear exposition, of 
 making easier what is difficult, of throwing light on what is 
 obscure, benefits doubtless his own cause in the first instance, 
 as is but fair : yet ultimately it greatly assists his antagonist ; 
 or rather assists the cause itself of truth, whatever that 
 may be : and there is no other cause, we are thoroughly 
 convinced, which he ever knowingly desires to promote. He 
 is never led, by any latent consciousness of a weak point, 
 to seek refuge in veiling his sense under a cloud of words ; 
 but on the contrary has no other aim in his language, than 
 that of making himself as intelligible as he can. Then 
 again there is no other phenomenist who has carried out 
 philosophical principles into nearly so large a field of 
 practical application ; and this is a farther advantage to 
 the cause of truth. We cannot indeed admit that he is, in 
 the fullest sense of that word, a consistent thinker ; we 
 cannot e.g. admit that his utilitarianism is the true philo- 
 sophical correlative to that generous self-sacrificing philan- 
 thropy which is so attractive a feature in his character, 
 and which so often exposes him to the charge of visionary 
 enthusiasm. f But he is almost entirely free from those 
 
 * " The man who seeks to enter the temple of Philosophy by any other 
 approach than the vestibule of psychology, can never penetrate into its inm-r 
 sanctuary; for psychology alone leads to and evolves philosophical truth, 
 even though it is itself subordinate to philosophy. Moreover he who attempts 
 to construct psychology by the aid and under tlie direction of a metaphysical 
 system, contradicts the order by which both psychology and philosophy nro 
 developed and acquired." (Porter on the Human Intellect, p. GO.) 
 
 t For ourselves we are so profoundly convinced of the intense social evils 
 VOL. 1. I)
 
 34 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 express and (one may even say) verbal self-contradictions, 
 of which he has pointed out so many in Sir W. Hamilton ; 
 and even those of his works which are least philosophical, 
 are evidently written under a vivid remembrance of his 
 philosophical tenets. So far therefore as self-contradiction 
 exists below the surface as is, we think, by no means 
 unfrequently the case such a fact is a most legitimately 
 available weapon against him in controversy. 
 
 The corner-stone of his system is that which we are to 
 oppose in our present essay ; his denial that there is any 
 truth cognizable by man as " necessary." Were he once 
 to admit that there is any one truth thus cognizable his 
 works might still be admitted to contain a large mass of 
 good philosophical matter, as we think indeed they do but 
 his philosophy as a whole would be at an end. On such 
 an hypothesis, we say, its whole framework and structure 
 would be proved rotten ; its materials, however valuable 
 in themselves, would have to be detached and rearranged ; 
 and his edifice would have to be reconstructed from its very 
 foundation. It is amply sufficient then, if we establish in 
 our present essay that there is at least one cognizable class 
 of necessary truths. By this means we shall have con- 
 cluded the question of principle ; and shall leave no more 
 behind than the question of comparative detail, what are 
 those propositions which justly vindicate to themselves that 
 title. We will leave to future essays this question of 
 comparative detail ; concerning ourselves here only with 
 the question of principle. Since therefore we are to choose 
 some special field whereon to join issue as a specimen of 
 the rest, there is one particular class of truths, which will 
 
 which result, here in England and in Europe generally, from the Church's 
 loss of political pre-eminence, that we are by no means disposed to dub a 
 man visionary and enthusiastic, for the mere offence of advocating very funda- 
 mental social changes. Yet we do charge Mr. Mill with visionary enthusiasm 
 for expecting real social amelioration from such remedies as those, which 
 alone, consistently with his principles, he can propose.
 
 Mr. MiWs Denial of Necessary Truth. 35 
 
 be generally accepted as in every respect most fitted to 
 effect a clear and salient result. Our direct argument shall 
 be, that mathematical truths are cognizable by mankind as 
 necessary. 
 
 This issue, again, may be still further narrowed. Mr. 
 Mill will not of course deny that, if mathematical axioms be 
 necessary, the validity of syllogistic reasoning must be also a 
 necessary verity ; and that the whole body of mathematical 
 truth must possess the same character. Our thesis then 
 shall be, that mathematical axioms (arithmetical, algebraic, 
 geometrical) are self-evidently necessary truths. By the 
 term " axioms," for the purpose of our present essay, we 
 understand those verities which mathematicians assume as 
 indubitably true, and use as the first premisses of their 
 science. And we are to assume the doctrine for which we 
 argued in our first essay ; viz. that whatever a man's 
 cognitive faculties indubitably declare, is known by him to 
 be infallibly true. 
 
 "We have elsewhere expressed our own suggestion, on the 
 true analysis of that idea " necessary," which is to be the 
 theme of our present essay. The idea itself, however, is so 
 pronounced and unmistakable, that every thinking person 
 understands its meaning in a certain vague but practically 
 sufficient way. Our present purpose accordingly will lead 
 us only to attempt such a delineation and embodiment of 
 this idea, as shall make clear the point at issue between 
 Mr. Mill and all objectivists. When we call a proposition 
 " necessary " then, we mean to say that its contradictory is 
 an intrinsically impossible chimera; is that which could 
 not be found in any possible region of existence ; is that 
 which even an Omnipotent Being* would be unable to 
 effect. And in order to show that the human mind cognizes 
 certain self-evidently necessary truths, we begin by putting 
 
 * We must not of courso, in this nulimcntnl stage of our argument gainst 
 Mr. Mill, assume that there is an Omnijiotent Being.
 
 36 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 out of court " tautologous " propositions those which 
 declare no more than has already been expressed in the 
 subject : for concerning them, of course, Mr. Mill himself 
 admits that their truth is known independently of experi- 
 ence ; and mathematical axioms are not of their number. 
 Our controversy with Mr. Mill is concerned, not with these 
 " tautologous," but with what may be called " significant " 
 propositions ; with propositions which declare something 
 not expressed in their subject. And our allegation is this. 
 There is many a " significant " proposition, such that, to 
 use F. Kleutgen's words, " by simply considering the ideas 
 of the subject and the predicate, one comes to see that 
 there really exists between them that relation which the 
 proposition declares " : * and every such proposition is self- 
 evidently known as necessary. 
 
 Firstly then we say, that if there are such propositions, 
 they are self-evidently necessary. Or we may express the 
 same truth somewhat differently. If in any case I know, 
 by my merely thinking or conception of some ens, that a 
 certain attribute, not included in that conception, is truly 
 predicable of that ens, such predication is a self-evidently 
 necessary proposition. Take for instance the axiom, that 
 all trilateral figures are triangular. If, by my very concep- 
 tion of a trilateral figure, I know its triangularity, and if 
 (as we established in our first essay) the avouchment of 
 my faculties corresponds infallibly with objective truth, 
 then I know infallibly that a trilateral non-triangular figure 
 is an intrinsically repugnant chimera ; that in no possible 
 region of existence could such a figure be found ; that not 
 even an Omnipotent Being could form one. All these are 
 obvious and undeniable consequences of the fundamental 
 
 F. Kleutjjen explains, tliat such propositions are called by Kant "syn- 
 thetical," but by Catholic philosophers "analytical" (Phil. Scol., n. 300). 
 We believe that all non-Catholic philosophers without exception follow 
 Kant's usage in this matter : and it will be more convenient therefore if we 
 avoid the U-rni altogether.
 
 Mr. Mills Denial of Necessary Truth. 37 
 
 proposition, that, by my very conception of a trilateral 
 figure, I know its triangularity : and to admit therefore this 
 fundamental proposition, is to admit that the triangularity 
 of all trilateral figures is cognizable as a self-evidently 
 necessary truth. 
 
 If this reasoning be admitted, what is our controversial 
 position? In such case taking the above-named axiom 
 as our specimen instance, all which we have to maintain 
 against . Mr. Mill is, that, by my very conception of a 
 trilateral figure, I know that the attribute triangularity is 
 predicable of every such figure. But we do not see how it 
 is possible to make clearer so very clear a proposition ; and 
 our direct business therefore is merely to answer Mr. Mill's 
 objections. 
 
 For these, we naturally turn in the first instance to his 
 special philosophical work, his " Examination of Sir "W. 
 Hamilton's Philosophy." He treats the question from 
 p. 318 to 326 ; and purports to account for the phenomena 
 on which objectivists build, by what he calls " the associa- 
 tion pyschology." By this term he denotes that psycho- 
 logical theory which alleges that man's belief in necessary 
 truth does not authenticate any corresponding reality, but 
 results from past uniformity in the association of ideas. 
 All my life long I have been seeing trilaterals which are 
 triangular, while I have had no one experience to the 
 contrary. So inseparable an association then thus Mr. 
 Mill argues has been established in my mind between the 
 ideas of trilateralness and triangularity, that I am deluded 
 into the fancy of some a priori connection between them, 
 independent of what is known by experience ; I am deluded 
 into the fancy, that by my very conception of a trilateral 
 figure I know its triangularity. We shall have, as we 
 proceed, to consider this argument in detail ; but we will 
 at once urge against it what seems an irrefragable argu- 
 ment ad Jtoinincm.
 
 38 The Philosophy of Theixni. 
 
 According to Mr. Mill, my having constantly experienced 
 the triangularity of trilateral figures, is merely one out of 
 a thousand sets of instances, in which I have observed the 
 unexceptional uniformity of the laws of nature. There is 
 no other experimental truth whatever, he thinks, which 
 rests on nearly so large a mass of experience, as does this 
 truth, that phenomena succeed each other in uniform laws.* 
 To this universal uniformity, " we not only do not know 
 any exception, but the exceptions which limit or apparently 
 invalidate the special laws, are so far from contradicting 
 the universal one that they confirm it." (" Logic," vol. ii. 
 p. 104.) Now the fact of my having constantly experienced 
 triangularity in trilateral figures, suffices (according to Mr. 
 Mill) for my having knit the ideas of trilateralness and 
 triangularity into such inseparable association that I 
 delusively fancy one to be involved in my very conception 
 of the other. Much more certainly therefore so Mr. Mill 
 in consistency should admit I must have knit into such 
 inseparable association the two ideas, " phenomena " and 
 " succeeding each other by uniform laws," that I necessarily 
 fancy one to be involved in my very conception of the 
 other. If, through my constant experience of triangular 
 trilateral, I am under a practical necessity of fancying 
 that in every possible region of existence all trilaterals are 
 triangular much more, through my constant experience of 
 uniformity in phenomenal succession, must I be under a 
 practical necessity of fancying, that in every possible region 
 of existence phenomena succeed each other by uniform 
 laws. Now am I under any such necessity, or under any 
 kind of approach to it ? We summon the defendant into 
 court as witness for the plaintiff. " I am convinced," he 
 says (" Logic," vol. ii. p. 98), " that any one accustomed to 
 
 * To prevent possible misapprehension, we should explain that we are 
 arguing entirely ad hominem. We do not ourselves admit that the uni- 
 formity of nature is a truth, which experience by itself would suffice to 
 establish.
 
 Mr. MilTs Denial of Necessary Truth. 39 
 
 abstraction and analysis, who will fairly exert his faculties 
 for the purpose, will . . . find no difficulty in conceiving 
 that in some one, for instance, of the many firmaments 
 into which sidereal astronomy now divides the universe, 
 events may succeed one another at random without any 
 fixed law." Put these two statements then together. I 
 find insuperable difficulty against fancying, that in any 
 possible " firmament " there can be non-triangular tri- 
 laterals ; but I find no difficulty whatever against fancying, 
 that in many a possible " firmament " phenomena succeed 
 each other without fixed laws. Yet I have experienced the 
 uniformity of phenomenal succession (according to Mr. 
 Mill) very far more widely, and in no respect less unex- 
 ceptionally, than I have experienced the triangularity of 
 trilaterals. The impossibility therefore which I find in 
 believing the non-triangularity of any possible trilateral, 
 cannot be in any way imagined to arise from constancy 
 of experience. In other words, Mr. Mill's psychological 
 principle breaks down. 
 
 We will now proceed to consider in order Mr. Mill's 
 course of argument, from p. 318 to p. 325 ; stating it as 
 far as possible in his own words. He begins thus : 
 
 It is strange that almost all the opponents of the Association 
 psychology should found their main or sole argument in refuta- 
 tion of it upon the feeling of necessity ; for if there be any one 
 feeling in our nature which the laws of association are obviously 
 equal to producing, one would say it is that. Necessary, 
 according to Kant's definition, and there is none better, is that 
 of which the negation is impossible. If we find it impossible, 
 by any trial, to separate two ideas, wo have all the feeling of 
 necessity which the mind is capable of. Those, therefore, who 
 deny that association can generate a necessity of thought, must 
 be willing to affirm that two ideas are never so knit together by 
 association as to be practically inseparable. But to allirm this 
 is to contradict the most familiar experience of life. Many 
 persons who have been frightened in childhood ran never be 
 alone in the dark without irrepressible terrors. Many a person
 
 40 Tfie Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 is unable to revisit a particular place, or to think of a particular 
 event, without recalling acute feelings of grief or reminiscences 
 of suffering. If the facts which created these strong associa- 
 tions in individual minds had been common to all mankind 
 from their earliest infancy, and had, when the associations were 
 fully formed, been forgotten, we should have had a necessity of 
 thought one of the necessities which are supposed to prove an 
 objective law, apd an a priori mental connection between ideas, 
 (pp. 318, 319.) 
 
 We have always thought this passage to be among the 
 weakest which Mr. Mill ever wrote. Firstly, the two 
 instances which he gives in no way exemplify a necessity 
 of tJuntght, but only a necessity of feeling ; the feeling of 
 fear in solitary darkness, and of grief in revisiting a par- 
 ticular place or in thinking of a particular person. Now 
 many wild theories have doubtless been maintained by 
 considerable persons ; but who in the world ever alleged, 
 that a necessity of feeling "proves an objective law and an 
 a priori mental connection between ideas " ? * 
 
 But a more important fallacy remains to be mentioned. 
 Mr. Mill's whole reasoning turns on the phrase, "necessity 
 of thought;" and yet he has used that phrase in two 
 senses fundamentally different. A " necessity of thought " 
 may no doubt be most intelligibly understood to mean, " a 
 law of nature whereby under certain circumstances I 
 necessarily think this, that, and the other judgment." But 
 it may also be understood to mean, "a law of nature 
 whereby / think as necessary this, that, and the other 
 
 * In the first of the two instances Mr. Mill might possibly be understood 
 to mean, that the timid person, so long as solitude and darkness remain, 
 actually believes the presence of some danger. Even if this were psycho- 
 logically true, it would plainly be nothing to Mr. Mill's purpose. But Mr. 
 Mill does not really think it at all certain that there is even this temporary 
 belief. " The emotion of fear may be excited, and I believe often is excited 
 simply by terrific imaginations. That these imaginations are even for a 
 moment mistaken for menacing realities, may be true, but ought not to be 
 assumed without proof." (J. S. Mill's edition of Mill's "Analysis," vol. i. 
 p. 408.)
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth, 41 
 
 judgment." Now we heartily agree with Mr. Mill, that 
 from a "necessity of thought" in the former sense, no 
 legitimate argument whatever can be deduced for a neces- 
 sity of objective truth. Supposing I felt unusually cold a 
 few moments ago ; it is a " necessity of thought " that I 
 shall now remember the circumstance : yet that past ex- 
 perience was no necessary truth. It is a " necessity of 
 thought " again, that I expect the sun to rise to-morrow : 
 and many similar instances could be adduced. The only 
 "necessity of thought" which proves the self-evident 
 necessity of objective truth, is the necessity of thinking 
 that such truth is self-evidently necessary. 
 
 This paragraph then exhibits from first to last a simple. 
 " ignoratio elenchi," such as we should not have expected 
 from a writer like Mr. Mill. He proceeds, however, to say 
 most truly, that Dean Mansel is a far more effective 
 opponent of phenomenism than Sir W. Hamilton ; and 
 accordingly, when he proceeds to answer that philosopher, 
 he puts forth far greater strength than in the earlier 
 paragraphs. Since we are here to enter on the most 
 critical part of our controversy, we must begin with first 
 distinctly setting forth (which we have not hitherto done) 
 Mr. Mill's own theory, on the kind ol certitude with which 
 men hold the truth of mathematical axioms, and on the 
 ground of that certitude. 
 
 This doctrine may be stated as follows. " I know the 
 fact that all trilateral are triangular, just as I know the 
 fact that all wood floats on the water and that all stones 
 sink therein. I have seen in my life a vast number of 
 trilateral figures, and I have found them all triangular ; 
 all other men have had the same experience ; and the same 
 laws of induction, which prove that throughout the sphere 
 of human observation wood floats on the water, prove also 
 that throughout the sphere of human observation trilateral 
 are triangular. Whether either of these two propositions
 
 42 The PMofiopliy of Theism. 
 
 is true 'in distant parts of the stellar regions' ("Logic," 
 vol. ii. p. 108), is a question on which I cannot form even 
 a reasonable conjecture." * 
 
 For our own part we are confident, that the repugnance 
 against this theory which will instinctively rise up in every 
 intelligent mind Mr. Mill himself admits that there is in 
 the first instance this instinctive repugnance is founded 
 on reasoning much deeper than Mr. Mill's. Still when 
 thinkers of such power as Mr. Mill and some of his sup- 
 porters advocate a paradoxical thesis, the paradox must not 
 be left to sink by its own weight, but must be assailed by 
 explicit argument. 
 
 Now we shall not here consider the question one way or 
 other, whether supposing reason did not prove mathe- 
 matical axioms true in every possible region of existence 
 experience could by itself suffice to prove them true through- 
 out the reach of human observation. Our purpose is to 
 maintain the utter falsehood of the above hypothesis ; to 
 maintain that mathematical axioms are known by the light 
 of reason to be self-evidently necessary. Dean Mansel has 
 supported this view, to our mind, with absolutely irre- 
 fragable arguments. And we must do Mr. Mill the justice 
 
 * We think Mr. Mill will admit that we have truly stated his theory ; 
 yet we will give a lew references to his works. Mathematical axioms 
 (" Logic," vol. i. p. 258) " are experimental truths : generalizations from ob- 
 servation." " The reverse of the most familiar principles of arithmetic and 
 geometry might have been made conceivable even to our present mental 
 facultie*, if those faculties had co-existed with a totally different constitution 
 of external nature." (On Hamilton, pp. 85, 86, note.) " We should probably 
 be as well able to conceive a round square as a heavy square, if it was not 
 that in our uniform experience at the instant when a thin:; begins to be round, 
 it ceases to be square." (Ib. p. 85.) See also " Logic," vol. i. pp. 259, 283. 
 In vol. i. p. 350, Mr. Mill speaks somewhat unexpectedly. " That a straight 
 line is the shortest distance between two points," he says, " we do not 
 doubt to be true even in the region of the fixed stars." But we do not see 
 how to reconcile this with his statement (vol. ii. p. 108) that " it would be 
 folly to affirm confidently * that " the special laws which we have found to 
 hold universally on our own planet " prevail " in distant parts of the stellar 
 regions;" and that ' it would be idle to attempt to assign any " " probability " 
 to such a an; position. We shall return to this in the text.
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. 43 
 
 to say, that he has given so fair a representation of those 
 arguments that we have no wish to cite them except as they 
 stand in Mr. Mill's own pages. We will place therefore 
 before our readers a long extract from the " Examination 
 of Hamilton," which will exhibit in close context the Dean's 
 reasoning and Mr. Mill's attempted reply. The passage 
 follows almost immediately that which we last extracted ', 
 and the italics are ours. 
 
 Mr. Hansel joins a distinct issue with the Association psycho- 
 logy, and brings the question to the proper test. "It has been 
 already observed," he says in his " Prolegomena Logica," " that 
 whatever truths we are compelled to admit as everywhere and 
 at all times necessary, must have their origin, not without, in 
 the laws of the sensible world, but within, in the constitutiou 
 of the mind itself. Sundry attempts have, indeed, been made 
 to derive them from sensible experience and constant association 
 of ideas ; but this explanation is refuted by a criterion decisive 
 of the fate of all hypotheses : it does not account for the 
 phenomena. It does not account for the fact that other associa- 
 tions, as frequent and as uniform, are incapable of producing a 
 higher conviction than that of a relative and physical necessity only." 
 
 This is coming to the point, and evinces a correct appre- 
 hension of the conditions of scientific proof. If other associations, 
 as close and as habitual as those existing in the cases in question, 
 do not produce a similar feeling of necessity of thought, the 
 sufficiency of the alleged cause is disproved, and the theory 
 must fall. Mr. Mansel is within the true conditions of the 
 Psychological Method. 
 
 But what are these cases of uniform and intimate associa- 
 tion, which do not give rise to a feeling of mental necessity ? 
 The following is Mr. Mangel's first example of them : " I may 
 imagine the sun rising and setting as now fur a hundred years, 
 and afterwards remaining continually fixed in the meridian. 
 Yet my experiences of the alternations of day and night havo 
 been at least as invariable as of the geometrical properties of 
 bodies. I can imagine the same stone sinking ninety-nino 
 times in the water, and floating the hundredth, but my 
 experience invariably repeats the former phenomenon only." * 
 
 * We would ourselves rathtr say : "I do not fancy mynelf to ctyni:c an;/ 
 intrinsic repugnance in the notion that the sun, after rising and setting for u
 
 44 Tfte Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 The alternation of day and night is invariable in our 
 experience ; but is the phenomenon day so closely linked in our 
 experience with the phenomenon night, that we never perceive 
 the one, without, at the same or the immediately succeeding 
 moment, perceiving the other? That is a condition present 
 in the inseparable associations which generate necessities of 
 thought. Uniformities of sequence, in which the phenomena 
 succeed one another only at a certain interval, do not give rise to 
 inseparable associations. There are also mental conditions, as 
 well as physical, which are required to create such an associa- 
 tion. Let us take Mr. Mansel's other instance, a stone sinking 
 in the water. We have never seen it float, yet we have no 
 difficulty in conceiving it floating. But, in the first place, wo 
 have not been seeing stones sinking in water from the first 
 dawn of consciousness, and in nearly every subsequent moment 
 of our lives, as we have been seeing two and two make four, 
 intersecting straight lines diverging instead of inclosing a space, 
 causes followed by effects and effects preceded by causes. But 
 there is a still more radical distinction than this. No frequency 
 of conjunction between two phenomena will create an in- 
 separable association, if counter-associations are being created 
 all the while. If we sometimes saw stones floating as well as 
 sinking, however often we might have seen them sink, nobody 
 supposes that we should have formed an inseparable association 
 between them and sinking. We have not seen a stone float, but 
 we are in the constant habit of seeing either stones or other 
 things which have the same tendency to sink, remaining in a 
 position which they would otherwise quit, being maintained in 
 it by an unseen force. The sinking of a stone is but a case of 
 gravitation, and we are abundantly accustomed to see the force 
 of gravity counteracted. Every fact of that nature which wo 
 ever saw or heard of, is pro tanto an obstacle to the formation of 
 the inseparable association which would make a violation of the 
 law of gravity inconceivable to us. Resemblance is a principle 
 of association, as well as contiguity : and however contradictory 
 a supposition may be to our experience in hoc materid, if our 
 experience in alia materid furnishes us with types even distantly 
 resembling what the supposed phenomenon would be if realized, 
 the associations thus formed will generally prevent the specific 
 association from becoming so intense and irresistible, as to 
 
 hundred years, shall remain fixed in the meridian; or that the stone shall 
 float the hundredth time."
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. 45 
 
 disable our imaginative faculty from embodying the supposition 
 in a form moulded on one or other of those types. 
 
 Again, says Mr. Mansel, " experience has uniformly presented 
 to me a horse's body in conjunction with a horse's head, and a 
 man's head with a man's body ; just as experience has uniformly 
 presented to me space inclosed within a pair of curved lines and 
 not within a pair of straight lines " : yet I have no difficulty in 
 imagining a centaur, but cannot imagine a space inclosed by 
 two straight lines.* " Why do I, in the former case, consider the 
 results of my experience as contingent only and tramgressible, con- 
 fined to the actual phenomenon of a limited field, and possessing no 
 value beyond it ; while, in the latter, I am compelled to regard them 
 as necessary and universal ? Why can I give in imagination to 
 a quadruped body what experience assures me is possessed 
 by bipeds only ? And why can I not, in like manner, invest 
 straight lines with an attribute which experience has uniformly 
 presented in curves ? " 
 
 1 answer : Because our experience furnishes us with a 
 thousand models on which to frame the conception of a centaur, 
 and with none on which to frame that of two straight lines 
 inclosing a space. Nature, as known in our experience, is 
 uniform in its laws, but extremely varied in its combinations. 
 The combination of a horse's body with a human head has 
 nothing, primd facie, to make any wide distinction between it 
 and any of the numberless varieties which we find in animated 
 nature. To a common, even if not to a scientific mind, it is 
 within the limits of the variations in our experience. Every 
 similar variation which we have seen or heard of, is a help 
 towards conceiving this particular one ; and tends to form an 
 association, not of fixity, but of variability, which frustrates 
 the formation of an inseparable association between a human 
 head and a human body exclusively. We know of so many 
 different heads, united to so many different bodies, that we have 
 little difficulty in imagining any head in combination with any 
 body. Nay, the mere mobility of objects in space is a fact so 
 universal in our experience, that we easily conceive any object 
 whatever occupying the place of any other ; we nmy imagine 
 without difficulty a horse with his head removed, and a human 
 
 * Here ftgrvin we would ourselves rather say : "I do not consider myself 
 to fognizi: any intrinsic repugnance in the notion that a centaur should rxist, 
 but [ do consider myself to cognize intrinsic repugnance in the notion that 
 two straight lines should enclose u space."
 
 46 The Philosophy of Tlieism. 
 
 head put in its place. But what model does our experience 
 afford on which to frame, or what elements from which to con- 
 struct, the conception of two straight lines inclosing a space? 
 There are no counter-associations in that case, and consequently 
 the primary association, being founded on an experience 
 beginning from birth, and never for many minutes intermitted 
 in our waking hours, easily becomes inseparable. Had but 
 experience afforded a case of illusion, in which two straight 
 lines after intersecting had appeared again to approach, the 
 counter-association formed might have been sufficient to render 
 such a supposition imaginable, and defeat the supposed necessity 
 of thought. In the case of parallel lines, the laws of perspective 
 do present such an illusion : they do, to the eye, appear to meet 
 in both directions, and consequently to inclose a space : and by 
 supposing that we had no access to the evidence which proves 
 that they do not really meet, an ingenious thinker, whom I 
 formerly quoted, was able to give the idea of a constitution of 
 nature in which all mankind might have believed that two 
 straight lines could inclose a space. That we are unable to 
 believe or imagine it in our present circumstances, needs no 
 other explanation than the laws of association afford ; for the 
 case unites all the elements of the closest, intensest, and most 
 inseparable association, with the greatest freedom from con- 
 flicting counter-associations which can be found within the 
 conditions of human life. 
 
 In all the instances of phenomena invariably conjoined 
 which fail to create necessities of thought, I am satisfied it 
 would be found that the case is wanting in some of the con- 
 ditions required by the Association psychology, as essential to 
 the formation of an association really inseparable (pp. 320-325). 
 
 The first remark which we would make on this care- 
 fully elaborated passage, is in itself of some importance. 
 Mr. Mill distinctly admits that there is a real difference 
 between the kind of conviction wherewith I accept those 
 truths which an objectivist accounts necessary, and those 
 truths which he accounts contingent.* Mr. Mill of course 
 attempts to explain this difference in some way consistent 
 
 * It can hardly be needful to explain that by " contingent " we simply 
 mean " not necessary."
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. 47 
 
 with his theory : but the admission which he so candidly 
 makes is none the less observable. 
 
 Next we would point out, how importantly he misunder- 
 stands the objectivist position. In his view the objectivist 
 appeals, not to the human reason, but to the human 
 imagination; and argues that some given mathematical 
 axiom is self-evidently necessary, on no other ground than 
 that men are incapable of imaging to themselves its contra- 
 dictory. Nor do we deny, as we have already implied, that 
 Dean Mansel's language gives our author much excuse for 
 his misapprehension ; though we are convinced that the 
 Dean had no such meaning as Mr. Mill supposes. I am 
 to the full as incapable of imaging that mutual action 
 of material particles which is called gravitation, as of 
 imaging a quadrangular trilateral : yet I do not regard the 
 former, while I do regard the latter, as intrinsically 
 impossible. What an objectivist really alleges is, that the 
 truth of any given mathematical axiom is known to me 
 by my very conception of its subject ; and consequently 
 that, under the light of reason, I infallibly cognize that 
 axiom as a self-evidently necessary truth. We have 
 in an earlier part of our essay set forth this argument. 
 The only answer, given to it by Mr. Mill in the above 
 extract, rests on the united force of two allegations. If 
 either of these allegations be untrue, the whole answer 
 breaks down ; while for ourselves we are confident that both 
 of them are untrue. The first is, that men never account 
 any proposition self-evidently necessary, except one which 
 they have repeatedly for an indefinite period observed by 
 experience to be true. The second allegation is, that when- 
 ever two phenomenal facts are imdeviatingly and unmistak- 
 ably experienced in union, a thinker almost inevitably is 
 deluded into the fancy that there is some jH'Cfsaan/ con- 
 nection between them. We will reply to these two allega- 
 tions, in the order in which we have introduced them.
 
 48 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 First, then, we confidently deny that every truth, 
 ordinarily accounted necessary, has been very frequently 
 observed as true by him who thus accounts it. Take the 
 very instance we have so often given. It is probable 
 enough that I have very often seen trilateral figures ; but 
 have I often, consciously or unconsciously, observed the fact 
 that they are triangular ? Our impression is, that very few 
 men observe this fact at all, except those given to mathe- 
 matical study. A youth of fifteen years old is beginning to 
 learn geometry ; and his tutor points out to him, that every 
 trilateral figure is triangular. Does he naturally reply, 
 " Of course it is ; I have observed it a thousand times " ? 
 On the contrary, we believe that in ninety-nine cases out of 
 a hundred the proposition will be entirely new to him ; and 
 yet (notwithstanding its novelty) will at once commend 
 itself as self -evidently a necessary truth.* But there are 
 many cases in which the student has had no opportunity 
 for previous observation. We wonder how many men there 
 are, who have even once experienced the fact, that 2 + 9 
 = 8 + 8. At all events the testimony given by every 
 student will be this. I am told by my teacher that 2 + 9 
 = 8 + 8. In order to show me that the fact is so, he does 
 not dream of referring me to my past experience, but 
 recommends a fresh purely mental experiment. He tells 
 me, e.g., to fancy myself holding two pebbles in one hand 
 and nine in the other, and then transferring one pebble 
 from the larger to the smaller group. I thus cognize that 
 in every possible region of existence 2 + 9 = 3 + 8: and I 
 arrive easily indeed at the more general proposition, that, 
 in every possible region of existence, (a + 1) + (& 1) = 
 
 * " A mathematical friend told me he perfectly well remembered when 
 a boy being taught without understanding it the axiom ' Two straight lines 
 cannot inclose a space.' When the fourth proposition of Euclid WHS shown 
 him, he remembers the universality and necessity of the axiom at once flash- 
 ing on him." (Muhaffy's Trauelation of Fischer's Commentary on Kaut, 
 introduction, p. is.)
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. 49 
 
 a + 6 ; where a and b are any whole numbers whatever. 
 Here is a large generality regarded by me as a self-evidently 
 necessary truth, where no one can possibly say that the truth 
 has been long and constantly experienced. And innumerable 
 similar instances may be given, as is most obvious. 
 
 Secondly, we no less confidently deny Mr. Mill's second 
 allegation, that the mere constant experience of two 
 phenomenal facts in union leads men almost inevitably to 
 fancy some necessary connection between the two. There 
 is a certain phenomenon, constantly experienced by the 
 inhabitants of this cold climate during far the greater 
 portion of the day, throughout nearly three quarters of 
 every year : we refer to the warmth-giving property of fire. 
 Every Englishmen has more frequent experience of this, 
 than he has even of two and two making four, or of things 
 equal to the same equalling one another. Nor is there any 
 exception whatever to this property : there is no observed 
 substance, which is brought near fire without its warmth 
 being increased. Yet we see no intrinsic repugnance what- 
 ever in the notion, that in some other region of existence 
 a substance may be found, which in every other respect 
 resembles earthly fire in consumption of coal or wood, in 
 destroying or melting this or that other portion of matter 
 and yet which does not possess this particular property of 
 imparting warmth. Nor again do I see any intrinsic 
 repugnance whatever in the notion, that here upon earth, 
 through preternatural agency, on one or other occasion fire 
 may fail to impart warmth. I have never even once ex- 
 perienced the equality of 2 + 9 to 3 + 8, and yet am con- 
 vinced that not even Omnipotence could overthrow that 
 equality. I have most habitually experienced the warmth- 
 giving property of fire, and yet see no reason for doubting 
 that Omnipotence (if it exist)* can at any time suspend or 
 
 * We must ajrain remind our reader* that, in this early bta^e of our argu- 
 ment with Mr. Mill, we lire uot at liberty to absume the txitltiirr of an 
 Omnipotent Beiny. 
 
 VOL. I. E
 
 50 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 remove that property. That which I have never experienced, 
 I regard as necessary; that which I have habitually and 
 unexceptionally experienced, I regard as contingent. Most 
 certainly therefore mere constant and uniform experience 
 cannot possibly account as Mr. Mill thinks it does for 
 the mind's conviction of self-evident necessity. 
 
 There is another different road, by which we may no 
 less securely travel to the overthrow of Mr. Mill's theory. 
 Necessary truths may be most clearly distinguished from 
 those merely physical, by one simple consideration. Putting 
 aside the propositions of psychology, with which we are not 
 here concerned, the philosopher learns experimental truths 
 no otherwise than by observing external nature ; but he 
 learns self-evidently necessary verities by examining Iris own 
 mind. A proposition is discerned to be self-evidently 
 necessary, whenever (once more to use F. Kleutgen's expres- 
 sion) " by simply considering the ideas of the subject and 
 predicate, one comes to see that there exists between them 
 that relation which the proposition expresses." So I judge 
 it self-evidently necessary, that " the disobedience of a 
 rational creature to his Holy Creator's command is morally 
 wrong ; " that " malice and mendacity are evil habits ; " 
 that "a + 6=(a-l) + (6 + l);" that "all trilateral figures 
 are triangular." That these various propositions are not 
 cognized by me as experimental truths, is manifest (we say) 
 from one simple consideration ; for in forming them, I have 
 not been ever so slightly engaged in observing external 
 nature, but exclusively in noting the processes of my own 
 mind. We are not here to consider the two first of the 
 above-recited propositions ; but at all events, as regards 
 mathematical axioms, no one can possibly say that they are 
 psychological affirmations. Since therefore they are ascer- 
 tained by a purely mental process, and yet are no psycho- 
 logical propositions, they cannot be experimental truths 
 at all.
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. -51 
 
 Now, in his "Examination of Hamilton," Mr. Mill 
 apparently denies that the truth of any proposition (not 
 tautological) can he known by my mere conception of its 
 subject. But in his " Logic " he admits distinctly, that 
 I may thus cognize the truth of geometrical axioms. These 
 are his words : 
 
 In the first place, it is said that if our assent to the pro- 
 position that two straight lines cannot inclose a space were 
 derived from the senses, we could only be convinced of its truth 
 by actual trial, that is, by seeing or feeling the straight lines ; 
 whereas in fact it is seen to be true by merely thinking of 
 them. That a stone thrown into water goes to the bottom, 
 may be perceived by our senses, but mere thinking of a stone 
 thrown into the water would never have led us to that con- 
 clusion ; not so, however, with the axioms relating to straight 
 lines : if I could be made to conceive what a straight line is, 
 without having seen one, I should at once recognize that two 
 such lines cannot inclose a space. Intuition is " imaginary 
 looking " ; but experience must be real looking : if we see a 
 property of straight lines to be true by merely fancying 
 ourselves to be looking at them, the ground of our belief 
 cannot be the senses, or experience ; it must be something 
 mental. 
 
 To this argument it might be added in the case of this 
 particular axiom, (for the assertion would not be true of all 
 axioms), that the evidence of it from actual ocular inspection is 
 not only unnecessary but unattainable. What says the axiom ? 
 That two straight lines cannot inclose a space; that after 
 having once intersected, if they are prolonged to infinity they 
 do not meet, but continue to diverge from one another. How 
 can this, in any single case, be proved by actual observation ? 
 We may follow the lines to any distance we please ; but wo 
 cannot follow them to infinity : for aught our senses can testily, 
 they may, immediately beyond the farthest point to which wo 
 have traced them, begin to approach, and ut last meet. Unless, 
 therefore, we had Homo other proof of the impossibility than 
 observation affords us, wo should have no ground for believing 
 the axiom at all. 
 
 To these arguments, which I trust I cannot be accused of 
 understating, a satisfactory answer will, J conceive, he found, if
 
 .52 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 we advert to one of the characteristic properties of geometrical 
 forms their capacity of being painted in the imagination with 
 a distinctness equal to reality ; in other words, the exact re- 
 semblance of our ideas of form to the sensations which suggest 
 them. This, in the first place, enables ua to make (at least 
 with a little practice) mental pictures of all possible combina- 
 tions of lines and angles, which resemble the realities quite as 
 well as any which we could make on paper ; and in the next 
 place, make those pictures just as fit subjects of geometrical 
 experimentation as the realities themselves ; inasmuch as 
 pictures, if sufficiently accurate, exhibit of course all the 
 properties which would be manifested by the realities at one 
 given instant, and on simple inspection ; and in geometry we 
 are concerned only with such properties, and not with that 
 which pictures could not exhibit, the mutual action of bodies 
 one upon another. The foundations of geometry would therefore 
 be laid in direct experience, even if the experiments (which 
 in this case consist merely in attentive contemplation) were 
 practised solely upon what we call our ideas, that is, upon the 
 diagrams in our minds, and not upon outward objects. For in 
 all systems of experimentation we take some objects to serve as 
 representatives of all which resemble them ; and in the present 
 case the conditions which qualify a real object to be the 
 representative of its class, are completely fulfilled by an object 
 existing only in our fancy. Without denying, therefore, the 
 possibility of satisfying ourselves that two straight lines cannot 
 inclose a space, by merely thinking of straight lines without 
 actually looking at them ; I contend, that we do not believe 
 this truth on the ground of the imaginary intuition simply, 
 but because we know that the imaginary lines exactly resemble 
 real ones, and that we may conclude from them to real ones 
 with quite as much certainty as we could conclude from one 
 real line to another. The conclusion, therefore, is still an 
 induction from observation. And we should not be authorized 
 to substitute observation of the image on our mind, for observa- 
 tion of the reality, if we had not learnt by long-continued 
 experience that the properties of the reality are faithfully 
 represented in the image ; just as we should be scientifically 
 warranted in describing an animal which we had never seen 
 from a picture made of it with a daguerreotype ; but not until 
 we had learnt by ample experience, that observation of such a 
 picture is precisely equivalent to observation of the original.
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. 53 
 
 These considerations also remove the objection arising from 
 the impossibility of ocularly following the lines in their pro- 
 longation to infinity. For though, in order actually to see that. 
 two given lines never meet, it would be necessary to follow them 
 to infinity; yet without doing so we may know that if they 
 ever do meet, or if, after diverging from one another, they begin 
 again to approach, this must take place not at an infinite, but at 
 a finite distance. Supposing, therefore, such to be the case, we 
 can transport ourselves thither in imagination, and can frame a 
 mental image of the appearance which one or both of the lines 
 must present at that point, which we may rely on as being 
 precisely similar to the reality. Now, whether we fix our con- 
 templation upon this imaginary picture, or call to mind the 
 generalizations we have h;td occasion to make from former 
 ocular observation, we learn by the evidence of experience, that 
 a line which, after diverging from another straight line, begins 
 to approach it, produces the impression on our senses which we 
 describe by the expression " a bent line," not by the expression 
 "a straight line." ("Logic," vol. i. pp. 261-264.) 
 
 The reply to Mr. Mill's attempted solution of the 
 difficulty is so obvious, that one wonders he can have 
 missed it; and we have implicitly given it in an earlier 
 part of this essay. He admits, it will have been seen, so 
 much as this. I have formed in my mind the idea of a 
 straight line ; and by merely contemplating this idea, I 
 may arrive with absolute certainty at a conviction, that no 
 two straight lines can inclose a space. Now let us suppose 
 for argument's sake the question is quite irrelevant that 
 my idea of a straight line was derived in the first instance 
 from some physical object which I had observed. At all 
 events I include no other property in my idea of a straight 
 line, than those properties which appertain to every straight 
 line found in any possible region of existence. If therefore, 
 by contemplating my idea of a straight line, I may know 
 certainly that two straight lines cannot inclose a space, this 
 cognition of mine extends to all straight lines which can IK- 
 found in any possible region of existence. Mr. Mill then 
 will in consistency be obliged to admit, that in no possible
 
 51- Tie Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 region of existence can two straight lines inclose a space ; 
 and that human thinkers know with certitude this impos- 
 sibility. In other words, he will in consistency be obliged 
 to admit the very proposition against which he is arguing ; 
 viz. that this mathematical axiom is known with certitude 
 as a necessary truth. 
 
 But indeed it is quite curious to observe how many 
 openings Mr. Mill has left for criticism in the extract we just 
 now gave. Thus, according to him, I must take two suc- 
 cessive steps on my way to the conclusion, that earthly 
 trilateral figures are triangular. First, I observe that the 
 picture I form in my mind of a straight line has a close 
 resemblance to earthly straight lines ; secondly, I satisfy 
 myself by mental experimentation that every figure made 
 up of three such straight lines, is triangular ; then, thirdly, 
 I infer that earthly trilateral figures inclusively are tri- 
 angular. Now every one who looks carefully at the matter 
 will see, that the first of these propositions does not at all 
 inflow into the last by way of proof, but is simply and 
 utterly superfluous. Yet it is this first proposition alone, 
 which has so much as the semblance of appealing to 
 experience, as any part whatever of my reason for holding 
 that trilateral figures are triangular. 
 
 Then (2) whereas Mr. Mill purports to account for 
 man's power of ascertaining axioms by mere mental ex- 
 perience he bases that power on " one of the characteristic 
 properties of geometrical forms." But in so arguing, he has 
 entirely left out of account arithmetical and algebraic axioms. 
 I have fully as much power of arriving by mental experi- 
 mentation at the knowledge that " (a - 1) + (I + 1) = 
 a -f b," as of arriving at the knowledge that " all trilateral 
 are triangular ; " yet here there is no question at all of 
 " forms " which can be " painted in the imagination with 
 a distinctness equal to the reality." 
 
 (3) "In all systems of experimentation," says Mr. Mill,
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. 55 
 
 "we take some objects to serve as representatives of all 
 that resemble them ; and in the present case [that of 
 geometrical axioms] the conditions which qualify a real 
 object to be the representative of its class, are completely 
 fulfilled by an object existing only in our fancy." This 
 view when drawn out will run as follows. If I observe that 
 one single stone sinks in the water by its own weight, I 
 legitimately conclude that all stones so sink : and yet 
 objectivists themselves admit, that my knowledge of this 
 general proposition is derived entirely from experience.* 
 In like manner so Mr. Mill argues if I observe that one 
 mentally pictured trilateral figure is triangular, I can doubt- 
 less legitimately infer that all trilaterals have the same 
 property : and yet objectivists are bound in consistency to 
 admit, that this fact does not negative the supposition, that 
 my knowledge of this general truth may be derived entirely 
 from experience. But why, we ask, do I conclude, from the 
 case of one stone, to the case of all stones ? Mr. Mill him- 
 self gives as the reason, that experience has conclusively 
 proved the uniformity of nature ; and certainly, unless this 
 uniformity were proved in one way or another, we should 
 proceed most illogically in arguing from the case of one 
 stone to the case of all. Mr. Mill then is here in effect 
 contradicting the very conclusion which he takes for granted. 
 He takes for granted, that geometrical axioms can be 
 securely ascertained by purely mental experimentation ; 
 and yet he implies that they can not be ascertained, until 
 by experience of the physical world men have learnt the 
 uniformity of nature. 
 
 (4) To explain our next criticism, we will once more 
 bring into juxtaposition two sentences of Mr. Mill's which 
 we have already adduced. " That a straight lino is tho 
 shortest distance between two points," Mr. Mill "dors not 
 doubt to be true even in the region of the fixed stars." 
 
 * Ohjrrtivists ilo nut ndmit it ; hut hi this pai-s for the ]>n>.-riit.
 
 50 Tlie Philosophy of 
 
 (" Logic," vol. i. p. 350.) Yet (vol. ii. p. 108) " it would 
 be folly," in his opinion, " to affirm confidently " that " in 
 distant parts of the stellar regions, where phenomena may 
 be entirely unlike those with which we are acquainted," 
 "those special laws" prevail, "which we have found to 
 hold universally in our own planet." To hold otherwise, he 
 thinks, would be "to make a supposition without evidence, 
 and to which it would be idle to attempt to assign any 
 probability." "Which of these two conflicting statements 
 represents Mr. Mill's real mind ? We can have no doubt 
 that the second does so. It would be a blunder, of which 
 thinkers far less clear-sighted than Mr. Mill could not be 
 guilty with their eyes open, to say that mathematical 
 axioms are mere "generalizations from observation" 
 ("Logic," vol. i. p. 258), and yet that a man can know 
 them to hold good externally to the reach of possible obser- 
 vation. Mr. Mill then considers it impossible to know, or 
 even to guess, whether " in the more distant parts of the 
 stellar regions " there may not be quadrangular trilateral, 
 and pairs of straight lines each pair inclosing a space. 
 
 Yet, in the extract before us, he alleges confidently that 
 two divergent straight lines will never meet. Let us concede 
 that experience can tell that they will not meet within tJie 
 reach of human observation. But what possible reason can 
 he consistently allege for even guessing that they may not 
 meet, after they have passed beyond human ken and entered 
 those inaccessible " distant parts of the stellar regions " ? 
 
 We believe that a careful observer would detect many 
 more paralogisms in the extract on which we have been 
 commenting ; but our readers will have had enough of this 
 particular passage. 
 
 The only other argument which we can call to mind, as 
 having been adduced by Mr. Mill against the self-evident 
 necessity of mathematical axioms, occurs in an earlier part 
 of his volume on Sir W. Hamilton ; p. 87, note. He has
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. 57 
 
 avowedly adopted this argument from another contemporary 
 writer, who has pressed into his service Eeid's " Geometry 
 of Visibles : " and the argument itself may be thus stated : 
 " If mankind had possessed only the sense of sight and not 
 that of touch, they would have accounted it a self-evidently 
 necessary truth that every straight line being produced will 
 at last return into itself, and that any two straight lines 
 being produced will meet in two points." Consequently, 
 such is Mr. Mill's implied inference, men's knowledge of 
 geometrical axioms depends, not on the immediate and 
 peremptory declaration of their cognitive faculties, but on 
 their possessing the sense of touch. 
 
 We must here say one preliminary word, on Mr. Mill's 
 strange attempt to enlist Eeid's authority on his side. He 
 speaks of "Eeid's conclusion that, to beings possessing only 
 the sense of sight, the paradoxes here quoted and several 
 others would be truths of intuition, self-evident truths." 
 But it is quite impossible that Reid can have intended what 
 is here implied, because notoriously he maintained that 
 men cognize with certitude the self-evident truth of mathe- 
 matical axioms. In p. 451 of the volume from which 
 Mr. Mill quotes, he says (sub fineiri) that "mathematical 
 axioms" possess "intuitive evidence;" and in p. 452 he 
 proceeds to enumerate them among the " first principles of 
 necessary truths." We are confident that Dr. Reid, in the 
 passage on which Mr. Mill relies, intended the very truth 
 which it will be our own business to set forth in opposition 
 to our present antagonist. 
 
 In order to the apprehension of Mr. Mill's argument, it 
 is necessary to premise, that both he and Dr. Reid account 
 differences of distance as made known to man, not really by 
 sight at all, but exclusively by touch. They hold therefore, 
 that, if any man possessing sight were without the sense of 
 touch, he would account all the objects seen by him to be 
 equidistant. We are perfectly willing to admit this doctrine
 
 58 The Philosophy of Tlteism. 
 
 for argument's sake, though we have no conviction of its 
 truth. 
 
 This being laid down, Mr. Mill in effect thus argues : 
 Let a planet be supposed, the inhabitants of which possess 
 the sense of sight but not that of touch ; while their mental 
 constitution is identical with that of the human race. The 
 objects, which the planetarian sees at any given moment, 
 are all accounted by him as equally distant from himself ; 
 and accordingly as ranged on the inner surface of a hollow 
 sphere, his eye being centre of that sphere. Let a straight 
 line be placed before his vision : it will appear to him as 
 the arc of a great circle of that sphere. He is told, how- 
 ever, on trustworthy authority that it is a straight line ; 
 and he will therefore enounce, as a self-evidently necessary 
 truth, that every straight line being produced will at last 
 return into itself, and that any two straight lines being 
 produced will meet in two points. Those geometrical 
 axioms therefore such is Mr. Mill's implied conclusion 
 which contradict these two propositions, are not known to 
 man by his mental constitution (for the planetarian has 
 the very same mental constitution) but by his possessing 
 and exercising the sense of touch. 
 
 When once this argument is stated, there can hardly be 
 any need of exposing its fallacy. The truth, which this 
 planetarian regards as self-evidently necessary, is self- 
 evidently necessary in the judgment of all objectivists : 
 only he has learned to clothe it in non-human language. 
 That form, w r hich he has learned to designate by the name 
 "straight line," is precisely that which human bcinf/s 
 designate an " arc of a great circle of a sphere." 
 
 Whether such a planetarian could conceive the idea 
 which men call a " straight line," is a question which we 
 shall not here discuss ; but if he do conceive that idea 
 possessing as he does the same mental constitution with 
 men he will cognize as self-evidently necessary, that no
 
 Mr. MiWs Denial of Necessary Truth. 59 
 
 straight line, however produced, can possibly return into 
 itself, and that no two straight line's can intersect in more 
 than one point. In what language he will have learnt 
 to express this idea " straight line," we cannot of course 
 guess. 
 
 We are not aware of any other reasoning of the least 
 importance anywhere employed by Mr. Mill, in opposition 
 to the objectivist doctrine on mathematical axioms. It 
 seems to us, that in every instance the only effect he has 
 legitimately produced, is to open out some fresh line of 
 argument, which tells with irresistible force against his 
 own conclusion. 
 
 We ought not, however, perhaps considering the 
 ultimate purpose of these essays entirely to pass over a 
 philosophical theory, which arrives at a goal substantially 
 the same with Mr. Mill's, by a route precisely opposite. 
 Our readers will remember that, towards the beginning of 
 our essay, we drew a distinction between "tautological" 
 and " significant " propositions. A proposition of the 
 former class declares no more than has already been 
 expressed in its subject. Suppose, e.g., some one were 
 gravely to enounce, that " every square is quadrilateral : " 
 "of course," I should reply ; " for ' quadrilateral ' is part 
 of what is expressed by the very word ' square.' ' Such 
 nugatory propositions are of the form "A is A : " and 
 Mr. Mill would himself admit that they are known inde- 
 pendently of experience; though reasonably enough he 
 might refuse to dignify them with the name of " a priori " 
 or " necessary." Now such a philosopher as we speak of, 
 while admitting that mathematical axioms are cognized 
 independently of experience, maintains that they arc 
 " tautological ; " and consequently that no inference can 
 reasonably be made from them to the case of " significant " 
 propositions. He denies accordingly, that there are any 
 " necessary " propositions of the latter class.
 
 00. The Ph ilosopl y of Tit e i#m . 
 
 As this view is fundamentally opposed to Mr. Mill's, it 
 is no part of our present business to reason against it at 
 any length. We will but draw attention to the whimsical 
 character of a theory which alleges that a vast body of 
 new truths can be syllogistically deduced from tautologies ; 
 and we will add one single argument by way of refutation. 
 So far is it from being true that "triangular" is part of 
 what is expressed by the word " trilateral," that on the 
 contrary I have comprehended the whole of what is meant 
 by " trilateral," before I have so much as asked myself the 
 question whether a trilateral figure has three angles or 
 any angle at all. So far is it from being true that 3 + 8 is 
 part of what is expressed by the words 2 + 9, that on the 
 contrary I have comprehended the whole of what is meant 
 by the latter before I have so much as thought of the 
 former, consciously or unconsciously, directly or indirectly. 
 
 Mr. Mill has some excellent observations on this theory, 
 so far as regards arithmetical axioms, in his " Logic," 
 vol. i. pp. 284-289. 
 
 We now, however, return to our general argument. 
 From what has been hitherto said three inferences may be 
 deduced, of much importance in their respective ways. 
 
 I. Mathematical axioms are not ordinarily intued at first 
 in an universal but in an individual shape. Dr. M'Cosh 
 has done very great service, by dwelling on this truth in 
 the case of all intuitions ; but our present concern is with 
 mathematical axioms. I hold 7 pebbles in one hand and 
 4 in the other, and then transfer one from the larger to 
 the smaller group. I intue, as a self-evidently necessary 
 truth, that the new 5 + 6 = the old 4 + 7 : that not even 
 Omnipotence could make the case otherwise. On reflection 
 I perceive that the same truth holds, not of these pebbles 
 only, but of all pebbles ; not of pebbles only but of all 
 numerable things. Still further, reflection enables me to 
 intue the more general axiom, a + 6 = (a + !) + (&-!);
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. 61 
 
 and the more general axiom still, a + b = (a + m) -f (b m) ; 
 where a, b, and m may be any whole numbers whatever, so 
 only, that m be not greater than b. Capability of being 
 universalized is indubitably a characteristic of self-evidently 
 necessary truths ; but we shall be quite mistaken, if we 
 fancy that they are ordinarily intued as universal. The 
 immense majority of mankind, while again and again 
 accepting them in their individual shape, seldom if ever 
 universalize an axiom from the beginning of their life to 
 the end. 
 
 II. There can be no need of employing words to prove 
 the very obvious proposition, that if mathematical axioms 
 are self-evidently necessary, the validity of syllogistic 
 reasoning is no less so. But the whole body of mathe- 
 matical truth is derived syllogistically from mathematical 
 axioms ; and it follows therefore, that the whole body of 
 mathematical truth is strictly necessary. 
 
 III. Even were there no other necessary truths than 
 those which (we trust) we have conclusively proved to be 
 such in our present essay, let us observe what results 
 from our argument. Entirely distinct from, entirely over 
 and above, the experimental order, there is a body of what 
 may be called " transcendental " truth ; truth which trans- 
 cends human experience.* We are not able yet to decide 
 whether all transcendental truth is necessary : but anyhow 
 all necessary truth is transcendental ; for the knowledge of 
 
 * It will conduce to clearness, if we accurately distinguish between our 
 use of the words " transcendental " and " intuitional." We call those truths 
 " intuitional," which the individual accepts exclusively on the ground of 
 mental intuition ; and we call those truths " transcendental " which are 
 neither experienced facts nor inferable from experienced facts. Thus the 
 truths testified by memory are " intuitional," but not " transcendental : " 
 they are facts which have been experienced, and therefore are not "trans- 
 cendental " truths ; yet they are known to him who remembers them, 
 exclusively on the ground of present intuition, and they are therefore " intui- 
 tional." On the other hand, Euclid's theorems are "transcendental," but 
 not generally "intuitional;" because they are not accepted on the ground of 
 intuition, but of deduction from intuitive truths.
 
 62 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 anything as necessary Mr. Mill will be the first to admit 
 is wholly unattainable from mere experience. Further, 
 among these transcendental truths are to be numbered the 
 propositions of geometry, arithmetic, algebra, the dif- 
 ferential calculus, calculus of variations, etc. Again, all 
 the truths of mechanics and physical astronomy are neces- 
 sary, if understood hypothetically. Take any proposition 
 whatever of physical astronomy : it is a necessary truth 
 that this proposition holds, if there be in existence a certain 
 attractive force. But still further. Scientific men have 
 not of course taken the trouble to work out a series of 
 necessary hypothetical propositions, except in those com- 
 paratively few cases where the hypothesis coresponds with 
 physical fact. But a million other hypotheses may be 
 framed ; as e.g. that the force of gravitation varies inversely 
 as the distance, or as the cube of the distance, etc. : and 
 for each one of these hypotheses, a new vast series of 
 necessary hypothetical propositions can be evolved. It is 
 plain then that, though there were no necessary truths 
 except mathematical, even so their number is literally 
 unimaginable and incalculable; immeasurably more than 
 a thousand times the number of experimental truths. All 
 trustworthy science, says Mr. Mill, is experimental : on 
 the contrary, the enormous majority of true scientific 
 propositions are transcendental. 
 
 This will be our best place, for explaining the exact 
 end at which we are aiming in this series of essays. Our 
 ultimate purpose is a philosophical establishment of 
 Theism : i.e. of the dogma, that there exists a Personal 
 God, Infinite in all perfections, the Creator and Moral 
 Governor of the universe. Those who deny that this dogma 
 is cognizable by man with certitude, may be called " anti- 
 theists ; " i.e. opponents of Theism. Of these, comparatively 
 few are dogmatic atheists ; men who think that reason
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. 63 
 
 disproves the existence of a Personal Creator. A far larger 
 number, of whom Professor Huxley may be taken as 
 representative, are "nescients;" i.e. deny that man can 
 know certainly, or even probably, anything whatever about 
 the matter. Others again, far more numerous perhaps 
 than is commonly supposed, regard it as probable that the 
 universe had an intelligent Maker ; but are driven, by the 
 existence of moral and physical evil, to deny that this 
 Maker combines Infinite Power with Infinite Love. We 
 are led by various indications to suspect that Mr. Mill 
 himself belongs to this category. Lastly, there are "pan- 
 theists." The pantheist holds with some emphasis the 
 cognizableness of the "Absolute" and the "Uncondi- 
 tioned ; " but denies the existence of a Personal God, to 
 Whom men are responsible, Who knows their thoughts, 
 and Who will requite them according to their works. Now 
 we believe that pantheists certainly Hegelian pantheists 
 hold in philosophy the objectivist doctrine : but they 
 have no important representative in England ; * and at all 
 events would require a totally distinct consideration. While 
 therefore our arguments, we hope, shall be such as to hold 
 their own against all comers, our direct contest shall be 
 only with those antitheists who profess the phenomenal 
 philosophy. 
 
 The phenomenistic doctrine is such as this : that an 
 ascertained truth, means a truth experienced or inferred 
 from experience ; that he who lays stress on -supposed 
 intuitions leaves a foundation of rock to build on the sand ; 
 that such a thinker, instead of manfully and philosophically 
 confronting facts, erects into a would-be oracle his own 
 individual idiosyncrasy ; that " a priori philosophy " means 
 simply the enthronement of prejudice and the rejection of 
 experience. And we fully admit, or rather indeed contend, 
 
 * Dr. Stirling, the loading English Hegelian, professes l>elief even in 
 Christianity. (" Secret of Hegel." preface, p. xxi.)
 
 64 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 that this phenomenistic doctrine issues legitimately in pro- 
 nounced antitheism. 
 
 Our first reply to it shall be founded on the faculty of 
 memory. " Our belief in the veracity of memory," says Mr. 
 Mill (on Hamilton, p. 508, note), "is evidently ultimate: 
 no reason can be given for it, which does not presuppose 
 the belief and assume it to be well founded." In other 
 words, according to his frank confession, when I trust my 
 memory when I believe myself to have experienced what 
 my memory distinctly testifies I am resting exclusively on 
 an intuition ; I am holding most firmly a truth for which 
 experience gives me no warrant at all.* Yet unless I hold 
 firmly this intuitive truth, I am literally incapable of 
 receiving any experience whatever ; I have no knowledge of 
 any kind except my present consciousness. The whole 
 fabric of experience then has, for its exclusive foundation, a 
 series of those intuitions which are called acts of memory. 
 If intuitions as such are to be distrusted, experience is an 
 impossibility and its very notion an absurdity. 
 
 Mr. Mill has laid himself open, we think, to just 
 criticism, for his mode of making this most honourable 
 admission. No one will doubt, either that the phenomenist 
 school professes the general doctrine we have ascribed to it, 
 or that Mr. Mill habitually identifies himself with that 
 school. Yet here is a most pointed exception to the school's 
 general doctrine ; and an exception which no phenorneiiist 
 had made before. Surely he might reasonably have been 
 expected not merely to state it (however explicitly and un- 
 mistakably) in a note, but to give it a prominent position 
 in his work. If ever there were a paradoxical position, his 
 is one on the surface. It is most intelligible to say that 
 
 * This is undeniably Mr. Mill's admission : for he says that no reason 
 whatever whether grounded on experience or on any other basis can be 
 given for the veracity of memory, "which does not presuppose the very thesis 
 for which it is adduced." A reason which presupposes the very thesis for 
 which it is adduced is undeniably no reason at all.
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. 65 
 
 there are no trustworthy intuitions ; and it is most intelli- 
 gible to say that there are many such : but on the surface 
 it is the ne plus ultra of paradox, to say that there is just 
 one such and no more. He seems to have been uncon- 
 sciously almost ashamed of this paradox ; and instead of 
 placing it in the foreground, has shrouded it in the obscurity 
 of a note. 
 
 Then further he was surely called on to state explicitly 
 his reasons. He holds that there is just one intuition one 
 and only one which carries with it its own evidence of 
 truth. There was an imperative claim on him then, as he 
 valued his philosophical character, to explain clearly and 
 pointedly where the distinction lies between acts of memory 
 and other alleged intuitions. He would have found the 
 task very difficult, we confidently affirm ; but that only 
 gives us more reason for complaining that he did not make 
 the attempt. To us it seems, that various classes of 
 intuition are more favourably circumstanced for the estab- 
 lishment of their trustworthiness, than is that class which 
 Mr. Mill accepts. Thus in the case of many a wicked 
 action, it would really be easier for the criminal to believe 
 that he had never committed it, than to doubt its necessary 
 turpitude and detestableness. Then in the case of other 
 intuitions, I know that the rest of mankind share them 
 with myself; and I often know also that experience con- 
 firms them so far as it goes : but I must confidently trust 
 my acts of clear and distinct memory, before I can even 
 guess what is held by other men or what is declared by 
 experience. We think it a blot on Mr. Mill's philosophy, 
 that he has chosen, as his only trustworthy class of in- 
 tuitions, a class for which there is less extrinsic evidence 
 than for that of many others. But we think it a far greater 
 blot on his philosophy, that instead of facing the difficulty 
 he has ignored it. 
 
 This, then, is our first argument against the phcnomi'iiist 
 VOL. i. i'
 
 60 Tlie Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 doctrine. So far from experience being a more trustworthy 
 guide than intuition, experience is not so much as possible 
 unless we are throughout guided by intuition. Our second 
 argument against the same doctrine is more closely con- 
 nected with the earlier part of this essay. Phenomenists 
 allege, that experience affords a legitimate basis for certi- 
 tude, and that intuition affords no such basis. On the 
 contrary without here discussing the question of " greater" 
 or " less " certitude at all events intuition affords a higher 
 kind of certitude than does experience. Experience at best 
 can but declare what happens within the reach of human 
 observation : but intuition avouches truths eternal and 
 immutable ; truths which necessarily hold good in every 
 possible region of existence. 
 
 But thirdly, we maintain against phenomenists, that the 
 best grounded conclusions of experimental science are not 
 certain at all, except in virtue of certain necessary truths 
 known mediately or immediately by intuition. In other 
 words we maintain, that the certainty of physical science 
 rests in last analysis, not on the phenomenal but on the 
 transcendental order. This is a conclusion of extreme im- 
 portance ; and we shall devote to it the remainder of our 
 essay. Our argument is this. 
 
 All physical science depends for its existence on the 
 fundamental truth, that the laws of nature are uniform.* 
 By introducing transcendental considerations, Catholics are 
 able to prove conclusively this fundamental truth. We 
 cannot indeed enumerate and weigh these transcendental 
 considerations, until we have reached a later stage of our 
 argument; here we are only contending, that no basis 
 
 * In saying that " the laws of nature are uniform," we mean, of course, 
 that no physical phenomenon takes place without a corresponding physical 
 antecedent, and that the same physical antecedent is invariably followed by 
 the same physical consequent. Of course we hold firmly against Mr. Mill 
 that such physical antecedents are efficient causes; but this consideration is 
 external to our present argument.
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. 67 
 
 adduced by consistent phenomenists can suffice for its 
 support. This is virtually admitted by the phenomenist 
 philosopher, who has closer philosophical connection with 
 Mr. Mill than has any other living writer : we refer to Mr. 
 Bain. His language is so remarkable, that we shall quote 
 it entire, italicizing one or two sentences. 
 
 Granting, however, that the belief in memory, as well as the 
 belief in present consciousness, is a primary assumption, we 
 next remark that it conies short of our needs. The most 
 authentic recollection gives only what has been ; something that 
 has ceased, and can concern us no longer. A far more perilous 
 leap remains ; the leap to the future. All our interest is concen- 
 trated on what has yet to be ; the present and the past are of 
 value only as a clue to the events that are to come. Now, it is 
 far easier to satisfy us of what has been, than of what is still 
 to be. 
 
 The postulate that we are in quest of must carry us across 
 the gulf, from the experienced known, either present or re- 
 membered, to the unexperienced and unknown must perform 
 the leap of real inference. " Water has quenched our thirst in 
 the past ; " by what assumption do we affirm that the same will 
 happen in the future ? Experience does not teach us this ; ex- 
 perience is only what has actually been ; and, after never so 
 many repetitions of a thing, there still remains the peril of 
 venturing upon the untrodden land of future possibility. 
 
 The fact, generally expressed as nature's uniformity, is the 
 guarantee, the ultimate major premise, of all induction. " What 
 has been, will be," justifies the inference that water will assuage 
 thirst in after times. We can give no reason, or evidence, for 
 this uniformity ; and, therefore, the course seems to be to adopt 
 this as the finishing postulate. And, undoubtedly, there is no 
 other issue possible. We have a choice of modes of expressing 
 the assumption, but, whatever be the expression, the substance 
 is what is conveyed by the fact of uniformity. 
 
 Let us word the postulate thus : " What has uniformly 
 been in the past will be in the future." Otherwise " what has 
 never been contradicted in any known instance (there being 
 ample means and opportunities of search) will always be true." 
 
 This assumption is an ample justification of the inductive 
 operation, as a process of real inference. Without it, we can do 
 nothing; with it, wo can do anything. Our only error in /
 
 CS The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 proposing to give any reason or justification of it, to treat it other- 
 wise than as begged at the very outset. If there bo a reason, it 
 is not theoretical, but practical. Without the assumption, wo 
 could not take the smallest steps in practical matters ; we could 
 not pursue any object or end in life. Unless the future is to 
 reproduce the past, it is an enigma, a labyrinth. (" Deductive 
 Loyic," pp. 273, 274.) 
 
 We give Mr. Bain every credit for his moral candour in 
 making the admission so repugnant to phenomenist prin- 
 ciples that, without this a priori presumption, science 
 would be impossible ; and yet that no " reason or justifica- 
 tion " for the assumption can possibly be given. Still we 
 must account the passage we have quoted discreditable to 
 his intellectual character. In his work on " The Senses 
 and the Intellect," Mr. Bain emphatically denies, that even 
 mathematical axioms are intuitively known; and yet he 
 maintains the intuitive cognizableness of such a proposition, 
 as that " what has uniformly been in the past will be in the 
 future." For this truly amazing assumption he gives no 
 reason whatever, and says that no reason can be given, 
 except that physical science could not go on without it. 
 Yet what would he himself say to an objectivist, who should 
 assume the intuitive cognizableness of morality, while giving 
 no other reason for that assumption, except that Chris- 
 tianity could not get on without it ? He would say, we 
 suppose, "so much the worse for Christianity;" and we 
 might similarly reply to him, if we chose to be so narrow- 
 minded, " so much the worse for physical science." We 
 really know not one of the " a priori fallacies " which Mr. 
 Mill in his "Logic " so ably denounces, more extravagantly 
 wild than Mr. Bain's. " Nature abhors a vacuum ; " " actio 
 non datur in distans ; " * " the heavenly bodies must move 
 
 * Some philosophers, even some Catholic philosophers, really consider this 
 axiomatic. F. Franztlin, however (*' De Deo Uuo," p. 350), says that Scotus, 
 Vasquez, Bid, Francis Lugo, Valentia, and many grave theologians either 
 doubt or dfiij its truth. And this fact, by the way, disproves Mr. Mill's
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. C9 
 
 in the most perfect of figures, i.e. a circle ; " there is not 
 one of these propositions, which may not quite as plausibly 
 be considered self-evident. Moreover, the thinkers who 
 have advocated such axioms as those above mentioned, 
 have at all events openly avowed themselves a priori philo- 
 sophers ; whereas Mr. Bain, the originator of this astonish- 
 ing tour de force, professes himself a severe and cautious 
 disciple of experience. 
 
 There are two doctrines importantly different, on the 
 uniformity of nature. There is the Catholic doctrine, that 
 the laws of nature are ordinarily uniform, but very often 
 miraculously suspended ; and there is the infidel doctrine, 
 that they are unexceptionally uniform. Mr. Bain's language 
 throughout implies the latter. In other words, he assumes 
 as intuitive a principle, which with one breath sweeps off 
 the whole Christian religion, without condescending to give 
 even one philosophical reason for his opinion.* 
 
 Mr. Mill is by no means so unfaithful to his pheno- 
 menism as Mr. Bain, in the proof which he gives for the 
 uniformity of nature. He thus reasons : 
 
 The considerations which, as I apprehend, give, at the 
 present day, to the proof of the law of uniformity of succession 
 as true of all phenomena without exception, this character of 
 completeness and collusiveness, are the following : First, that 
 we know it directly to be true of far the greatest number of 
 
 statement (" Logic," vol. ii. p. 317), that so recently as " rather more than a 
 century ago " this " was a scientific maxim disputed by no one and which no 
 one deemed to require any proof." For ourselves we can sec no shadow of 
 ground for the maxim. 
 
 * We ought not to conceal the fact, that tho sentence immediately fol- 
 lowing our extract runs thus: "our natural prompting is to a*#um>'. such 
 identity [of the future with tho past] ; to believe it first and prove it after- 
 wards ;" ami the last words may bo understood us meaning that we <-nn 
 " prove it afterwards." Certainly the sentence is expressed with discredit- 
 able obscurity; but Mr. Biiin had already said expressly that " experience 
 does not prove this;" and this sentence therefore must only mean, that 
 when the fnttin' fa-comes the prttent we shall be able to prove that it re- 
 sembles the pant.
 
 70 TIte Philosophy of Thtivm. 
 
 phenomena ; that there are none of which we know it not to be 
 true, the utmost that can be said being that of some we cannot 
 positively from direct evidence affirm its truth; while pheno- 
 menon after phenomenon, as they become better known to us, 
 are constantly passing from the latter class into the former ; 
 and in all cases in which that transition has not yet taken place, 
 the absence of direct proof is accounted for by the rarity or the 
 obscurity of the phenomena, our deficient means of observing 
 them, or the logical difficulties arising from the complication of 
 the circumstances in which they occur; insomuch that, not- 
 withstanding as rigid a dependence on given conditions as 
 exists in the case of any other phenomenon, it was not likely 
 that we should be better acquainted with those conditions than 
 we are. Besides this first class of considerations, there is a 
 second, which still further corroborates the conclusion. Although 
 there are phenomena the production and changes of which 
 elude all our attempts to reduce them universally to any 
 ascertained law; yet in every such case, the phenomenon, or the 
 objects concerned in it, are found in some instances to obey the 
 known laws of nature. The wind, for example, is the type of 
 uncertainty and caprice, yet we find it in some cases obeying 
 with as much constancy as any phenomenon in nature the law 
 of the tendency of fluids to distribute themselves so as to 
 equalize the pressure on every side of each of their particles; 
 as in the case of the trade winds, and the monsoons. Lightning 
 might once have been supposed to obey no laws ; but since it 
 has been ascertained to be identical with electricity, we know 
 that the very same phenomenon in some of its manifestations is 
 implicitly obedient to the action of fixed causes. I do not believe 
 that there is now one object or event in all our experience of 
 nature, within the bounds of the solar system at least, which 
 has not either been ascertained by direct observation to follow 
 laws of its own, or been proved to be closely similar to objects 
 and events which, in more familiar manifestations, or on a more 
 limited scale, follow strict laws : our inability to trace the same 
 laws on a larger scale and in the more recondite instances, being 
 accounted for by the number and complication of the modifying 
 causes, or by their inaccessibility to observation. (" Logic," vol. 
 ii. pp. 106, 107.) 
 
 Before we consider the value of this argument, a pre- 
 liminary remark will be in place. We have already said
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. 71 
 
 that, by help of transcendental considerations, the uni- 
 formity of nature is conclusively established ; and we will 
 here add, that these transcendental considerations are of 
 such a kind as to impress their force, not on philosophers 
 only, but on all mankind. Since then, as we consider, the 
 mass of men are at starting most reasonably and completely 
 convinced of the thesis which Mr. Mill desires to prove, it 
 is only to be expected that they should receive with ready 
 acquiescence any reasoning which is adduced for so un- 
 deniably true a conclusion. Let it be granted, then, that 
 the majority of Mr. Mill's readers are satisfied with his 
 argument. Still such a fact does not at all evince the 
 argument's real sufficiency, because the fact may so easily 
 be accounted for by the cause which we have stated. 
 
 Now Mr. Mill's reasoning amounts at best to this. If in 
 any part of the world there existed a breach in the uniformity 
 of nature, that breach must by this time have been dis- 
 covered by one or other of the eminent men who have given 
 themselves to physical experiment. But most certainly, 
 adds Mr. Mill, none such has ever been discovered, or 
 mankind would be sure to have heard of it : consequently, 
 such is his conclusion, none such exists. Now, in order to 
 estimate the force of this argument, let us suppose for a 
 moment that the fact were as Mr. Mill represents it ; let us 
 suppose for a moment that persons of scientific education 
 were unanimous in holding, that there has been no well- 
 authenticated case of a breach in the uniformity of nature. 
 What inference could be drawn from this ? Be it observed 
 that the number of natural agents constantly at work is 
 incalculably large ; and that the observed cases of uni- 
 formity in their action must be immeasurably fewer than 
 one thousandth of the whole. Scientific men, we assume 
 for the moment, have discovered that in a certain proportion 
 of instances immeasurably fewer than one thousandth of 
 the whole a certain fact has prevailed ; the fact of uni-
 
 72 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 forinity : and they have not found a single instance in which 
 that fact does not prevail. Are they justified, we ask, in 
 inferring from these premisses that the fact is universal ? 
 Surely the question answers itself. Let us make a very 
 grotesque supposition, in which however the conclusion 
 would really be tried according to the arguments adduced. 
 In some desert of Africa there is an enormous connected 
 edifice surrounding some vast space, in which dwell certain 
 reasonable beings who are unable to leave the enclosure. 
 In this edifice are more than a thousand chambers, which 
 some years ago were entirely locked up, and the keys no 
 one knew where. By constant diligence twenty-five keys 
 have been found, out of the whole number ; and the corre- 
 sponding chambers, situated promiscuously throughout the 
 edifice, have been opened. Each chamber, when examined, 
 is found to be in the precise shape of a dodecahedron. Are 
 the inhabitants justified on that account in holding with 
 certitude, that the remaining 975 chambers are built on the 
 same plan ? We cannot fancy that Mr. Mill would answer 
 in the affirmative : yet otherwise how will his reasoning 
 stand ? 
 
 But, secondly, it is as far as possible from being true 
 that men of scientific education are unanimous in holding 
 that there has been no well-authenticated case of breach in 
 the uniformity of nature. On the contrary, even to this 
 day the majority of such persons believe in Christianity, and 
 hold the miracles revealed in Scripture to be on the whole 
 accurately reported. The majority of scientific men believe 
 that, at one time, persons on whom the shadow of Peter 
 passed were thereby freed from their infirmities ; and that, 
 at another time, garments brought from the body of Paul 
 expelled sickness and demoniacal possession (Acts v. 15 ; 
 xix. 12). Will Mr. Mill allege that S. Peter's shadow, or 
 that garments from S. Paul's body, were the physical cause 
 of a cure, as lotions and bandages might be ? Of course
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. 73 
 
 not. Here then is a series of physical phenomena, result- 
 ing without physical cause; and Catholics to this day 
 consider that breaches in the uniformity of nature are 
 matters of every-day occurrence.* Even then if it were 
 true it seems to us (as we have already said) most untrue 
 that Mr. Mill's conclusion legitimately follows from his 
 premisses, still he cannot even approximate to establishing 
 those premisses, until he have first disproved Catholicity 
 and next disproved the whole truth of Christianity. 
 
 But the strongest objection against the sufficiency of 
 Mr. Mill's argument still remains to be stated. " All our 
 interest," says Mr. Bain most truly, " is concentrated on 
 what is yet to be ; the present and the past are of value only 
 as a clue to the events that are to come" Let us even 
 suppose then for argument's sake, that Mr. Mill had fully 
 proved the past and present uniformity of nature : still the 
 main difficulty would continue ; viz. how he proposes to 
 show that such uniformity will last one moment beyond the 
 present. It is quite an elementary remark that, whenever 
 a proposition is grounded on mere experience, nothing 
 
 * In the following passage F. Newman does but express what is held by 
 all thoughtful Catholics who are at all well acquainted with the facts of 
 their religion. We italicize one or two sentences : 
 
 " Putting out of the question the hypothesis of unknown laws of nature 
 (which is an evasion from the force of any proof) I think it impossible to 
 withstand the evidence which is brought for the liquefaction of the blood of 
 S. Januarius at Naples, and for the motion of the eyes of the pictures of the 
 Madonna iu the Roman States. I see no reason to doubt the material <>f 
 the Lombard Crown at Monza ; and I do not see why the Holy Coat at 
 Treves may not have been what it professes to be. I firmly believe that por- 
 tions of the True Cross are at Rome and elsewhere, that the Crib of Bethle- 
 hem is at Rome, and the bodies of S. Peter and S. Paul also. I believe tlmt 
 ut Rome too lies S. Stephen, that S. Matthew lies at Salerno, and S. Andrew 
 at Amalfi. I firmly believe that the relic* of the saint* arc fining innumerable, 
 miracles and graces daily, and that it needs only for a Catholic- to show devo- 
 tion to any saint in order to receive special benefits from his intercession. 
 I firmly believe that saints in their lifetime have before now rained tin: dnid 
 In life, crofted the sea without vewl*, multiplied ijrain and bread, cured in- 
 curable diwaw*, and stopped the operation of the laws of the universe in it 
 multitude of ways." (" lectures on Catholicism in England," p. ii'.iSJ
 
 74 The Ph'do8ophy of Theimn, 
 
 whatever can be known or even guessed concerning its 
 truth, except within the reach of possible observation. For 
 this very reason, Mr. Mill professes himself unable to know, 
 or even to assign any kind of probability to the supposi- 
 tion, that nature proceeds on uniform laws in distant stellar 
 regions. But plainly there are conditions of time, as well as 
 of space, which preclude the possibility of observation ; and 
 it is as simply impossible for men to know from mere 
 experience what will take place on earth to-morrow, as to 
 know from mere experience what takes place in the planet 
 Jupiter to-day. 
 
 In considering the question "on what grounds we 
 expect that the sun will rise to-morrow," Mr. Mill (" Logic," 
 vol. ii. p. 80) falls into a mistake very unusual with him ; 
 for he totally misapprehends the difficulty which he has to 
 encounter. He argues we think quite successfully that 
 there is a probability amounting to practical certainty that 
 the sun will rise to-morrow, on the hypothesis that the uni- 
 formity of nature so long continues. But the question he has 
 to face is, what reason can he have for knowing, or even 
 guessing, that the uniformity of nature will so long con- 
 tinue ? And to this, the true question at issue, he does not 
 so much as attempt a reply. 
 
 Notwithstanding the disclaimer, with which we started, 
 our recent course of argument may have led unwary readers 
 to fancy, that we have been in some way disparaging the 
 trustworthiness and certainty of physical science. So far 
 is this from being so, that on the contrary such trust- 
 worthiness and certainty constitute the major premiss of 
 our syllogism. That syllogism runs as follows. The 
 declarations of physical science are absolutely trustworthy 
 and certain : but if there were no human knowledge inde- 
 pendent of human experience, they would not be trustworthy 
 and certain ; consequently it is untrue that there is no 
 human knowledge independent of human experience. In
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth.- 75 
 
 other words, that doctrine of phenomenism, which in some 
 sense idolizes physical science, is in real truth fatal to the 
 object of its idolatry. 
 
 Here we conclude for the present. This essay has con- 
 sisted of two distinct portions : in the former of these we 
 have purported to prove against Mr. Mill, on grounds of 
 reason, the existence of certain necessary truths ; while in 
 the latter portion we have set forth some general considera- 
 tions, which tell importantly, as we think, against the 
 doctrine of phenomenism. These considerations may 
 sufficiently be summed up as follows. Phenomenism, taken 
 in its full extent, teaches primarily, that experience is the 
 only legitimate foundation for certitude ; and teaches 
 secondarily, as an inference from this, that there is no 
 necessary truth humanly cognizable as such. We have 
 replied firstly, as to intuitional truths in general, that (by 
 Mr. Mill's own admission) no experience is so much as 
 possible, unless a large number of truths be assumed, which 
 are not known by experience ; viz. truths testified by 
 memory. And we have replied secondly, as to necessary 
 truths in particular, that unless necessary truths were cog- 
 nizable, experimental science could not so much as exist. 
 
 Our ultimate purpose however in these essays, as we 
 have said, is to draw out, as completely as we can, the 
 philosophical argument for Theism. But it does not follow, 
 because Mr. Mill's phenomenism is false, that therefore 
 Theism is true ; on the contrary, for the full establishment 
 of that fundamental dogma, it will be necessary to accumu- 
 late a large number of philosophical premisses. This we 
 hope to perform in future essays.
 
 III. 
 
 MR. MILL ON THE FOUNDATION OF MORALITY.* 
 
 IN our last essay we argued against Mr. Mill, that 
 mathematical truths possess the attribute of " necessity ; " 
 and in this we are to argue against him, that moral 
 truths also are of the same kind. We have done im- 
 portant service, we consider, in our previous paper, not 
 only towards the particular conclusion there advocated, 
 but towards the conclusion also which we are now to main- 
 tain. The doctrine that there are truths possessing that 
 very singular quality expressed by the term " necessary "- 
 this doctrine is a priori both so startling, and also pregnant 
 with consequences so momentous, that the philosopher 
 may well require absolutely irresistible evidence before he 
 will accept it. This was our reason for placing mathe- 
 matical truths in the very front of our controversial 
 position; because they afford so much less room than 
 others for confusion and equivocalness, that their " neces- 
 sary " character is on that account more irresistibly evident. 
 When the philosopher is once obliged to admit that there 
 are propositions of this character, it is a matter of com- 
 parative detail which they are. This, therefore, is the 
 
 * An Ensay in aid of a Grammar of Assent. By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, 
 D.D., of the Oratory. London : Burns, Gates, & Co. 
 
 Dissertations and Discussions. By JOHN STUART MILL. London : J. W. 
 Parker. 
 
 Utilitarianism. By JOHN STUART MILL. London : Longmans. 
 
 The Emotions and the Will. Chap. XV. : Tlie Moral Seme. By ALEXANDER 
 BAIN, A.M. London: J. W. Parker.
 
 Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 77 
 
 position of advantage from which we approach our present 
 theme. 
 
 But from another point of view, we are less favourably 
 circumstanced in our present than in our former under- 
 taking. There is no difference of opinion worth mentioning 
 as to what those propositions are which are called mathe- 
 matical axioms : and there are only therefore two possible 
 alternatives ; viz. whether those axioms are, or are not, 
 self- evidently necessary. All phenomenists are on one 
 side, and all objectivists, as a matter of course, on the other. 
 But those who hold most strongly the "necessary" cha- 
 racter of moral science differ nevertheless importantly from 
 each other, as to what are those axioms on which the 
 science is founded. Whatever theory we adopt, we must 
 necessarily have for our opponents, not only all pheno- 
 menists, but a large number of objectivists also. Even 
 among Catholics there are some subordinate differences on 
 the subject ; and before we enter on our reply to Mr. Mill, 
 there are three little matters of domestic controversy which 
 we must briefly consider, in order to make clear the precise 
 position which is to be our controversial standpoint. 
 
 The first of these relates to a phrase which we have 
 more than once used. We are here assuming for the 
 moment, what we are afterwards to defend against Mr. 
 Mill, that there are certain moral axioms intuitively 
 known : * and we have frequently used the phrase "moral 
 faculty " to express that mental faculty whereby such 
 axioms are cognized. F. Liberatore (Ethica, n. 82) under- 
 stands this phrase to imply, that moral truths are not 
 discerned by the intellect and reason, but assumed by 
 blind propension and instinct. With great deference to 
 so distinguished a writer, we must nevertheless say that 
 this seems to us a complete misapprehension of Eeid's and 
 
 * I5y the term "axioms" are hero meant " sclf-evulently necessary 
 truths."
 
 7S The Philosophy of Tfteism. 
 
 Hutcheson's meaning ; and it is certainly removed to the 
 greatest possible degree from our own. By the phrase 
 "moral faculty" we mean neither more nor less (as we 
 have said) than the power, which resides in man's intellect, 
 of cognizing moral axioms with self-evident certitude. For 
 various reasons, it seems to us of extreme importance that 
 attention should be carefully fixed on this power ; and we 
 think it very desirable, therefore, to give it a special name.* 
 
 F. Newman habitually uses the word " conscience " to 
 express substantially the same thing ; nor could any word 
 be better adapted to the purpose, so far as regards the 
 ordinary usage of Englishmen. Our own difficulty in so 
 using it arises from the circumstance, that the word " con- 
 scientia " has a theological sense, importantly different 
 from F. Newman's, and yet not so far removed from it as 
 to prevent real danger of one being confused with the other. 
 The theological word " conscientia " does not commonly 
 express an intellectual power or habit; but an existing 
 declaration of the intellect, as to the morality (hie et nunc) 
 of this or that particular act: and so one hears of a 
 " correct " or an " erroneous," of a " certain " or a " doubt- 
 ful" conscience. Then again, and more importantly, its 
 office is the cognition, not so much of moral axioms as of 
 moral conclusions : and the first premisses too on which it 
 proceeds, are not merely moral axioms, but include God's 
 positive precepts, the Church's interpretation of the Divine 
 Law, and the Church's positive commands. We cannot, 
 then, but think it will be more conducive to clearness if we 
 avoid using this word in F, Newman's sense. 
 
 We now proceed to our second preliminary. It is a 
 very prominent doctrine of F. Newman's, that "con- 
 
 * It may be worth while also to cite Liberatore's own statement 
 " hominem individuum universamque societatem ad perfectionem moralem 
 jugiter amplificandam rt naturse incitari, atque ideo typo quodam honestatis 
 in animis insculpto gaudere, quo dijudicet quibus defectibus liberal! et quibus 
 bonis augeri debeat." (lutroductio ad Ethicam, art. iii.)
 
 Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 79 
 
 science " testifies emphatically God's existence. And very 
 many Catholic writers hold (as will be presently seen) that 
 whenever reason notifies to me the intrinsic turpitude of 
 this or that act, it thereupon notifies to me the existence of 
 some Supreme Legislator, who forbids it. This doctrine, 
 however, may be advocated in two essentially different 
 senses. 
 
 On the one hand, it may merely be alleged that when- 
 ever reason notifies to me the intrinsic moral turpitude of 
 this or that act, it further notifies, by most prompt and 
 immediate consequence, the prohibition of that act by some 
 Supreme Legislator. We incline to think that such is 
 F. Newman's meaning. At all events, we ourselves heartily 
 accept this doctrine, and are to maintain it in the course of 
 our present article. 
 
 But, on the other hand, it may be alleged that the idea 
 itself "moral turpitude" is either identical with, or 
 includes, that of "prohibition by a Supreme Legislator." 
 We cannot assent to such a proposition. We accept S. 
 Ignatius's teaching in the " Spiritual Exercises," that evil 
 acts possess a " fceditas et nequitia " of their own, " ex 
 natura sua, vel si prohibita non essent." We follow 
 Suarez in holding, that they would be "mala, peccata, 
 culpabilia," even if (per irnpossibile) there existed no law 
 strictly so called forbidding them. We follow Vasquez, 
 Bellarmine, Lessius, and other eminent theologians, in 
 their use of similar expressions.* We are not here arguing 
 
 * A considerable number of passages to this effect have been cited by 
 Dr. Ward, in his " Philosophical Introduction," from the most eminent 
 Catholic theologians and philosophers, including the expressions mentioned 
 in the text (pp. 42D-190). Since that work was published, the phrase used 
 in it " independent morulity '' has been adopted by some French infidels 
 to express certain tenets, which we consider to be us philosophically de- 
 spicable as they are morally detestable. But the phrase had imt bi-en dirtied, 
 to his knowledge at least, when Dr. Ward used it. F. Chaste], S..1. (Dr. 
 Ward, p. 4H1) raises the question, whether " there is n moral law iii'l>/n- 
 'Imtly of all Divine law," and proceeds to answer it in the iillirmativr. 
 Juarez (ib. p. Iu3, says, " dictamina rationis natural is, in qiiibus luuc lex
 
 80 The Philosophy of TJieism. 
 
 against those excellent Catholics who think otherwise : * we 
 are hut explaining the position we shall assume, in this 
 part of our controversy against Mr. Mill. 
 
 Thirdly, the question has been raised among Catholics, 
 whether there can he obligation, properly so called, apart 
 from man's knowledge of a Supreme Legislator. So far as 
 this question is distinct from the preceding, it seems to us 
 purely verbal. If, by saying that act A is of obligation, 
 you only mean that its omission would be culpable and 
 sinful, we hold (consistently with our previous remarks) 
 that there may be true obligation, without reference to 
 a Legislator's prohibition. So F. Chastel says, " there 
 would still remain moral obligation, real duty, though one 
 made abstraction of God and religion." On the other 
 hand, if the term be understood as implying the correlative 
 act of a Legislator who obliges, of course there can 
 be no obligation without full means of knowing such a 
 Legislator. 
 
 Without further delay, let us set forth the precise issue 
 which we are to join with Mr. Mill. There is a large 
 number of cognizable truths, which may be expressed in 
 one or other of the following shapes. "Act A is morally 
 good ; " " act B is morally bad ; " " act C is morally better 
 than act D." All these, it will be seen, are but different 
 shapes, in which emerges the one fundamental idea called 
 " moral goodness." We will call such judgments, therefore, 
 " moral judgments ; " and the truths cognized in them 
 " moral truths." t Our allegation against Mr. Mill is, that 
 a certain number J of these truths are cognized as self- 
 
 [naturalis] consistit, sunt intrinsece necessaria et independentia ab omui 
 voluntate etiam Divina." 
 
 * Dr. Ward has done so in his " Philosophical Introduction," pp. 78-90. 
 
 t We need hardly say that a " moral judgment " may be mistaken ; and 
 that in that case there is no corresponding " moral truth." 
 
 J " ' Parentes cole;' 'Deo convenientem cultum exhibe;' 'rationem 
 sensibus ne subjicias;' et alia innumera generis ejusdem." (Liberatore, 
 n. 80.)
 
 Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 81 
 
 evidently necessary. These we call " moral axioms." Mr. 
 Mill admits, of course, that moral judgments are very 
 frequently elicited ; but, denying as he does the existence 
 of any necessary truths, he denies inclusively that there are 
 moral truths self-evidently necessary. The ground which 
 he often seems to take is that no moral judgments are 
 intuitions, but that all are inferences ; though these infer- 
 ences, he would add, are so readily and imperceptibly 
 drawn, as to be most naturally and almost inevitably 
 mistaken for intuitions. 
 
 That we may bring this vital question to a distinct 
 issue, it is highly important to dwell at starting on the 
 fundamental idea "moral goodness." There is probably 
 no psychical fact, so pregnant with momentous con- 
 sequences in the existing state of philosophy, as man's pos- 
 session of this idea. Very many philosophers hold, that 
 it is complex and resolvable accordingly into simpler 
 elements ; we contend earnestly and confidently that it is 
 simple. 
 
 The strong bias of our opinion is, that Mr. Mill (as we 
 shall explain in a later part of our essay) so far agrees 
 with ourselves ; though his expression of doctrine would no 
 doubt be importantly different. It is very possible, however, 
 that the case may be otherwise ; and that he may regard 
 the idea before us as consisting of simpler elements. In 
 that case he must consistently say, that " morally good," 
 as applied to human acts, means neither more nor less 
 than "conducive to general enjoyment." Provisionally, 
 therefore, we shall assume this as Mr. Mill's position. 
 
 Now, this is an issue, one would think, which must 
 admit of speedy and definite decision : for there is perhaps 
 no one idea which so constantly meets one at every turn, 
 whether in literature or conversation, as that of " morally 
 good" with its correlatives. "I am bound to do what I 
 am paid for doing;" " how conscientious a man 11 is!"
 
 82 TJic Philosophy of TItcism. 
 
 " K behaved in that matter with much more uprightness 
 than L ; " " M is an undeniable scoundrel ; " "no praise 
 can be too great for N's disinterested benevolence and self- 
 sacrifice; " " whatever God commands, men of course are 
 bound to do." At this moment we are in no way concerned 
 with the truth or falsehood of such propositions, but ex- 
 clusively with their meaning. Our readers will see at once, 
 that these judgments, and a thousand others of daily 
 occurrence, contain unmistakably the idea " morally good," 
 under different aspects ; and if they consider the matter 
 with any care they will further see, that this idea is as 
 distinct from the idea " conducive to general enjoyment," 
 as any one can possibly be from any other. This is 
 the proposition which we now wish to illustrate and 
 establish. 
 
 Take the last instance we gave : " whatever God com- 
 mands, a man is bound to do ; " or, in other words, " what- 
 ever God commands, a man acts morally ill in failing to 
 do." Does the Theist mean, by this judgment, that the_ 
 individual's disobedience to God militates against general 
 enjoyment ? This latter statement may or may not be true ; 
 but it is no more equivalent to the former, than it is to a 
 geometrical axiom. Or let us take such a case as would be 
 most favourable to Mr. Mill's argument ; the case of one 
 whom he would regard as amongst the greatest benefactors 
 of his species. "How noble," Mr. Mill would say, "was 
 the self-sacrificing generosity of Howard the philanthro- 
 pist ! " Would he merely mean by this, that Howard's 
 generosity conduced immensely to general enjoyment ? He 
 would be the first indignantly to disclaim so poor an inter- 
 pretation of his words. By the term "noble," then, "or 
 "morally good," Mr. Mill means much more than "con- 
 ducive to general enjoyment." 
 
 But the particular idea " moral evil " deserves our 
 especial consideration, as exhibiting in clearest light the
 
 Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 83 
 
 peculiar character of moral judgments. Take any very 
 obvious case of wickedness. Consider, e.g., the judgment 
 elicited by David concerning his own past course of action, 
 when Nathan had said to him, " Thou art the man." Or 
 suppose I had been guilty of such conduct in an exaggerated 
 shape, as that ascribed to Lord Bacon (truly or falsely) 
 by Lord Macaulay. A politician of high and unblemished 
 moral character, with whose political principles I am heartily 
 in accordance, has admitted me to his friendship and trusted 
 me with his dearest secrets. I find, however, as time goes 
 on, that my best chance of advancement lies in attach- 
 ing myself to the opposite side. Filled with passionate 
 desire for such advancement, I make political capital by 
 disclosing my friend's confidences to his opponents ; and 
 I embark heartily in a course of political enterprise, 
 which has for its end his ruin. As I am about to reap 
 the worldly fruit of my labours, I am seized with a 
 violent illness : and in the tedious hours of slow recovery, 
 I "enter into myself," to use the expression of ascetical 
 writers ; I bitterly repent the past ; I judge that my suc- 
 cessive acts have been " sinful," " wicked." I judge, as a 
 consequence of this, that I have rendered myself worthy of 
 punishment ; that if there be a Moral Governor of the 
 Universe, He views my conduct with detestation ; etc. We 
 are not at this moment alleging that these various judgments 
 are true, but only considering their correct analysis. And 
 surely Mr. Mill will not on reflection maintain, that when I 
 am pondering on the moral turpitude of my past conduct, I 
 am in fact merely thinking of its evil effects on general 
 enjoyment. Doubtless, when I reflect on the malitia of 
 having supported a political cause which I deem unsound, 
 I base this malitia greatly on the evil which I have thereby 
 tried to inflict on my country ; but I base it also in part on 
 the concomitant judgment, that to inflict such injury is 
 intrinsically evil. And when I reflect on the malitia of my
 
 <S4> The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 ingratitude, and of my having perfidiously violated my 
 friend's confidence, in all probability the question does 
 not ever so distantly present itself, whether general enjoy- 
 ment is promoted or retarded by such practices. 
 
 We are arguing against the theory which we provision- 
 ally ascribe to Mr. Mill ; viz. that the idea " morally good " 
 is equivalent with the idea " conducive to general enjoy- 
 ment." But it seems to us that this whole matter may be 
 clenched, so as to render all evasion impossible. If this 
 theory were true, it w r ould be a simply tautologous pro- 
 position to say, that " conduct, known by the agent as 
 adverse to general enjoyment, is morally evil." This pro- 
 position, we say, would be as simply tautologous, as the 
 proposition that "two mutual friends desire each other's 
 well-being;" or the proposition, that "a hard substance 
 resists muscular pressure." These two latter propositions 
 are really tautologous : for a desire of each other's well- 
 being is expressed by the very term " mutual friends ; " and 
 "resistance to muscular pressure" is expressed by the very 
 term " hard substance." Now, it is an evident logical truth, 
 that the contradictory of a tautologous proposition is 
 simply unmeaning, because its predicate denies that very 
 thing which its subject affirms. (See " Mill on Hamilton," 
 p. 92.) " There are two mutual friends of my acquaintance, 
 who do not desire each other's well-being; " " some hard 
 substances I have met with do not resist muscular pres- 
 sure ; " for any meaning that such propositions convey, we 
 might even better (to use Mr. Mill's illustration) say that 
 " every Humpty Dumpty is an Abracadabra." Let us look 
 again, then, at the proposition, that " conduct, known by 
 the agent as averse to general enjoyment, is morally evil." 
 If this proposition were tautologous, its contradictory would 
 be unmeaning; it would be simply unmeaning to say, that 
 " some conduct, known by the agent as averse to general 
 enjoyment, may be morally good." Will Mr. Mill him-
 
 Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 85 
 
 self say that this is unmeaning? On the contrary, the 
 energetic protest with which he would encounter its 
 enunciation, sufficiently evinces how clearly he apprehends 
 its tenor. 
 
 Indeed, Mr, Mill himself, in a very remarkable passage 
 which we shall quote at length before we conclude, contra- 
 dicts the doctrine which we are here opposing. He says in 
 effect, that it would be morally better for all mankind to 
 undergo eternal torment than to worship such or such a 
 being, whom he imagines and describes. Now, most cer- 
 tainly eternal torment, endured by all mankind, is less con- 
 ducive to general enjoyment than would be the worship of 
 such a being; and Mr. Mill does not therefore consider 
 " morally good " as synonymous with " conducive to general 
 enjoyment." 
 
 Arguments entirely similar to those which we have here 
 given would equally suffice to disprove any other analysis 
 which might be attempted, of the idea " morally good ; " 
 and we conclude, therefore, that this idea is simple and 
 incapable of analysis. 
 
 We are now in a position to consider satisfactorily the 
 direct point at issue : the self-evident necessity of certain 
 moral truths. Let us go back to the moral judgments on 
 which we have already dwelt ; the moral judgments, elicited 
 on his sick-bed by the recently unscrupulous politician. 
 Take any one of their number: for instance, "my divulging 
 what my friend told me in confidence, was morally evil." 
 "We maintain that this judgment is the cognition of a self- 
 evidently necessary truth. 
 
 On this point let us refer to the remarks we made 
 in our second essay, on the notes of a self-cvidently 
 necessary truth, and let us apply them to the case before 
 us. It is known to me by my very idea of this my act- 
 so soon as I choose carefully to consider it that it was 
 morally evil ; I intuc irresistibly, that in no possible sphere 1
 
 80 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 of existence the relevant circumstances remaining un- 
 changed could such an act be otherwise ; that omnipotence 
 itself could not prevent such an act from being intrinsically 
 base and abominable.* In other words, if it be a self- 
 evidently necessary truth (see pp. 86, 37 of .our last essay) 
 that a trilateral figure is triangular, it is no less indubi- 
 tably a self-evidently necessary truth, that such an act as 
 we are considering is morally evil. 
 
 How may we consider Mr. Mill to stand in reference to 
 this argument ? He agrees with us, of course, that mankind 
 do again and again form legitimately, and with good reason, 
 what we have called "moral judgments: " judgments re- 
 ducible to the type " act A is morally good; " or " act B 
 is morally evil ; " or " act C is morally better than act D." 
 He adds, however, what is quite true, that we have no right 
 to consider any of these judgments intuitive, until we have 
 clearly shown that they are not inferential : for, as he most 
 justly observes, inferences from experience are often so 
 obviously and spontaneously drawn, that unless we are very 
 wary we may most easily mistake them for intuitions. We 
 
 * We do not for a moment forget the power, possessed by God, of changing 
 (as theologians express it) the " materiu " of the Natural Law ; but the 
 existence of this power, so far from conflicting with, on the contrary coufirms, 
 what is said in the text. The classical instance in point is the command 
 imposed by God on Abraham, of sacrificing his son ; and what all Catholic 
 theologians say is this. God, as the Creator of mankind, could (without 
 disparagement of His sanctity) inflict death on Isaac or on any one else ; and 
 it is no more repugnant to His Attributes that He should do this by human 
 intermediation, than that He should do it directly. God's command, then, 
 intrinsically changed the circumstances of Abraham's act, if the morality of 
 the act was intrinsically necessary, and external to the sphere of God's 
 Power. It would have been intrinsically wrong in Abraham, if he had 
 refused to slay Isaac when commanded to do so as God's vicegerent; and 
 God Himself could not make such refusal innocent. On the other hand, it 
 would have been no less necessarily wrong to tlay Isaac on his own authority ; 
 and God Himself could not make such slaughter innocent. 
 
 It should be added, that no such " mutatio inateriaj " can affect the 
 internal acts and dispositions of the will. For instance, God could not 
 possibly command His reasonable creatures to hate each other ; and still less 
 to hate Himself. Dr. Ward has stated this doctrine at length as clearly as 
 he could, " Philosophical Introduction," pp. KJ5-1UO.
 
 Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 87 
 
 are next, therefore, to show, that there are indubitably some 
 moral judgments, which are not inferential. Our argument 
 runs thus. 
 
 If the idea "morally good" be really simple as we 
 consider ourselves to have now conclusively established 
 then that idea cannot possibly be contained in the conclu- 
 sion of any syllogism, unless it be expressly found in one of 
 the premisses.* Take, then, any one of those moral judg- 
 ments, which Mr. Mill admits to be legitimately formed. If 
 he alleges that that judgment is an inference as indeed it 
 very possibly may be he does but shift his difficulty, and 
 in no respect lessens it. If the judgment be really the 
 conclusion of a syllogism, then, as we have said, that syl- 
 logism must contain some other moral judgment as one of 
 its premisses. If this premiss be itself a conclusion, we 
 are thrown back on an earlier moral premiss, until at length 
 we come to some moral judgment, which is immediate and 
 not inferential. If this primary moral premiss be not 
 cognizable as true, then neither is the ultimate conclusion 
 so cognizable : and this is against the hypothesis ; for 
 Mr. Mill admits that many moral judgments are cogniz- 
 able as true, and it is one of these which we are here 
 considering. If, on the other hand, the primary moral 
 premiss be cognizable as true, then a moral proposition 
 is cognizable as true, which is not inferred from experi- 
 ence ; and Mr. Mill is obliged to abandon the keystone of 
 his position. 
 
 It seems to us, then, that the real issue between Mr. 
 Mill and ourselves turns on the question, whether the idea 
 " morally good " be capable of analysis. If it means " con- 
 ducive to general enjoyment," then no doubt all moral 
 judgments are inferential and founded on experience ; but 
 
 * If " morally pood" were a complex idea, it mif;ht lie contained. <>f 
 course, in the conclusion of a syllogism, without appearing iu the pK'inif.-ea 
 except in its cvnttitucnt elements.
 
 88 TJte Philosophy of Tltcixni. 
 
 if it be incapable of analysis, then a certain number of 
 moral judgments must be intuitive. And if Mr. Mill once 
 admits that they are intuitive, he will certainly find no 
 difficulty in further admitting, that they are cognitions of 
 self-evidently necessary truths. 
 
 \Ve have worded our argument throughout, in harmony 
 with the opinion which to us seems true (see our last 
 essay, pp. 48, 49), that axioms are first intued in the 
 individual case, though capable of being universalized. 
 According to this view, what Catholics call " the first prin- 
 ciples " of morality, are simply these universalized axioms. 
 Firstly, for instance, I intue, as a self-evidently necessary 
 truth, that my own betrayal of my friend's confidence was 
 intrinsically wicked ; and I then further intue, as self- 
 evidently necessary, that all such betrayal in really 
 analogous circumstances possesses the same evil quality. 
 Those philosophers, on the contrary, who hold that axioms 
 are always intued in the universal, will regard every 
 individual moral judgment as the conclusion of syllogistic 
 reasoning, whereof some universal moral axiom has been 
 a premiss. But their substantial argument against Mr. 
 Mill may be precisely the same as our own. 
 
 Moreover, we have assumed throughout no other datum, 
 except the one for which we argued in the first of these 
 essays ; viz. that whatever my cognitive faculties indubi- 
 tably avouch, is infallibly true. The strong bias of our 
 own opinion is, that this is the very doctrine which 
 Mr. Mill will call in question; but most certainly he 
 has no right to do so. On one hand, no experience is 
 possible to me I have no knowledge whatever except 
 of my present consciousness unless I first unreservedly 
 believe the truth of whatever my memory distinctly 
 declares ; while on the other hand (as we have more 
 than once pointed out), Mr. Mill fully admits that I 
 have no ground whatever for this belief, except the present
 
 Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 89 
 
 avouckment of my faculties. If my faculties convey to me 
 infallible knowledge when they distinctly declare to me 
 a certain past experience, no less must they convey to 
 me infallible knowledge, when they declare to me (if 
 they do declare) the self-evident necessity of certain moral 
 truths. If I do not firmly trust them in the latter avouch- 
 ment, I have no right firmly to trust them in the former. 
 Nay, I have really stronger grounds for accepting the distinct 
 declarations of my moral faculty than the distinct declara- 
 tions of my memory. In the first place intrinsically, it 
 would be in some sense less utterly impossible to believe that 
 I never did betray my friend's confidence, than to believe 
 that such betrayal is not morally detestable. And in the 
 second place extrinsically, I find these obvious moral judg- 
 ments confirmed by every one I meet : whereas for the 
 trustworthiness of my memory, I can have no external 
 warrant at all ; because my absolute trust in its testimony 
 is a strictly requisite preliminary condition, in order that 
 I may know or even guess what any one human being 
 thinks or says. But we are to meet Mr. Mill in detail on 
 this point a few pages hence. 
 
 This datum, then, being assumed, we consider that we 
 have built thereon an argument absolutely irrefragable. 
 We consider our reasoning to have established conclusive!}', 
 (1) that the idea " morally good " is incapable of analysis ; 
 and (2) that various moral judgments are cognitions of self- 
 evidently necessary truths. We may add, that if the 
 Catholic reader desires to apprehend the relation which 
 exists between necessary truth and the One Necessary 
 Being, we would refer him to the Dublin Ilcvicw for July, 
 1809, pp. 153, 154. We there stated with hearty con- 
 currence F. Kleutgen's doctrine, that all necessary truths 
 are founded on God; that they are what they are, because 
 God is what He is. 
 
 Our next thesis is a very simple one ; and indeed almost
 
 90 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 (if not altogether) tautologous. All acts, morally good, 
 are " admirable " and " praiseworthy ; " all acts, morally 
 evil, are " the reverse of admirable " and " blameworthy ; " 
 all acts are more admirable and more praiseworthy in 
 proportion as they are morally better. 
 
 But now, lastly in order to express the whole doctrine 
 which we would place before our readers we must make 
 a very important supplement to what has hitherto been 
 said. Let us renew our old picture. I ain lying on a bed 
 of illness, and looking back remorsefully on my shameful 
 violation of my friend's confidence, and on a life of dis- 
 honest practices directed (as I myself knew) to the detriment 
 of my country's highest interests. Not only I intue that 
 a large number of my past acts have been morally evil, but 
 I further intue that they violated the command of some 
 living Personal Being.* This is the further thesis, which 
 we are now to advocate. The general axiom, we maintain, 
 is cognizable, that all morally evil acts are prohibited by 
 some living Personal Being. 
 
 Now, here let us distinctly explain our meaning. We by 
 no means say on the contrary, in an earlier part of our 
 article we have denied that the idea " morally evil " 
 either includes or is equivalent with the idea " forbidden 
 by some living Personal Being." The predicate of an 
 axiom is not commonly included in, or equivalent with, the 
 
 * "Ipsa ratio natriralis . . . discernendo actiones convenientes aut 
 repugnantes naturae humanse, prohibitionem vel imperium divinum nobis 
 offert." (Liberatore, Ethica, n. 79.) " Hoc" dictamen rationis " sic auclitu 
 quodam interne homo percipit, ut veie imperio aliquo se astrinpi sentiat. 
 . . . Cui voci intrinsecus prsocipienti si quis non pareat, sic stimulis angitur 
 ... ut ... ipsemet se accuset et arguat et pcenam a supremd quddam 
 potestate sibi infligendum expectet" (ib. n. 80). "Semper in illis " judiciis 
 practicis "involvitur obscurus saltern et indistinctus conceptus alicujus 
 occultse potestalis, . . . quae objective spectata non est nisi l)eus " (ib. n. 83). 
 On the other hand: " Divina voluutas bonitatem vel malitiam actionibus 
 impertire non posset, nisi ante prxsumalur bouum esse et honestum Deo 
 prsecipienti parere, turpe et illicitum reluctari. Hoc non snpposito, actio 
 tuauebit indifferent ctiam post Dei jussum vtl prohibitionem " (ib. n. 27).
 
 Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 91 
 
 idea of its subject ; for were it so, there would be no axioms 
 except tautologies. Take the parallel case, on which we 
 insisted in our last essay : " all trilaterals are triangular." 
 So far is it from being true (as we there pointed out) that 
 triangularity is included in the idea of trilateralness, that, 
 on the contrary, I call a figure " trilateral " in the fullest 
 sense of that word, before I have so much as considered 
 any question as to the number of its angles. Nevertheless 
 the proposition is axiomatic : because, to use F. Kleutgen's 
 expression, " by merely considering the idea of the subject 
 and predicate, I come to see that there exists between them 
 that relation which the proposition expresses ; " or (as we 
 ourselves expressed the same thought) because, from my 
 very conception of a trilateral, I know its triangularity. 
 
 This, then, is what we maintain in the present instance. 
 If after such an ill-spent life as we have supposed, while 
 lying on my sick-bed, I ponder in anguish of soul the idea 
 "morally evil" as truly applicable to so many of my past 
 acts, I find myself to know, by my very conception of that 
 attribute, that these acts have been acts of rebellion against 
 some living personal authority, external to myself. "We 
 make this allegation, on the sole possible and the abundantly 
 sufficient ground of an appeal to the indubitable facts of 
 human nature. We say, "external to myself;" because 
 to say merely that the lower part of my nature has rebelled 
 against the higher, is absurdly inadequate to express my 
 deep conviction. And we say "living personal authority," 
 because it is still more absurd to suppose that there can 
 be rebellion against an impersonal thing ; least of all 
 against an abstraction, which is in fact nothing at all. 
 I intue, then, the axiom, that all morally evil acts are also 
 forbidden me by some living personal authority external 
 to myself. 
 
 It is of vital moment here to muke manifest how com- 
 pletely distinct are the t\vo ideas; ''morally evil " on one
 
 92 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 hand, and " prohibited by a Personal Being " on the other. 
 For this purpose, let us take the following proposition : 
 "to do what is prohibited by my Creator is to do an act 
 morally evil." A moment's consideration will show that 
 this proposition has an entirely distinct sense from the 
 purely tautological one, that " what is prohibited by my 
 Creator is prohibited by a Personal Being." The term 
 " morally evil " expresses an idea entirely external to, over 
 and above, the idea expressed by the term " prohibited by 
 a Personal Being." And as, on the one hand, it is no 
 tautology, but an axiom, that "to do what is prohibited by 
 my Holy Creator is to do an act morally evil ; " so, on tho 
 other hand, we are here urging that it is no tautology, but 
 an axiom, that " all acts morally evil are prohibited by 
 some Personal Being." 
 
 But further, as Viva argues,* this Personal Being has 
 on me such paramount claims, that though all other beings 
 in the universe solicited me in an opposite direction, my 
 obligation would in no degree be affected, of submitting 
 myself unreservedly to His command. His Will, then, is 
 more peremptorily authoritative than the united will of all 
 existent or possible beings who are not He. 
 
 Nay, further and this is put by F. Franzelin t moral 
 laws hold good for all persons existent or possible ; all other 
 persons, therefore, existent or possible, are as unreservedly 
 subject to His command as I am. Consequently He is no 
 less than Supreme Legislator of the universe. 
 
 F. Kleutgen expresses substantially the same doctrine 
 with Viva and Franzelin, where he says that, "when 
 we vividly represent to ourselves our imperfection and 
 dependence," " God makes Himself felt within us by 
 His moral law, as an August Power to which we are 
 subject." 
 
 * Treating the condemned proposition on " philosophical sin." 
 t " De Deo Uno," p. 52.
 
 Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 93 
 
 But there are further facts of human nature to which 
 F. Newman conclusively appeals, as showing how universal 
 and how undeniably intuitive is man's conviction, that acts 
 morally evil are offences against a Supreme Euler. We 
 will remind our readers indeed of what we have already 
 said concerning F. Newman's use of the word " conscience." 
 But we need hardly beg them to observe how singularly 
 his remarks combine exquisite beauty of expression with 
 strong and irresistible appeal to facts. The italics are 
 our own. 
 
 In consequence of this prerogative of dictating and command- 
 ing, which is of its essence, Conscience has an intimate bearing 
 on our affections and emotions, leading us to reverence and 
 awe, hope and fear, especially fear. . . . No fear is felt by any 
 one who recognizes that his conduct has not been beautiful, 
 though he may be mortified at himself, if perhaps he has 
 thereby forfeited some advantage ; but, if he has been betrayed 
 into any kind of immorality, he has a lively sense of respon- 
 sibility and guilt, though the act be no offence against society ; 
 of distress and apprehension, even though it may be of present 
 service to him ; of compunction and regret, though in itself it 
 be most pleasurable ; of confusion of face, thouyh it may have 
 no witnesses. These various perturbations of mind, which are 
 characteristic of a bad conscience, and may be very considerable ; 
 self-reproach, poignant shame, haunting remorse, chill dismay 
 at the prospect of the future ; and their contraries, when the 
 conscience is good, as real though less forcible, self-approval, 
 inward peace, lightness of heart, and the like ; these emotions 
 constitute a generic difference between conscience and our other 
 intellectual senses ; common sense, good sense, sense of ex- 
 pedience, taste, sense of honour, and the like. . . . 
 
 Conscience always invoices the recognition of a living object, 
 towanh which it is directed. Inanimate things cannot stir unr 
 affections: these are correlative with persons. If, as is the case, 
 wo feel responsibility, are ashamed, are frightened, at trans- 
 gressing the voice of conscience, this implies that there is One to 
 ichom we are responsible, before whom we are ashamed, whose 
 claim upon us wo fear. If, on doing wrong, we feel the same 
 tearful, broken-hearted sorrow which overwhelms us on hurting a 
 mother; if, on doing right, we enjoy the same sunny serenity of
 
 04- TJte Philosophy of Tlieism. 
 
 mind, the same soothing satisfactory delight, which follows on 
 our receiving praise from a father, we certainly have within us the 
 image of some person, to whom our love and veneration look, in 
 whose smile we find our happiness, for whom we yearn, towards 
 whom we direct our pleadings, in whose anger we are troubled 
 and waste away. These feelings in us are such as require for 
 their exciting cause an intelligent being : we are not affectionate 
 towards a stone, nor do we feel shame before a horse or a dog ; 
 we have no remorse or compunction on breaking mere human 
 law ; yet, so it is, conscience excites all these painful emotions, 
 confusion, foreboding, self-condemnation ; and, on the other hand, 
 it sheds upon us a deep peace, a sense of security, a resignation, 
 and a hope, which there is no sensible, no earthly object to 
 elicit. " The wicked flees, when no one pursueth ; " then why 
 does he flee ? whence his terror ? Who is it that he sees in solitude, 
 in darkness, in the hidden chambers of his heart ? If the cause of 
 these emotions does not belong to this visible world, the Object 
 to which his perception is directed must be Supernatural and 
 Divine ; and thus the phenomena of Conscience, as a dictate, 
 avail to impress the imagination with the picture of a Supreme 
 Governor, a Judge, holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, retributive ; 
 and is the creative principle of religion (pp. 104-7). 
 
 We affirm then, as an axiom, that all acts morally evil 
 are prohibited by some Living Person external to the agent ; 
 and we affirm as an obvious inference, that this Person is 
 Supreme Legislator of the Universe.* 
 
 "We may sufficiently sum up what we have now main- 
 
 * It seems to us (speaking with all diffidence) lhat the view expressed hy 
 us in the text is serviceable, on two different doctrinal heads, in harmonizing 
 Catholic writers with themselves, with each other, and with facts. Thus 
 firstly Liberatore, Dmowski, and (we think) all modern Catholic philosophers, 
 hold, on the one hand, that God (according to human modes of conception) 
 cognizes any given act as intrinsically evil, antecedently to prohibiting it 
 by the Natural Law ; and yet they hold that, in intuing its moral evil, 
 men spontaneously and inevitably cognize the fact of its being prohibited 
 by some Supreme Legislator. It is not easy to see how these statements 
 can be combined, except according to the exposition which we have 
 drawn out. 
 
 Then, for another matter of doctrine. The vast majority of theologians 
 follow S. Thomas in holding, that the existence of God is not " per se nota 
 quoad nos ; " though they regard it as a truth, Reducible from first prin- 
 ciples by a very obvious and immediate consequence. On the other hand, it
 
 Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 95 
 
 tained, in three propositions : (1) the idea "morally good " 
 or " morally evil " is simple and incapable of analysis ; 
 (2) there are various human acts self-evidently known to 
 be morally evil; (3) such acts are further known to be 
 prohibited by a Supreme Ruler of the Universe. If Mr. 
 Mill admitted the two former of these propositions, he 
 would feel no difficulty in the third : in considering, there- 
 fore, the objections he may be expected to bring against our 
 doctrine, we will for brevity's sake dismiss from considera- 
 tion the last of our three above-named theses. 
 
 These objections, as in other similar instances, may 
 be of two different kinds : they may be objections against 
 the reasoning adduced for our conclusion, or they may be 
 objections against the conclusion itself. Of the former 
 kind, there is only one which occurs to us as possible ; and 
 we believe this to be the very objection on which Mr. Mill 
 will mainly insist. Take the judgment, applied to some 
 very obviously immoral act " act B is morally evil." 
 Mr. Mill may probably admit, both that this judgment is 
 immediate, and also that the idea " morally evil " is 
 perfectly simple : yet he may allege that such an avouch- 
 ment is not intuitive, because it would not have issued 
 from the mind at the time when the mind's revelations 
 were in their pristine purity . The quality of immediately* 
 eliciting on occasion this or that moral judgment, however 
 indubitably now possessed, may be no part (Mr. Mill will 
 say) of the mind's original constitution , but on the contrary 
 may result, by natural process, from various experiences, 
 
 is admitted by all, that a large number of moral axioms are self-evident ami 
 intuitively known ; while yet those very writers, who deny that God's 
 existence is " per se nota quoad nos," say that some knowledge of God is 
 included in the cognition of a moral axiom. According to the view given in 
 'our text, the knowledge of a Supreme Legislator of the Universe is an 
 infer fnrf though a very prompt and obvious one from the self-evident 
 truths of morality. 
 
 * We need hardly say that we hero use the word " immediately " as 
 opposed to " inferential!)-."
 
 9G The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 through which every man has passed.* Consequently (so 
 be will conclude) this subjective persuasion is no guarantee 
 whatever of objective truth. Such an objection brings us 
 back to certain expressions of Mr. Mill's, on which we 
 animadverted in the first of these essays, and which here 
 again require coniment.t But we must preface this com- 
 ment by a brief exposition of terminology. 
 
 We believe there is no difference whatever, among those 
 philosophers who use the word "intuition," as to the 
 signification of that word. Of course nothing could be 
 known at all unless some truths were known immediately 
 and by their own light ; and these are called " first truths." 
 Moreover, it is absolutely indubitable, that the facts of 
 " consciousness " properly so called the mental phenomena 
 which I experience at the present moment are " first 
 truths " to me. Now, the word " intuition " is used, by all 
 who do use it, to express those other truths, over and above 
 acts of consciousness, which are known to me immediately 
 and by their own light. Sir W. Hamilton, however, uses 
 the expression " acts of consciousness " to express all first 
 truths : and we think never was there a mode of speech 
 more exquisitely infelicitous, more singularly adapted to 
 introduce equivocation and perplexity, and to surround the 
 whole subject with almost impenetrable fog. Mr. Mill, 
 while justly disapproving this use of language, yet (much 
 to our regret) adopts it for purposes of argument with Sir 
 W. Hamilton (" On Hamilton," p. 193 et alibi) ; and this 
 
 * It should be explained that, in Mr. Mill's opinion, by a process of what 
 lie calls " mental chemistry," some idea nuiy result from others of the past, 
 while nevertheless in its prevent state it is simple and incapable of analysis. 
 (See "Logic" (seventh edition), vol. ii. p. 437.) He calls such an idea 
 indeed "complex," because (as he considers) it "results from," it has 
 been " generated by," other ideas ; but he adds, that it does not " consist 
 of" simpler ideas, and its true name, therefore, in its present state is surely 
 " simple." 
 
 t Since we wrote tliat article, we have again examined Mr. Mill's philo- 
 sophical writings, with a social view to this question, and we find hia 
 meaning much more pronounced and unmistakable than we had fancied.
 
 Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 97 
 
 fact must be remembered in looking at those passages of 
 his, to which we shall presently refer. Let us now, there- 
 fore, pass from this question of words to the question of 
 things. 
 
 The main thesis of the first essay in this volume, on 
 "Certitude," was, that man's cognitive faculties infallibly 
 testify objective truth ; and, as part of this, that I intui- 
 tively know whatever my mind immediately avouches. "VVe 
 admitted expressly (in full agreement so far with Mr. Mill) 
 that inferential judgments are again and again mistaken 
 for intuitive ones; and in our present article accordingly 
 we have shown (we trust) conclusively, that certain moral 
 judgments are not inferential but immediate. Mr. Mill, 
 however, in various passages goes much further than we 
 have here implied : he affirms that the very thing, which 
 my faculties now immediately declare, is not thereby in- 
 tuitively known, and that I must not accept it as self- 
 evidently true until I can show that it was declared by my 
 intuitive faculties, at the time "when they received their 
 first impressions ; " " at the first beginning of my intel- 
 lectual life;" when they were "in their state of pristine 
 purity." See "On Hamilton," pp. 152, 160, 171, 176, 
 185 ; " Logic," vol. ii. p. 439. In one place (" On Hamil- 
 ton," p. 173, n.) he repudiates the opinion that man's 
 intuitive faculties admit of development and improvement 
 by means of practice ; and in another (p. 172) implies that 
 no one's intuitive faculties can be trusted, except an infant's 
 " when he first opened his eyes to the light." 
 
 Now, the answer to all this is really very obvious and 
 conclusive. There is one class of intuitions, of which 
 Mr. Mill heartily admits the existence ; those which arc 
 called acts of memory. In consistency, however, he must 
 maintain that he can trust no avouchmcnts of his memory, 
 however clear and distinct, until he can show that that 
 faculty, " at the first beginning of his intellectual life," 
 
 VOL. I. II
 
 98 The Philosophy of Tliewm. 
 
 before it had received " development and education," nay, 
 " when he first opened his eyes to the light," would have 
 been capable of those avouchments. But it is indubitable 
 that he can never prove this ; because, so soon as he 
 attempt* to prove it, he takes for granted at every turn the 
 very thing to be proved, viz. the trustworthiness of his 
 present memory. So long as Mr. Mill adheres to the 
 philosophical tenet which we are opposing, he cannot in 
 consistency have any reasonable ground whatever for 
 trusting his memory ; and unless he trusts his memory, 
 he knows nothing whatever of any kind or description, 
 except only his mental experience of this particular moment. 
 In brief, there is no middle term whatever. Either the 
 mind's present avouchment must be accepted as infallibly 
 declaring objective truth, or blind, hopeless, and universal 
 scepticism is the inevitable lot of mankind. 
 
 Here, also, we must repeat a remark which we made in 
 our essay on " Certitude." Never was there a philosophical 
 proposition more preposterously unfounded than that which 
 Mr. Mill makes the foundation of his whole philosophy ; 
 viz. that the primordial avouchments of the human mind 
 certainly correspond with objective truth. We may safely 
 challenge him to allege so much as one colourable reason 
 for this proposition, unless he first assumes that the mind's 
 present avouchments are infallibly true. It is this latter 
 proposition which is primarily certain ; and the former 
 proposition has no other evidence whatever, except of 
 inference from the latter. He denies that very truth 
 which alone can supply any reasonable ground for what 
 stands as the sole basis of his intellectual speculations. 
 Our reason for this confident statement will be at once 
 understood by those who have read the essay to which we 
 refer. 
 
 This is our answer to the objection which Mr. Mill will 
 probably raise. We might have replied to it from an
 
 Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 99 
 
 entirely different point of view : for we confidently deny the 
 psychological allegation on which it is built ; we confidently 
 deny that men go through any series of experiences, which 
 could by possibility have generated their present moral 
 judgments. On this head we can refer to an unusually 
 able article, contributed to the Macmillan of July, 1869, by 
 Mr. R. H. Hutton, called "A Questionable Parentage of 
 Morals." Mr. Hutton's arguments indeed are directly 
 addressed against a theory ascribed by him to Mr. Herbert 
 Spencer ; * but they apply a longe fortiori to Mr. Mill's. 
 For ourselves, however, we think it better to abstain alto- 
 gether from this psychological question. We thus abstain, 
 in order that our readers' attention may be more un- 
 dividedly fixed on what we consider the glaring unreason- 
 ableness and utterly subversive tendency of that principle 
 of Mr. Mill's, which alone could give any controversial 
 value to such a psychological allegation. Never could we 
 have expected so able a thinker as Mr. Mill to take up a 
 position so relentlessly suicidal. 
 
 We hold, then, that no such objection will stand for a 
 moment or has so much as the slightest plausibility 
 against the reasoning adduced for our two theses. And 
 since we know of no other objection, we assume that they 
 are conclusively established. We next, therefore, proceed to 
 consider such objections as may be raised against our theses 
 themselves, and no longer against the arguments which we 
 have adduced in their behalf. There is only one of these 
 which impresses us as presenting any even superficial 
 difficulty ; we refer to the divergence of moral standard, 
 which has prevailed in different times and countries. Mr. 
 Bain lays much stress on this in the chapter which we 
 have named at the head of our essay, and which Mr. Mill 
 (in his " Utilitarianism ") commemorates with the warmest 
 
 * Wo use this form of expression, hccuusc Mr. Spencer afterwards di.s- 
 cliiimcd that theory.
 
 100 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 commendation. Mr. Bain lays stress, e.g., on such points 
 as "the change that has come over men's sentiments on 
 the subject of slavery " (p. 312). He lays stress, again, on 
 the inexhaustible varieties of what may be called ritual 
 morality : on such facts, as that the Mussulman women 
 think it a duty to cover their faces in public (p. 300) ; the 
 men to abstain from wine (p. 301) ; the Hindoos to venerate 
 the cow (p. 808) ; the Buddhists to avoid animal food (ib.). 
 How are such fundamental differences of moral judgment, 
 he asks, consistent with any supposition that the first 
 principles of moral truth are self-evidently known to man- 
 kind as universally and necessarily true ? 
 
 F. Harper gives the true reply to this obvious objection, 
 in the sixth of his papers contributed to the Month on 
 F. Newman's " Grammar." " First," he says, " I observe 
 with Sir J. Mackintosh, that people may differ as much as 
 they please about what is right and wrong, but they all 
 nevertheless agree that there is something right and some- 
 thing wrong." But further and more importantly, " we 
 have forgotten the influence that the will has over the 
 intellect in moral matters ; and the influence again which 
 passion, affection, prejudice, evil education, custom, have 
 in such subjects over both. By means of these and similar 
 causes, the perception of right and wrong has been blunted, 
 often choked. Still more often it is liable to be misdirected." 
 " These varieties, therefore," he adds, " of popular or national 
 judgment, however extensive, prove nothing against the 
 objective evidence and certitude of moral principles ; or 
 against the possibility of their subjective evidence and 
 certainty, as reflected in the individual conscience when left 
 free to its unbiassed determination and in its right balance." 
 
 The question, however, is of immeasurably more prominent 
 importance in our controversy with Mr. Mill than it was in 
 F. Harper's criticism of F. Newman ; and we will therefore 
 draw out, at much greater length and in our own way, what
 
 Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 101 
 
 is substantially identical alike with the doctrine of F. New- 
 man and F. Harper. 
 
 Firstly, however, we must observe, that phenomenists 
 here are in the habit of trying most unfairly to shift the 
 burden of proof from themselves to their opponents. We 
 allege with confidence that we have demonstratively proved 
 our theses. Unless, therefore, Mr. Bain demonstrates the 
 validity of his objection, he does nothing whatever ; for 
 great probability on one side is simply valueless against 
 proof on the other. At the same time, however, we do not 
 for a moment admit that our antagonists can give even 
 probable ground for the validity of their objection. 
 
 Then, further, we would point out that they appeal from 
 what is known to what is unknown. I am most intimately 
 aware of my own present or habitual thoughts and feelings : 
 I am also in various degrees well acquainted with those of 
 my friends, my compatriots, my contemporaries. Our 
 antagonists appeal from these, to the sentiments of bar- 
 barous tribes, separated from me most widely by time or 
 place or both, and of whose circumstances I know next to 
 nothing. And they make this appeal on a question in 
 which everything depends on circumstances ; a very little 
 divergence in these often sufficing to change an act from 
 intrinsically evil to intrinsically good. 
 
 We now proceed to give our own explanation of the 
 facts to which Mr. Bain has appealed ; reminding our 
 readers, however, that it is no business of ours to prove 
 our explanation sufficient, but Mr. Bain's business to 
 prove (if he can) that it is otherwise. We have already 
 conclusively (we trust) established our position ; Mr. Bain 
 has no standing in court, unless he conclusively establishes 
 his. 
 
 (1) Firstly, then, in one respect the most barbarous 
 nations emphatically confirm our view. As F. llarprr 
 quotes from Mackintosh, they may diiTt-r as to what is right
 
 102 The Philosophy of Theism-. 
 
 or wrong, but they all agree that there is a right and a 
 wrong. And so it has often been said though the present 
 writer has no such knowledge as would justify him in 
 affirming it from his own researches that every nation, 
 however savage, has some word in its language to express 
 "duty," as distinct from " expediency." Mr. Bain admits 
 throughout, that all those to whom he appeals have that 
 very same idea of what is meant by " right," or " wrong," 
 or "moral obligation," which is possessed by Europeans 
 of the nineteenth century.* It is true that he explains the 
 origin and authority of this idea in a way fundamentally 
 different from our own. But in raising this issue, he is 
 amenable to the court of modern and civilized experience ; 
 and by considering the most undeniable facts of human 
 nature as it exists around us, we are able (as we trust we 
 have shown) conclusively to establish our own doctrine. 
 
 Nay, (2) the number of moral axioms is by no means 
 inconsiderable which are intued by all men possessing the 
 use of reason throughout the world. In other words, men 
 not only agree everywhere on the existence of a "right" 
 and a " wrong," but in no inconsiderable degree on the 
 acts to which they ascribe those respective attributes. 
 Take the two instances on which we have ourselves insisted : 
 the sins of David, and of the dishonest and treacherous 
 politician. In either case there is no one, capable of under- 
 standing such actions, who will not in his cool judgment 
 condemn them without a moment's hesitation. We say 
 "in his cool judgment," because it is manifest that men 
 who are wholly absorbed and excited in the pursuit of some 
 temporal end, refuse commonly even to consider the moral 
 character of what they do. But otherwise, " there must be 
 admitted to exist," says Mr. Bain himself (p. 300), "a 
 
 * For instance. " Every man may have the feeling of conscience, that is 
 the feeling of moral reprobation and moral approbation. All men agree in 
 having these feelinrj$, though all do not agree in the matters to which they are 
 applied " (pp. 207, 298).
 
 M r. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 103 
 
 tolerably uniform sense of the necessity of recognizing 
 some rights of individuals : " " there are to a certain point 
 * eternal and immutable ' moral judgments ... in the re- 
 pudiation of the thief, the manslayer, and the rebel; " and 
 we may add, no less, of him who becomes the wanton enemy 
 of his benefactor, or who for private ends violates his 
 solemn promise, or who for personal reward inflicts on 
 his country what he knows to be a heavy injury. 
 
 (3) "We shall still further see the existing amount of 
 agreement on moral matters, by another consideration. 
 There are several classes of actions, on which there may 
 be indeed no universally received axiom of the form " act 
 B is morally evil " where nevertheless all mankind agree 
 in holding as self-evident that "act C is better than act D." 
 Thus men everywhere will consider some course of conduct 
 more admirable caeteris paribus, in proportion as it is more 
 unselfish, however little they may agree as to what amount 
 of selfishness is actually immoral. It is said, again, that 
 the most barbarous nations regard celibacy as a higher 
 state than marriage, while differing most widely from each 
 other as to the limits of actual obligation in such matters. 
 If this be true, we should be disposed to hold that the moral 
 judgment in question is really cognized by all men as self- 
 evidently true. For though Protestants earnestly repudiate 
 this axiom, we should regard this as one of the not infre- 
 quent cases in which men refuse to recognize what they 
 really cognize ; we should say that the preternatural hatred 
 of these Protestants for Catholicity, in this as in many 
 other cases, prevents their explicit perception of the most 
 obvious moral truths. But there is no need whatever of 
 insisting on this.* 
 
 * Mr. Bain, when reciting cases in which "strong antipathies" have boon 
 arbitrarily " made into moral rules " (p. ISO'.)), has the following shameless 
 remark: "There has been a very prevailing disposition to restrict tho 
 indulgences of sex. Some practices are so violently abhorred, that they uro 
 not permitted even to bo iniined " (p. 310). We must do Mr. Mill the
 
 104 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 (4) But no consideration perhaps so impressively shows 
 the unanimity of moral conviction even now prevalent 
 among mankind, as the following. All mankind, we say, 
 are agreed in holding that justice, beneficence, veracity, 
 fidelity to promises, gratitude, temperance, fortitude, that 
 these, and not their opposites, are the virtuous ends of 
 action. By this phrase we mean to express two proposi- 
 tions. On the one hand, every act, otherwise faultless,* is 
 accounted hy all men as good, if done for the sake of 
 justice, beneficence, or any one of the rest ; while, on the 
 other hand, every act is accounted by all men to be evil, if 
 it contravene these ends. Take any one in their number 
 say justice as standing for the rest. Many men doubtless 
 in various times and places have thought it right to do 
 many an act, which Catholics know to be unjust : still they 
 have never thought it right because unjust ; they have never 
 thought it right, for the sake of any virtuousness which 
 they have supposed to reside in injustice ; but because of 
 the virtuousness of beneficence, or gratitude, or the like. 
 Similarly, many men think an act wrong because they 
 think it unjust ; but they never think it wrong because they 
 think it just. They regard this or that just act as wrong, 
 because they regard it as opposed to beneficence or gratitude, 
 but never because they regard it as required by justice. In 
 one word, they think many an act good simply because 
 prompted by justice ; but they never think an act good 
 because prompted by injustice. And the same remark 
 applies, to the other virtuous ends of action which we have 
 named above. A "good man," in the judgment of all 
 mankind, means " a man possessing in various degrees the 
 
 justice to say, that no sentiment can be more violently opposed than this 
 to hit way of regarding similar subjects. 
 
 * We say " otherwise faultless," because it is perhaps possible that an 
 act, known to be intrinsically evil, may be done for the virtuousuess of some 
 good end. It is perhaps possible, e.g., that I may commit what I know to be 
 a tueft on A, lor the virtnouaneaa of benefiting some very deserving person B. 
 For ounelvca, however, we doubt whether this is possible.
 
 Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 105 
 
 qualities of justice, benevolence, veracity, fidelity to pro- 
 mises, gratitude, temperance, fortitude." 
 
 So much on the existing concurrence of moral judgments. 
 Our further remarks are directed to explain the existing 
 divergence. 
 
 (5) The moral faculty, like all other faculties and 
 perhaps more than any other, is perfected by cultivation ; 
 and the means whereby it is cultivated is moral action.* 
 If I only know two or three moral axioms and no others 
 whatever, I know that there are certain acts intrinsically 
 wrong and prohibited by the Supreme Euler ; or, in other 
 words, I know that there is a Natural Law whether its 
 extent be wide or narrow possessing irrefragable claims 
 on my obedience, and strictly binding, though the whole 
 universe solicited me to rebellion. Every other course of 
 conduct, then, is glaringly unreasonable, except (1) to obey 
 its precepts carefully, so far as I know them ; and (2) to 
 use every means at my disposal by interrogating my con- 
 sciousness, by praying for light to this Supreme Ruler, and 
 in every other attainable way in order to discover the full 
 extent of its enactments. In proportion as I give myself 
 more energetically to this task and specially in proportion 
 as I labour, not only to comply with strict obligation, but to 
 do what is morally the better and more pleasing therefore 
 to my Supreme Euler in that proportion two results 
 ensue. Firstly, the utterances of my moral faculty become 
 far more readily distinguishable from all other intellectual 
 suggestions ; t and secondly, the number of moral axioms 
 
 * Similarly F. Harper, as we have seen, holds that the perception of 
 right and wrong has been blunted, often choked, still moro often misdirected, 
 by passion, evil education, affection, prejudice, custom. lie adds that "the 
 great aim of a true education must be to strengthen the principle of law, and 
 then to direct it in a light channel." F. Newman, again, is constantly 
 laying extreme stress on the proposition stated in the text. 
 
 t There is one special means by which moral judgments become moro 
 nml more pointedly distinguished from all others, in proportion as the agent 
 grows in a habit of viitue ; viz. that they are ao intimately connected with
 
 100 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 within my cognizance is very rapidly increased. Certainly 
 we maintain with confidence, that no man's intellect really 
 avouches as self-evident a false moral verdict, on the case 
 brought up to it for judgment. But nevertheless, in con- 
 sistency with what has just been said, we have no difficulty 
 whatever in admitting, (1) that those whose moral faculty 
 is uncultivated may easily be mistaken as to its true 
 utterances ; and (2) that very often indeed they will see no 
 wickedness in many an act, which those more advanced in 
 moral discernment will intuitively cognize to be evil. 
 
 (6) We have said that no man's intellect avouches as 
 self-evident a false moral verdict, on the case brought up to 
 it for judgment ; and we are now to express our meaning in 
 this qualification, on which we lay great stress. The very 
 notion of an " axiom " as we have so often quoted from 
 F. Kleutgen is that it exists wherever, by merely com- 
 paring the ideas of subject and predicate, I come to see the 
 truth of a proposition. But suppose those ideas did not 
 correspond with objective facts : in that case of course the 
 supposed axiom is simply delusive, as applied to these facts. 
 A first-rate lawyer may give a faultless judgment on a case 
 
 a sense of sin. Moral perception grows so far more quickly than moral 
 nctiou, that a prevailing sense of sinfulness may be taken as an infallible 
 measure of advance in true goodness. It is a peculiar merit of F. Newman's 
 philosophy, to our mind, that he is ever so urgent in insisting on this. Mr. 
 Lecky whose views, as a whole, are to us simply revolting nevertheless 
 speaks well on this point. He criticizes (" European Morals," p. 07, note) 
 the language, so commonly found among philosophers of either school, about 
 the delight which is supposed to accrue to every good man from the testi- 
 mony of his approving conscience, and the pleasure which the good man 
 is supposed to receive from reflecting on that delight ; like " little Jack 
 Horner," says Mr. Lecky, " who said ' what a good boy am I ' ! " And ho 
 quotes a truly fatuous passage from Adam Smith. " The man who . . . 
 from proper motives has performed a generous action . . . feels himself . . . 
 the natural object ... of the esteem and approbation of all mankind [!!!]. 
 And when he looks backward to the motive from which he acted, and surveys 
 it in the light in which the indifferent spectator will survey it, he still con- 
 tinues to enter into it, and applaiula himself by sympathy with the approba- 
 tion of this supposed impartial judge. In both these points of view his con- 
 duct appears to him in every way agreeable. Mis>ry and icretchedness can 
 never enter the brtatt in which dwelleth complete self-satiiffaciiou."
 
 Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 107 
 
 proposed to him for consideration ; but if the case be 
 wrongly drawn up, the judgment is valueless or mischievous. 
 The same is true concerning moral judgments ; and we will 
 give one obvious instance. To the uninstructed and non- 
 Catholic reader of that unprincipled book Pascal's " Pro- 
 vincial Letters," such a circumstance as the following will 
 happen again and again. He will read in Pascal some 
 propositions, advocated by illustrious Catholic casuists, and 
 will regard it as axiomatic that they are immoral. And yet, 
 if he comes to apprehend those very propositions as illus- 
 trated by the context and taken in connection with the 
 general drift of these casuists, he will entirely revoke his 
 former judgment, and not improbably accept as self-evident 
 the very opposite. 
 
 This misstatement of the case is a most fruitful source 
 of apparent divergences in moral judgment. Whether from 
 prejudice and moral fault indefinitely varying in degree, or 
 from mere intellectual inaccuracy and want of comprehen- 
 siveness, it happens again and again that men totally 
 misapprehend the phenomena on w r hich they judge. Wo 
 may take an illustration from negro slavery, on which Mr. 
 Bain twice insists (pp. 299, 812) as illustrating his theory. 
 A and B are equally good men, and have therefore equally 
 cultivated their moral faculty. A, however, has lived mostly 
 among slaves, and is intimately acquainted with their cir- 
 cumstances and character. B, on the contrary, has derived 
 his scanty information on the subject entirely from slave- 
 holders ; and, moreover, has never had any reason for 
 pondering carefully on such light as the matter would 
 receive, from the known laws of human nature. Some 
 definite act of harshness to a slave will be cognixed by A 
 as self-evidently wrong ; while B forms no moral judgment 
 on it at all, axiomatic or otherwise. Mr. Bain himself 
 admits in substance what we are now affirming. " When 
 an abolitionist from Massachusetts," he says (p. 2Ui>)
 
 10S The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 " denounces the institution of slavery, and a clergyman of 
 Carolina defends it, both of them have in common the same 
 sentiment of justice and injustice" 
 
 (7) There are other instances, which are explicable by 
 a process very familiar to Mr. Mill. This writer is con- 
 stantly pointing out, how very easily an inference may be 
 mistaken for an intuition ; and we have always heartily 
 concurred in his remark. Now, many of the judgments 
 cited by Mr. Bain, on the obligatoriness of some ritual 
 observance, are conclusions of a syllogism. " Whatever 
 the Supreme Euler commands is of obligation : but He 
 commands this ; therefore this is of obligation." The only 
 moral axiom here is the major premiss, which is indubitably 
 true ; and it is an historian's business, not a philosopher's, 
 to trace the origin of the minor. Moreover, although some 
 of these ritual observances should be both intrinsically 
 immoral, and self-evidently cognizable as such by one who 
 has duly cultivated his moral faculty, this admission (as 
 is obvious) does not in any way affect our argument. 
 
 (8) In other cases, again, a moral judgment is the con- 
 clusion, not of unconscious, but of explicit and prolonged 
 reasoning. Mr. Bain seems really to speak (p. 312) as 
 though the question, whether slavery be or be not permis- 
 sible, could be axiomatically answered. We do not ourselves 
 think that it is capable of any universal solution ; we think 
 that what is permissible or even preferable in some circum- 
 stances, is intrinsically evil in others. But however this may 
 be, the true conclusion can only be reached by a sustained 
 process of reasoning a process in which moral axioms 
 doubtless play a large part, but in which a large part is 
 also played by various psychological and social data. And 
 the moral axioms will be precisely those premisses on which 
 both parties in the controversy profess agreement. 
 
 (9) Finally, the instances are by no means few in which 
 mere antipathy has been mistaken by philosophers for
 
 Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 109 
 
 moral disapprobation. It by no means follows, because 
 some body of men abhor some practice, that they regard it 
 as morally wrong. And, most fortunately for our purpose, 
 it happens that we have irrefragable proof of this, in facts, 
 which to the grandfathers of living Englishmen were 
 matters of every-day experience. We refer to the time 
 when duelling was of social obligation. Some hundred 
 years ago, any layman who refused to fight a duel under 
 circumstances in which public opinion required it, was 
 treated as a veritable Pariah : he was received into no 
 society of gentlemen ; no gentleman would give him his 
 daughter in marriage ; nay, to associate with him was to be 
 socially excommunicated. From such usages as these, had 
 they occurred in some distant and very partially known 
 period, Mr. Bain would have confidently inferred that 
 those who practised them accounted as morally evil the 
 refusal to fight duels ; and yet no fact in the world is more 
 certain than the reverse of this. These men were in 
 general so firmly convinced of the truth of Christianity that 
 they regarded with horror the very suspicion of infidelity. 
 On the other hand, it is equally undeniable that they knew 
 duelling to be forbidden by Christianity ; because for this 
 very reason no clergyman was expected to fight.* Again, 
 suppose one of themselves a man too of otherwise profligate 
 life were lying on his death-bed : they would probably 
 experience a momentary misgiving about his future lot; 
 though they would very likely soon reassure themselves, 
 by some blasphemous plausibilities about God's mercy. 
 But suppose a man of spotless life were on his death-bed, 
 who had been under their ban for his faithfulness to God 
 and his consequent refusal to fight ; the very notion would 
 not occur to them, that he had placed his s<ilrnti<>n in 
 jeopardy by conduct which nevertheless they so intensely 
 
 * See, in the Dublin Review for July, 1871, p. U4, Dr. H;imi><leirs uiiiuzin;* 
 letter to Mr. NVwuiun.
 
 110 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 abhorred. A defaulter was accounted by them " no gentle- 
 niaii ; " but they never doubted that he might be an admir- 
 able Christian. They abhorred his act, because it indicated 
 (as they thought) mental qualities, which to them were 
 intensely distasteful ; but not because they regarded it as 
 wicked or sinful. 
 
 Some reader may object, that he cannot believe such 
 absurd inconsistency to have existed in " enlightened " 
 England of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. We 
 reply, firstly, that the facts are simply notorious, and that 
 no one will dream of calling them in question. We reply, 
 secondly, that we willingly concede one premiss on which 
 this difficulty is based ; viz. these men's ludicrous and 
 contemptible inconsistency. There is no amount of imbecile 
 and childish self-contradiction, we verily believe, which 
 may not be expected from those truly pitiable persons, who 
 deliberately permit themselves in any other course of 
 conduct than that of labouring earnestly to make their 
 conscience their one predominant rule of life. 
 
 Mr. Mill himself admits, that an unfavourable judgment 
 is often formed of acts, which judgment is mistaken for one 
 of moral disapprobation without being so. "All professed 
 moralists," he says (" Dissertations," vol. i. pp. 386, 387), 
 " treat the moral view of actions and characters ... as if 
 it were the sole one ; whereas it is only one out of three. 
 . . . According to the first, we approve or disapprove ; 
 according to the second, we admire or despise ; according 
 to the third, we love, pity, or dislike." * 
 
 We pointed out above, that the onus probandi in this 
 matter rests entirely with Mr. Mill and Mr. Bain. We are 
 
 * We must incidentally protest against this doctrine of Mr. Mill's, so far 
 as he applies it to what ought to be, and not merely to what it. In propor- 
 tion as a man advances in virtue and love of God, in that proportion (we 
 must maintain) he approaches to that state of mind in which he admires and 
 loves thoso acts most which God most admires and loves, i.e. those which 
 are nuut excellent.
 
 Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. Ill 
 
 in no respect called on to prove that we have correctly 
 explained the facts on which they insist ; but they are 
 called on to disprove, if they can, the satisfactoriness of 
 our explanation. We have proved our theses on ground 
 totally distinct. They do not advance their cause one step, 
 unless they demonstrate conclusively that their objection 
 to those theses is valid ; unless they demonstrate conclu- 
 sively, that the existing variety of moral judgments cannot 
 be explained by the considerations we have set forth, and 
 by others which might be added. We are very confident 
 not only that they cannot demonstrate this conclusively, 
 but that they cannot render such an opinion even probable. 
 Here, however, is the advantage of controversy with living 
 men. If they honour us with their attention, we may beg 
 them to name that particular instance of moral diversity 
 on which they would especially insist, and to give their 
 reasons for thinking that this instance is conclusive against 
 our position. We promise beforehand that, if they make 
 such attempt, we will give it most explicit notice, and 
 grapple with it in the face of day. 
 
 There are no other objections to our doctrine so far, 
 at least, as we know of them which impress us as having 
 the slightest plausibility. Mr. Bain, e.g., complains (p. 291) 
 that objectivists assign no standard of moral truth. It 
 might as well be said that they assign no standard of 
 mathematical truth. A mathematical proposition is estab- 
 lished, if it is either on one hand cognized as axiomatic, 
 or on the other hand deduced from propositions which arc. 
 so cognized ; and precisely the same thing may be said of 
 a moral proposition. 
 
 Supposing, indeed, Mr. Bain's opponents alleged that 
 moral truth is purely subjective and created by the human 
 mind, such an objection as his would be intelligible. But 
 this is the very thing which is denied by objectivists in 
 general, and most emphatically by Catholics in particular.
 
 112 The Philosophy of TJicism. 
 
 An evil action is undoubtedly called by them "difformis 
 rectse rationi ; " but quite as often " contraria naturae 
 horainis," or " perturbatio ordinis naturalis." There is an 
 objective " natural order " of actions, then, a moral scale, so 
 to speak ; and it is the office of human reason to cognize, 
 not to create it. 
 
 It is a favourite argument of Mr. Mill's, that objectivism 
 keeps moral science in a stationary state, and interferes 
 with its legitimate progress. Now, the only progress of 
 which, consistently with his principles, he can here be 
 speaking is that which arises from fresh light being thrown 
 on the consequences of this or that action. But objectivists 
 hold as strongly as phenomenists, that the morality of 
 actions is importantly affected by their consequences ; and 
 that any light therefore, thrown on the latter, importantly 
 affects the former. 
 
 A Catholic philosopher, indeed, does undoubtedly hold 
 that in a very true sense moral science is stationary ; but 
 this conclusion does not result from his objectivism, but 
 from a different Catholic doctrine altogether. He considers 
 that moral truths are an integral part of Divine Revela- 
 tion ; and that though, like other revealed verities, they 
 admit elucidation and development, yet they are not pro- 
 gressive in that sense in which progressiveness may be 
 truly ascribed to a purely secular science. But this whole 
 question, though of the gravest moment, is entirely ex- 
 ternal to our present theme. 
 
 We are not aware of any other arguments which Mr. 
 Mill has ever alleged against our position. And how in- 
 sufficient those arguments are, may be seen from the very 
 unsuspicious testimony of Mr. Mill himself, who has not 
 been prevented by them from unconsciously embracing 
 one principal part of the very doctrine which he opposes. 
 He says with profoundest truth (" Dissertations," vol. i. p.
 
 Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 113 
 
 884), that " mankind are much more nearly of one nature 
 than of one opinion about their own nature ; " and it is 
 the very reason of our own sympathy with many exhibitions 
 of his personal character, that he has been quite unable to 
 confine the breadth of his own nature within the limits of 
 what we must call his own most narrow and contra-natural 
 theory. His theory is purely phenomenistic ; viz. that 
 "morally good" is simply equivalent with "conducive to 
 general enjoyment," and " morally evil " the reverse. Yet, 
 in almost every page of his writing on moral and political 
 subjects, he assumes the transcendental axiom, that 
 " benevolence is morally good " and " malevolence is 
 morally evil" : the idea "morally good" being that very 
 transcendental idea on which objectivists insist, but which 
 Mr. Mill in theory regards as delusive.* We are confident 
 that all familiar with his writings will concur in this 
 remark, when they understand what we mean. This view, 
 constantly implicit, occasionally finds explicit mention. 
 Thus, in a passage we shall immediately quote, he says in 
 effect that a benevolent being may, but that a malevolent 
 being can not, be a legitimate object of worship. Elsewhere 
 he describes a habit of disinterested benevolence as the true 
 " standard of excellence " ; t he affirms (" On Hamilton," 
 p. 123) that he " loves and venerates " moral goodness ; 
 and says (" Dissertations," vol. iii. p. 340) that "the cultiva- 
 tion of a disinterested preference of duty for its own sake " 
 
 * On the terms "phenomenistic" and "transcendental," see pp. 1, 2, 
 Gl, 62. 
 
 t "Man is never recognized by" Bentham "as a being capable of 
 desiring for its own sake the conformity of his own character to his standard 
 of excellence, without hope of good or fear of evil from other source than 
 his own inward consciousness." (" Dissertations," vol. i. p. 359.) But one, 
 " cwqual part " of morality " is self-education ; the training by the human 
 being himself of his affection and will " (ib. p. 30'-5) into accordance, of course, 
 witli the true "standard of excellence." We assume that the habit of disin- 
 terested Itenevolence is what Mr. Mill here intends to describe as the "truo 
 standard of excellence; " for otherwise he would be more inconsistent with 
 his professed principle?, than we even allege him to be. 
 
 VOL. i. I
 
 1 1 4 Tin' l*h ilnxopfty of Theixm. 
 
 is a hitjher state than that of sacrificing selfish preferences 
 to a more distant self-interest." What can he mean by the 
 word "excellence," or the word "venerate," or the word 
 " higher," consistently with his theory? Undoubtedly ho 
 is at liberty, without transcending the bounds of phenome- 
 nism, to allege that benevolence is beneficent and conducive 
 to the happiness of mankind : for happiness consists in a 
 series of phenomena, and experience can teach what con- 
 duces to the increase of such phenomena. But Mr. Mill 
 constantly goes further than this : he calls a habit of dis- 
 interested benevolence " high," " excellent," worthy of 
 " veneration," and the like. What right has the pheno- 
 mcnist to such notions as these ? What phenomena do 
 these notions represent ? Wherein is their objective counter- 
 part discerned by experience ? 
 
 But there is perhaps no one passage throughout his 
 entire works, in which Mr. Mill so unveils his innermost 
 nature nor is there any other to our mind so eloquent 
 as the following well-known invective of his, against a view 
 ascribed by him to Dean Mansel. 
 
 If instead of the "glad tidings " that there exists a Being in 
 whom all the excellences which the highest human mind can 
 conceive exist in a degree inconceivable to us, I am informed 
 that the world is ruled by a being, whose attributes are infinite, 
 but what they are we cannot learn, or what are the principles 
 of his government, except that " the highest human morality 
 which we are capable of conceiving " does not sanction them, 
 convince me of it, and I will bear my fate as I may. But 
 when I am told that I must believe this and at the same time 
 call thi.s being by the names which express and affirm the 
 highest human morality, I say in plain terms that I will not. 
 Whatever power such a being may have over me, there is one 
 thing which he shall not do; he shall not compel me to worship 
 him. I will call no being good, who is not what I mean when 
 1 apply that epithet to my fellow-creatures; and if such a being 
 can sentence me to hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go." 
 ("On Hamilton," pp. 123, 124.)
 
 Mr. Mill on ilie Foundation of Morality. 115 
 
 We have two preliminary remarks to make on this most 
 impressive passage before using it against Mr. Mill's con- 
 sistency. In the first place, all Catholics will substantially 
 agree with what we understand to be its doctrine. Let the 
 impossible and appalling supposition be put for argument's 
 sake, that men had been created by a malignant being, 
 who commanded them to cherish habits of pride, envy, 
 mutual hatred, and sensuality. The case is of course 
 utterly and wildly impossible ; but supposing it, un- 
 doubtedly men would be strictly obliged, at whatever 
 sacrifice, both to disobey those commands and to withhold 
 worship from the being who could issue them.* In the 
 second place, we are quite confident that Dean Mansel 
 meant no such doctrine as Mr. Mill supposes, though we 
 cannot acquit him of having expressed himself with singular 
 incautiousness. 
 
 The first inference we draw against Mr. Mill's con- 
 sistency from the passage just quoted, has been already 
 expressed. He accounts malevolence not merely to bo 
 maleficent which is all that can be said by a consistent 
 phenomenist but as intrinsically evil and base ; so evil 
 and base, that he would rather undergo eternal torment 
 than worship a malevolent being. 
 
 But secondly, he brings utilitarianism to a distinct issue ; 
 for he says in effect that all men, individually and collec- 
 tively, should rather undergo everlasting torment than 
 worship a malignant being who commands them to do so. 
 His professed theory the fundamental principle of his 
 whole moral philosophy is that morality consists exclu- 
 sively and precisely in promoting the happiness of one's 
 fellow-creatures. Yet here he says, that in a particular 
 
 * On the other hand, we should say that they would aho he under an 
 olilifjation of not doing that which would impair their permanent happiness. 
 Nor, of course, is there any difficulty whatever in the circumstance- that an 
 intrinsically impossible hypothesis issuts legitimately in two mutually 
 contradictory conclusions.
 
 1 1 G The Ph ilosttphy of Theixm. 
 
 case the true morality of all men would lie in promoting, 
 not the happiness, but the everlasting torment of all man- 
 kind.* He says, in effect, that all men would act basely 
 and wickedly if they worshipped a malevolent being. And 
 he cannot possibly mean, by the words " basely " and 
 " wickedly," that they would act " adversely to the promotion 
 of general enjoyment ; " because he holds that this baseness 
 and wickedness would remain, even if such conduct were 
 the sole means of exempting all mankind from an eternity 
 of woe. When a crucial case really comes before him, his 
 better nature compels him to decide sternly, peremptorily, 
 effusively, indignantly, against his own doctrine. 
 
 We have now concluded our own case. We must forego 
 what would have been a great accession to our argument, 
 by being obliged to postpone our detailed consideration of 
 Mr. Mill's own moral scheme. But we have already reached 
 the extreme bounds which we had prescribed to ourselves ; 
 and, in what remains of our present essay, can give no 
 more than a most perfunctory criticism of Mr. Mill's 
 doctrine. 
 
 Through his whole philosophical career, that gentleman 
 has consistently and most earnestly disclaimed what he 
 calls " the selfish theory ; " the theory which regards 
 morality as consisting in enlightened self-interest. On the 
 other hand, as we have just pointed out, he cannot, consist- 
 ently with his phenomenism, admit the existence of trans- 
 cendental virtue or transcendental obligation ; he cannot 
 speak of benevolence as intrinsically excellent, or of its 
 opposite as intrinsically detestable. Disclaiming thus at 
 once the morality of self-interest and the morality of trans- 
 cendental goodness, it is difficult at first to see what 
 
 * This remark hns already been made by Mr. Mivart, in his admirable 
 a Genesis of Species "(p. 11M). He states himself to have derived it from 
 Bev. Father Roberts.
 
 Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 117 
 
 possible footing is left him ; yet he is not left entirely 
 without means of answering the relevant questions. Thus 
 we may ask, what men mean when they say that A's conduct 
 is morally detestable, and they therefore abhor it ; while 
 B's conduct is morally good, and they therefore approve it. 
 They mean to express so Mr. Mill may reply without 
 inconsistency on the one hand, that abhorrence which 
 arises in their mind from a sense that A's habits tend to 
 their grievous detriment ; and on the other hand, that 
 complacency which arises in their mind from a sense that 
 B's conduct tends to their enjoyment. See c.y. " Disserta- 
 tions," vol. i. pp. 155, 156 ; " On Hamilton," p. 572. But 
 then we further ask Mr. Mill, why should I, a given indi- 
 vidual, aim, not at my own interest, but that of rny fellow- 
 men ? why is it my reasonable course to sacrifice myself in 
 their behalf? And to this question, so far as we can see, 
 his answer is glaringly inadequate. He will say indeed very 
 truly, that there is an unselfish element in human nature ; 
 that "the idea of the pain of another is naturally painful, 
 and the idea of his pleasure naturally pleasurable " (" Dis- 
 sertations," vol. i. p. 137) ; and that in this part of human 
 nature lies a foundation, on which may be reared the habit 
 of finding a constantly increasing part of my gratification 
 in the happiness of others. Mr. Mill may further say, and 
 indeed does say, that all mankind are prompted by the 
 strongest motives of self-interest, so to educate each indi- 
 vidual as that he may thus find gratification in other men's 
 enjoyment. Nay, and he may add further still though he 
 would find much difficulty in proving this that those who 
 have been thus trained lead happier lives in consequence 
 than they would otherwise have led. But when ho has 
 gone so far as this, he has exhausted his resources. He can 
 give no reason whatever why I, a given individual, who 
 have not been thus trained, and who, as a simple mutter 
 of fact, find very much less pleasure in other men's enjoy-
 
 IIS Tfifi J'tiHomJi o Tln''t#m. 
 
 ment than in my own should sacrifice the latter in favour 
 of the former. 
 
 We will illustrate the most essential and characteristic 
 part of this doctrine by a little fable, wildly absurd from the 
 standpoint of natural history, but none the less fitted to 
 express our meaning. The cats and rats are in a state of 
 internecine warfare ; and the fleas, if left to their natural 
 habits, perform acts which in various ways injure the 
 former and benefit the latter. Moved by this circumstance, 
 the cats capture a large number of young fleas, and train 
 them to take their pleasure in acts which have an opposite 
 tendency. The cats accordingly dearly prize the trained 
 fleas, and the rats the natural fleas : so much is quite 
 intelligible. But Mr. Mill should add, that the cats feel 
 toward the trained fleas, and the rats towards the natural 
 fleas, that very sentiment which is called in human 
 matters " moral approbation ; " while the rats feel towards 
 the trained fleas, and the cats towards the natural fleas, the 
 sentiment of " moral disapproval." 
 
 We are well aware, that Mr. Mill will indignantly 
 repudiate the parallel. What we allege is, that his spon- 
 taneous view (so to call it) is directly contradictory to his 
 speculative theory ; that the doctrine constantly implied by 
 him whenever he treats of human affairs, is that very 
 objectivist doctrine which in theory he denounces. We do 
 not of course mean that his implicit doctrine is Theistical ; 
 but we do say that it is objectivist, as ascribing intrinsic and 
 transcendental excellence to the practice of beneficence. 
 And the indignation with which he will regard such an 
 analysis of moral sentiments as is contained in our little 
 fable is to our mind a measure of his wide distance from 
 the genuine utilitarian philosophy. 
 
 In theory, however, he has made his doctrine even more 
 untenable, and (we must be allowed to add) even more 
 odious, by his denial of human free will. There is perhaps
 
 Mr. Mill on the Fowndotion of Morality. 119 
 
 no one philosophical theme on which he has enlarged with 
 so much earnestness and so much power as on this ; and 
 yet, so weak is his cause, we think there is no one on which 
 he can be so triumphantly refuted. In a future essay 
 we shall, first, meet him, hand to hand and step to step, 
 on this battle-field; and we shall, secondly, express that 
 detailed criticism on this moral system as a whole, which 
 we had hoped to give on the present occasion.
 
 IV. 
 MR. MILL'S REPLY TO THE "DUBLIN REVIEW."* 
 
 [The following essay had been entirely completed in its 
 first draft, and the greater portion of it actually sent to 
 press, when intelligence arrived of Mr. Mill's unexpected 
 death. Under these circumstances, we have been naturally 
 led to look through the essay with renewed care, to see 
 that it contain no particle of violence or bitterness ; but on 
 doing so we have found nothing to change in it, except one 
 or two expressions which implied that Mr. Mill was still 
 alive. Towards Mr. Mill, in fact, we were not likely to have 
 fallen into undue harshness of language ; and the less so, 
 because he was himself habitually courteous to opponents, 
 and especially to the present writer. On the other hand, 
 we expressed an opinion in a former essay an opinion 
 to which we were led by various indications in his 
 writings that he was not a believer in the One True God 
 Whom Christians worship ; and whereas, when avowedly 
 noticing our essay, he expressed no remonstrance on this 
 head, we may fairly assume that our opinion was correct. 
 Nor indeed does any one doubt that the tendency of his 
 philosophy as a whole is intensely antitheistic, insomuch 
 that many ascribe the overthrow of religious belief, e.g. in 
 Oxford, almost entirely to his influence. Now, it is the 
 
 * An Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy. By JOHN STUART 
 MILL. Fourth Edition. London : Longmans. 
 
 A System of Logic, liatiocinative and Inductive. By JOHN STPART MILL. 
 Eighth Kditiou. London : Longmans.
 
 Mr. Mill's Reply to the "Dublin Review." 121 
 
 firmly held doctrine of Catholics, that there is no invincible 
 ignorance of the One True God ; or, in other words, that 
 disbelief in God convicts the disbeliever of grave sin : so 
 that Catholics are confined within somewhat narrow limits 
 as to the amount of respect towards such a writer, which 
 they are at liberty to feel and to express. Our own per- 
 sonal sympathy with Mr. Mill on one or two points was so 
 great, that we believe there was more danger of our trans- 
 gressing those limits than of our committing the opposite 
 fault. 
 
 One such point of sympathy was what always impressed 
 us as his unselfishness ; his zeal for what he believed the 
 truth ; and his preference of public over personal objects. 
 Nor, again, must we fail to commemorate his earnest oppo- 
 sition to nationalism in every shape. He never spoke 
 otherwise than with grave reprobation of that pseudo- 
 patriotism, which implies that men can laudably direct a 
 course of conduct to the mere pursuit of their country's 
 temporal aggrandisement. His notions as to wherein 
 man's highest good consists must be accounted by every 
 Catholic deplorably erroneous ; but he was thoroughly 
 penetrated with the great truth, that the genuine patriot 
 aims at his countrymen's highest good, and not at their 
 worldly exaltation or glory. 
 
 A very able commentator on his character, in the Pall 
 Mall Gazette of May 10th, considers that Mr. Mill " was by 
 temperament essentially religious," and that his "absence 
 of definite religious convictions" produced "a sharp 
 contrast " in his mind " between theory and feeling." We 
 quite agree with what is indicated by this remark. Mr. 
 Mill possessed apparently passionate feelings of love, which 
 were ever yearning for an adequate object; and he was, 
 alas ! ignorant of Him Who implants such feelings in order 
 that they may be concentrated on Himself. It is in this 
 way we should account for " that generous, self-sacrificing
 
 122 The P}< ilo*n],Jn/ of Tliei*m. 
 
 philanthropy " which we commemorated in our above- 
 named essay as "so attractive a feature in his character;" 
 though we need hardly say how much more solid and 
 reliable is such philanthropy (in the Catholic's judgment) 
 where it is rested on the love of God. By the same 
 characteristic of Mr. Mill's mind we should also account 
 for language, in honour of his wife's memory, which other- 
 wise would almost have induced us to doubt the writer's 
 sanity. We are especially thinking, under this head, of his 
 amazing preface to the essay on "the Enfranchisement of 
 Women," contained in the second volume of his " Disserta- 
 tions and Discussions ; " and to the inscription on her 
 gravestone.* We confess that his possession of this loving 
 temperament, however questionable its exhibition may 
 have been in this or that particular, has ever given us 
 a feeling towards him, quite different in kind from that 
 which we can entertain towards any of his brother 
 phenomenists. 
 
 Turning to his philosophical character with which we 
 are here of course more directly concerned the following 
 pages, taken by themselves, might be understood as im- 
 plying a very far more disparaging estimate of that character 
 than we really entertain. It so happens, indeed, that the 
 particular controversy in which we are here engaged, deals 
 almost exclusively with what we must account his weakest 
 intellectual points. Among his strongest, we should name 
 what may be called the " encyclopedic" quality of his mind : 
 by which we intend to express not merely the extent of his 
 knowledge and information (though this was indeed extra- 
 ordinary), but his unfailing promptitude in seeing the con- 
 nection between one part of that knowledge and another ; 
 his viewing every theme in which he might be engaged, 
 
 * Here is one sentence of this epitaph : " Were there even a few hearts 
 and intellects like hers, this earth would already become the hoped-for 
 heaven."
 
 Mr. Mill's Reply to the "Dublin Review? 123 
 
 under the full light thrown on it by every fact which he 
 knew and every doctrine which he held. Cognate to this 
 was his sincere anxiety to apprehend his opponents' point 
 of view, and to derive from their disquisitions all the in- 
 struction he could. Then, his historical and political studies 
 went far below the mere husk of events ; for he possessed 
 (we think) great power of justly appreciating the broad 
 facts of every-day life, whether as recorded in the past or 
 witnessed in the present. His language, again, was the 
 genuine correlative of his thought clear, well-balanced, 
 forcible. What we must deny to him, is any sufficient 
 acquaintance with the subtler phenomena of mind. 
 
 This latter defect exhibited itself in two different ways. 
 Firstly, it altogether vitiated his metaphysics. We consider 
 that no really profound psychologian can be (as Mr. Mill 
 was) a phenomenist ; and, conversely, we think that Mr. 
 Mill's deficiency in psychological insight generated an 
 incapacity of doing justice to the arguments adduced against 
 his metaphysical scheme. At the same time, however, we 
 must state our own strong impression, that (whether from 
 early prejudice or whatever cause) he never fully gave his 
 mind, even so much as he might have done, to those par- 
 ticular psychological facts which are adduced by his 
 opponents as lying at the foundation of their system ; and 
 we think that the following essay will suffice in itself to 
 establish against him this charge. 
 
 Another consequence (we think) resulting from his un- 
 acquaintance with the subtler phenomena of mind, was his 
 tendency to the wildest speculations on such themes us 
 "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity." As we have already 
 said, Mr. Mill was very largely acquainted with facts, 
 both past and present : but in such speculations as those 
 to which we refer, facts could give him no guidance ; 
 and he had no other clue to assist him in his re- 
 searches except such as was afforded by (what we must
 
 The Philosophy of Tlieism. 
 
 be allowed to call) his shallow and narrow knowledge of 
 human nature. 
 
 We may perhaps say without impropriety, that Mr. 
 Mill's death is to us a matter of severe controversial dis- 
 appointment. We had far more hope of coining to some 
 understanding with him than with such writers as Mr. 
 Herbert Spencer and Dr. Bain, because he was in the 
 habit of apprehending and expressing his own thoughts so 
 much more definitely and perspicuously than they. Our 
 present essay, indeed, originally concluded with an earnest 
 appeal to him, that he would join issue on the themes 
 therein handled, more fully than he could do by mere 
 isolated footnotes and appendices. For the same reason 
 we shall continue to treat him as representing the anti- 
 theistic school. His books are not dead, because he is 
 dead ; and we think that they both are in fact, and are 
 legitimately calculated to be, very far more influential than 
 those of his brother phenomenists. We pointed out in an 
 earlier essay that, by singling out an individual opponent, 
 we did but follow his own excellent example ; and we may 
 here add that Sir W. Hamilton had died before Mr. Mill 
 commenced his assault. 
 
 On looking through our present paper, it occurs to us that 
 some may complain of what they may consider its undue 
 vehemence on such a purely speculative subject as the 
 character of mathematical axioms. But Mr. Mill himself, 
 we are convinced, would have been the last to make this 
 complaint. No other inquiry can be imagined so pregnant 
 with awful consequences, as the inquiry whether a Personal 
 God do or do not exist. It is this very doctrine (as we have 
 more than once explained) which we are vindicating in our 
 present series of articles. Now, the proposition that there 
 exists a vast body of necessary truth may well be (as we 
 are convinced it is) a vitally important philosophical preface 
 to the further proposition that there exists a Necessary
 
 Mr. Mill's Reply to the "Dublin Review" 125 
 
 Person.* But the doctrine that there exists a vast body 
 of necessary truth is so startling a priori, and is pregnant 
 also with consequences so momentous, that the philosopher 
 will require absolutely irresistible evidence before he will 
 accept it. It is most desirable, therefore, that it shall 
 be considered, as far as may be, on its own merits ; 
 that it shall be detached from other topics, on which 
 men's affections, antipathies, misapprehensions, prejudices, 
 will inevitably obscure and complicate their judgment. 
 Now, just such a neutral ground is afforded by mathe- 
 matical truth ; and we placed it therefore in the very front 
 of our controversial position. It affords an excellent 
 opportunity for considering the characteristics of necessary 
 truth as such, because no one can have any religious or 
 moral prejudice for or against any given mathematical 
 theorem. 
 
 It has also occurred to us as possible, that the following 
 essay may be accounted arrogant in its tone towards so 
 powerful and eminent a thinker as Mr. Mill. But let our 
 position be considered. As regards the particular themes 
 herein treated, we are deliberately of opinion, not that 
 there is more to be said on our side than on Mr. Mill's, 
 but that he is utterly and simply in the wrong ; that not 
 one of his arguments has the slightest force, and hardly 
 one of them the most superficial appearance of force. Now, 
 if a Catholic honestly thinks this, he should make his 
 readers distinctly understand that he thinks it ; because he 
 must know that the welfare of immortal souls suffers 
 grievous injury, from an exaggerated estimate of the argu- 
 mentative ground available for disbelief.] 
 
 We have said on a former occasion that Mr. Mill has 
 
 * The truth, known by Revelation, that thero are Throe NYcvssary 
 Persons in no wuy conflicts (we newl hardly say) with the truth, kiunvu l>y 
 , thut there exists Ow Necessary Person.
 
 120 The Philosophy of Tltc ism. 
 
 always been "singularly clear in statement, accessible to 
 argument, and candid or rather generous towards oppo- 
 nents ; " and the whole tone of his replies to the Dublin 
 Review is in full accordance with this estimate of his con- 
 troversial qualities. At the same time, it was his conviction 
 no less than our own, that the highest interests of mankind 
 are intimately involved in the prevalence of sound doctrine 
 on the matters in debate ; while on our side we further know 
 that these interests are inappreciable in magnitude and 
 eternal in duration. It is our bounden duty, therefore, to 
 do evenihing we can to expose what we consider the un- 
 reasonableness and shallowness of those phenomenistie 
 tenets which Mr. Mill has embraced. Of those tenets we 
 must ever affirm with confidence that they are (as we have 
 just implied) not unreasonable only, but incredibly shallow ; 
 and it is of extreme moment that this characteristic of 
 theirs be fully understood. Yet the very weakness of a 
 cause may in some sense set forth the ability of its advocate ; 
 and our predominant feeling towards Mr. Mill is one of 
 surprise, that so skilful and rarely accomplished a navigator 
 should have embarked in so frail a vessel. 
 
 "Without further preamble, however, let us commence 
 our work by entering again on the matters treated in our 
 first essay, and by seeing where Mr. Mill stands thereon 
 in relation to ourselves. We begin, then, with "the rule 
 and motive of certitude." 
 
 There is one truth which the extremest sceptic cannot 
 possibly call in question, viz. that his inward conscious- 
 ness, as experienced by him at the present moment, is 
 what it is. To doubt this, as Mr. Mill observes, would be 
 "to doubt that I feel what I feel." But this knowledge is 
 utterly sterile, very far inferior to that possessed by the 
 brutes ; and no one manifestly can possess knowledge 
 worthy of being so called, unless he knows the phenomena, 
 not only of his momentarily present consciousness, but also
 
 'Nr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin Review." 127 
 
 (to a greater or less extent) of that consciousness which 
 has now ceased to exist. A man cannot e.g. so much as 
 understand the simplest sentence spoken to him, unless, 
 while hearing the last word, he knows those words which 
 have preceded it. We ask this question, then : what means 
 has he of possessing this knowledge of the past ? On what 
 grounds can he reasonably accept, as true, the clearest and 
 distinctest avouchments of his memory ? "I am conscious 
 of a most clear and articulate mental impression that a very 
 short time ago I was suffering cold : " this is one judgment. 
 " A very short time ago I was suffering cold : " this is 
 another and totally distinct judgment. That a man knows 
 his present impression of a past feeling, by no manner of 
 means implies that he knows the past existence of that feel- 
 ing. How do you know, we would have asked Mr. Mill, 
 how do you know (on the above supposition of facts) that 
 a very short time ago you were suffering cold ? How do 
 you know e.g. that Professor Huxley's suggestion* is not 
 the very truth ? How do you know, in other words, that 
 some powerful and malicious being is not at this moment 
 deluding you into a belief that you were cold a short time 
 ago, when the real fact was entirely otherwise ? How do 
 you know, in fact, that any one experience, which your 
 memory testifies, ever really befel you at all ? 
 
 It is plain, then, and most undeniable, that the philo- 
 sopher cannot claim for men any knowledge whatever 
 beyond that of their momentarily present consciousness, 
 unless he establishes some theory on what scholastics call 
 the "rule and motive of certitude." He must (1) lay down 
 the " rule of certitude ; " or, in other words, explain what 
 is the characteristic of those truths which men may reason- 
 ably accept with certitude : and (2) he must lay down " the 
 
 * "It i.s conceivable that some powerful and malicious being may find 
 his pleasure in deluding UK, und in making us believe the tiling which is not 
 every moment of our lives." (" Lay Sermons," p. l{.")0.)
 
 128 The Philosophy of Tlmsm. 
 
 motive of certitude ; " or, in other words, explain what is 
 men's reasonable ground for accepting, as certain, those 
 truths which possess such characteristic. It is conceivable, 
 doubtless, that the principle he lays down may authenticate 
 no other avouchments except those of memory ; or it is 
 conceivable, on the contrary, that that principle may 
 authenticate a large number of other avouchmeuts. But 
 if he professes to be a philosopher at all, if he professes 
 to establish any reasonable stronghold whatever against 
 absolute and utter scepticism, some theory or other he 
 must lay down, on the rule and motive of certitude. And 
 such theory is, by absolute necessity, the one argumentative 
 foundation of his whole system. 
 
 We maintained in our first essay, that it is the 
 scholastic theory on this fundamental issue which alone 
 is conformable with reason and with facts. This theory is 
 of course set forth by different writers, with greater or less 
 difference of detail and of expression ; and we referred to 
 F. Kleutgen as having enunciated it with singular clear- 
 ness of exposition. Firstly, what is the rule of certitude ? 
 or, in other words, what is the characteristic of those 
 truths which I may reasonably accept as certain ? Every 
 proposition, he replies, is known to me as a truth, which 
 is avouched by my cognitive faculties when those faculties 
 are exercised according to their intrinsic laws ; whether 
 they be thus exercised in declaring primary verities, or 
 in deriving this or that inference from those verities. 
 Secondly, what is the motive of certitude ? or, in other 
 words, what is my reasonable ground for accepting the 
 above-named propositions as certainly true ? He replies, 
 that a created gift, called the light of reason, is possessed 
 by the soul, whereby every man, while exercising his 
 cognitive faculties according to their intrinsic laws, is 
 rendered infallibly certain that their avouchments corre- 
 spond with objective truth.
 
 Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin Review." 1 29 
 
 In advocating this theory, however, we guarded ourselves 
 against two possible misconceptions of its bearing. We 
 admitted, in the first place, how abundantly possible it 
 is, nay, how frequently it happens, that men misunder- 
 stand the avouchment of their intellect. In fact a large 
 part of our controversy with Mr. Mill proceeds on this very 
 ground : we allege against him, that this, that, and the 
 other proposition, which he denies, is really declared by 
 the human faculties, when exercised according to their 
 intrinsic laws. Then, secondly, we explained that our 
 appeal is made to the mind's positive, not its negative con- 
 stitution ; or, in other words, that we lay our stress on its 
 affirmations, not on its incapacities. It does not at all 
 follow, we added, because the human mind cannot conceive 
 some given proposition, that such proposition may not be 
 true ; nay, that it may not be most certain and inappre- 
 ciably momentous. This statement appears to us of great 
 importance, in regard to various controversies of the present 
 day. But it has little or no bearing on the points directly 
 at issue between Mr. Mill and ourselves. 
 
 Such, then, is the scholastic thesis, on the rule and 
 motive of certitude; viz. that man's cognitive faculties, 
 while acting on the laws of their constitution, carry with 
 them in each particular case immediate evidence of absolute 
 trustworthiness. It would be a contradiction almost in 
 terms if we professed to adduce direct arguments for this 
 thesis, because the very fact of adducing arguments would 
 imply that man's reasoning faculty can be trusted, which is 
 part of the very conclusion to be proved. But (1) we 
 adduced for our thesis what appears to us strong indirect 
 argument ; and (2) (which is much more important) we 
 suggested to the inquirer such mental experiments aa are 
 abundantly sufficient, we consider, to satisfy him of its 
 truth. Under the latter head we appealed to each man's 
 consciousness in our favour. That which his faculties 
 
 V(L. I. K
 
 130 Tlte Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 indubitably declare as certain, he finds himself under an 
 absolute necessity of infallibly knowing to be true. I 
 experience, e.g., that phenomenon of the present moment, 
 which I thus express : I say that I remember distinctly and 
 articulately to have been much colder a few minutes ago 
 when I was out in the snow, than I am now when sitting 
 by a comfortable fire. Well, in consequence of this present 
 mental phenomenon, I find myself under the absolute 
 necessity of knowing that a very short time ago I had 
 that experience which I now remember. Professor Huxley 
 suggests that "some powerful and malicious being" may 
 possibly " find his pleasure in deluding me," and in making 
 me fancy as past what has never really happened to me ; 
 but I am absolutely necessitated to know that I am under 
 no such delusion in regard to this recent experience. My 
 act of memory is not merely known to me as a present 
 impression, but carries with it also immediate evidence of 
 representing a fact of my past experience. And so with my 
 other intellectual operations, whether of reasoning or any 
 other. The subjective operation, if performed according 
 to the laws of my mental constitution, carries with it 
 immediate evidence of corresponding with objective truth. 
 
 All must admit that this is at least a consistent and 
 intelligible theory ; and for several intellectually active 
 centuries it reigned without a rival. Descartes, however, 
 the great philosophical revolutionist of Christian times, 
 substituted for it a strange and grotesque invention of his 
 own. He held that each man's reason for knowing the 
 trustworthiness of his faculties is his previous conviction 
 of God's Existence and Veracity. Nothing can be more 
 simply suicidal than this theory, because (as is manifest) 
 unless I first know the trustworthiness of my cognitive 
 faculties, I have no means of knowing as certain (or even 
 guessing as probable) God's Existence and Veracity them- 
 selves. We insisted on this consideration in our first essay ;
 
 Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin Revieiv." 131 
 
 but as we are here in hearty concurrence with Mr. Mill, 
 we need add no more on the present occasion. We fear 
 that Descartes's theory possesses, more or less partially, 
 not a few minds among the non-Catholic opponents 
 of phenomenism. 
 
 But if certain non-Catholic opponents of phenomenism 
 have exhibited shallowness in one direction, the whole body 
 of phenomenists * have exhibited still greater shallowness 
 in another. They have universally assumed, as the basis 
 of their whole philosophy, that each man knows with 
 certitude the past existence of those experiences which his 
 memory distinctly testifies. They admit of course that 
 unless this certitude existed man would possess less know- 
 ledge than the very brutes ; and yet, though its assumption 
 is to them so absolutely vital, not one of them has so much 
 as entertained the question, on what ground it rests. As 
 we have already asked, how do they know, how can they 
 reasonably even guess, that a man's present distinct 
 impression of a supposed past experience corresponds with 
 a past fact ? Still more emphatically how do they know 
 that this is not only so in one instance, but in every 
 instance ? that man is so wonderfully made and endowed, 
 that his present impression of what he has recently ex- 
 perienced always corresponds with what he has in fact so 
 experienced ? They make this prodigious assumption 
 without the slightest attempt at giving a reason for it nay, 
 and without any apparent consciousness that a reason 
 needs to be given. And then finally, as though to give 
 a crowning touch of absurdity to their amazing position, 
 they make it their special ground of invective against the 
 opposite school of philosophy, that it arbitrarily erects, 
 
 * There is only one exception with which we happen to bo acquainted, 
 viz. that of Professor Huxley, which we presently mention in the text. 
 
 By "phenomenists " (we need hardly say) we mean those philosopher* who 
 ascribe to mankind no immediate knowledge whatever except of phenomena.
 
 132 Tlte Philosophy of 
 
 into first principles of objective truth, the mere subjective 
 impressions of the human mind. One could not have 
 believed it possible that such shallowness should have 
 characterized a whole school of philosophers some of 
 them, too, undoubtedly endowed with large knowledge and 
 signal ability were not the facts of the case patent and 
 undeniable. 
 
 We mentioned just now, in a note, that an exception 
 to this universality is afforded by Professor Huxley ; 
 and there may of course be other exceptions, with which 
 we do not happen to be acquainted. In our first essay we 
 quoted one of the Professor's remarks, to which we here 
 refer. " The general trustworthiness of memory," he says, 
 " is one of those hypothetical assumptions which cannot 
 be proved or known with that highest degree of certainty 
 which is given by immediate consciousness ; but which, 
 nevertheless, are of the highest practical value, inas- 
 much as the conclusions logically drawn from them are 
 always verified by experience." To this singular piece of 
 reasoning we put forth an obvious reply. You tell us 
 that you trust your present act of memory because in 
 innumerable past instances the avouchments of memory 
 have been true. How do you know, how can you even 
 guess, that there has been one such instance ? Because 
 you trust your present act of memory; no other answer 
 can possibly be given. Never was there so audacious an 
 instance of arguing in a circle. You know forsooth that 
 your present act of memory can be trusted because in 
 innumerable past instances the avouchment of memory 
 has been true ; and you know that in innumerable past 
 instances the avouchment of memory has been true because 
 you trust your present act of memory. The blind man 
 leads the blind round a " circle " incurably " vicious." 
 
 Let us observe the Professor's philosophical position. 
 It is his principle, that men know nothing with certitude
 
 Mr. Mill's Eeply to the " Dublin Review" 133 
 
 except their present consciousness. Now, on this principle, 
 it is just as absurd to say that the facts testified by 
 memory are probably as that they are certainly true. 
 What can be more violently unscientific, we asked, from 
 the stand-point of experimental science, than to assume 
 without grounds as ever so faintly probable the very singular 
 proposition, that mental phenomena (by some entirely un- 
 known law) have proceeded in such a fashion that my 
 clear impression of the past corresponds with my past 
 experience 1 Professor Huxley possesses, no doubt, signal 
 ability in his own line ; but surely as a metaphysician he 
 exhibits a sorry spectacle. He busies himself in his latter 
 capacity with diligently overthrowing the only principle on 
 which his researches as a physicist con have value or even 
 meaning. 
 
 At present, however, our direct business is with Mr. 
 Mill ; and we are next to inquire how his philosophy stands 
 in reference to the rule and motive of certitude. As to the 
 rule of certitude, he speaks (it seems to us) so ambiguously 
 as to make it a matter of no ordinary difficulty to discover 
 which one of two contradictory propositions he intends to 
 affirm ; while, as to the motire of certitude, he unites with 
 his brother phenomenists in shirking the question altogether. 
 
 We shall begin with urging against him this latter 
 allegation. We did not bring it forward by any means 
 so strongly in our former essay,* because (as we shall 
 explain further on) we had good reason for understanding 
 him to admit much more in our favour than his present 
 reply shows him to have intended. Even now we entirely 
 concede that he (and again Dr. Bain) have made a distinct 
 step beyond earlier writers of their school. They have 
 advanced, we say, a little way beyond earlier writers, along 
 the road which, if duly pursued, would have brought them 
 
 * We only said, that ho"hnu failed in clearly anil consistently appre- 
 hending and bearing in mind tin; true doctrine."
 
 134 The Philosophy of Thelxni. 
 
 into the observed presence of the question with which we 
 are here engaged. Yet even they, we must maintain, have 
 nowhere arrived at a distinct apprehension, that there is 
 such a question to be considered as the motive of certitude. 
 
 With Dr. Bain we are not here concerned. As to Mr. 
 Mill, the direct basis of our allegation against him is of 
 course negative. He admits everywhere, that men's know- 
 ledge of their past experience is an absolutely indispensable 
 condition for knowledge.* But we believe no one place can 
 be mentioned throughout his works in which he so much 
 as professes to explain, on what principle it is that men 
 can reasonably trust their memory as authenticating their 
 past experience. At least, we protest we have been unable 
 to find such a passage, though our search has been minute 
 and laborious. 
 
 There is no part of his writings in which one might so 
 reasonably have expected to find some doctrine on the 
 motive of certitude, as in a passage on which we have 
 before now laid some stress a passage, indeed, which (for 
 reasons presently to be given) we originally understood in 
 a far more favourable sense than his subsequent explana- 
 tion permits. He had said ("On Hamilton," p. 209, note) 
 that " our belief in the veracity of memory is evidently 
 ultimate," because " no reason can be given for it which 
 does not presuppose the belief and assume it to be well 
 grounded." On this we made the following comment in our 
 second essay : 
 
 He holds that there is just one intuition one, only one 
 which carries with it [immediate] evidence of truth. There 
 was an imperative claim on him then, as he valued his philo- 
 sophical character, to explain clearly and pointedly, where the 
 distinction lies between acts of memory and other alleged in- 
 tuitions. He would have found the task very difficult, we 
 
 * For instance. " All who have attempted the explanation of the human 
 mind by sensation, have postulated the knowledge of past sensations as well 
 as of present." (" Ou Hamilton," p. 210, note.)
 
 Mr. Mitt's Reply to the " Dublin Review." 135 
 
 confidently affirm ; but that only gives us more reason for 
 complaining that he did not make the attempt. To us it seems 
 that various classes of intuition are more favourably circum- 
 stanced for the establishment of their trustworthiness, than is 
 that class which Mr. Mill accepts. Thus, in the case of many a 
 wicked action, it would really be easier for the criminal to 
 believe that he had never committed it than to doubt its 
 necessary turpitude and detestableness. Then, in the case of 
 other intuitions, I know that the rest of mankind share them 
 with myself; and I often know, also, that experience confirms 
 them as far as it goes ; but I must confidently trust my acts of 
 clear and distinct memory, before I can even guess what is held 
 by other men or what is declared by experience. 
 
 Mr. Mill thus replies : 
 
 Dr. Ward with good reason challenges me to explain where 
 the distinction lies, between acts of memory and other alleged 
 intuitions which I do not admit as such. The distinction is, 
 that as all the explanations of mental phenomena presuppose 
 memory, memory itself cannot admit of being explained. 
 Whenever this is shown to be true of any other part of our 
 knowledge, I shall admit that part to be intuitive. Dr. Ward 
 thinks that there are various other intuitions more favourably 
 circumstanced for the establishment of their trustworthiness 
 than memory itself, and he gives as an example our conviction 
 of the wickedness of certain acts. My reason for rejecting this 
 as a case of intuition is, that the conviction can be explained 
 without presupposing as part of the explanation the very fact 
 itself, which the belief in memory cannot. 
 
 Our readers, then, will observe that Mr. Mill, when 
 expressly challenged, gives no other reason for his belief in 
 the veracity of memory except only this. Memory, he 
 nays, must be assumed to be veracious, because " as all 
 the explanations of mental phenomena presuppose memory, 
 memory itself cannot admit of being explained : " or, in 
 other words (as he expressed the same thought somewhat 
 more clearly in his original note), because " no reason can 
 be given for the veracity of memory which does not pre- 
 suppose the belief and assume it to be well grounded."
 
 130 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 But a moment's consideration will show that this answer 
 implies a fundamental misconception of the point we had 
 raised. The question which he answers is, whether my 
 knowledge of past facts (assuming that I hare such know- 
 ledge) is on the one hand an immediate and primary, or on 
 the other hand a mediate and secondary, part of my know- 
 ledge.* But the question which we asked was totally 
 different from this. We asked, on what ground my belief 
 of the facts testified by my memory can be accounted part 
 of my knowledge at all. We asked, in short, on what reason- 
 able ground can my conviction rest, that I ever experienced 
 those sensations, emotions, thoughts, which my memory 
 represents to me as past facts of my life ? 
 
 We say that the question to which Mr. Mill has replied 
 is fundamentally different from the question which we 
 asked. Let it be assumed that my belief in the declarations 
 of my memory is a real part of my knowledge, and nothing 
 can be more pertinent than Mr. Mill's argument : he 
 shows satisfactorily, that such belief must be an immediate 
 and primary part of my knowledge, not a mediate and 
 derivative part thereof. But when the very question asked 
 is whether this belief be any part of my knowledge at all^ 
 Mr. Mill's reply is simply destitute of meaning. For con- 
 sider. We may truly predicate of every false belief which 
 ever was entertained nay, of every false belief which can 
 even be imagined that " no " satisfactory " reason can be 
 given for it which does not presuppose the belief and 
 assume it to be well grounded." If Mr. Mill, then, were here 
 professing to prove the trustivorthiness of memory, his argu- 
 ment would be this : " The declarations of memory," he 
 would be saying, " are certainly true, because they possess 
 one attribute which is possessed by every false belief which 
 was ever entertained or can even be imagined." 
 
 * Observe, e.g., his words : " Whenever this appears to be true of any 
 other part of our knowledge."
 
 Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin Review." 137 
 
 Or we may draw out against him, in a different shape, 
 what is substantially the same argument. Mr. Mill's first 
 business as it is that of every philosopher was to show 
 that philosophy is possible; or, in other words, to place 
 before his disciples reasonable grounds for rejecting the 
 sceptical conclusion. Now, the sceptic's argument as put, 
 e.g. (however inconsistently), by Professor Huxley may be 
 worded as follows : " No knowledge is possible to me, 
 except that which I possess at any given moment of my 
 actually present consciousness. No knowledge is possible 
 to me, I say, beyond this, because I cannot possibly acquire 
 more except by knowing that the declarations of my 
 memory may be trusted. But I see no ground whatever 
 for knowing that these may be trusted. How can I guess 
 but that as the Professor suggests some powerful and 
 malicious being may find his pleasure in deluding me, and 
 making me fancy myself to remember things which never 
 happened ? Nay, apart from that supposition, there may 
 be ten thousand different agencies, to me unknown, which 
 may have produced my present impression of a supposed 
 past, not one of which agencies in any degree implies that 
 this supposedly past experience was ever really mine." 
 Mr. Mill, we say, was absolutely required to give reasonable 
 ground for rejecting this view of things, under pain of 
 forfeiting his position of " philosopher " altogether. Let us 
 consider, then, how far the one argument which he gives for 
 the trustworthiness of memory will enable him to oppose 
 the sceptical view. His argument, if it can be logically 
 expressed at all, consists of two syllogisms which we will 
 draw out in form. 
 
 SYLLOGISM I. 
 
 Knowledge of much more than present consciousness i>s 
 possible to human beings.
 
 138 TJie Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 But such knowledge would not be possible, unless they 
 had reasonable grounds for trusting their memory. 
 
 Therefore they have reasonable grounds for trusting 
 their memory. 
 
 SYLLOGISM II. 
 
 Men have reasonable grounds for trusting their memory 
 (Conclusion of First Syllogism). 
 
 But they would not have such grounds, unless its veracity 
 were immediately evident, (because "no reason can be 
 given for it, which does not presuppose it "). 
 
 Therefore the veracity of memory is immediately 
 evident. 
 
 We beg our readers, then, to observe the character of 
 this argument. It abandons all profession of replying to 
 the sceptic at all ; it assumes, as the very major premiss 
 of its first syllogism, that precise proposition which the 
 sceptic expressly and formally denies. 
 
 We infer from all this, that the question which we 
 pressed on Mr. Mill, we will not say has not been answered, 
 but has not even been apprehended by him. With him, 
 as with other phenomenists, "the motive of certitude" is a 
 "missing link" of the philosophical chain. Even if the 
 merits of his philosophical structure were far greater than 
 we can admit, no one can deny that it is entirely destitute 
 of & foundation ; that he has exhibited no grounds whatever 
 on which inquirers can reasonably accept either his own 
 conclusions or any one else's. 
 
 A similar view of his position is impressed on our mind 
 by another paragraph, in which he treats the sceptical 
 tenet more directly, and in which he shows again that he 
 has not even a glimpse of the sceptic's true controversial 
 status. It will be better to give this paragraph at length ;
 
 Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin Review." 139 
 
 and we need only explain, by way of preface, that he uses 
 the word " consciousness," not in the sense in which we 
 uniformly use it, and which he himself accounts the more 
 usual and convenient, but in a totally different sense given 
 to it by Sir W. Hamilton. We italicize one sentence : 
 
 According to all philosophers, the evidence of consciousness, 
 if only we can obtain it pure, is conclusive. This is an obvious, 
 but by no means a mere identical proposition. If consciousness 
 be defined as intuitive knowledge, it is indeed an identical 
 proposition to say, that if we intuitively know anything, we do 
 know it, and are sure of it. But the meaning lies in the 
 implied assertion, that we do know some things immediately or 
 intuitively. That we must do so is evident, if we know any- 
 thing ; for what we know mediately depends for its evidence on 
 our previous knowledge of something else : unless, therefore, we 
 know something immediately, we could not know anything 
 mediately and consequently could not know anything at all. 
 That imaginary being, a complete sceptic, might be supposed to 
 answer, that perhaps we do not know anything at all. I shall 
 not reply to this problematical antagonist in the usual mariner, 
 by telling him that if he does not know anything, I do. I put to 
 him the simplest case conceivable of immediate knowledge, and 
 ask if we ever feel anything ? If so, then at the moment of feeling 
 do we know that we feel ? or, if he will not call this knowledge, 
 will he deny that when we have a feeling we have at least some 
 sort of assurance, or conviction, of having it ? This assurance 
 of conviction is what other people mean by knowledge. If he 
 dislikes the word, I am willing in discussing with him to 
 employ some other. By whatever name this assurance is called, 
 it is the test to which we bring all our other convictions. He 
 may say it is not certain ; but such as it may be it is our model 
 of certainty. \Ve consider all our other assurances and con- 
 victions as more or less certain, according as they approach the 
 standard of this. I have a conviction that there are icebergs on 
 the Arctic seas. I have not the evidence of my senses for it : I 
 never saw an iceberg. Neither do I intuitively believe it by a 
 law of my mind. My conviction is mediate, grounded on 
 testimony, and on inferences from physical laws. When I say 
 1 am convinced of it, I mean that the evidence is equal to that 
 of my senses. I am as certain of the fact as if 1 had seen it.
 
 HO TJie Philosophy of Thriwn. 
 
 And on a more complete analysis, when I say that I am con- 
 vinced of it, what I am convinced of is that if I were in the 
 Arctic seas I should see it. We mean by knowledge, and by 
 certainty, an assurance similar and equal to that afforded by 
 our senses : if the evidence in any other case can be brought up 
 to this, we desire no more. If a person is not satisfied with 
 this evidence, it is no concern of anybody but himself, nor 
 practically of himself, since it is admitted that this evidence is 
 what we must, and may in full confidence, act upon. Absolute 
 scepticism, if there be such a thing, may be dismissed from 
 discussion as raising an irrelevant issue, for in denying all 
 knowledge it denies none. The dogmatist may be quite satisfied if 
 the doctrine he maintains can be attacked by no arguments, but those 
 which apply to the evidence of our senses. If his evidence is equal 
 to that, he needs no more ; nay, it is philosophically maintain- 
 able that by the laws of psychology we can conceive no more, 
 and that this is the certainty we call perfect. (" On Hamilton," 
 pp. 157, 158.) 
 
 This whole passage, as we have observed, is very 
 significant. In the italicized sentence, Mr. Mill says that 
 scepticism cannot be assailed by any arguments, except 
 those which would overthrow "the evidence of the senses." 
 Very short work would be made of this statement by a 
 consistent follower of Professor Huxley. He would point, 
 of course, to the undeniable fact, that men's belief in the 
 " evidence of their senses " or in the phenomena of their 
 consciousness at any given moment on one hand, and 
 men's belief in anything else whatever on the other hand, 
 that these two beliefs rest respectively on grounds funda- 
 mentally different from each other. He would urge with 
 irrefragable force, that the former belief is independent of 
 the question whether their memory may or may not be 
 trusted; whereas every other belief is destitute of so much as 
 the hundredth part of a leg to stand on, unless the trust- 
 worthiness of memory be in some way made known to 
 them. Of this vital fact in the controversy with sceptics, 
 Mr. Mill seems absolutely and utterly unaware. 
 
 There is another passage of Mr. Mill's which we may
 
 Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin fiei-ieiv" HI 
 
 also adduce. We referred to it in our first essay ; but 
 now that we understand more clearly Mr. Mill's statements, 
 we had better quote it entire : 
 
 I must protest against adducing, as evidence of the truth of 
 a fact in external nature, the disposition, however strong or 
 however general, of the human mind to believe it. Belief is 
 not proof, and does not dispense with the necessity of proof. I 
 am aware, that to ask for evidence of a proposition which wo 
 are supposed to believe instinctively is to expose one's self to the 
 charge of rejecting the authority of the human faculties ; which 
 of course no one can consistently do, since the human faculties 
 are all which any one has to judge by: and inasmuch as the 
 meaning of the word evidence is supposed to be something 
 which when laid before the mind induces it to believe, to 
 demand evidence when belief is ensured by the mind's own 
 laws, is supposed to be appealing to the intellect against the 
 intellect. But this, I apprehend, is a misunderstanding of the 
 nature of evidence. By evidence is not meant anything and 
 everything which produces belief. There are many things 
 which generate belief besides evidence. A mere strong associa- 
 tion of ideas often causes a belief so intense as to be unshakable 
 by experience or argument. Evidence is not that which the 
 mind does or must yield to, but that which it ought to yield to, 
 namely, that by yielding to which its belief is kept conformable 
 to fact. There is no appeal from the human faculties generally, 
 but there is an appeal from one human faculty to another ; from 
 the judging faculty to those which take cognisance of fact, the 
 faculties of sense and consciousness. The legitimacy of this 
 appeal is admitted whenever it is allowed that our judgments 
 ought to be conformable to fact. To say that belief suffices for 
 its own justification is making opinion the test of opinion ; it is 
 denying the existence of any outward standard, the conformity 
 of an opinion to which constitutes the truth. We call one mode 
 of forming opinions right and another wrong, because the ono 
 does, and the other docs not, tend to make the opinion agreo 
 with fact to make people believe what really is, and expect 
 what really will be. Now, a mere disposition to believe, even if 
 supposed instinctive, is no guarantee for the truth of the thing 
 believed. If, indeed, the belief ever amounted to an irresistiHo 
 necessity, there would then bo no use in appealing from it, 
 because there would be no possibility of altering it. 1'ut even
 
 142 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 then the truth of the belief would not follow; it would only 
 follow that mankind were under a permanent necessity of 
 believing what might possibly not bo true ; in other words, that 
 a case might occur in which our senses or consciousness, if they 
 could be appealed to, might testify one thing, and our reason 
 believe another. (" Logic," vol. ii. pp. 96-98.) 
 
 Now, to begin with the opening sentences of this para- 
 graph. Of course we admit that, under particular circum- 
 stances, there may be a strong disposition of the human 
 mind to believe untrue propositions. But Mr. Mill's state- 
 ment is very different from this. No disposition to believe, 
 he says, " however strong or however general," can evidence 
 a fact. A more glaringly untenable philosophical statement 
 never was put forth. There is literally no " fact in external 
 nature," great or small, which does not rest in last resort, 
 for the " evidence of its truth," exclusively on " the disposi- 
 tion of the human mind to believe it." This is absolutely 
 undeniable ; for consider : No one fact can possibly be 
 established, except through the past experience of human 
 beings. Mr. Mill of all men will not deny this. But that 
 human beings ever had this past experience is a fact to 
 which not one with any show of reason could attach the 
 least shred of credibility, were it not for the " disposition " 
 of their " mind " to accept as true the declarations of their 
 memory ; and were it not for that inward gift possessed by 
 them, whereby they know that this acceptance is reasonable. 
 And a comment precisely similar might so easily be made 
 on each successive sentence of the passage, that we should 
 be guilty of tedious impertinence if we inflicted such 
 comment on our readers' patience. Our inference is as 
 before, that Mr. Mill, from wholly failing to apprehend the 
 position of sceptics, has also wholly failed to apprehend 
 the necessity of carefully considering " the motive of 
 certitude." 
 
 We have said, however, that Mr. Mill is one of two
 
 Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin Review." 143 
 
 phenomenist writers, who (as we think) have advanced a 
 little way beyond earlier writers of their school, towards 
 discerning the existence of this question. In Mr. Mill's 
 case, we are here specially referring to the ninth chapter of 
 his work " On Hamilton," concerning "the interpretation 
 of consciousness." In p. 159 he cites the distinction drawn 
 by Sir W. Hamilton, between the authority of what is 
 commonly called consciousness on one hand, and of what 
 is commonly called intuition on the other; * and in pp. 162-3 
 he expresses hearty concurrence with this distinction.! Sir 
 William proceeds still with Mr. Mill's full approval to 
 derive an instance of this distinction from the faculty of 
 memory. "I cannot deny," he says (Mill, p. 160), "the 
 actual phenomenon " that I have that present impression 
 which I call an act of memory, " because my denial would 
 be suicidal : but I can without self-contradiction assert that 
 [present] consciousness may be a false witness in regard to 
 any former existence ; and I maintain, if I please, that the 
 memory of the past, in consciousness, is nothing but a 
 phenomenon, which has no reality beyond the present." Mr. 
 Mill, then, has here got hold of the truth, that the two 
 beliefs belief in the present existence of the act of memory, 
 and belief in the past existence of those phenomena which 
 memory testifies that these two beliefs rest on foundations 
 totally different from each other. It is passing strange, 
 that he should have let this truth slip from his mind after 
 having once apprehended it ; that he should have failed to 
 inquire accordingly, what is the basis on which beliefs of 
 the latter kind reasonably rest ; and above all, that at the 
 
 * All those philosophers who use the word " intuitions " at all, use it in 
 the same sense. They use it to express those truths which are not indeed 
 mere facts of present consciousness, but which nevertheless are immediately 
 and primarily known with certitude. 
 
 t These are Mr. Mill's words of approval: " By the conception and clear 
 exposition of thin distinction, Sir W. Hamilton has" shown "that, whatever 
 he the positive value of his achievements in metaphysics, he has a greater 
 capacity for the subject than many metaphysicians of high reputation."
 
 Tlie Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 beginning of this very chapter (at pp. 157-8) he should 
 have expressed (as our readers have seen) an opinion 
 directly contrary to that doctrine of Sir W. Hamilton's which 
 he endorses in pp. 162-3. 
 
 We consider, then, that we have established a very grave 
 charge indeed against Mr. Mill's philosophical character. 
 It is the very first business of a philosopher to show that 
 he has a raison d'etre ; that philosophy can exist ; that 
 human knowledge is possible. Those who hold that no 
 human knowledge is possible, ground their opinion on the 
 alleged impossibility of authenticating the avouchments of 
 memory. Mr. Mill not only has not solved this difficulty, 
 not only has not attempted to solve it, but has not even 
 contemplated its existence. We are by no means implying 
 that herein he is inferior to other phenomenists ; on the 
 contrary we have said that he is somewhat in advance of 
 them : but what we wish to impress on our readers, is the in- 
 credible shallowness of the phenomenistic philosophy itself. 
 Mr. Mill has also replied to the rest of the criticism 
 which we expressed in our second essay, on his treatment 
 of the memory question ; and this will be our proper place 
 for dealing with his reply. One remark we made was, that 
 his statement about memory constitutes " a most pointed 
 exception to his school's general doctrine, and an exception 
 which no phenomenist had made before." To this Mr. 
 Mill answers ("On Hamilton," p. 210, note) that he "doubts 
 whether we can point out any phenomenist who has not 
 made it either expressly or by implication." We reply, 
 that we had understood him to admit in his note and we 
 had excellent reason for so understanding him much more 
 than (as now appears) he ever intended. We understood 
 him in his original note to express agreement with what 
 was said in Dr. Ward's " Philosophical Introduction," on 
 this particular theme.* Now, the view set forth in that 
 * Mr. Mill said : " Our belief in the veracity of memory is evidently
 
 Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin Review." 
 
 work was identical with the view advocated in the preceding 
 pages. Dr. Ward maintained, not merely that " the veracity 
 of memory" in each particular case is not known by reason- 
 ing or by consciousness, but further that it is known with 
 certitude by means of a gift which may be called the light 
 of reason ; that man's belief in the veracity of memory on 
 one hand, and of present consciousness on the other, rest on 
 grounds fundamentally different from each other ; but that 
 each rests on evidence abundantly sufficient. Dr. Ward, 
 we may add, laid his main stress on the proposition, that 
 the trustworthiness of memory, in any given case whatever, 
 is known, not at all by consciousness, but by the mind's 
 own inward light. We had no other notion, then, but that 
 Mr. Mill intended to express concurrence with this opinion. 
 And even if we had otherwise doubted this, we should have 
 been strongly confirmed in our existing impression by that 
 comment of Mr. Mill's on Sir W. Hamilton which we so 
 recently quoted. How were we to guess that the same 
 writer, who praised Sir William so warmly for his " con- 
 ception and clear exposition of this distinction," did not 
 himself recognize the distinction ? We consider, therefore 
 (as we have more than once said in the preceding pages), 
 that we had excellent reasons for considering Mr. Mill's 
 view to be coincident with our own on the motive of 
 certitude ; and we now can only regret our inevitable 
 mistake. We said in our first essay, that he " failed in 
 consistently apprehending and bearing in mind " what we 
 regard as "the true doctrine;" but we now see that ho 
 never in any way held it. Our readers, then, will under- 
 stand what was the view which we inevitably (though it 
 now appears mistakenly) ascribed to Mr. Mill : and this 
 
 ultimate," etc. "This point is forcibly urged in" Dr. Ward's " Philosophical 
 Introduction," "a book . . . showing u capacity in the writer," etc., etc. 
 Nor did Mr. Mill give the most distant hint that he differed from Dr. Ward's 
 view of the subject in its most essential particular. 
 
 VOL. I. j,
 
 14G The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 being so, we easily defend the criticism expressed by us in 
 our second essay. If Mr. Mill's doctrine bad been what 
 we supposed, it would have constituted " a most pointed 
 exception to his school's general doctrine;" for we are 
 certainly not aware of a single phenomenist writer, anterior 
 to Mr. Mill, who had so much as a glimpse of it. 
 
 Mr. Mill further takes exception to our remark, that " if 
 there ever were a paradoxical position, his is one on the 
 surface." But it will now be understood that we were 
 speaking of the position which we inevitably mistook for 
 his, and not of that which he really intended to assume. 
 We understood him to concur with our doctrine, that the 
 soul of man possesses a special gift, given for the very 
 purpose of authenticating intuitions. On such a supposi- 
 tion we do think it paradoxical to hold that there is just 
 one class of intuitions and no more. But we need hardly 
 say that the statement is of no controversial importance, 
 and we willingly withdraw it. 
 
 We confess, however, with regret one piece of careless- 
 ness, which Mr. Mill has pointed out. We did not suffici- 
 ently bear in mind that he had " avowedly left the question 
 open, whether our perception of our own personality is not " 
 another "case of the same kind ; " another case of intuition. 
 
 We now pass from Mr. Mill's doctrine (or rather absence 
 of doctrine) on the motive of certitude, to his doctrine on 
 the rule thereof. In particular as regards primary truths : 
 what is the characteristic, we should have liked to ask him, 
 of those judgments which man may reasonably accept as 
 immediately and primarily evident ? F. Kleutgen answers 
 and we are heartily in accord that all those and only 
 those judgments may reasonably be accepted as immediately 
 evident which man's existing cognitive faculties imme- 
 diately avouch as certain. 
 
 Now, whether it be taken as proof of Mr. Mill's obscurity 
 or of our own dulness, certain it is that on this point also,
 
 Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin Revievj." 147 
 
 when we wrote our first essay, we considered Mr. Mill's 
 doctrine to be far nearer our own than it really is. We 
 were led astray by such passages as the following, which 
 we quoted in p. 26 : " The verdict of our immediate and 
 intuitive conviction is admitted on all hands to be a decision 
 without appeal." " As regards almost all, if not all, philo- 
 sophers " and by his very phrase (we said) he implies 
 that he at all events is no dissentient "the questions which 
 divided them have never turned on the veracity of con- 
 sciousness : " where (as we explained) he is, by his own 
 express avowal, using the word " consciousness " in Sir 
 \V. Hamilton's sense of "immediate and intuitive convic- 
 tion." What Sir W. Hamilton calls " the testimony of 
 consciousness," so Mr. Mill proceeds, "to something beyond 
 itself, may be and is denied ; but what is denied has almost 
 always been that consciousness gives the testimony, not 
 that if given it must be believed." We might have added 
 other similar statements. Thus (p. 137) : " what con- 
 sciousness directly reveals, together with what can be 
 legitimately inferred from its revelations, composes by 
 universal admission all that we know." "All agree with" 
 Sir W. Hamilton (p. 165), "in the position itself, that a 
 real fact of consciousness cannot be denied." These 
 sentences, one would have thought, are most plain and 
 unmistakable in their assertion, that whatever is declared 
 by men's " immediate and intuitive conviction " is indubit- 
 ably true. Then there was another reason also for crediting 
 Mr. Mill with the same theory, viz. that, according to 
 this interpretation of his words, he would have laid down 
 a solid basis for his belief in the veracity of memory. If 
 those judgments may reasonably be accepted as primarily 
 evident, which man's existing cognitive faculties imme- 
 diately avouch as certain, then the various declarations of 
 memory indubitably rank among primarily evident truths. 
 In the same essay, however, we quoted other sentences
 
 148 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 of Mr. Mill, -which point to quite a different indeed, a 
 directly contradictory theory on the rule of certitude. 
 This theory is, that no judgment c*an be reasonably ac- 
 cepted by me as immediately evident which would not 
 have been declared by my cognitive faculties in their earliest 
 and primordial state.* And the sentences of Mr. Mill, 
 which we quoted as seeming to express this theory, are 
 such as the following. Men should only accept, he says, 
 "what consciousness told them at the time when its revela- 
 tions were in their pristine purity." " We have no means 
 of interrogating consciousness in the only circumstances in 
 which it is possible for it to give a trustworthy ansiver." 
 And we might have added several others even stronger. 
 That which is "a fact of our consciousness in its present 
 artificial state " may possibly " have no claim to the title of 
 a fact of consciousness generally, or to the unlimited credence 
 given to what is originally consciousness" (p. 163). "We 
 cannot study the original elements of our mind in the facts 
 of our present consciousness " (p. 179). " Could we try the 
 experiment of the first consciousness in any infant . . . what- 
 ever was present in that first consciousness would be the 
 genuine testimony of consciousness " (p. 178). And accord- 
 ingly Mr. Mill complains, that "in all Sir W. Hamilton's 
 writings " no " single instance can be found in which, 
 before registering a belief as a part of our consciousness 
 from the beginning, he thinks it necessary to ascertain that 
 it has not grown up subsequently " (p. 181). Of course Sir 
 W. Hamilton never dreamed of the strange tenet here 
 taken for granted by Mr. Mill. He never dreamed of the 
 tenet, that what he called " consciousness " i.e., as Mr. 
 
 * We expressed this theory, however, somewhat incorrectly. Mr. Mill, 
 we said, "seems to imply that the laics of man's mental constitution are 
 changed during his progress from infancy to manhood." The theory we 
 are criticizing has faults enough of its own to answer for, but need not be 
 understood as involving so greut a paradox as this. Mr. Mill pointed out to 
 us this misapprehension in a private letter.
 
 Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin Review!' 149 
 
 Mill himself explains, " immediate and intuitive conviction " 
 is no rule of certitude, except as regards its primordial 
 avouchments. 
 
 This tenet, indeed we must really be allowed to say- 
 is so transparently shallow that we were very unwilling 
 to believe it could be Mr. Mill's. In our first essay accord- 
 ingly we declared, " we cannot persuade ourselves that he 
 really means what he seems to say." When, however, we 
 looked more narrowly at Mr. Mill's language with a view 
 to our third essay, we arrived at a different conclusion ; 
 and "we found his meaning," as we said, "much more 
 pronounced and unmistakable than we had fancied." 
 We observed particularly (what had escaped our notice) 
 that he alleges this theory in direct opposition to the other, 
 as his reason for upholding what he calls the " psycho- 
 logical" as contrasted with the " introspective " method of 
 philosophizing ("On Hamilton," p. 179). This consideration 
 is decisive. We are obliged accordingly to credit this grave 
 writer with the theory which he so energetically professes, 
 and to understand him as holding that no declaration of 
 my cognitive faculties is trustworthy, unless it be a 
 declaration which those faculties would have put forth 
 when I was " an infant ; " when I " first opened my eyes 
 to the light " (" On Hamilton," p. 178). 
 
 Certainly he has here assumed very solid ground against 
 necessists.* He may very safely challenge them to show, 
 if they can, that when they were infants, first opening their 
 eyes to the light, their faculties would have avouched as a 
 necessary truth the triangularity of trilateral, or the 
 divergency of two intersecting straight lines. But then he 
 absolutely slaughters himself, by the weapon which ho 
 raises against his opponents. We would thus address one 
 
 * The word " necessarian is irretrievably appropriated to the purpose of 
 designating those who deny /rec icill. We have coined, therefore, the word 
 in the text, to express an idea for which some word or other ix urgently 
 needed.
 
 lf>0 Tie Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 of his disciples. You are very confident, doubtless, that 
 you really experienced this or that fact, which you re- 
 member to have occurred an hour or so ago ; and you will 
 very readily admit that if such memory were not trust- 
 worthy, experimental science would be even more utterly 
 impossible 'than metaphysical. Yet have you any ground 
 (even the faintest) for even conjecturing, that when you 
 were a new-born infant or, for that matter, when you were 
 a baby half a year old your memory could truly testify 
 the experience of your last hour ? Of course not. When, 
 therefore, Mr. Mill assumes the trustworthiness, whether of 
 his own or other men's memory, he is suicidally abandon- 
 ing the " psychological," and contenting himself with the 
 " introspective " method. Or, in other words, that "psy- 
 chological" method, which he regards as the one safeguard 
 of sound philosophy, overthrows the whole possibility of 
 experimental science. 
 
 But, in fact, we are greatly understating the case. 
 Take any one of Mr. Mill's living disciples. We have been 
 saying that, on his own theory, the avouchments of his 
 present memory are not primarily and immediately known 
 by him as true. But in our third essay we have further 
 urged, that (on his own theory) he has no means of even 
 making the inquiry whether they be true or no. He can- 
 not, we say, so much as begin to investigate the question 
 whether his existing memory be trustworthy, without taking 
 for granted that it is so ; for, unless he trust his existing 
 memory, he cannot so much as draw the most obvious of 
 conclusions from the simplest of premisses. But if he 
 takes for granted that the avouchments of his present 
 memory are true, then he is taking the present, and not 
 the primordial, declaration of his faculties as his rule of 
 certitude. We cannot conjecture why Mr. Mill has left 
 wholly unanswered this very direct objection, which w T e had 
 so clearly and definitely expressed.
 
 Mr. Mill's Reply to the "Dublin Review." 151 
 
 So far we have argued against this amazing theory 
 from its consequences. We have maintained that, by up- 
 holding it, Mr. Mill inflicts on himself no less a calamity 
 than that of philosophical suicide. Let us now in turn 
 consider the same theory as regards the evidence adducible 
 for its truth. It is necessarily an essential part of the 
 foundation on which Mr. Mill's whole philosophy rests ; 
 and we have a right to expect, therefore, that it shall itself 
 be inexpugnable. Yet was there ever, we ask, a more 
 gratuitous and arbitrary dictum than that whatever men's 
 faculties declared in their primordial condition, is infallibly 
 true ? On what ground (from his point of view) could Mr. 
 Mill even guess, that whatever a baby's memory distinctly 
 testifies is infallibly true ? Was there ever otherwise such 
 a basis as this attempted for a philosophical system ? such 
 a foundation as this laid down as the one support of all 
 human knowledge ? The whole mass of human knowledge 
 is made utterly dependent on what is about the most 
 gratuitous and arbitrary hypothesis which can well be 
 imagined. 
 
 Do we, then, ourselves, Mr. Mill might ask, doubt that 
 the avouchment of men's faculties in their earlier state is 
 infallibly true ? Speaking generally, we do not doubt this 
 at all ; though we should be sorry to commit ourselves on 
 Mr. Mill's case, of the new-born infant first opening his 
 eyes to the light. But we maintain confidently that the 
 veracity of my primordial faculties instead of being a 
 primary truth is an inference from the veracity of my 
 present faculties. Our position is most intelligible. What- 
 ever my existing faculties indubitably declare I am under 
 a necessity of infallibly knowing to be true, and I infer 
 from this fact that I possess a special gift (called by 
 scholastics the light of reason) which authenticates the 
 veracity of these faculties. Of these none is more vitally 
 essential than that of memory; and by uicuns of this
 
 152 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 faculty I know with infallible certainty a large number of 
 facts in my past life. Looking back at these, I find myself 
 to have possessed, at every period to which my memory 
 reaches, the same light of reason which I possess now ; and 
 I infer, therefore, that then, no less than now, my faculties 
 were veracious. In one word, the veracity of men's 
 faculties in their earlier state is inferred from their present 
 veracity ; whereas Mr. Mill, by a preposterous inversion of 
 the natural order, would authenticate the present by means 
 of the past. 
 
 Such is the contrast we would draw between the 
 theories of what may respectively be called " primordial " 
 and " existing " certitude. At the same time, we have been 
 uniformly careful to urge that there may be serious mis- 
 takes in interpreting the avouchment of men's existing 
 faculties. Particularly, we altogether admitted in our 
 first essay, "that again and again inferences are so 
 readily and imperceptibly drawn as to be most easily 
 mistaken for intuitions." In accordance with this we pro- 
 ceeded to say, that " in arguing hereafter with Mr. Mill wo 
 shall have no right of alleging aught as certainly a primi- 
 tive truth without proving that it cannot be an opinion 
 derived inferentially from experience." In our third essay 
 we acted sedulously on this principle : we argued carefully 
 that those moral judgments, which we were maintaining to 
 be intuitive, could not possibly be derived from experience, 
 however rapid and imperceptible the process of inference 
 might be supposed to be. We have no means of knowing 
 on what ground Mr. Mill would base his opposition to the 
 conclusions of that essay ; but we still strongly incline to 
 the opinion there expressed, that he would oppose it in no 
 other way than by falling back on his own amazing theory 
 of primordial certitude. 
 
 In regard to our second essay, our impression is 
 different. The main purpose of that essay was to establish
 
 Mr. Mill's Reply to the "Dublin Review." 153 
 
 against Mr. Mill the doctrine that the whole body of 
 mathematical truth possesses the attribute of necessity. 
 Now, if Mr. Mill really admitted that men's cognitive 
 faculties in their existing state declare this doctrine, and if 
 he denied the doctrine on no other ground than that the 
 faculties of a new-born infant would give no such testimony, 
 we should consider him abundantly refuted by the preceding 
 remarks. But we still think, as we thought when we wrote 
 the essay, that he assumes ground far stronger and more 
 plausible than this. He alleges, we think, that necessists 
 do not accurately analyze the declaration of their existing 
 faculties. I consider myself e.g. to cognize, as a self- 
 evident and necessary truth, that every trilateral figure is 
 triangular : but Mr. Mill would reply, that experience has 
 most unexceptionally united in my mind the two ideas of 
 trilateralness and triangularity ; and that accordingly I 
 mistake for intuition what is really a rapid and unconscious 
 inference from experience. In the remaining part of our 
 essay, then, this is the issue to be handled. And in this 
 later part of our discussion we are far more favourably cir- 
 cumstanced than we have been in our earlier. Hitherto 
 we have trodden ground on which Mr. Mill can hardly 
 be said to have entered into express controversy with 
 us at all, because of his silence on our first essay, and 
 on that part of our third which is connected therewith. 
 But as to our second essay on the necessary character of 
 mathematical truth he has encountered us explicitly, and 
 said all which he deemed necessary for our refutation. Wo 
 have the immense advantage, therefore, of knowing all 
 which can be said against us by that opponent, who is (to 
 our mind), immeasurably the ablest and most persuasive of 
 his school. 
 
 Certainly at the outset, Mr. Mill's theory on mathe- 
 matical axioms is very startling. If 1 were asked what arc
 
 l:">4f The, Philosophy of Thcixm. 
 
 those truths which are best known to me by constant and 
 uniform experience, all the world except phenomenist 
 philosophers would be greatly surprised by any hesitation 
 in my reply. The truths, I should answer, best known to 
 me by constant and uniform experience are such as these : 
 that fire burns ; that water quenches fire ; that wood floats 
 on water, while stones sink therein, etc. But Mr. Mill 
 tells me, that this reply is a complete mistake ; that there 
 is another class of truths, known to me by experience with 
 an immeasurably greater degree of familiarity than those 
 just mentioned. I ask in amazement to what truths he 
 can possibly be referring ; and he tells me, to such as 
 these : that trilateral are triangular, and that intersecting 
 straight lines mutually diverge. This is indubitably his 
 proposition ; for consider : I have no tendency whatever to 
 regard the former class of truths (the effect of water upon 
 fire, etc.) as eternal and immutable ; whereas he assures 
 me, that my considering the latter class (the triangularity 
 of trilaterals, etc.) to possess these attributes arises exclu- 
 sively from their having been to me such constant matters 
 of experience. He considers, therefore, that the triangularity 
 of trilaterals has been to me an immeasurably more 
 constant matter of experience than have been the most 
 familiar and every-day properties of fire and water. And 
 while this is indubitably Mr. Mill's thesis, no less indubit- 
 ably at first hearing it startles me beyond expression. Ask 
 the vast majority of Englishmen how often they have 
 observed that fire burns or that water quenches it ; they 
 will reply they have experienced it almost every day of 
 their lives. Ask them, on the contrary, how often they 
 have observed that trilaterals are triangular; they will 
 tell you that they have never to their knowledge experi- 
 enced it from the day they were born. Mr. Mill's statement, 
 then, is assuredly on the surface a startling paradox ; 
 and we are confident that closer examination will show
 
 Mr. Mill's Reply to the "Dublin Review!' 155 
 
 it to be undeniably and demonstrably erroneous. This 
 closer examination is what we are now to undertake, and 
 we will begin with reciting certain argumentative pre- 
 liminaries : 
 
 I. We did not in our essay attempt any analysis of the 
 word " necessary," nor even inquire whether such analysis 
 is possible. "Our present purpose," we said, "will lead 
 us only to attempt such a delineation and embodiment of 
 this idea as shall make clear the point at issue. When we 
 call a proposition "necessary," then, we mean to say that 
 its contradictory is an intrinsically impossible chimera ; is 
 that which could not be found in any possible state of 
 existence ; which even Omnipotence would be unable to 
 effect." To this explanation of the word Mr. Mill's silence 
 gives consent. 
 
 II. Mr. Mill himself is a phenomenist, one who avowedly 
 denies the cognizableness of necessary truth as such. If 
 he admitted that there is so much as one science which is 
 conversant throughout with necessary truth, he would, ipso 
 facto, be going over bag and baggage to what is now his 
 enemies' camp. It was well worth while, then, as we said, 
 " to choose some special field whereon to join issue as a 
 specimen of the rest." Now, " there is one particular 
 class of truths, which will be generally accepted as in every 
 respect most fitted to effect a clear and salient result." 
 Our contention then was, that mathematical truths vast 
 and inexhaustible as is their number are cognizable by 
 mankind as necessary. 
 
 III. But it was possible very greatly to narrow this 
 issue. "Mr. Mill will not of course deny that, if mathe- 
 matical axioms are necessary, the validity of syllogistic 
 reasoning must be also a necessary verity; and that the 
 whole body, therefore, of mathematical truth possesses 
 the same character." Our thesis was accordingly, " that 
 mathematical axioms (arithmetical, algebraic, geometrical)
 
 156 Tlie Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 are self-evidently necessary truths." And by the term 
 " axioms," for the purpose of our discussion, we under- 
 stood "those verities which mathematicians assume as 
 indubitably true, and use as the first premisses of their 
 science." Mr. Mill tacitly accepts all this as a fair and 
 straightforward joining of issue. 
 
 IV. We next come to a question of words. It is plain 
 that propositions may be divided, if we please, into two 
 classes : those which express no more than has been 
 already expressed by the subject, and those which do 
 express more. Now, it so happens that a distinction, sub- 
 stantially similar to this, is of vital importance in the dis- 
 cussion between necessists and phenomenists ; and it is 
 very desirable, therefore, that names shall be given to the 
 two above-named classes. All non-Catholics since Kant, 
 of either school, have used the words " analytical " and 
 " synthetical " for this purpose. But a Catholic cannot so 
 use these words without risk of serious misconception, 
 because Catholic philosophy has affixed to them quite a 
 different sense. What Catholics mean by calling a pro- 
 position " analytical " so F. Kleutgen explains is that 
 " by simply considering the idea of the subject and predicate, 
 one comes to see that there exists between them that 
 relation which the proposition expresses." But, as we shall 
 immediately urge, a most important class of those propo- 
 sitions which non-Catholics call " synthetical " possess the 
 very property mentioned by F. Kleutgen ; and these are 
 accordingly denominated by Catholics " analytical." In 
 our second essay, we attempted to evade this difficulty 
 by calling these two classes respectively "tautologous " 
 and " significant." An able writer, however, in the 
 Spectator was reasonably led by this nomenclature to 
 misunderstand some of our remarks ; and we cannot our- 
 selves, on consideration, defend its appropriateness. We 
 will adopt, therefore, the words used by Sir W. Hamilton
 
 Mr. Mill's Reply to the "Dublin Revieiv" 157 
 
 for the purpose before us, and will use the two words, 
 " explicative," " ampliative." From this, moreover, we 
 obtain the incidental advantage, that these two phrases are 
 to our mind really more fitted to express the intended 
 distinction than the other two. 
 
 We will define, then, these two terms thus. " Explicative " 
 propositions are those which declare no more than that 
 some idea (1) is, or (2) is not, identical with or included in 
 some other idea. If the former, they are " positively 
 explicative ; " if the latter, " negatively" so. "Ampliative " 
 propositions are those which declare more than this. And 
 it may be worth while to add, that various propositions 
 rank technically under the former head which in common 
 parlance would not be called so much as "explicative," but 
 are mere truisms : as " this apple is this apple," or "is an 
 apple." 
 
 V. All positively explicative propositions are at once 
 reducible to the principle of identity " A is A." Take e.g. 
 as one example, " all hard substances resist pressure : " 
 there is no meaning in this proposition, except that " all 
 hard substances are hard ; " or " all substances which resist 
 pressure resist pressure." * 
 
 VI. A second purely verbal explanation. " Self-evident " 
 truths, in the present essay, are by no means the same 
 thing with " primary " truths, but are only a particular 
 class of them. All those truths are " primary," which are 
 known to human beings immediately, and which need not 
 to be inferred from other truths. But we call no truth 
 "self-evident," unless it be cognized as certain by merely 
 pondering the proposition which expresses it ; by pene- 
 
 * We may be allowed a moment's digression to repeat a remark nmdo 
 by us on a former occasion. We suggested that what have been called 
 " the fundamental laws of thought," are but different exhibitions of the 
 principle of identity. Thus, the principle of contradiction ; "anything which 
 is not B is not B;" the principle of excluded middle; "anything which 
 is not B i not B."
 
 15cS The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 trating and comparing with each other the ideas respec- 
 tively expressed by the proposition's subject and predicate. 
 The fact that I was miserably cold a short time ago if it 
 be a fact is to me a " primary" truth : nevertheless it is 
 not a "self-evident" one, because it is known to me as 
 certain, not by my pondering the proposition which ex- 
 presses it, but by my consulting the attestation of my 
 memory.* 
 
 We should add, that these self-evident truths are called 
 by scholastic writers " principles " and " axioms." The 
 latter term is of much philosophical service ; but the word 
 " principles " has in English so many different senses that 
 we do not think it very well fitted to be a technical term. 
 In our present discussion we must refrain from using even 
 the word " axioms " in its scholastic sense, because Mr. 
 Mill gives the name "axioms" to the first premisses of 
 mathematical science, while denying that those premisses 
 are self-evident. There is another expression, common in 
 modern philosophy. Those truths are said to be " cog- 
 nizable a priori," which may be known independently of 
 experience, whether they be self-evident or only dcducible 
 from self-evident premisses. Such truths are called in 
 Catholic philosophy " metaphysically certain." 
 
 VII. All self-evident truths are necessary. This follows 
 at once from the theory of certitude. Take the proposition 
 " every trilateral is triangular : " and let us assume for the 
 moment that this proposition is self-evident; or in other 
 words that it is known by me to be true, if I do but duly 
 ponder it. But, as we urged in the earlier part of our 
 essay, the declaration of my faculties infallibly corre- 
 sponds with objective truth. Take therefore any trilateral 
 which can exist in the universe which can be formed 
 
 * We are well aware that we did not in our former essays preserve this 
 distinction of meaning between "primary" and "self-evident," but we are 
 of opinion that it will be found conducive to clearness of thought.
 
 Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin Review" 159 
 
 by Omnipotence itself I know infallibly of this trilateral 
 that it is triangular. It will be seen, then, by reverting to 
 that very explanation of the word "necessary" which we 
 gave at starting, that the triangularity of every trilateral 
 if it be a "self-evident" must also be a "necessary" 
 truth. 
 
 VIII. Mr. Mill nowhere, of course, dreams of denying 
 that all explicative propositions are self-evident. And 
 certainly though he would doubtless wish to avoid the 
 word "necessary" we take for granted he would admit 
 that the truth " A is A " must hold good in every possible 
 sphere of existence.* It is not therefore absolutely accu- 
 rate to say that he denies the cognizableness of any 
 necessary truth, but only of any necessary truth which is 
 not purely explicative. At the same time, we most heartily 
 concur with him in holding that these truths " A is A," 
 "B is B," "C is C" though they went through all the 
 letters of a thousand alphabets are utterly sterile, and 
 cannot by any possible mutual combination germinate into 
 an organic whole. There can be no syllogism without a 
 middle term. Although, therefore, it may not be strictly 
 true to say that Mr. Mill denies all necessary truth, he does 
 deny the possibility of any necessary science ; and denies 
 also the cognizableness of any such necessary truths as we 
 may call " fruitful." 
 
 IX. On the other hand, he holds as firmly as we do, that 
 mathematical axioms are ampliative and not explicative : 
 indeed, he would consider, as we do, that this fact is suffi- 
 ciently proved by the very existence of mathematical science. 
 Take our ordinary instance, " all trilateral are triangular:" 
 no one would dream of saying that the idea " triangular " 
 
 * Yet we observe that even thus we tnko ton much for granted. " Whether 
 the three so-called fundamental laws," he says ("On Hamilton," p. 491) and 
 tho principle of identity is one of these three "are laws of our thoughts 
 . . . inn-ly liecaiiae we perce.ioe tken to be univertally true of all obstrced 
 plienoniena, I will not positively decide."
 
 1 GO TJie Ph ilosopfiy of Theism. 
 
 is identical with, or contained in, the idea " trilateral." * And 
 though some able writers have maintained that the axioms 
 of arithmetic are purely explicative, this is not the place to 
 oppose them ; because Mr. Mill dissents from them as 
 eagerly and as confidently as we do. We briefly referred 
 to this question in our second essay. 
 
 We are thus at last brought to the point at issue between 
 Mr. Mill and ourselves. He denies, whereas we amrm, that 
 various ampliative propositions are self-evident and neces- 
 sary. And we are now to join issue on mathematical axioms, 
 as being special and critical instances of the general class 
 " ampliative." 
 
 In general accordance with what has been expressed, we 
 thus laid down in our second essay the immediate ground 
 on which the discussion was to turn. "If in any case," 
 we said, " I know by my very conception of some ens, 
 that a certain attribute, not included in that conception, 
 is truly predicable of that ens, such predication is a self- 
 evident necessary proposition." These words defined with 
 strict accuracy, as our readers will have seen, the kind of 
 necessary truth of which Mr. Mill certainly denies the exist- 
 ence, though they are incidentally faulty in expression, as 
 imping that explicative propositions are not necessary. 
 Mr. Mill himself might admit, though in different phrase- 
 ology, that explicative propositions are self-evident and 
 necessary ; and the controversy between him and ourselves 
 turns on the question whether certain ampliative proposi- 
 tions are not self-evident and necessary also. Moreover, as 
 has been seen, (/"they are self-evident, it follows that they 
 are necessary. 
 
 Here, then, is the direct and central combat we have to 
 
 * F. Kleutpen avowedly concurs with Kant's doctrine, on the cognizable- 
 ness of " synthetical a priori propositions " as self-evident ; differing only 
 from him on the appropriateness of this particular word " synthetical." On 
 this particular there is no difference of doctrine, but only of words, between 
 other writers of the s.-hola*tic following and the philosopher of Konigsberg.
 
 Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin Revieu'." Ifil 
 
 fight out with Mr. Mill, and we beg our readers to con- 
 centrate on it their best attention. We take, as our pattern 
 specimen, the judgment " all trilaterals are triangular." 
 We maintain (1) that this judgment is ampliative : because 
 (as is manifest) the idea "triangular" is neither identical 
 with, nor contained in, the idea "trilateral." We maintain 
 (2) that this judgment is self-evident : because its truth is 
 known by duly pondering the proposition which expresses 
 it ; because, as soon as I have apprehended it, I need not 
 go ever so little beyond the region of my own thoughts in 
 order to cognize its truth. Mr. Mill's reply is substantially 
 as follows ; and we print his whole paragraph in a note, 
 that our readers may judge for themselves whether we have 
 misconceived him.* The proposition " all trilaterals are 
 triangular " so Mr. Mill answers in effect is indubitably 
 ampliative ; because the idea expressed by the predicate is 
 not identical with, nor contained in, that expressed by the 
 subject. But the judgment expressed by the proposition is 
 
 * " It is not denied nor deniable that there are properties of things which 
 we know to be true (as Dr. Ward expresses it) by our ' very conception ' of 
 the thing. Hut this is 110 argument against our knowing tin m solely by ex- 
 perience, for these are cases iu which, in the very process of forming tho 
 conception, we have experience of the fact. It is not likely that Dr. Ward 
 has returned to the notion (so long abandoned and even forgotten by in- 
 tuitionists) of ideas literally innate, and thinks that we bring into the world 
 the conception of a trilateral figure ready made. He doubtless believes that 
 it is at least suggested by observation of objects. Now, the fact of three 
 sides and that of three angles are so intimately linked together in external 
 nature, that it is impossible for the conception of a three-sided figure to get 
 into the mind without carrying into the mind with it the conception of three 
 angles. Therefore, when we have once got the conception of a trilateral, we 
 have no need of further experience to prove triangularity. The conception 
 itself, which represents all our previous experience, suffices. And if the 
 association theory be true, it must follow from it that whenever any property 
 of external things is in the relation to the things which is required for the 
 formation of an inseparable association, that property will got into the con- 
 ception, and be believed without further proof. Dr. Ward will say that 
 triangularity is not included in the conception of trilateral. Hut this is 
 only true in the sense that triangularity is not in the connotation of the 
 name. Many attributes, not included in the definition, :ire included in the 
 conception. Dr. Ward cannot but see that <>n the experience h\ jMithesis, this 
 not only may but luiiat be the case." ("On Hamilton," p. :;:!7, note.) 
 
 \i>|.. |. M
 
 102 Tic Plnlwopby of Theism. 
 
 not arapliative at all, but explicative.* Why ? Because, 
 in consequence of the singular uniformity of my past 
 experience, I have come to include triangularity in my very 
 idea of trilateralness ; because, through this uniformity of 
 experience, I have acquired an inability of thinkinij of a 
 figure as trilateral without at the same moment (implicitly, 
 at least) thinking of it as triangular. According to Mr. Mil], 
 then, when an adult expresses the proposition that "all 
 trilaterals are triangular," the judgment which he elicits 
 would be truly analyzed and expressed by a different pro- 
 position ; by the proposition, that " all figures which have; 
 three sides and three angles are triangular." But this 
 proposition is of course purely explicative, and is admitted 
 by Mr. Mill himself to be self-evident. 
 
 We are so very confident of our cause, that we earnestly 
 desire to exhibit Mr. Mill's theory at its thoroughly best 
 advantage. We will put it, therefore, this way. The pro- 
 position was once placed before me for the first time in a 
 formulized shape (perhaps in some "object-lesson"), that 
 " horses differ greatly from each other in colour." Though 
 (by hypothesis) I have never before expressly contemplated 
 that proposition in form, I at once recognize it as expressing 
 a freshly familiar truth ; a truth vividly known to me by 
 every day's experience. Now, the very same thing took 
 place so Mr. Mill would say when the proposition was 
 first placed before me in a formulized shape, that " all 
 trilaterals are triangular : " I recognize it at once, as ex- 
 pressing a freshly familiar truth, vividly known to me by 
 
 * It may be asked how our ascription of this opinion to Mr. Mill is recon- 
 cileable with our recent statement, that he regards mathematical axioms as 
 ampliative propositions. But the answer is moot easy. According to 
 him, my judgment that all trilaterals are triangular was ampliative when first 
 I formed it, and indeed for a considerable time afterwards. He considers 
 that it was first formed through my experience of external nature ; and 
 that it became more and more familiar and intensified by the same cause 
 until at last (as explained in the text) it became part of my mind's habitual 
 furniture and is easilv mistaken for an intuition.
 
 Mr. Mill's Reply to the "Dublin Review." 163 
 
 every day's experience. According to Mr. Mill, the triangu- 
 larity of trilaterals is a truth as freshly known to me by 
 daily experience as is the fact that horses are of different 
 colours or that wood floats on water. Nay, according to 
 Mr. Mill, the first-named truth is known to me with in- 
 definitely greater freshness of familiarity than are the two 
 latter. For consider : Mr. Mill admits that all mankind 
 are under an incapacity of conceiving that even Omni- 
 potence could form a non-triangular trilateral ; whereas no 
 one of cultivated mind has the slightest difficulty in con- 
 ceiving that Omnipotence could make wood sink in the 
 water, or could make all horses of the same colour. And 
 it is Mr. Mill's precise allegation, that this contrast arises 
 exclusively from the fact that experience is so very much 
 more peremptorily uniform (if we may so express ourselves) 
 in testifying the triangularity of trilaterals than in testifying 
 the above-named properties of wood and of horses.* Mr. 
 Mill's contention, then, is as follows : " The truth that all 
 trilaterals are triangular, is known by every one with 
 
 * "Dr. Ward says that mere constant and uniform experience cannot 
 possibly account for the mind's conviction of self-evident necessity. Nor do 
 I pretend that it does. The experience must not only be constant and uni- 
 form, but the juxtaposition of the facts in experience must be immediate 
 and close; as well as early, familiar, and so free from even the semblance 
 of an exception that no counter-association could possibly arise." (" On 
 Hamilton," p. 339, note.) "Whether the" mathematical "axiom needs con- 
 tinuation or not, it receives confirmation in almost every instant of our lives. 
 
 . Experimental proof crowds in upon us in such endless profusion, and 
 without one instance in which there can be even a suspicion of an exception, 
 to the rule, that we should soon have stronger ground for believing the 
 axiom, even as an experimental truth, than we have for almost any of tins 
 general truths which we confessedly learn from the evidence of the senses. 
 Independently of a priori evidence, we should certainly believe it with an 
 intensity of conviction far greater than we accord to any ordinary physical 
 truth. . . . Where, then, is the necessity for assuming that our recognition 
 of those truths lias a different origin from the rest of our knowledge, when 
 its existence is perfectly accounted for by supposing its origin to be tho 
 same? when the causes which produce belief in all other instances exist 
 in this instance, nnd in a degree of strength ns much superior to what exists 
 in other cases as the intensity of the belief itself is superior?" (" Logic," 
 vol. i. p lii'.T.)
 
 1 G4 The Ph ilotophy of Thritnn . 
 
 indefinitely greater freshness of familiarit}" than the truth 
 that wood floats upon water." This is what he affirms, 
 and what we deny ; and it is precisely on this point that 
 issue is joined. 
 
 As politicians would say, we cannot desire a better issue 
 than this to go the country upon. We affirm as an in- 
 dubitable matter of fact, that Mr. Mill is here contradicted 
 by the most obvious experience. We affirm as an indu- 
 bitable matter of fact, that ninety-nine hundredths of man- 
 kind not only do not know the triangularity of trilateral 
 with this extraordinary freshness of familiarity, but do not 
 know it at all. Those who have not studied the elements 
 of geometry with hardly an exception if they were told 
 that trilateral are triangular, and if they understood the 
 statement, would as simply receive a new piece of informa- 
 tion as they did when they w r ere first told the death of 
 Napoleon III. Then, as to those who are beginning the 
 study of mathematics. A youth of fifteen, we said in our 
 second essay, is beginning to learn geometry, and his 
 tutor points out to him that every trilateral is triangular. 
 Does he naturally reply as he would if his tutor were 
 telling him that horses are of different colours "of course 
 the fact is so ; I have observed it a thousand times " ? On 
 the contrary, in all probability the proposition will be 
 entirely new to him ; and yet, notwithstanding its novelty, 
 will at once commend itself as a self-evident truth.* 
 Lastly, take those w T ho learned the elements of geometry 
 when they were young, and are now busily engaged in 
 
 * Mr. Mill does not directly reply to this allegation of ours. Nor does 
 he notice Mr. Mahuffy's testimony, quoted by us in the note. " A mathe- 
 matical friend," says the latter, " told me he perfectly well remembered, when 
 a boy, being taught, without understanding it, the axiom, that two straight 
 lines cannot enclose a space. When the fourth projwsition of Euclid was 
 shown to him, he remembers the universality and necessity of the axiom at 
 once flashing on him."
 
 J/r. Mill's Reply to the " DiiUin Review" 105 
 
 political, or forensic, or commercial life. If the triangularity 
 of trilatejals were mentioned to them, they would remember, 
 doubtless, that they had been taught in their youth to see 
 the self-evidence of this truth ; but they would also re- 
 member, that for years and years it had been absent from 
 their thoughts. Is it seriously Mr. Mill would allege, that 
 they know the triangularity of trilateral with the same 
 freshness of familiar experience (or rather with indefinitely 
 greater freshness of familiar experience) with which they 
 know the tendency of fire to burn and of water to quench 
 it ? or with which they respectively know the political 
 events of the moment, or the practice of the courts, or the 
 habits of the Stock Exchange ? If he did allege this in his 
 zeal for a theory, we should confidently appeal against so 
 eccentric a statement to the common sense and common 
 experience of mankind. 
 
 But is it not, then, Mr. Mill might ask, a matter to 
 every man of every-day experience, that trilaterals are 
 triangular? If by "every-day experience" he means 
 "every day observation " and his argument requires this, 
 we answer confidently in the negative. Even if we could 
 not lay our finger on the precise fallacy which has misled 
 Mr. Mill, it would be none the less certain that he has been 
 misled. It cannot possibly be true that the triangularity 
 of trilaterals is a matter to every man of every-day observa- 
 tion, because (as we said just now) patently and undeniably 
 the mass of men know nothing whatever <ilont it. But 
 Mr. Mill's fallacy is obvious enough to those who will look 
 at facts as they really are. In the first place putting 
 aside that very small minority who are predominantly 
 occupied with mathematical studies the very notion of a 
 " trilateral " does not occur to men at all, except accidentally 
 and on rare occasions. It is not because my eyes light by 
 chance on three straws mutually intersecting, or on some 
 other natural object calculated to suggest a trilateral, that
 
 1(5() The Philo8O2>hy of Tfieiwn. 
 
 therefore any thought of that figure, either explicitly or 
 implicitly, enters my mind. I am probably musing on 
 matters indefinitely more interesting and exciting ; the 
 prospects of the coming parliamentary division, or the point 
 of law which I am going down to argue, or the symptoms 
 of the patient whom I am on my way to visit, or the pro- 
 bable fluctuation of the funds. The keen geometrician may 
 see trilaterals in stocks and stones, and think of trilateral* 
 on the slightest provocation : but what proportion of the: 
 human race are keen geometricians ? 
 
 Then, secondly still excluding these exceptional geome- 
 tricians for a hundred times that observation might suggest 
 to me the thought of a trilateral, not more than once perhaps 
 will it suggest to me the triangularity of such trilateral. Mr. 
 Mill himself will admit, we suppose, that such explicit 
 observation is comparatively rare ; but he will urge, probably, 
 that I implicitly observe the triangularity of every trilateral 
 which I remark. We will make, then, a very simple sup- 
 position, for the purpose of testing this suggestion, as well 
 as for one or two other purposes connected with our argu- 
 ment. We will suppose that all rose stalks within the reach 
 of human observation had leaves of the same shape icith each 
 other. On such supposition, the shape of its stalk-leaves 
 would be a more obvious and obtrusive attribute of the rose 
 than is triangularity of the trilateral ; and yet, beyond all 
 possibility of doubt, one might very frequently observe a 
 rose, without even implicitly noticing the shape of its stalk- 
 leaves. The present writer can testify this at first-hand. 
 In a life of sixty odd years, he has often enough smelt roses 
 and handled their stalks, and yet he had not the slightest 
 notion whether their leaves are or are not similarly shaped, 
 until he asked the question for the very purpose of this 
 illustration. And it is plain that if he has not observed the 
 mutual dissimilarity of their leaves, neither would he have 
 observed their similarity did it exist. Now, we appeal to
 
 Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin Review:' 1G7 
 
 our readers' common sense, whether what we said at start- 
 ing is not undeniably true ; viz. that every ordinary person 
 is very far more likely to observe the shape of rose-stalk 
 leaves, than to observe the number of angles formed by the 
 sides of a trilateral. 
 
 At the same time, we fully admit that many a man may 
 have implicitly observed the similarity of shape in rose-stalk 
 leaves (supposing such similarity to exist) without having 
 explicitly adverted to the fact until he heard it mentioned ; 
 and in like manner this or that man may have implicitly 
 observed the triangularity of various trilaterals. But such 
 a circumstance does but give occasion to another disproof 
 of Mr. Mill's theory. Suppose I have implicitly observed 
 the former phenomenon. I hear the proposition stated, 
 that the shape of all rose-stalk leaves is similar, and I set 
 myself to test its truth by my former experience. I consult 
 my confused remembrance of numerous instances in which 
 I have looked at rose-stalks, and I come to assert, with 
 more or less positiveness, that all those within my observa- 
 tion have had similar leaves. On the other hand, I wish, 
 let us suppose, to test the proposition that all trilaterals 
 are triangular. If Mr. Mill's theory were true, I should 
 proceed as in the foregoing instance ; I should contemplate 
 my confused remembrance of numerous instances in which 
 1 have observed the triangularity. But the fact is most 
 different from this. I do not consult at all my memory of 
 past experience, but give myself to the contemplation of 
 some imaginary trilateral, which I have summoned into 
 my thoughts. And the impression which I receive from 
 such contemplation is not at all that the various trilaterals 
 / hare observed in times punt are triangular, but that in no 
 possible world could non-triangular trilaterals exist. Observe, 
 then, these two respective cases. My jirocexx of reason has 
 been fundamentally different in the two ; and the imprrxxion 
 tihi<'h I ircrirc from that process will have been funda-
 
 1 OS Thf Pit ilo*ophy of Theism. 
 
 mentally different in the two : consequently the two cases 
 are fundamentally different, instead of being (as they would 
 be on Mr. Mill's theory) entirely similar. 
 
 Our readers will observe that we have just now twice 
 used the word " impression," instead of such more definite 
 terms as "cognition" or "intuition." Our reason for this 
 is easily given. Hy the admission of Mr. Mill himself, every 
 adult who gives his mind to the careful thought of trilateral, 
 receives the impression that their triangularity is a necessary 
 truth : but Mr. Mill denies that this impression is a genuine 
 intuition, and we could not of course assume what Mr. Mill 
 denies. 
 
 Here we bring to a close the exhibition of our first 
 argument against Mr. Mill ; an argument which we must 
 maintain to be simply final and conclusive, even if no second 
 were adducible. According to his theory, the triangularity 
 of trilaterals (or any other geometrical axiom) is a pheno- 
 menon known to all men with as great freshness of familiarity 
 as the phenomenon that fire burns, or that water quenches 
 it ; or rather, the former class of phenomena is known to 
 all men with incomparably greater freshness of familiarity 
 than the latter. But such a proposition is undeniably 
 inconsistent with the most patent and indubitable facts. 
 This circumstance would of course be fatal to Mr. Mill, 
 even though we were entirely unable to account for it 
 psychologically ; but (as we have further argued) it can 
 be psychologically accounted for with the greatest possible 
 ease. , 
 
 A second argument has been incidentally included in 
 our exposition of the first. The mental process, whereby I 
 come to cognize the truth of a geometrical axiom, is funda- 
 mentally different from the mental process, whereby I come 
 to recognize the truth of an experienced fact ; whereas, on 
 Mr. Mill's theory, these two processes would be simply 
 identical.
 
 Mr. Mill's Reply to the "Dublin Revieic:' 160 
 
 There is a third and perfectly distinct line of argument, 
 which has been urged with great cogency by modern neces- 
 sists against the phenomenistic school. We have hitherto 
 been advocating the necessary character of geometrical 
 axioms, as an inferential truth ; and this is the line (we 
 think) most in harmony with the ordinary language of 
 Catholic philosophers. But non-Catholic necessists have 
 powerfully advocated the same truth, as one immediately 
 declared by the human faculties. Let us revert to our 
 specimen instance. We have hitherto contemplated the 
 proposition, that " all trilaterals are triangular : " we have 
 argued that the proposition is undeniably self-evident, and 
 from this we have inferred that it is also necessary. But 
 we will now contemplate a different proposition ; viz. th.it 
 " the triangularity of trilaterals is a necessary truth." We 
 maintain, in accordance with many modern philosophers, 
 that this propostion is immediately declared by the human 
 faculties ; that it is self-evident ; that it is recognized as 
 true by a mere pondering of its sense and comparison of 
 its terms. Mr. Mill himself admits that the declaration of 
 the human faculties is prima fade in our favour ; while wo 
 on our side allege that pro founder self-inspection does but 
 corroborate and intensify men's primdfacic impression. We 
 think, indeed, that in no way will the truth of our allegation 
 be more effectively forced on the inquirer's conviction than 
 by his considering (as we shall now proceed to do) Mr. Mill's 
 attempted refutation thereof. He lays very great stress on 
 this alleged refutation, and says that the principle on which 
 it rests is one which intuitionists ought to have specially 
 considered, "because it is the basis of the " phenomenistic 
 "theory." ("On Hamilton," p. 814.) We can only reply. 
 that the phenomenistic theory in that case rests on a basis 
 of extraordinary frailty. 
 
 Mr. Mill distinctly admits that, when the human miinl 
 contemplates mathematical axioms, there arise* in it a
 
 17<) The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 certain " conviction of self-evident necessity : " but he con- 
 siders that this conviction can be satisfactorily explained, 
 without accounting it a genuine intuition. These are his 
 words in reply to ourselves : 
 
 Dr. Ward says that more uniform and constant experience 
 cannot possibly account for the mind's conviction of Keif-evident 
 necessity. Nor do I pretend that it does. The experience must 
 not only be constant and uniform, but the juxtaposition of the 
 facts in experience must be immediate and close, as well as 
 early, familiar, and so free from even the semblance of an ex- 
 ception, that no counter-association can possibly arise. (" On 
 Hamilton," p, 339.) 
 
 Now, we must admit at once that this reply is no after- 
 thought of Mr. Mill's, but that, on the contrary, he had 
 repeatedly made the same statement on earlier occasions ; 
 and, indeed, in one passage which we actually quoted 
 (pp. 44, 45). We must admit, therefore, that in our 
 second essay we did not sufficiently bear in mind Mr. 
 Mill's previous explanation ; and we must accordingly 
 withdraw a reply to him, which we pressed with some 
 confidence, but which he has shown in his rejoinder to 
 labour under this fault. This, however, of course by the 
 way, as it does not affect the merits of Mr. Mill's argument 
 itself. That argument, it will be seen, runs thus. That 
 " conviction," he says, " of self-evident necessity," which 
 I receive when I contemplate a geometrical axiom, cannot 
 be shown to be a genuine intuition, because it may be 
 accounted for in quite a different way. In irhat way ? we 
 ask. He replies by the following syllogism. 
 
 Major. " If there be a phenomenon so circumstanced, 
 that not only my experience of it is constant and uniform, 
 but the juxtaposition of facts in experience is immediate 
 and close, and so free from even the persistent * semblance 
 of an exception that no counter-association can possibly 
 
 * Our reason for inserting the word " persistent" will presently appear.
 
 Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin Review." 171 
 
 arise an impression will inevitably be made on my mind, 
 that this phenomenon is a self-evidently necessary truth." 
 
 Minor. " But the triangularity of trilaterals, or any other 
 geometrical axiom, is a phenomenon thus circumstanced." 
 
 The consequent is obvious. 
 
 Now, plainly Mr. Mill would do nothing for his cause, 
 if we could successfully deny either of his premisses ; but it 
 so happens that we confidently deny both. We will begin 
 with the minor, which is expressed somewhat more clearly 
 and emphatically a few pages earlier. A geometrical axiom, 
 he says (p. 334), (1) is " founded on an experience beginning 
 from birth, and never for many minutes intermitted in our 
 waking hours : " while on the other hand (2) no counter- 
 association is ever formed ; because " experience affords " 
 no " case of persistent illusion " in which such axiom has 
 even the semblance of being contradicted. We have said 
 that we deny both Mr. Mill's major and his minor ; and \ve 
 now add, that we deny also both the statements contained 
 in his minor. 
 
 We deny them altogether (1) that a geometrical axiom 
 is " founded on an experience never for many minutes 
 intermitted in our w^aking hours." On the contrary, as 
 regards the mass of mankind, we affirm (and have already 
 given ample reasons for our affirmation) that the triangu- 
 larity of trilaterals has never been to them a matter of 
 observation at all. Of course a necessist will be the last to 
 deny that men's experience of such triangularity has been 
 " constant and uniform " in this sense, that they have never 
 once experienced any phenomenon inroitnistcnt therewith : 
 but such an admission gives no help whatever to Mr. Mill's 
 reasoning. 
 
 Then, (2) what does Mr. Mill mean, when he further 
 says that experience affords no case of persistent illusion 
 in which any geometrical axiom h;is oven the semblance of 
 contradicted? That there are "illusions" of the
 
 172 Tie Fhilum-qJ'?/ "f Tlelvm. 
 
 kind he expressly admits, though denying that such illusions 
 are " persistent ; " for he proceeds at once to mention one 
 himself. "In the case of parallel lines," he says, "the 
 laws of perspective do present such an illusion : they do to 
 the eye appear to meet in both directions, and consequently 
 to inclose a apace." Mr. Mahaffy had given another instance, 
 viz. a straight stick, appearing bent in the water, and 
 presenting thereby an illusion contradictory to the axiom, 
 that a straight line is the shortest way between two points. 
 But Mr. Mill replies, that these are not " persistent " 
 illusions ; and explains himself to mean (p. 335, note) that 
 their " illusory character is at once seen, from the imme- 
 diate accessibility of the evidence which disproves them." 
 Observe what is involved in this. 
 
 There are two different classes of truths, which we may 
 be allowed for the present purpose to call geometrical and 
 physical axioms respectively ; * both of which Mr. Mill 
 regards as unknown except through experience. He admits, 
 however, that the former class produce on the mind an 
 inevitable impression of their being necessary, while the 
 latter produce no such impression at all. We ask him to 
 explain how this difference arises, if both classes really 
 rest on the same kind of evidence. He replies firstly, that 
 geometrical axioms are known by far more unintermittent 
 observation than physical ; and on this part of his answer 
 we have already rejoined. He replies secondly, that no 
 persistent illusions befall me in which geometrical axioms 
 have even the semblance of being contradicted ; whereas in 
 the case of all physical axioms I am exposed to such 
 illusions. In other words, according to Mr. Mill, I am from 
 time to time under an illusion, that fire does not burn, nor 
 stones sink in the water without any " evidence " being 
 " immediately accessible " to me which would correct 
 
 * We here are for the moment using the word " axioms" in the inaccurate 
 sense of " obvious an<l elementary truths."
 
 Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin Review." 173 
 
 such illusion. Mr. Mill, we are sure, cannot have soberly 
 intended this ; yet, unless he intended it, his elaborate 
 argumentative structure is in ruins.* 
 
 We deny, then, the second proposition of his minor no 
 less peremptorily than we deny the first. We deny that 
 men's experience of geometrical axioms is exempt from 
 liability to illusion, in any sense which can assist Mr. Mill's 
 argument. 
 
 Before proceeding to Mr. Mill's major, let us revert for 
 a moment to our old instance ; the impression which he 
 admits to be inevitably made on my mind, that the triangu- 
 larity of trilaterals is a necessary truth. Does he mean 
 that this is merely a superficial impression ? that my 
 faculties, if carefully and accurately consulted, declare such 
 impression to be unfounded '? Or does he fall back on his 
 theory of primordial certitude, and give up the testimonj* of 
 men's existing faculties altogether ? If the latter be his 
 meaning, of course we can only refer to what we urged in 
 the earlier part of this essay. It is impossible to know 
 that my faculties, when I was a baby in arms, would have 
 
 * After the substance of this article had been completed, we came for the 
 first time across a work on Kant by Mr. Mahafty, from whose earlier volume 
 \\e gave an extract in our second essay. Had we met with it sooner we 
 should have maile much use of it, as it travels over many parts of the same 
 ground which we have ourselves trodden. We give an extract bearing on 
 what is said in the text : 
 
 Mr. Mill "had said 'had but experience afforded a case of illusion' in 
 which " mathematical " truths appeared to be reversed, the counter-associa- 
 tion might have been sufficient to disprove the supposed necessity of thought. 
 In other words, had we but the least starting-point to help our imagination 
 in doing it, we would have conceived the reverse of 2 + "2 = 4, or of a 
 straight line being the shortest between two points. This statement I took 
 up, and showed that in our every-day life there were such things as double 
 vision of an object single to the touch, and a straight stick apj>earing bent in 
 the water. I argued that on Mr. Mill's showing, these natural objects should 
 have been sufficient to defeat " the supposed necessity, " and that still they 
 were not so. ... I did not nieau to maintain [as Mr. Mill's answer implies] 
 that mankind had reason to brliw that 1 = 2, or that a bent line was the 
 shortest way between two points; but merely that, on Mr. Mill's own showing, 
 we had a hiiHicient amount of experience to enable us to conceive it " (Kant's 
 "Critical Philosophy," pp. 157, 158).
 
 17-4 Tin 1 Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 declared the necessity of a geometrical axiom ; just as it is 
 impossible to know that they would have faithfully repre- 
 sented to me my experience of one hour back. If Mr. Mill 
 is prepared on that account to disbelieve the distinctest 
 declarations of his memory, he will doubtless be consistent 
 in disbelieving, on the same ground, the necessity of 
 geometrical axioms. But as Mr. Mill always takes the 
 trustworthiness of memory for granted, an appeal from him 
 to men's primordial faculties as their rule of certitude is the 
 most glaring of inconsistencies. 
 
 "We are anxious, however, throughout so confident we 
 are of our cause to exhibit Mr. Mill's position at its 
 greatest possible advantage : and we will take for granted, 
 therefore, that his appeal is to men's existing faculties. 
 His major premiss, then, will be the following : " Let there 
 be a phenomenon so circumstanced that not only my expe- 
 rience of it is constant and uniform, but the juxtaposition 
 of facts in experience immediate and close, and so free from 
 the persistent semblance of an exception that no counter- 
 association can possibly arise. In such case (1) a super- 
 ficial impression will inevitably be made on my mind that 
 this phenomenon is a self-evidently necessary truth ; but 
 (2) my faculties, if carefully and accurately consulted, will 
 declare such impression to be unfounded. Mr. Mill's major, 
 then, like his minor, contains two separate statements ; 
 and in the case of his major, moreover, just as in the case 
 of his minor, we entirely deny them both. 
 
 The first of these statements, however, is so com- 
 paratively unimportant that a very few word swill suffice for 
 its examination. Mr. Mill alleges a supposed psychological 
 fact, viz. that certain conditions generate in the human 
 mind an inevitable primd facie impression that certain 
 propositions are necessary. What evidence does he adduce 
 of this supposed fact ? Absolutely none. He may say, 
 perhaps, that conclusive proof is impossible from the nature
 
 Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin Review." 17o 
 
 of the case ; that he does not even pretend that his con- 
 ditions apply, except to propositions which his opponents 
 regard as really necessary. But at least he might have 
 applied something like what he calls " the method of con- 
 comitant variation ; " he might have shown that in propor- 
 tion as there is a nearer approach to the fulfilment of his 
 conditions, in that proportion there is a nearer approacli 
 to the generation of this superficial impression. But the 
 fact is indubitably otherwise. All men have unceasing 
 experience of certain very obvious physical phenomena; 
 yet no one has the faintest appreciable tendency towards 
 doubting that Omnipotence could make fire innocuous, 
 could make wood sink in the water, or could make stones 
 float thereon. 
 
 But at last the question is one of fact, not theory ; and 
 its gist lies in the second of the two statements which we 
 have included in Mr. Mill's major. The question, in fact, 
 is simply this : what do the human faculties declare con- 
 cerning geometrical axioms ? We have always readily 
 conceded to Mr. Mill, that a man's self-inspection is often 
 very defective ; and that he will again and again carelessly 
 ascribe to his faculties some avouchment which is not 
 really theirs. As to this, however, there is one, and only 
 one, reasonable appeal ; viz. from a superficial to a pro- 
 founder examination of the human consciousness. Let 
 as many competent inquirers as possible devote themselves 
 to this examination ; let them, by painstaking introspection, 
 ponder on the true nature of their mind's avouchment, 
 when they contemplate the triangularity of a trilateral. 
 Is that avouchment such as the following : " I have never 
 met with nor heard of a non-triangular trilateral ? " Or is 
 is not rather : " A non-triangular trilateral is an intrin- 
 sically impossible chimera, which Omnipotence itself could 
 not fashion ? " There arc several arguments, we consider, 
 any one of which may with entire collusiveness be directed
 
 1 TiJ The PI Uosupliy of The Ism . 
 
 against Mr. Mill's theory : yet we could be content (were it 
 requisite) to abandon them all, and to rest our whole case 
 on the issue we have just raised. 
 
 In fact, Mr. Mill's silence on this matter is the most 
 emphatic controversial support which can well be imagined. 
 It is impossible to obtain from him a categorical statement, 
 that the existing faculties of an adult declare the "con- 
 tingent " * character of mathematical axioms. We say, 
 with some confidence, that no such statement is to be found 
 in any of his writings ; and that just where we should 
 most expect such a statement, he seems to check himself 
 in full career, and fall back on his amazing theory of 
 primordial certitude. In saying, then, most confidently that 
 the human faculties declare the necessary character of 
 geometrical axioms, we do but say what Mr. Mill himself 
 nowhere ventures expressly to deny. 
 
 So far we have been considering Mr. Mill's negative 
 thesis, viz. that mathematical axioms are not cognizable 
 as necessary truths. But his positive thesis is not so easily 
 intelligible. No one (we believe) was ever more anxious 
 than Mr. Mill to treat his opponents with perfect fairness ; 
 but, in fact, he has altogether failed to treat them fairly in 
 this particular matter, because he has kept so much in the 
 background his own actual theory, on the degree of certitude 
 possessed by these axioms, and on the grounds which he 
 considers sufficient to establish that certitude. He declares, 
 indeed, again and again, that their universal truth is amply 
 proved by uniform experience ; but we find it most difficult 
 to understand what he means by this allegation. Revert- 
 ing to an earlier example, let us suppose that all rose-stalks, 
 known as within human experience, have been observed to 
 possess leaves similar in shape, what conclusion should 
 
 * By " contingent," we need hardly say, is simply meant the contradictory 
 of " nccedsary."
 
 Mr. Mill's Reply to the "Dublin Revieiv." 177 
 
 I have a right to draw from this circumstance ? I could 
 not know that even in Dorsetshire or Hampshire, some 
 fresh method of planting or sowing might not be found to 
 produce indubitable roses, growing on stalks totally different 
 in shape from those hitherto experienced ; and I could not 
 even guess that, in some newly-discovered country, such 
 rose-trees should not be found abundant. In like manner 
 we do not see how Mr. Mill could reasonably even guess 
 but that, in some newly-discovered country, a tree may be 
 found the wood of which shall possess the capability of 
 being formed into quadrangular trilaterals. He says, 
 indeed, that the truth of mathematical axioms " pervades 
 all nature ; " but how can he reasonably even guess that 
 this is the case ? What stronger reason can he possibly 
 have for his opinion that trilaterals are everywhere 
 triangular, than his ancestors had for their opinion that 
 all swans are white, and that all metals sink in the 
 water ? * 
 
 Here, however, as in several other instances, Mr. Mill 
 has shown himself too clear-sighted to be quite satisfied 
 with his own position ; and he takes refuge in a thinty- 
 disguised reproduction of that very necessist theory, which 
 he so energetically repudiates. This fact is so very curious 
 and characteristic, that we beg our readers to give it special 
 attention. 
 
 " That a straight line is the shortest distance between 
 two points, we do not doubt to be true," says Mr. Mill, 
 " even in the region of the fixed stars." (" Logic," vol. i. 
 pp. 302-803.) What right has Mr. Mill, we asked, to hold 
 this truth without doubt ? He regards this axiom as merely 
 a fact known by experience. But " in distant parts of the 
 stellar regions," he affirms (vol. ii. p. 108), "where pheno- 
 
 * "Thnt nil metals sink in wator wns a uniform experience, from tho 
 origin of the human race to the discovery of potassium in the present century 
 by Sir Humphry Davy. That all swans (ire white was a uniform experience 
 down to the discovery of Australia " (Mill's " Loiric," vol. i. p. 30.')). 
 
 VOL. I. N
 
 178 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 mena may be entirely unlike those with which we are 
 acquainted, it would be folly to affirm confidently that " 
 those laws prevail "which we have found to hold uni- 
 versally on our own planet." In our second essay we 
 asked him distinctly how he could reconcile these two 
 statements ; how he could regard a certain property of 
 stellar straight lines as a truth known by experience, while 
 he admitted that the stellar region is beyond the reach of 
 experience. Mr. Mills tacitly replies by correcting the 
 earlier sentence. " That a straight line is the shortest 
 distance between two points we do not doubt," he had said, 
 "to be true, even in the region of the fixed stars." But 
 now he adds in a note a qualification. " In strictness, 
 wherever the present constitution of space exists ; which we 
 have ample reason to believe that it does in the region of 
 the fixed stars." In the new note of his work on Hamilton, 
 written with avowed reference to our criticism, he expresses 
 the same theory more fully. We italicize a few words. 
 
 Only if space itself is everywhere what we conceive it to be, can 
 our conclusions from the conception be everywhere objectively true. 
 The truths of geometry are valid, wherever the constitution of space 
 agrees with what is within our means of observation. That space 
 cannot anywhere be differently constituted, or that Almighty 
 power could not make a different constitution of it, we know 
 not (p. 338, note). 
 
 Here is a most undeniable ampliative proposition : viz. 
 " wherever the present constitution of space exists, a straight 
 line is always the shortest distance between two points." 
 Yet Mr. Mill admits that this ampliative proposition is 
 cognizable, independently of experience, as a "conclusion 
 from the conception " of space. It is really difficult to 
 imagine a more explicit surrender of the whole point at 
 issue between him and ourselves. 
 
 Or we may express the same self-contradiction of Mr. 
 Mill's in a somewhat different shape. It is impossible,
 
 Mr. Mill's Reply to the "Dublin Review." 179 
 
 Mr. Mill confesses, to know by experience that in the stellar 
 region trilaterals are triangular, because in that region 
 "phenomena may be totally unlike those with which we 
 are acquainted: " yet, according to him, I may confidently 
 " conclude " their triangularity from my " conception " of 
 stellar " space." In like manner, therefore, as to earthly 
 trilaterals. I need not resort to experience for my know- 
 ledge of their triangularity ; but I may " conclude " that 
 attribute from my very " conception " of earthly " space." 
 This is the very proposition which hitherto we have been 
 engaged in affirming and he in denying. 
 
 Here we close our direct and central conflict with Mr. 
 Mill. We have confined our attention to geometrical axioms, 
 and, indeed, almost exclusively to one such axiom ; because 
 the more closely the issue can be narrowed, the greater 
 hope there is of arriving at a definite decision. Nor is 
 there any inconvenience in such a course : because (1) it is 
 very easy for inquirers to apply to other mathematical 
 axioms what has been said of one ; and because (2) if there 
 were so much as one ampliative judgment which Mr. Mill 
 admitted to be necessary, by that very admission he would 
 be a refugee from the phenomenistic to the necessist camp. 
 
 On arithmetical axioms in particular, we will content 
 ourselves with placing on record the point at issue. We gave, 
 as our specimen instance, the axiom "2 + 9 = 3 + 8;" 
 and Mr. Mill replies to us, in the new edition of his work 
 on Hamilton, at p. 839. While we confidently maintain 
 against Mr. Mill that the axiom is self-evident, we never- 
 theless entirely agree with him that it is deducible from one 
 still simpler ; from the axiom that " change of arrange- 
 ment makes no difference in the number of objects." * We 
 heartily agree with him, that this latter judgment is 
 
 * Mr. Mill Fays inadvertently, "change of position ;" but we need hardly 
 point out that arithmetical axioms apply to succession in time, or indeed, to 
 any other aggregation, no less than to position in place.
 
 180 Tlte Philosophy of T fie ism. 
 
 ampliative, and not merely explicative. On the other hand, 
 whereas he alleges that nian's knowledge of it is derived 
 only from experience, we maintain, on the contrary, that 
 the axiom is not merely self-evident, hut among the most 
 superficially ohvious of self-evident truths. After the dis- 
 cussion of the previous pages, we need not trouble our 
 readers with arguments on this head. 
 
 One or two subordinate points were incidentally raised 
 in our second essay, and it will be more satisfactory not 
 to pass entirely over Mr. Mill's replies on those issues. At 
 the same time, our notice of those replies must necessarily 
 be very brief ; and we may mention to our readers for their 
 relief, that they can pass over what follows without losing 
 any essential part of our argument. 
 
 (1) Mr. Mill had argued as follows : 
 
 Many persons who have been frightened in childhood can 
 never be alone in the dark without irrepressible terrors. Many 
 a person is unable to revisit a particular place, or to think of a 
 particular event, without recalling acute feelings of grief or 
 reminiscences of suffering. If the facts which created these 
 strong associations in individual minds had been common to all 
 mankind from their earliest infancy, and had, when the associa- 
 tions were fully formed, been forgotten, we should have had a 
 necessity of thought ; one of those necessities which are supposed 
 to prove an objective law, and an a priori mental connection 
 between ideas. 
 
 We replied to this that a mere necessity of feeling has 
 never been affirmed to prove "an a priori connection 
 between two ideas." Mr. Mill, however, thus rejoins 
 (" On Hamilton," p. 329, note) : 
 
 If the person in whose mind a given spot is associated with 
 terrurs, had entirely forgotten the fact by which it came to be 
 so; and if the rest of mankind, or even only a great number 
 of them, felt the same terror on coming to the same place, and 
 were equally unable to account for it ; there would certainly 
 grow up a conviction that the place had a natural quality of
 
 Mr. Mill's Reply to the "Dublin Review" 181 
 
 terribleness, which would probably fix itself in the belief that 
 the place was under a curse, or was the abode of some invisible 
 object of terror. 
 
 Of course we entirely deny this. We would ask any 
 disciple of Mr. Mill this simple question. Let us suppose 
 that Mr. Mill's conditions were fulfilled : we ask, u-hat is 
 that particular ampliative judgment which, on that suppo- 
 sition, men would suppose themselves to cognize as self- 
 evident ? Mr. Mill avowedly cannot answer this question. 
 They might think it self-evident, he says, that the place was 
 under a curse, or they might think it self-evident that the 
 place was the abode of some terrific object ; but it is not 
 (according to him) more than probable that they would 
 think it either the one or the other. 
 
 (2) "We further objected that Mr. Mill had used the 
 words "necessity of thought" in two different senses: a 
 "law of nature whereby I necessarily think ;" and "a law 
 of nature whereby I think as necessary." Mr. Mill replies 
 ("On Hamilton," p. 339) that the on/?/ evidence "which can be 
 given for my thinking a thing as necessary, is my neces- 
 sarily thinking it. But we had adduced evidence of a totally 
 different character. Mr. Mill proceeds indeed to say, that 
 he has refuted our arguments for this different kind of 
 evidence ; but our preceding pages have, we trust, suffi- 
 ciently shown that his alleged refutation is invalid. 
 
 (3) Mr. Mill admits that men possess the power of 
 cognizing mathematical axioms by means of purely mental 
 experience. He accounts for this power by " one of tho 
 characteristic properties of geometrical forms ; " viz. " that 
 they can be painted in the imagination with a distinctness 
 equal to the reality." We urged against him that, in thus 
 speaking, he entirely leaves out of account arithmetical and 
 algebraic axioms ; though these, equally with geometrical, 
 can be arrived at by purely mental experimentation. He 
 replies ("On Hamilton," p. 340) as follows:
 
 182 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 I do not leave them out of account, but have assigned in 
 my Logic another and equally conclusive reason why they can 
 be studied in our conception alone; namely, that arithmetical 
 and algebraic axioms, being true not of any particular kind of 
 thing but of all things whatever, any mental conceptions what- 
 ever will adequately represent them. 
 
 We fully admH that in his " Logic " (vol. i. pp. 298- 
 295) Mr. Mill sets forth the true doctrine, that arithmetical 
 axioms hold good, not of any particular kind of thing, but 
 of all things whatever. But we cannot for the life of us 
 see that he anywhere assigns this doctrine as a "reason 
 why they can be studied " and known to be true, by men's 
 " conception alone." On the contrary, as it seems to us, 
 he distinctly denies that they can be so studied. These are 
 his words: " All who wish to carry the child's mind with 
 them in teaching arithmetic, all who wish to teach 
 numbers and not mere ciphers, now teach it through the 
 evidence of the senses" (p. 296). 
 
 (4) There remains to be reconsidered, a reply we gave 
 to an argument which Mr. Mill had based on Eeid's 
 " Geometry of Visibles." It would carry us much too 
 far, if we attempted to make our present rejoinder under- 
 stood by those who do not clearly bear in mind our earlier 
 remarks. We will here, therefore, presuppose them. 
 
 Mr. Mill (" On Hamilton," p. 92, note) does not attempt, 
 on his own account, any further discussion on the point ; 
 but contents himself with maintaining that Reid was of the 
 same mind with Mr. Mill himself, and with referring us to 
 Eeid's own arguments. We are still perfectly confident 
 that it is Mr. Mill who is opposing Eeid. It is certainly 
 not very probable that Eeid can have intended to argue 
 against the necessary character of mathematical axioms, 
 considering that he habitually and earnestly upheld their 
 necessary character. And there is one sentence of his 
 which will put the matter beyond dispute.
 
 Mr. Mill's Reply to the "Dublin Review." 183 
 
 Reid conceived certain imaginary " Idomenians," who 
 agree with human beings in every other particular, but who 
 possess the sense of sight without any accompanying sense 
 of touch. The Idomenians, he says, would regard as self- 
 evident certain strange geometrical propositions; as, e.g., 
 that " every straight line, being sufficiently produced, will 
 re-enter into itself." The question between Mr. Mill and 
 ourselves is this : whether in such an opinion they would 
 be (according to Eeid) referring to that figure which human 
 beings call a straight line ; or, on the contrary, to some 
 totally different figure (viz. the arc of a great circle), which 
 they will have learned to call by the name of a straight 
 line. Mr. Mill maintains the former alternative, and we 
 the latter. Now let our readers observe Reid's own words, 
 especially those which we italicize : 
 
 This small specimen of the geometry of visibles is intended 
 ... to demonstrate the truth of what we have affirmed above ; 
 namely, that those figures and that extension which are the 
 immediate objects of sight [and which, therefore, are those con- 
 templated by the Idomenians] are not the figures and the ex- 
 tension about which common geometry is employed. (Hamilton's 
 edition, p. 148.) 
 
 Surely this is final and decisive. 
 
 Our second essay, however, was not exclusively devoted 
 to the discussion of mathematical axioms, but contained in 
 its later part various general considerations, which tell 
 importantly (as we think) against the doctrine of pheno- 
 menism. There are only two of these which it has naturally 
 fallen in Mr. Mill's way to answer ; and on one of the two 
 relating to the faculty of memory we have rejoined in 
 the early part of this essay. The remaining one concerns 
 the very foundation of phenomenism. The whole body of 
 doctrine accumulated by a phenomenist depends throughout 
 on his premiss, that " the laws of nature are uniform." 
 Let this premiss be successfully denied, and straightway
 
 184 The Ph iloaophy of The ism. 
 
 there is no phenoinenistic philosophy. We allege that 
 phenomenists can adduce no grounds whatever, which 
 will reasonably be accounted sufficient to establish their 
 fundamental premiss ; and we criticized in that sense 
 Mr. Mill's arguments for the desired conclusion. In the 
 new edition of his Logic, Mr. Mill replies to our criticism 
 (vol. ii. pp. 109-111) ; though we think few readers will fail 
 to see how unsatisfactory is his self-defence. The question, 
 however, is one of such fundamental importance in the 
 conflict with phenomenism, that no merely perfunctory 
 treatment of it is permissible. In our next essay on Mr. 
 Mill, then, we hope to elucidate the matter in more detail. 
 
 One or two other questions, more or less cognate, are in 
 our mind, which we trust also to include in our next paper. 
 And so much having been accomplished, we have every 
 hope of continuing in subsequent papers without further 
 interruption and still with Mr. Mill as our representative 
 opponent the course of argument w r hich we originally pro- 
 jected against that poison of antitheism, which just now 
 so widely and so profoundly infects all the higher specula- 
 tions of non-Catholic Europe.
 
 V. 
 MR. MILL'S PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION.* 
 
 IT is impossible to pursue our controversy with Mr. Mill 
 without some preliminary notice of the very remarkable 
 autobiography which has appeared in this last quarter. 
 We will not ourselves, however, make any comment on Mr. 
 Mill's personal qualities as therein exhibited : because (1) 
 our argument concerns his philosophy, not himself; and 
 because (2) any attempt at subtle appreciation of character 
 is wholly beyond the present writer's power of thought and 
 expression. We will supply our omission, however, as best 
 we can, by placing before our readers large part of a very 
 able criticism which appeared in the Spectator and with 
 which on the whole we concur : 
 
 That this curious volume delineates, on the whole, a man 
 marked by the most earnest devotion to human good, and the 
 widest intellectual sympathies, no one who reads it with any 
 discernment can doubt. But it is both a very melancholy book 
 to read, and one full of moral paradoxes. It is very sad, in the 
 first instance, to read the story of the over-tutored boy, con- 
 stantly incurring his father's displeasure for not being able to 
 do what by no possibility he could have done, and apparently 
 without any one to love. Mr. James Mill, vivacious talker, and 
 
 " Autobiography. By JOHN STUART MILL. London: Longmans. 
 
 An Examination of i'z'r William Hamilton's Philosophy. By JOHN STCAUT 
 Mn,i,. Fourth Edition. London : Longmans. 
 
 A Si/xtcm of Logic, Jlatiocinative and Inductive. By Jons STUART MILL. 
 Eighth Edition. London : Longmans.
 
 186 The Philosophy of Theism, 
 
 in a narrow way powerful thinker as he was, was evidently as 
 an educator, on his son's own showing, a hard master, anxious to 
 reap what he had not sown, and to gather what he had not 
 strewed ; or, as that son himself puts it, expecting " effects 
 without causes." Not that the father did not teach the child 
 with all his might, and teach in many respects well ; but then 
 he taught the boy far too much, and expected him to learn 
 besides a great deal that he neither taught him nor showed him 
 where to find. The child began Greek at three years old, read 
 a good deal of Plato at seven, . . . began logic at twelve, 
 went through a "complete course of political economy" at 
 thirteen, including the most intricate points of the theory of 
 currency. He was a constant writer for the " Westminster 
 Eeview" at eighteen, was editing Bentham's "Theory of 
 Evidence " and writing habitual criticisms of the Parliamentary 
 debates at nineteen. At twenty he fell into a profound melancholy 
 on discovering that the only objects of life for which he lived 
 the objects of social and political reformers would, if suddenly 
 and completely granted, give him no happiness whatever. Such 
 a childhood and youth, lived apparently without a single strong 
 affection for his relation to his father was one of deep respect 
 and fear, rather than love, and he tells us frankly, in describing 
 the melancholy to which we have alluded, that if he had loved 
 any one well enough to confide to him, the melancholy would 
 not have been and resulting at the age of eighteen in the 
 production of what Mr. Mill himself says might, with as little 
 extravagance as would ever be involved in the application of 
 such a phrase to a human being, be called "a mere reasoning 
 machine," are not pleasant subjects of contemplation : even 
 though it be true, as Mr. Mill asserts, that the over-supply of 
 study and under-supply of love did not prevent his childhood 
 from being a happy one. Nor are the other personal incidents 
 of the autobiography of a different cast. Nothing is more 
 remarkable than the fewness, limited character, and apparently, 
 BO far as close intercourse was concerned, temporary duration, 
 of most of Mr. Mill's friendships. The one close and intimate 
 friendship of his life, which made up to him for the insufficiency 
 of all others, that with the married lady who, after the death of 
 her husband, became his wife, was one which for a long time 
 subjected him to slanders, the pain of which his sensitive nature 
 evidently felt very keenly. And yet he must have been aware 
 that though in his own conduct he had kept free from all stain,
 
 Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 187 
 
 his example was an exceedingly dangerous and mischievous one 
 for others, who might be tempted by his moral authority to 
 follow in a track in which they would not have had the strength 
 to tread. Add to this that his married life was very brief, only 
 seven years and a half, being unexpectedly cut short, and that 
 his passionate reverence for his wife's memory and genius in 
 his own words, " a religion " was one which, as he must have 
 been perfectly sensible, he could not possibly make to appear 
 otherwise than extravagant, not to say an hallucination, in the 
 eyes of the rest of mankind ; and yet that he was possessed by 
 an irresistible yearning to attempt to embody it in all the tender 
 and enthusiastic hyperbole of which it is so pathetic to find a 
 man who gained his fame by his "dry-light" a master; and it 
 is impossible not to feel that the human incidents in Mr. Mill's 
 career are very sad. True, his short service in Parliament, 
 when he was already advanced in years, was one to bring him 
 much intellectual consideration and a certain amount of popu- 
 larity. But even that terminated in a defeat, and was hardly 
 successful enough to repay him for the loss of literary pro- 
 ductiveness which those three years of practical drudgery im- 
 posed. In spite of the evident satisfaction and pride with 
 which Mr. Mill saw that his school of philosophy had gained 
 rapid ground since the publication of his "Logic," and that his 
 large and liberal view of the science of political economy had 
 made still more rapid way amongst all classes, the record of his 
 life which he leaves behind him is not, even in its own tone, 
 and still less in the effect produced on the reader, a bright and 
 happy one. It is "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought," 
 and of thought that has to do duty for much, both of feeling 
 and of action, which usually goes to constitute the full life of a 
 large mind. 
 
 And besides the sense of sadness which the human incidents 
 of the autobiography produce, the intellectual and moral story 
 itself is full of paradox which weighs upon the heart as well as 
 the mind. Mr. Mill was brought up by his father to believe 
 that Christianity was false, and that even as regards natural 
 religion there was no ground for faith.* But in the mean time, 
 he is most anxious to point out that religion, in what he thinks 
 the best sense, is possible even to one who does not beliovo in 
 God. That best sense is the sense in which religion stands for 
 
 * This is certainly an urnler-statement, as we shall show presently iu 
 the text
 
 188 Thf Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 an ideal conception of a perfect Being to which those who have 
 euch a conception " habitually refer as the guide of their 
 conscience : " an ideal, he says, " far nearer to perfection than 
 the objective Deity of those who think themselves obliged to 
 find absolute goodness in the author of a world so crowded with 
 suffering and so deformed by injustice as ours." Unfortunately, 
 however, this " ideal conception of a perfect Being " is not a 
 power on which human nature can lean. It is merely its own 
 best thought of itself; so that it dwindles when the mind and 
 heart contract, and vanishes just when there is most need of 
 help. This Mr. Mill himself felt at one period of his life. At 
 the ago of twenty he underwent a crisis, which apparently 
 corresponded in his own opinion to the state of mind that leads 
 to " a Wesleyan's conversion." . . . 
 
 It is clear that Mr. Mill felt the deep craving for a more 
 permanent and durable source of spiritual life, than any which 
 the most beneficient activity spent in patching up human 
 institutions and laboriously recasting the structure of human 
 society could secure him ; that he himself had a suspicion that, 
 to use the language of a book he had been taught to make light 
 of, his soul was thirsting for God, and groping after an eternal 
 presence, in which he lived and moved and had his being. 
 What is strange and almost burlesque, if it were not so melan- 
 choly, is the mode in which this moral crisis culminates. A 
 few tears shed over Marmontel's " Memoires," and the fit passed 
 away : 
 
 " Two lines of Coleridge, in whom alone of all writers I have found a true 
 description of what I felt, were often in my thoughts, not at this time (for I 
 had never read them), but in a later period of the same mental malady 
 
 " ' Work without hope draws nectar in a sieve, 
 And hope without an object cannot live.' 
 
 In all probability my case was by no means so peculiar as I fancied it, and I 
 doubt not that many others have passed through a similar state; but the 
 idiosyncrasies of my education had given to the general phenomenon a 
 special character, which made it seem the natural effect of causes that it was 
 hardly possible for time to remove. I frequently asked myself if I could or 
 if I was bound to go on living, when life must be passed in this manner. I 
 generally answered to myself that I did not think I could possibly bear it 
 beyond a year. When, however, not more than half that duration of time 
 had elapsed, a small ray of light broke in upon my gloom. I was reading 
 accidentally Mnrmontel's ' Me'moires,' and came to the passage which relates 
 his father's death, the distressed position of the family, and the sudden in-
 
 Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 189 
 
 spiration by which he, then a mere boy, felt and made them feel that he 
 would be everything to them would supply the place of all that they had 
 lost. A vivid conception of the scene and its feelings came over me, and I 
 was moved to tears. From this moment my burden grew lighter. The 
 oppression of the thought that all feeling was dead within me was gone. I 
 was no longer hopeless ; I was not a stock or a stone. I had still, it seemed, 
 some of the material out of which all worth of character and all capacity for 
 happiness are made. Relieved from my ever-present sense of irremediable 
 wretchedness, I gradually found out that the ordinary incidents of life could 
 again give me some pleasure ; that I could again find enjoyment, not intense, 
 but sufficient for cheerfulness, in sunshine and sky, in books, in conversation, 
 in public affairs ; and that there was once more excitement, though of a 
 moderate kind, in exerting myself for my opinions, and for the public good. 
 Thus the cloud gradually drew off, and I again enjoyed life ; and though I 
 had several relapses, some of which lasted many months, I never again was 
 as miserable as I had been." 
 
 And the only permanent instruction which this experience left 
 behind it seems to have been curiously slight. It produced a 
 threefold moral result : first, a grave alarm at the dangerously- 
 undermining capacities of his own power of moral analysis 
 which promised to unravel all those artificial moral webs of 
 painful and pleasurable associations with injurious and useful 
 actions respectively, which his father had so laboriously woven 
 for him during his childhood and youth : and further, two 
 notable practical conclusions one, that in order to attain 
 happiness (which he " never wavered " in regarding as " the 
 test of all rules of conduct and the end of life ") the best 
 strategy is a kind of flank march, to aim at something else, at 
 some ideal end, not consciously as a means to happiness, but as 
 an end in itself, so, he held, may you have a better chance of 
 securing happiness by the way than you can by any direct 
 pursuit of it ; and the other, that it is most desirable to cultivate 
 the feelings, the passive susceptibilities, as well as the reason- 
 ing and active powers, if the utilitarian life is to be made enjoy- 
 able. Surely a profound sense of the inadequacy of ordinary 
 human success to the craving of the human spirit was never 
 followed by a less radical moral change. That it resulted in a 
 new breadth of sympathy with writers like Coleridge and 
 Wordsworth, whose fundamental modes of thought and faith 
 Mr. Mill entirely rejected, but for whoso mode of sentiment, 
 after this period of his life, he somehow managed, not very 
 intelligibly, to make room, is very true; and it is also true that 
 this gave a new largeness of tone to his writings, and gave him 
 a real superiority in all matters of taste to the utilitarian clique
 
 190 The Philosophy of Tfieism. 
 
 to which ho had belonged results which enormously widened 
 the scope of his influence, and changed him from the mere ex- 
 positor of a single school of psychology into the thoughtful critic 
 of many different schools. But as far as we can judge, all this 
 new breadth was gained at the cost of a certain haze, which, 
 from this time forth, spread itself over his grasp of the first 
 principles which he still professed to hold. Ho did not cease to 
 be a utilitarian, but ho ceased to distinguish between the duty 
 of promoting your own happiness and of promoting anybody 
 else's, and never could make it clear where he found his moral 
 obligation to sacrifice the former to the latter. He still main- 
 tained that actions, and not sentiments, are the true objects of 
 ethical discrimination ; but he discovered that there was a 
 significance which he had never before suspected even in senti- 
 ments and emotions of which he continued to maintain that the 
 origin was artificial and arbitrary. He did not cease to declaim 
 against the prejudices engendered by the intuitional theory of 
 philosophy ; but he made it one of his peculiar distinctions as 
 an experience-philosopher, that he recommended the fostering of 
 new prepossessions, only distinguished from the prejudices he 
 strove to dissipate by being, in his opinion, harmless, though 
 quite as little based as those in ultimate or objective truth. He 
 maintained as strongly as ever that the character of man is 
 formed by circumstances, but he discovered that the will can act 
 upon circumstances, and so modify its own future capability of 
 willing ; and though it is in his opinion circumstances which 
 enable or induce the will thus to act upon circumstances, he 
 taught and thought that this makes all the difference between 
 fatalism and the doctrine of cau.se and effect as applied to 
 character. After his influx of new light he remained as strong 
 a democrat as ever, but he ceased to believe in the self-interest 
 principle as universally efficient to produce good government 
 when applied to multitudes, and indeed qualified his democratic 
 theory by an intellectual aristocracy of feeling, which to our 
 minds is the essence of exclusiveness. " A person of high 
 intellect," he writes, " should never go into unintellectual 
 society, unless he can enter it as an apostle ; yet he is the only 
 person with high objects who can ever enter it at all." You can 
 hardly have exclusiveness more extreme than that, or a doctrine 
 more strangely out of moral sympathy with the would-be 
 universalism of the Benthamite theory. In fact, it seems to us, 
 Mr. Mill's unquestionable breadth of philosophic treatment was
 
 Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 191 
 
 gained at the cost of a certain ambiguity which fell over the 
 root-principles of his philosophy an ambiguity by which he 
 gained for it a more catholic repute than it deserved. The 
 result of the moral crisis through which Mr. Mill passed at 
 the age of twenty may be described briefly, in our opinion, 
 as this : that it gave him tastes far in advance of his philosophy 
 foretastes, in fact, of a true philosophy ; and that this moral 
 flavour of something truer and wider served him in place of 
 the substance of anything truer and wider during the rest of 
 his life. . . . 
 
 On the whole, the book will be found, we think, even by 
 Mr. Mill's most strenuous disciples, a dreary one. It shows 
 that in spite of all Mr. Mill's genuine and generous compassion 
 for human misery and his keen desire to alleviate it, his relation 
 to concrete humanity was of a very confined and reserved kind, 
 one brightened by few personal ties, and those few not, 
 except in about two cases, really hearty ones. The multitude 
 was to him an object of compassion and of genuine beneficence, 
 but he had no pleasure in men, no delight in actual intercourse 
 with this strange, various, homely world of motley faults and 
 virtues. His nature was composed of a few very fine threads, 
 but wanted a certain strength of basis, and the general effect, 
 though one of high and even enthusiastic disinterestedness, is 
 meagre and pallid. His tastes were refined, but there was a 
 want of homeliness about his hopes. He was too strenuously 
 didactic to be in sympathy with man, and too incessantly 
 analytic to throw his burden upon God. There was something 
 overstrained in all that was noblest in him, this excess 
 seeming to be by way of compensation, as it were, for the 
 number of regions of life in which he found little or nothing 
 where other men find so much. He was strangely deficient iu 
 humour, which, perhaps, we ought not to regret, fur had he had 
 it, his best work would, in all probability, have been greatly 
 hampered by such a gift. Unique in intellectual ardour and 
 moral disinterestedness, of tender heart and fastidious tastes, 
 though narrow in his range of practical sympathies, his name 
 will long be famous as that of the most wide-minded and 
 generous of political economists, the most disinterested of 
 Utilitarian moralists, and the most accomplished and impartial 
 of empirical philosophers. But as a man, there was in him a 
 certain poverty of nature, in spite of the nobleness in him, a 
 monotonous joylessness, in spite of the hectic sanguiiioiiesa of
 
 192 TJte Philosophy of Thewn. 
 
 his theoretic creed, a want of genial trust, which spurred on 
 into an almost artificial zeal his ardour for philosophic recon- 
 struction; and these are qualities which will probably put a 
 well-marked limit on the future propagation of an influence 
 such as few writers on such subjects have ever before attained 
 within the period of their own lifetime. 
 
 Our own comments on the autobiography shall be con- 
 fined to one or two points, on which it illustrates (as we 
 think, very instructively) Mr. Mill's habits and character, 
 as a thinker on philosophy and religion. And firstly, the 
 present work makes it abundantly clear that we were 
 correct in our estimate of his opinion on religious subjects. 
 By "deism " is commonly understood the doctrine, that an 
 infinitely perfect Being is Author of the universe, but that 
 this Being has made no revelation to mankind. Mr. Mill 
 considers this doctrine no less obviously irrational and 
 immoral than Christianity itself. His father, he said 
 (pp. 39-40), "found it impossible to believe that a world so 
 full of evil was the work of an Author combining infinite 
 power with perfect goodness and righteousness. His 
 intellect spurned the subtleties by which men attempted to 
 blind themselves to this open contradiction." And in this 
 passage, as our readers will have observed, Mr. Mill not 
 only narrates as a fact his father's unbelief, but adds on 
 his own account the statement that " Theism is an open 
 contradiction." In p. 46 he says that " the ideal of good " 
 framed by such thinkers as himself, " is usually far nearer 
 to perfection than the objective Deity of those who think 
 themselves obliged to find absolute goodness in the author 
 of a world so crowded with suffering and so deformed with 
 injustice as ours." And in p. 70 he laments that " those 
 who reject revelation very generally take refuge in an 
 optimistic deism, a worship of the order of nature and the 
 supposed course of Providence, at least as full of contradic- 
 tions and perverting to the moral sentiments as any of the
 
 Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 193 
 
 forms of Christianity, if only it is as completely realized." 
 Moreover, any one who reads the volume will see that these 
 passages express what was his own doctrine from first to 
 last. If, then, by the term " God " be understood an 
 "infinitely perfect Being" Omnipotence, of course, being 
 included in "Perfection" nothing can be clearer than 
 that Mr. Mill throughout his life confidently denied the 
 existence of God. He implies, indeed (p. 39), that " dog- 
 matic atheism " is absurd : but he himself was in the 
 ordinary sense of the term a " dogmatic atheist ; " because 
 he confidently denied the existence of any such Being as 
 Him who is ordinarily called " God." 
 
 It may be worth while to add, that he not only rejected 
 deism as confidently as he rejected Christianity, but that 
 he thought Christianity the less unreasonable of the two. 
 His father "spoke with respect" of Butler's "Analogy" 
 (p. 38), which 
 
 kept him, as he said, for some considerable time, a believer in 
 the divine authority of Christianity, by proving to him that 
 whatever are the difficulties in believing that the Old and New 
 Testaments proceed from, or record the acts of, a perfectly wise 
 and good Being, the same and still greater difficulties stand in 
 the way of the belief that a Being of such a character can have 
 been the Maker of the universe. He considered Butler's argu- 
 ment as conclusive against the only opponents for whom it was 
 intended. Those who admit an omnipotent as well as perfectly 
 just and benevolent Maker and Ruler of such a world as this, 
 can say little against Christianity but what can, with at least 
 equal force, be retorted against themselves (p. 39). 
 
 In this last sentence, as in a former instance, the author 
 is avowedly expressing what is his own opinion as well as 
 his father's. In his view, then, the deistic theory is not 
 only faulty on the same ground with the Christian, but has 
 the additional faultiness of adducing arguments against 
 Christianity which are equally destructive of deism itself. 
 
 Further, from the very first opening of his reason to 
 
 VOL. J.
 
 104 The Philosophy of Tfieimn. 
 
 the day on which this autobiography was concluded, no 
 shade of doubt on the absolute and even obvious certainty 
 of atheism seems to have even momentarily crossed his 
 mind. At one critical period of his life (see pp. 182-140) 
 he was led to question profoundly the whole basis on which 
 he had been so carefully trained, and which he had hitherto 
 assumed as indubitable. He was impelled by the very 
 strongest motives to look in every possible direction for 
 some relief ; and yet there was one direction in which he 
 never thought of looking, viz. belief in God.* No one 
 more heartily denounced than he all habit of passive 
 acquiescence (as he would call it) in tenets once learned ; 
 yet his faith in atheism seems really to have rivalled, in 
 firmness, tenacity, undoubtingness, unfaltering persistency, 
 the faith of Catholics in the great verities of their creed. 
 Of every other tenet which he held, he felt it his duty again 
 and again to re-examine the grounds : but the truth of 
 atheism was too self-evident in his view to need re-examina- 
 tion. Catholics, in accordance with their fundamental 
 principles, hold the truth of Catholicity firmly and irre- 
 spectively of inquiry ; while Mr. Mill chose, in the very 
 teeth of his fundamental principles, to hold the truth of 
 atheism firmly and irrespectively of inquiry. 
 
 And at last what was the intellectual foundation of this 
 blind persistency ? Strange to say of a phenomenistic 
 philosopher, it was his absolute trust in the self-evident 
 character of a certain alleged axiom. He had been taught 
 from childhood to account it a self-evident contradiction in 
 terms, that a world so abounding in evil as this can have 
 been created by a Being infinite at once in love and in 
 power. It is meant by the very term " Infinite in love " 
 so he had been taught to think that such a Being 
 imparts all the happiness He possibly can ; and it is meant 
 
 * He snys in one place (p. 43), " I am one of the very few examples in 
 this country who has not thrown off religious belief, but never had it."
 
 Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 195 
 
 by the very term " Infinite in power," that He can impart 
 all the happiness He may wish. Looking, then, at the 
 experienced facts of life, he held that the affirmation of 
 God's Existence is not merely a statement open to in- 
 numerable objections and surrounded by innumerable diffi- 
 culties though this also he would have said but a direct 
 contradiction in terms ; as though one spoke of a crooked 
 straight line of a round square. We on our side maintain, 
 not only that his thesis is indefensible, but that it will not 
 bear a moment's consideration. We are not able, indeed, 
 to draw out an intelligible argument on this head, until we 
 can discuss the matter as a whole ; until we are directly 
 engaged in that theistic controversy on which this series 
 of essays is intended to converge. Even when we are 
 engaged in that controversy, we are not so insane as to 
 imagine that we can explain how it is that such a world as 
 this can have proceeded from an infinitely loving and 
 powerful Creator. Nay, the Catholic is not called on to 
 show positively, that any given objection of antitheists is 
 invalid ; because it is rather their business to prove it valid.* 
 The Catholic begins by drawing out the direct proof of 
 God's Existence a proof of the most urgent, immediate, 
 irrefragable, irresistible character that can well be imagined, 
 which penetrates the inmost depths of the human heart, 
 and which reasonably convinces million millions of men, 
 who would be wholly incapable of understanding its scientific 
 analysis. Of course, on the imaginary supposition that 
 any argument could be adduced on the opposite side, 
 which demonstratively disproves God's Existence absolute 
 scepticism must result ; and the Catholic philosopher is 
 therefore required further to answer any such alleged 
 argument. But here his obligation manifestly ends. We 
 
 * So ns regards e.g. transnbstantiation. Catholic jiliilosophors <lo 7mt 
 profess to hhow that this dojjnia is reconcilable with renwm ; they content 
 themselves with showing that it cannot be pnn\d irreconcilable therewith.
 
 190 The Ph 'dosopl y of Tlif i*m. 
 
 do not for a moment deny that the task incumbent on him 
 is arduous, and requires care, thougli it can most certainly 
 be achieved with triumphant success ; but we maintain 
 that to answer Mr. Mill's thesis is a task of no arduousness 
 at all. It may be arduous (though it is superabundantly 
 practicable) to answer this or that objection, which pro- 
 fesses to show Inj a train of reasoning that such a world as 
 this cannot have proceeded from an infinitely perfect Being ; 
 but it is most easy to answer Mr. Mill's allegation, that this 
 impossibility is a self-evident axiom. 
 
 Now, before going a step further, we must emphatically 
 premise one explanation. That Mr. Mill's irreligion was 
 due to grave personal sin on his part, we hold with firmest 
 faith ; because the Church teaches that there is no in- 
 vincible ignorance of God. But if it be asked in what 
 particular acts or omissions that sin consisted, we must 
 reply that it is God only Who knows men's thoughts ; and 
 that we must renounce absolutely and heartily all notion 
 of forming any judgment whatever on such a question. It 
 is not, however, at all inconsistent with this profession, to 
 point out that in this, that, and the other particular, Mr. 
 Mill's procedure was evidently faulty; because in no one 
 instance do we hazard a conjecture that in that particular 
 case he was acting culpably and against light. And it is 
 plainly of moment to show that his procedure was funda- 
 mentally faulty, in order that his authority may be estimated 
 at no more than its true value. 
 
 Now, certainly there was one knowledge which, before 
 all others, it behoved him to acquire ; viz. the true character 
 of the religion professed by his fellow-countrymen. There 
 was one Man, says Mr. Mill himself (" On Liberty," p. 47), 
 " who left on the memory of those who watched His life 
 and conversation such an impression of His moral grandeur, 
 that eighteen subsequent centuries have done homage to 
 Him as the Almighty in person ; " God in human nature.
 
 Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 197 
 
 What is more obviously incumbent on an inquiring student 
 than to study carefully the religion taught by this Man ? 
 Nor are there wanting the most authentic possible records 
 of that teaching. St. Paul e.g. would surely be as important 
 an author to master, as Demosthenes, Tacitus, Juvenal, 
 Quintilian (pp. 20, 21). Still more important to studj- 
 would be the extant memoirs of that Man, to Whom we 
 have already referred ; as such memoirs were recorded by 
 disciples " who witnessed His life and conversation," and 
 on w T hom "such an impression of His moral grandeur" 
 was produced. Now, we are not professing here to set 
 forth how such studies might have assisted in drawing 
 Mr. Mill from darkness to light; we are but alleging his 
 utter neglect of them, as proving his profound prejudice 
 and obduracy on things religious. 
 
 In no other way will the fact of this utter neglect be 
 more vividly impressed on the imagination of our readers, 
 than if we briefly recount the course of his studies : and 
 this also on other accounts is a matter of some interest. 
 By the time he was eight years old (p. 8) he had read 
 Herodotus, Xenophon's Memorabilia and Cyropanlia, parts 
 of Diogenes Laertius, Lucian and Isocrates (p. 5) ; the 
 histories of Robertson, Hume, Gibbon, Watson, Hooker, 
 and much of Rollin ; Plutarch's Lives ; Burnet's History 
 of his Own Time ; a large portion of the Annual Register 
 (p. 7) ; Millar's Historical View of the English Govern- 
 ment ; and numerous books of adventure and of amusement 
 (pp. 8, 9). He says, indeed (p. 43), that he " has men- 
 tioned at how early an age his father made him a reader 
 of ecclesiastical history : " but on looking back at the earlier 
 passage to which this refers, we find that what he has 
 mentioned in this line consisted only of Moshem's History ; 
 M'Oie's Life of John Knox ; and Sewell's and Purity's 
 Histories of the Quakers (p. 8). At about tlio same period 
 (p. 453) his father " taught him to take the strongest interest
 
 198 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 in the Reformation, as the great ami decisive contest against 
 priestly tyranny for liberty of thought." Mr. Mill also 
 (ib.) learned his father's account of " what had been thought 
 by mankind on the impenetrable problems," of which 
 Christianity is one attempted solution. From these studies 
 he proceeded (p. 11) to Virgil, Horace, Phtedrus, Livy, 
 Sallust, Ovid, Terence, Lucretius, Cicero, Homer, Sophocles, 
 Euripides, Aristophanes, Thucydides, Xenophon's Hellenics, 
 Demosthenes, ^schines, Lysias, Theocritus, Anacreon, 
 Dionysius, Polybius, Aristotle's Rhetoric * (p. 11), and 
 Mitford's History of Greece (p. 12). He also read some of 
 Milton's poetry, Goldsmith's, Burns's, Walter Scott's, 
 Dryden's, Cowper's, and Campbell's ; also Joyce's Scientific 
 Dialogues, and various treatises on chemistry (pp. 16, 17). 
 At twelve years old he began Logic (p. 18), and at the same 
 age he read the Athenian orators, Tacitus, Juvenal, and 
 Quintilian (p. 21). At about the same period (p. 24) he 
 studied very carefully his father's History of British India ; 
 and must have possessed, therefore (we may mention by 
 the way), a far more accurate knowledge of Hindoo theology 
 than he ever had of Christian. Then he advanced to 
 political economy (p. 28). Later on came a little psychology 
 (p. 62) ; and he then embarked on a course of jurisprudence 
 and Bentham (p. 64). To these he added (pp. 68, 69) 
 Locke, Helvetius, Hartley, Berkeley, Hume's Essays, Reid, 
 Dugald Stewart, and some of Brown. He also read an 
 anonymous work against " optimistic deism " (pp. 69-71), 
 which " contributed materially to his development." He 
 says expressly (p. 71) : "I have now, I believe, mentioned 
 all the books which had any considerable effect on my 
 earlier mental development ; " and adds : " From this point 
 I began to carry on my intellectual cultivation by writing 
 
 * F. Newman says (" Idea of a University," p. 100) that the classics have 
 in France subserved the spread of deism: the elder Mr. Mill seems to have 
 used them in the interest of atheism.
 
 Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 199 
 
 still more than by reading." It is an undeniable fact, then, 
 that when he first began his irreligious crusade,* he had 
 never given himself ever so superficially, either to a study 
 of Christian doctrine, or to an examination of the argu- 
 ments adduced for God's Existence. And his conduct was 
 even more remarkable at the mental crisis to which we 
 have already referred, when he was carried off violently 
 from his old moorings, and was looking everywhere for 
 a haven of rest. He was led to seek refuge in various 
 teachings of Coleridge, of Maurice, of Sterling : but the 
 thought did not so much as occur to him that anything 
 solid could be said in behalf of what they, one and all, 
 accounted the centre of their whole life, their belief in 
 Christianity. 
 
 A curious fact indeed may be adduced from this volume, 
 in further confirmation of our remark on the complete 
 absence of Christianity from his thoughts. We have 
 already pointed out how high was his estimation (if we 
 may use such words without profaneness, even when re- 
 counting an infidel's opinion) of our Blessed Lord's character 
 and work. On the other hand, he states (p. 113) that he 
 had obtained most valuable culture "by means of reverential 
 admiration for the lives and characters of heroic persons, 
 especially the heroes of philosophy : " and he mentions two 
 objects of this reverential admiration in particular; viz. 
 Socrates and Turgot. It did not enter his mind, apparently, 
 to regard the Founder of Christianity as even occupying a 
 high place among the heroic benefactors of mankind. 
 
 One cannot be surprised, then, at that ignorance of the 
 most elementary Christian doctrines, which meets one in 
 every corner of his writings where he mentions Christianity 
 at all. Of this we will cite an instance which occurs in 
 
 * It may most truly be called this; l>ecau.e from the firxt it was the aim 
 of his publications to promote the radical refuriu of society on seme irre- 
 ligious basis or other.
 
 200 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 the present volume. We extract the passage to which we 
 refer, italicizing one clause. 
 
 Of unbelievers (so called), as well as of believers, there are 
 many species, including almost every variety of moral type. 
 But the best among them, as no one who has had opportunities 
 of really knowing them will hesitate to affirm, are more 
 genuinely religious, in the best sense of the word religion, than 
 those who exclusively arrogate to themselves the title. The 
 liberality of the age, or, in other words, the weakening of the 
 obstinate prejudice which makes men unable to see what is 
 before their eyes because it is contrary to their expectations, has 
 caused it to be very commonly admitted that a deist may be 
 truly religious ; but if religion stands for any graces of character, 
 and not for mere dogma, the assertion may equally be made of 
 many whose belief is far short of deism. Though they may 
 think the proof incomplete that the universe is a work of design, 
 and though they assuredly disbelieve that it can have an 
 Author and Governor who is absolute in power as well as perfect 
 in goodness, they have that which constitutes the principal 
 worth of all religions whatever, an ideal conception of a Perfect 
 Being, to which they habitually refer as the guide of their 
 conscience; and this ideal of Good is usually far nearer to 
 perfection than the objective Deity of those who think them- 
 selves obliged to find absolute goodness in the author of a world 
 so crowded with suffering and so deformed by injustice as ours 
 (pp. 45-46). 
 
 No doubt, by the word " religion," are meant certain 
 "graces of character, and not mere dogma." But what 
 graces ? Would Mr. Mill have used the word "religion " 
 to express justice as such ? or benevolence as such ? or 
 veracity as such ? or fortitude or temperance as such ? Of 
 course there would be no sense in his doing so. What is 
 ordinarily meant by "religion" as a grace of character 
 is the habit of communion with God. A person is more 
 " religious " in proportion as he more has his thoughts 
 fixed on God's presence ; in proportion as the whole stream 
 of his life is devoted to the end of loving and obeying God. 
 It is most intelligible, then, to say that a deist can be
 
 Mr. MiWs Philosophical Position. 201 
 
 " religious ; " and all those indeed must think the saying 
 true, who consider (as we do) that there may be invincible 
 ignorance on the divine origin of Christianity. Such a 
 saying results from faithfulness to the rules of logic, not 
 from so-called "liberality" or "weakening of prejudice." 
 But what can possibly be meant by an atheist being 
 " religious " ? How can any man remember God's presence, 
 if he do not believe that God exists ? how can he devote his 
 life to loving and obeying God, if he thinks there is no God 
 to be loved and obeyed ? 
 
 When first we hear it, then, such language seems simply 
 astounding : but on consideration, one comes to see what 
 it indicates. It indicates that Mr. Mill had no notion of 
 what it is which Christians mean, when they speak of 
 "religiousness" or "piety." Had it not been for Mr. 
 Mill's case, we should have said that even those who do 
 not practise religion, know well what is meant by these 
 terms ; but Mr. Mill, while leading a life of laborious study, 
 remained to the end of his life profoundly ignorant of the 
 very existence of what the whole world around him knew to 
 be among the most widely extended and powerful springs 
 of human conduct. And this was the man who sat in 
 judgment, as if from an elevated pedestal, on the acts 
 and motives of saintly persons ; who claimed superiority 
 over the prejudices of the vulgar ; who condescendingly 
 patronized the mediaeval Church ; who was kind enough to 
 nee even in modern Catholicity much which he was happy 
 to approve, though far more which he was obliged to 
 condemn.* 
 
 It may seem heartless if, while making these comments, 
 we do not pause for a moment to bewail the hard lot of 
 
 * Observe e.g. such a sentence as this : " There are men who, not dis- 
 guising their own unbelief, have written deeper and finer thiny* in vindica- 
 tion of what religion has done for mankind, than would have sufficed to found 
 the reputation of some of its most admired defenders" (" Dissertations and 
 Discusaions," vol. ii. p. 122).
 
 202 The, Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 one, by nature so teachable, loving, and sensitive, placed 
 from his birth under the iron yoke of that bigoted and 
 intolerant atheist his father, and indoctrinated by him so 
 carefull}' to paganism. But (as we have already said) we 
 are attempting no appreciation whatever of his personal 
 character ; we are but mentioning this or that fact, which 
 bears importantly on the value of his speculations whether 
 in the sphere of religion or philosophy. 
 
 For, indeed, even in the matter of social philosophy, 
 how fatal to his intellectual character is what we have just 
 mentioned ! He was ignorant (as we have said) of the very 
 existence of what is among the most widely extended and 
 powerful springs of human conduct. The main purpose of 
 his life was to act directly or indirectly on the convictions 
 and actions of his contemporaries. To do so with any 
 hope of success, it was necessary that he should clearly 
 understand their existing motives, impulses, instincts. And 
 yet, in one very prominent particular, he was as ignorant 
 of the moral world in the midst of which he passed his 
 days as though he had never read of the past nor lived in 
 the present. 
 
 Then, again considering he claimed to take a leading 
 position in metaphysics and psychology how noteworthy 
 was his ignorance of what Catholics have done in that 
 direction. For many centuries a series of men, admitted 
 by Mr. Mill himself to be powerful thinkers, had concen- 
 trated their intellectual energy on the work of raising an 
 edifice of theological science, on the basis of the scholastic 
 philosophy. "We should not have been surprised, however 
 profoundly Mr. Mill might have differed from them : what 
 does surprise us is, that he took no pains to know them. 
 What would he have thought of himself, if he had written 
 his work on Hamilton without acquiring a knowledge of 
 Kant's philosophy ? Of course, whether Kant be or be not 
 intellectually superior to the giants of scholasticism, is a
 
 Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 203 
 
 matter of opinion : but it is a matter of undeniable fact 
 that the latter immeasurably surpassed him in the influence 
 of their speculations on the whole course of thought and 
 of society for many centuries. Yet, undeterred by this 
 crass ignorance, Mr. Mill permitted himself very freely to 
 criticize the intellectual characteristics of those very 
 centuries. 
 
 It will be said, perhaps, that at all events other anti- 
 theistic philosophers of the day are no less unacquainted 
 with Catholic theology and philosophy than Mr. Mill. We 
 heartily endorse this remark. Their dense ignorance of 
 Catholicity is a mark of their crooked and perverse intel- 
 lectual habits, which can be appreciated by the most 
 ordinarily educated Catholic. In fact, they are less ac- 
 quainted with Catholicity, and have far less wish to be 
 acquainted, than had Mr. Mill himself.* But, then, the 
 latter always laid claim to exceptional large-mindedness, 
 and honestly believed such claim to be legitimate. He 
 accounted himself " much superior to most of his contem- 
 poraries in willingness and ability to learn from everybody " 
 (p. 242). He professed " great readiness and eagerness to 
 learn from everybody, and to make room in his opinions 
 for every new acquisition by adjusting the old and new to 
 one another " (p. 252). He was eager to learn from every 
 quarter, except only the Catholic Church. 
 
 There are other passages in the autobiography besides 
 those we have mentioned, which bear importantly on Mr. 
 Mill's philosophical tenets : but (with one exception to be 
 immediately mentioned) they will be more conveniently 
 considered in subsequent essays, especially when we come 
 to handle again his utilitarian tenets. We therefore proceed 
 
 * Mr. Mill's autobiography has not unnaturally caused for the moment a 
 reaction npuinBt him, even aa compared with other writers of the sumo 
 school. Wo look forward to a reaction against this reaction. To our mind, 
 no one of the rent approaches him cither in intellectual clearness, candour, 
 and ability, nor, again, in zealous philanthropy.
 
 204. Ttie Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 to resume our controversy with him, at the point where we 
 left off in the preceding essay. 
 
 The principal topic with which we were occupied was 
 a consideration of Mr. Mill's reply to the arguments we 
 had adduced against him, on the necessary character of 
 mathematical axioms. It might appear, on the surface, 
 that this is somewhat a subordinate question, in its bear- 
 ing on the very vital points at issue between Mr. Mill 
 and ourselves : but we replied, that Mr. Mill " would 
 have been the last to make this complaint." Our state- 
 ment is fully borne out by the autobiography. He ac- 
 counted the controversy between intuitionism and pheno- 
 menism far more fundamental than any other, in matters 
 no less of social than of strictly philosophical speculation ; 
 and he accounted the discussion on the necessary character 
 of mathematical axioms to be the very turning-point of this 
 controversy. The former opinion is expressed in p. 273 ; 
 and in p. 226 he declares, that " the chief strength " of the 
 philosophy which he assails "in morals, politics, and 
 religion, lies in the appeal which it is accustomed to make 
 to the evidence of mathematics and the cognate branches of 
 physical science." " To keep it from these," he adds, " is 
 to drive it from its stronghold ; " and by parity of reason, 
 if we maintain it in these, we maintain it in its stronghold. 
 No one, then, could have a stronger conviction than Mr. 
 Mill himself, on the vital character of the issue which we 
 joined with him. We candidly expressed our opinion as 
 to the utterly worthless character of his reasoning. " We 
 are deliberately of opinion," we said, " that not one of 
 his arguments has the slightest force, and hardly one of 
 them the most superficial appearance of force." " The 
 whole mass of human knowledge," we further alleged, 
 " is made," by him, " utterly dependent on what is about 
 the most gratuitous and arbitrary theory which can well
 
 Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 205 
 
 be imagined." And we added, that Mr. Mill's death had 
 been to us a severe controversial disappointment. We 
 had been eager to engage in a hand-to-hand conflict with 
 so distinguished a champion, not on a few questions only, 
 however fundamental, but on the whole mass of philo- 
 sophical speculations, which leads onward to that one 
 supreme issue, the Existence of a Personal God. We 
 were full of confidence that a signal triumph must result 
 to the cause of truth, if we could induce Mr. Mill to 
 put forth his utmost strength on the other side. 
 
 At the same time, we are glad to think that the keystone 
 of his whole philosophical position lies in those very 
 doctrines on which he lived to publish his reply to our 
 adverse arguments. Every philosopher of the present day 
 has his " aggressive " as well as his " affirmative " position. 
 You understand his " aggressive " position so far as you 
 understand what those tenets are which he desires to over- 
 throw ; and you understand his " affirmative " position so 
 far as you understand what those tenets are which he 
 desires to establish in their place. Now, Mr. Mill's 
 "aggressive" position mainly consisted, (1) in his denying 
 the cognizableness of any necessary truths ; and (2) (as a 
 means for that denial) in his denying the competence of 
 men's existent faculties to avouch truth finally and without 
 appeal. Whereas, then, he regards the very " stronghold " 
 of necessists to be their view of mathematical axioms, we 
 may fairly say that the keystone of his "aggressive" position 
 consists (1) in his doctrine on mathematical axioms, and 
 (2) in his doctrine on the rule of certitude. On the other 
 hand, his " affirmative " position mainly consists in his 
 claim to substitute a body of science built exclusively on 
 experience, for a body of science purporting to be built 
 partly on necessary truth. But no body of science can 
 possibly be built on the exclusive basis of experience, unless 
 the philosopher first establishes on grounds of experience
 
 206 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 the uniformity of nature ; or what Mr. Mill calls " the law 
 of universal causation." Mr. Mill himself admits this as 
 heartily as we maintain it. The keystone, then, of Mr. 
 Mill's "affirmative" position lies in his doctrine, that the 
 uniformity of nature can be proved by experience ; while 
 the keystone of his " aggressive " position lies (as we have 
 seen) in his respective doctrines, on mathematical axioms, 
 and on the rule of certitude. And it so happens that 
 these are the very three doctrines on which he expressly 
 replied to our adverse arguments. In our last essay we 
 commenced our rejoinder on that reply, and on the present 
 occasion are to complete it. It is certainly a great matter 
 of regret to us, for the sake of truth, that such rejoinder 
 must now necessarily be final ; and it would have been a 
 matter of keen interest to us to know how he would have 
 encountered our remarks. 
 
 Our last essay was much longer than we could have 
 wished; but we were very desirous of drawing out unin- 
 terruptedly our whole counter-argument on the necessity 
 of mathematical axioms. To prevent our essay, however, 
 from swelling to an absolutely intolerable length, we were 
 obliged to omit all summary of our lengthened reasoning. 
 And we feel this to have been so great a disadvantage, that 
 one of our first procedures on the present occasion will be 
 in some degree to supply that deficiency. 
 
 Before commencing this, however, we shall make a 
 little further comment on a position of Mr. Mill's, which 
 we criticized. Our readers, on referring to our previous 
 remarks, will see that he makes two statements. Firstly, 
 he says that "wherever the present constitution of space 
 exists," the axioms of geometry are cognizable to man- 
 kind as "conclusions from that conception." Secondly, he 
 adds, that we have ample reason to know,* that the same 
 
 * His word is to " believe ; " but on looking at the context our reader 
 will see that he certainly means " know."
 
 Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 207 
 
 " constitution of space which exists on our own planet, 
 exists also in the region of the fixed stars." Now what 
 does he mean by this extremely vague term " constitution 
 of space " ? We can fancy his indignation, if one of his 
 opponents had used so vague a term as this without ex- 
 planation. Yet we affirm, with some confidence, that Mr. 
 Mill has nowhere even attempted to explain what he meant 
 by the term ; and we doubt indeed whether he ever used it, 
 except in the two notes, replying to our own criticism, 
 which he inserted in the latest edition of his respective 
 works on " Logic " and on " Hamilton." 
 
 There is only one meaning which we can think of as 
 intended by this phrase. We must suppose that he 
 accounts "the present constitution of space" as existing 
 wherever the three dimensions length, breadth, height 
 are predicable of all material objects. But if this were his 
 meaning, he would hold that a man can "conclude" the 
 truth of geometrical axioms " from his very conception " 
 of length, breadth, and height. This, however, is the 
 precise point at issue between him and his opponents ; and 
 if such were his meaning, he would be saying in so many 
 words that his opponents are in the right and he in the 
 wrong. We would beg our readers to look back at our 
 whole criticism in pp. 176-179. For our own part, we 
 believe this is one of the cases far more numerous 
 throughout Mr. Mill's works than might be supposed in 
 which his spontaneous reason is too strong for his artificial 
 and elaborated philosophy. 
 
 We will next direct our readers' attention to a remark 
 we made a page earlier. We observed how difficult it is to 
 know what is Mr. Mill's positive thesis, on the cognizable- 
 ness of mathematical axioms ; and also to know what are 
 the grounds alleged by him for such thesis. He declares 
 again and again, that the universal truth of these axioms, 
 throughout the planet Terra at least, is irrefragably proved
 
 208 Tht Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 by universal experience. Yet what does he himself say on 
 another occasion? "That all metals sink in water, was 
 a uniform experience from the origin of the human race 
 down to the discovery of potassium in the present century 
 by Sir Humphry Davy. That all swans are white, was 
 a uniform experience down to the discovery of Australia " 
 (" Logic," vol. i. p. 805). What stronger ground, then, has 
 he for his conviction that over the whole earth trilateral 
 are triangular, than his ancestors had for their entirely 
 mistaken conviction that over the whole earth swans are 
 white and metals sink in water ? How can he even guess 
 that in some newly-discovered country a tree may not be 
 found which shall possess the capability of being formed 
 into quadrangular trilateral, or into pairs of straight lines 
 of which each pair shall enclose a space ? 
 
 Mr. Mill, however, is much less anxious to state and 
 establish his positive than his negative thesfs on mathe- 
 matical axioms ; and unless his whole fabric of philosophy 
 is to collapse,* he must prove that these axioms are not 
 self-evidently necessary. We, on the contrary, as zealous 
 impugners of his philosophy, have been bent on proving 
 the contrary. And the general argument we have used 
 may be thus syllogistically stated. 
 
 Whatever the existent cognitive faculties of mankind 
 testify, is instinctively f known by mankind as certainly 
 true. 
 
 * This must not be understood in too extreme a sense. In a former 
 essay, we said that, on such a supposition, "his works might still bo 
 admitted to contain a large quantity of valuable philosophical matter, as we 
 think indeed they do ; but his philosophy as a whole would be at an end." 
 This is precisely what we still think. 
 
 t We had at first said " self-evidently," but in our last essay we found 
 it more convenient to appropriate that phrase in a different sense. We 
 think the word "instinctively" the best substitute, as expressing the irre- 
 sistible and (as it were) piercing character of the convictions to which we 
 refer. Let any reader consider the keen certitude with which he knows 
 that he experienced those sensations of ten minutes back, which his memory 
 vividly testifies.
 
 Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 209 
 
 But the existent cognitive faculties of mankind testif}', 
 that any given mathematical axiom is self-evidently 
 necessary. 
 
 Ergo, etc. 
 
 Now, it is most surprising that a writer generally so 
 clear as Mr. Mill, should so long have left it uncertain 
 which of these two propositions it is which he denies : see 
 e.g. the mutually contradictory propositions which we 
 quoted from him in our last essay. Such, however, 
 being the case, we entered at length into the proof of both 
 the above premisses. But after reading the autobiography, 
 we can hardly doubt that it is the former of the two 
 premisses against wl^ich Mr. Mill protests.* We shall not, 
 therefore, here attempt to epitomize our argument for our 
 minor premiss ; but we shall content ourselves on that 
 head with referring our readers to the whole course of our 
 remarks. We will but briefly say here, that it would 
 certainly be a bold step to deny this premiss. Take any 
 man of ordinary thoughtfulness and education ; and ask 
 him whether it is within the sphere of Omnipotence to 
 enclose a space by two straight lines, or to create a 
 quadrangular trilateral : there can be very little doubt what 
 his spontaneous answer will be. We here, then, assume 
 Mr. Mill to accept our minor premiss ; we assume him 
 to concede that, if mankind trust their existent faculties, it 
 is impossible for them to doubt the self-evident necessity 
 of any given mathematical axiom. 
 
 Mr. Mill, then, we take it, would have argued in some 
 such manner as this : and we confine ourselves for clear- 
 ness' sake to geometrical axioms, because whatever is said 
 of them may so easily be applied to arithmetical. " From 
 the first moment when an infant begins to move his arms 
 and legs," Mr. Mill would say, " he is beginning to acquire 
 
 * See particularly a passage in pp. 22"), 220, which wo bliall (junto in ;i 
 later part of our paper. 
 
 V<l.. 1. V
 
 21 The Philosophy of Thewm. 
 
 knowledge on the elementary truths of geometry. Before 
 arriving at the age of reason, he has been completely 
 saturated with his experience that two intersecting straight 
 lines always diverge, and that a straight line is the shortest 
 path between two points. No wonder, then, that, when he 
 comes to use his faculties, they are not only unable to con- 
 ceive any thought contrary to this uniform experience, 
 but have even been so moulded by that experience as to 
 pronounce its various particulars so many self-evidently 
 necessary truths." 
 
 Our answer to this view of things is virtually contained in 
 the essay to which we have referred; but none the less it may 
 be of important service if we reproduce it under a different 
 arrangement. We say, then, that two different replies may 
 be made to Mr. Mill's reasoning, as here drawn out. It 
 may be replied (1), that no such experience of geometrical 
 axioms as an adult has acquired could possibly produce on 
 his faculties such a result as Mr. Mill contends for. And 
 it may be replied (2), that the testimony of each man's 
 existent faculties is his infallible rule of certitude ; and 
 that he has no legitimate appeal from their present to their 
 past avouchment. If either of these replies be substantiated, 
 Mr. Mill's argument falls entirely to the ground ; but we 
 are confident that both can easily be substantiated, and we 
 shall proceed at once to do so. It is the second on which 
 we are far the more anxious to fix our readers' attention ; 
 but it will be more convenient if we begin with the first. 
 
 We are assuming, then, Mr. Mill to agree with our- 
 selves, that men's existent faculties avouch the self-evident 
 necessity of some given geometrical axiom. But he main- 
 tains that this avouchment of theirs can be explained by 
 the constant and unmistakable experience of that axiom 
 which every adult has gone through. We reply that their 
 avouchment is not thus explainable. It is quite untrue, we 
 say, that any experience of any geometrical axiom, which
 
 Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 211 
 
 an adult has had in his childhood, has any tendency so to 
 affect his faculties as that on that account they shall 
 pronounce such axiom to be a necessary truth. There 
 were three different arguments adduced by us in our last 
 essay for this proposition, either of which alone would be 
 conclusive. 
 
 I. According to Mr. Mill, such unintermittent and 
 unmistakable experience as I have had of any given 
 geometrical axioms suffices to make it impossible for me 
 to doubt, if I trust my existent faculties, that the reversal 
 of that axiom is beyond the sphere of Omnipotence. But 
 if this were so, it must follow that in proportion as I have 
 more accumulated experience of any truth, in that propor- 
 tion I find it more difficult (if I trust my existent faculties) 
 to regard the reversal of that truth as within the sphere of 
 Omnipotence. But is this anything like the case ? Most 
 evidently not. Suppose I have only once or twice in my 
 life tasted beet-root ; while, on the other hand (of course), 
 times without number I have felt fire to burn, and seen 
 wood float on water while stones sink therein. Yet most 
 assuredly I have not to the very smallest extent any greater 
 difficulty in supposing that an Omnipotent Creator could 
 prevent fire from burning or could support stones in the 
 water, than in supposing that He could alter the taste of 
 beet-root. 
 
 II. Let us take, as an instance of a geometrical axiom, 
 the proposition that two parallel straight lines will never 
 meet ; * and let us take as our instance of an obvious 
 physical fact, the warmth-giving property of fire. No one 
 who reflects will doubt that an English child's experience 
 of the latter truth is (to say the least) every whit as 
 constant and uniform as his experience of the former. Yet 
 
 * We define a "straight lino " to be " a line which pursues tlnrniplinnt. 
 the same direction ; " and wo define "parallel straight lines" to be "straight 
 lines which pursue the same direction with each other."
 
 212 TJt Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 when he comes to the age of reason, he pronounces that 
 the former is a necessary truth ; whereas he would be 
 simply amazed at the allegation that an Omnipotent 
 Creator could not on any given occasion deprive fire of its 
 warmth -giving property. 
 
 Now, Mr. Mill himself admits this latter fact ; but he 
 has a reply. " Fire," he says (" On Hamilton," p. 339), 
 "it is true, will, under certain needful conditions, give 
 warmth ; but the sight of fire is often unattended with any 
 sensation of warmth. . . . The visible presence of fire and 
 the sensation of warmth are not in that invariable conjunc- 
 tion and immediate juxtaposition which might disable us 
 from conceiving one without the other, and which might 
 therefore lead us to suppose their conjunction a necessary 
 truth." He indicates here, we suppose, such apparent 
 exceptions to the warmth-giving property of fire as take 
 place when, being out of doors, one sees a fire through the 
 window without receiving warmth from it. And so (ibid) 
 his general proposition is, that in order to generate the 
 mind's conviction of self-evident necessity, " the experience 
 must not only be constant and uniform, but the juxta- 
 position of the facts in experience must be immediate and 
 close, as well as so free from even the semblance of an 
 exception that no counter-association can possibly arise." 
 Wherever, then, there has been in past experience even the 
 semblance of an exception according to Mr. Mill there no 
 conviction of self-evident necessity will arise. To this we 
 answered, that (on his own showing) there has been in 
 past experience the semblance of an exception to the axiom 
 that two parallel straight lines will never meet. " In the 
 case of parallel lines," he says (" On Hamilton," p. 335), 
 "the laws of perspective do present such an illusion," or 
 semblance of exception : " they do to the eye appear to 
 meet in both directions." He does not himself, then, 
 attempt to maintain his own thesis ; for his own thesis
 
 Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 213 
 
 was, that in order to generate the conviction self-evident 
 necessity, there must have been freedom from all semblance 
 of exception in past experience. And he fails entirely, 
 therefore, in accounting for the fact .that mankind regard 
 the geometrical axiom as self-evidently necessary, while 
 they do not so regard the warmth-giving property of fire. 
 
 The only answer Mr. Mill can give to this is (" On 
 Hamilton," p. 335, note), that, as regards the axiom, the 
 apparent exception is such that its " illusory character is 
 at once seen, from the immediate accessibility of the 
 evidence which disproves " it. But it is obviously un- 
 deniable that, in the case of a fire seen from out of doors, 
 precisely the same explanation can be given. When a fire 
 is looked at from out of doors, there is an illusory exception 
 (no doubt) to the warmth-giving property of fire ; but its 
 " illusory character is at once seen, from the immediate 
 accessibility of the evidence which disproves " it. 
 
 "We sum up, then, this argument. If my past experience 
 of parallel straight lines can have generated in my mind 
 (as Mr. Mill maintains it has) a conviction that the fact of 
 their never meeting is a self-evidently necessary truth ; 
 then my past experience of fire would equally have 
 generated in my mind a conviction that its warmth-giving 
 property is a self-evideutly necessary truth. That the 
 latter supposition is mistaken Mr. Mill, of course, fully 
 admits ; it follows, therefore, that his own supposition is 
 equally false, and that this fundamental principle of his 
 philosophy is an error. 
 
 We added that Mr. Mahaffy has mentioned another 
 instance of illusion, as besetting men's experience of 
 geometrical axioms. I take a straight stick, and hy 
 manipulating it I add to the store of experience which 1 
 already possess, that a straight line is the shortest path 
 between two points. I plunge half-way in the water this 
 " shortest path between two points," and the said path
 
 21 4- Tie Philosophy of Thnmi. 
 
 appears crooked. Just as when I look at a fire through 
 the windows, I have a momentary illusion that fire does 
 not give warmth, so on this occasion I have a momentary 
 illusion that the shortest path between two points is 
 crooked. The former illusion is neither stronger nor more 
 persistent than the latter. If, therefore, my past experience 
 have not generated in me a conviction that the warmth - 
 giving property of fire is a self-evidently necessary truth, 
 how can it be my past experience which has generated in 
 me a conviction that this geometrical axiom is self- 
 evidently necessary ? Let some disciple of Mr. Mill's 
 attempt a reply. 
 
 III. Lastly, there is more than one geometrical axiom 
 which I have never known by experience at all; and in 
 regard to which, therefore, it is manifestly impossible that 
 my cognitive faculties can have been moulded by ex- 
 perience into its avouchment. Of this kind is the axiom 
 which we took as our specimen, that "all trilateral are 
 triangular." It is not only that students had noiformulized 
 this truth before they met with it in their Euclid, but the 
 great majority of them never knew it. Observe the contrast 
 between this axiom on the one hand, and a truth which 
 men really hare known by unformulized experience on the 
 other. The proposition was once placed before me for the 
 first time in a formulized shape, that " horses differ greatly 
 from each other in colour." Though (by hypothesis) I 
 have never before expressly contemplated this proposition, 
 I at once recognize it as expressing a fresh familiar truth ; 
 a truth vividly known to me by every day's experience. On 
 the other hand, most of those who have not studied the 
 elements of geometry, when first they are told that all 
 trilaterals are triangular, as simply receive a new piece of 
 information as they did when they heard that war had 
 been declared between Prussia and France. But that 
 which is received as a new piece of information cannot
 
 Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 215 
 
 possibly have been already known to them by past ex- 
 perience. 
 
 This last argument is indubitably valid as against Mr. 
 Mill ; because, throughout his reply to us, he fully admits 
 that the triangularity of trilaterals is a veritable axiom a 
 part of the geometrical basis, and not of the geometrical 
 superstructure. His disciples might imaginably allege 
 that it is no axiom at all ; but only a spontaneous inference, 
 imperceptible as such by reason of its rapidity from certain 
 genuine axioms. If they do allege this, they are called on 
 to state what those axioms are from which the proposition 
 could be deduced ; and we entirely deny the possibility of 
 their doing this. However, even on the supposition of 
 their success, the two first arguments we gave (either of 
 which is alone decisive) would remain unaffected. 
 
 We have now, then, made good our first reply to Mr. 
 Mill. We have shown, we trust, conclusively, that no such 
 experience of geometrical axioms as adults have acquired 
 in their youth could possibly produce on their cognitive 
 faculties any such effect as Mr. Mill's argument supposes. 
 But we think it of immeasurably greater importance to 
 establish against him our second reply ; to establish against 
 him the thesis, that the actual testimony of each man's 
 existent faculties is his infallible rule of certitude, and that 
 no legitimate appeal lies from their present to their past 
 avouchment. We consider this thesis (as we have often 
 said) to be of inappreciable moment : because its scope 
 extends far beyond the mere question of mathematical 
 axioms ; and its rejection would issue by necessary conse- 
 quence, in bringing down human knowledge to a level 
 below that of the brutes. We reasoned on this head 
 against Mr. Mill in a former essay ; and our present 
 business is merely to epitomize our former argument. 
 
 The thesis, then, which we defend, as at once so certain 
 and so fundamental, is this : that what each man's existent
 
 216 Tin' Philosophy of Thri#m. 
 
 faculties actually testify is instinctively known by him as 
 certainly true. It is by no means easy to understand, 
 what is the adverse theory advocated by Mr. Mill. If we 
 were to take literally some of his strange expressions 
 quoted by us, we should understand him as maintaining 
 a singular theory enough. We should understand him 
 as maintaining that no declaration of a man's cognitive 
 faculties is trustworthy, unless it be a declaration which 
 these faculties would have uttered when he was " an 
 infant," when he " first opened his eyes to the light " ; 
 that no argument is valid, unless it would have been 
 recognized as valid by a new-born infant ; that no avouch - 
 ment of memory concerning the past may reasonably be 
 trusted, unless the memory of a new-born infant would 
 have safely carried him so far back. But we will do our 
 author more justice than he has done himself, and state 
 his proposition in a form less revolting to common sense. 
 We will understand him, then, to mean, that it is not what 
 my faculties actually testify that I can with reason regard 
 as certainly true, but rather what they would have testified 
 had they grown to maturity according to their own intrinsic 
 laws of development, without being denaturalized and 
 artificialized by that great body of experience which has 
 accumulated round them during their long infancy. Now, 
 it will be very useful for the purpose of our present argu- 
 ment, if we devise some name to express the human 
 faculties in this purely imaginary condition. Let us call 
 these the "pure human faculties," and the point at issue 
 may then be stated thus. On our part, we contend that 
 the rule of certitude is the actual avouchment of man's 
 existent faculties ; whereas Mr. Mill contends that it is the 
 hypothetical avouchment of man's "pure'" faculties. 
 
 We argue, firstly, against Mr. Mill's theory, as we have 
 often argued before, that it lays the axe to the root of all 
 human knowledge whatever; that, if it w r ere sound, no
 
 Mr. .Mill's Philosophical Position. 217 
 
 human being could know anything as certain or even as 
 probable, except only the facts of his mornentaril} 7 present 
 consciousness. He could not e.g. apprehend the smallest 
 sentence spoken to him ; for what he at this moment hears 
 is only the last word of the sentence ; and how can he know 
 what were the earlier words ? Indubitably, indeed, the 
 first step (whatever it may be) which he has to take, in 
 order to arrive at any knowledge whatever,* is only rendered 
 possible by his trusting the avouchment of his memoiy. 
 But how could Mr. Mill consider such trust reasonable? 
 We say that the actual avouchment of his existent faculties 
 and of his memory inclusive!}' is instinctively known by 
 each man as certain; but this is precisely what Mr. Mill 
 denies. 
 
 In fact, Mr. Mill's position reminds one more of some 
 amusing Irish bull than of grave philosophical disquisition. 
 I encounter the familiar features of an old friend. Have 
 I a right to regard it as certain, or even probable, that I 
 ever saw those features before ? In other words, can I 
 reasonably believe those past phenomena to have occurred 
 which my memory most distinctly avouches ? The answer 
 to this question, according to Mr. Mill, depends on the 
 further question, whether my memory would have made 
 the same avouchment had it not become (as Mr. Mill would 
 say) artificialized and denaturalized. A true disciple of 
 Mr. Mill's, then, if he is so circumstanced, will not behove 
 that he ever saw his friend before, until he has first 
 examined the above-named preliminary question. But 
 how can he so much as begin to examine it without trust- 
 ing his existent memory? Yet it is unreasonable, in his 
 view, to trust his existent memory until he has gono 
 through that very investigation, which is impossible without 
 that trust. He has no means, therefore, whatever of 
 
 * For merely to experience the facts of his mouicutarily present con- 
 sciousness is uot to post-ess knowledge ut ull.
 
 218 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 arriving at any reasonable trust in the avouchments of his 
 memory ; his knowledge, accordingly, is confined to the 
 experience of his momentarily present consciousness, and 
 is inferior to that of the very brutes. 
 
 The same argument may be exhibited in a somewhat 
 different shape. How did Mr. Mill arrive at his theory, 
 that his existent faculties cannot be trusted? By certain 
 trains of reasoning. But such trains of reasoning had no 
 meaning, except for two assumptions : (1) the assumption 
 that logical reasoning is valid ; and (2) the assumption that 
 Mr. Mill on every occasion could trust his memory of what 
 he had previously observed or established. But these 
 assumptions were the most arbitrary and gratuitous of 
 inventions, unless he had been first of all warranted in 
 trusting his existent faculties, whether of reasoning or of 
 memory. 
 
 We have already said that his position reminds one of 
 what Englishmen tell as an amusing Irish bull. All the 
 world knows the story of the Irishman, who stood in the 
 coffee-room of a hotel, professing only to warm himself at 
 the fire, but in reality also occupied with reading a letter 
 which another guest was writing to a friend. The writer 
 observing this, proceeds to add on paper : " I should express 
 myself more fully on this matter, if there were not a black- 
 guard in the room, looking over my shoulder at everything 
 I write." " You insolent liar ! " exclaims the self-convicted 
 Irishman. His blunder was precisely this : that his denial 
 of the allegation made against him was directly based on 
 an admission of his truth. Just so Mr. Mill's denial of 
 our thesis is directly based on his affirmation of it. His 
 belief that it is true is the principal premiss which leads 
 him to the conclusion that it is false.* 
 
 * What has been urged by us, in this and several preceding articles on 
 the absolute necessity of assuming the veracity of memory, will be found (wo 
 think) a preservative against many false philosophies. For instance, there is
 
 Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 219 
 
 But now further. Mr. Mill's argument implies that, at 
 all events, if it could be shown that his "pure" faculties 
 would have declared the necessity of mathematical axioms, 
 he would no longer deny the latter doctrine, but, on the 
 contrary, accept it.* Yet on what ground would it be 
 reasonable then to accept it ? How could he know e.g. that 
 Professor Huxley's suggestion is not true ? that the human 
 faculties have not been purposely made deceptive by some 
 mendacious creator of mankind ? But this is only one of 
 a hundred hypotheses which may most easily be imagined, 
 all of them inconsistent with the supposition that man's 
 " pure " faculties would be trustworthy ; and on what 
 ground would Mr. Mill be warranted in assuming that all 
 these hypotheses are false? On what ground could he 
 assume the proposition that (by some totally unknown law) 
 the human faculties so proceed in their operation that if 
 sensible experience were only away they would invariably 
 declare what is objectively true ? On what ground could 
 he take for granted that which, from his point of view, is 
 surely a most startling proposition ? We are under no 
 such difficulty; because, on our view, each man knows 
 
 a philosophical tenet beginning to show itself which would deprive the 
 human faculties of their due authority, on the ground that any given avouch- 
 ment which they may put forth is but the result of certain physical ante- 
 cedents e.g. in the nervous system. In reply, we will concede for argument's 
 sake the fact alleged; because we maintain that no inference could be drawn 
 from the fact such as these philosophers suppose. 
 
 If they are to escape the most flagrant and monstrous inconsistency, they 
 must refuse to trust any given act of memory until they can know that it is 
 not the result of physical antecedents. But they cannot even begin to inquire 
 how far this is the case without trusting other acts of memory equally unau- 
 thuuticated ; and so on ad infinitum. 
 
 As modern philosophy proceeds, it will be seen (we predict) more and 
 more clearly that the received Catholic doctrine on the rule of certitude is 
 the one impregnable fortress from which every irreligious philosophy can be 
 defeated and overthrown. 
 
 * " The verdict of ... our immediate and intuitive conviction is ad- 
 mitted on all hands to be a decision without appeal. The next question is, 
 to what does" this intuitive conviction "buir witness?" (Mill, "On Hamil- 
 ton," p. 158.)
 
 220 The Philosophy of 
 
 instinctively on each occasion that his existent faculties 
 avouch truly. Mr. Mill rejects this, the only possible 
 foundation for human knowledge, and substitutes in its 
 place absolutely nothing. 
 
 Such are the arguments which we expressed, against 
 Mr. Mill's aberration on the rule of certitude. We do 
 not, however, admit that he gives in the autobiography 
 at all a true account of his opponents' doctrine. We 
 cannot even understand what he means, when he says 
 (p. 274) that they deem "intuition" to "speak with an 
 authority higher than that of our reason : " for what is 
 intuition except one part of reason ? And when he accuses 
 them (p. 226) of regarding as " intuitive every inveterate 
 belief of which the origin is not remembered," we must, at all 
 events, make one explanation. In our essay on "Necessary 
 Truth," we fully admitted that " again and again inferences 
 are so readily and imperceptibly drawn, as to be most easily 
 mistaken for intuitions ; and that we have no right of 
 alleging aught as certainly a primary truth, without proving 
 that it cannot be an opinion derived inferentially from 
 experience." W T hat those truths are which a man's existent 
 faculties avouch, this is a matter for keen psychological 
 investigation ; and on which, without such investigation, 
 we admit that very serious mistake is abundantly possible. 
 
 And this brings us to another matter of much import- 
 ance in our controversy with Mr. Mill. He distinguishes 
 (" Logic," vol. ii. p. 441) two essentially different kinds of 
 what he calls " complex ideas : " (1) those which consist of 
 simpler ones, and (2) those which have been generated by 
 simpler ones. The idea of an orange e.g., he says, is 
 complex in the former sense : it " really consists of the 
 simple ideas of a certain colour, a certain form, a certain 
 taste and smell, etc., because we can, by interrogating our 
 consciousness, perceive all these elements in the idea." 
 But he considers that, by a process of what he calls
 
 Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 221 
 
 " mental chemistry," some idea may result from the com- 
 bination of certain past ideas, which idea, nevertheless, in 
 its present state is incapable of analysis. "Whether the fact 
 be so, is a very interesting psychological question, on which 
 we need not here attempt to pronounce. But, as a matter 
 of language, we should call such ideas (if they exist) 
 " simple," not " complex." And as a matter of philosophy, 
 we should confidently deny that the question here raised by 
 Mr. Mill can give any help in deciding what it is which 
 man's existent faculties testify. 
 
 We shall best illustrate what we here mean, by reverting 
 to a former discussion of ours with Mr. Mill, on the founda- 
 tion of morality. We devoted some pages of that essay 
 to establish the conclusion that the idea " morally good " 
 is perfectly simple : and then, from that conclusion, we 
 drew the further inference that certain moral truths are 
 self-evidently necessary. Mr. Mill's reply to that argument 
 would probably be (see " Logic," vol. ii. p. 443, note), that 
 the idea "morally good" is not perfectly simple, because, 
 though it does not consist of simpler ideas, it was originally 
 generated by such. In company with Mr. Hutton, we entirely 
 deny that such can possibly have been the case, as we 
 stated. But what we are here pointing out is, that such 
 an allegation is utterly irrelevant. Let it once be admitted 
 that, so far as the existent human faculties are concerned, 
 "morally good" is an idea incapable of analysis; the con- 
 clusion inevitably follows (as we showed in the essay) that 
 the existent human faculties declare certain moral truths 
 to be self-evidently necessary. But it is what his faculties 
 d<> declare not what under imaginary circumstances they 
 would declare which alone is known by each man to be 
 infallibly true. 
 
 Our present business is not with Mr. Herbert Spencer ; 
 but we may mention, by the way, that (if we rightly under- 
 stand his various statements) his distrust of the human
 
 222 TJie Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 existent faculties exceeds even Mr. Mill's. He will not 
 even accept, as certainly true, what lie admits that his 
 "pure" faculties would unmistakably declare, because he 
 considers that he may inherit faculties which have been de- 
 naturalized and artificialized by ancestral experience. Our 
 whole answer to Mr. Mill contains a fortiori an answer to 
 Mr. Spencer.* And it is no small testimony to the strength 
 of Theistic philosophy, that its two ablest assailants in our 
 time have been driven to take refuge in different phases of 
 a theory so manifestly absurd and self-contradictory. 
 
 Here, then, we close what is necessarily our final reply 
 to Mr. Mill, on what we have called the keystone of his 
 " aggressive " philosophical position ; viz. his respective 
 doctrines on mathematical axioms and on the rule of 
 certitude. In our last essay we treated these two questions 
 in their logical order, and commenced with the latter : 
 whereas, on the present occasion, for the sake of varying 
 our treatment, we have proceeded inversely ; we have traced 
 back our difference from him on mathematical axioms, to 
 our difference from him on the rule of certitude. "We will 
 sum up under five questions, and so (we hope) give our 
 readers an intelligible conspectus of the whole. 
 
 Question 1st. Do the existent human faculties pronounce 
 that mathematical axioms are self-evidently necessary ? 
 We reply most confidently in the affirmative, and Mr. Mill, 
 if we may judge from his autobiography, does not himself 
 venture to answer this question in the negative. 
 
 Question 2nd. Can this avouchment of the human 
 faculties have been produced by the mere agency of past 
 experience ? We answer confidently in the negative ; Mr. 
 Mill confidently in the affirmative. 
 
 * We would refer our readers to a masterly article on Mr. Spencer in the 
 Quarterly of October, 1874. We heartily concur with it from first to last, 
 except, indeed, that its eulogy of Mr. Spencer's ability seems to us a little 
 beyond the mark. Mr. Spencer's reply to it in the Fortnightly of December 
 entirely misses its point.
 
 Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 223 
 
 Question 3rd. Supposing that the said avouchment 
 could have been thus produced, would this circumstance 
 afford any justification for doubting its certain truth ? Mr. 
 Mill answers this question in the affirmative ; we in the 
 negative. We maintain that the avouchment of each man's 
 existent faculties is his one infallible rule of certitude ; and 
 that a denial of this truth would degrade his knowledge to 
 a level below that of the brutes. 
 
 Question 4th. Mr. Mill implies that he accepts, as 
 certainly true, whatever his faculties would have declared, 
 had they not been denaturalized and artificialized by past 
 experience. Does he give any reason for this opinion ? 
 None whatever. He is wholly silent on the motive of 
 certitude. 
 
 Question 5th. What ground do we give for our own 
 doctrine, that whatever any man's existent faculties avouch 
 is known by him as certainly true ? We allege that in each 
 separate case this is known instinctively : and we give, as 
 our illustration of the term "instinctive," the keen and 
 instinctive certitude with which each man knows himself 
 to have experienced what his memory clearly and vividly 
 testifies. 
 
 We have been speaking on necessary truth in general, 
 and on the self-evident necessity of mathematical axioms 
 in particular. One or two further questions had better be 
 considered before we finally turn from this matter, though 
 Mr. Mill is not directly concerned with them. 
 
 I. One of these has been suggested to us by a non- 
 Catholic correspondent. He objects altogether to our 
 taking mathematical axioms as a sample of what we allege 
 about necessary truths in general. " Lines and angles," 
 he argues, are but imagined by geometricians. No fair 
 parallel can be made (he thinks) between such mere notions 
 on one hand, and facts on the other hand, such c.y. as
 
 224- The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 human actions, which have a real objective existence. Our 
 correspondent does not deny that there are various hypo- 
 thetically necessary truths concerning these imaginary 
 lines and angles ; but he denies that this furnishes any 
 kind of presumption, or even illustration, in favour of there 
 being e.fj. a necessary morality in human actions. He is 
 well aware that on this matter he has Mr. Mill for his 
 opponent, no less than ourselves ; and, in fact, we could 
 answer him at every point without going further for 
 materials than Mr. Mill's " Logic." Mr. Mill holds, that 
 every true proposition concerning angles and lines repre- 
 sents real objective truth. We will not, however, here draw 
 out Mr. Mill's (to our mind) conclusive argument for this 
 opinion ; because to do so would carry us a great deal too 
 far. We content ourselves with three replies, either of 
 which by itself appears to us decisive. 
 
 Firstly, we point to arithmetical truths. Let there be 
 16 rows of pebbles, each containing 18 : it is a necessary 
 truth that the whole number is 288. Omnipotence could 
 divide one pebble into two, or create new pebbles ; but it is 
 beyond the sphere of Omnipotence to effect that, so long as 
 there remain 1C rows of 18 pebbles each, the whole number 
 of pebbles should be either more or less than the sum of 
 two hundreds eight tens and eight units. Is not this an 
 external objective fact, if there be any such in the world ? 
 And the number of such arithmetical facts is simply in- 
 exhaustible. Then, secondly, take the theorems inex- 
 haustible in number of solid geometry. Omnipotence e.g. 
 can make a perfectly accurate parallelepiped : but it cannot 
 make one which shall not possess all the properties proved 
 by geometricians. And, thirdly, every proposition which 
 concerns areas may be most easily converted into a propo- 
 sition of solid geometry.* Even then, if it were true that 
 
 * Here is one instance of what we mean. Take a right-angled triangle, 
 and erect squares on all the aides as in Euclid I. 47. Suppose this figure to
 
 Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 225 
 
 lines and angles are mere geometrical notions, there 
 remains an inexhaustible number of mathematical pro- 
 positions which indubitably concern objective and external 
 facts. All these possess the attribute of necessity, and 
 they may very fairly be made samples of other necessary 
 truths which also concern objective external facts. 
 
 II. We now pass to an objection, which may imaginably 
 be made from an entirely different quarter, though no such 
 objection has happened to come within our knowledge. On 
 this, as on other occasions, we have often given, as a 
 special explanation of the term "necessary," that the 
 reversal of a necessary truth is external to the sphere of 
 Omnipotence. It is possible that here and there some 
 Catholic may have been startled by this expression, as 
 though it implied some disparagement of God's Attributes. 
 
 Now, since a very few words will suffice to remove any 
 such misapprehension, those few words had better be 
 inserted. 
 
 On a former occasion we laid down the following propo- 
 sition, as that for which in due time we shall contend. 
 We contend, with FF. Kleutgen and Liberatore, that all 
 necessary truths are founded on God's Essence ; that they 
 are what they are, because He is what He is. Let us 
 suppose, then, any Catholic to make the objection we 
 suggested above. We would ask him whether there is 
 any disparagement to God's Attributes in saying that He 
 cannot destroy Himself; that the destruction of God is 
 external to the sphere of Omnipotence. On the con- 
 trary, he will answer, God's Attributes would be intoler- 
 ably disparaged if He were not accounted Indestructible : 
 Existence is involved in His Essence. Secondly, we would 
 
 move parallelly with itself, and a solid figure is of course the result. Omui- 
 potence can create such a solid figure with perfect accuracy ; hut Omnipo- 
 tence cannot etlect that the portion of it generated by the square of tho 
 hypothenuse shall IHJ either greater or less than the sum of those two portions 
 generated by the squares of the sides.
 
 220 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 ask, whether there is any disparagement of God's Attributes, 
 in saying that He cannot change His Nature ; that He 
 cannot make Himself e.g. mendacious, unjust, unfaithful 
 to promises. On the contrary, the Immutability of His 
 Nature is perhaps what is in my mind more than anything 
 else, when I speak of His Greatness. But if He cannot 
 change His Nature, it follows that He cannot change what 
 is founded on His Nature ; that He cannot change necessary 
 truths. In saying, then, that the reversal of a necessary 
 truth is external to the sphere of Omnipotence, so far 
 from disparaging God's Attributes, we are extolling the 
 Immutability of His Nature. 
 
 III. We must preface our next inquiry by a short pre- 
 liminary statement. It is alleged by various phenomenists, 
 that there are no ideas in the mind, except copies in 
 various combinations of what has been cognized by the 
 senses.* "We need hardly say how intensely we deny this, 
 though we are not here considering the question at any 
 length. Take e.g. the idea " morally good." We have 
 maintained in a former essay that it is perfectly simple ; and 
 that perhaps no other idea can be named so constantly 
 recurring in one or other shape. Here we may add, that 
 there is no idea possessing more special characteristics of 
 its own, more readily and vividly cognizable ; while most 
 certainly it is no copy, or combination of copies, of any- 
 thing experienced by the senses. f In a future essay we 
 
 * This is not, however, Mr. Mill's opinion ; for (not to mention other ex- 
 ceptions he would make) we have already recounted his doctrine, that many 
 an idea is generated by " mental chemistry " from other ideas, which never- 
 theless does not consist of those ideas, nor is now any combination of them. 
 
 t The following passage from F. Kloutgen's work on the scholastic philo- 
 sophy will illustrate our meaning. We translate it from the French trans- 
 lation. The author is assailing the doctrine of innate ideas : 
 
 " But," it will be said, " should we be able, on sight of an individual action, 
 to conceive a maxim of morality, if we did not possess already certain notions 
 relative to the moral order ? Assuredly no. ... But are we at liberty thence 
 to infer that the mind finds in itself as innate those earlier ideas, or else that 
 it must have received them from some external source [d'ailleurs] ? Not at
 
 Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 227 
 
 hope to defend a similar proposition, in regard to the idea 
 "cause;" and in like manner the idea "necessary" is 
 certainly no copy, or combination of copies, of anything 
 cognized by the senses. 
 
 The question for which we have been preparing the 
 way is (as far as we see) of no practical importance ; but 
 for the sake of clearness, it may be worth while briefly 
 to enter on it. Is the idea " necessary " a simple or 
 complex idea? "We suggested on a former occasion that 
 it is complex, and that a " necessary " truth precisely 
 means a truth " of which there is no cause." Subsequent 
 reflection has induced us to doubt the truth of this sug- 
 gestion ; and has inclined us to the opinion that the idea 
 " necessary " admits no such analysis, and is, in fact, 
 altogether simple. Take the proposition, " every necessary 
 truth is uncaused." Is this a purely explicative proposi- 
 tion? Does the word " uncaused " merely express what 
 was already in my mind when I used the word " necessary ? " 
 or, on the contrary, does it add something to the former 
 idea ? If our reader gives the former answer, he holds the 
 opinion which we suggested in the essay we have referred 
 to; if he gives the latter answer, he holds the opinion to 
 which we now rather incline. 
 
 We now pass to what we have called the keystone of 
 Mr. Mill's " affirmative " position. His whole positive 
 doctrine from first to last depends on the proposition, that 
 the uniformity of nature can be proved by experience. We 
 did not deny that this uniformity could be proved by intro- 
 ducing premisses of that kind which Mr. Mill rejects ; but 
 we denied that it can be proved (as he is required on hi* 
 
 till ; for it is sufficient that the mind possesses, besides sensibility, u higher 
 power of knowledge, reason. . . . As we perceive in tho object, by means of 
 the senses, those phenomena which correspond tj the nature of tin- senses ; so 
 wo know, by the reason, that which is exclusively within the sphere of th:it 
 faculty " (Uiss. i. n. 01:5).
 
 228 Tlic Philosophy of Thrivm. 
 
 principles to prove it) from experienced phenomena alone. 
 In the new edition of his " Logic " Air. Mill replies to our 
 criticisms (vol. ii. pp. 109-111) ; and what we have now 
 to do is to rejoin on his reply. 
 
 " All physical science," we said, " depends for its 
 existence on the fundamental proposition, that the laws 
 of nature are uniform : " by which proposition " we mean, 
 that no physical phenomenon takes place without a corre- 
 sponding physical antecedent, and that the same physical 
 antecedent is invariably followed by the same physical 
 consequent." Mr. Mill professes to establish conclu- 
 sively, on mere grounds of experience, that such is the 
 fact ; at all events, throughout the whole of this planet. 
 ("Logic," book iii. chap. 21.) "His reasoning," we said, 
 " amounts at best to this. If in any part of the world 
 there existed a breach in the uniformity of nature, that 
 breach must by this time have been discovered by one or 
 other of the eminent men who have given themselves to 
 physical experiment. But most certainly, adds Mr. Mill, 
 none such has been discowred, or mankind would be sure 
 to have heard of it ; consequently, such is his conclusion, 
 none such exists." Mr. Mill tacitly admits that we have 
 stated his argument quite correct!}'. We, then, thus pro- 
 ceeded : 
 
 Now, in order to estimate the force of this argument, let us 
 suppose for a moment that the fact were as Mr. Mill represents 
 it ; let us suppose for a moment that persons of scientific educa- 
 tion were unanimous in holding that there has been no well- 
 authenticated case of a breach in the uniformity of nature. 
 What inference could be drawn from this? Be it observed, 
 that the number of natural agents constantly at work is incal- 
 culably large; and that the observed cases of uniformity in their 
 action must be immeasurably fewer than one-thousandth of the 
 whole. Scientific men, we assume for the moment, Lave dis- 
 covered that in a certain proportion of instances immeasurably 
 fewer than one-thousandth of the whole a certain fact has 
 prevailed, the fact of uniformity; and they have not found a
 
 Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 229 
 
 single instance in which that fact does not prevail. Are they 
 justified, we ask, in inferring from these premisses that the fact 
 is universal ? Surely the question answers itself. Let us make 
 a very grotesque supposition, in which, however, the conclusion 
 would really be tried according to the arguments adduced. In 
 some desert of Africa there is an enormous connected edifice, 
 surrounding some vast space, in which dwell certain reasonable 
 beings who are unable to leave the enclosure. In this edifice 
 are more than a thousand chambers, which some years ago were 
 entirely locked up, and the keys no one knew where. By 
 constant diligence twenty-five keys have been found, out of 
 the whole number; and the corresponding chambers, situated 
 promiscuously throughout the edifice, have been opened. Each 
 chamber, when examined, is found to be in the precise shape of 
 a dodecahedron. Are the inhabitants justified, on that account, 
 in holding with certitude that the remaining 975 chambers are 
 built on the same plan ? 
 
 Mr. Mill frankly replies : 
 
 Not with perfect certitude, but . . . with so high a degree of 
 probability that they would be justified in acting upon the 
 presumption until an exception appeared. 
 
 This we, of course, quite admit ; but it falls very far 
 short of Mr. Mill's thesis, and he therefore thus proceeds : 
 
 Dr. Ward's argument, however, does not touch mine as it 
 stands in the text. My argument is grounded on the fact that 
 the uniformity of the course of nature as a whole, is constituted 
 by the uniform sequences of special effects from special natural 
 agencies ; that the number of these natural agencies in the part 
 of the universe known to us is not incalculable, nor even ex- 
 tremely great, that we have now reason to think that at least 
 the far greater number of them, if not separately, at least in 
 some of the combinations into which they enter, have been made 
 sufficiently amenable to observation, to have enabled us actually 
 to ascertain some of their fixed laws; and that this amount of 
 experience justifies the same degree of assurance that the course 
 of nature is uniform throughout, which we previously had of 
 the uniformity of sequence among the phenomena best known 
 to us. This view of the subject, if correct, destroys the force 
 of Dr. Ward's first argument.
 
 230 The Philosophy of T/n'i*ni. 
 
 We do not see, on the contrary, how it touches our 
 argument ever so faintly. Mr. Mill accounts it to be 
 proved by experience that certain "natural agencies" 
 produce certain "special effects." We totally deny that 
 this has been proved, or that it can be proved, on mere 
 grounds of experience. There are none of these natural 
 agencies which can be cited more favourably for Mr. Mill's 
 purpose than that of gravitation. We ask, then, this 
 simple question : How could Mr. Mill show, by mere 
 experience, that particles throughout the earth (and 
 universe) attract each other in that particular way which 
 is spoken of as " the law of gravitation ? " What we said 
 on that general truth the uniformity of nature, we say 
 equally on that particular truth the law of gravitation. 
 The number of particles of matter in the universe is in- 
 calculably large, and the observed cases of their acting 
 according to the law of gravitation must be immeasurably 
 fewer than one-thousandth part of the whole. Scientific 
 men have discovered that in a certain proportion of in- 
 stances immeasurably fewer than one-thousandth of the 
 whole a certain fact has prevailed, the fact of gravitation ; 
 and they have not found a single instance in which that 
 fact does not prevail. Are they justified, we ask, in in- 
 ferring from these premisses that the fact is certainly 
 universal? Why, Mr. Mill has already answered in the 
 negative a question precisely equivalent. The very same 
 reasoning which showed how impossible it is to prove by 
 experience the uniformity of nature in general, shows 
 equally how impossible it is to prove by experience the law 
 of gravitation in particular. And the same remark is 
 applicable to all the other " natural agencies " which Mr. 
 Mill commemorates. His attempted answer only avails to 
 exhibit, more pointedly than it might have been seen 
 before, the extraordinary weakness of his case. 
 
 Our second argument was the following:
 
 Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 231 
 
 But, secondly, it is as far as possible from being true that 
 men of scientific education are unanimous in holding that there 
 has been no well-authenticated case of breach in the uniformity 
 of nature. On the contrary, even to this day the majority of 
 such persons believe in Christianity, and hold the miracles 
 revealed in Scripture to be on the whole accurately reported. 
 The majority of scientific men believe that at one time persons 
 on whom the shadow of Peter passed were thereby freed from 
 their infirmities ; and that at another time garments brought 
 from the body of Paul expelled sickness and demoniacal pos- 
 session. (Acts v. 15; xix. 12.) Will Mr. Mill allege that 
 S. Peter's shadow, or that garments from S. Paul's body, were 
 the physical cause of a cure, as lotions and bandages might be ? 
 Of course not. Here, then, is a series of physical phenomena, 
 resulting without physical cause; and Catholics to this day 
 consider that breaches in the uniformity of nature are matters 
 of every-day occurrence. Even then, if it were true it seems 
 to us (as we have already said) most untrue that Mr. Mill's 
 conclusion legitimately follows from his premisses, still he 
 cannot even approximate to establishing those premisses until he 
 have first disproved Catholicity and next disproved the whole 
 truth of Christianity. 
 
 Mr. Mill thus replies, the italics being his own : 
 
 Dr. Ward's second argument is, that many or most persons, 
 both scientific and unscientific, believe that there arc well- 
 authenticated cases of breach in the uniformity of nature, 
 namely miracles. Neither does this consideration touch what I 
 have said in the text. I admit no other uniformity in the 
 events of nature than the law of Causation ; and (as I have 
 explained in the chapter of this volume which treats of the 
 Grounds of Disbelief) a miracle is no exception to that law. In 
 every case of alleged miracle, a new antecedent is aftirmed to 
 exist ; a counteract ing cause, namely the volition of a supernatural 
 being. To all, therefore, to whom beings with superhuman 
 power over nature are a vera causa, a miracle is a case of the 
 Law of Universal Causation, not a deviation from it. 
 
 AVI uit an astonishing collapse is here both of memory 
 and of scientific intelligence ! Firstly, of memory. Nothing 
 can be more express than Mr. Mill's words, where he is 
 first occupied with setting forth the uniformity of nature.
 
 232 The Philosophy of Thf'ivm. 
 
 "When in the course of this inquiry," he says ("Logic," 
 vol. i. p. 876), " I speak of the cause of any phenomenon, I 
 do not mean a cause which is not itself a phenomenon . . . 
 the causes with which I concern myself are not efficient 
 but physical causes. . . . Between the phenomena which 
 exist at any moment and the phenomena which exist at the 
 succeeding instant there is an invariable order of succes- 
 sion." Is a volition, then, of the Invisible God a 
 phenomenon ? Mr. Mill laid down at starting, that he 
 recognizes no causes which are not phenomena ; and now 
 he tells us that God's volition may count as a cause. 
 
 Secondly, what a collapse of scientific intelligence ! 
 Mr. Mill professes to lay down a doctrine on the uniformity 
 of nature,* which shall suffice as a reasonable basis for 
 physical and other science. Yet what is the view he now 
 professes? He now advocates no doctrine inconsistent 
 with the supposition that there may be as many deities on 
 Olympus as Homer himself believed in ; and that each one 
 of these deities is arbitrarily interfering with the course of 
 nature every minute of every day. In all these cases " the 
 volition of a supernatural being" might count as " a new 
 antecedent," a " counteracting cause : " so that every 
 arbitrary and irregular phenomenon so brought about " is 
 a case of the law of universal causation," as he says, and 
 " not a deviation from it." Why, it is plain that if such 
 constant interference took place, there would be no " course 
 of nature," nor what he ordinarily calls " causation," at 
 all, and physical science would vanish from the sphere of 
 human knowledge. In other words, if we are to trust his 
 present language, he does not profess to prove that there is 
 any uniformity of nature whatever, or that phj'sical science 
 can reasonably exist. f 
 
 * He calls it " the law of universal causation ; " but we cannot ourselves 
 use this term, because of the vital difference with Mr. Mill on " causation," 
 which we are to set forth in a future essay. 
 
 t It may most fairly be asked, how belief in the Christian miracles is
 
 Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 233 
 
 It is quite true (as Mr. Mill implies in the words we 
 have quoted) that, in his comment on Hume's argument 
 against miracles, he had made the very same blunder -which 
 he now repeats. We have always attributed the former 
 blunder to the same cause, to which we also attribute the 
 one before us. Mr. Mill, we think, held so disparaging an 
 estimate of the philosophy which admits the existence of 
 miracles, that in dealing with it he was satisfied with the 
 first plausible argument which came to hand ; and did not 
 trouble himself to examine its merits very closely. 
 
 We further adduced a third argument : 
 
 But the strongest objection against the sufficiency of Mr. 
 Mill's argument still remains to be stated. " All our interest," 
 says Mr. Bain most truly, " is concentrated on ichat is yet to be ; 
 the present and the past are of value only as a clue to the events 
 that are to come." Let us even suppose, then, for argument's sake 
 that Mr. Mill had fully proved the past and present uniformity 
 of nature ; still the main difficulty would continue, viz. how he 
 proposes to show that such uniformity will last one moment 
 beyond the present. It is quite an elementary remark that, 
 whenever a proposition is grounded on mere experience, nothing 
 whatever can be known or even guessed concerning its truth, 
 except within the reach of possible observation. For this very 
 reason Mr. Mill professes himself unable to know, or even to 
 assign any kind of probability to the supposition that nature 
 proceeds on uniform laws in distant stellar regions. But 
 plainly there are conditions of time, as well as of space, which 
 preclude the possibility of observation ; and it is as simply 
 impossible for men to know from mere experience what will 
 take place on earth to-morrow, as to know from mere experience 
 what takes place in the planet Jupiter to-day. 
 
 Here is Mr. Mill's reply, with his own italics : 
 
 Dr. Ward's last and, as he says, strongest argument is the 
 familiar one of Reid, Stewart, and their followers that what- 
 ever knowledge experience gives us of the past and present, it 
 gives us none of the future. I confess that I see no force 
 
 consistent with belief in the existence of physical science. We answered this 
 question, however, directly nnd expressly in our essay " Science, Prayer, und 
 Miracles," (vol. ii. of this collection).
 
 234. Tltt Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 whatever in this argument. Wherein does a future fact differ 
 from a present or a past fact, except in their merely momentary 
 relation to the human beings at present in existence? The 
 answer made by Priestly, in his examination of Reid, seems to 
 me sufficient, viz. that though we have had no experience of 
 what is future, we have had abundant experience of what was 
 future. The " leap in the dark " (as Professor Bain calls it) 
 from the past to the future is exactly as much in the dark, and 
 no more, as the leap from a past which we have personally 
 observed to a past which we have not. I agree with Mr. Bain 
 in the opinion that the resemblance of what we have not 
 experienced to what we have is, by a law of our nature, pre- 
 sumed through the mere energy of the idea before experience 
 has proved it. This psychological truth, however, is not, as Dr. 
 Ward, when criticizing Mr. Bain, appears to think, inconsistent 
 with the logical truth that experience does prove it. The proof 
 comes after the presumption, and consists in its invariable 
 verification by experience when the experience arrives. The fact 
 which while it was future could not be observed, having as yet 
 no existence, is always, when it becomes present and can be 
 observed, found conformable to the past. 
 
 This rejoinder is more surprising than even the two 
 former. Any one who attentively peruses it will see that 
 it comes to this. We say that, on Mr. Mill's theory, no 
 one, during the year 1874, has any solid ground whatever 
 for supposing as even probable, that fire will burn or water 
 will quench thirst in the year 1875. Mr. Mill replies, that 
 at the end of 1875 he will have ground for knowing that 
 such has been the case during that past year. Dr. Bain 
 gays very truly, that " the present and past are of value 
 only as a clue to " the future ; and we argued that, on Mr. 
 Mill's theory, they are no clue whatever to the future. 
 That is true, replies Mr. Mill ; but still what is now future 
 will be known as soon as it shall have become past. Let 
 us observe what comes of this. We find from his auto- 
 biography that " the principal outward purpose of his life " 
 (p. 67) was so to act on mankind through the laws of 
 human nature, that various intellectual, political, and social
 
 Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 235 
 
 results might ensue, which he regarded as ameliorations of 
 unspeakable moment. Nevertheless according to the 
 very principles which he accounted to be essentially in- 
 volved in such amelioration he had no ground whatever, 
 at any one moment, for thinking it (we will not say certain, 
 but) ever so faintly probable, that the laws of human 
 nature were in future to continue the same. And yet if 
 they did not continue the same, his whole life would have 
 been one sustained blunder. 
 
 We made one final comment on Mr. Mill's treatment of 
 these subjects, which he has left entirely unnoticed. 
 
 In considering the question " on what grounds we expect 
 that the sun will rise to-morrow," Mr. Mill (" Logic," vol. ii. p. 
 80) falls into a mistake very unusual with him ; for he totally 
 misapprehends the difficulty which he has to encounter. He 
 argues we think quite successfully that there is a probability 
 amounting to practical certainty that the sun will rise to- 
 morrow, on the hypothesis that the uniformity of nature so long con- 
 tinues. But the question he has to face is, what reason can he 
 have for knowing, or even guessing, that the uniformity of 
 nature will so long continue? And to this, the true question at 
 issue, he does not so much as attempt a reply. 
 
 Nothing, then, can be more conspicuous and undeniable 
 than Mr. Mill's break-down in what is the one keystone of 
 his " affirmative " philosophical position. He professes to 
 build a philosophy on the exclusive basis of experience ; 
 and he heartily admits that such construction is impossible, 
 unless the philosopher first establishes the uniformity of 
 nature. But if he establishes that truth on some other 
 basis than experience, he docs not build his philosophy on 
 the exclusive basis of experience. Mr. Mill, then, is re- 
 quired by his principles to prove the uniformity of nature 
 from the mere facts of experience ; and we have now seen 
 how pitiably he fails in his attempt. We are very confident 
 that where ho has failed no other phenomenist will 
 succeed ; but if any one makes the attempt, we promise
 
 23G The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 beforehand to meet him straightforwardly and publicly. 
 Meanwhile, we consider ourselves to have shown, that 
 nothing, at all events, can be more ignominious than Mr. 
 Mill's philosophical position, whether on its " aggressive " 
 side or its " affirmative." 
 
 The paper of ours to which Mr. Mill replied, was 
 followed by another on " the foundation of morality." 
 In our next essay we hope to supplement that paper 
 by one encountering him in full detail on that most vital 
 theme, his denial of freewill.
 
 VI. 
 MR. MILL'S DENIAL OF FREEWILL.* 
 
 ON the present occasion our contention against Mr. Mill 
 will be purely psychological, though connected, of course, 
 with most important metaphysical questions, such as 
 morality and again causation. On every question between 
 intuitionists and phenomenists, we consider Mr. Mill by 
 far our ablest opponent, as we have often said. But on 
 the particular theme now before us, he is pre-eminently 
 the most suitable champion we could assail; for "the 
 theory of volition and of responsibility," says its advocate 
 in the Westminster Review (Oct. 1873, p. 305), which was 
 "first stated in this country by Hobbes," "is now asso- 
 ciated most closely with the name of Mr. J. S. Mill." In 
 addition, however, to the two works in which Mr. Mill 
 treats this theme, we have also named at the head of our 
 essay Dr. Bain's well-known treatise, which is identical 
 in doctrine with Mr. Mill's volumes. And in our present 
 essay we propose to join issue with Mr. Mill on a mere 
 question of fact, in regard to experienced phenomena. He 
 holds, "as a truth of experience," "that volitions do in 
 fact follow determinate moral antecedents, with the same 
 
 * F.fuminntion of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy. By JOHN STTAKT 
 Mil, i.. Fourth Edition. London : Longmans. 
 
 A f>y*trm of Logic, Raliocinative and Inductive. By JOHN STUART MILL. 
 Kifjlith Kdition. London : Longmans. 
 
 The Emotion* and the Will. By ALEXANDER BAIN. London : J. W. 
 Parker.
 
 23S The Philosophy of TJieiam. 
 
 uniformity and the same certainty as physical effects follow 
 their physical causes:" these moral antecedents being 
 "desires, occasions, habits, and dispositions, combined with 
 outward circumstances suitable to call those internal in- 
 centives into action" (" On Hamilton," pp. 576, 577). He 
 maintains, that if we knew any given " person thoroughly, 
 and knew all the inducements which are acting on him, we 
 could foretell his conduct with as much certainty as we can 
 predict any physical event " (" Logic," vol. ii. p. 422). This 
 doctrine has commonly been called " the doctrine of philo- 
 sophical necessity," and we think the name a very suitable 
 one. Mr. Mill, however, prefers the name " determinism ; " 
 and in this he apparently accords with the great body of 
 his fellow -thinkers : by all means, therefore, so let it be. 
 
 For ourselves, as we have already implied, we shall not 
 attempt in our present article to establish the full doctrine 
 of Freewill; because this cannot be done until we have 
 treated " causation," as we hope to do in the next essay 
 of our series.* On the present occasion we shall content 
 ourselves with disproving (as we consider) the psychical 
 fact w r hich Mr. Mill alleges. He calls his theory "deter- 
 minism ; " and we will call our own, therefore, by the name 
 of " indeterminism." The full doctrine of Freewill includes, 
 indeed, the doctrine of indeterminism ; but it includes also 
 a certain doctrine on the causation of human acts, which 
 we do not here profess to establish. 
 
 It is always of pre-eminent importance in controversy 
 to understand rightly the position of one's opponent, but 
 on no other question (we think) is this so necessary as on 
 the present. We will beg, therefore, our readers' most 
 careful attention, while we draw out what we apprehend to 
 
 * It ifl an inconvenience in philosophical controversy, that not un- 
 frequently some particular themo has to be treated piecemeal, in order that 
 nothing may be assumed without proof. It would have been indefinitely more 
 inconvenient if we had attempted to treat causation before we had dealt with 
 determinism.
 
 Mr. MiWs Denial of Freewill. 239 
 
 be Mr. Mill's theory, at a length which to them may pos- 
 sibly appear tedious and superfluous. As we proceed, we 
 will cite in footnotes illustrative passages from Mr. Mill 
 himself and from Dr. Bain. The determinist, then, may 
 be supposed to express himself as follows : 
 
 "By the term ' motive ' I understand the desire of some 
 pleasure which may be gained, or the aversion to some 
 pain which may be prevented, by some given course of 
 action.* For the sake of greater compendiousness, indeed, 
 I will call the avoidance of pain a negative pleasure ; and 
 I can then omit the second part of the above definition. 
 When a man in a boat sees the approach of a storm, and 
 rows to save his life, his motive is his desiring that negative 
 pleasure, the escape from death. 
 
 " If any motive at any moment acted alone, it would 
 as a matter of course be followed by action in the in- 
 dicated direction. But almost always conflicting motives 
 are at work; or, in other words, the pleasure desired 
 is seen to be unattainable, except with some concomitant 
 pain. Even a flower cannot be plucked without the 
 trouble of stooping. But in many cases there are power- 
 ful conflicting motives in several different directions. If 
 I enter on course A, I shall certainly or probably derive 
 pleasure M; but on the other hand, I shall certainly 
 or probably endure pain N : while at the same time, by 
 pursuing course A, I shall be prevented from pursuing 
 course B, or pursuing it at least with equal diligence ; 
 which said course B offers special pleasures of its own, 
 though these of course accompanied with its own pains, 
 and so on indefinitely. Under these circumstances, an 
 illustration of my position may be derived from mechanics. 
 
 * u A motive, being a desire or an aversion, is proportional to the plm- 
 santiu'ris us conceived by us of the thing desired, or the hurmfulncss of tlio 
 thing shunned." (" On Hamilton," p. G0, r >.) 80 Dr. Bain : " Various motives 
 [irwnt or prospective pleasures and jiaiint concur in urging us to act" 
 (p. .WO).
 
 24-0 Tlie Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 A certain physical point, possessing certain intrinsic 
 qualities, is solicited at this moment by several attracting 
 forces : such being the case, it moves definitely and de- 
 cisively ; not perhaps in the direction of any one force, but 
 at all events in a direction resulting from the joint influence 
 of all. The conflicting motives which act on my will are 
 analogous to the conflicting forces which act on the physical 
 point ; and my will commonly under these circumstances 
 moves definitely and decisively, not perhaps in the exact 
 direction of any one motive, but at all events in the direc- 
 tion which results from the joint influence of them all.* 
 From time to time, no doubt, there are pauses for delibera- 
 tion ; and there are cases, also, in which there exists for 
 a while much vacillation and (as one may say) vibration of 
 the will. I will expound these cases presently. But in the 
 enormous majority of instances even where there are 
 powerful motives acting on some side which does not prevail 
 there is no such vacillation at all, but one definite and 
 decisive resultant. Take as an instance, the demeanour in 
 battle of some brave soldier. He is stimulated by many 
 impelling motives : by a certain savage pleasure in aggres- 
 siveness, which is partly natural and is partly due to past 
 habit ; by desire of his country's success ; by zeal, perhaps, 
 for the cause in which his country is engaged ; by desire of 
 his countrymen's and of the world's applause ; by repug- 
 nance to the infamy which would follow a display of 
 cowardice, etc. Yet the motives are in themselves extremely 
 
 * Determinists " affirm as a truth of experience that volitions do, in point 
 of fact, follow determinate moral antecedents, with the same uniformity and 
 with the same certainty as physical effects follow their physical causes. 
 These moral antecedents are desires, aversions, habits, and dispositions, com- 
 bined with outward circumstances suited to call those internal incentives 
 into action. All these again are effects of causes; those of them which are 
 mental being consequences of education and of other moral and physical 
 influences." (" On Hamilton," pp. 576, 577.) So Dr. Bain says in effect that 
 the will's act is in every case determined by " the operation of the motive 
 forces of pleasurable and painful sensibility, coupled with the mental 
 spoutaneousness of the system " (p. 553).
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill. 241 
 
 strong which solicit him in the opposite direction. He is 
 vividly conscious (even though implicitly) of the danger 
 to which he is exposed ; of the fearful suffering, and death 
 itself, which may not improbably befall him ; he remembers 
 his wife and children whom he has left at home, and the 
 doubt whether he shall ever be with them again ; he has 
 seen, perhaps, his dear friend shot dead by his side, and 
 would be glad to have some brief time for the indulgence of 
 grief ; the whole scene around him is ghastly and repulsive 
 in the extreme. Yet in the teeth of these repelling con- 
 siderations, there is not one moment's faltering or hesita- 
 tion : the antagonistic motives are as nothing when 
 conflicting with those which stir him to action. Or take a 
 son, passionately devoted to his mother and tending her 
 in her old age. In vain he is solicited by this, that, and 
 the other antagonistic gratification : the one master passion 
 overbears all other motives, promptly and without a struggle. 
 And so, if you look at the lives of men in general, you will 
 find that, during very far the greater part of their existence, 
 they are pursuing without hesitation one very definite line 
 of conduct, though there is many a motive simultaneously 
 present, which by itself has a very strong tendency to 
 divert them from their course. 
 
 " Here I can explain what I mean by the power of a 
 motive : I mean its tendency to influence this or that man's 
 conduct, at this or that particular instant, by means of the 
 pleasure which it proposes. That assemblage of motives, 
 which influences the heroic soldier or the passionately 
 loving son in one direction, is indefinitely 'more powerful,' 
 ' stronger ' or, in other words, indefinitely more suggestive 
 of positive or negative pleasure than that which influences 
 him in the other.* Here, however, I must make two 
 
 * " Various motives present or prospective pleasures and pains concur 
 
 in urging me to act : the result of the conflict shows that one group ia 
 
 stronger tliiin another, and that is the whole case." (liain, p. f>o().) " It m 
 
 only an identical proposition to affirm that the greatest of two pleasures, or 
 
 vol.. I. K
 
 242 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 explanations, to prevent very serious misconception of my 
 meaning. 
 
 " Firstly. The natural difference of character among 
 men is enormous ; and this enormous difference is enor- 
 mously increased by difference of education and of past life. 
 That which may be a most powerful motive to one man, 
 will be a very weak one to another, and an actual cause of 
 repulsion to a third. Nay, so moody and changeable is 
 human nature, not only at different periods of his life, but 
 even at different moments of the same day the same object 
 is desired by the same man with very varying degrees of 
 intensity. This is partly caused, indeed, by the fact that 
 the nervous and muscular systems are so very differently 
 affected at different instants ; so that the very same object 
 is indefinitely more attractive at one instant than at 
 another.* Nor, again, is there any more common pheno- 
 menon than that a man's desire of some immediate 
 gratification is indefinitely stronger at the moment than 
 his desire of what he well knows to be far more to his 
 permanent welfare ; or, in other words, that the thought of 
 enjoying such gratification is at the moment far more 
 suggestive to him of pleasure than is the thought of 
 promoting his own permanent welfare. 
 
 what appears such, sways the resulting action ; for it is the resulting notion 
 that alone determines which is the greater." (Ibid. p. 447.) Mr. Mill is 
 express on this point: "Those who say that the will follows the strongest 
 motive, do not mean the motive which is strongest in relation to the icill, or, 
 in other words, that the will follows what it does follow. They mean the 
 motive which is strongest in relation to pain and pleasure ; since a motive, 
 being a desire or aversion, is proportional to the pleasantness as conceived by 
 us of the thing desired, or the painfulness of the tiling shunned." (" On 
 Hamilton," p. 605.) There is another passage of Mr. Mill's, which may be 
 cited as illustrating his doctrine in another point of view: "I dispute 
 altogether that we are conscious of being able to act in opposition to the 
 strongest present desire or aversion. The difference between a bad and a 
 good man is not that the latter acts in opposition to his strongest desire : it 
 is, that his desire to do right and his aversion to doing wrong are strong enough 
 to overcome and in the case of perfect virtue to silence any other desire or 
 aversion which may conflict with them." (Ibid. p. 585.) What is conscience, 
 he elsewhere asks, except a desire " the desire to do right ? " (Ibid. p. 583.) 
 * Bain, p. 442, and elsewhere.
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill. 243 
 
 " Secondly. Very prominently under the head of 
 ' pain ' ranks ' difficulty : ' such difficulty, e.g., as accom- 
 panies any attempt at breaking through a firmly established 
 habit. Suppose, e.g., I have established a very firm habit 
 of early rising. When the proper moment comes, very 
 strong motives on the other side are spontaneously and at 
 once counterbalanced by the difficulty of breaking through 
 my habit. And similar phenomena are by no means con- 
 fined to the case of habits. As one of a thousand instances, 
 there is a very strong impulse with some men, to throw 
 themselves down a precipice if they are standing close to 
 its edge ; an impulse which it requires powerful effort to 
 withstand. I am not, of course, taking a case where the 
 man's head becomes so dizzy that he loses his power of 
 remaining on the cliff. I am supposing a man with full 
 power over his actions, but conscious of this strange and 
 eccentric impulse. This impulse then acts as a strong 
 motive : and yet it cannot in any obvious sense of the 
 words be called either a desire of pleasure or an aversion 
 of pain. In fact, however, it is the latter. There is very 
 great difficulty i.e. 'pain' in resisting his natural 
 tendency to throw himself down, and strong motives on 
 the other side are required to counterbalance this difficulty.* 
 
 * The following passage from Mr. Mill's " Logic " deserves very careful 
 attention : 
 
 "As we proceed in the formation of habits and beccane accustomed to will 
 a particular act or a particular course of conduct because it is pleasurable, 
 we at last continue to will it without any reference to its being pleasurable. 
 Although, from some change in us or in our circumstances, we have ceased to 
 find any pleasure in the action, or perhaps to anticipate any pleasure in con- 
 sequence of it, we still continue to desire the action, and consequently to do 
 it. In this manner it is that habits of hurtful excess continue to bo practised 
 although they have ceased to be pleasurable; and in this manner also it is 
 that the willingness to persevere in the course which he has chosen does not 
 desert the moral hero, even when the reward, however real, which he doubtless 
 receives from the consciousness of well-doing, is anything but an equivalent 
 for the sufferings he may undergo or the wishes which ho may have to 
 renounce" (vol. ii. p. 488, 489). 
 
 The last clause of this sentence, if regard be had to its rhetoric, is one of 
 the numerous passages in Mr. Mill's works which imply a theory on morals
 
 244 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 " I have hitherto considered that great majority of 
 instances in which conflicting motives issue in a definite 
 and decisive resultant. But I admitted at starting that 
 this is not always the case. Sometimes, e.g., there occurs a 
 pause for deliberation. But what more easity explicable 
 than this on my theory ? The person pauses that he may 
 more fully understand the full nature and consequences of 
 proposed alternatives, before deciding which he prefers. 
 You will say perhaps that he sometimes pauses in order to 
 consider whether some action to which he is attracted be 
 consistent with morality; and I admit this. But, then, 
 this very fact implies that his desire of performing that 
 action is not so strong as his desire of acting in accordance 
 with morality.* 
 
 " So much on the particular case of pausing. Other 
 
 indefinitely truer and nobler than that in which lie philosophically acquiesced. 
 But its logical meaning is made obvious by the earlier clause. " Habits of 
 hurtful excess continue to be practised, although they have ceased to be 
 pleasurable," simply because their abandonment is so intensely painful. In 
 like manner, then, according to Mr. Mill, the difficulty of acting in opposi- 
 tion to a strongly formed virtuous habit affords a motive which will often 
 counterbalance very strong adverse solicitations. We may add that there arc 
 passagi-s similar to the above in his work "On Hamilton," in pp. 58S, 58;), 
 and in p. 605. 
 
 As to such other impulses as those mentioned in the text, Dr. Bain draws 
 especial attention to them (p. 433). Singularly enough, he adds that they 
 "are cases of action where we cannot discover any connection betwt en 
 pleasure enjoyed or pain averted, and the energy of active devotion made 
 manifest;" a statement which seems at first sight to subvert his whole 
 theory. He says, however, that " we must look for the explanation of this 
 influence, which traverses the proper course of volition, in the undue or 
 morbid persistency of certain ideas in the mind." In various parts of his 
 works, Dr. Bain lays stress on these " fixed ideas ; " and it is by no means easy 
 to see how he reconciles his language concerning them with his general 
 theory. One mode of doing so is that given in the text. In some passages 
 he seems to imply a different explanation ; viz. that these fixed ideas imply 
 a certain mild form of quasi-insanity ; and that acts done under their influence 
 are not properly volitions. We see no reason for pursuing further this 
 inquiry, because our reader will see clearly, as we proceed, that it can in no 
 way affect our own argument. 
 
 * " If I elect to abstain " from murder, " in what sense am I conscious 
 that I could have elected to commit the crime ? Only if I had desired to 
 commit it with a desire stronger than my horror of murder ; not with one 
 less strong." (Mill, " On Hamilton," p. 583.)
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill. 245 
 
 cases, again, no doubt exist, exemplifying what I have 
 called vacillation and vibration of will. The devoted son, 
 e.g. whom I just now mentioned, may fall in love, and 
 there will at times be much vacillation and vibration 
 between his respective desires of seeing the 3 r oung lady, 
 and of solacing his mother's old age. Such cases, however, 
 are very easily explained on my principles ; or rather, 
 indeed, my principles would lead me a priori to be sure 
 that there must be these cases of vacillation and vibration. 
 Where the motives on one side are notably stronger than 
 those on the other, there results a definite and decisive 
 spontaneous impulse ; but where the motives are very 
 nearly balanced, there must result (on the same principles) 
 vacillation and vibration. During a closely balanced con- 
 flict of motives, there is not a single instant in which there 
 does not pass across the mind some thought which adds 
 strength to, or takes it from, one or other of the contending 
 powers. Some time, then, must necessarily elapse before 
 the balance adjusts itself between forces neither of which 
 is for any two successive instants the same ; and this time 
 is, of course, one of vacillation and vibration.* If the 
 relative power of the two motives is constantly changing, 
 no wonder that the resultant is constantly changing 
 also. 
 
 " Here, then, is the simple doctrine of determinism ; 
 which I take to be a mere interpretation of universal 
 experience, a statement in words of what every one is 
 internally convinced of.f Every human being at every 
 moment is infallibly determined by the law of his nature to 
 
 * The last sentence is almost verbatim Mr. Mill's ("On Hamilton," p. 584). 
 An opponent had objected that " balancing one motive against another is not 
 willing, but judging." Mr. Mill replies: "The state of mind I am speaking 
 of is not an intellectual, but an emotional state. If there were any indis- 
 pensable act of judging in this state, it would only be judging which of the 
 two pains or pleasures was the greatest; and to regurd this as the operativu 
 force would lie conceding the point in favour of uecessuriauiaiu." 
 
 t These ure Mr. Mill's words in his '' Logic" (vol. ii. p. 1'Jli).
 
 246 The Philosophy of Tlteism. 
 
 choose that course of conduct which is apprehended by 
 him as the more pleasurable or the less painful." 
 
 Now, we are disposed to agree with by far the larger part 
 of all this ; and here is, in fact, a hopeful augury for the 
 discussion, because by consequence the issue is so very 
 much narrowed. We object, indeed, entirely, as a matter 
 of words, to using the term " motive " in its deterministic 
 sense ; for to our mind a large share of the confusion 
 which has so overspread the controversy has originated in 
 the equivocal use of this term. We will adopt, therefore, 
 the word "attraction," in a very similar sense to that 
 which determinists express by the term "motive." We 
 will call by the name of an "attraction" every thought, 
 which proposes some pleasure, positive or negative, to be 
 gained by some act or course of action ; and we will call 
 one attraction stronger than another, if the pleasure 
 proposed by the former is apprehended as greater is 
 more attractive at the moment than that proposed by 
 the latter. If the thought proposes " positive " pleasure, 
 it will be a " positive " in the other case a " negative " 
 attraction. 
 
 This terminology being understood, it is very plain (as 
 determinists urge) that every man, during by far the 
 greater part of his life, is solicited by conflicting attrac- 
 tions ; and it is further a manifest and undeniable matter 
 of fact that, in the very large majority of such instances, a 
 certain definite and decisive inclination or impulse of the 
 will spontaneously ensues. Further, we are thoroughly 
 disposed to agree with Mr. Mill, that this spontaneous 
 inclination or impulse is due to the greater strength of 
 attraction on the prevailing side ; or, in other words, to the 
 greater pleasurableness (positive or negative) anticipated 
 at the moment from one course of action as compared 
 with the other. So strong and constant is the observed 
 gravitation of human nature towards immediate pleasure,
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill. 247 
 
 that on this particular head Mr. Mill's theory seems to us 
 thoroughly reasonable and well grounded. Nor, again, is 
 this theory (to our mind) best refuted by dwelling on those 
 instances of pause, or, again, of vacillation and vibration, 
 to which reference has above been made ; although we are 
 very far from regarding the deterministic exposition of 
 those instances as at all sufficient. But we think that the 
 opposition between determinism and indeterminism is by 
 no means so clearly brought out by such cases, as it is by 
 the far more numerous ones in which the will's spontaneous 
 impulse is definite and decisive. The whole argument, 
 then (in our view), should be made to turn on one most 
 simple and intelligible issue. 
 
 We beg our readers, then, to fix their attention on that 
 definite and decisive spontaneous impulse of the will,* 
 which is so very common a phenomenon, and to which we 
 have so often referred. We entirely agree with Mr. Mill, 
 as we just now said, that this spontaneous impulse of the 
 will is infallibly determined at each particular moment, by 
 the balance of pleasurableness as apprehended at that 
 moment. But the whole deterministic argument rests 
 from beginning to end on the assumption that men never 
 resist this spontaneous impulse ; whereas we confidently 
 affirm, as an experienced fact, that there are cases of such 
 resistance numerous, unmistakable, nay, most striking. 
 What we allege to be a fact of indubitable experience is 
 this. At some given moment, my will's gravitation, as it 
 may be called, or spontaneous impulse is in some given 
 direction ; insomuch that if I held myself passively, if I 
 let my will alone, it would with absolute certainty move 
 accordingly; but, in fact, I exert myself with more or less 
 vigour to resist such impulse, and then the action of my 
 
 * It muy he better to point out that Dr. Bain winn-times (e.g. in p. 442) 
 uses the term "spontaneoUH impulse" he nowhere, wu believe, says " spon- 
 taneous iiuj'iilbf of the icill" in u sense fundamentally distinct from our own.
 
 2 IS The Philosophy of Theixm. 
 
 will is in a different, often an entirely opposite, direction. 
 In other words, we would draw our readers' attention to 
 the frequently occurring simultaneous existence of two very 
 distinct phenomena. On the one hand (1) my will's gravi- 
 tation or spontaneous impulse is strongly in one direction ; 
 while, on the other hand, at the same moment (2) its 
 actual movement is quite divergent from this. Now, that 
 which " motives " * to use deterministic language affect, 
 is most evidently the will's spontaneous inclination, impulse, 
 gravitation. The determinist, then, by saying that the 
 will's movement is infallibly determined by "motives," is 
 obliged to say that the will never moves in opposition to its 
 spontaneous impulse. And, in fact, he does say this. All 
 determinists assume as a matter of course that the will 
 never puts forth effort for the purpose of resisting its 
 spontaneous impulse. We, on the contrary, allege that 
 there is no mental fact more undeniable than the frequent 
 putting forth of such effort.t And on this critical point 
 issue is now to be joined. 
 
 * For convenience sake in this paragraph wo use the word " motives " as 
 determinists do. 
 
 t As it is very important to avoid all possibility of cavil, it will be per- 
 haps better to add one further explanation of the exact point at issue. Mr. 
 Mill and Dr. Bain hold that in each case the spontaneous impulse or inclina- 
 tion of the will is determined by the balance of immediate pleasure ; and 
 (taking into account the various explanations they give of their statement) 
 we are so far entirely in accord with them. But our own essential argument 
 would not be affected in the slightest degree, if this theory of theirs were 
 disproved. And it is worth while, at the risk of being thought tedious, to 
 make this clear. 
 
 The essence of determinism is the doctrine, that at any given moment the 
 will's movement is infallibly and inevitably determined by circumstances. 
 (1) internal and (2) external; i.e. (1) by the intrinsic constitution and dis- 
 position of the will, and (2) by the external influences which act on it. Now, 
 no one doubts that in every man, during far the larger portion of his waking 
 life, there exists what we have called a definite and decisive spontaneous 
 impulse of his will ; and determinists allege that circumstances (internal and 
 external) determine the will's actual movement, precisdy by determining its 
 spontaneous impulse. It is the very essence of determinism, therefore, to 
 allege that the will's actual movement is never divergent from its spon- 
 taneous impulse.
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill. 249 
 
 Before commencing our argument, however, there are 
 one or two further questions of terminology to be settled. 
 And, first, how shall we define the word " motive '? " Our 
 own acceptation of it may be thus set forth. We premise 
 the obvious truth, that some ends are aimed at for their 
 own sake, and others only for the sake of the former class : 
 the former we will call "absolute," the latter "relative," 
 ends. To these two classes of ends correspond two classes 
 of "motives." My "ultimate motive" in a course of 
 action is my resolve of pursuing some absolute end or ends, 
 with a view to obtaining which I begin and continue that 
 course of action. And what an "ultimate motive" is in 
 relation to an absolute end or ends, precisely that is an 
 "immediate" or "intermediate" motive in relation to a 
 relative end or ends. We say " end or ends," because it is 
 one of the most familiar among mental phenomena that 
 men often aim simultaneously at many ends. A youth, 
 e.g., applies himself to study, partly for the sake of enjoying 
 its pleasure, and partly for the sake of his future temporal 
 advancement. Where the end is single, we may call the 
 motive " simple ; " where there is more than one end we 
 may call the motive " complex." 
 
 But it is a different question altogether, and one entirely irrelevant to the 
 deterministic controversy, to inquire what is the exact fixed relation which 
 exists between circumstances on the one hand and the will's spontaneous 
 impulse on the other. Mr. Mill and Dr. Bain adopt on this question the 
 balance-of-pleasure theory ; and here wo agree with them. But quite 
 imaginably philosophers might arise (though we think this very improbable) 
 who should adduce strong arguments for some different theory on the subject. 
 Now this, as our readers will see, is a cross-controversy altogether, and in no 
 way affects the issue between determinism and its assailants. Wo have 
 ourselves assumed, throughout our essay, the balance-! >f- pleasure theory 
 as confessedly and indisputably true ; because (1) we account it the true one, 
 anil Injcause (2) it is held by all the determinists we ever heard of; but 
 nothing would bo easier than to mould our argument according to any 
 dill'rrent theory which might be established. The question, between dctcr- 
 minists and ourselves, is not at all how the will's spontaneous impulse is 
 farmed, but exclusively whether it is ever rrsixti'd. Determinists as such 
 say that it is never resisted, and indcterininists as such maintain the con- 
 trary.
 
 2:>0 The Philosophy of Tliewm. 
 
 So far we are on common ground with determinists. 
 But they hold that the " resolve of pursuing some absolute 
 end" is simply synonymous with the "desire of some 
 preponderating pleasure," positive or negative. For the 
 sake, therefore, of making ourselves more intelligible to our 
 Catholic readers, we will proceed a little further. Whatever 
 absolute end I aim at is always either " bonum honestum " 
 or "bonum delectabile ; " or, in other words, it is either 
 the practising of some virtuousness or the enjoying of some 
 pleasure. So far as this truth is needed in our future 
 argument, we shall not fail to prove it ; here we assume it. 
 My " ultimate motive," then, in any act or course of 
 action, will always be either (1) my resolve of practising 
 some virtuousness ; or (2) my resolve of enjoying or trying 
 to enjoy some pleasure ; or (3) some combination of such 
 resolves. In the first two cases my motive is " simple ; " 
 in the last it is " complex." We need hardly add how 
 often it happens that such " resolves," however real and 
 influential, are implicit or unreflected on. 
 
 So much on the word " motive ; " but now further. We 
 have already expressed our conviction that at any given 
 moment the will's spontaneous impulse (of which we have 
 said so much) is infallibly determined by the preponderance 
 of pleasure proposed. The thought of this preponderating 
 pleasure may be called the " preponderating attraction," 
 or " the resultant of co-existing attractions." Again, we 
 have often to speak of the will's " spontaneous impulse ; " 
 this we will sometimes call the will's "preponderating" 
 impulse ; or, for brevity's sake, we may omit the adjective 
 altogether, and speak of the will's "impulse." Resistance 
 to this impulse may be called " anti-impulsive effort " 
 issuing in " anti-impulsive action." 
 
 The determinist, then, denies that there is any such 
 thing in man as anti-impulsive effort, or (a fortiori) as 
 anti -impulsive action. According to his theory, not only
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill. 251 
 
 the will's spontaneous impulse, but its actual movement, is 
 at every moment infallibly determined by the balance of 
 pleasure. He readily admits that men often put forth 
 great efforts sometimes most intense efforts in response 
 to their preponderating attraction of the moment ; witness 
 the case above mentioned, of brave soldiers engaged in 
 battle. But he alleges that such effort is always in response, 
 and never in opposition, to their preponderating attraction ; 
 and that this must inevitably be the case while human 
 nature remains what it is.* On our side, if we expressed 
 our full mind, we should say that all men in full possession 
 of their faculties have a true moral power and by no 
 means unfrequently exercise it of anti-impulsive action ; 
 and that of course, therefore, they may be no less free 
 when they yield to their will's impulse than when they 
 resist it. In our present argument, however (as w r e have 
 explained), the ideas of " power " and " freedom " are to be 
 put in abeyance, and we are to speak only of experienced 
 facts. It is our purpose, then, here to prove against the 
 determinist that so far from anti-impulsive efforts and 
 action being non-existent they are by no means rare ; 
 nay, that in one particular class of men they are among 
 the commonest and most unmistakable phenomena in the 
 whole world. 
 
 We need hardly say that, in our view, devout Theists 
 are immeasurably the most virtuous class of human beings. 
 Consequently, in our view, devout Theists will, with absolute 
 certainty, immeasurably exceed other men in their anti- 
 impulsive efforts ; for the simple reason that they im- 
 
 * Wo cannot understand the determinists' objection to the word " neccs- 
 sarianism," as expressing their doctrine. According to that doctrine, so long 
 as my nature remains what it is, uiy volitions are infallibly determined by 
 circumstances external and internal. On the one hand, I have no power of 
 altering my nature; on the other hand, I have not, nor have had, any power 
 of controlling those past and present circumstances, which in combination 
 infallibly and inevitably determine my volition. How cau uuu imagine a 
 more complete " necebsitutiuu " of my whole conduct?
 
 252 The Philosophy of TJteism. 
 
 measurably exceed other men in the vigilant care with 
 which they adjust their volitions by a standard which 
 they consider supremely authoritative. Nor have we an}' 
 hesitation in saying that able and thoughtful men could 
 never have even dreamed of so monstrous a theory as 
 determinism, had the}' not been densely and crassly ignorant 
 of the practical working of devout Theism. Here, in fact, 
 is one of those instances, by no means few, in which a 
 devout Christian possesses no ordinary advantage over 
 irreligious men, in his power of investigating truth. He 
 could as easily doubt that he experiences temptation, as 
 that from time to time he resists it ; or, to put the thing 
 more distinctly, he could as easily doubt that at times 
 the preponderating impulse of his will is towards some 
 pleasurableness which he accounts unlawful, as he could 
 doubt that at this or that given moment he is resisting 
 such impulse. We will not, however, begin with consider- 
 ing the practical working, in this respect, of devout Theism ; 
 we will begin with that great majority of mankind who are, 
 either in theory or at least in practice, irreligious. Even 
 such men do from time to time resist their will's prepon- 
 derating impulse ; whether for the sake of acting virtuously, 
 or, much more frequently, for the sake of promoting their 
 permanent worldly interest. And as our whole appeal is, 
 of course, necessarily to experienced facts, we must be 
 pardoned a certain familiarity of illustration. We will 
 begin with such a case as the following : 
 
 I have for some time past been a reckless spendthrift, 
 and am well aware that I am travelling rapidlj- along the 
 road to ruin ; though my temperament is such that the 
 positive attraction of present pleasure greatly preponderates 
 over the negative attraction of escape from a direly 
 calamitous future. One fine day, however, in my travels 
 I come across a wretched and squalid creature, who re- 
 counts to me his history ; and I find that its earlier part
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Freeivill. 253 
 
 is a precise parallel of my own. The sight of his abject 
 and deplorable condition produces on me a profound im- 
 pression, and the idea of him is ever haunting me. While 
 this impression remains fresh, there is a complete reversal 
 in the relative power of those attractions which solicit me ; 
 and whenever the thought enters my mind of squandering 
 money, the memory of what I have seen promptly redresses 
 the balance, and the definite decisive impulse of my will is 
 towards economy. Time, however, passes on, and my 
 memory of the poor creature I met with becomes fainter, 
 until at last, on some occasion when I am very specially 
 drawn by some tempting indulgence, the decisive and 
 definite impulse of my will is towards wasting money in 
 its purchase. Is it, or is it not, infallibly certain, from the 
 laws of human nature, that I shall yield to this impulse ? 
 Are there, or are there not, cases in which a person so 
 circumstanced even though in no way under the influence 
 of religious motives by means of anti-impulsive efforts, 
 holds back his will, and fixes his thoughts again on the 
 ruined spendthrift he has seen ; until a lively counter- 
 attraction has resulted, and the will's preponderating 
 impulse has changed its direction ? Let an inquirer 
 honestly examine his own past consciousness, and let him 
 appeal to the testimony of others : we are very certain 
 what the answer will be. 
 
 It will be said, perhaps, that at last there is no very 
 courageous or heroic resistance here, seeing that the will's 
 impulse, though definite and decisive, was by no means 
 intense. The answer, however, is easy. Firstly, if one 
 unmistakable case of anti-impulsive effort be established, 
 the deterministic theory is overthrown. Secondly, we are 
 the very last to allege that any very courageous or heroic 
 resistance to preponderating impulse will be found, except 
 in devout Theists. 
 
 Our second illustration shall be taken from a far
 
 254 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 humbler and more commonplace event. A, B, and C, 
 three young brothers, go to a dentist. He tells them all 
 the same thing : " You have not been taught the proper 
 way of brushing your teeth. If you don't take more time 
 over it than is now your habit, and if you don't perform 
 the operation in the way I have just shown you, you will 
 lose all your serviceable teeth before you pass the prime 
 of life." The three of them accept his statement as true. 
 A has alwaj's had a perfect horror of false teeth. The 
 thought of such a danger is vividly present with him every 
 night and morning, when the tooth-brush is in his hands ; 
 and he spontaneously obeys the dentist's admonition. B, 
 by temperament, cares little for the future ; accordingly, 
 in a very few days he has forgotten all about the dentist, 
 and goes on just as he did before. Neither of these 
 cases evidently includes any phenomenon inconsistent with 
 determinism. C's history, however, is different. For two 
 or three weeks, indeed, his will's preponderating impulse 
 leads him to take the requisite trouble. One morning, 
 however, when the wind is southerly and the sky cloudy, 
 he is in a hurry to get his breakfast over and start off 
 hunting ; and his very decided impulse is to make his 
 tooth-brushing a most perfunctory operation. He dis- 
 tinctly remembers, however, the dentist's warning ; and 
 he knows well enough that, if he once begin to neglect it, 
 there is imminent danger of confirmation in a bad habit. 
 These thoughts are clearly and distinctly in his mind, 
 though not so vividly as to preponderate over the opposite 
 attraction. Nevertheless to use an equestrian simile such 
 as he would himself love he pulls himself up, and reins 
 himself in ; he dwells on the thoughts which are so clearly 
 and distinctly in his mind, until they become vivid, and 
 the balance of attraction is changed to the opposite side. 
 Determinists say that such a case as this never happens ; 
 that the laws of human nature forbid it. Will any candid 
 inquirer on reflection endorse their dictum ?
 
 Mr. MilVs Denial of Freewill. 255 
 
 We may appeal, indeed, to the universal voice of man- 
 kind, which, on a matter of observed fact, is the most 
 irrefragable of authorities.* It is quite proverbial, and in 
 every one's mouth, that man has a real power of following 
 reason where it conflicts with passion. Now, men would 
 not surely have come to believe in such a power had they 
 not observed numerous facts in corroboration ; especially 
 each man within the sphere of his own intimate self- 
 experience. 
 
 Further, considering how very small a proportion of 
 mankind can look on their own habitual conduct with 
 satisfaction, if they choose carefully to measure it even by 
 their own standard of right, emphatic stress may justly 
 be laid on the universal conviction that there is such a 
 thing as sin and guilt. There could be no sin or guilt if 
 every one's conduct were infallibly and inevitably deter- 
 mined by circumstances ; and what a balm, therefore, to 
 wounded consciences is offered by the deterministic theory ! 
 Yet so strong and ineradicable in the mass of men is their 
 conviction of possessing a real power against temptation, 
 that they never attempt to purchase peace of mind by 
 disclaiming that power. But, as we have already urged, 
 how could such a conviction have possibly come to possess 
 them, had they not frequently experienced that power in 
 its actual exercise ? t 
 
 * Mr. Mill (" On Hamilton," p. 581, note) speaks with contempt of 
 " accepting Hodge as a better authority in metaphysics than Locke or Kuut." 
 But we think there is much truth iu his opponent's affirmation, "that no 
 philosopher, unless he be one in a thousand, can see or feel anything that is 
 inconsistent with his preconceived opinion." 
 
 t Mr. Mill at times has certainly a singular way of expressing his ideas 
 on determinism. In his work " On Hamilton " (p. 575, note), he puts this 
 question, with an obvious implication tliat it must be answered in the 
 negative: "If I am determined to prefer innocence to the satisfaction of a 
 particular desire, through an estimate of the relative worth of innocence and 
 the gratification, can this estimate, while unchanged, leave me at liberty to 
 choose the gratification in preference to innocence?" Why plainly on 
 Mr. Mill's principles to whatever extent I may more highly fnh'nmti' the 
 of innocence as compared with the gratification, I am often inevitably
 
 250 The Philosophy of Theivm. 
 
 We cannot doubt, then, that even the mass of men who 
 live mainly for this world do by no means un frequently, 
 however languidly and falteringly, oppose themselves to 
 the spontaneous impulse of their will. For our own part, 
 indeed, we hold confidently that those cases of vacillation 
 and vibration, to which we have more than once referred, 
 are often results of this circumstance. Many of these 
 cases, doubtless, can be explained in the way suggested by 
 Mr. Mill ; but certainly not all. In several of them, we 
 are confident, the fact is, that the will first languidly and 
 falteringly resists its own spontaneous impulse, and then 
 (for want of due energy) sinks back into acquiescence ; 
 that another languid effort presently succeeds, to be again 
 followed by relapse ; and so on possibly for a considerable 
 period of time. Still though all men do, from time to 
 time, put forth some anti-impulsive effort it follows 
 obviously, as we have already said, from our philosophical 
 principles, that very far the most signal illustrations of the 
 doctrine we are defending will be found in the devout 
 Theist's resistance to temptation. Nor has the determmist 
 any right to ignore such facts because he himself may 
 believe that no God is cognizable and that devout Theism 
 is a superstition. If it be unmistakably proved that those 
 who hold and act on a certain belief (however untrue he 
 may consider that belief) do put forth great, or indeed any, 
 anti- impulsive effort, he is bound in reason to abandon his 
 theory. We will proceed, then, to exhibit, as clearly as we 
 can, those facts to which we invite his attention. To 
 Catholics they are familiar, and the determinist may easily, 
 if he chooses, convince himself of their truth. Nor is 
 
 driven to choose the latter in preference to the former. According to him, 
 this result will inevitably ensue, whenever the balance of pleasurublencss is 
 on the side of gratification. How strange that he should speak of " estimating 
 the relative irorth " of two objects, when ho meant to express " balancing 
 their relative pleasunibleness." He seems ashamed of his own theory, when 
 he has to face it.
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill. 257 
 
 there any reason why, in stating them, we should adopt 
 the artificial course of veiling our own hearty sympathy 
 with piety, or our conviction that those who are not devout 
 Theists are like poor sheep going astray. It suffices, if we 
 carefully avoid all " petitio principii ; " if we never assume 
 the truth of Theism as any part of our premisses ; if we 
 state distinctly and articulately the facts which we are 
 alleging in argument. 
 
 Before we begin this task, however, we will make one or 
 two preliminary remarks, which will enable us to accom- 
 plish it better. Our readers, therefore, will understand 
 that what immediate!} 7 follows is no integral part of our 
 argument, but only an introduction thereto. And the first 
 of these preliminary remarks is that a devout Theist thinks 
 very far more than another of merely interior acts. He will 
 feel it a sacred duty to contend most earnestly against his 
 will's impulse, though solicited thereby to no other offence 
 than an evil thought, whether it be of impurity, of anger, 
 of impatience, of pride, of vainglory. 
 
 Our second preliminary remark is, that to those who 
 have trained themselves in habits of virtue, virtue itself 
 supplies an attraction often an exceedingly powerful 
 one,* and which by itself suffices to counterbalance a 
 
 * What is here said in the text may at first cause a certain difficulty in 
 the mind of some Catholics, which we had better remove. Our comment, 
 however, will be more appropriately placed in a note, because it is so com- 
 plete a digression from our general argument. 
 
 It is held by the large majority of theologians, and appears to us in- 
 dubitably true, that no act is virtuous which is not directed " actually " or 
 " virtually " to " bonum houestum " to a virtuous end. Suppose, e.g., I meet 
 a poor man, who is a singularly worthy recipient of alms. At the same time 
 I neither know this fact nor think of inquiring about it, but I give him some 
 money, merely to obtain his services as guide to some beautiful scenery in 
 the neighbourhood. The act is materially most virtuous, because the man is 
 so worthy a rrcipient ; but any one would be supremely absurd who should 
 account it n formally virtuous act of almsgiving. 
 
 The difficulty, then, in the text which may at first strike a Catholic is this : 
 how can virtue ever supply an "attraction"? An act done merely for tho 
 sake of pleasure is no virtuous act at all ; and if it bo nnt done for tho sake of 
 pleasure, how in such cusos can virtue be said to supply an attraction ? Tho 
 
 VOL. I. S
 
 258 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 large number of opposite gratifications. Acts of love 
 towards God, of gratitude towards Christ, of zeal for God's 
 glory, are often in a pious man extremely pleasurable ; nay, 
 even such acts as resignation to God's will in trouble and 
 patience under cruel insults, not unfrequently carry with 
 them special sweetness of their own. The peace also of 
 subdued passions and a good conscience may afford a 
 pleasure which " passeth all understanding." At times, 
 again, the thought of heaven is most bracing and exhila- 
 rating. Then there are negative attractions also, which 
 act powerfully on the side of virtue. The knowledge of 
 that remorse, which will assuredly follow a good man's 
 momentary lapse from virtue ; the fear of hell or of 
 purgatory ; all these may act very strongly on the emotions. 
 Then as our supposed determinist set forth in his ex- 
 position of doctrine at the commencement of our essay 
 there are negative attractions, which are very powerful 
 without being emotional at all.* The difficulty, e.g., of 
 
 answer, however, is simple. An act need not be motived by pleasure at all ; 
 and yet a very large amount of pleasure may be aniiexed to its performance, 
 whether by the ordinary laws of human nature or by God's special inter- 
 vention. Take the instance above given. Suppose I had known the poor 
 man to be a most worthy recipient of alms ; and hud given him money, not in 
 return for any service whatever, but exclusively from my remembrance how 
 highly our Blessed Lord praised almsgiving ; and that forasmuch as I did it 
 to the least of His disciples, I did it to Him. No Catholic will deny that 
 this act was most virtuous ; yet I might have derived far more pleasure from 
 this thought of Christ than I should have obtained from the most beautiful 
 scenery to which the poor man could have guided me. 
 
 We do not, of course, at all deny that in very many cases there is a 
 mixture of motives. Perhaps I know very well how worthy a recipient of 
 alms is this man ; and I give him money, partly from such a reason as that 
 just described, but partly also that I may obtaiu his services as guide. 
 Different theologians pronounce differently on such a case, so far at least as 
 regards their mode of expression. We are ourselves disposed to say that the 
 integral energy of the will at any such moment should be considered as con- 
 sisting of two different acts, one motived by virtuousness, and the other by 
 pleasure; that the former act is simply virtuous, and the latter is simply 
 indifferent, neither good nor bad. 
 
 * A few words of psychological exposition will here be useful on these 
 non-emotional attractions ; though our doctrine on them is entirely concur- 
 rent with that of Mr. Mill and Dr. Bain. Let us take our illustration from
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill. 250 
 
 breaking through a firmly established habit is a very 
 powerful negative attraction, though accompanied with 
 little or no emotion. And a similar non-emotional but 
 strong negative attraction is experienced when some good 
 end is proposed by the intellect with unusual vividness a 
 vividness, perhaps, very far greater than is due to the 
 existing strength of acquired habit, because, proportionately 
 to such vividness, there would be peculiar difficulty and 
 pain in contravening that end. Taking all these and many 
 similar phenomena into consideration, it is easy to account 
 for the indubitable fact, that very frequently the spontaneous 
 impulse of a devout Theist's will is one of high virtue. 
 
 But every one well knows by experience how singularly 
 capricious is human emotion. The very same thoughts 
 
 Dr. Bain's own instance of early rising. A, B, and C agree in this, that the 
 spontaneous impulse of their will leads them on eome given morning to rise 
 at an hour when the counter-attractions are by no means weak which solicit 
 them to stay in bed. A is thus influenced because it is the first of Sep- 
 tember ; all yesterday he was thinking of the partridges, and now that the 
 happy day has arrived he springs out of bed with a joyous heart. B fancies 
 he hears an alarm of fire, and starts up in a panic : while C gets up in ac- 
 cordance with his firm and established habit. A is influenced by a positive 
 attraction, B by a negative one, both acting on their will through their 
 emotions. But consider the attraction which acts on C ; or, in other words, 
 the thought of pleasure or pain which influences his will. This thought is 
 nothing else than his sense of the difficulty which opposes his resisting the 
 impulse engendered by his habit. We see at once that this thought acts 
 powerfully on his will in the way of suggesting pain, without exciting his 
 emotions at all. On the other hand, there would be a strong emotion (of 
 pain) if his impulse were thwarted ; if, e.g., he were compelled to go on for 
 hours lying in bed, because on some bitterly cold morning he had neither 
 clothes to put on nor means of lighting a fire. 
 
 So far we are entirely at one with determinists. For the sake, however, 
 of giving one further instance of the contrast between their theory and 
 our own, we may add that we admit a fourth case ; that of D, whose spon- 
 taneous impulse would load him to lie in bed, but who, for the sake of some 
 good end, resists that impulse and gets up. The determinitjt must deny 
 that such a case is possible so long as the laws of human nature remain what 
 they are. 
 
 Dr. Bain, in his treatment of moral habits (pp. 500-510), speaks, so far as 
 we have observed, in entire consistency with his deterministic throry. For 
 our own part, we hold that anti-impulsive efforts are immeasurably the most 
 effective mount) of strengthening a good habit; but Dr. liain uowhuri; implies 
 that there such things.
 
 2GO The Philosophy of Theivm. 
 
 which on one day or at one moment excite the keenest 
 feeling, on another day or at another moment fail wholly of 
 any such effect. According to the laws of hum an nature, 
 this great emotional difference is probably far more con- 
 siderable in the case of more susceptible and highly-strung 
 souls than in that of ordinary mortals ; nor do we doubt 
 that God often, for purposes of probation, intensifies by 
 special agency the working of natural laws. Every one 
 acquainted with saints' lives well knows the vicissitudes 
 between spiritual rapture on one side and spiritual desola- 
 tion on the other, which constitute one principal probation 
 of those most highly favoured among mankind. 
 
 This statement, then, brings us to the particular fact 
 on which we lay stress in our present controversy. At 
 some given moment, some holy man finds suddenly a 
 strongly preponderating impulse of his will soliciting him 
 to some act, which he regards with intense disapprobation 
 as a grievous offence against his Creator. He still, of 
 course, retains that very considerable negative attraction to 
 good which is caused by his habits of virtue ; but his 
 emotions in that direction are for the moment in abeyance, 
 while those leading in the opposite direction are for the 
 moment so abnormally excited as vastly to predominate 
 over the opposite attraction. Here, then, we have a crucial 
 test of the deterministic theory. The enormous balance of 
 pleasurableness is on the side of yielding to the temptation ; 
 and according to determinists, therefore, the holy man (by 
 the very necessity of human nature) yields irresistibly 
 thereto as irresistibly as a physical point yields to the 
 resultant of the forces which attract it. We need hardly 
 say how violently such a statement is opposed to the most 
 undeniable facts. Nor, indeed, need we confine our atten- 
 tion to persons of saintly attainment ; the case of any 
 devout Theist will suffice. Let it once be understood what 
 is the deterministic theory, and no one, acquainted with
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill. 261 
 
 the most ordinary facts of Catholic experience, can hear it 
 advocated without amazement. For the deterministic 
 theory comes simply to this, that resistance to predominat- 
 ing temptation* is not so much as possible under the 
 existing laws of human nature. There is no single Catholic, 
 who has at any time so much as attempted to lead a devout 
 life, who does not know the reverse of this by his own 
 quite unmistakable self-experience. You might as well try 
 to persuade him that he is never visited with predominating 
 temptation as that he never resists it ; nay, you might as 
 well try to persuade him that the rain does not wet, that 
 the wind does not blow, that the sun does not warm. As 
 we said before, no pious man can possibly hold deter- 
 minism as soon as he comes to see what is meant by the 
 term. 
 
 It has been maintained, indeed, by determinists that no 
 psychological analysis is possible of such a phenomenon as 
 resistance to predominating temptation ; that the relation 
 between intellect and will, as testified by experience, 
 implies an absolute dependence of volitions on the motives 
 intellectually proposed. When we come (in a later part of 
 this essay) to treat objections, we will answer this in 
 detail ; here we will but make a brief remark. There is no 
 experienced fact in the whole world more conspicuously 
 manifest than that pious men very frequently do resist 
 predominant temptation. If, then, there be a psychological 
 theory which would lead validly to the conclusion that no 
 such resistance ever takes place, such theory is by that 
 very circumstance shown demonstratively to be false. On 
 the other hand, if it were really the case that the phenomena 
 
 * A person may be said to be visited by " temptation " whenever lie is 
 solicited by any attraction towards forbidden pleasures, even though such 
 attraction be more than counterbalanced by other opposite ones. By using 
 the term "predominant" temptation, then, we mean to express a case iu 
 which the attractions towards forbidden pleasure preponderate over their 
 opposes, so that the will's spontaneous impulse is fti the sinful direction.
 
 202 TJm Philosophy of TJteism. 
 
 of resistance have not yet been satisfactorily analyzed l>y 
 scientific men, that would be no ground for disbelieving 
 what experience so urgently testifies, but only for working 
 at the indicated psychological problem. No explanation at 
 all adequate has yet been discovered of the phenomena of 
 dreams ; but men do not on that ground deny, that there 
 are such things as dreams. However (as we shall set forth 
 a little further on) we think ourselves that the psycho- 
 logical explanation commonly given by indeterminists is in 
 substance entirely sound and sufficient. 
 
 There are two further facts, which we allege to bo 
 testified by experience ; and we will here set them forth, 
 not because we can lay any stress on them in our contro- 
 versy with determinism, but merely for the sake of avoiding 
 possible misconception. It is a very frequent phenomenon, 
 we hold, that a devout man, even when his will's 
 spontaneous impulse leads to an entirely virtuous act, 
 proceeds nevertheless by an effort to make his act more 
 virtuous (i.e. more efficaciously directed to the virtuous end) 
 than it otherwise would be. On the other hand, it is not 
 unfrequent that a man partially resists some temptation, 
 but not with sufficient energy for the avoidance (as Catholics 
 consider) of mortal sin. 
 
 We have now set forth, sufficiently for our purpose, 
 those broad facts of human action which make it so 
 obviously certain that determinism is false. At the same 
 time, our exposition will have shown how innocent we are 
 of charges frequently brought against indeterminists, that 
 they disparage the inestimable importance of virtuous 
 habits and of good moral education. What can be more 
 important for the cause of virtue than that the spontaneous 
 impulse of men's will should be as virtuous as it can 
 possibly be made ? And what other agency is there (on 
 our theory) which, on the whole, tends to make that 
 impulse virtuous, comparably with the effect produced by
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill 263 
 
 good habits and good education ? Zealous, indeed, as the 
 Church has ever been in upholding Freewill, still more 
 conspicuous has been her zeal for her children's moral and 
 religious training. 
 
 One further question remains to be asked. What are 
 the motives which actuate a man when he resists his will's 
 spontaneous impulse? In every instance, by far the 
 easiest course is to act in response to that impulse ; and no 
 one will take the trouble of resisting it, except for some 
 unmistakably worthy motive, some clear dictate of reason. 
 There are two, and two only, classes of motives which occur 
 to our mind as adequate to the purpose. First, there is the 
 resolve of doing what is right. We consider ourselves to 
 have shown irrefragably in the third essay in this volume, 
 that there are various acts, cognizable under certain cir- 
 cumstances to be base, detestable, forbidden by a Supreme 
 Euler; and certain others excellent, noble, approved, and 
 counselled by this Supreme Euler. Here, then, is one most 
 worthy motive for resisting my will's spontaneous impulse, 
 whenever that impulse solicits me to something detestable 
 and forbidden, or even to something less excellent than 
 another proposed alternative. Another motive, which often 
 suggests itself, is my desire of promoting my permanent 
 happiness in the next world, or even in this. It happens 
 again and again that my will's spontaneous impulse solicits 
 me to some act which even if I consider this world alone 
 is known by me as likely to result in misery ; or, at all events, 
 in much less happiness than I should otherwise enjoy. 
 Here it is a plain dictate of reason that I resist that 
 impulse, which otherwise would load to consequences BO 
 disastrous. It is an observed phenomenon, we contend, 
 that men do at times resist the spontaneous impulse of 
 their will, when induced so to do by one or other of these 
 two classes of motives ; * but where such motives are away, 
 
 * \Ve do not, of course, for a moment deny that dcterimnists include both
 
 2G4 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 it seems to us a matter of course that every one is always 
 led by his predominating attraction. 
 
 With one further explanation, we bring to a close our 
 positive exposition of the doctrine we would maintain. It 
 regards the distinction drawn by Mr. Mill, between mere 
 " determinism " and "fatalism." We here differ (we 
 think) from the large majority of his opponents ; for we 
 cannot but hold that he establishes his point (see his work 
 " On Hamilton," p. 601). Fatalists maintain that the will 
 can exercise no influence over the character ; and Mr. Mill 
 may earnestly deny this (as he does), without at all affirm- 
 ing that the will has any power of resisting its own 
 spontaneous impulse. Mr. Mill, of course, quite admits 
 that mere determinism is as absolutely contradictory to 
 Freewill as is fatalism itself. But the practical bearing on 
 the point at issue is excellently expressed by him, in a note 
 replying to an opponent, at pp. 602, 603. 
 
 Suppose that a person dislikes some part of his own character, 
 and would be glad to change it. He cannot, as he well knows, 
 change it by a mere act of volition. He must use the means 
 which nature gives to ourselves, as she gave to our parents and 
 teachers, of influencing our character by appropriate circum- 
 stances. If he is a fatalist, he will not use these means, for he 
 will not believe in their efficacy . . . but if he is a [determiuist 
 and] if the desire is stronger than the means are disagreeable, 
 he will set about doing what, if done, will improve his character. 
 
 We are now to consider the very numerous objections 
 that have been raised against indeterminism : a considera- 
 tion which, we venture to say, will at every step put in 
 clearer light the irrefragable truth of that doctrine against 
 
 the pleasurableness of virtue and the pleasurableneas of promoting a man's 
 own permanent interest among the attractions which influence his will. But 
 it is a matter of every-day experience that the pleasurableness of this or that 
 immediate gratification is more attractive than these at some given moment. 
 And what we allege is, that men not unfrequently resist such preponderating 
 attraction for the sake of practising virtue or of promoting their own per- 
 manent interest
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill. 2G5 
 
 which they are brought. It will be in various ways, how- 
 ever, more convenient to consider these objections as 
 brought, not merely against indeterminism, but against the 
 full doctrine of Freewill. Nor is such a procedure in any 
 way unfair to our opponents, but the very contrary, for it 
 does but offer them a larger target to shoot at. Hitherto, 
 then, we have been merely alleging, as an experienced fact, 
 that men often do resist their will's spontaneous impulse : 
 but in the next essay of our series we are to maintain, as 
 a doctrine deducible from the experienced fact, that they 
 possess the power of resistance; and that, possessing it, they 
 act with true freedom on every relevant occasion, whether 
 they exercise that power or no.* This is the doctrine of 
 Freewill ; and we are now to treat the various objections 
 which have been raised against it by determinists. 
 
 It is difficult to marshal Mr. Mill's objections in due 
 order, because he is directly answering, not our doctrine, 
 but Sir W. Hamilton's. "We gladly give all honour to Sir 
 W. Hamilton, for his zealous advocacy both of Theism and 
 of Freewill ; but there are particulars on which we widely 
 differ from him, and, indeed, we regard Reid as both a 
 sounder and abler, though of course a very much less 
 learned, philosopher. Indeed, we think Mr. Mill obtains 
 unreasonable advantage on many philosophical questions 
 by replying to Hamilton's statements and arguments rather 
 than to Reid's. At all events, we have not ourselves to do 
 with any of Mr. Mill's objections, except those which are 
 relevant against our own doctrine. We will take every 
 care, however, that no one of those objections shall fail to 
 be distinctly stated and examined by us, either in this or 
 in a following essay of our series ; and we will supplement 
 them with all the others known to us, which have bc-en 
 advanced by Dr. Bain and others of his school. 
 
 1. The first objection, we consider, shall bo that to which 
 * This doctriuo is developed in the essay on " Freewill." Ku.
 
 26C TJte Philosophy of TJtdsm. 
 
 we have already expressly referred ; viz. that no satisfactory 
 psychological analysis has ever been alleged, of such an act 
 as resistance to the will's spontaneous impulse. We have 
 already said that, if this were really the case seeing that 
 the fact of such resistance is undeniable no other inference 
 would be legitimate, except, perhaps, that psychologians 
 have been wanting in perspicacity. We think, however, 
 that the account of the matter commonly given by liber- 
 tarians is true and sufficient; viz. that the will can for a 
 moment suspend its movement, and then proceed to a 
 choice of the motive on which it shall proceed to act. But 
 perhaps it will be more satisfactory if we work the matter 
 out with more detail. We will take, therefore, as our 
 special instance, that of a devout Theist resisting strong 
 predominant temptation ; because it is this which, far more 
 vividly than any other, displays the phenomena of Free- 
 mil, and because what we say of this can be applied 
 without much difficulty to all other cases. 
 
 We will suppose, then, a holy man resisting some pre- 
 dominant temptation to mortal sin. Our own view of what 
 takes place under these circumstances is such as this. In 
 the very first instant he yields to it by necessity,* because 
 his will has had no time whatever to collect its self-deter- 
 mining power. In the next instant he does two things : he 
 suspends the act of consent, and he looks up to Almighty 
 God for strength and help. We may add that such prayer 
 continues with great intensity (though often perhaps im- 
 plicitly) through the whole ensuing conflict. After the 
 second instant, as we may call it, we arrive at the critical 
 point. Much more probably than not since he is so holy 
 a man even before the temptation began, God was im- 
 plicitly at least in his thoughts ; but otherwise, according 
 
 * According to Catholic terminology, the very first assaults of temptation 
 are called " motus prim5 primi ; " and to these the will consents without any 
 sin. They are followed by " motus secundo primi ; " and even to these the 
 will may consent without mortal sin.
 
 Mr. Mitt's Denial of Freewill. 267 
 
 to the experienced laws of Jiabit, the very presence of 
 temptation summons into his mind some virtuous thought, 
 distinct or confused as the case may be. From the motives 
 which present themselves, he rapidly chooses such as seem 
 most hopeful for success. Sometimes it may happen that 
 such thoughts speedily excite the appropriate sensible devo- 
 tion, and that his will's impulse at once changes its direc- 
 tion. At other times, though very little sensible devotion 
 may be excited, yet the good motives are so vividly set 
 before his mind, that they constitute a very strong non- 
 emotional attraction, and that in this case also the will's 
 impulse is speedily changed. At other times, lastly, the 
 force of predominant attraction long remains on the other 
 side, and he is left to support the arduous conflict in deso- 
 lation. Students of hagiology well know S. Catherine of 
 Sienna's fearful probation, and her heroic demeanour for 
 so many days.* For all that long period, so it would 
 seem, the preponderance of attraction was strongly towards 
 forbidden gratification, and her anti -impulsive action intense 
 and unremitting. 
 
 Such, in our view, is on the whole a true analysis of 
 what takes place under the circumstances. Those psycho- 
 logians who are not satisfied with it must really take on 
 themselves the trouble of discovering a better. The broad 
 fact of resistance remains simply undeniable. 
 
 II. A second objection, raised by determinists, often 
 takes the form of a triumphantly asked question. Can it 
 be gravely maintained, they ask, that a man ever acts 
 against his strongest motive ? Never was there a poorer 
 equivocation than this " Achilles " of our opponents. What 
 do the} 7 mean by " acting against the strongest motive " ? 
 Do they mean " resisting the strongest attraction " ? In 
 that case it is the negative, and not the affirmative, answer 
 
 * Wo need hardly say that Catholics attribute this moral power of resist- 
 ing grave temptation to the agency of grace. Such considerations, however, 
 are external to the present coutroveisy.
 
 268 Tlie Philosophy of TJiewm. 
 
 to their question, which is the true paradox. Is it para- 
 doxical to say that reason can resist predominant passion ? 
 or to say that it can not ? The ne plus ultra of paradox, 
 indeed, has been reached, we should think, by Mr. Fitz- 
 james Stephen, in his work on "Liberty, Equality, 
 Fraternity." " That any human creature," he says (p. 
 294), "ever under any conceivable circumstances, acted 
 otherwise than in obedience to that which, for the time being, 
 was his strongest wish, is to me an assertion as incredible 
 and as unmeaning as the assertion that on a particular 
 occasion two straight lines enclosed a space." " A man's 
 strongest wish " must be the wish which determined the 
 spontaneous impulse of his will. Mr. Stephen, then, is 
 not content with saying that men have, in fact, no power 
 of anti-impulsive effort ; but, he adds, that to affirm 'their 
 possession of that power is an " unmeaning " statement. 
 
 The only other sense in which we can understand this 
 phrase, "the strongest motive," is "the worthiest or most 
 reasonable motive." But to understand the determinist 
 as meaning this, is to suppose him in a state of absolute 
 hallucination. If all Theists acted consistently on what 
 they hold to be the worthiest and most reasonable motive, 
 they would lead lives of spotless virtue. 
 
 III. Another argument, somewhat similar to the former, 
 is frequently used by determinists. " When any change of 
 will is produced," they say, "it is always effected by the 
 agency of motives. Let it be supposed, for instance, that 
 a man is now beginning, for the sake of his own permanent 
 welfare, to shun some imprudent pleasure, in which he has 
 hitherto indulged. Well, by the very statement of the case 
 it is evident that a new motive has intervened, or, at all 
 events, has received great additional vigour ; viz. the desire 
 of his own permanent welfare. It is in exact accordance 
 with our doctrine that, where there is a change in the 
 motives, there is a change in the will's movement."
 
 Mr. Mitt's Denial of Freeivill. 269 
 
 It is this argument which, more than any other, has 
 impressed us with a sense of the evil resulting from the 
 equivocal use of the word " motive." Of course, in our 
 sense of the word, under such circumstances as the above, 
 a new "motive" has intervened; for this means neither 
 more nor less than that a new resolve has been formed. 
 But by "motive " they mean "the desire of some pleasure;" 
 and this being understood, we thus rejoin. 
 
 In the first place as far as our own experience and 
 observation go it is by no means universally true that 
 whenever a man begins to act with much greater vigour for 
 his own permanent welfare, the thought of promoting that 
 welfare has first become a more pleasurable and attractive 
 thought. Often it is so, but we think that often it is not 
 so. For argument's sake, however, we will waive this 
 demur, and will so far accept the determinists' allegation. 
 
 We proceed, then, to ask them this simple question. 
 Do they mean that, whenever a man begins to renounce 
 some imprudent enjoyment for the sake of his permanent 
 welfare, the pleasure of promoting that welfare has first 
 become greater than the pleasure of that enjoyment ? To 
 answer this question in the negative would be to abandon 
 their doctrine ; for it would be to say that a man sometimes 
 acts otherwise than according to the balance of pleasurable- 
 ness : they must, therefore, answer it in the affirmative. 
 But if the pleasure of promoting his own permanent welfare 
 has become greater to the agent than the pleasure of the 
 enjoyment, then his will's spontaneous inclination, impulse, 
 gravitation, is in favour of renouncement. The objection, 
 then, which we are here considering, turns out at last to 
 be nothing but the expression of that opinion with which 
 we have credited the determinists throughout : they do but 
 mean to say that no man ever acts in opposition to his 
 will's spontaneous impulse. This is the very opinion 
 against which we have been expressly arguing, and in
 
 270 Ttw Philosophy of Tfteism. 
 
 disproof of which we have adduced, as we consider, such 
 undeniable facts. It happens again and again, we are 
 quite confident, that a man will make efforts if he is a 
 devout Theist, very energetic and sustained efforts towards 
 renouncing this or that enjoyment for the sake of his per- 
 manent welfare at times when his thought of promoting 
 that welfare is distinctly less pleasurable than is the enjoy- 
 ment which he strives to renounce. And, in saying this, 
 we use the word " pleasurable " in the full sense given to 
 it by Mr. Mill and Dr. Bain ; as including negative pleasure, 
 and also what we have called " non-emotional attractions." 
 The proof, of course, which we give of our allegation, is the 
 fact on which we have so constantly insisted ; viz. that 
 such renouncement is often begun in opposition to the 
 will's spontaneous impulse. 
 
 IV. Wonderful to say, determinists sometimes accuse 
 their opponents of holding that men possess the power of 
 acting without any motive. Nay, even Sir W. Hamilton 
 (quoted by Mr. Mill in p. 572) calls a free act a " motiveless 
 volition." This comes entirely from the equivocal use of 
 the word " motive." 
 
 V. It has often been argued by libertarians that all men 
 are conscious of freedom, and that there is an end of the 
 matter. Against this argument Mr. Mill raises (1) a verbal 
 and (2) a real objection. In his verbal objection we think 
 he is right ; in his real objection he is most certainly 
 wrong. We begin with the former. "We are conscious," 
 he says (" On Hamilton," p. 580), " of what is, not of what 
 tc ill or can be:" and the word "conscious," therefore, is 
 used improperly by libertarians to express their meaning. 
 He admits, however (p. 582, note), on being taxed with 
 inconsistency by an opponent, that in his " Logic " he used 
 the word "consciousness" in the very sense to which he 
 objects in his work " On Hamilton," as expressing " the 
 whole of our familiar and intimate knowledge concerning
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill. 271 
 
 ourselves." We will use the word "self-intimacy" to 
 express what is here spoken of. And this verbal question 
 being disposed of, we will set forth in our own way the 
 argument to which Mr. Mill objects, that we may consider 
 the value of his objection. 
 
 Take an obvious illustration. I am in the habit of 
 walking out with a stick in my hand. I know, by self- 
 intimacy, that I brandish this stick about in whatever 
 direction I choose ; in other words, I have a confused 
 memory of numberless instances in which I have willed 
 to do this, and the result has followed; while I also re- 
 member that in no single case have I willed it without the 
 result following. In precisely the same way, I know by 
 self-intimacy that I resist in some degree my will's spon- 
 taneous impulse, whenever I make the attempt to do so. 
 Then, by a certain course of reasoning, the validity of 
 which is to be defended in the next essay of our series, I 
 infer from this latter phenomenon that I have a poicer of 
 resisting the impulse of my will ; or, in other words, that 
 I am a free agent. Now, how does Mr. Mill reply to this 
 reasoning? Surely by a most shallow sophism. When 
 two courses are open to us, he says ("On Hamilton," 
 p. 582), " I feel (or am convinced) that I could have chosen 
 the other course, if I had preferred it, that is, if I had liked 
 it better ; but not that I could have chosen one course while 
 I preferred the other." Such a statement would not possess 
 a moment's plausibility, were it not for Mr. Mill's ambiguous 
 use of the terms " prefer " and " like better ; " and we will 
 begin with exposing this equivocation. In one sense, I may 
 "prefer" course A to course B at some given moment; 
 viz. in this sense, that I am at the moment more attracted 
 by the former than by the latter ; that I spontaneously 
 gravitate to the former course, and not to the latter. And 
 yet at the very same moment I may "prefer" immeasurably 
 course B to course A : in this sense, that I think course B
 
 272 The Philosophy of Tfteism. 
 
 immeasurably preferable, as, e.g., being immeasurably more 
 conducive to my permanent happiness. Whether, there- 
 fore, I pursue course A or course B, in either case it may 
 be truly said that I pursue the course which I " prefer " to 
 the other ; the course which I " like better " than the other. 
 And it is this mere equivocation on which Mr. Mill un- 
 consciously rests for the prima facie plausibility of his 
 argument. Passing, however, from words to things, let us 
 look at the experienced facts of every-day life. Certainly 
 we do not deny it to be a matter of frequent occurrence 
 that (under such circumstances as those above described) 
 I effectively choose course A : " video meliora proboque, 
 deteriora sequor." But Mr. Mill has to maintain that 
 (under such circumstances) no human being does, or ever 
 did, effectively choose course B ; nay, and that no human 
 being has so much as the power of choosing it, so long as 
 the laws of human nature remain what they are. After 
 what has been said in the earlier part of our essay, we may 
 safely leave this question of fact to be determined by any 
 even moderately candid inquirer. 
 
 VI. Dr. Bain (p. 540) quotes Mr. Bailey with approval, 
 who argues that all the world in practice takes determinism 
 for granted : 
 
 Men are perpetually staking pleasure and fortune and 
 reputation, and even life itself, on the very principle [of deter- 
 minism] which they speculatively reject. . . . Take for example 
 the operations of a campaign. A general . . . cannot move a 
 step, without taking for granted that the minds of the soldiers 
 will be determined by the motives presented to them. When 
 he directs his aide-de-camp to bear a message to an officer in 
 another part of the field, he calculates on his obedience with os 
 little mistrust as he reckons on the magnifying power of the 
 telescope in his hand. When he orders his soldiers to wheel, to 
 deploy, to form a square, is he less confident in the result than 
 when he performs some physical operation when he draws a 
 sword, pulls a trigger, or seals a despatch ? etc.
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill. 273 
 
 As regards the external act of obedience, this kind of act 
 is precisely of the class which on our principles can be 
 predicted beforehand with almost infallible certainty. 
 When the general has issued a command, the spontaneous 
 impulse of any given soldier's will is towards obedience ; if 
 for no other reason, because he knows that he would be at 
 once shot down were he to hesitate ; and, on the other 
 hand, neither the motive of virtue nor the motive of 
 permanent self-interest has any place whatever on the 
 opposite side. Now, as our readers will remember, it is a 
 very important part of our thesis that no human being 
 takes the trouble of resisting the impulse of his will, 
 unless in such resistance he is pursuing either virtue or his 
 own permanent happiness. The facts, then, here cited by 
 Mr. Bailey, square entirely with our own theory ; and 
 those stated in his next paragraph are precisely of the 
 same kind. As regards his remarks referring to Political 
 Economy which we do not, however, think it worth while 
 to quote we can only recommend him to read the first of 
 Mr. Mill's "Essays on some unsettled questions of Political 
 Economy," in order that he may see their fundamental 
 fallacy. 
 
 But the very case thus placed before his readers by Dr. 
 Bain the case of military obedience signally illustrates 
 what to our mind is among the greatest blots in deter- 
 ministic morality : its confining attention to exterior acts. 
 Certain sentries, e.g., are ordered to stay at their posts for 
 so many hours. It may be predicted with almost infallible 
 certainty that they will do so, because they know they will 
 otherwise be shot ; and because, on the other hand, there is 
 no motive of virtue or self-interest which can come into 
 play in an opposite direction. Still, the interior act, com- 
 manding this exterior one, varies indefinitely with dinVrent 
 persons ; and there is no pretext whatever for saying that 
 you can rely beforehand on this being this or that. A, .<]., is 
 VOL. i. r
 
 274- TJte Philosophy of 
 
 actuated throughout by the simple motive of obedience to 
 God's command ; B, in addition to this, offers up his 
 wearisome duty as a penance for his sins ; C is animated 
 by zeal for his country's cause ; D is influenced by strong 
 convictions on the nobleness of military obedience ; E is 
 kept where he is, by no other motive than his dislike of 
 being put to death. And a similar remark may be made 
 on numberless other instances, where men agree with each 
 other as a matter of course in doing the external act, but 
 differ indefinitely as to the spirit in which they do it. It 
 is really difficult to determine how often (according to what 
 we account sound moral doctrine) the good man's probation 
 consists not in the external act which he has to do but in 
 the motives for which he does it. We may safely say that 
 during far the largest portion of his life, his growth in 
 virtue mainly depends, either (1) on his choice of good 
 motives for his every-day acts ; or (2) on acts altogether 
 interior, such as patience, self-examination, humility, 
 forgivingness, equitableness of judgment, purity, under 
 circumstances of trial. All this is entirely external to the 
 sphere of a determinist's thoughts. 
 
 VII. Mr. Mill alleges ("On Hamilton," p. 577) that 
 determinism is shown to be probable " by each person's 
 observation of the voluntary actions of those with whom he 
 comes into contact ; and by the power which every one has 
 of foreseeing actions with a degree of exactness proportioned 
 to his previous experience and knowledge of the agents, 
 and with a certainty often quite equal to that with which 
 he predicts the commonest physical events." We deny 
 this alleged fact entirely so far as it bears on the issue 
 between Mr. Mill and ourselves ; but we would beg our 
 readers, in the first place, to remember what is that issue. 
 We (1) heartily admit that in every single case every 
 man's spontaneous impulse of will may be predicted by me 
 (to repeat Mr. Mill's words) "with a degree of exactness
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill. 275 
 
 proportioned to my previous experience and knowledge of 
 the agent ; and with a certainty often quite equal to that 
 with which I predict the commonest physical events." We 
 further hold (2) that no person takes the trouble of resisting 
 this impulse with any considerable energy, except only 
 devout Theists ; and we hold (3) that an exterior act may 
 be predicted in the abstract with almost infallible certainty? 
 in all those many cases in which there is no motive of 
 duty or self-interest which can act in an opposite direction 
 to the will's spontaneous impulse.* We are confident that 
 no power of foreseeing men's conduct can be alleged as 
 known by experience, which presents even the superficial 
 appearance of implying any greater certainty and uniformity 
 of human action than might have been fully anticipated 
 from our own doctrine. "When we speak of Aristides as 
 just," says Dr. Bain (p. 539), "of Socrates as a moral 
 hero, of Nero as a monster of cruelty, and of the Czar 
 Nicholas as grasping of territory, we take for granted a 
 certain persistence and regularity as to the operation of 
 certain motives, much the same as when we affirm the 
 attributes of material bodies." We assent to this in its full 
 extent ; substituting only, of course, for the word " motives," 
 the word "attractions." Dr. Bain, on his side, proceeds to 
 admit that "the number and complication of motive forces 
 may elude our knowledge, and render prediction uncertain 
 and precarious." But let our readers observe this. No- 
 where has Dr. Bain, nor Mr. Mill, nor (so far as we know) 
 any other determinist whatever, attempted to show that 
 this " uncertainty and precariousness of prediction " is due 
 exclusively to "the number and complication of" attrac- 
 
 * By the phrase " predicted in the abstract," we mean that it could bo 
 predicted by a, person of superhuman and adequate intelligence, who should 
 thoroughly penetrate the antecedent facts. We say with " (iltnimt" not 
 "quite" "infallible certainty;" because it may be true indeed that tlio 
 exterior aet prompted by my will's spontaneous impulse is not o;jy<W to 
 duty ; and yet it is |K>ssihlo that I shall eh<x>so another in preference, as still 
 better and mr>- acceptable to God.
 
 27G The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 tions ; that it is not largely due to the freedom of men's 
 will. Yet until they have shown this, they have shown 
 nothing worth so much as a pin's head towards the estab- 
 lishment of their theory. 
 
 On the other hand, Mr. Mill refers very reasonably to 
 " each person's observation of the voluntary actions of 
 those with whom he comes into contact." Now, we are 
 confident that the careful examination of such a case will 
 be favourable to our doctrine rather than to his. We do 
 not mean that any experiment can be made on another 
 which is absolutely crucial and decisive ; * but we do say 
 that such an experiment will be to Mr. Mill a cause of 
 weakness rather than of strength. Suppose such an 
 instance as this. A widowed mother, most virtuous and 
 wise, devotes herself exclusively to the education of her 
 only son. She sees some critical probation of him ap- 
 proaching ; some abnormal circumstances, from under 
 which he will assuredly 'emerge, either much better or 
 much worse than he was before. Studying carefully (as 
 she has so long done) his temperament, tendencies, habits, 
 she is able to calculate with a real approach to certainty 
 what will be the impulse of his will under these circum- 
 stances ; though, of course, she does not intermit doing all 
 in her power to correct and elevate that impulse. But as 
 to how he will comport himself under the approaching 
 crisis on this she is profoundly anxious. The impulse 
 itself, she well knows, will be more or less in an evil 
 direction : will he nobly resist ? or will he, reluctantly, 
 indeed, but effectively, succumb ? She awaits with breath- 
 less solicitude the resolution of this doubt. We maintain 
 that such a description as this is more conformable to 
 observed facts than is Mr. Mill's allegation ; viz. that she 
 
 * We say "on another" because we have maintained that every man may 
 make on himself an experiment which shall be absolutely decisive of the fact 
 that he can resist his will's impulse.
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Free-will. 277 
 
 might be able (except for the imperfection of her knowledge 
 and discernment) to predict beforehand her son's movement 
 of will, just as she might predict the movement of a 
 physical point solicited by divergent attractions. 
 
 We do not, however, deny that, in proportion as men 
 have passed through the earlier part of their probation and 
 established firm habits of virtue, in that proportion their 
 resistance to predominant temptation (but only within 
 certain limits) may be predicted with much confidence. 
 But even if the power of prediction in such cases were 
 indefinitely greater than it is, it would in no way tend 
 to make probable Mr. Mill's theory. For consider. The 
 whole of Mr. Mill's position rests on the allegation that 
 men infallibly follow the most powerful attraction of those 
 which at the moment solicit them ; insomuch that the 
 balance of pleasurableness (positive or negative) may be 
 known with infallible certainty, by observing what that 
 direction is in which the will spontaneously moves. But 
 when any one is said to resist predominant temptation, we 
 mean, by the very force of the term, that he acts in opposition 
 to his spontaneous impulse ; that is (according to Mr. 
 Mill's theory itself) in opposition to the balance of pleasure. 
 Suppose, then, we could even predict with infallible cer- 
 tainty that in this or that given case this or that holy man 
 would resist predominant temptation, what could be 
 reasonably inferred from such a circumstance ? This could 
 reasonably be inferred from it that the said holy man will 
 act with infallible certainty in a way directly opposite to 
 that which determinists regard as his inevitable course. 
 
 On our side, we easily explain this power of probable 
 prediction, so far as it exists : we explain it partly on 
 psychological, partly on theological grounds. Psycho- 
 logically a confirmed habit of resistance to predominant 
 temptation generates a vast increase of facility and 
 promptitude in such resistance. Theologically he who
 
 27s The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 faithfully corresponds with grace in the earlier part of his 
 probation, is (by way of reward) visited with larger and 
 more persuasive supplies thereof in his later years. But 
 all this is, of course, external to the deterministic con- 
 troversy. 
 
 VIII. Mr. Mill argues " ad homines " from God's 
 prescience. " The religious metaphysicians," he says 
 ("Logic," vol. ii. p. 422), "who have asserted the freedom 
 of the will, have always maintained it to be consistent with 
 God's foreknowledge of our actions; and if with divine, 
 then with any other foreknowledge." But we deny entirely 
 that God calculates future acts of the will through their 
 fixed connection with phenomenal antecedents, because we 
 deny that there is any such fixed connection. According 
 to the " religious metaphysicians " in whom w r e repose 
 confidence, God's knowledge of future human acts supposes, 
 as its very foundation, the will's free exercise in this or 
 that direction. It is strictly and fully, we maintain, within 
 my own power, that God shall have eternally foreseen me 
 as acting in this way or in that. Or rather God does not 
 foresee anything at all, because He is external to time.* 
 
 " Nothing to Him is present, nothing past, 
 But an Eternal Now doth ever last." 
 
 IX. Determinists often imply this syllogism. " If 
 determinism were untrue, there would be no such thing as 
 psychological, social, historical science ; but by the con- 
 fession of all men there is such science, therefore deter- 
 minism is true." We replied to this argument directly 
 and expressly in our Essay on Science, Prayer, Freewill, 
 and Miracles, f and must refer our readers to what we 
 
 * " Dei proDscientia, ex doctrin& Patrum, res libere futures supponit." 
 " In hypothesi quod res futuraj sint, Deus eas viilere debet : coiisequenter 
 nempe ad liberam detcrminationem. . . . Cum verum sit hominem se deter- 
 minaturum ad talem vel talem actionem, hoc ipso diviuae notitite subest " 
 (" Perrone de Deo," nn. 393, 400). 
 
 t This essay is republished in the second volume of this collection. ED.
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill. 279 
 
 there said. Here we will only explain that we admit the 
 existence of psychological, social, and historical science, 
 but deny that the existence of such science is incompatible 
 with freewill. 
 
 X. Determinists sometimes seem to imply an a priori 
 argument in favour of their theory. " Since physical 
 phenomena proceed on uniform laws " so they seem to 
 reason " how incredible that psychical phenomena should 
 proceed otherwise ! " Before entering, however, on the 
 field of thought thus opened, we will make a very brief 
 digression. " Naturam expellas furca : tamen usque re- 
 curret." Antitheists, having no belief in the God who 
 created all things, very often erect the uniformity of nature 
 into a kind of deity. Theists would protest with horror 
 against the very notion of change in God as being a horrible 
 irreverence. Quite similarly, a very large proportion of 
 antitheists reject, not with philosophical serenity, but with 
 passionate outcry, the very notion of external interference 
 with the course of phenomena, whether such interference 
 be alleged as proceeding by way of freewill, or of miracles, 
 or of God's constant action on phenomena in answer to 
 prayer. 
 
 We now proceed to the particular objection which we 
 are here to consider. As a preliminary, however, we beg 
 to ask determinists who nowadays are also always pheno- 
 inenists how they came to be so certain that physical 
 phenomena do proceed on uniform laws. In our last 
 essay we challenged phenomenists to prove, if they could, 
 the uniformity of nature, by mere appeals to experience ; 
 and we answered one by one the arguments by which 
 Mr. Mill professed so to prove it. 
 
 However, we ourselves, of course, entirely admit the 
 uniformity of physical phenomena, though wo contend 
 that no proof of this truth can be derived from mere 
 experience. \Vu usk, then, where is the <i priori iiu-
 
 280 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 probability of the supposition that psychical phenomena 
 differ somewhat in this respect from physical ? Where, we 
 ask, is the a priori difficulty in thinking that every human 
 will has a true power of interfering with psychical uni- 
 formity of action, so far as such interference is involved in 
 its power of self-determination ? Surely the answer to 
 this question depends altogether on the doctrine adopted 
 concerning human morality. We quite admit that, if the 
 utilitarian theory of morals were true, there would be a 
 real a priori presumption against Freewill. But for our 
 part, we hold that moral doctrine which we set forth to the 
 best of our power in our third essay ; we contend that man- 
 kind have full means of knowing that there is a Supreme 
 Euler, who imposes on them the obligation of obeying a 
 multiform and multifarious moral law. But if this be 
 so, it is absolutely incredible that the alternative should 
 depend entirely on circumstances (external or internal) and 
 in no respect on their own self-determination, whether they 
 do or do not obey that Euler. W T e believe, indeed, that 
 most determinists will agree with us on this particular 
 head. In fact, they are in general (we think) less keen 
 and earnest in opposing Freewill itself than they are in 
 opposing that doctrine on morality which we maintain to 
 be the only true one. 
 
 XI. This brings us to the last objection which we shall 
 consider in our present article ; viz. that which turns on 
 the connection between Freewill and moral responsibility. 
 On this critical question, Mr. Mill concerns himself, of 
 course, exclusively with Sir W. Hamilton's exposition of 
 the argument ; and as (for our own part) we dissent in 
 some respects from that exposition, we must begin by 
 Betting forth in our own way the connection which we 
 allege to exist between men's cognizance of their freewill 
 and their cognizance of their moral responsibility. 
 
 If our readers wish thoroughly to apprehend what we
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill. 281 
 
 would urge on this matter, we fear we cannot exempt them 
 from the necessity of reading our essay on the principles 
 of morality.* In that essay we imagined a man lying 
 on his sick-bed, reviewing his past actions of treachery, 
 ingratitude, injustice, unprincipled ambition, and judging 
 as self-evidently true, that these actions have been 
 " morally evil," " sinful," nay, detested and forbidden by an 
 Existent Supreme Euler. Let us now for argument's sake 
 make a supposition, which we believe to be impossible. Let 
 us suppose this hitherto repentant sinner to become firmly 
 convinced, that he has had no real power of acting other- 
 wise than he did; that he had been, in each particular 
 case up to the very beginning of his life, inevitably com- 
 pelled by the very laws of his nature to that particular line 
 of conduct which he pursued. f His repentance would 
 necessarily vanish and his judgment on his own past acts 
 would be reversed. He would still intue clearly that such 
 acts if performed by a free person would have been wicked 
 and forbidden by a Supreme Ruler. But as he had come 
 to think that he had not himself been a free agent, he 
 would no more consider himself to have been blameworthy, 
 than he would account a log of wood blameworthy, which 
 had been made the cause of a frightful railway accident. 
 
 Our argument, then, is the following : We may infer 
 very confidently that such a repentant offender as we have 
 described is most firmly and profoundly cognizant, through 
 self-intimacy, of his own freedom. We may infer this 
 truth very confidently from the fact that he so resolutely 
 refuses, as is always found the case, to lay the flattering 
 unction on his soul, of fancying that he has not been free. 
 We do not say as Sir W. Hamilton seems to say that 
 men's intuition of moral evil includes an intuition of their 
 
 * The third essay of this collection. ED. 
 
 t The reason why we regard this ua nn "impossible supposition," is 
 because we are assuming that the man is now in earnest, and that he will not 
 therefore blind himself to manifest facts.
 
 282 Ttw Philosophy of Tlwism. 
 
 own free will. On the contrary, we do not regard their 
 conviction of their own free will as being a matter of 
 intuition at all, but as being the result of experience and 
 self-intimacy. Our argument is this. The firm and in- 
 eradicable conviction with which any given repentant 
 offender considers his moral intuitions to be applicable to 
 his own acts, shows how firm and ineradicable is that 
 conviction of his own free will which his self-intimacy has 
 produced. 
 
 We think that in hardly any part of his works has Mr. 
 Mill displayed more signal ability than in his argument 
 against Hamilton, from p. 586 to p. 591 ; but on reading 
 carefully through, not these pages only, but his whole 
 chapter on Freewill, we cannot find any semblance of reply 
 to the particular argument which we have here set forth. 
 
 We are sanguine that we have much strengthened our 
 case, by considering the objections hitherto recited ; having 
 been enabled by such consideration to place our full mean- 
 ing in clearer light, and to show, with greater variety of 
 illustration, how conformable is our doctrine with expe- 
 rienced facts. One objection, however, remains of a very 
 far more serious character, though it has not been adduced 
 either by Mr. Mill, Dr. Bain, or (so far as we know) by any 
 other writer of their school. " If all men," it may be 
 asked, "possess so real a power of resisting their will's 
 spontaneous impulse, how does it happen that this power 
 is by comparison so rarely and inconsiderably exercised ? " 
 Against Catholics in particular, as " ad homines," the same 
 difficulty may be still more urgently pressed. " You hold 
 that Catholics at least have full moral power, not only to 
 avoid mortal sin, but to make the pleasing God the one 
 predominant end of their life. Yet how few and far between 
 are those, of whom you will even allege that they do this ! 
 How amazingly few, on the supposition that all have the 
 needful power ! Again, you hold that those trained in
 
 Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill. 283 
 
 ignorance of religion have a true moral power without 
 supposing any special and authenticated Revelation to 
 arrive at a knowledge of the One True God. Yet how hard 
 you will find it to lay your finger on one single heathen 
 who in fact has done this ! " The difficulty here sketched 
 demands the most earnest attention ; but its treatment will 
 carry us into a line of thought entirely different in kind 
 from what has occupied us in our present essay. We will 
 therefore postpone its discussion to a future opportunity ; 
 content with having shown, by our mention of it, how very 
 far we are from ignoring it or wishing to slur it over. For 
 want of a better name, we will call it the " Calvinistic " 
 difficulty. 
 
 Another objection, which we also here pass over, is 
 founded on statistics and calculated averages ; and has 
 been borrowed by Mr. Mill (see " On Hamilton," p. 577) 
 from Mr. Buckle. If the Calvinistic objection is far the 
 strongest, Mr. Buckle's is certainly the weakest, of all which 
 have been adduced against Freewill. In fact, it tells 
 with its full force (whether that force be great or small) 
 against those very philosophers who adduce it. But as its 
 treatment will bring us across the same class of considera- 
 tions which are suggested by the Calvmistic objection, we 
 will treat the two in mutual connection.* 
 
 There are no other possible replies to our argument 
 which we can find mentioned by Mr. Mill or Dr. Bain, or 
 which suggest themselves to our mind ; but if such are 
 adduced by any opponent, we promise to give them careful 
 attention. Meanwhile it may be interesting to our readers, 
 and perhaps practically serviceable, if we here give a little 
 prospectus of what we hope to accomplish on future occa- 
 
 * The fuithor never carried out his intention of treating these arguments 
 expressly; hut the general drift of his view on the mutter is indicated in the 
 en say on "The Extent of Freewill," published in the second volume of this 
 collection. Eu.
 
 284 Tlie Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 sions. In the next essay of our series we are (1) to uphold 
 the doctrine of causation, and then (2) to state and defend 
 our own full doctrine on Freewill. If sufficient space still 
 remains, we hope in the same essay to answer the two 
 objections the Calvinistic and the Buckleian which we 
 have now held over ; otherwise their treatment shall com- 
 mence the next following paper of our series. Then, with 
 the full light which we shall have gained from these in- 
 vestigations, we shall return to a fuller elucidation of those 
 doctrines on morality which we exhibited in the third essay 
 of the present volume. That further elucidation, we think, 
 will make evident two conclusions. Firstly, it will make 
 clear, that the Catholic doctrine on morality is alone 
 true ; as distinguished, not only from utilitarianism, but 
 from every non-utilitarian theory other than the Catholic.* 
 Secondly, it will show how large an array of materials for 
 the Theistic argument will have already been brought 
 together, even before we directly encounter antitheists on 
 that supreme issue. 
 
 * We need hardly say that, according to Catholic doctrine, the highest 
 type of human virtue is that exemplified by the saints.
 
 VII. 
 APPENDIX ON FKEEWILL. 
 
 WE have heartily to thank the Spectator for a very cordial 
 and eloquent criticism of our essay on Freewill. The 
 criticism in question is well worthy of our readers' careful 
 attention, and it has suggested to us a few supplementary 
 remarks. Its principal portion runs as follows : 
 
 Dr. Ward takes the ambiguity out of the common Millite 
 and Bainite argument for determinism, by distinguishing between 
 the attractions which act involuntarily upon the will, and 
 which really determine the character and the strength of what 
 he, like Mr. Mill and his school, calls the resultant attraction or 
 repulsion i.e. the spontaneous impulse which springs out of all 
 these positive and negative attractions and the motives by 
 which he denotes any kind of resolves to act, including those 
 which are not results of attractions or repulsions exerted on the 
 will, but the product of the will's own force. What Dr. Ward 
 then contends is, that besides the spontaneous impulse which is 
 the resultant of all the various involuntary attractions and 
 repulsions exerted over the will on any one occasion, we are 
 often conscious of " an anti-impulsive effort," which restrains 
 and sometimes conquers this resultant impulse, and which must 
 therefore be due to the pure energy of the will. Of course the 
 determinists would assert, that what Dr. Ward ascribes to 
 anti-impulsive effort and treats as if it were exclusive of the 
 involuntary attractions and repulsions acting upon the will, is 
 really due to a very important, though often latent, element 
 amongst those attractions and repulsions. The determinists 
 allege that the action of the will is always really identical with 
 the direction of its spontaneous impulse, which Dr. Ward 
 earnestly denies; but the way in which the former would 
 state their difference with him would probably be this : they
 
 286 TJie Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 would say that Dr. Ward's " anti-impulsive effort " must itself 
 originate in some sort of desire or aversion, preference or dislike, 
 or at least in some habit of the mind, which is now perhaps 
 chronic, but is due to former influences of the attractive or 
 repulsive kind ; and that Dr. Ward has missed its true nature, 
 only owing to some disguise of form, which has served to merge 
 the latent attractions or repulsions in the moral or muscular 
 character of the struggles with opposite attractions or repulsions, 
 to which they are apt to give rise. For example, I make what 
 Dr. Ward means by an " anti-impulsive effort " to get up in the 
 morning, when for a moment the resultant of all the attractions 
 and repulsions operative on my will appears to be a " spontaneous 
 impulse" to turn round and drop off to sleep again. But the 
 determinists would probably regard the true rationale of such 
 a case as something of this kind : that what seems mere free 
 volition is nothing but a rush of involuntary force from half- 
 hidden springs, the laziness and love of sleep being felt in 
 every nerve, while the source of the desire or tendency by 
 which these cravings are overpowered, is for the moment sunk 
 beneath the surface of consciousness, and to be found in some 
 deep-rooted conviction, or custom, or habit of the past, which at 
 the present moment moulds my character, without seeming to 
 fascinate my will. 
 
 To this, Dr. Ward, as we understand him, would reply, that 
 he has already taken into account, in computing the character 
 of the " spontaneous impulse " of the moment, all these subtler 
 influences radiating from past emotions or formed habits ; that 
 he has taken great pains to exclude them from the " anti- 
 impulsive effort," and to include them in the resultant attraction 
 or repulsion which involuntarily sways the will before the " anti- 
 impulsive effort " is made. He would say (quite justly, as we 
 think), that if the determinist cannot directly trace the origin of 
 such an anti-impulsive effort to irresistible attractions and 
 repulsions, but is quite conscious of the plausibility of regarding 
 it as a living force putting forth a direct restraint over the 
 resultant of all the complex fascinations and antipathies which 
 spring out of our past character and tendencies, then the 
 deteruiinist is not arguing on the phenomena as they actually 
 appear, but only yielding to an imperious prejudice and 
 superstition, in insisting that what seems a pure anti-impulsive 
 effort is but an involuntary wish or fear in disguise. The onus 
 probandi clearly lies with those who assert, that what strikes us
 
 Appendix on Freewill. 287 
 
 all as a pure volition or effort of will, is really an unconscious 
 passion or aversion the character of which we have mistaken. 
 If we are no judges of the distinction between an involuntary 
 attraction (negative or positive) and the dead-heave of volition, 
 the argument fails altogether, and neither determinist nor 
 indeterminist need attempt a problem beyond his powers. If 
 we are judges of that distinction, then we must produce 
 psychological evidence of the paradox, that a tendency rooted 
 deep in character seems to us to be a mere momentary anti- 
 impulsive effort of the will's own creation. And on this point 
 we heartily go with the drift of Dr. Ward's exposition. The 
 whole strength of the determinist's argument lies in his fixed 
 assumption, not in the evidence which he produces. He reasons 
 in a circle. First, that which fascinates the will most power- 
 fully is the strongest motive : next, the motive on which we 
 act must be the strongest motive, and, therefore (though we 
 don't know it), it must have fascinated the will most powerfully; 
 and this, though so far as our consciousness answers to our self- 
 interrogation, it had not fascinated our will at all, but rather 
 repelled it. Dr. Ward's ingenuity, in giving a separate name 
 to the resultant of all the involuntary attractions and repulsions 
 acting upon our will, and then maintaining that over and 
 above these we are constantly conscious of exerting an " anti- 
 impulsive effort" which neutralizes the spontaneous impulse of 
 the will, puts the vicious circular logic of the determinists in 
 its strongest and most impressive light. 
 
 We certainly are ourselves of opinion, that the argument 
 against determinism is more simply conclusive than our 
 kind critic is prepared to admit. He entirely agrees with 
 us, indeed, that determinists fail in adducing any positive 
 ground whatever for their opinions ; still, he thinks that the 
 utmost argumentative result, which in strictness can be 
 legitimately attained, is the disjunctive proposition : "Either 
 determinism is false, or the whole problem is beyond the 
 human intellect." We venture to hold, on the contrary, 
 with perfect confidence, that the problem (when duly stated) 
 not only is not beyond the human intellect, but receives 
 a solution completely clear and unequivocal. 
 
 But on looking back at our essav under the li^ht of
 
 288 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 this thoughtful criticism, we arrive at the conclusion that 
 we failed in setting forth with due emphasis, and in 
 impressing on our readers with due detail and illustration, 
 the fundamental distinction on which our whole argument 
 turned the distinction hetween what we called " anti- 
 impulsive " effort or action on the one hand, and any 
 different kind of volition on the other. We set forth that 
 distinction indeed (as we cannot but think) clearly enough 
 in one passage : but to set it forth clearly once for all, was 
 by no means sufficient ; and we ought to have exhibited it 
 in more various lights and with far greater copiousness 
 of illustration. The passage to which we refer, runs as 
 follows : 
 
 What we allege to be a fact of indubitable experience is this. 
 At some given moment my will's gravitation, as it may be called, 
 or spontaneous impulse, is in some given direction, insomuch 
 that if I held myself passively, if I let my will alone, it would 
 with absolute certainty move accordingly ; but in fact I exert 
 myself with more or less vigour to resist such impulse, and 
 then the action of my will is in a different, often an entirely 
 opposite direction. In other words, we would draw our readers' 
 attention to the frequently occurring simultaneous existence of 
 two very distinct phenomena. On the one hand (1), my will's 
 gravitation or spontaneous impulse is strongly in one direction ; 
 while on the other hand, at the same moment (2) its actual 
 movement is quite divergent from this. Now, that which 
 "motives"* affect is most evidently the will's spontaneous 
 inclination, impulse, gravitation. The determinist, then, by 
 saying that the will's movement is infallibly determined by 
 " motives," is obliged to say that the will never moves in oppo- 
 sition to its spontaneous impulse. And in fact he does say this. 
 All determinists assume, as a matter of course, that the will 
 never puts forth effort for the purpose of resisting its spon- 
 taneous impulse. We, on the contrary, allege that there is no 
 mental fact more undeniable than the frequent putting forth of 
 such effort. 
 
 * For convenience' sake, in this paragraph we used the word " motives " 
 as determinists do.
 
 Appendix on Freewill. 289 
 
 Our chief object, then, in the following pages is to set 
 forth, as clearly and unmistakably as we can, the distinction 
 intended in this passage ; a distinction on which our whole 
 argument rests. Our readers may remember, that we called 
 by the name of an " attraction " " every thought which 
 proposes some pleasure, positive or negative, to be gained 
 by some act or course of action." This terminology being 
 understood, it is very plain (we added) "that every man 
 during by far the greater part of his life is solicited by 
 conflicting attractions ; and it is further a manifest and 
 undeniable fact, that, in the very large majority of such 
 instances, a certain definite and decisive inclination or 
 impulse of the will spontaneously ensues." The attraction, 
 to which this inclination or impulse corresponds, we have 
 called the "predominating" attraction ; and the allegation 
 of ours, on which our whole argument rested, was this. 
 Very often, no doubt, men act in accordance with this 
 spontaneous impulse, and yield to this predominant attrac- 
 tion; but by no means unfrequently they resist this 
 impulse, and put forth what we have called anti-impulsive 
 effort. This last fact it is which the determinist (as we 
 shall presently point out) is obliged by his doctrine to 
 deny. What we wish first of all to make clear, is the 
 broad and unmistakable contrast which exists between that 
 class of phenomena which he is obliged to deny, and that 
 other class which he willingly admits. Or, putting the 
 same consideration in a somewhat different shape, we wish 
 to make clear that "desire" is one thing, "resolve" 
 another thing ; and that men not unfrequently both 
 " resolve " and act, in opposition to their " desire." And 
 as such is the principal purpose for which we are writing 
 this Appendix, our readers must excuse us, should we 
 become tedious by having recourse to some varietv of 
 
 / . 
 
 homely illustration. 
 
 I. A youth is very unhappy at school : his studies are 
 VOL. i. r
 
 290 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 distasteful, his companions uncongenial, and his teachers 
 unsympathetic. His mind naturally dwells on these facts ; 
 and by degrees he comes to feel a strong desire, of not 
 waiting for vacation time, but running away at once. If 
 this continues, he will soon be scheming how to effect his 
 desire. 13ut he suddenly remembers, that the home, to 
 which he might perhaps escape to-morrow, would be a very 
 different home from what it is in vacation time. There 
 would be no smiles of welcome and plans for his amuse- 
 ment, but in their stead stern reproof and enforced return 
 to school. This negative attraction the thought of this 
 pain entirely preponderates over the earlier, and changes 
 his state of mind altogether. 
 
 Now, let us dwell for a moment on this latter state of 
 mind. In the earlier stage he really desired to leave school 
 at once, but in the later stage it would be absurd to say 
 that he desires it at all. Doubtless he may feel, as keenly 
 as he did before, the evils of school ; but what he desires 
 under existing circumstances is to stay there. His inclina- 
 tion towards the immediate leaving school may be called (if 
 you will) an " optation ; " * but it cannot be called a desire. 
 Or (putting the same thing in another way), there is no 
 need of self-restraint, to keep him at school ; for he has no 
 real desire of leaving it. There is no need of self-restraint 
 in order that he may act in accordance with his spontaneous 
 impulse and do just what he desires. 
 
 Now, let us make a different supposition. At home his 
 only parent is an indulgent mother, who is sure at any 
 time to receive him with open arms. Still, she has imbued 
 him with firm religious principle, which has been much 
 strengthened (let us say) by the religious discipline of the 
 school itself. Accordingly the thought soon spontaneously 
 
 From "optarem ; " " I should desire it," were it not for its accompani- 
 ments. The recognized Catholic word " vellcity " is far more expressive, 
 but it does uot express the precise idea in the text.
 
 Appendix on Freewill. 291 
 
 enters his mind that he would gain far more real good 
 where he is, and that his staying is far more accordant 
 with the "Will of God. Now, as we observed in our essay, 
 "to those who have trained themselves in virtue, virtue 
 itself supplies an attraction ; often an exceedingly powerful 
 one." It may well happen, therefore, that the various 
 attractions offered him in pleasing God may predominate 
 over the attraction which solicits him to leaving school, 
 and that here, again, his true desire is to stay. 
 
 But another supposition is at least equally possible. 
 The attraction, which solicits him towards running away, 
 may predominate over the attraction of pleasing God ; and 
 his real desire may accordingly be to leave school. From 
 the motive,* however, of virtue and permanent self-interest, 
 he sets himself to resist that which is his spontaneous 
 impulse and real desire ; in conformity with his resolve to 
 aim at a certain end he contends against the desire, which 
 of itself would lead him to act in opposition to that end. 
 Here is a case in which " self-restraint " really does come 
 in. As soon as he intermits for one moment his watchful- 
 ness and self-restraint, his desire asserts its supremacy, 
 and impels his will in its own direction. To cease struggling 
 with himself is to give up the cause of virtue and self- 
 interest. We do not at all mean that this state of things 
 will probably continue very long ; because he will do all he 
 can to effect that the preponderance of attraction shall be 
 in favour of the end which he has resolved to pursue. But 
 we say that this state of mind, while it lasts, is most unmis- 
 takably heterogeneous from that which we last described. 
 Surely no two phenomena can be more clamorously distinct 
 
 * According to our use of terms, to ask what is my "motive" for somo 
 action, is to usk what is that end which 1 have resolved to pursue, and for 
 the sake of which I resolve on the performance of that action. But if a 
 determinist asks me what is my "motive " in some action, hi- means to ak 
 mo what is that pleasure the desire of which allures me to do what 1 do. 
 Bee p. 246.
 
 202 The Philosophy of Tliclm. 
 
 from each other more impossible to be mutually confused 
 than the two which we are contrasting. To resist one's 
 immediate desire on the one hand, or to gratify it on the 
 other hand to practise self-restraint on one hand, or to 
 practise no self-restraint on the other hand these (where 
 distinctly exhibited) are not merely dissimilar, but violently 
 contrasted phenomena. 
 
 II. We choose for our second illustration a case in 
 which the motive of resistance is not virtue at all, but mere 
 worldly interest. I live with an old aunt, from whom I 
 expect a large legacy. I go to a concert with her full 
 permission, on promise of being most faithfully back by a 
 certain hour. While I am in the very height of enjoyment 
 at a symphony of Beethoven's, my neighbour happens to 
 announce the time ; and I find I must start at once, and 
 make great haste too, if I am not to give my aunt grievous 
 offence, and imperil the fruit of years' assiduity. It is most 
 probable that I shall start off without delay ; but two 
 alternatives are possible as to my state of mind in starting. 
 It may be that the dismay with which I contemplate the 
 threatened calamity entirely counterbalances the opposite 
 attraction. I make frantic efforts to push my way out, 
 regardless of my neighbour's convenience ; the strains of 
 Beethoven are to me almost as though they did not exist ; 
 at most, my inclination to hear more of them is no more 
 than a mere optation. On the other hand, it may be that 
 those strains still constitute my preponderating attraction, 
 and that reason has to contend against predominant 
 passion. My resolve, however, is firm not to offend the old 
 lady, and I exert vigorous anti-impulsive effort : neverthe- 
 less, my will is still under the fascination of the music; 
 and as long as that is within hearing, if I intermit my 
 effort for a moment, I tarry on my way. During the whole 
 of my passage to the outward air, I am dcsiriny to return, 
 though resole cd to depart ; nor is it till the music is out of
 
 Appendix on Freewill. 293 
 
 hearing that this conflict ceases. Now, no one can possibly 
 say that the two mental states which we have described are 
 similar to each other ; for it is most manifest that they are 
 violently contrasted. Self-restraint is the principal feature 
 in the latter case, while it is entirely absent in the former. 
 
 III. Our next illustration shall be for the purpose of 
 explaining that the present issue does not turn at all on 
 the question whether effort is put forth by the agent, but 
 only anti-impulsive effort. With this view, we will recur in 
 the first instance to the illustration which we derived from 
 the demeanour in battle of some courageous soldier. He 
 will often put forth intense effort, brave appalling perils, 
 confront the risk of an agonizing death. But to what end 
 is this effort directed ? He puts it forth in order that he 
 may act in full accordance with his spontaneous present 
 impulse ; that he may gratify what is his strongest wish, 
 his real desire ; in order that he may overcome the enemy, 
 obtain fame and distinction, avoid the reproach of cowardice, 
 etc. Such efforts as these we may call " congenial " efforts. 
 But now take the instance of a military officer possessing 
 real piety and steadfastly purposing to grow therein who 
 receives at the hand of a brother officer some stinging and 
 (as the world would say) " intolerable " insult. His nature 
 flames forth ; his spontaneous impulse, his real present 
 desire, is to inflict some retaliation, which shall at least 
 deliver him from the " reproach " of cowardice. Neverthe- 
 less, it is his firm resolve, by God's grace, to comport 
 himself Christianly. His resolve contends vigorously 
 against his desire, until the latter is brought into harmony 
 with his principles. Here, then, are two cases, which 
 agree with each other as being cases of intense effort ; 
 but the former is " congenial " effort, while the Litter is 
 "anti-impulsive." What is most remarkable in the last- 
 named officer is his "self-restraint;" but it would bo 
 simply absurd to talk of self-restraint in the former
 
 294 TJie Philosophy of TJiel^tn. 
 
 instance. No one who considers ever so little can overlook 
 the fundamental contrast between the two cases. 
 
 Doubtless it may happen perhaps it not unfrequently 
 happens that a soldier's pluck and courage may fail him 
 for the moment on some most sanguinary field, and that 
 he reinforces them by anti -impulsive effort. But the cases 
 to which we drew attention as illustrating " congenial " 
 effort are the far more numerous cases in which nothing of 
 the kind occurs. 
 
 One further explanation should here be made. We do 
 not deny that there may be sometimes difficulty in deciding 
 whether this or that given effort be " congenial " or " anti- 
 impulsive ; " but these will always be instances belonging 
 to what may be called the border-land. In such a case, 
 the attractions on either side do not greatly differ in power ; 
 and it requires careful self-inspection to determine on which 
 side the balance preponderates. To take -the common 
 illustration, what can be more mutually contrasted than 
 the respective shapes of a straight line and a circle ? And 
 yet the small arc of a very large circle is often quite in- 
 distinguishable from a straight line. But though it some- 
 times happens that the anti-impulsive effort is so slight as 
 not to be easily recognized for what it is, it happens quite 
 as often that such effort is so intense as to force its true 
 character on the notice of the most casual observer. We 
 cannot too often repeat that if there be such a thing in the 
 world as anti -impulsive effort, determinism is overthrown. 
 We are not at all concerned, therefore, to maintain that in 
 all cases, but only that in some cases, the putting forth of 
 such effort is an indisputable fact. 
 
 IV. W T e will next repeat the particular illustration cited 
 from us by our kind critic in the Spectator, with the view of 
 more distinctly confronting the difficulty which he expresses. 
 A rises at a given time on some given morning with simplest 
 promptitude and alacrity under the influence of a firmly
 
 Appendix on Freewill. 295 
 
 acquired habit, though he experiences at the moment more 
 pain than pleasure in so doing. How is this to be 
 psychologically explained ? According to Mr. Mill and Dr. 
 Bain, the explanation is such as the following ; and we are 
 entirely disposed to think it correct. It is true enough, 
 then, that the rising gives him at the moment more pain 
 than pleasure ; but, at the same time, he is keenly con- 
 scious that his lying longer in bed would, on the whole, 
 entail on him greater suffering than his getting up. His 
 real desire, then, is to rise from bed. He needs no " self- 
 restraint " in order that he may get up ; but he icould need 
 "self-restraint" in order that he should voluntarily lie 
 in bed. 
 
 Now consider, on the other hand, the case of B. His 
 desire his preponderating and spontaneous impulse is to 
 lie in bed ; but he resolves, from some motive or other, to 
 get up. In order to fulfil that resolve he exerts himself, 
 and puts forth anti-impulsive effort ; he exercises manly 
 self-restraint and forces himself to rise, though it be but 
 laboriously and against the grain. A starts from bed by a 
 spontaneous and indeliberate impulse ; but B resolves and 
 fails, resolves and fails again, until he at last succeeds by 
 a crowning effort in launching himself on the sea of active 
 life. Surely no mental states are more unmistakably con- 
 trasted than these two. 
 
 According to the Spectator, however, the determinists 
 would reply, " that what seems free volition " in B's case 
 " is nothing but a rush of involuntary force from half- 
 hidden springs ; the laziness and love of sleep being felt in 
 every nerve, while the source of the desire or tendency, by 
 which these cravings are overpowered, is for the moment 
 sunk beneath the surface of consciousness, and to be found 
 in some deep-rooted conviction, or custom, or habit of the 
 past, which at the present moment moulds his character 
 without seeming to fascinate his will." AVe must sav for
 
 2DC The PhilwoiJ, y of Tltcitsm. 
 
 ourselves that we cannot see the slightest plausibility in 
 such a reply. We will go all possible lengths in heartily 
 admitting that the will is often very powerfully affected by 
 influences, which are for the moment or permanently, if 
 you will sunk beneath the surface of consciousness. The 
 same thought of pleasure and pain shall occur with equal 
 vividness to Y and Z ; and yet it shall impel Y towards 
 action with immeasurably greater power than that with 
 which it impels Z, because of various circumstances in his 
 temperament and past history. Still, look at the matter 
 which way you will, all that these convictions, and habits, 
 and customs, and temperament can even imaginably do 
 is to effect that the desire the spontaneous and prepon- 
 derating impulse be this rather than that. But that act 
 of self-restraint or anti -impulsive effort, on which we are 
 throughout insisting, presupposes the spontaneous impulse 
 as already existing ; nor does it come into action at all, 
 until after the desire exists, until habits, temperament, cir- 
 cumstances, have done their work.* Here, precisely as 
 before, to act in accordance with my desire is one thing, and 
 to resist my desire is just the opposite thing. Nor is there 
 the most distant approach towards lessening the saliency 
 
 * An objection may be raised against what is said in the text, which it 
 will be more satisfactory expressly to notice. Suppose I desire some given 
 course of action, M ; and suppose I nevertheless resist that desire, from the 
 motive of virtuousness or of my permanent self-interest. This motive of 
 virtue or self-interest so the objector may argue on entering my mind 
 becomes in itself an attraction ; and may probably enough (on the very 
 principles of determinism) preponderate over the opposite attractions. We 
 answer, that such cases, undoubtedly, are by no means uncommon ; but that 
 they are not the cases on which we rest our argument. If the new attraction 
 preponderates over its rivals, then my desire is no longer for course M, 
 though I may have an optation towards that course. In such a case, there- 
 fore, although the action which I elicit is opposite to that which just 
 previously I had desired; nevertheless, at the moment of action my desire 
 and my action are in perfect mutual accordance. But the cases on which 
 we insist are those in which it is manifest that I resolve and act in direct 
 opposition to what (at the very moment of acting) I desire. The un- 
 deniable existence of such cases is the fact on which we rest as fatal to 
 determinism.
 
 Appendix on Freewill. 297 
 
 and impressiveness of this contrast, whether the desire 
 has been generated by obvious and recognized influences, 
 or by influences partially or entirely latent.* 
 
 V. There is one doctrine implied in what we have just 
 been saying, which it will nevertheless be more satisfactory 
 expressly to set forth. It has reference to what we called 
 in our essay " non-emotional attractions." It would be 
 quite unfair to allege that, according to determinists, my 
 action is always determined by that "motive" (as they 
 call it) which is accompanied by the most vivid picture of 
 pleasure for the moment. On the contrary, they hold, 
 even as a prominent part of their doctrine, that a thought 
 of pleasure or pain may exercise immense influence towards 
 action, while causing, nevertheless, little or no emotion. 
 We took every pains (we trust) to treat this part of their 
 theory with full justice. Take the preceding instance of A 
 rising from bed. The pain of rising may be far more 
 vividly presented to his imagination than the pain of lying 
 in bed. Nevertheless, what precisely results from his con- 
 firmed Jiabit of early rising is, (1) that the pain of lying in 
 bed would, in fact, be found (when the time came) to be 
 greater than the present pain of getting up ; and (2) that 
 this eventual predominance of pain is at this moment duly 
 and influentially appreciated by his practical reason.-f- 
 Determinists undoubtedly are quite explicit in urging this 
 consideration ; and (as we have often said) we are entirely 
 disposed so far to agree with them. 
 
 In like manner, suppose I have acquired in great 
 strength what Mr. Mill calls a habit of virtue ; i.e. a habit 
 of benevolence. It will happen again and again that I 
 spontaneously practise what in some sense may be called 
 self-sacrifice ; that is, I deny myself some great pleasure or 
 
 * See what wo observed in our notes ut pp. 243, 244, 248, 249. 
 
 t It will be sufficiently cleur hero from the context what we mean by this 
 term " practical reason ; " and it is not worth while to treat ut uny yreut 
 length a matter on which we aix entirely at one with dctmuiuists.
 
 298 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 endure some great pain for the sake of benefiting my 
 fellow-men. Moreover, I do this, though the pleasure 
 which I forego, or the pain which I endure, is painted on 
 my imagination with immeasurably greater vividness than 
 is the pleasure which I shall enjoy from acting beneficently, 
 or the pain which I should suffer from acting in a different 
 way.* We need not here give the explanation of this 
 phenomenon ; because to do so would only be to repeat, 
 almost word for word, the explanation which we just now 
 gave. 
 
 We entirely agree with determinists on the existence of 
 such phenomena as these ; but we say that they do not 
 tend ever so remotely to discredit the argument on which 
 we have insisted. In the former of our two instances, my 
 real desire was to get up ; and my inclination towards 
 lying in bed was a mere optation. In the latter case my 
 real desire was to practise self-sacrifice ; and I had no more 
 than an optation towards the contrary self-indulgence. It 
 still remains absolutely true, then, that, according to 
 determinists, men by the very constitution of their nature 
 are inevitably determined to do what they really desire. 
 See Mr. Mill's express language quoted by us already. 
 Though we find no pleasure in such or such an action, he 
 says, " we still continue to desire it, and consequently to do 
 it." " I dispute altogether that we are conscious of being 
 able to act in opposition to the strongest present desire or 
 aversion." 
 
 In one word. The whole deterministic controversy turns 
 on this one question : " Do I, or do I not, at various times 
 exercise self-restraint ? do I, or do I not, at various times 
 act in resistance (not to a mere optation, but) to my real 
 desire?" What can "motives," f or " circumstances," or 
 "temperament," or "habit," or " custom " imaginably do 
 
 * See the passages which we quoted from Mr. Mill, in pp. 242, 244, note, 
 t In the sense in which determinists use that word.
 
 Appendix on Freewill. 299 
 
 for me, except to effect that my desire shall be this rather 
 than that ? How can they imaginably influence my action 
 in those cases where my action is contrary to my desire ? 
 If, then, there are such cases, if it be true that I often act 
 in opposition to what at the moment is my real desire, then 
 it demonstratively follows that my will at such times acts 
 for itself; independently of " pleasure," or " pain," or " cir- 
 cumstances," or " temperament," or anything else. 
 
 And on this critical point we appeal confidently to the 
 experience of any man who will honestly examine his past 
 and present consciousness. The question to which our 
 essay was directed throughout was the question we have 
 first named. "Do men ever resist a real desire? Is 
 there such a thing as self-restraint ? " He would be an 
 unusually bold man who, fairly confronting this question, 
 should answer it in the negative ; but to answer it in the 
 affirmative is to reject determinism in every possible 
 shape. 
 
 It is urgently important, however, in reference to the 
 course of argument which we hope to pursue in future 
 essays, to make thoroughly manifest that determinism is 
 absolutely nowhere, as the saying is ; that it is not only 
 demonstratively, but even visibly and palpably false. We 
 had rather, therefore, run the risk of saying many words 
 too much than of saying one word too little. And in 
 accordance with this feeling, we will conclude by drawing 
 out in form the argument on which we have insisted, 
 whether in our original essay or in this Appendix. 
 
 The determinist reasoning, when analyzed, will be found 
 to consist of two propositions. 
 
 Prop. 1st. " Every man's desire at any given moment 
 is infallibly determined by circumstances (1) internal and 
 (2) external ; i.e. (1) by the intrinsic constitution and 
 tendency of his mind, and (2) by the external influences 
 which at the moment act on it."
 
 300 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 Prop. 2nd. "Everyman's will at any given moment 
 is infallibly determined as to its action by the desire which 
 prevails in his mind at that moment." 
 
 From these two propositions taken together, the deter- 
 ministic conclusion obviously follows ; viz. that every 
 man's will is infallibly determined by circumstances internal 
 and external, as to its action at any given moment. 
 
 Moreover, not only this is in fact the reasoning of a 
 determinist, but there is no other reasoning on which he 
 can possibly rely. It is most obvious that circumstances 
 cannot determine a man's will to some action, except by 
 disposing it thereto ; or, in other words, that they cannot 
 determine his action, except by determining his desire. His 
 desire, indeed, in many cases, may be negative and not 
 positive ; or, in other words, he may desire some course of 
 action not as being in itself attractive, but as being less 
 unattractive than any practicable alternative. Then, again, 
 when we speak of " desire," we by no means refer exclu- 
 sively to what is sometimes called " conscious " desire. 
 There are very many active impulses which lead so 
 immediately to action that they cannot be reflected on as 
 distinct from the action to which they spontaneously and 
 irresistibly lead. We include all these impulses under the 
 general name " desire." And all this being understood, it 
 is most evident that the determinist reasoning must consist 
 of the two propositions above recited. If a man's action is 
 infallibly determined by circumstances, this can only be 
 because (1) his desire is infallibly determined by them, and 
 because (2) his action is infallibly determined by his desire. 
 
 With the former of the two propositions we are entirely 
 disposed to concur. Not only so, but we are disposed to 
 concur with it in the particular shape in which Mr. Mill 
 and Dr. Bain maintain it. Subject to the explanations 
 they give of their own meaning, we are quite disposed to 
 agree with them, that what determines a man's desire at
 
 Appendix on Freewill. 301 
 
 any given moment is the balance of pleasure contemplated 
 by him at that moment. As we observed in our essay, 
 we think that that constant gravitation towards immediate 
 pleasure, which observation testifies as characteristic of 
 humanity, gives these writers a thoroughly solid foundation 
 for this part of their doctrine. 
 
 It has been, then, against the second proposition of 
 determinists that our whole argument has been directed. 
 We most confidently deny that at every given moment 
 every man's action is infallibly determined by the desire 
 which prevails in him at that moment. No doubt (1) there 
 are very many instances in which a man docs act in 
 harmony with his prevailing desire. There are (2) other 
 (we are confident) and very numerous instances in which 
 anti-impulsive effort is really put forth and anti-impulsive 
 action follows, but in which this circumstance does not so 
 force itself on an observer's notice but that determinists 
 may plausibly doubt it. But our main purpose throughout 
 has been to show (3) that there are other instances in 
 which it is seen with clearest evidence in which no one 
 not flagrantly uncandid can possibly doubt that a man 
 acts in opposition to his present prevailing desire. Indeed, 
 with one particular class of men, viz. devout Theists, the 
 phenomena of anti-impulsive effort are among the com- 
 monest and most unmistakable phenomena in the whole 
 world. But even if, instead of this vast multitude, there 
 were but one such phenomenon on absolutely certain record, 
 that one phenomenon would suffice to overthrow the deter- 
 ministic doctrine. If Mr. Mill admitted that one single 
 man on one single occasion resisted his prevalent desire, 
 that philosopher could not maintain it to be an invariable 
 law of human nature that men's actions are infallibly 
 determined by their desires. 
 
 We are the last to deny that indubitable truths are 
 often encountered by objections of real force, nay, of very
 
 302 Tlie Ph ilosophy of The ism . 
 
 great force. It may happen from time to time, we quite 
 admit, that some conclusion is established with absolute 
 certainty, insomuch that any one would act unreasonably 
 (and perhaps with grave culpability) if he failed to yield it 
 the most absolute and unreserved assent ; while at the 
 same time objections remain unsolved, which, if they stood 
 alone, would tend to make this very conclusion more or less 
 improbable. Here is one of the intellectual trials to which 
 God doubtless for wisest purposes of probation exposes 
 speculative thinkers. As we proceed indeed with our 
 present series of essays, we shall come across more than 
 one such truth as we have just described. But what we 
 here wish to point out is, that there is nothing of this kind 
 as regards the objections brought by Mr. Mill or Dr. Bain 
 against indeterminism. Let any one rightly understand 
 what such writers affirm ; and let him then proceed to look 
 at the most obvious and every-day facts of life ; he will be 
 able to discern with the clearest evidence, that their pre- 
 tentious theory is a mere sham and delusion.
 
 VIII. 
 MR. MILL ON CAUSATION.* 
 
 CONSIDERING the point at which our argument has now 
 arrived, it will be perhaps conducive to clearness if, before 
 proceeding further, we address a few preliminary words of 
 recapitulation and explanation to our Catholic readers. 
 
 The preceding essays form part of a projected series 
 as yet far from being concluded the purpose of which is 
 to establish securely on argumentative ground, against the 
 antitheists of this day, the existence of that Personal and 
 Infinitely Perfect Being whom Christians designate by the 
 name " God." This is a task peculiarly needed at the 
 present moment, when the whole stream of speculative 
 irreligion tends vigorously to denial of a Personal God. 
 We trust that our arguments, as far as they have gone, will 
 hold their own against all gainsayers ; but the particular 
 thinkers whom we have kept specially in mind are those 
 called "phenomenists." 
 
 It is the characteristic tenet of these persons (and hence 
 their name) that the knowledge possessed by any human 
 being is confined to his apprehension of phenomena 
 whether physical or psychical, exclusively as phenomena ; 
 that any given intellectual avouchment is cognized by him 
 as a phenomenon, and as nothing more ; or, in other 
 
 * A System of Logic. By JOHN STCART MILL. Eighth Edition. London : 
 Longmans. 
 
 An Examination of Sir W. Hamilton 1 * Philosophy. By JOHN STUART 
 MILL. Fourth Edition. London: Lonjnnuns.
 
 304 The Philosophy of Tfaisrn. 
 
 words, that no intellectual avoucbment can give him any 
 reliable information, except of its own existence and 
 characteristics.* For various reasons, we selected Mr. 
 Stuart Mill as the special representative of this school ; and 
 there is no doubt that, when we began our series, he held 
 far the highest place among them in the world's judgment. 
 His "Autobiography," in fact, and his "Essays on 
 Religion," have had so damaging an effect on his reputa- 
 tion, that it is now difficult to realize how " facile princeps " 
 of irreligious speculators he was accounted in 1871. But 
 for our own part, we still think that his former eminence 
 was well deserved, as regards any intellectual comparison 
 between himself and his brother phenomenists. His death, 
 as we have more than once said, was to us a matter of 
 severe controversial disappointment ; because we were full 
 of confidence that a signal triumph must have accrued to 
 the cause of truth had we succeeded in inducing him to 
 put forth his utmost strength against us. At the same 
 time, though we cannot now obtain that great advantage, 
 we shall still take him as direct representative of the school 
 which we are directly assailing ; while we shall from time 
 to time illustrate his position by citations from others who 
 agree with him. 
 
 As we call Mr. Mill's school "phenomenists," we may 
 with equal propriety call their opponents " intuitionists." 
 An " intuition " (as w r e use the term) is simply " an intel- 
 lectual avouchment, reliably declaring as immediately 
 evident some truth other than the mere existence and 
 characteristics of such avouchment." A " phenomenist," 
 then, precisely as such, denies that there are such mental 
 facts as "intuitions;" and any one therefore who denies 
 
 * " The notion that truths external to the mind may be known by intuition 
 or consciousness, independently of observation and experience, is, I am per- 
 suaded, in these times the great intellectual support of false doctrines and 
 bad institutions." (Mr. Stuart Mill's " Autobiography," p. 225. See also 
 p. 273.)
 
 Mr. Mill on Causation. 305 
 
 phenomenism, ipso facto upholds the existence of certain 
 "intuitions." 
 
 Now, it is most easy for an intuitionist to show by a 
 stroke of the pen that phenomenism cannot be accepted 
 with full consistency. For (as we have repeatedly asked) 
 what is an act of memory, except an intellectual avouch- 
 ment ? On phenomenist principles, then, an act of memory 
 gives me no reliable information, except of its own existence 
 and characteristics ; and consequently it gives me no ground 
 whatever for knowing, nay, even for reasonably guessing, 
 what have been my past impressions and thoughts. I have 
 very often that present impression, which I call an act of 
 most clear and articulate memory ; but, according to 
 phenomenism, I cannot know I cannot legitimately even 
 guess that this present impression corresponds to a past 
 fact. It is some years since we first urged prominently this 
 objection against phenomenism ; and, as far as we know, 
 no pheuomenist whosoever, looking that objection in the 
 face, has attempted to answer it. Mr. Mill certainly 
 noticed our argument and professed to meet it : but (as we 
 pointed out in our essay on his reply) the question to which 
 he replied was not less than "fundamentally different from, 
 the question which we had asked." 
 
 But, though an argumentum ad hominem against the 
 phenomenists is so very easily effected, it seemed to us of 
 vital importance that the conflict with phenomenism should 
 be carried very much further than this. Even as regards 
 the phenomenists themselves, no one can suppose that 
 their power of doing mischief is neutralized by a demon- 
 stration of their inconsistency. The most reasonable 
 thinker in the world even while entirely seeing that their 
 system, as a whole, is self-contradictory might attach 
 great weight to this or that individual objection alleged by 
 them against Theism, and might desire its refutation. 
 Moreover, the present profoundly disorganized state of
 
 30G TIte Philosophy of TJiciam. 
 
 thought renders it, in our humble judgment, the one press- 
 ing philosophical need of our time, that that very course 
 of argument be pursued, which controversy with pheno- 
 menists implies. They admit, it may be said, no first 
 principle whatever. If, then, we are to defend Theism in 
 a controversy against them, we must take nothing whatever 
 for granted ; we must set forth, link by link, the whole 
 chain of argument, by which (as we contend) our conclusion 
 is conclusively established. But the careful performance 
 of this task, as we just now said, is (to our mind) on other 
 grounds, also the one philosophical necessity of our time ; 
 and phenomenists, therefore, have unintentionally conferred 
 a very important service on philosophy, by compelling their 
 opponents to its execution. We wish we could ourselves 
 more competently satisfy this pressing philosophical neces- 
 sity ; but, at all events, we may be of service in suggesting 
 a track, which others hereafter shall more successfully 
 pursue. 
 
 Now, there is a distinction between that order of 
 arrangement which such a purpose requires, and that 
 order of arrangement which is commonly adopted by 
 Catholic philosophers : and we wish our Catholic readers 
 to bear in mind the nature of this distinction. We have 
 on former occasions dwelt on a vitally important doctrine, 
 inculcated by Catholic philosophers. The Catholic holds, 
 not only, of course, that reason is the gift of God, but also 
 that every single adult is (except for his own grave sin) led 
 by his reason, energizing, at least, implicitly, to the sure 
 and certain knowledge of various truths, which are of vital 
 importance to his well-being here and hereafter. So 
 momentous is this doctrine, that we think the issue of the 
 fundamental conflict between religion and unbelief will turn 
 practically on the alternative, whether the said doctrine be 
 accepted or rejected. We would refer our Catholic readers 
 to an article in the Dublin Ilevieic, for October, 1874, as
 
 Mr. Mill on Causation. 307 
 
 setting forth both our precise meaning in this statement, 
 and also our ground for making it.* 
 
 The purpose, then, at which a Catholic philosopher 
 commonly aims in his treatises, is not entirely the same 
 with that which our own controversy with phenomenists 
 obliges us to pursue. He desires to place before his reader 
 a map and exhibition of the various verities, which reason 
 suffices to establish ; and the order in which he exhibits 
 those verities is that which he judges most appropriate for 
 impressing them on the student's intelligence. As regards 
 the most fundamental of their number, it is not his busi- 
 ness to convince the learner of their truth, because the 
 learner is known to be already convinced; but rather to 
 give him the power of contemplating and exhibiting to 
 himself that knowledge, which he already possesses. And 
 although of course the teacher adduces arguments for each 
 successive conclusion, he is content to derive such argu- 
 ments from those various other philosophical doctrines 
 which he knows to be common ground between the student 
 and himself. 
 
 Now, though this method is probably more suitable than 
 any other to the end at which he aims, our readers will at 
 once see that, unless great care be taken, it may here and 
 
 * Dr. Mivart, in his admirable " Lessons from Nature," has the following 
 remark (p. 5) : " When any man has become a victim to doubt, he has no 
 rational choice, as he has no duty, but to reason out his doubts to the end ; 
 to seek to escape them by diverting his attention, or to obscure them by 
 calling up a cloud of emotion, is not only useless but blameworthy." Wo 
 are quite sure the excellent author docs not intend to say what his words, 
 nevertheless, may be misunderstood to mean. Suppose a person of ordinary 
 or less than ordinary intellectual education has permitted himself to bo 
 carried away for a period by the stream of antitheism, and lias become a 
 " victim to doubt" or to worse than doubt. What means has God given him 
 of recovery ? We have indicated what seems to us the true reply in tho 
 article mentioned in the text. But it is surely an undeniable fact of human 
 nature that none except a very small minority lire intellectually competent 
 to philosophical inquiries. With the great muss of men it would be the 
 most grotesque child's play if they gravely professed to explore and mutually 
 balance the argument* adducible for and against (tod's Kxistence, with a 
 view to discovering for themselves the truth by argumentative investigation.
 
 308 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 there involve an argumentative "petitio principii." It may 
 possibly happen that when doctrine A is in question, 
 doctrine B shall be alleged as a proof thereof; and that 
 when (a volume later, perhaps) doctrine B conies to be 
 considered, doctrine A in turn shall occupy the place o* 
 premiss. But in controversial philosophy as distinct 
 from the philosophy set forth by a Catholic addressing 
 Catholics a "petitio principii" is the one most fatal of 
 flaws. And the philosophical series in which we are 
 engaged is precisely controversial ; for it is intended as 
 offering humble suggestions to Catholics, as to the argu- 
 ments available against the desolating scepticism now so 
 widely prevalent. Here it is comparatively of minor 
 importance, whether the truths on which we insist be 
 arranged in the order best suited for their full apprehen- 
 sion ; while, on the other hand, it is the most urgent of 
 necessities, that every step be thoroughly made good before 
 proceeding to another. 
 
 Of the successive steps which are thus to be made good, 
 the first, on which all else depends, consists in refuting the 
 characteristic tenet of phenomenism. As we have so often 
 pointed out, if this tenet w r ere true if it were true that no 
 intellectual avouchment reliably declares as immediately 
 evident aught except its own existence it would follow 
 that no man has the power of knowing, nay, or of even 
 reasonably guessing, what has been any one of his past 
 experiences ; he has no power of knowing, or even reason- 
 ably guessing, any fact in the present or the past, excepting 
 the phenomena of his momentarily present consciousness. 
 We began our series, then, by laying down in opposition 
 to this desolating scepticism what we regard as the true 
 "rule and motive of certitude." We maintained that 
 whatever a man's existent cognitive faculties, if rightly 
 interrogated and interpreted, avouch as certain, is thereby 
 known to him as certain. This proposition we call " the
 
 Mr. Mill on Causation. 309 
 
 principle of certitude ; " and it is the first principle of all 
 possible knowledge. 
 
 Here, however, it may be useful to subjoin an explana- 
 tion. The principle of certitude is not a "logical," but 
 what may be called an " implicit and concomitant," first 
 principle. Take the case which we have often supposed. 
 I am at this moment comfortably warm, but have the 
 clearest memory that a very few minutes ago I was out 
 in the cold. My absolutely certain knowledge that a very 
 short time ago I experienced the sensation of cold this 
 knowledge is not an inference from premisses. No syllogism, 
 e.g., of the following type, has passed through my mind. 
 " Whatever my cognitive faculties declare as certain, is 
 really certain ; but they declare as certain that I was 
 recently cold ; therefore, etc." Such a syllogism, we say, 
 does not in the least represent the ground of my conviction. 
 On the contrary, I am far more immediately certain of the 
 particular proposition that I was recently cold, than of the 
 general proposition that whatever my cognitive faculties 
 avouch as certain is really so. The present act of memory 
 is immediately known by me, with keenest certitude, to 
 correspond with a fact truly past ; and I infer the general 
 principle of certitude, by means of reflecting on this and 
 a thousand similar data. We make, in passing, this 
 obvious remark, because we think it tends to harmonize 
 mutually certain dicta of different Catholic philosophers, 
 which on the surface present an appearance of discrepancy. 
 
 This principle of certitude, then, is the most fundamental 
 of those truths, which it is requisite to make good against 
 phenomenists. But there is a second, almost equally 
 fundamental. Theists regard Theism as a necessary verity ; 
 and we have, therefore, to maintain, as the final conclusion 
 of our argument, that God necessarily exists. But if the 
 idea "necessary" be contained in the conclusion, it is 
 indispensable for the validity of the reasoning that the
 
 31 The Ptt iloso)>hy of Theism. 
 
 same idea be contained in one or more of the premisses. 
 Nor, indeed, is it sufficient that one or more of the premisses 
 be a necessary trutli : it is further requisite that one or 
 more of the premisses be a necessary ampliatire truth. By 
 an " ampliative " proposition, as we have often explained, 
 \ve mean one which expresses what is neither explicitly 
 nor implicitly expressed in the subject. Any merely " ex- 
 plicative " proposition as soon as the sense of the terms 
 is fully understood at once assumes the shape " A is A." 
 Now, though the proposition "A is A" be indubitably a 
 necessary truth, no combination of such propositions as 
 " A is A," " B is B," " C is C "though they went through 
 all the letters of a thousand alphabets could issue argu- 
 mentatively in any conclusion beyond themselves. In 
 order, therefore, to establish the conclusion that " God 
 necessarily exists," one or more of our premisses must be 
 a necessary ampliative proposition. Here, therefore, we 
 are again brought into conflict with a fundamental tenet 
 of the phenomenists ; for they deny that any ampliative 
 proposition whatever is cognizable as necessary.* 
 
 The second, then, of our two fundamental propositions 
 is, that the human mind has a power on occasion of 
 certainly and immediately cognizing necessary ampliative 
 truths as such. Phenomenists deny this proposition, and 
 intuitionists maintain it. On no field can this battle be so 
 decisively fought out as on the field of mathematical axioms. 
 There are several reasons why we think this ; and Mr. 
 Fitzjames Stephen has incidentally mentioned a strong 
 one. " The words which relate to time, space, and 
 number," he says, " are perfectly simple and adequate 
 to what they describe ; whereas the words which relate to 
 common objects are nearly in every case complex, often to 
 
 It is not easy to find out whether they admit the proposition " A is A " 
 to be necessary ; we doubt, indeed, whether they have looked the question in 
 the face.
 
 
 Mr. Mill on Causation. 311 
 
 the highest degree." On the other hand, there is no part 
 of his case which Mr. Mill more carefully elaborated than 
 that which concerns mathematical axioms. He accounted 
 " the chief strength " of the intuitionist philosophy " in 
 morals, politics, and religion," to lie in " its appeal to the 
 evidence of mathematics." To expel it thence, he adds, 
 "is to drive it from its stronghold" ("Autobiography," 
 p. 226) ; and he put forth, accordingly, his very utmost 
 strength for the accomplishment of this task. This was 
 one special reason which led us to encounter him hand to 
 hand on this particular ground. Mr. Mill, feeling the vital 
 importance of the issue, replied promptly to our arguments ; 
 and Mr. Fitzjames Stephen, at a later period, assailed us 
 from a somewhat different point of view. On our side, we 
 thought it indispensable to reply; * so that, as it happened, 
 this particular constituent of our argument was swelled to 
 a somewhat disproportionate size. 
 
 We here, then, assume ourselves to have been successful 
 in showing that the human mind has a power of cognizing 
 immediately certain necessary ampliative truths as such. 
 Now, further, no one will doubt that, if any such truths be 
 cognizable, the validity of the syllogistic process is among 
 their number. In proposing, then, to establish Theism 
 argumentatively against phenomenists, what we propose is 
 this. We are first to lay down certain ampliative truths, 
 which we shall maintain to be immediately cognizable as 
 necessary, drawing out such an appeal to the phenomena 
 of man's intellectual nature as shall show us to be well 
 warranted in so maintaining. Then, combining these 
 truths with the facts of experience, we are to infer, as 
 legitimately resulting from this assemblage of self-evident 
 truths and experienced facts, that God certainly exists. 
 
 As we apprehend our position, the chk-f premisses 
 
 * The reply to Sir James (then Mr.) Stephen is not rrpuMished in this 
 collection. KUITOR.
 
 312 The Ph ilosophy of Theism. 
 
 needed for our argument are divisible into three classes : 
 we need (1) certain truths in regard to morality; (2) certain 
 truths in regard to causation; and (3) certain truths in 
 regard to human freewill. Immediately after our article 
 on necessary truths, and before Mr. Mill had replied to 
 that article, we entered on the first of these classes ; 
 and we proved, we trust, so much as this, viz. that 
 certain moral verities are cognizable as necessary. There 
 are further doctrines concerning morality, which it will 
 be important to point out and elucidate ; but before 
 approaching these, it was desirable to consider freewill. 
 The establishment of this truth against phenornenists 
 required the establishment of two conclusions, one psycho- 
 logical and the other metaphysical. Phenomenists allege, 
 as a matter of experience (to use Mr. Mill's words) that 
 " volitions follow determinate moral antecedents with the 
 same uniformity and the same certainty as physical effects 
 follow their physical cause." This is the tenet of deter- 
 minism.* We argued against it in our last essay but 
 one, and supplemented our reasoning by some further 
 remarks. We called our own. adverse position by the 
 name " indeterminism," being the purely negative position 
 that volitions are not certainly determined by psychical 
 antecedents. But freewill includes another doctrine be- 
 sides that of indeterminism ; it includes the doctrine that 
 man is a self-determining cause of volition. And this 
 proposition, of course, cannot be treated until we have 
 considered the question of causation. The principle of 
 causation, then, is to occupy us in our present essay. 
 
 Now, at starting, we must refer to one among the most 
 signal proofs Mr. Mill has ever given of his deficiency in 
 philosophical discernment. The sense in which he uses 
 the word " cause " is as simply different from that in which 
 
 * All pheuomenists are determinists ; but the converse by no means holds, 
 that all determinists are phenomenists.
 
 Mr. Mill on Causation. 313 
 
 intuitionists use it as is the word " box," when signifying 
 a "shooting-box" or an "opera-box."* We do not say 
 that he is entirely unaware of this fact ; but we do say that 
 he constantly fails to bear it in mind on occasions when, 
 for want of his doing so, his whole argument becomes 
 simply unmeaning.! This obstacle, then, against a mutual 
 understanding must at once be removed ; and our first 
 undertaking shall be, therefore, to make as clear as we can 
 what Mr. Mill means by a "cause." With him, the idea 
 of " cause " is essentially based on that doctrine which is 
 called " the uniformity of nature ; " and if nature that is, 
 visible and phenomenal nature, physical or psychical did 
 not proceed uniformly, there would be no such thing as a 
 " cause " at all. This is so undeniably his terminology, 
 that the very same truth which is sometimes called by him 
 " the uniformity of nature " is elsewhere called by him 
 "the law of universal causation." We must begin, then, 
 by considering (1) what phenomenists mean when they 
 affirm that nature proceeds uniformly ; and (2) how far we 
 can ourselves concur with the proposition which they thus 
 intend to express. 
 
 The phenomenist doctrine, on the uniformity of nature, 
 may easily be expressed with sufficient precision for our 
 present purpose. " Between the phenomena which exist 
 at any instant," says Mr. Mill ("Logic," i. 377), "and the 
 phenomena which exist at the succeeding instant, there is 
 an invariable order of succession." His whole theory, 
 indeed, of inductive logic (ii. 95) "depends on the assump- 
 tion that every event, or the beginning of every pheno- 
 menon, must have some antecedent, on the existence of 
 
 * We do not at all forget that every one, in writing on political or social 
 BiibjectH, uses the word " cause " in Mr. Mill's sense ; aa e.g. when it is asked 
 " What were the causes of the French Revolution ? '* or " What are the causes 
 of high wages?" But in philosophical discussions the case is quite other- 
 wise. 
 
 t See, as a signal instance of this, the whole argument in his " K.says on 
 Religion," from p, 142 to p. 145.
 
 314 The Philosophy of 
 
 which it is invariably and unconditional!}* consequent." 
 Similarly in a later work. " When we say that an ordinary 
 physical fact always takes place according to some in- 
 variable law, we mean that it is connected by uniform 
 sequence or co-existence with some definite set of physical 
 antecedents ; that whenever that set is exactly reproduced, 
 the same phenomenon will take place, unless counteracted 
 by the similar laws of some other physical antecedent ; 
 and that whenever it does take place, it would always be 
 found that its special set of antecedents (or one of its sets, 
 if it has more than one) has pre-existed " (" Essays on 
 Religion," p. 224). In other words, according to Mr. Mill, 
 no phenomenon ever shows itself be it physical or 
 psychical without a corresponding phenomenal ante- 
 cedent ; and the same phenomenal antecedent is invariably 
 followed by the same phenomenal consequent. This 
 intensely complex fact the uniformity of nature con- 
 sists, he would add, of certain less complex groups of 
 facts called " the laws of nature." It is a " law of nature " 
 e.g. that if wheat seed be duly sown, and there be no 
 adverse phenomena, wheat plant will in due time grow 
 up : and so in a million of other cases, physical or 
 psychical. He would hold that this existent uniformity 
 of nature may imaginably be brought to a close in two 
 different ways. On one hand, the existent laws of nature 
 might be changed for different laws : as e.g. it might be- 
 come a law of nature that, if wheat seed is sown, the barley 
 plant shall duly follow. On the other hand, the existent 
 laws of nature might come to an end, without being suc- 
 ceeded by any others whatever ; so that, in his own words, 
 " a chaos should succeed, in the which there was no fixed 
 succession of events, and the past gave no assurance of the 
 future." 
 
 We need hardly say that we substantially accept this 
 statement ; but we do so, subject to two important excep-
 
 Mr. Mill on Causation. 315 
 
 tions. We regard it as generally true, but by no means as 
 universally true, that visible and phenomenal nature pro- 
 ceeds uniformly. In the first place, we hold that this 
 uniformity of nature is interrupted with indefinite frequency 
 by miracles and other prodigies. In the second place, we 
 maintain that one most important class of psj'chical 
 phenomena, viz. human volitions, are largely external to 
 the common law of uniformity. 
 
 We are now able to understand what Mr. Mill means by 
 " cause." " We may define the ' cause ' of a phenomenon " 
 he says, " to be the antecedent, or the concurrence of ante- 
 cedents, on which it invariably and unconditionally follows " 
 (" Logic," i. 392). And he implies in this statement what 
 he has already stated in p. 376. " When I speak of the 
 cause of a phenomenon, I do not mean a cause which is 
 not itself a phenomenon. The causes with which I concern 
 myself are not efficient but physical causes." It is his 
 deliberate profession, that by the term "cause " he always 
 intends to express a certain phenomenon, more or less 
 complex a phenomenon which, according to the existent 
 laws of nature, is invariably and unconditionally followed 
 by another phenomenon more or less complex, which he 
 calls the effect of such cause. 
 
 As it is of some practical importance that our readers 
 shall be sufficiently familiar with Mr. Mill's view of causa- 
 tion, we will enter on one or two further details, which are 
 not strictly necessary to our subsequent argument. We 
 will consider briefly, then, a criticism which has sometimes 
 been made on his view, viz. that, according to that view, 
 day is the " cause " of night, and night of day. For our 
 own part, we think he has sufficiently disproved this 
 allegation. These are his words : 
 
 It is necessary to mir using the word cause, that we should 
 believe not only that the antecedent always lias l>een followed 
 by the consequent, but that, as long as the present constitution
 
 310 Thf Philosophy of Thrism. 
 
 of things endures, it always will be so. And this would not he 
 true of day and night. We do not believe that night will be 
 followed by day under all imaginable circumstances, but only 
 that it will be so provided the sun rises above the horizon. If 
 the sun ceased to rise, which, for aught we know, may be 
 perfectly compatible with the general laws of matter, night 
 would be, or might be, eternal. On the other hand, if the sun 
 is above the horizon, his light not extinct, and no opaque body 
 between us and him, we believe firmly that unless a change 
 takes place in the properties of matter, this combination of 
 antecedents will be followed by the consequent, day ; that if the 
 combination of antecedents would be indefinitely prolonged, it 
 would be always day ; and that if the same combination had 
 always existed, it would always have been day, quite inde- 
 pendently of night as a previous condition. Therefore is it that 
 we do not call night the cause, nor even a condition, of day. 
 The existence of the sun (or some such luminous body), and 
 there being no opaque medium in a straight line between that 
 body and the part of the earth where we are situated, are the 
 sole conditions, and the union of these, without the addition of 
 any superfluous circumstances, constitutes the caxise. (" Logic," 
 i. 391.) 
 
 The considerations here set forth by Mr. Mill bear on 
 another question, on which, as it seems to us, he has not 
 quite done justice to his own theory. He says (i. 380) 
 that there is no " scientific ground for the distinction 
 between the cause of a phenomenon and its conditions." 
 This certainly holds good (on his theory of causation) in 
 regard to any such condition as intuitionists call a " con- 
 dition sine qud non ; " but we doubt whether it holds good 
 in regard to conditions in general. No instance is more 
 commonly given as illustrating the distinction between a 
 "condition" and "cause," than the distinction between 
 ploughing and sowing. Every intuitionist says, as a 
 matter of course, that there is a real relation of causality, 
 indeed, between due contact of seed with earth on one 
 hand, and the plant's growth on the other ; but that the 
 ploughing is a mere condition, and does not causally inflow
 
 Mr. Mill on Causation. 317 
 
 into the effect. But it seems to us (though we by no means 
 speak confidently, and the matter is of no practical import- 
 ance whatever), that on Mr. MiWs own theory also, the 
 ploughing is not legitimately accounted part of the " cause.'" 
 Let it be supposed that hitherto the joint presence of A, B, 
 and C has been the invariable antecedent of M. It does 
 not, nevertheless, therefore follow (on Mr. Mill's theory) 
 that A is a partial cause of M, unless it be also true that, 
 so long as the present laws of nature endure, the union of 
 B and C will never be followed by M unless they are 
 accompanied by A. Now, it is included in the existent laws 
 of nature that whenever the seed is duly deposited in the 
 earth, the plant, except for accidental impediments, will in 
 course of time grow up ; and conversely also, that the plant 
 will never grow up unless seed has first been duly deposited 
 in the earth. But there is no ground that we know of for 
 accounting it inconsistent with the existent laws of nature, 
 that some other method be discovered, entirely different 
 from ploughing, whereby earth and seed shall be brought 
 into due contact. 
 
 Our two last remarks have been made by us, as we 
 said, with no other purpose than that of more familiarizing 
 the inquirer's mind with Mr. Mill's interpretation of the 
 word " cause." And if our readers think that our attempted 
 vindication of him has been unsuccessful, that he is obliged 
 in consistency to account night the cause of day, and to 
 deny all distinction between cause and condition, they 
 are perfectly welcome to think so : they will in no way, 
 by so thinking, be placed out of harmony with our own 
 general argument. We will now, however, without further 
 episode, pursue that argument. The sense, then, in which 
 intuitionists use the word " cause " is so fundamentally 
 different from Mr. Mill's, that it would be impossible to 
 contend against phenomenists without inextricable con- 
 fusion, unless we first close this inexhaustible inlet of mis-
 
 318 The Philosophy of TJteitmi. 
 
 apprehension. Indeed, we are confident, as we shall 
 presently argue, that the phenomenistic tenet on causation 
 could never have been persistently held by men even of 
 average intelligence, had they not veiled from themselves 
 the true nature of their tenet by their equivocal terminology. 
 For this reason we entirely decline, in argument with Mr. 
 Mill, to use the word " cause " in his sense ; and we must 
 at once, therefore, look about for some term which shall 
 sufficiently express his idea. On reflection, we think it 
 will be satisfactory if we use the word "prevenant" to 
 denote what he calls " cause ; " " postvenant " to denote 
 what he calls " effect ; " " prevenance " to denote what he 
 calls " causation." We think it not only no inconvenience, 
 but, on the contrary, a very great advantage, that these 
 words, being invented by ourselves for the occasion, can 
 have no other technical sense. It is becoming a more and 
 more common complaint that so much confusion of thought 
 finds entrance into philosophical discussion, through words 
 of ordinary use being employed to express important philo- 
 sophical ideas : it is becoming more and more commonly 
 felt, that no word can endure the rough handling of every- 
 day colloquialism without acquiring considerable ambiguity 
 of sense. On our own side, we must explain to our Catholic 
 readers that the " cause," with which oar reasoning con- 
 cerns itself throughout, is what Catholic philosophical 
 works call "the efficient cause."* 
 
 These verbal preliminaries having been laid down, we 
 are now to maintain that " the principle of causation " is 
 self-evidently cognizable, as a necessary ampliative truth. 
 The "principle of causation," or (as we shall sometimes 
 call it) " the causation doctrine," is expressed hi the state- 
 ment that " whatever has a commencement has a cause ; " 
 
 * Catholic philosophers, indeed, usually include " moral " cause under the 
 head of " efficient." But this sense is here excluded. A moment's consi- 
 deration will show that when these philosophers enounce " the principle of 
 causation," they do not at all include " moral " causation.
 
 Mr. Mill on Causation. 319 
 
 or, which is equivalent, that " every new doctrine or new 
 mode of existence has a cause."* Our readers will of 
 course ask for some explanation as to the sense in which 
 we, on our side, use this word " cause." We at once 
 admit that such explanation is most reasonably required 
 at our hands ; and this explanation, indeed, will occupy a 
 prominent place in the course of our argument. But, 
 before entering on our argument at all, we wish to avow 
 frankly that we base our conclusion, not on grounds of 
 experience, but of intuition ; that we shall appeal to 
 experience only as testifying the universality of a certain 
 intuition. And if phenomenists promptly exclaim, as they 
 are sure to do, that " intuition " means only " my private 
 persuasion," and that my own private persuasion can be 
 no evidence of objective truth, f our answer to this objec- 
 tion has been stated again and again. It is only through 
 intuition that either phenomenists or any one else can 
 
 * Some Catholics may possibly doubt whether we have laid a sufficiently 
 broad foundation for the Theistic argument in our way of stating the prin- 
 ciple of causation. Thus Dr. Mivart, whose authority on such a question is 
 very great, supplements the principle of causation as expressed in the text 
 by another, which he accounts equally evident, viz. that "everything must 
 be either absolute or caused ; " that is, that every contingent thing is caused 
 (" Lessons from Nature," p. 35G). He adds this supplement because of his 
 holding with S. Thomas, that reason cannot by itself disprove with certitude 
 the eternity of matter. It will be desirable, therefore, that we briefly place 
 before our Catholic readers the position on this subject, which we are 
 ourselves prepared in due course to sustain. 
 
 Now, Liberatore, who himself also holds S. Thomas's doctrine, admits 
 nevertheless that some scholastics and "almost all modern philosophers" 
 are against him (" Cosmologia," n. 30). I'etavius (do Deo, 1. iii. c. o', n. 1) 
 declares it to be the universal patristic doctrine, used constantly in contro- 
 versy with the Arians, thnt the notion of an eternal creature is cogni/ublo 
 by reason as intrinsically repugnant. It may be worth while further to add 
 that Liberatore himself (" Logic," n. 230) defines an " effect " as " that which 
 advances from the state of possibility to the state of existence ; " or, in other 
 words, which has a commencement. 
 
 With sincere deference, then, to those eminent Catholics who on tins 
 matter follow S. Thomas, we cannot do so ourselves. Nay, we regard tho 
 thesis that "all contingent things have a commencement " as more obtrusively 
 (if we may so apeak) axiomatic than the thesis that "all contingent thini:n 
 have a eause." 
 
 t Lerlain persons, aays Mr. Mill, "addict themselves with intolerant
 
 320 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 possess experience of phenomena. Those particular intui- 
 tions, which are called acts of memory, are literally the 
 only bases they can allege for any one experience which 
 they cite. In truth, each man's act of memory may be 
 called his own " private persuasion" or "internal feeling," 
 in a much more simple and literal sense than can those 
 intuitions of causality to which we shall now appeal. For 
 each man's memory of his past experience is strictly 
 peculiar to himself; whereas the intuitions, which we 
 shall here allege, are common, as we maintain, to all 
 mankind. 
 
 Now, as to what is the genuine positive sense of that 
 word " cause," which is the centre of our argument, this 
 is a question which we are presently to consider, with as 
 much accuracy and completeness as we can. But the first 
 fact to which we would draw attention should be noted 
 anteriorly to this consideration. It is most evident, on 
 even a superficial examination of facts, that a certain idea 
 of causation which is, at all events, fundamentally different 
 from the idea of prevenance and a belief in the widely- 
 spread existence of causation as so apprehended that this 
 idea and belief, we say, prevail generally among mankind. 
 Indeed, we are able to call Mr. Mill himself into court, as a 
 signal example of the thoroughly false intellectual position 
 in which any one is placed who attempts to identify causa- 
 tion with prevenance. His professed theory is, of course, 
 most intelligible. In no case of causation, he says (" On 
 Hamilton," p. 377), " have we evidence of anything more 
 than what experience informs us of ; and it informs us of 
 nothing except immediate, invariable, and unconditional 
 sequence." And the context shows, even if it could be 
 otherwise doubtful, that by " sequence " he here means 
 
 zeal to those forms of philosophy in which intuition usurps the place of 
 evidence, and internal feeling is made the test of objective truth " (" Essays 
 on Religion," p. 72).
 
 Mr. Mill on Causation. 321 
 
 sequence of phenomena. Yet, in his work on " Logic," the 
 following remarks are to be found remarks which, as 
 coming from Mr. Mill, may be characterized as not less 
 than astounding. He is speaking about the question of 
 miracles, and we italicize a word or two : 
 
 In order that any alleged fact should be contradictory to a 
 law of causation, the allegation must be, not simply that the 
 cause existed without being followed by the effect, but that this 
 happened in the absence of any adequate counteracting cause. 
 Now, in the case of the alleged miracle, the assertion is the 
 exact opposite of this. It is that the effect was defeated, not 
 in the absence but in consequence of a counteracting cause; 
 namely, a direct interposition of an act of the will of some being 
 who has power over nature. A miracle is no contradiction to the 
 law of cause and effect : it is a new effect supposed to be pro- 
 duced by the introduction of a new cause (ii. 167, 168). 
 
 In the eighth edition of his " Logic," when answering 
 a criticism of ours, Mr. Mill introduces a similar remark 
 into an earlier page : 
 
 I admit no other uniformity in the laws of nature than the law 
 of causation, and a miracle is no exception to that law. In every 
 case of alleged miracle a new antecedent is affirmed to exist, a 
 counteracting cause; viz. the volition of a supernatural being 
 (p. 110). 
 
 But his professed theory is, that " between foe phenomena 
 which exist at any instant and the phenomena which exist 
 at the succeeding instant there is an invariable order of 
 succession." Mr. Mill cannot surely mean to call a volition 
 of the Invisible God by the name of a phenomenon : and we 
 must account, then, for this extraordinary logical collapse 
 by the impossibility, which Mr. Mill himself experienced, 
 of expelling from his mind that idea which so clamorously 
 presents itself to all men the idea of true causation. 
 
 And this collapse is the more significant, if wo consider 
 what absolute havoc it makes of those very philosophical 
 
 VOL. I. T
 
 322 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 principles which he accounted more essential than any 
 others. Mr. Mill did not admit the existence of any science 
 except experimental ; and no one felt more strongly than 
 he that the uniformity of nature is a doctrine absolutely 
 indispensable to the very existence of experimental science, 
 whether physical or psychological. Take any one of the 
 million truths firmly established by such science ; e.g. the 
 truth that " all diamonds are combustible." How is it 
 possible for me to acquire reasonable proof of this truth ? 
 I know, by experience, that those diamonds are combustible 
 on which I have made the experiment ; and I know, by the 
 testimony of others, that those diamonds are combustible 
 on which they have made the experiment. But I have not 
 the shadow of ground for extending my proposition to all 
 diamonds, unless I have sufficient proof that nature proceeds 
 uniformly.* So keenly, indeed, did Mr. Mill feel the justice 
 of this remark, that he elaborated with great care a proof 
 of what he called " the law of universal causation," as being 
 the one corner-stone of his whole philosophical edifice. Yet 
 suddenly it appears that he held no doctrine at all of 
 " universal " phenomenal " causation." Suddenly it ap- 
 pears that he held no doctrine on the uniformity of nature 
 inconsistent with his supposing that there may be as many 
 deities on Olympus as Homer himself believed in, and that 
 each one of these deities is arbitrarily interfering with the 
 course of nature every minute of every day. In every one 
 such case, "the volition of a supernatural being" would 
 count with him as " a new antecedent," as a " counteract- 
 ing cause ; " so that every arbitrary and irregular pheno- 
 menon so brought about would be, in his view, " a case of 
 the law of universal causation," "and not a deviation from 
 it." If we could trust what he says in the two passages we 
 
 * It may most fairly be asked how belief in the Catholic miracles is con- 
 sistent with belief in the certainty of physical science. We answer this 
 question directly and expressly in our essay on " Science, Prayer, Freewill, 
 and Miracles."
 
 Mr. Mill on Causation. 323 
 
 have quoted, he never intended to defend "the law of 
 universal causation " in any such sense whatever as to 
 imply that nature proceeds uniformly ; or in any such sense 
 whatever as would represent that law to be a sufficient 
 foundation for experimental science. How, it may be asked, 
 do we account for this amazing bewilderment of thought ? 
 We reply that, even in the case of Mr. Mill, his intuitional 
 element is too strong for him. " Naturam expellas furca, 
 tamen usque recurret." The existence of a causality, entirely 
 distinct from prevenance, is so clamorous a dictate of 
 human intelligence that even Mr. Mill cannot be always 
 shutting his ears to it.* 
 
 And this lands us in a further comment. It is a 
 favourite topic of the phenomenistic controversialist that 
 intuitionists are self-condemned, by the very fact of their 
 admitting the existence of an opposite party. " How can 
 you say," he asks, " that the intuitions to which you appeal 
 are universal, when the very next moment you say that 
 they are not universal ? when the very next moment you 
 say that a large and dangerous school of philosophy declares 
 itself unconscious of their existence ? " We reply, in the 
 first place, that Mr. Mill often confesses that those intel- 
 lectual avouchments to which we appeal are universal ; and 
 only contends that they cannot in reason be accepted as 
 evidences of objective truth. But, further and it is to this 
 we are here specially drawing attention again and again, 
 when he is not thinking of his theory, he himself accepts 
 them as evidences of objective truth. Consider e.g. his 
 dealing with the idea of " morally good." It is the very 
 foundation of his moral system, that the term cannot 
 reasonably be used, except as signifying "beneficial to 
 mankind." And yet there is hardly any writer of the day 
 who so abounds with appeals to " virtue," " moral eleva- 
 
 * Mr. Mill speaks with a very fur greater reflection on thin matter, in his 
 posthumously published "Essays on Religion,'' pp. 21-220.
 
 324 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 tion," and the like, which are pure and simple nonsense if 
 you try the experiment of substituting for those terms what 
 he maintains to be their equivalent. Of course, we think 
 this fact most honourable to his moral nature ; but his 
 moral nature is thus advantageously exhibited to the sacri- 
 fice of his philosophical intelligence. The passages to which 
 we refer are as simply inconsistent with the theory professed 
 by him on morals, as those which we have been just now 
 citing are inconsistent with the theory professed by him on 
 causation. 
 
 In this spontaneous and unconscious admission of a 
 causation entirely distinct from prevenance, Mr. Mill does 
 but represent the rest of mankind. Not only all mankind 
 have an idea of causation as distinct from prevenance, but 
 they have an irresistible and deep conviction that causation 
 exists over and above mere prevenance. Had they not this 
 conviction, how would they regard the stream of phenomena ? 
 No such thing could be supposed by them to be in rerum 
 naturd, as " influx "or " dependence." The visible world 
 would be to them a mere phantasmagoria or external 
 picture. They would recognize no closer nexus between the 
 wheat seed and the wheat plant, or between the sun and 
 the sensation of warmth, or between human volitions and 
 human bodily movements, than between the first letter of 
 the alphabet and the second, or the boy who always stands 
 first in class and the boy who stands next him, or the 
 moment of time which we call " eleven o'clock " and the 
 moment of time which we call "five minutes past eleven."* 
 But every person of ordinary intelligence, who is not think- 
 ing of a gratuitously assumed theory, would peremptorily 
 
 * It might be said, with much plausibility, that in Mr. Mill's vocabulary 
 "eleven o'clock " ought to be called a cause of " five minutes after eleven ; " 
 for most certainly the later moment "invariably and unconditionally 
 succeeds" the earlier. We suppose Mr. Mill would reply that a moment of 
 time is not a phenomenon. But such reply would put in still stronger light 
 the amazing inconsistency of his culling God agency a " cause."
 
 Mr. Mill on Causation, 325 
 
 repudiate such a view of things, as repugnant to his deep 
 and sure conviction. 
 
 We have argued, then, that mankind not only have an 
 idea of causality, distinct from the idea of prevenance, but 
 that they have a conviction that causality exists among 
 phenomena, and not mere prevenance. Our second step 
 will be to consider more precisely what is this idea of 
 causality. We consider, on one hand> that the idea " cause " 
 is a simple idea, not composed of any others ; and on the 
 other hand, that it is a purely intellectual idea, not a copy 
 of anything experienced by the senses. In the course of 
 our essays we have already mentioned two such simple 
 and purely intellectual ideas, viz. "necessary" and 
 " moral good," and to these we here add that of "cause." 
 Now, of course there is ascertain difficulty in explaining an 
 idea of this kind. Were it a copy of some sensation, we 
 could content ourselves with referring to such sensation. 
 Were it composed of simpler ideas, we could explain it by 
 reciting those simpler ideas. But neither of these methods 
 being (by hypothesis) available, we can only suggest the 
 occasions on which an inquirer may unmistakably recognize 
 what is beyond doubt a very prominent part of his mental 
 furniture. Now, the instance most commonly given by 
 philosophers of a "cause," seems to us most happily 
 chosen for our purpose, as being one in which that idea is 
 exhibited with especial distinctness and prominence : we 
 refer to the influx of a man's mental volitions into his 
 bodily acts. I am urgently in need of some article, con- 
 tained in a closet of which I cannot find the key, and 
 accordingly I break open the closet with my fist. Certainly 
 my idea of the relation which exists between my volition 
 and my blow is something indefinitely beyond that of mere 
 universal and unconditional sequence. If on the one hand 
 that idea is incapable of being analyzed, on the other hand 
 it is to the full as incapable of being explained away or
 
 32G The Philosophy of TJicism. 
 
 misapprehended. The idea is as characteristic and as 
 clamorously distinguished from every other as is that of 
 " sweet," or "melodious," or "white." Phenomenists may 
 deny that it corresponds with any objective reality ; but 
 they cannot deny that it is in fact conceived by the human 
 mind, without exposing themselves to the intellectual con- 
 tempt of every one who possesses the most ordinary in- 
 telligence and introspective faculty. The words "force," 
 "power," "influx," "agency," or, on the other hand, 
 " dependence," may more or less suggest the idea 
 " cause ; " their respective significations being (as we hold) 
 more or less founded on that idea. But at last the most 
 efficacious way for each man to apprehend it, is to imagine 
 some such instance as we have named. 
 
 It will, perhaps, be serviceable if we give a second illus- 
 tration. I am bent on acquiring a knowledge of Euclid, 
 and I apply my mind therefore vigorously to mastering 
 the demonstration given by him of some theorem. Con- 
 sider the relation which exists between my volition on one 
 hand, and my intellectual process on the other. Here is an 
 instance, differing widely hi circumstances and detail from 
 that just now given : and yet this identical notion of "cause " 
 is no less unmistakably present to my mind when I consider 
 this case, than it was when I considered the former. 
 
 And now we come, lastly, to the third and crowning step 
 of our argument. The " principle of causation," or the 
 " causation doctrine," is, that " whatever has a commence- 
 ment has a cause." We maintain that this proposition is 
 cognized by the human mind as self-evidently certain and 
 necessary. 
 
 This psychological allegation can of course only be 
 established by means of psychological trial. But on whom 
 shall we make the trial? We will not exactly say "fiat 
 experimentum in anima vili ; " but at all events it will not 
 be fair to make the experiment on a philosopher, be he
 
 Mr. Mill on Causation. 327 
 
 intuitionist or phenomenist. If a landlord and farmer 
 disagree, they will not choose for arbitrator some landlord 
 or some farmer, but perhaps some lawyer. In like manner 
 disputing psychologians will not be satisfied with the 
 award of one who has already espoused his theory. And 
 we indeed on our side, as has been seen, have especial 
 reason for distrusting the verdict of phenomenists, because 
 again and again, when expressly confronting some philo- 
 sophical theory, they persuade themselves to disbelieve 
 their own possession of this or that conviction ; whereas, 
 when they allow themselves free play, that very conviction 
 proves its existence in their mind by the most undeniable 
 energy. We will not, then, appeal to the arbitration of 
 philosophers. But, as is clear, neither can we satisfactorily 
 appeal to the verdict of rough and uneducated minds, which 
 may be wholly incapable of introspection. It is manifest 
 indeed, we maintain, to impartial observers, that a convic- 
 tion of the causation doctrine energizes in them quite as 
 powerfully and constantly as in their more cultivated 
 neighbours, but we cannot expect them to depose to its 
 existence. The fair arbitrator, then, will be some person, 
 on the one hand, of sufficiently cultivated faculties, but, on 
 the other hand, who has not given his attention to philo- 
 sophical inquiries. To obtain from such a man his genuine 
 avouchment, you may deal with him in some such way as 
 the following : 
 
 You draw his attention to the fact that here is some 
 wheat on the ground ripe for the sickle. You place 
 intelligibly before his mind the doctrine, that what caused 
 the wheat to grow has been partly certain properties or 
 forces of the seed, and partly certain properties or forces 
 of the earth with which that seed has been brought into 
 contact. He entirely assents. " I should never have 
 dreamed," he says, " of any other notion." You point out 
 to him, however, the possibility that God or some super-
 
 328 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 natural being has miraculously there placed the wheat, 
 without any seed having been previously sown. " Well," 
 he replies, " it stands to reason that if there be a God, He 
 can do this ; but I need very strong proof indeed before I 
 accept the supposition of a miracle." Lastly, you suggest 
 to him, that perhaps neither was seed sown nor did any 
 preternatural being interfere, but that the wheat came 
 there without any agency at all. As soon as he under- 
 stands what you mean which probably he does not find 
 very easy he is angry at his common sense being insulted 
 by so self-evidently absurd a supposition. You rejoin, that 
 he believes God to exist without any cause ; and you ask 
 him why therefore he cannot believe that wheat may exist 
 without any cause. The obvious unfairness, as he will 
 account it, of such a suggestion increases his wrath. In 
 his own unscientific language, he gives you to understand 
 that God never began to exist ; nay, that Existence is 
 involved in his very Essence. " The monstrous allegation," 
 he will add, " against which I am exclaiming, consists in 
 your statement that a thing can begin to exist can come 
 from nothingness into being except through the agency of 
 some cause or other." If you then proceed to cross-ques- 
 tion him on this word " cause " if you suggest that he 
 means by it no more than " prevenant " his wrath is still 
 greater than before, so completely have you denaturalized 
 his meaning. And he will account it just as self-evidently 
 absurd to say that anything can commence without a 
 cause, as it would be to say that a trilateral figure can be 
 quadrangular, or that two straight lines proceeding in the 
 same mutual direction can finally intersect. 
 
 We have imagined this little scene for the purpose of 
 exhibiting those phenomena of human nature which, as we 
 maintain, make it so absolutely certain that men instinc- 
 tively regard the principle of causation as a self-evidently 
 necessary truth. We need not spend many words in
 
 Mr. Mill on Causation. 329 
 
 repeating what we have so often urged before; viz. that if 
 this psychological fact be admitted, the corresponding 
 ontological truth rests on an absolutely impregnable basis. 
 If the principle of causation be avouched by the human mind 
 as a necessary truth, it is a necessary truth. I should be 
 thought not less than insane, if I doubted the voraciousness 
 of my memory as to what I experienced two minutes ago ; 
 but I have in some sense even stronger reason for accept- 
 ing what not my own private intuition alone, but the 
 intuition of all mankind avouches as certain. 
 
 We may take this opportunity, however, for considering 
 a particular instance of objection often adduced by pheno- 
 menists an objection to which we have virtually replied 
 indeed again and again, but which we have not on earlier 
 occasions expressly encountered. " Is there any one of 
 your so-called intuitions," asks the phenomenist, " which 
 the human mind more spontaneously and irresistibly 
 avouches, than for many centuries it avouched as self- 
 evident that the sun moves round the earth? Yet you 
 admit that this latter avouchment was a pure delusion ; 
 and why therefore may not its avouchment of the causation 
 doctrine granting for argument's sake that that avouch- 
 ment exists be equally delusive ? " 
 
 We begin our reply by a remark, which is no part 
 indeed of our argument, but which is required for the 
 purpose of clearness. Take any time and place, in which 
 men never dreamed of Copernicanism. In that time and 
 place, their acceptance of geocentricism has nevertheless 
 not been an immediate judgment ; it has been one of those 
 numerous instances in which an inference is made so 
 rapidly, inevitably, and imperceptibly, as to bo easily 
 mistaken for an immediate judgment. The syllogism, of 
 which the geocentric judgment is the conclusion, may be 
 thus stated: "That which is incompatible with undoubted 
 phenomena is false ; but any theory other than geoceutri-
 
 330 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 cism is thus incompatible, and is therefore false." It may 
 be worth while also to add, that the major premiss of this 
 syllogism is undeniable. On the other hand, my assent to 
 the causation doctrine is not the mere conclusion of a 
 syllogism, but is an immediate judgment. For the only 
 syllogism which could possibly issue in that doctrine as in 
 its conclusion, would be reducible to the following form : 
 " Every X must have a cause ; but whatever has a com- 
 mencement is an X ; ergo, etc." : where X must represent 
 some class larger than that of " things which have a com- 
 mencement." But most certainly no syllogism of this type 
 passes through my mind as my motive of assent to the 
 principle of causation.* 
 
 We proceed, then, to answer the objection before us. 
 And, reverting to the geocentric syllogism as just now 
 drawn out, we answer the objection by simply denying that 
 men ever gave an absolute assent either to the minor 
 premiss or to the conclusion of that syllogism. We shall 
 be better able to explain what we here mean if we cite, with 
 a few verbal changes, a course of remark contained in a 
 former essay. 
 
 " Phenomenists are very fond of adducing this or that 
 instance, in which they allege that our faculties declare as 
 certain what is not really so. I see a straight stick in the 
 water, and my faculties (they urge) pronounce as certain that 
 the stick is crooked ; or if a cherry is placed on my crossed 
 fingers, my faculties pronounce as certain that my hand is 
 touched by two substances. All these superficial difficulties are 
 readily solved by resorting to a philosophical consideration, 
 which is familiar to Catholics, though (strangely enough) we 
 do not remember to have seen it in non-Catholic works. We 
 refer to the distinction between what may be called ' undoubt- 
 ing ' and what may be called ' absolute ' assent. 
 
 * The only possible "class X" would be "contingent things." But 
 even Dr. Mivart does not say nor could any one say on reflection that 
 the proposition "all contingent things are caused" is more immediately 
 evident to the human mind than the proposition " all commencing things 
 are caused."
 
 Mr. Mill on Causation. 331 
 
 " By ' absolute ' assent we understand an assent so firm as 
 to be incompatible with the co-existence of doubt ; but by 
 ' undoubting ' assent we mean no more than that with which 
 in fact doubt does not co-exist. Now, the mere undoubtingness 
 of an assent does not at all imply any particular firmness, but 
 arises from mere accident. For instance : a friend, coming 
 down to me in the country, tells me that he has caught a sight 
 of the telegrams as he passed through London, and that the 
 Versailles government has possession of Paris.* I had long 
 expected this, and I assent to the fact without any admixture of 
 doubt. In an hour or two, however, the morning paper comes 
 in ; and I find that my friend's cursory glance has misled him, 
 for that the army has only arrived close up to Paris. The 
 extreme facility with which I dismiss my former 'undoubting' 
 assent, shows how very far it was from being ' absolute.' Its true 
 analysis, in fact, was no more than this : ' there is an a priori 
 presumption that Paris is taken.' But as no particular motive 
 for doubt happened to cross my mind, I was not led to reflect 
 on the true character of the assent which I yielded. 
 
 " Now to apply this. Evidently it cannot be said that my 
 cognitive faculties declare any proposition to be certainly true, 
 unless they yield to that proposition ' absolute ' assent. But a 
 moment's consideration will show that my assent to the crooked- 
 ness of the stick or the duplicity of the cherry may accident- 
 ally indeed have been undoubting, but was extremely far from 
 being absolute. Its true analysis was, ' there is an a priori pre- 
 sumption that the stick is crooked, or that there are two objects 
 touched by my fingers.' The matter may be brought to a crucial 
 experiment by some such supposition as the following : 
 
 " I am myself but youthful, whether in age or power of 
 thought ; but I have a venerable friend and mentor, in whose 
 moral and intellectual endowments I repose perfect confidence. 
 I fancy myself to see a crooked stick, or to feel two touching 
 objects ; but he explains to me the physical laws which explain 
 my delusion, and I surrender it with the most perfect facility. 
 He proceeds, however let us suppose, for the purpose of probing 
 the depth of my convictions to tell mo that I have no reason 
 whatever for knowing that I ever experienced a certain 
 sensation, which my memory most distinctly declares me to 
 have experienced a very short time ago; or again, that as to the 
 particular trilateral figure which I have in my thoughts, I have 
 
 * This was of course written in 1871.
 
 332 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 no reason whatever for knowing it to be triangular, and that he 
 believes it to have five angles. Well, first of all I take for 
 granted that I have not rightly understood him. When I find 
 that I hare rightly understood him, either I suspect him (as the 
 truth indeed is) to be simulating ; or else I pluck up courage 
 and rebel against his teaching; or else (if I am too great an 
 intellectual coward for this) I am reduced to a state of hopeless 
 perplexity and bewilderment, and on the high-road to idiocy. 
 There is one thing, at all events, which I cannot do. I cannot 
 compel myself to doubt that which my existing faculties testify 
 as certain. So great is the distinction between merely * un- 
 doubting ' and ' absolute ' assent ; between my faculties testify- 
 ing that there is an a priori presumption for some proposition, 
 and their testifying that it is certainly true." 
 
 The contrast, contained in this latter paragraph, can be 
 applied with its full force to our present theme. I have 
 never heard of Copernicanism, and hold with " undoubt- 
 ing " assent the geocentric theory. But a venerable friend 
 and mentor explains to me, that heliocentricism is in no 
 respect incompatible with phenomena ; and indeed that, on 
 the heliocentric supposition, the familiar phenomena of 
 daily life would be precisely the same as on the geocentric. 
 So soon as I understand this, I have not so much as the 
 faintest difficulty in surrendering my geocentricism. My 
 belief in that theory may have accidentally been " undoubt- 
 ing," but it was extremely removed from being " absolute." 
 Now, the very contrary of this holds as to the principle of 
 causation. If I were called on to believe that something 
 came into existence without a cause, and if accordingly I 
 made an effort to do so, I should be " reduced to a state of 
 hopeless perplexity and bewilderment, and on the high-road 
 to idiocy." I could not possibly compel myself to believe 
 it, precisely because my existent faculties declare it to be 
 self -evidently false. 
 
 So much on this particular objection. As regards our 
 general argument, it may be worth while briefly to note one 
 thing further, which is evident as soon as stated. The idea
 
 Mr. Mill on Causation. 333 
 
 of causation in no way whatever depends whereas the 
 idea of prevenance entirely depends on the uniformity of 
 nature. To take our old instance, let us suppose that the 
 wheat plant had no prevenant whatever ; that the very 
 same phenomena, which in one time or place precede its 
 appearance, when found in combination at another time 
 and place usher in some completely different phenomenon 
 from that of the wheat plant. Such a circumstance would 
 not give me the slightest difficulty in understanding what 
 is meant by a cause, nor would it in the slightest degree 
 affect my certain knowledge that the wheat plant has a 
 cause. If secondary causes lost all power of acting 
 as God, in the Catholic belief, is indubitably free to 
 deprive them of that power such cessation of their power 
 would not ever so remotely tend to weaken that argument 
 for God's Existence, which is derived from the principle of 
 causation. 
 
 On looking through Mr. Mill's chapter on causation in 
 his reply to Hamilton (pp. 359-379), we find but one small 
 portion of it which, as far as we can see, requires any 
 further notice than is contained in the preceding pages. 
 Both Sir W. Hamilton and Mr. Mill himself (p. 371) 
 repudiate the theory of "Wolfe and the Leibnitzians," that 
 to deny the principle of causation would be to violate the 
 principle of contradiction. We do not know whether we 
 have made it sufficiently clear that we are ourselves at one 
 both with Hamilton and his critic, in heartily repudiating 
 that theory ; though we have been told by a learned friend 
 who seems to know, that "Wolfe and the Leibnitzians" 
 are as far from holding it as we are. Perhaps it will 
 conduce to more precise apprehension of what we have 
 throughout intended, if we notice expressly this possible 
 philosophical position. 
 
 We regard, then, that proposition which expresses the 
 causality doctrine, not as an "explicative," but us an
 
 334- TJte Philosophy of TJieism. 
 
 " ampliative " proposition. In fact, as we have already 
 said, if it were only " explicative," it could not possibly 
 have any philosophical importance ; whereas, in truth, there 
 is hardly a more important principle throughout the whole 
 range of philosophy. " Whatever has a commencement 
 has a cause." We are as far as Mr. Mill himself from 
 alleging, that by any possible analysis of the idea " having 
 a commencement " we can find therein included the idea 
 " having a cause." What we do allege as regards the 
 above-named proposition is, that, in F. Kleutgen's words, 
 "by merely considering the idea of the subject and the 
 predicate, I come to see that there exists between them 
 that relation which the proposition expresses."* I consider, 
 on one hand, the idea of "having a commencement." I 
 consider, on the other hand, the totally distinct idea of 
 " having a cause." And by considering the two ideas, I 
 come to see that there exists between them that relation 
 which is expressed in the principle of causation. My power 
 of cognizing the principle of causation just as my power of 
 cognizing other self-evident truths arises from that most 
 precious property of the human mind whereby it is 
 enabled to cognize with certainty as self-evident a large 
 number of ampliative truths. It is precisely in virtue of 
 possessing this property that the human mind is capable 
 of knowledge properly so called. 
 
 But now to deny the truth of an ampliative proposition, 
 however obtrusively self-evident such proposition may be, 
 is not in itself to violate the principle of contradiction. If 
 I say e.g. that some trilateral figure is quadrangular, I say 
 what is self-evidently absurd, and I say what leads by 
 
 * F. Kleutgen says that it is such a proposition as this which Catholic 
 philosophers intend to denote by the term " analytical." On the other hand, 
 non-Catholic philosophers, whether intuitionist or phenomenist, use the 
 word " analytical " as synonymous with what we call " explicative." We 
 have before said that for this reason we think it better to avoid the term 
 " analytical " altogether.
 
 Mr. Mill on Causation. 335 
 
 necessary consequence to a contradiction, but not what is 
 itself self-contradictory. 
 
 Here we bring to a close our treatment of causation. 
 We need hardly say, that there are many questions con- 
 cerning it on which we have not touched. In particular, 
 we may mention Mr. Martineau's theory a theory hardly 
 differing from what is called " occasionalism " that no 
 substance can be a cause, even a secondary one, unless it 
 possess intelligence. We feel great respect and gratitude 
 to Mr. Martineau, for his very valuable labours in the cause 
 of true philosophy ; but on this particular tenet we are 
 obliged to dissent from him with much confidence. At the 
 same time, we shall not enter into controversy on the 
 subject, because our purpose only requires us to deal with 
 those truths which are necessary for the argumentative 
 establishment of Theism. 
 
 In the next essay of our series we hope to conclude 
 what we have to say on freewill. Since we last wrote on 
 that theme, Dr. Bain has brought out the third edition of 
 his volume on " The Emotions and the Will," in which he 
 has inserted (pp. 498-500) a few pages of reply to our 
 former essay. Our first business, then, will be to re- 
 capitulate the arguments which we adduced against deter- 
 minism, with special reference to Dr. Bain's objections. 
 Secondly, we hope, by help of the causation doctrine, to 
 establish as certain that every human adult is to himself 
 a self-determining cause of volition. Lastly, we have to 
 answer two particular objections one of them extremely 
 momentous which we named in our essay on Mr. Mill's 
 " Denial of Freewill."
 
 IX. 
 
 FEEEWILL. 
 REPLY TO A REPLY OF DR. BAIN'S. 
 
 THE plan according to which we have hitherto laid out 
 our essays, and which we hope to continue, was set 
 forth, we trust, with sufficient clearness in our essay 
 on Causation. Our argument led us in due course to 
 the very fundamental and critical question of Freewill. 
 Our reasoning on that subject, we consider, was such as 
 will hold its own against all gainsayers ; but the two 
 opponents whom we encountered as specially representing 
 the hostile camp, were Mr. Stuart Mill and Dr. Bain. 
 Mr. Mill's death had at that time already occurred ; but 
 Dr. Bain, in the third edition of his great work on " The 
 Emotions and Will," referred to our essay on Mr. Mill's 
 denial of freewill, and professed to refute it. His remarks 
 expressed, we are bound to say, with most abundant 
 courtesy seem to us so very insufficiently considered that, 
 had they come from an ordinary writer, we should not have 
 thought it worth while to notice them. But Dr. Bain is 
 justly recognized as one of the two living thinkers Mr. 
 Herbert Spencer being the other who stand at the head of 
 the English psychological (as distinct from physiological) 
 movement towards antitheism. Then, his volume itself, 
 on the " Emotions and the Will," is one, we think, of very 
 conspicuous ability ; one which shows in various places
 
 Freewill. 337 
 
 great power of psychological analysis ; and one which 
 throws much light on some hitherto obscure corners of the 
 human mind. Moreover, he was the one living person 
 with whom we were in direct and immediate conflict. We 
 have really, therefore, a right to deal with him as with 
 a representative man, and to take credit on our own side 
 for whatever weakness may be found in his reasoning. At 
 last he has, of course, full liberty to " amend his plea ; " 
 and if he is disposed hereafter to make a greater approach 
 towards putting forth his full strength on the point at 
 issue, we promise him we shall encounter him with greater 
 readiness and gratification than we do at present. 
 
 If the reader wishes thoroughly to apprehend the 
 reasoning we put forth in our former essays on this subject, 
 we fear we cannot dispense him from the necessity of reading 
 our two articles. Even supposing him, however, to have 
 done so, a brief summary of our essential and fundamental 
 argument will fix its salient points more definitely in his 
 mind. Such a summary also may be useful, as exhibiting 
 the general lie of the controversy even to those who may 
 not care to go thoroughly into the matter. But, most of 
 all, such a summary is indispensable if Dr. Bain's various 
 replies are to be placed in a clear light. 
 
 We did not profess to treat the whole doctrine of Free- 
 will. We considered it exclusively on its psychological 
 side, reserving all metaphysical questions for later con- 
 sideration. Mr. Mill and Dr. Bain maintain, "as a truth 
 of experience," "that volitions follow determinate moral 
 antecedents with the same uniformity and the same. 
 certainty as physical effects follow their physical causes." 
 This, in fact, is the doctrine called by its upholders the 
 "Deterministic." We joined issue on their own ground of 
 experience, and alleged that experience testifies the pivciso 
 contradictory of their thesis. As Dr. Bain calls his doctrine 
 " Determinism," we called our contradictory one l>y tins 
 
 VOL. I. '
 
 338 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 name of " Indeterminisni." The full doctrine of Freewill 
 includes, indeed, the doctrine of Indeterminism ; but it 
 includes also a certain doctrine on the causation of human 
 acts. This latter is a metaphysical question, and must be 
 argued as, indeed, we argue it in the second part of our 
 present essay on metaphysical grounds. Here we have 
 no concern with it, except to mention that it is external 
 to the controversy of our previous essays. We began by 
 drawing out with much care a full statement of Dr. Bain's 
 theory, as we apprehend it. Dr. Bain implies that he is 
 satisfied with the accuracy of our analysis ; for he says 
 (p. 498) that " the arguments for and against Freewill 
 are clearly summarized " in our essay. We further pointed 
 out, that there are two different cases which need to be 
 separately considered. There are cases in which for 
 a while the will's spontaneous impulse exhibits much 
 vacillation and, as one may say, vibration. But we 
 added that " in the enormous majority of instances there 
 is no vacillation or vibration at all in this spontaneous 
 impulse ; that on the contrary, in these instances, there is 
 one definite and decisive resultant " of the various attrac- 
 tions which at any given moment act on the mind. We 
 think that our own doctrine of Indeterminism is established 
 by experience with no less conclusiveness in the former 
 than in the latter class of cases. Still, it is the latter class 
 of cases which place those mental facts on which we rely 
 in more intense and irresistible light ; and to this class of 
 cases, therefore, we mainly appealed. 
 
 In the great majority of those moments, therefore, which 
 together make up my waking life, my will is so promptly 
 determined by the combined effect of the various attractions 
 which solicit it, that its preponderating spontaneous impulse 
 is definite and decisive. So far Dr. Bain and ourselves are 
 in entire mutual agreement. Supposing, then, Dr. Bain 
 could show that men never resist this preponderating
 
 Freewill. 339 
 
 spontaneous impulse, we should not have a word further 
 to say in our defence. Our contention against him turns 
 precisely, critically, vitally, on one all-important and most 
 definite kind of phenomena. " What we allege to he a 
 fact of indubitable experience " these were our words 
 " is this. At some given moment my will's gravitation, 
 as it may be called, or preponderating spontaneous impulse, 
 is in some given direction ; insomuch that if I held myself 
 passively, if I let my will alone, my will would with absolute 
 certainty move accordingly : but in fact I exert myself, 
 with more or less vigour, to resist such impulse ; and then 
 the action of my will is in a different, often an entirely 
 opposite, direction. In other words, we would draw our 
 reader's attention to the frequently occurring simultaneous 
 existence of two very distinct phenomena. On the one 
 hand, my will's gravitation or preponderating spontaneous 
 impulse is strongly in one direction; while, on the other 
 hand, at the same moment its actual movement is quite 
 divergent from this. Now, that which motives " to use 
 Dr. Bain's terminology * " affect, is most evidently the 
 will's spontaneous inclination, impulse, gravitation. The 
 Determinist, then, by saying that the will's movement is 
 infallibly determined by ' motives,' is obliged to say that 
 the will never moves in opposition to its preponderating 
 spontaneous impulse. And, in fact, he does say this. All 
 Determinists assume, as a matter of course, that the 
 will never puts forth effort for the purpose of resisting 
 its preponderating spontaneous impulse. We, on the 
 
 * We used the word " motive" in a different sense from Dr. Bain. What 
 Dr. Bain calls a "motive," we called an " attraction." According to our uso 
 of terms, to ask what is my " motive " for some action, is to a* k what is that 
 end which I have resolved to pursue, and for the sake of which I resolve on 
 the performance of that action. But if a Determining asks me what is my 
 "motive" for some action, he means to ask me what is the attraction which 
 allures (and infallibly determines) me to do what I do. By "motive" he 
 means an "attraction ; " but by "motive" we mean, not a certain attraction, 
 or a certain *f>li<*itfitir>n, but a certain governing retolve.
 
 340 TJve Philosophy of Ttteiam. 
 
 contrary, allege that there is no mental fact more un- 
 deniable than the frequent putting forth of such effort." 
 " And on this critical point," we added, " issue is now to 
 be joined." * 
 
 We proceeded to give instances in which, we think, 
 no fair inquirer can doubt that men do put forth that 
 anti-impulsive effort, as we called it, on which we lay so 
 much stress ; and, be it observed, if so much as any of 
 these instances be admitted as genuine, the controversy is 
 conclusively decided in our favour. It is quite clear to our 
 mind, we say, that no intelligent person, who really gives 
 his attention to the matter, can fairly examine these 
 instances without admitting their collusiveness. It is not 
 all intelligent persons, however, of the phenomenistic 
 school who will really give their attention to what their 
 opponents say. And a most kind criticism of our essay, 
 which appeared in the Spectator, impressed us with tho 
 opinion that we had failed in conveying to adverse readers, 
 with due detail and illustration, the fundamental distinction 
 on which our whole argument turned; the distinction 
 between "anti-impulsive effort " on one side, and the will's 
 "preponderating spontaneous impulse " on the other. To 
 the supplying of this defect, therefore, we devoted a supple- 
 mentary essay. If our readers wish thoroughly to apprehend 
 the strength of our case, we must beg them to peruse that 
 essay. Here we can but exhibit a few specimens of the 
 instances which we suggested. And we should premise that, 
 in order to obtain greater freedom of expression, in this 
 second essay we somewhat enlarged our terminology. In 
 what here follows for the sake of still further, we hope, 
 elucidating our argument we have, in some unimportant 
 respects, somewhat modified the said terminology ; but no 
 
 * In quoting our former essays, we occasionally make some entirely 
 unimportant change of expression, in order to obtain, we hope, somewhat 
 greater clearness.
 
 Freewill. 341 
 
 one can even cursorily peruse our second essay on the 
 subject, without understanding us to mean exactly what we 
 shall now proceed to express. The chief term which we first 
 introduced in that essay, was the term " desire." If my 
 will's preponderating spontaneous impulse be directed to the 
 attainment of some given result, I may be said to have a 
 " preponderating desire," or simply " the desire," of that 
 result. Or, again, the said preponderating spontaneous 
 impulse may be called my " strongest " present impulse, or 
 my " strongest " present desire. Very frequently, of course, 
 there exists what may be called a " desire," but one which 
 is not the " strongest," the " preponderating," present 
 desire. For example : A is called very early on the 1st of 
 September, and feels a real " desire " to sleep off again ; 
 nevertheless, his wish to be early among the partridges is a 
 stronger, more influential, more keenly-felt, more stimu- 
 lating desire. His " strongest present desire," therefore, 
 his " strongest present impulse," his " preponderating 
 spontaneous impulse," is to get up at once ; which he 
 accordingly does, as a matter of course. His weaker desire 
 is to stay in bed, his strongest present desire to get up. 
 
 This terminology being understood, our illustrations 
 were directed to show that over and over again men resist 
 their strongest present desire. Let us revert to a preceding 
 illustration. When A is called early on the 1st of Septem- 
 ber, his strongest present desire is to get up, and he gets up 
 as a matter of course. But B, who is no sportsman, has 
 also ordered himself to be called early the same morning, 
 for a very different reason. He will be busy in the middle 
 of the day, and he has resolved to rise betimes, that he 
 may visit a sick dependent. When he is called, by far his 
 strongest present desire is to sleep off again : but he exerts 
 himself ; ho puts forth manly self-restraint, and forces 
 himself to rise, though it be but laboriously and against 
 the grain. A starts from bed by a spontaneous and
 
 34l> The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 indeliberate impulse ; but B resolves weakly and fails, 
 resolves more strongly and fails again, until he at last 
 succeeds by a still stronger and crowning resolve in launch- 
 ing himself on the sea of active life. " Surely," we added, 
 " no mental states are more unmistakably contrasted than " 
 the mental states of A and B respectively ; though both are 
 called early and both get up. A obeys his strongest present 
 desire, while B resists it.* 
 
 Parallel instances, we just now pointed out, are ex- 
 tremely frequent ; and to this point we shall presently 
 return. At the same time, we said in the first essay, 
 " very far the most signal," the most impressive, the most 
 arresting " instances of the doctrine we are defending, will 
 be found in the devout Theist's resistance to temptation." 
 We gave an illustration in our second paper. " A military 
 officer possessing real piety and steadfastly purposing to 
 grow therein receives at the hand of a brother officer some 
 stinging and, as the world would say, ' intolerable ' insult. 
 His nature flames forth ; his preponderating spontaneous 
 impulse his strongest present desire is to inflict some 
 retaliation, which at least shall deliver him from the 
 ' reproach ' of cowardice. Nevertheless, it is his firm 
 resolve, by God's grace, to comport himself Christianly. 
 His resolve contends vigorously against his strongest 
 present desire, until the latter is brought into harmony with 
 his principles." What a sustained series of intense anti- 
 impulsive efforts is here exhibited ! What could be wilder 
 
 * We do not forget that a third hypothesis is possible. In another man, 
 C, there may be that " vacillation " and " vibration " of the will's pre- 
 ponderating spontaneous impulse, which we have already mentioned. He 
 is, we may suppose, a much less keen sportsman than A. His desire of 
 lying in bed is at one moment slightly the stronger, and his desire of getting 
 up is slightly the stronger next moment. Such vacillation, indeed, may 
 continue for no very inconsiderable time. But what we nscribe to B is, that 
 when he is called, his indefinitely strongest present desire is his desire of 
 sleeping off again; and that he combats that desire, from a motive of 
 benevolence, by vigorous anti-impulsive effort. No one surely will doubt 
 that such a case is frequent enough.
 
 Freewill. 343 
 
 than to say that, during this protracted period, he is acting 
 in accordance with his strongest present desire, and with 
 his will's preponderating spontaneous impulse ? 
 
 Let it be distinctly observed that we rest our case, not 
 on the mere fact of an agent putting forth effort of the will, 
 however intense ; but anti-impulsive effort. Here, again, 
 we drew our illustration from some gallant soldier. Such 
 a man " will very often put forth intense effort ; brave 
 appalling perils ; confront the risk of an agonizing death. 
 But to what end is this effort directed ? He puts it forth in 
 order that he may act in full accordance with his preponde- 
 rating spontaneous impulse ; in order that he may achieve 
 what is his strongest present desire ; in order that he may 
 defend his country, overcome his country's foe, obtain fame 
 and distinction, gratify his military ardour, etc." Such 
 efforts as these efforts directed to the gratification of a 
 man's strongest present desire we called " congenial " 
 efforts; and undoubtedly the fact of such efforts being 
 frequently put forth affords no argument whatever against 
 Determinism. These efforts may be not less intense they 
 may, if you will, be indefinitely more intense than those 
 which we commemorated in the preceding case. The 
 two classes of effort mutually differ, not in degree but in 
 kind. As regards our present argument, their difference 
 is fundamental : that difference being, that " congenial " 
 efforts are hi accordance with the agent's strongest present 
 desire, whereas " anti-impulsive " efforts are in opposition 
 to it. And we may be permitted, perhaps, to point the 
 contrast more emphatically, by introducing what may in 
 some sense be called a theological consideration ; though 
 in truth the fact to which we refer is an observed fact of 
 experience, like any other. What soldier, then, could be 
 found who would bear insult, contumely, and contempt 
 with perfect patience, unless he were supported by earnest 
 and unfaltering prayer ? But certainly with a very large
 
 344- The Philosophy of Theism, 
 
 number there is no need of earnest and unfaltering prayer, 
 in order to heroic action in the field. There have been not 
 BO very few warriors of truly amazing intrepidity, who have 
 not exactly been men of prayer. So essentially different in 
 kind are the two classes of effort. 
 
 There is a very familiar use of language which will 
 throw still further light on the point before us. What we 
 have called " anti-impulsive " effort, is continually spoken 
 of in unscientific language as " self-control," or " self- 
 restraint." Take the pious soldier who receives a stinging 
 insult and bears it patiently : what is most remarkable in 
 his conduct is his " self-restraint." But no one would 
 commemorate the " self-restraint " of one who should be so 
 carried away, breathlessly as it were, by military ardour, by 
 desire of victory, by zeal for his country's cause, by a 
 certain savage aggressiveness, which is partly natural and 
 partly due to past habit who should be so carried away, 
 we repeat, by these and similar impulses, that, under their 
 influence, he faces appalling danger without so much as a 
 moment's deliberation or reflection. 
 
 In our supplementary essay, we thus summed up our 
 argument. "The whole Deterministic controversy," we said, 
 " turns on this one question : Do I, or do I not, at various 
 times exercise self-restraint ? Do I, or do I not, at various 
 times act in resistance to my strongest present desire ? " 
 For consider. " What can ' motives,' " in Dr. Bain's sense 
 of that term, "or 'circumstances,' or 'temperament,' or 
 ' habit,' or ' custom,' imaginably do for me at this moment, 
 except to effect that my desire shall be this rather than 
 that ? How can they imaginably influence my action in 
 those cases, where my action is contrary to my strongest 
 present desire ? If, then, there are such cases if it be 
 true that I often, or indeed ever, act in opposition to what 
 at this moment is my strongest desire then it demonstra- 
 tively follows that my will at such times acts for itself;
 
 Freewill. 345 
 
 independently of 'pleasure/ or 'pain,' or 'circumstances,' 
 or ' motives,' or ' habits,' or anything else." 
 
 The question is simply and precisely this : "Do men 
 ever resist their strongest present desire ? Is there such a 
 thing among men as 'self-restraint'?" "Let any one 
 rightly understand," we concluded, "what it is which 
 Mr. Mill and Dr. Bain affirm ; and let him then proceed to 
 look at the most obvious and every-day facts of life ; 
 he will be able to discern with the clearest insight that 
 their pretentious theory is a mere sham and delusion." 
 Never was a more egregious imposture palmed on the world 
 under the name of science and philosophy. 
 
 There is another matter, subordinate of course in im- 
 portance to the vital issue we have been considering, but 
 yet in its consequences of very considerable moment. We 
 have said incidentally that the cases are very frequent, even 
 with the most ordinary men, in which they put forth, 
 however languidly and feebly, some little amount of self- 
 restraint and self-control. There is honour among thieves. 
 Even a member of the criminal classes brings himself 
 again and again to resist his strongest present desire, in 
 order to a deliberate provision for his own safety. So 
 much is surely plain on the surface of facts. And the very 
 same circumstance the great frequency of anti-impulsive 
 effort is moreover made most manifest, by that conviction 
 of their own moral liberty, which so intimately possesses 
 the minds of all men in the whole world, except only that 
 infinitesimal portion of mankind, the Deterministic philo- 
 sophers. We appealed to this in our first essay. " Con- 
 sidering," we said, " how very few can look upon their 
 habitual conduct with satisfaction if they choose to measure 
 it even by their own standard of right, emphatic stress 
 may justly be laid on the universal conviction, that then 1 /'* 
 such a thing as sin and guilt. There could be no sin or 
 guilt, if every one's conduct were inevitably determined by
 
 34G The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 circumstances ; and what a balm, therefore, to wounded 
 consciences is offered by the Deterministic theory ! Yet so 
 strong and ineradicable in the mass of men is their con- 
 viction of possessing a real power against temptation, that 
 they never attempt to purchase peace of mind by disclaim- 
 ing that power." But how could it possibly happen that 
 this conviction is so profoundly rooted in their mind that 
 it bears so strong a prima fade appearance of being an 
 innate and indestructible instinct were there not in each 
 man's life a very frequent experience, on which that con- 
 viction is based ? 
 
 The remainder of our first essay was mainly occupied 
 in considering the various objections to our thesis which 
 Determinists have adduced. There will, of course, be no 
 reason for here reconsidering those objections, except so 
 far as Dr. Bain has reproduced them. Without further 
 preamble, therefore, we proceed to his reply. 
 
 The absolutely bewildering circumstance in that reply 
 is that Dr. Bain does not once throughout refer to that one 
 central and fundamental argument, on which we avowedly 
 based our whole case. No doubt, he is unaware of our 
 supplementary essay ; but what can have been more ex- 
 press and emphatic than our statement in the original one ? 
 As soon as ever we had concluded our exposition of the 
 Deterministic reasoning, we added, that " the whole argu- 
 ment, in our view, should be made to turn on one most 
 simple and intelligible issue." And we then proceeded to 
 set forth that issue in the plainest possible terms. Dr. Bain 
 complains (p. 498) that " we throw on him the burden of" 
 disproving Indeterminism ; whereas we assumed the whole 
 burden of proof ourselves, assailing Determinism unequi- 
 vocally and emphatically. Dr. Bain has resolutely ignored 
 our argument, and then complains of our not having 
 adduced one. We cannot at all conjecture the cause of this 
 singular omission.
 
 Freewill. 34-7 
 
 Dr. Bain begins what be does say by a courteous remark 
 that in our essay " some new aspects " of the Freewill 
 question "have been opened up." We cannot, however, 
 accept this compliment in anything like its full extent, 
 because so much of our argument was built on Mr. Lloyd's 
 pamphlet, which Dr. Bain has evidently never seen.* 
 
 Dr. Barn's first adverse criticism is this : 
 
 The writer too much identifies Determinism with the 
 utilitarian theory of morals, or, indeed, with pure selfishness ; 
 for he regards Freewill as the only known counterpoise to 
 selfish actions. Now, it is true that in illustrating the operation 
 of motives, the opponents of Freewill describe these usually as 
 " pleasures " or " pains ; " being a convenient summary and 
 representation of all possible motives. But they do not, there- 
 fore, maintain that all conduct is necessarily self-seeking. 
 Many anti-libertarians assert in the strongest manner the 
 existence of purely disinterested impulses. But the quoting of 
 these disinterested motives for example, pity and heroic self- 
 devotion would not alter one wliit the state of the argument. 
 As motives, these have a power to urge the will, and, when 
 present alone, they determine it ; in the case of a conflict, one 
 side will succeed, which is thereby shown to be the stronger, 
 and would prove so again should the situation be repeated 
 (p. 498). 
 
 We reply, in the first place, that, had we said what 
 Dr. Bain supposes, we should have been entirely justified, 
 by his and Mr. Mill's language, in ascribing to them the 
 doctrine which he here disavows. All Determinists, we 
 need not say, hold as their first principle that the will is 
 infallibly determined by what they call the " strongest 
 motive ; " and it will be seen in the above paragraph how 
 simply Dr. Bain takes this proposition for granted. Now, 
 let the two following statements be observed which wo ex- 
 tracted from Mr. Mill and Dr. Bain respectively in our 
 first paper. Mr. Mill says (the italics are ours) : 
 
 "The Freedom of the Will stated afresh." By 10. M. Lloyd. Long- 
 mans, ISGti.
 
 348 The Philosophy of TJieixm. 
 
 Those who say that the will follows the strongest motive 
 do not mean the motive which is strongest in relation to the 
 will, or, in other words, that the will follows what it does 
 follow. They mean the motive which is strongest in relation to 
 pain and pleasure : since a motive, being a desire or aversion, is 
 proportional to the pleasantness as conceived hy us of the thing 
 desired, or the painfulness of the thing shunned. 
 
 Still more pointedly Dr. Bain : 
 
 It is only an identical proposition to affirm that the greatest 
 of two pleasures, or what appears such, sways the resulting 
 action; for it is the resulting action alone that determines 
 which is the greater. 
 
 We quoted, of course, from Dr. Bain's second edition, 
 which was then the most recent. Mr. H. W. Lucas men- 
 tions in one of his papers we have not cared to verify the 
 statement that in Dr. Bain's third edition this sentence is 
 not to be found. It is curious that, in this third edition, 
 he should complain of us for misunderstanding him ; while, 
 at the same time, without making any avowal of the fact, 
 he withdraws the very sentence which we had quoted as 
 authenticating our view of his doctrine. 
 
 We should add that we were as far as possible from 
 ascribing to Dr. Bain the doctrine we have just named, in 
 the cruder and more obvious sense which many of his 
 expressions would bear. On the contrary, every one who 
 reads our first essay carefully, will see what very great 
 pains we took to interweave his various dicta which are 
 not very easily susceptible of mutual reconcilement into 
 one consistent theory. 
 
 But now we reply, secondly, that no words could possibly 
 be more express than those we used in disclaiming by 
 anticipation the precise view which Dr. Bain ascribes to 
 us. He thinks we hold Determinists, as such, responsible 
 for the thesis that the will is never influenced by " dis- 
 interested motives ; " or, in other words, that the mind is
 
 Freewill. 349 
 
 never attracted towards action, except by the thought of 
 personal enjoyment, positive or negative, in one or other 
 shape. Now, no doubt, we held Dr. Bain himself responsible 
 for this thesis, for the simple reason that, as has been seen, 
 he distinctly expressed it. But we went out of our way to 
 explain, with most unmistakable clearness, that our argu- 
 ment against Determinism was not in the slightest degree 
 affected by the cross controversy which Dr. Bain now raises. 
 As the matter is of much importance, we will inflict on our 
 readers a repetition of our whole passage. 
 
 As it is very important to avoid all possibility of cavil, it 
 will be perhaps better to add one further explanation of the 
 exact point at issue. Mr. Mill and Dr. Bain hold, that in each 
 case the spontaneous impulse or inclination of the will is 
 determined by the balance of immediate pleasure ; and, taking into 
 account the various explanations they give of their statement, 
 we are so far entirely in accord with them. But our own 
 essential argument would not be affected in the slightest 
 degree, if this theory of theirs were disproved. And it is 
 worth while, at the risk of being thought tedious, to make this 
 clear. 
 
 The essence of Determinism is the doctrine that, at any 
 given moment, the will's movement is infallibly and inevitably 
 determined by circumstances (1) internal, and (2) external : i.e. 
 (1) by the intrinsic constitution and disposition of the will, 
 and (2) by the external influences which act on it. Now, no 
 one doubts that in every man, during far the larger portion of 
 his waking life, there exists what we have called a definite and 
 decisive spontaneous impulse of his will. And Determinists 
 allege that circumstances, internal and external, determine tho 
 will's actual movement, precisely by determining its spontaneous 
 impulse. It is the very essence of Determinism therefore to 
 allege that tho will's actual movement is never divergent from 
 its spontaneous impulse. 
 
 lint it is a different question altogether, and one entirely 
 irrelevant to the Deterministic controversy, to inquire irfml 
 is exactly tho fixed relation which exists between circumstances 
 on the one hand, and the will's spontaneous impulse! >u tho 
 other. Air. Mill and Dr. Bain adopt on this question tho
 
 3oO The Philosophy of Theism, 
 
 halance-of-pleasure theory ; and here we agree with them. 
 But quite imaginably philosophers might arise (though we 
 think this very improbable) who should adduce strong argu- 
 ments for some different theory on the subject. Now this, as 
 our readers will see, is a cross controversy altogether, and in no 
 way affects the issue between Determinism and its assailants. 
 We have ourselves assumed, throughout our essay, the balance- 
 of-pleasure theory as confessedly and indisputably true ; because 
 (1) we account it the true one, and because (2) it is held by all 
 the Determinists we ever heard of; but nothing would be easier 
 than to mould our argument according to any different theory 
 which might be established. The question between Deter- 
 minists and ourselves is not at all how the will's spontaneous 
 impulse is formed, but exclusively whether it is ever resisted. 
 Determinists as such say that it is never resisted, and Indeter- 
 minists as such maintain the contrary. 
 
 Dr. Bain's second adverse criticism is the following : 
 
 Eemarking upon the assertion of the Determinists that the 
 number and complexity of the motive forces are the only 
 obstacles to our foreseeing the course of any one's voluntary 
 decisions the writer throws upon us the burden of showing 
 that any uncertainty or precariousness of prediction is due to 
 this, and not to the Freedom of men's Will. We reply that 
 this burden, on every principle of evidence, lies upon him. 
 The rule of Nature is uniformity ; this is to be accepted in all 
 doubtful cases, until an exception is made good (p. 498^). 
 
 Here is the paragraph to which we have already referred 
 as containing Dr. Bain's complaint, that we have thrown 
 on Determinists the burden of proof. But, if our readers 
 will refer to that passage of ours on which Dr. Bain 
 comments, they will see that the said passage is no part 
 whatever of our direct argument ; they will see that it 
 occurs among our answers to objections. We had already 
 given grounds such as we have exhibited in the earlier 
 part of our present essay for holding that the contra- 
 dictory of Determinism is among the most certain, nay, 
 the most obvious, of psychological facts. In our appeal to 
 these facts we threw no burden of proof whatever on Dr.
 
 Freewill. 351 
 
 Bain or any other Determinist. Nothing could be more 
 aggressive than our whole line of argument ; nor, we may 
 add, did we rest any part of that argument on the ex- 
 perienced impossibility of predicting human acts. Having 
 established, as we consider, our doctrine, we proceeded to 
 encounter the various objections against it which Deter- 
 minists have alleged. Among these objections is one 
 founded on " the number and complexity " of those attrac- 
 tions which at any given moment solicit the will. Dr. Bain 
 entirely admits that there is great " uncertainty and pre- 
 cariousness " in any attempt to predict future human 
 actions. We ascribe this fact, in a considerable degree, to 
 Freewill ; he ascribes it exclusively to that " number and 
 complexity " of attractions which we just now mentioned. 
 On this allegation of his we commented as follows : " No- 
 where," we said, " has any Determinist whatever attempted 
 to show that this uncertainty and precariousness of pre- 
 diction is due exclusively to the number and complexity of 
 attractions ; that it is not largely due to the Freedom of 
 men's Will. Yet, until they have shown this, they have 
 shown nothing worth so much as a pin's head towards 
 the establishment of their theory." Our own argument, 
 as we just now mentioned, was entirely independent of 
 this particular question. Still, if (per impossilile) Deter- 
 minists had been able to show that human conduct is 
 capable of being predicted with certainty in the abstract,* 
 they would have adduced an argument as irrefragable on 
 their side as ours is on our side ; and the net result would 
 have been a contradiction in terms. We pointed out, there- 
 fore, that not only Determinists have not shown this, but 
 that they have not even attempted to show it. Theso 
 thinkers so intolerant of a priori theories, so earnest 
 
 * By the phrase *' capable of being predicted th? abttract" vie inrnn 
 "capable in ituflf of being predicted: capable of beinp predicted. tln'rcl'rr, 
 by a person of superhuman and adequate intelligence, who should thoroughly 
 penetrate the antecedent facts."
 
 3.">2 The Philosophy of Tftei#m. 
 
 in upholding an exclusive appeal to experience, in 
 this particular allegation of theirs have not so much as 
 attempted any appeal to experience. They base their 
 conclusions entirely on a priori theories ; nay, on a priori 
 theories of what we must really call the very flimsiest 
 character. 
 
 This most strange circumstance, we say, is exhibited on 
 the very surface by that paragraph of Dr. Bain's which we 
 have last quoted. He does not profess to prove the uniform 
 sequence of human voluntary acts by any observation of 
 such acts. His belief in the uniform sequence of those 
 acts is based on considerations which he cannot himself 
 pretend to be anything stronger than conjectures, more or 
 less probable, derived from analogy. Even had these 
 conjectures possessed indefinitely greater force in the way 
 of probability than we can for a moment admit, what, 
 nevertheless, could possibly be their value? What could 
 possibly be the value of mere conjecture probable conjecture, 
 if you will when opposed to certain and constant experi- 
 ence ? What can possibly be the value of mere probability, 
 on one side, when weighed against absolute certainty on the 
 other ? But, in real truth, Dr. Bain's conjectural inferences 
 do not carry with them so much as the slightest appearance 
 of probability, unless he begins by assuming, on his own side, 
 what is the one vital and fundamental point of difference 
 between him and his opponents. A very few words will 
 make this clear. 
 
 No doubt, it is admitted by every one that all physical, 
 and a large number of psychical, phenomena proceed 
 ordinarily * in the way of constant and uniform sequence. 
 Therefore, argues Dr. Bain, it may be taken for granted, 
 as a matter of course, unless the contrary be proved, that 
 those psychical phenomena which are called acts of will, 
 
 * " Ordinarily ; " for we need not here discuss the question of miracles, 
 on which we speak in the later portion of our essay.
 
 Freewill. 353 
 
 also proceed in the way of constant and uniform sequence. 
 Certainly, we consider that we have proved most conclusively 
 the contradictory of this. But what we are now urging is 
 that apart altogether from proof on our side Dr. Bain's 
 inference is utterly fallacious on his, unless he assume what 
 is the one vital and fundamental point at issue between him 
 and the opposite school. The general uniformity of Nature, 
 we say, does not afford the very slightest presumption that 
 all acts of the human icill are included in this uniformity 
 unless it be assumed that there is no such thing in rcrum 
 naturd as morality in the Christian sense, nor any Moral 
 Governor of the world. If there is a God Who rewards and 
 punishes human acts, it is involved in the very notion of 
 such a doctrine that human acts are free. The presump- 
 tion, therefore, on which Dr. Bain relies, is, on the surface, 
 palpably irrelevant, except as addressed to those who have 
 already denied that there is a Moral Governor of the world. 
 That an Atheist, in whatever way he veils his Atheism, 
 will certainly repudiate Freewill this is the very last 
 thing we care to dispute. In our view, he has already 
 given up all which to a reasonable man makes life worth 
 the living ; and Freewill to him would be the most 
 inexplicable of portents. 
 
 Dr. Bain thus proceeds : 
 
 The writer is surprised that no one lias remarked what 
 he admits to be a difficulty in Freewill, namely, that the 
 power of resisting vicious impulses is so rarely exercised. The 
 truth is, in the eyes of the scientific psychologists, Freewill, 
 maintained purely as an aid to virtue, is an anomalous position, 
 and not capable of being argued on the ordinary grounds of 
 mental doctrines. If our consciousness seems to show something 
 distinct from the uniform sequence of motive and act, it shows 
 that equally for all sorts of conduct ; the restriction to virtuous 
 conduct is purely arbitrary, and, as already said, is n<>t '> 
 psychological but a theological assumption (pp. 4!'H, 4 ( .i'.)J. 
 
 There is one clause in this paragraph which \\v desire- 
 VOL. i. - A
 
 354 TJie Philosophy of Theivn. 
 
 to note, as the only one which indicates any perception 
 whatever on Dr. Bain's part of what our line of argument 
 had been. In this clause, and in this alone, he exhibits 
 some vague kind of surmise, that we had appealed to 
 " consciousness" as "showing in human action something 
 distinct from the uniform sequence of motive and act." 
 Why did he not extend his investigation further, and at 
 least learn what were those particular facts of consciousness 
 on which we relied ? 
 
 Otherwise there is a certain difficulty in dealing with 
 the paragraph before us, because it appears to confuse two 
 totally distinct passages of ours. However, our obvious 
 course will be to cite and defend the two in succession. In 
 our first essay on the subject we thus wrote : 
 
 We need hardly say that, in our view, devout Tbeists are 
 immeasurably the most virtuous class of human beings. Con- 
 sequently, in our view, devout Theists will, with absolute 
 certainty, immeasurably exceed other men in their anti- 
 impulsive efforts ; for tbe simple reason that tbey immeasurably 
 exceed other men in the vigilant care with which they adjust 
 their volitions with a standard whick they consider supremely 
 authoritative. 
 
 And we thus supplemented the above : 
 
 Nor has the determinist any right to ignore such facts, 
 because he himself may believe that no God is cognizable, and 
 that devout Theism is a superstition. If it be unmistakably 
 proved that those who hold and act on a certain belief (however 
 untrue he may consider that belief) do put forth great, or indeed 
 any, anti-impulsive effort, he is bound in reason to abandon his 
 theory. 
 
 If Dr. Bain is referring to these passages, he entirely 
 misunderstands us when he says that we " maintain Free- 
 will purely as an aid to virtue." We hold most strongly 
 that those who follow without resistance their will's spon- 
 taneous impulse are no whit less free in their act than
 
 Freewill. 355 
 
 those who resist it.* We did not say that devout Theists 
 " immeasurably exceed other men " in the number of their 
 free acts, but in the frequency, or at least in the intensity, 
 of " their anti-impulsive efforts" We were occupied in 
 showing how undeniable a mental phenomenon it is, that 
 men do from time to time resist their preponderating 
 spontaneous impulse. " Even the mass of men who live 
 mainly" or entirely " for this world, by no means " rarely, 
 nay, with considerable frequency, " do oppose themselves 
 to the spontaneous impulse of their will." But devout 
 Theists put forth immeasurably stronger and more sustained 
 anti-impulsive effort than any other class; and it is by 
 studying, therefore, the phenomena of their interior lives, 
 that by far the most striking and emphatic proof of our 
 thesis will be obtained. 
 
 If Dr. Bain asks why it is that Theists so very much 
 exceed other men in the intensity and persistency of anti- 
 impulsive effort, we gave a most intelligible reason. It is 
 because " they immeasurably exceed other men in the 
 vigilant care with which they adjust their volitions by a 
 standard which they regard as supremely authoritative." 
 Mr. H. W. Lucas, in the course of three very able articles 
 on Freewill contributed to the Month (February, April, 
 June, 1878) articles in which he frequently refers to our 
 own with much kindness of expression thus develops our 
 statement : 
 
 Christian asceticism teaches a man to value the inward in- 
 tention rather than the external deed. It teaches him to " watch 
 his heart," to observe his thoiights, and to direct them as often 
 as possible by positive acts to God, the end of his whole being. 
 It brings prominently before his mind the practice of self- 
 
 * Wo said in the essay quoted in the text tlmt it will " in various ways 
 be more convenient," when engaged in answering mere objections, to consider 
 those objections as brought, not merely against Indetenuinum, but against tho 
 full doctrine of Freewill. " Nor," we added, " is such a procedure in any 
 way unfair to our npjxments, but the very contrary ; for it does but offer them 
 a larger target to shoot at."
 
 350 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 control as a most important exorcise of the interior life. In 
 short, it is hardly necessary to insist that the habit of " recol- 
 lection " necessarily tends to multiply the daily number of ... 
 choiceful acts. Take, on the other hand, the case of a man who 
 has no belief in the supernatural. He, too, often resists the 
 greatest present impulse, either for the sake of others or with 
 a view to his own greater advantage in the future. But he 
 does not value the practice of self-conlrol as a constant means 
 of meriting in the sight of an All-seeing Dispenser of reward 
 and retribution. The self-control which he does exercise tends 
 to become habitual in other words, tends to embody itself in a 
 new set of impulses; and his wish must be so to establish 
 prudential and benevolent impulses in the mind, that fore- 
 sight and benevolence may be frictionless : and there is no 
 tendency to any higher kind of effort. Whereas, for the 
 Christian ascetic, there are simply no limits to the process of 
 self-perfection. He, too, endeavours to establish and cultivate 
 virtuous impulses ; but each set of such impulses once established 
 becomes for him a platform from which to mount upwards to 
 higher exercises of self-control. 
 
 According to our own humble view, then, all men 
 good, middling, and bad alike are equally free. But good 
 men exercise their freedom very largely in resisting their 
 preponderating spontaneous impulse ; whereas it is charac- 
 teristic of bad men, as such, that they so largely exercise 
 their liberty in abstaining from that resistance to spon- 
 taneous impulse, which nevertheless is fully in their power. 
 
 But we are disposed to think that there is another 
 psychological doctrine altogether entirely distinct from 
 Indeterminism, which Dr. Bain has greatly in his mind, 
 when he makes the comment we have just quoted. It is 
 a fundamental principle of Catholic theology and philosophy 
 that no one acts wickedly for wickedness' sake diopter 
 malitiam). Thus, it happens that the philosophies of good 
 and of evil acts proceed respectively on a mutually 
 different basis. He who is to act virtuously must in some 
 sense pursue virtue.* But the converse by no means 
 
 * So Dr. Mivart : " For au act to be good, it must be really directed by
 
 Freewill. 857 
 
 holds, that he who acts wickedly is in any sense pursuing 
 wickedness ; for his wickedness precisely consists in his 
 inordinate and, so to speak, unprincipled pursuit of pleasure. 
 In a later part of our series we hope to set forth this great 
 verity, with its psychological proof, as clearly and as full# 
 as we can. Here we are only concerned with it incidentally, 
 as throwing possible light upon the origin of Dr. Bain's 
 mistake. Libertarians speak of Freewill as exercised in 
 the direction of pursuing virtue, and again as exercised in 
 the direction of pursuing pleasure, but never as exercised 
 in the direction of pursuing wickedness. Moreover, they 
 hold that self-restraining exercise of Freewill, or what we 
 have called anti-impulsive effort, is with quite immeasurably 
 greater frequency put forth in the direction of virtue than 
 of pleasure ; because pleasure, of course, has only too great 
 attractiveness of its own. Dr. Bain may have observed 
 these statements, and inferred from them that Libertarians 
 " maintain Freewill purely as an aid to virtue." But such 
 a statement, as we have pointed out, implies a complete 
 misapprehension of the doctrine we advocate. 
 
 Lastly, we must entirely deny Dr. Bain's allegation, 
 that what we affirm is in any kind of way a "theological 
 assumption." Doubtless, in arguing on philosophical 
 ground against philosophers, we should be guilty of an 
 intolerable sophism if we based our argument in any 
 degree upon any theological doctrine i.e. on any doctrine 
 which we do not claim to know otherwise than through 
 Revelation. But not only we made no appeal to any such 
 doctrine, we made no appeal even to Theism : which it 
 would of course, indeed, have been grossly paralogistic to 
 io, since we are maintaining Freewill as a premiss towards 
 the establishment of Theism. We thought we had made all 
 
 the doer to a good end, either actually or virtually. Tin; idea <>f good, 
 which ho has in the past apprehended, must } influencing the 111:111 at t!i 
 time, whether he advert* to it or not ; otherwise the action in n<>t inntl " 
 (" Lessons from Nature," p. 118.)
 
 358 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 this quite clear in a passage which we just now quoted. 
 The Determinist's theory is, that no man resists his 
 strongest present impulse ; and his theory, therefore, is 
 conclusively and finally refuted if it be shown that any one 
 man and much more if it be shown that a large class of 
 men do often resist their strongest present impulse. The 
 refutation of Determinism would be none the less irre- 
 fragable, though these resisters of their strongest present 
 impulse were the most ignorant, the most superstitious, 
 the most degraded of mankind. The appeal is made, not 
 to any religious doctrine whatever, but to an observed 
 psychical fact. 
 
 So much on the particular passage above quoted from 
 our essay. But there is another entirely distinct passage, 
 in quite a different part of that essay, to which, we fancy, 
 Dr. Bain may partially refer. Here it is : 
 
 One objection remains of a far more serious character, 
 though it has not been adduced either by Mr. Mill or Dr. Bain, 
 or, so far as we know, by any other writer of their school. " Jf 
 all men," it may be asked, " possess so real a power of resisting 
 their will's spontaneous impulse, how does it happen that this 
 power is by comparison so inconsiderably exercised ?" Against 
 Catholics in particular as ad homines the same difficulty may be 
 still more urgently pressed, " You hold that Catholics at least 
 have full moral power, not only to avoid mortal sin, but to 
 make the pleasing God the one predominant end of their life. 
 Yet how few and far between are those of whom you will 
 even allege that they do this how amazingly few on the 
 supposition that all have the needful power ! " The difficulty 
 here sketched demands the most earnest attention ; but its 
 treatment would carry us into a line of thought entirely 
 different in kind from what has occupied us in our present 
 essay. We will therefore defer its discussion to a future 
 opportunity, content with having shown, by our mention of it, 
 how very far we are from ignoring it or wishing to pass it over. 
 
 The reason for our having introduced, in some sense 
 prematurely, these considerations, may be briefly stated.
 
 Freewill. 359 
 
 The ultimate purpose of our series, as we have so often 
 explained, is to use these preliminary doctrines Free- 
 will, the reasonable basis of Morality, the principle of 
 Causation, etc. as so many steps towards the argumen- 
 tative establishment of Theism. Now, the main considera- 
 tion on which modern antitheists predominantly dwell- 
 that which is both in itself immeasurably their most power- 
 ful stronghold, and is felt by them to be so is the existence 
 upon earth of evil, in that degree and kind which experience 
 testifies. In our view, we frankly avow, all other religious 
 difficulties put together do not even approach in gravity to 
 this difficulty, though it stood alone. The contemplation 
 of the world's existent state is, as F. Newman says, "a 
 vision to dizzy and appal ; and inflicts upon the mind the 
 sense of a profound mystery, which is absolutely beyond 
 human solution." If, then, in our treatment of Theism we 
 did not place practically and emphatically before our 
 readers the full character and dimensions of this difficulty, 
 it would be better not to write on our theme at all. Surely 
 to say this is no exaggeration, but the simplest common 
 sense. For what kind of persuasiveness could the advocate 
 of Theism hope to exercise, who should be felt by his 
 opponents or again, which is even more important, by 
 seriously perplexed inquirers not really to apprehend that 
 antitheistic argument which weighs with them more than 
 do all the rest put together ? We thought it, therefore, of 
 great importance to show from the earliest moment how 
 fully our mind is occupied, how deeply penetrated, by the 
 truly tremendous facts on which antitheists lay such 
 prominent stress. Now, that portion of our series in which 
 we catch, as it were, the first glimpse of this bewildering 
 enigma is the discussion of Freewill ; and we would not, 
 therefore, allow that discussion to pass without showing that 
 we carefully bore the difficulty in mind with a view to its 
 future examination. It is not, of cbui'se, .until we tslmll
 
 3GO The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 have set forth the absolutely impregnable basis on which 
 Theism reposes that the opportune moment will have 
 arrived for directly and, we hope, unflinchingly confronting 
 the whole difficulty. 
 
 For the moment, however, we have nothing to do with 
 this difficulty, except so far as it may be accounted a refu- 
 tation of the Freewill doctrine ; and, considered in this 
 narrow point of view, it is most easily disposed of. We 
 claim to have established Indeterminism on absolutely 
 irrefragable psychological grounds ; and we further allege, 
 that the arguments to be adduced in the second part of our 
 present paper develop with certainty the doctrine of Inde- 
 terminism into the full doctrine of Freewill. Now, the 
 facts to which we draw attention in the above-quoted 
 paragraph have not even the primd facie appearance of con- 
 tradicting this great doctrine. The thesis which, as we 
 hold, we shall have conclusively established is that the 
 human will is free to resist its preponderating spontaneous 
 impulse. The fact to which Dr. Bain draws attention is, 
 that this power, if it exist, is at all events exercised in a 
 comparatively inconsiderable degree, at least as regards 
 persistence and intensity. Well, there is not here even the 
 primd facie appearance of contradiction. To say that a 
 certain power exists, is not even primd facie incompatible 
 with saying that it is comparatively little exercised. Let us 
 take a somewhat grotesque illustration. Dr. Bain does not 
 doubt that the immense majority of adults possess a 
 permanent power of standing for a short time on one leg ; 
 yet out of the million millions who possess this power, how 
 many and how often are they in the habit of exercising it ? 
 The utmost which can be said is, that the fact to which we 
 draw attention renders the doctrine of Freewill an ira- 
 probable one. Well, let us concede so much, at least for 
 argument's sake. Still, whereas the objection to Freewill 
 cannot possibly be alleged as going beyond the sphere of
 
 Freewill. 301 
 
 probability, the argument in its favour is irresistibly con- 
 clusive. And probability on one side, we need not say, is 
 simply worthless against certainty on the other. 
 Dr. Bain proceeds : 
 
 Libertarians admit that to strengthen a good motive by 
 good education, inculcation, or other means, and obversely to 
 weaken some vicious motive, would have the very same effect 
 as the supposed outburst of the free and uncaused will. Why 
 not, therefore, be content with an assumption that is thoroughly 
 consistent with the whole of Nature's working, rather than 
 admit an exceptional principle that hardly admits of intelligible 
 wording? (p. 499). 
 
 We protest at starting against Dr. Bain using the terms 
 "free" and "uncaused" as synonymous; but on this we 
 are to speak in the second part of our paper. 
 
 Secondly, it is strange we should have to impress on 
 Dr. Bain that what he represents all Libertarians as 
 admitting is precisely what we emphatically and energetic- 
 ally deny. To " strengthen a motive," using the word 
 "motive" in Dr. Bain's sense, has an effect fundamentally 
 and most pointedly different from that produced by an 
 "outburst of Freewill." By "strengthening a good motive," 
 or, as we should express it, by intensifying the influence 
 of some healthy attraction, I change for the better my 
 will's preponderating spontaneous impulse ; but an " out- 
 burst " of freedom is characteristically manifested by 
 resistance to such impulse. 
 
 Thirdly, Dr. Bain asks w r hy we should not be "content " 
 with his "assumption." He speaks as though the con- 
 troversy between him and us were of no very serious and 
 vital matter ; whereas the ultimate question is nothing less 
 than this, whether there be or be not a Moral Governor of 
 the world. We should have thought antitheists were ut 
 one with Theists in distinctly recognizing that what is us 
 issue between the two parties is about the most inoim ntout 
 and awful alternative which can agitate the luuuuu juuul.
 
 302 The Philos^hy of Theism. 
 
 Dr. Bain continues : 
 
 The writer in the Dublin Review allows that " in proportion 
 as men have passed through the earlier part of their probation, 
 and established firm habits of virtue, in that proportion their 
 resistance to predominant temptation (but only within certain 
 limits *) may be predicted with much confidence." But if good 
 habits and good training do so much, how do we know that 
 they are not the sole and sufficient cause of moral goodness ? 
 And how can we find out where their influence ceases, and the 
 influence of an unpredictable volition begins? (p. 499). 
 
 Dr. Bain here expresses himself as though we considered 
 all free acts absolutely unpredictable ; whereas, in the very 
 paragraph which he quotes from us, we were arguing that 
 free acts are by no means entirely incapable of more or 
 less approximate prediction. Mr. Mill had argued that 
 human action is in greater degree predictable than it would 
 be if man possessed Freewill. We maintained against 
 him " that no power of foreseeing man's conduct can be 
 alleged as known by experience, which presents even the 
 superficial appearance of implying any greater certainty 
 and uniformity of human action than might have been 
 fully anticipated from our own doctrine." As part of 
 our argument for this thesis, we wrote the passage 
 which Dr. Bain quotes. " In many cases (such was our 
 remark) even that standing refutation of Determinism 
 a man's resistance to predominant temptation f may 
 be predicted with much confidence. Suppose A have 
 acquired a strong habit of resistance to evil impulses, and 
 
 * Dr. Bain italicizes these five words. 
 
 t In our essay on Mill's " Denial of Freewill," we explained what we meant 
 by the phrase "predominant temptation." "A person," we pointed out, "may 
 be said to be visited by 'temptation' whenever lie is solicited by any attraction 
 to forbidden pleasure ; even though that attraction bo more than counter- 
 balanced by other divergent ones. By using the term ' predominant ' 
 temptation, then, we refer to a case in which the attractions towards for- 
 bidden pleasure predominate over other co-existing attractions ; so that the 
 will's preponderating spontaneous impulse is iu a sinful direction."
 
 Fiwwitt. 363 
 
 suppose the predominant temptation which at any given 
 moment assails him be inconsiderable, the fact that he 
 resists predominant temptation at all is a conclusive proof 
 of his freedom ; but, nevertheless, if I know him intimately, 
 I can predict as a matter of extreme probability that he will 
 resist. Nevertheless my power of probable prediction does 
 not extend beyond certain limits." Let the predominant 
 temptation be, on another occasion, indefinitely stronger 
 I may be in the greatest doubt and anxiety as to how he 
 will comport himself under his probation. What can be 
 simpler and more intelligible than this ? 
 
 There is one little matter, however, here which still 
 requires explanation, though Dr. Bain has not referred 
 to it. In our article, we thus argued ; and we have 
 quoted the passage in a previous page. " What," we 
 asked, "can 'motives,' or 'circumstance,' or 'tempera- 
 ment,' or 'habit,' or 'custom,' imaginably do for me, 
 except to effect that my desire shall be this rather than 
 that ? How can they imaginably influence my action in 
 those cases where my action is contrary to my strongest 
 present desire ? " Yet in the passage cited by Dr. Bain we 
 have averred that habit can be of very important service, 
 not only as effecting that my present strongest desire shall 
 be this rather than that, but also, and even more impor- 
 tantly, in facilitating my resistance to my strongest present 
 desire. Are not these two statements, it may be asked, 
 mutually contradictory ? 
 
 The direct answer to this objection is extremely simple. 
 We placed the words "habit," "motives," and the rest 
 within inverted commas, to show that we were using them 
 in the sense given them by Determinists. Now, we ex- 
 plained, that Dr. Bain in his whole treatment of moral 
 habits and we suppose all other Determinists do thu 
 same entirely omits all reference to that most important 
 factor in the formation of a moral habit, the will's repeated
 
 304 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 anti-impulsive efforts. This is, so far, to his philosophical 
 credit, as he shows entire consistency in shutting his eyes 
 to that psychical fact men's repeated resistance to their 
 strong present desire on which we have throughout laid 
 such prominent stress. And we still entirely hold what we 
 set forth : we hold that "habit," as described by Dr. Bain, 
 cannot imaginably "do anything for me, except to effect 
 that my " strongest present " desire shall be this rather 
 than that." 
 
 It will be far more satisfactory, however, if we do not 
 content ourselves with this logically sufficient reply ; if we 
 add a few words on the relation which exists between moral 
 habit on the one side, and anti-impulsive effort on the other. 
 First, however, we would remind our readers that the fact 
 itself of men resisting their strongest present desire is, as 
 we have so often urged, by itself a standing demonstration 
 of Indeterminism. And we would especially insist on the 
 very obvious circumstance, that this demonstration is no 
 whit less irrefragable if only the fact of resistance be 
 admitted whatever the degree of facility with which, in 
 any given case, the resistance may be accomplished. The 
 essential doctrine of Determinism is, that men, by the very 
 constitution of their nature, inevitably obey their strongest 
 present desire. This allegation is conclusively refuted by 
 one single fact of resistance ; the question of greater or less 
 facility being simply irrelevant. 
 
 These remarks being premised, we are now to consider 
 the permanent effect produced on a man's mind, in the 
 way of habit, by a sufficient series of anti-impulsive 
 efforts. 
 
 It will be found, on consideration, we believe, that this 
 effect consists of two entirely different particulars. We 
 are not, of course, attempting to set forth in detail the full 
 theory of habits, but only saying so much as is required 
 for our immediate purpose. And we will take, by way of
 
 Freewill. 365 
 
 illustration, an instance to "which we have more than once 
 referred : the instance of some brave soldier receiving a 
 most bitter insult, and taking it patiently. In time past 
 he has received many such insults, greater or less as it 
 may be, and in every instance by a strong anti-impulsive 
 effort (united, doubtless, with earnest prayer but that is 
 not to our present purpose) has compelled himself to behave 
 Christianly under the temptation. One effect of these re- 
 peated acts will have been importantly to elevate what, on 
 any given occasion, is his will's preponderating spontaneous 
 impulse. There is many a little insult he now receives 
 which some years ago would have generated a spontaneous 
 predominant desire of retaliation, but which now engenders 
 no such predominant desire whatever : his will's strongest 
 present desire is to forgive the offender. Let us suppose, 
 however, that the insult is of a specially stinging character, 
 and that his will's preponderating spontaneous impulse is 
 in the evil direction. Here the second good result of his 
 previous anti-impulsive efforts comes into clear view and 
 into practical exercise. He finds it far easier now than he 
 did ten years ago, to " conquer nature " (as ascetical writers 
 say), and to resist his strongest present desire. Here, 
 then, are two quite different results effected in his mind 
 by his past anti-impulsive efforts. Firstly, his will's 
 spontaneous impulse on any given occasion is much more 
 in the direction of virtue than would otherwise have been 
 the case ; and, secondly, his resistance to a preponderating 
 spontaneous evil impulse (should such arise) is much 
 readier and easier than it would otherwise have been. 
 Dr. Bain, in his theory of moral habit, sees clearly enough 
 the first of these two results, but is entirely blind to the 
 second. 
 
 He next argues thus : 
 
 The existence of such an uncertain power [as Freewill] is 
 as likely to discourage as to encourage the understood means of
 
 3G6 TJie Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 virtuous training; unless wo suppose that the Freewill impulse 
 is a grant proportioned to the goodness of the previous training 
 (p. 499). 
 
 It is a continually increasing surprise how it can be 
 that a thinker of Dr. Bain's great ability and generally 
 keen psychological insight, so persistently fails in catching 
 even a glimpse of what his opponents mean. What Liber- 
 tarian ever called "the Freewill impulse" a "grant"? 
 According to Libertarians, it is precisely and critically the 
 contradictory of a " grant ; " being the agent's own self- 
 determined choice. God grants to men, no doubt, the 
 power of free choice ; but it is implied in the very idea of 
 that power that the choice itself is no grant from God 
 at all. 
 
 Next comes the argument, which Determinists are very 
 fond of adducing, that belief in Freewill "is as likely to 
 discourage as to encourage the understood means of virtuous 
 training." We replied to this argument in our first essay 
 on the subject. We set forth the immense value of virtuous 
 training and habits ; and we dwelt on these as one principal 
 cause of "the indubitable fact that very frequently the 
 spontaneous impulse of a devout Theist's will is one 
 of high virtue." We also drew attention to the "very 
 frequent phenomenon," " that a devout man -even when 
 his will's spontaneous impulse leads to a virtuous act 
 proceeds, nevertheless, by an effort to make his act more 
 virtuous (i.e. more efficaciously directed to the virtuous 
 end) than otherwise it would be." The advantage, then, 
 of virtuous training and habits is not less inestimably great 
 on the Libertarian than on the Deterministic hypothesis. 
 Who, indeed, in the whole world are more urgent than 
 Catholics in upholding the necessity of careful religious 
 education ? Yet who are more uncompromising advocates 
 of Freewill ? 
 
 We have now quoted textually every syllable in which
 
 Freewill 367 
 
 Dr. Bain directly replies to our essay. But a page follows, 
 occupied with miscellaneous denunciations of that doctrine 
 which is so distasteful to him. Freewill, if it existed, 
 would be a " mysterious uncertainty that baffles all pre- 
 diction " (p. 499) ; its acts would be a series of " caprices " 
 " that no man could predict, and, therefore, no man trust 
 to " (p. 500) ; it would be a power which may " forsake a 
 man in some critical moment when he most wants it ; " "a 
 power that comes from nothing, has no beginning, follows 
 no rule, respects no known time or occasion [!], operates 
 without impartiality " [! !] (Ibid.). In one word, this 
 alleged Freewill is " an influence that we can take no 
 account of, that we do not know how to conciliate or to 
 appease ; an inscrutable fate, realizing all the worst results 
 that have ever been attributed to the sternest deliverances 
 of the necessitarian and the fatalist " (Ibid). It seems 
 almost impossible to grapple with such wild statements as 
 these. According to Dr. Bain, when I say that within a 
 certain sphere I can act as I choose, this is equivalent to 
 saying that, within the said sphere, I am governed by an 
 " inscrutable fate " external to myself. In other words, to 
 say that I have full control over my actions is to say that 
 I have no control over them whatever. The " deliverances 
 of the necessitarian and the fatalist " he admits to be 
 " stern ; " but to say that I am neither fated nor neces- 
 sitated, he accounts still sterner. He has failed to explain, 
 however, what third alternative remains. 
 
 Perhaps it will be more satisfactory if we place the issue 
 before our readers in a concrete shape. And we begin with 
 a very obvious remark. The doctrine of Freewill, which 
 we are to discuss, must be the doctrine of Freewill, not 
 as travestied by its opponents, but as clothed in that 
 particular shape in which its advocates hold it. Dr. Bain, 
 we say, was bound to contemplate the doctrine, not from 
 his own religious or non-religious standpoint, but from the
 
 3(5S The Philosophy of TMsm. 
 
 standpoint of those who are zealous for its maintenance. 
 But who are these ? Indubitably they are the thinkers who 
 consider the one fundamental verity of man's life to be 
 God's moral government of the world ; who hold as the 
 one true principle of human action, that good acts meet 
 with divine reward, and evil acts with divine chastisement. 
 Such a man knows, let us say, that in a short time he will 
 be visited by some serious temptation, and is full of anxiety 
 as to the issue. Determinists tell him : " Whether you do 
 or do not resist this temptation, is an alternative no more 
 within your power than is the alternative whether to-morrow 
 w r ill be a fine day or rainy. The result depends exclusively 
 and infallibly on circumstances, external and internal, over 
 which you have no control whatever." He replies at once 
 that if this were the true law of human action, it would be 
 as unjust in the Creator to punish him for evil actions as 
 for evil dreams. Far different is the language of Liber- 
 tarians. " The whole issue," they tell him, " rests critically 
 and in the last resort simply with yourself. Begin at once 
 to pray God for strength ; impress carefully on your mind 
 the motives which will avail you in your trial ; work at 
 this day after day ; when the decisive moment comes, place 
 your trust in God, and put forth at the same time your 
 own hearty effort. Do all this, and success is absolutely 
 certain. Such preparatory exercises may be somewhat 
 irksome, and the crowning effort itself will, no doubt, be 
 in some sense distasteful; but God has given you the 
 pow r er, as experience will at once show you, to resist your 
 will's preponderating impulse, and to overcome all the 
 difficulties which lie in your path. Sursum corda." Here 
 is an intelligible and consoling doctrine, which every moral 
 agent can take and use to his unspeakable blessedness, and 
 which places God's moral governance before his eyes as a 
 living and satisfying reality. But Determinists, who follow 
 Dr. Bain's lead, tell him that such advice would make him
 
 Freeuill. 309 
 
 place his trust in " caprices of his will, which no man can 
 predict, and, therefore, no man can trust to ; " in an agency 
 " which may forsake him in some critical moment when he 
 most wants it ; " in " an influence that he can take no 
 account of, nor know how to conciliate or appease ; " in 
 " an inscrutable fate realizing all the worst results that 
 have ever been attributed to the sternest deliverances of 
 the necessitarian or the fatalist." Surely all this is more 
 like the invective of a rhetorician than the utterances of a 
 grave philosopher. 
 
 Here, then, having replied in detail to the whole of 
 Dr. Bain's reply, we close the first part of our paper. 
 
 CAUSATION AND FREEWILL. 
 
 In our reply to Dr. Bain's objections we have made 
 ourselves responsible, as we explained in a note, for the 
 full doctrine of Freewill. But our readers will remember 
 that in our positive exposition we have not advanced beyond 
 the psychological doctrine of " Indeterrninisrn." Deter- 
 minists allege, as an observed psychical fact, " that volitions 
 follow determinate moral antecedents with the same uni- 
 formity and the same certainty as physical effects follow 
 their physical causes ; " that the will's course of action is 
 infallibly and inevitably determined at every moment by 
 the circumstances (1) internal, (2) external, of that moment. 
 We have entirely denied this alleged psychical fact ; in 
 support of that denial we have appealed to a thousand 
 undeniable mental phenomena ; and by so doing have 
 established, we consider, the doctrine of Indeterminism. 
 This doctrine, however, is purely a negative one ; it is 
 simply the doctrine that the doctrine of Determinism is 
 false. Our next step must be, by introducing the meta- 
 physical principle of Causation, to develop the negative 
 psychological doctrine of Indeterminism into the positive 
 metaphysical doctrine of Freewill. It will not be requisite 
 
 VOL. i. 2 B
 
 370 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 to elaborate our present argument with any extraordinary 
 care, because all the essential part of our controversy with 
 the Determinists has now been brought to an end. There 
 never has been, and there never will be, a philosopher who, 
 on the one hand, admits the doctrine of Indeterminism, 
 and also that doctrine of Causation maintained by us in 
 our essay on that subject, who, on the other hand, would 
 hesitate for a moment to accept the entire doctrine of 
 Freewill. 
 
 It will be in many ways convenient, if we here re- 
 produce that portion of our then remarks, in our essay 
 on Causation, which has a more especial bearing on the 
 Freewill question. And, in particular, we must remind 
 our readers of the fundamentally different sense in which 
 the word " cause " is used by Phenomenists, who are 
 always Determinists, and by Intuitionists respectively. 
 This distinction requires especially to be borne in mind, 
 when we are engaged with our present theme. Deter- 
 minists uniformly allege that the doctrine of Freewill 
 represents certain voluntary actions as being external to 
 the sphere of " causation ; " whereas, in the Libertarian's 
 view, it is precisely free acts which testify the principle of 
 " causation " more prominently and emphatically than do 
 any other mental phenomena whatever. It is really 
 astounding this is not too strong a word to observe 
 how uniformly Determinists forget (what it is impossible 
 they should not know) that they use the word " causation " 
 in a sense fundamentally different from that given it by 
 the opposite school. 
 
 For instance : the Phenomenist and Intuitionist agree 
 in saying that the sun " causes " light and warmth.* But 
 
 * We do not forget the theory of that excellent philosopher, Dr. Mar- 
 tineau a theory hardly different from what ia called " occasionalism "- 
 that no substance can be a true "cause" unless it be intelligent. This 
 theory, however, is comparatively rare among Intuitionists, and it will be 
 more convenient to ignore it in our text There is no Theistic conclusion,
 
 Freewill. 871 
 
 by so speaking, the Phenomenist only means that that 
 phenomenon which is called the sun's presence is 
 "universally and unconditionally" (to use Mr. Mill's 
 phrase) followed by those two other groups of phenomena, 
 which are called the presence of light and of warmth. He 
 recognizes no kind of "influx" or "agency "in the sun, 
 as regards the production of light and warmth. He recog- 
 nizes no closer nexus between the sun and the sensation of 
 warmth than between the first letter of the alphabet and 
 the second ; or between the moment of time which we call 
 " eleven o'clock " and the moment of time which we call 
 " five minutes past eleven." In one word, by " causation " 
 he means no more than " uniform phenomenal sequence." 
 But, according to the Intuitionist's view, as exhibited by 
 us in our essay on Causation, the case is very different. 
 The idea of " cause " is as entirely distinct from that of 
 "phenomenal sequence," as any one idea in the whole 
 world is distinct from any other. That very notion of 
 " influx " or " agency," which a Phenomenist excludes from 
 the idea of " cause " is the precise notion which an 
 Intuitionist expresses by that term. Such was our state- 
 ment in the essay we refer to ; and we will here quote a 
 portion of what we then set forth : 
 
 " The idea ' cause,' " we said, " is a simple idea not 
 composed .of any others ; * and, on the other hand, it 
 is a purely intellectual idea, not a copy of any thing 
 experienced by the senses. Now, of course," we added, 
 " there is a certain difficulty in explaining an idea of this 
 
 we believe, which we purport to establish by our method, which Dr. Mar- 
 tineau could not equally establish by his. But it would be most incon- 
 veniently periphrastical if we laboured so to construct our language 
 throughout as to include his theory. And at last, for reasons given in our 
 essay on Causation, we must be permitted (in a spirit removed most widely 
 from any disrespect) to account that theory a mistaken one. 
 
 * We explained that by the word "cause" we throughout meant what 
 Catholic philosophers call "the efficient cause." Moreover, we exclude the 
 "moral cause," which they usually include under "the efficient,"
 
 372 Thf Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 kind. Were it a copy of some sensation, we could content 
 ourselves with referring to such sensation. Were it a 
 compound of simpler ideas, we could explain it by reciting 
 those simpler ideas. But neither of these methods being 
 (by hypothesis) available, we can only suggest the occasions 
 on which an inquirer may unmistakably recognize what 
 is undoubtedly a very prominent part of his mental 
 furniture. Now, the illustration commonly given by philo- 
 sophers of a ' cause ' seems to us most happily chosen ; as 
 the very one in which that idea is exhibited with especial 
 distinctness and prominence. We refer to the influx of 
 a man's volitions into his bodily acts. I am urgently in 
 need of some article contained in a closet of which I cannot 
 find the key, and accordingly I break open the closet with 
 my fist. Certainly my idea of the relation which exists 
 between my volition and my blow, is most absolutely 
 distinct from that of universal and unconditional sequence. 
 If, on the one hand, the idea of * cause ' is incapable of 
 being analyzed, on the other hand it is to the full as in- 
 capable of being explained away or misapprehended. The 
 idea is as characteristic and as clamorously distinguished 
 from every other, as is that of ' sweet,' or ' melodious,' or 
 ' white.' Phenomenists may deny that it corresponds with 
 any objective reality ; but they cannot deny that it is in 
 fact conceived by the human mind, without exposing them- 
 selves to the intellectual contempt of every one who pos- 
 sesses the most ordinary intelligence and introspective 
 faculty." Then, so much being understood as to the 
 meaning of this word " cause," Intuitionists maintain that 
 this indubitably existing idea does correspond with an 
 objective reality. And when, therefore, they say that the 
 sun " causes " light and warmth, they mean, not that that 
 phenomenon which is called the sun's presence is uniformly 
 and unconditionally followed by those other groups of 
 phenomena which are called the presence of light and
 
 Freewill. 373 
 
 warmth, but that that substance, which is called the sun, 
 exercises a power, which they call the " causal" power, of 
 diffusing light and warmth. 
 
 It is implied, we may add, in their whole notion of a 
 "cause," that a cause must be one or other substance. When 
 they mention the influx of my volition into some blow 
 which I deal forth, they would thus explain their meaning 
 in detail. The blow is nothing else than a certain move- 
 ment of my closed hand. The cause of that movement is 
 my soul ; which addresses, if we may so speak, to my hand 
 that command, which is called a "volition." 
 
 It seems to us accordingly of great importance that, in 
 all philosophical discussion, an Intuitionist shall abstain 
 with great care from using this word "causation" in the 
 sense which Phenomenists give to it. Yet what they call 
 " causation " is so extremely important a fact, and so con- 
 stantly requires the philosopher's notice, that some ex- 
 pression for it is a kind of necessity. Accordingly we took 
 the liberty of coining a terminology for the purpose. 
 Throughout what remains, therefore, of our series, we 
 shall use the word "prevenant," to express what Pheno- 
 menists call a " cause ; " " postvenant," to express what 
 they call an "effect;" "prevenance," to express what 
 they call " causation." 
 
 It will be understood, then, at once, that what they call 
 "the law of causation," and we call "the law of pre- 
 venance," is simply the well-known law of uniform pheno- 
 menal sequence. It is no difficult matter to understand 
 what is meant by that law ; and we have nowhere seen it 
 more clearly set forth than in some sentences of Mr. Mill's, 
 which we quoted in our essay. As we pointed out, how- 
 ever, in the same essay, even in regard to the cjcistt-nce 
 of this law, there is a very important difference between 
 Phenomenists and Intuitionists. The former consider it 
 absolutely universal ; whereas Intuitionists regard it as
 
 374 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 generally holding, indeed, but nevertheless as subject to 
 two important exceptions. " In the first place, they hold 
 that this uniformity of nature is interrupted with indefi- 
 nite frequency by miracles and other prodigies. And in 
 the second place, they maintain," as we have been main- 
 taining in our present paper, "that one most important 
 class of psychical phenomena viz. human volitions are 
 largely external to the common law of uniformity." 
 
 Having made clear, then, what we meant by " cause," 
 we proceeded to take a further step. We proceeded to set 
 forth what appear to us conclusive psychological grounds 
 for holding, as a self-evident truth, as a philosophical 
 axiom, that " whatever has a commencement has a cause." 
 This we called the " doctrine " or " principle " of " causa- 
 tion " or " causality." And when we speak of psychology 
 as establishing a metaphysical truth, there is, of course, 
 one fundamental premiss on which we build our argument. 
 This premiss is the doctrine which we call " the principle 
 of certitude," and which we have maintained to be the first 
 principle of all possible knowledge. It is the doctrine, that 
 whatever a man's existent cognitive faculties, if rightly 
 interrogated and interpreted, avouch as certain, is thereby 
 known to him as certain. 
 
 It will conduce to a clear apprehension of our future 
 argument if, before proceeding further, we compare in 
 detail those two theories regarding the phenomenal world 
 which are advocated by the Intuitionist and the Pheno- 
 menist respectively. In what immediately follows, there- 
 fore, we are not professing to adduce any argument whatever ; 
 we are merely exhibiting the two antagonistic views, for the 
 purpose of more distinct apprehension. And firstly, to 
 repeat a previous remark, in regard to one particular class 
 of mental phenomena viz. deliberate acts of human 
 will the Intuitionist excepts them, whereas the Pheno- 
 menist does not except them, from the otherwise prevailing
 
 Freewill. 375 
 
 law of uniform sequence. Putting these, however, on one 
 side, the Intuitionist and Phenomenist alike hold that 
 phenomena, both physical and psychical, ordinarily proceed 
 according to the law of prevenance. The Phenomenist, 
 however, considers that this is an ultimate fact, proved by 
 experience, and in no other way ; though we have more 
 than once called on him to adduce, if he can, any even 
 plausible reason for his affirmation that experience, taken 
 by itself, would warrant any such conclusion.* The 
 Intuitionist takes up entirely different ground. He holds 
 that " prevenance " is the result of " causation." Accord- 
 ing, to him, e.g., those groups of phenomena which are 
 called the presence of light and warmth, follow ordinarily 
 on that phenomenon which is called the sun's presence, 
 simply because that substance which is called the sun has 
 the causative power of diffusing light and warmth. And 
 so in every other instance of prevenance. Then this differ- 
 ence of view leads to another, which we should not fail to 
 point out. The Phenomenist and Intuitionist agree, we 
 have said, in holding, that phenomena ordinarily proceed 
 according to the law of prevenance. But Intuitionists have 
 no philosophical difficulty whatever in admitting those 
 exceptions to prevenance which are called miracles ; whereas 
 the Phenomenist, if he would be consistent, must resolutely 
 deny the fact of their existence. Let us assume, e.g., it 
 were alleged on grounds of human testimony, that on one 
 most solemn occasion, the sun, being present, failed to 
 diffuse light. The historical proof of such a statement, for 
 anything we here say, may or may not be satisfactory. 
 But as a matter of philosophy, the Intuitionist sees in it no 
 
 * Our own humble opinion is, that the law of prevenance cannot be 
 established as certain by appealing exclusively to facts of experience ; and 
 that neither can it be established as certain by appealing exclusively to 
 tlie principle of causation : but that it can be established with certainty by 
 api>ealing to Imth those sources of knowledge in mutual combination. This 
 thesig, however, requires to be worked out with great care, and it is entirely 
 external to the course of our own argument.
 
 oTG The Philosophy of Tltclam. 
 
 difticulty whatever. In such a case, he would say, the 
 sun's effect does not come into actual existence because of 
 a counteracting effect which is at the same moment pro- 
 duced by the immediate causative act of God. But the 
 Phenomenist is compelled by his philosophical theory, if 
 he be consistent, to be proof against any amount of testi- 
 mony which may be adduced for such a miraculous fact. 
 In his view, the one sole foundation of human knowledge 
 is men's undeviating experience of phenomenal uniformity. 
 To admit, therefore, that in any one case still more, that 
 in a series of cases there has been an experienced inter- 
 ruption of that uniformity, would be to overthrow his whole 
 structure of knowledge from its very foundation. 
 
 In the view of an Intuitionist, then, there are three 
 different classes of phenomena, for which the philosopher 
 is required to assign a proximate cause.* First, we will 
 mention those phenomena which he calls free acts of the 
 will ; and to what proximate cause he refers them, is the 
 very inquiry which we are immediately to institute. 
 Secondly, we may name those phenomena which he 
 accounts miraculous ; and the proximate cause of these, in 
 his view, is the First Cause, God. Lastly, we will consider 
 that enormously large series of phenomena, physical and 
 psychical, which proceed according to the law of preve- 
 nance. As to physical phenomena we are distinguish- 
 ing these for the moment from psychical their proximate 
 causes are those innumerable physical substances which 
 exist in the universe, each possessing its own permanent 
 properties and forces. It is these substances which, in 
 accordance with their action and interaction, causatively 
 produce those physical phenomena which surround men on 
 all sides, and which proceed according to the law of preve- 
 
 * By a " proximate " cause, we need hardly say, we mean " a substance 
 which produces the effect, without intervention of any other substance." 
 If I am stabbed, the proximate cause of my wound is not the aggressor's 
 hand, but his dagger.
 
 Freewill. 377 
 
 nance. But now as regards those psychical phenomena, 
 which proceed in the soul of any given man according to the 
 law of prevenance. Of these there may be in any given 
 man either one proximate cause, or two, but never more. 
 One proximate cause is his soul, possessing its own forces, 
 properties, acquired habits. In many instances, however, 
 whether or no in all, another proximate cause co-operates 
 viz. his body. For his body, in many instances, at least, by 
 its own properties, powerfully conduces to psychical results. 
 
 Here, then, we close our exposition, and resume our 
 thread of argument. Let us recount in inverse order the 
 three statements we have just made, and see how far we 
 have hitherto adduced sufficient proof of their truth. 
 Firstly, then, as regards those physical and psychical 
 phenomena which proceed according to the law of preve- 
 nance, we consider that the statement which we have just 
 made has been conclusively established in our essay on 
 Causation. Secondly, as regards those phenomena which 
 the Intuitionist accounts miraculous, we consider that our 
 statement as yet is entirely unproved. At the present 
 stage of our argument, we have no right whatever to 
 assume that God exists, still less that He works miracles. 
 And now, thirdly, as regards those phenomena of the 
 human will which we have already shown to be outside the 
 law of prevenance, we will proceed without further delay 
 to inquire what is their proximate cause. We begin with a 
 preliminary remark. 
 
 From the doctrine of causation already laid down, a 
 further conclusion at once results. The sun, we have said, 
 is a proximate cause of light and warmth. But the sun 
 itself had a commencement, and therefore must have a 
 cause. The sun is a cause indeed, but a caused cause an 
 " intermediate " cause. Our present purpose, however, is 
 not to insist at length on this truth, because the more 
 appropriate place for insisting on it will be at that portion
 
 378 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 of our series in which we hope hereafter to exhibit the well- 
 known argument for a First Cause. What we here wish to 
 point out, is an extremely important distinction which may 
 imaginably exist between one and another class of these 
 intermediate causes. In regard to those phenomena which 
 proceed according to the law of prevenance, it is manifest 
 that their proximate causes are determined, in any given 
 instance, by strictest necessity to one fixed and definite 
 result. Every such proximate cause has its proper effect 
 marked out for it, and must produce that proper effect 
 neither more nor less. The sun, e.g., must cause at any 
 moment that precise amount of light and warmth, neither 
 exceeding nor falling short, which is determined according 
 to the law of prevenance. If two or more proximate causes 
 are at work together, the effect of one will no doubt be 
 often modified by the effect of the other ; but this fact is of 
 course in no way inconsistent with that we have just said. 
 Nor would our remark be less indubitable, though at such 
 moment some preternatural intervention were effected with 
 the course of phenomena. Even on such a supposition, 
 the cause itself, as we have already said, would none the 
 less exercise activity towards its proper effect ; though that 
 effect might be prevented from coming into actual existence, 
 because of a counteracting effect simultaneously produced 
 by some preternatural cause. In all such cases, then, we 
 say, the proximate cause has its own proper effect marked 
 out for it by strictest and most absolute necessity. Let us 
 call such causes " blind " causes.* So the sun, the earth, 
 that stone, this knife, the pen I hold, is a " blind" cause of 
 its appropriate effects. 
 
 * The distinction in the text is substantially equivalent to the distinc- 
 tion made by Catholic philosophers between a " necessary " and a " free " 
 cause. But it appeared more appropriate not to use the Litter phrase, until 
 the doctrine of Freedom should be established. 
 
 We shall make no further reference in our text to cases of preternatural 
 intervention. They do not, as has been seen, at all affect our argument; 
 and we have sufficiently shown that we do not forget their possibility.
 
 Freewill. 379 
 
 Turning from physical to psychical phenomena the 
 same doctrine holds. Let us consider those various 
 psychical phenomena of mine, which proceed according to 
 the law of prevenance. In the case of all these phenomena, 
 it is involved, by hypothesis, in the very constitution of 
 my nature, that, given certain psychical and corporeal 
 antecedents, one definite group of psychical consequents 
 infallibly and inevitably follows. My soul and body then, 
 in jointly producing this phenomenal group, have their 
 proper agency marked out for them by strictest and most 
 absolute necessity: they are causes indeed, but "blind" 
 causes. If it be not too grotesque an illustration, consider 
 what happens when water is boiled in a kettle. The water 
 possesses certain forces and properties of its own ; the fire 
 possesses certain forces and properties of its own ; and 
 when the two substances are brought into due proximity, 
 they produce by their joint causative agency that pheno- 
 menon of the former which is called " boiling." Apply the 
 analogy to any one of my psychical phenomena, which pro- 
 ceeds according to the law of prevenance. My soul 
 possesses certain forces and properties ; my body possesses 
 certain forces and properties ; and on the occurrence of 
 certain given circumstances, on a certain given occasion, 
 the two substances produce, by their joint causative agency, 
 that phenomenon of the former which is called, e.g., an 
 " emotion." 
 
 So much, then, on " blind causes." But now we can, at 
 all events, easily imagine that there may be what we will 
 call an " originative " intermediate cause. We can easily 
 imagine that some substance shall not be determined by 
 its superior cause with strict and inevitable necessity to 
 one fixed effect ; but, on the contrary, shall be permitted a 
 certain latitude of choice. Nor, again, have we any diffi- 
 culty in imagining that the very same substance may 
 be necessitated to act as a " blind " cause in regard to one
 
 380 Tlte Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 class of its effects, while nevertheless it can act as an 
 " originative " cause in regard to another class. It is 
 involved, of course, in the whole supposition that the 
 substance, which acts as an originative cause, must be an 
 intelligent substance, such as is the human soul. More- 
 over, whereas we have said that our supposition is an easily 
 imaginable one, we are not aware of any philosopher who 
 has attempted to show that it is one intrinsically im- 
 possible. 
 
 Our readers will, by this time, have anticipated the 
 course which our remarks are to pursue. Let us take the 
 particular case to which we have so often referred. I have 
 just received some stinging insult, and I am at this 
 moment conscious of two entirely different psychical pheno- 
 mena, which irresistibly force themselves on my attention. 
 One of these is my preponderating spontaneous impulse ; 
 which powerfully prompts me to plans of retaliation. The 
 other phenomenon is my firm and unfaltering resistance to 
 that impulse. The two phenomena continue in mutual 
 company for a considerable period, and we are now to 
 consider the proximate cause of each. Now, as to the 
 former, we are in one most important respect altogether 
 accordant with the Determinists. We hold, as they do, 
 that by the very constitution of my nature, my preponde- 
 rating spontaneous impulse follows, by infallible and 
 inevitable consequence, from antecedent phenomena ; that 
 it is most strictly determined by the law of prevenance. It 
 results, therefore, from our principles, that the proximate 
 causes of this preponderating spontaneous impulse viz. 
 my soul and my body are here acting as "blind" 
 causes. 
 
 But, now, as to the accompanying phenomenon, my 
 resistance to this impulse : what is its proximate cause ? 
 Its proximate cause is manifestly my soul.* But, in this 
 
 * For we heartily follow Mr. Lucas (the Month, February, 1878, p. ^44)
 
 Freewill. 381 
 
 case, does my soul act as a " blind " cause ? Most certainly 
 not. A blind cause is necessitated to act according to the 
 law of phenomenal prevenance ; whereas we trust we have 
 abundantly shown, both in our previous essays on the 
 subject and in the earlier part of our present paper, that 
 the law of prevenance issues in my preponderating spon- 
 taneous impulse, and by no means in my active resistance 
 to that impulse. My soul, then, in producing a psychical 
 phenomenon of this latter kind, acts as an " originative " 
 cause : it acts in virtue of a power (which it is thereby 
 shown, within certain limits, to possess) of choosing an 
 alternative. As a blind cause, it is co-operating with my 
 body in producing its own preponderating spontaneous 
 impulse ; and, at the same moment, as an originative 
 cause, it is effecting its own free resistance to that impulse. 
 
 And here we would earnestly press on our reader's notice 
 a fact of extreme importance which, we are confident, will 
 be admitted as certain by every one who fairly examines 
 what takes place in his own mind. Consider those various 
 periods of time during which I am occupied in vigorously 
 resisting certain solicitations e.g., to revengefulness 
 which intensely beset me. It is a matter of direct, un- 
 mistakable, clamorous consciousness that, during those 
 periods, it is my own soul and no external agency which 
 is putting forth active and sustained anti-impulsive effort. 
 Nor, indeed, is this remark less applicable to all cases of 
 anti-impulsive effort ; though, of course, where the effort 
 is less vigorous, the consciousness of w ? hat we speak is less 
 obtrusive. 
 
 But more than this may be said. The experience 
 which I obtain even in one such protracted and vehement 
 struggle is amply sufficient to give me an intimate nr.d 
 infallible knowledge of one all-important fact. We refer 
 
 in holding that "no one in these days need concern himself to maintain, in 
 scholastic language, a real distinction between the soul and itw faculties."
 
 3*'2 Tie Philosophy of Theixm. 
 
 to the fact, that at every moment of the struggle it has 
 depended on my own free choice with what degree of 
 efficacity I have contended against the temptation. We 
 shall have to pursue this subject in some detail on a future 
 occasion.* 
 
 In the ahove view of originative causation we have not 
 spoken of my body as co-operating with my soul, because, 
 as we have already pointed out, an originative cause must 
 necessarily be an intelligent substance. Nor have we 
 hesitated, at last, to use the word " free," because, as 
 we shall immediately point out, the notion of freedom is 
 included in the notion of an originative cause. 
 
 Many Libertarians, when explaining Freewill, are in 
 the habit of introducing reference to the human personality ; 
 to the " Ego." We do not find this necessary ; and if it 
 be not necessary, we think it very undesirable. Those 
 questions which concern the " Ego " are so intricate, and, 
 we may add, so intimately mixed up with theological 
 dogma, that their treatment requires most anxious care. 
 Nor can we see that the true doctrine of human personality, 
 whatever it may be, has any special relevance to the exposi- 
 tion with which we are here engaged. Without further 
 reference, therefore, to the " Ego," we now proceed with 
 that exposition. 
 
 To sum up matters, then, as far as we have gone, 
 assuming for a moment the truth of Theism. If we con- 
 template that vast assemblage of substances and phenomena 
 in the universe which are known to man by experience 
 and reason bound together as they are in a chain of 
 
 * We abstain from saying, with some Libertarians, that the free agent 
 is at every moment directly and immediately conscious of his freedom ; 
 because it seems to us unintelligible how the direct and immediate con- 
 sciousness of one given moment can testify an abiding power. Our own 
 way of speaking would be that I have an unremitting and most intimate 
 knowledge of my own freedom, founded on my intimate familiarity with my 
 own repeated mental acts. As far as we can see, however, the question 
 between these Libertarians and ourselves is purely a verbal one.
 
 Freeivill. 383 
 
 interacting causation we may observe this circumstance. 
 There are two kinds of substances * and neither experience 
 nor reason testifies more than two which act as originative 
 causes : these two are (1) God, and (2) the souls of men. 
 The First Cause, God, is, we need not say, originative of 
 everything. He created that vast number of physical sub- 
 stances which first existed in the universe, endowing each 
 with its own forces and attributes, and enabling them to 
 coalesce into fresh substances. He conserves the agency 
 of substances, as of so many blind causes ; and, through 
 that agency, He preserves the enormous multitude of 
 physical phenomena which succeed each other regularly 
 and harmoniously, according to the law of prevenance. f 
 He created the human body and conserves its agency, with 
 its own appropriate efficacy as a blind cause towards the 
 production, not of physical only, but also of psychical 
 phenomena. He created the human soul, uniting it mys- 
 teriously with the human body, endowing it also with 
 diversified efficacy as a blind cause, and conserving it in 
 the exercise of that efficacy. And by these two combined 
 agencies He originated that large number of psychical 
 phenomena which, no less than physical, move forward 
 regularly and harmoniously, according to the law of pre- 
 venance. But over and above all this, He endowed the 
 human soul with the unspeakably important and charac- 
 
 * We feel the extreme awkwardness of this expression, but cannot think 
 of a better. 
 
 t We must not be understood to imply by this phrase that, having 
 created substances each possessing its own forces and attributes, God leaves 
 them to themselves, with only the co-operation of His general concursus, 
 in their generation of corresponding phenomena. In our essay on " Science, 
 Prayer, Freewill, and Miracles," we earnestly deny this; and we ba>e 
 on our denial a defence of the Christian's prayer for temporal (not to sny 
 spiritualj blessings. Certainly (as we argue at length in that essay) there 
 is no vestige of inconsistency in saying that even while phenomena inovo 
 strictly and rigorously on the law of prevenance God, nevertheless, is 
 actively working at every moment behind the veil, and stimulating their 
 course in this or that direction.
 
 SS4 The Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 teristic power of originative causation. This power enables 
 me, within certain limits, at my own pleasure and choice, 
 to break off from the chain of prevenance ; nay, to act, in 
 a certain true sense, independently of God. It is involved, 
 we say, in this doctrine of Freewill which we maintain, 
 that God has, to a certain extent, abdicated the control- 
 ment of my acts, and left them to my own independent 
 choice.* 
 
 Here we give up our momentary assumption of Theism, 
 and proceed at once to the last stage of our argument. 
 At this point we introduce, more prominently and directly 
 than hitherto, the term " Freewill ; " and we thus define 
 that term in connection with our preceding remarks. At 
 whatever moment and within whatever sphere my soul has 
 the proximate power of acting as an originative cause 
 whether it exercise that power or no at that moment and 
 within that sphere my " will " is said to be " free." And 
 it remains to show that this definition is precisely equivalent 
 to that which is more commonly given than any other by 
 Catholic philosophers. We do not mean that Catholics 
 are bound to this latter definition ; for the Church allows 
 considerable latitude of opinion on the matter. At the 
 same time, she fully permits her children to hold what 
 for ourselves we do hold that no view of Freewill is 
 altogether satisfactory to the intellect, except that taken by 
 the great Jesuit theologians ; and we think that their view 
 is becoming every day the more commonly accepted one 
 among Catholics. It is nsualty expressed thus : " Potentia 
 libera est ea quce, positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum, 
 potest agere et non agere." There is a certain awkward - 
 
 * We may at this point assure our theological readers, how very far we 
 are from forgetting the vast and inestimable influence for good exercised by 
 God over man's Freewill. We have elsewhere ventured to express, ns the 
 bias of our own judgment, that " those exercises of Freewill on which the 
 salvation of any given person substantially and predominantly depends, are 
 those whereby he prays to God for infallible grace."
 
 Freewill. 385 
 
 ness, indeed, in this exact form of the definition, because 
 some given "power" may possibly be "free " in some acts, 
 and yet not in all. F. Palmeri, accordingly, words it some- 
 what differently : " Libertas est ea indifferentia activa 
 agentis, qua, positis omnibus ad agendum requisitis, potest 
 agere et non agere : " and it is in this form that we prefer 
 it. To appreciate its bearing, whether in one form or the 
 other, let us consider any given moment of human action. 
 My soul possesses certain qualities, intrinsic and inherent ; 
 certain faculties, tendencies, habits, and the like ; and it is 
 solicited by various attractions, having respectively their 
 own special intensity, direction, and adaptation to my 
 temperament. In order that my soul may act, nothing 
 more is necessary than that which now exists : " Posita 
 sunt omnia requisita ad agendum." * My will cannot be 
 free, say these theologians, unless at this very moment my 
 soul has a real power, at least, of either doing this given 
 act or not doing it. They consider, of course, that in a 
 vast majority of cases it has more power than this ; it has 
 the power of acting with greater or less efficiency in this or 
 that direction. But unless it have, at least, so much power 
 as above described, my will is not free at all. And we 
 should add two very obvious explanations. Firstly, when 
 the will is said to act, this is a mere figure of speech ; for it 
 is the soul which acts.f Secondly, when the soul is said 
 to "act, "the immediate reference is to its own internal 
 action ; whether or no that internal action be the resolving 
 on, nay, the immediately commanding of, some external 
 act. 
 
 * The Theist indeed holds that (iod's coiicursus is also necessary ; but 
 then he further holds that it is always given. 
 
 t Unless, indeed, a real distinction be supposed between the soul and 
 its powers. We have already quoted, however, with assent Mr. Lucas's 
 repudiation of such a doctrine. It is one for which much might be said 
 if it were permissible, on matters of pure philosophy, to go by authority, 
 but for which we have never seen any argument that appears to us of 
 weight. 
 
 VOL. I. - <-'
 
 386 Tfte Philosophy of TfteUin. 
 
 Such, then, being the more recognized Catholic defini- 
 tion of Freewill, we are now to show that this definition 
 is precisely equivalent to that which we just now gave in 
 our own language, and in accordance with our earlier 
 remarks. And one or two homely illustrations will make 
 this abundantly clear. 
 
 I am walking, for health's sake, in my grounds on a 
 bitterly cold day. My strongest present desire is to be back 
 comfortably in the warm house ; but I persistently refuse 
 to gratify that desire, remembering the great importance 
 of a good walk, not only for my general health, but for my 
 evening's comfort and my night's sleep. Plainly, according 
 to the Jesuit definition, my will acts with perfect freedom. 
 My present action is resistance to my strongest present 
 desire ; and I have full proximate power to abstain, if I 
 choose, from the continuance of this action by resolving to 
 go indoors. But no less plainly this act is free, according 
 to that definition of Freewill which we onrsclces set forth. 
 My soul and body, co-operating as blind causes, generate 
 my preponderating spontaneous impulse towards going 
 indoors ; while my soul, acting as an originative cause, 
 generates my continued resistance to that preponderating 
 spontaneous impulse. 
 
 Conversely. I am sitting over the fire, with a novel in 
 my hand ; and my strongest present desire is to continue 
 in my present position. I remember, indeed, that nothing 
 in a small way can well be worse for me, and that I shall 
 pay dearly for my self-indulgence. " Video meliora pro- 
 boque : deteriora sequor," and I stay just as I am. Here, 
 again, according to the Jesuit definition, I am undeniably 
 free ; for I am entirely able, without any further " requisita 
 ad agendum," either to continue my self-indulgent action 
 or to abstain from it. And here, again, my freedom is 
 equally manifest, according to our own definition of free- 
 dom. True, indeed, my soul is not at this moment acting
 
 Freewill. 387 
 
 as an originative cause ; but it has the proximate power of 
 so acting if it pleases.* 
 
 At last, indeed, the fact before us is perhaps too obvious 
 to need illustration. It is most plain on the very surface, 
 that whenever and within whatever sphere I have the 
 proximate power to do or not to do this action, at that time 
 and within that sphere my soul has the proximate power to 
 act, if it so choose, as an originative cause. And if this be 
 so, the two definitions of Freewill are of course mutually 
 equivalent. But the sense of the term being thus under- 
 stood, there is absolutely nothing which we need add to our 
 preceding remarks, in order to show that men do possess 
 that power called Freewill, and by no means unfrequently 
 are able to exercise it. Moreover, what we have now said 
 is abundantly sufficient, as will be shown in subsequent 
 essays, for the direct purpose we have in view : it is an 
 exposition of Freewill abundantly sufficient as a premiss 
 for the establishment of Theism. At the same time, we are 
 here brought into the close presence of a question which 
 in other ways is of the gravest importance, both speculative 
 and practical. During how many moments of the day, in 
 what acts, under what conditions, am I free ? Some Liber- 
 tarians, e.g., have implied, or even expressed, a proposition 
 of this kind: "My will is not at this moment free," they 
 say, or seem to say, "unless I am at this moment placing 
 before myself the alternative, ' shall I now do this act or not 
 do it ? ' Otherwise," so they proceed, " how can it be true 
 that I have the proximate power to abstain from it ? How 
 can it be said that I have the proximate power of abstaining 
 from an act, when the very thought of abstaining from it 
 does not occur to me ? " This position seems to us, as we 
 
 * In this particular case, indeed, it may perhaps be said really to art as 
 an originative cause, aa originating the act " I don't choose just now to resist 
 my strongest present desire 1 ." For reasons, however, which will appear 
 hereafter, we prefer our definition as it stands.
 
 388 Tic Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 have said, so pregnant with momentous results, whether 
 for good or evil, that we think it deserved much more 
 sustained and systematic notice than it has commonly 
 received. We will give two different illustrations of what 
 seems to us undeniably involved in it. 
 
 Firstly, take the case of a holy man occupied in medita- 
 tion and prayer. At first he places before himself the 
 alternative, "Shall I do this or not do it?" But as he 
 proceeds in his hoi} 7 task, he is too much immersed in the 
 thought of God to think at all about himself. He dwells, e.g., 
 on the mysteries of Christ ; he makes corresponding acts of 
 faith, hope, and love ; he prays for the Church ; he prays 
 for his enemies ; he prays for the various pious ends which 
 he has at heart ; and his thoughts are entirely filled with 
 such holy contemplations. It seems not less than grotesque 
 to suppose that all this time he has been asking himself the 
 question, " Shall I go on with these prayers of mine or 
 shall I leave them off ? " And yet, according to what seems 
 the obvious meaning of that position which we criticize, as 
 soon as ever he ceases to ask himself this question, his 
 moral freedom comes temporarily to an end. From that 
 moment his prayers are no more free and therefore no 
 more formally good and no more meritorious than if lie 
 were in bed and asleep. 
 
 A picture on the opposite side. In my evening examen, 
 I observe clearly that, during a long conversation which I 
 have had with a friend, I have been largely animated by 
 vainglory, and I ask forgiveness of my sin accordingly. 
 Yet at the time when I was occupied in that conversation, 
 I had no suspicion whatever of the motive which was in 
 fact at work. It would seem to follow, from the doctrine we 
 criticize, that the acts of vainglory, not having been free, 
 had not been culpable ; and that to repent of them was as 
 absurd on my part as it would be to repent of a bad dream.
 
 Freewill. 389 
 
 For, plainly, since I did not know that these acts of vain- 
 glory existed, still less did I ask myself the question 
 whether I should continue them or no. In fact, as far as 
 we can see, the doctrine before us would deny the possibility 
 of there being such offences as secret sins at all ; for if I do 
 not know of the sinful acts, how, on this view, can I be held 
 responsible for their commission ? Yet Abbe Gay, in that 
 ascetical work of his which has obtained so unusually wide 
 authorization and approval (see the Dublin Review for July, 
 1878, p. 229), gives a very different account of this matter ; 
 and here surely he represents all ascetical writers without 
 exception. He commemorates that " unhappy legion of 
 sins, unknown and concealed from ourselves, from which 
 David besought God to purify his soul." " Ab occultis 
 meis munda me." How can I be purified from offences, 
 which, being inculpable, have carried with them no defile- 
 ment ? 
 
 We suppose that, with most of our readers, such in- 
 ferences as these will be reductiones ad absurdum of the 
 premiss from which they result. Yet it requires great care 
 to draw out accurately such principles on Freewill as 
 may sufficiently guard against conclusions so intolerable. 
 This necessary inquiry, moreover, is so intimately connected 
 with many remarks which we have made in this or preced- 
 ing essays, and is indeed so necessary as a supplement of 
 those remarks, that we are very unwilling to omit it. The 
 next subject, indeed, which is to occupy us the " Reason- 
 able Basis of Morality " will itself supply more than one 
 premiss, which will be of great importance in such a dis- 
 cussion. What we hope, then, to do, is this : After having 
 concluded our treatment of this last-named theme, we 
 purpose to suspend for a moment the direct course of our 
 series, and insert an intercalary essay, addressed to 
 Catholics, in order that we may handle this domestic quc'S-
 
 390 Tfie Philosophy of Theism. 
 
 tion with the carefulness due to its critical importance. 
 We are particularly desirous of submitting our views on 
 this matter to the judgment of Catholic thinkers.* 
 
 * The essay here referred to is the essay on tho " Extent of Freewill," 
 the last in the second volume of this collection. En. 
 
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