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 A N T I E N T 
 
 METAPHYSICS^ 
 
 OR, THE 
 
 SCIENCE OF UNIVERSAL Se 
 
 W I T H A N 
 
 APPENDIX, 
 
 CONTAINING 
 
 AN EXAMINATION OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 OF SIR ISAAC NEWTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 VOLUME FIRST. 
 
 Magni eft ingenli revocare Mentem a Senfibus, et Cogitatloncm a Confuetudinc 
 abducere. Cicer. Tu/culan, ^tae/i. Lib. i. Cap. \6. 
 
 EDINBURGH: 
 
 PRINTED FOR T, CADELL, LONDON J AND J. BALFOUR AND CO, EDINBURGPI. 
 
 MjDCCjLXXIX,
 
 HI 
 
 C O N T E N 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 X P L A I N I N G the Nature of the Science of Metaphyfics, 
 
 and containing Definitions and Obfervations neceffary for what 
 follows. 
 
 E 
 
 C H A P. I. 
 
 Of the Subjeft of Metaphyjtcs — All Things in Nature either Body or Mind — Subject of 
 Phyftcs is Body joined with Mind — Subject of Metaphyfics is Mind by itfelf Page i 
 
 C H A P. IL 
 
 Definition of Body and Mind — Definitions of Body given by Modern Philofophers not 
 proper — Definitions here given agree with thofe given by Plato and Ariftotle — Ob- 
 jeftions to thefe Definitions anfwered— Impropriety of the Englifh Language with 
 refpedl to the Ufe of the word Move — Inconfiftence of Mr Locke on the Subjed of 
 ik/?Wand Body - p. 6 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 0{ Motion — ^Things preparatory to the Definition of Motion — Two Definitions of it 
 given by Ariftotle — One of them better than the other — Not defined by Modern 
 Philofophers — nor by Plato — Ariftotle's Divifion of Motion — Plato's Divifion dif- 
 ferent—Compared with that of Ariftotle's, both as to Matter and Style p. 13 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Univer/als conne£led with Motion— -Habit — Power of two kinds, viz. Capability — and 
 Faculty — Energy^ likewife of two kinds — different from Action — A^iion and PaJJion 
 reciprocal — The two great Principles of Nature are One Things that is always ac- 
 tive, and another, that is always pa/Jive — Change a very general Idea — more general 
 than Motion — Different Kinds of Change — All Change produced by fome Caufe — 
 
 a 2 Dif-
 
 iv CONTENTS. 
 
 Different kinds o( Caufes — The Do^lrlne of Caufes a great Difcovery of Arlftotle — Of 
 Being, and the /Occidents of Being Page 26 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Mind, the chief Subject of Metaphyfics, but not the on]y—Bei)jgj and its general At- 
 tributes, the Subjedl of Metaphyfics — The Vniverfe alfo, and the firft Caufes and 
 Principles of Things — Full Definition of Metaphyfics — The Properties of this Sci- 
 ence, and the feveral Names by which it is known— Encomium of it by Ariftotle— • 
 The Subje£l of it the fame with the Dialectic and the Sophiftical Art — The Know- 
 ledge of it neceflary for detecting the Fallacies of the Sophifts. p. 40 
 
 BOOK II. 
 
 Of the. Principles conftituting the Universe^ 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 The Science of Metaphyfics takes in the whole Univerfe, as it treats of the Caufes and 
 Principles of Things— "Thefe reducible to three Heads —Of Matter and Form — Thefe 
 eafily diftinguifhable in Works of Art % alfo in the Works of Nature — Of Mat- 
 ter — difficult to form an Idea of Matter — the fame difficulty with refpeft tQ. 
 Subftance — Mr Lock's Notions concerning Matter and Subjiance — Whether the 
 firft Matter has a real Exiftence — Whether it has a feparatc Exiftence — Di- 
 greffion concerning the reality of Ideas — Diftin£lion made upon that Head — O- 
 pinion of the Pythagoreans, Plato, and Ariftotle, concerning Matter — Matter not to 
 be perceived by the Senfes, nor to be apprehended even by the Intellcft, except by 
 Analogy — No perfeiSl Idea, or Knowledge of the Eflence of any natural Subftance 
 
 p. 45 
 
 C H A P, IL 
 
 Defcription of Form — Siibjlantial Forms of the Peripatetics explained — Form not per- 
 ceived by our Senfes, nor even by the Intelleft, otherwife than by Analogy — That 
 Analogy explained — Forms really exifting in individuals, but not feparated from Mat- 
 ter, except in the Mind of fome Intelligent Being — We have no clear Idea of either 
 the Matter or Form of natural Subftances — All human Knowledge only by Simili- 
 tudes and Refemblances — Privation not afeparate Principle of Nature, but included 
 
 in
 
 CONTENTS. T 
 
 in Matter — Matter and Form the Elements of Nature — joined with Extenfion they 
 form Btdy — with the Addition of Figure, Body becomes not infinite — certain Quali* 
 ties being further added, Matter becomes the Elements — What thefe Qualities are 
 — A principle of Motion further neccflary to make a phyfical Body Page 57 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 The Definition of Af/n^ further explained — Proved, that nothing can move itfelf— 
 That Mind does not move itfelf^—What is meant h^ Organization and Organs p. 66 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Ariftotle*s Definition of TkTzW— Shown not to be fufficiently comprehenfive in two rc- 
 fpeds — Alfo not fufficiently particular — Plato's Definition of Mind — This alfo im- 
 perfedl in two refpedls — The Definition above given the true Definition — agreeable 
 to the Opinion of Plato and Ariftotle, and of the Philofophers before them p. 75 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Other TkfiWj befides the Rational ox InteUeElual-—i:\\t Brute Mind— The Vegetable — 
 That which moves unorganized Bodies — As great Varieties of Minds as of Bodies'"^ 
 The Scale of Nature not otherwife compleat — Mind not degraded by animating un- 
 organized Bodies — 1 he wonderful Operation of thefe Bodies in Nature — The Ani- 
 mal and Intelledual Life the Subject of the prefent Inquiry — Of the Animal Life — 
 Senfe, Appetite, Pain, and Pleafure, neceffary for the Prefervation and Continuation 
 of the Animal Life — The Phantafia alfo neceffary for the Animal Oeconomy — The 
 Mind, excited by the Afliftance of the f hantafia, and the confequent Appetites, 
 moves the Body, not directly, but by the intervention of certain Machinery — All 
 Animal's muft have Senfes, one or more, and alfo the Phantafia — Difference betwixt 
 Ariftotle and his Commentators on this lafl Point — Six differences betwixt 
 Senfe and Imagination — Memory does not belong to the Animal Nature — A cer« 
 tain Degree of Ratiocination, or Comparifon of Perceptions, belongs to fome Brute , 
 Animals of the better kind , p. 8j 
 
 CHAP. vr. 
 
 The Importance, the Utility, and the Comprehenfiveuefs of the Philofophy of Mind — 
 The Certainty of that Philofophy — The wonderful Chain in Nature by which the 
 
 feveral
 
 ^l 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 feveral Minds are connedled together — The Human Mind begins where that of the 
 Brute leaves off, the comparative Faculty— This is the Foundation of the Intelle£lual 
 Mind — By it Ideas are formed — Progrefs of that Formation — Ideas, a fimpie Percep- 
 tion of the Intellect— But complex Perception neceflary — The Nature of it, and of 
 the Difcurjui Mentis — The Conclufion of that Procefs, either Science or Opinion—' 
 Difference betwixt the two— The laft Operation of the Intelka, that by which it re- 
 cognizes itfclf Page 99 
 
 CHAP. vir. 
 
 Philofophy of the Human Mind founded upon the preceding Hiflory of it — Single and 
 complex Apprehenfion — Combination of Propofitions, or Syllogifm — Diftindion bc' 
 tvvixt the Operations of the Mind upon, fubjedts without the Mind and within it — 
 Diflin£lion betwixt the Gnoftic and Oredlic Faculties of the Mind — ^This Diftindlion 
 not properly ftated by the Commentators upon Ariftotle— Only two Gnoftic Facul- 
 ties, Senfe and Mellecl — Different Meanings of the Word Senfe — The Mind Active 
 as well as Paffive in Perceptions of Senfe — The Perceptions of the Objedls of Senfe 
 by the means of the Phantafia—Oi Intellefl — It perceives Ideas either fingle, or in 
 combination — Of Reafoning — Science and Opinion — Explication of all the different 
 Words upon the Sabjedl of Mind — Of the Operation of Intelledl in AbJlraElion 
 
 p. 108 
 
 CHAP. VIIL 
 
 Continuation of the Subject of IntcUeB — IntelleEl divided into Speculative and Practi- 
 cal — Difference betwixt thefe two — The Virtue of Prudence belongs to the Practical 
 Intellect — Manner of Reafoning of the Pra£tical Intellect — Cco^, real, or apparent, 
 the Motive of all Rational Actions — Difference betwixt Weak and Wicked Actions 
 —The Nature of the Speculative IntelleB — The End of it Truth — Speculative In- 
 ielle5l operates without the Affiftance of the Scn/es or Phantafia — Paffage of Aiiftotle 
 upon that Subject explained P* I'P 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 ^Of the Orcclic Powers of the Mind — Thefe not fitly divided, either by Philoponus or 
 Plato — Different Ore£Iic Powers belonging to the Animal and the Intellectual Na- 
 turc — Thofe of the Jnimal Nature — Thofe of the Intelledual- — What is the Caufe of 
 
 'Animal,
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 vu 
 
 Animal, that is, Voluntary Motion — Ariflotle^s Opinion upon the Subject — Mind, 
 the Caufe of all Motion, according to the Definition of it Page 126 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 The Human and Brute Minds fpecifically different— If they be of different Speciefes, 
 there muft be fixed Boundaries betwixt them — Comparifon of the two — No Compa- 
 rifon betwixt us and the lowefl Kind of Animals — The Comparifon only betwixt us 
 and the higher Sort — Different Speciefes of Animals muft have different Minds — 
 Comparifon of our Senfes with thofe of other Animals — Two Differences betwixt 
 our Phantafia and that of the Brute — Difference htVNiyiX.om Comparative Faculty and 
 that of the Brute — One Clafs of the objects of Human Perception quite different 
 from thofe perceived by the Brute — Therefore the Faculty different. — Man recogni- 
 zes himfelf — The Brute not— Comparifon of the Oredic Powers of the Man and 
 Brute — ^Thofe of the Brute, being directed by Nature, do no hurt — Thofe of the 
 Man, being guided by Opinion, do a great deal — Summary of the Account of the 
 Human Mind, and of that of the Brute — The Error of our modern Philofophers in 
 confounding Ideas and Perceptions of Senfe — Objection that, though other Animals 
 have not the Ufe of Intelled, they may have the Faculty — That objedion anfwered 
 
 p. 131 
 
 CHAP. XL 
 
 Plato's Notion of our Knowledge in this State exprefled by an Allegory— All derived 
 from Senfation — Such Knowledge moft Imperfed — This illuftrated by the Know- 
 ledge we get from the Senfe of Sight— What Intelka can do to fupply the Defeds 
 ol Senfe — The Knowledge of fuperior Minds very different from ours- What ours will 
 be when we are difincumbered of the Body—It will be fuch as is incredible to ihe 
 Material Philofophers — That the Mind has Perceptions in this State, even of fenfible 
 Objeds proved, from our Phantafia — from our Dreams — from Appearances to us 
 Tvhen awake— from the Cafe of thofe that walk in their Sleep— Inftances of thefc 
 Kinds— The Senfes not the Caufe of the Perception of Senfible Objcds— This illu- 
 ftrated by a Comparifon p. 14P 
 
 C H A P.
 
 VIU 
 
 N T E N 
 
 CHAP. xir. 
 
 The Qccftlon concerning the Parts or the Mind confukred — The Word Part ufed In: 
 feveral Senfes — Whether there be in Man diftind Mental Subftances, or only dif- 
 fe^^nt Qualities of the fame Mind — The vegetative Mind a diftinft fubftance from 
 the Animal or Intellei^ual — The Animal alfo diftind from the Intelledual— All 
 the three form together a wonderful Trinity Page 164 
 
 CHAP. XIII. 
 
 The antlent Philofophers made the diftin£lion betwixt Body and Mind, and believed 
 that both exiflcd — Some of them believed that Mind was Corporeal, and that every 
 Thing elfe was fo — This theToundation of Atheifm— The Belief in Incorporeal Sub- 
 ftances the Foundation of Theifm — Different Manners In which Things exift — In- 
 corporeal Subllance exifts In the moft perfect Manner — Obje£lion to the Exiflence 
 of Immaterial Subftances, that they cannot be conceived — Anfwer to this Objedion 
 twofold— f/ry?. That they can be conceived — Secondly^ If they could not, no Reafon 
 from thence to conclude that they did not exift p. 169 
 
 CHAP. XIV. 
 
 "T'hree Proofs of the Immateriality of Mind in general — the firft taken from the Nature 
 of Motion — the fecond from the Nature of Body — and the third from the Nature of 
 Mind itfelf — The laft a Demonftration ex ab/urdo— the other two a Priori p. 176 
 
 CHAP. XV. 
 
 Proofs in the preceding Chapter a priori — thofe in this Chapter a fojleritrif being from 
 the Phaenomena of Nature — Rule of philofophifing in this Matter the fame as that 
 laid down by Sir Ifaac Newton— Laws of Nature concerning Body — No Vis Jnertiae 
 in Body — on the contrary, a Vis Mobilitatis — The feveral Ways in which Body is 
 moved — Caufe of thefe feveral Motions — One Caufe material, viz. by Impulfe of 
 Body upon Body — Two things required in order that this Caufe fhould operate — 
 No fuch thing as Attra61:ion, properly fpeaking — only a Tendency in one Body to 
 move towards another — Caufe of the Motion of the Celejiial Bodies, according to the 
 New Philofophy, mere Hypothefis— 1 hat Motion nor to be accounted for by external 
 
 Impulfe
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 IX 
 
 Impulfe of a fubtile Fluid — ^The Averfion of our prefent Philofophers to Mzrzi— In 
 what Senfe Nature can be faid to produce the Motion of Bodies — Mind effential to 
 Nature — Motion in the Vegetable not to be accounted for by Mechanic Caufes — ftill 
 lefs the Motion of the Animal — Wonderful Power exerted by the Moving Principle 
 in the Animal — Senfation cannot be produced by a Material Caufe—Reafoning and 
 Confcioufnefs izx Uh Page i8i 
 
 CHAP. xvr. 
 
 Concerning the feparate Exiftence of Minds — Ariftotle's Dodrine upon this Subject — 
 The Moving Principle in Bodies unorganized, and in Vegetables, cannot exift fepa- 
 rately — More Doubt as to the Animal Mind — Separate Exiftence of the Intellectual 
 Mind or Soul clearly proved from its Energ'its—'Immortality of the Soul alfo evident 
 from its Nature p. 196 
 
 CHAP. XVII. 
 
 Of the Difference of the feveral Kinds of 3Iinds — The firft Kind that which moves un- 
 organized Bodies — Several Motions produced by it — Gravitation— Attraction — Re- 
 pulfion — Circular Motion— The Principle of thefc Motions internal— Comparifon 
 of thefe Principles of Motion with Intelle£t, and with one another — They all a6l 
 without Confcioufncfs, Intelligence, End propofed, Deliberation, or Intention — 
 Definition of Nature — Difference betwixt the Vegetable and the Principle of Motion 
 in unorganized Bodies— Difference betwixt the Vegetable and Animal — Definition 
 of the Animal Nature, and of Inftin£l — Reafon why Inftindt never errs — Cudworth's 
 Piaftic Nature the fame with Ariftotle's Nature — Nature fuppofes a God — Only from 
 the Study of the Human Mind that we can form any Conception of God — This Study 
 the Foundation of Theifm — The Philofophy of Mind only to be learned from the 
 Books of the Aniients p. 205 
 
 C HA P. XVIII. 
 
 The Docflrlne of all Bodies being moved by an internal A6bive Principle, not new- 
 maintained by Plato and Ariftotle — alfo by Leibnitz, and other Authors — Difference 
 cf Minds admitted by every Body — The Vegetable Mind has fomething like Appe- 
 tite and Inclination — The Mind in unorganized Bodies has fomething of the fame 
 Kind — The Belief, that there is no Principle in unorganized Body diftind from 
 
 b Matter,
 
 XI CONTENTS. 
 
 Matter, the Foundation of Atheifm — Anfwer to the Objedions, that this Syftem 
 multiplies Minds — that it makes all Nature to be a Wonder, and a Miracle— The 
 Atheifl is the greateft of all Believers — Vanity the great Source of Atheifm — Cure 
 propofcd for this Vanity Page 228 
 
 C H A P. XIX. 
 
 The Philofophy of this work fdifFerent from the Newtonian Philcfophy — particularly 
 concerning the Motion of the Celeftial Bodies — Opinion of the Ancients, that thefe 
 Motions were carried on and condutled by Mind — All Motion on Earth both begun 
 and carried on by Mind — The fame in the Celeftial Regions, according to the an- 
 tient Philofophy — The Newtonian Philofophy not fo uniform or confiftent with itfelf 
 — The combined Motion of the Planets, according to the Newtonian Syftem, not ne- 
 ceflary nor probable — gives too great an Advantage to Atheifm — lays not the Foun- 
 dation of Theifm broad enough, by fuppofing the World to have been produced at 
 a certain Time — Opinion of all the Antients that it was eternal — If Mind moves the 
 Celeftial Bodies, it muft be by a fimple and uncompounded Motion — Sir Ifaac's Gra- 
 vitation of the Celeftial Bodies a Fa6ly not a Caiifc — The Subtile Spirit pervading all 
 Bodies an Occult Caufe — favouring a little of Miterialifm — But this corretled in the 
 Q^ery annexed to his Optics— Three Opinions concerning the Origin and Conti- 
 nuance of Motion— Dr Clarke's Opinion in this Matter dift'srent from Sir Ifaac's 
 
 p. 251 
 
 CHAP. XX. 
 
 Chance numbered among the Caufes of Things — NtcefTary to inquire what fort of a 
 Caufe it is — The common Opinion concerning Chance-— Al^h'w.g not by Accident, 
 bccaufe we do not know the Caufe of it — Examples of that in the Weather, Dice, 
 and Cards — Chance refers to an End propofed by Nature or Man — Examples of this 
 — Things happening befides that end not always fortuitous — Examples of this 
 — Fortuitous, and by Accident^ not the fame — Different Names given, in Greek, to 
 what happens hcfida the End intended by Nature, and that which is intended by 
 Man — Definition oi Chance from the foregoing Inveftigation — Confequence of this 
 DoiStrine of Chance p. 2S4 
 
 CHAP. xxr. 
 
 No Difpute among the Antient Philofophers concerning Free-vjill ^Vid^Neceffity — Rcafon 
 of this — The Diftin<Si:ion betwixt Senje and IntelleB neceffary to be made for under- 
 ftanding this Matter— Definition oi JVill—JVili &nd Free -will ihe fame — Difference be- 
 twixt
 
 O N T E N T S. 
 
 XI 
 
 twixt IVill and Material Necejjlty in Bodies unorganized, and In Vegetables— be- 
 twixt Will^n^ In/iin6l in Brutes — What conftitutes a free Agent — Where Reafon is 
 rcoft perfe£V, there is the greatefl: Freedom — In what Senfe Will is neceflary, as well 
 T^sfrce — Necefllty oi Will eflential to its Nature — Every thing neceflary in that Senfe 
 —A Caufc for every thing, and every Caufe mufl; produce its EfFe£t— Moral NecefTity 
 even ftronger than Natural— -Dr Clarke's Opinion in this Matter — ^The Opinion of a 
 hte Writer of Eflays on the fame Subjeft p. 296 
 
 BOOK III. 
 
 Of the Categories, or Universal Forms. 
 C H A P. I. 
 
 Philofophy among the Antients the Knowledge of all things in the Unlverfe — All 
 things to be known by their Caufes only — The Knowledge of all Firft Caufes belongs 
 to Metaphyfics — Three Kinds of Caufes already treated of— Formal Caufes now to 
 be confidered — The Nature and Number of them firft difcovered in the Pythagorean 
 School — publifhed firft by Arcibytas, in his Work concerning the Univerfe— then by 
 Ariftotle, under the Name oi Categories— Gxtzl Utility of this Difcovery — Reference 
 to Mr Harris's Work for the Explanation of each particular Category Page 311 
 
 C H A P, II. 
 
 Ncceffary to be proved that Generals exlft — That Necefilty owing to the total Ignorance 
 of Antient Philofophy — That there are Ideas exifting fomewhere, and particularly in 
 the Divine Mind — Whether they exift in the Human Mind, a Queftion of Fa^l — • 
 The Confulion of Senfe and Imagination with Intelledt, the Ground of the Error of 
 the Materialifts on this Point— No Science without Ideas—Neither Definition nor 
 Demonftration of Individuals p. 321 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 General Obfervations upon the Categories— Other Divifions of the whole of things, 
 fuch as that made by Porphyry, and alfothat made by Plato — The Nature of the Di- 
 
 b 2 rifioE
 
 XII 
 
 O N T E N T S. 
 
 vifion made by Archytas— -his Work Metaphyfical— Arlflotle's Book of Categories a 
 Logical Work— The Nature of Porphyry's Divifion— The Nature alfo of Plato's— 
 Both different from that of Archytas — Examination of the Univcrfals of Archytas — 
 AVhether there be too many or too few of them — not too many of them — nor too few 
 — Shown that Motion ought not to be one of Archytas's Univerfals — nor Time—not 
 Space — nor Matter — nor Form — nor Powcr-^nor Faculty — Mind, confidcrcd as a 
 Subflance, falls under this Divifion — Habit likewife falls under it — Ariftotle's Divi- 
 f:on into Categories, not compleat — Conclufion of this Part of the Work. Page 329 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 The Subje£l of Metaphyfics, Univerfals or Generals^ of the highcfl: Kind— What Ge- 
 nerals are not to be underftood without fome Knowledge of Logic — Difference be- 
 twixt Mathematics and Metaphyfics — Mathematical Ideas — Number — This the Sub- 
 jedl of Arithmetic — Figure the Subject of Geometry — Analyfis of it into Superficies, 
 Lines, and Points — Motion — This the Subjed both of Geometry and Arithmetic — 
 — The Subjects of Metaphyfics — Confiders what is different, and what is common, 
 in theSubje<Sls of Mathematics — Its Way of confid.<.ring Motion — ^Treats of Subjects 
 not comprehended in any particular Science — The proper Subject of Metaphyfics is 
 immaterial Subflances — The Way of coming to the Idea of them—Difference be- 
 twixt Antient and Modern Philofophy — No fufficient caufe of Motion affigned by the 
 Moderns — Nature, according to their Syftems, defedtive p. 336 
 
 BOOK IV. 
 
 Of the Adjunds of Nature, Time, Space, and Place. 
 
 C H A P. I. 
 
 Timet though not a Caufe, a neceffary Adjun£l of the Material World— TzW, like 
 CTery thing in the Material World, dependent upon Motion— -not to be comprehend- 
 ed at once, but to be inveftigated — Exijience^ Duration^ included in the Idea of 
 Time — Time a Meafure of nothing but Duration — but not of the Duration of all 
 Beings — only of fuch as are liable to Change of one Kind or another — ^What Kind of 
 
 Meafure
 
 O N T E N T S. 
 
 £IIt 
 
 Meafure Time is — It muft: be by Motion — This Motion mufl be perpetual, and it muft 
 revolve into itfelf, and begin where it left off — The Motion of the Celeftial Bodies of 
 this Kind — Definition of Time — Confequences of this Definition — Body, Motion, 
 Number, muft all join to make Time — How far Time participates of the Nature of 
 Body — How Timt applies to Mind fuch as ours — Moments not Time — nor any part of 
 Time — Common Divifion of Time into prefcnt^ paftj zn(] future — Nature of the prf- 
 fent — properly fpeaking, has no exijlence — Time altogether of a moft fhadowy Na- 
 ture — How Timt is applied to Motion — Difference betwixt Time and Eternity no 
 
 Difference, according to the Syftem of the Materiallfts — If the Univerfe be not Eter- 
 nal, and is to have an End, then Time muft have had a beginning, and will have an 
 End — Difficulty of Conceiving a Being whofe Duration is not meafured by Time^— 
 yet it is neceffary fo to conceive Divinity — What Pktimis fays upon this Subjedb 
 
 Page 347 
 
 CHAP. 11. 
 
 space taken in two Senfes, a larger and ftrlder — The Inquiry here concerning Space 
 
 in the ftrider Senfc, that is, roid of Body — Different Opinions concerning Space . 
 
 confidered by fome as different from Body and Mind, and as a kind of Rival to 
 Deity — Space confidered upon the Suppofition of nothing exifting — Then Space is 
 nothing but the mere Capability of receiving Body — In what Senfe Space can be faid 
 to have the three Dimenfions — Space confidered llkewife upon the Suppofition of Deity 
 exifting from all Eternity, but not the Material World — Upon that Suppofition, 
 Hkewife, Space nothing but mere Potentiality — Laftly^ Space^ confidered upon the 
 Suppofition of the Exiftence of the Material World — Upon that Suppofition, it has 
 no exiftence but in relation of Body, ahd fhat in three refpefts — but abfolutely, in 
 itfelf, a mere non-entity — Place is nothing but Space filled with Body — From thence 
 arifes a (hort Definition of SpacCy viz. that it is Place^ §^v>«^«, or in Capacity p. 369 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 Leibnitz's Definition of Space — and of T'zW— erroneous as to both, but altogether er- 
 roneous as to Space — Abluid Confequence of thcfe errors — Dr Clark's Opinion con* 
 cerning Space — The Confequence of the Dodlor's Opinion is, that Space is an effen- 
 
 ■. \\A Property of the Divine Nature — Uiiable to anfwer Mr Leibnitz's Objedion to 
 hib Notion oi Space — The Ground of the Doclor's Error— fhe Ground of the Error 
 of both p. 3^^ 
 
 BOOK
 
 xi* CONTENTS. 
 
 BOOK V. 
 
 Concerning the Principles of Science, and of Truth and Cer- 
 tainty. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 The Principles of all Arts and Sciences to be found in Metaphyfics— It belongs to Me- 
 taphyfics to explain the Principles of Science, and to defend them againft the Cavils 
 ofSophifts — Truth Logical znd Metaphy/ical — Logical Truth or Propofitions the 
 Subjedl of this Chapter — Propofitions analyzed — In all Propofitions, one Term at 
 lead mud be a General or Idea — Divifion of Propofitions into thofe which have both 
 Terms general, and thofe which have only one Page 373 
 
 CHAP. 11. 
 
 Common Senfe not fufficlent for explaining the Principles of Evidence or Certainty — 
 nor any Learning to be found in Englifli or in French — Mr Locke's own Account of 
 his Effay — His Miftake of the Axiom of the Schools, upon which he builds his whole 
 Work, is a fundamental Error of his Book — Of general Propofitions, that is, Pro- 
 pofitions of which both the Terms are general — Mr Locke's Account of the Truth of 
 fuch Propofitions very imperfect — ^The Pielation betwixt the two Terms of the Propo- 
 fition, fuch as is neceflary to make the Propofition true, particularly explained — All 
 Propofitions either affirm or deny a Genus of a Species^ or an Accident of a Subfiance 
 
 P- 379 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 The Neceffity of underftanding the Principles of Logic, in order to underfiiand the 
 Principles of Science and Demonftration — The Greatefl: Genius, without teaching, 
 not fufficient for that Purpofe — Ariftotle how taught — Cafe of the Philofophers be- 
 fore his Time who had not learned to analyfe Reafoning — General Propofitions, ei- 
 ther Axioms, or Propofitions to be demonllrated — Nature of the Evidence of Axioms 
 
 may be explained— This is bed done with refpe<Sl to the Axioms of Geometry 
 
 Geometry the firft Science among Men — and the Reafons why it was fo — Inftances 
 
 from
 
 O N T E N T S. 
 
 XT 
 
 from the Axioms of Euclid — Evidence of thofe Axioms the immediate Perception of 
 a Contradi<flion, if they were not true — Confcioufnefs the Foundation of the Perception 
 ofTruth — Therefore theBrutes hare no fuch Perception — Axioms and Demonftration 
 in other Sciences as well as Mathematics — Inftances of Axioms in Phyfics and Me- 
 taphyfics — Inftances of Axioms relating to the other Categories as well as to Quan- 
 tity Page 357 
 
 CHAP. IV, 
 
 When the Propofition is not felf evident, then there muft be the Difcurjus Mentis in 
 order to prove it — The Nature of this Difcurjus — All the Di/curfuSy however various, 
 reducible to the Syllogiftical Form — Definition of Syilogifm — Form of the Syllogifm 
 explained by Ariflotle in hhjirji Analytics — The Analyfis there mofl: wonderful — 
 Syllogifm may be peife£l in its Form, and yet the Conclufion may be falfe, dubious, 
 or certain — according to the Nature of the PremifTes — What makes the Syllogifm 
 demonftrative explained by Ariflotle in his laft Analytics — The Method obferved by 
 Ariflotle in that great Work — The Nature of Dcmonji ration — Definition as Necefla- 
 ry for it as Axioms — Two Kinds of Demonftration — the one diredi — the other indi- 
 reel — or ex ahfiirdo. — The Difference betwixt Analyfis and Demonflration — Analvfis 
 the Method of Difcovery in all Sciences — Similitude betwixt the analytical Reafon- 
 ing and the Demonftration ex abfurdo — The Dialectical Method of Reafoning differ- 
 ent from ar.y yet mentioned— 1 iie Biale61ic of Ariftotle quite different from 
 that of Plato — Ariftotle's Dialedic much praclifed before his Time — but only 
 reduced to an Art by him — Nature cf this Kind of Reafoning iliuftrated by Ex- 
 amples p. ^tjS 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Of Propofitions, whofe SubjeCl Is an Individual Thing — Individual Things either Ma- 
 terial or Immaterial — Of Propofitions, whofe Subject is a Corporeal Thing— ^Of 
 thefe there can be no Science — Nature of our Knowledge of Corporeal Things— Ufe 
 of that Knowledge p. 410 
 
 C H A P. VL 
 
 The Doubt about the Exiftence cf the Material World not fo old as Plato and Ariftotle 
 — Firft ftarted, in Modern Times, by Dr Berkeley. — Two Anfwcrs given to it, but 
 neither of them fatisfadory — Other Proofs, therefore, neceffary— Previous Obferva- 
 
 tions concerning Mr Hume's Syftem of Philofophy on this Subjcft Proof of 
 
 the
 
 XVI 
 
 O N T E N T S. 
 
 the Exiftence of External Objeas from a Principle acknowledged by the Sceptics, 
 viz. Confcioufnefs.— Proof from the Cafe of Blind and Deaf Men— Proof from the 
 Mind being paflive in the Perceptions of Senfe—Objeaion anfwered— Mr Locke's 
 Diftinaion of Primary and Secondary Qiialities defended— Objeaion from our 
 Dreams anfwered— The Mind then has not the entire Ufe of its Faculties — There- 
 fore not able to diftinguifli betwixt lUufion and Reality Page 414 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 Of the Nature of Reafoning by Induaion — This Reafoning ufed both in Natural Phi- 
 Jofophy, and in the Ordinary Affairs of Life — From this Way of Reafoning in Na- 
 tural rhilofuphy, the Laws of the Motions of Bodies are inferred — From thefe Laws 
 we leafon downwards, and demonflrate — This is the Science of modern Natural 
 Philofophy — ^The Evidence of thofe Laws of Nature very different from that of 
 Axioms — The Reafon for our Belief in thefe Laws twofold — Every Experimental 
 Philofopher is, in fome refpea, a Theift, though he may not know it — Of Induaion 
 in the common Affairs of Life— -of the fame Kind with Induaion in Natural Philo- 
 fophy, but not near fo certain — Reafon of the Difference — Speculations concerning 
 the Duration of this Syftcm of Nature and of Man do not belong to this Part of the 
 Work P- 430 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 Geometry, according to Plato, is all built upon Hypothefes, and does not demonflrate 
 its own Principles — It is only by Means of the Firfl Philofophy that it can be made a 
 perfta Science — In what Senfe Geometry is founded upon Hypothefes — Definitions 
 and Poflulates mere Suppofitions — Nature of Definition — Euclid does not define 
 Magnitude, the Subjea of this Science ; but fuppofes both that it is known, and 
 that it exifts — Neither does he define any of the three Dimenfions ; bur fuppofes 
 them likewife known — Euclid fuppofes Magnitude to be terminated by Superficiefes, 
 Lines, and Point!! — Definitions he gives of thefe are to be explained by the Firfl Phi- 
 lofophy — No Definition of Equality by Euclid, but an Axiom in place of a- Defini- 
 tion — Equality only belongs to Magnitude and Number — Magnitude, the Standard 
 of Equality, not only for itfelf, but for other things — That Magnitude is moved or 
 changes its Pofition, is ar.other Geometrical Lypothefis — This, and the other Hypo- 
 tbtfcs above mentioned, are General Hypothefes — The Definitions are particular 
 Hypothefes — Difterence betwixt Definitions and Poflulates — The Axioms refultfrom 
 the Definitions, and have their Evidence founded upon them — All Geometry, there- 
 fore, hypothetical •, and we can only fay that its Hypothefes are pofllble — To- make 
 
 it
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 xvii 
 
 it a Real Science, the Real Exiftence of the Material World mud be proved — The 
 fame is true of Arithmetic Page 43(5 
 
 CHAP. IX, 
 
 The Non Exiftence of the Material World no Difcovery of our Scots Philofopher — 
 But, that we have no Idea of Caufe and Effect, a Difcovery claimed by him — But 
 this no Difcovery of his in the Senfe in which he feems to underftand it — Iti the 
 Senfe to v/hich his followers have extended it, it is a Difcovery, but a falfe one — 
 That we have the Idea of Caufe and EfFecl, in Matters of Science, proved by the 
 Authority of Ariftotle — and by the Reafon of the thing — Definition of Caufe — The 
 ^^w^ra/ comprehends i[\c particulars xxnAQV it, which therefore depend for their Ex- 
 iftence upon the general — Difference betwixt Demonftrative and Inductive Reafon- 
 ing — Nature of Cafuality in Matters of Science — Very difi'erent from Cafuality ia- 
 Fa6ts of Natural or Civil Hiftpry — Truth, Divine as well as Eternal P* 453 
 
 C HAP. X. 
 
 All the Antient Philofophers believed in the Exiftence ofldeas^ — Differed only as to the 
 Manner of their Exiftence — That Ideas and Senfations are the fame, a Difcovery of 
 Modern Times — Plato's Opinion concerning Ideas — This truly his Opinion, not falfe* 
 ly imputed to him by Ariftotle — Ariftotle's Opinion concerning Ideas — Thefe, ac- 
 cording to his Philofphy, are of three Kinds— That there are Ideas exifting in our 
 Minds, is a Matter of Fa£l, to be proved by Indudion — Examples Irom the Works 
 of Art — Ideas formed, in the like Manner, from the Works of Nature — Uf thefe 
 ideas, all the different Kinds mentioned by l^orphyry — That we have the Faculty, by 
 which Ideas are formed, viz. Inte/le&f and are thereby diftinguifhed from the Brutes 
 ■ — Reafon for arguing in this manner from Art to Nature — Diftm£lion of Ideas into 
 Corruptible and Incorruptible — Ariftotle reconciled with himfelf as to fuch Ideas-— 
 In what Senfe Ideas may be faid to have a Being diftindt from Particulars — This 
 .Diftin£lion, explained and fhov/n to be made by every Body p. 462 
 
 G H A P. XL 
 
 The Foundation of all Syllogifm, and, confequently, of all Reafoning, Is, that one 
 Idea contains another as a part of it — This illuftrated by Exaa.pies, and fliown to ap* 
 ply to all Kinds of Syllogifm — In what Senfe one Idea can be faid to contain ano- 
 
 c ther
 
 xviri 
 
 CONTENTS^ 
 
 ther— The Genus contains the Species, and therefore is praedicated of It — As the 
 Genus contains the Species, fo the Species contains the Genus — The Reafon why 
 this DifBculty has not occurred to Modern Sceptics — It did occur to Plato, but is fol- 
 vcd neither by him nor Ariftotle — Solution of the Difficulty — Illuftrations from Ma- 
 terial Things, fuch as Seals and Statues — lUnftration from Ideas in the Mind of an 
 
 Artift from the Intelligible Forms in the Mind of the Supreme Artift—Obferva- 
 
 tions arifing from this Theory — Primo, It appears how Generals are the Caufe of 
 Particulars — SecundOy It explains how the Genus contains many Speciefes, but the 
 Species only one Genus — Tertio, It explains the myfterious Language of Plato con- 
 cerning Idas'— La/i/y, It Ihows the Progrefs of Things upwards, and how all Thing* 
 tend to one (P* 473 
 
 CHAP. xir. 
 
 Of Propofitions, the Subject of which is a particular Mind — Mind particular Is the Sub- 
 je£l of Intelled — therefore may be the Subjeft of Demonftration — Inftances of Dc- 
 monftration concerning Mind — The Exiftence of that Great Mind, which is the 
 Caufe of all Things, is demonftrable — There we are to feek for the Origin of Truth, 
 not in the Mind of Man, nor in the Material World — It is from God that Truth de- 
 rives its Eternity and Immutability — Truth would not be eternal and Immutable, rf 
 the Opinion of Des Cartes were true — God is the Fountain of Beauty as well as of 
 
 Truth The Difference betwixt Beauty and Truth — The Intdledual World, the j 
 
 perfed Model of all Beauty in Theory—Beauty in Pradlice fomething more perfed 
 
 ftill The Univerfe, therefore, moft perfe£Uy Beautiful — How far Man can advance 
 
 in Beauty, either Speculative or Practical — To reduce our Ideas of Beauty to Prac- 
 tice, and make a little World of them, is the greateft Effort of Human Intellect— . 
 The Materials out of which Man makes thefe little Worlds — His own Species the 
 nobleft of thefe Materials — Other Materials of this Creation— fuch as Sounds — Co- 
 lours— Stone— and Metal— The Gift of Genius bellowed but upon few— Whole Na- 
 tions appear to want it altogether— One Nation had it in the moll eminent Degree 
 
 p. 485 
 
 APPENDIX.
 
 CONTENTS. six 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 Dissertation on the Principles of the Newtonian Philo- 
 sophy. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 An Inquiry into the Principles of the Newtonian Philofophy belongs to this Work— 
 The Queflion concerning the Motion of the Celeftial Bodies of great Importance 
 with rcfpe£l to Natural Religion, and the Do6lrine of rheifm— This Do£lrine con- 
 fifts of two Parts — The Philofophy of Des Cartes repugnant to the better Part of 
 Theifm — The Philofophy of Sir Ifaac Newton not fo Material and Mechanical as 
 that of Des Cartes — The Principles of it, however, ought to be carefully examined, as 
 tending to the DKbslief of the Providence of God in the greateft part of the Vifible 
 World — The Account of the Motion of the Celeftial Bodies given by Sir Ifaac— 
 Their Motion compofed of two Motions of Projeifiion and Gravitation— One of 
 thefe two Motions Mechanical — Sir Ifaac's Philofophy in his Principia incompleat, 
 as it accounts only for one of thefe two Motions — Sir Ifaac in vain endeavoured to fup- 
 ply this Defe6l afterwards— All the Caufes of Gravitation that can poflibly beaflTigned 
 — The lafl Caufe mentioned, viz. the conftant Agency of Mind, the true Caufe — 
 This adopted by the Newtonians at prefent, and a great Improvement of Sir Ifaac's 
 Syftem — But a farther Amendment is neceflary p. 497 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 The Queflion betwixt Sir Ifaac and the Antients ftated — a Qucdion not within the 
 Sphere of Mathematics, but belonging to the Firft Philofophy i it relates to the mo- 
 ving Powers in the Univerfe — Thefe either Mind or Body — Body moves Body 
 only by Contact — therefore no fuch thing as its Action in vacuo — The manner 
 in which body moves Body threefold — The Manner in which Mind moves 
 Body altogether different — well defcribed by Dr Clarke— The Diflin£lion of 
 the Different Kinds of Motion applied to the Solution of the Queftion — Accord- 
 ing to Sir Ifaac's Hypothefis, one Part of the Planetary Motion produced by 
 Mind immediately ; other two Parts of it produced only mediately by Mind — But 
 all the Motions proved, by fundry Arguments, to be immediately produced by 
 Mind — Projc^lion and Gravitation fuch mere Hypothefes, that fome Newtonians are 
 difpofed to give them up ; but they fay the Circular Motion has, by its Nature, a 
 Tendency both to and from the Center — This Hypothefis examined in the next 
 Chapter p. 509 
 
 c 2 CHAP.
 
 sx C O N T E N 
 
 C HA P. III. 
 
 Upon the Suppofitioti of the Circular Motion being, by its Nature, combined of a Cen- 
 tripetal and a Centrifugal Force, no occafion for the Hypothefis of Projection and 
 Gravitation — No need, alfo, for the Firft Law of Motion — That every Motion inaa 
 Orbit is fo combined, not a Self-evident Prcpofition — altogether improbable, as the 
 IMoviiig Power is one fimple Power — Sundry Reafons given why it is impofTible it 
 fliould be fc — Sir Ifaac has proved nothing to the contrary — All his Definitions, 
 Laws of Motion, and Demonftrations, concerning it, relate only to Motion produ- 
 ced by bodily -Impulfe — The Circular Motion, though produced by Mind, may be 
 refolved into the combined Circular Motion of which Sir Ifaac fpeaks — This fuffi- 
 cient for the Purpofe cf Sir Ifaac'd Philofophy Page 519 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 The Foundation of the Mechanical Philofophy is Sir Ifaac Newton's Firft Law of Mo- 
 tion, fo far as it relates to the perpetual Motion of Bodies once fet in Motion — This 
 Propofition ought to be ftridlly examined, as it is of dangerous confequence to the 
 Do6lrine of Theifm — Tiie whole Law confidered — Two Parts of it undoubtedly true 
 — the third Part, concerning the continuance of Motion, only difputed — The Meaning 
 of Tis in/itay in this Law, oppofed to z'is imprejja — ^This Law relates to Motion 
 produced by bodily Impulfe, therefore cannot affe£l what has been faid of the Mo- 
 tion of the Celeftial Bodies by Mind — comprehends the Circular Motion as well 
 as the Rc6lilineal — The Advantage that the Atheifl: will m'lke of the ConcefTion that 
 Matter can move itfclf — The Pfopofition, if true, muftbe eitlier Self evident or De- 
 monflrable — not Self-evident— can only be demonftrated a priori—The Queftion al- 
 ' together MetaphyGcal — Reft and Motion confounded in this Law of Motion — Strange 
 Inaccuracy of LxprefTion — The Q^ueftion is concerning the EfTence of Matter, and 
 whether Motion be eflential to Matter — That it is not eflential to Matter, proved by 
 feveral Arguments — How the Motion is continued, after the Pulfion has ceafed, ac- 
 counted for — That this Motion is not continued for ever, proved by feveral Reafons 
 — Objedion anfwered p. 528 
 
 CHAP. V, 
 
 Sir Ifa?c fuppofef, in his Princlpia, that the Firft Mover is a Material Caufej that 
 tlurcicre nothijig moves butv/hatis moved — This the Opinion of fome antient Phi- 
 
 lofophers.
 
 C O N T E N T S. 
 
 XXI 
 
 lofophers that are refuted by Ariftotle— Sir Ifaac an excellent Mathematician andSci- 
 cntifical Mechanic — but not learned in Firft Philofophy — This appears from the in* 
 confiflericy of his Opinion concerning the Origin of Motion — Difference between his 
 Philofophy on this Subject in his Principia and his Queries— Even in his Queries, 
 
 his Philofophy not confiftent with itfelf— Apology for his Mechanical Philofophy 
 
 His whole Syftem founded upon the Analogy betwixt the Motion of Projediles here 
 on Earth, and that of the Celeftial Bodies— But the conclufion too hafly, that they 
 are produced in the fame Manner — The Reafoning of the Newtonians, that the fame 
 Effeds muft be produced by the fame Caufes, mifapplied — Sir Ifaac's Philofophy, as 
 it (lands, founded upon four Hypothefes— None of thefe necefiary — Therefore they 
 ferve no Purpofe but to mcumber his Syftem— The Hutchifonian Philofophy alfo 
 Mechanical — Prejudices in favour of the Mechanical Philofophy not eafily to be fur- 
 •mounted— They take their Rife from the Experimental Philofophy Page 544 
 
 ERRATA.
 
 ERRATA. 
 
 Page 9. I. 10. ftr move read are moved 
 ib. 1. 13. for move readzxt moved 
 
 1 5. 1. 1 2. for arcliite£t read archetype *" 
 
 21. 1. ix. for moves read is moved 
 ib. 1. 22. for move reaa be moved 
 159. 1. 13. for No6lambuU read Somnambule 
 166.1. I. /or all as r^^i as all 
 ib. 1. 20. for like read like in man 
 
 167. I. 1 2. for two read two, the vegetable and the animal % 
 ib. 1* 26. for triKt read (•!«« 
 
 168. 1. ult. for indlvifible, and, by confequence, without parts, re^d Without 
 
 parts, and, by confequence, indivifiWc, 
 175. 1. ult. add to the note p. 8^. 
 192. I. 23. for ftones read ftonc weight 
 
 ib. I. 25. for ftones read&.ont weight 
 229. 1. 16. for {■^vy;,nn) read {-^y^nvy 
 233. 1. 10. for 1690 read 1698 
 
 ib. 1. 18. for ipfe read ipfa 
 292*1. iQ' for Kttr fi,fiifin**{ read KXTx (rvfcfii/inK6f 
 294. 1. 3 1. /or diftinftion r^diideftination 
 431. I. 12. /or reducible r^^ideducible 
 441. I. ult. /or philof<?phy r^j^ philofophcr
 
 J? R E F A C E. 
 
 HOWEVER little merit there may be in this Work, or how- 
 ever much wearied the reader may be in the perufal of it, he 
 cannot blame the Author for a deceit, common enough at prefent, of 
 impofing upon him by a fpecious title ; for I have chcfen one which, 
 fo far from alluring readers, will frighten many from opening the 
 book ; nor do I believe that there is a bookfeller in Great Britain, who 
 upon the credit of my title-page, would offer me a (hilling for my 
 copy, if I had a mitsd to fell it. Indeed, the fubjedl is altogether un- 
 fafhionable, not only among the vulgar, who ridicule it under the 
 name of metaphyfic^ but even among the philofophers of the prefent 
 age, who are fo much converfant with particular and individual things, 
 as hardly to believe that there exifts a fcicnce of Univerfals. Their far- 
 theft remove from matter is to Mathematics, the fcience of which the 
 Antients very much efteemed, becaufe they thought mathematical ideas 
 wereof eafieft abftradion, and therefore proper to difentangle the Mind 
 from Matter, and teach it to rife to nobler fpeculations ; and it is from 
 this ufe of it that the fcience has its name. But our modern philofo- 
 phers feem to think, that Geometry, Arithmetic, and the application 
 of thefe fciences to body, is the whole of philofophy ; and, I doubt, 
 many of them believe that nothing exifts except body, and its attri^ 
 butes« 
 
 The ftyle, too, I am afraid, is not of popular relifh, any more than 
 -the fubjedt ; wanting that fprucenefs and trimnefs which is fo fa- 
 fhionable at prefent in writings upon all fubjedls. Many now-a-days 
 feem to me to read, like Hamlet in the Play, ivords^ ivorJs^ with- 
 out any confideration of the matter, and to regard drefs as the princi- 
 pal quality of a book, as well as of a perfon. It is but fair to let all 
 
 a fuch
 
 11 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 fuch readers know that they will be dlfappolnted, If they expe^l to 
 find here what they call Jine language. From the authors I have 
 (ludied, I have not learned to cut philofbphy into fliort, fmart, fenten- 
 ces, after the manner of Seneca : And I fhould think my fubjedl dif- 
 graced, if I were to treat it in the ftyle of Tacitus, and his modern 
 imitators among the French and BritiQi. The reader, therefore, is to 
 expert nothing here but a plain and fimple ftyle, neither poetical nor 
 oratorial, nor mixed (abfurdly as I think) of both thefe ; unadorned, 
 therefore, with epithets, antithefes, and poetical defcriptions, and with- 
 out any amhlt'wus ornaments of any kind. This ftyle the reader, if 
 he has formed his tafte upon fome of the faftiionable w^riters of this 
 age, vYill, I know, think very infipid* 
 
 I had once refolved never to publiih any thing in this age, upon the 
 fubje£t of philofophy, for the fame reafon which Varro gave for not 
 publiihing on that fubjedt in his age, namely, that the unlearned 
 would not underftand him, and the learned would not read him ; 
 ' for,' fays he, * thofe who are learned in the Greek learning will 
 
 * chufe rather to read what the Greeks have written upon philofophy, 
 
 * than any thing 1 could write : And, if they have not Greek learn- 
 
 * ing, they will not care to read what, without that learning, is not to 
 
 * be underftood *.' For the fake of my memory, however, I took 
 large notes of what I had read in the antient writers upon philofophy, 
 to which I joined fome obfervations and explanations of my own. 
 And in this manner I had written a great deal before I refolved to pu- 
 blifti : But, finding that thefe notes could be of little ufe, even to my- 
 felf, unlefs they were put in foiiie order, and fair copies made of them, 
 1 thought the beft amanuenfis I could employ for that purpofe was a 
 printer ; and, as they may be of fome ufe to thofe who are difpofed to 
 philofophize in a better manner than is ufual at prefent, and to employ 
 
 their 
 
 * Cicero. Academ. Quaeft. lib. i. cap. 2.
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 Ill 
 
 their thoughts upon the nobleft fubjeds that can fill the mind of man, 
 I have given them to the public, hoping that every one, who takes the 
 trouble to read them, will at leaft be convinced, that the philofophers 
 of antiquity have not beflowed fo much time and labour upon thefe 
 high fubjeds to no purpofe. 
 
 The authors I have chiefly followed are, Plato and Arlftotle, toge- 
 ther with the later philofophers of the Alexandrian School, fuch as, 
 Plotinus, Porphyry, Jamblichus, Ammonius Hermeias, and his fcho- 
 lars, Simplicius and Johannes Philoponus, the two bed commentators 
 upon Ariftotle ; likewife Proclus, who was thought to underftand the 
 philofophy of Plato fo well, that he was dignified with the title of his 
 fuccejfor. As the writings of thefe later philofophers are very rare, and 
 themlelves but little known, I propofe, in a future volume, (if I live 
 to publifh another), to give fome account of them, and, at the fame 
 time, a Ihort hiftory of this philofophy. 
 
 I fhould think myfelf ungrateful, if I did not acknowledge my obli- 
 gations to one modern author, of whom I have made much ufe. It 
 is-Dr Cudworth, author of ' The true intelleftual Syflcm of the 
 * Uni'verfe.^ Ke is more learned in the whole antient philofophy, the 
 older as well as the later, than any modern author I know : And the 
 ftyle in which he writes is copious and learned, very different from 
 the fafliionable llyle of this age. The book is at prefent little 
 known, and hardly read by any body. Before it fell into my hands, 
 I had formed my fyftem, which 1 was exceedingly pleafed to find a- 
 grecd fo well with the Doctor's. And, indeed, it is no wonder that 
 it {liould, confidering that they are both drawn from the fame 
 fources. I was particularly pleafed that he agreed with me in what I 
 have laid down as a fundamental principle, that body cannot move it- 
 felf, and, therefore, what moves body mud be incorporeal *. He 
 
 a 2 has 
 
 * Cudworth, page 888.
 
 iv PREFACE. 
 
 has alfo fupported very well my opinion, that there is in every part 
 of nature an adive prinriple operating for a certain end, but with- 
 out confcioufnefs or knowledge ot that end. This is his plajllc nature^ 
 as he calls it ; and it was hearing of it that firft gave me the curiofity 
 of looking into his book. 
 
 There is another modern author by whom I have likewife been af- 
 filed, Mr Baxter, the author of the treatife upon the Immortality of 
 the Human Soul. This author is learned in the modern philofophy ; 
 nor is he unlearned in the antient. Though I do not agree with him 
 in every particular, as 1 do with Cudworth, I think his work has a 
 great deal of merit, and is a fyftem of pure Theifm, proceeding upon 
 that grand principle above mentioned, that body cannot move it- 
 felf. 
 
 As far as Mr Harris has gone in this metaphyfical philofophy, there 
 was nothing further to be done : And, accordingly, I have referred 
 to him for the particular explanation of the feveral categories or 
 predicaments, and have only made feme general obfcrvations upon 
 them. 
 
 Thefe are the authors by whom I have been affiiled in this work. 
 As to the authors who have written in fupport of Atheifm and irrell- 
 gion, 1 have taken very little notice of any of them, except one, who 
 lay fo much in my way, that I could not have pafled him by, with^ 
 out afFedation — I mean Mr David Hume> the author of the Eflays, 
 Moral, Political, and Philofophical. I have, however, fuch an aver- 
 'fion to controverfial writing, that, I believe, 1 fliould not have 
 made any particular anfwer, even to him, but have allowed his im- 
 piety to be buried with him, if he hlmfelf had been contented with 
 that, and had not, even after death, endeavoured to continue ftill 
 his vain triumph over religion, having left, by way of legacy to 
 the public, certain works, to be publilhed by his executors, more
 
 PREFACE. V 
 
 impious, if poflible, according to my information, than any that 
 he publifhed during his life *. When an author of fo great repu- 
 tation among certain perfons, and whofe tenets, I am forry to fay, 
 have got a very faft hold of many, ignorant of antient learning, and 
 knowing nothing of philofophy but what they have learned from 
 fome late French and Englifh books — when fuch an author, 1 fay, that 
 has been fo much celebrated and praifed, both alive and dead, fhows 
 fo much zeal in the caufe of Atheifm, I (hould have been thought to 
 have betrayed the caufe of Theifm, if I had not taken particular 
 
 notice 
 
 * Since writing the above, I have feen two fpccimens of his pofthumous im- 
 piety ; at lead, they were put into my hands as virrittea by him, though I have 
 been told finee, that his friends deny them to be his ; which indeed I am 
 not furpriled at j but I am convinced that they belong to him, not only from 
 the matter, but the ftyle, which is dry, inanimate, and without the leaft co* 
 louring of claflical elegance. One of them is a treatife upon Suicide, which 
 was printed many years ago, but not then publifhed, for reafons that arc 
 pretty well known. The other is a Difcourfe on the mortality of the Sou!. 
 In both thefe, the author throws off the mafk of fcepticifm, and, in the firfl mentioned, 
 he dogmatically maintains, that ^ man is at liberty to go out of this world whenever 
 he thinks proper ; and, in the oiher^ with as little ceremony, and as pofitively, main- 
 tains, that the human foul is as mortal as the body that it inhabits : For proof 
 of which, his chief argument arifes from confounding fenfat.ons and ideas, the 
 fundamental prmciple, as I have obferved, of his whole philofophy ; for he there af- 
 ferts, that the mind operates only by the organs of the body, that is, the fenfts, and 
 that it cannot aO; but in conjunction with the body : And, indeed, were that true, 
 it would be impofTible, as I have faid, (p. 200. and 227 ) that philofophy could fur- 
 nifi-i any convincing proof of the feparate exiftence of the foul. And, in general, I 
 obferve, that the foundation of all Atheifm is a total ignorance of the philofophy of 
 Mind, foa« to be unable to diftinguifli betwixt the operations of Mind in ccnjunc- 
 tion with body, and its operations by itfelf. There is a third work of his, not ytt 
 printed, at leafl that I know, but which has been feen in manufcript by feveral, ani 
 which, I have been told, is worfe, if polTible, than any of the other two, or than any 
 thing he publifhed during his life ; for there the being of a God is denied more ex. 
 plicitly than by Spinofa, or any Atheifl of modern times, except it be the author of thf 
 Syfleme de la Nature.
 
 VI 
 
 R E F 
 
 notice of his arguments. At the fame time, I know that there is 
 an anfwer already written to him, which I have read with a great 
 deal of pieafure, where the abfurdities of his philofophy are cx- 
 pofed with much pleafantry, and made to appear as ridiculous as 
 they really are : And, though I know that he and his friends have 
 complained much of the ftyle of this anfwer, it is, 1 think, with- 
 out any reafon ; for a man, who had infulted fo much the rehgion of 
 his country, and had been fo rude and ill-bred as to publilh, that no 
 man could be a Chriftian, unlefs the whole principles of his under- 
 Handing were fubverted *, was not enticled to be treated even with the 
 regard which Dr Beattie has fliewn him. But, as many people, I 
 know, wanted a more ferious and phiiofophical anfwer to Mr Hume's 
 arguments, though I thought Dr Beattie's anfv^er was all that they 
 deferved ; yet, that nothing might be wanting in fuch a caufe, I have 
 given an anfwer ftridlly phiiofophical, and fuch as, I think, muft fatif- 
 fy every one who will take the trouble to ftudy and underftand it. In 
 this anfwer, though I have treated his opinions with the greateft free- 
 dom, and given them the epithets which they deferve, I have abftained 
 from that illiberal abufe, which no zeal, even in the beft caufe, can ju- 
 i^ify. 
 
 There are, I knew, who think that fuch authors are beft treated 
 w.ith contempt and negled, and that, to anfwer them, may do more ill 
 than good : But, when their writings are read and admired by per- 
 fons of rank and condition — when their opinions are adopted by men 
 of fcience, it is time for every good man, and lover of his country, to 
 take the alarm. I think it is impoffible that any man of common 
 fenfe can really believe, whatever he may profefs, that religion, as 
 well as government, is not abfolutely neceffary for men living in fo- 
 ciety. Now, it is well known, that opinions, as well as manners and 
 cuftoms, defcend from the better fort of people, in every country, to 
 the lower fort, and fo become univerfally prevalent. ' To the difbelief, 
 
 there- 
 * EfTay on Miracles, towards the end.
 
 PREFACE. vli 
 
 therefore, and negled of religion, among perfons cf high rank, in 
 Britain, may, I think, fairly be afcribed that irreligion, and the confe- 
 quent corruption of manners, which diftinguilh more, I am afraid, 
 than any thing elfe, the commonality of this ifland from the fame 
 rank of men in any other nation in Europe, and which, if not fooa 
 checked, muft end in the dellrudion of the nation. 
 
 It might have been expeded that I fhould have taken more particular 
 notice of the arguments that have been ufed againft natural religion, by 
 fome other writers, both French and Britlih : Bat I hope I have fur- 
 nilhed principles fufficient to anfwer them all. And, befides, 1 mufc 
 confefs the truth, that, though I have looked a little into thofe authors, 
 their ftyle, as well as their matter, is fo different from that of the au- 
 thors I am accuflomed to read, that 1 had not patience to read them 
 with the attention which is neceflary to make a particular anfwer to 
 them. Another reafon is, that, as this work is intended more for 
 pofterity, than the prefent age, 1 did not think proper to mix with it a 
 controverfy with authors, whofe writings, if I may venture to pro- 
 phecy, will be quite forgotten in not many years, however they may 
 flatter themfelves with not only the continuance, but the increaie of. 
 their literary fame. 
 
 The fafhionable reader, accuftomed to a fair and neat margin, noJ" 
 fullied by references and quotations, will be much difgufted by feeing 
 the bottom of luy page fo loaded vv-ith authorities from learned au- 
 thors ; and he will particularly be offended with the pedantry of my 
 Greek quotations, in which, 1 own, 1 abound ; becaufe they not on- 
 ly ferve for authorities, in fupport of what I advance, but exprel's my 
 meaning much better than 1 can do in hnglilh. What others can do 
 in philofophy, without the help of learning, by the force of genius 
 merely, I cannot tell : For my own part, I am not afhamed to make 
 the fame confeffion which Cicero made, * That, dillrufting my natu- 
 
 *ral
 
 Vlll 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 * t^\ abilities, I have fought the afliftance of learning t»* ^^^ o^ 
 the fame learning to which Cicero applied, I mean the Greek 
 learning. Now, the Greek learning is not to be underftood 
 without the Greek language ; and 1 Ihould deceive my reader, 
 if I did not let him know, that, without at lead a competent know- 
 ledge of that language, he can never underftand the Greek philofo- 
 phy. This, I know, will be a very difagreeable truth to the gene- 
 rality of my readers, who may think that, by the fupcriority of their 
 genius, jomed with the ftudy of French, Englifh, or, perhaps, La- 
 tin books, they may become philofophers ; but, as I do not write to 
 flatter vanity and indolence, I muft be forgiven to tell them, that, if 
 they are neither Greek fcholars, nor will take the trouble of beco- 
 ming fuch, they ought to give over thoughts of philofophy. If they 
 are curious about the hiftory of nature, the modern difcoveries will 
 furnifh them a great deal of that kind, more than was known to the 
 antients ; and they may be very good geometers, aftronomers, and 
 learned in mechanics, without knowing a word of either Greek or 
 Latin : But, in philofophy, I have never known any man fucceed 
 izvho was not a fcholar. 
 
 I hope, therefore, that this work will have the effed of ma- 
 king thole, who take the trouble to read it, and who are not 
 Greek fcholars, defire, at leaft, to be fuch; and will perfuade 
 thofe who have already learned the language of the Greeks, to 
 apply it to the ftudy of their philofophy ; or, if it fhould have 
 neither of thefe cfFedts, it may, at leaft, ferve to diminifh vani- 
 ty, and to hinder men from thinking themfelves philofophers, be- 
 caufe they may happen to be learned in natural hiftory, experimental 
 men, mathematicians, or aftronomers. 
 
 Upon 
 
 * Pro Lucio Muraena, cap. 30.
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 IX 
 
 Upon the whole, however ill this work may be generally received, 
 I have no reafon to complain of the ingratitude of the public, as I 
 frankly own that it was chiefly for my own lake that 1 compofed it, 
 
 Condo et compono quae mox depromere poflum j 
 
 I lay up, like the bee, for the winter— —of old age, which is co- 
 ming faft upon me, when 1 could not have made fuch a collection 
 as this ; but, even then, I hope to be able to enjoy it, and to ipend 
 the laft years of my life in the ftudy, of all others the moft befit- 
 ting a man who is foon to enter into the world of fpirits, 1 mean, 
 the contemplation of the Great Spirit, and of the Wifdom, 
 Gooduefs, and Power, manifefted ia his Works. 
 
 ^ INTRODUCTIOR
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 WH A T I propofe, in this Work, is to revive antientTheifm, 
 particularly the theifm of Placo and Ariftotle, which, like the 
 greateft part of antient philofophy, is almoft intirely loft in this age. 
 The confequence of this is, that our modern philofophers, even fuch 
 of them as are theifts, make their fyftem of Nature much too mecha- 
 nical ; for they phyftologife without Mind ; and, though they allow 
 that Mind was neceffary at firft to produce this univerfe, and fet it a- 
 going, they think it may go on without Mind, by the powers of Mat- 
 ter and Mechanifm merely : Whereas the antients thought, that the 
 operations of Nature could no more go on without the conftant and 
 unremitting agency of Mind, than an univerfe could have been at firft 
 produced without Mind. 
 
 Modern theifm may be divided into two kinds ; the firft is that of 
 Dcs Cartes, the French philofopher. He admits the exiftencc of an in- 
 corporeal Deity akogether feparated from Matter, whom he makes the 
 author of the univerfe, and all things in it, and beftows on him all 
 thofe perfedions of Goodnefs, Wifdom, and Intelligence, which are 
 commonly afcribed to him. This is his theology : But his phyfiology 
 is abfolute materialifm ; for, rejeQing all final caufes, and fo exclu- 
 ding Intelligence and defign from the fyftem of the univerfe, he de- 
 rives every thing from Matter once fet in motion by the Deity, by 
 which he accounts not only for the formation and motion of the ce- 
 ieftial bodies, but the organization and fuccelfive generation of animals 
 
 a and
 
 n 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 and plants, and even the Inftind of brutes, by which they preferre 
 the individuals, and continue the race in fo wonderful a manner *• 
 
 The other fyftem of Modern theifm is that of Sir Ifaac Newton. 
 His philofophy is not fo comprehenfive as the philofophy of Des 
 Cartes ; for he does not meddle with plants or animals here on 
 earth, except that he has faid, that fenfation, and the fpontane- 
 ous movement of animals, are produced by 2ijubtilcfpirit'\ : Bitt 
 he has nowhere faid, nor do I believe he thought,, that the 
 bodies of plants or animals are the work of mere matter and me- 
 chanifm. It is with the ftars chiefly that his philofophy is conver- 
 fant ; and, with refpedt to them, he admits that they were formed by 
 Almighty Power and Wifdom, and alfo put in motion ; but, being 
 once fet agoing, he maintains that they go on of themfelves by the 
 power of matter and mechanifm merely, without the agency of 
 Mind J. 
 
 The antient fyftem of theifm, which I here prefent to tlie reader, is. 
 ^cry different from either of thofe two above mentioned. It proceeds 
 upon this principle, that Mind is the author of all the motion in the 
 univerfe, which, though it may be continued and propagated by ihe 
 impulfe of Body upon Body, muft have originated from Mind : So- 
 that all Bodies are moved by Mind, either mediately or immediately ;, 
 and, therefore, when Body is moved, and it cannot be fliown to be 
 moved by the impulfe of another Body, it muft neceflarlly be fuppofed- 
 to be moved immediately and diredly by Mind. The confequence of 
 this principle is, that, as the motions of animals, vegetables, and vari- 
 ous other motions upon earth, cannot be accounted for from any ma- 
 terial 
 
 • Sec what I have further faid concerning Des Cartes's philofophy in the Diflerta- 
 
 tion annexed to this rolume. 
 t Principia^ in fine. 
 % See aho, concerning this philofophy, the DiflTcrtation annexed.
 
 INTRODUCTION. iii 
 
 terlal and mechanical caufe, they muft be fuppofed to be produced by 
 Mind. In the heavens, tbefe philofophers proceeded in the fame man- 
 ner as on earth : And, as the motions of the celeftial bodies cannot 
 be accounted for by any material and mechanical caiifes, they maintain- 
 -ed, that they are moved diredly and immediately by Mind, without 
 having recourle to hypothefes of gravitating and projedile forces. 
 
 This antient fyftem has this advantage over the Newtonian, that it 
 is more univerfal ; fo univerfal, that it is well entitled to the name of 
 philojophy^ and thtfrji philofophyy as it explains the principle of all 
 motion, and all produdion in the heavens and in the earth. 
 
 Nor are we to imagine that, becaufe the antients made Mind the 
 ^reat agent in Nature, and an eflential part of the fyftem of Nature, 
 they did therefore confound phyftology and theology ; but, on the con- 
 trary, they diftinguifhed, I think properly, betwixt the two, and 
 fet the proper bounds to each of them, making theology to be the 
 dodrine of Mind feparated from all Body, while phyftology explains 
 the operation of Mind in Body, by which all the natural operations are 
 produced, either immediately, or by the intervention of other bodies; 
 for it cannot he denied that there is a great deal of tnechamjm in Na- 
 ture, that ia, motion produced by the adion of Body upon Body. 
 
 With refped to Experimental Philofophy, as it is called, I am very 
 far from denying the ufe of it ; but I would have the gentlemen who 
 value themfelves fo much upon this kind of manual philofophy, todl- 
 ftingulfh betwixt the phaenomena and the principles of Nature, and 
 not Imagine that the latter, as well as the former, are objeds of fenfe, 
 to be dlfcovered by chymical analyfis, or feen through a microfcopc. 
 They (hould confider themfelves as the hiftorians of Nature, who, by 
 great attention, and minute obfervation, inveftigate fads which efcapc 
 
 a 2 the
 
 iv INTRODUCTION. 
 
 the vulgar, andjmay be called the anecdotes^ or fecret hijlory^ of Nctturc, 
 But hiftory and philofophy are two things very different ; though, I 
 admit, that, without the knowledge of fads, it is impofTible to form 
 •any fyftem of natural philofophy that is not a mere dream, being no 
 other than the imaginations of men, in place of the wifdorn of God. 
 But nothing deferves the name of philofophy except what explains the 
 caufes and principles of things ; and, therefore, as the niaterial world 
 is all in motion, and every thing in it produced and preferved by mo- 
 tion, it is the chief bufinefs of natural philofophy to (how what is the 
 principle of this motion, by which all the operatipns of nature are car- 
 ried on. This principle is, according to my philofophy. Mind, which, 
 operating in Body, and direding its movements, is what I call Na^ 
 ture. To diflinguifh the different kinds of this Mind, according to its 
 different operations in bodies organized and unorganized, and to (how 
 how thofe operations differ from one another, belongs to the philojo' 
 phy of Nature : And, as it is impofhble to conceive that Mind 
 can do any thing without an end or purpofe, being either itfelf intel- 
 ligent, or diredled by intelligence, it is a principal part of this fcience, 
 and, I think, the mofl delightful part of it, to inveftigate final caufes, 
 and to fhow, if poffible, of what ufe every thing in the fyflem is, and 
 how conducive to the harmony and beauty of the whole. But fince, 
 as I have faid. Mind not only moves Body immediately, but by the in- 
 tervention of other bodies, that is, by mechanifm, it belongs to the 
 natural philofopher to difcover by what laws matter thus operates up- 
 on matter ; and with what force, and in what diredlion, bodies impel 
 one another ; and what relation the time bodies are in motion, their 
 velocity, and the fnace they go through, have to one another. This 
 is difcovered by a proper application oi- geometry to the motion of bo- 
 dies ; and, in this way, tuathematics are of fingular ufe, not only in the 
 arts of life, but in the philofophy of Nature. But, if a mathematician 
 goes farther, and irjquires concerning the principle of motion, and the 
 operations of Mind \n body, or feparated from Body, he goes out of 
 his fcience, and incroaches upon the province of the natural philofo- 
 
 pher,
 
 INTRODUCTION, r 
 
 ph^r, or the metaphyfician. To the metaphyfician it belongs, as I have 
 faid, to treat of Mind leparate from body, or, at leaft, operating fepa- 
 tately. Of this latter kind, there is one that we know moft intimately, 
 which, though not feparated from body at preient, is, by its nature, 
 reparable, and does adually operate feparatelv, even in this ftate of its 
 exiftence — I mean the human foul ; the iludy of which, therefore, is 
 of the greateft importance ; not only in refped of religion and mora- 
 lity, but of theology or thefrj philofophy ; as ir is only by the diligent 
 ftudy of it we can ever attain to any knowledge of the Supreme 
 Mind. 
 
 And here we may obferve by what regular fteps the antients afcend- 
 ed to that Supreme Mind, the contemplation of which is the end of all 
 philofophy. They began with that loweft Mind, or Motive Principle, 
 which is in all phyfical bodies, unorganized as well as organized. 
 From thence they proceeded to the Motive Principle in the vegetable and 
 the animal ; and from the animal or fenfitive Nature, they afcended to the 
 rational and intellectual Nature of man ; and, by ftudying this, the di- 
 vine part, in our nature, they attained, as far as human capacity could 
 attain, to the knowledge of what is moft exalted in the univerfe, and 
 at the top of the pyramid. Thus, proceeding regularly through Phy- 
 fics, and never lofing fight of Mind, they came, at laft, in the natural 
 order of things, to Metaphyfics, and that part of it which is the fum- 
 mit of philofophy, and of all human knowledge, I mean Theology. 
 The progrefs of the moderns in thefe fpeculatioas is not fo regular ; 
 for, without going through Phyfics, we endeavour to rife at once to the 
 higheft regions of Metaphyfics, or, if we take Phyfics in our way, it 
 is a kind of Phyfics in which Mind is almoft wholly laid afide, and 
 Matter and Mechanifm fubltituted in its place. And it is this pre- 
 pofterous way of (ludying Metaphyfics which has produced fuch wild 
 and extravagant notions, and brought fo great a difgrace upon the 
 nobleft of all fciences. 
 
 The
 
 571 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 The reader who is not acquainted ^ith antient philofophy, and 
 has not comprehenfive views of Nature, will be lurprifed that I 
 ihould call by the name of Mind, that principle of motion, which 
 Tuns through all Nature, and is in all bodies, unorganized as weli as 
 organized. He will readily allow that it is Mind that novcs our bo- 
 dies : He will not, perhaps, difpute with me, that the brutes have 
 Minds of a certain kind: The motive principle in the vegetable, if he 
 do not mairrtain its movements to be altogether material and mecha- 
 nical, he will call Life, not Mind. As to the motion in unorgani- 
 zed bodies, he will believe, if he be a materialift, that matter has 
 the power of moving itfelf ; or, fuppofing that he is a theift, and be- 
 lieves that the Deity is the origin of all motion, he will have no 
 idea that Mind is the immediate caufe of the movement of thofe ina- 
 nimate bodies, as they are commonly called. But, as all things in this 
 unlverfe either move or are moved, what moves I have called MzW, 
 what is moved, 1 call Body ; and thus, I have made a twofold divifion 
 of the univerfity of things, which is better, I think, than a threefold 
 divifion, into Mijid, Life, and Body ; and I have given a definition 
 of each of the members of my divifion perfedly agreeable to the na« 
 ture of things. 
 
 What I deliver here as the thelfm of Plato and Arlftotle, is much 
 more antient than thofe philofophers, and, for any thing I know, the 
 moft antient philofophy in the world. It undoubtedly came to them 
 from the fchool of Pythagoras ; but it certainly was not invented by 
 him, but brought by him from Egypt. There it took its rife among 
 the colleges of priefts, men fequeflered from the world, and confecrated 
 to religion and learning, who muft have made an extraordinary pro- 
 grefs in philofophy, and every other fcience, by uninterrupted ftudy, 
 continued from father to fon, during a long fucceflion of ages, far ex- 
 ceeding, in length of time, the period, not only of arts and fciences, 
 but of civilization, ia any part of Europe — That, not only philofophy, 
 .but all arts and fciences, came originally from Egypt into Europe, c- 
 
 vcn
 
 INTRODUCTION, til 
 
 ven the neceffary arts of life, Is a fa£t well known to thofe who are 
 learned in the hiftory of learning ; and, particularly, this univerfal 
 philofophy was firft imported into Greece, under the veil of myftery, 
 by Orpheus, and other myftagogues, and revealed only to thofe who 
 were thought worthy of being initiated into their folemn myfteries, 
 fuch as the Eleufinian and Samothracian. It was delivered more plainly, 
 and, I believe, more fully, by Pythagoras, and cultivated in colleges 
 inftituted by him in Magna Graecia^ upon the model, no doubt, of the 
 colleges of priefts in Egypt* After the deftrudion and difperiion of 
 thefe Pythagorean colleges in Italy, fome fragments of this philofophy, 
 like fcattered planks of a (hipwreck, were collected and preferved by 
 Plato and Ariftotle, and their commentators of later times ; fome of 
 \5thom were particularly induftrious in coUedting the few remains that 
 were then to be found of the Pythagorean fchool. All the merit, 
 therefore, that I pretend to, is that of having ftudied diligently what is 
 yet to be found of this moft antient philofophy, the moft valuable re- 
 mains of antiquity, according to my judgment, that have efcaped the 
 ravages of time and barbarity. 
 
 Metaphyfics, I know, are, at prefent, in great difrepute among met> 
 of fenfe, from the ufe that, of late years, has been made of them. 
 Young men,, who get a little fmattering of this fcience, are apt to abufe 
 it very much, difputing againft every thing, even the cleared truths, 
 and, like puppies, (to ufe an expreflion of Plato,) pulling and tearing 
 whatever they can lay hold of. Some elderly men, too, of little learn- 
 ing, and much vanity, afFed to diftinguifh themfelves by fingular opi. 
 nlons, and refuting all vulgar notions ; among which they reckon 
 thebehef in God and his providence. But the metaphyfics I here deliver 
 are of a very different kind, and which, therefore, I have entitled Antient 
 Metapyhftcs, where, it is hoped, the reader will find nothing adverfe, ei- 
 ther to natural or revealed religion ; But, on the contrary, I truft that, 
 from thofe antieat mafters, I have learned the pureft theology, and 
 
 auii,
 
 viii INTRODUCTION. 
 
 fhall, upon their principles, be able to eftablifh, not only the great 
 truths of natural religion, but fome of the fundamental dodrines of 
 Chriftianity. 
 
 The work will be divided into three parts. T\\tfirjl of which, con- 
 tained in this volume, will explain the fubjed of Metaphyfics, its na-, 
 ture, and extent, and will lay down the general principles of the 
 fcience. 
 
 In \\\tJecQnd part, I propofe to treat of Man ; and, through Man, 
 to proceed to God and Nature ; which will be the fubjed of my third 
 and lajl part. 
 
 In the fecond part, I propofe to confider Man in a more extenfive 
 view than he has hitherto been confidered by writers upon morals and 
 politics, not only as a fpecies of animal by himfelf, but as a part of 
 the fyftem of the univerfe, and containing in himfelf a type, as it 
 were, or model of the whole fyftem ; for, it was an antient notion, and 
 which, I think, I have (hown to be true, even in this part of my work, 
 ' That man is, in himfelf, a little world, being compofed, not only of 
 
 * the four elements, but of the vegetable, the animal, and the intellec- 
 
 * tual life.' And, in that part of my work, I hope to make it appear, 
 that what I have advanced in another work is true, * That it would 
 
 * not be according to the order of Nature, if thefe three fhould operate 
 ' at once in Man, but that there muft neceflarily be a progrefs from 
 
 * the 'vegetable to the animal^ and from the a7iimal to the intelle^ualy 
 
 * not only in the individual^ but in ihQ fpecies.* 
 
 The.firft part of my work, contained in this volume, is divided in- 
 to five Books, The firft gives an account of the nature of the fcience, 
 explains what Body, Mind, and'^Motion, are, and gives the definitions 
 of feveral other terms ufed in this work. 
 
 In
 
 INTRODUCTION. ix 
 
 In the fecond book, 1 treat of the conftituting and elementary prin- 
 ciples of fhis univerfe ; or, in other words, of the ttficient and Maieri- 
 al Caules. And, under this head, I have Ipoken very largely of Mind, 
 the prime efficient caule ot every tning in the univerfe. 
 
 The fubj ft of the third book is the Categories, or the Univerfal 
 Formal Caules of all things in Nature. 
 
 The fourth book treats of thofe Adjunfts of Nature, Time, Space, 
 and Place. 
 
 The ffth book treats of the principles of Science and Certainty, and 
 defends them againft the cavils of fophifts and fceptics, both an- 
 tient and modern. 
 
 I intended to have added a fixth book, containing the Hiftory of this 
 Philofophy, and giving iome account of the authors who have treated 
 of It : But this 1 referve for the fecond part of my work ; and, in place 
 of it, I have fubjoined, by way of Appendix, a DilTertation upon the 
 Principles of the Newtonian Philofophy. 
 
 A N T IE N T
 
 A N T I E N 
 
 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 ^><xxxx>o<><x><><xxxxxxxxxx:§|!><><:^x>o<xxxxx><><><x 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Of the fuhjeB of Metaphyfics — All Things in Nature either Body or 
 jVlmd — SubjeB of Phyfics is Body joined ivith Mind — Siihjedl of 
 Metaphyfics is Mind by it/elf 
 
 Etaphysics is a fcience fo abftrufe, and fo remote from com- 
 mon apprehenfion, that even the fubjed of it is not ealily 
 underftood by thofe who are not accuftomed to abilrad thinking. 
 And, accordingly, I obferve, that Ariilotle, in more than one paflagc 
 of his metaphyfics, has been at great pains to explain what his fub- 
 jecl is, and, for that pnrpofe, has n.ade feveral nice difiinaions, of 
 which I wll not take notice at prefent ; but w^ill fet out with one 
 which ^s obvious, and made by every one j 1 mean the diOinaion be- 
 twixt body and ndnd -, and which, at the fame time, is mod compre- 
 henfive; for every thing in nature is either body or mind, or their ac- 
 
 A cidents.
 
 2 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book I. 
 
 cidents *. All the fubjeds of human knowledge, however various, 
 may be referred to one or other of thefe heads. 
 
 Aiinci exifts either by itfelf, or joined with body: For I differ fo much 
 in opinion from thofe philofophers, who think there Is nothing elfe 
 ejilfting but body, that T hold there is BOt in the whole univerfe,/ as 
 far as our knowledge extends, any bodj without mind. Mind^ there- 
 fore, according to the philofophy I have been taught, pervades the u- 
 niverfe, mixes with, and informs every body in it, and produces all 
 the various motions by which the fyftem of nature is carried on. 
 
 Deum namque ire per omncs 
 
 Terrafque, tradlufque maris, coelumque profundum. 
 
 And again, 
 
 -— totamque, infufa per artus, 
 
 Mens agitat moleiji, et magno fe corpore niifcet. Virg. 
 
 The Divinity we conceive to be pure energy ; and it is by ading 
 and energifing that every thing in nature partakes more or lefs of 
 divinity. Nothing, therefore, is dead or fenfelefs ; but all full of life 
 and motion. 
 
 It was in this way that the great philofophers of antiq^uity di- 
 vided the univerfity of things ; for all things exiiling, they faid, 
 
 were 
 
 * I ufe the word accident in the moft general A;nre, to denote every quality, pro- 
 perty, aftion, or operation of any fuhjiance^ whether eflential to it, or what is common- 
 ly called accidental. The meaning ot the word is much better exprefl'cd by the Greek 
 word c-v,t4S;S>i'cef, denoting every thing that accompanies, or goes along with JubflancCy 
 than by the Latin word accidens^ from which ours is derived- 
 
 This divifion of all things into body and mind is given by Plato in the Epinoinisy 
 page I CIO. editio Ficiniy where he adds, that there is no third thing diflmtl from ei- 
 ther, all things being either body or mind.
 
 Chap. I. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 3 
 
 were either feparated from matter^ or united with it *. And, accor- 
 ding to this divifion of things, they divided fpecidative ph'ilofophy^ 
 which, they faid, was either phyfics^ the fubjed: whereof were 
 things infeparablefrom matter^ both as they exifted in nature, and ac- 
 cording to our conception of them ; — or rnetaphyfics^ the fubjedl of 
 which was, what is entirely feparated from viatter^ both in its own 
 nature, and according to our conception of it ")'. 
 
 Betwixt thefe they placed a third fcience, viz. Mathematics ; the fub- 
 je(Sl of which Vas, what did not exlft feparated from matter In its 
 own nature, but was, by the ad: of our minds, abftracted from mat- 
 ter^ and confidercd as exiPiing feparately : So that it was in one rc- 
 fpedl feparated from matter^ in another not feparated ; and, therefore, 
 was confidered by the antients as a fcience lying betwixt the other 
 two, and participating in fome fort of each. Of this kind they confi- 
 dered number Sindfgure to be ; the firft, being the fubje<5l of arithme- 
 tic, the fecond of geometry J, 
 
 Mind, 
 
 * The former of thefe Ariftotle calls x'^^cttcc, or uv.v r-za vxvig. The other he calls 
 ■«;)ij«g<ff-T6«, or ^iru. ryii Cxyh. Arifl. mctaphyf. lib. 6. chap. i. 
 
 t Ariflotle, ibid. Where he fays, that the fubjeds of phyfics are, both by their na- 
 ture, and by our conceptions of them, fo much joined with matter^ that we cannot 
 define them, or give any account of them without it. For, fays he, we cannot tell 
 -what bone, flefli, a root, a leaf, bark, or, in general, what an animal or vegetable 
 is, without taking into our confideration the matter of which they are compofed, as 
 well as the form. 
 
 X See Ariftotle in the paffage above quoted. See alfo Ammonius Hermeius's in- 
 troduftion to his comnuntary upon the ^ve ivcrds of Pcij.hyry, where he has ex- 
 plained this whole matter very fully and diflindly. Among other things, he tells u^, 
 that the mind, contemplating a circle, for example, of wood, or brafs, takes off, as 
 it were, i\\e foryn of it, without the matter^ as wax takes the impreflion of a feal : 
 
 '><iu. ii\ -^fiiTi^Yi y.ai ix,o^ui)i Tcoi^' U-jtoh ^i^.'^ t«; vAi;j, ucrvf^ei xt^^of ;.«€»/ To iKTwrufta rev ^kktv
 
 4 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book I. 
 
 MinJy therefore, pure ??imJf intirely feparate from body and 
 its attributes, is the proper liibjedl of the fcie'nce I call metaphyfics. 
 And here we may obfcrve the reafon of the name given by Ariftotle 
 to the books in -which he treats of this fcience ; thefe he. calls 
 ^^iTx T« (pvv.^x, or, as we have tranOated it, metaphyftcs^ im[)orting, 
 that the fubjccl of it is fornething tranfcendent, or beyond 'phy- 
 Jicsy and that the ftudy of it ftiould come in order after phy- 
 ftcs. For, it is evident, that, as in this Hate of our exiftence, 
 all our knowledge originates from our fenfes, we can have no idea of 
 pure m'lmU but by obferving its operations in body. The only foun- 
 dation, therefore, upon which metaphyfics can properly reft, is phyfics ; 
 the fubjedt of which, as I have faid, is a compound of body and mind. 
 
 Thofe, 
 
 >.<9t;, ^i) -Tr^nr-KaXut ri t»j vAjjj. And, with refpe£l to mathematics, he fays, they arc very 
 properly placed betwixt material qx phyfical entities, and immaterial ox divine^ as he calls 
 them, becaufe it is thro' them that we are to pafs from the former to the latter ; and, from 
 that ufe of them, they are called, he fays, ftuin^xTx^ as it is by them we are taught to 
 afcend from material things to immaterial and divine : Aias rovro yx^ xa:< /^ci^nuxrx m- 
 
 yevrxtf en oh t«iit« fixv^xyovTxe kxi i&ic-hvTu? v««v xcu^xra^y uvxyicSui tTirt tx &h». And 
 
 he gives us, upon this occafion, a very fine quotation from Plotinus, who fays, that 
 the youth fliould be taught mathematics, in order to accuftom them to the contem- 
 plation of immaterial natures ; for, if we were to pafs immediately from phyfics to 
 metaphyfics or theology, we fhould be dazzled and blinded, like thofe who come at 
 once out of a dark houfe into a great light. We ought, therefore, to (lay fome time 
 in a place moderately lighted, and from thenc. pafs into the great light. See a great 
 deal faid to the fame purpofe by Proclus in his commentary upon the firft book of 
 Euclid. This I would have obferved by our modern philofophers, who feem to va- 
 lue geometry too much for its own fake ; or, if they make any ufe of it, it is only 
 by applying it to hcdy. And, indeed, the whole of our natural philofophy at pre- 
 fent appears to be nothing more than the obfervation of the phaenomena of nature, 
 which I call natural hijiory.., not philofophy ; or the application of geometry to the 
 motion of bodies. But, fo far from making the ufe the antients made of it, to e« 
 levatethe mind to the contemplation of fuperior natures, I fufpe£l many of thofe phi- 
 lofophers do not believe that any fuch natures exift, and are fo much converfant with 
 extcujioa and its properties, as to imagine that nothing exills which is not ex- 
 tended.
 
 Chap. I. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 5 
 
 Thofe, therefore, who ridictile the noblefl: of all fciences, under the 
 name of nictaphyfic^ not only do not know the nature of the fclence, 
 but appear to me, not to underftand even the title of Ariflotle's books 
 which treat of it, but to imagine that it has fome connedion with 
 what we call in Englifh phyfic. 
 
 It is called by Ariftotle the jirfi philofophy \ becaufe, though it 
 be laft in the order of human knowledge, on account of the weaknefs 
 of our iuhid^ and its neceffary progrefs from objedts of fenfe to thofc 
 of intelledt, it is firfl: in the order of nature, as treating of what is 
 higheft in nature *, and comprehending, as we fhall afterwards fee^ 
 the principles of nature and of all arts and fciences. 
 
 The proper fubjed, then, of metaphyfics is mind^ pure and fepa- 
 ratejrom all matter. But there are alfo other things comprehended 
 under this fcience, and which fhall be explained in the fequel. F4)r, 
 as I obferved in the beginning of this chapter, it is a fcience of which 
 even the fubjed is not eafily, or at once, to be explained. 
 
 * Arlftot. metaphyf. lib. 6. chap, i. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 •6 A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I C S. Book!. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Defiiition of Body and Mind — Definitions of Body gi'ven by modern 
 Philofophers not proper — Definitions here gi'uen agree '7.vitJj thofe gi- 
 ven hy Plato and Arifiotle — Ohje6lions to thefe Dcfnitious anfiwered — 
 Impropriety of the EnglfJj Language ixrith refpecJ to the life of the 
 Word Move. — Inconfifience of Mr Locke upon the Suhje6i (s/Mind 
 and Bodv. 
 
 IN the preceeding Cb.aptcr, I rup|X)red that the difference of body 
 and mind^ and the nature of each, was known to tlie reader ; but 
 metaphyfics^ or the firfl: philofophy, fuppofes nothing to be known, 
 nor alTumes any thing from common fenfe or apprehenfion, but de- 
 fines and demonftrates every thing, as far as it is capable of demon- 
 {^ration ; we muft therefore try whether we cannot give fome defini- 
 tion of body and mindy taken from the nature of things as exifting — 
 for it is to be confidered that metaphyfics is not, like mathematics, a 
 fcience of the ideas or notions of our mind^ but of things as they exift 
 ia nature. 
 
 This is the more neceffary, that there has not been, in my opinion, 
 any good definition yet given of body by our modern philofophers ; 
 and, as there are but two things in nature, body and mind^ fo that, 
 what is not body is mind^ it is evident that, without the knowledge of 
 hody^ we cannot know what mind is. The vulgar, and moft obvious 
 definition is manifeflly imperfedt, viz. That ivhich affecls ourfenfes. 
 For, though whatever does fo, is undoubtedly body^ there may be, and 
 certainly is body^ which is not perceived by any of our fenfes. Nei- 
 ther is the definition given by fome of our philofophers, by which 
 body is made to be that which has three dimenfions, lengthy breadth^ 
 and depth, any better j for, though that be a very proper definition 
 ^iven by Euclid of a folid. it is not at all a proper definition of body ; 
 for thefe three dimenfions are only the boundaries of body^ of which 
 
 boun-
 
 Chap. II. A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I C S. 7 
 
 boundaries geometry is the fcience, not body itfelf, which is what is 
 coatained within thole boundaries. The fame objection lies againft the 
 dehnition which makes body to be the fame with extenfion ; for a thing 
 is faid to be extended^ that confifts of parts which are co-exiftenc 
 and continuous, that is, have a common boundary ; and the three 
 dimenfions are but extenfion differently confidered, according to 
 the ditferent pofition of the parts, with rerpe(f^ to one another, 
 and to us. For extenfion, confidered as fituated before or behind, is 
 what we call length ; confidered as lying to the right or left of us, it 
 is breadth ; and confidered as going up or down, it is depth. Befides, 
 fpace is extended as well as body. The definition, therefore, is too 
 comprehenfive. But, on th^ other hand, the definition is not compre- 
 henfive enough, by which body is defcribed ' to be that which refifls, 
 * and is impenetrable.' For, according to the opinion of certain phi- 
 lofophers, there are fome fluids fo fubtle as to penetrate all bodies. We 
 muft therefore try whether we can find a definition oibody more com- 
 prehenfive, and more adapted to the nature of things as they actually 
 exiil, which, as I have faid, are the fubjecl of metaphyfics. It ought 
 alfo to be fuch, as to have a relation to 7nind. For, as the whole uni- 
 verfe confifts of body and 7mnd, and as thefe two are wonderfully 
 mixed together, in every part of nature, and in the material world, 
 according to my apprehenfion, never feparated, it is manifed that they 
 muft have a natural connection and relation one to another. Now, 
 there is, in all the par':s of the material and vifible world, a perpetual 
 uiOilon : For the celeiVial bodies move coaftantly in one refpecl or a 
 nother ; and all here below is in a continual viciditude of generation 
 and corruption, which cannot be without jnotion. Now, where tiiere 
 is motion, there muft be there fomething that moves. — What is moved, 
 I call body ; — What moves, I call mind. And this definition takes in 
 the opinion of all the phllofophers who believe that there is fuch a 
 thing in nature as ??nnd diftinQ from body : For thefe all agree that 
 mind is either mediately or imm^cdiately the caufe of all motion. /\nd, 
 as there is nothing in nature but bod^ and mind, that which is moved 
 muft necefl'arily be body. 
 
 For
 
 8 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book I. 
 
 For explaining this definition, it is proper toobferve, that, under the 
 term, is moved^ I include what is moveable, or capable of being mo^ 
 ved*. For, though all bodies which fall under our obfervation are 
 in fome kind oi motion or another, at lead:, have a tendency to move, 
 there is nothing to hinder us to conceive body perfedly at reft. And 
 we cannot tell but that fomewhere in the univerfe body may be in that 
 ftate. It is further to be obferved, that, by motion, I here mean only 
 that kind o*^ motion which confiflis of change of place or fituation, and 
 which, as I fhall afterwards (how, is peculiar to body. Again, under 
 mind, in this definition, I include, frj}, The rational and intelleftual ; 
 2^/y, The animal life ; 3^/y, That principle in the vegetable, by which 
 it is nouriflied, grows, and produces its like, and which, therefore, is 
 commonly called the vegetable life ; and, 4tbly, That motive principle 
 which I underftand to be in all bodies, even fuch as are thought to be 
 inanimate t* 
 
 This 
 
 * This is the fenfc of the Greek word *<».it»v, and of all the verbals of that ter- 
 mination, fuch as, 7rt>i;:rey, etKooof^r,rov, 7rpxy,T6v, &c. ; all which denote paJ/iTe capa^ 
 city : whereas the verbals in <««;, fuch as, «(vjiT<x«j, 7ra<;jT<««j &c. denote adiive capa- 
 city. See Ariftotle, Metaph. lib. 13. cap. 9. where, unlefs we are able to make 
 the diftinclion betwixt xtv^-rov^ y-ivivfunov, KiKivyjuivov, x<>>;5-<$, and y-iv/iTiKov, it is impof- 
 fible to underftand a very fine and mofl fubtle theory concerning motion. All thefe 
 differences cannot be expreffed without much circumlocution in Englifh, which is not 
 a language like the Greek, the work of philofophers, who made all thofe nice diftinc- 
 tions, but, like the other languages of Europe, a barbarous dialc£l, and a corruption of a 
 better language See what I have further faid upon this fubjecl in the 2d vol. of the Or. 
 of Lang, p- i8f). The diftin<flions which I have here made, and which are there like wife 
 jnade, mny appear no better than difficiles tiugae to moft reader?; but t!iey are neccffa- 
 ry, net only for underllanding the Greek language, if that be of any value, but for 
 underftand ing the nature of things- 
 
 f The Greek word •^vx.n denotes the three firft kinds I have mentioned, 
 ^vhich are not expreflcd by any one word that I know in Englifh ; for the word 
 mind^ that I have uled to exprefs them, denotes, in common ufc, only the lationul 
 mind, or f<iul, as it is otherwife called. The fourth kind that I have mentioned, v:e. 
 
 the
 
 Chap. II. ANTIE NT METAPHYSICS. 9 
 
 This is the didinclion betwixt body and mini made by Plato in his 
 tenth book of Laws, [p. 951. d Jeq. editio Ficini). And, as to Ari- 
 ftotle, he has made motion ib eiFential to body^ that, by it, he has both 
 defined and divided body : For he has defined a phyftcal body (for fo 
 he calls what I call fimpk body, in oppofition to ',Av,or matter, which 
 I fliall fpeak of afterwards,) to be " that which has the principle of 
 motion in itfelf*." Now, according to Ariftotle, motion is in that which 
 is tno'ued, not that which 7noves t- And, as he has thus defined 
 body by motion, fo he has divided it in the fame manner ; for, 
 fays he, fome bodies move in a circle, that is, by a motion re- 
 volving into itfelf, which, being the mofl excellent kind of mo- 
 tion, belongs to the moft excellent bodies, viz. the celeftial : O- 
 thers move in a ftraight line, either towards the centre, or from it. 
 And, laflly, others have a motion mixed of the circular and redineal ; 
 fuch is the motion of animals. And, as thefe are all the kinds of mo- 
 tion pofTible, fo thefe are all the different bodies that can exift J. 
 This is Ariftotle's notion of body \ and, as to the principle of motion, or 
 moving principle, which he fuppofes to be in all bodies, it is what he 
 calls nature'^ ; and, that he believed natwe to be a principle quite dif- 
 ferent from body, is evident, both from his books of Phyfics and Meta- 
 phyfics. And indeed, the main defign of his whole phllofophy of na- 
 ture is, to prove, that tlie firfi principle of motion in the univerie is 
 an immaterial principle, eternal, iin:r>oveable, and unchangeable ; 
 for with this he concludes both his Phyfics and Metaphyiics. 
 
 ' And here the reader may perceive the reafon why I hive faid, that 
 body does not exiil by itfelf, but always united with mhid. For, as 
 all body, as far as we know, is in motion, or has a tendency to move, 
 
 B and, 
 
 the irotive principle in ?.ll bodies, is not commonly in Grctk called -^vxri- But 
 Ariftotle, in a pallage which I fliall afterwards quot^^, hyi th.;c it is 'wx.T.f ^'f/ji. . 
 • Phyfic. lib. ". cap. i- De Coelo. lib. I. cap. 2 
 
 t Phyfic. lib. 3. c;ip. ?. % i'b. i- Dc Cof lo, c<ip. 2. 
 
 § Phyfio. lib. 2. cap. 1. He makes 72<2/?/r<? al fo tc be the princip'e of r^'^f in Louies 
 by which I fuppofe he means, that thofe bodios which h< Calls heavy, that is, which 
 move toward the centre of the eaich, would rejl if they were thferc
 
 10 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book. I. 
 
 and, as there can be no motion without a moving power, which I call 
 m:nd^ there cannot, confequently, be any body without mind. 
 
 To thcfe definitions I have j^iven of body and inind^ it may be ob- 
 jected, that they only contain a property of each ; for it rtill remains 
 to be inquired, What body is, v>rhich is thus moved F What mi?id is, 
 which thus moves ? 
 
 But to this I anfwer, that it mufl: always be remembered, that meta- 
 phylics is tlic fcience of things, not of ide^s. Now, with refpcdl to 
 our ideas, which are the creatures ot our own minds, being formed by 
 that operation of the mind called ahjlraciion, we can give proper de- 
 finitions, explaining the very cffence of the thing ; and of this kind 
 are the definitions in .nathematics. But, of the works of God, we 
 know not the effenceor conftituent principles ; we therefore cannot de- 
 fine any natural fubfiance, otherways than by mentioning fome diftin- 
 guifliing quality or qualities, common to every individual of the kind. 
 Thus, in defining an animal, vegetable, or mineral, we can do nothing 
 more than fpecify certain principal qualities of it ; but what is the ef- 
 fence of it, and that conflituent principle from which all thefe quali- 
 ties refult, is beyond the power of the human mind, in its prefent flate, 
 to difcover *. 
 
 Now, thefe definitions of body and mind exprefs that quality of each 
 which is moft confpicuous, both to fenfe and reaion ; for it is that qua- 
 lity of each by which the whole bufineis of nature is carried on, above^ 
 
 below, 
 
 * See what I have fu: *.er faid upon this fubjc£l» Vol. I. of the Origin of Language, 
 p 139. in tlie nete, ftcoT)* edition- 
 
 Sir liaac Ncw'on, in the Schclium Gcneralc, at the end of his Pnncipin, f.ys, 
 that we have no iinowletige of the eflence or iutimate nature of any fubfi^ance, not 
 even corporeal fubflances. * Quid fit rei alicuju. inbftantia minimc cognofclmus. 
 — Intimas (corporuin) fubftantias nullo f-nfu, null, adlione reflexa, cogncfc!inu.s, et 
 multo iT.inus ideaVn habemus fubitantias \)l\ — Hunc cognofcin-'us foiummodo pe/ pro- 
 piietateb iuuS ct atinbuta,' Sec. And in ihac way oniy we kj,ow his v\-oiics.
 
 Chap. rr. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. fi 
 
 below, and round about us. They alfo mark that neceffary connec- 
 tion which there is, and mud be, in this univerfe, betwixt the two : 
 For, as there is fomething that is inovcd^ there mufl: of neceinty be 
 foniething that tJioves\ and lliis I call wi/zc/, v/hich is the author of all 
 motion, being that which moves all bodies, either immediately, or me- 
 diately by the intervention of other bodies ; that is, by w'lat we call 
 mechanifin. And, in this manner, motion is carried on, withv)ut cea- 
 fing, through the univerfe. 
 
 Before I conclude this chapter, I cannot help taking notice of a very 
 great impropriety of fpeech which has crept into the tnglKh language, 
 (even the language of philofophers,) by which we confound ihQ pouucr 
 that moues the body, with the thing that is moved : For we fay, that 
 the body, which oidy is movcd^ moves ; confounding, in this way, 
 not only the grammatical fignification of the words, but the real di- 
 flindion of things ; and a diftindtion of no lefs importance to philofo- 
 phy and juft thinking, than that of body and viind. In languages n-.ore 
 perfect, and of more accurate expreffion, fuch as the Greek and La- 
 tin, this diftindion is always preferved : For x^vs* and y./>/j,T«» in Greek, 
 and movct and movettir in Latin, fignify things as different as anion 
 and pajfion. Now., as an impropriety of ^x/)r^zo;z leads naturally to an 
 impropriety of thinking, fuch confufion of the fignitication of words 
 ought carefully to be avoided, efpecially in an • age, when there is a 
 vifible tendency, in our philofophy, to confound body and mind^ and to 
 make every thing material. 
 
 The definition that 1 have given of lody^ agrees very well wit!i tliat 
 vis inertiac which, by our modern philolbphcrs, is held to be of the 
 clTence of matter, and with that firft law of motion laid down by the 
 Newtonian philofophers, * That body is, by its nature, mtxtXy pa/Jivc,'' 
 fo as to be equally incapable of beginning motion^ when it reds, or 
 flopping it when it is once begun : For the one is an exertion of aidi- 
 vity as well as the other. But it is not fufficient to define body by 
 
 B 2 pi^^ffii^iiy
 
 12 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book I. 
 
 pajjtvity merely, without exprefling of njuhat it is paffive ; And, as 
 paffion and aclion are co-relatives, which cannot exiil the one without 
 the other, we cannot pcrfedly underftand the definition of body with- 
 out taking inind Hkewife into our confideratlon. z^nd not only have 
 the Newtonians given this true account of the nature of body, but alfo 
 Mr Locke, in his Effay on the Human Underftanding, has exprefsly 
 faid, "• That matter cannot move itfelf \^ (Lib. 4. cap. !o. ^10). And 
 again, ' That adive poiver is the proper attribute of Jpirit, pc^lve 
 
 * poiver^ of matter ;' (Lib. 2. cap. 23. § 28.) This is true and genuine 
 theijm ; whereas, to maintain that matter has any aclive powder, is 
 downright atheifm^ or, what is the fame thing, materialifm. For, if 
 any the leaft particle of matter can move itfelf, the vv'hole fyftem of 
 the material world may do fo. Mr Locke does not appear to be aware 
 of this confequence, and plainly forgets himfelf, when he fays, ' That 
 
 * there is no contradidiion in body thinking ; and that it may be fo mo- 
 ' dified as to have that J acuity \ (Ibid. lib. 4. cap. 3. § 6.) But there is 
 a manifeft contradidicn, that thefamx thing fJjould, by its nature^ have 
 an adive poiver^ andfljould not have an adive poiver : Nor are there 
 any two things moreoppofite than body and mind ; for they are as oppo- 
 fite as affirjnation and negation. But it is no wonder, that a philofo- 
 pher, who, like Mr Locke, fets out with confounding the operations 
 of the w/w^/ through the body^ and witl^. the afhftance of the organs of 
 the body^ and its operations by iiltlf, I mean fenfitions and ideas^ 
 ihould, on fome occafions, forget the dlftin6lion between body and 
 tnind* : But, from the definitions here given of them, 1 hope they will 
 appear, not only different and diRindt, but ol natures fo oppofite that 
 they cannot, like other things in nature, run into one another, but 
 muil forever remain perfedtly dif^inguifhed from one another. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
 * See V h3t I have further faid upon this fubje£^, in a note upon pnge 93. of the fe- 
 cond edition ot the firfl volume of the Origin and Progrefs of Language.
 
 Chap. Iir. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 13 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 Of Moiion-^Things preparatory to the Defnition of Motion — Tijoo De- 
 finitions of it given by Arijlotle — One of them better than the other — 
 Not Defined by Modern Philofiophers^ — Nor by Plato — Arfiotle^s 
 Divi/ion of Motion — Platd*s Divifiion different — Compared ivith 
 that ofi Arifiotie's, both as to Matter and Style. 
 
 TH O S E of our modern philofophers, who have not enlarged 
 their ideas by the ftudy of antient philofophy, will no doubt 
 be furprifed at this definition that I have given of mind. Such phi- 
 lofophers have no other idea of mind but as a thing which thinks 
 and reafons. But thofe who have been taught by the antients to re- 
 cognife the vegetable and animal^ as well as the ratiotial life, and who 
 have learned that there is in all natural bodies a principle of a^ivity, 
 which, according to Ariftotle, is nature itfelf, all the reft being no- 
 thing hntfidnjelejs ina6live matter; and who have alfo learned, tliat the 
 chief attribute of divinity is that of being ihtfirfl mover and author 
 of that motion by which the whole bufinefs of nature is carried on, 
 will judge very differently, and think that 1 could not have defined 
 mind by any property more charadcriftic of its nature than the poiver 
 of moving^ nor any more general, being common to all minds, from 
 the higheft to the loweft. 
 
 As it is ncceffary that we Ihould know what motion is, in order to 
 underftand perfedly the nature both of boay and mind, I proceed 
 now to give a philofophical c-ccount ol it; without which there is no 
 fcicnce of metaphyfics, nor ony pcrfetfl: Tcience of r^atural philofophy; 
 tnction being the fole agent in all natural productions and operations 
 of every kind. Tuithcr, it is viotion that produces all the perceptions 
 
 of
 
 14 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book I. 
 
 of our fenfes, and, by confequence, our Ideas, which all arlfe from thofe 
 perceptions; fo that the philofophy oi" mind is likewife, In this refped, 
 founded upon tnotioju There is nothing, therefore, In philofophy,, 
 which it Is of greater importanccL to underliand well, than the nature 
 of motion. 
 
 According to Mr Locke, there can be no definition of motion^ be- 
 caufe It is what he calls an idea of fenfation ; that is, in proper philo- 
 fophical language, a perception of fenfe. If this be true, there cannot, 
 for the fame reafon, be any definition, nor, by confequence, any fci- 
 ence of any of the fubjefts of natural philofophy ; for they are all 
 perceived by the fenfes, as well as motion. Sounds for example, is 
 perceived by the ear^ as motion is perceived both by the ear and eye^ 
 and even by the touch ; therefore, according to Mr Locke's dodrine, 
 there Is o^ found neither art nor fclence : Nay, there can be no fcience 
 even of geometry ; for the fubjeds of geometry are ideas, which are 
 all abftraded from perceptions of fenfe, from whence all our know- 
 ledge of every kind is derived. If, therefore, thtre be any truth at all 
 in Mr Locke's obfervatlon, it is this, that there can be no fcience of 
 the particular perceptions of fenfe; but we mufl: firft form, by abfirac- 
 tion, general ideas from thofe particular perceptions. But this may 
 be applied equally to every thing that is made the fubjed: of fcience. 
 Let us try, therefore, whether we cannot make of motion an objed of 
 intelled, or wlicthcr It mufl: continue always to be perceived only by 
 the fenfes, in the fame manner that it is perceived by the brute ani- 
 mals. 
 
 The objeds of Intelled being fomething fixed and permanent. It 
 feems at firft ImpofTible to make an objed of intelled of a thing fo 
 fleeting and tranfitory as motion^ which is not one moment the fame 
 thing, butcxifts by perpetual change and variation. But there is one 
 thing which the intelled immediately apprehends in this fo change- 
 able
 
 Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. li- 
 
 able being; and that Is, change hfelf ; for to that genw,^ motion un- 
 doubtedly belongs. 
 
 Thus far, therefore, a philofopher eafily proceeds in this inveni- 
 gation : But it is only a fhort way ; for we have but a very im per- 
 fect idea of motion^ if we know no more cf it than that it is th.mge; 
 nor can we, by fuch an account of it, fufficiently diftinguifh it from 
 another univerfal which has a great connection with it, but is diffe- 
 rent, as lliall be afterwards fhown; I mean time. We muft therefore 
 know fomething more particular about it; and, as all change is from 
 fomething to fomething, we muft inquire from ivhat^ and to ivhat 
 motion is a change. And in this inquiry we muft have again recourfe 
 to nature^ the great architect of all fcience and all art. And I hope 
 to fhow, that Ariftotle's definition of mioton (for it is not mine) is as 
 much founded in nature, as the definition I have given of boc-Ij and 
 77nW, and proceeds from a view as compreheniive of the nature of 
 things, as it is acute and penetrating. 
 
 That nature does nothing in vain or at random, but propofes fome 
 end in all her operations snd productions, muft be admitted by every 
 one who believes that this univerfeis produced and governed by ?nincf, 
 and not by blind chance. And indeed, in moft things, it is obvious, 
 not only to the philofophical, but to the common obferver. For it is 
 of the effence of ?nind to do every thing for fome purpofe ; even fub- 
 ordinate minds, we fee, ad in that manner, always propofing fomething 
 ?s their end ; and much more mult the great Mind, that animates and 
 direds this univerfe, ad fo. When that end, propofed by nature in 
 her produdions, is attained, then is the thing laid to be in its natural 
 Jiau, and which muft necefi'arily be the perfedion of its natwe. '1 his 
 ftarc, in the language of Ariftotle's philofophy. is called entelecheia, a 
 word made by himfclf, which, from its compofnion, denotes /J^r^/^r- 
 
 tlon,
 
 i6 ANTIENT METAPEIYSICS. Book I. 
 
 tion, or the accompliihment of an end *. This word has been much 
 ridiculed as a mere found without any meaning,. invented by Ariftotle 
 to cover his ignorance, and impofe upon mankind; whereas, it is a 
 word denoting that which is mod perfed in natural produdions, to 
 which nature always tends, and which, for that reafon, is to be con- 
 fidered by every philofopher as principal in nature. 
 
 There is alfo in the works of art a perftdion which the artift aims 
 at, and, which when attained, the work is faid. to be compleated, or 
 in a ftate of perfedion ; and, in general, every volition of an intelli- 
 gent agent propofes fome end, which being attained, the adion is 
 compleat. 
 
 But, in both nature and art, and the adions of intelligent agents, 
 there is a progrefs, and, by confequence, a change from one thing to a- 
 nother; and this change is motion'. And we have new feen to ivhat 
 this change is; for, in the progrefs both of nature and art, it is to 
 the end propofed, that is, the entelecheia^ or ftate of perfedion of the 
 thing. 
 
 Further, as there is a ftate of perfedion in all the works of nature 
 and art, fo there is alfo a decay, and at laft a diflblution and extindion 
 of all the works of art, and of thofe too of nature, at leaft in this 
 fublunary world. For, as animals and vegetables, and other natural 
 produdions, come to a ftate of maturity, fo they decline from that 
 
 ftate 
 
 • The word is derivtil from anXtt tx^^ ; and it is likely that Ariftotle has taken It, 
 with lome variation, from the books of thePythagoreans, in one of which, yet prefer- 
 ved to un, viz. Ocellus Lucanus ^rip* rev jt^vto;, the word c-f>TjA«(« is ufed in the fame 
 fenfe : For, fpeaking of thtjirji mattcryht fays, '^vyay.ei ovi Trc-ivrx i> tovtui Trfurm yivy^riu^, 
 c-u»T£/«« ^» yiyof^iix, xtti xx^ovrx (pvcrn. Gale's opufcula mycholog'ca, page 517. where we 
 have tumfcii and a-wnxeixj oppofed in the fame manner as in Ariftotl? ^wcij^ii and £»re- 
 xix.fiin are j and from this, and feveral other pr.flages that might be quoted, both from 
 this author, and from Timaus the Locrian, it appears, that Plato and Ariltotle have 
 not only taken the matter of their natural philofophy from the Pythagoreans, but 
 a great part of the language of it.
 
 Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 17 
 
 ftate, decay, and at laft are totally dlflfolved. Now, this progrefs alfo 
 is fuch a change as I call motion ; and thus far we fee from ivhat^ to 
 ivhat the change is ; for it is from a ftate of perfection to a ftate of 
 decay and diffolution. 
 
 Here our idea of motion begins to be more full and compleat. 
 But, in the other cafe of the progrefs towards perfedion, it is not fo 
 compleat ; becaufe we have hitherto difcovered to ivhat the change is, 
 but lioifrom ivhat. 
 
 In order to find out this, we muft make a diftindlon, well known 
 in antient philofophy, but which our modern philofophers hardly e- 
 ver mention ; the diftindion I mean Is betwixt actual exiftence, or 
 exifting evEpy«^, as Ariftotle has exprefled it, and exifting only potenti- 
 ally, that is, In poiver or capacity. This, however, is a diftindlion 
 which runs through all nature and art ; and, without which, it is im- 
 poffible to explain perfedly many things in the fyftem of nature. 
 But, as it is fo little known, fome words will be neceflary to explain 
 it. 
 
 That every thing exifting, whether by nature or art, was, before 
 it exifted, poflible to exift, is evident; for it could never have exiftcd, 
 if it had not been fir ft in the poijuer or capacity of exifting ; and, as 
 every thing both ot nature and art is produced by certain determinate 
 caufes, the prodndions both of nature and art are faid, with proprie- 
 ty enough, to exift potentially in thofe caufes, even before they are 
 produced. And thus, things do in fome forr exift, even before they 
 exift : hut then this exiftence is very dift'erent iro.-u that ftate of per- 
 fedtion above mentioned, to which waeu tiie tiiin.; is i'rvived, it is 
 faid to exift a^fually, adlu, et non-puteutia ; 01, as Ariil^ tic l.ab exprefled 
 it, ev^pyH*, a vvt^rd which he has ukd lo exprefs rhis kind of cxiftcnce, 
 which is beft ihown by its energies 01 operations. 
 
 C The
 
 i8 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book 1. 
 
 The firA kind of exigence, wl/ich, I know, will, by the unlearned 
 reader, be thought a mere Ihadovv, wiihout fubftance or reahty, is faid 
 by Ariiluile to be 6» hyxnc4, that is, in poiver or capacity. In this way 
 plants exiil in their feetis, animals in the embryo, works of art in the 
 idea of the artiil and the materials of which they arc made, and, 
 in general, evei^y • living in the caules which produce it. From 
 this power or capacity, there is a progrefs to energy^ or adual exift- 
 ence : So that here, in the produdion of things, we find, that there is 
 a progrefs from one thing to another, njiz. from a ftate of mere capacity 
 to a ftate of a^uality or energy*. — Again, as before we found, that there 
 was a progrefs from the ftate of maturity and perfedion of every thing 
 to its decay and difiblution ; and as, when the thing is come to its 
 maturity, it has the capacity of decaying and diflblving, the progrefs 
 thereto may be faid to be from a ftate of capacity to what we may 
 alfo call acluality or energy^ in as much as it is the end now propofed by 
 nature, as the maturity or perfedion of the thing was before. The pro- 
 grefs in both cafes is what I call motion ; and it now appears, that, in 
 both, the progrefs is from capacity to energy : And we are now 
 able to anfwer the queftion propofed above ; ' /ro?u tvhat^ and to 
 'what, motion is a change V For it is univerfally true of all motion, 
 that it is a change from capacity to energy ; becaufe every motion, 
 however irregular it may feem, and whether proceeding from nature, 
 or from the will and inclination of fome fenfitive being, has a ten- 
 dency to fome end ; which end, when attained, is denoted by the 
 yjovd energy: And it is equally certain, that the thing moved muft, 
 before it be moved, have the capacity or po'wcr of being moved. 
 
 Having thus difcovered, that motion lies betwixt capacity and ener- 
 gy, it is evident, that it muft have a connedion with each of them ; 
 
 and, 
 
 • The progrefs towards a£lual exiftencc is expreflVd in Greek by the word y«»»T«<, 
 while the aaual exiftence is denoted by the word «^t«. Two wcrds of common ufe 
 among the Greek philofophers, but which can hardly be rendered into Engiifh.
 
 Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 19 
 
 and, from this double connexion, Arlftotle has given us two defini- 
 tions of it, one of them taken from the energy, or end, to which it 
 tends, the other from the capacity from which it begins. The firft 
 is exprelTed in two words, 'uiz. tvtpyux xtim^ *j or imperfed energy ; the 
 other is £»t£Xs^«« Te» sv l-jmu.e< \ tv ^«v«^«, which may be tranflated thus : 
 
 * The ferfe6iion of ivhat is in capacity , confidered merely as in capaei- 
 
 * //.* The meaning of the laft words is, that nothing is confidered 
 in the thing that is moved, but merely its capacity : So that motion 
 is the perfection of that capacity, but not of the thing itfelff- Ihe 
 reafon why it is faid to be the perfection of capacity is,thatitis forae- 
 thing more than mere capacity ; for it is capacity exerted, which, 
 when it has attained its end, fo that the thing has arrived at that ftate 
 to which it is deftined by nature, or art, ceafes, and the thing 
 begins to exlft sysgy««£, or acliially : And, therefore, Ariftotle has very 
 properly called this exertion the perfe^lion of capacity^ fince capacity 
 can go no further. 
 
 This laft definition appears to be that which Ariftotle prefers ; for 
 he has given us the other only as it were in pafling ; v^rbereas this he 
 has given us, when treating formally of the fubjeCt ; and no doubt it 
 is a better definition ; for rhe other is a definition by negation ; 
 whereas this tells us pofitively what the thing is, and makes the pro- 
 per difiinclion betwixt mcvt capacity i 2in(\ capacity exerted ; and alio 
 betwixt the utmoft perfedion of capacity^ and energy^ or the thing 
 compleated. 
 
 In this manner I have explained, at fome length, this famous de- 
 finition of Ariftotle, which by many has been complained of as ob- 
 
 fcure ; 
 
 * Ariftotle, 5r£g< •v^^Piivjj, lib. 2 cap 5. 
 
 t In this wr.y Ariftotle hi;..l"t'lf has explained thefe words in the ytli chap, of his 
 Jjth book of Mctaphyfics. A piece oi bi ^s, fays he, is a itc!tUL", hurxfcn (01 in capa' 
 city) \ but the motion by which it becomes a ftatue is not ttTtxt^^fiK, or xhc J/cr/cCl ion of 
 the brafs, but the perfection of its capacity.
 
 20 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book L 
 
 fcure ; and, by others, has been ridiculed as altogether without mean- 
 ing. But I hope that 1 have ihown, that it is taken from a compre- 
 henfive view of nature and art, and of every kind of generation and 
 produfti n *. And I defirc any one, who is not fatisfied with Arifto- 
 tle's definition, to try whether he can give a better ; and then he will 
 be convinced of the difficulty there is in defining a thing fo fhadowy 
 and unfubftantial, that it may be faid to be fomething betwixt the t» 
 ex and the t« ,«„<»», being and no being ; for what exifts only potentially^ 
 may be faid not to exifl at all. One thing is evident, that it is a de- 
 finition which has coft Ariftotle a great deal of pains, as appears from 
 his treating of it at great length, both in his Phyfics, lib, 3. and 
 in his Metaphyfics, lib. 1 3. cap. 9. "f. Our modern philofophers, 
 though they have been at great pains to inveftigate the laws of mo- 
 tion, have hardly thought it worth their while to tell us what motion 
 is ; for, as to the common definition of it, viz. change of place or fi- 
 tuation, that is not motion^ but the effe<ft of motion : For, I afk, How is the 
 place or fituation changed .'* and the anfwer can be no other than. By motion. 
 So that the queftion recurs, What is this fame motion^ by which not only 
 place and fituation are changed, but generation and corruption are pro- 
 duced, grovvth or decay, alteration of all forts, and, in fhort, every change 
 that can happen to body ? And, befides, it is not comprehenfive e- 
 nough, as it takes in only one kind of motion^ viz. that from place to 
 place. 
 
 This 
 
 * See this definition of Arifloile more fliortly explained in a note upon the 2d chap, 
 of the ifl book of the ifl vol of the Origin and Progrtfs of Language. 
 
 t In this chapter, Ariftotle is at great pains to Ihow of howdifEcult definition it is. 
 It is not, fays he, capacity ^ it is not energy, it is not /)r/z;^//o;2, neither is it any of the 
 categories, fuch zsfubjlancey quantity, quality, reUti»n, &c. not being, like them, any cir- 
 cumfcribed or determined kind of being ; nor has it any fixed or permanent cxiftcnce 
 of any kind. Neither does it cxift all at once, but by fucceinon. Ann, after having 
 in this way told us all that it is not, he concludes in this way ; tJe-n Mytr», to Xi^h*, 
 
 mmt Kcn tr||y««» xixi y.n fvl^yHMV rtji ti^iifctyr,y (that is what he Calls tvi^yitx -Vajj, v r the 
 
 real exiftence of any thing), <^n» /*iy x*^^'^"* ithx»f<-*^»^ hayui. So that it is energy, 
 and /:o/encrgy, difficult to be feen or comprehended^ but pojfible to exiji-
 
 Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 21 
 
 This leads me to the dlvifion of motion given by Arlflotle, and 
 which naturally follows its definition. It is taken from the efF;ds 
 which it produces, and, according to him, is o^ four kinds, and I elongs 
 to three categories, viz. quality, quantity^ and ivhere. The firH: kind 
 is that well known motion from place to place^ which falls under the 
 category laft mentioned ; the fecond is alteration^ by which the 
 quality of any thing is changed, the fubftance remaining the fame. 
 This belongs to the category of quality. The third is increafe, and 
 the fourth diminution^ both belonging to the category of quantity. 
 
 The definition of motion above given is fuch, that it will apply, at 
 leaft in one refped, to mind as well as body. And the divifion now 
 given fhows what that one refpedt is, viz. quality. For it cannot be 
 denied, that inferior minds, fuch as ours, change in quality ; and, as 
 that change does not happen at once, but by progrejfton, that pro- 
 grefllon is the motion applicable to mind; and, accordingly, in com- 
 mon language, we fay, that our minds are monjed, or altered ; that is, 
 have changed their quality. But, with refpedt to the other three 
 kinds of fnotion, which fall under the two categories of quantity and 
 ivhere^ it is impoflible to conceive, that immaterial fubflances, having 
 no parts, and being indivifible, can be monjcd any of thcfe ways. 
 
 And, therefore, though, when our body monjes, the mind may be 
 faid to move with it ; that is only x«t<» <rv^Z%%AK6u or by the accident of 
 its junction with the body j but not -^ui" dur,, or by its own nature, as A- 
 riftotle has very well diifinguifhed *. It is, however, true, that when 
 philofophers fpeak of motion, it is always, to be underftood of body, 
 unlefs they have otherways explained their meaning f. 
 
 With 
 
 * De Anima, lib. i. cap. 3. 
 
 f As this motion of the mind may anpear to many very unph-lofophical, fee what 
 Phiicponup has fa.d upon the id hook of Arlftut'e yn^t 4'rxn<:- tov/iirvis he rrWMle of 
 
 the bock, at thele words, Tr^eJTO) fiU ouv *? rov ayrou ovro<; rou -rxT^ii", xxi rov *itt.6<!«j<, xui 
 
 TO'j f^i^yiiSf, &c. where he fays cxprefsly, thnf fty^'^t';, or Uiin'u.f^, -/hich is the change of 
 the mind from a flate of ignorance or error to knowledge, is motion.
 
 22 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Bookl. 
 
 With refpect to bodily motion^ it Is to be obferved, that It 
 cannot exift without change of place^ taken in the largeft lenfe ; 
 For, though there be no total change of the place of the thing, 
 as in the cafe of progrefTive motion, yet, where there is alteration, di- 
 minution, or augmentation, there muft neceiTarily be a change of 
 place, at leall of the parts ot the thing. So that change of place, of 
 one kind or another, is efl'ential to all kinds of bodily motion. But we 
 are not to take change of place, the firft member of the above divi- 
 fion, in that large fenfe ; but we muft underftand it only of a total 
 change of the fituation of the thing, which is exprefled by the Greek 
 word <p»^u, denoting carrying or transferring from one portion of fpace 
 to another. And, in this way underftood, the fjrft member of this 
 divifion will not comprehend the other three; for the thing that is 
 moved muft either change the fpace it occupies totally, or there muft 
 only be a change with refped to its parts. If it change totally, then 
 it is the firft kind of motion I mentioned ; but, if not totally, if the 
 motion^ for example, be only internal, fo that there is no more but a 
 tranfpolition of the parts of the thing, or if there be an addition to the 
 fpace the thing occupies, by an addition to its parts, then is there one 
 or other of the three motions above mentioned. 
 
 Before I quit this fubje£l, I cannot help obferving, that Ariftotlehas, 
 I think, {hownagreatfuperiorlty above his mafter Plato, in treating this 
 fubje<5t of motion : For, in xhe frfi place, Plato has not thought pro- 
 per to give us any definition of it ; but, for that, has, like Mr Locke, 
 trufted to common fenfe and apprehenfion. Whether it was, that he 
 thought that fufficient, or that, according to his fyftem of ideas, there 
 could be no idea of motion^ not being a fubftance, nor having any 
 thing fixed or permanent. But, though he has not defined it, he has 
 divided it with great appearance of accuracy * ; for he has made no 
 lefs than ten different kinds of it. The firft is, that, where the motion 
 
 is, 
 
 • De Leglbug, Lib. lo. page 950. editio Ficini.
 
 Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 23 
 
 is, as he exprefies it, in one place^ fuch is the motion of a circle round 
 the centre, or of a Hue, in the formation of a circle, round one point ; 
 by which, he obferves, a thing is produced, that he calls very wonder- 
 ful, namely, that the fame motion fliould have different degrees of 
 quicknels and flownefs, according as the feveral circles, produced by 
 that motion^ are greater or leiler, and in proportion to the difference of 
 the circles. T\\t next Vm^ o{ motion \h^ when the place is changed, 
 and the body moving is continually changing its centre. The third 
 he c^\hjeparatien ; \\\t fourth is compofttion ; the f/th is diminution ; 
 the /ixtb, augmentation ; the feventh is generation., by which body ac- 
 quires its three dimenfions, and becomes perceptible by Jenfe ; the 
 eight is corruption or de/iruclion ; the ninth is that motion ivhich can 
 monje other things, but cannot monje itfelf ; and the lajl is that ivhich 
 can, not only move other things, but itfelf, and ivhich produces all the 
 other motions aboue mentioned. 
 
 Here it may be obferved, that the feveral members of this divifion 
 plainly comprehend one another ; fo that, properly fpeaking, it is no 
 divifion at all. For ih<t frji kind of motion which, he fays, is in one 
 place, is plainly comprehended under the jecond member of the divi- 
 fion, viz. motion which changes places : For it ia a fubdivifion of that 
 kind of motion, which is, either when the whole body changes its 
 place, that is what we call progre/Jive motion; or, when only the parts 
 change place, the whole body continuing to occupy the fame fpace. 
 In this way, he might have made a diitinClion o^ motion, by change of 
 place ; but, to divide motion, as if any of it could be without change 
 of place, taken in the large fenfe, was improper. The third and 
 fourth members are alfo the fatne with the ffth and fixth j for 
 diminution is nothing but feparation, and augmentation is nothing 
 but compcfition or accumulation. As to the Je'Uinith, viz. gcjie^ 
 ration, it is rejeded altogether by the Dodors of the Peripatetic 
 School ; becaufe a thing cannot be laid to be moved, or to be, 
 in any way, cither a^live or pajfvc, before it exilt ; they do not, 
 
 there-
 
 24 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book L 
 
 therefore, fay, that the thing which is in generation, or in the aft of 
 being generated, is moved, but the elements of which it is compofed 
 are moved. And, as to corruption, there can be no doubt but that the 
 thing corrupted is moved ; but it is a motion which falls under one or 
 other of the four heads mentioned by Ariftotle. And, lajily, in the 
 ninth and tetith members of Plato's divifion, it is plain that he con- 
 founds the povuer moviiig, or the caufe of the motion, with the jnotion 
 itfelf. For, when one body, by impulfe upon another, moves that o- 
 ther, it is plain that the motion of the body moved is the fame as if it 
 were produced by any other caufe. And, as to the body moving, it is 
 no more than the injlrument by which the motion is performed. 
 So that body cannot, with propriety, be faid to move, but only 
 mind, either immediately and directly, or mediately by the interpofi- 
 tion of fome other body \ as, when I move a ftone by a lever, it is not 
 the lever that moves the ftone, but /ufing the lever as an inftrument. 
 And, as to the tenth, it is confounding body with mind, the motion of 
 body with the motion of mind, and the effe6i with the caufe ; for the 
 mind that moves is certainly different from body that is moved,z.wA the 
 adion of mind is likeways diftinct from the motion of body ; and the 
 motion produced in body is an effecfit which mufl be different from the 
 caufe that produces it. 
 
 This is the divifion of Plato, liable to fo many objedlons. On the 
 other hand, Arillotle's divifion is full and comprehenfive, but without 
 repetition, or one m.ember of the divifion including the other. For 
 change of place, in the firft member, taken in a tlrid fenfe, and as it is 
 commonly underflood, for a total change of the fituation of the thing, 
 does not comprehend the other three. And it was necellary, accord- 
 ing to the notions of the antients> that thefe kinds of motions Ihould 
 be diflinguifhed from the firft : For, thougU the celcftial bodies are 
 continually changing their fituations and, in that (enfe, always in mo- 
 tion, yet, if Plato and Arifintle are iu the right, they fufFer no alte- 
 ration, augmentation, or diminution. 
 
 The
 
 Chap. Iir. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 25 
 
 The difference of ftyle, alfo, betwixt the mafter and fcholar, in treat- 
 ing this matter, is worth being obferved. Plato, by the affedation of 
 variety and elegance, both of words and compofition, has made the mat- 
 ter really veryobfciire, eventothofe who underftand both the language 
 and the fubjecl, and are converlant in the writings of the Greek phi- 
 lofophers. On the other hand, the ftyle of Ariftotle, in treating 
 this, and every other matter of Ccience, is perfedly didadic, without 
 that fuperfluity of words which is frequently to be found in Plato^ 
 and without any ornament, either of words or compofition ; and, tho* 
 its brevity may make it obfcure to the unlearned, which his interpre- 
 ters fay he intended, I will venture to fay, that, where the text is not 
 corrupted, which it frequently is, and where the work had received the 
 laft hand of the author, which was certainly not the caie of all his 
 works, it is to be underflood, by the learned, with due pains and at- 
 tention ; and I will further venture to fay, that, when he has found 
 out the meaning, he will think his pains and attention well be- 
 ftowed. 
 
 To conclude: From the account here given of motion^ it is evident 
 that by it the whole bufincfs of nature, above, below, and round about 
 us, is carried on ;— that nothing which has a beginning, or is to have 
 an end, can be produced or put an end to, without it; — that, as nature is 
 continued and connected in all her operations, not proceeding by Itarts 
 and bounds, but by regular gradations, it is impoffible that any thing 
 can be generated, come to maturity, or be extihguiflicd, without pall- 
 ing from one flate to another. Now that palLige is liiotion. To thofe, 
 therefore, who hold that mind is the fiift of things, and principal in 
 the univerie, it will not appear furprifmg that 1 have made ino'vijig^ or 
 producing motiouy an eiTential attribute of mifid, 
 
 D CHAP.
 
 s6 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book I. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Univerfals conneBed ivith Motion — Habit — Power of tivo kindst vh. 
 Capability — and Faculty — Energy Ukeivife of tivo kinds — different 
 from Adlion — Action and Paflion reciprocal — 77?^ tivo great Prin^ 
 ciples of Nature are One Thing, that is alivays adtive, and another, 
 that is alivays paffive — Change a uery general Idea — jnore general 
 than Motion — Different kinds 0/ Change — AH Change produced by 
 fome Cau(e — Different kinds o/Caufes — The Docirine o/' Caufes ^ 
 great Difcovery of AriJiotle-^OfBtrng^ and the Accidents 0/ Being, 
 
 HAVING thus explained the general idea of motion^ I will 
 now proceed to explain fome other univerfals which are con- 
 nedted with it, and belong to the fyftem of the univerfe. 
 
 In \hefrft place, as we have feen tliat motion is a progreffion from 
 one ftate to another, it is proper to explain what fate is, which is 
 fu})pofed to be fomething permanent, in contradiftin^fliou to motion^ 
 which, by its nature, is fleeting and tranfitory. A ftate, in this fenfe, 
 is what is called in Greek v^,?, and which is properly tranflated into 
 Englifh by the word habit^ though that word be commonly ufed in 
 an abufiive fenfe, to denote cujlom or ife^ by which hcdnt is formed. 
 Now, habit is a certain conftitution, frame, or difpofui( n of parts, 
 whether it be the work of nature or art, by which every thing is fitted 
 to a6t or fuffer in a certain way ; for notiing exifts that is not, by 
 nature or art, de(\ined for one, or other, or both of tnefe puipoies, 
 otherways it would exift in vain; and nature does nothing in vain ; 
 
 nor
 
 Chap. IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 27 
 
 nor does art, which a£ts in imitation of nature : And therefore habit 
 is properly defined, in reference to fome a^ion or pajfton *. 
 
 From habit ncccffarily xz{\.\\\.s poiver or capacity, (in Greek av^au-h), 
 which Ariftotle has dlftinguiflied into two kinds. The firft is, the mere 
 capacity of becoming any thing. The fecond is, the poiver or faculty 
 of energizing^ according to the hahit, when it is formed and acquired ; 
 or, in other words, after the thing is become^ and actually exifts, 
 which at firfl: was only in the capacity of exifing. This Ariftotle 
 illuftrates, by the example of a child, who is then only di general m 
 poiver^ {'•' ^vv^«£*,) that is, has the power of becoming a general : Bat, 
 when he is grov^^n up, and has become a general, then he has the 
 power of the fecond kind, that is, the poivcr of performing the ofHce 
 of a General t* Ariftotle, in the paflage quoted below, fays, that this 
 difference is anonymous in Greek. But, as it is fit that two things 
 fo different Ihiould be diftinguiftied by different names, I would call 
 the firft capability y and the other faculty ; and I would fay that the 
 child has the capability of being a General, but, when he is grown 
 up, and has learned the bufinefs, he has the faculty. It is to 
 be obferved, that Ariftotle, when he ufcs the word e^y»««<j, or 
 pozver^ fimply, as in Iws definition of 7noticH, means the firR- 
 kind o^ poiver, or what I call capability %. It is alfo to be obfer- 
 ved, that poiver, or capacity, is a^ive as well as paf/ive, and that 
 
 D 2 there 
 
 * «E|(? is defined by Ariftotle, lib. 5. Metapb. cap. 20. to be, in one feufe, tbe ftme 
 witb ^itih<r^i, which he defines, cap. 19. in this manner, Li<th<rii Myiru^ rc-j e^^vto? f^i^n 
 
 Inxoi ii }.xh<rii : But his commentators make a dillinaion betwixt the two ; for rh-.-y 
 fay 'ilii is more permanent, ^ixHca kfs To. And I think there is the fame diilindion 
 in Englifh betwixt habit and difi>ofitlony which lait word anfwers exaclly, both in iciiie 
 and etymology, to the Greek 2.«ei«-««. 
 
 t Ariftotle, «■'.§. -|</;»:is. lib. 2. cap. 5. in fine. 
 
 \ See ^'urther, upon this fubje<Sl, Philoponus's commentary upon the chapter above 
 quoted of Ariftotle, ^£?* A'^yj'ii- Sec the 8th book of /Vriftotle's PhyHcs, an.! Siinpii- 
 cius's Commentary, page 281, Sec alfo Ariftctle's MetaphyCcs, hb. i- cap. 12. and 
 lib. 9. cap. I.
 
 28 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book L 
 
 there is a poiver of fnfferlng^ as well as of doing ; and thefe two 
 powers correfpond to one another *. 
 
 As from habit refults capahiUty^ and from capahility faculty ^ fo itoxx\facuU 
 ty refults energy^ which is the faculty exercifed or produced into action. 
 But this energy ^'w\i\z\\ is the reiult of habit diud faculty formed, is to be 
 diiiinguifhed from thofe energies by which the habit or J acuity is ac* 
 quired. Thus, the energies of a perlon who learns any art or fcience, 
 are different from the energies of that art or fcience, after he has 
 learned it. And, in the fame manner, the energies or operations of 
 nature, by which any natural fubfiance is formed, are different from 
 the operations of that fubfiance after it is formed. Of the firft kind 
 are the energies of 7?iotion) which, as I have faid, is a palfage from one 
 ftate to another. But the other kind of energies, though they be a 
 change likewife from a ftate of re/ly to a flate of aciivity, and therefore 
 fall under the general definition of motion ; yet they are a different 
 fpecies ot fnotiott, commonly expreffed by the term a^ionf. 
 
 This leads me to inquire into the nature of this univerfal a^iont 
 and its correfpondent,^;>^o«, which run through the whole of nature ; 
 for every thing, as was faidj is deftined by nature to slOl or fuffer, 
 or both J ; and, where there is an agent, there mufl of neceffity be a 
 patient, that is, fomething on which the operation is performed. 
 
 And 
 
 * Milton, therefore, has made Belial fay very properly, 
 
 *' to /lifer, as to ddy 
 
 Our ftrength is equal, nor the law unjuft, 
 
 That fo ordains," Par. Loft. lib. 2. v. 199. 
 
 And, from many other p;iflages of this poem, it appears that Milton was very well 
 acquainted with this higheft philorophy of which we treat. 
 
 t i>ee Ariftotie's Metaphyfics, lib. 9. chap. 6. where power and energy are very well 
 contrafted together, and iiluftrat-d by many examples. 
 
 \ Archytas yrtet rev oTof, d treatifv! prcftrved to us by Simplirius, in his ccmmentary 
 «pon Arlllotlc's Caiegoncs, has laid, in a paflage quoted by Mr Harris, in his Philofo- 
 
 phica!
 
 Chap. IV. ANTIENTMETAPHYSICS. 29 
 
 And we will begin with patience or fuffering, in Greek -^n^yjiu and 
 which, as well as f?iotio7i, belongs to the general idea of change ; for 
 we can conceive no fuffering without fome change in the patient. But, 
 then, what change ? Is it a change from place to place ? or from great- 
 er in quantity to lefs, or vice uerja ? or is it only a change of quality ? 
 And this laft is the truth, according to the doctrine of Ariftotle, and 
 his commentators. For, in their language, where a thing changes 
 place, or increafes or diminiJJocs^ it is moved, but does not. fuffer, unlefs 
 it be changed in quality. Suffering, therefore, is only in one category, 
 viz. the category of quality, whereas ^notion, as we have fcen, is in 
 three categories, viz. quantity, quality, and ivhere ; the neceffary con- 
 fequence of which is, that every thing thdit fuffers is moved, but not 
 *uice verfa : So that the idea of motion is more general than that of 
 fuffering, and comprehends it. Again, as aSling zx\djuffering are rela- 
 tives, of which one cannot exift without the other, and muft necefTarily 
 ccrrefpond in every particular, it follows that, to a6l is to operate a 
 change of quality in the patient *. 
 
 Farther, as much as the agent a^s, {o much muft the p2it\cntfuffer; 
 or, in other words, the impreflion made upon the paffive object muft 
 be juft in proportion to the force of the adive object : And this too 
 is a neceflary confequence of a^ion and pajjion being relative and cor- 
 refpondlng in every particular. It is in this way that I would under- 
 ftand that maxim of the Newtonian philofophy, '* that a^ion and 
 " re-aSlion are equal ;'* though 1 think re-a^iion is a very improper 
 
 term 
 
 phical ArrsHgements, page iii. that everything in nature either a£\s or fuffers, or botii 
 afts and f'lffVrs J whr.t only atls, but does not I'ufFtr, is God ; what only fufl'crs, but 
 docs not dci js mattjr, or th* jirji matter^ as wt- comrnomy call it ; and the elcnuiits 
 ef other natu; -1 fubltances, arc both aclix'e and paJJlvC' 
 
 * hee Aiiflotle, Boole 2. De /Inimay and Pulojxjnus's commentary upon thefe 
 woids, t'jwaids the aijddlc ol the boi<k, s^fl(T«»,^i» oi/C, '«« Xbv xjt»v •»t«4, 7ov Trxr^nr 
 x«: .(>■ x.iiinrfic(t, &c. where Philoponus obfervcs, that vm* is d. -rived from Tttef. bee 
 alfo Aiillotlc's metaph. lib. y chap. 21. where he gives us the levcral figmfications of 
 the word wos^*?.
 
 3P ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book L 
 
 term for exprcffing the mere pamvity of any thing : Nor do I well 
 conceive how it can be applied, except to elaftic bodies, which, no 
 doubt, acl as well 2,^JuJer *. 
 
 But, is there no change in the agent as well as the patient ? There 
 is, when the agent changes from' a ftate of rejl to aclivity. But, fup- 
 pofe a being to energize continually, as we conceive of fuperior na- 
 tures, to whom the di^in»fiion above mentioned, betwixt capacity and, 
 energy, does not apply. In fuch beings there is no change from inac- 
 th'ity to aciinjity. And, if we can fuppofe, in fuch a being, no fuc- 
 cefTion of energies, or paffing from one to another, but, as Philoponus 
 exprefles it, in the paffage above quoted f) ^l^ ihe energies throzvn oui 
 at onccy then there is no change at all in the agent. And this is the 
 idea we ought to have of the Supreme Being, as fhall be afterwards 
 more fully explained. 
 
 But what fhall we fay of the energies of inferior minds, fuch as ours, 
 which either do not energize perpetually, or at lead energize by 
 fucceflion ? Can they be faid lofiiffer when they energize ? As, for ex- 
 ample, when a man having acquired the fcience, or hah'it of a geo- 
 
 . meter, 
 
 * If the Newtonian philofophers had not aflerted, in the clearefl: terms, the 
 mere pafliyity of matter, and its indifference, cither to motion or reft, one fhould 
 have thought, by their way of exprelTing this Jaw of nature, that they imagined 
 matter, qua matter, had a power of a6iion in it ; for this the term re-a6lion 
 Icems to import. But, as Baxter, in his Enquiry into the nature of the human foul, 
 has well obferv^, it denotes no more than refijlance or rc/tjiency, which is neceffarily 
 implied in all pafTion ; for we cannot conceive pafTiun without foivic reliflance. Butthen 
 this reCftance miifl be overcome, otherwife there can be no imprejjion made^ nor any 
 change of any kind produced in the patient ; and, if lo, how can aclion and refiftance 
 be equal ; therefore I doubt whether, even with that explication, the maxim be true. 
 But the truth is, when properly expreffed, what I h.^ve laid down in the text, that ac- 
 tion zndipafficn are equal, in fo far as they muft neccflarijy correfpond toone another. I 
 have heard another meaning given to this Jaw of motion, viz. that as much force as the 
 ac7zY'^ body communicates to the /><2/7t;r, fo much it lofesof its own : But, even in this 
 way underftood, it is not expreffed properly, nor with that clearncfs and accuracy, 
 with which an ;ixIom fliould be expreffed.
 
 Chap. IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 31 
 
 meter, and energizes according to that habit, that is, demonftrates 
 geometrical propofitions, does htfiiffer ? And Ariftotle, and his com- 
 mentator on the palTage above quoted, fay, that he does not ; becaufe 
 there is no change of quality •> but only the bringing of Jjabit in- 
 to perfection by exertion. For the fame reafon, he cannot be fald to 
 aB^ becaufe he produces no change of quality ; yet he energizes. E- 
 very energy^ therefore, of a habit formed, is not action^ unlefs it pro- 
 duce a change of quality upon fomething : And, with this diftindion, 
 we are to underfland the general pofuion above laid down, ' That 
 * the energies of formed habits fell under the category of adion.'^ 
 
 The idea, therefore, of energy, is more general than that of afiion, 
 and comprehends it ; for, v^^hatever acfs, energizes ; but not 'vice verfa. 
 And hence it is, that energy is applied to all beings, even the Supreme 
 -Being, vvho is fald, by Ariftotle, to be all energy, without mere poijjer 
 or capacity ; which, in its nature, is fomething imperfedt and defec- 
 tive, and therefore cannot be afcribed to the Supreme Being *. Nei- 
 ther can this Being be properly faid to aB, unlefs where he produces 
 changes upon any fubjedt ; and far lefs can he be faid tojuffer : But 
 energy applies properly to all the operations of fuch a being ; and it 
 is, as 1 have obferved, energy without ceafing, and without tranfition 
 from one thing to another. 
 
 As all generation and corruption are produced hy aSling 2iV\di fuffer'- 
 27igy and as generation and corruption aie continually going on in this 
 lower world, it is evident, that the two great principles of nature arc, 
 that which alwa) s ac/s, and that which always Jujjers f : And this 
 
 brings 
 
 * Ariftot. Metaphyf. Jib, 14. cap. 6. 7. 8. 
 
 t To the i'auicpuipoic is ;i p^illigc in,.in older book of phllofopliy ft'll than the works of 
 Archyras, \ bolievc; the cldcft extant, of whufi authduicicy wc aic ciic.iin, aiui from the 
 fame ic\.\oo\,viz. Ocellus Lucanu^ , v-howrit^'s, ^rs^* tov :7x»rti. Th*.- wjrds are, A, li /^c^xt 
 tlvreet 6»c^i'C,o'J3-f Kut riiivcvTi to TtanratlU; f^i^^i rcu y.ic-f^ou Kxi «x.<>>jT#y; \\ tn.rc OalCjWho hiispu- 
 
 blilhcd
 
 32 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Eook L 
 
 brings us back to the firft divifion I made of th'mgs into mind and 
 hody-t mind being always active^ body always pajjt'ue. 
 
 Further, as there can be no generation or corruption without change, 
 every thing here below the moon mud, of neceflity, be in a conftant 
 viciflitude and fucceffion of one ftate to another. Change, therefore, 
 is a moft general idea, more general than even motion ; for all motion 
 is change, and, accordingly, we have made change the^^««j- of mo- 
 tion : But all change is not motion ; for there is a change from non- 
 exijience to exiftence, which is called ysvss-;?, ox generation) but which, 
 as I have already obferved, is not motion *. 
 
 With refped to thofe changes made upon any thing, the fubftance 
 
 ilill continuing the fame, it is to be obferved, that, if the change be 
 
 from 
 
 bliflied this work in his Opufcula Mythologica, very properly correds the tAct, p. 515. 
 by reading xitTrxhi, (a word, which is ufed by the fame author in a fragment of his 
 preferved by Stobaeus, inferted alfo by Gale in his Colle<Slion, page 538.)} for, with- 
 out that corre£lion, uTrnSn and «k«mtov would denote the fame thing; becaufe, what 
 is incapable of fuffering, is, by confcquencc", incapable of being moved: But he 
 carries his correction too far, when he changes xKt*nToi into eiHy.tvnroy, that word de- 
 noting what is always capable of being moved ; which is certainly not the meaning 
 of Ocellus Lucanus j for then again there would be no oppofition betwixt the two 
 principles. We muft, therefore, let the word «k/»iit«v ftand as it is, or, if we will 
 change it, it muft be into ««e<Jt(v;oT<x.«v j which, I am perfuaded, is the true reading in 
 the fragment above mentioned, of the fame author, in place of niiKivnToi ; fo that we 
 ought to read there, t« 01 xH>ctyr)TtKoy xv^zfvei, to ti xeiTrudii xvti^vHTxi ^ and fo thfi fenfe 
 cf both paflages will be the fame, viz that, in nature, there are two principles, the 
 one tbat always a^s, and never fuffers ; the other that never a^s^ but always Juffers ; 
 that is, in two words, mind and matter i which I apprehend to be the true fyll;>:m of 
 the univerfe, if we under ftand by matter ^ not body, that is, matter with its feveral 
 qualities of extenfion, refiftance, &c. •, but \.\\c Jirji m-Jter^ th;it is, matter vf:x\\out 
 any of thofe qualities, which, as we fliall fc.^ afterwards, was held in the Pythago- 
 rean fchooi to be one of the principles of nature. And what makes the divifion ivctwixt 
 thefe two principles of nature, is, according to our author, the ccurfc of the moon. \h;ch 
 he fays is the ifthmus betwixt immortality and generation. lo-d^f^e? yu^ ifIiv ctieivcctntt; 
 
 X.XI yiiy,ciui o tti^i t«» c-tAn^viv o^cuoi. Ibid. 
 
 * Ariftotle calls this chiiige t| tv),^ vTs-tKM^nvtu tt? Cz-eiai/^iver. Metaph\f. lib. 13. 
 chap. II. See alfo Philoponus in the paflage above quoted. See fuithei, Philopo* 
 nus's commentary upon the third chapter of the firft book of Ariftotle </«? ^mnui.
 
 Chap. rV. ANTIENT M K T A P H Y S I C S. 35 
 
 and/>W;ir//>/^Jof things, they were feeking for they did not know whcit ; 
 and, therefore, fome of them ftumbled upon one kind o{ canj'e^ and fome 
 of them upon another; and there is one of them, 'vvl. \.\\c. formal caufc^ of: 
 which all the philofophers before Socrates were ignorant, if it be true 
 what Ariftotle fays, * that Socrates was the firft who defined any 
 
 * thing *'.' It was only the material caiije that the firfl: philofophers 
 of Greece, as he fays, and particularly Thales, foiight after. Plato, 
 the fcholar of Socrates, appears to have been the firll of the Ionic 
 fchool that introduced formal caufes into natural philofophy. Thcfe 
 he called ideas^ and made them the principles of all things. Antl 
 the reafon why he infifts fo much upon this kind of caufe, and fo 
 little upon the other three, is given us by Ariftotle in the end of his 
 firft book of raetaphyfics, 'viz. ' that heftudied mathematics too much, 
 
 * and, inftead of ufing them as th^ handmaid of Philofophy, made them 
 
 * Philofophy itfelff*' Upon which Alexander Aphrodifienfis, in his com- 
 mentary upon Ariftotle's Metaphyfics, and Fonfcca, the learned Jefuite 
 above mentioned, have very well obferved, that mathematics inquire net 
 about any other caufe, except the formal^ negledling altogether the matd- 
 rial, the efficient^ and the fnal. Plato, however, in the Phoedo, fpeaks a 
 good deal offnal caujes ; but, in the fyftem of natural philofophy, 
 which is contained in the Timaeus, he fays very little of it. As to 
 efficient caifesy Ariftotle tells us, that Anaxagoras was the firft who 
 introduced mind as the efficient caufe of the univerfe ; for which he 
 commends him, as fpeaking like a fober man among babbling drunk- 
 ards; for he appears every where to take pleafure in decrying the 
 philofophy before him : And, with refpedt to this dodrine of caufes J, 
 he iays, ' That philofophy before his time did not well know what it 
 
 * would be at, and did but lifp and ftammer.* 
 
 ^ There 
 
 * Metaph. lib. i. cap. 6. 
 
 f Tiyon TK fixdiif^eCTx T«<j vuv.v) tptX»9-e<ptUy ipiii<rKo»T»)v uXXuV X^P'* ^t""* ^W ve^yuxT$vt<r- 
 
 iui; pag. 854. edit. Uu Val. As he is fpeaking there of the iIo£lrine of ideas, the 
 obfervation is undoubtedly meant to apply to Plato, and to his followers who efpoufed 
 that dodtrine ; and I think may very well be applied to fome philofophers of our age, 
 who make mathematics the whole of philofophy, 
 X Lib. I. Metaphyf. z^i^/z^.
 
 36 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book L 
 
 There yet remains another 7ini'verfal to be confidered, more univer- 
 fal than any I have hitherto mentioned, viz. being ; for this is an idea 
 that applies to every thing v/hich exifts in any way, whether as fub^ 
 ftance or accident^ whether aSiually or potentially^ whether in the na- 
 ture of things, or only in our notions; for even what we call ent'm 
 rationis^ or fidions of our mind, fuch as a hippocentaur^ or inoiintain of 
 gold^ have a teing\ even negation ox privation have an exillence; nay, 
 according to Ariftotle, we can fay, that nothing has a being * In 
 fhort, wherever we can ufe the fubftantive verb is, there muft be fome 
 kind of bei7ig. 
 
 It is not, however, all the kinds of being, that I have mentioned, 
 that are the fubjedt of metaphyfics; for, as I obferved before, nothing 
 is the fubjed of metaphyfics but things exifting in nature, either 
 aHually or potentially. And therefore, abftrad notions, which exift 
 only in the mind, have nothing to do with this fcience; (o that, in me- 
 taphyfics, there is no difference betwixt the abflrad and the concrete f. 
 
 As all things exifiing are tiiher frib/lances or accidents, and as acci- 
 dents have no exiftence independent or by themfelveS; it is manifeft, 
 that ftibftance is that which chiefly deferves the appellation of being, 
 as it is that in which all other things exifl". Whatever other thing, 
 therefore, is fpoken of as exilling, muft be in reference to fub- 
 ffance J. In this manner, all the o^her nine categories, quantity, qua^ 
 lity, &:c. exin only in reference, to the firfl fubj!ance\ and even the 
 
 negation 
 
 * TO jttJi o>, tivoct nn tv, <paM.£», Metaphyf. lib. 4. cap. 2. 
 
 f This is the foundation of the maxim which is delivered by Fonfeca, page 839. 
 as the common opinion of all the philofophers. * In tranfcendentibus concreta et ab- 
 « ftrafta praedicari de fe invicem, ut tinum de uaitafe, unitas de uno, verum dc ve- 
 » ritate^ ZiZ. 
 
 \ See Ariftctle's Metaphyfics, lib.' 4. cap. 2. where he fays, that every thing that 
 
 exifts is either e«<r««e or ■Ka'^% cva-ioic, or tot? as cvcixvy >i (pfofuiy >i a-TffY.a-fiiy J) 7r»tarnTt(, » v»in- 
 
 y.Xt TO«J «V, er/«< /i!i 0", ?>*/J2V.
 
 Chap. IV. A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I C S. 33 
 
 froni capahUity to hahit^ fuch a change heing for the better, and beln"- 
 the perfection of the thing, not the deftrudion, is not faid to be 
 fuffering \ and, in general, that term is not applied, but to a change 
 that is accompanied with fome deQrLi£lion,(p()«^«, as, for example, when 
 black is changed to ivhite^ there is a deflrudtion of the black ; and, 
 in general, when any quality of a fubjc6t is changed, there is a de- 
 ftrudtion of the quality from which the change is. Therefore, in 
 fuch cafes, there is fuffering ; but, in all other changes, there is only 
 alteratioTiy or «AAa<«5-«5, except in the change above mentioned, from 
 none7itity to entity ; for that is not even alteration^ which is only 
 from one fpecies of quality, or accident, to another, the fubjedt re- 
 maining tbe fame *. 
 
 All change mufi: be produced by fomc caufe ; the idea of change 
 :is therefore necelTariiy conneded with the dodrine of caufes j in treat- 
 ing of which, Ariftotle has excelled all the philofophers that went before 
 him ; nor has there been any thing worth obferving added to his difcoveries 
 fince. And, as it belongs to the firft philofophy to know the firft 
 <:au(es and principles of things, it is of neceffity that the metaphyfi- 
 cian fhould know the nature oi 2l cauje^ and be able to diftinguifh 
 the different kinds of them. 
 
 The general idea of a caufe is, That^ ivithout nvhich, another 
 ihing^ called the effed, cannot he ; and it is divided by Arillotle into 
 four kinds, known by the name of the material^ the formal^ the effi- 
 cicnt^ and xh'^ fnal. The firft is, that of which any thing it, made : 
 Thus, hqfs or marble are the material caufes of a flatue \ earthy air, 
 fre, and ivater^ 01 all natural bodies. The formal cauje is the form, 
 idea^ architype-, or pattern of a thing ; for all thefe words Ariftotle ufes 
 to txprefs it. Thus, the idea of the artift is the formal caufe of the 
 ftatue ; ^nd of all natural lubftances, if we do not fuppofe them the 
 work of chance, \.\\^ formal caufe are the ideas of the divine mind ; and 
 
 E this 
 
 t £| HSd^rtareiD^tvoti «j n5(»7r»?ro<«^syflV, t«v «vtou VTrtxHfUJov fittHTtfi See PhiloponuSj
 
 34 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book!, 
 
 this formi concurring with the matter^ produces every work, whether 
 of nature or art. The efficient caufe is the principle of the change or 
 motion which produces the thing. In this fcnfe, the ftatuary is the 
 caufe of the ftatue, and the God of nature, the caufe of ail the works 
 of nature. And, lajilyy ihef nal caufe is that^ for the fake of ivhich^ 
 any thing is done. Thus, the ftatuary makes the ftatue for pleafure, 
 or for profit; and the works of nature are all for fome good end *. 
 
 It may be obferved of thefe caufe's^ that the two firft of them, viz.. 
 the material and the formal, are internal, and make part of the thing "f"; 
 and theforjnal caufe is what is commonly contained in the definition 
 of the thing if. 
 
 It may be alfo obferved of this divlfion of caufes, that two of them 
 plainly fuppofe a mind and a defign in nature as well as in art, 'v'lz, 
 xht formal and the fnal-, for it is evident, that neither of thefe could 
 exift> if the univerfe was the work of chance, or of material caufes. 
 
 This difcovcry of Ariftotle concerning caufes, is, I think, one of the 
 principal things that he has added to the flock of philofophy ; for, 
 according to the account that he gives of the opinions of philofophcrs 
 before him, it is evident, that, when they were inquiring about the caufes 
 
 and 
 
 * See all this explained at great length by Arillotle, lib. 2. cap. 3. of his Phyfics, 
 and lib. 5. cap. 2. of his Metaphyfics, where there are many diflindions made, very 
 well worth attending to, betwixt th€ firfl: and fecond principal and fubordinate caufes. 
 .See alfo what Fonfeca, a learned Jefuite, in his commentary upon Ariftotle's Meta«. 
 phyfics, has faid upon the fubjedl of thefe caufes, quacjlio i. ad caput ^- lib. i. IMeta- 
 jh^fiC. where he demonftrates, that there can be neither fewer of them- nor more. 
 
 t Thefe are called by Ariflotle evv7r«»;^i6VT«. 
 
 % This is what Ariflotle calls the to n uv to**, or, the Xoyn ir.t eva-ixg, or fimply A«yoj ^ 
 whereas the ovrtic is the natural fubftance, or the thing as it exifls, {Arijlot. de Animay 
 lib^ 2. cap. I.), that is, a corr.pound of thcmatter and/orw. There is nothing, however, 
 to hinder the njatter likew fe to be taken into the definition ; and, in that way, AriflotJe 
 fays, 'that all natural fubftances Ihould be defined ;' lib. 6. cap. i. Metaphyfic
 
 Chap. IV. AN T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I C S. 
 
 a9 
 
 Thefe, and many other fuch words, ufed, not only in metaphyfics; 
 but in other fciences, Ariftotle has explained very diligently in his 
 fifth book of metaphyfics, diftinguiQ-iing all the different fignifica- 
 tions in which they are uled, birt afcertaining'one princij)al to which 
 all the red refer. It is, I believe, the bed metaphyfical vocabulary 
 extant, and will be' very much efteemed by thofe who know how 
 much accurate fpeaking contributes to juft thinking : For, though 
 the diftindions there made may leem trllimg and frivolous, or, per- 
 haps, not intelligible to thofe who have not learned to know the 
 difference betwixt rowwoMj^w/f and philojophy^ they. will, to the learn- 
 ed, appear ufcful in all reafoning, and efpecially upon matters of ab- 
 ftrufe fcience, but of abfolute neceffity in refuting captions and fo- 
 phifms, which, without thofe diftindions, cannot be anfwered. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
 accident, which may at firft fight appear a little extraordinary. He fays, that a phy- 
 fidian does not cure a man except by accident^ but Calias or Socrates^ or any other 
 who happens to be a man. But, is there wo general oi which curing can be properly 
 predicated? There is; and Arillotle has exprefled it by the Greek word SifXTnv- 
 T»v, which we may tranllate curabie. Milton, who was learned in 'the philofophy, as 
 well as the language of the Greeks, has ufed the expreflTion by accident in this phiio- 
 fophical fenfe. For, in the argument to the Sampfon Agoniftcs^ he fays, ' That 
 ' Sampfon, when he pulled down the houfe, killed the lords of the Philiflines, and 
 « himfelf ^_y .7fai^/z/ i' which, at firlt fight, niufl appear very lira nge, as the killin;^ 
 cf himfelf was as neceffary as the killing thofe lords. But the meaning is, the killin? 
 thofe lords was the intention of Sampfon, not the killing himfelf; which, though it ne- 
 ceffariiy happened along with the other, yvzsbefide his intention. The killing, there- 
 fore, the lordsi was y.x6' kwo with refptd to his intention: But the killing of himfelf 
 was-x<»T« cvfcZtirix.oiy or by accident. In this fenfe, it is, that, as I before obferved, our 
 mind is faitl to be moved when our body is moved; for that is not, nor can be xx6' ecvro, 
 as the mind, not having parts, is incapable of motion from place to place: It is there- 
 fore x«ct« (rvftSfSuK«?, that is, not by its own nature, but by t/te accident oi its being 
 joined with the body. In this way, alfo, a man is moved by the motion of a boat, in 
 which he is, with this diflerence only, that the man in the boat may be moved i^xi' Uvro, 
 though he is at that time moved y.xrx c-vft^tt>;y.c; ^ whereas, the mind cannot at any time ' 
 be moved Kxf Uvrc.
 
 40 
 
 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book:L 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Mind, the chief SuhjeSf of Metaphyfics^ but not the only — Being, and 
 its general Attributes^ the Subje^ of Metaphyfics — The Univ(*rfe dU 
 fo^ and the firfi Caufes and Principles of Things — Full Definition of 
 Metaphyfics — The Properties of this Science ^ and the fieveral Names 
 by ivhich it is knoivn — Encomium of it by Arifiotle — The Subject oj it 
 the fame ivith the Diale^ic and the Sophifiical Art — The Knoivledge 
 of it neceffary for dete^ing the Fallacies of the Soph if s, 
 
 THOUGH mind be, as I have faid, the chief fubje£t of metaphyfics^ 
 there are other things in nature of which the confidcration be- 
 longs to \\\G firfi philofophy ; for, even with regard to tnind itfelf, as it is 
 but one kind of beings the nature of it cannot be fully underftood, unlefs 
 we know what being in general is, ai;d what are the common accidents^ 
 or properties that belong to it as bein^, 1 he fubjed, therefore, of meta- 
 phyfics, according to Ariflotle, is the to o., \ ew, or beings qua being ; for 
 he tells us, that it is not any particular kina of b'-ingy luch as ani- 
 mals or <uegetables^ lines or numbers^ that is the i'bj^ct of metaphyfics, 
 but bthi^ in general, and its common attributes *. And he ib at great 
 pains to fhow, that, though the fubjed; be lo cumprchcnfive, and fo 
 various, yet the fcience is but one f. 
 
 Some of the common attributes of being I have already mention- 
 ed ; one particularly v^ith v»'hich I fet out, and vv.hJch is principally to 
 be attended to, *viz, that fonic beings are- by their naUire, intirely fe- 
 paralcd from inattei or bojy^ while others are joined with it. Whe- 
 ther 
 
 ♦ Mftnp'^yf. lib. ^i- cap. I. et lib. 6- Cap. i. 
 ■<^- Mctaphyf. lib. 4. cap. 2.
 
 Chap. IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 37 
 
 negation of being, or 7iofietitity, has, as I have obferved already, an ex- 
 iftence, by having a relation io Jiib/iance. Being, therefore, is principally 
 predicated of fubftance; and, though it be alfo predicated of other things, 
 it is not fo predicated exadly in the fcime {cai'e ; yet, not homonym 
 movjly^ox equi'vocally^ but in a way that Ariflotle calls ^-p*? i?, that is, in 
 relation to one thing v;hich is confidered as principal ; for that is the 
 proper meaning of the prepofnion ^pa? with the accufative cafe : And 
 he illuftrates this by the example of the word vy(«y»v, or healthy, which 
 applies equally to what produces health, what preferves health, and 
 what is a fign of health j all which fignifications are not homony" 
 mousi neither are they fynonymous, but they are fomething betwixt 
 the two ; for they are ^p*? Iv, that is, they have all a relation to om 
 principal thing, viz. health, that being the chief thing in them all. 
 
 One \S2i\{o an univerfal predicate, as well SiS being, of all things 
 exifting ; for every thing that has a being, confidered feparately, and 
 as diftind from other things, is one : And this is not only true of fub- 
 Jlances, but of all their properties and accidents j for every one of thefe 
 is by itfelf owr. So that one, as well as being, is the general predicate 
 of all the categories *; nor is there any difference betwixt being and 
 one, or the to ov and the ro U, as Ariftotle has exprefled it, except that 
 (?;i^ expreffts the negation oi many, which being implies. 
 
 Oppofed to one is vmUitiicle, and of thefe two the univerfe may be 
 faid to confift ; for all is either ofte or many, and every thing io divi- 
 fible or indivifible. ^ Under one Ariftotle claffes the ideas of fame, 
 like,2iX\A equal', and under multitude, he ra.nks dive r/ity, iinlikenejs, and 
 inequality, all which terms he very accurately explains f- And thefe 
 
 two 
 
 * Pilctaphyf. lib. lo. cap. 2. 
 
 t Mct'Aphyf. lib. lo-cap. 3. See what further Ariftotle has falil upon the fubjed of 
 the one in his Metaphyfics, lib. 5. cap. 6- where he has very accurately diftinguiflied the 
 clifFerent fignifications of the t. ev, and explained what one in number is, cne in fpecice, 
 •ne in kind, and ons in proportion or analogy.
 
 38 ANTIENT MET APH YSICS. Book I. 
 
 two may be ranked among the principles of the univerfe; for of one 
 and Diultitiide^ Jamentjs and divtrjity^ likenefs and unlikmefs^ equality 
 and inequality^ the "juholc ot things is compofed, makh^g that * renim 
 * co7icordta dijcors^ of which Horace fpcaks. 
 
 hWfubfiances have accidents ; for every thing in nature acls or fuf~ 
 /ersy and has. quahties by which it a^s oxjuffers, 
 
 Thefe accidents are predicated of fubftances -either kx6' d-jjp, or kxt» 
 »-v^ej€««xaf, words which occur very frequently in Ariftotle's writings, 
 and therefore ought to be explained. An accident is xx6' kvro of a fub- 
 JlancCy when it is neceflary to that fubftance, fo as the fubftance can- 
 not exift without it. This is the cafe when it is deduced by neceflary 
 confequence from the definition of a fubtlance ; for, if it be includejd 
 in the definition, then it is not y.cS «yr«, but part of the to t. «v «»«», or x*- 
 y«5 T„? c^^^xi'. — That is, in Englifh, It is not an ejfential property of the 
 fubftance, but the ejfence^ or part of the ejjence of the fubftance. 
 
 In this manner, to have the three angles equal to two right angles, 
 is an eflential property of a triangle; whereas, being bounded by three 
 lines, is the eflence of a triangle. It may be obferved, that a proper- 
 ty may be neceflfary to a thing, and yet not be ^ao'ii-T* of that thing. 
 For example, having three angles equal to two Tight, is a neceflfary 
 property of an ifojceles triangle, yet not kx^ ii^ro of it, but of a triangle; 
 becaufe it does not refult from the definition of an ijofceles triangle, 
 like the property of having two angles at the bafe equal, but from the 
 definition of a triangle: On the other hand, an accident is kxtx <rvuZi^^KOi 
 of any fubftance, when it may, or may not, accoapany the fubftance, 
 and vet the fubftance continue the. lame; lo that fuch an accident is 
 3&vha[, in common language, is called accidental to a thing *. 
 
 Thefe, 
 
 * Arlflct. Mctaphyf lib i^- c?p \Z. anH 30. And, in the fitft chapter of the 
 ■firfl Lcci> oi mcU] i.yljc&, he givti ».n txan.plt oi a thing being y.u.ix iry^^ii'fc^jjx)?, or by 
 
 accuitiit.
 
 Chap. V. A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I C S. 41 
 
 ther there was any being intirely feparated from body^ appears to have 
 been a doubt In the time of Arlftotle as well as now: And it appear^;, 
 from feveral paiTages In his metaphyfics, that it was the chief 
 purpofe of that work, to prove, that fuch bangs did exift ; and, ac- 
 cordingly, wlih that proof he concludes the work. It is therefore e- 
 vident, that, according to Ariftotle's notion, mind^ and that moH: per- 
 fect mind^ which is feparated from ail matter^ was the chief fubject of 
 metaphyfics. But, as 7nind is one kind of beings it is not poiTible 
 perfedly to underftand the nature of m'lnd^ without knovving what 
 being is, and its general attributes, which muft belong to m'lnd^ as well 
 as other beings : And there is one kind of being which it is abfolutely 
 neceffary to know, in order to underftand the nature of ;;/i«./, and 
 that is body ; for, as body^ according to the definition that Is given of 
 it, is as oppofite to zw/W, as negation is to affirmation ; and as of op- 
 pojites there is the fame fcience, it is impofiible that the one can be 
 underftood without the otlier. And it is for this reafon, that, in this 
 fcience, though the chief fubjed of it be mind^ I have thought' 
 proper to fay fo much of body^ and fhall ftill fay a great deal more of 
 it. 
 
 Further, all beings are contained in the univerfe ; and the umver/e 
 itfelf is a being, and one being, according to the notion of all the an- 
 tient philofophers that were not Atheifts, and, according to the no- 
 tion of fon^e of them, an anmiate being *. Now, if there be any phi- 
 lofophy, or fcience of any kind, to which the knowledge of this being 
 belongs, it muft be metaphyfics ; nor is there any philofophy to which 
 
 F the 
 
 * This was undoubtedly the do^lrlne of the Pythagorean fchool, as is evident from 
 that muft valuable fragment of it, ftill prcfcrved in the treatife of Timaeus the Lo- 
 crian, De anima mundi. And in this, as in other things, Plato follows the philofophy 
 of Pythagoras, as is evident from the dialogue which bears the name of TimafUSf 
 pag. io/}8. edith Ficini*
 
 42 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book. I. 
 
 the definition oi pbilofophy in general can be To well applied, viz. the 
 knoiJuJeclge of all things divine and human ; that is, the whole univerfe f. 
 
 Now, as all things cannot be known by the hunian mind, other- 
 wife than in their firft caufes and principles, the firft philofophy muft 
 neceflarily be the knowledge of fuch firft caufes and principles, which 
 are the firft of be itigs, and do virtually contain in themfelves all other 
 beings : And, for that reafon, Ariftotle fays, they have more of enfitjr 
 in them than other things '^. Now, though mind be the principal thing 
 in the univerfe^ being the firft mover and author of all generation and 
 production, yet, as there are in the univerfe inaterial caufes^ as well as 
 efficient., jinaU diW^ for?Jial, it is neceffary that they alfo fhould be con- 
 fid ered as a part of ihcjirjl Philofophy. 
 
 Metaphyfics, therefore, being the knowledge of the univerfe, 
 and of the firft caufes and principles of things, it muft necefTarily 
 comprehend the knowledge of the firft caufe of all, that is, the Deity^ 
 or Supreme Being : And this is the fubjedt of the higheft part of it, 
 called theology. But, as God is not to be known by us, except by his 
 works, and, as we cannot afcend to the firft caufe otherwife than by 
 the fcale of inferior caufes^ the ftudy of the univerfe^ and the princi- 
 ples of it, muft neceflarily, by way of preparation to theology., be ftu- 
 died by the firft Philofopher. And, accordingly, Ariftotle having ex- 
 plained thofe pHnciples in his book of metaphyfics, concludes them 
 with theology y or the doctrine of the firft caufe. 
 
 And now we fee the whole extent of the fcience of metaphyfics ; 
 for, thougii the proper fubjedt of it be mind., feparated froai ^natter., 
 fuch as, I hope, I fliall demonftrate the Supreme mind to be, tlie great 
 
 author, 
 
 fThis is Plato's definition of philofophy : And it is explained by Ammonius in his 
 commentary upon Porphyry's inrrodudlion, p 5. in the fame way that I have cxpiain- 
 cd it ; that is, to denote the knowledge of all things; for, fays hc^ by divine^ is 
 meaned things eternal and unchangcabie ; by humati) things changeable, and in genera- 
 tion and corrnption. 
 
 \ Metaphyf. lib. 2- chap. I.
 
 Chap.V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 
 
 43 
 
 author, and firft caufe of all things ; yet, as that caufe cannot be recog- 
 nifed but through inferior and fubordinate caufes, metaphyfics muft 
 neceflarily comprehend the knowledge of tliefe, as well as of the firfl 
 caufe ; and, therefore, in its full extent, may be defined, * The 
 * fcience of the caufis^ and principles of all things exifting ;* of 
 mind chiefly, as being that which is principal in the imiverfe, and 
 the firfl; caitje of all things, and likewife of whatever elfe may be cal- 
 led a caufe or principle, though inferior and fubordinate to mi7id. 
 
 From this definition, it is evident, that this fcience is juftly entitled 
 umv erf al philofophy \ firfl ^ becauCe its fubjed: is the univerfe ; and,y^- 
 condly^ becaufe it explains and demonftrates, as far as they are capa- 
 ble of demonftrati on, the principles of every other kind of philofo- 
 phy, and of all arts and fclences ;• for the principles of nature muft 
 neceflarily be the principles of every art and fcience. It may there- 
 fore be faid to be the fcience of fciences^ as comprehending, in 
 fome (ort, all other fciences. It is called alfo, as we have faid, 
 \\\t firft philofophy ^ from its rank and dignity in nature among the o- 
 ther fciences: But, from the order in which it muft necefl^xrily be 
 learned, it is commonly known by the name of metaphyfics \ which 
 appellation, as I have obferved, is taken from the title of Ariftotle*s 
 books where he treats of it ; for Ariftotle himfelf does not call it 
 by that name, (though I fee his commentators of the Alexandrian 
 fchool, and particularly the oldeft of them, Alexander Aphrodi- 
 fienfis, gives it that name,) but by the name of sa^<«, or, as the Latins 
 tranflated it, fapientia ; which was the only word the Latins had for 
 philolophy, till about the time of Cicero, when they adopted the 
 Greek word philofophia. In the introdudion to his books of me- 
 taphyfics, he has made a very fine encomium upon it, fliowin^-, that 
 it has every property which can make one fcience more va- 
 luable than another : For it is the moft univerfal of all fcien- 
 ces, being the knowledge of all things, as far as it is pc>fli')le tor iiian 
 to know them, which can only be by general notions. It is the fci- 
 
 F 2 ence
 
 44 AN TIE NT METAPHYSICS. Book I. 
 
 cnce of caufts more than any other, becaufe it is the fcience of the 
 firft caiifes. It is the moft difEcult fcience, becaufe it is moft removed 
 from fenfe and common apprehenfion : At the fame time, it is the 
 clearefl: and moft accurate of all fciences, becaufe it treats of things 
 which are firft in nature, though laft in our conception ; and 
 which, therefore, are the fimpleft, or leaft compounded. And, fur- 
 ther, it is, more than any other fcience, what every fcience fhould be 
 to the human mind, valuable for its own fake, not for the fake of any 
 utility, profit, or pleafure that it produces *. And, therefore, fays A- 
 riftotle, it was not difcovered till both the neceflary and pleafurable 
 arts were invented f. And, /^/y. As the end of all philofophy is to 
 know God, this philofophy, more than any other, anfwers that end ; 
 the chief fubject of it, and that with which it concludes, being, as I: 
 have faid, the knowledge of the firft caufe of ail things. 
 
 Ariftotle has obferved, that diahtlic and metap.hyfics are converfant 
 about the fame fubje6t. J. For, as dialedl'ic does not treat of any par- 
 ticular fubjed, but argues from general topics, applicable to all fub- 
 jeds, it is the knowledge o^ generals^ as well as metaphyfics ; but then, 
 it is a knowledge, taken, not from the nature of things, but the opi- 
 nions of men ; and its principles are all afllimed, none of them either 
 f^lf-evident or demonftratcd : And therefore diaJeclicM not a fcience, 
 like metaphyfics, but rather 2. faculty^ as Alexander Aphrodifienfishas 
 very well obferved, in his Introdudion to his Commentary upon Ari- 
 ftoile's Books of Topics. 
 
 Ariftotle Ins alio obferved §, that the fophlftical art was converfant 
 
 about the f'^me fubjeds as metaphyfics : For the t» •> and the to ^r, <,f, 
 
 that is, being and no being ; and the general principles and properties of 
 
 beings were the chief topics of the fophifts. And it was by captious 
 
 and fallacious arguments drawn from thence, that they confounded men, 
 
 and endeavoured to overturn the principles of all fcience and certainty. 
 
 In order, therefore, to refute and filence them, the knowledge of this 
 
 kicnce was abfolutcly neceflary. 
 
 BOOK 
 
 * Metaphyf lib. i. cap, 2, f Metaphyf. lib- i. cap. i. in fine 
 
 I lb. lib. 4. cap. 2, pag. 871. § lb. ibid.
 
 Ghap. I. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 45 
 
 B G O K IE 
 
 (Df the Principles conftitucing the Universe, 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Xhe Science, of Metaphyftcs takes in the ivhole Uni'verfe, as it treats of 
 the Caiifes and Principles of Things — Thefe reducible to three Heads 
 — (9/ Matter and Form — Thefe eafily diftinguipoable in Works of 
 Art \ aljo in the Works of Nature — Of Matter — difficult to form an 
 Idea 0/ Matter — the fame Difficulty ivith refpccl /o Subftance — Mr 
 Locke's Notions concerning Matter and Subftance — Whether ihefrfl 
 Matter has a real Exijience — Whether it has a feparate Exifcnce — 
 DigreJ/ion concerning the reality of Ideas — Difindlion made upon that 
 Head — Opinion of the Pythagoreans, Plato^ and Ariftotle, concerning 
 Matter — Matter not to be perceived by the Senfes^ nor to he appre- 
 hended even by the Intelleii^ except by Analogy — No perfe^ Idea, or 
 Knoivledge of the Efjence of any natural Subjlance, 
 
 N the preceeding Book I have fpoken of beings and its mod gene- 
 ral attributes, fuch as motioUy energy^ a^ion, pa/Jwn^ habit, poivei', 
 and the like ; and what I have there faid may, I think, fuffice for that 
 part of the fcience which, by our modern metaphyficians, is called 
 Ontology. This part of the work. I confider as only preparatory to 
 what is to follow ; for the proper fubjeO of metaphyfics is the Uni^ 
 verfe, and the firft caufes and principles of things ; and, among thefe, 
 chiefly mind, which, as it is thtfrf caufe of all things, is, as I have 
 faid, the chief fubjed of metaphyfics, 
 
 The
 
 46 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IL 
 
 The caufes and principles of things may, I think, be fitly confidered 
 under three heads : Fufli The conjlitnting or elementary principles^ 
 by which, and out of which, this univerfe is produced, fuch as, change^ 
 motion^ energy, aSfion, pa/Jion, poiver^ habit, faculty, matter, form, and 
 muid. All thele may be reduced to two of the caufes mentioned by 
 Ariftotle, viz. the efficient and the material \ and, in the lafl thing I 
 mentioned, viz. 7iiind, is included the fnal caufe. Under the fecond 
 head, I confider things ^xtz.^y formed and conflituted, and inquire in- 
 to their nature, and thofe principles which make them what they are. 
 All thefe fall under that kind of caufe which Ariftotle calls \\\t formal 
 caufe. And, laflly, under the third head, I treat of thofe things, 
 which, though they be not, properly, the caufes of things * in the 
 uniirerfe, are the neceflary concomitants of them, fuch as, duration^ 
 thne, /pace, and place f . 
 
 To 
 
 * They are called by the commentators of Arlflotle, c-t/jaiiTi*, being fuch things, 
 which, though not caufes, mufl eiift along with the caufes, otherways nothing could 
 be produced. 
 
 t There are preferved to us two very valuable pieces of Pythagorean philofophy, that 
 of Ocellus LucanuSi Trt^t rev Trxrrn, and that of Archytas the 'Tarentinc, bearing the fame 
 title. T'he firft is, I believe, the moft antient piece of philofophy in the world, of the 
 authenticity of which we are fure. For the author was dead fomc generations, it would 
 appear, before Plato, as is evident from the epiftle of Archytr.s to Plato, wherein he 
 tells him, he had got this workof Ocellus, among others, from his defcendents See what 
 Gale^ in his mythological works, has faid of this author, in the preface to his treatife. 
 
 It is from him that Ariftotle has taken his dodlrine of the eternity of the world, his 
 Jifth elementy and his notion of the tranfmutation of the elements into one another; 
 and particularly the lafl, which he has iaid down in his book Dc ortu et interitUy al- 
 moft in the words of Ocellus ; See Gale, iibi fitpra. And from him, and Timaeus 
 the Locrian, both he and Plato have taken their notions of thtjirjl matter. Achytas, 
 the other author, who writes alfo iresf rtv mn'ira^ was a contemiporary of Plato j and it 
 is fro.u that work of his that Ariftotie, as I huve t'.fewhere obfervcd, has taken his book 
 of Cdttgones. Thele two authors, treating both of the univerfe, appear to have confi- 
 dered it under the two fcveral views which 1 have propofed in th-^ two firft heads. 
 For Ocellus, in his treatife, fpeaks chielly of the ejicient ?n<-i lUiittriul caufes^ by 
 which, and out of which, ail things in nature are produced^ iuch as matter and forniy 
 
 and
 
 Chap. I. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 47 
 
 To one or other of thefe three heads may be reduced all the gene- 
 ral principles of this fcience, of which 1 propofe to treat in this nrfl 
 part of my work ; and, if thefe are well explained, I hope the appli- 
 cation to both nature and man, will appear not very difficult, at the 
 fame time that it is produQive of great and important confequences. 
 
 As to the/r/? head, under which I treat of the efficient and ma- 
 tend caufes of the univerfe, and what may be called the elements of 
 nature^ I have already anticipated feveral things falling under it, fach 
 as motion^ change^ poiver, habits and the other things mentioned above, 
 which I thought neceffary, in order to make my definition of body 
 and mind more Intelligible ; and, particularly, I have been very full 
 upon the fubjed oi Jiiotion^ without the knowledge of which, It is im- 
 pofTible, in my opinion, to know what either body or 77iind is. I now 
 proceed to fpeak of ?natter dsAform. 
 
 That thefe are the elements of all natural fubflances, and that the 
 whole vifible world is a compound of thefe two, is a philolophy, I 
 believe, as antient as any ; for, it is not only the philofophy ot Plato 
 and Ariftotle, but v/e find It laid down in that moll valuable niece of 
 genuine Pythagorean philofophy already mentioned, viz. Timaeus the 
 Locrian his treatife De Anima Mundi ; and 1 have no doubt that Py- 
 thagoras brought it with him from Egypt. That there Is, in the 
 works of art, a diilindtion betwixt matter 2.wAform^ and that every 
 piece of art is a compound of thefe two, every man, who knows the 
 meaning of the terms, will admit. Nor is it pofTible, 1 fhould tUmk, 
 to deny that the works of nature are compounded In the lame 
 manner ; for example, that every animal and vegetable fubltance has 
 
 a 
 
 and thzt principle which is always a^ivc, and that which is zUvnys pajivc. Whereas 
 Archytas, in his trc.itiic, Ipeaks ot what I propofe to coiiii'lcr under the fecond head, 
 viz. the general principles of things already conftituted, which he reduces to certain 
 claffcs, called Categories.
 
 48 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book IL 
 
 a certain form belonging to it, which makes It what it is, and alfo 
 matter^ with which \\\\^form is incorporated. 
 
 It is alfo admitted by all the modern, as well as antlent philofo- 
 phers, that this matter may be reduced to certain elements, of which 
 it is coinpofed, fuch as earthy ivatcr^ air, and^r<r, which, on that ac- 
 count, are calkd the elements^ by way of eminence. But the an« 
 tients did not flop here ; for the great difference that I obferve betwixt 
 the antients and moderns, in matters of fcience, is, that the antients 
 did generalize more, and carried their inveftigations as far as pofTible, 
 upon every fubjed ; and, accordingly, they have carried the analyfis 
 of body farther than the elements. For, obferving that thefe elements 
 changed into one another, and run an eternal round of tranfmuta- 
 tion*, tbey were thence led to fuppofe, that there was fomething 
 common to them all, and \.h.dXjireymr^. earthy and w^/^r, were all the 
 fame matter^ but under a difFerentyc?rw. 
 
 But what is this matter ? Is it body, of which we have talked fo 
 rr.uch ? It is not ; for body h tlie compound oi matter 2j\^ form. 
 
 What 
 
 • Milton has moft beautifully defcribed this fucceflxve change of the elements, in 
 Adam and Eve's morning hymn. 
 
 " Air, and ye elements, the eldefl birth 
 
 *• Of Nature's womb, that in quaternion run 
 
 " Perpetual circle, multiform ; and mix 
 
 ** And nourifti all things ; let your ceafelefs change 
 
 " Vary to our great Maker flill new praife." — Par. Loft, B. 5. v. i8o' 
 
 And it is from this Proteus-like appearance of the elements, that Plato infers that 
 there is fomething befides earth, air, fire, and, water, which ailumes all thefe different 
 appearances. And we are told by the antient authors whom Mr Harris quotes, in 
 his Philosophical Arrangements, page 81. that the Fable of Proteus is an admirable 
 type of the tranfmutafion of the elements; and it is to be obfcrved, that it is a very 
 antient fable, as antient as the days of Homer, not the invention, therefore, of the la- 
 ter Greek poets and mythologifts, nor, I am perfuaded, of Homer himfcif, but pro- 
 bably brought from Ejiypt by Orpheus, or fome other myftagogue; for it very much re- 
 fembles the fymbols of the Pythagoreans, which undoubt-djy came from thence; only 
 tht drefs 01 it is more poetical, bee the Verfes of Homer and Virgil ; alfo Mr Harris, 
 nbijupra.
 
 Chap. I. AN TIENT METAPHYSICS. 49 
 
 What Is it then ? It is, what is called by the philofophers of Eu- 
 rope, who, about an hundred years ago, took the trouble to ftudy the 
 antient books of philofophy, ^htfrji matter, and is wittily ridiculed 
 by Hudibras, under the appellation of matter iindreffed. And it is 
 truly matter 'void of form *, as our more grave and philosophical 
 Poet calls it, Vv^ithout any of thofe qualities that we afcribe to bcdy, fucK 
 as hot, cold, moifl, dry, and even without the three dimenfions, that 
 is, without extenfion, which includes all the three : For, as I have al- 
 ready obfervedt) they are nothing elfe but extenfion in different direc- 
 tions ; before and behind, which is what we call length ; to right and 
 left, which we call breadth ; and up and down, which is depth. 
 
 That our modern philofophers (liould have no idea of this matter^ 
 and fliould treat it as a vain, airy notion, and no more than a dream 
 of Ariftotle, and other antient mufty philofophers, is not to be won- 
 dered, when Mr Locke, our great author of the philofophy of mind, 
 has faid exprefsly, that he has no idea of fuhjlance^ the very firft of 
 the Categories, the dodrine of which is efteemed, by all thofe who 
 have ftudied the antient philofophy, to be the very elements or chate- 
 chifm of philofophy. At the fame time, Mr Locke thinks that he has 
 very clear ideas of different qualities inherent in fublfances. Now, I 
 would afk Mr Locke, How he comes by thefe clear ideas ? Is it not 
 by abRradlon ? And is it not a more violent abftradioa, if I may fo 
 fpeak, by which qualities are abftradted from a fubftance in which only 
 they can exift, than that of the fubftance from the qualities, feeing the 
 fubftance can cxiH:,' without, at lead, any particular quality. But Mr 
 Locke fpeaks fo confufedly and ambiguoufly of abftrad ideas of every 
 kind, that it is plain he doubted whether there was any fuch opera- 
 tion of the human mind as abftradlon. And as, through his whole 
 book, he confounds ideas and fenfations, it is plain that he had no no- 
 tion of the mind's having any perception, except by the fenfes, nor 
 knew that it could operate by itfelf, without the affiftance of the bo- 
 dy or its organs; that is, in other words, he did not know what an 
 
 G idea 
 
 * Milton Par. Loft. f See above, page 7.
 
 so ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 idea was, though he has written a whole book upon the fubjed ; and 
 has given us a fydeni of the philofophy of mind, without making the 
 diftindion, which is the foundation of that whole philofophy, betwixt 
 the mind operating by itfelf, and operating by the afliflance of the 
 fenfes: And, becaufe the mind muft of neceflity at firft operate by the 
 means of the fenfes only, he has from thence raihly concluded, that it 
 can never operate in any other way *. 
 
 But, whether Mr Locke had any idea of fubflance, or not, it is evi- 
 dent, that there muft be fomething in which the feveral qualities of 
 fubftance are inherent ; for we can very well conceive, abftraded from 
 any fubftances, fuch qualities as hoty colJ, jnoijl^ dry^ hitter^ fiveet^ 
 rounds Square^ and the like, and dill there will remain fomething, 
 which we call xki^fith fiance of the thing, that is, xh^fubfiratiim for all 
 thefe qualities. Now, it is only carrying abftradion further, and fepa- 
 rating from this fubftance even extenfion and figure of every kind, 
 and then we have remaining this matter of the antient philofophers. 
 
 I will give another illuftration from mathematics, which, perhaps, 
 will be better underftood, as all our natural philofophers profefs to be 
 mathematicians, and fome of them are really learned in that fcience. No 
 man, who is not a profefTed fceptic, and does not fet himfelf up, out of 
 wantonnefs or vain oftentation of fuperior parts, to difpute the clcareft 
 truths, will deny that we have clear ideas of the fubjeift of geometry ; for, 
 otherwife, there could be no certainty in that fcience. Now, the fubjeds 
 of geometry are the boundaries of bodies, viz. points^ lines^ Surfaces^ 
 ?ind folids : For a point is the termination of a liney a line is the boun- 
 dary of 2i fur/ace, and ajurjace of a /olid. Therefore, a /olid is defi- 
 ned to be that which has three dimenfions, viz. lengthy breadth^ and 
 depth ; dijiirface what has two, viz. length and breadth] a line Vv^hat 
 
 has 
 
 • See TV'bat I have further faid on this fubjccfl in the Origin and Progrefs of Lan- 
 guage, vol. I. book I. chap. 4. in the beginning.
 
 Chap. I. AN TIE NT METAPHYSICS. 51 
 
 has only length ; and a pobit what has no diinenfions at all. If, of 
 thefe, we have clear ideas, as every body muft allow who adnits the 
 certainty of mathematical knowledge, we muft admit that we have 
 at leaft Tome idea of that which is thus bounded and extended diifer- 
 ent ways : For it is of neceflity that a thing fliould be diiferent from 
 its bounds, and that there ihould be fomething which is thus limited 
 and dcfcribed by certain dimenfions. Here, therefore, we have found 
 what. we were feeking, matter v^^ithout its dimenfions, that is, without 
 extenfion, .which is the very firfty<?r;« that matter affumes. And here 
 alio we may learn, in pafTing, to diflinguifh the different fubje<Sl:s of 
 geometry and natural philofophy ; for the fubjed of geometry is the 
 boundaries of body\ noti^J/ j whereas the fubjei^ of natural philofo- 
 phy is hody^ with its dimenfions, and all its. other natural affedions. 
 
 It may be afked., Whether this matter^ without dimenfions, or any 
 other quality of body^^ does really exift ? and my anfwer is, That it has 
 a real exiftence,as much as its dimenfions or boundaries, and as much 
 as any other quality of body. 
 
 If any one is furprlfed that I give a real exiftence to a thing tliat 
 appears fo chimerical as w/flZ/cT without ^x/^w/ww, let him afk him- 
 felf, Whether he docs not give a real exiftence to the wax, without the 
 figure ? Now the figure is nothing but extenfion bounded. 
 
 If it be further afecd, Whether it has a feparate exiftence by itfelf, 
 diftind from all the qualities of body ? my anfwer is, That we have no 
 idea of it exifting feparately *,becaure we find no fuch thing in nature, 
 from which we draw all our ideas ; but, whether there may not be 
 
 G 2 . fuch 
 
 * Ammonlus, in Prnedlcamentis, pag 62. quoted by Mr Harris in his Philof. Ar- 
 rangements, page 85. lays, that it is fpoken of by philofophers as a thing having an 
 exiftence di(lin£l from body, in order to Oiow more clearly the orderly generation of 
 things, and their progrefs from one thing to another.
 
 £1 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book TL 
 
 fu.:h a thing exidlng in the regions of infinite fpace, as tnatter without 
 form and dimenfions, is what I think no man can take upon him to 
 decide. 
 
 Whatever is true of 7natter in general, will apply equally to the 
 particular matter of each particular fuhftance, and which I believe is 
 meaned by our modern philofophers, when they fpcak of xhi^fubjlance 
 of any thing as diftind from its attributes : For, as to X.\\q fubjhintial 
 forms of the Peripatetics, they are quite different from the matter, as I 
 fhall afterwards fhow. 
 
 And here it may not be improper to obferve, that the philofophers 
 of this age have fallen into great confufion concerning ideas^ by not 
 making the proper diflindions ; for fome of them fpeak of ideas as 
 exifling only in the mind \ others of them, as of things having a real 
 exif^ence in nature. Now, in one fenfe, neither of thefe opinions is 
 true; in another, both are true. Ideas are undoubtedly the creatures 
 of the viind^ being formed by the mind^ either from external objeds, 
 that is, the objeds of fenfe, or from refledions upon its own opera- 
 tions : And therefore, in as much as they are only the operations of the 
 mind-t they may be faid only to have an exiftence in the mind. But 
 we ought to difllnguifh betwixt the idea and its objeSi : For, tho* the 
 idea be only in the mina, the objed of it may have a real exiflence 
 out of the mind. And this is the cafe of all the ideas we form from 
 natural objeds. But there may be likewife ideas formed from no- 
 thing that is to be feen in nature, by w^hich I mean, that the mind 
 may conned together particular ideas, which it has formed from na- 
 tural objeds, (for all our ideas, as I have faid, are from nature,) into 
 one complex form, which has no exiftence in nature, fucn as, ilie idea 
 of a Hippocentaur, or whatever fancy or fear has conceived, 
 
 •■' Gorgons, and Hydras, and Chimeras dire," 
 
 Such
 
 Chap. I. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 53 
 
 Such ideas are what the fchoolmen call entia rationis ; and both thefe, 
 and their obje6ls have no exiftence except in the mind. If Mr Locke 
 •had made this diftimStion, he would not have fallen into fuch confu- 
 fion and contradiction concerning ideas, or ahjlracl ideas^ as he calls 
 them ; fometimcs fiippofing them to have a real exiftence, and fome- 
 times not. 
 
 The next thing to be confidcred is, Whether the objedls of our 
 ideas, being fuch as have a real exiftence out of the mind, have alfo 
 a feparate exiftence, as we conceive them, or whether they do not 
 neceflarily exift in fomething elfe ? For, I fuppofe every philofopher 
 is fo much of a logician as to underftand this diftindion, with which 
 Ariftotle begins his logical work *, betwixt what exifts by itfelf, 
 and independent of other things; and what exifts in another thing, 
 without which it cannot exift; or, in other words, betwixt fubjlance 
 and accident. Now, the accidents of fubftances have no feparate ex- 
 iftence by themfelves; and, as they cannot exift without \.hc fubjiance, 
 neither can we conceive the matter of any fubftance exifting without 
 the accident : So that there is nothing which has a feparate exiftence 
 out ot the iiiind, except our ideas of natural fubftances, taken with 
 the matter in which they exift ; and, accordingly, in this way, as 
 Ariftotle has told us, all natural fubftances ought to be defined f. 
 Thefe diftindions, properly made, would have prevented a great deal 
 of confufton and contradidion, which our modern philofophers have 
 run into, concerning ideas. 
 
 But, to return to matter^ which the reader will obferve I diftinguifli 
 from hody^ of which only 1 have treated in the preceeding part of 
 this work ; for body is matter fenfible\ that is, with thofe qualities 
 which make it perceptible by our fenfes. What appears to have 
 
 given 
 
 • See Ariftotlc's categories, cap. 2. ' 
 
 t ii^riftotk's metaphylics, lib. 6. cap- i.
 
 54 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 given the antients the idea of this univerfal matter^ is the tranfmuta.- 
 tion of the elements into one another *. This made them fuppofe, 
 that there was one common fubjedl of all thefc changes, which received 
 the contrary qualities producing thefe changes. Plato, in the 
 Timaeus, page 1059. editio Ficini^ fpeaking of thefe changes, fays, 
 that the appearances of the elements are fo different, and the trans- 
 mutation of the one into the other fo quick, that we cannot, with cer- 
 tainty, fay, that any one of them is what we call it, ^r^, air, earth, or 
 ivater, but we ought to fay that it is like one of thefe ; and he ejQ- 
 plains the matter by a comparifon : For, fays he, fuppofe a m.an takes 
 a piece of gold, which he fadiions into various forms, fuch as tri- 
 anp'les, and other figures, if he fhows you one of thefe, and afks you 
 what it is ? the fafeft anfwer that you can make, is. That it is gold : 
 For, if you fay that it is a triangle, while you fpeak, the figure may 
 be changed. Of this kind, fays he, is matter. You cannot fay it is any 
 07ie thing, yet it is not nothing', for it is undoubtedly y/97«^//^/?i^, and 
 fo much fome thing, that without it nothing could exilf, at leaft of the 
 vihblc world : For it is that which receives all imprelTions; and, like 
 a piece of v^ax, takes off- ewevy/orm, but itfelf has none. There are, 
 therefore, continues our author, three things in nature, that which is 
 produced, that in which it is produced, and that from whence it is 
 produced, and v*'hofe likenefs it is; or, in other words, the pattern and 
 iirchetyfe. This he has copied, and indeed all the reft of the philo- 
 fophy of thiS: dialogue, from Timaeus the Locrian; who, in his trea- 
 tife of the foul of the ivorld, fays, that all things are three, viz. idea, 
 matter, and body, or what is fenfible, and produced of the two firft f ; 
 meaning by idea the pattern or archetype, [ov form, as ic is frequently ; 
 called, both by Plato and Timaeus) and which mixes with, and 
 moulds and. falhions the, matter in a manner wonderful and inexpref- 
 
 fible. 
 
 * See Ocellus Lucanus, page 513. — 518. in Gale's opufcula mythologica. 
 
 + Ta 2s I <itx«»T«, iSix^, v\-x,y, aurdnToi Ti,oicy ix.y»ji>t rcvTiti-j, Timaeus Locrin, page ic8p. 
 editio Ficiiii. Here we are to underftarul, that Timxus is fpeaking of the world as it 
 cxifls and is conftiruted, and of the matter of which it is- made, not of the great firft 
 cuufeof it, of which he fpeaks afterwards, as diftintt from all thefe three.
 
 Chap. 1. A N T 1 E N T METAPHYSICS. SS 
 
 fible. And the Locrlan compares, as Plato docs, the icka to the fa- 
 ther, the matter to the mother, and the vlfible ivor/d, and all its vari- 
 ous forms, to the children. 
 
 This is the opinion of Plato, and the Pythagorean philofophers, 
 concerning ;;z^//^r : And, as to Aridotle, it is evident, that he has 
 taken his natural philofophy, as well as Plato, from the Pythagore- 
 ans, though he has difguifed it, and enlarged it much more : For it is 
 from them that he has taken his notion of the eternity of the v^'oild, 
 of generation and corruption, and of the Jirji 7Jiatter among other 
 things *; for he has made matter and form to be the principles 
 of all natural things, to which he has added privation. This ap- 
 pears not to have been reckoned by the Pythagoreans among the prin- 
 ciples of things ; nor indeed is it properly one, as 1 fhall afterwards 
 obferve ; but they knew that it was neceflary for the production of 
 natural fubftances, which I fhall prove in its proper place. 
 
 But, how are we to conceive this ftrange being, if it may be called 
 a being at jill, what has no determined exiflence, nor is any one 
 thing ? Is it by the fenfes ? It is not ; for Plato tells us exprefsly, 
 that it is not to be feen, nor apprehended by any of the fenfes ; and 
 it muft be fo, not being the vifible world, but that out of which the 
 vifible world is produced. Or, is it to be apprehended by intelledl ? 
 Neither can this be ; for the objeCl of intelled is the idea or fonn 
 of which matter receives the impreflion. But, how then come we to 
 have any notion of it at all ? It is, fays Timacus, and after him Plato, 
 /♦y«rf<* vo6<f, by a hajiard kind of reafon; not by any direO: conception 
 of it, fays Timaeus, but by analogy f. And Plato fays, (ibid, page 
 
 io6i.) 
 
 * Lib. I. phyfic cap. 8. verfus Jinem. See alfo metaphyfics z*. page io6. Editio 
 Silburgii, quoted by Mr Harris in his Philofophical arrangements, page 178. 
 
 f Tco fAri-7t») >c«t' iv^vuficiv vdHaSuiy «AA«t x«t' «»«Aoy««». See this vcry accurately explain- 
 ed by Mr Harris in his Philofophical arrangements, page 75. ct fcqiicn. where he 
 fliows that we have a notion of this primary viattcr, both by abftra6\ion and ana- 
 logy. *
 
 56 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IL 
 
 J 06 1.) that, while we are in this flate of exiftence, flambering, and 
 as it were dreaming, we cannot fee the truth of things, except by 
 fhadows and images, as we fee them in our fleep. And the truth is, 
 that we know not the fubftance or effence of any of the works of na- 
 ture, but only fome of their quahties or properties. For example, 
 all that we know of any animal or vegetable is, that it has fuch or 
 fuch qualities, and by thefe we define it. But what is the fubftance 
 of it, and what is the hidden elTence of It, producing all thofe vifible 
 qualities, we cannot tell ; and yet, it is evident, that, without know- 
 ing the effence of a thing, we cannot give a proper definition of it. 
 It is therefore true what I have obferved elfewhere *, that it is only 
 our own ideas that we can properly define. And fo much for matter ; 
 by which it is always to be underftood that 1 mean the firft matter^ 
 as it is commonly called, in contradlftindion to body^ which is matter 
 %vitbform\ and I proceed now to fpeak of this/c?n;/. 
 
 CHAP, 
 
 * Origin and Progrcfs of Language, 2il edit. vol. i.
 
 Chap. II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 57 
 
 CHAP. n. 
 
 Defcription 6/ Form — Subftantlal Forms of the Peripatetics explained 
 
 lorm not perceived by our Sen/es, nor even by the Intellecl^ otherzui/e than 
 by Analogy — That Analogy explained — Forms really exijling in Individu- 
 als^ hut not JeparatedfromMattcr ^except in the Mind of fome intelligent 
 Being — We have no clear Idea of cither the Matter or Form of natural 
 fuhjlances — All human Knoivledge oniy hy fimilitudes and refemblan- 
 ces — Privation not a feparate Principle of Nature, but included in 
 M^//^r— Matter and Form the Elements of Nature— joined ivith 
 Extenfton they form Body — vuith the addition of Figure, Body be- 
 comes not infinite — certain ^lalities bein^ further added., Matter 
 becomes the Elements — What thefe ^lalities are — A principle of Mo- 
 tion further necejfary to make a phyftcal Body. 
 
 FORM is that of which jnatter is the receptacle ; and it is not on- 
 ly the outward fhape and figure of the thing, according to the 
 common acceptation of the word, but it is that which makes the thing 
 vuhat it is, and gives it not only its name and denomination, but its 
 nature : In ihort, u is the ejfence of the thing, from which refult not 
 only its figure and fhape, but all its other qualities. It is called by 
 Plato and the Pythagoreans, the idea of the thinj ; but it is not lucli 
 an idea as we have of any natural fubllancc, that is, an idea abfirac- 
 ted from matter, and containing only vifible and tangible qualities of 
 the lubjcdt, but an idea of a much higher order, luch as we muft fiip- 
 pofe ia the n.ind of the Deity, If we believe the univerfc to be the 
 production of w?W. It is dlilinguilhed by the Peripatetics from the 
 ideas that v/e form by abftradion, by the name of ^r^a t«» ;ro\AA/r that is, 
 ideas exifiing before the individuals in which they are incorporated, 
 
 H and
 
 5^ ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book 11. 
 
 and from which they are, by us, abftracted. But, in the language of 
 Plato, and the Pythagorean fchool, they are called fimply ideas, 
 
 Thefe ideas are, if I miftake not, thtfiibjiantial or eljential forms of 
 the Peripatetics, fo much exploded, and even ridiculed by our modern 
 philofophers, but which 1 think muft neceflarily have an exiftence, 
 not only in the mind of the Deity, where all things exift, but in every 
 natural fubftance ; tho* 1 hold it to be impoflible that we can have any 
 direct or immediate comprehenfion of them, any more than we have 
 of the matter of fuch fubftances. But, as we can have fome idea of 
 ihef?iatter from analogy *, fo, in the fame manner, we may have fome 
 notion of this i7itenialform^\^\\\di conftitutes the effence of all natural 
 fubftances; and this notion we derive from the analogy of our own ideas, 
 which we form by abftradion from material fubftances. By this opera- 
 tion of the mind, we create a fpecies of beings, the ejftntial forms of 
 which we perfedly know ; whereas, the effence of the works of God 
 we can never perfedly know in this ftateof our exiftence. For example, 
 the effence of any material triangle, whether of earth or ftone, or of 
 whatever other matter, I never can know ; but when, from the earth or 
 ftone I abftrad the figure of a triangle, and form the idea of it without 
 the matter ; of this being, thus created by myfelf, I know perfedly 
 the efl'ence, and define it to be ' a figure bounded by three lines.'* 
 This is the eflential form of a triangle, from which all the properties, 
 that Euclid has demonftrated of it, refult. Now, in the fame manner, 
 I fay, that, of every natural fubftance, every animal^ for example, and 
 njegetable^ there is a form, from which refult all the properties of this 
 animal and vegetable, fuch as fgure^ fize, colour^ &c. ; all which are 
 perceptible by our fenfes ; but the internal form^ from which they all 
 refult, is not perceptible by our fenfes, nor even by our underftand- 
 ing, diredly and immediately, nor otherways than by the analogy I 
 have mentioned. 
 
 Another 
 
 * See the preceding chapter.
 
 Chap. IT. A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. 
 
 59 
 
 Another example may be given, and which comes ftill nearer to 
 the cafe of animal and vegetable lubflances, and that is, from the 
 works o£ art, fuch as a clocks or any other machine. There the artill 
 muft neceffarily know the fubjlantial or ejjhntial form ; that is, thofe 
 parts of the machine which are principal, and produce all the move- 
 ments, — in fliort, make the thing what it is. That fuch 2l form does 
 really exill in the works of nature, as well as in thofe of art, is evi- 
 dent from this, that there could not be otherways any principle of 
 union in natural fubftances, but all their feveral qualities would be in- 
 dependent one of another. Now, we cannot fuppofe this imperfec- 
 tion in the works of God, or that any thing made by him is lefs per- 
 fect than the beings created by us, fuch as the works of human art, 
 and our ideas of mathematical figures, which we fee virtually com- 
 prehend all their properties, they being, from thofe ideas, all dedu^ 
 cible.- 
 
 And, in thefe internal forms ^ we may obferve all the differences of 
 genus, fpecies, and individual, that we fee in the 'vifible Jorm ; Of ani- 
 mal, for example, there is one fortji, which we may call \.\\q generic 
 Jorm. Certain additions to ihxsform make the fpecijic form, or form of 
 each fpccies of animals ; and certain other additions conftitute the 
 forjn of the particular animal of any ipecies ; fo that, in every indivi- 
 dual animal, there really exift all the ihvtQ forms ; whereas \\\e generic 
 and fpecific forms, feparated and abftradled from the individual, exill 
 only in idea. . 
 
 If the fame qucflion be aiked here that was afked before with re- 
 fped to matter. Whether fonn has any real exiftence feparated from 
 matter ? my anfwer is, That, according to the philofo()hy of the Licae- 
 tun, it has not ; and that, without matter, it is a mere idea, exifling only 
 in the mind of an intelligent being; but, according to the philofophy 
 of the Academy, it has a real exiftence feparated Irom matter, out of 
 the mind of any intelligent being. Of this, more afterwards. 
 
 H 2 From
 
 6o ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book 11. 
 
 From what is here faid, it is ftill further evident, that what I ob- 
 ferved was true, ' that we have no perfect idea of any natural fub- 
 * ftance:' For it now appears, that wc have no diJiin^t comprehen- 
 fion of the ejfential form of any fuch fubftance, any more than of the 
 fnatter. Nor is this to be wondered at ; for, in ihejirfi place, it is im- 
 poffible that we can perceive by our fenfes this interjial form^ any more 
 than the matter^ diverted of all the cjualities which affe^ our fenfes. 
 And, fecondly^ It is as impoffible that either of them fhould be per- 
 :fe(Sl]y comprehended by our intelled:, unlefs we could fuppofe, that 
 the ideas of our minds are as perfect as thofe of the Divine, 
 
 If this wanted any further proof, it is evident from the way in 
 which we form definitions of any fuch fubftance : It is from quali- 
 ties of them which are perceptible by our fenfes ; for it is a combina- 
 tion of a certain number of fuch qualities, united together in a certain 
 matter as a fuhflratum^ which conflitutes our ideas of all natural fub- 
 ftances. Now, what are thefe qualities ? They are no other but qua- 
 lities which the natural fubftance has in common with thofe of the 
 fame kind and thofe of the fame fpecies : For, though definition is 
 very properly faid by Ariftotle to confift of the genus and the fpecifw 
 difference^ yet that fpecific difference is no other than the qualities 
 which every individual of the fpecies has in common with other indi- 
 viduals of the fame fpecies, in thf fame manner as the genus is con- 
 ftituted of all thofe qualities whichi he individual has in common with 
 thofe of the fame genus. So that the qualities which conftitute the 
 fpecies, are called differential qualities^ only becaufe they diftinguifh 
 the fpecies from other fpeciefes of the fame genus; for, in reality, 
 they are all finiihtudes ; and the truth is, that the intelle6l perceives 
 nothing but by fimilitudes, as I have elfewhere obferved *. Now, 
 every individual fubftance, befides what is common to other things, 
 
 muft: 
 
 * Origin and Progrefs of Language, vol. i. book i. chap. 6. page 68. 69. 70. 
 and 71.
 
 Chap. IL ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 6i 
 
 muft have fomething peculiar to Itfelf, which makes it what it is, and 
 nothing elfe, and is the foundation of all its idiojjiatical qualities, as 
 they may be called, by which it is diftinguiQied from every fubflance 
 of the fame fpecies : And, when we add to all this, that thofc fimilar 
 qualities of natural fubilances by which we detine them, are only fuch 
 as affedt our fenfes, and which, therefore, are fuperficial, and far re- 
 moved from the internal ftrmfture of the thing, it is perfe(^ly evident, 
 that we can have no idea of the ejjential form of any fuch fubftance : 
 And, indeed, it muft be obvious to cor.nion fenfe, that it is impoflible 
 I can know the effence of any individual thing, by only knowing that 
 it refembles other things in certain qualities which affedt our fenfes j 
 and what is true of individuals, mult neceiTarily be true of genufes 
 and fpeciefes, fmce it is from individuals that we form our ideas of 
 them. 
 
 And here again we may fee the juflice of Plato's obfervation above 
 quoted, * That^ in this ftate of our exiftence, we fee things only as in 
 * a dream ;' for we fee not the fubftance of any thing, but only fha- 
 dows as it were, or likenefles and refemblances. And it may ferve to 
 juflity a method of reafoning which he frequently ufes, and particu- 
 larly in the TitiKsus, from images or fimilitudes ; for all our ideas are 
 truly nothing more than fimilitudes, denoting the likenefs that one thing 
 has to another. 
 
 And fo much for form, the other principle of natural bodies. To 
 thefe Ariflotle has added a third, which he calls ^Ti^r.rt-,, or priva- 
 tiojif an addition that he has thought proper to make to the Py- 
 thagorean and Platonic philofophy, in order to give his fyftem the ap- 
 pearance of novelty; but without any necefTuy, as I apprehend ; for it 
 is not a caii/e, as he himfeU admits, fuch as niittcr and form, but is 
 only that without which the firft fnatler could not receive the impref- 
 fion of siny form ; for it muft be clear of every Jorm, which is what he 
 calls privation, before it can admit any. Now, this is necelfaiily implied 
 
 in
 
 62 ANT IE NT METAPHYSICS. Book IL 
 
 in the notion of matter ; for, as it has the capacity of all fonii, fo it 
 has the privation of all form. In this way Ariftotle himfelf has ex- 
 plained the nature of matter in the paffage above quoted from the firft 
 book of his Phyfics, cap. 8. verfus fnem. And Plato, in the Ti77iaus^ 
 has very much infilled upon this quality of 7;/^^/c'r as abfolutely necef- 
 fary, in order to fit it to receive all forms ; and he illuftratcs his mean- 
 ing by a comparifon : Thofe, fays he, v^rho make unguents or per- - 
 fumes, prepare the liquid fo, to which they are to give the perfume, 
 that It may have no odour of its own. And, in like manner, thofc, 
 who take off an imprefTion of any thing upon any foft matter, clear 
 that matter of every other imprefTion, making it as fmooth as 
 poffible, in order that it may better receive the figure or image intend- 
 ed. In like manner, fays he, matter^ in order to receive the fpeciefes of. 
 all things, muft have in itfelf the fpecies of nothing * 
 
 The principles, therefore, of which all natural bodies are compofed, 
 are two, viz. matter and form ; the one of which is the ??iaterial cau/e, 
 the other ihc formal ; and both are inherent caufes, called by Arifto- 
 tle {vu3r«5^«vTx, exilling in the thing itfelf; whereas, the other two caufes, 
 viz. the efficient and the fnal^ are external^ or without the thing. 
 They are alfo called elements^ being that of which the thing is com- 
 pofed, and that into which it is ultimately refolved t J fo that all ele^ 
 ments are caufes^ but all caufes are not elements J. 
 
 Of thefe two elements of nature, the one is perfe(5lly fimple, admit- 
 ting of no variation in itfelf; I mean matter. The other is of great va- 
 riety ; and there is a progrefTion in it worth obferving. The firft form 
 that matter alfumes is extenfwn^ by which its parts become contiguous, 
 
 that 
 
 * ToeaTev tvi xxi tm rx rui-ffxirun ttiH ti ovruv, xaru ttmv iccvttv, iroXXxKtg xPefiaiufcterx xxXv^ 
 fii>.Mfri hx,i<r^cn, sru^Ttiv iKTog xvTuf w^cctjxh jri(p-j)ti>xi Tuy eii'ijr. PlatOllis TimaeUS, Pag. . 
 1060. edit. Ficini. 
 
 t Metaph.lib. 5. cap. 3. 
 
 ■\. Ibid. lib. 14- cap. 4. See alfo Mr Harris's Philof. arrangements, page 92.'
 
 Chap. II. AN TIEN T METAPHYSICS. 63 
 
 that is, joining to one another, and having one common boundary. 
 Extenfion, as I have faid, is threefold, lengthy breadth, and depths 
 which are called the three dimenfions of body^ and which I have already 
 explained. 
 
 This is the Srft ftep of nature's progrefs in the formation of things; 
 for matter, extended into thefe three dimenfions, becomes what we 
 call body. 
 
 Again, if body were infinite, there would be no fgure ; for fj^ure 
 is body bounded and limited : Figure, therefore, is the fecond Hep of 
 this progrefs of nature *. , ~ 
 
 But matter, thus extended and bounded, though it be body, is not 
 phyftcal body ; in order to make it that, the addition of certain quali- 
 ties is neceffary, and then it becomes one or other of the four elements, 
 commonly fo called, earth, air, fire, ivater ; which are fo called, be- 
 caufe they are the only elements that, as far as we know, have any 
 exiftence by themfelves : For we have hitherto difcovered nothing that 
 is not either earth, air, fire, or ivater^ or refolveable into thefe. 
 
 It is, as we have fai.d, by the addition of certain qualities, that mat- 
 ter extended and figured becomes the four elements. But, what are 
 thefe qualities ? They are, according to the dodrineof antient philofo- 
 phy, oppofttes, fuch as heat and cold, moifi and dry, denfc and rare, 
 heavy and light. Thefe, in that fragment of antient Pythagorean 
 philofophy which I have fo often mentioned, viz. Ocellus Lucanus, 
 arc reckoned among the principles of nature ; the four firft of which, 
 according to Ocellus, conftitute the firjl phyfical bodies, and the four 
 laft, fecondary phyfical bodies; which, according to him, are rough or 
 
 fimooth^ 
 
 * See what Mr Harris fays further upon thefe different forms which matter aflumes; 
 <:ap. 5. PhilofophiCiil Arrangements.
 
 64 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IL 
 
 fmooth, hard or foft^ thick or th'in^ blunt or /harp ; fo that, according 
 to this philofophy, there are fixteen quahties of body in all *. But, 
 as thefe qualities are all included under fonnt I think it is not necef- 
 fary to make them feparate and diftindl principles of nature. And, 
 accordingly, Ocellus, when he mentions them, does not fpeak oiform 
 at all ; hut lays, that they and matter conftitute the firft phyfical bo- 
 dies, which we call elements \ At the fame time, I think it proper to 
 obferve, that thefe qualities do chiefly, ii' not altogether, make the 
 
 form of natural bodies. 
 
 Thefe contraries, of which the nature of things, 
 ■ " rerum concordia difcors," 
 
 is undoubtedly compofed, (how the evident neceflity of fome j^/y? mat^ 
 ter\ for, as thefe contraries fucceed and give place to one another, and, 
 as it is impoffible, according to Ocellus's obfervation '|', that contraries 
 can change inro one another, there mufl: of necefhty be fome com- 
 mon fubjedt in which the contraries cxifl: fucceflively, and which, by 
 that fuccefTion, fuffers a change :j:. 
 
 Eur, 
 
 * Galcs's opufcula mythologlca, p. 518. et feq. 
 t Ibidp. 519. 
 
 \ That the univerfe is made up of contraries, ani this its iiarmony, £0 fpeak in the 
 lan'^unge of muficians, moft wonderfully varied by difcords, is a fatl that may be 
 eafily proved by induBion. Ocellus Lucanus, we fee, has endeavoured to reduce to 
 numbers thefe difcords, making in all fixteen of them. And Ariftotle, in the 5th 
 chap, of his firfl book of Metaphyfics, mentions fome other Pythagorean philofophers 
 who numbered ten combinations of oppofites, fiich as finite and infinitey even and 
 cdd^ one and multitude^ right and left, male and female, &c. And though we cannot 
 intirely truil what Ariftotle has faid of the opinions of the Pythagoreans, we arcfure, 
 at leafl, fro.n the Philebus of Plato, that they made the finite and the infinite two o£ 
 the principles of nature ; and indeed it is evident, that all the quahties of fubflances, 
 fuch as hot and cold, moift and dr'j\ are, by their nature, infinite; and, if the finite 
 were not applied to them, that is, if they were not fo tempered and meafured that 
 they might confift together, no fubftance could fubfift. And it is in this fenfc, as I 
 iaiagine, that the Pythagoreans made number the principle of all tbing,s.
 
 Chap. II. ANTIENTMETAPHYSICS. 65 
 
 But, further, matter thus extended and bounded, and, by the ac- 
 ceffion of certain qualities, become one or other of the hril: elemen- 
 tary bodies, is not yet a phyfical body, according to Arirtotle's notion, 
 without the addition of another thing, 'viz. a principle of motion^ 
 which, according to this philolbpher, is effential to all phyftcal bodies. 
 And this, no doubt, is agreeable to the phaenomena of nature ; for 
 we fee no body in this univerfe that does not of itfelf move one way 
 or another, without any external impulfe. And this leads me to the 
 third great principle of things, the firfi: in dignity and in the order of 
 nature, being the efficient caufe of every thing that exifts in the uni- 
 verfe, and the author of all beauty, order, and regularity: 
 
 Nee fine te quidquam dias in luminis oras 
 Exoritur, neqae fit laetum aut amabile quidquam *. 
 
 For mind is the real cekjVial Venus -^ the true Goddefs of the philofopher. . 
 
 CHAP, 
 
 * Lucretius in procemio.
 
 66 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS, Book II. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 The defn'ition of Mind further explained. — Proved, that nothing can 
 move itj elf— That Mind does not move itfelf—What is meatit by Or- 
 ganization and Organs. 
 
 MIND I have defined to be that which 7noves, body that which 
 is moved. And, if the diftindion b.twixt what moves and is 
 moved be real, the diftindion betwixt t7iind and body muft alio be 
 real. 
 
 That there is a diftindion, in idea at leafl:, betwixt what moves 
 and is moved, cannot, I think, be denied. But it may be faid, that 
 tlie diftiiidlion is only ideal, and that, like many other of our notions, 
 it does not aj^plv to the nature of things, at leall, not univerlally ; 
 for that even the philofophers who allert the exiftence of mind as di- 
 ftind from body, and particularly Plato, define 77iind to be that which 
 moves itfelf, and, confequently, both J7iovcs and is moved. Now, if 
 mi^id moves itjelf, why may not body do the fame ? and, if it does, 
 then there is an end of the diftindion I have made betwixt 7iu7id and 
 body. 
 
 This argument is the foundation of the whole fyftem of material* 
 ifm. For, if 77iatter has not in itfelf the a6live power of 7noving, as 
 it has undoubtedly xhe pajfive capacity of being moved, it is impolTi- 
 ble that thofe material philufophers, who maintain that there is no- 
 thing
 
 Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 67 
 
 thing in the univerfe but body^ can ever account either ''or the begin- 
 ning or continuation of 7710 1 ion. It is, therefore, an argument that de- 
 ferves to be very maturely confidered, fince, according to my appre- 
 henfion, without this diftindtion betwixt what inoves and is 77ioved, 
 the fydem of Theifm cannot be eftabhlhed upon foHd philofophical 
 principles. 
 
 What it is that 77ioves body, whether it be a principle^ iiitenial or 
 exterTiaU whether it be other hody^ or what 1 call w/W, in contradi- 
 ftin<£lion to hody^ I am not now 10 inquire. All I propole at prefent 
 is to fhow, that the 77iovi7ig principle^ whatever it be, is diltindt from 
 that which is nwued ; and this I propofe to prove, frjl^ By an argu- 
 ment a priori^ that is, from the nature of th.^ thing ; and, idly^ By 
 indudtion from particular inftances, which the phaenomena of nature, 
 as well as the works of art, afford us. 
 
 The firft kind of proof arifes from the nature of 77iovi7ig and beifig 
 7noved.^ That there is a relation betwixt thele two, nobody can de- 
 ny ; and the relation is no other than that of a6lion and pafft07i ; for, 
 to Jiio've is to aB ; to be 77iovsd is \.o Jnffer^ or to be pajfive. 
 
 Thus much is evident to common fenfe ; but there was a philofo- 
 phy among the antients, firfl dilcovered in the fcliool of Pythagoras, 
 and afterwards adopted by Ariiiotle, which more iully explains the. 
 nature ot this thing we call relatioti. This philofophv, very little known 
 al prefent, but of which I Ih.all treat more at large In tlie fequel, is a 
 great bianch of the fcience of imi^K'r/ids ; the fubjedl of it being the nv^ft 
 general ideas, comprehending under them all other ideas, and, by con- 
 fequence, containing the principles of all things in tiie univerfe. Thefe 
 iiniverials it ranks and diOributes into certain cl •.({(. s, ten in number, 
 called, m the language of the Greek philofophy, categories^ but com- 
 monly, among us, predicaments ; a word we have taken from a bar- 
 
 I 2 baroub
 
 68 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 barous tranflation, made by the ichoolmen, of the Greek word 
 into Latin. One of thefe is relatiouy the nature of which is, that 
 the reI(iti'ves-,oT things related, neceffarily refer to one another, fo that 
 the relation betwixt them cannot be conceived, unlefs both exiff. Re- 
 latives are, therefore, a clafs of beings which have no feparateur inde- 
 pendent exigence each by irfelf, but which neceffarily depend upon one 
 another for their exiilence *. 
 
 From this account of relation, it is evident, that it muft neceffirrly 
 be betwix'' two things at leaft t ; for, if we could conceive the fa-nc 
 individual thing related to itfelf, then the things of this category 
 would be no longer dependent upon other things for their exiftence, 
 but would have each a feparate and iiidependent exiilence. And, fur- 
 ther, it is neceffary that the two things related Ihuuld exift together; 
 for, if we could conceive one of them exifting feparately, it would have 
 an independent exigence, and be no longer a relative thing J. 
 
 To 
 
 * Therefore, fays Ariftotle, In the beginning of his chapter upon this category, 
 (cap 7. of the hook of categories), things related are always exprefled with refer nee 
 
 to one another; Unog n ^t rx TOiWjrcc Xiyiraiy ocree eei/TX aTTi^ i^Ttv, iri^av Hveci Xiyirxi, « 
 
 o'xua-tui «A/tfj ?r§o« iii^ot. - And again, a little after, he fays, rr^oj t< ou» sc-to, oV« cc'jtk u-n^ 
 
 IB-Xiv., IriPuv eivxt Xtyirxt. H ottutovi oc.\}.u; w^oj 'iTi^oy, o<6» 0^0; fAiyst >Ayirxt ^rgoj ste^ov, 
 5r£9j T» yc.p uiycc MyiTcti to eg«s. y.cci re cy.oiiy, TtVi Ofzoioy XiyiTca-, y.en TJtA/.os o« t« t»;«vt<6 
 
 ttTBtJlUi 7rp6i T< ^iylTtll. 
 
 ■f This is the reaton given by Ammonius, in his commentary upon this chapter of 
 'the book of categories, fol. 94. lor the plural name given to this category, both by 
 Arcliytas and Ariftotle, viz. tx tp^h n ; for, fays he, it is a relation or habitude : 
 Now, fay.-^ he, a relation cannot be conceived but in two things at lead. T« ar^e? rt 
 
 tryjiirti; t;; £»-T(v, >)* S't (Tyj.<rii t o-jXx/J7T ai t»^t/y/ Tfe^xyiAXvi fimo^HTxt, oi» rovre srAiiS-yvT/xa^j i^rt- 
 t ^^o:'.H ti rx Tpc? Ti 'xr-ix T>« (fviTH (ivxi, Kxi im /^i¥ rcuv TS-XHs-rMt xXijSi; urn. ^xux yxp ^i- 
 
 7r>.ct7-(«v T£ fs-r/ y.xi vi^K.s-y, Sic. After this, he proceeds to flate an objection to this rule 
 in the inftances of tsric-rrtrov and i^is-Tr,f4.ti, %vhut is to be undcrjloody and what under' 
 ftands ; and «<(r^iiT«y and xia-he-i?, ivhat is Jen/ible, or perceived by the /enfeSf and the 
 
 fenfesy
 
 Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 69 
 
 To illuftrate this by fome examples : — In the relation of dotibk and 
 h'ilf, it is evident, that there muft be two diftind things ; for the lame 
 thing eannot be the do7if?/e of itfelf and the half of itfelt : And, fur- 
 ther, it is evident, that they muH. exift together, or not at all ; for, if 
 there be a double^ there muli be a half ; and, if there be a half^ there 
 muft be a double. Again, in the relation of father and Jon^ ewety 
 one muft conceive the perfons to be diftindt, and to exift together ; 
 for, if there be not a father^ there cannot be ixjon ; and, it there be 
 not ayo72, there cannot be ajather. In like manner, in the relation of 
 underjlanding, and the being underjiood ; v^hat underftands muit necef- 
 farily be diltind from what is underftood; and the one cannot be con- 
 ceived to exift without the other. Alfo, if there be that which de- 
 7/r^j, there muft be a different thing which is defired\ and the two 
 muft neceffarily exift together. Likewife, if there be an agents that 
 is, a thing that a6ls^ there muft neceflarily be a different thing, that 
 is 'patient^ or a5ied upon ; nor can we conceive the one to exift with- 
 out the other : And, for the fatne reafon, if there be that which monjes 
 there muft be a different thing that is moved ; and, wherever the one 
 is, the other muft neceffarily be. 
 
 And 
 
 fenfes^ox that v:hich perceives. All which, he fays, may exifl: feparately and inde. 
 peiuienily one of another. But Ammonius, his commentator, has .inlwercd this ob- 
 jc<5lion moft fatisf.actorily, page iro. by making the obvious diftindion betwixt the 
 things related, and the relation betwixt them; for the things related may fubfill fepa- 
 rately, and altogether independent of one another; but the relation betwixt them 
 cannot cxifl, unlefs the things related exift both at the fame time. Thus, for example, 
 the mind or the underftanding has undoubtedly a feparate cxiftence from the objedt of 
 the undorltanding, or the thing underftood. But the relation betwixt them cannot exift, 
 unlefs they both exift; at the fame time. The fame is true cf what is perceived by 
 fenfe, and the fenfe itfelf. And, in like manner, what moves, confidered by itfelf, 
 has a feparare cxiftence, diftintl: from what is moved. J he human mind, for ex.>m- 
 ple, is, ly its nature, and confidered in itfelf, diftind from the body which it mows ; 
 but the relation betwixt the two, by which the one movesy and the other is viovej, 
 cannot exift but in conjunction with them both.
 
 7© ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 And thus, I think, I have proved tliat; where any thing is moved^ 
 there mnft be neceiTarily Tjinething that moves it, and which muft be 
 different from what is mo'ved. Nothing, therefore, can move itfelf; 
 fo that, when we lee a thing moved^ we muft neceffarily conclude that 
 there is lomcthing which produces the 7;/c?/iow, either internal or exter- 
 nal with refped to the thing movcd^ and different from that thing. 
 And. vvlien we fay, that a thing moves itjelf, an animal, for example, 
 we can n:iean nothing elfe, if we underftand what we fay, than that 
 there is an internal principle in the body of that animal, which moves 
 it. 
 
 It is to be obfervcd, that this argument, from the nature of relation^ 
 does only apply to body, and to local motion^ but not to the higher fort 
 of mind, which I call intelle^i : For that mind is fo diftinguillied from 
 every thing elle in nature, by the faculty oi reflexion, of which I Ihall 
 fay a great deal in the fequel, that it is an exception from the ge- 
 neral rule that I have laid down concerning this category of rela- 
 tion ; for, by means of that faculty, it becomes its own object, and re- 
 ciprocates upon itfelf. Intelleci, therefore, contemplates itfelf, under- 
 ftands itfelf, defires itfelf; And the Supreme Intelkcl we conceive to 
 have no other object but itfelf ; and therefore it is faid to be all in 
 all. 
 
 There are, I know, who will not be convinced by arguments of this 
 kind ; and indeed they are not to be underftood, except by fuch who 
 have been a little accuftomed to abftrad: reafoning, which I am afraid 
 is not the cafe of many now a-days who call themfclves philofophers: 
 for they are fo n^uch converfant with individual things, and obterve 
 and experiment fo much upon objects of fenfe, that they have hardly 
 any conception of imiverjals : /\nd> if they have learned no more of 
 the philofophy ot minJ than what is taught by Mr Locke, they will 
 not believe that iiniverfals have any exiftcncc. But, as nothing Ccin be 
 proved, except by arguments, either a priori^ or a pojieriori ; if 
 
 they
 
 Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 71 
 
 they be not convinced by the proof I have given a priori^ they ought 
 the more to attend to that which I am now to offer to them a pofterU 
 ori^ that is, by induBion from particular examphs ; which I hone v ill 
 make the diflindlon betwixt what moves and is moved^ obvioub to the 
 moft unphilofophical of my readers. 
 
 Whether this diftindlion obtains in bodies inanimate that are tjwved^ 
 or whether it takes place even in other animal bodies, may not be fo 
 obvious to fome of thofe readers ; but, that it takes place in their own 
 bodies, they muft know, from the moft certain of all knowledge, con- 
 fcioufnefs ; for, w^hen they raifeup their arm, they know certainly that 
 it is not the arm that moves itfelf. If, indeed, they have any know- 
 ledge of anatomy, they will know that this motion is performed by 
 the machinery of mufcles, finews, and bones : But they muft know, 
 with equal certainty, that thefe do not tnove themfelves, but that they 
 are moved by an adt of their will : So that here the diftindion muft 
 be acknowledged, betwixt the moving povoer and the body moved: 
 And thus, in one work of nature, at leaft, we are perfe6;ly fure that the 
 body which is moved does not move itjelf. 
 
 As to the works of art, every man, though he be not a mechanic, 
 but has 01 ly com.mon fenfe and obfervation, muft make a diftindtion 
 betwixt the moving povoer of any machine, and the vueight that is 
 moved by it. 
 
 Now, this diftindion being thus eftabUflied, from thefe particular 
 inftances, both of nature and of art, it muft be extended from analogy 
 to every body that is in motion^ unlefs fome good rcafun can be given 
 to the contrary. That this analogy will go to the bodies of other ani- 
 mals, as well as man, will hard'y, 1 think, be denied ; but it cannot 
 ftop there, but muft go on to every other body that it in motion^ wi)e- 
 ther vegetable, or what is commonly called inanimate; and we muft 
 
 fay
 
 72 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IL 
 
 'fay likevvifc of them, that what moves them, be it internal or external, 
 7nind or nuitUr^ is fometliing difi^rent from them. 
 
 As to what is faid of mind nwuing itfdj^ 1 have ah*eady fhown 
 in what lenl'e wind can be faid to be inonjed"^ : And it is evi- 
 dent that it caniiot be faid to be moved in the fenfe in which body is 
 moved : For Ioi\J. motion^ as 1 have fhown, is elfential to all the mo- 
 tions oi body. Now, i[t 7/;i72c/ be immaterial, indivifible, and without 
 parts, as 1 hope in the fcquel to dernonftrate it to be, it is incapable of 
 local inotion ; and, if it cannot be moved^ it is evident that it cannot 
 move itftlf ; for, to be moved^ and to move, as I have faid, are rela- 
 tives, which II uft exift together, or not at all. 
 
 As to Plato's definition of mind, it is, as fhall be fhown in the next 
 chapter, inaccurate in the expreffion. And indeed, although, according 
 to that general and mofl: comprehenfive definition of motion given by 
 Ariftotle, inferior minds may, as I have obferved, be faid, in a certain 
 fenfe, to be tiioved, when they change from a (late of reft to a ftate 
 of a6lion, or from one energy to another f, it were to be wiihed that 
 the term which, in all fenfes, is applicable to body, and which, even 
 by phllofophers, is commonly applied only to body, fhould never be 
 applied to mittd ; but that we fhould call thofe changes to which it is 
 liable, its aftions and energies, not its motions ; and Ihould fay, that it 
 is, by its nature and effence, a^live, and that it Juffers only by its 
 connexion with the body. 
 
 And here we have again that diftindion made by fome antient phi- 
 lofophers, quoted above \, betv/ixt mind dnd body, viz. that the oi.e acis, 
 and the other is a^/ed upon ; a diftindion which runs ttirough all na- 
 ture, and is t:ie fundamental principle, in my apprehenfion, ot the fy- 
 ftem of the univ<:rfe. It is true, indeed, that body feems to acl, as 
 well as \.o Jujjtr ; but then it ads only as the inftrument of 7nuid, and 
 cannot, in ftrid pri-^riety, be faid to aSi any more than the lever that 
 
 move s 
 
 * Seepage 21, f Ibidem. % Page 31. 32.
 
 Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 73 
 
 moves the ftone, or the tool ufed by the artift *. For, in common 
 language, we fay that it is the jnan who nwues the ftone by means of 
 the lever^ and the xirtijl who operates upon the fubjedt of his art by his 
 
 tools. 
 
 Of what nature this ?no'uing potver is, what fort of fiibflance it is, 
 or what properties belong to it, I determine nothing at prefent ; but I 
 think I have faid enough to eftabhfh the dlftindion that I have made 
 betwixt body and mind ; and, to fliow that, as body certainly is movedy 
 and yet cannot move itfelf, there muft be in nature fome other moving 
 principle^ which is what I call mind. And I will only further add, 
 that, where, in the works of nature, the moving principle h internal, 
 and appears to ad not immediately, but by the intervention of a cer- 
 tain mechanifm, the conflrudion, arrangement, and difpofition of the 
 feveral parts of the body neceflary for that purpofe, is called organiza- 
 tion ; and thofe parts, by means of which the motion is performed, are 
 called organs. 
 
 Such bodies as are moved by an internal principle, without any ex- 
 ternal impulfe, are commonly faid, but not with philofophical pro- 
 priety, to move themfehes. But nothing, as I have ihown, can move 
 itfelf: And the principle of ?jiotion in them, though internal, is as 
 diftindt from the body moved^ as if it were external t« This internal 
 
 K principle, 
 
 * To this purpofe Proclus, in the fecond book of his Commentary upon the Timacus, 
 
 TT«V S'b T« -TTOiav)! uiruf4,XTt)) l(f\t, KCiv ytc^ orafict t], ^vfct^lfiV x<r0ft,XTOi^ ZTOUI. ** EvCiy thing that 
 
 ** a(ls is incorporeal', for, though it be body which ac7j, it is by iticorporcal poivcrs that 
 " it aFls'^ "When, therefore, we fee one body moving another, though it be body 
 which immediately produces the motion, it is not of itfelf that it does fo, but by in- 
 corporeal powcKf x\\-3it\Sy by viind, which gives it the r;?£j/zri'/io"arr that it communi- 
 cates to other bodies. 
 
 t Arillotle, in his Phyfics, particularly in the 8th book, cap. 4. fpeaks much of 
 the T« vp" uvruv xivovfcivx. ; but it is plain, from what he fays there, and clfcwhere, that 
 he only means, by that expreflion, thofe things which have the principle of motion 
 internal : And that he believed that, in every thing, what moves is different from wh.at 
 
 IS
 
 74 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 principle, or inifid^ as I call it, is in all bodies ; and the only diftinc'^ion 
 I make is, thai- in lome bodies, luch as the animal and vegetable, it o- 
 perates by organs, in others, it operates immediately, and without the 
 intervention or any organs, at lealt, luch as we can difcover *\ 
 
 A like impropriety of fpeech we life, when we fay, that 7mnd moves 
 it/elf, which neceffarily luppofes that it is moved; whereas, in the fenfe 
 of bod?/)/ jnotiouy of which only I mufl be underftood to fpeak, it is im- 
 poflible, as 1 already obferved, that it can be moved 'f. We ought, 
 therefore, to fay, if we would fpeak properly and philofophically, that 
 mi7id a^ls, and is, by itfclf, excited to action. And, inftead of faying, 
 that it is moved, we fhould fay that lifufers, though even that be not 
 from its own nature, but from its conjundion with body if. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
 is moved J is evident; for he concludes the chapter in thefe words, K^avTa «^« t«c x<K«t<jt«£v« vVa 
 TiiofKivoiTo. And, in the beginning of the next chaper, he makts the fame diltintlion 
 that I do betwixt th^ moving prwciple operating immediately by itfelf, or by the in- 
 tervention of another thing, ■n y«g ov d<' uuto to xivat/v, uXXa 5"/ \rig^c7 Kivei TO xivowy n ot 
 tcvro. 
 
 * See the preceeding note 
 
 t Ariftotle, in his firft book, De Anima, employs a chapter (chap. 5.) to prove 
 that the mind cannot he moved, and confequently that it cannot be faid to move itfclf, 
 "which he concludes with thefe words on (Atv cw ov^ Itov n mvn^^Sat rr,* yw;^*!* <p«v£gev sx 
 
 X faee this proved by Ariftotle, in the chapter above quoted.
 
 Chap. IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 75 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 ArijlotWs Definition of Mind — Shoivn not he fiifficiently comprehenfive 
 in tivo reJpeBs — Aljo not fufficiently particular — Plato's Definition 
 o/Mind — This alfio imperfecl m tivo refipeds — The Definition above 
 ginjen the true Definition — agreeable to the Opinion ofi Plato and A- 
 rtjiotle, and oj the Philofiophers before them. 
 
 THE only definition that Ariftotle has given of mind,'m general, is, 
 that it is the entelechcia^ or perfection^ of a phyfical organized 
 body * ; and, from what he fays, in another paffage of the fame book, 
 by perfe5iion^ he means the fornix or sjS^,?, which is no doubt what gives 
 perfeBion to every thing. As, therefore, every thing exifting is ei- 
 ther matter ox fiorm^ or what is compounded of thefe two, that is, the 
 natural Jubfiance-, tnind (for fo I tranflate the word 4'->^x>>y is one of 
 thele three, viz. \\\^ form. And this d'^^finition, no doubt, as far as it 
 goes, is a true definition ; for it is evident that mind is the perfection, 
 and that which gives the fiorniy and conftitutes the eflence of every 
 thing in which it is inherent. And it is true what Ariliotle fays after- 
 wards t, that mind is fo much the principle of the body in which it 
 exifts, that it is a caiife of that bodv-, in three different refpeds. Fitfi^ 
 it is, as we have faid, \\\^ formal cauje^ n^aking the thing what it is, 
 whether animal or vegetable. Secondly^ it \^\\\q final c^rz/d', being that 
 for the fake of which the body is formed ar^d organized, and without 
 which it would be of no ufe. And, lajlly^ it is the efficient caufie\ for 
 it is the motive poiver of the body, by which all its energies and ope- 
 
 K 2 rations 
 
 * De /^nimay lib. 2. cap. I. n Ts-^arn Dinhiy^Hix, crufixni ^v<rixov, cfyxrizov. ]Jy ff^tirn 
 ivreAzx^-x he meanft, according to the explication I have given of thcfe wonls abovcj^ 
 the pcrfcdlion of powety or hal?ity not of a6luality or energy. Sec above, page 19. 
 
 t Ibidem, cap. 4. p.ig. 634. liditio Val.
 
 76 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IL 
 
 rations of every kind are produced : So that It is, in every refped, a 
 caiife and principle y excepting only the meaneft and loweft cau/e, viz. 
 the material. 
 
 I have, however, feveral objedlons to this definition. In the 
 j^r/? place, I. think it Is not comprehenfive enough, as it leaves out the 
 higheft and moft excellent kind of fJiitid^ that which is abflradled from 
 all f?iaUer, not in idea only, but in reality, and, by confequence, the 
 Supreme Mind, For this Is not only implied, and indeed exprefled, in 
 the definition, but Arlftotle has told us, that he fo meant It, and com- 
 mends the * opinion of thofe philofophers who thought that mind was 
 ' neither bod/y nor without one ; for, fays he, it Is not bodyy but fome- 
 * thing belonging to boclj ; and therefore It exifts in bodyy and in fuch 
 ' or fuch a bodjf not in any bodji as fome of the antlents thought *.' 
 By this we are not to underftand that Ariftotle believed that no mi?id 
 exifted feparately from matter ; for he has aflerted the contrary In moft 
 exprefs terms, and has made Theology, or the dodrine of fnind 
 feparate from matter, the conclufion both of his phyfics and me- 
 taphyfics : — Or, that even the Intelledual part of our ffiind did not 
 exift feparately from body : Though I obferve, that one of his inter- 
 preters, Alexander Aphrodifienfis, was of that opinion ; againft whom 
 Johannes Philoponus difputes, and fhows the contrary from many 
 paflages which he has coUedcd *f ; but one, I think. Is fufhcient, 
 which is to be found In the 3d book, chap. 4. De Anima, where he 
 fays exprefsly, ' That the aBlmal, or fenfitlve part, cannot be without 
 ^ body ; huiihc intelle^ is, by Its nature, fcparated from body J.' Ari- 
 llotle, therefore, is as far from being a materialift as any phllofopher; 
 l)jut we are to confider that this book, De Anima, Is a part of Ariftotle's 
 Natural Phllofophy; and a feqnei to his books of General Phyfics §. In 
 
 them, 
 
 * De Anima, lib. 2. cap. 2. in fine. 
 
 f See his introduQion to his Commentary upon the books De Anima, and what he 
 has faid in his Commentary upon the 5th chapter of the firft book. 
 
 ;J; T« f^iv yxp ctir6r,Ti)ctt ovk uviv c-ufjtecioi, o ot icvi ;^<yp*e~roj. 
 
 § In the introduction to thtfe books De Anima, he fays, tox.n h kui -rg^ci ttM^nav
 
 Ohap. IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 77 
 
 them, he treats oi mind as a part of nature, and not as of a thing be- 
 yond or above nature. Now, in all natural fublUnces, mind is ever 
 joined with body ; fo that it did not belong to his fubjedl to inquire 
 concerning mind feparate from body^ which is the proper fubje^t of 
 metaphyfics; and accordingly he has treated of it in his books of Me- 
 taphyfics *. But, even in thefe very books De Anima, he has been at 
 pains, as 1 have obferved, to let the reader know his fentiments con- 
 cerning the feparate exigence of the intelleclual mind, 
 
 Buti/econdly, even as to fni?id united with body^ his definition is not 
 comprehenfive enough ; nor has he taken in all the natural fubftances 
 upon which mind ads; for his definition, as he has explained it at great 
 length, takes in only vegetable and animal fubftances : And yet all other 
 natural bodies have a principle o^ motion in them ; and accordingly, by 
 that principle, aseflential to them, he himfelf has defined a pb)Jica/ body. 
 Now, this principle in bodies, by which, as he fays, fome afcend, fome 
 defcend, and fome are moved in a circle t> it is plain, from many 
 paiTages in his works, he confidered as difiind from body, as much as 
 the principle that moves an animal or vegetable ; and, in one paflage, 
 he has compared it to that principle in animals or vegetables, and fays 
 it is, as it were, a life m body J. He has not, however, thought pro- 
 per 
 
 * Philoponushas made an apology for him fomewhat different, In his commentary 
 upon the words above quoted, from the end of the fecond chapter of the fecond book 
 l)e Anima. 
 
 f Arifl. de Coelo, lib. i.cap. 2- See above, p. 9. 
 
 X Lib. 8. De Phyfic. aufcultatione, cap. i. where, fpeaking of the eternity of motion, 
 
 hd fays, TOUT* cc6ticvicToy Kxi UTTUiriTTov vztu^y^ii Toti ova-i, 'oiev Ctan th evs-x. Ton (pva-n c-vvta-Ta/ci 
 
 7rx<rty And, in the beginning of the 4th book, de Coelo, he fpeaks of bodies that 
 are light or heavy, having in them tusrv^^tirrx Kinr.Tiu';, where that pnncipleof motion in 
 phyfical bodies which, in the other paflage, he had faid was a kind of life, he.calls here an 
 zn'^mztimg /park of motion ; intimating, by thefe expreflions, that the movin? principle 
 in thefe inanimate bodies, as they are called, is not fo apparent as in the animate: 
 But that it is truly in all, and of the very cflence of a phyfical body, he has faid in 
 many places : And nature herfelf, according to him, is nothing elfe but this principle 
 of motion in bodies, «^-<)j m? y.»v»jri*iy j and this he makes to be the difference betwixt 
 
 th-
 
 78 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book. 11. 
 
 per to apply it to the Greek word ^i.vx,n, though it appears that Thales, 
 the founder of the Ionian fchool, was not fo fcrupuious, but afcribed 
 the 7notio?i of the atcradtion of the iron by the loadftone to mind or 
 ^•'Aji* And, in the fame way, he, no doubt, accounted for all the other 
 phaenomcna of nature of the fam.e kind. 
 
 Laflly^ When he tells us that the mind is i\\eJon?i of an organized 
 hody^ he tells us what is true, but he does not tell us enough ; for he 
 does not tell us in what \.\\\%fo>m confifts : And it is, as if one fhould 
 fay, that the dcfi:iition of any one thing was \\.s form, without letting 
 us know what x\\q form is. Now, I have exprelfeJ, in my definition, 
 what that form is, and have laid, that it is a ?7iotive poijuer) a defini- 
 tion, which, I think, mort perted;ly diftinguifhes mind irom.body, and 
 comprehends every kind of mind frv)m the higheil to the lowelb. And 
 fo much for Ariftotltr's definition of mind. 
 
 Plato*s definition is, * That mindh what \% fdf-moved\\^ thereby di- 
 ftinguilliing it from tody^ which is either moved by mind, or by another 
 body ; for both Plato and Ariftotle, and all philofophers, both antient 
 ^nd modern, who are not atheifts, agree in this, that body cannot mo'vs 
 itfelf. Agalnft this definition of Plato, Ariftotle has argued at great 
 length, in his firft book De Anima, cap. 3. where he maintains, not 
 only that the mind is no\. felf -moved, bat that it is not moved at all. 
 And he adds, that it is impofTible, by its nature, that it can be moved. 
 And, upon the fuopofition, that Plato meant bodily motion, in which 
 fenfe Ariftotle underftands him, it is evident that mind, not being a 
 
 mate^ 
 
 the works of nature and thofe of art, that the former have the principles of motion in 
 themfelves, and the latter are moved from without; lib. 2. phyf. cap. i. And not onlydoes 
 this principle move, but it moves with defign, and for a certain purpole, in the fame 
 manner as art moves the materials upon which it works. It is, fays he, as if the art 
 of ftiip-building was in the wood. This, he adds, is mofl manifeft in the inftance of 
 a phyfician curing himfelf; for that is likefl: of all to nature. Lib. 2. Phyf. cap. y in 
 fine. * Ariftotle, lib. i. De Anima, cap 2. 
 
 t «i^T«x(»*)T«», the tranflation of which, according to the ftri^t propriety of the wor<I, 
 is, * capable of being moved by it/elf,*
 
 Chap. IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 79 
 
 fnateriai {uhd^nce, cannot be 7?iovedy except by accuknt \ as, when a 
 . man in a iliip is vioved, not by his mo'ving, but by the /5?7/>V W5v/Ǥ- ; 
 Or, to give an example ftill more appofite, as, when rowers in a boat 
 are moved themfelvcs by the moinng of the boat-, for the mind moves 
 the body as the roivers do the ^o^^ and, by confequence, is moved itfelf. 
 But Philoponus, in his Commentary upon this chapter, Oiows, I think, 
 very plainly, that the difference betwixt the two philoibphers is, in 
 this inftance, as in many others, only in appearance ; and that Ari- 
 ftotle here has either milunderftood Plato, or affeded to milunder- 
 ftand him, which he fays is often the cafe, that he might have the 
 pleafure of refuting him * : For Plato does not mean here 7?iotion^ fuch 
 as that of body i but motio}i that is applicable to mi7id : For, according 
 to Arillotle's own definition of motion, he Ihows that mind is moved^ 
 when it is changed from one habit to another ; and, it may be added, 
 when it paflcs from a Hate of reft to adivity, or from one energy to 
 another t* 
 
 But, even in this fenfe, I think his definition is not good ; for, in 
 \\\t frjl place, it comprehends only inferior 77iinds^ not the Supref7te 
 Mind^ in vuho7n there is no change^ 7ior Jloadovu of change, Scco7idiy, 
 Whatever may be the cafe of mind feparated from body, it may be 
 doubted whether the movements or changes that happen to niijid, while 
 
 uni- 
 
 * Philoponus, In thepaffage above quoted, is very angry with Ariftotle for rniftaking the 
 fymbols of the I'ythagoreans, uf.d by Piaio in the 1 imaeus, by which he makes the mind 
 to confill of right lines and circles, for literal truths The I'yth.igoreans, he lays, not wil- 
 ling to publifh their dodlrines to all the world, at the Lnwc time, net pleafed with the 
 allegories of the poets, which not only cover the truth, but arc apt to lea-I young minds 
 into great and mifchicvous errors, chofe oth.r kinds ot alhgones, wh-ch they called 
 fyvibolsy and by which they concealed their philolophy from tne vulg.ii, and, at the 
 fame time, did no harm to the ignorant. And, u) on this occaCon, Philoponus has 
 given us a very ingenious explanation of thofe iymboL, ufed by PJato to exprefs the 
 nature cf the mind. 
 
 •]• See what I have further faid upon this fubjeft, in the chapter on motiony page 21.
 
 8o ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IT. 
 
 united to ^'^^j do not as often proceed from the body as from the 
 mind. Some of them, we are fure, do fo ; and, indeed, mind and body 
 are fo united, that the one muft neceflarily affect the other ; fome- 
 times the afFedion proceeding from the mindy and producing fympa- 
 thetic movements in the body^ as in the cafe of fear or anger, or fuch 
 like pafTions ; and fometimes proceeding from the bodyt and produ- 
 cing fympathetic emotions in the mind, as in the cafe of pain. 
 
 It is evident, therefore, that Plat6*s definition is imperfect, and 
 will not apply to what I call mind 'y jirft^ in refpedt that it does 
 not comprehend the Supreme Mind^ which may be called the ISiind of 
 Isl^inds ; 3iVi(\ificondlyy becaufe it docs not apply to all the movements 
 and changes of inferior minds, many of which do not proceed from 
 the mind itfelf, but from the borly with which it is united. It would 
 therefore have been better, as I obferved in the prececding chapter, if 
 Plato had not applied motion at all to the w/W, which he certainly 
 did not believe to be corporeal ; and, inflead of faying that it was /hlf-- 
 movedi had faid it ^2i^Jelf-a5live ; and l.have no doubt but that was 
 his meaning. 
 
 From this examination of the definitions given oimind by Plato and 
 Ariftotle, it appears, 1 think, ftill more evident, that the definition I 
 have given is the true one, being liable to none of thofe objedions, to 
 which the definitions, both of the mafter and fcholar, are liable. And 
 it appears, from the account which Ariftotle has given us of the opi- 
 nions of the philofophers before his time concerning it *, that they al! 
 agreed in making ^^ poorer of moving one, at leafij of the principal 
 attributes of 7?and : And the lateft of them, Anaxagoras, did, as he 
 informs us, define mind by that poiver only. But, fays he, they ima- 
 gined that it not only ??wvedyhut ivas moi'ed', becaufe they laid, that 
 -every thing here below, that moved other things, was alfo 7?2ove£l 
 
 itfelfo 
 
 * ,h'ih. I. (De Anlma,) cgp. a-
 
 Chap. IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Si 
 
 itfelf. And in this, according to him, confifted their error ; not in 
 making the pozver oi moving the charaderiftic of mind ; for, it is evi- 
 dent, that he beheved mind to.be the Author of all the 7notion in the 
 univerfe ; but it was mind nnmaterial^ and, by confequence, imnwue- 
 able. As to Plato, he has made, in the paflage above quoted *, the very 
 diflin6lion ihat I have made, betwixt ^^^/ and 7?/zW, and has exprefsly 
 faid, that mind \s what ?}ioves itfelf^ and every thing elfe; and body is 
 what is moved. And Proclus, the beft interpreter of Plato, and who, in 
 later times, was alone dignified with the name of his fuccelTor, in his 
 Commentary upon the Timaeus, book 2. page 90. has faid, that body 
 is, by its nature, Ui^^Kmrov, that is, incapable of moving itfelf ; and 
 further, that it is unable to adhere or keep together. It is there- 
 fore kept together, as well as moved, by fomething elfe. And this 
 fomething, which moves body^ and keeps it together, muft be an adive 
 principle : But, whatever is aHive^ is not body. It is, therefore, 
 «r»f««T«v, or immaterial^ that is, mind. 
 
 Thus, it appears, that all the antient philofophers, however much 
 they may have differed concerning 7nind^ in other refpeds, agreed in 
 this, that it was the principle of motion : And indeed, I think it is 
 impoffible to find any thing elfe, that the three kinds of mind, which 
 they comprehended under the term -i^vyj,^ had in common : For the 
 njegetable life has certainly nothing elfe in common with the ani??ial 
 2.w^JenJitive \ nor cither of thefe two with the intelleBual And, as 
 to the fourth kind of life, or qtiafi-life, as Arifiotle calls it, that is 
 to be found in all bodies ; it is nothing elfe but this motive power, 
 in different diredions, according to the different natures of the bo- 
 dies. 
 
 * See page 9. 
 
 L CHAP.
 
 82 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book 11. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Other Minds befiJcs the iUtional or Intclledual. — The Brute Miiid — ■ 
 The Vegetable — That ivhich moves miorganized Bodies — As great 
 Varieties ^ Minds as 0/ Bodies — The Scale of Nature not other-wife 
 compleat — Mind not degraded by animating unorganized Bodies — The 
 ivonderjiil Operation of theje Bodies in Nature — The Animal and 
 IntelleBual Life the SnhjeB of the pre/ent Inquiry. — Of the Animal 
 Life — Senfe^ Appetite^ Pain^ and Pleajurc, neceffary for the Prejer~ 
 'uation and Coiitinu t'on of the Animal Lile — 77?^ Phantafta alfo ne- 
 ceffary for the Animal Oeconomy — The Mind, excited by the Affflance 
 of the Phantafuh and the con/equent Appetites, monjcs the body, not 
 direct ly^ but by the intervention of certain Machitiery — All Animals 
 77iufi have Senfes. one or more, and alfo ihe Phantafta — Difference be- 
 titnxt Ariflotle and his Commentator's on this laft Point — Six differ^ 
 ences betivixt Senfe and Imagination — Memory does not belong to the 
 Animal Nature — A certain degree of Ratiocination, or Comparijon of 
 Perceptions, belongs tofome Brute Animals of the better Kind. 
 
 S, therefore, according to the opinion of all the antient philofo- 
 phers who were not Atheifts, it is inijia that moves, body that 
 is moved ; and, as all bodies are in motion, or have a tendency to be 
 moved, it is evident that there muft be jnind ewcxy vvhere in the uni- 
 verfe. It is therefore an univerfal of the iirlf order, as univerfal as 
 matter and fonn^ and more univerfal than body ; fince there is wzWwith- 
 out body, but no body, as far as we know, without mind, 
 
 I know the general opinion is, that thought and intelligence are ef- 
 fential to mind, and that it is only what thinks and underitands that 
 
 deferves
 
 Chap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 8 
 
 o 
 
 defcrves the name of mind: Such, I know, is the common ufe of the 
 word in EngUfli, though I have (hewn above*, that, as the Greek phi- 
 lofophcrs had more extenfive views of things than we, fo their philo- 
 fophical laiiguage Vv'as more comprehenfive ; and therefore they had a 
 word {4.vxn) which exprefled, not only the human mind, but hkewife 
 the internal principle of the brute animal and the vegetable, perceiving, 
 betwixt thefe, a relation and conformity, which, it appears, our modern 
 philofophers do not perceive, or, at leail:, do not attend to. But, without 
 dif^uting about theufe of words, let me afkthe philofophers of this age, 
 Whether there be not fomcthing within the brute, as well as within the 
 man, which moves the one as well as the other? All the philofophers 
 of Britain, at lead, will admit that there is ; and, if fo, I think it not 
 improper to call by the fame name the internal principle, which 
 produces the fame effect in both, however different they may be in 
 other refpects ; for it is by what they have in common, that -we chfs 
 things under the {ame genus, and call them by the i'a.mc generic name, 
 however different they may be in /pedes. Thus, we call by the fame 
 name of animal, creatures very different from one another, becaufe they 
 have in common what belongs to the general idea of animal. A<^ain 
 there are motions in the vegetable, which cannot be accounted for from 
 any external impulfe, luch, particularly, as the motion of the juices 
 upwards. Thefe motions, therefore, inufl: likewife be produced by 
 forne internal principle, by which the vegetable is nourilhed, grows, 
 and propagates its kind, as well as the animal. And this principle of 
 movement, although the movement be not (o various as that of the a- 
 nimal, I call by the fame generic name of ?nind. Again, thofe move- 
 ments of the bodies called inanmiate, by which fome moue ojie v/ay, 
 fome another, f)me in a ftraight line, fome in a circular; as they have 
 not hitherto been accounted for by any material impulfe from with- 
 out, and, I firirly believe, never can, 1 mult likewife afcrihe to fome 
 internal princi; Ic, which, having that genend charaderiftic of miml, of 
 producing motion^ 1 call by the iame general name oJt mind. 
 
 L 2 If 
 
 * See page 8,
 
 84 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 If it be faid that, in this way, I make a great variety of mixjds, dif- 
 fering much from one another in their quahties and properties, and of 
 degrees of excellence very different, my anfwer is, that I admit the 
 truth of tlie obfcrvation ; but, I fay, that my fyftem is, tor that, the 
 more agreeable to the general analogy of nature, ot which the variety 
 is infinite, and the fulnefs and perfection as great as the variety ; for 
 it is well faid, bv one of Ariftotle's commentators of the Alexandrian 
 fcliool, ' 'I hat the Univerfe is the complement ot 2\\ joniu or fpe- 
 * ciefes'^,'' containing in it all the pclFible fpeciefes of things, tvery 
 thing, however, in it, is cither body or miyid. But, oi bodies^ wh^t prodi- 
 gious varieties do we fee, and how different from one another in kind, 
 in beauty, and in excellence ? How much more perfect is the organic- 
 zed body, than a lump of unorganized brute matter? Among organized 
 bodies ihemfelves, how much more delicate the ftru6ture, and accurate the 
 conformation of one than of another ? And, among the unorganized^ what 
 a wnde interval betwixt the fubtile eledtric fire and the maffy reck, the 
 diamond and the clod ? and how many different kinds, and different 
 degrees of excellence, lie betwixt thefe extremes ? Now, nature would 
 be imperfed, and, as it were, mutilated, if there was not, at leafl, the 
 fame variety in what is principal in nature, mindy that there is in 
 body, which is fo much inferior in dignity and excellence. 
 
 And here it may be obferved, how full and compleat, according to 
 my fyftem, the fcale of nature is in this matter of 77iind, and how it ari- 
 fes, by juft degrees, one ftep above another. Firft, there is that mind 
 which fimply moves body in a certain determined diredtion. This is 
 the loweft kind of mind, of leaft variety and excellence, and below 
 what the antients called -^vyji^ or life ; yet it is effential, according to 
 Ariftotlc, to a phyfical body. Next to that is the mind which moves 
 the vegetable with much greater variety, producing, by its various mo- 
 tions, the nutrition, growth, and proj^agation of the plant : This is 
 what is known by the name of the vegetable life. Next to it is the 
 
 animdi 
 
 * Tr>.ti(aiux le-Ti ruv h\ui I Ketr^t;, Joaniics Philoponus's introdu(flion to his commentti- 
 ry upon Ariftotle*s books, Dc Anima.
 
 Chap. V. ANTIENTMETAPHYSICS. 85 
 
 animal life^ producing ftlll greater variety of motion ; for It has fen- 
 fation fuperaddcd to the vegetable hre, by which the animal per- 
 cei'ves^ and has communication with objects external. And, laft of all, 
 comes ifitel/ecf-i which is eiientially diiHnguiihed from the other three, 
 hy cofifciGu/nefs ; for none of the other three knows what it does ; 
 whereas intelle£t recognifes itlelt, as well as other natures *. 
 
 It may he thought that I degrade wzW very much, when I bring it fo 
 low as to make it move even unorganized bodies : But, in doing fo, I 
 think I only fill up the fcale of nature. That fcale certainly would not be 
 compleat, if there was no 7nind below the human, as well as above it. 
 Now, there is belov7 it that of the brute, having many things in 
 common with the human, as we (hall afterwards fee, particularly rati- 
 ocination. In a certain degree : But, would the progrels of nature 
 downward be compleat, if there were no mind below that of the ani- 
 mal ? I think it certainly would not ; and therefore there is the 've- 
 getable life. But ftill there is fomething even below that ; for there is 
 movement in unorganized hodxQs^ which cannot be accounted for from 
 any mechanical caufe. The progrefs, therefore, cannot end in the 'ue- 
 getahki and m.ufl: go further down to every body that is moved^ but 
 further it cannot go. 
 
 Nor is the lowed kind o? life ufelefs, however contemptible It may 
 appear, compared with higher mind \ but, on the contrary, by it, un- 
 der the dire<^lion of intellect is carried on the whole bufinefs of the 
 univerfe ; for it is by the various motions of bodies, to or from one 
 another, commonly known by the namQ ot attrac:iion and re-pulfion — by 
 their motion downwards, or tendency to a centre, called, in the lan- 
 guage of modern philoibohy, g>avitation,'-^by their motion up- 
 ward, or from the centre, fuch as the motion of flame, — ui;u i>y 
 
 tiicii- 
 * The three fiift of thcfc minds make wh-.it is ca'letl, in ihe Language of anticut 
 philofophy, nature, in contiMiliflintfUon to man Ami the ilifierencc betwixt thcia .uid 
 man is, that they a6l neceflarily, without cicliberation, not knowing for what purpofc 
 they acl, nor recognizing their own opt ratdi.o j whercis 7nan ad^s with Jelibcidtion, 
 without neceffity, knov;in^ for what puipofe he a<^s, and confcious of his own ac- 
 tions. — But of this more aiLcrwards.
 
 86 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Ecok II. 
 
 their circular motion, or motion revolving into itfelf, that every- 
 thing is generated and produced, and the whole frame of na- 
 ture preferved and fufrained. And, particularly, it is to one of 
 thefe motions, viz, the attra^ion of cohcjion^ that what we call body 
 n ay be faid to owe its cxir.ei\ce; for it is by this principle that body 
 is extended, and has the properties of folidity and impenetrability; and 
 without it tl'icre could be no animal or vegetable, rock or mountain, 
 or any thing elevated upon the face of the earth; for it is a power 
 which overcomes even gra'vitationi making the inferior parts of any 
 body adhere to the fuperior, when, otherways, by the power of gra- 
 vitation, they would fall down towards the centre, and be fpread into 
 a horizontal furface, like a fluid *. 
 
 Ariftotle, in the work I have fo often quoted, has obferved, that the 
 
 vegetable life is the foundation of both the animal or fenfuive life, 
 
 and of the rational and intelledual ; for, fays he, if there was not that 
 
 nourifhment and growth which belongs to the vegetable life, there 
 
 would be nc\l\\Qr /en/at ion nor intelleSl'\y at leaft, incorporated with bo~ 
 
 dy^ of which he muft always be underfto. :d to fpeak in this work, De 
 
 Anima ; for it is, as I obfervt d before, a part of his natural philofophy. 
 
 And, in this refped:, he compares the 'vegetable life to the triangle in 
 
 plain redilineal figures: Y x every re6lilineal figure is refolvable into 
 
 trijingles; and, if there were no triangles, there could be no redtilineal 
 
 figure :j:. But the fame, with as great jufiice, may be (aid of this 
 
 priiKiple of cohefion, without which, there v.'ould be neither 'vege- 
 
 tcibk nor animal life i nor any kind of embodied wzW, nor indeed 
 
 any body^ as I have already obferved, fince it is that principle which 
 
 makes body. 
 
 To 
 
 * See, upon this fuhjcc):, Baxter in bis "Enquiry irto the Human Soul, page 64. 
 See aJfo Proclus in the pafT^'ge above qacfcd, pigc 7^. from the 2d Book ot his Com- 
 mt-nt iPy upon the Timaeus, page 90. wiu-re he aiTjrts the Jpirituality or immatt-r'uility 
 of this princ p!e of cohefioii, in tlie fo'lowtng w<>rcs, ttuv to vuhxtikb* voiviTiKty nvoi ij-t/, 
 -TTx-j 01 T<) Ttifivy xs-ojf^uTcy icrri, * Wh.itever Icccps together actsp and whatever a5Is is 
 * incorporeal -f Lib. 2. dc An'imaj cap. 2. \ Lib. i. cap. 3.
 
 Chap. V. A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I C S. 87 
 
 To explain more particularly the nature of the lowefl: kind of life 
 which moves unorganized bodies, or of that which animates the ve- 
 getable^ belo igs to the fecond part of my work, in which I am to ap- 
 ply my philofophy of mind to the operations of nature : But I will here 
 treat of the animal ^.nA rational life ^ as 1 think it is necelfary to explain 
 them, in order to make ftill more evident the difiin£tion betwixt body 
 and tnind^ which I hold to be the foundation, not only of the philofophy 
 of mind^ but of natural philofophy, of metaphyfics, and particularly 
 of the highefi: part of metaohylics, theology : For 1 hold it impofiiblc 
 to attain to the ultimate end of philofophy, which is the knowledge 
 or God, without being able properly to make this diftindtion. Now, 
 in the animal and rational life^ the operation of ^nind is much more 
 vifible, being obvious to common fenfe and obfervation, than in the 
 other two kinds of life: For, in the animal and the ratiovMl life^ we 
 know, from the moft certain of all knowledge, namely conjcioujricfsy 
 the operations of 'mind -^ and, by attention and obfervation of the Aruc- 
 ture of the body, wq difcover by what means it ads, and how it is 
 aded upon. 
 
 I will begin with the animal life. All animals, as well as vege- 
 tables, muft grow and be nourlihed : The former, becaufe there is, 
 by the order of nature, a progrefs from the embryo, or firil rudiments 
 of the animal, to its itate of perfection : The latter, becaufe it is form- 
 ed of materials that are daily wailing, and therefore ftand in 
 netd of conl^ant repair; which repair is by the means of nouriili- 
 ment *. And it is by nourilhrnent that the animal is not only pre- 
 ferved from death and diffolution, but it is by nourlfhment alfo, that 
 it grows and comes to maturity. Now, it is from with-ut that ani- 
 mals receive their nourifliment ; and fometimes they have to fcek it 
 at a confiderablc dillance. In order, therefore, to be nourilhed, they 
 muit have fome knowledge of external objcds, and mufl be able to 
 
 dillinguifh 
 
 * Sec' Phibponus*s jntrodu<Slion to his comrrt'etifarj' upcn'Arlflotlc's books de /Inima.
 
 S8 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 dlflin^^uifh what is proper for nouriflnng them, from what is not. 
 Ti is the) do hy the iBCaiis of what we cdiW fenjat ion ; for which 
 nature has provided five /en/es^ and no more to any aiiimai, 
 judging ihele fufficient tor the purpofe hoth of /i'uiiig, and of 
 H'ui7ig ivell. But, as Ihe docs ncnhing in vain, to (ome (he has 
 given fewer, their (kite of life requiring no more ; but to all ihe 
 has given one, viz. touch : For that is the -fenfe which is the founda- 
 tion of all the oUierb, every one ot tiicm operating by the touch ; and 
 therefore, without that fenfe, there could be no fcniitive nature. Sen- 
 fation, therefore, may be defined, ' the perception, by the minJ, of ex- 
 ' tcrnal objedls, by the means of certain parts of the lod^i called the 
 * organs of Jenje.^ 
 
 Further, all animals propagate their kind. And this,- fays Arif- 
 totle, Is the chief concern of nature ; for the intention of nature is to 
 make every thing eternal, like Its great Author, as far as their nature 
 will permit *. Of fome kinds of being, the Individuals are eternal; 
 bur, as all cannot be fo, there are others which are eternal only by 
 fucceflion ; fo that the fpecics always continues, and is one and the 
 fame, though the individuals perifh f. And by how much the fpe- 
 cies is of more value than the individual, fo much the more care has 
 nature taken to provide for the prefervatlon of the fpecies. And, ac- 
 cording to Ariftotlc, It is for the fake of the fpecies that fhe has pro- 
 vided for the Individual J: Now, it is by generation that the fpecies 
 is continued. 
 
 But the care of nature for the prefervatlon of the fpecies, as well 
 as of the Individual, would be ineffedual, if there were not certain /;«- 
 
 pu/fis 
 
 • Ariflotle de Jnimay cap. 4. lib. 2. 
 t Ariflot. ibid. 
 
 i Ar\{\ot\ey ulfi fu^ra. Sec alfo Philoponus in ,his introdu(ftion to his commentary 
 on thefc books.
 
 Chap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 89 
 
 pulj'es of the pi hid of the animal, difpofing him both to feek nourlHi- 
 ment, reft, and whatever elfe is neceflary for the deifip^ and ivell-bcin^ 
 of the individual, and likewife to propagate his kind. Thcfc impulfcs 
 arife from the objeds which are prefented to him by the fenfe : They 
 are what we call appetites. And both that which prompts the animal 
 to preferve the individual, and that which prompts him to propagate 
 his kind, are exprefled in Greek by the word eT^^t;^^,**; which, accor- 
 ding to the account we have given of the animal conftitution, 
 muft neceffarily attend fenfation, and therefore is elfential to the ani~ 
 7nal or fenfiti've nature. 
 
 Again, as nature has been pleafed to diiiwc-x. pkafurc to the gratifi- 
 cation of thefe appetites, in order to prompt the animal to gratify 
 them, and to reward him, as it were, for obeying the call of nature ; 
 hence it comes, that pleafure likewife is effential to the animal con- 
 ftitution, and, by confequence, its oppofite ^^/«; for, wherever there 
 is pleajure in the gratification of any appetite, there muft of ncceirity 
 be pain in the difappointment. or counterading of that appetite. 
 
 Farther ftill, if there were no other infiinSJive impulfe given to the 
 animal, the purpofe of nature would not be fulfilled ; for it is necef- 
 fary, not only that the animal fhould provide for the individual, and 
 likewife propagate his kind, but further, it is for thefe very purpofes 
 neceffary, that he ftiould defend himfclf, as far as he is able, againft 
 every thing that w^ould hurt or deftroy him, and that he Ihould have 
 a certain degree of refolution and perfffverance in his purfuits. Nature, 
 therefore, has given the animal an impulfe or iiwuemeyit of the mindy 
 by which he is prompted to encounter danger, to refift when attacked, 
 and to overcome difficulties which may occur in the gratification of 
 his appetites. This principle of the animal nature is expreffed in 
 
 M Greek 
 
 • See Philoponus's commentary, ibid.
 
 90 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 Greek by the word ^v^o^-f, which we may tranflate into Engllfh,. 
 
 anger. 
 
 But the animal oeconomy would not be yet compleat, If nature had 
 not beftowed upon us another thing, more wonderful, I think, in the eyes 
 of the philofopher, than any thing I have yet mentioned. I have faid, 
 that the impulfe, which excites an animal to fupplyhis own wants, and 
 to propagate his kind, is excited by the objects prefented by the fenfe :. 
 But, fuppofe there is no objecft within the reach of fenfe proper to ex- 
 cite the animal to either, yet it may be neceifary that the animal 
 fliould feek for both. How then is this want to be fupplied ? and how 
 is the animal to be prompted to feek for an object that the fenfe does 
 not prefent to him ? The anfwer is, That nature, by a wonderful con- 
 trivance, prefents to the mind of the animal, and m.akes, as it v;ere, a 
 pidure within him of the forms of thofe objects of the appetite af the 
 animal, by which he is prompted to feek them as much as if they 
 were really before him. This magic lanthorn of the mind, (for fo £ 
 think it may be called), is, in Greek, expreffed by the word <p^.vT«. 
 (r<«, in Engliih imag'inatiofii ox fancy ^ by which the images of things 
 pi-efentcd to the mind by the fenfes are preferved ; fo that the percep- 
 tions of fenfcj which otherways would be fleeting and tranfitory, ac- 
 quire, in this way, fome kind of duration and permanency; and, by 
 this admirable contrivance, the mind is moved from within as (Irong- 
 ]y, and fometimes more ftrongly, than by objeds from without. 
 
 By thefe two irapulfcs, proceeding either from real objects percei- 
 ved by the fenfe, or from the pictures of them in the imagination, the 
 animal is prompted to a^, that is, to move his body, which is the in- 
 itrument th;it nature has given him for fupplying his wants : And it 
 remains now only to be inquired, By what kind of mcchanifm the f?iind 
 moves the body, and employs it in gratifying its appetites and fupplying 
 
 its wants ? 
 
 That 
 
 t See Philoponus in his introduction to his commentary on the books de A^ima,
 
 Chap. V. A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I C S. 9-1 
 
 That ui'ind. Incorporated with an animal hod)\ does not move that 
 body diredly and immediately, but by a certain kind of machinery, 
 is a difcovery for which we are indebted to anatomy ; for, by it wc 
 •learn, that the mind moves the members of the hodyh^ a machinery o^' 
 miifcles,finews, and bones, which perform the office of that mechani- 
 cal power called a lever ; but whi<:h, by a certain ftrucSlure of the body, 
 necefTary for other purpofes, is made to be of a kind that requires an 
 extraordinary power to move it, far exceeding any power of human 
 machinery that was to adt in fb fmall a fpace. 
 
 In different animals the ftructure of the body is different, according 
 to the different appetites, inclinations, oeconomy, and manner of life 
 of the animal. But, as to the machinery by which the mind of the 
 Bnlmal ads upon the hodyy and. in that way, performs Its natural 
 fundions, it Is pretty much the fame in all animals. And, with re- 
 fpe£t to the mind, it confifts, in all animals without exception, of the 
 parts above mentioned, 'viz, the fenfitive^ ^\\t phantaJlicaU or hnagina- 
 //W, the emotion of ^/)/><?//V^ and anger ^ together with the fenfation of 
 pain and pleafure. 
 
 That the fenfitlve part is effential to the animal, and that there can 
 be no animal without, at leaft, the fenfe oi touchy is, I think, agreed 
 by all philofophers. And Ariftotle admits, that all animals have the 
 feeling of pleafure^ and, by confequence, the defire of it, or what I 
 call appetite'^. I think It is neceffary too, that every animal iliould 
 have a principle of felf-defence, and a certain degree of fortitude, by 
 which he refifts dangers and overcomes difficulties, though I do not 
 remember that Ariftotle has any where faid fo expreisly ; but he has 
 denied that all animals have a phantafta ; and, particularly, he fays, 
 that ants, and bees, and worms, have it not f. But, in this, both his 
 
 M 2 com- 
 
 * Ariflot. De Jnima, lib. 2- cap. 3. 
 t Ibid. lib. 3 cap. 4.
 
 / 
 
 92 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IL 
 
 commentators, Philoponus and Simplicius, differ from him ; for they 
 both agree, that all annuals, even thofe mentioned by Ariftotle, have 
 it in fome degree ; and the way that Philoponus fiwes his author*s 
 credit is, by faying, that Ariftotle means that the bee, for example, 
 has not a phantafta fuch as the dog or horfe, by which it can learn 
 any thing, or is capable of difcipline ; but one of an inferior kind, by 
 which it has only a confufed and general perception of things, but 
 which, it feems, is fufficient for the purpofes of its oeconomy *. Thefe 
 commentators appear to me to be in the right ; for the perceptions of 
 fenfe, unlefs they were retained in the phantafta.^ would not be fuffi- 
 cient for the purpofes of nature. An animal could not feek the food 
 that nature has deftined for him, without a pidture of it in the 
 imagination ; nor could he find the way back again to the place 
 where he found that food, unlefs the place was likewife paint- 
 ed in his phantafia. And, in many cafes, it appears impoffible, 
 that an animal, without fuch help, could either propagate or 
 rear the offspring. And, as to the bee in particular, it is evi- 
 dent, that, without fome fuch inward directory, fhe could not, at 
 any confiderable diftance, find her way back again to her hive, 
 which, it is certain, fhe does. And, further, though there be a 
 myltilude of hives in the fame place, fo like to one another, that one 
 fliould think it impoffible to diflinguifh the one from the other, yet 
 the bee never miftakes another hive for her own ; and this fhows not 
 only tliat fhe has an impreffion of it on the phantafia^ but a very ac- 
 curate one. And, as to the authority of Ariftotle, on the other fide, 
 he appears to me to have altered his opinion upon maturer confide- 
 ration ; for, in the nth chapter of the 3d book Do Anuria^ he fays 
 exprefsly, that ther€ can be no defire or appetite without a phantafia. 
 Now, without defire or appetite, there can be no animal. And he 
 
 fur- 
 
 * Philoponus accufes Ariflotle of contradi<Sllng himfelf upon this point, faying in 
 one place, That all animals have the phantafia ; in another, That fome have it not. 
 And he oppofes nx^cn A^t<TraTiXYn to I w* AftrTonMi' See hi3 commentary on the 
 4th chap, of the 3d book De ^nima>
 
 Chap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 93 
 
 further fays, in the fame paffage, that even the mod impcrfedl ani- 
 mals, fuch as have but the fingle fenfe of touchy have appetite [t-Tn^t,- 
 fcta) and Hkewife a pbantafta\ but, fays he, an indefinite one, that is, 
 as his interpreter Philoponus underftands it, an obfcure one, in which 
 the objeds are not diflindtly reprefented ^^ 
 
 Further, all animals candlftinguifli the perception of one fenfe from 
 that of another ; for example, they can diftinguifhyw^f^ from ivhite^ 
 and either from /outid. Now, this diftindion cannot be made by any 
 one of the five fenfes, which only perceive and diftinguifli their pro- 
 per objeds. Neither can this be done by mtelk^y fuppofing that all 
 animals were poffeffed of it ; becaufe fenfible and corporeal things 
 are not the objeds of intelkSi, At fame time, it is evident, that a di- 
 ftindion muft be made by fome faculty of the mind, which perceives 
 them both at once ; for otherways it is impoffible to compare them. 
 Now, for this purpofe, Ariftotle has thought, that a kind of fixth fenfe 
 
 \vas 
 
 * See the commentary of Simplicius upon this parage of Ariftotle, page 86 where 
 he very properly obferves, that all animals appear to have a diftin£l phantafia of the re 
 ijov, or what \s p /enfant ; that is, what is proper for the nourifhment of the animal 
 and the prefervation of the fpecies. But fome animals, fays he, have no diitimfl: 
 phantafia where the nouriflmient is to be found; and, therefore, they have no tiiftiiKH: 
 or determined progrefTive motion : And this appears to be the cafe of worms and flies. 
 The imperfect animals, who have no progrefTive motion, and only one fenfe, have 
 likewife a diflimft enough phantafia of what is proper for their nouridinient ; for we 
 fee oyfters, when they want nourifliment, opening their fhells ; but, as tliey are con- 
 fined to one place, and as they do not go to the nourifliment, but the nouri{liment 
 comes to them, they have no phantafia at all diredling them to the phice where the 
 nourifliment is to be found, or inftru<Sling them how it is to be fought for. Thus far 
 Simplicius ; to which it may be added, that, as nature docs every thing that is 
 neceffary, but nothing more than is necefl'ary, it would have been very fupcrfluous 
 to have given to worms or flies, which find their nourifliment every where, a phan- 
 tafia, as dift;in£l and comprehenfive as that of a horfe or dog. And, as to thofe im- 
 pcrfedl animals, which are fixed to one fpot, it would have been altogether unnecef- 
 fary to have given them any other phantafia than that which dirccfls tljem to prepare 
 for the reception of the nourifliment when it comes to them.
 
 94 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book 11. 
 
 was neccflary, which he calls a common fenfe ; becaufe it has no par- 
 ticular object of its own, but perceives and compares together the ob- 
 jeds of all the other fenfes *. But I agree with Philoponus, (in the 
 end of his commentary upon the paiTage in Ariftotle t)> that this com- 
 vionfcnfe and \\\t phantafia is the fame thing ; for it is evident, that, 
 by means of s\\t phantafta^ animals do, in other Vefpe(5ls, compare their 
 perceptions, and reafon concerning them ; and why not, likewife, in 
 refpect of their difference from one another ? And the phantafia folves 
 all the difficulties ftarted by Ariftotle concerning the manner of this 
 perception, as, that it mud be , by one and the lame faculty of the 
 mind, and at the fame inftant. 
 
 ArlRotle has been at great pains to diftinguifh ht\-^\yi\. fenjatlon and 
 wiagmation\. And his commentator Philoponus has enumeratedj 
 and very well explained, fix differences that he makes betwixt the two. 
 The firft is, that, in dreams, we undoubtedly make ufe of the imagi- 
 nation, by which, and which only, they are produced. But, in 
 dreams, the fenfes do not operate : Therefore, fenfc and imagination 
 are difTerent. The fecond is, that new-born children have the ufe of 
 their fenfes, but no imagination ; for proof of which, Philoponus fays, 
 that a child, at firft, will apply for fuck to any breaft as well as that 
 of its mother, and to any thing in the form of a breaft, though it be 
 of wood or ftone. And, though he once burn himfelf in the fire, he 
 will return to it again. Neither of which, fays Philoponus, would 
 happen, if the phantafia had retained either the image of the mother 
 and her breaft, or of the fire. The third difference Philoponus re- 
 jects, namely, that all animals have Jtnjation^ but all have not imagi^ 
 nation. The fourth difference is, thaty^-w/? is always converfant about 
 things really exiftingj whereas, the objects of imagination are often 
 
 things 
 
 ♦ Lib 1,. De Jnima, cap. 2. See alfo his commentators Philoponus and SimpIU 
 cius upon this chapter, which appears to me to need a commentary very much, 
 t See alfo rhlL.pcmus upon the 4th chap, of book 3d, Dc y^ninia. 
 J: Lib. j. cap. 4. ibid.
 
 Chap. V. A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. 
 
 95 
 
 things not exiting ; therefore, fen/e is aUvaye true, imagination ohzn 
 falfe a id deceiving. Bat this dillindion, 1 apprehend, only belongs 
 to the rational nature : For it is only man that Is a poet, and makes, 
 of the images in his phantafia^hj joining and disjoining, arranging"- 
 and compounding them together, pidures of things that have no ex- 
 iftence in nature. But the brute has nothing of the poetical faculty ; 
 and, therefore, there is nothing in his pJoantafia, but the images of 
 things really exifling, fuch as he received them from his fenfes ^'■. 
 The fifth is, fays Pliiloponus, the folution of an objevftion, rather than 
 making a diftindion of the two : For, when we fee a thing at a di- 
 ftance, and do not fee it diftindly, we fay, that ive Jancy ive fee it ; 
 therefore, fancy , or imagination^ is nothing more than a weaker or ob- 
 fcurer fenfation. But, if this were true, fays Philoponus, a more di- 
 ftind vlfion would be a more perfeSl fancy \ which is what no bodjr 
 will fay. The fixth and lafl: difference is, that, when our eyes are o- 
 pen, we fee a colour, or any other objed ; but, when we fluit our 
 eyes, we only imagine it ; that is, fee it in the phantafia. And 
 this laft I hold to be the eflential difference betwixt the tv^^o, that 
 what we perceive by the fenfe is prefent, and operating upon the 
 fenfe, whereas the objed of imagination is not prefent. The confe- 
 quence of which, is another 7;z^/m^/ difference, very much to be at- 
 tended to ; becaufe it applies to all the faculties of the mind ; fome of 
 which operate on things without the mind, others on things within. 
 Now, the imagination is one of the latter, and, in that refped, may 
 be compared to intellcB \ and, accordingly, it is called by Ariftotle n-<>,;; 
 TTx^nn^oiy or intcl/e^ paj/ive, as yiiiloponus informs us t« As to the 
 
 dif- 
 
 ♦ This, I find, is the opinion of Simplicius in his commentary upon the ^th 
 chapter of the third book De Animuy foL 60. of the commentary. 
 
 f The paflage is in his introdutlion to his commentary upon the books Dc .^nima. 
 I will give the words, becaufe they fliow that Philoponus makes the efleiuial difTe- 
 r£nce betwixt fenfe and imagination the fame that I do. T«» Si uXoyaif rr.( ^^xf^i 
 
 tvvauiuv, Ml fiif tte-t r^vucTiKXi' «'< h, 'OiTmui xui c^lKTiKxt. K*t yyoxfliKUi tin, fjevT<*5-.«»
 
 96 ANTIENT M-ETAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 difFerence betwixt imagination and intelleSl^ and the other internal fa- 
 culties of the mind, (fo 1 call them from the objeds on which they ope- 
 rate), 1 fliall obferve that, when I come to fpeak of the int elk Bual mind. 
 
 Tlie reader may perhaps be furprifed, that I have not mentioned 
 memory as one of the faculties of the mind belonging to the animal 
 nature, efpecially if he has read what Ariftotle has faid in more than 
 one place, inz. That other anii^als have memory as well as man *. 
 But [ obferve, that, in his books Dc Anima^ where he has treated 
 more accurately than any where elfe of all the faculties of the mind-t 
 and particularly of the phantafia^ as belonging to the animal 7iature, 
 and not to man only, he no where mentions memory as being of that 
 kind. And, in his book upon the fubje<ft of memory and reminifcence^ 
 though he fpeaks there of memory as belonging to other animals, he 
 admits, that there is memory of ideas, as well as of fenfible cbjeds. But 
 I incline to make a diftindion betwixt memory and imagination ; and, 
 to fay that memory is only of ideas, coniequently belongs only to man; 
 and that imagination is only of fenfible objeds, confequently belongs 
 both to man and brute. And this opinion is fupported by the autho- 
 rity of Plato in the Philebus, who exprefsly makes the diilindrion be- 
 twixt what is tvritten in the mind, and what is painted in it '\. Now, 
 what is written, I call ideas ; and memory is that part of the mind in 
 which they are preferved, and as it were recorded ; whereas, the paint- 
 ings in the 7ni7id are the images of fenfible objeds, which indeed only can 
 
 be 
 
 acti cticB'ViTii. oictPi^'^VTi ot aXXtj^tyv «evT««. on ij fiti eitc-B.^rii wg«; to ixre; dTroTHfirxt, 
 « J'e 'f'xitu'7'tei iiiiov £%« T>jv yvHTir »i (/,'}}> yx^ UKr^r,<TK;y to wcc^av fiovcv x.x( cv um'Aet^- 
 Zci*nxi i^aih*, toi;to otaiv. n 6t (pxvTcurfx., ■rx^x t/jj xt(rB-ti<nui ^ix-aova-tt, Tovi fvTin-ji run cae-^^- 
 TW, 11 fcXMTti, reiiTovi cfJUTrXxtlei, o6iv x^i 7r«£*'.;T<x«v rovn avTr^v xxXh o Apu/loTiXrii' itui uty, «Jj 
 £»6iii i^BVcrxv T« yvv(rlTov, kxi xttX*) tt^o^osAJ), ue-ri^ iKMVt^^ iri^xXXove-xv, KXI OV ^<« KxlxTKiV/S^' 
 TTxS'itTiKov ii, 01071 y.ZTx TVT^fov KXi ovK. xtr^YiiiXTt/ltii; yiyvcfTKfi. tK^.v)^)) o£ (f>x)frx!rix, htOVH (pXYC 
 T«r«s6 T<f cvTx' ^xvTxG-tti yx^ iffXiVf » T»v (pxviDTCiV c^ttTt?. irTJie-j yxf tf IcfjTr, T« i^o) d>xyiv- 
 
 TX. 
 
 * Lib. I. cap. 1. Metp.phyf. Lib. de Memoria et R.erninifcentia, cap. i. 
 ?}- Pag. 388» editio Fjciiii.
 
 Chap.V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 97 
 
 be painted ; and the repofitory of them, I call the imagination. And I may- 
 quote Ariftotle againft himlelf from his book concerning memory ; (or 
 he there fays, that memory necefTarily implies a fenfe of time, and what 
 is/r/? and lajl : For, fa)s he, every body that remembers any thing, 
 fays to himfelf, * I knew this before.' Now, brutes have no idea of 
 time^ or of/r/? and lajl^. And it is certain, that they have nut ton- 
 fcioufnefs or rejle&ion^ by which only they can review their own 
 operations. At the fame time, it mufl; be admitted, that the ima- 
 gination, in the brute, ferves the purpofe of memory in us; for, 
 whenever he fees the objedl that is painted in \\\% phantafta^ he knows i: 
 again, but without any perception of the time when he firfl faw it. I 
 incline, therefore, to think, that memory belongs only to the rational na- 
 ture, as well as reminijcence^ which Arillotle acknowledges is peculiar 
 to man f, 
 
 N As 
 
 * See Ariftot. de Jnimay lib. 3. cap. 11. and Philoponus's commentary thereon. 
 
 t Lib. De Memoria, in fine. See alfo Michael Ephefius's commentary upon this 
 work of Ariftotle, where, though he does not deny that the brutes have memory, he 
 makes a diftincflicn betwixt their memory and the memory of man, which I confefs 
 I do not underftand : But I think it is evident, from the account he givi^s of memory, 
 in his introdudlion to his commentary, that it is impoifible that the brutes can have 
 it: For he fays, that memory is nothing e!fe but the operation of the phantajia pre- 
 fenting the image of the fenfible thing to the animal, with the addition, that, at fuch 
 a particular time, the objed was feen by the animal. Now, it is, I think, impoflible 
 that the brute can have that recolledtion, ?nd, therefore, upon him the power of the 
 phantafia can only operate in prefenting to him the objedl juft as he faw it at fii ft, with- 
 out any addition of time: And very often we recolK-£l things in the fame manner* 
 for, having feen a man once, and fo having a pidlure of him in the phantafia, I know 
 him again, but without recollc(Sling the time when I faw him. In fuch a cafe I 
 have only a notion of duration^ or ii7nc indefnitef as it is called by Philoponus ; but 
 none at all of time definite^ or meafured by the application of number to mot ion \ 
 number being that which defines every thing. And this definite time is only what is, 
 properly fpeaking, called time. See Ariftotle in his books De Coe!o, where he calls 
 time «gi5,t405 T})5 KivY.o-it'ii. Now, it is certain, that the brutes have no notion of this 
 kind of time, for this plain reafon, that they have no notion of number. Sec what 
 Philoponus has very well faid upon this fubjed in his commentary upon the loth and 
 
 nth
 
 98 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book 11. 
 
 As to that degree of reafon, or faculty of comparing their percep- 
 tions, which we fee in fonne brutes, I think it is not common to them 
 all, nor eflential to the fenfitive nature^ but peculiar to fome brutes of 
 the hlgheft order ; but, as it is common to all men, and is an effential 
 part of the conftltution of the human mindy I fliall fpeak of it in the 
 next chapter, in which I am to treat of that mind. 
 
 11th chapters of Ariftotle's 3d book De /inima. And here we may obfervethe dliFe- 
 rence betwixt the phantafia of the man and of the brute', for the phantafia of the 
 man has very often the recollection of time joined with it, whereas the brute has no 
 idea of timey but only a fimple perception of the identity of the objecl:, which he at- 
 tains by comparing the obje£l of fenfe now perceived by him with the image re- 
 tained iu his phantafia of the fame objeft formerly perceived. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 Chap. VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 99 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 The Importance, the Utility, and the Comprehenfivenefs of the Phihjo- 
 phy of Mind — The certainty of that Philofophy — The ivonJer- 
 
 ful Chain in Nature by luhich the feveral Minds ar£ connecied to^e- 
 ther — The Human Mind begins ivhere that of the Brute leagues off, 
 the comparati've Faculty — This the foundation of the InleUecluai 
 Mind — By it Ideas are formed — Progrefs of that Formation — Ideas, a 
 
 fimple Perception of the Intcllefl — But complex Perception nece/Jary 
 
 The Nature of it, and of the Dlfcurfus Mentis — The Conclujton of 
 that Procefs, either Science or Opinion — Difference betuuixt the 
 tivo — The loft Operation of the Intelleci, that by ivhich it recogni^ 
 
 fes itfelf 
 
 TH E knowledge of the human mind is of the greatefl: impor- 
 tance in philofcphy ; for, if we know it, we muft of neceflity 
 know inferior minds, the powers of which are all contained in the 
 human : Nor can we attain to any knowledge oi fuperior, but by fomc 
 analogy or refemblance, which we may fuppofe they have to the high- 
 er faculties of our ?mnds : So that the ftudy of the human mind is, 
 of neceffity, previous to the Hudy of the higheft part of philofophy ; 
 I mean theology. It is a ftudy too of as great concern to us, as it is 
 of importance ; for, what can be of greater concern to wan than the 
 knowledge of himielf ? And the certainty of it is as great as the im- 
 portance and utility of it : For the knowledge of our mitids proceeds 
 from the mod certain caufc of knowledge, confcioifnefs \ by means of 
 which, our knowledge of mind is much more intimate, and much 
 more latisfadory to a philofophical inquirer, than our knowledge of 
 body. But, certain as the fcience is, it is not without its difficulties, 
 and therefore it requires much attention and accurate obfervation ; 
 nor can we expert, afier all, to have a perfect knowledge of the cf- 
 fence, even of our own minds ^ any more than of any other thing in 
 
 N 2 « nature]
 
 lOO ANTTENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 nature; thoui^jh I think, by the intimate knowledge we attain of its 
 operations, we may come much nearer to the knowledge of its eflence 
 than of that ot body. 
 
 The dncHirine of ui'ind Is no lefs comprehenfive than it is ufeful and 
 in-.portant. For, as rnmd is the caufe of all iJiotioriy whatever is moved, 
 that is, the whole miiverfe, and all the various 7?ioving principles we 
 fee in it, belong to the philofophy of nmid. Thefe principles are fo 
 conneded together, as well as every thing elfe in nature, that it is im- 
 poiTiMe to underftand perfedly one kind of them without knowing 
 likewife the other. 
 
 That mtndt which pervades and animates the whole univerfe, and 
 is the principle of that motion which is eflential to all phyfical bodies, 
 is the foundation, as we have feen, of all kinds of life, the 'vegetable^ 
 the animal, and the rational. In like manner, the vegetable is the foun- 
 dation of the animal, and the animal agsan of the ratiotial. So that there 
 is no void in this part of nature, any more than in the corporeal; but e- 
 very kind of life is infeparably connected with another, all hanging to- 
 gether in one indifToluble chain, and each fupporting, or fupport- 
 ed by the other. The confequence of which is, that, what is 
 moft perfed of ?nind embodied, muft neceffarily be joined with 
 what is moft imperfeift. And they are fo neceffarily depending 
 one upon another, that what is moft perfed in the lower order 
 of mifids, is moft imperfed in the order immediately above; 
 but, at the fame lime, is the foundation of its greateft per- 
 fedion. For example, what I obferved to be the greateft perfedion 
 of the brute nature, and which brought it the neareft to humanity, 
 namelv, the faculty of comparing its peiceptions, is the loweft of the 
 intelletlual mind ; but, at the fame time, that, without which, it could 
 not perform its energies, nor be what it is, as 1 fhall preiently Ihow. 
 
 The rntional, or, to fpeak more properly, the intelleBiial life, being, 
 si& 1 obici ved, no more than a fuperftrudure upon the animal-, as I 
 
 concluded
 
 Chap. VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. loi 
 
 concluded my account of that life with this faculty of comparifon^ fo 
 with it I will begin the account I am now to give of the human mind. 
 
 That the brutes poflefs this comparative faculty, at Icaft in a certain 
 degree, is, I think, evident; for they compare their perce[)tions, are 
 often doubtful, and deliberate, and then a6t in conlequence of a deter- 
 mination upon one fide or other ; which we may call an opinion that 
 they have formed *. And here the mind of the brute adis by 
 itfelf, without the affiftance of the hody^ or its organs ; for, it is 
 certainly not the/?«/^, nor even the phmitajia^ that compares, though 
 they furnifh the materials for the compariibn, upon which the mind 
 ads, as the ftatuary does upon the block of marble. 
 
 It was for this reafon, that the antient philofophers, and par- 
 ticularly the Pythagoreans, did not deny reafon to the brute ; 
 becaufe reafon, according to them, confifted in that faculty of 
 compariibn, which, as we have feen, the brutes pofTefs; But, 
 it is to be obferved of thefe comparifons made by the brutes, that they 
 are only of the perceptions of fenfe, either immediately and diredly 
 from the fenfe, or prelerved in \\\q phantajia, hn<\, fecondlyy the brute 
 makes thefe comparifons, only when he is incited by fome bodily ap- 
 petite, 
 
 * Ariftotle, in the nth chapter of his 3d book de Jnima, feems to apply the word 
 J#|as, or opinion^ tx> the brutes ; for he diftinguiflies betwixt opinion formed from fylio- 
 gifm, which is the opinion of intelleEl^ and belongs only to man^ and that which is 
 without fyllogifm. And his Commentator Simplicius, ia his note upon this pafTage, 
 page 87. fays, that Jamblichus maintained that ^«^4«, taken in the mofl: general fenfe, 
 applied to the determination of the mind of the brute; and that he made the fame 
 diftindlion exprefsly which 1 have faid Ariftotle feems to have made. 
 
 Though 1 have faid abuvt;, that the brute delihenitcs, that is true only in one fenfe; for, 
 haying no idea oi gojd^ nor foreftcing con'equ.nces, he never deliberates, whether he 
 fhould yield or not to any inipulie from ajipetite, if there be but one impulfe; but, if 
 there be two diflercnt impulfes, he mull of necifluy delibeiate, which of them hi Oiall 
 follow: "Whereas, man h.'v:ng the iAca oi good, nnd forel.cing conlequences, delibe- 
 rates in evejy cafe, whexe th re is but one impulfe from appetite, as well as where 
 there are m.my ; and therefore, I think, man may be called a deliberating animal, in ton- 
 tradiftinftion tc the brute, who deliberates but feldom, and on particular occaHons. — 
 But this fhall be more fully explained afterwards.
 
 102 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Bookll. 
 
 petite, or by fome infl:in£tive paiHon, either for his offspring, or the 
 herd to which he belongs : And, the only ufe he makes of this com- 
 paraiive faculty, is for the prefervation of the individual, and the con- 
 tinuation of the fpecies. And, had mankind been intended for no 
 other purpofe, this kind of ratiocination would have been fufficient for 
 him. But man, by nature, was deftined for a nobler purpofe. He 
 is fet as a fpe£lator in this great theatre of the univerfe, where he is 
 to attend, not to the outward appearances of things only, and the ef- 
 feds they produce upon his fenfes, but to difcover their nature and 
 eflence ; — to admire the wonderful art and contrivance by which 
 they are put together, fo as to form one piece of amazing uniformity 
 and regularity, as well as variety; — to recognife his own and other 
 7?imdsy — and, by degrees, to rife to the contemplation of that Supreme 
 Mind, whofe infinite goodnefs, wifdom, and power, have produced 
 the wonderful fcene prefented to him. For this purpofe, it is necel- 
 fary that he fliould ad: from a nobler motive than the mere preferva- 
 tion of the individual, or propagation of the fpecies ; and that, not 
 contented with the perceptions of fenfe, he (hould form ideas of things, 
 by which only any knowledge is to be attained. Thefe ideas, as I 
 have faid, are the proper objeds of intelleSiy and the materials of all 
 our reafonings and opinions : So that, if the nature of them be well 
 explained, and the way in which they are formed, we fhall be able 
 pretty well to underftand the nature of this prime faculty of the hu- 
 man mindf which I call intellect. 
 
 In order to explain the operations of intclleci^ by which only its na- 
 ture can be difcovered, it is proper to obferve, that, as all our know- 
 ledge, in this ftate of our exKlcnce, comes originally from our fenfes, 
 it is of abfolute neceflity that the firfi: operation of our minds ihould 
 be upon the objeds of fenfe : Thefe we compare together, as other 
 animals do; and from thefe comparifons we draw conclufions, and 
 form what may be called opinions^ concerning what is ufeful, or what 
 is hurtful, in the oeconomy of the animal life. This is the only 
 .yfe of the rational faculty which children among us have for feveral 
 
 years
 
 Chap. VI. A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I C S. j 03 
 
 years of their life ; and the only uCe, whic1\ whole nations, or rather 
 herds of men, had for many generations before arts and civility were 
 introduced among them : But, as foon as that happened, the latent 
 powers of the human mind exerted themfelvcs, and the lutelleB began 
 to compare the perceptions of fenfe, in order to invcftigate the nature 
 of things, and, for that purpofe, to form ideas. 
 
 For explaining their nature, it will be proper to recolle<St what we 
 have faid before, That all fenfible or corporeal objecls are matter and 
 fonn joined together. Of thefe, the 7natter is not the proper objcd 
 of hitelkd^ but the form is ; which is fo congenial to intelle^y 
 that it was faid, by fome philofophers of old, whom Ariflotle com- 
 mends, to be the place, or region oi/ortns, or fpeciefes * ; and the pro- 
 per bufmefs of the human mind, in this its ftate of exiftence, and the 
 only way in which it can employ its fuperior faculties, and truly enjoy 
 itfelf, is, by inveliigating iht^Qforms^ and evolving them out of the 
 matter in which they are immerfed. 
 
 This is done, by comparing together the perceptions of fenfe, not 
 for the purpofe of animal life only, for that the brutes do as well as 
 we, and it is there, as I have faid, that the brute ends, and 7nan be- 
 gins ; but, in order to difcover the nature of thofe external things, 
 which operate upon the fenfes, and to find out ihdxform which con- 
 ftitutes xhtfitbjiance or ejjence of every one of them. 
 
 For this purpofe, the mind makes the review of its fenfations ; and the 
 way in which it proceeds is this ; As all our knowledge, in this flate, is 
 derived from the fenfes, we obferve,that not only different natural fub- 
 ftances affed; our fenfes differently, but alfo the fame fubftance. For 
 example, a rofe affeds our fenfes of fight, touch, and fmcll. Now, 
 that quality which affeds any one of our fenfes, fuch as the colour, 
 for example, we abflrad from the other qualities affeding the other 
 
 fenfes, 
 
 f Lib. 3. de ^nima, cap. 5.
 
 104 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book TL 
 
 fenfes, or the fame fenfe in a different way ; and we make it a fepa- 
 rate obj'"<5l of the contemplation of the mind ; and this abftra^lion, as 
 I have faid elfewhere *, is the firfl: operation of the human intelledt, 
 and peculiar to man . For the brute makes no fuch diftin£tion or fepa- 
 ration, and perceives the thing no otherways, than as it is prefented to 
 him by his lenfes, that is, with all its qualities taken together. This 
 quality, thus feledtd from the reft, we find likewife in other lub- 
 ftances ; and then we begin to generalize, which is the next 
 operation of the intellc£t after ahJliaciion\ and thus we form the 
 general notion or idea of this quality. In this manner, having 
 formed the idea of fcveral qualities, and finding thefe feveral qualities 
 united in one fubftance, we, from that union, charaderize that fub- 
 ftance ; and, finding the fame qualities united in other fubftances, we 
 again generalize, and form an idea of this fubltance f ; which idea is 
 no other than ihtjorm of the fubftance, as we conceive it. Rut it is 
 not, as I have elfewhere obferved, the real ejjential form of the thing, 
 but only a colledlion of fuch fenfible qualities of the thing, as we think 
 of the greateft: importance. 
 
 From the account I have given of this procefs of the mind, it is e- 
 vident, that not only the comparative faculty is necelfary, but alfo the 
 fhantafia^ without which we could not generalize, unlefs we were to 
 carry the objeds always about with us, and fet the one befide the o- 
 ther. And here again we fee, that the intelledual faculty is intimate- 
 ly connected with the animal faculties ; and that it is no more, as I 
 have faid, than a fuperftrudure upon the animal foundation. 
 
 Here we have found that objed of the intellect which I before 
 mentioned, and which is no other than the idea, or form, of any 
 thing, coUedted, as we have fceri, from many individuals. It is certain- 
 ly not an objcdl of fenfe, which perceives only the individual, but not 
 the general : Neither is it an objed of the pbantafta, in which, like- 
 wife' 
 
 '* Origin and Progrefs of Language, vol. i. page 60, edit. 2. 
 t Ibidem, page 67.
 
 Chap. VI. A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. 105 
 
 ^-wife there is nnjhing but individuals; for it is impoiTible that what 
 h common and general can be painted, or reprefented under any cor- 
 poreal form. And, as there only remains a third faculty by which 
 we perceive fingle things, viz. mtellcft, it mufl: be an objetl: of intel- 
 le(5l. 
 
 Were our minds of a fuperior nature, or were they not immerfed, 
 as they are, in matter^ this kind or perception would be fufficient for 
 us ; and we ihould fee all things at once, with all their confequences, 
 conncdions, and dependencies. Having, for example, apprehended 
 the idea, ox form, of any thing, we fhould at once, and in one view, 
 and without circuit or colledion, fee all its properties and qualities. 
 But this is denied to us in our prefent ftate; and, therefore, we are o- 
 bliged to proceed by the method of dedudion and interence. This 
 procefs of the mind is called in Greek ^<«v«,*, and in Latin dijcurfus 
 mentis, not improperly tranllated by Shakefpeare, difcourjc of reaJon\ 
 in fhort, it is what is commonly called reajoning. 
 
 In this procefs, the i7iind proceeds from ftep to ftep ; and each of 
 thefe fteps is what is called a propofition, by which two ideas, or at 
 leaft one idea and a particular thing are joined together, fo that the 
 one is predicated of the other. This wonderful procefs, not the lefs 
 wonderful for being fo common, has been explained by Ariftotle at 
 great length, in his books of Analytics, in which he has analyzed 
 human reajojiing with fo much accuracy and fubtility, tliat, if it be 
 really all his own, it is the greated difcovery in fciencc tha' ever was 
 made by one mortal man : — But it is the conclufion of rcafoning with 
 which we are at preient concerned. 
 
 This conclufion is Q.\i\\Q\' fcience or opinion^ \ For underftanding rhc 
 
 O diffe- 
 
 * See Plato in the Sophiftn, Avherc he fays, that J*^« is «TeTt>i£vr»9-K t^j t^-^-
 
 io6 A N T X E N T METAPHYSICS. Book. 11. 
 
 difFerence betwixt thefe two, it Is proper to obferve, that all things 
 exifting are either of neceffary exigence, and are always invariably 
 the fame, without change or alteration ; or they are contingents^ which 
 are continually changing. Of this kind are all things that are gene- 
 rated, and, by confequence, corrupted ; lb that they are in a condant 
 flux and viciffitude of corruption and generation. This is the nature 
 of all individual things in this fublunary world : Whereas we conceive 
 celeftlal things, immaterial fubftances, ideas, and the truths refultlng 
 from them, to be eternal and immutable. Of this laft kind are the 
 fubjecls of fcience. And, if we reafon of thefe fubjeds properly, and 
 in fuch a manner as to deduce things from their caufes, then is \\. fci- 
 ence. But, if our conclufion is drawn from premlfes which do not 
 infer it, or, If we believe it to be true, withoat perceiving the caufe 
 why it is fo, then it is no more than opinion^ though it may be true ; 
 for opinion is either true or falfe ; whereas, in Jc'icnce^ there is no 
 error. 
 
 The reafoning, therefore, upon fubjeds of this kind, may conclude 
 either mfcieiice or opinion : But, if the reafoning be upon fubjeds of 
 the other kind, 'viz. fubjeds mutable and perifhable, fuch as all indi- 
 vidual things are, then the conclufion can be nothing more than opi- 
 nion, which may be true or falfe as It happens, but can never be de- 
 monftrative, nor any thing more than probable *. 
 
 1 he 
 
 * This is the account giv^eii of the difference betwixt le^x an J iTnt-ryifiyi by Simp)i- 
 cius, in his commentary upon the 4th chap, cf Ariftotle, lib. 3. De JnimUy pag. 58. 
 of the commentary, where he defines ^o^ec» to be tdv vi^t tx i»'^tx»f*i^» y-c^i ctxx»g ly^ar 
 
 i7roXr,-^ii. x.tn 5r£g< ru, aLVxyx-snx xviv tjjj utriui TrmliVm tviff-rrifivt* os t^v ottrixg^ kxi rav tnei uircfj- 
 
 T«j i^oiruv XiyiKijt ««iiA<|<)'. ycfn o£ tjj» «5g»«v Kttt xut^ie-Tov tm* c^uf Hv^ixv ; where it may 
 be obferved, that he makes the voyj to be only the perception of fimple terms : But, as 
 I know no other faculty of the mind by which we perceive the connedion of the 
 terms combined, either axioms, or propofitions of any kind, I have extended ths ufe 
 of the word to the perceptiqn likewife of complex terms.
 
 Chap. Vr. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 107 
 
 The laft operation of the human intelled that I fhall obferve, Is that 
 by which, abftrading Itfelf from all outward things, it turns, as it 
 were, upon itfelf, and makes itfelf its own objed ; or, as it may be ex- 
 prefled in one word, refieSis, This is the great operation of intelledl, 
 by which, more than by any thing elfe, we are diftinguiflied from the 
 brute, and of which, therefore, 1 fhall have occafion in the fequel to 
 fay a great deal more. 
 
 O 2 CHAP.
 
 loS ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 CHAP. VU. 
 
 PhiJofoPhy of the Human Mind founded upon the preceding Hijiory of 
 if — Smgle and complex Apprehenfio7i—Co?nhination of Propofitions^or 
 Syliogifm — DiJIin^ion hetivixt the Operations of the Mind upon Sub-^ 
 
 jecls ivithout the Mind and 'U'ithin it — Di/ltnSfionberwixt the Gno- 
 ftic and Oreaic Faculties of the Mind — This Diflinclion not properly 
 
 fluted by the Commentators upon Ariflotle — Only tivo Gnojlic Facul- 
 ties, Senfe and Intelled — Different meanings of the ivord ^cwk — 
 Ihe Mind AOiWe as ivell as Paffive in Perceptions of Senje — The Per- 
 ceptions of the ObjeSls of Senfe, by the means of the Phantafia — Of 
 InteHeSl — // percei'ves Ideas either ftngle, or in combination — Of 
 Reafoning — Science and Opinion — Explication of all the different 
 Words ujed upon the SubjeSl of Mind — Of the Operation of Intellect in 
 Abftradion. 
 
 IN the preceding chapter, I have only delivered a plain hlftory of 
 the operations of the human mind, which I propofe to make the 
 ground-work of the philofophy of it, which is to be the fubjed of 
 this chapter. 
 
 And I begin with the dinin£lion with Vx^hich Ariftotle begins his 
 lo"-ical works, 'viz. the diftindion betwixt fingle apprehenftons and com- 
 plex^ \ a dilVmclion, which is evident from the account above given 
 of the operations of the human mind. By fmgle apprehenfon, I 
 me.m the apprehe^ifion of a fingle thing ; by complex apprehenfion, I 
 mean the apprehenfion of things in combination ; that is, when they 
 
 are 
 
 * Twv >iiyo4tevft;v, Toe, f^ni tcotru, <rvit7rX»Ki)j> AlyeT«(, rx '.I kvcj o-jtiTrXonm. Tct ^iv e-jv aecToc 
 
 iiKf. Categoiiae, cap. 2.
 
 Chap. VII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 109 
 
 are joined together in propofitlons, and the one predicated, that is, 
 affirmed or denied, of the other. Of the firft kind are all the percep- 
 tions of fenfe ; and it is in this way alfo that the mind perceives ideas • 
 for, though ideas, as we have leen, are collecled Iroin the many^ yet 
 is every idea but one fmgle thing, and mull be apprehended at once 
 by the mind, by one fingle individual a6l, or not at all, in the fame 
 way as the objeds of fenfe are apprehended by the fenfe. l^he other 
 kind of apprehenfion, is that by which the mind, perceiving two things 
 at once, perceives alfo their connections. The operation of this facul- 
 ty of the mind is exprefled in Greek by the word i-^icm^'h, which de- 
 notes the apprehenfion the mind has of the truth of any propofition. 
 By the fame faculty is performed that more complex operation of the 
 mind, by which it perceives not only connexion oi ideas ^ but oi pro- 
 pofitions^ that is, combinations of ideas. And this laft operation of the 
 mind is, what is called fyllogifm or coUeSIion^ by which propofitions 
 are collecfled by the mind in fuch a way, that, by their means, it per- 
 ceives the truth of a propofition different from any of them *. 
 
 Another dlflindion, of great importance in this matter, is betwixt 
 the operations of ;?/zW, when it is employed upon fubjecls that have 
 exifience without it, and, when it is employed upon things. that have 
 no exigence but within itfelf. Of the firif kind cS fubjeds are all the 
 objeds of fcdfe, whether immediately brought into tlie niind 
 by the perceptions o^ fenfd^ or prefervcd in it by tlie nicans of the 
 phaiitafia. Of the other kind are, firfl, our ideas^ v;hich have certain- 
 
 ly 
 
 * This is Arifloile's dtfinition of a fyllogifm : (T'j>.>.oy c-iitx, ttrn } tyaf »» '« Ttiit^uv t<- 
 vuv 'iTffOV ri Tifj KHUivvv s? oroetytcni trt,u?«(»« rni rccjTx u*ui. And he adds, by Way of cx- 
 p.nnatio!!, Afv*" ^^ ''■^ txvtx «i«/, to Om iuvtm a-vfi'oXive^i. re o't oix Txurx s-vft^xttuf, re 
 fir.h'-'oi froA^'.v c.;yo'j v^ixrlitv jrgo? to ylia-^Xi to uvxyy.uicv i whcrC WC mny obfcFVC, that A- 
 
 rillotle rri?,kt;s ryllogifm a fpcciis of the ;i«ye5 ; hy which word, as 1 have clfcw here 
 oburved, the Greeks denoted comparijon of every k:nd And, accordingly, it is e- 
 TiiifPt, that fyllogifm, and -very operation of intelkdl, is founded, as I have faid., 
 upon our faeuhy of comparilbn.
 
 no ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book 11. 
 
 ly no exiftence in the vifible world (for all things there are individu- 
 als) and, according to the philofophy of Ariftotle, have no exiftence at 
 all, except in inhid. And, fecondly, our oivn minds ; and, from our oivn 
 7nmdsy by analogy and comparifon, we form ideas of other minds^ 
 which are objeds without us, but of a different kind from the objects 
 before mentioned, 'uiz. objeds oifenfe. 
 
 I come now to a divifion of the powers of the human mind, made 
 by Ariftotle's commentators of the Alexandrian fchool, particularly 
 by Philoponus, in his introdudion to his commentary upon Ariftotle's 
 books, De Anima. It Is, I think, of great importance, and will lead 
 us, if rightly undcrftood, more than any other, into a full and com- 
 prehenfive knowledge of the human mind. The divifion I mean, is 
 into Gnod'ic and Oreclic. By the firft we know and perceive ; and, by 
 the fecond, we defire or incline; under which I include alfo averfion ; 
 for averfion is the defire of the ab fence of any thing. Under the firft 
 of thefe, Philoponus reckons five powers of the mind, viz. fenfe, phan- 
 tafia, opinion, a<«v*/«, or difcourfe of reaj'on, as it may be tranflated, and 
 N«v?, or intelkcl. Now, this divifion is, I think, in one refpedt, defec- 
 tive, and, in another, it is much too full ; for, if it be confidered as 
 an enumeration of all the powers and faculties of the miiid, there are 
 two wanting, namely, rnemory^ which, as I have faid, is the repofi- 
 tory of ideas ; 2cc\^^ fecondly ^ it<5-1))^«, oxfcience^ by which the mind makes 
 fcientific or demonftrative conclufions of reafon. Again, if it be con- 
 fidered as a divifion only of \k\^ gnofic powers of the mind, and as 
 fuch only Philoponus has given it us, it is much too fall ; for the p7/^- 
 fi'ic powers, or powers of perception, are only two ; — that by which 
 we perceive the obje£ts of fenfe, whether prefent, through the opera- 
 tion of them upon our organs^ or abfent, by the means of the phan- 
 tafia ; and with this faculty of perceiving thofe objeds, I join the fa- 
 culty of comparing them, in the manner above mentioned ; — and that 
 by which wc apprehend ideas, either fingle or in combination, in the 
 
 manner
 
 Chap. VII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. in 
 
 manner that I have explained above. The firfl: of thefc is common 
 to us with the brutes, the fecond is peculiar to us. 
 
 This diftindion is as real as the diitindion hetw'ixi general and pc:r^ 
 tkuhir^ or betwixt the idea and the individual objed ; or, in other 
 words, betwixt what really exifls, and what has only an exifiencc in 
 the mind. And, that it is a full and compleat divifion, is evident 
 from this, that every thing in nature is either part'uidar or fr^ncral' 
 and there are no objeds with which the mind can be convcrfant, ex- 
 cept either objeds of fenfe, or objeds of intelled. Faculties, therefore, 
 that are exercifed upon objeds fo different, ought to be confidercd as 
 different faculties : And, accordingly, we fmd that the faculty which 
 operates upon particular objeds, whether fingle or compared together, 
 is common to us with the brutes ; whereas, the faculty which operates 
 upon generals^ whether fmgle, or in combination, is peculiar ta 
 man. 
 
 The firfl kind of perception I mentioned, of particular objeds when 
 prefent, is well known by the name of fenje ov fen/at ion y as I would 
 chufe to call it ; for the viovd fenfe , I obferve, is ufed in different figni- 
 fications ; denoting, either the organ of fenfe, the impreflion which 
 bjdies make upon that organ, the adual perception of the mind ari- 
 fing from that imprefTion, which is what I chufe to diftinguiih by the 
 name of fen/ation ; and, laftly, the power or faculty which the 
 mind has to perceive in that way. And this is the meaning in which 
 I ufe the word fen/e. And I think it is of great advantage, in 
 matters of philofophical inquiry, to ule terms that are not ambiguous-, 
 and to diflinguifh by ivords things that are, in their natures^ dilUnd, 
 as the four things I have juff now mentioned certainly are : For, that 
 the organ of fenfe is different from the impreflion made upon it, bv 
 external objeds, no body can doubt ; and, to the philofopher it is as 
 evident that there is a difference betwixt the imprefhon of the objod 
 upon the organ, and the perception of the mind j for it often happens, 
 
 that
 
 2 12 ANT I EN T METAPHYSICS. Book 11. 
 
 that the imprelTiori made upon the organ does, not reach to the mind ; 
 fo that, ' feeing ive fee^ and do not percei'ue ;' which convinces me that 
 there is fomething more than mere paffivity in the perception of ob- 
 je6ls of fenfe, and that the mind acts as well as fijfdrs ; though the 
 one follows tlie other fo inf^antaneoully, that it is only the philofopher 
 that can m,;ke the ciiRindion : And, in general, it appears to me, that 
 all xht gnojlic^ o\' perceptive powers of the mind, mul^, of neceihty, be 
 adive ; for, to knoiv, or io perceive, is to aS't ; and the only ditFerence 
 that, in this refpcdt, can be betwixt tiicm, is, that fome of them, muft 
 be roufed to aclion, by external impreffionsnK.de upon the nnnd, or, 
 in other words, that the mind mudjuffer before it ads ; whereas, o- 
 thers of them ac} without any (uch Ji/ferings. And, lajl/y, the Jeftfa- 
 tion-t or adual perception of tiie objed, and the faculty oi perception, 
 or \.\\efenfe^ as 1 chufe to call it, are as different as pozutr and adUality'^ 
 or l^Jfocu^i^ an.d sv:§y««, as the Greek philofophcrs expreis it. 
 
 The other kind of particular objeds, which, I faid, was perceived 
 in this way, is the images of fenfible things preierved in ([\q phantafta : 
 And it is to be cbferved, that there is here, too, a great confufion of 
 language ; for there are here three things to be diitinguilhed ; Jirji^ 
 The repofitory, as it may be called, of inch images ; 2r//y, The faculty 
 the mind has of perceiving them ; and, InJIly^ The ad of perception. 
 Now, for all thefe three, 1 know but one word, even in Greek, and 
 that is, phantafia. And yet it is evident that, in analyzing the opera- 
 tions of the mind, thefe three muft carefully be diftinguilhed, other- 
 ways we fhall ntver be able fufficiently to dilUnguifh, in this matter, 
 the man from the brute ; for, as to the phantafia itfelf, and the paint- 
 ing of the images there, to ufe Plato's metaphor, I. do not know that 
 there is any great difference betwixt us and the more perfedf brute 
 animals. But, as to the faculty of perceiving thcle images, and the 
 adual perception of them, there is a great difference; for the brute 
 never perceives any of thefe images, unlefs prompted by fome bodily 
 
 appetite.
 
 €hap. VII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 113 
 
 appetite, or propenfity, neceflary, either for the prefervatlon of the 
 individual, or of the fpecies ; whereas, the human mind can, without 
 any fuch prompter, and felf-moved, coiijure up thofe forms, or phan- 
 toms, as they may be called, in the imagination, and join or disjoin 
 them, vary, and put them together, as it thinks proper. In this 
 way, a man makes of his imagination a kind of magic Ian- 
 thorn, in which he exhibits to himfelf pidures of all kinds, beau- 
 tiful and pleafant, or ugly and frightful. This, in our dreams, makes 
 *wild ivorky as Milton fays *; but, when we are awake, it produces 
 all the fine arts of imitation and defign, which make the delight 
 of human life. But, however fanciful and various thofe pidures may 
 l)e, the materials of them are always taken from fenfe ; for the warm- 
 €ft imagination of the poet can create none new. The maxim of the 
 fclioolmen, therefore, that nihil eft in intelkciu, quod non fuit in fenfu^ 
 though it be not true of intelled, is certainly true of the phantafia. 
 
 The next thing I obferve, concerning the operations of the mind 
 upon particular objeds, is the comparing them together, either as they 
 are perceived by the fenfe, or reprefented by the imagination. This 
 faculty, as I have obferved, is common to us with the better kind of 
 brutes ; but there is but one name, even in Greek, both for the facuU 
 (y, and the act of comparing, viz. Aoye?, which, as I have faid, the 
 Greek philofophcrs apply even to brutes t* And, as we have no other 
 word to exprefs /oyaj but reafon^ I hope it will not give offence, if I 
 fliould fay that thefe brutes have reafouy at leaft, in fome degree. But 
 there is no word at all in Englifh to exprefs the conclufion of that 
 comparifon or deliberation among the brutes, which is a determina- 
 tion to ad in one way or another : Nor do I know that there is any 
 v;ord for it in Greek, at leaft in common ufe, (for fome philofo- 
 phcrs, as I have obferved before, give it the name of ^4*,) ex- 
 
 P cept 
 
 * PaTadife Loft, Book 5. v. H2. 
 
 t See Porphyry, in his work, Be Ahjiincntia. See alfo Ariftotle, lib. 2. Di AnU 
 ma, cap. 3. in fine.
 
 114 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 cept it be i^f*^ : Neither does that exadly exprefs it ; for it only 
 denotes that impulfe of the mind, which is confequent upon it, and 
 immediately precedes the adl:, and is not peculiar to brutes, but is^ 
 common to man with other animals *. 
 
 Thefe are all the operations of the human mind which fall under 
 the firft clafs of its gnoftic powers, viz. the faculty of perceiving par- 
 ticular ohjeds, whether fmgle or in combination ; and i come now to 
 fpeak of that higher gnoftic faculty, by which it perceives generals^ 
 either fingly, each by itfelf, or combined together in proportions. This 
 faculty, in Greek, is called -s^oti-, and, in Euglilh, inteikB, By this fa- 
 cultVi it is admitted, by all philofophers who have reafoned to any 
 purpofe upon the fubjedt of mind^ that we perceive fingle ideas ; and, in 
 the fame manner, that we perceive external objeds by the fenfes ; that 
 is, at once, by one fingle individual a£l ; or, as the Greek philofophers ex- 
 prefsit, ftice. £7ri?«Av,. It isalfo admitted, by all thefe philofophers, that it is by 
 the intelledl we perceive the truth of felt-evident propofitions : So that 
 this kind, at leaft, of complex apprehenfion, is the operation of this 
 faculty : And, for the fame reafon, 1 think, it muft be admitted, that 
 the perception of the truth of any propofition, however we attain to 
 that perception, is the z.€i of the intellect, and is as much one fingle 
 individual acft, as the apprehenfion of a fingle idea. The only que- 
 
 ftiouy 
 
 * The diftinction that I here make betwixt ^oyof, or reafon, and Nouj, or intellecf, 
 one of which, I iav, is cominon to man and brute, the other peculiar to man, will 
 r,o doubt appear to many readers new and ftrange ; but it is not any difcovery of minej 
 being to be found, as every thing elfe of any value in this work is, in the writings of 
 the antient phili fophers, particularly, in a mod valuable piece of Pythagorean phi ofo» 
 phy, Hierocles in Aurca Cdrmina^ ^^///o Needham, p. iCo. where he fays, that the 
 -Xoyti or -^vxYt ;i<>v;v.*i, holds the middle place betwixt the irrational, that is, the lowed 
 f^rt of our nature, and intellea, which is the higheft. This i-s juit where 1 have 
 placed it ; for the fenfes and phantafia are^the irrational part ot our nature, being alto- 
 gether incapable of comparifon, in which the effence of reafon confifts. Now, I have 
 fct above them the rational faculty, and above it the intellea : As. tht-rcfore, the 
 antients diflingu (bed in this m.anner, it cannot be wondered, that, to the better forts 
 of brute, th( y gave that faculty, which is next to the high^ ft firulty in man, though, 
 as we have feen, very different from it, and, by many degrees, lefs excellent.
 
 Chap.VIL ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 115 
 
 ftion, then, remaining, is, Whether the hxv.t^, the a^^*, and the £r*=^»;^=, 
 be,as Philoponus fuppoies, faculties different from the n»v», ovintellecf. 
 Now, I fay, they are all three only different operations of the intel^ 
 lecl : The l^x^otx, as 1 have already faid, is no more than the di/- 
 courfe of the intellect, by which it pafies from one thing to another, 
 as the etymology of the word in Greek imports *, in order to difcover 
 the connedtion of two ideas, which otherwife it could not difcover ; 
 or, in other words, it is in order to prove a propofition that is not felf- 
 evident. The refult of this operation of the intellect is, as I have al- 
 ready obfervedf^ either J.|«, or ezT<«ri«^»,, that \$^ opinion^ or Jcierice, ac- 
 cording to the nature of the fubjed, or the manner in which the in- 
 -quiry has been conduded. 
 
 And thus, I think, I have proved, that there are but two gnojlic 
 •poiiJers in the human mind; the one by vfh'ich particular things, that 
 is> objeds of/enje^ are perceived ; the other by which generals, or z- 
 deas. are perceived, inftead of five that Philoponus makes them. And 
 I think I have fhown, that the other three are only different manners 
 of operating of the two I have allowed, not different powers. I can, 
 however, very eafily excufe the miftake that Philoponus has fallen 
 into, when I confider the promifcur.us, and, I may fay, inaccurate, 
 ufe of words by Ariftotle himfelf upon this fubjed : Particularly, as 
 his commentator Simplicius has obferved J, he has confounded Nov? 
 
 P 2 aad 
 
 ■* Philoponus gives another derivation of the word lixvoiec^ which is certainly not 
 grammatical ; nor do I think it is fo agreeable to the nature of the thing j for he de- 
 rives it from 5~*«"v«, fifrnifying, to perfe^l or accompli/hi whereas the hccvetx is only 
 a rfiearch or inveftigitioii, where the mind pafles from one thing to another; and 
 it is only tlie conciufion of it, that is, i-pnt/ltiftn, or lo^x, which can be called perftHion, 
 or accomplijhment. His derivation of pluntaHa, above given, is more agreeable to the 
 naiuie oi the thing, bur as ungranimatical ; for the true derivation is given us by Ari- 
 ftotle himfelf, who hy^ it is fiom <?«»?, or ;ts derivative, <?.-.*>«» j b) winch, he lays, this 
 way of perceiving things is compared to the clearelt and molt evident of our fenies, viz. 
 Jeeing- Lib 2 P,e /4nima, cap. 4. in fine 
 
 f Pages 1 01;. lOi'i. 
 
 X In his Commentary upon the third book, Dc Jnimaf page 8 a.
 
 ii6 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book n. 
 
 and httvcixt and yo»^6ui and 5i«».«^:?«; ; but, from what I have fald, I hope 
 the meaning of all the terms upon this fubjed is fufficiently diftin- 
 
 gulfhed, fuch as «<7.^««r<f, (Pxvtxficc, N«yj, vv*?^r>^it, ^txvoix, h^x, and tTTitrliifi^. A& 
 
 to the terms jufl: now mentioned, vBdtri^xt and lixvoetf^xt, there can be no 
 difficulty in underftanding them, if we know what Nov? and ^,«t-w» are : 
 As little in underftanding what v«,j5-<,-, P(»i1#s, 5'««vov)t«, ^o|xe-1«,and t^iFinrx', for all 
 thefe words, by the analogy of the Greek language, have a determi- 
 ned fignlfication in reference to the verb from which thjy are derived ; 
 the firft, for example, fignifylng the adion of the verb, the reft de- 
 noting the fubjeds of that adion : And it is only to be obferved with 
 refped to vc-yirx, or the fubjeds of intelled, that they are of two kinds, 
 the one, material things, as they exift in nature ; but which, by the 
 operation of the mmd, that we call abflra^iotiy {upca^tTi-,, in the lan- 
 guage of Ariftotle), are made objeds of the intelled. Of this kind 
 are all mathematical entitles, and indeed almoft all the fubjeds of 
 fcience- The other kind of vcvtrx are immaterial fubftances, which ex.- 
 ift feparately from all matter, and therefore have no need to be ab- 
 ftraded from it by fo artificial an operation of our mind : For it may 
 be obferved, that though thefe abjira5led beings are not, as I have al- 
 ready obferved *, what the fchoolmen call entia raiionis^, yet they have 
 not the fame real exiftence that either corporeal or incorporeal fub- 
 ftances have. 
 
 The abftradlon by which we form thofe notions, Is another opera- 
 tion of the human mtelleH^ which deferves our particular attention ; 
 for it is, as I have fliown, the foundation ot all the other operations ; 
 becaufe it b by it that intelled creates, as it were, fubjeds for itfelf, 
 and the firft fubjeds upon which it operates ; for the other kind of vo>,- 
 T^., that Is, immaterial fubftances, come not to be the objeds of intel- 
 le^l, till it has been for a long time exercifed upon the ideas of nb- 
 firaBion : And, though imititig be no doubt, as Ariftotle has obferved, 
 the great work of intelle8-\, yet it Is evident, from what Ijiave: 
 
 faid 
 
 * I'age 53. 
 
 t Orig. and Prog, of Lang. vol. i. book i. cap. 6. p. 61. edit. 2.
 
 Chap. Vir. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 117 
 
 fald above, that feparation is the firft acl of intelle5l^ without which 
 it could not have objeds Upon which to operate. 
 
 There Is an ohfervation of Simphcius * upon the fubjeift of abilrac- 
 tion, which I think well worth taking notice of, as it fbiows, more 
 than any thing, that it is the Oi^eration of the highefl: faculty of our 
 mind. He fays, that t-hoie ideas of the qualities of bodies^ which w^e 
 abftradt from the bodies^ are correded and improved by the iniclk^^ 
 and made more perfect than they exift in the bodies. Thus, there is 
 not in nature a perfecS): circle, or a perfedt fphere, nor any other ma- 
 thematical figure, fo perfect as it is conceived by the mind. The fame, 
 I think, may be faid of m.oral qualities: For there is not exifting, 
 neither a perfect good man, fuch as we can conceive, nor, I believe, 
 a perfedl villain +, 
 
 Thus, I have fhown, that there are in the human mind but two 
 gnoftic poiverSi viz. fenfe and intelkft ; — that the brutes have JcTife as 
 well as we ; — and that they preferve in their phantafia the perceptions 
 oi fenfe ^ as well as we do :— Further, that they compare together the 
 perceptions oi fenfe ^ and therefore, may be faid, in fome degree, to rea- 
 fon ; — That, as the objeds of intelleSl are quite different from the 
 objeds of fenfc^ fo the faculty itfelf is altogether different, and is the 
 
 great' 
 
 * In his commentary upon the 3d book dc y^nlmay fol. 65. 
 
 t Here we may fee the origin of that ideal beauty, of which painters and ftatuaries 
 fpeak fo much, and which, they acknowledge, is the perfc£lion of their art : For, it is 
 no other than ideas of beauty, taken from forms adlually exiiting, but correclcd and 
 improved by the intellect ; fo that they become foniething tranfccncLiut^ and beyond 
 nature, though not unnatural, becaufe they are nature made more perfedl. And the 
 fame> I think, may be faid of all the works of art, in which there is nothing perfcdV, 
 but what is more beautiful than any thing to be fcen in nature: For, though the in- 
 dividual objects may be exa^lily copied from nature, yet, there muft be an arrange- 
 ment and difpofition given to them, fuch as is not to be found in nature, othcrwifc 
 the piece will not be fine, and, indeed, will not deferve the name of a piece of art, 
 from which it will be as different as a portrait is from a pidure.
 
 ii8 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IL 
 
 great prerogative of the human mind^ denied to the brute: — That the 
 Jirji operation of this faculty is ahJlraBion^ by which it forms its pro- 
 per obje<St, VIZ ideas; — the /econd is that by which it apprehends thofe 
 ideas, whether fingle, or joined together in propofitions ; — and the 
 third and /aji, is the dijciirfus mentis^ or ?)«»«<«, as it is called in Greek, 
 by which it inveftigates and difcovers the connection of ideas, that it 
 could not at once difcover; and the conclufion of this laft operation 
 is, as I have (hown, either /ww^:^ or opinion. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 Chap. VIII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. n 
 
 CHAP. VIIL 
 
 Continuation oj the Subject o/Intelled — Intelle<St divided into Specula^ 
 tive and Pra^ical — Difference hetivixt thefe tivo — The Virtue of 
 Prudence belongs to the Pra&ical Intelled. — Manner of reafoning 
 of the P radical Intellect — Good, real or apparent ^ the Motive 
 of all Rational Aclions — Difference betvuixt Weak and Wicked 
 Anions — The Nature of the Speculative Intelled — The End of it 
 Truth — Speculative Intelled operates ivithout the Affifiance of the 
 Senfes or Phantafia — Paffage of Ariftotle upon that Subje^ explained. 
 
 S intellefl is undoubtedly the governing principle in us, and 
 may be faid to conllitute w^w, I think it is proper to inquire 
 ftill further concerning it, before I proceed to fpeak of the oreSlic part 
 of mind. And, there is a dilllndion made by Arillotle betwixt intel" 
 letl employed in contemplation merely, that is, the nou? ^=»/)>;7.*e5, and 
 vntelleSl employed in pradice, or the Navj TrfejxT***?, that deferves well to 
 be attended to. The obje<Sl of the contemplative intellect Is truth on- 
 ly, and the difcovery of the nature of things ; whereas, the objed of 
 pradical intellect is the practice of Ife^ and the conduct of han:an 
 affairs, though the inlelled may be, as we have feen, and indeed mufl: 
 be, in a certain degree, employed in all the arts, the mechanical as 
 well as the liberal. 
 
 And here we muft not fall into the fame n^iftake that we kc Phi- 
 loponus has fallen into, in treating of the gnoftic faculties of the niindy 
 nor make, as he has done, the operations of the fame tacultv diftin«£t 
 faculties : For, both the theoretical and practical intellect are the 
 fame faculty of the mind^ but emplojed upon difierent iuljcds, and 
 
 for
 
 120 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IL 
 
 for different purpofes ; the fubjed of the one being altogether gene* 
 rah and theorems of mere fpeculation ; whereas, the fubje<3: of the 
 other is both general truths and particular things ; for, it is in parti-- 
 cularsy and not in generalsy that practice confifts. 
 
 It may be objeded, ihdii generals ov ideas are the only objects of 
 the tJitelkfty and that particular things are the perceptions of ihtfenfe 
 alone ; and that, therefore, thefe things cannot be confidered by the 
 intelkcl. But this confequence does not follow : For, though the in- 
 telle^l does not perceive things corporeal, yet, when thefe perceptions 
 are brought into the mind by the Jenfes^ the intellect can review and 
 confider them. And, it is by fuch a review, as we have faid above, 
 that the intelleB forms to itfelf its proper obje(Sl:, ideas ^ comparing to- 
 gether the perceptions of fenfe^ and difcovering in what they agree, 
 and in what they are different : For, it is the privilege of this fupe- 
 rior faculty of the niindy to make ufe of the materials imported by the 
 other gnomic faculty, viz. the72'«y^, not only for the purpofe of crea- 
 ting new materials for hfelf, but for any other purpofe it thinks pro- 
 per. In this cafe, it applies its theorems and general propofitions to 
 particular things, in order to regulate the condud of ii/c, or, in any 
 other refpedt, to dired the adions of men. 
 
 From this account of practical intelle^^ it is eafy to perceive, that 
 the virtue we call prudence belongs to it. This virtue is mofl juiily 
 fet at the head of all the virtues, as being that, without which, tiiere 
 can be no other virtue ; for every adlion, though it proceed from the 
 beft natural difpofition, if it be not the refult of previous deliberation, 
 and determined choice, is not a virtuous adion, nor, indeed, proper- 
 ly fpeaking, a human adion, but the adion of the mere animal ; 
 fome of whom, we fee, perform adions which may be called goody 
 as they produce a great deal of good ; fuch, for example, as the care 
 of the offspring, being abfolutely neccffary for the prefervation of the 
 
 fpecies;
 
 Chap. VIII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 121 
 
 fpecies ; yet, as they do not proceed from any general theorem or 
 propofition, applied to particular fadts, they are not vh-tues. 
 
 The operation of the intelleSI in this pradical reafoning, is called 
 in Greek /ssSAEys-zj *, that is, deliberation ox conftderation; and the de- 
 termination of the mind^ preferring one adion to another, is called 
 x;)»««ff7«?, that is, choice^ in confequence of deliberation. 
 
 Ariftotle has obferved t* that, in the reafonings of this kind, the 
 minor of the fyllogifm is always a particular propofition: And this, as 
 he obferves, does more immediately and diredly prompt us to adtion, 
 than the general propofition in the major \ for general propofitions of 
 themfelves do not move to adion, but muft be firft applied to par- 
 ticulars. 
 
 It will be afked, what is this general propofition, which ultimatelv> if 
 not immediately, moves man to every adion proceeding from delibera- 
 tion or choice ? This is to aik, in other words, what it is we aim at, or 
 propofe by fuch actions? And the anfwer is, it is ^00^, either real or appa- 
 rent. If it bereally ^0^^, then is theadion truly wife and virtuous; but,, 
 if it be only feemingly^oo^:/, and not really fo, then is the adion weaker 
 vicious. On the. other hand, the motive of the brute is the to i.ov, or 
 what is pleasant, or agreeable to the it\\{t. And, as many men, and, I 
 believe, all men upon fome occafions, ad from this motive merely, 
 without choice or deliberation, in lo far they a6t like brutes; but, 
 whenever they chule and deliberate, they do the thing, becaufe they 
 hold it to be i^cod\ If they think fo, overcome by the prelent pleaiure, 
 
 CL and 
 
 * See what Ariflctle has faid concerning /3svXjyc-<j, and the nvj ^tlMv-riKtiy and alfo^ 
 concerning -Tpe:«!<f!-K, in h'S \(S. and 6th books of Morals. 
 
 \ Book 3d de Aninia^ cap. 11, infine^
 
 122 A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I C S. Book 11. 
 
 and contrary to what would be their judgment if the temptation 
 were removed, then they are only weak, or intemperate : But if, up- 
 on cool deliberation, the determination of their judgment is, that it is 
 bed: for them to ad: fo, then are they truly vicious and wicked, not 
 weak: Yet do they a£t as rational creatures; but, for that very reafon, 
 are ib much the worfe, becaufe the corruption of the leading principle 
 of the animal makes him the word of his kind : And if, to this cor- 
 ruption, courage and refjlution, with great abilities, are joined, he is 
 the moft mifchievous and mofl dangerous animal in this lower world *. 
 
 From what is here faid, the fyllogifm mentioned by Ariftotle may 
 eafily be formed. It proceeds in this way : 
 
 M^hat is good ought to be done. 
 
 This particular a^ion is good. 
 
 Therefore^ this particular a^ion ought to be done. 
 
 Here the mrjor propofition is general, the jfiinor particular ; and the 
 conclufion, as muH: neceffarily be, according to the rules of fyllogifm, 
 likewife particular. And thus much for the pradical intelle^. 
 
 As to the fpeculative^ it is wholly converfant with the proper ob- 
 jedt of inieiledl, ideas^ and theorems ; for, though it may foinetimes 
 defcend to particular i-d0.s and obfervations, it is only with a view to 
 theorems and /peculations which it may from thence raife. Nor has 
 it any thing ro do with pra^ ice-, or a^ion of any kind. And, as the 
 fnnl lauje. or end pre pofed by the other mtelle^, is what is good^ fo 
 the end ot this is iruth. 
 
 The 
 
 * See vh?t Arifl^otle has falcl upon this fubje£l in the 7th book of his morals, 
 wh'='re he h ^s V'rrv .tcuran-Iy aiitiniiuifhcd betwixt MKfxs-ix anJ «xo>i«c,a o; xxy-ix, and 
 e-«>v «c->.»)i -nid ty.'.gccTHUy with many other diftinitiuns, Avhich are not the iefs fohd for 
 their not being obvious.
 
 Chap.Vni. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 123 
 
 The ideas with which inferior fciences are converfant, are thofe 
 which are ahftraded from material things. But the chief fubjcdt, as 
 I have often faid, of the fcience of which 1 treat, is mindj and imma- 
 terial JubJJances, 
 
 From this account of the fpeculative intellect^ it is evident, that, 
 in the greater part by far of its operations, it has no need at all of 
 the fcnfes or phantafia^ which, as we have feen, are abfoKitely necef- 
 fary in the operations of the practical intelle^ : And, as to the lafl: men- 
 tioned fubjed of this intelle^, it is impoffible to have a juft notion of 
 it under a bodily form ;' becaufe it is as incapable of being painted in 
 the pbantafta^ as apprehended by the fenfe. And, even with refpedt 
 to ideasy abrtraO:ed from material fiib/lajices ^xhty are much better con- 
 ceived, without any affifiance ivoxn fenfe or imagitiatioji'. For, as Plato has 
 obferved in thePhaedo,the/'^<7W//7/z^ difturbs us very much by intruding 
 its images into the fpeculations o^fcience^ and particularly, the TrzifKc:*? of 
 dinjine things^ the ideas of which are altogether confounded by afcribing 
 to them any of the qualities of body^. Ariftotle has indeed faid, that we 
 cannot think without the affirtance of the phantafta f ; but it appears 
 from that and other paflages, that this is to be underftood only of the 
 practical intelleci \'. And it is clearly the opinion of both his com- 
 mentators, that pure intellect^ when difengaged from all material 
 
 0^2 things^ 
 
 * See what Phlloponus has faid upon this pafTige of Plato, in the beginning of his 
 introduction to his commentary apon AriHotle's books De /^nimct. 
 
 t Dc Jnima, lib. 3. cap. 7. 
 
 J '] he pafTage is in thcfe words : T>] h "oittio-^rty.y, -^'jx,^ t» t^x*TciTuxTct 'cioy xi(r'}f,uxTx 
 
 r 4'vz'>- V/hsre it id evident, tliat, though Ariflotle has mentioned t!ie 4"jzi ^ix^inrttn 
 in general, he means th., ^jixtoiu Tr^tixr ikv). This appears from the whole context, and 
 from rh--? very part of it where h'^ naentions the tyxSov, and the x«x«y, and the to ^,a.K. 
 T»v, and the to cpfjx.jci, which are the cbjctis oi i\\c praclicalintellc^. But, that Arif- 
 
 totlc
 
 124 A NT IE NT METAPHYSICS. Book II, 
 
 things^ does operate without the p bant q/i a. It muft, hovever, be coa- 
 feiTv-'d, that we are fo muchiiiinierfed In matter from our firil coming 
 into this world, io much intangled with it, by the neceffity of our 
 mixed nature, that it is very difficult to think with perfed abdradion : 
 But, by much practice in fpeciilatlvs fciences, we come at laft to be 
 able to do it. Of this, I think, we need no other proof than the fci~ 
 ence of arithmetic^ with the ideas of which, though the mod abftraifl 
 of any, we become fo familiar, by condant ufe from our earlied youth, 
 
 that 
 
 totle believed that the vovj iicooitty.i; could operate by Itfelf, without any mixture of 
 •fenfe or phantafia, is evident from what he fays in chap. 6. of the fame book, That 
 this N«vf is, by its nature, feparated from body, unmixed, impaffive, and pure energy. 
 And that this is the opinion of his commentator Simplicius, is evident from his commen- 
 tary upon thepaflagc firfi: quoted. And Philoponus, in his commentary upon the laft 
 mentioned pafTage, enumerates the operations of intelledt without the (pajvras-i*, as 
 when it makes itfelf its objeil, when it contemplates divine^ or immaterial fubjlances^ 
 alfo when It contemplates generals, or whatever elfe can be apprehended without the 
 fenfes. And he fays this is alfo the opinion of Ariftotle. And, for further proof 
 that he is in the right as to Ariftotle's opinion, I refer the reader to the 9th chapter 
 •of the fame 3d book De /JnimA ; in the end of which he has thefe words, t* 5g 5T-g«« 
 
 rjc y«r,>mTct rtvt ^nirei rev f^n ipayrxTfieiTu dvat ; « evc'i rxvrci (fo Philoponus reads it in 
 
 place of t' «>.>.«£, as it is commonly printed) ipuvrxc^xTXy «aa' ovk. »vtv <pxiTx<ry.xrai. 
 Here Ariftotle is fpcaking of the common vaytux-rnj or notions of corporeal thmgs, 
 •which are unc^ouhtedly phantafmsj that is, the objecSls of the phantajia ; whereas, the rrj«. 
 T« voAuxrx that he here mentions, are, as Simplicius has well obferved upon the paf- 
 fage, our ideas of fubftances, and particularly of incorporeal fubftances : And he 
 fldtrs the doubt> whether they be not alio phant^fms ? and he folves it in his com- 
 mon way, by ufking -^ queftion j the anfwer of which is plain to thofc who are ac- 
 quainted with Ariftotle's manner, that they are not phantafms. though they could not 
 have exiftcvl without phantafms; that is, the ideas could not have been formed with- 
 out aiTiftance from 'J\\c phantafia ; which is certainly true of them as wcIJ as of every 
 othf; :dea. And, if thcic w re any doubts of our apprehenfion of fimple i-'eas 
 wiihoutth.:; affiitance of ihi- phantafui, 1 think Lh>.re can be none concerning our ap- 
 preiienhon of them wncn combined in piopolirons, efpeciai.y the e propouiiuis liiat 
 ^rcca.ki,' axiom., !u..hasthis ' that every toing muji cit he be or not be.' -.tc: wnat 
 Ph lopi.nus has i.' . coiutjuiu:^ mcic axioma m his mtrodutuon to his commen- 
 tary u^un the DooKi De Auirna.
 
 Chap. VIIL ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 125 
 
 that I believe no body, in folving an arithmetical problem, makes any 
 ufe of the i?naginatton at all, or thinks of any corporeal thing. 
 And Plotinus, and fome of the later Platonifts, pretended, that, by 
 thinking often upon divine fubjedls, they came, at laft to have the 
 fame clear and diftindt notions of them, without the lead mixture of 
 any thing grofs or material, and to be in fome fort united with them 
 in a manner incomprehenfible to vulgar minds*. And fo much for 
 the gnojiic poivers of the human mind. 
 
 * See what Philoponus has faid upon this fubje£l In the heginning of the intro- 
 du(Slion to his commentary upon Ariftotle's books Dc Anirna. Sec alfo the author of 
 the life of Plotinus, affixed to his works. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 126 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 G H A P. IX. 
 
 0} the Oredic Powers of the Mind — Thefe not fitly divided^ either by 
 Philoponiis or Plato — Different Oxt^XizPoivers belonging to the Animal 
 and the TntelleBual Nature — Thofe of the Animal Nature — Thofe of 
 the Intelledual — What is the Caufe of Animal, that is^ Voluntary 
 Motion — Arifiotle^ s Opinion upon the Subjed — Mind, the Caufe of all 
 Motion, according to the Definition of it, 
 
 AN, as well as every other animal, being by nature deftined to 
 a£t, it was neceflary not only that he (hould knoiv, but that 
 he fhould have fome principle of aSlion, The oredic powers, there- 
 fore, as well as (h^gnofiic^ are eflential parts of the animal compofition; 
 but the gnofiic have, by nature, the precedence ; for, unlefs we fuppofe 
 animals to adl by mere chance, without any dire<ftion at all, they mud 
 neceflarily knoiv before they afl, 
 
 Gnofiic and oreSlic poivers being thus neceflarily joined together in 
 the animal nature, and correfponding the one to the other, it is na- 
 tural to fuppofe, that, as man has more gnofiic poivers than 
 other animals, he fhould alfo have defires and propenfities 
 more than they have; neverthelefs, Philoponus, or whoever befides 
 (for it is not Ariftotle) has made the diviiion of the faculties of the 
 mind into gnofiic and oredic^ has omitted altogether the oreBic part 
 of the intelleSiual jnindy and has given us only that of the mere animal 
 or ftnftive mind^ vphich he has fubdividcd into g^,s^,,4,« and ^y^*-, or 
 appetite and anger. And Plato, who has divided the human mind 
 into i;r<V«'V»«' ^""^ ^"vsj ^^^s> bcfidcs omitting the o> e5iic [>o^jueis of 
 the intelle6liial 7nind, plainly confounded the gnofiic and orec lie facul- 
 ties : For, whether we underftand b/ Mya the mere comparative facul- 
 ty,
 
 Chap. IX. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 127 
 
 ty, which the brutes pofTefs as well as we, or the n.uj that is peculiar 
 to man, it is evident, that Aeya« belongs to the gnojlic faculties of the 
 human mind. 
 
 The oreH'ic poivers of the bnitearei as I have obferved, fitly divided 
 into what I call appetite and anger ; for, as the brute has nothing to do 
 here but to nourifh and fupport the individual, and to propagate and e- 
 ducate the fpecies, and likewife to defend hiinfelf and hisofFspring againil 
 danger, and to overcome difficulties, thefe impulfes are fufficient for 
 both thofe purpofes. By the firft, he is diredicd to provide nouri(hment, 
 and every other thing neceflary both for his being and ivell-being : 
 And he is likewife impelled to propagate the fpecies, and to take that 
 care of the offspring which is nccellary for raifing it ; for that c-re^yn, 
 or natural affedion, which is fo ftrong in the brutes, I comprehend 
 under jm.%,«/«, or appetite^ as I tranflate it : And, by the other, he is 
 enabled to defend himfelf againft dangers, to overcome difficulties, 
 and, in fhort, to exert that ftrength of mind, which is neceflary, in 
 fome degree at leaft, for the prelervation of every animal and his off- 
 fpring, 
 
 Thefe are the oreSiic p)Owers of the brute, correfponding to the^w<7- 
 Jlic poivers ; and they are the fame in man, fo far as he participates 
 of the fame animal nature, and has the fame gnojlic poivers. But he 
 has, befides, the fuperior gnoflic faculty of intelleil; and there mufl 
 needs be fome defires and propenfities correfpondiag to this fa- 
 culty ; and, as this faculty is divided ]nio pra^ical and J/jeculativei it 
 is natural to fuppofe that there ihould be the fame number of oreclic 
 poix^ers^ each curreiponding to each of the oti'cr two. What corrc- 
 fponds to x\\^Jpeciilatn>e intelle^^ is the love of knonvltdgc . For, as truth, 
 and the knowledge of the nature of things, is the (>i)jed of this part 
 cl" the mind, and, as it is iinpoflible to fuppofe, that iniellect can adl 
 without fome ixjotive, what n.oves men to fcarch for truth, muft be ilie 
 love ot knowledge : And, accoruingly, Aniiotle has obferved, that, 
 
 not
 
 12 8 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 not only the philrifophers defire knowledge, but even the vulgar, 
 though they enjoy but little of the pleafure of it*. Nor is that to be 
 wondered <it ; for it is the plcaiure of intellet^, of which the vulgar 
 have but a fmall (hare. 
 
 The oreciic poiver correfponding to the praSIicel iiitelleSij is the de- 
 fire of good \ under which I include ihc fair and the hand/oiue^ or the 
 rt y.uxty^ as ihc Grccks call it, which, by fome philofophers, was held 
 to be the only qood t : )^ or good ^ being, as i have already obferved, the 
 objed of this part of the human mind, it muft necelTarily be defired by 
 it : Whereas, as I have likewife obferved, the object of the purfuit of 
 the brute is the t« 'y,lv, or the pkqfant ; and that is fufficient for all 
 the purpofes of his nature, as fhali be afterwards fhown. 
 
 In treating of the practical intelk^, Ariftotle takes occafion to in- 
 quire what it is that produces the progreffive motion in animals ? an 
 inquiry which, I think, might have been made more general, and 
 extended to the motion, even of fuch animals who do not change their 
 place altogether, but only in part. Upon this queftion, he befiows 
 two chapters, viz. the loth and nth of his third hook De Jnima ; 
 in the firft of which, he doubts, according to his manner, and, in the 
 fecond, decides. The refult of the whole is, that there are three things 
 which produce the animal motion ; Jir/ly the Nov?, or i?d£:Ikc7i under 
 
 which 
 
 * f^x*ixvi(V cu (^avoy rs(j tpiXora^tii rX<!-ro¥ ciXXa xxt T«<? uXXoii cfioia;' aXX' itti Z^xjcv 
 
 xo(vc,nvo-i» 'avrov. Lib. De Poetica, cap. 4. See ^\(o Metaphyf. lib. i. cap. i. 
 
 t The philofophers I mean are the Stoics. Ariftotle wrote a book cti»« rov uyxiov 
 x,^, Tcv >cuXov, which he fomewhcre quotes. This book is unfortunately loft, as well 
 as many works of his : But he has, in his books of Rhetoric, lib i. c.ip. 9. in initio, 
 given us two definitions of the t. x.xXci. The one is ^v ^Z uvr^ «<g£T6» c», i3r«*»»T<,y »,. 
 And the other is «» «y«tio» «v, ^Iv »,, It« ccyxlo,. This laft definition 1 like beft; for I 
 hold the fair, or the handfome, to be that which, being good, that is, ferving fome ufe- 
 ful purpofe of nature, is, at the fame time, pleafant to us, becaufe it is good; for. if any 
 thing be defired, merely becaufe it hpkafant, and not becaufe it is good, it is the t« 
 vt^Vf and not the t* r.tiXty,
 
 Chap. IX. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 129 
 
 which he includes \ht phantnfia^ being an Internal principle, as I be- 
 fore obferved, as well as the intelle6l^ and the goverxjing principle ia 
 brutes, and alfo in feme men. Secondly, the .^ei.f, that is, defire^ or 
 appetite. And, laftly^ the t« »^e*to., that is, the ohjetl deftred. And it 
 is certainly true, that animal motion cannot be produced without all 
 the three. But I think it is worth the while to conhder more particu- 
 larly, in what manner each of them contributes to the produdioii of 
 motion ; and I will begin with the lafi^ that is, the objeft de fired ; the 
 final caufe of the motion, which, therefore, is the firfl or principal 
 caufe, being that for the fake of which every other caufe operates. 
 Now this, in man, confidered as an intelledual being, is either ^o<9^ or 
 knoijuledge \ the one being the object of the pra£lical, the other of the 
 fpeculative intellecl:. But, of man, confidered as an animal merely, 
 the object is, ijuhat is pleafant. The objed, whichever of the three 
 it be, is itfelf immoveable, as Ariftotle has obferved : But it moves 
 the dejire or appetite ; and that again moves the animal. And it is 
 in this way, that the defire, as the efficient caufe, produces the move- 
 ment. But it is through the medium of the mind that it does fo ; tor 
 the defire firft excites the mind to a£t, and then the mind produces 
 the movement ; fo that rhe mind is the immediate efficient caufe of 
 the movement, and the defire only the remoter. But the defire 
 cannot arife, unlefs the object be known ; and thus we fee that 
 the gnoftic powers ot the mind are its fundamental powers, witli- 
 out which we canriot luppole it either to adl:, or to defire to 
 a(St ; for the coujmon laying \v;ll apply, that ' ignoti nulla cu^ 
 * piuo^'* 1 he mind, therefore, muR knoiv before it aas ; and, what- 
 ever is the governing ^w^?zf principle in It, whether intellect, phan- 
 tafta^ or fenfe, mull be the prime efficient caufe of all the movements 
 of tne body, that can be called anin;al, voluntary, or fj-ontaneous 
 ■of which the principal is progrelfive motion : For, as to the morions, 
 by v.liich growth and nutrition are juoduced, they are ins'oluntary, 
 and belong nut to the aninial, but to the vegetable life. 
 
 R And
 
 ISO A N T I F V T METAPHYSICS. Book If. 
 
 And, here, after gomg a great round, and departing very far, as- 
 it (h'jiild Term, from the original definition we have given of mindy 
 viz. "1 hai if is ivhut moves ^ we are come back to it again ; and we 
 fi,i(l that it applies to every kind of mind, even the intellectual ; For 
 the intelled, when it defcends from abftradt fpeculations to the prac- 
 tice ot life, does neceflarily, as the governing principle of the mind, 
 produce the motions of the body ; and, even when it is overcome, and 
 governed by pajfton and appetite, inftead of governing them, yet it is 
 ftill what moves the iiian, if the ad:ion be the confequence of any rea- 
 foning or deliberation at all. It is, therefore, I think, true, notwith- 
 ftanding what Ariftotle has faid to the contrary *, that there is fonie- 
 thing in common belonging to all minds ; and fom.e other definition 
 may be given of mind in general, than that it is the perfedion of an 
 organized body. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
 • Vide fupra, p. 75.
 
 Chap. X. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 131 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 The Human and^xuXQ^Vxn^hfpecificaUy different — If they be of diff'erent 
 Speciefes^ there muji he fixed Boundaries betivixt them — Comparifon 
 of the tivo — No Companion betivixt us and the loivejl Kind of Am- 
 mals — The Cojnpanfon only betivixt us and the higher Sort — DiJ/er^ 
 ent Specie/es of Animals 7nufl have different Mmds — Comparijon of 
 
 * our Senfes ivith thofe of other Animals — Tivo Differences betivixt 
 our Phantafia and that oj the Brute — Difference bctivixt our Com- 
 parative Faculty and that of the Brute-^-One Cla/s of the Objects of 
 Human Perception quite different from thoje perceived by the Brute 
 — Therefore the Faculty different — Man recognizes himfelf — The 
 Brute not — Comparijon of the Orectic Poivers of the Man and Brute 
 — Thoje of the Brute^ being directed by Nature^ do no hurt, — Tho/b 
 of the Matt, being guided by Opinion, do a great deal — Summary of 
 the Account of the Human Mind^ and oJ that of the Brute — The Er^ 
 ror of our Modern PhiloJophe*s in confounding Ideas and Per- 
 ceptions of Senje — Objection that^ though other Anivuds have not 
 the Ufe of InlciUct^ they may have the Faculty — That Objection an- 
 Jivered, 
 
 ALTHOUGH, from the preceeding charters, it be evident 
 that,! think, the human mind is \eiy diiiCciu from thv^ brute, 
 and of a nature much fupcrior ; and. although it be not difficult to 
 coiled:, from what is faid there, the arguments that move me to ihink 
 fo ; yet, as it is a ivatter o{' fuch ci nfeqaencc, I have thought it not 
 knproper to 1 ate, in his chapier, iholo arguments by iliemrdves, un- 
 mixed with any tiiin^ die. lur ihe liuman Uiind is fo intiu.attiy 
 
 ^^ 2 connetitcd
 
 132 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book 11. 
 
 conneded and interwoven with the animal, that it is a matter of nice 
 difcrimination to feparate them. Iknovv that, in fiich cafes, fuperfi- 
 cial inquirers fatisfy themfelves, by obferving, that, in nature, things 
 are blended together, and run into one another infenfibly, like dif- 
 ferent fhades of the fame colour ; fo that it is impolfible to fay where 
 the one begins, or the other ends. But I hold that, in nature, the fpe- 
 ciefes of things are abfolutely diftind ; and if, at any time, they are 
 mixed, ihe produdion is unnatural, and does not go farther than the 
 individual monfter ; (for fo I call every production out of the com- 
 mon courfe of nature;) and, if it were otherwife, there would be no 
 beauty, order, or regularity, in nature; but every thing would be 
 mixed with every thing, according to the notion of Anaxagoras : 
 And, however fair the outward appearance of this world may be, fo 
 as to deferve the name given it in Greek, xsc-^o?, yet it would, in rea- 
 lity, be no better than the original chaos of the poets. I hold, there- 
 fore, that, if the human mind be truly of a kind different from the 
 brute, there are certain fixed limits and boundaries which feparate 
 them; however difficult it may be for us to find them out. 
 
 In order to make this difcovery, the readied way will, I think, be 
 to ftate the comparifon betwixt the two minds ; and to oblerve, frjiy 
 in what they agree; and this will make the things, in which they dif- 
 fer, more obiervable. 
 
 In the firfi: place, I ihlnk it is impoffible to maintain, that the minds 
 of ijuorms^jiies^ or of thofe animals of fo low a kind, as to be fomething 
 betwixt animal and vegetable, and which, therefore, are called 
 Zoophitcs, are of the fame kind with our minds, even in poivcr or ca- 
 pacity : For, as nature does nothing in vain, according to that excel- 
 lent maxim of Ariilotle *, it is impoffible to fuppofe, that fhe would 
 
 be 
 
 * Ar\(\.ot]c De Jfiimaj lib. 3. cap 10. His words zre, ftKrt fi/t^iv n (Pvs-ig -anu juxTtiVy 
 fcnn «jroAMaf« t«» «ivuyKciiM*j 1 hat nature does nothing fuperjiuous or nnnecejfary ; 
 
 nor
 
 Chap.X. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 133 
 
 be fo prodigal and fuperfluous, as to give them a capacity which they 
 never could exert. And, if their minds be not fuch as oars in capa^ 
 c'lty^ as they are certainly not fuch in energy or aciuality^ I think we 
 may fairly conclude, th.it they are of a different fpecies : For I do not fee 
 how we are to difcriminate fpeciefcs, if it be neither by poiver nor by 
 energy. The only queftion, therefore, is, betwixt us and animals of a 
 higher order, fuch as dogs, horfes, elephants, beavers, &c. ; and it is 
 only with fuch animals that I am to make the comparifon of our fpe- 
 cies. 
 
 That we are a fpecies of animals different from any of thofe juft 
 now mentioned, no body, 1 believe, will deny. Nor, do I think, it 
 can be denied, that the fpeciefes of animals are more diftinguifhed 
 by their mhuU or inward principle, than by their outward figure ; for, 
 as it is the mind that is the moving power, and which therefore is 
 principal in every animal, and, as the body is no more than the organ 
 or inftrument that the mind ufes for accompliihing the purpofes, 
 for which, by nature, the animal was deftined, it foll(;ws, of neceffa- 
 ry confequence, that, if there be a diftindion of fpeciefes, it mult be 
 in the mind chiefly, and only by confequence in the body ; So that 
 there muft be a fpecies of mind for every fpecies of animals ; and, 
 however near two fpeciefes may feem to come to one another, ftill 
 there mull be fome difcriminating mark, which diflin:^Lii{hes the mind 
 of the one from that of the other. And this argument alone, how- 
 ever metaphyficcd it may feem, (for that is the common name given 
 by the vulgar to arguments that they do not underftai'd), is, in my 
 opinion, fufficicnt to decide, that there mnft be a diiTerencey/>^f //?<:, and 
 not in degree r,nlv, betwixt our mind, and that of any other fpecies 
 of animals. !ut it ftill remains to be inquu'ed in what this diffe- 
 rence coiifirts ? 
 
 In 
 
 nor is there any thing -wanting of ^v hat is ncref/'.iry. Tliis I hoKl to be an axiom of 
 natural philofophy, from which many great confcquencesare to be deduced.
 
 134 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 In this inquiry I will follow the divifion, above mentioned, of the 
 animal mind into gnofl'ic and oret}ic<i beginning with the gnojlic^ which, 
 as 1 have faid, is the foundation of the other. 
 
 The^?/o,'?/V faculties are the a(ftive powers of the mincU by which 
 it perceives different objeds : By one kind of them, the mind per- 
 ceives external objeds through the medium of the organs of fenfe. 
 Thefe the better fort of brutes have, as well as we, as many in num- 
 ber, but different in degree ; for every animal has organs of fenfe 
 fuited to the life for which it is, by nature, deftined : Nor do I be- 
 lieve there is any one fpecies of animals that has fenfations of pre- 
 cilely the fame degree of acutenefs and intenfenefs that another has. 
 Arillotle has obferved, ihat the fenie of fmell is imperfed in us '^', 
 whereas, in fo:iie other animals, it is moft acute, fo that by it they 
 perform a great part of their animal fundions. The fenfe o^ Jight^ 
 on the other hand, 1 am perfudded, is more perfed in us than in 
 mod other animals : For it is by it, as Arillotle has obferved, that 
 we acquire the moft knowledge "f ; and, I think, there can be no doubt 
 that we are by nature dellined for acquiring knowledge, of which, 
 as the fame philolopher has oblerved, all men are more or lets de- 
 firous J. I believe too, that our fenfes, both of tajle and of touchy 
 are more delicate and difcrim-nating, than the fame fenfes in moft 
 other animals § : And, perhaps, the fame is true alfo of our hearing ; 
 at leart, it is certain, that, by cultivaiion, we have given it a power of 
 difcriminatiiig founds, which no other animal has. 
 
 The 
 
 * De ^nima, lib. 2. cap. 9. 
 
 t Aletaj-hj/. in initio, where Ariftotle fpcaks of our jiatural ways of acquiring 
 knowledge. What we acquire by hearing ox difcourfc, \v: cunliders as artificially ac- 
 quired-, for, wnatcver doubts others may have Ahonx. J pcech being an invemion oi urt, 
 Ariftotle had none : And, accordingly, he makes words to be lignihcant cnJy by com- 
 patt. — See his book of Interpretation. 
 •^ Ibidem — Poetic c.ip 4 
 
 § Ariftotle (lib. 2. de Animas cap. y.) fays, that we hate the moft exquifite touch of 
 cny animaL
 
 Chap. X. A N T I E N t M E T A P H Y S I C S. 135 
 
 1 he p bant q/i J, as I have faid, is ihe repofitory of the peiceptlons 
 of the objeds of fenfe, by the means of which they opjrate upon the 
 f?nnd, even when the objeds are not prefcnt. In this manner, the 
 brutes are affected, as well as we. But there are two differences, 
 which 1 have already obferved, betwixt their ph.int.'ifia and ours. The 
 firft is, that their phantafta only operates, either when the objea it- 
 felr is again piefented to them, or, when any natural, inftindive de- 
 fire, neceffary either for the prefervation of th- individual, or the con- 
 tinuation of the fpecies, excites the perception of the objedt in the 
 phantafia ; whereas, our phantafta, as Ariifotle has obferved t> is at 
 our command, and we can, at any time, conjure up the forms in it ; 
 and thefe phantoms very often affedt us as ftrongly, or more ftrongly, 
 than the real objects, hn^^/econdly^ we can not only call up thofe 
 forms when we pleafe, but we can mould and falliion them according 
 to our fancy ; adding to them, or taking from them; feparating or 
 combining them, in a manner very different from their appearance 
 in nature : And we can make them more perfed, as in the cafe of 
 geometrical figures ; which (hows evidently, that, even in this matter 
 of the phantafia^ and with reipe6t to external objedtt:, there is a power 
 in us, fuperior to any which the brute poffeffes ; for the brute pre- 
 ferves, in his phantafia^ the objeds, juft as he received them from 
 nature, without making any alteration in them, for the better, or the 
 worfe. 
 
 And, as to the comparifon of the perceptions of fenfe, a faculty, 
 which, as I obferved, the brute poffeffes in a certain degree, there is 
 llkewife the difference whivh I have obferved betwixt our phantcfia 
 and that of the brute, namely, that the brute never makes the compa- 
 rifon, unlefs inftigated by one or other of tiie natural deiires above 
 mention-d ; whereas, man makes the comparifon without any fuch 
 
 inftigation. 
 
 Further, 
 
 t Lib. 3. capi 3. de An'ima,
 
 136 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IL 
 
 Further, we have a fet of perceptions quite difFerent from the per- 
 ceptions of the brute, becaufe t]>e objeds of them are quite different. 
 And, as Ariftotle has well obferved f, where the objeds of percep- 
 tion are difFerent in kind, the faculty of perception mull: be alfo d-if- 
 ferent. The objects 1 mean are ideas^ or gem-rais. Thele are intirely 
 difFerent from particular objeds of fenfc, which only are perceived by 
 the brute, and are things that have a real exigence in nature ; whereas 
 ideas are mere creatures of the mind'. So that here the human mind 
 exerts a creative power, which, to the philofopher, mull appear lome- 
 thing very wonderful ; fo wonderful, that we might be thought our- 
 felves a vifionary being, without any thing real or fubllantial in us, 
 it we did not confider, that it is in this way we difcover the forms 
 and elFences of thmgs, as far as it is poflible for the human faculties 
 to difcover them, in the (late they are in here below, overlaid and 
 buried in matter, out of which we are obliged, as it were, to dig 
 them. 
 
 Laft of all, and what, more than any thing I have hitherto faid, 
 makes it evident that our mind is of a nature quite difFerent from 
 that of the brute, is the power which it has, oi turning upon itielf, 
 making itfelf its own objed, ana thereby difcovering its own na- 
 ture :J: ; and, by analogy, the nature, likewife, of fuperior minds. 
 Now, whatever degrees of fenfe, or even ot realon, we may allow to 
 thofe fuperior brutes 1 mentioned, this faculty no body will pretend 
 
 that 
 
 t Lib- 6. cap. 6. ethic. 
 
 X See Philoponus upon this fubjed, in his introdudlon to lils commentary upon 
 Ariftotle's books de Anima\ his words are, I think, remarkable; and, as the book is in 
 the hands of very few, I will here tranfcribe them. — 'OvS's* tw* a-v/^ctTui 'eivro ixvr« 
 
 •yiyyuTK^y o«^£ 5rges ixvre tTriTrei^lTxt. iv y«g oion itcvr/tv yi^ei^,» ixXa ri ruv cvuxruf.* ciXh^ avV 
 iei iiXtyot^vtayuHg, y.xi ret uiru.uoirot Ivcui, ixuTeig i<rx7iv. ov yx^ iio'tv '«yTijv '» avj/fs, 4 h xKcifiy J) 
 «3-Awj »; ««!-^>i «•/?.« vat ^»)T« 7r«<«5 £tt« i^ytrs*;. uX\' c Xt>yo<; ifTt, o TTi^t xvtm ^>jT*y, /V ftiVToi ■^vx.l 
 >) XeytKYi, «i/T» 'ixvTr,t y«yvAi(rx«. xvTri yovt io-Ttv ij l^^nrevtrx, uvrn h ^nTovfitiyi, tcuTr^ 7i':v fi^KCVFX, 
 jtvTii n 'ivjxcrxeftevj) )j yivve-Kovcx KXi yivaQ'-cui^n- uQaiftxToi xfx ivx^ytii tczitoiOHKrxi.
 
 Chap.X. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 137 
 
 that they poflefs ; or that they are able to recognife their own minds^ 
 or to form any notion of fuperior minds. 
 
 As to the oreclic powers of the human mind^ compared with tlofc 
 of the brute, it has thefe, as i have obferved, correlponding to its 
 gnoJlic\ for, as it has the [2ime gnojlic powers that the brute has, it has 
 the fame oreciic powers, viz. appetite and anger : But, as it has, be- 
 fides, the gnojlic power of intelUB^ either theoretical or praclicaU it 
 has tw^o oreclic facukies, correlponding each to each of the other, but 
 both unknown to the brute, viz. the love of kimivledge or truths an- 
 fwering to the theoretic intelleB ; the other the pursuit of what is 
 gcod^ anfwering to the pra^ical intelle6i, This^oor/, as I have faid, 
 is either real or apparent. If the-^c^^?*:/ we purfue be real, and if the 
 mind have ftrength enough to make the irrational defires (and brutal, 
 as they may be called) of appetite and anger fubmit to this intellectu- 
 al purfuit of what is good^ then is the man perfect in praciice-t and 
 what the philofopher calls a ^0(5^ /7Zfl«; Apparent good^ on t!ie other 
 hand, is only the ^00^ of opinion^ not of nature; for every man, as I 
 haTC obferved, who ads rationally, is determmed by fome opinion of 
 goodt right or wrong; fo that the whole happinefs of our lives de- 
 pends upon our forming right opinions concerning what is good or 
 ill in human life. 
 
 The brute, on the other hand, defires only what is pUafanty with- 
 out having any idea of w^hat is good: And this is fufficient for the 
 purpoles of animal life; for nature has annexed pleafure to thofe ope- 
 rations, and thofe only, which are neceflary for the prefervation of 
 the individual, or the continuation of the kind; fo that there is no 
 harm in the animal being guided and determined in his adions by 
 thofe pleafurcs. For, as the enjoyment of thcai is not heightened, 
 as among us, by opinion and imagination, nor any improper means 
 ufed to excite the defire of them, they can lead to no blamcablc ex- 
 cels; whereas we, by leaving nature, and following opinion, and 
 
 S living 
 
 /
 
 IZS A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book IL 
 
 living in an unnatural manner, make even thofe natural pleafures 
 pernicious to us, and contrive others, which, having no foundation 
 in nature, cannot poliibly be ^oo£^. But this, as I liave faid, is the 
 confequence of anarchy and mifrule in the mind) by which, inftead 
 of the fuperior power of mtdle6t governing it, the inferior paffions 
 reign in its ftead. 
 
 From this account of the hnite^ it is evident, that he belongs to 
 nature^ not to man^ according to the divifion that I have made of the 
 things of this fublunary world * ; for he cannot recognife his own ac- 
 tions, and therefore is intirely unconfcious of what he does : Neither 
 does he know for what purpofe, or to what end, he a<^s, but blindly 
 and necelTarily follows appetite or inclination, which, though it lead 
 him unerringly to what is good^ (I fpeak of fuch brutes as are in the 
 natural ftate, not of thofe that are tamed, and, as it may be fai<3, civi- 
 lized by us), it is a. good of which he has no idea. 
 
 And here we may fee clearly the meaning of a word which is in 
 every body's mouth, but not underflood by every body ; I mean, in- 
 JiinSit which is the governing principle of the brute, by which he is 
 directed- to purfue or avoid certain things, without knowing for what 
 purpoie or to what end, and, therefore, without hefitation and delibe- 
 ration ; for the brute never deliberates, except in the particular cafe a- 
 bove mentionedjwhen he is drawn different ways by different appetites 
 or inclinations \. 
 
 » See above, p. 85: 
 
 f Cautus enim metuitfoveam lupus y accipiterqve- 
 
 SufpeHos laqueosy et opertum m'llvius hamum. Ho rat. 
 
 On the one hand, hunger impells the animal, on the other, fear or concern for 
 fclfprefervation pulls him back; therefore he deliberates. But, where thereis.no 
 contrary inflin£l to reftrain him, he always follows appetite, without deliberating or 
 thinking of confequences as man does. See above p. 10 1.
 
 Chap. X. AN TIE NT METAPHYSICS, 139 
 
 We may obferve here in pafling, that the brute has tliis in com- 
 mon witli the vegetable ; that the -principle or mind^ as 1 chufe 
 to call it, of the vegetable, does every thing neceflary for the 
 prefervation of the individual fubftance to which it is united, 
 and for the propagation of the kind, as well as the brute, 
 and, like him, without knowing that it does fo. But there is this dif- 
 ference betwixt them, that the brute has pleafure in attaining thofe 
 things which nature direds him to purfue, and pain when he is dif- 
 appointed of his purfuiis, and meets with the contrary of what he de- 
 fires : Whereas the vegetable has no fenfe either of pleafure or pain; 
 and in this chiefly confifts the difference betwixt ihtfenftthvc and ve- 
 getable nature : — But of this more afterwards. 
 
 To conclude this comparifon of the human and brute natures^ 
 the whole matter com<^s to this iffue : The humanmind^ though immer- 
 fed at firft in matter, as well as that of every other animal here be- 
 low, can emerge from it; and, by exerting its native power, can. adt 
 without the afli (lance of the body, v;hich it is fo far from 
 needing in thefe operations, that it is incumbered and obflruded 
 by it. By this power it tranfports itfelf, as it were, into that i- 
 deal world, which every man, who believes in God, muft believe to 
 be the archetype of this material world ; and, in this way, may be 
 l^id to <:onverfe with thofe eternaiyor^/j of things in the divine mind, 
 of which all things we fee here are but fliadows. And not only does 
 our mind thus open to itfelf a newwwld, but, by the ftudy of Its own 
 nature, it difcovers mind itfelf-, and rifes,as near as it is pofllble for us, 
 under this load of flefli, to that fupreme mind^ the author of nature, 
 and every thing in nature, whether ideal or material. By ftudles of this 
 kind, we attain, in fome degree, to what we conceive to be the divine, the 
 chief perfedion of mind^the ability to employ itfelf within itfelf, without 
 Ihe Jean dependence upon, or connedion with, any thing external. Nor is it 
 
 S ^ pofTiblc
 
 I40 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book 11. 
 
 poflible to fay, how far the human mind, by being conflantly em- 
 ployed in Aich meditations, and abflrat^ed almoft intirely from the 
 body, fo difpofed, by a proper diet and manner of life, as not 
 to obftrucl its operations, may go in this afccnt towards di'vinity. 
 Neither can I intirely difbelievc, though I think I am no enthufiafti- 
 cal vifionary, the accounts delivered down to us of the progrefs made 
 byPlotinus, and others of the later Platonifts in that road *. 
 
 Thus much, I think, at leaft, we may conclude, with great certain- 
 ty, from the operations of the mind while it is in the body, that when it 
 is releafed from this prifon of flefli and blood, it will adl with much more 
 vigour, and in a manner very different from what it does at prefent : For 
 then, as Ariftotle fays, it is what it truly is, that is, immortal SLnd eternal f . 
 And he further tells us ivhat it is in the fame chapter ; for he fays, it is, 
 by its nature, feparable from body, unmixed, and impafTive ; and its 
 
 effence 
 
 * This Plotlnus flourifhed in the fecond century, and may be fald to be the founder 
 of the Alexandrian fchool. He was, I think, the greateft philofopher of later times, 
 and a genius truly divine. Nor do I think that ever there was a mind, merely human, 
 of more fublime fpeculation, or m.ore abftrafted from matter^ than his was. Porphyry, 
 his fcholar, who writes his life, fays, that, while he was with him, he, Plotinus, was four 
 times raifed above humanity, and united by an energy ineffable to the Divinity that 
 is above all; Tt? iTc Trtin hw. And he fays, that he himfelf was once exalted in the 
 fame manner when he was 68 years of age. This I. know will be laughed at by our 
 modern philofophers ; but, as Hamlet fays in the play, * There are more things in 
 * heaven and earth than our philofophy dreams of.' 
 
 J- ^t/fiio-Bm ^1 ifTtfiOfty, TovS' oVe^ J5-T/, text Tovr* ^ovtv etUvuTtv kxi xiltcy, lib. 3. dc Jnima, 
 
 cap. 6. where the difference betwixt thofe two epithets is faid, by Philoponus, to be 
 this: That ct^amrot denotes, that the mind has cflentially life in it; fo that it cannot 
 be without life, and be at all ; and that is what we call in Englifli immortal. The o- 
 ther epithet «<2*oy cxpreffes this further, that it not only mud have life always whca 
 it exifls, but that it docs always cxift ; or, as ! have tranflated it, is eternal. See 
 Philoponus's commentary upon this 0th chapter.
 
 Chap. X. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 141 
 
 efTence Is energy. The meaning of which he afterwards explains, 
 by telling us, that it does not Ibmetimes think, and fometimes not, 
 but always t- And I have no doubt of the truth of what Phlloponus 
 fays in his -commentary upon the firfi: book De Amma^ ' That intel- 
 * lect,when feparated from body, has no need of the ^■.a.^oix, or difcourfe 
 ' of re af on ;' becaufe, without fcarching for truth, as It does now, and 
 paiTing from premifes toconcUifion, It fees, every thing immediately and 
 intuitively, having iht fonns of every thing within itfclf, and not being 
 difturbed In its operations by the body ; for, fays he, the body is the 
 caufe of its ignorance, and, therefore, of its fearch for knowledge. 
 And, in a following pafTage, he fays, that the mind, In that feparate 
 ftate, has no need of memory any more than of reafon. But, fays he, 
 in this flate, our knowledge is fleeting and tranfitory, like the body 
 to which we are joined : We therefore need memory^ In order to re- 
 tain what we have once learned ; for memory Is the know^ledge of 
 what we knew before : But, in our feparate ftate, v/e have \\\t forms 
 of all things, that fall within our comprehenfion, in the mind at once; 
 fo that there is neither firft nor laft in our knowledge *. 
 
 And here we nuay fee the reafon why Arlftotle and his commenta- 
 tors afcribe only one operation to the vay?, or hitclle^^ viz. ftmplc 
 
 ap- 
 
 -|- KV.I ovroi vovi '^i>^is-ic; koci Uftt'//,i, xxi a^at^jjf, ti) cva-iu, uv Uipyna — «>iA' ov^ oti ^ei ten, 
 ere ti ev nti. Ibid, cap 6. 
 
 • Philoponus's commentary upon the 5th chapter of the firfl book De ^nima, 
 where I think it appears from Ariftotle's own words, that Philoponus has very fair- 
 ly given us his fenfe ; for Ariftotle fays, t» h ^tutotto-S-ui kii ^tXHf, y, f-tia-nv, ovk i/ln 
 
 tKfitev 'x-ee%, uXXu, rov^t rov f;jj«»T«j tKH¥Cy ^ ixnfo i^a. h« xxi rtvrtv ^6ei^»fnrcv, fJTt ^n)« 
 fi.c*lvii. cvrt ^iXit. ev yu^ iKHvev tjv, ciaXx rev Koivev^ uxcXuM^i' Ji t$v( la-ui Bii»rtf»f n 
 
 xMi KTcu^H ta-Tiv. De Anima^ lib. i. cap. 5. A divine fentence, and which alone ought 
 to have acquitted Ariftotle of any fufpicion of Atheifm or Materialifm, if there had 
 been nothing more to the fame purpofc in l)is works.
 
 142 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book H, 
 
 apprchcnfwn ; for that is its only operation in its feparated and per- 
 fect ftate : But as, in this ftate, it muft neceflfarily operate by difcourfe 
 of reafoihz.uA apprehend complex truth, that is,the /r?///j of propofitionsy 
 I have ahb afcribed that operation to it. 
 
 The account of the brute mitid, in oppofition to this of the humane 
 is very Ihort. He perceives only material objedts, either prefent or 
 abfent, by the means of the phantafia, which I confider as a bodily 
 organ, and a kind of fecondary fenfe. He converfes, therefore, only 
 v'ith Jtmtter^ and ads only by the body^ through the body, and for the 
 purpofes of the body ; that is, for the prefervarion and propagation of 
 the animal life ; and all his inclinations and defires have that tenden- 
 cy. His gnojiic powers, therefore, are all connedted with the body ; 
 and, as to the practical part, he is, as we have feen, direcfled intirely 
 by pleafure : And though, as I have fhown, he is thus well 
 direded, (for God has created nothing ill), yet we are to con- 
 fider that pleafure is not the end of nature, but only the means fhe 
 ufes to attain her end, which is what is good. Now, it is by this that 
 man is direded, when he afls as a man fliould a^. And, in this re- 
 fped, he imitates God and nature, when he forms a plan of adion, of 
 which the end is good. And, when he extends this plan beyond 
 himfelf to thoufands of his own fpecies, forming diftate ot polity upon 
 fuch a plan, he may be faid to do the moft Godlike ad which mortal 
 man can do, and to create fomething like an tiniverfe. 
 
 From this fhort view of the matter, it is evident, that there can be 
 no more dangerous error in the philoiophy of 7nind, than what has 
 been maintained by fome modern philofophers, * That we have no i- 
 * deas, but only perceptions of fenfe ;' or, in other words, that our 
 minds cannot a^ without the affiflarce of our bodies. In the frfl 
 place, it degrades us into brutes, leaving no other difference betwixt 
 
 us
 
 Chap. X. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 14^ 
 
 DS and the better kind of them, except in degree ; for ^11 that we 
 can value ourfelves upon above them, according to this philofophy, is, 
 that we have clearer and more diftindl perceptions of fenfe ; that we 
 retain them longer, and compare them better together. 
 
 2dly^ I apprehend this error goes very much farther; for, as thofc 
 philofophers deny the exiftence of ideas altogether in any mind, with- 
 out making a diftindion betwixt fuperior and inferior minds, the 
 confequence neceflarily is, that, even in the Supreme Mind, (if they 
 allow any fuch to exili), there is nothing but perceptions of fenje ; 
 from which two other confequences neceflarily refult ; Fir/l^ That there 
 IS an end of that intelledual world in the Mind of the Deity, which, 
 according to all philofophers, both antient and modern, who are not 
 atheifts, is the pattern and archetype of this material world. And, 
 2dly^ That this world could not have been the production of God, 
 even if we could fuppofe it formed without any plan or defign, but 
 muft have been prior to God, or, at lead, coeval with him, as it is 
 from it that he muft have had his perceptions of fenfe, as well as we 
 have. Now, I think it is better to do, as Mr Hobbes has done, to give 
 no underftanding at all to the Deity, than to give him an underftand- 
 ing fo entirely dependent on matter, and of a lower degree, than what 
 falls to the fliare of an ordinary man *. But Mr Hobbes, when he 
 reafons in this way~ concerning the underftanding of the Deity, plainly 
 means to deny his exiftence altogether : And the philofophers I fpeak 
 of muft have the fame meaning, if they know the confequences of 
 their own dodrine t. But, to return to tl:e human mind. 
 
 It 
 
 * Mr Hobbes's words are, * (liionlam fcientia rt intcIkcStus in nobis nihil aliuvl 
 funt, quam fufcitatus, a rebus externis organa prementibus, animi tumultus, non eft: 
 putandum aliquid tale accidere Deo. Signum enim efl potentiac ab alio dependen- 
 tis.* (De Cive cap. 15. feft 14.) 
 
 t The firft; philofophcr, of modern times, who advanced this notion, of the non- 
 exlftence of ideas even in mind, was Dr Berkeley, who, I have the charityto think, 
 was no Atheift, and that, therefore, he did not (ee the confequence of his opinion : 1 
 cannot, however, help faying, that his philofophy, upon the whole, is the mofh ex- 
 traordinary that ever appeared in the world. If he had denied the exiftence of ideas 
 
 only.
 
 144 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 It mav be obje<Sled, that the human mind has all thofe great ta- 
 lents> I have mentioned, only in poiver or capacity, when it makes its 
 firrt appearance in this world : 1 hat the brutes may have the fame 
 latent powers, though hitherto we have not difcovered them ; becaufe 
 they never have exerted them, for want, perhaps, of opportunities, and 
 that inlh'u6tion to which we know that man owes fo much ; and we 
 have more reafon to think fo, that fome of them, by education and in- 
 ftrudion, iire carried on very far ; and how much farther they might 
 be carried, were due pains bellowed upon them, it is impoffible to 
 fay. 
 
 That the great powers of the human mind are, at firfl:, latent, 
 and immeried in matter, fo that the infant is no more than a man 
 in capacity-, is a fad that, I think, cannot be denied. Ariliotle fays, 
 that, at his birth, his mind is like a tablet, v^'ith nothing v;ritten upon 
 it, or, as we would fay, a white fheet of paper. And even the Plato- 
 nic philofophers, who maintain, that his ideas are not acquired here, 
 but brought with him, acknowledge, that they are fo overwhelmed at 
 firfi with matter, that they lie, like fparks under afhes, which do not 
 appear till they are ftirred and roufed ; and that, they fay, is done by 
 the objeds of fenfe. And, therefore, the dodrine that I have main- 
 tained 
 
 onlv, and left matter in the world, there might have been fome reality in our knoiv- 
 ledge, fuch as it was, and our fenfations, at leaft, might have had fome foundation in 
 nature ; but, when he takes away both ideas and matter, what does he leave in the 
 place of them, but mere delufion, and an empty dream ? As to a later philofopher, 
 who maintains the fame doftrine concerning ideas, I have not the fame charity for him, 
 but rank him with Mr Hobbes, with this difference only, that he has put his atheifm 
 into ^ more fceptical form, and is a man of lefs genius, as well as lefs fcience, 
 
 I obferve, too, that the French material philofophers, fuch as the author of the trea- 
 tife Stir V Efprit, and he that writes Le Syjleme de Id Nature, the mofl profefled book 
 of atheifm that has been publiflied in our time, maintain likewife, that there is nothing 
 in our minds but perceptions of fenfe, or ideas of fenfation, as Mr Locke calls them : 
 And the reafon is plain, that, if they (hould admit that the mind could operate by it- 
 felf, without the affiftaiice of the body, it might be fuppofcd that the mind could ex- 
 exifl likewife without the body, and that there was really a difliudion betwixt mind 
 and body.
 
 Chap. X. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 145 
 
 talned elfewhere, concerning the progrefs of the human mind, from a 
 flate no better than mere brutality, (however itrange it may appear in 
 modern times,) is the doctrine of all the great philofopners of .m i- 
 quity * : So that the only queftion is, Whether we do not, even at 
 
 * There is a curious paflage in Philoponus's Commentary upon Ariftotle's treatlfc 
 De yinima, lib. 2. towards the beginning, where he gives an account of the progrefs of 
 man, from his conception to his maturity ; which is the more to be obferveci, that 
 PhiloponuE was not only one of the beft commentators upon Ariflotle, but a Chriflian. 
 Man, fays he, when fu ft conceived in the womb, is no animal at all, but tt^vx»i', or ina- 
 nimate ; then he becomes an ifi4'v'/-'^*j but only of the vegetable kind, that i^ to fay, 
 organized, and baring growth and nourifhment, but withoux fenfe or motion: Then 
 he becomes a Zoophile, having the fenfe of touch, and a certain movement, but with- 
 out change of place, fticking to the womb, like an oyfter to its fliell or rock. Then, 
 after delivery, he becom-^s a i^«o», or animal having motion from place to place, and 
 cn.rg'zing by all the fenfes. He is yet, however, but an irrational animal, or ^<!#»» 
 «>.«y«> ; and it is only in procefs of time, according to Philoponus, that he becomes |A'»r 
 >«V<*«». Nay, he is not, fays this author, even at his birth, an animal of a perfe£l: 
 kind; for he wants the (puvrxs-tx^ or imagination, and thereiore refembles a worm, or 
 fuch other incomplete animal. — That very young children want imagination, Philo- 
 ponus proves in this way ; A young child, fays he, wili fuck any thing that refembles 
 a p.ip, and he will come to the fire, and burn himfelf ; and this, not once, but fevcral 
 times Now, this proceeds from his not having thofe objetl.i piittured in his imagina- 
 tion at firft, as they arc aftcrw^^rds, when he knows the fire, and fhuns it ; and does not 
 miftake a finger, or any thing clfe, for his mother's pap. See Philoponus's Commen- 
 tary upon that part of Ariftotle's 3d book, De -'nima^ where he treats of iht phantafia. 
 
 This is the fjatural progtefs of man ; but his civil progrefs, as it may he called, muft 
 be very much lunger; the one being the progrefs of the. body, which is mortal, and 
 butfhort lived ; the other, of the mindy which is immortal j the progrefs of the one, too 
 being from nature, the progrefs of the other depending upon culture and inftru£lioo. 
 Even when that is adhibited, the progrefs, wc fee, is but flow ; but, without that, when 
 men, inftead of being taught, muft invent every thing, how very much flower will it 
 be? 
 
 To thefe reafons, and to this authority from Philoponus the Commentator of Ari- 
 ftotle, I will add the authoritv of Ariftotle liimfeif, who has ticne. fo far as to fay, that 
 vthe Nev,-, or intellect, till it has got inU'lUgiblcSt that is, ideas, in it, docs v.zt cxift except
 
 146 AN TIE NT METAPHYSICS. Book IL 
 
 firft, excell them, in poiver and capacity^ as much as wc do after- 
 wards, by the means of culture and civilization^ excell them in energy 
 or aciuality ? 
 
 And, in the frfl place, ponjoers and capacities are latent thingo, 
 which are no otherwife to be known to us, except by their energies 
 and operations. Now, it muft be admitted, that no brute has ever dif- 
 played thofe fuperior talents, of which the human mind is poflefled. I 
 have allowed that they can reafon in a certain degree, by comparing 
 the perceptions of fenfe, and, from that compariion, drawing certain 
 conclufions, for the direction of the oeconomy of their lives. Thus 
 far the antient philofophers have gone, and no farther. But, as to in- 
 telled, no antient philofopher has beftowed it upon them, nor any 
 modern, who could diftinguifh betwixt the operations of intellect, and 
 the ratiocination above mentioned. Now, nature does nothing in vain, 
 according to Ariflotle's maxim * ; and, therefore, we cannot fuppofe 
 that fhe has given to any animal a poiver that never was exerted, or 
 which, we have any reafon to think, ever will be exerted. 
 
 zdo-i This argument will be much ftrengthened, if we confider what 
 h is that has given man the opportunity of exerting thofe powers, which 
 
 un- 
 
 Ji/»«;M«, that is, in capacity^ and is nothing at all anuuUy, or i»i*y«f . And, in that fituation, 
 he conpares it to a tablet or book, in which nothing is written, and fays that it is no more 
 than the place or receptacle oi forms. {De Atima^ lib. 3. cap. 5.) It is evident, there- 
 fore that, according to Ariftotle*s opinion, till our mind be ftocked with fenfationsj 
 and till we have learned, from thofe fenfations, to form ideas by abftradion, and 
 then to compare thofe ideas, we have no more intellect than a child. How long the 
 human mind muft have continued in this condition, in a ftate of nature, muft be evi- 
 dent to every one who has been able to diveft himfelf of the notions which we acquire 
 by living in a fbte of civilization, and has carried back his thoughts to that original 
 llate, prior to civil life, and all its arts and fciences. 
 
 • Dc Jninia, Lib. 3. cap. 10. See a former note, page 132.
 
 Chap. X. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 147 
 
 undoubtedly are latent in him at the time of his birth, and which do 
 ftill continue fo, in many barbarous nations. This is no other than 
 fecial intercourfe; without which, it is evident, that the human mind 
 would ftill have continued in a ftate very little above that of the brutes. 
 And the more frequent and clofe this intercourfe is, the greater the 
 improvement. Now, we have examples of brutes living, for ages, in 
 the moft ftrld: fociety, fuch as is not only political, but domeftic, and 
 yet exerting nothing like the poiver of the human intelle^. The ani- 
 mal I mean is the beaver, whom I have already mentioned, as one of 
 thofe that come the neareft to the human fagacity. This animal 
 ftill lives, in the manner I have mentioned, in the wilds of America ; 
 and is, I believe, a more antient inhabitant there than any of the Indian 
 tribes ; yet they have formed no ideas, nor invented any fciences, not 
 even arts ; for, though they pradife certain neceffary arts, fuch as 
 that of building their dikes and huts, yet they cannot be called artSy 
 in the proper fenfe of the word, as being founded upon general prin- 
 ciples and theorems ; but are either no more than mere inftind, or at 
 moft, what Ariftotle calls e^^th^/*, that is, experience and objernjatiouy 
 which, no doubt, is the mother of all arts, but is not art^ till it be car- 
 ried the length of principles and theorems *. When, therefore, oppor- 
 tunity and occafion offer, to call forth any latent power in an animal, 
 and yet it is not produced into <7^, we may, I think, conclude, with 
 great certainty, that there is no fuch power in the animal. 
 
 Lajlly^ the beaver, and thofe other animals I mentioned, as coming 
 neareft to man, want, not only the ufe of fpeech, which I am perfuaded 
 man wanted at firft, {perhaps for feveral ages), but the faculty of fpeech, 
 becaufe they have not the proper organs. Now, it is only, as Ariftotle 
 has obfervedt> by converfation, or the intercourfe o^ fpeech, that we 
 
 T 2 learn 
 
 • Ariftot. Metaph. in initio. 
 t Ibidem.
 
 148 ANTTENT METAPHYSICS. Bookll. 
 
 learn any thing ; by which he means, are taught any thing by others : 
 And it is certainly true that, without the ufe of fpeech, it is impoflible 
 that man could have improved his mind fo much ; not fo much, 1 be- 
 lieve, as to have beconie an intelledual creature. Now, we cannot 
 fuppole that nature W'juld have adled fo vainly and fuperfluoufly, as to 
 have beftovved on any animal a power or faculty, without giving him, 
 at the fame time, what was neceflary for exerting that power. 
 
 In this manner, I thinki have proved, — That man Is an animal fuperior 
 to any other upon this earth in poiversind capacity^ as well as in energy 
 or atluality — That, in this laft refpedt, and, as he actually exifts, thofc 
 faculties which he has in common with the brute, fuch as the phan- 
 tafia, and the reafoning or comparative faculty, he pofleiles in a fupe- 
 rior degree — That he has one faculty which the brute has not in the 
 leaft degree, and which is very much more excellent than any that is 
 bellowed upon the brute, viz. the intellect, which is felt-moved, not by 
 any thing from without — which operates by itfelf, without the afli- 
 ftance of the body — whofe objects are things within the Mind of eter- 
 nal and unchangeable exiftence, not things in generation and corrup- 
 tion — and, laftly, which can make itfelf its own objed ; and, by re- 
 cognizing itfelf, can rife to the contemplation of fuperior minds, and 
 even of the Supreme Mind. This is that fpark of divinity within us, 
 whi.jh, properly roufed and flirred, foftered, and nouriflied, by fuitable 
 culture, will bring us as near co the Divinity as it is poflible for any 
 mind, clothed with body, to come. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 Chap. XI. ANTIENT M;E T A P H Y S I C S. 149 
 
 G H A P. XL 
 
 Plato* s Notion of our Knoivkdge in this State exprejfed by an Allegory 
 — All derived from Senfition — Such Knoivledge jnoft imperfect — 
 
 This ilb.if rated by the Knoivledge tue get from the Senfe of Sv^ht 
 
 What Intellect can do to fupply the DefeSfs ^/Seni'e — The Knoivledge 
 offuperior Minds very diffet ent from ours — What ours ivill be ivhen ive 
 are difencumbercdoj the Body — // ivill befiich as is incredible to the 
 Material Philofophers — That the Mind has Perceptions in this StatCy 
 even of Jenfble ohje&s^ proved — from our Phantafia — fro7n our 
 Dreams— ^r'c>w Appearances to us ivhen aivake — from the Cafe of 
 thofe that ivalk in their Sleep — Inflances of theje Kinds — The Senfes 
 7iot the Caufe of the Perception of Senftble Objects — This illuf rated 
 by a Comparifon, 
 
 WHAT I hinted in the end of the laft Chapter, about the (late 
 of the human mind in this body, will, if duly conlidered, 
 lead us to further difcoveries of the nature of our mind, and enable us 
 to make fome conjectures concerning its poivers when feparated from, 
 the body. 
 
 Plato has laid, in more than one place, that, in this flate of our ex- 
 iftence, wc perceive only the images of things, but are not convcri'ant 
 with the things themfelves ; and he has compared us to prifoners 
 chained down in a cave, in fuch a manner, that they caniK)t turn their 
 heads, but can only look forward towards the end or bott^^m of the 
 cave. Me further fuppofes, a great fire or light at tlie mouth of the 
 cave, and betwixt them and that light, figures of men, and other ani- 
 mals, and of many different natural or artificial fubflanccs, io placed, 
 
 that
 
 ISO ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BookIL 
 
 that the fliadovvs of them are projeded upon the bottom of the cave, 
 and which, therefore, the prifoners fee, though they cannot fee the 
 fubftances *. This may be thought to be one of Plato's vifionary 
 notions, which amufes the fancy, without informing the underftand- 
 ing ; and, indeed, it is sparable, (a manner of teaching in which an- 
 tient wifdom delighted much,) but a parable mofl: expreflive of truth 
 and reality ; and the interpretation of the parable I take to be this : 
 
 Our ideas, by which only we know any thing, are all poflerior to 
 our fenfations ; our knowledge, therefore, we have only at fecond 
 hand, refleded, as it were, from material things : Whereas higher in- 
 telligences are converfant, we muft fuppofe, with the original ideal 
 forms, not fecondary, or derived from matter, like thofe which are the 
 objeds of our knowledge. Thus, therefore, like Plato's prifoners, wc. 
 fee not the things themfelves, but certain reprefentations or fnnilitudee 
 of them, w^hich may very properly be compared to Ihadows. 
 
 Further, the notions we get in this way, mufl: appear exceedingly 
 iraperfe(St, if we confider that fenfation is nothing elfe but the commu- 
 nication of motion from the external objed; to the mind or fentient 
 part, through the medium of what is called the organs of Jhi/g ; for 
 that all objeds of fenfe are perceived by fome impreffion which they 
 make upon thefe organs, is a thing well known to all philofophers : 
 And the only difference among our fenfations is, that the motion from 
 fome of thefe objed:s is communicated to the organ at a greater di- 
 flance, and fome at a lefs, or in contact. 
 
 1 will take, for example, the fenfe of feeing, which Is our mofl ex- 
 cellent fenfe, and that to which, according to Arillotle's obfervation f, 
 we owe the greateft part of our knowledge. 1 ufe it as an example 
 for another reafon alfo ; becaufe the way in which vilible objedts ope- 
 rate 
 
 • Plato De Kfpvb. lib. 7 in initio. 
 f Metaph. lib. 1. in initio.
 
 Chap. XI. A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. 151 
 
 rate upon that organ of fenfe, and the progrefs of the communication 
 of the motion from the objedt to the mind, are better known with re- 
 fpe£t to this fenfe, than with refped: to any other ; for here we have 
 difcovered that the rays of Hght, which are refleded from the object, 
 are received in the pupil of the eye, there refracted and converged, fo 
 as to form a picture of the objedt in the retina or bottom of the eye, 
 and which, by the optic nerve being conveyed to the brain, the feat, as- 
 is fuppofed, of all fenfation, is perceived by the mind. 
 
 From this account of vifion, it is evident, that the mind is not con- 
 verfant with the vifible objedt itfelf, but only with the image, or ,^*,. 
 A<.», as the Epicureans called it, thrown off from the objed. And this 
 is made ftill more evident by the common experiment of a room 
 darkened, and a lens put in a hole in the window-fhutter, which re- 
 ceives the rays from the objeifls without, and, refracting them in the 
 fame manner as the pupil of the eye does, makes a picture of them 
 upon the oppofite wall. Here it is evident, that the mind- only per- 
 ceives images of objeds : Nor is the cafe much altered when we come 
 out of a dark room and walk abroad ; for we carry with us a kind of 
 camera obfcura, in which we perceive only the images of the objeds as 
 they are painted upon the retina of the eye. Still, therefore, we know 
 nothing of them except thofe idols of them, which, according to Epi- 
 curus*s notion, fly off from their furface *, and, fo far from penetra- 
 ting into the ii fide, or efience of them, we cannot even fee the 
 furface of them near, but it muft be at the diftance of what is called ^ 
 dijlin^i vifion* 
 
 Alchough 
 
 • In this matter of vifion^ the Epicureans appear to me to have come nearer the 
 truth than the other philofophers of antiquity, and even the mathematicians ; for, ac- 
 cording to Euclid, vifion is produced by rays that come from the eye, not by rays 
 that come to the eye from the objed. See Euclid's Optics, and what I have further 
 faid upon this fubjed in the Origin and Progrefs of Language, voj. i. page 26. edit. 2-
 
 rp ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BooklL 
 
 Althnugb we cannot trace the progrefs of every fenfation in the 
 fame nr.anntrr as we do that of fight, yet we are fure that, all of them 
 affed: the mind in the manner above mentioned, by motion from the 
 objed. commuiicajed to the mind through the rne.ilum r.f the organ. 
 Now, it IS evident, that, by this motion^ or a^lion oi the obj.d: up- 
 on the organ, we can never dilcover the nature or i flence of (he 
 ol'jeci:: r*nd, accordingly, it is agreed among philofiphers, that, by 
 fe.'ft: merely, we do not know the nature of any thing. It remains, 
 therefore, only to cop.lider what tntelUti can do in the matter. Now, 
 it appears to me, that all that this prime faculty of the mind can do, 
 is to c.jlled: together the different ways in which any natural fubftance 
 moves our organs ot fenfe, that is, all its fenfible qualities, and to make 
 thefe, or the ■irincipal of them, the definition of fuch fubftances *. But it 
 is evident, that this definition, inftead of giving us the nature and (.'flence 
 of the thing, gives us no more than fome of its operations upon our or- 
 gans of perception. Thefe operations we colledl and arrange, afcribing 
 each to the objed that produces it, and, in this way, difcriminating 
 the feveral things around us : But what the internal conftitution of 
 thofe things is which makes them proper to produce fuch impreflions 
 upon us, or what their nature is, otKerwife than in relation to us, and 
 fo far as they operate upon us, we know not. 
 
 On the other hnnd, we muft fuppofe that fuperior intelligences are 
 converfant with the inin(.^fl: effences of things, and perceive the inter- 
 nal coi.ftitution of every thing, from which are derived all its proper- 
 ties, and all its operations upon us and other objeds. For this pur- 
 pofe, it is evident, that they mull have faculties which we not only 
 
 have 
 
 * This is the account which Ariftotle giv-s of our knowledge of the «w5-*a, or ef- 
 
 fcnce of anv thinir, t?rE<S"«» -/<*? !;^s*««'' «stoo«§«v«4< y.xrix, t;)v CPx^tctix'' tts^i tsdv s-v,t4«s£»«eT«y, 
 
 ») Till trX*T»/>,7) T«V T^itlTTWl', To 6 KXl TTi^t T^J OVTlXi i^OftlH Xl /«»/£(» «T< ^dhlTTlt. DCC What 
 
 I have further laid vpon this fubjeft above, page 56.
 
 Chap. XI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 153 
 
 have not, but of which we have hardly an idea ; and we have ftill lefs 
 an idea of the manner of the perception of the Supreme Mind, of which 
 we can fay no more with any certainty, except that he is not obhged 
 to look abroad for difcovering tlie effences of things, as inferior intel- 
 ligences mufl; do, but has within himfelf the yorwj- or ideas of all 
 things conrtantly prefent, fo that he perceives them always, and at one 
 view, without the afTiflance of memory or recollection, and without 
 paffing from one thing to another, as we do. 
 
 How far our minds, in this ftate of their exiftence, can ever ope- 
 rate in a manner any ways refembling thofe Superior Intelligences, 
 or whether we can attain to any communication with fuch intelligen- 
 ces, as fome philofophers have pretended to do *, I will not take 
 upon me to determine; but this 1 will venture to affirm, that, if we live 
 as we ought to do in this world, and, by the exercife of our luperior 
 faculties, difengage ourfelves, as much as poffible, from the body, 
 when, at laft, we are intirely difencumbered of the load of it, and 
 come out, like the butterfly out of the worm, or the ferpent in Virgil, 
 
 Pofitis novus exuviis, nitidufque juventa, 
 
 we {hall then perceive in a very different manner, and fee not 
 the fhadows only, but the things themfelves ; for we fliall then ope- 
 rate always, as we do now fometimes, by the pure intelkB^ without 
 the ule of either fenfes or imagination ; and (liall, in that way, be 
 converfant iuimediately with the ideal lorms, not as now, through 
 the medium only of our fenfes. 
 
 This, I know, will appear merely vifionary, and no better than 
 philofophical enth'ifiafm, to iho!e wlio believe, that our minds, at pre- 
 fent, can oper<ite only by the Icnks. Such men will fay, that they 
 have no idea of their operating otherwife in any flate of their ex- 
 
 U iftence; 
 
 • See above, page 140.
 
 rj4 AN TIE NT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 iftence ; and they will tell you, that, without organs of fenfe, we can 
 have no perception of" any kind ; and, I doubt not, but that ihey 
 would fay the fame of Superior Intelligences, even of the Supreme ; 
 for, if they believe in a God at all, they muft have the fame grofs 
 conception of him that Epicurus had, who could not conceive that 
 God could fee without eyes, hear without ears, and, in fhort, had any 
 underftanding at all without the ufe of fenfes *. But, I maintain, that, 
 in a feparate flate, even the human mind will perceive, not only in- 
 teliedual, but fenfible objeds, without the ufe of the fenfes : And I 
 think, that there is not only reafon and philofophy to convince a man 
 of this, who believes in the exiftence of any thing befides matter, 
 but alfo fads, fufficient, at leaft, to convince me, that, even in this 
 flate, the mind has this power of perception. 
 
 In ihtfrjl place, by the means of the phantafta^^ we perceive fen- 
 fible objcdts in this way, and that too in the mofl; lively manner. 
 How nature has contrived this, whether by the means of any 
 thing material, upon which the objeds are painted, as upon a 
 canvas, or, in whatever other way it is done, I believe, it is impof- 
 fible for us to difcover: But it evidently fh.ows that the mind, and not 
 only the intelkduaU but the animal mind, has, by its nature, a power 
 of perceiving fenfible objects without the alTiftance of the organs of 
 fenfe, and vv'hen the objeds are at a great diftance, and far out of tiie 
 reach of thofe organs. 
 
 But, 2r/o, This power of the mind is ftill more manifeft in the cafe of 
 our drcam.s. What the caufe is of this wonderful phacnomenon of our na- 
 ture, not the leib wonderful in the eye of the philofopherfor being com- 
 mon, I do not prx)|)ofe i^re accurately to inquire : I will only fay, 
 tliat I do not think the caufe can be what Ariiloile has aiTigned for it, 
 
 namely, 
 
 ** See Cudvrorth's intellectual ryn.jm, book !■ chap. I. page ^o.
 
 Chap. XI. AN TIE NT METAPHYSICS. 155 
 
 namely, the motion flill remaining in the organs of fenfe, after tlie fcn- 
 fation is gone * ; for, if that were the cafe, our moft recent fenfatione 
 would be always the fubjedl of our dreams ; which, though it be 
 fometimes the cafe, yet i appeal to every man's experience, whether 
 his dreams be not more commonly compofed of things that he has 
 neither perceived by his fenfes, nor thought of for a great v/hile before : 
 Neither do 1 think that, by the phantafia fingly, we can account 
 for dreams; for, though the phantafia undoubtedly contain, not only 
 recent perceptions of the fenfe, but very old ones, no reafon can be af- 
 figned why fuch or fuch objeds, rather than others, fliould be finglcd 
 out of that repofitory of phantafms, as I may call it, and prefented to 
 the mind. And^fdcondly-, we very often fee things in our dreams, that 
 we never faw or thought of before, and which, confequently, cannot 
 be in thephantafia. Thus, we fee perfons in our dreams entirely unknown 
 to us ; and they are reprefented to us in fo lively and diftind: a manner, 
 that, if we happen ever really to fee them, we know them immediately 
 for the perfons we had feen in our dreams ; and we hear of things 
 that we never heard of before, but which we afterwards find to be 
 realities. Of this kind, I have heard feveral {lories ; but there are 
 two recorded by Plutarch, the one in the life of Lucullus^ and the 
 other in the life of Powpey-, which I will relate as fa€ls, of the truth 
 of which I think there is no reafon to doubt. * Lucullus, v;hen he 
 was making war in Pontus againft Tigranes, took Sinope, a Greek 
 city, fituated upon the Euxine fea, which fome Ciiicians, fricnda of 
 the King, had taken poflefTion of; but, upon Lucullus coming before 
 it, fled in the night-time, having firft i'et fire to the city, and killed a * 
 great number of the Sinopians. Lucullus, however, made fuch hafte, 
 that he catched in the city, and put to the fword, 8000 of the Ciiici- 
 ans, who had not time to make their efcape ; but the city he fpared, 
 and. fuch of the inhabitants as had efcaped the cruelty of ihc barba- 
 rians. This he did, on account of a dream that he had the night 
 before, in which a man appeared to him, and bid him go on ; 
 " for," -fays he, '* Autolycus comes, deliring to meet with you." Lucul- 
 lus did not know what to make of this dream, never having heard of. 
 
 U 2 this 
 
 * Arift. De Infomniis*
 
 156 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book If, 
 
 this Autolyciis. But, the next day, after he had taken the city, and 
 was purfuing the Ciiicians, who made their efcape by fea, he found a 
 ftatue upon the fea-fliore, which they had not had time to get on 
 board, and carry off. This ftatue, he vv iS told, was ihe (latue of 
 Autolycus, who had accompanied Hercules in his expedition againft 
 the Amazons, and having been Ihipwrecked, and IcFt in tnat country, 
 founded this Greek city, wliich, upon his account, Luculhis fpared ; 
 remembering, as Plutarch fays, what Sylla had written in the CAJin- 
 mentaries of his hfe, which he left vsith Lucullus, that he ought to re- 
 gard nothing fo much as what was fignified to him in dreams *.' 
 
 This is the flory of Lucullus's dream. The other ftory, told by the 
 fame author, in the life of Pompey, is of a dream of a Roman called 
 Petitius, commander of a coafting veflcl, which happened to be fta- 
 tioned upon the coafl: of Theffaly, not far from LarifTa, at the time 
 when Pom.pey was defeated in the battle of Pharfalia ; the night after 
 which, he had a dream, in which Pompey appeared to him in a mean 
 drefs, and much dejeQed. This dream he was telling to fome of the 
 crew, when one of them called out, that there was a boat coming from 
 the land towards them, and that the people in it made figns to be ta- 
 ken into the (liip. Upon the boat's drawing near, he immediately 
 knew Pompey by the figure he had fccn of him in his dream ; for 
 Pompey, when he fled from the field of Pharfalia, had thrown away 
 all enfigns of dignity, and dilmifled all his attendants f. 
 
 There are, 1 know, who will reject this, and other narratives of the 
 fame kind, that might be produced, related by grave hiftorians, not as 
 hearfays, but as matters of fad, and this upon the credit of their fyftem 
 of philofophy, which is no other than matenali/m^ and the difbelief of 
 all fpirituai beings. But 1 would have thofe philofophers try how they 
 can accoupt, upon their fyftem, for our ordinary dreams, in which 
 
 we 
 
 * Plutarchus in Vita Luculli, pp.g. 506. Editio Frar\cofurti. 
 t Idem in Vita Pompeii, p. 658.
 
 Chap. XI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 157 
 
 we certainly hear and fee, and have other perceptions of fenfe, with- 
 out the life of the organs of fenfe; and do no nmore queftion the re- 
 ahtles of thefe appearances, than of what we perceive when we are a- 
 wake, and reafon and refled; upon them, in the fame manner as if 
 they were real. The account that Ariftotle gives of them cannot, as 
 I have faid, be admitted. And, as to Fpicurus*s notion, that they are 
 produced by thin membranes, or exwviae^ as Lucretius calls them, 
 which fly off from the furface of things, it is too ridxulous to be fe- 
 rioully refuted. There remains only, therefore, Baxter's hypothefis *, 
 that they arife from the agency of other minds operating upon ours, 
 while the body is at refi: ; a fyftem which, however f^range and im- 
 probable it may appear to many, I am not difpofed to reject, at leaft, 
 not till a better is found out, believing, as I do, that we are furrounded 
 by minds invifible, and that 
 
 Millions of fpiritual creatures walk the earth 
 Unfeen, both when we wake, and when we fleep {-. 
 
 But, 3^io, Not only have we dreams of what never fell under our 
 fenfes, or employed our waking thoughts, but we have vifions of the 
 fame kind when awake. And here 1 will not entertain the reader with 
 (lories of theT^Tom/y/^^/ J, which, however, I cannot entirely dif- 
 believe, unlefs 1 could, at the fame tin-e, be convinced that there are 
 not other minds l;ere below, befides ours, of greater knowledge, and 
 greater power, which may communicate with our minds, in the way 
 that fpirits communicate with one another : Neither will I relate the 
 well known ftories of the appearances to Dion and to Brutus, fome 
 time before theit dtath, though thefe bf fo well attefted, being feen, 
 not by vulgar men, but by philofophers, and men who were far from 
 
 being 
 
 ♦ See the Enquiry'lnto the Nature of the Human Soul, Se£l. 6- p. 196. 
 
 t Parad Loft. B.4 v. 678, 
 
 X A v/ay of forcfeeinEr thinjis by v^fion, in which they are reprcfcnted in tlie mnnner 
 they happen. It is well known in the Highlands of Scotland, and, as I have been in- 
 formed, among other nations^^ who are nearer the natural ftate than jhq.
 
 158 AN TIE NT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 being fuperftitlous, that, I think, they cannot be doubted of, except by 
 thofe who believe, like the Sadduceesof old, that there is neither angel 
 mrjpirit. But I will relate a ftory, told by a late French writer, who is 
 certainly not an cnthufiaft, nor too much ^fpiritual philofopher, as 
 the reader may perhaps fufpevSt me to be ; tor he has fo little notion 
 of our minds operating without our bodies, that he makes us not only 
 perceive objeds of fenie, but form ideas, think, and reafon, by the aid 
 of certain fibres and nerves. The author I mean is Charles Bonnet, 
 who has publifhed at Geneva, in the year 1769, what he intitles, 
 " Eflai Analytique fur les Facultes de TAme." This author, in his 
 fecond volume, chap. 27. page 176. relates, that he knov\rs a fober 
 fenlible man, and of good judgment and memory, who fees, at times 
 when he is broad awake, figures of m.en and women, birds, beads, 
 carriages, buildings, &c. Thefe appear to him to move different ways, 
 fometimes coming near him, fomctimes going farther off; fometimes 
 augmenting, fometimes diminifhing ; difappearing altogether fome- 
 times, and then appearing again. All thefe objeds are reprefented to 
 him in a mofllively manner, and appear to him jufl as if they were 
 really prefent. He knows, however, that it is only avilion; and is nor, 
 like thofe vifionaries, that miftake what they fee for realities. They are 
 reprefentations, therefore, which only amufe him ; but it is an amufe- 
 mcnt that is not of his own procuring ; for he is not apprifcd of their 
 coming ; nor does he know what fcene is next to be prefented to him. 
 — Thus far our French author. Thofe who account for every thmg 
 from matter and motion will, I know, fufpedl that thefe appearances- 
 were the effe^l of a flrange difeafe in the man's eyes, of which tha' 
 they can give no rational account, they w^ill be ready to lay hold of i^t, ra- 
 ther than be obliged to have recourfa to ;;wW, for explaining the phae- 
 nomenon. But the fa£t is, as related by the French author, that he is an 
 old man, who has very little ufe of his eyes at all ; for, when he was 
 far advanced in years, he was twice couched for a cataract in both eyes ; 
 and, after recovering his fight by that operation, he loft it again by 
 leading too much ; {^ that, at the time that Bonnet wrote,, he had loft 
 
 en.tirely
 
 Chap. XL ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 159 
 
 entirely the fight of his heft eye, and, hy the other, could only diftin- 
 guifli objeds near him. If, therefore, we believe this fdt\y we cannot 
 doubt but that the human mind, even in this ftate of its exiftence, not 
 in a dream, or any ways difordered by bodily difeafe or madnefs, can 
 perceive objeds of fenfe, without the ufe of the fenfes. 
 
 4t0t Walking in fleep is not a common phaenomenon, yet not very 
 uncommon, and fo well attefled, that we cannot doubt of the truth of 
 it. Thefe night-walkers fee every thing as well as they do when 
 awake ; but they have not the ufe of their eyes, which are fometimes 
 fhutjor, when they are open, they have not that motion of them which 
 is neceifary for the purpofe of vifion. Of one ot thefe, there is a very 
 remarkable ftory told in the French Encyclopedic, under the word 
 Noifa7nbule. He was a ftudent of divinity in the univerfity of Bour- 
 deaux, and was in ufe to rife in his fleep, and to write and read fer- 
 mons without the ufe of his eyes. The ftory is attefled by the Archbi- 
 fliop of Bourdeaux, who thought it a phaenomenon worthy of his 
 particular attention. And, that he might be fure he did not ufe his 
 eyes, he put a covering betwixt them and the paper while he was wri- 
 ting and reading. 
 
 There was a phaenomenon of the like kindj concerning which I had 
 an opportunity of being very particularly and accurately informed. It 
 was the cafe of a young girl, in the neighbourhood of my houfe in the 
 country, who had a difeafe that is pretty well known in the country 
 where I live, under the name of the loiiphig^ that is, the jumping agiie\ 
 and which is no other than a kind of frenzy, which feizes the patients 
 in their fleep, and makes them jump and run like perfons pofll^fled. 
 The girl was attacked by this difeafe three years ago, in the fpring, 
 when flie was about fixteen years of age, and it bfled fomething more 
 than three months. The fit alv/ays feized her in the day-time, com- 
 monly about "feven or eight o'clock in the morning, after fhe had been 
 out of bed two or three hour?. It be;jan with a heavinefs and drowfi- 
 nefs, which ended in fleep, a'l leafl, what had the appeaiauce of fleep, 
 
 tor
 
 i66 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS* Book II. 
 
 for her eyes were clofe (hut. In this condition, {he would leap up 
 upon ftools and tables, with furprifing agility ; then fhe would get 
 out of the cottage, where fhe lived with her father, mother, and bro- 
 ther, and run with great violence, and much fafter than fhe could do 
 when well, but always with a certain deftination to fome one place in 
 the neighbourhood ; and to which place flie often faid, when fhe found 
 the fit coming upon her, that Ihe was to go; and, after fhe had gone to 
 the place ot her deflination, if (he did not there awake, fhe came back with 
 the fame certain diredion, tho' fhe did not always keep the high road, but 
 frequently went a nearer way acrofs the fiields ; and tho' her road, for this 
 reafon, was often very rough, fhe never fell, notwithftandingthe violence 
 with which fhe ran. But all the while fhe ran, her eyes were quite 
 fliut, as her brother attefls, who often ran with her to take care of 
 her, and who, though he was much older, flronger, and cleverer, than 
 fhe, was hardly able to keep up with her. When Ihe told, before the fit 
 came on, to what place flie was to run, fhe faid fhe dreamed the night 
 before, that fhe was to run to that place ; and, though they fomrtimes 
 diffuaded her from going to a particular place, as to my houfe, for ex-» 
 ample, where they faid the dogs would bite her, fhe faid fhe would 
 run that way, and no other. When fhe awaked, and came out of her 
 delirium, flie found herfelf extremely weak; but foon recovered her 
 ftrength, and was nothing the worfe for it, but, on the contra- 
 ry, was much the worfe for being reftrained from running. Wlien 
 fhe awaked, and came to herlelf, fhe had not the lead remem- 
 brance of what had pafTed whde fhe was afleep. Sometimes flie 
 would run upon the top of the earthen fence which furrounded her 
 father's little garden ; and, though the fence was of an irregu- 
 lar figure, and very n.-^rrow at top, yet flic never fell from it, 
 nor from the top of the houfe, upon which flie would fometimes get 
 by the affillance of this fc ce, though her eyes were then likewife 
 Ihut. Some time before the d f-rdvT Kft her, flie dreamed, as fhe faid, 
 that the water of a "eil in t!ie neighbourhood, called the cbiping nr Jl^ 
 would cure her ; and, accordingly, fhe drank of it very plentifully, 
 
 both
 
 Chap. Xr. A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I C 3. 1 5i 
 
 both when (he was well, and when fhe was ill. Once, when fhe was 
 ill, {he expreUed) by figns, a violent defire to drink of it, (for fhe did 
 not, while in the fit, fpeak fo as to be intelligible), and they having 
 brought her other water, (he would not let it come near her, but re- 
 jecfted it with figns of great averfion ; but, when they brought her 
 the water of this well, {he drank it greedily, her eyes being all the 
 while (hut. Before her lad fit came upon her, lb c fa id fhehadjufi: 
 three leaps to make, and flie would neither leap nor run more. And 
 accordingly, having fallen aileep, as ufual, flie leaped up upon the 
 ftone at the back of the chimney, and down again ; and having done 
 this three times, flie kept her word, and never leaped or run more. 
 She is now in perfect health. 
 
 This account I had from the father, mother, and brother, whom I 
 examined feparately and together, and likewlfe from the girl herfelf, 
 fo far as fhe remembered ; for, as 1 have faid, fhe had no memory of 
 what paiTed while fhe was in the fit ; but fhe remembered very well 
 every thing that happened when fhe was not, and particularly her dreams. 
 And fhe told me, that fhe flept very well at night, had a good ftomach, 
 and was in every refped well till the fit felzed her. It began, fhe fays, 
 at her feet, and, like a coldnefs or numbnefs, crept upwards and up- 
 wards, till it came to her heart ; after which flie had no more fenfe or 
 feeling of the condition flie was in. 
 
 What I have faid of this girlrememberlng nothing of what pafTed 
 while fhe was in the fit, is the cafe of all night-walkers. It is by this 
 chiefly that night-walking is diflinguifhed from dreaming; and it 
 proves to me, that the mind is then more difengaged from the body 
 than it is even in dreaming. For it is not only without the ufe of the 
 fenfes, but without memory, which a philofopher that I quoted above *, 
 thinks our mind will have no need of when it is difengaged from the 
 the body. 
 
 X What 
 
 * oee p, 141.
 
 162 A NTI EN T MET A PHYSICS. Book. 11. 
 
 What has induced men to believe that the mind could not perceive? 
 the objeds of fenfe, without the organs of fenfe, is a miRaken notion, 
 that thefe organs are the caufe of our fenfations, by which, no doubt, 
 they mean the efficient caufe ; but I deny that they arc even the in- 
 flrumental caufe; and, if we would (peak with ilri^t propriety, we 
 ought not to fay that we perceive, by the means of our feiilVs, but 
 we ought only to lav, that they remove the impediment, which would 
 elfe hinder our perception. It is, as if a perfon who Rood betwixt me 
 and an objesSl that I wanted to fee, (hould move out of the way : That 
 would not be, in any i'eni'c, the cuu/,; of my feeing the objcd, though 
 it would be that without which 1 could not fee it *. Now, the body 
 is to be confidered in like manner as an impediment to the perception 
 of the mind, which we may figure to ourfelves as fhut up in the dark 
 room above mentioned, with five peep-holes or inlets of the light, by 
 the means of which it perceives certain images reflected upon the wall. 
 In this way, the impediment to our perceptions is fo far removed, and 
 a total ecliple of the mind, which would otherwife take place, prevent- 
 ed ; but no new faculty, or even means of[ perception, is given. 
 
 Let me fiippofe a man confined in fuch a dark chamber from his in- 
 fancy, with no other ufe of light but what he receives through a hole 
 
 in 
 
 * This dr{Hn£lion betwixt a cau/e, properly fo called, and that without which a 
 caufe could not operate, is a dillin^tion of great importance in philofophy. It is 
 made by Plato in the Phaedo, p. 74. editio Feint, in thefe words : «aao ^iv t« eo-rt t» 
 
 «(T»«y ro) cfr;, «A>,« S* Exfoo, ^veu ov r« enTtov ovk ecv ttot^ «i) xiritv. Such things are Called, 
 
 in the language of Ariftotle, «-t;v«c»T««, or co-caufes^ becaufe, without them, the princi- 
 pal caufes could not operate. But, of thefe, a difi:in£lion is to be made ; for fome of 
 them are really caufes, fuch as the tools with which an artift works, and fuch as the 
 bones and (inews of the human body, of which Plato, in the paffage here quoted, is 
 fpeaking, as it is by thefe that the mind moves the body. Thefe are called injlru- 
 mental r:i\i{i:s; and they are no other than the immediate efficient caufes of the cfFe<^s 
 proi^uced. The other kind of thefe e-vienrix^ and it is that of which I am now fpe^ik- 
 ing, is not even an inftrvmental caufe, though it be that without which the efficient 
 caufe could not operate, as it removes the impediment to the operation of that caufe.
 
 Chap. XL ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. i6^ 
 
 in the wall, in which was fixed a lens, that reprefented the images 
 of things without, upon the oppofite wall. And let us fuppofe farther, 
 that, like P ato's prifoners, he was {o chained, that he could not look 
 at objeils diredly through this glafs, but was only permitted to fee 
 them as refleded upon the wall : While he continued in this room, 
 he would naturally believe that there was no other way of perceiving 
 vifible objeds. But, let us fuppofe him taken out of the dark room, 
 and produced into broad day -light, how great would his furprife be, to 
 fee fo much greater variety of objeds, and fo much more diftindtly 
 too, and to handle and examine ti^em every way ? The fame we may 
 fuppofe our furprife will be, when we are freed from the cajnera objcu- 
 ra which we carry 3bout with us, and perceive things with fo much 
 more clearnefs and diftindlnefs than when \\q were in it. 
 
 Thus, in imitation of Plato, I have endeavoured, by another fimili- 
 tude, to explain my notion of the powers of the mind, when delivered 
 from this dark prifon, in which it is at prefent confined. And I truft 
 that, from what 1 have faid in this and the preceeding chapters, I have 
 fhown clearly, that the mind has powers and faculties independent of 
 the body, and which probably will be exerted to much greater advan- 
 tage when it is difencumbered of the body : And this, I hope, will 
 have prepared the reader for what I am to undertake to prove, in the 
 fequel, that the mind is a fubftance altogether different from the body. 
 But, before I proceed to this, 1 think it proper to examine what the 
 antients have faid concerning the feveral parts of the iiiind. 
 
 X 2 CHAP.
 
 i64 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IL 
 
 CHAP. XII. 
 
 The ^isfiion concerning the Parts of the Mind confidered — The Word 
 Part uj'ed iiijeveral Senjes — Whether there be in Man diJlhiEl men- 
 tal Subftances, or only dijferent ^alities of the fame Mind — The ve- 
 getative Mind a diflind Suhjlancc from the Animal or Intellectual — 
 The Animal dijlin^l aljofrom the Intelledual — All the three form to- 
 gether a "juonderful Trinity. 
 
 BOTH Plato and Ariftotle fpeak much of the parts of the 
 mind ; and Ariftotle has employed a whole cttapter *, to fhow 
 that Plato has not made a full and compleat divifun of thele parts \ 
 but neither of them has told us explicitly in what fenle they uie tlic 
 word pari \ and yet I think that was necelfary, as it is a word tliat is 
 vfed in various fenfes. 
 
 It is a relative word, and is always ufed in relation to a ivhole ; and, 
 like all relatives, ihey muft neceflarily exift together. But tiiere 
 are ivholes of difTerent kinds ; for, in xhcff/l place, there is an ex- 
 tcvdcd is'hole-, of which the parts lie contiguous, fuch as vody and 
 fpace. Secondly', There is a whole, of which the parts are fcparated or 
 dilcrete, inch as number^ which, from thence, is called quantity ^\{c txe^ 
 Thirdly^ There is a nx-hole^ of which the parts do not exift together, but 
 
 only 
 
 * De ^niviajVih^ 3. cap. 10.
 
 Chap. XII. ANT I EN T METAPHYSICS. 165 
 
 only by fuccefTion, fuch as timey confifting of mhmtesy hours, and dajs, 
 or as many more parts as we pleafe, but which all exift fucceflively, or 
 not together. Fourthly^ There is what may be called a logical ivhok, 
 fuch as a genus, of which the feveral fpeciefes are parts : AnimaU for 
 example, is a ivhole, in this fenfe j and man, dog, horjc, &c. are the 
 feveral parts of it. And, Fifthly, The different qualities of the fame 
 fubflance may be faid to be parts of that fubftance. 
 
 As to the firfl: fenfe of the word, no body, I believe, ever imagined 
 that the mind was^tzc^. And, if the reader be not yet perfuaded that 
 it is nc: body, 1 hope, in the fequel, to be able fully to convince him. 
 Neither do I think that any of my readers will fuppofe that it is either 
 number or time : So that it only remains to be inquired, whether 
 what we call parts of the mind, be only different qualities of the 
 fame fubftance, or different fubftances, but of the fame genus, viz, 
 mind ; for, as mind is a general name for a certain kind of fubliance, 
 all its feveral fpeciefes muff neceffarily be fubftances. 
 
 The human mind, of which only I am now fpeaking, is compofed 
 of the vegetable, the animal, and the intelledual minds ; and the que- 
 ftion is. Whether thefe three be all the fame fubftance, of which the 
 vegetative, animal, and intelledual powers are but different qualities ? 
 or, Whether they be different fubftances ? 
 
 Firft, let us compare the vegetable with the animal and intell^^c^ual 
 life : And this comparifon is the more eafily made, as, in the vege- 
 table, that kind of life is fepara^cd from both ; whereas, in all ani- 
 mals, the vegetable and animal life are neceflarily joined ; and in fome, 
 fuch as man, all the three : whereas, with refpc£t to the vegetable, I 
 think it is perfedly clear that the mind in it miift be different from 
 either the animal or iiUellecLuil mind; for, if it were the fame, it would 
 
 have
 
 i66 ANtlENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 have the faiie qualities and properties, as all men, being of the 
 fame ipecies, have the lame qvialities, though ditTering in degree. But 
 the quahtles of the 'vegetable hie are altogether different from thofe 
 of either die nmnial Qiintelkciual \ and they not only exift feparately, 
 but, when ali the three exift together, the energies of the 'vegetable 
 lii"e are quiie d.Rind from thofe of the animal or intelkBuaL Nor 
 will any man of common fenfe fay, that the power by which we grow 
 and are nuurilhed, is the fame by which an animal perceives, defires, 
 or (huns, or that by which a man thinks and reafons. The 'vegeta- 
 ti've power, we know, operates heft, when we neither have the ufe of 
 fenfe nor reafon, that is, in our fleep ; and, if fo, it is clear that it muft 
 be difiindl from both. 
 
 This much, therefore, appears to be certainly true, that the vegeta- 
 ble mind is diftind from either the animal or intelledual. And, if 
 fo, we have at leaft two diffind fubftances joined together, and incor- 
 porated in the fame individual, however wonderful it may feem. And 
 this leads us to believe, that it is not improbable, far lefs impoffible, 
 that three diflindt fubflances may be united in man. What makes 
 the only difference in the cafe is, that, by the order of nature, the in- 
 telledual life cannot be without both the vegetable and animal ; where- 
 as, the vegetable can be without either of the other two ; but, tho' the 
 animal and intelledual be thus neceffarily conjoined, there is nothing 
 to hinder their being feparate and diftind in their nature, as well as 
 the animal and the vegetable. 
 
 And that they are fo, I think, is evident from their different ener- 
 gies and operations : Nor is there any way by which we can de- 
 termine, that any two fubftarxes are of the fame or different fpecies, 
 except by their operations ; efpecially, if they be fubftances that have 
 not fhape or colour, or any iuch quality falling under the fenfes. 
 
 Now,
 
 Chap. XII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 167 
 
 Now, I think I have proved, in a moft fatisfadory manner, that their 
 operations are altogether different. 
 
 Here, therefore, we have, in every man, a trinity y as myfterious, 
 but not lefs certain and real, than that higher Trinity which ftumbles 
 unbelievers fo much ; but which I fhall fliow afterwards, is as much a 
 dodtrine of philofophy as of religion. For we have a hypojlaiic and 
 confuhftantial union of three diftin^l fubftances, all joined together to 
 make one individual intellectual beings where we may conceive, as I 
 find fome of Ariftotle's commentators * did, one principle fuperemi- 
 nent over the reft, pure and unmixed altogether with body ; that is, 
 the N«vf, or pure intelleSl^ from which, by a wonderful prcceflion, 
 come the other two ; the one participating little of the divine'part of 
 us, but a great deal more of matter ; the other contrariwife, partaking 
 more of the firft principle, and lefs of the material part. 
 
 That Ariftotle believed in this trinity, as well as his commentators, I 
 think, is evident ; for, as to the animal and vegetable mind being diftindt, 
 he appears to have had no doubt: And that he believed the intelle<ftual 
 to be diftindt from the animal, I think is clear from feveral paiTages of 
 his works f. And here we have difcovered, in this moft extraordi- 
 nary compound, mmu > for fo he appears to the philofopher), a numeri- 
 cal ivhoky gonfifting of three diftmdl fubftances, joined together in a 
 
 won- 
 
 * See Simpliclus in his commentary upon the 3d book Dc ^nimUf page 6g. and 
 alfo feveral other pail'ages. 
 
 t One of thefe I quoted before, p. 140. lib. 3. cap 6. De ^^nima. Another may be feen 
 in the ^d book of the lame work, cap. i. where, fpeaking »•£§< row rov, nxt rm hu^irt- 
 KTSf ^vDxutucy in comp:^ir:ron with the animal life, he fays, ioixt ^vxyii yi*oi eti^sv eitm. kui 
 rovTo fiivot iyh}(^iTut ^u^tl^if^x. KxietTrs^ to uthtv tov (pIx^Tov. And, in the next chapter of 
 the fame book, towards the '.nd, he diftinguiihes betwixt >^oyiir^oi. which, it is plain, 
 he afcribcs to other animals as well as man, and the »«V5 C.<v^sr<x»sj for, fays he, -rt^i
 
 i55 ANTIEN T MET APH YSICS. Book IL 
 
 wonderful manner, and Incorporated in the fame mafs of matter : And, 
 if it be true, what the antient philofophers faid, that 7nan is a little 
 world, there mufl be the fame union of thefe three principles in the 
 great world. 
 
 But, as there is in the great world phyjtcal hod}\ not organized, but 
 having a principle of motion in it, fo alfo is there in our little one : 
 And this principle of motion I comprehend under the general name 
 o^ mind I though Ariftotle fays, as I have before obferved,. that it is 
 only like to mind. That it is different from any of the three prin- 
 ciples above mentioned, is evident from its operations, by which only 
 we can diflinguifh the difference of things; for, that its operation is 
 altogether different, not only from thought and reafon, but from the 
 operation of the animal and vegetable principle, as different as the 
 animal or vegetable is from unorganized matter, is evident to com- 
 mon obfervation. 
 
 Thus I have fliown in what fenfe the human mind can be faid to 
 confift of parts, namely, that it is compofed of three diftindt fubftan-i- 
 ces, united together in a wonderful manner ; but each of thefe fub- 
 
 ftances we are to conceive as fimple in itfelf, and indivifible ; for I am 
 
 « 
 
 now to proceed to fhow, that they are each of them immaterial fub- 
 flances, indivifible, and, by confequence, without parts* 
 
 CHAP-
 
 Chap. XIII. ANTIENTMETAPHYSICS. 169 
 
 ) 
 
 CHAP. XIII. 
 
 The Antient Philofophers made the DijltnSlion betwixt Body and Mindy 
 and bclie'ved that both exifled — Some of them believed that Mind 
 ivas corporeal^ and that every Thing elfe ivas fo — This the Foun- 
 dation of Atheifm — The Belief in incorporeal Subjlances the Founda^ 
 tion of Theijm- -Different Manners in ivhich Things exifl — Incorpo^ 
 real Snbjlance exifts in the mofl perfefl Manner — Obje^ion to the 
 Exiftence of Immaterial Subflances^ that they cannot be conceived-—^ 
 Anjiver to this ObjeSiion tnvofold — Firft, That they can be conceived 
 —Secondly, If they could 710 1, no Reafon from thence to conclude 
 that they did not exifl. 
 
 ALL the antient philofophers, whofe opinions Plato and Ariftotlc 
 have mentioned conceriiing body and mind^ agreed in the diftinc- 
 tion that I make betwixt the two, and appear to have had no doubt 
 of the exiftence of both ; for, though Democritus, and after him Epi- 
 curus, denied that there was a governing mind in the univerfe, yet 
 neither of them doubted of the exiftence of the human mind^ or that 
 there was thought and reajon^ ivijdom and counfcU in our little bodies, 
 though none any where elfe. But the great point in difpuce among 
 the philofophers of thofe days was, What was the nature of mind ? 
 Whether it was a fubftance different from bodyy or whether it w^as 
 not body^ but more fubtile, and of a finer texture than ordinary body ? 
 All the Atheiftical philofophers of antiquity maintained, that there 
 was nothing exiHing but/r^, air^ earth, and irater ; and that, of one 
 or other of thefe, or all together, varioudy modified, mind was made. 
 The Theifts, on the other hand, maintained, that inind was of a nature 
 
 Y and
 
 1^0 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BooklL 
 
 2iX\^fiihftance quite diftln6t from body ; and alfo, that it was the eldeft 
 of things in the univerfe, and every thing clfe produced from it. In 
 this way the controverfy is fairly ftatcd hetwixt the Atheifts and The- 
 ifts by Plato in his loth Book of Laws*. All thofe, therefore, iii 
 antient times, Avho admitted the exigence of immaterial fubftances, were 
 of confequence Theifts ; and the fame, I conceive, is the cafe of the 
 philofophers of our time. For, tho' there were among the antients fome 
 Materialifts who wereTheifls, particularly the Stoics, who, notwithftand- 
 ing they believed in an all-wife and all-powerful God, maintained never- 
 thelefs, that he was corporcah I have never heard of any philofopher, 
 antient or modern, who believed in the exiRence oF incorporeal fub- 
 ftances, and yet did not believe in God t- If) therefore, it can be made 
 out, that there is fuch athing cxifting in nature 2isfuhftance incorporealy 
 the confequence is admitted by all philofophers to be, that there is a 
 God ; and, accordingly, by the great Theifts of antiquity, and parti- 
 cularly Plato and Arillotle, there is nothing io much laboured as to 
 prove, that immaterial fuljlances do exift : For, fays Ariftotle, if fuch 
 fubftances do exift, the Divinity muft neceflarily be one of them %, 
 
 As, 
 
 * Plato, pag. 949. eilitio Picini, Avhere he fnys, that the opinion, that fire, air, 
 earth, and water, were the whole of things, and conflituted what we call Ndture, 
 was the fource of Atheifm. And, in the Sophifta, page 172. he fays, that the Athe- 
 ifts of his time maintained, that only what they could lay hold of, and refilled the 
 touch, was fubftance, and had a real exiftence : And, if any one told them, that 
 things exifted v/hich had no body, they defpifcd him, and did not think it worth their 
 while to converfe with him. 
 
 t This is the opinion of Cudworth in his intelledual fyftem, page 135. where, 
 fpeaking of the feveral kinds of Atheifts, he fays, ' All Atheifts are mere corporeal' 
 
 * z/?j, that is, acknowledge no other fubftance befides body or matter. For, as 
 
 * there was never any yet known, who, afferting incorporeal fubftance, did deny a 
 ' Deity \ fo neither can there be any reafon why he, that admits the formei', fliould 
 « exclude the latter.* And, in another paflage, page 768. he fays, ' That, though 
 
 ■« all corporealifls be not therefore of neceftity Atheifts, yet Atheifts univerfally 
 
 * have been corporealift: ; this being always their firft and grand poftulatum, that there 
 
 * is no other fubftance befides body.*
 
 Chap.XIir. AN TIE NTT METAPHYSICS. 171 
 
 As therefore, it is a queftion of the greateft importance, both ia 
 rel'idon and philofophy, it ought to be treated with the greateft atten- 
 tion ; and, that the nature of the queftion may be the better underftood, 
 a d wherein the difference betwixt fubflances jrmterial a.nd imniaterial 
 cr-nfifls, I \^\\\ beuin with ftating the different v/ays in which wc can 
 coiKclvc things exifting. 
 
 And, in the frjl place, All things exift either in parts or without 
 i)nrts. Befides thefe, there is no third way of exifting ; for, there can 
 be no niiddSe betv^ixt thele two ; nor can we conceive the fame thing 
 exiiling both in parts and without par ts. 
 
 Of the things which exifi by />^r/j, there are three kinds: The firfl 
 is of things, the parts of which are not co-exijlenty huifuccejji've^ fucU 
 as time or motion^ no two parts of which can exift together. The exift- 
 ence, therefore, of fuch things is fleeting and tranfitory, and tlie mofl 
 imperfed of all exiftence ; for it is of fo fhadowy a nature, that, while 
 we. fay it zV, it ceajes to be. 
 
 The next kind of things confifiing o? parts, is fuch whnfe />/7r/j' are 
 co-exiilent and contiguous. Things of this kind are faid to be extend^ 
 ed ; for, extenfion is nothing elfe but co-exiflence and jun^ion of parts. 
 This kind of being has, no doubt, a more real exiftence than the o- 
 ther ; but its exiftence is likewife imperfect, in as much as it does not 
 exift all together, but each part by itfelf, joined together indeed, but 
 eacli capable of feparation from the other ; fo that we can fay, this 
 is one part of it, and that another *. And this is true, not only of 
 
 Y 2 the 
 
 ttTMvt* IV «i) wov Ktct r» Sntf, xeci uxj7% k¥ «d ?r{«»T»i Kttt Kv^tcrtcTn tt^y;n, Metaph. lib. 1 3. 
 cap. 7. — See alfo lib. 6. cap. 1. 
 
 * This is the account that Plof'nus gives of maprnitude, w<«ft«< fjnyxitvq, r« f*i* «>a« 
 T« Ji «tx^♦. And Simplicius, in hi& commentary upon Arillotlc's Fbyfics, page 3 gives 
 
 the
 
 172 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 the ivhok, but of every the fir ailed part •, and, as it exifts, fo It is ge- 
 nerated and produced ; for it is not produced all together, but one part 
 after anoiher *. I'his, therefore, is the nature of ^o^/, that all the 
 parts of it, however homogeneous, are different from one another in 
 pofition ; and the isohok is not one fimple fubitance, but a multitude, 
 or heap of fubilances, as many as there are parts into which it is divi- 
 fible t. It is alfo an imperfed exiflence in another refped, that fome- 
 thing always may be conceived to be added to it j fo that it is never 
 perfed or com pleat in itfelf. 
 
 The third kind of things exlfting by parts Is, when the parts are co- 
 exiftent, yet not contiguous, or joined, but feparate and disjoined. Of this 
 kind is number^ the parts of which are feparated by nature^ and only 
 united by the operation of the mhicL The ivhok of this kind is more d 
 perfed than either of the other two ; for it is not divifible into parts, 
 which are likewife infinitely divifible, but is all relolvable into parts 
 perfectly fimilar one to another, which have no place or pofition, and 
 which are incapable of divifion : From whence it is evident, that the 
 ivhole of this kind is much more fimple and uncompounded than ei- 
 ther of the other two. But ftill it is divifible, at leaft into a certain 
 number of parts ; fo that it is not an indivifible ivhole ; and It has the 
 other kind of imperfedion, mentioned above as belonging to magni- 
 tude, that It is capable of further augmentation iti infinitum ; and> 
 therefore, it is not in this refped a perfcd and compleat ivhok any 
 
 more than magnitude, 
 
 I 
 
 the fame account of it j ^£|t«-T» ^jv x-rXui n. o-tuuxrucf^ twttt Trxe-a, uXXmi ttWo^tv rui ftt^i- 
 mv Ktiuiiui. Hence it comes that the pari; arc fituated at a diftance or divided from one 
 another ; and therefore it is called lixo-ictTi •i/<r<«i whereas Plotinus tells us, N#vj «v 
 'tieta-Ttti «<p* '«wToi»: lntelle6l is not divided from itfelf. 
 
 * Sec Simplicius's commentary upon the firlt book of Ariflotle De Animay fol, »o« 
 page 2. in fine. 
 
 \ See more upon this fubjeft m Cudworth'sintelledual fyftem, p. 829»
 
 Chap.XIII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 173 
 
 I come now to fpeak of that which exifts without parts. And it is 
 evident from what has been faid, that this muft he the moft perfed: 
 exiftence of any ; for we cannot fay of fuch a fubftance, as we can do 
 of bodjy that here is a part of it, there is a part of it ; or that one part 
 of it exifted firft, another laft ; or that it is aliud extra aliud^ one thing 
 ivithout another. Nor is it Hke numher^ which, though divifible into 
 parts perfedly fimilar, and not having the difference even of pofition, 
 is ftill divifible : Nor does it refemble either magnitude or number in 
 this refpe6t, that it is capable of addition or augmentation in infinitum^ 
 and therefore is by its nature undetermined and unlimited. But it is 
 one perfect ivhole^ indivifible, compleat in itfelf, and incapable either 
 of augmentation or diminution. This moft perfed kind of exiftence 
 I afcribe, as is natural, to the 7noft perfe^ thing : And I fay, that mind 
 exifts in this way *, 
 
 - It will, I know, be faid, that fuch a being as I have defcribed is In- 
 conceivable ; and thofe indeed muft think fo, who believe that we 
 have no other faculty of perception, except Jen/e and imagination: 
 For it certainly cannot be apprehended by /enje., nor pidured in the 
 imagination, under any corporeal form. But, I hope,! have proved to 
 the fatisfadion of every intelligent reader, that we are pofftffed of a 
 faculty much fuperior to thofe, and that by it we can apprehend what 
 has neither colour nor Jljape, and ivhat eye hath not feen. no) ear heard. 
 And, I hope alfo, that I have fo explained incorporeal fubftance, as to 
 make it an objed of that fuperior faculty, though not of fenfe and 
 imagination, which it is impolTible it can be. 
 
 If 
 
 * Proclus. in his commentary upon the fecond book of the Timaeus, has onpo- 
 fed to mind what is in generation, and liable to corruption, ni the following words : 
 
 T# tvi fAiti oAov x«* fin iy.x \rru<rxi ti/ in T»)y tvcriKf ij T))» iU^ytix* ix,ev, yif^Tof tTtoyeuxCtTKt. KXi 
 Cix yiniTtafi to r^ttvh TTxytUi ii(ptc-r>\xiY, x.xi to ntxt xvrn yiyvt/^ivtv sjtjv, «aa' «vx «r. romvTog
 
 174 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book IT. 
 
 If piitid were the only thing to be conceived in I'lis n anner, there 
 might appear Tome weight in the objedion: But, let us coniider how 
 it IS w'lh the qualities and properties ot mind? Can any man 
 perceive by his lenfe, or figure in his imagination, thought and retijbuy 
 ^ruaetice^ jujiice^ or temperance., or any faculty or power ot the mind 
 of any kind ? x'^nd, if the qualities of mind cannot be in that way 
 conceived, how can we imagine that mind itielf can be i'o conceived? 
 
 And here we may obferve the difference betwixt the prope ties of 
 body and of 7mnd. Thofe of body^ fuch as extenfion.fi^u ^, and colour ^ 
 we can reprefent by the imagination, as we can do bo^y iiieU ; but 
 the qualities of mind vvc cannot fo reprefent. 
 
 Further, if we have as clear a conception of fuhflance Incorporeal^ 
 as we have of corporeal, what more can we defire? Now, I fay, we 
 have, to the full, as clear a conception of the Jubflance of mind^ as we 
 have of that of body^ and a much clearer conception of its operations. 
 For what do we know ot body, except that it is extended.^ coloured^ 
 figured^ tangible., &c. But of vi\\?it jubilance are thefe the proper- 
 ties ? When any one has told me that, then will I tell him what the 
 fubflance of mind is. But, in the mean time, I think I have made 
 its nature fuflicicntly intelligible, by comparing its properties with 
 thofe of ^or/;', aid Ihown that they are quite oppofite. And, as to 
 the operations of mind., it is evident, that we know them much bet- 
 ter, as we know them by the mod certain and Intimate of all know- 
 ledge, viz. conjciviifnefs. 
 
 But, fuppofe I fhould allow, that we could not conceive the man- 
 ner of exigence of an incorporeal fubflance; are we from thence to 
 conclude, that it docs not exift ? This would be a very dangerous 
 dodrine In philofophy as well as religion. Nothing, 1 thmk, is n ore 
 inconceivable, than how our mind., or call by v^^iatever other name 
 
 you
 
 €hap.XIIl. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 175 
 
 you pleafe the principle of motion within us, moves our body ; and 
 yet nothing is more certain than that it does move it. 
 
 Suppofe that a bUnd man fhould deny the exiftence of colours, or 
 a deaf man of founds, becaufe they could not conceive the nature of 
 them, or hov/ they could exiil; would they not be thought ridiculous? 
 And yet they would have much more realbn to deny the exiftence of 
 colours or founds, than we have to deny the exiftence of 7nind, or iw- 
 material fuhjlance ; for they might fay, and fay truly, that they have 
 not the leaft idea, not even the moft imperfed, of colour or found ; 
 whereas, I hope I have proved, that we have at leaft an idea, if not a 
 fenfation, or imagination, of immaterial fubftance. And they might 
 -further fay, that they do not, nor cannot, know any properties or qua- 
 lities, effedls or operations, of colours or founds ; whereas, the proper- 
 ties and operations of m'lnd^ we know with the greatefl: certainty, by 
 .daily experience and obfervation *. 
 
 The truth, therefore, appears to be, that, in our prefent ftate, we 
 have not faculties by which we can difcover the elTence, or manner of 
 exiftence of any thing, but only the properties or accidents of things. 
 But we muft not, for that reafon, difbelieve the exiftence of the 
 things, otherwife we {hall believe that nothing exifts, and the whole 
 univerfe will be to us an uni'verfal blank. 
 
 Having thus removed all objeiTiions to the exiftence of immaterial 
 fubftance, from our inability to conceive it, I will now proceed to 
 prove that it does adually exift, 
 
 CHAP. 
 
 * See tills argumcDt very well Inforced by Dr Clark, in liis Demonflration of inc. 
 iBeing and Attributes of God, p. 82. 4th edit.
 
 176 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 CHAP. XIV. 
 
 Three Proofs of the Immateriality of Mind in general — the firjl taken 
 from the Nature oj Motion — the Jecond from the Nature oj Body — 
 and the third Jrom the Nature o/Mind itjelf- — Jhe lajl a Demonftra* 
 tion ex abiurdo — the other tivo a priori. 
 
 AS I underftand by ;«zW> that motive poiver which animates, not 
 organized bodies only, fuch as animals and vegetables, but un- 
 organized bodies, — which, in fhort, pervades the whole univerfe, fu- 
 ftains and keeps together the mighty frame, being the principle of co- 
 hefion in bodies as well as ofmotion^ I will firft givefome general proofs 
 of the immateriality of this principle, applying equally to all bodies, 
 and then [ will confider particularly the different bodies in this uni- 
 verfe, and offer fome particular arguments to prove, that the 77ioving 
 principle^ however different in the feveral bodies, mufl neceffarily be 
 immaterial. 
 
 The firff general proof I fubmlt to the confi deration of the reader, 
 is built upon what I think I have already demonftrated, that what 
 moves is diftind: from what is moved ; and that, where there is motion^ 
 there muft neceffarily be two things, one that moves^ and another that 
 is moved. That there is thisdiilindion in idea at leall, and that it a<Stu- 
 ally obtains in all machines of human invention, cannot be denied. 
 But I think I have given a general demonftration, arifing from the na- 
 ture of motion, th;it it obtains univerfally, in all the works of nature as 
 well as of art ; and therefore, that nothing can move itfelf. 
 
 This
 
 Chap. XIV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 177 
 
 This being eftablifhed, Ifay, that what moves mufl be either material 
 or immaterial ; for the one of thefe being the negation of the other, 
 there can be no middle betwixt them, becaufe a thing muft neceflarily 
 he or not be. Ifj then, it be immaterial, there is an end of the que- 
 ftion ; but, if it be faid to be material, then I fay that it mu(t be wo- 
 V^d itfelf, before it can move any thing elfe ; for it is only in that way 
 that body can move body. If, then, it muft be firft moved itfelf, but 
 cannot itfelf move itfelf, I afk. What it is that moves it ? If it be an- 
 fwered. That it is another material mover, then I repeat the fame 
 queftion, to which the fame anfwer muft be given : And fo we have 
 an infinite feries of material movers^ without any beginning, or prin^ 
 ciple of motion. Now, this is abfurd, and contradictory to this firft 
 principle of natural philofophy, admitted by all philofophers, antlent 
 and modern, that nothing can be produced ivithout a caiife. For, un- 
 lefs there be a firft caufe, of which nothing elfe is the caufe, there is 
 ultimately no caufe at all ; and we do no more than put off or remove 
 the difficulty, without folving it, as the Indian did, when he was afked, 
 What fupported the earth ? and anfwered. An elephant, — What fiip- 
 ported the elephant ? — A tortoife. — His anfwer, as the ftory goes, 
 went no further. But, if he had named a million of things, each fup- 
 porting the other, unlefs he could have named one thing, which it- 
 felf needed no fupport, it is evident that he never would have account- 
 ed for the earth being fupported. 
 
 This, I think, is a demonftration a priori^ taken from the nature of 
 motion : I will give another from the nature of body itfelf. 
 
 All body is, by its nature, feparable and divifible. If, therefore, 
 there were not fomething that kept it together, it would be no longer 
 body, for it would have no extenfion nor jundion of parts. What 
 keeps body thus together, is called the principle of cohefion^ which is a 
 tendency in the feveral parts of the body to be joined, and to remain 
 joined to oue another \ and, as that cannot be without a tendency to 
 
 Z move
 
 178 ANTIENT METAPHY SICS. Book II. 
 
 move towards one another, it may be very properly afcribed to that 
 principle o^ motion which Ariftotle has made to be eflentially inherent 
 in all phyfical bodies. And, accordingly, all the Newtonian philofo- 
 phers hold tidhefion to be nothing elfe but attraSlion in conta6t. This 
 principle of motion is {0 ftrong in bodies, that it often overcomes ano- 
 ther principle by which all the bodies here on earth tend towards the 
 earth, and which is called by our modern philofophers attra^ion ; for 
 it is by the particles of mattery of which bodies are compofed, adhering 
 to one another, and not falling to the ground by their natural tenden- 
 cy to the centre of the earth, that bodies fland ered ; for, otherwife, 
 all animals and vegetables, mountains, and rocks, and elevations of 
 every kind, would be diffufed into a horizontal plain, along the fur- 
 face of the earth, like water *. And this accordingly happens, when 
 the principle of adhefion is overcome, either by violence, or by lapfe 
 of time, in the ordinary courfe of nature ; for then the body is difTol- 
 ved, and falls to pieces. This, we fee, happens every day in animals 
 and vegetables ; and, therefore, in them, this principle of adhefion is 
 recognized by every body, and is called the life of the animal or vege- 
 table; but it is as real in the bodies that are called inanimate, though 
 not fo generally obferved and acknowledged ; and may very properly 
 be faid, in the language of Ariftotle, to be a kind of life in them. Now, 
 I afk. What is the nature of this principle of adhefion ? Is it mate- 
 rial or immaterial ? If it be faid to be material, and to be a kind of 
 cement which keeps bodies together, then I afk, What keeps this ce- 
 ment together, or gives it this cementing quality \ If another cement 
 for this cement is alledged, I repeat the quellion ; and fo I drive my op- 
 ponent to the necefhty of going on from cement to cement in infinitum. 
 And therefore it appears, that here, likewiie, unle.s we have recourfe 
 to an immaterial caufe, there is no other caufe or principle to be found ; 
 
 and 
 
 * As Ariftotle has defined nature to be a principle of rejl, as well as of motion^ it is 
 not unlikely that he has had in view this adhefion of botlies, which keeps them in a 
 ftate Avhich, if not at perfeil rcfi^ may be faid to be at reji compared with the ordinary 
 motions of body.
 
 Chap. XIV. AN TIE NT METAPHYSICS. 179 
 
 and body muft adhere together^ a« -well as 7nove, without any caufe at 
 all *. 
 
 Thus, It appears to be proved, from the nature, both of jjtotion and 
 of body moved^ that the motive principle is immaterial ; and I will add a 
 third proof, from the nature of mind itfelf. If mind be material, it mull: 
 neceflarily confift of an infinite number of parts, all different from 
 one another, at leaft in pofition. Now, Is each of .thefe parts mind ? 
 or, Is it not ? If each of them be mind, then. In every man, in every 
 animal, and in every vegetable, and, indeed, in every piece of matter, 
 inftead of one mind, there is an infinite number of minds. And, if 
 fo, I afk, What does the magnitude, and the confequent number of 
 minds contribute ? Would not one mind have done the bufinefs as well ? 
 And can we fuppofe nature fo fuperfluoufly profufe, as to have beftow- 
 ed upon every animal and vegetable an infinite number of minds, 
 when one was fufficient ? And another abfurdity will follow, that a 
 part will tie the fame thing with the whole. Again, if it be fald, that 
 each of the parts Is not mind by itfelf, I afk. How It Is pofTible to 
 conceive that any number of parts, each of which is without life, fenfe, 
 or motion, being accumulated, fhould produce life, fenfe, or motion ? 
 or, if it were poffible to conceive this, it would be neceffary to deter- 
 mine what number of thefe fenfelefs and inanimate parts it would re- 
 
 Z 2 quire 
 
 * This argument is ftatcd, and very -well urged by Philoponus, in his introduction 
 to his commentary upon Ariftotle's books De Anima. It is an excellent piece of philo- 
 fophy, which I recommend to the perufal of the learned reader : And I think it de- 
 ferves the more attention, that Philoponus was not only an t'xcellent Ariftotclian phi- 
 lofopher, but a Chriftian, who, as Suidas informs us, wrote fereral books in defence of 
 Chriftianity. In him, therefore, wc may expert to find, not only the pliilofophy of 
 Ariftotle, but the philofophy of the firft fathers of the church. This argument, in fup- 
 portof the mind's immateriality, is probably taken from Proclus, in his commentary 
 upon the Timacus. And though Philoponus carried it no farther than to the vegetable 
 animal^ and rational life, yet the paffagc in Proclus which I quoted above, pag. 7:2 and 
 86 goes to the full length that I have carried the argument, namely, to all bodies 
 unorganized as well as organized.
 
 i8o ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BookIL 
 
 quire to make a mind *. This demonftration is of the kind which 
 the mathematicians call ab ahfurdo^ that is, from the abfurd confe- 
 quences which would follow, if we (hould fuppofe the contrary to be 
 true. Now, though this kind of demonftration be not, properly 
 fpeaking, a priori^ nor fo inftrudive as that which argues from caiife 
 to effe^^ and ihows, not only that the thing is true, hut why it is 
 true ; yet it equally proves the proportion ; and therefore is as con- 
 vincing. 
 
 * This is an argument of Plotinus, in his Eneads, p. 460- as mentioned by Cud- 
 worth in his Intellectual Syflem, p 823. 
 
 CHAP,
 
 Chap. XV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. i&i 
 
 CHAP. XV. 
 
 Proofs in the preceding Chapter a priori — thofe in this Chapter a pofte- 
 riori, being from the Phaenomena (5/' Nature — Ride of philofophlfing in 
 this Matter the Jame as that laid doivn by Sir Ifaac Newton — Lauus 
 of Nature concerning Body — No Vis Inertiae /wBody — on the contra- 
 ry ^ a Vis Mobilitatis — The f ever al Ways in nx^hich Body is moved — 
 Cauje of thefejeveral Motions, — Om Caufe material^ viz, by Impulfe of 
 Body upon Body — Tivo things required in order that this Caufefhould 
 operate — Nojuch thing as Attra6tion, properly fpeaking — only a Ten^- 
 dency in one Body to move toivards another — Cauie of the Motion of 
 the Celeflial Bodies, according to the Neiv Philofophy^ tnere Hypothec 
 Jis — That Motion not to be accounted for by external Impulje of a fubtle 
 Fluid — The Averfion of our prefent Philojophers to Mind — In vuhat 
 Senfe Nature can be faid to produce the Motion of Bodies. — Mind efjential 
 to Nature — Motion in the Vegetable not to be accounted for by Me- 
 chanic Caufes — fill lefs the Motion of the Animal — Wonderful Poiver 
 exerted by the Moving Principle in the Animal — Senfation cannot be 
 produced by a Material Caufe — Reafoning and Conlcioulneis far lefs, 
 
 THE proofs in the preceding chapter, of the immateriality of 
 the moving principle or mind^ are drawn from the nature ot the 
 things to which they relate ; namely, motion^ body, and 7hind ; and 
 therefore are what are commonly called arguments a priori. But thofe 
 I am to ftate in this chapter are a po/ieriori, for they are drawn trom 
 the phaenomena of nature, that is, facets falling unJer our obfcrvation 
 and experien.:e ; from which we argue backwards to their caufes. 
 
 I obferved, in the beginning of this work, that the fcicnce of meta- 
 phylies is founded upon phyfics, a:id, as the name imports. C(u-nes, ui 
 the order of teaching, after phjfics ; becaufe mind, which is its lub- 
 
 jecl,,
 
 1^2 AN TIE NT METAPHYSICS. Bbok IT. 
 
 jeS:, cannot be otberwife known to us, except by its operations on 
 pbyfical bodies ; (o tbat W€ muft firft ftudy and know thefe before we 
 can know what mind is. This obfervation applies particularly to the 
 queftion now before us, concerning the immateriality of fnind ; for 
 immaterial is a negative term, importing no more than that the fub- 
 je(fl to which we apply it, has not the qualities or affections of matter ; 
 for, with refpeCt to the eflence of either body or mind, as I have had 
 occafion to obferve more than once before, we know nothing ; all, 
 therefore, we can ki"iow of immaterial fubftances, is from matter. And 
 again, the properties of matter are only to be known by us from fenfe 
 and obfervation. It mufl: therefore be laid down as a pojlulatum in 
 this argument, that no qualities, properties, or laws of matter, are to 
 be fuppofed, which are not proved to exift by obfervation or experi- 
 rience. This is a rule of philofophifmg adopted by Sir Ifaac Newton, 
 and which, I think, ought to be invariably followed in all inquiries of 
 every kind concerning nature. 
 
 But, tho* I adopt Sir Ifaac*s rule of philofophifing, T cannot fo rea*- 
 dily agree with what he lays down as laws of nature concerning body^ 
 particularly that law which aflerts, that there is a 'uis inertiae in matter 
 or hody^ (thefe two being the fame in the language of his philofophy) ; 
 for 1 hold it to be contrary to the rule of philofophifmg above men- 
 tioned which he has prefcribcd to himfelf ; becaufe it is evident, from 
 common obfervation, that every hody^ that we are acquainted with, is 
 either in motion^ or has a tendency to be in motion^ If, therefore, by 
 the 'VIS inertiae is meant a tendency in body to continue at reft, which 
 is the only proper meaning that can be given to the word, it is mani- 
 feftly repugnant to the phaenomena of nature ; fromwhicl;! it appears,, 
 that there is no body that has a tendency to reft : Or, if the meaning."^ 
 be, as I believe it is, that bodies perfevere in the motion that is given 
 them, either by nature or external impulfe, till fome contrary force 
 cither gives them another motion, or flops their motion altogether, 
 
 the
 
 Chap. XV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 183 
 
 the propofitlan is true ; but I think it rauft be owned that it is ill ex-i 
 prefled *. 
 
 Laying it down, therefore, as a certain fad, that all bodies we know 
 are moved^ or, at leaft, have a tendency to be moved ; and that, fo far 
 from there being a vis inertiae in them, there is in them a vis niobili^ 
 tcitis, let us next inquire into the feveral ways in which they are 
 moved. And it appears to me, that Ariftotle's divifion is full and 
 com pleat, viz. that they are moved, either in a ftraight line, a circu- 
 lar line, that is, a line revolving into itfelf, or in a direction mixed 
 
 of 
 
 * I have heard a better name given to this quality in body, viz. vis perfevermitiae^ 
 or, as we may exprefs it more {imply in Engliih, refijlcnce ; which undoubt- 
 edly is an eflentiai property in bodyj for, if body were altogether foft and yielding, 
 it would be incapable of either impelling or being impelled. The confequence of 
 •this would be, that we could have no fenfation, or perception of body by our fenfes, 
 which is produced by impulfe upon the organs of our fenfe, either immediately by the 
 body perceived, as in the cafe of Uuch and tajie^ or mediately, by the intervention of 
 other bodies, which are repelled by the body perceived, and, in that way, the motion 
 communicated to our organs, as in the cafe oi fight. And, further, there coulil be 
 no motion of body by impulfe of other body ; becauie, if there were no rcfiitence in body^ 
 there could be no impreflion made upon it. 
 
 With refiftence are neceffariiy joined two other qualities of body, viz. foUdity and 
 impenetrability. By the firft of which is meant, inch a junction and coiietion of 
 parts, as neceffariiy make refifbence to any impreflion j and, by the other, the im- 
 polTibility that any two particles of matter fhoula occupy the fame fpace, which would 
 be the cafe, if one of them could fo penetrate the other, as perfectly to incorporate 
 with it. Thefe are qualites of matter, which we are fure, from obieivation and ex- 
 perience, that it poffefles : And therefore we may lay them down as the bafis of our 
 reafoning upon this fubjc£l, according to the rule of pnilofophiling above mentioned. 
 
 1 have elfewhere in this work, (pag. 29- 30.) obferved an inaccuracy of exprclhon, 
 likewife, in another law of motion laid down by JSir ifaac Newton, that * a<fl:ion and 
 * re-aftion are equal.' 'I'hat I am right in the fenfe 1 have given to that axiom ot the 
 Newtonian philofophy, I will not pofitiveiy allirm. But this i think 1 may venture 
 to affirm, that it is not exprefled fo clearly .is an axiom ought to be cxpreneti : And, 
 in general,! cannot help obferving, that 8ir liaac, though h^. m.iy havt been as good, or 
 perhaps a better geometer, yet he was not fuch a mailer of language as iiuc'id, in 
 whofe elements there is a propriety and brevity of expreffion which 1 have often ad- 
 mired.
 
 i«4 A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I C S. Book II. 
 
 of thefe two*.- Ariflotle fuppofeSj that the motion in the ftraight 
 line is either /o the center, as heavy bodies are moved; ot from 
 the center, as light bodies are moved. But, had he obferved thofe 
 motions of the fmall particles of matter which chcmiftry exhibits, 
 he would have been convinced, that bodies have a tendency to move, 
 both to a.nd J'rom one another, in every diredion ; and Empedocles, 
 wlio made friendlhip and enmity two of the principles of nature, 
 would have feen his hypothefis wonderfully verified in the attradions, 
 as they are called, and repulfions of chemical bodies. Thefe are the 
 fads w^hich mud be the bafis of any fyftem of philofophy upon this 
 fubjed ; but they are no more than fads ; and philofophy is the know- 
 ledge of cau/cs. We muft, therefore, inquire what is the cau/e of all 
 thofe various motions of body. 
 
 And one cauje is obvious to common obfervation, namely, matter 
 ading upon matter. For, that one body moves another by triifi07idin<\ 
 pulfwn, or, as it may be exprefled in one word, by impuJje^ is a fad 
 of daily experience. And, not only are all the works of art perform- 
 ed in this way, but a great part of the bufinefs of nature is carried on 
 by motion communicated from one body to another ; for, that there 
 is a great deal of machinery in nature, is known, not only to men of 
 fcience, but to every common obferver. We may therefore lay it 
 down, as a law of nature, that body moves body by impidfe. 
 
 But, for this purpofe, it is neceflary, in \S\^ firjl place, that the body 
 moving (liould be 7noved itfelf, and by fome other cau/e than itfelf ; as 
 I think I have dcmonflrated, that nothing can move itfelf. This 
 
 caufcy 
 
 <Pve-iy >ctvr,c-iMi tcf^x''-^ <?«jt4t> eiyut ecvr«ii. ttub-u 'S'i Kiyr.c-ti, ecrjj KMrx Terror, f,' Kuy^ovf^.ti (pcfctty »j 
 £v.^«« *jj x.'jKh^, 'jj {* T<u/TA»v ftocTij' u7r>~cci "i uf' eiVTKi 6V0 fitYctt, jJC CoelO; Ilb> It cap. 2.
 
 Chap. XV. AN TIE NT METAPHYSICS. 185 
 
 caufe^ therefore, afTigned to motion, does not account for the begin- 
 ning of it, but only for the continuance or propagation of it. For, 
 if we (hould fay, that this motion, by impuljc^ goes on in infinitum'^ 
 body ftill hnpeU'ing body ; in the firft place, this would be to give no 
 beginning to motion ; and, in the fecond place, it would be to affign 
 no caufe for it, becaufe, as I have ihown, an infinite feries of caufes is 
 no caufe at all. 
 
 2^/k, In order that body fhould move body by impidfey it is of ne- 
 ceflity that the two bodies fhould be in contact ; for this is implied in 
 the nature of motion fo produced. To fuppofe, therefore, that body 
 attraSIs body, or operates upon it any way at a diftance, is a mere 
 hypothefis,not fupported by any phaenomena of nature, contradidory 
 to that fundamental law of nature, according to the Newtonian philo- 
 fophers, which lays it down, that there is a vis inertiae in all matter ; 
 inftead of which, attra5iion fuppofes an adive principle in matter. 
 And, further, 1 fay, it is abfolutely inconceivable, that a thing fhould 
 ad or operate in any way where it is not ; fo that it is not only a 
 mere fuppofition, but an impofTible fuppofition. 
 
 It is commonly faid by the Newtonian philofophers, that they do 
 not pretend to account for the caufe of attradion, but they only fpeak 
 of it as an effe^. But an effed is d^Jaft \ and I deny the fad, that 
 one body attrads another. Attradion, therefore, is not, it' they pleafe^ 
 an occult cauie, though there be very many fuch in n^iture, 1 mean 
 caufes unknown to us. Nor do I think that Ariltotle, when he fpcako 
 of occidt caujes^ means to conceal his ignorance, but to profefs it. But 
 it is, what is worfe, an occuli tad ; which ought to be proved fo much 
 the more clearly, by how much the caule of it is not only unknown to 
 us, but altogether inconceivable. 
 
 Aa It
 
 $86 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BookIL 
 
 It is no doubt true, that bodies are movent or have a tendency to he 
 moved, towards one another *. A llone, for example, falling from a 
 height, is moved towards the earth ; and, if any thing oppofe it, and 
 prevent it from falling, ftill it has a tendency to be moved that way, 
 which is what we call its iveight. This is the fadt, and all the faft. 
 But, to fuppofe that the earth aitradis the ftone, is mere hypothefis : 
 And it might as well be fuppofed, that, when I move towards any 
 body, I am attraded by that body ; for, we are not to fuppofe that the 
 motions of natural bodies are at random, and without any certain di- 
 redion. This, indeed, is very often the cafe of our motion, but never 
 of any thing guided by nature. But, becaufe the motion is in a de- 
 termined diredion towards a certain objedt, we cannot fay that it is 
 attraded by that objed, unlefs we have a mind to fpeak in a figura- 
 tive and poetical flyle. 
 
 As 
 
 * It is in this way that Sir Ifaac Newton himfelf has explained attra<^ion. Hanc 
 vocem attraElionis ita hie accipi velim, ut in univerfum folummodo vim aliquam 
 fignificare intelligatur, qua corpora ad fe mutuo tendant, cuicunque demum caufae 
 attribuenda fit ilia vis. Principia Philof Schol. generakyfub Jinem. And Dr Clark, 
 in his controverfy with Mr Leibnitz, (5th Reply, p. 355.) has faid, in like manner, 
 that, by attra^ioriy he only means the tendency of bodies towards one another, which 
 he fnys, very truly, is a fa£l or phaenomenon of nature that cannot be difputed. But, if 
 no more is meant, why ufe the word attraSiion, which certainly denotes an active 
 force, by which one body operates upon another ? Why not call it, what it truly is, a 
 tendency to be moved ? And, though we fhould not difpute about words, when the 
 meaning is eflablifhcd, yet I doubt this improper ufe of the word nitration has led, 
 not only the vulgar, but even fome philofophers of the Newtonian fchool, fince the 
 days of Sir Ifaac and Dr Clark, into fome obfcure notion of an aElive poioer in matter. 
 
 But, further, though I admit that there is fuch tendency in a (lone to fall to the 
 earth, becaufe, in fa6t, we know that it does fall to the earth, if nothingprevents it, yet 
 I deny that there is any fuch tendency in the planets to fall into the fun ; and all that 
 we know of the matter is, that they are moved round him in certain orbits. I fay, there- 
 fore, that attraQion, even in the ftnfe of tendency of bodies to be moved towards one 
 another, is-, with rcfpe^l to the celeftial bodies, a mere hypothefis.
 
 Chap. XV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 187 
 
 As to the motion of the planets, it is fiippofed by the new philofo- 
 phy, to be compofed of two motions, the one a projeftilc motion^ and 
 the other an attra&ive : And the hypothefis Is, that they were at firfl: 
 moved by God Almighty, in aftraight line; but that, by iheattradion 
 of the fun counterading this redilineal motion, they are moved in an 
 ellipfis round the fun. But this, as 1 have faid, is mere hypothefis ; 
 for, in the firft place, how can it be known that they were at firfl: im- 
 pelled in a ftraight line, and did not move from the beginning in the 
 fame way they do at prefent ? -i^/fyy There is no reatbn to fuppofe 
 that the fun attrads them, though they are moved round him, any 
 more than to fuppofe that, becaufe I go round a certain objed, I am 
 attraded by it *. 
 
 If, therefore, we will renounce hypothefis, and fpeak no more of 
 combined motions ^ or of centripetal and centrifugal force^ but adhere to 
 the plain fad:, which is fimply this, that bodies move in different di- 
 rections, and by different kinds of motion, it only remains to be in- 
 quired, What is the caufe efficient of thofe various motions ? Whether 
 it be immaterial, as I fuppofe it to be, or material ? for one or other 
 of them it mufl: of neceffity be. And we are fo far advanced in the 
 inquiry, as to have difcovered that, if it be material, it muft neceffariiy 
 operate by the body moving impelling the body that is moved. 
 
 Now, in the firft place, I fay, in point of fad, that there are no 
 phaenomena which lead us to believe, that either a (lone falls to the 
 ground, or the celeftial bodies are moved, by any external i.iipulfe of 
 other bodies. I know that Sir Ifaac Newton did attempt to account 
 for thefe motions, by a certain fubtile fluid, which he thought was 
 fufKcient to produce fuch wonderful effcds. But, 1 believe, all his 
 
 A a 2 followers 
 
 • See wliat 1 have faid on this fubjeft in the preceding note, and what I fliall fay 
 fuithei upon it in another chapter of thii book.
 
 i88 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IL 
 
 followers have given up this way of accounting; for thefe motions ; 
 and, indeed, Sir Ifaac only propofes it as a query or conjecture *; fo 
 that, according to this philofophy, as it is now generally received, 
 there is no caufe fo much as pretended to be affii^ned for eifher of 
 thefe movements. But, 2^/k, Suppofe that the exiftence of fuch a 
 fluid {hould be admitted, and its efficacy to move fuch ponderous bo- 
 dies, ftill the queftion recurs, How is this fluid itfelf moved ? and 
 there are but two ways of anfwering that queftion ; either by admit- 
 ting an immaterial caufe, or byfuppofing another fubtile fluid, which 
 is to move the firfl: fluid ; and fo on, in iJifinitum ; which, as I have 
 obferved, is not accounting for the motion, even by an hypothefis. 
 
 I mud: own, f think there is fome truth in Dr Cudworth's obferva- 
 tionf, that the philofophers of this age are feized with a kind o^ pneuma- 
 topkobia and hylomania^ a defperate averfion to mind^ and a paflionate 
 love for matter ; for, how elfe can I account for their fuppofing, with- 
 out either proof or probability, the exiftence of a fluid, and a fluid too 
 of fo extraordinary a kind, as not to have that property which they 
 fay is common to all bodies, I mean gravitation, rather than employ, 
 for folving the phaenomenon, a power which we are fure exifts in na- 
 ture, and which they admit produces motion, at leafl of one kmd, I 
 mean the animal motion ? 
 
 But, fuppofe we (hould admit the exiftence of this invifible fluid, 
 How can we conceive it to produce the effeds afcribed to it ? It is a 
 known law of motion, that, when body moves body, the force is in 
 proportion to the mafs and velocity of the moving body ; or, as the 
 mathematicians exprefs it, in a ratio compounded of its mafs and ve- 
 locity. Now, fetting afide the motion of the celeftial bodies of fuch 
 prodigious mafs, and which are moved with fuch wonderful velocity, 
 let us confider the common phaenonjenon of heavy bodies falling to 
 the earth. This phaenomenon is fo common, that it does not fo much 
 
 as 
 
 • Newton's Optics, fecond edition, injine. 
 t Intelle£lual Syflem
 
 Chap. XV. ANTIENTMETAPHYSICS. 189 
 
 as draw the attention of the vulgar : But it is not, for that, the lefs 
 wonderful in the eyes of the philofopher ; for he knows that there 
 can be no effect without a caufe, and that the caufe mud: be corre- 
 fpondent to the efFed, and of etficacy fufficient to produce it ; and that, 
 therefore, when a tower falls to the ground, perhaps in a folid mafs,or 
 when a rock, of fome thoufand tons weight, tumbles from, tht: top of 
 a mountain, carrying every thing before it that ftands in its way, 
 there muft be fome power that impells it. Now, if this power be 
 that fuppofed fluid, how prodigious muft its mafs, or its velocity, or 
 both, be, to produce fo extraordinary an effed ? and it is to be obfer- 
 ved, in the morion of thofe falling bodies, that their velocity, and, by 
 confequence, their force, always increafes, as the time of the motion 
 continues, contrary to all other mechanical motions, which decreafe, 
 and grow weaker, the longer they are continued, and the tarther 
 they are propagated or carried on ; fo that here we have an iavifible 
 fluid, ading, not only with a prodigious force, but indefinently, and 
 with an accumulating force. A philofophy of this kind does not ex- 
 plain nature, fuch as God Almighty has made it, but creates a new 
 world, and makes new laws of matter and motion. And, indeed, it is to 
 be wondered, that Sir Ifaac fhould have propofed, even as a query, 
 this caufe of motion, after he had refuted fo folidly Des Carte-'s fyftein 
 of vortices ; for Sir Uaac's fluid is liable to the fame objedions which 
 ftrike againft thofe vortices \firft^ that there is no proof of its exiftence, 
 2iX\^^f£Condlyy if it did exift, it would not anlwer the purpofe. 
 
 This proof, from the phaenomena of nature, applies equally to mo- 
 tion ot all bodies, wheiher animate or inanimate, as they are com- 
 monly called : Nor, indeed, dv) i thmk that any diflindion can be 
 made betwixt them, as to the quellion, Whether the principle of mo- 
 tion be material or immaterial ? Though 1 know it is very common to 
 make a great diflindion, and to fay that aninial bodies are moved by 
 mind and by intention', whereas inanimate bodies are moved by 7iature, 
 
 But
 
 i^b AN TIE NT METAPHYSICS. Book 11. 
 
 But what is nature ? I fay, it is nothing elfe but mind in body, and 
 operating by the means of body ; for I make this dillinOion of mind, 
 —I fay, that it exifts by itfelf, detached from all body, or, at leaft, ope- 
 rates by itfelf : or, otherways, it exifts in body, and never operates 
 but by means of body. Mind, exifting without body at all, and, by 
 confequence, operating without body, is the Supreme mittcfy or what- 
 ever other higher intelligences we may fuppofe fubordinate to that 
 w/W. Mimiy again, joined with boci/t but able to operate without the 
 afliftance of locfy, is fuch a ?rimd ^s the human. And, la/Iiy, mind in 
 body, and operating always in and through body, is what I call na- 
 ture. In this manner, I confider mind and nature as infeparably con- 
 neded ; and, if we feparate them, we muft introduce into nature, ei- 
 ther blind chance, or mere mechanifm ; that is, in other words, we"^ 
 mufl be Atheifts. 
 
 The more various and complicated the movement is, the more un- 
 likely that it fliould proceed from any material caufe. Now, the 
 movements we have hitherto been (peaking of, are fnnple, compared 
 With that by which a vegetable body is nourifhed, grows, and propa- 
 gates its kind. And, accordingly, I do not know that any philofo- 
 pher hitherto has fo much as pretended to account for the growth, 
 nourilhment, and propagation of a vegetable, by caufes merely me- 
 chanical ; yet I do not think "ihat a vegetable life is generally ac- 
 knowledged by our modern philofophers, though it was fo by all the 
 antients, who were not Atheifts. 
 
 As to the animal life, I think it is generally allowed by the philofo- 
 phers o{ Britain, to proceed from a principle immaterial. Thofe wha 
 would make a machine of the animal bociy, do not appear to me to 
 underftand thoroughly what is called a machine., or to diftinguifh 
 rightly betwixt a machine and its moving power. A machine or en- 
 gine is nothing elfe but A certain dijpqfttion or arrangement oj pieces 
 
 of
 
 Chap.XV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 191 
 
 of matter^ fo put together^ as to coj7miunicate and convey the motion 
 from the moving povuer to the body that is moved ; fo that the 
 machine, properly lb called, is what is intermediate betwixt the mo- 
 ving power and the body to be moved, and is as different from the 
 one as it is from the other. This diftindion is evident in machines 
 of" human conftrudion ; for the loweft mechanic, and even the com- 
 mon obferver, readily diftinguifhes betwixt the machinery and the 
 moving power, whether that be air^ nvater^ vapour^ or what we call 
 gravitation. Thus, in a clock, nobody confounds the wheels and 
 pullies with the weight or poife which makes them move. But the 
 philofopher goes farther, and inquires what is the power that moves 
 the poife ? And, it we make the diftindion, in machines of our own 
 invention, why not in thofe machines made by God Almighty, fuch 
 as an animal body ? 
 
 For, that there is a great deal of machinery in an animal body, it is 
 impoflible to deny. Anatomy very clearly (hows us, that its move- 
 ments are performed by the means of mufcles, finews, and bones • 
 and, befides thefe folid parts, there are no doubt many fubtilc fluids of 
 different kinds, by which a great part of the aniuial oeconomy is car- 
 ried on, but the operations of which are not fo cafily perceived. But all 
 this mechanifm is diftind from the moving power . For, let the ma- 
 chine be ever fo various and complicated ; let the animal fpirits, or 
 fuccus nerveus^ as it is called, be taken into the play, in order to give 
 as much aid as poflible to our materialills ; let the motion be continu- 
 ed and propagated through ever fo many different bodies ; flill there 
 muft be fome power which begins the motion ; and that power, I fay, is 
 an immaterial principle, which I call 7nind \ and which always moves 
 bodies, though it may not ad immediately and diredly upon them, 
 but by the intervention of organs and inflruments, to us often imper- 
 ceptible. 
 
 Further,
 
 iqi ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book XL 
 
 Further, the force exerted by mind^ in the animal body, Is fuch as 
 is Impoffible to be exerted by any material caule operating in fo fmall 
 a fpace ; for the bones of any animal that raifes a weight, are fo ma- 
 ny levers which the mufcles move by the means of the finews. For 
 example, when a man raifes and holds out any weight with his ex- 
 tended arm, the bone of his arm below the elbow is the lever ; the 
 fulcrum, or center of motion, is the joint of the elbow; and ih^ poivcr 
 operates by (inews or tendons inferied into the bone below the elbow, 
 and near to It ; which fmews are moved by a great mufcle above the 
 elbow : The lever, therefore, here, is one of that kind where the pouuer 
 has the difadvantage ; for the learned in mechanics know, that there 
 are three kinds ot levers, in two of which the/>ow^r has the advantage, 
 that is, a poiver of lefs mafs or quantity of matter will move a weight 
 of greater : But, in the lever of the third kind, \.hc pouuer acting be- 
 twixt the fulcrum and the weight, the ponver has the difadvantage, and 
 therefore mufi: be a greater quantity of matter than the weight. Now, 
 the human arm Is a lever of this kind, and \}[\z poiver of this lever has 
 the greater difadvantage, that it Is very near the fulcrum, and at a 
 great diftance from the weight ; in fo much, that Borelli * has Ihown, 
 that, in order to fupport a pound weight, which a man holds out with 
 his extended arm, there muft be, by the laws of mechanifm, a force of 
 70,000 pounds. Now, a ftrong man can hold out in his hand two 
 f^ones, which, according to this calculation, will require 2l poiver to 
 raife it, by a lever of fuch a conlfrudion, ot no lels than 140,000 
 flones. So great a poiver^ exerted by mind In fo fmall a fpace as the 
 human body, may, i think, enable us to form fome conception how 
 fuperior minds, in the great expanfe of heaven, may move thofe vaft 
 bodies with fuch incredible celerity. What the machinery may be 
 there, we cannot tell ; but the fame ingenious author has demon- 
 ftrated, that, if the animal machinery were fo contrived, as to give the 
 poijuer all the advantage that it commonly has in machines of human 
 invention, not only the animal would be monilroufly deformed, but 
 
 incapable 
 
 * Borelli de Motu ^nimaliunu
 
 Chap. XV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. i 
 
 93 
 
 incapable of moving. Now, if the power here be material, and its 
 operations mechanical, I afk, How is a mafs of matter of fuch power 
 to be contained, or to operate in our little bodies ? And here, again, 
 it appears, that the materialifts, in order to fupport their fyftem, m.iift 
 afcribe powers to matter hitherto entirely unknown, and invent new 
 laws of motion and mechanifm. 
 
 But neither is this all ; for an animal not only moves its own and 
 other bodies, but it perceives, and, not only objeds prefent by its fen- 
 fes, but obj <^s abjent^ by the means of that wonderful contrivance of 
 the pbdiitdjia. And further, it has appetites and defires \vhich impel it 
 to every adion that is neceflary for the preiervation of the individual, 
 and the propagation of the fpecies. Now, let us fuppofe, for once, 
 that the motion of the ai.imal is produced by matter, either moving 
 itlelf, or moved by fome other matter; I afk, by what laws of matter 
 or motitm, hitherto difcovered, can perception of ohjecls a'olent, as 
 well as prefent, be produced, and likewife appetites and defires ? If 
 ^d//^r alone can produce thefe wondertul tffeds, it n^uit be either 
 when it is at refi^ or when it is in motion. While it continues at 
 re(f, nobody will fay, that, by the power of its own nature, it ever 
 can become /entie?it, or have appetites and defires. It muft, therefore, 
 for that purpofe, be put in motion ; but it is iinpoffjble to conceive 
 that, fimply by being moved quicker or flower, or in any, or in all direc- 
 tions, it (hoiild acquire thefe qualities. A IkkIv, then, by itfclt, whe- 
 ther at relt or in motion, cannot becowe Jenticnt. It mu:i, theretore, 
 for that purpofe, impel fome other body ; and w!i;tt will that im()uire 
 produce ? — Motion.- -And what will tha f/ioaon ^Touuce? — Cban:^e of 
 Jituation.of hulk, or ofji^ure^ in thebodv i .nieii.ii^or i!n[)ell d. — in one 
 or other of thefe ways, are .dl the van .usqi li-ics ot bodies, affec- 
 ting our fenies in fo many different s^avt*, produced. Let, i her- fore, 
 the morions, concourfes, embraces, jufti ngs, (hoiks, concretions, fc- 
 cretions, of bodies, be ever fo varif us, and as coiiiple.\ ab it is poffible 
 
 B b to
 
 194 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book 11. 
 
 to imagine, ftill they can produce nothing more than motion, and the 
 confequent alteration of fituation, bulk, and fi,^are : And, whoever 
 will venture to affirm, that they can , produce any thing elfe, I will 
 venture to affirm, that he fpeaks without ideas, and does not know 
 what he fays ; for, as all our ideas are from nature, if he fpeaks of any 
 produsi^ion that is not to be found in nature, he fpeaks without ideas. 
 
 But, if fenfation, appetite, and dcfire, and all the other things belong- 
 ing to the animal nature, cannot be accounted for by material caufes, 
 what (hall we fay of the operations oiintelleB? How can we conceive 
 that matter, either by itfelf, or adling upon other matter, ffiall produce 
 thinking and reafoning ; (hall form ideas^ which are things altogether 
 immaterial, and go thro* the long procefs (as it often is) of comparing 
 them together, and making inferences and conciufions from that 
 comparifon ? Or, if all this could be accounted for from material 
 caules, What (hall we lay of the power of refle^Jion which our mind 
 has, by which it perceives and recognizes itfelf, reviews its own ope- 
 rations, approves or condemns iifelf ; which laft ufe of the refleding 
 power is what we call conjcunce ? Now, if all this can he produced 
 by matter and motion, then we may fay, as Lucretius fays, * That 
 * any thing may be produced by any thing *.' In fhort, it appears to 
 me, as I faid before, that, in order to fupport the caufe of materialifm, 
 the whole fyftem of nature, as It is at prefent, mufl: be overturned, 
 and a new world created. And, Indeed, it muft be fo, if, according 
 to my fyftem, inind is principal in the univerfe, and matter only fub- 
 fervient to its ufes and purpofes. 
 
 In this manner, I think, I have proved, both by abftrad reafoning, 
 and from the phaenomena of nature, that the prmclple of motion in 
 this univerfe, whether in bodies organized or unorganized, is immate- 
 rial. And this iaft proof from the phaenomena, though it be not 
 dire-dly and immediately from the nature of the thing, and that there- 
 fore 
 
 * ex omnibus rebus 
 
 Omnc genus nafci poflet Lib, i. ver. i6o.
 
 Chap. XV. ANT IE NT METAPHYSICS. 195 
 
 fore I have called it a proof a pojlerion ; yet It appears to me to be as 
 convincing as the proof a priori contained in the preceding chapter ; 
 for the amount of it is this, That, whatever is moved, muft be moved 
 either by body or mind. It is not moved by body ; therefore It muft 
 be moved bv mind. This is a demonftration of the fame kind with 
 thofe demonftrations of the mathematicians, which prove, that one 
 line, or one figure, is equal to another, by proving, ly?, That it is not 
 greater ; 2^/y, That it is not lefs. The neceff.-.ry confequence of which 
 is, that it is equal. Nor do 1 think, that the demonllration here can 
 be evaded, otherways than by fuppofing, either that body may be 
 moved in fome third way of moving bodies, never heard nor thought 
 of, or, that body may move body oth.rways than by impulfe. Now, if, 
 m order to evade any argument, it be allowed to make^ fuppofitions of 
 things, the exiftence of which is not only not proved, nor probable, 
 but of which 1 deny that any man can have fo much as a conception, 
 I afk, What can be proved in phyfics, or in any thing elfe ? 
 
 The next thing to be confidered, is. Whether this immaterial prin- 
 ciple of motion exifts in body only, or leparated from body, and by 
 itfelf ? a fubjcd of very great importance, both in religion and phi- 
 lofophy ; and which, thererore, very well deierves a chapter by itfelf. 
 
 Bbs CHAP.
 
 196 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 CHAP. XVI. 
 
 Concerning the feparate Exijlence 0/ Minds — Ariftotle's DoSfrine upon this 
 SubjeB — The Moving Principle in Bodies unorganized^ and in Vege- 
 tables, cannot exift Jeparately — More Doubt as to the Animal Mind 
 — Separate Exijlence of the Intelledual Mind or Soul clearly proved 
 from its Energies — Immortality of the Soul alfo evident from its 
 Nature, 
 
 1''*"T might appear that this queftion was already determined, by our 
 having proved, that the principle of motion was immaterial. And 
 accordingly Philoponus tells us *, that a certain Platonic philofopher, 
 who lived fome time before him, Numenius, was of opinion, that the 
 vegetable and anhnal life, as well as the tntellefltml, had a feparate 
 exiftence. But this is a confequence that does not follow ; for 
 the principle, though immaterial, may, by its nature, be fo eflentially 
 conne<fted with matter, as never toexift without it. And Numenius's 
 argument will go fo far as to prove, that this principle in unorganized 
 bodies, which does nothing elfe but nr>ove them, has likewife a fepa- 
 rate exiftence. But this, I believe, no philofopher ever dreamed of. 
 I think, therefore, that the rule laid down by Ariftotle muft be fol- 
 lowed in this cafe, that, wherever there is any energy of mind (fo I 
 tranflate ^vx,'^) which is peculiar to it, and not conneded with body, it 
 may exift feparately ; whereas, if there be no energy of that kind, 
 
 but 
 
 * Ph'loponus, in his Introdudion to his Commentary upon Ariftotle's Books 
 De /Inima.
 
 Chap. XVI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 197 
 
 but all irs energies are neceflarily connedted with body, then it has no 
 feparate exiftence *. 
 
 For underftanding this rule the better, there are three thijigs 
 to be diftinguifhed— the ejj.nce of the thing, by which it exiils, 
 
 and is what it is, its faculties, and, laftly, its energies or 
 
 operations. Of thefe, the two laft muft neceflarily depend upon 
 the firlt ; for, from the eflence of every thing, mufl proceed 
 both its faculties and energies. But, as we cannot difcover the 
 eflence of any thing, except from its energies and operations, we 
 muft, in this cafe, confider what the energies of the feveral minds are, 
 from which we can reafon, both concerning their faculties, and their 
 eflTence or exiftence ; for faculties or powers are hidden things, as well 
 as eflences, and not otherways difcoverable, but by ihe exerciie of 
 them. Now, there are minds which energize only in conjundtioa 
 with body, and which have no faculties that do not operate by body ; 
 From whence I conclude, that thofe minds have no Teparate exiftence ; 
 for it would be in vain for them to exiil;, if they d-d not energize; 
 and, as Ariftotle tells us, nature does nothing in vaai f . According 
 to- this rule, therefore, it is impoflible that the mind which informs un- 
 organized bodies can have any ieparate exiftence ; for, as it does no- 
 thing but move body, no reaion can be afiigned why it fliould exift 
 without body. The fame reaion will apply to the ^vegetable lije ; for 
 we cannot conceive to what purpole it fh^uld exift, without fome body 
 to nourifh, to make grow, and to contmue by propagaiion. 
 
 As 
 
 * Arif!otIe's words are, E« usv ou» eo-t* r< t&»» t«j vw;^?:? i^ym \, Trxh.fixrm tcm, tva's- 
 
 J(^»itO Kf CCVTtil '/^Uf^ll^ia-tm- i» ^8 yltijJlli iC-TO <J(»y «S9T/;,#v>i «:»«,) -^».g(0-Tl). Lib. I. ■!r9pi\V'M, 
 
 Andy in anothei place, 'Oe-«y y*^ tTny ^t^y^uy k i^z^yt.* ootfccirucr,, Jif/tflP 'on Tx-jTKi cinv 
 o-ufinr*( eclvvxTo)! l)5^«f;^i'<», oiov /S«^»^hv tcvtu 7.00U1 That is, ' "Whatever principle operates 
 
 * bodi/y^ or with body only, that principle cannot exift without hdy, any more than 
 
 * ivatking can be wirhouty<?<rf .* 
 
 ■\ iA.r^v r, (fvirn jreiei f/.xT/it^ ^yirt «:r«A«;rf< r»>y xy*iyKtcit>)f—-Dc //ni^ra. Lib. 3. Cnp. 10.
 
 J98 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IT. 
 
 As to the animal, there is more doubt ; becaufe the animal 
 nature appears not to be fo entirely joined with jfhitter, but they 
 may be conceived to be leparate ; for the animal has magina' 
 tion or phantafia, which, as it operates without the fenfes, as well 
 as the N«vs or hitelkS}, Ariftotle calls n<,«? -Tixh-nKo^., or paffive in- 
 tellcSi ; giving it the name of inlelk5l^ becaufe it hath within itfelf 
 the fubjecl of its knowledge ; but adding the epithet of paffivCy be- 
 caufe it is, by the impreffions, and, as it were, the fignatures of 
 ienlible objects made upon it, that it knows things, as his commen- 
 tator Philoponus has obferved *'. And the animals of the better fort, 
 as we have feen, compare their perceptions and reafon in a certain de- 
 gree, which is an operation altogether diftind from body. On the 
 other hand, it may b^ faid, that all the operations of the mind of the 
 animal relate only to body, and to external things, which are necefla- 
 ry, either for the iupp')rt of the individual, or the propagation of the 
 kind. Thefe argu »ents, on b »t!i fides, have induced fome of Ari- 
 ftotle's commentators, particularly Philoponus, his Chriftian commen- 
 tator t» to divide the matter, and to admit, that the mind of the ani- 
 mal may exift without the body which at prefent it inhabits ; but that 
 it muft neceffarily have foi.e clothmg or covering of body, but body 
 jTiuch more fubtile, and of a finer texture than the bodies of animals 
 upon this earth, and which, therefore, they call difpiritual body J. 
 
 As what energizes only in conjun<flion with matter, cannot exift 
 without matter, fo, according to Arillotle's rule, what energizes by it- 
 felf, and without matter, mult, by its nature, be capable of a feparate 
 exigence, though, for the time, it be united with w<3//^r. And, in- 
 deed, while it a6ts and energizes by itfeif, it may be confidered as ex- 
 illing by itfelf; becaufe every thing thai atts does fo tar turth exift. 
 
 Belidcs 
 
 • Phlloponus's Introduftion to his Commentary on Ariflotle's books De Anima. 
 
 f Fhilopoiius, ui»i iupra, 
 
 1 ?r»»w^Ti*o» <r»^«. bee i^hiloponus, in the paflagc above quoted*
 
 Chap. XVI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 199 
 
 Befides, it would be abfurd to fuppofe, that the energies of any thing, 
 which are but the third in order from its eflence, ihould have the dig^ 
 nity and pre-eminence of a feparate exigence, and not the fubftancc 
 or eflence itfelf. Now, that our intelledual mind, or /ow/, as I would 
 chufe to call it in one word, does ad: by itfelf, even while it is 
 confined in this prifon of fl, fh and blood, 1 think I have proved be- 
 yond all doubt ; for, fuppoimg that any one fhould (till doubt 
 of the foul's being able to perceive even objedls of fenfe, with- 
 out the affiliance of the fenfes, and by its own natural power of per- 
 ception, notwithftanding both the reafons and fads that I have men- 
 tioned to prove it, the operations of the intelled upon thofe objeds 
 are, in my apprehenfion, of themfelves fufficient to prove its fe- 
 parate nature ar-d exigence. And we might as well maintain, that the 
 ftatuary was of the fame nature and fubftance with the block of mar- 
 ble upon which he operates, as that the intelJed is of the fame nature 
 with the bodies upon which it exercifes its faculties. But, when we 
 further confider, that the mind operates upon itfelf, and is in fo far 
 independent of all things from without, and wrapped up, as it were, 
 in itfelf, I think there cannot be the leafl: doubt, but that it exifts in 
 the fame manner, unmixed, as Ariftotle fays, with any thing elfe *. 
 
 And 
 * Ciceroappears, tome, not to have fally underftood this refledling power of the/«- 
 telleBual mind or fouly when he coir. pares the foul to ihe eycy which, he fays, fees aJl 
 things but does not fee itklf Non vaict tantum animus ut feipfum ipfe videat: At ut 
 oculus, fie animus fefe non videns, alia cernit. Tnjculnn. ^laji . lib. i. cap. 28. For 
 Cicero was not fo far advanced in philofophy, as to have any diftindl conception of 
 immaterial fubitunce : And, accordingly, in this very book, (cap. 26.) he fuppofes 
 that the human mind, and even God himfelf, is of the fubltance oi air yjire, or of 
 Ariftotle^s fifth element. The h€t is, that the only f:ifh:onabie phiioiophies at that 
 time in Home were tlie Epicuraean, the Stoic, and thcfe of tlic old and new Academy. 
 Now, it appears that the boolcs of philofophy which Cicero lludied the moll, next to 
 thofe of his own fed, which was that of the New Acndt^iy, were the books of 
 the Stoics, who maintained that all tnind, even the Divinity itfelf, was nothing 
 more than a fubtile fire. As to Arifiode, he tells us, in another place viz 
 the beginning of his Topics, that his philofophy was very little ftudicd at that 
 time, even by the learned, and his books very rare. Some of them, however it 
 appears he had read, particularly hisPhyfics, and his books De Coelo i where, having 
 
 found
 
 20O ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 And here, ag.iln, we may obferve, of what hnportance, both to re- 
 ligion and philofophy, the diRindion.is, betwixt the operations of our 
 mind in conjun-flion with body, and its operations feparated from bo- 
 dy — that is, hQtvnxt fen/at ions and ideas ; for, without that dirtindtion, 
 it appears to me, that philofophy furnidies no latis.fying evidence of 
 the feparate exigence of the hu:nan foul, any more than of die ani- 
 mal or vegetable life. But, on the contrary, according to Ariftotle's 
 rule, whatever energizes , or operates only with body, cannot exili with- 
 out body ; for he did not conceive that energy and exijience could be 
 feparated. I therefore fay, that Mr Locke, by confounding ideas and 
 fcnfations, has laid the foundation, though, 1 believe, without intend- 
 ing it, of all the Atheiftical philofophy fmce his time : And, accord- 
 ingly, as I have obferved, all thofe philofophers maintain that there is 
 no fuch difiindion. 
 
 There are other arguments, however, ufed by Philoponus, and other 
 philolophers, both antient and n\odern, in fupport of the feparate ex- 
 iftence of the foul, v\hich I would not chufe to give up, fuch as, that the 
 foul does not grow old with the body, but is often in greateft vigour when 
 the body is moft decayed ; and, that the foul fometimes coniiimes and 
 deftroysthe body, which could not happen if it were, by its nature, fub- 
 ftantially and ncceffarily united with the body. 1 hefe, and fuch like 
 arguments, have, no doubt, their weight ; but, 1 confels I do not think 
 
 there 
 
 found that Ariflotle compofed his celtftial bodies of a fifth element, he imagined 
 thiit he made the human foul, and the Divinity itfelf, of the fame fluff; whereas, 
 there is nothing more certain, than that A riflutle maintained the exiflence of immate- 
 rial fuhflance ; and afTcrted the human mjnd to be of that kind. And, as. to 
 the Divinity, the conclufion, both of his phyfics and metaphytics, is, th.it there is 
 a Being, immaterial, eternal, unchangeable, the author of all motion, yet im- 
 moveable itfelf But, as to Cictro, belicvng, ;is he did, that the foul was corporcaJ, 
 it was no wonder that h; could not conceive how it fliould have the power of feeing 
 and contcmp ating itfe't, which is the faculty that, of all others, difUnguiflies the 
 human foul the moft from any thmg mateiiaL
 
 Chap.XVI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 201 
 
 there are any of them which conclude fo demonftratively as the one 
 above ftated. 
 
 The next thing to be confidcred concerning the human foul is, its 
 immortality ; as to which, Philoponus fays, that no man who admit- 
 ted it to be immaterial, and to have a ieparate exiftence, ever enter- 
 tained any doubt. And, indeed, it is impoffible that we can conceive 
 any way in which it (hould be perifhable of itfelf, that is, by its own 
 nature, or otherwife, except by the immediate a6t of God ; for death is 
 truly what it is called, a diflblution ; nor can we conceive any thing 
 dying or perifhing, except by a feparation or difcerption of its parts, 
 which cannot happen to an immaterial fubftance * ; for the only way 
 in which we can conceive any thing to be diflblved is, by the fepa- 
 ration or difarrangcment of its parts, or by its being joined with, or 
 affected by any thing foreign to its nature. Now, neither of thefe 
 two can happen to an immaterial foul, in a ftate of feparation from 
 the body : For, in that ftate, according to Ariftotle, it cannot fuffer ; 
 all its fufferings, from paffions, fuch as fear, anger, grief, according 
 to him, arifing from the bodyt; the tcrreni artus moribund aque meni' 
 hray as Virgil calls them ; 
 
 Hi'nc 
 C c 
 
 * This is Cicero*s argument for the immortality of the foul: For, having hid it 
 down, that nihil animis admixtum, nihil concretum, nihil copulatum, nihil cpagmen* 
 tatum, nihil duplex; he adds, quod cum ita fit, certe nee fecerni, nee dividi, nee dif- 
 cerpi, nee diftrahi poteft, ncc Interire igitur. Eft enim interitus quafi diflcffus et fe- 
 cretio et direptus earum partium quae ante intoritum jun£lione aliqua tenebantur; 
 Tujadan ^ic/lionSy lib. i. cap. 29. — And certainly we have no conception of any fpe- 
 cies of corporeal thing perifhing in any other way. 
 
 t Lib. I. De Anima, Cap. 5. where he fays, that iov<; is p«»T£j«» t< kxi X7r»tn — where 
 he likewife fays, that there is no motion in the mind, but that the motion.of the body 
 fometimcs reaches to it, and fometimes proceeds from it, e» tKin*i (t>i >|'y;^j)) rm )»<»)s-8»j
 
 202 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IL 
 
 Hinc raetuunt, cupiuntque, dolent, gaudentque ; nee auras 
 Rcfpiciunt, claufae tenebris et carcere caeco. 
 
 I will add a demonftratlon of the Immortality of mind, taken from 
 Plato, the rather, that it is founded upon the definition which I have 
 given of miiid, and which, as 1 have fhown, is the fame with Plato's 
 definition, viz. that it is what tnoves^ whereas body is what is moved* 
 Whatever, fays he, is moved by any thing elfe, may ceafe to be moved \ 
 and then it ceafes to live, or to be animated : And this is the cafe of 
 body. But mind has a principle of motion in itfelf, and is, by its na- 
 ture, T^^^^zW. Therefore it can never ceafe to move and to a£t^ 
 fmce it cannot depart from itfelf, nor renounce its own nature. — Far- 
 ther, as it is the principle of movement difFufed all over the univerfe, 
 it can have no beginning ; for all things arife from a principle ; but 
 a principle has itfelf no beginning or origin : And, as it had no be- 
 ginning, fo it can have no end ; for, if it were to end, the heavens, and 
 all nature muft ftand ftill, nor could they be again fet in move*' 
 ment *. 
 
 Thus, 
 
 * The paflage of Plato is in the PhaedruSy p. I22i. edit. Ficini. and I will give the 
 reader Cicero's tranflation of it, together with his obfervations upon it — Quod Temper 
 moveter, id aeternum eft. Quod autem motum affert alicui, quodque ipfum agitatur 
 aliunde, quando finem habet motus, vivendi habeat necefle eft. Solum igitur quod 
 fc ipfum movet, quia numquam deferitur a fe, numquam ne moveri quidem definit. 
 Quinetiam caeteris quae moventur, hie fons, hoc principium eft movendi. Principii 
 autem nulla eft origo ; nam ex principio oriuntur omnia : Ipfum autem nulla ex re 
 alia nafcipoteft: Nee e-nim eflVt principium quod gigneretur aliunde. Quod fi nun- 
 quam oritur, ne occidit quidem unquam, Nam principium extindlum, nee ipfum ab 
 alio renafcetur, nee a fe aliud creabir ; fiquidtm necefle eft a principio oriri omnia. 
 Ita fit, ut motus principium ex eo fit, quod ipfum a fe movetur. Id autem nee nafci 
 poteft, nee mori : Vel concidat omne coelum, omnifque natura confiftat, neceffc^ eft, 
 nee vim ullam nancifcatur qua ut primo impulfu moveatur. Cum pateat igitur aeter- 
 num id cfl"e quod fe ipfum moveat, quis eft qui banc naturam animis efle tributam 
 
 neget?
 
 Chap. XVI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 203 
 
 Thus, I think, I have proved, by arguments, both a priori and 
 pojierioriy that inindi or the mo'uing principle in all bodies, is immate- 
 
 C c 2 rial ; 
 
 neget ? Inanimum eft enim omne, quod pulfu agitatur externo. Qu^od autem eft 
 animal, id motu cictur interiore, et fuo- Nam haec eft propria natuia animi atque 
 vis. Quae, fi eft una ex omnibus quae feipfum femper moveat: Neque nata certe eft, 
 et aeterna eft.-— And Cicero's obfervation is in thefe words : * Licet concurrant ple- 
 
 * beii omnes philofophi (fie enim ii, qui a Platone et Socrate et ab ea familia diflident, 
 
 * appellari videntur) non modo nihil unquam tam eleganter explicabunt, fed ne hoc 
 
 * quidem ipfum quam fubtiliter conclufum fit, intelligent. Sentit igitur animus fe 
 
 * moveri; quod cum fentit, illud unafentit, fe ri fua, non aliena, moveri: Nee accide- 
 
 * re pofle, ut ipfe unquam a fe deferatur. Ex quo efficitur aeternitas : Nifi quid ha* 
 
 * bes ad haec* Tufcutan ^ejiisns, lib. i. cap. 23. This is all that could be expected 
 from a philofopher who profefled to believe, that nothing was certain, but only fome 
 things more probable them otheis. 
 
 It may be obferved, that Plato, in this paflage, has fallen into that inaccuracy of ex- 
 preflion, which I took notice of before, page 78. for which he is feverely reprehend- 
 ed by his fcholar Ariftotle, {Cap. 3. iib i. de Jn{ma)y in faying, that the mind is xvt» 
 x<yi)r«j, which Cicero has tranflated qiiodfe ipfum movet ; for, whatever moves itfelf, 
 rnuft be moved^ and what is moved muft be body^ which certainly Plato did not be- 
 lieve the mind to be. But the argument is equally conclufive, if we underftand, as 
 Plato no doubt meant it, that the mind is a moving Principle, and is felf-a6live, that 
 is, a5live by its nature and ejfencey without being a^ed upon, or impelled to aSlion by 
 any other thing. In fliort, Plato's opinion was the fame with Ariftotle's, in this mat- 
 ter, as in other things, where they have exprefled themfelves differently, that energy^ 
 or a^iony is of the very eflence of mind. And indeed, I think it is impoflible to 
 conceive mind exifting without energizing : And if it could exift fo, but for a mo- 
 ment, there could be nothing in the nature of things to hinder it from exifting fo to 
 all eternity, that is, it would be of a nature mortal and periftiing. It is, therefore, 
 true, what Ariftotle fays in a paflage that I have quoted above (p. 141.) that the mind, 
 tv-^ cTi (*%)) voit 'oTt ^t *v f»ti. So that, though we do not always recolIe£l our thoughts, 
 not when we are waking, any more than when we are fleeping, we may be fure that 
 the mind is always thinking.
 
 204 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BookIL 
 
 rial ;— -that the human foul is not only immaterial, but has a feparate 
 exiftence, and alfo, that it is immortal. There are other obferva- 
 tions to be made upon this important article of mind ; but thefe will 
 be the fubje<a of fome other chapters. 
 
 C H A P-
 
 Chap. XVII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 205 
 
 CHAP., xvir. 
 
 Of theDifference of the Jeveral Kinds o/'Minds — The firft Kind that ivh'ich 
 moves unorganized Bodies — Several Motions produced by it. — Gravi- 
 tation — Attraciion-^Repulfion — Circular Motion — 77?^ Principle of 
 thefe Motion^ internal — Compari/ons of thefe Principles of Motion zvith 
 Intelle^s and nvith one another — Ihey all atl ivithout Confcioiifnefs^ 
 IntrJUgencei End propofed^ Deliberation^ or Intention — Definition of 
 N iture — Difference betivixt the Vegetable and the Principle of Mo- 
 tion in unorganized Bodies — Difference betivixt the Vegetable and 
 Animal — Definition oj the Animal Nature, and of Inftin(St — Reafon 
 nvhy Inl'tindt never errs — Cudvuorth^s Plaftic Nature the fame vuith 
 Arifiotle*s Nature — Nature fuppojes a God — Only from the Study of 
 the Human Mind that vue can form any Conception of God — This Study 
 the Foundation of Theifm — The Philofophy of Mind only to be learned 
 from the Books of the Antients, 
 
 HA V I N G faid fo much of mind in general, and the human 
 mind in particular, 1 will, in this chapter, explain more parti- 
 cularly the difference that I apprehend there is betwixt the feveral 
 minds 1 have mentioned, beginning with the lowefl kind, but which 
 is abfolutely neceflary for carrying on the bufmefs of nature, and 
 even for the exiftence of a material world. 
 
 Andj frjl, this fo powerful principle is that which unites and keeps 
 together all the feveral bodies ; in fo much that, without it, there- 
 would be no fuch thing as body in the univerfe. It is thcrcff^re the 
 principle of union in body j and, as it is only mind that unites, oi is 
 
 adive
 
 2o6 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book 11. 
 
 aGlve in any wav, it Is for that reafon, I think, if there were no o- 
 ther, to be clafled under tnind. It is by it that bodies are difcrimina- 
 ted from one another, and receive different appellations, fuch as 
 earthy ftone^ ivood^ Szc. ; for, without this principle, nothing could be 
 called any thing, but all things would be mixed with all, according 
 to the philofophy of Anaxagoras. 
 
 Secondly^ It is this principle which gives the feveral motions to bo- 
 dy, by which it may be faid to live, and to be animated. Of thefe 
 motions Ariflotle has made a general divifion, and which I think tull 
 and compleat, into fuch as are in a ftraight line, fuch as are in a 
 curve revolving into itfelf, and fuch as are mixed of thele two ; or, as 
 I would rather chufe to exprefs it, are neither the one nor the other. But 
 I will' divide them more particularly, beginning with thofe that are in 
 a ftraight line. 
 
 Andj^r/?, there is that motion well known under the name of gra- 
 'vitation^ by which bodies here below tend towards the centre of the 
 earth. This motion, as 1 have oblerved, cannot be accounted for 
 from any material impull'e. It cannot be, as 1 think I have demon- 
 flrated, the matter itfelf which m.oves itfelf ; and, therefore, it only 
 remains, that it muft be produced by inind. And, indeed, as gravita- 
 tion does not operate in proportion to the furface of bodies, but to 
 their mafs or folid contents, it is impojGTible to conceive how it fhould 
 be produced by any material poiver^ as matter adts only upon the 
 furface of matter *. The only queftion, then, is, Whether it be mind 
 operating externally upon the body, or internally, that is, rcfiding in 
 the bodv, and animating it ? And I find tliat appears to have bren 
 a doubt ccmcerning the motion of the celeftial bodies in the days of 
 Plato ; for, though all the philofophers of thofe days, who were 
 
 not 
 
 ♦ See this argument very well enforced by Dr Clarke, in his Demonftration of the 
 Being and Attributes of God, p. 83.
 
 Chap. XVII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 207 
 
 not Athelfts, believed the motion of thefe bodies to be carried on by 
 mind, fome appear to have thought, that it was by mind externally 
 operating npon them, and, as it were, pulhing them on, while others 
 thought that it was mind internal animating them, and moving them, 
 as our minds move our bodies *. And, among the modern philofo- 
 phers, I find one that has written an excellent book upon the human 
 foul, viz. Mr Baxter, who afcribes this motion of gravitation, as well 
 as every other natural motion of body, to the immediate agency of 
 the Deity. But, though I am forry to differ from an author whom I 
 think the moft perfect Theift of any that has written in this cen- 
 tury, I cannot help thinking it more agreeable to the analogy of na- 
 ture, that the motive principles of thefe bodies Ihould be internal. It 
 is fo undoubtedly in our bodies ; and every philofopher, in Britain at 
 leaft, believes it to be fo likevvife in the bodies of the brutes. Neither 
 do I ;,fee that there is any good reafon for flopping at the vegetable, 
 betwixt which and the brutes there is no other difference but what 
 fenfation and progrefTive motion make. Thus far Ariflotle, and all 
 the antients who were not Atheifls, have clearly gone. And, further, 
 Ariflotle lays it down as the foundation of his natural philofophy, 
 that there is an internal principle of motion in all phyfical bodies, 
 though he does not call it by the name of -^vxn^ or mind ; and 
 only fays it is like a mind. But Plato is more explicit upon this 
 fubjed ; for, he fays exprefsly, in the pafTage quoted in the beginning 
 of this work f, that it is mind that moves^ and body that is moved. 
 And the later Platonifls, and particularly Proclus, is ftill more explicit 
 
 upon 
 
 * Plato, in the loth Book of Laws, (p. 954. edit- Ficirii,) propofes three opinions 
 upon this fubjed. Two of them are thofe mentioned in the text; the third is, tiiat 
 Twzncf external to the ceieftial body did not immediately move it, and pufh it on, but 
 did it by the intervention of another body of fire or air, which it allumed to itlcil, and 
 fo moved body by body. 
 
 tP.9.
 
 2o8 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IL 
 
 upon this fubje^t ; for he blames Ariftotle for animating the celeftial 
 fpheres, and putting them under the diredion and fuperintendency of 
 mind, but leaving all the lower elements dead and inanimate*. And 
 this appears to be likewife the opinion of the moft antient philofophcr 
 of Greece, Thales ; and I doubt not, but that he brought it from 
 Egypt with him ; for he faid that the whole univerfe was full of 
 gods, that is, of minds ; and, particularly, he faid, that it was mind in 
 the load (lone which attraded iron. 
 
 And, I think, this hypothefis of mine is agreeable, not only to an- 
 tient philofophy, but to religion ; for our fcripture tells us, that the 
 Deitv, in his intercourfe with men, employs fubaltern minds or an- 
 gels, as they are called, to execute his will. And I fee no reafon why 
 we may not fuppofe, that, by the fame miniftry, he carries on the o- 
 perations of nature : And, 1 think, it gives a much higher idea of 
 the Supreme Mind, than if we were to fuppofe him performing all 
 natural operations, fuch as the formation of plants and animals in their 
 fuccelTive generations, and the movement of every the leaft body, or 
 concretion of matter, by his own immediate agency, and, as it were by 
 his own hand f. If it be true, as I fuppofe, that there is as great a variety 
 of minds in the univerfe as of bodies, it is evident, that, if all the bufi- 
 nefs of nature was to be the immediate work of the Supreme Mind, 
 thofe inferior minds which, as I fuppofe, defcend below the Supreme, 
 in infinite gradation, and, in that way, fill up the fcale of nature, 
 would want employment, and ' be ufelefs for any thing that appears in 
 * the creation'. — Further, the progrefs in the generation, as well as the 
 corruption of all things here below, is very flow, nature proceeding 
 ftep by flep, from one rtate of the thing to another. Now, it feems 
 
 more 
 
 * Proclus in TImaeum, p. 285. et 287. See alfo Cudworth's Intellectual Sy- 
 ■ftem, p. 236. 237. 
 
 t See the book de Mundo, afcrib&d to Ariftotle, cap. 7.-— See alfo Cudworth's In- 
 telleclual Syftem, p. 149. where this matter is very well treated.
 
 Cfiap. XVII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS, 209 
 
 more worthy of the Divine Majefty, that this operofe procefs fhould 
 be gone thro* by inferior agents of limited power, to whom it is pre- 
 fcribed to ad only in a certain way, than that it fliould be the immediate 
 work of Omnipotence, who could do the work all at once, and by a 
 jiat, without going fo much round about. — And, lafily^ this hypothefis 
 will account for Nature fometimes being difappointed of her end, and 
 making what we may call wiperfe5l and bungling njoork. This may 
 happen through the inaptitude or ftubbornnefs of the matter not yield- 
 ing to the force of an inferior operator;, but could never happen, if 
 the agent were omnipotent. 
 
 This reafoning, if it be good, will apply to all the other natural 
 movements which I am now to mention. The next of the rectili- 
 neal kind, that I fhall take notice of, is the movement of fire or 
 flame, which is the oppofite of the movement of gravitation ; for it is 
 doivnivard^ or towards the centre of the earth ; whereas the move- 
 ment of fire is upijuards, or from the centre. I know there are fome 
 who think that flame afcends in the air in the fame way that any 
 lighter body riles in a heavier fluid ; but it is to me evident, that the 
 motion of flame is quite diff^erent from that of lighter bodies 
 which we fee in the air, fuch as duft and feathers: For they only float 
 in the air ; whereas flame fprings up in a fpire, with a force and im- 
 petuofity, which cannot be afcribed to the air in which it moves, but 
 to fom^ innate and inflindive principle of movement in the body it- 
 felf. And, if there could be any doubt that the afcent of fire was na- 
 tural to that element, there are other movements of bodies upwards, 
 which cannot be accounted for from any adventitious or mechanical 
 cauie ; fuch is the motion of the juices of a tree upwards from 
 the root, through the trunk, to the bran^'hes. And the vegetable af- 
 fords another inflance of this motion, ftill more obvious to the fcnfc : 
 For, take a plant in a fl')Wcr-pot, and reverfe the flower-pot (o that 
 the head of the plant fliall be down, keeping the earth Hill in theflower- 
 
 D d pot,:
 
 210 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book 11. 
 
 pot, the Rem of the plant will neverthelefs bend itfelf, and grow up- 
 ward, even though a welgtit be appended to keep it down. It 
 appears, theretore, to be certain, that there is in nature a motion up- 
 ward as well as downward ; fuch as cannot be accounted for from 
 any material impulfe, or mechanical caule, of any kind. 
 
 The third rectilineal motion I {hnll mention is, that by which bo- 
 dies move toward one another. This, as well as gravitation, or the 
 motion of bodies to a centre, is called, in the language of our modern 
 philolophy, attraction ; a very improper name for it, as I Ihall take 
 occafion afterwards to obferve. It is a motion unknown to Ariftotle, 
 and to all the antient philalophers, as far as I know ; but, by later 
 experiments, it is certainly known to exift in nature. And chemiftry, 
 particularly, exhibits to us wonderful examples of it ; from which it 
 appears, that bodies, by this movement, fometimes unite themfelves to 
 one kind of body, and then, finding another that they like better, they 
 go to that other, and incorporate themfelves with it. This is what is 
 called, in chemical language, eleciive attra^ion^ by which the parti- 
 cles of matter appear to chufe and prefer one kind of body to another. 
 And, indeed, in fuch kinds of movement, mind is, 1 think, vifible, 
 even to the mod vulgar and ignorant. 
 
 This kind of movement appears to me to be the principle of cohe- 
 fion in bodies, by which all the different kinds of natural bodies are 
 formed and difcriminated one from another. The effedt of this prin- 
 ciple is mofl vifible in the common chemical experiment of the folu- 
 tion of falts of different kinds in water ; for, when the water is evapo- 
 rated, all the feveral particles of the different falts range themfelves, 
 as it were, under their proper flandards, and unite to form cryilals of 
 the feveral kinds. And, in this manner, I imagine the homogeneous 
 particles of all the different bodies in the univerle have united to form 
 thofe bodies. 
 
 The
 
 Chap. XVII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 2ti 
 
 The /o«r/^ kind of recStillneal motion, and which appears alfo to 
 have been unknown to the antients, but is now univerfally acknow- 
 ledged, is the oppofite of what is called attraciion^ and therefore is de- 
 noted by the name of repulfiQn'^\ by which bodies, inllead of moving 
 towards one another, move a contrary way, and, as it were, fiy from one 
 another. What the influence of this principle of nature is, and whether 
 it be as univerfal as the influence of the other principle laft mentioned, 
 is not, I believe, well known; but l am told that there is a philofopher 
 now in Geneva, Le Sage^ I think, is his name, who is^ writing a 
 book to prove, that all the phaenomena of nature, which Sir Ilaac 
 Newton has explained by attraftion^ may be as well or better ex- 
 plained by repulfion, 
 
 Thefe are all the redilineal motions which are conftant and uniform 
 in nature. The next kind of motion mentioned by Ariftotle is the 
 circular motion, which he afcribes to the celeflial bodies, and which 
 he no doubt fuppofed to be exactly circular^ but which, by later difco- 
 veries, is found to be elliptical. It is, however, true, that it is a mo- 
 tion of the circular kind, in fo far as it revolves into itfelf. And i be- 
 lieve it is likewife true, as Ariftotle fuppofes, that it is peculiar to the 
 ccleftial bodies : At leaft, we have not hitherto difcovered any other 
 bodies that move regularly and conftantly in fuch a line. 
 
 The laft kind of motion that Ariftotle mentions, Is what is 
 betwixt the other two, that is, what is neither in a ftraight line, 
 
 D d 2 nor 
 
 * As both attraflion and repulfion feem to have been unknown to the antients, 
 there is one divifion of fimpie or uncompounded motion made by Ariilotle, which is 
 not compleat. That motion, fays he, is either to a centre, /rom a centre, or round ;i 
 centre ; Lib i. de Coelo, cap. 2. For that motion, by which bodies attract or repel 
 one another, is a fimple rcdilineal motion, but none of thefe three.
 
 212 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book 11. 
 
 nor in a circular, but in a curve, which is neither the one nor the 
 
 other. 
 
 This mixed kind of motion Is to be obferved chiefly in animals, 
 though they alfo, upon occafions, move either in ftraight lines or 
 in circles ; and the realbn of this variety of motions in them is plain, 
 namely, that their mind, or moving principle, direds them to move 
 different ways, as the exigencies of their nature require. Whe- 
 ther there be of this mixed motion in the vegetable and mineral king- 
 doms, or only the fimple motions of up and cloivn, to andyrowz, 1 be- 
 lieve we have not yet experience fufficient to determine. 
 
 Man is not only moved by that principle of motion, which is com- 
 monly known by the name of miimai life, but by a higher priiiciple, 
 which I call intellcd : But Ariftotle*s divifion is fo comprehenlive, 
 as to take in that motion, and, indeed, every motion that can be con- 
 ceived. 
 
 Of intelled I have faid a great deal, and fhall fay fomething more 
 in the end of this chapter ; but, in the mean time, 1 will proceed to 
 explain, ftill more particularly, the operations of the prmciple of mo- 
 tion in unorganized bodies, in vegetables, and anm:kals, by comparing 
 them with one another, and with the operations of intelled; in man. 
 And, in ii\ejirjl place, I will confider in what the three hrft principles 
 I have mentioned agree, and in what they differ from the operations of 
 the intelleii ; and, in the next place, I will confider in what they dif- 
 fer among theinfelves, and what each has particular and peculiar to 
 itfelf. 
 
 And, in ihtfrfl place, they all agree in this, that the moving prin- 
 ciple has no con/doufnefs^ by which, I mean, that it does not review 
 
 its
 
 Chap. XVII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 213 
 
 its own operations, and make itfelf its objedl ; or, in one word, re^ 
 jit6i : For this I hold to be the proper meaning of the term confci-* 
 oufnefs ; which I am not furprifed to fee miftaken by Mr Locke, and 
 the French philofophers * : But, I confefs, 1 am furprifed to find 
 fo accurate a metaphyfician as Do6tor Clarke confounding percep- 
 tion and confcioufnefs^ which he does through his whole book of 
 the Demonftration of the Being and Attributes of Godf; and, 
 for want of making the proper diltindion betwixt the two, he has 
 . faid nothing, when his argument required that he tliould have 
 faid a great deal, of that prime faculty of the human intelleSiy 
 
 by 
 
 * See what I have faid upon this fubjedl: in the firft volume of the Origin and Pro- 
 grefs of Language, 2d edition, p. 155. 
 
 \ See Demonftration of the Being and Attributes of God, p. 54. and 57. 4th edit, where 
 it is plain, that the Dotlcr ules thought, intelligence^ confcioujnejsy perceptiony and knew- 
 ledge, as fynonymous terms. Nay, he has confounded the motive powerj or principle 
 of motion, with ititelligence. In conftquence of which, he has given us a proof of 
 intelligence in the Deity which is altogether inconcluCve. The Deity, fays he, mufl: 
 be intelligent, becaufe he is the author of motion ; p, 6j. Now, if the Doctor had 
 diftingu.fhed, as the antient Gretk philofophers do, betwixt Navs an<l 4'"X^i he would 
 have known, that motion cannot indeed be produced without ■^v^*i, or 7nind, as 1 tran- 
 flate it, but may be produced without Nov?, or intelligence ; and, in fa£l, it is foprodu* 
 ced, both in brute animals and vegetables, which no man, who knows what he fays, 
 will fay, have intelligence or conlcioufnels. But the Doctor, though he was a very 
 acute metaphyfician, learned too in the New Philofophy, and, at the fame time, an 
 excellent Greek and ,Latiri ftholar, did not apply his Greek learning fufficiently 
 to what 1 think is its beft ufc — the ftudy of Greek phiiplophy. If he had done that, he 
 would have learned to have made the diftindlion above mentioned betwixt ■4'v;c» and 
 N«v5, that is, betwixt mi w<i that only moves, and mind thaii likewife under/lands. And 
 his conclufion from the Deity's being the author of motion, would only have been, 
 that the Deity was »2i/?^, and not matter -, but he ought not to have concluded, as 
 he has don/, that he was an Intelligent Being. And, in general, I cannot help ob- 
 ferving, that, however learned we m<iy be in the philofophy of body by the ftuily of 
 modern books, yet, without the knowledge of the antient philolophy, we are mife- 
 rably defeftive in the philofophy oi mind, as I could fhow, by many other examples, 
 from modern books of philofophy, if it were not an invidious and ungracious tafk, to 
 expofc the errors of authors who have otherwifc a great deal of merit.
 
 214 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BookIL 
 
 by which, more than by any thing elfe, we are diftinguifhed from the 
 brute, and our mind removed at the greateft diftance from every thing 
 material ; for it is by conjcioufncfs that a being is attentive to itfelf, is 
 prefent, as it were, with itfelf, perceives itfelf, and has enjoyment of 
 itfelf. In fliort, it is that faculty,, by which we come the neareft to 
 our idea of Divinity '*. If there were no diftindion betwixt it and 
 perception, then would the brutes be confcious as well as we. Now, I 
 hold it to be certain that they are not ; and, therefore, I have fet down 
 nvant of confcioiifnefs as common to all the natural moving principles 
 above mentioned. 
 
 Thefe natural motive povuers, not only have not this prime fa- 
 culty of intcUeSi, but they have not intelkEl at all ; for they do not 
 contemplate the nature of things, apprehend generals, or form ideas. 
 They adt, therefore, without intelligence or defign, not having any 
 idea of the end for which they a6l; : For this reafon, they are to be 
 confidered ' As manual opifcers, that a£t fubferviently under the ar- 
 ' chite^onical art and wifdom of the Divine Underftanding,* as Cud- 
 worth has very well exprefTed it f. Though, therefore, they work re- 
 gularly, orderly, artificially, and to a certain end, yet they do not in- 
 tend that end, or underfland the reafon of what they do. And, if it 
 
 were 
 
 * Sec, on this fubje£l:, Cudworth's Intellectual Syflem, p. 159. 
 
 t Intelle£lual Syftem, p. 156. — The thought is not: his, but he has taken it from 
 Ariflotle, in the beginning of his Metaphyhcs, whom he has quoted. He has alfo 
 quoted a palTage from Plotinus, which (hows, 1 think, as much as any, the depth of 
 the underftanding of that philofopher. He fays, that nature is the laft of mindf being 
 no more than an obfcure image or imitation of Divine Wifdom ; as when, fays he, 
 wc make a deep impreifion with a feal upon a thick piece of wax, the (lamp or figna- 
 ture, on that fide which we imprcfs, will be ftrong and clear, but, on the other fide». 
 ■weak and faint. And from thence, he adds, it comes, that nature does not know, but 
 only afts, Itv ovh a^i (pve-ii,^t»»» 61 xoiE(. This, I think, is a moll apt fimilitude, illuftra- 
 ting my notion of the progrefs of mind downward from the highell Mind, to that 
 which a<^s in natural things, without intelligence, or knowledge of what it does.
 
 Chap.XVIL ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 215 
 
 were otherwife, and that the brute and vegetable, not to fpeak of un- 
 organized natures, could be fuppofed to propofe to themfelves the ends 
 of their actions, and to devife means for accomplifhlng thofe ends ; 
 in fhort, if they could be fuppofed to operate as human art does, they 
 would have infinitely more intelligence than any human artift ; for 
 no art of man can produce works of fuch wonderful contrivance as 
 thofe of nature. But the Wifdom that diredts thofe works is as much 
 fuperior to human wifdom as the works are to human works. 
 
 3//0, Thofe moving principles a£t without cohfultation or delibe- 
 ration, as well as without confcioufnefs or intelligence. This is un- 
 douhtedly true of the vegetable, and of the rtiotive principle in unor- 
 ganized bodies. But, as the better fort of aniri als come near to hu- 
 man nature, they, as 1 have already obferved *, deliberate upon parti- 
 cular occafions ; but it is not fuch a deliberation as the human ; for 
 they do not deliberate concerning ends and purpofes, of upon gene- 
 ral notions of what is ^00^ or ill\ but all their deliberations are con- 
 cerning particulars, as, whether they fhall yield to one particular in- 
 ftindive impulfe in preference to another. And, as to the works of 
 fome brutes, fo wonderfully artificial, which the (Indents of nature ad- 
 mire fo much, fuch as the cells of bees, the webs of the fpider, the nefts 
 of fome birds, — they perform them neither by art^ as Ariftotle fays', 
 nor with inquiry or deliberation f: And he ridicules thofe who think 
 that nature ads for no end, becaufe they do not fee the motive prlrl- 
 dple confulting and deliberating; and he adds, very properly, * for 
 * even art does not deliberate J.' And, if it be true, that even hu- 
 man art, when it is perfed, does not fearch, confult, or deliberate, 
 
 but 
 
 • Page loi — 1:?8. 
 
 •|- Ot/Tg ti-^f-zi •uTf ^»iT>i<r«{»T« sure 'RtuXivc-ai^ivx Trom- 
 
 ;|: XTtv^f 01 TO firt 6<«5-^«» 'nates T#f y£»l7,^«/, ttif fcn <Swr< T« x»y«w» Btv^ivmutfoll' KtCITtt 
 
 *Mi A n^vn \v S$vXiviT«tii Phyf, B. 2. c. 8.
 
 2i6 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IL 
 
 but ads readily and eafily ; how much more fhould Divine Wifdora, 
 that directs nature, adt without conluhing or hefitating ? 
 
 If any one is difficulted to conceive how any thing fhould be done 
 regularly and artificially, without counfel or defign in that which 
 does it, let him ftudy himfelf diligently, and he will find examples 
 fufficient of that in his own little ivorld. What a deal of wonderful 
 work is going on within us, by which the blood circulates, concoc- 
 tion, digeftion, fecretion, and many other chemical procefles are per- 
 formed, without our knowing any thing of the matter, all carried on 
 by a principle not intelligent, nor confcious of what it does, yet work- 
 ing moft artificially to a certain end. Even the works of human art 
 we very frequently perform w^ithout art, that is, without attending to 
 the rules of the art, which many of us have never learned. Thus to 
 read, to fpeak, to fing, or to play upon any mufical inftrument, are 
 certainly works of art, which we learn with great trouble and pains ;. 
 yet the energies of thefe arts we perform without attending to the art,, 
 and often without any confcioufnefs, or knowing what we are doing. 
 This is the effeiSt of cuftom or habit, which is faid to be a fecond na- 
 ture in man*: and, indeed, it may be faid to be his firft and original 
 nature ; for, as I have elfewhere obferved, the nature of man is fuch, 
 that he, by ufe and cuftom, acquires many faculties that other ani- 
 mals have from nature. Hahit^ therefore, in man is what nature is 
 in other things ; and if we fee men, from mere habit, performing 
 moft artificial things, we ought not to wonder that nature does the 
 fame. And, in human fociety, we may obferve fomething like this- 
 of nature ; for there it is abfolutcly neceflary, that, by far the greater 
 part of mankind fhould a£t in that way; very few of the fpecies 
 having that architedonical knowledge mentioned above, or being quali- 
 fied to ad with intelligence, and the certain knowledge of ends : And 
 
 yet 
 
 • Origin and Progrefs of Language, vol. i. p. 24. 2d edit.
 
 Chap. XVIL ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 217 
 
 yet thefe arc tHe only perfons that are fit to govern either themfelves 
 or others. Under them, tUerefore, the reft of mankind muft ad Hke 
 mafoiis or brick-layers under the diredion of an architect, without 
 knowing for what purpofe they ad, yet ading orderly and artificial- 
 
 What makes us fo much furprifed at the artifice of nature, is our 
 being lo much accuftomed to the works of human art, in which 
 the art is always external to the matter upon which it operates ; 
 for the art is in the man, not in the wood-, (lone, or metal, which is 
 -only the lubjed ot the art. But, in nature, the art is internal, being 
 in the matter upon which it operates. This Ariftotle very well il- 
 luftrates, by fuppofing, that the wood of which the (hip is made had 
 in itfelfthe fhip-wright art ; tor then, fays h r, it would ad juft as na- 
 ture ads *, that is, without knowing either theend tor which it operates, 
 or the nature of the means that it employs ; for to know that, belongs 
 to a higher principle, namelv, the N««f or Intelletl, which, having 
 the perfed knowledge of the end tor which it ads, and jf the relation 
 .of the means to that end, guides and direds this fubordinate vita! 
 principle, which we call nature. 
 
 Laflly^ Nature, as it ads without intelligence, {0 it ads without 
 "wilU or intention ; for iinll is the determination of intelligence to ad. 
 Of confequence, therefore, nature ads neceff^rily ; for, where ivill is 
 not, there necejfity muft be. And this necefflty is truly what the an- 
 tient philofophers called /^/^ ; for the Aphrodifian philofopher, the 
 oldeft commentator upon Ariftotle, has riglitly faid, * Th^ fate is na-' 
 * ture^ and nature fate f.' 
 
 E c Nature^ 
 
 • E< iv»i ey Tfti l,v\»» n trnvvrtiyixi, iutatg «» rr^vrtt t-rtiH' Phyf lib. 2. cap. 8. 
 t Te TJ uute^uift* kktx ^v(r»y, xm< to kktx ^vrtt uftxojAini. Alcxand. Aohrodlf, lib. 
 ie FaUi.
 
 2i8 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 Nature^ therefore, * is that mind, or principle of motion in body, 
 * whidi adls for a certain end or purpofe, but without knowledge of 
 ' that end, without confcioufnefs, intelligence, deliberation, or inten- 
 ' tion, and fatally or neceflarily.' And, in thefe properties, I have fhown, 
 that all the vital principles I have mentioned, that in unorganized bo- 
 dized bodies, and that in organized, whether vegetable or animal, a- 
 gree : And I am now to inquire into the difference betwixt them, and 
 what each has peculiar to itfelf. 
 
 And, to begin with the motive principle in the vegetable, compared 
 with that in the unorganized body : By the vital principle in the 
 vegetable, it is nourifhed, grows, and propagates its kind ; whereas 
 the fame principle in the unorganized body does no more than move 
 it in a certain and determinate way, (for nothing in nature is undeter- 
 mined or fortuitous.) The con^Vquence of this difference neceffarily 
 is, that the movement of the latter is Hmple and uniform, either up 
 or doivn^ to or fro?n^ one another : Whereas the movements of the 
 vegetable, by which fuch operations are performed, muft needs be ma- 
 ny and various. 2dly^ The principle of union, which, as I have faid, 
 is in all natural fubffances, and makes every one of them what it is, 
 and nothing elfe, muft needs be different in unorganized and vegetable 
 fubftances : For, in the unorganized, it appears to be nothing elic but 
 the attradion and coheHon of homogeneous particles ; whereas, in the 
 vegetable, as well as in the animal, there is a certain nature by which 
 the plant is preierved and kept together, and all the feveral parts of 
 which it is com^wfed are made to co-operate to the fame end, viz. the 
 growth, prelervatlon, and propagation of the plant : And it is by this 
 kind of mind or genius^ as we m.ay call it, of each particular plant, 
 that the plant continues ftill the fame, though every particle of its 
 emitter be changed. 
 
 And
 
 Oiap. XVIL A NT IE NT METAPHYSICS. 219 
 
 And here we have difcovered a mind different from any of the mo- 
 tive powers of bodv above mentioned ; for thefe move only one hodj 
 in a certain determined diredti^n : Whereas the vital principle in the 
 vegetable governs a fyPtem or ivhole ; for luch und mbtedly the vege- 
 tabie, as well as the animal, is. Now, where there is a ivhole, there 
 muft be fome principle of union ; for it is not fuffi lent that there 
 fliould be feveral principles operating feparately, but there muft be 
 one which fuperiniends the whole, direding and adjufting, as in this 
 cafe, the feveral parts of the organic body of the vegetable, in fuch a 
 manner, as to make them all confpire to the growth, nutrition, and 
 propagation of the plant *> But we are not to fuppofe that this genius 
 of the tree, this Dryad or Hamadryad, as the Poets call it, has intelli- 
 gence, confcioufnels of what it does, or any knowledge of the end tor 
 which it ads, but, like the principle of motion in matter inanimate, 
 ads merely as the inferior minifter of that Superior intelkd which 
 prefides over the univerfe. 
 
 This is the difference betwixt the ^vegetable and body unorganized ; 
 and I am now to explain the differenc^^ betwixt the animal and the 
 'vegetable : And in it is to be obferved, that the animal contains in it 
 two diftind natures ; one of the vegetable kind, by which it is nou- 
 rifhed, grows, and propagates its kind, as the vegetable docs. The 
 mechanic ftrudure of this part of the animal is much more various, 
 complex, and artificial, than that of the vegetable. But the vital prin- 
 ciple which directs and luperincends this part of the animal oeconomy, 
 
 xL e 2 ]g 
 
 * Cudworth, in his Intelleaual Syftem, p. 164. exprefles this in the followin<T 
 words: ' For the leveral parts of matter, diftant one from another, aQing alone by 
 
 * thcmfelves, without any common direarix, bting not able to confer together, nor 
 
 * communicate with each other, could never polRbly confpire to make up one fuch 
 
 * uniform and orderly fyftem or compages as the body of every a/z/mo/is'— and he 
 might have added, * the vegetable,*
 
 -20 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Bool: It 
 
 is no doubt of a kind analogous to that which prefides in the vegetable, 
 but more excellent, by how much it has a greater kingdom to govern. 
 
 As to the other part of the animal nature, and which, properly 
 fpeaking, is the anurah h is very different from the vegetable, and 
 come8 much nearer to intelled : For it has perception, appetites, and 
 ilejires, and what conftitutes pieajure and pain. And it comes thus 
 far dill nearer intelled, that it may be (aid to have an end in its pur- 
 fuits : For the brute, when he is hungry, propoles to eat, and of that 
 food which is natural to him; and, in like manner, when he is in /«/?, 
 his objedt is the jemale of his kind : But he has no end beyond the 
 immediate objedt of his appetite ; for he knows not that eating will 
 nourifli him, or that coition will propagax his kind. 
 
 The perception of the animal is by certain organs, which we call 
 organs oijenje. By thefc he has a communication with external ob- 
 jeds, fuch as the vegetable has not : But of thefe external objects he 
 forms no ideas, does not recognize his own mind, nor is confcious of 
 any of its operation?. — But, of the difference betwixt the animal and 
 intelledlual mind, 1 have faid enough in a preceeding chapter *. 
 
 From this accompt of the animal mind, it is evident that it 
 muft be much more pertedt than that ot the vegetable, becaufe 
 the oeconomy over which it prelides is much more various and 
 artificial ; for, as the animal has different appetites and delires, 
 thele muft be all lb adjufted together, as to contribute to the 
 end propofed by Nature, the prefervation of the individual, and 
 the CO tinuation of the kind. Each or them, iherefore, muft be 
 kept within its juft bounds ; and there muft be a balance of ttie af- 
 fedions and pafhons, in their mind, as well as in ours. The feihfh. 
 
 paffions, 
 
 ' Chap. 10. lib. 2. p. 132,
 
 Chap.XVir. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 221 
 
 paffions, for example, muft not go too far on the one fide, nor the fo- 
 cial and benevolent on the other, otherways diforder and mifery would 
 enfue *. This balance is kept even by what we call inftintl.^ which is 
 no other than ' Divine Wifdom diredin"; the mind of the brute to that 
 * which is beft, both for the animal itfelf, and for the kind.* And this 
 mind, fo dire<3:ed, is the animal nature. 
 
 Here we may fee evidently why inJlinSl is faid never to err; and why 
 nature, according to Ariftotle, whether it be confidered in the animal, 
 vegetable, or unorganized body, does nothing in vain, but every thing 
 in the bcft way pofTiole : So that, if we could difcover, in every cafe, 
 what is bclf, we ihould be fure, fays Ariftotle, that nature does it f. 
 
 When the animal or vegetable dies, then does the mind, which 
 kept together the body, and conduded all its operations, forfake it • 
 in confequence of which the body is dilfolved, and the feveral parts, of 
 which it was compofed, return to the levcral elements from whence 
 they were taken, viz. earth, air, fire, and waier, and retain nothing 
 but -the elemental powers of motion, which are natural to all buoy, 
 whether organized or unorganized. As to what beco.i es ot tneniiud, 
 
 and 
 
 * When I fpcak of the brute hzXngfelJiJhy we mud not underftand the word in die 
 fame fenfe as when we fay, that a man is felfiih ; for a feiiiih man lorms a lylicm of 
 felf-intereft, from which he excludes altogether, oi nc^iedts too uiuch, tut mtticit of 
 his kind- But the brute forms no Jy/iemy nor has any luca ot a ivhoie oi an^ kuui, but 
 has ditftrent appetites and inclinations, fome tending to prelcrve the indiviuuui, others 
 the kind- 
 
 t De Animalium incejfu, cap. 2 Where he repeats a maxim that he often incul- 
 cates, ain* which he appears t( have confidered as an axiom of natural phiiolonhy 
 that ^ Nature does nothing in vain' 'Ori n (pva-n evh* aoin ^«t»v And, in order to 
 apply it to nnimais, which are the fuSjed of this book, he adds, «>.>.'«.« tx r^v ,,^^^^.
 
 222 AKTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book If. 
 
 and whether it exifts 'after the diflblution of the body, I have faid 
 fomethuig in a preceedhig chapter, and will fay more in the fecond 
 part of my work. 
 
 What I have faid here concerning the animal and vegetable natures, 
 agrees perfedly with Ciidworth's dodrine of Plajlic Nature^ which, 
 though it has been thought a peculiar fancy and conceit of this very 
 karned divine, is in truth no other than the doQrlne of Arlrtotle ; for 
 Cudwmih^s PlaJIic Niiture is neither more nor lefs than what Ari- 
 Rotle calls fimply Nature, or <pv^ii. This he has every where diftin- 
 guifhed from matter, and has faid, that it is a principle or caufe much 
 fuperior to ?natler *. And, in his admirable treatife, De Partibus A- 
 nimalium, cap. i. he diftinguifhes it from the matter, figure, colour, 
 or any other property of the body ot animals, and makes it to be the 
 principle of 'all the order and regularity that we obferve in the move- 
 ments and operations of animals. It is true, that Ariftotle, in this 
 work, fpeaks of it as belonging only to animals ; and Cudworth feems 
 to think, that it extends no further than to animals or vegetables. But 
 it is evident that Ariftotle carried it to all phylical bodies, unorganized as 
 well as organized; for it is a fundamental principle in his natural philo- 
 fophy,that all phyfical bodies have in them a principle of motion; which 
 principle he calls by the fame name of nature. And, in the books De 
 Coeh, he has explained the different manners in which this principle 
 moves different bodies. It is true, indeed, he has not dwelt fo nmch upon 
 the operations of this principle in the elemental bodies, as in the ve- 
 getable, 
 
 * 'ji (pvc-i? fAuXU¥ u^'^/i pcici eciTtx T»i« i/Xm- De Part- Jnimalium, lib, i. cap, i. pag. 97.0. 
 Edit- Du Val. And, in another paffage in the fame chapter, page 969. he fays, that 
 this "principle, which he calls <^vs-<j 'v£x« tov ^«;s« ;r«>T«, that is, does every thing for 
 fome end. And he fays elfewhere, that it works moft artificially for this end, exceeding, 
 by far, any thing of human art.
 
 Chap. XVII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 22*3 
 
 getable, animal, and celeftial ; and, for this reafon, is cenfured by Pro- 
 dus, in a paflage above quoted, as leaving the elements to move at 
 random, without any mind direding them *. But, that he recognized 
 the principle in thofe fimple bodies, as well as the more artificial, is 
 evident from many paiiages of his philofophical works ; and, indeed, 
 it is an effential part of his fyftem of natural philofophy. And every 
 philoiopher, w^io is not a m.aterialift, and who believes that niatter can- 
 not move itfelf, muft admit that all thofe bodies are maved by mind, 
 either external, or internal, fupreme, or fubordinate.. 
 
 Thus, I have endeavoured to diftinguifh the feveral minds which 
 inform and animate nature, and produce the different movements 
 that we oblerve in the material world, making three kinds or orders 
 of them, rifmg one above another. The firft, and lowed of them, is 
 that which makes unorganized bodies cohere and move in differeat 
 diredions, but each kind of body only in one determined diredion; 
 A higher kind of mind is that which informs the 'vegetable ; and a 
 higher ftill that which conftitutes Jeiifiti've life, and direds the move- 
 ments of the animaL 
 
 And here we may fee the grofs error of thofe Dhilofophers, antient 
 or modern, who ji ake Nature their God, and would lubllitute, in place 
 of the Supreme Intelled, this animaiing Ipiiit which we fee d iff u fed 
 through the whole univerfe j for this fpirit is lo far from excluding 
 intelligence from the government of the worlu, or making it unnccef- 
 fary, that it manifeftly fuppofes it : For, ab Nature acLs wuhout intelli- 
 gence, or knowledge ot its end, y.t works regularly and artificially, 
 for attaining that end ; it is evident ttat iticie mull be fome higiier 
 pov^er than nature, which propofes thai end, and direds the operation 
 of ihofe natural agents towards it: And this Power is Gael 1 he 
 Atheilt, therefore, is reduced to the neeelfity, eith.er ot maintaining, 
 that Nature does nothing for any end or purpolt, which is contrary to 
 
 commoa 
 
 f Page 208.
 
 :^24 A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I C S. Book II. 
 
 common obfervation and experience, as much as if a man (hould main- 
 tain, that a {lone did not fall to the gn>und ; or, he muit fay, tha^ an 
 end n ay he propofed, and the bell means contrived for accompliih- 
 ing that end, withont intelligence ; which is an abfolute contradiction ; 
 for iiitelhgence in adion is nothing elie but propofing ends, and devi- 
 ling means. 
 
 It is moO truly faid in Scripture, that man Is made after the image 
 
 of God, by which we are to underftand the Joul or inielledual part of 
 
 man ; for. to fay that he refembles the Divinity in his fenfitive or 
 
 animal nature, would be highly profane and impious. But, by his 
 
 intelled, he comes nearer to the Divinity than any thing we know ; 
 
 and, therefore, as I have clfewhere faid, it is only by the ftudy of our 
 
 own minds that we can come to know any thing of the Divinity, or 
 
 of any Superior Mind : So that the precept of Antient Wiidom, 
 
 •which diredts us to know ourfelves, is not only an admirable moral 
 
 precept of fovereign ufe in the condud of life, but it is the foundation 
 
 of the higheft philofophy, and particularly that part of it which is 
 
 .called theology. 
 
 « 
 
 This prime faculty of man's nature is not beftowed upon him at 
 once ; but, like almoft every other thing belonging to him, is acqui- 
 red by flow degrees, and, like other things in nature, has a regular 
 progrefs. In this ftate of our exigence, it is neceffarily conneded 
 with the fenfitive part of our nature, in fo far as it is the fenfes which 
 roufe it, as it were, to adion, and furnifh it the materials upon which 
 to ad. Of thele materials it forms ideas in the manner I have defcri- 
 bed ; which ideas are the proper objed of intelle^ : For, as particu- 
 lars are the objed of ihe/enjes, fo generals are the objed of intelle^i* 
 The next operation of the intelled is, to compare thefe ideas thus form- 
 ed, and to dilcover their agreement or difagreement : And this is the 
 dijcurjus mentis, or reafonivg, as it is commonly called. The third 
 
 great
 
 Chap. XVIT. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 225 
 
 great operation of intelledl: is that by which it Is confcious of what It 
 does, reviews its own operations, or, in one word, refle^h. I call this 
 the great operation of intelle6i^ becaufe, by it, it feparates itfelf from 
 all external things, and is converfant only with itfelt, enjoys itfelf, 
 and, in this way, as 1 have obierved, more than in any other, ap- 
 proaches to Divinity. And, laftly, by being converfant with ideas, the 
 objeds of IntellecSt, and by ftudying diligently itfelf and its own na- 
 ture, it comes at laft to form the idea of m'md and immaterial fub- 
 ftance in general, and to form fome notion of higher minds, and even 
 of the Supreme Mind. 
 
 How we come to form this great Idea, and arrive at the knowledge 
 of that, which to know, is the completion of philofophy, and the per- 
 fedion of human nature, belongs not to this part of my work to ex- 
 plain. I {hall only here obferve, that, without ftudying our own 
 minds, it is iinpofTible we can have any idea of the exiftencc of fuch a 
 Being ; for it is only by that fludy that we can conceive, what council^ 
 what deftm is, — what forming a plan, what propofing an end is, and 
 what devifmg means for executing that end. That there is fomething 
 within us which does fo, we know, by the moft certain of all know- 
 ledge, confcioufnefs ; and, that there is fuch an Intelligence in the 
 univerfe, we know with as great certainty, as we know that there is 
 intelligence in other men: For, how do we know that other men are 
 intelligent ? Is it not by their adions and their works, all bearing 
 the plain marks of council and defign ? And, are there not the 
 fame, or infinitely greater marks of an Intelligent Being in the 
 univerfe ? Whoever requires ftronger evidence than this, of the ex- 
 iftence of fuch a Being, does not know what he would be at, nor 
 what fort of evidence belongs to different truths. It is impoffible that, 
 by confcioufnefs, he can know any thing but what pafles within him- 
 felf : And it is impoffible that, by any reafoning a priori^ he can 
 difcover any thing of the nature of God, but that he muft have ex- 
 
 Ff illed
 
 lit ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Bookll. 
 
 ifled from all eternity, and neGeflarily and independently ; and, fur- 
 ther, that he mutt be, by his nature and eiTence, immaterial. But 
 what the particular nature of this Bei-ng is, whether he be wife or 
 good, we can only difcover from his works, in the fame manner as 
 v;e difcover thofe qualities in our fellow creatures. The ini'ijible things 
 of Gody fays the A^oixXc. from the creation of the ivorld^ arc clearly 
 feeHy being under jlood by the things that are made*. To afk any other 
 proof, is to afk a proof which the nature of the cafe will not admit ; 
 and, to attempt to give it, is to weaken the evidence of fo clear a 
 truth. 
 
 Thus It is, that we proceed from Nature to God, through man. We 
 firft difcover, in nature, a principle ading artificially for a certain end : 
 And this principle we prove, by reafouing both a priori and a po- 
 Jleriori, to be immaterial. Then, by ftudying ourfelves, we find out, 
 that there is, at leait in our little bodies, a principle of couulel and 
 wifdom, which forms d^figns, and contrives means for executing 
 thole defigns. And, hifilyy from as certain reafoning as the nature of 
 the cafe will admit, we conclude, that there is fuch a principle in the 
 univerfe. Thus we become perfedt Theilts : But, for this, it is abfo- 
 lutely necefTary that we fhould be learned in the philofophy of mind j 
 for, without that knowledge, we fhall be apt to afcribe to body the 
 qualities which only belong to mind, and realon after the manner of 
 certain philofophers, of whom I Ihall, in the fequel, take notice. 
 Whether the modern philofophy, fo much converfant with matter, 
 will lead to this knowledge, or whether we mull not return again to 
 the aniients, and take them for our guides in this moft important ftu- 
 dy, is fubmitted to the reader from what has been already faid, and 
 will be further faid. in the courfe of this work. For my own part, I 
 mufl confeis, that it is from the amient books, and from them only» 
 
 that 
 
 * Romans, i. zo.
 
 Chap. XVIL ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 227 
 
 that I have learned to know any thing of 7nind ; for they have taught 
 me to diftinguifh betwixt fenfe and intelled, and 10 make a dillmdion 
 ftill nicer, betwixt intelledt and that reafunmg faculty by which we 
 compare the perceptions of lenie, and which the brutes poflels as well 
 as we. Mr Locke,our great author tor the philofophy of mind, has, not 
 only, not made this laft dirtindion, but has plainly confounded fenfe 
 and intelled, fenlations and idea?^ ; and, in this manner, has taken a- 
 way, though, I believe, without intending it, the only folid ground 
 upon which Theifm can ftand, and laid a foundation, upon which all 
 the Atheirtical writers, fince that time, have built. And, indeed, if 
 we believe that the human foul cannot operate without the body, 
 there are no arguments in philofophy to convice us that it can exijl 
 without the body ; nor is it pofTiblc that we can have any juft idea of 
 fuperior mind, far lefs of the Supreme. 
 
 •Ff2 CHAP.
 
 228 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IL 
 
 CHAP. XVIIL 
 
 T.he DoElrine of all Bodies being moved by an internal ASlivePrijicipky not 
 neiv — maintained by Plato and Ariftotle — alfo by Leibnitz, and other 
 Authors — Difference of Minds admitted by every Body — The Vegetable 
 Mind has fomething like Appetite and Inclination — The Mind in unorga" 
 nized Bodies has fomething of the fame Kind — The Belief that there is 
 110 Principle in unoiganized Body difincl from Matter, the Foundation 
 of Atheifm — Aufvuer to the ObjeBions, that this Syfem multiplies 
 Minds — that it makes all Nature to be a Wonder, and a Miracle — The 
 Atheifi is the greatefi of all Believers — FaJiity the great Source of 
 Atheifm — Cure propofedfor this Vanity, 
 
 NOTWITHSTANDING the pains I have taken, In the preceeding 
 chapter, to explain and fupport my fyftem, I know very well, 
 that by far the greatefi: part of my readers (if there be any that have 
 accompanied me thus far) will think it very abfurd and ridiculous, 
 efpecially that part of it which gives mind to fenfelefs and inanimate 
 things, as they are commonly called. And it is fo different from what 
 is to be found in the books that are commonly read, that I am perfua- 
 ded it will be thought a mere fancy and conceit of my own, fuch as 
 never entered into the imagination of any before me. 
 
 That my fyflem fhould be thought new, is not to be wondered at, 
 in an age where the old philofophy is fo much forgot, that it is no lefs 
 new than when it was firft introduced into the weftern parts of Eu- 
 TOpe, by the Greeks that came to Italy, after the taking of Conf^antl- 
 iiople by the Turks \ for the language of this philofophy is lofl in 
 
 aim oft
 
 Chap. XVIII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 229 
 
 almoft all the nations of Plurope ; and, tho* it be the particular honour 
 of England, that it is better preferved, and more efteemed there than 
 any where elfe, yet, I am afraid, the philofophy,!© which it is the key, 
 js but very little ftudied even in England. But, that the doclrine which I 
 maintain, concerning a Jtwid^ ov hit ernai motive principle in body unor- 
 ganized, as well as organized, is maintained both by Plato and Ari- 
 ftotle, I do pofitively aver ; and-, therefore, this part of my phi- 
 fophy is not new, however it may appear at prefent, but as old, I be- 
 lieve, as any philofophy in the world ; for it is very certain, that both 
 Plato and Ariftotle took their philofophy of nature from the fchool of 
 Pythagoras. And it is as certain, that Pythagoras brought his philo- 
 fophy from Egypt, the parent country of all arts and fciences *. 
 
 That 
 
 "• ThaleSjtlie firft pTiilofopher of Greece, and wTio certainly learned his philofophy in 
 Egypt, was among the number of thofe philofophers who thought, as I do, that mind 
 was mixed with the whole body of the univerfe j and, therefore, he faid, * That aU 
 
 * was full of Gods' K«< !► TA' Ixca ^g TOtj uvTYtV (•4't/;i^vi») ftif^t^xt <px(rtv, oh* KTUi K»t 
 
 OccXvii air,fn TTciVTx TTMjn &i'^y tiniict ', Jriftotlcy De Jnima, lib. i. cap. 8. And Plato, in 
 the EpinomiSi ufes the very fame exprelTion, as a faying of the philofophers before 
 him ; for, fays he, -xayKiicXui; tt xxi 'iKx^i h^utui t# 0£*» mui ttx^tu 5rA£<t, And it was 
 for this reafon, no doubtj that Thales faid, that the loadftone had in it a mind, be- 
 caufe it moved iron, as Ariflotle informs us, Lil>. i. De Jnima, cap. 2. not conceiving 
 how any thing could move another, except by the means of mind. 
 
 Ariftotle, giving an account of the opinions of philofophers before his.'time, concerning 
 mind, fays, that they all agreed that mind was diftinguiflied from body by two things, 
 xtv/i(rti Tj, Kxi ra) xi(r6scyii<rfxiy by movement iiwdi jenfatiori' Then proceeding to explain their 
 opinions more particularly, he fays, f«a-(» sy/«j Kxt f^-xXia-rx kxi TcfuTw; ^v^vi* i*»«« t« Jt«»«yn. 
 Some think that jnind is chief y and principally that which mov€S. But, fays he, 
 imagining that nothing could move another tiling, but what was firft moved itfelf, 
 therefore they thought that mind was one of thofe things which were moved, as well as 
 
 did move. OojSsvtss t» f4» ztvovfttvcy xvro, i^7i i>^iy^iirixi xivitv iTi^o», T*;v Kit^vutfv* t< ti;» 
 
 •^vx,rtv CUT*; vttO.x/Sov iiv«< ; Lib. I. De Anima, cap. 2. This was a grofs material notion, 
 Avhich Ariftotle has fully refuted in the next chapter of this book. It proceeded from 
 dobfierving, that body moved body only in that wny. It was, however, a notion that Plato
 
 230 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 That Plato was a genuine Theift, and confequently believed that 
 body did not move itfelf, but was moved by mind, is well kn^wn to 
 thc^fe who know any thing at all of his philofophy. And it is evi- 
 dent, from the pafllige that I have quoted in the beginning of this 
 work, that he rr ade the fame diftindion betwixt body and mind which 
 I do, making the one to be that which moves, the other that which is 
 moved *. And, as to Ariftotle, it is the foundation of his whole na- 
 tural 
 
 gave too much countenance to, as I have elfewhere obferved, by defining mind to be 
 thai ivhicb was moved by itfelf In the fame ftcond chapter, he fays, that all the phi- 
 lofophers agreed in defining mind by three things, motion, fcnfation, and immateria- 
 lity : ^Ofit,ovT*i ^i 7r«>Jf; T))v il'v^ti* TftfiVy t/; UTTitv Kivna-ti, eiifbn<riif lei xs-tuuxrci. Now, 
 
 immateria.ity, and ihe power of moving^ is common to all minds ; and, according to 
 my opinion, is the definition of mind : So that the on!y error in the opinion of thofe 
 philolophers was, in making fenfation eflcntial to mind; which is a notion rejeded by 
 Ariftotle, who, through thefe whole books De Anima, fpe^ks of the vegetable^ as well as 
 iht/enjitive mind, making it common both to vegetables and animals; and, particu- 
 larly, in the end of the pth chapter of the firft book, he fayj, ttuci It ««« « iv rtn tpvTot^ 
 ttf^n ■<\,vxn T<j Kfar (<.ova( ytf tucvta-, Ktttuvu kxi t^ua. xut <pvrx. But, whi<tever Other things 
 thofe antient phiiofophers added to the definition of mind, they ail agreca in making 
 the power of moving an eflential property of it. In defining mind, therefore, in the 
 comprehenfive way I have done, I think I may venture to affirm, that 1 take in the 
 opinion of all the phiiofophers of antiquity, who were not Atheilts, and believed that 
 there was a diftindion between mind ^nd body. 
 
 * The pafTage is in his loth book of laws, page ^;\ . et fcquen. edit. Ficini, where he 
 proves, that mind is more antient than body, and is the moving principle in the uni- 
 verfc, while body is that which is moved And he concludes the dt monftration with 
 
 thefe words : 'ixM*i>rxT/i ^ilnKTXi -^vx/i t»» Trx^iruf rfiffivrxTA, y£V9«i»») re «^;i/„ x<v,e-£6;f. 
 
 And, a little after, when he comes to fpeak of the motions of the heavenly bodies, he 
 
 fays, -^v/^r.y h iioiicovtrx^ kxi vmycov^xv «» xtvxti t«/j wair,) * i-oy«r»a<j (Ctwi- o-^ kxi t«» «t//i«y«if 
 
 «»*yx:i) S-,o.*£.» f«»«* ; where the leaincd reader may obierve, that Plato, fpe^.king oi the 
 •^'vyjfi, ufes not only the word Jio/r-ous-*, but tvo/v-ei-ir* ; fo that it is evi'^ent he belie- 
 ved the moving principle to be internal, and within the bodies, nutcxt(rnal It 
 is therefore paft all doubt, that what Ariftotle calls <?v8-/s, or xf^-^r, tu? x<v>js-j«;, was, ac- 
 cording to the philofophy of his mafter, "^v;i/.), or mind*
 
 Chap.XVIir. A NT IE NT METAPHYSICS. 231 
 
 tural philofophy, that there is a principle in all bodies which moves 
 them in Tome particular diredtion ; for that principle is what he calls 
 nature ; and which, he fays, is in all animals and plants, and likewile 
 in the fimple eleniental bodies, fuch as fire, air, earth, and water : And, 
 as this principle is undoubtedly ?nind in animals and plants, accord- 
 ing to the notion of Ariflotle, and all the philofophers of antiquity 
 who were not Atheifts, it follows neceflarily, that this principle in the 
 elemental bodies he mentions, muft be the lame, or of the fame 
 kind *. 
 
 Neither 
 
 * Ariftotle's words are, (in the beginning of his 2d book of Phyfics,) T*/ cvtc^v ru, 
 
 ftm iirri <fve-ii, rx ^i ^/ etKhcti ««T<«j. ^vtrii fiiv, rx Tt tfixx. x.oc,i fss^vj arvTav, kxi tx (pvru kxi tx 
 etTTXu T»» (TUfcctTuv ttcv y«, nxi w», xut x7,^, ;£«; l^ftifc Txijrx yx^ avxt y.xi tx Totxvrx (pjo-i: d>xu,iv' 
 
 And, in the 8th chap, of the fame book, where he proves that nature does every thing 
 for fome end, he argues from the example of brute animals, fuch as ipiders and ants 
 who undoubtedly work for a certain end or purpofe: And he concludes the ar'^ument 
 
 thus, ?»«y£§«» «T* itrriv « «<7<a « roixvrvi iv to/? (pi/rn yivejCtSye<s x«/ auc-*. • it is evident 
 
 * therefore, that fuch a caufe or principle is in natural things.' Now, this c ufe is 
 no other than what he calls nature, and has defined it to be a principle of movement 
 in all phyficaV bodies. Alex.mder Aphrodifienfis, therefore, the oldefl commentator 
 upon Ariftotle, is certainly in the right, who fays, that Ariftotle, in his deiininun of 
 nature, comprehends mind, as bimplicius informs us, in his Commentary upon this 
 book of Ariftotle, page qg. It is very true, that Ariftotle, in his books a-8§< %/.v;^^i,;, ap- 
 pears to make a djftin{^ion betwixt ;«z/2(^, and this piinciple in unorganiztd bodies* 
 for he there fays, that it is only *«9-?rtg 4"^zi- But it is to be conliJcred, tlut Arntotle 
 in his books ^s?* -4'v;t')5. treats only of the animal and vegetable life, and the rational 
 foul i to which three only, as I linor oblerv.d, (p. 8.) the wor i ■^nx.fi, in its ordinary 
 ufe, applies. It was, therefore, very natural for him to make a ditfcrcnce betwixt thefe 
 minds in organized bodies, ana that m unorganized j and there is no dcubt a great 
 difference, which 1 have endeavoured to explain. But they ire on.y uift.ient Ipeciefes 
 of the fame genus, mind. And I th.nk it is evident, fron> the pailages above quoted, 
 that Arlltotle confidered them as fuch ; and, if thofe paffjges flo not ni.kc it .ufFicicntly 
 clear, there is one in his f^rft chapter De Partibus .--Inivialium, page yOy edit. Du ^u/, 
 which puts it out of all doubt ; for he fiys there, th.t it is not the huhnefs of a natural 
 philofopher to treat of all mind; for, fays he, all 7nind is not naiiirc but only one or 
 
 more
 
 232 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IL 
 
 Neither is this dodrine entirely antient ; but it is fupported likewifc 
 by modern authority. The firft 1 Ihali alledge, is that of a philofopher 
 
 of 
 
 more parts, that is, fpecicfes of it. cvh yx^ r«s-« Y«;^;«^t;r«f, «xa« Tf^eg<e» tfuTuj, .if, 
 i KKi -mtku^,. And, indeed, if we hold that the motive principle in unorganized bodies 
 is immaterial, as well as that in organized bodies, which 1 think every man muft do 
 who believes in God, I would defire to know, by what other name we are to call that 
 which is immaterial, if not by the name of m;Wj for all things exifting are either maN 
 ter or mind? Now, that Ariftotle was a Theift, no body can doubt, who has ftudied 
 his works with any attention ; and, particularly, that he believed nature to be a prin- 
 ciple of movement quite different from the matter which it moves, is evident from the 
 whole fyftcm of his natural philofophy; fo that it is unnccefTary to prove it by particular 
 paflages ; 1 fliall, therefore, only quote one, which happens to be at prefent before me. 
 It is in the fiift chapter of his incomparable work, De Partibus Aniynalium, p. 970. 
 (edit. Du Val,) Avhere, fpeaking of thofe natural philofophers that fpeak only of the 
 matter of natural things, he fays, that thofe philofophers know not what ;2c/Mr<f is ; 
 for fays he, nature is more a principle than matter. ct^z*i 7«? »i ?'■'«"'« /^«>^^4» -rm ixr^i. 
 
 It is further to be obferved, that Ariftotle not only diftinguiflies the motive principle 
 in organized bodies, from that in vegetables and animals, but all the three from intel- 
 leEl • which, from feveral paflages I have quoted above, he makes to be a principle 
 very different from what he calls nature; making the difference to confifl chiefly in 
 this that intclled a6ls not only for a certain end and purpofe, but with knowledge of 
 that end and with intention : Whereas nature adls, indeed, for an end, and moft ar- 
 tificially, in order to attain that end, but blindly, and without knowledge or intention. 
 But becaufe he makes this difference betwixt intelletfl and the mind of the animal or 
 Tegetable, docs he therefore deny that intclled is mind? On the contrary, through the 
 whole of his books ^m 4--';^'!f> he fpeaks of the intellect as a fpecies of mind^ but much 
 higher and nobler than any of the other two ; tutn^** t. yi^a ■^v^'n. 
 
 The truth, therefore, appears to be, that all the four kinds belong to the general 
 idea of mind, but dlflerent very much one from another, in dignity and excellence. 
 And that he thought the principle, in organized or elemental bodies, internal, as 
 well as the other principles, is evident from his whole Phyfics, particularly the firft 
 chapter of the 2d book, where he makes the diflinflion betwixt the works of art and 
 the things of nature, to be, that the latter have a principle of movement in themfelves j 
 
 whereas
 
 Chap.XVIII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 233 
 
 of great reputation upon the continent, and who, I really think, was 
 a man of great genius, having done as much in philofophy as I think 
 could well be done without the affiftance of the antients ; for he was 
 fo little of a fcholar, that he had not even a language in which to ex- 
 prefs his philofophy. He holds, as I do, that there is no body at reft, 
 but that all bodies are either actually in motion, or have a n'lfus to- 
 wards motion ; and that, therefore, his monads., which he makes the 
 elemental principles of things, have all in them a principle of adivity, 
 in which, he fays, there are, as it wQrCy perception a.nd appetite. 
 
 The pafTage is to be found (A^a Erud, Lipfiae^ Anno 1690, pag. 
 435.J in a diflfertation, where he difputes with one Sturmius, a Ger- 
 man author ; one of whofe objections he anfwers in this way ; ' Re- 
 
 * fponderi commode poteft ex recepta non minus quam vera philofo- 
 
 * phia, materiam intelligi, vel fecundam, vel primam : Secundatn effe 
 
 * quidem fubftantiam completam, fed non mere paffivam ; Primam 
 
 * effe mere pafTivam, fed non effe completam fubftantiam, accidereque 
 
 * adeo debere animam vel formam animae analogam, five unM-^c^x^ '^^' 
 
 * 9rg«T»i>, id eft, nifum quendam feu vim agendi primitivam, quae ipfe 
 
 * eft lex infita decreto divino imprefla. A qua fententia non puto 
 
 * abhorrere virum celebrem et ingeniofum, qui nuper defendit corpus 
 ' conftare ex materia et fpiritu ; modo fumatur fpiritus non pro re in^ 
 ' telligente (ut alias folet,) fed pro anima vel forma animae analoga, 
 
 * nee pro fimplici modificatione, fed pro conftitutivo, fubftantiali, per- 
 
 * feverante, quod monadis nomine appellare foleo, in quo eft velut 
 ' perceptio et appetitus.* And a little after he fays, * Arbitror ne- 
 
 ^ g * que 
 
 whereas, the things of art, #1/^'*' 'V"' *^" t*irK^^Mi «,«^t;T<,v, *,' ^i (rv^^f/Sfl^ct'^ «>t;T./« 
 
 A,S*v«,5 \ y,,»<„s uyxi. \ fc^^rc, ,« t..t*» fy^» ^ccr» T»,r..rc» ; that is, ' The things of art 
 
 « have no principle of movem- nt or change in themfelves, or ^vhich is natural to 
 
 * them, except in fo far as they happen to be made of earth or flone, or any thine 
 
 * mixed of thefe.' ' ^
 
 234 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IL 
 
 * que ordini, neque pulchrltudlni, ratlonive reriira efle confentaneum, 
 
 * ut vitale aliquid feu immanenter (I fuppofe he means indejinenter) 
 
 * agcns fit in exigua tantum parte materiae, cum ad majorem perfec- 
 
 * tionem pertineat, ut fit in omni ; neque quicquam obftet, quo minus 
 
 * nbiqnc fmt animae aut analoga faltem animabus ; etfi dominantes 
 
 * anlmae, atque adeo intclligentes, quales funt humanae, ubique efle 
 
 * non pofTint.' 
 
 Though the Latin be barbarous, yet I think the pafTage is -in- 
 telligible ; and the meaning is, that, in all body, which is what 
 he calls the fecimda materia^ (in contradiftindtion to the Jirft matter, 
 -without form or quality,) there is an adive principle, which he 
 calls lijcy or fomething analogous to life, and which, he fays, hai 
 no intelligence, but conftantly moves body^ or gives it a tendency 
 to motion : And this is what, in the language of his philofo- 
 phy, he calls a monad. But it is nothing elfe than that principle of 
 motion which Ariftotle fays is in all phyfical bodies, which 1 have 
 called tnind^ and which Ariftotle fays is *c^<r-xie, ■^vxn, or* ^^^^ '^ mind. 
 
 The next modern author I fhall quote is Do£tor Cudworth, a moft 
 ingenious and learned writer, of whom I have made more ufe in 
 compofing this work, than of any other modern. He maintains, what 
 is the foundation of my whole fyllem, that body cannot move itfelf, 
 and that, therefore, when we fee body in motion, we are fure that the 
 motion muft have proceeded, at leaft originally, from fome incorporeal 
 caufe *. And from his w^ords, which 1 have quoted below, it is evi- 
 dent that he thought this a fundamental dodriae of Iheiim. 
 
 The 
 
 * 
 
 Cudworth's Intellcflual Syftem, p. 888. His words are, * Since no body can 
 * polhbJy move iucif, that which firft moved matter muft of netellity be incorporeal ; 
 
 * nor
 
 Chap.XVllI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 235 
 
 The laft modern authority I (hall alledge, is that of the greateft 
 metaphyfician, in my opinion, that ever was in England, to whom 
 the caufe of religion and morals is very much indebted ; I mean Dr 
 Clarke. He, in his difcourfes upon the evidence of natural and reveal- 
 ed religion, has told us, that, to maintain that God originally created 
 a certain quantity of matter and motion, and left them to frame a 
 world at adventures, without any determined or particular view, de- 
 fign, or diredion, cannot be defended confidently, otherwife than by 
 having recourfe to downright Atheifm. Then he goes on to fay, 
 
 * That, feeing matter is utterly incapable of obeying any laws, the 
 ' very original laws of motion themfelves cannot continue to take 
 
 * place but hy foine thing Juperior to matter continually exerting on it a 
 
 * certain force or power, according to fuch certain and determinate 
 ' laws.' And a little after he adds, * That mofi: univerfal principle 
 « of gravitation itfelf, the fpring of almofl all the great and regular 
 
 * inanimate motions in the world, anfwering (as I hinted in my for- 
 
 * mer difcourfe,) not at all to the furface of bodies, (by which alone 
 ' they can ad one upon another), but entirely to their /olid contents, 
 
 * cannot poffibly be the rcfult of any motion originally impreffed on 
 
 * matter, but muft of neeeffity be caufed by fomething which pene- 
 
 G g 2 « trates 
 
 * nor could It move It by local motion, as any body moves another, or as engines and 
 
 * machines move, by trufion or pulfion, they being before moved, but mufl: do it by a- 
 
 * nother kind of adion, fuch as is not local motion, nor heterckingjie, but dutokinefie, 
 
 * that is, by cogitation- Wherefore that conceit of the Atheifts, that an incorporeal 
 
 * Deity could not poflibly move the matter of the -worldy becaufe it would run thro' 
 
 * it, and could not fallen or lay hold thereupon, is abfurd, becaufe this moves matter 
 
 * not mechanically, but vitally, and by cogitation only. And, that a cogitative bein^, 
 
 * as fuch, hath a natural imperium over matter, and power of moving it, without any 
 
 * engines or machines. Is unqueftionably certain, even from our own fouls, which 
 
 * move our bodies, and command them every way, merely by will and thought. And 
 « a perfea mzWprefiding over the matter of the whole world could much more irre- 
 
 * fiftibly, and with infinitely more eafe, move the whole corporeal univerfe, merely by 
 
 * will and cogitation, than we can our bodies/
 
 236 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 * trates the very folld fubftance of all bodies, and continually puts 
 
 * forth in them a force or power entirely different from that by which 
 
 * matter ads on matter ; which is, by the way, an evident demonflra- 
 
 * tion, not only of the world*s being made originally by a vSupreme 
 
 * Intelligent caule, but, moreover, that it c^epends every moment on 
 
 * fome Superior Being, iorxhe pre/ervation of its frame; and that all the 
 
 * great motions in it are caufed by fome immaterial power, not having 
 
 * originally imprefied a a certain quantity of motion upon matter, but 
 ' perpetually and actually exerting itfelf every moment, in every part 
 
 * of the world. Which preferring and governing poiver^ whether it 
 
 * be immediately the power and action of the lame Supreme Caufe that 
 
 * created the world, or of iome lubordinate inllruments appointed by 
 ' him, to dired and prefide refpedively over certain parts thereof, does 
 
 * either way give us a very noble idea of Providence *.' From thefe 
 words, it is evident, that this great author believed it to be an efTential 
 part of the dodrineof Theifm, that all the m,otions of the univerfe, and 
 particularly the motlonof gravitation, were not only begun, but conti- 
 nued and carried on, by an immaterial power, perpetually and adually 
 exerting itfelf, not by a motion originally impreffed upon matter^ ac- 
 cording to the dodrinc of the modern Newtonians ; and, further, that 
 he thought it no abfurdity to believe, that this immaterial power was 
 not the Supreme Power that created the world, but fubordinate inftru- 
 ments, appointed by him to dired and prefide over certain parts 
 thereof. 
 
 Thus, I think, I have fhown, that my dodrlne is no novelty, nor 
 any crude notion of my own, obtruded upon the public. But it will 
 be faid, that it is not the lefs abfurd for being fupported by great au- 
 thorities and great names; that it is contrary to common lenfe, as well 
 as common language, to maintain, that inanimate bodies are animated. 
 
 And, 
 
 * Pag. r6. ry. and i8. edit. 4th.
 
 Chap. XVIir. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 237 
 
 And, indeed, thofe who-have not learned from antient philofophy, to 
 form a notion fufficiently comprehenfive of body and mind, and 
 who imagine that nothing is mind but what thinks, reafons, and re- 
 fleds, will have no conception of mind in fuch bodies. But 1 would 
 afk thefe gentlemen, firft, Whether they do not believe that it is mind 
 that moves their own bodies ? To this, I fuppofe they will anfwer^ 
 That they do. Next, I afk them, What it is that moves the bodies 
 of other animals ? To this, I take it for granted, that the anfvver like- 
 wife will be. That this motive principle is alfo mind. Or, if they re- 
 fufe to dignify it with the name of 77iind^ they will allow, at leaft, ihat 
 it is fomething diftind: from their bodies, as much as the motive prin- 
 ciple in us is diftind from our bodies. But this mind of the brute, 
 or by whatever other name they chufe to call it, for I will quarrel 
 with no man about words, they will, no doubt, allow to be different 
 from our minds. Here, therefore, it is admitted, that there are two 
 minds, both moving bodies, yet different from one another, and the 
 one much more excellent than the other. But, how can we flop here, 
 and not admit that the vegetable is likewife moved by mind^ or fome 
 principle diftind from the body, by what name foever it be called ? 
 For ihe vegetable is an organized body, as well as the animal, and is 
 nouriihed, grows, and propagates its kind, like the animal. It is true,, 
 indeed, it has not ienfation, as the animal has ; and it is confined to 
 one fpot of earth ; whereas the animal is an emancipated fon of the 
 earth, as he is called by fome author that I have read. It has not, 
 therefore, the lame variety of movements as the animal j but, fuch as 
 they are, it is impoffible to account for them from material or mecha- 
 nical caufes. And there is one of them that I have not yet mentioned, 
 but vvhich 1 think well worth obferving : It is a movement of a plant 
 grov^'ing in a dark corner of a cellar, by which it indines icfdf towards 
 the iigiit that comes in at the window. This is a movcmeut which. 
 (hows a kind of inclination or appetite very much rclembling tliat of 
 the ienlitive mind : So that, if we will make machines of plants,, 
 
 we
 
 238 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book 11. 
 
 we muft, like the French philofophers, make machines alfo of the 
 brutes. 
 
 Here, therefore, are three kinds of mind, the intelledual, the ani- 
 mal, and the vegetable, all moving body, but fubordinate and inferior 
 one to another ; fo that, I tliink, it muft be acknowledged, that there 
 are different degrees of minds producing motion, and that it is not on- 
 ly the thinking and reafoning mind which does fo. And, indeed, the 
 only doubt feems to be. Whether the Superior Mind or Intelled be 
 the immediate caufe of the motion, though it certainly direds and fu- 
 perintends it, and therefore may be hid to he the primum mobile P 
 or, Whether the motion be not immediately produced by an inferior 
 mind, as there appears to be a progrefs in every part of nature, which 
 does nothing by ftarts or bounds, but by all regular fteps and tranfi- 
 tions from one thing to another, though to us often imperceptible ? 
 
 The only queftion, therefore, is concerning the motions of the bo- 
 dies called inanimate, betwixt which, and thofe of the vegetable, there 
 is no difference, except that they are lefs various ; becaufe the body 
 which is moved is likewife lefs various, and of fimpler texture : But 
 they are as conftant and regular, and have a tendency to a certain end 
 and purpofe, as well as thofe of the vegetable. And there are fome of 
 them, which, like thofe of the vegetable, feem to be direded by fomc 
 kind of inclination or appetite, fuch as the motions of eledive attrac- 
 tion above mentioned, where there appears not only appetite and in- 
 clination, but fomcthing of choice or preference of one thing to ano- 
 ther. 
 
 I have infifled fo much upon the mind, or principle of movement, 
 in body unorganized, not only becaufe I know it will be the chief ob- 
 jedlion made to my fyftem, but becaufe one of the principal fources of 
 materialifm and atheifm, both in antient and modern times, appears 
 
 to
 
 Chap. XVIir. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 239 
 
 to me to be the motions obferved in thofe bodies, and particularly in 
 modern times, when the experimental phiiofophy, as it is called, has 
 made fuch curious and accurate obfervations upon thofe motions, and, 
 by the means of glaifes, has difcovcred in the minute particles of mat- 
 ter fuch a wonderful variety of adion, invifible to the naked eye. 
 1 his phiiofophy, which is wholly converfant with hody^ has led fome 
 of theie philofophers, that were not acquainted with a higher kind of 
 phiiofophy, to believe that, as thofe motions could not be accounted 
 for by any material impulfe or external caufe of any kind, they were 
 effential to matter, and that it was of the nature and effence of certain 
 bodies to move themfelves in a certain way ; and, as they obferved, 
 that thofe motions were all directed to certain ends and purpofes, and 
 that, by them, all the buiinefs of nature was performed, they conclu- 
 ded, that nothing more was neceifary for the fyflem of the univerfe, 
 and that nature alone, operating as we fee, by powers which they 
 fuppofed to be innate, and effential to matter, might produce and pre- 
 ferve every thing in the univerfe, and the univerfe itielf, without any 
 mind or intelligence direding and prefidmg over the whole *. This 
 
 is 
 
 * The firft experimental philofophers in Europe were the chcmyfls, fuch as Para- 
 celfus, Van Helmont, and their followeis. They appear to have beeri very difTirently 
 affeded, by obferving the wonderful movements an-.ong the minute particles of mat- 
 ter •, for, inftead of being matcrialifls, like fome of our late experimental philofophers, 
 they went to the other extreme, as was thought by many, who judged them to be no 
 better than wild enthufiafts. They believed that the univerfe was full of mind and 
 fpiritual beings ; for, otherwife, they thought there would be a void in the creation ; 
 and, particularly, that the earth, the air, the fire, and the water, were ail animated by 
 principles of life and motion, but without intelligence. Thefe,they faid, made all cor- 
 poreal fubftances what they were, and gave life, aftion, effence, and exiflencc, to all 
 bemgs oi that kind. '1 he four elements, they faid, ferved for bodies to thefe adive 
 principles, which they cAXc^i fpiritual elements ; and, when the body was diflbJved or 
 corrupted, the fpirit went away to animate another body ; fo that, according to them, 
 the corruption of one thing was the generation of another. See the French Encyclo- 
 pedicy under the article TheoJopheSi where their dogmas are ftatcd at great length. 
 
 And,
 
 240 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 15 the phllofophy of feme late French writers, particularly the author of 
 the Syjieme de la Nature^ who have fyftematifed Atheifm, and whofe 
 writings 1 therefore like better than thofe of a philofopher among 
 ourfelves, who has argued againft all the principles of Theifm, and, 
 indeed, every principle of human knowledge, without endeavouring 
 to eftablifh any thing. /\nd I like them better for another reafon, 
 that thofe authors acknowledge an end and purpofe in the works of 
 Nature, tho* fhe operates, as they fay, not only blindly, and without any 
 defign or confciuufnefs, but without any fuperior direction or fuperin- 
 tendence ; whereas the Britifh author either did not perceive, or has 
 jiot acknowledged, any end in the operations of Nature, but has de- 
 fended Atheifm, upon what, I think, the moft abfurd of all principlest 
 that all things happen by chance, or by material and mechanical ne- 
 cedlty, in the univerfe, and that nothing is done for any purpofe or 
 defign '^'. 
 
 Now, 
 
 And, thou|];Ti they defplfed antlent phllofophy, and, indeed, did not underftand it, 
 yet it is furprifing what a conformity there is betwixt many of their opinions, and 
 thofe of Plato and Ariftotle : Particularly, they maintained, that the celeftial bodies 
 were all animated. And I was furprifed to find, among them, my notion, that there 
 was in the microcofm, many a trinity of principles, correfponding to the Trinity in the 
 Great World. 
 
 * All Atheifts, antient and modern, are agreed in this, that body or matter is the 
 o;ily thing exifling in the univerfe, and that all things, even mind, re.ifon, and intel- 
 lect, are nothing elfe but various modifications of matter produced by its various 
 movements. This is the fundamental principle of their fyftem, in which they all a- 
 gree ; but they differ in this, that fome of them maintain, that thefe movements of 
 body are not regular, artificial, or for any end or purpofe j but that bodies, being mo- 
 ved, did neccffarily juftle and impel one another, and, by various conjundlions and 
 disjun£lions, and all the other effedls which the concourfe of bodies mufl occafion, 
 firft produced, and flill preferve this wonderful frame of things. This was the doc- 
 trine of Democritus, Leucippus, and Epicurus, and by far the greater part of the 
 Atheills of antient times. But th^re was one Strato, a Peripatetic, and fcholar of 
 Theophraflus, who_, not being able to account, upon this hypothefis, either for the 
 
 move-
 
 Chap.XVm. ANT IE NT METAPHYSICS. 241 
 
 Now, if it be admitted to thofe philofophers, that the principle mo- 
 ving unorganized body, and in a certain diredion too, and for a cer- 
 
 H h tain 
 
 movement of natural bodies, or for the order and regularity which he obferved in na- 
 ture, maintained, that there was in body a certain principle of a6livity, or a kind of 
 life inherent in it, and eflential to it, by which it was moved, and not at random, but 
 in a methodical and artificial manner, and for a certain end and purpofe. And, in 
 this way, he accounted for the regular motion of the celeftial bodies, the formation of 
 plants and animals, their growth, nutrition, prefervation, and propagation. But this 
 principle, he faid, had no intelligence or knowledge of the ends for which it operated, 
 iror any confcioufnefs of its own operations. See a more particular account of Strato's 
 do£lrine, given by Cudworth, in the third chapter of his firft book. Of thefe two fy- 
 ftems of Atheifm, the firft is the moft abfurd that it is pofHble to conceive. And I 
 think there is nothing could have driven men to believe it, (if any did ever really 
 believe it,) except that defperate abhorrence of mind, or incorporeal fubftance, and 
 that doating madnsfs upon matter, or the Hylomania, of which Cudworth fpeaks, 
 (P- ^35- }> for, in the frji place, it gives no account at all of the beginning of 
 motion, as Ariftotle informs us, {Metaphyfic. lib. i. cap. 4. in fine.) ^dly^ From 
 motions begun, they do not fay how, and carried on without any order or de- 
 fign, they account, not only for the formation of the celeftial bodies, and of 
 plants and animals here on earth, and for their firft movements, but for the 
 continuation of thefe movements, in the moft regular and orderly manner, and for 
 certain ends and purpofes, and for the regular progreftion of plants and animals, 
 from one ftate to another, till, at laft, they arrive at the ftate propoled by nature. 
 And, lafilyt they give no account at all, how, from matter, or any of its movements, 
 combinations, properties, or qualities, of any kind, could arife that thought and rea- 
 fon, which they were fure they poffefled thomfelvcs, though there was none other in 
 the univerfe. Yet this fyftem, abfurd as it is, is what our Britifti philofophcr has cho- 
 fen to defend. On the other hand, the Stratonic fyftem, or Hylozoic, as Cudworth 
 chufes to call it, is in fo far right, as it fuppofes a principle of activity in all matter, 
 afting regularly for a certain end. And it is only erroneous, fir/i^ in fuppofing that 
 this principle is material, and of the eflence of matter: Secondly, That there is no 
 principle of intelligence in the univeife, under the diredlion and fuperintendency of 
 which the a(ftive principle, in all matter, a£ls fo regularly and artificially, without 
 knowing for what purpofe it a£ts. And thus, though they muil have acknowledged 
 that there was, in their little bodies, a certain principle of counlel and defign, which 
 propofed for its end the good of its particular fyftem, yet they fuppofed that there was 
 no iuch pr mciple in the univerfe, but that every particle of matter was independent of 
 
 another.
 
 242 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 tain purpofe, Is eflentlal to body, it will, I think, be difficult to flop 
 there ; and I do not at all wonder, that thefe gentlemen have proceed- 
 ed, and made not only the vegetable, but the animal and Intelledual 
 natures, the produdion of mere matter and motion, as well as the reft 
 of the univerfe ; whereas, if I have fucceeded in proving, that there Is 
 a principle of movement in all bodies, unorganized as well as organi- 
 zed, diftind from body itfelf, and of a nature and eflence quite differ- 
 ent ; that this principle rifes ftill higher and higher, till it comes to in- 
 telledt, which not only ads for certain ends and purpofes, but plans 
 and contrives thofe ends and purpofes, and is confcious of its own o- 
 pcratlons, I think I have ftruck at the very root of Atheifm ; for, if It 
 be once admitted, that there is, in our little bodies, an immaterial 
 principle which propofes ends, devifes means to bring about thofc 
 ends, which, in (hort, governs the adions of men, and direds the bu- 
 finefs of a great part of this lower world, the tranfition is eafy and na« 
 tural to minds ftill fuperior to ours, and with much greater powers and 
 faculties, till at laft we come to the Supreme Mind, by which the 
 whole univerfe is guided and diredcd, and under which, what is called 
 Nature^ is no more than an inferior minifter or operator. 
 
 It may be objeded, that, allowing body cannot move itfelf, and, 
 that all motion In the univerfe proceeds from the Deity, Why may 
 we not fuppofe, that God has beftowed upon different kinds of bodies 
 the power of moving in different diredions, in order to carry on the 
 bufinefs of nature ? But, It will be faid, there is no neceffity to fup- 
 pofe that there is a mind in all bodies, and to confound the diflindion 
 betwixt bodies animate and inanimate. 
 
 To 
 
 another, and aQing by itfelf, without any reference to any thing elfe, fo that t^ere 
 could be no general fyftem of things in the univerfe. In fhort, this fyftem of Atheifm 
 is nothing elfe but the Nature of Ariftotle, and the Plaflic Nature ^ or Spermatic Prin- 
 ciple^ of Cudworth, but without fubordination to Deity. And this is a fylteni whick 
 fome late French writers have adopted.
 
 Chap.XVirr. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 243 
 
 To this ] anfwer, that all the poivers znd properties of body, as well 
 as l?oJy itfelf, do proceed, no doubt, from the Firft Caufe, and Great 
 Author of the univerfe ; but, if he have beftowed upon body the 
 power of moving itfelf, what is that but giving it a mind ? for, how 
 elfe Ihall we dillinguifh mind and body^ except by aHivity and pajfi'ui- 
 tyy mind being that which, by its nature and eflencc, is ac^i^e ; body^ 
 on the other hand, eflentially/^rt^jtW, and, therefore, only fit to be adt- 
 cd upon, not to adt. Now, to move, is to a^ ; and, therefore, if body 
 be moved, and, if the motion proceed from an internal principle, that 
 principle muft be a mindy which it has pleafed the Almighty to be- 
 llow upon it. What, therefore, is called a motion originally impref- 
 fed by the Deity upon matter, is nothing elfe, when explained, but 
 mind beftowed by God upon matter^ and which operates continually 
 in producing the motions of the univerfe ; for, to fuppofe that 
 fuch original impreflion could carry on the bufinefs of nature, without 
 the continual exertion of an Immaterial power, is, according to the o- 
 pinion of Dr Clarke, in the pafTage above quoted *, inconfiftent 
 with the belief of a Providence, and a ftep towards Atheifm. 
 
 It will be further faid, that I make a wonder — a miracle of Nature 
 — That I fill the world with fpirits — That 1 want to bring back the 
 antient mythology of Dryads and Hamadryads, Wood Nymphs, and 
 Water Nymphs, and other invifible Genii, inhabiting the earth, air, 
 and feas — or to revive the Sylphs and Gnomes of the Rofycrutians — 
 In fhort, that my fyflem ie altogether vifionary and enthufiaRical. 
 
 To this I anfwer, that, as there is nothing elfe in nature, except 
 mind and body, there is no abfurdity in fuppofing, that there is as 
 much of the one as of the other ; for, fince body is paflive, mind ac- 
 tive, and the whole fyftem of nature is carried on by adion and paf- 
 fion, it is only fuppofmg, that, where-ever there is a patient, there is 
 
 H h 2 likewife 
 
 * Pages 235, 236.
 
 244 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 likewife an agent. Even of the higher kind of mind, I mean the 
 animal, we are fure there is in nature very great abundance. The 
 larger and better fort of animals, indeed, are not to be found in fo 
 great numbers ; nor is it fit they fliould : But the earth, air, and wa- 
 ter, fvvarm with fuch prodigious numbers of the lefler animals, that I 
 do not believe we have yet difcovered half the number of the fpeciefes 
 of them, Befides thofe that are vifible to the naked eye, glaffes difcover, 
 as it were, a new world of them; for we find that there is no part of any 
 animal or vegetable fubftance, dead or alive, in which we cannot dif- 
 cover, by the help of good microfcopes, life and motion, in various 
 forms and figures *. The vegetable life ftiU abounds more, and mul- 
 tiplies much fafter ; for it appears to be a rule of Nature, that what 
 is of an inferior kind abounds much more than what is more excel- 
 lent ; and, if fo, it is not to be wondered, that the mere loco-motive 
 life fhould abound much more than either the vegetable or animal. I 
 would not, however, affirm, that even that life is infinite, and with- 
 out bounds ; for, though all matter be infinitely divifible in idea, I 
 do not think there is any reafon to believe that, in fadt, it is fo divi- 
 ded. That human art cannot fo divide it, is evident ; nor do I be- 
 lieve that Nature has done it ; for Nature, as Ariftotle fays, abhores 
 infinity f* And, if it be true that the univerfe is one compleat fy- 
 {lem, which, I think, every Theift ought to believe, it muft necefla- 
 rily be bounded by number and meafure : For, where there is infi- 
 nity, in the proper fenfe of the word, there can be no fyftem ; and, 
 therefore, as undoubtedly there is a top of the pyramid, io there mufl: 
 be a bafis of certain and definite dimenfions. I hold, therefore, that 
 the Newtonian philofophy, and the Epicurean of old, are in the 
 
 right, 
 
 * Buffon's Nat. Hift. 
 
 fi '^ I ipvc-i; (ftvyei T« MTTii^tv, And he adds the reafon, r* fit* y«g «xm§«i' ^tiajj, « J'l 
 ^ua-ii miH 4»)Ti< TsA.s. ' What is infinite has no end j but Nature always aims at an end.' 
 r)f Gen. Jnimaliumy lib. i. cap. i.
 
 Chap. XVIII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 245 
 
 right, in fuppofing that there are bounds fet by Nature to the divi- 
 fion of matter, and that the elements of bodies are particles infi- 
 nitely hard, and therefore indivifible ; and which, from thence, are 
 called atoms. Whether thefe atoms have any life and motion in 
 them, or, whether the moving principle be given only to a certain 
 colledtion or aflbciation of them, I cannot pretend to determine ; but 
 it is evident, that the loco-motive Ufe can defcend no lower than to 
 atoms. 
 
 As to the ivonder and miracle imputed to my fyftem, it would, in- 
 deed, I think, be fomething miraculous, if I fuppofed that all the 
 motions of this univerfe were produced by the immediate agency of 
 the Supreme Mind. But as, on the contrary, I fuppofe that all the 
 motions of the feveral bodies proceed immediately from inferior minds, 
 I fhould be glad to know how that can be called miraculous. How, 
 indeed, mind moves body, we cannot account : We may fay, there- 
 fore, that, to us, it is wonderful. But, for that, we are not the lefs 
 certain that it exifts. And, as it is a fadt of which we are daily 
 confcious, it cannot, I think, be faid to be even extraordinary. Fur- 
 ther, that Nature fhould a£t regularly and artificially, for a certain end, 
 without confcioufnefs or intelligence, cannot appear either miraculous 
 or extraordinary, as we know that we ourfelves frequently do fo *• 
 Lajlly^ Neither can it appear extraordinary and miraculous, that there 
 fhould be intelligence in the univerfe, when it is in our little bodies ; 
 or that, while the affairs of men are diredled by counfel and defign, 
 the great work of Nature, fo much more regular and artificial, 
 fhould go on at random, without any wifdom, forefight, or direc- 
 tion. 
 
 It requires, therefore, I think, no extraordinary faith to believe in 
 my fyftem ; whereas, the Materialifls or Atheids, tliough they be 
 commonly called unbelievers, appear to me to be the grcatcfl believers 
 
 of 
 
 * See above, page 216.
 
 2^6 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book 11. 
 
 of any ; for, in \\\tjirji place, they believe that matter moves itfetf, 
 contrary to the clearefl proof a prioriy amounting even to demonftra- 
 tion, and contrary to the evidence of fenfe and common obfervation. 
 And, fecondly, They believe, not only that matter moves itfelf, but 
 that it moves itfelf for a certain end ; and, for attaining that end, em- 
 ploys the mofl: artificial means, not doing the thing at once, but pro- 
 ceeding, by regular fteps, from one ftate of the thing to another, till, 
 at laft, it comes to that certain end ; and all this progrefs they fup- 
 pofe to be without any end propofed, or means contrived to execute 
 that end. And, lajily^ They believe, what I think as extraordinary 
 a part of their creed as any, that there is no mind in the univerfe fu- 
 perior, or even equal, to the human mind ; for, whether it be the 
 fortuitous concourfe of atoms, or blind Nature^ operating without in- 
 tention or defign, that has produced this w^onderful frame of things, 
 it muft appear very extraordinary, that, in all the infinite variety of 
 nature, there fhould have happened to be produced but one intelli- 
 gence, and that luckily fliould have fallen to our fhare *. And yet I 
 think it is perfedly confiftent with their fyftem, not to admit any o- 
 ther intelligence, at leaft, none fuperior to the human ; for, other- 
 wife, it would not be eafy to determine where to ftop, till they fhould 
 come to the Supreme Intelligence : And I doubt it would be necef- 
 fary for them to admit, that, as our intelligence governs and direds 
 human affairs, fo thofe higher intelligences govern and direct higher 
 things, fuch as the bufinefs of Nature, and the adminiflration of tha 
 univerfe. 
 
 k 
 
 * The fyflem of the antient Greek mythologies, who derived all thing* from thofc 
 anceftors of nature, as Mihon calls them, Chaos and Nighty appeals to me very much 
 more reafonable than the fyftem of our modem MateriaJifts ; for ihofe wvythologifts 
 brought out of ChaoS; not only the human mind, but all the ۩d5, chat is, buperior 
 Minds. 
 
 ^
 
 Chap.XVIIL ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 547 
 
 It Is an obfervatlon as old as the days of Plato *, that vanity, and 
 a fond conceit of wifdom and fuperior parts, is the great fource of A- 
 thcifm. And it is an obfervation that, I believe, will be found as true 
 now as it was then ; at lead, the believers of that kind that I have 
 
 converfed 
 
 * The paffage is in the loth book of his LawSy in the beginning, where he fays, 
 That we are not to Imagine that luft, intemperance, or violent paflions of any kind, 
 are the only caufe of Atheifm ; but what chiefly gives rife to it is, »fcx9r» [txXx '/;c6xi7rn, 
 liK»vrx inxi fityta-Tn <p^cty»rii' * A grievous ignorance, but appearing to itfelf the 
 
 * greateft wifdom/ And, a little after, he calls Atheifm t«» 7r*>x Ttoxxtn ^'o^x^aumr 
 fiHBt cri^MTXTtt vTrxfrmy A«y«». * That which, to many, fecms the wifeft of all doc- 
 
 * trines.* 
 
 The triumph of the Atheift over religion and popular prejudices, is finely defcribed 
 by Lucretius, in the praife he bellows upon his mafter Epicurus : 
 
 Quem nee fama Dcum, nee fulmina, nee minitanti 
 
 Murmure compreflit coelum, fed eo magis acrem 
 
 Virtutem irritat animi, confringerc ut ardla 
 
 Naturae primus portarum clauflra cupiret ; 
 
 Ergo vivida vis animi pcrvicit, et extra 
 
 ProcelTit longe flammantia moenia mundi, 
 
 Atque omne immenfum peragravit mente animoque:— -— 
 
 And again, 
 
 Quare rcliglo pedibus (uhjcCiz viciflim 
 
 Obteritur, nos exaequat vi6toria coelo. Lib. I. 
 
 This philofophical pride, joined to the vanity of a French bel efprit, has produced 
 fuch works as Le /y/leme dc !a Nature, Traite fur /' Efprit, I' Homme Machine, not to 
 mention works of the fame kind in our own country, which are as difgraccful to 
 philofophy, as they are pernicious and hurtful to fociety, and an infult upon its laws. 
 A fcholar, however, and a man of tafte, would read their works with fome pleafure 
 as he docs the poems of Lucretius, if it could be faid of them, what Lucretius fays 
 very truly of himfelf, that 
 
 ■Mufaeo contingit cunfla lepore. 
 
 But I will venture to affirm, that no man, who, by the ftudy of the bcft monu- 
 mentsof the writing art, has learned to know what good writing is, will approve of 
 the ftyle of thofc writers, any more than of their matter. 
 
 i^»v
 
 24^ ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IL 
 
 converfed with, were remarkably vain, afltiming to themfelves a very 
 large fhare of that fuperiority, which they fo liberally beftowed upon 
 their fpecies. And it muft be evident to every body, that nothing 
 but vanity could induce them to publilh doftrines fo pernicious ta 
 mankind ; for, to do them juftice, I do not think that they have any 
 mifanthropy in their nature ; but, on the contrary, I have known 
 fome of them that were very kind and friendly, provided, only, that 
 you allowed them to be the greatefl: geniufes and finefl: writers of the 
 age. And, though I have obferved in them, likewife, the greateft ma- 
 lignity, and mod inveterate hatred, againft thofe who did not allow 
 them the praife they claimed, yet I confider that rather as the neceffa- 
 ry confequence of their vanity, the moft vindidive paffion in our na- 
 ture when it is crofTed and difappointed, than as a fign of any ill 
 temper or malevolent natural difpofition. The fame was the character 
 of the great author of their philofophy, Epicurus, who lived in great 
 friendfliip with his admirers and followers, but could not bear thofe 
 who differed from him in matters of philofophy. He, therefore, not 
 only abufed the philofophers who went before him, as Ariftotle and 
 Phaedo, one of the difciples of Socrates ; but there was one Timocra- 
 tes, the brother of his moft intimate friend and companion Metro- 
 dorus, againft whom he wrote whole volumes, becaufe he prefumed 
 to differ from him in fome points of philofophy ; and, from the fame 
 principle of vanity, he was ungrateful to Democritus, from whom he 
 had learned what is beft in his philofophy ; and he treated very ill 
 Naufiphanes his mafter ; but from whom he profefled that he learn- 
 ed nothing *. 
 
 I have often thought that this immoderate vanity of theirs might 
 
 be fomewhat corrected at leaft, and their chara<flers, as well as their 
 
 tafte, improved, if they were fcholars, and could ftudy antient hifto- 
 
 ry, as it ought to be lludied ; for there they would find men (o much 
 
 fuperior to themfelves in arts and arms, and in fcience too, except 
 
 that 
 * Cicero dc Nat. Deor. lib. I- cap. 33.
 
 Chap.XVIII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 249 
 
 that they had not difcovered there was no God, that I think that it 
 is impoflible their vanity ihould not be mortified by the comparifon. 
 And, if tliey could carry their learning ftill farther, and read Homer 
 with ,good tafte and underftanding, confiderlng him not only as a 
 poet, but as an hlflorian, they would find in him charadcrs of n-:en 
 ftill iup^rior ; the heroes he delbribes being men that excelled others 
 fo much, both in body and mind, in council and in fight *, that rhey 
 were by nature deftined to govern ; for thofe heroic governments, 
 which obtained at that time in Greece, I confider as not of human in- 
 ilitution, but from nature ; for we fee that, in all the herds of grega- 
 rious animals living in the natural ftate, there are fome by Nature 
 defigned to lead and dire<SI: the reft ; fome kind of government being 
 neceflary In all focieties ; and this deftgnation Is marked by fuperior 
 fize, ftrength of body, and fpirit f. Thefe men, by the joint fuffrage 
 of all antiquity, were acknowledged to be much fuperior to the ordi- 
 nary race of men, and to be fomething betv/ixt Gods and men, to 
 which they gave the name of hero. From the ftudy of fuch charac'* 
 ters, as they arc moft accurately defcribed by Homer, they might 
 learn to form fome notion of Natures fuperior to their own, and get 
 free of that moft abfurd, and even impious vanity, by w^hich they 
 fet themfelves, as it were, at the head of the creation, and believe 
 themlelves to be the moft excellent creatures that are, were, or will 
 
 I i be. 
 
 * '0< fri^i i^i'i ^ovM Lummy Urt^iV tin; i y,ii)c^o-^nu IliAD. I. V. 258. 
 
 This Is the defcription which Neftor gives of the Grecian heroes who fought at 
 Troy. 
 
 t Homer has defcrited one bf thefe hcavcn-horn, and truly jurc-divim kings, in 
 the following lines : 
 
 JLKVi-nr^it t' tj^'j ttf*frTHi, 'tiK <r(piertv fujixtrtMvfi.
 
 250 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IT. 
 
 be *. But it may be truly faid of them, what Cicero fays of their 
 mafter Epicurus, ' Nihil olet ex Academia, niliil ex Licaeo, nihil ne 
 * e puerilibus quidem difciplinis t«' And they glory, too, as Epicurus 
 did, ' Se magiftrum habuiflfe nullum ;* which, fays Cicero, pleafantly 
 enough, I fhould have believed, il he had not faid fo ; as I would be- 
 lieve the proprietor of an ill built houfe, who boafted that he had em- 
 ployed no architect X* 
 
 CHAP. 
 
 * Efle autem hominem qui nihil in omni mundo melius fe efle putct, decipientis 
 arrogantiae eft. Cicero de Nat, Deor. lib- 2. cap. 6. 
 
 t Ibid. Lib, I. cap. 26' 
 
 f Quod et non praedicanti tamen facile quidem crederem, ficut mali aedificii do* 
 mino jjlorianti, fe archite(5tum non habuiire. Ibid.
 
 Chap. XIX. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 251 
 
 CHAP. XIX. 
 
 The Philojophy of this Work different from the Newtonian Philofophy-^ 
 particularly concerning the Motion of the Celejlial Bodies — Opinion of 
 the Antients, that thefe Motions ivere carried on and conducted by 
 Mind — All Motion on Earth both begun and carried on by Mind — 
 7he fame iji the Celeflial Regions^ according to the antient Philofophy 
 — The Neivtonian Philofophy not fo uniform or confijlent "juith lifelf — 
 The combined Motion of the Planets.^ according to the NeiJDtonian Sy^ 
 /lem, not necefjary nor probable — gives too great an Advuntag.'i to A- 
 theifn — lays not the Foundation ofTheifn broad enow^h^ by Juppofin^ 
 the JVorld to have been produced at a certain Time — Opinion of all the 
 Antient s that it vuas eternal — If Mind moves the Celeflial Bodies^ it 
 muft be by a fimple and uncompounded Motion — Sir Ifaac^s Gravitation 
 of the Celeflial Bodies a Fa<Sb, not a Caufe — 77?^ Subtile Spirit perva- 
 ding all Bodies mi Occult Caufe — favouring a little of Materialijm-—' 
 But this corrected in the ^lery annexed to his Optics — Ihrec Opinions 
 concerning the Origin and Continuance of Motion, — Dr darkens Opi^ 
 nion in this Matter different fro?n Sir ljaac*s» 
 
 TH E fyftem of philofophy contained in the preceeding llieets 
 muft already have appeared to the reader very different from 
 the philofophy at prefent in falhion : And I am now to explain more 
 particularly wherein this difference confifls ; and to endeavour to fup- 
 port my philofophy, or rather the philofophy of the antients, (for I 
 do not pretend to have invented any thing), againft the Newtonian 
 philofophy, in the points with refpedl to which they differ. 
 
 There is one point, in which, I hope, I agree with all the philofo- 
 phers of the Newtonian fchool, as I am fure I do with the founder 
 of it, and that is, the belief of the exiftence of a God, and that he is 
 ultimately the Author of all the motion in the univerfe. But in this 
 
 I i 2 . we
 
 252 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 we differ, that thofe philofophers maintain, that the motion, being 
 once begun, is continued and carried cm without mind, at leafl: in the 
 celeftial regions ; r.nd that by far the greater part of the vifible world 
 is no more than a great machine : Whereas, on tiie other hand, I 
 maintain, that, as the motion was begun, ^o it is carried on by mind, 
 fupreme or fubordinate, in the celellial regions, as well as here on 
 earth. This was undoubtedly the opinion ot Plato and Ariftotle *, 
 
 and, 
 
 * As to Plato, he, in a paflage above quoted, page 207. relates three fcveral opi- 
 nions concerning the motions of the celeftial bodies, but all agreeing that mind was 
 the moving principle. Of thefe three, it appears, from a paflage in the Epinomisy 
 (p. lO'^o. edit. Ficini,) that the opinion Avhich fuopofed them to be moved by mind 
 internal, in the fame manner as our bodies are, and by a mind intelligent, and of the 
 bcft kind, was his opinion j for he fays there, that the univcrle is peopled with five 
 different kinds of animals, vvhofe bodies are compofcd of the five different elements, 
 earth fire, water, air, and aether, each predominating in each kind of animal, more or 
 lefs. One of thefe five kinds of animals he makes the celeftial bodies to be, confift:- 
 ing, as he fuppofes, chiefly of fire, their bodies of the imeft kind, and animated by 
 the hapoieft and bed minds, yvu^Ks-it h J» hi tx^tti. th x.ut ev^ave)! th-jx^ uvici t,6>m 
 yc.y„, (meaning the animals whofe bodies arc compofcd chiefly oi fire,) I h ttch ^i'/i 
 
 0civxi (c-iev y-vo; ccyTpaiy yiyeyivxi, fuuxTo; ftEV 7v)(,ov nxX\ic-rcv, ilfjx.y,i o tvoxiucvis-TiiT/ig T£ 
 
 x«* xfts-T/,;. Then he proceeds to argue againff thofe who, becauie their motions 
 •were fo conftant and regular, fuppofed them to proceed from mattei and mechanifm ; 
 whereas, fays he, they ought to have concluded quite contrary wife ; for, bow abfurd is 
 it to admit that our m.otions, fo much lefs conftant and regular, are guided by an 
 intelligent mind, and to deny that the movements or the celeftial bodies, fo much 
 more conftant and regular, are guided in the fame manner? And he concludes with 
 
 thefe remarkable words, hi h, 'oc-m !px:>.ort^»v ztt* ^n'^^rs,- yy.) ri X:-^avyrx yt, e-*s?>»5 Vt ri 
 MyovTx (pxiVicrfiii. ^p-jUx? y,tv ow ii t,? xtTicci ■nyx^i.^a (r^fixrar, n (pv^n;, r. t< tcjo-jtov, oi/cjk 
 
 vK^iir, i^u. The rcea^ilng of which is, * Thrt we po( r mortals ought not to imagine 
 
 * that we have n.ind and intelligence, but that thofe glorious beings are mere bodies 
 
 * earned about by certain fluids, or moved by fome km. of nature that nobody can ex- 
 * pt;\ir..' Ire m whenc- it oppe.irs, ihnc the way 01 accounting iur the celeftial motions 
 by fluids and vortices, is not a modern invention, but was a notion of the material 
 and mechanical philofophers in the days of Tlato.
 
 Chap. XIX. A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. 253 
 
 and, as far as I know, of a]} tlic pbilofopliers of antiquity, tli^t were 
 not Atheifts. I hope, therefore, 1 fhali be exciife(i, if I endeavour to 
 defend it, even agauift Sir Ifaac Newton and his ibllowers. 
 
 That all motion here on earth is not only begun, but carried on, by 
 mincl^ fo that, without the continual operation of mind, it would ceafe, 
 
 is 
 
 As to Ariftotle, he thoup^ht, as well as Plato, that there was a -^vyjA r«y y.«5-|i4ay, or 
 w/«^ anlmcitlns; the whole univerfe j for he has faid exprefs'y, that the oyg^vo?, by 
 which he means the whole univerfe, is tiA^vy^'^i^ or tmimated , lib. 2 de Ccelo^ cap. 2. 
 p- 4(;4. edit. Du Faf, and the commentary of bimpiicius upon the palTage, folio 94. 
 By which we are not to fuppoie, that either Plato or Anftotle believed that this mind 
 was the Supreme God, which was the opinion of the Stoics, and, I think, of Spi- 
 noza, among the moderns, if there beany fcnfc at 2-.ll in his philofophy But, on the 
 contrary, it is evident, that both thole phiio.'ophers believed that the Supreme Godf 
 the firft ptrfon of the 'irinity of Plato, w,\s not on.'y, in his own nature and elT-nce, 
 immaterial, but x'^^i<rT»s and «|))^/),«!v»5 Irom all matter, not being incorporated with 
 any matter ; and, therefore, altogether immoveable ana unchangcaok, and yet the 
 Author of all motion, 
 
 -' Stabilifque manens, dat cuncla moveri. 
 
 Boe thins de Confol Philof. 
 
 Further, Ariftotle has exprefsly faid, that, not only the whole ov^xu?, or univerfe; 
 has a mind belonging to it, but that the particular celeltial bodies are all animated by 
 fevcral minds, and thofe minds intelligent. And he condemns the opinion of thofe 
 who thought that they Avere mere inanin.ate bodies His Avords are, axa' 'tiuiii '<y? we§» 
 
 fHTi)^»vTuf v7roX»fc^Kvuv TT^xliui Kcii ^^.1?, Lib. 2. De Coelo, cap, l <.. p. 4'^4« edit. Du Val, 
 See alfo, Simplicius's Commentary upon the paifage, foho i 17- where he fhows tiiat 
 the- word tt^^uXk;, in Ariilotlc's language, can ^pply oniy to intelligent beings ; and it is 
 in this way that Ariftotle accounts lor the fceming irregularity of their motions, which, 
 he fays, muft be underftood to be all for the bell, though we be not able always to^ 
 find out the purpofes they ferve. 
 
 1 hope, therefore, the prejudice againft antient philofophy, and in favour of the 
 modern, is not yt-t fo great, that 1 fliould be thought arrogant or prefumptuous, m 
 endeavouring to fupport the antient againft the modern, in this particular of the prin- 
 ei-ple of the motion of the ccleftial bodies.
 
 254 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book If. 
 
 is a fad that I think cannot be denied, at lead with refped to animal 
 and vegetable bodies. For, jirft^ Mind is the caiife of all the fponta* 
 iieous motions of cur bodies, as nuift be acknov.'ledged by every phi- 
 Icfopher who admits tb-? (Viilindtion betwixt h:idy and mind. And it 
 is, I believe, the opinion of all the philofophers in Britain, that the 
 fame kind of motion in other animals is produced by the fame caufe. 
 It is true, in producing thefe motions, it operates by the mecha- 
 nical powers of mufcles, finews, and bones, by which the motion, be- 
 gun bv mind, is continued and propagared to the extremities of the 
 animal body, and from thence to external bodies. But, without the 
 unceafipg operation of mind, not only impelling at firft, but renewing 
 the impulfes from time to time, the motion very foon ceafes. As to 
 the involuntary motions in animals, fuch as the circulation of the 
 blood, refpiration, digeftion, and the like, by which the animal life, 
 growth, and nutrition, are carried on; till thefe be explained, by 
 material and mechanical caufes, which hitherto has not been done, and, 
 if I may venture to prophecy in matters of philolophy, never will be 
 done, I muft afcribe thefe likev^rife to mind, but to a mind of a differ- 
 ent kind, commonly known by the name of the 'vegetable life, being 
 the caufe of fimilar motions in the vegetable. Further, the motions 
 of unorganized bodies here on earth, fuch as the motion of gravitation, 
 till it fhall be accounted for from any mechanical caufe, 1 muft alfo 
 afcribe to mind, and to mind indefinenliy operating, which, in the cafe 
 of gravitation, produces a motive force that is always increafing and 
 accumulating. And, lajlly. The motion of projediles here on earth is 
 evidently from mind, that is, from animal force, applied either medi- 
 ately or immediately to the bodies moved, but with this difference be- 
 twixt it and the natural motion of bodies towards the centre, that the 
 motion of projeailes is continually decreafing, till, at laft, it ceafes 
 altogether ; whereas the motion of gravitation is continually in- 
 
 crcaiing. 
 
 In
 
 Chap. XIX. A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. 2 
 
 55 
 
 In this manaer is motion produced and continued here on Ci.rth — 
 In the fame manner, according to the antlent phi-lolophy, ib motion 
 carried on in the celeftial regions, with this difference, that the ceief- 
 tial bodies have all of them, as far as they are within the reach of our 
 obfervation, a conftant regular motion, of a circular kind, either roimd 
 a center, or upon their own axis, or both ; whereas no body hers oa 
 earth has any conftant motion of that kind. 
 
 According to this philofophy, tlierefore, the fyfiem of the unlvcrfe 
 is uniform and the fame, with refpedt to this great agent in nature, 
 motion^ which is produced and carried on by viind here on earth, a- 
 bove, below, and round about us. "I he Newtonians, on the other 
 hand, are reduced to the necefTity of making a diftlndion betwixt the 
 movements here below the moon, at leafi: fo far as regards animal and 
 vegetable bodies, and thofe In the celePial regions. 1 he former they 
 mull admit to be carried on by the continual operation of mind adting 
 upon body, either immediately or mediately, by the ir.tervention of 
 other bodies. As to the celeftial bodies, they mamtain, that the pla- 
 nets, both primary and lecondary, gravitate towards their refpettive 
 centres, in the fame manner that bodies here below gravitate tvvards 
 the centre of the earth. By this motion, if there were no othci, all 
 the celeftial bodies of our fyilern woulci run together into one mais ; 
 but the Almighty, flty they, has given another motion, viz. an impulfc m 
 a ftralght line, by which, and the power ot gravitation combined the 
 planet is moved round the center of its mutiun in an ehiptic curve, 
 fo that it is fometimes nearer its centre, fometimes at a gi eater di- 
 ftance from it, and varies its movement accordingly, fometinies a.o- 
 vi.ig quicker, and lonietimes moving flower. In this manixer, they 
 fay, the planets have continued to move tliele fix thoufand years, like 
 a piece of clock-w(Tk, wivhout any intcrpofition of mind, and by 
 mere mechanihn, aijd may continue to be i^o moved to all eternity, if 
 the Almighty Power do not iaterpoie in an extraordinary and 
 
 miiaeuluus
 
 1S6 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 miraculous manner. Sir Ifaac, It Is true, fays, in his Principia, that, 
 pven v^'hile the lyftein Lfio, it may deliderate the mending hand of the 
 Creator. Rut the meaning of tbis, as he has explained it in the 
 Query at the end of his Optics, is, that the adtion of the comets up- 
 on the planets, or of the planets upon one another, may, in a 
 great length of rime, difturh their movement (o much, that a 
 mending hand will be required. But Sir Ifaac does not ieem to un- 
 derhand, that the centripetal and centrifugal fovce$,.ii^ they are call- 
 ed, which he fuppofes to be originally imprefled upon them, will ever 
 fail. 
 
 From this account of the Newtonian Aftronomy, it is evident, that 
 the fyftem of the heavens is, according to il, a mere machine, very 
 different from any thing to be feen on earth, where there is no perpe^ 
 tuiim 7nobile of a machine, neither of the workmanihip of nature, nor 
 of man, and where all the natural movements of bodies, whether or- 
 ganized or unorganized, are fimple and uncompofed, not being com- 
 bined of motions counteradin:^ one another. Ihe Newtonian Philo- 
 fophy, therefore, is not fo fimple or uniform, nor fo univerfal, as its 
 followers would make us believe ; and I have always thought that it 
 would be more confiftent, and better explain the whole of nature, 
 if they could make machines of the bodies of all animals, as the 
 French have done of the bodies of brutes, and allowing them to have 
 been made, and once fet agoing by God, have (hewn that they 
 might go on iike the celeftial bodies, by the power of matter and me- 
 chanifin merely. Such a philofophy would have comprehended heaven 
 and earth, and eftablifhed an univerfal law of nature, extending thro' 
 thi^ vv'hole univerfe ; whereas, iu the Newtonian Philofophy, as It 
 ftands, there is vranting that analogy and unity of defign, which every 
 part of nature feems to indicate* 
 
 Sir
 
 Chap. XIX. A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. - r^ 
 
 Sir Ifaac's aHironomy fappofes, that the power of gravitation, by 
 ^hich bodies tend towards fome center, extends through the whole 
 univerfe, at leaft, through all our fyftem. ' This power,* fays Sir 
 Ifaac, * I do not affirm to be effential to matter, or inherent in its na- 
 
 * ture-^* I wifh he had faid the thing more ftrongly, and had affirmed 
 pofitively, ' That a power of moving itfelf was not eiTential to rnat- 
 
 * ter ;* as evevy body v;ho fays the contrary is plainly an AtheiH;, in 
 confequence of that principle, whether he knows it or not. The New^ 
 tonians, therefore, to avoid that imputation, muft admit, that the 
 motion of gravitation is- from nriirid, " mediately or immediately, as 
 well as the projedile motion of the planets ; and, as their phiiofophy 
 does not fuppofe that the Deity acts indefinently upon matter^ far 
 lefs that there is any mind, or internal principle, ading conflantly 
 upon body, they, muft needs fuppofe, that gravitation, as v-ell as the 
 projedile motion, is produced by one. impulfe given by the Deity, and' 
 which (till continues to operate with undiminifhed force. But this, 
 as I have faid, is mere hypothefis, not at all neceflary, nor even pro- 
 bable. It might have been faid to be neceffary, if we could hare dlf- 
 covered no other- natural inovement in body, except a tendency to- 
 wards a center ; but^ as there are io many other natural movements ia 
 body, one diredtly oppofite to this, it is far from being ncceifary to. 
 fuppofe this fingle movement to be univerlal in Nature; and, not 
 only it is not rieceifary, but it is very ii!>probable, when weconfidcr,. 
 that animals here qn earth perforin fuch motions as ihofe ot the planets,. 
 tho' not conftantly, but occalionally, nor with the Tame regularity, as 
 may be well fuppofed. Why, then, ought we nut to believe, that the 
 heavenly bodies perform the tame motion, animaied by the Ian. c principle 
 — -w/?W, and even intelligaice, as the antient philol ph. I!^ lappo.cu ? u 
 is a comn>on way of arguing among the Newioniai.s, that, where wc 
 fee the fame effeds produced, we are to luppolc the iauic caule. JNow, 
 
 K k the 
 
 * Gravitatem corporihus effentiatem efle, minime affirmo. Piinclpia Mathcmaticafi 
 ziol. 3. Regula Philofophandi ^tia*
 
 258 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 the planets have the fame kind of motion ; Why not aflignthe faine 
 caufe for it ? Why, rejcdingthis caufe, fhould wefuppofe a combined 
 motion, fuch as is not to be found any where in Nature befides, un- 
 lefs wiiere fome kind of violence is oifered to Nature, as in the cafe of 
 projedile motions here on earth ? 
 
 But what I diflike moft in Sir Ifaac*s philofophy is, that it gives a 
 great deal too much countenance to the Atheiftical fyftem, though, I 
 am firmly perfuaded, that was not intended by Sir Ifaac : For, if the 
 celeftial machine has gone on for fix thoufand years, and may, by its 
 nature, go on to all eternity, the Atheill wnll afk. Why it may not 
 have gone on in the fame way from all eternity ? and Theifm will be 
 embarrafled with the difficulty of diftinguiQiing betwixt eternity a par- 
 te pofi^ and a parte ante, and of fhowing, that a thing may be eternal 
 ex parte pofl'i and not ex parte ante ; a diftindtion that is not made 
 by any antient philofopher *, and, I doubt, cannot be well fupported 
 upon any principles of philofophy. 
 
 Neither does this philofophy of Sir Ifaac lay the foundation of 
 Theifm broad enough : For it necefiarily fuppofes, that the univerfe 
 had a be^-inning in time, becaufe the impulfe or impulfes, by which 
 the celeftial bodies were put in motion, muft, of neceffity, have been 
 friven at fome determined time. Now, this fyftem of Theifm ex- 
 cludes all the phllofophers of antiquity, without exception ; parti- 
 cularly Pythagoras, his fcholar Ocellus Lueanus, the moft antient 
 philofopher of whom we have any remains, whofe authenticity we are 
 fure of, Archytas the Tarcntine of the fame fchool t» likewife Plato, tho' 
 I know that is difputed, but without any good reafon, as I Ihall fhow 
 in the proper place, Ariftotle his fcholar moft certainly, and all the 
 
 Pla- 
 
 * Plato, in his argument in the Phaedo to prove the immortality of the foul, does 
 plainly make no fuch diftindion ; but, on the contrary, argues, as if the prae-exiftence 
 of the foul was neceflarily conncOed with its pofl-exiftence ; and proves the one by the 
 other. And, in the fame manner, Cicero aigues in his book of Difination. 
 
 + See Gales's preface to his edition of Ocellus Lucanus's work De Univer/o, pa. 
 i)liflKd among his Opufcula Alylhdogica.
 
 Chap. XIX. AN TIE NT METAPHYSICS. 259 
 
 Platonics of later times, without exception, fuch as Plotinus, Porphyry, 
 Jamblichus, and Proclus. For all thefe maintained, that the univerfc 
 was an eternal emanation of an Eternal Being, to whofe eflence, ener- 
 gy, and that principal energy of production and prefervation, belongs ; 
 nor could they conceive a time when the wifdom and goodnefs of God 
 were not manifefled in the works of creation. 
 
 I know this dodrine of the eternity of the world is generally^ 
 thought to be adyerfe to the account of the civ'^ation given by Mofes. 
 But 1 fay, imOi That, though the truth of revelation muft neceifarily^ 
 be founded upon natural jeliglon, and the belief of the exigence of a 
 God, it is not proper that a philofophlcal fyftera of Theifm fliould be 
 built upon revelation. 2^(9, It is not at all necefiary {q to interpret the 
 tvords of Mofes ; for the Scripture, in fpeaking of the ads of Divine 
 power, iifes a language fuited to the capacity of men, as might be 
 proved by very many examples. Now, as all the produdions, we are 
 acquainted with, are in time, and exift pofterlor to their caulVs ; and, 
 as. it is difficult, and, I believe, to many people, impoffible, to con- 
 ceive a thing produced by another thing, as its caufe, and yet co-eter- 
 nal with that caufe, Mofes, fpeaking afrer the manner of men, makes 
 the world to be produced, like the other produdions we fee, in time. 
 And, in like manner, the Pfalmift, fpeaking of the -Meffiah, makes 
 God fay, * Thou art n-.y Son, this day I have begotten thee;' though I 
 hold no man to be a Chriftian, and not even a perfed Theift, who dves 
 not believe in the eternity of the Second Perfon of the Trinity ; and, 
 ' 1 hat he was begotten from everlafting of the Father,' according to the 
 language of the Church of England. And I think the moft dangerous 
 here(y in the Chriftian Church was that of Arius, who m.iintaiued, 
 'That lime was when he was not*.' And it is Plato, ipeaking in the 
 fame manner, hi the Timaeus^ of the protiudioii ut tlic world, that has 
 led lome modern philoioptiers to think that he believed the production 
 
 of it to be temporary t' 
 
 K k 2 Lufllyy 
 
 * His expreflion was, jjv, ot« oy« »j». 
 
 t Thi- roticn of the tenipoiaiy produclion of the world was no older th. ii tlu; fe- 
 cond or third century; and began among the ChnlLuint), niiftakin^, as 1 tn.i.k. the 
 
 fen fa
 
 26o A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 Lafily^ Upon the fuppofition that mind moves the celeftlal bodies, 
 as it does every thing elfe, I fay it is impoffible they can be moved in 
 
 the 
 
 fenfc of Mofe?, and difFering in this point fiom the Jews themfelves, as appears from 
 what Philo Judaeus has written in his treatife, ^sj* tdj oiffini^nx^ ra« tcoT^ov. This new 
 do6lrine began to be received, as I imagine, about the time that the notion was in- 
 troduced into the Chriftian Church, but without any warrant from Scripture, 
 of the fouls of men being created later than their bodies, and infufed into them : But 
 this was a notion that would not go down, even with all the Chriftians. And one of 
 them, Synefius, a writer of the fourth century, could not be perfuaded, by the offer 
 of a billioprick, that his foul was the younger brother to his body ; fee Cudworth's 
 Intelle(SluaI Syllem, pages 38. and 39,; where he has given us the.words 'of Syne- 
 fius, which are, xfCtXa t>;j ■^v^yi* oux tx,%iU7U TTOTi era>f^xTii Cc-re^tyiVij vt^i^nv, And, if he 
 believed that fouls were from all eternity, it is not likely that he believed the univerfe 
 to be only five or fix thoufand years old. Philoponus, the commentator upon Arif- 
 totle, who was a Chriftian, has thought himfelf bound, it would feem, by the religion 
 which he profcfled, to write in defence of the temporary produ6lion of ihe world, a- 
 gainft Proclus, who maintained the opinion of the antient philofophers, that it was 
 eternal. In this treatife, Avhich is preferved to us, Philoponus endeavours to prove 
 it to b; impoffible, by the nature of things, that the world, being made by God, 
 fiiould be coeval with its Maker. But it is evident that he proceeded upon the vulgar 
 and grofs notion, of the world being made by God, in the fame manner as a piece of 
 wo'k is by a human artifl. In that cafe, no doubt, the caufe producing mufl be prior 
 in time to the produft^on ; but he ought to have learned, from the authors that he had 
 iludied and commented upon, that the produ<Slions of men, and, in general, all pro* 
 duclions here on earth, are very improperly compared to the produ£lions of God, 
 which are all emanations of his Nature, as necefiary as his Nature itfelf. Cudworth, 
 who is a moft candid reafoner, and fair inquirer, upon every fubjedl that he has 
 treated, frankly acknowledges, that ' he is prone to believe, that, could the world 
 * have been from eternity, it ftiould certainly have been fo.' IntelieiStual Syflem, 
 page 887. By which he means, that there (hould have been from all eternity this ma- 
 nileftation of the goodnefs, wifdom, and power of God, if it had not been abfolutely 
 impcflible, by the nature of things. But, Where is the impofiibility that a thing fliould 
 have betn from all eternity, that is admitted to have exifled for 6000 yearj, and may 
 exift we do not know how many thoufand years longer ? What is, by nature, impof- 
 fible, implies a contradiction ; and what implies a contradiction, cannot exifl for a mo- 
 ment. But, upen this fubje«£l, I will fay a great deal more in the fecond part of my 
 work, where 1 will fiiow, that, though thofe pious antient philofophers aflerted the 
 world to be eternal, they did not, therefore, believe, that the matter of which it was 
 ■made is independent of God j but they held, that the mattery as well as the form of 
 
 the
 
 Chap. XIX. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 261 
 
 the double way that Sir Ifaac fuppofes. If, Indeed, we could believe 
 that the principle of gravitation was eiTential to body, and inherent 
 
 in 
 
 the univerfe, did all proceed from one firfi: caufe. And this, 1 think, is enough to fatisfy 
 every Chriftian, as well as every I heiftical phiiofopher. I will only add here, that, not 
 only the Theiftical philofophers of antiquity, but alfo the Atheiftical, were of opinion, 
 that the univerfe was eternal ; for Epicurus, and his followers, maintained, that 
 their worlds had no beginning, but were from all eternity, one going down, and ano- 
 ther rifing up; and fo fucceeding one another, without end. For they believed that there 
 was an infinite number of worlds, each independent upon the other : Whereas, the 
 fchools of Plato and Ariflotle maintained that the univerfe was one fyflem, whereof all 
 the parts were conne£led, and dependent one upon another : but, as it was material 
 and all matter being, by its nature, liable to change and vicifTitude, they maintained 
 that the univerfe had fufFered in time paft, and would lufFer in time to come, great 
 changes ; fo that what we know has happened in our earth, they conceived had hap- 
 pened, and would happen in every part of the univerfe ; but flill the fyflem would be 
 preferved in the fame manner as the fyflem of an animal or vegetable bony is pre- 
 ferved, notwithflanding the conflant changes that it undergoes. And the only dif- 
 ference they made betwixt the two was, that, in the animal or vegetable, the changes 
 are much quicker ; whereas, in the univerfe, they are very much flower, and the fuc- 
 ceflive flates of it of infinitely longer duration. — Whoever is fliocked with this antient 
 notion of the eternity of the world, may read what the learned and pious Dr Clarke 
 has faid upon the fubjedl, in his Demonllratlon of the Being and Attributes of God 
 (P3ge35' 4th edit.) where he very fairly acknowledges it to he the opinion^of the antient 
 philofophers, and even of Plato, though, as I have obfervcd, that has been difputed • 
 and, like Dr Cudworth, lliows no abhorrence of it, nor thinks it at all irreconcile- 
 able to genuine Theifm. His words are, * That the followers of Plato maintained 
 
 * that the creation of the world was not to be underflood a creation in fivie, but only 
 « in order of nature ^ caufality, and dependence ; that is, that the will of God, and his 
 
 * power of ading, being necellarily as eternal as his elTence, the effeds of that will 
 
 * arid power might be fuppcfed coeval to the will and power themfelves ; in the fame 
 ' manner zs light would eternally proceed from the////?, or tk fhado-w from the intcrpo^ 
 
 * fed bodjy or an imprejjion from an impofed fcal^ if the refpedive caufes of thefe efTeds 
 
 * were fuppofed eternal.' And, for thefe fimilitudes, he quotes antient authorities. 
 As fit a fimilitude, I think, may be taken from the definitions and axioms of fcicncc, 
 and the propofitions proved by them ; for thefe propofitions are tiuths as eternal as the 
 definitions and axioms, -which, however, are undoubtedly the caufe of their being true* 
 And hence it is, that they arc faid to be proved a priori, meaning, not priority in 
 time, tut a priority of cdujahty, as Dr Clarke cxprcfTes it. But, notwithflanding 
 theiie authorities and illuftrations, I would not be undcrflocd to afhrm any thing at 
 
 prcfent
 
 262 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book 11. 
 
 in its nature, the confequence would neceflarily be, that the motion 
 muft be combined : For the Deity mud have given a projedile force 
 to the body, in order to counteract and overcome fo far its gravitating 
 power, fo that it would be a contention, as it were, betwixt material 
 neceffity and the pov/er of the Deity ; the refult of which is a kind of 
 compromife, by which neither the one nor the other prevails, but the 
 matter is divided pretty equally betwixt them. But, though Sir Ifaac 
 do not pofitively affirm, that gravitation is not eflential to body, I 
 am pcrfuaded, that he believed the one movement, as well as the 
 other, to be produced by mind ; and, if fo, it is impoffible to fuppofc 
 that the motion of the planets fliouid be combined of two motions ; 
 for, how can we fuppofe that mind, whether fupreme or fubordinate, 
 would ufe two movements, when one fimple one, in a circular or el- 
 liptical line, w^ould do the bufincfa ? This would be a fuppofition, 
 contrary to the firfl law of philofophifing laid down by Sir Ifaac, 
 ' That Nature does nothing in vain ; and, that it is in vain to do a 
 
 * thing by many means that can be done by fewer.' And again, 
 
 * Nature is fimple, and does not wantonly abound in fuperfluous cau- 
 
 * fes of things*;' and, if we were to fuppofe Nature fo fuperfluous, it is 
 not eafy to conceive how it could be done; for, we cannot conceive that 
 mind, in order to produce one motion, fhould firft give the body a 
 movement tov;ards the center, and then the projedtile motion, by 
 which it is carried from the center; and if, at once, it was moved ia 
 the ellipfis, it is, to me at leafl, inconceivable how it fhould be mo- 
 ved at one and the fam.e time, and by the fame moving power, two 
 
 motions 
 
 prcfcnt po(:tiveIy on this fubjcd ; all I rrean to fhow is, that It is much too narrow a 
 fyftem of Theifm, which excludes from the appellation oiTheiji fo many philofophers 
 •who have been always efteemed, not onlyTheifts, but many of them very religious meni 
 
 • Natura nihil .igit fruftra, et fruftra fit per plura quod fieri poteft per pauciora.— 
 Natura enim (implex t(l, et rerum caufis fuperfluis non luxuriat> Principia Mathema" 
 tica, vol- , Rcgiila Ptima Philojophandi — And in this he agrees with Ariflotle, who 
 has faicl, fpeakin^ of the motion of the celeflial bodies, that God and Nature do no- 
 thing in vain- e «6 ©t»;x«< n (pvs-ii tvho f^xTct 7ir«tov<rt, Lib. I. dc Coelo, cap. /\. infne.
 
 Chap. XIX. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 263 
 
 motions fo contrary. Even if we were to fuppofe that a principle 
 of movement was effential to the body, or, in other words, that the 
 body moved itfelf, how could we conceive that it fhould move itfelf 
 two oppofite ways at once, or, that there fliould be two principles 
 
 of movement in the fame body counteracting one another. In 
 
 fhort, if the univerfe be governed by one principle, whether fiiind 
 or matter, it appears impoITible that the motions of the celeftial bo- 
 dies {hould be mixed t)f fuch different motions, and that, therefore, 
 Sir Ifaac's fyftem cannot be defended, except upon the hypothecs of 
 two principles in the univerfe controlling and counteracting one ano- 
 ther ; an hypothefis which I am far from thinking Sir Ifaac meant to 
 maintain. 
 
 I have never heard any thing fald againft this reafoning, except 
 that the nature of the circular or elliptical motion is fuch, that, fup- 
 pofing no previous tendency to the center, yet it cannot be performed 
 without both that tendency, and a tendency to fly off in a tangent, or 
 ftraight line ; fo that it is neceffarily a compofed motion of a centn- 
 petal and centrifugal force. 
 
 If this propofition can be demonftrated, I muft no doubt fubmit to 
 it. This, however, is not pretended ; but I have been told, that the 
 evidence of it is fuperior to any demonftration ; for it is an axiom. 
 But this I venture abfolutcly to deny ; for, though 1 do not pretend to 
 have learned any more than the elements of geometry, axioms and 
 definitions belong to the elements. Now, I have learned from my 
 mafters, the antients, in geometry, as well as every other fcience, that 
 the circle or ellipfis is the moft fimple of all figures, being defcribcd 
 by one line revolving into itfelf; whereas, every other figure mufl: be 
 formed by more than one line, and, if it is a rectilineal figure, 
 by three lines at lealt ; confcquently, the circular or elliptical mo- 
 tion, muft, of all motions delcribing figure, that is, inclofing fpace, 
 
 be
 
 264 - A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book If. 
 
 be the: moft fimplc, and the leaft varied and compounded -K Further, 
 I. fay, that no propofitlon, repugnant to common fenfe and obferva- 
 tion, can be an axiom. Now, let any man move in a circular or el- 
 liptical line defcribed to him, and he will iiad no tendency in himfelf^ 
 either to the center, or from it, much lefs both. If, indeed, he at- 
 tempt to make the motion with great velocity, or, if he do it care- 
 
 lefsly- 
 
 * Proclus, who was both a geometer, and a mofi: fublime philofopher, in his fecond 
 book upon the Elements of Euclid, p. 23. accounts for Euclid beginning with the 
 recbilineal figures, fuch as triangles and fquares, and not with the circle, in this 
 
 raanner : E< v«4g »«' tp-jo-a xpttrlMv o.Kt»xA«;, ««« « ^4^* xvtov ^^of/uaniec T-fii roiy ivSvy^xfitcuf 
 a-jtriXi tb Ktit yvuTiUif uXtC vfuiv -Tr^iTfiKOVim fAnXXn »? ») ■ti^i rovrav hdxTKoiAix Toif uTiMs-ri^xi^ 
 x*« «5ro TAiv «<«-^i)7»y iTFi Tx, totiTct tiirccyitv T»iv Oixvoixv a-xtvo'ovs-i. Kect "/x^ Ton; fill xi(!-9nroi; 
 eiKeix tx sv6vypx^y~x r^r,uxTX, Tan ^£ >9>ito«j <j Kvy^Xo;' c/ oTi 6r> to y.sv X7r>.ovv x.xt ftovatit; xxt 
 ^VPta-utfoY ■xeotryjxii t>j (pvs-n ruf syrav, to ^i Toiy.i'Xoy y.xi i-coPiTTwg xv^avofiivcv ra T^^/iSit Tuv Ttl^H* 
 
 y^ve-av ■^xtv^ai oixipipu {lege vr^os-r.xii) To«f xic-BnTctg. The paffage is incorredlly printed, a5 
 almoft.all the works of thofe later philofophers are, either fiom the defedl of the raa« 
 iiufcripts, or the inaccuracy of the printer. 1 have already corxeded one word in it > 
 and there is another part of it which needs corredion- It is where the word «t£A=^- 
 Ttfxt occurs, to which fliould be added the words, tav hxtaav ix,ovirh y.xi xtto tu> XK!-B^ru» 
 iTTi Tx vc/jTx ,uirxytiv xvTnv G-TTiveove-i' But, be thelc correttions as they may, the general 
 fenfe of the paffage is clear, which is, * That, tho' the circle be the moft fimple, uncom- 
 
 * pounded, and determinate figure of any, therefore firft in the order of nature, and 
 « mod refembling things intelligible ;.yet it is more proper for thofe ofimperfeaundei> 
 
 * {landings, and who, therefore, mufl. by degrees proceed from things fenfible to things 
 < intelligible,' (for this, as 1 have obfcrved elfewhere, page 4th, was underftood, by 
 antient philofophers, to be the chief ufe of mathematics,) ' to begin with retlilineal" 
 
 * figures, bfcaufe they being compounded, and confiding of more or fewer lines, which 
 
 * may be increafed at pleafure, refemble fenGble things more.' In the fame man- 
 ner, Aridotie proves, in the fecond chapter of his firft book De Coelo^ that the circle, 
 is more fimple and perfe£l than any nclilineal figure, becaufe the ftraight lines, of 
 which any retUlineai figure is compofed, may be increased or diiTDnifhcd at pleafure; 
 fo that th>.y are not compleat in themfeJvcSi whereas, the line which roims the circle,- 
 can admit neither addition nor diminution, and therefore is compleat in irtclf : And,, 
 as the line which forms the circle is perfectly fimple, fo aifo is the motion in that: 
 line. And, in the next ch^ipter, towards the end, he fays, that the circidar motion,^ 
 and the motion in a ftraight line, are the only fimple motions.
 
 Chap. XIX. ANTIE NT METAPHYSICS. ,265 
 
 lefsly and inattentively, he may go out of the line, cither towards the 
 center, or from it ; but this is to be afcribed, not to the nature of the 
 motion, but to our infirmity, or, perhaps, to the animal form, which 
 is more fitted for progrefiive motion in a right line, than for any kind 
 of curvilineal motion. But this is not the cafe of a fphere or fpheroid, 
 which is equally adapted to movement in all directions. 
 
 The vulgar, I know, will think it incredible, that a fphere fhould 
 be animated, or, that mind fhould move body, otherwile than by the 
 machinery of bones, mufcles, and finews ; but the philofopher, who 
 has more enlarged ideas of tniitdy and its poivers^ and knows that the 
 whole univerfc is moved by the Supreme Mind, without the aid of 
 any fuch machinery of any kind, will rejedt fuch a narrow no- 
 tion, and will ridicule it in the fame manner as the learned philofo- 
 phers of old ridiculed the fancy of Epicurus, that intelligence could 
 only be in the human form ; for which reafon, he gave that form to 
 his Gods *. 
 
 What has led men Into this miflake, concerning the circular 
 motion, is motion produced by material and external impulfe ; 
 that is, by one body impelling another. In fuch a cafe, as that 
 motion is always in a flraight line, it is evident that feveral im* 
 pulfes, in different diredlions, are abfolutely neceffary, in order to 
 form a circle or ellipfis; but, where mind is the mover, and efpeci- 
 ally mind internal, as I fuppofe, there can be no difficulty in con- 
 ceiving the motion to be made fimply and in a natural way ; or, ra* 
 ther, it is impoffible to conceive it otherwife. 
 
 Thus, I think, I have proved^ that, if the Celeftial bodies are moved 
 by mind, and by mind not controulcd by material neceffity, they cannot 
 
 LI be 
 
 * Cicero Dc Naiura DeiruiHi lib. i. cap^ tjt
 
 ii66 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 be moved by a compounded motion, fuch as the Newtonians fuppofe. 
 The cafe of projectiles here on earth is evidently different ; for they are 
 moved by animal force, or forne other external impulfe, controuled by 
 the po^yer of gravhation previoufly in the body, which being a natu- 
 ral and internal principle of movement, counterads, and, at laft, over- 
 con, es the adventitious and external impulfe, making the body de- 
 fcribc, while in motion, a curve, called a Parabola ; and this motion is 
 really and adually compounded of the motion of gravitation and the 
 projectile motion, both operating at the fame time. 
 
 It was the analogy betwixt this motion of projediles here on earth, 
 and the m.otion of the celeftial bodies, which Sir Ifaac has inveftigated 
 and difcovered with wonderful fagacity, that made him fuppofe their 
 motion to be produced in the fame v;^ay ; and, that the motion given 
 by the Almighty to the planets, was, in like manner, controuled 
 and bended from the ftraight line, by the force of gravitation. 
 
 And the great argument urged by the Newtonians, in fupport of 
 their fyftem, is, that the fame caufe muft produce the fame effc£t *. 
 
 To this argument I anfwer, that I admit it is the fame caufe which 
 produces the motion of projediks on earth, and the motion of the 
 moon, and other celeftial bodies, namely mindy the author of all the 
 motions in the univerfe, according to my fyllem. But there is nothing 
 to hiader the fame caufe to produce the fame effeds, by different 
 means, if there can be a reafon affigned for the difference of the 
 means. For, however ridiculoufly Mr Leibnitz may have applied his 
 grand principle, of a fuihcient reafon for every thing, 1 hold it to be 
 an axiom of natural philoCophy, nor can I conceive intelligence of any 
 kind, much lefs the Supreme Intelligence, adnjg without a reafon, in 
 
 any 
 
 * See M'Laurin's Account of Su Ifaac Newton's Phllofophical Difcoveries, 
 Look 111. ch<;p. i. injine.
 
 Chap. XIX. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 267 
 
 any the leafl: thing. Now, the reafon of the motion of projediles 
 here on earth being produced by two powers operating differently, is, 
 that it was neceflary thofe two powers fhould cxift ; for the fyftem of 
 nature here below could not have been carried on without both gravi- 
 tation and projedion, whether by animal force, or by fome other ex- 
 ternal impulfe ; whereas, in the celefcial regions, there can be no 
 reafon affigned for a double force being applied for producing the 
 fimpleft ot all motions, by which fpace can be inclofed. This, as I 
 have ihown, would be contrary to a fundamental law of nature, ac- 
 knowledged by Sir liaac Newton. At the fame time, as the two mo- 
 tions are precifely of the fame kind, it is perfectly agreeable to the 
 wiidom of Nature, and that uniformity of defign that we fee in all 
 her works, that they Ihould be governed by the fame laws. Now, 
 that the motions are the fame, is admitted by all the philofophers of 
 this fchool, and, indeed, is the foundation of their fyftem : For tney 
 tell uf, that * the moon is a projedile; and that, if {he were brought 
 
 * down to earth, and projected in the fame line, and with the fame 
 ' velocity as bodies here on earth, (he would move in the fame curve ; 
 
 * and, if any body was carried from our earth, to the diRance of the 
 
 * moon, and was projected in the fame diredion, and with the fame 
 ' velocity with which the moon is moved, it would proceed in the 
 
 * fame orbit which the moon defcribes, with the fame velocity *.' And 
 they tell us, that every projedile, if the projection was of fufficient 
 force to overcome the refiftence of the medium, and the force of gra- 
 vitation towards the earth, would go round the earth as the moon 
 does ; and the fame conformity that is betwixt the motion of the 
 moon and projedilesupon earth, has been fhown to take place betwixt 
 the motions of other fatellites round their primary planets, and of the 
 primary planets themfelves round the fun. Now, it would be fome- 
 thing anomalous and incongruous in Nature, if two motions of the 
 
 L 1 2 fame 
 
 * See M'Laurin, ubifuprd.
 
 268 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 fame kind were not governed by tlic fame general laws, but with 
 fuch difference, as the different raaffes of the bodies, and their differ- 
 ent diflances from the center, ought to produce. For I hold it to be a 
 general law of Nature, that things related do mutually affed one ano- 
 ther, and different relations of things produce different efftds ; for, 
 .otherwifc, the relation would be to no purpofe, contrary to that 
 axiom, as it may be called, of natural philofophy, * Thar Nature has 
 * done nothing in vain.' Now, there is certainly a relation betwixt 
 the body that is moved round, and the body round which it is mo- 
 ved ; and, as all relations are mutual, thefe two bodies, therefore, 
 muft mutually affe<51: one another ; and it would be anomalous in Na- 
 ture, and out of rule and order, if the different proportions of maffes, 
 and of diftances, betwixt the bodies furrounded andfurrounding, made 
 no difference as to the motion of the furrounding bodies. AH thefe 
 differences Sir Ifaac has combined, and eftimated the effects of them, 
 with wonderful fagacity, and has fhown a power of inveftigation and 
 dedudion, which does honour to the human genius, proceeding from 
 what is compounded to what is fimple, from effeds to caufes, and from 
 particular caufes to caufes more general ; from the motions of bodies, 
 inferring the moving forces ; and, from the analyfis of the motion of 
 projectiles here on earth and of the celeftial bodies, and the comparl- 
 fon of thofe two motions thus analyzed, raihng general theorems of 
 motion ; and, lajlly^ from thofe theorems reafoning downwards, and, 
 in that way, accounting for many phaenomena of nature, of which no 
 account had been given before, and which were therefore judged to 
 be irregularities and enormities in the fyliem. 1 fhould ftill admire 
 Sir Ifaac more, if I had gone deeper into mathematics ; but, having 
 only learned, as I have faid, the elements of geometry, the principles 
 of the fcience, and the manner of reafoning ufed in it, 1 cannot pre- 
 tend to follow Sir Ifaac in his demonftraiions and calculations ; which, 
 therefore, 1 muft content myfelf with believing only, to be pertedly 
 juft and accurate j and, if I could iufped any miiUke in Sir Ifaac's 
 
 calcu-
 
 Chap. XIX. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 269 
 
 calculations, I am mofr firmly convinced of the truth of the Pythago- 
 rean raaxim, * That ev^ery thing hi nature is according to number and 
 ' meafure ;* that not only the diflances and periods of the planets are 
 regulated by certain proportions^ but that all things in Nature, 
 which are homogeneous, and confequcntly fufceptible of ratios and 
 proportions, are regulated in the fame way. And, not only has he 
 applied the principles of geometry and mechanics to the motions of 
 the celeRial bodies, better than any man that ever exiftcd, but he has 
 made more curious experiments than ever man made, upon the moft 
 fubtile of all bodies, li^bt; and has, by a molt wonderful diiTedtion and 
 unravelling, * untivijled all the Jlnning robe of day ^'^ as it is well ex- 
 prefled by Mr Thomfon, in his poem upon the death of Sir ifaac 
 Newton, 
 
 As a geometer, therefore, and experimental phllofopher, I admire 
 Sir Ifaac as much as any of his followers can do, at leaft, as 
 much as my fmall knowledge in thefe matters will allow me to do. 
 He has, no doubt, explained wonderfully well the mechanifm of the 
 lyftem, and lliown by what laws all the various motions in the hea- 
 vens are governed ; and 1 only differ from him as to the movino- 
 fjoiver of the machine, which I make to be mind operating fimply 
 and uniformly; whereas Sir Ifaac makes it to be either ;?2zW operating 
 in a double and very complicated way ; or, as that appears to be im- 
 pofTible, I rather believe he thought, though he has not faid fo, that 
 there wasfome necefTity in matter, that m:.de it tend towards a center 
 and which, therefore, made the combined motion neceffary. He has 
 therefore made of the heavens a machine pf an extraordinary kind, of 
 which, the power that firft fet it agoing, he acknowledges to be mind: 
 but he nakes it to go on without that power ; whereas, all the ma- 
 chines that we know, are moved only by the condant operations of 
 the power which firft fets them a-going. 
 
 If
 
 270 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BookIL 
 
 If this machinery, extraordinary as it is, could have been extended 
 from t'le heavens to the earth, and it could have been fliown, that 
 things here, I mean animals and vegetables, and the minute particles 
 of ma|:ter, were moved ia the fame v^ay, Sir Ifaac's fyftem, as I have 
 already obferved, would have been more fimple and uniform, and his 
 philolophy would have been, as his followers boaft, univerfal. But, 
 as that is not pretended to be the cafe, his fyilem of nature is, in this 
 refped, incongruous, without that fimplicity and uniformity of de- 
 fign, fo remarkable in all the works of nature. And this incongruity be- 
 twixt Sir Ifaac^s fyftem of the heavens and of the earth, muft ajjpear 
 the more extraordinary, when we confider, that his whole fyftem is 
 built upon the analogy betwixt certain motions on earth and thofe in 
 heaven. 
 
 Had Sir Ifaac ftudied the books of antient philofophy, which It does 
 not appear he ever looked into, probably for want of knowledge of 
 the language in which they are written, he would have formed a more 
 comprehenfive idea oi philofophy .^ and what a ph'ilofopher fhould be. He 
 would have learned there, that -philofophy is the bioivledge of all things 
 divine and human ; that is, of things eteroal and unchangeable, as 
 well as of things perpetually fluctuating betwixt generation and cor- 
 ruption, that is, betwixt being and no being : And that, however ex- 
 cellent a mathematician or mechanic a man may be, however accu- 
 rate and fagacioiis he may be in making experiments, without that u- 
 niverfal knowledge, he is no philofopher, but is only pofl^efl^ed of 
 inferior arts and fciences, which may be ufed as minifters or 
 
 hand a: aids to philofophy. From thefe books, he would have 
 
 learned to know, what body and mind^ matter and motion^ in their 
 full extent, are ; and thence he would have difcovered, that mind 
 was not only principal in nature, but as univerfal as body^ as 
 "different in kind and degree, and the author of all the motions in 
 body ; confequently, that Nature was nothing elfe but what Ariftotle 
 has made it to be, mind in body^ or, as that philofopher has expreft^ed it,
 
 Chap. XIX. ANTIENT M F T A P IT T S T C C 271 
 
 2l prhuipk of motion^ by which !>jc!y is iKoved io jjII the ways pof- 
 fihle. Had he known thit?, he would ii;.'.t have made; a rncfhme of the 
 heavens, nor divided the celeflial m-'tlons bctv^ixt \r^^r\d. and mecha- 
 nilm, the Divine Power and maierial necefTity, but wouk: have ac- 
 knowledged, that all motion there, as well as on ear<h, was both be- 
 gun and carried on by mind ; and fo would have formed a more uui- 
 verfal, as well as more fimple philofophy, comprehending both heaven 
 and earth, and all things that are therein : For it is imp'^fTible ihat 
 philofophy can be the knowledge of the univerie, and of the firfi caufe 
 of things, unlefs it comprehend the knowledge of mind^ which is fo 
 much difirufed thro' all narure, and is the author of all motion, and, by 
 confequence, of all generation and produdion of every kind. Accor- 
 dingly, all the antient philofophers, particularly Plato and Ariftotle, 
 have made mind an eflential part of thetr Tyftem, whether relating to 
 things in heaven, or things in earth. But Sir Ifaac, as he knew no- 
 thmg of the antient phiiofophy, was not, 1 am afraid, learned in the 
 philofophy of mind ; and, therefore, he has endeavoured to explain e- 
 very thing in the heavens by what he thoroughly underftood, I mean 
 geometry and mechanics ; and would have done the fame, if he could, 
 with refpedl to things on earth. 
 
 Sir Ifaac, therefore, 1 doubt, in antient times, while philofophy 
 flouriflied, would not have been dignified with the name of a philo- 
 fbpher \ and, 1 am afraid the philofophers of thole days would not have 
 been quite fatisfied, even with his fylfem oi aftronomy being formed 
 upon a principle vi'hich is not a caufe, but a fa6"t, as his followers now 
 admit. Now, a philofopher defires to know the caufes and prin- 
 ciples of things ; for philofophy, as Ariftotle tells U9, is the knowledge 
 of caufes ; and we can then only be properly faid to know a thing, 
 when vv^e know the caufe of it. But, what is worle, it is a fatt 
 which is OTi\y Juppofed^ not proved ; and, 1 think 1 have fhown, that it 
 is not a probable fuppofuion> nor a neceflary one, fince all the phae- 
 
 nomena
 
 272 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book IL 
 
 nomena of the motions of the celeftial bodies may be explained with- 
 out it. 
 
 Final caufesy as Arluwile has obferved, arc the principal caufes : 
 And, indeed, every man who believes that the univerle is the produc- 
 tion of intelligence and deiign, muft hold that the final caufe is, as the 
 name imports^ the cajije of caujes^ being that, for the fake of which 
 the other three caufes are employed : For, if it had nor been for a 
 certain end, the efficient caufe would not have operated ; the formal 
 would not have given a nature and effence to the thing, fit to anfwer 
 the end intended ; and matter would not have been employed to pro- 
 duce a 'viftble world. Further, the beauty of nature, as Ariftotle has 
 obferved, confifts in final caufes, without which we can conceive no 
 beauty in any thing *. Now, if we are to judge in this matter by fi- 
 nal caufes, it is evident that the principle of motion, we call gra^uita^ 
 tion, ^^as abfolutely neceflary here below, as the bufinefs of nature 
 could not be carried on without it. But, in the celeftial regions, it 
 ferves no purpofe, except what can be ferved in a more natural and 
 fimple manner without it. 
 
 But gravitation is not the only fa£t which Sir Ifaac*s fyflem of a- 
 ftronomy fuppofes ; for there is another which he alfo requires us to 
 believe, and that is, the impulfeof projedion given by the Deity to the 
 celeftial bodies. Now, this is a poftulatum which none of the philo- 
 fophers of antiquity, who, as I have fhown, all believed the world to 
 be eternal, would have granted ; becaufe it plainly fuppofes the world 
 not to have been an eternal produdion of an eternal caufe, but to have 
 been made and fet agoing at a particular time, like any piece of hu- 
 man machinery. 
 
 Thus, 
 
 * T« yuf un rvy^t^rm^ «Aa' (»£«« mn U rtn; tyu ^vc-ia; i^yit;, ia-Ti Kkt /u,xXtcrTtc. cv it'^fiKtt 
 
 wnvrny-ii 'n yiytntiXtvi, rni rov KitX»v x,*>^hi iiM<fif — Dc Partibus Animaliunii lib' l. 
 cap. 5.
 
 Chap. XIX. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 273 
 
 Thus, it appears that Sir Ifaac's aftronomy, inftead of afligning the 
 caufc of the motions of the heavenly bodies, lays down X.\vo/a^s as 
 pojiulatay which he defires fhould be granted to him, but which arc 
 neither neccflary nor probable. If, indeed, it could be proved, that 
 the circular motion is aciually combined of a centrifugal and centri- 
 petal tendency, both thefe hypothefes would have been altogether un- 
 necelTary. But this, 1 am perfuaded, was not the opinion of Sir Ifaac 
 himfelf ; nor do I know that it has been advanced in print by any of 
 his followers : I muft, therefore, till I am better informed, hold the 
 antient opinion to be the truth, that the circular motion is afimple un- 
 <:ompounded motion. 
 
 But, even upon this fuppofition, Sir Ifaac, I think, was not driven to 
 the neceffity of his two hypothefes ; for, though the circular motion of 
 the celeftial bodies be not aBually compounded of gravitation and pro- 
 jection, there is nothing to hinder it to be refolved or analyzed in- 
 to thefe two motions in different dire<flions, in the fame manner as 
 the motion of projeCtiles on earth is analyzed ; for the redilineal mo- 
 tion, though mofl perfedly fimple, may be analyzed into two motions, 
 in the diredion of two lines forming the fides of a parallelogram, of 
 which the line of the body's motion is the diagonal^ without the leafl: 
 neceffity of fuppofing, that the redilineal motion was adually produ- 
 ced by two forces ading in the diredion of the two fides of the paral- 
 lelogram, or that it has any tendency to go anywife out of a ftraio-ht 
 line, either to the right or left *. In this way, all Sir lfaac*s demon- 
 ftrations and calculations, arifing from the refolution of the motions of 
 the celeftial bodies, will ftand upon as firm a bafis as ever, and his 
 fyftem be much more fimple and plain, being difencumbered of two 
 
 M m hypo- 
 
 • See Mf M«Laurm upon the Philofophical Difcoveries of Sir Ifaac Newton, 
 book II. chap. 2. p. 121. X22. and 157.
 
 274 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book 11. 
 
 hypothcfes, which, in every refpea, appear to be altogether unnecef- 
 fary *. 
 
 And, indeed, I cannot help thinking, that Sir Ifaac went a little out 
 of his province, as a geometer and mechanic, when he meddled at all 
 with the caufe or principle of motion of the celeQial bodies ; for ma- 
 thematics can do no more than calculate and compare together motions 
 
 and 
 
 • As the circular or elliptical motion Is proved, by fa6l and obfcrvation, to be re- 
 folvable into two motions, one from the cent-r, the other to it, 1 thought that there 
 muft be fome reafon for this, and that the reafon was no other than the nature of 
 the motion. And, as it is demonllratcd, and was known even to the antients, that 
 a motion in a ftraight line, as Hmple as any motion can be conceived to be, is never- 
 thelefs refolvable into the two motions mentioned in the text, I fufpe£led that it was 
 likewife demonflrable a priori, that the circular or elliptical motion was refolvable 
 into the centripetal and centrifugal motions ; and, accordingly, upon inquiry, I am 
 iniormud tliat bir Ifaac has adlually deinonllrated it to be fo. Now, this being the 
 cafe, it appears that thofe who maintain that the orbicular motion is necefTarily com- 
 pofed of the centripetal and centrifugal motions, are only miftaken in fuppofing that 
 it is actually focompofed ; and, therefore, that it has a double tendency, to the centre 
 and from it. Whereas, if they had faid, that the motion, though perfedly fimpjc in 
 itfelf, as fimple as the motion in a flraight line, was ncverthekfs compofed oi the cen- 
 tripetal and centrifugal motions, in fo far as to be refolvable into thefe, it would have 
 been no more than the truth, and would have ferved every purpoie of the philofophy 
 they meant to dctentl. 
 
 It^'may beobjeftcd, that 1 have taken no notice of Sir Ifaac's fyftem of the tides, 
 which he explains by his grand principle of gravitation and attraction : But, if there 
 be no fuch thing as gravitation in the celeftial regions, as 1 have endeavoured to fhow, 
 and, if we have no conception of body operating upon body by attradion, or any orher 
 way than in contaft, it neccilarily follows, that the movement of the tides muft be 
 accounted for, like every other movement that is not mechanical, from the i/nmcdiate 
 operation ot mind. But it muft be fuppofcd, that the mind which move* the waters, 
 will do It regularly, and in conformity to the motions of the moon, more or lefs, as 
 fhe is nearer to, or farther from the w.;ters ; for, as 1 have obierved above, it would 
 be anomalous, and out of the order oi nature, if two bodies, fo related as the moon 
 and our i?rth, the one iurrounding, the other furrounded, fliould not have an in- 
 fluence upon one another, and a mutual lympathy.
 
 Chap. XIX. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 275 
 
 and forces. But what is the caiife of thefe motions, and what is the 
 motive force, is an inquiry that belongs to phllofophy, and to the firfl: 
 philofophy, whofe fubje(Sl is the univcrfe, and the principle of all pro- 
 du(5tion and generation in it ; an inquiry, for which the fludy of geo- 
 metry and mechanifm will not alone qucdify any man. 
 
 Sir Ifaac went Aill further out of his province, when he inquired 
 concerning the origin of other motions which he obferved among the 
 fmaller bodies, fuch as repulfion, magnetlfm, and eledricity. In mea- 
 furing thofe motions, he did not find that his geometry and mechanics 
 could be of any life to him ; he fhould, therefore, have either let them 
 alone altogether, or, if he was to inquire concerning the caufe of 
 them, he fhould have olcribed them to mind, which, one (hould have 
 thought, was moft natural for a Theifl:, fuch as Sir Ifaac certainly 
 was, to have done, as they could not be accounted for from any me- 
 chanical caufe. 
 
 But, inftead of mind, he employs a fuhtile fp'int^ pervading 
 all bodies, by which he accounts, not only for the attradion, co- 
 hefion, and repulfion of the fmall particles of matter, and for all 
 the phaenomena of eledricity, but for fenfation, and the fpontaneous 
 motion of animals *. Now, \X\\^ fuhtile /pint is more aa occult caufe 
 
 M m 2 than: 
 
 His words are, Adjicere jam liceret nonnulla de fpiritu qUodam fubtilifTimo, cor- 
 pora crafla pervndente, et in iifdem Jatente ; cujus vi et a£tionibus particulae corporum 
 ad minlmas diflantias fe mutuo attrahunt, et contiguac fa<^ae cohacrent ; et corpora 
 cledrica agunt ad diftantias majores, tarn repell^rido quam attrahtndo corpufcula vi- 
 cina; et lux emittitur, reflt6i:itur, rcfringitur, infleclitur, et corpora calefacit ; et {<cx\. 
 fatio omnis excitatur, et membra animalium ad voluntatem moventur, vibratioiiibus 
 fcilicet, bujus fpiritus per foiida nervorum capillamcnta ab externis fenfuum organis ad 
 cerebrum, et a cercbro in mufculos, propagatis. Sed haec paucis exponi non poflunt • 
 neque adefl fufficicns copia experimentorum, quibus leges aclionum bujus fpiritus ac- 
 curate determlnari et monftrari debent — Injine Principiorum.
 
 276 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book I U 
 
 than any mentioned by Arlftotle ; for Arlftotle, when he fpeaks of 
 ocadt caufesy does not fay what they are ; nor does he mean, as I have 
 faid, to conceal his ignorance, but to confefs it ; whereas, Sir Ifaac 
 mentions the caufe particularly, by calling it a moji Juhtile fpirit. 
 
 Now, in i\vQfrJi place, I deny that any fuch fpirit exifls, or that we 
 can even conceive it to exift. And, indeed, I. wonder that a philofo- 
 phy, which profefles to be founded upon the phaenomena of nature, 
 and what falls under fenfe and obfervalion, fhould fuppofe a material 
 thing, which does not, like other matter, only occupy empty fpace, 
 but pervades folid bodies, or (hould fuppofe bodies that could be pe- 
 netrated in that way, that is, bodies without impenetrability or re- 
 fiftence. And, idly. Sir Ifaac has not lliown, nor attempted to fhow> 
 how this fpirit, fuppofing it to exift, could perform the v/onderful ef- 
 fects he afcribes to it, direding the motions of the bodies it pervades 
 regularly and uniformly, and to a certain end and purpofe. If mere 
 matter, however fubtlle, can do this, I fhould defire to know the di- 
 ftindion betwixt matter and rnind. 
 
 Sir Ifaac, in this refped, puts me in mind of an antient philofo* 
 pher, Anaxagoras, who maintained, as Sir Ifaac does, that mind was 
 the caufe of all things ; but, when he came to explain the particular 
 phaenomena of nature, inftead of having recourfe to mind, employed 
 airs and aethers, fubtile fpirits and fluids, and I know not what ; in 
 fhort, any thing rather than mind — a caufe which he admitted to ex- 
 ift in the univerfe — but, rather than employ it, had recourfe to ima- 
 ginary caufes, of the exiftence of which he could give no proof *. 
 
 The 
 
 • It was for this reafon that Socrates, in the Phaedo, fays he was fo much difap- 
 pointed in his hopes of being inftrufted by the philofophy of Anaxagoras : * For,' fays 
 he, * I was told that he made mind or intelle^ the caufe of every thing in the uni- 
 
 ' verfe ;
 
 Chap. XIX. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 777 
 
 TheTragicpoets, of old, when they coold not otherwlfe untie the knot 
 of their fable, brought down a God in a machine* who folved all dif- 
 ficulties ; but fuch philofophers as Anaxagoras will not, even whea 
 they cannot do better, employ fiiind or Divinity. 
 
 Our philofophers, fince Sir Ifaac's time, have gone on in the fame- 
 trad, and flill, I think, farther j for their labour feems to be like that 
 of the lipicureans of old, to account quo quaeqiie modo fiant opera fine 
 jyivum t ; and, tho* they do not, like thofe Atheiftical philofophers, 
 exclude the Divinity altogether from the fyftem of nature, by placing 
 him in certain extramundane fpaces, they put him at the end of 
 fo long a chain of material caufes, as to be almofl: quite out of fight ; 
 whereas, according to my philofophy, and the philofophy of the pious 
 antients, he is near to e'very one of us, and in him, we, as well as every 
 thing elfe, live, move^ and have our being. 
 
 What greater length certain philofophers, both at home and abroad, 
 have gone of late years, is very well known. Some of thefe philofo- 
 phers ufe the name of Sir Ifaac, and pretend to build their fyftem upon- 
 his principles ; but they abufe thofe principles moft grofsly, when they 
 would, by arguments drawn from them, exclude the Deity altogether 
 from the fyfiem of the univerfe; for, tho' Sir Ifaac has no doubt made 
 a machine of the heavens, it is evident that he believed the Deity to be 
 the maker and contriver of this machine, and the firft author of all its 
 motions, and of all the motions in the univerfe, even oi gravitation ; for, 
 
 though 
 
 * verfe ; but, when 1 came to read his books, ** 'gw avt^x rm fny »• cvlii y^^vfuvt', avh 
 
 *' Toifltf uirtxi iTTcciTiMiii^oi «; T« Oixtteg-fceiv Tx yr^xyfCxTx, xt^a? it text xttt^Xf Kxt u^xrx uiTivtit" 
 
 <* lav, KXi xXXx TraAAee y.xi MTtTTx" — Editio Ficin'i, p. 73- And Ariflotle, in his Met-'p lib. I. 
 cap. 4. fayi, that Anaxagoras f^nxa'^ %giiT«< Ta» fu, viei T»y Koa-ficaTi-ttixy (ailuciing, no 
 doubt, to the pradlice of the Tiagic Poets mentioned above >) nxt irxt uvoQncv\ hn ny* 
 
 XlTlUly 1% XIXyKtii iS-Tt, T«TI 1>.KH XVTtT, fV dt TCtf XXMli TTXVTX ftXhXtt XiTiXTXI rUf ykVtf^ifiii'^ 
 
 •}• Lucretius,
 
 ayS A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I C S. Book IL 
 
 though he has not fald To ercprefsly m his Principia^ and has thrown 
 out fome things there concerning the attra^ion and repiilfion of fmall 
 bodies, the phaenomena of electricity, fcnfation, and fpontaneous mo- 
 tion, which, as I have obferved, favour a good deal of inaterialifm^ he 
 has, uDon fecond thoucrhts, corrected that in the fecond edition of his 
 optics, in the laft query, where he fays, That the particles of matter 
 are moved by certain aclivs principles, which are the caufes of gravita- 
 tion, of magnetic and cieil ic attradions, of fermentation, and the co- 
 hefion of bodies *. In this paiTage. he plainly. diltingailhcs this ^c- 
 iive principle from the matter which it moves; and, therefore, has 
 gone a ftep further than he has done in his Frincipia, whc-'e he has 
 only faid^ that he does not affirm gravitation to be an eflential proper- 
 ty of ??iatter ; whereas, here, I think, he fays exprefsly, that it is not, 
 and that the aclive principle^ which produces gravitation, is alto- 
 gether diftind from matter ; and, if (o, I afk, what elfe it can be but 
 mi?hl P for, as there is nothing elfc in the univerfe but matter and. mindy 
 if it be not matter, it mult be Jiiind. 1 hus tar, therefc^re, 1 have the 
 pleafure to think, that I agree with Sir Ifaac : And, if he likewife be- 
 lieved, as he feems to fay, that this active principle in njatter was ne- 
 cefl'ary, not only for the beginning of motion, but for carrying it on f, 
 then his philofophy, and the philofophy of the antients, which I have 
 endeavoured to defend, are perfedtly the fame. 
 
 And here we may obferve how much more confiftently Sir Ifaac 
 Newton has fjxiken of the nature of matter than Mr Locke, who, after 
 having defined ininJ to he poiver aftive, and bjdy poiver pajjive, has 
 faid, tliat there is no coritradidion in body thinking, and it may 
 be fo modified, as to have that quality J. But luch an aflcrtion is, as 
 
 I 
 
 * Second edit of the Optics, p. 376. and 377. 
 
 t /^'^- P- 373- 
 
 % Lccke's Eflay, lib. 4. cap. 10. fedt. 10. And Cap. 3. feci. 6.-
 
 Chap. XIX. A N T I E N T M F T A P R Y S I C 3. 
 
 I have elfewhere oblervrd ti an n^^folute contraciir-i'.-n ; for ii io ■d6 
 if he hnd f.iid, that tiic fciioe rhing was. efleDt'ally adtive, and elTenti- 
 aliy paflive, capaMe ot btgiuning motion, and iiot capauL* ot begin- 
 ning motion ; or, in other words, that tiie lame thing ir.ight be, and 
 not be Whereas, Sir llaac, h )lding fall by t tat fu; dament.ii jj; inciple 
 of !'is phiiolophy, that mutter is, by its nature ai-d clTcnce, aliOji^eiher 
 paifive, lo as to be incapable, either of heginnitig motion, or ftoppnig 
 it when begun, lays it down, in this paiTage ot his <.)ptics, that the ac- 
 tive p inciple, which he fuppofes to be in all particles of n.a'ter, is no 
 modification of matter, but fomething akog.ther diftind from it. 
 
 Upon the whole, there can only, I think, be three opinions upon this 
 very important fubjed, concerning the origin and continuation of mo- 
 tion ; one or other of which muft neceffarily be the truth. The htll is, 
 that the ponvtr of motion is elfential to matter ; or, in other words, 
 that it moves itfeif. The feciud is, that, though it have not in iilelr a 
 principle of motion, yet it may have Inch a principle im})rc{red upon 
 it, and, in that way, may be not only put in motion, but contnuie in 
 motion ; fo that the bufinels of the univerfe may be earned on by tiiis 
 firft original impreffion, without more. Or, hdlly, that all the mo- 
 tions of the univerTe are not only begun, but are continually carried 
 on,, by the conftant agency of mind^ or an immaterial power. 
 
 As to the flrfl of thefe opinions, which muft be the opinion of all 
 the n.aterialillb, who arc not, like i picurus and his followers, {o ienle- 
 leis, as not to give i( m^e account of the bcgnnmg and contmuation of 
 mcjtion, I thuik 1 have demonfiritcd, that nothiiig can move itlelf, 
 and that the moving" principle, and the body moved, muft neceftarily 
 be diftind. On the other hand, tlie materiahlls n.uft maintain, not 
 only that body moTcs itielf, but that it can Hop its own motion, and 
 
 reft 
 
 t Page 12.
 
 28o ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 reft of itfelf ; for, when a body coheres to another, and incorporates 
 with it, fo far it refts ; and, therefore, they muft fay that body has, in 
 itfelf, and of its own nature, a principle of reft, as well as of motion. 
 Now, this is not only not fupported by any of the appearances of na- 
 ture, but is diredly contrary to them j for it is proved by experiment, 
 as well as by reafoning, that a body, once put in motion, continues to 
 move, till, by fome external force, or contrary impulfe, it be ftopped. 
 — But, further, thefe philofophers muft not only maintain, that body 
 has, by its nature and eflTence, the power of moving itfelf, and ceafing 
 to move, but, likewifc, that it has the power of operating for a certain 
 end, and ufing the moft artificial means to attain that end. 1 he con- 
 fequence of which is, that, as thefe gentlemen acknowledge no 
 intelligence in the univerfe, except their own, and as there necef- 
 farily muft be fomewhere intelligence, when any being ads for a 
 certain end, and attains that end by the moft proper means, it is evi- 
 dent that there muft be in the matter^ befides the power of motion 
 and reft, tinder Jland'mg and intelligence. Now, if fuch fuppofitions are 
 allowed, there is an end of all philofophy of fad and experiment ; 
 and we may fuppofe bodyy or any thing elfe in nature, to be what we 
 pleafe. 
 
 The fecond hypothefis is that of Sir Ifaac Newton ; by which he 
 fuppofes that a certain force, imprefTed originally upon matUr^ will 
 make it perform all the motions that are neceflary for the fyftem of 
 the univerfe. In the paflage above quoted, from the laft query of his 
 Optics *, he feems to fay, that the adive principle, which he fuppofes 
 in all the particles of matter, is neceflary, not only for putting bodies 
 into motion, but for preferving and continuing their motion. But, in 
 
 ano- 
 
 * -Page 573.
 
 Chap. XIX. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 281 
 
 another paflage In the fame Query *, he fays, ' That, though the 
 * world could not rife out of chaos by the mere laws of nature, yet, 
 ' bf^ing oiice formed, it may coatinic, by thefe hws, for many ages.' 
 That is to fay, as I underftand the words, that the world, being once 
 formed and fet a^^omg, will go on of itlelf, by the force of mere mat- 
 ter and mechanifm, according to certain laws of motion originally im- 
 prefled upon it. Now. though the word ivoiid ufed here is broad e- 
 nough to comprehend all things on this earth, animals and vegetables, 
 as well as inanimate bodies, vet I am perfuaded Sir Ifaac had nothing 
 in view but the fyftem of the heavens, as it is explained in hi^ Princi- 
 pal where he undoubtedly makes a machine uf the folar fyltem. But, 
 as I have obferved, the fyftem of Des Cartes, and the other French 
 philofophers, who make a machine of ani.nals a'^d vegetables here on 
 earth, as well as of the celeftial bodies, is more confiftent with itfelf, 
 and more agreeable to the analogy that we obierve in nature, than Sir 
 Ifaac's fyllem. And, I think, we may fairly argue, that if, by virtue of 
 the force originally impreffed, the celeftial bodies continue to move, all 
 the bodies here on earth do hkewile move in the fame manner. But if, 
 on the contrary, it be certain that not only organized bodies here on 
 earth are not moved m that way, but even unorganized bodies, I think 
 the conclufion will be tair on the other fide. Now, that the brute ani- 
 mals are mere n achines, n()b')dy, I thi;,k, can ferioufly believe, who 
 does not, at the fame time, believe, that wc ourfelves are mere ma- 
 chines, and are only moved by impulfes origuially given us. Neither 
 has it been hitherto attempted, as far as I know, to account in that 
 way for rhe motion of the vegetable. And, even as to unorganized 
 bodies, 1 think it is as imi^oifible that they can perform all their various 
 movements from any force originally imprcfled upon them. In this 
 way, we might account f> r a ftop.e falling to the ground once ; but, 
 how fhall we account for its falling fo a fecond, third, and innumer- 
 
 N n able 
 
 * Page 378.
 
 282 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 abie times ? In this way, we may account for the aquafortis once faften- 
 \ii<^ upon iron, and diiT lv;ng it ; but, when the njis hiiprejfa is this way 
 exhau 'ed what account can we give of its leaving the iron, when a 
 piece rf lapis calavdnaris is thrown into the vienjlruuiu^ running to the 
 lapis caldniinans^ and dillulving it ? and then, again, after it has dif- 
 folvLd filver, u iien a p:ece of copper is thrown into the foUition, it lets 
 go the filv:r and < oes to it. The only effedt we can conceive of any 
 in^puHe givtn to body, is to move it in a ftraight line. Nor have we 
 any idea of iis moving in any other dircdion, except by a new 
 impulle given it in another line. Far lefs have we any idea of the 
 fame origmaJ impulfe continuing to make it move, after its motion is 
 once {lopped. If, therefore, thefc fo various movements, and fo 
 often renewed, of the minute particles of bodies, can only be 
 be produced by an immaterial power conilantly operating, 1 fay the 
 fame of greater bodies, even of the celeftial bodies ; and, without 
 forming hypothefes of gravitating and projedile forces, and of com- 
 bined motions thence rel'ulting, I fay, as the antients laid, that thofe 
 bodies are moved, like any thing here on earth, by irmid, guiding and 
 governing their motions, not arbitrarily, or at random, but according 
 to fixed and eilablifhed laws. This is the opinion of Dr Clarke, in 
 the paflage above quoted *', where he rejeds altogether the notion 
 of matter's obeying any laws originally imprefled upon it, and fays, 
 that it is moved by fomething fuperior to matter^ continually exerting 
 on it a certain force or pov.-er, according to certain and determinate 
 laws. And, in another paffage of the fame work t^ he fays flill 
 more appofitely to my prefent purpofe, ' All things that are done in 
 
 * the world, are done either immediately by God himfelf, or by 
 ' created intelligent beings : Matter being evidently not at all capable 
 
 * of any lazus or poivers whatfoevcr, any more than it is capable of 
 
 * intelligence, excepting only this one negative poijuer^ that every 
 
 * part 
 
 * Page 253. 
 
 t Evidence of Natural and Revealed Religion, page 300. fourth edition.
 
 Chap. XIX. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 283 
 
 * part of it will, of Itfelf, always and neceflfarlly continue in that 
 
 * ftate, whether of reft or motion, wherein it at prefcnt is : So 
 
 * that all thofe thin,^s which we commonly fay are the efFeds of the 
 
 * natural poivcrs of matter-^ and la'ws of motion^ oi gra'vitation^ at' 
 
 * traHioiu and the like, are indeed (if we will fpeak ftri^ly and 
 
 * properly,) the effedls of God\s ading upon matter continually and 
 ' every moment, either immediately, by himfelf, or mediately, by 
 ' feme created intelligent beings.* 
 
 Thus, it appears, that this great fcholar, philofopher, and divine, 
 to whom both natural and revealed religion are lb much obliged, 
 though intimately connetfted with Sir Ifaac, and very well acquainted 
 with his philofophy, yet differs froni him in this material point ; 
 and, rejecting the notion of the heavens being a machine, moved by 
 certain forces originally impreffed upon the celeftial bodies, aflerts 
 the perpetual and immediate agency of mind thrcnigh the whole uni- 
 verfe. And it is evident, from the paflage firft quoted, that he 
 thouj^ht this an eflential part of the dodrine of Theifm, and that 
 it is neceffanly connected with the proof of the world's being 
 originally produced by a Supreme, Intelligent Caufe ; and indeed 
 it is fo ; for, how can we demonftrate that mind is the origin of 
 all motion in the univerfe, otherwife than by ftiowing that mere 
 matter and mechanilm never could have produced it ? Now, in the 
 fame way, I prove, that, as motion cannot be begun, fo neither 
 can it be carried on without mind, ehhcr in the heavens, or on the 
 earth. 
 
 N nl CHAP.
 
 284 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IL 
 
 CHAP. XX. 
 
 Chance numbered among the Caufes of Things — NeccJJary to inquire 
 ivhat fort of o Caufe it is — The common Opinion concerning Chance — 
 A Thing not by accident, hecauje ive do not knonv the Caufe of it — Ex^ 
 ajnplcs of that in the Weather, Dice, and Cards — Chance refers to an 
 End propo/ed by Nature or Man — Examples of this — Ihings happen- 
 inght{\(\ts that End not ahv ays fortuitous — Examples of this — Fortui- 
 tous, and by accident, not the fame — Different Names gi'uen, in Greek, 
 to ivhat happens befides the End intended by Nature, and that ivhich 
 is int elided by Man — Definition of Chance from the foregoing Invefti- 
 gilt ion — Conjequence of this Doctrine (p/^ Chance. 
 
 HAVING faid fo much of caifes In general, and oi mind in 
 particular, before I conclude this Book, 1 will give fome account 
 of one caufe hitherto not mentioned, but which, by certain philofo- 
 phers, is thought the caufe of every thing in the univerle, and, by al- 
 iDofl: every body, is held to be the caufe of very many things that 
 daily happen, and particularly in human life ; I mean chance. And 
 it will not appear unconneded with mind, which I have infilled fo 
 much upon, if it be true, as I think it is, what Ariftotle fays, that 
 chance neccfljrily fuppofes mind, which is firft in the order of things, 
 and chance only an acceffory to it ; for Ariflotle, among many other 
 things that he has added to philofophy, is the firft, as far as I know, 
 who has given any rational and philofophical account of what is 
 
 called
 
 Chap. XX. A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I C S. 285 
 
 called chance^ or fortune. This he has done in the fecond book of his 
 Phyfics ; but, as he writes fhortly, and often obfcurely, 1 will endea- 
 vour to explain his dodrine to the Englifh reader, with fome additions 
 to it, which I think it is neceflary to make. 
 
 And I will begin, as Ariftotle has done, with ftating what is com- 
 monly faid concerning chance or Jortune ; and, by examining what 
 is right, and what is wrong, in what is fo faid, we may, perhaps, 
 come to the truth. 
 
 In the Jifjl place, it is commonly faid, that what happens by chance 
 or accident, or fortuitoufly, (for we ufe all thefe words as fynonimous,) 
 happens rarefy : And this is rightly faid ; for, whatever happens com- 
 monly, and in the ordinary courfe of things, is not a fortuitous event, 
 becaufe we forefee and expert it ; whereas, what happens by chance 
 or accident, is always unforefeen, and unexpected. 
 
 But, becaufe fortuitous events are rare, we ought not from thence 
 to conclude that rare events are fortuitous ; for, if that were fo, then 
 earthquakes, inundations, eclipfes, would be fortuitous events : But 
 thefe were never accounted fortuitous, even in the ages of the greatefi: 
 ignorance, but were believed to be the immediate work of God. Of 
 eclipfes, we now know the caufe with fo great certainty, that we cal- 
 culate, to a minute, when they are to happen ; and, though we are 
 not fo fure of the caufes of earthquakes and inundations, nor, fuppofe 
 we were fure of the caules, do we know the operation of them with 
 fucli certainty, as to be able to f oretel thofe events ; yet the philofopher 
 knows, that they proceed from natural caufes, operating as regularly 
 as thofe which produce the moft common events. 
 
 But, the moft common nfc, I believe, of the word chariceis, to denote 
 an event that is not produced by a certain and determinate caufc, orfuch 
 
 an
 
 286 A N T I N E T METAPHYSICS. Book 11. 
 
 an event as may be, or may not be produced by any caufe. But the phllo- 
 fophcr knows that every thing le not only produced by fome caufe, but 
 by a fixed and determinate caufe, that is, by a caufe which has a natural 
 tendency to produce that effed, and which operates regularly for that 
 purpofe. But thefe caufes we very often do not know ; and therefore 
 we fpeak of the events produced by them as uncertain, and fay, that 
 they happen by accident. 
 
 In this way wc applythe word accident^ when we fay, that, * By ac- 
 ' cident, it was a bad day yefterday, but ic may happen to be a good 
 * day to-inorrovv.' i his is ipeakiug unphilofophically and i;nproper- 
 ly: bccauie all fuch exents are produced by c:ules as certain and deter- 
 minate as any other thing in nature, though we do not kiiow them, at 
 lean, cannot com bine them, and calculate their efFeds ; for we know, 
 in geupral, that the changes of the weather are produced by certain 
 changes in our atmofphcre j and we know farther, that the changes 
 in the atmofphere are produced by feveral different caufes, all opera- 
 ting regularly and uniformly ; wl ch caufes though we may be 
 able to enumerate, yet we cannot explain how, and m what degree, 
 each of them opejates. For the fame reafon, it is a common impro- 
 priety of fptech, that the caft of a dve, or a good or bad hand at 
 cards, is a matter of chance ; becaufe thefe events depend upon caufes 
 as certain as the weather, at,d known to us pretty much in the fame 
 Wciy ; for we know, in general, that it is the motion given to the dye, 
 when it is fli ken and thrown out of tl e box. that produces the calf, 
 as it is the fhuffling and cutiir g the c.rds ti.at makes the hand fuch as 
 it is. But, though we kr)ow that thife are the caules ot thoie events, 
 yet we cannot tell how they opeiate, or by what fleps and progrefs 
 of intermediate caufes they produce thefe efFeds. 
 
 It is n-^t, therefore, our ignorance of caufes that makes chance; for 
 we often difpute about the caufes of things that are moft certain in 
 
 their
 
 Chap. XX. A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I G S. 287 
 
 their event, and happen every day. Thus, the rlfing and fettlng of 
 the Tun fome afcrlbe to material caufes ; others to miml^ as I do ; and 
 fome divide the matter betwixt mind and material neceffity, Bclides, 
 \^ chance depended merely upon our apprehenfions of things, and the 
 greater or leis extent or certainty of our knowledge, it would have no 
 foundation in nature ; and, therefore, to treat of it, would not belong 
 either to the natural philofopher, or the metaphyfician, but to thofe 
 arts whofe fubjeds are the opinions of men. 
 
 And here the matter appears to be more involved than ever, and the 
 reader may fay, that, inftead of clearing it up, I have only puzzled 
 and perplexed it ; for, if what happens commonly is not chance — if 
 neither, what happens rarely, is not always chance — if what is pro- 
 duced by fixed and determinate caufes, is likewife not chance — and, if 
 every thing in nature is fo produced — and, if even our ignorance of 
 thofe caufes will not make the event fortuitous — What then \?> fortune 
 or chance ? It appears to be nothing but a name ; and this great 
 Goddefs, whom all the world adores, and to whom fo many temples 
 and altars have been reared, is nothing but a mere phantom of the 
 imagination. 
 
 And it would be fo, if nature and man never produced any thing 
 but what they intended ; for we are to remember, that mind, accord- 
 ing to my fyftem, produces every thing in the world, either a6ling 
 without choice or deliberation, and without intelligence, which is what 
 I call Nature, or, with choice, deliberation, and intelligence, which is 
 what 1 call Ma7i. 
 
 And here begins to appear the folution of the difficulty ; for, It is 
 evident, that many things happen, befidcs what man intends or pro- 
 pofes ; and, alfo, fome things happen different from what we know 
 is aimed at by Nature. 
 
 Now,
 
 288 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book TI. 
 
 •r 
 
 Now, what name fhall we give to thofe things ? We cannot call 
 them natural things, or from nature — neither can we fay that they 
 are from human intention. 1 hey are, therefore, what we cdWJortiti- 
 tons events : And the caul- that produces them is what is called 
 chatice, But> it is evident that they all have a relpedl: to fome end 
 propoled by Nature or by man : So that nothing is more true than 
 what Ariilotle fays, that, if there were no end intended, there could be 
 no chance *. 
 
 To begin w^ith the Intention of man— A man digs a piece of 
 ground, with an intention either to low or plant it ; but, in digging, 
 he finds a treafure. This is befide his intention, and thereh)re is iaid 
 to be chance. Again, a man goes to the market-place, to purchafe 
 " fomething that he wants, and he meets a friend whom he did not ex- 
 ped:to fee, a'^d believed tf) he at a great diftance : This, likewife, being 
 a thing different from the intcntif)n of the man, is called chance : 
 And it will not be the lefs chance^ that the man does, at the fame 
 tia.e, what he intended to do, viz. j^urch jfing what he wanted, aS 
 the man, in the other cyfe, digs the ground which he intended to dig; 
 for, all that is nec' flary to make ch nce^ is, ihat fomething fh;>uld 
 happen befides what is intended, whether what is intended happen 
 or not. 
 
 This is chnnce. with refpe^l to man. What we call chance In Nature 
 depends entirely upon what we zaW final caiifcs. That there arc inch 
 in every cpetat on of nature, nobody who is not an Atheift, and 
 an Atlieifl: of the nmfl cbfurd kind, can doubt.- But thefe ends 
 are, to us, olten not known ; and, therefore, we may be often miila- 
 
 ken 
 
 • In the fifth chapter of the fecond book of his Phyfics, he tells us, that chance be- 
 longs to the things that are Ivir-x rev — Ea-rt h l^mx rev io-ce T« ctira ttxveitti tcv ^^»^Siiv[, *tti 
 
 oirtc icirt (pvs-Eft;?, * What is done lor an end, proceeds either from underftanding or from 
 * Nature.'
 
 Chap. XX. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 289 
 
 ken in pronouncing, that any natural event is from chance^ as we 
 fometimes are in thinking that events of human life are from chanccy 
 which are truly from intention. But there are natural events, that, we 
 know with great certainty, are befides the end propofed by nature. 
 Thus, for example, when a hanging wall falls upon a paflenger, and 
 cruflies him, the deftination of Nature was only, that the ftones of the 
 wall, being no longer kept together by the cement, fhould fall to the 
 ground, according to their natural movement ; fo that the crufluag of 
 the man was fomething that happened befides the purpofe of Nature. 
 Again, the end propofed by Nature, in the copulation of animals, is., 
 that they fhould produce an animal of the fame fpecies, with the form, 
 and all the members and parts belonging to animals of that fpecies. 
 But, if an animal of another fpecies is produced, or, if it be what is 
 called a mon/ler, the produdion is acknowledged by every body to be 
 bejides Nature^ or ^«^« <pvyiv^ as the Greeks exprefs it. And this is pro- 
 perly faid ; But it is not fo proper to fay, that, it is contrary to Na- 
 ture ; for, thoug,h many things happen contrary to the intention of 
 marii whofe power is fo much limited, nothing can be properly (aid to 
 happen contrary to the deftination of Nature. 
 
 For underftanding of this, the reader will be pleafed to recolle£l: 
 what I laid before, that every thing in the univerfe is produced by 
 fixed and determinate caufes, operating regularly for a certain purpofe. 
 Whatever, therefore, in the cafe laft mentioned, hinders the natural 
 produd:ion of an animal, and diftorts or disfigures it, a<£ls as regular- 
 ly, and with as certain a deftination, as the caufes which promote a 
 natural birth ; fo that, in fome fcnfe, even a monfter may be faid to be 
 natural. In like manner, though a thing happen befides tlie intention, 
 or even contrary to the intention of a man, it will be according to the 
 deftination of Nature, or intention of fomc other man. Thus, in the 
 example above given, when I go to the market-place to purchafe any 
 thing, and fee a friend that 1 did not exped to fee, or, perhaps, an 
 
 O a enemy,
 
 9^ 
 
 A N T I £ N T METAPHYSICS. Book IL 
 
 enemy, that 1 neither expeded nor wi'lied to fee ; though this happen 
 heftdcs or contrary to my intention, it is according to the intention of 
 the perfon 1 meet, who comes to the market-phice for fome purpofc 
 or other. Again, in the cafe of a man digging and finding a trea- 
 fure, tho' the treafure was found hejules the intention of the digger, 
 it was put there according to the intention of the perfon who hid it. 
 Further, in the cafe of a paiTenger being cruihed by the fall of a wall, 
 though this event was bejides the deftination of Nature, it was accor- 
 ding to the intention of the perfon crulhed, not that he intended to be 
 crufhed, but that it was by intention he walked along the fide of the- 
 wall. 
 
 And here we may perceive fomething In this matter that feems to 
 have efcaped even Ariilotle. And it is this, that, whenever any thing 
 happens by accident, there muft neceflarily be aconcourfe of two cau- 
 fes to produce the effect ; either both from nature* as in the cafe of the 
 monflrous birth, or both from man, as in the cafe of finding the trea- 
 fure, or meeting accidentally with a friend ; or, one from Nature, and 
 the other from man, as in the cafe of the paffenger opprefled by the 
 fall of the wall. The chance, therefore, i& in the concourfe of the 
 two caufes, not in any one of them taken feparately ; for, in that way, 
 they operate each of them in a natural and ordinary way. And it is 
 in this way, that chance and necejjity^ which, in their nature, appear 
 to be diametrically oppofite, are to be reconciled ; for all the opera- 
 tions of Nature, taken feparately, are neceflary : But, when they con- 
 cur to produce an event which otherwife could not have happened, 
 that event is what is called chance. In like manner, what proceeds from 
 will and intention, is alfo neceflary in a certain fenfe, as a perfon cannot' 
 zQi otherwife than according to the laft determination of his will ; But 
 it is a neceflity ot a quite different kind from^ material or natural nc- 
 ceflity, as fliall, in the next chapter, be more particularly explain- 
 ed.
 
 Chap. XX. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 291 
 
 ed. Each, therefore, of the fevcral intentions of man, in theinftances 
 above given, may be faid, in fome fenfe, to be neceflary ; and mod 
 certainly they are not fortuitous ; but it is the concourfe of the two 
 intentions to produce an event, intended, perhaps, by neither of the 
 men, and certainly not by one, which makes that event fortuitous. 
 
 By thefe diftindions, it might be thought that this fubjed was ex- 
 haufted; but the variety of Nature is not fo foon exhaufied ; and there 
 ftill remains one diftindlion more to be made ; for, let us fuppole that 
 the concourfe of the two caufes, which produce the event, is necefTary, 
 and in the ordinary courfe of things ; 1 fay the event, in that cafe, is 
 not fortuitous. My meaning will be beft explained by an example 
 or two. Suppofe I take a long and a quick journey, for fome pur- 
 pofe or another; the neceflary confequence of fuch a journey is fatigue. 
 Here, therefore, are two caufes ; the one the intention of man, which 
 produces the journey, the other, the operation of Nature upon my 
 body, in confequence of the exercife. In this manner, two cau- 
 fes concurring, the one intentional, and the other natural, pro- 
 duce the fatigue. But, though this production be befides my inten- 
 tion, yet, as it is the neceflary confequence of my intention that it 
 fhould be produced, it is not a fortuitous event. 
 
 This example is mixed of the intention of man, and the deftination 
 of Nature ; but I will give another, which is entirely from Nature, and 
 which isfurniflied me by Ariftotle. The decline and old age of man is 
 an event propofed by Nature ; but, that he fliould become gray when 
 he grows old, is not propofed by Nature: Yet, as it always happens, and 
 is the neceflary confequence of his growing old by the decay of moi- 
 fture at that time of life, it is not a fortuitous event, though it be be- 
 fides the intention of Nature, as the fatigue of the journey was be- 
 fides the intention of the perfon who made it. I am perfuaded many 
 other examples of the fame kind might be collected by a diligent ob- 
 
 ferver
 
 2,qz ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IL 
 
 ierver of Nature : And I believe it is the true account to be given q£ 
 vs'hat Buffon calls excrefcent parts in animals, fuch as tlie breads and 
 nipples of raen, which are of no ufe in theinlelves, but are the necef- 
 fary confequences of other parts that are of ufe, or of the whole frame: 
 and flrudlure of the animal. 
 
 Thus, it appears evident, that chance is no more but a fecon- 
 dary caufe, dependent entirely upon mind and intention ; and not 
 upon one intention, as we have feen, but upon two. It is there- 
 fore clearly, as AriHotle has faid, no more than an acceffory of 
 imnd, Ariftotle calls it a caufe x«t« «7ut^^i,3ii*6j, or hy accident *. And 
 it is true, whatever is produced by chance, is, y.u7oi ,yv^.^i^ny^6i: But^ 
 whatever is ««t« e-y^4/3£,3/,y,o,-, is not therefore chance ; as, in the cafe 
 above mentioned, the fatigue of the journey, and the graynefs of old 
 age, are both »zrx ^ft^e^sssxo?, being fecondary events, not intended by 
 man or Nature; yet they are not fortuitous, being the neceflary confe- 
 quence of vphat was intended. Therefore Milton has faid very pro- 
 perly, as I. mentioned before t» that, when Sampfon pulled down the 
 houfe, he killed the Lords of the Philiftines, and, by accident, him- 
 felf ; for, as his intention was to kill the Lords of the Philiflines, his. 
 killing himfelf was y.«T« Ft<f«/3i/3««e?, or by accident \ but it would have 
 been very improper to have faid, that it was fortuitoufly, or by chance, 
 
 Ariftotle has not only diftinguifhed, as I have done, betwixt the 
 two cafes, when the event happens bejides the intention of man, and. 
 when it happens befides the end propofed by Nature ; but he has gi- 
 ven different names to the two events, which it feems his language 
 afforded, but which,. I think, ours does not. The former he calls 
 
 'TVY,%. 
 
 ♦ Ariflotle, Phyf. lib. 2. cap. ^ 
 t P. 39.
 
 Chap. XX. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 293 
 
 rvx,-Ay and the other «t;T.ft«ro» *. But both, he fays, are fortuitous and 
 fecondary, or an appendix to intention or Nature. 
 
 Thus, I Gondude my invefllgation of this fubjed, which was not 
 underftood before Ariftotle wrote, nor, 1 beheve, by any body fmce 
 his time, vv'ho has not read him. And, from this inveftigaiion, it ap- 
 pears, that * Chance is a rare event, produced by the concourfe of two 
 ' caufes, both from Nature ; or both from the intention of man ; or 
 ' one from each ; but the concourfe of the two caufes not nece/Tary, 
 
 * or in the ordinary courfe of things, and the event produced befulct 
 
 * the deftination of Nature^ or intention of illvw.' 
 
 Thus, I think, I have clearly made out, that chance is not a mere 
 phantom or creature of our imagination, but that it has a real exift- 
 ence in nature, as real as mind, to which it is an appendix. And the 
 confequence of this dodtrine is what Ariftotle has faid, that, even if we 
 (hould allow chance to have produced this univerfe, it neceffarily fup- 
 pofes intelligence and Nature pre-exiftent t« Philofophers, there- 
 fore, of modern times, who exclude mind from the fyftem of Nature,- 
 fpeak mofi: abfurdly, and without knowing what they fay, when they 
 fpeak of chance making a world, and carrying it on ; for, infiead of 
 chance^ if they underftood their own fyftem, they would fay that it 
 was material necejfity that firft produced, and ftill preferves the world ; 
 or, in other words, that there are certain powers in matter, by which 
 it ads Vi^ithout mind or intelligence^ or any end propojed^ and confe- 
 quently neceffarily ; which powers, operating in this way, have not 
 only produced this wonderful frame of the univerfe, but fuftain and 
 preferve it J How they account for blind ncceftity producing i'uch 
 
 , won- 
 
 * Ibid, in fine 
 t Arift. lib. 2. cap 6. 
 
 :j: This is the fyftem of Epicurus and his followers, to whom the abfurdity of ma-- 
 king Chance produce every thing, when, at the fume time, they exciuded mind and 
 
 intel-
 
 ::^94 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 wonderful effeds, let them < confider ; but this necejfity Is truly their 
 fyftem, not chance. And they are fo far in the right, that all the mo- 
 lions of nature, which are not from choice or deliberation, may be 
 faid to be neceiTary. And, accordingly, whatever can be accounted 
 for in Nature from mechanical caufes, is neceiTary, and, I think, well 
 accounted for. But their fyftem, as I already have obferved, is defec- 
 tive in thefe two capital points ; firft, that they do not fhow how- 
 motion fhould ever have begun in the univerfe ; nor, fecondly, how 
 fuch wonderful ends (hould have been accompliftied by fuch wonderful 
 means, without <any ends propofed, or means contrived j that is, in 
 one word, without intelligence. 
 
 Before I conclude this chapter. It is proper-to obferve, that the terms 
 vecejfary and contingent^ (^vajv"*'*' ««' iy^izoi^^'o') ^^ much ufed, not only in 
 the books of both antient and modern philofophy, but in common dif- 
 CQurfe, are to be underftood in a fenfe very different from the necejfity 
 ,and chance of which I have been here treating ; for thefe have, as I 
 have fhown, a real exiftence in nature; whereas the other are only 
 relative to our knowledge and apprehenfion, and therefore belong not 
 
 to 
 
 intelligence from the univerfe, has been falfely imputed by fome modern philofophers ; 
 for, it is evident that ILpicurus's fyflem, as explained by Lucretius, is a fyftem of ma- 
 terialifm, accounting for the produdlion of every thing from the powers of the differ- 
 ent particles of matter, of various fizcs and figures, impelling one another, fometimes 
 joining together, fometimes feparating, and, in that way, exhibiting all the different 
 forms and motions we fee in the univerfe. Neither does he fay, that the motion of 
 the atomSj which was the caufe of all thefe various impulfes, concretions, and fecre- 
 tions, was produced by chance : But he tells us, that the atoms, by their gravity, 
 fall downwards, and, having got a fmall oblique inclination, (parvum clinamen ■prin~ 
 cipioruTn, as Lucretius calls it,^ he does not fay by chance, though he does not tell us 
 how, they meet and juftle, and produce all the effedls above mentioned. And, fo far 
 .is chance from being predominant in Epicurus's fyftem, that it was abfolutely exclu- 
 ded in all natural events ; for, as there was no diftintlion, according to him, or end 
 propofed, in any of the operations of Nature, nothing could happen bejides that endj 
 that is, nothing could happen by chance-
 
 Chap. XX. A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS; 295 
 
 to the nature of things, but the opinions of men. In this (snCe we 
 fay, that a thing is necejfary^ which happens conftantly and regularly, 
 without one inftance to the contrary. Of this kind is the defcent of 
 heavy bodies, the afcent of flame, the rifing or letting of the fun; for 
 thefe things, we know from experience, happen conftantly and uni- 
 formly : And, it is by experience and induction only, not ^ priori^ 
 that we know any thing of the qualities of natural things ; and there- 
 fore thefe events are nccejfary in a fenfe very different from that in 
 which we fay that the theorems of fcience are neceffary truths. Con- 
 tingent^ on the other hand, is that which does not happen conftantly 
 and regularly. Of this kind antient philofophy has diftinguilhed 
 three different fpeciefes ; for either the event happens more frequently 
 one way than another, and then it is faid to be %yri r« x«xv; of this kind 
 are the regular productions of nature, and the ordinary adions of men: 
 Or it happens more rarely, fuch as the birth of monfters, or other ex- 
 traordinary productions of nature, and many accidents that hap- 
 pen to man : Or, lafily^ it is betwixt the two, and happens as often the 
 one way as the other ; or, as they exprefs it in Greek, ixcn^ ijv^i. Of 
 this kind are fome things in nature, fuch as the birth of a male or fe- 
 male child ; a good or bad day in fome climates of the earth ; and many 
 things among men, fuch as good or bad luck at play. All thefe laft 
 mentioned events are in reality as neceffary as thofe firft mentioned, 
 fuch as the falling of heavy bodies, &c. But, as they do not happen 
 conftantly and uniformly, and, as we cannot account for their hap- 
 pening fometiines one way and fometimes another, we fay they are 
 contingent. 
 
 GH AP.
 
 296 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book 11. 
 
 CHAP. XXL 
 
 No Difpute among the Anttent Philofophers concerning Free-will and 
 NeceJ/ity — Reafon of this — The Diftin6lion betivixt Seafe and Intel- 
 led: necejjary to be made for underjlanding this matter — Definition of 
 Will — Will and Free-will the fame — Difference betivixt Will and ma- 
 terial Neceflity in Bodies unorganifed^ and in Vegetables — betivixt 
 Will and Inftind: in Brutes — What conjlitutes a free Agent — Where 
 Reafon is mojl perfe^^ there is the greateft Freedom — Jn ivhat StJife 
 Will is necelFary, as ivell as free — Neccffity of V^'iW efential to its 
 7iatiir^ — Euery thing necejjary in that Senfe — A Caufe for every things 
 and every Caufe muji produce its Effect — Moral necejfity even fir ong^ 
 £r than natural — Do5ior Clarke'' s Opinion in this matter — The Opi^ 
 nion of a late Writer of EJJays on the fame Subje^i, 
 
 HAVING mentioned, in the preceding chapter, material necejfity 
 and ivill, as things oppofite, and having al fo fpoken of uuill^ 
 as neceffary likewife in fome refped, I think it belongs to the theory 
 of mind to explain this matter a little further. 
 
 Till I was better acquainted with the antient philofophy, I have of- 
 ten wondered, why there was nothing faid in the books of Plato and 
 Ariftotle, nor in any of the writings of the philofophers of that age, or 
 of any preceding age, as far as I know, upon a queftion that has been 
 fo much agitated in later times, concerning free ivill and neceffity in 
 
 human
 
 Chap. XXI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 297 
 
 human adions. Bur, when I had acquh'ed more knowledge in that 
 phllofophy, and found that they had diftingulfhed accurately betwixt 
 Jenje and intelleH^ fenfations and ideas ^ injlincl and opinion^ appetite and 
 iJuilU I fco" difcovered the reafon why there was no difpute among 
 them, upon a queftion about which fo many volumes have been writ- 
 ten in modern times, and to fo little purpofc ; for, I maintain, that, if 
 the things I juft now mentioned are well defined, and carefully diftin- 
 guiflied one from another, there can be no difpute upon the fubjed:, 
 not even among the vulgar, far lefs among philofophers. And, how- 
 ever paradoxical, at firft fight, it may feem, I defpair not to make it 
 evident to common apprehenfion, that all luiU is free-ivill ', and that, 
 at the fame time, it is necejfary, but of a necejjtty very different from 
 material or phyfical neceflity. 
 
 I do not, however, pretend to make this dodrine intelligible to thofe 
 who have not learned to diftinguifli two faculties of the mind fo dif- 
 ferent 2i%fmje and intellect^ and who confequently ojQViioviW^fenJations 
 and ideas^ making no difference betwixt them, but what a late philo- 
 ibpher has thought proper to make, viz. that the former \s s. Jlronget^ 
 the latter a iveaker imprejfton upon the mind ; fo that they differ only 
 in degree, not in kind. This philofophy, if it may be called fuch, 
 not only takes away all diftindion betwixt the fenfitive and intellec- 
 tual part of our nature, and has many other bad confequences, of 
 which I have taken notice elfewhere ; but it puts an end to 2\\ fcience 
 of the human mind ; for, where there is no diftindion of kind, but 
 only degrees of quality of things of the fame kind, of which it is im- 
 poffible there can be any certain meafure or ftandard, there no fcience 
 
 can be *. 
 
 P p This 
 
 * The reafon why quantity^ whether continuous or difcrete, though it be but an 
 accident or property of fubftance, is a fubje£l of fcience, is, that each kind of it fur- 
 nifhes a ftandard or meafure for itfelf. Thus extcnfiQUf which is quantity continuous, 
 
 can
 
 298 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book 11. 
 
 This dlftlndion being admitted,! define 'will to be * the determina- 
 * tion of intellect, to ^^, or not to ac? ;' but, as we cannot conceive in- 
 tdkCt to be determined, except by Tome motive, in order to make the 
 definition compleat, we mufl fay of what kind the motive is which de- 
 termines intelled : And I fay it is ^oody real, or apparent ; for, betwixt 
 thefe two, there is no difference in this argument. Now, good is nei- 
 ther a perception of fenfe, nor an image of fuch perception in the 
 phantafia, (for with thefe intellect is not converfant) ; but it is an idea, 
 and often a very complex idea, comprehending what is pleafant, what 
 is beautiful or handfome ; alfo, what is profitable to ourfelves or o- 
 thers, to our friends, to our country, and even to all mankind. 
 
 And here we may perceive, that ivill^ by its nature and effence^ 
 muft be free in this refped, that its determinations are all from with- 
 in ; for, whatever influence external circumftances may have upon 
 our iz'il/i however we may be allured by pieafure, or overcome by 
 pain, ffill it is the intelledt itfelf which determines itfelf, according 
 to its apprehenfions of good or ill in things *. Freedom, therefore, 
 in this fenfe, being eflential to zvili, ivill smd/ree-ijuill are terms ab- 
 
 folutely 
 
 caji, be meziared by any part of itfelf; and, in like manner, nttmbery which is quan- 
 tity difcrete, can be meafured by number or by unit ; whereas qualities^ fuch as hst 
 and cildy black and luhite, hard ziid f oft y ike have no common meafure, and there- 
 fore cannCt be fcientincally compared together; for which reafon, as Ariftotle has ob- 
 fer.ved, in the chapter of his Categories concerning ^ualityy it is only of quantity that 
 T7e fay. That it is equal or unequaly t<rey xut «v»<r«» : whereas, to qualities, we can only 
 apply th^ term ji'ttav kuli i/^xXXii that is, more or lefs- For the fame reafon, he mij[ht 
 have faid, there can be no ratios or proportions of qualities ; for we cannot fay of them, 
 as Ave can fay of quantities, that the cne is a half or a third of the other. 
 
 * When the mind, contrary to its inclination, is determined to do nny thing, that 
 mixture of choice and neceifity is, 1 think, well expreiTed by Homer, when he fays 
 that aperlcn did the thing,
 
 Chap. XXL ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 299 
 
 folutely fynonimous ; and the addition or epithet of free to ijoill is al- 
 together fuperfluous. Accordingly, in the Greek language, Jt is ne* 
 ver added ; and, though we have tranflated the expreffion into Latin, 
 and fay, liberum arbitriimiy I. do not remember that Cicero, or any 
 Latin writer upon philofophy in that age, ufes fuch an exprelTion. 
 
 We {hall underftand better the nature of ivilli and that eflentlal 
 freedom which belongs to it, when we compare it with the operations 
 of matter unorganized, or organized, that is, the vegetable and icnCi- 
 tive natures. 
 
 And firft, as to unorganized matter, it is moved, as we have feen, 
 either by an internal principle, which is what I call Nature^ or by ck* 
 ternal impuUe ; and, in both cafes, it is moved in one uniform direc- 
 tion, without any thing like fenfe, underftanding, choice, or delibera- 
 tion ; and therefore, as it cannot, by any ad: of its own, or by any 
 power from within, alter, in the leaft, its motion or direction, 1 fay it 
 is neceffarily moved. And this necefTity is what I call material or phy- 
 ftcal necejftty. 
 
 Of the fame kind is the movement of the vegetable ; which, though 
 more various, is equally neceffary. 
 
 The movement of the animal is flill more various ; and, as he has 
 fenfe s and diphantafta^ purfues certain ends and purpofes, and often de- 
 liberates which of two things he fhould do, it is a matter of more nice 
 difcrimination to diftinguifli \\\timpuljes^ by which headts, from ivill \ 
 Nor, indeed, is it pofifiblc, without accurately making the diftinflion 
 betwixt y?«/^ and intelie^^ appetite and w///; for the brute, though he 
 has fenfes and appetites, which dlrcd him to certain objeds, has no 
 intelled, and confequently no idea of what i^good or ?7/,and therefore 
 no ivill; and, though he fometimes deliberates, it is only whether he 
 
 I" P 2 fhali
 
 300 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 fhall follow this or that impulfe of appetite, not concerning what is 
 good or ill. 
 
 The brute, therefore, as he has no ivill^ muft ad neceflarily ; for 
 there is no medium betwixt thefe two. But it is a necejjtty of a differ- 
 ent kind from what I call material necejfity ; for his movements are 
 fpontaneous, proceeding from appetite and defire, which Is not to be 
 found in unorganized matter, nor even in the vegetable, which, there- 
 fore, has no fpontaniety. But, as thcfe appetites and defires do not 
 arife from any opinions that he has formed, like our defires, and 
 therefore are not from himfelf, but are given him by Superior Wif- 
 dom for the prefervation of the individual and continuation of the 
 kind, and are fuch that he muft necefTarlly be led by them, his ac- 
 tions, therefore, are alfo neceffary ; but it is a neceffity which ought 
 not to be called material necejfity^ but rather divine necejfity ; the na- 
 ture of which, I fhall, in the fequel, explain. 
 
 But, though the movements of the brute be neceffary, we are not 
 from thence to conclude, as the Cartefians do, that the brute is a mere 
 machine ; for a machine is that which has Its moving principle from 
 without ; whereas the moving principle of the brute is internal, and a 
 part of himfelf, though, in its movements, it be direded by an Intelli- 
 gence not belonging to him. 
 
 From this account of ijoilU and the adions which refult from It, com- 
 pared with the operations of the brute, the vegetable and unorganized 
 matter, it Is evident that there can be no w/// but where there are 
 ideas, and a comparifon of thofe ideas ; from which comparlfon there 
 arlfes the propofition, that fuch a thing is good, or fuch a thing is ill; 
 therefore it ought to be done or not done ; And, whatever animal 
 cannot reafon and form propofitions of that kind, has not 'ujill But 
 the moving principle muft be either thofe appetites or defires of the 
 
 brute
 
 Chap. XXI. A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I C S. 301 
 
 brute above mentioned, which are commonly known by the name of 
 inftincl\ or, it muft be a more fimple principle ftill, without fenfe, ap- 
 petites, or defires, and without pain or pleafure. Such is the moving 
 principle in the vegetable, and in all unorganized bodies. 
 
 And here w^ may fee what it is that conftltutes 2ifree agent. It is 
 being governed by reafon, and determined in all our adions and pur- 
 fuits by notions of what is good or ill. When, therefore, at any time, 
 we are led to do a thing from mere appetite or paffion, without confi- 
 dering whether it ht good 01 ill^ we cannot then be faid, with propri- 
 ety, to ivill what we do ; but we adl like the brute, by an impulfe 
 altogether irrational, and worfe than the brute in this refpecSt, that his 
 impulfes are diredted by Superior Wifdom, ours too often by vicious 
 habits that we have contracted. 
 
 The more perfe£l our reafon is, the more perfect our liberty or 
 freedom ; and, where reafon is abfolutely perfect, there liberty is 
 mofl: perfed. The Deity, is, therefore, of all agents, the moft free ; 
 whereas man, though he be no doubt a free agent, as often as he adls 
 with choice and deliberation, and according to what he thinks reafon- 
 able ; yet, if his reafon be difturbed by paffion, if it be weak and in- 
 firm, or ra(h and prefumptuous, his freedom is far from being perfed, 
 and he is not improperly faid to be a flavetothofe follies and paffions 
 which, under the appearance of reafon, miilead him : But ftill, as 
 his motives are from within, and his adions the refult of that deter- 
 mination of the undcrflanding, called iJoilU they are 'voluntary adions* 
 which cannot be faid properly of any adion of the brute. 
 
 But, though the will of man be eflentially free, his adions are not 
 always fo ; for, though we be free to ivilU we are often not free to 
 ad according to our ivill\ and it is only the Deity, with whom, to 
 
 ^will and to ^^, is the fame thing. 
 
 Thus,
 
 S02 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IL 
 
 Thus, it appears that liberty is fo much of the eflence of ivill, that 
 thofe adions only which proceed from ivill are 'voluntary and free 
 a<3:ions. And therefore, thofe who fpeak of ivill being moved or de- 
 termined in the fame manner as body is moved by external force, do 
 not underftand what they fay ; for, as ivill muft be determined 
 from within, and of itfelf, it is the fame thing as if they faid, that ivill 
 is not ivilL 
 
 But, is not the ivill neceffarily determined by what appears to in- 
 telledl to be the beft reafon ? It no doubt is fo ; nor is it poflible to 
 conceive any creature iviUing what he does not think beft. But this 
 is improperly called necejfity ; for necejfity is always from without, 
 and cannot be without two things ; an agent', who applies force or 
 violence, and a patient who fuffers it. Nothing, therefore, can force 
 itfelf: So that, when we fay, that the intellect is necelTarily determi- 
 ned by the ftrongeft reafon, we can mean nothing, but that neceffity, 
 which is in the nature of every thing, and is the fame by which a 
 triangle, or any other geometrical figure, has all the properties belong- 
 ing to its nature. 
 
 The neceflity, therefore, which is afcribed to ivill., is no other than 
 that neceffity, by which every thing is what it is. And in this fenfe, 
 not only every thing in nature is neceffary, but the great Author of 
 Nature himfelf is neceifary, both in his exiftence and in his attributes, 
 and particularly with regard to his ivill ; for it is admitted by all 
 philofophers and divines, that the Deity muft, of neceffity, always 
 ivill and do what is beft : And this neceffity is eflential to his nature, 
 refulting from his perfed. wifdom and goodnefs. The neceffity of 
 the ivill of man is fo far of the fame kind, that it is internal, 
 and arifing entirely from the agent himfelf: But he differs in 
 this important refped, that (ht Divine Will \s neceffarily determi- 
 ned by the moft perfed vv'ifdom and goodnefs, without inquiry 
 
 or
 
 Chap. XXI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 303 
 
 cr deliberation) and without any poffibillty of error ; whereas the hu- 
 man intellect inquires and deliberates, looks before and behind, tries 
 to forefee confequences, and to difcover effedls in their caufcs : And, 
 as his intelledlual faculties are but weak, and very often difturbed by 
 pailion, in fuch fearches and inquiries he is very liable to error. 
 
 But this internal neceffity, in the cafe of both God and man, is ve- 
 ry different from that external impulfe which makes body neceflarily 
 move in a certain direction, or even from that internal principle of 
 movement which moves body, but without knowledge, intelligence, 
 or confcioufnefs, of what it does. 
 
 This dodrine of the neceffity of the tvill^ I know, is a do6lrlne of 
 hard digeftion with many divines and philofophers ; but I would afic 
 thofe philofophers and divines this fmiple queftion. Whether the 
 greater good, real or apparent, be not the cauie of the determi- 
 nation of the will ? Their anfwer, no doubt, will be. That it is a 
 caufe, but not a neceflary caufe. I aik:, again. What they mean by 
 a caufe not necelfary ? To which, 1 think, their anfwer muff be, 
 that a caufe not necelfary is that which produces the effe^ fometimes, 
 
 but not always. But every thing muft be produced by fome caufe ; 
 
 and, if the motive of the greater good is at any time not the caufe of 
 the determination of the will, I afk. What is the caufe ? To this que- 
 ftion, I believe, it is beyond the power of man to give an anfwer : So 
 that the argument comes to this, that the motive of the greater good 
 is the caufe of the determination of the ijuill^ but not always ; and, 
 when it is not the caufe, no other caule can be affigned. Now, if I 
 aflign a caufe which is admitted to be fuch, and if no other caufe can 
 be affigned, it muft be held to be the only caufe. If it be faid that 
 chance may be the caufe of the determination of the ivill^ I have 
 fliown, in the proceeding chapter, that what is the effed: of c/j..?jce is 
 produced by as neceflary caufcs as any thing elfe in Nature; and, that 
 
 it
 
 304 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book IT. 
 
 it is not the uncertainty of the caufe, but that it is the concourfe of 
 two caufes, both operating neceflarily, which makes chance. If, by 
 chance^ is meant what I beHeve is the vulgar fenfe of the word, an e- 
 vent which may or may not be produced by any caufe, my anfwer is, 
 that there is no fuch thing in Nature as chance in this fenie of the 
 word, every thing being neceffarily produced by fome determinate 
 caufe, and nothing being a caufe which does not produce its effect. 
 Even the Materiahfts of old, fuch as Epicurus, did not fay that any 
 thing was produced by chance of this kind, (though I know it is com- 
 monly underftood otherwife,) but by material neceffity ; and, indeed, 
 to maintain that any thing is produced by fuch chance, is to give up 
 the whole fyflem of nature, and puts an end, at once, to all philofophy 
 upon the fubje(Sl. 
 
 And this neceiTity of if///, I apprehend to befo much ftrongerthan 
 material neceffity, that the latter may, by the ad of the f eity, be fuf- 
 pended, at leaf!:, for a time. A flone, for example, may be fufpended ia 
 the air, without that ftone being annihilated, or even the motion of 
 the celeftial bodies we might conceive ftopt for a while, and yet thofe 
 bodies flill continue to exill *. But we could not conceive this men- 
 tal 
 
 * Sucli things are commonly called m'lradeiy and are much ridiculed by our free- 
 thinkers, who fay that they are, by NaturCy impolTible, and cannot be believed to 
 happen, except by ignorance and fuperftition. But, if Nature be what I have 
 defined it, viz. mind without intelligence acting in body, or upon body, there is no 
 abfurdity in fuppofing that this mind (hould not only a£l in its ordinary and regular 
 courfe, but fometimes in an extraordinary manner, under the controul and direction 
 of intelligence, lupreme or fubordinate. We every day experience, that, by our 
 fmall fhare of intelligence and animal force, we arc able to controul the powers 
 of Nature in fome degree ; and it is juft as eafy to conceive how the fame thing may 
 be done, in a much greater degree, by a greater power or intelligence. If man can 
 fufpcnd in the air a weight of i oo tons, Why may not an angel fufpend one of 
 100,000 ? If we can flop or divert the courfe of great rivers here upon earth. Why 
 
 may
 
 Chap. XXI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 305 
 
 tal neceffity to ceafe, and yet the intelledual mind continue to exift ; 
 for it is impofTible, as I faid, to conceive intellcsfl determining itfelf to 
 ad, while it continues to be intelled, otherwife than by the motive of 
 the greateft good. 
 
 At the fame ti'ne, I would not be underftood to deny, that the hu- 
 man intelledl may be, and very often is, influenced in its determina- 
 tions, by fuperior minds; but it is in a way which prelerves both the 
 freedom and neceffity of the ijuill^ according to the explanation tliat I 
 have given of them; for thofe fuperior minds influence the human only 
 by luggeiting motives of adion to them, which otherwife would not 
 occur: And in this way the freedom of our wz// is preferved. And 
 I am perfuaded it often happens, that our wills are determined by mo- 
 tives that come from whence we do not know. And it is in this 
 way chiefly, according to my apprehenfion, that Providence direds 
 and governs the affairs of men *. But the queftion is not, from 
 
 Q^q whence 
 
 may not mind, very much fuperior to man, flop even the courfe of a planet ? On 
 this occafion, I will quote the words of Dr Clarke : * There is no fuch thing as what 
 
 * men commonly call the courfe of nature^ or the power of nature. The courfe of na- 
 
 * ture, truly and properly fpeakmg, is nothing elfe but the 'will of God producing 
 
 * certain efFefts in a continued, regular, conftant, and uniform manner : "Which 
 
 * courfe, or manner of acl:ing, being, in every movement, perfectly arbitrary, is as 
 
 * eafy to be altered^ at any time, as to be preferved. And if (as feems moll probable) 
 
 * this continual acting upon matter be performed by the fubferviency of created in- 
 
 * telligences appointed to that purpofe by the Supreme Creator ; then it is as eafy for 
 
 * any of them, and as n;uch within their natural power (by the permifTion of God) to 
 
 * a/i'^^r the couife of Nature at any time, or in any refpc£t, as it is to prefcrve or 
 
 * continut it* Evidences of Natural and Rcvcaletl Religion, page 300. 4th edition. 
 Here the reader will obfcrvc, that the Do£lor thinks it probable that the bufinefs of 
 
 Nature is carried on by fuboidinate minds continually adling upon matter, which is 
 jufl: my fyftem. 
 
 * It is therefore, I think, a very probable f^lion of the poets, when they tell us, 
 that fUch or fuch a counfel was fuggefted to their hero, by fomc God or fuperior 
 
 power.
 
 3o6 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 
 
 whence the motives come that influence our will, but whether they do 
 it neceirarily or not ? Now, I fay, that motives, from whencefoever 
 they come, or however fuggefled, do neceflarily determine the will ; 
 nor is it poffible to conceive it otherwife determined. 
 
 In this doc5lrine oi free ivili and nccejfity^ I am glad to find, that I 
 agree, in the main, with that great metaphyfician, whom I have fo of- 
 ten quoted, Dr Samuel Clarke, in his remarks on a book entitled, ' A 
 * Ph'ilojoph'ical Enquiry into Human Liberty,^ He maintains, as I do, 
 that iv'ill is, by its nature and effence, free^ and that it is a contradic- 
 tion in terms to fuppofe an adion proceeding from iJoilU that is a «i;(9- 
 hintary adion, not to htfree. As to necefftty, he makes a diftindion 
 betwixt the judgment of the mind, the refolution to ad, and con- 
 fequent adion. In judgment, he fays, the mind is paffive, and is as 
 neceflarily determined by what appears the better reafon, and the 
 weightier motive, as the fcale of the balance is weighed down by the 
 greater weight. But, with regard to refolution and adion, the mind is 
 adive, not paifive ; and, for that reafon, there can be no neceflity in the 
 cafe. But this appears to me to be a diftindion without a difference ; 
 for the mind is adive in all its operations, as much when it affents to 
 any propofition, as when it refolves and ads in confequence of that 
 allent ; for adion and energy are of the effence of mind. The Su- 
 preme Mind we can have no conception of, without conftant and un- 
 
 ceafing 
 
 power. Thus, Homer j in the beginning of the Iliad, tells us, that Juno infpired A- 
 
 chillcs with the thought of calling an aflcnably of the Greeks, to deliberate how the 
 plague tvas to be (lopped : 
 
 In the fame manner, iEneas, in the i2th ALnck], is infpired by his mother with 
 the thought of attacking the city of Laurcntum : 
 
 Hie mentem iEneae genetrix puicherrima mifit, 
 Iret ut ad muios, urbique adveiteret agnien.
 
 Chap. XXL ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 307 
 
 ceafing energy ; and even the human mind partakes fo far of Divi- 
 nity, as to be conftantly active. Further, I fay that the adion of every 
 mind is, by its nature and efl'ence, determined in a certain way, fo 
 that it cannot adl otherwife ; which is faymg no more than, that every 
 thing muR ad: according to its nature. And, indeed, it is impoflible 
 to conceive how any thing fhould- adl in another manner. 1 hat the 
 mind of the Deity is always neceffarily determined both to ivill 
 and to do what is beft, is, as I have obferved, admitted by all philofo- 
 phers and divines ; the reaion of which is no other than, that his na- 
 ture is unchangeable and invariably fuch ; and he muft necc-flarily acfl 
 according to his nature. And, for the fame reafon, man mufl ad ac- 
 cording to what feems to him beft ; for that is his nature. Thele po- 
 rtions, if they had been fairly ftated to the Dodor, 1 am perfuaded he 
 would have agreed to. Nor would he, I believe, have denied that our 
 tefolutions and adions, though voluntary, are the neceflary confe- 
 quence of the judgment of the mind : So that I am perfuaded what 
 difference there is betwixt the Dodor and me, is more in words than 
 in reality. 
 
 But, whether I agree wnth the Dodorornot, I totally difagree with the 
 late author above mentioned, who, as I have obferved, puts an end to 
 all fcience of mind, by difiingulfhing fenfations and ideas no other- 
 wife than by the greater or lefs livelmefs of the impreffion they make 
 upon the mind. And accordingly, in treating this fubjed of liberty 
 and ncLeffity^ he makes no differeiice betwixt ideas and fenfations^ be- 
 twixt Jenfe and intelkSi, appetite and it'/V/, betwixt material neceflity, 
 by whicli any body is moved contrary to its natural tendency by ^a- 
 ternal force, and that internal neceffity by which the mind is determi- 
 ned. And, as he proceeds in this manner, it is no wonder that his 
 conclufion is, that there is no fuch thing as liberty of nxnll or aHion^ 
 and that we are nothing but a kind of automates^ or machines, merely 
 pafTive, and aded upon by external impulfe, 
 — — -Ut nervis mobile lignum. 
 
 Q^q 2 One
 
 3o8 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book I L 
 
 One llirnid have thought, that the author might have been fatisfied 
 with the glory of maintaining a paradox fo contrary to the common 
 fe-.le and feelings of mankind; but he defired to be as impious and 
 blalphemous as he is paradoxical ; and, therefore, the conclufion of 
 his argument is, That, as there is a continued chain of neceflary 
 caufes pre-ordained and pre-determined, influencing the volitions of 
 men^ in the fame manner as the operations of matter \ and, as this 
 chain of caufes reaches from the Original Caufe of all, that caufe 
 muft be mediately the Author of all moral evil, as well as natural; 
 confequently cannot be that Good and Beneficent Being, which we 
 fuppofe him to be, but a Being of a very different kind, wicked 
 and malignant, being ultimately the author of guilt and moral turpi- 
 tude in all his creatures, and, by confequence, the caufe of all their mi- 
 
 fery *. 
 
 What 
 
 • This author is lefs fceprical in a conclufion of fuch daring impiety, than he ufu- 
 ally is in his conclufions. That 1 may not appear to have mifreprefented his mean- 
 ing, I will give his words, taken from the London edition of his works, publiflied in 
 four volumes, under the title of ' Eflays and Treatifes on Several bubjecls, by David 
 
 * Hume, Efquire.' In the third volume is contained his treatife upon liberty and nc- 
 cejfity; where, after having laid it down, that the liberty of human a£lions, and their 
 merit and demerit, is founded upon nothing elfe but their proceeding from the inter- 
 nal difpofitions of the mind, and having alfo laid it down, that the difpofitions and vo- 
 litions of the human mind are determined in the fame manner as the operations of 
 matter, by a C07it'inued chain of necejfary caufes^ reaching from the Original Caufe of ally 
 to every fingle volition of every fingle creature^ (p. 141.) he flates this alternative, 
 ' Either that, if human a£lions can be traced up, by a necefTary chain, to the Deity, 
 
 * they can never be criminal, on account of the infinite perfe^lion of that Being, 
 
 * from whom they are derived, and who can intend nothing but what is altogether 
 
 * good and laudable : Or, if they be criminal, we mud retract the attribute of perfec- 
 
 * tion which we afcribe to the Deity, and muft acknowledge him to be the ultimate 
 
 * author of guilt and moral turpitude, in all his creatures ;' p. 142. Then, having 
 rejetled the firft alternative, and having fhown that human actions are criminal, the 
 fecond alternative, according to his method of reafoning, is unavoidable. And, accord- 
 ingly, he conclujcs his argument in thefc words : * The fecond obje£lion, (viz. 
 
 * that the Deity is ultimately the author oi guilt and moral turpitude in all his crea- 
 
 * tureSj)
 
 Chap. XXL A N T 1 E N T M E T A P H Y S I C S. -09 
 
 What is here faid concerning this famous quefliou of Hherty and 
 neceffity, I thought necelTary for the underllanding more fully the 
 
 . nature 
 
 * tnres,) admits not of fo eafy and fatIsfa£lory an anfwer. Nor is It pofTible to explain 
 
 * diflindlly, how the Deity can be the mediate caufe of all the adions of men, without 
 
 * being the author of fin and moral turpitude.' Then, dcfiring to cover this (hocking 
 impiety with the veil of myflery, he adds, * Thefe are mylteries which mere natural 
 
 * and unalTiiled reafon is very unfit to handle ; and, whatever fyftem it embraces, it 
 
 * niufl find itfelf involved in inextricable difficulties, and even contradi6lions, at 
 
 * every flep which it takes with regard to fuch fubjedls. To reconcile the indifference 
 
 * and contingency of human adlions with prefcience, or to defend abfolute decrees, 
 
 * and yet free the Deity from being the author of fin, has been found hitherto to ex- 
 
 * ceed all the fkill of philofophy.' 
 
 It was to have been wiffied that this author had kept to the philofophy that he had 
 the honour firfl to import into this country from the Continent, which teaches, 
 
 Naturam rerum baud divina mente coortam, Lucretius. 
 
 and that there is nothing in the univerfe befides matter and motion. Who maintains 
 this do^irine, however impious he may be thought, cannot be faid to blafphcme a 
 Being whofe exiftence he denies; But he who fuppofes that there is a God, and, at the 
 fame time, maintains, that he is wicked, malignant, and the author of themifery of his 
 creatures, is both impious and blafphemous in the higheft degree. 
 
 The doclrine of the Manichaeans, that there were two governing principles in the 
 univerfe, one gcod^ the other evil ^ which, of late, has been attempted to be revived 
 by Mr Baylc, was thought the trod dangerous herefy that ever was in the Chrillian 
 ehurc^. But, before Mr David Hume, i believe there never was heretic or philolopher, 
 rntient or modern, nor, I believe, any mortal man, v/ho maintained that there was but 
 one governing principle in the univerfe, and that this principle was evil and malig- 
 nant in the higheft degree ; — in (liort, that the God of this univerfe was a devil. Sup- 
 pofe, what I think can hardly be conceived, that a man was firmly perfuadcd of a fy- 
 ffem fo abfurd, as well as impious, there is nothing but the moll extravagant vanity, 
 regardlcfs altogether of the good of fociety, or quiet of mens minds, that could induce 
 bim to publiffi it- 
 
 As to the perplexities and abfurdities on both fides, which this author pretends to 
 find in the quefiion concerning liberty and neceffity, I ccnfider them only as fomc 
 kind of apology for the fide he has chofen to take in this queflion ; but, if they were 
 real, it is not to be wondered at, that an author, who has not learned to dillinguiffi 
 betwixt fenfe and intellect, appttite and AviJl, and v ho, confcqurntly, is ignorant of 
 
 the
 
 310 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS, Book II. 
 
 nature of mind, and for explaining that prime operation of intelled In 
 'pradical life, 1 mean the iviil. It will be the bufinefs of another part 
 of my work, to account for moral as well as natural evil in the uni- 
 verfe, without charging either upon the Deity, where I hope very 
 clearly to demonftrate, that there could have been no material world, 
 no general laws by which it was to be governed, and, by confequence, 
 no fyftem in the univerfe, without both, in a certain degree. And, at 
 the fame time, I trufi: I fliall be able to fhow, that the proper ufe or 
 abufe which man makes of his liberty and free-will, is the ground of 
 merit or demerit, rewards or punilhments. 
 
 And here I conclude what I have to fay on the fubjed: of Mifid, the 
 great efficient caufe of the univerfe, the Author of all produdion, and 
 of all beauty, order, and regularity ; not only the Firft Mover, but that 
 by which all motion, through every part of Nature, is perpetually and 
 conftantly carried on ; — that, in fhort, by which the whole frame of 
 things is fuftained and preferved. 
 
 the firfl principles of the philofophy of mind, fhould be puzzled and perplexed in a 
 queflion, which, no doubt, requires very juft thinking, and exad difcrimination of 
 things that feenainglv very much refemble one another. 
 
 BOOK
 
 Chap. I. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 311 
 
 BOOK III, 
 
 Of the Categories, or Universal Forms. 
 
 CHAP. L 
 
 Philofophy among the Ant'ients the Knoivledge of all Things in the Uni^ 
 njerfe — All things to be knoivn by their Cati/es only — The Knozuledge 
 of allFirJl Caufes belongs to Metaphyftcs — Three Kinds of Caufes alrea^ 
 dy treated of — Formal Caifes noiv to be confidered — The Nature and 
 Number of them firft difcovered in the Pythagorean School — publfhed 
 firfi by Archytas^ in his Work concerning the Univerfe — then by Ari~ 
 ftotle-i under the Name 0/ Categories — Great Utility of this Difcovery — 
 Reference to Mr Harris'' s Work for the Explanation of each particular 
 Category. 
 
 TH E Antients, as 1 have obferved elfewhere, appear to have had 
 more general and extenlive notions upon every fubje6t than we 
 have, but particularly concerning that fcience we call philojophy. A- 
 mong us, a man who knows a great many fadts of natural hiflory, 
 who is a geometer, and, efpecially, if he be likewife an adronomer, 
 and apply geometry and calculation to the motions of the celeftial 
 bodies, is accounted a philofojiher j but, among them, philofophy was 
 
 an
 
 311 ANTIF. NT METAPHYSICS. Book III. 
 
 an univerfal fcience, for it was the fcience of the univerfe^ and of all 
 things therein contained, divine and human. 
 
 It may be alked, How t;ic human capacity can acquire or contain 
 the knowledge of all thin^a ? Of individuals, the knowledge muft be 
 admitted to be infinite and incomprehenfible by us : .And even the 
 Jpeciefcs of things are fo many, as not to be numbered, and far lefs the 
 knowledge of them to be acquired by mortal man — How then is the 
 philolopher to know all things ? 
 
 The anfv^'er is, that there are only two ways of acquiring this uni- 
 verfal knowledge — The firft is, by knowing the elements and confti- 
 tuting principles of this univerie — The fecond is, by knowing, in ge- 
 neral, the nature of all things exifting in it ; that is, by reducing them 
 to general clafles, and underftanding the nature of each ot tbefe claf- 
 fes ; of which, every genus, fpecies, and individual, comprehended un- 
 der that clafs, muft neceflarily participate. Of the firft of thele kinds 
 of univerfal knowledge, 1 have already treated, and have endeavoured 
 to explain the nature of motion^ energy^ action, paj/ion, viaKer^Jorm^ 
 mind^ and the other things above mentioned ; which are, undoubtedly, 
 the elements or principles, of which, or by which, this univerfe may 
 be faid to have been made or conltituted : And, under this head, are 
 to be found the materia^ efficient^ Siudjinal caufes of all things. And I 
 am now to proceed, according to the method I propofed, to treat of 
 the fecond kind of univerfal knowledge, by which we learn to know 
 the formal caufes of all things : For, as metaphyfics is the fcience of 
 principles ov frjl caufes^ it is neccflary that it fliould treat of all thefe 
 four caufes. 
 
 By the knowledge of the three firft: caufes, We know what may be 
 called iojmogony^ or the generation and production of all things 5 and, 
 
 by
 
 Chap. I. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 313 
 
 by the knowledge of the laft, we know the nature of all things as they 
 actually exift. 
 
 As this univerfal knowledge, which, as I have faid, diftinguifhes 
 philofophy from all particular fciences, is not to be calily underliood 
 by thofe who are entirely ignorant of the autient philofophy, I will, 
 for their fake, give an explanation of it from an author who has writ- 
 ten the beft introdudion to philofophy fhat ever was written, I mean 
 Ammonius Hermeiras, the fcholar of Proclus, and the mafler of both 
 Philoponus and Simpiicius, the two mod voluminous commentators 
 upon Ariftotle. In his commentary upon Porphyry's Introdudion, 
 p. 14. he thus explains how this univerfal knowledge is to be acquired: 
 ' It is impoffible,' fays he, ' to know each individual of any fpc- 
 ' cies, becaufe thefe are of number infinite and incomprehenfible, at 
 
 * leaft to us ; and, in this refped, it is impoiTible to know all 
 
 * things : But we may know the nature of the fpecies. Lvery par- 
 
 * ticular man, for example, we canpot know ; but, if we know the de- 
 ' finition of man, we know the nature of man, of which every indi- 
 ' vidual of the fpecies participates ; and, in this fenfe, we may be faid 
 
 * to know all men* The fame is true of horfes, dogs, and every other 
 
 * animal we know. Further, the fpeciefes of animals, though not infi- 
 
 * nite in number, are fo many, that it is impoffible we can know them 
 
 * all, except by reducing them to one common nature ; and, in this 
 ' way, acquiring the idea of animal^ we may be faid to know all the 
 ' fpeciefes of animals, and, by confeq'uence, all the individuals under 
 
 ' thofe fpeciefes ; in fliort, all animals.-^ The fame is the procefs 
 
 ' of the human mind, with refped to vegetables, till we acquire the 
 
 * idea of 'vegetable, by which we know all vegetables of every kind. 
 
 * Further, if we would acquire knowledge ftill more comprehenfivc, 
 
 * we try to form an idea more general, comprehending both animal 
 ' and vegetable, by endeavouring to dlfcover what they have in com- 
 ' men. In this way, w6 form the idea of the t« tu-h?c'», or of life 
 
 R r * and
 
 314 ANTIENTMETAPHYSICS. Book III. 
 
 * and animation ; and thus we know all that is animated, whether a- 
 
 * nimal or vegetahle. — By a like procefs of the mind, from particulars 
 
 * to generals, and from what is general to what is more general, we 
 
 * acquire the idea of what is inanimate^ comprehending earth, Hone, 
 
 * minerals, &:c. all which we may be faid in this v^ay to know. — 
 ' Further, to make our knowledge (till more comprehenfive, we difco- 
 
 * ver, that what is animate and inanimate, has fomething in common, 
 ' which we call body; and thus we acquire the knowledge of all 
 
 * things corporeal. — In the like manner, from particular minds, or a- 
 *^ nitr.ating principles, we acquire the idea of mind in general ; and, by 
 
 * obferving what mind has in common with body, we enlarge our 
 ' knowledge ft ill further, and acquire the idea oi fuhjiance^ the fir ft of 
 
 * the general clafles above mentioned. — In the lame manner, proceed- 
 
 * ing ftill from particulars to generals, and from what is general to 
 
 * what is more general, we form the ideas of the reft of thefe clafles, 
 ' fuch as qiiantity<i quality-, ^'C. ; and, by doing fo, we may be faid to 
 
 * kr^ow, in general, at leaft,- all the particulars contained under thefe 
 
 * feveral clafles *.* 
 
 Thus far Ammonlus, who has faid enough to explain this general 
 kind of knowledge, but not to be underftood except by thofe who 
 know the elements, at leaft, of logic ; a fcience in which, I am afraid, 
 many of our modern philofophers are very deficient ; and yet, with- 
 out underftanding fo much of it as to know what genus^fpecies, differ^ 
 ence^ proper^ and accidental^ are t> it is impoffible to have any com- 
 prehenfion of this univerfal philofophy ; nor, even in particular fci- 
 
 ences, 
 
 * See all this explained at more length by Ammonlus, ubifupra. 
 
 f Thefe are Porphyry's^Ti;^ ouon/j,- as they are called, upon which he has written 
 a treatife that he intended for an introduction to Ariftotle's logical works. And it is 
 from Ammonius's commentary upon that introdu6lion that I have taken what I hate 
 quoted from Ammonius.
 
 Chap. I. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 315 
 
 ences, to carry on any inveftigation properly : For, without this know- 
 ledge, we cannot dirtinguiili beiwixt that method of inveftigating by 
 which we begin with the higheft genus, to which the thing we want 
 to know the nature of belongs, and continue dividing it into feveral 
 fubordinate fpeciefes, till, at laft, we find the thing we are feeking for. 
 This is called the method of divifion^ of which Plato has given us fome 
 fine examples in his SophiJIa a.nd Polilicus : And Mr Harris has given 
 us a very beautiful one in his Dialogue upon Art. The other me- 
 thod, called the Method of Andy ft s^ is the reverfe of this ; for, inftead 
 oi dejcending from what is more general to what is lefs, wq afcend 
 from what is lefs general to what is more ; a method of inveftlgation 
 which undoubtedly has been the method of difcovery in all fciences, 
 becaufe it begins where human knowledge begins, that is, with parti- 
 culars and individuals ; and, therefore, is the only method that can 
 be pradifed when the thing is entirely unknown. But, to be able to 
 diftinguifli thofe two methods, and to pradife either of them that is 
 moft proper, it is abfolutely neceflary to have fome knowledge at lead 
 of that art^ which Cicero fays is the greateft of all arts, ' Quae docet 
 * rem univerfam tribuere in partes, latentem explitare deiiniendo,'&c.* 
 
 Thofe philofophers, I know, who deny the exiftence of generals, and 
 fay that we have nothing but fenlations, ftronger or weaker, will laugh 
 at thefe divifions into genus, fpecies, &c. ; but fuch philofophers arc 
 mere materialifts, and-muft, in confequence of thefe principles, deny 
 the exiftence of mind altogether, and, particularly, as I have fliown, 
 the exiftence of the Supreme Mind, which it is impoffible to conceive 
 without ideas. And, if he be the Author of the univerfe, there muft 
 of neceffity be an intelledual world, as well as a material. Secondly^ If 
 there be only fenfations, and no ideas, it is impoffible there can be any 
 fcience, which cannot be without generals, and an order too and fubor- 
 dination of generals, one rifing above another, till we come to univer- 
 
 R r 2 falj 
 
 * Brutusy five de claris Oratoribus, cap. 41.
 
 3i6 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III. 
 
 fals, or categories, as they are called by Ariftotle, above which there 
 are none other ; for, as fliall be afterwards fhown, the whole doctrine 
 of the ryllogiftn depends upon the fubordination of generals, and the 
 one comprehending the other. And, lajily^ if there be no difference 
 betwixt fenfations and ideas, it is impollible to affign any chara^leriftical 
 and fpccific mark of difference betwixt man and hriite^ fuch as diftinguiihes 
 them in kind, and not in degree only; in which refpedt, the animals of 
 the fame fpecies are clearly diflinguifl^able one from another. Whereas, 
 if the difference betwixt ideas and fenfations be admitted, the diftinc- 
 tion is eafily made o^ kind, betwixt the two. Now, in order to per- 
 ceive this difference, I only defire that a man fliould look about him, 
 and confider the face of Nature, fuch as it prefents itfelf to him. In 
 the firfl place, there are a great many different objeds, which he per- 
 ceives by his fenfes ; and this the brute dues as well as he. But, Does 
 not man do fomething more ? Does not he arrange and diftribute thefe 
 cbjeds into different claffes ? Does not he confidtr fuch an animal, 
 fuch a vegetable, as belonging to a certain clals of beings ? And does 
 not he make thofe claffes an object of his contemplation, and a fubjedt 
 
 of his thoughts and reafonings ? Now, I aflc. Whether the brute 
 
 does fo ? and I think the anfwer muff be, That he does not. If fo, 
 there mufl: then be a fuperior faculty in man, by which he makes thofe 
 arrangeuicnts and dillributions, and forms thofe notions or claffes. 
 Now this faculty I call intelk^iy and thofe notions or claffes, which are 
 the ol)je(fts of it, ideas. And in this way, I fay, man is effeniially and 
 f^ ecilically diflinguiiiicd from the brute, not in degree only. 
 
 In this manner, I think, the diftindion betwixt y2';z/3' and intelkSJy 
 Jenjatior.s and ideas^ and, confequently, ;;/^w and brute^ mult be obvious 
 to eveiv 'iian u. common ienfe, though he has learned no logic, nor 
 any iciencc oi a!«y kind. And, though I have faid a great deal alrea- 
 dy upon this uifftiencc, yet 1 hope the reader will forgive me for 
 
 ftatmn:
 
 Chap. I. A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. 3^7 
 
 ftating it again ipxthis obvious and familiar manner, as it is the foun- 
 dation of all philofophy, and particularly of this metaphyfical philo- 
 fophy, which is the fcience, not o^ generals only, but of wiiverfals.- — 
 But 1 now return to the proper fubjedl of this chapter, which is con- 
 cerning the nature of this univerfal knowledge that v/e acquire by the 
 fludy of the categories. 
 
 A general fcience of this kind, it is manifeft, will not fit a man for 
 the pra6tice of any particular art, or of the great art or life, without 
 the knowledge of more particular arts and fciences, and without that 
 obfervation and experience which is abfolutely neceffary for acquiring 
 the knowledge of individuals ; for it is of thefe, as 1 have obferved, 
 that practice confifts. But it is the knowledge of a philofopher ; who 
 knows nothing worthy of that name, if he does not know the caufes, 
 and ihtjirjl caufes, too, of all things. And it is not only the know- 
 ledge of the higheli kind, but a knowledge that may be very ufeful, 
 when brought down to the practice of life, and joined with expe- 
 rience. 
 
 Further, the fecond part of this univerfal knowledge, of which I 
 am now to treat, viz. the dodrine of the highelf ^^«^r^, or Cni} formal 
 caufes of all things, is abfolutely neceHary for perfect fcience or de- 
 monftration of every kind; fo that, without it, no man can be faid to 
 be perfedly learned in any one particular art or fcience. The reafon 
 of which is, that there can be no fcience without definition, nor any 
 perfe(5t definition, without the knowledge of thefe higheft genera. 
 
 For underftanding of this, we muft be fo far logicians, as to know 
 the diftindtion of genus andjpeciesy and that every definition confilU of 
 the fpecific diff^ereuce and the genus ; that is, the general ide;;, ct m- 
 prehending the thing defined. Thus, in the definition of riicur the 
 fpecific difference is rational^ and capable of hit elk tl andjcience \ and 
 
 the
 
 ^i8 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book HI. 
 
 the ^enus is an'wial. So that 7nan is an <3wi;;/^/ rational, and capable of 
 intelleci and/nVwr^. But, by that definition, it is impoffible I can know 
 what man is, unlefs 1 know what animal is ; and that, again, I can know- 
 no otherwile than by definition ; 1 inuft therefore iikewife define ani' 
 mat : Nor can 1 do that, without difcovering the genus of anhnaU as, 
 before, 1 dilcovered the genus of man. 1 hat genus I accordingly find 
 out to be the to \^'4vx.'iv, or animated Jiibjiance. But, how far am I to 
 eo on in this way ? if I am to go on to infinity, and there be no 
 flop, it is evident there can be no compleat definition, nor, confe- 
 quently, any fcience ; for there is no fcience of infinites. There muft 
 therefore be, of neceffity, fome higheft genus, beyond which we can- 
 not go. And this highell genus is what I call the {ird formal caufe 
 of the thing, being that univerfal form which comprehends the parti- 
 cular form of the thing defined, as well as of many other things *. 
 
 The queftion, then, is, What i\ic{e forms are, and how many ? for, 
 if they could not be reduced to number, there could be no fcience of 
 them ; and the principles of things would, in fo far, be infinite and 
 incomprehenfible. But, in the Pythagorean fchool, or, rather, I be- 
 lieve 
 
 * See Origin of Language, Vol. I. page 72. and page 520. where this rife of ideas 
 or generals, above one another, till we come to thofe univerfals, is explained. I will 
 only add here, that the definition of any thing is, in the language of Arillotle, called 
 the ii^o;, the ro t« '«> 'uvxi, or, fimply, the ra nveny or, laftly, the ^#y«s rvn ova-ica, all 
 ■which denote the fame thing, viz. the idea ox form of the thing, which is what is com- 
 prehended in the definition. For the matter, though we may confider it in conjunc- 
 tion with the form, (as Arillotle fays we ought to confider all natural fubftances,) is 
 never part of the delinition, being, by its nature, indefinable. There is, therefore, a 
 diflin^tion betwixt the cva-ix, or thing actually exifling, that is, the matter and form 
 conjoined, and the P^ayoj t»;; oy7/«j, that is, the ybrw fimply, as comprehended in the 
 definition. Thus, there is a difference betwixt a^d^uTrei, that is, the compound, and 
 TO itvxi xvi^aTrmy that is, the form fimply; a manner of fpe iking, not intelligible, ex- 
 cept to thofe who know the diftinclion betwixt matter and fonn ; and that, in the o- 
 pinion of Arillotle, and, indeed, all the antlcnt philofophers, it is the /orw which 
 gives being 10 the thing, and makes it what it is.
 
 Chap. I. ANTIENTiMETAPHYSICS. 319 
 
 lieve, in the Colleges of Priefts in Egypt, the number of them was 
 fixed, names given to them, and their nature explained. This fo great 
 difcovery was firft publilhed by Archytas, the Pythagorean, In a work 
 which he intiiled, ^i,, r^v^x^ro?, or, 0/ the XJni^erfe ; for it was cer- 
 tainly intended by him as a metaphyfical work, in which the univer- 
 fal forms of all things in Nature were to be explained. This work, 
 as I have obferved elfewhere, was transferred by Ariftotle into his Lo- 
 gical SyJIem ; and very properly fet at the head of it, under tlie name 
 of Categories^ by way of eminence, that is, Univerfal Praedicates\ and 
 it was very properly fo placed ; for, as it was the profcffcd intention 
 of that work, to explain the Nature of fcience and demonftration, and, 
 as it has been fhown that there can be no perfed fcience without the 
 knowledge of thefe univerfals, it was very proper that Ariflotle fhould 
 begin with them, as the foundation of all fcience. And he has, not 
 only in his logic, but through the v/hole of his philofophlcal works, 
 made frequent ufe of them, both in proving and refuting. 
 
 The dodrine of the Categories has this further advantage, that it 
 fhows us, at once, the whole extent of human knowledge ; for every 
 thing that is to be known, falls under one or other of the Categories. 
 Now, a general view of this kind may, I think, be of great ufe in pre- 
 venting pedantry and conceit : For one learned in the fuhjecls of any 
 one category, for example, a mathematician, who has ftudied both 
 geometry and arithmetic, and fo is learned in the category of quan- 
 tity, both continuous and difcrete, may therefore imagine, as many of 
 them have done, that he is a philofopher, and has that univerfal 
 knowledge which I have faid belongs to philofophy ; i)ut, if he has 
 ftudied the categories, he will know how many other fubje61:s there 
 are of knowledge, and how fliort he is of the knowledge oixh.^po'wers 
 and principles of the univerfe ; For, though it be true, in one refpecff, 
 what the Pythagoreans faid, that all Nature confifts in number, under 
 which they included figure, and every thing having meafure or pro- 
 portion of any kind ; yet, in order to know the univerfe, we muft 
 
 know
 
 320 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III. 
 
 know the things to which the properties of number and Jigurg are ap- 
 plicable. 
 
 The number of thefe Categories is ten ; and they are enumerated 
 by Ariftotle in the beginning of his bookjuft now mentioned. The 
 particular nature of each of them has been fo accurately and elegantly 
 explained by Mr Harris, in his Philofophical Arrangements, that, 
 without repeating what he has faid, I fhall only make fome general 
 obfervations upon them. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 Chap. II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 321 
 
 C H A P. II. 
 
 Neceffary to be proved that Generals exifi — That NeceJJtty ozving to 
 the total ignorance of antient Philofophy — That there are Ideas 
 exijling fomeivhere^ and particularly in the Divine Mind — Whether 
 they exijl in the Human Mind^ a ^eftion of FaSi — The Confufion of 
 Senfe and Imagination ivith Intelle^^ the Ground of the Error of the 
 Materialifis on this Point. — No Science vuithout ideas — Neither Defi- 
 nition nor Demonflration of Individuals, 
 
 BU T, before I proceed to thofe obfervatlons, It will be proper to 
 fhow that the Categories have an exiftence ; for, if it be true 
 that there is no fuch thing as intellect, and that there is no difference 
 betwixt fenfations and ideas, except in the degree of the impreffion that 
 they make upon the mind, according to the philofophy of the author 
 of the Effays^ then there is no fuch thing exifting as generals, nor, by 
 confequence, categories, or predicaments, which are no other than the 
 moft general ideas. Whereas, on the other hand, if it be proved that we 
 have the conception of generals, it is, I hope, made fufficiently evi- 
 dent, in the preceeding chapter, that there is a progrefs in the mind 
 from lefs general to more general, till we come to what is moft ge- 
 neral of all, or univerfal, that is, the categories. 
 
 That there {hould be any difpute upon this fubjed, muft appear 
 very wonderful to thofe who have ftudied the philofophy of Plato and 
 
 S s Ariftotle ;
 
 322 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III. 
 
 Arlftotle ; and, indeed, it is to me a proof, that even the memory 
 of antient philofophy is in hazard of being loft among us. As to 
 Plato, the chief end and general fcope of his philofophy is, to raife the 
 mind from material and particular things, which he confiders as ha- 
 ving no exiHence, properly fpeaking, but as in a conftant flux and vi- 
 cifTitude of generation and corruption, to gcncrsih or ideas j (a v^rord, 
 which, as I have elfewhere obferved *, he borrowed from the Pytha- 
 gorean School,) confidering thefe alone as truly exifting, and the only 
 proper objeds of fcience t. And, as to Ariftotle, the diflindion be- 
 twixt fenfe and intelled, particulars and generals, the former being 
 the objeds of fcnfe, and the latter of intelled, runs through his whole 
 philofophy; and, particularly, is the foundation of his fv ft em of lo- 
 gic, and of the fyllogifm, which he tells us, again and again, cannot 
 be without general propofitions. And it is plain, from almoft every 
 page of his works, that he had no notion that there could be demon- 
 ftration or fcience of any kind, without generals. And it is evident, 
 from his fetting the book of Categories at the head of his philofophi- 
 cal works, that he thought the knowledge of the moft general ideas 
 a neceflary introduction to philofophy* 
 
 That a man who believed nothing, and afFeded even to doubt of 
 his own exiftence, and who, befides, had no regard to religion, either 
 natural or revealed, ftiould argue againft the exiftence of ideas, and, 
 by allowing us only fenfations, more or lefs lively, deprefs us to the 
 rank of brutes, is not fo much to be wondered at : But, that a Chrif- 
 
 tian, 
 
 * Origin and Progrcfs of Language, Vol. I. p. ti6. edit. 2. 
 
 t It was for this reafon that he confidered not the corporeal man, orhorfe, as the real 
 man or horfe, bccaufe they were conftantly changing, and, at laft, periflied, or, at 
 leaft, were diflblved; but the idea of the man, or the horfe, he faid, was the thing i 
 which, therefore, he called the ecura-xtt^u-xci or the avTo-'iTTTrc;, that is, the 7nan itjelfy 
 or the horfe itfelf'y an expreflion which I know has beert much ridiculed by matcriali:!*, 
 both antiLnt and modern, but which, I think, a proper expreffion, importing that di- 
 ftinftion betwixt corporeal and intelle^ual things, which is the foundation of all tro: 
 philofophy.
 
 Chap. II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 323 
 
 tian, and a BIfhop, fuch as Dr Berkley, the Intention of whofe writing 
 was to confute the Atheifts, and to eftabUfh the belief of immaterial 
 fubftances upon the moft folid grounds, fhould maintain the fame doc- 
 trine, can be afcribed to nothing elfe but to abfolute ignorance of the 
 philofophy of both Plato and Ariftotle ; for, tho' Arillotle would not 
 admit that thofe ideas had a feparate exiftence, not only out of any cor- 
 poreal fubftance, but out of the mind of any intelligent being, which 
 he fays his mafter Plato maintained ; yet, neither he, nor any of the 
 philofophers of his fchool, had the leaft doubt but that they exifted in 
 the mind. 
 
 With men who, out of mere vanity, maintain the moft extravagant 
 paradoxes, without regard of what the confequences may be to religion 
 and morality, provided they acquire the reputation of great abilities 
 and fuperior parts, it would be vain to argue ; but, to thofe who believe 
 in God, and think there is fuch a thing asfcieiice and clemoti/Iratioji, 
 1 would fuggeft the following conliderations : 
 
 And, in the frjl place, if they believe that there is a God, and that htf 
 is the author of the univerfe, they muft admit the diftindlion betwixt 
 the intelledual and the material or vifible world, and, confequently, 
 that there are ideas, at leaft in the Divine Mind ; for, however they 
 may confound fenfations and ideas in the human mind, where both 
 undoubtedly exift, it is impoffible they can believe that the Deity can 
 have any perception by organs of fenfe ; fo that nothing can be in 
 his mind but ideas, which every Theift muft believe to be the pattern 
 and exemplar of the vifible world. It muft therefore be evident, to all 
 thofe who are not Atheifts, that there are ideas exifting, at leaft, in one 
 mind ; and from thence he may conclude, that it is not impoflible that 
 the human mind may fo far participate of the Divine Nature, as to be 
 able to form ideas, infinitely lefs perfed, no doubt, than thofe of the 
 Divine Mind ; and with thi« remarkable difference, that our ideas, in 
 
 S f 2 this
 
 324 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IIL 
 
 this prefent ftate of our exiftence, and united as we are with matter, 
 cannot be formed without the afliftance of our fenfes, and of fenfible 
 objeds : Whereas, it would be impious and abfurd, in the higheft 
 degree, to fuppofe that the Deity had any fuch dependence upon mat- 
 ter. 
 
 It being thus certain, that there are ideas fomcwhere, the only que- 
 flion remaining is a queflion of fad, Whether or not the human mind 
 has the capacity of forming ideas ? or, in other words. Whether it has 
 the capacity of confidering one or more qualities of a thing, feparate 
 from the reft ? Whether, for example, it can confider the quality of 
 being bounded by three lines in a triangle, abftraded from being 
 white or black, of wood, ftone, or metal ? Or, Whether it can per- 
 ceive it only as it is prefented by the fenfes, that is, w^ith all the qua- 
 lities which are peculiar to it, and diftinguifh it from every other in- 
 dividual triangle ? This queftion I have treated of at great length in 
 the Origin and Progrefs of Language * ; where, 1 think, I have put it 
 beyond all doubt, from fad and obfervation, as well as reafon, that 
 the human mind has fuch a power. And, indeed, if there were 
 nothing elfe to prove it, the fcicnce of arithmetic is alone fufficient ; 
 for, though number be one of the moft abftrad ideas we have, by 
 which we divefl things of every quality and circumftance, even 
 of thofe common attributes of time and fpace, and leave them no- 
 thing but the fimple quality of exifting each by itfelf, yet, even our 
 children are able to form this moft abltrad idea, and add, fubtrad, 
 and multiply, without the leaft thought of applying numbers to parti- 
 cular things ; a proof of which is, that they confider each unit as per- 
 fedly equal to another, without the leaft difference among them,, 
 which they could not do, if they applied them to men, oxen, flieep,. 
 &c. ; and they alfo confider them as indivifible, till they come to be 
 
 taught 
 
 • Vol. I. b. I. c. 9. p. 110. edit. 2>
 
 Chap. II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 325 
 
 taught that kind of arithmetic we call fradlons, but which was un- 
 known to the antients, and is truly the arithmetic of ratios. 
 
 It will be faid, that the idea of number^ thus abftra6ted from all fen- 
 fiblc things, or, even a general triangle, cannot be apprehended by the 
 fenfe, or pidlured in the imagination. And this, no doubt, is true ; 
 and if, like the brutes, we had no other faculties except fenfe and ima- 
 gination, like them, too, we fhould have no ideas : But we have ano- 
 ther faculty, and that a much fuperior one, I mean intellect : And 
 the fundamental error of thofe philofophers, and which leads, as I 
 have fhown elfewhere *, to the moft dangerous confequences, is their 
 confounding intclledl with fenfe or imagination. The confequence of 
 whlcbis, no doubt, what the author of the Eflays maintains, that ideas 
 and fenfations differ only in the degree of impreffion they make upon 
 the mind, not in kind. 
 
 That, without ideas, there can be no fcience, will be evident from 
 the follov^'Ing confideratlon, that all material things are perpetually in 
 motion of one kind or another, and therefore conflantly changing. 
 This v»'as known to the philofophers of Greece, as early as the days of 
 Heraclitus, who faid that every thing was in a perpetual flux, and con- 
 tinually paffing, like a river : So that, by our fenfes, wc never can 
 apprehend the fame thing twice, any more than we can i)athe twice 
 in the fame river '|\ And this philofophy of his was adopted, as Ari- 
 ftotle tells us J, by Plato, who every where fpeaks of material things 
 
 as 
 
 * Page 142 — 200. 
 
 fCratylus, a follower of Heraclitus, found fault with his maftcr, becaufe he faid that 
 one could not bathe twice in the fame river •, for, fays he, he cannot bathe once in 
 the fame river. And he carried the matter fo far, at laft, as to aflirm nothing, bat 
 only to point -with his finger, things being conftantly in motion, and nothing ftand- 
 ing flill, fo long as that any thing can be aflirmed of them. Arijiot. lib. 4. Metaph. 
 cap. 5. p. 378. edit. Da Fa/. And, no doubt, this is the necellary confequence of 
 the do£trine of Heraclitus, and every fyftem of materialifm. 
 
 J Metaph. lib. i. cap. 6. See what I have further faid upon this fubjedl, Orig. and 
 Prog, of La))g. vol; I. book i. cap. 9. p. 114. 2d edition.
 
 326 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III. 
 
 as having no permanent exlftence, nor ex'iflence properly fo called, but 
 fomething which he expreffes by a word that, like many other terms 
 of the Greek philofophy, cannot be rendered into Englifli, without 
 much circumlocution *. Such things, therefore, being perpetually 
 changing, cannot be objedts of fcience, or of eternal truth, of which 
 the objeds muft, like itfelf, be eternal. Whereas, fliould we attempt 
 to demonftrate any property of a material thing, it would not continue 
 the fame thing till the demonftration was ended. Therefore, fays A- 
 riftotle, there is no definition, demonftration, or fcience, of particular 
 or individual things. And, I will venture to fay, that no man, who is 
 a man of fcience of any kind, or who knows what fcience or demon- 
 ftration is, will maintain the contrary ; for, what is the objedt, ac- 
 cording to thofe material philofophers, of the geometrical fcience of a 
 triangle, for example ? it is an indetermined number of particular tri- 
 angles, perceived by the fenfe, with a number of indetermined qua- 
 lities, fuch as being black or white, equilateral, ifofceles, fcalenum, right- 
 angled, obtufe-angled, &c. Now, will any man, who is a geometer, 
 
 faj, 
 
 • The word is yinvi^ \ and every material being, he fays, is i> yuts-ei, or, as he o« 
 
 thervvife expreffes it, ovk ts-rt, tt>^xa ymroa ; the meaning of which is, that fuch things 
 are never in any fixed or permanent flate, but are perpetually changing from one ftatc 
 to another, and becoming what they were not before. To fuch things he oppofes the 
 T« ei-Tflt, a word which occurs in almoft every page of Plato, by which he means no- 
 thing cife than the ideas of things which are permanent and immutable, while the 
 (f/^'/w^j themfclves are conflantly changing •, and therefore he fays they are, yiyv»ii.i,x, 
 
 •ircc Ss ovS'sTTOTf ; whereas ideas are the r«. «vt«, and the ru atet y.ui'a)<rxvroiiy x«< x«t« reivrx. 
 
 t)^»*Tci, And, in the Timaeus^ he divides all things into thefe two claffes. His 
 
 words are, 'Eo-rt^ ovf o/j xxt' tf^n* ool»y ?rg«iiT»v 0(Ui^iTiov Tet of rt to »f ^i¥ ctni^ yii%vt¥ Si ovk 
 iX,*''- >'-"■' 1"' Ta yiyia^i^tf «6», «y 6i c<rv(it7rcTt. to j^i* oij vtric-ii f^trx Xtyov 7ri^i>.yt7rriiif ectH KXTe6 
 'Tu-jrx e>. T« S' XV ^e|« ^tir' uis-^niritjg xXoyov, 6»|<te-Ts», yiyiof^mi kxi XTioX'Kvf^.'cVov^ tirt/i J'j tvSiE. 
 
 woij «». Timaeus, pag. 1046. edit. Ficini. It is with this diflin£lion that Plato begins 
 his Cofmogony, and Syflem of the Univerfe; and, indeed, it is a diftinftion which ap- 
 pears to me to be the foundation of the whole philofophy of Nature, though it be not 
 made in any modern book of natural philofophy thit I remember to have feen. For 
 in no other way can we conceive any thing in the univerfe to be fixed, ftable^ 
 and permanent ; but, in this way conceived, the univerfe, and every thing in it, is e- 
 ^crnal and unchangeable as its great Author.
 
 Chap. II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 327 
 
 fay, that fuch a confufed complicated notion (and fuch all the percep- 
 tions of fenfe are) is a proper fubjedt of a fcience of fuch certainty as 
 geometry ? 
 
 But, further, upon the fuppofnion that we have only perceptions of 
 fenfe, weaker or ftronger, there not only can be no fcience, but no 
 truth or falfehood ; becaufe there can be no criterion of either j or, if 
 there be any, every man muft be the ftandard of truth to himfelf, ac- 
 cording to the dodrine of the antient fophift Protagoras ; and every 
 thing will be true which appears to be fo to every man. Now, as things 
 appear very differently to different men, and to the fame men at dif- 
 ferent times, the confequence neceffarily is, that the fame thing will be 
 both true and falfe ; or, in other words, that there is no fuch thing as 
 either truth or falfehood. The foundation of this opinion, as Ari- 
 ftotle informs us *, is no other than the dodrine maintained by thofe 
 among us who deny the exiftence of ideas, viz. that we have no 
 knowledge except fenfation, nor, confequently, any other criterion of 
 truth or falfehood befides our fenfes. Now, as fenfation depends not 
 only upon the operations of external objeds upon our organs of fenfe, 
 but upon the difpofuion of thefe organs, it will often happen that, 
 though the operation of external objeds be the fame, yet the fenfa- 
 tion will be very different, by means of the different difpofition of the 
 organs, not only in different men, but in the fame man at different 
 times. And, befides the difpofuion of the organs, there are, in thofe 
 fenfes which perceive things at a diftance, fuch as fight and hearing, 
 different difpofitions of the media through which fuch fenfes operate ; 
 and thefe, as is well known, make a great difference in their percep- 
 tions. So that, according to this philofophy, truth or fcience is a mere 
 fpedre or phantom, appearing differently to different men, or to the 
 fame man at different times, without any fubffance or reality. But, 
 the true anfwer to Heraclitus, Protagoras, or whoever elfe, antient or 
 
 modern^ 
 
 ♦ Metaph. lib. 4. cap. ^^
 
 328 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III. 
 
 modern^ phllofophifes in this way, is what Arlftotle makes, that there 
 is fomething elfe in the univerfe befides matter and motion ; for there 
 is that which is immoveable, without generation or corruption, mean- 
 ing ideas *. 
 
 I think I may therefore conclude, that thofe who deny the exigence 
 of ideas, are not only perfedly ignorant of the antient philofophy, 
 but of the nature of fcience, and of truth in general. 
 
 Having thus cleared my way to the Categories, I will proceed to 
 make fome obfervations upon them in the next chapter. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
 *His words are, Et< V aliuirtftiv uvr»Oi vTriXxftfixiltf Kxt uXXri> »vfikv inxi TUf oiTui, ji at/T« 
 
 *<»»«■<« ivx^^iiy auTi cpSc^x, ovTt yine-ii r» irugetvuD- Metaph. lib. 4. Cap. 5. This fcn- 
 tence alone, I think, would be fufficient to acquit Ariftotle of any imputation of 
 materialifm ; for, as ideas are undoubtedly immaterial things, it is impoflible to con- 
 ceive how the foul, if material, could produce them j for what is immaterial never 
 can come from what is material.
 
 Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 329 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 General Obfervations upon the Categories — Other Diviftons of the ivhole 
 of Things^ fuch as that made by Porphyry^ and aljo that made by 
 Plato — The Nature of the Divifton made by Archytas — his Work Me- 
 iaphyjical — AriJlotW^s Book of Categories a Logical Work — The Na- 
 ture of Porphyry"* s Divifion — The Nature alfo of Plato* s — Both dif- 
 ferent from that of Archytas — Examination of the Uni'uerfals of Archy- 
 tas — Whether there be too many or toofeiv of them — not too many of 
 them — nor too feiv — Shoivn that Motion ought not to be one of Ar" 
 chytas^s Uni'uerfals — nor Time — nor Space — nor Matter — nor Form — 
 nor Power — nor Faculty — Mind^ confidered as a Subflance^ falls wider 
 this dinji/ion — Habit likeivife falls under it — Arifotle*s Di'vifton into 
 Categories -i not compleat — Conclufion of this Part of the Worh, 
 
 THERE have been other divifions made of the unlverfity 
 of things, fuch as that divifion treated of by Porphyry, in his 
 introdudion to Ariftotle's book of Categories, where he has divided 
 all things into genus^ Jpecies^ difference^ property -^ and accident. Such 
 alfo is the divifion made by Plato, confifting likewife of five 
 members, viz. being (for fo I tranflate the ovtna of Plato,) fwirnefst 
 difference^ motion^ and refl. If thefe divifions are in the fame refpedt, 
 and are full and compleat, it is manifeft that the divifion of Archytas, 
 and of Arlftotle, muft be improper, as confiding of two many mem- 
 bers : And, fuppofing them to be in different refpcds, and for differ- 
 ent purpofes, it is to be inquired in what refpcds they differ ; and, 
 
 T t when
 
 330 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book III. 
 
 when that Is determined, it will ftlll remain to be inquired, whether 
 the divlfion of the categories be full and compleat, fuch as has nothing 
 wanting, or nothing redundant ? Thefe, I think, are queftions of 
 fome curiofi-ty, and of great importancej for underflanding rightly the 
 dodrine of the Categories. 
 
 And the firfl thing to be confidered is, in what view, and for what 
 purpofe, Archytas made this divifion of things. And I think it is evi- 
 dent, both from the title of the work, and from what Simplicius has 
 preferved to us of it, which, I believe, is by far the greateft part of it, 
 if not all, that it was a metaphyfical work, in which it was the in- 
 tention of the author to treat of the general principles of all things 
 in the univerfe that adually exifted, and which conftituted the w^hole 
 of things : In fhort, it was what I am treating of now, under the fe- 
 Gond head of my divifion of metaphyfical fubjedls, viz. the univerfal 
 forms of all things. 
 
 It is not, therefore, of the efficient caufes^ or of the conftituting prin- 
 ciples of the univerfe, that Archytas treats, but of i\it formal caujesy 
 and of things as already conftituted. And I think it is further evi- 
 dent, that the fubftances of which he treats are natural fubftances, not 
 fubftances immateriaU and feparatedyrow T?tatter ; for, in a paffage quo- 
 red from him by Simplicius, he divides fubftances in the fame manner 
 that Timaeus the Locrian does, into matter, form, and the compound 
 of thefe two, which is the natural body ; and, as the Juhfances of 
 which he treats are of that kind, fo muft alfo the accidents be : So that 
 the whole univerfals of Archytas, being either material fubftances or 
 their accidents, it is evident that his work muft be confidered as a 
 treatife of phyfics, or rather metaphyfics, as it treats not of the particu- 
 lar afi^edions of natural bodies, but of their general principles, and 
 common properties. 
 
 On the other hand, it is evident that Ariftotle's book of Categories 
 is a logical work : For, the intention of his logic being to explain 
 
 what
 
 Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 331 
 
 what fyllogifm was, and particularly demonftratlve fyllogifm ; and, as 
 all fyllogifms confift of propofitions, and propofitions, again, of terms, 
 the method of fclence required that he fhould begin with terms, as the 
 elements of the whole compofition. And, in order to m.ake fcienceof 
 his work, it was neceflary that the number of thefe terms, I mean of 
 the general clafles to which they were all reducible, fhould be afcer- 
 tained, as well as the nature of them explained ; for, of what is infi- 
 nite, there is no fcience ; and, without this, the doctrine of the catego- 
 ries would have been as imperfedl as the grammatical art would have 
 been, if the number of letters, or elemental founds of which words 
 are compofed, had not been afcertained. Now, this being the nature of 
 Ariflotle*s work, it is no doubt polTible that the divifion of thefe terms 
 into ten clafles may not be full and compleat, though Archytas's divi- 
 fion of natural fubftances and accidents may be. 
 
 As to Porphyry's /"i;^ ijuords^ as they are called, it is evident that 
 they can be none of the univerfals treated of by Archytas ; for they 
 have no exiftence in nature, but only in our minds, being nothing elfe 
 but terms denoting certain operations of our minds upon the t« oyr^, or 
 the things exifl:ing in this univerfe, by which we confider and invefti- 
 gate them in a certain way, difcovering, that they have fome things in 
 common, fome things proper or peculiar, fome things differencing' or 
 diftinguifhing, and fome things accidental. But Archytas, in his book, 
 confiders what all thefe things are in themfelves, not the progrefs of 
 our underftanding in the inveftigation of them. 
 
 For the fame reafon that neither genus nov /pedes, nor any other of 
 the five things mentioned by Porphyry, could be numbered among the 
 univerfals of Archytas, it is evident that even truth itfelf cannot be 
 one of them ; for truth is nothing but the perception of the connexion 
 of two terms of a propofition. Now, a propofition is a combination 
 of two ideas made by the mind ; fo that it is plainly an operation of 
 the mind, and ntiih^rjubjlance nor accident exifting in nature. 
 
 Tt 2 Of
 
 332 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IIL 
 
 Of the fame nature with Porphyry's fi'ue ivords^ are the unlverfals 
 of Plato above mentioned ; for they are only io many different ways 
 of confidering the things of the univerfe : For we confider them, ei- 
 ther as having a determinate nature in themfelves, which conflitutes 
 their eflence, and makes them what they are ; which I take to be the 
 meaning of the t« .7, or the h<tix of Plato, being different from tlie »r/«j 
 or fubllance of Archytas and Ariflotle, and applicable to qualities as 
 well as to fubftances properly fo called * ; or we confider them as the 
 fame, or as different ; or as at reft, or as in motion. — In fhort, it ap- 
 pears to me that Plato intended to divide, in this way, all the propor- 
 tions that we form concerning the things of this univerfe, not the 
 things themfelves. And, 1 believe, it will be found, upon exami- 
 nation, that all the propofitions we form concerning things relate, 
 either to their eifence, their famcnefs, their difference, their motion,, or; 
 their reft. 
 
 Thus, it appears that the unlverfals, both of Porphyry andof Platois. 
 are logical divifions, not of things, fuch as the unlverfals of Archytas; 
 but it ftill remains to be inquired, Whether Archytas's divifion be a 
 compleat one ? It Is certainly fo far compleat, as it is a divifion of 
 things miojubflance and accident ; for, the firft category \%JubJlance^ 
 and all the other nine are accidents.. But, as a general divifion into 
 fubftance and accident would not have made us much wifer, it ftill. re- 
 mains to be confidered, Whether he has made, a proper divifion of the 
 accidents into nine claffes ? and, Whether there be not too many of 
 them, or too few \ 
 
 That 
 
 * See thefe words, »(r<«, tkwtot*)? iTt^orvi?, very well explained by Ammonius, in his- 
 commentary upon Porphyry's introt u6tion, p. 79. c-jthc, fay;^ he, is not here oppofedi 
 to accident^ {as in the C.it( gorj<:s,) but denotes the nature and effence of things, or, 
 that by which they ;ire faid to be what they are. rxvroTva^ or/amene/s, mufl be in all 
 things, bec-iufe they have all the fame original ; and £Tj;«THf, 01 differencey mufl be 
 in all things, becaule they are many^ and not one.
 
 Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 533 
 
 That there are not too many of them, every body mufl be convin- 
 ced, who confiders what they are ; for he will find them diftind one 
 from another, and that not one includes another. Nor do I think 
 that any philofopher has thought that the number of them was too 
 great. But it appears, from Simplicius's commentary upon the cate- 
 tegories of Ariftotle, that many of the commentators before hini^ 
 thought them too few, and therefore were inclined to add to the num- 
 ber, and, particularly, to make motion one of them. 
 
 I will therefore begin with motion, and endeavour to account why 
 it is not one of the univerfals of Archytas : And I hope this will not 
 be difficult to do, after what 1 have faid of it ; for, in xh^frji place, it 
 is evidently not one of Khtfonnai caufes of natural things, of which, 
 as I have oblerved, Archytas treats in this work, but one of the effi- 
 cient caufes, and, indeed, the immediate efficient caufe of all genera- 
 tion and produdion ; it cannot, therefore, be faid to be any thing ex- 
 iting that is generated and produced, but the caufe of fuch exiltence. 
 2<i/j, It is not only not any thing, but it can nut be faid to be ^.Wcjlate 
 of any thing ; for it is, as we have {Q<in^ a paflfage from one ftate to a- 
 nother. As, however, it cannot be denied that it afFcds natural things 
 very much, and produces great changes and alteradons upou ihem, 
 the efFeds of motion, if not moiion itieif, muit De conlidered as lailing. 
 under the catcgones of doing .m\(\ Juff cringe the moving power being 
 confidered as doing and aciing ; and the thing moved^ -d.^ juffei ing. 
 
 Akin to motion h time ; which, as fhall be fhown afterwards, is- 
 nothing elfe but number applied to motion, by which the duration of 
 the exiftence of any thing is meafured. This, confidered anfluteiy 
 and abftradedly in itfelf, is certamly no natural thing exiiling, and, 
 therefore, does not belong to rchytas'b lubjed: ; but, as it acco:n})a- 
 nies the exigence of material things *, I propofe to treat or it, ucder 
 
 the 
 
 * This is the reafon given by '-Implicius, why neither time nor place are rxkor-ed 
 among the categories ^ becaufe, fays he, they are ibmething without nature, thac is, 
 
 not.
 
 334 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III. 
 
 the third head of my divifion. But, though the abftrad notioa of 
 time does not belong to Archytas*s univerfals^ yet, in fo far as it re- 
 lates to particular things, it is to be confidered as falling under the 
 category of ivhen ; for, all things that are generated and produced, 
 that is, all things in this lower world, are properly faid to exift in 
 time \ for to them we apply the diftindlion oi paft^ prefent^ ^.wd future. 
 
 Space^ as I fhall fliow afterwards, is either a mere no7i-entity, or to 
 be conceived only in relation to body ; and, in fo far as it has relation 
 to any particular body^ fo as to be the place of that body^ it is denoted 
 by the category, ivhere. 
 
 As to matter and forju^ they are clearly the elements of natural 
 things, not the things themfelves ; and, therefore, have been treated of 
 by me under my firft head. Befides, as they have no exiftence fepa- 
 rate from body, and its accidents, they could not have properly fallen 
 under Archytas's fubjedt, which, as I have faid, is confined to the ma- 
 terial and the vifible world. 
 
 As to poivers sind faculties y of which I have faid fo much, they are 
 not things exi/lingt but only the cau/es of things exifiing ; and therefore 
 have been treated under my firft head ; and, as to mind^ the greateft 
 power in nature, fo far as it is a fubflance, it falls under the firft cate- 
 gory ; but, fo far as it is only a caufe efficient^ it does not belong to 
 Arcbytas's fubjed. 
 
 With refped to hahity it falls under the category, quality ; habit being 
 compofed of qualities, one or more ; and the adion or paflion thence 
 
 re- 
 
 not in nature, and only accompanying it. And he fays, that matter, form, and motion, 
 are none of the categories, becaufe they are what conftitute or fill up nature. His 
 words are, y-ca ycc^ •» rv, ^v<rti tdi i\v6it 7rj£j«sxo>i9v^«t/FT*i» • %^cy»( xMi o roTtoi otKtl HiKi' 'utrTrt^ 
 T«» rvuTrXn^ttvvTMVf iA»j x«« itooi Ken Ktf/ie-if,
 
 Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 335 
 
 refulting, has each its proper place in the philofophical arrangements 
 of Archytas. 
 
 Thus, I think, I have fhown, that there is nothing wanting in the 
 univerfals of Archytas ; and, as it is admitted that they are not too 
 many, it follows, that the fyftem is compleat, without either redun- 
 djincy or defedt. 
 
 But, as to Ariftotle's logical work of the categories, as it was in- 
 tended for a fyftem of univerfal praedicables, I doubt it cannot be faid 
 to be compleat, without thofe univerfals that 1 have mentioned, fuch 
 as motion^ matter^ form^ poiver^ faculty ^^z, which are certainly^r^^^i- 
 cableSi and are, accordingly, often praedicated. And Ariftotle himfelf 
 feems to have been confcious of this dete<5t in the fyftem, as he has 
 added, to the dodrine of the categories, a good deal concerning mo-- 
 tion^ habit i pri'vatioriy and oppofites. 
 
 Thus, I have explained both the univerfals of Archytas, and the 
 categories of Ariftotle ; and have endeavoured to fhow that, whatever 
 defeats there may be in Ariftotle's categories, the fyftem of Archytas 
 is compleat. And I think I have afligned the reafon of the dift'crence 
 betwixt them, namely, that Archytas's work was truly a metaphyfical 
 work, but which Ariftotle by transforming into a logical work, has 
 made neither the one nor the other compleat. In the next chapter I 
 will conclude this book, by comparing this univerfal fcience of cate- 
 gories, with other fciences, and particularly mathematics. 
 
 G H A ^.
 
 136 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 The SuhjeEl of Metaphyfics^ Univerfals or Generals, of the hlghejl Kind 
 — What Generals are not to be underjlood ^without fome Knoivledge of 
 Logic — Difference betivixt Mathematics and Metaphyfics — Mathema" 
 tical Ideas — Number — This the SubjeSi of Arithmetic — Figure the Sub^ 
 jedi of Geometry — Analyfis of it into Superficies^ Lines^ and Points—* 
 Motion — This the Subject both of Geometry and Arithmetic — The Sub- 
 je5ls of Metaphyfics — Confiders ivhat is different^ and ivh at is common,, 
 in the Subjects of Mathematics — Its iVay of confidering Motion. — 
 Treats of Subje^s not comprehended in any particular Science — The 
 proper SubjeSi of Metaphyfics is immaterial Subfiances — The Way of 
 coming to the Idea of them — Difference betivixt Ant tent and Modern 
 Philofophy — Nofufficient Caufe of Motion affigned by the Moderns — 
 Nature^ according to their Syftem^ defe^live. 
 
 THOSE who believe, like the antlent philofophers mentioned by 
 Plato, that nothing exifts but what they can grafp or lay hold 
 of with their hands, will uo doubt think this whole dodrine of cate- 
 gories to be merely phantaftical, without any foundation in truth or 
 reality — umbrarum hic locus efl^ according to them ; and they will fay, 
 that fuch airy unfubftantial notions are altogether unworthy of a fci- 
 ence, which pretends to treat only of things really exifting. The phi- 
 lofophers I mean are thofe who deny the exiftence of generals, 
 even in the mind, and afTert that there is nothing there but the 
 perception of fingular and individual things; and the plain fcope 
 of which philofophy, as I have fliown elfewhere, is, to exclude 
 
 intd-
 
 Chap. IV. A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I G S. 337 
 
 intelligence from the univerfe, to make us believe that there is no- 
 thing exifting but the material world, and this framed without that 
 archetype, which we call the intelledual world j that is, in other 
 words, without counfel or defign. 
 
 There are others who, though they admit generals^ wnll not fo rea- 
 dily allow that there is any reality in uniuerfals, fuch as the cate- 
 gories. We admit, fay they, that there is the fpecies, man^ diftindi 
 from the Individuals of that fpecies ; but we do not know what to 
 make of the genus, as you call it, animal. It is the misfortune, as I 
 obferved before, of many philofophers now a-days, that they have not 
 learned logic ; for, if they had, they would know, that what is genus 
 with rcfped to one fpecies, is fpecies with refpe6l: to another genus. 
 Thus, for example, animal is the genus with refped to Jiian^ but it is 
 the fpecies with refpe£l to animated fubftance. Ir is therefore impof- 
 fible to make any difference in this matter, betwixt genus and fpecies. 
 Nor, indeed, can it be conceived how we fliould generalize {o far as to 
 form the idea of a man, and why we fhould not generalize fo much 
 farther, as to form the idea of an animal ; for, if we can make fuch a 
 colledion of qualities as belong to man, and to man only, diftinguiih- 
 ing him from every other animal. Why fliould not we make likewife 
 fuch another coUedion, agreeing to all animals, and to animals only, 
 and diftinguifhing them from every other animated fubftance ? 
 
 That men, who have no fcience, fliould not readily conceive the na- 
 ture o^ generals, nor be able to diftinguifli betwixt Peter, James, or 
 John, and the idea of the fpecies, I do not fo much wonder ; but, I 
 confefs, I have often wondered to hear mathematicians deny the ex- 
 iftence o': generals ; becaufe this appeared to me to be giving up their 
 fcience ; for, if they fay that they demonflrate nothing but of the par- 
 ticular triangle upon the paper, they muft confefs that the truths of 
 their fcience are not univerfal truths, nor demonjlrative truths ; as 
 
 ^ ^ notliinir
 
 3S8 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III. 
 
 nothing can be demonftrated of any particular material thing, all fuch 
 things being, as I have fliown *, in conftant flux, without any (lability 
 or permanency ; and therefore incapable of being the objeds of 
 fcience. 
 
 Having mentioned mathematics^ I will conclude this book, with 
 comparing mathematical ideas with metaphyfical ; by which we ihall 
 be able to difcover more clearly the nature of both fciences, and what 
 rank each af them ought to hold among the fubjeds of human know- 
 ledge. 
 
 Of both, the archetype is Nature^ the original of all our ideas ; for> 
 of this book, all arts and fciences are only a tranfcript. But the dif- 
 ference is, that the mathematician takes his ideas from what is moft 
 obvious in nature, and ftands, as it were, in the title-page of this 
 book ; whereas metaphyfics go very much deeper into it, inquiring 
 into the caufes of things, confidering thofe general principles from 
 which every thing lefs general proceeds ; and, by thefe fteps, afcend- 
 ing even to that univerfal principle from which all things in the uni- 
 verfe are produced : While the fcience of mathematics takes its 
 fubjeiSls from the productions, not the principles of nature, being con- 
 verfant with the properties of the material and vifible world, and thofe 
 properties of it which, by their nature, are moft fimple and determi- 
 nate, being perfe(31y feparate and diftindt one fr6m another ; and not 
 mixing with, or running into one another, like other things ia na- 
 ture ; therefore eafy to be comprehended in an exa^ and precife defi- 
 nition*. 
 
 The firft of this kind is number, defined by Euclid to be a multitude 
 of monads. Now, a monad is the fimpleft, that is, the leaft complex 
 of all ideas ; fcr it confiders the thing, without any quality or acci- 
 dent, even of time or ^lace^ and only as exifting, and as feparate and 
 
 diflinft 
 
 ? Page 325V
 
 Chap. IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 339 
 
 diftin(St from every other thing. It has, therefore, no adjundl or con- 
 comitant of any kind, not even place or pofition ; in which refpefl, as 
 Ariftotle has obferved, it is a fimpler idea than even a mathematical 
 point, which, though it have no parts, and be therefore indivifible as 
 well as the monad, cannot be conceived without pofition. 
 
 Many of thefe monads, or o;;^j, confidered together by the mind, yet 
 fo as each is diftindt from the other, is what I call multitude. But, ia 
 order to make number, I think we mufl; add to Euclid's definition, and 
 fay that it is multitude defned or limited ; for, without fome limita- 
 tion, we do not, even in common fpeech, call it number: And brute 
 animals have the perception o^ multitude, and can diftinguifli betwixt 
 it and one ; but have not any perception of number. And there are 
 barbarous nations who have only the idea of number carried fo far : 
 (Monfieur la Condamine fays, that he met Vs^ith one upon the banks 
 of the river Amazons, that could count no farther than three :) And 
 farther, they have nothing but the confufed perception of multitude, 
 which they fignify by pointing to the hairs of their head. 
 
 Plato has obferved, that we have the Idea of number from all the 
 fenfes. The reafon of which, he fays, is, that man was made for con- 
 templation and fcience : And, as the knowledge of number is the 
 foundation of all fcience ; therefore nature has made the perception of 
 it more general than any thing cKe, making it to arife from whate- 
 ver we fee, hear, touch, tafte, or fmell. But we are not from thence 
 to imagine, that number is a perception of fenfe, or, as Mr Locke 
 would call it, an idea offenfation ; for each fenfe only perceives its own 
 objeds ; and each aa of its perception is fingle and individual, ftand- 
 ing by itfelf, without any confideration of any other a£t of perceptioa 
 of the fame, or any other fenfe. It is, therefore, intellea only that 
 joins and puts together, as well as feparates, and recognizes both the 
 Qnc and the many, 
 
 U u s Thefe
 
 340 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III. 
 
 Thefe are the rabjedls of arithmetic. As to geometry , the fubje6: 
 of it x^Jigure^' which is either plane ox foil d. Of the folid, the plane 
 or fuperfcies is the boundary ; and what is contained within the fu- 
 perficies bounding the fohd, is what we call body, T\\q fuperfcies^ a- 
 galn, Is bounded by lines^ and the lines by di point. 
 
 Thus, it is evident, that geometry does not go deep into the nature 
 of things ; for the fubjeifl of it is neither body nor 7?iind ; of which 
 two the univerfity of things confifts ; but It Is only the furface of 
 things with which It is converfant : But, as the ideas o^fgiires^fuper^ 
 fciefeSi and luies^ are fimple and determinate, and therefore capable of 
 moft prccife definition, the fclence from thence arifing Is accurate and 
 demonftratlve, though it do not, as Plato has obferved, and as we fliall 
 afterwards ihow, demonftrate Its principles, but afTumes them. 
 
 There is a third fubjed of mathematical fclence befides number^ and 
 the dimenfions of body ; and that Is motion : For the mathematician 
 confiders ^0^/ in motion, as well as at reft; explains the different 
 kinds of its motions ; fhows how they are compounded ; and applies 
 arithmetic to calculate the force of the movi?ig pozver^ and the quanti- 
 ty of motion produced by it. From motion, thus confidered, arife 
 three branches of mathematical fcience, viz. aftronomy, mechanics^, and 
 vnific ; which, in fo far as they derive their principles from geometry 
 and arithmetic, are demonftrative fciences. 
 
 Thefe are the fubjedls of mathematical knowledge ; and we are now 
 to (how how much farther metaphyfics go into the nature of things — 
 The fubjed of metaphyfics is the ivhole of things. This, as I have 
 obferved, cannot be otherways known than in its principles or caufes. 
 Now, thcle muft neceffarlly be what is mofl general in nature ; for it 
 is from generals \\\zX particulars are derived, which cannot exift with- 
 out the generals \ whereas the generals may exift without th^ particu- 
 lars^
 
 Chap, IV. AN TIEN T METAPHYSICS. 341 
 
 lars. Thus, the fpecies, maity cannot exlft without the genus, an'ujial ; 
 but animal may be without man : And this holds univerfally of all 
 genufes and fpeciefes. The fubje6t, therefore, of metaphyfics, is w4iat 
 is principal in nature, and firft, if not In priority of time, in dignity 
 and excellence, and in order likewife, as being the caufes of every 
 thing in the univerfe. Leaving, therefore, particular fubjed:s, and their 
 feveral properties, to particular fciences, this univerfal fcience compares 
 thefe fubjeds together; confiders wherein they differ, and wherein they 
 agree : And that which they have in common, but belongs not, in 
 particular, to any one Icience, is the proper fubjed of metaphyfics. 
 
 In this manner, it confiders the fubjef^s of mathematics above men- 
 tioned, viz. number i the dlmenjions of body y and motion. The two firft 
 are the fubjeds, as I have faid, the one of arithmetic-, the other of geo-- 
 metry ; and it finds this difference betwixt the tVv'o, that the fubjedt of 
 geometry is continuous ; that is, the parts of it are contiguous, touch- 
 ing one another, and having one common boundary ; whereas the 
 parts of the fubjed of arithmetic are, by their nature, disjoined and fe- 
 parated from one another, each Handing by itfelf. Another difference 
 which it difcoverSj is, that the parts of the one have place or pofition, 
 whereas the parts of the other have none * ; and a third is, that the 
 one is dlvifible into an infinite number of parts, whereas the divillon 
 of the other can be carried no farther than the monad, w^hich, by its 
 nature, is one indivifible thing. According to thefe differences, 
 therefore, metaphyfics diflinguifhes the fubjeds of thefe two parti- 
 cular fciences, calling the one 'magnitude "I'j and the other number. 
 
 But 
 
 * Sec thofe two difTerences fully explained by Ariflotlc, in the 6th chapter of his 
 book of Categories. 
 
 t Euclid ufes this word {fttyih',^ or magnitude^) very frequently, but nowhere defines 
 it, referring it, as well as other things, to common fenfe and obfervation ; and this 
 1 think wife in him ; fo'r the definition of it muft neceffarily have carried him beyond 
 the bounds of his fcience, and into metaphyfics.
 
 342 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IIL 
 
 But things are fo connecfted in this univerfe, and the one and the 
 many Co mixed together in every part of it, that things are not only 
 different, each from the other, but they alfo hold to one another by 
 fome common band or tie, fo that the one is to be found in them as 
 
 well as the many ; and they are both the Jame and different. This 
 
 is the cafe of number and magnitude^ as well as of other things ; for 
 they are not only different in the refpeds above mentioned, but they 
 are the fame in this refpeiSt, that they have both parts which may be 
 meafured or numbered : And it is for this reafon that, as Ariflotle has 
 obferved *, the terms equal or unequal^ can only properly be applied 
 to them. Whereas, of other things, we lay, that they are like or 
 unlike. They muft therefore belong to the fam.e genus ; and that 
 genus is what is called by the metaphyficians quantity^ and is divided 
 by them into continuous and difcrete, that is, magnitude and num- 
 ber t- 
 
 As to motion, the mathematician takes It up according to common 
 •apprehenfion, and applies to it the principles of geometry and arith- 
 metic, without troubling himfelf to inquire concerning its nature, and 
 what rank it holds in the order of beings ; whereas, the metaphyficiaii 
 inquires into its nature and effence ; fhows that it has nothing fixed 
 or determinate in its nature, but Is a progrefs from one (late to ano- 
 ther : That, therefore, it is that which produces all things that are in 
 generation ; but that, therefore, it is not of the number of things ac- 
 tually produced and conftltuted, and, by confequence, none of the ca- 
 tegories — that it is in the thing tnoved^ not in that which moves ; and9 
 confequently, that the thing which moves may itfelf not be moved — 
 and, laJlly^ihdX what moves muft, of neceffity, be different from what 
 ts moved ; and, therefore, that nothing can move itjelf. 
 
 The 
 
 * Arlftot. Categ. cap. 6. injine. 
 
 t Euclid, in his definitions, has not mentioned quantity, though jt be the genus of 
 the two fubjefts of which he treats, magnitude and number, becaufe it is an univerfal, 
 and a metaphyfical idea •, and the reafon probably why he has not defined magnitude, 
 though he has fo often mentioned it, is, that he could not have done it without taking 
 notice of quantity.
 
 Chap.IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 343 
 
 The moft obvious properties of things are thofe I have mentioned, 
 viz. number^ figure^ and motion^ which are the fabjedts of the particu- 
 lar fciences I have named. But there are many other properties of 
 things, vi^hich, not being of a nature fo fimple or determinate, and 
 therefore not eafily abflraded, have not hitherto been made the fub- 
 je€t of any particular fcience, fuch as hitter SLud/weetj cold and hot 
 moiji and dry, Thefe, and fuch like, are all thrown in together, un- 
 der one category, to which the name of quality is given. In like 
 manner, all adions and energies, however different they may be, are 
 clafled under the category of a^ioji. And fufferings, likewife, however 
 different in kind, are all comprehended under the category of fuffer-^ 
 ing. And fo on, with refped to the reft of the nine categories of acci- 
 dents, all v/hich are inherent in the firft chief category, viz. fubftance 
 which does not belong to any particular fcience, but only to this uni- 
 verfal fcience ; the nature of which is, that it comprehends not only 
 what is the fubjed of particular fciences, but alfo thofe things which 
 hitherto have not been reduced to fcience. 
 
 The metaphyfical ideas I have hitherto mentioned are all abftraded 
 from matter ; more abftraded, indeed, than the mathematical, and 
 more general ; and, confequently, nearer the principles and the original 
 of the univerfe. But the ideas I am now to mention, are offubftances 
 altogether immaterial, which, as I have faid, are the proper fubjea: of 
 metaphyfics. The only pafTage which can lead the philofophcr into 
 this invifible world is motiofi-, {or, having learned to diflinguifh betwixt 
 what movesy and is moved^ he foon difcovers that the moving power 
 of this univerfe cannot be material.. 
 
 It was by this road that the great philofophers of antiquity afcend- 
 cd to the Firft Caufe and Author of all motion, himfelf unmoved and 
 "unchangeable, 
 
 flabilifque manens, dat cundla moveri. 
 
 But
 
 344 AN TIE NT METAPHYSICS. Book III. 
 
 But it is a road not much frequented by our modern philofophers, who 
 appear to me to be difpofed to account for the operations of nature 
 from any other caufe rather than mind, and to employ a God only as 
 the tragic poets of old did, when they could in no other way extri- 
 cate their fable. 
 
 There is another road to Deity ; but neither is it much beaten by 
 the philofophers of this age. It is that which lies through formal 
 caufes. In the works of art, every body diftinguiihes betwixt the mat- 
 ter and the form ; but, in the works of nature, we feem to think that 
 'all is material ; whereas, all the antient philofophers, fuch of them, at 
 leaft, as were not Atheifts, made the diftindioii betwixt matter and form 
 the foundation of their natural philofophy : And with the formal 
 caufe is necefTarily conneded \\\q. final caufe ; for, if there be a formi 
 of any thing, by which it anfwers a certain purpofe, there muft necef- 
 {dsAy \it 2l final caufe ^ or end propofed. And, again, if there be an 
 end propofed, there muft be a form fuitable to that end, unlefs we can 
 believe what Epicurus profefled to do, (for I cannot think he really 
 believed fo), that the eye, being formed, fuch as it is, by mere mat- 
 ter and mechanifm, the ufe of it, for feeing, was afterwards, upon 
 trial, found out. Some, indeed, of our more religious philofophers, 
 fpeak a good deal of final caufes ; but the greater part of them feem to 
 confider nothing in the works of nature except matter and mechanifm. 
 
 But this material and mechanical philofophy is eflentially de- 
 fedive in this refped, that it affigns no efficient caufe of the o- 
 perations of nature, unlefs they could fhow, that matter and me- 
 chanifm could operate without any moving power, or had that 
 moving power in themfelves. It is true, indeed, that the BritiHi 
 philofophers, with the exception of very few, allow the neceffity 
 of an immaterial firft mover ; but they fay, that the machine, being 
 once put In motion, goes on of itfelf, like a piece of clock- 
 work.
 
 Chap. I. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 345 
 
 work, by mere mechanical caufes. But this wonderful machine they 
 have never been able to explain, except by making fuppofitions of 
 mechanical powers of attradlion, repulfion, and the like, which, if not 
 inherent in matter, and elTential to it, are, they fay, originally impref- 
 fed upon it ; but that one original impreffion fliould produce fuch a 
 variety of motions, and fhould give matter 2in adive and truly felf-mo- 
 ving power,'- is not, as 1 have fhown *, fupported by any experiment 
 or obfervation, and is diredly contrary to that vis inertiae^ or perfe(3; 
 pafllvity, which they fay is eflential to matter, 
 
 I fhould think this mechanical fyflem more compleat, if they made 
 every thing mechanical, the animated, as well as the inanimate parts of 
 nature. And, accordingly, the opinion of the French philofophers ap- 
 pears to me more confident, who make animals to be machines ; and, 
 though they profefs to confine this to brute-animals, I have little doubt 
 but that the greateft part of them, at leaft, believe that man likewife is 
 a machine ; and one of them has written a book to prove it t. But 
 our philofophers, who allow that the movements of men and other a- 
 nimals are produced, neither by mere matter and mechanifm, nor by 
 the immediate ad of the Deity, but by fome internal principle, call it 
 nmidi life, or whatever elfe you will, ought not, I think, to flop there, 
 but to account for all the other motions they fee in the univerfe, in 
 the fame manner — But of this I have faid enough in the preceding 
 book. 
 
 Thus, I have concluded what I have to fay upon the fubjed of the 
 Categories ; the dodrine of which undoubtedly belongs to this fcience 
 
 Xx of 
 
 * Page 282. 
 
 t Abbe du Prade, author gf the book entitled, Vhamme Machine
 
 346 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III. 
 
 oijir/l caufes and principles ; for thefe are e'rher what is altogether 
 imn aterlal, and not exifting in matter, which, as I have faid, is the 
 proper fubjecfl of metaphy^.cs, or what, though material, and exilting 
 in matter, is farrheft removed from fenfe, and of hlghefl: abHradi in, 
 fuch as the Categories. And, accordingly, Ariftotle, in his books 
 of metaphyfics, has explained fome of th-^m at great length, which he 
 thought he had not fufEciently explained in bis books of categories. 
 And, indeed, the dodrine of the categories belongs fo much to the 
 Jirji philofophy, that a confiderable progrefs muft have been madr in 
 that philofophy before they could have been difcovered. Now a- the 
 firfl: philofophy was undoubtedly laft in the order ci invention, I am 
 perfuaded that every branch of philofophy had been cultivated, and 
 every particular fcience brought, at leaft, to fome degree of perfedion, 
 before men could have fuch inlarged views of things, as to arrange 
 and divide into certain clafTcs, that infinite variety of things which 
 compofe this univerfe. That Pythagoras, or his fchool, which laded 
 no longer than his life, fhouid have carried philofophy and fcience fo 
 far, cannot be fuppofed. I therefore have not the leall doubt but that 
 this philofopher brought the dodrine of the categories with him from 
 Egypt, and that it was there difcovered, in the colleges of the prieftSi 
 ^ho appear to me to have carried philofophy and fcience of all kinds 
 much farther than ever they have been carried fince. 
 
 In the next book, I proceed to inquire concerning thofe adjunds or 
 concomitants of Nature, time^fpace^ and place, Thefe make the third 
 head, under which I propofed to confider the univerfity of things. 
 And I will begin with time, 
 
 BOOK
 
 Chap.r. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 347 
 
 BOOK IV. 
 
 Of the Adjuncls of Nature, Time, Space, and Place, 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Time, though not a Qiiife, a nccejjary AdjunB of the Material World — 
 Time, like every thing in the Material Worlds dependent upon Mo- 
 tion — not to be comprehended at once^ but to be invejiigated — Exift- 
 ence, Duration, included in the Idea ofT'im^ — Time a Meajure of no^ 
 thing but Duration — but fiot of the Duration of all Beings — only of 
 
 fuch as are liable to Change of one Kind or another — What Kind of 
 Meafure Time is — // muf be by Motion — This Motion nmfl be perpC" 
 tuaU and it mufl revolve into itfelf and begin ivhere it left off — The 
 Motion of the Cele/Iial Bodies of this Kind — Defnition o/'Time — Con- 
 
 fequences of this Defnition Body^ Motion^ Number^ mufl all join to 
 
 make Time — Hoivfar Time participates of the Nature of Body — Hoii^ 
 Time applies to Mind fuch as ours — Moments wo/ Time-— «or ^2«/ 
 part o/Time — Common Divfion of Time into prefent, paft, and fn- 
 ture — Nature of the prefent — properly [peaking^ has no exi/lence-^ 
 ■ Time altogether of a moft fljadcivy Nature — Hoiv Time is applied 
 to Motion — Difference bctivixt Time ^7/2^ Eternity — no Difference^ ac- 
 cord iw^ to the Syflem of the Materiali/Is — If the U7iiverfe be 7wt eter- 
 nal^ and is to have an End^ then Time mufl have had a beginnings 
 ana ivill huve an End — Dfficulty of Conceiving a Being ivhofe Dura^ 
 tion is not meafured by Time — yet it is neceffaryfo to conceive Divi- 
 nity — V/hat Plotinusy^/j/j upon this SubjecL 
 
 TH A T ti?ne, though not a caufc, is a neceflary adjunct or con- 
 comitant of the material world, cannot be denied ; for every 
 thing in it exifls in time 5 and the divifions of timcy viz. paft, prefent, 
 
 X X 2 and
 
 34S ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV. 
 
 and future, apply to it. It therefore belongs to this univerfal philo- 
 fophy to treat of it. 
 
 If there were no motion^ fays Euclid, there would be no found, nor 
 any fenfe of hearing* — He might have added, nor any other perception 
 of fenfc — Further, there would have been no vifible world, nor gene- 
 ration or produdion of any kind here below — and, among other 
 things, time could have had no exiftence. And this ftill further fhews 
 us the necefTity of knov^^ing what motion is, upon which fo many 
 things depend, and without the knowledge of which it is impoffible to 
 underftand either phyfics or metaphyfics. 
 
 Time is like motion, and many other things, which every body 
 thinks he knows, and, indeed, has fome notion of it, but very few 
 perfedly underftand. ' If no body afk me what time is,' fays St Au- 
 guftine, * I think I know ; but, if any body afk me, I cannot tell.* 
 And, indeed, it is not eafy to give a clear idea of time at once ; but, in 
 the following manner, I think, the definition of it may be inveftigated, 
 and brought out by degrees, beginning with the mofl: general of all 
 ideas, exijlence. 
 
 If nothing exifted, it is evident there could be no fuch thing as 
 time. 
 
 Further, if there were no continuation of exiftence, there could be 
 no time^ becaufe there would be nothing to which it could be ap- 
 plied. This continuation of exiftence is what is called duration. 
 
 Further, ftill, as time is acknowledged by every body to be a mea^ 
 fure of fomething ; and, as we can conceive it applied to nothing but 
 duration^ (for it cannot be applied to quantity, that is, to magnitude 
 
 and 
 
 • Euclid, fcUio Canonis in initio^
 
 Chap. I. A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. 349. 
 
 and number, nor to quality, fubftance, or any other of the categories, 
 confidered abfolutely in themfelves, and without refpect to duration)^ 
 it follows, that time is the meafure of duration. 
 
 But, can time be applied to the duration of all beings ? Suppofe a 
 being altogether unchangeable, both as to its fubflance, and as to its 
 qualities and energies — eternal likewife, as well as invariably the 
 fame — How can we conceive any meafure of duration applied to fuch 
 a being ? The whole of its duration, being infinite, is impollible to 
 be meafured ; nor can any period or ftate of it be meafured, as there 
 is no change or fucceffion of ftates or of energies in fuch a being, by 
 which any period of its exiftence can be marked and bounded. It re- 
 mains, therefore, that only the duration of fuch beings can be mea- 
 fured as change, either in fubftance, or in their qualities or energies ; 
 and, if fo, we can make the definition of time a little more particular, 
 by faying, ' That it is the meafure of the duration of beings liable to 
 * change or fucceffion.' 
 
 Thus, we have difcovered the fiihjeBs to which the meafure of time 
 16 applied ; But it remains to be inquired what this meafure is, of 
 what nature, and from whence taken. 
 
 As the things to be meafured exift by change and fuccefllon, it is 
 evident that the meafure mufl be of the fame kind : For the meafure 
 or ftandard mufl: of neceffity be like to the thing meafured, otherwife 
 it could not be applied to it. If, for example, it were magnitude that was 
 to be meafured, whofe parts are continuous and co-exifient, the mea- 
 fure muft be of the fame kind. A^ain, if the thing to be meafured were 
 number, whofe parts are difcrete, the meafure muft be number, or the 
 common meafure of number — unity. In like manner, when the thing 
 has no parts co-exiftent, but exifts only by fucceffion, the meafure 
 muft be of that kind ; and, if it were a thing that exifted wholly by 
 change and fucceffion, the more perfed meafure it would be. Now, 
 
 as
 
 350 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV. 
 
 as was obferved before*, tbereare only two tbings whicb exifl: in tbat 
 way ; t'wic itfelf, concerning which we are inquiring, and motion '\, 
 Motion, therefore, is the meaftire we want ; which, when applied to 
 beings liable to change and fucceffion, is thus. 
 
 But neither is this fufficiently determinate — For, hov/ is motion to 
 be made a meafure, fo as to be applied to the fubjeds of time ? This 
 Ariftotle has informed us of, by telling us, that we get the idea of 
 thiie^ by obferving what h fir/} and lajl in motion if: And, no doubt, 
 the interval betwixt what is firft and laft, in the movement of any 
 particular body, may be made a flandard or m.eafure, which will ap- 
 ply to any thing capable of being fo meafured. But, how are we ta 
 fix what is firft and laft in the motion of any body ; Suppofe the bo- 
 dy moves in a ftraight line, we may determine what is firft, if the line 
 has a beginning which we know ; and if it be not infinite, and that 
 we know the end of it, we can alfo determine the laft : But this will 
 only be a meafure while this motion lafts, and no longer ; whereas 
 time is underftood to be a perpetual meafure of duration. 
 
 In order, therefore, to make motion the m.eafure we want, it is 
 required, . i7;;o, That the motion be perpetual. 2doy That it re- 
 volve into itfelf, and begin again at the fame point. 3//0, That 
 the duration of its revolutions be always the fame. With thefe re- 
 quifites, the motion of any particular body will be a meafure of 
 duration. But human art has hitherto contrived no fuch motion ; nor 
 has any natural motion been difcovered, with thefe requifites, except 
 the motions of the celefiial bodies; and, therefore, men, in all ages and 
 rations, have made their motions the meafure of duration ; particularly, 
 
 the 
 
 * Page 17T. 
 
 ITime, fays Arlflotle, cannot be its own meafure ; x^n^ isx ^ae^KrtAt xi<>ii** Arlft. 
 Phyf. lib. 4. cap. 15. § 7. For, if it were its own meafure, what way could we define it ? 
 % Arift, PhyGc. lib. 4. cap. 16. § 6.
 
 Chap. r. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 351 
 
 the motions of the fun and moon, being the moft confpicuous of thofe 
 bodies *. 
 
 And now we have the full definition of time. ' It Is the meafure 
 
 * of the duration of things that exift in fucceffion, by the motion of 
 
 * the celeftial bodies.' 
 
 From this definition, feveral confequences are to be drawn. And, in 
 ihtjirjl place, as motion and time may be both divided into any gi- 
 ven number of parts, io^ by dividing the periods of the revolution of 
 thofe bodies into any determined number of parts, we divide ti/ne^ in 
 like manner, into months, days, hours, minutes, &c. 
 
 2dOi All the fubjeds to which tujie is applicable, are faid to be in 
 time, and are all, fome way or other, affected by time. But it is evi- 
 dent, as was before obferved, that beings, which fuffer no change, nei- 
 ther in fubflance, qualities, nor energies, cannot be iji time. Of this 
 kind, we conceive Divinity to be; and, therefore, he is not ift time but 
 in eternity^ or s» «(«•.,, as the Greek philofophers exprefs it, by which 
 is meant fimply duration, or continuation of exiftence, but without 
 being any ways bounded or limited. Of the fame kind, are all things 
 that, in any fenfe, may be faid to be unchangeable and eternal ; fuch 
 as theorems and propofitions of fcience ; and, therefore, Ariftotle very 
 properly extends the obfervation to every thing eternal, and which 
 continues always the famef. Of fuch things we fhould not fpeak with 
 any diliindion of time. But, as language was invented for the ufe of 
 men converfant with things in generation and corruption, there is no 
 verb of that kind in in any language, as 1 have elfewhere obferved J. 
 
 * See Arift. phyf. lib. 4 cap. ult. § 8. It has been doubted, I find, of old, whether 
 the revolutions of the fun were all equal to one another, as Plutarch tells us, De Ifidc 
 ct Ofiridey i?i initio. 
 
 t Tat dfioira. Phyf lib. 4. cap. 19. § 7. 
 
 ■t Origin of Language, vol.2, page I22'
 
 352 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV. 
 
 2tiOy As there is no time vA'Ithout motion^ fo there is no motion with- 
 out body. And there Is a fourth thing v;hlch alfo muft be confidered, 
 viz. number. For the revolutions of the motion, or the parts of that re- 
 volution, muft be numbered. And hence it is that AriQotle has defined 
 time not improperly to be the number cf motion *. Thefe four are 
 all conneded, but different. Body comes firft in order, and is the 
 leading idea, as, without ir, there could not be motion. Next comes 
 motion ; by which we are to underfland only one of the three kinds 
 of motion before mentioned, viz. from place to place, exprefled by- 
 one word in Greek, viz. spc^*, for the other kinds of motion would not 
 ferve the purpofe of a meafuref; and not even all, as I have fliovvn, 
 of that kind. And to this motion, number applied, produces time. 
 From this account, it is evident that time is an adjuncSt made to mo^ 
 iion by the mind, through the application of number to it ; for, with- 
 out number, there can be no \\\t or application of any thing to any 
 purpofe in human life. Moreover, as motion cannot be without body, 
 nor time without motioUy it is of neceffity that both time and motion 
 fhould participate of the qualities of lody-^ from which they are deri- 
 ved. As body, therefore, is continuous, and infinitely divifible, fo is 
 motion^ and likewife time f. But they are continuous in a different 
 manner. For the parts of body are continuous, as co-exifting and 
 lying together. But, as in motion, the feveral parts of the body oc- 
 cupy feveral fpaces, not at once, but by fucceffion, one after another, 
 it is neceffary that the parts of motion^ though continuous, fliould not 
 be co-exiflcnt, but exiftent by fucceffion ; but they mufl be infinitely 
 divifible, as the parts of the body moved are ; and, as time is nothing 
 but motion ufed as a meafure, the fame mull be true of tijne, 
 
 • «§/*(«•? Tijf KifnciMf, Arifl. Phyf. lib. 4. cap. ult. § 7<. 
 t Ibid. cap. 17. § 3. 
 $ Ibid. cap. 18. 57.
 
 Chap. I. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 353 
 
 4/^, As the general idea of motion will apply to fuch a mind as 
 the human, where, though there be no change of fubftance, there is a 
 change and fucceffion of energies, we have from thence fome idea of 
 order, and of nril and laft, and likewife of an interval betwixt ; but9 
 as we have no ftandard by which to mcafure that interval, it is not 
 Time, but, as Ariftotle has obferved, only thefirft rude notion of Time. 
 But, as I can apply it to the duration of things, and fay, that a thing 
 has laded from the time I had one thought, till I had fuch another, it 
 may be confidered as fome bound or limit fet to duration, though not 
 a determined one, fuch as Time *. 
 
 5/(9, As Time is duration bounded, and as it is infinitely divifible, it 
 follows, that the bounds or terminations of the different portions of 
 it are infinite in number. Thefe bounds are called moments or /«- 
 Jlants ; and they are what points are in a line, which may be infinite 
 in number, as the line is infinitely divifible. But it is well obferved 
 by Ariftotle, that Time does not confift of inftants any more than a 
 line does of points f ; for an inftant is no part of time, but the boun- 
 dary of its feveral portions, in the fame manner as a point is no part 
 of a line, but the termination of it, or of any certain part of It ; with 
 this difference betwixt the two, that a point has a fituatlon, and Is 
 fixed ; whereas, an inftant is continually moving, as the body is, from 
 the motion of which Time arifes J. It is, therefore, the intervals be- 
 twixt moments that are the parts of Time, as the intervals betwixt 
 points in the fame line are parts of that line ; and, as fome geometers 
 have conceived a line to be generated by the flux of a point, fo we 
 may conceive Time to be generated by the flux of an inftant, which is 
 therefore here and there, and every where, in Time, 
 
 * See Arift. lib. 4. cap. 16. 
 
 t Ibid. cap. 17. § 7. 
 
 X Ibid. Phyf- cap. ult. § 14.
 
 354 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV. 
 
 6/0, The common divifion of Time is mio prefent, paj, 2<x\^ future. 
 The prefent is the noiv indant ; which, like all the inftants of time, i& 
 the beginning of one portion of it, and the end of another, as the fame 
 point in a line is the beginning of one portion of it, and the end of 
 another. The miv, therefore, ftands betwixt the part and the future, 
 being the end of the one, and the beginning of the other. Bur, as it 
 has no parts, and is not time, it follows, that what we call ihc prefent 
 tune, is made up of fo much of the time immediately before this noiv, 
 and of lb much of the time immediately after it ; that is to fay, of fo 
 much of the part, and fo much of the future ; fo that, properly fpeak- 
 ing, there is no fuch thing as time prefent '*. 
 
 7^0, It is therefore true what Mr Harris has faid, that Time iVa 
 being of a moft fhadowy and unfubftantial nature, and which comes 
 nearer than any other to no-~being : For the paft is no longer, the 
 future is not yet, and the prefent has no exigence \ he might have add- 
 ed, nor ever had : For there is this difference betwixt the paft and 
 the prefent, that the paft had an exiftence ; and Horace fays, that even 
 the Divinity cannot make it not to have exifted 
 
 Non tamen irritum cfficiet, infedumque reddet 
 Quod fugiens fcmel hora vexit 
 
 and alfo, betwixt the prefent and future, that the future has a 
 certain exiftence, potentially at leaftj, whereas the prefent neither 
 
 has^ 
 * There are fome words denoting the prefent, ^vhIch take in a portion c£ either 
 paft or future. Thus, Ariftotle tells us, Phyf. lib, 4. cap. 19. § 2.. that ,1, applies to 
 any portion of time near to the prefent noiv, whether before or after it. Thus, I can 
 fay, ritn /3^^..«, or «^« /3s/3.,^...«. The fame I take to be the fignification of the Latin moM, 
 ^nd the Englifh ;2o-u. ; for I can fay moxfeci, and mo^faciam; and, in Engiifh, 1 have 
 m-oi done it, and I fhall now do it. In^ie fame pafTage, Arillotle tells us, that «gT, 
 is confined to the time immediately preceding the prefent na-w ; and, I think, itihould 
 be rendered in Englifli h^j jvjl novj. M'hen came you ? Juft now ; which is in Gxeek 
 u^n -heov On the other hand, if I have a mind to exprefs only the future time, near- 
 eft to the prefent inftant, the word, in Englifti, is prefen^Jy. When will you do it ? 
 Pre/snt/y.
 
 Chap. L A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I C S. 355 
 
 has bady nor ivili have an exldence ; and is nowife diftinguiflied from 
 the pa/^ a.nd future J but as a boundary betwixt the two ; which I have 
 fhown is no part of time, any more than a point is of a line. 
 
 Laflly^ It is true what Ariftotle obferves *, that, as motion is the 
 meafure of Time, fo Time is the meafure of motion ; for, by applying 
 Time to motion, we fay, that one motion is quicker or flower than an- 
 other, or lafts longer or (horter time than another. But it is to be 
 obferved, that, from motion, we muft firft have formed a meafure of 
 Time, before we can fo apply it ; fo that it is ftill true, that it is from 
 motion only that Time originally proceeds. And, 2^0, The reafon why 
 Time can be applied to motion is, that it is of a nature perfectly fimilar, 
 and therefore like meafures like ; but it cannot be applied to magni- 
 tude, whofe parts are co-exiftent ; nor to number, whofe parts are dif- 
 crete, unlefs by accident '\ ; as, when we fay that a road is four hours 
 long, or a number is four times as great as another, the meaning of 
 which is, that the motion by which the journey is to be performed 
 will continue four hours, and that the operation of multiplying the 
 leflTer number muft be four times repeated in order to make it equal to 
 the greater. 
 
 From thefe confideraiions, the truth of what I fald in the beginning 
 of this chapter is ftill further apparent, viz. that Time cannot be ap- 
 plied to any being of ftable and permanent duration^ without change 
 or variation of any kind, but only to beings that are in a conftant flux, 
 and always changing, either as to their fubftance, or their qualities and 
 energies. The common diftinftion, therefore, betwixt Eternity and 
 Time appears to be well founded ; the former only applying to a being 
 
 Yy 2 with- 
 
 * Ibid. cap. 18. § 6. et feq, 
 
 t I ufe the word accident here in the fenfe that Ariftotle ufes the word c-vff.liifii^x.o{f 
 to denote a property that we afcribe to a thing that does not arife from the nature of 
 the thing itfelf, but from fomething elfc which we conGder as conne6ted with it- 
 'i'hus, the property of Time, which we afcribe to a road, does not belong to the road, 
 qua road, but to the motion we make in travelling that road.
 
 356 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book IV.% 
 
 without change or variation of any kind ; the latter, to beings which 
 exift only by fucceffion, either as to their fubftance, or their accidents. 
 Of the firfl kind, we conceive the Deity to be, whom we believe not 
 only to have been from all eternity, but to be ivithout change^ or flja- 
 dotv of change. As to his eternity, it is admitted by all philofophers, 
 that there never was a time when nothing exifted ; but there always 
 mufl: have been Jomething^ otherwife nothing could ever have been. 
 Whatever, therefore, the firft caufe or principle of things be, whether 
 mind or matter, atoms or empty fpace, it muft have been, according 
 to the fentiments of the whole philofophers, from all eternity ; fo that 
 a Deity, or Firft Caufe, of one kind or other, is admitted by all philo- 
 fophers, and acknowledged to have exifted from all eternity. Of the 
 other kind are all material fubftances, which are in perpetual flux, 
 and conftantly changing, both as to fubftance and accidents. Thofe 
 philofophers, therefore, whofe Deity v;as matter, and who maintained, 
 that nothing but matter exifted in the univerfe, did not acknowledge 
 any being of ftable and permanent duration ; confequently, according 
 to them, every thing exifted in time ; and they did not acknowledge 
 the diftindion above mentioned betwixt time and eternity *. And 
 one of thefe philofophers, viz. Heraclitus, faid very properly, that evc- 
 
 * Democritu.3 and Epicurus, who make a vacuum to be one of the principles of na' 
 ture, did acknowledge this dillin£tion ; becaufc a vacuum, if it be any thing at all, is 
 certainly a permanent and durable exiftence, without change or variation, at leaft 
 while it continues a vacuum. But it is to be obferved, in xhcfirjl place, that a va- 
 cuum, by being filled with body, undergoes the greatefl of all changes, for it pafles 
 from a ftate of exiftence to a ftate of non-exiftence. And this, according to their fy- 
 Hem, was conftantly happening, by the perpetual motion of their atoms. 2dly, One, 
 at leafi, of their principles of nature, was in perpetual fiux and change ; fo that, fup- 
 pofing their vacuum to be of permanent duration, the other principle was continually 
 changing. Here, therefore, are two principles of things, of natures quite difFcrent; the 
 one fixed and immoveable, the other in ccnftant motion. But the truth is, that, ac- 
 cording to thofe philofophers, there is no fixed or permanent principle in nature : So 
 that, according to them, time and eternity were the fame, and every thing eternal;: 
 ^ttt every thing unftablc, without order or arrangement, conftancy, or fixed duratioa.
 
 Chap. I. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 357 
 
 ry thing flowed like a river, and that our apprehenfions were fuch as 
 the nature of things ; fo that, as we could not bathe twice in the fame 
 river, neither could we have twice the ikme apprehenfion of the fame 
 thing, idly^ Of this kind, likewife^ are immaterial fubftances, whofe 
 qualities and energies are various and fucceffive ; for to them Time 
 may likewife be applied. But, though immaterial fubftances, in this 
 way, maybe thefubje6t of Time, as well as material, yet, without body, 
 and body moving by a motion revolving into i-tlelf, we cannot con- 
 ceive any ftandard or meafure of Time, 
 
 A confequence of the principles here laid down Is, thr.t, if the vi- 
 fible world had a beginning, and was not from all eternity, then, ac- 
 cording to the hypothefis of genuine Theifm., time was when there 
 was no Time. And, again, if this world fb.ould be totally deftroyed and 
 annihilated, Time will be when there wfti be no time. For, in both 
 thefe cafes, there neither is a fubjeQ, to the duration of which Time 
 can be applied ; nor is there any ftandard or meafure for it. It is on- 
 ly, therefore, during the exiftence of the material world, that there 
 can be fuch a thing as' Time. But, though Time do then exift:, it can* 
 not be applied to the eternal and unchangeable Being, becaufe he is 
 not a fa bje^Il Vs'hofe exift'^^nce can, in that way, be meafured. 
 
 This, I know, v^ill appear incomprehennblc to moft: of my readers, 
 and a contradiction in terms, that time was when there was no time* 
 And it muft be owned, that this notion is fo remote, both from com- 
 mon apprehenfion and common fpeech, that it is not very eafy to find 
 words to exprefs it, which do not feem, at leaft, to imply a contradic- 
 tion. For our bodies, and the fenfitive part of bur nature, are lo ef- 
 fcntially connedled with Time, and fo necefl'ariiy carried on with it, that 
 it is very difticult for us to conceive any notion of a timelefs eternity, 
 or of any Being whofe duration is not to be meafured in the fame 
 manner as ours is. But, if we are fo far advanced in this philofophy, 
 
 as
 
 358 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV. 
 
 as to form an idea of a being who is invariably the fame, both as to 
 fubftance, and as to qualities and energies,whofe effence confifts in ac- 
 tion, and who can never fufFer or be moved, and who had no begin- 
 ning, nor can have any end, then we (hould clearly perceive, that, to 
 fuch a being, it is impofTible to apply time ; for, how can infinite du- 
 ration be meafured ? or, how can any part of thai duration be diftin- 
 guifhed from another, when all of it is the fame, without any change 
 or fucceflion of any kind ? Of a Being of fuch immutable perfedion, 
 it may, indeed, be faid, in one fenl'e, that yrjlerday^ to-day, and for- 
 ever, are the fame ; but it is only in a figurative fenfe ; for, v;e are not 
 to imagine it to be poflible by nature, that thcfe three periods of time 
 (hould be accumulated and united into one ; but, we are to underftand, 
 that the famenefs and uniformity of the exigence of this Being is 
 fuch, that no diftindion of time can be applied to it. 
 
 It is of the more importance to conceive the Deity thus unextended 
 as to Time, that we fliall thereby be better enabled to conceive him 
 likewife unextended as to parts, place, and fpace. Betwixt thefe two 
 there is a very great connexion, as is moft acutely and ingenioufly ob- 
 ferved by Plotinus, a philofopher of as great depth as, I believe, any 
 that ever lived ; fometimes of much greater depth than I can fathom. 
 He has faid, that, as we cannot conceive the Deity to be ftretched out 
 in Time, and divided into paft, prefent, and future ; fo, neither can we 
 conceive him to be extended in parts different from one another, and 
 differently fituatcd, and, by confequcnce, feparable *. In fliort, we 
 cannot conceive the Deity to be magnitude, that is, compofed of an 
 infinite number of magnitudes f. 
 
 Thus, 
 
 » See the paflage quoted by Cudworthj p. 781. 
 
 t See alfo Simplicius's defcription of body or magnitude, Mi^ie-rH fn> a^xui « <r«««- 
 Tixij evc-im irxctt «XA<yv uX^Xx^ov rvi fit^iut xM/ttvA-c. In Arift. Phyf. p. 3. And Plotinus 
 fays fomewhere, that body is «>.a« ^ttsr' «a/». This is the beft account I have ever met 
 
 v.'ith,
 
 Chap. I. ANTIENT METAPHYISICS. 359 
 
 Thus, I have finKhed what I have to fay of timey a fubjed which 
 undoubtedly belongs to this univerfal fcience ; for the univerfe exifts 
 in it. It began with the univerfe, and can never end but with it. It 
 is, in fhort, a neceflary adjunct of nature, without which no vifible 
 world ever could have exifted. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
 with, of that wonderful and moft myfterlcus unity and perfed indivifibility of the 
 Godhead, which mufl be extended to his duration as well as his fubllance. And, as 
 Plotinus has obferved, in the paflage above quoted, this manner of exifting is the moft 
 perfeft that can be conceived •, more perfed, I doubt, than human intelle6l can form a 
 clear idea of. Nor do I think we can do more than perceive the necelTity of the moft 
 perfe£l Being exifting in that manner ; for, I think, we clearly fee the impoffibiiity of 
 his duration being in a conftant flow like a river, and one moment hurrying to over- 
 take another, and always fomething ftill to come ; fo that nothing is perfe£l or com- 
 pleat. However difBcult it may be, therefore, to conceive it, yet the neceffity is ap- 
 parent, that his duration fliould be fhut up and included in eternity, in the fame man- 
 ner as his fubflance mufl: be altogether and within itfelf, not divided into parts, oije 
 of which lies here, one there 5 and thefe parts again infinitely divifible.
 
 |6o ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV. 
 
 C H A P. II. 
 
 Space taken in tivo Senfes^ a larger and a jlricler — The Inquiry here 
 concerning Space hi the Jlri tier Senfe, that is^ 'void o/Body — Different 
 Opinions concerning Space — confidered by fome as different from Body 
 a7id Mind, and as a kind of Ritual to Deity — Space confidered upon 
 the Suppofition oj Nothing exifiing — Then Space is nothing but the 
 viere Capability oj receiving Body — In ivhat Senfe Space can be /aid to 
 have the three Dimenftons — Space confidered likeivife upon the Suppofi^ 
 iion (?/■ Deity exijling from all Eterfiity, but not the Material World — 
 Upon that Suppofition, likeivife. Space nothing but mere Potentiality — 
 LaOly, Space confidered upon the Suppofition of the Exiftence of the Ma- 
 ierial World — Upon that Suppoftion, it has no Exiftence but in Relation 
 o/'Body, and thai in three RefpeBs — but abfohtely, in it/elf, a mere 
 Non-entity — Place is nothing but Space filled vuith Body — From 
 thence arifes a floor t Definition o/' Space, viz. that it is Place, ^w»«,tt«, 
 or in Capacity. 
 
 s 
 
 PACE, taken in the moft general fcnfe, comprehends whatever 
 is extended, and may be meafured by the three dimenfions, 
 length, breadth, and depth. In this fenfe, it is the fame with exten- 
 fion. Now, Space, in this large fignification, is either occupied by 
 body, or it is not. If it be not, but is void of all matter, and con- 
 tains nothing, then it is Space in the ftrideft fignification of the word, 
 and as it is commonly ufed in Englifli philofophical language, being' 
 the fame with what is called a vacuum^ 
 
 Whether
 
 Chap. ir. A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. 361 
 
 Whether there be any fuch thing in Nature 2.%fpace^ \\\ this fenfe 
 of the word, is a queftion that does not belong to this part of rr;y 
 work, but will be treated of in the fecond part ; the fubjedt of which 
 is Nature : And I am only to inquire here, what the nature of /pcice 
 is, and what notion we ought to have of it, upon the fuppoiition that 
 it exifls. 
 
 This inquiry is more neceflary, that it feems to be confidered by 
 many of our modern philofophers as fomething entirely dillindt, both 
 from body and 7mnd : So that, according to them, 1 have been hi- 
 therto miftaken in fuppofing, that all things are either body or wzW. 
 Some of them fee-n to confider it as a kind of rival to Deity ; for they 
 afcribe to it no lefs than four attributes of the Deity, etefnity. imfnobi^ 
 lity^ infinity^ and necefjary exiftence ; and others of them have gone fo 
 far as to make Deity, in fome fenfe, dependent xn'^owjpace ; for they 
 tell you, that infinite /pace is \X\t fenforitim of the Deity ; by which, if 
 they mean any thing, they muft mean, that it is by /pace that the 
 Deity perceives, as we do by organs of fenfe. It is therefore worth 
 while to inquire. Whether Jpace be entitled to this rank and prece- 
 dency in Nature ? or, Whether it be not the meaneft thing in Nature, 
 if any thing at all — and fuch as cannot, in any fenfe, be called a caufe 
 or principle of things ? 
 
 Let us fuppofe, however extravagant and abfurd the fuppofition 
 may be, that time was when nothing exifted, neither body nor mind^ 
 fiihjlance nor accident ; flill, however, there would h^fpace and a va~ 
 cuiiiUy fuch as in an exhaufted air-pump, but without bounds or li- 
 mits. 1 defire to know. What fort of being ih\s /pace is ? It cer- 
 tainly is noijubjiance ; neither is it accident ; for, Cf what fhould it 
 -be the accident ? Is it then nothing? It is, in one fenfe ; for it is no- 
 thing aflually exifling ; but it is fomething potentially ; for it has the 
 capacity of receiving body^ for which it furnilhes roofu or place. It 
 
 ^' ^ has,
 
 362 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book IV. 
 
 has, therefore, a potential cxlftence, of a very fingular kind ; for o- 
 ther things that exift potentially have the capacity of becoming7o;w- 
 thing. Thus, wood, for example, has the capacity of becoming a 
 chair or a table ; brafs the capacity of becoming a ftatue or a vafe ; 
 and the firft matter has the capacity of becoming every corporeal 
 thing : But /pace has not the capacity of becoming any thing, but 
 only of receiving any thing. In fhort, it is not, nor cannot become 
 any thing itfelf, nor hath any adual exigence ; but is that without 
 which nothing corporeal could exift. It is not, therefore, a caufe, in 
 any fenfe of the word ; for it is not the 7naterial or formal caufe of 
 any thing ; neither is it the efficient ox final ; but it is merely pajjive 
 of the exiflence of body. 
 
 It may be objeded, that we can conceive ^^r^, in fuch a cafe, to be 
 meafured by yards and feet, as well as body ; therefore fomething more 
 may be predicated of it than merely being the receptacle of body^ viz. 
 that it is capable of being meafured, and that it has the three dimen- 
 fions ; but this is only a confequence of its capability to receive W/ ; 
 for body muft be in it before it can be meafured ; for it is only by 
 the application of body to it that it is meafured ; and, being applied to 
 it, it is of neceflary confequence that its dimenfions fhould correfpond 
 with the dimenfions of body^ becaufe it furrounds and bounds body. 
 It is not, therefore, fpeaking properly, to fay, ihditfpace has the three 
 dimenfions, as thcfe belong only to body-y diud fpace^ as furrounding 
 body J does no more than correfpond to thefe dimenfions. 
 
 Space^ therefore, upon the fuppofitlon of its being the only thing 
 exifting, is nothing but the capacity of receiving body^ whenever it 
 fhall exift ; and it is "ptvitCdy pqffive of body ; not only receiving it, 
 but letting it pafs through it, without the leaft refiftence. And this is 
 one difference, among others, betwixt matter z.udi/pace, that matter is 
 cffentially and neceflarily exifting, or antitypus, as the Greek philofo- 
 
 phers
 
 Chap. It. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 363 
 
 phers exprefTedit ; whereas, ^^r^ is perfectly yielding, and unrefift- 
 ing. 
 
 But, let me make another fuppofitlon, not extravagant or abfurd, 
 that hody^ and all the vifible world, had a beginning, and that once 
 nothing cxifted but that Being which is alone of neceflary as well as 
 eternal exiftence ; [pace would then exift likewife ; but it would then 
 be no niore than what it was upon the other fuppofition, viz. a capa- 
 city of receiving body. But it is faid that, upon this fuppofition, it is 
 eternal, or neceflfarily exiftent, and immoveable, as well as the Deity. 
 And, in this way, certain free-thinkers endeavour to put it upon a 
 footing with Deity. But, as to eternity, it is evident that the capaci- 
 ty, ox potentiality^ as it may be called, of every thing, mufl have been 
 from all eternity. Every thing that now adually exifts, mud, upon 
 the fuppofition I now make, have once exifted in the ideas of the Di- 
 vine Mind, that is, only in capacity. And, for the fame reafon, what 
 was neceifary for receiving and admitting them, after they were crea- 
 ted, muft neceflarily have exifted alfo, otherwife the things them- 
 felves were not capable of exifting. For the fame reafon, it is evi- 
 dent, that fpace muft be of neceflTary as well as eternal exiftence, being 
 the receptacle of things which could not otherways have exifted. 
 And, as to its being immoveable, it has that in common with every 
 thing which is not body ; for every immaterial fubftance, every idea, 
 every form, and every capacity of exiftence, cannot, by its nature, be 
 moved. And, as to what is commonly faid, that God fills infinite 
 fpace^ it is fpeaking very improperly of God, as if he were a material 
 fubftance that could occupy ^flr<r. And, to fay, that fpace is the/^^z- 
 forimn of the Deity, is ftill a more improper expreflijn, as it fup- 
 pofes that the Divinity could not perceive but in the manner 
 we perceive objects of fenfe, that is, by the means of organs of 
 feafe* 
 
 Z Z 2 But,
 
 364 AN TIE NT METAPHYSICS. Book IV. 
 
 But, laying afide all fuppofitlons* I come now to what Is the fadt, 
 namely, that a vifible world exifts; and I will fuppofe that, in this 
 world, or without it, there may be luch a thing as a 'vacmnUy ovfpace^ 
 void of body. What (hall we fay of fuch^^^'^ ? The fame, in my 
 opinion, that we faid of it upon the former fuppofition, viz. that it is 
 the receptacle of body. From thence refult, upon this laft fuppofition, 
 two other properties o^fpacc^ namely, that it marks the interval or di- 
 flance betwixt bodies ; z.^{\^feco7idlyi that it bounds and limits them- 
 
 As to the firft, if we fuppofe feveral bodies^ not continued or joined 
 together, to be contained \n/pace^ it follows, of neceifary confequence, 
 that there mufl: he /pace betwixt them. ; which /pace is called inter^ 
 valor diftance betwixt bodies. And, as to the other, it is likewife e- 
 vident, that the fuperhcies of all bodies muft be bounded hy /pace y 
 for, if they were not fo bounded, they would be infinite. And, if we 
 fuppofe the whole colledion of bodies that conftitute the uiiiverfe not 
 to be infinite, but bounded, it is evident that the boundary can be no- 
 thing elfe hwifpacc. It is true, indeed, that \.\i\sfpacej which we fup- 
 pofe to be on the ouifide of the world, is infinite; but, for that reafon, 
 to compare fpace with the Deity, is as abfurd as it is impious; for, 
 to fay lhz.\. fpace is infinite, is faying no more, than that there is room 
 for more creation, and more worlds, if it fhall pleafe the Almighty to 
 make them *. 
 
 To conclude, therefore, from all thefe different views in which 
 
 Jpace has been confidered, it is evident, that it is nothing elfe but a re^ 
 
 ktion ; and it is relative to body^ and to body only ; and this in three 
 
 refpeds j 
 
 * In what fenfe the Deity is infinite, and how his infinity is to be tliftinguiflicd 
 £rom tlie infinity of other things, will be explained in the fecond part of this work.
 
 Chap. II. ANTIENTMETAPHYSICS. 365 
 
 refpeds ; /r/?, as to Its capacity of teceWm^ body ; iriJ/-, as to its 
 bounding or limiting body ; and, lajly, as to its being the diftance be- 
 twixt bodies that are feparated. And, except thofe relations to body^ it 
 is, in every other refpedt, a mere non- entity. Whatever, therefore, 
 has been faid of it, as of a thing exiiling by itfelf, that is, a fubftance, 
 or as quality, quantity, or belonging to any other category, ex- 
 cept relation, is without any ground, and is the error of thofe who 
 have not ftudied univerfals, nor have been taught to diftinguilli 
 accurately betwixt the feveral things of which this univerfe is compo- 
 fed. 
 
 After I have faid fo much of /pace, what I have to fay of place is 
 very fliort. It Is, according to my apprehenfion, nothing but /pace 
 occupied by body, according to the di{Hnd:ion with which I fet out In 
 the beginning of this chapter, betwixt /pace void of body or 'uacumny 
 2iVi6.fpace filled with body. Place, therefore, according to this defi- 
 nition, is different from body, as that which contains Is different from 
 that which Is contained. If there be no vacuum round the body, but 
 other bodies, then is the body not bounded hj /pace, but by the cir- 
 cumambient bodies. And, If there be no 'vacuum in Nature, this- 
 muft be the cafe of all bodies ; and, if (o, the place of every body muft 
 be bounded by the circumambient bodies. And, as Ariiiotle holds 
 that opinion, he accordingly has fo defined p/<7C^ *. 
 
 From this account of place, we are enabled to give a Ihorter defi- 
 nition of /pace than what has hitherto been given, namely, that it is 
 place "^^yxuH, or potentially ; and, when it is filled with body, then It 
 is place a^iially, or fr£gv$(^. This is only exprefling, in fewer words, 
 
 what 
 
 * 7a ^i^cti T«y ;rfg<£;^ovT»s rfi),uHTcu De Natural! Aufcultatlone, lib. 4. cap. 6» 
 verfusjinem>
 
 366 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV. 
 
 \vhat I faid before, thdX /pace was what was capable of receiving or 
 admitting body^ or the capacity ot being tilled with boJy^ that is, 
 becoming place ; for the capacity or power ot becoming any thing, 
 is that thing potentially* 
 
 CHAP.
 
 Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 367 
 
 GAAP. HI. 
 
 Leibnitz* s Definitwi of S^^ce — and of Time — erroneous as to hoth^ hut 
 altogether erroneous as to Space — Abfurd Conjequenee of thefe Errors 
 — Dr Clark's Opinion concerning Space — The Confequence of the DoC" 
 tor^s Opinion is, that Space is an effcntial Property of the Di'uine Na~ 
 $ure — Unable to anfwer Mr Leibnitz's ObjeSiion to his Notion o/' Space 
 '—The Ground of the Dolor's Error — The Ground of the Error of 
 both. 
 
 WH A T I have faid concernlng^j^:^ In the preceding chapter» 
 would, 1 am perfuaded, appear unfatisfacStory to the reader, 
 and he might perhaps think me a fupercilious contemner of modern 
 philofophy, if I (hould not examine the different notions o^ Space de- 
 livered by Dr Clarke and Mr Leibnitz, in thofe famous letters that 
 paffed betv?een them concerning the principles of natural philofo- 
 phy. 
 
 Mr Leibnitz there afferts, ih^tjpace is nothing elfe but the order of 
 things co-exifting, as time is the order of things fucceflive. 
 
 That time is the order of things fuccefTive, Is fo far true, that there 
 is order in time; for there isfrjl and lajl. But, it is evident that Mr 
 Leibnitz, who was not learned in Greek philofophy, did only difcover 
 a part of what had been difcovered by Ariftotle about 2000 years be- 
 fore, concerning time. And, I believe, that will be found to be the 
 
 cafe
 
 3^6. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV. 
 
 cafe of every man in later times, who has pretended to philofophife 
 without the afliftance of the antients. And it is well if they have dif- 
 covered any part of the truth, and have not been altogether in an er- 
 ror, while they thought they were making great difcovcries. lliis is 
 not the cafe with Mr Leibnitz ; for he was right in two things ; Jirfl^ 
 that there was order, or firji and laj}^ in ti7}ie ; ^nd^ fecoiulfy^ that it ap- 
 plied only to things in fucceflion : But he did not know, that the 
 idea of time was taken from jnotio?i, and that, though it was nect:flary 
 to obferve the order of the nwuing body in its progrefs, and what pre- 
 ceded in that progrefs, and what was fubfequent ; yet, it was not that 
 order, by itfclf, which conftituted /zW, but the interval betwixt any 
 two points in the progrefs of the motion. 
 
 But I cannot fay fo much for Mr Leibnitz, with refped to his doc- 
 trine of/pace; for there he appears to me to have miffed of the mark 
 intirely, /pace not being the order of co-exiftents, but a thing altoge- 
 ther different. 
 
 By order, in this definition oi/pace, Mr Leibnitz does not mean the 
 fame kind of order by which he defines lime; for that order is nume- 
 rical order, by which things avejir/i or lajl, fecond, third, or fourth, 
 &c. This order, like number itfelf, hath nothing to do with pofition ; 
 whereas, the order that he applies to /pace, is, as he himfelf has ex- 
 plained it, an order o£ pojihon, that is, fituation or arrangement, by 
 which things arc placed in a ftraight line, or a curve, in the figure of 
 a triangle, fquare, pentagon, <Scc. Now, that order of pofition is not 
 fpace. It is true, indeed, that bodies, placed in any kina of order, 
 muft neceffarily be in Jpace ; but the order in which the bodies are 
 placed, and the Jpace in which they are placed, muft neceffarily be 
 diftind. 
 
 This
 
 Chap. II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 369 
 
 This erroneous notion of Space has led Mr Leibnitz to the abfur- 
 dity of faying, that, fuppofing the whole fyftem of the vifible world 
 to be moved out of the place which it prefently occupies, into fome 
 other portion of Space, beyond the limits of this univerfe, ftill it would 
 be in the fame Space, provided the order and arrangement of the bo- 
 dies, with refpedl to one another, was continued the fame. And his 
 imperfedt notion of Time has made him fay, that, if the world had 
 been created a thoufand years fooner, it w^ould have been created at 
 the fame time, provided there had been the fame order of fucceffive 
 things. . ,i )«-ii, '-■;•..-.(; 
 
 This is the opinion of Mr Leibnitz concerning Space — Let us next 
 examine that of his antagonift Dr Clarke. He has not given us any 
 precife definition of Space ; but he has told us, jirjl^ That it is fome- 
 thing, and not abfolutely nothing, idiy^ That it is not an idea mere- 
 ly, but has fome real exiftence. 3^/y, That it is not the bare relation 
 of one thing to another, arifing from their order or fituation among 
 themfelves. 4//^/^, That it is not Body. 5^^/^, That it is not fub- 
 ftance of any kind : And from thence he infers, that it is a property 
 or accident^ ; and, as what is an accident muft, of neceflity, be acci- 
 dent of fome fubftance, he has faid that it is an accident or proper- 
 ty of God f. 
 
 In examining this opinion of the Dodor, which appears to me al- 
 together new, and, if there be any truth in it, a difcovery made by 
 the Dodtor himfelf, let us firfl: inquire what is meant by faying, that 
 any thing is property or attribute of a fubftance. And the meaning 
 
 Aaa I 
 
 • Page 305. of the Colleaion of thefe Letters in French and Englilh. 
 ■f Ibid, page 77. 127. I2C).
 
 570 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV. 
 
 I take to be no other than this, that It is a quahty inherent in the fub- 
 ftance. If it be fuch a quahty, that the fubftance cannot exift with- 
 out it, then it is what we call an ejjential property ; but, if it be only 
 fuch a quality of the fubftance, that it may be away, and yet the 
 fubftance exift, then it is faid to be an accidental property .^ or an ac- 
 cident, in the ftrideft fenfe of the word. Mow, of this latter kind, 
 it will be admitted, that there is nothing, in the Divine nature, but, 
 that all the qualities which w^e afcribe to Deity are ejfential attributes, 
 exifting neceflarily, as well as the fubftance to which they belong. If, 
 therefore, it be true, that Space is a property of the Deity, it muft be 
 an eflential part of the Divine Nature. 
 
 Againft this opinion of the Dodor, I think Mr Leibnitz argues 
 well, when he fays, that if Space, in general, be part of the Divinity, 
 fo muft every part of Space. And this Divine attribute muft be di- 
 vifible into an infinite number of parts. Nor do I well underftand 
 the Doctor's anfwer, when he fays, that Space is indivifible except in 
 idea ; for, though it be not divifible, like matter, the parts of which 
 can not only be bounded and diftinguiftied one from another, but 
 difcerpted, ox feparated one from another, which the parts of Space 
 cannot be, it is likewife true what Mr Leibnitz fays, that, by lines 
 drawn, or fuperficiefes interpofed, the feveral parts of Space may be 
 adually divided and diftinguifhed one from another. 
 
 Further, if Space be an eflential attribute of the Deity, Why (hould 
 not Matter, which fills that Space, be alfo a part of the Deity ? for, 
 however low or vile a thing Matter may appear to be, it feems to be 
 of greater dignity and eminence than that which only contains it ; 
 for, out of Matter, as I before obferved, joined with Form, all the dif- 
 ferent Speciefes of corporeal things are made. 
 
 What
 
 Chap. 11. ANTIEiNT METAPHYISICS. 371 
 
 What appears to have led the DcxStor into this error, was his 
 fcruple to allow any thing to be of eternal and neceflary exiftencc, 
 as Space undoubtedly is, which was not entirely dependent upon 
 Deity, and part of his Nature. But, if the Do61:or had underftood 
 that Space was nothing abfolutely in itfelf, but only relative to Body, 
 and, therefore, that it had no a(3:ual exiftence, but exifted only ^oteti" 
 tially^ or in poffibitity^ till Body was created, he would eafily have got 
 over that fcruple, and have feen, that this poffibility of Space exiiVmg, 
 was no more part of the Divine Nature than any other poffibility, 
 and, indeed, than the whole vifible creation ; for, if the world was 
 not eternal, it exifted once only in the idea of the Divine Mind, that 
 is, in poffibility. And the foundation of the error, both of the Doctor 
 and Mr Leibnitz, upon this fubjed:, appears to me to be this, 
 that they have not known or attended to that diftindion which 
 runs thro 'the whole antient philofophy, betwixt what aBually exifts, 
 and what exifls only potentially. Every thing exifted in this latter 
 way, in the Divine Mind, before creation or production j and it might 
 as well be pretended, that every animal and vegetable made part of 
 the Divine Nature, as that Space does. 
 
 It muft, however, be confefled, that Dodor Clarke has come nearer 
 the truth than Mr Leibnitz, and has avoided all the abfurdities that 
 Mr Leibnitz has fallen into, in confequence of his notion of Space. 
 The Dodor alfo was in the right in denying that Space was nothing 
 more than the relation of one thing to another, arifmg from their ft- 
 tuation or order among themfelves ; but he ftiould, at the fame time, 
 have obferved, that Space was relative to Body in general, and that, 
 without Body, it had no adual exiftence, but was like all other things, 
 which exift only in idea or poffibility. 
 
 And thus much of Space and Place, which are undoubtedly uni- 
 verfals, making part of the fyftem of this univerfe \ for, though they 
 
 A a a 2 be
 
 372 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV. 
 
 be not principles or caufes, in any fenfe, yet they muft neceflarily have 
 been, otherwife there could have been no fyftem of nature, nor any 
 vifible world. 
 
 In my next Book, according to the method I have propofed, I will 
 proceed to treat of the general principles of Science, and of the nature 
 of Xf uth and Evidence. 
 
 BOOK
 
 Chap,r, ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 373 
 
 BOOK V, 
 
 Concerning the Principles of Science, and of Truth 
 and Certainty. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 The Principles of all Arts and Sciences to he found in Metaphyftcs — li 
 belongs to Metaphyftcs to explain the Principles of Science <, and to de^ 
 Jend them againjl the Cavils of Sophifts — Truth Logical and Meta- 
 phyfical — Logical Truth or Propojitions the Suhje6l of this Chapter — 
 Propofttions analyzed — In all Propofitions, one Term at leaf mufl he 
 a General or Idea — Divifion of Propofttions into thqfe *which have 
 both Terms general, and thofe ivhich have only one. 
 
 IT has been often faid, in the courfe of this work, that it is in the 
 firft phiiofophy that we are to feek for the principles of all arts and 
 fciences : And, indeed, it is a matter of common obfervatlon, that 
 CTery deep difquifitlon, upon any fubje6t, ends in metaphyfics. This 
 I fhall afterwards (how more at large, and prove by particular exam- 
 ples. But, in this chapter, I propofe to inquire what is the principle 
 of all fcience and demonftration of every kind — an inquiry which, I 
 
 think,
 
 374 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 think, neceflarlly precedes the other ; for, it will be impoffible to fhow 
 that the principles of particular fciences are to be found in metaphy- 
 fics, if we cannot Ihow that it is to that fcience we owe the know- 
 ledge of ivhat fcience is-, and that it is from the principles which it 
 furnifhes, that we are able to eftablilli the certainty of fcience, and to 
 defend it againft all the cavils of fophiftry ; for there have been, in 
 anticnt times, as well as modern, men, who have endeavoured to ihake 
 the foundations of all human knowledge ; And, accordingly, we fee 
 that Ariftotle, in his books of metaphyfics, argues much againft men 
 of that kind, who, in his time, denied even the truth of axioms* 
 
 What Truth is, was a queftion afked at our Saviour by the Roman 
 Governor, but which is not anfwered ; nor, indeed, was it necelTary 
 to anfwer it, the nature of truth being difcoverable by our own facul- 
 ties, unafTifted by revelation, as well as the language, by which 
 truth is enunciated, and the other arts of life. It is, however, a difco- 
 very that does not feem to have been made, at leaft, by the philofo- 
 
 k 
 
 phers of Greece, till Arlftotle wrote his books of Analytics, the pro- 
 feffed defign of which is, to fhov/ what ScieHce or Demonftrative 
 Truth is^ 
 
 The Truth, of which I am here to treat, is what Is called Logical Truths 
 being perceived by the aG* of the mrnd, comparing together its own 
 ideas or perceptions ; and it is diftinguiihed from what is called Meta- 
 phyjical or tranfcendental Truths which belongs only to fingle ideas ;, 
 for, if the idea be agreeable to Nature, the fource and origin of all our 
 ideas, and, if it involve no contradidtion, fuch as the idea of a round 
 fquare would involve, it is faid to be a true idea. In the fame fenfe we 
 may fay, that any piece of human workmanfliip is tnie ivork^ being 
 conformable to the idea in the mind of the artift. And, in a like fenfe, 
 we fay, that the works of Nature herfelf have Truth in them, as 
 they are conform to the ideas ia the Divine Mind. And this truth is 
 
 the:
 
 aap. I. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 375 
 
 the fame with i\\2k.\. goodnefs which is mentioned in Scripture, where it 
 is faid that * God faw that his works were good,* * anfwering his 
 * fair idea,' as Milton has very well paraphrafed it. 
 
 As to the Truth of which I am fpeaking, it is evident, JirJ}^ That 
 there muft be a Mind which perceives it ; fecondly^ That there muft 
 be perceptions in this Mind, which are compared together ; for it is 
 this comparifon or combination which makes what we call a propoji^ 
 tion ; and it is the truth of proportions that is the fubjedt of our 
 prefent inquiry. Thefe perceptions, thus combined together in pro- 
 pofitions, are what we call, in logical language, the terms of the pro- 
 pofition ; and the one of thefe terms is faid to be affirmed or 
 denied of the other ; fo that every proportion is either affirmative or 
 negative ; and what is affirmed or denied is called the praedicate of 
 the propofition ; and the terra of which it is praedicated or denied, is 
 thtfubje^ of the propofition : So that every propofition necelTarily 
 confifts of a praedicate and a fubjed *• 
 
 All 
 
 * According to the common ufe of language, it is fometimes not very ob- 
 vious which is the praedicate of the propofition, and which is the fubjedl. 
 In the natural order of things, the praedicate fliould go before the fubje£l ; 
 whereas, commonly, in Englifli, it is juft the contrary ; for we fay, God is 
 jujlf Man is unjuft ; where the praedicates, Jufi and unjujly are put laft, and the fub- 
 jefts, God ^nd Man, firft. In the learned languages, it may be either way; but, ac- 
 cording to Ariftotle's manner of analyzing thefe propofitions, the praedicate is al- 
 ways placed firft j and, if the propofition be affirmative, it is joined with x\\tfiibjeEl 
 by the prepofition tcxrx. Thus, the two propofitions I have mentioned, he would ex- 
 prefs in this way, ttKetita-w^ khvm 0e«v. '«S'»k/« kut* ec*6^uTov. And it is from this ufe 
 of the prepofition,, that the term Kxrnyo^ovftivav^ which is the Greek name for the prae- 
 dicate, and KXTnyo^id, are derived. Again, if the propofition be negative, the praedi- 
 cate is connected with the fubjed, according to Ariftotle's analyfis, by the prepofition 
 «T», or, evKXTXj as x^iKix XTTO Tov Q'.fj, Of, e<j KxTfc T»v QitUf ,God ij not unjuji. 
 
 Tbl5
 
 376 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 All the perceptions of the human mind are either ideas or percep- 
 tions of fenfe, that is, they are perceptions, either of generals, or of par- 
 ticular 
 
 Thii way of analyzing propofitions into their praedicate and fubje£l, is, I think, 
 ufcfuJ, efpecially when the propcrition is much involved, which is the cafe when the 
 praedicatc, or fubje£t, or both, are expreiTed, not by one word, but by fereral words, 
 perhaps feveral fentences : For, though Man, for exannple, be the fubje(5l of a pro- 
 pofition, yet, it may be msn, in fach circumftances, as will require feveral fenteii- 
 ces to exprefs. And, in like manner, what is praedicated of INIan, may be a thing 
 that cannot be expreffed, except in many words ; yet, foi all this, the propofition is 
 but one fimple propofition. And this happens, not only in propofitions requiring 
 proof, but in axioms or felf« evident propofitions, which one fliould think the fimpleft 
 of all propofitions ; as, for example, in the firll axiom of Euclid, that things equal to 
 the fame thing are equal to one another, Equality is predicated, not of any two or 
 more things in general, but of two or more things that are equal to the fame thing : 
 So that here the fubjeft of the propofition cannot be exprefled without feveral 
 words. 
 
 The exprefilon of our EngliHi language is fo imperfeQ, that we often cannot- diflli>. 
 guifli whether the propofition be affirmative or negative} whereas, in Greek, that is 
 clearly dillinguiflied by the arrangement of the words. For example, «>i'g«y5re; irrn 
 4v}iKtttn, is an affirmative propofition, the praedicate of which is, notjujiy that being 
 affirmed, of Man ; whereas, cot^curci «i>* te-Tt* J<je«td?, is a negative propofition, the 
 praedicate /t{y? being denied of Man. And the reafon of the difference is, that the 
 negative cu being prefixed to hicuioi, is underftood to be joined with ^ixtcieif fo as to 
 make the praedicate of the propofition *w ttKcuciy notju/i; whereas, when it is prefixed 
 to the verb irri*, it is conftrued with that verb, and makes the propofition negative. 
 But, in Englifln, as we cannot put the negative before the verb, but only after it, we 
 can only fay, Man is notjujiy which is altogether ambiguous, and may be underftood, 
 either as an affirmative or a negative propofition. In this inftance, the fenfe is pretty 
 much the fame, whether the propofition be confidered as affirmative or negative ; but, 
 in other inftances, the difference will be very great ; as, for example, myS^MTrti \vi»rtu 
 ttw T^iyjit^ is an affirmative propofition, where the capacity of not running is affirmed of 
 Man. But xf6^»7rei cu ^uictreti r^i^iiv^ is a negative propofition, which denies that the 
 capacity of running belongs to Man ; yet, in Engliffi, we can exprefs thefe two propo- 
 fitions, fo different in their fenfe, only in one way, viz. Man camiQt run j and, for 
 
 the
 
 Chap. I. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 377 
 
 ticular and indlvidaal things. That thefe two are not the fame, and, that 
 ideas are quite different from fenfationsjnot indegree» but in kind, I hope 
 I have already fully proved. And I think I have alfo made it evident, 
 that there can be no fcience or truth, of any kind, without ideas. And, 
 accordingly, we cannot con'ceive any propofition, of which one of the 
 terms, at leaft, is not an idea ; for, fuppofing the propofition to be af- 
 firming or denying lomething of a particular thing, fuch as an object 
 of fenfe, that which we affirm or deny muft be an idea or a general ; 
 for, fuppofe that it is a property, which we fay belongs or does not 
 belong to it, as, for example, that it is, or is not, round or fquare, white 
 or black, k is the idea of that property which we affirm or deny: Or, if 
 the propofition were fimply, that the particular thing exifts or does not 
 exift, ft ill It would be the idea of exiflence that we affirmed or denied 
 of the thing: Or, if the propofition were, that one particular thing 
 was not another, even, in that cafe, the praedlcate of the propofition 
 would be the idea of di'verfity ; for the meaning of the propofition is, 
 that the two things are different. 
 
 Thus, it appears, that, though both terms of a propofitioii 
 may be general, yet both cannot be particular. And hence comes 
 a divifion of propofitions, which is to be attended to, into thofe 
 of which both the terms are general, and thofe of which one of 
 them only, viz. the praedicate, is a general, and \h^fubjeti a par- 
 
 B b b ticular 
 
 the fame reafon, namely, that the genius of our language is fo flinted in arrangement 
 and compofition, that we can put the negative only after the verb, but not before it. 
 
 Thefe things, I know, it will be faid, are true indeed, but they are ufelefs fubtle- 
 tles. difficult trifles ; but it is to be conHdered, that words are the fymbols or figns, 
 which we ufe in reafoning ; and, if we do not know the force of them, whether 
 fingly or in propofitions, we can no more reafon well, than we can folve an arithme- 
 tical or algebraical problem, without knowing the import of the cyphers or cha- 
 rafters we ufe.
 
 378 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 ticular thing. Of the firft kind of propofitions is made what we 
 call fcience or dejnon/Iration, From the fecond kind arifes another 
 fort of evidence, which T (hall explain in the fequel. But I will begin 
 with the propofitions of the firfl kind. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 Chap. 11. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 379 
 
 CHAP. ir. 
 
 Common Senfe not fnfficient for cxplainhig the Principles of Evidence or 
 Certainty — nor any Learning to he found in Engliflj or in French — 
 }Ar Locke's otvn Account of his E fay —His Mijiake of the Axiom of 
 the Schools i upon ivhich he builds his ivhole Ifork^ is a fundamental 
 Error of his Book — Of General Propofitions^ that isy Propojitions of 
 ivhich both the Terms are general — Mr Lockers Account of the Truth 
 of Juch Propojitions very i7nperfed — The Relation betivixt the tivo 
 Terms of the P ropofition-, Juch as is neccfjary to moke the Propofttion 
 true, particularly explained — All Propojitions cither affirm or deny a 
 Genus of a Species, or an Accident of a Subftance. 
 
 TH O S E of my readers, who are not learned, will be furprifed to 
 find tbat fo many difiind:ions, and nice dilcriminations of things, 
 arc required to inform them what Evidence is ; and they will be apt 
 to fay, what an Englifh Judge faid to a Jury, who afked him that 
 queftion, * That every thing is Evidence which they think is fuch.* 
 Common Jenje^ they will fay, is fufficient to let us know what 
 Certainty and Convidion are, and when we ought to be con- 
 vinced, and when not. But I will tell them, that, not only 
 common Jtnfe is not fufficient for this purpofe, but even the moft 
 micommonjenje^ and the greatefl natural genius j and that, in order 
 to know what truth and I'cience are, they muft either have nivented 
 themlelves a great fyfiem of icience, fuch as Ariftotlc has delivered in 
 
 B b b 2 his
 
 38o ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BookV. 
 
 his books of Analytics, or they mufl: have learned it from others. And 
 I will further add, that, if they are to be taught, it mud be by good 
 mafters, living or dead. As to dead mafters, I mean authors who have 
 written books upon the fubject, I am afraid there are none either ia 
 Engliili or French, that will much inftrua them. Our only ftandard 
 book of the philofophy of Mind is Mr Locke's Eflay upon the Hu- 
 man Underrtanding, of which he is fo modelt as to give this account 
 in his preface, ' That fome hafty and undigefted thoughts, on a fub- 
 
 * ]eCt never before confidered, gave the firft entrance to his Effay ; 
 ' which, begun by chance, was continued by entreaty, written by in- 
 
 * coherent parcels, and, after long intervals of negled, refumed again, 
 ' as humour or occafion permitted.' That there Ihould be any de- 
 gree of perfedion in fuch a work, cannot be expeded. And, indeed, 
 to a man of learning and philofophy, it appears no other than a hafty 
 colledion of crude undigefted thoughts, by a man who thought and 
 reafoned by himfelf, upon fubjedts of the grcateft difficulty, and deep- 
 eft fpeculation, without the affiftance of learning ; for, that he was 
 not an antient fcholar, or learned in antient philofophy, is apparent. 
 And, in his time, there was hardly any thing in French and Englifh 
 books that deferved the name of philofophy ; and the philofophy of 
 the fchoolmen was then almoft entirely out of fafhion. He has, howe- 
 ver, adopted one maxim of it, and made it thefoundation of his whole 
 fyftem ; but a maxim abfolutely falfe, in the fenfe in which he has 
 underftood it. The maxim I mean is, thdil Nihil ejl in intdk^u quod 
 non prius fuit in Jtnfu *. Upon the credit of which, he has confound- 
 ed fenfations and ideas, generals and particulars. But it is no maxim 
 of Ariftotle, who has every where moft carefully diftinguifhed betwixt 
 fenfe and inteiled:, and, cosilcquemly, betwixt their different objeds, 
 fenfations and ideas. And, though i believe the ichoolmen meant it 
 
 ia 
 
 • See what I have faid of this maxim, p. 113. where I have obferved, that, though 
 it be not true of the intellt^) it is true of the phantafia.
 
 Chap. II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 381 
 
 In no other fenfe, but that, in this ftate of our exiftence, we have, 
 from our fenfes, the materials upon which intelled operates and forms 
 its ideas, they have, no doubt, exprefled it ill, and in fuch a wav, as 
 to lead Mr Locke into a capital error, fo that he does not appear to 
 have profited by the little learning he had ; we muft, therefore, if we 
 have a mind to be well inftruded in this philofophy, go, not to Ari- 
 ftotle's interpreters, the fchoolmen, who knew nothing of him except 
 by Latin verfions from the Arabic, but to Ariftotle himfelf, and his 
 Greek interpreters of the Alexandrian School, who not only had the 
 ufe of books that are now loft, but appear, to me, to have had pr^feVved 
 among them a traditional knowledge of his philofophy. From Ari- 
 ftotle, with the afliftance of thefe interpreters, I am now to deliver 
 what I think necelTary for explaining the nature of Science, and Cer- 
 tainty, and Evidence of every kind. 
 
 Having premlfed thus much, I proceed, according to the diftlnc- 
 tion that I have made of propofitions into general and particular *, 
 beginning with general, by which we compare together generals or 
 ideas ; for, as 1 have elfewhere oblerved, all our knowledge, in this 
 ftate of our exiilence. Is compariJon\ for, by comparmg particular 
 things, we acquire ideas, by comparmg ideas we form propolitions> 
 and, by comparing propofitions, we reaion and lyllogize. 
 
 As 
 
 • This is a divlfion of propofitions made by Ariflotle, in the following words 
 which I quote the rather that they dtablilli, beyond all doubt, his belief in the dillinc- 
 tioii betwixt generals and particulars, a diflinrton that 1 hold to be the foundation of 
 all philofophy. Ejre* V m-n ra /Xiv, xzdoXou t<x> v^x/utcruv, rx ^i K.ceS' 'ikocs-tov >.%yu '^i 
 
 K«6AA;«; ti ruv jsotfl' 'kuttoi etvxyKf, §"« XTTofxtUTB-xt Uf vttx. x,n ri n u,f„ on u.%v rain xxicXov nf, 
 
 en h iuf Kx6 (kx't-to^ Ariit. Dc InterpfctatiOi.e. And he tuitiicr fays, that, with- 
 out generals, there can bf no demonltration. --nalytic. Po/ier lib. t.cap. i. ininitio. 
 bo that thofe who maint un that there are no generals, ciu cunicqueuily mainuin, that 
 there is no iuch thing as Uemoaftration.
 
 3S2 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 As we have very many ideas of very many things, it is impof- 
 fible but that our ideas muft have fome relation one to another ; and 
 it is this relation which makes the truth or faH'ehood of any propoii- 
 tion. But what is this relation ? if we can find out this, then we 
 fliiiU know what truth, and its oppofite, faljehood, is. All that Mr 
 Locke has find upon the fubjedt is, that truth confifts in the percep- 
 tion of the agreement or difagreement ot our ideas, meaning, 1 fup- 
 pofe, by the agreement, an affirmative propofition, and, by the difa- 
 gree^ti^eut, a negative propofition. But we are very little the wlier for 
 knayvii,:Vg this, unlefs we know, at the fame time, what kind of agree- 
 ment it is that makes a true affirmative propofition, and what kind 
 of difagreement a true negative ; for it will prefently appear, that it 
 is not every kind of agreement or difagreement that makes a true 
 propofition. 
 
 And, in the jirjl place, in every true affirmative propofition, and, 
 indeed, in every propofition, one of the terms, as we have feen, muft 
 be the praedlcate, the other, ihQ/ubjeSi. Here, therefore, is ib far a 
 difagreement of the ideas in a true affirmative propofition. The two 
 terms of the propofition may, indeed, be the fame, making what is 
 called an identic propofition ; but that is truly no propofition at all, be- 
 ing only a repetition of the fame thing ; as, when we fay, * A man 
 * is a man,' ' An animal is an animal,' ' A triangle is a triangle.' 
 Nor will it alter the cafe, if w^e exprefs the meaning of one of 
 the terms by feveral words, as, when we fay, that man is a ra- 
 tional animal, capable of intelled: and fcience ; or, that a triangle 
 is a figure bounded by three lines ; for that is only explaining the 
 meaning of the word, which is a definition^ not a propofition *. 
 
 Thofe, 
 
 • The difference betwixt a definition and a propofition is, that the definition only 
 tells us what the thing, exprefled by the word, is, without afTirming or denying any 
 thing of it ; whereas, a propofition affirms or denies fomething of it. ^tt Arijiotl, 
 Analytic. Pojier. lib. i. cap. lo. in fine.
 
 Chap. II. ANT IE NT METAPHYSICS. 383 
 
 Thofe, therefore, who would prove the truth of all propofitions, 
 even of axioii:is, by reducing them to identic propoiitions, do not, 1 
 imagine, know what they would be at. 
 
 In order, therefore, to find out what kind of agreement or difagree- 
 ment of xXx? praedicate with \\\t fuhje^ makes a true propofition, we 
 muft try to difcover the feveral relations that a praedicate can have to 
 a fubjedt ; for it is evident that, in every true propofition, there muft 
 be a relation of one kind or another betwixt ihe praedicate and/ub- 
 
 je^ : Now, thefe relations may be reduced to two general heads, the 
 relation of Genus and Species^ and that of Accident and Suhjlance *"; for 
 all propofuions muft either praedicate the genus of i\\Qjpecies^ as when 
 we praedicate animal of man^ hor/e^ or dog ; or the accident of th.Qfub' 
 
 jlance in which it is inherent, as when we praedicate the colour, ivhite, 
 of any animal ; and it is only in one or other of thefe two ways that 
 
 any thing can be praedicatcd of another f. 
 
 And 
 
 * The way that Ariftotle, in the fecond chapter of his Categories, exprefies thefe 
 two relations, is, by faying, that the firfl is Kxd* i7roy.(^/^ivov, when the genus is praedi- 
 catcd of the fpecies as a fubjcdl that is under it ; and the other, he fays, is £» vTriKtiui- 
 »«, when the accident is praedicated of the fubftance, as being in it, and not having 
 any exiftcnce without it ; for that is the true diftinclion betwixt crt;;4^2/3»x«j, or acci- 
 dentt and ««o-/«;, or fubjlance ; fubflance exifting by itfelf, and not in any thing elfe j 
 •whereas accident cannot fubfift by itfelf, but only in fubftance. 
 
 t Ammonius, in his commentary upon the categories, page 59 obfervss, thnt" 
 there are three ways of praedicating ; the one, he fays, is *«t« (py»-i», or natural -, the 
 other, 7r«5<» <J)wc-<v, or unnatural ; and the third is, y-xTu (rvu^%iiv,x.ci^ or, b^ accident. Of 
 the firft kind of praedication are the two 1 have mtntioned, viz. when the genus is 
 praedicated of ih^ fpecies, or the accident of xhc fiihjiance. What he calls the unnatU' 
 r«/ pra' dication is, he fays, juft the rcverfe of this, as, when we praedicate xhcfiib' 
 fiance of thf- accident, or the Jf^ecies of the genus, or, what is the fiime thing, the indi- 
 ' viduai oi tht (pedes. Oi the firft, he gives this example, ro (piXoa-etpovv tovto Y.oK^ciTn; 
 to-Ti. "Where Socrates, the/?//y/a;/rd', is praedicated of the quality /A/Vo/o/'^^r- But 
 this unpi^tural praedication is plainly refoivcd into one that is natural ; for the propo- 
 fition come* juft to this, that the fubft;ince phi/ofophijtng, and the fubftance called 
 Socrates f are the fame j that is, the genus /W(?»//Vy is praedicated of the particular 
 
 relation
 
 384 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 And here, again, we may fee, that, in a true affirmative propofuion 
 of the firft kind, when the genus is praedicated of the fpecies, there is 
 a very great difagreement betwixt the two ideas, in this refped, that 
 the one comprehends or contains the other ; whereas, the other is 
 contained under it, as the part is under the whole ; for that is the re- 
 Lition which genus and fpecies have to one another ; the genus, cmi- 
 mah for example, comprtheading rnan^ horje^ dog. ^^i-x. as parts of it. 
 Attain, in the other way of praedicating, where an accident is praedi- 
 cated of a iubftance, the dijagreement is very great ; for the accident 
 is inherent in the fubftance, and cannot exift without it ; whereas, the 
 
 fubftance 
 
 relation that is betwixt Socrates and the philofophifing fubftance. The inftance he 
 eives of the other is, when we fay, * That this man is hocrates ;' where, fays he, we 
 praedicate Stcrates^ the individual, of man the fprcies, inftead of praedicating in the 
 natural way the fpecies ;»an, of Socrates the individual. But this propofition is like- 
 Avife refolvable into a natural praedication of the fame kind ; for the plain meaning 
 of the propofition is, that a particular fuhjiance belonging to the fpecies man is the fame 
 \i\\k\.x}a^ fubftance CTiWo-i. Socrates. The third manner of praedicating is, he fays, 
 ■when accidcnty inflead of being praedicated oi ^Jiibjiance in the natural way, is prae- 
 dicated of another accident, of which he gives this example, fpeaking of Socrates, r» 
 9«^«(xg«v T»t/T» <p<?,4(ro?'ov icri. * This bald thing is a philofopher.'' But the refoiution of 
 this into a natural praedication is flill more obvious : for it is faying no more than 
 that t.\vt fubftance, which is bald, has the quality of philofophifing, where the quality, 
 in the natural way, is praedicated of the fubftance. This is plain in the Engiifh tran- 
 flation where we muft ufe the word thing, which, in fuch an expreflion, can denote 
 nothing but fubftance ; whereas, in the Greek, Avhere the article fupplies the place of 
 any noun, it is not fo very obvious. In Englifli, and, I believe, in every other lan- 
 guage, there are many expreflions like this ; as, when we fay, that * Goodnefs is a- 
 • miable,' ' Wifdom is profitable ;' where it is plain that we ufe the abftra£l nouns, 
 goodnefs and wifdom, for the fubftantive noun and the adjeftive : So that it is the 
 fame thing as if we praedicated the quality of amiablenefs of a good man, or oi being 
 profitable of a wife man 
 
 And thus, I think, it moft evidently appears, that all prcpofitions of every kind are 
 either praedications of the two kinds I have mentioned, or refolvable into thefe. 
 Whoever defires to be further informed upon this fubjed, may confult Aiiftotle, in 
 his Laft JnalyticSs lib. i. cap- 22. and his Commentator Philoponus, p. 52. who, I 
 think, has explained the matter much better than Ammonius.
 
 Chap. IL ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 385 
 
 fubftance Is that which exifts by itfelf, and in which the accident is 
 inherent. 
 
 As, therefore, the general idea of agreement or difagreement will 
 not account for the truth of propofitions, let us confider what parti- 
 cular agreement or d'ljagreement arifes from the two relations I have 
 mentioned betwixt the pracdicate and fubjed: of a proportion ; and 
 this will be pretty obvious from what has been already faid : For if, 
 in the firfl: kind of propofitions, the praedicate has really the relation 
 of genus to the fubject, as a fpecies under it, then is the propofition a 
 
 true affirmative propofition. Again, if the praedicate has really 
 
 not that relation to the fubje(5t, then is the propofition, which denies 
 that the fubje(St is a fpecies of the praedicate, a true negati'ue propor- 
 tion. And, in the other kind of propofitions, if the praedicate has re- 
 ally the relation of accident to xh^JubjeSi^ and is inherent in it, as ac- 
 cident is in fubftance ; then is the propofition a true affirmative pro- 
 pofition. Again, if the praedicate and fubjed have really not that 
 
 relation to one another, then is the propofition, which denies the ex- 
 iftence of that relation betwixt them, a true negative propofition. 
 And thus we fee that the particular agreement or difagreement of 
 ideas, which make a true propofition, whether affirmative or negative., 
 is their agreeing or dilagreeing in the relation of genus and fpecies, or 
 of accident and fubftance. 
 
 To illuftrate this by examples : When I praedicate animal of matty 
 or, when I fay, as we exprefs it in Knglifh, that ' Nlan is an Animal^ 
 it is a true affirmative propofition, becaufe animal is really the genus 
 
 G^ man, Again, if! deny that anitnal cdn be praedicated oi dijloncy 
 
 that is, if I lay, that ' An animal is not a ftone,' it is a true negative 
 propofition, animal not being the genus oi Jlone, And, with refpedt 
 to the other kind of propofitions, if I praedicate ivbite of ;;/j?/, or, in 
 other words, fay, that ' Man is white,' the propofition is a true aj- 
 
 C c c Jirmative
 
 386 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V, 
 
 ■firmati'ue propofitlon, becaiife ivhite Is an accident really inherent in 
 
 marly as a fubftance. Again, if I fay, that ' A crow is not white,* 
 
 it is a true negative propofition ; becaufe I rightly deny that ivhite Is 
 an accident inherent in a crow as a fubftance. 
 
 And thus, I think, that, by the afliftance of antient phllofophy, I 
 have made fome fcience, and fomething determinate, out of that ge- 
 neral and moft imperfe<^ account given of Truth by Mr Locke. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 3C 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 The Necejfity of underftanding the Principles of Logic ^ in order to under-' 
 fiand the Principles of Sciettce and Demonjlration — The greateji Cr- 
 nius^ ivithout teachings not fiifficient for that Purpofe — Ariftotle hoiv 
 taught — Caje of the Philojophers before his Time ivho had not learned 
 to analyfe Reafoning — General Propofttions^ either Axioms^ or Propofi-^ 
 tions to be demonflratcd — Nature of the Evidence of Axioms may be 
 explained — This is bef done ivith refpeB to the Axioms of Geometry— ^ 
 Geometry the fir fl Science among Men — and the Reafcns njuhy it ivas 
 fo — In/Iances from the Axioms of Euclid — Evidence of thofe Axioms 
 the immediate Perception of a Contradi^ion^ if they ivere not true—^ 
 Confcioufiefs the Foundation of the Perception of Truth — Therefore 
 
 ~ the Brutes have no fuch perception — Axioms and Demonflration in <?- 
 ther Sciences as ivcll as Mathematics — In/lances of Axioms in Phyftcs 
 ^nd Metaphyfics — Tnftances of Axioms relating to the other Categories 
 as ivell as to ^lantity^ 
 
 H A T I have faid in the preceding chapter concerning the 
 connedion of the praedicate or attribute with the fubjed, in 
 propofitions of which both the terms are general, is not to be under- 
 ftood by a reader who does not know the difference betwixt Senfe 
 and Intellect, Generals and Particulars, Genus and Species, Accident 
 and Subflance ; for, (I mufl repeat it again, tho' I fliould give offence,) 
 let a man flatter himfelf as much as he will, and think as highly as he 
 pleafes of his genius and natural parts, I will ufe the freedom to tell 
 him, that, without the knowledge of thefc firft Principles of logic, he 
 
 . C c c 2 never
 
 3S8 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V, 
 
 never can underftand, as a phlloropher ouglit to underftand, the philo- 
 fophy of Mind, and the nature of Truth and Science. Thefe principles 
 are to be learned from Ariftotle's book of Categories, with the aflift- 
 ance of Porphyry's Introduction to that book, and of Ammonius*s 
 Commentary upon both the Introdudlion and the Book iifelf. There 
 are, I doubt not, Tome French or Englifh fyftems of logic which may 
 be of ufe to the reader ; but with thefe I am not much acquaint- 
 ed, nor defire to be more, becaufe I chufe to go to the fource it- 
 felf, being well aflTured, from what I know of them, that, if 
 they have not drawn from that fource, they have produced no- 
 thing that is valuable upon the fubjed. Not that I believe it to be 
 abfolutely impoffible, even as men are educated and live at prefent, 
 that our times fhould produce a great genius in philofophy ; but I 
 fay, that genius mufl: be taught, and by good maPiers ; and, that it is 
 impoffible, without fuch affiftance, for any mortal man to invent a 
 •whole fyftem of fcience. I think I may fay, without offence to any 
 modern philofopher, that Ariflotle had as acute and inventive a genius 
 in philofophy as any of them ; yet, I will venture to affirm, that, un- 
 lefs he had been taught, as he was, both by Socrates and Plato, and, 
 unlefs he had Rudied diligently, as it appears he did, the writings of 
 the more antient philofophers of the Ionic and Eleatic fchool, and of a 
 greater fchool than either of thefe, I mean the Pythagorean, from 
 which he took his book of Categories, the foundation of his 
 whole fyftem, he never could have difcovered the Syllogifm, (if 
 it be true that it is his difcovcry), nor produced that compleat 
 fyftem of logic to be found in his book of Categories, his firft 
 and fecond Analytics, his Topics, and his treatife of Sophifm, to 
 which the labours of all the ages fince his time have added no- 
 thing confiderable. Before him, many philofophers, no doubt, rea- 
 foned very well, and made great difcoveries; but they reafoned as the 
 women and children fpoke ; for, though women and children, who 
 have been well educated, may fpeak very well, they do it by mere ha- 
 bit,
 
 Chap. III. ANT IE NT METAPHYSICS. 389 
 
 bit, without heing" able to give any account hotv they do it ; the rea- 
 fon of which is, that they cannot analyfe ia^^gnage into its eieaieits, 
 nor account how thefe elements are compofed into Ipeech ; for analy- 
 fis is the work of art or fcience. In the fame manner, the philoto- 
 phers before Ariilode could reafon very well ; but, as they could not 
 analyfe realbn, fo they could not give any rational account wby one 
 argument was conciufive, and another jnconclufive ; but they knew 
 them to be fo only by common fenje^ thai is, natural fenfe, not inftruct- 
 ed by fcience.- — But to return to our fubjedb. 
 
 In all the propofitions I now fpeak of, the mind perceives the con- 
 nedion betwixt the praedicate and the fubje6t, either directly and im- 
 mediately, or by a procefs of reafoning, that is, by the exercife of the 
 Ittcsem, as it is called in Greek, the difcurfus mentis^ as it is called in 
 Latin, or difcourfe of reafon^ as it may be tranflated into Engliin. (;f 
 the firft kind are Axioms, or propofitions of intuiiive evidence. Thefe, 
 though they cannot, by their nature, be demonftrated, yet fome ac- 
 count, 1 think, may be given of the nature of the evidence upon 
 ■which we believe them to be true ; for it will not fati&ty a philoio- 
 pher to fay, that, by inftincl^ we believe them to be true ; becaufe ?«- 
 Ji'tnft has nothing to do v/ith intelled, or fpeculative truth of any 
 kind, it ferving only to dired pradical life, as it does entirely among 
 the brutes, and, in fome inftances, among us. It, therefore, relates 
 only to appetites and inclinations prompting us to ad, but has no 
 concern with opinions or belief of any kind, and, conf.^quentlv, not 
 with common fcnfe^ which is nothing but opinion in the ordniary af- 
 fairs of life, not formed by art or fcience, but arifing from experience 
 and common obfervation. 
 
 I will begin with the axioms of geometry, which, I am perfuadcd, 
 was the firft fcience, properly fo called, among men. This 1 believe tor 
 two reafons j the firft is, that the ideas of geometry are the fimpleft-, 
 
 the
 
 S9^ 
 
 ANTIENT METAPtTYSICS. Book V. 
 
 the moft determinate, and eafieft abftraded of any of the ideas that 
 we form of corporeal things ; for the ideas of figures, lines, and di- 
 menfions, are the fuperficial qualities of bodies, obvious both to fight 
 and touch, and having nothing to do with the inward frame or tex- 
 ture of body, from which its other qualities refult, and of which, as I 
 have faid more than once, we know nothing. 2^0, The mind, in opera- 
 ting upon lines and figures, has an afliftance from the fenfe and ima- 
 gination, which it cannot have in other abftrad fciences. The afTift- 
 ance I mean is that of diagrams : But we ought to take care not 
 to miftake thok Jjfmbols of ideas, which would not be at all neceflary 
 if our intelledl were more perfedt, for the ideas themfelves ; fo 
 as to imagine that geometry is converfant only with fenfible ob- 
 jeds. For thefe reafons, 1 believe that geometry was the firft fcience 
 among men, begun, as Ariftotle informs us *, among the Egyptian 
 priefts, the firft men, of whom we have any knowledge, that had lei- 
 fure, and were dedicated to the ftudy of religion and philofophy. For 
 the fame reafons, it is evident, that it is the moft proper fcience for en- 
 abling the mind to difentangle itfelf from matter, and to begin its a- 
 fcent towards the Immaterial world, and the invi/ible tJoings of God ; for 
 which purpofe, chiefly, as I have elfewhere obferved t» the ftudy of 
 it was recommended by antient philofophy. It is alfo a fcience of the 
 greateft certainty and accuracy ; not only becaufe the ideas of it are 
 fo clear and determinate, but the fubje^ls of it, lines and figures, have 
 a fixed ftandard and meafure of their ovv^n kind, by which they can be 
 cxadly compared together, and pronounced to be equal or unequal, 
 or in fuch and fuch a ratio to one another ; whereas, the qualities of 
 body, I fpeak of quality as contradiftingulftied from quantity)^ fuch 
 as hard or foft, fweet or bitter, hot or cold, cannot be fo meafured ; 
 
 and 
 
 * Mctaph. lib. I. cap. I. in fine* 
 t Sec page 3. et feqitcn.
 
 Chap. in. ANTIENTMETAPHYSICS. 391 
 
 and therefore we fay of them, as Ariftotle has obferved, not that 
 they are equal or unequal, but more or ids, like or unlike *. 
 
 The firft geometrical axiom I fliall mention Is this, ' That the 
 * whole is greater than the part.* The meaning of which is, when it 
 is analyfed according to Ariftotle's method, thut greater than the part 
 is an accident or quality of the idea of ivhole. Now, this is a felf- 
 evident propofition; becaufe the connection betwixt the praedicate aod 
 fubje<fl is immediately feen, if we underftand the meaning af the 
 terms ; for a whole being that which confifts of parts, two or more, 
 all which together are only equal to the whole, we immediately per- 
 ceive that it would be a downright contradiction to fuppofe that one 
 of thefe parts was equal to the whole. 
 
 Another of thefe axioms, and which Is placed firft in Euclid's or- 
 der, is, * That things which are equal to the fame thing are equal to 
 
 ' one 
 
 • See Ariftotle's Categories, cap. 6. injlne. This Ariftotle fays of quantity in ge- 
 neral ; and it is as true of quantity difcrete^ or number^ as it is of quantity continu- 
 QUSy fuch as body \ and, for the fame reafon, namely, that number furnillies for itfelf 
 a fixed ftandard oi meafure, by which its quantity is precifeJy afcertained •, fo that 
 one number maybe faid to be exadlly equal to another, or in a certain ratio to it. A- 
 mong other difcoveries of Nature we have made in modern times, by means of expe- 
 riments, we have found out a way of meafuring the degrees of heat and cold, by the 
 afcent of fluids in a glafs tube. But, in the firfh place, as we do not know the begin- 
 ning of heat or cold, we cannot tell what ratio any degree of it has to the whole. But, 
 idly^ we are by no means fure that the degrees marked upon even a mercurial ther- 
 mometer, are exa£tly equal to one another. We are very fure that the afcent of fpi- 
 rit of wine, in a thermometer, is very different, according to the diilerent degrees of 
 heat; and, though the difference is not near fo great in a mercurial cheimometer, 
 there is good reafon to think, or, rather, there is a certainty, that there is fome differ- 
 ence. We cannot, therefore, prccifely know even the excefs of one dcgret of heat or 
 cold above another. — See what I have further faid concerning the difference of qua- 
 lity and quantity, in a note upon page 297.
 
 392 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 ' one another *,' where the accident or quality of belpg equal to one 
 another, is praedicated of things equal to the fame thing. As there 
 is fomc dilpute about this axiom, before I come to inquire concerning 
 ic, I muft obferve, that, though the greater part of Euclid's axioms 
 relate to equality, yet he has given us no precife definition of it ; 
 which, however, was the more necefTary, that there is equality in 
 number^ as well as in itiagnitudc^ but very different one from another. 
 It is true, there is one of the axioms which lays it down, 'That 
 * things which are congruous, or fitting to one another t> are equal.* 
 But, fuppofing this to have been among the definitions, which it ought 
 to have been, it is not fufficiently precife; for congruous, ox fitting, are 
 terms of too indefinite a meaning for a mathematical definifion. The 
 true definition, therefore, of equality of magnitude^ with which only 
 geometry is concerned, is that given by Appollonius %, ' Magnitudes,' 
 fays he, ' are equal, which occupy the fame fpace.' And which de- 
 finition Dr Simpfon has very properly adopted. 
 
 This being premlfed, the evidence of this firfl: axiom is eafiiy 
 explained ; for, let us fuppofe that the magnitudes are not equal to 
 one another, there would be a contradidion to the hypothefis, appa- 
 rent 
 
 * I cannot help obferving a little inaccuracy In the exprelTion of this axiom, fuch as 
 is hardly ever to be found in Euclid, not, as far as I know, in any other inftance. It 
 fhould have been expreffed thus, * Things, which are each equal to the fiime, are equal 
 < to one another ;' for two or more things, taken together, (not feparately^) maybe 
 equal to a third thing, and yet not equal to one another. I am the more furprifed at 
 this inadvertency, and in the firfl: axiom too, that I obferve that, in his propofitions, 
 where he compares two things to other things, in point of equality, he exprefles, that 
 it is each to each, Uxn^ci Uxn^cA. See the fourth propoHtionof the firfl book. 
 
 •f The Greek is, t« t!px^/^o^»vTx i-k uh>.n>-u, t<rx ctXXnXtii ic-n, which Dr. Simpfon has 
 thus tranflated, with more regard to the meaning tVan the words: * M.ignitudes, which 
 
 * coincide with one another, that is, which exadly fill the fame fpace, are equal to 
 
 * one another.' 
 
 t See Proclus, in his Commentary upon the firil book of Euclid, page 70.
 
 Chap. III. ANT IE NT METAPHYSICS, 393 
 
 rent at firfl view, without inference or dedudion ; for, if A were equal 
 to C, and B equal to C, and yet A greater or leis than B, then it would 
 not occupy the fame fpace which B occupies, viz. the place of C, which 
 would be contrary to the hypothefis, laying it down, that A and B are 
 equal to C ; that is, occupy the fame fpace which C does. I therefore a- 
 gree with Proclus in the paflage above quoted, that this axiom is truly 
 an axiom, or feif-evident propofition, and that Apollonius was in the 
 wrong to feek for a demonftration of it. And accordingly Proclus 
 has fhown, that the propofition, by which he proves it, is plainly a 
 fuppofition of what is iaqueftion, or 2l petitio principiiy namely, that 
 two magnitudes, which poifefs the fame place with a third, poffefs 
 each the fame place that the other does. 
 
 What I have faid of this firft: axiom concerning equality, will, I 
 hope, be fufficient to fliow that, not only the evidence of all the a- 
 xioms relating to equality, but of all the other axioms of Kuclid, a- 
 rifes from the inconfiftency and contradidlion to the hypothefis which 
 the mind immediately perceives there would be in luppofing the con- 
 trary; for it would be, to fuppofe the fame thing to be and not to be. If 
 a fceptic is not fatisfied with this, but inquires further, how the mind 
 perceives the connexion or contradidion betwixt the ideas in fuch pro- 
 pofuions? I anfwer that queftion by afking another, How does the 
 mind know that it perceives the two ideas ? The anfwer m.uft be, That 
 it is by confcioufncfs ; and I fay it is by the fame confcioufnefs that we 
 perceive the relation betwixt the two ideas, it being impoilible that we 
 fhould have the perception of the two ideas, and not, at the fame time, 
 perceive the relation betwixt them. 
 
 It is by confcioufnefs, therefore, that we perceive truth ; for, with- 
 out confcioufnefs, we cannot know it to be truth. The brutes, 
 therefore, wanting confcioufnefs, have not, as Simplicius has obfer- 
 
 D d d ved.
 
 394 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 ved *, any perception of truth ; for, though they have true percep- 
 tions, and perceive alfo the relations betwixt thofe perceptions, yet 
 they do not perceive that they perceive^ and, confequently, have no 
 perception of truth. The neceffity of this reflex adt of the mind is 
 moft apparent in fyllogiftical truth ; for, if a nnan is not confcious of 
 the truth of tlie two premifTes of a fyllogifm, and does not refled, 
 or, as it were, look back upon them,, he cannot proceed to infer the 
 conclufion. 
 
 Thofe, who have ftudied mathematics much, and no other fcience, 
 are apt to grow fo fond of them, as to believe that there is no cer- 
 tainty in any other fcience, or any other axioms except thofe of Eu- 
 clid. But, if they were philofophers, and could fee the whole extent 
 of the objeds of human knowledge! they would know, that fcience is 
 not confined to one of the categories, viz. quantity, but that there are 
 axioms and demonftrations belonging to every one of the categories^ 
 and fome to all of them in general, particularly one mentioned by 
 Ariflotle f, viz. * That it is impojQTible the fame thing can be, and not 
 * be, at the fame time, and in the fame refpedt.* This is the moft 
 univerfal of all the axioms, and the moft certain, fays Ariftotle, of 
 all the principles J. It is, indeed, the foundation of all truth, and 
 
 all 
 
 * Ov '*>( uXiiSovf umXYiVT tKTi n uXcyaf yvats-Hy «AA«{ fttftv t*v T^nytietrtiy ivTriP xect la-Ti 
 ixvTfit yfmctmif Tig; in xwrt tovtc ynucrKU i}\Uf i; in (tXyi6i>fy ri ye&fliw; MfTMijyojccEV);;* *vtj^ 
 
 y«5 HivTJii" yvuTiTm, SimpUcU Comment, ad lib. 1' Arijistelii de Jnimay feU 57. And 
 he adds, what is certainly true, that the brute is wholly converfant with external 
 things, without attending to any thing that pafles within himfelf; and therefore he 
 has no notion of truth in fpeculation. Neither in practice has he any knowledge of 
 what is good or ///, (for that alfo is acquired by refte(^ion alone), but only of what is 
 pleafant and difagreeable. 
 t Metaph lib. 4. cap. 4.
 
 Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 395 
 
 all fcience ; for, if it were not true, we could affirm and deny the 
 fame thing at the fame time, fo that nothing would be either true or 
 falfe. It is, as I have obferved, by difcovering this repugnancy and 
 contradidbion in the contrary of the geometrical axioms above men- 
 tioned, that we perceive' their evidence. And, if it was by inference 
 and deduction that we perceived this contradiction, I would fay, as 
 fome have faid, that they were demonftrable. But, as we perceive it 
 intuitively, and by one fmgle ad of the intellecSl *, I think they are 
 felf-evident propofitions of intuitive, not demonftrative truth. 
 
 There is another logical axiom, which belongs alfo to the whole ca- 
 tegories, and which Ariftotle has made the foundation of his dodrine 
 of the fyllogifm, viz. ' What can be praedicated of any general, may 
 
 * be praedicated of every particular comprehended under that general;* 
 or, as the fchoolmen have exprcfled it, ^lod verum eft de toto^ verum 
 eft de omni. 
 
 There is alfo a third axiom, which applies to all the categories, and 
 is the foundation of all true phyfics and metaphyfics, viz. ' That no- 
 
 * thing can be produced without a caufe ;' or, in other words, ' That 
 
 * nothing can come out of nothing ;' an axiom, of which the truth 
 was admitted by all the philofophers of antiquity, by Epicurus as 
 well as Plato, who have both made it the foundation of their cof- 
 mogeny f. And Ariftotle tells us, that all the phyfiologifts, with- 
 
 D d d 2 out 
 
 • • M/« ivijioXvif as the Commentators upon Ariftotle exprefs it, whereas, in the pro- 
 ccfs of reafoning, there are TtXHom £7r<i3«A««, more afts or exertions of the intelledt up- 
 on the queftion propofed. 
 
 f See Plato in the Timaetif, p'. 1046- fdit. Ficini. n«v ra y^yjawfye* vt* atnov nut 
 i\ Kvicyxftf y.iyvirxtf vxDTi itct^ (^vittrti x.o*i'i *tiriov yiHo-iv <r;^«v. And EpicurUS fayS, in Lu- 
 
 cretius, 
 
 Principium hinc cujus nobis exordia fumet, 
 
 Nulhm rem e nihilo gigni divinitus unquam. Lik i. in initir
 
 S9^ A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. ^ook V. 
 
 out exception, of his tiine, and before his time, agreed in that prin- 
 ciple *. 
 
 Thefe are axioms belonging to all the categories in general ; but 
 there are others which belong to fome of ihem in particular ; fuch as 
 concerning fubQance, that it muft neceffarily exiit by itfelf, and is the 
 ground-work or fubjecff, in which all the other categories are inherent ; 
 fo that it is an axiom relating to them, that they cannot exift by 
 themfclves. And, with refped to the category qf relation in particu- 
 lar, it is an axiom of which i have had occafion to make ufe t» ' That 
 
 * it cannot fubfift without two things, at leaft, exifting at the fame 
 
 * time.' And alfo, with refped to the category of fufFering, it is an 
 axiom, * That, where there is a patient, there mufl be alfo an agent.' 
 Many more axioms, relating to other things befides quantity, might 
 be enumerated ; but thefe are fufficient for the prefent purpofe. And 
 it is to be obferved, that the evidence of them is the fame as of the 
 geometrical axioms, namely, that the fuppofition of the contrary im- 
 plies a contradidion and impofhbility, which the mind immediately 
 perceives. 
 
 Thus, I have endeavoured to give fome account of the truth of 
 axioms, without pretending that they are capable of demonftration ; 
 for, if they could be demonftrated, they would not be axioms ; and, if 
 there were no axioms, and every thing was to be demonftrated, there 
 could be no demonftration ; for the fame reafon, that, if there were 
 no categories, or general clafTes, to which things could be ultimately 
 referred, there could not, as 1 have obferved, be any definition J. And 
 the reafon is, that, in both cafes, the thing would go on in infinitum. 
 
 Now, 
 
 * Arlftotle, therefore, fays, that it was y.oivn h^ct ray (Pva-ix^y, which is pretty much 
 the fame name that I.uclid gives to his axioms, viz, Ktimt uftiK:, that is, notions cona^ 
 mou to all men that have any ufe of reafon. 
 
 f Book 2. chap. 3. p 67. 
 
 % Book 3. chap. I. p. 317.
 
 Chap.III. ANT1ENTMETAPHYSIC5. 
 
 397 
 
 Now, of infinity there is no fcience nor comprehenfion *. Our fcep- 
 tics, therefore, when they demand a proof of axioms, inftead of fhow- 
 ing their genius or learning, fhow only their ignorance, according to 
 Ariftotle's judgment f' 
 
 CHAP. 
 
 * This is the reafon that Ariftotle gires why there cannot be a demonftration of 
 
 every thing. *OA*f ^ev yx^ uvxtruv ulvvtcrdv aTTi^ei^tv avxtf Hf xTiti^ov yx^ xv fix't^t•^* 
 *M(rTt fiTiil' cvrui nvHt xTtia^iv.. Metaph. lib^ 4. cap. 4. hi initio, 
 
 \ Eo-T/ yxg xTTtti^ive-ix r« fCTi yirvKtiv rivav hi ^»jTe»» XTroht^iv^ xut niuv tv ttr For it is ig» 
 
 norance, and want efinfiru&ion, not to know of ivhat to require demonftrati$ni and of 
 •what net. Ibid.
 
 398 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 When the Propofttion is notfelf-evident^ then there muft he the Difcurfus 
 Mentis in order to prove it — l.he Nature of this Dilcurfus — All the 
 Difcurfus, houuever various^ reducible to the Syllogiflical Form — De- 
 finition of Syllogifm — For?n of the SyllogiJt7i explained by Arijlotle in 
 his firft Analytics — The Analyfis there mofl ^wonderful — Syllogifm 
 may he perfetl in its Fornix and yet the Conclifion may he jalfe^ dubiousy 
 or certain^ according to the Nature of the PremiJJes — What makes 
 the Syllogifm demonjlrative explained by Ari/lotle in his laft Analytics 
 ^—The Method obferved by Arijlotle in that great Work — The Nature 
 of Demonflration — Definition as necefjary for it as Axioms — Tiva 
 Kinds of Demonflration — the one dire(St — the other indiredl — or ex 
 abfurdo — 27?^ Difference hetivixt Analyfis and Demonftration — A" 
 nalyfis the Method of Difcovery in all Sciences — Similitude betwixt the 
 analytical Reafoning and the Demonf ration ex abfurdo — The Dialec- 
 tical Method of Reafoning dfferentfrom any yet mentioned — The Dia- 
 lectic of Arifotle quite different from that of Plato — Arijlotle* s Dia- 
 le£lic much praSiifed before his Time — but only reduced to an Art by 
 him — Nature of this Kind of Reafoning illujl rated by Examples, 
 
 IF the mind do not perceive intuitively the connection betwixt the 
 praedicate and fubjc(ft, as in the cafe of axioms, or felf-evi- 
 dent propofitions, it can do it no otherwife than by the intervention 
 of other ideas, or by the ufe of middle terms, as they are called 
 
 in
 
 Chap. IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 399 
 
 in the language of Ariftotle. And this application of the middle 
 term, firft to one of the terms of the propofition, and then to the other, 
 is performed by that exercife of the intelle<St, which is very properly 
 called in Greek hccvo,x, becaufe the intelled, in this operation, goes be- 
 twixt the two terms, as it were, and pafles from the one to the other. 
 In Latin, as there is not the fame facility of compofition, it is expref- 
 fed by two words, difcurfus mentis^ mens being the fame thing in La- 
 tin, as N«t/j in Greek ; and the Latin expreffion is rendered into Eng- 
 lifh by difcourfc of reafon, or, as it is commonly called, reafoning^ 
 
 When the difcurfus is performed, and the argumentation compleat- 
 cd, it is called by Ariftotle a fyllog\fm\ which, according to the ety- 
 mology of the word, imports that it is a collection : And undoubted- 
 ly the conclufion is a colledion from the premiHes ; and accordingly 
 it is defined by Ariftotle to be * Speech^ in which certain things be- 
 *' ing laid down, another thing, different from thefe, does, by necelTary 
 ' confequence, follow from what is fo laid down *,' 
 
 This neceflity of the conclufion Is in every fyllogifm, if it be trulv 
 a fyllogifm j that is, if the fyllogiftical form be obferved ; and the 
 form is fo univerfal, that it applies to all kinds of reafoning ; fo that 
 every argument is a fyllogifm, tho* all the propofitlons may not be ex- 
 prefted, but one of them implied or underftood ; which kind of incom- 
 pleat fyllogifm is called an Enthymema^ importing that one of the pro- 
 pofitlons is in the mind of the fpeaker or writer. All ratiocination, there- 
 fore, however various or complex it may feem, if the conclufion be rightly 
 inferred, is refolvable into the fyllogifm ; and, if the conclufion be not 
 
 rightly 
 
 Hi, T« T«t-T« uvui which he thus accurately explains, Aiyco h, t* T«vr« uyxs, to ^,x 
 
 rttvrci a-vuficiinm, ro ^iythyoi t^u6i> /get, jrpocr^jiy jrfoi to yiyier$«c{ to coccyKmcf. ^nalytica. 
 
 Prioraj lib, i. ca^. i.
 
 400 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 rightly inferred, then there is a defe^ft in the form of the fyllogifm ; 
 and it is what Ariftoile calls unJyllogifiicaL 
 
 But, what is this form of the fyllogifm, of fuch univerfal ufe, and 
 the touch-ftone, as it fccms, of all kind of reafoning I This queftioa 
 is anfwered by ArirtoMc> in his Fir/i Analytics, which are fo called, be- 
 caufe they analyfe human reafon into its elemental parts, fhowi ng, at 
 the fame time, how thofe parts are to he put up again, as it were, and 
 combined, fo as to produce certain conclufions ; the work therefore is 
 fynthetical as well as analytical though it be denominated from that 
 part of it which muft neceflarily precede the other, and may, liiere- 
 fore, be confidered as principal. The book of Categories, and that of 
 Interpretation, the one treating of fimple terms, the other of the com- 
 pofition of thcfe into propofitions, are only preliminaries to this 7nag- 
 nwn opus ; yet are they, confidered by themfelves, works of great 
 fcience, and particularly the laft, which contains fpeculat'ons c^xceed- 
 ingly fubtile and intricate. And the whole, taken together., is lo won- 
 derful a fyftem of fcience, that, if Arifl:otle be trulv the author of it, 
 it is the greatefl difcovery in fcience that ever was made by a fingle 
 man, fince the beginning of the world. But 1 have fome reafons, 
 which I fliall give in a more proper place, for thinking that Ariftotle 
 took the dodirine of the fyllogifm from the Pythagorean School, as 
 well as the dodrine of Categories *. 
 
 But, though the fyllogifm be perfect as to its form, the conclufion 
 may not be true ; for, if either of the premises be falfe, probable, or 
 doubtful, the conclufion will be of the fame kind ; whereas, if the 
 premifles be neceflarily true, the conclufion will likewife be fo. And 
 
 this 
 
 * See, upon t>iis fubjea, the laft book of this volume, where I give an account of 
 Ariftolle's philofophy, and where there is a great deal more faid concerning the fyllo- 
 gyfm.
 
 Chap. IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 401 
 
 this is what is called demonjlration. And a fyllogifm of this kind is 
 a demonftrative fyllogifm ; the nature of which, as diftinguifhed from 
 other fyllogifms, is explained by Ariftotle in his laft Analytics, or Fof- 
 teriora^ as they are commonly called by the Latin interpreters. 
 
 And here the reader may obferve the general method of this great 
 work of Analyfis ; the defign of which, as Ariftotle tells us in the 
 beginning of it, was to fhow what fcience or demonftration is ; a 
 queftion very much agitated in the Theaetetus of Plato, but nothing 
 determined. And I have little doubt but that Ariftotle defired to have 
 the glory of anfwering a queftion which his mafter had only puzzled 
 and perplexed. Now, analyfis is the method of invention in every 
 fcience; for, in difcovering any fcience, we begin with the compound, 
 and relolve it into its elements or firft principles ; but, according 
 to the method of teaching, where the analyfis ends, there the 
 teaching begins. Thus, whoever firft made a fcience of language, 
 muft have begun with the compound^^^c:^, which he would conti- 
 nue to analyfe or unravel, till he came to its ultimate elements, viz. 
 the elemental or uncompounded founds ; and, where the analyfis 
 ends, the grammatical art, as it is taught, begins*. 
 
 In the fame manner, Ariftotle, propofing to explain the de- 
 monftrative fyllogifm, analyfes it firft into the fyllogifm of which 
 
 E e e it 
 
 • It is the fame in praSIice as in thory. When any thing is propofed to be done, 
 the mind begins with the contemplation of that thing; and then it confiders all the 
 particulars which are neceflary for the doing it. And in doing this, it goes back in 
 order, till it comes to what is firft to be done. Thus, if a man propofes to build a 
 , houfe, the completion of which is the putting on the roof, by which it is to anfwer the 
 chief purpofe of a houfe; the beginning of the theory is the roof or covering ; but, in 
 order to fupport a roof, there muft be walls ; and, in order to have walls, a foundation 
 muft be dug. And here, where the theory ends, the pradlice begins.
 
 402 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 it is a fpecies ;. then the fyllogifm into propofitions ; and, laft- 
 ly, propofitions into fimple terms, which are the elements of this 
 fcience. Beginning, therefore, with terms, without which propofi- 
 tions arc not to be underftood, he proceeds to propofitions; from: 
 propofitions he goes to fyllogifm ; and from fyllogifm in gene- 
 ral, he proceeds to the demonftrative fyllogifm ; which, wiihout 
 the knowledge of what fyllogifm in general is, cannot be under- 
 ftocd. 
 
 Thus much, I hope, will be fufficient to fhow the method that A- 
 riftotle has followed in this great work, and that this, and no other 
 method, was proper to make a fcience of it. But, as to particulars, it: 
 would not be proper that I fhould enter into them, as I do not write a 
 logical, but a metaphyfical work. 1 Vi^ill, therefore, only add as much- 
 as will be necelfary to fhow the nature of demon/oration, or fcienti- 
 fjcal truth, and of other evidence of an inferior kind. 
 
 And, Jir/i, as to demonftration, it is not only neceflary that the 
 terms of the propofition, to be connedled in this way, fhould be ideas 
 or generals, but alfo, that the middle term, conneding them, fhould 
 be of that kind ; And that middle term either fhould be an axiom, 
 or it fhould be conneded with each of the two terms, by fome 
 axiom, or, which is the fame thing, by fome propofition before de- 
 monftrated. 
 
 But, before the two terms of the propofition to be demonflrated can 
 be thus conneded, we muft know perfedly the nature of the two. 
 terms, that is, the praedicate and fubjed, as well as of the term by 
 which they are to be conneded ; for, otherways, it will be impoflible 
 to know that they are neccffarily conneded. Now, it is by definition 
 that the nature and effence of any thing is made known ; and hence 
 it appears, that definition, as well as, axioms, is abiolutely neceffary 
 
 for
 
 Chap. IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 403 
 
 -for demonftration. And, accordingly, all Euclid's demonftrations re- 
 fult from definitions and axioms, which, therefore, are very properly 
 prefixed to his work. 
 
 And thus it appears that all demonftration, or fcience properly fo 
 called, is derived from the knowledge of the nature and elTence of the 
 fubjedls of the demonftration, and from felf-evident propofitions. 
 
 Demonftration is of two kinds ; it is either what is called direSi — or it 
 is what Ariftotle calls apagogical, that is, ex abfurdo, as our mathemati- 
 cians exprefs it. The former is, when we demonftrate from the nature of 
 theihing as comprehended in its definition. The other is, when we 
 demonftrate the impofTibility of the contrary, by ihovving the abfurd 
 confequences that would follow upon the fuppofition of the contrary. 
 This method of demonftration muft appear, at firft fight, to be a 
 round-about way of coming to the truth, and, therefore, it is very 
 properly oppofed to the dired: method. It is, however, as convincing, 
 and proves equally that the thing is ; but it does not fliow us ivhy 
 it is,' which the other does, being deduced from the nature of the 
 thing; and, therefore, the other is very properly judged by Ariftotle 
 to be preferable, and more fcientifical. 
 
 Not only is the analytic method ufed in whole fyftems of fcience, fuch 
 -as the philofophy of the human mind, but in the in veftigation of particular 
 propofitions, whether theorems or problems; and the method is the fame 
 in both, namely, to begin where the teaching ends, that is, to fuppofe 
 the theorem to be already demonftratcd, or the problem performed, and 
 then confider what the confequences will be ; and, if we find that thefc 
 confequences do lead us, by one or more fteps, to fome axiomatical 
 truth or propofition before demonftratcd, with which the theorem or 
 problem IS neceflarily conneded, there is an end of the analyfis, and 
 there the teaching begins ; for, by defcending from this principle, tb 
 
 E e c 2 which
 
 404 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 which we have thus afcended, we demonftrate the propofition to be 
 true. 
 
 In this way, every propofition of Euclid may be analyfed ; and as, 
 in this way, every fyftem of fcience has been difcovered, fo I have 
 little doubt but that the greater part of the particular proportions of 
 Euclid have been inveftigated and difcovered in the fame way ; for 
 men would naturally fufpe£t the propofition to be true, before they 
 could demonftrate it ; and this would lead them to confider what the 
 confequences would be, upon the fuppofition that it was true. And, 
 accordingly, we know very well that the antients pradifed this me- 
 thod very much in geometry, and, I believe> likewife, in other fci- 
 ences. 
 
 It very much refembles the demonftration ex ahfurdo. And it is 
 truly of the fame kind in this refpedt, that they are both from confe- 
 quences ; for the one fhows that, if the contrary of the propofition be 
 fuppofed true, the confequences would be abfurd and impoffible ; 
 while the other fhows, that, if the propofition be fuppofed to be true, 
 it is neceffarily connected with fome known truth. They both, there- 
 fore, argue from the efFed to the caufe, and therefore are faid to be 
 a pofteriori ; whereas, dired: demonftration argues from the caufe to 
 the cfFed, and therefore is faid to be a priori ; and, where it can be 
 had, is, for thefc reafons, more fatisfying to the mind, and more phi- 
 lofophical. 
 
 It is in this way that Porphyry the philofopher, as quoted by Pro- 
 clus *, has explained the different methods of fcientifical reaioning.^ 
 All fuch reafonings, fays he, is tiihtvfrom the principles, or to the prin- 
 ciples ; 
 
 ♦ Proclus's Commentary upon the firft book of Euclid's Elements, lib. 3. p. 69.
 
 Chap. IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 405 
 
 clples ; and each of thefe Is twofold. The former Is txihtv from pr'm- 
 ciples felt-evident, or from propofitions already demonftrated. Again, 
 the reafoning to the principles does either eftabliili thofe principles, or 
 overturn them. If it eftablifh tliem, it is analyfis, which I have al- 
 ready explained ; and it is oppofed \.oJyntheJis^ by which we defcend 
 from the principles which we have difcovered by the analyfis^ and, in 
 that way, demonftrate a priori. If, on the other hand, it overturn 
 the principles, then it is what is called apagogical realoning, or a re- 
 duction to what is abfurd or impoffible. This happens, v^hen we fup- 
 pofe, as I have faid, the contrary of what is propofed to be proved, 
 and (how that fuch a fuppofition is neceflarily conneded with fome- 
 thing that is abfurd or impoifible. 
 
 This is the nature of demonftrative and fcientifical reafoning. But 
 there is another kind of realoning, which was much pra6tifed, even 
 by philofophers in antient times, and was always, and is ftill the chief 
 kind of reafoning ufed by rhetoricians and public fpeakers, being al- 
 mofl the only kind of reafoning that can be underftood by the/»^o- 
 />/(?, that is, by men who are not taught or inftruded. It was called 
 dialefiic by Ariftotle ; but it is to be obferved, that his dialeciic is 
 very different from the dialeElic of his mailer Plato, which was en- 
 tirely of the metaphyftcal kind, being deduced from the higheft and 
 moft univerfal principles. Plato, at the fame time, knew very well 
 the dialeciic of Ariftotle, and has praCtifed it very much ; nor was 
 there any kind of reafoning more in falhion at that time, being ufed, 
 not only by the orators, but by the fophifts, who, not having fcience, 
 and,confeqaently, not being able to argue from the nature of the thing, 
 argued dialefUcatly. Bur it was not reduced to an art, till Ariftotle,. 
 to whom arts, as well as philofophy, have been fo much obliged) com- 
 pofed his books of topics. 
 
 It
 
 4o6 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 It does not argue, as I have faid, from the nature of the thing, nor 
 from axioms belonging to particular fciences. It has, therefore, no- 
 thing to do with definition, nor with principles of fcience. From this 
 account of it, the reader will be apt to imagine that it is merely an 
 art of fophiilry, teaching men to argue and difpute without any 
 fcience, and upon fubjcds which they do not underftand. But, though 
 it was very much ufed, and abufed too, by the fophifts of old, yet, as 
 Ariftotle has taught it, it is not an art of fophiflry or deceit, which to 
 have taught, would have been moft unworthy of a philofopher ; but 
 it is an art that has its principles from which it fairly draws its con- 
 clufions. 
 
 Thefe principles are either afTumed by the fpeaker, as probable 
 truths generally believed ; or they are granted by thofe to whom he 
 fpeaks ; and, from thefe principles, he argues by the means of the ge- 
 neral propofitions, called, by Ariftotle, topics, being the place or feat 
 of arguments, y^<3'^j argumentorum^ as Cicero has explained the word*. 
 
 The thing will be beft Illuftrated by two or three examples. Sup- 
 pofe the queftion to be proved is, ' that temperance is good or benefi- 
 cial.' To prove this from the nature of virtue, would be to argue 
 from the principles of a particular fcience, viz. morals, and is not an 
 argument of the kind of which I fpeak. But, in order to prove the 
 point dialeB'ically, I afluiiie, either from common opinion, or the 
 conftflion of my adverfary, that ' intemperance is evil or prejudicial.' 
 And then I argue thus : If intemperance is an evil, temperance, which 
 is the contrary, is good. And the topic, or general propofition, in 
 which this argunient is included, is, that, * \Vhen two things are op- 
 
 * pofite, whatever follows from the one, the contrary thereof will fol- 
 
 * low from the other if.' 
 
 Again, 
 
 * Cicero's Topics, in initio. 
 
 t Ariftotle's iopics, lib. 2. cap. 8. — Rhetoric, lib. 2. cap. 3. in initis.
 
 Chap.IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 407 
 
 Again, if it be propofed to prove that a thing is evil, I affume this 
 propofition, that the thing deftriidive of it is good ; and then I argue 
 from this topic, that, * Of any thing the deftru(5tion being good, the 
 ' thing itfelf muft be evih' 
 
 Another very common topic, much infifled on by the rhetoricians 
 of thofe times, and, I believe, of all times, is, that, 'Whoever does 
 
 * what is more, whether good or ill, muft be prefumed to do what is 
 •■ lefs.' The topic which includes this argument is, that, ' Where the 
 '^greater is, the lefTer will alfo be *.' And another more common to- 
 pic ftill, in all popular affemblies, is, that, ' Whoever falls into contra- 
 ' dictions or abfurdities in arguing a caufe, has a bad caufe.' Nor is 
 there any argument more prevalent among the people, though it be of 
 no weight among philofophers, and men of fcience, who will confider 
 the caufe independent of the abilities of the fpeaker. 
 
 Another topic, which is not conclufive, but from which fpecious 
 arguments may be drawn, is that by which I prove that it is not 
 good to be wife or learned, becaule fuch are envied, and to be envied 
 is an ill thing. The topic there is, that, * Whatever thing ill follows 
 
 * from, that thing is not good ;* or, to exprefs it more generally or to-" 
 pically, * Every thing is of the nature of that which follows from it.' 
 And this, Ariftotle tells us, was the whole art of Calippus, a rhetori- 
 cian or fophift: of his time. This argument, if both good and ill fol- 
 low from the thing, n^ay be turned different ways, as in the inftance 
 before us, where many g >od things may be mentioned, as the confe- 
 quences of being wife and learned : And, to fhow the amphibology 
 of this argument, Ariifotlc quotes a famous faying of a prieftefs, vvho: 
 diffuaded her Ion from haranguing in public afllmblies of the people., 
 
 'If. 
 
 • Arijlot Rhetor, ibid. This is called the to ^«aa«v xa« '.jVtoi', and is a fruitful, 
 topic, as may be feen from Anftotie's i.iouk-. oi ^ upics.
 
 4oS ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 * If,' fays ilie, * you counfel what Is jufl:, men will hate you ; if what 
 
 * is unjuft, the Gods.' For the argument may be turned contrarywife, 
 in this manner : ' If you counfel what is unjuft, men will love you ; 
 
 * if what is juft, the Gods ;' And the conclufion will be quite oppofite, 
 namely* that you ought to be a public fpeaker. And thus, Ariftotle 
 takes care to inform us, when the topic is inconclufive, or. when it is 
 ambiguous, and proving either way. 
 
 From thefe inftances, it is hoped the nature of this kind of dialec- 
 tical or topical argumentation, will be fufficiently evident, tirft, I 
 muft know of the thing in queftion certain qualities or properties ; 
 for, as Ariftotle obferves, if I know nothing at all of the fubjed:, I 
 can form no argument concerning it. Aftliming, therefore, fome parti- 
 cular propofition concerning it, either from common belief, or the con- 
 ceflion of my adverfary, I try whether from thence I cannot draw fome 
 conclufion by the means of fome general propofition or topic tending 
 to eftablifh what I would be at. Thefe general propofitions may be 
 called the axioms of this art ; and they fo far refemble the axioms of 
 geometry, that, as thefe are applicable to all kinds of lines and figures, 
 and many of them to every fubje£t of quantity, fo the topics may be 
 applied to every fubjedt of difputation, of whatever kind. 
 
 Another thing is alfo evident from what has been faid, — That 
 this art is of univerfal ufe, not only in public fpeaking, but in 
 our private intercourfe with men ; for it is the only way we can argue 
 with them upon the fuhje£t of any art or fcience which they have not 
 learned. But, it is to bcobferved, that, though the ftudy of Ariftotle's 
 art will, no doubt, furnifti a great number of topics, yet, the ready 
 ufe of them will chiefly depend upon our natural fagacity in perceiving 
 what is confequent, or what follows from what, and what is contradic- 
 tory or repugnant. With a great deal of this natural fagacity, men 
 
 who
 
 Chap. IV. A N T I E N r M E T A P H Y S I C S. 409 
 
 who have learned no art or Iclence, no logic, dialccllc, or rhetoric, will 
 confound fpeakers who appear very eloquent and plaufible. This is 
 the cafe of the Indians of North America, as I was alTured by a mif- 
 fionary who had been long among them * ; and the fame thing 
 has been confirmed to me by others : For, both in their private 
 converfations, when we can make them take the trouble to rea- , 
 fon, and in their conferences and debates with us on public bu- 
 finefs, they fhow a wonderful power of dialedical reafoning. With- 
 out laying down any principles upon their fide, they do no 
 more than lay hold of what we have faid, and fhow either that 
 what we would deduce from it is not confequent, or that we are 
 repugnant and contradictory to ourfelves. — Their natural parts, I am 
 perfuaded, as I have faid elfewhere f, are fuperior to ours ; and there- 
 fore it behoves us the more to take all the affiftance we can from 
 learning. Now, I am convinced that the diligent ftudy of Ariftotle's 
 topics, together with his books of rhetoric, in which a great deal of 
 argument of the fame kind is to be found, would give our orators a 
 copioufnefs of argument, which they can never otherwife acquire. Nor 
 are Ariftotle*s books of topics difficult to be underflood ; for they are 
 of a popular kind, like his poetry and rhetoric, and therefore are 
 written in a ftyle not fo concife and obfcure as his books of deep phi- 
 lofophy : And, if any affiftance were neceflary for the underfianding 
 them, we have a very accurate commentary upon them by Alexan- 
 der Aphrodifienfis, Ariftotle's oldeft commentator of the Alexandrian 
 School, 
 
 F f f CHAP. 
 
 * Monfieur Boubaud. See what I have faid of this mifTionary in the firfl: volume 
 of the Origin and Progrefs of Language, 2d edit, book 3 chap. 10. page 558. 
 t Origin and Progrefs of Language, vol. 3. injinc.
 
 410 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BookV. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Of Propofttions, ivhofe SubjeB is an Individual Thing — Individual 
 Things either Material or Immaterial ^OJ Propofitions^ ivhofe 
 SubjeSl is a Corporeal Thing — Of thefe there can be no Science — Na- 
 ture of our Knovuledge of Corporeal Things — Ufe of that Know- 
 ledge, 
 
 TH U S, I have finifhed what I have to fay upon what may be 
 called ideal propofitions, that is, propofitions of which both the 
 terms are ideas, and have fhown what the nature of truth is, both 
 felf -evident and fyllogiftical, in fuch propofitions. I now proceed to 
 the propofitions of the other kind, concerning particular or individual 
 things, of which only the greater term or praedicate is an idea; for 
 that 1 have fhown to be neceffary in all propofitions. 
 
 All particular things are either material or immaterial, that is, either 
 body or mind ; and I will begin with propofitions of which the fub- 
 jed: is corporeal. Now, of fuch fubjeds, it is impoffible there can be 
 any fcience or demonftration, for the following reafons. 
 
 Firji^ Thefe fubjeds are, as I have (hown, in a continual flux, 
 and perpetually changing their ftaie ; fo that what is affirmed or de- 
 nied of them, may ceafe to be true, before the enunciation is made. 
 Now, as fcience is fomething fixed and permanent, and the truths of 
 
 it
 
 Chap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 411 
 
 it eternal, the fuhjed of it muft, in like manner, be ftable and perma- 
 nent, without change or variation. 
 
 Secondly^ We know nothing, as I have more than once faid, of the 
 nature and effence of body : We only know fome qualities or proper- 
 ties of it J and thefe, when attentively examined by the philofopher, 
 are no other than the perceptions of our mind, produced by the im- 
 preffion made by body upon our organs of fenfe ; or, as Mr Hobbes 
 has expreffed it, a tumult of the 7nind, excited by external things pref- 
 Jitig upon the organs of fenfe * ; which would be a good enough defi- 
 nition of fenfation, if it did not confound that tumult which the fenfa- 
 tion of pain or pleafure excites in the mind, with the fimple perception of 
 the objed. In ihort, all fenfation is nothing but the motion of external 
 things, affedting, in different ways, our minds. And, that thefe affec- 
 tions of our minds muff be very various and different, at different 
 times> is evident, from this confideration, that our fenfations muft ne- 
 ceffarily depend upon three things, /"r/?, the nature and difpofition of 
 the external objed which produces them ; fecondly^ the habit or dif- 
 pofition of the organ upon which theimpreffion is made, that is com- 
 municated to the mind ; and, thirdly, where the objedt ( perates upon 
 the organ, not immediately, but through a medium, as in the cafe of 
 feeing, hearing, and fmelling, the fenfation muft depend upon the 
 conftitution of that medium. 
 
 Thus, it appears, that, in the perceptions themfelves, fo various and, 
 mutable, and depending upon fo many accidents, it is impoffible there 
 can be any fcience. And the only fcience that can be in the matter 
 
 Fff2 is 
 
 • Sufcitatits a rebus externis organa prementlbuSi animi tumultus. See the 
 paflage ouot-d at length, book 2. cap. 10. p. 14^ from whence It appears, that Mr 
 Hobbes falls into a much more dangerous error, when he confounds this tumult 
 with fcience and intellect.
 
 412 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 is concerning the nature and conftitution of the external objedl, the 
 organs of our fenfes, and the medium through which the obje(!^ o- 
 perates upon the organ. But, as all thefe are body, and as we 
 know nothing of the nature or eflence of body, it is impoflible we 
 can demonftrate any thing concerning them, though we are aflured 
 that every thing concerning them is governed by fixed and invariable 
 laws *. 
 
 From the reafon here given, why nothing material can be the fub- 
 je(5t of demonftration, it is evident, on the other hand, why ideas are 
 the proper fubjedt of fcience ; for, as ideas arc the creatures of the 
 mind, we know perfedly their nature and eflence, and therefore can 
 compare them fo, as to perceive their connedion, either intuitively, or 
 by the intervention of other ideas ; Whereas, body, being the work- 
 manlhip of God, we cannot penetrate into its eflence. 
 
 But, do our fenfes give us no information ? and, do we know no- 
 thing at all of fenfible objeds ? My anfwer is, that our fenfes give us fo 
 much information, and fo valuable, that, without fuch information, we 
 could not exift in this world. And,berides, they furnifli to us the ma- 
 terials, out of which intelled forms its objeds : And it is by means 
 of the fenfes that we difcover the /pedes which informs all material 
 things, which alone is fixed and permanent, and which, therefore, is 
 the only objed of fcience. 
 
 But ftill it will be afked, Do we know nothing at all of the matter 
 itfelf ? Can we apprehend nothing of the river as it pafles, to ufe 
 
 the 
 
 * This is the reafon (fays Philoponus, in his commentary upon the fir ft book of 
 
 ^^riftotle's firfl Analytics, page 18.) why Ariftotle, in enumerating the feveral fpeci* 
 
 cfes of propofitions, of which the fyllogifm is compofed, has omitted to mention pro- 
 
 . pofiticns concerning individuals, or of which individuals are the fubjcft ; for, fays 
 
 rhiloponus, luch propofitions are entirely ufelefs in matters of fcience.
 
 Chap.V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 413 
 
 the allufion of Heraclitus * ? Cannot we be at leaft affured that there 
 is a river ; that fomething truly exifls without us ; and that all is not 
 dream and deiufion ? 
 
 The anfwer to this quellion will be the fubjea of the next chap- 
 ter. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
 See page 325-
 
 414 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 The Doiiht about the Exigence of the Material M'orldnotfo old as Plato 
 and Arijlotle — Firjljiarted^ in Modern Times^ by Dr Berkeley — Tnvo 
 Anjivers gi'uen to it^ but neither of them JatisfaSlory — Other Proofs^ 
 therefore^ necejjary — Prenjious Objervations concerning Mr Hume^s 
 Syjlem of Philojophy on this Subje^ — Proof of the Exiftence of Exter- 
 nal ObjeSls from a Principle acknoijuledged by the Sceptics^ 'viz. Con- 
 fcioufnefs — Proof from the Cafe of Blind and Deaf Men — Proof from 
 the Mind Bang paj/i'ue in the Perceptions of Senfe — ObjeSiion anjiver- 
 ed — Mr Locke'* s Dijlinfl'ion of Primary and Secondary ^alities de^ 
 fended — Oijeftionfrom our Dreams anfivered — The Mind then has 
 not the entire life of its Faculties — Therefore not able to dijiinguifh 
 betivixt Illufion and Reality, 
 
 TH E doubt concerning the exiftence of the material world was 
 firft ftarted in modern times by Dr Berkeley, and greedily caich- 
 ed at by the author of the Treatife upon Human Nature, and of the 
 Effays, as very favourable to his defign of overturning all fcience and 
 certainty, and evidence of every kind. In antient times, it was tirft 
 advanced by Pyrrho, who, finding no other way lo diitmguilh himfelf, 
 and to get a name among the great philofophers that had gone be- 
 fore him, did, as I believe, out of mere vanity, (the prevailing paiTion 
 of fceptics in all ages, whatever their pretenfions to u.odefty may be,) 
 firft broach this extravagant paradox, which, however, if it were true, 
 would not anfwer Mr Hume's purpole, ot putting an end to ail Icience 
 
 and
 
 Chap. VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 415 
 
 and certainty ; for, though there were no material geometrical figures 
 extant in the univerfe, as indeed there is none that anfwers to the de- 
 finition of them, every demonftration in Euclid would be equally true, 
 though geometry would not be, as I fhall afterwards Qiow, that real 
 fcience, which it truly is. But, if there be no ideas neither, as Mr 
 Hume maintains, there can be no fcience nor knowledge of any kind. 
 
 It appears, therefore, that this controverfy about the exiftence of 
 body was, like the controverfy above mentioned, concerning Jree- 
 ivill^ unknown in the better days of philofophy, that is, in the days 
 of Plato or Ariftotle, or even before their time, but only in later times, 
 when philofophy became frivolous and paradoxical, and, at the fame 
 time, not accurate in making proper diftindions of things ; for, if 
 Pyrrho had accurately diftinguifhed, in the matter of fenfation, as 
 Plato does in the Cratylus, betwixt the objed, the organ, and the per- 
 ception of the mind, I think it is impofhble that he could have thought 
 of advancing fuch a dodrine, which plainly confounds the objed with 
 the perception, making fenfation to be only perception, and fo nothing 
 more but a phantafm or fpedre of the mind. 
 
 Mr Locke has been blamed for giving occafion to this error, by 
 making the diftindion betwixt the primary and fecondary qualities of 
 bodies, maintaining, that the former had a real exiftence in the bodies, 
 while the latter exifted only in our Minds. That Mr Locke did not 
 mean to give a handle to fuch an extravagant fcepticifm, any more 
 than to feveral other abfurd, as well as impious notions, that have 
 been grafted upon his philofophy, 1 hold to be certain. Nor do I 
 think that he was much miftaken, as I (hall ihow afterwards, in ma- 
 king the diftindion, that he has made, betwixt the primary qualities of 
 body, fuch as extenfion and folidity, and thofe he Q2i\h fecondary^ fuch 
 as hot and cold, fweet and bitter. But he was certainly to blame, for not 
 making more explicitly the diftindion with refped to thofe laft fenfa- 
 
 tionsj
 
 4^6 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.' 
 
 tions, which he makes with refped to the former, viz. betwixt the fen- 
 fation itfelf, and the external object which produces it. 
 
 There have been two anfwers given to Dr Berkeley and Mr Hum^, 
 but neither of which, I muft own, fatisfies me. The firft is of the 
 declamatory kind, fetting forth, with a great deal of wit and ridicule, 
 the abfurdity of fuch an opinion, fhowing, at the fame time, that it 
 leads to univerfal fcepticifm, and a difbelief of the moft importaat 
 truths of religion and morality ; aflerting likewife, what I am perfua- 
 ded is true, that no man ever fincerely believed that matttr does not 
 exift. But a philofopher is not convinced by declamation : Nor is ri- 
 dicule a philnfophical argument, whatever influence it may have up- 
 on the people ; and it no doubt has a great deal. Neither is an opi- 
 nion neceflarily falfe, becaufe it leads to dangerous confequences. And 
 there may be many things true which are believed by nobody. 
 
 The other anfwer Is more philofophical ; but neither is it fatisfylng 
 to me at leaf!. It aflerts, that the perception of every fenfible object 
 is neceflarily accompanied with a belief of its exigence; that this is 
 the conftitution of our nature, and that we are to inquire no more a- 
 bout it. But this belief is a matter of fadl, which cannot be eafily 
 granted without proof. And, that it is conftant and univerfal, I do 
 abfolutely deny. And I aver, that by far the greater part of mankind 
 ad according to the appearances the fenfe prefents to them, without 
 confidering whether thefe appearances are from without or from with- 
 in ; or, in other words, whether the objedt have any real exifteiice. In 
 fhort, they have no opinion upon the fubje<S, any more than the 
 brute-animals have, who a£t in confequence of thefe fenfatlons, as 
 well as we do. And, as to the thinking few, who have formed opi- 
 nions upon this and many other fiibjeds, that the vul,ear never think 
 of, if they fay that they believe that the objedls of fcnie are real ex- 
 iftences, they muft give fome reafon fur their belief j for I have no 
 
 con-
 
 Chap. Vr. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 417 
 
 conception of what Is called a natural or inftln£tlve belief; inftln£t, in 
 the way I have explained it *, and as I believe the word is generally 
 underftood, Is a principle of adtion, directing all the appetites and in- 
 clinations of the brute-animals, and many of ours : But it has nothing 
 to do with opinion or belief ; and, accordingly, the brute-animals 
 have neither : It is only the intelligent animal who forms opinions, 
 and believes. Now, it is impoffible that intelledl can believe any 
 thing without a reafon. And of this no man can have the leaft 
 doubt, who has learned his logic, and who knows how ideas are 
 formed, and how they are put together in propofitions, in which the 
 mind either gives a direcfi and imnediate aflent, upon the grounds I 
 have mentioned, or is convinced of the truth of them by ratiocina- 
 tion. 
 
 All, therefore, that can be made of this argument, in favour 
 of the exiftence of maiter, is, that none of the vulgar have any 
 doubt of it. But this general belief will not fatisfy the philofo- 
 pher, who will fay, that, in our dreams, we fee and hear moft 
 diftindly, and have other very ftrong impreflions of the objeds of 
 fcnfe. Thefe objeds, however, have no real exiftence, or, at leaft, 
 do not operate upon our fenfes j and yet, while our dreams continue, 
 we have no more doubt of the exiftence of them, than we have of the 
 exiftence of the like objeds when we are awake ; and, even when we 
 are awake, we have conceptions of objeds which we are fure do not 
 exift, fuch as the images we conceive of mountains of gold, Hippo- 
 centaurs, Gorgons, Chimaeras, and the like. Now, the^defenders of this 
 fceptlcal philofophy will fay. Why may not our perceptions of fenfe^ 
 be fuch as our dreams, and very often our waking thoughts are — mere 
 fancies and creatures of the mind, without any real objeds? Nor, in- 
 deed, have I yet heard any good anfwer to this argument ; for, that 
 
 ^ ZZ we 
 
 "• See, above, pages 138. 221.
 
 4i8 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 we have a phantafuh in which things, that have no real exiftence, are 
 pidured in the mofl: lively manner, and have not only fliape and co- 
 lour, but voice and adion given to them, is a fa6t that cannot be de- 
 nied. 
 
 Thus, It appears, that the arguments hitherto ufed to prove the ex- 
 iftence of a material world are not fatisfadtory ; and the reafon may be, 
 what is fomewhere obferved by Ariftotle, that the nearer any thing is 
 to a firft principle, and a felf-evident truth, the more difficult it is to 
 be proved, though it be that which every body believes. But, as it is 
 the bufinefs of metaphyfics to explain the firft principles of fcience, fo 
 it belongs alfo to it to prove the truth of the moft immediate deduc- 
 tions from thofe principles, efpecially if they be controverted. 
 
 But, before I begin this proof, I cannot help obferving, that it is 
 moft extraordinary that Mr Hume, who denies the exiftence of the 
 human mind, or of any mind in the univerfe, fhould deny, at the 
 fame time, the exiftence of matter \ for, if he had admitted the ex- 
 iftence of m'lnd^ it might have appeared poflible that our minds fhould 
 have produced all thofe illufions that we call objet-^s of fenfe, and be- 
 lieve to be real, in the fame manner as it a(5lually does produce them 
 in our fleep ; and it might have been faid, with fome colour of rea- 
 fon, that our whole life was but a dream. But how fuch illufions 
 fhould be produced, without either matter or mind^ is to me altogether 
 inconceivable : Nor, do I think, can it be believed by any man, who 
 does not, at the fame time, believe that any thing may be produced 
 without a caufe. There were, no doubt, antient philofophers, as well 
 as there are modern, who denied the exiftence of mind^ and therefore 
 were called matcr'ialijls. There have been others who, admitting the 
 exiftence of mind, denied the exiftence of matter. Such was Dr 
 Berkeley. Nor does it appear that Pyrrho, however fceptical he was 
 in other things, ever called in queftion the exiftence of his own mind, 
 
 or
 
 Chap. VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 419 
 
 or even of a mind in the univerfe ; fur I do not remember that ever he 
 was branded with the name of Atheift. The glory, therefore, ap- 
 pears to be referved for Mr Hume, to difpute the exiftence of both 
 mind and body^ and to differ in this refped, not only from the vul- 
 gar, but from all the philofophers that had been before him. But I 
 do not think that he has fhown abilities or learning fufficient to fup- 
 port his pretenfions to fo much fuperior wifdom. Thus much, at 
 leaft, might have been expeded of him, that he (hould have faid fome- 
 thing to reconcile the two opinions, the one with the other, and to 
 convince us how things could go on in the world as they do, fuppo- 
 fing all to be a dream, without either mind or body ; for all the philo- 
 fophers before his time, who were Atheifts, were, at the fame time, 
 Materialifts, and endeavoured to account for every thing in nature, 
 and all the operations of men, our waking thoughts as well as our 
 dreams, from mere matter and motion. Whereas Mr Hume, taking 
 away matter, and, by confequence, motion, denying the exiftence of 
 mind alfo, has left nothing in the univerfe, befides his own perceptions, 
 which are produced by no caufe that he affigns, and are an accident 
 without a fubftance. What a ftrange face of nature is this ! and what 
 an extraordinary philofophy muft this appear to any man who has but 
 learned the elements of logic \ 
 
 A man who maintains opinions fo very fingular, and which lead 
 to fuch extraordinary confequences, fhould be able to bring the cleareft 
 proof of them; fuch as, that it is impoffible, or implies a contradic- 
 tion, that the contrary opinion fliould be true : And particular- 
 ly, with regard to this queftion concerning the exiftence of mat- 
 ter, he {hould be able to fliow, that the idea of a fubftance ha- 
 ving folidity, impenetrability, refiftence, extenfion alfo, and figure, 
 implies a contradiction. But this he has not fo Jmuch as attempt- 
 ed to prove ; and therefore it muft be fuppofed that it is at leaft 
 poflible that body may exift ; from which a philofophy altogether 
 different from Mr Hume's would infer, that it docs adually exift. 
 
 G g g 2 But
 
 420 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 But it would be vain to ufe fuch an argument againft Mr Hume, be- 
 caufe it fuppofes a firft caufe, in the mind of which the idea of every 
 thing poflible exifts, and, for that reafon, is a^ually produced, as we 
 cannot conceive any idea in the mind of fuch a being that is not 
 brought into energy and a&uality ; for otherwife it v^^ould be there in 
 vain. But this is a philofophy altogether out of fight of fuch philofo- 
 phers ; We mufl:, therefore, in arguing with them, endeavour to 
 prove, in fome other way, that there is fomething material exifting, 
 which produces our fenfations. 
 
 But what fort of proof are we to ufe againft men who deny that 
 there is fuch a thing as truth, or even that there is one thing more 
 probable than another ? But, 1 think, I can convince others, if not 
 them, from a principle which they themfelves have unwarily admit- 
 ted, namely, the principle of conjcioufnefs^ by which they fay they are 
 convinced that they have perceptions ; for, if Mr Hume had carried 
 his fcepticifm fo far, as to difpute that he had even perceptions, it 
 would have been impoffible to have proved, at leaft upon his prin- 
 ciples, that there was fuch a thing as body. But he admits that he 
 is a bundle of perceptions. And the argument from thofe percep- 
 tions againft him, for the exiftence of matter^ is fo much the fair- 
 er, that, from thofe very perceptions, he argues againft the exiftence 
 of matter ; for, fays he, we know nothing of material objecls, but by 
 our ideas of them. Now, our ideas are not folid, extended, or figu- 
 red ; therefore it is impoflible that we can know that there are any 
 fuch fubftances. And he adds, that our own philofophy, meaning 
 Mr Locke's, admits, that our jierceptions of the fecondary qualities of 
 external objedls, fuch as white and black, b.tter and fweet, have no 
 exiflence in the objeds themlVlves. And, for the fame reafon, what 
 we call primary qualities, fuch as extenfion and folidity, have likewife 
 no exiftence in the objeds. 
 
 My
 
 Chap. VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 421 
 
 My only poftulatum, therefore, in this cafe, is fuch, that the 
 greateft fceptic mufi: grant it, namely, * That the evidence of con- 
 ' fcioufnefs is infallible.' It is upon this evidence that Des Cartes 
 was convinced of his own exiftence ; ' jpor,* fays he, * / think ; 
 * therefore I amJ* Now, that he thought, he could not know other- 
 wife than by confcioufnefs. And one Ihould have imagined the fame 
 argument might have convinced Mr Hume of his exiftence, though it 
 feems it did not ; for 1 do not think fo meanly of this argument as 
 fome do : But, on the contrary, I am perfuaded that we cannot be 
 fure of the exiftence of any thing but from its operations. And 
 the only difference in this matter, betwixt our own exiftence and that 
 of other things, is, that we know our own operations by confciouf- 
 nefs : Whereas, the operations of other things, we know only by the 
 information of our fenfes. And he is fo far, likewife, in the right, 
 that he lays the foundation of his phllofophy upon this cleareft of all 
 evidence, being that without which there would be no demonflration 
 or proof of any kind : For, if we were not confcious of having per- 
 ceived the truth of the premiffes, we never could infer the conduiion. 
 -—But, to proceed in our argument. 
 
 It is then admitted, that, by confcioufnefs, we know that we have 
 perceptions of fenfe : By the fame means we know the difference of 
 thofe perceptions ; that the perception of Jeeing, for example, is 
 not the fame with the perception of hearing. And, further, we 
 know, in the fame way, the difference of the fame perception in dif- 
 ferent circumflances. I fee, for example, a jire at fome diftance. 
 This I call the perception of the fenfe. I fhut my eyes, and I ftili 
 have the perception of fire ; but it is a perception, I fay, not from the 
 fenfe, but from the phantafia. And the difference betwixt the two, I 
 know, is, that the one is from within, and the other from without. 
 That the one is from within, I know with the fame certainty that I 
 know 1 have the perception, and, by the fame means, by confciouf- 
 nefs.
 
 422 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 nefs. And, in the fame manner, I know that, when I open my eyes^ 
 I have a different perception ; and my reafon tells me that the dif- 
 ference muft arife from fomething that comes in at my eyes, which I 
 have opened, and, thro' that channel, affedts my mind. It is in 
 this way that, when I am in a dark place, and open a hole, I have, 
 thro' it, the perception of light that I had not before. If it were poflible 
 to doubt that the perception of the fire, when the eyes are open, was 
 from without, a man might foon convince himfelf, by going near, 
 and putting his hand into it ; for then he would feel mo(t fenfibly the 
 difference betwixt the image of the fire which he had before from 
 within, by the means of the phantafia, and the perception he now 
 has of it from without : So that, if our feeling, as well as our other 
 perceptions, be real, as Mr Hume acknowledges, it muft be admitted 
 that there is a perception of fire, and, for the fame reafon, of other 
 objeds of fenfe from without. And, indeed, if all were from within, 
 and that we might have perceptions without thofe five inlets to the 
 mind we Z2}\jenfesy then a man, who, from his birth, was deprived of 
 all his fenfes, might neverthelefs have all the perceptions we have, 
 and, for any thing I know, many more ; Whereas, the fad: is, 
 that a man, deprived from his birth of one of thefe fenfes, fuch as 
 feeing or hearing, has not the leaft perception or notion of the objeds 
 of that fenfe : Nor can a man of the livelieft imagination have the 
 leaft perception of any corporeal thing, but what refembles the per- 
 ceptions of fome one or other of the fenfes : So that the phantcifta^ 
 tho' a faculty of wonderful power, which performs fuch extraordinary 
 things, both when we are afleep and awake, fupplying, in fome mea- 
 fure, the ufe of our fenfes, is neverthelefs confined in all its operations 
 to objeds fuch as we have perceived by the fenfes. And all the fairy 
 fcenes that it reprefents to us are nothing but fo many images of the 
 material world, very often, indeed, ftrangely and wildly put toge- 
 ther. 
 
 More-
 
 Chap.Vr. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 423 
 
 Moreover, It Is to be confidered, that the appearances In the phaft" 
 tafia are, for the greater part, voluntary ; for we can, by an a6t of 
 our w/7/, call up any Image in the phantafia that we pleafe ; but, as 
 to the perceptions of fenfe, they do not depend upon our will. 
 
 Thefe arguments are, I think, fufiicient to convince even fuch as 
 are not philofophers, of the exiftence of things without us. But, with 
 refpecSt to the philofopher, who knows the nature of fenfation, and 
 how It is produced, one fingle argument is demonftrative ; for, in the 
 perceptions of fenfe, every man is confcious that he is paflive, and that 
 he is moved or excited to fenfation by fomething. Now, wherever 
 there is a patient^ there muft of neceffity be an agent. And, where- 
 ever any thing is moved, there muft of neceflity, as I have elfewhere 
 demonftrated *, be fomething that moves. As, therefore, the organ of 
 fenfe is moved, and fometimes In the moft fenfible manner — and, as 
 nothing can move itfelf, there muft needs be fomething different from 
 the organ, and which Is the thing that moves It. The motion, we 
 are confcious, is produced by Impulfe upon the organ ; and as nothing 
 can impel body but what has folidity and refiftence ; therefore I con- 
 clude, that what ads upon the organ is body as well as the organ it- 
 felf f. 
 
 Fuither, 
 
 • Page 67. etfequetu 
 
 t It is in this way that Ariftotle argues againfl certain philofophers before his time, 
 fuch asHeraclitus and Protagoras, who, as he fays, maintained, that we were not fure of 
 the exiftence of any thing except our fenfations ; and that, therefore, they were the 
 only ftandard of truth and falfehood. According to this dodrine, fays Ariftotle, {f 
 there were no animals, nothing would exift, becaufe there would be no fenfation, 
 which is an affcaion of an animal. Now, we may fuppofe that no animal cxifts, and 
 therefore no fenfation, the confequence of which would be, according to' the 
 notion of thofe philofophers, that no fenfible objea, that is, objeft perceived 
 by the fenfe, exifts. But it is impolTible to fuppofe, that the things which 
 produce the fenfation fhould not exift, even without the fenfation ; for the 
 fenfation does not produce itfelf; but there neceffarily muft be fomething be- 
 fides the fenfation, which, in the order of nature, is prior to the fenfation; 
 for what moves is, by_ nature, prior to what is moved. The words are remark- 
 able.
 
 424 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 Further, that we have ideas, as well as perceptions by the fenfe, of 
 fenfible objeds, I think it is impofTible to deny. A geometer, for ex- 
 ample, has undoubtedly the idea of lines and figures, concerning 
 which he demonftrates {■•> many things. Now, I would defire to 
 know of thofe fceptical pliilofophers from whence we got thefe ideas. 
 The common account given of them is, that they are abftradled by 
 the mind from fenfible obje»Ss. Now, if that be not the true account, 
 I defire to know of thofe philofophers in what other way we come 
 by them ? If they cannot anfwer this queftion, they muft acknow- 
 ledge that their philofophy is very detedive, as they cannot affign 
 any caufe for fo common a phaenomenon, of which it is impoilible to 
 <ieny the exiflence. The only anfwer, that I think it is poffible to 
 make, is one or other of thele two ; either, that thofe ideas are innate, 
 and born with us, or, that they are communications made to us by 
 fuperior minds. But 1 anfwer both thefe hypothefes by afki»ig ano- 
 ther very fimple queftion, Why has not the blind man the idea of 
 colours, or the deaf man of founds, either innate, or by communication 
 with other minds ? 
 
 As to what is faid, that, if the objeds of the perceptions of our 
 fenfes were any thing external, our perceptions, which Mr Hume 
 
 choofes 
 
 able, and therefore I will give them. ^O.^s t' «w»5 ten to utr^ATo)/ ^»vo», tvhr xi £<« ^q 
 
 *VT<«» Ttiy %iA\!^v/,iif. «<7.9-y,j-<; yag o-jk oty em- t» ct-iv cv> /tt^TS tk. cii<rBnT» Htxt, fcr,Ti tx ec,i7^v\f/.xTctf 
 ie-0$ tiXijiiS' fi'J V«e ecir^xvouivo-j tt^^oj tovt* I'^rt. tt oi ftc V!T«z:-if<,iyci ^n iiixi « vtni tj))" atjc- 
 ^n<rii, zxi rt»Z'J airS->!<ri/wj, os^^viXToy. ov yn^ o/i ^y «ie-^»r<f, «vt« invtm i<rrtP, ctXX* tvTt T« 
 * Ttgov x«r« Tj)' at<(r^i)(r<» a xTiwyKn -x^an^ot nvxi tm «6(5-9iirl«f. to yaf Kitouy rai/ niyovf^i^ov (pv(rtt 
 iT^tTiscv ic-Ti. Meiaph. lib. 4. cap. 5. injine. He adds, K«< n Xtyirxt tt^o^ xXMXx txv- 
 xa x\i7Uy ou^y r,rrcy ; which is ftating ail obje-£lion to himfelf, viz. that what moves, 
 an4 what is moved, fall under the category of relatitn^ or v^oi t<, and are, as we exprefs 
 it, CQ relatives y and therefore muft exift together. But the anfwer is, that, though the 
 one, therefore, cannot, in time, be prior to the other, yet it may be in dignity, and the 
 order of nature, as the caufe muft neceflarily be to the effc£l, though both may have 
 been from all eternity, which is tlie cafe, according to Ariftotle, of the univerfe and 
 its author.
 
 Chap. VI. A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I C S. 425 
 
 choofes to call ideas, would necefTarily refemble the objeds which we 
 perceive, otherwiie we could not know that we perceive them : And 
 therefore our perception of a JoluU extended^ a fweet or bitter ob- 
 jed, muft be folid, extended, fweet, or bitter. This argument, I fay, 
 when attended to, proves nothing at all, and is really altogether unin- 
 telligible ; for, when we confider that the perceptions of fenfe are 
 produced by the preflTure of external objeds upon the organs of fenfe, 
 which being from thofe organs communicated, to the mind, caufes 
 therein a certain perception, that we caWjenfat'ton^ it is impoffible 
 to conceive how the perception or affedion of the mind fhould re- 
 femble the objed by which it is affected. We might as well con- 
 ceive, that the fenfation that we have from the prick of a fword 
 fhould refemble the fword. 
 
 But, if Mr Hume had not confounded, as he every where does, the 
 perceptions of fenfe with the ideas of intelledt, he would have k^n. 
 that there was a very great difference betwixt the perceptions them- 
 felves, and the ideas thence formed, and that there is fome ground for 
 Mr Lookc's diflindion betwixt the primary and fecondary qualities 
 of body ; for it is the bufinefs of intelled to inveftigate the nature of 
 things, and to find out the/pecies or idea in the material form. Now, 
 in certain objeds perceived by the fenfe, it can do that with great ac- 
 curacy. For example, with refped to its perception of exteiifion and 
 fgure^ it can diftinguiOi length, breadth, and depth ; and all the fe- 
 veral figures, by which body is bounded, it can fcparate and difcri- 
 minate one from another ; and there can be no reafon to doubt but 
 that thefe ideas, thus formed, havei their models and archetypes in the 
 nature of things, and that the bodies thus bounded are the very ob- 
 jeds which affed our fenfes of feeing and touching. And according- 
 ly, we find that the fcience which we form of thofe ideas, ap})lies per- 
 fedly well to all bodies. It is the fame with regard to the ideas 
 which we form from the perceptions of the fenfe of hearing ; for of 
 
 H h h founds
 
 426 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 founds we form a fcience and art, which we call muftc^ and which alfo 
 appliv'S to the nature of things as they exift; fo that neither is there here 
 any reafon to believe that the intellect is deluded by falle appearances. 
 But, as to the other three fenfes/of touching, tafting, and fmelling, we 
 have not hitherto been able to difcover the nature and conftitution of the 
 objeds which produce them, fo as to be able to form ideas concerning 
 them, of which fcience can be made. They continue, therefore, only 
 to ferve the purpofes of animal life, and of obfervation and experience, 
 without being reduced to fcience. Now, thofe qualities of body, fuch 
 as folidity and extenfion, of which the mind can form diftin^t ideas, 
 and which are fo far of the nature and effence of body, that we can- 
 not conceive body without them, Mr Locke calls primary qualities, 
 and fays that they have a real exiftence in the bodies ; whereas the 
 other qualities, of which we cannot form fuch clear ideas, he fays, are 
 only perceptions of the mind : And, if he had faid more exprefsly, 
 what it is evident he meant, that thefe perceptions are produced by 
 certain qualities in the body, as well as thofe of which we can make 
 fcience, and had added the reafon why we can make fcience of the one 
 fet of perceptions, but not of the other, his philofophy would have 
 been nowife imperfect or defedlive, and he would have fufEciently 
 eftabliflied his diftindlion betwixt primary and fecondary qualities of 
 bodies ; the firft being thofe of which we form clear ideas, the other 
 thofe of which we know no more than that they affect our fenfes in a 
 certain way. 
 
 What only remains to be confidered, is the cafe of dreams, in which 
 undoubtedly we perceive objects of lenie, which fometimes make a 
 greater impreffion upon us than what we perceive when we are a- 
 wake. That our dreams have their leat in the phantafia, and that we 
 fee things when we are awake, by means of the fame wonderful fa- 
 culty, is ceruinly true. And it is hktwiie true, what Ariftotle has 
 
 ob»
 
 Chap. VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 427 
 
 obferved*, that theintclled employs itfelf upon thefe appearances in our 
 fleep, reafons, and draws conclufions concerning their* in thefar.-.e man- 
 ner as it does upon tlie appearances prefcnted to us by our fenfes whea 
 we are awake. Where, then, it will be faid, is the difference betwixt 
 our waking and fleeping- perceptions ? and how fliall we know that 
 our whole life is nothing but a dream ? And, indeed, if all the powers 
 of the mind, as well as the power of perception, and the reafoning fa- 
 culty, were employed in our dreams, I think it would be impoffible to 
 diftinguifh betwixt our waking and fleeping life. But the difference 
 betwixt the two I take to be this, that, while we fl^ep, we have no 
 exercife of memory, and, by confequence, no power of reviewing 
 our former actions, and comparing the paft with the prefent : For it is 
 well known that we converfe with perfons in our dreams, who have 
 been dead long before, as if they were flill alive, without the lead 
 memory or recolledion of their being dead. 
 
 I know it is faid, and believe it to be true, that perfons fometimes 
 know that they are dreaming ; but this happens very ftldom ; and, 
 when it does happen, 1 am perfuaded the perfon is in a Hate inter- 
 mediate betwixt fleeping and waking, and always wakes very foon 
 after. 
 
 Thus, it appears, that the mind, in dreaming, has not the full ex- 
 ercife of its faculties, wanting confcioufnefs and reflection, by which 
 our minds are more diftinguilhed from the brute mind than by any. 
 thing elfe ; fo that it is not to be wondered that the brutes have 
 dreams as well as we. On the other hand, In our waking flate, we 
 exercife all the powers of our mind ; we have memory, recollection, 
 confcioufnefs, and refledion ; we can review our adions and opera- 
 tions ; can compare the ftate we are then in with the flate we were 
 in when afleep, and can fliow the difference betwixt the two. 
 
 H h h 2 In 
 
 * Ariftotl. de Jnfomniis.
 
 428 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 In fiich a condition, therefore, we are able to diftinguifh betwixt 
 illuiion and reality, our dreaming, and our waking thoughts, and 
 pronounce, with certainty, that the perceptions of fenfe, when we 
 are awake, are produced by objeds without us ; whereas, when 
 we are afleep, they are all from within, and the work of the phantafia 
 only. 
 
 Nor are there wanting many examples of men, while awake, being 
 in [o imperfedl a Hate of mind : For madmen, and perfons in a de- 
 lirium, haN^e no recolledion of their paft adions, and a£l- as if the 
 phantafms of imagination were realities. Now, I confider a dream as 
 a kind of fhort madnefs or delirium, of which we recover when we 
 awake ; and I think it as ridiculous to judge of truth and nature by 
 what appears to the madman, as by what appears to the dreaming 
 man. 
 
 Nor fliould it move us, that what we fee in our dreams very often 
 afFe(^s us as much, and fometimes more, than what we fee when we 
 are awake : For the fictitious fcene we fee upon the ftage, or the re- 
 prefentations of the magic lanthorn, affedt us very much ; But there 
 is this difference betwixt thefe reprefentations, and what is prefented 
 to us in dreams, that we know the former to be mere illufion ; 
 whereas we do not know the latter to be fo, but take them for reali- 
 ties, unlefs when we are, as I obferved before, upon the confines of 
 fleeping and waking, and have the confcioufnefs of our waking 
 thoughts j ined with our dreams. 
 
 Thus, I think, I have proved, that the fcene which nature prefents 
 to us is not an illufion, but confifts of real objeds, which, by impulfe 
 upon our organs of I'enle, produce all our fenfations ; and, as noth ng 
 can impel, or be impelled, that is not folid and extended, and, as every 
 
 thing
 
 Chap. VI. A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I C S. 429. 
 
 thing that is folid and extended is body, I think I may conclude, that 
 what exifts without us, and produces our fenfations, is body. And, 
 though it be fleeting and tranfitory, and in a conftant flux like a ri- 
 ver, yet I think I have fhown, that intellect can apprehend fome- 
 thing of it as it paflTes, and make it a permanent obje<a of art and 
 fcience. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 430. ANTIENTMETAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 CHAP. VIL 
 
 Of the Nature of Reafonlng by Induction — This Reafoning ufed both in 
 Natural Philojophy^ and in the ordinary Affairs of Lije — From this 
 Way of reafoning in Natural Philojophy, the Laivs of the Motions of 
 Bodies are inferred — From theje La'dos ive reafoft doivnwards, and 
 demon/Irate — This is the Science of modern Natural Philojophy — The 
 Evidence of thofe Laivs of Nature fery different pom that of Axiomt 
 ^—The Reafonfor our Belief in thefe Laivs tuuotold — Eve^y Lxperi^ 
 mental Philofopher is, injome rejpccl, a The iff ^ though he may not 
 knouu it — Of InJuSlion in the common Affairs of Life — of the fame 
 Kind ivith lndu6lion in Natural Philofophy, but not near jo cettani^-^ 
 Reafon of the Difference — Speculations concerning the Duratvm of this 
 Syjiem of Nature and of Man do not belong to this Part oj the Work, 
 
 AS from many individual material things we form ideas, or ge^ 
 neral ideas, as they are commonly called, fo, from many pro- 
 pofitions concerning fuch things, we form general conclufions ; and I 
 propofe, in this, chapter, to inquire concerning the nature of this kind 
 of evidence. It is a manner of reafoning, well known by the name of 
 Indu^ion; by which, having difcovered, by experience and obferva- 
 lion, that a propofition, affirming or denying fuch or fuch a quality 
 of a particular material thing, is true of a great number of particulars 
 of the fame fpecies of things, we infer that it is true of all ; and we 
 alfo infer, that it not only is fo at prefent, but will continue to be fo 
 
 in
 
 Chap. VII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 431 
 
 in time to come. And we may alfo carry this ratiocination to time 
 paft, and conclude that it has always been fo. It is in this way, 
 chiefly, that we reafon in natural philofophy; and it is our only me- 
 thod of reafoning concerning the affairs of life. I will begin with 
 our reafonings of this kind upon the lubjedt of Nature. 
 
 It is by indudiori that we form all thofe general propofitions con- 
 cerning the motions and operations of body, which we call the laws 
 of motion and of nature ; for we can prove nothing concerning them 
 a priori^ not even that a ftone falls to the ground. As little can 
 we prove demonftratively, or a priori^ that the motion of fall- 
 ing bodies is uniformly accelerated ; a principle from which 
 many confequences are reducible, relating to the velocity of fall- 
 ing bodies, the fpace through which they fall, and the time : Nor 
 can we otherwife prove, though I believe the general opinion is dif- 
 ferent, that grand principle of mechanics, *That the moment of every 
 ' bc'dy IS in a compound ratio of the mafs of its matter, and its veloci- 
 
 * ty ;' for by no reafoning a priori can it ever be demonftrated, that as 
 much as I take away from the mafs of any body, if fo much I add ta 
 its velocity, the moment or 'weight will continue the fame. — In the fame 
 manner, we know, * That, if one body, by impulle, moves another, 
 ' as much as the body moved acquires of the motive force, fo much 
 
 * will the body moving lofe' : Or, as the Newtonians chufe to cxprefs 
 it, Aciion and re-aftion are equal : Andin this way, and in no other, is 
 it proved, that body, moved by impuhe of another body, goes on in 
 the dircdion of a flraight line, and retains the motion coma.unicated 
 to it till It be retarded, or flopped alroirethcr, by (ome contrary 
 force. Thefe, and other propofitions concerning motion, being found 
 always to hold in every indance in which they have been tried, from 
 them general conclufions are fbrnsed, whi.h we call hnvs of nature • 
 and, confidering them as axioms or felf-evident propofitions in natural 
 philofophy, we reafon downward from thein, and in that way 
 ftriaiy ocmonftrate or prove a priori^ that is, from cuu/e to effe^. 
 
 And
 
 432 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 And this I hold to be all the fcience that is in modern natural philofo- 
 phy. 
 
 But thefe laws of nature are very far from having the evidence of 
 axioms^ properly fo called ; for» as we do not know the effence of bo- 
 dy, we cannot from thence deduce its properties, that is, we cannot 
 demonftrate them ; and much lefs can we perceive them intuitively ; 
 for we can fee no contradidion in fuppofmg that a ftone fliculd go 
 upwards, as flame does, inftead of falling downwards, fuch as we 
 conceive in fuppofing that a pari is equal to the ivhok. 
 
 Yet, that the ftone falls to the ground, and that bodies are moved 
 in the feveral other ways above mentioned, no body doubts ; but this 
 unlverfal belief does not fatisfy the philofopher, and he itdl inquires, 
 upon what grounds do men believe fo ? The auihor of the Lflkys 
 fays, that It is ciijlom which produces this belief *. but cultom hath 
 nothing to do with belief, or any ot the operations of uitellect ; it re- 
 lates only to praBice \ for, by being in the frequent ule ot domg any 
 thing, we form the habit or difpohtion to do it. And this is common 
 to us with the brutes, who have no belief or opinion of any kind, 
 which is peculiar to the rational or intelledlual nature. We therefore 
 never believe without fome reafon, though perhaps that reafon may 
 not be attended to, and Is only difcoverable upon refledlon. And the 
 reafon. In this cafe, I take to be twofold ; one of which operates 
 upon the vulgar, the other upon the philofopher. The firft is, that, 
 having obferved the fame thing happen often, and not feeing any 
 reafon why It ftiould not happen again, we believe that It will happen 
 in time to come, and that it has happened in time paft. This reafon 
 is only a negative reafon, which has no other foundation than our ig- 
 norance 
 
 "* Volume third of Mr Hume's Eflays, fe^l. 5.
 
 Chap. Vir. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 433 
 
 norance. But the reafon of the philofopher Is fomething more pod- 
 tlve ; for he beheves that the fame thing that has often happened will 
 happen again in the fame circumftances, becaufe he iuppofes that there 
 is a fyftem in nature according to which every thing happens regu- 
 larly, orderly, and uniformly. And fo far does the experimental 
 philofopher carry this notion of a fyftem, that, upon the credit of one 
 experiment, made with great caution and accuracy, he firmly be- 
 lieves that the fame effedt will be produced, if the circumftances are 
 exai^ly the fame ; for he does not fuppofe that there is any thing in na- 
 ture fingularor anomalous, or that happens without fome fixed or de- 
 termined caiife operating regularly and conftantly. Nay, he goes ftill 
 further, upon the fuppofition of the order and regularity of nature ; 
 for, without one experiment, or the poflibility of an experiment, he 
 believes that one year is precifely equal to another in duration *, be- 
 caufe he cannot believe that nature would be fo irregular as to make 
 the duration of one revolution of the earth round the fun unequal to 
 that of another. And, in this way, I believe every experimental 
 philofopher is fo far a Theift, whether he knows it or not ; for it is 
 impoflible to believe, upon any rational ground, that there is a fyftem 
 in nature, without believing that, at the fame time, there is intelli- 
 gence. 
 
 Our reafoning concerning human life, and the aff'alrs of men, 
 grounded upon what we call moral evidence^ is of the fame kind ; 
 for, by obferving the fame thing happen often, we conclude that, in 
 like circumftances, it will happen again. For example, having obfer- 
 ved ourfelves, or learned from hiftory, and the teftimony of others, 
 that men of fuch an age, and fuch a character, have, in fuch or fucli 
 circumftances or fituaiions, aded fj or fo, we believe that men of the 
 fame age, and fame charader, will, at other times, a6t in tl.e fame 
 manner. Having alfo obfcrved, that ftates, conftituted and govern- 
 ed in a certain way, and having their citizens educated according to 
 
 I » i certain 
 
 * Some of the antlents appear to have doubted of this. See what I have faid, p 351.
 
 434 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 certain rules, have a6ted in fuch and fuch a manner, and have been 
 fortunate or unfortunate in certain circumftances and fituations, we 
 infer, that a ftate of the fame kind, and in the fame circumftances, 
 will have the like fortune. In accurate reafoning of this kind, 
 con(\i\. prudence and political ivifdom : And from much experience 
 in human affairs, no doubt, many general rules may be formed con- 
 cerning both the conduct of private life, and the government of na- 
 tions ; yet fuch prudential and political rules are not near fo certain 
 as the laws of nature above mentioned ; for, though there be a fyftem 
 in the affairs of men, as well as in Nature, it is far from being fo 
 conftant, regular, and uniform, as the fyflem of nature ; the one being 
 formed and carried on by infinite wifdom and power, the other an ar- 
 tificial fyftem, framed and adminiftrated by an animal of weak intelli- 
 gence and ftrong paffions, and which, therefore, is liable to many dif- 
 orders from within, as well as from without. 
 
 But how far are we to carry this notional fyftem In the natural 3ind 
 the moral world ? In the natural world, are we to believe that the 
 fame frame and conftitution of things has always been, and will al- 
 ways continue to be ? and, in the jnoral world, that men always have 
 been^ and always will be fuch, as we know from experience they are, 
 and fuch as we are informed by hiftory they have been for fome 
 thoufands of years. Are we to believe that they will ftill continue 
 to go on with the fame vicllTitude of charaders and manners, virtues 
 and vices, arts and fciences, happinefs and mifery ; in fhort, with all 
 the variety and uncertainty in their fortune and condition that has been 
 for fo many ages paft ? Thefe are queftions which no doubt belong to 
 Xhefrji philofophy, but not to this part of it of which I am now treating, 
 concerning the nature of evidence, and the foundation of human 
 knowledge. I will therefore here conclude what 1 have to fay upon 
 the fubjed of proof by induction, after obferving, that there is no 
 proof of this kind, nor any evidence of fads, but upon the fuppofi- 
 
 tion
 
 Chap. VII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 435 
 
 tion of what I have endeavoured to prove in the preceding chaptefi 
 that a material v^orld exifts. 
 
 In the next chapter, I proceed to examine the nature of an evi- 
 dence of a very different kind, viz. geometrical evidence, which> 
 however, I will fhow has fome dependence upon material things. 
 
 I i i 2 CHAP.
 
 436 ANTIENTMETAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 CHAP. VIIL 
 
 GtQfhetfyi according to Plato, is all built upon Hjpothefesy and does not 
 demonjhnte its oivn Principles. — // is only by means of the Firji Philo- 
 fophy that it can be made a perfetl Science. — In ivhat Sen/e Geometry 
 is founded upon Hypothefes. — Definitions and Pojiulates mere Suppofi^ 
 tions. — Nature of Definition. — Euclid does not define Magnitude^ the 
 Suhjecl of this Science ; butfuppofes both that it is known .md that it 
 ^xfis. — Neither does he define any of the three Dimenfnns ; but luppo- 
 fes them likeivife knoivn. — Euclid Juppofes Magnitude to (e tei minuted 
 by Super liciefes. Lines ^ and Points. — Definitions he gives oj ihci'e are 
 to be explained by the Firfl Philofophy. — No Definition of Equality hy 
 Euclid, but an Axiom in Place of a Definition. — Equalitv only belongs 
 to Magnitude and Number. — Magnitude, the Standard of Equality, not 
 only j or it/elf but for other Things. — That Magnitude is moved or 
 changes it s pofttion-, is another Goemetrical Hypothefis — This, and the 
 other Hypothejes above mentioned, are General Hypothefes. — The Defi- 
 nitions are particular Hypothefes. — Difference betivixt Definitions and 
 Poflulates. — The Axioms rejult from the Definitions, and have their 
 Evidence founded upon them. — All Geometry, therefore, hypothetical ; 
 andivecan only fay that its Hypothejes ate pojfible. — To make it a Real 
 Science, the Real Exiflence of the Material World miift be pr oved, 
 — The fame is true of Arithmetic. 
 
 PLATO has faid, that the principles of geometry are all hy- 
 pothefes ; and that, therefore, a fcience founded upon fuch prin- 
 ciples, cannot be a perfed fcience * ; for no fcience can be perfect 
 
 which 
 
 ♦ Plato de Republica, lib. 6. infnt, pag. 688. Edit. Ficini. And lib. 7. p. 704. 
 where, fpeaking of geometry, he ufes thefe words, '« y.<§ k^^c.-^ fn* 'e^n oir^, nxiuTYi h
 
 Chap. VIIL ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 437 
 
 which argues ■rom pnnciples that it afTumes, without either demoii- 
 flrating them, or fliowing them to be felf-evidcnt. By this he does 
 not mean to dil'parage geometry, which he ftudicd very much him- 
 felf, and earneftly recommended to his fcholars i But he fays it is 
 imperfect, compared vv'iih. dialed ict which, in his language, Is the fame 
 with vvhat Ariftotle calls ihcjitji philofophy^ and is now commonly 
 known by the name of Metaphyfics * ; becaufe it does not demonftrate 
 its own principles, but takes them for granted, or fuppofes them to be 
 true ; whereas, metaphyfics demonftrates the principles of all fciences, 
 as well as its own. It, therefore, 1 think, belongs to my fubjedl:, to 
 fhow in what refpe£t geometry proceeds upon hypothefes, and how 
 metaphyfics fets it upon a more f lid and firm foundation, by fliowing 
 the reality of thofe hypothefes. And this 1 think the more neceffary , that 
 
 there 
 
 x«e< Tot fAlra^v e| 'av f4» «<oe <rvfi7ri7rXiKrxt, Tig f^-^^xvuf tsj* ToieivT-/,v e^«A«7<«» wars Sxic-T^tojn ys- 
 viiF^xi ; the meaning of which is, that ' what begins with that which it does not know, 
 
 * and when the end and all betwixt isconne£bed with what is thus not known, that never 
 
 * can defervcthe name of fcience ' He, therefore, does not call it e^Ko-Tr^ttn, but Itctvcix^ 
 being, no doubt, ax\ operation of the j-ovj, which is exprefTed by the word '^tuvtiu^ but 
 not proceeding from felf-evident or demonftrative principles- Ariftotle agrees with 
 his matter, that the principles both of geometry and arithmetic are affumed ; for, fays 
 he, the one afTumes that magnitude exifts, the other that a monad exifts. And he 
 further fays, that it is of nccelTity that all inferior and fubordinate fciencf s fhould af- 
 fume their principles, even fuch as may be demonftrated j becaufe it is impoffible they 
 can be demonftrated from the principles of the fcience, being themfelves the princi- 
 ples to be demonftrated. Wc muft, therefore, go for thedemonftration of them to ano- 
 ther fcience, and that fcience is no Lther th.m the firft philofophy, whicr^ as it demon- 
 ftrates the principles of all other ftiMic^^s, may be called the fcience of fciences. Arift. 
 Analytic. Pofterior. lib. i. cap 9 and 16. 
 
 * We are not to confound the dialc5lic of Ariftotle with the diale6lic of Plato ; for, 
 as I have obferved, the diale6iic of Ariftotle is the art of argumentation from common 
 topics very well known, and much pradifed in the days of Plato, but not known bv 
 that name, though the pradice of it was exprelfed by the verb ^ixXiyf.T(>xt.
 
 438. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 there are many, I believe, excellent geometers that never dreamed of 
 this imperfection of their fcience ; nor do I know any one in modern 
 times who has handled this matter with any accuracy, except Dr Bar- 
 row in his mathematical le(Sl:ures, who, befides being a great geome- 
 ter, was very learned in the Greek philofophy, as he has clearly fhown 
 in thofe lectures, of which I have made fome ufe in this chapter. 
 
 In the firfl: place, if the fubje6: of any fcience is not proved to have 
 A real exiftence, that is, to be fomething in rerum natura^ and not to 
 exift merely in notion or idea, that fcience muft be altogether hypo- 
 thetical, and rather an ideal than a real fcience. Now magnitude, 
 which is the fubjed of geometry, Euclid has not only not proved to 
 have a real exiftence, but has not fo much as defined it, leaving it to 
 common fenfe to find out what it is, and alfo to be fatisfied as to its 
 reality. 
 
 Furthermore, the fcience of geometry is founded upon definTtTons, 
 poftulates, and axioms, which accordingly Euclid has premifed to his 
 demonftrations. Now, I will (how that definitions and poftulates are 
 no more than fuppofitions, and that axioms are only propofitiona 
 founded upon thefe fuppofitions. 
 
 Definition^ 'as Ariftotle tells us, is not a propofttion ; becaufe it af- 
 firms or denies nothing *. Neither is it the fignification of a word, ex- 
 plained by other words better known ; for, if that were the cafe, our 
 common didionaries would, under every word they explain, give u& 
 fo many definitions. But a definition ' is the unfolding or develope- 
 ' ment of a complex idea, into the feveral ideas of which it is compo- 
 ' fed j' which compofition is indeed commonly marked by one word, 
 
 thou|;h, 
 
 * Arift, de Interpretatlone. cap. 5^
 
 Chap. VIII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. " 439 
 
 though that be not at all neceflary, but only convenient for the ufe of 
 fpeech. There Is, therefore, nothing affirmed concerning the idea 
 thus developed, not even that it exifts. There is one thing, however, 
 neceflarily implied in every definition, namely, that the ideas contain- 
 ed in the definition are of fuch a nature that they may confift toge- 
 ther, or, in other words, that the aflbciation and combination of them 
 is pojjzble ; for, whatever is not in its nature inconfiftent, and contra- 
 didory, is pojfihle ; whereas, what is inconfiftent, and contradidory, is 
 impoj/ibki becaufe it cannot be conceived to exift. Thus, if I fhould 
 define any figure to be a round fqiiare^ that would be no definition, be- 
 caufe it would be a definition of what is impoffible. Every definition, 
 therefore, is an hypothefis of what is pofiible. 
 
 Before I apply this to the definitions of Euclid, I will fay fomething 
 of the fubjeift of this fcience, viz. magnitude^ which, as I have obfer- 
 v^d, Euclid has not defined, for a reafon which will appear immedi- 
 ately, namely, that it would have carried him out of the bounds of 
 the fcience ; for magnitude belongs to the genus of quantity^ which is 
 one of the categories. But it is the bufinefs of metaphyfics to explain 
 it, being one of the great conftituent principles of the univerfe, with- 
 out which no material world could have cxifted. And accordingly 
 Ariftotle, though he had faid a great deal about it, in his categories, 
 enough, as he thought, to make it underftood as a praedicate of a pro- 
 pofition, has explained it moft accurately in his metaphyfics *. There 
 he has defcribed it to be that which is divifible into parts, each of 
 which is OK^, and fomething by itfelf. And he divides it into two fpe- 
 ciefes, the one quantity difcrete^ the other quantity conthmous. The 
 former of thefe has its parts feparated and disjoined one from another, 
 and is what we call number. The latter is that which has its parts 
 contiguous, and joined together by one common" boundary. And 
 
 it 
 
 * Lib. 3. cap. 1.
 
 440 A N TIEN T MET A PHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 it is menfuicJ as the orhcr is 7iumhered\ for, thougli the parts, into 
 whicii q.ia icity continuous ib divided, may be numbered ; yet that 
 divifi )ii iuto parts can;iot be without menfuration, that is, the ap- 
 plication of ibme quantity of the fime kind to it j fo that the capaci- 
 ty of being meafured is the primary atfedtion of this kind of quantity. 
 It is a quantity of this kind that Euclid calls magnitude^ and which is 
 nothing elfe than body, or matter extended, but of which the exten- 
 fion only is confidered by geometers, not the thing itfelf that is ex- 
 tended. Now, this extenfioii is in three feveral ways, the diftindion 
 of which, as is natural enough, we have taken from the pofition of 
 our own bodies ; for, what is before and behind us, we call length ; 
 what is to the right and left of us, we call breadth ; and what is up 
 and down, with refped; to us, we call depth. Thefe are the three di- 
 menfions of body ; and whatever has all the three, is called a foUd, 
 which Euclid has defined to be that which has length, breadth, and 
 depth, or thicknefs. But he has not told us what any of thefe three are, 
 leaving that alfo to common fenfe and apprehenfion. As to the real 
 exiftence of body, and by confequence of its dimenfions, the geo- 
 meter proves nothing ; but he goes upon the fuppofition that they 
 do exift ; and, as there is nothing impoffible in the fuppofition, there 
 is no reafon why it Ihould not be granted. 
 
 Further, geometry fuppofes that all magnitudes are not infinite or 
 indefitiite, but that fome are terminated or bounded ; and, therefore, 
 that there is fuch a thing di^fgurCy which is nothing elfe but ??iagni" 
 tude tenninated \ this, alfo, is an hypothefis that muft be granted. 
 
 This being admitted, the p:eometer proceeds, and fays, that a fo- 
 lid is bounded b) fuperficiefes ; and a (uperficies, as Euclid has defi- 
 ned it, is that wl\ich has length and breadth, but not thicknefs. That it 
 muft have length and breadth, is evident ; but he has not told us why 
 it has no thicknefs, leaving this likewife to xhtfiji philofophy to ex- 
 plain
 
 Chap. VIII. A NTIENT METAPHYSICS. 441 
 
 plain, which Is not difficult for him to do; for, if ithad depth orthicknefs, 
 rt would not be the boundary or extremity of the folid ; for it would 
 have itftlf an extrenuty, which would be the extremity of the folid. 
 This Ariftotle fhortly expreflfes, by faying, * That an extreme muft ne- 
 *'ceirarily be different from that to which it is the extreme*.* 
 
 Further ftill, a fuperficles, if it be not infinite, which is contrary to 
 the hypothefis, mulf have bounds or extremities likewife. The bound 
 or extremity of a fuperficies is what is called a line^ defined by Euclid 
 to be length without breadth. But neither does he tell us why the 
 line has not breadth, leaving this alfo to the metaphyfician, who gives 
 the fame reafon for a line wanting breadth, that he does for a fuperfi- 
 cies wanting depth, namely, that it would not otherwife be an extre- 
 mity, for it would itfelf have an extremity. 
 
 Again, according to the hypothefis, a line alfo mufl: have Its extre- 
 mities; and thofe extremities are called points, which, fays Euclid, have 
 no parts, though he does not add the reafon, which is, that otherwife 
 they would not be extremities,. 
 
 All thefe confequences refult from the hypothefis of magnitude li- 
 mited ; And, from the fame hypothefis, there is another neceflar^^ con- 
 fequence, that it muft have a fite or pofition, which, as Ariftotle has 
 oblerved, is what diftinguifiies eflentially the fubjedl of geometry from 
 that of arithmetic ; for monad and number have no fite. Now, if 
 magnitude have a pofition, it mufi neceflarily occupy a certain por- 
 tion of fpdce, which is called \i2, place. 
 
 And from hence we may colled the definition of equality^ namely, 
 occupying or filling the lame (pace, of which Euclid has made an axi- 
 om, viz. axiom eight, though, 1 think, he rather Ihould have put it 
 among his definitions. 
 
 K k k And 
 
 • Phyf. lib. 6. cap. f .
 
 442 ANTIENT. METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 And here we may obferve, in pafling, the truth of Ariftot1e*s obfer- 
 vation, that equal or unequal can only be applied to quantity^ not to 
 quality i for it is impoflible that the definition of the equality of 
 magnitudes can be applied to any thing but magnitude. And, as to 
 numbers, the equality of them is made by their conlifting of the fame 
 number of monads, which Ukewife cannot be applied to qualities *. 
 
 That 
 
 * Quantity, therefore, is not only a (landard Ly which it meafures itfelf, but it is 
 the flandard by which every thing elfe is meafured. Thus, without magnitude, there 
 is not only no motion, but no menfuration of motion ; for, we fay motion is great or 
 fmall, quick or flow, according to the fpace which the magnitude goes through in a 
 certain time; and, as time cannot be without motion, fo it is meafured by motion; 
 for it is meafured by the fpace which the body that is moved runs through. Thus, 
 what makes the year, is the fpace of the ecliptic, compafTed by the fun. The meafure, 
 therefore, both oi motion and time^ is ultimately derived from magnitude- (See Ariftot. 
 Metaph. lib. 5. cap, 3.) The moment, or the weight of bodies, is, in the fame manner, 
 meafured by magnitude ; for that body has the greateft weight, that can raife up or 
 impel forward the greateft magnitude. Even qualities, as far as they are capable of 
 meafure, are mealured by magnitude and motion. Thus, the thermometer meafures 
 the degrees of heat and cold by the expanfion of bodies ; and it is in that way only 
 we can fay one degree of heat is equal to another; for, when we fay fo, we do not ap« 
 ply the ^crm equal to the degrees of heat, but to the expanfion of the magnitude ; 
 meaning, that, by the one degree of heat, the magnitude was as much expanded as 
 by the other. But, as I have elfewhere obferved (p. 39i-)> even that cannot be faid with 
 cxaclnefs. 
 
 As to quantity difcrete^ or number^ It is a meafure that applies to every thing that 
 can be divided into parts correfponding to monads ; and the ufe of it is ftill more ne- 
 ceffary than the menfuration by magnitude ; for, without it, men couM not live at all In 
 fociety, or carry on any of the common arts of iiie. I he moft; wonderful application of it, 
 I think, is to mu(;cal founds, by wliich they are divided into notes ; and the ratio of the 
 notestoone another, according totheir different degrees ofacutenefs or gravity, is afcer- 
 tained by numbers But even this was, at firlf, done by magnitudes, or weights ftretching 
 thtfe firings j but, as the confequence of that was only to make the vii. rations of the 
 firing more or fewer in the fame time, it is ultimately by numbers thai the ratio of 
 7iotes is fixed.
 
 Chap. VIIL ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 443 
 
 That a magnitude fliould have a fite or pofition, is abfolutely necef- 
 fary ; but it is not necclTary that it (hould change its pofition, that is, 
 fliould be moved : Yet this is a geometrical hypothefis, which every 
 one, but a quibbling fbphilt, fuch as, they fay, Zeno the Eleatic was, 
 who contended that there was no fuch thing as motion, muft admit. 
 And the conlequence of this movement of magnitudes is, that they 
 may be conceived in any part of fpace, or in any pofition, with re- 
 fped to one another. 
 
 Thefe may be called the general hypothefes of geometry ; and I 
 come now to fpeak of Euclid's definitions, which are only more par- 
 ticular hypothefes ; for he feems to have imagined, that thofe general 
 hypothefes did not belong to his fcience, but that it was the bufinefs 
 of the firft philofophy to examine them, and to inquire whether they 
 were to be admitted or no. Of his definitions of a point, line, and 
 fuperficies, I have already fpoken. The fourth definition is an hypo- 
 thefis concerning a line, by which it is fuppofed to lie evenly betwixt 
 its extreme points, and then it is called 2.Jiraight line. The feventh 
 definition, of a plain fuperficies, is an hypothefis of a fuperficies, in 
 which any two points being taken, the ftraight line between them lies 
 wholly in that fuperficies. The eighth definition, of a plain angle> 
 proceeds upon the general hypothefis above mentioned, of magnitudes 
 being capable of variety of pofitions, with refped: to one another, and 
 fuppofes that two lines in a plane inclineone to theother,foasto meet, 
 but not in the fame direction. The definition of a right angle is, in like 
 manner, taken from the pofition of one line, with refpedt to another. 
 And the fame is true, not only of all his definitions of angles, but of 
 all his definitions of plain figures, that is, lines inclufingZ/j^cd". And 
 what he calls parallel lines are lines fuppofed to be in luch a pofition 
 to one another, that, though produced ever lo far at either extremity, 
 they never will meet *. 
 
 K k k 2 Thefe 
 
 * That Euclid's defiii'ttons are all hypothefes, is the opinion of Proclus, in the 
 fecond book of his commentary upon Euclid's Firft Book of Elements, p. 22. An 
 
 authority
 
 444 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. BooTc V, 
 
 Thefe are the definitions prefixed to the firft book of his elements : 
 And I mighti in the lame way, go over the definitions prefixed to his 
 other books ; but enough, 1 think, has been faid, to fliow, that Eu- 
 did's definitions are truly nothing more than fo many hypothefes. 
 
 As a definition is an hypothefis of what is poffible in theory, fo a 
 poftulate is an hypothefis of what is poffibie in pradice. The one is 
 what may be conceived, the other what may be done. Of this kind 
 are Euclid's three poflulates ; for certainly a ftraighi line may be drawn 
 from any one point to another, which is his Jir/i poftulate ; and, like- 
 wife, a terminated ftraight line may be produced to any indefinite 
 length ; which is his fecond. And his third is, that a circle may be 
 defcribed from any centre, at any diftance from that centre. This 
 poftulate might have been made more evident to fenfe, if it had been 
 expreflTed In this way, ' That any circle may he defcribed by the ex- 
 
 * tremity of any ftraight line being moved round, till it return to the 
 
 * point from which it fet out, the other extremity remaining fixed ;' 
 for, this way exprefled, we not only fee the poftibility of its being 
 done, but we diftindly conceive the manner in which it is done *. 
 
 As 
 
 authority for which I have great refpe£l, as he was not only a fuhlime metaphyfician, 
 but a good geometer. In this pafTage he fays, that there is but one fcience that is 
 •»yx<>*£T«j, meaning Metaphyfics. 
 
 • A circle would have been better defined in this way by Euclid, than by its pro- 
 perty of having al! the lines drawn from the circumference to the centre equ.il ; for 
 every definition from the generation and production of the thing, is better than from 
 any of its properties, after it is produced. In this way, Euclid has defined a fphere 
 from the revolution of a femicircle about its diameter, when he might have defined it, 
 as he has done the circle, from the equality of the lines drawn from its ct^ntre to its 
 fupcrficies. But, as Barrow has very well obferved, (Mathematical Lectures, p. 223.) 
 when a thing is defined by its generation, the puiribiliry of its cxiflience is evidently 
 fhown, and mathcmitical truth requires no more than that the fubjcct of it Ibouid have 
 a poflibility of exiftence- In like manner, he has defined a tylinder from the turning 
 of a parallelogram round its fide^ and a cone from the rotation of a triangle about its
 
 Cliap. VIIL ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 445 
 
 As to the axioms, they are all founded upon the definitions, being 
 felf-evident propofitions, refuliing from thofe definitions ; for, if it be 
 once admitted that magnitude has a certain ftandard by which it can 
 be meafured, viz. the fpace that it occupies, and that, therefore, one 
 magnitude may be faid to be equal or unequal to another ; from thefe 
 hypothefes, I fay, all the axioms neceflarily follow ; for axioms, as I 
 liave obferved, are only true, becaufe, to fuppofe the contrary, would 
 he a contradidion ; and the contradiction is to fome definition. For 
 example, the axiom, that if two magnitudes arc equal to a third, they 
 are equal to one another, is true ; becaufe, to fuppofe otherwife, would 
 be contradictory to the definition of equality ; for, if the one was great- 
 er than the other, they could not be both congruous to, or occupy the 
 fame place as a third magnitude*. And there is one of Kuclid's axioms 
 that implies this contradidion to a definition ftill more evidently, and 
 it is the I ith, which fays, that all right angles are equal to one ano- 
 ther ; for, to fuppofe the contrary, would be, at once, to deftroy the 
 definition of a right angle. And, as all the demonfi:rations are dedu- 
 ced from definitions, poftulates, and axioms, it follows, of necelTary 
 confequence, that, as Plato fays, the whole fcience of geometry is by^ 
 potheticaL 
 
 The quefiion, then, is, what is to be done to make It a pofit'wc 
 fcience, and to give it a real foundation in the nature of things, not in 
 our ideas only ; for it is not fufficient to explain, as I have done, the 
 feveral hypothefes upon which Euclid proceeds, and to fliow that they 
 are perfedly intelligible, and fuch as are at leaft poffible to exlft ; but 
 it muft be further fhown, in order to make geometry a real fcience, 
 that they do actually exifl: ; for we are not to imagine that, becaufe 
 Euclid has defined the feveral figures which are the fubjeCt of his 
 demonfirations, therefore thofe fig)ires do really exift. A man may 
 define a Hippocentaiir or a Chimaa^a^ and,.from fuch definitions, may 
 draw confequences that are deflionftratively true ; but it will not from 
 
 thence 
 
 * See whatl have faid in explanation of this axiom, page 392.
 
 446 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 thence follow that thofe animals do a£lually exifl:. Nor, indeed, are 
 Euclid's definitions, properly fpeaking, definitions, except upon the 
 fuppofition of the exiftence of the things defined ; for, otherwife, they 
 are not definitions of things^ but explanations of ivords^ becaafe 
 a definition exprefles the nature and eifence of the thing defined ; 
 and, therefore, of a non-entity, or nothings there can be no definition. 
 But I may give a name to a thing that has no exigence, luch as a 
 Hippocentaur, or a Chimaera, and 1 may explain what notion or idea 
 I affix to the word *. It is evident, therefore, that, upon the fuppofi- 
 tion of a material world not exiting, Euclid's fcience is merely no- 
 tional and nominal, without any foundation in the nature of things : 
 So that it is neceilary, in order to eftablifh the reality ot geometry and 
 other fciences, to prove the exiftence of a material world. This I have, 
 endeavoured to do in a preceeding chapter ; .and, if I have fucceeded, 
 the confcquence is, that magnitude^ the fubjedt ot geometry, is not a 
 mere notion, but a thing actually exifting ; and fo is, likewife, inag- 
 mtude limit edy ox figure. For, though, perhaps, there is not to be 
 found a perfed geometrical figure, yet they all exift in the way that 
 Michael Angelo faid the ftatue exifted in the block of marble, 
 « which,' fays he, * the ftatuary does no more than produce, by taking 
 ' away what is fuperfluous.' 
 
 Arithmetic, too, w^ould be merely a notional fcience, if there were 
 no material world exifting j for then there would be nothing that 
 
 could 
 
 * This (lifl:in£lion betwixt the definition of a thing, and the explanation of a name, 
 is dated by Ariftotle, in his La(l Analytics^ lib. 2. cap. 7. and is explaineil, at preat 
 length, by Philoponus and Eullratlus, in their commentaries upon the pailage, where 
 they have fliown, that wc n.ay give a defcription of the notion we exprt-fs by any 
 word which will be fuflicient for making our meaning underflood, but will not be a 
 definition of the thing. For example, when I fpeak of a man, I may fay that I de- 
 note by that word an animal that walks eredt, looks up, and fpt-aks. This will fuffi- 
 ciently explain what animal I mean, but it is far from the definition ot a man.
 
 Chap.vrrr. antient metaphysics. 447 
 
 could be numbered^ as there would be nothing, in the other cafe, that 
 could be meaj'ured. 
 
 It may be further obferved on this head, that, upon the fuppofition 
 of no material world exifting, not only thofe faiences of geometry and 
 arithmetic would have been merely notional, but they never could 
 have exifted ; for it is from the material world that both the geometer 
 and arithmetician take their ideas of magnitudes and numbers. 
 
 As to Arithmetic, Euclid, in his book upon arithmetic, has defined 
 well enough, for his purpofe, the monads which is the principle of 
 number. He has faid it is that by which every thing is faid to be 
 one ; for it was not his bufinefs, as an arithmetician or geometer, to 
 enter into a metaphyfical difquifition concerning the one-t and to fhow 
 that it is neceflarily connected with exiflence ; and that the ens and the 
 ununiy as the fchoolmen fpeak, are truly one and the fame thing. But 
 he has not been fo fortunate in his definition of number^ which, he 
 fays, is a multitude compofed of monads *; by which he has plainly 
 confounded two ideas, which are not only dlftin£t, but, in fome fort, 
 oppofite ; for multitude^ as well as number^ confifts oi monads ^ that is, 
 of feparate and detached things, not of one continued body. And, 
 accordingly, the barbarous nations, when their arithmetic fails them, 
 and they want to denote multitude that they cannot number, they 
 point not to the earth or fea, but to the hairs of their head, which are 
 feparated and detached one from another. Euclid, therefore, ought 
 to have defined number, as Ariftotle does, to be * multitude defined 
 *or limited t.' 
 
 But, 
 
 * Ex. ftoixtuy c-v/KifiLtivav ■^X^Seg. 2cl defin. lib. 2. 
 
 f n^jiJef iriTTu^xs-ixiyovy and TrXnSoi he defines to be ro oKet^inv tvyc({.t'.t ti{ fiii p'4"'«;tH| that 
 is, monads. Metaph. lib. 5. cap. 13.
 
 448 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 But, if Euclid has been unfortunate in this definition, he has been 
 remarkably fortunate in his definitions of the feveral kinds of numbers, 
 and their feveral properties and affedions, which are exprefled with a 
 clearnefs, and a brevity at the fame time, that are really wonderful. 
 Of this kind, particularly, is his definition of proportion in numbers, 
 which is as fliortly exprefTed as his definition of proportion in magLii- 
 tudes prefixed to his fifth book, but much more clearly. 
 
 Ariftotle has obferved *, that the point, as well as the monad, is- 
 indivifible ; but the difference betwixt them is, that the monad is not 
 only indivifible, but it has no fite or pofition ; whereas the point has sn 
 fite. And, indeed, the monad is one of the moft abftra£l ideas that 
 we have ; for it feparates from the thing every affedlion or quality ex- 
 cept exiftence and unity ; which, with refped: to fingle things, arc 
 truly the fame ; for we never have the idea of a fingle thing, but we 
 confidcr it as one. And, accordingly, in common language, we fay 
 oneftngle thing. 
 
 As to the compofitlon o^ monads, or number, befides being multitude 
 defned, it has order ; for it has not only a regular progreffum up- 
 wards, but in all its compofitions by multiplication, and in its ratios^, 
 that is, the relation of one number to another, there is a wonderful 
 regularity, very little known to our modern mathematicians, but which 
 was very much fludied by the antients, as is evident from the treatife. 
 upon arithmetic of Nicomachus, a Pythagorean philolopher of later 
 times. 
 
 And here we may obferve the reafon why the Pythagoreans made 
 number the fymbol of immaterial and divine things ; for, befides that 
 they are the mod abftracSt of all ideas derived from fenfible objeds, 
 being divefted of all the common properties of material ihings, even 
 time and place, they have order and proceffion, luch as the Pythago- 
 reans 
 • Metaph. lib. 5- cap- 6.
 
 Chap. VIII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 449 
 
 reans conceived to be in the Divinity. And the principle of Divinity, 
 as well as of Number, is unity perfedly indivlfible *. 
 
 L 1 1 Plato, 
 
 * It is a ftrange fancy of Dr Barrow, in his Mithematical Le(flures, p'. 29. that geo- 
 metry is, in the order of nature an I indignity, prior to arithmetic; mignitude being;, 
 according to him, the primary idea, of which number is only an aifeclion, ferving for 
 no other purpofe but to number the parts of magnitude. In this, as in other things, 
 the Do<Slor h.td done better to have followed his guides, the antients. It is a crude 
 thought of the DoQ;or*s, which he has endeavoured to fupport by reafons that I think 
 are not intelligible ; for magnitude is, as I have obferved, not fo fimple an idea as 
 number, including, befidea exiftence, fpace, and pofition in that fpace. And, /econdfyy 
 number, and its principle, the monade, are fo much primary ideas, that, without them, 
 we have no idea of any thing elfe. As to magnitude, if we were to confider it as infi- 
 nite, we mud conceive it as one thing, and we mufl: alfo confider it as confifting of a 
 multitude of parts contiguous to one another : So that the moft fimple conception we 
 can have of magnitude involves both the one and the many^ befides fpace and fitua- 
 tion. But, when we confider magnitude as bounded, the cafe is ftill clearer ; for we 
 can have no idea of the fimpleft rexSlilineal figure, viz. a triangle, without firft having 
 the idea of the number three. The Do£lor, in his reafoning upon the fubjedl, feems 
 to confound meafure with number ; for meafure is certainly an afFe£bion of magnitude 
 only, and therefore belongs to geometry only. But, when the parts meafured come to 
 be numbered, then there is the application of another fcience to geometry. 
 
 It is to be obferved, that the antients not only diflinguiflied betwixt the monade and 
 number, but would not allow the duad to be number ; for, they faid, it was no more 
 than a flep of progreflTion from the monade to number ; therefore was betwixt the two, 
 and neither the one nor the other. It was quite different from the monade,inthis refpe<St, 
 that the monade is'not increafed by being multiplied into itfelf, but only by being added 
 to itfelf ; whereas, the duad is increafed by multiplication, as well as by addition ; 
 and it differs from number in this rcfpeft, that number is more increafed by being 
 multiplied, than by being added to itfelf; whereas, the duad is juft as much increafed 
 by being added to itfelf, as'j^ being multiplied by itfelf; fo that it is plainly betwixt 
 the two, and participating fomething of each. This is an obfervation of Prcclus, in 
 his fecond book of his Commentary upon Euclid, page 45. iSee alfo Jamblichus's 
 Commentary upon the Arithmetic of Nicomachus. Such obfervations upon theprinciples 
 of number are little attended to in modern times. But this diftindion betwixt the 
 
 duad
 
 450 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 Plato, in his feventh book De Republican has obferved, with great 
 juflice, that there is no fcience which abftra(fts the mind fo much from 
 matter and fenfe, as arithmetic. It does fo, he fays, much more than 
 geometry, the fubjedl of which, viz. lines and figures, have pofition, 
 and are reprefented to the mind by material fymbols ; whereas num- 
 bers are (o much abRradlied from matter, that they cannot be exprefled 
 by any material form j fo that the mind, in the ftudy of them, is obli- 
 ged 
 
 duad and number appears to have been known even to the grammarians, who, 
 in antient times, formed a language according to the rules of art. And, accordingly, 
 we find the Greek language, and other antient languages, which were the work of men 
 of fcience, had a dual number. See what I have further faid on this fubje£l in the 
 Origin and Progrefs of Language, vol. 2. book i. cap. 8. p. 88. 
 
 Proclus, in the paflage above quoted, obferves, that the fcience of magnitude, as de- 
 livered by Euclid, proceeds in the fame manner as the fcience of number j for Euclid 
 begins his definitions of figures with the circle, which is the fimplefl of all figures, 
 being contained under one line, and therefore like to the monade of the arithmetician. 
 Then he proceeds to the femicircle, which may be called the duad of magnitude, as it 
 Is contained by two lines, the one a flraight line, and the other a curve. And 
 from thence he goes on to the triangle, which may be called the firft numerical figure. 
 In this manner, the antients compared things together ; and, by difcovering refem^ 
 blances between things feemingly moft different, fuch as figures aiui numbers, formed 
 fyftems of fcience, of much greater extent and comprehenfion than what is to be found 
 among us. Proclus, in this work, not only carries on the analogy betwixt numbers 
 and figures, but he finds out wonderful refemblances betwixt the (\iii philofophy and 
 both geometry and arithmetic ; explaining, after the manner of the Pythagoreans, by 
 figures and numbers, the prpceflion of Divinity, and the progrefs of mind in gene^ 
 ration and produclion. This he may have carried too far ; iior do I think the metar 
 phyfical part of this work the mafl: valuable part of it : But the geometrical part 
 I think admirable ; for he has explained the principles of geometry, and fbown the 
 method of reafoning in that fcience, compared with that in other fciences, better than 
 any body. This he was able to do by being a philofopber, and a man of univerfal 
 knowledge, as well as a very good geometer ; whereas, the mere geometer, though 
 he may improve feveral of the arts of life, and m vy be alfo ufeful to the philofopber, 
 yet he himfelf does not underftand even the pr'nciples of his own fcience, nor what 
 lank it holds in the Ericyclopediey or fyftcm of univerfal learning.
 
 Chap. VIIL ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 451 
 
 ged to be converfant with the pure ideal form, altogether unafTilled 
 by the fenfes. 
 
 And yet, however remote numbers may be from fenfe and fenfible 
 objeds, it is certain that the knowledge of them was the firft thing 
 like fcience among men. The reafon of which is, that men could 
 not live together in fociety, nor carry on any common bufmefs, either 
 for their fuftentatlon, or for their defence, without the ufe of num- 
 bers *. Now, necejfity^ according to the common faying, is the mother 
 of invention ; and therefore it is not to be wondered, that fo urgent a 
 neceiTuy produced fo early even thefe mod abftra6t ideas of numbers, 
 in which they were fo far affiled by the fenfes, that whereas other 
 ideas are abitradted only from particular fenfes, fuch as our ideas of 
 vifible objeds trom the fight, of audible objeds from the hearing, the 
 idea of nu nber is furnilhed by every fenfe ; for we diftinguiih one^ 
 tivo; three, not only in what we fee or hear, but in what we touch, 
 taile, and fmell. And further, we have the idea of it from the con- 
 fcioulnefs of what pafTes in our own minds ; for we know that we 
 have different thoughts, in order one after another, and which, there- 
 fore, we can count. 
 
 Thus, I have endeavoured to fhow in what fenfe geom.etry is a 
 hypothetical fcience ; and that even arithmetic, though a more ab- 
 ftrad fcience than geometry, is hypothetical, in fo far as it fuppofes 
 the exiftence of things to be numbered. 
 
 L 1 1 2 In 
 
 • It is well obferved by Plato, de Republica, lib. 7. p. 697. edit. Ficiniy that it was a 
 moft abfurd fiaion of the tragic poets in Athens, that Palamedes, at the fiege cf IVoy, 
 invented numbers, and taught the Greeks to count their army and their fleet • as if it 
 had been poflible that the Greeks were fo far advanced in the arts of life, as to have 
 government, religion, and navigation, and to carry on fo great a war on the other fide 
 of the fta, without the ufe of numbers. « What a ridiculous general,' fays Plato, 
 « would Agamemnon have been, if he had not known how many legs or arms he 
 • had !'
 
 4SZ AN TIE NT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 In tlie preceding chapters, I explained the different kinds of 
 reafoning, fuch as the Jcientifical or danoyiflrativcy the analytical^ 
 the diale^icaU and the indii^ive. But there is one kind ot rea- 
 Ibning, and which is of daily ufe, that I have not yet mentioned, 
 viz. the reafomtig from examples ; by which I prove, that, becaufe 
 fuch a thing happened in fuch and fuch circumftances, the fame 
 thing will happen in like circumflances. That this reafoning is not 
 demonftrative, is evident. But, in order more clearly to under- 
 hand the nature of it, we muft have recourfe to a divifion of rea- 
 foning made by the philofophers of the Peripatetic School. All 
 reafoning, they faid, is either from greater to lefs, from lefs to greater, 
 or from equal to equal '*. From greater to lefs^ that is, from generals 
 to particulars^ is the demonftrative reafoning, if the premiflfes be felf- 
 evident propofitions, or demonftrated truths : If not, the reafoning is 
 only of the dialedical kind. From lefs to greater^ that is, from parti' 
 culars to generals y is reafoning by induflion. And from equal to equals 
 that is, from one particular to another that is like it, is reafoning from 
 examples. And, befides thefe, there is no other method of reafoning ; 
 for the analytical is rather a method of inveftigation than reafoning : 
 Or, if it is to be accounted reafoning, it is of the indudive kind, pro- 
 ceeding from confequences to principles, that is, from particulars to 
 generals^ 
 
 CHAP. 
 
 • See Philoponws's Commentary on the firfl book of AriftotIe*s Firfi /Analytics, 
 fol- 10.
 
 Chap. IX. A N T r E N T METAPHYSICS. 453 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 Tb€ Non-Exijlmce of the Material World no Difcovery oj our Scots Phi' 
 lojopher — But^ that ive have no Idea of Caufe and EfFe^, a Difcovery 
 claimed by him — But this no difcovery of his in the Senfe in ivhich he 
 feems to undcrjland it — In the Senje to ivhich his folloivers have eX' 
 tended ity it is a Difcovery^ but afalfe one — That ive have the Idea 
 of Caufe and Effe^^ in Matters of Science, proved by the Authority of 
 Arifiotle — and by the Reajon of the Thing — Definition of Caufe — The 
 general comprehends the particulars under it, ivhich therefore depend 
 for their Exifence upon the general — Difference betivixt Demonftra-' 
 five and Indu6iive Reajoning — Nature of Caufality m Matters of 
 Science — very different from Caulality in Fafls of Natural or Civil 
 ^j/?c?rj— Truth, Divine as well as Eternal. 
 
 IN the preceding chapters, I have fhown that, upon the fuppofition 
 of there being no material world, human knowledge has no folid 
 foundation ; and, that even thofe fciences which feem to have the 
 greateft certainty, fuch as geometry and arithmetic, are like our 
 dreams, in which our reafonings are fometiraes very juft and conclu- 
 five, but unlupported by fadt and reality. 
 
 The dodrine of the non-entity of matter was not, as I have obfer- 
 Ted, a difcovery of our Scots philofopher. But what I am now 
 
 $0
 
 454 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 to fpeak of In this chapter, he gives as a difcovery of his own ; and a 
 moft wonderful dircovery it is, 1 know, thought to be by his follow- 
 ers. It is this, * That we have no idea o^ cauje and effeSi ;' ' for,* fays 
 he, * what we call a caufe^ is nothing more than an event, which, by 
 ' experience and obfervation, we have always found to precede another 
 
 * that we call the effe^i ; but, that the one produces the other, that is, 
 
 * is the caufe of the other, we have no knowledge at all. We perceive 
 
 * that the two events are conjoined^ but not conneBed* From his rea- 
 fonings on this fubjedt, and the particular inftances to which he ap- 
 plies the general propofition *, we fhould imagine that he carried it 
 no farther than to fa<fls, and natural and human events. But, confi- 
 dered in this view, it is certa'niy no difcovery of Vlr Hume*s ; for 
 every philofopher kno\AS that we can onlv realon corc^ruing fuch e- 
 venrs from indudion ; and, that fuch realbning is not de onHrative, 
 for the caufe which I have afligned in the ch pter up )n the lubjcdt of 
 that fort of reafoning, but only probable. And this '^ r Hume ac- 
 knowledges. But,m the end of his diflertations upon th;.-^ fubjedl:, he 
 feems to have carried the matter further ; for he lias given us a gene- 
 ral definition oi caii/e and effedi^ which may comprehend cverv matter 
 of fcience f* And 1 know that feveral of his followers carry his doc- 
 trine fo far ; the confequence of which is, to overturn all fc cnce and 
 demonftration.. But this, 1 am perfuaded, was not intended by 
 Mr Hume, at leafl, not in this part of his work. And the prin- 
 cipal reafon, as appears to me, why he has infifted fo much 
 upon this notion of caufe and effed, is, that he might draw the 
 notable conclufion, which he draws in the end of one of his Ef- 
 fays J, viz. * that, as the produdion of the world by the Deity is a 
 
 * iingle event, to which we, by experience, know nothing fimilar ; 
 
 * there- 
 
 • See vol. 3d of his EflTiys, § 4. and 5. 
 
 f Vol. 3. fe<Sl 7- p. III. The definition is, ^ An ohje^l followed by another , and 
 ' where all the ohje&St fimilar I0 thejirji^ are followed by obje&s ftmilar to the fecond,'* 
 t Eflay upon a Providence and a Future State, vol. 3. p. 207.
 
 Chap. IX. A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. 455 
 
 * therefore we can have no idea of God*s being the author of the uni- 
 
 * verfe.' 
 
 To refute this fo impious aflertion, does not belong to this part of 
 my work ; nor is it neceiTary, I would fain hope, for the greater part 
 of my readers. But fome of Mr Hume's fchool having, as I faid, car- 
 ried his dodlrine of our having no idea oi caufe and effe5ly fo far as to 
 overturn the principles, not only of theology, but of every other 
 fcience, and of all demonftration, I think it is proper, in this place, 
 to vindicate thofe principles, and to defend them againft fuch an at- 
 tack, which is grounded, as I think I fhall be able to fliow, upon ab- 
 folute ignorance of the nature of fcience and demonftration. 
 
 That, in all demonftration and reafoning a priori^ we argue from 
 generals to particulars ; as, on the contrary, in reafoning by induc- 
 tion, we argue from particulars to generals, is a fad: that cannot be 
 denied. And further, it is equally certain, that the particulars which 
 are inferred from the generals are fome way or another connecled'w'Mh 
 them ; fo that they are not only conjoined but conneBed, Here, there- 
 fore, is that connexion which Mr Hume defiderates with refpecS to 
 fads or events ; for which reafon, he denies that we have any idea of 
 the one being the caufe of the other. The only queftion, therefore, 
 is. Whether the connedion, which undoubtedly is betwixt the gene- 
 rals and particulars from them inferred, or, in other words, betwixt 
 the premifles and conclufion, in demonllrative reafoning, is fuch a 
 connedion as that upon which we beftow the name of caiijc and ef- 
 fe6i? 
 
 That the two firft propofitions in a fyllogifm are the caufe of the 
 conclufion, has been the opinion of all phdoldphers ever fince there 
 was a fyuem of logic known j and, particularly, it is the opinion of 
 
 Ariitotle,
 
 4S6 ANTIENT METAPHYSIS. Book V, 
 
 Ariftotle, the author of ihe Syllogiftn, mofl explicitly declared *. But, 
 as the authority of Ariftotle is now become obfolete, and, as we live 
 in an age when the cleareft principles are called in queftion, I will 
 endeavour to prove it in form. 
 
 And, in \\\tjirjl place, I will give a definition of caufe^ which (hall 
 be {horter than that of Mr Hume*s, and, I think, fully as clear. 
 Caufe^ I fay, is, * That without which another thing, called the effe^^ 
 
 * could not exift.' This is a definition which, I think, cannot be 
 controverted; and, if fo, 1 alk any geometer, Whether the idea of a 
 triangle, as contained in its definition, is not the caufe of all its pro- 
 perties, as being that, without which, thofe properties could not ex- 
 ift. If it be alked. How thofe properties do thus depend for their ex- 
 iftence upon the definition of a triangle ? the anfwer is, that the idea 
 of a triangle is more general than that of any of its properties, as it 
 virtually comprehends them all ; fo that they all flow from it, and are 
 produced, as it were, out of it ; for that is the nature of this caufa- 
 tion. For the fame reafon, any of Euclid's axioms is the caufe of the 
 propofition which he proves by them. As, for example, the axiom, 
 
 * That, if any two things are equal to a third, they are equal to one 
 
 * another,' is the caufe, that any two particular lines being equal to a 
 third, they are equal to one another ; for the lines or figures could not 
 be equal if the axiom were not true : And the axiom being the 
 more general propofition, virtually contains in it the particular propo- 
 fition concerning thefe lines which flows from it, and is educed out 
 of it. And the effe^^ in this cafe, has that dependent exiftence which 
 
 every 
 
 * Analyiica, Poft. lib. i. cap. 22. Where, fpeaking oi iTi^nrrt^Hi or fcience, he fays, 
 that we only underftand a thing, or know it fcientifically, when we know the caufe 
 ■of it. oT«» T)iv mruM atu^iix ynuc-x-ir/y \i r'l to •^c^a.y^x ta-riy. — And again, in the fame 
 chapter, he fays, that fcience or demonftration is, when the premifles are the caufe of 
 the conclufion. AvxyKn tji» «a-oS^HxT<x.))y iTTie-Tn/LcnVy i| uXr,6»iy t enytn, kxi Tr^urvr, KKt xfti^ 
 »■*», KKt '/tv^ifcaiTi^tify xcci TT^uTi^tiff XXI AITIGN rev c-vf67rt^x(r[^xTC{,
 
 Chap. IX. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 457 
 
 every effeB muft have upon its caufe ; for the two lines would not be 
 equal if the axiom were not true : Whereas, on the other hand, the 
 axiom would have been true, if thefe particular lines had never ex- 
 ifted ; fo that there is no mutual or reciprocal dependence in the 
 cafe. 
 
 And it is the fame with ideas that it Is with propofitions ; for the 
 more general idea is the caufe of the particular idea under it, becaufe 
 it comprehends it. Thus, the idea of animal comprehends man ; the 
 confequence of which is, that man could not have exifted without a- 
 nifnalf but animal might have been without man. Therefore animal 
 is the cai{/e of ?nany according to the definition that I have given of 
 caufe, but not man of animal: So that, in the whole procefs of the 
 human mind, the formation of our ideas, as well as our reafonings, 
 what is general is prior in excellence and dignity to what is particu- 
 lar, which is included in it, and produced out of it. 
 
 And here we may very clearly fee the difference betwixt in- 
 dudive reafoning and demonftrative ; for, tho' the indudion were ne- 
 ver fo full, fuppofe the thing could be fliown to hold in ten thou- 
 fand different inftances, yet we never could from thence infer that it 
 was univerfally true. And why ? Becaufe particulars do not con- 
 tain the general, but the general the particulars ; therefore the ge- 
 neral is the cau/e of the particulars, but not the particulars of the^^- 
 7teral. And, if it were otherwife, all iiuclid's reafonings from defi- 
 nitions and axioms would be no better than indudlive reafoning. For 
 it is certainly true, what Ariftotle fays *, that there is no demonftra- 
 tive or fyllogiftlcal reafoning, of any kind, in geometry, or in any o- 
 ther fcience, without a general propofition, from which the particular 
 proportion made ufe of in the fyllogifm is deduced. Of this Ari- 
 
 M m m ftotle 
 
 * Firft Analyt. book i. cap. 24.
 
 458 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS, Book V. 
 
 ftotle gives vs an example from geometry, in a very curious demoa- 
 ftratlon*, which he gives us of the fifth propofition of the firft book of 
 Euclid, concerning the equality of the angles at the bafe of an ifoicelea 
 triangle. And the fame may be faid of every demonftration in Eu- 
 clid ; for It is only upon the fuppofition of the general propofitioa 
 being true, that any ftep of the demonftration proves any thing. 
 Thus, for example, if, in any demonftration concerning a triangle, it 
 be aflfumed. That the three angles of that triangle are equal to two 
 right ones, this proves nothing, unlefs the general propofition be ad- 
 mitted, That the angles of all triangles are equal to two right ones. 
 This being admitted, I' fylloglfe thus : All triangles have their 
 angles equal to two right ones. This figure is a triangle. I'here- 
 fore this figure has its angles equal to two right ones. Thofe gentle- 
 men, therefore, who deny that the particular propofition is deduced 
 from the general or, in other words, that the general is the caufe of 
 the particular, muft deny, at the fame time, the truth of every demon- 
 ftration of Euclid. 
 
 further, I fay that, in demonftration, we not only argue from' 
 caufe to effe^i but the demonftration evidently Iliows us how the 
 cau/e produces its effeci ; for when from the definitioa of a triangle 
 any of its properties is deduced, we clearly perceive how the definition 
 is the cau/e of that property. And how any axiom, or propofition, 
 formerly demonftrated, produces the inference that we draw from it 
 in demonftrating any propofition, is felf-evident. 
 
 The reader that has learned his logic, and, particularly, if he has 
 ♦•ead the two books of Ariftotle's La/l Analytics, will be fiirprifed that I 
 have been at fo much pains to prove a propofition that muft appear to 
 him perfectly evident ; for Ariftotle, in thefe books, has ihown, th.^t de- 
 monftration muft not only be from the cauje^ butfrom \.h.c primary diwA 
 
 mojl 
 
 * Ariftot. ibid.
 
 Chap. IX. ANTI EN T METAPHYSICS. 459 
 
 mojl general caufe ; fo that, if the proof be from a particular caufe^ 
 when there is one more general comprehending the /?(3r^zV«/(3r, it is 
 not demonftration properly fo called. 1 his he makes plain, not only 
 to thofe who have ftudied his logic, but to fuch as know a little of the 
 elements of geometry ; without which, it appears, that he thought no 
 man was capable of learning logic, or any other fcience. If a man, 
 fays he, only knows that an ifofceles triangle has its three angles equal 
 to two right angles, he has no fcience or demonftrative knowledge of 
 that propofition ; becaufe, though he may, no doubt, demonftrate that 
 an ifofceles triangle has its angles equal to two right ones, yet, if he 
 do not demonftrate it from its true caufe^ vizi the nature of the triangle 
 in general, he cannot be faid to know it fcientifically. Now, That all 
 triangles have their angles equal to two right ones, is the general 
 propofition. That one fpecies of a triangle, viz. the ifofceles, has this 
 property, is a particular propofition, comprehended under the general. 
 Now, I afk any geometer, Whether the caufe of an ifofceles triangle 
 having this property, is not, that all triangles have it ? or, as A- 
 riftotle has expreffed it. Whether it be not qua triangle, not qua 
 ifofceles triangle, that it has this property *? If fo, it is evident 
 that, at leaft in this inftance, the general propofition is the caufe 
 of the particular 'j and, for the fame reafon, it is fo, in every in- 
 ftance. 
 
 Thus, it appears, not only from the authority of Ariftotle, but from 
 , the reafon of the thing, that, to fuppofe we have no idea of caufe and 
 
 M m m 2 efe^y 
 
 * See Analytica Pofteriora, lib. i. cap. 24. His words are, Etyxf ro h<rtv »^Uii 
 
 tTTM^^eiy f«fl ri ic-cc-KiMi;, ec7^X^ y| T^cywvijv « alur^ in lerctrKiXi',, »i'ttov *i^if -^ ocvro, a (lege i) i 
 tioui tri Tg(y«v»». 'OAws ti, II ftev ^t>) e»T»j )J r^tyaiiov, tirx hiKyv(;ty, ovk av eo) «^o5"i<|<$. 
 
 And, a little farther, he fays, E< ^ nvotu^ii *tsv ktt/ rvxx»yi7[A0i T»f ecirixc, hki io-j J~/« t«* 
 
 T« K«d»/ot; V «iT<*rtge»' '•» yx^ y.xd' «VT» iTrce^^H t/, t«vt« «vt» «t/Ta( nnuf t« h x»ttX»Vf 
 
 ■XgUZOV ftlTtCV «Cg« T* KH$»XCV,
 
 46o ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 effefty In matters of fcience, is to overturn all fcience and demonftra- 
 tion. 
 
 The reader will obferve that, in my definition of caufe, I have not 
 mentioned priority of time : And the reafon is, that it has nothing to 
 do with this kind of caiifation \ for the corollary is an eternal truth, as 
 much as the proportion from w^hich it is deduced. And what is 
 proved by the axiom, has been true from all eternity, as well as the 
 axiom. And the reafon of this is plain ; for, as in demonflration, we 
 argue from general to particulars ; and, as the particulars are parts of 
 the general, and contained under it, it is evident that the parts of any 
 ivhole muft be co-eval with the 'whole. 
 
 And it is in this fenfe that truth may be faid, not only to be eter- 
 naU but divine, becaufe, in this refpedt, it refembles the productions of 
 Divinity, which we conceive to be eternal, as their author. Thus, we 
 fay that the fecond and third perfons of the Trinity, proceeding from 
 the firft, are CO- eternal with the firft, and yet of exiftence dependent upon 
 him. And, in the fame manner, the antients, as I have obferved, con- 
 ceived the material world to be an eternal emanation of the Eternal 
 Caufe, 
 
 But it is otherwife with refped to things that are in generation and 
 corruption, or the corruptible things of this ivorld^ as they are called in 
 Scripture ; for there, the caufe producing, is always prior in time to the 
 effed produced. And this is the common notion of caufe and effed ; 
 for the vulgar have no idea of that Divine caufation which I have 
 juft now endeavoured to explain. 
 
 Thus, I have (hown that, in matters of fcience, we have a clear 
 idea of caufe and effed, and perceive diftindly how the caufe pro- 
 duces the effedl: ; and that this is fo eifential to fcience, that, without 
 it, there is no fcience. As to fa<^s of natural and civil hiftory, 1 have 
 
 ihown,
 
 Chap. IX. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 461 
 
 fhown, in the chapter concerning the nature of inductive reafon- 
 ing, that, though we have no fcientifical knowledge of caufe and 
 efFe(St, which it is impoflible, by the nature of things, that we 
 fhould have, yet every man who beheves in God, and, by confe- 
 quence, in an eftablilhed fyftem and order of things in the uni- 
 verie, has fufficient ground to beHeve that the events which conftantly 
 precede^ are the caufe of thofe which con^d^niXy folloiv. 
 
 CHAP-
 
 462 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS, Book V. 
 
 CHAR X. 
 
 All the Antient F.hilofophers believed in the Exijlence of Ideas. — Differed 
 only as to the Manner of their Exiflencc, — That Ideas and Senjations 
 are the fame ^ a Difcovery of Modern Times. — Plato* s Opinion concerning 
 Ideas. — This truly his Opinion^ not falfely imputed to him by Ariflotle» 
 ^—ArifotWs Opinion concerning Ideas. — Thefe, according to his Phi- 
 
 lojophy^ are of three Kinds. That there are Ideas exijling in our 
 
 Minds, is a Matter of Fa^, to be proved by InduBion. — Examples 
 
 from the Works of Art. — Ideas formed, in the like Manner, from the Jf orks 
 
 of Nature. — Of thefe Ideas, all the different Kinds mentioned by Por^ 
 
 phyry. — That ive have the Faculty, by vuhich Ideas are formed, viz. 
 
 Intellect, and are thereby diJlinguifJoed from the Brutes. — Reafonfor 
 
 arguing in this Manner from Art to Nature. — Diflinttion of Ideas into 
 
 Corruptible and Incorruptible. — Arijiotle reconciled ivith Himfelf as to 
 
 fuch Ideas. — In vohat Senfe Ideas may be J aid to have a Being diflinft 
 
 from Particulars. — This DfiinBion explained, andfhoivn to be made 
 
 by every Body. 
 
 AS there can be no demonftration or reafoning of any kind, with- 
 out ideas or generals, it behoves an author, who has underta- 
 ken to lay down the principles of human reafoning, to explain accu- 
 rately the nature of ideas, and to anfwer every oDJedion that may oc- 
 cur to them. 
 
 There were, in antient times, but two opinions concerning ideas, 
 that of l:'lato, and that of Ariftotle, both agreeing as to their exiflence^ 
 
 and
 
 Ghap.X. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 465 
 
 and differing only as to the manner of their exiftence ; for it is a dif- 
 covery that was referved to modern times, that there are no ideas, and 
 that all the perceptions of the human mind are nothing but fenfations 
 more or lefs lively. Even the materialifts, fuch as the Epicureans^ 
 did not, as far as I know, deny the difference betwixt fenfations 
 and ideas ; nor did Pyrrho, who doubted of the exil^ence of the ma- 
 terial world, and denied that truth was to be difcovered with certain- 
 ty in any thing, difpute the exiftence of ideas in his own mind. 
 
 The opinion of Plato upon this fubjed, was likewife the opinion of 
 the Pythagoreans, from whom it is evident, that Plato took his whole 
 philofophy, his morals, phyfics, and metaphyfics, and, among other 
 things, his dodtrine of ideas, which was this : ' That the ideas ox forms 
 ' of things, in contradiftindion to the matter^ not only have an exift- 
 ' ence, but a feparate exiftence, fubfifling by themfelves, out of the 
 
 * mind of any intelligent being. — That they are immaterial fubflances, 
 
 * not only animated, but having intelligence. — That, from thofe ideas, 
 ' proceed all the variety of things in this univerfe, which, by partici- 
 
 * pation of them, are each the thing it is, and diflindt from every other 
 ' thing, deriving from the idea of wiiich'it participates its nature and 
 'denomination. Thus, for example, a maii^hy participating of the i- 
 
 * dea of 7}ian^ has the nature of a man, and is fo denominated. In like 
 ' manner, a horje is a hor/e^ and fo of other animals j and not only did 
 ' fubftances exill by the participation of thofe ideas, but alfo qualities 
 
 * and properties ; thus, a thing was one by the participation of the idea 
 ' of one ; and it w2l& good or /air^ by the participation of the ideas of 
 ^ good 2indi fair \ yet thofe ideas, thus mixed and incorporated with fo 
 ' many diflPerent fubjeds, we^e not therefore divided or difcerpted, but 
 
 * ftill retained she unity a d integrity of their natu'-e ; and, therefore, 
 ' in the language of the Platonifts, the idea is the thing itfelf *, pure 
 
 * and 
 
 * This they called «,vr<t Mti^MTrci, kvto 'iTTTn;, xvre t# kxKov, xvto to tt'yxi*^. Sec
 
 464 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BookV. 
 
 * and unmixed with every thing elfe ; whereas, the fubjedts that only 
 
 * participate of it, and from thence receive their denomination, are no 
 
 * more than imper'ed refemblancesofit, in which there is always a mix- 
 
 * ture of matter^ and likewife of other ideas ; fo that, to fingle it out by 
 
 * itfelf, and to perceive the pure ideal fonn by itfelf, feparated from e- 
 
 * very thing material, and from every other idea, is the higheft perfec- 
 ' tion of human reafon.' 
 
 This was the opinion of Plato \. As to Ariftotle, he denied the 
 fubjlantiality or feparate exiftence of ideas, and maintained that they 
 
 only 
 
 f There are many, at prefent, who cannot believe that Plato maintained an opinion, 
 which feems to them fo abfurd ; and it appears, from a pafTage of Philoponus's com- 
 mentary upon the Firft 15ook of Ariftotle's /a/? Analytics, folio 53. That there were 
 fome in his time who faid, that Plato, when he fpoke of his ideas as being real things, 
 meant no more, than that they really exifled in the mind of the Deity : And, in this 
 way, they endeavoured to reconcile the mafler and the fcholar. But this explanation 
 of the ideas of Plato, Philoponus rejects. And in this, and another pafTage in his 
 commentary upon the Second Book of Ariftotle's Phyfics, he exprefsly aflerts, that 
 Plato maintained his ideas to be fubftances, having a feparate exiftence by themfelves ; 
 whereas, the ideas of Ariftotle exifted primarily only in the fupreme intelligence, 
 and from thence were derived to corporeal forms, and from them to human inteiligen- 
 ces. And, indeed, it is impoflible to believe that Ariftotle, whatever freedom he may 
 have taken with more antient phiiofophers, would have imputed fuch an opinion to his 
 mafter, and difputed againft it at fo great length, if it had not been really his opinion, 
 when he could have been contradi£led by fo many living at the ti.ne he wrote. And, 
 befides, as Philoponus has oblerved, in the paftage above quoted from his commentary 
 upon the laji Analytics, we know, from what is preferved of the hiftory of thofe two 
 phiiofophers, that it was the chief point upon which they differed j and that Ariftotle, 
 even during the life of Plato, difputed with him very warmly upon that point. 
 
 And, if there were any doubt in the matter, Plato himfelf has faid enough to con- 
 vince us, that his fcholar did not mifreprefent his opinion ; for, in the Parmenides, 
 where he treats profefledly of ideas, he fays exprefsly that the idea exifts, avrn kx6' '«•- 
 T>i», and denies in fo many words that it exifts in our minds, p. 1 1 14. Eclitio ficini : And 
 
 the
 
 Chap. X. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 465 
 
 only exifted in the mind of an intelligent being. Originally, accor- 
 ding to him, they exift in the divine intelledt, where they form what 
 we call the intelkElual world. From thence proceeds the material 
 world, which is a copy of all iho^t forms or ideas, primarily exiting 
 
 N n n in 
 
 the contrary opinion, that it is only a conception of our minds, and exifts only there, is 
 ftated and endeavoured to be refuted p. 1 1 13. And there is a pafTage in the Sophijlay 
 p. 174. Edit. Ficini, where he fpeaks of ideas, not only as haring a feparate exiftence, 
 but teils us what fort of beings they are, viz. beings endowed both with life and in- 
 telligence. And, indeed, it is impoflible that he could have fpoken of them in fo my- 
 flerious a manner, as he has done in the PhilebuSf and many other dialogues, repre- 
 fenting them as beings of a moft wonderful kind, which, continuing always one and 
 the fame, do neverthelefs exift entire and undivided, in an infinite number of things 
 at the fame time, if he had believed them to be only notions in the mind of an intel- 
 ligent being. 
 
 Nor do I think that Arlflotle has done his mafter any injuftice in reprefenting his o- 
 pinion to be, that the ideas were in paiticular and material things »«r« fcihli*, or f>y 
 participation, not *;«#' 'o,tta («*,««, or as a copy. Ariftotle's Mctaphyf. lib 2. cap. 6. For 
 though, in the ParmeniJes, he ftates both opinions, yet, I think it is evident, from 
 what he fays there, and likewife from fome paflages in the Philebus, and other parts 
 of his works, that his opinion was, that the ideas exifted in particular things by par- 
 ticipation. And it is further true, what Ariflotle hys, di&o /ceo, that he has nowhere 
 explained the nature oi \.\\\s participation, but every where talks of it as a moft myde- 
 rious thing. 
 
 And Ariflotle has not only truly ftated the opinion of his mafter upon this fubie£t 
 but he has accounted how he came to be of that opinion ; for, fays he, In bis younger 
 days, he learned the philofophy of ileraclitus, which taught, that all material things 
 were in a conftant flux, fo that of them there could be no fcicnce; and this opinion 
 he retained to the laft. l>ut having ftudied the philofophy of morals under Socrates, 
 and having learned from him to inveftigate generals, and to dejine, he thought that it 
 was impcflible there could be any definition of material or particular things, which 
 were continually changing ; and therefore he fuppofed another kind of beings, of 
 fixed and permanent exiftence, and which therefore were the proper objedls of defini- 
 tion and fcience. Thefe he calLd IdeaSy and faid they only were the t« •»t<k, or ihiiws 
 really cxijling ; and therefore to find out this t* •> upon any fubjc<fl, is, in the language 
 of Plato, to difcover the truth. See Ariftotle ubi/vpra, Mttaphyf. lib. i. cap. 6.
 
 466 A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I S. Book V. 
 
 in the Divine mirtd. The firft kind of ideas, the Peripatetics called xfc 
 tm* «-«a;v«», or, before the many. Theotherkind, they faid were u re*? rr^xMHy 
 or, in the muny ; and thefe lafl are the Juhjlantial forms oi the Peripa- 
 tetics, that is, the form which gives the fubdance or effcnce to the 
 ithing, and makes it what it is. And laft of all come the ideas in our 
 n-jinds, which, being formed from the niany^ and only in confequence 
 of their exiftmg in the many^ are faid to be «»< t*.? «-oaa.<5 ; and as we get 
 them by abftrading the forms of material things from the matter in 
 which they exifl:, thcv arc properly enough called abfiraB ideas^ in 
 eontradiftindion to the two other kinds, thofe exifting before the ma- 
 nyy and thofe in the many. But it is very improper to ufe thofe terms 
 when we fpeak of ideas in general, as if there were no ideas, but what 
 were abftraded from matter. And it is ftill more improper to diftin- 
 guifli, by that appellation, ideas ixom fenfations^ as if fenfations were 
 ideas, only not abftraded from matter ; and, as if it were not of the 
 utmoft confequence in philofophy, and indeed the foundation of all 
 philofophy, to diUinguilh particulars from generals. 
 
 Whether Plato's dodrlne of ideas deferve the cenfure which Ari- 
 ftotle has thrown upon it, of being no better than the flourifh of a 
 mufician *, that is, mere found, without fenfe or meaning ; or whe- 
 ther there be not more meaning in it than Ariflotle feems to have ap- 
 prehended, is an inquiry which belongs more properly to the fecond 
 part of my work, where I am to treat, not of the ideas of the human 
 mind, but of the ideas of the Jirfi order; for it is only the ideas of 
 the human mind that 1 am now concerned with, and thofe, I fay, do 
 
 exift 
 
 • T« yxf ii^n <i;ffT*., TtfiTiCf^xTu yxp urn, Analytic. Pofterior. lib. l- cap. 22. p. 1 5 1. 
 infnc, Edit.Du-Val, where Philopunus, in his commentiry upon the paffage, fol. 53. 
 tells us, th<,t, by the word Tt^eT.^^^T*, we are to underfland ti/^ flounfti of thofe that 
 played upon the Cithara, in order to try whether their arings were right tuned, be- 
 fore they began to play.
 
 Chap. X. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. aSjB 
 
 exift in tlie manner explaiaed by Ariftotle, that is, in the mind, aiid 
 .confequently have as real an exiftence as the mind itfelf. 
 
 To argue that, if no fuch ideas exifted, there could be no truth, fci- 
 ence, demonftration, or reafoning of any kmd, will prove nothing to 
 the fceptic, who doubts of every thing, and would make us believe that 
 there is no fuch thing as truth or certainty. Neither would it con- 
 vince thofe philofophers, who do not believe in God, to fay, that, if the 
 univerfe be the production of wifdom and counfel, not of chajice and 
 material neceffity, there muft neceflarily exift ideas of the firft kind, 
 I mean the ideas in the Divine intellect ; and, if it be true, that we 
 have any participation of the Divine nature, there muft alfo be in our 
 minds (ome ideas refe nbling thefe. But I will argue from fads, that 
 cannot be contraverted by the greateft fceptic and moft confirmed un- 
 believer. 
 
 When a human artift executes any piece of work, has he not the 
 idea of it in his mind before he executes it ? This, I think, cannot 
 be denied ; and, if fo, it is a clear proof that the firft kind of ideas I 
 mentioned is to be found even among us. Further, I afk, whether or 
 not the idea of the artift is not in the work that he has executed ? 
 And, I think, this queftion muft likewife be anfwered in the affirma- 
 tive, as it is the idea of the artift that gives the thing its formt and 
 makes it what it is ; and, if fo, we have likewife here the fecond kind 
 of ideas I mentioned, which exifts in the material fubftancc. I afk 
 further. Cannot we, by contemplating this piece of art, find out the i- 
 dea of the artift, and fo make it our own idea? If this neither cannot 
 be denied, then have we likewife here an example of the third kind 
 of ideas I mentioned, which, by us, are abftraded from material things, 
 and made the (;bjeds of the mind's contemj^lation, feparated from the 
 matter in which they exift. 
 
 N n n 2 Let
 
 468 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 Let me further fuppofe, that this artift executes many works, fome 
 of the fame kind, fame of a different kind ; cannot I form a notion, 
 not only of each particular work by itfelf, but of what they have 
 in common, Hkewife of that in which they differ, and alfo of their 
 feveral quaHties and properties ? 
 
 Now, to apply this to the fovereign artifl:, the author of this uni- 
 verfe, and of all the wonderful things in it ;. — or, let me fuppofe that 
 there is no artift in the cafe, no plan, no defign, no previous idea of 
 the work that was to be executed, but all the effe6t of chance or ma- 
 terial neceffity; ftill I can find out the frame or conftitution of the feveral 
 produdions of nature ; I can likewife difcover what they have in com- 
 mon, and alfo wherein they differ from one another. Further, I can 
 rccognife in them certain qualities which 2ire peculiar to fome of them,, 
 and never are feparated from them ; ethers, again, which are accident 
 taU and may be in them, or not, jufl as it happens. And thus we 
 have all thofe five clalTes of ideas, of which Porphyry treats ^, viz. ge- 
 nus, fpecies, difference, peculiar, and accidental. 
 
 The only doubt, therefore, that can pofTibly be, with refped to the 
 cxiflence of ideas in our mind, is, whether or not we have in fad the 
 power of thus abflrading and generalizing ? or, in other words, whe- 
 ther we have the faculty of intelk^, or only the faculties of fenfe and 
 imagination ? for thofe who deny that we have ideas muft neceffarily 
 maintain that we have no more intelled than the brutes, and only, like 
 them, fenfes, imagination, and memory. Now, that we have the fa- 
 culty of abflrading and generalizing, is a fad that, I think, I have 
 made evident, by what I have faid above t> where I have fhown, that 
 even our children pofTefs this faculty, when they can operate upon 
 that mof\ abftrad idea of number^ without applying it to any parti- 
 cular thing. At the fame time, 1 do not deny that it is very difficult 
 in many cafes, and a great work of fcience, to form a perfed idea of 
 
 a 
 
 * Porphyry's Introdu£lion to Ariftode's Categories, 
 t beep. 324.
 
 Chap. X. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 469 
 
 a thing, clear and dIfl:in<St, feparate from all other ideas, and without 
 any thing material ftlcking to it ; and that, in exerciling this higheft 
 faculty of the mind, we are much obftru£led by the animal part of 
 our nature, 1 mean, by the fenfes and imagination. But that we have 
 the faculty, if not from nature, at leafl from ufe and experience, and 
 that it may be greatly improved in the fame way in which it is ac- 
 quired, are fads that I hold to be uncontravertible. 
 
 In treating this argument, I have proceeded in a way that may be 
 thought unnatural and prepofterous ; for I have argued from art to 
 nature, that is, from the efFed to the caufe, {all art being derived from 
 nature), inftead of arguing from nature to art, that is, from the caufe 
 to the effe«5t. But this would have been fuppofing, what my adver- 
 farics in this argument are not willing to grant, that there is a Being, 
 the author of this univerfe, in whofe mind there are the ideas of every 
 thing here exifting, I have, therefore, chofen rather to argue from 
 the works of art, concerning the exiftence of which there can be no 
 difpute ; and to fliow that, if we have ideas of thofe works, we muft, 
 for the fame reafon, have ideas of the works of nature. 
 
 From the account here given of ideas, it is evident that the nrft or- 
 der of them muft be eternal and unchangeable, like the Being in whofe 
 intellect they refide ; and thefe may be underftood to be what are 
 called, in the language of Scripture, the incorruptible things of God. 
 The fecond order, Vv'hich exifts in the niany^ that is, in material things, 
 muft of neceffity, like them, be corruptible and perifhing ; but, like 
 them, they are conftantly renewed, fo that there is no blank or gap in 
 nature. And, as to the ideas in our minds, as they are, in this ftate of 
 our exiftence, acquired, fo they are alfo loft by oblivion, and many 
 other caufes. But. thofe who believe our minds to be eternal, and of 
 divine original, will likewife believe, that neither is there here any 
 gap in nature ; but that, as we had ideas before we came into this pri- 
 
 fon
 
 47G> A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 ion of fleOi and blood, fo we fliall have then, hkewife, after we 
 are releafed from it, by fome other method of coQimunication 
 with the great fource of all ideas, Viz. Nature, and its Divine Au- 
 thor *. 
 
 From this account of ideas, it is evident in what fenfe generals may 
 be faid to be, or not to be, befides particulars, which I find, from a 
 paifage of Ariftotle f, was a puzzle in antient times. Co: fidered, as 
 Plato confiders them, they are beings having a lubftance, and exift- 
 ing feparately, not only from the corporeal things which ^-articipate of 
 them, but from the mind which conceives them. On ihe other hand, 
 according to Ariftotle, confidered as fubftances, tliiV have no being at 
 all, heftdts particulars. But, confidered as in the ' . d of the Supr'^ne 
 Caufe, thty have an exiftence, and an exiilence more real than particu- 
 lars, becaufe they are eternal and unchangeable, as Ariftotle has faid, 
 whereas particulars are corruptible and perilhing %, 
 
 Neither 
 
 • The (Hfl:in£lion that I have made here betwixt thofe ideas which are incorrup' 
 tible, and thofe which art corruptible^ will, I think, be fufficient to aiiiwcr the puzzle 
 that Philoponus makes upon this luhjetl, in his commentary upon the hrft book of the 
 laji JnatyticSy fol. 6i. where he endeavours to fet Ariftotle at Viiian.e with himfelf, 
 becaufe that he fays in one place, {Laft y^nalyticsy lib. i. cap 24 ) that generals are in- 
 corruptible^ hux. \)7iVX.\cvi\MS corruptible ; whereas, in the beginning of his work wi^i 
 v^X"** ^^'^ ^^yS' ^^^^ generals are either nothing at all, or pofterior to particulars. But 
 this contradiction is only in appearance ; lor, in the firft paflage, he is fpeaking only of 
 the firft order of ideas, thofe in the Divine Mind, which are undoubtedly incorrup- 
 tible ; whereas, thofe exilhng in matter, are as certainly corruptible. But, in the 
 book ^i§( ■4't/%»j, he is fpeaking of the ideas of the human mind, which, as they are 
 formed from particular things, are undoubtedly, in order, pofterior to them. And, as 
 to the doubt that he ftates oi ideas having any exiftence at all, it muft be underftood 
 of fuch an exiftence as Plato gives them. 
 
 t ylnalytic. Pojlericr. lib. I. cap. 24. 
 
 \ Ariftotle, ibid. His words are, E« ^iv «») m A»yos s/y, xki ^n of^uw^Kc r» xxieXov., «»» «» 
 «v5'i» r!rT6» (»(*(> rui Kctra ^i^e( «(AA«««r^^9kO' *ff^ Tti afim^Tdy tt \KHftif ta-rr ruhxttro. 
 
 JlAfU, fitl^TCC flH^^tf.
 
 Chap. X. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 471 
 
 Neither have they a lefs real exiftence becaufe chey do not exift fe- 
 parately; for that is the caie of qualities or accidents, fuch as black and 
 white, round and fquare, which do not exift feparately, but neceflarily 
 in fubftances, yet have a real exiftence as well as the fubftances. In 
 like manner, ideas, though they exift only in particular fubftances, or 
 in the mind of fome iatelligent being, have a real exiftence. 
 
 It makes, however, a difference, whether the idea exifts only in our 
 minds, or whether it does not likewife exift in particular and mate- 
 rial things. If it exift only in the firft manner, it is a mere notion, 
 and what the fchoolmen call an ens rationis, fuch as the idea of a 
 Chimaera, or a Hlppocentaur, or of any other animal that never exift- 
 ed. Whereas, if it exift not only in our mind, bit in fome material 
 thing, or, in other words, if the idea be produced into adl, then has it 
 what may be properly called a real exiftence. 
 
 To conclude, the whole argument concerning the exiftence of ideas 
 comes to this : Not only the philofopher, but every the moft vulgar 
 man, diftinguifties, in the works of art, betwixt the mutter Sind the 
 form, obferving, tiiat the fame matter takes various forms, according 
 to the pleafure of the artift, and different matter the fame forni : He 
 therefore thinks and fpeaks of theyorw, without taking into his con- 
 fideration the 7natter of which it may be made ; and this form, even 
 in common language, is called the idea of the thing. In like manner, 
 the various natural fubftances, with which we are furrounded, have 
 various fhapes, texture, and conformation of parts, and other qualities 
 and properties, which difcriminate them one from another, and make 
 every thing to be whit it is» in contradiftindion to every other tiling. 
 Thefe conftitute (he form of fuch fubftances; and, when wc have got a 
 clear and diftind notion of this form, we are faid to have an icica of the 
 thing ; and this idea, likewife, we coiifider as diftind from the matter., 
 of which we have no diftind notion at all, but only a confufed appre- 
 
 henfion 3,
 
 472 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS, Book V, 
 
 henfion ; fo that it is truly only the idea of fuch things that wc 
 know. 
 
 Thus, I think, I have proved, that ideas or generals have a real ex- 
 igence, as well as the particular objeds of fenfe. And I will proceed, 
 in the next chapter, to folve forne difficulties that may occur concern- 
 ing the ccmblnation of ideas in propofitions and fyllogifms. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 Chap. XL ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 473 
 
 CHAP. XI. 
 
 The Foundation oj all Sylloglfm^ and, confequently , of all Reafoning^ is, 
 that one Idea contains another as a Part of it — This illiift rated by 
 Exam-pies, and fJooivn to apply to all Kinds of Syllogfm — In ivhat 
 Sen/e one Idea can be f aid to contain another — The Genus contains the 
 Species, and therefore is praedicated of it — As the Genus contains the 
 Species, Jo the Species contains the Genus — The Rea/on ivhy this Diff- 
 culty has not occurred to Modern Sceptics — It did occur to Plato, but 
 is fohed neither by him nor Ariflotk — Solution of the Difficulty — 
 Illujirations from Material Things, fuch as Seals and Statues — Illujlra- 
 tion from Ideas in the Mind of an Artijl -^from the Intelligible 
 Forms in the Mind of the Supreme Artifl — Obfer'uations arifing from 
 this Theory — Primo, it appears houu Generals are the Caife of Parti- 
 culars — Secundo, It explains hoiv the Genus contains many Speciefes, 
 hut the Species only one Genus — Tertio, // explains the myfterious 
 Language of Plato concerning Ideas — Laftly, // fljoijus the Progrefs 
 of Things up'wards, and hoiv all Things tend to one. 
 
 AL L demonftrative reafonlng, and, indeed, all reafonlng of every 
 kind, fuppules, not only the exiOence of generals, but that 
 there is a lubordmation of them, one to anotuer : Or, la other wordsy 
 that one idea is more general than another; and, that the lefs general 
 idea is contained in, and makes apart of the more general. And, ac- 
 cordingly, the whole do^rine of the fyllogifm, to which all demon- 
 
 O o o ftrative
 
 474 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 ftrativc reafoning, and, indeed, all reafoning ot every kind, is redu- 
 cible, depends upon this propofition, That, it one idea contains, or 
 does not contain, the whole of another ; and, if that other does con- 
 tain, or does not, tiie whole of a third, then does the firft contain, or 
 not contain, the whole of the third ; or, in other words, if one of 
 the ideas is a part, or not a part of another, and, if a third idea is a 
 part, or not a part of that idea which is a part of the firfi:, then will 
 the third idea be a part, o ■ no part, of the firfl. But, as thofe things 
 are not cafiiy exprefled by words, I will do, as Ariftotle has done in 
 his logical works, I will ufe letters, as general characters, to exprefs 
 them. The propofition, then, exprelTed ni that manner, is this, That, 
 if A contains the whole of B, and B contains the whole of C, then A. 
 contains the whole of C : Vr, if A does not contain B, nor any part of 
 it, or, what is the fame thing, excludes B, and, it B contains the whole 
 of C ; then does A exclude C, and €very part of it And, to make the 
 matter ftill clearer, I will do, as Ari^otle's commentators do, and 
 fometimes himfelf, apply thefe general characters to a particular ex- 
 ample ; as thus, if the general idea oifubjlance contain the whole idea 
 of an'imaU and if animal contain the whole idea of man^ then will Juh- 
 fiance contain the whole idea of man. Or, to put it in the ordinary 
 fyllogiflical form, Every animal is a fubftance ; Every man is an ani- 
 mal : Therefore every man is a fubltance. And this is afyllogifm of 
 which the conclufion is affirmative. And, as for the negative conclu- 
 fion, take this for an exam.ple : The idea of a flone does not contain, 
 or, what is the fame thing, excludes the whole idea of animaL T he 
 idea of animal contains, or includes the whole idea of man ; there- 
 fore the idea of Jlone excludes the whole idea of man ; which, in the 
 fyllogillical form, runs thus : No {tone is an animal ; Every man 
 is an animal \ Therefore no man is a ftone. 
 
 In
 
 Chap. XL A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I C S. 475 
 
 In all thefe inHances, k is manifefl:, that the more general idea is 
 confidered as a ivhole^ and the lei's general as a part ; and upon this 
 relation of the one to the other the conclufion of the argument alto- 
 gether depends. And, accordingly, in this way Ariitotle has ex- 
 plained the principle of fyllogifm *. 
 
 O o o 2 But 
 
 * His way of exprefling, that the more general idea contains the whole of the lefs 
 general, is, that the former is y-xT» vxvro'; of the latter. And the way he exprefles the 
 relation of the lefs general to the more general, is by faying, that the lefs general is 
 «» «Aai of the more general. The cxpreiTions, therefore, denote the fame thing, only 
 confidered in different refpe£ts. His words are. To ^5 iv ixv e^vxi It-^ov In^fj y.ct ro 
 
 x.x,rx TfuVTOi KiiTriye^^a-^xi ^xneov 6xri^ov, locurnv la-Ti. Myo^Aii ^6 to kxtx TrxvTCi y-arnyo^fio-^xty 
 
 Ircv ^■/\^i)i vj rov vTroKet^ivov Xx^i^v, xx6^ on ^xri^ov^»v My^&fitriTxt. j4na!yt. Prior cap. I. in fins. 
 And, in the beginning of the 4th chapter thereafter, he exprefles the relation of the 
 three terms of the fyllogifm to one another in the fallowing words : 'Ot^f oyv l^oi r^^/j 
 
 evrui sp^erf(ri wf«5 asAAijAoi/j, *6iij-Ti rov ia-^xToy if oXa fiJxi rm fA.Z'rai^ y.xi rov /atrov ev oAai rco 
 
 TTfuTM «v<e<, -/j jwjj «vfl!;, xvxyK/i Tftic xK^uv Hvxi (TuXXoyKrf^av tsAmov. And, in an after pafl'age 
 of the fame book, he fays exprefsly, that, if the one idea is not to the other as a 
 •whole is to a part, and, if that other is not to a third as a part to a ivhole^ there is no 
 
 fyllogifm : 'OXug yx^ « ft>j Ett/v, •»? oXev TT^Oi ui^oi, y.xi xAXo 5r»«; toito 'w? y.lpo^ TOOi cXov. s^ 
 cvGtvii tm TitouTtfvi'iiiiVv(riti I ditxvvuv av^i yx^ yivirxi a-vX\oyi'7jxai. Ibid^ cap. 4.. 
 
 The only inftances I have given of fyllogifms are thofe whofe conclufions are either 
 univerfal affirmatives, or univerfal negatives, or, in Ariftotle's language, that are t'x- 
 thtr Kxrx 7rx*r6i;, or x.xrx f.t,/,^ivoiy becaufe I would not embarrais the argument with 
 fyllogifms whofe conclufions are either particular affirmatives, or particular negatives; 
 that is, as Ariflotle has exprefled it, either kxtx nyoi, or oj kxtx T<»af, or, what is the 
 fame thing, «w xxrx Travros. But the reafon of the thing is the fame with refpT^t to 
 thefe particular propofitions, and with refpe£l to the univerfal ; becaufe v.-hat is the 
 rule for the whole, muft alio be the rule for the part. Ihus, if A contain B wholly, 
 and B contain a part of C -, then will A contain a part of C ; that is, the conclufion 
 will be a particular affirmative. Again, if A exclude I> wholly, and B includes a part 
 of C, then will A t-xclude a part of C ; where the conclufion is a particular negative, 
 or ov X.XTX vttvTci And, as all the conclufions of fyllogifm muft ol necrllity be cither 
 affirmative or negative, and each of thefe cither general or particular, wc have 
 here a (hort view of the whole doflrine of fyllogifm, whi h manifeftly depends upon . 
 the principle of one idea containing, or not containing another, as a part of it. 
 *
 
 47^ ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 But the queftion is, in what fenfe one idea can be faid to be part of 
 another ? And this is a queftion of very great importance, as, with- 
 out being able to anfwer it, we cannot give any rational account of the 
 evidence of the fyilogifm, nor, indeed, of any other kind of reafoning, 
 which, as I have faid, is all reducible to fyilogifm. 
 
 One anfwer to this queftion is obvious enough, namely, that the 
 more general idea, which contains the lefs general, as a part of it, is 
 the genus ; and the lefs general, fo contained, is the fpecies ; for it is 
 only, when ideas have that relation to one another, that the one can 
 be faid to contain the other as a part. This will be evident, if we 
 conhder that, when one idea thus contains another> it is always prae- 
 dicated of that other. Thus, the idea of animal^ which contaiub the 
 idea of man^ is praedicated o^ man^ and we fay, Man is an anhnal'^. 
 Now, as I had occafion to obferve before t» one idea can be praedicated 
 of another only in two refpe(fl:s, either -ds genus and jpcfcies, or as acci- 
 detit and Jiihjiance. Now, though the accident can be praedicated of 
 the fubftance, it is only praedicated of it as inherent in it, n t as con- 
 taining it; or, as Ariftotle expreiTes it, it is »» vV«e<;«i»4., not «««' ^ a-e^tsi^eviv; 
 for it is impoffible that we can fay, that the colour ivhite^ for exam- 
 ple, which we praedicate of man^ or any other animal, can be iaid to 
 contain that animal. It remains, therefore, that it is only when the 
 genus is praedicated of the fpecies, that the one idea can be faid to 
 contain the other as a part of it. 
 
 But here the queftion recurs. In what fenfe the fpecies can be faid to 
 be part of the genus ? It is not, as one piece of matter is part of an- 
 other, 
 
 * The genius of ourlanguage will not admit fuch propofitions to be exprefled in a 
 more natural way, by putting the praedicate, which is the greater term, firft, as in 
 Greek, i^<w«v tc^n « «v«j6,xe? ; or, to exprcfs it in Ariflotle's logical language, !««» xxnc 
 Ttv «»<i§«5r«'j ; by which any ambiguity that may aiile from the ufe of the fubftantive 
 verb ia-Tt is removed. 
 
 tp.383-
 
 Chap. XL A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I C S. 477 
 
 other, or one portion of fpace, or of time, is part of another, or as 
 one number is part of another. Nor is it in the fenfe that we fay- 
 that any quahty inherent in a fubftance makes part of that fubflance ; 
 for, as I have faid, this relation of ideas, by which they are confidered 
 as ivhole and part^ has nothing to do with fubjlance and accident. 
 The queftion, therefore, appears to beof fome difficuhy. And the dif- 
 ficulty will appear the greater, if we confider that the genus not only 
 contains the fpecies, but the fpecies alfo contains the genus: So that 
 the genus may be faid to be a part of the Ipecies, as well as the fpe- 
 cies of the genus * ; for the fpecies, man^ undoubtedly contains the 
 genus, animal, which is fo efTential a part of man, that we cannot 
 conceive man to exift without it : And therefore it is made part of 
 the definition of man. Now, how can we conceive that the fame 
 thing fhould be both part and ivhole, with reiped: to another thing ? 
 or, in other words, that one thing Ihould both contain and be con- 
 tained in the fame thing ? Here, therefore, the matter appears to be 
 very much involved and perplexed ; and we are at as great a lofs as 
 ever to know upon what foundation the evidence of the fyllogifm, 
 ^nd of every other kind of reafoning, refts. 
 
 This is an objedion to the certainty of human reafoning, which has 
 not occurred to any of our modern fceptics, for a reafon that is plain 
 enough, namely, that they are not fo learned in logic as to fee it. But 
 it appears to have occurred to Plato, in the Politicus *, where he fays, 
 * That every fpecies is a part, but every part is not a fpecies.' But he 
 adds, that a more particular explanation of this difference betwixt the 
 
 two, 
 
 * This was very well known in the Peripatetic fchool ; for they diftinguifhed be- 
 twixt the genus or fpecies fhat was i-^i rar, ^«>a«,5, and that which was sv 'to<s ^oaao/j. 
 The genus and fpecies of the firft kind is that which comprehends the fpeciefes or indi- 
 viduals under it ; whereas, what is t» t.^ ;r»AA«,j, is what exift<= in the fpeciefes or in- 
 dividuals, and makes a part of them. See what I have faid above, concerning this 
 diftinftion of ideas, p. 466. 
 
 t Page 532. Edit, Ficini,
 
 47^ A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 two, would be a work of time and difficulty, and would carry hirn too- 
 far from the fubjecl on hand. I wifh, however, that, if not there, in 
 fome other place, he had exphiined this matter. But this he has not 
 done, as far as I know. Neither has Ariftotle done it in hi& Logic, 
 where he has talked fo much of one term of a propofition' being a part 
 of another, and has made it, as 1 have fhown, the toundation of hia 
 whole fyfteni. 1 can aifign no other reafon for this omiffion, ex- 
 cept the fame which I affign for his giving no account, in his E- 
 thics, of the//zV and the handfome^ which> however, he has made 
 the principle of all virtuous adions, namely, that fuch inquiries be- 
 long to the firft philofophy, not to particular fciences, fuch as logic or 
 morals, which, like other fubordmate fciences, alTume their principles, 
 and refer you to \htjitjl fcience, or Icienee of fciences, for the demon- 
 ftration and explanation of them. But, neither in his Metaphyfics 
 have I found any folution of this difficulty concerning the principle 
 of his Logic ; nor have any of his commentators, as far as I know, 
 fupplied this defe£L We muft, therefore, try what we can do, without 
 their affiftance, to folve it. 
 
 In ihefrjl place, it Is impoffible, by the nature of things, that the 
 genus (hould contain the fpecies as a part of it, and the fpecies fhould 
 likewife contain the genus, in the fame refped. But, in different re* 
 fpeds, it is poffible that each of them may contain the other, and be 
 contained by it. We muft, therefore, try to diftmguifh the different 
 manners of coiita'ming^ and being contained. And there is a diltinc- 
 tion that runs through the whole of antient philofophy, folving many 
 difficulties that are otherwife infurmountable, and which, 1 hope, will 
 like ife folve this difficulty. The diftin£tion 1 mean is the diitindion 
 betwixt what exifts h;xuti, or potentially only, and that which exiils 
 jngv««, or atlually. In the tirft fenie, every thing exifts in its caufes ; 
 and, in the other ienfe, nothing exifts but what is adually produced* 
 "Now, in this firft fenle, the whole Ipecies exifts in the genus ; for the 
 
 genus
 
 Chap. XT. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 
 
 479 
 
 genus virtually contains the whole fpecies, not only what actually cxifts 
 of it, but what may exill of it in any future time. In the fane manner, 
 the lowefl: fpecies, below which there is nothing but individuals, con- 
 tains virtually all thofe individuals, prefent and future. Thus, the 
 fpecies man^ comprehends all the individuals now exifting, or that 
 ihall hereafter exift; w^hich, therefore, are faid to be parts of the fpecies 
 man. On the other hand;, the genus is a^ually contained in the fpe- 
 cies ; and the fpecies, likewife, in each of the individuals under it. 
 Thus, the genus animal is aBually contained in the fpecies man, vv-ith- 
 out which it could not be conceived to exift. And, for tl.c fame rea- 
 fon, the fpecies man is a6liiall) contained in each individual *. 
 
 I will endeavour to illuftrate this dodrine of mine by fome exam- 
 ples : And 1 will begin with one that is much uied by the philofo- 
 |)h€r« of the Alexandrian School, but for another purpole that 1 iLall 
 mention atterwards. The example is that of a hgure upon a leal, 
 which virtually contains all the impreffions of that figure that are 
 made, have been made, or fliall be made ; whereas each imprcffion 
 aSlually contains the figure of the feal but once. In like manner, the 
 famous ftatue of the Vmus of Medicis contains virtually in it all the 
 many copies that have been made of it, or that (hall hereafter be made 
 t)f it in Paris plaller, or metal ; whereas each of the copies contains 
 only one Venus : And thus it is that the idea of man contauis virtu- 
 ally Peter, James, and John ; whereas, each of thefe contains adually 
 but one man. 
 
 But 
 
 * It 18 a piece of juftlce which I think I owe to an author, hardly known at all in 
 the weftern parts of Europe, to acknowledge that I got the hint of the folution of this 
 difficulty from him. The author I mean is a living Greek author, Eugenius Djaco- 
 iius, at prefent Profeflbr, as I am informed, in the Patriarch's Univerfity at Conftan- 
 tinople, who has written an excellent lyft..-m of logic, in very good Attic Greek. See 
 what I have turther faid of him in the Origin and Progrefs of Language, vol. i- p. 45 
 2d edition.
 
 48o A N T I K N T METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 But feals and ftatues, it may be faid, are material things, and 
 which, therefore, are net lo fit to illuftrate conceptions and ideas of 
 the mind, which are immateriah I will, therefore, in the next ex- 
 ample I am to give, go a ftep beyond the material thing, and afcend 
 to the idea of the artift who made the feal or the ftatue. In his idea, 
 I fay, was virtually contained, not only one ftatue which he Ihould 
 afterwards make, but twenty, or one hundred, if he fhould make as 
 many from the fame idea ; and not only thefe, but all the copies that 
 Ihould, at any after time, be made of his ftatue, by other artifts. 
 Whereas, every one, either of duplicates made by himfelf, or of co- 
 pies made by others, would aBually contain his idea but once. 
 
 But I will afcend a ftep higher, and a great ftep it is — from the 
 ideas of a human artift, to the intelligible forms in the mind of the 
 Sovereign Artift, which make what we call the intelle^iual ivorld^ the 
 pattern and architype of the material. And this brings us diredly 
 home to our fubjedt ; for the^e forms in the mind of the Divinity are 
 nothing elfe but the genufes and fpeciefes ot which we are fpeaking. 
 Now, that in thefe genufes all the fpeciefes are virtually contained, 
 and, in the fpeciefes, all the individuals of every kind, no body will 
 deny who believes in God ; for it is in this fenfe, and this fenfe on- 
 ly, that all things are in God ; becaufe it is impofTible to imagine that 
 they can be in him a6lually and materially, Suppofe, therefore, the 
 material world not to have been from all eternity, but that time was 
 when it was not, even then it exifted 'virtually and potentially in the 
 ideas of the Divine Mind. But, when thefe ideas are exerted into adt, 
 and ihtfor7ns imprefled, as it were, upon matter^ then fuch material 
 thing contains this form really and abually. And it was to illuftrate 
 this production of the vifible world from the intelledtual, that the A- 
 lexandrian philofophers ufed the comparifon of the feal. But I ufe it 
 for another purpofe, namdy, to (how that the figure upon the feal 
 may be multiplied in injinitum^ by impreffions of it upon wax, and 
 
 yet
 
 Chap. XI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 481 
 
 yet the form IS hut one t containing virtually d\\ the fsvcral impref- 
 fions, and, at the fame time, a^iially contained in each of the impref- 
 fions. 
 
 From this theory of mine thus illuftrated, there arife feveral impor- 
 tant obfervations. And, in the Jir/} place, we may now fee clearly, 
 what was maintained in a preceding chapter *, that generals are the 
 CdiUkoi' particulars : For, that the generals in the Divine mind are the 
 caufe of the particulars in the material world, no man, who is not an 
 athieft, will deny. And, as we participate fo far of the Divine nature, 
 as to have ideas or intelligible forms in our minds, not felf-originated 
 indeed, like thofe of divinity, but derived from the forms of the vi- 
 fible world, thofe forms, where we are able to produce them into ad, 
 are undoubtedly the caufe of the thing fo produced. And, lajlly^ the 
 more general forms of natural things may be faid to produce the more 
 particular, and to be the caufe of them, according to the definition I 
 have given of caufe, being that without which they could not exifl. 
 Thus, the genus, or more general idea of ani7ualy is the caufe of the 
 particular fpecies man, fince, without anifual, ?nan could not exift, 
 whereas animal could exift without man ; and, if it be afked ivbat 
 caufe? the anfwer is, the formal caufe ; for, it is another power which 
 reallfes tho^t forms, and makes them to exift really and materially^ 
 and that power is the efficient caufe ; and, if we add the matter upon 
 which thtit forms are impreflcd, and the end for which that is done, 
 then have we all the four caufes of Ariftotle, the material, thtjormaly 
 the effuient, and the fnal. And thus it appears, in what (e\\{e every 
 general idea is the caufe of every particular Idea under it, and every 
 general propofition the caufe of every particular propofitlon derived 
 from it ; and how It comes, that, when from particulars we afcend to 
 generals, which, by the infirmity of our natures, we are obliged to do, 
 we difcover the caufes of things ; and that, when we reafon down- 
 wards from generals to particulars, that way of rcafoning is the moft 
 
 P p P excellent, 
 
 • Chap. 9 cf this Book.
 
 482 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 excelleiit, and is dtmonjlration properly fo called, by which we 
 prove, not only that a thing is^ but 'why it is, and by which we come 
 as near as we can to fuperior intelligences, who Teethings in their cau- 
 ics, and, through the generals, recognife the particulars. 
 
 Secitndo^ We may alio fee here the reafon why the genus can con- 
 tain lo many Ipeciefes, differing all, in fome rer^>eds, each from the o- 
 ther, yet all united in one common genus ; whereas, the fpecies con- 
 tains but one genuSj to which it belongs. And, for the fame reafon, the 
 individuals of every fpecies contain only each the fpecies to which it 
 belongs * : For the fame thing may contain many things potentiaUyy 
 as many as can be produced out of it ; but nothing a^ually exifting can 
 contain any thing but that which is a^iually in it, and conftitutes its 
 nature and eflence. 
 
 And here we may perceive the reafon why an univerfal affirmative 
 propofition does not reciprocate ; for, though I can praedicate the ge- 
 nus animal of the whole fpecies man^ and all the individuals under it, 
 I cannot praedicate man of the whole genus animaU and all the fpeci- 
 efes and individuals under it, becaufe man contains nothing more but 
 the genus animaU fo far as it exifts in him, not as it exifts in other a- 
 nimals ; for that would be to make one fpecies of animals, or one in- 
 dividual of that fpecies, many fpeciefes, or many individuals. The 
 propofition, therefore, into which the univerlal affirmative above men- 
 tioned is convertible, is, that man may be praedicated ot fome animal "f, 
 
 Tertio, 
 
 * It may be objeQed, that the individual man contains, not only the fpecies wa«, 
 but the genus animal, and, above it, the genus animated body ; then an higher genus 
 ftill, body ; and, laflly, the higheft of all, Jiibjlance. But it is to be obferved, that the 
 individual ma7i, in aUlually containing the fpecies man^ does alfo aBimlly contain all 
 the feveral genules above it, the fpecies, as I have lliown, a^litatiy containing the ge- 
 nus above it. 
 
 t This is the diftinO;ion made by Arillotle, betwixt the univerfal affirmative, and 
 the particular affirmative, which, as I have obferved, he expreffies thus, x<«t« 7r«>Tfl;, and 
 xKTx Ttroi J fo that, though we can fay (^&'e» xcerx Trzvroi xv^fuTrcvy we cannot fay cfjSfUTrti 
 amrx ttxvtcs (,u6v, but Only «y^/)«!rej xxtx tocj ^«eu,
 
 Chap. XI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 483 
 
 Tertio, From this theory of genus and fpeci s, I think we may ex- 
 plain the myfterious langtuge in which Plato (peaks of ideas, without 
 -adopting his fyftem of ideas. An idei, he tells us, is, * That which 
 
 * makes one of the many ; which, preferving the unity and integrity of 
 
 * its own nature, runs through and mixes with things injinite in num- 
 
 * ber; and yet, however multifo*'m it may appear, is always the fame \ 
 
 * fo that, by it, we fiad out and difcriminate the thing, whatever 
 ^ different (hape it may affame, and under whatever difguife it may, 
 
 * Proteus-hkey hide itfelf * ;' for, according to the account that I have 
 given of the matter, it is evident, that the vifible forms, whicli are de- 
 rived from the Intelligible form, mu!l: be many^ and likewne rr.Tj, in 
 refpet^: of the original form, whxh, like the fignature of the feal. th3y 
 have all impreffed upon them. Further, that this form, when it 15 
 produced into ad, muft neceflarily run through, and mix with an infi- 
 nite number of things, the original form ftill remaining on« arwJ the 
 fame, without addition, diminution, or alteration of any kind. And, 
 laftly, it is no doubt true, that this form, by being mixed and incorpo- 
 rated with matter, is very often obfcured and hid ; fo that it is very diffi- 
 cult to find it out feparated from the matter, and difcriminated from 
 other forms with which it may be mixed. Neither is it difhculr. I 
 think, from the principles I have laid down, to clear up that puzzle, 
 which Ariftotle objeds to the dodrine of ideas, both of Plato, and of 
 the Pythagoreans ; the former of which faid, that all things were 
 what they were h%participation of the idea, the latter by i7nitation f ; 
 for both were in the right, and expreffed the fame thing only by dif- 
 ferent words; for the material thing is truly an imitation of the ideal 
 form, and, as it has that form upon it, may alfo be properly enough 
 faid to participate of it. 
 
 P p p 2 Lajlly, 
 
 '* See Plato in Philebo, et alibi. 
 
 t Metaphyf. lib. i. cap. 6. p. 848. Editio Du Pai.
 
 484 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 Lajlly^ From what I have faid of thefubordinatlon of ideas, we may ob- 
 
 ferve the progrefs of things upwards, and the wonderful tendency of all 
 
 things in nature towards one principle of union. This is to be found in 
 
 all the feveral clafl'es of being, which ftill rife, one above another, till they 
 
 end in that one category to which they belong. And here the ana- 
 
 lyfis of logic ends ; but where logic ends, theology begins, and fliows 
 
 that all the ten categories terminate in one principle, and have one 
 
 common origin, the intelleB Diu'ine^ the fource of every thing exifting, 
 
 or that can exiil in theuniverfe, where all things exift in themoft perfe<5t 
 
 iinity \ for there is noifirjl or laji there, nor the fuccefTion of ideas as 
 
 in our minds, but all things are prefent at once; and the /?^y?, xhQ pre* 
 
 fenty and ihtjuturCy what is precedent ^ and what is confequent^ are 
 
 feen in one view. In this manner, not only logic, but every other 
 
 fcience, ends in theology^ the fummit of all philofophy, and which 
 
 to know, is the perfedion of human nature. 
 
 Having thus removed, as I hope, all objections to the principles of 
 human knowledge, I will now proceed to fome further fpeculations 
 concerning mind^ with which I am to conclude this book, and this 
 part of my work. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
 #
 
 Chap. XII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 485 
 
 CHAP. XIL 
 
 Of Propofttions, the SiihjeSi of ivhich is a particular Mind. — Mind par- 
 ticular is the SubjeB of hit elk ^ — therefore may be the Siihjetl of De- 
 monjlration — Inflances of Demonfl ration concerning Mind — The Exifl^ 
 ence of that great Mind^ ivhich is the Caufe of all Things^ is demon- 
 frahle — There ive are to feck for the Origin q/" Truth, not in the AIi?id 
 of Many nor in the Material World — // is from God ^/:?^/ Truth dengues 
 its Eternity and Immutability — Truth ivould not be eternal and immii- 
 table^ if the Opinion of Des Cartas ivere true — God is the Fountain of 
 Beauty as ivell as of Truth — The Difference betivixt Beauty and 
 Truth — The IntelleSlual Worlds the perfeSl Model of all Beauty /« 
 Theory — Beauty in Praclice Something moreperfeSifiill — TheUiiiverfe^ 
 therefore^ mofl perfecily beautiful — How far Man can advance in Beau- 
 ty, either Speculative or Praflical — To reduce our Ideas of Beauty to 
 PraflicCy and make a little World of them^ is the great eft Effort of Hu- 
 7nan intelled — The Materials out of ivhich Man makes thefe little H^orlds 
 — His oivn Species the noblefl of thefe Materials — Other Materials of 
 this Creation — fuch as Sounds — Colours — Stone — and Metal — The 
 Gift of Genius befloived but uponfeiv — Whole nations appear to ivant 
 it altogether — One Nation had it in the mofl eminent Degree, 
 
 ALTHOUGH I have faid a great deal of mind^ the reader will for- 
 give me for concluding this book with another chapter upon it, 
 fince I could nototherwifefinifli my dodrine of propofitions, which, he 
 will recoiled, 1 divided into two kinds* i—Thofe of which both 
 
 praedicate 
 
 » See page 378 — 410
 
 486 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 praedlcate and fubjed: were generals ; and tbofe of which the prae- 
 dicate was a general, but the lubject a particular thing. Thefe, again, 
 I lubdivided into luch whofe lubje(ii was a particular corporeal thing, 
 and fuch whofe fubje:t was a particular mind. Of all the other kinds 
 of proportions 1 have already fpokca. And it only remains that I 
 fliould fay fomeihing of the laft kind. 
 
 Every particular body is the objed of fenfe, and of fenfe only; 
 and, for that reafon, and on account of its perifhable nature, it ne- 
 ver can be the fubjedt of fcieuce. Mind, on the other hand, whe- 
 ther general or particular, is the obje£t only of intelledt ; for it cannot 
 be apprehended by fenfe, nor otherwife conceived but by intellect. 
 And as it is, of its nature, eternal and incorruptible, there is nothing to 
 hinder even a particular mind to be the fubject of fcience and de- 
 monftration. And though we do not perfedly know the fubltance 
 or efTence of mind, any more than of body, yet, knowing perfectly fome 
 efTential properties of it, we can, from thence, by ftrid demonftration, 
 deduce others. Thus, for example, we know that a^ivity is of the 
 eflence of mind ; from which we have already feen, that many impor- 
 tant confequences follow, and many more will be deduced from it, 
 when we come to treat of God and Nature. 
 
 Again, mind is, by its nature, immaterial : What is immaterial has 
 no parts : And what has no parts cannot be moved. This is a propo- 
 fition that I have taken for granted in the preceding part of this 
 work; "but, if any body fhould doubt of it, it may be thus eafily demon- 
 flrated from the nature of motion : What is moved has its parts 
 fucceffively in different parts of fpace : What, therefore, has no parts, 
 cannot be moved. And thus we conclude, as Ariftotle does, that no 
 particular mind, fuch asthe human, can be moved diredly, immediately, 
 or of itfelf, and by its own nature, but by accidenty that is, by its 
 happening to be conjoined with another fubilance by its nature 
 moveable, viz. body, along with which it is therefore moved. 
 
 It
 
 Chap. XII. AN TIE NT METAPHYSICS. 487 
 
 It is from the nature of mind, fo different from body, joined with 
 the exiftence of the material world, which, I think, I have fufficiendy 
 proved, againft all the cavils of thofe who pretend to difbdieve it, 
 that we conclude there is a God, felf-originated, neceflnrily exiftent, 
 and the author of all other things exifting in the univerfe. This, I 
 truft, I fhall be able moft clearly to demonftrate in the proper place. 
 But, taking it at prefent for granted, I proceed to (how, that truth and 
 fcience are to be deduced from a much higher origin than the humaa 
 mind, even from God himfelf. And, in this way, I think I fhall 
 properly conclude what I have faid upon the excellence and ftability 
 of truth and fcience, to which oiherwife, it appears, that fomething- 
 would be wanting. 
 
 For, if truth w^ere nowhere elfe to be found, but in a mind fuch as 
 ours, connedled lb intimately with body, and from thence liable to fo 
 many diforders and perturbations, and to oblivion among other things, 
 it might juftly be doubted, whether truth deferved the epithets that 
 are beftowed upon it, of eternal and im??mtatk, Befides, as there can 
 be no truth without generals, and as all we know of truth is from the 
 material world, where thofe generals or fpeciefes of things are immer- 
 fed in matter, and in continual motion and agitatioii with matter, the 
 curious and philofophic mind will naturally inquire whence thofe fpe- 
 ciefes or forms of things come, and whether they are not to be found 
 fomewhere in a more fixed and per )ianent Itate. And, if he be not 
 a follower of that tnacl philofophy, which believes that nothing exifts 
 in the univerfe befides matter, he will immediately perceive, that thofe 
 forms could not have originated from matter. Ihis will lead him to 
 feek for their origin ellewhere. And, as there is nothing in the uni- 
 verfe but matter and mind, they mufl: therefore proceed from mind, 
 and mind intelligent. Thus healcends from the material to the intel- 
 le<^ual world, which muft as certainly exiil as the material, ii it be 
 true that this univerfe is not the work of blind chance, or ot material 
 
 neceffity,.
 
 488 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BookV. 
 
 neceflity, but of counfel and defign. Now, this intelledual world, 
 comprehending fuch infinite variety of forms, all united together in 
 one amazing fyftem, can be nowhere elfe but in the mind of the 
 Deity *. 
 
 Here we may fee with what propriety God is called in Scripture 
 the God of Truth ; for in him are all ideas or fpeciefes of things, with 
 all their connexions, dependencies, and relations to one another. I'hefe, 
 by a wonderful proceflion, of which we can have no idea, are produ- 
 ced into a<51:, and become the material or vlfible world, which is no 
 other than a tranfcript of the Divine Mind, fuch as is legible even 
 by us poor mortals ; for it is from thence that we firft derive our 
 ideas, recognizing the feveral forms and fpeciefes of things, and invef- 
 tigating their feveral connections, dependencies, and relations, with 
 much labour and agitation of mind — from thence, by the help of this 
 firft philofophy, of which I treat, we afcend to the fountain of all 
 truth, and all fcience, and difcover there that tranfcendant truth which 
 I mentioned in the beginning of this bookf, and which alone can give 
 
 to 
 
 * This Inte]!e£lual world may be confidered as poetically defcribed in the follow- 
 ing beautiful Ijnes of Homer, fo well tranflated by Lucretius, that it is not eafy to fay, 
 whether the tranflation or original be mod beautiful. The paflage in Homer is, 
 
 0*jXt/'-47r»v5^', *«C< ^x.^t hvv S09J cta-(pxXif cctei 
 
 Efiutvxi' at/r' xvifioiTi Ttixa-a-iTxty ovti vor' cftfi^M 
 
 AtviTxtf tvrt yjuy tfriTn^.vxTxt' xXXx /^xX xiS^n 
 
 JliTTTxTxt «>ysf£As5, Mvxti l' isTtlit^ouii xiyM* Odyf. O- V. 4^* 
 
 The words of Lucretius are, 
 Apparet divum numen, fedefque quietae ; 
 Quas nequeconcutiunt venti, neque nubila nimbis 
 Adfpergunt ; neque nix acri concreta pruina 
 Cana cadens violat; fempcrque innubilus aether 
 
 Integit, et large diffufa luminc ridct. Lib. 3- v. 18. 
 
 In this manner thofe poets may be underflood to have contrafled the (lillnefs and 
 tranquillity of the intelledual world, with the conftant motion and agitation, the ne- 
 vcr-ceafing round of generation and corruption of the material world- 
 t rage 374-
 
 Chap. XIL ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 489 
 
 to truth that eter7iity and immutability T^hich is fo much talked of, 
 but fo little underftood ; for, as I obferved a little before, if no other 
 being had any perception of truth, except man, and if there were no 
 other pattern or archetype of it but this material world, in confl-ant 
 motion and change, it might indeed be faid to be fomething realy and 
 not merely ideal or notional ; but it could not, I think, be faid, with 
 much propriety, to be eternal and immutable. 
 
 Nor could it, I think, deferve thefe epithets, if what Des Cartes, 
 and fome other French philofophers, who pretend to be Theiils, have 
 faid, were true, that truth and falfehood are, by their nature, arbitra- 
 ry, depending altogether upon the will of the Deity, lb that it was in 
 his power to have made truth falfehood, or falfehood truth. But they 
 might as well have maintained, that it was in the power of the Deity 
 to change his nature, and be other than what he is, a felf-exiftent 
 Being, neceffarily exiftlng, and, in every refped, unchangeable* 
 * without change, or fhadow of change ;' for thefe ideas of his mind, 
 from which all truth is derived, are part of his nature and effence, 
 and therefore unchangeable. 
 
 But, is not beauty fomething different from truth ? and is not God 
 the fountain of the one as well as the other ? — And firfl, as to the 
 difference betwixt truth and beauty^ there is truth in a fingle propoli- 
 tlon, but no beauty ; for, in order to give beauty to truthy there muft 
 be a combination of proportions mutually conneded and dependent 
 one upon the other. In (hort, there muft be a fyftem, of which the 
 mind perceiving the union, is, at the fame time, ftruck with thai niofl 
 agreeable of all perceptions, which we call beauty* And the greater 
 variety there is in this fyftem, the greater the number of parts, and 
 the n^.ore various their connections and dependencies upon one ano- 
 ther, the greater the beauty, provided the mind can dlftindly com- 
 prehend the whole, and the feveral parts, in one united view. 
 
 Q.qq Of
 
 490 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 Of this kind of beauty, the firft and the greatefl: that it is poffible 
 to conceive, and which, of neceffity, muft be the archetype and model 
 of all beauty, is the intelledual world above mentioned, where there 
 is fuch infinite variety, and, at the fame time, fuch wonderful order 
 and regularity, that it is impoflible for human intelled to have any 
 more than a very rude and ini perfect idea of it. 
 
 Here, then, we have the utmoft limit of theoretical beauty, or beau- 
 ty in contemplation. But there is a beauty flill higher, and more per- 
 fedt, and which is at the very top of the pyramid. It may be called 
 praSlical beauty, becaufe it produces into ad the ideal beauty, and 
 gives it life and energy. It is what we conceive gives the higheft 
 perfedlon even to God himfelf, and crowns all his other attributes ; 
 for, if the intelledual world had never been produced into ad, and 
 the Deity had contented himfelf with the mere contemplation of it, 
 through all the ages of eternity, we fhould have conceived fomething 
 defedlve in power and goodnefs, and even the ideal beauty of the in- 
 telledual world we fliould not have confidcred as compleat ; but, 
 when all thefe wonderful ideas are realized, when every thing is pro- 
 duced into life and being, and when God Almighty has pronounced 
 that they are all good^ and * anfwering his fair idea,* as our poet ex- 
 prefles it, then are poiver^ goodnefs^ and beauty^ compleat. 
 
 What remains to be confidered is, how far man can advance to- 
 wards this perfection of power, goodnefs, and beauty, both theoretical 
 and pradical. That he mull: be forever greatly defedlve in power 
 and goodnefs, is evident ; nor is it pofTible that he can comprehend in 
 his mind fuch theoretical beauty as that of the intelledual world ; far 
 lefs can he put it into execution. However, as to beauty in theory, 
 there is no man, I believe, who has attained to the ule of intelled, 
 that has not fome idea of it. But, where the intelled is imperfed, there 
 
 the
 
 Chap.Xn. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 491 
 
 the idea of beauty will alfo be i;Tjperfe<5t ; and it is only the moft per- 
 fed intelleds that can comprehend any great plan of beauty. 
 
 But what (hall we fay as to the production of fuch a plan in- 
 to adl and execution ? This, fo far as it can be performed by 
 man, is the higheft perfedion of his nature, and that in which he 
 comes the nearcft to Divinity ; for, by the imitation of Divinity, he 
 produces a little world out of the ideas of his mind. It is this creative 
 faculty which is denoted by the word genius, being that which, every 
 body allows, diftiaguifhes one man from another more than any thing 
 elfe. 
 
 But, out of what materials is this little creator to make thofe beau- 
 tiful works ? — -And here we may perceive how much his power is li- 
 mited, compared with that of the great Creator ; yet he has fome ma- 
 terials ; and the nobler the materials upon which he works, the nobler 
 and more beautiful the workmanfhip. 
 
 His firfl: and bed materials are himfelf, and the reft of his fpecies— 
 the nobleft of animals undoubtedly here below. Thefe, if he can 
 mould and fafhion into a fyftem of polity, imitating, as far as pof- 
 fible, the great fyftem of the univerfe, it is the nobleft, the moft beau- 
 tiful, and moft ufeful creation, that can be made by man, and that in 
 which he comes neareft to the great Creator. The reft of the ani- 
 mal race is already, by wifdom far fuperior to that of man, formed 
 into fyftems of wonderful beauty. And, though man, by the care 
 and culture he has beftowed upon thofe animals, has made them fub- 
 fervient to his purpofes, and exceedingly ufeful to him, he has been 
 very far from improving their nature and inftindts ; but, on the contra- 
 ry, has depraved all of them that he has meddled with, more or lefs ; 
 And the fame may be faid of the vegetable life. 
 
 Qjl q 2 There
 
 49* ANTI^NT METAPHYSICS. BookV. 
 
 There remain, therefore, only, for the fubject of his art, belides his 
 own fpecies, things inanimate, fuch 2,% founds^ colours^ jloncy and ivood. 
 Of thefe he makes wonderful works ; the beauty of which chiefly 
 confifts in the expreffion of that which is nobleft in nature, iiiindi 
 without which there can be no true grace or real beauty in the works 
 of art. 
 
 The firft and nobleft of thefe inanimate materials, \^ found \ which, 
 confidered as a fubjedt of art, is divided into articulate fou.id, or lan- 
 guage, and mufical found. The firft of thefe is the direcL and imme- 
 diate expreffion of intellect, fentiment, and paffion ; and therefore it 
 furnilhes the materials of the higheft art, next to that which I have 
 already mentioned. This art is well known by the name of poetry. 
 And the works of it may be of great extent, as well as great beauty 
 and variety ; for the fubjeft of it is man^ engaged in various purfuits 
 and fcenes of action, but which muft all have an union fit to confti- 
 tute a ivhok, confifting of parts varioufly dependent upon, and ccn- 
 neded with each other. 
 
 Mufical founds, that is, founds, the ratio of which to one another, 
 in refpett to acutenefs and gravity, we can meafure, are the materials 
 of which the mufical art is made ; an art which, though it do not ex- 
 prefs ideas, as words do, affords a language of fentiment and paffion, 
 more expreffive than the language of words. Where paffions, there- 
 fore, are to be excited, and the fentiments and manners of men form- 
 ed without reafon or philofophy, which mufl: be the cafe with regard 
 to very young men, and the vulgar of all ages, there is jio art fo ufe- 
 ful, and which can be fo much employed for the general benefit of all 
 mankind. 
 
 Colours are the materials of the fined art of illufion that ever was 
 invented, I mean paintings which fpeaks to the eyes in the moft for- 
 cible
 
 Chap, XIL ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 493 
 
 cible and agreeable manner. But it is inferior both to poetry and 
 mufic, in this refped, that there is no fucceflion in it, but it reprefents 
 its objeds all at once ; (o that a piece of painting cannot be of any- 
 great extent or comprehenfion, otherwife the eye could not take it all 
 in, nor could the mind perceive a ivbok in it. 
 
 Of the two lalt arts I fliall mention, the materials are more folid ; 
 for they are Aone, metal, or timber, upon which fculpture operates in 
 flatues, alto, or baflo-relievos, and architecture in elegant and ftately 
 buildings, both arts of great beauty, and the latter, likewife, of great 
 Utility ; but they are confined, like painting, to objedts reprefented 
 all together, and without fucceflion ; and therefore are not capable of 
 the fame extent and comprehenfion as poetry and mufic. 
 
 The works of thefe fine arts are really creations^ by which man 
 imitates the highefl: perfedlion of the Divine Nature, and endeavours 
 to produce a little world, refembling the beauty of the great world 
 of God. As the great gifts of nature are beftowed very fparingly, 
 and but upon very few, it is impoflible that, in any nation, there can 
 be many who excel in this greatefl: perfe<tlion of the human mind, 
 genius. Nay, there appear to be whole nations, who have not at 
 all, in any degree worth obferving, this creative power of genius. 
 Of this kind, is the great nation of the Chinefe, who, though they 
 excel in all mechanic arts, many of which they feem to have invented ; 
 andjtho' they have, or, at leafl:, had the moft exadt internal police that 
 I believe any nation ever had ; yet, in the fine arts, they have made 
 no progreis at all, wanting, as it would feem, thofe ideas of the hauti^ 
 ful d^\^ fuhlime^ which naturally lead men to exprefs them in the dif- 
 ferent ways 1 have mentioned. Their ftatuary, therefore, and fculp- 
 ture are without grace or beauty ; nor is their architedure of any value. 
 Their paintings, and their mufic, have no exprefllon of any thing that 
 is beautiful or fuhlime ; and, in their poetry, which, I believe, is all 
 of the dramatical kind, they fliow that they have not fo much as the 
 
 idea
 
 494 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BookV, 
 
 idea of a whole, and its dependent parts, without which, as 1 have ob- 
 ferved, there can be no beauty *. 
 
 On the other hand, the Greek nation appears to have been the na- 
 tion of the greateft genius that ever exifted ; inlbmuch, that the tine 
 arts may be faid to be wholly theirs. For, though from other coun- 
 tries, and particularly from Egypt, they learned the mechanic arts, 
 fcience's, government, religion, and police, it is evident to me that the 
 fine arts were all of their own growth. For, thqugh the Egyptians 
 pradifed mufic, painting, and fculpture, it was but in a low degree, 
 without that grace and beauty which can intitle them to the appel- 
 lation oijine arts. 
 
 It appears, therefore, that in our fpecies, as in other fpeclefes 
 of animals, the excellency of it is confined to certain races of the ani- 
 jpal, in certain countries of the earth, not difFufed over the whole fpe- 
 cies. And it is only by imitating thofe men, whom heaven has 
 thought proper, in this manner, to feledt from the reft of the fpecies, 
 that other men can attain, in any great degree, to this higheft perfec- 
 tion of human nature. 
 
 And here I conclude this part of my work, in which I ex- 
 hibit a face of nature quite different from that which is prefented 
 
 by 
 
 • The Chinefe have that faculty, which nature nppearsto have beftowed univerfally 
 upon the whole fpecies, 1 mean the faculty of imitation ; for, in their paintings, they 
 imitate nature very exa£lly- But they liave no notion of what the French call la belle 
 naturcy by uhich we are to underftand that ideal beauty which gives the perfeftion to 
 all the produ(flions of the fine arts- We fhould imagine that we faw in their paintings a 
 tafte for the wild and the grotefque, and a variety of fcenery and landfcape, that ap. 
 pears to us wonderful. But travellers tell us, that thefe are landfcapes really to be 
 feen in their country- And, particularly, thofe houfes that we fee nitched in rocks» 
 often very high, with fteep winding paths up to them, Mr Bel], in his travels through 
 Tartary into China, tells us, are very frequently feen in the mountainous parts of their 
 country*
 
 Chap. XIT. ANTIENT METAPHYSl C S. 495 
 
 by the author of the EfTays. According to him, every thing in the 
 univerfe is carried on, either by material neceffity, (for he fays, and 
 fays rightly, that there is no chance in nature), or, which appears to 
 be his fyftem, by a wicked being, the author of all turpitude and mo- 
 ral evil. And it Is this that diftinguifhes his philofophy, as I have ob- 
 ferved, from all other philofophy, antient or modern ; for, though 
 there have been other philofophers before him, who were Atheifts, he 
 is the only one who ever profefled to believe that there was a de-* 
 vil, but no God * : — In the human mind, fays this philofopher, there 
 are nothing but fenjations more or lefs lively, but no ideas^ and, 
 by confequence, no fcience or certainty, but every thing muft ap- 
 pear to every man as it affects his fenfes : — Even our fenfatlons 
 are no better than mere delufion, and an empty dream, as there 
 is no material world, and, therefore, nothing that can make any 
 impreffion upon our fenfes : — And, lajlly^ we ourfelves are no- 
 thing but a bundle of perceptions, that is, an accident without a 
 fubftance. On the other hand, my fyftem is, that there is mind in 
 the univerfe, as well as hody^ and that what is called nature confifts 
 of mind and body. — That there is a Supreme Mind, the author of 
 Nature, and which governs and direds her operations. — That this 
 Mind is immaterial, and entirely feparated from all matter, un- 
 changeable, both in its effence and energies, innnitely powerful, 
 wife, and good, the fountain of all truth, order, regularity, and 
 beauty, in the univerfe.-^That, below this Supreme Mind, and 
 in infinite degrees of fubordination, there are other minds, which 
 move the feveral parts of this ftupenduous frame, and accomplifh 
 certain ends, by the beft means that infinite wifdofn can devife. 
 — That fome of thefe minds have intelligence and confcioufnefs 
 of the ends for which they aft : And, among thefe, is the human 
 mind ; which, as it is conneded with body, has fenfatlons ; but, as 
 
 it 
 
 ♦ Sec what I have further faid concerning this extraordinary fyflem, p. 308.
 
 496 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 
 
 it is intelligent, has likewife ideas, and, by confequence, the percep- 
 tion of truth, and of order, regularity, and beauty, derived imme- 
 diately from the material world which exifts around it, and upon 
 which the Divinity has imprefled the fignature of intelligence, good- 
 nefs, and beauty, and has, as it were, tranfcribed himfelf. 
 
 This was antlent philofophy — This was the ivifdom of the Egyp^ 
 tians'^y brought by Pythagoras into Greece and Italy, cultivated in 
 the fchools of Plato and Ariftotle, and, in their writings, delivered 
 down to us. To revive the ftudy of thefe writings, and, with that 
 ftudv, the fyftem of genuine theifm, is the defign of this work-~a 
 defign that, I am perfuaded, will be approved of by the wife and good, 
 however much it may be difliked by the difciples of that wretched, 
 impious philofophy which has become fafhionable of late, and which 
 is built upon no other foundation than the total ignorance of the 
 Greek philofophy, and even of the language of it ; for, in proportion 
 as the Greek language has been more or lefs cultivated in the feveral 
 parts of Europe, the Atheiftical philofophy has more or lefs prevailed. 
 On the continent, where the Greek tongue is very near quite forgot, 
 it is almoft univerfal. In England, where the Greek language is ftill 
 (ludied, it is very much lefs prevalent. And here, in Scotland, I have 
 obferved that, as claffical learning declinesjthe philofophy of Mr David 
 Hume gains ground. 
 
 * Ads of die Apoftles, chap- y verfe sa- 
 
 I N I • S>
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 Dissertation on the Principles of the Newtonian 
 Philosophy. 
 
 C H A f. I. 
 
 Jn Inquiry into the Principles of the Newtonian Philofophy belongs to 
 this Work — The ^leftion concerning the Motion of the Celejlial Bodies 
 of great Importance ivith refpe^ to Natural ReligioUy and the Doclrine 
 oj Theifm-^This Do^irine confifls of tivo Parts— The Philofophy of 
 Des Cartes repugnant to the better Part of Theifm — The Philofophy 
 of Sir Ifaac Neuuton not fo Material and Mechanical ^7/ that of Des 
 Cartes — The Principles ofit^ hoijuevery ought to be carefully e^amincdy 
 as tending to the Disbelief of the Providence of God in the great ejl 
 Part of the Vifible World — The Account of the Motion of the Celeflial 
 Bodies given by Sir Ifaac — Their Motion compofed of the tivo Motions 
 ofProjedion and Gravitation — One of thcfe tivo Motions Mechanical 
 — 5/r Ifaac' s Philofophy in his Principia incompleat-, as it accounts only 
 for one of thefe tivo Motions — Sir Ifaac in vain endeavoured tofupply 
 this Defe5l aftervoards — All the Caufes of Gravitation that can pof^ 
 fibly be affigned — The lajl Caufe mentioned^ viz. the conflant Agency of 
 Mind, the true Caufe — This adopted by the Neivtonlans at prefent, and 
 a great Improvement of Sir Ifaac'* s Syflem^But a fart her Amendment 
 is neceffary, 
 
 F T E R reading over the Nineteenth Chapter of the Second 
 Book of the preceding volume, concerning the Newtonian Phi- 
 lofophy, and converfing and xorrel ponding upon the fubjed with 
 fome friends very much more learned than I in tliat philofophy, I 
 have thought proper, by way of Appendix to this part of my work, to 
 fubjoin a DiiTertation upon the fame fubjed, in which I propofe to fay- 
 nothing concerning the geometrical, mechanical, and agronomical 
 principles of the Newtonian fyftem, thefe having been already fufll- 
 c i en tbi- examined by others more capable to judge of them, but to in- 
 
 R r r quire
 
 498 DISSERTATION ON 
 
 quire into the metaphyfical principles upon which it is founded : For,, 
 as the principles of all fclences are contained in this firft pliilofophy, 
 which is therefore called the fcience ot fclences ; and as, accordingly, 
 i have endeavoured, in this work,, to explain the principles of geome- 
 try and arithmetic, it belongs, I think, to my fubjed, to inquire whe- 
 i\ier a philofophy, which, at prefent, is (o fafliionable, agrees with the 
 principles of this firft philofophy ; an inquiry which, as far as I know, 
 has not been made with any accuracy. 
 
 The queflion treated of in the chapter above mentioned, is, Whether 
 the celeftial bodies are moved by the immediate operation, and con- 
 ilant agency of Mind, according to the opinion of the anlient philofo- 
 phers? or Whether, as the Newtonians maintain, the heavens area 
 machine, which God Almighty has indeed contrived, framed, and fee 
 a-going, but which goes on of itfelf, without his interpofition, or that, 
 of any other Mind, by the operation of caules merely material and 
 mechanical ? This is a queflion of great importance to the religion of 
 Nature and the dodtrine of Theifm, which confids of two parts. The 
 JifJI teaches us, that Mind is the eldeft of things, and that there is a 
 Supreme Mind, which is the firft Caufe and Author of this univerfe i 
 xhe/econdj That the univerfe is not only the produdion of this Su- 
 preme Mind, but that it is governed and carried on by this Mind, or 
 Minds fubordinaie to him, and employed by him as his minifters» 
 And it is in this fenfe that the Deity may be laid to be every where 
 prefent, informing and animating every part of Nature, guiding and 
 diredting the whole : Nor do I know that the infinity and ubiquity of 
 God can be any way better explained. Of theie two parts of theifm, 
 this iaft, which afferts the providence of God over all his works, is, 
 in my apprehenfion, the better half of religion, both natural and re- 
 vealed ; for, I do not think that any man can be faid to be truly reli- 
 gious, who has not a fenfe of a prefent Deity in the works of Nature, 
 as well as the affairs of men. 
 
 K philofopher, therefore, fuch as Des Cartes, who afiigns to Deity 
 BO other part, except, at firft, to turn round a vortex or whirlpool of 
 
 matter,
 
 THE NEWTONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 499 
 
 matter, from which, according to certain general laws of matter and 
 motion, proceeds all this wonderful frame of things ; not only the ce- 
 leflial bodies, and their movements, but the organization and fuc- 
 ceflive generation of animals and plants ; and who maintains that all 
 this is not only originally produced, but is preferved and carried on 
 without the guidance of any Mind ; and who makes the brute-animals 
 to be no more than machines, and afcribes all the various operations of 
 their infl:in<5l to caufes merely material and mechanical. — Such a phi- 
 lofopher I hold to be very little better than a downright Atheift, differ- 
 ing only from the mere materialift in this, that he has recourfe to 
 Deity in order to account for the origin of motion, without which, e- 
 very fyftem of materialifm mud be eifentially defedive. Nor is it to 
 be wondered that, when Des Cartes had gone fo far, his fiiccefTors, the 
 prefent French philofophers, (hould go one ftep farther, and endeavour 
 to frame a world out of mere matter and mechanifm, without giving 
 the Deity even the trouble to begin the motion : And feme ot them, 
 we know, have gone fo far as to nnake a machine of the human mind, 
 as well as of the brute *. And, indeed, it appears to me impofTible, 
 that a man who believes that all the appetites and inclinations of the 
 brutes, fo wonderfully fuited to the prefervation of the individual, 
 and the continuance of the kind, all their operations, in confequence 
 of tho(e appetites and inclinations, and even their reafonings, (for that 
 they have a reafon of a certain kind, I have elfewhere fhown t]) to be 
 mere clock-work, can think oiherwife of the human mind. 
 
 As to the phllofophy of Sir Ifaac Newton, it is not, as I have obfer- 
 ved J, univerfal, but is confined to the heavens, and the movements of 
 the celeflial bodies. He does not, therefore, meddle with the organi- 
 zation or generation of plants or animals ; nor do I belive he thought 
 that thcfe could be accounted for by matter and mechanifm. Neither 
 does he lay any thing of the minds of animals, and their operations, 
 except what 1 wilh he had not faid, that a fubtile Ipiritwas the caufe 
 
 R r r 2 of 
 
 * Abbe Pradc, riiomme machine. t P^ge lor. t Pjge 205.
 
 jca DISSERTATION ON 
 
 of fenfatlon and fponlaneous motion *, But of the heavens, I think, 
 ft is evident, he makes a machine, of which, mdeed, he fays the Deity- 
 is the contriver and fabricator, and the mover, too, if not immediate/}; 
 at leaft mediately y being ultimately the Author of all motion in the 
 univerfe : But the celeftial bodies, being once fct a-going, go on, he 
 fays, of themfclves, mechanically, without the interpofition of Deity, 
 except upon fome extraordinary occafions, when, for certain reafons 
 that he mentions, the machine may need the mending hand of the 
 Creator. With refpe<^, therefore, to the great operations of Nature, and. 
 by far the greater part of the vifible world, there is no Divine Provi- 
 dence, according to Sir Ifaac, conftantly operating ; and the Deity is as 
 much out of the univerfe as the Gods of Epicurus, whom that philofo- 
 pher has placed in certain extra-mundane fpaces, out of the hurry and 
 buftle of his worlds. A phiiofophy of this kind is, at leaft, a ftep to- 
 wards the difbelief of what I call the better part of Theilm, the Pro- 
 vidence of God ; and, if it be extended further, and brought down 
 from the fkies to this our earth, (and I fee no good reafon why it 
 ihould notj, it puts an end to it altogether. It therefore behoves not 
 only every good Chriflian, but every believer in the religion of Na- 
 ture, to examine very fcrupuloufly^ the principles of a phiiofophy which 
 lead to fuch confequences. 
 
 Sir Ifaac's machine of the heavens, and which is exceedingly well 
 reprefented by the machine called an Orrery, is moved by two feveral 
 powers : The one is called the projefiile force^ which is an impulfe, 
 fuch as that by which one body impels another, and by which, there- 
 fore, the planet is neceflarily moved in a ftraight line : The other is 
 called attrat'tion^ or, as I would rather chufe to call it, granjitatioHy by 
 "which the planet is impelled towards its center ; and, from thefe two 
 forces com.bined, refults that motion in an ellipfis, by which the pla- 
 net is carried round its center ; and, as the projedile force, once im- 
 preflcd, continues for ever, and, as the motion towards the center, or 
 centripetal force, as it is called, is every inftant renewed, this elliptical 
 
 motion, 
 
 * Jnjine Principiorum. See page 275. of thia volume*
 
 THE NEWTONIAN PHILOi>OPHY. 502 
 
 motion, though it may be difturbed by certain caufcs, which Sir Ifaac 
 pientions, never can ceafe altogether. 
 
 As to the origin of thefe tViTo motions ; the projedile motion, Sir 
 Ifaac fays, was impreffed upon the body at fome particular time, when 
 this our fyftem had a beginning. As to gravitation ; Sir Ifaac, in his 
 Principia, does not pretend to affign the caufe of it, as he tells us in 
 the conclufion of that work ; he only fays, negatively, that he does not 
 affirm it to be effential to matter ; but, as to the manner of its opera- 
 ting, it is evident that he underftood it to operate by impulfes incef- 
 fantly repeated : And in this way he accounts for its force increafmg 
 as the diftaiice from the center decreafes. There is, therefore, accor- 
 ding to Sir Ifaac, this difference betwixt the projedile impulfe and gra- 
 vitation, that the one is but fingle, and needs not be repeated, the 
 motion produced by it being one motion originally impreffed upon 
 body, and which continues for ever ; whereas the motion of gravita- 
 tion is continually accelerated by inceffant pulfations. 
 
 From this account of the Newtonian philofophy, which, I hope, 
 every reader will think -a fair and a candid one, it is evident that Sir 
 Ifaac has made a machine, as 1 have faid, of the heavens, having given 
 to the celeftial bodies a motion that is mechanical ; for 1 call nucha' 
 KiVfl/ every motion that goes on of itfelf, without the immediate and 
 dired application of the moving power, which, according to my phi- 
 lofophy, is Mind, operating either immediately, or by the interven- 
 tion of other bodies. When it operates in the laiter way, and when 
 the motion is communicated from body to body, that motion is com- 
 monly called mechanical ; but, when the body, once put in motion, 
 continues to be moved of itfelf, without the immediate 0| eraiion of 
 Mind, though it do not communicate its motion, I call th:it mt^tion 
 likewife mechnnicah to diftinguifh it from motion produced immedi- 
 ately by Mind *. 
 
 Of 
 
 * See what I have faid of the difTerence betwixt a machine and the moving Power,- 
 page 190- 
 
 The
 
 ^2 D I S S E R T A T I O N O N 
 
 Of this machine of the heavens, therefore, the two great motions, ac- 
 cording to Sir Ifaac, are, as 1 have faid, the proje^ile motion and gra- 
 vitation. But what are the moving powers which produce thefe mo- 
 tions ? And it is evident, from the principles laid down in the Prin- 
 cipia, as (hall be afterwards (hown, that Sir Ifaac fuppoles both to be 
 produced by bodily impulfe, with this difference, only, that the firfl is 
 produced by a fingle impulfe, the other by repeated impulies : '\nd this 
 is all we can learn of the moving power of this machine from the Princi- 
 pia, where he does not fo much as tell us of what kind the body is which 
 impells the planet, either in the line of projedionjor towards the cen- 
 ter. The machinery, therefore, of the heavens, as explained by him 
 an that work, is certainly very imperfect, as any account of a machine 
 
 mull: 
 
 The matter, I think, may be diftln£lly and fclentifically conceived In this way. 
 'When any body is movid, there muft neceffarily be a moving power, as nothing can 
 be produced without a caufe. This moving povi'er, according to my philofophy, is 
 Mind, of whofc nature and eflence it is to move, as much as it is of the nature and 
 cfTence of Boi'y to be moved. Now, Mind moves Body, either direclly and immedi- 
 ately, or it does not. If in the former wiiy, I fay the motion is not material cur 
 mechanical, but imm.'.terial, the mover being an immaterial power, and acting im« 
 mediately and directly : If in the other way, the motion is by the interven- 
 tion of other bodies, and is commonly communicated from Body to Body ; and 
 this motion I call material and mechanical. Of this kind are all the machines of 
 human conftruclion, becaufe all thofe machines are ultimately moved by Mind, ac- 
 cording to my philofophy, whatever name we may give to the moving power, calling 
 it Air, AVatcr, Fire, Weights, or Springs ; and of the fame kind are the machines 
 of Nature's workmanfhip, fuch as animal bodies, which are moved immediately by 
 mufclcs, fincws, and bones, but ultimately by Mind. To thefe two kinds of motion. 
 Sir Ifaac has been pUafed to add a third, which goes on, not cnly without the direct 
 and immediate agency of Mind, but without any agency at all of Mind, or of any 
 other power except the matter itfelf. This is Sir Ifaac's projectile motion of the pla- 
 nets. Whether there be any fuch thing in Nature as Body moved in this way, by its 
 own power, or by a vis ivfita^ as the Nev;tonians fpeak, I (hall afterwards inquire ; 
 but, in the mean time, fuppofing it to be fo moved, I call that motion likewife mate- 
 rial and mechanical \ for, though the motion be not communicated from Body to Body, 
 as in the cafe of machines commonly fo called, 1 do not know by what other name to 
 call it, in coatradiftiniflion to motion produced immediately and directly by Mind.
 
 THE NEWTONIAN PHILOSOPHY. ^03 
 
 niufl: fieeds be, which does not mention the moving power. This de-r 
 fe6l In his fyflem he has never fupplied with refpedt to the projedile 
 motion. His followers, indeed, fay, that the projedion of the planets 
 is the immediate operation of Deity ; but this Sir Ifaac has nowhere 
 faid ; though, I am perfuaded, he believed that the Deity was medi- 
 ately, or by the intervention of other bodies, the caufe- of the projec- 
 tile motion, as w^ell as of every other motion in the univerfe. And, 
 indeed, as he fays that both the projedile motion and gravitation are 
 produced by an impulfe, or impreired force, as he calls it, in the fame 
 manner as body is moved by body, it is impoffible it could be produ*. 
 ced immediately by Mind, as 1 fhail, in the fequel, demonflrate. I 
 fhall, however, in the prefent argument, fuppoie, with his followers, 
 that the projedile motion is the immediate operation of the Supreme, 
 Mind. But, even upon that fuppofition, it is flill true, that the fyfterrift 
 of the heavens is a machine, according to the definition above given of. 
 a machine, fince it goes on without the conftant and immediate agency, 
 of Mind. As to gravitation, he has, in the Queries fubjoined to his 
 Optics, endeavoured to account for it by a fubtile fluid, which moves 
 the bodies that gravitate towards each other. But this is an occult, 
 cauje^ if ever there was one ; for, in iht Jirji place, there is no evi- 
 dence that any fuch fluid exifts ; Tindi^fecondly^ if it did exiil, he has 
 not fhown how it could produce fuch wonderful effeds *. And, fur- 
 ther, I fay, that it is abfolutely inconceivable how a fluid, with which 
 'he fills the celeftial fpace, (hould be able to impel fuch vaft bodies, 
 and yet, at the fame time, not refift their motions, and fo, by degrees, 
 def^roy the projedile force : For what can impel can refifi, and what 
 
 can- 
 
 *"See what I have faid further upon this fubjed,. page 197. It is only this caufe af- 
 figned to gravitation, which can be called an occult CdUie, in the Newtonian philofo- 
 phy ; for thofe who fpcak 01 gravitation itfeif as an occult caufe, do not appear to me 
 to underftand what they fay ; for gravitation is the motion itfeif, which undoubtedly 
 has an exillence, at leaft, here on earth ; but the queflion is concerning the caufe of. 
 that motion.
 
 5^4 
 
 DISSERTATION ON 
 
 cannot refifl: cannot impell. But, befides this, it appears to me very 
 extraordinary, that a Theift, fuch as Sir Ifaac Newton certainly was, 
 {hould ever attempt to afcribe to mere matter, a motion fo regular and 
 orderly as gravitation, the force ot which increafes in a certain deter- 
 mined proportion to the time it continues, and the fpace it goes through. 
 I do not wonder, therefore, that this way of mendmg Sir Kaac't, phi- 
 lofophy is now generally, 1 believe I may fay univerlally, rejeded by 
 all his followers. And, indeed, if it could be admitted, it only puts 
 the difficulty a little farther off ; for, fince Body cannot move Body, 
 unlefs it be firft moved itfelf, What is it that moves this fluid ? 
 
 Setting afide, therefore, this caufe of gravitation, there remain only- 
 other four caufes which can be affigned for it. The Jirfi is, That it is 
 effential to matter. 2^0, It is produced by a vis imprejja^ or a force 
 originally imprefled upon the body, by which it ftill continues to be 
 moved in the fame manner as it is moved by the projedile force. 
 3//(?, It is produced by pulfations continually repeated, by which the 
 body is impelled with a force conftantly accumulating towards the 
 center. Or, InfAy^ It is the effed of the immediate and continual a- 
 gency of Mmd. If the fluid be out of the queftion, I think it is im- 
 poffible that any other caufe can be affigned for this motion. 
 
 As to the firft of thefe ; to maintain that matter can of itfelf, and 
 by its own nature and eflehce, move itfelf, and in a manner too fo or- 
 derly and regular, is, I think, -downright atheifm, of that fpecies 
 of it which was maintained by Strato the Peripatetic, and is called, 
 by Cudworih, the hylozo'ic *. To fay, as Mr Locke fays, that 
 God may have fuperadded to matter the power of thinking, or 
 of moving itfelf, is to fpeak like a man who does not know the 
 
 diftindion 
 
 * See what I have further faid upon this fpecies of Atheifm, page 240.
 
 THE NEWTONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 505 
 
 dillinftion betwixt Body and Mind ; for what elfe is Mind but that 
 which moves, and thinks, and operates, according to rule and meaibre ? 
 And he might have as well faid, that we ourfelves were nnhing elfe 
 but matter, with the power of thinking fuperadded to it, which is fo far 
 true, that, in us, a thinking fubftance is joined with a material fub- 
 flance in a moft wonderful, and to us incomprehenfible, manner. 
 But, 1 hope, none of my readers imagine that the fubftances are not 
 diftind, or that thought is not a quality entirely contradidory and re* 
 pugnant to the nature and eflence of matter *. 
 
 Neither will the vis imprejfa account for gravitation ; for it is im- 
 poflible to conceive that a torce but once imprefled, and not repeated, 
 ihould make a body not only continue in n-jotion, but with a torce 
 continually increafing, as the diftance from the body to which it gra- 
 vitates decreafes ; and this in a fixed determinate proportion. 
 
 The third way of accounting for gravitation is what Sir Ifaac has 
 chofen ; but, as I have faid, it is rather givmg an account how it ope- 
 rates, than afligning a caufe for it. I do not wonder, therefore, that 
 moft of the Newtonians are now difpofed to adopt the only other al- 
 ternative remaining, and to agree with Dr Clarke t» that gravitation 
 is produced by the immediate and conftant agency of Mind ; for, if 
 this motion be not produced by a fluid, or any other material caufe, it 
 muft of neceflity proceed from Mind. And this, I think, is a very 
 great corre6l:ion and improvement of Sir ifaac's fyftem ; for, as Mind 
 cannot be under any neceflity of ading by repeated i.vpulles, but 
 muft be fuppofed to ad conftantly and uniformly, his fyftem is f eed 
 from the incumbrance of thofe polygons of an infinite number of fides, 
 
 S 8 6 of 
 
 • See what I have further faid upon this lubjeft, p. ^78. 
 
 f See concerning Dr Clarke's philofophy, page 22 j. and 282.
 
 5o6 DISSERTATION ON 
 
 of v/hich he compofes the orbits of the planets. Thefe fides of pofjr- 
 gons always incrcafing in number, and diminifliing in magnitude, 
 become at laft evanefcent, as he exprelTes it, and undiftinguifhable 
 from the curve. Inftead of thefe, which only his hypothefis of gra- 
 vitation, ading by repeated impulfes, made neceflary, we muft fup- 
 pofe Mind to be always carrying the planet, with a fteady tendency, 
 towards its center, of fuch a force, that, if the planet were let loofe 
 from its orbit, it will go to the center with a force accelerating as 
 the fquares of the diftances inverfely. 
 
 But, how^ever great this improvement may be, I think it is evident, 
 that Sir Ifaac, when he wrote his Principia, had no idea of the celeftial 
 motions, or any part of them, being produced by the conftant agency 
 of Mind, as I fhall afterwards more clearly (how : But a farther cor- 
 redion, I think, will ftill be neceffary, in order to make Sir Ifaac's 
 philofophy ftand firm upon found metaphyfical principles. 
 
 And here I know I fhall be laughed at by thofe who underftand no 
 fcience higher than mathematics, which they are pleafed to call Philo- 
 fophy, and have only examined the lines, and figures, and calculations, 
 of Sir Ifaac's fyftem : But, if 1 have any readers that have accompa- 
 nied me thus far, I hope they, at leaft, will be convinced, that the prin- 
 ciples of all fcience are to be found in this firft fcience ; and that, if 
 the principles of any inferior fcience cannot bear a ftrid metaphyfical 
 examination, that fcience does not ftand upon a found foundation.— 
 But to proceed : 
 
 Even this amendment of Sir Ifaac's fyftem removes but one-half of 
 my objedion to it ; for ftill one part of ihe motion of the planets is 
 mechanical, I mean the projedile motion ; for, as I have faid, whatever 
 motion goes on of ilfelf, without the continual agency of Mind, is 
 
 me-
 
 THE NEWTONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 507 
 
 mechanical. Sir Ifaac's fyftem, therefore, halts clumfily enough be- 
 twixt Mind and Mechanifm ; fo that the antient fyftem which I de- 
 fend has, at leaft, the merit of being more fimple and uniform, 
 which afcribes the motion wholly to Mind ading indefinently upon 
 the planet. 
 
 I know very well that, in the age in which we live, the authority 
 of the antients goes for very little. We can now only defire ueniam 
 nntiqiiis^ non laudes et praemia ; and the fafhionable language among 
 our philofophers at prefent is, that the antients did very well, confi- 
 dering the times in which they lived ; but, had it been their happinefs 
 to have fallen into an age fo learned as ours, they would have done 
 much better. But there is a modern authority, which fhould difpofe 
 the candid reader to liften, without any violent prejudice to the argu- 
 ment, by which I will endeavour to prove, that the planets are not 
 moved mechanically in any part of their motion, but altogether by 
 the immediate and conftant agency of Mind. The authority I mean 
 is that of Dr Samuel Clarke, which I have already made ufc of, but 
 muft again have recourfe to it. And the reader will have the greater 
 regard to it, that he was not only one of the beft fcholars, and greateft 
 metaphyficians, in modern times, but was alfo very learned in Sir 
 Ifaac*s philofophy, and intimately conneded with him, having tran- 
 flated into Latin fome of his works ; fo that he cannot be fufpedcd of 
 any prejudice againft him or his philofophy. Now, the Dodor's o- 
 pinion is clear and exprefs, that all the great motions in the univerfe 
 are caufed by fome immaterial power continually exerting itfelf, and 
 not ading by any motion originally imprelTed upon the bodies ; (o 
 that, though he acknowledges the truth of Sir Ifaac's firft law of mo- 
 tion, that body, once put in motion, continues in that ftate till it be 
 (topped by fome external caufe ; yet he rejeds the notion of the ce- 
 leftial bodies continuing to move in confequence of any impulfe once 
 
 S f f 2 given
 
 5o8 DISSERTATION ON 
 
 given them without the conftant agency of Mind ; and therefore his 
 opinion mud be, that they are moved by Mind in the fame manner 
 that our bodies are. To this purpofe, I have quoted two paffages 
 from the Dodor, (page 235. and page 282.), and I (hall give a- 
 gain the words of the laft paflage, upon another part of this argu- 
 ment. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 THE NEWTONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 509 
 
 CHAP. IL 
 
 The ^eftton betwixt Sir Ifaac and the Antients Jlated — a ^leftion not 
 •within the Sphere of Mat hematics ^ but belon^rin^ to the F'lrjl Philofo^ 
 phy ; it relates to the Moving Poivers in the Uniuerfe — Thefe either 
 Mind or Body — Body moves Body only by ContaSl — therefore no fuch 
 Thin^ as iti ^flion in vacuo— 77?^ Manner in ivhieh Body moves 
 Body threefold — The Manner in vuhich Mind moves Body altogether 
 different — ivell dtjcnbed by Dr Clarke — The DiJlinSlion of the differ^ 
 gnt Kinds of Motion applied to the Solution of the ^leflion — According 
 to Sir Ifaac* s Hypothefis^ one Part of the Planetary Motion produced 
 hy Mind immediately ; other two Parts of it produced only mediately 
 by Mind — But all the Motions proved^ by Jundry Argw?ients, to be im- 
 mediately produced by Mind — Proje^ion and Gravitation fuch mere 
 Hypothefesj that fome Newtonians are difpojed to give them up ; but 
 they fay the Circular Motion has, hy its Nature y a Tendency both to atid 
 from the Center — Ihis Hypothefts examined in the next Chapter, 
 
 TH E queftion, then, betwixt Sir Ifaac and his friend Dr Clarke, 
 (not to mention the Antients,) is, Whether the ceieftial bo- 
 dies are not altogether movfd by the continual agency of Mind ; or 
 whether, at leaft, one half of the motion is not produced by a force 
 once impreffed upon them, but continuing perpetually ? I his is the 
 queftion fairly Hated, according to the amendment made upon Sir I- 
 faac*b fyftem,. by his later tollowers. 
 
 This is a qucRion that goes entirely out of the fnhcre of mathema- 
 tics into a philofophy, that Sir Ifaac does not appear to me ever to have 
 
 ftudied ;
 
 5IO DISSERTATION ON 
 
 ftudied ; the philofophy, I mean, is metaphyfics, and the philofophy 
 of Mind ; for, by mathematics, after having discovered, from obfer- 
 vation, certain phaenomena concerning the motion of bodies, we can 
 inveftigate theorems concerning the velocity and force with which 
 they are moved, the fpaces they pafs through, and their pofitions 
 with refpedt to one another. But the queflion here is concerning the 
 principle of motion in thefe bodies — "What is the moving power ? — 
 and in what manner that power operates fo as to produce the motion? 
 — 1 hefe are queftions, in which geometry, mechanics, or calculation, 
 can be of no ufe. Whether a genius like Sir Ifaac's, that excelled fo 
 much in lines and figures, could have made the fame proficiency in 
 the ftudy of Mind, and of the firft philofophy, is what I will not pre- 
 tend to determine ; but this, I think, I know very certainly, that, 
 however great Sir Ifaac^s genius was, even for metaphyfics, he could 
 not underftand it, without having ftudied it. And this, farther, I 
 think, I know alfo, with great certainty, that, let a man be e- 
 ver fo great a geometer, yet, if he be not learned in the firft philo- 
 fophy, he cannot underftand even the principles of his own fcience. 
 
 The firft thing to be confidered in this inquiry, is the moving 
 power. Every body that is moved, (and nothing but body can be 
 properly faid to be moved *), is moved either by fome other body, or 
 by Mind ; I mean by body immediately ; for, according to my philo- 
 fophy. Mind is ultimately the only moving power in the univerfe. 
 When body moves body, the body moving muft neceflarily be in con- 
 tadl, either mediately or immediately, with the body moved ; for I 
 hold, that fucli of the Newtonians, that fpeak of bodies at a diftance 
 attrading one another, fpeak without having an idea of what they 
 fay, unlefs they can ftiow that there is fome medium betwixt the bo- 
 dies, by v^'hich they can operate upon one another. An attraction, 
 
 . there- 
 
 * See this demonftrated, page 286.
 
 THE NEWTONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 511 
 
 therefore, in 'uacuoy betwixt the fun and the planets that move round 
 him, or betwixt the moon and our earth and feavS, is a non-entity ab- 
 folutely inconceivable. And, therefore, as the word attra^ion denotes 
 the one body operating upon the other, in the way of drawing it to 
 it, and indeed it can denote nothing elfe, it ought to be laid afide al- 
 together ; and, in place of it, the word gra'uitation, or the tendency of 
 the bodies to one another, which is the way that Sir Ifaac himfelf 
 has explained gravitation, Ihould be ufed *. 
 
 Body, therefore, can only move body by impulfe ; and this in two 
 ways ; either by the moving body propelling the other body; or by 
 drawing it to it, in the way that the weights in a balance weigh down 
 the fcale. The firft way is fubdivided into other two ; for, ei- 
 ther the body, propelling the other, continues in contad: with it, and 
 is carried along with it, and this way of body moving body may be 
 called trufton ; or the propelling body makes the other body change 
 its place, without following it, or continuing to be in contadl with it • 
 and this way of body moving body may be called piilfwn ; fo that 
 body moves body by draiving it to it, by trufton, or by pulfton. And 
 in thefe three ways only can body move body. 
 
 When Mind moves body immediately, and without the interven* 
 tion of other bodies, it does it, I apprehend, in a manner quite differ- 
 ent. What that manner is, we cannot pofitively fay ; but, negatively, 
 we can fay that it does not move it by impulfe, as body moves body ; 
 for we cannot conceive that an immaterial fubftancc, without folidity 
 or refiftence, can impel any body, becaufe it is only by its folidity 
 and refiftence that body can impell or be iirpelled ; fo that, what is 
 not body, that is, what has not parts continuous and cohering, can 
 neither a6t nor fuffer in that manner. Further, as body can operate 
 
 only 
 
 * See more upon this fubje£i, page 185. i8(5.
 
 512 DISSERTATION ON 
 
 only upon body by touch, whether in the way of propelling or at- 
 tradlng, we are taught, even by the philolophy of Epicurus, that no- 
 thing but body can touch or be touched. 
 
 * Tangere enim, et tangi, nifi corpus nulla poteft: res *.' 
 
 Negatively, therefore, we can fay, with great certainty, that 
 Mind does not move body, either by propelling it, or attracting 
 it, or touching it in any way. And, if we would know any 
 thing more poiitive about it, I think it may be fitly compared to the 
 power of gravitation, as it is very well defcribed by Or Clarke, in his 
 DiTcourfes upon the Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion, in 
 the following words : * That moft univerfal principle of gravitation, 
 
 * itfelf the fpring of almoH: all the great and regular inanimate mo- 
 ' tions in the world, anfwering (as 1 hinted in my former difcourfe) 
 ' not at all to the furface of bodies, 'by which alone they can ad: one 
 
 * upon another), but intirely to their folid contents, cannot poffibly be 
 
 * the refult of any motion originally imprefTed on matter, but mufl, 
 ' of neceflity, be caufed by fomething which penetrates the very folid 
 
 * fubdance of all bodies, and continually puts forth in them a force or 
 
 * power intirely different trom that by which matter ads on matter ; 
 
 * which is, by the way, an evident demonftration, not only of the 
 
 * worltl'b being made originally by a Supreme Intelligent Caufe, but, 
 
 * moreover, that it depends every moment on fome luperior being for 
 
 * the prefervation of its fran e ; and, that all the great motions in it 
 ' are caufed by fome immaterial power not having originally im- 
 
 * preffed a certain quantity of motion upon matter, but perpetually 
 
 * and adually exerting itfelf every moment, in every part of the 
 
 * world ; which preferving and governing poiver^ whether it be im- 
 ' mediately the power and adion of the fame Supreme Caufe that ere- 
 
 * ated the world, or of fome fubordinate inltruments appointed by him 
 
 * to dired and prefide refpedivcly over certain parts thereof, does, el- 
 
 * ther way, give us a very noble idea of Providence.' This account 
 
 of 
 
 * Lucret. lib. i. v. 305.
 
 THE NEWTONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 513 
 
 of the Dodor's gives a very good reafon why Mind cannot a£l upon 
 body in the fame manner that body does, namely, becaufe body adls 
 upon body by its furface; for it is only by the furface that body can 
 touch body ; and, as I have faid, it is only by conta»5t that body can ope- 
 rate; and he perfedly agrees with my notion, that Mind is the moving 
 principle of bodies that gravitate towards each other. But, if it were 
 impoffible for us to give any account at all how Mind moves body, we 
 ought not therefore to deny the fad, of which we have the cleareft e- 
 vidence that we can have of any thing — confcioufnefs : And, to pre- 
 tend that we can account for every thing that happens in Nature, is 
 neither more^ nor lefs than to pretend to know all the fecrets of the 
 Almighty; one of the greateft of which is that wonderful manner in 
 ^vhich he has joined together two things of natures fo very different 
 as Mind and Body, with fuch a clofe and intimate union. 
 
 I fhall only further obferve on this head, that, with refpecl to the 
 motion of Body by Mind, there appears to be a difference betwixt or- 
 ganized and unorganized body : For, upon organized body, it is evi- 
 dent that Mind operates by certain organs ; whereas, upon unor- 
 ganized body, it appears to operate more immediately, without the 
 intervention of any organs ; fo that, however extraordinary the afTer- 
 tion may feem, I hold it to be true, that the adion of Mind, in a 
 ftone falling, is more obvious, becaufe more immediate, than in the ac- 
 tions of our bodies. 
 
 Having thus laid down the diftindion betwixt the two motive 
 powers, and their different manners of ading, I proceed to apply this 
 diftin£tion to the quellion in hand. And, in the Jirjl place, 1 admit 
 that, when body is moved in a circle by body, the motion muff of ne- 
 ceflity be combined in the manner that Sir Ifaac fays the motion of 
 the planets is combined ; for I have no idea, nor do I believe that 
 any other man has, of any body moving another body otherwife than 
 
 Ttt in
 
 514 D I S S E R T A T I O N O N 
 
 in a ftraiglit line, whether it more it by propelling or attracting if; 
 So that, if Sir llaac were a materialirt, and believed that body was on- 
 ly moved by body, and, if I were of the fame opinion, we fliould bs 
 perfectly agreed, and I fliould admit that the planetary motion was 
 altogether mechanical. But Sir Ifaac was not a materialift ; for, lmo^ 
 He believed that all motion was originally from Mind, and that the 
 projedile impulfe, if not immediately ^ was mediately^ and by the inter- 
 vention of other bodies, from the Deity j though, even fuppofing it to 
 be, as his followers fay, immediately from Deity, flill the motion, as 
 1 have obferved, is mechanical, in fo far as it goes on without the con- 
 ftant agency of Mind. But, 2^0, it now feems admitted by the New- 
 tonians, that gravitation is produced by the conftant agency of Mind : 
 And fo far, therefore, the planetary motion is certainly not mechanical 
 
 Thus, it appears, that, as the Newtonian philofophy is now modelled, 
 all the motions of a planet are admitted to be, mediately, or immedi- 
 ately, produced by Mind. One of thefe motions, they fay, is the im- 
 mediate operation of Mind, viz. the motion of gravitation. The only 
 quellion, therefor^, is concerning that motion by which it g.oes on in 
 its orbit, whether it be in confequence of a projedile impulfe given it 
 in a ftraight line, or whether it be produced by the immediate agency 
 of Mind, like the other motion. The latter opinion is what I main- 
 tain ; and I fay, that the celeftial bodies are uniformly moved in all 
 their motions, and in every part of their motions, by the conftant a- 
 gency of Mind. 
 
 On the other hand, the Newtonians, admitting that one part, which 
 compofes the planet's motion in its orbit, viz. its gravitation, is produced 
 by the immediate and conftant agency of Mind, maintain, that the other 
 part of that motion is produced only mediately by Mind, that is, by 
 means of a projedile impulfe. And there is a third motion of the planet,. 
 TisL, its motion on its axis, which, they fay, alfo is produced by a pro- 
 jedile
 
 THE NEWTONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 513 
 
 jedile impulfe ; fo that the planet, being once fet a-fplnning, like a 
 top, continues to do fo, without any further agency of Mind ; whereas 
 I fay, that all the three motions are produced by the immediate and 
 never ceafing agency of Mind, and that its motion in its orbit is as 
 fimple and uncompounded as the line in which it is performed, or as a 
 motion in a ftraight line, with which, therefore, Ariftotle fitly com- 
 pares it *. 
 
 And, imOi I think It muft be admitted, that, as the manner of 
 Mind moving body is fo different from that of body moving body, 
 it is at leaft probable that the motion is begun and carried on in a 
 different manner. 
 
 2do-i If Mind be in this cafe the moving power, as Sir Ifaac ad- 
 mits, if not immediately, at leafl mediately, and Mind Intelligent, or 
 at leaft direded by Intelligence, it is impoffible to fuppofe but that 
 fuch a Mind would perform the motion in the moft natural and dire(5l 
 manner, without taking the circuit which Sir Ifaac fuppofes, of firft 
 projeding the body in a ftraight line, and then bending that line inta 
 a curve. If, indeed, the dodrine of the materiallfts were true, that 
 matter had, in itfelf, the power of moving itfelf, and that, therefore, 
 gravitation was an efTeniial property of matter, the projedile motion 
 was abfoluiely neceffary, in order to countera6t the material neceffity 
 by which the body was moved towards the center. But, fmce gravi- 
 taiion is no eflential quality of matter, there is no neceffity for the im- 
 pulfe in the ftraight Ime, nor, by confequence, for gravitation, but 
 both are entirely fuperfluous, unlefs it could be demonftrated, that 
 it was impoffible for body to be moved in a circle or ellipfis, even 
 by Mind, without the motion being in a ftraight line. But this, 
 
 Tt t 2 I 
 
 ♦ Ariftotle, De Cceh, cap. 2. where he fays, that the only two fimple motion} 
 are, the motion in a ftraight line, and tUut in a circle.
 
 5l6 DISSERTATION ON 
 
 I think, is hardly to be conceived, far lefs to be denionftrated ; for 
 to me, who am not learned in the fublime geometry, and in the doc- 
 trine of prime and ultimate ratios, it does not appear pofTible that any 
 part of the circular motion, not even the leaft part, can be in a ftraight 
 line ; and, therefore, I cannot conceive how the motion fhould be- 
 gin in a flraight line, which, however, is Sir Ifaac's fuppofition. 
 And I think it is very near as difficult to conceive how the fame 
 Mind fhould firft move the body towards the center, and then impell 
 it in a ftraight line from the center, though, if that were the cafe, there 
 would be no part of the orbit in a ftraight line. If, indeed, the motion 
 were produced by different powers, this, as I have faid, would be 
 neceflary. But it is hardly conceivable how one and the fame mo- 
 ving power fhould, in the fame motion, and at the very fame inftant, 
 aCt and counteraft itfelf. But further — Suppofing the poffibility were 
 admitted of IViind producing a circular motion in this indirect and 
 round about way, either by firft projeding it, or firft moving it to- 
 wards the center, I think it cannot be denied but that, at leaft, it is 
 pofTible that Mind may give a circular motion to body in the fimple 
 and dired manner, as we know, from certain experience, that our 
 Mind can move our Body in a circle, without beginning, either by a 
 motion in a ftraight line, or by a motion towards the center ; and, if 
 it be poffible to be done in that plain and fimple way, we muft pre- 
 fume that, as Supreme Intelligence prefides in the univerfe, it is 
 done in no other way. 
 
 But, pioy If it be true what I have laid down, fupported by the au- 
 thority of Dodor Clarke, that it is impoffible, by the nature of things, 
 that Mind can move body, as body moves body, that is, by impulfe, 
 there 16 an end of Sir llaac's fyftem, fo far as it is founded upon 
 the i-iojedile motion ; for that motion can be underftood to be no- 
 thiri; elfe but an impulfe by which the body is moved in a ftraight 
 line •, and fo, I believe, it is underftood by all the Newtonians. Now, 
 if it be true, that it is impoffible that Mind can adl upon body in the 
 
 way
 
 HE NEWTONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 517 
 
 way of Impulfe, there is an end, both of the proje<flile force and of gra- 
 vitation ; both ^A^hich would have been abfolutely neceffary, if the cir- 
 cular motion of the planets had been produced by bodily impulfe j for 
 it is, as I have faid, impoflible to conceive that body can move body o- 
 therwife than in a ftraight line ; but it is equally impoITible to conceive 
 that Mind can move body by impulfe ; and, therefore, if Mind be the 
 power that moves the planets, both projedion and gravitation are not 
 only unneceflary, but altogether inadmiffible, as repugnant to the idea 
 of Mind moving body, and ferving no other purpofe but to pro- 
 duce a motion, which not only may be produced without them, but 
 cannot be produced by themi where Mind is the agent. 
 
 I omit here what I have urged in the body of this work, that Sir 
 Ifaac's philofophy is not comprehenfive enough to take in all the fy- 
 ftems of Theifm, and that it excludes all the philofophers of anti- 
 quity who believed in God, but, at the fame time, believed that the 
 world was eternal ; for, upon that fuppofition, there could have been 
 no impulfe, or projectile force, which muft neceil'arily have been gi- 
 ven at fome particular time. 
 
 The facSl of the projedion of the planets, and the fuppofition of the 
 power of gravitation extending over the univerfe, at leaft over all our 
 folar fyftem, and of the motive powers of the planets being fo ftrangely 
 mixed, that one third part of their motions is produced by Mind, the 
 other two by mechanifm, are fuch mere hypothefes, and fo unfit to 
 be the principles of any fcience, that I find fome of the Newtonians, 
 with whom I have converfed, difpofed to give them up. But, fay rhey, 
 the circular or elliptical motion, however produced, whether by Mind 
 or bodily impulfe, is, of its nature, not fimple, but combined of a cen- 
 tripetal and a centrifugal force, which will anfwer all the purpofes of 
 Sir Ifaac Newton's aftronomy, and explain all the phaenomena of the 
 heavens in the manner he has done. 
 
 This
 
 S\S DISSERTATION ON 
 
 This Is a queftion that I do not think of great Importance, 
 as the point of the projedlle impulfe, and of the planets being 
 carried on by that impulfe, is given up, and it is admitted that 
 the bodies are moved, in all their feveral motions, by the imme- 
 diate and conHant agency of Mind. It was on account of that 
 principle aflumcd by the Newtonians, and which, I think, is a ftep 
 towards materialifm, that I have been led to make thefe obferva- 
 tions upon Sir Ifaac's philofophy. That nothing, however, may be 
 omitted, concerning the principles of a philofophy which is at prefent 
 fo generally prevalent, I will likewife examine this pofition, the more 
 efpecially that I have to defend here likewife the dodrine of my Ma- 
 ilers, the Antients, who have aflerted that the circular motion is as 
 fimple as the redilineal *. 
 
 * Sec Ariftode, D^ Coeh, cap. 2. ubi fupra. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 THE NEWTONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 519 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 Upon the Siippofition of the Circular Motion beings by its Nature^ combi^ 
 tied of a Centripetal and a Centrifugal Force ^ no Occafion for the Hypo^ 
 thefis of Projeilion and Gravitation — Noneed^ alfo, for the Fir ft Laiv 
 of Motion — That every Motion in an Orbit is fb combined, not a Self- 
 evident Propo/ition, — altogether improbable, as the Moving Power is 
 one fimple Poiver — Sundry Rea/ons given vuhy it is impofjibk it fjjould 
 befo — Sirlfaac has proved nothing to the contrary — AH his Def nit ions ^ 
 Laivs of Motion^ and Demonfl rations^ concerning it, relate only to Mo" 
 tion produced by bodily Impulfe — Th^ Circular Motion, though produced 
 by Mind, may be rcfolved into the combined circular Motion of vohich 
 Sir Ifaacfpeaks — This fufficient for the Purpofe of Sir Jfaac's Philofo- 
 phy. 
 
 AN D, in the/r/? place, I fliould be glad to know, if this dodrlne 
 be true, for what purpofe have the Newtonians fpoken fo much 
 about projedlon and gravitation, and 'founded their fcience upon hy- 
 pothefes, which appear now to be altogether unneceffary? 
 
 idly^ I defire alfo to know for what purpofe they have laid it down, 
 in their firfl law of motion, that a body, once put in motion, does per- 
 petually continue in motion till it be flopped by external impediment, 
 a law which appears to me to be laid down by Sir Ifaac for no other 
 purpofe than to account for the planetary motion, upon the hypothe- 
 cs of projedion, which is now given up ? 
 
 But,
 
 520 DISSERTATION ON 
 
 But, to come to the point : — I think it muft be admitted, that we 
 have, at lead, an idea of a circular movement, without any tendency 
 either to the center, or from it, and an idea derived from that great 
 fource, and, indeed, only fource of all our ideas concerning the opera- 
 tions of Mind, I mean confcioufnefs ; for we are fure, by our own ex- 
 perience, that, when our Mind moves our body to go round in a 
 circle, it performs that motion, w^ithout either centripetal or centri- 
 fugal inclination. It is true, that, when we perform the motion 
 quickly, and repeat it often, we have a tendency to go out of the cir- 
 cular line in the tangent ; and therefore we are obliged to incline our 
 bodies inwards towards the center. But there are two things to be 
 confidered ; firjl^ That Mind moves our body, not immediately, but 
 by the intervention of organs ; whereas, the planets being, as I obfer- 
 ved, unorganized bodies, are immediately moved by Mind. Secondly^ 
 By means of thofe organs, our bodies are moved in parts, one-half be- 
 fore the other ; whereas, we cannot conceive a fphere or fpheroid ta 
 be otherwife moved than altogether. To thefe confiderations, it may 
 be added, that the Mind which animates thofe celeflial bodies, we 
 ought to conceive as much more perfedt than our Minds, and, confe- 
 quently, that they can perform the circular motion much more regu- 
 larly than we can do ; and; in general, that all their movements are 
 infinitely more regular than ours. And, befides, we cannot conceive 
 that their Minds are {o much affected by their bodies, as ours are ; 
 for, otherwife, they would grow dizzy, and contrad a terrible vertigo^ 
 by going round always the fame way, and with fuch prodigious vdo- 
 city^ 
 
 It is certain, therefore, that we have an Tdea of fuch a motion, and 
 that, to fuppufe the exiftence of it, implies no contradidion or inconfi- 
 ftency. It cannot, therefore, be laid down, as a felf-evident proportion, 
 which fome are much inclined to do, that every motion in a circle or 
 ellipfis, however produced, is neceffarily combined of a centripetal and a 
 
 cea-
 
 THE NEWTONIAN PHILOSOPHY, 521 
 
 centrifugal force ; but it muft be proved ; and the ftrider proof will 
 be neccflary, that it appears to be contrary to common fenfe and ob- 
 fervation. 
 
 2.do, Even where a motion is produced by powers operating in dif- 
 ferent directions, it is perfedly fimple ; the motion I mean is that in 
 the diagonal of the parallellogram, of which the two fides are the lines 
 of the diredion of the two powers adding upon the body. But, in this 
 cafe, where there is but one power that produces the motion, and that 
 ading internally, and upon every particle of the body, not upon the 
 turface only, as Dr Clarke has well obferved, there is ftill lefs reafon 
 for fuppofing that the motion fhould not only be combined, but fo in- 
 tricately combined, as to confift of three feveral motions ; one, by 
 which the body moves forward in the circle ; another, by which it in- 
 clines to the center ; and a third, by which it tends to fly off in a tan- 
 gent ; and all thefe feveral tendencies ading upon the body at the fame 
 time, and in every inftant of its movement. Is it not much more na- 
 tural to fuppofe, that the motion is as fimple as the power that pro- 
 duces it, or as the line which it defcribes, and which, by its nature, 
 is as fimple, and as little compounded, as a flraight line ? 
 
 But, pioy To come clofer to the point, it is a principle of mctaphy- 
 fics, which cannot be difputed, that nothing can exifl without a caufe. 
 Now, where there is neither projedion nor gravitation, what is there 
 that can produce this double tendency in the body to and from the 
 center ? In the motion of projediles on earth, where all the three 
 tendencies above mentioned are undoubtedly combined, it is eafy to 
 account for each of them. It is the force imprefled by the impulfe of 
 body, which makes the body go forward in its courfe ; and it would 
 go forward in a flraight line, but for the power of gravitation, which 
 bends it from the flraight line towards the earth. And hence come 
 the two -other tendencies, the one centripetal, by which it iaclines 
 
 U u u down-
 
 522 DISSERTATION ON 
 
 downwards, the other centrifugal, by which it tends to go in a ftraight 
 line, according to the direftion in which it was at firft moved. But, 
 where there is no impulie or projedion, and no gravitation, but the 
 body is only moved forward in a curve, it is to me inconceivable how 
 it iliould have a tendency, either to the center, or from the center. 
 
 I have infifled the more upon this example of projediles on earth, 
 that it was from them, as is generally believed, that Sir Ifaac took the 
 firft idea of his fyfiem. And it is no doubt true, that the motion of 
 the celeftial bodies may be analyzed into the motions which compofe 
 the motion of thefe projediles ; but, becaufe the motion of the celes- 
 tial bodies could be fo refolved, Sir Ifaac from thence too haftily con- 
 cluded, that they were actually fo combined, without attending to this 
 eflential difference betwixt the two motions, that the one was produced 
 by bodily impuUe, the other immediately and diredly by Mind. Add 
 to this another mofl: material difference, that, in projediles on earth,, 
 there are two n.oving powers quite diftind from one another ; the 
 one, bodily impulfe, by which the body is projected ; the other. Mind, 
 or whatever other power operates by gravitation. Now, that thefe two 
 powers, fo diff'erent, and ading fo differently, as to counteract one an- 
 other, Ihould produce a motion combined of different tendencies, is 
 no wonder. But it is to me altogether inconceivable, how one and 
 the fame power, ading upon the fame body, fhould give it two ten- 
 dencies at the fame time, fo different as the centripetal and the centrif* 
 fugal. 
 
 4/0, That the different tendencies to and from the center of the ce- 
 leflial bodies moving in a circle or ellipfis, as well as of projediles 
 here on earth, are caufed by two different forces ading upon them; 
 and, that the centrifugal tendency is the effed of the projedile force, 
 and the centripetal of gravitation, is, I think, acknowledged by the 
 Newtonians, when they tell us> that, if the projedile force be great, 
 
 and
 
 THE NEWTONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 523 
 
 and the gravitation fmall, then v;ill tlie cuiviture of the circle be 
 ffnall, and nearer to the ftraight line. If, on the contrary,, the gravi- 
 tating force be great, and the projectile fmall, then will the curviture 
 of the orbit be greater, and recede farther from the tangent or ftraight 
 line ; for, fay they, efreds muft be proportional to their caufes * ; 
 which is plainly faying, that the projection is the caufe of the centri- 
 fugal tendency, and gravitation of the centripetal : So that, if there 
 were neither projection nor gravitation, there would be neither cen- 
 trifugal nor centripetal tendency. 
 
 5/0, Whether the motioa was from all eternity, or had a beginning 
 iu time, can make no difference as to the nature of the motion. Sup- 
 pofing, then, the motion never to have had a beginning, there could 
 have been no projection, and, if no projedion, no centrifugal ten- 
 dency ; as it has been fhown that this tendency is produced by 
 the projection, and is greater or lefs, in proportion to the projeCtilc 
 force : And, if there be no centrifugal tendency, there can be no cen- 
 tripetal ; it being impoffible to conceive that, in the circular motion, 
 there can be the one without the other. And this is another proof, 
 that, from the nature of the motion merely, there arifes neither of the 
 two tendencies. 
 
 btOj If it were admitted that, by tlie nature of the circular motion, 
 the body had a tendency to go to the right and to the left — to the 
 center and from it ; yet, even this admifhon would not ferve the 
 purpofe of Sir Ifaac ; for his mechanifm of the heavens requires, that 
 he fhould likewife prove, that, by the nature of the motion, the body 
 has fuch a tendency to go out of the circle on one fide, that, if it were 
 not reftrained, it would fly off in a tangent, and continue its motion 
 
 U u 2 in 
 
 * See Sir Ifaac*s Principia, vol. i. clef. 5. with the Commentaries of Thomas Lc 
 Seur, and Frances Jacquier,
 
 524 DISSERTATION ON 
 
 in that ftralght line forever : And, further, that it has fo violent a 
 tendency the other way, that it would be carried to the center by a 
 force which increafes, as the fquares of the diftances, inverfely ; for 
 all this muft neceflarily follow, if projection and gravitation are laid 
 afide, and the centripetal and centrifugal forces afcribed only to the 
 nature of the movement. 
 
 From thefe confiderations, it appears to me altogether unaccount- 
 able, how the circular or elliptical motion fhould be, by its naturer ne- 
 ceflarily combined, and not as fimple as the line in which it is mo- 
 ved. There are, however, fome of Sir Ifaac's followers, who pretend 
 that he has demonftrated, by lines and figures, and geometrical necef- 
 fity, that it is fo combined ; and, as I know that geometry has its pa- 
 radoxes, as well as other fciences, I was at firft difpofed to believe that 
 it might be fo ; but, upon looking into the Principiat I was convinced 
 that Sir Ifaac there only treats of one of the two kinds of motion 
 mentioned above, viz. of motion produced by the Impulfe of body up- 
 on body ; nor does he appear to me to have had any idea of the mo- 
 tion of body by Mind, at leafl:, of the manner of that motion. And, 
 accordingly, it is evident, both from his definitions, and from his 
 laws of motion, that he fuppofed the motion of the celeftial bo- 
 dies to be compofed of different motions in ftraight lines, that 
 being the only motion which can be produced by body ading 
 upon body *. Of this kind is the projedile motion of the pla- 
 ne ts> 
 
 * That Sir Ifaac, In his Pritjcipiay fpeaks only of this kind of motion, is evident, as 
 1 have faid, both from his definitions and his laws of motion; for, in his third defi- 
 nition, he lays it duwn, that theie is rcCflence in every body which changes its flate, 
 cither of reft or of motion. Now, this cannot be conceived, unlcfs it be impelled by 
 anothtr bocJy ; for it c.n refifl nothing that is not folid and extended like itfelf, and 
 vhich therefore rtfiflb a? much as it is refifled. And, accordingly, the Commentary 
 upon this definition plainly (uppofes that it applies only to the adlion of body upon 
 body; foi he fays, • Ettnim, nulla potefl tfle a6lio corporis in corpus, quin iudlatio 
 * quaedam, ut loquitur Clar. h'crvmnuSx in Phoroncmiaf fiat inter ccrpuo agens ct pa» 
 
 * tieus.
 
 THE NEWTONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 52-, 
 
 nets/which, though he had fuppofed to be the immediate operation of 
 Mind, as his followers do, yet, having no idea, fuch as his friend Dr 
 Clarke had, of the manner in which Mind moves body, he fuppofed it 
 to be by impulfe, in the way that body moves body : And of the 
 fame kind is his motion of gravitation ; and which, therefore, he en- 
 deavoured to account for by the impulfe of a fluid. 
 
 In order to fhow how, from thefe two r^dillneal motions, the circu- 
 lar motion may refult, he has made ufe of his dodrine of prime and 
 ultimate ratios ; and, by the means of (ides of polygons, evanefcent^ as 
 he calls them, that is, growing infinitely lefs and lefs, as they increafe 
 in number, he accounts for the circular motion b(^ing produced by 
 projection and gravitation, though both operating in ilraight lines *, 
 
 Now, 
 
 * tiens, dum alterum alterl refiftit ; alloqui corpus motum poflet, fine motus proprii 
 
 * detrimento, aliud quodcunque movere.' This, furely, cannot be underftood of 
 motion by Mind. And, in the 4th definition, where Sir Ifaac fpeaks of the 7'/V im- 
 preffui he fays it is * Diverfarum originum, ut ex i£lu, ex preffione, ex vi centripeta.' 
 Now, the iElus and the prejjio can certainly be underftood only of the aftion of body 
 upon body. And, as to the vis centripetal in the following definition he compares 
 it to that force by which a ftone in a fling is kept from flying oiF, and which is cer- 
 tainly, as he explains it, by the a6lion of the hand retaining the ftone, that would 
 otherwife fly off. Of this kind, he tells us, is the motion of the planets, which, by 
 the fame means, are drawn from the redlilineal motion, and obliged to revolve in 
 curve lines ; and he adds, ' et par eft ratio corporum omnium quae in gyrum aguu' 
 
 * tur.' And his laws of motion alfo relate to the fame kind of motion j particularly 
 his third Jaw, concerning aElion and re-adlion, which he cxprefl'es in the following 
 words : * A6lioni contrariam femper et aequalem efle rc-a£lionem, five corporum 
 
 * duorum afliones in fe niutiio fcmpcr efle acquales, et in partes contr.rias dirigi.' 
 Here the rule is exprefsly applied to two bodies a£ting upon one another ; and the ex- 
 plication he gives of the rule will only ap^^ly to fach a cafe: * Q^iicquid premit vcl 
 
 * trahit alterum, tantundem ab eo premitur vcl trahitur •, fi quis Japuiem digito pre- 
 
 * mit, premitur et hujus digitus a lapidc.' Ihis it is impoinble to apply to ths adion 
 of an incorporeal fubftance upon body. 
 
 * This do6lrine of prime and ultimate ratios belongs to what we call JJuxionSj and 
 the French call the geometry of the infinicmsnt petlts- I have been told that fome geo- 
 meters, and particularly the late Ur 8imfon ol Giafgow, had a great deal of doubt of 
 the dodrine of prime and ultimate ratios, and wrote foraething againft it, which, how" 
 
 ever.
 
 52d DISSERTATION ON 
 
 Now, if a circular motion can be produced in this vvavi any motion 
 of the fame kind, though not produced in the fame way, but refulting 
 ftom the operation of Mind, may be refolved or analy(ed in the fame 
 way ; juft as motion in a ftraight hne, though produced by one lingle 
 impulfe, and therefore perfe^lly fimple, may be refolved into two 
 forces adding in the diredion of the two fides of the parallelogrami 
 of which the ftraight line is the diagonal. And this Is a refolution 
 of the motion in a ftraight line, which Sir ifaac. has. ufed very much *. . 
 
 It, is, therefore, I think, true, what I have obferved eJfewhere t> 
 that this refolution or analyfis of the circular motion will ferve Sir 
 Ifaac's purpofe, without embarrafling his fyftem with hypothefes of 
 projection and gravitation, centripetal and centrifugal forces ; for, if 
 the motion can be refolved" into thefe two powers of projedion and 
 
 gra- 
 
 ever, was never publiflied. If there were any defe£l there, I doubt it would overturn 
 the whole theory of proje£lion and gravitation : But this I leave to the confuieration 
 of the geometers, and of thofc who are learned enough in fluxions, to underftand Mr 
 M'Laurin's defence of them. 
 
 * See thej^r/? propofition of fe£lion 2d, book ifl:,'^and the/^r;?;;^ propofition of the 
 fame fedtion. I have been told, that, from thefe two propofitions, it may^be inferred, 
 that the circular motion is, by its nature, combined : But, in the hrfl of thefe propofi- 
 tions, he only demonftrates, that a body, moved in a circle round an immoveable 
 centre, will, by radii drawn from the circumf rence to the center, defcribe jireas pro- 
 portionable to the times of the motion : AnAy in the fecond propofition, that, if a body 
 moved in any curve line, defcribe areas, formed by radii drawn towards any point, 
 proportionable to the times, the body is impelled by a centripetal force towards the. 
 fame point.. And it is evident that both the propofitions are demonftrated by the re- 
 folution of the circular motion into the motions of projedlion and gravitation : So that 
 the demonllrations plainly fuppofe, what indeed is the hypothefis of the whole book, 
 that all motion is primarily and originally in ftraight liaies, being produced by bodily 
 impulfe, which certainly can produce no other motion, unlefs when two fuch motions, 
 in a ftraight line, are combined in the manner Sir Ifaac fuppofes.' — In fiaort, throug{i 
 the whole Principia, he treats of no other motion but that which is produced by body 
 operating upon body : And his notions appear to me to have been fo grofs, and fo 
 little raifed above m?tter, that he had no idea of any moving power, except that aloue 
 which Is perceived by fcnfej I mean body, 
 t See page 237.
 
 THENEWTONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 527 
 
 gravitation, it is perfedly agreeable to the analogy and regularity of 
 nature, that It fhould follow the laws of the(e two powers, and, that 
 a circular motion, though produced by Mind, fhould have the fame 
 properties as a circular motion produced by bodily impulfe, in the 
 way that Sir Ifaac has defcribed it. And, in this way, that exad fimi- 
 larlty which Sir Ifaac has difcovered betwixt the motion of the planets 
 and of projediles on earth, and which, in my apprehenfion, is the 
 greateil difcovery that Sir liaac lias made, will be eafily accounted 
 for. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 528 DISSERTATION ON 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 The Foundation of the Mechanical Philofophy is Sir Ifaac Newton's Firjt 
 Laiv of Motion, fo far as it relates to the perpetual Motion of Bodies 
 oncefet in Motion — This Propofition ought to he flridly examined^ as it 
 is of dangerous confequence to the DoShine of Theijm — The ivhole 
 Laiv conftdered—Tivo Parts of it undoubtedly true— the third Party 
 concerning the continuance of Motion^ only diJputed~The meaning of 
 vis infita, in this Laiv^ oppofed to vis imprefla — This Laiv relates 
 onh to ?notion produced by Bodily Impulfe, therefore cannot affeSi ivhat 
 has been faid of the Motion of the Celeflial Bodies by Mind^compre^ 
 bends the circular Motion as ivell as the re5lilineal — The Advantage 
 that the Atheifl ivill make of the Conceffion that Matter can move it' 
 
 felf The Propofition^ if true, rnuft be either fe If evident or demon" 
 
 fr able— not Selfc'vident — can only be demonjlrated a priori — The ^e- 
 flion altogether metaphyfical^Refi and Motion confounded in this Laiv 
 of Motion— Strange Inaccuracy of Expreffion — The ^leflion is concern^ 
 ing the Effence of Matter^ and ivhether Motion be effential to Matter 
 — That it is not effential to Matter^ proved by Jeveral Arguments 
 — Hozv the Motion is continued^ after the Pulfion has ceafed^ ac^ 
 counted for ^Th at this Motion is not continued for ever, proved by fe^ 
 veral Reafons — Objedion anfivcred. 
 
 Think I have faid enough, In the preceding chapter, to fliow that 
 
 the hypothefis of proje<5lion and gravitation is not only unnecef- 
 
 fary, but impoiTible, upon the fuppofition of ihe celeftial bodies being 
 
 moved by Mind immediately and diredly ; but, as I am very defirous 
 
 to
 
 THE NEWTONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 529 
 
 to put an end altogether to this mechanical phllofophy, I will go a little 
 farther in this chapter, and will endeavour to {how the faiiity, as well 
 as the dangerous tendency of that part ofSirlfaac's firft law of motion, 
 which aflerts, that body, once put in motion, will continue to move u- 
 niformly in a ftraight line, unlefs it be flopped, or its motion changed 
 by fomething external. This law of motion Des Cartes firft laid 
 down, by which he has made a machine of the whole univerle ; and 
 it has been adopted by Sir ifaac, in order to make a machine of the 
 heavens, and a machine of a moft extraordinary kind, of which there 
 is no other example in art or nature ; for all other machines that we 
 know are moved by the conftant agency of the moving ^ ower ; 
 whereas, both Des Cartes and Sir Ifaac's machines continue to be 
 moved after the moving power has ceaied to a£t. 
 
 This is that original impreffed motion which Dr Clarke, in the paf- 
 fage I have quoted above, rejeds, in the great motions of the uni- 
 verfe. And it was the authority of fo great a fcholar and philoio- 
 pher that firft difpofed me to call in queftion this maxim, which I 
 before fubmitted to as an axiom that could not be difputed, not having 
 any propenfity to differ from opinions generally received, unlefs I fee 
 a very good reafon for it. And 1 was the lefs inclined to deny the 
 truth of the propofition altogether, that Dr Clarke, as I have obferved, 
 admits it, though he fays it does not apply to the motions of the cc- 
 leftial bodies. But, for the fame reafon, that it does not apply to 
 them, I am convinced, upon mature confideration, that it does not ap- 
 ply to any thing in nature, and is not only falfe, but tending, in its 
 confequences, towards abfolute materialifm, though, I am perfuaded, 
 that Sir Ifaac had no luch thing in view, whatever Des Cartes might 
 have had. 
 
 This whole law of motion, as enunciated by Sir Ifaac, is as follows : 
 ' All bodies perfevcre in their ftate, whether of reft or of motion, 
 
 X X X * uni-
 
 530 DISSERTATION ON 
 
 * uniformly In a ftralght line, iinlefs in fo far as, by fome force im- 
 
 * prefled upon them, they are obliged to change that ftate *.* As to 
 
 the 
 
 * It Is thus exprefled by Sir Ifaac in Latin : * Corpus omne perfeverat in ftatu fuo 
 
 * quiefcendi vel movendi uniformiter in directum, nifi quatenus a viribus impreflis 
 
 * cogitur flatum ilium mutare.' Cicero, I believe, would have faid, in flat ii quietus 
 vel motus ; for qiiiefco, in Latin, does not denote * /*</?,' but the adlion of one that is 
 going to reft ; and it anfwers to the Greek word *i^tftt^eft»t or 'tffrxfcxt, both which do 
 not denote refl, but motion of the kind I mentioned. See Ariftotle's Phyfics, lib. 6. 
 cap. 12. in initio, and his Commentator, Simplicius, page 235. where a man, not ac» 
 quainted with the propriety of the Greek language, will be furprifed to read, to 'io-tx- 
 ^4f»e» KiiHTXi, and TO Y;^iuovy c'jx. tvtfy^ireii 7i^ttit^i(riui. Again, fiatus movendi does not 
 fignify what Sir Ifaac means to denote by it, namely, the flate of a thing that is mo- 
 ved, is in motion, but the ftate of a thing that is moving-, or, to make it plainer 
 to thofe who are accuftomed to that impropriety of language, by which we confound 
 moving, and being moved, it is the action of moving fome other thing; for the Latin 
 gerund \s al<vays ufed in an a6live fenfe, when it is not joined with fome nounfubflan- 
 iive ; fo \.\\zx.J}atv.s movendi is the fame v;\x.\\Jiatus agendi, Jiatus cimnndi, flatus le- 
 gcndiy &c. Such criticifms as this, and fome others that 1 have made upon the lan- 
 guage of this philofophy, will, I know, appear frivolous to many j but accurate fpeak- 
 ing is infeparably conne<5led with accurate thinking; and there is fome reafon to fu« 
 fpe6l that thofe who, both in their Latin and Englifti, confound two things fo diiFerent 
 as moving, and being moved, have not perfedly diftinguifhed them in their thoughts, 
 but have fome confufed notion that what is moved alfo moves, that is, moves itfelf^ 
 
 The Greek fcholar will be pleafed to obferve how accurately the Greek language 
 diftinguiflies every thing concerning moving and being moved. In the active lineage, 
 there is t* x(»»u», to >i;v!j5-«y, to xtKtyr,KCi, to KtinTiKov j that IS, in Englifh, what moves, 01 
 is movinp — what did move •'what has 7noved, and flill continues to move, and -what is 
 capable tomove. Again, in \\\cfajjlve line, there is, to Kmevtuvov — to x«y«tfE> — to xuiHi. 
 fx.(ioi, r.nd to xnr.Tc* ; in Englifti, luhat is in moving, (an aukward circumlocution, by 
 which wc fupply the want of the prejcnt participle pajjlvc ) — vjhat ruas inoved — what 
 been moved, and flill continues to be moved — and what is capable of being moved, or, 
 in one word, moveable. No philofopher, I think, could have diftinguiflied better the 
 different clicumftances of the aclion and paffion cf this verb, than the common ufe of 
 the Greek language has done. But, as 1 have obfcrvcd ell -where, (See Origin and 
 Progrcfs of Language, vol. 2d.) the Greek language was not formed by the vulgar, 
 but was the work of philofophers, as well as grammarians, and is therefore a ftudy, 
 ici its own fake, not unvrorthy of a philofopher.
 
 THE NEWTONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 531 
 
 the firft part of this law, which fays that body at reft continues at reft 
 till it be moved by fome power different from itfelf ; or, in other 
 words, that body cannot move itfelf; it is a propofition that every phi- 
 lofopher, who is not a materialift, muft affent to. And it is equally 
 certain, that body, once put in motion, cannot, of itfelf, alter the di- 
 rection of that motion, nor make it either quicker or flower. The 
 only queftion, therefore, is, Whether a body, once put in motion, can, 
 of itfelf, and by its own natural power, continue the motion ? I fay, 
 
 * of itfelf, and by the power of its own nature ;* for that undoubtedly 
 is the meaning of Sir Ifaac's i>is inftta, which Sir Ifaac, in his third de- 
 finition, applies equally to that power by which a body at reft conti- 
 nues at reft, and that power by which, being in motion, it continues 
 in motion : And he makes it a general property of all matter ; for he 
 fays, * Materiae vis inftta eft potentia reftjlendi^ qua corpus unumquod- 
 
 * que^ quantum infe ejiy pctjeverat injlatu fuo vel quiefcendi vel mo- 
 
 * vendi uniformiter in dire6lum,^ Now, that all matter, by its own 
 nature and efl*ence, and by that perfed paffivity which all theifts 
 afcribe to it, and by which they eflentially diftinguifli it from Mind, 
 continues at reft when it is at reft, is evident ; and, by the fame 
 power and neceflity of its nature, according to Sir Ifaac, it continues 
 in motion when it is in motion. What makes Sir Ifaac's meaning ftill 
 further evident, is the diftinaion that he makes in this third defini- 
 tion, and in the following, betwixt the vis inftta and the vis impreJJa^ 
 by which laft he undoubtedly means an external force imprefled up- 
 on the body, in oppofition to that internal power eflential to its na- 
 ture, by which it continues either at reft or motion *. 
 
 It is to be remembered, that all Sir Ifaac*s definitions concerning 
 motion relate only to motion produced by the operation of body upon 
 
 X '^ 2 body. 
 
 * I obfervc that the vis infita is tranflated by Dr John Clarke, in what he has 
 written upon Sir Ifaac's principles of philofophy, inherent forte.
 
 CO. D I S S E R T A T I O H O N 
 
 body. This law, therefore, concerning the continuance of motion, is 
 to be underilood only of motion of that kind ; for, as to motion pro- 
 duced immediately and diredly by Mind, it is evident that Sir Ifaac 
 does not here fpeak of it, and 1 doubt whether he had any idea of it. 
 This motion, we know by the moll certain of all knowledge, viz. con- 
 fcioufnefs, continues no longer than the movmg power continues to 
 a*fl ; for it is in this wa,y that our minds move ourbodies. V/hat, there- 
 fore, I have faid, concerning the motion ot the celeftial bodies, upon 
 the fuppolition that it is produced by the immediate agency of Mind, 
 will hold good, even allowing this law ot Sir Ifaac's to be, true. 
 
 As this law, concerning the continuance of motion, is exprefled, 
 one iliould imagine that it related only to motion in a ftraight linCv 
 and not to motion in a circle; but we muft alfo remember that, ac- 
 cording to Sir Ifaac's philolophy, all motion, even the circular, begins 
 in a ftraight line ; and, therefore, if the motion in a ftraight be per- 
 petual, fo muft the circular ; and, accordingly Sir Ifaac, in his expla- 
 nation of this firft law of motion, tells us, that a wheel, whofe parts, 
 by cohering, perpetually retrad it from the redilineal motion, does 
 not ceale to roll, except in fo far as it is retarded by the air. His 
 words are, ' Trochusy cujus partes cohaerendo perpetuo retrahunt fefe a 
 ' motibus refiihneis, non Cdjfut rotari nift quatenus ab acre retardatur^ 
 And he adds, ' Majora autem flanetarum ei cometarum corpora mctus 
 ^ JuQS'i et pfogrejjivos et circuUircsy inj'patiis minus reftfientibus fa6los, 
 * confcrvant diutius.^ What he fays here concerning the motion of 
 the celeftial bodies, he exprefies much more ftrongly in his Scholium 
 Gcnerale, with which he concludes his Principia, and plainly tells us, 
 that the motion of thofe bodies is perpetual, according to the laws of 
 motion that he has laid down, that is, by the vis infita^ and the 
 imprejjed force of gravity : * Corpora orimia in ijiis fpatiis liberrime 
 
 mo*
 
 THE NEWTONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 533 
 
 ' mover iMent; et propterea planetac et comctae in orh'ihu, fpecis er 
 ^ pofttione datis^ Secundum leges fupra expofttas per pet uo. revolvi' 
 
 The queftion, therefore, is concerning the powers of matter, and {he 
 eternity of motion of every kind ; a queftion of the higheft importance 
 to the dodrine of theifin, and the religion of nature;. for, if it be granted 
 to the Atheiil that matter can, of itfelf, continue to move itfelf, and 
 forever too, it will be difficult to convince him that it could not, by its 
 own power, likewife begin to move itfelf; or, perhaps, he will main- 
 tain that this felf-motion of matter was from ail eternity, rejeclino* ilie 
 modern diftindion, exprefled in barbarous Latin, betwixt eterni- 
 ty a parte poji^ and a parte ante ; and he will, it is likelv, not a- 
 gree to the diftindion that Sir liaac makes betwixt the ^ols infja 
 and the "jIs iriiprejfa^ but will fay, if the body can, by its own native 
 power, go on in the redilineal line of projedion, it can alfo 
 go on in the centripetal line, by the fame power, without tho 
 agency of any thing extrinfic, or foreign to its nature — In fhort, he 
 will fay, that body, for the fame reafon that it can move itfelf uni- 
 formly, that is, with the fame degree of velocity, in a (Iraight line, 
 one way, can move itfelf every way, and do every thing which we fee 
 is done by motion in the univerfe. This queftion, ot fo great impor- 
 tance, is another queftion that cannot be determined by geometry or 
 mechanics ; nor will Sir \{A2Si\Juhlme geometry^ as it is called, avail 
 him in the decifion of this queftion, which is altogether metaphyfical, 
 belonging to the firft philofophy, whofe bufmefs it is to explain the 
 firft principles of things. 
 
 The firft queftion to be confidered is, Whether it be a felf-evident 
 propofition, or only a demonftrable one ; for, it it be true, it muft be 
 either the one or the other. Now, that it is an axiom, or felf-evident 
 propofition, I cannot admit ; for it is certamly not intuitively evident, 
 that a body can continue itfelt in motion, and that, being once fet a- 
 
 going.
 
 534 DISSERTATION ON 
 
 going by a momentary impulfe, it will go on forever in a certain di- 
 redion, and with the fame degree of velocity. And, indeed, if it were 
 an axiom, it would be very extraordinary, that no philofopher ever 
 thought of it before Des Cartes, w^ho firft devifed it, to fupport his 
 mechanical philofophy ; and for the fatne reafon it was adopted by 
 Sir Ifaac Newton. 
 
 If, therefore, it be not an axiom, and yet be true, it muft be 
 proved. This can be done only in two ways ; either a priori, that 
 is, from the na-ture of the thing, or a pojleriorh that is, from fadl and 
 experiment. Now, in this latter way, it is impoflibleit can be proved : 
 For, I wo, Powers and Faculties are latent things, which may be appre- 
 hended by intellect, but cannot be perceived by fenfe ; fo that it is im- 
 poflible, by any experiment or obfervation, to difcover by what power 
 a body is moved by itfelf, when the operation of another body upon it 
 has ceafed. And, zdo. Though the fad be true, that a body continues 
 in motion after the impulfe which put it in motion has ceafed, yet, 
 we find that all the motions fo produced, do languifli and decay by 
 degrees, and, at laft, flop altogether. This, I know, the Newtonians 
 impute to fome obftacle in the medium, which cannot be entirely re- 
 moved by any human art ; but they tell qs, that the rarer they can 
 make the medium, the longer will the motion continue ; and from 
 thence they conclude, that, if they could make a perfed vacuum, it 
 would continue for ever ; but this conclufion is far from being de- 
 monftrative ; for it fuppofes the very thing in queftion, namely, that 
 the motion is, by its nature, perpetual, and therefore can only be 
 put an end to by fomething external; whereas, I fay, that the motion 
 is not, by its nature, perpetual j and therefore may ceafe in two ways, 
 either by the refiftence of obftacles, or by decaying and perifhing 
 through time, as every other thing in this fublunary world does. 
 
 It feems, therefore, evident, that the propofition cannot be proved 
 apojl^riori'y and, if fo, it only remains to be confidered whether it dan 
 
 be
 
 THE NEEWTONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 535 
 
 be demonftrated a priori. Now, to determine this, we muft know the 
 nature and eflence of this thing we call matter ; for, knowing it, we 
 fhall know whether motion be efTential to matter or not ; and, if we 
 difcover it to be efTential, we fhall know, with great certainty, frft^ 
 that it moves itfelf, 2iud,Jecondly^ that the motion is eternal, and does 
 continue as long as the matter exifts ; whereas, on the contrary, if we 
 find that it is not efTential to matter, but adventitious, then we fhall 
 know, with equal certainty, that matter does not move itfelf, and that, 
 as it is moved by fomething of a nature foreign to it, there is no necef- 
 fity to fuppofe that the motion will be eternal. Now, this, as I have 
 faid, is certainly a metaphyfical queftion ; for matter, abftra(3:ed from 
 form^ and from Mind^ which gives it its form and qualities of every 
 kind, is altogether a metaphyfical entity. 
 
 Before I begin this inquiry, I cannot help obferving, that a man 
 who has fludied the antient philolbphy, will be furprifed to find two 
 things, of natures fo different as reft and motion, fo much confounded 
 as they are, in this law of motion ; for the pruiciple, both of reft and 
 motion, is made to be the fame, viz. the vis infita^ or vis inertias^ as it 
 is called, by which the body continues both at refl and in motion. 
 Now, it appears, that reft and motion are not only different in their 
 natures, but altogether oppofite ; for a body at reft does not change its 
 place, and neither aQ:s, nor is aded upon ; whereas, a body that 
 is moved, goes through fpace, and is certainly a6ted upon ; and, if fo, 
 there muft be fomething that atfts, and, if there be any thing in its 
 way, the body itfelf adts, by moving out of the v^ay the obftacle to its 
 motion. How, then, a ftatc of motion and reft can be compared to- 
 gether, and the fame principle applied to both, is what I cannot con- 
 ceive. I cannot, therefore, fuppofe, tliat, becaufe a body at reft conti- 
 nues at reft, till it be excited to motion by fomething external, there- 
 fore a body, in a ftatc fo different from that of motion, continues in 
 motion till it be ftopped by fomething external. A man, too, who is 
 
 ac-
 
 536 DISSERTATION ON 
 
 accuflomed to the accuracy and propriety of the language of antleat 
 philolbphy, will be furprifed to find that the principle of reli and niac- 
 tivity of body (hould be called by the name of 'uis, and denoted, 
 botli by the term vis inftta^ and the term vis incrtuie^ nomine 
 ftgnifcantiffifno^ as Sir Ifaac fays in his expUnat»on of his third defini- 
 tion ; and he will be more lurpriled ihll to find the fame term of vis 
 inertiae applied to the principle by which body continues in motion ; 
 and which, therefore, according to the. common ufe of words, fhould 
 be rather called vis mobilitatis. 
 
 But, allowing the Newtonians to fpeakas inaccurately as they pleafe, 
 though there be fome realon to think that inaccuracy of expreflioa 
 has led many of them to inaccuracy of thinking, let us come more 
 clofely to the queftion. — And, in the jirjl place, it muft be ad- 
 mitted, in point of fad, that a body here on earth, after it is once put 
 in motion by bodily impulfe, continues, at leaft, for fome time, in mo- 
 tion ; and, if this motion be efTential to matter, it is no doubt true, as 
 I have faid, that body moves itielf, and that the motion muft continue 
 forever, or, at leaft, as long as the body exifts. The queftion, there- 
 fore, is concerning the nature and eflence of matter, or body, which, 
 in this inquiry, I confider as the fame thing ; and fo I fee it is confi- 
 dcrcd by 8ir Ifaac, who ufes the word materia and corpus incJifterentiy. 
 Now, though it be impoflible to fay what is the fubftance or efllnce 
 of matter, fince, as I have had occafion, more than once, to oblerve, 
 we know not, in this ftate of our exiftence, the eflence of any one na- 
 tural thing, there is an eflential quality of matter, which we know, 
 fo eflential, that, according to the philofophy of antiquity, it is pre- 
 vious to all its other qualities ; the quality I mean is pajfivity and 
 perfe^ ina^ivitj, which makes [it a fit fubjedt to receive all forms, 
 qualities, and properties, of every kind ; and therefore is held by 
 thofe philofophers to be, in the order of nature, prior to them all, 
 even to fuch as we reckon moft efl^ential to matter, luch as iolidity, 
 
 im-
 
 THE NEWTONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 537 
 
 impenetrability, and even extenfion *. The efTence of Mind, on 
 the other hand, they faid, confifted in aHivity : And therefore body- 
 is primarily and originally moved by Mind : But it is alfo,at fecond 
 hand, moved by body ; and this in two different ways, as 1 have ob- 
 ferved, either by trufion or by pulfion. 
 
 In one or other of thefe ways body is moved, according to the doc- 
 trine of antient philofophy. When Mind is immediately and diredly 
 the caufe of the motion, it is evident that this caufe muft adt conliantly 
 and inceflantly .while the motion continues ; and I will venture to fay, 
 that we have no idea of Mind moving body otherwife : And when it 
 is moved by trufion, or the preffure of another body upon it, the 
 caufe, in the fame manner, operates conftantly and inceflantly, while 
 the motion continues. But, what Ihall we fay of motion by puiiion, 
 or i^Uy as Sir Ifaac exprefles it t ? How is it continued after the pul- 
 fion that produced it has ceafed ? To fay that the pulfion is the 
 caufe of it, is an anfwer that may pafs with a vulgar man ; but it will 
 not fatisfy a philofopher, who will fay that pulfion was indeed the 
 caufe of the beginning of the motion, but never can be the caufe of 
 its continuance ; for nothing that has ceafed to exift can be the caufe 
 of any thing prefent ; fo that, to fay that the pulfion is ftill the caufe 
 of the motion, is to fay, in effed, that the motion is without any 
 caufe. And, indeed, to fay that an efficient caufe, fiich as pulfion is 
 of motion, produces any effed, without operating, or, what is the fame 
 thing, after it has ceafed to operate, is to fpeak without ideas. And the 
 fame holds with refped to other efficient caufes. Thus, an artift is the 
 efficient caufe of the work he produces ; but, after his operation has 
 ceafed, he is not the caufe of the continuance of that work, nor of any 
 
 Y y y move- 
 
 • See what I have faid upon this fubjeO under the difference beturixt matter and 
 body, chap. r. book 2. p. 53. and chap. 2. p. 6j. 
 
 + Definit. 4. lib. i.
 
 538 DISSERTATION ON 
 
 movements it may make. And, in natural fabllances, the feed is the 
 firft caufe of the motions by which a' plant is produced ; but it is by 
 other principles of motion that the plant grows, is nourifhed, and fub- 
 fifts; And in animals, the parent is the efficient caufe of the offspring, 
 but only as the origin of the motion by which it is produced, not as 
 the caufe of the after motions of the animal, by which it continues to 
 exift. 
 
 It is alfo commonly faid, that the motion is communicated by the 
 body that gives the impulfe to the other body ; and that it is by this 
 communicated motion that the other body is moved: But this, when 
 attentively confidered, is faying no more than that the body impelled 
 is moved by the other body, and with a velocity in proportion to the 
 impelling force, which therefore is faid to be communicated to it in a 
 certain decree. 
 
 It remains, therefore, only to confider the hypothefis, that the body, 
 after the impulfe has ceafed, continues to be moved by a certain 
 power, which is of the nature and eflence of matter, and is therefore 
 called by Sir Ifaac a vis in/it a, or inherent force. This, as I have ob- 
 ferved, is a notion very dangerous to the dodrine of Theifm, and 
 therefore ought to be very carefully examined. 
 
 And, in xhtfrji place, I afk, If there be a principle of motion eflen- 
 tial to matter, why does not that principle move the body, while it is 
 at reft, as well as continue its motion after it is once moved I 
 
 Secnndo, I afk, Why do not the Newtonians account alfo for 
 gravitation by this principle of felf-motion ? Why fliould it be 
 confined only to projedion ? And, indeed, it appears to me, that 
 no other reafon needs be given for all the motions of the univcrfe. 
 Although thcfe motions be different, in difFeren< bodies, and different 
 
 in
 
 THE NEWTONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 539 
 
 in the fame body at difFerent times, yet, if we allow body to move 
 itfelf, we may allow it to move different ways, and with different degrees 
 of velocity. 
 
 But, pio^ Whoever fays that body moves itfelf, confounds all di- 
 ftindlion betwixt body and Mind ; and, in effedl, fays, that there is 
 neither one nor other, but fome indefinable thing, which can have 
 no exiflence. When a thing is moved, there mufl be neceffarily 
 fomething that moves. If, therefore, body, after the pulfion has cea- 
 fed, is, of itfelf, and by its own nature and efTence, moved, there 
 mufl be fomething in it which moves it. Whatever moves, adts ; for, 
 to move, is to ad. There muft, therefore, be in the body a principle 
 of adivity j and, as the motion is of the nature and effence of the 
 body, this principle of adivity muft be effential to it. But body is, 
 by its nature and effence, entirely paffive and inadive : This the 
 Newtonians allow, and exprefs it 7iomine fign'ijicantijfimo^ as Sir Ifaac 
 fays, calling it 'vis inertiae : And fo body is both effentially a^ive, 
 and effentially maflive ; which is impofGble. 
 
 But, what then is it that moves the body after the pulfion has cea- 
 fed ? And I fay it is that principle of motion which Ariftotle fays is 
 in all phyfical bodies, and which I call Mind, This principle, we 
 know, moves bodies various ways, fometimes up, fometimes down, 
 fometimes to the right, and fometimes to the left ; and the fame body 
 is moved in difFerent dircdlions, at different times, according to the po- 
 fition of the objedt toward which it is moved. Further—the principle is 
 Jatent in bodies, and does not exert itfelf, except upon particular oc- 
 cafions. Thus, the principle of motion in iron, by which it is moved 
 towards the magnet, does not exert itfelf but when the magnet is near ; 
 and then it ads in all diredions. And the fame is the cafe of the 
 chemical attradions j for the particles of filver do not feparate them- 
 
 Y y y 2 felvei
 
 ^40 DISSERTATION ON 
 
 /elves from the mafs, and unite themfelves with the aquafortis, except 
 when they are very near or in conta(5t with it. 
 
 The only thing further that remains to be oonfidered, is, whether 
 this motion, after the puUion has ceafed, does, by its nature, continue 
 for ever, if it be not flopped by the refiftence of the medium ? or, 
 whether it continues only for fome time, greater or lefs, as the im- 
 pulfe is more or lels violent. It cannot be proved, as I have obferved, 
 by any experiment, to be perpetual ; fo that, if it can be proved at all, 
 it mud be by arguments a prioriy or from the nature of the thing ; 
 but uiefe arguments appear to me to prove the contrary. 
 
 It is a principle in metaphyfics and theology, that all the works of 
 God are like their great Author, eternal, in oneway or another; for, 
 fays Ariflotle, every thing participates of eternity and divinity, as far 
 as its nature will admit *. Some animals of the higher order, fuch as 
 we conceive angels and archangels, are no doubt eternal in the indivi- 
 duals. Other animals, fuch as men, and all the animals of this earth, 
 are eternal only by generation and fucceffion ; fo that they continue 
 the fame fpecificaUy^ if not numerically f. Inanimate bodies, again, 
 are diifolved, and appear in different forms and concretions. On 
 the other hand, the works of mortal creatures are, like themj mortaL 
 
 debemur morti 
 
 Nos noflraque. 
 
 How, then, can wc imagine, that the punieft infed flioukl be able to 
 produce a motion which is, by its nature, eternal ? This is an effed 
 no ways adequate to the caufe ; and, as there can be nothing without 
 
 & 
 
 ♦ De Jnima, lib. 2. cap. 4* 
 
 •\ A^ii^u fiii euj^ '»5 «5'« >'« '». Arift. ibid*
 
 THE NEWTONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 541 
 
 a caiife, when any caufe is made to operate beyond its power or efR- 
 cacy, the thing fuppofed to be produced muft be without a caufe. 
 
 2do^ It is admitted that, in this cafe, the motion is retarded, and, at 
 laft, ceafes altogether, by the refiftence of the medium. It is therefore 
 confeffed not to be, in every'refped, eternal ; and, if it is put an end 
 to in one way, why not in another ? why not in the way that all 
 mortal things end, by gradual decay, and, at laft, death ? The a£livc 
 principle, therefore, which moves body for fome time, grows weaker 
 and weaker by degrees, like the animal life when it draws to an end, 
 and, at laft, like it, ceafes altogether ; for we are not to underftand, 
 as the Newtonians do, in arguing upon this fubjedl, that the body 
 flops itfelf : This, indeed, would be giving adivity to body. But I 
 fay that the adive principle which is in the body, and is quite dif- 
 tin<5t from the body, ceafes to exert itfelf. 
 
 2,tio^ In a queftion of this kind, which cannot be determined by ex- 
 perimeni, even thofe philofophers who would confine all our know- 
 ledge of nature to fads and experinients, muft, 1 think, allow that the 
 argument from final caufes deferves fome attention. Now, it is abfo- 
 lutely necefTary for carrying on the bufinefs of nature here below, that 
 there fhould be motion by bodily impulfe, in the way of pulfion as. 
 well as of trufion ; but there can be no reafon given why this motion 
 fhould be eternal ; and, therefore, as Nature does nothing in vain, 
 we cannot fuppofe it to be eternal. 
 
 Lajlly^ Nature, according to Ariftotle, is a principle of reft, as well 
 as of motion : And, accordingly, we fee that bodies have determinate 
 motions to certain places, and for certain ends, which when they have 
 attained, they ceafe to be moved. Thus, heavy bodies are moved to- 
 wards the center of our earth ; and, if they were to arrive at that cen- 
 ter,
 
 54^ DISSERTATION ON 
 
 ter, we muft fuppofe that they would reft there *. In the fame manner. 
 iron is moved towards the magnet ; and, when it is there, it refts. In 
 like manner, the particles of metals, when they are diffolved in a men- 
 ftruum, are moved towards the menftruum, and, when they are in- 
 corporated with it, they are at reft. But a motion, in empty fpace, 
 going on in itifnitum, without any determination or purpofe, is a thing 
 altogether anomalous, and fo much out of the ordinary courfe of na- 
 ture, that it never can be fuppofed, but muft be proved by the moft 
 convincing arguments. 
 
 But it will be faid, if the motion be not eternal, it muft laft fomc 
 determinate time. Now, what is that determinate time ? My anfwer 
 is. That, in all we know of nature, bodies are always retarded, more 
 or lefs, by the refiftence of the medium through which they pafs. We 
 are unable, therefore, by any experiment we can make, to determine 
 how long a body will contmue its motion zn -vacuo ; but, as we know 
 with great certainty, that there is nothing in nature but what is go- 
 verned by rule and meafure, ratio and proportion, we are fure that the 
 motion of bodirs m vaaw. (if there be fuch a thing as a vacuum) 
 muft be, fome way or other, determinate : And we might go a little 
 farther, and fay, without hazard of error, that the duration of the 
 
 motion 
 
 * I know the Newtonians maintain, that the body, when it arrives at the center of 
 the earth, would not reft there, but would pafs the center, and fwing backward and 
 forward, w.th an ofcillatory motion: Bat they proceed, upon the fuppofition imo 
 Thatgr.v.tat.on is produced by pulfation; and, 2do, That motion, fo produced con' 
 tmues forever : Whereas, I, fuppoHng that gravitation is produced immediately and 
 d.reaiy by the grand agent in nature-.>//«^, and not believing that there is any fuch 
 thmg m nature as body continuing to be moved perpetually by material neceffitv c.n 
 not conceive how body (hould be carried by Mind beyond the place of its deftination" 
 I therefore hold, th.t a body, when it arrives at the center of the earth, refts as iron 
 does when u comes to the loadflcne. As to the motion of a pendulum here on earth 
 It .3 plamlycon^pounded of different forces, acting in differem direcl.ons, viz bod,lv 
 rmpulfe and gravitation : Whereas, the n,otion of a body towards the center of the 
 earth zs perfectly fimple , fo that there can be no argument drawn from the ouc to the 
 other. ^ ""^
 
 THE^NEWTONIAN PHILOSOPHY. ^43 
 
 motion will depend upon the force of the Impulfe : So that, with re- 
 fpedt to two bodies that are moved in vacuo^ the continuance of the 
 motion of the one will be to the continuance of the motion of the o- 
 ther, caeteris paribus^ as the force of the impulfe by which the one is 
 moved is to the force of the impulfe by which the other is moved. 
 
 Thus, it appears, that the continuance in motion, of bodies, moved 
 by pulfion, may be accounted for, without having recourfe to the 
 atheiftical fyftem of matter moving itfelf, and without y^/^m«^ hy^ 
 pothefes *, but according to the general analogy of nature ; for, 
 if the principle of motion, in the iron^ (not to mention the other in- 
 ftances I have given), be excited, and put in exertion, though before 
 latent, by the loadftone being preiented to it, Why (hould not the 
 principle of motion be excited in any body by pulfion ? And there 
 is only this difference betwixt the two cafes, that we cannot fo eafily 
 give a reafon for the phaenomenon of the iron being put in motion 
 by the loadftone, as we can do for the other ; for, as to the other, if 
 the one body, ftriking againft the other, were only to produce a mo- 
 tion as momentary as the impulfe which caufes it, neither the bufi- 
 nefs of nature, nor of art here below, could be carried on. 
 
 And here we may obferve, both in the iron attracted by the mag- 
 net, and the body impelled continuing in motion, that the principle 
 of motion, in each of them, by which they tend towards the center of 
 the earth, operates conftantly and incelTantly ; whereas, the principle 
 by which the one is moved towards the iron, 'and the other continues 
 to be moved, after the pulfion Is ceafed, operates only occafionally. 
 And from hence, I think, wc may infer, that neither of them adls 
 eternally. But, as the one ceafes to a<5l when the iron is united to 
 the loadftone, fo the other ceafes to a£l when the body has gone far 
 enough to anfwer the purpofes of nature. 
 
 CHAP' 
 
 • * Hypothfes nonJingOf fays Newton, in his Scholium Gencrak.
 
 544 DISSERTATION ON 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Sir Ifaacfuppofesy in his Friiicipia^ that the Firjl Mover is a Material 
 Caufe ; that therefore nothing moves but ivhut is moved — This the 0- 
 pinion qfjome antient Philojophers that are refuted by Arijlotle — Sir 
 Ifaac an excellent Mathematician and Scientijical Mechanic — but not 
 learned in the Firjl Philofophy — This appears from the Inconfijlency of 
 his Opinions concerning the Origin of Motion — Difference betiveen his 
 Philofophy on this SuLjccl in his Principia and his Queries — Even 
 in his ^teriesy his Philofophy not conjifient nvith itfelf- — Apology for 
 his Mechi^nical Philofophy — His ivhole Syflem founded upon the Ana- 
 logy bet'U'ixt the Motion of ProjeSliles here on Ear t hi and that of the 
 Celtfial Bodies — But the Conclufton too hajly^ that they are produced 
 in the fame Manner — The Rea/oning of the Newtonians, that the fame 
 Effe^ls mufl be produced by the fame Caufes, mifapplied — Sir Ifaac* s Phi^ 
 lofophy^ as it ft and s, founded upon four Hypothefes^None of thefe ne^ 
 ceffary — Therefore they ferve 7io Purpofe but to incumber his Syftem— 
 The Hutch fonian Philofophy alfo Mechanical — Prejudices in favour 
 of the Mechanical Philofophy not eafily to be furmounted—They take 
 their Rife from the Experinuntal Philofophy. 
 
 BU T, fuppofing this doctrine, of the continuance of motion 
 by a power effential to matter, not to be fo dangerous to the re- 
 ligion of nature as I would make it appear — and fuppofing it could be 
 admitted as a probable hypothefis, which is all, I think, that a reafon- 
 able Newtonian can dtfire, what fhall we fay of a fyftem of natural 
 philofophy, in which there is no mention of any moving power, ex- 
 cept body. Sir Ifaac, indeed, in his Scholium Generale, profefles his 
 
 belief
 
 THE NEWTONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 545 
 
 belief (and I am perfuaded very fincerely) in the exiftence of an Im- 
 material being, the author of the univerfe : But, when we look into 
 the fyftem to which the Scholium is annexed, we find that, however 
 pure his theology may be, his phyftology is altogether material and 
 mechanical ; for there is not a word of Mind from the beginning of 
 the Principia to the end of it. He has fald nothing, as I have obfer- 
 ved, in his Principia, of the caufe of gravitation ; but it is evident, 
 from the account he gives of the manner of its operating, that he fup- 
 pofes it to be produced by bodily impulfe conftantly repeated : As to 
 the projedile force, whatever his followers may fay, it is evident, from 
 the name he gives it, of i;ij imprejj'a^ that he fuppofed it to be a force 
 external ading..upon the furface of the body, not internally, and up- 
 on every particle of the body, in the manner that Dr Clarke fup- 
 pofes Mind to move body. The projedile force, therefore, is the 
 operation of body upon body : And, accordingly, the continuance 
 of the projedile motion, after the impulfe which produced it has 
 ceafed, is grounded upon Sir Ifaac's firft law of motion, which is 
 derived from the obfervation of the effedt of the Impulfe of body 
 upon body here on earth. All the great motions, therefore, in the 
 univerfe are produced, according to Sir Ifaac, by bodily impulfe. 
 And even animal motion, and fenfation, are produced, he fays, in 
 the fame manner : For, if matter be the caufe of them, though fo 
 fubtile, as to be called, by Sir Ifaac, fpirit^ they muft be produced 
 by impulfe likewife j fmce matter, as 1 have fhown, cannot other- 
 wife a6t upon matter. And, even In his lafl: thoughts upon the fub- 
 je<3:, 1 mean the Queries fubjolned to his Optics, he does not fpeak 
 of Mind as producing any motion, though he mentions an adive 
 principle in matter, to which he there afcrlbes all the motions In 
 the univerfe. It is, therefore, evident to me, that Sir Ifaac had no 
 conception how .motion could be produced othcrwife than by impulfe, 
 that is, by body moving body, and therefore proceeded upon the no- 
 tion that the celeftial bodies were moved by other bodies, which con- 
 fequently muft themfelves have been moved. His example fhows 
 how neceffary it is that thofe who carry their fpeculations be- 
 
 ^ z z yond
 
 546 DISSERTATIONON 
 
 yond body, and Inquire concerning the principle of motion, fliould 
 be learned in that firfl: philofophy, which teaches that an im- 
 material caufe is the author of all motion in the univerfe, but 
 itfclf immoveable. Thefe are the very words of Ariftotle, and the 
 fum of his whole philofophy *. But this fublime philofophy, Sir Ifaac 
 appears to me to have known nothing of, and not even to have made 
 accurately the diftindion which is the foundation of that philofophy, 
 but which is confounded in our common way of fpeaking in Englifli, 
 viz. betwixt what moves and is moved, and to have fuppofed, that 
 whatever moves, is alfo itfelf moved f. 
 
 By what I have here faid, I hope it will not be underftood that I 
 •mean to difparage Sir Ifaac, and his works ; on the contrary, I have 
 the higheft opinion of him as a mathematician and a fcientifical me- 
 chanic. But. 1 would not have his followers call his Principia a fyftem 
 of philofophy, but of aftronomy ; for, it appears to me, that, as far as he 
 has ventured into philofophy, and inquired into the principle of mo- 
 tion, fo far he has gone beyond his depth, and has been led to advance 
 proportions, which, I think, dangerous to the genuine fyftem of 
 Theifm, though, I am perfuaded, without intending it. That Sir Ifaac 
 was not learned in the firft philofophy, which takes in the whole uni- 
 verfe, and inquires into the principles of which it is conftituted, and, 
 particularly, the principle of motion by which the whole frame of the 
 
 uni- 
 
 * His whole theology is comprehended in thefe few words, t» ^rgwro x-itoui «x(»ijt«k. 
 See his Metaphyfics, and the lad book of his Phyfics. From this it is evident, that he 
 had no idea of the firft principle moving body by impulfe ; for, what fo moves, muft 
 not only be capable of being moved, and therefore not toctvmtt^ but it muft be aHu- 
 
 ally itfelf moved 
 
 f This was tlie opinion, as Ariftotle tells us, lib. i. Dt Jnima, cap. 2. of fome 
 antient philofophers, (fee the pafTage quoted in a note upon page 229.) — a grofs ma- 
 terial jiotion, (which Ariftotle has fully refuted in the next chapter of the fame book, 
 De Atjtnia), proceeding, I fuppofe, as Sir Ifaac's noton did, from obferving that body 
 moved boily only in that way : And, therefore, having no idea but of one moving 
 power, viz. body, snd of that kind of motion which is produced by body acling upon 
 body, (and indeed no other motion falls under the cbfervation of fer>fe), they imagi- 
 ned that whatever moted was itfclf moved.
 
 THE NEWTONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 547 
 
 unlverfe is fuftained and preferved, and the bufinefs of nature carried 
 on, is, I think, evident, from the vacillancy and inconfiftency of his 
 opinions upon this fubjedt. 
 
 In his Principia, he fays nothing at all of the caufe of the attradlion 
 or gravitation of the celeftial bodies ; only, he tells us, negatively, 
 that he does not affirm gravitation to be eflential to matter. But, as 
 to the attradion of the fmall particles of matter at very fmall diftan- 
 ces, and the cohefion of bodies, he affirms, in the Scholium fubjoined 
 to his Principia, that they, as well as eledricity, fenfation, and the 
 voluntary motion ot animals, are produced by a moft fubtile fpirit, 
 which pervades grofler bodies, and is latent in them *". But, in his 
 fecond thoughts upon the fubjed, I mean his Queries, fubjoined to 
 the laft edition of his Optics, he affigns for the caufe of all the mo- 
 tion in the unlverfe, certain adive principles, by which the particles 
 of matter are moved, and which, he fays, are the caufes of gravitation, 
 oi magnetic and ^/^^nV attractions, of fermentation, and the cohefion of 
 bodies f. And, in another paflage in the fame Query J, he fays ex- 
 prefsly, that the 'uis inertiae, by which bodies perfift in their motion 
 or reft, and which he infifts fo much upon in his Principia, making 
 it, together with attradion, the principle of the motion of the celeftial 
 bodies, is not fufficient, either to put bodies in motion, or to keep 
 them in motion ; and that, therefore, fome other principle is ne- 
 ceflary for that purpofe ; which principle can be no other than that 
 adive principle in matter which he afterwards mentions §. Now, as 
 
 Z z z 2 here 
 
 * See the pafTage quoted at large, in Sir Ifaac's own words, page 275. 
 
 t Pages 376. 377. of his Optics, Eiiglilh edition, 1721. % Pages 372. 373. 
 
 5 His words are, * The vis inertiae is a paflive principle, by which bodies perfifl 
 
 * in their motion or rtfl:, receive motion in proportion to the force impreding it, and 
 
 * refifl: as much as they are refifled By this principle alone there never could have 
 
 * been any motion in the world ; fomeother principle was neceflary for putting bodies 
 into motion, and now they are in morion, fome other principle is neceflary for confer- 
 
 * ving motion •,' Pag. 372. 373. Here he appears to give up theflrange notion of bodies 
 continuing to move by their vis inertiae^ and afcribes their continuance of motion to 
 
 thofe
 
 558 DISSERTATION ON 
 
 here he plainly diftingulflies this adive principle from the matter 
 which It moves, and, as there is nothing in the univerfe but matter 
 and Mind, I would fain believe that Sir Ifaac, by aflive prin- 
 ciple here, meant Mind, though he does not call it by that name. 
 If fo, he fairly gives up his fuhtih fpirity his firft law of mo- 
 tion, fo far as it relates to the continuation of it, and, in fhort, 
 his whole mechanical fyftem, and adopts the phllofophy of the 
 antients, which I defend. But, if I am to quote Sir Ifaac*s words, I 
 mufi: quote them fairly ; and I muft own that, in an after paflage in 
 the fame Query, he appears to return again to the mechanical fyftem ; 
 for he there fays, * That, though the world could not rife out of chaos 
 
 * by the mere laws of Nature, yet, being once formed, it may conti- 
 
 * nue, by thefe laws, for many ages *.* Now, by the laivs of Nature y 
 It is well known, that, in the language of his phllofophy, is meant the 
 laws of matter and motion ; and, tho* he has faid elfewhere, that the 
 fyftem might, fome time or another, need the mending hand of the 
 Creator, he has explained how he thought that might come to pafs, 
 not by any defed of the mechanical power, by which, he fuppofes, 
 the fyftem of the heavens is carried on, but chiefly by means of co- 
 mets traverfing the orbits of the planets, and difturbing their motions. 
 How to reconcile thefe paflages one with another, or how to deter- 
 mine which are the firft, and which the laft thoughts of Sir Ifaac up- 
 on this fubje£t, I muft own I do not well know : But, I think, it 
 would have been better that his followers had laid hold of the two firft 
 paflages I have quoted, as the real fentiments of Sir Ifaac, than to en- 
 deavour, as they have done, to defend his mechanical fyftem of the 
 heavens. 
 
 Thus 
 
 thofe aRive principles which he fuppofes to be In all bodies. This is precifely my o« 
 pinion, with fome difference in the exprefljon ; for what he calls a^ive principle I call 
 Mind^ as knowing no other aftive principle, that is, which has a^ivity in itfelf, and 
 of its own nature, in the univerfe* 
 * Pa^e 378.
 
 THE NEEWTONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 549 
 
 Thus much, however, may be faid, by way of apology, for his 
 mechanical phil >lophy, that, at the time he wrote, the philofo- 
 phy of Des Cartes was the only philofopay in fafhion, the philolbphy 
 of the antients being then altogether out of fafhion. Now, he thought 
 that he made a great improvement upon Des Cartes's materialifm, 
 when he fuppofed the celeRial bodies to have been formed by 
 the Deity, and taken out of chaos, as he cxprefTes it ; and, no doubt, 
 it was fome amendment of Des Cartes's fyllem ; whereas, if he had 
 gone the full length of antient philofophy, and maintained that they 
 were likewife moved by the conftant agency of Mind, his [)hilofophy 
 would not only have been irreprehenfible, but much more compleat 
 and compreheniive, taking in the earth, as well as the heavens, and, in 
 fhort, the whole of nature. 
 
 It Is, I think, evident, that Sir Ifaac formed his fyftem upon the a*-- 
 nalogy that he had difcovered, and a great difcovery it was, betwixt 
 the motions of the celeftial bodies, and the motion of projediles here 
 on earth ; and, no doubt, the analogy is very great ; for the projedile 
 on earth has its centre as well as the planet ; And the Newtonians 
 tell us, that, if it were projeded with fufficient force, it would go round 
 its center, the earth, as the moon does *. From fuch an analogy, 
 he had good reafon to conclude, that they were governed by the 
 fame laws ; but he went too far when, from thence, he inferred, 
 that they were both produced by the fame caufes, that is, by pro- 
 je(5tion and gravitation. It was fufficient for his purpofe that 
 the celeilial motions were of the fame kind, and could be relbl- 
 ved or analyfed into thei'e two powers, though they were not adually 
 compofed of them, like the motion of projediles on earth j for it 
 would have been contrary to the order and regularity of nature, if 
 they had not been governed by the laws of thole motions, into which 
 
 they 
 
 * See what I have further faid upon this fubjedl, page 267.
 
 550 
 
 DISSERTATION ON 
 
 they could be refolved. Thus, the motion of a body in a ftraight 
 line being refolvable into the motions of the two fides of a parallelo- 
 gram, of which it is the diagonal, though it be adually not fo com- 
 pounded, is governed by the laws of the two motions of which it 
 might have been compounded, and into which it is refolved ; for it is 
 in a ftraight line, as they are, and it is performed in the fame time. 
 In like manner, the motion of the planets being refolvable, as the mo- 
 tion of projeQiles on earth is, into the motion of projedion and gravi- 
 tation, though not actually fo compounded, is a motion of the fam.e 
 kind, and carried on by the fame laws. Upon this fimple principle, all 
 Sir Ifaac's demonftrations and calculations would have flood as firm 
 as upon the fuppofition that he has made, of the celeftial motions 
 being produced in the fame manner as the motion of projediles on 
 earth. 
 
 There is a proportion which the Newtonians lay down as an 
 axiom, and upon which they feem to build their whole philofophy, 
 viz. * That, where there are the fame effeds, there muft be the fame 
 ' caufes *.' * Therefore,' lay they, ' the motions of projectiles on 
 
 * earth, and of the celeftial bodies, being of the fame kind, muft be 
 
 * produced by the fame caufes, that is, projedion and gravitation.' But 
 this propofition appears to me to be mifapplied ; for it only proves, 
 that, where there is a motion of the fame kind, it (hould produce the 
 fame cffeds ; but it does not at all prove that the two motions muft a- 
 rife from the fame caufe, and be produced by the operations of the fame 
 powers ; for two motions, if they be of the fame kind, will have the 
 fame effeds, and be governed by the fame laws, though they proceed 
 from caufes quite dift*erent, like a fimple motion in a ftraight line, 
 produced by one impelling force, and the fame motion, produced by 
 two impelling forces, ading in different diredions. 
 
 From 
 • See page 267,
 
 THE NEWTONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 551 
 
 From thefe obfervations, 1 think, not only our philofophical fyflein 
 of Theifm will be much improved, but it appears to me, that the ad- 
 mirers of Sir Ifaac Newton are indebted to me for clearing his philo- 
 fophy of many doubts and difficulties to which it is liable; for it ftands, 
 at prefent, upon four hypothefes, or poflulata^ none of which can be 
 eafily granted ; but with none of which his lyftera, in my apprehcn- 
 {ion, has any thing to do. The Jirfi and, capital one, and which made 
 the other three neceflary, is, That, at fome time or another, when this 
 frame of things had a beginning, the planets were put in motion by 
 projection in a ftraight line. Secundo^ That the power of gravitation 
 prevails in the heavens as well as here on earth, by which this ftraight 
 line was bent into a curve. Tertioy That a body, put in motion in a 
 ftraight line, will continue in motion forever, if it be not ftopped by 
 fomething external. And, laftly^ That the motion of the celeftial bo- 
 dies might not be fo ftopped, the Newtonians maintain, that their mo- 
 tion is in vacuo. 1 he three firft of thefe hypothefes I have given my 
 reafons for not believing, which I hope will be fufficient to make them 
 appear at leaft doubtful, and requiringa further examination. And, as to 
 ^ vacuum, it is well known that many philofophers, both antient and 
 modc-n, have denied it ; and even Sir Ifaac himfelf has given it up, 
 when he endeavours to account for the motion of the celeftial bodies 
 by a fubtile fluid. On the other hand, 1 maintam, that Sir Ifaac's phi- 
 lofophy requires none of thefe fuppofitions, but ftands upon a firm 
 bottom of fads and obfervations, and principles of geometry, which 
 cannot be contraverted. From the fads, he has, by a wonderful in- 
 dudion, colleded general laws, concerning the motions of the celeftial 
 bodies ; and from thefe general laws he has reafoned downwards, de- 
 monftrating, a priori^ what was before only known by experience and 
 obfervation, determining fome things much more accurately than they 
 can be determined by any obfervation, and accounting for many things 
 which before were thought unfurmountaule difficulties, and unaccount- 
 able oddities in the fyftem of nature. If, therefore, he bad taken the 
 
 motions
 
 552 D I S S E R T A T I O N O N 
 
 motions of the celeftial bodies as difcovered to his hand by the labours 
 of aftronomers before him, and the experience of thoufands of years, 
 and had not meddled at all with philofophy, nor inquired into the 
 caufe of the motions of thofe bodies, he would have formed a mod 
 compleat fyftem of aftronomy, with refpedt to the motions of the pla- 
 nets round their feveral centers. As to the influence which the pla- 
 nets have upon the motions of one another, and which the comets 
 have upon the motions of them all, he has endeavoured to account for 
 that, from the tendency which we obferve in the particles of matter 
 here below to move towards one another. And, as it may be prefu- 
 fumed that things below have a refemblance to things above, accord- 
 ing to the faying of antient philofophy *, I think it is very probable, 
 that there is a fimilar tendency among the celeftial bodies to one ano- 
 ther. But this tendency cannot be any effential quality of matter, 
 any more than the tendency to a center ; nor can it be accounted for 
 from any mechanical caufe ; and therefore it mud: be fuppnfed to be 
 the effeifl of that principle of activity which Sir Ifaac allows to be in 
 all matter, and which is no other than what I call Mind : For, as 
 all motion is produced, either by the adtion of body upon body, which 
 I call Mechanical Motion, or immediately by Mind, if we can give no 
 account of any motion from the former of thefe caufes, nor cannot fo 
 much as conceive the pofTibility of accounting for it in that way, we 
 are neceflarily led to afcribe it to the latter. 
 
 There is, at prefent, in Britain, a fet of pious philofophers, who pre- 
 tend to derive all their philofophy from the Hebrew Scriptures. Among 
 them I expeded to find, that the celeftial motions, as well as the mo- 
 tions here on earth, would be afcribed to Mind, fupreme or fubordi^ 
 nate : But, upon looking into fome of their writings, I found, to my. 
 
 great 
 
 * iivfivuiyt timi T« Win rtts *«T#, was a faying of the antient Chaldean philofophy, 
 as Pfellus has told us.
 
 THE NEWTONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 553 
 
 great furprlfe, that they, as well as Sir Ifaac Newton, made a niachlne 
 of the heavens, accounting for the motion of the planets from light 
 or aether^ and fpirit or air^ without giving the Deity any other 
 trouble than to begin the motion, and once fet the machine agoing*. 
 The proof of their fyftem has been hitherto derived chiefly from the 
 etymology of Hebrew words : But I am told they are now employed 
 in finding out a proof of a very different kind, I mean by experi- 
 ments and obfervations. But, I believe, I may venture to prophefy, 
 that, in the experimental and mechanical philofophy, they will be 
 found much inferior to Sir Ifaac ; and I am perfuaded that, upon a 
 diligent and impartial fludy of the Scriptures, without being influen- 
 ced by prejudice in favour of any fyftem, it will appear that, accord- 
 ing to the doctrine of Scripture, the natural world is as much under 
 the immediate government and direction of God, and his angels, as 
 the moral world, and the affairs of men. 
 
 Upon the whole, it appears to me, that, ever fince experimcufing 
 philofophy came fo much into fafhion, our philofophy has had a 
 great tincture of materialifm and mechanifm, which even the religious 
 among us have not efcaped. And, indeed, I have otten wondered 
 how Sir Ifaac's philofophy fhould go fo eafily down with the reli- 
 gious. It is true, that his Theology in the Scholium Generak is very 
 pure ; and I am perfuaded that he was not only a genuine Theift, but 
 a good Chriftian. But, when his fyftem of natural philofophy is con- 
 fidered, it is evident that he makes all the motions of the univerfe, even 
 animal motion, to be produced by body impelling body. Nor, indeed, 
 does he appear to have had any idea how motion could be produced o- 
 
 4 A therwife, 
 
 * What was firft moved they call fire -y and, accordingly, they tell us, that * the 
 
 * matter of the hearens was firft put into this a£lion of fire by the immediatv.' power 
 
 * of God, but is now kept up and fupported, and continued by the machine itfelf, 
 
 * by the mechanical operations of the light and fpirit, in their oppofite and contrary 
 
 * motions from center to circumference, and from circumference to center j' p.igc 
 124. of An Inquiry after Philofophy and Theology, by Richard Spearman. Efquiri,
 
 554 
 
 DISSERTATION ON 
 
 therwife. hn^.fecondly, he fuppofes that body has in itfelf the power 
 of continuing motion, betwixt which, and the power of beginning 
 motion, I cannot fee any real diftindion. Now, to maintain that bo- 
 dy has, in itfelf, the power of moving itfelf, I hold to be downright 
 materialifm. 
 
 Materialifm having, in this manner, crept into aftronomy, it has 
 dlffufed itfelf over the whole of natural philofophy. When 1 read the 
 works ofour natural philofophers, I fhould imagine that there was no- 
 thing but matter and motion in the univerfe. Even Sir Ifaac has told 
 us, that a fubtile fpirit is the caufe of fenfation \ and, for the fame rea- 
 fon, he might have faid, that it was the caufe of thought and reafonitig. 
 Such philofophers feem to have forgot, if they ever knew, that Mind 
 gives matter hs/ormj without which it is not bodyy nor has qualities 
 or properties of any kind ; and that it is Mind which begins and car- 
 ries on motion. They confider Nature as carelefsly and fuperficially 
 as a man would confider a machine of human invention, who fhould 
 cbferve only fome of the wheels and fprings of it, without giving any 
 attention to the moving power ; for the moving power in the univerfe 
 is Mind, which, though jt operate much by means of mechanifm, 
 muft, like the moving power in human machines, conflantly adt ; (o 
 that, without the unceafing energy of Mind, there would be, at 
 once, an end of this wonderful frame of things, this moft magnificent 
 difplay of the wifdom, goodnefs, and power of God. Whoever, 
 therefore, pretends to give us either a hiftory or philofophy of Nature, 
 without making Mind the chief objed of his attention, may be com- 
 pared to a writer of the civil hiftory of a nation, who does not take no- 
 tice of the governing power of that nation. 
 
 To conclude — What I have faid here againft Sir Ifaac*s philofophy 
 in his Principia, though fupported by his own authority in his later 
 
 "workj
 
 THE NEWTONIAN PHILOSOPHY, Js5 
 
 work, will, I know, be unfavourably received by thofe who have been 
 nurfed, as it were, in the mechanical philofophy, and have grown old 
 in it ; for it is a moft difficult lefTon, 
 
 Quae imberbes dedicere, fenes perdenda fateri. ^ 
 
 But thofe who are claffical fcholars, and who have a genius that can 
 comprehend the whole of philofophy, without being confined to the 
 narrow fcience of lines and figures, will, at lead, give a fair hearing 
 to what I have faid againft the modern philofophy, and will be difpo- 
 fed to believe that the antiems, whofe writings they admire fo much 
 upon other iubjeds, have not gone altogether wrong, either in natu- 
 ral philofophy or theology.
 
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